ARISTOTLE

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS
ON COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY
ON THE COSMOS
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS
ON COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY

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ON THE COSMOS

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PREFATORY NOTE

Professor E. S. Forster completed his versions of *De Sophisticis Elenchis* and *De Generatione et Corruptione* before he died. I have checked the proofs and added a brief index.

D. J. Furley

London
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DE SOPHISTICIS
ELENCHIS
INTRODUCTION

I. THE PLACE OF THE TOPICA IN THE ORGANON

Both the Topica and the De Sophisticis Elenchis have always been regarded as genuine works of Aristotle. The two treatises are closely connected; the De Sophisticis Elenchis is an appendix to the Topica and its final section forms an epilogue to both treatises; indeed Aristotle himself seems sometimes to regard the two as forming a single work, since he twice quotes the De Sophisticis Elenchis under the title of the Topica.

It is generally admitted that what we call logic and Aristotle himself calls analytic was an early preoccupation of the philosopher and a direct outcome of discussions on scientific method held in the Platonic Academy. Plato himself, however, never attempted a formal treatment of the subject and the theories put forward, for example, in the Theaetetus, Sophist, Parmenides and Politicus were never developed into a regular system. But while Aristotle's systematic treatment of the process of inference and, above all, his discovery of the syllogism owe little to Plato, it has been generally recognized that the Platonic dialogues contain some of the germs from which the Aristotelian system was afterwards developed; for
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example, in the *Theaetetus* the doctrine of the categories is already implicit in the recognition of the abstract notions of substance, quality, quantity, relation, activity and passivity.

Of the logical treatises of Aristotle, which since about A.D. 200 have passed under the title of the *Organon* or 'instrument' of science, the most important are (1) the *Prior Analytics*, in which he sets forth the doctrine of the syllogism in its formal aspect without reference to the subject-matter with which it deals, (2) the *Posterior Analytics*, in which he discusses the characteristics which reasoning must necessarily possess in order to be truly scientific, (3) the *Topica*, in which he treats of the modes of reasoning, which, while syllogistically correct, fall short of the conditions of scientific accuracy. The *Categories* and the *De Interpretatione* are subsidiary treatises dealing, in the main, with the term and the proposition.

A great deal of time and ingenuity has been expended, particularly by German scholars, in an attempt to fix the exact order in which the various treatises which constitute the *Organon* were composed. The problem is complicated by the fact that the treatises, in the form in which they have come down to us, seem to consist of rough notes, which were evidently subjected to a certain amount of revision due to the modification and development of his original doctrines. This process has naturally given rise to minor inconsistencies such as would naturally occur if corrections were made or additions inserted which were not completely adapted to the context in which they were placed.

It has been generally recognized that the whole
of the *Topica* does not belong to the same date. H. Maier holds that the oldest portion consists of Books II-VII, and that it was written under the direct influence of the Academy and belongs to the same period as the Aristotelian *Dialogues*, which have survived only in fragments; in particular, he points out that the term *συλλογισμός* is not used in the technical sense which it afterwards acquired (or, if it is used in that sense, e.g., in 130 a 7, it is a late insertion), whereas in the second half of Book VII the term is used in its well-known Aristotelian sense, and that, consequently, Books II-VII were composed before the philosopher made his greatest contribution to logic. He holds that Books I and VIII belong to the same period as Book VII, 4-5, and form an introduction and conclusion to the treatise written after the discovery of the syllogism and that the *De Sophisticis Elenchis* was a subsequent addition to the *Topica*. On the other hand, F. Solmsen and P. Gohlke hold that Books I-VII form the earlier portion of the work and that Book VIII and the *De Sophisticis Elenchis* were added subsequently.

As regards the relation of the *Topica* to the rest of the *Organon*, Maier considers the *Topica* as a whole to be earlier than the *Analytics*; Solmsen suggests that the order was (1) *Topica* I-VII, (2) *Posterior Analytics* I, (3) *Topica* VIII and *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, (4) *Posterior Analytics* II, (5) *Prior Analytics*; Gohlke holds that the traditional order of the two *Analytics* is correct, and that the *Topica* and *De Sophisticis Elenchis* presuppose the *Analytics*.

In short, there is general agreement that the bulk of the *Topica* embodies Aristotle's earliest contribu-

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tion to the systematic study of logic and that it was written in part before his discovery of the syllogism.

II. THE CONTENT OF THE TOPICA

The purpose of the Topica is, in the words of its author (100 a 18 ff.), 'to discover a method by which we shall be able to reason from generally accepted opinions about any problem set before us and shall ourselves, when sustaining an argument, avoid saying anything self-contradictory'; that is to say, it aims at enabling the two participants, the 'questioner' and the 'answerer,' to sustain their parts in a dialectical discussion. The subject, then, of the treatise may be described as the dialectical syllogism based on premises which are merely probable as contrasted with the demonstrative, or scientific, syllogism, which is the subject of the Posterior Analytics and is based on premises which are true and immediate. The probable premises which make up the dialectical syllogism are described (100 b 21 ff.) as 'those which commend themselves to all or to the majority or to the wise.' The uses of dialectic are, we are told, three in number, (1) for mental training, (2) for general conversation, and (3) for application to the sciences, because (a) if we can argue a question pro and con, we shall be in a better position to recognize truth and falsehood, and (b) since the first principles of the sciences cannot be scientifically demonstrated, the approach to them must be through the study of the opinions generally held about them.

After the general introduction in Book I, Aristotle, in Books II-VII. 3, gives a collection of the τόποι which
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give their name to the treatise. The term τόποι is somewhat difficult to define. They may be described as 'commonplaces' of argument or as general principles of probability which stand in the same relation to the dialectical syllogism as axioms stand to the demonstrative syllogism; in other words, they are 'the pigeon-holes from which dialectical reasoning is to draw its arguments.'

Books II and III deal with the problems of accident; Books IV and V with those of genus and property; Books VI and VII. 1-3 with those of definition. Books VII. 4-5 and Book VIII, after giving some additional notes, conclude the treatise by describing the practice of dialectical reasoning.

III. The De Sophisticis Elenchis

Just as Aristotle treats of the demonstrative and the dialectical syllogism in the Posterior Analytics and the Topica, respectively, so in this treatise, which forms a kind of appendix to the Topica, he deals with the sophistical syllogism. A knowledge of this is part of the necessary equipment of the arguer, not in order that he may himself make use of it but that he may avoid it, and that the unwary may not be ensnared in the toils of sophistical argument; in fact, Aristotle is carrying on the Socratic and early-Platonic tradition by attacking the Sophists, who taught the use of logical fallacy in order to make the worse cause appear the better.

The term ἔλεγχος is strictly applied to the confutation of an actual adversary, but it is also used more

a W. D. Ross, Aristotle, p. 59.
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widely of the confutation of an imaginary opponent. The treatise is, in fact, a study of fallacies in general, which are classified under various headings and fall into two main classes, those which depend on the language employed and those which do not. Some of these fallacies would hardly deceive the most simple minds; others, which Aristotle seems to have been the first person to expose and define, are capable not only of deceiving the innocent but also of escaping the notice of arguers who are employing them.

After two introductory chapters the work naturally falls into two parts, chapters 3-15, the refutation of fallacies, and chapters 16-33, the solution of fallacies, while chapter 34 forms an epilogue to the work.

IV. The Manuscripts

The chief manuscripts for the *Topica* and *De Sophisticis Elenchis* are:

A Urbinas 35  saec. ix-x ineunt.
B Marcianus 201  an. 955
C Coislinianus 330  saec. xi
D Coislinianus 170  saec. xiv
u Basileensis F. 11.21  saec. xi-xii
C Vaticanus 1024  ‘satis vetustus’
P Vaticanus 207  ‘non recens’
f Marcianus App. IV. 5  saec. xiv
q Ambrosianus M. 71  saec. xv
N Laurentianus 72. 18  saec. xv
i Laurentianus 72. 15  saec. xiv
T Laurentianus 72. 12  saec. xiii
O Marcianus 204  saec. xiv

Of these A and B are in a class by themselves.
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Bekker preferred A, Waitz B; the Teubner Editors give a slight preference to B, the readings of which are sometimes supported by papyrus fragments. C sometimes preserves the true reading.

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ARTICLES AND DISSERTATIONS

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS

H. Maier, Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles, Tübingen, 1900.
F. Solmsen, Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik, Leipzig, 1929.

In translating the Topica and De Sophisticis Elenchis I have used the text of Bekker in the Berlin Edition, and when I translate any other reading this is noted at the foot of the page. I have constantly referred to the Teubner text of Strache-Wallies, which does not, however, seem to me to mark any considerable advance on that of Bekker. I have found Waitz's edition of the Organon of great use, and the Latin version of Pacius is often helpful. I have frequently consulted the Oxford translation by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge. For the De Sophisticis Elenchis the notes and paraphrase in Poste's edition are often enlightening, though I cannot always agree with his interpretation.

My aim in translating has been to represent Aristotle's meaning as closely and faithfully as I can in simple English without resorting to paraphrase or trying to express it in modern terminology.

I have to thank my friend and former colleague Professor W. S. Maguinness, of King's College, London, for reading through my version and giving me the benefit of his fine scholarship and accuracy. He has suggested several improvements in the text which I have been glad to adopt.
οι μέν είσι συλλογισμοί, οί δ' ούκ ούντες δοκούσι, φανερόν. Ὅσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τούτων γίνεται διὰ τυνος ὁμοιότητος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ὅσαύτως ἔχει. καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἑξιν οἱ μὲν ἔχουσιν εὖ, οἱ δὲ φαίνονται, φυλετικῶς φυσήσαντες καὶ ἑπισκευάσαντες αὐτούς, καὶ καλοὶ οἱ μὲν διὰ κάλλος, οἱ δὲ φαίνονται, κομμωσάντες αὐτούς. ἔπι τε τῶν ἄφιξιν ὅσαύτως καὶ γὰρ τούτων τὰ μὲν ἄργυρος τὰ δὲ χρυσός ἐστιν ἀληθῶς, τὰ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν οὖ, φαίνεται δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν, οίον τὰ μὲν λιθαργύρινα καὶ τὰ καττυτέρινα ἄργυρα, τὰ δὲ χολοβάφια χρυσά. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ συλλογισμὸς καὶ ἐλεγχος ὁ μὲν ἐστιν, ὁ δ' οὐκ

164 a 20 1. Περὶ δὲ τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἑλέγχων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων μὲν ἑλέγχων ούντων δὲ παραλογισμῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἑλέγχων λέγομεν, ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρῶτων.

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οἱ μὲν εἰσὶ συλλογισμοί, οἱ δ' οὐκ ούντες δοκούσι, φανερόν. Ὅσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τούτων γίνεται διὰ τυνος ὁμοιότητος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ὅσαύτως ἔχει. καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἑξιν οἱ μὲν ἔχουσιν εὖ, οἱ δὲ φαίνονται, φυλετικῶς φυσήσαντες καὶ ἑπισκευάσαντες αὐτούς, καὶ καλοὶ οἱ μὲν διὰ κάλλος, οἱ δὲ φαίνονται, κομμωσάντες αὐτούς. ἔπι τε τῶν ἄφιξιν ὅσαύτως καὶ γὰρ τούτων τὰ μὲν ἄργυρος τὰ δὲ χρυσός ἐστιν ἀληθῶς, τὰ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν οὖ, φαίνεται δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν, οίον τὰ μὲν λιθαργύρινα καὶ τὰ καττυτέρινα ἄργυρα, τὰ δὲ χολοβάφια χρυσά. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ συλλογισμὸς καὶ ἐλεγχος ὁ μὲν ἐστιν, ὁ δ' οὐκ

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a The reference appears to be provision of members of the tribal choruses at Athens for choral competitions (see Xen. Mem. iii. 4, 5).
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I. Let us now treat of sophistical refutations, that is, arguments which appear to be refutations but are really fallacies and not refutations, beginning, as is natural, with those which come first.

That some reasonings are really reasonings, but that others seem to be, but are not really, reasonings, is obvious. For, as this happens in other spheres from a similarity between the true and the false, so it happens also in arguments. For some people possess good physical condition, while others have merely the appearance of it, by blowing themselves out and dressing themselves up like the tribal choruses a; again, some people are beautiful because of their beauty, while others have the appearance of beauty because they trick themselves out. So too with inanimate things; for some of these are really silver and some gold, while others are not but only appear to our senses to be so; for example, objects made of litharge b or tin appear to be silver, and yellow-coloured objects appear to be gold. In the same way also reasoning and refutation are sometimes real and sometimes not, but appear to be real

b Protoxide of lead, a by-product in the separation of silver from lead.
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έστι μὲν, φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν· οἱ γὰρ ἀπειροὶ ὠσπερ ἄν ἀπέχουντες πόρρωθεν θεωροῦν. 165 a ὁ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τινῶν ἔστι τεθέντων ὡστε λέγειν ἔτερον τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν κειμένων διὰ τῶν κειμένων, ἐλεγχός δὲ συλλογισμὸς μετ’ ἀντιφάσεως τοῦ συμπεράσματος. οὐ δὲ τούτο ποιοῦσι μὲν οὐ, δοκοῦσι δὲ διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας, ὅτι εἰς τόπος εὐφυεστάτος ἐστὶ καὶ δημοσιώτατος διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα διαλέγεσθαι φέροντας, ἄλλα τοῖς ὀνό−μασιν ἀντὶ τῶν πραγμάτων χρώμεθα συμβόλοις, τὸ συμβαίνον ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἡγούμεθα συμβαίνειν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ψήφων τοῖς λογιζομένοις. τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοιον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀνόματα πεπέρανται καὶ τὸ τῶν λόγων πλήθος, τὰ δὲ πράγματα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀπειρά ἔστιν. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν πλείω τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τούνομα τὸ ἐν σημαίνειν. ὠσπερ οὖν κἀκεῖ οἱ μὴ δεινοὶ τὰς ψήφους φέρειν ύπὸ τῶν ἐπιστημών παρακρούονται, τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων οἱ τῶν ὀνομάτων τῆς δυνάμεως ἀπειροὶ παραλογί−ζονται καὶ αὐτοὶ διαλεγόμενοι καὶ ἄλλων ἀκούοντες. διὰ μὲν οὖν ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὰς λεξιθησο−μένας ἐστὶ καὶ συλλογισμὸς καὶ ἐλεγχὸς φαινόμενος μὲν οὐκ ὄν τὸ. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τισὶ μᾶλλον πρὸ ἔργου τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι σοφοῖς ἥ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν (ἔστι γὰρ ἡ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη σοφία οὐδα δ’ οὖ, 12
owing to men's inexperience; for the inexperienced are like those who view things from a distance. Reasoning is based on certain statements made in such a way as necessarily to cause the assertion of things other than those statements and as a result of those statements; refutation, on the other hand, is reasoning accompanied by a contradiction of the conclusion. Some refutations do not affect their object but only appear to do so; this may be due to several causes, of which the most fertile and widespread division is the argument which depends on names. For, since it is impossible to argue by introducing the actual things under discussion, but we use names as symbols in the place of the things, we think that what happens in the case of the names happens also in the case of the things, just as people who are counting think in the case of their counters. But the cases are not really similar; for names and a quantity of terms are finite, whereas things are infinite in number; and so the same expression and the single name must necessarily signify a number of things. As, therefore, in the above illustration, those who are not clever at managing the counters are deceived by the experts, in the same way in arguments also those who are unacquainted with the power of names are the victims of false reasoning, both when they are themselves arguing and when they are listening to others. For this reason, therefore, and for others which will be mentioned hereafter, there exist both reasoning and refutation which appear to be genuine but are not really so. But since in the eyes of some people it is more profitable to seem to be wise than to be wise without seeming to be so (for the sophistic art consists in apparent and
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καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας ἀλλ' οὐκ οὕσης), δῆλον ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τούτοις καὶ τὸ τοῦ σοφοῦ ἔργον δοκεῖν ποιεῖν μᾶλλον 25 ἣ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν. ἔστι δ' ὃς ἐν πρὸς ἐν εἰπεῖν ἔργον περὶ ἐκαστὸν τοῦ εἰδότος ἀφευδεῖν μὲν αὐτὸν περὶ ὧν οἶδε, τὸν δὲ ψευδόμενον ἐμφανίζειν δύνασθαι. ταύτα δ' ἔστι τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ δύνασθαι δοῦναι λόγον, τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ λαβεῖν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τοὺς βουλομένους σοφιστεύειν τὸ τῶν εἰρημένων 30 λόγων γένος ἐπιτεῖν· πρὸ ἔργου γάρ ἐστὶν· ἢ γὰρ τοιαύτη δύναμις ποιῆσει φαίνεσθαι σοφόν, οὐ τυγχάνουσι τὴν προαίρεσιν ἔχοντες.

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον λόγων γένος, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτης ἐφίενται δυνάμεως οὖς καλοῦμεν σοφιστάς, δῆλον. πόσα δ' ἔστιν εἴδη τῶν λόγων τῶν 35 σοφιστικῶν, καὶ ἐκ πόσων τὸν ἁριθμὸν ἡ δύναμις αὕτη συνεστήκε, καὶ πόσα μέρη τυγχάνει τῆς πραγματείας οὔτα, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συντελοῦντων εἰς τὴν τέχνην ταύτην ἦδη λέγωμεν.

II. Ἐστι δὴ τῶν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι λόγων τέταρτα γένη, διδασκαλικοὶ καὶ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ πειρα-165b στικοὶ καὶ ἐριστικοί, διδασκαλικοὶ μὲν οἳ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρχῶν ἐκάστον μαθήματος καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου δοξῶν συλλογιζόμενοι (δεὶ γὰρ πιστεύειν τὸν μαθάνοντα), διαλεκτικοὶ δ' οἳ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων συλλογιστικοὶ ἀντιφάσεως, πειρα-
not real wisdom, and the sophist is one who makes money from apparent and not real wisdom), it is clear that for these people it is essential to seem to perform the function of a wise man rather than actually to perform it without seeming to do so. To take a single point of comparison, it is the task of the man who has knowledge of a particular subject himself to refrain from fallacious arguments about the subjects of his knowledge and to be able to expose him who uses them. Of these functions the first consists in being able to give a reason, the second in being able to exact one. It is essential, therefore, for those who wish to play the sophist to seek out the kind of argument which we have mentioned; for it is well worth his while, since the possession of such a faculty will cause him to appear to be wise, and this is the real purpose which sophists have in view.

It is clear, then, that a class of arguments of this kind exists, and that those whom we call sophists aim at this kind of faculty. Let us next discuss what are the various kinds of sophistical arguments and what are the various component parts of this faculty, and into what different divisions the treatment of the subject falls, and all the other elements which contribute to this art.

II. Of arguments used in discussion there are four kinds, Didactic, Dialectical, Examination-arguments and Contentious arguments. Didactic arguments are those which reason from the principles appropriate to each branch of learning and not from the opinions of the answerer (for he who is learning must take things on trust). Dialectical arguments are those which, starting from generally accepted opinions, reason to establish a contradiction. Examination-arguments
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5 στικοὶ δ᾽ οἱ ἐκ τῶν δοκοῦντων τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ καὶ ἀναγκαίων εἰδέναι τῷ προσποιουμένῳ ἔχειν τήν ἐπιστήμην (διὸ τρόπον δέ, διώρισται ἐν ἔτεροις), ἐριστικοὶ δ᾽ οἱ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδόξων μὴ ὅντων δὲ συλλογιστικοὶ ἡ φαινόμενοι συλλογιστικοὶ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν ἐν τοῖς 'Ἀνα-

10 λυτικοῖς εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ τῶν διαλεκτικῶν καὶ πειραστικῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγωνιστικῶν καὶ ἐριστικῶν νῦν λέγωμεν.

III. Πρῶτον δὴ ληπτέον πόσων στοχάζονται οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀγωνιστικοὶ καὶ διαφιλοσοφοῦντες. ἔστι δὲ πέντε ταῦτα τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἐλεγχὸς καὶ ψεύδος καὶ παράδοξον καὶ σολοκισμὸς καὶ πέμπτον τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀδολεσχήσαι τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον· τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι τὸ πολλάκις ἀναγκάζεσθαι ταῦτο λέγειν· ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐκαστὸν εἶναι τούτων. μάλιστα μὲν γὰρ προαιροῦνται φαίνεσθαι ἐλέγχοντες, δεύτερον δὲ ψευδόμενόν τι δεικνύοντι, τρίτον εἰς παράδοξον ἄγειν, τέταρτον δὲ σολοκίζειν ποιεῖν· τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι τὸ ποιῆσαι τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζειν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον· τελευταίον δὲ τὸ πλεονάκις ταῦτο λέγειν.

IV. Τρόποι δὲ εἰσὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐλέγχων δύο· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἕνη τῆς λέξεως. ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐμποιοῦντα τὴν φαντασίαν ἐξ τῶν ἀριθμῶν· ταῦτα δὲ ἔστιν ὁμοιομανία, ἀμφιβολία, σύνθεσις, διαίρεσις, προσωπία, σχήμα λέξεως· τούτου δὲ πίστις ἢ τε διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ συλλογισμὸς, ἄν τε ληφθῇ τις ἄλλος, καὶ ὁτι

a Topics 159 a 25 ff.
b Topics i-viii.
are those which are based on opinions held by the answerer and necessarily known to one who claims knowledge of the subject involved (in what manner, has been described elsewhere \( a \)). Contentious arguments are those which reason or seem to reason from opinions which appear to be, but are not really, generally accepted. Demonstrative arguments have been treated in the *Analytics*, and dialectical arguments and examinations have been dealt with elsewhere.\(^b\) Let us now deal with competitive and contentious arguments.

III. We must first of all comprehend the various objects at which those aim who compete and contend in argument. They number five: refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism, and, fifthly, the reduction of one’s opponent to a state of babbling, that is, making him to say the same thing over and over again; or, if not the reality, at any rate the appearance of each of these things. Their first choice is a plain refutation, their second to show that their opponent is lying, their third to lead him on to a paradox, their fourth to make him commit a solecism (that is, to make the answerer, as a result of the argument, speak ungrammatically), and, lastly, to make him say the same thing over and over again.

IV. There are two modes of refutations; one has to do with the language used, the other is unconnected with the language. The methods of producing a false illusion in connexion with language are six in number: equivocation, ambiguity, combination, division, accent and form of expression. The truth of this can be verified by induction and by syllogistic proof based on this (though some other assumption is also possible), that this is the number of ways in

\(^{a}\) Contentions.

\(^{b}\) The aims of contentious argument are five in number.
τοσανταχώς ἃν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ λόγοις μὴ ταύτῳ δηλώσαμεν. εἰσὶ δὲ παρὰ μὲν τὴν ὅμωνυμίαν ὦ τοιοίδε τῶν λόγων, οἷον ὦτι μανθάνουσιν ὦ τί ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ γὰρ ἀποστοματιζόμενα μανθάνουσιν ὦ τι γραμματικοῖ. τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ὅμωνυμον, τὸ τε ἔξυπνοι κρῆμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν ἐπιστήμην. καὶ πάλιν ὦτι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθὰ· τὰ γὰρ δέοντα ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ κακὰ δέοντα. διὶτὸν γὰρ τὸ δέον, τὸ τ' ἀναγκαῖον, ὦ συμβαίνει πολλάκις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν (ἔστι γὰρ κακόν τι ἀναγκαῖον), καὶ τάγαθά δὲ δέοντα φαμεν εἶναι. ἔτι τὸν αὐτὸν καθῄσθαι καὶ ἐστάναι, καὶ κάμνειν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν. ὦσπερ γὰρ ἀνίστατο, ἐστηκεν, καὶ ὅσπερ ὑγιάζετο, ὑγιαῖνεν ἀνίστατο δ' ὦ καθήμενος καὶ ὑγιάζετο δ' κάμνων. τὸ γὰρ τὸν κάμνοντα ὀτιοῦν ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν ὦν σημαίνει, ἀλλ' ότε μὲν ὦτι ὦ νῦν κάμνων,1 ότε δ' ὦς ἔκαμεν πρότερον. πλῆν ὑγιάζετο μὲν καὶ κάμνον καὶ δ' κάμνων· ὑγιαίνει δ' ὦ κάμνων, ἀλλ' δ' κάμνων, οὗ νῦν, ἀλλ' δ' πρότερον. παρὰ δὲ τὴν ἄμφιβολίαν ὦ τοιοίδε, τὸ βούλεσθαι λαβεῖν με τοὺς πολεμίους. καὶ ἄρ' ὦ τες γινώσκει, τοῦτο γινώσκει; καὶ γὰρ τὸν γινώσκοντα καὶ τὸ γινωσκόμενον ἐνδέχεται ὦς γινώσκοντα σημαίναι τούτῳ τῶν λόγων. καὶ ἄρα δ' ὦ ὅρᾳ

1 Deleting ἦ καθήμενος after κάμνων with Wallies.

\[a \ i.e. \ can \ write \ or \ spell.\]
\[b \ i.e. \ 'ought \ to \ be.'\]
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, iv

which we can fail to indicate the same thing by the same terms or expressions. Arguments such as the following are based on equivocation: 'Those who know, learn; for it is those who know the use of letters that learn what is dictated to them.' Here 'learn' is equivocal, meaning 'understand by using knowledge' and 'acquire knowledge.' Or again, 'Evils are good, for what must exist is good, and evil must exist.' Here 'must exist' is used in two senses; it means 'what is necessary,' which is often true of evils (for some evil is necessary), and we also say that good things 'must exist.' Or again, 'the same man is seated and standing and is a sick man and restored to health; for it is the man who stood up that is standing, and it is he who was recovering his health that is restored to health, but it was the man who was seated that stood up and the man who was sick that was recovering.' For that 'the sick man' does such and such a thing or has such and such a thing done to him, has not one meaning only but at one time means 'the man who is now sick,' and at another time 'the man who was formerly sick.' But it was the sick man who began to recover his health when he was actually sick, but he is in good health when he is not sick and is not the sick man now but the man who was formerly sick. The following examples are connected with ambiguity: 'To wish me the enemy to capture,' and 'when a man knows something, surely there is knowledge of this'; for it is possible by this expression to signify both the knower and the thing known as knowing. And 'what a man sees, surely that

\[ \text{i.e.} \] 'knowledge of this' can mean either knowledge on the part of the knower or knowledge of the thing known.
10 τις, τούτο ὁρᾶ; ὁρᾶ δὲ τὸν κίωνα, ὡστε ὁρᾶ ὁ κίων. καὶ ἄρα ὁ σὺ φῆς εἶναι, τοῦτο σὺ φῆς εἶναι; φῆς δὲ λίθον εἶναι, σὺ ἄρα φῆς λίθος εἶναι. καὶ ἄρ’ ἐστι συγάντα λέγειν; δι’ τὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ συ- γάντα λέγειν, τὸ τε τὸν λέγοντα συγάν καὶ τὸ τὰ λεγόμενα. εἰσὶ δὲ τρεῖς τρόποι τῶν παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν, εἰς μὲν ὅταν ἦ ὁ λόγος ἢ τοῦνομα κυρίως σημαίνῃ πλείω, οἷον ἀετός καὶ κύων, εἰς δὲ ὅταν εἰσθότες ὡμεν οὕτω λέγειν- τρίτος δὲ ὅταν τὸ συντεθὲν πλείω σημαίνῃ, κεκω- ρισμένον δὲ ἀπλῶς, οἷον τὸ ἐπίσταται γράμματα. ἐκάτερον μὲν γὰρ, εἰ ἐτυχεὶν, ἐν τῇ σημαίνῃ, τὸ ἐπίσταται καὶ τὰ γράμματα· ἀμφὶ δὲ πλείω, ἢ τὸ τὰ γράμματα αὐτὰ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἢ τῶν γραμ- μάτων ἄλλων.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀμφιβολία καὶ ὁμωνυμία παρὰ τού- τους τοὺς τρόπους ἐστίν, παρὰ δὲ τὴν σύνθεσιν τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον τὸ δύνασθαι καθήμενον βαδίζειν καὶ 25 μὴ γράφοντα γράφειν. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτο σημαίνει, ἀν διελών τις εἴπῃ καὶ συνθεῖς, ὡς δυνατὸν τὸ καθήμενον βαδίζεινε· καὶ τοῦθ’ ὡσαύτως ἂν τὶς συνθῆ, τὸ μὴ γράφοντα γράφειν· σημαίνει γὰρ ὡς ἔχει δύναμιν τοῦ μὴ γράφοντα γράφειν. ἐὰν δὲ 30 μὴ συνθῆ, ὅτι ἔχει δύναμιν, ὅτε οὐ γράφει, τοῦ

1 Reading τὸ for τὸν.
2 Deleting καὶ μὴ γράφοντα γράφειν after βαδίζειν with Wallies.

The personal pronoun not being expressed in Greek, τοῦτο, being neuter, can be either the subject or object of the verb ὁρᾶ.

*b 'eagle' or 'pediment.'

c 'Dog,' 'dogstar' or 'Cynic philosopher.'

d In which case the meaning is that a man, while sitting, has the power to walk (if he wishes to do so).
(he) \(^a\) sees: a man a pillar sees, therefore the pillar sees.' Again, 'Surely you insist on being what you insist on being. You insist on a stone being: therefore, you insist on being a stone.' Again 'Surely speaking is possible of the silent.' 'Speaking of the silent' can also be taken in two ways, either that the speaker is silent or the things spoken of are silent. There are three modes connected with equivocation and ambiguity: (1) when the expression or name properly signifies more than one thing, such as \(\alpha \varepsilon \tau \omicron \omicron \) and \(\kappa \nu \omega \nu\); (2) when we customarily use a word in more than one sense, (3) when a word has more than one meaning in combination with another word, though by itself it has only one meaning, for example, 'knowing letters'; for it may so happen that taken separately 'knowing' and 'letters' have only one meaning, but taken together they have more than one meaning, namely, either that the letters themselves have knowledge or that someone else has knowledge of the letters.

Ambiguity and equivocation then take these forms. The following examples are connected with the combination of words, for instance, 'A man can walk when sitting and write when not writing.' The significance is not the same if one utters the words separately \(^d\) as it is if one combines them, namely, 'a man can walk-while-sitting,' \(^e\) and, similarly, in the other example, if one combines the words and says 'a man can write-when-not-writing,' for it means that he can write and not write at the same time; whereas if one does not combine the words it means that, when he is not writing, he has the power to

\(^a\) In which case the meaning is that it is possible for a man to walk and sit at the same time.
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166 a  γράφειν, καὶ, μανθάνει νῦν γράμματα, εἰπέρ ἐμῶς ἦπαν ἄ ἐπίσταται. ἔτι τὸ ἔν μονὸν δυνάμενον φέρειν πολλὰ δύνασθαι φέρειν.

Παρὰ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὅτι τὰ πέντε ἐστὶ δύο καὶ τρία, καὶ περιττά καὶ ἄρτια, καὶ τὸ μείζον ἵσον: 35 τοσοῦτον γὰρ καὶ ἐτὶ πρόσ. ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος διηρημένος καὶ συγκείμενος οὐκ ἀεὶ ταύτῳ σημαίνειν ἂν δόξευεν, οἷον "ἐγὼ σ' ἔθηκα δούλον ὄντ' ἐλεύθερον" καὶ τὸ "πεντήκοντ' ἀνδρῶν ἐκατὸν λίπη δίος Ἀχιλλεύς."

166 b  Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσωφίδιαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄνευ γραφῆς διαλεκτικοῖς οὐράδιον ποιήσαι λόγον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις καὶ ποιήμασι μᾶλλον, οἷον καὶ τὸν Ὦμηρον ἔνιοι διορθοῦνται πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας 5 ὡς ἀτόπως εἰρήκοτα "τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὀμβρῳ." λύουσι γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇ προσῳδίᾳ, λέγοντες τὸ οὐ δεξύτερον. καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, οτι οὐκ αὐτὸς ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν "διδομένοι δὲ οἱ εὐχὸς ἀρέσθαι," ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ ἐνετέλλετο διδόναι. τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτα παρὰ τὴν προσῳδίαν ἐστίν.

10 Οἴ δὲ παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως συμβαίνουσιν,

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a With a different combination of words this can mean, 'He understands now what he knows because he has understood letters.'

b This can also be taken to mean, 'Being able to carry many things, you can carry one single thing only.'

c If $5 = 2$ and $3$, $5 = 2$ and $5 = 3$, and so $5$ is both odd and even; again, if $5 = 2$ and $5 = 3$, then $3 = 2$, i.e. the greater is the less, since $3$ is also $2 + 1$.

d From an unknown source in Greek comedy imitated by Terence, Andria 37.
write. Again, 'He now understands letters, since he has understood what he knows'\(^a\); and further, 'One single thing being able to carry, many things you can carry.'\(^b\)

The following propositions are connected with division: '5 is 2 and 3,' '5 is odd and even,' 'the greater is equal to the less,' for it is so much and something more.\(^c\) For the same sentence divided would not always seem to have the same meaning as when taken as a whole, for example, 'Free I made thee a slave'\(^d\) and 'goodly Achilles left a hundred (and) fifty men.'\(^e\)

It is not easy to construct an argument relating to accent in discussions which are not written down, but it is easier in written matter and poetry. For example, some people emend Homer to meet the objection of critics that his phrase 'τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ πρὸς ταῦτα ὁμοίως' is a strange one.\(^f\) For they solve the difficulty by a change of accent, pronouncing the οὖ more sharply.\(^g\) Also in the passage about Agamemnon's dream\(^h\) they say that Zeus himself did not say, 'But we grant him to secure the fulfilment of his prayer' but bade the dream to grant it.\(^i\) Such examples, then, depend on accentuation.

Refutations which depend on the form of expression.\(^j\)

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\(^a\) Probably quoted from some Cyclic poem. The words can mean either 'left 150 men' or 'left a hundred men fifty.'

\(^b\) *I.ii. xxiii. 328: 'part of which decays in the rain.'*

\(^c\) *i.e. substituting οὖ, 'not,' for οὐ: 'and it does not decay in the rain.'*

\(^d\) *II. ii. 1-35; but the actual words quoted occur in II. xxi. 297 and are spoken by Poseidon. For this and the following example see *Poet.* 1461 a 22-23.*

\(^e\) *i.e. διδομεν.*

\(^f\) *i.e. διδομεν = διδοναι, the infinitive being used as an imperative.*
οταν τὸ μὴ ταυτὸ ὤσαίτως ἐρμηνεύῃται, οἶον τὸ ἄρρεν θῆλυ ἢ τὸ θῆλυ ἄρρεν, ἢ τὸ μεταξὺ θάτερον τούτων, ἢ πάλιν τὸ ποιὸν ποσὸν ἢ τὸ ποσὸν ποιόν, ἢ τὸ ποιοῦν πάσχον ἢ τὸ διακείμενον ποιεῖν, καὶ 15 τὰλλα δ', ὡς διήρηται πρῶτερον. ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὴ τῶν ποιεῖν ὅν ὡς τῶν ποιεῖν τι τῇ λέξει σημαίνειν. οἶον τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ὁμοίως τῷ σχῆματι τῆς λέξεως λέγεται τῷ τέμνειν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν. καὶ τοὶ τὸ μὲν ποιόν τι καὶ διακείμενον πιὸς δηλοῖ, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν τι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

20 Οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ἔλεγχοι ἐκ τούτων τῶν τόπων εἰσὶν: τῶν δ' ἔξω τῆς λέξεως παραλογισμῶν εἶδη ἐστὶν ἑπτά, ἐν μὲν παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἢ μὴ ἀπλῶς ἄλλα πῇ ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ πρὸς τι λέγεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἔλεγχου ἀγνοιαν, τέταρτον δὲ τὸ 25 παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον, πέμπτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν, ἕκτον δὲ τὸ μὴ αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον τιθέναι, ἐβδομον δὲ τὸ τὰ πλεῖον ἔρωτήμαta ἐν ποιεῖν.

V. Οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός παραλογισμοὶ εἰσὶν, ὅταν ὁμοίως ὁτίον ἄξιωθη τῷ πράγματι καὶ τῷ συμβεβηκότι ὑπάρχειν. ἔστι γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ πολλὰ συμβεβηκέν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη πᾶσι τοῖς κατηγορουμένοις, καὶ καθ' οὗ κατηγορεῖται, ταυτὰ 2 πάντα ὑπάρχειν. οἶον εἰ ὁ Κορίσκος ἔτερον ἀν-

1 Reading παρὰ <τὸ> τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν with Strache.
2 Reading ταὐτὰ with Casaubon.
sion occur when what is not the same is expressed in the same form; for example, when the masculine is expressed by the feminine or vice versa, or the neuter by the masculine or feminine; or again when a quality is expressed by a quantity or vice versa, or the active by a passive or a state by the active, and so forth according to the distinctions previously made. For it is possible for something which is not of the nature of an action to signify by the language used something which is of the nature of an action; for example, to 'flourish' is a form of expression like to 'cut' or to 'build'; yet the former denotes a quality and a certain disposition, the latter an action. So too with the other possible examples.

Refutations, then, connected with language are based on these commonplaces. Of fallacies unconnected with language there are seven kinds: (1) those connected with Accident; (2) those in which an expression is used absolutely, or not absolutely but qualified as to manner or place or time or relation; (3) those connected with ignorance of the nature of refutation; (4) those connected with the consequent; (5) those connected with the assumption of the original point to be proved; (6) those which assert that what is not a cause is a cause; (7) the making of several questions into one.

V. Fallacies connected with Accident occur when it is claimed that some attribute belongs similarly to the thing and to its accident; for since the same thing has many accidents, it does not necessarily follow that all the same attributes belong to all the predicates of a thing and to that of which they are predicated. For example, 'If Coriscus is different

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\(^a\) Topics 103 b 20 ff.
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166 b

θρώπου, αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἑτερος· ἦστι γὰρ ἀνθρώπος. ἢ εἰ Σωκράτους ἑτερος, ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνθρώπος,

35 ἑτερον ἀνθρώπου φασίν ὑμολογηκέναι διὰ τὸ συμ-βεβηκέναι, οὔ ἐφησεν ἑτερον εἶναι, τούτον εἶναι ἀνθρωπον.

Ot δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς τόδε ἦ πὴ λέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ κυρίως, ὅταν τὸ ἐν μέρει λεγόμενον ὡς ἀπλῶς

167 a εἰρημένον λῃθῇ, οἶνον εἰ τὸ μὴ ὅν ἐστὶ δοξαστόν, ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὅν ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ταύτον εἶναι τέ τι καὶ εἶναι ἀπλῶς. ἦ πάλιν ὅτι τὸ ὅν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅν, εἰ τῶν ὁντων τι μὴ ἔστιν, οἶνον εἰ μὴ ἀνθρωπος. οὐ 5 γὰρ ταύτο μὴ εἶναι τι καὶ ἀπλῶς μὴ εἶναι· φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τὸ πάρεγγυ τῆς λέξεως καὶ μικρὸν διαφέ-ρειν τὸ εἶναι τι τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ πὴ καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς.

οἶνον εἰ ὁ Ἰνδὸς ὅλος μέλας ὅν λευκὸς ἐστὶ τοὺς ὁδόντας· λευκὸς ἀρα καὶ οὐ λευκὸς ἐστιν. ἦ εἰ

10 ἀμφῶ τὴ, ὅτι ἀμα τὰ ἐναντία ὑπάρχει. τὸ δὲ τοιούτον ἐπ᾽ ἐνών μὲν παντὶ θεωρῆσαι ράδιον, οἶνον εἰ λαβὼν τὸν Αἰθίοπα εἶναι μέλανα τοὺς ὁδόντας ἑροιτ᾽ εἰ λευκός· εἰ οὖν ταύτη λευκός, ὅτι μέλας καὶ οὐ μέλας, οὕτω διελέχθαι συλλογιστικῶς τελειώσας τῆν ἐρωτησιν. ἐπ᾽ ἐνών δὲ λανθάνει
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v

from "man," he is different from himself, for he is a man; or 'if he is different from Socrates, and Socrates is a man,' they say that it has been admitted that Coriscus is different from a man, because it is an accident that the person from which he said that Coriscus is different is a man.

Fallacies connected with the use of some particular expression absolutely or in a certain respect and not in its proper sense, occur when that which is predicated in part only is taken as though it was predicated absolutely. For example, 'If that-which-is-not is an object of opinion, then that-which-is-not is'; for it is not the same thing 'to be something' and 'to be' absolutely. Or again, 'That-which-is is not, if it is not one of the things which are, e.g. if it is not a man.' For it is not the same thing 'not to be something' and 'not to be' absolutely; but, owing to the similarity of the language, 'to be something' appears to differ only a little from 'to be,' and 'not to be something' from 'not to be.' In like manner when something is predicated in a certain respect and absolutely; for example, 'If an Indian, being black all over, is white in respect of his teeth, then he is white and not white.' Or if both attributes belong in a certain respect, they say that the contrary attributes belong simultaneously. In some cases this sort of fallacy can be easily perceived by anyone; if, for example, after securing an admission that the Ethiopian is black, one were to ask whether he is white in respect of his teeth, and then, if he be white in this respect, were to think that he had finished the interrogation and had proved dialectically that he was both black and not black. In some cases, on the other hand, the fallacy escapes detection, namely,
πολλάκις, ἐφ' ὅσων, ὅταν πὴ λέγηται, κἂν τὸ ἀπλῶς δόξειν ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἐν ὅσοις μὴ ράδιον θεωρῆσαι πότερον αὐτῶν κυρίως ἀποδοτέον. γίνεται δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν οἷς ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει τὰ ἀντικείμενα· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἅμφω ἡ μηδέτερον δοτέον ἀπλῶς εἶναι κατηγορεῖν, οἷον εἰ τὸ μὲν ἦμισυ λευκὸν τὸ δ' ἦμισυ μέλαν, πότερον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν;

Οἳ δὲ παρὰ τὸ μὴ διωρίσθαι τί ἐστι συλλογισμός ἢ τί ἐλεγχος, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν ἐλλειψιν γίνονται τοῦ λόγου· ἐλεγχος μὲν γὰρ ἀντίφασις τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐνὸς, μὴ ὀνόματος ἀλλὰ πράγματος, καὶ ὀνόματος μὴ συνωνύμου ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ συναρίθμουμένου τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ, κατὰ ταύτο καὶ πρὸς ταύτο καὶ ὑσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸ ψεύσασθαι περὶ τινος. ἐνοι δὲ ἀπολιπόντες τι τῶν λεχθέντων φαίνονται ἐλέγχειν, οἷον οἳ ταύτῳ διπλάσιον καὶ οὐ διπλάσιον· τὰ γὰρ δύο τοῦ μὲν ἐνὸς διπλάσια, τῶν δὲ τριῶν οὐ διπλάσια. ἦ εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ διπλάσιον καὶ οὐ διπλάσιον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταύτο· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μῆκος διπλάσιον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλάτος οὐ διπλάσιον. ἦ εἰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ ταύτο καὶ ὑσαύτως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁμα· διόπερ ἐστὶ φαινόμενος ἐλεγχος. ἔλκοι δ' ἃν τις τούτων καὶ εἰς τοὺς παρὰ τὴν λέξων.

Οἳ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν γίνονται μὲν
where, when an attribute is ascribed in some respect only, an absolute attribution would also seem to follow, and where it is not easy to see which of the attributes can be properly assigned. An instance of this occurs when both the opposite attributes belong similarly; for then it is generally held that it must be conceded that either both or neither can be predicated absolutely; for example, if something is half white and half black, is it white or black?

Other fallacies arise because no definition has been given of what a syllogism is and what a refutation, and there is some defect in their definition. For a refutation is a contradiction of one and the same predicate, not of a name but of a thing, and not of a synonymous name but of an identical name, based on the given premisses and following necessarily from them (the original point at issue not being included) in the same respect, relation, manner and time. A false statement about something also occurs in the same manner. Some people, however, appear to refute, omitting some of the above-named points, showing, for example, that the same thing is double and not double, because two is the double of one but not the double of three. Or, they show that if the same thing is double and not double of the same thing, yet it is not double in the same respect; for it is double in length but not double in breadth. Or, if it is double and not double of the same thing and in the same respect and manner, yet it is not so at the same time; and so there is only an apparent refutation. One might, indeed, force this fallacy also into the category of those connected with language.

Fallacies connected with the assumption of the (4) *Petitio principii*.
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οὐτῶς καὶ τοσαυταχῶς ὅσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἑξ ἀρχῆς αἰτεῖσθαι, φαίνονται δὲ ἐλέγχειν διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνορᾶν τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἐτερον.

167 b 'Ο δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον ἐλέγχος διὰ τὸ οἷεσθαι ἀντιστρέφειν τὴν ἀκολούθησιν. ὅταν γὰρ τούθε ὄντος ἡ ἀνάγκη τοῦ ἤ, καὶ τούθε ὄντος οἴονται καὶ θάτερον εἶναι ἡ ἀνάγκη. οἴθεν καὶ αἱ περὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀπάται γίνονται. πολλάκις γὰρ τὴν χολήν μέλι ὑπέλαβον διὰ τὸ ἐπεσθαί τὸ ξανθὸν χρῶμα τῷ μέλιτι. καὶ ἔπει συμβαίνει τὴν γῆν ὑσαντὸς γίνεσθαι διάβροχον, κἂν ἢ διάβροχος, ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὑσαί. τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. ἐν τε τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς αἱ κατὰ τὸ σημεῖον ἀποδείξεις ἐκ τῶν ἐπομένων εἰσίν. βουλόμενοι γὰρ δεῖξαι ὅτι μοιχός, τὸ ἐπόμενον ἠλάβον, ὅτι καλλωπιστής ἢ ὅτι νύκτωρ ὁρᾶται πλανώμενος. πολλοῖς δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ κατηγορούμενον οὐχ ὑπάρχει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογιστικοῖς, οἷον ὁ Μελίσσου λόγος ὅτι ἄπειρον τὸ ἀπαν, λαβὼν τὸ μὲν ἄπαν ἀγένητον (ἐκ γὰρ μὴ 15 ὄντος οὐδὲν ἀν γενέσθαι), τὸ δὲ γενόμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενέσθαι. εἰ μὴ οὖν γέγονεν, ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει τὸ πᾶν, ὡστε ἄπειρον. οὐκ ἀνάγκη δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν οὐ γὰρ εἰ τὸ γενόμενον ἀπαν ἀρχὴν ἔχει, καὶ εἰ τι ἀρχὴν ἔχει, γέγονεν, ὡσπερ οὐδ' εἰ ὁ 20 πυρέττων θερμός, καὶ τὸν θερμὸν ἀνάγκη πυρέττειν. 30
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original point to be proved arise in the same manner and in the same number of ways as it is possible to beg the original point; they have an appearance of achieving a refutation because men fail to perceive at the same time what is the same and what is different.

The refutation connected with the consequent is due to the idea that consequence is convertible. For whenever, if A is, B necessarily is, men also fancy that, if B is, A necessarily is. It is from this source that deceptions connected with opinion based on sense-perception arise. For men often take gall for honey because a yellow colour accompanies honey; and since it happens that the earth becomes drenched when it has rained, if it is drenched, we think that it has rained, though this is not necessarily true. In rhetorical arguments proofs from signs are founded on consequences; for, when men wish to prove that a man is an adulterer, they seize upon the consequence of that character, namely, that the man dresses himself elaborately or is seen wandering abroad at night—facts that are true of many people, while the accusation is not true. So, too, in dialectical reasonings; for example, the argument of Melissus that the universe is infinite assumes that the universe has not come into being (for nothing could come into being from what does not exist) and that everything which has come into being has come from a beginning; if, therefore, the universe has not come into being, it has no beginning and therefore is infinite. But this does not necessarily follow; for even if what has come into being always has a beginning, anything that has a beginning need not have come to be, any more than it follows that a man who is hot must be in a fever because a man who is in a fever is hot.
'Ὁ δὲ παρὰ τὸ μὴ αὐτίον ὡς αὐτίον, ὅταν προσληφθῇ τὸ ἀναίτιον ὡς παρ' ἐκεῖνο γινομένου τοῦ ἐλέγχου. συμβαίνει δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον συλλογισμοῖς· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον 25 ἀναίρειν τι τῶν κειμένων. ἦν οὖν ἐγκαταριθμηθῆ ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοις ἑρωτήμασι πρὸς τὸ συμβαίνον ἀδύνατον, δόξει παρὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι πολλάκις ὁ ἐλέγχος, οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ψυχὴ καὶ ζωὴ ταύτῶν· εἰ γὰρ φθορὰ γένεσις ἐναντίον, καὶ τῇ τινὶ φθορᾷ ἔσται τις γένεσις ἐναντίον· ὁ δὲ θάνατος φθορά τις καὶ ἐναντίον ζωῆς, ὅστε γένεσις ἡ ζωὴ καὶ τὸ ζῆν γίνεσθαι· τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἀρα ταύτων ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἡ ζωή. οὐ δὲ συλλελόγισται· συμβαίνει γάρ, κἂν μὴ τις ταύτῳ φη τὴν ζωὴν τῇ ψυχῇ, τὸ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐναντίον ζωῆς μὲν θανάτῳ ὄντι φθορᾷ, φθορὰ δὲ γένεσιν. ἀσυλλόγιστοι μὲν 30 οὖν ἀπλῶς οὐκ εἰσίν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ προκείμενον ἀσυλλόγιστοι. καὶ λανθάνει πολλάκις οὐχ ἦττον αὐτοῦς τοὺς ἐρωτῶντας τὸ τοιοῦτον.

Οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον καὶ παρὰ τὸ μὴ αὐτίον λόγου τοιοῦτοι εἰσίν· οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ τὰ δύο ἑρωτήματα ἐν ποιεῖν, ὅταν λανθάνῃ πλείω ὄντα καὶ 168 α ὡς ἐνὸς ὄντος ἀποδοθῇ ἀπόκρισις μία. ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν οὖν βάδιον ἱδεῖν ὅτι πλείω καὶ ὅτι οὐ δοτέον 32
The refutation connected with taking as a cause what is not a cause, occurs when that which is not a cause is foisted into the argument as though the refutation were due to it. Such a case occurs in reasonings leading up to an impossibility; for in these one is bound to destroy one of the premisses. If, therefore, what is not a cause is enumerated among the questions which are necessary for the production of the resultant impossibility, the refutation will often seem to come about as the result of it; for example, in the argument that 'soul' and 'life' are not identical. For if coming-into-being is contrary to perishing, then a particular kind of coming-into-being will be contrary to a particular kind of perishing; now death is a particular kind of perishing and contrary to life; life, therefore, is a coming-into-being and to live is to come-into-being. But this is impossible; and so the soul and life are not identical. But this conclusion is not the result of reasoning; for the impossibility occurs even if one does not assert that life is identical with the soul but merely says that life is contrary to death, which is a perishing, and that coming-into-being is contrary to perishing. Such arguments are not absolutely inconclusive but only inconclusive as regards the point at issue, and the questioners themselves are often equally unconscious of such a state of affairs.

Such, then, are the arguments connected with the consequent and the falsely imputed cause. Those which are connected with the union of two questions in one occur, when it is not noticed that they are more than one and one answer is given as though there was only one question. Sometimes it is easy to see that there is more than one question and
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ἀπόκρισιν, οἶνον πότερον ἡ γῆ θαλαττά ἐστιν ἡ ὀὐρανός; ἐπ’ ἐνίων δ’ ἦττον, καὶ ὡς ἐνὸς ὄντος ἡ ὀμολογοῦσι τῷ μὴ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον,

5 ἡ ἐλέγχεσθαι φαίνονται, οἶνον ἀρ’ οὔτος καὶ οὗτος ἐστιν ἀνθρώπος; ὡστ’ ἂν τις τύπτῃ τοῦτον καὶ τούτον, ἀνθρώπων ἁλλ’ οὖν ἀνθρώπους τυπτήσει. ἡ πάλιν, ἄν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἁγαθὰ τὰ δ’ οὔκ ἁγαθά, πάντα ἁγαθὰ ἡ οὐκ ἁγαθά; ὀπότερον γὰρ ἂν φη, ἐστι μὲν ὡς ἐλέγχου ἡ ψεῦδος φανόμενον δόξειν ἂν ποιεῖν· τὸ γὰρ φάναι τῶν μὴ ἁγαθῶν τι εἶναι ἁγαθῶν ἡ τῶν ἁγαθῶν μὴ ἁγαθῶν ψεῦδος. ὅτε δὲ προσληφθέντων τυών καὶ ἐλέγχος γίνοιτο ἀληθινὸς, οἶνον εἰ τις δοῖ τῇ ὀμοίωσ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ λέγεσθαι λευκὰ καὶ γυμνὰ καὶ τυφλά. εἰ γὰρ τυφλὸν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὁμιν πεφυκὸς δ’ ἔχειν, καὶ τυφλὰ ἔσται 10 τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα ὁμιν πεφυκότα δ’ ἔχειν. ὅταν οὖν τὸ μὲν ἔχῃ τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχῃ, τὰ ἁμφα ἔσται ἡ ὀρῶντα ἡ τυφλά· ὀπερ ἀδύνατον.

VI. Ἡ δὴ οὕτως διαφημεῖν τοὺς φαινομένους συλλογισμοὺς καὶ ἐλέγχους, ἡ πάντας ἀνακτέον εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἁγνοιαν, ἀρχὴν ταύτῃ ποιη- 20 σαμένους· ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαντᾶς ἀναλύσαι τοὺς λεχθέν- τας τρόπους εἰς τὸν τοῦ ἐλέγχου διορισμόν. πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἀσυλλόγιστοι· δεῖ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν κειμένων συμβαίνειν τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὡστε λέγειν εἶς ἀνάγκης ἀλλὰ μὴ φαίνεσθαι. ἐπειτα καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τοῦ 34
that an answer should not be given, for example, when it is asked 'Is the earth sea, or is the sky?' Sometimes, however, it is less easy, and thinking that there is only one question, people either give in by not answering the question or suffer an apparent refutation. For example, 'Is A and is B a man?' 'If so, if a man strikes A and B, he will strike a man, not men?' Or again, 'Where part is good and part evil, is the whole good or evil?' Either answer might possibly seem to involve an apparent refutation or false statement; for to say that something is good when it is not good or not good when it is good is a false statement. Sometimes, however, if certain premisses are added, there might be a genuine refutation. For example, if one agrees that a single thing and a number of things are alike called 'white' or 'naked' or 'blind.' For if 'blind' is used of something which does not possess sight though it is its nature to possess it, it will also describe a number of things which do not possess sight though it is their nature to possess it. When, therefore, one thing has sight while another has not, they will either both be able to see or both be blind; which is impossible.

VI. We must either divide apparent reasonings and refutations in the manner just described or else refer them all to a false conception of refutation, making this our basis; for it is possible to resolve all the kinds of fallacy which we have mentioned into violations of the definition of refutation. Firstly, we must see if they are inconelusive; for the conclusion ought to follow from the premisses laid down, so that we state it of necessity and do not merely appear to do so. Next, we ought to see if they accord with the
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dοιρισμοῦ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ λέξει οἱ μὲν εἰσι
25 παρὰ τὸ διυττὸν, οὗν ἡ τε ὁμωνυμία καὶ ὁ λόγος
καὶ ἡ ὁμοιοσχημοσύνη (σύνηθες γὰρ τὸ πάντα ὡς
tόδε τι σημαινεῖ), ἢ δὲ σύνθεσις καὶ διαίρεσις καὶ
προσῳδία τῷ μή τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἢ
tούνομα διαφέρον. ἐδει δὲ καὶ τούτο, καθάπερ
καὶ τὸ πράγμα, ταύτων, εἰ μέλλει ἐλέγχος ἢ συλ-
30 λογισμὸς ἔσεσθαι, οὗν εἰ λύπιον, μὴ ἰμάτιον συλ-
λογίσασθαι ἄλλα λύπιον. ἀληθῶς μὲν γὰρ κάκεινο,
ἀλλ’ οὐ συλλελόγισται, ἄλλ’ ἐτὶ ἐρωτήματος δεῖ,
ὅτι ταύτων σημαινεῖ, πρὸς τὸν ξητοῦντα τὸ διὰ τι.

Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὀρισθέντος τοῦ συλ-
35 λογισμοῦ φανεροὶ γίνονται. τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ ὀρισμὸν
dεῖ καὶ τοῦ ἐλέγχου γίνεσθαι, πλὴν προσκεῖσθαι
τὴν ἀντίφασιν· ὃ γὰρ ἐλέγχος συλλογισμὸς ἀντι-
φάσεως. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς τοῦ συμ-
βεβηκότος, οὐ γίνεται ἐλέγχος. οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῦτων
ὄντων ἀνάγκη τόδ’ εἶναι, τούτῳ δ’ ἔστι λευκόν,
40 ἀνάγκη λευκὸν εἶναι διὰ τὸν συλλογισμὸν. οὐδ’

168 b εἰ τὸ τρίγωνον δυὸν ὀρθαῖν ἵσας ἔχει, συμβεβηκε
δ’ αὐτῷ σχήματι εἶναι ἡ πρῶτῳ ἡ ἀρχῇ, ὅτι
σχήμα ἡ ἀρχῇ ἡ πρῶτον τούτο. οὐ γὰρ ἡ σχήμα
οὐδ’ ἡ πρῶτῳ, ἀλλ’ ἡ τρίγωνον, ἡ ἀπόδειξις.
δομῶς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὥστ’ εἰ ὁ ἐλέγχος
5 συλλογισμός τις, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
ἐλέγχος. ἄλλα παρὰ τούτο καὶ οἱ τεχνῖται καὶ
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remaining parts of the definition. For of the fallacies connected with language, some are due to a double meaning, for example equivocation and ambiguous phraseology and similarity of formation (for it is customary to indicate everything as a particular substance), whereas composition, division and accentuation are due to the phrase not being the same or the name different. For the name also, like the thing signified, ought to be the same, if refutation or reasoning is to result. For example, if the subject is a mantle, you should come to a conclusion about a mantle, not about a cloak; for the latter conclusion is also a true one, but the reasoning is not complete, and a further question must be asked to prove that words mean the same thing, if the answerer asks how you have refuted him.

Fallacies connected with Accident become obvious when 'proof' has been defined. For the same definition ought to be true also of refutation, except that 'the contradictory' is added; for refutation is a proof of the contradictory. If, therefore, there is no proof of the accident, no refutation takes place. For if, when A and B are, C is, and C is white, it does not necessarily follow that it is white because of the syllogism. And again, if the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles, and it happens to be a figure, element or principle, it does not necessarily follow that because it is a figure, element or principle it has this character; for the demonstration is concerned with it not qua figure or qua element but qua triangle. And so likewise with the other instances. Thus, if refutation is a kind of proof, an argument depending on an accident could not be a refutation. Yet it is along these lines that specialists and men of
λοις οἱ ἐπιστήμονες ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνεπιστημόνων ἐλέγχονται. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ποιοῦνται τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς πρὸς τοὺς εἰδότας. οἱ δὲ οὐ δυνάμενοι διαφεῖν ἢ ἐρωτῶμενοι διδόασιν ἢ οὐ δόντες 10 οἴονται δεδωκέναι.

Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ πῆ καὶ ἄπλως, ὅτι οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ κατάφασις καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις. τοῦ γὰρ πῆ λευκοῦ τὸ πῆ οὐ λευκόν, τοῦ δὲ ἄπλως λευκοῦ τὸ ἄπλως οὐ λευκόν ἀπόφασις. εἰ οὖν δόντος πῆ εἶναι λευκόν 15 ὡς ἄπλως εἰρημένον λαμβάνει, οὐ ποιεῖ ἐλεγχον, φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τὴν ἁγνοιαν τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἐλεγχον.

Φανερώτατοι δὲ πάντων οἱ πρότερον λεχθέντες παρὰ τοῖν τοῦ ἐλέγχου διορισμόν· διὸ καὶ προσηγορεύθησαν οὕτως· παρὰ γὰρ τοῦ λόγου τὴν 20 ἐλλευψιν ἢ φαντασία γίνεται, καὶ διαφορομένους οὕτως κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσι τούτοις θετέον τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐλλευψιν.

Οἱ τε παρὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ τὸ ἀναίτιον ὡς αἴτιον τιθέναι δῆλοι διὰ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ. δεῖ γὰρ τὸ συμπέρασμα τῷ ταῦτ' εἶναι1 συμβαίνειν, 25 ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἀναίτιοισ· καὶ πάλιν μὴ ἀριθμομένου τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ παρὰ τὴν αἰτησίαν τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ.

Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον μέρος εἰσὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος· τὸ γὰρ ἐπόμενον συμβεβηκέ, διαφέρει δὲ

1 Omitting αἴτησιν τοῦ after εἶναι with ABC.

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a 167 a 21 ff.
b παραλογισμοῖ from παρά and λόγος in the sense of 'definition.'
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vi

science in general are refuted by the unscientific; for they argue with the men of science with reasonings based on accident, and the latter, being incapable of making distinctions, either give in when questioned, or think that they have done so when they have not.

Fallacies which depend on whether a statement is made in a limited sense or absolutely occur because the affirmation and denial are not of the same thing. For 'not partly white' is the negation of 'partly white,' and 'not absolutely white' of 'absolutely white.' If, then, one takes the admission that something is partially white to mean that it is absolutely white, he does not cause a refutation but only seems to do so owing to ignorance of what a refutation is.

The clearest fallacies of all are those already mentioned as connected with the definition of refutation (hence also their name); for the semblance of a refutation is due to the defect in the definition, and, if we distinguish fallacies in this way, we must put down 'defect of definition' as common to all these cases.

Fallacies due to assuming the original point and stating as a cause what is not a cause are clearly exposed by means of the definition. For the conclusion ought to follow because this and that is so, which is not the case when the alleged cause is not the cause; and, again, the conclusion should follow without the original point being included, which is not true of arguments based on the begging of the original point.

Fallacies connected with the consequent form part of those due to accident; for the consequent is an accident but differs from the accident because the

(3) The confusion of absolute and qualified statements.

(4) Defective definition.

(5) Petitio principii.

(6) The consequent.
τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ἐστὶν 
30 ἐφ’ ἐνὸς μόνου λαβεῖν, οἷον ταύτῳ εἶναι τὸ ξανθὸν 
καὶ μέλι καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ κύκνον, τὸ δὲ πορεπό-
μενον ἀεὶ ἐν πλείουσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῳ ταύτα 
καὶ ἀλλήλους ἁξιοῦμεν εἶναι ταύτα· διὸ γίνεται 
παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον ἑλεγχος. ἔστι δ’ οὐ πάντως 
ἅλθες, οἷον ἂν ἦ λευκὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς· καὶ 
35 γὰρ ἦ χιῶν καὶ ὁ κύκνος τῷ λευκῷ ταὐτόν. ἦ 
πάλιν, ὡς ἐν τῷ Μελίσσου λόγῳ, τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι 
λαμβάνει τὸ γεγονέναι καὶ ἄρχην ἔχειν, ἦ τὸ ἴσα 
gίνεσθαι καὶ ταύτῳ μέγεθος λαμβάνειν. ὅτι γὰρ 
τὸ γεγονὸς ἑχει ἄρχην, καὶ τὸ ἔχον ἄρχην γεγονέναι 
ἄξιοι, ὡς ἄμφω ταύτα ὅντα τῷ ἄρχῃ ἔχειν, τὸ 
40 τε γεγονός καὶ τὸ πεπερασμένον.2 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 
169 α ἐπὶ τῶν ἴσων γινομένων εἰ τὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέγεθος 
καὶ ἐν λαμβάνοντα ἴσα γίνεται, καὶ τὰ ἴσα γινόμενα 
ἐν μέγεθος λαμβάνει. ὡστε τὸ ἐπόμενον λαμβάνει. 
ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἑλεγχος ἐν τῇ 
ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ ἑλεγχοῦ, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ ὁ παρὰ τὸ 
5 ἐπόμενον. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἄλλως. 
Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ἐν ποιεῖν ἐν 
τῷ μὴ διαρθροῦν ἡμᾶς ἡ μὴ διαλείπειν τὸν τῆς προ-
tάσεως λόγον. ἦ γὰρ πρότασις ἐστὶν ἐν καθ’ ἐνός.

1 Reading ἴσα for ἴσως.
2 Bekker misprints πεπερασμένον as πεπερασμένων.

a But it does not follow that because snow is white and 
swan is white, therefore snow is swan.
b Cf. 167 b 13 f.
c Cf. 179 a 26 ff., 181 a 22 ff.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vi

accident can be secured in the case of a single thing by itself, for example, a yellow thing and honey are identical, and so is a white thing and a swan, whereas the consequent always exists in more than one thing; for we claim that things which are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another; and this is how refutation proceeds when the consequent is involved. It is not, however, always true, for example, in the case of accidental whiteness; for both 'snow' and 'swan' are the same in respect of whiteness. Or again, as in the argument of Melissus, someone takes 'to have come into being' and 'to have a beginning' as the same thing, and 'to become equal' as the same thing as 'to take on the same magnitude.' For because what has come into being has a beginning, he claims also that what has a beginning has come into being, on the ground that 'having come into being' and 'being finite' are both the same thing, because both have a beginning. Similarly, too, in the case of things which become equal, he assumes that, if things which take on one and the same magnitude become equal, then also things which become equal take on the same magnitude. In doing so he is assuming the consequent. Since, then, the refutation where accident is concerned depends on ignorance of the nature of refutation, so also, it is clear, does the refutation where the consequent is concerned. But we must examine this question from other points of view also.

Fallacies connected with the union of several questions in one are due to our failure to differentiate or distinguish the definition of the term 'proposition.' For a proposition is a single predication about a single subject. For the same definition applies
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ο γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁρος ἐνὸς μόνου καὶ ἀπλῶς τοῦ πράγματος, οἶον ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐνὸς μόνου ἀνθρώπου· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ οὖν μία πρώτας ἡ ἐν καθ' ἐνὸς ἀξίοντα, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἐσται πρώτας ἡ τοιαύτη ἐρώτησις. ἔπει δ' ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ προτάσεων, ὁ δ' ἐλεγχος συλλογισμός, καὶ ὁ ἐλεγχὸς ἐσται ἐκ προτάσεων. εἰ οὖν ἡ πρώτας ἐν καθ' ἐνὸς, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ οὕτως ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἀγνοίᾳ: φαίνεται γὰρ εἶναι πρώτας ἡ οὐκ οὕσα πρώτας. εἰ μὲν οὖν δέδωκεν ἀπόκρισιν ὡς πρὸς μίαν ἐρώτησιν, ἐσται ἐλεγχος, εἰ δὲ μὴ δέδωκεν ἄλλα φαίνεται, φαινόμενος ἐλεγχος. ὡστε πάντες οἱ τρόποι πίπτουσιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἀγνοιαν, οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, ὅτι φαινομένη ἡ ἀντίφασις, ὁπερ ἢν ἰδιον τοῦ ἐλέγχου, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ὁρον.

VII. 'Η δ' ἀπάτη γίνεται τῶν μὲν παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι διαιρεῖν τὸ πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον (ἐνια γὰρ οὐκ εὐπορον διελείν, οἶον τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ταύτον), τῶν δὲ παρὰ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν τῷ μηδὲν οἶεσθαι διαφέρειν συντιθέμενον ἢ διαιρούμενον τὸν λόγον, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν προσωπικὴν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο δοκεῖ σημαίνειν ἀνιέμενος καὶ ἐπίτεινόμενος ὁ λόγος, ἐπ' οὐδενὸς

1 Reading τρόποι for τόποι with Michael Ephesius.
2 Adding ἡ with Wallies.
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to 'one single thing' and to 'the thing' simply; the definition, for example, of 'man' and of 'one single man' is the same, and so, too, with the other instances. If, therefore, a 'single proposition' is one which claims a single predicate for a single subject, a 'proposition,' simply, will also be a question of this kind. And since reasoning is based on propositions, and refutation is a process of reasoning, refutation will also be based on propositions. If, therefore, a proposition is a single predication about a single thing, clearly this fallaey also depends on ignorance of the nature of refutation; for what is not a proposition appears to be one. If, therefore, a man has given an answer as though to a single question, there will be a refutation, but if he has not given it but only appears to have done so, there will be only an apparent refutation. Thus all the kinds of fallacy fall under the heading of ignorance of the nature of refutation—those connected with language because the contradiction, which is a particular characteristic of refutation, is only apparent, and the rest because of the definition of reasoning.

VII. In fallacies connected with verbal equivocation and ambiguous phrases the deception arises from the inability to distinguish the various meanings of a term (for there are some which it is not easy to distinguish, for example, the meanings of 'unity,' 'being' and 'identity'). In fallacies connected with combination and disjunction the deception is due to the supposition that it makes no difference whether the term is combined or disjoined, as indeed is generally the case. So, too, in those connected with accentuation; for it does not seem ever, or seems very seldom, to alter the significance of the word whether it is pronounced [Note (β). All the above fallacies arise from confused thinking and the inability to make distinctions.]
30 ἡ οὖν ἐπὶ πολλῶν. τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα διὰ τὴν ὁμοίοτητα τῆς λέξεως. χαλεπὸν γάρ διελεῖν ποία ὁσαύτως καὶ ποία ὡς ἔτερως λέγεται. σχεδὸν γάρ ὁ τούτο δυνάμενος ποιεῖν ἐγγὺς ἐστὶ τοῦ θεωρεῖν τάληθες. μάλιστα δέ ἐπιστάται ὑπεπινεύειν, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ κατηγοροῦμενον τινὸς ὑπολαμβάνομεν τόδε τι καὶ ὡς ἐν ὑπακούομεν. τῷ γὰρ ἐνὶ καὶ τῇ ουσίᾳ μάλιστα δοκεῖ παρέπεσθαι τὸ τόδε τι καὶ τὸ ὄν. διὸ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν οὖσος ὁ τρόπος θετέως, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι μᾶλλον ἡ ἀπάτη γίνεται μετ’ ἄλλων σκοπουμένων ἡ καθ’ αὐτοὺς (ἡ μὲν γὰρ μετ’ ἄλλου σκέψις διὰ λόγων, 40 ἡ δὲ καθ’ αὐτοῦ οὖν ἤττον δὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρᾶγματος), εἶτα καὶ καθ’ αὐτοῦ ἀπατᾶσθαι συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου ποιηταὶ τὴν σκέψιν· ἔτι ἡ μὲν ἀπάτη ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἡ δ’ ὁμοιότης ἐκ τῆς λέξεως. τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακρίνειν τὸ ταῦτα καὶ τὸ ἔτερον καὶ 5 ἐν καὶ πολλά, μηδὲ τοῖς ποίοις τῶν κατηγορημάτων πάντα ταῦτα καὶ τῷ πράγματι συμβεβηκέναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον· μέρος γάρ τι τοῦ συμβεβηκότος τὸ ἐπόμενον. ἔτι καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῶν φαίνεται καὶ ἀξιοῦται οὕτως, εἰ τόδε ἀπὸ τοῦδε μὴ χωρίζεται, μηδ’ ἀπὸ θατέρου χωρίζεσθαι θά- 10 τερον. τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐλλευθεροῦσαν τοῦ λόγου καὶ

1 Reading with Poste ἐπιστάται for ἐπιστᾶται.
with a lower or a higher pitch. In fallacies connected 
with the form of expression the deception is due to 
similarity of language; for it is difficult to distinguish 
what sort of things belong to the same and what to 
different categories; for he who can do this very 
nearly approaches a vision of the truth. What in 
particular seduces us into giving our assent to the 
fallacy is the fact that we suppose that every predi- 
cate of something is an individual thing and it pre- 
sents itself to our ears as a single thing; for it is to 
the one and to substance that ‘individuality’ and 
‘being’ are generally held most truly to be attached. 
On this account also this kind of fallacy must be 
classed among those connected with language; firstly, 
because the deception occurs more commonly when 
we are inquiring with others than by ourselves (for 
an inquiry with someone else is carried on by means of 
words, whereas in our own minds it is carried on quite 
as much by means of the thing itself); secondly, 
because, even in solitary inquiry, a man is apt to be 
deceived when he carries on his inquiry by means of 
words; and, thirdly, the deception arises from the 
similarity, and the similarity arises from the language. 
In fallacies connected with accident the deception is 
due to inability to distinguish the identical and the 
different, the one and the many, and what kinds of 
predicates have all the same accidents as their sub- 
ject. So, too, in fallacies connected with the con- 
sequent; for the consequent is a branch of the 
accident. Furthermore, in many cases it appears 
to be true and is treated as axiomatic that, if A 
is inseparable from B, then also B is inseparable 
from A. In fallacies connected with the defect in 
the definition of refutation and with the distinction
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tών παρὰ τὸ πῆ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἐν τῷ παρὰ μικρὸν ἢ ἀπάτη: ὡς γὰρ οὐδὲν προσομαιοῦν τὸ τί ἢ πῆ ἢ πῶς ἢ τὸ νῦν καθόλου συγχωροῦμεν. ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβανόντων καὶ τῶν ἀναίτων, καὶ ὅσοι τὰ πλεῖόν ἐρωτήματα ὡς ἐν 15 ποιουσίν· ἐν ἀπασί γὰρ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν· οὗ γὰρ διακριβοῦμεν οὔτε τῆς προτάσεως οὔτε τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ τὸν ὄρον διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν.

VIII. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔχομεν παρ’ ὅσα γίνονται οἱ φαινόμενοι συλλογισμοὶ, ἔχομεν καὶ παρ’ ὅπόσα οἱ 20 σοφιστικοὶ γένοιτʼ ἃν συλλογισμοὶ καὶ ἐλέγχοι. λέγω δὲ σοφιστικὸν ἐλέγχον καὶ συλλογισμὸν οὐ μόνον τῶν φαινόμενον συλλογισμὸν ἢ ἐλέγχον, μὴ ὄντα δὲ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ὃντα μὲν, φαινόμενον δὲ οἰκεῖον τοῦ πράγματος. εἰσὶ δ’ οὕτωι οἱ μὴ κατὰ τὸ πράγμα ἐλέγχοντες καὶ δεικνύντες. ἀγνοοῦντας, 25 ὡπερ ἦν τῆς πειραστικῆς. ἔστι δ’ ἡ πειραστικὴ μέρος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς· αὕτη δὲ δύναται συλλογίζεσθαι ψεύδος δι’ ἄγνωσιν τοῦ διδόντος τὸν λόγον. οἱ δὲ σοφιστικὸν ἐλέγχοι, ἃν ἦν καὶ συλλογίζοντα τῇ ἀντίφασιν, οὐ ποιοῦσι δῆλον εἰ ἄγνοει· καὶ γὰρ τὸν εἰδότα ἐμποδίζουσι τοῦτοι τοῖς λόγοις.

30 Ὁτι δ’ ἔχομεν αὐτοὺς τῇ αὐτῇ μεθόδῳ, δῆλον· παρ’ ὅσα γὰρ φαίνεται τοῖς ἰκονούσιν ὡς ἠρωτημένα συλλογισθαί, παρὰ ταῦτα κἂν τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ δόξειν, ὡς τ’ ἔσονται συλλογισμοὶ ψευδεῖς διὰ τούτων ἢ πάντων ἢ ἐνίων· δ’ γὰρ μὴ ἐρωτηθεῖς
between a qualified and an absolute statement the deception is due to the minuteness of the difference; for we regard the qualification of a particular case or respect or manner or time as having no extra significance and concede the universality of the proposition. So, too, when people assume the original point and when the wrong cause is assigned and when several questions are united in one; for in all these cases the deception is due to the minuteness of the difference; for we fail accurately to carry out the definition of ‘proposition’ and ‘reasoning’ from the above-mentioned cause.

VIII. Since we know the various sources from which apparent reasonings arise, we also know those from which sophistical reasonings and refutations would arise. By sophistical refutation and reasoning I mean not only the seeming but unreal reasoning or refutation but also one which, though real, only seems to be, but is not really, germane to the subject in hand. These are those which fail to refute and show up ignorance within the sphere of the subject in hand, and this is the function of examination. Now this is a department of dialectic, but it may reach a false conclusion owing to the ignorance of the person under examination. But sophistical refutations, even if they prove the contradictory of his view, do not make clear whether he is ignorant; for men try to entrap even the man of scientific knowledge by these arguments.

That we know them by the same method is clear; for the same reasons which make the hearers think that a conclusion has been reached as a result of questions, would make the answerer think so too, so that there will be false proofs as a result of all or some of these causes; for what a man thinks he has
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35 οίηται δεδωκέναι, καὶ ἔρωτηθεὶς θείη. πλὴν ἐπὶ γέ τινων ἄμα συμβαίνει προσερωτάν τὸ ἐνδεές καὶ τὸ ψεύδος ἐμφανίζειν, οἶον ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τὴν λέξιν καὶ τὸν σολοικισμόν. εἰ οὖν οἱ παραλογισμοὶ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως παρὰ τὸν φανόμενον ἔλεγχον εἰσι, δή- λον ὦτι παρὰ τοσαῦτα ἄν καὶ τῶν ψευδῶν εἶχαν 40 συλλογισμοὶ παρ᾽ ὁσα καὶ ὁ φανόμενος ἔλεγχος.

170 a ὁ δὲ φανόμενος παρὰ τὰ μόρια τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἐκά- στου γὰρ ἐκλείποντος φανεῖ ἄν ἔλεγχος, οἶον ὁ παρὰ τὸ μῆ συμβαίνον διὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον καὶ ὁ τὰς δύο ἐρωτήσεις μίαν ποιῶν παρὰ τὴν πρότασιν, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ ὁ παρὰ τὸ 5 συμβεβηκός, καὶ τὸ τοῦτον μόριον, ὁ παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον ἐτι τὸ μῆ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου συμβαίνειν ἐτι ἀντὶ τοῦ καθόλου τὴν ἀντίφασιν καὶ κατὰ ταῦτο καὶ πρὸς ταῦτο καὶ ὅσαύτως παρὰ τε τὸ ἐπὶ τὶ ἡ παρ᾽ ἐκαστον τοῦτων ἐτι παρὰ τὸ μῆ ἐναριθμομένου τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ τὸ ἐν 10 ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν. ὡστ᾽ ἔχομεν ἃν παρ᾽ ὁσα γίνονται οἱ παραλογισμοὶ παρὰ πλείω μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἶνεν, παρὰ δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα ἔσονται πάντες.

"Εστι δ᾽ ὁ σοφιστικὸς ἔλεγχος οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἔλεγ- χος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τινὰ καὶ ὁ συλλογισμὸς ὅσαύτως.
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cconceded without being questioned, he would grant if he were to be questioned. But of course it sometimes happens that, as soon as we ask the requisite question, we make the falsehood obvious, as happens in verbal fallacies and those due to solecism. If, therefore, false proofs of the contradictory depend on the apparent refutation, it is clear that proofs of false conclusions must be also due to the same number of causes as the apparent refutation. Now the apparent refutation depends on the elements which compose a genuine one; for, if any one of these is lacking, there would only be an apparent refutation, for example, that which is due to the conclusion not resulting from the argument (the reduction to an impossibility), and that which unites two questions in one and is due to a fault in the proposition, and that which is due to the substitution of an accident for the essence of a thing, and—a subdivision of the last mentioned—that which is due to the consequent; moreover, there is the case where the result follows in word only and not in reality, and also where, instead of the contradiction being universal and in the same respect, relation and manner, there is a restriction in extent or in connexion with another of these qualifications; and then again there is the case of the assumption of the original point due to a disregard of the principle of not reckoning it in. Thus we should know the various conditions under which false proofs occur, for there are no further conditions under which they could occur, but they will always result from the above causes.

A sophistical refutation is not an absolute refutation but is relative to some person, and so likewise is a sophistical proof. For unless the refutation which
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ἀν μὲν γὰρ μὴ λάβῃ ὃ τε παρὰ τὸ ὀμόνυμον ἐν σημαίνει καὶ ὃ παρὰ τὴν ὁμοιοσχημοσύνην τὸ μόνον τόδε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὁσαυτῶς, οὔτ' ἔλεγχοι οὔτε συλλογισμοί ἔσονται, οὔθ' ἀπλῶς οὔτε πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἐὰν δὲ λάβωσι, πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἔσονται, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐκ ἔσονται: οὐ γὰρ ἐν σημαίνον εἰλήφασιν, ἄλλα φαινόμενον, καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ.

20 IX. Παρὰ πόσα δ' ἔλεγχονται οἱ ἔλεγχομενοι, οὐ δεὶ πειρᾶσθαι λαμβάνειν ἀνευ τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστήμης ἀπάντων. τούτῳ δ' οὐδεμᾶς ἐστὶ τέχνης: ἀπειροὶ γὰρ ἵσως αἱ ἐπιστήμαι, ὡστε δήλων ὦτι καὶ αἱ ἀποδείξεις. ἔλεγχοι δ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἀληθεῖς: ὁσα γὰρ ἐστιν ἀποδείξει, ἐστὶ καὶ ἔλεγξει τὸν θέμενον τὴν ἀντίφασιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, οἷον εἰ σύμμετρον τὴν διάμετρον ἔθηκεν, ἔλεγξει εἰν ἀν τῆς τῆς ἀποδείξει ὦτι ἀσύμμετρος. ὡστε πάντων δεῖσει ἐπιστήμονας εἰναι: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔσονται παρὰ τὰς ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ ἁρχὰς καὶ τὰ τούτων συμπεράσματα, οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἰατρικῇ, οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐπιστημῶν. ἄλλα μὴν καὶ οἱ ψευδεῖς ἔλεγχοι ὁμοίως ἐν ἀπειροῖς: καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ τέχνην ἐστὶ ψευδῆς συλλογισμός, οἰον κατὰ γεωμετρίαν ὃ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ κατὰ ἰατρικὴν ὃ ἰατρικός. λέγω δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἐκεῖνης ἁρχὰς. δήλων οὖν ὦτι οὐ πάντων τῶν ἔλεγχων ἄλλα τῶν

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depends on equivocation assumes that the equivocal term has only a single meaning, and unless that which depends on similarity of termination assumes that there is only substance, and so on, neither refutation nor proof will be possible, either absolutely or relatively, to the answerer; whereas, if they do make these assumptions, they will be possible relatively to the answerer, but not absolutely; for they have not secured a statement which has a single meaning but only one which appears to be such, and only from a particular person.

IX. Without a knowledge of everything which exists we ought not to try and grasp the various ways in which the refutation of those who are refuted is brought about. This, however, is not the function of any art; for the sciences are possibly infinite, and so clearly demonstrations are also infinite. Now there are true as well as false refutations; for whenever demonstration is possible, it is possible also to refute him who maintains the contradictory of the truth; for example, if a man maintains that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with its sides, one should refute him by proving that it is incommensurate. So we shall need to have scientific knowledge of everything; for some refutations will depend on the principles of geometry and their conclusions, others on those of medicine, and others on those of the other sciences. Moreover, false refutations also are among things which are infinite; for every art has a false proof peculiar to it, geometry a geometrical proof and medicine a medical proof. By 'peculiar to an art' I mean 'in accordance with the principles of that art.' It is clear, then, that we need not grasp the commonplaces of all refutations

[Note (γ). A complete grasp of all refutations is impossible, because they are infinite in number.]
parà tìn diallektikòn lêptéon toûs tôpous· òutoi
gár kounoi prós âpasaî têxhîn kai dýnami. kai
tôn mén kai th' ekásthîn épisthîmên éleghxîn toû épî-
stîmônós èstì têwрейn, eîte me' ón faînetai eî t'
èstì, òia tî èstî· tô tôn de' ek tôw kounôw kai upò
40 mîthmîan têxhîn tôw diallektikôn. eî gár èxomev
èx òn oî êndoxoi sulllogismoi peri ótioûn, èxomev
èx òn oî éleghxoi· ó gár éleghxos èstîn antifâsews
sulllogismos, òstì' òi èis òi dûo sulllogismoi anti-
fâsews éleghxos èstîn. èxomev 'ara par' ópôsa
pántes eîwî oî toioûtoî. eî èi toût' èxomev, kai
5 tôs lûseis èxomev· aî gár tôutôw ènostaîseis lûseis
eîswî. èxomev ðe, par' ópôsa gînontai, kai tôw
phainomévous, phainomévous ðe ouîch òtouwû ìllâ tôîs
toioôde· âôrista gár èstîn, èán tîs skopi òi par'
ópôsa phaiônontai tôîs tychôswîn. òstî fanevô
òti tôu diallektikôn èstî tô dûnasmîn labeîn par'
ósa gînetai òia tôw kounôw òîw ènèghxos òî phainô-
10 mevos èlèghxos, kai òî diallektikôs òî phainómenev
diallektikos òî peirastikós.

X. Ónû èstî ðe diaphorâ tôw lógwv òîn lêgouû tînes, tô eînai tôw mèn prós tôvoma lógous,
etérous ðe prós tîn diânôian' âtopon gár tô upo-
lamvânêv àllous mèn eînai prós tôvoma lógous,
etérous ðe prós tîn diânôian, àll' ou tôw autôus.
tî gár èstî tô me' prós tîn diânôian àll' òî èstî
15 ìllâ khrîtai tô ónômati, ef' ô oîômenos erwtaísbhai,1

1 Reading with Poste ef', ô oîômenos erwtaísbhai for oîômenos
erwtaísbhai ef' ô of the mss.
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but only those which concern dialectic; for these are common to every art and faculty. And it is the function of the scientific man to examine the refutation which is peculiar to each science and see whether it is apparent only and not real, or, if it is real, why it is so; whereas it is the function of dialecticians to examine a refutation which depends on common principles which do not fall under any one art. For if we know the sources of generally accepted proofs about any particular subject, we know also the sources of the refutations; for a refutation is a proof of a contradictory, and so one or two proofs of a contradictory make up a refutation. We know, then, the various sources of all such proofs, and, knowing these, we also know their solutions; for the objections to these are the solutions. We also know the various sources of apparent refutations—apparent, that is, not to everyone but only to a certain kind of mind; for it would be an endless task to examine the various ways in which they are apparent to the man in the street. It is, therefore, clear that it is the function of the dialectician to be able to grasp the various ways in which, on the basis of common principles, a real or apparent refutation, that is, dialectical or apparently dialectical or part of an examination, is brought about.

X. No real distinction, such as some people propose, exists between arguments used against the word and those used against the thought; for it is absurd to suppose that some arguments are used against the word and others against the thought, and not the same in both cases. For what is failure to use the argument against the thought except what happens when a man does not apply the term in the meaning about which the man questioned thought that he
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ο ἐρωτώμενος ἔδωκεν; τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ τούτο ἦστι καὶ πρὸς τούνομα. τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅταν ἐφ’ 20 ὃ ἔδωκεν διανοηθεὶς. εἰ δὴ τι πλεῖω σημαίνοντος τοῦ ὁνόματος οἴκοιτο ἐν σημαίνειν καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν καὶ ὁ ἐρωτώμενος, οἰον ἵσως τὸ ὅν ἡ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν ἐν οἰόμενος εἶναι ἠρώτησε, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος ὅτι ἐν πάντα, οὕτος πρὸς τούνομα ἦσται ἡ πρὸς τὴν 25 διάνοιαν τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου διειλεγμένον; εἰ δὲ γέ τις πολλὰ οἴεται σημαίνειν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους ἐστὶ λόγους τὸ πρὸς τούνομα καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν ὅσοι πλεῖω σημαίνουσιν, εἶτα περὶ ὄντων ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἔστι τὸ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι, 30 ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἔχειν πως πρὸς τὰ δεδομένα. εἶτα πρὸς τούνομα πάντας ἐνδέχεται αὐτοὺς εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ πρὸς τούνομα τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι ἐστὶν ἑνταῦθα. εἰ γὰρ μὴ πάντες, ἐσονταὶ τινὲς ἑτέροι οὕτε πρὸς τούνομα οὕτε πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν· οἱ δὲ φασὶ πάντας, καὶ διαμορίνται 35 ἡ πρὸς τούνομα ἡ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι πάντας, ἀλλούς δ’ οὐ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσοι συλλογισμοὶ εἰσὶ παρὰ τὸ πλεοναχῶς, τούτων εἰσὶ τινὲς οἱ παρὰ

1 Omitting τίς after εἰ δῇ.
2 Omitting Ζῆρων after ἐρωτῶν as a gloss.
was being questioned when he made the concession? And this is equivalent to using it against the word; whereas to use it against the thought is to apply it to the sense about which the man was thinking when he made the concession. If, then, when the word has more than one meaning, both the questioner and the man questioned were to think that it had only one meaning—as, for example, 'unity' and 'being' have several meanings but both the answerer answers and the questioner puts his question on the supposition that there is only one meaning and that the argument is that all things are one—will the argument have been directed against the word and not rather against the thought of the man questioned? If, on the contrary, one of them thinks that the word has several meanings, obviously the argument is not directed against the thought. For application to the word and application to the thought belong primarily to arguments which signify several things ambiguously, but, secondarily, to any argument whatsoever; for the application to the thought does not depend on the argument but on a certain attitude of mind in the answerer towards what has been conceded. Next, it is possible for all arguments to be applied to the word; for in the case under discussion 'to be applied to the word' means 'not to be applied to the thought.' For if all are not applied to the word or the thought, there will be a third class not applied to either; but they declare that the classification is exhaustive and divide them into those applied to the word and those applied to the thought, and there is no other class. But, as a matter of fact, reasonings dependent on the word are amongst those dependent on a multiplicity of meanings. For it is an
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toúνομα. ἀτόπως μὲν γὰρ καὶ έιρήται τὸ παρὰ
toúνομα φάναι πάντας τοὺς παρὰ τὴν λέξιν· ἀλλ’
οὖν εἰσὶ τινὲς παραλογισμοὶ οὐ τῷ τὸν ἀποκρινό-
μενον πρὸς τούτους ἔχειν πως, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ
40 ἐρώτημα τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν ἔχειν, δ’ πλείω σημαίνει.

171 a Ὁλας τε ἀτοπον τὸ περὶ ἐλέγχου διαλέγεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ μὴ πρότερον περὶ συλλογισμοῦ· ὃ γὰρ ἐλεγχος
συλλογισμός εἶστιν, ὡστε χρή καὶ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ
πρότερον ἢ περὶ ψευδοὺς ἐλέγχον· ἔστι γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦ-
τος ἐλεγχος φαινόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀντιφάσεως.
διὸ ἢ ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ ἐσται τὸ αἰτιον ἢ ἐν τῇ
ἀντιφάσει (προσκείσθαι γὰρ δεὶ τὴν ἀντίφασιν),
οτὲ δ’ ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ἢν ἢ φαινόμενος ἐλεγχος. ἔστι
δὲ ὁ μὲν τοῦ συγώντα λέγειν ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει, οὐκ
ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ, ὁ δὲ, ὃ μὴ ἔχοι τις, δοῦναι, ἐν
10 ἀμφοῖν, ὁ δὲ ὅτι ἡ Ὄμηρον ποίησις σχῆμα διὰ τοῦ
κύκλου ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ. ὁ δ’ ἐν μηδετέρῳ
ἀληθῆς συλλογισμός.

Ἀλλὰ δὴ ὅθεν ὁ λόγος ἡλθε, πότερον οἶ ἐν τοῖς
μαθήμασι λόγοι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν εἰσιν ἢ οὔ; καὶ
eὶ τινι δοκεὶ πολλὰ σημαίνειν τὸ τρίγωνον, καὶ
15 ἐδωκε μὴ ὡς τούτο τὸ σχῆμα ἐφ’ οὖ δυνατό
ὅτι δύο ὅρθαι, πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν οὗτος
διείλεται τὴν ἐκείνου ἢ οὔ;

"Ἐτι εἰ πολλὰ μὲν σημαίνει τούνομα, ὃ δὲ μὴ νοεῖ
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absurd statement that 'dependent on the name' describes all arguments connected with language. The truth is that there are some false arguments which do not depend on a particular attitude of mind on the part of the answerer towards them but are due to the fact that the argument itself involves the kind of question which can bear more than one meaning.

It is quite absurd to discuss refutation without previously discussing proof; for refutation is a proof, and so we ought to discuss proof before discussing false refutation; for such refutation is an apparent proof of a contradiction. Therefore the cause of falsity will lie either in the proof or in the contradiction (for the contradiction must be added), but sometimes in both, if there be a merely apparent refutation. In the argument that 'the silent speaks,' the refutation lies in the contradiction, not in the proof; in the argument that 'a man can give away what he has not got,' it lies in both; in the argument that 'Homer's poetry is a figure' because it forms a 'cycle,' it lies in the proof. The argument that errs in neither respect is a true proof.

But to resume from the point whence the argument digressed, are mathematical arguments always applied to the thought or not? If anyone thinks that the term 'triangle' has several meanings and has granted it in a sense other than a figure which he has proved to contain two right angles, has the questioner reasoned against the answerer's thought or not?

Further, if the name has several meanings but the answerer does not think or imagine that this is so,

\* 170 b 40.
μηδ' οίεται, πώς οὗτος οὐ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν διείλεκται; ἣ πώς δὲι ἐρωτᾶν πλὴν διδόναι διαίρεσιν, 20 εἴτ' ἐρωτήσει τις εἰ ἔστι σιγώντα λέγειν ἢ οὔ, ἢ ἔστι μὲν ὡς οὔ, ἔστι δ' ὡς ναὶ; εἰ δὴ τις δοῤῥ μηδαμῶς, ὦ δὲ διαλεξθείη, ἄρ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν διείλεκται; καίτοι ὁ λόγος δοκεὶ τῶν παρὰ τούνομα εἶναι. οὗκ ἄρα ἐστὶ γένος τι λόγων τὸ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πρὸς τούνομα εἴσιν καὶ 25 τοιοῦτοι οὐ πάντες, οὐχ ὅτι οἱ ἐλεγχοὶ, ἀλλ' οὐδ' οἱ φανόμενοι ἐλεγχοὶ. εἰσί γὰρ καὶ μὴ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν φανόμενοι ἐλεγχοὶ, οἷον οἱ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός καὶ ἐτέροι.

Εἰ δὲ τις ἄξιοι διαιρεῖν, ὅτι λέγω δὲ σιγώντα λέγειν τὰ μὲν ὡδὶ τὰ δ' ὡδὶ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶ 30 πρῶτον μὲν ἀτοπον, τὸ ἄξιοῦν (ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ τὸ ἐρωτῶμενον πολλαχῶς ἔχειν, ἀδύνατον δὲ διαιρεῖν ὃ μὴ οίεται). ἐπειτα τὸ διδάσκειν τί ἄλλο ἐσται; φαινοῦν γὰρ ποιήσει ὡς ἔχει τῷ μήτ' ἐσκεμμένῳ μήτ' εἰδότι μήθ' ὑπολαμβάνοντι ὅτι ἄλλως λέγεται. ἐπεί καὶ ἐν τοῖς μὴ διπλοῖς τί κωλύει 35 τοῦτο παθεῖν; ἄρα ἵσαι αἱ μονάδες ταῖς δυάσιν ἐν τοῖς τέτταρσιν; εἰσὶ δὲ δυάδες αἱ μὲν ὡδὶ ἐνοῦσαι αἱ δὲ ὡδί. καὶ ἄρα τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμην ἢ οὔ; ἐστι δ' ἐναντία τὰ μὲν γνωστὰ τὰ δ' ἀγνωστα.  

1 Reading εἴτ' ἐρωτήσει for εἴτ' ἐρωτήσει.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, 

has not the questioner reasoned against his thought? Or how else must the question be asked except by offering a distinction? In which case one will ask, 'Is it or is it not possible for a man to speak when silent, or is the answer in one sense "No," in another "Yes"?' But if the answerer were to refuse to grant the possibility in any sense and the questioner were to argue that it is possible, has he not argued against the thought of his opponent? Yet the argument is generally regarded as among those connected with the name; there is not, therefore, any class of argument which is directed against the thought. Some arguments are directed against the name, and such arguments are not all of them even apparent refutations, still less true refutations. For there are also apparent refutations which are not connected with language, for example, amongst others, those connected with accident.

But if one claims to make distinctions, saying, 'By "the silent speaking" I mean sometimes one thing and sometimes another,' this claim is, in the first place, absurd (for sometimes the question does not seem to involve any ambiguity, and it is impossible to make a distinction where no ambiguity is suspected); and, secondly, what else will didactic argument be but this? For it will make clear the position to one who neither has considered nor knows nor conceives that a second meaning is possible. For why should not the same process be used where there is no double meaning? 'Are the units in four equal to the twos?' Bear in mind that the twos are contained in one sense in one way and in another sense in another way.' Again, 'Is the knowledge of contraries one or not?' Notice that some contraries
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171 b ὡστ' ἑοικεν ἀγνοεῖν ὁ τούτο ἄξιων ὧτι ἑτερον τὸ
διδάσκειν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ ὧτι δεῖ τὸν μὲν
dιδάσκοντα μὴ ἐρωτᾶν ἀλλ' αὐτὸν δῆλα ποιεῖν, τὸν
δ' ἐρωτάν.

XI. Ὡτὶ τὸ φάναι ἡ ἀποφάναι ἄξιοιν οὐ δει-
κύντος ἑστὶν, ἀλλὰ πείραν λαμβάνοντος. ἡ γὰρ
5 πειραστική ἑστὶ διαλεκτικὴ τις καὶ θεωρεῖ οὐ τὸν
eἰδότα ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀγνοοῦντα καὶ προσποιοῦμενον.
ὁ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ πράγμα θεωρῶν τὰ κοινὰ δια-
λεκτικός, ὁ δὲ τοῦτο φαινομένως ποιῶν σοφιστικός.
καὶ συλλογισμὸς ἐριστικὸς καὶ σοφιστικός ἑστὶν
ἐἰς μὲν ὁ φαινομένος συλλογισμός, περὶ ὅν ἡ δια-
10 λεκτικὴ πειραστική ἑστὶ, κἂν ἄλλης τὸ συμπέρασμα
ἡ· τοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὶ ἀπατητικὸς ἑστὶ· καὶ ὅσοι μὴ
ὅντες κατὰ τὴν ἐκάστου μέθοδον παραλογισμοὶ
dοκοῦσιν εἶναι κατὰ τὴν τέχνην. τὰ γὰρ ψευδογρα-
φήματα οὐκ ἐριστικά (κατὰ γὰρ τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν τέχνην
οἱ παραλογισμοὶ), οὐδὲ γ' εἰ τὶ ἑστὶ ψευδογράφημα
15 περὶ ἄλλης, οἷον τὸ Ἰπποκράτους ἡ ὁ τετραγω-
νισμὸς ὁ διὰ τῶν μηνίσκων. ἀλλ' ὡς Βρύσων
ἐτετραγώνιζε τὸν κύκλον, εἰ καὶ τετραγωνίζεται ὁ
κύκλος, ἀλλ' ὧτι οὐ κατὰ τὸ πράγμα, διὰ τοῦτο
σοφιστικός. ὡστε ὁ τε περὶ τῶνδε φαινομένος
συλλογισμὸς ἐριστικὸς λόγος, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τὸ πράγμα

a On the method of squaring the circle by means of
lunules and those employed by Hippocrates and Bryson see
Ivor Thomas, Greek Mathematical Works (Loeb Classical
Library), vol. 1, pp. 234-253, 310-313 (Hippocrates); 314-
317 (Bryson); and E. Poste, Soph. El. pp. 245 ff.
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are knowable, others are not.' Thus the man who makes this claim seems not to know that didactic is one thing and dialectic another, and that the man who employs didactic should not ask questions but himself make things clear, while the dialectician asks questions.

XI. Further, to demand that the answerer should either affirm or deny is not the function of one who is displaying something but of one who is making an examination. For the art of examination is a kind of dialectic and has in view not the man who knows but the man who is ignorant and pretends to know. The man, then, who views general principles in the light of the particular case is a dialectician, while he who only apparently does this is a sophist. Now one form of contentious and sophistic reasoning is reasoning which is only apparent, with which dialectic deals as a method of examination, even though the conclusion be true; for it is deceptive in the matter of cause. Then there are those false reasonings which do not accord with the method of inquiry peculiar to the subject yet seem to accord with the art concerned. For false geometrical figures are not contentious (for the resultant fallacies accord with the subject-matter of the art), and the same is the case with any false figure illustrating something which is true, for example, Hippocrates' figure or the squaring of the circle by means of lunules. On the other hand, Bryson's method of squaring the circle, even though this be successful, is nevertheless sophisticical, because it does not accord with the subject-matter concerned. And so any merely apparent reasoning on these topics is a contentious argument, and any reasoning which merely appears to accord
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20 φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, καὶ ἢ συλλογισμός, ἑριστικὸς λόγος· φαινόμενος γὰρ ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ πράγμα, ὅστ' ἀπατητικὸς καὶ ἄδικος. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἢ ἐν ἄγωνι ἄδικία εἰδὸς τι ἔχει καὶ ἐστὶν ἄδικομαχία τις, οὕτως ἐν ἀντιλογίᾳ ἄδικομαχία ἢ ἑριστικὴ ἔστιν· ἐκεῖ τε γὰρ οἱ πάντως νικᾶν προαιρούμενοι 25 πάντων ἄπτονται καὶ ἐνταῦθα οἱ ἑριστικοὶ. οἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτοι ἑριστικοὶ ἀνθρώποι καὶ φιλέριδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ δόξης χάριν τῆς εἰς χρηματισμὸν σοφιστικὸν· ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, χρηματιστικὴ τις ἀπὸ σοφίας φαινομένης, διὸ φαινομένης ἀπο- 30 δείξεως ἐφεύρται. καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν αὐτῶν μὲν εἰσὶν οἱ φιλέριδες καὶ σοφισταί, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐνεκεν. καὶ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς μὲν ἐσται σοφιστικὸς καὶ ἑριστικός, ἀλλ' οὗ κατὰ ταύτων, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν νίκης φαινομένης, ἑριστικός, ἢ δὲ σοφίας, σοφιστικός· καὶ γὰρ ἡ σοφιστικὴ ἔστι φαινομένη σοφία 35 τις ἀλλ' οὐκ οὕσα. ὁ δ' ἑριστικὸς ἐστὶ πως οὕτως ἐξων πρὸς τὸν διαλεκτικὸν ὡς ὁ ψευδογράφος πρὸς τὸν γεωμετρικὸν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τῷ διαλεκτικῷ καὶ τὸν γεωμετρικὸν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τῷ διαλεκτικῷ παραλογίζεται καὶ ὁ ψευδογράφος τῷ γεωμέτρῃ. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὀφελομένος, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ἑριστικῶν ἑριστικοὶ ἐστὶ· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἑριστικὸς, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ἑριστικῶν ἑστὶν. ἡ γὰρ διαλεκτικὴν ἐπὶ μὲν τὰλλα ὑπὸ τῆν τέχνην ψευδογράφηκεν. 1 Reading τῷ διαλεκτικῷ with Wallies for διαλεκτικῇ. 2 Reading τῷ γεωμέτρῃ with Poste for τὸν γεωμέτρητην.

165 a 22.

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with the subject-matter, even though it be genuine reasoning, is contentious argument; for it only apparently accords with the subject-matter and so is deceptive and unfair. For just as unfairness in an athletic contest takes a definite form and is an unfair kind of fighting, so contentious reasoning is an unfair kind of fighting in argument; for in the former case those who are bent on victory at all costs stick at nothing, so too in the latter case do contentious arguers. Those, then, who behave like this merely to win a victory, are generally regarded as contentious and quarrelsome, while those who do so to win a reputation which will help them to make money are regarded as sophistical. For, as we have said, the art of the sophist is a money-making art which trades on apparent wisdom, and so sophists aim at apparent proof. Quarrelsome people and sophists use the same arguments, but not for the same reasons; and the same argument will be sophistical and contentious but not from the same point of view. If the semblance of victory is the motive, it is contentious; if the semblance of wisdom, it is sophistical: for sophistry is an appearance of wisdom without the reality. The contentious arguer bears much the same relation to the dialectician as the drawer of false geometrical figures bears to the geometrician; for he reasons falsely on the same basis as the dialectician, while the drawer of false figures argues on the same basis as the true geometrician. But the latter is not a contentious reasoner, because he constructs his false figure on the principles and conclusions which come under the art of geometry, whereas the former, arguing on principles which come under dialectic, will clearly be contentious on the other subjects.
οἱον ὁ τετραγωνισμὸς ὁ μὲν διὰ τῶν μηνίσκων οὐκ ἑριστικός, ὁ δὲ Ἀρτύσων ἑριστικός· καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐκ ἔστι μετενεγκεῖν ἄλλο
5 ἡ πρὸς γεωμετρίαν μόνον διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἱδίων εἶναι ἀρχῶν, τὸν δὲ πρὸς πολλοὺς, ὅσοι μὴ ᾔσαι τὸ δυνατὸν ἐν ἐκάστῳ καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀρμόσει γάρ. ἡ ὦς Ἀντιφῶν ἑτετραγώνιζεν. ἡ εἶ τις μὴ φαίη βέλτιον εἶναι ἀπὸ δείπνου περιπατεῖν διὰ τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον, οὐκ ἰατρικός· κοινὸς γάρ. εἰ μὲν
10 οὐν πάντη ὁμοίως εἶχεν ὁ ἑριστικός πρὸς τὸν διαλεκτικὸν τῷ ψευδογράφῳ πρὸς τὸν γεωμετρήν, οὐκ ἄν ἦν περὶ ἑκείνων ἑριστικὸς. νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ διαλεκτικὸς περὶ γένος τι ὀρισμένου, οὐδὲ δεικτικὸς οὐδενός, οὐδὲ τοιοῦτος οἶς ὁ καθόλου. οὔτε γάρ ἐστιν ἄπαντα ἐν ἐνὶ τινὶ γένει, οὔτε εἰ εἶπη, οἴν
15 τε ὑπὸ τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τὰ ὄντα. ὡστ' οὐδεμία τέχνη τῶν δεικνυουσῶν τινὰ φύσιν ἑρωτητικὴ ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐξεστίν ὀποτερονοῦν τῶν μορίων δοῦναι· συλλογισμὸς γὰρ οὐ γίνεται ἐξ ἁμφοῖν. ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ ἑρωτητικὴ ἐστίν. εἰ δ' ἐδείκνυεν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ γε πρῶτα καὶ τὰς οἰκείας
20 ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἂν ἦρωτα. μὴ διδόντος ὁ γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι εἶχεν ἐξ ὧν ἔτι διαλέξεται πρὸς τὴν ἑνστασιν. ἡ

1 Bekker's didónτος is a misprint for didóntos.

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a See Phys. 185 a 17; Ivor Thomas, op. cit. pp. 310-317.
b That motion is impossible; see Phys. 239 b 10 ff.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xi

For example, the squaring of the circle by means of lunules is not contentious, whereas Bryson's method is contentious. It is impossible to transfer the former outside the sphere of geometry because it is based on principles which are peculiar to geometry, whereas the latter can be used against many disputants, namely, all those who do not know what is possible and what impossible in any particular case; for it will always be applicable. And the same is true of the way in which Antiphon used to square the circle. Or, again, if someone were to deny that it is better to take a walk after dinner because of Zeno's argument, it would not be a medical argument; for it is of a general application. Accordingly, if the contentious argument stood in every respect in the same relation to the dialectical as the constructor of false figures stands to the geometrician, there would be no contentious argument on those topics. But, as it is, dialectical argument has no definite sphere, nor does it demonstrate anything in particular, nor is it of the nature of the universal. For there is no genus which includes all things, and, if there were, it would not be possible for them to come under the same principles. So no art which aims at showing the nature of anything proceeds by interrogation; for it is impossible to grant either one of two portions of the question; for a proof cannot result from both of them. Dialectic, however, does proceed by interrogation, whereas, if it aimed at showing something, it would refrain from questions, if not about everything, at any rate about primary things and particular principles; for if the opponent refused to grant these, dialectic would no longer have any basis on which to argue against the
δ' αυτή καὶ πειραστικὴ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ πειραστικὴ
tοιαύτη ἑστὶν οἰα ἡ γεωμετρία, ἀλλ' ἢν ἂν ἔχοι
cαὶ μὴ εἰδῶς τις. ἔξεστι γὰρ πεῖραν λαβεῖν καὶ
tὸν μὴ εἰδότα τὸ πράγμα τοῦ μὴ εἰδότος, εἰπέρ
25 καὶ δίδωσιν οὐκ ἔξ ὅν οἴδεν οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων,
ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐπομένων, ὅσα τοιαύτα ἑστὶν ἡ εἰδότα
μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει μὴ εἰδέναι τὴν τέχνην, μὴ εἰδότα
δ' ἀνάγκη ἀγνοεῖν. ὡστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδενὸς
ὄρισμένον ἡ πειραστικὴ ἐπιστήμη ἑστίν. διὸ καὶ
περὶ πάντων ἑστὶ· πᾶσα γὰρ αἱ τέχναι χρώνται
30 καὶ κοινὸς τις ὑπὸν. διὸ πάντες καὶ οἱ ἴδιωται τρόπον
tινὰ χρώνται τῇ διαλεκτικῇ καὶ πειραστικῇ· πάντες
gὰρ μέχρι τῶν ἐγχειροῦσιν ἀνακρίνειν τοὺς ἑπαγ-
γελλομένους. ταῦτα δ' ἑστὶ τὰ κοινά· ταῦτα γὰρ
οὐδὲν ἤττον ἴσασιν αὐτοὶ, κἂν δοκῶσι λίαν ἔξῳ
λέγειν. ἐλέγχουσιν οὖν ἀπαντεῖ· ἀτέχνως γὰρ
35 μετέχουσιν τοῦτοι οὐ ἐντέχνως ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἑστὶ,
kαὶ ὁ τέχνη συλλογιστικὴ πειραστικὸς διαλεκτικὸς.
ἐπεὶ δ' ἑστὶ πολλὰ μὲν ταῦτα1 κατὰ πάντων, οὐ
τοιαύτα δ' ὡστε φύσις τινὰ εἶναι καὶ γένος, ἀλλ'
οιὸν αἱ ἀποφάσεις, τὰ δ' οὐ τοιαύτα ἀλλὰ ἱδια,
ἐστὶν ἐκ τούτων περὶ ἀπάντων πείραν λαμβάνειν,

1 Reading ταῦτὰ for ταῦτα with BC and omitting καὶ with ἈΒ.
objection. Dialectic is at the same time an art of examination; for neither is the art of examination of the same nature as geometry but it is an art which a man could possess even without any scientific knowledge. For even a man without knowledge of the subject can examine another who is without knowledge, if the latter makes concessions based not on what he knows nor on the special principles of the subject but on the consequential facts, which are such that, though to know them does not prevent him from being ignorant of the art in question, yet not to know them necessarily involves ignorance of it. Clearly, therefore, the art of examination is not knowledge of any definite subject, and it therefore follows that it deals with every subject; for all the arts employ also certain common principles. Accordingly, everyone, including the unscientific, makes some kind of use of dialectic and the art of examination; for all, up to a certain point, attempt to test those who profess knowledge. Now this is where the common principles come in; for they know these of themselves just as well as the scientists, even though their expression of them seems to be very inaccurate. Thus they all practise refutation; for they perform unmethodically the task which dialectic performs methodically, and the man who carries out an examination by means of an art of reasoning is a dialectician. Now there are many identical principles in every sphere, but these are not such as to have a particular nature and form a particular class—resembling, in this respect, negations—while others are not of this kind but limited to special spheres; it is, therefore, possible by means of these to hold examinations on every subject, and that there can be an
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172 b καὶ εἰναι τέχνην τινά, καὶ μὴ τοιαύτην εἰναι οἷα
αἱ δεικνύουσαι. διόπερ ὁ ἐριστικός οὐκ ἔστιν
οὕτως ἔχων πάντη ὡς ὁ ψευδογράφος· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται
παραλογιστικὸς ἐξ ὄρισμένου τινὸς γένους ἀρχῶν,
ἀλλὰ περὶ πάν γένος ἔσται ὁ ἐριστικός.

5 Τρόποι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν οὕτως τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγ-
χων· ὅτι δὲ ἔστι τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ
tούτων καὶ δύνασθαι τάντα ποιεῖν, οὐ χαλεπῶν
ἰδεῖν· ἢ γὰρ περὶ τὰς προτάσεις μέθοδος ἀπασαν
ἐχει ταύτην τὴν θεωρίαν.

XII. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐλέγχων εἰρηται τῶν
10 φαινομένων· περὶ δὲ τοῦ ψευδόμενον τι δεῖξαι καὶ
tὸν λόγον εἰς ἀδόξον ἀγαγεῖν (τούτο γὰρ ἢν δεύ-
τερον τῆς σοφιστικῆς προσερέσεως) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν
ἐκ τοῦ πυθάνεσθαι πως καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως
συμβαῖνει μάλιστα. τὸ γὰρ πρὸς μηδὲν ὀρίσαντα
κείμενον ἐρωτάν θηρευτικὸν ἔστι τούτων· εἰκῇ γὰρ
15 λέγοντες ἀμαρτάνουσι μᾶλλον· εἰκῇ δὲ λέγονσι,
ὅταν μηδὲν ἔχωσι προκείμενον· τὸ τε ἐρωτάν
πολλά, καὶ ὀρισμένον ἦ πρὸς ὁ διαλέγεται, καὶ τὸ
tὰ δοκοῦντα λέγειν ἄξιον ποιεῖ τιν' εὐπορίαν τοῦ
eἰς ἀδόξον ἀγαγεῖν ἢ ψεῦδος· εάν τε ἐρωτώμενοι
φῇ ἢ ἀποφῇ τούτων τι, ἄγεϊν πρὸς ὁ ἐπιχειρήματος
20 εὐπορεῖ. δυνατὸν δὲ νῦν ἦττον κακουργεῖν διὰ
tούτων ἢ πρότερον· ἀπαιτοῦνται γάρ τὶ τοῦτο πρὸς
tὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ. στοιχεῖον δὲ τοῦ τυχεῖν ἢ ψεύδους
tινὸς ἢ ἀδόξου τὸ μηδεμίαν εὐθὺς ἐρωτάν θέσιν,
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xi–xii

art of doing this, though not of the same kind as the demonstrative arts. For this reason the contentious arguer is not in all respects in the same position as the constructor of a false geometrical figure; for the contentious arguer will not reason falsely on principles of a definite class but will deal with every kind.

These, then, are the modes of sophistical refutations. It is easy to see that to investigate them and to be able to apply them is the task of the dialectician; for the method of dealing with propositions constitutes the whole of this study.

XII. We have now dealt with apparent refutations. As for showing that the answerer is stating a fallacy and leading the argument towards a paradox—for this was the second aim of the sophist—this is, in the first place, best achieved by some kind of inquiry and by questioning. For to ask a question without defining it in relation to a subject laid down is a good method of hunting out things of this sort; for people are more likely to fall into error when they speak at random, and they speak at random when they have no definite subject set before them. Also to ask a number of questions, even though the point against which one is arguing is defined, and to demand that the answerer should say what he thinks, gives ample opportunity of leading a man into a paradox or fallacy, and also, if, when asked, he says ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to any of the questions, of leading him to topics on which one has abundant material for attacking him. This unfair method, however, is much less practicable than formerly; for people demand, ‘What has this to do with the original question?’ An elementary rule for obtaining a fallacious or paradoxical statement is not to put any thesis directly but to pretend that

(B) FALLACY AND (C) PARADOX. How these are to be caused:

(a) By asking vague questions.

(b) By asking numerous questions.
Άλλα φάσκειν ἑρωτᾶν μαθεῖν βουλόμενον· χώραν γὰρ ἐπιχειρήματος ἢ σκέψις ποιεῖ.

25 Πρὸς δὲ τὸ ψευδόμενον δείξαι ἰδίος τόπος ὁ σοφιστικός, τὸ ἄγειν πρὸς τοιαύτα πρὸς ἀ εὐπορεῖ λόγων· ἔσται δὲ καὶ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς τούτο ποιεῖν, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον.

Πάλιν πρὸς τὸ παράδοξα λέγειν σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν γένους ὁ διαλεγόμενος, ἔτ' ἐπερωτᾶν ὁ τοῖς πολλοῖς οὗτοι λέγουσι παράδοξον· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐκάστοις τι τοιοῦτον. στοιχείον δὲ τούτων τὸ τὰς ἐκάστων εἰληφέναι θέσεις ἐν ταῖς προτάσεις. λύσις δὲ καὶ τούτων ἢ προσήκουσα φέρεται τὸ ἐμφανίζειν ὅτι οὐ διὰ τὸν λόγον συμβαίνει τὸ ᾧδοξον' ἀεὶ δὲ τούτο καὶ βούλεται ὁ ἀγωνιζόμενος.

"Ετὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν βουλήσεων καὶ τῶν φανερῶν δοξῶν· οὐ γὰρ ταύτα βουλονταί τε καὶ φασίν, ἄλλα λέγουσι μὲν τοὺς εὐσχημονεστάτους τῶν λόγων, βουλονται δὲ τὰ φαινόμενα λυσιτελεῖν, οἷον τεθνάναι καλῶς μᾶλλον ἡ ζῆν ἡδέως φασὶ δεῖν καὶ πένεσθαι δικαῖως μᾶλλον ἡ πλούτειν αἰσχρῶς, βούλονται δὲ τάναντία. τὸν μὲν οὖν λέγοντα κατὰ τὰς βουλήσεις εἰς τὰς φανερὰς δόξας ἀκτέον, τὸν δὲ κατὰ ταύτας εἰς τὰς ἀποκεκρυμμένας· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον παράδοξα λέγειν· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τὰς φανερὰς ἡ πρὸς τὰς ἐφανεῖς δόξας ἐρούσιν ἑναντία.
one is asking from a desire to learn; for this method of inquiry gives an opening for attack.

A special method of showing up a fallacy is the sophistical method, namely, to lead one's opponent to the kind of statements against which one has plenty of arguments; it will be possible to do this in a right and in a wrong way, as has already been said.a

Again, to elicit a paradox, you should see to what school the person who is discussing with you belongs, and then question him on some pronouncement of that school which most people regard as paradoxical; for every school has some tenet of this kind. An elementary rule in this connexion is to have a ready-made collection of the theses of the different schools among your propositions. The proper solution here too is to make it clear that the paradox does not result because of the argument; now your opponent always desires that this should be so.

Furthermore, you should seek for paradoxes in men's wishes and professed opinions. For they do not wish the same things as they declare that they wish, but they give utterance to the most becoming sentiments, whereas they desire what they think is to their interest. They declare, for example, that a noble death ought to be preferred to a pleasurable life and honourable poverty to discreditable wealth; but their wishes are the opposite of their words. He, therefore, whose statements agree with his wishes must be led to express the opinions usually professed, and he whose statements agree with the latter must be led to state the opinions usually hidden; for in both cases they must necessarily fall into paradox, for they will contradict either their professed or their secret opinions.
Πλείστος δὲ τόπος ἐστὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν παράδοξα λέγειν, ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ Καλλικλῆς ἐν τῷ Γοργίᾳ γέγραπται λέγων, καὶ οἱ ἄρχαιοι δὲ πάντες ὄντο
10 συμβαίνειν, παρὰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν νόμον· ἐναντία γὰρ εἶναι φύσιν καὶ νόμον, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κατὰ νόμον μὲν εἶναι καλὸν κατὰ φύσιν δ' οὐ καλὸν. δεῖν οὖν πρὸς μὲν τὸν εἰπόντα κατὰ φύσιν κατὰ νόμον ἀπαντῶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν κατὰ νόμον ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν ἄγειν· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ἔσται 1
15 λέγειν παράδοξα. ἦν δὲ τὸ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκοῦν. ὥστε δὴλον ὅτι κάκεινοι, καθάπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν, ἥ ἐλέγξαι ἢ παράδοξα λέγειν τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐπεχείρουν ποιεῖν.

"Ενια δὲ τῶν ἐρωτημάτων ἔχει ἀμφοτέρως ἄδοξον
20 εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, οἷον πότερον τοῖς σοφοῖς ἢ τῷ πατρὶ δεῖ πείθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττειν ἢ τὰ δίκαια, καὶ ἄδικεισθαι αἱρετώτερον ἢ βλάπτειν. δεῖ δ' ἄγειν εἰς τὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἐναντία, ἐὰν μὲν λέγῃ τις ὅσ ὀἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, 25 εἰς τὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἐὰν δ' ὃς ὦ τοὺς πολλοί, ἐπὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐν λόγῳ. φασὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν εἰς ἀνάγκης τὸν εὐδαιμόνα δίκαιον εἶναι· τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἄδοξον τὸ βασιλέα μὴ εὐδαιμονεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἰς τὰ οὕτως ἄδοξα συνάγειν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἰς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ νόμον ὑπεναντίωσιν ἄγειν· ὃ μὲν γὰρ νόμος 
30 δόξα τῶν πολλῶν, οἱ δὲ σοφοὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατ' ἀληθείαν λέγουσιν.

1 Reading ἔσται for εἶναι.

a Plato, Gorgias 482 e.
A commonplace rule which makes men utter paradoxes in abundance is the application of the standards of nature and law, which Callicles is represented as applying in the Gorgias and which all the ancients regarded as valid; for according to them Nature and Law are opposites, and justice is a good thing according to law but not according to nature. Therefore, to a man who speaks in terms of nature you must reply in terms of law, and when he speaks in terms of law you must lead the argument to terms of nature; for in both cases the result will be that he utters paradoxes. In the view of the ancients what accorded with nature was the truth, while what accorded with law was the general opinion of mankind. It is, therefore, clear that they also, like the men of to-day, tried to refute the answerer or to make him utter paradoxes.

Some questions involve a paradox whichever way they are answered; for example, ‘Ought one to obey the wise or one’s father?’ and, ‘Ought one to do what is expedient or what is just?’ and ‘Is it preferable to suffer or to inflict a wrong?’ You ought to lead men to opinions opposed to those of the majority and of the wise—if a man speaks as trained arguers do, you should lead him to opinions opposed to the majority; if he speaks as do the majority, to opinions opposed to expert reasoners. For some say that the happy man is necessarily just, but in the view of the majority it is paradoxical that a king should not be happy. To lead a man to paradoxes of this kind is the same thing as to bring him into opposition to the standards of nature and law; for law is the opinion of the majority, but the utterances of the wise accord with the standards of nature and truth.

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XIII. Καὶ τὰ μὲν παράδοξα ἐκ τούτων δεὶ ζητεῖν τῶν τόπων· περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιῆσαι ἁδολεσχεῖν, δὲ μὲν λέγομεν τὸ ἁδολεσχεῖν, εἰρήκαμεν ἥδη. πάντες δὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι τοῦτο βούλονται ποιεῖν· εἰ μηδὲν διαφέρει τὸ ὄνομα ἢ τὸν λόγον εἰπεῖν, διπλάσιον δὲ καὶ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεως ταύτα, εἰ ἀρα ἐστὶν ἡμίσεως διπλάσιον, έσται ἡμίσεως ἡμίσεως διπλάσιον. καὶ πάλιν ἃν ἀντί τοῦ διπλάσιον διπλάσιον ἡμίσεως τεθῇ, τρὶς έσται εἰρημένον, ἡμίσεως ἡμίσεως ἡμίσεως διπλάσιον. καὶ ἀρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἥδεος; τοῦτο δ΄ ἐστὶν ὀρέξις ἥδεος· ἐστὶν ἀρα ἡ ἐπιθυμία ὀρέξις ἥδεος ἥδεος.

173 b Εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων ἐν τε τοῖς πρὸς τι, οὐσα μη μονὸν τὰ γένη ἄλλα καὶ αὐτὰ πρὸς τι λέγεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν ἀποδίδοται (οἴον ἢ τε ὀρέξις τινὸς ὀρέξις καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τινὸς ἐπιθυμία, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τινὸς διπλάσιον καὶ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος)· καὶ ὅσων η ὁυσία οὐκ ὄντων πρὸς τι ὄλως, ὃν εἰσὶν ἔξεις ἡ πάθη ἢ τῃ τοιοῦτον, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτῶν προσδηλοῦται κατηγορομένων ἐπὶ τούτων. οἴον τὸ περιττόν ἄριθμὸς μέσον ἔχων· ἐστι δ΄ ἄριθμὸς περιττός· ἐστὶν ἀρα ἄριθμὸς μέσον ἐχων ἄριθμος. καὶ εἰ τὸ σιμὸν κοιλότης ῥίνὸς ἐστίν, ἐστι δὲ ρίς σιμή, ἐστὶν ἀρα ρίς ρίς κούλη.

Φαίνονται δὲ ποιεῖν οὐ ποιοῦντες ἐνίοτε διὰ τὸ μη προσπυνθάνεσθαι εἰ σημαίνει τι καθ’ αὐτὸ λεχθὲν

a 165 b 16.
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XIII. It is, then, by these commonplace rules that you should seek to obtain paradoxes. Next, as to making people babble, we have already said what we mean by this term. Arguments of the following kind all have this end in view: 'If it makes no difference whether one uses the term or the definition of it, and "double" and "double of half" are the same thing, then if "double" is "double of half," it will be "double of half of half"; and if "double of half" be substituted again for "double," there will be a triple repetition, "double of half of half of half."' Again, 'Is not "desire" "desire of pleasure?"' Now "desire is an appetite for pleasure": therefore "desire is an appetite for pleasure."

All arguments of this kind take place (a) when relative terms are used, where not only the genera but the terms themselves are relative and are rendered in relation to one and the same thing (for example, appetite is appetite for something, and desire is desire of something, and double is double of something, namely, double of half), and (b) where terms are used of which, though they are not relative at all, the substance (namely, the things of which they are states or affections or the like) is indicated in their definition, since they are predicated of these things. For example, 'odd' is a 'number which has a middle unit,' and an 'odd number' exists, therefore an 'odd number' is 'number-that-has-a middle-unit number.' Again, if 'snubness' is 'concavity of the nose,' and there is a 'snub nose,' then a 'snub nose' is a 'concave-nose nose.'

Men sometimes appear to induce 'babbling' when they do not really do so, because they do not further inquire whether 'double' used by itself has a signifi-
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tὸ διπλάσιον ἢ οὐδέν, καὶ εἰ τι σημαίνει, πότερον
15 τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα λέγειν εὐθὺς. ἀλλὰ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ τὸ ὄνομα ταῦτό εἶναι ταῦτο καὶ σημαίνειν.

XIV. Σολοικισμὸς δ’ οἶον μέν ἐστιν εὑρηταί πρό-
20 τερον. ἐστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιοῦντα
φαίνεσθαι καὶ ποιοῦντα μὴ δοκεῖν, καθάπερ ὁ
Πρωταγόρας ἐλεγεν, εἰ ὁ μῆνις καὶ ὁ πῆλης ἄρρεν
ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λέγων οὐλομένην σολοικίζει μὲν
κατ’ ἐκείνον, οὐ φαίνεται δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὁ δὲ οὐλο-
μενον φαίνεται μὲν ἄλλ’ οὐ σολοικίζει. δῆλον οὖν
ὅτι κἂν τέχνη τις τοῦτο δύνατο ποιεῖν· διὸ πολλοὶ
tῶν λόγων οὐ συλλογιζόμενοι σολοικισμὸν φαίνον-
25 ται συλλογίζεσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέγχοις.

Εἰ τι δὲ πάντες σχεδὸν οἱ φαινόμενοι σολοικισμοὶ
pαρὰ τὸ τὸδε, καὶ ὅταν ἡ πτώσις μῆτε ἄρρεν μῆτε
θῆλυ δῆλοι ἀλλὰ τὸ μεταξῦ. τὸ μὲν οὗτος ἄρρεν
σημαίνει, τὸ δ’ αὐτὴ θῆλυ· τὸ δὲ τοῦτο θέλει μὲν τὸ
30 μεταξῦ σημαίνειν, πολλάκις δὲ σημαίνει κάκεινων
ἐκάτερον, οἶον τί τοῦτο; Καλλιόπη, ξύλον, Κορί-
σκος. τοῦ μὲν οὖν ἄρρενος καὶ τοῦ θῆλεος δια-
φέρουσιν αἱ πτώσεις ἀπασαί, τοῦ δὲ μεταξῦ αἰ μὲν
αἱ δ’ οὐ. δοθέντος δὴ πολλάκις τοῦτο, συλλογί-
ζονται ὡς εἰρημένου τοῦτον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλην
35 πτώσιν ἀντὶ ἄλλης. ὦ δὲ παραλογισμὸς γίνεται
diὰ τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὸ τοῦτο πλειόνων πτώσεων·

a 165 b 20. b Because it is in fact feminine.
cation or no, and, if it has, whether the same or a different one, but they appear to draw the conclusion immediately. It appears, however, to have the same signification also because the word is the same.

XIV. What solecism is has already been stated. It is possible to commit it, and not to commit it, yet to seem to do so, as well as to commit it, yet seem not to do so. If, as Protagoras used to say, \( \mu \nu \) (wrath) and \( \pi \tau \lambda \eta \varepsilon \xi \) (helmet) are masculine, according to him, he who calls wrath a ‘destruction’ (\( \omega \nu \lambda \omicron \mu \epsilon \nu \nu \nu \)) commits a solecism, though he does not appear to anyone else to do so, but he who calls it a ‘destructor’ (\( \omega \nu \lambda \omicron \mu \epsilon \nu \nu \nu \)) appears to commit a solecism but does not do so. It is obvious, therefore, that one might produce this effect by art also; therefore many arguments appear to infer a solecism, when they do not really do so, as happens also with refutations.

Almost all apparent solecisms occur owing to the word ‘this’ or ‘it’ (\( \tau \omicron \delta \epsilon \)) and when the inflection denotes neither the masculine nor the feminine but the neuter. ‘He’ (\( \omega \nu \tau \omicron \omicron \)) denotes a masculine, ‘she’ (\( \alpha \omega \tau \eta \)) a feminine, whereas ‘this’ or ‘it’ (\( \tau \omicron \nu \tau \omicron \omicron \)), though meaning to signify a neuter, often signifies either a masculine or a feminine. For example, ‘What is this (\( \tau \omicron \nu \tau \omicron \omicron \))? ’ ‘It is Calliope,’ or ‘It is a log’ or ‘It is Coriscus.’ The case-forms of the masculine and feminine are all different, but some of those of the neuter are different and others not. Often, therefore, when ‘it’ (\( \tau \omicron \nu \tau \omicron \omicron \)) has been granted, people argue as if ‘him’ (\( \tau \omicron \nu \tau \omicron \nu \nu \nu \)) had been used, and they similarly use another case in place of some other. The false reasoning arises because ‘it’ (\( \tau \omicron \nu \tau \omicron \omicron \)) is common to more than one case; for it signifies
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to gar touto sμμαινει oτε μεν ϑυτοσ ϑε δε τοιτον. deι δ' εναλλαξ sμμαινειν, μετα μεν τοι εστι το ϑυτοσ, μετε δε τοι ειναι το τοιτον, oιον εστι Κοριςκοσ, ειναι Κοριςκον. και επι των θηλεων ϑυν ονομαιων ϑυαιτως, και επι των λεγομενων μεν

174 a σκευον εχοντων δε θηλειας η αρρενος κλησιν. οσα
gar εις το ο και το ν τελευτα, ταυτα μονα σκευους
εχει κλησιν, oιον ξυλον, σχοινιον, τα δε μη ουτως
αρρενος η θηλεος, ον ειναι φερομεν επι τα σκευη,
oιον άσκος μεν αρρεν τουνομα, κλινη δε θηλυ.
dιοσπερ και επι των τοιουτων ϑυαιτως το εστι και
tο ειναι διοισει. και τροπον τινα ομοιος εστιν ο
σολοικισμοσ τοις παρα το τα μη ομοια ομαιως
λεγομενοις ελεγχοις. ωσπερ gar εκεινοις επι των
πραγματων, τοιτοις επι των ονοματων συμπιπτει
σολοικιζειν· ανθρωπος γαρ και λευκον και πραγμα
και ονομα εστιν.

10 Φαυερον oδυ οτι των σολοικισμων πειρατεον εκ
tων ειρημενων πτωσεων συλλογιζεσθαι.

Ειδη μεν oυ ταυτα των αγωνιστικων λογων και
μερη των ειδων και τροποι oι ειρημενοι. διαφερει
d' ου μικρον, εαν ταοθη πως τα περι την ερωτησιν
15 προς το λανθανειν, ωσπερ εν τοις διαλεκτικοις.
εφεξης oδυ τοις ειρημενοις ταυτα πρωτον λεκτεον.

XV. 'Εστι δ' προς το ελεγχειν εν μεν μηκος.

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a i.e. the fallacy from the figure of speech (figura dictionis).

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sometimes 'he' (οὗτος) and sometimes 'him' (τοὐτον). It ought to signify them alternately; with the indicative 'is' (ἐστὶ) it ought to signify the nominative 'he' (οὗτος); with the infinitive 'to be' (εἰναι) it ought to signify 'him' (τοὐτον), for example, 'It is Coriscus,' '[I believe] it to be Coriscus.' So likewise with feminine nouns and with so-called articles of use, which can have either a masculine or a feminine designation; for only those which end in -ον have the designation which belongs to an article of use, e.g., ξύλον (log), σχοινίον (rope). Those which do not take this form have a masculine or a feminine termination, and some of these we apply to articles of use; for example, ἄσκος (wine-skin) is masculine and κλίνη (bed) is feminine. Therefore, in such cases there will be the same difference when the indicative 'is' (ἐστὶ) is used and the infinitive 'to be' (εἰναι). Also, in a way, solecism resembles the kind of refutation which is due to the use of similar terms for dissimilar things; for as in the one case it happens that we commit a solecism in the category of actual things, so in the other we commit it in that of names; for 'man' and 'white' are both names and things.

Clearly, then, we must try and argue up to a solecism on the basis of the above-mentioned case-forms. These are the branches of competitive arguments and their sub-divisions, and the above are the methods of employing them. Now it makes no small difference whether the accompaniments of the question are arranged in a certain way with a view to concealment, as in dialectics. Therefore, as a sequel to what has been said above, we must first treat of this subject.

XV. To effect a refutation one expedient is length; How to ask
χαλεπῶν γὰρ ἀμα πολλὰ συνορᾶν. εἰς δὲ τὸ μῆκος τοῖς προειρημένοις στοιχείοις χρηστέον. ἐν δὲ τάχος: ὑπερίξοντες γὰρ ἤττον προορᾶσιν. ἐτὶ δ' ὀργὴ καὶ φιλονεικία: ταραττόμενοι γὰρ ἤττον δύνανται φυλάττεσθαι πάντες. στοιχεία δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς τὸ τε φανερὸν ἐαυτὸν ποιεῖν βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀναισχυντεῖν. ἐτὶ τὸ ἐναλλάξ τὰ ἐρωτήματα τιθέναι, εάν τε πρὸς ταύτα πλείους τις ἔχῃ λόγους, εάν τε καὶ ὅτι οὕτως καὶ ὅτι οὐχ οὕτως: ἀμα γὰρ συμβαίνει ἣ πρὸς πλεῖον ἢ πρὸς τάναντια ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακήν. ὅλως δὲ πάντα τὰ πρὸς τὴν κρύψιν λεχθέντα πρότερον χρήσιμα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγωνιστικοὺς λόγους: ἢ γὰρ κρύψις ἐστὶ τοῦ λαθεῶν χάριν, τὸ δὲ λαθεῖν τῆς ἀπάτης.

Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀνανεύοντας ἄττ' ἄν οἰηθῶσιν εἶναι πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ἐξ ἀποφάσεως ἐρωτητέον, ὡς τοῦναντίον βουλόμενον, ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἱσόυ ποιοῦντα τὴν ἐρωτήσιν: ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ τί βουλεῖται λαβεῖν ἢττον δυσκολαίνουσιν. ὅταν τ' ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν διδῷ τις τὸ καθ' ἑκαστὸν, ἔπαγοντα τὸ καθὸλον πολλάκις οὐκ ἐρωτητέον, ἀλλ' ὡς δεδομένῳ χρηστέον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὕτως καὶ αὐτοὶ δεδωκέναι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούοντισι φαίνονται διὰ τὴν τῆς

a Topics viii. 1.
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for it is difficult to keep many things in view simultaneously. To produce length the above-mentioned elementary rules must be employed. One resource is speed; for when people lag behind they see less far ahead. Further, there are anger and contentiousness; for when people are agitated they are always less capable of being on their guard. Elementary rules for rousing anger are to make it plain that one wishes to act unfairly and to behave in an altogether shameless manner. Another device is to put one's questions alternately, whether one has several arguments leading up to the same point or whether one has arguments proving both that this is so and that this is not so; for the result is that the answerer is on his guard at the same time against either several or contrary attacks. In a word, all the resources for concealment mentioned before are also useful against competitive arguments; for concealment is for the purpose of escaping detection, and escape from detection is for the purpose of deception.

When dealing with those who refuse to consent to anything which they think is in favour of your argument, you must put your question in a negative form, as though you wanted the opposite of what you really want, or, at any rate, as if you were asking your question with indifference; for people are less troublesome when it is not clear what one wants to secure. Often, when in dealing with particulars a man grants the individual case, you ought not, in the process of induction, to make the universal the subject of your question but assume that it is granted and use it accordingly; for sometimes people think that they have themselves granted it and appear to their hearers to have done so, because they recall questions effectively:

1. By prolixity and rapidity.

2. By alternating questions.

3. By interrogation from negation.

4. By assuming that the universal has been granted.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΕ

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ἐπαγωγής μνείαν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἥρωτημένα μάτην.
ἐν οἷς τε μὴ ὁνόματι σημαίνεται τὸ καθόλου, ἀλλὰ
τῇ ὁμοιότητι χρηστεύον πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον· λανθάνει

40 γὰρ ἡ ὁμοιότης πολλάκις. πρὸς τε τὸ λαβεῖν τὴν

174 b πρότασιν τούναντιον παραβάλλοντα χρὴ πυνθάνε-

σθαι. οἴον εἰ δέοι λαβεῖν ὅτι δεῖ πάντα τῷ πατρὶ

πείθεσθαι, πότερον ἄπαντα δεῖ πείθεσθαι τοῖς γο-

νεόσιν ἡ πάντ' ἀπειθεῖν; καὶ τὸ πολλάκις πολλά,

πότερον πολλὰ συγχωρητέον ἡ ὁλίγα; μάλλον γάρ,

5 εἴπερ ἄνάγκη, δοξείειν ἃν εἶναι πολλά· παρατιθε-

μένων γὰρ ἐγγὺς τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ μείζω καὶ

μεγάλα φαίνεται καὶ χείρω καὶ βελτίω τοῖς ἀνθρώ-

ποισ.

Σφόδρα δὲ καὶ πολλάκις ποιεῖ δοκεῖν ἐληλέγχθαι

τὸ μάλιστα σοφιστικῶν συνοφάντημα τῶν ἐρωτῶν-

10 των, τὸ μηδὲν συλλογισμένου μὴ ἐρωτήμα ποιεῖν
tὸ τελευταίον, ἀλλὰ συμπερατικῶς εἴπειν, ὡς

συλλογισμένους, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τὸ.

Σοφιστικῶν δὲ καὶ τὸ κειμένου παραδόξου τὸ

φαινόμενον ἡξίων ἀποκρίνεσθαι προκειμένου τὸ

dοκοῦντος εἰς ἄρχῆς, καὶ τὴν ἐρωτήσει τῶν τοιοῦ-

15 τῶν οὕτω ποιεῖσθαι, πότερον οὐ δοκεῖ; ἀνάγκη

γὰρ, ἂν ἡ τὸ ἐρωτήμα εἰς ὅν ὁ συλλογισμός, ἡ

ἐλεγχὸν ἡ παράδοξον γίνεσθαι, δόντος μὲν ἔλεγχον,
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the process of induction and think that the question
would not have been asked without some object.
Where there is no term to signify the universal, you
should nevertheless use the resemblance of the
particulars for your advantage; for the resemblance
often passes unnoticed. Also, in order to secure your
premiss, you should contrast it with its contrary in
your question. For example, if you want to secure
the premiss that one ought to obey one’s father in
all things, you should ask whether one should obey
one’s parents in all things or disobey them in all
things. If you want to establish that the multiplica-
tion of a number many times over results in a large
number, you should ask whether it should be con-
ceded that it is a large or that it is a small number;
for, if pressed, one would rather that it should seem
to be large. For the juxtaposition of contraries
increases the quantity and quality of things, both
relatively and absolutely, in the eyes of men.

Often the most sophistical of all frauds practised
by questioners produces a striking appearance of
refutation, when, though they have proved nothing,
they do not put the final proposition in the form of
a question but state conclusively, as though they had
proved it, that ‘such and such a thing, then, is not
the case.’

Another sophistical trick is, when the thesis is a
paradox, to demand, when the generally accepted
view is originally proposed, that the answerer should
reply what he thinks about it, and to put one’s
question in some such form as ‘Is that your opinion?’
For, if the question is one of the premisses of the
argument, either a refutation or a paradox must
result. If he grants the premiss, there will be a

(5) By assuming that a proposition is effected through comparison of the contrary.

(6) By substituting a statement for a question.

(7) By placing your opponent on the horns of a dilemma.
It has been conjectured that the author of this dialogue was Speusippus.
refutation; if he refuses to grant it and even denies that it is the generally accepted view, he utters a paradox; if he refuses to grant it but admits that it is the generally accepted view, there will be the appearance of a refutation.

Moreover, as in rhetorical arguments, so likewise also in refutations, you ought to look for contradictions between the answerer’s views and either his own statements or the views of those whose words and actions he admits to be right, or of those who are generally held to bear a like character and to resemble them, or of the majority, or of all mankind. Also, just as answerers, when they are being refuted, often draw a distinction, if they are on the point of being refuted, so questioners also ought sometimes, when dealing with objectors, if the objection is valid against one sense of the word but not against another, to resort to the expedient of declaring that the opponent has taken it in such and such a sense, as Cleophon does in the Mandrobulus. They ought also to withdraw from the argument and cut short their other attacks, while the answerer, if he perceives this move in time, should raise anticipatory objections and get his argument in first. One should also sometimes attack points other than the one mentioned, excluding it if one can make no attack on the position laid down, as Lycophron did when it was suggested that he should deliver an encomium on the lyre. To those who demand that one should take some definite point of attack (since it is generally held that one ought to assign the object of a question, whereas if certain statements are made the defence is easier), you should say that your aim is the usual result of refutation, namely, to deny what your opponent

(8) By seeking contradictions between the views of your opponent and the school to which he belongs.

(9) By pleading that a term has a double sense.

(10) By withdrawal from your position to avoid attack.

(11) By attacking irrelevant points.

(12) By maintaining that your object is simply the contradiction of your opponent’s thesis.
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ἀπέφησε φήσαι, ἀλλὰ μή ὦτι τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή. οὐ δεὶ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα προτατικῶς ἐρωτᾶν· ἐνια δὲ οὖν ἐρωτητέον, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁμολογομένους χρηστέον.

175 a XVI. Ἐξ ὄν μὲν οὖν αἱ ἐρωτήσεις, καὶ πῶς ἐρωτητέον ἐν ταῖς ἀγωνιστικαῖς διατριβαῖς, εἰρηται· περὶ δὲ ἀποκρίσεως, καὶ πῶς χρῆ λύειν καὶ τί, καὶ πρὸς τίνα χρῆσιν οἱ τοιούτοι τῶν λόγων ὑφέλιμοι, μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον.

5 Χρῆσιμοι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πρὸς μὲν φιλοσοφιὰν διὰ δύο. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἢ το πολὺ γινόμενοι παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ἀμείνον ἔχειν ποιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ ποσαχῶς ἐκαστὸν λέγεται, καὶ ποία ὁμοίως καὶ ποία ἐτέρως ἢ τῷ πρὸς πραγμάτων συμβαίνει καὶ ἢ τῷ πρὸς ὁνομάτων. δεύτερον δὲ πρὸς τὰς καθ' ἀυτὸν ζητήσεις· ὁ γὰρ υφ' ἐτέρου ραδίως παραλογιζόμενος καὶ τοῦτο μὴ αἰσθανόμενος κἂν αὐτὸς υφ' αὐτοῦ τούτο πάθου πολλάκις. τρίτων δὲ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἢ τῷ πρὸς δοξαν, τὸ περὶ πάντα γεγομόνασθαι δοκεῖν καὶ μηδενὸς ἄπειρως ἔχειν· τὸ γὰρ 10 κοινωνοῦντα λόγων ψέγειν λόγους, μηδὲν ἔχοντα διορίζειν περὶ τῆς φαιλότητος αὐτῶν, ὑποφιάν δίδωσι τοῦ δοκεῖν δυσχεραίνειν οὐ διὰ τάληθες ἀλλὰ δι' ἄπειριαν.

'Αποκρινομένοι δὲ πῶς ἀπαντητέον πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους, φανερόν, εἰπέρ ὅρθως εἰρήκαμεν πρότερον ἢ τῶν εἰςιν οἱ παραλογισμοὶ, καὶ τὰς ἐν 15 κοινωνοῦντα λόγων ψέγειν λόγους, μηδὲν ἔχοντα διορίζειν περὶ τῆς φαιλότητος αὐτῶν, ὑποφιάν δίδωσι τοῦ δοκεῖν δυσχεραίνειν οὐ διὰ τάληθες ἀλλὰ δι' ἄπειριαν.

1 Reading ὁμολογομένους with Wallies for ὁμολογομένων.
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affirmed and affirm what he denied, and not to prove that the knowledge of contraries is the same or not the same. One should not ask the conclusion in the form of a proposition, and some propositions should not be asked at all but treated as admitted.

XVI. We have now dealt with the sources of questions and how they ought to be asked in competitive arguments. We must next treat of answering, and how solutions are brought about, and what are their subjects, and for what purpose such arguments are useful.

They are useful for philosophy for two reasons. In the first place, as they generally turn on language, they put us in a better position to appreciate the various meanings which a term can have and what similarities and differences attach to things and their names. Secondly, they are useful for the questions which arise in one’s own mind; for he who is easily led astray by another person into false reasoning and does not notice his error, might also often fall into this error in his own mind. A third and last reason is that they establish our reputation, by giving us the credit of having received a universal training and of having left nothing untried; for that one who is taking part in an argument should find fault with arguments without being able to specify where their weakness lies, rouses a suspicion that his annoyance is apparently not in the interests of truth but due to inexperience.

How answerers should meet such arguments is obvious if we have adequately described above the sources of false arguments and distinguished the fraudulent methods of questioning. To take an argument and see and disentangle the fault in it is not the same thing as to be able to meet it promptly when

THE SOLUTION OF FALACIES (chs. xvi–xxxiii).
General Remarks. The reasons for studying solutions.
ταχέως. δὲ γὰρ ἂσμεν, πολλάκις μετατιθέμενον ἀγνοοῦμεν. ἐτὶ δ’, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ θάττον καὶ τὸ βραδύτερον ἐκ τοῦ γεγυμνάσθαι γίνεται μᾶλλον, 25 οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἔχει, ὡστε, ἂν δῆλον μὲν ἡμῖν ἢ, ἀμελετητοὶ δ’ ὄμεν, ὑστεροῦμεν τῶν καίρῶν πολλάκις. συμβαίνει δὲ ποτε, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασιν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀναλύσαντες ἐνίοτε συνθείναι πάλιν ἀδυνατοῦμεν· οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς 30 ἐλέγχοις, εἰδότες παρ’ ὦ ὁ λόγος συμβαίνει συνεργα, διαλύσαι τὸν λόγον ἀποροῦμεν.

XVII. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ὡσπερ συλλογίζεσθαι φαμεν ἐνδόξως ποτὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ἀληθῶς προαιρεῖσθαι δεῖν, οὕτω καὶ λυτέον ποτὲ μᾶλλον ἐνδόξως ἡ κατὰ τάληθες. ὅλως γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς μαχε-35 τέον οὐχ ὡς ἐλέγχοντας ἄλλ’ ὡς φαινομένους· οὐ γὰρ φαμεν συλλογίζεσθαι γε αὐτοὺς, ὡστε πρὸς τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν διορθωτέον. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἐλεγχὸς ἀντίφασις μὴ ὀμώνυμος ἐκ τινων, οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι διαιρεῖσθαι πρὸς τάμφιβολα καὶ τὴν ὀμωνυμίαν· οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ συλλογισμόν. ἄλλ’ οὐδένος ἄλλου 40 χάριν προσδιαιρετέον ἄλλ’ ἡ ὡτι τὸ συμπέρασμα φαίνεται ἐλεγχοειδεῖς. οὐκοιν τὸ ἐλεγχὴν ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν εὐλαβητέον, ἐπει τὸ γ’ ἐρωτᾶν ἀμφίβολα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τὴν ὀμωνυμιάν, ὅσαι τ’ ἄλλαι τοιαῦτα παρακρούσεις, καὶ τὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐλεγχὸν ἀφαινίζει καὶ τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον καὶ μὴ ἐλεγχόμενον ἁδηλον ποιεῖ. ἐπει γὰρ ἐξεστιν ἐπὶ τέλει συμπεραναμένου
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one is asked a question. For we often fail to recognize something which we know when it is presented in a different form. Furthermore, as in other spheres a greater degree of speed or slowness is rather a question of training, so in argument also; therefore, even though something may be clear to us, yet, if we lack practice, we often miss our opportunities. The same thing happens sometimes as with geometrical diagrams; for there we sometimes analyse a figure but cannot reconstruct it; so too in refutations we know how the argument is strung together, but we are at a loss how to take it to pieces.

XVII. In the first place, then, just as we say that we ought sometimes deliberately to argue plausibly rather than truthfully, so too we ought sometimes to solve questions plausibly rather than according to truth. For, generally speaking, when we have to fight against contentious arguers, we ought to regard them not as trying to refute us but as merely appearing to do so; for we deny that they are arguing a case, so that they must be corrected so as not to appear to be doing so. For if refutation is unequivocal contradiction based on certain premisses, there can be no necessity to make distinctions against ambiguity and equivocation; for they do not make up the proof. But the only other reason for making further distinctions is because the conclusion looks like a refutation. One must, therefore, beware not of being refuted but of appearing to be so, since the asking of ambiguities and questions involving equivocation and all similar fraudulent artifices mask even a genuine refutation and make it uncertain who is refuted and who is not. For when it is possible in the end, when the conclusion is reached, to say that
5 μη ὁπερ ἐφησεν ἀποφήσαι λέγειν, ἀλλ' ὁμωνύμως, 
ei καὶ στὶ μάλιστ' ἐτυχεν ἐπὶ ταύτων φέρων, ἄδηλον 
ei ἐλήλεγκται. ἄδηλον γὰρ εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει νῦν. εἰ 
δὲ διελὼν ἦρετο τὸ ὄμωνυμον ἢ τὸ ἄμφιβολον, 
οὐκ ἂν ἄδηλος ἢν ὁ ἔλεγχος. ὁ τ' ἐπιζητοῦσι νῦν 
μὲν ἦττον πρότερον δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ ἐριστικοί, τὸ ἦ 
ναὶ ἢ οὖ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸν ἐρωτώμενον, ἐγίνετ' 
ἀν. νῦν δὲ διὰ τὸ μή καλῶς ἔρωταν τοὺς πυθανο-
μένους ἀνάγκη προσαποκρίνεσθαι τὶ τὸν ἐρωτώ-
μενον, διορθοῦντα τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῆς προτάσεως, 
ἐπεὶ διελομένου γε ἵκανῶς ἢ ναὶ ἢ οὖ ἀνάγκη λέγειν 
τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον.

15 Εἰ δὲ τις υπολήψεται τὸν κατὰ ὁμωνυμῶν ἔλεγχον 
εἶναι, τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔσται διαφυγεῖν τὸ ἔλεγ-
χεσθαι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ὀρατῶν 
ἀναγκαῖον ὃ ἐφησεν ἀποφήσαι ὅνομα, καὶ ὃ ἀπ-
ἐφησε φήσαι. ὡς γὰρ διορθοῦνται τινες, οὐδὲν 
ὀφελος. οὐ γὰρ Κορίσκον φασίν εἶναι μουσικῶν 
καὶ ἁμοῦσον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον τὸν Κορίσκον μουσικῶν 
καὶ τοῦτον τὸν Κορίσκον ἁμοῦσον. ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς 
ἔσται λόγος τὸ τοῦτον¹ τὸν Κορίσκον τῷ τοῦτον 
τὸν Κορίσκον ἁμοῦσον εἶναι ἢ μουσικῶν· ὁπερ ἁμα 
φησὶ τε καὶ ἀπόφησιν. ἀλλ' ἵσως οὗ ταῦτο ση-
μαίνει· οὔδε γὰρ ἐκεῖ τοῦνομα. ἧστε τί διαφέρει;²

¹ τοῦτον added by Waitz.
² Poste reads τί for τῇ and adds the question mark.
one's opponent contradicted what he asserted only by means of an equivocation, however true it may be that he happened to be tending in the same direction, it is uncertain whether a refutation has taken place; for it is uncertain whether he is speaking the truth now. If, however, one had made a distinction and questioned the equivocal or ambiguous term, the refutation would not have been uncertain. Also, the object of contentious arguers—though it is less their aim in these days than formerly—would have been carried out, namely, that the person questioned should answer 'Yes' or 'No'; as it is, however, because the questioners put their questions improperly, the person questioned is obliged to add something in his answer by way of correcting the unfairness of the proposition, since, if the questioner makes adequate distinctions, the answerer must say either 'Yes' or 'No.'

If anyone is going to imagine that an argument which rests on equivocal terms is a refutation, it will be impossible for the answerer to avoid being refuted in a certain sense; for in dealing with visible things one must necessarily deny the term which he asserted and assert that which he denied. For the correction which some people suggest is useless. For they do not say that Coriscus is musical and unmusical, but that this Coriscus is musical and this Coriscus is unmusical. For it will be making use of the same expression to say that this Coriscus is unmusical (or musical) as to say that this Coriscus is so; and one is affirming and denying this at the same time. But perhaps it does not mean the same thing; for neither did the name in the former case; so what is the difference? But if he is going to assign to the
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25 εἴ δὲ τῷ μὲν τὸ ἀπλῶς λέγειν Κορίσκον ἀποδώσει, τῷ δὲ προσθήσει τὸ τινὰ ἢ τόνδε, ἄτοπον· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον θατέρω· ὁποτέρω γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

Οὐ μὴν ἄλλ’ ἐπειδή ἄδηλος μὲν ἐστιν ὁ μὴ διορισμένος τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν πότερον ἐλήλεγκται ἢ οὐκ 30 ἐλήλεγκται, δέδοται δ’ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὸ διελεῖν, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ μὴ διορίσαντα δοῦναι τὴν ἑρώτησιν ἄλλ’ ἀπλῶς ἀμάρτημα ἐστιν, ὡστε κἂν εἰ μὴ αὐτός, ἄλλ’ ὃ γε λόγος ἐλήλεγμένῳ ὦμοιος ἐστιν. συμβαίνει μέντοι πολλάκις ὀρθῶς τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν ὁκνεῖν διαρεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν πυκνότητα τῶν τὰ τοι-35 αὔτα προτεινόντων, ὅπως μὴ πρὸς ἀπαν δοκῶσι δυσκολαίνειν· εἰτ’ οὐκ ἂν οὐθέντων παρὰ τοῦτο γενέσθαι τῶν λόγων, πολλάκις ἀπήντησε παράδοξον. ὡστ’ ἐπειδὴ δέδοται διαρεῖν, οὐκ ὄκνητεόν, καθάπερ ἐλέξθη πρότερον.

Εἰ δὲ τὰ δύο ἐρωτήματα μὴ ἐν ποιεῖ τις ἑρώτημα, 40 οὐδ’ ἂν ὁ παρὰ τὴν ὦμωνυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν ἐγίνετο παραλογισμός, ἄλλ’ ἢ ἐλεγχος ἢ οὐ. τὶ

176 a γὰρ διαφέρει ἐρωτήσαι εἰ Καλλίας καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς μονικοὶ εἰσίν ἢ εἰ ἀμφοτέροις ἐν ὕσσον ἢν ἐτέρως οὕσιν; εἰ γὰρ πλείω δηλοῖ ἐνός, πλείω ἡρώτησεν. εἰ οὖν μὴ ὀρθὸν πρὸς δύο ἑρωτήσεις μίαν ἀπόκρισιν ἀξιόν λαμβάνειν ἀπλῶς, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν προσ-5 ἦκε τῶν ὦμωνυμων ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἀπλῶς, οὐδ’ εἰ 92
one person the simple appellation 'Coriscus,' while to the other he adds 'a certain' or 'that,' it is absurd; for the addition belongs no more to the one than to the other; for it makes no difference to whichever of the two he adds it.

However, since, if one does not distinguish the meanings of a doubtful term, it is not clear whether he has been confuted or not, and since the right to draw distinctions is conceded in arguments, it is obvious that to grant the question simply, without making distinctions, is a mistake; so that, even if the man himself does not appear to be refuted, yet his argument certainly appears to be so. It frequently happens, however, that, though people see the ambiguity, they hesitate to make the distinction, because of the numerous occasions on which people propose subjects of this kind, in order to avoid seeming to be acting perversely all the time. Then, again, though people would never have thought that the argument would hinge upon this point, they are often confronted with a paradox. So, since the right to draw a distinction is conceded, we must not hesitate to use it, as was said before.

If one does not make two questions into one, the fallacy which depends on equivocation and ambiguity would not exist either, but either refutation or absence of refutation. For what is the difference between asking whether Callias and Themistocles are musical and asking the same question about two people both with the same name? For if one indicates more things than one, one has asked more questions than one. If, therefore, it is not correct to demand simply to receive one answer to two questions, clearly it is not proper to give a simple answer to any equivocal
κατὰ πάντων ἀληθές, ὥσπερ ἀξιοῦσι τινες. οὐδὲν γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρει ἢ εἰ ἢ ἰτετο, Κορίσκος καὶ Καλλίας πότερον οὐκ εἰσίν ὡς οὐκ οἶκοι, εἰτε παρόν-
tων ἀμφοῖν εἰτε μὴ παρόντων. ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ πλεῖονς αἱ προτάσεις· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἀληθές εἶπεν,1 διὰ 10
tοῦτο μία ἡ ἐρώτησις. ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ καὶ μυρίᾳ ἕτερα ἐρωτηθέντα ἐρωτήματα ἀπαντᾷ ἢ ναὶ ἢ οὔ ἀληθές εἰναι λέγειν· ἀλλ' ὁμως οὐκ ἀποκρίτεον μιᾷ ἀποκρίσει· ἀναιρεῖται γὰρ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι. τοῦτο δ' ὁμοιον ὡς εἰ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα τεθεῖ τοῖς ἑτέροις. εἰ οὐν μὴ δει πρὸς δύο ἐρωτήσεις μίαν 15 ἀπόκρισιν διδόναι, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμι-
ωνύμων τὸ ναὶ ἢ οὔ λεκτέον. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὃ εἰπὼν ἀποκεκριται ἀλλ' εἰρήκεν. ἀλλ' ἀξιοῦται2 πως ἐν τοῖς διαλεγομένοις διὰ τὸ λανθάνει τὸ συμβαῖνον.

"Ὡσπερ οὖν εἶπομεν, ἐπειδὴπερ οὐδ' ἑλεγχοὶ 20 τινες οὔτε δοκοῦσιν εἰναι, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ λύσεις δόξουσιν εἰναι τινες οὐκ οὔται λύσεις· ἃς δὴ φαμεν ἐνίστη μᾶλλον δειν φέρειν ἢ τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἀγωνιστικοῖς λόγοις καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ διπτὸν ἀπαντῆσει· ἀποκρίτεον δ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν δοκοῦντων τὸ ἐστὶν λέγοντα· καὶ γὰρ οὔτως ἦκιστα 25 γίνοιτ' ἀν παρεξέλεγχοι· ἀν δὲ τι παράδοξον ἀναγ-
κάζῃται λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μάλιστα προσθετεόν τὸ δοκεῖν· οὔτω γὰρ ἀν οὔτ' ἑλεγχος οὔτε παράδοξον γίνεσθαι δόξειεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πῶς αἰτεῖται τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ

1 Reading εἶπεν for εἰπεῖν.
2 Reading ἀξιοῦται for ἀξιοῦται with Wallies.
question, even though the term is true of all the subjects, as some people claim that one ought. For this is just the same as asking 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home or not at home?', whether they are both at home or not there; for in both cases the number of propositions is more than one. For if the answer is true, it does not follow that the question is a single one. For it is possible that it is true to say 'yes' or 'no' when asked a countless number of questions; but, for all that, one ought not to answer them with a single reply, for that means the ruin of discussion. This resembles the case of the same name being applied to different things. If, therefore, one must not give one answer to two questions, it is obvious that neither should one say 'yes' or 'no' where equivocal terms are used; for then the speaker has not given an answer but made a statement, but it is regarded in a way as an answer amongst those who argue, because they do not realize what is the result.

As we said, then, since there are some seeming refutations which are not really refutations, in like manner also there are some seeming solutions which are not really solutions. These we say that we ought sometimes to bring forward in preference to true refutations in competitive argument and in meeting ambiguity. In the case of statements which appear to be true one must answer with the phrase 'granted'; for then there is the least likelihood of any accessory refutation; but if one is obliged to say something paradoxical, then in particular one must add that it seems so, for then there can be no appearance either of refutation or of paradox. Since it is clear what 'begging the original question' means and since
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d̓ηλον, οἶονταί δὲ πάντες, ἀν1 ἤ σύνεγγυς, ἀναπε-
tέον καὶ μὴ συγχωρητέον εἶναι ἐνα ὡς τὸ ἐν ἄρχῇ
30 αὐτοῦντος, ὅταν τὸ2 τοιοῦτον ἀξιοὶ τις ὁ ἀναγκαῖον
μὲν συμβαίνειν ἐκ τῆς θέσεως, ἢ δὲ ψεύδος ἢ ἄδοξον,
tαύτῳ λεκτέον. τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνοντα
τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ θέσεως. ἔτι ὅταν τὸ καθόλου
μὴ ὀνόματι ληφθῇ ἀλλὰ παραβολῆ, λεκτέον ὃτι σὺχ
35 ὡς ἐδόθη οὐδ’ ὡς προϋπενε λαμβάνει· καὶ γὰρ
παρὰ τούτῳ γίνεται πολλάκις ἐλεγχος.

'Εξειργόμενον δὲ τούτων ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ καλῶς ἐδείχθαι πορευτέον, ἀπαντώντα κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον
dιορισμὸν.

'Εν μὲν οὖν τοὺς κυρίως λεγομένους ὀνόμασιν
ἀνάγκη ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ διαιρούμενον. ἀ
40 δὲ συνυπονοοῦντες τίθεμεν, οἴον ὅσα μὴ σαφῶς

176 b ἀλλὰ κολοβῶς ἐρωτᾶται, παρὰ τούτῳ συμβαίνει
ὁ ἐλεγχος, οἴον ἃρ’ ὁ ἄν ἢ Ἀθηναίων, κτήμα ἐστὶν
Ἀθηναίων; ναί. ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἄνθρωπὸς ἐστὶ τῶν ζώων; ναί. κτήμα
ἀρα ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν ζώων. τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον
5 τῶν ζώων λέγομεν, ὃτι ζώον ἐστὶ, καὶ Λύσανδρον
τῶν Λακώνων, ὃτι Λάκων. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἐν οἷς
ἄσαφες τὸ προτεινόμενον οὐ συγχωρητέον ἀπλῶς.

'Ὅταν δὲ δυσών ὄντων θατέρου μὲν ὄντος ἐξ

1 Reading ἄν for ἄν with Wallies.
2 Reading τὸ for τε with Wallies.

a 168 a 17 ff.
people always consider that assumptions which lie near the conclusion must be demolished and that some of them must not be conceded on the ground that the opponent is begging the question, so when someone claims something of such a nature that it must necessarily follow from the thesis and it is false or paradoxical, we must use the same plea; for the necessary consequences are generally regarded as part of the same thesis. Furthermore, when the universal which has been obtained has no name but is indicated by a comparison only, we must say that the questioner takes it not in the sense in which it was granted nor as he proposed it; for a refutation often hinges on this point too.

When we are excluded from these expedients, we must have recourse to the plea that the argument has not been properly set forth, attacking it on the basis of the classification of fallacies given above.

When terms are used in their proper senses, one must answer either simply or by making a distinction. It is when our statement implies our meaning without expressing it—for example, when a question is not asked clearly but in a shortened form—that refutation ensues. For instance, 'Is whatever belongs to the Athenians a property of the Athenians?' 'Yes; and this is likewise true of everything else.' 'Well, then, does man belong to the animals?' 'Yes.' 'Then man is a property of the animals. For we say that man "belongs to" the animals because he is an animal, just as we say that Lysander "belongs to" the Laconians because he is a Laconian.' Obviously, therefore, when the premiss is not clear, it must not be conceded simply.

When it is generally held that, if one of two things ...
ανάγκης θάτερον εἶναι δοκῆ, θατέρον δὲ τοῦτο μή
10 ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἐρωτώμενον πότερον dia τὸ ἐλάττον
didóναι ἀληθεύοντες γὰρ συλλογίσασθαι εἶκ πλειώ-
νων, ἐὰν δ' ἐπιχειρή ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐναντίω
τῷ δ' οὐκ ἐστιν, ἂν ὁ λόγος ἀληθῆς ἡ, ἐναντίω
φάναι, ὅνομα δὲ μή κεῖσθαι τοῦ ἑτέρου.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐνια μὲν ὃν λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν μή
15 συγχωροῦντα ψεύδεσθαι ἂν φαίνει ἐνια δ' οὐ, οἷον
ὁσα ἀμφιδοξοῦσιν (πότερον γὰρ φθαρτή ἡ ἀθάνατος
ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν ζώων, οὐ διώρισται τοῖς πολλοῖς), ἐν
οῖς οὐν ἄδηλον ποτέρως εἶσθε λέγεσθαι τὸ προ-
τεινόμενον, πότερον ὡς αἱ γνῶμαι (καλοῦσι γὰρ
γνώμας καὶ τὰς ἀληθείς δόξας καὶ τὰς ὅλας ἀποφα-
20 σεις), ἡ ὡς ἡ διάμετρος ἀσύμμετρος, ἔτι τε οὐ
tάληθες ἀμφιδοξεῖται, μάλιστα μεταφέρων ἂν τις
λαυθάνοι τὰ ὁνόματα περὶ τούτων. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ
ἀδηλον εἶναι ποτέρως ἔχει τάληθες, οὐ δόξει σοφί-
ζεσθαι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν οὐ δόξει ψεύδεσθαι.
25 ἡ γὰρ3 μεταφορά ποιήσει τὸν λόγον ἀνεξέλεγκτον.

"Επὶ ὁσα ἂν τις προαισθάνηται τῶν ἐρωτημάτων,
προενστατέον καὶ προαγορευτέον οὕτω γὰρ ἂν
μάλιστα τὸν πυθανόμενον κωλύσειν.

1 Reading πότερον for πρότερον.
2 Inserting τε after ἔτι.
3 Reading γὰρ for δὲ with AB.
is true, then the other is necessarily true, but, if the second is true, the first is not necessarily true, when asked which is true, we ought to concede the less inclusive; for the greater the number of premisses, the more difficult it is to draw a conclusion. If the disputant tries to establish that A has a contrary while B has not, if his contention is true, we ought to say that both have a contrary but that no name is laid down for one of the two.

Regarding some of the statements which they make, most people would declare that anyone who did not concede them was lying, while they would not say so about others, for example, about subjects on which people disagree (for instance, most people have no decided opinion whether the soul of living creatures is destructible or immortal). Therefore, when it is uncertain in which sense the suggested premiss is generally used, whether as maxims are employed (for people call both true opinions and general affirmations by the name of 'maxims') or like the statement, 'the diagonal of a square is incommensurate with its sides,' and further, where the truth is a matter of uncertainty,—in these cases one has an excellent opportunity of changing the terms without being found out. For, because it is uncertain in which sense the premiss bears its true meaning, one will not be regarded as playing the sophist, and, because of the disagreement on the subject, one will not be regarded as lying; for the change will make the argument proof against refutation.

Furthermore, whenever one foresees any question, one must be the first to make one's objection and say what one has to say, for thus one can best disconcert the questioner.
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XVIII. Ἐπεὶ δὴ ἔστιν ἢ μὲν ὃρθῇ λύσις ἐμφάνισις οὐν ὑποδοθεὶς συνελογισμῷ, παρ’ ὅποιαν ἐρώτησιν συμβαίνει τὸ ψεῦδος, ὁ δὲ ψευδὴς συνελογισμὸς λέγεται διὶ ὡς (ἡ γὰρ εἰ συνελεγισται ψεῦδος, ἢ εἰ μὴ ὃν συνελογισμὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι συνελογισμὸς), εὖν ἂν ἢ τε εἰρημένη νῦν λύσις καὶ ἢ τοῦ φαινομένου συνελογισμοῦ παρὰ τί φαίνεται τῶν ἐρωτημάτων διόρθωσις. ὡστε συμβαίνει τῶν λόγων τοὺς μὲν συνελεγισμένους ἀνελόντα, τοὺς δὲ φαινομένους διελόντα λύειν. πάλιν δὴ ἐπεὶ τῶν συνελεγισμένων λόγων οἱ μὲν ἀληθὲς οἱ δὲ ψεῦδος ἔχουσι τὸ συμπέρασμα, τοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα ψευδείς διὶ ὡς ἐνδέχεται λύειν· καὶ γάρ τῷ ἀνελείν τι τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, καὶ τῷ δεῖξαι τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔχον οὐχ ὀύτως· τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς προτάσεις τῷ ἀνελείν τι μόνον· τὸ γὰρ συμπέρασμα ἰληθὲς. ὡστε τοῖς βουλομένοις λύειν λόγον πρῶτον μὲν σκέπτεον εἰ συνελεγισται ἢ ἀσυνελεγιστος, εἶτα πότερον ἀληθὲς τὸ συμπέρασμα ἢ ψεῦδος, ὅπως ἡ διαιροῦντες ἡ ἀναιροῦντες λύωμεν, καὶ ἀναιροῦντες ἢ ὡδὲ ἢ ὡδὲ, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. διαφέρει δὲ πλεῖστον ἐρωτώμενον τε καὶ μὴ λύειν λόγον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ προὶδεῦν χαλεπὸν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἰδεῖν ρᾶν.

XIX. Τῶν μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν ὀμωνυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν ἐλέγχων οἱ μὲν ἔχουσι τῶν ἐρωτημάτων τι πλείω σημαίνον, οἱ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα πολλαχῶς

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a In ch. xvii.  
b 176 b 36 ff.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xviii-xix

XVIII. Since a correct solution is an exposure of false reasoning, indicating the nature of the question on which the fallacy hinges, and since 'false reasoning' can mean one of two things (for it occurs either if a false conclusion has been reached or if what is not a proof appears to be such), there must be both the solution described just now, and also the rectification of the apparent proof by showing on which of the questions it hinges. The result is that one solves the correctly reasoned arguments by demolishing them, the apparent reasonings by making distinctions. Again, since some correctly reasoned arguments are true, while others are false, in their conclusions, it is possible to solve those which are false in their conclusion in two ways, either by demolishing one of the questions or by showing that the conclusion is not as stated. Those arguments, on the other hand, which are false in their premisses can only be solved by the demolition of one of the premisses, since the conclusion is true. Those, therefore, who wish to solve an argument should observe, firstly, whether it has been correctly reasoned or is not reasoned, and, next, whether the conclusion is true or false, in order that we may achieve a solution either by making a distinction or by demolishing a premiss and doing so in one or other of the two ways just described. There is a very wide difference between solving an argument when one is being questioned and when one is not; for in the latter case it is difficult to see what is coming, but when one is at leisure it is easier to see one's way.

XIX. Of the refutations which hinge upon equivocation and ambiguity some involve a question which bears more than one sense, while others have

(A) The Solution of REFUTATIONS (chs. xix-xxxii).
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λεγόμενον, οἷον ἑν μὲν τῷ σιγώντα λέγειν τὸ συμπέρασμα διττὸν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μὴ συνεπιστασθαι τὸν ἐπιστάμενον ἐν τῶν ἐρωτημάτων ἀμφίβολον. καὶ τὸ διττὸν ὅτε μὲν ἔστιν, ὅτε δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἄλλα 15 σημαίνει τὸ διττὸν τὸ μὲν ὅν τὸ δ’ οὐκ ὦν.

"Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἑν τῷ τέλει τὸ πολλαχῶς, ἃν μὴ προλάβῃ τὴν ἀντίφασιν, οὐ γίνεται ἐλεγχός, οἷον ἑν τῷ τὸν τυφλὸν ὁρᾶν· ἀνευ γὰρ ἀντιφάσεως οὐκ ἦν ἐλεγχός. ὃςοι δ’ ἑν τοῖς ἐρωτήμασιν, οὐκ 20 ἀνάγκη προαποφήσαι τὸ διττὸν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτο ἄλλα διὰ τοῦτο ὁ λόγος. ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν οὖν τὸ διπλοῦν καὶ οἴνομα καὶ λόγον οὕτως ἀποκριτέον, ὅτι ἔστιν ὡς, ἔστι δ’ ὡς οὖ, ἦσερ τὸ σιγώντα λέγειν, ὅτι ἔστιν ὡς, ἔστι δ’ ὡς οὖ. καὶ τὰ δέοντα πρακτέον ἔστιν ἂ, ἔστι δ’ ἂ οὖ· τὰ γὰρ δέοντα 25 λέγεται πολλαχῶς. ἐὰν δὲ λάθῃ, ἔπι τέλει προστιθέντα τῇ ἑρωτήσει διορθώτεον· ἃρ’ ἔστι σιγώντα λέγειν; οὖ, ἄλλα τόνδε σιγώντα. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι δὲ τὸ πλεοναχῶς ἐν ταῖς προτάσεσιν ὁμοίως. οὐκ ἃρα συνεπιστανται ὁ τι ἐπίστανται; ναί, ἄλλ’ οὐχ οἱ οὕτως ἐπιστάμενοι· οὐ γὰρ ταυτὸν ἔστιν ὅτι

1 Reading προλάβῃ with B.
a conclusion which can bear several meanings; for example, in the argument about 'the speech of the silent,' the conclusion has a double meaning, and in the argument that 'a man who knows is not conscious of what he knows,' one of the questions involves ambiguity. Also, that which has a double meaning is sometimes true and sometimes false, the term 'double' signifying that which is partly true and partly untrue.

When the diversity of meaning occurs in the conclusion, no refutation takes place, unless the questioner secures a contradiction beforehand, as, for example, in the argument about the 'seeing of the blind'; for there never was refutation without contradiction. Where the diversity of meaning occurs in the questions, there is no need to deny the ambiguity beforehand; for the argument is not directed towards it as a conclusion but carried on by means of it. At the beginning, therefore, one ought to reply to an ambiguous term or expression in the following manner, that 'in one sense it is so and in another it is not so'; for example 'the speaking of the silent' is possible in one sense but not in another. Or again, 'what needs must is to be done sometimes and not at other times'; for the term 'what needs must' can bear several meanings. If one does not notice the ambiguity, one should make a correction at the end by adding to the questioning: 'Is the speaking of the silent possible?' 'No, but speaking of this particular man when he is silent is possible.' So likewise also where the variety of meaning is contained in the premisses: 'Are not people conscious of what they know?' 'Yes, but not those who know in this particular way'; for it is not the same thing
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30 οὐκ ἔστι συνεπιστασθαί καὶ ὅτι τοὺς ὁδι ἐπιστα- 

cένους οὐκ ἔστιν. ὡλως τε μαχετέον, ἀν καὶ 

άπλως συλλογίζηται, ὅτι οὐχ ὁ ἐφησεν ἀπέφησε 

πράγμα, ἀλλ’ ονομα· ὤστ’ οὐκ ἔλεγχος.

XX. Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν 

καὶ σύνθεσιν πῶς λυτέον· ἂν γὰρ διαιροῦμενος καὶ 

35 συντιθέμενος ὁ λόγος ἑτερον σημαίνη, συμπεραινο- 

μένον τούναντίον λεκτέον. εἰςὶ δὲ πάντες οἱ τοι- 

οὕτοι λόγοι παρὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν. ἃρ’ 

ὡς εἰδες σὺ τοῦτον τυπτόμενον, τούτῳ ἐτύπτετο 

οὗτος; καὶ ὡς ἐτύπτετο, τούτῳ σὺ εἰδες; ἔχει 

177 b μὲν οὖν τι κάκ τῶν ἀμφιβόλων ἐρωτημάτων, ἀλλ’ 

ἔστι παρὰ σύνθεσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστι διττὸν τὸ παρὰ 

τὴν διαίρεσιν (οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος γίνεται διαιροῦ- 

μενος), εἰπερ μὴ καὶ τὸ ὀρος καὶ ὀρος τῇ προσῳδίᾳ 

λεχθὲν σημαίνει ἑτερον. (ἀλλ’ ἐν μὲν τοῖς γεγραμ- 

5 μένοις ταύτων ὁνομα, ὅταν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων 

γεγραμμένον ἢ καὶ ὀσαύτως, κάκει δ’ ἥδη παρά- 

σημα ποιοῦται, τὰ ἓ δ’ φθεγγόμενα οὐ ταὐτά.) ὤστ’ 

οὐ διττὸν τὸ παρὰ διαίρεσιν. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι 

οὐ πάντες οἱ ἔλεγχοι παρὰ τὸ διττὸν, καθάπερ 

tivés φασιν.

10 Διαιρετέον οὖν τῷ ἀποκρινομένω· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν

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a In both examples the meaning can be either 'with a stick' or 'with your eyes.'

b i.e. breathings and accents.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xix–xx

to say that it is not possible for those who know to be conscious of what they know and that those who know in a particular way cannot be conscious of their knowledge. Generally speaking, too, even though one’s opponent argues in a straightforward manner, one must contend that what he has contradicted is not the actual fact which one affirmed but merely its name, and so there is no refutation.

XX. It is evident, too, how fallacies which turn on the division and combination of words should be solved; for, if the expression signifies something different when it is divided and when it is combined, when the opponent is drawing his conclusion we must take the words in the contrary sense. All such expressions as the following turn upon the combination or division of words: ‘Was so-and-so being beaten with that with which you saw him being beaten?’ and ‘Did you see him being beaten with that with which he was being beaten?’ a The argument here has something of the fallacy due to ambiguous questions, but it actually turns on combination. For what turns on the division of words is not really ambiguous (for the expression when divided differently is not the same), unless indeed ὁ̂ρωσ and ὁ̂ρωσ, pronounced according to the breathing, constitute a single word with different meanings. (In written language a word is the same when it is written with the same letters and in the same manner, though people now put in additional signs, b but the words when spoken are not the same.) Therefore an expression whose meaning turns on division is not ambiguous, and it is clear also that all refutations do not turn upon ambiguity, as some people say.

It is for the answerer to make the division; for

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(a) Am-biguous division, and (4) am-biguous combination of words.


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идеи́в тои́ς ὀφθαλμοῖς τυπτόμενον καὶ τὸ φάναι ἰδεῖν
тоις ὀφθαλμοῖς τυπτόμενον. καὶ ὁ Εὐθυδήμου δὲ
λόγος, ἀρ' οἶδας συ νῦν οὕσας ἐν Πειραιεὶ τριήρεις
ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὅν; καὶ πάλιν, ἀρ' ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα
σκυτέα μοχθηρὸν εἶναι; εἰη δ' ἂν τις ἀγαθὸς ὅν
σκυτεύς μοχθηρὸς· ὅστ' ἔσται ἀγαθὸς σκυτεύς
μοχθηρὸς. ἀρ' ὧν αἱ ἐπιστήμαι σπουδαίαι, σπου-
δαία τὰ μαθήματα; τοῦ δὲ κακοῦ σπουδαίον τὸ
μάθημα· σπουδαῖον ἄρα μάθημα τὸ κακὸν. ἀλλὰ
μὴν καὶ κακὸν καὶ μάθημα τὸ κακὸν, ὡστε κακὸν
μάθημα τὸ κακὸν. ἀλλ' ἔστι κακῶν σπουδαία ἐπι-
20 στήμη. ἀρ' ἄληθὲς εἰπεῖν νῦν ὅτι σὺ γέγονας;
γέγονας ἄρα νῦν. ἥ ἄλλο σημαίνει διαίρεθέν; ἄλη-
θὲς γὰρ εἰπεῖν νῦν ὅτι σὺ γέγονας, ἀλλ' οὐ νῦν
γέγονας. ἀρ' ὡς δύνασαι καὶ ἄ δύνασαι, οὔτως
καὶ ταῦτα ποιῆσαι ἂν; οὐ κιθαρίζων δ' ἔχεις
dύναμιν τοῦ κιθαρίζων· κιθαρίζεις ἂν ἄρα οὐ κιθαρί-
25 ζων. ἦ οὗ τούτου ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ οὐ κιθαρί-
ζων κιθαρίζειν, ἀλλ' ὅτε οὗ ποιεῖ, τοῦ ποιεῖν;

Λύουσι δὲ τινες τούτου καὶ ἄλλωσ. εἴ γὰρ ἐδωκεν
ὡς δύναται ποιεῖν, οὐ φασὶ συμβαίνειν μὴ κιθαρί-
ζοντα κιθαρίζειν· οὓς γὰρ πάντως ὃς δύναται ποιεῖν,
30 δεδοσθαί ποιήσειν· οὕ ταῦτον δ' εἶναι ὃς δύναται

a See Rhet. 1401 a 27 and Cope and Sandys' note.

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'I-saw-a-man-being-beaten with my eyes' is not
the same thing as to say 'I saw a man being-beaten-
with-my-eyes.'—Then there is Euthydemus' saying,
'Do you know now in Sicily that there are triremes
in Piraeus?'—And, again, 'Can a good man who
is a cobbler be bad?' 'No.' 'But a man who is
good can be a bad cobbler; therefore he will be a
good-bad cobbler.'—Again, 'Things of which
the knowledge is good are good objects of learning, are
they not?' 'Yes.' 'But the knowledge of evil is
good; therefore evil is a good object of learning.'
'But, further, evil is both evil and an object of
learning, so that evil is an evil object of learning;
but it has already been seen that the knowledge of
evils is good.'—'Is it true to say at the present
moment you are born?' 'Yes.' 'Then you are born
at the present moment.' Does not a different division
of the words signify something different? For it is
true to say-at-the-present-moment that you are
born, but not to say you are born-at-the-present-
moment.—Again, 'Can you do what you can and as
you can?' 'Yes.' 'And when you are not playing
the harp you have the power of playing the harp;
and so you could play the harp when you are not
playing the harp.' In other words, he does not possess
the power of playing-when-he-is-not-playing, but he
possesses the power of doing it when he is not doing
it.

Some people solve this in another manner also.
If he has granted that a man can do what he can do,
they say that it does not follow that he can play the
harp when he is not playing it; for it has not been
granted that he will do it in every way in which he
can,—for it is not the same thing to do it in the way
καὶ πάντως ὃς δύναται ποιεῖν. ἀλλὰ φανερὸν ὅτι
οὐ καλῶς λύουσιν· τῶν γὰρ παρὰ ταὐτὸν λόγων ἢ
αὐτῇ λύσις, αὐτῇ δ’ οὐχ ἁρμόσει ἐπὶ πάντας οὐδὲ
πάντως ἑρωτωμένους, ἀλλ’ ἔστι πρὸς τὸν ἑρωτώντα,
οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον.

35 XXI. Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσωπίαν λόγου μὲν οὐκ
εἰσίν, οὕτε τῶν γεγραμμένων οὕτε τῶν λεγομένων,
πλὴν εἰ τινὲς ὁλίγοι γένουτ’ ἂν, οἶνον οὕτος οἱ λόγοι.
ἀρά γ’ ἔστι τὸ οὐ καταλύεις οἰκία; ναὶ. οὐκοῦν τὸ
οὐ καταλύεις τοῦ καταλύεις ἀπόφασις; ναὶ. ἔφησας
δ’ εἶναι τὸ οὐ καταλύεις οἰκίαν· ἡ οἰκία ἀρα ἀπό-
φασις. ὡς δὴ λυτέον, δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα σημαίνει
ὀξύτερον τὸ δὲ βαρύτερον ῥηθέν.

XXII. Δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ ὤσαύτως λέ-
5 γεσθαι τὰ μὴ ταῦτα πῶς ἀπαντητεύον, ἐπείπερ
ἐχομεν τὰ γένη τῶν κατηγοριῶν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐδώκεν
ἑρωτήθησι μὴ ὑπάρχειν τι τούτων ὡσα τί ἔστι
σημαίνει· ὁ δ’ ἐδείξεν ὑπάρχον τι τῶν πρὸς τι ἡ
ποσῶν, δοκούντων δὲ τί ἔστι σημαίνειν διὰ τὴν
λέξιν, οἶνον ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχῃ λόγῳ. ἄρ’ ἐνδέχεται τὸ
10 αὐτὸ ἅμα ποιεῖν τε καὶ πεποιηκέναι; οὐ. ἀλλὰ
μὴν ὅραν γε τὶ ἅμα καὶ ἑωρακέναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ
κατὰ ταῦτο ἐνδέχεται· ἄρ’ ἔστι τὶ τῶν πάσχειν
ποιεῖν τι; οὐ. οὐκοῦν τὸ τέμνεται καὶ ἐσται αἰσθά-
νεται ὡμοίως λέγεται, καὶ πάντα πάσχειν τι ση-

— The point here is the difference of breathing and the
presence or absence of the circumflex accent.

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in which he can and in every way in which he can. But clearly this solution is not a good one; for the solution of arguments which turn on an identical principle is identical, whereas this solution will not suit every argument nor every form of question into which it can be put, but is directed against the questioner, not against the argument.

XXI. Arguments do not arise owing to accentuation either in written or in spoken language, though a few might occur such as the following: A house is ‘where you lodge’ (ο ᾧ καταλύεις), isn’t it? Yes. Is not ‘you do not lodge’ (ο ᾧ καταλύεις) the negation of ‘you lodge’ (καταλύεις)? Yes. But you said that ‘where you lodge’ (ο ᾧ καταλύεις) was a house; therefore a house is a negation. It is obvious how this must be solved; for the spoken word is not the same with the acuter and with the graver accent. a

XXII. It is plain also how we must meet arguments that turn on the identical expression of things which are not identical, seeing that we possess the various kinds of categories. Suppose that one man when questioned has granted that something which denotes a substance is not an attribute, and another man has shown that something is an attribute which is in the category of relation or quantity but generally held, because of its expression, to denote a substance, as for example in the following argument: Is it possible to be doing and to have done the same thing at the same time? No. But it is surely possible to be seeing and to have seen the same thing at the same time and under the same conditions. Or again, Is any form of passivity a form of activity? No. Then ‘he is cut,’ ‘he is burnt,’ ‘he is affected by a sensible object’ are similar kinds of expression and all denote...
μαίνει· πάλιν δὲ τὸ λέγειν τρέχειν ὁρᾶν ὁμοίως
15 ἀλλήλοις λέγεται· ἄλλα μὴν τὸ γ' ὁρᾶν αἰσθάνεσθαι
τί ἐστιν, ὡστε καὶ πάσχειν τι ἀμα καὶ ποιεῖν. εἰ
dὲ τις ἐκεῖ δοῦσιν μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄμα ταύτῳ ποιεῖν
καὶ πεποιηκέναι, τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἑωρακέναι φαίη
ἐγχωρεῖν, οὔπω ἐλήλεγκται, εἰ μὴ λέγοι τὸ ὁρᾶν
ποιεῖν τι ἄλλα πάσχειν· προσδεῖ γὰρ τούτον τοῦ
20 ἐρωτῆματος· ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀκούοντος ὑπολαμ-
βάνεται δεδωκέναι, ὡτε τὸ τέμνειν ποιεῖν τι καὶ τὸ
tετμηκέναι πεποιηκέναι ἐδωκε, καὶ ὁσα ἄλλα
ὁμοίως λέγεται. τὸ γὰρ λοιπὸν αὐτὸς προστίθησιν
ὁ ἀκούων ὡς ὁμοίως λεγόμενον· τὸ δὲ λέγεται μὲν
οὐχ ὁμοίως, φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τὴν λέξιν. τὸ αὐτὸ
25 δὲ συμβαίνει ὁπερ ἐν ταῖς ὁμωνυμίαις· οἶνεται γὰρ
ἐν τοῖς ὁμωνύμοις ὁ ἄγνως τῶν λόγων ὁ ἐφήσεν
ἀποφήγα σαν πράγμα, οὐκ ὀνομα· τὸ δὲ ἐτι προσδεῖ
ἐρωτῆματος, εἰ ἐφ' ἐν βλέπων λέγει τὸ ὁμωνυμον·
οὔτως γὰρ δόντος ἐσται ἐλεγχος.

"Ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ οἶδε οἱ λόγοι τούτοις, εἰ ὁ τις
30 ἔχων ύστερον μὴ ἔχει ἀπέβαλεν· ὁ γὰρ ἕνα μόνον
ἀποβαλὼν ἀστράγαλον οὐχ ἔξει δέκα ἀστράγαλον.
ἡ δὲ μὲν μὴ ἔχει πρότερον ἔχων, ἀποβέβληκεν, ὡςον
dὲ μὴ ἔχει ἡ ὁσα, οὐκ ἀνάγκη τοσαύτα ἀποβαλεῖν.

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a Knucklebones were used as dice by the Greeks.
some form of passivity; and, on the other hand, ‘to say,’ ‘to run,’ and ‘to see’ are forms of expression similar to one another; but ‘to see’ is surely a way of being affected by a sensible object, so that passivity and activity occur at the same time. In the former case, if someone, after granting that it is impossible to be doing and to have done the same thing at the same time, were to say that it is possible to see a thing and to have seen it, he has not yet been refuted supposing that he declares that seeing is a form not of activity but of passivity. For this further question is necessary, though he is supposed by the hearer to have granted it when he granted that ‘to cut’ is ‘to be doing something’ and ‘to have cut’ is ‘to have done something,’ and so with similar forms of expression. For the hearer himself adds the rest, on the supposition that the significance is similar, whereas it is not really similar but only appears so owing to the expression. The same thing occurs as in fallacies of ambiguity; for in dealing with ambiguous terms the man who is not an expert in argument thinks that his opponent has denied the fact which he asserted, not the term, whereas yet another question needs to be asked, namely, whether he is using the ambiguous term with his eye upon one meaning only; for if he grants this, a refutation will be achieved.

Similar to the above are also the following arguments: Has a man lost what he had and afterwards has not? For he who has lost one die $^a$ only will no longer have ten dice. Is not what really happens that he has lost something which he had before but no longer has, but it does not follow that he has lost the whole amount or number which he no longer

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$^a$: Examples (continued).
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ἐρωτῆσας οὖν ὁ ἐχεῖ, συνάγει ἐπὶ τοῦ ὅσα· τὰ γὰρ
35 δέκα ποσά. εἰ οὖν ἥρετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰ ὅσα τις μὴ
ἐχει πρῶτερον ἔχων, ἀρά γε ἀποβέβληκε τοσάδτα,
ουδεὶς ἂν ἐδωκέν, ἀλλ’ ἡ τοσάδτα ἡ τούτων τι. καὶ
ὀτί δοῖη ἂν τις ὁ μὴ ἐχει. οὐ γὰρ ἐχει ἕνα μόνον
ἀστράγαλον. ἡ οὖ δεδωκέν ὁ οὐκ ἐχεν, ἀλλ’ ὡς
οὐκ ἐχε, τὸν ἑνα; τὸ γὰρ μόνον οὐ τόδε σημαίνει

178 b οὐδὲ τοιούντε οὐδέ τοσόντε, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐχει πρός τι,
οἶον ὅτι οὐ μετ’ ἄλλου. ὦσπερ οὖν εἰ ἥρετο ἀρ’ ὁ
μὴ τις ἐχει δοῖη ἂν, μὴ φάντος δὲ ἔροιτο εἰ δοῖη
ἂν τις τι ταχέως μὴ ἔχων ταχέως, φήσαντος δὲ
συλλογίζοιτο ὅτι δοῖη ἂν τις ὁ μὴ ἐχει. καὶ
5 φανερόν ὅτι οὐ συλλελογίσται· τὸ γὰρ ταχέως οὐ
τόδε διδόναι ἀλλ’ ὴδε διδόναι ἔστιν· ὡς δὲ μὴ ἐχει
tiς, δοῖη ἂν, οἶον ἥδεως ἔχων δοῖη ἂν λυπηρᾶς.

"Ομοιοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦδε πάντες. ἀρ’ ἡ μὴ ἐχει
χειρὶ τύπτοι ἂν; ἡ ὁ μὴ ἐχει ὀφθαλμῷ ἱδοὶ ἂν;
10 οὐ γὰρ ἐχει ἕνα μόνον. λύουσι μὲν οὖν τινὲς λέ-
γοντες καὶ ὡς ἐχει ἕνα μόνον καὶ ὀφθαλμὸν καὶ
has? In the question, therefore, he is dealing with that which he has, in the conclusion with the total number; for the number was ten. If, therefore, he had asked in the first place whether a man who formerly possessed a number of objects which he no longer possesses, has lost the total number of them, no one would have granted this, but would have said that he had lost either the total number or one of the objects. Again, it is argued that a man could give what he had not got; for what he has not got is one die only. Is not what really happens that he has not given that which he has not got but has given it in a manner in which he has not got it, namely, as a single unit? For ‘single unit’ does not denote either a particular kind of thing or a quality or a quantity but a certain relation to something else, namely, dissociation from anything else. It is, therefore, as though he had asked whether a man could give what he has not got, and on receiving the answer ‘No,’ were to ask whether a man could give something quickly when he had not got it quickly, and, on receiving the answer ‘Yes,’ were to infer that a man could give what he had not got. It is obvious that he has not drawn a correct inference; for ‘giving quickly’ does not denote giving a particular thing but giving in a particular manner, and a man could give something in a manner in which he did not get it; for example, he could get it with pleasure and give it with pain.

Similar also are all the following arguments: Further examples.

‘Could a man strike with a hand that he has not got or see with an eye that he has not got?’ For he has not got only one eye. Some people, therefore, solve this by saying that the man who has more than one
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ἀλλ’ ὁτιοῦν ὁ πλείω ἔχων. οἱ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ ἔχει ἔλαβεν· ἐδίδον γὰρ μίαν μόνον οὕτος ψῆφον· καὶ οὐτός γ’ ἔχει, φασὶ, μίαν μόνην παρὰ τούτον ψῆφον. οἱ δ’ εὐθὺς τὴν ἐρώτησιν ἀναροῦντες, ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ὁ μὴ ἔλαβεν ἔχειν, οἴον οἴον λαβόντα ἠδύν, διαφθαρέντος ἐν τῇ λήψει, ἔχειν ὃξυν. ἀλλ’ ὁπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον, οὕτω πάντες οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν λύουσι. εἰ γὰρ ἤν αὐτῇ λύσις, δόντα τὸ ἀντικείμενον οὐχ οἴον τε λύειν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· οἴον εἰ ἐστι μὲν ὁ ἐστι δ’ ὁ οὐ, ἡ λύσις, ἀν ἀπλῶς δῷ λέγεσθαι, συμπεραίνεται· εὰν δὲ μὴ συμπεραίνηται, οὐκ ἂν εἰη λύσις· ἐν δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις πάντων διδομένων οὐδέ φαινει γίνεσθαι συλλογισμόν.

"Ετὶ δὲ καὶ οἶδ’ εἰσὶ τούτων τῶν λόγων. ἀρ’ 25 δ’ ἐγραφαίς, ἐγραφεῖ τις; ἐγράφαται δὲ νῦν ὅτι οὔ καθησαί, ψευδὴς λόγος· ὣν δ’ ἀληθῆς, οτ’ ἐγράφετο· ἀμα ἄρα ἐγράφετο ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθῆς. τὸ γὰρ ψευδὴ ἡ ἀληθῆ λόγον ἡ δόξαν εἶναι οὐ τόδε ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε σημαίνει· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης. καὶ ἀρ’ ὁ μανθάνει ὁ μανθάνων, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὁ μανθάνει; μανθάνει δὲ τις τὸ βραδὺ ταχύ. οὐ τοῦν πον ὁ μανθάνει ἀλλ’ ὡς μανθάνει εἰρηκεν. καὶ ἀρ’ ὁ βαδίζει τις πατεῖ; βαδίζει δὲ τὴν ἡμέραν

a It seems probable that a new argument is dealt with here, cf. b 36 καὶ ὁτι κτλ. οἱ δὲ possibly introduced a second solution of the previous argument which has fallen out.
b But B may already possess other pebbles.
c 178 b 33.
eye (or whatever it is) has also only one. There is also the argument of some people that 'what a man has, he has received': A only gave one pebble, and B has, they say, only one pebble from A. Other people argue by directly demolishing the question raised, saying that one can have what one has not received; for example, one can receive wine that is sound but have it in a sour condition if it has gone bad in the process of transfer. But, as was said before, all these people direct their solutions not to the argument but to the man. For if this were a real solution, it would be impossible to achieve a solution by granting the opposite, as happens in all other cases; for example, if 'it is partly so and partly not so' is the solution, an admission that the expression is used without qualification makes the conclusion valid; but if no conclusion is reached, there cannot be a solution. In the above examples, even though everything is conceded, yet we say that no proof has been effected.

Moreover, the following also belong to this class of arguments: 'If something is written, did someone write it?' It is written that 'you are sitting'; this is a false statement, but was true at the time when it was written; therefore what was written is at the same time false and true. No, for the falsity or truth of a statement or opinion does not denote a substance but a quality; for the same account applies to an opinion as to a statement. Again, 'Is what the learner learns that which he learns?' A man learns a slow march quick; it is not then what he learns that is meant but how he learns it. Again, 'Does a man trample on that through which he walks?' But he walks through the whole day. Was not what
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όλην. ἣ οὐχ ὁ βαδίζει ἀλλ' ὅτε βαδίζει εἰρήκεν. οὐδ' ὅταν τὴν κύλικα πίνειν, ὅ πίνει ἀλλ' ἐξ οὐ. 35 καὶ ἀρ' ὁ τῆς οἶδεν ἢ μαθῶν ἢ εὐρῶν οἶδεν; ὡν δὲ τὸ μὲν εὑρὲ τὸ δ' ἔμαθε, τὰ ἀμφῶς οὐδέτερον. ἦν ὁ μὲν ἅπαν, ἥ δ' ὃ ὃν ἐπαντὰ; 1 καὶ ὅτι ἐστὶ τις τρίτος ἄνθρωπος παρ' αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς καθ' ἐκαστον. τὸ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅπαν τὸ κοινὸν οὐ τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε τι ἢ πρός τι ἢ πῶς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων τι ση-

179 a μαίνει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Κορίσκος καὶ Κο-

ρίσκος μουσικός, πότερον ταύτον ἢ ἐτερον; τὸ μὲν γὰρ τόδε τι τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε σημαίνει, ὡστ' οὐκ ἕστων αὐτὸ ἐκθέοθαν· οὐ τὸ ἐκτίθεοθαι δὲ ποιεῖ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅπερ τόδε τι εἰναί συγ-

δ' χωρεῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἔσται τόδε τι εἰναί, ὅπερ Καλλίας,

καὶ ὅπερ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. οὐδ' εἰ τὶς τὸ ἐκτίθε-

μενον μὴ ὅπερ τόδε τι εἰναί λέγοι ἀλλ' ὅπερ ποιον, οὐδὲν διοίσει· ἐσται γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν τι, οἰων ὁ ἄνθρωπος. φανερόν οὖν ὅτι οὐ δοτέον τόδε τι εἰναί τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, 10 ἀλλ' ἦτοι ποιον ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποσον ἢ τῶν τοιούτων τι σημαίνειν.

XXIII. Ἐλως δ' ἐν τοῖς παρὰ την λέξιν λόγοις ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἐσται ἢ λύσις ἢ παρ' ὃ

1 Reading ἄ δ' ὃν ἐπαντά with Pickard-Cambridge.
was meant not what he walks through but when he walks? Just as when we talk of a man drinking a cup, we refer not to what he drinks but to that out of which he drinks. Again, 'Is it not either by learning or by discovery that a man knows what he knows?' But, supposing that of two things he has discovered one and learnt the other, he has not either discovered or learnt the two taken together. Is it not true to say that what he knows is each single thing, but not all the things taken together? There is also the argument that there is a 'third man' beside 'man' and 'individual men.' This is not so, for 'man' and every generic term denotes not an individual substance but a quality or relation or mode or something of the kind. So, too, with the question whether 'Coriscus' and 'the musician Coriscus' are the same thing or different. For the one term denotes an individual substance, the other a quality, so that it is impossible to isolate it; for it is not the process of isolation which produces the 'third man' but the admission that there is an individual substance. For 'man' will not be an individual substance as Callias is, nor will it make any difference if one were to say that what is isolated is not an individual substance but a quality; for there will still be a one as contrasted with the many, for instance 'man.' It is obvious, therefore, that it must not be granted that the term predicated universally of a class is an individual substance, but we must say that it denotes either a quality or a relation or a quantity or something of the kind.

XXIII. To sum up, in dealing with arguments which turn on language the solution will always depend on the opposite of that on which the argument
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15 εἰ παρὰ προσωφίαν οξείαν, ἡ βαρεία προσωφία λύσις, εἰ δὲ παρὰ βαρείαν, ἡ οξεία. εἰ δὲ παρ' ὄμωνυμίᾳ, ἔστι τὸ ἀντικείμενον ὄνομα εἰπόντα λύειν, οἷον εἰ ἄψυχον1 συμβαίνει λέγειν, ἀποφήσαντα μὴ εἶναι, δηλοῦν ὡς ἔστων ἐμψυχον. εἰ δ' ἄψυχον ἐφησεν, δ' ἐμψυχον συνελογίσατο, λέγειν ὧς ἔστων ἄψυχον. ὃμοιως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἄμφιβολίας. εἰ δὲ παρ' ὁμοιότητα λέξεως, τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἔσται λύσις. ἀρ' δ' μὴ εἴη, δοῖῃ ἀν τις; ἡ οὖχ δ' οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλ' ὡς οὗκ ἔχει, οἷον ἕνα μόνον ἀστράγαλον. ἀρ' δ' ἐπίσταται, μαθῶν ἡ εὑρῶν ἐπίσταται; ἀλλ' οὐχ δ' ἐπίσταται. καὶ2 δ' βαδίζει 25 πατεῖ, ἀλλ' οὖχ ὅτε. ὃμοιως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

XXIV. Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός μία μὲν ἡ αὐτὴ λύσις πρὸς ἀπαντας. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀδι- όριστόν ἔστι τὸ πότε λεκτέων ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ὑπάρχῃ, καὶ ἐπ' ἐνίων 30 μὲν δοκεῖ καὶ φασὶν, ἐπ' ἐνίων δ' οὖ φασιν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι, ῥήτεον οὖν συμβιβασθέντος3 ὃμοιως πρὸς ἀπαντας ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαίον. ἔχειν δὲ δει προφέρειν τὸ οἶον. εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός. ἀρ' οἴδας ὁ μέλλω

1 Reading ἄψυχον with Poste for ἐμψυχον.
2 Omitting εἰ after καὶ.
3 Reading συμβιβασθέντος with Α.

a See note on 178 a 31. b See 178 b 32-33.
turns; for example, if the argument turns on combination, the solution will be by division, if on division, by combination. Again, if it turns on acute accentuation, grave accentuation will be the solution, and vice versa. If it turns on equivocation, it can be solved by the use of the opposite term; for example, if it so happens that one says something is inanimate after having denied that it is so, one must show that it is animate; and, if one has said that it is inanimate and one’s opponent has argued that it is animate, one must assert that it is inanimate. Similarly, too, in the case of ambiguity; if the argument turns on similarity of language, the opposite will be the solution. ‘Could one give what one has not got?’ Surely not what he has not got but he could give it in a way in which he has not got it, for example, a single die a by itself. ‘Does a man know the thing which he knows by learning or discovery?’ Yes, but not ‘the things which he knows.’ Also a man tramples on the thing through which he walks, not on the time through which he walks. b And similarly, too, with the other instances.

XXIV. To meet arguments which turn upon accident one and the same solution is universally applicable. It is undetermined on what occasions the attribute should be applied to the subject where it belongs to the accident, and sometimes it is generally held and stated to belong and sometimes it is denied that it necessarily belongs. We must, therefore, when a conclusion has been reached, assert in every case alike that it does not necessarily belong. But we must have an example to bring forward. All such arguments as the following turn on accident: ‘Do you know what I am about to ask you?’ ‘Do you know the man...
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σε ἐρωτάν; ἂρ' οἴδας τὸν προσιόντα ἢ τὸν ἐγκεκαλυμμένον; ἂρ' ὁ ἀνδριάς σὸν ἐστὶν ἐργον, ἢ 35 σὸς ὁ κύων πατήρ; ἄρα τὰ ὀλιγάκις ὀλίγα ὀλίγα; φανερὸν γὰρ ἐν ἄπασι τούτοις ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κατὰ τὸν συμβεβηκότος καὶ κατὰ τοῦ πράγματος ἀληθεύεσθαι: μόνοις γὰρ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀδιαφόροις καὶ ἐν οὐσίν ἀπαντά δοκεῖ ταὐτὰ ὑπάρ-

179 b χειν· τῷ δ' ἀγαθῷ οὐ ταύτην ἐστὶν ἀγαθῷ τ' εἶναι καὶ μέλλοντι ἐρωτάσθαι, οὐδὲ τῷ προσιόντι ἢ ἐγκεκαλυμμένῳ προσιόντι τε εἶναι καὶ Κορίσκω: ὥστ' οὐκ εἰ οἴδα τὸν Κορίσκον, ἀγνοοὶ δὲ τὸν προσιόντα, τὸν αὐτὸν οἴδα καὶ ἀγνοῶ· οὐδ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐμὸν, 5 ἐστὶ δ' ἐργον, ἐμὸν ἐστὶν ἐργον, ἀλλ' ἢ κτῆμα ἢ πράγμα ἢ ἄλλο τι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

Λύουσι δὲ τινες ἀναροῦντες τὴν ἐρώτησιν· φασὶ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ταῦτῳ πράγμα εἰδέναι καὶ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ ταῦτό· τὸν οὖν προσιόντα οὐκ εἰδότες, 10 τὸν δὲ Κορίσκον εἰδότες, ταῦτῳ μὲν εἰδέναι καὶ ἀγνοεῖν φασίν, ἀλλ' οὗ κατὰ ταῦτό. καὶ τοῦ πρῶτον μὲν, καθάπερ ὅδη εἴπομεν, δεῖ τῶν παρὰ ταῦτο λόγων τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι διόρθωσιν. αὐτὴ δ' οὐκ ἐσται, ἄν τις μὴ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἢ πῶς ἔχειν τὸ αὐτό ἀξίωμα λαμβάνῃ, οἴον εἰ ὀδε

a See 179 b 15. Cf. Plato, Euthydemus 298 e.
b The reference here is to the question (a 33) ‘Do you know what I am about to ask you?’ The reply is ‘no.’ ‘I am going to ask you about the good; therefore, you do not know about the good.’
c 177 b 31.
who is coming towards us? ’ or ‘ the man with his face covered? ’ ‘ Is the statue your work? ’ or ‘ Is the dog your father? ’ a ‘ Is the result of multiplying a small number by another small number itself a small number? ’ It is obvious that in all these instances it does not necessarily follow that the attribute which is true of the accident is also true of the subject. For it is only to things which are indistinguishable and one in essence that all the same attributes are generally held to belong; but in the case of the good, it is not the same thing to be good and to be about to be the subject of a question.b Nor in the case of ‘ the man who is coming towards us ’ (or ‘ with his face covered ’), is ‘ to be coming towards us ’ the same thing as ‘ to be Coriscus ’; so that, if I know Coriscus but do not know the man who is coming towards me, it does not follow that I know and do not know the same man. And again, if this is ‘ mine ’ and if it is also ‘ a piece of work,’ it is not therefore ‘ a piece of my work ’ but may be my possession or chattel or something else. The other instances can be treated in the same way.

Some people obtain a solution by demolishing the thesis of the question; for they say that it is possible to know and not to know the same thing but not in the same respect; when, therefore, they do not know the man who is coming towards them but know Coriscus, they say that they know and do not know the same thing but not in the same respect. Yet in the first place, as we have already said, c the method of correcting arguments which turn on the same principle ought to be identical, yet this will not be so, if one takes the same axiom to apply not to ‘ knowledge ’ but to ‘ existence ’ or ‘ being in a certain state ’; for
15 ἐστὶ πατήρ, ἐστὶ δὲ σῶς· εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ ἐνίων τοῦτ ἐστίν ἀληθές καὶ ἐνδέχεται ταὐτὸ εἰδέναι καὶ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα οὐδὲν κοινωνεῖ τὸ λεχθὲν. οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον πλείους μοχθηρίας ἔχειν. ἀλλ' οὐ ς ἡ πάσης ἀμαρτίας ἐμφάνισις λύσις ἐστίν· ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ ὅτι μὲν ψεῦδος συλλελόγισται
20 δεῖξαι τινα, παρ' δὲ μή δείξαι, οἶον τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ κινηθῆναι. ὡστε καὶ εἰ τις ἐπιχειροῖ συνάγειν ὡς ἀδύνατον, ἀμαρτάνει, κἂν εἰ μυριάκις ἡ συλλελογισμένος· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτὴ λύσις. ἤν γὰρ ἡ λύσις ἐμφάνισις ψευδοῦς συλλογισμοῦ, παρ' δ' ὁ̂ς ψευδῆς: εἰ οὖν μή συλλελόγισται ἡ
25 καὶ ἀλήθες ἡ ψεῦδος ἡ ψευδῶς ἡ ἐπιχειρεῖ συνάγειν, ἡ ἐκεῖνον δήλωσις λύσις ἐστίν. ἵσως δὲ καὶ τοῦτ ἐπ' ἐνίων οὐδὲν κωλύει συμβαίνειν· πλὴν ἐπὶ γε τούτων οὐδὲ τοῦτο δόξειν ἀν' καὶ γὰρ τὸν Κορίσκον ὅτι Κορίσκος οἶδε, καὶ τὸ προσιόν ὅτι προσιόν. ἐνδέχεσθαι δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ αὐτὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μή, 30 οἶον ὅτι μὲν λευκὸν εἰδέναι, ὅτι δὲ μουσικὸν μὴ γνωρίζειν· οὖτω γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ οἶδε καὶ οὐκ οἶδεν, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταὐτόν. τὸ δὲ προσιόν καὶ Κορίσκον, καὶ ὅτι προσιόν καὶ ὅτι Κορίσκος, οἶδεν.

'Ὅμοιως δ' ἀμαρτάνουσι καὶ οἱ λύοντες, ὅτι ἀπας

1 Reading with W. A. Pickard-Cambridge ψεῦδος ψευδῶς.

a Cf. a 34 f., the false conclusion being, 'This dog is your father.'
example, 'this dog is a father, this dog is yours.' Though it is sometimes true and it is possible to know and not to know the same thing, yet the suggested solution is quite inapplicable in the above instance. But there is no reason why the same argument should not contain several flaws, but it is not the exposure of every fault that forms a solution; for it is possible for a man to show that a false conclusion has been reached without showing on what point it turns, as, for instance, in Zeno's argument that motion is impossible. Even, therefore, if one were to attempt to infer the impossibility of this view, he is wrong, even though he has given countless proofs; for this procedure does not constitute a solution, for a solution is, as we saw, an exposure of false reasoning, showing on what the falsity depends. If, therefore, he has not proved his case or else if he attempts to draw an inference, whether true or false, by false means, the unmasking of this procedure is a solution. But perhaps, though in some cases there is nothing to prevent this happening, yet it would not be generally admitted in the instances given above; for he knows that Coriscus is Coriscus and that what is coming towards him is coming towards him. But there are cases in which it is generally held to be possible to know and not to know the same thing; for instance, one can know that someone is white but be ignorant of the fact that he is musical, thus knowing and not knowing the same thing but not in the same respect; but as to what is coming towards him and Coriscus, he knows both that it is coming towards him and that he is Coriscus.

An error similar to that made by those whom we have mentioned is committed by those who solve
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179 b

35 ἀριθμὸς ὀλίγος, ὥσπερ οὖς εἴπομεν· εἰ γὰρ µὴ συμπεραινοµένου, τοῦτο παραλιπόντες, ἀληθὲς συµ- 
πεπεράνθαι φασὶ, πάντα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ πολὺν καὶ 
ὁλίγον, ἀµαρτάνουσιν.

"Ενιοὶ δὲ καὶ τῷ δυτὶκῷ λύουσι τοὺς συλλογισµοὺς, 
οἴον ὅτι σὸς ἐστὶ πατήρ ἡ νῦς ἡ δοῦλος. καὶ τοιοῦ 
180 a φανερὸν ὃς εἰ παρὰ τὸ πολλαχῶς λέγεσθαι φαίνεται 
ὁ ἐλεγχὸς, δεῖ τοῦνοµα ἡ τὸν λόγον κυρίως εἶναι 
πλειόνων· τὸ δὲ τόνδ’ εἶναι τοῦτο τέκνον οὐδεὶς 
λέγει κυρίως, εἰ δεσπότης ἐστὶ τέκνου· ἀλλὰ παρὰ 
5 τὸ συµβεβηκός ἡ σύνθεσις ἐστὶν. ἀρ’ ἐστὶ τοῦτο 
σῶν; ναὶ. ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο τέκνον; σὸν ἀρὰ τοῦτο 
tέκνον· ὅτι συµβεβηκεν εἶναι καὶ σῶν καὶ τέκνον, 
ἀλλ’ οὐ σῶν τέκνον.

Καὶ τὸ εἶναι τῶν κακῶν τι ἀγαθῶν· ἡ γὰρ φρόνη-
σίς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήµη τῶν κακῶν. τὸ δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ-
των εἶναι οὐ λέγεται πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ κτήµα. εἰ 
δ’ ἄρα πολλαχῶς (καὶ γὰρ τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν τῶν ζωῶν 
φαµὲν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐ τι κτήµα) καὶ έάν τι πρὸς τὰ 
κακὰ λέγηται ὡς τινός, διὰ τοῦτο τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν, 
ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦτο τῶν κακῶν. παρὰ τὸ πῇ οὖν καὶ 
ἀπλῶς φαίνεται. καὶ τοιοῦ ἐνδέχεται ἓνως ἀγαθὸν 
15 εἶναι τι τῶν κακῶν δυτὶκῶς, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου 
tοῦτος, ἀλλ’ εἰ τι δοῦλον εἰη ἀγαθὸν μοχθηροῦ, 
μᾶλλον. ἓνως δ’ οὐδ’ οὕτως· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἀγαθὸν καὶ

ᵃ When it is equivalent to our 'so-and-so’s.'
the argument that every number is small; for if, when no conclusion has been reached, they pass over the fact and say that a conclusion has been reached and is true because every number is both large and small, they are committing an error.

Some people, too, solve these reasonings by the principle of ambiguity, saying, for example, that 'yours' means 'your father' or 'your son' or 'your slave.' Yet it is obvious that, if the refutation turns upon the possibility of several meanings, the term or expression ought to be used literally in several senses; but no one speaks of A as B's child in the literal sense if B is the child's master, but the combination is due to accident. 'Is A yours?' 'Yes.' 'Is A a child?' 'Yes.' 'Then A is your child,' for he happens to be both yours and a child; but for all that he is not 'your child.'

There is also the argument that 'something "of evils"' is good; for wisdom is a knowledge "of evils."' But the statement that this is 'of so-and-so' is not used with several meanings but denotes possession. Granting, however, that the genitive has more than one meaning (for we say that man is 'of the animals,' though not a possession of theirs), and if the relation of so-and-so to evils is expressed by the genitive, it is therefore a so-and-so 'of evils,' but so-and-so is not one of the evils. The difference seems to be due to whether the genitive is used in a particular sense or absolutely. Yet it is perhaps possible for the saying 'Something of evils is good' to be ambiguous, though not in the example given above, but rather in the phrase 'a slave is good of the wicked.' But perhaps this example is not to the point either; for if something is 'good' and 'of so-and-so,' it is not at
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τούτου, ἀγαθὸν τούτου ἅμα. οὖδὲ τὸ τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν
φάναι τῶν ζῷων εἰναι οὐ λέγεται πολλαχῶς· οὐ
gὰρ εἰ ποτὲ τι σημαίνομεν ἀφελόντες, τοῦτο λέ-
gεται πολλαχῶς· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἦμισυ εἰσόντες τοῦ
ἐποὺς δός μοι Ἰλιάδα σημαίνομεν, οίον τὸ μήν
ἀείδε θεά.

XXV. Τούς δὲ παρὰ τὸ κυρίως τόδε ἢ πῇ ἢ
ποῦ ἢ πῶς ἢ πρὸς τι λέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς,
λυτέον σκοποῦντι τὸ συμπέρασμα πρὸς τὴν ἀντί-
φασιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τούτων τι πεποιθέναι. τὰ
gὰρ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα καὶ φάσιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν
ἀπλῶς μὲν ἄδυνατον ὑπάρχειν τῷ αὐτῷ, πῇ μέντοι
ἐκάτερον ἢ πρὸς τι ἢ πῶς, ἢ τὸ μὲν πῇ τὸ δ'
ἀπλῶς, οὐδὲν κωλύει. ὥστ' εἰ τόδε μὲν ἀπλῶς
τόδε δὲ πῇ, οὕτω ἐλεγχος. τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῷ συμ-
περάσματι θεωρητέον πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν.

Εἰς δὲ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι τοῦτ' ἔχοντες.
ἀρ' ἐνδέχεται τὸ μὴ ὦν εἰναι; ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐστὶ γέ
τι μὴ ὦν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὦν οὐκ ἐσται· οὐ
gὰρ 35 ἐσται τι τῶν ὄντων. ἀρ' ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτὸν ἅμα
eυορκεῖν καὶ ἐπιορκεῖν; ἀρ' ἐγχώρει τὸν αὐτὸν
ἀμα τῷ αὐτῷ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀπειθεῖν; ἢ οὔτε
tὸ εἰναι τι καὶ εἰναι ταῦτον; τὸ δὲ μὴ ὦν, οὐκ εἰ
ἐστι τι, καὶ ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς· οὔτ' εἰ εὐορκεῖ τόδε ἢ
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the same time 'so and-so's good.' Nor is the statement that 'man is of the animals' used with several meanings; for a phrase does not acquire several senses every time we express its meaning in an elliptical form; for we express, 'Give me the Iliad' by quoting the half line 'Sing, goddess, the wrath.'

XXV. Arguments which turn upon the use of an expression not in its proper sense but with validity in respect only of a particular thing or in a particular respect or place or degree or relation and not absolutely, must be solved by examining the conclusion in the light of its contradictory, to see if it can possibly have been affected in any of these ways. For it is impossible for contraries and opposites and an affirmative and a negative to belong absolutely to the same subject; on the other hand, there is no reason why each should not belong in a particular respect or relation or manner, or one in a particular respect and the other absolutely. Thus if one belongs absolutely and the other in a particular respect, no refutation has yet been reached. This point must be examined in the conclusion by comparison with its contradictory.

All the following arguments are of this kind: Is it possible for what is-not to be? But surely it is something which is not. Similarly, too, Being will not be; for it will not be any particular thing which is.—Is it possible for the same man at the same time to keep and to break his oath?—Is it possible for the same man at the same time to obey and disobey the same order? Is it not true, in the first place, that being something and Being are not the same thing? On the other hand, Not-being, even if it is something, has not absolute being as well. Secondly, if a man keeps his oath on a particular occasion or in a par-

(2) The use of words with or without qualification.
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180 a  

τῆδε, ἀνάγκη καὶ εὐφορκεῖν, δ' ὁ μόσας ἐπιορκήσειν

180 b εὐφορκεῖ ἐπιορκῶν τοῦτο μόνον, εὐφορκεῖ δὲ οὐ· οὐδ' ὁ ἀπειθῶν πείθεται, ἀλλὰ τι πείθεται. ὁμοίως δ' ὁ λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ ψεύδοσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν ἁμα καὶ ἀληθεύειν· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι εὐθεῶρητον, ποτέρως ἀν τις ἀποδοίη τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀληθεύει̣ν ἦ ζεύδει̣ 5 ζθαί, δύσκολον φαίνεται. κωλύει δ' τὸν αὐτὸν οὔδεν ἀπλῶς μὲν εἶναι ψευδῆ, πῇ δ' ἀληθῆ, ἦ τινὸς καὶ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τινά, ἀληθῆ δὲ (αὐτὸν) μὴ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸς τι καὶ ποῦ καὶ πότε· πάντες γὰρ ὁι τοιοῦτοι λόγοι παρὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνουσιν. ἄρ' ἦ νῦσεια ἦ ὁ πλοῦτος ἁγαθὸν; ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄφροι 10 καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς χρωμένω σὸν ἁγαθὸν· ἁγαθὸν ἁρα καὶ ὁκ ἁγαθὸν. ἄρα τὸ ψυγείαν ἦ δύνασθαι ὑπὸ πόλει ἁγαθὸν; ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ὅτε οὐ βέλτιον· ταύτου ἁρα τῷ αὐτῷ ἁγαθὸν καὶ ὁκ ἁγαθὸν. ἦ οὐδέν κωλύει ἀπλῶς ὅν ἁγαθὸν τῷ ὑδ' εἰναι ἁγαθὸν, ἦ τῷ ὑδὲ μὲν ἁγαθὸν, ἀλλ' οὐ νῦν ἦ οὐκ ἐνταὐθ' ἁγαθὸν; 15 ἄρ' ὁ μὴ βουλεύτ' ἀν ὁ φρόνιμος, κακὸν; ἀποβαλεῖν δ' οὐ βούλεται τάγαθὸν· κακὸν ἁρα τάγαθὸν. οὐ γὰρ ταύτην εἰπεῖν τάγαθὸ εἰναι κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν τάγαθὸν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ τοῦ κλέπτου

1 Reading τὸν αὐτὸν or τοῦτον for αὐτὸν.
ticular respect, it does not necessarily follow that he is a keeper of oaths, but he who he has sworn that he will break his oath keeps his oath on this particular occasion only by foreswearing himself, but is not a keeper of oaths; nor is he who disobeys obedient, except to a particular order. The argument is similar which deals with the question whether the same man can say what is at the same time both true and false; but it presents apparent difficulties because it is not easy to see whether the qualification 'absolutely' should be applied to 'true' or to 'false.' But there is no reason why the same man should not be absolutely a liar yet tell the truth in some respects, or that some of a man's words should be true but he himself not be truthful. Similarly, too, if there are qualifications of relation or place or time. All the following arguments turn upon a point of this kind. Is health (or wealth) a good thing? But to the fool who misuses it, it is not a good thing; it is, therefore, a good thing and not a good thing.—Is health (or political power) a good thing? But there are times when it is not better than other things; therefore the same thing is both good and not good for the same man. Or is there no reason why a thing should not be absolutely good but not good for a particular person, or good for a particular person, but not good at the present moment or here?—Is that which the wise man would not wish, an evil? But he does not wish for the rejection of the good; therefore, the good is an evil. This is not true; for it is not the same thing to say that the good is an evil and that the rejection of the good is an evil. So likewise with the argument about the thief; it does not follow,
λόγος. οὐ γὰρ εἰ κακὸν ἐστιν ὁ κλέπτης, καὶ τὸ
20 λαβεῖν ἐστὶν κακόν· οὐκον τὸ κακὸν βούλεται, ἀλλὰ
τάγαθον· τὸ γὰρ λαβεῖν ἀγαθὸν ἁγαθὸν. καὶ ἡ
νάσας κακὸν ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν νάσας.
ἀρα τὸ δίκαιον τοῦ ἀδίκου καὶ τὸ δίκαιος τοῦ
ἀδίκως αἱρετώτερον; ἀλλ᾽ ἀποθανεῖν ἀδίκως αἱρε-
τώτερον. ἀρα δίκαιον ἐστιν τα αὐτῶν ἔχειν ἔκαστοι;
25 ἀ δ᾽ ἂν τις κρύᾳ κατὰ δόξαν τὴν αὐτοῦ, κἂν ἡ
ψευδῆ, κύρια ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου· τὸ αὐτὸ ἀρα
δίκαιον καὶ οὐ δίκαιον. καὶ πότερα δεὶ κρύειν τὸν
τὰ δίκαια λέγοντα ἡ τὸν τὰ ἀδίκα; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ
τὸν ἀδικούμενον δίκαιον ἐστιν ἰκανῶς λέγειν ἡ
ἐπαθεν· ταύτα δ᾽ ἦν ἀδίκα. οὐ γὰρ εἰ παθεῖν τι
ἀδίκως αἱρετόν, τὸ ἀδίκως αἱρετώτερον τοῦ δι-
30 καίως· ἀλλ᾽ ἀπλῶς μὲν τὸ δίκαιως, τοδὲ μέντοι
οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀδίκως ἡ δικαίως. καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ
αὐτῶν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ τάλλοτρα οὐ δίκαιον· κρίσιν
μέντοι ταύτην δικαίαν εἶναι οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἶον ἂν
ἡ κατὰ δόξαν τοῦ κρίναντος· οὐ γὰρ εἰ δίκαιον
τοδὲ ἡ ὁδή, καὶ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
35 ἀδίκα ὅντα οὐδὲν κωλύει λέγειν γε αὐτὰ δίκαιον
eἶναι· οὐ γὰρ εἰ λέγειν δίκαιον, ἀνάγκη δίκαια
eἶναι, ὃσπερ οὐδ᾽ εἰ ωφέλιμον λέγειν, ωφέλιμα.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δικαίων. ὥστ᾽ οὐκ εἰ
if the thief is an evil, that to acquire things is also an evil. The thief, therefore, does not wish for what is evil but for what is good; for to acquire something good is good. Also disease is an evil, but to get rid of disease is not an evil.—Is what is just preferable to what is unjust and are just circumstances preferable to unjust? But it is preferable to be put to death unjustly.—Is it just that each man should have his own? But judgements which a man passes in accordance with his personal opinion, even if they are false, are valid in the eyes of the law; the same thing, therefore, is just and not just.—Again, should judgement be given in favour of him who says what is just or of him who says what is unjust? But it is just for the victim of injustice to state in full the things which he has suffered, and these things were unjust. For if to suffer something unjustly is an object of choice, it does not follow that unjust circumstances are preferable to just, but, absolutely, justice is preferable; but this does not prevent unjust circumstances being preferable to just in a particular case. Again, it is just that a man should have his own, and it is not just that he should have what belongs to another; but there is no reason why any judgement which is given in accordance with the judge’s opinion should not be just; for, if it is just in a particular case and in particular circumstances, it is not also absolutely just. Similarly, too, there is no reason why, though things are unjust, merely saying them should not be just. For if to say things is just, it does not follow that they are just, any more than, if it is expedient to say things, it follows that those things are expedient. Similarly, too, with things that are just. So that if what is said is unjust,
180 b  
τὰ λεγόμενα ἄδικα, δὲ λέγων ἄδικα νικᾷ. λέγει γὰρ δὲ λέγειν ἐστὶ δίκαια, ἀπλῶς δὲ καὶ παθεῖν ἄδικα.

181 a  
XXVI. Τοῖς δὲ παρὰ τὸν ὀρισμὸν γινομένοις τοῦ ἐλέγχου, καθάπερ ὑπεγράφη πρῶτον, ἀπαντήτεον σκοποῦσι τὸ συμπέρασμα πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν, ὅπως ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὕσαυτώς καὶ ἕν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ. ἔὰν δ' ἐν ἀρχῇ προσέρηται, οὐχ ὀμολογητέον ὡς ἀδύνατον τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι διπλάσιον καὶ μὴ διπλάσιον, ἀλλὰ φατέον, μὴ μέντοι ὡδί, ὡς ποτ' ἢν τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι διωμολογημένον. εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες οἶδ' οἱ λόγοι παρὰ τὸ τοιοῦτο. ἄρ' ὁ εἰδὼς ἐκαστὸν ὅτι ἐκαστὸν, οἴδε τὸ πράγμα; καὶ δ' ἄγνοϊς ὕσαυτώς; εἰδὼς δὲ τις τὸν Κορίσκον ὅτι Κορίσκος, ἄγνοοι ἂν ὅτι μουσικός, ἄστε ταυτὸ ἐπίσταται καὶ ἄγνοει. ἄρα τὸ τετράπετυχο τοῦ τριπήχεος μεῖζον; γένοιτο δ' ἄν ἐκ τριπήχους τετράπετυχι κατὰ τὸ μήκος· τὸ δὲ μεῖζον ἐλάττονος μεῖζον· αὐτὸ ἄρα αὐτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἐλαττον.

15 XXVII. Τοὺς δὲ παρὰ τὸ αὐτεἰσθαί καὶ λαμβάνειν τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ πυθανομένω μέν, ἄν ἦ δῆλον, οὐ δοτέον, οὐδ' ἂν ἐνδοξοῦ ἦ, λέγοντα τάληθες. ἂν δὲ λάθη, τὴν ἄγνοιαν διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν

ₐ 167 a 23.
it does not follow that it is a case of the man who uses unjust pleas winning his cause; for he is saying things which it is just for him to say but which are, absolutely, unjust for anyone to suffer.

XXVI. Refutations which are connected with the definition of the refutation must, as suggested above, be met by examining the conclusion in the light of its contradictory and seeing how the same term shall be present in the same respect and in the same relation, manner and time. In putting this additional question at the beginning, you must not admit that it is impossible for the same thing to be both double and not double but must admit the possibility but not in the way that was once admitted to fulfil the conditions of a refutation. All the following arguments depend upon a point of this kind. 'Does he who knows that A is A, know the thing A?' And, similarly, 'Does he who does not know that A is A, not know the thing A?' But one who knows that Coriscus is Coriscus, might not know that he is musical, so that he both knows and is ignorant of the same thing.—Again, 'Is an object which is four cubits long greater than an object which is three cubits long?' But an object three cubits long might become four cubits long. Now the greater is greater than the less; therefore the object is itself greater and less than itself.

XXVII. In refutations which are connected with the begging and assuming of the original point at issue, it should not be granted to a questioner, if his procedure is obvious, even though his view is generally accepted, but you should state the truth. If, on the other hand, his procedure is not detected, you should, owing to the badness of such arguments,
ARISTOTLE

181 a
toioùtwv lógonv eis tôn érwtwnta metatrepptéon
ws ou dieilegmenon': o gar ëleugvos ãneu tout ou 20
árchiß. eîn' oti eðóth suxh ws toutw xherisoumenou, 
all' ws pros touto sullugionuméno toûnavtión ë
epi tout paraxelégxon.

XXVIII. Kai touti dià tout parapoméno soum-
biβiβázontas ep' auto òto lógon deiktéon. ësita de
ditt' ë tout epoménon akoloubhßis. ò gar ws tout
25 en mére òto katholou, oux anðhrwptw ësoun' ãxioùta
gar, ei touta metà toutde, kai tout elnav metà toutde.
ò kata tas antithéseis: ei gar tout totde akoloubhei,
tout antikeimevno tout antikeímenon. par' ò kai ò tout
Melisoun lógonv: ei gar tout gegevnon ëxei arxhín, tout
âgennhtov ãxioi ù ëxein, òst' ei âgennhtos ò ouro-
30 vos, kai ãpetíros. tout ò ouk ëstiai: anápalin gar
ò akoloubhßis.

XXIX. Osoi te parà tout proosthènai tou sull-
gugízontai, skopeîn ei afairoumenou sümßaínei ùhdein
ìtton tout adýnaton. kapetíta touto èmfainistéon,
kai lektéon ws èðwkev oux ws dokouv all' ws
35 pros tout lógonov, ò de kérrhtai oudein pros tout
lógonov.

XXX. Pròs de tout tout plieî ërwtìmata en
poioúntas euðhsw ën ãrchi dioristéon. ërwtíhsw
gar mia pros ìn mia ðpokrisi ëstiai, òst' outhe
make your ignorance recoil on the head of the questioner, on the ground that he has not argued properly; for refutation must proceed without any assumption of the original point. Next, you must argue that the point was granted with the idea that he was going to use it not as a premiss but in order to argue the opposite view to it or for the purpose of refutations on side issues.

XXVIII. Again, those refutations which draw their conclusions through the consequent must be exposed in the argument itself. There are two ways in which consequences follow: Either as the universal follows from the particular, as 'animal' follows from 'man'; for it is claimed that, if A accompanies B, then B also accompanies A. Or else the process goes by opposites; for if A follows B, A's opposite will follow B's opposite. It is on this, too, that the argument of Melissus depends; for he claims that, if that which has come to be has a beginning, that which has not come to be has no beginning, and so, if the heaven has not come to be, it is also eternal. But this is not true; for the sequence is the reverse.

XXIX. In refutations which are argued by means of some addition, you must examine whether the impossibility occurs none the less when the addition has been withdrawn. If so, then the answerer should make this fact clear and should state that he granted the addition not because he believed in it but for the sake of the argument, but that his opponent has made no use of it at all for his argument.

XXX. In dealing with those who make several questions into one, you should draw a distinction immediately at the beginning. For a question is single to which there is only one answer, so that one
181 a
πλείω καθ' ἐνὸς οὕτε ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν καθ'

181 b ἐνὸς φατέον ἢ ἀποφατέον. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑμω-
νύμων ὅτε μὲν ἀμφοῖν ὅτε δ' οὐδετέρῳ ὑπάρχει,
ὡστε μή ἀπλοῦ οὖντος τοῦ ἐρωτήματος ἀπλῶς ἀπο-
κρινομένοις οὐδὲν συμβαίνει πάσχειν, ὁμοίως καὶ
ἐπὶ τούτων. ὅταν μὲν οὖν τὰ πλείω τῷ ἐνὶ ἢ τῷ
5 ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχῃ, τῶ ἀπλῶς δόντι καὶ ἀμαρ-
tόντι ταύτην τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίωμα
συμβαίνει· ὅταν δὲ τῷ μὲν τῷ δὲ μή, ἢ πλείω κατὰ
πλειόνων, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς ὑπάρχει ἁμφότερα ἁμφότεροι,
ἔστι δ' ὡς οὖχ ὑπάρχει πάλιν, ὡστε τοῦτ'
eυλαβητέον.  οἶον ἐν τοῖς ἅμα λόγοις. εἰ τὸ μέν
10 ἔστιν ἁγαθὸν τὸ δὲ κακὸν, ὅτι ταύτα ἀληθές εἰπεῖν
ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ πάλιν μήτ' ἁγαθὸν μήτε
κακὸν (οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἕκατερον ἕκατερον), ὡστε
ταύτῳ ἁγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ οὕτ' ἁγαθὸν οὕτε κακὸν.
καὶ εἰ ἔκαστον αὐτὸ ἀυτῷ ταύτων, καὶ ἄλλου ἐτέρουν,
ἐπειδὴ ὃ ὅλλοις ταύτα ἄλλα αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐτέρα
15 αὐτῶν, ταύτα ἕαυτοῖς ἐτέρα καὶ ταύτα. ἐτι εἰ τὸ
μέν ἁγαθὸν κακὸν γίνεται, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἁγαθὸν
ἔστιν, δὗο γένοιτ' ἄν. δυνών τε καὶ ἄνων ἕκατε-
ρον αὐτὸ ἀυτῷ ὦσιν, ὡστε ἵσα καὶ ἄνω συν αὐτὰ
αὐτοῖς.

Ἐμπίπτουσι μὲν οὖν οὕτοι καὶ εἰς ἄλλας λύσεις·
20 καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἁμφότερον αὐτῶν πλῆθος σημαίνει·
οὐκοιν ταύτων, πλῆθον ὄνομα, συμβαίνει φήσαι καὶ

1 Reading ἐπειδὴ for ἐπεὶ δ' with Poste.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxx

must not affirm or deny several things of one thing nor one thing of several things, but one thing of one thing. But just as in the case of equivocal terms, a predicate is sometimes true of both meanings and sometimes of neither, and so, though the question is not simple, no detriment results if people give a simple answer, so too with these double questions. When, therefore, the several predicates are true of one subject, or one predicate of several subjects, no contradiction is involved in giving a simple answer, though he has made this mistake. But when the predicate is true of one subject but not of the other, or several predicates are true of several subjects, then there is a sense in which both are true of both but another sense, on the other hand, in which they are not; so one must be on one's guard against this. The following arguments illustrate this: (1) Supposing A is good and B evil, it is true to say that they are good and evil and, on the other hand, that they are neither good nor evil (for A is not evil and B is not good), so that the same thing is good and evil and neither good nor evil; (2) If everything is the same as itself and different from anything else, since things are not the same as other things but the same as themselves, and also different from themselves, the same things are both different from themselves and the same as themselves; (3) Moreover, if that which is good becomes evil and that which is evil is good, they would become two; and of two unequal things each is equal to itself, so that they are both equal and unequal to themselves.

These refutations also fall under other solutions; for the terms 'both' and 'all' have several meanings, so that to affirm or deny the same thing is verbal only,
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181 b

ἀποφήσαι· τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἦν ἔλεγχος. ἀλλὰ φανερὸν ὅτι μὴ μιᾶς ἐρωτήσεως τῶν πλειόνων γινομένης, 1 ἀλλ’ ἐν καθ’ ἐνὸς φάντος ἢ ἀποφάντος, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ἀδύνατον.

25 XXXI. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπαγόντων εἰς τὸ2 ταύτῳ πολλάκις εἰπεῖν, φανερὸν ὡς οὐ δοτέον τῶν πρὸς τι λεγομένων σημαίνειν τι χωριζομένας καθ’ αὐτὰς τὰς κατηγορίας, οἰον διπλάσιον ἀνευ τοῦ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος, ὅτι ἐμφαίνεται. καὶ γὰρ τὰ δέκα ἐν τοῖς ἐνὸς δέουσι δέκα καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ μὴ ποιῆσαι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῇ ἀποφάσει ἡ φάσις· ἀλλ’ ὀμοι σου ἐν τις λέγοι τοδὶ μὴ εἶναι λευκόν, λέγει αὐτὸ λευκόν εἶναι. τὸ δὲ διπλάσιον οὐδὲ σημαίνει οὐδὲν ἦσος, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμίσει· εἰ δ’ ἅρα καὶ σημαίνει, ἀλλ’ οὐ ταύτῳ καὶ συνηρημένον. οὐδ’ ἡ ἐπιστήμη 35 ἐν τῷ εἴδει, οἰον εἰ ἔστιν ἡ ἱατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη, ὀπερ τὸ κοινὸν· ἔκεινο δ’ ἦν ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς δι’ ὃν δηλοῦται κατηγορομένοις τοῦτο λεκτέον, ὡς οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ χωρίς καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ δηλούμενον. τὸ γὰρ κοίλον κοινὴ μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ δηλοὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σμοῦ καὶ τοῦ βοικοῦ, προστιθέμενον 182 a δὲ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἄλλα, τὸ μὲν τῇ ῥών τὸ δὲ τῶν σκέλει, σημαίνειν· ἐνθα μὲν γὰρ τὸ σμόν, ἐνθα δὲ

1 Reading γινομένης for γινομένων.
2 Inserting τὸ before ταύτῳ.
3 Reading σημαίνειν (σημαίνει ABD).
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxx–xxxi

and this, as we saw, is not a refutation. But clearly, if one of the several questions is not asked but the answerer affirms or denies a single predicate of a single subject, the reduction to an impossibility will not occur.

XXXI. As regards those who lead one on to repeat the same thing several times over, it is clear that one must not allow that predications of relative terms have any signification in themselves when separated from their correlatives; for example, that 'double' apart from the expression 'double of half' is significant, just because it appears in that expression. For 'ten' appears in the expression 'ten minus one' and 'do' in the expression 'not do,' and affirmations in general in negations; but, all the same, if one were to say 'this is not white,' one is not saying that it is white. 'Double' has possibly no signification at all, just as 'the' in 'the half' too signifies nothing. If it has any signification, it is not the same as in the combined expression. Nor is 'knowledge' of a specific kind, such as 'medical knowledge,' the same as 'knowledge' as a general term; for the latter has always meant 'knowledge of the knowable.' When dealing with terms which are predicated of the terms by means of which they are defined, you must say that the term defined is not the same when taken separately as it is in the combined expression. For 'concave' has the same general meaning when used of the snub-nosed and of the bandy-legged, but when it is combined in the one case with the nose and in the other with the leg, there is no reason why it should not signify different things, for in the first case it signifies 'snub,' in the other 'bandy,' and it makes
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182 a
tò ραβδὸν σημαίνει· καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει εἴπεῖν ρίς
σιμῆ ἢ ρίς κοίλη. ἔτι οὐ δοτέον τὴν λέξιν κατ᾽
eὐθὺς· ψεύδος γὰρ ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἐστι τὸ σιμὸν ρίς
κοίλη ἀλλὰ ρίνὸς τοῦ, οἰον πάθος, ὡστ’ οὐδὲν
ἀτοπον, εἰ ἡ ρίς ἡ σιμῆ ρίς ἐστιν ἔχουσα κοιλότητα
ρινὸς.

XXXII. Περὶ δὲ τῶν σολοικισμῶν, παρ’ ὦ τι
μὲν φαίνονται συμβαίνειν, εἰπομεν πρότερον, ὡς
dὲ λυτέον, ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν λόγων ἐσται φανερῶν.
10 ἀπαντεσ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῖδε τοῦτο βούλονται κατα-
σκευάζειν. ἂρ’ ὁ λέγεις ἀληθῶς, καὶ ἐστι τοῦτο
ἀληθῶς; φῆς δ’ εἰναι τι λίθον· ἐστιν ἢρα τι λίθον.
ἡ τὸ λέγειν λίθον οὐκ ἐστι λέγειν ο ἀλλ’ οὐν, οὐδὲ
tοῦτο ἀλλὰ τοῦτον· εἰ οὐν ἑροιτό τις, ἂρ’ οὐν ἀληθῶς
λέγεις, ἐστι τοῦτον, οὐκ ἀν δοκοῖ ἐλληνίζειν,
15 ὡσπερ οὐδ’ εἰ ἑροιτο, ἂρ’ ἢν λέγεις εἰναι, ἐστιν
οὗτος; ξύλον δ’ εἰπεῖν οὕτως, ἡ ὁσα μῆτε θῆλυ
μῆτ’ ἄρρεν σημαίνει, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. διὸ καὶ οὐ
γίνεται σολοικισμός, εἰ δ’ λέγεις εἰναι, ἐστι τοῦτο;
ξύλον δὲ λέγεις εἰναι· ἐστιν ἢρα ξύλον. ὁ δὲ λίθος
καὶ τὸ οὗτος άρρενος ἐχει κλῆσιν. εἰ δὲ τις ἑροιτο,
ἀρ’ οὗτος ἐστιν αὐτη; εἰτα πάλιν, τί δ’; οὐχ
20 οὗτος ἐστι Κορίσκος; εἰτ’ εἰπειεν, ἐστιν ἢρα οὗτος
αὐτη, οὐ συλλελογισται τὸν σολοικισμόν, οὐδ’ εἰ

1 Reading εἰπεῖν οὕτως for εἴπειν οὕτος.
2 Reading δὲ for δῆ.

a 165 b 20 f.
b The argument is clear in the original, because Greek is
an inflected language, whereas English does not distinguish
140
no difference whether you say ‘a snub nose’ or ‘a coneave nose.’ Further, the expression must not be allowed to pass without qualification; for it is a falsehood. For snubness is not a coneave nose but something, namely a condition, appertaining to a nose; so there is nothing absurd in supposing that a snub nose is one which possesses nasal concavity.

XXXII. As regards solecisms, we have already stated $^a$ the apparent cause of their occurrence; how they should be solved will be clear in the actual arguments. All the following arguments aim at producing this result: ‘Is a thing truly that which you truly affirm it to be?’ You affirm something to be a stone (accusative masculine) $^b$; therefore something (nominative neuter) is a stone (accusative masculine). Or does speaking of a stone (a masculine word) involve the use of the relative ‘whom’ rather than ‘which’ and the pronoun ‘him’ rather than ‘it’? If, then, one were to ask, ‘Is a stone him whom you truly state him to be?’, he would not be considered to be talking good Greek any more than if he were to ask, ‘Is he whom you state her to be?’ But the use of the word ‘stick,’ or any other neuter word, in this way, involves no difference between the nominative and accusative; therefore no solecism is committed if you say, ‘Is this what you affirm it to be?’ You affirm it to be a stick; therefore it is a stick. ‘Stone,’ however, and ‘he’ have the masculine gender. Now if one were to ask, ‘Can “he” be a “she”?’, and then again, ‘Why? Is he not Coriseus?’ and then were to say, ‘Then he is a she,’ he has not proved the solecism even if Coriseus

between the nominative and accusative except in the personal pronouns and the relative.

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182 a
to Korískos sēmaínei óper aúth, mú δídowši de
ó ἀποκρινόμενος, allá deí touto proserwerthēnai.
eí de mút' ēstiv múte δídowsin, ou sullleológustai
óute tō ònthe outhe pri's touto ērwteteménon. ómoeivos
25 ouv deí kakeí touto líthov sēmaínein ōtous. eí de
múthe ēstí múthe didotei, ou lektéon touto sumpérassma
faiúntai de parà touto tēn ēnómoion ptoios touto
óνomatos ómoeían fainevthai. ēr állhēres ēstiv eis-
pein ōti ēstiv aúth, óper eínai fῆs aúthēn; eínai
de fῆs ēspída. ēstiv ēra aúth ēspída. ŏ ouk
30 anágykh, eí mú touto aúth ēspída sēmaínei all' ēspis, touto
odulei de ēstiv aúth toutou, ēstiv ōtous, fῆs d' eínai Klēwna, ēstiv ēra ōtous
Klēwna: ou gār ēstiv ōtous Klēwna: eīrhetai gār
ōti ó fēmu eínai toutou, ēstiv ōtous, ou toutou:
oude gār ēn ēllhēnizoi ōtows touto ērwthēma lechēn.
35 ēr ēpístasai touto; touto d' ēstī líthos: ēpí-
stasai ēra líthos. ŏ ou tautō sēmaínei touto touto
ēn touto ēr ēpístasai touto kai ēn touto touto de
līthos, all' en méν touto prótop touto, ēn de touto
ûstērop ōtous; ēr ou ēpisthēmen ēxeis, ēpístasai
touto; ēpisthēmen d' ēxeis líthov: ēpístasai ēra
182 b líthov. ŏ touto méν toutou líthov légeis, touto de toutou

a But Cleon.
signifies a 'she,' though the answerer refuses to concede this; but this must be the subject of a further question. But if neither this is so nor does he concede it, then the solecism has not been proved either in fact or relatively to the person to whom the question was put. Similarly, therefore, in the first example also, 'he' must signify the stone. If, however, this is neither true nor is conceded, the conclusion must not be stated, though it is apparently true, because the case which is used of the word, which is unlike, appears to be like.—'Is it true to say that this object is what you affirm it to be?' You affirm it to be a shield (accusative), therefore it is a shield (accusative). Or is this not necessarily so, if 'this object' (nominative) signifies not shield (accusative) but shield (nominative), while 'this object' (accusative) signifies shield (accusative).—Nor again if he is what you affirm him to be, and you affirm him to be Cleona (accusative of Cleon), is he therefore Cleona? for he is not Cleona¹; for the statement was that he not him is what I affirm him to be. For the question if asked in this form ² would not be Greek either.—'Do you know this?' But this is a stone (nominative); therefore you know a stone (nominative). Has not 'this' a different force in the question 'Do you know this?' and in 'This is a stone,' in the first case standing for an accusative and in the second for a nominative?—When you exercise recognition of an object, do you not recognize it? You exercise recognition of a stone; therefore you recognize 'of a stone.' Do you not in the one case put the object in the genitive and say 'of the stone,' and in the other case in the accusative and

¹ i.e. with the subject in the accusative.

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λίθον· ἐδόθη δ', οὖ ἐπιστήμην ἔχεις, ἐπίστασθαι, οὐ τούτον, ἀλλὰ τούτο, ὥστ' οὖ λίθον ἀλλὰ τὸν λίθον.

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οἱ τοιούτοι τῶν λόγων οὐ συνογιζονται σολομικομον ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, καὶ διὰ τί τε 5 φαίνονται καὶ πώς ἀπαντητέον πρὸς αὐτούς, φανερῶν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

XXXIII. Δεὶ δὲ καὶ κατανοεῖν ὅτι πάντων τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσὶ βάσιν κατιδείν οἱ δὲ χαλεπώτεροι, παρὰ τί καὶ ἐν τίνι παραλογιζονται τὸν ἁκούντα, πολλάκις οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐκεῖνοι οἴντες. τὸν αὖ-10 τὸν γὰρ λόγον δεὶ καλεῖν τὸν παρὰ ταῦτο γνώμενον· ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος τοῖς μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν τοῖς δὲ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῖς δὲ παρ᾽ ἔτερον δόξειν ἄν εἴναι διὰ τὸ μεταφερόμενον ἔκαστον μὴ ὁμοίως εἶναι δῆλον. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τὴν ὁμώνυμιαν, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τρόπος εὐθείατος εἶναι 15 τῶν παραλογισμῶν, τὰ μὲν καὶ τοῖς τυχόνσιν ἑστι δήλα (καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι σχεδὸν οἱ γελοῖοι πάντες εἰσὶ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν), οἷον ἀνὴρ ἐφέρετο κατὰ κλίμακος δίφρον, καὶ ὅπου στέλλεσθε; πρὸς τὴν κεραίαν. καὶ ποτέρα τῶν βοῶν ἐμπροσθεν τέχεται; οὔδετέρα, ἀλλ' ὁπίσθεν ἀμφω. καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ βορέας; οὐ 20 δῆτα· ἀπεκτόνηκε γὰρ τὸν πτωχὸν καὶ τὸν ὄνομένου. ἃρ' Εὔαρχος; οὐ δῆτα, ἀλλ' Ἀπολλωνίδης.

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a The two meanings of the phrase are uncertain; the Oxford translation suggests (1) ‘a man got the body of the car taken off its chassis,’ and (2) ‘he came a “sitter” (δίφρος) down from the ladder.’

b The reply takes the word in the sense of ‘To what do you fasten the sail when you furl it?’

c The answer understands the question to mean ‘which cow will calve forwards?’
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxii–xxxiii

say 'a stone'? But it was granted that, when you exercise recognition of a thing, you recognize 'it' not 'of it,' so that you recognize not 'of a stone' but 'a stone.'

That arguments of this kind, then, do not prove solecism but only appear to do so, and why they appear to do so and how you must face them, is clear from what has been said.

XXXIII. It must be noted about arguments in general that in some it is easier and in some more difficult to see why and where they mislead the listener, though often the latter are identical with the former. For an argument must be called identical when it depends on the same principle, but the same argument might be held by some people to depend on diction, by others on accident and by others on something else, because each, when applied in different contexts, is not equally clear. So, just as fallacies due to equivocation, which are generally regarded as the stupidest form of fallacy, some are obvious even to ordinary minds (for almost all the most laughable remarks depend upon diction). For example, 'A man was carried over the standing board of the framework of the chariot'\(^a\); and 'Whither are you bound?' 'To the yard-arm'\(^b\); 'Which of the two cows will calve in front?' 'Neither, but both behind.'\(^c\) 'Is the north wind\(^d\) clear?' 'No, certainly not; for he has killed the beggar and the purchaser.'\(^e\) 'Is he Evarchus?' 'Certainly not; he is Apollonides.'\(^f\)

\(a\) The answerer takes Boreas as a proper name.
\(b\) The literal meaning of these names might be rendered 'good-manager' and 'squanderson.'
ARISTOTLE

182 b
tòv aútv òé tòpovn kai tòw álloów oxeîdòv òi pлеî-
stov, tà òé kai toûs èmpieirótátovs faînteî lâv-
tháneiv: súmeiòn òe tòútovn òti màxontai pollàkis
peri tòw ónòmátwv, òîon pòteron taútovn súmaî-
25 neì kátà pàntwv tò òn kai tò èn ëterov. òois
mèn vàr dòkêi taútovn súmaînev tò òn kai tò èn:
òi òe tòv Zînîwovs lógov kai Parmévîdov ëlîwsi
dià tò pollàkhis fànavi tò èn légyêthai kai tò ón.
ómow sò de kai tòw parà tò súmpiebeîkôs kai para1
tòw álloów èkastov oî mèn èsontai ráous ïdeîn oî
30 òe xalêpòteroi tòw lógowv: kai labeîn èn tîn gênev,
kai pòterov èleghov ë h òuk èleghov, ou rádiov
ómow peri pàntwv.

"Èsûi òé drímmè lógov òstîs àporeîn poieu má-
listà: dàknei vàr òöstos málistà. àpòria òi èsûi
disè, òi mèn èn toîs suîllèloqosuèmovs, ò ti ànèlû
35 tis tòw èrwstîmátwv, òi òi èn toîs èrístîkovs, òwv
èîpè tis tò protaîmèn. diôspèr èn toîs suîllèloqosu-
îkov ói drímmûteroi lógovi ëxèteîn màllôn poioùsîn.
èsûi òe suîllèloqostîkos òeî lógov drímmûtatós, àn èx
òti màlistà dokoûntov òti màlistà ènîdôxov ànaiîrî.
èîs vàr òwî òi lógov métatìðeuênhè tòs àntîfàsèwos
183 a àpàntas òmòiouv èxèi toûs suîllèloqosuîov: àeî vàr
èx ènîdôxov òmòiouv ènîdôxov ànaiîrîseî òi kàtàskèná-
seî, diôspèr àporeîn ànagkàîov. màlistà mèn òwîn
ò toîoùtovs drímmûs, ò èx èsou to súmpèrasma poîwv
5 tòis èrwstîmâsî, deûteros òî èx àpàntovn òmòiouv.

1 Reading with Poste tòw parà tò súmpiebeîkôs kai parà for
tòw peri tòs súmpiebeîkôtovs kai peri.
146
And so on with almost all the rest of the ambiguities, but some even the most expert seem to fail to discern. A proof of this is that people often dispute about the terms used, for example, whether 'Being' and 'Unity' always mean the same thing or something different; for some people hold that 'Being' and 'Unity' are identical in meaning, while others solve the argument of Zeno and Parmenides by saying that 'Unity' and 'Being' are used in several senses. Similarly, too, of the arguments which are dependent on accident and each of the other classes, some will be easier to detect and others more difficult, and it is not always equally easy to grasp into which class they fall and whether refutation takes place or not.

A shrewd argument is one which causes most embarrassment; for it bites deepest. Embarrassment is of two kinds. In a reasoned discussion one is in doubt which of the questions one should subvert, whereas in contentious arguments it is about the way in which one is to express the proposition. Hence it is in reasoned discussions that shrewder arguments are more stimulative of inquiry. Now a reasoned argument is shrewdest when from the most generally accepted premises possible it subverts the most generally accepted thesis possible. For the single argument, if the contradictory is changed about, will result in all the syllogisms being alike; for from generally accepted premises it will subvert or establish an equally generally accepted conclusion; therefore embarrassment must necessarily arise. Such, then, is the shrewdest argument which puts the conclusion on an equality with the premises. The next shrewdest is that which argues from premises which are all on an equality; for this will cause an equal
οὗτος γὰρ ὁμοίως ποιήσει ἀπορείν ὅποιον τῶν ἐρωτημάτων ἀναφετέον. τούτῳ δὲ χαλεπόν ἀναφετέον μὲν γὰρ, ὃ τι δ' ἀναφετέον, ἀδηλον. τῶν δ' ἐριστικῶν δρμύτατος μὲν ὁ πρῶτον εὐθὺς ἄδηλος πότερον συλλελόγισται ἡ ὁ, καὶ πότερον παρὰ ἱενδός ἡ διαίρεσιν ἐστιν ἡ λύσις, δεύτερος δὲ τῶν ἀλλών ὁ δήλος μὲν ὅτι παρὰ διαίρεσιν ἡ ἀναίρεσιν ἐστὶ, μὴ φανερὸς δὲ ὅν διὰ τῶν τῶν ἠρωτημένων ἀναίρεσιν ἡ διαίρεσιν λυτέος ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἡ πότερον αὐτῇ παρὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἡ παρὰ τι τῶν ἐρωτημάτων ἐστίν.

'Ενιστε μὲν οὖν ὁ μὴ συλλογισθεὶς λόγος εὐήθης ἐστιν, ἐὰν ἢ λίαν ἄδοξα ἡ ψευδή τὰ λήμματα· ἐνιστε δ' οὐκ ἄξιος καταφρονεῖσθαι. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἐλλείπῃ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐρωτημάτων, περὶ οὐ δ' ὁ λόγος καὶ δι' ο, καὶ μὴ προσλαβών τοῦτο καὶ μὴ συλλογισάμενος εὐήθης ὁ συλλογισμός, ὅταν δὲ τῶν ἕξωθεν, οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητος οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν λόγος ἐπιεικῆς, δ' ὁ ἐρωτών ἠρώτηκεν οὐ καλῶς.

'Εστι τε, ὅσπερ λύειν ὅτε μὲν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὅτε δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἑρωτώντα καὶ τὴν ἑρωτήσων ὅτε δὲ πρὸς οὐδέτερον τούτων, ὁμοίως καὶ ἑρωτάν ἐστὶ καὶ συλλογιζεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν θέσιν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον καὶ πρὸς τὸν χρόνον, ὅταν ἡ πλείονος χρόνου δεομένῃ ἡ λύσις ἡ τού παρόντος καιροῦ. 1

XXXIV. Ἐκ πόσων μὲν οὖν καὶ ποίων γίνονται τοῖς διαλεγομένοις οἱ παραλογισμοί, καὶ πῶς δειξομέν τε ἰενδόμενον καὶ παράδοξα λέγειν ποιή-

1 Reading ἀλλ' ἡ with Wallies.
2 Omitting with Waitz τὸ διαλεχθῆναι πρὸς τὴν λύσιν as a gloss.
embarrassment as to which kind of question ought to be subverted. The difficulty lies in this, that something must be subverted but it is not clear what. The shrewdest of contentious arguments is that which, in the first place, immediately makes it uncertain whether the reasoning is conclusive or not, and also whether the solution is due to a false premiss or a distinction. Of the rest, that comes next which clearly depends on a distinction or a subversion, but it is not clear which of the premisses it is on the subversion or distinction of which the solution depends, but only whether this process depends upon the conclusion or one of the premisses.

Now sometimes an inadequately reasoned argument is stupid if the premisses assumed are too paradoxical or false; but sometimes it is not deserving of contempt. For when some question is wanting such as concerns the argument or the means of carrying it on, the reasoning which has failed to supply this and is not properly argued is stupid; but when something which is merely extraneous has been omitted, the reasoning is by no means to be lightly condemned but is respectable, though the questioner has not asked his questions well.

As it is possible to address the solution sometimes to the argument, sometimes to the questioner and his mode of questioning and sometimes to neither of these, so likewise also it is possible to address one’s questions and reasonings both to the thesis and to the answerer and to the time, when the solution needs more time than the present occasion supplies.

XXXIV. The number, then, and the nature of the sources from which fallacies arise in discussion, and how we are to show up a pretender and make him...
30 σομεν, ἐτι δ' ἐκ τίνων συμβάινει ὁ σολοκισμός, καὶ πῶς ἐρωτητέουν καὶ τίς ή τάξις τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, ἐτι πρὸς τί χρήσμοι πάντες εἰσίν οἱ τοιούτοι λόγοι, καὶ περὶ ἀποκρίσεως ἀπλῶς τε πάσης καὶ πῶς λυτέον τοὺς λόγους καὶ τοὺς σολοκισμούς, εἰρήσθω περὶ ἀπάντων ἡμῖν ταῦτα. λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς προθέσεως ἀναμνήσασιν εἰπεῖν τι βραχύ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

Προειλόμεθα μὲν οὖν εὑρέων δύναμιν τινα συλλογιστικὴν περὶ τοῦ προβληθέντος ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὡς ἐνδοξοτάτων· τούτο γὰρ ἐργον ἐστὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ τῆς πειραστικῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲ προσκατασκευάζεται πρὸς αὐτὴν διὰ τὴν τῆς σοφιστικῆς γειτνίασιν, ὡς οὐ μόνον πεἰραν δύναται λαβεῖν διαλεκτικῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς εἰδώς, διὰ τούτο οὐ μόνον τὸ λεχθὲν ἐργον ὑπεθέμεθα τῆς πραγματείας, τὸ λόγον δύνασθαι λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως λόγον ὑπέχοντες φυλάξομεν τὴν θέσιν ὡς δὲ ἐνδοξοτάτων ὀμοτρόπως. τὴν δ' αἰτίαν εἰρήκαμεν τοῦτον, ἐπεὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Ἡσικράτης ἦρωτα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπεκρίνετο· ὦμολογεὶ γὰρ οὐκ εἰδέναι. δεδήλωται δ' ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι καὶ πρὸς πόσα καὶ ἐκ πόσων τούτο ἐσται, καὶ οἶθεν εὑπορήσομεν τούτων, ἐτι δὲ πῶς ἐρωτητεύον ἡ τακτεύων τὴν ἐρώτησιν πάσας, καὶ

1 Reading with Pacius σολοκισμός for συλλογισμός.

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ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxiv

utter paradoxes, and, further, in what circumstances a solecism occurs, and how to ask questions, and what is the right arrangement of questions, and, moreover, what is the use of all such arguments, and also about all answering of questions in general and in particular how to solve arguments and solecisms, on all these subjects let the treatment we have given suffice. There remains to call to mind our original purpose and say a few words about it and then bring our treatise to an end.

Our purpose, then, was to discover a faculty which could reason on the problem set before us from the most generally accepted premisses that exist; for this is the function of dialectic in itself and of the art of examination. But, since there is further added to it, on account of its close affinity with the art of sophistry, that it can undertake an examination not only dialectically but also with a pretence of knowledge, we therefore proposed as the purpose of our treatise not only the above-mentioned task of being able to conduct an argument but also the discovery how, when supporting an argument, we are to defend our thesis by means of the most generally accepted premisses in a consistent manner. Of this we have given the reason; for this was why Socrates used to ask questions but never answered them, because he confessed ignorance. An indication has been given, in what has been said above, of the number of cases in which this will apply and of the various kinds of material which can be used for this and the various sources from which we may obtain an abundance of them; moreover also how questions must be asked and about the arrangement of questions in

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2 Reading with Pacius σολοικισμοῦς for συλλογισμοῦς.
PERI THE ἈΠΟΚΡΙΣΕΩΝ KAI LΥΣΕΩΝ ΤΩΝ PROS TOUS SYLLOGISMOUS. DEDΗΛΩΤΑΙ DE KAI PERI TΩΝ ἈΛΛΩΝ, ὍΣΑ ΤΗΣ ΑΥΤΗΣ ΜΕΘΟΔΟΥ TΩΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ ἘΣΤΙΝ. PROS DE TOUTOΣ PERI TΩΝ PARALOGISMOYN DIELΗΛΥΘΑΜΕΝ, 15 ΩΣΠΕΡ ΕΙΡΗΚΑΜΕΝ ᾿ΗΔΗ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ. ΟΤΙ ΜΕΝ ΟΥΝ ΕΧΕΙ ΤΕΛΟΣ ΊΚΑΝΩΣ Δ ΠΡΟΕΙΛΟΜΕΘΑ, ΦΑΝΕΡΟΝ· ΔΕΙ Δ’ ᾿ΗΜΑΣ ΜΗ ΛΕΛΗΘΕΝΑΙ ΤΟ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ PERI ΤΑΥΤΗΝ ΤΗΝ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑΝ. TΩΝ ΥΑΡ ΕΥΡΙΣΚΟΜΕΝΩΝ ἈΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΤΑ ΜΕΝ ΠΑΡ’ ΕΤΕΡΩΝ ΛΗΦΘΕΝΤΑ ΠΡΩΤΕΡΟΝ ΠΕΠΟΝΗΜΕΝΑ ΚΑΤΑ ΜΕΡΟΣ ΕΠΙΔΕÕΩΚΕΝ ὩΠΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΑΡΑΛΑΒΟΝΤΩΝ 20 ΥΣΤΕΡΟΝ· ΤΑ Δ’ ΕΞ ΥΠΑΡΧΗΣ ΕΥΡΙΣΚΟΜΕΝΑ ΜΙΚΡΑΝ ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΔΟΣΙΝ ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ ΕΙΩΘΕ, ΧΡΗΣΙΜΩΤΕΡΑΝ ΜΕΝΤΟΙ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΥΣΤΕΡΟΝ ΕΚ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΑΥΞΗΣΕΩΣ. ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΝ ΥΑΡ’ ΙΣΩΣ ΆΡΧΗ ΠΑΝΤΩΣ, ΩΣΠΕΡ ΛΕΓΕΤΑΙ· ΔΙΟ ΚΑΙ ΧΑΛΕΠΩΤΑΤΟΝ· ΌΣΩ ΓΑΡ ΚΡΑΤΙΣΤΟΝ ΤΗ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙ, 25 ΤΟΣΟΤΩ ΜΙΚΡΟΤΑΤΟΝ ΟΝ ΤῪ ΜΕΓΕΘΕΙ ΧΑΛΕΠΩΤΑΤΟΝ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΟΦΘΗΝΑΙ. ΤΑΥΤΗΣ Δ’ ΕΥΡΗΜΕΝΗΣ ΡΑΙΟΝ ΤΟ ΠΡΟΣ- ΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΣΥΝΑΥΞΕΙΝ ΤΟ ΛΟΙΠΟΝ ΕΣΤΙΝ· ΩΣΠΕΡ ΚΑΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΟΥΣ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΕ, ΣΧΕΔΟΝ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΣ ΆΛΛΑΣ ΠΑΣΑΣ ΤΕΧΝΑΣ. ΟΙ ΜΕΝ ΓΑΡ ΤΑΣ ΆΡΧΑΣ ΕΥΡΟΝΤΕΣ ΠΑΝΤΕΛΩΣ ΕΠΙ ΜΙΚΡΟΝ ΤΙ ΠΡΟΗΓΑΓΟΝ· 30 ΟΙ ΔΕ ΝΥΝ ΕΥ∆ΟΚΙΜΟΥΝΤΕΣ ΠΑΡΑΛΑΒΟΝΤΕΣ ΠΑΡΑ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ ΟΙΟΝ ΕΚ ΔΙΑΔΟΧΗΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΜΕΡΟΣ ΠΡΟΑΓΑΓΟΝΤΩΝ ΟΥΤΩΣ ΗΥΞΗΚΑΣΙ, ΤΙΣΙΑΣ ΜΕΝ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΟΥΣ ΠΡΩΤΟΥΣ, ΘΡΑΣΥ- ΜΑΧΟΣ ΔΕ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΙΣΙΑΝ, ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ ΔΕ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΟΥΤΟΝ, ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ ΠΟΛΛΑ ΣΥΝΕΝΗΝΟΧΑΙ ΜΕΡΗ· ΔΙΟΣΠΕΡ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΘΑΥΜΑΣΤΟΝ ΕΧΕΙΝ ΤΙ ΠΛΗΘΟΣ ΤΗΝ ΤΕΧΝΗΝ. ΤΑΥΤΗΣ ΔΕ 152
general, and about answers and solutions applicable to the reasonings employed. All the other points have also been set forth which belong to the same system of argument. In addition to these we have also explained about fallacies, as we have already remarked above. That what we purposed has been satisfactorily carried through to the end is plain; but we must not fail to observe what has happened regarding this inquiry. In all discoveries, either the results of other people's work have been taken over and after having been first elaborated have been subsequently advanced step by step by those who took them over, or else they are original inventions which usually make progress which at first is small but of much greater utility than the later development which results from them. It is perhaps a true proverb which says that the beginning of anything is the most important; hence it is also the most difficult. For, as it is very powerful in its effects, so it is very small in size and therefore very difficult to see. When, however, the first beginning has been discovered, it is easier to add to it and develop the rest. This has happened, too, with rhetorical composition, and also with practically all the other arts. Those who discovered the beginnings of rhetoric carried them forward quite a little way, whereas the famous modern professors of the art, entering into the heritage, so to speak, of a long series of predecessors who had gradually advanced it, have brought it to its present perfection—Tisias following the first inventors, Thrasymachus following Tisias, Theodorus following Thrasymachus, while numerous others have made numerous contributions; hence it is no wonder that the art possesses a certain amplitude. Of our
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΕΣ

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35 τῆς πραγματείας οὐ τὸ μὲν ἢν τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἢν προεξειρ-γασμένον, ἀλλ’ οὐδέν παντελῶς ὑπήρχεν. καὶ γὰρ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἑριστικοὺς λόγους μισθαρνοῦντων ὀμοία τις ἢν ἢ παίδευσις τῇ Γοργίου πραγματείᾳ. λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ῥητορικοὺς οἱ δὲ ἑρωτητικοὺς ἐξίδοσαν ἐκμανθάνειν, εἰς οὓς πλειστάκις ἐμπίπτειν

184 a ἠφήθησαν ἐκάτεροι τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους. διόπερ ταχεία μὲν ἄτεχνος δ’ ἢν ἡ διδασκαλία τοῖς μαν-θάνουσι παρ’ αὐτῶν. οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἄλλα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παίδευεν ὑπελάμβανον, ὡσπερ 5 ἤν εἰ τὰς ἐπιστήμην φάσκων παραδώσειν ἑπὶ τὸ μηδὲν πονεῖν τοὺς πόδας, εἶτα σκυτοτομικὴν μὲν μὴ διδάσκοι, μηδ’ οἶδεν δυνήσεται πορίζεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, δοῖ ὅποι πολλὰ γένη παντοδαπῶν ὑποδημάτων. οὕτος γὰρ βεβοήθηκε μὲν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, τέχνην δ’ οὐ παρέδωκεν. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ῥη- 

184 b τορικῶν ὑπήρχε πολλὰ καὶ παλαιὰ τὰ λεγόμενα, περὶ δὲ τοὺς συλλογίζεσθαι παντελῶς οὐδέν εἰχομεν πρότερον ἀλλο λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἡ τριβῆς ζητοῦντες πολὺν χρόνον ἐπονούμεν. εἰ δὲ φαίνεται θεασαμένοισ ὑμῖν ὡς ἐκ τοιοῦτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπαρχόντων ἔχειν ἢ 5 μέθοδος ἰκανῶς παρὰ τὰς ἀλλὰς πραγματείας τὰς ἐκ παραδόσεως ηὐξημένας, λοιπὸν ἂν εἰς πάντων ὑμῶν ἢ τῶν ηκροαμένων ἔργων τοῖς μὲν παραλειμμένοις τῆς μεθόδου συγγνώμην τοῖς δ’ εὐρη-μένοις πολλὴν ἐχειν χάριν.
present inquiry, however, it is not true to say that it had already been partly elaborated and partly not; nay, it did not exist at all. For the training given by the paid teachers of contentious argument resembled the system of Gorgias. For some of them gave their pupils to learn by heart speeches which were either rhetorical or consisted of questions and answers, in which both sides thought that the rival arguments were for the most part included. Hence the teaching which they gave to their pupils was rapid but unsystematic; for they conceived that they could train their pupils by imparting to them not an art but the results of an art, just as if one should claim to be about to communicate knowledge for the prevention of pain in the feet and then were not to teach the cobbler’s art and the means of providing suitable foot-gear, but were to offer a selection of various kinds of shoes; for he has helped to supply his need but has not imparted an art to him. Also, on the subject of rhetoric there already existed much material enunciated in the past, whereas regarding reasoning we had absolutely no earlier work to quote but were for a long time labouring at tentative researches. If, therefore, on consideration, it appears to you that, in view of such original conditions, our system is adequate when compared with the other methods which have been built up in the course of tradition, then the only thing which would remain for all of you, or those who follow our instruction, is that you should pardon the lack of completeness of our system and be heartily grateful for our discoveries.
DE GENERATIONE ET CORRUPTIONE
INTRODUCTION

That the *De Generatione et Corruptione* is a genuine work of Aristotle has never been disputed. It belongs to the group of physical treatises which also includes the *Physics*, the *De Caelo* and the *Meteorologica*. Its composition has been generally ascribed to the period covered by Aristotle’s residence in the Troad, in Mitylene and in Macedonia, that is, *circa* 347 to 335 B.C.

Professor H. H. Joachim, to whose work I am deeply indebted, tells us that during the preparation of his version for the Oxford Translation of Aristotle he realized that something more was called for. “It soon became evident,” he writes, “that a mere translation would be of little or no value, since the intrinsic philosophical interest of the original depends, to a large extent, upon what it implies and presupposes. In short, Aristotle’s fascinating and masterly little treatise calls for a commentary in almost every sentence. It is full of allusions to the speculations of his predecessors and contemporaries, and inextricably interwoven with the theories elaborated in his other works, particularly in the *Physics*, *De Caelo* and *Meteorologica*, of which no modern English editions exist.” Anyone who attempts to translate the *De Generatione et Corruptione* must feel that a translation by itself is unsatisfactory, but the present translator
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has found it impossible, within the scope of a Loeb version, to do more than provide brief explanatory notes on some of the major obscurities and to give the references where Aristotle is obviously referring to passages in his other treatises, and to recommend those who require something more to consult Professor Joachim's masterly commentary (Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-away, Oxford, 1922).

Amongst the other works which have been consulted most use has been made of the Latin Version of Franciscus Vatablus in vol. iii of the Berlin Aristotle and of Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-away: Some Comments by Dr. W. T. Verdenius and Dr. T. H. Waszink (Leiden, 1946), which was kindly sent to me by a friend, Dr. H. J. Drossaart Lulof. The summary of the treatise given by Sir W. D. Ross in his Aristotle (pp. 99-108) has also been very useful.

The text which has been used is that of I. Bekker in the Berlin Aristotle, any divergences from which, except for obvious misprints, have been noted.

The De Generatione et Corruptione discusses the πάθη to which the natural bodies in the sublunary sphere are liable, namely, "coming-to-be" (γένεσις) and "passing-away" (φθορά). In Book I these processes are explained and distinguished from alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) and from "growth and diminution" (ἀνάξησις καὶ φθίσις); incidentally the views of Anaxagoras and Empedocles are examined and shown to be inconsistent. In the second half of the book it is shown that what comes-to-be is formed by combination (μίξεις) of certain natural constituents, a process which implies "action and passion" (ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν), which in their turn imply contact (αφή). Book II proves that the material constituents of
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all that comes-to-be are the elements or "simple bodies," Earth, Air, Fire, and Water, and shows the manner in which they are transformed into one another and how they combine. Aristotle then briefly discusses the material, formal and final causes of "coming-to-be" and "passing-away," in particular criticizing the theory of Socrates in the *Phaedo*. He further states that the efficient cause of the double process is the sun's annual movement, and, in conclusion, shows that what "comes-to-be" is necessary, since absolute necessity is characteristic of a sequence of events which is cyclical, that is to say, continuous and returning upon itself.

Manuscripts

\[ J = \text{Vindobonensis, phil. Graec. 100 (10th century)} \]
\[ E = \text{Parisiensis Regius 1853 (10th century)} \]
\[ F = \text{Laurentianus 87. 7 (12th century)} \]
\[ H = \text{Vaticanus 1027 (12th century)} \]
\[ L = \text{Vaticanus 253 (14th or 15th century)} \]

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΓΕΝΕΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΘΟΡΑΣ

Α

314 α 1 1. Περὶ δὲ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῶν φύσει γινομένων καὶ φθειρομένων, ὡμοίως κατὰ πάντων, τὰς τε αἰτίας διαρρέεται καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν, ἐτὶ δὲ περὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ ἄλλου ὁσσεως, τί ἐκάτερον, καὶ πότερον τὴν αὐτὴν ὑποληπτέουν φύσιν εἶναι ἄλλου ὁσσεως καὶ γενέσεως, ἢ χωρίς, ὥσπερ διώρισται καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν.

Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀρχαίων οἱ μὲν τὴν καλομένην ἀπλὴν γένεσιν ἄλλοις ὁσσιν εἶναι φασιν, οἱ δὲ ἐτερον ἄλλοις ὁσσιν καὶ γένεσιν. ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ τὸ πᾶν λέγοντων εἶναι καὶ πάντα ἐξ ἐνὸς γεννῶσιν, τοῦτοι μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν γένεσιν ἄλλοις ὁσαὶ καὶ τὸ κυρίῳς γινόμενον ἄλλοις ὁσάι. ὅσοι δὲ πλείω τὴν ὠλὴν ἐνὸς τιθεάσων, οἰον Ἔμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Λεύκιππος, τοῦτοι δὲ ἐτερον. καὶ τοιο Ἀναξαγόρας γε τῇ ὁικείᾳ φωνῇ ἡγνόσεις. λέγει

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BOOK I

1. In discussing coming-to-be and passing-away of things which by nature come-to-be and pass-away, as exhibited uniformly wherever they occur, we must distinguish their causes and definitions; further, we must deal with "growth" and "alteration," and inquire what each of these terms means, and whether we are to suppose that the nature of "alteration" and coming-to-be is the same, or whether each is of a separate nature corresponding to the names by which they are distinguished.

Of the ancient philosophers some assert that what is called "simple" coming-to-be is "alteration," while others hold that "alteration" and coming-to-be are different processes. Those who hold that the universe is a simple entity and who generate all things from a single thing, must necessarily maintain that coming-to-be is "alteration," and that what comes-to-be in the proper sense of the term undergoes "alteration." Those, on the other hand, who hold that the matter of things is more than one, must regard the two processes as different—Empedocles, for example, and Anaxagoras and Leucippus. Anaxagoras, however, misunderstood his own statement;
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314 a

γοῦν ὡς τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ταῦταν
15 καθέστηκε τῷ ἄλλῳ ὀσοῦ. πολλὰ δὲ λέγει τὰ στοιχεῖα, καθάπερ καὶ ἐτεροί. Ἕμπεδοκλῆς μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὲν σωματικὰ τέτταρα, τὰ δὲ πάντα μετὰ τῶν κινούντων ἐξ τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ἄπειρα καὶ Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος. ὦ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ὀμοιομερὴ στοιχεῖα τίθησιν, οἶνον ὀστοῦν καὶ
20 σάρκα καὶ μυελόν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν ἐκάστῳ συνώνυμον τὸ μέρος ἑστίν. Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος ἐκ σωμάτων ἀδιαιρήτων τὰλλα συγκείσθαι φασί, ταύτα δ' ἄπειρα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ τὰς μορφὰς, αὐτὰ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ διαφέρειν τοὺτοις ἐξ ὧν εἰσὶ καὶ θέσει καὶ τάξει τούτων. ἔναν-
25 τίως δὲ φαίνονται λέγοντες οἱ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν τοὺς περὶ Ἕμπεδοκλέα. ὦ μὲν γὰρ φησὶ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν στοιχεῖα τέσσαρα καὶ ἀπλὰ εἶναι μᾶλλον ἡ σάρκα καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀμοιομερῶν, οἱ δὲ ταύτα μὲν ἀπλὰ καὶ στοι-
χεία, γῆν δὲ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα σύνθετα.

314 b παντοπεριμένων γὰρ εἶναι τούτων.

Τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἐνὸς πάντα κατασκευάζοντων ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν ἄλ-
λοισιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ μένειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῦτα καὶ ἐν (τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἁλλοιοῦσθαι φαμεν) τοῖς δὲ τὰ
5 γένη πλείω ποιοῦσι διαφέρειν τὴν ἁλλοίωσιν τῆς

a Diels, fr. 17.

b i.e. compounds (though, it may be, in different proportions) of the same four simple bodies—Earth, Air, Fire and Water—such as wood, the metals, and blood, flesh and marrow in animals. Such compounds, when divided, still retain the same constituents.
for example, he says that coming-to-be and destruction constitute the same process as "being altered," \(^a\) though, like others, he says that the elements are many. Thus Empedocles holds that the corporeal elements are four, but that all the elements, including those which create motion, are six in number, while Anaxagoras, Leucippus and Democritus hold that their number is infinite. For Anaxagoras puts down as elements things which have like parts, \(^b\) for example bone, flesh and marrow, and anything else of which the part bears the same name as the whole; whereas Democritus and Leucippus say that all other things are composed of indivisible bodies, and that these are infinite both in number and in the forms which they take, while the compounds differ from one another in their constituents and the position and arrangement of these. Anaxagoras and his school obviously take a view directly opposite to that of Empedocles and his school; for Empedocles says that Fire, Water, Air and Earth are four elements and are "simple" rather than flesh and bone and similar things which have like parts, whereas Anaxagoras and his school assert that the things which have like parts are "simple" and are elements, but that Earth, Fire, Water and Air are composite, for each of them is, they say, a "general seed-ground" for things which have like parts.

Those, therefore, who construct everything out of a single element must necessarily say that coming-to-be and passing-away are "alteration," for their substratum remains the same and one (and it is such a substratum which we say undergoes "alteration"); but those who make the kinds of things more than one must hold that "alteration" differs from coming-
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314 b

gενέσεως· συνιόντων γὰρ καὶ διαλυμένων ἡ γένεσις
συμβαίνει καὶ ἡ φθορά. διὸ λέγει τούτων τῶν
τρόπων καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, ὅτι "φύσις οὐδένος ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ 
μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξις τε μιγέντων." ὁτι 
μὲν οὖν οἰκεῖος ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν τῇ ὑποθέσει
10 οὕτω φάναι, δῆλον, καὶ ὅτι λέγουσι τῶν τρόπων
tούτων· ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ τούτως τὴν ἄλλοισιν
εἶναι μὲν τι φάναι παρὰ τὴν γένεσιν, ἀδύνατον
μέντοι κατὰ τὰ υπ’ ἐκεῖνον λεγομένα. τούτῳ δ’
ὅτι λέγομεν ὄρθως, ράδιον συνιδεῖν. ὥσπερ γὰρ
ὅρωμεν ἡρεμοῦσας τῆς οὐσίας ἐν αὐτῇ μεταβολὴν
15 κατὰ μέγεθος, τὴν καλομέμενην αὔξησιν καὶ 
φθίσιν, οὕτω καὶ ἄλλοισιν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλ’ εἰς ὁποῖαν
ὁπλείους ἀρχὰς ποιοῦντες μιᾶς ἀδύνατον ἄλλοι-
σθαι. τὰ γὰρ πάθη, καθ’ ἃ φαμεν τούτῳ συμ-
βαίνειν, διαφοραὶ τῶν στοιχείων εἰσίν, λέγω δ’
oἶον θερμοῦ ψυχρόν, λευκὸν μέλαν, ἕθρον ὑγρόν,
20 μαλακὸν σκληρὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκαστον, ὥσπερ
καὶ φησίν Ἐμπεδοκλῆς "ἡ ἡλίου μὲν λευκὸν ὅραν 
καὶ θερμὸν ἀπάντη, ὀμβρόν δ’ ἐν πᾶσιν 
δυνόμενα τε ῥιγαλέον τε," ὁμοίως δὲ διορίζει καὶ 
ἐπὶ τῶν 

λοιπῶν. ὡστ’ εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν ἐκ πυρὸς 
γενέσθαι

υδωρ μηδ’ εἰς ύδατος γῆν, οὐδ’ ἐκ λευκοῦ μέλαν
25 ἐσταὶ οὐδὲν οὐδ’ ἐκ μαλακοῦ σκληροῦν’ ὁ δ’ αὐτῶς
λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. τούτῳ δ’ ἦν ἄλλοισισ.
ἡ καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι μίαν ἀεὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὑπο-

a Diels, fr. 8. b Diels, fr. 21 lines 3 and 5.

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1

to-be, for coming-to-be and passing-away occur when things come together and are dissolved. This is the reason why Empedocles also is speaking to this effect, when he says that "there is no origin of anything, but only a mingling and separation of things which have been mingled." It is clear then, that their description of coming-to-be and passing-away in this way accords with their assumption and that they actually describe them in this way; they also must, however, admit that "alteration" is something different from coming-to-be, though they cannot possibly do so consistently with the views which they express. It is easy to see that we are correct in saying this; for just as we see changes in magnitude taking place in a thing while its substance remains unchanged (what we call "increase" and "diminution"), so also we see "alteration" occurring. Nevertheless, the statements of those who suppose the existence of more than one first principle make it impossible for "alteration" to take place. For the qualities, in respect of which we say that "alteration" occurs (for example, hot and cold, white and black, dry and moist, soft and hard, etc.) are differences affecting the elements. As Empedocles says,

The sun is white to look upon and hot
In every part, the rain is dark and chill;

and he likewise characterizes also the other elements. Hence, as it is impossible for Water to come-into-being from Fire, or Earth from Water, neither will black come into existence out of white, nor hard out of soft; and the same argument applies also to the other qualities. Now this is what "alteration" has always meant. From this it is also clear that it must be assumed that a single matter belongs to the "con-
314 b

θετέον ὑλήν, ἂν τε μεταβάλλῃ κατὰ τόπον, ἂν τε κατ᾽ αὐξήσιν καὶ φθίσιν, ἂν τε κατ’ ἄλλοισιν. ἐτὶ δ’ ὦμοίως ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τούτο καὶ ἄλλοισιν. 315 a εἴτε γὰρ ἄλλοισις ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐν στοιχείον καὶ μία ἡ πάντων ὑλή τῶν ἐχόντων εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολήν, κἂν εἰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐν, ἔστιν ἄλλοισις.

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ὁ ὤν ἐν τούτῳ ἐναντία λέγει καὶ πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὸς. ἀμα 5 μὲν γὰρ οὐ φησιν ἔτερον εἶ ἔτερον γίνεσθαι τῶν στοιχείων οὐδὲν, ἄλλα τάλλα πάντα ἐκ τούτων, ἀμα δ’ ὅταν εἰς ἐν συναγάγῃ τὴν ἀπασαν φύσιν πλὴν τοῦ νεῖκους, ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς γίνεσθαι πάλιν ἐκαστον. ὡστ’ εἴς ἐνὸς τινος δῆλον ὅτι διαφοραῖς τισὶ χωριζομένων καὶ πάθεσιν ἐγένετο τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ 10 τὸ δὲ πῦρ, καθάπερ λέγει τὸν μὲν ἦλιον λευκὸν καὶ θερμὸν, τὴν δὲ γῆν βαρὺ καὶ σκληρὸν. ἀφαιρομένων οὐ τούτων τῶν διαφορῶν (εἰσὶ γὰρ ἀφαιρεταὶ γενόμεναι γε) δῆλον ὡς ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι καὶ γῆν εἴς ὤδατος καὶ ὕδωρ ἐκ γῆς, ὦμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστον, οὐ τότε μόνον ἄλλα καὶ νῦν, 15 μεταβάλλοντα γε τοῖς πάθεσιν. ἔστι δ’ εἴς ὅν εἰρηκε δυνάμενα προσγίνεσθαι καὶ χωρίζεσθαι πάλιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ μαχομένων ἄλληλοις ἢτι τοῦ νείκους καὶ τῆς φιλίας. διόπερ καὶ τότε εἶ ἐνὸς ἐγεννήθησαν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ πῦρ γε καὶ γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ

a i.e. when the elements originally came-to be.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 1

trary poles,” whether they change in respect of place, or of “growth” and “diminution,” or of “alteration”; furthermore, that the existence of a single matter and that of “alteration” are each as necessary as the other, for, if “alteration” takes place, then the substratum is a single element, and so all things which change into one another have a single matter, and, conversely, if the substratum is one, “alteration” takes place.

Empedocles, then, seems to contradict the observed facts and himself as well. For he denies that any one of his elements comes-to-be from any other element, but declares that all other things come-to-be from these elements, and at the same time, after collecting all nature, except Strife, together into one, he declares that each thing again comes-to-be out of the One. Hence it is clear that out of a One, when separation took place owing to certain differences and qualities, one thing came-to-be Water and another Fire, as is shown by his calling the sun “white and hot” and the earth “heavy and hard.” If, therefore, these differences are taken away (and it is possible to take them away, since they came-to-be), it is clear that Earth must necessarily come-to-be out of Water, and Water out of Earth, and similarly with each of the other elements, not only then but also now, when they undergo a change in their qualities. According to his statements, the qualities can be attached and can be separated again, especially as Strife and Love are still fighting against one another. This is also the reason why the elements were originally generated from the One; for, I suppose, Fire, Earth and Water

\[ ^a \text{i.e. when according to Empedocles “Strife” is gaining the upper hand.} \]
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315 a

ἐτι οὖντα ἐν ἢν τὸ πᾶν. ἄδηλον δὲ καὶ πότερον
20 ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν θετέον τὸ ἐν ἢ τὰ πολλά, λέγω δὲ πῦρ
καὶ γῆ καὶ τὰ σύστοιχα τούτων. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ὡς
ὑλὴ υπόκειται, εξ οὐ μεταβάλλοντα διὰ τὴν κίνησιν
γίνονται γῆ καὶ πῦρ, τὸ ἐν στοιχείοιν. ἢ δὲ τούτο
μὲν ἐκ συνθέσεως γίνεται συνιόντων ἐκείνων,
ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἐκ διαλύσεως, στοιχειωδέστερα ἐκεῖνα
25 καὶ πρότερα τὴν φύσιν.

2. "Ολως τε δὴ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορὰς τῆς
ἀπλῆς λεκτέον, πότερον ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἐστι καὶ πῶς
ἐστίν, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπλῶν κινήσεων, οἶον
περὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ ἄλλωσεως. Πλάτων μὲν οὖν
30 μόνον περὶ γενέσεως ἐσκέψατο καὶ φθορᾶς, ὅπως
ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως οὐ
πάσης ἄλλα τῆς τῶν στοιχείων, πῶς δὲ σάρκες ἢ
ὀστά ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν τοιούτων, οὐδὲν. ἐτι
οὔτε περὶ ἄλλωσεως οὔτε περὶ αὐξήσεως, τίνα
τρόπον ὑπάρχουσι τοῖς πράγμασιν. Οἶλως δὲ παρὰ
τὰ ἐπιτολῆς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὔδείς ἐπέστησεν ἐξω
35 Δημοκρίτου. οὕτος δ’ ἔουκε μὲν περὶ ἅπαντων
315 b φροντίσαι, ἢδη δὲ ἐν τῷ πῶς διαφέρει. οὔτε γὰρ
περὶ αὐξήσεως οὔδείς οὐδὲν διώρισεν, ὡσπερ λέ-
γομεν, ὡ τι μὴ κἂν ὁ τυχῶν εἴπειεν, ὧτι προσιόντος
αὐξάνονται τοῦ ὁμοίου1 τῷ ὁμοίῳ (πῶς δὲ τούτο,

1 τοῦ ὁμοίου addidi.

a i.e. Water and Air.
b Namely, that set up by Strife.
c Timaeus 52 d ff.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 1–2

did not exist separately at all while they were still one. Now it is also not clear whether we must ascribe to him the One as his starting-point, or the Many—by which I mean Fire and Earth and their co-
ordinates. For the One, in as much as it forms, as its matter, the substratum from which Earth and Fire come-to-be through the change due to motion, is an element; on the other hand, in as much as the One comes-to-be through a process of composition, due to the coming together of the Many, whereas the Many are the result of dissolution, the Many are more "elementary" than the One and by nature prior to it.

2. We must, therefore, deal in general with the subject of unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away, and discuss whether they exist or not, and how they exist, and with the other simple motions, such as "growth" and "alteration." Plato, it is true, investigated coming-to-be and passing-away, but only as to the manner in which passing-away is inherent in things, and as regards coming-to-be he did not deal with it in general but only that of the elements; he never inquired how flesh or bones or any other similar things came-to-be, and, further, he did not discuss how "alteration" and "growth" are present in things. In fact no one at all has applied himself to any of these subjects, except in a superficial manner, with the single exception of Democritus. He seems to have thought about them all, and from first to last he excels in his manner of treatment. For, as we assert, no one else made any definite pronouncement about "growth," except such as any man-in-the-street might make, namely, that things grow by the coming together of like with like (without a word as
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οὐκέτι), οὐδὲ περὶ μίξεως, οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων
5 ὡς εἰπεῖν οὔδενός, οἶνον τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ πᾶσχειν,
τίνα τρόπον τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ πᾶσχε τὰς φυσικὰς
ποιῆσεις. Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος ποιή-
σαντες τὰ σχήματα τὴν ἄλλοισιν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν
ἐκ τούτων ποιοῦσι, διακρίσει μὲν καὶ συγκρίσει
γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν, τάξει δὲ καὶ θέσει ἄλλοισιν.
10 ἔπει δ’ ὄντο τάληθες ἐν τῷ φαίνεσθαι, ἐναντία δὲ
καὶ ἀπειρα τὰ φαινόμενα, τὰ σχήματα ἀπειρα
ἐποίησαν, ὡστε ταῖς μεταβολαῖς τοῦ συγκειμένου
τὸ αὐτὸ ἐναντίον δοκεῖν ἄλλω καὶ ἄλλω, καὶ μετα-
κινεῖσθαι μικρὸν ἐμμυγνυμένου, καὶ ὅλως ἔτερον
φαίνεσθαι ἐνὸς μετακινηθέντος· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ
15 τραγῳδία καὶ κωμῳδία γίνεται γραμμάτων.

ʾΕπεῖ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν πᾶσιν ἐτερον εἶναι γένεσις
καὶ ἄλλοισις, καὶ γίνεσθαι μὲν καὶ φθεῖρεσθαι
συγκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα, ἄλλοισθαι δὲ
μεταβαλλόντων τῶν παθημάτων, περὶ τούτων ἐπι-
στήσασι θεωρητέον. ἀπορίας γὰρ ἔχει ταῦτα καὶ
20 πολλὰς καὶ εὐλόγους. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι σύγκρισις
ἡ γένεσις, πολλὰ ἀδύνατα συμβαίνει· εἰσὶ δ’ αὐ
λόγοι ἔτεροι ἀναγκαστικοὶ καὶ οὐκ εὔποροι διαλύειν
ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι σύγ-
κρισις ἡ γένεσις, ἡ ὅλως οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις ἡ ἁλ-
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to how this happens), and they tell us nothing about "mixing" and practically nothing about the other terms, such as "action" and "passion," that is, how one thing acts upon and another is affected by physical action. Democritus, however, and Leucippus postulate the "figures" and make "alteration" and coming-to-be result from these, attributing coming-to-be and passing-away to their dissociation and association, and "alteration" to their arrangement and position; and, since they held that the truth consisted in appearance, and appearances are contrary to one another and infinite in number, they made the "figures" infinite in number, so that, owing to changes in the compound, the same thing seems to be contrary to different people and to be "transposed" by the mixing in of a small ingredient and to appear quite different owing to "transposition" of one constituent. For a tragedy and a comedy are composed of the same letters.

Since almost all philosophers think (a) that coming-to-be and "alteration" are different processes and (b) that things come-to-be and pass-away by "association" and "dissociation," whereas they undergo "alteration" by a change of their qualities, we must fix our attention on these views and examine them; for they present many arguable questions for discussion. For if coming-to-be is "association," many impossible situations arise; and, on the other hand, there are other compelling arguments, not easy to disentangle, to prove that coming-to-be cannot be anything else. If, on the other hand, coming-to-be is not "association," either coming-to-be does not

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1 εἰ δὲ scripsi: εἰτε codd.
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315 b

λοίωσις, ἡ καὶ τοῦτο διαλύσαι χαλεπὸν ὅν πειρατέον.

25 Ἄρχῃ δὲ τούτων πάντων, πότερον οὕτω γίνεται καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται καὶ αὐξάνεται τὰ ὄντα καὶ τάναντία τούτοις πάσχει, τῶν πρώτων ὑπαρχόντων μεγεθῶν ἀδιαιρέτων, ἢ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ μέγεθος ἀδιαιρετον· διαφέρει γὰρ τοῦτο πλείστον. καὶ πάλιν εἰ μεγέθη, πότερον, ὡς Δημόκριτος καὶ Λεύκιππος, σώματα

30 ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν, ἢ ὤσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαιῷ, ἐπίπεδα. τούτο μὲν οὖν αὐτό, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ἀλλοις εἰρήκαμεν, ἄλογον μέχρι ἐπιπέδων διαλύσαι. διὸ μᾶλλον εὐλογον σώματα εἶναι ἀδιαιρετα. ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα πολλὴν ἔχει ἄλογιαν. ὅμως δὲ τούτοις ἀλλοιῶσι καὶ γένεσιν ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν, καθάπερ

35 εἰρήται, τροπῇ καὶ διαθηγῇ μετακινοῦντα τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ταῖς τῶν σχημάτων διαφοραῖς, ὅπερ ποιεῖ Δημόκριτος (διὸ καὶ χροιῶν οὐ φησιν εἶναι· τροπῇ γὰρ χρωματίζεσθαι), τοῖς δ’ εἰς ἐπίπεδα διαιροῦσιν οὐκέτι. οὐδὲν γὰρ γίνεται πλὴν στερεὰ συντιθεμένων· πάθος γὰρ οὐδ’ ἐγχειροῦσι γεννᾶν οὐδὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν.

316 a Ἀνίτιον δὲ τοῦ ἐπ’ ἐλαττὸν δύνασθαι τὰ ὁμολογοῦμενα συνορᾶν ἡ ἀπειρία. διὸ ὅσοι ἐνσκήκασι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, μᾶλλον δύνανται ὑποτίθεσθαι τοιαῦτας ἀρχὰς αἱ ἐπὶ πολὺ δύνανται συνεῖρειν.

1 εἰ post ἦ omisi cum EH.

a Plato, Timaeus 53 c ff.
b De Caelo 299 a 6 ff.
c These terms are explained in Met. 985 b 15 ff.

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exist at all or it is "alteration"; or else we must try to unravel this problem too, difficult as it is.

The starting-point for dealing with all these problems is the question, "Do things which exist come-to-be and 'alter' and 'grow,' and undergo the contrary changes, because the primary existences are indivisible magnitudes? Or is no magnitude indivisible?"

For it makes a great difference which view we take. Again, if primary existences are indivisible magnitudes, are they bodies, as Democritus and Leucippus assert? Or are they planes, as is the view expressed in the Timaeus? To resolve them into planes and to stop at that point is, as we have said elsewhere, in itself contrary to reason. Hence it is more reasonable to hold that they are indivisible bodies, though this view also involves considerable irrationality. Nevertheless, as has been said, it is possible with these bodies to bring about "alteration" and coming-to-be if one "transposes" the same thing by "turning" and "intercontact" and by variations of the "figures," as Democritus does (hence he denies that colour exists, for coloration, he says is due to the "turning" of the "figures"); but it is impossible for those who divide bodies into planes to bring about "alteration" and coming-to-be; for, when planes are put together, nothing can result except solids; for they never even try to generate any quality from them.

The reason why we have not the power to comprehend the admitted facts is our lack of experience. Hence those who have lived in a more intimate communion with the phenomena of nature are better able to lay down such principles as can be connected together and cover a wide field; those, on the other
οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν λόγων ἀθεώρητοι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὄντες, πρὸς ὅλην βλέψαντες ἀποφαίνονται ῥᾴον. ἵδιοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅσον διαφέρουσιν οἱ φυσικῶς καὶ λογικῶς σκοποῦντες. περὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἄτομα εἶναι μεγέθη οἱ μὲν φασὶν ὅτι τὸ αὐτοτρίγωνον πολλὰ ἐσται, Δημόκριτος δ' ἂν φανεῖν οἰκείως καὶ φυσικῶς λόγοις πεπείσθαι. δὴ λοιπὸν δ' ἐσται δ' λέγομεν προϊόνσιν.

15 Ἐχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν, εἰ τις θείη σώμα τι εἶναι καὶ μέγεθος πάντη διαιρετόν, καὶ τοῦτο δυνατόν. τί γὰρ ἐσται ὅπερ τὴν διαίρεσιν διαφεύγει; εἰ γὰρ πάντη διαιρετόν, καὶ τοῦτο δυνατόν, κἂν ἄμα εἴη τοῦτο πάντη διηρημένον, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἄμα διήρηται κἂν εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο, οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη ἀδύνατον.

20 οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέσον ὡσαύτως, καὶ ὅλως δὲ, εἰ πάντη πέφυκε διαιρετόν, κἂν διαιρεθῇ, οὐδὲν ἐσται ἀδύνατον γεγονός, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂν εἰς μυρία μυριάκις διηρημένα ἦ, οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον· κἂτοι ἰσως οὐδεὶς ἂν διέλοι. ἐπεὶ τούτων πάντη τοιοῦτον ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα, διηρήσθω. τί οὖν ἐσται λοιπὸν; μέγεθος; οὔ γὰρ οἶνον τε ἐσται γὰρ τι οὗ διηρημένον, ἣν δὲ πάντῃ διαιρετόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδὲν ἐσται

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a i.e. the Platonists.
b See De Lin. Insec. 968 a 9 ff.

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COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I.

hand, who indulge in long discussions without taking the facts into account are more easily detected as men of narrow views. One can see, too, from this the great difference which exists between those whose researches are based on the phenomenon of nature and those who inquire by a dialectical method. For on the subject of atomic magnitudes one school maintains their existence on the ground that otherwise the "ideal triangle" will be many, while Democritus would appear to have been convinced by arguments germane to the subject and founded on the study of nature. What we mean will be clear as we proceed.

If one postulates that a body, that is, a magnitude, is divisible throughout and that such a division is possible, a difficulty arises, namely, what will the body be which escapes division? If it is divisible throughout and this procedure is possible, it might be simultaneously divided throughout, even though the divisions have not been made simultaneously, and, if this were to result, no impossibility would be involved. Therefore, supposing it is of a nature to be divisible throughout, by a series of similar bisections or on any other principle, nothing impossible will have been achieved if it has actually been divided, since, even if it has been divided into innumerable parts innumerable times, there is no impossibility, though perhaps no one would carry out this division. Since, therefore, the body is divisible throughout, let us suppose that it has been divided. What then will be left? A magnitude? No: that is impossible, since then there will be something which has not been divided, and it was divisible throughout. But if no body or magnitude is to be left
οὕμα μηδὲ μέγεθος, διαίρεσις δ’ ἔσται, ἡ ἔκ
στιγμῶν ἔσται, καὶ ἀμεγέθη ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται, ἡ
οὐδὲν παντάπασιν, ὥστε κἂν γίνοιτο ἐκ μηδενὸς
κἂν εἰη συγκείμενον, καὶ τὸ πᾶν δὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλ’ ἡ
30 φαινόμενον. ὄμοιως δὲ κἂν ἡ ἔκ στιγμῶν, οὐκ
ἔσται ποσὸν. ὅποτε γὰρ ἦπτοντο καὶ ἐν ἧν μέγεθος
καὶ ἀμα ἴσαν, οὐδὲν ἐποίουν μείζον τὸ πᾶν. δια-
ρεθέντος γὰρ εἰς δύο καὶ πλεῖω, οὐδὲν ἔλαττον οὐδὲ
μείζον τὸ πᾶν τοῦ πρότερον, ὥστε κἂν πᾶσαι συν-
teθῶσιν, οὐδὲν ποιήσουσι μέγεθος. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ
316 b εἰ τι διαιρομένου οἶνον ἐκπρισμα γίνεται τοῦ σώ-
ματος, καὶ οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ μεγέθους σώμα τι ἀπέρ-
χεται, ὅ αὐτὸς λόγος, ἐκεῖνο πῶς διαιρέτον; εἰ
δὲ μὴ σώμα ἄλλ’ εἰδὸς τι χωριστὸν ἡ πάθος ὁ
ἀπήλθεν, καὶ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγεθος στιγμαὶ ἡ ἄφαι τοῦ
5 παθοῦσαι, ἀτοπον ἐκ μὴ μεγεθῶν μέγεθος εἶναι.
ἐτι δὲ ποῦ ἐσονται καὶ ἀκίνητοι ἡ κυνούμεναι αἱ
στιγμαί; ἀφῆ τε ἀεὶ μία δυνοῦν τινῶν, ὡς οὕτως
τινὸς παρὰ τὴν ἀφῆν καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν
στιγμήν. εἰ δὴ τις θήσεται ὁτιοῦν ἡ ὀπηλικονοῦν
σώμα εἶναι πάντῃ διαιρέτον, πάντα ταῦτα συμ-
10 βαίνει. ἐτι ἐὰν διελῶν συνθώ τὸ ἕυλον ἡ τι ἄλλο,
pάλιν ᾗσον τε καὶ ἐν. οὔκοιν οὕτως ἔχει δηλονότι
κἂν τέμω τὸ ἕυλον καθ’ ὁτιοῦν σημεῖον. πάντῃ
ἀρα διήρηται δυνάμει. τι οὖν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν διαί-

a i.e. the sum of the separated parts.
and yet division is to take place, the body either will consist of points, and its constituents will be things of no magnitude, or else it will be absolutely nothing; and so it would come-to-be and be compounded of nothing, and the whole would be nothing but an illusory appearance. Similarly, if it consists of points, it will not be a magnitude; for when the points were in contact and formed a single magnitude and were together, they did not make the whole any larger. For when it was divided into two or more parts, the whole was no smaller or larger than before; so that, if all the points were to be put together, they will not make any magnitude. Further, if, when the body is being divided, a minute portion of it, like a piece of saw-dust, is formed and in this way a body is detached from the magnitude, the same argument holds good, and the question arises: "In what sense is this portion divisible?" If it was not a body which was detached but a separable form or quality, and if the magnitude is points or contacts thus qualified, it is absurd that a magnitude should be composed of things which are not magnitudes. Furthermore, where will the points be? And, are they motionless or do they move? Also a contact is always a contact of two things, since there is always something as well as the contact or the division or the point. All this results, if one is going to posit that any body of any size whatever is divisible throughout. Furthermore, if, after having divided a piece of wood or some other object, I put it together again, it is again both equal to what it was and a unity. Obviously this is so at whatever point I cut the wood. The wood has, therefore, been divided potentially throughout. What then, is there in the wood besides the division? For
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΕΣ

316 b

ρεσιν; εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστι τι πάθος, ἄλλα πῶς εἰς ταῦτα διαλύεται καὶ γίνεται ἐκ τούτων; ἥ πῶς
15 χωρίζεται ταῦτα; ὡστ' εἴπερ ἀδύνατον εὖ ἄφων ἢ στιγμῶν εἶναι τὰ μεγέθη, ἀνάγκη εἶναι σώματα ἀδιαιρετα καὶ μεγέθη. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ ταῦτα θεμένους οὐχ ἢττον συμβαίνει ἀδύνατον. ἐσκεπταὶ
de περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν ἔτεροις. ἄλλα ταῦτα πειρατέον λύειν· διὸ πάλιν εὖ ἀρχῆς τὴν ἀπορίαν λεκτέον.

20 Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀπαν σῶμα αἰσθητὸν εἶναι διαιρετὸν καθ' ὅτι οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ
πέρα τοῦ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμει διαιρετὸν, τὸ δ' ἐντελεχεία ὑπάρξει. τὸ δ' εἶναι ἀμα πάντη διαιρετὸν δυνάμεi ἀδύνατον δόξειν ἢν εἰναι. εἰ γὰρ δυνατόν, κἂν γένοιτο, οὐχ ἢστε εἶναι ἀμα ἄφων ἐντελεχεία.

25 ἀδιαιρετον καὶ διηρημένον, ἄλλα διηρημένον καθ' ὅτι οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ
οὐδὲν ἀρα ἔσται λοιπὸν, καὶ εἰς ἀσώματον ἐφθαρμένον τὸ σῶμα, καὶ γένοιτο δ' ἢν πάλιν ἢτοι ἐκ στιγμῶν ἢ ὅλως εὖ οὐδενὸς. καὶ
tοῦτο πῶς δυνατόν;

'Αλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γε διαιρεῖται εἰς χωριστὰ καὶ ἂεi eἰς ἐλάστω μεγέθη καὶ eἰς ἀπέχουτα καὶ κεκυρι-

30 σμένα, φανερόν. οὔτε δὴ κατὰ μέρος διαιροῦντι εἰη ἢν ἀπειρος ἢ θρύμις, οὔτε ἃμα οἶνον τε διαιρεθήναι κατὰ πάν σημεῖον (οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν) ἄλλα μέχρι τοῦ.

ἀνάγκη ἃρα ἀτόμα ἐνυπάρχειν μεγέθη ἀόρατα, ἀλλως τε καὶ εἴπερ ἔσται γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ ἡ

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a i.e. points of division and quality.
b Phys. 231 a 21 ff.  
c i.e. uncuttable.
even if there is some quality, how is it dissolved into these constituents and how does it come-to-be out of them? And how are these constituents separated? Therefore, since it is impossible for magnitudes to consist of contacts or points, there must be indivisible bodies and magnitudes. However, if we posit these, an equally impossible consequence arises, which has been the subject of discussion elsewhere. But we must try to solve these difficulties, and so the problem must be stated again from the beginning.

It is, then, in no wise absurd that every perceptible body should be divisible at any point whatsoever and also indivisible; for it will be potentially divisible and actually indivisible. But it would seem impossible that it should be, even potentially, divisible throughout at the same time; for, if that were possible, it would actually happen, with the result, not that it would actually be simultaneously both things—indivisible and divided—but that it would be divided simultaneously at any and every point. Nothing will, therefore, be left, and the body will have passed-away into a state of incorporeity, and so it also might come-to-be again either from points or absolutely from nothing. And how is this possible?

It is clear, however, that a body is divided into magnitudes which are separable and grow smaller and smaller and come apart from one another and are separated. If you divide a body piece by piece, the process of breaking it up would not be infinite, nor can it be divided simultaneously at every point (for this is not possible), but the process can only be carried on within a certain limit. There must, then, exist in a body atomic magnitudes which are invisible, especially if coming-to-be and passing-away
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316 b
μὲν διακρίσει ἡ δὲ συγκρίσει. ὦ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκάζειν
317 a δοκῶν λόγος εἶναι μεγέθη ἀτόμα οὔτος ἑστίν· ὅτι
dὲ λανθάνει παραλογιζόμενος, καὶ ἡ λανθάνει, λέ-
γωμεν.
'Επει γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶ στιγμὴ στιγμῆς ἐχομένη, τὸ
pάντη εἶναι διαρετῶν ἑστὶ μὲν ὡς ὑπάρχει τοῖς
μεγέθεσιν, ἐστὶ δ' ὡς οὖ. δοκεῖ δ' ὅταν τοῦτο
tεθῇ, καὶ ὁποῖον καὶ πάντη στιγμὴ εἶναι, ὡστ' ἀναγκαίον εἶναι διαρεδήναι τὸ μέγεθος εἰς μηδὲν·
pάντη γὰρ εἶναι στιγμῆν· ὅστε ἡ ἐξ ἀφῶν ἡ ἐκ
στιγμῶν εἶναι. τὸ δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ὑπάρχει πάντη,
ὅτι μία ὁποῖον ἐστὶ, καὶ πᾶσαι ὡς ἕκαστη, πλείους
dὲ μᾶς οὐκ εἰσίν (ἐφεξῆς γὰρ οὐκ εἰσίν), ὡστ' οὐ
πάντη. εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μέσον διαρετῶν, καὶ κατ'
ἐχομένην στιγμῆν ἐσται διαρετῶν· οὐχὶ δὲν· οὗ
γάρ ἐστὶν ἐχομένου σημείου σημείου ἡ στιγμὴ
στιγμῆς. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ διαίρεσις καὶ2 σύνθεσις.
"Ὡστ' ἐστι καὶ διάκρισις καὶ σύγκρισις, ἀλλ' οὔτ'
eἰς ἀτόμα καὶ ἐξ ἀτόμων (πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ ἄδυνατα)
15 οὔτε οὖτως ὡστε πάντη διαίρεσιν γενέσθαι (εἰ
gὰρ ἤν ἐχομένη στιγμὴ στιγμῆς, τούτ' ἄν ἦν), ἀλλ'
eἰς μικρὰ καὶ ἐλάττω ἑστί, καὶ σύγκρισις ἐξ
ἐλάττων. ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ ἀπλὴ καὶ τελεία γένεσις
συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει ὥρισται, ὡς τινὲς φασιν,
tὴν δ' ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ μεταβολὴν ἀλλοίωσον. ἀλλὰ

1 οὐχὶ δὲ J: om. cct. codd.
2 καὶ II: ἡ.
are going to take place by association and dissociation respectively. This, then, is the argument which is thought to necessitate the existence of atomic magnitudes, but let us now show that it conceals a false inference, and where this false inference lies.

Since no point is contiguous to another point, the divisibility throughout of a body is possible in one sense, but not in another sense. When such divisibility is postulated, it is generally held that there is a point both anywhere and everywhere in it, so that it follows that the magnitudes must be divided until nothing is left. For, it is urged, there is a point everywhere in it, so that it consists either of contacts or of points. But divisibility-throughout is possible only in the sense that there is one point anywhere within it and that all its points taken separately are within it; but there are not more points than one anywhere in it (for the points are not "consecutive"), so that it is not divisible throughout; for then, if it was divisible at its centre, it will also be divisible at a contiguous point. But it is not; for one moment in time is not contiguous to another, nor is one point to another. So much for division and composition.

Hence both association and dissociation occur but neither into atomic magnitudes and out of them (for the impossibilities involved are numerous), nor in such a way that division-throughout occurs (for this would be possible only if point were contiguous to point); but dissociation occurs into small, or relatively small, parts, while association occurs out of relatively small parts. But unqualified and complete coming-to-be is not defined as due to association and dissociation, as some people assert, while they say that change in what is continuous is "alteration." In fact,
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317 a
20 τούτ’ ἐστὶν ἐν ὧν σφάλλεται πάντα. ἔστι γὰρ γένεσις ἀπλὴ καὶ φθορὰ οὐ συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει, ἄλλ’ ὅταν μεταβάλλῃ ἐκ τοῦδε εἰς τόδε ὀλον. οἱ δὲ οἴονται ἄλλοισιν πᾶσαν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολήν· τὸ δὲ διαφέρει. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὅλην.

25 ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἡ μεταβολή, γένεσις ἐσται ἡ φθορά, ὅταν δ’ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἄλλοισις. διακρινόμενα δὲ καὶ συγκρινόμενα εὐφθαρτα γίνεται. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττων ὑδάτια διαφρῆθη, θάττον ἀὴρ γίνεται, ἐὰν δὲ συγκριθῇ, βραδύτερον. μᾶλλον δ’ ἐσται δὴλον ἐν τοῖς ύστερον. νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω, ὅτι ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν σύγκρισιν, οἰαν δὴ τινὲς φασιν.

3. Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, πρῶτον θεωρητέον πότερον ἔστι τι γνώμενον ἀπλῶς καὶ φθειρόμενον, ἡ κυρίως μὲν οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δ’ ἐκ τινος καὶ τ’, λέγω δ’ 35 οἶον ἐκ κάμνοντος ὑγιαίνων καὶ κάμνον εξ ὑγιαί- 317 b νοντος, ἡ μικρὸν ἐκ μεγάλου καὶ μέγα ἐκ μικροῦ, καὶ τάλλα πάντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. εἰ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἐσται γένεσις, ἀπλῶς ἄν γίνοιτο ἐκ μὴ οὖντος, ὡστ’ ἀληθεὶς ἄν εἰη λέγειν ὅτι ύπάρχει τισὶ τὸ μὴ οὖν.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 2-3

this is where the whole mistake occurs; for unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away are not due to association and dissociation, but take place when something as a whole changes from "this" to "that." But some philosophers hold that all such change is "alteration," whereas there is a difference. For in that which underlies the change there is a factor corresponding to the definition and a material factor; when, therefore, the change takes place in these, coming-to-be or passing-away will occur, but, when the change is in the qualities (that is to say, there is an accidental change), "alteration" will result.

Things which are associated and dissociated become liable to pass-away; for if drops of water are divided into still smaller drops, air comes-to-be from them more quickly, whereas, if they are associated together, air comes-to-be more slowly. This, however, will be clearer in what follows; for the moment let us assume this much as established, namely, that coming-into-being cannot be association of the kind which some people assert it to be.

3. Having made the above distinctions, we must first inquire whether there is anything which comes-to-be and passes-away in an unqualified sense, or whether nothing comes-to-be in the strict sense, but everything comes-to-be something, and out of something—for example, comes-to-be healthy out of being ill, and ill out of being healthy, or small out of being large, and large out of being small, and so on in the other instances which one might give. For, if there is to be coming-to-be without qualification, something must come-to-be out of not-being without qualification, so that it would be true to say that there are things of which "not-being" can be predicated; for...
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317 b
tis men gar genesis ek mhe ontos tinos, oion ek
5 mhe leuko h mhe kalou, h de aplh ex aplwos mhe
ontos.

To de aplwos hto to protou smeainei kath'
ekasthena kathegorian tov ontos, h to katholou kai
to pantta periexhon. ei men ou to protou, ouxia
esta genesis ek mhe ouxiai. w de mhe uparxei ouxia
mide todhe, dhlon wos oude twv allwv oudeima kath-
gorwv, oion oute poion oute poson oute to poii
choresta gar an eih ta pathi twv ouxiwv. ei de
to mhe on allos, apofasis estas katholou panton,
wste ek mheidon anagnkh ginesthai to ginomenv.

Peri men ou tounton en allous te diaporthyta kai
diowristai tois logois epileon synptomos de kai
vyn lektew, oti trupon men tina ek mhe ontos aplwos
ginetai, trupon de allon ex ontos ae' to gar
dunamei on entelecheia de mhe on anagnh prooplarchwv
legoemenv amfoterwos. o de kai tounton diowris-
smewon exe theumasthn aporiaan, palin epanapo-
dustew, pws estin aplh genesis, eit' ek dunamei
ontos ouxa eite kai pws allw. aporhsie gair an
thie apo ouxia genesis kai tov toude, allla
mhe tov toioide kai tosoide kai po (ton auton de'

a Phys. i. 6-9.
b i.e. as "being" and as "not-being."
some kind of coming-to-be proceeds from some kind of not-being, for example, from "not-white" and "not-beautiful," but unqualified coming-to-be proceeds from unqualified not-being.

Now "unqualified" signifies either (a) that which is primary in each category, or (b) that which is universal and universally comprehensive. If, then, it signifies that which is primary, there will be a coming-to-be of substance out of not-substance; but that which has not a substance or a "this" obviously cannot have any predicate from the other categories, either, for example, quality, quantity or position, for then the properties would exist apart from the substances. If, on the other hand, "unqualified not-being" signifies that which does not exist at all, this will be a general negation of all being, and, therefore, what comes-to-be must come-to-be out of nothing.

This problem has been discussed and settled at greater length elsewhere; but a short restatement of it is called for here: In one way things come-to-be out of that which has no unqualified being, in another way they always come-to-be out of what is; for there must be a pre-existence of that which potentially is, but actually is not, in being, and this is described in both ways. This having been established, a question involving extraordinary difficulty must be re-examined, namely, how can there be "unqualified coming-to-be," whether it comes from what exists potentially or in some other way? For one might raise the question whether there is a coming-to-be of substance (that is, of the "this") at all, and not rather of a "such" or a "so-great" or a "some-where"; and the same question might be asked...
317 b

τρόπον καὶ περὶ φθορᾶς). εἰ γὰρ τι γίνεται, δῆλον ὡς ἔσται δυνάμει τις οὐσία, ἐντελεχεία δ' οὖ, εἰς ἢ γένεσις ἔσται καὶ εἰς ἢν ἀνάγκη μεταβάλλειν τὸ φθειρόμενον. πότερον οὖν ὑπάρξει τι τούτω τῶν ἀλλών ἐντελεχεία; λέγω δ' οἶνον ἄρ' ἐσται ποσὸν ἡ ποιῶν ἡ ποῦ το δυνάμει μόνον τόδε καὶ ὑν, ἀπλῶς δὲ μὴ τόδε μηδ' ὑν; εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἄλλα πάντα δυνάμει, χωριστὸν τε συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ οὐτως ὑν, καὶ ἐτι, ὁ μάλιστα φοβοῦμεν διετέλεσαν οἱ πρῶτοι φιλοσοφήσαντες, τὸ ἐκ μηδενός γίνεσθαι προὐπάρχοντος. εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τὸδε τι ἡ οὐσίαν οὐχ ὑπάρξει, τῶν δ' ἀλλων τι τῶν εἰρημένων, ἐσται, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, χωριστά τὰ πάθη τῶν οὐσιῶν. περὶ το τούτων οὖν ὁσον ἐνδέχεται πραγματευτέον, καὶ τίς αἰτία τοῦ γένεσιν ἂει εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ἀπλὴν καὶ τὴν κατὰ μέρος.

318 a Οὔσης δ' αἰτίας μιᾶς μὲν οἶδεν τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι φαμέν τῆς κινήσεως, μιᾶς δὲ τῆς ὑλῆς, τῆν τουατὴν αἰτίαν λεκτέον. περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνης εὑρηταῖ πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως λόγους, ὧτι ἐστὶ τὸ 5 μὲν ἀκίνητον τὸν ἄπαντα χρόνων, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον ἂεί. τούτων δὲ περὶ μὲν τῆς ἀκινητοῦ ἀρχῆς τῆς ἐτέρας καὶ προτέρας διελεῖν ἐστὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐργον.

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a In lines 10, 11 above.

b i.e. qualified, that is, changing in respect of quality, quantity or position.

c Phys. 258 b 10 ff.
about passing-away also. For, if something comes-to-be, it is clear that there will be substance, not actually but potentially, from which the coming-to-be will proceed and into which that which is passing-away must change. Will any other attribute then belong actually to this supposed substance? For example, I mean, will that which is only potentially a "this" (and only potentially exists), and which is not a "this" and does not exist without qualification, possess size or quality or position? For, (1) if it actually possessed none of these determinations but possesses them all potentially, the result is (a) that a being which is not a determined being can possess a separate existence, and (b) that coming-to-be arises out of nothing pre-existent—a view which inspired great and continuous alarm in the minds of the early philosophers. On the other hand, (2) if, although it is not to be a "this" or a substance, it is to possess some of the other attributes which we have mentioned, then, as we said, the qualities will be separable from the substance. We must, therefore, deal with these matters to the best of our ability, and also with the causes of continuous coming-to-be, both the unqualified and the partial.

Now there are two meanings of "cause," one being that which, as we say, results in the beginning of motion, and the other the material cause. It is the latter kind with which we have to deal here; for with cause in the former sense we have dealt in our discussion of Motion, when we said that there is something which remains immovable through all time and something which is always in motion. To come to a decision about the first of these, the immovable original source, is the task of the other and prior
περὶ δὲ τοῦ διὰ τὸ συνεχῶς κινεῖσθαι τάλα κινοῦντος ύστερον ἀποδοτέον, τί τοιοῦτον τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστα λεγομένων αἰτίων ἐστιν. νῦν δὲ τὴν ώς ἐν 10 ὑλὴς εἶδει τιθεμένην αἰτίαν εἴπωμεν, δι’ ἂν ἂεὶ φθορὰ καὶ γένεσις οὐχ ὑπολείπει τὴν φύσιν. άμα γὰρ ἄν ἵσως τούτο γένοιτο δήλον, καὶ περὶ τοῦ νῦν ἀπορηθέντος, πῶς ποτὲ δεῖ λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀπλῆς φθορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως.

"Εχει δ’ ἀπορίαν ἰκανὴν καὶ τί τὸ αἰτίον τοῦ συνείρειν τὴν γένεσιν, εἴπερ τὸ φθειρόμενον εἰς τὸ 15 μὴ ὅν ἀπέρχεται, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅν μηδὲν ἐστιν. οὔτε γὰρ τὶ οὕτε ποιοῦ οὕτε ποσοῦ οὐτε ποῦ τὸ μή ὅν. εἴπερ οὖν ἂεὶ τὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀπέρχεται, διὰ τί ποτ’ οὐκ ἀνήλωται πάλαι καὶ φροῦδον τὸ πᾶν, εἰ γε πεπερασμένον ἢν ἐξ οὐ γίνεται τῶν γινομένων ἐκαστον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ ἀπειρὸν εἶναι ἐξ οὐ 20 γίνεται, οὐχ ὑπολείπει· τούτο γὰρ ἀδύνατον. κατ’ ἐνέργειαν μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐστιν ἀπειρὸν, δυνάμει δέ ἐπὶ τὴν διαφρεσίν, ὡστ’ ἐδε χαίτην εἶναι μόνην τὴν μὴ ὑπολείπουσαν τῷ γίνεσθαι τι ἂεὶ ἐλαττον ’νῦν δὲ τούτο οὐχ ὄρῳμεν.

"Αρ’ οὖν διὰ τὸ τὴν τοῦτο φθορὰν ἄλλου εἶναι 25 γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τοῦτο γένεσιν ἄλλου εἶναι φθορὰν

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a Usually called πρώτη φιλοσοφία.
b See 336 a 13 ff.
c Or “specific” causes, as opposed to causes in the universal sense: cf. Phys. 195 a 27 ff.

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branch of philosophy, while, regarding that which moves all other things by its own continuous motion, we shall have to explain later which of the individual causes is of this kind. For the moment let us deal with the cause which is placed in the class of matter, owing to which passing-away and coming-to-be never fail to occur in nature; for perhaps this may be cleared up and it may become evident at the same time what we ought to say about the problem which arose just now, namely, about unqualified passing-away and coming-to-be.

What is the cause of the continuous process of coming-to-be is a perplexing enough problem, if it is really true that what passes-away vanishes into "what is not" and "what is not" is nothing; for "what is not" is not anything and possesses neither quality nor quantity nor position. If, therefore, some one of the "things-which-are" is constantly vanishing, how is it that the whole of being has not long ago been used up and has not disappeared, provided, of course, that the source of each of the things which come-to-be was limited? For, I suppose, the fact that coming-to-be never fails is not because the source from which it comes is infinite; for this is impossible, since nothing is actually infinite but only potentially so for the purpose of division, so that there would have to be only one kind of coming-to-be, namely, one which never fails, because something which comes-to-be is successively smaller and smaller. But, as a matter of fact, we do not see this happening.

Is it, then, because the passing-away of one thing is the coming-to-be of another thing, and the coming-to-be of one thing the passing-away of another thing,
ARISTOTLE

318 a ἀπαντοῦν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν μεταβολήν; περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ γένεσιν εἶναι καὶ φθοράν ὁμοίως περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν οὐντῶν, ταύτην οἶητέον εἶναι πᾶσιν ἰκανὴν αἰτίαν. διὰ τί δὲ ποτε τὰ μὲν ἄπλῶς γίνεσθαι λέγεται καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὰ δ' οὐχ ἄπλῶς,

πάλιν σκεπτέον, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ γένεσις μὲν τοὐδεὶ φθορὰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ φθορὰ μὲν τοὐδεὶ γένεσις δὲ τοῦτο. ζητεῖ γὰρ τινα τοῦτο λόγον. λέγομεν γὰρ ὅτι φθείρεται νῦν ἄπλῶς, καὶ οὐ μόνον τοδὲ· καὶ αὐτῇ μὲν γένεσις ἄπλῶς, αὐτῇ δὲ φθορᾷ. τοδὲ δὲ γίνεται μὲν τι, γίνεται δ' ἄπλῶς οὐ· φαμὲν γὰρ τὸν μανθάνοντα γίνεσθαι μὲν ἐπιστήμονα, γίνεσθαι δ' ἄπλῶς οὐ.

318 b Καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις διορίζομεν λέγοντες ὅτι τὰ μὲν τόδε τι σημαίνει τὰ δ' οὖ, διὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει τὸ ζητούμενον· διαφέρει γὰρ εἰς ἃ μεταβάλλει τὸ μεταβάλλον· οἰον ἵσως ἢ μὲν εἰς πῦρ ὁδὸς γένεσις μὲν ἄπλῆ, φθορὰ δὲ τινὸς ἔστιν, οἰον γῆς, ἢ δ' γῆς γένεσις τίς γένεσις, γένεσις δ' οὐχ ἄπλῶς, φθορὰ δ' ἄπλῶς, οἰον πυρός, ὁσπερ Παρμενίδης λέγει δύο τὸ ὁν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅν εἶναι φάσκων, πῦρ καὶ γῆν. τὸ δὴ ταῦτα ἢ τοιαῦθ' ἐτερα ὑποτίθεσθαι διαφέρει οὐδέν· τὸν γὰρ τρόπον ζητούμεν, ἄλλ' οὖ τὸ ὑπο-

a Fr. 8 lines 53 ff. (Diels), but Parmenides mentions this theory as being wrong.

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that the process of change is necessarily unceasing? As regards the occurrence of coming-to-be and passing-away in everything which exists alike, the above must be regarded by all as an adequate cause; but why some things are said to come-to-be and to pass-away without qualification and others with qualification, must be examined once more, if it is true that the same process is a coming-to-be of "this," but a passing-away of "that," and a passing-away of "this" but a coming-to-be of "that"; for the question calls for discussion. For we say "It is now passing-away" without qualification, and not merely "This is passing-away"; and we call this a "coming-to-be," and that a "passing-away," without qualification. But this "comes-to-be-something," but does not do so without qualification; for we say that the student "comes-to-be learned," not "comes-to-be" without qualification.

Now we often make a distinction, saying that some things signify a "this," and others do not; and it is because of this that the point which we are examining arises, for it makes a difference into what that which is changing changes. For example, perhaps the passage into Fire is "coming-to-be" without qualification but "passing-away-of-something" (for instance, of Earth), while the coming-to-be of Earth is qualified (not unqualified) coming-to-be, but unqualified passing-away (for example, of Fire). This agrees with Parmenides' theory, for he says that the things into which change takes place are two and asserts that these two things, what is and what is not, are Fire and Earth. Whether we postulate these or other things of a like kind makes no difference; for we are seeking not what underlies these changes, but
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318 b

10 κείμενον. ή μὲν οὖν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὑπὸ ἀπλῶς ὁδὸς
φθορά ἀπλῆ, ή δ’ εἰς τὸ ἀπλῶς ὑπὸ γένεσις ἀπλῆ.
οἷς οὖν διώρισται εἰτε πυρὶ καὶ γῆ εἰτε ἄλλοις τισί,
τούτων ἔσται τὸ μὲν ὃν τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν. ἕνα μὲν οὖν
τρόπον τούτῳ διοίσει τὸ ἀπλῶς τι γίνεσθαι καὶ
φθείρεσθαι τοῦ μὴ ἀπλῶς, ἄλλον δὲ τῇ ὦλῃ ὁποῖα
15 τίς ἂν ἦν. ἦς μὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον αἱ διαφοραῖ τόδε τι
σημαίνουσι, μᾶλλον οὐσία, ἦς δὲ στέρησιν, μὴ ὄν,
οἷον τὸ μὲν θερμὸν κατηγορία τις καὶ εἴδος, ἢ δὲ
ψυχρότης στέρησις· διαφεροῦσι δὲ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ
tαῦτας ταῖς διαφοραῖς.

Δοκεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς πολλοῖς τῷ αἰσθητῷ καὶ
20 μὴ αἰσθητῷ διαφέρειν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἀἰσθητὴν
μεταβάλλῃ ὦλῃ, γίνεσθαι φασίν, ὅταν δ’ εἰς ἀφανῆ,
φθείρεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ὃν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι
καὶ τῷ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι διορίζουσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ μὲν
ἐπιστητὸν ὃν, τὸ δ’ ἀγνωστὸν μὴ ὃν· ἢ γὰρ αἰσθησις
ἐπιστήμης ἔχει δύναμιν. καθάπερ οὖν αὐτοὶ τῶ
25 αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τῷ δύνασθαι καὶ ᾧν καὶ εἶναι
νομίζουσιν, οὔτω καὶ τὰ πράγματα, τρόπον τινὰ
the manner in which they take place. The passage, then, into that which "is not" without qualification is unqualified passing-away, while the passage into that which "is" without qualification is unqualified coming-to-be. Hence, whatever it is by which the things which change are distinguished from one another—whether it be Fire and Earth or some other pair—one will be "a being," the other "a not-being." One way, then, in which unqualified will differ from qualified coming-to-be and passing-away is obtained by this method. Another way of distinguishing them is by the special nature of the material of that which changes; for the more the differences of material signify "a this," the more is it a real being, whereas the more they signify a privation, the more unreal it is. For example, "hot" is a positive predication and a "form," while "cold" is a privation, and Earth and Fire are distinguished from one another by these differences.

In the opinion of most people the difference between qualified and unqualified depends rather on perceptibility and imperceptibility; for when there is a change to perceptible material, they say that coming-to-be takes place, but, when they change to invisible material, they say that passing-away occurs: for they distinguish between "that which is" and "that which is not" by their perception and non-perception, just as what is knowable is and what is unknowable is not (for to them perception has the force of knowledge). As, therefore, they themselves think that they live and have their being in virtue of perceiving or having the power to perceive, so, too, they consider that things exist because they perceive them—and, in a way, they are on the right road to

A note on why most people identify the real with the perceptible and the unreal with the imperceptible.
ARISTOTLE

318 b
diώκοντες τάληθες, αυτὸ δὲ λέγοντες οὐκ ἄληθες. συμβαίνει δὴ κατὰ δόξαν καὶ κατ᾽ ἄληθειαν ἄλλως τὸ γίνεσθαί τε ἀπλῶς καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι. πνεῦμα γὰρ καὶ ἀὴρ κατὰ μὲν τὴν αἰσθήσειν ἦττον ἔστιν (διὸ καὶ τὰ φθειρόμενα ἀπλῶς τῇ εἰς ταῦτα μεταβολῆ φθείρεσθαι λέγουσιν, γίνεσθαί δ᾽ ὅταν εἰς ἀπτόν καὶ εἰς γῆν μεταβάλλῃ), κατὰ δ᾽ ἄληθειαν μᾶλλον τόδε τι καὶ εἴδος ταῦτα τῆς γῆς.

Τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὴν μὲν ἀπλὴν γένεσιν φθορὰν οὐσάν τινος, τὴν δὲ φθορὰν τὴν ἀπλὴν γένεσιν οὐσάν τινος, εἰρηται τὸ αἰτίον (διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν ὑλὴν δια-319 a ψέφων ἢ τῷ οὐσίαν εἶναι ἢ τῷ μῆ, ἢ τῷ τῆς μὲν μᾶλλον τῆς δὲ μῆ, ἢ τῷ τῆς μὲν μᾶλλον αἰσθήσειν εἶναι τὴν ὑλὴν ἢς καὶ εἰς ἢν, τὴν δὲ ἦττον εἶναι). τοῦ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς γίνεσθαι λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ τι μόνον, μὴ τῇ ἢς ἄλληλων γενέσει, καθ᾽ οὖν εὐπομεν 5 νῦν τρόπον (νῦν μὲν γὰρ τοσοῦτον διώρισται, τί δὴ ποτε πάσης γενέσεως οὐσίας φθορᾶς ἄλλον, καὶ πάσης φθορᾶς οὐσίας ἐτέρου τινὸς γενέσεως, οὐχ ὁμολογὸν ἀποδίδομεν τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι τοῖς εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβάλλουσιν. τὸ δ᾽ ὑστερον εἰρη-μένον οὐ τοῦτο διαπορεῖ ἄλλα τί ποτε τὸ μανθάνον 10 μὲν οὖ λέγεται ἀπλῶς γίνεσθαι ἄλλα γίνεσθαι ἐπιστήμον, τὸ δὲ φυσικὸν γίνεσθαι, ταῦτα δὲ δι-ώρισται ταῖς κατηγορίαις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ τόδε τι

\[a\] τοῦ μὲν (318 b 33) is answered by τοῦ δὲ (319 a 3), and the construction is broken by the parenthesis.

\[b\] i.e. in 318 a 33 ff.

\[c\] i.e. to the question raised in lines 3-5 above.

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the truth, though what they actually say is not true. Indeed, the popular opinion about the way in which unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away occur, differs from the truth; for Wind and Air have less reality according to our perception of them (hence, too, things which pass-away are said to do so in an unqualified sense by changing into Wind and Air, and to come-to-be when they change into what is tangible, namely, into Earth), whereas in truth they are more a definite something and a "form" than Earth.

We have now stated the reason why there is unqualified coming-to-be, which is the passing-away of something, and unqualified passing-away, which is the coming-to-be of something (for it depends on the difference of the material, from which and into which the change takes place, and on its being substance or not, or on its having more or less of the nature of substance, or on its being more or less perceptible); but why are some things said to come-to-be without qualification, while others come-to-be some particular thing only and not by coming-to-be reciprocally out of one another in the manner which we described just now? (For up to the present we have only determined this much, namely, why, although all coming-to-be is a passing-away of something else and all passing-away is a coming-to-be of some other thing, we do not attribute coming-to-be and passing-away uniformly to things which change into one another; but the problem afterwards raised does not discuss this difficulty, but why that which learns is said to come-to-be learned and not to come-to-be without qualification, yet that which grows is said to come-to-be). The answer is that this is determined by the differences of the categories; for
σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ τοιόνδε, τὰ δὲ ποσὸν· ὅσα οὖν μὴ ὁυσίαν σημαίνει, οὐ λέγεται ἀπλῶς, ἄλλα τί γένεσθαι. οὐ μὴν ἄλλο ὁμοίως ἐν πάσι γένεσις μὲν 15 κατὰ τὰ ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συντοιχίᾳ λέγεται, οἷον ἐν μὲν ὁυσίᾳ ἐὰν πῦρ ἄλλο οὐκ ἐὰν γῆ, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιῶ ἐὰν ἐπιστήμον ἄλλо οὐχ ὅταν ἀνεπιστήμον.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς γίνεσθαι τὰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ ὅλως καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁυσίαις αὐταῖς, εἴρηται, καὶ διότι τοῦ γένεσιν ἦναι συνεχῶς αἰτία ὡς ὑλή 20 τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὅτι μεταβλητικὸν εἰς τάναντια, καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ θατέρου γένεσις ἢ τό τῶν ὁυσιῶν ἄλλου φθορᾶ καὶ ἡ ἄλλου φθορᾶ ἄλλου γένεσις. ἄλλα μὴν οὐδὲ ἀπορήσαι δεί διὰ τί γίνεται ἢ ἀπολλυμένων· ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι ἀπλῶς φασίν, ὅταν εἰς ἀναίσθητον ἔλθῃ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁν, 25 ὁμοίως καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος φασίν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀναίσθητον. εἰτ' οὖν ὄντος τινὸς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου εἴτε μὴ, γίνεται ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. ὡστε ὁμοίως καὶ γίνεται ἐκ μὴ ὄντος καὶ φθείρεται εἰς τὸ μὴ ὁν. εἰκότως οὖν οὐχ ὑπολείπει· ἡ γὰρ γένεσις φθορᾶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἡ δὲ φθορᾶ γένεσις τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.

30 Ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀπλῶς ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις

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*a i.e. the two parallel columns containing co-ordinate pairs; see W. D. Ross on Met. 1054 b 35.

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some things signify a "this," others a "such-and-such," others a "so-much." Those things, therefore, which do not signify substance are not said to come-to-be without qualification, but to come-to-be something. However, coming-to-be is said to take place in all things alike when a thing comes-to-be something in one of the two columns: in substance if it comes-to-be Fire, but not if it comes-to-be Earth; in quality, if it comes-to-be learned, but not if it comes-to-be ignorant.

It has already been stated how some things come-to-be without qualification and others do not, both generally and in the substances themselves, and that the substratum is the material cause why coming-to-be is a continuous process because it is subject to change into the contraries, and, in the case of substances, the coming-to-be of one thing is always a passing-away of another, and the passing-away of one thing another's coming-to-be. It is, however, not necessary even to raise the question why coming-to-be goes on when things are being destroyed; for, just as people use the term passing-away without qualification when a thing has passed into the imperceptible and into apparent non-existence, so likewise also they talk of coming-to-be from non-existence, when a thing appears out of imperceptibility. Whether, therefore, the substratum is something or is not, what comes-to-be does so from not-being; and so it comes-to-be from not-being and passes-away into not-being in the same manner. Therefore it is probable that coming-to-be never fails; for it is a passing-away of that which is not, and passing-away is a coming-to-be of that which is not.

But about that which "is not," unless you qualify
πότερον τὸ ἐτέρον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστὶν, οἷον γῆ καὶ τὸ βαρὺ μὴ ὄν, πῦρ δὲ καὶ τὸ κοῦφον ὁ ἄλλ' ἐστι καὶ γῆ τὸ ὄν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν ὑλή ἡ τῆς γῆς, καὶ πυρὸς ὅσαντως. καὶ ἀρά γε ἐτέρα ἐκατέρων ἡ ὕλη, ἡ οὐκ ἂν γίνοιτο εἰς ἀλλήλων οὐδ' εἰς ἐναντίων; τούτως γὰρ ὑπάρχει τάναντια, πυρί, γῆ, ὕδατι, ἀέρι. ἡ ἐστι μὲν ὡς ἡ αὐτή, ἐστι δ' ὡς ἡ ἐτέρα· δ' μὲν γὰρ ποτε ὄν ὑπόκειται τὸ αὐτό, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ 5 τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

4. Περὶ δὲ γενέσεως καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως λέγωμεν τά διαφέρουσιν· φαμέν γὰρ ἐτέρας εἶναι ταύτας τὰς μεταβολάς ἀλλήλων. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐστὶ τι τὸ ὑποκειμενὸν καὶ ἐτέρον τὸ πάθος δ' κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου λέγεσθαι πέφυκεν, καὶ ἐστι μεταβολὴ ἐκατέρων τούτων, ἀλλοιώσεις μὲν ἐστιν, ὅταν ὑπομένοντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, αἰσθητοῦ ὄντος, μεταβάλλῃ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ πάθεσιν, ἡ ἐναντίως οὖσιν ἡ μεταξύ, οἷον τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνει καὶ πάλιν κάμνει ὑπομένου γε ταύτο, καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς στρογγύλος, ὅτε δὲ γνωσεῖθαι ὁ αὐτὸς γε ὄν. ὅταν δ' ὅλον μεταβάλλῃ μὴ ὑπομένοντος αἰσθητοῦ τινὸς ὡς ὑποκειμένου τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἄλλ' οἶον ἐκ τῆς γονῆς αἷμα πάσης ἡ ἐξ ὕδατος ἀήρ ἡ ἐξ ἀέρος παντὸς ὑδώρ, γένεσις ἦδη τὸ τοιοῦτον, τοῦ δὲ φθορά, μᾶλιστα δε, ἂν ἡ μεταβολὴ ἐπὶ 10 τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

1 post κοῦφον add. τὸ EL.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 3-4

it, one might well be puzzled. Is it one of the two contraries? For example, is Earth, and that which is heavy, "not-being," but Fire, and that which is light, "being"? Or is this not so, but is Earth also "what is," while "what is not" is matter—the matter of Earth and of Fire alike? And is the matter of each different, or else they would not come-to-be out of one another, that is, contraries out of contraries? For the contraries exist in these things, namely, in Fire, Earth, Water and Air. Or is the matter the same in one sense, but different in another? For their substratum at any particular moment is the same, but their being is not the same. So much, then, on these subjects.

4. Let us now deal with coming-to-be and "alteration" and discuss the difference between them; for we say these forms of change differ from one another. Since, then, the substratum is one thing and the property which is of such a nature as to be predicated of the substratum is another thing, and since change takes place in each of these, "alteration" occurs when the substratum, which is perceptible, persists, but there is change in its properties, which are either directly or immediately contrary to one another: for example, the body is healthy and then again sick, though it persists in being the same body, and the bronze is spherical and then again angular, remaining the same bronze. But when the thing as a whole changes, nothing perceptible persisting as identical substratum (for example, when the seed as a whole is converted into blood, or water into air, or air as a whole into water), such a process is a coming-to-be—and a passing-away of the other substance—particularly if the change proceeds from something imper-
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γίνεται εὖ ἀναισθήτου εἰς αἰσθητὸν ἡ ἀφή ἡ πάσαις

taῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οἷον ὅταν ψῦχρ γένηται ἡ φθαρῆ
eἰς ἀέρα· ὁ γὰρ ἀηρ ἐπιεἰκῶς ἀναισθητὸν. ἐν δὲ
tούτοις ἂν τι υπομένῃ πάθος τὸ αὐτὸ ἐναντιώσεως
ev τῷ γενόμενῳ καὶ τῷ φθαρέτι (οἷον ὅταν εὖ
ἀέρος ψῦχρ, εἴ ἀμφὸς διαφανή ἡ ψυχρά), οὐ δὲ
tούτον θάτερον πάθος εἶναι εἰς ὁ μεταβάλλει. εἰ

dὲ μὴ, ἔσται ἀλλοίωσις. οἷον ὁ μουσικὸς ἄνθρωπος
ἐφθάρη, ἄνθρωπος δ’ ἀμοῦσος ἐγένετο, δ’ ἄνθρω-
pος ὑπομένει τὸ αὐτὸ. εἰ μὲν οὖν τούτου μὴ πάθος
ἡν καθ’ αὐτὸ ἡ μουσικὴ καὶ ἡ ἀμουσία, τοῦ μὲν
γένεσις ἡν ἂν, τοῦ δὲ φθορά· διὸ ἄνθρώπου μὲν
tαῦτα πάθῃ, ἄνθρωπον δὲ μουσικοῖ καὶ ἄνθρώπου

30 ἀμοῦσου γένεσις καὶ φθορά· νῦν δὲ πάθος τούτο
tου υπομένοντος. διὸ ἀλλοίωσις τὰ τοιαῦτα.

"Ὅταν μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἦ ἡ μεταβολή τῆς
ἐναντιώσεως, αὐξὴ καὶ φθίσις, ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τόπον,
φορά, ὅταν δὲ κατὰ πάθος καὶ τὸ ποιόν, ἀλλοίωσις,

320 a ὅταν δὲ μηδὲν υπομένῃ οὐθατέρον πάθος ἡ συμ-

βεβηκὼς ὀλως, γένεσις, τὸ δὲ φθορά. ἐστὶ δὲ ὐλὴ
mάλιστα μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὸ υποκείμενον γενέσεως καὶ
φθορᾶς δεκτικόν, τρόπον δὲ τώα καὶ τὸ ταῖς ἀλλαὶς

5 μεταβολαῖς, ὅτι πάντα δεκτικὰ τὰ υποκείμενα ἐναν-

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COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 4

ceptible to something perceptible (either to touch or to all the senses), as when water comes-to-be out of, or passes-away into, air; for air is pretty well imperceptible. But if, in these circumstances, any property belonging to a pair of contraries persists in being the same in the thing which has come-to-be as it was in the thing which has passed-away—if, for instance, when water comes-to-be out of air, both are transparent or cold—that into which it changes is not necessarily another property of this thing; otherwise the change will be "alteration." For example, the musical man passed-away and an unmusical man came-to-be, but the man persists as identically the same. Now if musicality (and unmusicality) were not in itself a property of man, there would be a coming-to-be of the one and passing-away of the other; therefore, these are qualities of a man, but the coming-to-be and the passing-away of a musical man and of an unmusical man; but, in fact, musicality (and unmusicality) are a quality of the persistent identity. Consequently such changes are "alteration."

When, therefore, the change from one contrary to another is quantitative, it is "growth and diminution"; when it is a change of place, it is "motion"; when it is a change of property (or quality), it is "alteration"; but when nothing persists of which the resulting state is a property or an accident of any kind, it is a case of coming-to-be, and the contrary change is passing-away. Matter, in the chief and strictest sense of the word, is the substratum which admits of coming-to-be and passing-away; but the substratum of the other kind of change is also in a sense matter, because all the substrata admit of
τιώσεων τινων. περὶ μὲν οὖν γενέσεως, ἐπὶ ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ, καὶ πῶς ἔστι, καὶ περὶ ἄλλοιώσεως διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

5. Περὶ δὲ αὐξήσεως λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν, τι τε διαφέρει γενέσεως καὶ ἄλλοιώσεως, καὶ πῶς αὐξάνεται τῶν αὐξανομένων ἕκαστον καὶ φθίνει ὁτιοῦν τῶν φθινόντων. σκεπτέον δὴ πρῶτον πότερον μόνως ἐν τῷ περὶ ὁ ἔστιν αὐτῶν ἡ πρὸς ἀλληλα διαφορά, οἷον ὦτι ἡ μὲν ἐκ τοῦδε εἰς τόδε μεταβολή, οἷον ἐκ δυνάμει οὐσίας εἰς ἐντελεχεία οὐσίαν, γένεσις ἔστιν, ἡ δὲ περὶ μέγεθος αὐξῆσις, ἡ δὲ περὶ πάθος ἀλ-λοίωσις. ἀμφότερα δὲ ἐκ δυνάμει ὁντῶν εἰς ἐντελεχειαν μεταβολή τῶν εἰρημένων ἔστιν, ἡ καὶ ὁ τρόπος διαφέρει τῆς μεταβολῆς. φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἄλλοιούμενον οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μεταβάλλει κατὰ τόπον, οὕτω τὸ γυνόμενον, τὸ δ' αὐξανόμενον καὶ τὸ φθίνον, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τοῦ φερομένου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φερόμενον ὅλον ἄλλαττε τόπον, τὸ δ' αὐξανόμενον ὃσπερ τὸ ἐλαυνόμενον τοῦτον γὰρ μένον-τος τὰ μόρια μεταβάλλει κατὰ τόπον, οὕτω ὃσπερ τὰ τῆς σφαίρας τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἵσοι τόπῳ μετα-βάλλει τοῦ ὅλου μένοντος, τὰ δὲ τοῦ αὐξανομέ-

1 καὶ φθορᾶς post γενέσεως add. Bekker.
certain kinds of contrariety. Let this, then, be our
decision on the question about coming-to-be, whether
it exists or not, and how it exists, and about "alteration."

5. It remains, therefore, for us to deal with
"growth" and to discuss \(a\) how it differs from com-
ing-to-be and from "alteration," and \(b\) how
"growth" takes place in each thing that grows and
how "diminution" occurs in each thing that dimin-
ishes. First we must consider whether the difference
between them lies only in the sphere of each. For
example, is it because the change from one thing
to another (for instance, from potential to actual
substance) is coming-to-be, while the change in re-
spect of magnitude is "growth"; and the change
in respect of property is "alteration," and both the
last two involve a change from what is-actually to
what is-potentially? Or does the difference also lie
in the manner of the change? For it is manifest that,
whereas neither that which is altering nor that which
is coming-to-be necessarily changes in respect of
position, that which is growing and that which is
diminishing \(do\) change in this respect but in a manner
different from that in which that which is moving
changes. For that which is moving changes its place
as a whole, but that which is growing changes its
position like a metal which is being beaten out; for,
while it retains its place, its parts undergo local
change, but not in the same manner as the parts of
a revolving globe. For the latter change their places
while the whole remains in an equal space, whereas the
parts of that which is growing change so as to occupy
an ever larger space, and the parts of that which is
diminishing contract into an ever smaller space.

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"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ μεταβολὴ διαφέρει οὐ μόνον περὶ ὁ ἄλλα καὶ ὦς τοῦ τε γινομένου καὶ ἀλλοιομένου καὶ αὐξανομένου, δὴ λοιπ. περὶ δὲ ὁ ἐστὶν ἡ μετα-

βολὴ ἡ τῆς αὐξήσεως καὶ ἡ τῆς φθίσεως (περὶ μέγεθος δὲ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ φθίνειν), 30 ποτέρως ὑποληπτέον, πότερον ἐκ δυνάμει μὲν μεγέθους καὶ σώματος, ἐντελεχεία ὁ ἀσωμάτου καὶ ἀμεγέθους γίνεσθαι σῶμα καὶ μέγεθος, καὶ τούτου διχῶς ἐνδεχομένου λέγειν, ποτέρως ἡ 

αὐξήσις γίνεται; πότερον ἐκ κεχωρισμένης αὐτῆς καθ᾽ αὐτῆς τῆς ὑλῆς, ἡ ἐνυπαρχούσης ἐν ἄλλω 320 σώματι; ἡ ἄδυνατον ἄμφοτέρως; χωριστὴ μὲν γὰρ οὐσα ἡ οὐδένα καθέξιτά τόπον, [ἡ] οἶον στιγμὴ 

tis, ἡ κενὸν ἔσται ἡ σῶμα οὐκ ἀισθητόν. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τιν 

eῖναι· ἀεὶ γὰρ που ἔσται τὸ γινόμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ, 5 ὦστε κάκεινο, ἡ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς. 

ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ γ᾽ ἐν τιν ὑπάρξει, εἰ μὲν κεχωρισμένον οὐτὸς ὦστε μὴ ἐκεῖνον καθ᾽ αὐτὸ ἡ κατὰ συμ-

βεβηκὸς τι εἶναι, συμβῆσται πολλὰ καὶ ἄδυνατα. λέγω δ᾽ οἶον εἰ γίνεται ἀνὴρ ἐξ ὑδατος, οὐ τοῦ ὑδατος ἔσται μεταβάλλοντος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ὥσπερ 10 ἐν ἀγγείῳ τῷ ὑδατι ἐνείναι τὴν ὑλὴν αὐτοῦ. ἀπείρους γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει ὑλὰς εἶναι, ὦστε καὶ 

γίνεσθαι ἐντελεχεία. ἐτὶ δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ οὕτω φαίνεται 

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a i.e. either as itself occupying a place, or contained in something else.
It is clear, then, that the changes both of that which comes-to-be and of that which "alters" and of that which "grows," differ not only in sphere but also in manner. But how are we to conceive the sphere of the change which is growth and diminution? Growth and diminution are generally regarded as taking place in the sphere of magnitude. Are we, then, to suppose that body and magnitude come-to-be out of what is potentially body and magnitude but is actually incorporeal and without magnitude? And since this can be meant in two different senses, in which of these senses does growth take place? Does it come from matter which exists separately by itself or matter previously existing in another body? Or is it impossible for growth to take place under either of these conditions? For, since the matter is separate, either it will take up no space, like a point, or else it will be void or, in other words, an imperceptible body. Of these alterations the first is impossible, and in the second the matter must be in something. For, in the first case, what comes-to-be from it will always be somewhere, so that the matter too must exist somewhere, either directly or indirectly; in the second case, supposing it is to be in something else, if it is so separated as not to belong to that something, either directly or indirectly, many impossibilities will arise. For example, if Air comes-to-be from Water, it will not be due to any change in the Water but owing to the presence of the matter of the Air in the Water, as in a vessel. For there is nothing to prevent there being an infinite number of matters contained in the Water, so that they might actually come-to-be; and, furthermore, the Air cannot be seen coming-to-be
γινόμενος ἄρτε ἐξ ὑδατος, οἷον ἐξιὼν ὑπομένον-
tos.

Βέλτιον τούν ποιεῖν πάσιν ἁχώριστον τὴν ὑλήν ὡς οὕσιν τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, τῷ λόγῳ 15 δὲ μὴ μίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ στιγμὰς θετέον οὐδὲ γραμμὰς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑλήν διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας. ἐκείνο δὲ οὐ ταῦτα ἔσχατα, ἡ ὑλή, ἢν οὐδέποτ᾿ ἀνευ πάθους οἰόν τε εἶναι οὐδὲ ἀνευ μορφῆς. γίνεται μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς ἐτέρων ἐξ ἐτέρου, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν ἀλλοις διώρισται, καὶ ὑπὸ τινος δὲ ἐντελεχείᾳ.

20 οὕτος ἡ ὁμοουείδους ἡ ὁμογενοῦς, οἷον πῦρ ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἡ ἀνθρωπός ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπον, ἡ ὑπ’ ἐντελεχείαις· σκληρὸν γάρ οὐχ ὑπὸ σκληροῦ γίνεται. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ οὕσιας ὑλὴ σωματικῆς, σώματος δ’ ἡ ὑδὴ τουουδί (σῶμα γὰρ κοινὸν οὐδέν), ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ με- γέθους καὶ πάθους ἐστί, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ χωριστῇ, 25 τόπῳ δ’ οὐ χωριστῇ, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ πάθη χωριστά.

Φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τῶν διηπορημένων ὃτι οὐκ ἐστιν ἡ αὐξήσεις μεταβολῆ ἐκ δυνάμει μεγέθους, ἐντελε-
χείᾳ δὲ μηδὲν ἔχοντος μέγεθος· χωριστὸν γὰρ ἄν εἴη τὸ κενὸν, τοῦτο δ’ ὅτι ἄδυνατον, εὐρηταὶ εἰν ἐτέρους πρότερον. ἐτι δ’ ἡ γε τοιαύτη μεταβολῆ 30 οὐκ αὐξήσεως ἵδιος ἀλλὰ γενέσεως· ἡ γὰρ αὐξήσεις ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐνυπάρχοντος μεγέθους ἐπίδοσις, ἡ δὲ φθώσις μείωσις (διὸ δὴ ἐχεῖν τι δεῖ μέγεθος τὸ

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*a* See *Met.* 1032 a 12 ff.

*b* Or "form"; see *Met.* l.c. 25 ff.

*c* In 320 a 27–b 12.

*d* *Phys.* iv. 6-9.
in this manner out of Water, namely, issuing forth while the Water is left as it was.

It is better, therefore, to suppose that the matter in anything is inseparable, being the same and numerically one, though not one by definition. Further, for the same reasons also, we ought not to regard the matter of the body as points or lines; matter is that which has points and lines as its limits and cannot possibly ever exist without qualities and without form. Now one thing comes-to-be, in the unqualified sense, out of another, as has been determined elsewhere and by the agency of something which is actually either of the same species or of the same genus—for example, Fire comes-to-be through the agency of Fire and Man through that of Man—or through an actuality (for that which is hard does not come-to-be through that which is hard). But since there is also a matter out of which corporeal substance comes-to-be, but already belonging to a body of such-and-such a kind (for there is no such being as body in general), this same matter is also the matter of magnitude and quality, being separable by definition but not in place, unless the properties are also separable.

Now it is clear from the difficulties which we have discussed, that growth is not a change from a potential magnitude which actually has no magnitude; for then, "the void" would be separable, and that is impossible, as has already been stated elsewhere. Moreover, such a change is not peculiar to growth but characteristic of coming-to-be; for growth is an increase, just as diminution is a reduction, of the already existing magnitude (hence that which grows must already possess a certain magni-
ARISTOTLE

320 b

αὐξανόμενον), ὥστ' ὦν κ᾽ εἶ ἀμεγέθους ὥλης δεὶ εἶναι
tὴν αὐξήσιν εἰσ ἐντελέχειαι μεγέθους· γένεσις γὰρ
ἀν εἰπ σώματος μᾶλλον, ὦν αὐξήσις. ληπτέον δὴ
μᾶλλον οἴον ἀποτομέον τῆς ἕκτησεως εἰς ἀρκῆς,
ποίου τινὸς οὖντο τοῦ αὐξάνεσθαι ἢ τοῦ φθίνειν τὰ
αύτα ἔκτομεν.

Φαίνεται δὴ τοῦ αὐξανομέον ὅτι οὖν μέρος ἔλη-
ξῆσθαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ φθίνειν ἐλαττον γε-
γονέαν, ἐτὶ δὲ προσιόντος τινὲς αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ
5 ἀπιόντος φθίνειν. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ ἡ ἀσωμάτω ἀὐ-
ξάνεσθαι ἢ σώματι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀσωμάτω, ἔσται
χωριστὸν τὸ κενὸν· ἀδύνατον δὲ μεγεθοὺς ἔλην
εῖναι χωριστὴν, ὥσπερ εἰρηται πρότερον· εἰ δὲ
σώματι, δύο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματα τόπων ἔσται, τὸ
τε αὐξόμενον καὶ τὸ αὐξὸν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο
10 ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ οὗτος ἐνδέχεται λέγειν
gίνεσθαι τὴν αὐξήσιν καὶ τὴν φθίνων, ὥσπερ ὅταν
ἐξ ὑδατός ἀήρ τοτε γὰρ μείζων ὁ ὅγκος γέγονεν·
οὐ γὰρ αὐξήσις τοῦτο ἀλλὰ γένεσις μὲν τοῦ εἰς ὁ
μετέβαλεν ἔσται, φθορὰ δὲ τοῦ ἔναντίου· αὐξήσις
de οὐδετέρου, ἀλλ’ ἡ οὐδενὸς ἡ ei τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν
15 ὑπάρχει, τῷ γινομένῳ καὶ τῷ φθαρέντι, οἴον εἰ
σῶμα. τὸ δ’ ὑδωρ οὐκ ηὔξηται οὐδ’ ὁ ἀήρ, ἀλλὰ
tὸ μὲν ἀπόλωλε τὸ δὲ γέγονεν· τὸ σῶμα δὲ, εἴπερ,
ηὔξηται. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἀδύνατον. δεὶ γὰρ σώ-

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a In 320 a 27 ff.  b i.e. steam.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5

tude), so that growth must not be from matter without magnitude to an actuality of magnitude; for that would be rather a coming-to-be of a body and not a growth. We must, therefore, lay hold more closely and, as it were, get to grips with our inquiry from the beginning as to the nature of growth and diminution, the causes of which we are seeking.

It appears that every part of that which grows has increased, and likewise in diminution every part has become smaller, and, further, that growth occurs when something is added and diminution when something departs. Growth, then, must be due to the addition of something incorporeal or of a body. If it is due to something incorporeal, there will be a void existing separately; but, as has been stated before, it is impossible for matter of magnitude to exist separately; whereas, if it grows by the addition of a body, there will be two bodies in the same place, one which grows and the other which causes the growth, and this also is impossible. But neither is it admissible for us to say that growth or diminution occurs in the manner in which it occurs when air is produced from water. For then, the volume has become greater; for it will not be a case of growth but of a coming-to-be of that into which the change has taken place, and a passing-away of its contrary. It is a growth of neither, but either of nothing or of something (for example, "body") which belongs in common both to that which is coming-to-be and to that which has passed-away. The water has not grown nor has the air, but the former has perished and the latter has come-to-be; and the "body," if anything, has grown. But this is also impossible; for in our account we must preserve the character-
321 a

ζειν τῷ λόγῳ τὰ υπάρχοντα τῷ αὐξανομένῳ καὶ φθίνοντι. ταῦτα δὲ τρία εστὶν, ὅν ἐν μὲν ἑστι τὸ
20 ὀτιοῦν μέρος μεῖξον γέγνεσθαι τοῦ αὐξανομένου μεγέθους, οἷον εἰ σάρξ τῆς σαρκός, καὶ προσιόντος
τινός, καὶ τρίτον σωζομένου τοῦ αὐξανομένου καὶ ύπομένοντος. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ γίνεσθαι τι ἀπλῶς
ἡ φθείρεσθαι οὕχ ύπομένει, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι
ἡ αὐξάνεσθαι ἡ φθίνειν ύπομένει τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ αὐ-
25 ἕνωμενον ἡ ἀλλοιούμενον. ἀλλὰ ἐνθα μὲν τὸ πάθος
ἐνθα δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ αὐτὸ οὐ μένει. εἰ δὴ ἐσται
ἡ εἰρημένη αὔξησις, ἐνδέχεσθαι ἂν μηδενὸς γε προσ-
iόντος μηδὲ ύπομένοντος αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ μηδενὸς
απιόντος φθίνειν καὶ μὴ ύπομένειν τὸ αὐξανόμενον.
ἀλλὰ δεῖ τούτῳ σώζειν. ύπόκειται γὰρ ἡ αὔξησις
tοιοῦτον.
30 Ἀπορήσεις δ' ἄν τις καὶ τί ἑστι τὸ αὐξανόμε-
νον, πότερον ὥς προστίθεται τι, οἷον εἰ τὴν κρή-
μαν αὐξάνει, αὐτῇ μεῖξιν, ὥς δὲ αὐξάνει, ἡ τροφή, οὐ.
διὰ τί δὴ οὐν οὐκ ἄμφω ηὔξηται; μεῖξιν γὰρ καὶ
ὁ καὶ ὥς, ὥσπερ ὅταν μίξης οἷον ὤδαιτι. ὡμοίως
gὰρ πλεῖον ἐκάτερον. ἦ ὅτι τοῦ μὲν μένει ἡ οὐσία,
35 τοῦ δ' οὐ', οἷον τῆς τροφῆς, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ
321 b ἐπικρατοῦν λέγεται ἐν τῇ μίξῃ, οἷον ὅτι οἰνος:
pοιεῖ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ οἰνοῦ ἔργον ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ τοῦ ὦδατος
tὸ σύνολον μίγμα. ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ' ἀλλοιώσεως,
eἰ μένει σάρξ οὖσα καὶ τὸ τί ἑστι, πάθος δὲ τι

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a i.e. the generation of air from water.
b i.e. the persistence of that which grows.
c In line 22 above.
d With λέγεται understand πλεῖον.
Coming-to-be and Passing-away, I. 5

istics which belong to what is growing and diminishing. These characteristics are three: (a) that every part of the growing magnitude is greater (for example, if flesh grows, every part of it grows); (b) that it grows by the accession of something; and (c) that it grows because that which grows is preserved and persists. For while a thing does not persist in unqualified coming-to-be or passing-away, in alteration and growth or diminution that which grows or alters persists in its identity, but, in the case of alteration the quality, and, in the case of growth, the magnitude does not remain the same. Now if the change mentioned above a is to be growth, it would be possible for something to grow without anything being added to it or persisting and to diminish without anything going away, and for that which grows not to persist. But this quality b must be preserved; for it has been assumed c that growth has this characteristic.

One might also raise this difficulty: What is it which grows? Is it that to which something is added? For example, if a man grows in his leg, is it his leg which is greater, while that which makes him grow, namely, his food, is not greater? Why have not both grown? For both that which is added and that to which the addition was made are greater, just as when you mix wine with water; for each ingredient is similarly increased. Or is it because the substance of the leg remains unchanged, but that of the other (i.e. the food) does not? For in the mixture of the wine and water it is the prevailing ingredient which is said to increase, d namely the wine; for the mixture as a whole performs the function of wine and not of water. Similarly, too, in the process of "alteration," flesh is "altered," if
321 b

υπάρχει τῶν καθ’ αυτό, ὁ πρότερον οὐχ ὑπήρχεν,
5 ἡλλοίωται τούτο· ὃ δ’ ἡλλοίωται, ὅτε μὲν οὐδὲν
πέπονθεν, ὅτε δὲ κάκεινο. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄλλοιον καὶ
ἡ ἄρχη τῆς κινήσεως ἐν τῷ αὐξανομένῳ καὶ τῷ
ἀλλοιομένῳ· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν, ἔπει καὶ
τὸ εἰσελθὸν γένοιτ’ ἂν ποτε μεῖζον, καὶ τὸ ἀπο-
λαύσαν αὐτοῦ σῶμα, οἶνον εἰ εἰσελθὸν γένοιτο
πνεῦμα. ἀλλ’ ἐφθαρταί γε τοῦτο παθόν, καὶ τὸ
κινοῦν οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ.

’Επεὶ δὲ διηπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν ίκανῶς, δεῖ καὶ
τῆς ἀπορίας πειρᾶσθαι λύσιν εὑρεῖν, σωζόντας τὸ
ὑπομένοντός τε τοῦ αὐξανομένου καὶ προσιόντος
τινὸς αὐξάνεσθαι, ἀπιόντος δὲ φθίνειν, ἐτὶ δὲ τὸ
ὀτιοῦν σημεῖον αἰσθητὸν ἢ μεῖζον ἢ ἐλαττὸν γεγο-
νέαι, καὶ μὴτε κενὸν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα μήτε δύο ἐν
τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ μεγέθη μήτε ἀσωμάτως αὐξάνεσθαι.

ληπτέον δὲ τὸ αὐτῖον διορισμένοις πρῶτον ἐν μὲν
ὅτι τὰ ἀνομοιομερή αὐξάνεται τῷ τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ
αὐξάνεσθαι (σύγκειται γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἑκαστοῦ),

20 ἐπειθ’ ὅτι σὰρξ καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ ἑκαστὸν τῶν
tοιούτων μορίων ἐστὶ δυττῶν, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
ἐν ὑλῇ ἐνδός ἐχόντων· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὑλὴ λέγεται καὶ
τὸ ἐνδός σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν. τὸ οὖν ὀτιοῦν μέρος
αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ προσιόντος τινὸς κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἐνδός
ἔστιν ἐνδεχόμενον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὑλὴν οὐκ ἔστιν.

a i.e. the organic parts. b i.e. the tissue.
it remains flesh and its substance remains the same, but some inherent quality now belongs to it which did not belong before; but that by which it has been altered sometimes has not been affected but sometimes has also been affected. But that which causes alteration and the source of movement reside in that which grows and in that which is altered (for the motive agent is within them); for that which has entered might sometimes become greater as well as the body which benefits by it (for example, if, after entering in, it were to become wind), but after having undergone this process, it has passed-away and the motive agent is not in it.

Now that the difficulties have been adequately discussed, we must try to find a solution of the problem. In doing so we must maintain the doctrine that growth occurs, when that which grows persists and grows by the accession of something (and diminishes by the departure of something), and that every perceptible particle has become greater (or less), and that the body is not void, and that there are not two magnitudes in the same place, and that growth does not take place by the addition of anything incorporeal. We must grasp the cause of growth by making the distinctions (i) that the parts which are not uniform grow by the growth of the parts which are uniform—for each part is composed of these—and (ii) that flesh and bone and every such part, like all other things which have their form in matter, are of a double nature; for the form as well as the matter is called flesh or bone. It is quite possible, then, that any part can grow in respect of form by the addition of something, but not in respect of matter; for we must regard the process as like that
321 b
dei γαρ νοήσαι ὡσπερ εἰ τις μετροῖ τῷ αὐτῷ
25 μέτρῳ ὑδώρ, ἀεὶ γαρ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο τὸ γινόμενον.
oútw δ' αὐξάνεται ἡ ὕλη τῆς σαρκός, καὶ οὐχ ὀτιωοῦν παντὶ προσγίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὑπεκρεῖ
tὸ δὲ προσέρχεται, τοῦ δὲ σχήματος καὶ τοῦ εἴδους ὀτιωοῦν μορίῳ. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν τούτω
μᾶλλον δῆλον, οἶνον χειρός, ὄτι ἀνάλογον ηὐξήται.
30 ἡ γαρ ὅλη ἔτερα οὐσα δήλη μᾶλλον τοῦ εἴδους
ἐνταῦθα ἡ ἐπὶ σαρκός καὶ τῶν ὀμοιομερῶν: διὸ καὶ
tεθνεῶτος μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι ἐπὶ σάρξ
cαὶ ὅστοιν ἡ χείρ καὶ βραχίων. ἠστέ ἐστί μὲν
ὡς ὀτιοῦν τῆς σαρκός ηὐξήται, ἐστὶ δ' ὡς οὐ.
κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ εἴδος ὀτιωοῦν προσελήνθεν, κατὰ
35 δὲ τὴν ὅλην οὐ. μείζον μέντοι τὸ ὅλον γέγονε
322 a προσελθόντος μὲν τινὸς, δ' καλεῖται τροφή καὶ
ἐναντίον, μεταβάλλοντος δὲ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ εἴδος, οἶνον
ei ξηρῷ προσόι υγρὸν, προσελθὼν δὲ μεταβάλοι
cαὶ γένοιτο ξηρόν. ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ ὡς τὸ ὀμοίον
ὅμοιω αὐξάνεται, ἐστὶ δ' ὡς τὸ ἀνόμοιον₁ ἀνο-
μοίω.
5 Ἀπορήσεις δ' ἂν της ποιῶν τι δεῖ εἶναι τὸ ὃ
αὐξάνεται. φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι δυνάμει ἐκεῖνο, οἶνον
ei σάρξ, δυνάμει σάρκα. ἐντελεχεία τρ' ἄλλο,
φθαρέν δὴ τοῦτο σάρξ γέγονεν. οὐκοῦν οὐκ αὐτὸ
cαθ' αὐτὸ (γένεσις γὰρ ἂν ἦν, οὐκ αὐξήσις). ἀλλὰ

₁ τὸ ἀνόμοιον addidi.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 5

which happens when a man measures water with the same measure, for there is first one portion and then another in constant succession. It is in this way that the matter of the flesh grows; something flows out and something flows in, but there is not an addition made to every particle of it, but to every part of its figure and "form." That the growth has taken place proportionally is more obvious in the parts which are not uniform, for instance, in the hand; for there the matter, being distinct from the form, is more noticeable than in the flesh and the parts which are uniform; for this reason one is more likely to think of a corpse as still possessing flesh and bone than that it has a hand and an arm. Therefore, in one sense it is true that every part of the flesh has grown, but in another sense it is untrue; for in respect to its form there has been an accession to every part, but not in respect to its matter; the whole, however, has become greater (a) by the accession of something which is called food, the "contrary" of flesh, and (b) by the change of this food into the same form as that of the flesh, just as if moist were to be added to dry, and, after having been added, were to change and become dry; for, it is possible that "like grows by like" and also that "unlike grows by unlike."

One might raise the question what must be the nature of that by which a thing grows. It is clear that it must be potentially that which is growing, for example, potentially flesh, if it is flesh which is growing; actually, then, it is something different. This, therefore, has passed-away and come-to-be flesh—not alone by itself (for that would have been a coming-to-be and not growth); but it is that which
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕ

τὸ αὐξανόμενον τοῦτῳ. τί οὖν παθὼν ὑπὸ τούτου [ἡξῆθη]; ἡ μικθέν, ὦσπερ οὖν ἐι τις ἐπιχεὶον 10 ὕδωρ, ὃ δὲ δύναιτο οἶνον ποιεῖν τὸ μικθέν; καὶ ὦσπερ τὸ πῦρ ἀφάμενον τοῦ καυστοῦ, οὖτως ἐν τῷ αὐξανομένῳ καὶ ὁντὶ ἐντελεχείας σαρκὶ τὸ ἐνὸν αὐξητικὸν προσελθόντος δυνάμει σαρκὸς ἐποίησεν ἐντελεχείας σάρκα. οὐκοῦν ἀμα ὄντος· ἐι γὰρ χωρὶς, γένεσις. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὖτω πῦρ ποιῆσαι ἐπὶ τὸ 15 ὑπάρχον ἐπιθέντα ξύλα. ἀλλ' οὖτω μὲν αὐξησις, ὅταν δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ ξύλα ἀφθη, γένεσις.

Ποσὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν καθόλου οὐ γίνεται, ὦσπερ οὐδὲ ξώον ὃ μὴν ἀνθρωπος μήτε τῶν καθ' ἐκαστα· ἀλλ' ὅς ἐνταῦθα τὸ καθόλου, κάκει τὸ ποσὸν. σάρξ δὲ ἡ ὁστοῦν ἡ χείρ καὶ τοῦτων τὰ ὁμοιομερή, 20 προσελθόντος μὲν δὴ τινὸς ποσοῦ, ἀλλ' οὖ σαρκὸς ποσῆς. ἢ μὲν οὖν δυνάμει τὸ συναμφότερον, οἶον ποσὴ σάρξ, ταύτη μὲν αὐξηθεὶς καὶ γὰρ ποσῆν δεὶ γενέσθαι καὶ σάρκα· ἢ δὲ μόνον σάρξ, τρέφει· ταύτη γὰρ διαφέρει τροφῆ καὶ αὐξησις τῷ λόγῳ. διὸ τρέφεται μὲν ἐως ἃν σώζηται καὶ φθίνων, 25 αὐξανεται δὲ οὐκ ἀεί. καὶ ἡ τροφῆ τῇ αὐξησις τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν, τὸ δ' εἶναι ἀλλο· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ

1 ἡξῆθη seclusit Joachim.
2 φθίνων L.: φθινει G.: φθινη H.

a And not a growth of already existent tissue.

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grows which now comes-to-be flesh owing to the food. How has the food been affected by the growing thing? Is it by admixture, as if one were to pour water into wine, and the latter were able to convert the mixture into wine? And like fire when it takes hold of inflammable material, so the principle of growth present in that which grows (i.e. in what is actually flesh) lays hold of the added food which is potentially flesh, and turns it into actual flesh. The added food must, therefore, be together with that which grows; for, if it is separate, it would be a case of coming-to-be. For it is possible to produce fire by placing logs on the fire which is already in existence; in this case there is growth, but, when the logs themselves are set on fire, there is a coming-to-be of fire.

"Quantum-in-general" does not come-to-be, just as "animal," which is neither man nor any other particular animal, does not come-to-be; but what "animal-in-general" is in coming-to-be, that "quantum-in-general" is in growth. But what comes-to-be in growth is flesh or bone or hand and the uniform parts of these, by the accession of such-and-such a quantity of something, but not of such-and-such a quantity of flesh. In so far, then, as the combination of the two, e.g., so much flesh, is a potentiality, it produces growth; for both quantity and flesh must come-to-be, but in so far as it is potentially flesh only, it nourishes; for it is here that nutrition and growth differ in their definition. Therefore the body is nourished as long as it is kept alive, even when it is diminishing, but it is not always growing; and nutrition, though it is the same as growth, is different in its being; for, in so far as that which is added is
ARISTOTLE

322 a

προσιόν δυνάμει ποση σάρξ, ταύτη μὲν αὐξητικὸν σαρκός, ἢ δὲ μόνον δυνάμει σάρξ, τροφὴ.

Τούτο δὲ τὸ εἴδος [ἲνευ ὤλης], ὃ ὄνω αὐλός, δύναμὶς τις ἐν ὤλῃ ἑστῖν. ἐὰν δὲ τις προσίῃ ὤλη, οὕσα δυνάμει αὐλός, ἔχουσα καὶ τὸ ποσὸν δυνάμει, οὕτω ἐσονται μείζους αὐλοὶ. Ἐὰν δὲ μηκέτι ποιεῖν δύνησαι, ἄλλ' ὄνω υδώρ ὀὐν ώς ἀεὶ πλεῖον μνημένον τέλος υδρη ἡ ποιεῖ καὶ υδώρ, τότε φθίσων ποιεῖται τοῦ ποσοῦ, τὸ δ' εἴδος μένει.

322 b 6. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πρῶτον δεῖ περὶ τῆς ὥλης καὶ τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων εἰπεῖν, εἰτ' ἑστὶν εἰτε μὴ, καὶ πότερον ἄδιον ἑκαστὸν ἢ γίνεται πῶς, καὶ εἰ γίνεται, πότερον ἢ ἀλλήλων γίνεται πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἢ τι πρῶτον ἐν αὐτῶν ἑστὶν, ἀναγκή δὴ πρότερον εἰπεῖν περὶ ὧν ἀδιορίστως λέγεται νῦν. πάντες γὰρ οἱ τὰ στοιχεῖα γεννώντες καὶ οἱ τὰ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων διακρίσει χρώνται καὶ συγκρίσει καὶ τῷ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν. ἔστι δ' ἡ σύγκρισις μίξις: πῶς δὲ μεγνύσαι λέγομεν, οὐ διώρισται σαφῶς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἀλλοιώθησαι δυνάτων, οὐδὲ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, μη-δενὸς ποιοῦντος μηδὲ πάσχοντος καὶ γὰρ οἱ πλεῖω τὰ στοιχεῖα ποιοῦντες γεννώσι τῷ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ τοῖς ἢς ἐνὸς ἀνάγκη

1 ἲνευ ὥλης seclusit Joachim.
2 αὐλὸς ... αὐλὸς ... αὐλοὶ Joachim: αὐλὸς ... αὐλὸς ... ἀυλοι codd: tibia ... tibia ... tibiae vertit Vatablus.

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a In 321 b 22 ff.
b i.e. the Pluralists, like Anaxagoras, Democritus and Plato, who regard Earth, Air, Fire and Water as composed of some prior constituents.
c i.e. other Pluralists, like Empedocles, who regard them as actual elements.

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potentially so much flesh, it is productive of the growth of flesh, but, in so far as it is only potentially flesh, it is nutriment.

This "form" of which we spoke is a kind of power present in matter, as it were a channel. If, therefore, matter is added which is potentially a channel and also potentially possesses such-and-such a quantity, these channels will become bigger. But if the "form" is no longer able to function, but, as water mixed with wine in ever-increasing quantities eventually makes the wine waterish and converts it into water, it will cause a diminution of the quantity, though the "form" still persists.

6. We must first deal with the matter and the so-called "elements" and determine whether they exist or not, and whether each is eternal, or whether there is a sense in which they come-to-be, and, if so, whether they all come-to-be in the same manner out of one another, or whether one among them is something primary. We must, therefore, first deal with matters about which people at present speak only vaguely. For all those who generate the elements and those who generate the bodies composed of the elements, apply the terms "dissociation" and "association" and "action" and "passion." Now "association" is a process of mixing; but what we mean by mixing has not yet been clearly defined. But there cannot be "alteration" any more than there can be "dissociation" and "association" without an "agent" and a "patient." For those who suppose the elements to be several in number ascribe the generation of composite bodies to the reciprocal "action" and "passion" of these elements, whereas those who derive them from a
ARISTOTLE

322 b

λέγειν τήν ποίησιν, καὶ τοῦτ’ ὁρθῶς λέγει Διο-
γένης, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἔξε ἐνὸς ἥν ἀπαντᾷ, οὐκ ἂν ἦν τὸ
15 ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ὑπ’ ἄλληλων, οἶνον τὸ θερμὸν
ψύχεσθαι καὶ τούτῳ θερμαίνεσθαι πάλιν· οὐ γὰρ
ἡ θερμότης μεταβάλλει καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης εἰς ἄλληλα,
ἀλλὰ δὴλον ὅτι τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ὥστε ἐν οἷς τὸ
ποιεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀνάγκη τούτων μίαν
εἶναι τήν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάντ’
20 εἶναι τοιαύτα φάσκειν οὐκ ἄλληθες, ἂλλ’ ἐν ὁσοὶς
tὸ ὑπ’ ἄλληλων ἐστὶν.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν καὶ
περὶ μίξεως θεωρητέου, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἀφῆς·
οὔτε γὰρ ποιεῖν ταῦτα καὶ πάσχειν δύναται κυρίως
ά μὴ οἶνον τε ἄφασθαι ἄλληλων, οὔτε μὴ ἄφαμενά
25 πως ἐνδέχεται μικρῆς πρῶτον. ὥστε περὶ τριῶν
tούτων διοριστέον, τι ἀφῇ καὶ τί μίξις καὶ τί
ποίησις.

Ἀρχὴν δὲ λάβωμεν τὴν ὀντων ὁσοὶ ἐστὶ μίξις, εἶναι ταῦτ’ ἄλληλων ἀπτικὰ·
καὶ εἰ τι ποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ πάσχει κυρίως, καὶ τούτως
ὁσαυτως. διὸ πρῶτον λεκτέον περὶ ἀφῆς. σχεδὸν
30 μὲν οὖν, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀνομάτων ἐκαστον
λέγεται πολλάχως, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀμωνύμως τὰ δὲ
θάτερα ἀπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων καὶ τῶν προτέρων, οὔτως
ἐχει καὶ περὶ ἀφῆς. ὀμως δὲ τὸ κυρίως λεγόμενον
323 a ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐχουσι θέσιν. θέσις δ’ οἰσπερ καὶ
single element must necessarily hold that there is "action"; and Diogenes \(^a\) is right in saying that there could not be reciprocal action and passion, unless all things were derived from one. For example, what is hot would not become cold, and the cold become hot again; for it is not heat and cold which change into one another, but it is obviously the substratum which changes; so that, where action and passion exist, their underlying nature must be one. It is not, however, true to say that all things are of this kind; but it is true of all things between which there is reciprocal action and passion.

But if we must go into the question of "action" and "passion" and of "commingling," we must also investigate "contact." For action and passion ought properly to be possible only for such things as can touch one another; nor can things be mixed with one another in the first instance without coming in some kind of contact. Hence we must decide about these three things, namely, what is "contact," what is "mixture," and what is "action."

Let us take this as our starting-point. All existing things which can undergo mixture must be able to come into contact with one another, and this must also be true of any pair of things, one of which acts and the other is acted upon in the proper sense of the word. Therefore we must first speak about "contact." Practically speaking, just as every other term which is used in several senses is so used owing to verbal coincidence or because the different senses are derived from different prior meanings, so it is also with "contact." Nevertheless, "contact" in its proper sense belongs only to things which have "position," and "position" belongs to those things
tόπος: καὶ γὰρ τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ὁμοίως ἀποδοτέον ἀφὴν καὶ τόπον, εἴτ' ἐστὶ κεχωρισμένον ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν εἴτ' ἀλλὸν τρόπον. εἰ οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ διωρίσθη πρότερον, τὸ ἀπεσθαί τὸ τὰ ἐσχατὰ 5 ἔχειν ἁμα, ταῦτα ἂν ἀπτοῖτο ἀλλήλων ὁσα διωρισμένα μεγέθη καὶ θέσιν ἔχοντα ἁμα ἔχει τὰ ἐσχατα. ἔπει δὲ θέσις μὲν ὅσοι καὶ τόπος ὑπάρχει, τόπον δὲ διαφορὰ πρώτη τὸ ἀνω καὶ κάτω καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ἀπαντά τὰ ἀλλήλων ἀπτόμενα βάρος ἂν ἔχοι ἣ κουφότητα, ἣ ἀμφω ἢ θάτερον. 10 τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα παθητικά καὶ ποιητικά· ὅστε φανερὸν ὅτι ταῦτα ἀπεσθαί πέφυκεν ἀλλήλων, ὃν διηρημένων μεγεθῶν ἁμα τὰ ἐσχατά ἐστιν, ὃντων κινητικῶν καὶ κινητῶν ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων. ἔπει δὲ τὸ κινοῦν οὐχ ὁμοίως κινεῖ τὸ κινούμενον, ἄλλα τὸ μὲν ἀνάγκη κινούμενον καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖν, τὸ δ’ ἀκίνητον οὖν, δὴ- 15 λον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐρόμεν ὁσαιτως· καὶ γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖν τί φασι καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν κινεῖν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα διαφέρει γε καὶ δεί διορίζειν· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα τε πάν τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖν, εἰπερ τὸ ποιοῦν ἀντιδήσομεν τῷ πάσχοντι, τοῦτο δ’ οἶς ἢ κίνησις πάθος, πάθος δὲ καθ’ ὅσον ἄλλοιοῦται

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Phys. 226 b 21-23.
which have also a "place"; for "place," just as much as "contact," must be attributed to mathematical objects, whether each exists in separation or in some other manner. If, therefore, as has been defined in a previous work, for things to be in "contact" they must have their extremities together, only those things would be in contact with one another, which, possessing definite magnitudes and a definite position, have their extremities together. Now, since position belongs to such things as also have a "place," and the primary differentiation of "place" is "above" and "below" and other such pairs of opposites, all things which are in contact with one another would have "weight" and "lightness," either both of these qualities or one or other of them. Now such things are capable of "acting" and "being acted upon"; so that it is clear that those things are of a nature to be in contact with one another, the extremities of whose separate magnitudes are "together" and which are capable of moving one another and being moved by one another. But, since that which moves does not always move that which is moved in the same way, but one mover must move by being itself moved, and another while itself remaining unmoved, it is clear that we must speak in the same terms about that which "acts"; for the "moving thing" is said to "act" (in a sense) and the "acting thing" to "move." There is, however, a difference, and a distinction must be made; for not every "mover" can "act," if we are going to employ the term "agent" in contrast to the term "patient," and the term "patient" is applied only to those things for which the movement is an "affection." 

\[ b \] See *Met.* x. 1022 b 15 ff.
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323 a 20 μόνον, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ θερμόν· ἄλλα τὸ κινεῖν ἐπί πλέον τοῦ ποιεῖν ἐστὶν. ἐκεῖνο δ' οὖν φανερόν, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ώς τὰ κινοῦντα τῶν κινητῶν ἀπτοτ' ἂν, ἐστὶ δ' ώς οὖ. ἀλλ' ὁ διορισμὸς τοῦ ἀπτεσθαι καθόλου μὲν ὁ τῶν θέσιν ἐχόντων καὶ τοῦ μὲν κινητικοῦ τοῦ δὲ κινητοῦ, πρὸς ἄλληλα δὲ, κινη-
25 τικοῦ καὶ κινητοῦ ἐν οἷς ὑπάρχει τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν. ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν ώς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ἀπτό-
μενον ἀπτομένου ἀπτόμενον· καὶ γὰρ κινεῖ κινοῦ-
μενα πάντα σχεδὸν τὰ ἐμποδῶν, ὅσοις ἀνάγκη καὶ
φαίνεται τὸ ἀπτόμενον ἀπτεσθαι ἀπτομένου· ἐστὶ
δ', ώς ἐνίοτε φαμεν, τὸ κινοῦν ἀπτεσθαι μόνον τοῦ
κινομένου, τὸ δ' ἀπτόμενον μὴ ἀπτεσθαι ἀπτο-
30 μένον· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κινεῖν κινούμενα τὰ ὀμογενῆ,
ἀνάγκη δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπτομένου ἀπτεσθαι. ὡστε εἴ
τι κινεῖ ἀκίνητον ὁν, ἐκεῖνο μὲν ἂν ἀπτοτο τοῦ
κινητοῦ, ἐκείνου δὲ οὐδὲν· φαμεν γὰρ ἐνίοτε τῶν
λυποῦντα ἀπτεσθαι ἡμῶν, ἀλλ' ὅπικ αὐτοὶ ἐκείνου.
περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀφῆς τῆς ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς διωρίσθω
τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

323 b 7. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν λεκτέον ἐφ-
εξῆς, παρειλήφαμεν δὲ παρὰ τῶν πρῶτον ὑπεναγ-
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(an "affection," that is, such as whiteness and heat, in virtue of which they only undergo "alteration"), whereas to "move" is a wider term than to "act." But this, at any rate, is clear, that there is a sense in which the things which move can come into contact with the things which are capable of being moved, and a sense in which they cannot do so. But the distinction between contact in the most general sense and "reciprocal contact" is that, in the first sense, two objects should have position and that one should be capable of moving and the other of being moved; in the second sense, that there should be one thing capable of moving and another of being moved, possessing, respectively, the qualities of "agent" and "patient." Generally, no doubt, if one thing touches another, the latter also touches the former; for almost all things, when they move, cause motion in the things which stand in their way, and in these cases that which touches must, and obviously does, touch that which touches it. But it is possible, as we say sometimes, for that which causes motion merely to touch that which is moved, and that which touches need not touch something which touches it; but because things of the same kind impart motion by being moved, it seems to follow necessarily that they touch that which touches them. Hence, if anything causes motion without being itself moved, it might touch that which is moved, though not itself touched by anything; for we say sometimes that a man who grieves us "touches" us, though we ourselves do not "touch" him. So much for our definition of contact in the realm of Nature.

7. Next we must deal with "action" and "passion." We have inherited conflicting accounts from "action" and "passion";
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τίους ἀλλήλοις λόγους. οἱ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖστοι τοῦτο γε ὁμονοητικῶς λέγουσιν, ὡς τὸ μὲν ὁμοίου ὑπὸ
tοῦ ὁμοίου πᾶν ἀπαθές ἦστι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλ-
λον ποιητικὸν ἢ παθητικὸν εἶναι θάτερον θατέρων
(πάντα γὰρ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν ταύτα τοῖς ὁμοίοις),
tὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια καὶ τὰ διάφορα ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν
εἰς ἀλληλα πέφυκεν. καὶ γὰρ ὅταν τὸ ἐλαττον
πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλείστου φθείρηται, διὰ τὴν ἐναντίωσιν
tοῦτο φασὶ πάσχειν· ἐναντίον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πολὺ
τῷ ὁλίγῳ. Δημοκρίτος δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἴδιως
ἐλέεξε μόνος· φησὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὁμοίον εἶναι
tὸ τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον· οὐ γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖν τὰ
ἐτέρα καὶ διαφέροντα πάσχειν ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ
κἂν ἐτέρα ὄντα ποιή τι εἰς ἀλληλα, οὐχ ἢ ἐτέρα

15 ἀλλ’ ἢ ταύτων τι ὑπάρχει, ταύτη τοῦτο συμβαίνειν
αὐτοῖς.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, ἑοίκασι δὲ
οἱ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λέγοντες ὑπεναντία φαί-
νεσθαι λέγειν. αὐτιον δὲ τῆς ἐναντιολογίας ὅτι
dέον ὅλον τι θεωρήσαι μέρος τι τυγχάνουσι λέ-
γοντες ἐκάτεροι· τὸ τε γὰρ ὁμοίον καὶ τὸ πάντῃ
20 πάντως ἀδιάφορον εὐλογον μὴ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ
ὁμοίου μηδὲν (τὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον θάτερον ἦσται ποιη-
tικὸν ἢ θάτερον; εἴ τε ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου τι πάσχειν
δυνατὸν, καὶ αὐτὸ ύφ’ αὐτοῦ· καίτοι τοῦτων οὔτως
ἐχῶντων οὕδεν ἂν εἰη οὔτε ἀφθαρτον οὔτε ἀκίνη-
tον, εἴπερ τὸ ὁμοίον ἡ ὁμοίον ποιητικὸν, αὐτὸ γὰρ
our predecessors. For most of them agree in declaring that (i) like is always unaffected by like because, of two things which are like, neither is, they argue, at all more liable than the other to act or to be acted upon (for all the same properties belong in a like degree to things which are like), and (ii) things which are unlike and different are naturally disposed to reciprocal action and passion; for, when the lesser fire is destroyed by the greater, it is said to be thus affected owing to its contrariety, the great being the contrary of the small. Democritus, however, in disagreement with all other philosophers, held a view peculiar to himself; for he says that the agent and the patient are the same and alike, for (he declares) it is not possible for things which are "other" and different to be affected by one another, but even if two things which are "other" do act in any way upon one another, this occurs to them not in as much as they are "other," but because some identical property belongs to them both.

These, then, are the views expressed, and it appears that those who so expressed them were obviously in opposition to one another. But the reason of this opposition is that each school, when they ought to have viewed the problem as a whole, in fact only stated part of the truth. For, firstly, it is reasonable to hold that that which is like another thing, that is, in every respect absolutely without difference from it, cannot be in any way affected by the other thing which is like it. (For why should one be more likely to act than the other? And if like can be affected by like, it can also be affected by itself; yet, if that were so—if like were liable to act qua like—nothing would be indestructible or immovable, for everything
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25 αὐτὸ κινήσει πᾶν· τὸ τε παντελῶς ἐτερον καὶ τὸ μηδαμῇ ταὐτὸν ὤσαύτως. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν πάθοι λευκότης ὑπὸ γραμμῆς ἢ γραμμῆ ὑπὸ λευκότητος, πλὴν εἰ μὴ που κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἶον εἰ συμβέβηκε λευκὴν ἢ μέλαιαν εἶναι τὴν γραμμήν· οὐκ ἔξιστησι γὰρ ἄλληλα τῆς φύσεως ὃσα μὴ τ' ἐναντία

30 μήτ' ἐξ ἐναντίων ἐστίν. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὖ τὸ τυχὸν πέφυκε πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ὃσα ἢ ἐναντία ἐστίν ἢ ἐναντίωσιν ἔχει, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχον τῷ γένει μὲν ὀμοιον εἶναι καὶ ταὐτό, τῷ δ' εἴδει ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐναντίον (πέφυκε γὰρ σῶμα μὲν ὑπὸ σώματος, χυμὸς δ' ὑπὸ χυμοῦ,

324 a χρῶμα δ' ὑπὸ χρώματος πάσχειν, ὅλως δὲ τὸ ὀμογενὲς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀμογενοῦς. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὃτι τάναντία ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει πάντα, ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ πάσχει τάναντία ὑπ' ἄλληλων), ὥστε ἀνάγκη πῶς μὲν εἶναι ταὐτὰ τὸ τε ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, πῶς δ' ἐτερα καὶ ἀνόμοια ἄλληλοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ πάσχον καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τῷ μὲν γένει ταὐτὰ καὶ ὀμοια τῷ δ' εἴδει ἀνόμοια, τοιαῦτα δὲ τάναντία, φανερὸν ὃτι παθητικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ ἄλληλων ἑστὶ τὰ τ' ἐναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξύ· καὶ γὰρ ὅλως φθορὰ καὶ γένεσις ἐν τούτοις.

5 Τιοῦτοι καὶ εὐλογοῦν ἡδὴ τὸ τε πῦρ θερμαίνειν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ψύχειν, καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιητικὸν ὀμοιοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὸ πάσχον· τὸ τε γὰρ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἐναντία ἑστὶ, καὶ ἡ γένεσις εἰς τούναντίον. ὥστε
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will move itself.) And, secondly, the same thing happens if there is complete difference and no kind of identity. For whiteness could not be affected in any degree by line, or line by whiteness, except perhaps incidentally, if, for example, it happened that the line was white or black; for unless the two things are contraries or made up of contraries, one cannot displace the other from its natural condition. But, since only such things as possess contrariety or are themselves actual contraries—and not any chance things—are naturally adapted to be acted upon and to act, both "agent" and "patient" must be alike and identical in kind, but unlike and contrary in species. For body is by nature adapted so as to be affected by body, flavour by flavour, colour by colour, and in general that which is of the same kind by something else of the same kind; and the reason of this is that contraries are always within the same kind, and it is contraries which act and are acted upon reciprocally. Hence "agent" and "patient" are necessarily in one sense the same, and in another sense "other" and unlike one another; and since "agent" and "patient" are identical in kind and like, but unlike in species, and it is contraries which have these characteristics, it is clear that contraries and their "intermediates" are capable of being affected and of acting reciprocally—indeed it is entirely these processes which constitute passing-away and coming-to-be.

It is, then, now reasonable to hold both that fire heats and that what is cold cools and, in general, that what is active assimilates that which is passive to itself; for the agent and patient are contrary to one another, and coming-to-be is a process into the

Aristotle's definition of "agent" and "patient."
ἀνάγκη τὸ πάσχον εἰς τὸ ποιοῦν μεταβάλλειν· οὔτω γὰρ ἔσται εἰς τοῦναντίον ἡ γένεσις. καὶ
15 κατὰ λόγον δὴ τὸ μὴ ταὐτὰ λέγοντας ἀμφοτέρους ὁμώς ἀπετέθαι τῆς φύσεως. λέγομεν γὰρ πάσχειν ὁτὲ μὲν τὸ ὑποκείμενον (οἶνον ὑγιάξεσθαι τὸν ἄνθρω-
πον καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ τὰλα τὸν
αὐτὸν τρόπον), ὁτὲ δὲ θερμαίνεσθαι μὲν τὸ ψυχρόν,
ὑγιάξεσθαι δὲ τὸ κάμμον· ἀμφότερα δὲ ἐστὶν ἄληθή
20 (τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιοῦντος· ὁτὲ 
μὲν γὰρ τὸν ἄνθρωπόν φαμεν θερμαίνειν, ὁτὲ δὲ 
τὸ θερμόν· ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡ ὑλὴ πάσχει, ἐστι δ' 
ὡς τοῦναντίον). οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ἐκεῖνο βλέπαντες 
ταῦτόν τι δεῖν ψήθησαν τὸ ποιοῦν ἔχειν καὶ τὸ 
πάσχον, οἱ δ' εἰς θάτερα τοῦναντίον.

25 Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον ὑποληπτέον εἶναι περὶ τοῦ 
ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ὄνπερ καὶ περὶ τοῦ κινεῖν καὶ 
κινεῖσθαι. δικῆς γὰρ λέγεται καὶ τὸ κινοῦν· ἐν 
ὅ τε γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, δοκεῖ τοῦτο κινεῖν 
(ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ πρῶτη τῶν αὐτῶν), καὶ πάλιν τὸ 
ἔσχατον πρὸς τὸ κινούμενον καὶ τὴν γένεσιν. 
ὅμως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ ποιοῦντος· καὶ γὰρ τὸν 
30 ἱερὰν φαμεν ὑγιάξειν καὶ τὸν οἶνον. τὸ μὲν οὖν 
πρῶτον κινοῦν οὕδεν κωλύει ἐν μὲν κινήσει ἀκίνη-
τον εἶναι (ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον), τὸ δ' 
ἔσχατον ἀεὶ κινεῖν κινούμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ ποιήσεως

— i.e. immediately next to that which is moved.
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contrary, so that the patient must change into the agent, since only thus will coming-to-be be a process into the contrary. And it is reasonable to suppose that both schools, though they do not express the same views, are yet in touch with the nature of things. For we sometimes say that it is the substratum which is acted upon (for example, we talk of a man as being restored to health and warmed and chilled and so on), and sometimes we say that what is cold is being warmed and what is ill is being restored to health. Both these ways of putting the case are true (and similarly with the agent: for at one time we say that it is the man that causes heat, and at another time that it is that which is hot; for in one sense it is the matter which is acted upon and in another sense it is the "contrary"). One school, therefore, directed its attention to the substratum and thought that the agent and patient must possess something identical, the other school, with its attention on the contraries, held the opposite view.

We must suppose that the same account holds good of "action" and "passion" as about moving and being moved. For "move" is also used in two senses; for that in which the original source of motion resides is generally held to cause motion (for the original source is the first of causes), and so also is that which is last in relation to that which is moved and to the process of coming-to-be. Similarly, too, in the case of the agent; for we speak of the doctor, and also of wine, as healing. Now, in motion, there is nothing to prevent the first mover being unmoved (in fact in some cases it is actually necessary), but the last mover always causes motion by itself being moved; and in action, there is nothing to prevent
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tὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπαθὲς, τὸ δ’ ἐσχατον καὶ αὐτὸ πάσχον· ὅσα γὰρ μὴ ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν ὕλην, ποιεῖ 35 ἀπαθῆ ὄντα (οἴον ἡ ἰατρικὴ, αὐτὴ γὰρ ποιούσα

324 b υγείαν οὐδὲν πάσχει ὑπὸ τοῦ υγιαζομένου), τὸ
dὲ σιτίον ποιοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ πάσχει τι· ἡ γὰρ θερμαί-
nυεται ἡ ψύχεται ἡ ἄλλο τι πάσχει ἀμα ποιοῦν.

ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὡς ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ σιτίον τὸ ἐσχατον καὶ ἀπτόμενον.

5 "Ὅσα μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐν ὕλῃ ἔχει τὴν μορφῆν, ταῦτα μὲν ἀπαθὴ τῶν ποιητικῶν, ὅσα δ’ ἐν ὕλῃ, παθη-
tικά. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ὕλην λέγομεν ὁμοίως ὡς εἰπεῖν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι τῶν ἀντικειμένων ὀποτεροῦν, ὥσπερ γένος ὄν, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον θερμὸν εἶναι παρόντος τοῦ θερμαντικοῦ καὶ πλησιάζοντος ἀνάγκη

10 θερμαίνεσθαι· διὸ, καθάπερ εἱρηται, τὰ μὲν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀπαθὴ τὰ δὲ παθητικα. καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ κινήσεως, τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν· ἔκει τε γὰρ τὸ πρῶτος κυνὸν ἄκινητον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν τὸ πρῶτον ποιοῦν ἀπαθὲς.

ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν αὐτὸν ὡς θεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς

15 κινήσεως. τὸ δ’ οὖ ἐνεκα οὐ ποιητικὸν (διὸ ἡ υγεία οὐ ποιητικὸν, εἰ μὴ κατὰ μεταφορὰν); καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ποιοῦντος ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ, γίνεται τι τὸ πάσχον, τῶν δ’ ἐξεων παρουσῶν οὐκέτι γίνεται, ἀλλ’ ἐστιν ἦδη· τὰ δ’ εἴδη καὶ τὰ τέλη ἐξεις τινές.

a Of which the two opposites are species.

b Such as "health" or "disease."
the first agent being unaffected, but the last agent is itself also affected. For those things which have not the same matter act without being themselves affected (for example, the art of the physician which, while it causes health, is not itself acted upon by that which is being healed), but food, while it acts, is itself all somehow acted upon, for, while it acts, it is at the same time being heated or cooled or affected in some other way. Now the art of the physician is, as it were, an original source, while the food is, as it were, the final mover and in contact with that which is moved.

Of the things, then, which are capable of acting, those of which the form does not consist in matter are not affected, but those of which the form consists in matter are liable to be affected; for we say that the matter of either of the two opposed things alike is the same, so to speak, being, as it were, a kind a; and that which is capable of being hot must become hot, if that which is capable of heating is present and near to it. Therefore, as has been said, some of the active agencies are unaffected, while others are liable to be acted upon; and what holds good of motion is also true of the active agencies; for as in motion the first mover is unmoved, so among active agencies the first agent is unaffected. The active agency is a cause, as being the source from which the origin of the movement comes, but the end in view is not "active" (hence health is not active, except metaphorically); for, when the agent is present, the patient becomes something, but when "states" b are present, the patient no longer "becomes" but already "is," and the "forms," that is the "ends," are a kind of "state," but the matter, qua matter,
ARISTOTLE

324 b

ή δ' ὡλῃ ὡλῃ παθητικῶν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πῦρ ἔχει ἐν
20 ὡλῃ τὸ θερμὸν. εἰ δὲ τι εἶναι θερμὸν χωριστὸν, τότε
οὐδὲν ἂν πάσχω. τούτῳ μὲν οὖν ίσως ἀδύνατον
ἐϊναι χωριστὸν. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἐν συνοιντα, ἐπ' ἐκεῖνων
ἀν εἰ οὐ τὸ λεγόμενον ἄλληθες. τί μὲν οὖν τὸ
ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἔστι καὶ τίς ὑπάρχει καὶ διὰ
τί καὶ πῶς, διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

8. Πῶς δὲ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο συμβαίνειν, πάλιν
λέγωμεν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ πάσχειν ἑκαστὸν διὰ
τινῶν πόρων εἰσιόντως τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐσχάτου καὶ
κυριωτάτου, καὶ τούτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ ὅραν καὶ
ἀκοῦειν ἡμᾶς φασί καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνεσθαι
πάσας, ἐτι δὲ ὅρασθαι διά τε ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος καὶ
tων διαφανῶν, διὰ τὸ πόρουσ ἔχειν ἀσφάτους
μὲν διὰ μικρότητα, πυκνοῦς δὲ καὶ κατὰ στοῖχον,
καὶ μᾶλλον ἔχειν τὰ διαφανῆ μᾶλλον.

Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τινῶν οὕτω διώρισαν, ὡσπερ
καὶ Ἑμπεδοκλῆς, οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τῶν ποιοῦντων
καὶ πασχόντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ μίγνυσθαι φασιν ὅσων
35 οἱ πόροι σύμμετροι πρὸς ἄλληλους εἰσίν· ὅδ' δὲ
325 a μάλιστα καὶ περὶ πάντων ἐνι λόγῳ διωρί-
κασι Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος, ἀρχὴν ποιησά-
μενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἦπερ ἐστὶν. ἐνίοις γὰρ τῶν
ἀρχαίων ἔδοξε τὸ ὅν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐν εἶναι καὶ
ἀκίνητον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κενὸν οὐκ ὄν, κινηθῆναι δ' 5
οὐκ ἂν δύνασθαι μὴ ὄντος κενοῦ κεχωρισμένου,
οὐδ' αὖ πολλὰ εἶναι μὴ ὄντος του διεῖργοντος.

a Namely, Parmenides and Melissus.
is passive. Now fire holds the heat embodied in
matter: but, if there were such a thing as "the hot"
apart from matter, it could not be acted upon at all.
Heat, therefore, perhaps cannot exist separately;
but, if there are any such separate existences, what
we are saying would be true of them also. Let this,
then, be our explanation of "action" and "passion," and
when they exist, and why and how.

8. Let us now go back and discuss how it is possible
for action and passion to occur. Some people hold
that each patient is acted upon when the last agent
—the agent in the strictest sense—enters in through
certain pores, and they say that it is in this way that
we also see and hear and employ our other senses.
Furthermore, they say that things are seen through
air and water and the other transparent bodies,
because they have pores, which, owing to their
minuteness, are invisible, but are set close together
and in rows, and are more transparent the closer
together and in more serried array they are.

Some philosophers (including Empedocles) held
this theory as regards certain bodies, not confining
it to those which act and are acted upon; but mixture
also, they assert, takes place only between bodies
whose pores are symmetrical with one another. The
most methodical theory, however, and the one of
most general application has been that enunciated
by Leucippus and Democritus, taking what is the
natural starting-point. For some of the ancient
thinkers a held that "what is" must necessarily be
one and immovable; for they argued that the void
does not exist, but that, if there is not a void existing
separately, "what is" could not be moved; nor,
again, could there be a multiplicity of things, since
τούτο δ' οὐδὲν διαφέρειν, εἰ τις οἴεται μὴ συνεχές εἶναι τὸ πάν ἀλλ' ἀπτεσθαι διηρημένον, τοῦ φάναι πολλὰ καὶ μὴ ἐν εἶναι καὶ κενὸν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ πάντη διαρετῶν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν, ὡστε οὖδὲ πολλὰ, ἀλλὰ κενὸν τὸ ὅλον· εἰ δὲ τῇ μὲν τῇ δὲ μὴ, πεπλασμένως τινὶ τούτῳ ἐοικέναι· μέχρι πόσου γὰρ καὶ διὰ τὸ τὸ μὲν οὔτως ἔχει τοῦ ὅλου καὶ πληρές ἐστι, τὸ δὲ διηρημένον; ἄτι ὁμοίως φάναι ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν λόγων, ὑπερβάντες τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ παριστάντες αὐτὴν ὡς τῷ λόγῳ δέον ἀκολουθεῖν, ἐν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ πάν εἶναι φασιν, καὶ ἀπειρον ἔννοι· τὸ γὰρ πέρας περαιῶν ἄν πρὸς τὸ κενὸν. οἱ μὲν οὖν οὔτως καὶ διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἀπεφήναντο περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας· ἔτι δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων δοκεῖ ταῦτα συμβαῖνειν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων μανία παραπλήσιον εἶναι τὸ δοξάζειν οὔτως· οὐδένα γὰρ τῶν μανομένων ἐξεστάναι τοσοῦτον ὡστε τὸ πῦρ ἐν εἶναι δοκεῖν καὶ τὸν κρύσταλλον, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα διὰ συνήθειαν, ταῦτ' ἐνίοις διὰ τὴν μανίαν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν.

Λεύκιππος δ' ἔχειν ὑήθη λόγους οὔτινες πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ὁμολογούμενα λέγοντες οὐκ ἀναφήσουσιν οὔτε γένεσιν οὔτε φθορὰν οὔτε κίνησιν καὶ τὸ πλήθος τῶν οὗτων. ὁμολογήσας δὲ ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς φαινομένοις, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἐν κατασκευάζουσιν ὡς οὐκ' ἄν

1 οὐκ Ε: οὔτε FHJL.

a i.e. the Monists.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8

there is nothing which keeps them apart; and they declare that, if one holds that the universe is not continuous but maintains contact in separation, this does not differ from saying that things are "many" (and not "one") and that there is a void. For if the universe is divisible throughout, there is no "one," and therefore no "many," but the whole is void; but to suppose that it is divisible at one point but not at another seems like a baseless invention. For how far is it divisible? And why is part of the whole indivisible and a *plenum*, and part divided? Moreover, they say that it is equally necessary to deny the existence of motion. As a result, then, of these arguments, going beyond and disregarding sense-perception, on the plea that they ought to follow reason, they assert that the universe is one and immovable; some add that it is infinite as well, for the limit would be a limit against the void. Some philosophers, then, set forth their views about the truth in this manner and based them on these grounds. Furthermore, though these opinions seem to follow logically from the arguments, yet, in view of the facts, to hold them seems almost madness; for no madman is so out of his senses as to hold that fire and ice are "one"; it is only between things which are good and things which, through habit, *seem* to be good, that some people, in their madness, see no difference.

Leucippus, however, thought that he had arguments, which, while agreeing with sense-perception, would not do away with coming-to-be and passing-away, or motion, or the multiplicity of things which are. While making these concessions to things as they appear, and conceding to those who postulate the oneness of things that there could not be motion
κόψων οὔσαν ἄνευ κενοῦ τὸ τε κενὸν μὴ ὁν, καὶ τοῦ ὄντος οὔδὲν μὴ ὅν φησιν εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ κυρίως ὅν παμπληθὲς ὁν· ἂλλ' εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὔχ ἐν, ἂλλ' ἂπειρα τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἀόρατα διὰ σμικρότητα τῶν ὁγκῶν. ταῦτα δ' ἐν τῷ κενῷ φέρεσθαι (κενὸν γὰρ εἶναι), καὶ συνιστάμενα μὲν γένεσιν ποιεῖν, διαλυόμενα δὲ φθοράν. ποιεῖν δὲ καὶ πάσχειν ἢ τυγχάνονσιν ἀπτόμενα (ταύτῃ γὰρ οὔχ ἐν εἶναι), καὶ συντιθέμενα δὲ καὶ περιπλεκόμενα γεννᾶν· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἔνος οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι πλῆθος, οὔδ' ἐκ τῶν ἀληθῶς πολλῶν ἐν, ἂλλ' εἶναι τοῦτ' ἄδυνα-

325 b τον, ἂλλ' ὁσπερ Ἕμπεδοκλῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τυνὲς φασι πάσχειν διὰ πόρων, οὔτω πᾶσαν ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ πᾶν τὸ πάσχειν τοῦτον γίνεσθαι τὸν τρόπον, διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ γινομένης τῆς διαλύσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως, ὑπεισδυνομένων στερεῶν.

Σχέδον δὲ καὶ Ἕμπεδοκλῆι ἀναγκαίον λέγειν, ὁσπερ καὶ Λεύκιππὸς φησιν· εἶναι γὰρ ἄττα στερεά, ἄδιαίρετα δὲ, εἰ μὴ πάντῃ πόροι συνεχεῖς εἰσίν. τοῦτο δ' ἄδυνατον· οὔδὲν γὰρ ἔσται ἔτερον στερεῶν παρὰ τοὺς πόρους, ἄλλα πᾶν κενὸν. ἀνάγκη ἂρα τὰ μὲν ἀπτόμενα εἶναι ἄδιαίρετα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ αὐτῶν κενά, οὐς ἐκεῖνος λέγει πόρους. οὔτως δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος λέγει περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν.

Οἱ μὲν οὐν τρόποι καθ' οὐς τὰ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ δὲ πάσχει, σχέδον οὐτοί λέγονται· καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ-
without a void, he declares that the void is "not being," and nothing of "what is" is "not being"; for "what is" in the strictest sense is a complete *plenum*. "But this 'plenum,'" he says, "is not one but many things of infinite number, and invisible owing to the minuteness of their bulk. These are carried along in the void (for there is a void) and, when they come together, they cause coming-to-be and, when they dissolve, they cause passing-away. They act and are acted upon where they happen to come into contact (for there they are not one), and they generate when they are placed together and intertwined. But from that which is truly one, a multiplicity could never come-into-being, nor a one from the truly many; but this is impossible. But " (just as Empedocles and some of the other philosophers say that things are acted upon through their pores) "all 'alteration' and all 'passion' occur in this way, dissolution and passing-away taking place by means of the void, and likewise also growth, when solids creep into the voids."

Empedocles, too, is almost compelled to take the same view as Leucippus; for he says that there are certain solids, but they are indivisible, unless there are continuous pores throughout. But this is impossible; for then there will be nothing solid except the pores, but the whole will be void. It necessarily follows, therefore, that those things which are in contact are indivisible, but the spaces between them, which he calls pores, must be void. This is also Leucippus' view about "action" and "passion."

These, then, are, roughly speaking, the accounts given of the way in which some things "act" and other things are "acted upon." As regards this
των, καὶ πῶς λέγουσι, δὴλον, καὶ πρὸς τὰς αυτῶν
15 θέσεις αἰς χρωται σχεδὸν ὀμολογουμένως φαίνε-
tαι συμβαίνου. τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἦττον, οἶον Ἑμπέ-
dοκλεῖ τίνα τρόπον ἔσται γένεσι καὶ φθορὰ καὶ
ἀλλοίωσις, οὐ δῆλον. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀδιαίρετα
tὰ πρῶτα τῶν σωμάτων, σχήματι διαφέροντα
μόνον, ἦξ ὧν πρῶτων σύγκειται καὶ εἰς ἄ ἔσχατα
dιαλύεται. Ἑμπεδοκλεῖ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα φανερὸν
ὅτι μέχρι τῶν στοιχείων ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν
φθοράν, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων πῶς γίνεται καὶ φθεί-
ρεται τὸ σωρευόμενον μέγεθος, οὔτε δὴλον οὔτε
ἐνδέχεται λέγειν αὐτῷ μὴ λέγοντι καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς
ἐνιαίοις στοιχεῖοι, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων,
20 ώσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαιῷ γέγραφε Πλάτων· τοσοῦτον
γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον Λευκίππῳ
λέγειν, ὅτι ὁ μὲν στερεὰ ὁ δὲ ἐπίπεδα λέγει τὰ
ἀδιαίρετα, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπείρους ὥρισθαι σχήματι
[τῶν ἀδιαίρετων στερεῶν ἐκαστὸν], ὃ δὲ ὦρισμένοις,
ἐπεὶ ἀδιαίρετά γε ἄμφοτεροι λέγουσι καὶ ὦρισμένα
30 σχήματιν. ἐκ δὴ τούτων αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αἱ δια-
κρίσεις Λευκίππῳ μὲν [δύο τρόποι ἰν εἴεν,] διὰ τὸ
tοῦ κενοῦ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς (ταύτῃ γὰρ διαιρετῶν
ἐκαστὸν), Πλάτων δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀφῆ μονὸν· κενὸν
γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι φασιν.
Καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἀδιαίρετων ἐπιπέδων εἰρή-
καμεν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι λόγοις· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδι-
35 αἱρέτων στερεῶν τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον θεωρήσαι τὸ

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a i.e. Leucippus and the other Atomists.
b i.e. the Atomists.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8

...it is obvious what their views are and how they state them, and they are clearly more or less consistent with the suppositions which they adopt. This is less clearly the case with the other school; for example, it is not clear how, in the view of Empedocles, there are to be coming-to-be and passing-away and “alteration.” For to the other school the primary bodies, from which originally bodies are composed and into which ultimately they are dissolved, are indivisible, differing only in structure; but to Empedocles, it is clear that all the other bodies, down to the elements, have their coming-to-be and passing-away, but it is not evident how the accumulated mass of the elements themselves comes-to-be and passes-away; nor is it possible for him to give an explanation without asserting that there is also an element of fire and likewise of all the other kinds, as Plato has stated in the *Timaeus.* For Plato is so far from giving the same account as Leucippus that, while both of them declare that the elementary constituents are indivisible and determined of figures, (a) Leucippus holds that the indivisibles are solid, Plato that they are planes, and (b) Leucippus declares that they are determined by an infinite number of figures, Plato by a definite number. It is from these indivisibles that the comings-to-be and dissolutions result: according to Leucippus, through the void and through the contact (for it is at the point of contact that each body is divisible); according to Plato, as a result of contact only, for he denies that a void exists.

Now we have dealt with indivisible planes in earlier discussions; but with regard to indivisible solids, let us leave for the moment further discussion.

53 A ff.  
*De Caelo* 298 b 33 ff.
ARISTOTLE

325 b

συμβαίνον ἄφελσθω τὸ νῦν, ὡς δὲ μικρὸν παρεκ-

326 a βάσιν εἰπεῖν, ἀναγκαῖον ἀπαθές τε ἐκαστὸν λέγειν
tῶν ἀδιαίρετων (οὐ γὰρ οἶον τε πάσχειν ἄλλ’ ἢ
dιὰ τοῦ κενοῦ) καὶ μηδενὸς ποιητικὸν πάθος: οὐτὲ
γὰρ ψυχρὸν οὔτε σκληρὸν οἶον τ’ εἶναι. καίτοι
τούτῳ γε ἄτοπον, τὸ μόνον ἀποδούναι τῷ περι-

5 φερεῖ σχήματι τὸ θερμὸν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τουναν-
tίον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἄλλῳ τινὶ προσήκειν τῶν σχημάτων.
ἄτοπον δὲ κἂν εἰ ταύτα μὲν υπάρχει, λέγω δὲ
θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης, βαρύτης δὲ καὶ κούφοτης
καὶ σκληρότης καὶ μαλακότης μὴ υπάρξει· καίτοι
βαρύτερον γε κατὰ τὴν υπεροχῆν φησιν εἶναι

10 Δημόκριτος ἐκαστὸν τῶν ἀδιαίρετων, ὡστε δήλου
ὅτι καὶ θερμότερον. τοιαῦτα δ’ οντα μὴ πάσχειν
ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων ἀδύνατον, οἰον ὑπὸ τοῦ πολὺ υπερ-
βάλλοντος θερμοῦ τὸ ἥρεμα θερμὸν. ἄλλα μὴν
eἰ σκληρὸν, καὶ μαλακόν. τὸ δὲ μαλακὸν ἦδη τῷ
πάσχειν τι λέγεται· τὸ γὰρ υπεικτικὸν μαλακόν.

15 ἄλλα μὴν ἄτοπον καὶ εἰ μηδὲν υπάρχει ἄλλ’ ἢ
μόνον σχῆμα· καὶ εἰ υπάρχει, ἐν δὲ μόνον, οἰον τὸ
μὲν ψυχρὸν τὸ δὲ θερμὸν· οὔδε γὰρ ἀν μία τις εἶν
ἡ φύσεις αὐτῶν. ὅμως δὲ ἀδύνατον καὶ εἰ πλεῖον
tῷ ἐνί· ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ ὅν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔξει τὰ πάθη,

20 ὡστε καὶ ἐὰν πάσχῃ εἰπὲρ ψύχεται, ταύτη τι
καὶ ἄλλο ποιήσει ἢ πείσεται. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ

1 ταύτη τι J : ταύτη τι E1 : ταύτη τοι F : ταύτο τι H.

a i.e. of the Atomists.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8

of what they involve and deal with them in a short
digression. It is a necessary part of the theory \(^a\) that
each "indivisible" is incapable of being acted upon
(for it cannot be acted upon except through the void)
and incapable of producing an effect on anything
else; for it cannot be either cold or hard. Yet it
is certainly strange that heat can only be attributed
to the spherical figure; for then it necessarily
follows that its contrary, cold, must belong to another
of the figures. It is also strange if these properties,
I mean heat and cold, belong to the indivisibles,
while heaviness and lightness and hardness and soft-
ness are not going to belong. Yet Democritus says
that the more each of the indivisibles exceeds, the
heavier it is, so that clearly it is also hotter. Being
of this kind, it is impossible that the indivisibles should
not be acted upon by one another, for example, the
slightly hot should be acted upon by what far sur-
passes it in heat. Again, if an indivisible can be
hard, it can also be soft; and the soft is always
so-called because it can be acted upon; for that
which yields to pressure is soft. But, further, it is
strange that no property except figure should attach
to the indivisible; and that, if properties do attach
to them, only one should attach to each, e.g. that one
"indivisible" should be cold and another hot; for,
then, neither would their substance be uniform. It
is equally impossible, too, that more than one pro-
PERTY should belong to one indivisible, for, being
indivisible, it will possess these properties in the
same place; so that if it is acted upon by being
chilled, it will also, in this way, act or be acted upon
in some other way. And similarly with the other
properties also; for this problem also confronts in
ARISTOTLE

326 a
toīs stereā kai toīs ēpípeda légousin ēdíaíreta
svymbainei tōn autōn trṓpon. ōute gár manōtera
ōute ἀπκνόtera oīōn te γίνεσθαι κενοῦ μὴ ὄντος
25 ēn toīs ēdíasīrētōs. ēti d' ētopon kai tō mikrā
mēn ēdíasīrēta eīnai, megalā dē μή νῦν mēn gár
εὐλόγως tā meīζω θραύσται μᾶλλον tōn mikrōn· tā
mēn gár διαλύεται ῥαδίως, oīōn tā megalā· προσ-
koppe tāv pōllōiś· tō dē ēdíasīrēton ólōs diā
ti māllon ὑπάρχει tōn megalōn toīs mikrōis; ēti
30 dē pōteron mίa pāntωn ē phūsēs ēkeínwv tōn
stereōn, ē diaφērēi θάterα tōn ētērōn, wōster
an eī tā mēn eī phūrīna, tā dē γῆiṇa tōn óngkōν;
ei mēn gár mίa phūsēs ēstīn ēpāntωn, tί tō χωρί-
savn; ē diā tī oū gīnetai áφάμενα ēv, wōster
ūdōr údastos ōtān bīγη; oūdēn gár diaφērēi tō ús-
35 tēron tōv proterōv. ei d' ētera, poīa tānta; kai
326 b dēlōn wōs taītα thētēon ἄρχαs kai aūtías tōn svym-
βαινόντων māllon ē tā skhūmata. ēti dē diaφe-
rōnta tīn phūsēn, kān poīh kān pāskh thuggανontα
 állhλwv. ēti dē tī tō kīnōv; ei mēn gár ēteron,
pαθητικά1. eī d' aútō aútō ékaosthon, ē diaīretōn
5 ēstai, kαt' álllo mēn kīnōv kαt' álllo dē kīnou-
μενον, hē kαtα tαυτό tαναντία ὑπάρξει, kαi hē ἤλη
ouv mōnon ἄριθμω ēstai mīa ἀλλα kai dυnάmei.
"Osoi mēn oūn diā tῆs tōn pórōn kīnηsēwos fāsī

1 pαθητικά EHL : -ōn F.

a See Phys. 190 b 24, 192 a 1 ff.

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the same way both those who assert that "indivisibles" are solid and those who say they are planes, for they cannot become either rarer or denser, because there can be no void in the "indivisibles." Further, it is strange that there should be small "indivisibles" but not large ones; for it is natural to suppose at this stage that the larger bodies are more liable to be shattered than the small, for the former, like large things in general, are easily dissolved, since they come into collision with many other bodies. But why should indivisibility in general attach to small things rather than large? Furthermore, is the substance of all these solids uniform or does it differ in different groups, as if, for example, some were fiery and some earthy in their bulk? For if they are all of one substance, what has separated them from one another? Or why do they not become one when they come into contact, just as water does when it touches water? For there is no difference between the two cases. But if they belong to different classes, what are their different qualities? Indeed it is clear that we ought to postulate that these classes rather than the "figures" are the origins and causes of the resulting phenomena. Moreover, if they were different in substance they would act and be acted upon reciprocally if they touched one another. Again, what sets these in motion? For if it is something other than themselves, they must be liable to be acted upon; but, if each is its own mover either it will be divisible, in part causing motion and in part being moved, or contraries will belong to it in the same respect, and the matter of it will be not only arithmetically but also potentially one.\(^a\)

As for those who say that the processes of being


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tα πάθη συµβαίνειν, ει μεν καὶ πεπληρωµένων τῶν πόρων, περίεργον οί πόροι· ει γὰρ ταύτη τι πάσχει το πᾶν, κὰν μη πόρους ἔχουν ἀλλ' αὐτὸ συνεχές ὃν πάσχοι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. ἔτι δὲ πῶς ἐνδέχεται περὶ τοῦ διοράν συµβαίνειν ὡς λέγονσων; οὔτε γὰρ κατὰ τὰς ἄφας ἐνδέχεται διεναὶ διὰ τῶν διαφανῶν, οὔτε διὰ τῶν πόρων, εἰ πλήρης ἐκαστος· τί γὰρ διοίσει τοῦ μὴ ἐχειν πόρους; πᾶν γὰρ ὁµοίως ἔσται πλήρες. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ καὶ κενα μὲν ταῦτα (ἀνάγκη δὲ σώματα ἐν αὐτοὶς ἐχειν), ταυτὸ συµβησται πάλιν. εἰ δὲ τηλικαίτα τὸ μέγεθος ὡςτε μη δέχεσθαι σώμα µηδὲν, γελοιον τὸ μικρὸν μὲν οἰοσθαὶ κενὸν εἶναι, μέγα δὲ μη µηδ' ὀπηλικοῦν, ἡ το κενὸν ἀλλο τι οὐσθαὶ λέγειν πλήν χώραν σώματος, ὡςτε δὴλον ὅτι παντὶ σώματι τὸν ὅγκον ἔσον ἔσται κενὸν.

" Ὅλως δὲ το πόρους ποιεῖν περίεργον· εἰ μὲν γὰρ µηδὲν ποιεῖ κατὰ τὴν ἀφήν, οὐδὲ διὰ τῶν πόρων ποιήσει διον· εἰ δὲ τῷ ἀπτεθαί, καὶ μη πόρων ὄντων τα μὲν πείσεται τά δὲ ποιήςει τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλα τούτων τὸν τρόπον πεφυκότων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτως λέγειν τοὺς πόρους ὡς τινες ὑπολαµβάνουσιν, ἡ ψεύδος ἡ µάταιον, φανερὸν ἢ τούτων ἐστὶν· διαρετῶν δ' ὄντων πάντῃ τῶν σωµάτων πόρους ποιεῖν γελοιον· ἡ γὰρ διαρετά, δύναται χωρίζεσθαι.

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a i.e. the body is none the less impenetrable, even if it is held that the pores, though they contain bodies, are themselves, qua pores, empty channels.

b i.e. the very fact that a body is everywhere divisible makes it possible to open up a channel in it.

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acted upon occur through movement in the pores, if this happens although the pores are filled, the pores are an unnecessary supposition; for if the whole body is acted upon at all in this way, it would be acted upon in the same way even if it had no pores, in its own continuous self. Again, how is it possible to carry out the process of seeing through a medium as they describe it? For it is not possible to penetrate through the transparent bodies either at the points of contact or through the pores, if each pore is full. For how will this condition differ from the possession of no pores at all? For the whole will be equally full throughout. Furthermore, if these channels, though they must contain bodies, are void, the same result will occur again \(^a\); but if they are of such a size that they cannot admit any body, it is absurd to suppose that there is a small void but not a big one, of whatever size it be, or to think that "a void" means anything except a space for a body; so that it is clear that there will be a void equal in cubic capacity to every body.

In general, then, it is superfluous to postulate the existence of pores; for if the agent effects nothing by contact, neither will it effect anything by passing through pores. If, however, it effects anything by contact, then, even without there being any pores, some of those things which are by nature adapted for reciprocal effect of this kind will be acted upon, while others will act. It is clear, therefore, from what we have said that it is either false or useless to talk of pores of the kind which some people suppose to exist, and, since bodies are everywhere divisible, it is ridiculous to postulate pores at all; for since bodies are divisible, they can be separated into parts.\(^b\)
9. Τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσι γεννᾶν καὶ 30 ποιεῖν καὶ πᾶσχειν, λέγωμεν λαβόντες ἀρχήν τὴν πολλάκις εἰρημένην. εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ μὲν δυνάμει 35 τὸ δὲ ἐνελεξεῖα τοιοῦτον, πέφυκεν οὐ τῇ μὲν τῇ δ' οὖ πᾶσχειν, ἀλλὰ πάντη καθ' ὅσον ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, ἤττον δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἦ τοιοῦτον μᾶλλον ἐστὶ καὶ ἤττον· καὶ ταύτῃ πόρους ἀν τις λέγοι μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς μεταλλευομένοις διατείνουσι τοῦ 250

a It is difficult to extract any meaning from this sentence as it stands. Joachim supposes a lacuna after τῇ δὲ μη.
9. Let us now deal with the question about the way in which existences have the power of generating and of acting and being acted upon, starting from the principle which we have often enunciated. For if there exists that which is potentially of a certain kind as well as that which is actually so, it is of a nature, in so far as it is what it is, to be acted upon in every part, and not in some part but not in another, and to a more or a less extent according as it is more or less of that particular nature; and one might speak of pores as having a particular nature in a greater degree, just as there are veins of substance which can be acted upon which stretch continuously in metals which are being mined. Every body, then, which is coherent and one is not acted upon; and this is equally true of bodies which do not touch either each other or other bodies which are of a nature to act or be acted upon. Fire is an example of what I mean: it heats not only when it is in contact with something, but also if it is at a distance; for it heats the air, and the air heats the body, being of a nature both to act and to be acted upon. But having enunciated the theory that a body is acted upon in one part but not in another, we must first make the following declaration: if the magnitude is not everywhere divisible, but there is a divisible body or plane, no body would be liable to be acted upon throughout, but neither would any body be continuous; but, if this is not true and every body is divisible, there is no difference between “having been divided but being in contact” and “being divisible”; for if it is possible for a body to be “separated at the points of contact”—a phrase which some people use—then, even if it has not yet been divided,
μένον· δυνατὸν γὰρ διαφεβητὴν γίνεται γὰρ οὐδὲν
15 ἀδύνατον. ὅλως δὲ τὸ τοῦτον γίνεσθαι τὸν τρόπον
σχιζομένων τῶν σωμάτων ἀτομον· ἀναίρει γὰρ οὖν
τὸς ὁ λόγος ἀλλοίωσιν, ὅρμωμεν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ σώμα
συνεχεῖ ὅτε μὲν υγρὸν ὅτε δὲ πεπηγὸς, οὐ δια-
ρέσει καὶ συνθέσει τούτῳ παθόν, οὐδὲ τροπὴ καὶ
diαθηγῆ, καθάπερ λέγει Δημόκριτος· οὔτε γὰρ
20 μετατεθὲν οὔτε μεταβαλὸν τὴν φύσιν πεπηγὸς ἐς
ὑγρὸν γέγονεν· οὔδὲ ἐνυπάρχει τὰ σκληρὰ καὶ πε-
πηγότα ἀδιαίρετα τοὺς ὁγκοὺς· ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως ἀπαν
ὑγρόν, ὅτε δὲ σκληρὸν καὶ πεπηγὸς ἔστω. ἐτι
δ' οὗδ' αὔξησιν οἶνόν τ' εἶναι καὶ φθίσων· οὐ γὰρ
ὁτιοῦν ἔσται γεγονὸς μεῖζον, εἰπερ ἐσται πρόσθεσις,
25 καὶ μὴ πᾶν μεταβεβληκός, ἡ μιχθέντος τινὸς ἡ
καθ' αὐτὸ μεταβαλόντος.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὸ γεννᾶν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ
25 γίνεσθαι τε καὶ πάσχειν ὅπ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ τίνα
τρόπον ἐνδέχεται, καὶ τίνα φασὶ μὲν τινες οὐκ
ἐνδέχεται δὲ, διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

30 10. Λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρήσαι περὶ μίξεως κατὰ τὸν
αὐτὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν τρίτον
τῶν προτεθέντων ἐς ἀρχῆς. οἰκετεύον δὲ τι τ' ἐστὶν ἡ μίξεις καὶ τί τὸ μικτὸν, καὶ τίσων ὑπάρχει
τῶν ὄντων καὶ πῶς, ἐτι δὲ πότερον ἔστι μίξεις ἡ
τοῦτο ψεύδος· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐστὶ μιχθῆναι τι ἔτε-
35 ρον ἐτέρῳ, καθάπερ λέγουσι τινες· ὄντων μὲν γὰρ
327 b ἐτι τῶν μιχθέντων καὶ μὴ ἡλλοιωμένων οὐδὲν μᾶλ-

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a The other two being ἀφή (ch. 6) and ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν (chs. 7-9).
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it will be in a condition of having been divided; for since it can be divided, nothing impossible results. And, in general, it is strange that it should happen in this way only, namely, if the bodies are being split; for this theory does away with "alteration," whereas we see the same body remaining in a state of continuity, though it is at one time liquid and at another solid, and it has not undergone this change by "division" or "composition," nor yet by "turning" and "mutual contact," as Democritus declares; for it has not become solid instead of liquid through any change of arrangement or alteration of its substance, nor do there exist in it those hard and congealed particles which are indivisible in their bulk, but it is liquid and at another time hard and congealed uniformly throughout. Furthermore, it is also impossible for there to be growth and diminution; for if there shall be any addition—as opposed to a change in the whole, either by the admixture of something or by a change in the body itself—no part of it will have become greater.

Let this, then, be our explanation of the way in which things generate and act and come into being and are acted upon by one another, and the manner in which these processes can occur and the impossible theories which some philosophers enunciate.

10. It now remains to consider "mixture" by the same kind of method; for this is the third of the subjects originally proposed. We must consider what "mixture" is and what it is that can be mixed and of what things mixture is a property and how; and, further, whether there is such a thing as mixture, or is it a fiction. For, according to some people, it is impossible for one thing to be mixed with another; for (a) if the ingredients still exist and are not altered
λον νῦν μεμίχθαι φασιν ἡ πρῶτερον, ἀλλ' ὅμοιως ἐχειν, θατέρου δὲ φθαρέντος οὐ μεμίχθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τὸ δ’ οὐκ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ μίξιν ὅμοιως ἐχόντων εἶναι· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ εἰ ἀμ-φοτέρων συνελθόντων ἐφθαρται τῶν μιγνυμένων ἐκάτερον· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι μεμιγμένα τὰ γε ὅλως οὐκ οὖντα.

Οὗτος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὁ λόγος ἐστιν ἡτείν διορίσαι τί διαφέρει μίξις γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, καὶ τί τὸ μικτὸν τοῦ γεννητοῦ καὶ φθαρτοῦ· δήλον γὰρ ὡς δεὶ διαφέρειν, εἴπερ ἔστιν. ὡστε τούτων οὖντων φανερῶν τὰ διαπορηθέντα λύοιντ’ ἂν.

'Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ὑλὴν τῷ πυρί μεμίχθαι φαμεν οὔτε μίγνυσθαι καιομένην, οὔτ’ αὐτὴν αὐτῆς τοῖς μορίοις οὔτε τῷ πυρί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πῦρ γίνεσθαι, τὴν δὲ φθείρεσθαι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον οὔτε τῷ σώματι τὴν τροφὴν οὔτε τὸ σχῆμα τῷ κηρῷ μιγνύ-μενον σχηματίζειν τὸν οἴγκον· οὔδὲ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ λευκὸν οὐδ' ὅλως τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἔξεις οὖν τε μιγνυσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν· σωζόμενα γὰρ ὀράται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔδὲ τὸ λευκὸν γε καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐνδέχεται μιχθῆναι, οὔτ' ἀλλο τῶν μὴ χωριστῶν οὐδέν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ πάντα ποτὲ ὅμοιοι φάσκοντες εἶναι καὶ μεμίχθαι· οὐ γὰρ

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a i.e. "white" and "knowledge" cannot exist by them-
at all, they are no more mixed than they were before, but are in a similar state; and (b) if one ingredient is destroyed, they have not been mixed, but one ingredient exists while the other does not, whereas mixture is composed of ingredients which remain what they were before; and in the same way (c) even if, both the ingredients having come together, each of them has been destroyed, there is no mixture; for things which have no existence at all cannot have been mixed.

This argument, then, seems to seek to define in what respect "mixing" differs from coming-to-be and passing-away, and how that which is "mixed" differs from that which comes-to-be and passes-away; for obviously "mixture," if there is such a thing, must be something different. When, therefore, these questions have been cleared up, our difficulties would be solved.

Now we do not say that wood has mixed with fire nor that it mixes, when it is burning, either with its own particles or with the fire, but we say that the fire comes-to-be and the wood passes-away. Similarly we do not say that the food mixes with the body or that the shape mixes with the wax and so forms the lump. Nor can "body" and "white" be "mixed" together, nor, in general, can "properties" and "states" be mixed with "things"; for we see them persisting unchanged. Again, "white" and "knowledge" cannot be mixed together, nor any of the terms which cannot be used separately. This is what is wrong in the theory of those who hold that formerly all things were together and mixed; for selves; a man can be "white" and "learned," but these attributes can only exist as properties of someone.
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ἀπαν ἀπαντὶ μικτόν, ἀλλ’ ὑπάρχειν δὲι χωριστὸν ἐκάτερον τῶν μυχθέντων· τῶν δὲ παθῶν οὐδὲν χωριστὸν. ἐπει δ’ ἔστι τὰ μὲν δυνάμει τὰ δ’ ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν οὖν, ἐνδέχεται τὰ μυχθέντα εἶναι

25 πως καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἐνεργεία μὲν ἐτέρου οὖντος τοῦ γεγονότος ἐξ αὐτῶν, δυνάμει δ’ ἔτι ἐκατέρον ἀπερ ὤσαν πρὶν μυχθῆναι, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολωλότα· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ λόγος διηνόρει πρότερον· φαίνεται δὲ τὰ μυγνύμενα πρότερον τε ἐκ κεχωρισμένων συνιόντα καὶ δυνάμενα χωρίζοντα τάλιν. οὔτε διαμένουσιν

30 οὖν ἐνεργεία ὡσπερ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ λευκόν, οὔτε φθειρόνται, οὔτε θάτερον οὔτ’ ἀμφῶ· σώζεται γὰρ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν. διὸ ταῦτα μὲν ἀφείσθω· τὸ δὲ συνεχές τούτοις ἀπόρημα διαιρετέον, πότερον ἡ μέξις πρὸς τὴν αἰσθήσιν τί ἔστιν.

"Ὅταν γὰρ οὔτως εἰς μικρὰ διαιρεθῇ τὰ μυγνύμενα, καὶ τεθῇ παρ’ ἀλληλα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὤστε μὴ δῆλον ἐκαστὸν εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, τότε

328 a μέμικται η’ οὐ, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ὡστε ότιοῦν παρ’ ότιοῦν εἶναι μόριον τῶν μυχθέντων; λέγεται μὲν οὖν οὔν ἐκείνως, οἷον κριθᾶς μεμίχθαι πυροῖς, ὅταν ἡτισοῦν παρ’ οὖντιοῦν τεθῇ. εἴ δ’ ἔστι πᾶν σῶμα διαιρετόν, εἴπερ καὶ ἔστι σῶμα σώματι μικτόν ὁμοιομερές,

5 ὀτιοῦν ἂν δέοι μέρος γίνεσθαι παρ’ ὀτιοῦν. ἐπει 256
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everything cannot be mixed with everything, but each of the ingredients which are mixed must originally exist separately, and no property can have a separate existence. Since, however, some things have a potential, and other things an actual, existence, it is possible for things which combine in a mixture to "be" in one sense and "not-be" in another, the resulting compound formed from them being actually something different but each ingredient being still potentially what it was before they were mixed and not destroyed. (This is the difficulty which arose in our earlier argument, and it is clear that the ingredients of a mixture first come together after having been separate and can be separated again.) They do not actually persist as "body" and "white," nor are they destroyed (either one or both of them), for their potentiality is preserved. Let us, therefore, dismiss these questions, but the problem closely connected with them must be discussed, namely, whether mixture is something relative to perception.

When the ingredients of the mixture have been divided into such small particles and so set side by side with one another that each is not apparent to the sense-perception, have they then been mixed? Or is this not so, and is mixture of such a nature that every particle of one ingredient is side by side with a particle of the other ingredient? The term certainly is used in the former sense; for instance, we say that barley is mixed with wheat when each grain of barley is placed side by side with a grain of wheat. But if every body is divisible, then since body mixed with body is made up of like parts, every part of each ingredient ought to be side by side with a part of the other. But since it is not possible for a body to be
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δ' οὐκ ἔστων εἰς ταλάχιστα διαρεθήναι, οὔτε σύνθεσις ταύτο καὶ μίξις ἄλλ' ἔτερον, δὴλον ὡς οὔτε κατὰ μικρὰ σωζόμενα δεὶ τὰ μεγνύμενα φάναι μεμίχθαι (σύνθεσις γὰρ ἐσταὶ καὶ οὐ κράσις οὔδ' 10 μίξις, οὐδ' ἕξει τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τῷ ὦλῳ τὸ μόριον. φαμέν δὲ δεῖν,1 έπιπερ μέμικται,2 τὸ μιχθὲν ὀμοιωμερές εἶναι, καὶ ὀππερ τοῦ ὦδατος τὸ μέρος ὦδωρ, οὔτω καὶ τοῦ κραθέντος. ἂν δ' ἣ κατὰ μικρὰ σύνθεσις ἢ μίξις, οὔθεν συμβήσεται τούτων, ἀλλὰ μόνον μεμιγμένα πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν· καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ 15 τῷ μὲν μεμιγμένον, ἐὰν μὴ βλέπῃ οὔτ', τῷ Λυγκεί δ' οὐδὲν μεμιγμένον) οὔτε τῇ διαρέσει ὅστε ὀτιοῦν παρ' ὀτιοῦν μέρος· ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὔτω διαρεθήναι. ἢ οὖν οὐκ ἐστι μίξις, ἢ λεκτέον τούτο πῶς ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι πάλιν.

"Εστὶ δὴ, ὡς ἐφαμέν, τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ποιητικά, τὰ δ' ύπὸ τούτων παθητικά. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄντι-20 στρέφει, ὅσων ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη ἐστί, καὶ ποιητικά ἀλλ' ἔλλων καὶ παθητικά ὑπ' ἀλλ' ἔλλων· τὰ δὲ ποιεῖ ἀπαθή ὄντα, ὅσων μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη. τούτων μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐστὶ μίξις· διὸ οὐδ' ἡ ἰατρικὴ ποιεῖ ὑγίειαν οὖδ' ἡ ὑγίεια μεγνυμένη τοῖς σώμασιν. τῶν δὲ

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1 δ' E L.
2 μέμικται Γ: μεμίχθαι Ε: δεὶ μεμιχθαί τι Ι.

"One of the Argonauts, famous for his keen sight (Apollonius Rhodius i. 153 ff.).

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divided into its smallest parts and "composition" and mixture are not the same thing but different, it is clear (a) that we must not say that the ingredients, if they are preserved in small particles, are mixed (for this will be "composition" and not "blending" or "mixing," nor will the part show the same ratio between its constituents as the whole; but we say that, if mixing has taken place, the mixture ought to be uniform throughout, and, just as any part of water is water, so any part of what is blended should be the same as the whole. But if mixing is a composition of small particles, none of these things will happen, but the ingredients will only be mixed according to the standard of sense-perception, and the same thing will be a mixture to one man, if he has not sharp sight, but to the eyes of Lyneceus a will not be mixed); it is also clear (b) that we must not say that things are mixed by means of a division whereby every part of one ingredient is set by the side of a part of the other; for it is impossible for them to be thus divided. Either, then, there is no mixing, or another explanation must be given of the way in which it occurs.

Now, as we maintained, some of those things which exist are capable of action and others capable of being acted upon by them. Some things, then, namely, those whose matter is the same, "reciprocate," that is, are capable of acting and being acted upon by one another, while other things, namely, those which have not the same matter, act but are not liable to be acted upon. Of the latter, then, no mixing is possible; hence, neither the art of healing nor health mixing with the patients' bodies can produce health. But of things which are capable of
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ποιητικῶν καὶ παθητικῶν ὁσα εὐδιαίρετα, πολλά
25 μὲν ὁλίγοις καὶ μεγάλα μικροῖς συντιθέμενα οὐ
ποιεῖ μέξιν, ἀλλ' αὐξῆσιν τοῦ κρατοῦσος· μετα-
βάλλει γάρ θάτερον εἰς τὸ κρατοῦν, οἷον σταλαγμός
οἶνου μυρίοις χοεύσιν ὑδατος οὐ μίγνυται· λύεται
γάρ τὸ εἴδος καὶ μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ πᾶν ὑδωρ.
ὅταν δὲ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἰσάζῃ πῶς, τότε μετα-
30 βάλλει μὲν ἐκάτερον εἰς τὸ κρατοῦν ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ
φύσεως, οὐ γίνεται δὲ θάτερον, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ καὶ
κοινῶν.

Φανερῶν οὖν ὅτι ταῦτ' ἐστὶ μικτὰ ὁσα ἐναντίωσιν
ἐχει τῶν ποιούντων· ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἀλλήλων
ἐστὶ παθητικά. καὶ μικρὰ δὲ μικροῖς παρατιθέμενα
μίγνυται μᾶλλον· ῥᾷν γὰρ καὶ θάττον ἄλληλα
35 μεθίστησιν. τὸ δὲ πολὺ καὶ ὑπὸ πολλοῦ χρονίως

328 b τοῦτο δρᾶ. διὸ τὰ εὐδριστα τῶν διαρετῶν καὶ
παθητικῶν μικτὰ (διαδρείται γὰρ εἰς μικρὰ ταῦτα
ῥαδίως· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν τὸ εὐδριστῶ ἐννεὶ), οἷον τὰ
ὕγρα μικτὰ μάλιστα τῶν σωμάτων· εὐδριστὸν γὰρ
μάλιστα τὸ ὕγρον τῶν διαρετῶν, ἐὰν μὴ γλύσχρον
5 ἦ· ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ πλείω καὶ μείζω μόνον ποιεῖ
tὸν ὕγκον. ὅταν δ' ἦ τάτερον μόνον παθητικὸν ἦ
σφόδρα, τὸ δὲ πάμπαν ἱρέμα, ἦ οὐδὲν πλείον τὸ
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action and capable of being acted upon, those which are easily divisible, when many of one of them are compounded with few of another or a large bulk with a small, do not produce a mixture but an increase of the predominant ingredient, for there is a change of the other ingredient into the predominant. (For example, a drop of wine does not mix with ten thousand measures of water, for its form is dissolved and it changes so as to become part of the total volume of water.) But when there is some sort of balance between the "active powers," then each changes from its own nature into the predominant ingredient, without, however, becoming the other but something between the two with common properties.

It is clear, therefore, that those agents are capable of admixture which show contrariety, for these can be acted upon by one another; and they mix all the better if small particles of the one ingredient are set side by side with small particles of the other, for then they more easily and more quickly cause a change in one another, whereas a large quantity of one takes a long time to be affected in this way by a large quantity of the other. Hence, those of the divisible and susceptible materials whose form is easily modified are capable of mixture; for they are easily divided into small particles (for that is what "to be easily modified in form" means); for example, the liquids are the most "mixable" of bodies, since of "divisibles" liquid is the most easily modified in form, provided it is not viscous (for viscous liquids merely increase the volume and bulk). But when one only of the ingredients is susceptible to action—or is excessively susceptible, while the other ingredient is only slightly so—the result of the mixture
μικθὲν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἡ μικρὸν, ὅπερ συμβαίνει περὶ τὸν καττίτερον καὶ τὸν χαλκὸν. ἕνα γὰρ ψελλὴ-
ζεταὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἐπαμφοτερίζει·
φαίνεται γὰρ πως καὶ μικτὰ ἡρέμα, καὶ ὡς
θάτερον μὲν δεκτικὸν θάτερον δὲ εἴδος. ὅπερ ἐπὶ
tοῦτων συμβαίνει· ὦ γὰρ καττίτερος ὃς πάθος τι
ὡν ἀνευ ὑλῆς τοῦ χαλκοῦ σχεδὸν ἀφανίζεται, καὶ
μικθεῖσ ἀπεισὶ χρωματίσασ μόνον. ταῦτο δὲ τοῦτο
συμβαίνει καὶ ἐφ' ἐτέρων.

15 Φανερὸν τοῖνυν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι ἔστι
μίξις καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί, καὶ ποῦα μικτὰ τῶν
ὄντων, ἐπείπερ ἔστιν ἕνα τοιαῦτα οὐ παθητικὰ
tε ὑπ' ἄλληλων καὶ εὐόριστα καὶ εὐδιαίρετα· ταῦτα
γὰρ οὔτ' ἐφθάρθαι ἀνάγκη μεμιγμένα οὔτ' ἔτι
tαῦτα ἀπλῶς εἶναι, οὔτε σύνθεσιν εἶναι τὴν μίξιν
20 αὐτῶν, οὔτε πρὸς τὴν οίσθησιν· ἄλλ' ἔστι μικτὸν
μὲν ὁ ἀν εὐόριστον ὃν παθητικὸν ἡ καὶ ποιητικὸν
καὶ τοιούτῳ μικτὸν (πρὸς ὁμόνυμον γὰρ τὸ μικτὸν),
ἡ δὲ μίξις τῶν μικτῶν ἀλλοιωθέντων ἐνωσὶς.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 10

of the two is no greater in volume or very little greater, as happens when tin and copper are mixed. For some things adopt a hesitant and wavering attitude towards one another, for they appear somehow to be only slightly "mixable," one, as it were, acting in a "receptive" manner, the other as a "form." This is what happens with these metals; the tin almost disappears as though it were a property of the copper without any material of its own and, after being mixed, almost vanishes, having only given its colour to the copper. And the same thing happens in other instances too.

It is clear, then, from what has been said, that there is such a process as mixing, and what it is, and how it occurs, and what kind of existing things are "mixable," seeing that some things are of such a nature as to be acted upon by one another and easily modified in shape and easily divisible. For it does not necessarily follow either that they are destroyed by having been mixed, or that they simply remain still the same, or that their "mixture" is composition, or only dependent on perception; but anything is "mixable" which, being easily modified in shape, is capable of acting or being acted upon, and is "mixable" with something of the same kind as itself (for the term "mixable" is used in relation to something else which is also called "mixable"), and mixture is the union of "mixables," when they have undergone alteration.
1. Περὶ μὲν οὖν μῖξεως καὶ ἀφής καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν εἴρηται πῶς ὑπάρχει τοῖς μεταβάλλουσι κατὰ φύσιν, ἐτὶ δὲ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς ἀπλῆς, πῶς καὶ τίνος ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν. ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀλλοιώσεως εἴρηται, τί τὸ ἀλλοιώθοθαί καὶ τίν’ ἔχει διαφορὰν αὐτῶν. λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ καλοῦμενα στοιχεία τῶν σωμάτων.

Γένεσις μὲν γὰρ καὶ φθορὰ πάσαις ταῖς φύσει συνεστώσαις οὐσίαις οὐκ ἁνεῦ τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων· τούτων δὲ τῆν ὑποκειμένην ὤλην οἱ μὲν 35 φασιν εἴναι μίαν, οἷον ἁέρα τιθέντες ἢ πῦρ ἢ τι 329 μεταξὺ τούτων, σῶμα τε ὃν καὶ χωριστόν, οἱ δὲ πλεῖον τῶν ἄριθμὸν ἐνός, οἱ μὲν πῦρ καὶ γῆν, οἱ δὲ ταύτα τε καὶ ἁέρα τρίτον, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ τούτων τέταρτον, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· ἐξ ὧν συγκρινομένων καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ ἀλλοιωμένων συμ- 5 βαίνει τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν τοῖς πράγμασιν.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν τὰ πρῶτα ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεία κα- λῶς ἔχει λέγειν, ἐστω συνομολογοῦμενον, ἐξ ὧν μεταβαλλόντων ἡ κατὰ σύγκρισιν καὶ διάκρισιν ἡ

1 πῶς καὶ τίνος L1D1: τίνος καὶ πῶς E.L2: καὶ τίνος καὶ πῶς HL.
BOOK II

1. We have now dealt with the way in which mixture, contact and action-and-passion are attributable to things which undergo natural change; we have, moreover, explained how unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away exist, and with what they are concerned and owing to what cause they occur. Similarly, we have dealt with "alteration" and explained how it differs from coming-to-be and passing-away. It remains to consider the so-called elements of bodies.

Coming-to-be and passing-away occur in all naturally constituted substances, if we presuppose the existence of perceptible bodies. Some people assert that the matter underlying these bodies is one; for example, they suppose it to be Air or Fire, or an intermediate between these two, but still a single separate body. Others hold that there are more than one material, some thinking that they are Fire and Earth, others adding Air as a third, others (like Empedocles) adding Water as a fourth; and it is, they say, from the association and separation or alteration of these that coming-to-be and passing-away of things comes about.

Let us, then, be agreed that the primary materials from the changes of which, either by association or by separation or by some other kind of change,
κατ' ἄλλην μεταβολήν συμβαίνει γένεσιν εἶναι καὶ φθοράν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ποιοῦντες μᾶλλον ὑλὴν παρά
tὰ εἰρημένα, ταῦτην δὲ σωματικὴν καὶ χωριστὴν,
ἀμαρτάνουσιν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἄνευ ἐναντιώσεως εἶ
ναι τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο ἀισθητής. ἡ γὰρ κοῦφον ἢ
βαρὺ ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῷ ἀπειρον
tοῦτο, ὃ λέγουσι τινὰς εἶναι τὴν ἀρχήν. ὡς δ' ἐν
tῷ Τιμαῖῳ γέγραπται, οὐδένα ἔχει διορισμὸν· οὐ
15 γὰρ εἴρηκε σαφῶς τὸ πανδεχές, εἰ χωρίζεται τῶν
στοιχείων. οὔδὲ χρῆται οὐδέν, φήσας εἶναι ὑπο-
κείμενον τι τοῖς καλομένοις στοιχείοις πρότερον,
οἶνον χρυσὸν τοῖς ἐργοῖς τοῖς χρυσοῖς. (καίτοι καὶ
τοῦτο οὗ καλῶς λέγεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λεγό-
μενον, ἄλλ' ὅπερ μὲν ἄλλοισις, ἐστιν οὕτως, ὃν
20 δὲ γένεσις καὶ φθορά, ἀδύνατον ἐκεῖνο προσαγο-
ρεύσθησαι εἰς οὐ γέγονεν. καίτοι γἐ φήσι μακρὸ
ἀληθέστατον εἶναι χρυσὸν λέγειν ἑκαστὸν εἶναι.)
ἀλλὰ τῶν στοιχείων ὅντων στερεῶν μέχρι ἐπιπέδων
ποιεῖται τὴν ἀνάλυσιν· ἀδύνατον δὲ τὴν τιθήνῃ
καὶ τὴν ύλὴν τὴν πρώτῃ τὰ ἐπίπεδα εἶναι. ἦμεῖς
25 δὲ φαμὲν μὲν εἶναι τινὰ ύλὴν τῶν σωμάτων τῶν
αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτην οὐ χωριστὴν ἄλλ' ἂεὶ μετ'
ἐναντιώσεως, εἰς ὅσον γίνεται τὰ καλομένα στοιχεία.
διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐτέροις ἀκριβέστερον.
οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ἐπειδή καὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐστιν
ἐκ τῆς ύλῆς τὰ σώματα τὰ πρώτα, διοριστέον καὶ
30 περὶ τούτων, ἀρχὴν μὲν καὶ πρώτην οἰομένους εἶναι

1 αἰσθητῆς II J: αἰσθητοῦ E: το αἰσθητῶν F: αἰσθητὸν ὅν L.

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a Plato, Timaeus 51 a.  b Ibid. 49 d—50 c.  
c Ibid. 53 c ff.  d Ibid. 49 a.  
e Phys. i. 6 and 7.  

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coming-to-be and passing-away occur, are rightly described as “sources” and “elements.” But (a) those who postulate that there is a single matter, besides the bodies which we have mentioned, and that this is corporeal and separable, are mistaken; for it is impossible that this body can exist without “perceptible contrariety,” for this “infinite,” which some say must be the source of reality, must be either light or heavy, or hot or cold. And (b) what is written in the Timaeus a is not accurately defined; for Plato has not clearly stated whether his “omnirecipient” has any existence apart from the elements, nor does he make any use of it, after saying that it is a substratum prior to the so-called elements, just as gold is the substratum of objects made of gold. (Yet put in this way the statement is not a happy one. Things of which there is coming-to-be and passing-away cannot be called after that out of which they have come-to-be, though it is possible for things which are altered to keep the name of that of which they are alterations. However, what he actually says b is that by far the truest account is to say that each of the objects is “gold.”) However, he carries the analysis of the elements, c though they are solids, back to “planes,” and it is impossible for the “Nurse,” d that is the primary matter, to consist of planes. Our theory is that there is matter of which the perceptible bodies consist, but that it is not separable but always accompanied by contrariety, and it is from this that the so-called elements come into being; but a more accurate account of these things has been given elsewhere. e However, since the primary bodies are also derived in this way from matter, we must explain about these also, reckoning as a source and as primary Aristotle’s view that the elements are primary matter and certain “contrarieties.”
329 a
tήν ὑλήν τήν ἄχωριστον μέν, ὑποκειμένην δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν ὑλή τῷ ψυχρῷ οὔτε τούτῳ τῷ θερμῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀμφοῖν. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν τὸ δυνάμει σῶμα αἰσθητὸν ἄρχη, δεύτερον δ’ αἱ ἐναντιώσεις, λέγω δ’ οἶνον θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης, τρίτον δ’ ἤδη πῦρ καὶ ύδωρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα, καὶ οὐχ ὃς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ ἔτεροι λέγουσιν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἄλλοιώσις), αἱ δ’ ἐναντιώσεις οὐ μετα-βάλλουσιν. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ ὡς σῶματος ποίας καὶ πόσας λεκτέον ἄρχας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλ-λοι ὑποθέμενοι χρῶνται, καὶ οὐδὲν λέγουσι διὰ τι αὐταὶ ἢ τοσαῦτα.

2. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ζητοῦμεν αἰσθητοῦ σῶματος ἄρχας, τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶν ἄπτοτο, ἄπτον δ’ οὐ ἡ αἰσθητός ἄφη, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐναντιώσεις σῶματος εἰδὴ καὶ ἄρχας ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἄφήν· κατ’ ἐναντίωσιν τε γὰρ διαφέρουσιν, καὶ κατὰ ἄπτην ἐναντίωσιν. διὸ οὔτε λευκότης καὶ μελανία οὔτε γλυκύτης καὶ πικρότης, ὁμοίως δ’ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐναντιώσεων οὐδὲν ποιεῖ στοιχεῖον. καίτων πρότερον ὅψις ἄφης, ὡστε καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρότερον. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι σῶματος ἄπτοῦ πάθος ἢ ἄπτον, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἔτερον, καὶ εἰ ἔτυχε τῇ φύσει πρότερον.

Αὐτῶν δὲ πρῶτον τῶν ἄπτων διαρετέον ποιών πρῶτα διαφοράι καὶ ἐναντιώσεις. εἰσὶ δ’ ἐναντι-ώσεις κατὰ τὴν ἄφην αἴδε, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ἔτηρν

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the matter which is inseparable from, but underlies, the contrarieties; for "the hot" is not matter for "the cold," nor "the cold" for "the hot," but the sub-stratum is matter for them both. Therefore, firstly, the potentially perceptible body, secondly, the contrarieties (for example, heat and cold), and thirdly, Fire and Water and the like are "sources." For the bodies in this third class change into one another and are not as Empedocles and others describe them (otherwise alteration could not have taken place), whereas the contrarieties do not change. Nevertheless, even so the question must be decided what kinds of contrariety and how many of them there are which are sources of body; for all other philosophers assume and make use of them without stating why they are these and why they are of a particular number.

2. Since, therefore, we are seeking the sources of perceptible bodies, and this means tangible, and tangible is that of which the perception is touch, it is clear that not all the contrarieties constitute "forms" and "sources" of body, but only those connected with touch; for it is in the matter of contrariety that they differ, that is, tangible contrariety. Therefore neither whiteness and blackness, nor sweetness and bitterness, nor any of the other perceptible contrarieties constitute an element. Yet sight is prior to touch, so that its subject is also prior; but it is a quality of tangible body not in virtue of its tangibility but because of something else, even though it happens to be naturally prior.

Of the tangible differences and contrarieties themselves we must distinguish which are primary. The following are contrarieties according to touch: hot

\[ a \text{ i.e. as immutable.} \]
ARISTOTLE

329 b

20 ύγρόν, βαρὺ κούφον, σκληρὸν μαλακόν, γλύσχρον κραύρον, τραχὺ λείον, παχὺ λεπτόν. τούτων δὲ βαρὺ μὲν καὶ κούφον οὐ ποιητικὰ οὐδὲ παθητικά· οὐ γὰρ τῶν ποιεῖν τι ἐτερον ἢ πάσχειν ύφ᾽ ἐτέρου λέγονται. δὲ δὲ ποιητικὰ εἶναι ἀλλήλων καὶ παθητικά τὰ στοιχεῖα· μίγνυται γὰρ καὶ μετα-

25 βάλλει εἰς ἀλληλα. θερμὸν δὲ καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ύγρὸν καὶ ἔθρον τὰ μὲν τῶν ποιητικά εἶναι τὰ δὲ τῶν παθητικὰ λέγεται· θερμὸν γὰρ ἐστι τὸ συγκρίνον τὰ ὀμογενή (τὸ γὰρ διακρίνειν, ὅπερ φασὶν ποιεῖν τὸ πῦρ, συγκρίνειν ἐστὶ τὰ ὀμόφυλα· συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐξαιρεῖν τὰ ἀλλότρια), ψυχρὸν δὲ τὸ

30 συνάγον καὶ συγκρίνον ὀμοίως τὰ τε συγγενῆ καὶ τὰ μὴ ὀμόφυλα, ύγρὸν δὲ τὸ ἀόριστον οἰκείῳ ὀρῷ εὐόριστον ὑν, ἔθρον δὲ τὸ εὐόριστον μὲν οἰκείῳ ὀρῷ, δυσόριστον δὲ. τὸ δὲ λεπτὸν καὶ παχὺ καὶ γλύσχρον καὶ κραύρον καὶ σκληρὸν καὶ μαλακὸν καὶ αἱ ἀλλαὶ διαφοραὶ ἐκ τούτων· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ

35 ἀναπληρητικὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ ύγροῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ ὦρίσθαι

330 a μὲν εὐόριστον δὲ εἶναι καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ ἀπτο-

270 μένῳ, τὸ δὲ λεπτὸν ἀναπληρητικὸν (λεπτομερεῖς γὰρ, καὶ τὸ μικρομερεῖς ἀναπληρητικὸν· ὅλον γὰρ
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 2

and cold, dry and moist, heavy and light, hard and soft, viscous and brittle, rough and smooth, coarse and fine. Of these heavy and light are not active nor yet passive; for they do not get their names because they act on something else or are acted upon by something else; elements, on the other hand, must be mutually active and passive, for they mix and change into one another. But hot and cold, and dry and moist are terms of which the first pair get their names because they are active, the second pair because they are passive; for "hot" is that which associates things of the same kind (for to "dissociate," which, they say, is an action of Fire, is to associate things of the same class, since the result is to destroy things which are foreign), but cold is that which brings together and associates alike both things which are of the same kind and things which are not of the same class. Moist\(^a\) is that which, though easily adaptable to form, cannot be confined within limits of its own, while dry is that which is easily confined within its own limits but is not easily adaptable in form. From the moist and the dry are derived the fine and the coarse, the viscous and the brittle, the hard and the soft and the other contrasted pairs. For since "capacity for filling up something" is characteristic of the moist, because it is not confined within bounds but is adaptable in form and follows the shape of that which comes into contact with it,\(^b\) and that which is "fine" is "capable of filling up something" (for it consists of small particles, and that which consists of small particles is capable of filling up something, for the whole is in

\(^a\) Aristotle means liquid.

\(^b\) e.g., water conforms with the shape of the vessel into which it is poured.
ARISTOTLE

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ολον ἀπτεται: τὸ δὲ λεπτὸν μάλιστα τοιοῦτον), φανερῶν ὅτι τὸ μὲν λεπτὸν ἐσται τοῦ ὑγροῦ, τὸ δὲ
5 παχῦ τοῦ ἔηρου. πάλιν δὲ τὸ μὲν γλύσχρον τοῦ ὑγροῦ (τὸ γὰρ γλύσχρον ὑγρὸν πεπονθὸς τι ἐστιν, οἶνον τὸ ἔλαιον), τὸ δὲ κραυρὸν τοῦ ἔηρου· κραυρὸν γὰρ τὸ τελέως ἔηρον, ὡστε καὶ πεπηγέναι δι᾽ ἐλλεψιν ὑγρότητος. ἔτι τὸ μὲν μαλακὸν τοῦ ὑγροῦ (μαλακὸν γὰρ τὸ ὑπείκον εἰς ἕαυτό καὶ μη μεθυστά-
10 μενον, ὅπερ ποιεῖ τὸ ὑγρὸν· διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν μαλακόν, ἄλλα τὸ μαλακὸν τοῦ ὑγροῦ), τὸ δὲ σκληρὸν τοῦ ἔηρου· σκληρὸν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ πε-
πηγὸς, τὸ δὲ πεπηγὸς ἔηρον. λέγεται δὲ ἔηρον καὶ ὑγρὸν πλεοναχῶς· ἀντίκειται γὰρ τῷ ἔηρῷ καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ διερόν, καὶ πάλιν τῷ ὑγρῷ καὶ τὸ
15 ἔηρον καὶ τὸ πεπηγὸς· ἀπαντὰ δὲ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἔηροῦ καὶ τοῦ ὑγροῦ τῶν πρῶτων λεχθέντων. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀντίκειται τῷ διερῷ τὸ ἔηρον, καὶ διερόν μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ἔχον ἀλλοτρίων ὑγρότητα ἐπιπολῆς, βε-
βρεγμένον δὲ τὸ εἰς βάθος, ἔηρον δὲ τὸ ἐστερημένον ταύτης, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ μὲν διερόν ἐσται τοῦ ὑγροῦ,
20 τὸ δ᾽ ἀντικείμενον ἔηρον τοῦ πρῶτου ἔηρου. πάλιν δὲ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ πεπηγὸς ὡσαύτως· ὑγρὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἔχον οἰκείαν ὑγρότητα, βεβρεγμένον δὲ τὸ ἔχον ἀλλοτρίων ὑγρότητα ἐν τῷ βάθει, πε-
πηγὸς δὲ τὸ ἐστερημένον ταύτης. ὡστε καὶ τού-
των ἐσται τὸ μὲν ἔηροῦ τὸ δὲ ὑγροῦ. δῆλον τούτων
25 ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ ἀνάγονται εἰς τὰς

a See 329 b 30 ff.
contact with the whole, and that which is fine consists of the smallest possible particles), it is clear that the fine is derived from the moist and the coarse derived from the dry. Again, the viscous is derived from the moist (for that which is viscous is moisture which has undergone a certain treatment, as in the case of oil), and the brittle is derived from the dry; for the completely dry is brittle, so that it has become solid through lack of moisture. Further, the soft is derived from the moist (for the soft is that which gives way and sinks into itself but does not change its position, as does the moist; hence, too, the moist is not soft, but the soft is derived from the moist). The hard, on the other hand, is derived from the dry; for that which has solidified is hard, and the solid is dry. Now "dry" and "moist" are used in several senses; for both moist and damp are opposed to dry, and, again, solid as well as dry is opposed to moist. But all these qualities are derived from the dry and the moist which we mentioned originally. For the dry is opposed to the damp, and the damp is that which has foreign moisture on its surface, soaked being that which is damp to its innermost depth, while dry is that which is deprived of foreign moisture. Therefore, clearly the damp will be derived from the moist, and the dry, which is opposed to it, will be derived from the primary dry. So likewise, on the other hand, with the moist and the solidified; for moist is that which contains its own moisture in its depth, while soaked is that which contains foreign moisture there, and solidified is that which has lost its foreign moisture; so that of these the latter derives from the dry, the former from the moist. It is clear, then, that all the other differences are re-
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πρώτας τέτταρας. αὕται δὲ οὐκέτι εἰς ἐλάττους· οὗτε γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν ὀπερ ὑγρὸν ἢ ὀπερ ἔρημον, οὗτε τὸ ὑγρὸν ὀπερ θερμὸν ἢ ὀπερ ψυχρὸν, οὗτε τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ἔρημον οὖθ' ὑπ' ἄλληλ' οὖθ' ὑπὸ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν εἰσιν· ὥστ' αὖγκη τέτταρας εἶναι ταύτας.

3. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα τὰ στοιχεῖα, τῶν δὲ τεττάρων ἐξ αἱ συζεύξεις, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία οὐ πέφυκε συνδυάζεσθαι (θερμὸν γὰρ καὶ ψυχρὸν εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πάλιν ἔρημον καὶ ὑγρὸν ἀδύνατον), φανερῶν ὅτι τέτταρες ἐσονται αἱ τῶν στοιχείων συζεύξεις,

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θερμοῦ καὶ ἔρημος, καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ, καὶ πάλιν ψυχροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ, καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ἔρημος. καὶ ἴκολοθηκε κατὰ λόγον τοῖς ἀπλοῖς φανομένοις σώμασι, πυρὶ καὶ ἄερι καὶ ύδατι καὶ γῆ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ θερμὸν καὶ ἔρημον, ὁ δ' ἀέρ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν (οἶνον ἀτμίς γὰρ ὁ ἀέρ), τὸ δ' ύδωρ ψυχρὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, ἡ δὲ γῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἔρημον, ὥστ' εὐλόγως διανείμεσθαι τὰς διαφορὰς τοῖς πρώτοις σώμασι, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν εἶναι κατὰ λόγον. ἀπαντεὶ γὰρ οἱ τὰ ἀπλὰ σώματα στοιχεῖα ποιοῦντες οἱ μὲν ἐν, οἱ δὲ δύο, οἱ δὲ τρία, οἱ δὲ τέτταρα ποιοῦν. 10 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἐν μὸνον λέγουσιν, εἶτα πυκνώσει καὶ μανώσει τάλλα γεννώσι, τούτως συμβαίνει δύο ποιεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς, τό τε μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν ἢ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν· τάς τὰ δημιουργοῦντα, τὸ δ' ἐν ὑπόκειται καθάπερ ὑλή. οἱ δ' εὐθὺς δύο ποιοῦντες, ὀσπερ Παρμενίδης πῦρ καὶ 15 γῆν, τὰ μεταξὺ μίγματα ποιοῦσι τούτων, οἶνον ἀέρα καὶ ύδωρ. ὡσάυτως δὲ καὶ οἱ τρία λέγοντες,

a i.e. are mathematically possible.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 2–3

duced to the first four, and these cannot be further reduced to a lesser number; for the hot is not that which is essentially moist or essentially dry, nor is the moist essentially hot or essentially cold, nor do the cold and the dry fall in the category of one another nor in that of the hot and moist; hence these must necessarily be four of these elementary qualities.

3. Now since the elementary qualities are four in number and of these four six couples can be formed, but contraries are not of a nature which permits of their being coupled—for the same thing cannot be hot and cold, or again, moist and dry—it is clear that the pairs of elementary qualities will be four in number, hot and dry, hot and moist, and, again, cold and moist, and cold and dry. And, according to theory, they have attached themselves to the apparently simple bodies, Fire, Air, Water and Earth; for Fire is hot and dry, Air is hot and moist (Air, for example, is vapour), Water is cold and moist, and Earth is cold and dry. Thus the variations are reasonably distributed among the primary bodies, and the number of these is according to theory. For all those who make out that the simple bodies are elements make them either one or two or three or four. Therefore (a) those who hold that there is only one and then generate everything else by condensation and rarefaction, as a result make the sources two in number, the rare and the dense or the hot and the cold; for these are the creative forces, and "the one" underlies them as matter. But (b) those who hold that there are two from the beginning—as Parmenides held that there were Fire and Earth—make the intermediates, Air and Water, mixtures of these; and (c) the same thing is done also by

The four elementary qualities (hot, cold, dry, moist) by being coupled together in different ways, constitute four simple bodies, Earth, Air, Fire and Water.
καθάπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν· τὸ γὰρ μέσον μίγμα ποιεῖ. καὶ σχεδὸν ταύτα λέγονσιν οἱ τε δύο καὶ οἱ τρία ποιοῦντες· πλὴν οἱ μὲν τέμνουσιν εἰς δύο τὸ μέσον, οἱ δὲ ἐν μόνον ποιοῦσιν. ἐνοι 20 δ' εὐθὺς τέτταρα λέγονσιν, οἴον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. συν-ἀνεψὶ δὲ καὶ οὕτος εἰς τα ὁ δύο· τῷ γὰρ πυρὶ τάλλα πάντα ἀντιτίθεσιν.

Οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ὁ ἄγρ καὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀπλοῦν, ἄλλα μικτὸν. τὰ δ' ἀπλὰ τοιαύτα μὲν ἐστὶν, οὐ μέντοι ταύτα, οἱον εἰ τι τῷ πυρὶ ὀμοίου, πυροειδές, οὐ πῦρ, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀέρι 25 ἑρεοειδές· ὀμοίως δὲ κατὶ τῶν ἀλλων. τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ θερμότητος, ὡσπερ καὶ κρύσταλλος ψυχρότητος· ἡ γὰρ πῆξις καὶ ἡ ξέσις ὑπερβολαί τυνὲς εἰσιν, ἡ μὲν ψυχρότητος, ἡ δὲ θερμότητος. εἰ οὖν ὁ κρύσταλλος ἐστὶ πῆξις υγροῦ ψυχροῦ, καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐσται ξέσις ἐξηροῦ θερμοῦ. διὸ καὶ οὖδὲν 30 οὕτ' ἐκ κρύσταλλου γίνεται οὔτ' ἐκ πυρὸς.

"Οντων δὲ τεττάρων τῶν ἀπλῶν σωμάτων, ἐκά-τερον τοῖν δυὸν ἐκατέρω τῶν τόπων ἐστίν· πῦρ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄγρ τοῦ πρὸς τοῦ ὄρους φερομένου, γῆ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ μέσον. καὶ ἄκρα μὲν καὶ εἰλικρινέστατα πῦρ καὶ γῆ, μέσα δὲ καὶ με-μιγμένα μᾶλλον ὕδωρ καὶ ἄγρ. καὶ ἐκατέρα ἐκα-τέρως ἑναντία· πυρὶ μὲν γὰρ ἑναντίον ὕδωρ, ἄερι δὲ γῆ· ταύτα γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἑναντίων παθημάτων

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a It is doubtful what is meant here. The commentator Philoponos suggests that it was a collection of otherwise unpublished doctrines of Plato and thinks that Aristotle is referring to a theory of Plato that there was “the great” and “the small” and a third ἀρχή, which was a mixture of these and served as matter; but there is nothing to support this theory. H. H. Joachim takes “the Divisions” to mean the
those who hold that there are *three*, as Plato does in the "Divisions," \(^a\) for he makes "the middle" a mixture. Those who hold that there are two and those who postulate *three* say practically the same things, except that the former divide the middle into two, while the latter treat it as one. But (\(d\)) some declare that there are four from the start, for instance Empedocles, though he also reduces these to two, for he too opposes all the others to Fire.

Fire, however, and Air and each of the other bodies which we have mentioned are not simple but mixed, while the simple forms of them are similar to them but not the same as they are; for example, that which is like fire is "fiery," not fire, and that which is like air is "air-like," and similarly with the rest. But fire is an excess of heat, just as ice is an excess of cold; for freezing and boiling are excesses, the former of cold, the latter of heat. If, therefore, ice is a freezing of moist and cold, so fire will be a boiling of dry and hot; and that is why nothing comes to be from ice or from fire.

The simple bodies, then, being four in number, make up two pairs belonging to two regions; for Fire and Air form the body which is carried along towards the "limit," while Earth and Water form the body which is carried along towards the centre \(^b\); and Fire and Earth are extremes and very pure, while Water and Air are intermediates and more mixed. Further, the members of each pair are contrary to the members of the other pair, Water being the contrary of Fire, and Earth of Air, for they are sections in the *Timaeus* (35 \(a\) ff.), where Plato makes the middle of his three kinds of substance a blend of the other two.

\(^b\) *Cf. De Caelo* 308 \(a\) 14 ff.
ARISTOTLE

331 a

συνέστηκεν. οὗ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς γε τέτταρα οὖν τὰ ἐνὸς ἐκαστὸν ἔστι, γῆ μὲν ἔχρον μᾶλλον ἢ ψυχρόν,
5 ὦδωρ δὲ ψυχρόν μᾶλλον ἢ ύγρόν, ἄντ φ’ ύγρόν μᾶλλον ἢ θερμοῦ, πῦρ δὲ θερμοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ ἔχρον.

4. 'Επεὶ δὲ διώρισται πρότερον οτι τὸις ἀπλοῖς
σώμασιν εἴς ἀλλήλων ἡ γένεσις, ἄμα δὲ καὶ κατὰ
tὴν αἴσθησιν φαίνεται γινόμενα (οὐ γὰρ ἃν ἢν ἀλ-
10 λοίωσις· κατὰ γὰρ τὰ τῶν ἄπτῶν πάθη ἢ ἀλλοιωσίς
ἐστιν), λεκτέον τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς εἰς ἀλληλα μετα-
βολῆς, καὶ πότερον ἄπαν εἰς ἀπαντὸς γίνεσθαι
δυνατὸν ἢ τὰ μὲν δυνατὸν τὰ δ’ ἀδύνατον. οτι μὲν
οὖν ἀπαντα péφυκεν εἰς ἀλληλα μεταβάλλειν, φανε-
ρόν· ἡ γὰρ γένεσις εἰς ἑναντία καὶ εἰς ἑναντίων, τὰ
15 δὲ στοιχεῖα πάντα ἐχει ἑναντίωσιν πρὸς ἀλληλα
dιὰ τὸ τὰς διαφορὰς ἑναντίας εἶναι· τοῖς μὲν γάρ
ἀμφότεραι ἑναντίαι, οἷον πυρὶ καὶ ὦδατι (τὸ μὲν
γὰρ ἔχρον καὶ θερμόν, τὸ δ’ ύγρὸν καὶ ψυχρόν),
τοῖς δ’ ἡ ἐτέρα μόνον, οἷον ἀέρι καὶ ὦδατι (τὸ μὲν
20 γὰρ ύγρὸν καὶ θερμόν, τὸ δὲ ύγρὸν καὶ ψυχρόν).
ἀστε καθόλου μὲν φανερὸν ὅτι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς γί-
νεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἥδη δὲ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν οὐ χαλεπὸν
ἰδεῖν πῶς· ἀπαντα μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἄπαντων ἔσται,
διότι δὲ τῷ θάττον καὶ βραδύτερον καὶ τῷ βρόν
καὶ χαλεπώτερον. ὃσα μὲν γὰρ ἐχει σύμβολα
25 πρὸς ἄλληλα, ταχεία τούτων ἡ μετάβασις, ὃσα δὲ

a De Caelo 304 b 23 ff.
made up of different qualities. However, since they are four, each is described simply as possessing a single quality, Earth a dry rather than a cold quality, Water a cold rather than a moist, Air a moist rather than a hot, and Fire a hot rather than a dry.

4. Since it has been determined in a former discussion that the coming-to-be of simple bodies is out of one another, and at the same time, too, it is evident from sense-perception that they do come-to-be (for otherwise there would have been no alteration—for alteration is concerned with the qualities of tangible things), we must state (a) what is the manner of their reciprocal change, and (b) whether any one of them can come-to-be out of any other one of them, or some can do so and others cannot. Now it is manifest that all of them are of such a nature as to change into one another; for coming-to-be is a process into contraries and out of contraries, and all the elements are characterized by contrarieties one to another, because their distinguishing qualities are contrary. In some of them both qualities are contrary, for example, in Fire and Water (for the former is dry and hot, the latter is moist and cold), in others only one, for example, in Air and Water (for the former is moist and hot, the latter is moist and cold). Hence, it is clear, if we take a general view, that every one of them naturally comes-to-be out of every one of them and, if we take them separately, it is not difficult now to see how this happens; for all will be the product of all, but there will be a difference owing to the greater and less speed and the greater and less difficulty of the process. For the change will be quick in those things which have qualities which correspond with one
μὴ ἔχει, βραδεία, διὰ τὸ βαῖνον εἶναι τὸ ἐν ὑ ὁ τὰ
polla metaβάλλειν, οἷον ἐκ πυρὸς μὲν ἐσται ἀὴρ
θατέρου μεταβάλλοντος (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑν θερμὸν καὶ
ξηρὸν, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν καὶ υγρόν, ὥστε ἄν κρατηθῇ
τὸ ἕθρον ὑπὸ τοῦ υγροῦ, ἀὴρ ἐσται). πάλιν δὲ ἐξ

30 ἀέρος ὑδρῷ, ἐὰν κρατηθῇ τὸ θερμὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ
(τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑν θερμὸν καὶ υγρόν, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν καὶ
υγρόν, ὥστε μεταβάλλοντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ὑδρῷ ἐσται).
tὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐξ ὑδατος γῆ καὶ ἑκ γῆς
πῦρ. ἔχει γὰρ ἀμφων πρὸς ἀμφων σύμβολα· τὸ μὲν

35 γὰρ ὑδρῷ υγρὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, ἡ δὲ γῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ
ξηρὸν, ὥστε κρατηθέντος τοῦ υγροῦ γῆ ἐσται. καὶ
331 b πάλιν ἐπει τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἕθρον καὶ θερμόν, ἡ δὲ γῆ
ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν, ἐὰν φθαρῇ τὸ ψυχρὸν, πῦρ ἐσται
ἐκ γῆς.

"Ωστε φανερὸν ὅτι κύκλῳ τε ἐσται ἡ γένεσις
τοῖς ἀπλοῖς σώμασι, καὶ ράστος οὕτος ὁ τρόπος
tῆς μεταβολῆς διὰ τὸ σύμβολα ἐνυπάρχειν τοῖς

5 ἐφεξῆς. ἐκ πυρὸς δὲ υδρῷ καὶ ἐξ ἀέρος γῆν καὶ
πάλιν ἐξ ὑδατος καὶ γῆς ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ ἐνδέχεται
μὲν γίνεσθαι, χαλέπωτερον δὲ διὰ τὸ πλειόνων

10 εἶναι τῆς μεταβολῆς· ἀνάγκη γὰρ, ἐὰν ἐσται ἐξ
ὑδατος πῦρ, φθαρῆναι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ υγρόν,
καὶ πάλιν ἐὰν ἐκ γῆς ἀὴρ, φθαρῆναι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν
καὶ τὸ ἕθρον. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐὰν πυρὸς καὶ
αέρος ὑδρῷ καὶ γῆ, ἀνάγκη ἀμφότερα μεταβάλλειν.
ἀὐτὴ μὲν οὖν χρονιστέρα ἡ γένεσις· ἐὰν δὲ ἐκα-

a σύμβολα was originally used of two pieces of wood or
bone broken away from one another and kept by the two
parties to a contract as a means of identification.

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another, but slow when these do not exist, because it is easier for one thing to change than for many; for example, Air will result from Fire by the change of one quality; for Fire, as we said, is hot and dry, while Air is hot and moist, so that Air will result if the dry is overpowered by the moist. Again, Water will result from Air, if the hot is overpowered by the cold; for Air, as we said, is hot and moist, while Water is cold and moist, so that Water will result if the hot undergoes a change. In the same way, too, Earth will result from Water, and Fire from Earth; for both members of each pair have qualities which correspond to one another, since Water is moist and cold, and Earth is cold and dry, and so, when the moist is overpowered, Earth will result. Again, since Fire is dry and hot, and Earth is cold and dry, if the cold were to pass away, Fire will result from Earth.

It is clear, therefore, that the coming-to-be of simple bodies will be cyclical; and this manner of change will be very easy, because the corresponding qualities are already present in the elements which are next to one another. The change, however, from Fire to Water and from Air to Earth, and again from Water and Earth to Air and Fire can take place, but is more difficult, because the change involves more stages. For if Fire is to be produced from Water, both the cold and the moist must be made to pass-away; and, again, if Air is to be produced from Earth, both the cold and the dry must be made to pass-away. In like manner, too, if Water and Earth are to be produced from Fire and Air, there must be a change of both qualities. This method of coming-to-be is, therefore, a lengthier process; but if one
τέρον φθαρη θάτερον, ράων μέν, οὐκ εἰς ἄλληλα
de ἡ μετάβασις, ἀλλ' ἐκ πυρὸς μέν καὶ ὑδατος
ἐσται γῆ καὶ ἀέρ, εξ ἀέρος δὲ καὶ γῆς πῦρ καὶ
15 ὑδωρ. ὅταν μὲν γαρ τοῦ ὑδατος φθαρη τὸ ψυχρὸν
tοῦ δὲ πυρὸς τὸ ἔθρον, ἀέρ ἐσται (λείπεται γαρ
tοῦ μὲν τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ δὲ τὸ ψυχρόν), ὅταν δὲ τοῦ
μὲν πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ δ' ὑδατος τὸ ψυχρόν, γῆ
dia τὸ λείπεσθαι τοῦ μὲν τὸ ἔθρον τοῦ δὲ τὸ
ψυχρόν. ῥωσαῦτως δὲ καὶ εξ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς πῦρ
20 καὶ ὑδωρ· ὅταν μὲν γαρ τοῦ ἀέρος φθαρη τὸ θερμὸν
τῆς δὲ γῆς τὸ ἔθρον, ὑδωρ ἐσται (λείπεται γαρ
tοῦ μὲν τὸ ψυχρόν τῆς δὲ τὸ ἔθρον), ὅταν δὲ τοῦ
μὲν ἀέρος τὸ ψυχρόν τῆς δὲ γῆς τὸ ἔθρον, πῦρ
dia τὸ λείπεσθαι τοῦ μὲν τὸ θερμὸν τῆς δὲ τὸ ἔθρον,
ἀπερ ἢν πυρός. ὁμολογουμένη δὲ καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσει
25 ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς γένεσις· μάλιστα μὲν γαρ πῦρ ἡ φλὸξ,
αὐτὴ δ' ἐστὶ καπνὸς καιόμενος, ὁ δὲ καπνὸς εξ
ἀέρος καὶ γῆς.

Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐφεξῆς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται φθαρέντος ἐν
ἐκατέρῳ θατέρῳ τῶν στοιχείων γενέσθαι μετά-
βασιν εἰς οὐδὲν τῶν σωμάτων διὰ τὸ λείπεσθαι ἐν
ἀμφὸν ἡ ταύτα ἡ ταναντία. εξ οὐδετέρων δὲ
30 εὔχωρεὶ γίνεσθαι σῶμα, οἷον εἰ τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς
φθαρείη τὸ ἔθρον, τοῦ δ' ἁέρος τὸ ψυχρόν· λείπεται
γαρ ἐν ἀμφὸν τὸ θερμὸν· ἐὰν δ' εξ ἐκατέρου τὸ
θερμὸν, λείπεται ταναντία, ἔθρον καὶ ψυχρόν.

a i.e. those which pass into one another by the “cyclical”
process described in 331 b 2 ff.
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quality of each element were to be made to pass away, the change will be easier but not reciprocal; but from Fire and Water will come Earth and (alternatively) Air, and from Air and Earth Fire and (alternatively) Water; for when the cold of the Water and the dryness of the Fire have passed-away, there will be Air (for the heat of the Fire and the moisture of the Water are left), but, when the heat of the Fire and the moisture of the Water have passed-away, there will be Earth, because the dryness of the Fire and the cold of the Water are left. In the same manner also Fire and Water will result from Air and Earth; for when the heat of the Air and the dryness of the Earth pass-away, there will be Water (for the moisture of the Air and the cold of the Earth are left), but when the moisture of the Air and the cold of the Earth have passed-away, there will be Fire, because the heat of the Air and the dryness of the Earth, which are, as we saw, the constituents of Fire, are left. Now the manner in which Fire comes-to-be is confirmed by our sense-perception; for flame is the most evident form of Fire, and flame is burning smoke, and smoke is composed of Air and Earth.

No change, however, into any of the bodies can take place from the passing-away of one of the elements in each of them taken in their consecutive order, because either the same or the contrary qualities are left in the pair, and a body cannot come-to-be out of identical or contrary qualities; for example, it would not result if the dryness of Fire and the moisture of the Air were to pass-away (for the heat is left in both), but, if the heat passes-away from both, the contraries, dryness and moisture, are
331 b

όμοιως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἐν ἀπασὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἐφεξῆς ἐνυπάρχει τὸ μὲν ταῦτο τὸ δ' ἐναντίον.

35 ὥσθε ἀμα δῆλον ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἐνὸς εἰς ἐν μετα-
βαίνοντα ἐνὸς φθαρέντος γίνεται, τὰ δ' ἐκ δύο

332 a εἰς ἐν πλειόνων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀπαντα ἐκ παντὸς
gίνεται, καὶ τίνα τρόπον εἰς ἄλληλα μετάβασις
gίνεται, εἴρηται.

5. Οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ἔτι καὶ ὁδὲ θεωρήσωμεν περὶ

αὐτῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τῶν φυσικῶν σωμάτων ὕλη,

5 ὡσπέρ καὶ δοκεῖ ἐνίοις, ὑδωρ καὶ ἄηρ καὶ τὰ

τοιαῦτα, ἀνάγκη ἦτοι ἐν ἡ δύο εἶναι ταῦτα ἡ πλείω.
ἐν μὲν δὴ πάντα οὐχ οἶον τε, οἶον ἀέρα πάντα ἡ

ὑδωρ ἡ πῦρ ἡ γῆν, εἴπερ ἡ μεταβολὴ εἰς τάναντια.

εἰ γὰρ εἴη ἄηρ, εἰ μὲν ὑπομένει, ἀλλοίωσις ἔσται

ἀλλ' οὐ γένεσις. ἀμα δ' οὐδ' οὕτω δοκεῖ, ὥστε

10 ὑδωρ εἶναι ἀμα καὶ ἀέρα ἡ ἄλλ' ὀτιοῦν. ἔσται δὴ

τις ἐναντίωσις καὶ διαφορὰ ἦς ἐξεῖ τι θάτερον

μόριον τὸ πῦρ οἶον θερμότητα. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ

ἔσται τὸ γε πῦρ ἄηρ θερμός· ἀλλοίωσις τε γὰρ τὸ

τοιοῦτον, καὶ οὐ φαίνεται. ἀμα δὲ πάλιν εἰ ἔσται

15 ἐκ πυρὸς ἄηρ, τοῦ θερμοῦ εἰς τούναντίον μετα-

βάλλοντος ἔσται. ὑπάρξει ἀρα τῷ ἁέρι τούτῳ,

καὶ ἔσται ὅ ἄηρ ψυχρόν τι. ὥστε ἀδύνατον τὸ

πῦρ ἁέρα θερμὸν εἶναι· ἀμα γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ θερμὸν

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a See Phys. 224 a 21 ff.
left. So likewise with the others too; for in all the consecutive elements there exists one identical and one contrary quality. It is, therefore, at the same time clear that some elements come-to-be by being transformed from one into one by the passing-away of one quality, but others come-to-be by being transformed from two into one by the passing-away of more than one quality. We have now stated that all the elements come-to-be from any one of them, and how their change into one another takes place.

5. Let us, however, proceed to discuss the following points about them. If Water, Air and the like are, as some people hold, matter for the natural bodies, there must be either one or two or more than two of them. Now they cannot all of them be one (for example, they cannot all be Air or Water or Fire or Earth), because change is into contraries. For if they were all Air, then, if Air continues to exist, "alteration" will take place and not coming-to-be. Furthermore, no one holds that Water is at the same time also Air or any other element. There will, then, be a contrariety (or difference), and the other member of this contrariety will belong to some other element, for example, heat will belong to Fire. Fire, however, will certainly not be "hot air"; for such a change is an "alteration" and also is not observed to happen. Another reason, too, is that, if Air is to be produced from Fire, it will be due to the changing of heat into its contrary. This contrary, therefore, will belong to Air, and Air will be something cold; hence it is impossible for Fire to be "hot air," for, in that case,

\[ e.g., \text{if Air is to alter into Fire, we must assign one of a pair of contrary qualities to Air and the other to Fire.} \]
καὶ ψυχρῶν ἦσται. ἄλλο τι ἄρ’ ἀμφότερα τὸ αὐτὸ ἦσται, καὶ ἄλλη τις ὑλή κοινή.

Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος περὶ ἀπάντων, οἳ οὐκ ἦστιν ἐν τούτων ἐξ οὐ τὰ πάντα. οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ἄλλο τί γε παρὰ ταῦτα, οἷον μέσον τι ἄρεσ καὶ ὡδατος ἢ ἄρεσ καὶ πυρός, ἄρεσ μὲν παχύτερον καὶ πυρός, τῶν δὲ λεπτότερον· ἦσται γὰρ ἀὴρ καὶ πῦρ ἐκεῖνο μετ’ ἐναντιότητος· ἀλλὰ στέρησις τὸ ἔτερον τῶν ἐν· ἀντίων· ὅστ’ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μονοῦσθαι ἐκεῖνο οὐδέ· ποτε, ὥσπερ φασὶ τινες τὸ ἀπείρον καὶ τὸ περιέχον. ὁμοίως ἀρὰ ὡστὶν τούτων ἡ οὐδέν.

Εἰ οὖν μηδὲν αἰσθητόν γε πρότερον τούτων, ταῦτα ἂν εἰ ἔν πάντα. ἀνάγκη τούν ἦ ἅει μένοντα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα εἰς ἅλληλα, ἢ μεταβάλλοντα, καὶ ἡ ἀπάντα, ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ’ οὗ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαιῷ. 30 Πλάτων ἔγραψεν. ὅτι μὲν τούν μεταβάλλειν ἀνάγκη εἰς ἅλληλα, δεδεικτα πρότερον· ὅτι δ’ οἷον ὁμοίως ταξέως ἄλλο ἐξ ἅλλου, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἔχοντα σύμβολον θάττον γίνεται ἐξ ἅλληλων, τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἔχοντα βραδύτερον. εἰ μὲν τούν ἦ ἐναντιότητι μία ἐστὶ καθ’ ἕν μεταβάλλειν, ἀνάγκη δύο εἰναι· ἢ γὰρ ὑλή τὸ μέσον

a Aristotle’s πρώτη ὑλή.
b i.e. without having some quality attached to it.
c This was the doctrine of Anaximander.
d The “boundless” cannot exist without being qualified by a contrary; if it is qualified by a contrary, it is one of the elements.
e i.e. there can be no simple bodies but Earth, Air, Fire and Water.
f Timaeus 54 b-d.
g 331 a 12 ff.
h See 331 a 23 ff. and note.
the same thing will be hot and cold. Both Fire and Air will, therefore, be something else which is the same, that is, there will be some other "matter" which is common to both.

The same argument holds good of all the elements and shows that there is no single one of them from which all are derived. Yet neither is there anything other than these from which they come, for example, an intermediate between air and water (coarser than Air, but finer than Water) or between Air and Fire (coarser than Fire, but finer than Air). For the intermediate will be Air and Fire with the addition of a pair of contraries; but one of the contraries will be a privation, so that it is impossible for the intermediate to exist by itself, as some people declare that the "boundless" or "all-embracing" exists; it is, therefore, one of the elements (it does not matter which), or nothing.

If, therefore, there is nothing—nothing perceptible at any rate—prior to the four elements, these must be all that there are; it follows, therefore, necessarily, that they must either persist and be unable to change into one another, or they must undergo change, either all of them or some of them only, as Plato wrote in the Timaeus. Now it has been shown above that they must change into one another; and it has previously been stated that they do not come-to-be equally quickly from one another, because elements which have a corresponding quality come-to-be more quickly out of one another, while those which have not this do so more slowly. If, therefore, the contrariety, in virtue of which they change, is one, the elements must be two; for the matter, which is imperceptible and inseparable, is the intermediate
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332 b ἀναίσθητος οὖσα καὶ ἀχώριστος. ἔπει δὲ πλείω ὀρᾶται ὄντα, δύο ἂν εἶναι αἱ ἐλάχισται. δύο δ’ ὄντων οὐχ οἷόν τε τρία εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τέσσαρα, ὥσπερ φαίνεται· τοσαῦτα γὰρ αἱ συζυγίαι· ἓξ γὰρ οὐσῶν τὰς δύο ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἑνάντια
5 εἶναι ἀλλήλαις.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων εὑρηται πρότερον· ὅτι δ’ ἐπειδὴ μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς ἀλληλα, ἀδύνατον ἀρχῆν τινα εἶναι αὐτῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τῷ ἄκρῳ ἢ μέσῳ, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἄκρως οὐκ ἔσται, ὅτι πῦρ ἔσται ἢ γῆ πάντα· καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος τῷ φάναι
10 ἕκ πυρὸς ἢ γῆς εἰςαί πάντα· ὅτι δ’ οὐδὲ μέσον, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τισὶν ἀὴρ μὲν καὶ εἰς πῦρ μεταβάλλειν καὶ εἰς ὑδρῷ, ὑδρῷ δὲ καὶ εἰς ἀέρα καὶ εἰς γῆν, τὰ δ’ ἐσχάτα οὐκέτι εἰς ἀλληλα ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον1·
δεὶ μὲν γὰρ στηναὶ καὶ μὴ εἰς ἀπειρον τοῦτο ἑναι ἐπ’ εὐθείας ἐφ’ ἐκάτερα· ἀπειρον γὰρ αἱ ἑναντιό-
15 τητεῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐσονται. γῆ ἐφ’ ὕ Γ, ὑδρῷ ἐφ’ ὕ Υ, ἀὴρ ἐφ’ ὕ Α, πῦρ ἐφ’ ὕ Π. εἰ δὴ τὸ Α μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ Π καὶ Υ, ἑναντιότης ἔσται τῶν ἈΠ. ἔστω ταῦτα λευκότης καὶ μελανία. πάλιν εἰ εἰς τὸ Υ τὸ Α, ἔσται ἄλλη· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτο τὸ Υ καὶ Π. ἔστω δὲ ἕξηρότης καὶ ὑγρότης, τὸ μὲν
20 Ἐ ἕξηρότης, τὸ δὲ Υ ὑγρότης. οὐκοιν εἰ μὲν μένει τὸ λευκόν, ὑπάρξει τὸ ὑδρῷ ὑγρὸν καὶ λευκόν, εἰ δὲ μῆ, μέλαιν ἔσται τὸ ὑδρῷ· εἰς τάναντια γὰρ ἡ μεταβολὴ. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἡ λευκὸν ἡ μέλαιν εἶναι

1 ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον add. Joachim.

a Bk. II. chs. 2 and 3.
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between them. But since the elements are seen to be more than two, the contrarieties would be at least two; but if the latter are two, the elements cannot be three but must be four, as is evidently the case; for the couples are of that number, since, though six are possible, two of these cannot occur because they are contrary to one another.

These matters have been dealt with before, but that, when the elements change into one another, it is impossible for any one of them, whether at the end or in the middle of the series, to be a "source" is clear from the following considerations. There will be no "source" at the ends, since they will all be Fire or Earth; and this is the same as arguing that all things are derived from Fire or Earth. That the "source" cannot be in the middle either—as some people hold that Air changes both into Fire and into Water, and Water both into Air and into Earth, while the end-elements are not further changed into one another—is clear from these considerations. There must be a halt, and the process cannot continue in either direction in a straight line to infinity; for, otherwise, the number of contrarieties belonging to a single element will be infinite. Let E stand for Earth, W for Water, A for Air and F for Fire. Then (a), if A changes into F and W, there will be a contrariety attaching to AF. Let this contrariety be whiteness and blackness. Again (b), if A changes into W, there will be another contrariety; for W is not the same as F. Let this contrariety be dryness (D) and moisture (M). If, then, the whiteness persists, Water will be moist and white; if not, Water will be black, for change is into contraries. Water, therefore, must be either white or black. Let it, then, be the
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tò ùδωρ. ἐστὶ ν δὴ τὸ πρῶτον. ὅμοιως τοῖνυν καὶ τῷ Π τὸ Ξ ὑπάρξει ἡ ἐξηρότης. ἐσται ἀρα
25 καὶ τῷ Π τῷ πυρὶ μεταβολὴ εἰς τὸ ὑδωρ. ἐναντία γὰρ ὑπάρχει. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ τὸ πρῶτον μέλαν ἦν,
ἐπείτα δὲ ἔξηρόν, τὸ δ' ὑδωρ ἡγρόν, ἐπείτα δὲ λευκόν. φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι πᾶσιν ἐξ ἄλληλων ἐσται
ἡ μεταβολὴ, καὶ ἐπὶ γε τούτων, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῷ Γ τῇ γῇ ὑπάρξει τὰ λοιπά καὶ δύο σύμβολα, τὸ
30 μέλαν καὶ τὸ ἡγρόν. ταῦτα γὰρ οὐ συνδεδυσται πως.

"Ὅτι δ' εἰς ἀπειρόν οὐχ οἰόν τ' ἱέναι, ὅπερ μελ-
lήσαντες δείξειν ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἐμπροσθεν ἂθομεν, δὴ-
λον ἐκ τῶνδε. εἰ γὰρ πάλιν τὸ πῦρ, ἐφ' ὑΠ, εἰς
ἀλλο μεταβαλεὶ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμψει, οἰον εἰς τὸ Ψ,
ἐναντιότης τις τῷ πυρὶ καὶ τῷ Ψ ἀλλη ὑπάρξει
35 τῶν εἰρημένων: οὐδενὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπόκειται τῶν
333 a Γ Υ Α Π τὸ Ψ. ἐστω δὴ τῷ μὲν Π τὸ Κ, τῷ δὲ
Ψ τὸ Φ. τὸ δὴ Κ πᾶσιν ὑπάρξει τοῖς Γ Υ Α Π:
μεταβάλλουσι γὰρ εἰς ἄλληλα. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦτο
μὲν ἐστω μῆπως δεδειγμένον. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο δῆλον,
5 ὅτι εἰ πάλιν τὸ Ψ εἰς ἄλλο, ἄλλη ἐναντίότης καὶ
tῷ Ψ ὑπάρξει καὶ τῷ πυρὶ τῷ Π. ὅμοιως δ' ἀεὶ μετὰ τοῦ προστιθεμένου ἐναντίοτης τις ὑπάρξει
tοῖς ἐμπροσθεν, ὡστ' εἰ ἀπειρα, καὶ ἐναντιότητες
ἀπειροὶ τῷ ἐνὶ ὑπάρξουσιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐσται
οὔτε ὀρίσασθαι οὐδὲν οὔτε γενέσθαι. δεῖσθαι γάρ,
εἰ ἄλλο ἐσται ἐξ ἄλλου, τοσαύτας διεξελθεῖν ἐν-
10 ἀντιότητας, καὶ ἐτί πλείους, ὡστ' εἰς ἐννια μὲν
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first of these. Similarly, D will also belong to F; therefore a change into Water will be possible also for Fire (F); for it has qualities which are contrary to those of Water, since Fire was first black and then dry, while Water was first moist and then white. It is clear, then, that the change of all the elements from one another will be possible, and that, in the above examples, E (Earth) will possess also the two remaining "corresponding qualities," blackness and moisture (for these have not yet been in any way coupled together).

That the process cannot go on to infinity—which was the thesis that we were about to prove when we digressed to the above discussion—will be clear from the following considerations. If Fire (F) is to change in turn into something else and not to revert again, for example into Z, another contrariety other than those already mentioned will belong to Fire and Z; for it has been laid down that Z is not the same as any of the four, E, W, A and F. Let K belong to F, and Φ to Z; then K will belong to EWAF; for they change into one another. But, let us admit that this has not yet been demonstrated; yet this is evident that, if Z in turn is to be changed into another element, another contrariety will belong both to Z and also to Fire (F). Similarly, with each addition which is made, a fresh contrariety will attach to the preceding elements of the series, so that if the elements are infinite in number, infinitely numerous contrarieties will also attach to the single element. But if this is the case, it will be impossible to define any element and for any element to come-to-be. For if one is to result from another, it will have to pass through so many contrarieties and then through still more. Therefore (a), change into some elements
οὐδέποτε ἔσται μεταβολή, οἷον εἰ ἀπειρα τὰ μεταξὺ ἀνάγκης δ', εἴπερ ἀπειρα τὰ στοιχεῖα· ἐτι δ' οὐδ' εξ ἀέρος εἰς πῦρ, εἰ ἀπειροι αἱ ἐναντιώτητες. γίνεται δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ πάσας ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μὲν κάτω τοῦ Π τὰς τῶν ἀνωθεν, τούτους δὲ τὰς τῶν κάτωθεν, ὅπερ πάντα ἐν ἔσται.

6. Θαυμάσεις δ' ἄν τις τῶν λεγόντων πλεῖω ἐνὸς τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων ὡστε μὴ μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἄλληλα, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησί, πῶς ἐνδέχεται λέγειν αὐτοῖς ἐννοεῖν συμβλητὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα. καίτοι λέγει οὔτω· "ταῦτα γὰρ ἴσα τε πάντα." εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀνάγκη ταυτό τι εἰναι υπάρχων ἀπασι τοῖς συμβλητοῖς ὥς μετροῦνται, οἷον εἰ εξ ὑδατος κοτύλης εἰς ἀέρος δέκα· τὸ αὐτὸ τι ἢν ἄρα ἄμφω, εἰ μετρεῖται τῷ αὐτῷ. εἰ δὲ μὴ οὔτω κατὰ τὸ ποσόν συμβλητὰ ὡς ποσόν ἐκ ποσοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅσον δύναται, οἷον εἰ κοτύλη ὑδατος ἴσον δύναται ψύχειν καὶ δέκα ἀέρος, καὶ οὔτως κατὰ τὸ ποσόν οὐχ ἢ ποσόν συμβλητά, ἀλλ' ἢ δύνανται τι. εἰנטל δ' ἄν καὶ μὴ τῷ τοῦ ποσοῦ μέτρῳ συμβάλλονθαι τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, οἷον ὡς τὸ τὸν τὸν τὸν λευκὸν τὸς ἄρα θερμὸν. τὸ δ' ὡς τὸς σημαίνει ἐν μὲν ποιῷ τὸ ὄμοιον, ἐν δὲ ποσῷ τὸ ἴσον. ἀτοπον δὴ φαίνεται, εἰ τὰ σώματα ἀμετάβλητα οὔτα μὴ ἀναλογίᾳ συμβλητά ἔστιν,

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a Fr. 17 line 27 (Diels).

b i.e. if one element is as hot as another is white, they have "by analogy" the same amount, one of heat, the other of whiteness.

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will never take place, for instance, if the intermediates are infinite in number (and they must be so if the elements are infinite): and further (b), there will not even be a change from Air into Fire, if the contrarieties are infinitely many; and (c) all the elements become one, for all the contrarieties of the elements above F must belong to those below F, and vice versa; they will all, therefore, be one.

6. One may well express astonishment at those who, like Empedocles, declare that the elements of bodies are more than one (and, therefore, do not change into one another), and ask them how they can assert that the elements are comparable. Yet Empedocles says, "For these are all not only equal. . . ." Now (a) if what is meant is that they are equal in amount, all the "comparables" must all possess something identical by means of which they are measured, if, for instance one pint of Water is equivalent to ten pints of Air, in which case both have always had something identical about them, since they were measured by the same standard. But (b) if they are not comparable in amount (in the sense that so much of the one is produced from so much of the other), but in power (for instance, if a pint of water and ten pints of air have an equal cooling power), even so they are comparable in amount, though not qua amount, but qua so much power. And (c) it would be possible also to compare their power not by the measure of quantity, but by an "analogy": for example, "as X is hot, so Y is white." But "analogy," while it signifies similarity in quality, signifies equality in quantity. Now it is obviously absurd that the bodies, though unchangeable, are comparable not merely by "analogy," but by the
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ἀλλὰ μέτρῳ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῷ εἶναι ἵσως\(^1\) θερμοῦ ἡ ομοίωσις\(^2\) πυρὸς τοσοῦτο καὶ ἀέρος πολλαπλάσιον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ πλεῖον τῷ ὁμογενὲς εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἔξει τὸν λόγον.

35 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' αὔξησις ἃν εἴη κατ' Εμπε-

333 b δοκλέα, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν πυρὶ γὰρ αὔξει τὸ πῦρ· 'αὔξει δὲ χθόνι μὲν σφέτερον δέμας,\(^3\) αἰθέρα δ' αἰθήρ.' τάυτα δὲ προστίθεται δοκεῖ δ' οὐχ οὖτως αὔξεσθαι τὰ αὔξανόμενα. πολὺ δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἀποδοῦναι περὶ γενέσεως τῆς κατὰ φύσιν. τὰ γὰρ γνώμενα φύσει πάντα γίνεται ἢ ἂεὶ ὧδι ἡ ὁς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἂεὶ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης. τί οὖν τὸ αἰτίον τοῦ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρωποῦ ἢ ἂεὶ ἡ ὁς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸν πυρὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐλαΐαν; ἡ καὶ, ἐὰν ὧδι συντεθῇ, ὡστού; οὐ γὰρ ὅτες έτυχε συνελθόντων οὐδὲν γίνεται, καθ' ἂν ἐκεῖνος φήσιν, ἀλλὰ λόγω τινί. τί οὖν τούτων αἰτίων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ πῦρ γε ἡ γῆ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖδ' ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος· συγκρίσεως γὰρ μόνον, τὸ δὲ διακρίσεως αἰτίων. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἐκάστου, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον ''μίξεις τε διάλλαξις τε μυγέντων,''' ωσπερ ἐκεῖνος φήσιν. τύχη δ' ἐπὶ τούτων ὄνομάζεται, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγος· ἐστι γὰρ μι-

χθήναι ὃς έτυχεν. τῶν δὴ φύσει ὄντων αἰτίων

\(^{1}\) ἱσως: ἱσον codd.  \(^{2}\) ομοίωσις F: ομοιον FHL.  
\(^{3}\) δέμας H: γένος EFL.  \(^{4}\) καθ' EHL: καθάπερ F.

a Empedocles, fr. 37 (Diels).

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measure of their powers; that is, that so much Fire and many times as much Air are comparable because they are equally or similarly hot. For the same thing, if greater in amount, will, by being of the same kind, have its ratio increased correspondingly.

Further, according to Empedocles, growth, too, would be impossible except by addition: for in his view Fire increases by Fire and "Earth increases its own body, and ether increases ether," and these are additions; and it is not generally held that things which increase do so in this way. And it is much more difficult for him to give an account of coming-to-be by a natural process. For the things which come-to-be naturally all come-to-be, either always or generally, in a particular way, and exceptions or violations of the invariable or general rule are the results of chance and luck. What, then, is the reason why man always or generally comes-to-be from man, and why wheat (and not an olive) comes-to-be from wheat? Or does bone come-to-be, if the elements are put together in a certain manner? For, according to Empedocles, nothing comes-to-be by their coming together by chance but by their coming together in a certain proportion. What, then, is the cause of this? It is certainly not Fire or Earth; but neither is it Love and Strife, for the former is a cause of "association" only and the latter of dissociation only. No: the cause is the substance of each thing and not merely, as he says, "a mingling and separation of things mingled"; and chance, not proportion, is the name applied to these happenings: for it is possible for things to be mixed by chance. The cause, then, of things which exist naturally is that they are in

\[\text{Empedocles, fr. 8 (Diels)};\text{ see also above, 314 b 7 f.}\]
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to oútws éxein, kai ἡ ἐκάστου φύσις αὐτή, περὶ ὑς οὐδὲν λέγει. οὐδὲν ἀρα περὶ φύσεως λέγει. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ εὐ τούτο καὶ ἀγαθόν: ὁ δὲ τὴν μίξιν μόνον ἔπαινε. καίτοι τὰ γε στοιχεία διακρίνει οὐ τὸ νεῖκος, ἀλλ' ἡ φιλία τὰ φύσει πρότερα τοῦ θεοῦ· θεοί δὲ καὶ ταῦτα.

"Ετι δὲ περὶ κινήσεως ἀπλῶς λέγει· οὐ γὰρ ἰκανὸν εἰπεῖν διότι ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος κινεῖ, εἰ μὴ τοῦτ' ἡν φιλία εἰναι τὸ κινήσει τοιοῦτo, νεῖκει δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτo. ἔδει οὖν ἡ ὁρίσασθαι ἡ ὑποθέσθαι ἡ ἀποδείξαι, ἡ ἀκριβῶς ἡ μαλακῶς, ἡ ἀλλως γέ πως. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ φαίνεται καὶ βία καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κινοῦμενα τὰ σώματα, καὶ κατὰ φύσιν (οἶνον τὸ πῦρ ἀνώ μὲν οὐ βία, κατῶ δὲ βία), τῷ δὲ βίᾳ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐναντίον, ἐστι δὲ τῷ βίᾳ, ἐστών ἀρα καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν κινεῖσθαι. ταύτην οὖν ἡ φιλία κινεῖ, ἡ οὐ; τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὴν γῆν κάτω καὶ διακρίσει έοικεν· καὶ μᾶλλον τὸ νεῖκος αὐτῶν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν κινήσεως ἡ ἡ φιλία. ὡστε καὶ ὅλως παρὰ φύσιν ἡ φιλία ἃν εἶη μᾶλλον. ἀπλῶς δὲ εἰ μὴ ἡ φιλία ἡ τὸ νεῖκος κινεῖ, αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων οὐδεμία κίνησις ἐστὶν οὐδὲ μονή. ἀλλ' ἀτοπον. 334 a ἔτι δὲ καὶ φαίνεται κινοῦμενα· διέκρινε μὲν γὰρ τὸ νεῖκος, ἡνέχθη δ' ἀνω ὁ αὐθηρ οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ νεῖκους, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν φήσων ὡσπερ ἀπὸ τύχης

1 κάτω ΕΗ: ἀνω FL.

a Although it is entitled περὶ Φύσεως.

b i.e. natural motion.

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such and-such a condition, and this is what constitutes the nature of each thing, about which he says nothing. There is nothing "About the Nature of Things" in his treatise. And yet it is this which is the excellence and the good of each thing, whereas he gives all the credit to the mixing process. (Yet it is not Strife but Love that dissociates the elements which are by nature prior to God, and they are also gods.)

Further, his account of motion is superficial. For it is not enough to say that Love and Strife move things, unless Love has been given a certain faculty of movement and Strife a certain other. He should, then, have either defined or laid down or demonstrated their powers of movement either accurately or loosely, or at any rate in some manner. Furthermore, since the bodies are seen to move by compulsion (that is, unnaturally) and also naturally (for example, Fire moves upwards without compulsion, but downwards by compulsion), and that which is natural is contrary to that which is by compulsion, and movement by compulsion actually occurs, it follows that natural motion also occurs. Is this, then, the motion which Love sets going, or not? No: for, on the contrary, it moves the Earth downwards and resembles "dissociation," and Strife rather than Love is the cause of natural motion; and so, generally speaking, Love rather than Strife would be contrary to nature, and unless Love or Strife is actually setting them in motion, the simple bodies themselves have no motion or rest at all. But this is strange; and, moreover, they are actually seen to move. For although Strife caused dissociation, it was not by Strife that the ether was carried upwards, but at one time Empedocles talks as if it were due to chance,
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(‘οὔτω γὰρ συνέκυρσε θέων τότε, πολλάκι χ’ ἄλλως’), ὅτε δὲ φησὶ πεφυκέναι τὸ πῦρ ἀνω 5 φέρεσθαι, ὁ δ’ αἰθήρ, φησὶ, ‘‘μακρῆσι κατὰ χθόνα δύτετο ὦλαις.’’ ἀμα δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον ὀμοίως ἔχειν φησὶν ἐπὶ τε τοῦ νείκους ύνν καὶ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας. τί οὖν ἔστι τὸ κυνών πρῶτον καὶ αἰτίον τῆς κινήσεως; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ νείκος, ἀλλὰ τῶν κινήσεως ταῦτα αἰτία, εἰ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνο ἀρχή.

10 'Ατοπον δὲ καὶ εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ἤ ἐν τι αὐτῶν· αἱ γὰρ ἄλλωσεις αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς πῶς ἐσονται, οἶον τὸ μουσικὸν εἶναι καὶ πάλιν ἀμοισον, ἡ μνήμη ἡ λήθη; δὴλον γὰρ ὅτι εἰ μὲν πῦρ ἡ ψυχὴ, τὰ πάθη ὑπάρξει αὐτῆ ὅσα πυρὶ ἡ πῦρ· εἰ δὲ μικτόν, τὰ σωματικά· τούτων δ’ οὔδεν σωμα-

15 τικόν.

7. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐτέρας ἐργοὺ ἐστὶ θεωρίας. περὶ δὲ τῶν στοιχείων εἰς ὅν τὰ σώματα συνέστηκεν, ὁσοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ τι εἶναι κοινὸν ἡ μετα-

βάλλειν εἰς ἄλληλα, ἀνάγκη εἰ θάτερον τούτων, καὶ θάτερον συμβαίνειν· ὅσοι δὲ μὴ ποιοῦσιν εἰς ἄλληλων γένεσιν μηδ’ ὃς εἰς ἐκάστου, πλὴν ὡς ὥς ἐκ 20 τοῖχον πλίνθους, ἀτοπον πῶς εἰς ἐκείνων ἐσονται σάρκες καὶ ὅστα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτων. ἔχει δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον ἀπορίαν καὶ τοῖς εἰς ἄλληλων γεν-


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Fr. 53 (Diels).

b Fr. 54 (Diels).
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 6-7

saying, "For thus in its rush it encountered them then, but oft-times in other wise," \(^a\) whereas on another occasion he says that it is the nature of Fire to be borne upwards, and ether, he says, "sank with long roots into the Earth." \(^b\) At the same time he also says that the Earth is in the same condition now under the rule of Strife as it was formerly under that of Love. What, then, is the "prime mover" and cause of motion? It certainly is not Love and Strife; but these are the causes of a secondary motion, if the "prime mover" is the original source.

It is also strange that the soul should consist of the elements or be one of them; for how, then, will the "alterations" in the soul take place? How, for example, could the change from being musical to being unmusical occur, or could memory or forgetfulness occur? For evidently, if the soul is Fire, only such effects will be produced upon it as can be produced by Fire \textit{qua} Fire; whereas, if it is a mixture of elements, only the corporeal effects will be produced; but no one of these effects is corporeal.

7. The discussion, however, of these questions is the task of another investigation. But, as regards the elements of which bodies are composed, those who think that they all have something in common or that they change into each other, if they hold one of these views, must necessarily hold the other. For those, on the other hand, who do not make them come-to-be out of each other nor one from another taken singly (except in the sense that bricks come-to-be out of a wall), there is the paradox as to how flesh and bones and any of the other compounds will result from the elements. This suggestion involves a difficulty also for those who generate the elements.

How single bodies are combined to form compounds.
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νῶσιν, τίνα τρόπον γίνεται ἡξ αὐτῶν ἔτερον τι παρ’ αὐτά. λέγω δ’ οἶον ἐστὶν ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ καὶ ἐκ τούτου γίνεσθαι πῦρ· ἐστὶ γὰρ τι κοῦνν 25 τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ σὰρξ ἡξ αὐτῶν γίνεται καὶ μυελὸς· ταῦτα δὴ γίνεται πῶς; ἐκεῖνοσ τε γὰρ τοῖς λέγουσιν ὡς Ἄμπεδοκλῆς τίς ἐσται τρόπος; ἀνάγκη γὰρ σύνθεσιν εἶναι καθάπερ ἐκ πλίνθων καὶ λίθων τοῖχος· καὶ τὸ μῆγμα δὲ τούτῳ ἐκ σωζομένων μὲν ἐσται τῶν στοιχείων, 30 κατὰ μικρὰ δὲ παρ’ ἄλληλα συγκειμένων. οὕτω δὴ σὰρξ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστον. συμβαίνει δὴ μὴ ἡξ ὅποιον μέρους σαρκὸς γίνεσθαι πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, ὅσπερ ἐκ κηροῦ γένοιτ’ ἄν ἐκ μὲν τοῦ τοῦ μέρους σφαίρα, πυραμίς δ’ ἡξ ἄλλου τυνῶς· ἀλλ’ ἐνεδέχετο γε ἡξ ἐκατέρου ἐκάτερον γενέσθαι. 35 τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τούτων γίνεται τὸν τρόπον ἐκ τῆς 334 b σαρκὸς ἡξ ὅποιον ἅμφως· τοῖς δ’ ἐκεῖνως λέγουσιν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐκ τοῖχου λίθος καὶ πλίνθος, ἐκάτερον ἡξ ἄλλου τόπου καὶ μέρους. ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ τοῖς ποιοῦσι μίαν αὐτῶν ὕλην ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν, πῶς ἐσται τι ἡξ ἅμφοτέρων, οἶον ψυχροῦ καὶ 5 θερμοῦ ἢ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ σὰρξ ἡξ ἅμφως καὶ μηδέτερον ἐκεῖνων, μὴδ’ αὖ σύνθεσις σωζομένων, τι λείπεται πλὴν ὕλην εἶναι τὸ ἡξ 300
from each other, namely, in what manner does anything else other than the elements themselves come-to-be out of them. The following is an example of what I mean: Water can come-to-be out of Fire and Fire out of Water (for their substratum is something common to both), but flesh, too, and marrow come-to-be out of them; how do they come-to-be? What manner of coming-to-be is ascribed to them by those who hold such a view as that of Empedocles? They must maintain that the process is composition, just as a wall comes-to-be from bricks and stones; moreover, this “mixture” will consist of the elements preserved intact but placed side by side with one another in minute particles. This, supposedly, is what happens in the case of flesh and each of the other compounds. The result is that Fire and Water do not come-to-be out of any and every part of the flesh; for example, while a sphere might come-to-be from one part of a piece of wax and a pyramid from another, yet it was possible for either shape to have come-to-be out of either part of the material. This, then, is how coming-to-be occurs when both Fire and Water come-to-be out of any part of the flesh. But for those who hold the above view this is impossible, but the process can only take place as stone and brick come-to-be out of a wall, that is, each out of a different place and part. Similarly, a difficulty arises also for those who make out that the elements have a single matter, namely, how anything will result from two of them taken together, for instance, cold and hot or Fire and Earth. For if flesh consists of both and yet is neither of them, and again is not a compound in which they are preserved intact, what possibility remains except that the result of their composition
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334 b

ἐκείνων; ἡ γὰρ θατέρου φθορὰ ἡ θάτερον ποιεῖ ἡ τῆς ὕλην.

"Αρ' οὖν ἐπειδὴ ἦστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, ὅταν μὲν ἀπλῶς ἡ θάτερον ἐντελεχεία,

dυνάμει θάτερον ἦσται· ὅταν δὲ μὴ παντελῶς, ἀλλ' ὡς μὲν θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ὡς δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν διὰ τὸ μηκὲν παρά φθείρειν τὰς ὑπεροχὰς ἀλλήλων, τότε οὕθ' ἡ ὕλη ἦσται οὗτε ἐκείνων τῶν ἐναντίων ἐκά-

tερον ἐντελεχεία ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ

dυνάμει μᾶλλον εἶναι θερμὸν ἡ ψυχρὸν ἡ τοῦναντίον,

cατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον διπλασίως θερμὸν δυνάμει ἡ
ψυχρόν, ἡ τριπλασίως, ἡ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον τοιοῦτον; ἦσται δὴ μικρὸν τὰλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναν-

tίων ἡ τῶν στοιχείων, καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐξ ἐκείνων
dυνάμει πως οὕτων, οὔχ οὔτω δὲ ὡς ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλὰ
tὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον· καὶ ἦστων οὕτω μὲν μίξις,

ἐκείνως δὲ ὡς τὸ γινόμενον. ἔπει δὲ καὶ πάσχει

tαναντία κατὰ τὸν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις διορισμόν·

ἐστι γὰρ τὸ ἐνεργεία θερμὸν δυνάμει ψυχρόν καὶ τὸ

ἐνεργεία ψυχρὸν δυνάμει θερμὸν, ὦστε εὖν μὴ

ισάζῃ, μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ
tῶν ἀλλῶν ἐναντίων· καὶ πρῶτον οὕτω τὰ στοι-

χεῖα μεταβάλλει, ἐκ δὲ τοῦτον σάρκες καὶ ὅστα
cαὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοῦ μὲν θερμοῦ γινομένου ψυχ-

ροῦ, τοῦ δὲ ψυχροῦ θερμοῦ, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ μέσον

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a It is difficult to see any meaning in the words and they should perhaps be omitted.

b i.e. the case where one contrary destroys the other, (lines 6, 7).

c See 323 b 1 ff., where the law of the reciprocal action-and-passion of contraries is stated.

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COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 7

is matter? For the passing-away of either of them produces either the other or the matter.

Is the following a possible solution based on the fact that there are greater and less degrees in hot and cold? When one of them is actually in being without qualification, the other will be potentially in existence; but when neither completely exists but (because they mix and destroy one another's excesses) there is a hot which, for a hot, is cold, and a cold which, for a cold, is hot, then the result will be that neither their matter nor either of the two contraries will be actually in existence without qualification but an intermediate, and according as it is potentially more hot than cold or, vice versa, it will possess a power of heating greater in proportion—whether double or treble or in some such ratio—than its power of cooling. The other bodies will result from the contraries (that is, from the elements) when mixed together, and the elements will result from the contraries existing somehow potentially—not in the sense in which matter exists potentially but in the manner already explained. Thus "mixture" takes place, whereas what comes-to-be in the other case is matter. But since the contraries also are acted upon according to the definition given in the first part of this treatise—for the actually hot is potentially cold, and the actually cold is potentially hot, so that, unless the hot and cold are equalized, they change into one another (and the like happens in the case of the other contraries)—thus in the first place the elements are transformed; but out of them flesh and bones and the like come-to-be when the hot is becoming cold and the cold becoming hot and they reach the mean, for at that point there is neither hot

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334 b

έλθην· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ οὐδέτερον, τὸ δὲ μέσον πολὺ καὶ οὐκ ἄδιαίρετον. ὥμοιώς δὲ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ
30 ὑγρὸν καὶ τὰ τουλάτα κατὰ μεσότητα ποιοῦσι σάρκα καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ τάλλα.

8. "Απαντά δὲ τὰ μικτὰ σώματα, οὐσα περὶ τὸν
tοῦ μέσου τόπον ἑστίν, ἐξ ἀπάντων σύγκειται τῶν
ἀπλῶν. γῆ μὲν γὰρ ἐνυπάρχει πάσι διὰ τὸ ἐκαστὸν
εἶναι μάλιστα καὶ πλείστον ἐν τῷ οὐκείῳ τόπῳ,
35 ὑδωρ δὲ διὰ τὸ δεῖν μὲν ὀρίζεσθαι τὸ σύνθετον,
335 a μονὸν δ’ εἶναι τῶν ἀπλῶν εὐόριστον τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐτί
dὲ καὶ τὴν γῆν ἀνευ τοῦ ὑγροῦ μὴ δύνασθαι συμ-
μένειν, ἀλλὰ τούτ’ εἶναι τὸ συνέχον· εἰ γὰρ ἐξ-
αιρεθεὶς τελέως εἴξ αὐτῆς τὸ ὑγρὸν, διαπίπτοι ἂν.

Γῆ μὲν οὖν καὶ ὕδωρ διὰ ταύτας ἐνυπάρχει τὰς
5 αἰτίας, ἀν’ δὲ καὶ πῦρ, ὅτι ἐναντία ἑστὶ γῆ καὶ
ὕδατι· γῆ μὲν γὰρ ἀέρι, ὕδωρ δὲ πυρὶ ἐναντίον ἑστίν,
ὡς ἐνδεχεται οὐσίαν οὐσία ἐναντίαν εἶναι. ἐπεὶ
οὖν αἱ γενέσεις ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εἰσί, ἐνυπάρχει
dὲ θάτερα ἄκρα τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀνάγκη καὶ θάτερα
eνυπάρχει, ὥστ’ ἐν ἀπαντι τῷ συνθέτῳ πάντα τὰ
10 ἀπλὰ ἐνέσται. μαρτυρεῖν δ’ ἐοίκε καὶ ἡ τροφὴ
ἐκάστων· ἀπαντά μὲν γὰρ τρέφεται τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐξ
ἀνυπερ ἑστίν, ἀπαντα δὲ πλείοσι τρέφεται. καὶ γὰρ
ἀπερ ἄν δοξείειν εἰ μόνῳ τρέφεσθαι, τῷ ὑδατί τὰ
φυτὰ, πλείοσι τρέφεται· μέμικται γὰρ τῷ ὑδατί

a i.e. the Earth as the centre of the universe.
b i.e. because the region in which mixed bodies exist consists mainly of earth.
c i.e. cold-dry (Earth) and cold-moist (Water).
d i.e. hot-moist (Air) and hot-dry (Fire).
nor cold. (The mean, however, has considerable extension and is not indivisible.) In like manner also it is in virtue of being in a "mean" condition that the dry and the moist and the like produce flesh and bone and the other compounds.

8. All the mixed bodies, which exist about the region of the centre, are compounds of all the simple bodies. For Earth enters into their composition, because every simple body exists specially and in the greatest quantity in its own place; and Water forms part of them, because that which is composite must have limits, and Water is the only one of the simple bodies which is easily confined within limits, and furthermore, the Earth cannot remain coherent without moisture, and this is what holds it together; for if the moisture were entirely removed from it, it would fall apart.

Earth, therefore, and Water enter into the composition of simple bodies for these reasons; so also do Air and Fire because they are contraries of Earth and Water—Earth of Air, and Water of Fire, in the sense in which one substance can be contrary to another substance. Since, then, comings-to-be result from contraries, and one pair of extreme contraries is already present, the other pair must also be present, so that all the simple bodies are found in every compound. The food of each compound serves to supply evidence of this; for they are all nourished by foods which are identical with their constituents, and all are nourished by more than one food. For indeed the plants, which would seem to be nourished by one food only, namely, Water, are fed by more than one food, for there is Earth mixed with the Water—and this, too, is why farmers experiment by
γῆ· διὸ καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ πειρῶνται μίξαντες ἄρδευν.

15 ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν τροφὴ τῆς ὑλῆς, τὸ δὲ τρεφό-

μενον συνειλημένον τῇ ὑλῇ ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἴδος,

εὐλογον ἢ δὴ τὸ μόνον τῶν ἀπλῶν σωμάτων τρέ-

φεσθαί τὸ πῦρ ἀπάντων ἕξ ἄλληλων γινομένων,

ἀσσερ καὶ οἱ πρότεροι λέγουσιν· μόνον γὰρ ἐστὶ

καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ εἴδους τὸ πῦρ διὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι

20 φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ὄρον. ἔκαστον δὲ πέφυκεν εἰς

tὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν φέρεσθαι· ἡ δὲ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ

eἴδος ἀπάντων ἐν τοῖς ὀροῖς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἄπαντα

tὰ σώματα ἐξ ἀπάντων συνεστηκε τῶν ἀπλῶν,

εἰρηταὶ.

9. Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶν ἕνα γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτά, καὶ

25 ἡ γένεσις τυγχάνει οὕσα ἐν τῷ περὶ τὸ μέσον τῶ-

πω, λεκτέον περὶ πάσης γενέσεως ὀμοίως πόσαι τε

καὶ τῖνες αὐτῆς αἱ ἀρχαῖ· βάιν γὰρ οὕτω τὰ καθ’

ἔκαστον θεωρήσομεν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν καθόλου λά-

βωμεν πρῶτον.

Εἰσὶν οὖν καὶ τὸν ἄριθμὸν ἵσαι καὶ τῷ γένει αἱ

30 αὐταὶ αἴτπερ ἐν τοῖς ἁίδιοισ τε καὶ πρῶτοις· ἡ μὲν

γάρ ἐστιν ὡς ὑλή, ἡ δ’ ὡς μορφή. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν

τρίτην ἐτι προσυνάρχειν· οὐ γὰρ ἰκαναὶ πρὸς τὸ

γεννῆσαι αἱ δύο, καθάπερ οὐδ’ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις.

ὡς μὲν οὖν ὑλῆ τοῖς γεννητοῖς ἐστίν αἴτιον τὸ δυ-

νατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης

35 ἐστίν, οἴον τὰ ἁίδια, τὰ δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐκ ἐστιν.

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a See 321 b 16 ff.
making mixtures and use them for watering. Now whereas food is of the nature of matter, and that which is fed is the "shape" and "form" taken together with the matter, it is reasonable to suppose that of the simple bodies, while all come-to-be out of one another, Fire is the only one which is fed, as is the view also of the earlier philosophers. For Fire alone—and to a greater extent than the rest—is of the nature of "form," because it naturally tends to be borne towards the limit. Now each of the simple bodies tends to be borne to its own place, and the "shape" and "form" of all of them depend on their limits. It has now been explained that all the compound bodies are composed of the simple bodies.

9. Since some things are of a nature to come-to-be and to pass-away, and since coming-to-be actually takes place in the region about the centre, we must discuss the number and the nature of the sources of all coming-to-be alike; for we shall more easily form a theory about the particulars when we have first grasped the universals.

These sources, then, are equal in number to and identical in kind with those which exist among eternal and primary things. For there is one in the sense of material cause, a second in the sense of formal cause, and the third too must be present also; for the two sources are not enough to generate things which come-to-be, just as they are not enough in the case of primary things either. Now cause in the sense of matter for things which are of a nature to come-to-be is "the possibility of being and not-being." For some things exist of necessity, for example, the things which are eternal, and some things of necessity do not exist; and of these two classes it is impossible
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touton de ta men adunaton mou eina, ta de adu-

335 b naton einai dia to mou enedexethai para to anagkaion allws exein. enia de kai einai kai mou einai dunata, ope per esti to geneiton kai pharaton: potete men gar esti touto, potete di ouk estin. woste anagkhei ge-

5 nevon einai kai phoron peri to dunaton einai kai mou eina. di o kai wos men ulh touti estin aition tois geneitous, wos de to ou enekven h morphi kai to eidos: touto di estin ho logos ho tis ekastou ouxia.

Dei de proseivai kai tin trite, hnum antites men oneiroptousi, legei di oudeis, alli oie men ikanhn wghthsan aitian einai pros to ginesthai tin tav einon phous, wsper o en Paidwni Socrathts: kai gar keino, epitimhssas tois allous ws oudein eirhkosin, upotithetai oti esti tav owtov ta men eidh ta de melektika tav einon, kai oti einai men ekaston legetai kata to eidos, ginesthai de kata

15 tin metalthsin kai phereosehai kata tin apobolhn, woste ei tauta alhthi, ta eidh oietai ex anagkhs aitia einai kai geneosews kai phoros. oie di aitivn tin ulhn apd tauntic gar einai tin kinhsin. ou- dteroi de legousi kalws. ei men gar estin aitia
tav eidh, dia ti ouk aei geneva suvekws, alla potete

20 men potete di ou, owtov kai tav einon aei kai tav

a Plato, Phaedo 96 a—99 c.
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for the first not to be, while for the second it is impossible to be, because they cannot be other than they are in violation of the law of necessity. Some things, however, can both be and not be. This is the case with that which can come-to-be and pass-away; for at one moment it exists, at another it does not exist. So coming-to-be and passing-away must occur in the sphere of what can-be-and-not-be. This, then, is the cause, in the sense of material cause, of things which are of a nature to come-to-be, whereas cause, in the sense of their "end in view," is their shape and form; and this is the definition of the essential nature of each of them.

But the third source must also be present, of which everyone dreams but never puts into words. But some people have thought the nature of the "forms" was enough to account for coming-to-be. Socrates, for instance, did so in the Phaedo; for he, after finding fault with the other philosophers for having made no pronouncement on the subject, lays it down that some of the things which exist are "forms" and others "partakers in the forms," and that each thing is said to exist in virtue of the "form" and to come-to-be in virtue of its participation in the "form" and to pass-away because of its rejection of it. Hence he thinks that, if this is true, the "forms" are necessarily the causes of both coming-to-be and passing-away. On the other hand, some have thought that the matter in itself was the cause; for it is from this, they said, that movement arises. But neither of these schools of thought is right. For, if the "forms" are causes, why do they not always generate continually but only intermittently, since the "forms" and the partakers in them are always there? Further-
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μεθεκτικῶν; ἔτι δ’ ἐπ’ ἐνίων θεωροῦμεν ἄλλο τοῦ αἰτίου ὄν. ὑγίειαν γὰρ ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἐπιστήμην ὁ ἐπιστήμων, οὕσης καὶ ὑγιείας αὐτῆς καὶ ἐπιστῆμης καὶ τῶν μεθεκτικῶν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ δύναμιν πραττομένων. εἰ δὲ τὴν ὑλὴν τις φήσεις γεννᾶν διὰ 25 τὴν κίνησιν, φυσικώτερον μὲν ἂν λέγοι τῶν οὕτω λεγόντων· τὸ γὰρ ἄλλου καὶ τὸ μετασχηματίζον αἰτιώτερον τε τοῦ γεννᾶν, καὶ ἐν ἀπασιν εἰσώθαμεν τούτο λέγειν τὸ ποιοῦν, ὁμοίως ἐν τε τοῖς φύσει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ τέχνης, ὅ ἂν ἢ κινητικόν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ οὕτωι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν· τῆς μὲν 30 γὰρ ὑλῆς τὸ πάσχειν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ κινεῖν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐτέρας δυνάμεως (δὴ λοι οὐκ ὑπὸ τῶν τέχνης καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει γινομένων· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ τὸ ύδωρ ζῆσον ἐξ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ τέλος κλίνην, ἀλλ’ ἢ τέχνη). ὡστε καὶ οὕτωι διὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς, καὶ οὔτε παραλεί- 35 πουσι τὴν κυριωτέραν αἰτίαν· ἔξαιροῦσι γὰρ τὸ τί 336 α ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὴν μορφήν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδιδόσι τοῖς σώμασι, δι’ ἃς γεννᾶσι, λίαν ὀργανικῶς, ἀφαιροῦντες τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰτίαν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πέφυκεν, ὡς φασί, τὸ μὲν θερμὸν διακρίνειν τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν συνιστάναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 5 ἔκαστον τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, ἐκ τούτων λέγουσι καὶ διὰ τούτων ἀπαντά τάλλα γίνεσθαι.
more, in some cases we see that something else is the cause; for it is the physician who implants health and the scientific man who implants scientific knowledge, although health itself and science itself exist and also the participants in them; and the same thing is true of the other operations carried out in virtue of a special faculty. On the other hand, if one were to say that matter generates by means of its movement, he would speak more in accordance with the facts of nature than those who state the view given above; for that which "alters" and transforms is a more potent cause of bringing things into being, and we are always accustomed, in the products alike of nature and of art, to make out that whatever can cause motion is the acting cause. However, these thinkers are also wrong; for to be acted upon, that is, to be moved, is characteristic of matter, but to move, that is to act, is the function of another power. (This is evident both in the things which come-to-be by art and in those which come-to-be by nature; for water does not itself produce an animal out of itself, nor does wood produce a bed, but art). So, for this reason, these thinkers are not correct in what they say, and also because they omit the most potent cause; for they exclude the essential nature and the "form." Moreover, also, when they do away with the formal cause, the powers which they attribute to bodies and which enable them to bring things into being are too instrumental in character. For since, as they assert, it is the nature of the hot to separate and of the cold to bring together and of each of the other qualities the one to act and the other to be acted upon, it is out of these and by means of these, so they say, that all the other things come-to-be and
καὶ φθειρεσθαί· φαινεται δὲ καὶ τὸ πῦρ αὐτὸ κινούμενον καὶ πάσχον. ἐτὶ δὲ παραπλήσιον ποιοῦσιν ὥσπερ εἴ τις τῷ πρόιν καὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὀργάνων ἀπονείμοι τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν γινομένων· ἀνάγκη γὰρ πρῶντος διαρείσθαι καὶ ξέοντος λειάνεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀμοίωσ. ὥστ' εἴ ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖ καὶ κινεῖ τὸ πῦρ, ἀλλὰ πῶς κινεῖ οὐ προσθεωροῦσιν, ὅτι χεῖρον ἢ τὰ ὀργάνα. ἦμων δὲ καθόλου τε πρότερον εὑρηται περὶ τῶν αἰτίων, καὶ νῦν διώρισται περὶ τῇς ὦλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς.

10. Ἕτι δὲ ἐπεί ἡ κατὰ τὴν φορὰν κίνησις δεδεικται ὅτι αἴδιος, ἀνάγκη τούτων ὄντων καὶ γένεσιν εἶναι συνεχὼς· ἡ γὰρ φορὰ ποιήσει τὴν γένεσιν ἐνδελεχώς διὰ τὸ προσάγειν καὶ ἀπάγειν τὸ γεννητικὸν. ἀμα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ πρότερον καλῶς εὑρηται, τὸ πρῶτην τῶν μεταβολῶν τὴν φορὰν ἀλλὰ μῆ τὴν γένεσιν εἰσεῖν· πολὺ γὰρ εὐλογωτερον τὸ ὀν τῷ μὴ ὄντι γενέσεως αἰτίον εἶναι ἡ τὸ μή ὅν τῷ ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι. τὸ μὲν οὖν φερόμενον εἶστι, τὸ δὲ γινόμενον οὐκ ἐστιν· διὸ καὶ ἡ φορὰ προτέρα τῆς γενέσεως. ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπόκειται καὶ δεικται συνεχῆς οὕσα τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ γένεσιν καὶ φθορά, φαμεν δ' αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν φορὰν τοῦ γίνεσθαι, φανερὸν ὅτι μᾶς μὲν οὕσης τῆς φορᾶς οὐκ ἐνδεχεται γίνεσθαι ἀμφω διὰ τὸ ἐναντία εἶναι.

1 οὐ προσθεωροῦσι: οὐ προσθεωροῦσιν Ε: οὐ προθεωροῦσιν Η: οὐχ ὄρωσιν FI.

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a Phys. ii. 3-9.  
b See 335 a 32–b 7.  
c Phys. viii. 7-9.  
d i.e. the sun, see below.  
e Phys. 260 a 26 ff.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 9-10

pass-away. But it is evident that Fire itself is moved and is acted upon; moreover, they are doing much the same thing as if one were to ascribe to the saw or to any other tool the causation of objects which are brought into being; for division must take place when a man saws and smoothing when he uses a plane, and a similar effect must be produced by the use of the other tools. Hence, however much Fire is active and causes motion, yet they fail to observe how it moves things, namely, in a manner inferior to that in which the tools act. We have ourselves dealt with causes in general in a previous work, and we have now distinguished between matter and form.

10. Moreover, since the change caused by motion has been proved to be eternal, it necessarily follows, if that is so, that coming-to-be goes on continuously; for the movement will produce coming-to-be uninterruptedly by bringing near and withdrawing the "generator." At the same time it is evident that our statement in a former work was also right in which we spoke of motion, not coming-to-be, as the "primary kind of change." For it is far more reasonable that that which is should be a cause of coming-to-be of that which is not, than that that which is not should be cause of being to that which is. For that which is being moved exists, but that which is coming-to-be does not exist; therefore movement is prior to coming-to-be. Now since it has been suggested and proved that coming-to-be and passing-away happen to things continuously, and we maintain that motion is the cause of coming-to-be, it is clear that, if motion is simple, both processes cannot go on because they are contrary to one another; for nature has ordained

\[ \text{Cf. } 317 \text{ b 33 ff.} \]
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tὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡςαύτως ἔχον ᾧθεῖ τὸ αὐτὸ πέφυκε
ποιεῖν. ὡστε ἦτοι γένεσις ᾧθεῖ ἐσται ἡ φθορά. δεῖ
30 δὲ πλείους εἶναι τὰς κινήσεις καὶ ἑναντίας, ἡ τῇ
φορᾷ ἡ τῇ ἀνωμαλίᾳ. τῶν γὰρ ἑναντίων τὰ ἑναντία
αἵτια.

Διὸ καὶ οὖχ ἡ πρώτη φορὰ αἵτια ἐστὶ γενέσεως
καὶ φθορᾶς, ἀλλὰ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λοξὸν κύκλον. ἐν
ταύτῃ γὰρ καὶ τὸ συνεχὲς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι
dύο κινήσεις. ἀνάγκη γὰρ, εἰ γε ᾧθεῖ ἐσται συνεχῆς
336 b γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ, ἀδὴ μὲν τὶ κινεῖσθαι, ἣν μὴ
ἐπιλείπωσιν αὕται αἱ μεταβολαί, δύο δ', ὅπως μὴ
θάτερον συμβαίνῃ μόνον. τῆς μὲν οὖν συνεχείας
ἡ τοῦ ὀλου φορὰ αἵτια, τοῦ δὲ προσεῖναι καὶ
ἀπιέναι ἡ ἐγκλίσις. συμβαίνει γὰρ ὅτε μὲν πόρρω
5 γίνεσθαι ὅτε δ' ἐγγύς. ἀνίσον δὲ τοῦ διαστήματος ὅντος ἀνώμαλος ἐσται ἡ κίνησις. ὡστ' εἰ
tῷ προσεῖναι καὶ ἐγγύς εἰναι γεννᾶ, τῷ ἀπιέναι
tαὐτὸν τοῦτο καὶ πόρρω γίνεσθαι φθείρει, καὶ εἰ
tῷ πολλάκις προσεῖναι γεννᾶ, καὶ τῷ πολλάκις
ἀπελθεῖν φθείρει. τῶν γὰρ ἑναντίων τὰ ἑναντία
10 καὶ ἐν ὑσω χρόνῳ καὶ ἡ φθορὰ καὶ ἡ γένεσις ἡ
κατὰ φύσιν. διὸ καὶ οἱ χρόνοι καὶ οἱ βίοι ἐκάστων
ἀριθμὸν ἔχουσι καὶ τούτῳ διωρίζονται. πάντων γὰρ
ἐστὶ τάξις, καὶ πάς βίος καὶ χρόνος μετρεῖται
περιόδων, πλην οὐ τῇ αὕτῃ πάντες, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν

a The revolution of the πρῶτος ὦρανός or outermost sphere
which revolves once every twenty-four hours.
b The annual course of the sun in the ecliptic circle.
c i.e. of the πρῶτος ὦρανός, which also involves the revolu-
tion of the concentric spheres.
d The inclination of the ecliptic to the equator of the outer-
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that the same thing, as long as it remains in the same state, always produces the same result, so that either coming-to-be or passing-away will always result. The movements, however, must be more than one and contrary to one another either in the direction of their motion or in their irregularity; for contraries are the causes of contraries.

It is not, therefore, the primary motion $^a$ which is the cause of coming-to-be and passing-away, but the motion along the inclined circle $^b$; for in this there is both continuity and also double movement, for it is essential, if there is always to be continuous coming-to-be and passing-away, that there should be something always moving, in order that this series of changes may not be broken, and double movement, in order that there may not be only one change occurring. The movement of the whole $^c$ is the cause of the continuity, and the inclination $^d$ causes the approach and withdrawal of the moving body; for since the distance is unequal, the movement will be irregular. Therefore, if it generates by approaching and being near, this same body causes destruction by withdrawing and becoming distant, and if by frequently approaching it generates, by frequently withdrawing it destroys; for contraries are the cause of contraries, and natural passing-away and coming-to-be take place in an equal period of time. Therefore the periods, that is the lives, of each kind of living thing have a number and are thereby distinguished; for there is an order for everything, and every life and span is measured by a period, though this is not the same for all, but some are

most sphere; according to Aristotle, the equator of the Universe is in the same plane as the earth's equator.
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ἐλάττων οἱ δὲ πλείονι· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐνιαυτὸς, τοῖς
de μείζων, τοῖς δὲ ἐλάττων περίοδός ἐστὶ τὸ
μέτρον.

Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ² κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν ὁμολογού-
μενα τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῶν λόγοις· ὅρωμεν γὰρ ὅτι
προσιόντος μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου γένεσις ἐστιν, ἀπιόντος
de φύσις, καὶ ἐν ᾗσι χρόνῳ ἐκάτερον· ίσος γὰρ ὁ
χρόνος τῆς φθορᾶς καὶ τῆς γενέσεως τῆς κατὰ

20 ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐν ἐλάττων
φθείρεσθαι διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα σύγκρασιν· ἁνω-
μάλου γὰρ οὕσης τῆς ὑλῆς καὶ οὐ πανταχοῦ τῆς
αὐτῆς ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀνωμάλους εἶναι
καὶ τὰς μὲν θάντους τὰς δὲ βραδύτερας, ὡστε
συμβαίνει διὰ τὴν τούτων γένεσιν ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι
φθοράν.

25 'Αεὶ δ’, ὥσπερ εἰρηταί, συνεχῆς ἐσται ἡ γένεσις
καὶ ἡ φθορά, καὶ οὐδέποτε ὑπολείψῃ δι’ ἣν εἴπομεν
αὐτίαν. τοῦτο δ’ εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ
ἐν ἀπασίν αεὶ τοῦ βελτίωνος ὅρεγεσθαι φαμέν τὴν
φύσιν, βελτιων δὲ τὸ εἶναι ἡ τὸ μὴ εἶναι (τὸ δ’ εἶναι
30 τοσαχῶς λέγομεν, ἐν ἄλλοις εἰρηταί), τοῦτο δ’
ἀδύνατον ἐν ἀπασίν ὑπάρχειν διὰ τοῦ πόρρω τῆς
ἀρχῆς ἀφίστασθαι, τῷ λειπομένῳ τρόπῳ συνε-
πλήρωσε τὸ ὁλον ὁ θεός, ἐνδελεχὴν³ ποιήσας τὴν
γένεσιν· οὕτω γὰρ ἀν μάλιστα συνειροῦτο τὸ εἶναι
diὰ τὸ ἐγγύτατα εἶναι τῆς οὕσις τὸ γίνεσθαι ἀεὶ
337 a καὶ τὴν γένεσιν. τούτου δ’ αὐτίων, ὥσπερ εἰρηταί

1 ὅ ante περίοδός omisi.
2 τὰ addidī.
3 ἐνδελεχὴ FH: ἐντελεχὴ E.

a See 318 a 9 ff.
b Metaphysics, passim.

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measured by a smaller and some by a greater period; for some the measure is a year, for others a greater or a lesser period.

The evidence of sense-perception clearly agrees with our views; for we see that coming-to-be occurs when the sun approaches, and passing-away when it withdraws, and the two processes take an equal time; for the space of time occupied by natural passing-away and coming-to-be is equal. It often happens, however, that things pass away in too short a time owing to the commingling of things with one another; for, their matter being irregular and not everywhere the same, their comings-to-be must also be irregular, sometimes too quick and sometimes too slow. The result is that the coming-to-be of certain things becomes the cause of the passing-away of other things.

As has already been remarked, coming-to-be and passing-away will take place continuously, and will never fail owing to the cause which we have given. This has come about with good reason. For nature, as we maintain, always and in all things strives after the better; and "being" (we have stated elsewhere the different meanings of "being") is better than "not-being," but it is impossible that "being" can be present in all things, because they are too far away from the "original source." God, therefore, following the course which still remained open, perfected the universe by making coming-to-be a perpetual process; for in this way "being" would acquire the greatest possible coherence, because the continual coming-to-be of coming-to-be is the nearest approach to eternal being. The cause of this continuous process, as has been frequently remarked, is cyclical
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πολλάκις, ἡ κύκλω φορά· μόνη γάρ συνεχῆς. διὸ καὶ τάλλα ὁσα μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, οἶον τὰ ἀπλὰ σώματα, μυμεῖται τὴν κύκλω φοράν· ὅταν γὰρ ἐξ ὑδατος ἀὴρ γένηται καὶ ἐξ ἀέρος πῦρ καὶ πάλιν ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ, κύκλω φαμὲν περιεληλυθέναι τὴν γένεσιν διὰ τὸ πάλιν ἀνακάμπτειν. ὥστε καὶ ἡ εὐθεία φορὰ μιμουμένη τὴν κύκλω συνεχῆς ἔστω.

"Ἀμα δὲ δὴλον ἐκ τούτων ὁ τινες ἀποροῦσιν, διὰ τί, ἐκάστου τῶν σώματων εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν φε- ρομένου χώραν, ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ χρόνῳ οὐ διεστάσι τὰ σώματα. αἰτίον γὰρ τούτον ἐστὶν ἡ εἰς ἄλληλα μετάβασις· εἰ γὰρ ἐκαστὸν ἐμενεν ἐν τῇ αὐτῷ χώρᾳ καὶ μὴ μετέβαλλεν ὑπὸ τοῦ πλησίον, ἦδη ἀν διεστήκεσαν. μεταβάλλει μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν φοράν διυλήν οὖσαν· διὰ δὲ τὸ μεταβάλλειν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μένειν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ χώρᾳ τεταγμένη.

∆ιότι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, καὶ τί τὸ γεννητὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν, φανερῶν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. ἐπεί δ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι τι τὸ κινοῦν, εἰ κίνησις ἐσται, ὥσπερ εἰρητα πρότερον ἐν ἑτέροις, καὶ εἰ ἀεὶ, ὅτι ἀεὶ τι δεῖ εἶναι, καὶ εἰ συνεχῆς, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀγένητον καὶ ἀναλοώτον· καὶ εἰ πλείους εἶναι αἱ κύκλως κινήσεις, πλείους μὲν, πᾶσας δὲ πως εἶναι ταῦτας ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχήν· συνεχοὺς δ' ὀντος τοῦ

a Phys. 255 b 31 ff.

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motion, the only motion which is continuous. Hence also the other things which change into one another, for instance, the simple bodies, by being acted upon or having power to act, imitate cyclical movement. For when Air comes-to-be from Water, and Fire from Air, and Water again from Fire, we say that coming-to-be has completed the cycle, because it has come back to its starting-point. Hence motion in a straight line is also continuous because it imitates cyclical motion.

This at the same time clears up a point which some people find puzzling, namely, the reason why, since each of the bodies is being borne along towards its own place, the bodies have not become separated in the infinity of time. The reason is their reciprocal change of position; for if each remained in its own place and was not transformed by its neighbour, they would have long ago been parted. Their transformation, then, is due to the movement of a double kind; and, owing to their transformation, none of them can remain in any fixed position.

From what has been said, it is evident that coming-to-be and passing-away take place, and why this is so, and what it is that comes-to-be and passes-away. But if there is to be movement, there must, as has been explained elsewhere in an earlier treatise, be something which causes movement, and if movement is to go on always, that which causes it must go on always and, if it is to be continuous, that which causes it must be one and the same and unmoved, un-generated and unalterable; and if the cyclical movements are to be more than one, they must, in spite of being more than one, be all subject somehow to one cause; and since time is continuous, the move-
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χρόνου ἀνάγκη τῇν κίνησιν συνεχῆ εἶναι, εἰπερ ἀδύνατον χρόνον χωρίς κινήσεως εἶναι. συνεχοῦς

25 ἄρα τινὸς ἀριθμὸς ὁ χρόνος, τῆς κύκλῳ ἀρα, καθ-ἀπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγοις διωρίσθη. συνεχῆς

δ’ ἡ κίνησις πότερον τῷ τὸ κινοῦμενον συνεχές εἶναι ἡ τῷ τὸ ἐν ὃς κινεῖται, οἴον τὸν τόπον λέγω ἡ τὸ πάθος; δὴλον δὴ ὁτι τῷ τὸ κινοῦμενον ὥς γὰρ τὸ πάθος συνεχές ἄλλῃ ἡ τῷ τὸ πράγμα ὃς συμβέβηκε συνεχῆς εἶναι; εἰ δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐν ὃς, μόνῳ τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ὑπάρχει· μέγεθος γὰρ τι ἔχει. τούτου δὲ τὸ κύκλῳ μόνον συνεχές, ὡστε αὐτὸ αὐτῶ ἄεί συνεχές. τούτῳ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ ποιεῖ συνεχῆ κίνησιν, τὸ κύκλῳ σώμα φερόμενον ἡ δὲ κίνησις τὸν χρόνον.

11. Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐν τοῖς συνεχῶς κινούμενοι κατὰ

35 γένεσιν ἡ ἄλλοισιν ἡ ὅλως μεταβολὴν ὁρῶμεν

337 b τὸ ἐφεξῆς ὁν καὶ γινομένον τὸδε μετὰ τόδε ὡστε μὴ διαλείπειν, σκεπτέον πότερον ἔστι τι δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκῃς ἔσται, ἡ οὔτεν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐνδεχεται μὴ γενέσθαι. ὁτὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐνα, δήλον, καὶ εὐθὺς τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔτερον διὰ τοῦτο· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἅ

5 ἄληθὲς εἰπείν ὁτι ἔσται, δεὶ τούτῳ εἶναι ποτε ἄληθὲς ὁτι ἔστιν· δ’ ἐν νῦν ἄληθὲς εἰπείν ὃτι μέλλει, οὔτεν

a Phys. 217 b 29 ff.

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ment must be continuous, because it is impossible for there to be time without movement. Time, then, is a way of reckoning some kind of continuous movement and, therefore, of cyclical movement, as was laid down in our original discussion. But is movement continuous because that which is moved is continuous or because that in which it moves is continuous (for example, the place or the quality)? Clearly because that which is moved is continuous; for how could the quality be continuous except because the thing to which it belongs is continuous? And if it is because the place in which it occurs is continuous, continuity is to be found only in the place in which it occurs; for it has a certain magnitude. But of that which moves, only that which moves in a circle is continuous in such a way that it is always continuous with itself. This, then, is what produces continuous motion, namely, the body which is moved in a circle, and its movement makes time continuous.

11. When in things which are moved continuously in the course of coming-to-be or alteration or change generally, we observe a sequence, that is, one thing coming-to-be after another in such a way that there is no cessation, we must inquire whether there is anything which will necessarily exist in the future or whether there is no such thing, or whether any one of them may possibly fail to come-to-be. For it is evident that some of them fail to come-to-be, and the readiest example is the difference which for this reason exists between "something will be" and "something is about to be"; for if it is true to say "something will be," it must be true at some future date to say that it is. On the other hand, though it is true now to say that "something is about to happen,"
κωλύει μὴ γενέσθαι· μέλλων γὰρ ἂν βαδίζειν τις
οὐκ ἂν βαδίσειν. ὡλς δ', ἐπεὶ ἐνδέχεται ἐνια
τῶν ὄντων καὶ μὴ εἶναι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ γινόμενα
οὕτως ἔξει, καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦτ' ἔσται. πότε-
ρον οὖν ἀπαντά τοιαῦτα ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἐνια ἀναγκαῖον
ἀπλῶς γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἔστω ὦσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι
tὰ μὲν ἀδύνατα μὴ εἶναι τὰ δὲ δυνατὰ, οὕτως καὶ
περὶ τὴν γένεσιν; οἶον τροπᾶς ἄρα ἀνάγκη γε-
νέσθαι, καὶ οὐχ οἶον τε μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι.

Εἰ δὴ τὸ πρότερον ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι, εἰ τὸ
ὑστερον ἔσται (οἶον εἰ οἰκία, θεμέλιον, εἰ δὲ
tουτο, πηλόν), ἃρ' οὖν καὶ εἰ θεμέλιος γέγονεν,
ἀνάγκη οἰκίαν γενέσθαι; ἢ οὐκέτι, εἰ μὴ κάκεινο
ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι ἀπλῶς; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀνάγκη καὶ
θεμελίου γενομένου γενέσθαι οἰκίαν· οὕτω γὰρ ἢν
τὸ πρότερον ἔχων πρὸς τὸ ὕστερον, ὥστ' εἰ ἐκεῖνο
ἔσται, ἀνάγκη ἐκεῖνο πρότερον. εἰ τοῖνυν ἀνάγκη
gενέσθαι τὸ ὕστερον, καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀνάγκη· καὶ
eἰ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ τὸ ὕστερον τοῖνυν ἀνάγκη, ἀλλ'
oū δι' ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὑπέκειτο ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐσό-
μενον. ἐν οἷς ἄρα τὸ ὕστερον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἐν
τούτοις ἀντιστρέφει, καὶ ἀεὶ τοῦ προτέρου γενο-
25 μένου ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι τὸ ὕστερον.
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there is nothing to prevent its not happening—a man might not go for a walk, though he is now “about to” do so. In general, since it is possible for some of the things which “are” also “not to be,” obviously things which are coming-to-be are also in this case and their coming-to-be will not necessarily take place. Are, then, all the things which come-to-be of this kind? Or is this not so, but it is absolutely necessary for some of them to come-to-be? And does the same thing happen in the sphere of coming-to-be as in that of being, where there are some things for which it is impossible “not to be” and for others which it is possible? For example, solstices must come-to-be and it is impossible that they should be unable to occur.

If it is necessary for that which is prior to come-to-be if that which is posterior is to be—for example, foundations must have come-to-be if a house is to exist, and there must be clay if there are to be foundations—does it follow that, if the foundations have come-to-be, the house must necessarily do so? Or is this no longer so, if there is no such absolute necessity? In this case, however, if the foundations have come-to-be, the house must come-to-be; for such was the assumed relation of the prior to the posterior that, if the posterior is to be, the prior must have preceded it. If, therefore, it is necessary that the posterior should come-to-be, it is necessary also that the prior should have come-to-be, and, if the prior, then also the posterior, not, however, because of the prior, but because the future being of the posterior was assumed as necessary. Hence, whenever the posterior is necessary, the reverse is also true, and always when the prior has come-to-be, the posterior must also come-to-be.
The argument is as follows: let $x$ be one of the future members of the series of events, $x$'s occurrence is contingent on the future occurrence of a still later member of the series, which is itself contingent on a still later member, $y$. The occurrence of every subsequent member of the infinite series is therefore conditionally, not absolutely, necessary. If $x$'s occurrence were absolutely necessary, $x$ would be the begin-
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 11

Now if the series is to go on indefinitely downwards, any particular later member of the series must come-to-be not by absolute, but only by conditional, necessity; for it will always be necessary that another later member of the series should exist first in order to make it necessary that the earlier member of the series should come-to-be. Hence, since the infinite has no beginning, neither will there be any primary member of the series which will make it necessary for the other members to come-to-be. And further, it will not be possible to say with truth, even in the case of members of a series which is limited, that there is an absolute necessity that they should come-to-be. For example, a house will not necessarily come-to-be when its foundations have come-to-be; for unless it is always necessary for a house to come-to-be, the result will be that when its foundations have come-to-be, a thing, which need not always be, must always be. No: if its coming-to-be is of necessity, there must be an "always" about its coming-to-be; for what must necessarily be, must at the same time always be, since what "must necessarily be" cannot "not-be"; hence, if a thing is "of necessity," it is eternal, and, if it is eternal, it is "of necessity"; if, therefore, the coming-to-be of a thing is "of necessity," it is eternal and, if it is eternal, it is "of necessity."

If, then, the coming-to-be of anything is absolutely necessary, it must be cyclical and return upon itself; for coming-to-be must either have a limit or not have a limit, and if it has not a limit, it must proceed either

ning of the series (i.e. would necessitate the earlier members); but the series is infinite and therefore has no beginning or end.
eis euthu 'he kúklw. toútwv d' eüper éstai aîdios, oûk eis euthu oìón te diá to µêdamos einai árkhìn µêr' án kátw, òs épi òtwv èsoémonwv, lamhánomen, µêr' ánw, òs épi òtwv ginooménon: ánágky d' einai 10 árkhìn, µ'h peperasmeýnhs ouûhs, kai aîdion einai. dio ánágky kúklw éinai. ántistrepfein òra ánágky éstai, oìón ei toði eì ánágkhs, kai to práteron òra: álìa µhì ei touòto, kai to ústeron ánágky gevésba. kai touòto åei dìh sunechós: oûðèn gàr touòto diaférëi légein diá dúo òis pollw. en tì 15 kúklw òra kivhþe kai gevëseid eòsti to eì ánágkhs áploìs: kai eìte kúklw, ánágky ékastov ginësba kai gevonënai, kai eì ánágky, ò toútwv gevësia kúklw.

Táûta mèn dìh eulôgos, épeti aîdios kai allìos éfánh ò kúklw kínhseis kai ò toû ouðanov, óti 338 a taûta eì ánágkhs ginëtai kai éstai, òsai táûths kivhþeis kai ósai diá táûthn: éi gàr to kúklw kínoomenov åeì ti kivèi, ánágky kai toûtwv kúklw einai thn kînhsin, oìón tìs ìnì òforá s ouûhs kú-kklw ò ãìlos1 òdi, épeti d' ouûtw, aì òræi diá touòto

1 kúklw ò ãìlos F, Bonitz.

a Rectilinear movement, proceeding ad infinitum, does 326
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 11

in a straight line or in a circle. But of these alternatives, if it is to be eternal, it cannot proceed in a straight line, because it can have no source, whether we take the members of the series downwards as future events or upwards as past events. But there must be a source of coming-to-be, though without coming-to-be itself being limited, and it must be eternal. Therefore, it must be a cyclical process. It will, therefore, have to return upon itself; for example, if a certain member of the series is necessary, then the one before it is also necessary, and further, if the latter is necessary, then the one which follows must necessarily come-to-be. And this goes on always continuously; for it makes no difference whether we speak of a sequence of two or many members of the series. Therefore, it is in cyclical movement and cyclical coming-to-be that absolute necessity is present, and if the process is cyclical, each member must necessarily come-to-be and have come-to-be, and, if this necessity exists, their coming-to-be is cyclical.

This conclusion is only reasonable, since cyclical movement, that is, the movement of the heavens, has been shown on other grounds to be eternal, because its own movements and the movements which it causes come-to-be of necessity and will continue to do so; for if that which moves in a cycle is continually seeking something else in motion, the movement of those things which it moves must also be cyclical. For example, since the upper revolution is cyclical, the sun moves in a particular way, and since this is so the seasons come-to-be in a cycle and not involve an \( \alpha \varphi \chi \eta \) from which coming-to-be might derive its necessity.

\[ b \text{ Phys. viii. 7-9.} \]
5 κύκλῳ γίνονται καὶ ἀνακάμπτουσιν, τούτων δ' οὕτω γινομένων πάλιν τα ὑπὸ τούτων.

Τῇ οὖν δὴ ποτε τὰ μὲν οὕτω φαίνεται, οἷον ὑδατά καὶ ἀὴρ κύκλῳ γυνόμενα, καὶ εἰ μὲν νέφος ἐσται, ὀὲι ὑσαι, καὶ εἰ ὑσει γε, ὀὲι καὶ νέφος εἶναι, ἀνθρωποί δὲ καὶ ξώα οὐκ ἀνακάμπτουσιν εἰς αὐτοὺς ὅστε πάλιν γίνεσθαι τὸν αὐτόν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη, εἰ δ' πατήρ ἐγένετο, σὲ γενέσθαι· ἀλλ' εἰ σὺ, ἐκεῖνον, εἰς ἐυθὺ δὲ ἐνοκεν εὐπαι αὐτὴ ἡ γένεσις); ἀρχῇ δὲ τῆς σκέψεως πάλιν αὐτή, πότερον ὁμοίως ἄπαντα ἀνακάμπτει ἡ οὕ, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἁρίθμῳ τὰ δὲ εἴδει μόνον. οὖσων μὲν οὖν ἀφθαρτὸς η οὐσία η κινομένη, φανερὸν ὦτι καὶ ἁρίθμῳ ταῦτα ἐσται (ἡ γὰρ κίνησις ἀκολούθει τῷ κινομένῳ), οὖσων δὲ μὴ ἀλλὰ φθαρτή, ἀνάγκη τῷ εἴδει, ἁρίθμῳ δὲ μὴ ἀνακάμπτει. διὸ ὑδρῷ ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ ἀὴρ ἐξ ὑδατὸς εἴδει ὁ αὐτός, οὖν ἁρίθμῳ. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἁρίθμῳ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὄν ἡ οὐσία γίνεται οὐσα τοιαύτη οία ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ εἶναι.

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\(\text{a}\) The sun moves in a circle in the ecliptic, and solar motion causes the cyclical changes of season, on which depend the vital periods of living things upon the earth.

\(\text{b}\) And not to be cyclical.

\(\text{c}\) In some cycles the same individual always recurs, in others successive individuals of the same species.

\(\text{d}\) As was the doctrine of Empedocles (cf. 315 a 4 ff.).
return upon themselves; and since they come-to-be in this manner, so do those things which they cause to come-to-be.\(^a\)

Why, then, is it that some things evidently come-to-be cyclically, for example rains and air, and if there is to be cloud, it must rain, and if it is to rain, there must also be a cloud, yet men and animals do not return upon themselves, so that the same creature comes-to-be a second time? For there is no necessity, because your father came-to-be, that you should come-to-be; but if you are to come-to-be, he must have done so; and in this case the course of coming-to-be seems to be in a straight line.\(^b\) The starting-point for the discussion of this problem is this, to ask the question again whether all things alike return upon themselves, or whether some things recur \emph{numerically} and others only specifically.\(^c\) Therefore, obviously, those things of which the substance (which is what is moved) is imperishable will be numerically the same; for the nature of the movement depends on that of the thing moved; but those things which are not of this kind but perishable must recur specifically and not numerically. Hence, when Water comes-to-be from Air or Air from Water, the Water or the Air is the same specifically but not numerically; and if these things also do seem numerically the same,\(^d\) yet this is not true of those things whose "substance" comes-to-be, when it is such that it is possible for it not to be.
PSEUDO-ARISTOTLE
DE MUNDO
INTRODUCTION

Analysis

The treatise opens with a short introductory chapter, commending to Alexander the study of "the cosmos and the greatest things in the cosmos," and continues with a description of the various parts of the cosmos, working from the region of the aether on the outside of the sphere to the earth at the centre. Chapter 2 describes the shape, the arrangement and the material of the heavens, and indicates very briefly the nature of the "fiery element" and the air that lie inside the outer sphere of aether. Chapter 3 describes the geography of the sea and the earth; the author naturally concentrates on the "inhabited world," though he maintains that there are other inhabited worlds also, beyond the seas. Chapter 4 is a very summary account of the "most notable phenomena in and about the inhabited world"; a section on meteorology, including an elaborate catalogue of winds, is followed by a description of the things that happen on or in the earth or sea—volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tidal waves, etc.

The last sentence of Chapter 4 introduces the main theme of the work: there are many changes in the sublunary world, but the system as a whole remains constant, and is subject neither to generation nor to
destruction. In Chapter 5 the language is heightened in what is virtually a hymn to the eternal cosmos. Chapters 6 and 7 tell of the cause that ensures its eternity—the god who rules everything with his all-pervading power. This god is described in Chapter 6 by means of a series of similes, which show how a remote and transcendent god can maintain the order and arrangement of the cosmos without personal intervention; Chapter 7 lists a number of names by which God is known and shows how they arise from various aspects of his function.

Philosophy and Religion

Before examining the problem of the authorship and date of the De Mundo, we must consider its purpose and its philosophical position. It is an open letter, written with the most careful attention to style and language, summarizing persuasively the results of a study of the cosmos. The open letter was a common form of literary expression, particularly for protreptic discourses; the outstanding examples are Isocrates’ Ad Nicoclem and Aristotle’s lost Protrepticus, addressed to Themison, the prince of Cyprus. The De Mundo shows many similarities to these protreptic addresses in style; but the author’s purpose, emphasized several times, is to provide a summary of his subject, and in this he approaches the pattern of Epicurus’s letters or the popular “Introductory” (ἐἰσαγωγαὶ) of the Hellenistic period.

The author’s attitude of mind is given in a word in the first chapter: “let us theologize (θεολογῶμεν) about all these things.” A.-J. Festugière has shown

\[ \text{a Le Dieu cosmique, pp. 341 ff.} \]
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how typical this is of that "koine spirituelle" which grew in the late Hellenistic age and flowered in the Roman Empire; nature is explored, not as the object of scientific enquiry, but as the expression of the cosmic deity, and the results are presented straightforwardly as dogma.

The theology and cosmology of the De Mundo is, in general, Peripatetic, but the author borrows his details from many schools. Parallel passages and possible sources have been analysed in great detail by W. Capelle, W. L. Lorimer and Joseph P. Maguire, and there is no need to repeat their analysis. Capelle traced many of the details to Posidonius, and this view was for many years generally accepted. Maguire, however, found no reason to believe that anything came from Posidonius except some of the meteorology, and showed that the closest parallels are in the Neo-Pythagorean writers; he established at least that we cannot attribute a doctrine to Posidonius simply because it occurs in the De Mundo, but it would be surprising if a work written after the time of Posidonius were not considerably influenced by him. The paramount difficulty is that the author was an eclectic, living in an age when eclecticism was the fashion and there was a great deal of common ground between different schools; it is therefore sometimes impossible to say which authors, or even which schools, were chosen as sources.

The scientific chapters of the De Mundo are typical of many "introductions" and summaries, and very likely are themselves derived from similar elementary handbooks rather than from the detailed expositions of original authors. The doctrine of the cosmic deity,

* See Bibliographical Note, below.
which is the climax of the book, developed gradually in the history of Greek religion. Its chief exponents were the Stoics, and no doubt the *De Mundo* is influenced by Stoic religious thought. But the author rejects an important part of the Stoic doctrine: his god is not immanent in the world, interpenetrating all things, but remote, unmoved and impassive. He maintains the order of the cosmos by means of an undefined "power," which relieves him of the dishonourable necessity of personal intervention.

Clearly we have here a development, however remote, of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. At first sight the god of the *De Mundo* seems far removed from the god of *Physics* viii and *Metaphysics* \( \Lambda \), who is inferred as the necessary result of a theory of motion, whose only activity is thought which has itself as its object, and who moves "as the object of love." Aristotle himself, however, seems to have spoken with a rather different voice in his published works. In the *De Philosophia* he said that the orderly movement of the heavenly bodies was one of the reasons for man's belief in gods. Cicero reports an elaborate passage from Aristotle to this effect\(^a\): suppose there were men who had lived all their lives in caves under the earth and were then released; "when they saw, suddenly, the earth and seas and sky, when they learnt the vastness of the clouds and the force of the winds, when they beheld the sun and learnt its great size and beauty and the efficacy of its work, that it spreads its light over all the sky and makes day, and when night darkened the lands and then they saw the whole sky adorned with a pattern of stars, and the changes in the moon's light

\(^a\) Cic. *De Nat. Deor.* ii. 37 = Arist. fr. 12 Rose.
as it waxes and wanes, and the rising and setting of them all, and their courses planned and immutable for all eternity—when they saw this, they would think at once that there are gods and that these mighty works are the works of gods." This is close to the spirit of the De Mundo.

In one other important respect the author sides with the Peripatetics and Neo-Pythagoreans against the Stoics. Most of the Stoics believed that the element of fire was more powerful than the other elements, and that it periodically enveloped the cosmos in a universal conflagration (ἐκπυρωσίς). Pseudo-Aristotle is emphatic in his rejection of this doctrine: the elements are equally balanced and there is no universal conflagration, nor any other kind of cosmic destruction. The eternity of the cosmos was maintained by Aristotle in the lost De Philosophia, and in the De Caelo. In Hellenistic times it was believed by the Stoic Panaetius, but his successor Posidonius apparently reverted again to ἐκπυρωσίς. There are two Hellenistic treatises extant which argue that the cosmos is eternal—De Universi Natura, falsely attributed to the Pythagorean Ocellus of Lucania, and Philo (or Pseudo-Philo), De Aeternitate Mundi.

Author and Date

It is almost universally agreed that this treatise is not a genuine work of Aristotle. The style and various details of doctrine all make it unthinkable that it was written either by Aristotle himself or during his lifetime; but no such certainty is possible about the identity of the author or the date of composition.

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a Cf. fr. 22 Rose.  
b Bk. I. 10-12.
The first problem to be decided is whether the treatise was attributed to Aristotle by the author or by someone else. The probability is that it was a deliberate forgery. Attempts have been made to show that the Alexander to whom the work is addressed is someone other than Alexander the Great: but it is difficult to find another Alexander who might be called "the best of princes." Probably the author followed the example of an earlier forger, the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, in the hope that his work might be taken as a respectful tribute from the master to his most famous pupil.

The late Hellenistic author Demetrius says that Aristotle's letters to Alexander were more like treatises (συγγραμματα) than real letters. A man called Artemon, who is mentioned by Demetrius, arranged the letters then supposed to be by Aristotle into eight books. We can conclude from this that at the time of Demetrius, who was roughly contemporary with Pseudo-Aristotle, there was in circulation a collection of Aristotle's letters, which included letters to Alexander which were in the form of "treatises." It would seem therefore that the author of the *De Mundo* had ample precedent for the form of his work, whether the *De Mundo* was known to Demetrius or not.

The habit of attributing one's writings to an older and greater author in the same tradition was par-
ticularly common among the Pythagoreans of the Hellenistic age; the author of the *De Mundo* owes much to these Neo-Pythagoreans, and he certainly reproduces enough genuinely Aristotelian thought to make it reasonable that he should wish to usurp Aristotle's name.

This is an important point. Those who have proved that the work is a forgery have sometimes overlooked that it is a forgery of *Aristotle*, and that in this fact we might find a little help in dating the treatise. For if the author is imitating Aristotle at all, it is surely the Aristotle of the *Protrepticus* and *De Philosophia*, the Aristotle whose "flumen orationis aureum" was praised by Cicero,\(^a\) rather than the Aristotle of the school-treatises which survive to-day. The school-treatises were either lost or disregarded after the death of Theophrastus, and did not begin to occupy the attention of the learned world again until the appearance of Andronicus's edition in the late first century B.C.\(^b\)

These considerations will be variously interpreted. Those who believe that knowledge of Aristotle's work was absolutely confined to the published writings until Andronicus's edition, will say that the author of the *De Mundo* shows knowledge of doctrines (e.g. of the Unmoved Mover, if this was not contained in the *De Philosophia*, and various meteorological details) which were known only after Andronicus. But it is likely that much of Aristotle's doctrine was known throughout the period, at least in his own school,

\(^a\) *Acad. Pr.* ii. 38. 119.

\(^b\) The date usually given for this is c. 40 B.C. I. Düring (Notes on the History of the Transmission of Aristotle's Writings, Göteborg, 1950) thinks this is the earliest possible date, and would prefer 40–20 B.C.
even though it did not appear in the published works. I am inclined to believe that the author of the *De Mundo* could have known all the Aristotelian matter that he reproduces *before* the publication of Andronicus’s edition, and that the style and manner of the work indicate a date before this edition made Aristotle’s school-treatises more widely known.

Other evidence for the date is confused and difficult. It is certain that Apuleius *De Mundo* is a translation of the Greek, but it is not quite certain that this is genuinely by Apuleius. If it is, we have a *terminus ante quem* of c. A.D. 140. The work seems to have been known to Maximus of Tyre and must therefore be before A.D. 180–190. From other reports, references and imitations in later authors nothing firmer than this can be deduced.

To reach a *terminus post quem* by an analysis of the sources is equally difficult, since it is usually hard to say who was the first to express a particular doctrine. Nevertheless some of the meteorology appears to depend on Posidonius and his pupil Asclepiodotus, and we might therefore give c. 50 B.C. as the *terminus*. There is no agreement about the date of the Neo-Pythagorean sources. Attempts have been made to argue from the silence of Cicero, Seneca and Pliny, but arguments from silence do not carry much weight.

The date has been given by various scholars as follows: Zeller, 1st cent. A.D.; Diels, in the reign of Augustus; Wilamowitz, in the Julio-Claudian dynasty; Capelle, the first half of the 2nd cent. A.D.; Lorimer, probably A.D. 40–140; Maguire and Festugièrè, the first few decades of the 1st cent. A.D. In my view there is some slight reason for saying that
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it was written before or not long after Andronicus’s edition, and virtually no reason for choosing any other time within the limits already mentioned.

Bibliographical Note

The editio princeps (1497) was based on a single ms., and this remained the common text until Bekker added the results of collation of four more mss. in the Berlin Aristotle (1831). Parts of the treatise were edited by Wilamowitz and Wendland and printed in Wilamowitz’s Griechisches Lesebuch, Text II (1906), pp. 188-199.

W. L. Lorimer took into account the readings of over seventy mss., the quotations in Stobaeus and others, the Latin version of Apuleius, the Armenian and Syriac versions, and two mediaeval Latin versions. He published his results in three books: The Text Tradition of Ps.-Aristotle “De Mundo” (St. Andrews University Publications, xviii, 1924); Some Notes on the Text of Ps.-Aristotle “De Mundo” (St. Andrews University Publications, xxi, 1925); and Aristotelis De Mundo (Paris, 1933). The last of these contains the Greek text with a very detailed apparatus criticus and a German translation by E. König of the Syriac version (chaps. v-vii only).


The important article by Hans Strohm, “Studien

a Prof. E. H. Warmington has pointed out to me that the geography of ch. 3 confirms an early date.
[ARISTOTLE]

zur Schrift von der Welt,” *Mus. Helv.* ix (1952), pp. 137-175, did not reach me until this book was in proof. Strohm agrees with me in minimizing the influence of Posidonius and in marking the connexions with early Aristotle.


I am indebted to all these, and particularly (as all students of the *De Mundo* must be) to W. L. Lorimer.

**TEXT**

The text is based on Bekker’s edition in the Berlin *Aristotle*; I have indicated deviations from Bekker, except those that seem trivial.

The four mss. used by Bekker are designated as follows:

- O = Vat. 316.
- P = Vat. 1339.
- Q = Marc. 200.
- R = Paris. 1102.

Where necessary I have added references to mss. collated by Lorimer, as follows:

- B = Hieros. Patr. 108.
- C = Laur. 87, 14.
- D = Paris. 1302.
- E = Vat. Urbin. 125.
- F = Laur. 87, 16.
- G = Vat. 1025.
- W = Paris. 1038.

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Nearly all the deviations from Bekker follow Lorimer; to avoid complicating the notes unduly, where I have followed Lorimer against Bekker and the mss. are fairly equally divided, I have used the abbreviations “Bekk.” and “Lor.” without listing the mss. “Lor. (Notes)” refers to the second and “Lor. (De Mundo)” to the third of Lorimer’s works cited in the Bibliographical Note above.

I wish to record my indebtedness to Professor T. B. L. Webster for reading my work in typescript; I am very grateful for his criticisms and suggestions.

D. J. F.
1. Πολλάκις μὲν ἐμοιγε θείον τι καὶ δαμόνιον ὄντως χρήμα, ὥ 'Αλέξανδρε, ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔδοξεν εἶναι, μάλιστα δὲ ἐν οἷς μόνῃ διαραμένη πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὀλων θέαν ἐσπούδασε γνώναι τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταύτης ἀποστάντων διά τὸ ύψος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, αὕτη τὸ πράγμα οὐκ ἐδεισεν οὐδ' αὐτὴν τῶν καλλίστων ἀπηξίωσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγγενεστάτην ἑαυτῇ καὶ μάλιστα πρέπουσαν ἐνόμισεν εἶναι τὴν ἐκείνων μάθησιν. ἔπειδὴ γὰρ οἷς οἶνον τῇ τῶ σῶματι εἰς τὸν οὐράνιον ἀφικέσθαι τόπον καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐκλιπόντα τὸν οὐρά-

10 νον ἐκείνων χώρον κατοπτεῦσαι, καθάπερ οἱ ἀνόητοι ποτὲ ἐπενόουν Ἄλωάδαι, ἡ γοῦν ψυχὴ διὰ φιλοσοφίας, λαβοῦσα ἡγεμόνα τῶν νοῦν, ἐπεραιώθη καὶ ἐξεδήμησεν, ἀκοπιάτον τινα ὁδὸν εὑροῦσα, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων ἀφεστώτα τοῖς τόποις τῇ διανοιᾷ συνεφρόνησε, ῥαδίως, οἷμαι, τὰ συγγενῆ γνωρίσασα, καὶ θείως ψυχῆς ὄρματι τὰ θεῖα κατα-

— See Introduction, p. 338.
ARISTOTLE
ON THE COSMOS

1. I have often thought, Alexander, that philosophy is a divine and really god-like activity, particularly in those instances when it alone has exalted itself to the contemplation of the universe and sought to discover the truth that is in it; the other sciences shunned this field of inquiry because of its sublimity and extensiveness; philosophy has not feared the task or thought itself unworthy of the noblest things, but has judged that the study of these is by nature most closely related to it and most fitting. It was not possible by means of the body to reach the heavenly region or to leave the earth and explore that heavenly place, in the manner once attempted by the foolish Alcaudae: so the soul, by means of philosophy, taking the mind as its guide, has crossed the frontier, and made the journey out of its own land by a path that does not tire the traveller. It has embraced in thought the things that are most widely separated from each other in place; for it had no difficulty, I think, in recognizing things that were related to it, and with “the soul’s divine eye” it

b Otus and Ephialtes, the mythical Giants, who tried to reach heaven by piling Pelion on Ossa.

c Probably a quotation: cf. the eye of the soul in Plato, Rep. 533 d.
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λαβοῦσα, τοίς τε ἀνθρώπων προφητεύουσα. τούτο
dὲ ἔπαθε, καθ’ ὅσον οἶδον τε ἢν, πάσιν ἀφθόνως
μεταδόθην ψυχὴ τῶν παρ’ αὐτῇ τιμῶν. διὸ
καὶ τοὺς μετὰ σπουδῆς διαγράφαντας ἦμιν ἐνὸς
tόπου φύσιν ἡ μᾶς σχῆμα πόλεως ἡ ποταμοῦ μέγε-
θος ὡς κάλλος, οἶδα τινὲς ἡδὴ πεποιηκασί, ἐπὶ
φράζοντες οἱ μὲν τὴν Ὁσσαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν Νύσσαν,1
οἱ δὲ τὸ Κωρύκιον ἄντρον, οἱ δὲ οἴκοι ἐτύχε τῶν
ἔπι μέρους, οἰκτίσσειν ἂν τις τῆς μυκροψυχής, τὰ
tυχόντα ἐκπεπληγμένους καὶ μέγα φρονοῦντας ἐπὶ
25 θεωρία μικρά. τούτο δὲ πάσχουσι διὰ τὸ ἀθέατοι
tῶν κρειττόνων εἶναι, κόσμου λέγω καὶ τῶν ἐν
cόσμῳ μεγίστων. οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἂν τούτοις γνη-
391 b σῶς ἐπιστήσαντες ἑθανόμαζον τι τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ
πάντα αὐτοῖς τὰ ἄλλα μικρὰ κατεφαίνετο ἃν καὶ
οὐδενὸς ἄξια πρὸς τὴν τούτων ὑπεροχὴν.
Лέγωμεν δὴ ἡ ἡμείς καὶ, καθ’ ὅσον ἐφικτόν,
θεολογῶμεν περὶ τούτων συμπάντων, ὡς ἐκαστὸν
5 ἐχει φύσεως καὶ θέσεως καὶ κινήσεως. πρέπειν δέ
γε οἶμαι καὶ σοί, ὅτι ἡγεμόνων αἵρετω, τὴν τῶν
μεγίστων ἱστορίαν μετίεναι, φιλοσοφία τε μηδὲν
μικρὸν ἐπινοεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοιούτοις δώροις δεξι-
οῦσθαι τοὺς ἀρίστους.

2. Κόσμος μὲν οὖν ἐστι σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ
10 γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις περιεχόμενων φύσεων.
λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἐτέρως κόσμος ἡ τῶν ὀλων τάξις τε
καὶ διακόσμησις, ὑπὸ θεοῦ2 τε καὶ διὰ θεοῦ3 φυλατ-

1 Νύσσαν Lor.: Νύσσαν Bekk.
3 θεόν codd. Lor.: θεῶν codd. al. Stob. Bekk.

a Cf. Pausanias x. 32. 2.
b Cf. Introduction, p. 334.

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grasped things divine, and interpreted them for mankind. This came about because it wished to impart to all unsparingly, as far as possible, a share of its own privileges. So those who have earnestly described to us the nature of a single place, or the plan of a single city, or the size of a river, or the beauty of a mountain, as some have done before now—some of them tell us of Ossa, some of Nyssa, others of the Corycian cave, or whatever other detail it happens to be—all these might well be pitied for their meanness of spirit, since they are overawed by commonplaces and pride themselves on insignificant observations. The reason is that they are blind to the nobler things—I mean the cosmos and the greatest features of the cosmos. For if they once genuinely gave their attention to these things, they would never wonder at any other; everything else would appear small and worthless to them, in comparison with the matchless superiority of these.

Let us, then, take up the subject, and so far as they are attainable let us theologize about all the greatest features of the cosmos, discussing the nature, position and motion of each. It is right, I think, that even you, the best of princes, should undertake the study of the greatest things, and that philosophy should have no humble intentions, but should greet the most excellent men with worthy gifts.

2. *Cosmos*, then, means a system composed of heaven and earth and the elements contained in them. In another sense, *cosmos* is used to signify the orderly arrangement of the universe, which is preserved by God and through God. The centre of

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tομένη. ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν μέσον, ἀκίνητον τε καὶ ἔδραϊν ὄν, ἡ φερέσθιος εἶληχε γῆ, παντοδαπῶν ζῴων ἐστία τε οὗσα καὶ μήτηρ. τὸ δὲ ὑπέρθεν 15 αὐτῆς, πᾶν τε καὶ πάντη πεπερατωμένον εἰς τὸ ἀνωτάτω, θεῶν οὐκηθήριον, οὐρανὸς ὁνόμασται. πλήρης δὲ ὁν σωμάτων θείων, ἀ δὴ καλεῖν ἄστρα εἰσόθαμεν, κινούμενοι κίνησιν ἀίδιον, μιᾷ περιαγωγῇ καὶ κύκλῳ συναναχορεύει πᾶσι τούτοις ἀπαύστως δι’ αἰῶνος. τοῦ δὲ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ 20 κόσμου σφαιροειδοῦς ὄντος καὶ κινούμενου, καθ-άπερ εἶπον, ἐνδελεχῶς, δύο ἀκίνητα ἕς ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ σημεία, καταντικρὺ ἄλληλων, καθάπερ τῆς ἐν τὸρνω κυκλοφορουμένης σφαίρας, στερεᾷ μένοντα καὶ συνέχοντα τῇ σφαίραν, περὶ δὲ ὅ πᾶς ὅγκος 25 κύκλῳ στρέφεται· καλοῦνται δὲ οὕτως πόλοι· δι’ ὅν εἰ νοῦσαμεν ἐπεζευγμένην εὐθέιαν, ἣν τινες 392 a ἄξονα καλοῦσι, διάμετρος ἐστι τοῦ κόσμου, μέσον² μὲν ἔχουσα τὴν γῆν, τοὺς δὲ δύο πόλους πέρατα. τῶν δὲ ἀκινήτων πόλων τούτων ὁ μὲν ἀεὶ φανέρος ἐστιν ὑπὲρ κορυφῆν ὃν κατὰ τὸ βόρειον κλίμα, ἀρκτικὸς καλούμενος, ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ γῆν ἀεὶ κατακέ-5 κρυπται, κατὰ τὸ νότιον, ἀνταρκτικὸς καλούμενος.

Οὐρανοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄστρων οὐσίαν μὲν αἰθέρα καλοῦ-

¹ eis codd. Lor.: ἂς P Bekk.
² πᾶς ὅγκος κύκλῳ στρέφεται Stob. Lor.: πᾶς κόσμος κινεῖται. ὁ μὲν οὖν κόσμος ἐν κύκλῳ περιστρέφεται codd. Bekk.

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the cosmos, which is unmoved and fixed, is occupied by "life-bearing earth," a the home and mother of living beings of all kinds. The region above it, a single whole with a finite upper limit everywhere, the dwelling of the gods, is called heaven. It is full of divine bodies which we call stars; it moves eternally, and revolves in solemn choral dance b with all the stars in the same circular orbit unceasingly for all time. The whole of the heaven, the whole cosmos, c is spherical, and moves continuously, as I have said; but there are necessarily two points which are unmov ed, opposite one another, just as in the case of a ball being turned in a lathe; they remain fixed, holding the sphere in position, and the whole mass revolves in a circle round them; these points are called poles. If we think of a straight line joining these two together (some call this the axis), it will be a diameter of the cosmos, having the earth at its centre and the two poles at its extremities. One of these two stationary poles is always visible, above our heads in the North: it is called the Arctic d pole. The other is always hidden under the earth, in the South: it is called the Antarctic pole.

The substance of the heaven and the stars we call

a Cf. Hesiod, Theog. 693.
b Ps.-Aristotle seems to recall Euripides, Ion 1079 ὅτε καὶ Διὸς ἀστερωπὸς ἀνεχόρευσεν αἰθήρ, χορεύει δὲ σελάνα. Cf. also Soph. Ant. 1146 f. He develops the same image below, 399 a 14.
c Ps.-Aristotle here uses κόσμος in a third sense, as a synonym for οὐρανός. This sense is quite common from Plato onwards.
d The terms Arctic and Antarctic do not appear in extant literature before Hipparchus (2nd cent. B.C.).

3 μέσον TWZ L.or.: μέσην codd. cet. Bekk.
μεν, οὐχ, ὡς τινὲς, διὰ τὸ πυρῶδη οὖσαν αἴθεσθαι, πλημμελοῦντες περὶ τὴν πλεῖστον πυρὸς ἀπηλλαγμένην δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἂν ἰθεῖν κυκλοφορομένην, στοιχεῖον οὖσαν ἔτερον τῶν τεττάρων, ἀκήρατον τε καὶ θείον. τῶν γε μὴν ἐμπεριεχομένων ἀστρων τὰ μὲν ἀπλανὴ τῷ σύμπαντι οὐρανῷ συμπεριστρέφεται, τὰς αὐτὰς ἔχοντα ἔδρας, ὥν μέσος ὁ ζωοφόρος καλούμενος κύκλος ἐγκάρσιος διὰ τῶν τροπικῶν διέξωσται, κατὰ μέρος διηρημένος εἰς δώδεκα ξωδίων χῶρας, τὰ δὲ, πλανητὰ οὖντα, οὔτε τοῖς προτέροις ὁμοταχῶς κινεῖσθαι πέφυκεν οὗτε ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐτέροις καὶ ἐτέροις κύκλοις, ὡστε αὐτῶν τὸ¹ μὲν προσγειότερον εἶναι, τὸ¹ δὲ ἀνώτερον. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀπλανῶν πλῆθος ἔστων ἀνεξεύρετον ἀνθρώποις, καὶ περ ἐπὶ μᾶς κινουμένων ἐπιφανείας τῆς τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ· τὸ δὲ τῶν πλανήτων, εἰς ἐπτὰ μέρη κεφαλαίουμενον, ἐν τοσοῦτοι ἔστι κύκλοις ἐφεξῆς κειμένοις, ὡστε ἂεὶ τὸν ἀνωτέρω μείζω τοῦ ὑποκάτω εἶναι, τοὺς τε ἐπτὰ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐμπεριεχομένοις, πάντας γε μὴν ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἀπλανῶν ὑφαίρας περιειλήφθαι. συνεχῇ δὲ εἶχεν ἂεὶ τὴν θέσιν ταύτην ὁ τοῦ Φαῖνοντος ἀμα καὶ Κρόνου καὶ Δίος λεγόμενος, εἰθ’ ὁ Πυρόεις, Ἦρακλέους τε καὶ Ἀρεος προσαγορεύμενος, ἔξης δὲ ὁ Στίλβων, ὃν ἱερὸν Ἐρμοῦ καλοῦσιν ἐνιοῦ, τινὲς δὲ

1 τὸ . . . τὸ Lor.: τῶν . . . τῶν Bekk.
2 καὶ Lor.: ὁ καὶ BD: om. cett.

* The author follows Aristotle in making aether a fifth

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*aether,* not, as some think, because it is fiery in nature and so burns (they fall into error about its function, which is quite different from that of fire), but because it always moves in its circular orbit; it is an element different from the four elements, pure and divine. Now, of the stars which are encompassed in it, some are fixed and move in concert with the whole heaven always keeping the same position in it; in the middle of these the circle of the zodiac, as it is called, set obliquely through the tropics, passes round like a girdle, divided into the twelve regions of the zodiac. The others, the planets, move, according to their nature, at speeds different from the fixed stars and from each other, each in a different circle, in such a way that one is nearer the earth, another higher in the heavens. The number of the fixed stars is not to be known by men, although they all move on one visible surface, namely that of the whole heaven: but the class of planets contains seven units, arranged in the same number of circles in a series, so that the higher is always greater than the lower, and all the seven, though contained one within another, are nevertheless encompassed by the sphere of the fixed stars. The circle which is always in the position next to this sphere is that which is called the circle of Phaenon (the Bright one) or Cronus (Saturn); then comes the circle of Phaëthon (the Shiner) or Zeus (Jupiter); next Pyroeis (the Fiery one), named after Heracles or Ares (Mars); next Stilbon (the Glittering one) which some dedicate to Hermes (Mercury), some element: the Stoics identified it with fire. He rejects the derivation of the word from αἴθεσθαι (to burn) and relates it to ἀεί θεῖν (move always), as Plato and Aristotle did (cf. Plato, Crat. 410 b, Aristot. De Caelo 270 b 22).

* Earth, air, fire and water.
This is the “Pythagorean” order of the planets, adopted by Aristotle, Eudoxus, Eratosthenes, and probably the early Stoics. The other order commonly given by ancient writers, the “Chaldean,” puts Venus and Mercury below the sun; this order was adopted by Panaetius, and probably also by
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to Apollo; after this is the circle of Phosphorus (the Light-bearer), which some call after Aphroditê (Venus) and others after Hera; then the circle of the sun; and the last, the circle of the moon, is bounded by the terrestrial sphere. The aether, then, contains the divine bodies and their ordered orbits.

After the aetherial and divine element, which is arranged in a fixed order, as we have declared, and is also unchangeable, unalterable and impassive, there comes next the element that is through the whole of its extent liable to change and alteration, and is, in short, destructible and perishable. The first part of this is the fine and fiery substance that is set aflame by the aether because of the latter’s great size and the swiftness of its motion. In this fiery and disorderly element, as it is called, meteors and flames shoot across, and often planks and pits and comets, as they are called, stand motionless and then expire.

Next under this is spread the air, opaque and icy by nature, but when it is brightened and heated by movement, it becomes bright and warm. In the air, which itself also has the power to change, and alters in every kind of way, clouds are formed and rain falls in torrents; there is snow, frost and hail, and gales and whirlwinds; thunder and lightning,

Posidonius. Lorimer writes (Notes, p. 51) that there were few upholders of the “Pythagorean” order after 200 B.C., though it appears in an unknown astronomer in Rhodes of about 100 B.C. (I.G.Ins. i. 913).

\(\gamma\eta\) here must refer to the whole “sublunary” sphere, not to the earth proper.

This is inconsistent with 395 a 29 ff. where these phenomena are put in the air.

The coldness of the air is a Stoic doctrine; Aristotle said it was warm and capable of being inflamed by motion (Meteor. 341 a 18).
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अस्त्रापाय वा प्रवेदिके करान्वह मुर्वन्व से गन्धव सुमपहगादी。

3. एविः देठ अरियो फृसेव्य गर्ह कालाासामान्येन्द्राय वर्तमानाय। फुतोव्स ब्र्वूस्वा काल ज्ञानीय ते ते पोतामोस, तों में अन्न गीव्य एल्टेम्बोन्स, तों देश अन्त्युण्यमेन्यू ईस भालासान्य। पेपोकिल्तै दे काल चलाओं मुर्वन्वा औरेस्तै दे उष्ठिलोक्य वा बाधूव्युलोक्य द्रुम्मोस्त काल पोलेसिन, अ तो सोफोन ज्ञान, अ अन्ध्रवपोस, इद्रूखात्याय, नेश्यूस ते एवलायोस वा ह्पेरियूस। त्यां में अन्य ओकुमेन्यू अ पोल्य लोकोस ईस ते नेश्यूस वा ह्पेरियूस दीव्ये, आन्वो ओ काल ह्युष्मासा मा नेश्यों देस्तिन, अपो त्यां 'अलाविकी तकुमेन्य थालास्सिस पेरुप्रेमेन्य। पोल्यास देश काल एक्स कोस त्योदे अन्त्युण्यमेन्यू आपवेन्या देस्तीर्याय, तां में मेश ज्ञान्याय, तास देश एलाप्तौस, अमिन देश पासस प्लेन त्योदे आरात्यूस। अपर गार ओ पर्य ह्यमन नेश्यूर प्रोस ताती ता पेलाग्य पेपोन्यास, तोतो असे ह्युष्मासी प्रोस त्यां 'अलाविकी थालास्सान पोलाइ ते एटेरिय प्रोस सुम्प्सान त्यां थालास्सान काल गार अन्यामु मेगालाम तिन्यो ईसी नेश्यू मेगालाम पेरिक्लु-जोमेवा चलागेसेन। देश सुम्प्सान त्यो उग्रो फुसी एपिपोल्योस्साक, कातात तिनां त्यां गीव स्पिल्यूस तास कलुमेनास एवास्फायकुवितै ओकुमेन्यू एविः अन ईव्य त्यां अरियो मालिस्ता फृसेव्य। मेतादे ताती एन तों बुदोय कातात तो मेसाइटासन तो जिम्मु सुन्येरीमेन्य गी पासा काल पेपीस्मेन्य सुन्येरीरोज-35 केन, अकिंतोस काल एसालन्योस्त काल तूटे एस्ती तोय

1 एवाप्याकुवितै व्यनी। Usener Lor.: एवाप्याकुवितै codd. Bekk.

4 Aristotle apparently thought nothing but sea lay from Gibraltar westwards to India (Meteor. 362 b 28). Strabo (i. 4. 6 = 65 e) notices the possibility of other inhabited worlds in his discussion of Eratosthenes.

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too, and falling thunderbolts, and the clash of innumerable storm-clouds.

3. Next to the element of air comes the fixed mass of earth and sea, full of plants and animals, and streams and rivers, some winding about the surface of the earth, others discharging themselves into the sea. This region is adorned with innumerable green plants, high mountains, deep-shaded woodland, and cities established by the wise creature, man; and with islands in the sea, and continents. The inhabited world is divided by the usual account into islands and continents, since it is not recognized that the whole of it is really one island, surrounded by the sea which is called Atlantic. Far away from this one, on the opposite side of the intervening seas, there are probably many other inhabited worlds, some greater than this, some smaller, though none is visible to us except this one; for the islands we know stand in the same relation to our seas as the whole inhabited world to the Atlantic Ocean, and many other inhabited worlds to the whole ocean; for these are great islands washed round by great seas. The whole mass of the wet element lies on the surface of the earth, allowing the so-called inhabited worlds to show through where there are projections of the earth; it is this element that would properly be next in order to the air. After this, set in the depths at the centre of the cosmos, densely packed and compressed, is the whole mass of the earth, unmoved and unshaken. And this is the whole of that part of the

Taking μάλιστα with the verb; it is probably postponed for rhythmic effect. The meaning is that water is in theory next to air, but earth sometimes protrudes through the water. οὐλοὺς (properly "stains" or "marks") in the previous line seems to be used in the sense of οὐλάδας ("projections").
κόσμου τὸ πᾶν ὁ καλοῦμεν κάτω. πέντε δὴ στοι-
χείᾳ ταῦτα ἐν πέντε χώραις σφαιρικῶς ἐγκείμενα,
περιεχομένης ἀεὶ τῆς ἐλάττονος τῇ μείζονι—λέγω
δὲ γῆς μὲν ἐν 'ὕδατι, 'ὕδατος δὲ ἐν ἀέρι, ἀέρος δὲ
ἐν πυρὶ, πυρὸς δὲ ἐν αἰθέρι—τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συν-
estήσατο, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄνω πᾶν θεῶν ἀπεδείξεν
5 οίκητήριον, τὸ κάτω δὲ ἐφημέρων ζῷων. αὐτοῦ
γε μὴν τοῦτο τὸ μὲν ὕγρον ἑστὶν, ὁ καλεῖν ποτα-
μοῦς καὶ νάματα καὶ θαλάσσας εἰθόμεθα, τὸ δὲ
ἐξηρόν, ὁ γῆν τε καὶ ἡπείρους καὶ νῆσους ὕμνο-
ζομεν.
Τῶν δὲ νήσων αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν μεγάλαι, καθάπερ ἡ
10 σύμπασα ἢδε οἰκουμένη λέγεται πολλαί τε ἐτεραί
μεγάλοις περιρρέομεναι πελάγεσιν, αἱ δὲ ἐλάττους,
φανερὰ τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἐντὸς οὔσαι. καὶ τούτων αἱ
μὲν ἀξιόλογοι, Σικελία καὶ Σαρδῶ καὶ Κύρνος
Κρήτη τε καὶ Εὔβοια καὶ Κύπρος καὶ Λέσβος, αἱ
15 δὲ ὑποδεστεραῖ, ὃν αἱ μὲν Σποράδες, αἱ δὲ Κυ-
κλάδες, αἱ δὲ ἄλλοις ὑμνομάζονται.
Πέλαγος δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔξω τῆς οἰκουμένης Ἀτλαν-
tικὸν τε καὶ Ὀκεανὸς καλεῖται, περιρρέων ἡμᾶς.
ἐν δὲ τῷ πρὸς δύσεις στενοπόρῳ διανεωγὸς
1  στόματι, κατὰ τάς Ἡρακλείους λεγομένας στῆλας
20 τὸν εἴσρουν εἰς τὴν ἔσω θάλασσαν ὅσ ἐν εἰς λιμένα
ποιεῖται, κατὰ μικρὸν δὲ ἐπιπλατυνόμενος ἀνα-
χεῖται, μεγάλους περιλαμβάνων κόλπους ἀλλήλους
συναφεῖς, πῆ μὲν κατὰ στενοπόρους αὐχένας ἀν-
εστομωμένοις, πῆ δὲ πάλιν πλατυνόμενος. πρῶτον
μὲν οὖν λέγεται ἑγκεκολπώσθαι ἐν δεξιᾷ εἰσπλέοντι
25 τάς Ἡρακλείους στῆλας, διότι, εἰς τὰς καλο-
μένας Σύρτεις, ὅν τὴν μὲν Μεγάλην, τὴν δὲ Μικρᾶν,
καλοῦσιν· ἐπὶ θάτερα δὲ οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἀποκολποῦ-
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cosmos that we call the lower part. So these five elements, occupying five spherical regions, the larger sphere always embracing the smaller—earth in water, water in air, air in fire, fire in aether—make up the whole cosmos; the upper part as a whole is distinguished as the abode of the gods, and the lower part as that of mortal creatures. Of the latter, some is wet, and this part we call rivers and springs and seas; the rest is dry, and this part we name land and continents and islands.

There are various kinds of island: some are large, like this whole inhabited world of ours, as I have said, and many others which are surrounded by great oceans; others are smaller, visible to us and within the Mediterranean. Some of these are quite considerable—Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Crete, Euboea, Cyprus and Lesbos; some are smaller, like the Sporades, the Cyclades, and others with various names.

The ocean that is outside the inhabited world is called the Atlantic, or Ocean, and surrounds us. To the West of the inhabited world, this ocean makes a passage through a narrow strait called the Pillars of Heracles, and so makes an entry into the interior sea, as if into a harbour; gradually it broadens and spreads out, embracing large bays joined up to each other, here contracting into narrow necks of water, there broadening out again. They say that the first of these bays that the sea forms, to starboard, if you sail in through the Pillars of Heracles, are two, called the Syrtes, of which one is called the Major, the other the Minor; on the other side it does not form gulfs

1 διανεωγώς L. Ὑ. : διανεωγώς Bekk.
The Ocean makes three separate incursions into the inhabited world—the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Caspian (see n. c below). Festugière (op. cit. p. 465) thinks these Eastern seas are spoken of as prolongations of the Mediterranean; but πάλιν εἰσρέων here is parallel to τὸν εἰσσαφήν... ποιεῖται at 393 a 19.

Are these two gulfs or one? If two, they are respectively the Gulf of Cutch (or the Gulf of Cambay) and the Persian Gulf; if one, probably the Persian Gulf is meant. The Greek could be interpreted either way.

By Έρυθρά (red) the author probably means what was...
ON THE COSMOS, 3

at first in the same way, but makes three seas, the Sardinian, Galatian and Adriatic; next to these, and across the line of them, is the Sicilian sea; after this, the Cretan; and continuing this on one side are the Egyptian and Pamphylian and Syrian seas, on the other the Aegean and Myrtoan. Lying opposite these that I have described, in another direction, is the Pontus, and this has very many parts: the innermost part is called Maeotis, and the outermost part, towards the Hellespont, is joined by a strait to the sea called Propontis.

In the East, the Ocean again penetrates (the inhabited world)\(^a\); it opens out the gulf of India and Persia\(^b\) and without a break reveals the Red Sea,\(^c\) embracing these as parts of itself. Towards the other promontory (of Asia),\(^d\) passing through a long narrow strait and then broadening out again, it makes the Hyrcanian or Caspian sea\(^e\); beyond this, it occupies a deep hollow beyond Lake Maeotis. Then little by little, beyond the land of the Scythians and Celts, it confines the inhabited world as it passes towards the Galatian Gulf and the Pillars of Heracles, already described, on the farther side of which the Ocean generally called the Erythraean Sea, which might include our Red Sea (called the Arabian Gulf at 393 b 28).

\(^d\) Lorimer (Notes, p. 80, n. 3) quotes Mela i. 2 (9) to confirm this interpretation. In Mela, the two promontories are the land between the Nile and the Red Sea, and that between the Tanaïs and the Caspian.

\(^e\) Or “bounding the Hyrcanian and Caspian country” (Forster). But \(\theta\lambda\alpha\lambda\alpha\sigma\sigma\alpha\nu\) is easier to understand here than \(\gamma\eta\nu\); admittedly \(\omicron\rho\iota\iota\zeta\omicron\omicron\nu\) has an odd sense (perhaps “marking out”), but the author is running short of synonyms for “forming” seas. At all events, he means the Caspian Sea, which was thought of as a gulf of the Northern Ocean from the time of Alexander to Ptolemy.
'Ωκεανός. ἐν τούτῳ γε μὴν νῆσοι μέγισται τυχ-χάνονσιν οὔσι δύο, Βρεττανικαὶ καὶ Ἀλβίων καὶ Ἱέρνη, τῶν προϊστοριμένων μείζους, ὑπὲρ τοὺς Κελτοὺς κείμεναι. τούτων δὲ οὐκ ἐλάττους 15 ἦ τε Ταπροβάνη πέραν Ἰνδῶν, λοξὴ πρὸς τὴν οἰκουμένην, καὶ Ἡ Φεβόλ καλομένη, κατὰ τὸν Ἀραβικὸν κειμένη κόλπον. οὐκ ἀλλάξει δὲ μικραὶ περὶ τὰς Βρεττανικὰς καὶ τὴν Ἱβηρίαν κύκλων περιστεφάνωνται τὴν οἰκουμένην ταύτην, ἣν δὴ νῆσον εἰρήκαμεν· ἥς πλάτος μὲν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ βαθύ-20 τατον τῆς ἱπειροῦ βραχὺ ἀποδέου τετρακισμυρίων σταδίων, ὥς φασιν οἱ εὐ γεωγραφήσαντες, μῆκος δὲ περὶ ἐπτακισμυρίους μάλιστα. διαρεῖται δὲ εἰς τε Εὐρώπην καὶ Ἀσίαν καὶ Αἰβύνην.

Εὐρώπη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡς ὤροι κύκλων στῆλαι τε Ἡρακλέους καὶ μυχοὶ Πόντου βαλλαττά τε Ὑρ-25 κανία, καθ' ἣν στενότατος ἰσθμὸς εἰς τὸν Πόντον διήκει· τινὲς δὲ ἄντι1 τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ Τάναϊν ποταμὸν εἰρήκασιν. Ἀσία δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰρημένου ἰσθμοῦ τοῦ τοῦ Πόντου καὶ τῆς Ὑρκανίας θαλάσσης μέχρι θατέρου ἰσθμοῦ, δὲ μεταξὺ κεῖται τοῦ τοῦ Ἀραβικοῦ κόλπου καὶ τῆς ἔσω θαλάσσης, περι-

1 post μέγισται add. τε Bekk.
2 Βρεττανικαὶ Lor. : Βρεττανικαὶ Bekk.
3 Ἀλβίων Lor. : Ἀλβίον Bekk.

a Very mysterious. It might well be Socotra, as Bochert suggests (Arist. Erdkunde, p. 93); Capelle (op. cit. p. 539) suggests Madagascar; Mühlenhoff (Deutsche Altertums- kunde, pp. 322 f.), quoted with approval by Lorimer (Notes, p. 37, n. 1), suggests it is the island in Lake Tana (Psebo in Strabo) in Abyssinia, magnified and transplanted.
ON THE COSMOS, 3

flows round the earth. There are two very large islands in it, called the British Isles, Albion and Ierne; they are larger than those already mentioned, and lie beyond the land of the Celts. No smaller than these are Taprobane (Ceylon) beyond the Indians, which lies obliquely to the inhabited world, and the island known as Phebol, a by the Arabian Gulf. There is quite a number of other small islands round the British Isles and Spain, set in a ring round this inhabited world, which as we have said is itself an island; its breadth, at the deepest point of the continent, is a little short of 40,000 stades, in the opinion of good geographers, and its length is approximately 70,000 stades. It is divided into Europe, Asia and Libya.

Europe is the area which is bounded in a circle by the Pillars of Heracles and the inner parts of the Pontus and the Hyrcanian Sea, where a very narrow isthmus passes between it and the Pontus; but some have said the river Tanaïs, instead of this isthmus. Asia is the region from this isthmus of the Pontus and the Hyrcanian Sea to another isthmus, which lies between the Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean;

b Posidonius put the length of the οἰκομένη at 70,000 stades, but no one reports his figure for the width; since he thought the Ocean was quite close to Maeotis in the North, his figure would presumably be under 30,000 stades “in agreement with the view then current” (Thomson, History of Ancient Geography, p. 213). Eratosthenes estimated the length at 70,800 stades (with the addition of 7,000 for bulges and possible islands), and the width at 38,000.

c Strabo reports (xi. i. 5 = 491 c) that Clitarchus and others made this isthmus absurdly narrow, while Posidonius thought it was 1,500 stades.

d These variant opinions are noted by Eratosthenes ap. Strabo i. 4. 7 (65 c).
[ARISTOTLE]

393 b

30 εὐχόμενος ὑπὸ τε ταύτης καὶ τοῦ περὶ 'Ωκεανοῦ τινὲς δὲ ἀπὸ Ταναΐδος μέχρι Νείλου στομάτων τὸν τῆς 'Ασίας τίθενται ὄρον. Λιβύη δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ 'Αραβικοῦ ὠσθοῦν ἐως Ἡρακλέους στηλῶν.

394 a ό δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Νείλου φασὶν ἐως ἐκείνων. τῆν δὲ Αἴγυπτον, ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ Νείλου στομάτων περιπρομένην, ό μὲν τῇ 'Ασίᾳ, ό δὲ τῇ Λιβύη προσάπτουσι, καὶ τὰς νῆσους ὀμὲν ἔξωρέτους ποιοῦσι, ό δὲ προσνέμουσι ταῖς γείτοσιν ἀεὶ μοίραις.

5 Γῆς μὲν ἡ καὶ θαλάττης φύσιν καὶ θέσιν, ἤντινα καλεῖν εἰώθαμεν οἰκουμένην, τοιάνδε τινά ἱστορη-καμεν.

4. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀξιολογωτάτων ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς παθῶν νῦν λέγωμεν, αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα κεφαλαιούμενοι.

Δύο γὰρ δὴ τινες ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἀναθυμιάσεις ἀνα-10 φέρονται συνεχῶς εἰς τὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀέρα, λεπτο-μερεῖς καὶ ἀόρατοι παντάπασιν, εἰ [τι]² μὴ κατὰ τὰς ἔως ἐστὶν αὐ [τε] διὰ³ ποταμῶν τε καὶ ναμά-των ἀναφερόμεναι θεωροῦνται. τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐστι ξηρὰ καὶ καπνώδης, ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀπορρέουσα, ἡ δὲ νοτερὰ καὶ ἀτμώδης, ἀπὸ τῆς ύγρᾶς ἁναθυ-15 μωμένη φύσεως. γίνονται δὲ ἀπὸ μὲν ταύτης ὁμίχλαι καὶ δρόσοι καὶ πάγων ἱδέαι νέφη τε καὶ ὀμβροὶ καὶ χιόνες καὶ χάλαζαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ξηρᾶς ἀνεμοί τε καὶ πνευμάτων διαφοράι βρονταί τε καὶ ἀστραπαί καὶ πρηστῆρες καὶ κεραυνοὶ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα

1 post δὲ add. τὸ CGZ Bekk. ² τι secl. Lor.
it is surrounded by the Mediterranean and the en-
circling stream of the Ocean; but some say that Asia
stretches from the Tanaïs to the mouths of the Nile. 
Libya lies between the Arabian isthmus and the 
Pillars of Heracles (but some say from the Nile to 
the Pillars). Egypt, which is encompassed by the 
mouths of the Nile, is attached by some to Asia, and 
by others to Libya, and some make the islands 
separate, others attribute them to their nearest 
region of mainland.

We have now given some account of the nature 
and situation of the land and sea which we call "the
inhabited world."

4. Now let us turn to the most notable phenomena
in and about the inhabited world, summarizing only
the most essential points.

There are two exhalations a from it, which pass
continually into the air above us, composed of small
particles and entirely invisible, except that in the 
early mornings some can be observed rising along
rivers and streams. One of these is dry and like
smoke, since it emanates from the earth; the other
is damp and vaporous, since it is exhaled from the
wet element. From the latter come mists, dews, the
various kinds of frost, clouds, rain, snow and hail;
from the dry exhalation come the winds and various
breezes, thunder and lightning, fiery bolts (πρητητήρες) b
and thunderbolts and all the other things of the same

a For the two exhalations and their products cf. Aristot. 
Meteor. i. 4-12. Much of this chapter derives, ultimately, from
Aristotle; the proximate sources are discussed by Maguire
(op. cit. pp. 128-133). 

b Cf. 395 a 10 and note.

3 ai [τε] διὰ σcripsi: ai τε διὰ vel ai τε ἐκ codd.: ὄτε ἀπὸ
Lor. (De Mundo): ai [τε] ἀπὸ Lor. (Notes).
Δὴ τούτοις ἐστὶ σύμφωνα. ἐστὶ δὲ ὀμίχλη μὲν 20 ἀτμώδης ἀναθυμίασις ἁγώνος ὑδατος, ἀέρος μὲν παχυτέρα, νέφους δὲ ἀραιοτέρα· γίνεται δὲ ἦτοι εἰς ἀρχὴς νέφους ἢ εἰς ὑπολείμματος. ἀντίπαλος δὲ αὐτῆς λέγεται τε καὶ ἐστὶν αἰθρία, οὐδὲν ἄλλο οὐσα πλὴν ἄηρ ἀνέφελος καὶ ἀνόμιχλος. δρόσος δὲ ἐστιν ὑγρὸν εἰς αἰθρίας κατὰ σύστασιν λεπτὴν φερόμενον, 25 κρύσταλλος δὲ ἀθρόου ὕδωρ εἰς αἰθρίας πετηγός, πάχυνθε δὲ δρόσος πετηγνία, δροσοπάχυνθε δὲ ἡμίπαγης δρόσους. νέφος δὲ ἐστὶ πάχος ἀτμώδες συνεστραμμένον, γόνυμον ὑδάτος· ὦμβρος δὲ γίνεται μὲν κατ᾽ ἐκπεσμὸν νέφους εἰ διάλα πεπαχυσμένου, διαφορὰς δὲ ἵσχει τοσάδε ὄσα καὶ ή τοῦ νέφους 30 θλύμας· ἡπία μὲν γὰρ οὕσα μαλακὰς ψακάδας διαστείρει, σφοδρὰ δὲ ἀδροτέρας· καὶ τοῦτο καλοῦμεν ύστόν, ὦμβρον μεῖζω καὶ συνεχῇ συστρέμματα ἐπὶ γῆς φερόμενον. χων δὲ γίνεται κατὰ νεφῶν πε-πικνωμένων ἀπόθραυσιν πρὸ τῆς εἰς ὕδωρ μετα- 35 βολῆς ἀνακοπέντων· ἐργάζεται δὲ ἡ μὲν κοπὴ τοῦ ἀφρώδες καὶ ἐκλευκον, ἡ δὲ σύμπηξις τοῦ ἐνόντος ὑγροῦ τήν ψυχρότητα οὐτως χυθέντος οὐδὲ ἡραω- 394 b μένοι. σφοδρὰ δὲ αὕτη καὶ ἀθρόα καταφερομένη νυφετὸς ὀνόμασται. χάλαζα δὲ γίνεται νυφετοῦ συστραφέντος καὶ βρῖθος ἐκ πιλῆματος εἰς κατα- φορὰν ταχυτέραν λαβόντος· παρὰ δὲ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἀπορρηγγυμένων θραυσμάτων οἱ τε ὅγκοι μείζους 5 αἱ τὲ φοραὶ γίνονται βιαιότεραι. ταῦτα μὲν οὐν ἐκ τῆς ὑγρᾶς ἀναθυμίασεως πέφυκε συμπάππειν. Ἐκ δὲ τῆς ἑηρᾶς ὑπὸ ψύχους μὲν ὀσθεώσης ὡστε ῥεῖν ἀνέμοις ἐγένετο· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν οὕτος πλην 364
class. Mist is a vaporous exhalation which does not produce water, denser than air but less dense than cloud; it comes into being either from a cloud in the first stage of formation or from the remnant of a cloud. The condition contrary to this is rightly called a clear sky, for it is simply air, with no cloud or mist. Dew is moisture that falls out of a clear sky in a light condensation; ice is solidified water, frozen in a clear sky: hoar-frost is frozen dew, and dew-frost is half-frozen dew. Cloud is a dense, vaporous formation, productive of water: rain comes from the compression of a well-compacted cloud, and varies in character according to the pressure on the cloud: if the pressure is light it scatters gentle drops of rain, but if it is heavy the drops are fuller: and we call this latter condition a downpour, for it is larger than a shower of rain and pours continuous drops of rain upon the earth. Snow occurs when well-condensed clouds break up and split before the formation of water: the split causes the foamy and brilliantly white condition of the snow, and its coldness is caused by the coagulation of the moisture contained in it, which has not had time to be either fused or rarefied. If there is a thick and heavy fall of snow, we call it a snow-storm. Hail occurs when a snow-storm is solidified and gathers weight because of its increased density so as to fall more rapidly; the hailstones increase in size and their movement increases in violence according to the size of the fragments that are broken off the cloud. These then are the natural products of the wet exhalation.

From the dry exhalation, when it is forced to flow by the cold, wind is produced: for this is nothing but

1 φερόμενον Locr. : φερόμενα Bekk.
άηρ πολὺς ἰέων καὶ ἄθροὸς· ὦτις ἀμα καὶ πνεῦμα
λέγεται. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἐτέρως πνεῦμα ἢ τε ἐν
φυτοῖς καὶ ζῴοις καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα ἐμβυχός
tε καὶ γόνυμοι οὐσία, περὶ ἣς νῦν λέγειν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον.
τὰ δὲ ἐν ἁέρι πνεύματα πνεύματα καλοῦμεν ἀνέμοις,
αὖρας δὲ τὰς ἐξ ὑγροῦ φερομένας ἐκπνοάς.
tῶν δὲ ἁνέμων οἱ μὲν ἐκ νενοτισμένης γῆς πνέοντες
ἀπόγειοι λέγονται, οἱ δὲ ἐκ κόλπων διεξάγοντες
ἐγκολπίαι· τοῦτοις δὲ ἀνάλογον τι ἔχουσιν οἱ ἐκ
ποταμῶν καὶ λυμῶν. οἱ δὲ κατὰ ὑδάς ἐφούς
gινόμενοι καὶ ἀνάλυσιν τοῦ πάχους πρὸς ἐαυτοὺς
ποιοῦμενοι ἐκνεφίαί καλοῦνται· μεθ’ ὤδατος δὲ
ἄθρως βαγέντες ἐξυδρία λέγονται. καὶ οἱ μὲν
ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς συνεχεῖς ἑφοὺ κέκλημεν, βορέαι δὲ
οἱ ἀπὸ ἀρκτοῦ, ζέφυροι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ δύσεως, νότοι
dὲ οἱ ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας. τῶν γε μην ἑφοὺ καὶ
καὶ λέγεται ο ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ τὰς θερινὰς ἀνατολὰς
tόπου πνεύμων ἄνεμος, ἀπηλιώτης δὲ Ῥ ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ
tὰς ἑσπερινὰς, ἑφοὺς δὲ Ῥ ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ τὰς ξει-
μερινὰς. καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ζέφυρων ἀργεστῆς μὲν
ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς θερινῆς δύσεως, ὅν τινες καλοῦσιν ὀλυμ-
pίαν, οἱ δὲ ἱάπυγα· ζέφυρος δὲ Ῥ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑσ-
μερινῆς, λυβ. δὲ Ῥ ἀπὸ τῆς ξειμερινῆς. καὶ τῶν
βορεῶν ἰδίως ο μὲν ἔξις τῷ καὶ καλεῖται βορέας,
ἀπαρκτίας δὲ Ῥ ἐφεξῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ πόλου κατὰ τὸ
μεσημβρινὸν πνεύμων, θρασκίας δὲ Ῥ ἔξις πνεύμων τῷ

1 Βαγέντες B Lor.: βαγέντος codd. cet. Bekk.

_a_ This is a common Greek way of describing points of the compass. They divided each quarter by three; so their
air moving in quantity and in a mass. It is also called *breath*. In another sense "breath" means that substance found in plants and animals and pervading everything, that brings life and generation; but about that there is no need to speak now. The breath that breathes in the air we call *wind*, and the breath that comes from moisture we call *breeze*. Of the winds, some blow from the earth when it is wet and are called *land-winds*; some arise from gulfs of the sea and are called *gulf-winds*. There is a similarity between these winds and those which come from rivers and lakes. Those which arise at the breaking up of a cloud and resolve its density against themselves are called *cloud-winds*; those which burst out all at once accompanied by water are called *rain-winds*. Eurus is the name of the winds that blow steadily from the East, Boreas is the name of the North winds, Zephyrus of the West winds, and Notus of the South winds. One of the Euri is called Caecias: this is the one that blows from from the direction of the summer sunrise. Apeliotes is the one that comes from the direction of the equinoctial sunrise, and Eurus proper the one that comes from the direction of the winter sunrise. Of the Zephyri, which blow in the opposite direction, Argestes comes from the direction of the summer sunset; some call this Olympias, and some Iapyx. Zephyrus proper comes from the direction of the equinoctial sunset, Lips from the direction of the winter sunset. Of the winds called Boreas, the one properly so-called is next to Caecias; next to it is Aparctias, which blows from the North pole to the South; Thrascias is the one minor points cannot be translated simply into modern terms. Equinoctial sunrise and sunset can be taken as E. and W.
ἀργεστη, ὅν ἐνιοὶ κιρκίαν¹ καλοῦσιν. καὶ τῶν νότων ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀφανοῦσ πόλου φερόμενος ἀντίπαλος τῷ ἀπαρκτίᾳ καλεῖται νότος, εὐρόνοτος δὲ ὁ μεταξὺ νότου καὶ εὐροῦ· τῶν δὲ ἐπὶ θάτερα μεταξὺ λιβῶς καὶ νότου οἱ μὲν λιβόνοτον, οἱ δὲ 35 λιβοφοίνικα, καλοῦσιν.

Τῶν δὲ ἀνέμων οἱ μὲν εἰσὶν εὐθὺπνοοί, ὅποσοι διεκπένευσι πρόσως κατ’ εὐθείαν, οἱ δὲ ἄνακαμψὶ·

395 a πνεοί, καθάπερ ὁ καυκλὸς λεγόμενος, καὶ οἱ μὲν χειμῶνοι, ὡσπερ οἰ νότοι, δυναστεύοντες, οἱ δὲ θέρους, ὡς οἱ ἑτησίαι λεγόμενοι, μίξιν ἔχοντες τῶν τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἄρκτου φερομένων καὶ ζεφύρων· οἱ δὲ ὀρνιθίας καλοῦμενοι, ἕαρινοὶ τινες ὄντες ἀνεμοί, 5 βορέας εἰσὶ τῷ γένει.

Τῶν γε μὴν βιαίων πνευμάτων καταγίς μὲν ἐστὶ πνεῦμα ἀνωθεν τύπτων ἐξαίφνης, θύελλα δὲ πνεῦμα βίαιον καὶ ἀφίων προσαλλόμενον, λαῖλαψ δὲ καὶ στρόβιλος πνεῦμα εἰλούμενον κάτωθεν ἄνω, ἀναφύσιμα δὲ γῆς πνεῦμα ἀνω φερόμενον κατὰ τὴν 10 ἐκ βυθοῦ τινος ἡ βίγματος ἀνάδοσιν· ὅταν δὲ εἰλούμενον πολὺ φέρηται, πρηστήρ χθόνος ἐστιν. εἰλθεῖν δὲ πνεῦμα ἐν νέφει παχεί τε καὶ νοτερῷ, καὶ ἐξωσθεῖν δὲ αὐτοῦ, βιαῖως βίγμων τὰ συνεχὴ πιλῆμα τοῦ νέφους, βρόμον καὶ πάταγον μέγαν ἀπειργάσατο, βροντὴν λεγόμενον, ὡσπερ ἐν ὑδάτι

¹ κιρκίαν Forster: καυκλόν codd. Bekk.

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a Phenomena connected with wind and those connected with thunder and lightning are not clearly distinguished in Greek, and translation is difficult. Here πρηστήρ seems to
next Argestes, though some call this Circias. Of the winds called Notus, the one that comes from the invisible pole, opposite to Aparetias, is properly called Notus, and Euronotus is the one between Notus and Eurus. The one on the other side, between Notus and Lips, is sometimes called Libonotus, sometimes Libophoenix.

The current of some winds is direct—that is, they blow straight ahead; the current of others varies in direction, as in the case of Caecias. Some of them prevail in the winter, like the Noti; some prevail in the summer, like those called Etesian winds, which are a mixture of North winds and Zephyri. Those which are called Ornithian winds, which occur in the spring, belong to the class Boreas.

Of the violent types of wind, a squall is a wind that strikes suddenly from above; a gust is a violent wind that suddenly jumps up at you; a whirlwind, or cyclone, is a wind that whirs upwards in a spiral. A blast of wind from the earth is a gust caused by the expulsion of wind from some pit or chasm; when it moves with a fierce whirling motion, it is an earth-hurricane (πρηστήρ). When the wind whirs round in a thick cloud full of water and is pushed out through it and forcibly breaks up the closely packed material of the cloud, it makes a great din and crash, which is called thunder—as air does when it is passed violently mean some kind of whirlwind, but in 394 a 18 and 395 a 24 it is a sort of thunderbolt. Aristotle says (Meteor. 371 a 15): "When it (i.e. the cloud pulled down by a descending whirlwind) is inflamed as it is pulled downwards... it is called a πρηστήρ; for it inflames (σωκέκπημπρησι) the neighbouring air and colours it with its fire." The name implies a connexion with fire and perhaps here the πρηστήρ comes up from a fiery chasm (cf. 395 b 20).
15 πνεῦμα σφοδρῶς ἐλαυνόμενον. κατὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ νέφους ἔκρηξιν πυρωθὲν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ λάμψαν ἀστραπὴ λέγεται. δ’ ὅθ’ πρῶτον τῆς βροντῆς προσέπεσεν, ὡστερον γενόμενον, ἑπεὶ τὸ ἀκούστον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄρατοῦ πέφυκε φθάνεσθαι, τοῦ μὲν καὶ πόρρωθεν ὄρωμένον, τοῦ δὲ ἐπειδὰν ἐμπελάσῃ τῇ 20 ἀκοῇ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν τὸ μὲν τάχιστον ἢ τῶν ὄντων, λέγω δὲ τὸ πυρῶδες, τὸ δὲ ἔττων ταχύ, ἀερῶδες ὄν, ἐν τῇ πλῆξει πρὸς ἀκοῇ ἀφικνούμενον. τὸ δὲ ἀστράλω μαν ἀναπυρωθὲν, βιάως ἄχρι τῆς γῆς διεκθέων, κεραυνὸς καλεῖται, ἔαν δὲ ἦμιπυρον ἢ, σφοδρὸν δὲ ἄλλως καὶ ἀθρόων, πρηστήρ, ἕαν δὲ 25 ἀπυρον παντελῶς, τυφῶν ἡ ἐκαστὸν δὲ τοῦτων κατασκήημαν εἰς τὴν γῆν σκηπτὸς ὄνομαζεται. τῶν δὲ κεραυνῶν οἱ μὲν αἰθαλώδεις ψολόεντες λέγονται, οἱ δὲ ταχέως διάττοντες ἀργῆτες, ξεικίαπ δὲ οἱ γραμμοειδῶς φερόμενοι, σκηπτοὶ δὲ ὅσῳ κατασκήηπτουσιν εἰς τι.

Συλλήβδην δὲ τῶν ἐν ἄερι φαντασμάτων τὰ μὲν 30 ἐστὶ κατ’ ἐμφασιν, τὰ δὲ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν—κατ’ ἐμφασιν μὲν ἱριδεῖς καὶ ῥάβδοι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καθ’ ὑπόστασιν δὲ σέλα τέ καὶ διάττοντες καὶ κομῆται καὶ τὰ τοιούτων παραπλῆσια. ἵπισ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐμφάσις ἡλίου τμήματος ή σελήνης, ἐν νέφει νοτερῷ καὶ κοῖλῳ καὶ συνεχεὶ πρὸς φαντασίαν, ὡς ἐν 35 κατόπτρῳ, θεωρουμένη κατὰ κύκλου περιφέρειαν. ῥάβδος δὲ ἐστὶν ἱριδος ἐμφάσις εὐθεία. ἄλως δὲ 395 ἐστὶν ἐμφάσις λαμπρότητος ἀστρον περίανγος.

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a See p. 368, n. a.
b τυφῶν is often a typhoon or hurricane (cf. 400 a 29), but here it is connected with lightning. In mythology Typhon
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through water. Because of the breaking up of the cloud the wind is set on fire, and flashes: this is called lightning. This lightning falls upon our senses before the thunder, though it occurs later, because what is heard is by nature slower than what is seen: for the latter is seen a great way off, the former only when it approaches the ears; particularly when one is that swiftest thing of all, the element of Fire, while the other is less swift, since it is of the nature of air and impinges upon the hearing by physical contact. When the flashing bolt is aflame and hurtles violently to the ground it is called a thunderbolt; if it is half alight, but in other respects strong and dense, it is called a fiery bolt; if it is altogether fireless it is called a smoking bolt; but each one of these when it falls upon the ground is called a falling-bolt. Lightning is called smoky when it looks dark, like smoke; vivid, when it moves very rapidly; and forked, when it moves along jagged lines; but when it falls on to something it is called a falling-bolt.

Briefly, the phenomena of the air are divided into those which are mere appearances and those which are realities: the appearances are rainbows and streaks in the sky and so on; the realities are lights and shooting stars and comets and other such things. A rainbow is the appearance in reflection of a portion of the sun or moon, seen, like an image in a mirror, in a cloud that is wet and hollow and presents an unbroken surface, and shaped like an arc of a circle. A streak is a straight rainbow. A halo is an appearance of brightness shedding its light round a star;

is the son of Typhos, the giant, who causes the eruption of Etna; hence the connexion with fire.

κεραυνός is used for “lightning” and “thunderbolt.”
διαφέρει δὲ ἵριδος ὁτι ἡ μὲν ἴρις ἔξ ἐναντίας φαίνεται ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, ἡ δὲ ἄλως κύκλω παντὸς ἀστρου. σέλας δὲ ἐστὶ πυρὸς ἀθρόου ἐξαισὶ ἐν ἀέρι. τῶν δὲ σελάων ἡ μὲν ἀκοντίζεται, ἡ δὲ 5 στηρίζεται. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐξακοντισμός ἐστι πυρὸς γένεσις ἐκ παρατρύψεως ἐν ἀέρι φερομένου ταχέως καὶ φαντασίαι μῆκους ἐμφαίνοντος διὰ τὸ τάχος, ὁ δὲ στηριγμός ἐστι χωρίς φορὰς προμήκης ἐκτασις καὶ οἶνον ἀστρον ῥύσις· πλατυνομένη δὲ κατὰ θάτερον κομήτης καλεῖται. πολλάκις δὲ τῶν 10 σελάων τὰ μὲν ἐπιμένει πλείονα χρόνον, τὰ δὲ παραχρήμα σβένυνται. πολλαί δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι φαντασμάτων ἱδέαι θεωροῦνται, λαμπάδες τε καλουμέναι καὶ δοκίδες καὶ πίθοι καὶ βόθυνω, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα ὁμοίότητα ὡς προσαγορευθεῖσαι. καὶ τὰ μὲν τούτων ἐσπέρια, τὰ δὲ ἔως, τὰ δὲ ἀμφιφαὶ 15 θεωρεῖται, ἑπανίως δὲ βόρεια καὶ νότια. πάντα δὲ ἀβέβαια· οὐδέποτε γὰρ τι τούτων αἱ φανερὸν ἱστόρηται κατεστηριγμένον. τὰ μὲν τοῖνυν ἀέρια τοιαῦτα.

Ἐμπεριέχει δὲ καὶ ἡ γῆ πολλὰς ἐν αὐτῇ, καθάπερ ύδατος, οὐτώς καὶ πνεύματος καὶ πυρὸς πηγᾶς. 20 ποταμῶν δὲ αἱ μὲν ὑπὸ γῆν εἰσὶν ἀόρατοι, πολλαί δὲ ἀναπνοὰς ἔχουσι καὶ ἀναφυσίες, ὡσπερ Λιπάρα τε καὶ Λίτνη καὶ τὰ ἐν Αἰολοῦ νῆσοις· αἱ δὲ¹ καὶ θέουσι πολλάκις ποταμοῦ δίκην, καὶ μύδρους ἀναρριπτοῦσι διαπύρους. ἐνιαὶ δὲ ὑπὸ γῆν οὐσία πλησίον πηγαίων ύδατον θερμαίνουσι ταῦτα, καὶ τὰ 25 μὲν χλιαρὰ τῶν ναμάτων ἀνιάσι, τὰ δὲ ὑπέρζεστα, τὰ δὲ εὕ ἐχοντα κράσεως.

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it differs from a rainbow in that the rainbow appears opposite the sun or moon, but the halo is in a circle round the whole of the star. A light is the kindling of a mass of fire in the air. Some lights shoot like javelins, others are set in one position in the sky. The shooting is a generation of fire by friction in the air; the fire moves rapidly, giving the impression of length because of its rapidity. The latter, the stationary light, is extended and lengthy but keeps the same position, as if it were an elongated star; if it spreads out towards one end it is called a comet. Often there is a variation in the duration of the light, some lasting a long time, some being extinguished at once. There are also many phenomena of different kinds to be seen, called torches and planks and jars and pits, taking their names from their likeness to these objects. Some of these can be seen in the West and some in the East, and some in both; they rarely appear in the North and South. All of them are unstable; for none of them has ever been described as always visible in the same place. So much, then, for the things of the air.

The earth contains in itself many sources, not only of water, but also of wind and fire. Some of these are subterranean and invisible, but many have vents and blow-holes, like Lipara and Etna and the volcanoes in the Aeolian islands. These often flow like rivers and throw up fiery, red-hot lumps. Some of the subterranean sources, which are near springs of water, impart heat to these: some of the streams they make merely lukewarm, some boiling, and some moderately and pleasantly hot.

1 at δὴ codd. Lor.: at δὲ Bekk.
395 b Ὄμοιως δὲ καὶ τῶν πνευμάτων πολλὰ πολλαχοῦ γῆς στόμια ἀνέωκται· ὅπως εἰς οὐδὲν φοιεθήναι τοὺς ἐμπελάξοντας, τὰ δὲ ἀτροφεῖν, τὰ δὲ χρησμωδεῖν, ὡσπερ τὰ ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ Λεβαδείᾳ, τὰ δὲ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀναίρεται, καθάπερ τὸ ἐν Φυγίᾳ. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ συγγενὲς πνεύμα εὐκρατοῦ ἐν γῇ παρεξώσθεν εἰς μυχίων σήραγγας αὐτῆς, εξέδρον γενόμενον ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων τόπων, πολλὰ μέρη συνεκράδανεν. πολλάκις δὲ πολὺ γενόμενον ἐξωθεὶ ἐγκατελῆθη τοῖς ταύτης κοιλώμασι καὶ 396 αποκλεισθέν ἐξόδου μετὰ βίας αὐτῆς συνετίναξε, ζητοῦν ἐξόδου ἑαυτῶ, καὶ ἀπειράσατο πάθος

τούτο ὁ καλεῖν εἰώθαμεν σεισμόν. τῶν δὲ σεισμῶν οἱ μὲν εἰς πλάγια σείοντες κατ᾽ ἄξειας γωνίας ἐπικλένται καλοῦνται, οἱ δὲ ἀνω ῥυπόθνεται καὶ κάτω κατ᾽ ὀρθὰς γωνίας βράσται, οἱ δὲ συνιζήσεις ποιοῦντες εἰς τὰ κοίλα ἴζηματίαι· οἱ δὲ χάρματα ἀνοι-γοντες καὶ τὴν γῆν ἀναρρηγνύντες ῥήκται καλοῦνται. τούτων δὲ οἱ μὲν καὶ πνεῦμα προσαναβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ πέτρας, οἱ δὲ πηλόν, οἱ δὲ πηγὰς φαίνουσιν τὰς πρότερον οὐκ οὕσας. τινὲς δὲ ἀνατρέπουσιν κατὰ μίαν πρόσωπον, οὐς καλοῦσιν ὡστα. οἱ δὲ ἀνταπ-πάλλοντες καὶ ταῖς εἰς ἐκάτερον ἐγκλίσει καὶ ἀποσάλεσθι διορθοῦντες ἀεὶ τὸ σειόμενον παλματία λέγονται, τρόμομ πάθος ὀμοίων ἀπεργαζόμενοι. γίνονται δὲ καὶ μυκηταὶ σεισμοί, σείοντες τὴν γῆν μετὰ βρόμου. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ χωρίς σεισμοῦ γίνεται μύκημα γῆς, όταν τὸ πνεῦμα σείει μὲν μὴ αὐταρκεῖς ἡ, ἐνειλούμενον δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ κόπτηται μετὰ

Similarly, too, there are in many places on the earth's surface open vents for the winds, which have various effects on those who approach them, causing ecstatic inspiration, or wasting sickness, or in some cases prophecy, like those at Delphi and Lebadeia, or even complete destruction, like the one in Phrygia. Often, too, a moderate earth-born wind, forced into deep, hollow caves in the earth and becoming dislodged from its home, causes shocks in many places. Often when a large quantity from outside is confined within the hollows of the earth and cut off from exit, it shakes the earth violently, seeking an exit for itself, and produces the effect that we call an earthquake. Earthquakes which shake the earth obliquely at a very acute angle we call horizontal; those which blast upwards and downwards perpendicularly are called heaving earthquakes; those which cause a settlement of the earth into hollows are called sinking earthquakes; and those which open up chasms and split the earth are called splitting earthquakes. Some of them stir up a wind, or rocks, or mud; and some reveal springs that were not there before. Some, called thrusting earthquakes, overturn things with a single heave. Others cause recoil this way and that, and in the process of lurching to one side and rebounding again the things that are shaken are held upright: these are called oscillating earthquakes, and their effect is a sort of trembling. There are also roaring earthquakes, which shake the earth with a great din. There is often, also, a roaring of the earth without an earthquake, when the wind is not sufficient to shake the earth but lashes about enveloped in the

2 ἀνατρέπουσι Lor.: ἀνατρέποντες Bekk.
3 ἀνταποπάλλοντες Lor.: ἀναπάλλοντες Bekk.

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15 ῥοθίου βίας. συσσωματοποιείται δὲ τὰ εἰσιόντα πνεύματα καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ύγρῶν κεκρυμμένων.

Τὰ δὲ ἀνάλογον συμπίπτει τούτοις καὶ ἐν θαλάσσῃ χάσματά τε γὰρ γίνεται θαλάσσης καὶ ἀναχωρήματα πολλάκις καὶ κυμάτων ἐπιδρομαί, ποτὲ μὲν ἀντανακοπὴν ἔχουσαν, ποτὲ δὲ πρόωσιν μόνον, ὥσπερ ἰστορεῖται περὶ Ἐλίκην τε καὶ Βοῦραν. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἀναφυσήματα γίνεται πυρὸς ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ καὶ πηγῶν ἀναβλύσεις καὶ ποταμῶν ἐκβολαὶ καὶ δένδρων ἐκφύσεις ὤσαὶ τε καὶ δίναι ταῖς τῶν πνευμάτων ἀνάλογον, αἱ μὲν ἐν μέσοις πε-25 λάγεσιν, αἱ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς εὐρίτους τε καὶ πορθμοὺς. πολλαὶ τε ἀμπώτεις λέγονται καὶ κυμάτων ἁρσεῖς συμπεριοδεύειν αἰεὶ τῇ σελήνῃ κατὰ τινάς ὀρισμένους καιροὺς.

'Ως δὲ τὸ πᾶν εἰπεῖν, τῶν στοιχείων ἐγκεκραμένων ἀλλήλους ἐν ἀεί τε καὶ γῇ καὶ θαλάσσῃ 30 κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς αἱ τῶν παθῶν ὁμοιότητας συνίσταντας, τοῖς μὲν ἐπὶ μέρους φθοράς καὶ γενέσεις φέρουσα, τὸ δὲ σύμπαν ἀνώλεθρον τε καὶ ἀγένητον φυλάττουσα.

5. Καίτοι γε τις ἑθαύμασε πῶς ποτε, εἰ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀρχῶν συνέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος, λέγω δὲ 35 ἐχθρόν τε καὶ ύγρῶν, ψυχρῶν τε καὶ θερμῶν, οὐ πάλαι διεφθαρται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὡς κἂν εἰ πό-396 b λιν τινὲς θαυμάζοιεν, ὡπως διαμένει συνεστηκυῖα ἐκ τῶν ἐναντιωτάτων ἐθνῶν, πενήτων λέγω καὶ πλούσιων, νέων γερόντων, ἀσθενῶν ἔχθρων, ποιη-ρῶν χρηστῶν. ἀγνοοῦσι δὲ ὅτι τοῦτ' ἐν πολιτι-1 ἐναντιωτάτων codd. pler. I.or.; ἐναντίων codd. cet. Bekk.

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earth with tumultuous force. The blasts of wind that enter the earth are recondensed also by the moisture that is hidden in the earth.\textsuperscript{a}

There are also analogous happenings in the sea: chasms occur in the sea, and its waves often withdraw; and there are incursions of waves, sometimes with a recoil, sometimes with a forward rush only, as they say was the case at Helice and Bura.\textsuperscript{b} Often too there are exhalations of fire in the sea and eruptions of fountains, and rivers are shot forth, and trees grow, and there are currents and vortices like those of the winds, some in the middle of the oceans, some in the narrows and straits. There are many tides and tidal waves too, which are said to occur in concert with the moon at certain definite times.

To sum up, since the elements are mingled one with another, it is natural that phenomena in the air and land and sea should show these similarities, which involve destruction and generation for the individual parts of nature, but preserve the whole free from corruption and generation.

5. Some people, however, have wondered how the cosmos, if it is composed of the "opposite" principles (I mean dry and wet, cold and hot), has not long ago been destroyed and perished; it is as if men should wonder how a city survives, composed as it is of the most opposite classes (I mean poor and rich, young and old, weak and strong, bad and good). They do not recognize that the most wonderful thing of all about

\textsuperscript{a} \textit{i.e.}, wind entering the earth may (a) cause an earthquake, (b) cause a roar only, or (c) be recondensed and so cause neither.

\textsuperscript{b} Cf. Strabo viii. 7. 2 (384 c), i. 3. 10 (54 c), Aristot. Meteor. 343 b 1, etc., on the destruction of these two cities in Achaia. The date was 373/2 B.C.
κῆς ὀμονοιας τὸ θαυμασιώτατον, λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν μίαν καὶ ὀμοιαν ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἀποτελεῖν διάθεσιν, ὑποδεχομένην πᾶσαν καὶ φύσιν καὶ τύχην. ἵππως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ φύσις γλίστεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀποτελεῖ τὸ σύμφωνον, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ὀμοίων, ὡσπερ ἀμέλει τὸ ἄρρεν συνήγαγε πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ καὶ οὐχ ἐκάτερον πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον, καὶ τὴν πρῶτην ὀμονοιαν διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων σημῆνεν, οὐ διὰ τῶν ὀμοίων. έοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ τέχνη τὴν φύσιν μιμομομένη τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ζωγραφία μὲν γὰρ λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, ἄχραν τε καὶ ἔρυθρων, χρωμάτων ἐγκερασμένη φύσεις τὰς εἰκόνας τοῖς προηγο-μένοις ἀπετέλεσε συμφώνους, μουσικὴ δὲ ὀξεῖς ἀμα καὶ βαρεῖς, μακρούς τε καὶ βραχεῖς φθόγγους μίξασα ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς μίαν ἀπετέλεσεν ἀρμο-νίαν, γραμματική δὲ ἐκ φωνηέντων καὶ ἀφώνων γραμμάτων κρᾶσιν ποιησάμενη τὴν ὀλην τέχνην ἀπ’ αὐτῶν συνεστήσατο. ταύτῳ δὲ τοῦτο ἦν καὶ τὸ παρά τῷ σκοτεινῷ λεγόμενον „Ηρακλείτω∙ „συνάψιες ὁλα καὶ οὐχ ὁλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερό-μενον, συνάδου διάδου∙ καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα.” οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὴν τῶν ὀλων σύ-στασιν, οὐρανοῦ λέγω καὶ γῆς τοῦ τε σύμπαντος κόσμου, διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐναντιωτάτων κράσεως ἄρχων

1 τὸ . . . ἀποτελεῖν Lor.: ὅτι . . . ἀποτελεῖ Bekk.
2 ὑποδεχομένην Lor.: ὑποδεχομένη Bekk.
3 sic Diels (Vorsokr. 622 B 10): v. Lor. ad loc.

The idea that art imitates nature occurs in Aristotle's Protrepticus (see Jaeger, Aristotle, pp. 74 ff.), and in Phys. B 199 a 15, Meteor. 381 b 5, De Part. Anim. 639 b 15 ff. But in Aristotle the point of comparison concerns teleology, not
the harmonious working of a city-community is this: that out of plurality and diversity it achieves a homogeneous unity capable of admitting every variation of nature and degree. But perhaps nature actually has a liking for opposites; perhaps it is from them that she creates harmony, and not from similar things, in just the same way as she has joined the male to the female, and not each of them to another of the same sex, thus making the first harmonious community not of similar but of opposite things. It seems, too, that art does this, in imitation of nature: for painting mixes its whites and blacks, its yellows and reds, to create images that are concordant with their originals; music mixes high and low notes, and longs and shorts, and makes a single tune of different sounds; by making a mixture of vowels and consonants, grammar composes out of them the whole of its art. This is precisely what Heracleitus the Dark meant when he said "Junctions are wholes and not-wholes, concord and discord, consonance and dissonance. One out of All; All out of One." So in the same way the complex of the Universe, I mean heaven and earth and the whole cosmos, by means of the mixture of the most opposite elements has been

the harmony of opposites. The four colours mentioned by Pseudo-Aristotle are the colours of the restricted palette used by the Four Colour Painters, of whom the earliest recorded is Polygnatus and the latest Aëtion in the age of Alexander the Great. Cf. Pliny, N.H. xxxv. 50, and A. Rumpf, JHS lxvii (1947), p. 16. It has been suggested that Empedocles' comparison of painting and creation (Diels, Vorsokr. 31 B 23) was inspired by Four Colour Painting. It is not likely that the author read Heracleitus in the original, or that the whole context is to be attached too closely to Heracleitus. Maguire (op. cit. pp. 134 ff.) finds the closest parallels to this passage in the Neo-Pythagoreans.

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μία διεκόσμησεν ἀρμονία: ἔηρον γὰρ ύγρῷ, θερμὸν
dὲ ψυχρῷ, βαρεῖ τε κοῦφον μυγέν, καὶ όρθὸν περι-
φερεῖ, γῆν τε πᾶσαν καὶ θάλασσαν αἰθέρα τε καὶ
ηλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν διεκόσμησε
μία ἡ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα δύναμις, ἐκ τῶν ἀμίκ-
των καὶ ἑτεροίων, ἀέρος τε καὶ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς καὶ
ὕδατος, τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμου δημιουργήσασα καὶ
μᾶ διαλαβοῦσα σφαιρὰς ἐπιφανείας τὰς τε ἐναντιω-
tάτας ἐν αὐτῷ φύσεως ἀλλήλως ἀναγκάσασα ὀμο-
λογήσαι καὶ ἐκ τούτων μηχανησμένη τῷ παντὶ
σωτηρίαν. αἰτία δὲ ταύτης μὲν ἡ τῶν στοιχείων
35 ὀμολογία, τῆς δὲ ὀμολογίας ἡ ἱσομοιρία καὶ τὸ
397 a μηδὲν αὐτῶν πλέον ἑτέρον ἑτέρου δύνασθαι: τῆν
γὰρ ἵσην ἀντίστασιν ἔχει τὰ βαρέα πρὸς τὰ κοῦφα
καὶ τὰ θερμὰ πρὸς θάτερα,1 τῆς φύσεως ἐπὶ τῶν
μειζόνων διδασκούσης ὅτι τὸ ἵσον σωστικὸν πώς
ἐστὶν ὀμονοίας, ἡ δὲ ὀμόνοια τοῦ πάντων γενετήρος
5 καὶ περικαλλεστάτου κόσμου. τῆς γὰρ ἂν εἰή φύσις
τοῦδε κρείττων; ἢν γὰρ ἂν ἐπὶ τῆς, μέρος ἐστὶν
αὐτοῦ. τὸ τε καλὸν πᾶν ἐπώνυμον ἐστὶ τούτου καὶ
tὸ τεταγμένον, ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου λεγόμενον κεκο-
σμηθαι. τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους δύνατ' ἂν ἐξισω-
θῆναι τῇ κατ' οὐρανὸν τάξει τε καὶ φορᾷ τῶν
10 ἀστρῶν ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης, κινομένων ἐν ἀκρι-
βεστάτοις μέτροις ἐξ αἰώνος εἰς ἑτέρον αἰῶνα; τῆς
dὲ γένουτ' ἄν ἀψευδεία τοιάδε, ἤτανα φυλάττουσιν
αἱ καλαὶ καὶ γόνιμοι τῶν ὅλων ὄρων, θέρη τε καὶ
χειμῶνας ἐπάγουσι τεταγμένος ἦμέρας τε καὶ
1 θάτερα ETZ Lor.: τὰ θάτερα codd. cet. Bekk.

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organized by a single harmony: dry mixed with wet, hot with cold, light with heavy, straight with curved—the whole of earth and sea, the aether, the sun, the moon and the whole heaven have been set in order by the single power which interpenetrates all things: from things unmixed and diverse, air and earth and fire and water, it has fashioned the whole cosmos and embraced it all in the surface of a single sphere, forcing the most opposite elements in the cosmos to come to terms, and from them achieving preservation for the whole. The cause of its preservation is the agreement of the elements, and the cause of the agreement is the principle of equal shares and the fact that no one of them has more power than each of the others: for the heavy is in equipoise with the light, and the hot with its opposite. In these greater matters nature teaches us that equality is the preserver of concord, and concord is the preserver of the cosmos, which is the parent of all things and the most beautiful of all. For what being could be better than this? Anything that might be suggested is a part of it. And everything that is beautiful takes its name from this, and all that is well-arranged; for it is called “well-ordered” (κεκοσμίωσθαι) after this “universal order” (κόσμος). What particular detail could be compared to the arrangement of the heavens and the movement of the stars and the sun and moon, moving as they do from one age to another in the most accurate measures of time? What constancy could rival that maintained by the hours and seasons, the beautiful creators of all things, that bring summers and winters in due order, and days and nights to make

2 εἰπη EP Lor.: εἰποι codd. cet. Bekk.
3 τί Lor.: τίς Bekk.
νύκτας εἰς μηνὸς ἀποτέλεσμα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ; καὶ
15 μὴν μεγέθει μὲν οὕτος1 πανυπέρτατος, κυνήσει δὲ
δέξιτατος, λαμπρότητι δὲ εὐανεύστατος, δυνάμει δὲ
ἀγήρως τε καὶ ἀφθαρτος. οὕτος ἐναλίων ζώων
καὶ πεξζῶν καὶ ἀερίων φύσεις ἐξώρισε καὶ βίους
ἐμέτρησε ταῖς ἐναυτοῖς κυνήσεωιν. ἐκ τούτου πάντα
ἐμπνεῦ τε καὶ ψυχὴν ἵσχει τὰ ζώα. τούτου καὶ αἱ
20 παράδοξοι νεοχθέσεις τεταγμένως ἀποτελοῦνται,
συναραττόντων μὲν ἀνέμων παντοῖων, πιπτόντων
dὲ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ κεραυνῶν, ρηγυμένων δὲ χειμώνων
ἐξαισίων. διὰ δὲ τούτων τὸ νοτερὸν ἐκπεζόμενον
τὸ τε πυρῶδες διαπνεόμενον εἰς ὁμονοιαν ἄγει τὸ
πᾶν καὶ καθόστησιν. ἢ τε γῆ φυτοῖς κομῶσα παντο-
25 δαποῖς νάμασι τε περιβλύσουσα καὶ περιοχουμένη
ζώοις, κατὰ καυρόν ἐκφύσα τα πάντα καὶ τρέ-
φουσα καὶ δεχομένη, μυρίας τε φέρουσα ἰδέας καὶ
πάθη, τὴν ἀγήρω φύσιν ὁμοίως τηρεῖ, καίτοι καὶ
σεισμοῖς τυνασσομένη καὶ πλημμυρίσσει ἐπικλυζομένη
30 πυρκαίας τε κατὰ μέρος φλογιζομένην. ταύτα δὲ
πάντα ἐσχεκεν αὐτῇ πρὸς ἀγαθοῦ γινόμενα τὴν δὲ
αἰῶνος σωτηρίαν παρέχειν. σεισμοῖς τε γὰρ δι-
exάττουσιν αἱ τῶν πνευμάτων παρεμπτώσεις κατὰ
tὰ ῥήγματα τὰς ἀναπνοὰς ἴσχοσαι, καθὼς ἄνω
λέλεκται, καθαρομένη τε ὁμοροθεὶς ἀποκλὺζεται
35 πάντα τὰ νοσώδη, περιπνεομένη δὲ αὐραίας τὰ τε
ὑπ’ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ ὑπέρ αὐτῆς εἰλικρινεῖται. καὶ
397 b μὴν αἱ φλόγες μὲν τὸ παγετῶδες ἡπιαίνουσιν,2 οἱ
πάγου δὲ τὰς φλόγας ἀνιάσιν. καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους
tὰ μὲν γίνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀκμάζει, τὰ δὲ φθείρεται.

1 οὕτος l. o. r.: ὁ αὐτὸς Bekk.
2 ἡπιαίνουσιν(B) BCFG l. o. r.: πιαίνουσιν codd. cet. Bekk.
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up the number of a month or a year? In size too the cosmos is mightiest, in motion swiftest, in brightness most brilliant, in power never-aging and indestructible. It is this that has given a different nature to the creatures of the sea, the land and the air, and measured their lives in terms of its own movements. From this all creatures breathe and take their life. Of this even the unexpected changes are accomplished in due order—the winds of all kinds that dash together, thunderbolts falling from the heavens, and storms that violently burst out. Through these the moisture is squeezed out and the fire is dispersed by currents of air; in this way the whole is brought into harmony and so established. The earth, too, that is crowned with plants of every kind and bubbles with springs and teems with living creatures everywhere, that brings forth everything in season and nurtures it and receives it back again, that produces a myriad shapes and conditions—this earth still keeps its never-aging nature unchanged, though it is racked by earthquakes, swamped by floods, and burnt in part by fires. All these things, it seems, happen for the good of the earth and give it preservation from age to age: for when it is shaken by an earthquake, there is an upsurge of the winds transfused within it, which find vent-holes through the chasms, as I have already said; when it is washed by rain it is cleansed of all noxious things; and when the breezes blow round about it the things below and above it are purified. Furthermore the fires soften things that are frozen, and frost abates the force of the fires. And of the particular things on the earth some come into being while some are in their prime and others are perishing:

\[395\, b\, 26.\]
397 b

καὶ αἱ μὲν γενέσεις ἐπαναστέλλουσι τὰς φθοράς,
5 αἱ δὲ φθοραὶ κουφίζουσι τὰς γενέσεις. μία δὲ ἐκ πάντων περαινομένη σωτηρία διὰ τέλους ἀντιπερι-
ισταμένων ἄλληλοι καὶ τοτε μὲν κρατοῦντων, τοτὲ
δὲ κρατουμένων, φυλάττει τὸ σύμπαν ἄφθαρτον δι’
αἰῶνος.

6. Λοιπὸν δὲ δὴ περὶ τῆς τῶν ὀλῶν συνεκτικῆς
10 αἰτίας κεφαλαιώδῶς εἰπείν, ὃν τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν
ἀλλων· πλημμελές γὰρ περὶ κόσμου λέγοντας, εἰ
καὶ μὴ δι’ ἀκριβείας, ἀλλ’ οὖν γε ὡς εἰς τυπώδη
μάθησιν, τὸ τοῦ κόσμου κυριώτατον παραλιπέιν.
ἀρχαίος μὲν οὖν τὸς λόγος καὶ πάτριος ἐστὶ πᾶσιν
ἀνθρώποις ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ πάντα καὶ διὰ θεοῦ ἢμῖν
15 συνεστηκεν, οὐδεμία δὲ φύσις αὐτὴ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν
ἐστίν αὐτάρκης, ἐρημωθείσα τῆς ἐκ τούτου σω-
tηρίας. διὸ καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν εἰπείν τνες προήχθη-
σαν ὅτι πάντα ταύτα ἐστὶ θεῶν πλέα τὰ καὶ δι’
ὀφθαλμῶν ὑδαλλόμενα ἢμῖν καὶ δι’ ἄκοης καὶ
πάσης αἰσθήσεως, τῇ μὲν θείᾳ δυνάμει πρέποντα
20 καταβαλλόμενοι λόγον, οὐ μὴν τῇ γε οὐσία. σωτήρ
μὲν γὰρ οὖν τῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ καὶ γενέτωρ τῶν
ὄπωσδήποτε κατὰ τόνδε τῶν κόσμων συντελου-
μένων ὁ θεός, οὐ μὴν αὐτουργοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου
ζῷου κάματων ὑπομένων, ἄλλα δυνάμει χρώμενος
ἀτρύτω, δι’ ἢς καὶ τῶν πόρρω δοκοῦντων εἶναι
25 περιγίνεται. τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρώτην
ἐδραν αὐτοῦ ἔλαχεν, ὕπατος τε διὰ τοῦτο ὄνο-
μασται, [καὶ]1 κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν "ἀκροτάτη κο-

1 καὶ om. BCG Lor.
ON THE COSMOS, 5–6

and generation is set in the balance against destruction, and destruction lightens the weight of generation. There is one single principle of preservation, maintained without interruption among all these things that interchange with one another, ascending to power and declining in turn, and this keeps the whole system safe, eternally indestructible.

6. It remains now to discuss summarily, as the rest has been discussed, the cause that holds the world together; for in describing the cosmos, if not in detail, at least sufficiently to convey an outline, it would be wrong for us to omit altogether that which is supreme in the cosmos. It is indeed an ancient idea, traditional among all mankind, that all things are from God and are constituted for us by God, and nothing is self-sufficient if deprived of his preserving influence. So some of the ancients were led to say that all the things of this world are full of gods,\(^a\) all that are presented to us through our eyes and hearing and all the senses; but in saying this they used terms suitable to the power of God but not to his essence. For God is indeed the preserver of all things and the creator of everything in this cosmos however it is brought to fruition; but he does not take upon himself the toil of a creature that works and labours for itself,\(^b\) but uses an indefatigable power, by means of which he controls even things that seem a great way off. God has his home in the highest and first place, and is called Supreme for this reason, since according to the poet \(^c\) it is on "the loftiest crest"

\(^a\) Cf. the saying attributed to Thales (Diels, \textit{Vorsokr.}\(^6\) 11 A 22 = Aristot. \textit{De Anima} 411 a 7).

\(^b\) The \textit{αὐτουργός} (cf. 398 a 5, b 4) is the man who works his own land without a slave, \textit{e.g.} Electra’s husband in Euripides’ \textit{Electra}.

\(^c\) Hom. \textit{Il.} i. 499.
[ARISTOTLE]

397 b ρυφῆ" τοῦ σύμπαντος ἐγκαθιδρυμένος οὐρανοῦ· 
μάλιστα δὲ πως αὐτοῦ τῆς δυνάμεως ἀπολαῦει τὸ 
πλησίον αὐτοῦ σῶμα, καὶ ἔπειτα τὸ μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνο, 
30 καὶ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἄχρι τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς τόπων. διὸ 
γῆ τε καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐοικεν, ἐν ἀποστάσει πλείστη 
τῆς ἐκ θεοῦ ὄντα ὕφελείας, ἀσθενῆ καὶ ἀκατάλληλα 
eῖναι καὶ πολλῆς μεστὰ ταραχῆς· οὐ μὴν ἄλλα 
[καὶ]¹ καθ᾽ ὀσον ἐπὶ πᾶν διακενίσθαι πέφυκε τὸ 
θείον, καὶ τὰ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ὀμοίως συμβαίνει τά τε 
35 ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, κατὰ τὸ ἔγγον τε καὶ πορρωτέρω θεοῦ 
398 a εἶναι μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἦττου ὕφελείας μεταλαμβά-
νοντα. κρείττον οὖν ὑπολαβεῖν, ὁ καὶ πρέπον ἑστὶ 
καὶ θεῶ μάλιστα ἀρμόζουν, ὡς ἐν οὐρανῷ δύναμις 
идρυμένη καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις ἀφεστηκόσιν, ὡς ἐνι 
γε εἰπεῖν, καὶ σύμπασιν αἰτία γίνεται σωτηρίας, 
5 μᾶλλον ἡ ὡς διήκουσα καὶ φοιτῶσα ἐνθα μὴ καλὸν 
μηδὲ εὐσχήμον αὐτουργεῖ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς. τοῦτο μὲν 
γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων ἡγεμόσιν ἀρμότει, παντὶ καὶ 
tῷ τυχόντι ἐφιστασθαί ἔργῳ, οἰον στρατιάς ἀρχοντ 
η τὸλεως ἡ οἶκου, [καὶ]² εἱ χρεων στρωματο-
δεσμον εἰη δήσαι καὶ εἰ τι φαυλότερον ἀποτελεῖν 
10 ἔργον, ὥσ καὶ τὸ τυχόν ἀνδράποδον ποιήσειεν, ἀλλ᾽ 
oiον ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἰστορεῖται. τὸ 
<γὰρ> Καμβύσου ³ Ξέρξου τε καὶ Δαρείου πρό-

¹ καὶ om. CGZ Lor.
² καὶ del. Wendland et Wilamowitz.
³ ὁ om. Kambysou sic Lor.: ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως οὐκ 
ἀν τὸ τυχόν ἀνδράποδον ποιήσειεν ἀλλ᾽ οἶον ἰστορεῖτο Καμβύσου 
κτλ. Bekk.: v. Lor. ad loc.

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ON THE COSMOS, 6

of the whole heaven that he dwells: his power is experienced most of all by the body that is closest to him, less by the next, and so on down to the regions inhabited by us. So earth and the things that are on earth, being at the farthest remove from the help of God, seem to be feeble and discordant and full of confusion and diversity; but nevertheless, in that it is the nature of the Divine to penetrate to everything, even the things around us occur in the same way as the things above us, each having a greater or smaller share of God's help in proportion to its distance from him. So it is better to suppose, what is also fitting and most appropriate to God, that the power which is based on the heavens is also the cause of preservation in the most remote things, as we may say, and indeed in everything, rather than that of itself it carries out its tasks on earth by penetrating and being present where it is not honourable or fitting that it should.\(^a\) For it is not fitting even among men for princes to superintend each and every action that may have to be done—for example, the commander of an army or leader of a city or head of a household, if it were necessary to pack up bedding or perform some other menial task which could be done by any slave—but rather it is fitting that they should act in the manner which was adopted, according to the records, under the Great King.\(^b\) The pomp of Cambyses and Xerxes and Darius was ordered on a

\(^a\) The "power" has here become identified with god; this is literally inconsistent with 397 b 19 above.

\(^b\) Pseudo-Aristotle describes the King of Persia in his glory in the 6th/5th century B.C. He accords well with Herodotus's (i. 98) account of Deioces' palace and régime at Ecbatana. This is a description of a fabulous past such as Aristotle would hardly have given.

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σχήμα εἰς σεμνότητος καὶ ύπεροχῆς ύψος μεγαλοπρεπῶς διεκεκόσμητο· αὐτὸς μὲν γάρ, ὥς λόγος, ἵδρυτο ἐν Σούσως ἢ Ἔκβατάνοις, παντὶ ἀόρατος,
15 θαυμαστὸν ἐπέχων βασιλείων ὁ ήκον καὶ περίβολον χρυσῶ καὶ ἡλέκτρῳ καὶ ἠλέφαντι ἀστράπτοντα· πυλῶνες δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ συνεχεῖς πρόθυρα τε σύχνοις εἰργόμενα σταδίους ἀπ' ἀλλήλων θύραις τε χαλκαῖς καὶ τείχεσι μεγάλους υἱὸν ἔξω δὲ τούτων ἄνδρες οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ δοκιμώτατοι διεκεκόσμητο,
20 οἱ μὲν ἀμφ' αὐτὸν τὸν βασιλέα δορυφόροι τε καὶ θεράποντες, οἱ δὲ ἐκάστου περιβόλου φύλακες, πυλώραι τε καὶ ἠτάκουσται λεγόμενοι, ὡς ἂν ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτὸς, δεσπότης καὶ θεὸς ὄνομαζόμενος, πάντα μὲν βλέποι, πάντα δὲ ἄκουι. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων ἄλλοι καθεστήκεσαν προσόδων ταμίαι καὶ
25 στρατηγοὶ πολέμων καὶ κυνηγεσίων δώρων τε ἀποδεκτήρες τῶν τε λουπῶν ἐργῶν ἑκαστοί κατὰ τὰς χρείας ἐπιμεληταί. τὴν δὲ σύμπασαν ἄρχην τῆς Ἀσίας, περατουμένην Ἐλλησπόντῳ μὲν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἐσπέραν μερῶν, Ἰνδῷ δὲ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἔως, διελήφεσαν κατὰ ἐθνὴ στρατηγοῖ καὶ σατράπαι
30 καὶ βασιλεῖς, δοῦλοι τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως, ἠμε-ροδρόμοι τε καὶ σκοποὶ καὶ ἀγγελιαφόροι φρυκτωρίων ὁ ἐπόπτηρες. τοσοῦτος δὲ ἦν ὁ κόσμος, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν φρυκτωρίων, κατὰ διαδοχὰς πυρσεύσμων ἀλλήλους ἐκ περάτων τῆς ἄρχης μέχρι Σούσων καὶ Ἔκβατάνων, ὡστε τὸν βασι-
35 λέα γινώσκειν αὐθημερὸν πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ καὶ ποιούμενα. νομιστέων δὴ τῆς τοῦ μεγά-
398 b λου βασιλέως ὑπεροχῆν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν κόσμων

1 φρυκτωρίων . . . φρυκτωρίων scripsi: φρυκτωρίων . . .
φρυκτωρίων Bekk.
ON THE COSMOS, 6

grand scale and touched the heights of majesty and magnificence: the King himself, they say, lived in Susa or Ecbatana, invisible to all, in a marvellous palace with a surrounding wall flashing with gold, electrum and ivory; it had a succession of many gate-towers, and the gateways, separated by many stades from one another, were fortified with brazen doors and high walls; outside these the leaders and most eminent men were drawn up in order, some as personal bodyguards and attendants to the King himself, some as guardians of each outer wall, called Guards and the Listening-Watch, so that the King himself, who had the name of Master and God, might see everything and hear everything. Apart from these there were others appointed as revenue officials, leaders in war and in the hunt, receivers of gifts to the King, and others, each responsible for administering a particular task, as they were necessary. The whole Empire of Asia, bounded by the Hellespont in the West and the Indus in the East, was divided into nations under generals and satraps and kings, slaves of the Great King, with couriers and scouts and messengers and signals-officers. And such was the orderly arrangement of this, and particularly of the system of signal-beacons which were ready to burn in succession from the uttermost limits of the Empire to Susa and Ecbatana, that the King knew the same day all that was news in Asia. Now we must suppose that the majesty of the Great King falls short of the majesty of the god who rules the cosmos by as much

2 πυρσενόταν όλληλοις Lor.: πυρσενουσών άλληλας Bekk.
[ARISTOTLE]

398 b

ἐπέχοντος θεοῦ τοσσύτων καταδεεστέραν ὡςον τῆς ἐκεῖνον τὴν τοῦ φαυλοτάτου τε καὶ ἀσθενεστάτου ζῷον, ὥστε, εἰπέρ ἁσεμνον ἢν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δοκεῖν Ξέρξην αὐτούργειν ἀπαντα καὶ ἐπιτελεῖν αἶ βούλοιτο καὶ ἔφιστάμενον διοικεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀπρεπὲς ἂν εὖ θεῖ. σεμνότερον δὲ καὶ πρεπωδέστερον αὐτὸν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω χώρας ἱδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν διὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου διήκουσαν ἦλιον τε κινεῖν καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὸν πάντα οὐρανὸν περιάγειν αὐτίων τε γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς σωτηρίας. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπιτεχνῆσεως αὐτῷ δεῖ καὶ ὑπηρεσίας τῆς παρ’ ἑτέρων, ὡσπερ τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν ἄρχουσι τῆς πολυχειρίας διὰ τὴν ἁσθένειαν, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ ἢν τὸ θείοτατον, τὸ μετὰ βαστώνης καὶ ἀπλῆς κινήσεως παντοδαπᾶς ἀπο- τελεῖν ἰδέας, ὡσπερ ἀμέλει δρόσων οἱ μηχανοποιοί, διὰ μᾶς ὄργανον σχαστηρίας πολλὰς καὶ ποικιλὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποτελοῦντες. ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ νευρο- σπάσται μίαν μήρινθον ἐπισπασάμενοι ποιοῦσι καὶ αὐχένα κινεῖσθαι καὶ χειρὰ τοῦ ζῷου καὶ ὄμων καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε πάντα τὰ μέρη, μετὰ τινος εὐνυθμίας. οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἡ θεία φύσις ἀπὸ τινος

1 μηχανοποιοί Ζ I.or. (Notes): μηχανοτέχναι I.or. (De Mundo): μεγαλότεχνοι codd. pler. Bekk.

1 It is not clear what kind of machine is meant; the 390
as the difference between the King and the poorest and weakest creature in the world, so that if it was beneath the dignity of Xerxes to appear himself to be the actual executor of all things, to carry out his wishes himself and to administer the Empire by personal supervision, it would be still more unbecoming for God. It is more noble, more becoming, for him to reside in the highest place, while his power, penetrating the whole of the cosmos, moves the sun and moon and turns the whole of the heavens and is the cause of preservation for the things upon the earth. He has no need of the contrivance and support of others, as rulers among us men need a multitude of workers because of their weakness; the most divine thing of all is to produce all kinds of result easily by means of a single motion, just like the operators of machines, who produce many varied activities by means of the machine’s single release-mechanism.\(^a\) In the same way too the men who run puppet-shows,\(^b\) by pulling a single string, make the creature’s neck move, and his hand and shoulder and eye, and sometimes every part of his body, according to a rhythmical pattern. So also the divine being,

“varied activities” probably refer to the various parts of the machine, and do not imply multi-purpose machines. *Mechanopoios* is most frequently used of military engineers. *Schasteria* is used of the release mechanism of catapults and ballistae. It is also used of the release-mechanism of automatic machines (such as Hero’s machine for providing holy water); but in conjunction with *mechanopoios* and *organon* a reference to catapults, etc., seems more likely.

\(^a\) Plato twice refers to puppets in the *Laws* (644 d, 804 b) as well as in the shadow-theatre of the *Republic* (514); in the *Laws* the puppets are worked by wires. Aristotle uses the example of puppets to illustrate a scientific theory in *De Gen. An.* 734 b 10 ff.
[ARISTOTLE]

398 b

άπλής κινήσεως τοῦ πρώτου τὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὰ συνεχὴ δίδωσι καὶ ἀπ’ ἐκείνων πάλιν εἰς τὰ πορ-

ωτέρω, μέχρις ἂν διὰ τοῦ παντὸς διεξέλθῃ· κυ-

νηθὲν γὰρ ἐτέρον υφ’ ἐτέρου καὶ αὐτὸ πάλιν ἐκίνησεν ἄλλο σὺν κόσμῳ, δρώντων μὲν πάντων οἰκείως ταῖς 25 σφετέραις κατασκευαίς, οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς δὲ ὅδοι πᾶσιν οὕσης, ἀλλὰ διαφόρου καὶ ἐτεροίας, ἔστι δὲ οἷς καὶ ἐναντίας, καίτοι τῆς πρώτης οἴον ἐνδόσεως εἰς κίνησιν μᾶς1 γενομένης· ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τις εἴς αἴπους2 ὤμοι δύσει σφαίραν καὶ κύβον καὶ κώνον καὶ κύ-

λινδρον—ἐκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ ἰδιον κινή-
30 θήσεται σχῆμα—ἡ εἰ τις ὁμοί ζῷον ἐνυδρόν τε καὶ 
χερσαίον καὶ πτηνὸν ἐν τοῖς κόλποις ἔχων ἐκβάλοι-

δήλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μὲν νηκτὸν ἁλόμενον εἰς τὴν 
ἔαντος διάιταν ἐκκύθεται, τὸ δὲ χερσαίον εἰς τὰ 
σφέτερα ήθη καὶ νομοῦς διεξερτύσει, τὸ δὲ ἀέριον 
ἐξαρθὲν ἐκ γῆς μετάρσιον οἰχήσεται πετόμενον,

35 μᾶς τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας πᾶσιν ἀποδούσης τὴν 399 a οἰκείων εὐμάρειαν. οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ κόσμου-

διὰ γὰρ ἀπλῆς τοῦ σύμπαντος ύπρανοῦ περιαγωγῆς 

ημέρα καὶ νυκτὶ περατουμένης ἀλλοίᾳ πάντων δι-

έξοδοι γίνονται, καίτοι ὑπὸ μᾶς σφαίρας περιεχο-

μένων, τῶν μὲν θάττων, τῶν δὲ σχολαιότερον 

5 κυνουμένων παρά τε τὰ τῶν διαστημάτων μῆκη 

καὶ τὰς ἰδίας ἐκάστων κατασκευάς. σελήνη μὲν 

γὰρ ἐν μηνὶ τὸν ἐαυτῆς διαπεραίνεται κύκλον αὐξο-

μένη τε καὶ μειομένη καὶ φθινοῦσα, ἦλιος δὲ ἐν
ON THE COSMOS, 6

with a single movement of the nearest element distributes his power to the next part and then to the more remote parts until it permeates the whole. One thing is moved by another, and itself then moves a third in regular order, all things acting in the manner appropriate to their own constitution; for the way is not the same for all things, but different and various, in some cases quite opposite, though the key of the whole movement, as it were, is set by a single opening note. For instance, a similar effect would be produced if one threw from a height a sphere, a cube, a cone and a cylinder, all together: each of them will move in the manner appropriate to its own shape; or if one held in the folds of one’s cloak an aquatic animal, a land animal and a winged animal, and then threw them out all together; clearly the animal that swims will leap into its own habitat and swim away, the land animal will crawl off to its own customary pursuits and pastures, and the winged creature will rise from the ground and fly away high in the air; a single cause has restored to all of them the freedom to move, each in the manner of its species. So too in the case of the cosmos: by means of a single revolution of the whole heaven completed in a night and a day, the various motions of all the heavenly bodies are initiated, and though all are embraced in one sphere, some move rapidly and others more slowly, according to their distances and their individual characters. For the moon completes its orbit in a month, waxing and waning and disappearing; the sun and those which have an equal

1 μᾶς Lor.: μίαν codd. Bekk.


[ARISTOTLE]

399 a

ένιαυτῷ καὶ οἱ τοῦτον ἴσόδρομοι, ὃ τε Φωσφόρος καὶ ὁ Ἐρμοῦ λεγόμενος, ὃ δὲ Πυρόεις ἐν διπλασίοιν 
10 τούτων χρόνῳ, ὃ δὲ Δίως ἐν ἔξαπλασίοιν τούτου, καὶ τελευταῖος ὁ Κρόνου λεγόμενος ἐν διπλασίοι 
καὶ ήμίσει τοῦ ὑποκάτω. μία δὲ ἐκ πάντων ἄρμονία 
συναδόντων καὶ χορευόντων κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν 
ἐξ ἐνός τε γίνεται καὶ εἰς ἐν ἀπολήγει, κόσμων 
ἐτύμως τὸ σύμπαν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκοιμών ὄνομάσσασα. 
15 καθάπερ δὲ ἐν χορῷ κορυφαίου κατάρξάντος 
συνεπηχεῖ πάς ὁ χορὸς ἀνδρῶν, ἐσθ' ὅτε καὶ γυ 
ναϊκῶν, ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς ἐξυπάραις καὶ βαρύ 
τέραις μίαν ἄρμονίαν ἐμμελὴ κερανύντων, οὕτως 
ἐχει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τὸ σύμπαν διέποντος θεοῦ· κατὰ 
γὰρ τὸ ἀνωθεν ἐνδόσιμον ὑπὸ τοῦ φερωνύμως ἀν 
20 κορυφαίου προσαγορευθέντος κινεῖται μὲν τὰ ἄστρα 
ἀεὶ καὶ ὁ σύμπας οὐρανός, πορεύεται δὲ διττὰς 
πορείας ὁ παρμφαίς ἡλίος, τῇ μὲν ἡμέραν καὶ 
νύκτα διορίζων ἀνατολή καὶ δύσει, τῇ δὲ τὰς τέσ 
σαρας ὥρας ἀγων τοῦ ἔτους, πρὸς τε βόρειος καὶ 
ὅπισώ νότιος διεξέρπων. γίνονται δὲ ὑπὸ ἀκ 
25 καιρὸν καὶ ἀνεμοι καὶ δρόσοι τὰ τῆς πάθη τὰ ἐν τῷ 
περιέχοντι συμβαῖνοντα διὰ τὴν πρώτην καὶ ἄρχ 
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1 ἄρχεγον Wendland et Wilamowitz, Lor.: ἄρχαιόγονον codd. Bekk.

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course with it, namely Phosphorus (Venus) and Hermes (Mercury), complete their course in a year, Pyroeis (Mars) in twice this time, Zeus (Jupiter) in twelve years, and lastly the star called after Cronus (Saturn) in two and a half times the period of the one below it. The single harmony that is produced by all these as they sing and dance in concert round the heavens has one and the same beginning and one and the same end, in a true sense giving to the whole the name of "order" (κόσμος) and not "disorder" (ἄκοσμία). Just as in a chorus at the direction of the leader all the chorus of men, sometimes of women too, join in singing together, creating a single pleasing harmony with their varied mixture of high and low notes, so also in the case of the god who controls the universe: the note is sounded from on high by him who might well be called the chorus-master; then the stars and the whole heavens move continually, and the all-shining sun makes his double journey, dividing night from day by his rising and setting, and bringing the four seasons of the year as he moves forwards to the North and back to the South. There are rains in due season, and winds, and falls of dew, and all the phenomena that occur in the atmosphere—all are the results of the first, original cause. These are followed by the springing up of rivers, the swelling of the sea, the growth of trees, the ripening of fruit, the birth of animals, the nurture, the prime and the decay of all things; and the individual constitution of each thing contributes to the process, as I have said. So when the leader and author of all things, unseen except to the eye of

\[ a \text{ i.e. thirty years. These periods correspond to those of Eudoxus (ap. Simplic. In de Caelo 495. 26 ff.).} \]
399 a
πλὴν λογισμῶν, σημείην πάση φύσει μεταξὺ οὐρανοῦ
tε καὶ γῆς φερομένην, κινεῖται πάσα ἐνδελεχῶς ἐν
κύκλοις καὶ πέρασιν ἱδίοις, ποτὲ μὲν ἀφαιρεμένη,
poté de φαινομένη, μυρίας ἱδεάς ἀναφαίνονσά τε
καὶ πάλιν ἀποκρύπτουσα ἐκ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς. έουκε
399 b
dè κομιδή τὸ δρόμουν τοὺς ἐν πολέμου καυροῖς
μάλιστα γινομένους, ἐπειδαν ἡ σάλπιγξ σημείην τῷ
στρατοπέδῳ· τότε γὰρ τῆς φωνῆς ἑκατόσ ἀκού-
σας ὁ μὲν ἀστίδα ἀναφεταί, ὁ δὲ θώρακα ἐνδύεται;
5 ὁ δὲ κνημίδας ἡ κράνος ἡ ζωστήρα περιτίθεται·
kai ὁ μὲν ἢππον χαλινοῦ, ὁ δὲ συνωρίδα ἀναβαίνει,
ὁ δὲ σύνθημα παρεγγυά· καθίσταται δὲ εὐθέως ὁ
μὲν λοχαγὸς εἰς λόχον, ὁ δὲ ταξίαρχος εἰς τάξιν,
ὁ δὲ ἢππεύς ἐπί κέρας, ὁ δὲ ψιλὸς εἰς τὴν ἱδιὰν
ἐκτρέχει χώραν· πάντα δὲ ὕφ᾽ ἕνα σημάντωρα δο-νεῖται κατὰ προστάξειν τοῦ τὸ κράτος ἐχοντος ἤγε-
μόνος. οὕτω χρῆ καὶ περὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος φρονεῖν·
ὑπὸ γὰρ μιᾶς ῥοπῆς ὀστρυομένων ἀπάντων γίνεται
tὰ οἰκεῖα, καὶ ταύτης ἀοράτου καὶ ἀφανοῦς. ὁπερ
οὐδαμῶς ἐστιν ἐμπόδιον ὑστε ἐκείνη πρὸς τὸ δρᾶν
ὑστε ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸ πιστεύσαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχή, δι'
10 ἦν ζωμέν τε καὶ οἶκους καὶ πόλεις ἔχομεν, ἀόρατος
όσα τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῆς ὁρᾶται· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ τοῦ βίου
diáκοσμος ὑπὸ ταύτης εὑρηται καὶ διατετακται καὶ
συνέχεται, γῆς ἀρόσεις καὶ φυτεύσεις, τέχνης ἐπί-
νοιαι, χρῆσεις νόμων, κόσμοι πολιτείας, ἐνδήμου
πράξεις, ὑπερόριος πόλεμος, εἰρήνη. ταῦτα χρῆ
15 καὶ περὶ θεοῦ διανοεῖσθαι, δυνάμει μὲν ὄντος ἱσχυ-
ροτάτου, κάλλει δὲ εὐπρεπεστάτου, ζωῆς δὲ ἄθανά-
tου, ἀρετῆ δὲ κρατίστου, διότι πάση θυντῆ φύσει
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reason, gives the sign to every moving thing between heaven and earth, everything is moved continually in its orbit and within its peculiar limits, now disappearance, now appearing, revealing innumerable different forms and concealing them again, all from a single beginning. The process is very like what happens, particularly at moments in a war, when the trumpet gives a signal in a military camp; then each man hears the sound, and one picks up his shield, another puts on his breast-plate, and a third his greaves or helmet or belt; one harnesses his horse, one mounts his chariot, one passes on the watchword; the company-commander goes at once to his company, the brigadier to his brigade, the cavalryman to his squadron, and the infantryman runs to his own station; all is stirred by a single trumpeter to a flurry of motion according to the orders of the supreme commander. It is a similar idea that we must have of the universe: by a single inclination all things are spurred to action and perform their peculiar functions—and this single agent is unseen and invisible. Its invisibility is no impediment either to its own action or to our belief in it; for the soul, whereby we live and build households and cities, though it is invisible is perceived through its deeds: for all the conduct of life is discovered, arranged and maintained by the soul—the ploughing and sowing of land, the inventions of art, the use of laws, the order of a city's government, the activities of people in their own country, and war and peace with foreign nations. This is what we must also believe about God, who is mightiest in power, outstanding in beauty, immortal in life, and supreme in excellence, because

1 ἀντής codd. Lor.: ἀντοῖς codd. al. Bekk.
γενόμενος ἀθεώρητος ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων θεω-
ρεῖται. τὰ γὰρ πάθη, καὶ τὰ δὲ ἀέρος ἀπαντὰ καὶ
tὰ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐν ὕδατι, θεοῦ λέγουτ’ ἂν ὄντως
25 ἔργα εἶναι τοὺ τὸν κόσμον ἐπέχοντος. ἐξ οὗ, κατὰ
tὸν φυσικὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα,

πάνθ’ ὅσα τ’ ἦν ὅσα τ’ ἔσοθ’ ὅσα τ’ ἐσται ὅπλοσω,
δένδρεά τ’ ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἂνερες ἡδὲ γυναίκες
θηρές τ’ οἰνωνὶ τε καὶ ὕδατοθρέμμονες ἴχθος.

ἐοικε δὲ ὄντως, εἰ καὶ μικρότερον παραβαλεῖν,1
30 τοῖς ὀμφαλοῖς λεγομένοις τοῖς ἐν ταῖς φαλῶν
[λίθοις],2 οἱ μέσοι κείμενοι κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἐκάτερον
μέρος ἐνδειχθοῦ ἐν ἀρμονίᾳ τηροῦσι καὶ ἐν τάξει τὸ
πάν σχῆμα τῆς ψαλίδος καὶ ἀκίνητον. φασὶ δὲ καὶ
tὸν ἀγαλματοποιὸν Φειδίαν κατασκεύαζοντα3 τὴν ἐν
35 ἀκροπόλει Ἀθηναίων ἐν μέση τῇ ταύτῃ ἀσπίδι τὸ
ἐαυτοῦ πρόσωπων ἐντυπώσασθαι, καὶ συνάδησαι τῷ
400 a ἀγάλματι διὰ τινός ἀφανοῦς δημιουργίας, ὡστε ἐξ
ἀνάγκης, εἰ τις βουλόντοι αὐτὸ περιαρεῖν, τὸ σύμπαν
ἀγαλμα λύειν τε καὶ συγχεῖν. τοῦτον οὖν ἔχει τὸν
λόγον ὁ θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ, συνέχουν τὴν τῶν ὀλων
5 ἀρμονίαν τε καὶ σωτηρίαν, πλὴν οὔτε μέσος ὄν, ἐνθα ἡ γῆ τε καὶ ὁ θολερὸς τόπος οὗτος, ἀλλ’ ἂν
καθαρὸς ἐν καθαρῷ χωρῷ βεβηκώς, ὃν ἐτύμως κα-
λούμεν ὑπάρχων μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄρου εἶναι τὸν ἄνω,
"Ολυμπὸν δὲ οἶνον ὀλολαμπῆ τε καὶ παντὸς λόφου καὶ

1 μικρότερον παραβαλεῖν I.or.: μικρότερον, παραβάλλειν τὸν
κόσμον Bkk.
2 λίθοις del. Wendland et Wilamowitz.
3 κατασκευάζοντα BDZ; [Arist.] De Mir. Ausc. 155; I.or.:
kata skuevaζomenev Bkk.
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though he is invisible to every mortal thing he is seen through his deeds. For it would be true to say that all the phenomena of the air, the land and the water are the works of the God who rules the cosmos; from whom, according to Empedocles a the natural philosopher,

grows all that is and was and is yet to come,
the trees and the whole race of men and women,
beasts, birds and water-nurtured fish.

Though it is rather a humble comparison, he is truly like the so-called "keystones" of vaults, which lie in the middle and by their junction with each side ensure the proper fit of the whole structure of the vault and preserve its arrangement and stability. They say too that the sculptor Pheidias, when he was making the Athena on the Acropolis, carved his own face into the middle of her shield, and by some hidden trick of craftsmanship attached it to the statue in such a way that if anyone tried to remove it he inevitably destroyed and demolished the whole statue. b And this is the position held in the cosmos by God, who maintains the orderliness and preservation of the whole: except that he is not in the centre—for here lies the earth, this turbulent, troubled place—but high aloft, pure in a pure region, which we rightly call "heaven" (οὐράνιον) because it forms the uppermost boundary (ὁποῖος ἀνω) or "Olympus" because it shines brightly all over (ὅλος ἁλυρίας) and is

a Diels, Vorsokr. 6 31 B 21.

b Cf. Ps.-Aristot. De Mir. Ausc. 846 a 19 ff.; Plut. Pericles 31; Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 15. 34; Val. Max. viii. 14. 6. Cicero and Plutarch only mention the portrait. The statue was the gold and ivory Athena in the Parthenon. In several economic crises the gold was removed and melted down and later restored.
400 a

ατάκτου κινήματος κεχωρισμένον, οδά γίνεται παρ’ ἧμῖν διὰ χειμώνος καὶ ἀνέμων βίας, ὥσπερ ἐφή καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς ["Ομηρος"]

Οὐλυμπόνδ’, θὰ φασί θεῶν ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ ἐμμεναί. οὐτ’ ἀνέμοισι τυνάσσεται οὔτε ποτ’ ὀμβρῳ
dεύται, οὔτε χιῶν ἐπιπίλναται, ἀλλὰ μᾶλ’ αἰθρὴ πέπταται ἀνέφελος, λευκὴ δ’ ἐπιδέδρομεν αὐγή.

15 συνεπιμαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος ἀπας, τὴν ἄνω χώραν ἀποδοὺς θεῶ. καὶ γὰρ πάντες ἀνθρωποὶ ἀνατείνωμεν
tὰς χεῖρας εἰς τὸν ὦρανον εὐχὰς ποιοῦμεν. καθ’ ὄν λόγον οὐ κακῶς κάκειν ἀναπεφώνηται

Ζεὺς δ’ ἔλαχ’ ὦρανον εὐρύν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλησι.

20 διὸ καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὰ τιμώτατα τὸν αὐτὸν ἐσέχει τόπον, ἄστρα τε καὶ ἡλίος καὶ σελήνη.

μόνα τε τὰ ὦρανα διὰ τὸ τοῦτο αἰὲ τὴν αὐτὴν σώζοντα τάξιν διακεκόσμηται, καὶ οὔποτε ἄλλοιωθέντα

μετεκινῆθη, καθάπερ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς εὔτρεπτα ὄντα πολλὰς ἐτεροωσεῖς καὶ πάθη ἀναδέδεκται.

25 σεισμοὶ τε γὰρ ἦδη βίαιοι πολλὰ μέρη τῆς γῆς ἀνέρρηξαν, ὀμβροὶ τε κατέκλυσαν ἐξ ἦλιου καταρραγέντες,

ἐπιδρομαί τε κυμάτων καὶ ἀναχωρήσεις πολλάκις καὶ ἡπείρους ἔθαλαττωσαν καὶ θαλάττας ἡπείρωσαν, βιαὶ τε πνευμάτων καὶ τυφώνων ἐστὶ

30 ὅτε πόλεις ὦλας ἀνέτρεψαν, πυρκαίαί τε καὶ φλόγες

αἱ μὲν ἐξ ὦρανοῦ γενόμενα πρῶτον, ὥσπερ φασίν, ἐπὶ Φαέθοντος τὰ πρὸς ἐω μέρη κατέφλεξαν,

ἀἱ δὲ πρὸς ἐσπέραν ἐκ γῆς ἀναβλύσασαι καὶ ἐκφυσήσασαι, καθάπερ τῶν ἐν Αἴτημι κρατήρων ἀναρραγέντων καὶ ἀνὰ τὴν γῆν φερομένων χειμάρρουν

400 b δίκην. ἔνθα καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐσεβῶν γένος ἐξόχως

400
removed from all darkness and disorderly motion such as occurs among us when there is a storm or a violent wind; as the poet says, a

To Olympus, where they say the gods' dwelling stands always safe; it is not shaken by winds, nor drenched by showers of rain, nor does snow come near it; always unclouded the air spreads out, and a white radiance lies upon it.

And all ages bear witness to this fact, and allot the upper region to God: all of us men stretch out our hands to the heavens when we pray. According to this reasoning, the following also has been well said b:

To Zeus belongs the wide heaven in the clouds and the aether.

So also the same place is occupied by the most honoured of perceptible things, the stars and the sun and the moon; and for this reason only the heavenly bodies always keep the same order and arrangement, and are never changed or altered; while the transient things on earth admit many alterations and conditions. For violent earthquakes before now have torn up many parts of the earth, monstrous storms of rain have burst out and overwhelmed it, incursions and withdrawals of the waves have often made seas of dry land and dry land of seas; sometimes whole cities have been over-turned by the violence of gales and typhoons; flaming fires from the heavens once burnt up the Eastern parts, they say, in the time of Phaëthon, and others gushed and spouted from the earth, in the West, as when the craters of Etna erupted and spread over the earth like a mountain-torrent. Here, too, the race of pious

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a Hom. Od. vi. 42-45.  
b Hom. II. xv. 192.

1 "Ομηρος om. Z Lor.
ἐτύμησε τὸ δαμόνιον, περικαταληφθέντων ὑπὸ τοῦ ῥεύματος διὰ τὸ βαστάζειν γέροντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἁμών γονεῖς καὶ σώζειν· πλησίον γενόμενος ὁ τοῦ πυρὸς ποταμὸς ἐξεσχίσθη παρέτρεψε τοῦ φλογ-5 μοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνθα, τὸ δὲ ἐνθα, καὶ ἐτήρησεν ἀβλαβεῖς ἀμα τοῖς γονεῦσι τούς νεανίσκους.

Καθόλου δὲ ὅπερ ἐν νηὶ μὲν κυβερνήτης, ἐν ἀρματὶ δὲ ἴμισχος, ἐν χορῷ δὲ κορυφαῖς, ἐν πόλει δὲ νομο<θέτη>s, ἐν στρατοπέδῳ δὲ ἠγεμόν, τούτο θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ, πλὴν καθ’ ὅσον τοῖς μὲν καματη-10 ροῖς τὸ ἀρχεῖν πολυκίνητον τε καὶ πολυμέρμην, τῷ δὲ ἀλυστὸν ἄπονον τε καὶ πάσης κεχωρισμένου σωματικῆς ἀσθενείας· ἐν ἀκινήτῳ γὰρ ἱδρυμένος πάντα κινεῖ καὶ περιάγει, ὅπου βουλεῖται καὶ ὅπως, ἐν διαφόροις ἱδείας τε καὶ φύσεις, ὅπερ ἀμέλει καὶ ὁ τῆς πόλεως νόμος ἀκίνητος ὥν ἐν ταῖς τοῖς
15 χρωμένων ψυχαῖς πάντα οἰκονομεῖ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πολυτείαν· ἐφεπόμενοι γὰρ αὐτῷ δηλοῦντι ἐξίασων ἄρχοντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀρχεῖα, θεσμοθέται δὲ εἰς τὰ ὀικεῖα δικαστήρια, βουλευταὶ δὲ καὶ ἐκκλησιασ-ταὶ εἰς συνέδρια τὰ προσήκοντα, καὶ ὁ μὲν τις εἰς τὸ πρυτανεῖον βαδίζει σιτησίμονειν, ὁ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς
20 δικαστὰς ἀπολογησόμενος, ὁ δὲ εἰς τὸ δεσμωτή-ριον ἀποθανοῦμενος· γίνονται δὲ καὶ δημοθυνιά νόμων καὶ πανηγύρεις ἐναύσσοι θεῶν τε θυσίαι καὶ ἡρώων θεραπεῖαι καὶ χοὰι κεκμηκότων· ἀλλὰ δὲ ἄλλως ἐνεργοῦμενα κατὰ μίαν πρόσταξιν ἡ νό-μων ἐξουσίαν σώζει τὸ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ὄντως ὅτι

25 πόλις δ’ ὁμοῦ μὲν θυμιαμάτων γέμει, ὁμοῦ δὲ παιάνων τε καὶ στεναγμάτων,

1 νομο<θέτη>s coni. I.or. : νόμος codd. Bekk.
ON THE COSMOS, 6

men was especially honoured by the divinity, when they were overtaken by the stream of lava, because they were carrying their old parents on their shoulders to keep them safe; for when the river of fire drew near them it was split in two and turned one part to this side and the other to that, and preserved unharmed both the young men and their parents.

In a word then, as the helmsman in his ship, as the charioteer in his chariot, as the leader in a chorus, as the lawgiver in a city, as the commander in a military camp, so is God in the cosmos, except that their command is wearisome and fraught with many movements and cares, while God rules without pain and toil, free from all bodily weakness: for he is established in the immovable, and moves and directs all things as and where he wishes, among the varieties of form and nature; just as the law of the city, itself immovably established within the minds of those who observe it, disposes all the activities of the state: for in obedience to the law the magistrates go to their offices, the judges to their appropriate courts, the councillors and members of the assembly to their appointed meeting-places; and one man goes to the Prytaneum for his meals, another to the law-courts to defend himself, a third to prison to die. The law also ordains public feasts and annual festivals, sacrifices to the gods, cults of heroes and libations to the dead: and other varied activities, all arising from a single ordinance or authority of the law, accord well with these words of the poet:

The city is full of heavy incense-fumes,
with crying for deliverance, and laments.

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\(^a\) The story is told of Amphion and his brother by the poet of the \textit{Aetna} (625 f.)

\(^b\) Soph. \textit{O.T.} 4-5.
οὗτως ὑποληπτέον καὶ ἕπι τῆς μείζονος πόλεως, λέγω δὲ τοῦ κόσμου νόμος γὰρ ἡμῖν ἰσοκλινὴς ὁ θεός, οὐδεμιᾶν ἐπιδεχόμενος διόρθωσιν ἡ μετά-30 θεσιν, κρείττων δὲ, οἴμαι, καὶ βεβαιότερος τῶν ἐν ταῖς κύριεσιν ἀναγεγραμμένων. ἤγουμένοι δὲ ἀκινήτως\(^1\) αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐμμελῶς ὁ σύμπας οἰκονομεῖται διάκοσµος οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς, μεμερισµένος κατὰ τὰς φύσεις πάσας διὰ τῶν οἰκείων σπερµάτων εἰς τε φυτὰ καὶ ζώα κατὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη· καὶ γὰρ

401 a ἄμπελοι καὶ φοινικεῖς καὶ περσέα

συκέα τε γλυκεραί καὶ ἐλαίαι,

ὡς φησιν ὁ ποιητής, τὰ τε ἀκαρπα μέν, ἄλλας δὲ παρεχόμενα χρείας, πλάτανοι καὶ πίτυες καὶ πῦξιν

κλήθης τ᾽ αὐγειρός τε καὶ εὐώδης κυτάρισσος,

5 αἱ τε καρπῶν ὀπώρας ἦδυν ἄλλως δὲ δυσθησαῦριστον φέρουσαι,

ὅχιναι καὶ ῥοιαὶ καὶ μηλέαι ἄγλακαρποι,

τῶν τε ζῷων τὰ τε ἄγρια καὶ ἦμερα, τὰ τε ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ἕπι γῆς καὶ ἐν ύδατι βοσκόμενα, γίνεται καὶ 10 ἀκμάζει καὶ φθείρεται τοῖς τοῦ θεοῦ πειθόμενα θεσμοῖς. "πάν γὰρ ἐρπετὸν πληγῇ νέμεται," ὡς φησιν Ἦρακλείτος.

7. Εἰς δὲ ὄντων πολυώνυμός ἐστι, κατονοµαζόμενος τοῖς πάθεσι πάσιν ἀπερ αὐτός νεοχμοῖ. καλούµεν 15 δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ Ζήνα καὶ Δία, παραλλήλως χρώµενοι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ὡς κἂν εἰ λέγουµεν δί' ὃν ξῶµεν. Κρόνου δὲ παῖς καὶ χρόνου λέγεται, διήκων εἰς αἰῶνος ἀτέρµονος εἰς ἑτερον αἰῶνα. ἀστραπαῖος τε καὶ βρονταῖος καὶ αἴθριος καὶ αἰθέριος κεραυνός

\(^1\) ἀκινήτως Stob. Lor. : ἀεικινήτως codd. Bekk.
So it is, we must suppose, with that greater city, the cosmos: God is a law to us, impartial and admitting no correction or change; he is surely a stronger and more stable law than those inscribed on tablets. Under his motionless and harmonious guidance all the orderly arrangement of heaven and earth is administered, extending over all things through the seed proper to their kind, to plants and animals by genus and species; vines, palms and perseae, "sweet figs and olives," as the poet says, and those that bear no fruit but serve some other purpose, planes and pines and box-trees, "the alder, the poplar and the sweet-scented cypress-tree"; and those which in the autumn bring forth a harvest that is sweet but hard to store, "pears and pomegranates and apples with shining fruit"; and animals, some wild, some tame, that live in the air and on the earth and in the water,—all these come into being and grow strong and perish, obedient to the laws of god. "For every creature that crawls is driven to pasture by his goad," as Heracleitus says.

7. Though he is one, he has many names, according to the many effects he himself produces. We call him both Zena and Dia, using the names interchangeably, as if we were to say "Him through whom (διὰ ὅν) we live (ἐπὶ ὃν)." He is called the Son of Cronus and of time (Chronos), because he lives from endless age to another age; God of Lightning and of Thunder, God of the Air and Aether, God of the Thunderbolt

---

a At Athens, tablets on which the early laws were written.  
b Hom. Od. xi. 590.  
c Hom. Od. v. 64.  
d Hom. Od. xi. 589.  
e Diels, Vorsokr. 22 B 11.  
f Ζηνα and Δία are used interchangeably as accusatives of Zeus.
401 a

τε καὶ υτέτιος ἀπὸ τῶν υτετῶν καὶ κεραυνῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καλεῖται. καὶ μὴν ἐπικάρπιος μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν
καρπῶν, πολίευς δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων οὐνομάζεται,
γενέθλιος τε καὶ ἐρκεῖος καὶ ὀμόγνιος καὶ πατρῷος 1
ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς ταῦτα κοινωνίας, ἐταιρεῖος τε καὶ
φίλιος καὶ ξένιος καὶ στράτιος καὶ τροπαιοῦχος,
καθάρσιος τε καὶ παλαμναῖος καὶ ἰκέσιος καὶ μελί-
χιος, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταί λέγουσι, σωτήρ τε καὶ
25 ἐλευθέριος ἐτύμως, ὡς δὲ τὸ πᾶν εἰπεῖν, οὐράνιος
tε καὶ χθόνιος, πάσης ἐπώνυμος φύσεως ὦν καὶ
τύχης, ἀτε πάντων αὐτὸς αἰτίου ὦν. διὸ καὶ ἐν
τοῖς Ὁρφικοῖς οὐ κακῶς λέγεται

Zeús πρώτος γένετο, Zeús οὐστατος ἄρχικέραυνος. 2
Zeús κεφαλή, Zeús μέσσα, Δίος δ' ἐκ πάντα
τέτυκται.

401 b

Zeús πυθμὴν γαϊής τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος:
Zeús ἁρπην γένετο, Zeús ἀμβροτος ἐπλετο νύμφη:
Zeús πνοή πάντων, Zeús ἀκαμάτου πυρὸς ὄρμη:
Zeús πόντου βίζα, Zeús ἕλιος ἣδε σελήνη:
5 Zeús βασιλεὺς, Zeús ἀρχὸς ἀπάντων ἄρχικέραυ-
νος. 3

πάντας γὰρ κρύψας αὖθις φάος ἐς πολυγηθές
ἐξ ἀερῆς κραδίης ἀνενέγκατο, μέρμερα βέζων.

Οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἀνάγκην οὐκ ἄλλο τι λέγεσθαι
πλὴν τούτων, οἴονει ἀνίκητον αἰτίαν 4 ὄντα, Εἰμι-
10 μέγην δὲ διὰ τὸ εἰρεῖν τε καὶ χωρεῖν ἄκωλυτος,

1 πατρῷος Wendland et Wilamowitz, Lor.: πάτριος codd. Bekt.
2 ἄρχικέραυνος P Lor.: ἄρχικέραυνος codd. cet. Bekt. (et
401 b 5).

406
ON THE COSMOS, 7

and the Rain—he takes his name from all these things. He is called Harvest-God and City-God, God of the Family and the Household, God of Kinsmen and Ancestral God, because of his connexion with these things; God of Fellowship and Friendship and Hospitality, of War and Victory, of Purification and Vengeance, of Supplication and Grace, as the poets say, and in a true sense Saviour and Liberator. To sum up all, he is a God of Heaven and God of Earth,\(^a\) and takes his name from every kind of nature and estate; for he himself is the cause of all. So it is rightly written in the Orphic books \(^b\):

Zeus is the first-born, Zeus is last, the lord of the lightning;
Zeus is the head, Zeus the centre; from Zeus comes all that is;
Zeus is the foundation of the earth and the starry heavens;
Zeus is a man, Zeus an immortal maid;
Zeus is the breath of all things, Zeus is the spring of tireless fire;
Zeus is the root of ocean, Zeus is the sun and moon;
Zeus is king, Zeus is the master of all, the lord of the lightning.

For he hid all men away, and has brought them again to the lovely light from the holiness of his heart, working great marvels.

I think too that Necessity (Ἀνάγκη), is nothing but another name for him, as being a cause that cannot be defeated (ἀνίκητος); and Destiny (Ἠμαρμένη), because he binds things together (εἰρείν) and moves

\(^a\) Ξθόνος usually implies the Underworld; but Pseudo-Aristotle is probably stretching the meaning slightly to suit his own cosmology.


\(^3\) vid. 401 a 28.

\(^4\) αἷριαν CG Lor.: οὖσιαν codd. al. Bekk.
401 b

Πεπρωμένην δὲ διὰ τὸ πεπερατώσθαι πάντα καὶ μηδὲν ἐν τοῖς οὐσίων ἀπειρον εἶναι, καὶ Μοῖραν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ μεμερίσθαι, Νέμεσιν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκάστης διανεμήσεως, Ἀδράστειαν δὲ ἀναπόδραστον αἰτήν οὖσαν κατὰ φύσιν, Ἀίσαν δὲ ἀεὶ οὖσαν. τά τε περὶ 15 τὰς Μοίρας καὶ τὸν ἄτρακτον εἰς ταύτῳ πως νευεῖ τρεῖς μὲν γὰρ αἱ Μοῖραι, κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους μεμερισμέναι, νήμα δὲ ἄτρακτον τὸ μὲν ἔξειργασμένον, τὸ δὲ μέλλον, τὸ δὲ περιστρεφόμενον· τέτακται δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ γεγονός μία τῶν Μοιρῶν, Ἄτροπος, ἐπεὶ τὰ παρελθόντα πάντα ἄτρεπτα ἦστι, 20 κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέλλον Λάχεσις—[εἰς] πάντα γὰρ ἢ κατὰ φύσιν μὲνει λήξις—κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐνεστὸς Κλωθώ, συμπεραίνουσά τε καὶ κλώθουσα ἐκάστῳ τὰ οἰκεία. περαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ο μύθος οὐκ ἄτακτως.

Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν ὁ θεός, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ γενναῖος Πλάτων φησίν. “ὁ μὲν δὴ 25 θεός, ὥσπερ ὁ παλαιός λόγος, ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτήν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὁντων ἄπαντων ἔχων, εὐθεία περαινεῖ κατὰ φύσιν πορευόμενον· τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ εὐνέπεται δίκη, τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός—ὡς ὁ γεννήσεσθαι2 μέλλων μακάριος τε καὶ εὐδαιμονων ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς μέτοχοι εἰη.”

1 εἰς del. Wendland et Wilamowitz.
without hindrance; Fate (Πεπρωμένη), because all things are finite (πεπερατόσθαν) and nothing in the world is infinite; Moira, from the division of things (μερίζευν); Nemesis, from the allocation of a share to each (διαινέμησις); Adrasteia—a cause whose nature is to be inescapable (ἀναπόδραστος αἰτία); and Aisa—a cause that exists for ever (ἀεὶ οὖσα). The story of the Fates (Μοῖραι) and the spindle also has much the same tendency: there are three Fates, corresponding to different times, and part of the yarn on their spindles is already completed, part is still to be spun, and part is now being worked. The past is the concern of one of the Fates, called Atropos, because all past things are irreversible (ἀτρεπτὰ); the future belongs to Lachesis, for a fortune allotted (ληγίς) by nature awaits all things; the present is Clotho’s province, who settles each man’s own destiny and spins (κλωθεῖν) his thread. So the story ends, and it is well said.

All these things are no other than God, as the great Plato tells us: “God, as the ancient story says, holding the beginning and the end and the middle of all things that are, moves by a straight path in the course of nature, bringing them to fulfilment; and behind him, taking vengeance on all that fall short of the divine law, follows Justice—let no man be without this, even from his earliest years, if he is to live in blessed happiness.”

\[a\] ὁ μὲν ... τιμωρός Laws 715 ε—716 ἂ: ἦς ... εἶ ἴν
Laws 730 ἃ. The antecedent of ἦς in Plato is ἀληθεία. Pseudo-Aristotle runs the two passages together, making δίκη the antecedent of ἦς.
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