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PREFACE

In proceeding with this edition of the *Moralia* a few changes have been made from the standard created and maintained by Professor Babbitt. The spelling μίγνυμι has been adopted, and γίνομαι and γινώσκω have been preferred. But variation of ττ and σσ has been allowed. Elsewhere the orthography adopted by Mr. Pohlenz in the Teubner edition has been followed, or not abandoned without reason.

The expert assistance of Professor F. H. Fobes of Amherst College and that of Professor L. C. Barret and Mr. J. A. Notopoulos of Trinity College must be gratefully acknowledged. All three read the proof, and the two last, parts of the manuscripts. They removed innumerable errors and inconsistencies, but for blemishes that may yet remain they are not responsible.

W. C. Helmbold

Trinity College,
Hartford, Conn.
THE TRADITIONAL ORDER of the Books of the Moralia as they appear since the edition of Stephanus (1572), and their division into volumes in this edition.

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CAN VIRTUE BE TAUGHT?
(AN VIRTUS DOCERI POSSIT)
INTRODUCTION

This slight and possibly fragmentary essay, or declamation, makes no considerable addition to the theory of knowledge. Virtue is assumed to be an "art"; since the practice of all other arts is unsuccessful without instruction, Virtue (ἀρετή), or the Good Life (τὸ εὖ ζῆν), or Prudence (φρόνησις)—for Plutarch appears to equate the three—must be learned, if we are to be successful in the dependent arts. Plutarch appeals as usual to common sense, but does not take the trouble to prove any of his assumptions; yet the work, even in its present mutilated state, is a graceful exercise in popular philosophy.

While Plutarch's slipshod and half-defined position is not directly contrary to that of Plato (e.g. in the Meno), it must be observed that two pupils of Socrates, Crito and Simon, wrote works with the titles, "Οτι οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ μαθεὶν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ (That Men are not made Good by Instruction) and Περὶ ἀρετῆς ὁτι οὐ διδακτῶν (That Virtue cannot be Taught), respectively. Whether these books differed radically from the Platonic or Socratic position, as developed in the Meno and the Republic, cannot be argued here.

We must note in passing that G. Siefert (Commentationes Ienenses, 1896, pp. 102-105) held that Plutarch

\[a\] Diogenes Laertius, ii. 121, 122.
wrote this work in connexion with the *De Fortuna* (see the parallels recorded in the notes) and that it is not mutilated, but unfinished.\(^a\) This is quite possible.\(^b\)

The text is very uncertain, for although the essay appears in several important classes of mss., they differ considerably among themselves. The text which must serve as the basis of the present translation is only presented with the greatest hesitation.

The work appears as No. 180 in the Lamprias catalogue, where it bears the title Περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰ διδακτέον \(^c\) ἡ ἀρετή.

\(^a\) "Ne hic quidem liber fragmentum est, sed schedula tantum a Plutarcho in suum usum obiter composita."

\(^b\) Xylander’s supposition, recently repeated without argument by Hartman, that this is not a work of Plutarch, seems untenable.

\(^c\) Bernardakis would rightly emend to διδακτῶν.
1. Περὶ τῆς ἄρετῆς βουλευόμεθα καὶ διαποροῦμεν, εἰ διδάκτον ἐστὶ τὸ φρονεῖν τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν τὸ εὖ ξήν. εἰτα¹ θαυμάζομεν, εἰ ρητόρων μὲν ἔργα καὶ κυβερνητῶν καὶ ἀρμονικῶν καὶ οἰκοδόμων καὶ Β γεωργῶν μυρὶ² ἐστὶν, ἀγαθοὶ δ' ἀνδρεῖς ὀνομάζονται καὶ λέγονται μόνον, ὡς ἰπποκένταυροι καὶ γίγαντες καὶ κύκλωπες. ἐργον δ' ἀμεμφῆς εἰς ἄρετὴν³ οὐκ ἔστιν εὗρεῖν οὐδὲ πάθους ἀκέραιον ἦθος οὐδ'⁴ ἀθλικτῶν αἰσχροῦ βίον⁵. ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τι καλὸν ἡ φύσις αὐτομάτως ἐκφέρει, τοῦτο πολλῷ τῷ ἀλλοτρίῳ, καθάπερ ὑλὴ καρπὸς ἀγρίᾳ καὶ ἀκαθάρτῳ μηνύμενος, ἐξαμαυροῦται. ἄλλως μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι καὶ ἀναγνώσκειν γράμματα καὶ γεωργεῖν καὶ ἰππεύειν⁶. ὑποδείσθαι μανθάνουσιν, περιβάλλεσθαι⁷. οἰνοχοεῖν διδάσκοντος ὁφοποιεῖν. ταῦτ' ἀνεύ τοῦ μαθεῖν οὐκ ἔστι χρησίμως ποιεῖν, δι' δ' δὲ ταῦτα πάντα, τὸ εὖ βιοῦν, ἀδίδακτον καὶ ἀλογον καὶ ἀτεχνὸν καὶ αὐτόματον;

2. "Ω ἀνθρώποι, τί τὴν ἄρετὴν λέγοντες ἀδί-

¹ εἰτα] εἰτ' οὐ Reiske.
² μυρὶ" Wyttenbach, confirmed by one ms.: μυρία δ'.
³ καὶ ἀκέραιον after ἄρετὴν deleted by Wyttenbach.
⁴ οὐδ'] καὶ in some mss.
⁵ βίον Pohlenz: βίον οὐ βίον καὶ ἀκέραιον.
CAN VIRTUE BE TAUGHT?

1. When we discuss Virtue we debate the question whether Prudence, Justice, and the Good Life can be taught; then we are surprised that the achievements of orators, pilots, musicians, architects, and farmers are past counting, whereas "good men" is only a name and a mere term, like "Centaurs," "Giants," or "Cyclopes"! And it is impossible to find any deed that is faultless as regards its virtue, or any character undefiled by passion, or any life untouched by dishonour; but even if Nature does spontaneously produce something that is excellent, this excellence is obscured by much that is foreign to it, like wheat mixed with wild and impure stuff. Men learn to play the harp, to dance and to read, to farm and to ride the horse; they learn to put on shoes and to don garments, they are taught to pour wine and to bake meat. All these things it is impossible to do properly without instruction; but shall that for the attainment of which all these things are done, that is, the Good Life, be unteachable, irrational, requiring no skill, and fortuitous?

2. O mortal men! Why do we assert that virtue

\[^a\) i.e. tares; cf. Moralia, 51 Α.\]

\[^6\) After \(\iota\pi\ne\nu\epsilon\nu\) some mss. add \(\kai\ \tau\i\ \delta\epsilon\i\v\nu\);\]

\[^7\) \(\pi\epsilon\i\beta\alpha\lambda\lambda\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\i\) \(\kai\ \\alpha\le\i\varphi\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\i\) added in some mss.\]
(439) δακτον εἶναι ποιοῦμεν ἀνύπαρκτον; εἰ γὰρ ἡ μάθησις γένεσις ἔστιν, ἢ τοῦ μαθεῖν κύλυσις ἀναίρεσις. καίτοι γ’, ὡς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, διὰ τὴν τοῦ ποδὸς πρὸς τὴν λύραν ἀμετρίαν καὶ ἀναρ-μοστίαν οὔτ’ ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφῆς πολεμεῖ οὔτε φίλως φίλῳ διαφέρεται, οὔτε πόλεις πόλεσε δι’ ἀπεχθείας γνώμεναι τὰ ἔσχατα κακὰ δρῶσι τε καὶ πά- 

D σχούσων ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων· οὔδε περὶ προσώπιας ἔχει τις εἴπειν στάσιν ἐν πόλει γενομένην, 3 πότερον Τέλ- 
χινας 4 ἢ Τέλχινας ἀναγνωστεόν· οὔδ’ ἐν οὐκία διαφορὰν ἀνδρός καὶ γυναικὸς ὑπὲρ κρόκης ἡ στήμονος. ἅλλ’ ὁμως οὔτ’ ἂν ἰστὸν οὔτε βιβλίον ἡ λύραν ὁ μὴ μαθῶν μεταχειρίσατο, καίπερ εἰς οὐδὲν μέγα βλαβησόμενος, ἅλλ’ αἴδειται γενέσθαι καταγέλαστος (”ἀμαθὴν” γάρ, ’Ἡράκλειτός φησι, “κρύπτειν ἀμείνον”), οἶκον δὲ καὶ γάμον καὶ πολιτείαν καὶ ἁρχὴν οἴεται καλῶς μεταχειρί- 

σεσθαί 5 μὴ γυναικὶ μαθῶν συμφέρεσθαι 6 μὴ θεράποντι μὴ πολίτη μὴ ἁρχομένω μὴ ἁρχοντι; 

Παιδὸς ὄψοφαγοῦντος ὁ Διογένης τῷ παιδαγω- 

gῷ κόνδυλον ἔδωκεν, ὄρθως οὐ τοῦ μὴ μαθῶν 

Ε ἅλλὰ τοῦ μὴ διδάξαντος τὸ ἀμάρτημα ποιήσας. 

εἶτα παροιμίδος μὲν ἡ κύλικος οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνεῖν 

1 τοῦ ποδὸς] ἐν τῷ ποδὶ Plato. 

2 ἔσχατα κακὰ] ἔσχατα Plato. 

3 γενομένην Emperius and a few mss.: γινομένην. 

4 ἢ Τέλχινας added by Xylander. 

5 μεταχειρίσεσθαί most mss. have -σασθαι or -ζεσθαί. 

6 μαθῶν συμφέρεσθαι added by W.C.H. after Pohlenz.
is unteachable, and thus make it non-existent? For if learning begets virtue, the prevention of learning destroys it. Yet truly, as Plato\(^a\) says, just because a foot of verse is out of measure with the lyre and fails to harmonize with it, brother does not war with brother, nor does friend quarrel with friend, nor do states conceive hatred toward other states and wreak upon each other the most extreme injuries and suffer them as well; nor can anyone say that civil strife has ever broken out in a state over a question of accent, as, for instance, whether we should read Télchines or Telchínes,\(^b\) nor that a quarrel has ever arisen in a household between husband and wife as to which is the warp and which the woof. Yet, for all that, no one, unless he has received instruction, would attempt to handle a loom or a book or a lyre, though he would suffer no great harm if he did so, but he is merely afraid of becoming ridiculous (for, as Heraclitus\(^c\) says, “It is better to conceal ignorance”); but everyone thinks that without instruction he will handle successfully a home, a marriage, a commonwealth, a magistracy—though he has not learned how to get along with wife, or servant, or fellow-citizen, or subject, or ruler!

Diogenes, when he saw a child eating sweet-meats, gave the boy’s tutor a cuff, rightly judging the fault to be, not that of him who had not learned, but of him who had not taught. Then, when it is impossible

\(^a\) Cleitophon, 407 c.; cf. Moralia, 534 f.

\(^b\) The latter, according to Herodianus Technicus, i. p. 17 (ed. Lentz).

\(^c\) Diels, Frag. d. Vorsokratiker\(^5\), i. p. 172, Frag. 95; the fragment is given more fully in Moralia, 644 f and in a different form in Frag. 1 of That Women Also Should be Educated (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 125).
πειδεύς, ἄν μή μάθη τις εὐθὺς ἐκ παιδῶν ἀρξάμενος, ὥς Ἀριστοφάνης, ¹
μὴ κυλίζειν μηδ’ ὀψοφαγεῖν μηδ’ ἰσχεῖν τῷ πόδ’ ἐπαλλάξ. ²


¹ Wytenbach would add φησίν.
² ἐπαλλάξ mss. of Aristophanes.
³ πρῶτοι Reiske: πρῶτον.
⁴ καίτοι Emperius: καὶ αὐτῶν.
⁵ τί added by Pohlenz.

⁷ Adapted from Clouds, 983.
⁸ Cf. Juvenal, viii. 97: furor est post omnia perdere naulum, which indicates the proverbial character of the 8
to eat and drink politely in company if one has not learned from childhood, as Aristophanes a says,

Not to laugh like a clown, nor dainties gulp down, nor to cross one leg on the other; yet can men enter without censure the fellowship of a household, a city, a marriage, a way of life, a magistracy, if they have not learned how they should get along with fellow-beings? When Aristippus was asked by someone, "So you are everywhere, it seems, aren't you?" "Well then," he replied with a laugh, "I am wasting my fare, b if indeed I am everywhere." Why, then, would you also not say, "If men do not become better by teaching, the fee given to their tutors is wasted"? For these are the first to receive the child when it has been weaned and, just as nurses mould its body with their hands, c so tutors by the habits they inculcate train the child’s character to take a first step, as it were, on the path of virtue. So the Spartan, d when he was asked what he effected by his teaching, said, "I make honourable things pleasant to children." And yet what do tutors teach? To walk in the public streets with lowered head; to touch salt-fish with but one finger, but fresh fish, bread, and meat with two e; to sit in such and such a posture; in such and such a way to wear their cloaks.f expression. Aristippus, having the entrée everywhere, need waste no money in transit.

a Cf. Moralia, 3 e; Plato, Republic, 377 c.
b Cf. Moralia, 432 d, infra.
c The point is obscure and the text corrupt.
d Cf. Moralia, 5 a and 99 d. See Aristophanes, Clouds, 973 ff., for the way good boys should sit and walk in public; Birds, 1368, for the proper way to wear a cloak.
PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

(440) 3. Τί οὖν; ὁ λέγων λειχῆνος ιατρικὴν εἶναι καὶ παρωνυχίας, πλευρίτιδος δὲ καὶ πυρετοῦ καὶ φρενίτιδος μὴ εἶναι, τί διαφέρει τοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι τῶν μικρῶν καὶ παιδικῶν καθηκόντων ἔστι δι- δασκαλεία καὶ λόγοι καὶ ὑποθήκαι, τῶν δὲ μεγά- λων καὶ τελείων ἁλογος τριβῆ καὶ περίπτωσις ἐστιν; ὡς γάρ ὁ λέγων ὅτι δεῖ κόπτην ἐλαύνειν μαθόντα κυβερνάν δὲ καὶ μὴ μαθόντα γελοῖος ἐστιν, οὕτως ὁ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀπολείπον τε- χνῶν μάθησιν, ἄρετῆς δὲ ἀναιρῶν τοῦναντίον έουκε τοῖς Σκύθαις ζουεῖν. ἔκεινοι μὲν γάρ, ὡς φησιν Ὁρόδοτος, τούς οίκετας ἐκτυφλοὺς ὅπως πῦαρ

Β παραδιδώσῳ αὐτοῦς· οὕτως δὲ ταῖς δούλαις καὶ ὑπηρέτουι τεχναὶ ὡσπερ ὃμα τοῦ λόγον ἐντιθεῖσ 

Καίτοι γ' ὁ στρατηγὸς Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Καλλίαν τὸν Χαρίου ἐρωτῶντα καὶ λέγοντα, „τίς εἰ; τοξότης; πελταστής; ἵππευς; ὀπλίτης;‟ „οὐδε- εῖς;‟ ἐφη, „τούτων, ἀλλ' ὁ τούτοις πᾶσιν ἐπι- τάττων;‟ γελοῖος οὖν ὁ λέγων ὅτι τοξική καὶ ὀπλιτική καὶ τὸ σφενδονᾶν καὶ τὸ ἱππεύειν διδα- κτόν ἐστιν, στρατηγική δὲ καὶ τὸ στρατηγεῖν ὡς ἐτυχε παραγίνεται καὶ οἰς ἐτυχε μὴ μαθοῦσιν. οὐκοῦν ἐτι γελοιότερος ὁ μόνη τὴν φρόνησιν μὴ

1 καθηκόντων] καθηκόντως in most mss.
2 κυβερνάν δὲ καὶ μὴ μαθόντα added by Iannotius.
4 παραδιδώσῳ W.C.H.; γάλα δῶσιν Salmasius; παραδέωσιν Canter; γάλα δονώσι Stephanus: παραδώσων.
5 Καλλίαν τὸν Χαρίου Dittenberger: τὸν Χαβρίου Καλλίαν.
6 στρατηγική Wytenbach: στρατηγία.

* Herodotus, iv. 2, which passage is not at all explicit, but
3. What then? He who says that the physician's art concerns itself with rashes and hang-nails, but not with pleurisy or fever or inflammation of the brain, in what does he differ from one who says that schools and lectures and precepts are for instruction in trifling and childish duties, but that for the great and supreme duties there is only brute knocking about and accident? For just as he is ridiculous who declares that one must be taught before pulling at the oar, but may steer the boat even without having learned; so one who grants that the other arts are acquired by learning, but deprives virtue of this, appears to be acting directly contrary to the practice of the Scythians. For the Scythians, as Herodotus \( ^a \) says, blind their slaves that these may hand over the cream to themselves; but such a man as this gives Reason, like an eye, as it were, to the subservient and ancillary arts, while denying it to virtue.

Yet when Callias, son of Charias, asked the general Iphicrates, \( ^b \) "Who are you? Bowman, targeteer, horseman, or hoplite?" Iphicrates replied, "None of these, but the one who commands them all." Ridiculous, therefore, is the man who declares that the art of using the bow, or of fighting in heavy armour, or of manipulating the sling, or of riding a horse may be taught, but that the art of commanding and leading an army comes as it chances and to whom it chances without previous instruction! Surely he is yet more ridiculous who affirms that prudence alone cannot be taught, for without pru-

\( ^a \) Cf. *Moralia*, 99 E, 187 B.

appears to mean that the slaves are blinded to prevent their stealing that part of the milk considered most valuable by their masters.
(440) διδακτὴν ἀποφαίνων, ὡς ἂνευ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ὀφελος οὐδὲν οὐδ᾽ ὄνησις ἔστιν. εἰ δ᾽ ἡ γεμών αὐτῇ καὶ κόσμος οὐδα πασῶν καὶ τὰξις εἰς τὸ χρήσιμον ἐκαστον καθίστησιν, αὐτίκα τὸς δεῖπνον Χάρις, ἡ σκημένων καὶ μεμαθηκότων παιδῶν δαίτρευσαι καὶ ὀπτῆσαι καὶ οἴνοχοῆσαι, εἰ μὴ διάθεσις μηδὲ τάξις εἴη περὶ τοὺς διακονοῦντας;

1 εἰ δ᾽] εἰ γε Stephanus.
2 καὶ] τε καὶ Homer.
3 περὶ Wyttenbach: πρὸς.
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dence there can be no gain or profit from the other arts. But if prudence is in command, the principle which orders all the arts, which assigns each person to a place of usefulness, what joy, for instance, can one have at a banquet, though the servants are well-trained and have learned to

Carve the meat and roast it well and pour the wine, if there be no system nor order in the servitors?

There is, perhaps, a lacuna at this point, as indicated by Pohlenz, who supplies "how, then, must one not pay even more heed to prudence than to the other arts?"

Homer, Od. xv., 323.

Possibly a large part of the essay is missing.
ON MORAL VIRTUE
(DE VIRTUTE MORALI)
INTRODUCTION

If the present essay is the work of Plutarch, we may, perhaps, be surprised at the diffuseness with which the author permits himself to wander at leisure over the preserves of Aristotelian psychology, while almost completely neglecting the promises made in such high-sounding terms in his first sentence. The purpose of the essay is apparently to refute certain tenets of Stoic psychology, and these are, to be sure, attacked with some spirit, but at such length and with so little attention to logic or to their intended meaning, that complete success is not to be expected. The point which is continually belaboured is that there are two parts of the soul, the Rational and the Irrational; for Moral Virtue to arise, the Rational must control the Irrational. So much our author has gleaned from Aristotle and to this he adds very little; nor can he apply his vast reading in poetry and philosophy with much effect to the demolition of Stoic dogma, which he appears in several points to have misunderstood. On the whole,

a The only recent attempt, that of Hartman, to show that it is not, relies on the looseness of the reasoning, the tediousness of the argumentation, and the absence of anything that might be called structure. But all three of these are by no means unusual in admittedly genuine works. The language and phraseology appear to the present editor, at any rate, to be Plutarchean.
ON MORAL VIRTUE

whether from the standpoint of popular or from that of serious philosophy, this is one of the least successful of Plutarch’s works.\(^a\)

A word on the terminology is necessary: Aristotelian usage is probably intended throughout the greater part of the work. I have, therefore, followed most English Aristotelians in my rendering of many terms, with δύναμις “capacity” or “faculty” or “power,” φρόνησις “prudence,” and the like. ζήτεις I have rendered “acquired state,” but πάθος and its forms and derivatives I have translated “emotions,” “passions,” “experiences,” according to my interpretation of the context.\(^b\)

It is interesting to notice that Pope in the Essay on Man (ii. 51 ff.) has apparently drawn his philosophy from Plutarch’s diluted Aristotelianism rather than from the fountain head.\(^c\)

The ms. tradition is fairly good. The work has been well edited by Mr. Pohlenz in the Teubner series; from this edition most of the critical notes and the parallel passages have been taken.

The work is No. 72 in Lamprias’s catalogue of Plutarch’s writings.

\(^a\) But Hartman’s words are no doubt too harsh: “Multo . . . Chaeronensi indignior hic libellus, quem, ut ad finem perlegas quantum tibi est taedii devorandum!”

\(^b\) See Mr. H. Rackham’s very just remarks in the preface to his recent (L.C.L., 1935) edition of the Atheniensium Respublica.

\(^c\) Cf. T. Sinko (Eos, xv. 1909, pp. 119-122), who further holds this essay to be the product of Plutarch’s youth, comparing the more mature attitude toward the passions to be found in De Cohibenda Ira and De Tranquillitate Animi.
ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ἩΘΙΚΗΣ ΑΡΕΤΗΣ

D 1. Περὶ τῆς ἱθικῆς λεγομένης ἀρετῆς καὶ δο-
κούσης, ὃ δὴ μάλιστα τῆς θεωρητικῆς διαφέρει
tῷ τῷ μὲν πάθος ὑλὴν ἐχειν τὸν δὲ λόγον εἴδος,
eἰπεῖν πρὸκείται τίνα τ' οὐσίαν ἐχει καὶ πῶς
ὑφιστασθαί πέφυκε καὶ πότερον οἰκεῖος λόγω κε-
κόσμηται τὸ δεδεγμένον αὐτὴν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς
ἡ μετέσχηκεν ἄλλοτρίον καὶ εἰ μετέσχηκε, πό-
tερον ὡς τὰ μεμιγμένα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἡ μᾶλλον
ὡς ἐπιστασία τινὶ χρώμενον καὶ ἁρχῆ μετέχειν
λέγεται τῆς τοῦ ἁρχοντος δυνάμεως. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ
δύναται καὶ ἀρετὴ γεγονέναι καὶ μένειν παντα-

Ε πασιν ἄυλος καὶ ἄκρατος, ὃιμαί δὴλον εἶναι.
βέλτιον δὲ βραχέως ἐπιδραμεῖν καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐτέρων,
οὐχ ἱστορίας ἐνεκα μᾶλλον ἡ τοῦ σαφέστερα γενέ-
σθαι τὰ οἰκεία καὶ βεβαιότερα, προεκτεθέντων
ἐκείνων.

2. Μενεδήμος μὲν ὁ ἐξ Ἐρετρίας ἀνήρρει τῶν
ἀρετῶν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς, ὡς μᾶς
οὐσίας καὶ χρωμένης πολλοίς ὀνόμασι τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ

1 αὐτὴν μόριον Sieveking: μόριον αὐτῆν.
2 ἄυλος καὶ ἄκρατος Pohlenz: ἄυλον (οὐ ἄλογον) καὶ ἄκρατον.

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ON MORAL VIRTUE

1. It is my purpose to speak of that virtue which is called "moral" and reputed to be so, which differs from contemplative virtue chiefly in that it has as its material the emotions of the soul and as its form reason, and to inquire what its essential nature is and how, by its nature, it subsists; whether, also, that part of the soul which receives it is equipped with its own reason, or does but share in the reason of some other part; and if the latter, whether it does this after the manner of elements that are mingled with what is better than themselves, or rather, whether this portion of the soul is guided and governed by another part and in this sense may be said to share in that governing part's power. For that it is possible for virtue also to have come into being and to remain entirely independent of matter and free from all admixture with it, I think is quite obvious. It is better, however, to run summarily through the opinions of the philosophers holding opposing views, not so much for the sake of inquiring into them as that my own opinions may become clearer and more firmly established when those of the philosophers in question have been presented.

2. In the first place, Menedemus of Eretria deprived the virtues of both plurality and differences by asserting that virtue is but one, though it goes under
Plutarch's Moralia

σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην λέγεσθαι, καθάπερ βροτὸν καὶ ἀνθρωπον. Ἀρίστων δ' ὁ Χίος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἁρετὴν ἔποιει Γ καὶ υγείαν ὁνόμαζε· τῷ δὲ πρὸς τί πως διαφόρους καὶ πλέονας, ὥσ εἰ τις ἑθελοὶ τὴν ὁρασιν ἑμῶν λευκῶν μὲν ἀντιλαμβανομένην λευκοθέαν καλεῖν, μελάνων δὲ μελανθέαν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἑτέρον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἁρετή ποιητέα μὲν ἑπισκοποῦσα καὶ μὴ ποιητέα κέκληται φρόνησις, ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ 441 κοσμοῦσα καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ εὐκαίριον ἐν ἡδοναῖς ὀρίζουσα σωφροσύνην, κοινωνήμασι δὲ καὶ συμβολαίοις ὀμιλοῦσα τοῖς πρὸς ἑτέρους δικαιοσύνη· καθάπερ τὸ μαχαίριον ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλο διαρεῖ, καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ περὶ οὐλας διαφόρους μιᾷ φύσει χρώμενον. ἐοίκε δὲ καὶ Ζήνων οἰς τούτῳ πως ὑποφέρεσθαι ο Ὀριζεύς, ὀριζόμενος τὴν φρόνησιν ἐν μὲν ἀπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην, ἐν δ' ἁρετέοις σωφροσύνην, ἐν δ' ὑπομενετέοις ἀνδρείαν ἀπολογούμενοι δ' ἀξιόνων ἐν τούτοις τὴν ἐπιστήμην φρόνησιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὠνομάσθαι.

Β Χρύσιππος δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἁρετὴν ἰδία ποιοτητὴν συνιστάσθαι νομίζων, ἐλάθει αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν

1 υγείαν] υγεία in most mss.
2 μελανθέαν] μελανοθέαν in two mss.
3 ἀρετέοις Wytttenbach, confirmed by G: ἀρετέοις.
4 ἰδία] ἰδία in some mss.

* Cf. for example, Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, vi. 6. 1: prudence is "concerned only with things which admit of variation."

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many names: the same thing is meant by temperance and courage and justice, as is the case with "mortal" and "man." And Ariston of Chios himself also made virtue but one in its essential nature and called it health; but in its relative aspect he made certain distinctions and multiplied virtues, just as though one should wish to call our sight "white-sight" when it is applied to white objects, or "black-sight" when applied to black objects, or anything else of the sort. For instance virtue, when it considers what we must do or avoid, is called prudence; when it controls our desires and lays down for them the limitations of moderation and seasonableness in our pleasures, it is called temperance; when it has to do with men's relations to one another and their commercial dealings, it is called justice—just as a knife is one and the same knife, though it cuts now one thing, now another, or as a fire retains its single nature though it operates upon different substances. Moreover it appears likely that Zeno of Citium also inclines in some measure to this opinion, for he defines prudence as justice when it is concerned with what must be rendered to others as their due, as temperance when concerned with what must be chosen or avoided, as fortitude when concerned with what must be endured; and those who defend Zeno postulate that in these definitions he uses the word prudence in the sense of knowledge. Chrysippus, however, by his opinion that corresponding to each several quality a virtue is formed by its own distinctive attribute of quality, unwittingly stirred up a "swarm of virtues,"


(441) Πλάτωνα σμήνοις ἀρετῶν οὐ συνηθῶν οὐδὲ γνωρίμων ἐγείρας· ὥς γὰρ παρὰ τὸν ἀνδρείον ἀνδρείαν καὶ παρὰ τὸν πρᾶον πραότητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην παρὰ τὸν δίκαιον, οὔτω παρὰ τὸν χαριέντα χαριεντότητας καὶ παρὰ τὸν ἔσθλον ἔσθλότητας καὶ παρὰ τὸν μέγαν μεγαλότητας καὶ παρὰ τὸν καλὸν καλότητας, ἑτέρας τε τοιαύτας ἐπιδεξιότητας, εὐ-απαντησίας, εὐτραπελίας ἀρετᾶς τυθέμενος, πολλῶν καὶ ἀτόπων ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν δεομένην ἐμπέπληκε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν.

3. Κοινῶς δ’ ἀπαντεῖ οὕτω τῇ ἀρετῆς τοῦ ὁ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς διάθεσιν τινα καὶ δύναμιν γεγενημένην ὑπὸ λόγου, μᾶλλον δὲ λόγον οὕτων αὐτὴν ὁμολογούμενον καὶ βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑποτίθενται· καὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἀλογον διαφορὰ τινι καὶ φύσει τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ ταύτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, δ’ ἡ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικόν, δι’ ὅλου τρεπόμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐν τε τοῖς πάθει καὶ ταῖς καθ’ ἔξιν ἡ διάθεσιν μεταβολαίς κακίαι τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετῆν, καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἀλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ, λέγεσθαι δ’ ἀλογον, ὅταν τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῆς ὁμο第三者 ἦχυρῳ γενομένῳ καὶ κρατήσαντι πρὸς τι τῶν ἀτόπων παρὰ τὸν αἰρόντα λόγον ἐκφέρῃτατ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον ἐκ φαίλης καὶ

1 συνηθῶν οὐδὲ γνωρίμων Capps: συνηθῶς οὐδὲ γνώριμον.
2 τὴν added by Hartman.
3 ψυχῆς before τοῦ deleted by Hartman.

a Meno, 72 a; cf. Moralia, 93 b.
as Plato has it, which were not familiar nor even known; for as from the adjective "brave" he derived "bravery," from "mild" "mildness," and "justice" from "just," so from "charming" he derived "charmingnesses," from "virtuous" "virtuousnesses," from "great" "greatnesses," from "honourable" "honourablenesses," postulating also the other qualities of the same sort, dexterousnesses, approachablenesses, adroitnesses, as virtues, and thus filled philosophy, which needed nothing of the sort, with many uncouth names.

3. Yet all of these men agree in supposing virtue to be a certain disposition of the governing portion of the soul and a faculty engendered by reason, or rather to be itself reason which is in accord with virtue and is firm and unshaken. They also think that the passionate and irrational part of the soul is not distinguished from the rational by any difference or by its nature, but is the same part, which, indeed, they term intelligence and the governing part; it is, they say, wholly transformed and changes both during its emotional states and in the alterations brought about in accordance with an acquired disposition or condition and thus becomes both vice and virtue; it contains nothing irrational within itself, but is called irrational whenever, by the overmastering power of our impulses, which have become strong and prevail, it is hurried on to something outrageous which contravenes the convictions of reason. Passion, in fact, according to them, is a vicious and intemperate reason, formed from an evil


\(^b\) For the phrase cf. Plato, *Parmenides*, 141 ν: Marcus Aurelius, ii. 5.
(441) διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ρώμην προσλαβούσης.1

'Εσικε δὲ λαθείν τούτοις ἀπαντας, ἢ διιτὸς ἢμῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐκαστός ἐστι καὶ σύνθετος. τὴν γὰρ ἔτεραν διπλόνην οὗ κατείδον, ἄλλα τὴν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος μὲν ἐμφανεστέραν οὖσαν. οτι δ' αὐτῆς ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἑαυτῇ σύνθετον τι καὶ διφύες καὶ ἀνόμοιον, ὥσπερ ἔτερον σώματος τοῦ ἀλόγου πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀνάγκη τινὶ καὶ φύσει συμμιγέντος Ε καὶ συναρμοσθέντος, εἰκὸς μὲν ἐστὶ μηδὲ Πυ-θαγόραν ἀγνοήσαι, τεκμαιρομένοις τῇ περὶ μον-ςικήν σπουδὴ τοῦ άνδρός, ἢν ἐπηγάγετο τῇ ψυχῇ κηλήσεως ἑνεκα καὶ παραμυθίας, ὃς οὐ πάν ἐχούση διδασκαλία καὶ μαθήμασιν ὑπήκοον οὐδὲ λόγῳ μεταβλητόν ἐκ κακίας, ἀλλὰ τινὸς ἔτερας πειθοὺς συνεργοῦ καὶ πλάσεως καὶ τιθασεύσεως δεόμενον, εἰ μὴ παντάπασι μέλλοι φιλοσοφία δυσμεταχείρι- στὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀπειθές.

'Εμφανῶς μέντοι καὶ βεβαιῶς καὶ ἀναμφιδόξως Πλάτων συνείδεν, ὅτι τούτοις τε2 τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ γἐ ἐμψυχων οὐχ ἄπλοιν οὖν ἀσύνθετον οὐδὲ μονοειδές ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ταυτοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἔτερου μεμιγμένον δυνάμεως3 πὴ μὲν ἂεὶ κατὰ ταύτα κοσμεῖται καὶ περιπολεὶ μιὰ τάξει κράτος ἐχούσῃ χρώμενον, πὴ δ' εἰς τε κυνήσεις καὶ κύκλους σχιζόμενον ὑπεναντίους καὶ πλανητοὺς ἁρχὴν δια-

1 προσλαβούσης] προσλαβούστα in many mss.
2 τε Pohlenz: γε.
3 δυνάμεως] φύσεως Plato and Moralia, 1012 c.

3 Cf. Moralia, 943 a and 1083 c.
and perverse judgement which has acquired additional violence and strength.

But it seems to have eluded all these philosophers in what way each of us is truly two-fold and composite.\(^a\) For that other two-fold nature of ours they have not discerned, but merely the more obvious one, the blend of soul and body. But that there is some element of composition, some two-fold nature and dissimilarity of the very soul within itself, since the irrational, as though it were another substance, is mingled and joined with reason by some compulsion of Nature—this, it is likely, was not unknown even to Pythagoras, if we may judge by the man’s enthusiasm for the study of music, which he introduced to enchant and assuage the soul,\(^b\) perceiving that the soul has not every part of itself in subjection to discipline and study, and that not every part can be changed from vice by reason, but that the several parts have need of some other kind of persuasion to co-operate with them, to mould them, and to tame them, if they are not to be utterly intractable and obstinate to the teaching of philosophy.

Plato,\(^c\) however, comprehended clearly, firmly, and without reservation both that the soul of this universe of ours is not simple nor uncompounded nor uniform, but that, being compounded of the potentialities of sameness and otherness, in one part it is ever governed in uniformity and revolves in but one and the same order, which maintains control, yet in another part it is split into movements and circles which go in contrariety to each other and wander about, thus giving


\(^b\) *Timaeus*, 35 a ff.; cf. also the treatise *De Animae Procreatione in Timaeo* (Moralia, 1012 b ff.).

forás καὶ μεταβολῆς καὶ ἀνομοιότητος ἐνδιδοσι
taῖς περὶ γῆν φθοράις⁠¹ καὶ γενέσεων· ἦ τ' ἀνθρώπον
ψυχῇ μέρος τι ἡ² μύμμα τῆς τοῦ παντὸς οὐδα καὶ
συνημμοσμένη κατὰ λόγους καὶ ἄριθμοις ἐοικότας
442 ἐκεῖνος οὕχ ἀπλῆ τίς ἔστιν οὐδ' ὄμοιοπαθής, ἀλλ' ἐτερον μὲν ἔχει τὸ νοερὸν καὶ λογιστικόν, ὁ κρα-
teίν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἄρχειν προσήκόν
ἔστιν, ἐτερον δὲ τὸ παθητικόν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ πολυ-
πλανές καὶ ἀτακτον ἐξεταστοῖο³ δεόμενον. οὐ πάλιν
dιχῇ μεριζομένον, τὸ μὲν άεὶ σώματι βουλεθαι
συνεῖναι καὶ σῶμα θεραπεύειν πεφυκός ἐπιθυμη-
tικόν κέκληται, τὸ δ' ἔστι μὲν ἡ τούτω προστίθε-
μενον, ἐστι δ' ἡ τῷ λογισμῷ παρέχων ἵσχυν καὶ
δύναμιν, θυμοειδές. ἀποδείκνυσι δὲ τὴν διαφορὰν
μάλιστα τῇ τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ φρονοῦντος ἄντι-
βάσει πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ τὸ⁶ θυμούμενον, ὡς
τῷ⁷ ἐτερ' εἶναι πολλάκις ἀπειθοῦντα καὶ δυσ-
Β μαχοῦντα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον.⁷

Ταύτας ἐχρήσατο ταῖς ἄρχαις ἐπὶ πλεῖστον⁸
'Αριστοτέλης, ὡς δῆλον ἔστων ἐξ ἧν ἐγραφεν;
ὑστερον δὲ τὸ μὲν θυμοειδές τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ
προσένειμεν, ὡς ἐπιθυμίαν τινα τὸν θυμὸν ὄντα καὶ

¹ καὶ μεταβολῆς . . φθοράῖς omitted in most mss.
² τι ἡ W.C.H.: ἡ τι.
³ ἐξεταστοῦ van Herwerden; ἐγγυητοῦ Apelt: ἐγ. ἑαυτοῦ.
⁴ ἐπὶ τοῦτο before καὶ deleted by Hartman.
⁵ τὸ added by Hartman.
⁶ ὡς τῷ Apelt: ὡστε.
⁷ βέλτιον] βέλτιστον in all mss. but Α.
⁸ πλεῖστον] πλέον in most mss., perhaps rightly.
rise to the beginnings of differentiation and change and dissimilarity in those things which come into being and pass away on earth; and also that the soul of man, \(^a\) since it is a portion or a copy of the soul of the Universe and is joined together on principles and in proportions corresponding to those which govern the Universe, \(^b\) is not simple nor subject to similar emotions, but has as one part the intelligent and rational, whose natural duty it is to govern and rule the individual, and as another part the passionate and irrational, the variable and disorderly, which has need of a director. This second part is again subdivided into two parts, one of which, by nature ever willing to consort with the body and to serve the body, is called the appetitive; the other, which sometimes joins forces with this part and sometimes lends strength and vigour to reason, is called the spirited part. And Plato \(^c\) shows this differentiation chiefly by the opposition of the reasoning and intelligent part to the appetitive part and the spirited part, since it is by the very fact that these last are different that they are frequently disobedient and quarrel with the better part.

Aristotle \(^d\) at first made use of these principles to a very great extent, as is obvious from his writings. But later \(^e\) he assigned the spirited to the appetitive part, on the ground that anger is a sort of appetite

\(^a\) Cf. Timaeus, 69 c ff.

\(^b\) Cf. Themistius, Paraphrasis Aristotelis de Anima, i. 5 (p. 59 ed. Spengel).

\(^c\) Republic, 435 a ff.

\(^d\) Cf. 448 A, infra, and the note.

\(^e\) Cf. De Anima, iii. 9 (432 a 25); Magna Moralia, i. 1 (1182 a 24); Ethica Eudemia, ii. 1. 15 (1219 b 25); Ethica Nicomachea, i. 13. 9 (1102 a 29); Iamblichus, Protrepticus, 7 (p. 41 ed. Pistelli).
(442) ὁρείξεν ἀντιλυπήσεως. τῷ μὲντοι παθητικῷ καὶ ἀλόγῳ μέχρι παντὸς ὡς διαφέροντι τοῦ λογισμοῦ χρώμενος διετέλεσεν, οὐχ ὅτι παντελῶς ἀλογὸν ἑστιν ὢσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ τὸ θρεπτικὸν καὶ φυτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος (ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὅλως ἀνήκοα λόγου καὶ κωφά τρόπον τινὰ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐκβεβλάστηκε καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα παντελῶς κατα-
cέφυκε) τὸ δὲ παθητικὸν οἰκείου λόγου στέρεται καὶ ἁμοιρόν ἑστιν, ἀλλως δὲ τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ φρονοῦντος εἰσακούειν καὶ τρέπεσθαι πρὸς ἐκεῖνο καὶ ὑπείκειν καὶ κατασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἐὰν μὴ τέλεον ἢ διεφθαρμένου ὑφ’ ἱδονῆς ἀμαθοῦς καὶ ἀκολάστου διαίτης.

4. Οἱ δὲ θαυμάζοντες ὅπως ἀλογὸν μὲν ἑστὶ λόγῳ δ’ ὑπῆκοον, οὐ μοι δοκοῦσι τοῦ λόγου περινοεῖν τὴν δύναμιν

ὁσῇ πέφυκε κἂν’ ὅσον διέρχεται

τῷ κρατεῖν καὶ ἄγειν οὐ σκληραῖς οὐδ’ ἀντιτύπους ἀγωγαῖς, ἀλλὰ τυπικαῖς καὶ τὸ ἐνδόσιμον καὶ πει-
thήνιον ἀπάσης ἀνάγκης καὶ βίας ἔχουσας ἀνυσι-
μότερον. ἐπεὶ καὶ πνεῦμα δήπον καὶ νεῦρα καὶ

D οὔσι καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος ἀλογ’ ἑστιν,

ἀλλ’ ὅταν ὄρμη γένηται, σεῖσαντος ὢσπερ ἥνιας τοῦ λογισμοῦ, πάντα τέταται καὶ συνήκται καὶ

ὑπακούει· καὶ πόδες τε θεῖν διανοηθέντος εὔτονοι καὶ χεῖρες εἰς ἔργον καθιστανται βαλεῖν ἢ λαβεῖν

1 κἂν’ Dübner: καὶ ἐφ’.
2 τέταται| τέταται in many mss.
3 εὔτονοι] ἔπονται in some mss.
and desire to cause pain in requital; to the end, however, he continued to treat the passionate and irrational part as distinct from the rational, not because this part is wholly irrational, as is the perceptive part of the soul, or the nutritive and vegetative part (for these parts are completely unsubmitting and deaf to reason and, so to speak, mere off-shoots of our flesh and wholly attached to the body), but though the passionate part is wanting in reason and has no reason of its own, yet otherwise it is by nature fitted to heed the rational and intelligent part, to turn toward it, to yield to it, to conform itself thereto, if it is not completely corrupted by foolish pleasure and a life of no restraint.

4. Those who wonder how it is that this part is irrational, yet subservient to reason, do not seem to me to reflect thoroughly upon the power of reason, through its mastery and guidance, not by harsh and inflexible methods, but by flexible ones, which have a quality of yielding and submitting to the rein which is more effective than any possible constraint or violence. For, to be sure, even our breathing, our sinews and bones, and the other parts of the body, though they are irrational, yet when an impulse comes, with reason shaking the reins, as it were, they all grow taut and are drawn together in ready obedience. So, when a man purposes to run, his feet are keyed for action; if he purposes to throw or to grasp, his hands fall to their business. And most

\[a\] Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, i. 1 (403 a 30); Seneca, De Ira, i. 3. 3.

ορμήσαντος. ἄριστα δ' ὁ ποιητὴς τὸ συμπαθοῦν καὶ συγκατασχηματιζόμενον τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ ἀλόγου παρίστησι διὰ τούτων:

ὡς τῆς τήκετο καλὰ παρῆμα δάκρυχεούσης,
κλαιούσης ἐὰν ἄνδρα παρήμενον· αὐτὰρ Ἄδνυσ-
σειν
θυμῷ μὲν γοῦσαν ἔτιν ἑλέαρε γυναῖκα,
Ε ὁμβαλμοὶ δ' ὡς εἰ κέρα ἑστασαν ἕσε σίδηρος
ἀτρέμας ἐν βλεφάροις, δόλῳ δ' ὁ γε¹ δάκρυν
κεῖθεν.

οὔτω κατήκουν εἰχε τῆς κρίσεως καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα
καὶ τὸ αἷμα καὶ τὸ δάκρυν.

Δηλοῦσι δὲ καὶ παρὰ καλαίς καὶ καλοῖς, οἷων²
οὐκ ἐξ λόγου οὐδὲ νόμος θυγεῖν, αἰδοίων φυγαὶ καὶ
ἀναχωρήσεις ἡσυχίαν ἀγόντων καὶ ἀτρεμοῦντων.
ὁ μάλιστα συμβαίνει τοῖς ἐρώσιν, εἰτ' ἀκούσας
ὡς ἀδελφῆς ἑρώτες ήθυγατρὸς ἡγονήκασιν· ἀμα³
γάρ ἑπτῆς ἐπιθυμοῦν ἀψαμένον τοῦ λόγου καὶ
τὸ σῶμα τὰ μέρη⁴ συνευσχημονύντα τῇ κρίσει
παρέσχε. σιτίοις γε μὴν πολλάκις καὶ ὄψιοι μᾶλ'
ηδέως προσενεχέντες αὖ αἰσθανταί καὶ μάθωσιν
αὐτοῖς τῶν μὴ καθαρῶν τι μηδὲ νομίμων ἔδη-
δοκότας, οὐ τῇ κρίσει μόνον ἑπταὶ⁵ τὸ λυποῦν καὶ
dάκρυν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ δόξῃ συνιστρεπό-
μενον καὶ ἀναπιμπλάμενον ἐμετοι καὶ διατροπὴ
nαινδύοις ἑσχοναι.

Δέδοικα δε μὴ δόξαιμ παντάπασιν ἐπαγγελγὰ καὶ
443 νεαρὰ τῷ λόγῳ περαινεῖν, ψαλτήρια διεξών καὶ

¹ δ' ὁ γε] ὁ γε in all mss. but G. ² οἷων Capps: ὅν.
⁵ ἑπταὶ Naber; ἑπτιτήταται Reiske: ἑπτιτίθεται.
excellently does the Poet a portray in the following words the sympathy and conformity of the irrational with reason:

Thus were her fair cheeks wet with tears, as she
Wept for her lord, though he sat by. In heart
Odysseus pitied his lamenting wife,
But kept his eyes firm-fixed within their lids
Like horn or iron: with guile he hid his tears.

Under such subjection to his judgement did he keep his breathing and his blood and his tears.

An evident proof of this is also the shrinking and withdrawal of the private parts, which hold their peace and remain quiet in the presence of such beautiful maidens and youths as neither reason nor law allows us to touch. This is particularly the case with those who first fall in love and then hear that they have unwittingly become enamoured of a sister or a daughter; for lust cowers as reason asserts itself and, at the same time, the body brings its parts into decent conformity with the judgement. Indeed, very often with foods and meat, when men have partaken of them with gusto, if they then perceive or come to know that they have eaten something unclean or unlawful, not only is this judgement of theirs attended by displeasure and remorse, but the body itself, revolted and sharing the mind's disgust, falls a prey to the retchings and vomitings of nausea.

But I fear that I shall be thought to be rounding out my discourse with instances which are altogether seductive and exotic, if I recount in full how harps and

a Homer, Od., xix. 208-212; cf. Moralia, 475 a, 506 a-b, and De Vita et Poesi Homeri, 135 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 409).
(443) λύρας καὶ πηκτίδας καὶ αὐλοὺς, καὶ ὁσα μουσικής προσῳδὰ καὶ προσήγορα μηχανησαμένης ἀνθρωπίνοις πάθεσιν ἁψυχα συνήδεται1 καὶ συνεπιθρηνεῖ καὶ συνάδει καὶ συνακολασταίνει, τὰς κρίσεις ἀναφέροντα καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ήθη τῶν χρωμένων. καίτοι καὶ Ζήνωνα φασίν εἰς θέατρον ἀνιόντα κιθαρῳδόντος Ἀμοιβέως πρὸς τοὺς μαθητάς, "ίψανε," εἰπείν, "ὁπως καταμάθωμεν οἰαν ἐντερα καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ἡύλα καὶ ὀστᾶ λόγου καὶ ρυθμοῦ2 μετασχόντα καὶ τάξεως ἐμμέλειαν καὶ φωνῆν ἀφίσουν."

'Αλλὰ ταῦτ' εάσας, ἡδέως ἃν αὐτῶν πυθοίμην, εἰ Β κύνας καὶ ὑπόνους καὶ ὁρνιθάς οἰκουροὺς ὀρώντες ἔθει καὶ τροφῆ καὶ διδασκαλία φωνᾶς τε συνετᾶς καὶ πρὸς λόγου υπηκόους κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις ἀποδιδόντας καὶ πράξεις τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡμῖν ἔχουσας, 'Ομήρου τ’3 ἀκούοντες τὸν Ἀχιλλεά λέγοντος

ὁτρύνειν ὑπόνους τε καὶ ἀνέρας

ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην, ἐτὶ θαυμάζουσι καὶ διαποροῦσι εἰ τὸ θυμοῦμενον ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ λυποῦμενον καὶ ήδόμενον ὑπακούειν τε τῷ φρονοῦτι καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ συνδιατίθεσθαι πέφυκεν, οὐκ ἀποικοῦν οὐδ’ ἀπεσχισμένον4 οὐδὲ πλασσόμενον οὐδὲ τυποῦμενον ἀνάγκαις τισὶν ἡ πληγαῖς,
ON MORAL VIRTUE, 443

lyres, pipes and flutes, and all the other harmonious and consonant instruments which musical art has devised, void of soul though they be, accord in songs of both joy and grief, in stately measures and dissolute tunes, with human experiences, reproducing the judgements, the experiences, and the morals of those who use them. And yet they say that even Zeno on his way to the theatre when Amoebeus was singing to the lyre, remarked to his pupils, "Come, let us observe what harmony and music gut and sinew, wood and bone, send forth when they partake of reason, proportion, and order."

But, letting these subjects pass, I would gladly learn from my opponents whether, when they see dogs, horses, and domestic birds, through habituation, breeding, and teaching, uttering intelligible sounds and moving and assuming postures in subordination to reason, and acting in a manner conformable to due proportion and our advantage; and when they hear Homer declaring that Achilles

Urged on both horses and men to battle—whether, I say, they still wonder and are in doubt that the element in us which is spirited and appetitive and experiences pain and pleasure, does, by its very nature, harken to the intelligence, and is affected and harmoniously disposed by its agency, and does not dwell apart from the intelligence, nor is it separated therewith, nor moulded from without the body, nor formed by any extraneous violence or

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a Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., i. p. 67; cf. also Moralia, 1029 e.
b Cf. Life of Aratus, xvii. (1034 ε); Athenaeus, xiv. 623 δ; Aelian, Varia Historia, iii. 30.
c Adapted from II., xvi. 167.
(443) ἀλλὰ φύσει μὲν ἐξηρτημένον ἄει δ’ ὄμιλον καὶ συντρεφόμενον καὶ ἀναπυπλάμενον ὑπὸ συνηθείας.

Διὸ καὶ καλῶς ὄνομασται τὸ ἰθος· ἐστὶ μὲν γάρ, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, ποιότης τοῦ ἀλόγου τὸ ἰθος· ὄνομασται δ’ ὅτι τὴν ποιότητα ταύτην καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἔθει λαμβάνει τὸ ἀλόγον ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου πλαττόμενον, οὐ βουλομένου τὸ πάθος ἐξαρείν παντάπασιν (οὔτε γάρ δυνατὸν οὔτ’ ἀμενον), ἀλλ’ ὅρον τινὰ καὶ τάξιν ἐπιτιθέντος αὐτῷ καὶ τὰς ἑθικὰς ἄρετάς, οὐκ ἀπαθείας οὔσας ἀλλὰ συμ-

D μετρίας παθῶν καὶ μεσότητας, ἐμποιοῦντος· ἐμ-

ποιεῖ δὲ τῇ φρονήσει τῆς τοῦ παθητικοῦ δύναμιν εἰς ἐξιν ἀστείαν καθιστά. τρία γὰρ δὴ ταῦτα φασὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπάρχειν, δύναμιν πάθος ἐξιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις ἀρχή καὶ ύλή τοῦ πάθους, οἷον ὀργιλότης αἰσχυνηλία θαρραλεότης· το δὲ πάθος κίνησις τῆς ἡδὴ τῆς δυνάμεως, οἷον ὀργή αἰδῶς

1 θάρσος. ἡ δ’ ἔξις ἱσχὺς καὶ κατασκεύη τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀλόγον δυνάμεως ἐξ ἔθους ἐγγενομενή, κακία μὲν ἂν φαιλως, ἄρετή δ’ ἂν καλῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παϊσαγωγηθὴ τὸ πάθος.

5. Ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐ πᾶσαν ἄρετὴν μεσότητα ποιοῦν ἔν’ ἡθικὴν καλοῦσι, λεκτέον ἄν εἰπε περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς ἄρξαμενοι ἁνωθεν. ἐστὶ τοῖνυν τῶν

1 θάρσος or θάρσος before αἰδῶς deleted by Bernardakis after Reiske.

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a Cf. Moralia, 3 λ, 551 ε; Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, ii. 1. 1 (1103 a 17).

b Cf. 452 b, infra.

c Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, ii. 5 (1105 b 19); Stobaeus, Elogae, ii. 7. 20 (vol. ii. p. 139 ed. Wachsmuth).

d “The capacities are the faculties in virtue of which we can be said to be liable to the emotions, for example, capable 34
blows, but that by its nature it is dependent upon the intelligence and is always in association with it and nurtured together with it and influenced by familiar intercourse.

Therefore, also, ethical, or moral, virtue (éthos) is well named,\(^a\) for ethical virtue is, to but sketch the subject, a quality of the irrational, and it is so named because the irrational, being formed by reason, acquires this quality and differentiation by habit (éthos), since reason does not wish to eradicate passion completely (for that would be neither possible \(^b\) nor expedient), but puts upon it some limitation and order and implants the ethical virtues, which are not the absence of passion but a due proportion and measure therein; and reason implants them by using prudence to develop the capacity for passion into a good acquired disposition. For these three things the soul is said to possess \(^c\): capacity, passion, acquired state. Now capacity \(^d\) is the starting-point, or raw material, of passion, as, for instance, irascibility, bashfulness, temerity. And passion is a kind of stirring or movement of the capacity, as anger, shame, boldness. And finally, the acquired state is a settled force and condition of the capacity of the irrational, this settled condition being bred by habit and becoming on the one hand vice, if the passion has been educated badly, but virtue, if educated excellently by reason.

5. But inasmuch as philosophers do not make virtue as a whole a mean nor apply to it the term "moral," we must discuss the difference, starting with first principles. Now in this world things of feeling anger or fear [mss. read pain] or pity." (Aristotle, l.c., Rackham’s translation adapted.)
πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἄπλως ἐχοντα τὰ δὲ πῶς ἐχοντα πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἄπλως μὲν οὖν ἐχοντα, γη ὑπανὸς ἀστρα θάλασσα· πῶς δ' ἐχοντα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀγαθὸν κακὸν, αἰρετὸν φευκτὸν, ἠδυ ἀλγεων· ἁμφω δέ τοῦ λόγου θεωρούντος, τὸ μὲν περὶ τὰ ἄπλως ἐχοντα μόνον ἐπιστημονικον καὶ θεωρητικον ἐστι, τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς πως ἐχουσι πρὸς ἡμᾶς βουλευτικον καὶ πρακτικον· ἀρετὴ δὲ τούτον μὲν ἡ φρόνησις, ἐκεῖνον δ' ἡ σοφία. διαφέρει δὲ σοφίας φρόνησις ἡ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ πρὸς τὸ πρακτικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν ἐπιστροφῆς καὶ σχέσεως τινος γενομένης ύφισταται κατὰ λόγου ἡ φρόνησις. διὸ φρόνησις μὲν τύχης δεῖται, σοφία δ' οὐ δεῖται πρὸς τὸ οἰκείον τέλος οὐδὲ βουλής· ἐστι γὰρ περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὀσιάτως ἐχοντα. καὶ καθάπερ

444 ὁ γεωμέτρης οὐ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ τριγώνου, εἰ δυνεῖν ὁρθαῖς ἱσας ἔχει τὰς ἐντὸς γωνίας ἀλλ' οîtreν (αἱ γὰρ βουλαι περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλλως ἐχόντων, οὐ περὶ τῶν βεβαιῶν καὶ ἀμεταπτῶτων), οὔτως ὁ θεωρητικὸς νοὺς περὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ μόνιμα καὶ μίαν αἰὴ φύσιν ἐχοντα μὴ δεχομένην μεταβολάς ενεργῶν, ἀπῆλλακται τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι. τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν εἰς πράγματα πλάνης μεστὰ καὶ ταραχῆς καθιεῖσαν ἐπιμίγνυσθαι τοῖς τυχηροῖς πολλάκις

1 ἄπλως Gesner's "Stobaeus": ὁπως.
3 ἄπλως "Stobaeus": πῶς or ὁπως.
4 κατὰ ταῦτα Wyttenbach, cf. Plato, Phaedo, 78 c, for example: καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ.
5 καὶ added by Wyttenbach.
6 ὁρθαίς] ὁρθαίν Reiske.
are of two sorts, some of them existing absolutely, others in some relation to us. Things that exist absolutely are earth, heavens, stars, sea; things that exist in relation to us are good and evil, things desirable and to be avoided, things pleasant and painful. Now reason a contemplates both of these, but when it is concerned merely with things which exist absolutely, it is called scientific and contemplative; and when it is engaged with those things which exist in relation to us, it is called deliberative and practical. The virtue of the latter activity is called prudence, that of the former wisdom; and prudence differs from wisdom in that when the contemplative faculty is occupied in a certain active relationship with the practical and passionate, prudence comes to subsist in accordance with reason. Therefore prudence b has need of chance, but wisdom has no need of it, nor yet of deliberation, to attain its proper end; for wisdom is concerned with things that remain ever the same and unchanging. And just as the geometer does not deliberate whether the triangle has its internal angles equal to two right angles, but knows it to be true (for deliberation concerns matters that are now one way, now another, not things that are sure and immutable), just so the contemplative mind has its activity concerning first principles, things that are permanent and have ever one nature incapable of mutation, and so has no occasion for deliberation. But prudence must often come down among things that are material and are full of error and confusion; it has to move in the realm of chance; to deliberate where

\[a\] Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, vi. 1. 5 (1139 a 7).
\[b\] Ibid. iii. 3. 4-9 (1112 a 21); vi. 5. 3-6 (1140 a 31); contrast also Moralia, 97 E-F.
(444) ἀναγκαῖον ἐστι καὶ τῷ ὑπελευθερωμένῳ χρῆσθαι περὶ τῶν ἄδηλοτέρων, τῷ δὲ πρακτικῷ τὸ βουλευτικὸν ἐκδεχομένην ἐνεργείαν ἤδη καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου συμπαραβόντος καὶ συνεφελκομένου ταῖς κρίσεσιν ὀρμής γὰρ δέονται. τὴν δ' ὀρμὴν τῷ πάθει ποιεῖ τὸ ἥθος, λόγου δεομένην ὀρίζοντος, ὅπως μετρία παρῇ καὶ μήθει ὑπερβάλλῃ μήτ' ἐγκαταλείπῃ τὸν καιρὸν. τὸ γὰρ ὑπὲρ παθητικὸν καὶ ἁλογον κινήσει χρῆται ταῖς μὲν ἄγαν σφοδραῖς καὶ ὀξείαις ταῖς δὲ μαλακωτέραις ἢ προσήκει καὶ ἀργοτέραις. θειν ἐκαστον δὲν πράττομεν ἂει μοναχῶς μὲν κατορθοῦται πλεοναχῶς δ' ἀμαρτάνεται1. τὸ γὰρ βαλείν τὸν σκοπὸν ἐν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπλοῦν, ἀστοχοῦσι δ' ἀλλοτ' ἄλλως, ὑπερβάλλοντες τὸ μέτριον ἢ προαιπολεὶποντες. τούτ' οὖν τοῦ πρακτικοῦ λόγου κατὰ C φύσιν ἔργον ἑστὶ, τὸ ἐξαιρέιν τὰς ἀμετρίας τῶν παθῶν καὶ πλημμελείας. ὅτι καὶ γὰρ ὑπ' ἀρ- ρωστίας καὶ μαλακίας ἡ δέους καὶ ὁκνὸν προεν- δίδωσι2 ἡ ὀρμή καὶ προαιπολείπει τὸ καλὸν, ἐνταῦθα πάρεστιν ἐξεγείρων καὶ ἀναρριπτών. ὅτι δὲ παλιν ἐκφέρεται ῥυέσα πολλῇ καὶ ἀτακτος, ἐκεῖ τὸ σφοδρὸν ἀφαιρεῖ καὶ ἱστησιν. οὕτω δ' ὀρίζον τὴν παθητικὴν κίνησιν, ἐμποιεῖ τὰς ἡθικὰς ἀρετὰς περὶ τὸ ἁλογον, ἐλλεύψεις καὶ ὑπερβολὴς με- σότητας οὐσίας. οὐ γὰρ ἄπασαν ἀρετὴν μεσότητι γίνεσθαι ῥήτεον ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἄπροσδείης τοῦ ἀλόγου

1 ἀμαρτάνεται Emperius: ἀμαρτάνει.
2 προενδίδωσιν Turnebus: προσενδίδωσιν.
the case is doubtful; and then at last to reduce deliberation to practice in activities in which decisions are both accompanied by and influenced by the irrational, whose impulsion they, as a matter of fact, need. The impulsion of passion springs from moral virtue; but it needs reason to keep it within moderate bounds and to prevent its exceeding or falling short of its proper season. For it is indeed true that the passionate and irrational moves sometimes too violently and swiftly, at other times more weakly and slothfully than the case demands. Therefore everything that we ever do can succeed but in one way, while it may fail in many ways: for to hit the mark there is but one single, uncomplicated, way, yet it can be missed in several ways, according to whether we exceed the mean, or fall short of it. This, then, is the natural task of practical reason: to eliminate both the defects and the excesses of the passions. For wherever, through infirmity and weakness, or fear and hesitation, the impulsion yields too soon and prematurely forsakes the good, there practical reason comes on the scene to incite and rekindle the impulsion; and where, again, the impulsion is borne beyond proper bounds, flowing powerfully and in disorder, there practical reason removes its violence and checks it. And thus by limiting the movement of the passions reason implants in the irrational the moral virtues, which are means between deficiency and excess. For we must not declare that every virtue comes into being by the observance of a mean, but, on the one hand, wisdom, being without any


\* The good is the mean.
καὶ περὶ τὸν εἰλικρινῆ καὶ ἀπαθή νοῦν συνισταμένην

D σοφίά¹ αὐτοτελῆς  ὑπὸ ἑπιστήμης τοῦ λόγου καὶ
dύναμις, ἢ τὸ θειότατον ἐγγίνεται ἡς ἐπιστήμης καὶ
μακαρώτατον· ἢ δ` ἀναγκαία διὰ τὸ σώμα καὶ
dεομένη νῆ Δία² τῆς παθητικῆς ὀσπερ ὀργανικῆς
ὑπηρεσίας ἐπί τὸ πρακτικόν, οὐκ ὦ σα φθορὰ τοῦ
ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐδ` ἀναίρεσις ἀλλὰ τάξις καὶ
dιακόσμησις, ἀκρότης μὲν ἑστὶ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ
ποιότητι, τῷ ποσῷ δὲ μεσότης γίνεται τὸ ύπερ-
βάλλον ἐξαιρόσα καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον.

6. 'Επει δὲ πολλαχῶς τὸ μέσον (καὶ γὰρ τὸ
κεκραμένον τῶν ἀκράτων μέσον, ὡς λευκοὶ καὶ
μέλανος τὸ φαιόν· καὶ τὸ περιέχον καὶ περιεχό-
Ε μενον τοῦ περιεχομένου καὶ περιέχοντος, ὡς τῶν
dιώδεκα καὶ τεττάρων τὰ ὀκτῶ· καὶ τὸ μηδετέρον
tῶν ἀκρῶν μετέχον, ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακοῦ τὸ
ἀδιάφορον), τούτων μὲν οὐδενὶ τῶν τρόπων ἡ ἀρετὴ
προσρητέα³ μεσότης· οὔτε γὰρ μῆγα τῶν κακιῶν
ἐστιν οὔτ' ἐμπεριέχοσα τούλαττον ἐμπεριέχεται
τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῷ προσήκοντος, οὔτ' ἀπήλλακται
παντάπασι τῶν παθητικῶν ὀρμῶν, ἐν αἷς τὸ μάλλον
cαὶ τὸ ἥττον ἐστὶ· γίνεται δὲ μεσότης καὶ λέγεται
μάλιστα τῇ περὶ φθόγγους καὶ ἁρμονίας ὀμοῦς·
ἐκείνῃ τε γὰρ ἐμμελής οὔσα φωνῆ, καθάπερ ἡ νήτη

¹ καὶ φρόνησις after σοφία deleted by W.C.H. (Patzig would
write συνισταμένη νοῦν, deleting σοφία καὶ φρόνησις.)
² νῆ Δία Reiske: διὰ.
³ προσρητέα] εἶν ἄν in many mss.

"Some would render, more naturally, "extreme and
potentiality"; but, in Plutarch's view, neither "extreme"
nor "potentiality" could be called "self-sufficing."
40
need of the irrational and arising in the activity of the mind, pure and uncontaminated by passion, is, as it were, a self-sufficing perfection and power of reason, by which the most divine and blessed element of knowledge becomes possible for us; on the other hand, that virtue which is necessary to us because of our physical limitations, and needs, by Heaven, for its practical ends the service of the passions as its instrument, so to speak, and is not a destruction nor abolition of the irrational in the soul, but an ordering and regulation thereof, is an extreme as regards its power and quality, but as regards its quantity it is a mean, since it does away with what is excessive and deficient.

6. But since a "mean" is capable of various interpretations (for that which is a compound is a mean between the simple uncompounded substances, as grey is of white and black; and that which contains and is contained is a mean between the contained and the container, as eight of twelve and four; and that which partakes of neither of the extremes is a mean, as the indifferent is a mean between good and bad), in none of these ways can virtue be called a mean, for it is not a mixture of the vices, nor, encompassing what falls short of due measure, is it encompassed by that which is in excess of it; nor is it entirely exempt from the impulses of the passions, wherein are found excess and deficiency. But it is a mean, and is said to be so, in a sense very like that which obtains in musical sounds and harmonies. For there the mean or mesé, a properly-pitched note like the nête and

*Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, ii. 6. 4-9 (1106 a 24).
*Cf. Moralia, 1007 E ff., 1014 c, and 451 F, infra.
καὶ ὑπάτη, τῆς μὲν τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς δὲ τὴν
Γ βαρύτητα τὴν ἀγαν ἀπέφευγεν· αὐτὴν\(^1\) τε κύνησις
οὖσα καὶ δύναμις περὶ τὸ ἀλογον, τὰς ἐκλύσεις καὶ
tὰς ἐπιτάσεις καὶ ἄλος τὸ μάλλον καὶ τὸ ἤτον
445 ἔξαιρει τῆς ὀρμῆς, εἰς τὸ μέτριον καὶ ἀναμάρτητον
καθιστάσα τῶν παθῶν ἐκαστον. αὐτίκα τὴν μὲ
ἀνδρείαν μεσότητα φασίν εἶναι δειλίας καὶ θρα-
σύτητος, ὅν ἡ μὲν ἐλλευμις ἡ δ’ ὑπερβολὴ τοῦ
θυμοειδοῦς ἐστι· τὴν δ’ ἑλευθεριότητα μικρολογίας
καὶ ἁσωτίας, πραότητα δ’ ἀναληψίας καὶ ᾠμότη-
τος· αὐτὴν τε σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην, τὴν
μὲν περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια μήτε πλέον νέμουσαν αὐτῇ
τοῦ προσήκοντος μήτ’ ἐλαττον, τὴν δ’ εἰς τὸ μέσον\(^2\)
ἀναισθησίας καὶ ἀκολασίας ἀεὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας
καθιστάσαν.

Ἐν φ’ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα δοκεῖ τὸ ἀλογον τῆς πρὸς
Β τὸ λογικὸν διαφοράς αὐτοῦ\(^3\) παρέχειν κατανόησιν,
καὶ δεικνύει τὸ πάθος ως ἐτερόν τι κομιδῆ τοῦ
λόγου ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ ἀν διέφερε σωφροσύνης ἐγ-
κράτεια καὶ ἀκολασία ἄκρασια περὶ τὰς ἱδονὰς
καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, εἰ ταῦτον ἢν τῆς φυχῆς φ’ ἐπι-
θυμεῖν φ’\(^4\) τε κρίνειν πέφυκε. νῦν δὲ σωφροσύνη
μὲν ἐστίν οὗ τὸ παθητικὸν ὠσπερ εὐήνων θρέμμα
καὶ πρᾶον ὁ λογισμὸς ἥνιοχεὶ καὶ μεταχειρίζεται,
περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας χρώμενος υπείκοντι καὶ δεχο-
μένως τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ ἐυσχήμον ἐκοινώς· ὁ δ’

\(^1\) αὐτὴ Reiske: αὐτὴ.
\(^2\) ἀπαθείας after μέσον deleted by Pohlenz.
\(^3\) αὐτοῦ Dübner: αὐτοῦ.
\(^4\) φ . . . φ Wyttenbach, confirmed by mss.: δ . . . δ.

\(^a\) The highest and lowest sounds of the heptachord; presumably the \(mesē\) is the fourth note of a scale of seven.
the hypatē, a escapes the sharp highness of the one and the heavy deepness of the other; so virtue, being an activity and faculty concerned with the irrational, does away with the remissions and over-strainings of the impulse and its excesses and defects altogether, and reduces each passion to moderation and faultlessness. So, for instance, they declare courage b to be a mean between cowardice and rashness, of which the former is a defect, the latter an excess, of the spirited part of the soul; so, likewise, liberality is a mean between parsimony and prodigality, and gentleness between insensibility and cruelty; and temperance itself and justice are means, the latter distributing to itself in contracts neither more nor less than what is due, the former ever regulating the desires to a mean between lack of feeling and intemperance.

In this last instance, indeed, the irrational seems, with particular clearness, to allow us to observe the difference between itself and the rational, and to show that passion is essentially quite a different thing from reason. For self-control c would not differ from temperance, nor incontinence from intemperance, as regards the pleasures and desires, if it were the same part of the soul that we naturally use for desiring as for forming judgements. But the fact is that temperance belongs to the sphere where reason guides and manages the passionate element, like a gentle animal obedient to the reins, making it yielding in its desires and willingly receptive of moderation and propriety; thus A (mesē) is to D above (nētē) as A is to E below (hypatē).

a Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, ii. 7. 2-4 (1107 a 33); Stobæus, Ecl. ii. 7. 20 (vol. ii. p. 141 ed. Wachsmuth).

b Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, vii. 9. 6 (1151 b 33).
(445) ἐγκρατής ἀγεί μὲν ἐρρωμένως τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ κρατοῦντι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, ἀγεί δὲ οὐκ ἀλύπως οὐδὲ πειθομένην ἄλλα πλαγίαν καὶ ἀντιτείνουσαν οἰον. 

C ὑπὸ πληγῆς καὶ χαλινοῦ καταβιασόμενος καὶ ἀμακροῦν, ἀγώνων ὡν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ θορύβον μεστὸς· οἰον ὁ Πλάτων ἐξεικονίζει περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὑποζύγια, τοῦ χείρονος πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ξυγομαχοῦντας ἀμα καὶ τὸν ἕνιοχον διαταράσσοντος, ἀντέχειν ὁπίσω καὶ κατατείνεις ὑπὸ σπουδῆς ἀναγκαζόμενον ἀεὶ.

μὴ βάλη φοίνικας ἀκ χειρῶν ἰμάντας
κατὰ Σμωνίδην. οθεν οὐδ' ἀρετήν ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτοτελή τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἄλλ' ἐλαττον' ἀρετής εἶναι μεσότης γὰρ οὐ γέγονεν ἐκ συμφωνίας τοῦ χείρονος πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον οὐδ' ἀνήρτητα τοῦ πάθους τὸ ὑπερβάλλον, οὐδὲ πειθομένον οὐδ' ὀμολογοῦν τῷ D φρονοῦντι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἄλλα λυποῦν καὶ λυποῦμενον καὶ καθεργόμενον ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ὥσπερ ἐν στάσει δυσμενῆς καὶ πολέμου συνοικεί.

πόλις δ' ὁμοὶ μὲν θυμιμάτων γέμει, ὁμοὶ δὲ παιάνων τε καὶ στεναγμάτων· 

ἡ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς ψυχῆ διὰ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν καὶ τὴν διαφοράν. κατὰ ταῦτα δ' οἰονται καὶ τὴν ἀκρασίαν

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1 τὸ μέτριον... ἐρρωμένων omitted in almost all mss.
2 βάλη] ποβάλη Edmonds.
3 αὐτοτελή ἀξιοῦσι all mss. except G.
4 ἐλαττον] ἐλαττόν τι Fási.

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a Phaedrus, 253 c ff.

44
but the self-controlled man, while he does indeed direct his desire by the strength and mastery of reason, yet does so not without pain, nor by persuasion, but as it plunges sideways and resists, as though with blow and curb, he forcibly subdues it and holds it in, being the while himself full of internal struggle and turmoil. Such a conflict Plato \(^a\) portrays in his simile of the horses of the soul, where the worse horse struggles against his better yoke-fellow and at the same time disconcerts the charioteer, who is ever forced to hold out against him and with might and main to rein him in.

Lest he let fall from his hands the crimson thongs, as Simonides \(^b\) has it. That is the reason why they do not account self-control even a virtue \(^c\) in the absolute sense, but less than virtue. For it is not a mean which has been produced by the harmony of the worse with the better, nor has the excess of passion in it been eliminated, nor has the desiderative part of the soul become obedient and compliant to the intelligent part, but is vexed and causes vexation and is confined by compulsion and, though living with reason, lives as in a state of rebellion against it, hostile and inimical:

The city reeks with burning incense, rings
Alike with prayers for health and cries of woe \(^d\)
even so is the soul of the self-controlled man because of its lack of consistency and its conflict. And on the same grounds they hold that incontinence also is

\(^a\) Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, iv. 9. 8 (1128 b 33): it is rather “a mixture of virtue and vice.”

\(^b\) Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 4-5; quoted also in *Moralia*, 95 c, 169 d, 623 c.
ελαττόν τι κακίας εἶναι παντελῆ δὲ κακίαν τὴν ἀκολασίαν. αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσα καὶ πάθος φαύλον καὶ λόγον, ύφ' οὐ μὲν ἐξάγεται τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρόν, ύφ' οὐ δὲ τῷ κακῶς κρίνειν προστιθεμένου ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ τὴν Ἐ ἀισθησιν ἀποβάλλει τῶν ἀμαρτανομένων. ἡ δ' ἀκρασία τῷ μὲν λόγῳ σώζει τὴν κρίσιν ὄρθῃν οὖσαν, τῷ δὲ πάθει φέρεται πάρα τὴν κρίσιν ἱσχύοντι τὸν λόγον μᾶλλον. οἶδεν διαφέρει τῆς ἀκολασίας: ὅπου μὲν γὰρ ἠττᾶται τοῦ πάθους ὁ λογισμὸς ὅπου δ' οὐδὲ μάχεται, καὶ ὅπου μὲν ἀντιλέγων ἐπεται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὅπου δ' ὑφηγεῖται συναγορεύων, καὶ ὅπου μὲν ἣδομένων κοινωνεῖν ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀμαρτανομένων ὅπου δ' ἁχθομένων, καὶ ὅπου μὲν ἐκών φέρεται πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρόν ὅπου δὲ προδίδωσιν ἄκων τὸ καλὸν.

'Ὡς τοῖς πραττομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν οὐχ ἠττῶν δὲ καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἔνεστιν ἡ διαφορὰ κατάδηλος. Ἐ ἀκολάστων μὲν γὰρ αἴδε φωναί:

tίς δὲ χάρις, τί δὲ τερπνόν ἄνευ χρυσῆς 'Αφρο-

diτῆς;

τεθναίην ὅτε μου μηκέτι ταῦτα μέλει.

καὶ ἔτερος

tὸ φαγεῖν τὸ πιεῖν τὸ τῆς 'Αφροδίτης τυχ-

χάνειν,

τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσθήκας ἀπαντ' ἐγὼ καλῶ

1 τῷ] τὸ in most mss. 2 χάρις] βίος Stobaeus. 3 ἄνευ] ἄτερ Stobaeus. 4 μέλει] μέλοι Stobaeus.

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a Cf. Moralia, 705 c-e.
b Mimnermus, Frag. 1, vv. 1-2 (ed. Bergk and ed. Diehl); Edmonds, Elegy and Iambic, i. p. 89.
something less than a vice, but that intemperance is a full-fledged vice. For intemperance possesses both an evil passion and an evil reason; under the influence of the former, it is incited by desire to shameful conduct; under the influence of the latter, which, since its judgement is evil, is enlisted with the desires, intemperance loses even the perception of its errors. But incontinence, with the aid of reason, preserves its power of judgement intact, yet by its passions, which are stronger than its reason, it is swept along against its judgement. That is why incontinence differs from intemperance, for in it reason is worsted by passion, whereas with intemperance reason does not even fight; in the case of incontinence reason argues against the desires as it follows them, whereas with intemperance reason guides them and is their advocate; it is characteristic of intemperance that its reason shares joyfully in the sins committed, whereas with incontinence the reason shares in them, but with reluctance; with intemperance, reason is willingly swept along into shameful conduct, whereas with incontinence, it betrays honour unwillingly.

So also the difference between them is not less manifest in their words than in their actions. These are, for instance, the sayings of intemperate persons:

What pleasure can there be, what joy, without
The golden Aphrodité? May I die
When things like these no longer comfort me.  

And another says,

To eat, to drink, to have one's way in love:
All other things I call accessory.

a Alexis, Frag. 271 ed. Kock, vv. 4-5; the whole fragment is quoted in Moralia, 21 d.

ON MORAL VIRTUE, 445
PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

446 φησίν, ὥσπερ εξ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς συνεπινεύων ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ὑπερεπόμενος. οὐχ ἦττον δὲ τούτων ὁ εἶπὼν

ἔα μ’ ἀπολέσθαι· τοῦτο γὰρ μοι συμφέρει τὴν κρίσιν ἔχει τῶ λίθον συννοσῳδόν. Αἱ δὲ τῆς ἀκρασίας έτεραι καὶ διαφέρουσαι γνώμην ἔχουσά μ’ ἡ φύσις βιάζεται καὶ

αἰαί, τὸδ’ ἦδη1 θείον ἀνθρώπως κακόν, οταν τις εἰδῆ τάγαθον χρῆται δὲ μή καὶ

εἶκεν2 γὰρ ἦδη θυμὸς οὐδ’ ἔτε αντέχει, θινώδες ὡς ἁγκιστρόν ἁγκύρας σάλων.

θινώδες ἁγκιστρόν οὐ φαύλως λέγων τὸ μὴ κάτοχον τοῦ λογισμοῦ μηδ’ ἀραρός, ἀλλὰ μανότητι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μαλακία προϊέμενον τὴν κρίσιν. οὐ Β πόρρω δὲ τῆς εἰκόνος ταύτης κάκεινα εἰρηταί

ναις ὡς τις ἐκ μὲν γῆς ἀνήρτημα3 βρόχοις, πνεί δ’ οὕρος, ἡμῖν δ’ οὐ4 κρατεί τὰ πεισματα·

πεισματα γὰρ λέγει τὰς ἀντεχούσας κρίσεις πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρόν, εἴθ’ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ πνεῦματος πολλοῦ

1 τὸδ’ ἦδη Moralia, 33 ε: τὸ δή.
2 εἶκεν F. G. Schmidt: έλκει.
3 ἀνήρτημα] ἀνήρτηται in all mss. but G.
4 δ’ οὐ Turnebus: δ’ εὖ.


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as though with all his soul he were acquiescing in pleasures and were being subverted thereby. Not less than these does he who says

Leave me to die, for that is best for me,

have his judgement suffering with the same ailment as his passions.

But the sayings of incontinence are otherwise and different:

A mind I have, but Nature forces me;

and

Alas! from God this evil comes to men
When, knowing what is good, they do it not;

and

The spirit yields and can resist no more,
Like anchor-hook in sand amid the surge.

Here not inaptly the poet terms "an anchor-hook in sand" that which is not under the control of reason, nor firmly fixed, but surrenders its judgement to the loose and soft part of the soul. Very close to this imagery are also those famous lines:

I, like some ship, am tied by ropes to shore,
And when winds blow, our cables do not hold.

For here the poet calls "cables" the judgements which resist shameful conduct and then are broken

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* Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag.², p. 911, ades. 379; quoted also in Moralia, 782 d. Some ascribe this and the following quotation to Euripides.

(446) ἰηγνυμένας τοῦ πάθους. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι πλησίστιος μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς ἤδονας ὁ ἀκόλαστος ὕπο τῶν ἐπι-
θυμιῶν φέρεται καὶ δίδωσιν ἑαυτὸν καὶ συγκατ-
eυθύνει: πλάγιος δ' ὁ ἀκρατής, οὗν ἐξαναφέρειν γλυκόμενος καὶ διωθείσαν τὸ πάθος, ὑποσύρεται καὶ περιπίπτει περὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν· ὡς Ἀνάξαρχον ἐσιλλαίνε Τίμων

ἐν δὲ τὸ θαρσαλέον τε καὶ ἐμμενές ὁ ὄρούσαι 
φαίνετ' Ἀνάξαρχον κύνεον μένος· ὁς ὅτα καὶ 
eιδώς,

ὡς φάσαν, ἀθλιός ἐσκέ, φύσις δὲ μιν ἐμπαλν 
ἡγεν

ἡδονοπλήξ, ἢ ἡ πλεῖστοι ὑποτρείουσι̣ σοφιστῶν.

οὔτε γὰρ ὁ σοφὸς ἐγκρατής ἀλλὰ σώφρων, οὔθ' ὁ 
ἀμαθής ἀκρατής ἀλλ' ἀκόλαστος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἦδεται 
τοῖς καλοῖς ὁ δ' οὐκ ἀχθεῖ τοῖς αἰσχροῖς. σοφι-
stικῆς οὖν ψυχῆς ἡ ἀκρασία λόγον ἐχούσης οἷς 
ἐγνωκεν ὁρθῶς ἐμμένειν μὴ δυνάμενον.

7. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία τοιαύτας ἐχει διαφοράς 
πρὸς τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ἢ δ' ἐγκράτεια πρὸς τὴν 
σωφροσύνην αὖθις αὐτὰς ἀντιστρόφους ἀναλόγως.
τὸ γὰρ δάκνον καὶ τὸ λυποῦν καὶ τὸ ἀγανάκτοιν 
οὖπω τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀπολέομεν· τῆς δὲ σώφρονος 

ψυχῆς τὸ πανταχόθεν ὀμαλὲς καὶ ἀσφυκτὸν καὶ 
ὑγιαῖνον, ὃ συνήρμοσται καὶ συγκέκρατα τὸ

1 ὑποσύρεται Reiske, confirmed by three mss.: ὑποσύρει.
2 ἐμμενές] ἐμμανένes in some mss.
3 ὃς Xylander from 705 D: ὃν.
4 ἡδονοπλήξ] ἡδονοπλῆς?
5 ὑποτρέιουσι] ὑποστρομέουσι Nauck.
6 τοιαύτας Reiske: ταύτας.

a Frag. 9 (ed. Wachsmuth, p. 106); portions are quoted
by passion, as by a great gust of wind. Truly the intemperate man is swept along to his pleasures by his desires with sails full-spread and delivers himself over to them and steers his course directly thither; whereas the course of the incontinent man zigzags here and there, as he strives to emerge from his passion and to stave it off and is yet swept down and shipwrecked on the reef of shameful conduct. Just as Timon used to lampoon Anaxarchus:

The Cynic might of Anaxarchus seemed
Steadfast and bold, wherever he wished, to spring;
Well did he know the truth, they said, and yet
Was bad: for Nature smote him with desire
And led him back from truth—'twas Nature's dart,
Before whom trembles many a Sophist heart.

For neither is the wise man continent, though he is temperate, nor is the fool incontinent, though he is intemperate. For the wise man takes pleasure in what is honourable, but the fool is not vexed by shamefulness. Incontinence, therefore, is the mark of a sophistic soul, which has, indeed, reason, but reason which cannot stand firm by its own just decisions.

7. Such, then, are the differences between incontinence and intemperance; and again between continence and temperance, these differences being the counterpart of the former. For continence is not yet free from remorse and pain and indignation; but in the soul of the temperate man there is serenity on all occasions, freedom from violent changes, and sanity, by which the irrational is harmonized and blended again in Moralia, 529 a and 705 d; cf. also Diels, Frag. d. Vorsokratiker, ii. p. 238.
(446) ἀλογον πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν εὑπειθεῖα καὶ πραότητι
θαυμαστὴ κεκοσμημένων. εἴποις δ’ ἂν ἐπιβλέψας
δὴ τὸ τ’ ἐπείτ’ ἀνεμος μὲν ἐπαύσατο, ἡ δὲ γαλήνη
ἐπλετο νηνεύη, κοίμησε δὲ κύματα δαίμων.

τὰ σφοδρὰ καὶ περιμανὴ καὶ οἰστρώδη κινήματα
τῶν ἐπιθυμῶν τοῦ λόγου κατασβέσαντος, ὅν δ’
ἡ φύσις ἀναγκάιως δεῖται, ταῦθ’ ὀμοπαθὴ καὶ
ὑπήκοα καὶ φίλα καὶ συνεργὰ πεποιημένου ταῖς
πρακτικαῖς προαρέσεσιν ὡστε μὴ προεκθείν τοῦ
Ε λογισμοῦ μηδ’ ὑπενδιδόναι μηδ’ ἀτακτεῖν μηδ’
ἀπειθεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάσαν ὅρμην εὐάγγειον οὖσαν

ἀθηλον ἔπιψι πῶλον ὡς ἀμα τρέχειν,

ἐπιβεβαιώσαν τὸν Ξενοκράτους λόγον, ὅν ἐκεῖνος
eître πerὶ τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντων, ὅτι μόνοι
ποιοῦσιν ἐκουσίως ἄ ποιοῦσιν ἀκόντες οἱ λοιποὶ διὰ
tὸν νόμον, ὡσπερ ὑπὸ πληγής κύνες ἡ γαλαῖ
ψόφω τῶν ἕδονῶν ἀποτρεπόμενοι καὶ πρὸς τὸ
δεινὸν ὑποβλέποντες. 7

"Οτι μὲν οὖν γίνεται τις ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοιαύτης
ἐτερότητος 8 αἴσθησις καὶ διαφορᾶ 9 περὶ τὰς ἐπι-
θυμίας, ὡς τινος μαχομένου καὶ τάναντια λέγοντος
F αιτᾶτι, οὐκ ἄδηλον ἐστιν. ἔνιοι δὲ φασὶν οὐχ ἔτερον
εἶναι τοῦ λόγου τὸ πάθος οὐδὲ δυνὴν διαφορᾶν

1 δ’ added by Capps.
2 δὴ τὸτ’] αὐτίκ’ Homer.
3 κοίμησε] κοίμασε in most mss.
4 ὀμοπαθὴ] ὀμοιοπαθὴ in all mss. but G.
5 κύνες ἡ γαλαῖ Bernardakis, confirmed by G (κύνες iam Reiske): κὺνος ἡ γαλάς).
6 ψόφω] most mss. have ψόφον or φάβω.
7 ὑποβλέποντες] ἀποβλέποντες in all mss. but G.
8 ἐτερότητος Wyttenbach, confirmed by G: στερρότητος.
9 διαφορᾶ Reiske: διαφορά.
with reason, when this is equipped with great persuasion and a wonderful gentleness. And you would say, as you looked at the man,

Then, indeed, ceased the gale; a windless calm
Arose; some god had laid the waves to rest,\(^a\)
since by reason the violent, raging, and furious movements of the desires had been quenched and those movements which Nature absolutely requires had been made sympathetic, submissive, friendly, and, when the man chose a course of action, willing to co-operate, so that they did not outstrip the dictates of reason, nor fall short of them, nor misbehave, nor disobey, but so that every impulse was easily led

As new-weaned foal beside his mother runs,\(^b\)
and confirmed the remark of Xenocrates\(^c\) about true philosophers, that they alone do willingly what all others do unwillingly because of the law, even as dogs by a blow and cats by a noise are turned from their pleasures and regard with suspicion the danger that threatens them.

It is quite obvious, then, that there is in the soul a perception of some such distinction and difference as regards the desires, as though some force were fighting against them and contradicting them. But some affirm\(^d\) that passion is not essentially different from reason, nor is there quarrelling between the

\(^a\) Homer, *Od.*, xii. 168.
\(^c\) Frag. 3; cf. *Moralia*, 1124 E.
καὶ στάσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνὸς λόγου τροπὴν ἐπὶ ἀμφότερα, 447 λανθάνουσαν ἡμᾶς ὑπῆρτι καὶ τάχει μεταβολής, οὐ
συνορῶντας 1 ὀτι ταύτων ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὦ 2 πέφυκεν ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ μετανοεῖν, ὑργίζοντας καὶ δεδείναι,
φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀὐσχρὸν ὕφ 3 ἡδονῆς καὶ φερο-
μένης πάλιν αὐτῆς ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ γὰρ ἐπι-
θυμίαι καὶ ὑργίνη καὶ φόβον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα
dόξας εἶναι καὶ κρίσεις πονηρᾶς, οὐ περὶ ἐν τι
γινομένας τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ἀλλ' ὁλον τοῦ ἤγε-
μονικοῦ ροπᾶς καὶ έξεις καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ
ὀρμᾶς, καὶ ὀλας ἐνεργείαις τινὰς οὕσας ἐν ὀλίγῳ
μεταπτωτάς, ᾧσπερ αἰ τῶν παίδων ἐπιδρομαί τὸ
ῥαγδαῖον καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν ἐπισφαλῆς ὑπ’ ἀσθενείας
καὶ ἁβέβαιον ἔχουσι.

Ταῦτα δὲ πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ τῇ ἑνάργυρᾳ 3 ἐστὶ
Β καὶ τῇ άίσθησιν. οὐδείς γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τοῦ ἐπι-
θυμουντος αἰσθάνεται μεταβολὴν εἰς τὸ κρίνον οὐδὲ
τοῦ κρίνοντος αὐτὰ πάλιν εἰς τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, οὐδὲ
παύεται μὲν ἐρῶν, ὅτε λογίζεται καθεκτέον εἶναι
tὸν ἔρωτα καὶ διαμαχέτεον πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἐξίσταται
dὲ πάλιν τοῦ λογίζοντας καὶ κρίνειν, ὅταν ἐνδιδό
μαλασσόμενος ὕπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας· ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ
λόγῳ πρὸς τὸ πάθος ἀντιβαίνων ἐν τῷ πάθει
ἐστὶν ἐτι, καὶ πάλιν κρατοῦμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους
διορὰ τῶν λογισμῶ τὸ ἀμαρτανόμενον καὶ οὕτε τῷ
πάθει τὸν λόγον ἀνήρρηκεν οὕτε τῷ λογίζοντας τοῦ
πάθους ἀπήλλακται, φερόμενος δ’ ἐκατέρωσε μέσος

1 συνορῶντας Iannotius, confirmed by a few mss.: συ-
ορῶντες.
2 ὦ] ὄ in many mss.
3 ἑνάργυρᾳ] ἑνέργεια in many mss.

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two and factious strife, but only a conversion of one and the same reason to its two aspects; this escapes our notice by reason of the suddenness and swiftness of the change, for we do not perceive that it is the same part of the soul with which we naturally desire and change to aversion, are angry and afraid, are swept along by pleasure to shameful conduct, and then, when the soul itself is being swept away, recover ourselves again. In fact, they say, desire and anger and fear and all such things are but perverse opinions and judgements, which do not arise in one certain part of the soul, but are inclinations and yieldings, assents and impulses of the whole directive faculty and, in a word, certain activities which may in a moment be changed this way or that, just as the sudden assaults of children\(^a\) have an impetuosity and violence that is precarious and inconstant because of children's weakness.

But this doctrine is, in the first place, contrary to the clear evidence of our perceptions. For no one ever perceives in himself a change from desiring to judging, nor again a change from judging to desiring; nor does the lover cease loving when he reasons that he must restrain his love and fight against it, and then give up again the process of reasoning and judging when he is softened by desire and yields to love; but both while by reason he still continues to oppose passion, he continues in the passion, and again, when mastered by passion, he plainly sees his error by the light of reason: and neither through passion has he done away with reason, nor through reason is he rid of passion, but being borne back and forth from one to the other he lies between them and

\(^a\) Cf. *Moralia*, 458 d, infra.
(447) ἀμφοὶν καὶ κοινὸς ἐστιν. οἴ δὲ νῦν μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν
C γίνεσθαι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, νῦν δὲ τὸν ἀντιταττόμενον
τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ λογισμὸν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, οὐδὲν
ἀπέχουσι τῶν μη δύο τὸν κυνηγόν εἶναι καὶ τὸ
θηρίον ὑπολαμβανόντων, ἀλλὰ ταύτῳ σῶμα χρώ-
μενον μεταβολῆ νῦν μὲν εἶναι θηρίον νῦν δὲ
γίνεσθαι κυνηγόν. ἐκεῖνοι τε γὰρ ἐμφανεῖ τι
παρορώσιν οὕτω τε πρὸς τὴν αἰσθήσιν ἀντιμαρ-
τυροῦσιν, οὐχ ἐνὸς τινος μεταβολῆς ἀλλὰ δυνῆν ἄμα
μάχης καὶ διαφορᾶς εἰν αὐτοῖς1 αἰσθανομένην.2

"Τι οὖν;" φασίν, "οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πολλάκις διχοφορεῖ καὶ πρὸς ἐναν-
tίας ἀνθέλκεται δόξας περὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀλλ' 
D ἐν ἐστὶ;" "πάνω μὲν οὖν," φήσομεν, "ἀλλὰ τὸ
συμβαίνον οὐχ ὅμοιον"· οὐ γὰρ μάχεται πρὸς ἑαυτὸ
tῆς ψυχῆς τὸ φρονοῦν, ἀλλὰ μᾶ χρώμενον δυνάμει
dιαφόρων ἐφαπτέται λογισμῶν· μᾶλλον δ' εἰς
λογισμὸς ἐστιν ἐν πράγμασι γνώμενος ἐτέρως
ὁσπερ ὑλὰς διαφεροῦσαις. οἶδεν οὖτε λύπῃ τοῖς
ἀνευ πάθοις λογισμοῖς ἐνεστίν, οὔθ' ὡσπερ ἐκβια-
ζόμενοι παρὰ γνώμην αἱροῦντας θάτερον, ἄν μὴ νὴ
Δία λανθάνῃ πάθος τι προσηρτημένον ὡσπερ ἐπὶ
ζυγοῦ. καὶ γὰρ τούτο συμβαίνει πολλάκις, οὗ
λογισμοῦ τινος πρὸς λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ φιλοτιμίας ἢ
φιλονεικίας ἢ χάριτος ἢ ξηλοτυπίας ἢ δέους ἀντι-

1 αὐτοῖς] all mss. but G have ἑαυτοῖς.
2 αἰσθανομένην] some mss. have αἰσθανόμενοι or -όμεθα.

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participates in both. For those who assume now that desire becomes the controlling faculty, now that it is reason which arrays itself against desire, are in the same position as those who assume the hunter and the beast to be not two, but one and the same body which, by a change, is now the beast, and now becomes the hunter. For just as those persons overlook something quite plain, so these testify against the evidence of perception, which tells us that we have in these cases, not a changing of some one thing, but two things struggling and fighting against one another.

"What then?" they object. "Is it not true that man's deliberative faculty also is often divided and distracted toward contrary opinions regarding what is expedient, but that it is yet one and the same?"

"Quite so," we shall say, "but the process is not parallel." For the intellectual part of the soul does not here oppose itself, but, using one and the same faculty, applies itself to different lines of reasoning; or rather, there is but one single reason, which functions on things essentially different, as though on different matters. Therefore neither is pain present in reasoning where passion is absent, nor are men forced, as it were, to choose a course contrary to reason, unless indeed some emotion is furtively attached, as it were, to one pan of the balances. This, in fact, happens often: when it is not reasoning that opposes reasoning, but ambition or contentiousness or the pursuit of

*Cf.* Emerson, *Brahma*:

If the red slayer think he slays,  
Or if the slain think he is slain,  
They know not well the subtle ways  
I keep, and pass, and turn again.
Ε βαινοντος, οϊςεθαι λόγων ἕιναι δυεϊν διαφοράν· ὤσπερ ἐν τούτοις·
αἵδεσθεν μὲν ἀνήμασθαι, δεῖσαν δ' ὑποδέχθαι· καὶ
tὸ μὲν σφαγῆναι δεινὸν εὐκλειαν δ' ἔχει,
tὸ μὴ θανεῖν δὲ δειλὸν ἡδονή δ' ἐνι.

καὶ περὶ τὰς κρίσεις τῶν συμβολαίων υποτρέχουτα
tὰ πάθη τὴν πλείστην ἐμποιεῖ διατριβήν· καὶ περὶ
tὰ συμβούλια τῶν βασιλέων οἱ πρὸς χάριν λέγοντες
οὐ δυείν κρίσεων τῇ ἔτερᾳ συναγορεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ
πάθει των προστίθενται παρὰ τὸν τοῦ συμφέρον-
tος λογισμὸν. διό τοῦτος ῥήτωρας ἐν ταῖς ἀριστοκρα-
tίαις οἱ ἀρχόντες οὐκ ἐώσι παθαίνεσθαι· ἐπεὶ γὰρ
ἱ' εὐθείᾳ ροπήν ὁ ἀπαθὴς λογισμὸς ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον·
ἀν δὲ πάθος ἐγγίνηται, μάχθην ποιεῖ καὶ διαφορᾶν
tὸ ἱδόμενον καὶ τὸ ἀλγοῦν πρὸς τὸ κρίνον καὶ τὸ
βουλεύομενον. ἔπει διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ σκέ-
μασιν οὐ πρόσεστι τὸ μετὰ λύπης ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτέρων
ἀγεσθαι καὶ μετατίθεσθαι πολλάκις, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς τ'
448 Ἀριστοτέλης Δημόκριτος τε καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐνια
tῶν πρόςθεν αὐτοῖς ἀρεσκόντων ἀθορύβως καὶ
ἀδήκτως καὶ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀφείσαν; ὡτι τῷ θεωρη-
tικῷ καὶ μαθηματικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθος οὐδὲν
ἀνθέστηκεν ἀλλ' ἀτρεμεῖ καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονεῖ τὸ

1 λόγων Bernardakis, confirmed by G: διὰ λόγων.
2 τῶν] some mss. have δὲ τῶν, perhaps rightly.
3 μαθηματικῷ] μαθητικῷ Jaeger, perhaps rightly.

a Homer, II., vii. 93.
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favour or jealousy or fear that opposes, we think it is a difference between two reasons, as in the verse:

To refuse they were ashamed, but feared to accept;
and this:

To die is dreadful, yet it brings fair fame;
Not to die is craven, yet there's pleasure there.

And in the judgement of suits concerning business affairs the passions rush in unawares and cause the greatest waste of time. So also in the councils of kings those who speak to obtain favour are not advocating one or the other of two decisions, but are submitting to some emotion which is contrary to their calculation of what is expedient. Therefore in aristocratic states the magistrates do not allow political speakers to make passionate harangues, for reason, if not influenced by passion, inclines to a just balance toward what is right; but if passion intervenes, the part of the soul that feels pleasure and pain fights and opposes the part which forms judgements and deliberates. Otherwise, why is it that in philosophical speculations no feeling of pain is present when, under the influence of those who hold different opinions, we change our views again and again, but that Aristotle himself and Democritus and Chrysippus have recanted without any dismay or pain, and even with pleasure, some of the dogmas they previously held? It is because passion has set up no opposition to the contemplative and scientific part of the soul and the irrational part remains quiet and

Evang., xiv. 6. 9, where Cephasodorus attacks the young Aristotle by an onslaught on the Platonic Ideas, οἰηθεὶς κατὰ Πλάτωνα τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην φιλοσοφεῖν. See also 442b, supra.
(448) ἀλογον ἐν τούτοις. διὸ πρὸς τάληθες ὁ λογισμός, ὅταν φανῇ, προέμενος τὸ ψεῦδος ἀσμένως ἀπ- ἐκλινε. ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ἔστιν οὐκ ἐν θατέρῳ τὸ πειθόμενον καὶ μεταπειθόμενον. αἳ δὲ πραγ- ματικαὶ βουλαὶ καὶ κρίσεις καὶ διάντα τῶν πολλῶν ἐμπαθεῖς οὐσαί δυσδιάν τῷ λόγῳ παρέχουσι καὶ δυσκολίαν, ἐνυσχομένῳ καὶ ταραττομένῳ περὶ τὸ

Β ἀλογον, ἀνταῖρον αὐτῷ μεθ' ἂδονής τινος ἢ δέους ἢ λύπης ἢ ἐπιθυμίας. καὶ τούτων κριτήριον ἢ αἰσθησίας ἔστιν, ἀμφοτέρων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ γὰρ ἂν περιγένηται θάτερον, οὐκ ἄνηρκε θάτερον, ἀλλ' ἐφέλκεται καταβιαζόμενον καὶ ἀντιτείνον. ὁ γὰρ νοοθέτων αὐτὸν ἔρωντα κρῆται τῷ λογισμῷ πρὸς τὸ πάθος, ὡς ἀμφοτέρων ἐνότων ἃμα τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ χειρὶ φλεγμαίνον ἔτερον μέρος πιέζων καὶ δυεῖν ὄντων καὶ διαφερόντων ἐπαισθανόμενος. ἐν μέντοι ταῖς ἀπαθεῖσι βουλαῖσι καὶ σκέψεισι, οἷας ἔχει μάλιστα τὸ θεωρητικόν, ἂν μὲν ἴσαι μένωσιν,

C οὗ γέγονε κρίσις ἀλλ' ἀπορία, στάσις οὔσα καὶ μονὴ διανοίας ὑπ' ἑναντίων πιθανῶν. ἂν δὲ ῥοπῇ γένηται πρὸς θάτερον, ἡ κρατήσασα τὴν ἐτέραν λέλυκεν, ὥστε μὴ λυπεῖν μηδ' ὑπεναντιοῦσθαι πρὸς τὴν δόξαν. οὖν δὲ λογισμῷ μὲν ἀντικείσθαι λογισμῷ δοκοῦντο, οὐ γίνεται δυεῖν καὶ ἐτέρων

1 διὸ πρὸς] διόπερ in most mss.
2 φανῇ] φαύῃ in most mss.
4 μονὴ Basel ed. of 1542, confirmed by G: μόνῃ.
5 πιθανῶν Wyttenbach, confirmed by G: παθῶν.

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a Cf. Moralia, 71 Α, and Euripides, Frag. 665 there cited. 60
does not meddle with these matters. Therefore reason, as soon as the truth appears, dismisses the false and gladly inclines toward the truth; for it is in reason, not in its opposite, that the faculty resides which yields to persuasion and, through persuasion, changes opinion. But with most people, their deliberations, judgements, and decisions which are to be converted into action are in a state of emotion and therefore offer obstructions and difficulties to the path of reason, for reason is checked and confused by the irrational, which, with some emotion of pleasure or fear, pain or desire, rises up to oppose it. In such cases the senses make the decision, since they have contact with both; and if, in fact, one gains the mastery, it does not destroy the other, but forces it to comply and drags it along resisting. For the lover who admonishes himself uses reason against his passion, since they both exist at the same time in his soul, as it were pressing with his hand the other member, which is inflamed, and clearly perceiving that there are two distinct forces and that they are at variance. On the other hand, in those deliberations and speculations where passion is absent (and these are the sort in which the contemplative faculty most commonly engages), if they be equally balanced, no judgement has taken place, but merely a perplexity has arisen, which is a rest or suspension of intellectual activity brought about by opposing probabilities; but if the inclination falls to either side, the winning opinion has cancelled the other, with the result that there is no pain nor any opposition left. In general, when it appears that reason is opposing reason, there is no perception of them as two distinct things, but as a single thing
(448) αἰσθησις ἀλλ' ἐνός τινος ἐν διαφόροις γνωμένου
φαντασίας· ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἄλογον μάχηται τῷ λο-
γισμῷ, μήτε κρατεῖν ἀλύπως μήτε κρατεῖσθαι
πεφυκὸς εὐθὺς εἰς¹ δύο διώστησι τῇ μάχῃ τὴν ψυχήν
καὶ ποιεῖ τὴν διαφοράν πρόδηλον.

8. Οὐ μόνον τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῆς μάχης ἀλλ' οὐδὲν
D ἴττον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκολούθιας κατάδοι τις ἄν τὴν
παθητικὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς λογιστικῆς² ἔτεραν οὐσιν.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔστι μὲν ἔραν εὐφυοὺς πρὸς ἁρέτην καὶ
γενναίου παιδὸς ἔστι δὲ φαύλου καὶ ἀκολάστουν,
συμβαίνει δὲ θυμῷ χρήσθαι μὲν ἄλογως πρὸς
παιδας αὐτοῦ καὶ γονεῖς χρήσθαι δ' ύπερ γονέων
καὶ παιδῶν δικαίως πρὸς πολεμίους καὶ τυράννους·
ὡσπερ ἐκεῖ μάχης καὶ διαφοράς τοῦ πάθους πρὸς
τὸν λογισμὸν αἰσθησις ἔστιν, οὕτως ἐνταῦθα πει-
θοὺς καὶ ἀκολούθια, οἷον ἐπιρρέοντον³ καὶ
συνεπιδιδόντος. ἔτι⁴ τοίνυν καὶ γυναικα γῆμας
Ε κατὰ νόμους ἀνὴρ ἐπιεικῆς διανοεῖται περιέπειν
καὶ συνεῖναι δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως, χρόνῳ δὲ τῆς
συνηθείας ἐντεκούσης πάθος αἰσθάνεται τῷ λο-
γισμῷ τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιτευνόμενον.
ὡσπερ αὐτῷ καὶ νέοι διδασκάλιοι ἐπίτυχοντες
ἀστείοις ὑπὸ χρείας τὸ πρῶτον ἔπονται καὶ ζη-
λοῦσιν, ὡστερον δὲ καὶ φιλοῦσιν ἀντὶ γνωρίμων καὶ
μαθητῶν ἐρασταὶ καλούμενοι καὶ ὄντες. τὸ δ' αὐτῷ
συμβαίνει καὶ πρὸς ἄρχοντας ἐν πόλει χρη-
στοὺς καὶ γείτονας καὶ κηδεστὰς· ἀρξάμενοι γὰρ

¹ eis Reiske: ὑσ.
² λογιστικῆς] λογικῆς in most mss.
³ ἐπιρρέοντος Wytenbach: ἐπιρρέοντος.
⁴ ἐτι Reiske: ἐπει.
which arises in different impressions made upon the senses. Yet when there is a struggle against reason on the part of the irrational, which, by its very nature, can neither conquer nor be conquered without pain, straightway the irrational splits the soul in two by its battling and makes the distinction between the two perfectly obvious.

8. It is not only from their dissension, however, but no less from their agreement, that one can perceive that the source of passion is essentially different from that of reason. For since it is equally possible to love a noble youth, well-formed by nature for virtue, and to love an evil and profligate one, and since it happens that one both becomes angry irrationally against one’s own children or parents, and angry justly on behalf of parents and children against enemies and despots; just as in the one case there is perception of struggle and dissension of passion against reason, so in the other there is perception of persuasion and agreement on the part of passion, which inclines the scales, as it were, in favour of reason and increases its power. Yet again, when a good man has lawfully married a wife, his intention is to treat her respectfully and consort with her honourably and soberly; but as time goes on, his intimacy with her has given birth to passion, when he perceives that his love and affection increases by the exercise of his reason. So again, when young men happen upon cultivated teachers, they follow them and admire them at first because of their usefulness; but later they come to feel affection for them also, and in place of familiar companions and pupils they are called lovers and are actually so. The same thing happens also in people’s relations to good magistrates in cities and good neighbours and
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υπὸ χρείας τινὸς καθηκόντως ἀλλήλοις ὁμιλεῖν, ἐπειτα λανθάνουσιν εἰς τὸ φιλεῖν ύποφερόμενου, Συνεπισπασμένου τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ συναναπεί- σαντος τὸ παθητικόν. ὃ δ' εἰπὼν

αἰδώς τε· δισαὶ δ' εἰσίν, η μὲν οὐ κακῇ
η δ' ἀχθος οἶκων·

ἀρ' οὖ δήλος ἐστι συνησθημένος ἐν έαυτῷ τούτῳ τὸ πάθος πολλάκις μὲν ἀκολουθοῦν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ συγκατακοσμούμενον, πολλάκις δὲ παρὰ τὸν λόγον ὅκνους καὶ μελλήσει καιροὺς καὶ πράγματα λυμαίνομένον;

9. Όις καὶ αὐτοὶ τρόπον τινὰ διὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν ὑπείκοντες, αἰδεύσατε τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι καλοῦσι καὶ τὸ ἡδεσθαι χάρειν καὶ τοὺς φόβους εὐλαβείας· ταύτην μὲν οὐδενὸς ἂν αἰτιασαμένου τὴν εὐφημίαν, εἰ ταύτα πάθη προστιθέμενα μὲν τῷ λογισμῷ τούτοις καλοῦσι τοῖς ὀνόμασι, μαχόμενα δὲ καὶ βιαζό- μενα τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκείνοις. ὅταν δὲ διακρύοις ἐλεγχόμενοι καὶ τρόμωσι καὶ χρόας μεταβολαῖς ἀντὶ λύπης καὶ φόβου δηγμοὺς τινας καὶ συν- θροήσεις· λέγωσι καὶ προθυμίας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ύποκοριζώντας, σοφιστικὰς δοκοῦσι οὐ φιλοσο- 

Β φοὺς διακρούσεις καὶ ἀποδράσεις ἐκ τῶν πραγ- μάτων μηχανᾶται διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων.

Καῖτοι πάλιν αὐτοὶ τὰς τε χαρὰς ἐκείνας καὶ τὰς βουλήσεις καὶ τὰς εὐλαβείας εὐπαθείας καλοῦσιν

1 καθηκόντως] καθηκόντος in most mss.
2 μὲν . . . δὲ] omitted in most mss.
3 Όις καὶ αὐτοὶ Turnebus: οὐ καὶ αὐτοῖς.
4 ἐνάργειαν] ἐνέργειαν in all mss. but G and E.
5 συνθροήσεις Haupt: συνεόρσεις.
6 διακρούσεις Xylander: διακαύσεις.
relatives by marriage; for in the beginning they dutifully associate with one another from some consideration of usefulness, but later they are carried unconsciously into genuine affection, reason drawing along, and aiding in the persuasion of, the passionate element. Is it not obvious that he a who said,

And modesty. Two kinds there are: the one
Not bad, the other burdening our homes,

has perceived in himself that this emotion often follows the lead of reason and is arrayed at reason's side, but often, contrary to reason, by hesitations and delays ruins opportunities and actions?

9. But my opponents, though forced to concede in a manner these arguments because of their obvious truth, yet persist in calling shame "modesty," b pleasure "joy," and fears "precautions." No one would blame them for this euphemism if they would but call these same emotions by these soft names when they attach themselves to reason, and call them by those harsher names when the emotions oppose and offer violence to reason. But when, convicted by their tears and tremblings and changes of colour, in place of grief and fear they call these emotions "compunctions" and "perplexities" and gloss over the desires with the term "eagernesses," they seem to be devising casuistic, not philosophic, shifts and escapes from reality through the medium of fancy names.

And yet these very men, c to cite another instance, call those "joys," "volitions," and "precautions" of

a Phaedra is the speaker: Euripides, Hippolytus, 385-386.
c Ibid. iii. pp. 105-108.
(449) οὐκ ἀπαθεῖας, ὀρθῶς ἐνταῦθα χρώμενοι τοῖς ὅνωμασι. γίνεται γὰρ εὐπάθεια τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὸ πάθος οὐκ ἀναιροῦντος ἀλλὰ κοσμοῦντος καὶ τάττοντος ἐν τοῖς σωφρονοῦσιν. οἱ δὲ φαύλοι καὶ ἀκρατεῖς τὶ πάσχουσιν, ὡστε τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα κρίναντες φιλεῖν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου καὶ τῆς ἐρωμένης μὴ δύνανται, τὴν δ' ἐταίραν καὶ τὸν κόλακα κρίναντες, εὐθὺς καὶ φιλῶσιν; εἰ γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἢν κρίσις, ἐδεὶ τῇ τοῦ φιλεῖν χρήναι καὶ μισεῖν κρίσις. Οὐκ οὐκ ἦν παλίν μᾶχεται καὶ τὸ ἔπεσθαι καὶ τὸ μισεῖν, νυνὶ δὲ συμβαίνει τάναντια, ταῖς μὲν προστιθεμένου τοῦ πάθους κρίσεις ταῖς δ' ἀπειθοῦντος. ἢ καὶ φασιν αὐτοῖ, τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκβιαζομένων, οὐ πάσαν εἶναι κρίσιν πάθος ἀλλὰ τὴν κινητικὴν ὀρμῆς βιαίου καὶ πλεοναζούσης, ὀμολογοῦντες ἐτερον εἶναι τὸ κρίνον καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἐν ἡμῖν ὁσπερ τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ κινούμενον. αὐτὸς τε Χρύσιππος, ἐν πολλοῖς ὀριζόμενοι τὴν καρπερίαν καὶ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἔξεσις ἀκολουθητικὰς τῷ ἀἱροῦντι λόγῳ, δῆλος ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ὀμολογεῖν ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς ἐτερον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν ἐν ἡμῖν τοῦ ὧν ἀκολουθεῖν

10. Ἡσα τοίνυν τὰ ἀμαρτήματα πάντα καὶ πάσας τιθέμενοι τἀς ἀμαρτίας, εἰ μὲν ἄλλη πη παρορώσι τάληθες, οὐκ ἐστὶ καιρὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι διελέγχειν.

1 καὶ τὸ] Sieveking would delete τὸ.

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b Ibid. iii. p. 119.
their "right sensibilities to emotion," not "insensibilities," in this case using the terms correctly. For a "right sensibility" arises when reason does not destroy the emotion, but composes and sets it in order in the souls of temperate persons. But what it is that happens in the case of evil and incontinent persons when, though their judgement tells them to love father and mother in place of a favourite or mistress, they cannot do this; yet when their judgement bids them to love courtesan and flatterer, they immediately do that very thing? For if emotion and judgement were one, love and hate would follow upon our judgement of what we ought to love and hate; but as it is, the contrary happens: with some judgements the emotion joins forces, others it disregards. Therefore even these very men\(^a\) affirm, since the evidence forces them to do so, that not every judgement is an emotion, but only that which sets in motion a violent and excessive impulse, thereby acknowledging that in us the faculty of judging and the faculty of feeling emotion are different, in the sense that the one is that which sets in motion, the other that which is moved. And Chrysippus himself in many places, by defining endurance and continence as states which follow the convictions of reason, is obviously forced by the evidence to acknowledge that that within us which follows is different from that which it follows when persuaded, or, on the other hand, fights against when it is not persuaded.

10. Now if, by positing\(^b\) that all errors and faults are equal, they are in some other way overlooking the truth, this present discourse is not the proper occasion to confute them; but in the case of the
(449) ἐν δὲ τοῖς πάθεσι1 φαίνονται κομιδὴ παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν ἐνιστάμενοι τῷ λόγῳ. πάν μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἀμαρτία κατ' αὐτοῦς ἐστὶ, καὶ πᾶσ ὁ λυποῦμενος ἢ φοβοῦμενος ἢ ἐπιθυμῶν ἀμαρτάνει: μεγάλαι δὲ τῶν παθῶν διαφοραὶ κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἤττον ὀρῶνται. τίς γὰρ ἂν φαίη τὸν Δόλωνος φόβον ἵσον εἶναι τῷ Αἰαντος "ἐντροπαλι-ζομένον" καὶ βάδην ἀπιόντος ἐκ τῶν πολεμίων

Ε "δλίγον γόνυ γονὸς ἀμείβοντος"; ἡ τῇ Πλά-τωνος ἐπὶ Σωκράτει τελευτάσαντι λύπη τὴν 'Αλεξάνδρου διὰ Κλείτων, αὐτὸν ἀνελεῖν ὀρμή-σαντος; ἐπιτείνονται γὰρ οὐ μετρῶς καὶ τῷ παρὰ λόγον2 αἱ λύπαι, καὶ τὸ παρ' ἑλπίδα σύμπτωμα τοῦ κατὰ λόγον ὀδυνηρότερον· εἰ προσδοκῶν εὐχερεύντα τινα3 καὶ θαυμαζόμενον ὁφεσθαι πύ-θοντο4 κατεστραβωμένον, ὡς Φιλώταν Παρμενίων. θυμῷ δὲ τίς ἄν εἴτοι πρὸς 'Ανάξαρχον ἵσον κεχρη-σθαι Νικοκρέοντα καὶ πρὸς Φιλήμονα Μάγαν. ἁμφοτέρους λοιδορηθέντας ὑπ' αὐτῶν; ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπέροις σιδηροῖς κατέπτισε καὶ κατέκοψεν5 ἐκεῖνον· ὁ δὲ τῷ Φιλήμον τὸν δήμον ἐκέλευσεν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἐτράχηλον ἐπιθείναι γυμνὴν τὴν μάχαιραν εἰτ'
emotions they certainly appear to be in opposition to reason and contrary to plain evidence. For, according to them, every emotion is an error, and every one who grieves or fears or desires is guilty of error. Yet there are seen to be great differences in the emotions according to their greater or lesser intensity. For who would declare that Dolon's fear was no greater than that of Ajax, who "often faced about" and departed slowly from the midst of his enemies, "scarcely changing knee for knee"? Or that the grief of Alexander, who attempted to kill himself because of Cleitus, was equal to Plato's grief for the death of Socrates? For griefs are increased immoderately by unpredictable circumstances, and an unexpected occurrence is more painful than one quite likely to happen; if, for instance, one should expect to see someone in prosperity and honour and then should learn that he had been cruelly tortured, as Parmenion did of Philotas. And who would affirm that the rage of Nicocreon against Anaxarchus was equal to that of Magas against Philemon, though they had both been reviled by their opponents? For Nicocreon with iron pestles ground Anaxarchus to powder, but Magas merely ordered the public executioner to place his naked blade on Philemon's neck and then to let him go. That is the

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a Cf. 463 D, infra; 474 E-F, infra (Carneades).

b Philotas, the son of Alexander's general Parmenion, was suddenly executed on suspicion of conspiracy; cf. Life of Alexander, xlix. (693 b).

c A friend of Alexander who insulted Nicocreon, tyrant of Cyprus, so markedly that the latter took his revenge after Alexander's death; cf. Diogenes Laertius, ix. 58-59.

d Cf. 458 A, infra: see Hartman, De Plutarcho, p. 205, for the absurdity of this comparison.
διδό καὶ νεῦρα τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν θυμὸν ὁ Πλάτων προσεῖπεν ὃς ἐπιτεινόμενον τε πικρία καὶ πραότητι χαλώμενον.

Ταῦτα τοίνυν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα διακρούμενοι τὰς ἐπιτάσεις τῶν παθῶν καὶ τὰς σφοδρότητας οὐ φασι 450 γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν ἧν τὸ ἁμαρτητικὸν, ἀλλὰ τὰς δῆξεις καὶ τὰς συστολὰς καὶ τὰς δια-χύσεις εἶναι τὰς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἴπτον τῷ ἀλόγῳ δεχομένας. καὶ τοῖς καὶ περὶ τὰς κρίσεις φαίνονται γινόμεναι διαφοραί. τὴν τε γὰρ πενίαν οἱ μὲν οὐ κακῶν οἱ δὲ καὶ μέγα κρίνουσι κακῶν, οἱ δὲ γε καὶ μέγιστον, ὡστε καὶ κατὰ τῶν πετρῶν καὶ κατὰ τῆς θαλάττης ὥθειν ἔαντος· τὸν τε θάνατον οἱ μὲν ἀγαθῶν στερήσει μόνον οἱ δὲ καὶ τιμωρίας αἰω-νίοις ὑπὸ γῆν καὶ κολασμοῖς φρικώδεσι κακῶν εἶναι νομίζουσιν· ἡ τε τοῦ σώματος ψύεια τοῖς μὲν ὡς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ χρήσιμον ἀγαπᾶται, τοῖς δὲ τῶν ὄντων δοκεῖ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν· οὔτε γὰρ

Β πλούτου χάρισ ὡστε

οὔτε

τὰς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώποις βασιληθέδους ἀρχᾶς,

τελευτῶντες δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀρετήν ἀνωφελῆ καὶ ἀν-όνητον ἠγούνταί, τοῦ ψυχαίνειν μὴ παρόντος· ὡστε

1 δήξεις Amyot, confirmed by G: λήξεις.
2 ἀλόγῳ Meziriacus, confirmed by G: λόγῳ.
3 ψύεια Bernardakis, confirmed by G: ψύεια.
4 χάρισ Pohlenz: χάριν.
5 τὰς . . . ἀρχᾶς Aldine ed.: τὰς . . . ἀρχᾶς.

an Republic, 411 b; contrast Moralia, 457 b-c, infra.
reason why Plato also called anger "sinews of the soul" on the ground that it is intensified by harshness and relaxed by gentleness.

So to elude these and similar difficulties my opponents deny that these intensities and violences of the emotions come into existence in accordance with the judgement, in which lies the liability to error; but maintain that the irritations, contractions, and diffusions admit of increase and diminution through the operations of the irrational element. Yet there obviously are differences in judgements also; for some adjudge poverty not to be an evil, others to be a great evil, still others to be the greatest evil, so that they even hurl themselves down from precipices or throw themselves into the sea. Some think death to be an evil merely because it deprives them of the good things of life, others because there are eternal torments and horrible punishments beneath the earth. By some the health of the body is cherished because it is in accordance with Nature and useful, to others it appears the greatest good in the world; for neither do they value

Joy in wealth or children,

nor

In that kingly rule that makes man like to gods in comparison therewith; and finally they think even virtue to be useless and unprofitable if health be not

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*b* The Stoics, as generally throughout the essay; cf. von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., iii. p. 119.


d* Ariphron, Paean to Health, vv. 3-4 (Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec., iii. p. 597, or Edmonds, Lyra Graeca, iii. p. 401); cf. Moralia, 497 A, infra.
(450) φαίνεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς τοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον τοὺς δ’ ἦττον ἀμαρτάνοντας.

'Αλλ’ οὖ τοῦτο νῦν διελεγκτέον, ἐκεῖνο δ’ ἐκ τούτου ληπτέον, ὅτι συγχωροῦσι καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς κρίσεως ἑτέρον εἶναι τὸ ἄλογον, καθ’ ὁ φασὶ γίνεσθαι τὸ πάθος σφοδρότερον καὶ μείζον, ἐρίζοντες πρὸς τούνομα καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα, τὰ δὲ πράγματα διδόντες τοῖς διαφέρειν τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ κρίνοντος ἀποφαυνομένοις. ἐν οὖν τοῖς περὶ Ἀνομολογίας ὁ Χρύσιππος εἶπὼν ὅτι “τυφλὸν ἐστιν ἡ ὅργη καὶ πολλάκις μὲν οὐκ ἐὰν ὁρᾶν τὰ ἐκφανῇ πολλάκις δὲ τοῖς καταλαμβανομένοις ἐπιπροσθεὶ,” μικρὸν προελθὼν, “τὰ γὰρ ἐπιγινόμενα,” φησί, “πάθη ἐκκρούει τοὺς λογισμοὺς, καὶ τὰ ὡς ἑτέρως φαινόμενα, βιαίως προωθοῦντα ἐπὶ τὰς ἐναντίας πράξεις”. εἶτα χρῆται μάρτυρι τῷ Μενάνδρῳ λέγοντι,

οἶμοι τάλας ἐγωυς, ποῦ ποθ’ αἰ φρένες ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνον ἰσαν ἐν τῷ σώματι τὸν χρόνον, ὡτ’ οὐ ταῦτ’ ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖν’ ἠρούμεθα;

D καὶ πάλιν ὁ Χρύσιππος προελθών, “τοῦ λογικοῦ,” φησί, “ζώου φύσιν ἐχοντος προσχρῆσθαι εἰς ἕκαστα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ύπὸ τοῦτον κυβερνᾶσθαι, πολλάκις ἀποστρέφεσθαι αὐτὸν ἠμᾶς ἀλλή βιαίο-

1 διελεγκτέον] διαλεκτέων in some mss.
3 ποθ’ αἱ Grotius: ποτε.
4 ὡτ’ added by Xylander; ὡν Reiske.
5 ἐκεῖν’ ἠρούμεθα Xylander: ἐκεῖνα αἱρούμεθα.
present. Hence it plainly appears that some make a
greater, some a lesser, error in their judgements also.

This doctrine, however, need not be confuted at
present, but that other point may be assumed from this
discussion: that my opponents themselves also concede
that the irrational part is essentially different from
judgement, the irrational, in accordance with which
they say that emotion becomes greater and more
violent; their contention is concerning the name and
the expression, but they really surrender the point at
issue to those who assert that the passionate and
irrational element is different from the reasoning and
judging. In his book On the Failure to Lead a Consis-
tent Life Chrysippus has said, "Anger is a blind
thing: often it prevents our seeing obvious matters,
and often it obscures matters which are already appre-
hended"; and, proceeding a little further, he says,
"For the passions, when once raised, drive out the
processes of reasoning and all things that appear
otherwise than they would have them be, and push
forward with violence to actions contrary to reason." He
then uses as evidence the words of Menander:

Ah woe, alas for me! Where ever were
My wits awandering in my body then
When I made choice to do not this, but that?

And again, Chrysippus proceeds to say that every
rational creature is so disposed by nature as to use
reason in all things and to be governed by it; yet
often reason is rejected when we are under the im-
pulse of some other more violent force. Thus in this

a Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., iii. p. 94; the title was
interpreted by Xylander as De Dissensione Partium Animi.
b Frag. 567, Kock, Comic. Att. Frag., iii. p. 173 (Allinson,
p. 497).
(450) τέρα φορά ἄρα χρωμένους,” ὁμολογῶν τὸ συμβαίνον ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τὸν λόγον τοῦ πάθους διαφορᾶς.

"Ἐπει καὶ γελοιόν ἔστιν, ἢ φησι Πλάτων, αὐτὸν τινα λέγειν αὐτοῦ κρείττονα καὶ πάλιν χείρονα, καὶ τὸν μὲν κρατοῦνθ' έαυτοῦ τὸν δὲ μη κρατοῦντα. (11.) πῶς γὰρ οἶνον τε τὸν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ κρεῖττον εἶναι καὶ χείρον περὶ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ τρόπον τινά διστοῦ πεφυκότος ἐκάστου καὶ τὸ Ε ἐμὲν χείρον ἐν ἐαυτῷ τὸ δὲ βέλτιον ἔχοντος; οὕτως γὰρ ὁ μὲν τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπηκοώ τῷ χείροι χρώμενος ἐγκρατῆς ἐαυτοῦ καὶ κρείττων ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ καὶ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπόμενον περιορῶν καὶ ὑπηρετοῦν τὸ κρεῖττον ἠττων ἐαυτοῦ καὶ ἀκρατῆς λέγεται καὶ παρὰ φύσιν διακεῖμενοι.

Φύσει γὰρ προσήκει θείον ὅντα τὸν λογισμὸν ἤγεισθαι καὶ ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀλόγου τοῦ τῆν γένεσιν αὐτόθεν ἐχοντος ἐκ τοῦ σώματος. ὡς καὶ συνεξ-ομοιοῦσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν παθῶν καὶ ἀναπτύμπλασθαι πεφυκεν, ἐνδεδυκὸς αὐτῷ καὶ καταμεμυγμένον, ὡς δηλοῦν αἱ ὀρμαι πρὸς τὰ σωματικά κινούμεναι καὶ ἵσταμεναι καὶ σφοδρότητας ἐν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος μεταβολαῖς καὶ ἀνέσεις λαμβάνονσαι. διὸ νέοι μὲν ἄξεις καὶ ιταμοὶ περὶ τε τὰς ὀρέξεις διάπυροι καὶ οἰστρώδεις αἰματος πλήθει καὶ θερ-μότητι, τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτῶν ἡ περὶ τὸ ἡπαρ ἀρχῇ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ κατασβένναι καὶ γίνεται μικρὰ

1 τοῦ] καὶ in most mss.
2 καὶ after μὲν deleted by Pohlenz.

a Republic, 430 E.
b Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 86 b.
c Ibid. 71 a.
passage he plainly acknowledges what conclusion is to be drawn from the difference which exists between passion and reason.

Why, it would be ridiculous, as Plato says, for a man to say that he is now better than himself and again worse than himself, and sometimes master of himself and sometimes not. (11.) For how is it possible for the same man to be both better and worse than himself, or to be master of himself and at the same time be mastered, if in some way or other each man were not by nature double and had not both the worse and the better within himself? This being the case, he who holds the worse in subjection to the better is self-controlled and better than himself, but he who permits the better part to follow and be in subjection to the intemperate and irrational part of his soul is called worse than himself and incontinent and in a state contrary to Nature.

For, in accordance with Nature, it is proper that reason, which is divine, should lead and rule the irrational, which derives its origin directly from the body to which Nature has designed that it should bear a resemblance and share in the body's passions and be contaminated by it, since it has entered into the body and has become merged with it; that this is so is shown by our impulses, which arise and are set in motion toward corporeal objects and become violent or relax in keeping with the changes of the body. For this reason young men are swift and impetuous and fiery in their appetites, and stung by madness, as it were, through the abundance and heat of their blood; but in old men the source of desire, which is seated about the liver, is in the process of being extinguished and becoming small and weak, whereas
καὶ ἀσθενήσις· ἵσχυε δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ λόγος τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῷ σώματι συναπομαραμομένου. τούτῳ δὲ ἀμέλει καὶ τὰς τῶν θηρίων ἥθοποιεῖ πρὸς τὰ πάθη φύσεις· οὐ γὰρ ὀρθότητι δοξὼν οὐδὲ φαυλότητι δῆπον τοῖς μὲν ἀλκαί καὶ ὅρμαι πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα δεινὰ παριστανται, τοῖς δὲ ἀμήχανοι πτοιαὶ καὶ φόβοι τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ' αἱ περὶ τὸ ἀἵμα καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ σῶμα δυνάμεις τὰς τῶν παθῶν διαφορὰς ποιοῦσιν, ὥσπερ ἐκ βίῶσις τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς ἀναβλαστάνοντος καὶ συναναφέροντος τὴν ποιότητα καὶ τὴν κράσιν. τοῦ δ' ἀνθρώπου ταῖς μὲν παθητικαῖς ὅρμαις τὸ σῶμα συμπαθοῦν καὶ συγκινούμενοι ἔλεγχουσιν ὡχρότητες ἐρυθήματα πρόμοι πεδίσεις καρδίας, διαχύσεις.

Β' αὖ πάλιν ἐν ἑλπίσιν ἡδονῶν καὶ προσδοκίαις· οὕτω δὲ μὴ μετὰ πάθους ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ κινήται τὸ διανοητικὸν, ἡσυχίαν ἀγεῖ τὸ σῶμα καὶ καθεστήκεν οὔτε κοινωνοῦν οὔτε μετέχον αὐτὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦ φρονοῦντος, εἰ τοῦ παθητικοῦ μὴ συνεφιάπτοτο μηδὲ συμπαραλαμβάνοι τὸ ἄλογον· ὡστε καὶ τούτω δ' ὄντα δηλοῦσθαι καὶ διαφέροντα ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἄλληλων.

12. Καθόλου δὲ τῶν ὄντων αὐτοὶ τὲ φασὶ καὶ δῆλον ἔστιν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἔξει διοικεῖται, τὰ δὲ φύσει, τὰ δ' ἄλογως ψυχῆ, τὰ δ' καὶ λόγον ἑχούσῃ καὶ

1 φόβοι] φυγαί in two mss. is perhaps right.
2 κράσιν Camerarius: κρίσιν.
3 μετέχον αὐτὸ] μετὸν αὐτῷ or μεστὸν αὐτῷ in some mss.
4 παθητικὸν μὴ Reiske, confirmed by a few mss.: μαθηματικὸν.
reason increases more and more in vigour as the passionate element fades away together with the body. And this, of course, is what determines the natures of wild beasts also as regards the passions. For it is not, I presume, by the rightness or wrongness of their opinions that some of them oppose apparent dangers with valour and impetuousness whereas others have helpless flutterings and fears in their souls; but the faculties which control the blood, the breath, and the body in general cause the difference in their affections, since the emotional part springs up from the flesh as from a root and carries with it its quality and composition. But that in man his body is affected and moved together with the impulses of his passions is proved by his paleness \(^a\) and blushing, his trembling and palpitations of the heart, and again by his cheerful and relaxed expression when in hope and expectation of pleasures. But whenever the intellect acts, not accompanied by emotion but by itself alone, the body remains in repose and at rest, neither sharing nor partaking in the activity of the mind, so long as the body does not have to deal with the emotional element or include the irrational in such activity. Consequently, this fact also makes it plain that there are two parts within us which differ from each other in their faculties.

12. And in general, both as my opponents \(^b\) themselves admit and as is quite obvious, in this world some things are governed by an acquired disposition, others by a natural one, some by an irrational soul, others by a rational and intellectual one; and in practically

\(^a\) Cf. De Libidine et Aegritudine, 6 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 5).

(451) διάνοιαν· ὃν ὀμοῦ τι πάντων ὁ ἄνθρωπος μετέσχηκε καὶ γέγονεν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς εἰρημέναις διάφορας· καὶ γὰρ ἔξει συνέχεται καὶ φύσει τρέφεται καὶ λόγω χρήται καὶ διανοία. μέσεσιν οὖν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦ ἄλογου, καὶ σύμφωνον ἔχει τὴν τού πάθους ἀρχήν, ὥς ἐπεισόδιον ἀλλ' ἀναγκαίαν οὐδὲν, οὐδ' ἀναρρετέαν παντάπασιν ἀλλὰ θεραπείας καὶ παιδαγωγίας δεομένην. οἶδεν οὗ Ὑθάκιον οὐδὲ Λυκούργειον τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἔργον ἔστιν, συνεκκόπτειν καὶ συνδιαφθέιειν τὰ ὦφέλιμα τοῖς βλαβεροῖς τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ' ἥπερ ὁ φυτάλμος θεὸς καὶ ὁ ἡμερίδης, τὸ ἄγριον κολοῦσαι καὶ ἀφελεῖν τὴν ἀμετρίαν, εἶτα τιθασεύειν καὶ παρίστασθαι τὸ χρῆσμον. οὐτε γὰρ οἶνον οἱ φοβοῦμενοι τὸ μεθύειν ἐκχέονσιν

D οὐτε πάθος οἱ δεδιότες τὸ ταρακτικὸν ἀναιροῦσιν ἀλλὰ κερανύουσι. καὶ γὰρ βοῶν καὶ ἱππῶν τὰ πηδήματα καὶ τοὺς ἁφηνασμοὺς οὐ τὰς κινήσεις οὐδὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἄφαιροῦσι, καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι δεδαμασμένοις χρήται καὶ χειροθέσεων ὁ λογισμός, οὐκ ἐκνευρίσας οὐδ' ἐκτεμών παντάπασι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ύπηρετικὸν.

1 ο' added by W.C.H.
2 παρίστασθαι, cf. 451 α, supra] περίστασθαι in most mss., παριστάναι in one.

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a Cf. Moralia, 15 d-e. Lycurgus, king of Thrace, angered with Dionysus, cut down the vines; cf. Apollodorus, Bibliotheca, iii. 5. 1, with Frazer's notes (L.C.L., vol. i. pp. 327 ff.).

b Cf. Moralia, 529 b-c.

c Poseidon: cf. Moralia, 158 d, 730 d.

d Dionysus: cf. Moralia, 994 A; both Poseidon and Dionysus are said to be lords of τῆς ύγράς καὶ γονίμου ἀρχῆς in 78
all these things man participates and he is subject to all the differences I have mentioned. For he is controlled by his acquired disposition, nurtured by his natural disposition, and makes use of reason and intellect. He has, therefore, some portion of the irrational also and has innate within him the mainspring of emotion, not as an adventitious accessory, but as a necessary part of his being, which should never be done away with entirely, but must needs have careful tending and education. Therefore the work of reason is not Thracian, not like that of Lycurgus—a—to cut down and destroy the helpful elements of emotion together with the harmful, but to do as the god who watches over crops and the god who guards the vine do—to lop off the wild growth and to clip away excessive luxuriance, and then to cultivate and to dispose for use the serviceable remainder. For neither do those who fear drunkenness pour out their wine upon the ground, nor do those who fear passion eradicate the disturbing element, but both temper what they fear. It is, in fact, the rebellious kicking and plunging of oxen and horses that men do away with, not their movements and activities; even so reason makes use of the emotions when they have been subdued and are tame, and does not hamstring nor altogether excise that part of the soul which should be its servant. For

Moralia, 675 f. Poseidon's functions as a god of vegetation are perhaps to be derived from his position as god of fresh streams and fountains; see Farnell, Cults of the Greek States, iv. p. 6.

\[\text{Cf. Plato, Laws, 773 d.}\]

\[\text{See Hartman, De Plutarcho, pp. 203 f., for criticism of the ellipsis. Plutarch's meaning is, of course, that wine is tempered by water, and passion by reason.}\]

\[\text{Cf. 449 f, supra.}\]
"ὑφ’ ἀρμασι" γὰρ "ἵππος,"

ως φησι Πίνδαρος,

ἐν δ’ ἀρότρῳ βοῦς·
κάπρῳ δὲ βουλεύοντα1 φόνον κύνα χρή τλάθυμον ἐξευρεῖν.

ἀν πολύ χρησιμώτερα τὰ τῶν παθῶν θρέμματα τῷ λογισμῷ συμπαρόντα καὶ συνεντεύοντα2 ταῖς ἄρε—Ε ταῖς· ὁ θυμὸς τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ μέτριος ὄν, ἡ μισοπονηρία τῇ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ ἡ νέμεσις ἐπὶ τοὺς παρ’ ἄξιαν εὐτυχοῦντας, ὅταν ἀμ’ ἀνοία καὶ ὑβρεὶ φλεγόμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἑπισχέσεως δέωνται. φιλίας δὲ φιλο—

στοργίαν ἡ φιλανθρωπία ἐλεόν ἢ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ συναλγεῖν εὐνοίας ἀληθινῆς οὐδὲ βουλόμενος ἂν τις ἀποσπάσειν οὐδ’ ἀπορρήξειν.3 εἰ δ’ οἱ τὸν ἔρωτα τῇ ἐρωτομανίᾳ συνεκβάλλοντες ἀμαρτάνοντιν, οὐδ’ οἱ τὴν ἐμπορίαν4 διὰ τὴν φιλαργυρίαν ψέγοντες κατορθοῦσιν. ἀλλ’ ὁμοιον τι πράττουσι τοῖς τὸ τρέχειν διὰ τὸ προσπεταίειν καὶ τὸ βάλλειν διὰ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἀναφεύγει, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄδειν τὸ 

Φ παράπαν διὰ τὸ ἀπάδειν ἀπεχθώς ἔχουσιν. οἰον γὰρ ἐν φθόγγοις μουσικῇ τὸ ἐμμελὲς οὐκ ἀναίρεσι βαρύτητος καὶ ἀξύτητος, ἐν δὲ σώμασιν ἰατρικῇ τὸ ὑγιεῖνον οὐ φθορᾶ θερμότητος καὶ ψυχρότητος, ἀλλὰ συμμετρίας καὶ ποσότητι κραθεισῶν ἀπερ—

1 βουλεύοντα] βουλεύοντι in some mss.
2 συνεντεύοντα] συνεπτεύοντα in most mss.
3 ἀπορρήξειν Reiske: ἀποτήξειν.
4 ἐμπορίαν Mudvig: ἐπιθυμίαν.
ON MORAL VIRTUE, 451

The horse is meet for the chariot,
as Pindar a says,
the ox for the plough;

But if you think to slay a boar, you must find a stout-hearted hound.

Yet much more useful than these beasts are the whole brood of passions when they are present in the service of reason and help to intensify the virtues: anger, if it be moderate, will assist courage, and hatred of evil will aid justice, and righteous indignation
will oppose those who are prosperous beyond their deserts when their souls are inflamed with folly and insolence c and they need to be checked. For who, even if he so wished, could separate or sever from friendship a natural propensity toward affection, from humanity, pity, and from true benevolence the mutual participation in joy and grief? And if those err who discard love entirely because love may bring madness, neither are they right who blame commerce because it may beget covetousness; on the contrary, what they do is somewhat like the action of those who would abolish running because one may chance to stumble, or shooting d because one may overshoot the mark, and dislike any singing at all because some sing off key. For as in the realm of sound musical art produces consonance, not by doing away with the deep low and the shrill high notes e; and in the case of the body, medical art produces health, not by the removal of heat and coldness, but by the proportionately quantitative

a Frag. 234 ed. Bergk; 258 ed. Boeckh (p. 611 ed. Sandys); the quotation is given more fully in 472 c, infra.
d Cf. Moralia, 459 d, infra.  
Cf. 444 E-F, supra.
γάζεται, τοιούτον ἐν ψυχῇ τὸ ηθικὸν ἐγγενομένης ὑπὸ λόγου ταῖς παθητικαῖς δυνάμεις καὶ κινήσεων 452 ἐπιεικείας καὶ μετριώτητος. οἴδοντι γὰρ ἐοικε καὶ φλεγμαίνοντι σώματι τὸ περιαλγοῦν καὶ περιχαρές καὶ περίφοβον τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐ τὸ χαίρον οὐδὲ τὸ λυπούμενον οὐδὲ τὸ φοβούμενον. καὶ καλῶς "Ομηρος εἰπὼν

τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ οὔτ' ἄρ τρέπεται χρῶς οὔτε τι λίθῳ ταρβεὶ
tὸν φόβον οὐκ ἀφεῖλεν ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄγαν φόβον, ὡς ἄνδρεά μὴ ἀπόνου καὶ θαρραλεότης μὴ θρασύτης γένηται. διὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν ἄγαν ἀφαιρετέον ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀμύνας τὴν ἄγαν μισοπονηρίαν. οὔτω γὰρ ὃ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάλγητος ἀλλὰ σώφρων, ὃ δὲ δίκαιος οὐκ ὁμοιὸς οὐδὲ πικρὸς ἐσται.

Β τῶν δὲ παθῶν παντάπασιν ἀναιρεθέντων, εἰ καὶ δυνατὸν ἔστιν, ἐν πολλοῖς ἀργότερος ὁ λόγος καὶ ἀμβλύτερος, ὡσπερ κυβερνήτης πνεύματος ἐπιλείποντος. ταῦτα δ' ἀμέλει καὶ οἱ νομοθέται συνιδόντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ ἐξηλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους: πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους σάλπιγξ καὶ αὐλοῖς εἰπείρουσι καὶ αὐξοῦσι τὸ θυμοειδὲς καὶ μάχμον. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐν ποιήμασιν, ἂ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, τὸν τεχνιτὴν καὶ διηκριβωμένον ὁ μουσῶλητος καὶ κατάσχετος ἀποδείκνυσι γε-

1 ηθικὸν Camerarius, confirmed by G; oikeión Wyttenbach: μικὼν or οἴκον.
2 οἴδοντι Bernardakis, confirmed by mss.: οἴδωντι.
3 περίφοβον Turnebus: περίλυπον.
4 οὔτε Homer: οὖδέ.
5 οὐκ άλλ' οὐκ Reiske.
6 πολιτείας] πολιτείας καὶ in all mss. but one.
7 καὶ before σάλπιγξ deleted by Sieveking.
admixture of the two; so in the soul moral virtue is produced when equity and moderation are engendered by reason in the emotional faculties and activities. For a soul possessed of excessive pain or joy or fear is like a swollen and feverish body; it is not so, however, if the joy or pain or fear be moderate. And Homer in his admirable words,

A valiant man will never change his hue,
Nor will his fear be over-great,

does not abolish fear, but excessive fear, in order that the valiant man may have not foolhardiness but courage, not audacity but daring. In his pleasures, therefore, a man must rid himself of excessive desire, and in punishing wrong, of excessive hatred of evil: for in this way he will be, in the former case, not insensible but temperate, and in the latter case, just, not savage nor cruel. But if the passions could in reality be entirely done away with, in many persons reason would be too inactive and dulled, like a pilot when the wind dies down. It is surely this truth that the legislators also have perceived when they try to put into their constitutions the emotions of ambition and emulation as regards the citizens' relations to each other, but in relation to the enemy try to rouse and increase their spirited and fighting qualities with trumpets and pipes. For it is not in poetry only that, as Plato says, he who is inspired and possessed by the Muses renders ridiculous the

\* Cf. 443 c, supra.
\* Contrast 458 e, infra.
\* Phaedrus, 245 A; cf. Ion, 533 A ff.
(452) λοίον, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς μάχας τὸ παθητικόν καὶ εὐθουσίωτες ἀνυπόστατον ἐστὶ καὶ ἀήττητον. οἱ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ὁμήρος ἐμποιεῖν φησί τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ὥς εἶπών ἐμπνευσέ μένος μέγα ποιμένι λαῶν. καὶ οὐχ οἱ γ' ἀνευθεὶς θεοῦ τάδε μαίνεται καθάπερ ὄρμημα τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ὀχήμα τὸ πάθος προστιθέντας.

Αὐτούς γε μὴν τούτους ὅραν ἐστὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἐπαίνους τοὺς νέους παρανοώντας πολλάκις δὲ νουθεσίας κολάζοντας. ἢν τῷ μὲν ἐπεταί τὸ ἤδεσθαί, τῷ δὲ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ γὰρ η νουθεσία καὶ ὁ ψόγος ἐμποιεῖ μετάνοιαν καὶ αἰσχύνην, ὡς τὸ μὲν λύπη τῷ γένει τὸ δ' φόβος ἐστὶ καὶ τούτοις μᾶλιστα χρῶνται πρὸς τὰς ἐπανορθώσεις. ἢ καὶ Διογένης, ἐπαινομένου Πλάτωνος, "τι δ' ἐκείνοις," εἴπεν, "ἐχει σεμνόν, ὅς τοσούτων χρόνου φιλοσοφῶν οὐδένα λελύπηκεν," οὐ γὰρ οὕτως τὰ μαθήματα φαίνεις ἄν, ὡς ἔλεγε Ξενοκράτης, λαβᾶς εἶναι φιλοσοφίας, ὡς τὰ πάθη τῶν νέων, αἰσχύνην ἐπιθυμίαν μετάνοιαν ἔδωκεν λύπην φιλοτιμίαν ὡς ἐμμελὴ καὶ σωτήριον ἀφὴν ἀπτόμενος ὁ λόγος καὶ ὁ νόμος εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν ὁδὸν ἀνυσίμως καθιστησί τὸν νέον. ὡστε μὴ κακῶς

1 καὶ] καὶ τὸ in most mss.
2 Ξενοκράτης] ὁ κράτης in some mss.; ὁ σωκράτης B.

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a Il., xv. 262: Apollo to Hector.
man who is an artist equipped with exact knowledge of technique, but in battles also the passionate and inspired is irresistible and invincible. This quality it is that Homer says the gods instil into men:

So did he speak and breathed great might
Into the shepherd of the people;

and

Not without some god does he
These deeds of madness;

as though the gods were adding passion as an incitement or a vehicle to reason.

Indeed we may see these very opponents of mine often inciting young men with praise and often chastising them with admonitions; and of these, in the first case pleasure is the consequence, in the second pain (in fact, admonition and rebuke engender repentance and shame, of which the first is a kind of pain, the second a kind of fear); and of these methods they make particular use to improve their charges. As Diogenes also remarked, when Plato was being praised, "What is there so august about one who has spent so much time talking philosophy, yet has never caused anyone pain?" For surely studies could not so properly be called, to use Xenocrates’ words, the "grips of philosophy," as could the emotions of young men: shame, desire, repentance, pleasure, pain, ambition. On these if reason and law obtain a suitable and salutary grip, they efficaciously set the young man upon the path that he should take. Therefore the

\[\text{Vol. VI D 85}\]
(452) εἶπείν τὸν Ἀλκωνα παιδαγωγὸν, ὅτι ποιήσει τὸν παῖδα τοῖς καλοῖς ἦδεσθαι καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τοῖς αἰσχροῖς, οὗ μεῖζον οὐδὲν ἔστιν οὐδὲ κάλλιον ἀποφήναι τέλος ἑλευθέρω προσηκούσης παιδείας.

\[a\] Cf. 439 f., supra; Plato, Laws, 653 b-c.
ON MORAL VIRTUE, 452

Spartan a tutor was not wide of the mark when he said that he intended to make a boy entrusted to him delight in honourable and be vexed at dishonourable things. Than this saying there can be shown no greater nor fairer end of such education as befits a free-born child.
ON THE CONTROL OF ANGER
(DE COHIBENDA IRA)
INTRODUCTION

The subject of this essay is not the emotion of anger itself, but the cure best applicable to the passion. In form it is a dialogue, but, apart from the beginning and the end, it is as undramatic as the later works of Plato. The principal speaker, Fundanus, treats the subject in a manner partly general and partly specific, and concludes with a pleasant history of his own cure. Hirzel (Der Dialog, ii. p. 170) has described the work as a monument (Ehrendenkmal) to the memory of Fundanus, dedicated to Sulla.

Scholars concerned in the investigation of the sources used by Plutarch for this discourse have arrived at varying results: some have imagined that Stoic writers were used, others that the Peripatetic Hieronymus of Rhodes was Plutarch’s principal authority. The numerous parallels to Seneca’s De Ira have been used by both parties to substantiate their theories, but it is more likely that Plutarch, while borrowing numerous loci communes and examples

a Wilamowitz, Hermes, xxix. 152; Schlemm, Hermes, xxxviii. 587 ff.

b Allers, De Senecae Librorum de Ira Fontibus, p. 9; Pohlenz, Hermes, xxxi. 321 ff.; accepted by Daebritz, RE, i. 8. 1562. In Hermes, xl. 292, note 1, Pohlenz attempts to refute Schlemm’s arguments.

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from earlier writers, constructed for himself the main features of the dialogue. The self-portrayal of Fundanus and his cure, the frame-work of the whole discourse, is clearly Plutarch's own device. The author's debt to preceding literature is, as always, immense, yet the creation of such a work as this is by selection and arrangement; and for that Plutarch is alone responsible.

The essay was known to Aulus Gellius (i. 26), who relates a pleasant anecdote of Plutarch and a rascally slave who ventured to reprove the philosopher for his anger. Among English writers Jeremy Taylor has made admirable use of the essay by paraphrase and even translation, in his Holy Living, iv. 8.

The ms. tradition is good. The work is apparently missing in the Lamprias catalogue, since Περὶ ὀργῆς (No. 93) almost certainly refers to a different work from which Stobaeus has preserved a fragment (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 138).

Books on "Anger" were very plentiful in Cicero's day (Epp. ad Quint. Frat., i. 1. 37).

There is extant also a free Syriac translation (ed. Lagarde, Analecta Syriaca, Leipzig, 1858) which helps occasionally in the constitution of the text.

ΠΕΡΙ ΔΟΡΓΗΣΙΑΣ
ΤΑ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ
ΣΤΑΛΑΣ, ΦΟΥΝΔΑΝΟΣ

Γ 1. ΣΤΑΛΑΣ. Καλῶς μοι δοκοῦσιν, ὃ Φουνδάνε, ποιεῖν ὁι ζωγράφοι διὰ χρόνου τὰ ἔργα πρὶν ἡ συντελεῖν ἐπισκοποῦντες. ὅτι τὴν ὁμιν αὐτῶν ἀφιστάντες τῇ πολλάκις κρίσει ποιοῦσι καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπτομένην τῆς παρὰ μικρὸν διαφοράς, ἣν 453 ἀποκρύπτει τὸ συνεχές καὶ τὸ σύνηθες. ἔπει τοῖνυν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ διὰ χρόνου προσελθεῖν χωρίς γενόμενον καὶ διαστήσαντα τῆς συνεχείας τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ποιοῦν ἐκα- στὸν αὐτοῦ φαυλότερον κρίτην ἡ ἐτέρων· δεύτερον ἂν εἴη τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἐφορᾶν διὰ χρόνου καὶ παρ- ἐχειν ὁμοίως ἑκεῖνοι ἑαυτὸν, οὐκ εἰ γέρων γέγονε ταχὺ καὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον ἡ χείρον ἐσχήκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ Ἰθὸς ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἰ τὶ χρηστὸν ὁ χρόνος προστέθεικεν ἡ τῶν φαύλων ἀφήρηκεν. ἤγω γοῦν ἐνιαυτῷ μὲν ἀφιγμένος εἰς Ὁμήρην δεύτερω, συνὼν δὲ σοι μὴν τοιοῦτον πέμπτον, τὸ μὲν εἰς ὑπαρχόντων δι᾿ εὐφυίαν

1 ΤΑ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ . . . ΦΟΥΝΔΑΝΟΣ] not in the mss.

*a Sextius Sulla, a friend of Plutarch (cf. Moralia, 636 α, and Prosopographia Imperii Romani, iii. p. 239).

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ON THE CONTROL OF ANGER

(Speakers in the Dialogue: Sulla and Fundanus)

1. Sulla.\(^a\) A good plan, as it seems to me, Fundanus,\(^b\) is that which painters follow: they scrutinize their productions from time to time before they finish them. They do this because, by withdrawing their gaze and by inspecting their work often, they are able to form a fresh judgement, and one which is more likely to seize upon any slight discrepancy, such as the familiarity of uninterrupted contemplation will conceal. Since, therefore, it is impossible for a man to contemplate himself from time to time by getting apart from himself and interrupting his consciousness of himself by breaking its continuity (and this is what, more than anything else, makes every man a poorer judge of himself than of others), the next best course would be for him to inspect his friends from time to time and likewise to offer himself to them, not to see if he is grown old suddenly or if his body is better or worse, but for them to examine both his behaviour and his character to learn whether time has added some excellence or taken away some vice. As for me, since I have returned to Rome after a year’s absence and this is now the fifth month that I have been with you constantly, I do not

\(^a\) C. Minicius Fundanus, a friend of Pliny (Epp., v. 16); cf. Pros. Imp. Rom., ii. p. 377.
PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

Β ἀγαθῶν ἐπίδοσιν γεγονέναι τοσαύτην καὶ αὐξησιν (453) οὐ πάνυ θαυμαστὸν ἤγομαι· τὸ δὲ σφοδρὸν ἐκεῖνο καὶ διάπυρον πρὸς ὀργὴν ὀρώντι μοι πρᾶον οὕτως καὶ χειρόνθες τῷ λογισµῷ γεγενηµένον ἐπέρχεται πρὸς τὸν θυµὸν εἰπεῖν

ὡ τούτοι, ἢ μάλα δὴ μαλακότερος.

αὕτη δ' ἡ μαλακότης οὐκ ἄργιαν οὐδ' ἐκλυον, ἀλλ' ὁσπέρ ἡ κατευγασμένη γῇ λειότητα καὶ βάθος ἐνεργὸν ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔσχηκεν ἀντὶ τῆς φορᾶς ἐκείνης καὶ τῆς ὀξύτητος. διὸ καὶ δῆλον ἔστων οὐ παρακμή λιν δι' ἥλικιαν τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐδ' αὐτομάτως ἀπομαρανόµενον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ λόγων τινῶν χρηστῶν θεραπευόµενον. καίτοι (τὸ γὰρ ἄληθὲς εἰρήσεται πρὸς σὲ) ταῦθ' ἢµῖν Ἔρως ὁ ἐταῖρος

C ἀπαγγέλλων ὑποπτος ἢν τὰ µὴ προσόντα πρέποντα δὲ προσεῖναι τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς δι' εὐνοιαν ἐπί-

μαρτυρεῖν, καῖτορ, ὡς οἶδα, οὐδαµὴ πιθανὸς ὃν τῷ πρὸς χάριν ὑφίεσθαι τοῦ δοκοῦντος. ἀλλ' ὑν ἐκείνος τε τῶν ψευδομαρτυρῶν ἀφεῖται, καὶ σὺ, τῆς ὁδοιπορίας σχολὴν διδούσης, διέλθ' ἢµῖν ὁσπέρ ἰατρείαν τινὰ σεαυτοῦ, ἡ χρησάμενος οὕτως εὐ-

ήµιον καὶ ἀπαλὸν1 καὶ τῷ λόγῳ πρᾶον καὶ ὑπήκουν ἐποιήσαν τὸν θυµὸν.

ΦΟΤΝΔΑΝΟΣ. Ἐήτ' οὐ σκοπεῖς, ὥς προθυμὸτατε

Σύλλα, µὴ καὶ αὐτὸς εὐνοία καὶ φιλία τῇ πρὸς ἡµᾶς

1 ἀπαλὸν Hartman and Pohlenz: ἀπλοῦν.
find it altogether surprising that, of the virtues which were already yours by gift of Nature, there has been so great an increment and increase; but when I see that that violent and fiery tendency of yours toward anger has become so gentle and submissive to reason, it occurs to me to say with reference to your temper

O wonder, how much milder has it grown!

Yet this mildness has brought about no inactivity or feebleness in you, but, like the earth when it has been subdued by cultivation, it has received a smoothness and depth conducive to fruitful action in place of that impetuousness of yours and quickness of temper. For that reason it is evident that the spirited part of your soul is not withering away through any abatement of vigour caused by age, nor yet spontaneously, but that it is receiving the skilful treatment of some excellent precepts. And yet—for I shall tell you the plain truth—when our friend Eros told me all this, I suspected that he was bearing witness, by reason of his goodwill, to qualities that were not actually present in you, yet should be so in men of breeding, although, as you know, he is by no means the sort of man to surrender his own opinion as a favour to anyone. But as things are, Eros stands acquitted of the charge of bearing false witness, and do you, since our journey gives us leisure for conversation, tell me, as though you were recounting some medical treatment, what remedy you used that you have made your temper so obedient to the rein and tender-mouthed, so mild and subservient to reason.

FUNDANUS. Well, what about you, my generous friend Sulla? Are you careful not to let your
(453) παροράσ τι τῶν ἡμετέρων; Ἡρωτί μὲν γὰρ οὐδ’

D αὐτῷ πολλάκις ἔχοντι κατὰ χώραν ἐν τῇ Ὀμηρικῇ

πείσῃ μένοντα τὸν θυμόν, ἀλλὰ τραχύτερον ὑπὸ

μυαλογηρίας, εἰκὸς ἐστὶ πραοτέρους ἤμας φανῆναι,

καθάπερ ἐν διαγραμμάτων μεταβολαῖς νῆται τινες

πρὸς ἐτέρας νήτας τάξιν ὑπατῶν¹ λαμβάνουσιν.

στιλλ. Οὐδέτερα τούτων ἔστιν, ὡς Φοινδάνε·

ποίει δ’ ὡς λέγω, χαριζόμενος ἡμῖν.

2. φώνη. Καὶ μὴν ὡς γε μεμνήμεθα Μουσικίνου
cαλῶν ἐν ἔστιν, ὡς Σύλλα, τὸ δεῖν ἀεὶ θεραπευόμενοι βιοῦν τοὺς σώζεσθαι μέλλοντας. οὐ γὰρ

ὡς ἔλλεβορον, οἴμαι, δεί θεραπεύσαντα συνεκφέρο-

σθαι² τῷ νοσήματι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ’ ἐμένοντα τῇ

Ερυμῆν συνέχειν τὰς κρίσεις καὶ φυλάσσειν. φαρ-

μάκοις γὰρ οὐκ ἐστιν ἀλλὰ σιτίος ὑγίειν ἡ

dύναμις αὐτοῦ, μετ’ εὐτονίας³ ἐξὶν ἐμποιοῦσα

χρήσιν οἷς ἂν γένηται συνήθης· αἱ δὲ πρὸς ἀκ-

μάξοντα τὰ πάθη καὶ οἰδοῦντα παρανέσεις καὶ

νοικεύσαι σχολῆ μὲν ἀνύτους καὶ μόλες, οὐδὲν⁴
de τῶν ὀσφραντῶν διαφέρουσιν, ἄ τους ἐπιληπ-

τικοὺς ἐγείροντα πιπτοῦντας οὐκ ἀπαλλάττει τοῦ

νοσήματος. ὅμως δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ παρ’ ὅν

ἀκμάζει καιρὸν ἁμωσγείτως ὑπείκει καὶ παρίησι

¹ υπατῶν Hatzidakis: ὑπάτων.

² συνεκφέρεσθαι Pohlenz; συνεκρεῖν Madvig: συνεκφέρειν.

3 εὐτονίας Pohlenz and Kronenberg; ἐννοίας Apelt: εὐγε-

νείας or εννοίας.

4 οὐδὲν] οὐδενί most mss.
goodwill and friendship for me make you overlook some of my real qualities? For since on many occasions not even Eros himself can keep his temper in its place in that Homeric obedience, but when it becomes too exasperated through hatred of evil, it is reasonable to suppose that I appear more gentle to him, just as in changes of key certain high notes assume the position of low notes in contrast with other high notes.

Sulla. Neither of these suppositions is true, Fundanus. Please do as I ask.

2. Fundanus. One of those excellent precepts of Musonius which I remember, Sulla, is: "He that wishes to come through life safe and sound must continue throughout his life to be under treatment." For I do not think that reason should be used in one’s cure as we use hellebore, and be washed out of the body together with the disease, but it must remain in the soul and keep watch and ward over the judgements. For the power of reason is not like drugs, but like wholesome food, engendering an excellent state, together with great vigour, in those who become accustomed to it; but exhortations and admonitions, if applied to the passions when they are at their height and swollen, can scarcely accomplish anything at all, and that with difficulty. They are no better than those aromatic preparations which rouse epileptics when they lie prostrate, but do not rid them of the disease. Yet the other passions, even at their height, do in some sort yield and admit reason, when it comes from without to the rescue,

* Od., xx. 23, cited in full 506 b, infra.

b Frag. 36 ed. Hense.
PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

βοηθοῦντα λόγον ἔξωθεν εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς οὐχ ἡ φήσιν ὁ Μελάνθιος
tὰ δεινὰ πράσσει τὰς φρένας μετοικισάς,
ἀλλ' ἐξοικίσας τελείως καὶ ἀποκλείσας, ὡσπερ οἱ
Γ συνεμπιπράντες ἐαυτοὺς ταῖς οἰκίαις, πάντα τα-
ραχῆς καὶ καπνῷ καὶ ψόφου μεστὰ ποιεῖ τὰ ἐντός,
ὡστε μήτ' ἰδεῖν μήτ' ἀκοῦσαι τῶν ῥφελοῦντων.
διὸ μᾶλλον ἐν χειμῶν καὶ πελάγει ναῦς ἔρημος ἀνα-
454 λήψεται κυβερνήτην ἔξωθεν ἡ προσδέξεται λόγον
ἀλλότριον ἄνθρωπον ἐν θυμῷ καὶ ἐργῇ σαλεύων, ἃν
μὴ παρεσκευασμένον ἔχῃ τὸν οἰκείον λογισμόν.
ἀλλ' ὡσπερ οἱ πολιορκίαις προσδεχόμενοι συνάγουσι
καὶ παρατίθενται τὰ χρήσιμα1 τὰς ἔξωθεν ἔλπιδας
ἀπεγνωκότες, οὗτω μάλιστα δεῖ τὰ πρὸς τὸν θυμὸν
βοηθήματα πόρρωθεν λαμβάνοντας ἐκ φιλοσοφίας
κατακομίζειν εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, ὥστε ὅταν ὁ τῆς χρείας
ἀφίκηται καπρός, μὴ ῥάδιως παρεισάγειν δυνησμοῦ-
νους. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκοῦει τῶν ἐκτὸς ἡ ψυχὴ διὰ τὸν
θόρυμον, ἐὰν μὴ καθάπερ κελευστὴν ἐνδόθην ἔχῃ
Β τὸν αὐτῆς λόγον ὄξεως δεχόμενον καὶ συνιέντα τῶν
παραγγελλομένων ἕκαστον· ἀκούσας δὲ τῶν μὲν
ἡρέμα καὶ πρᾶξις λεγομένων καταφρονεῖ, πρὸς δὲ
tοὺς ἐνισταμένους τραχύτερον ἐρεβίζεται. καὶ γὰρ
ὑπερήφανος καὶ αὐθάδης καὶ ὅλως ὑφ' ἐτέρου2 ὁ
θυμὸς δυσκίνητος ὡν, ὡσπερ ὀχυρὰ τυραννὶς ἔξ

1 χρήσιμα] some mss. have χρήματα or ἐπιτήδεια.
2 ἐτέρου] ἐτέρων Schellens.

a Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., p. 760; quoted again in
Moralia, 551 a. The poet is not the Athenian tragic poet,
but Melanthius of Rhodes (circa 150 B.C.), according to
Wilamowitz, Hermes, xxix. 150 ff.
into the soul; but temper does not, as Melanthius says,

Shunt off the mind, and then do dreadful deeds,
but on the contrary, it shuts out sense completely and locks it out, and just like those who burn themselves up in their own homes, it makes everything within full of confusion and smoke and noise, so that the soul can neither see nor hear anything that might help it. For this reason a ship deserted by her crew in the midst of a storm far out at sea will more easily be able to take on a pilot from the outside, than will a man who is being tossed upon the billows of passion and anger admit the reasoning of another, unless he has his own powers of reason prepared to receive it. But just as those who expect a siege collect and store up all that is useful to them if they despair of relief from without, so it is most important that we should acquire far in advance the reinforcements which philosophy provides against temper and convey them into the soul in the knowledge that, when the occasion for using them comes, it will not be possible to introduce them with ease. For the soul hears nothing from the outside because of its tumult unless it has its own reason within, which, like a boatswain who directs the rowers, will promptly catch and understand every order given. Yet if the soul has heard words of advice which have been quietly and mildly spoken, it despises them; and toward any who insist in a rougher fashion, it grows exasperated. In fact, temper is overbearing and stubborn and altogether difficult for anyone other than itself to move, and, like a well-fortified tyranny,

(454) έαυτής\(^1\) ἐχειν ὄφειλε σύνοικον καὶ συγγενές τὸ καταλῦον.\(^2\)

3. Ἡ μὲν οὖν συνέχεια τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ τὸ προσκρούειν πολλάκις ἐξιν ἐμποιεὶ πονηρὰν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἢν ὀργιλότητα καλοῦσιν, εἰς ἀκραχολίαν καὶ πικρίαν καὶ δυσκολίαν τελευτῶσαν, ὅταν ἐλκύδης καὶ Ο μικρόλυπος ὦ θυμὸς γένηται καὶ φιλαίτιος ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ὡς σίδηρος ἀσθενῆς καὶ λεπτὸς ἀναχα- ρασόμενος· ἢ δὲ παραχρήμα ταῖς ὀργαῖς ἐνιστα- μένη καὶ πιέξουσα κρίσις οὐ τὸ παρὸν ἱάται μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν εὐτὸνον ποιεῖ καὶ δυσπαθῆ τὴν ψυχήν. ἐμοὶ γοῦν συνέβη διὸ ἢ τρις ἐνστάντι πρὸς ὀργὴν τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων παθεῖν, οὐ τὸ πρῶτον ὡς ἐμοί Λακεδαιμονίους ἀντήτους εἶναι δοκούν- τας, οὐδεμιᾶν ὑστερον ἡττήθησαν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν μάχην 
φρόνημα γὰρ ἔσχον ὡς κρατεῖν ἔστι τῷ λογισμῷ. ἐώρων δ’ οὐ μόνον ψυχροῦ κατασκευασμένου λήγουσαν ὀργήν, ὡς 'Αριστοτέλες ἱστόρησεν, ἀλλὰ 
D καὶ φόβου προσαχθέντος ἀποσβεννυμένην· καὶ νὴ 
Δία χαρὰς ἐπιγενομένης ἄφνω καθ’ Ὀμηρὸν 
' ἰάνθη’ καὶ διεχύθη πολλοῖς θυμὸς. ὡστε μοι 
παριστατο μὴ παντελῶς ἀβοήθητον εἶναι τοῖς 
γε βουλομένοις τὸ πάθος.

Οὔδὲ γὰρ ἀρχὰς ἔχει μεγάλας ἄεὶ καὶ ἱσχυρὰς, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ σκώμμα καὶ παιδία καὶ τὸ γελάσαι τινα 
\(^1\) έαυτής] έαυτοῦ Reiske. \(^2\) καταλῦον] καταλύον W.C.H.

\(^a\) Cf. Plato, Republic, 411 b-c.
\(^b\) At the battle of Leuctra, 371 b-c.
\(^c\) This is apparently from a lost work, though not included in Rose's collection of fragments. In Problemeta, x. 60 (898 a 4), however, Aristotle observes that fear is a process of cooling; cf. also De Partibus Animalium, ii. 4 (651 a 8 ff.).
must have its destroyer born and bred in the same household.

3. To be sure, when anger persists and its outbursts are frequent, there is created in the soul an evil state which is called irascibility, and this usually results in sudden outbursts of rage, moroseness, and peevishness when the temper becomes ulcerated, easily offended, and liable to find fault for even trivial offences, like a weak, thin piece of iron which is always getting scratched. But if judgement at once opposes the fits of anger and represses them, it not only cures them for the present, but for the future also it renders the soul firm and difficult for passion to attack. In my own case, at any rate, when I had opposed anger two or three times, it came about that I experienced what the Thebans did, who, when they had for the first time repulsed the Spartans, who had the reputation of being invincible, were never thereafter defeated by them in any battle; for I acquired the proud consciousness that it is possible for reason to conquer. Not only did I see that anger ceases when cold water is sprinkled on it, as Aristotle says, but that it is also extinguished when a poultice of fear is applied to it. And, by Heaven, if joy comes on the scene, in the case of many the temper has been quickly “warmed,” as Homer says, or dissipated. Consequently I came to the opinion that this passion is not altogether incurable, for those, at least, who wish to cure it.

For anger does not always have great and powerful beginnings; on the contrary, even a jest, a playful

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\[ a \] Il., xxiii. 598, 600, al.; for Plutarch’s interpretation of \( \text{iââvōsâi} \) see \( \text{Moralia, 947 D: } \) \( \text{âléan } \tau\omega \text{ } \sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tauι \text{ } \mu\epsilon\theta' \text{ } \nu\delta\omega\nu\nu\epsilon\), \\
\( \text{ô} \text{p} \text{e} \text{r } \text{Ô} \text{m} \text{p} \text{r} \text{o} \text{s } \text{iââvōsâi } \text{kéklēkev}; \text{ see also } \text{Moralia, 735 F.} \)
(454) καὶ τὸ διανεῖσαι καὶ πολλὰ τοιαύτα πολλοὺς εἰς ὀργὴν καθίστησιν, ὥσπερ ἡ Ἑλένη τὴν ἀδελφιδὴν προσαγορεύσασα, παρθένε μακρόν δὴ μῆκος Ἡλέκτρα χρόνου, παρώξυνεν εἰπεῖν, ὀψὲ γε φρονεῖς ἐν τοῖς λιποῦσῃ ἀισχρῶς δόμους· καὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ὁ Καλλισθένης εἰπὼν, τῆς Ἔμεγάλης κύλικος περιφερομένης, "οὐ βούλομαι πιὸν 'Ἀλέξανδρον' Ἄσκληπιοῦ δεῖσθαι."

4. Καθάπερ οὖν τὴν φλόγα θριξὶ λαγώσας ἀν- απτομένην καὶ θρυαλλίσας καὶ συρφετῶ δάδιον ἐστιν ἐπισκέπτες· εὖν δὲ ἐπιλάβηται τῶν στερεῶν καὶ βάθος ἕχοντων, ταχὺ διεθθείρε καὶ συνείλεν ύψηλον ἡβῆσασα τεκτόνων πόνον οὐς φησιν Αἰσχύλος· οὕτωσι τῷ θυμῷ προσέχων ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐκ τινος λαλιᾶς καὶ βουμο- λοχίας συρφετῶδες ὅρῳ καπνίωντα καὶ δια- καλομενον οὖν μεγάλης δεῖται πραγματείας, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις αὐτῷ τῷ σωπῆσαι καὶ καταμελησαι Γ' κατέπαυσε. καὶ γὰρ τὸ πῦρ ὁ μὴ παρασχὼν ύλῆν ἐσβέσε, καὶ ὀργὴν ὁ μὴ θρέψας ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ μὴ φυσήσας ἑαυτὸν ἐφυλάξατο καὶ καθείλεν. οὐκ ἤρεσκεν οὖν μοι, καίπερ ἄλλα χρῆσμα λέγων καὶ

1 'Ἀλέξανδρον Xylander from Mor., 624 a: ἀλέξανδρε.
2 ἡβῆσασα Salmasius: ἡβάσασα.
3 καπνίωντα] καπνίοντα or kapnizonta in some mss.
4 ἤρεσκεν] ἤρκεσεν in some mss.

a Euripides, Orestes, 72, 99.
b Cf. Moralia, 623 f—624 a; Athenaeus, x. 434 d.
c A jibe at Alexander's assumed divinity, "Alexander"

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word, a burst of laughter or a nod on the part of somebody, and many things of the kind, rouse many persons to anger; just as Helen, by thus addressing her niece,

Electra, virgin for so long a time, provoked her to reply,

Too late you're wise; but once you left your home
Disgraced.\(^a\)

And so was Alexander provoked by Callisthenes,\(^b\) who said, when the great bowl was going its rounds, "I do not care to have a drink of Alexander and then have to call in Asclepius." \(^c\)

4. And so, just as it is an easy matter to check a flame which is being kindled in hare's fur\(^d\) or candle-wicks or rubbish, but if it ever takes hold of solid bodies having depth, it quickly destroys and consumes

With youthful vigour lofty craftsmen's work,\(^e\) as Aeschylus has it; so the man who at the beginning gives heed to his temper and observes it while it is still smoking and catching flame little by little from some gossip or rubbishy scurrility need have no great concern about it; on the contrary, he has often succeeded in extinguishing it merely by keeping silent and ignoring it. For he who gives no fuel to fire puts it out, and likewise he who does not in the beginning nurse his wrath and does not puff himself up with anger takes precautions against it and destroys it. I was therefore not satisfied with what taking the place of Dionysus, the wine god, until the physician god, Asclepius, would have to be called in: on the authenticity of the story see Macurdy, \textit{Jour. Hell. Stud.}, l. (1930), 294-297. \(^d\) Cf. \textit{Moralia}, 138 \(r\)

παραίνων, ὁ 'Ιερώνυμος, ἐν οἷς οὐ φησι γινομένης ἀλλὰ γεγενημένης καὶ οὕσης αἰσθησιν ὁργῆς εἶναι διὰ τὸ τάχος. οὕθεν γὰρ οὕτω παθῶν συλλεγόμενον καὶ διακινούμενον ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν ἐμφανῆ 455 καὶ τὴν αὐξήσων. ὡς δὴ καὶ Ὁμήρος ἐμπείρως διδάσκει, λυπηθέντα μὲν εὐθὺς ἐξαίφνης ποιῶν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα τοῦ λόγου προσπεσόντος, ἐν οἷς λέγει ὡς φάτο· τὸν δὲ ἄχεος νεφέλη ἐκάλυψε μέλαια·

θυμούμενον δὲ βραδεὺς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι καὶ διὰ λόγων πολλῶν ἐκκατόμενον· οὗσ εἰ τις ύψεῖλεν αὐτῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ διεκόλυσεν, οὐκ ἄν ἔσχεν αὐξήσων ἡ διαφορὰ τηλικαύτην καὶ μέγεθος. θεν οἱ Σωκράτης οὐσίκες αἴσθησιν κινουμένου τραχύτερον αὐτοῦ πρὸς τίνα τῶν φίλων,

πρὸ χείματος  

Β στελλόμενος ἐνεδίδου τε τῇ φωνῇ καὶ διεμεδία τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ τὸ βλέμμα πραότερον παρεῖχε, τῷ ῥέπεων ἐπὶ θάτερα καὶ πρὸς τούναντίον ἀντικινεῖσθαι τῷ πάθει διαφυλάττων ἐαυτὸν ἀπτῶτα καὶ ἀήττητον.

5. Ἐστὶ γάρ τις, ὡ ἑταίρε, πρῶτη καθάπερ τυ-

1 χείματος Mor., 129 Α, 503 Α, infra: κύματος.
2 ὡστ' ἀνὰ ibid.: ὡς τίνα.

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a Of Rhodes, Peripatetic philosopher of the third century B.C.


c Of Patroclus's death, brought by Antilochus: II., xviii. 22.

d II., i. 101 ff.

e Cf. Seneca, De Ira, iii. 13. 3.

f Author unknown: Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec., iii. p. 721; 104
Hieronymus says—although he contributes other useful remarks and advice—in the passage where he declares that we have no perception of anger when it comes into being, but only when it has already come into being and exists, the reason being the swiftness with which it acts. For the truth is that none of the emotions, at the time when they are gathering and beginning to move, has a birth and increase so easy to perceive. Indeed Homer also skilfully teaches us this lesson when he causes Achilles to be suddenly overwhelmed by grief on receiving the report, in the passage where the poet says:

He spoke, and a black cloud of grief closed round Achilles;

but Homerportrays Achilles as being slow to lose his temper with Agamemnon and as becoming inflamed only when many words had been spoken. Yet if either one of the men had held back their words at the beginning and prevented their utterance, the quarrel would not have had so great a growth or have reached such magnitude. That is the reason why Socrates, as often as he perceived himself being moved to too great harshness against any of his friends, betaking himself to coast

Before the storm along some promontory, would lower his voice, cause a smile to spread over his face, and make the expression of his eyes more gentle, preserving himself from fault and defeat by setting up within himself an influence to counteract his passion.

5. For the first way, my friend, to dethrone temper
(455) ράννω κατάλυσις τοῦ θυμοῦ, μή πείθεσθαι μηδ' ὑπακούειν προστάττοντος αὐτοῦ μέγα βοῶν καὶ δεινόν βλέπειν καὶ κόπτειν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλ' ἴσον ἵστιν καὶ μὴ συνεπιτείνειν ὅπερ νόσημα ῥητασμῷ καὶ διαβοῦσι τὸ πάθος. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔρωτικα πράξεις, οἷν ἐπικωμίας καὶ ἀρϊστῆς καὶ στεφανώσας θύραν, ἔχονσιν ἀμοσγέτῳς κοουφισμόν οὐκ ἀχαρίν οὐδ' ἀμοσοῦν.

εἶθων δ' οὐκ ἐβόησα τίς η τίνος, ἀλλ' ἐφίλησα τὴν φλίην. εἰ τούτ' ἔστ' ἀδίκημ', ἀδικὼ,

αἱ τε τοὺς πενθοῦσιν ἐφέσεις τοῦ ἀποκλαῦσαι καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι πολὺ τι ὅς λύτης ἀμα τῷ δακρύῳ συνεξάγουσιν· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς ἐκριπτίζεται μᾶλλον οἷς πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσιν οὶ ἐν αὐτῷ καθεστώτες.

'Απεμείν οὐν κράτιστον ἡ φεύγειν καὶ ἀποκρύπτειν καὶ καθορμίζειν ἑαυτοὺς1 εἰς ἴσον ἴσαν, ὅπερ ἐπιληψίας ἀρχομένης συναισθανομένους, ἵνα μὴ πέσωμεν μᾶλλον δ' ἐπιπέσωμεν· ἐπιπέπτομεν δὲ τοῖς φίλοις μάλιστα γε καὶ πλειστάκις. οὐ γὰρ πάντων ἔρωμεν οὐδὲ πᾶσι φθονοῦμεν οὐδὲ πάντας φοβοῦμεθα, θυμῷ δ' ἄθωτον οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἀνεπί-

D χειρήτων. ἀλλ' ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ πολεμίους καὶ φίλους καὶ τέκνους καὶ γονεύσι καὶ θεοῖς νὴ Δία καὶ θηρίοις καὶ ἀψύχος σκεῦεσιν, ὥς ο Θάμυρις2

ῥηγνὺς χρυσόδετον κέρας, ῥηγνὺς3 ἀρμονίαν χορδότονον λύρας.

1 έαυτοὺς Bernardakis: ἑαυτόν.
2 Θάμυρις] θαμύρας G.
3 ῥηγνὺς] ῥηγνὺς δ' van Herwerden.

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*a Callimachus, Epigram 43 (42), vv. 5, 6 (Anth. Pal., 106
as you would a tyrant, is not to obey or hearken when it bids us cry aloud and look fierce and beat our breasts, but to keep quiet and not intensify the passion, as we would a disease, by tossing about and making a clamour. It is quite true that lovers’ practices, such as serenading in concert or alone and crowning the beloved’s door with garlands, do in some way or other bring an alleviation that is not without charm or grace:

I came, but did not shout your name or race;
I merely kissed the door. If this be sin,
Then I have sinned.\(^a\)

So too the surrender of mourners to weeping and wailing carries away much of their grief together with their tears. But temper is the more readily fanned into flame by what people in that state do and say.

The best course, therefore, is for us to compose ourselves, or else to run away and conceal ourselves, and anchor ourselves in a calm harbour, as though we perceived a fit of epilepsy coming on,\(^b\) so that we may not fall, or rather may not fall upon others; and we are especially likely to fall most often upon our friends. For we do not love or envy or fear everyone indiscriminately, but there is nothing that temper will not touch and assail: we grow angry with enemies and friends, with children and parents, yes, even with the gods, with wild beasts and soulless implements, as Thamyris did:

Breaking the lyre-arms, overlaid with gold,
Breaking his melodious, taut-strung lyre \(^c\);


\(^a\) Cf. Seneca, De Ira, iii. 10. 3.
\(^b\) Cf. Homer, Il., ii. 594-600.
PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

(455) καὶ ὁ Πάνδαρος αὐτῷ καταρώμενος, εἰ μὴ τὰ τόσα καταπρῆσεις "χερσὶ διακλάσσας." ὃ δὲ Ερέξης καὶ τῇ θαλάττῃ στύγματα καὶ πληγὰς ἐνέβαλε καὶ Ἐρᾶς τὸ ὄρος ἐξέσειπεν ἐπιστολάς, "Ἀθω δαιμόνιος ὀρανόμηκες, μὴ ποιεῖν εἰς ἐμοῖς ἑργοὺς λίθους μεγάλους καὶ δυσκατεργάστους· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τεμῶν ἢ μὲν σε εἰς τὰ ἐστι τοῦ θυμοῦ φοβερὰ, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ γελοιά· διὸ καὶ μισεῖται καὶ καταφρονεῖται μάλιστα τῶν παθῶν. ἀμφότερα δ’ ἐσκέφθαι χρῆσμοι.

6. Ἐγὼ γοῦν, εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς οὐκ οἶδα, ταύτην δὲ τῆς ἱατρείας ἄρχην ποιησάμενος, ὠσπέρ οἱ Λάκκωνες ἐν τοῖς εἰλωσι τὸ μεθύειν οἶον ἑστι, κατεμάνθαν τὴν ὀργήν ἐν ἑτέροις. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, ἢ φησιν Ἰπποκράτης χαλεπωτάτην εἶναι νόσου ἐν 

Γ ἤ τοῦ νοσοῦντος ἄνομοιότατον αὐτῷ γίνεται τὸ πρόσωπον, οὔτως ὅρων ὑπ’ ὀργῆς ἐξισταμένους μάλιστα καὶ μεταβάλλοντας ὡς ἄρον βάδισμα φωνῆν, οἶον εἰκόνα τοῦ πάθους ἀπεματτόμην ἐμαυτῷ, πάνω δυσχεραίνων εἰ φοβερὸς οὕτως καὶ παρακεκινηκὼς ὀρωμαί ποτε τοῖς χίλοις καὶ τῇ γυναικὶ καὶ τοῖς θυγατρίοις, οὐ μόνον ἰδεῖν ἄγριος καὶ ἀσυνήθης ἀλλὰ καὶ φωνὴν ἀπήνη καὶ τραχεῖαν ἀφιέται, ὠσπέρ ἑτέροις τῶν συνήθων ἐνετύχανον, οὐκ ἦθος οὐ μορφήν οὐ λόγον χάριν οὐ τὸ πιθανὸν καὶ προσηνέες ἐν ὀμίλίᾳ δυναμένοις ὑπ’ ὀργῆς δια-

1 ὀρανόμηκες Emperius: ὀρανόμηκη.
2 σὲ] σαυτὸν some mss.
3 εἰς] εἰς τὴν some mss.
4 τῆς ἱατρείας Reiske, confirmed by mss.: τὴν ἱατρείαν.
5 ἢ early editors: ἦν.
6 ἑτέροις] εἰνόις Wyttcchenbach.

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and Pandarus, who invoked a curse on himself if he did not "break with his hands" his bow and burn it. And Xerxes not only branded and lashed the sea, but also sent a letter to Mount Athos: "Noble Athos, whose summit reaches heaven, do not put in the way of my deeds great stones difficult to work. Else I shall hew you down and cast you into the sea." For temper can do many terrible things, and likewise many that are ridiculous; therefore it is both the most hated and the most despised of the passions. It will be useful to consider it in both of these aspects.

6. As for me—whether rightly I do not know—I made this start in the treatment of my anger: I began to observe the passion in others, just as the Spartans used to observe in the Helots what a thing drunkenness is. And first, as Hippocrates says that the most severe disease is that in which the countenance of the sufferer is most unlike itself, so I observed that those who are transported by anger also change most in countenance, colour, gait, and voice, and thus formed for myself a picture of that passion and was exceedingly uncomfortable to think that I should ever appear so terrible and deranged to my friends and my wife and daughters, not merely savage and unfamiliar to their sight, but also speaking with so harsh and rough a voice as were others of my intimate friends whom I used to meet at times when anger had made them unable to preserve their character or bearing or grace of speech or their

\[b\] Cf. Herodotus, vii. 35.
\[c\] Contrast ibid. vii. 24.
\[d\] Cf. Moralia, 239 a, and the note.
\[e\] Prognosticon, 2 (vol. i. p. 79 ed. Kühlewein).
\[f\] Cf. Seneca, De Ira, ii. 35.
456 φυλάττειν. Γαϊώς μὲν οὖν Γράκχω τῷ ρήτορι καὶ τῶν τρόπων ὄντι χαλεπῶ καὶ περιπαθέστερον λέγοντι διηρμοσμένον ἦν συρέγγιον, ὡς τὴν φωνὴν οἱ ἀρ-μονικοὶ σχέδην ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα διὰ τῶν τόνων ἄγουσι καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔχουν οἰκέτης αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὅπισθεν ἐστώς ἐνεδίδον τόνων ἐπιεικῆ καὶ πράον, ὡς τὴν κραυγὴν ἀνεκαλεῖτο καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ θυμικὸν ἀφήρει τῆς φωνῆς, ὥσπερ ὁ τῶν βουκόλων κηρόπλαστος ὁτοβεῖ δόναξ ἀχέτας ὑπνοδόταν νόμον,

ἐπιθέλγων καὶ καθιστά τὴν ὄργῃν τοῦ ρήτορος. ἐμοὶ δ’ εἰ τις ἐμμελὴς καὶ κομψὸς ἀκόλουθος ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ἡχόμην αὐτοῦ προσφέροντος ἐπὶ ταῖς ἔξοπτρον, ὥσπερ ἐνίοις προσφέρονσι λουσα-μένοις ἐπ’ οὐδενὶ χρησίμῳ. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἰδεῖν παρὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα καὶ συντεταραμένον ὧν μικρὸν ἐστὶν εἰς διαβολὴν τοῦ πάθους. καὶ γὰρ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν λέγουσιν οἱ παιζόντες αὐλοῦσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ σατύρου νουθετεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ προσέχειν.

οὐ τοι πρέπει τὸ σχῆμα· τοὺς αὐλοῦς μέθες καὶ θᾶπλα λάζειν καὶ γνάθους εὐθημόνει.

θεασαμένην δὲ τοῦ προσώπου τὴν ὄψιν ἐν ποταμῷ τῳ δυσχεράναι καὶ προέσθαι τοὺς αὐλοῦς. καὶ τοιούτοι

1 σχέδην Canter, confirmed by mss.: σχολὴν.
2 τὸ γὰρ] τὸ δ’ most mss.
3 καὶ θᾶπλα Meineke, confirmed by mss.: καὶ θ’ ὀπλα.

a Cf. Life of the Gracchi, ii. (825 ὃ), and Ziegler’s references ad loc.

b Aeschylus, Prometheus, 574-575: Io speaks with reference to the piping of Argus as he guards her.
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winning and affable manners. The case of Gaius Gracchus the orator will serve as illustration. He was not only severe in his disposition, but spoke too passionately; so he caused a pitch-pipe to be made of the sort which musicians use to lead the voice up and down the scales to the proper note; with this in hand his servant used to stand behind him as he spoke and give him a decorous and gentle tone which enabled Gracchus to remit his loud cries and remove from his voice the harsh and passionate element; just as the shepherds'

Wax-joined pipe, clear sounding,  
Drones a slumberous strain,

so did he charm and lay to rest the rage of the orator. But as for me, if I had some attentive and clever companion, I should not be vexed if he held a mirror up to me during my moments of rage, as they do for some persons after bathing, though to no useful purpose. For to see oneself in a state which nature did not intend, with one's features all distorted, contributes in no small degree toward discrediting that passion. In fact, those who delight in pleasant fables tell us that when Athena played on the pipes, she was rebuked by the satyr and would give no heed:

That look becomes you not; lay by your pipes  
And take your arms and put your cheeks to rights;

but when she saw her face in a river, she was vexed and threw her pipes away. Yet art makes melody

(456) παραμυθίαν ἡ τέχνη τῆς ἀμορφίας ἔχει τὴν ἐμμέλειαν.1 καὶ ὁ Μαρσύας, ὡς ἔοικε, φορβεῖα τινι καὶ περιστομίοις τοῦ2 πνεύματος τὸ βαγδαῖον ἐγκαθήρθε καὶ τού προσώπου κατεκόσμησε καὶ ἀπέκρυψε τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν,

χρυσῷ δ’ αἰγλήντι συνήρμοσεν3 ἀμφιδασείας κόρσας, καὶ στόμα λάβρον ὀπισθοδέτοις ἰμάσιν. ἡ δ’ ὀργή φυσώσα καὶ διατείνουσα τὸ πρόσωπον ἀπρεπῶς, ἔτι μᾶλλον αἰσχρὰν ἀφίησι καὶ ἀτερπῇ φωνῇ

κινοῦσα χορδᾶς τὰς ἀκινήτους φρενῶν.

τὴν μὲν γὰρ θάλασσαν, ὅταν ἐκταραχθεῖσα τοῖς πνεύμασι τὰ βρύα καὶ τὸ φύκος ἀναβάλλῃ, καθαίρεσθαι λέγουσιν. ἢ δ’ ὁ θυμὸς ἐκβράσσει τῆς ψυχῆς περιτρεπομένης ἀκόλαστα καὶ πικρὰ καὶ σπερμολόγα ῥήματα, τοὺς λέγοντας πρώτους καταρρυπαίνοντες καὶ καταπίμπλησιν ἀδοξίας, ὡς ἄει μὲν ἐχοντας ἐν αὐτοῖς4 ταῦτα καὶ πλήρεις ὄντας, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς ἀνακαλυπτομένους. διὸ κουφοτάτου πράγματος, ὃς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, λόγου5 βαρυτάτην ζημίαν τίνος, ἐχθροῖ καὶ κακολόγου καὶ κακοήθεις δοκοῦντες εἶναι.

7. Ταῦτ’ οὖν ὀρῶντι μοι καὶ παραφυλάττοντι συμβαίνει πίθεσθαι καὶ διαμνημονεύειν ἐπιεικῶς πρὸς ἐμαυτόν, ὡς ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν πυρετῷ

1 ἐμμέλειαν] ἐμμέλειαν most mss.
2 βία before τοῦ deleted by Dübner.
3 συνήρμοσεν] προσήρμοσεν Tzetzes.
4 αὐτοῖς Hartman: αὐτοῖς.
5 λόγου here and Mor., 90 c] λόγων Plato and Mor., 505 c, infra, 634 f.

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some consolation for unsightliness. And Marsyas, it seems, by a mouthpiece and cheek-bands repressed the violence of his breath and tricked up and concealed the distortion of his face:

He fitted the fringe of his temples with gleaming gold And his greedy mouth he fitted with thongs bound behind; but anger, which puffs up and distends the face in an unbecoming way, utters a voice still more ugly and unpleasant,

Stirring the heart-strings never stirred before.

For when the sea is disturbed by the winds and casts up tangle and seaweed, they say that it is being cleansed; but the intemperate, bitter, and vulgar words which temper casts forth when the soul is disturbed defile the speakers of them first of all and fill them with disrepute, the implication being that they have always had these traits inside of them and are full of them, but that their inner nature is now laid bare by their anger. Hence for a mere word, the "lightest of things," as Plato says, they incur the "heaviest of punishments," being esteemed as hostile, slanderous, and malicious.

7. When I, accordingly, observe these things, and store them carefully away, it occurs to me to lay up and quite thoroughly remember for my own use that,

\( a \) Cf. Moralia, 713 d.

\( b \) Simonides, according to Tzetzes, Chiliades, i. 372 (Frag. 177 Bergk, 160 Diehl, 115 Edmonds); attributed by Schneidewin to Simias Rhodius (cf. Powell, Coll. Alex., p. 111).

\( c \) Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag.\(^2\), p. 907, ades. 361; quoted again in Moralia, 43 d; 501 a, 502 d, infra; 657 c.

\( d \) A combination of Laws, 935 a and 717 d, as in Moralia, 90 c, 505 c, 634 f; cf. also Schlemm, Hermes, xxxviii. 596.
(456) κρείττον δ’ ἐν ὥργῃ τὴν γλῶτταν ἀπαλὴν ἔχειν καὶ λείαν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πυρεττόντων ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχῃ, σημεῖον ἐστὶ πονηρὸν ὅπερ αἶτιον. ἡ δὲ τῶν θυμουμένων τραχεῖα καὶ ὑπορά γενομένη1 καὶ Ἐρνέισα πρὸς λόγους ἀτόπους ἔχθρας ἀνηκέστον δημιουργὸν ὑβριν ἐκφέρει καὶ δυσμενείας ὑπούλου κατήγορον. οὐδὲν γὰρ ὁ ἄκρατος ἀκόλαστον οὔτω καὶ δυσχερές ὡς ὁ θυμὸς ἀναδίδωσι2: κάκεινα μὲν γέλωτι καὶ παιδία μέλει,3 ταῦτα δὲ χολὴ κέκραται: καὶ παρὰ πότον μὲν ὁ σιωπῶν ἐπαχθῆς τοῖς συνοὐσι καὶ φορτικὸς, ἐν ὥργῃ δὲ σεμνότερον οὐδὲν ἤσυχίας, ὡς ἡ Σαφφῶ παραίνει

σκιδναμένας ἐν στήθεσιν ὅργας4 μαφυλάκαν γλώσσαν πεφύλαξθαι.5

8. Οὐ ταῦτα δὲ μόνον ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δίδωσι τὸ προσέχειν ἀεὶ τοῖς ἀλισκομένοις ὧπ’ ὥργῃς, ἀλλὰ Λ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τοῦ θυμοῦ κατανοεῖν φύσιν, ὡς οὔκ εὐγενῆς οὐδ’ ἀνδρώδης οὔδ’ ἔχουσα φρόνημα καὶ μέγεθος ἐστίν. ἄλλα δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ ταρακτικὸν αὐτοῦ πρακτικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀπειλητικὸν εὐθαρσές εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀπειθῆς ἱσχυρόν· ἐνοὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν ὁμότητα μεγαλούργιαν καὶ τὸ δυσπαραίτητον εὐτονίαν καὶ μισοπονηρὰν τὸ δύσκολον οὐκ ὀρθῶς τίθενται: τὰ γὰρ ἔργα καὶ τὰ κινήματα καὶ τὰ

1 γενομένη[ γνωμένη most mss.
2 ἀναδίδωσι[ ἀνάδεικνυμι most mss.
3 παιδία μέλει] παιδία καὶ μέλει Madvig.
4 σκιδναμένας . . . ὅργας G. Hermann and Bergk: σκιδναμένης . . . ὅργης.
5 μαφυλάκαν γλώσσαν πεφύλαξθαι G. Hermann: πεφυλάχθαι γλώσσαν μαφυλάκαν (or μαφυλάκταν).

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just as it is a good thing in a fever, so it is an even better thing in anger, to keep the tongue soft and smooth. For if the tongue of men who are sick of a fever is in an unnatural state, it is a bad symptom, but not the cause of their malady; but when the tongue of angry men becomes rough and foul and breaks out in unseemly speeches, it brings forth insolence which creates irremediable enmity and argues a festering malevolence within. For unmixed wine produces nothing so intemperate and odious as anger does: words flown with wine go well with laughter and sport, but those which spring from anger are mixed with gall; and whereas the man who keeps silent at a drinking-bout is disagreeable and irksome to the company, there is nothing more dignified, if one is angry, than holding one’s peace, as Sappho advises:

When anger swells within the breast,
Restrain the idly barking tongue.

8. But it is not these considerations only that constant watching of those who are in the grip of anger furnishes us, but also an understanding of the general nature of ill temper—that it is not well-bred, nor manly, nor possessing any quality of pride or greatness. Yet most people think its turbulence to be activity, its blustering to be confident boldness, its obstinacy force of character; and some claim that even its cruelty is magnificence in action and its implacability firmness in resolution and its moroseness hatred of evil, but they are wrong in this.

a Frag. 27 ed. Bergk, 126 ed. Diehl, 137 ed. Edmonds; it is unlikely that Plutarch wrote the Aeolic accents which are here restored.

b Cf. 462 e, 482 c, infra.
σχήματα μικρότητα πολλήν καὶ ἀσθένειαν κατη-
457 γορεῖ, οὕτω μόνον ἐν οἷς παιδάρια σπαράττουσι καὶ
πρὸς γύναια διαιπικραίνονται καὶ κύνας καὶ ἱπποὺς
καὶ ἡμίονους οἶονται δεῖν κολάζειν, ὡς Κτησιφῶν ὁ
παγκρατιαστὴς ἀντιλακτίσαι τὴν ἡμίονον ἁξίων,
ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς τυραννικὰς μαίφονιάς τῷ πικρῷ
τὸ μικρόψυχον αὐτῶν καὶ τῷ δράωντι τὸ πεπονθὸς
ἐνορώμενον ἔοικε τοῖς δήγμασι τῶν ἐρπετῶν, ὅταν
διακαὶ καὶ περιώδινα γένηται, τὴν φλεγμονὴν
ἀπερειδομένων σφοδράν² τοῖς λευτηκόσιν. ὡς γὰρ
οἴδημα μεγάλης ἔστιν ἐν σαρκὶ πληγῆς πάθος,
οὕτως ἐν ταῖσ μαλακωτάταις ψυχαῖς ἢ πρὸς τὸ
Β λυπήσαι ἐνδοσὶς ἐκφέρει μείζονα θυμὸν ἀπὸ μεί-
ζονος ἀσθενείας. διὸ καὶ γυναῖκες ἄνδρῶν ὀργιλώ-
terai, καὶ νοσοῦντες ὑγιαινόντων καὶ γέροντες
ἀκμαζόντων καὶ κακῶς πράττοντες εὐτυχοῦστων.
ὀργιλώτατος γὰρ ὁ φιλάργυρος πρὸς τὸν οἰκονόμον,
ὁ γαστρίμαργος πρὸς τὸν ὕψοποιόν, ὁ ζηλότυπος
πρὸς τὸ γύναιον, ὁ κενόδοξος κακῶς ἀκούσας·
χαλεπώτατοι δ' ἂγαν φιλοτιμίαιν
μνώμενοι ἐν πολίεσσων³ ἄνδρες·
ἴστασιν⁴ ἅλγος ἐμφανές

κατὰ Πίνδαρον. οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ λυπουμένου τῆς
ψυχῆς καὶ πάσχοντος ἀνίσταται μάλιστα δι' ἀσθέ-
νειαν ὃ θυμός, οὐχὶ νεύροις, ὥς τις εἴπε, τῆς ψυχῆς

¹ οὐ] οὐ γὰρ Reiske.
² σφοδράν] σφόδρα most mss.; σφόδρ' ἐν Reiske.
³ πολίεσσω Böeckh: πόλεσσω.
⁴ ἴστασιν] ἦ στάσιν most mss.: ἔστασαν Schneidewin.
⁵ μάλιστα before τῆς deleted by W.C.H.
ON THE CONTROL OF ANGER, 456-457

For the actions and the motions and the whole demeanour of angry persons declare their utter littleness and weakness, not only when they rend little children and rage bitterly against women and think it proper to punish dogs and horses and mules, as Ctesiphon the pancratist did, who thought it right to kick back at his mule; but also in the butcheries that tyrants perpetrate, their meanness of soul is apparent in their cruelty and their perverted state in their action, and is like the bites of vipers, which, when thoroughly inflamed with rage and pain, eject their excessive fiery passion upon those who have hurt them. For just as with the flesh a swelling results from a great blow, so with the weakest souls the inclination to inflict a hurt produces a flaring up of temper as great as the soul's infirmity is great. That is also the reason why women are more prone to anger than men, and sick persons than healthy, and old men than men in their prime, and the unfortunate than the prosperous. Most prone to anger, for instance, are the miser with his steward, the glutton with his cook, the jealous man with his wife, the conceited man when he has been maligned; but worst of all are

Men who court too eagerly
Ambition in the towns:
Manifest is the pain they bring,

as Pindar has it. In like manner from the pain and suffering of the soul, caused generally by weakness, there arises the outburst of passion which is not, as

a The cruel tyrant, like the viper, indulges in rages as a sort of defence-reaction, a proof of inherent weakness.
c Cf. Life of Coriolanus, xv. (220 E).
9. Ἐν οὖν φαύλα παραδείγματα τὴν θέαν ὦν εὖχαριν ἀλλ' ἀναγκαίαν μόνον εἴχε· τούτος δ' ἠπίως καὶ λείως ὁμιλούντας ὄργανός κάλλιστα μὲν ἀκούσματα κάλλιστα δὲ θεάματα ποιούμενος, ἄρχομαι καταφρονεῖν τῶν λεγόντων.

αὐτίς ἠδίκησας· ἄνδρ' ἰνεκτέον τόδε;
καὶ

βαίνει λαξ, ἐπὶ τραχύλου βαίνε, καὶ πέλα χθονι, καὶ τάλλα παραξυντικά, δι' ὄν ἐνιοί τὸν θυμόν ἐκ τῆς γνακωνίτιδος εἰς τὴν ἄνδρωνίν οὐκ εὖ

D μετουκίζουσιν. ἦ γὰρ αὐτὴ κατὰ τάλλα τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ συμφερομένη περὶ μόνης μοι δοκεὶ διαμάχεσθαι τῆς πραότητος, ὃς αὐτὴν μᾶλλον προσηκούσης. ἄνδρώπων μὲν γὰρ κρατῆσαι καὶ χειροσι βελτιώνων ὑπήρξε, τὸ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ στήσας κατὰ θυμοῦ τρόπαιον (ὁ χαλεπὸν εἰναὶ μάχεσθαι φησιν Ἡράκλειτος· "ὁ τι γὰρ ἄν θέλη, ψυχῆς ὄνειται") μεγάλης ἐστὶ καὶ νικητικῆς

1 That is, ἄνδρα, not ἄνδρι.
2 γὰρ Reiske, confirmed by mss.: μὲν.
3 αὐτή Capps: αὐτὴ.
4 τῇ omitted in most mss.
5 μάχεσθαι] διαμάχεσθαι most mss.

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a Plato, Republic, 411 b; contrast Moralia, 449 r, supra. Plutarch seems to be unwilling to name Plato when he is forced to contradict him. But see Pohlenz, Hermes, xxxi. 332 (on Philodemus, De Ira, xxxi. 24).
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someone has said, like "sinews of the soul," but like the strainings and convulsions of the soul when it is stirred too vehemently in its impulse to defend itself.

9. These base examples, to be sure, were not pleasant to observe, but merely unavoidable; but in discussing those who deal with transports of rage in a mild and gentle way I offer instances which are very beautiful both to hear and to witness, and I begin with a word of scorn for those who say,

"It was a man you wronged: should a man bear this?"

and

Trample him underfoot, tread on his neck,
And bring him to the ground!

and other provocative expressions, by using which some err in transferring anger from the women's quarters to the men's. For although courage gets along well with justice in all other respects, yet, as it seems to me, it fights for the possession of gentleness alone, as belonging rather to itself. But although cases do occur in which even baser men gain the mastery over their betters, yet to erect in the soul a trophy of victory over anger (which Heracleitus says it is difficult to contend against: "for whatever it wishes, it buys at the price of the soul") is proof of a great and victorious strength which

\textsuperscript{c} Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec., iii. p. 694; Diehl, Anthologia Lyrica, i. p. 265; Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus, ii. p. 304: an anonymous tetrameter attributed by Meineke to Archilochus.

\textsuperscript{d} Diels, Frag. d. Vorsokratiker, i. p. 170, Frag. 85: cf. Life of Coriolanus, xxii. (224 c), and Moralia, 755 d. But Heracleitus's meaning is probably that it is Love, not Anger, which it is difficult to contend against.
(457) ἅσχυος, ὥσπερ νεῦρα καὶ τόνους ἀληθῶς ἐπὶ τὰ πάθη τὰς κρίσεις ἐχούσης.

Διὸ καὶ συνάγειν ἄεὶ πειρῶμαι καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν οὐ ταῦτα δὴ μόνον τὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων, οὐσ φασὶ χολῆν οὐκ ἔχειν οἱ νοῦν οὐκ ἐχουσει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Εἰ τὰ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τυράννων οἶον Ἀντιγόνου τὸ πρὸς τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς ζητῶ, τὴν σκηνὴν λοιδοροῦντας αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀκοῦσαν τὴν γὰρ βακτηρίαν ὑποβαλὼν ἔξω, "παπαί," ἐπειν, "οὐ πορρωτέρῳ ποι τραπόμενοι κακῶς ἐρείθ᾽ ἡμᾶς;" Ἀρκαδίωνος δὲ τοῦ Ἀχαίοῦ τὸν Φιλίππον ἂει κακῶς λέγουσαν καὶ φεύγειν παραινοῦσαν

eἰσόκε τοὺς ἀφίκηται οἱ οὐκ ἴσασι Φιλίππον

εἰτὰ πῶς ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ φανέντος, ὄντος δεῶν οἱ φίλοι κολάσαι καὶ μὴ περιθεῖν οὐ δὲ Φιλίππος ἐντυχῶν αὐτῷ φιλανθρώπως καὶ ξένια καὶ δώρα πέμψας ἐκέλευσεν υἱοτερον πυνθάνεσθαι τὶνας λόγος γενομένης ἐπιστρέφον οὐστὰς ἀπαγγέλλων πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας. οὐ δὲ πάντες ἐμαρτύρουν ἐπαινέτην αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι τὸν ἄνδρα θαυμάσιον, "ἐγὼ των, ἐφη, "βελτίων ἰατρὸς ὑμῶν." ἐν Ὀλυμπίαν δὲ βλασφημίας περὶ αὐτοῦ γεγομένης καὶ τινῶν λεγόντων οὐΚ οἰμῶξαι προσήκει τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ὅτι εὖ πάσχουσεν ὑπὸ τοῦ Φιλίππου

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1 μόνον] μόνα most mss.
2 οὐκ added by Reiske.
3 τοὺς] most mss. have ὅτι τοὺς.
4 γὰρ] omitted in some mss.

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a Perhaps a correction (as 457 c, supra) of Plato, Republic, 411 b (cf. also Moralía, 449 r, supra).

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possesses against the passions the weapons of its
dependences, as in very truth its nerves and sinews.a

For this reason I always strive to collect and
to peruse, not only these sayings and deeds of the
philosophers, who are said by fools to have no bile,b
but even more those of kings and despots. There is,
for instance, the remark of Antigonus c to his soldiers
who were reviling him near his tent in the belief that
he could not hear them: he merely thrust out his
staff and cried, “Good heavens! will you not go
somewhere farther off to abuse me?” And there is
the case of Arcadion d the Achaean who was always
railing against Philip and advising flight

Until one comes to men who know not Philip e;
when Arcadion later visited Macedonia on some
chance or other, Philip’s friends thought that he
should not be let off but punished. Yet Philip, when
he met him, treated him kindly and sent him friendly
presents and gifts; and later bade his friends inquire
how Arcadion now spoke of him to the Greeks.
When all testified that the fellow had become a
wonderful eulogist of the king, Philip said, “Then I
am a better physician than you.” So in Olympia f
when Philip was being defamed, and some persons
said that the Greeks should smart for it since they
spoke evil of Philip though they were being well

b That is, our “no guts”; cf. Archilochus, Frag. 131,
Bergk, and Capps’s note on Menander, Perikeiromenê, 259.
c Cf. Moralia, 182 c; Seneca, De Ira, iii. 22. 2.
d Cf. Athenaeus, vi. 249 c-d: Arcadion, while in flight
from Macedonia, accidentally met Philip who asked him
how long he was going to stay in exile. This is Arcadion’s
reply.
e A parody of Homer, Od., xi. 122; xxiii. 269.
f Cf. Moralia, 143 f; 179 a with Nachstädt’s note ad loc.
PLUTARCH’S MORALIA

κακῶς αὐτὸν λέγουσι, "τί οὖν," ἔφη, "ποιήσουσιν, ἃν κακῶς πάσχουσιν;"

Καλά δὲ καὶ Πεισοστράτου τὰ πρὸς Θρασύβουλον 458 καὶ Πορσίννα τὰ πρὸς Μούκιον καὶ Μάγα τὰ πρὸς Φιλήμωνα: δημοσίᾳ γὰρ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κωμῳδηθεῖσ' ἐν θεάτρῳ.

α. παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως γράμμαθ' ἦκει σοι, Μάγα. β. Μάγα κακόδαιμον, γράμματ' ὃν ἐπίστασαν.

λαβῶν ὑπὸ χειμῶνος εἰς Παραιτόνιον ἐξενεχθέντα, στρατιώτην¹ μὲν ἐκέλευσε γυμνῆ μαχαίρα θυγεῖν τοῦ τραχήλου μόνον ἑτα κοσμίως ἀπελθεῖν ἀστραγάλους δὲ καὶ σφαῖραν ὡς παιδαρίω νοῦν ὑ τι ἔχοντι προσπέμψας ἀφήκε. Πτολεμαίος δὲ γραμματικὸν εἰς ἀμαθίαν ἐπισκόπτων ἢρώτησε τὸς οὗ Πηλέως πατήρ ἦν κάκεινος, "ἀν σὺ πρότερον εἶπης," ἔφη,


Β "τὸς τοῦ Λάγου" τὸ δὲ σκώμμα τής δυσγενείας ἢπτετο τοῦ βασιλέως, καὶ πάντες ἡγανάκτησαν ὡς ὑ τι ἐπιτήδειον ὃν καὶ ἀκαἰρον² καὶ ὁ Πτολεμαῖος, "εἰ μὴ τὸ φέρειν," ἔφη, "σκωπτόμενον, οὐδὲ τὸ σκώπτειν βασιλικὸν ἐστὶν." 'Αλέξανδρος δὲ πικρότερος αὐτοῦ γέγονεν ἐν³ τοῖς περὶ Καλλισθένη καὶ Κλείτον. ἦ καὶ Πῶρος ἀλώνισ παρεκάλει χρήσασθαι βασιλικῶς αὐτῷ καὶ πυθομένου, "μὴ τὶ πλέον;" "ἐν τῷ βασιλικῶς," ἕφη, "πάντ'

¹ στρατιώτην Stegmann, confirmed by mss. : στρατιώτην.
² ὃν καὶ ἀκαϊρον E. Schwartz : ὅντα χαλεῖν (or φέρειν).
³ γέγονεν ἐν] γέγονε Xylander and Kronenberg.

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1 Cf. Moralia, 189 c, and Nachstädlt ad loc.
2 Ibid. 305 F ; Life of Publicola, xvii. (106 a-d) with Lindskog’s note.
3 Cf. 449 F, supra.
5 Officially the father of Ptolemy I, who, however, was 122
treated by him, Philip said, "What will they do, then, if they are badly treated?"

Likewise admirable was the behaviour of Peisistratus to Thrasybulus, and of Porsenna to Mucius, and of Magas to Philemon. For when Magas had been publicly ridiculed by Philemon in a comedy at the theatre:

A. For you some letters, Magas, from the king.
B. Unhappy Magas, who no letters know! Magas later captured Philemon, who had been cast ashore by a storm at Paraeonium, and ordered a soldier merely to touch Philemon on the neck with a naked sword and then depart courteously; and Magas sent dice and a ball to Philemon, as to a senseless child, and sent him on his way. So also Ptolemy, when he was jeering at a pedant for his ignorance, asked him who was Peleus' father; and the pedant replied, "I shall tell you if you will first tell me who was the father of Lagus." This was a jest at the dubious birth of the king, and everyone was indignant at its improper and inopportune character; but Ptolemy said, "If it is not the part of a king to take a jest, neither is it to make one." But Alexander had behaved more harshly than was his custom toward Callisthenes and Cleitus. And so Porus, when he was taken captive, requested Alexander to treat him "like a king." When Alexander asked, "Is there nothing more?" "In the words 'like a king,'" replied Porus, "there is commonly thought to have been the bastard son of Philip of Macedon.

1 Cf. Life of Alexander, lv. (696 d-e); 449 E, supra; Seneca, De Ira, iii. 17. 1.
2 Cf. Moralía, 181 E, 332 E; Life of Alexander, lx. (699 c), and Ziegler's note.
PLUTARCH’S MORALIA

(458) ἔνεστι.” διὸ καὶ τῶν θεῶν τὸν βασιλέα “Μειλί-χιον,” Ἀθηναίοι δὲ “Μαμάκτην,” οἴμαι, καλοῦσι. Κ οὐ δὲ κολαστικὸν ἐρυνῶδες καὶ δαμονικόν, οὔ θείον οὔδ’ ὀλύμπιον.


1 ἀνοικίσαι Reiske: οἰκίσαι.
2 ἀμα stands before σκοπῶν in the mss.; transferred here by Capps (ἀνασκοπῶν E. Schwartz).


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everything." For this reason also they call the king of the gods Meilichios, or the Gentle One, while the Athenians, I believe, call him Maimactes, or the Boisterous a; but punishment is the work of the Furies and spirits, not of the high gods and Olympian deities.

10. Just as, then, someone said of Philip b when he had razed Olynthus to the ground, "But he could not possibly repopulate a city so large," so one may address Anger and say, "You are able to overturn and destroy and throw down, but to raise up and preserve and spare and forbear is the work of mildness and forgiveness and moderation in passion, the work of a Camillus or a Metellus c or an Aristeides or a Socrates; but to attach oneself to the wound and to sting is the part of an ant or a horse-fly." d As I study, however, anger's method of defending itself, I find it for the most part ineffectual, since it spends itself in biting the lips e and gnashing the teeth, in vain attacks and railings coupled with senseless threats, and eventually resembles children f running races, who, through lack of self-control, fall down ridiculously before they reach the goal toward which they are hastening. Therefore there was point in what the Rhodian said to the Roman general's servant who was shouting and talking insolently: "What you say," said the Rhodian, "matters nothing

b Cf. Moralia, 40 E, 215 b. For the thought see Pindar, Pythian Odes, iv, 484.


d Cf. Seneca, De Ira, ii. 34. 1; cf. Socrates' comparison of himself to a gad-fly in Apology, 30 E.

e Cf. Seneca, De Ira, i. 19. 2-3.

f Cf. 447 a, supra.
(458) λέγεις ἄλλα τι τήνος σιγῇ." καὶ τὸν Νεοπτόλεμον ὁ Σοφοκλῆς καὶ τὸν Εὐρύπυλον ὀπλίσας

ἀκομμὴ ἀλοιδόρητα,

φησίν,

ἐρρηξάτην ἐσ κύκλα ἕχαλκέων ὀπλών.

Τὸν μὲν γὰρ σίδηρον ἔνιοι τῶν βαρβάρων φαρ-Ε μάσσουσιν, ἢ δ’ ἀνδρεία χολῆς οὐ δεῖται. βέβαται γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τὸ δὲ θυμικὸν καὶ μανικόν εὐπερίθραυστὸν ἑστι καὶ σάθρων. ἀφαιροῦσι γοῦν αὐλοῖς τὸν θυμὸν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν μαχομένων, καὶ Μοῦσας πρὸ πολέμου θύουσιν ὅπως δ’ λόγος ἐμμένη. καὶ τρεψάμενοι τοὺς πολέμιους οὐ διώκουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀνακαλοῦνται τὸν θυμὸν, ὥσπερ τὰ σύμμετρα τῶν ἐγχειριδιών εὐανακόμιστον ὅντα καὶ ράδιον. ὀργῇ δὲ μυρίους προανείλε τῆς ἀμύνης, ὥς Κῦρον καὶ Πελοπίδαν τὸν Ῥηβαίον. Ἀγαθοκλῆς δὲ πρᾶσω ἔφερε λοιδορούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιορκομένων καὶ τινὸς εἰπόντος, "Κεραμεῦ, πόθεν ἀπο-Γ δώσεις τοῖς ἐξένισ τὸν μισθὸν;" ἐπιγελάσας, "αἰκα ταύταν ἐξέλω." καὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον ἀπὸ

1 ἀκομμὴ Badham, who would also add τε at the end of the line: ἐκόμπα'.

2 κύκλα| σκύλα Pearson.

3 τὸν Ἀντίγονον] τὸν αὐτὸν W.C.H.

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b The poison of anger.

c Cf. Moralia, 238 b, with Nachstädtt ad loc.

d Cf. Pausanias, iv. 8. 11.
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to me, but what your master doesn't say." And Sophocles, when he has armed Neoptolemus and Eurypylus, says

Without a vaunt, without reviling, they
Have rushed within the ring of brazen arms.

For although there are barbarians who poison their steel, true bravery has no need of bitter gall, for it has been dipped in reason; but rage and fury are rotten and easily broken. At any rate the Spartans use the playing of pipes to remove from their fighting men the spirit of anger, and they sacrifice to the Muses before battle in order that reason may remain constant within them; and when they have routed the enemy, they do not pursue, but sound the recall to their high spirits, which, like small daggers, are manageable and can be easily withdrawn. Yet wrath has slain thousands before its revenge was accomplished, as, for instance, Cyrus and Pelopidas the Theban. But Agathocles endurred with mildness the revilings of those he was besieging, and when one of them cried out, "Potter, how will you get pay for your mercenaries?", Agathocles laughed and said, "If I take this town." And there is the case of Antigonus, who, when some men on the

* Cf. Seneca, De Ira, ii. 35. 1: tale ira telum est: vix retrahitur.

† Probably Cyrus the Younger, cf. Xenophon, Anabasis, i. 8. 26-27; but Cyrus the Great may be meant, cf. Seneca, De Ira, iii. 21, which is not, however, quite in point; nor is Herodotus, i. 205 ff.

‡ Cf. Life of Pelopidas, xxxii. (296 a).

§ Cf. Moralia, 176 e; Diodorus, xx. 63. Agathocles was the son of a potter.

' The One-eyed: cf. Seneca, De Ira, iii. 22. 4-5; related of Agathocles in Moralia, 176 e-f.
toû teîxous tinês eis amorphián éskwpton.  

6 toi pros autoûs, ‘‘kai mên edókoun eûprosôpos einai.’’

laðwv de tên pôlin épipraske toutû skôptontas,

6 marturâmenos oti proû toutû deisptas ëxei tôn

6 lôgon, ãn pôlin autoûn loïdorôsin.

6 ‘‘Oroû de kai syngyôrous1 sfallomêvous up’ orghès

6 megâla kai õíteras. ‘‘Aristotêles 6 iôtoreî

6 459 Satýrou tou Òou Samióu2 toutû fîlous emphrázai ta 6ta

6 kherô dikênu ëxontos, ôpws mû syngxêi to pràigma
dia thumôn upô toutôn exhôrôn loïdoroûmenos. autoûs

6 6 hûmas ou pollakis ékfeûgei to kolásai plêm-

6 melíasanta dûlôn;3 apôdîdraksounou gáp tás

6 âpeilas kai toutûs lôgous deîsantes. ìper ouû aî

tîthai pros tâ pайдia lêgousûi, ‘‘mê klaiê kai

6 lîpsi,’’ touto pros toutôn thumôn ouk âkhêstos lek-

6 téon, ‘‘mê spénde midiê bôa mûdê épeîgou, kai

6 màllon õ théléis genîsetai kai thélton.’’ kai gáp

6 pайдia patîp õidôn épîxeiroûnta ti siðhriô dieléiû

6 ò temeîn,4 autoûs laðwv toutô siðhÌrôn épîzûsê. kai

6 tout thumôu tîn timôrìan pařelômenos o lôgos5

6 B autoûs ãsfallôs kai âblabôs kai óphelômês ékô-

6 lasê tout ãzîon ouû éauntôn wûspèr õ thûmôs ânt,

6 èkeînou pollákìs.

11. Pántow de tout pathedon ãthiûmuo deomênou,

6 oîon dâmáxontos kai kataðloûntos âskhêsei to

6 âlogon kai dûspetihês, ou pros állo màllon ëstiv

1 syngyôrous Kaltwasser: kûnegous.

2 tout Samiow] omitted by all mss. except G, but found in

Stobaeus also.

3 plêm melíasantas dûlous Reiske.

4 temeîn] periteîmeîn some mss.

5 o lôgos added by Amyot, confirmed by õ logiûmos in G.

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wall of a town jeered at him because of his deformity, said to them, “Why, I thought my face was handsome!” But when he took the town he sold as slaves those who jeered at him, protesting that he would have speech with their masters if they reviled him again.

I observe also that both advocates and orators commit serious mistakes because of anger; and Aristotle\(^a\) relates that the friends of Satyrus the Samian, when he was to plead, stopped up his ears with wax, that he might not spoil his case through temper at the insults of his enemies. And as for ourselves, does it not happen often that the punishment of a delinquent slave eludes our power? For slaves are made afraid by threatening words and run away.\(^b\) The words, therefore, which nurses use with children, “Stop crying and you shall have it!” may, not without benefit, be applied to temper: “Stop hurrying and shouting and making haste, and you shall have what you want better and more easily!”

For if a father sees his son trying to cut something in two or to make a notch in it with a knife, he takes the knife himself and does it; so likewise, if reason takes upon itself the punishment which temper would inflict, it chastises the person who deserves it safely and harmlessly and for that person’s good, and does not, as temper often does, punish itself instead.\(^c\)

11. But however true it is that all the passions have need of a process of habituation, which tames as it were and subdues by rigorous training the irrational and obstinate element of the soul, there is no passion

\(^a\) Problemata, iii. 27 (875 a 34 ff.); cited by Stobaeus, iii. p. 551 ed. Hense.
\(^b\) Cf. Seneca, De Ira, iii. 5. 4.
\(^c\) Cf. Xenophon, Hellenica, v. 3. 7.
(459) ἐγγυμνάσασθαι τοῖς οἰκέταις ἦ πρὸς τὸν θυμόν. οὔτε γὰρ φθόνος οὔτε φόβος οὔτε φιλοτιμία τις ἐγγίνεται πρὸς αὐτούς. ὅργαι δὲ συνεχεῖς πολλὰ ποιοῦσαι προσκρούματα καὶ σφάλματα διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ὥστε ἐν ὀλισθηρῷ χωρίῳ, μηδὲν ἐν-ισταμένου μηδὲ κωλύνοντος, ὑποφέρουσιν. 1 οὐ γὰρ ἔστων ἀναμάρτητον ἐν πάθει τὸ ἀνυπεύθυνον κατα-σχεῖν, μὴ πολλῇ 2 τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐμπεριλαβόντα

C πραὸττη μηδὲ πολλὰς ὑπομείναντα φωνὰς γυναικὸς καὶ φίλων ἐγκαλοῦντων ἀτονίαν καὶ ῥαθυμίαν. οἷς μάλιστα παρωξυνόμην καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας ὡς τῷ-μὴ κολάζεσθαι διαφθειρομένους. ὡς μὲν-τοι συνεΐδον ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἐκείνους ἄνεξικακία
χείρονας ποιεῖν βελτίων ἔστων ἡ πικρία καὶ θυμῷ διαστρέφειν ἀπὸ τοῦν εἰς ἐτέρων ἐπανόρθωσιν ἐπειτα πολλοὺς ὁρῶν αὐτῷ τῷ μὴ κολάζεσθαι πολλάκις αἰδομένους κακοὺς εἶναι καὶ μεταβολῆς ἀρχὴν τὴν
συγγνώμην μᾶλλον ἤ τὴν τιμωρίαν λαμβάνοντας, καὶ νὰ Δία δουλεύοντας ἐτέρως ἀπὸ νεύματος

D σωπῇ 3 προθυμότερον ἢ μετὰ πληγῶν καὶ στιγ-μάτων ἐτέρως, ἐπειθόμην ἡγεμονίκωτερον εἶναι τοῦ
θυμοῦ τῶν λογισμῶν. οὐ γὰρ, ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς εἶπεν,

"ινα γὰρ δέος, ἐνθα καὶ αἴδως·

ἀλλὰ τούναντίον αἴδομένοις ὁ σωφρονίζων ἐγγίνε-

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1 ὑποφέρουσιν Reiske: ὑποφέρουσαι.
2 πολλῇ πολλὴν most mss.
3 καὶ after σωπῇ deleted by E. Schwartz after Hartmann.

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a Homer), Cypria, Frag. 20 ed. Kinkel; cf. Plutarch, 130
that we can better learn to control by practising on
servants than temper. For no envy or fear or rivalry
enters into our relations with them, but frequent
fits of anger bring about many conflicts and errors,
and because of the absolute power we possess, there
being no one to oppose or prevent us, these cause us
to slide and fall, since we are, as it were, on slippery
ground. For it is impossible that irresponsible power
under the influence of passion should be free from
error, unless he who wields this power shall encom-
pass it with a bulwark of gentleness, and shall hold
out against many pleas of wife and friends, all
charging him with laxity and easy-going ways. By
such charges I myself used to be very greatly ex-
asperated against my slaves, in the conviction that
they were being ruined by not being punished. At
long last, however, though late it was, I came to
perceive that, in the first place, it is better to make
them worse by forbearance than by harshness and
anger to pervert my own self for the correction of
the others. In the second place, when I observed
that many, just because they were not being pun-
ished, were often ashamed to be bad, and made
pardon, rather than correction, the starting-point
of reformation, and, I swear, performed their duties
more zealously for the kind of master who gave
orders silently with a nod than for the others who
used blows and branding-irons, I began to be con-
vinced that reason is more fit than anger to govern.
For it is not as the Poet a has said,

Where fear is, there is also reverence;
but, on the contrary, in those who revere there is
Life of Cleomenes, ix. (xxx.) (808 e); Plato, Euthyphro,
12 A-B.
(459) ταὶ φόβοι, ἡ δὲ συνεχὴς πληγὴ καὶ ἀπαραίτητος οὐ μετάνοιαν ἐμποιεῖ τοῦ κακουργεῖν ἄλλα τοῦ λανθάνειν πρόνοιαν μᾶλλον. τρίτον ἄεὶ μνημονεύων καὶ διανοούμενος πρὸς ἐμαυτόν, ὡς οὐθ' ὁ τοξεύειν ἡμᾶς διδάξας ἐκώλυσεν 1 βάλλειν ἄλλα μὴ διαμαρτάνειν, οὔτε τῷ κολάζειν ἐμποδὸν ἔσται τὸ διδάσκειν εὐκαίρως τοῦτο ποιεῖν καὶ μετρίως καὶ ὠφελίμως καὶ πρεπόντως, πειρῶμαι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀφαιρεῖν

Ε μάλιστα τῷ μὴ παραιρεῖσθαι τῶν κολαζομένων τὴν δικαιολογίαν ἅλλ’ ἀκούειν. ὃ τε γὰρ χρόνος ἐμποιεῖ τῷ πάθει διατριβήν καὶ μέλλησιν ἐκλύουσαν ἦ τε κρίσις εὐρίσκει καὶ τρόπον πρέποντα καὶ μέγεθος ἀρμόττον κολάζεως· ἔτι δ' οὐχ ὑπολείπεται πρόβασις τῷ διδόντι δίκην ἀντιτείνειν πρὸς τὴν ἑπανόρθωσιν, ἀν μὴ κατ' ὀργὴν ἅλλ' ἐξελεγχθεὶς κολάζηται· τὸ τ' 2 αἰσχρότον οὐ πρόσεστι, φαινεῖται δικαιότερα τοῦ δεσπότου λέγοντα τὸν οἰκέτην.

"Ωσπερ οὖν ὁ Φωκίων μετὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτήν οὐκ ἐὼν προεξανίστασθαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐδὲ ταχὺ πιστεύειν, "τ' σήμερον," εἶπεν, "ἀνδρεῖς Ἄθηναιοι, τεθνηκε, καὶ αὐριον ἔσται καὶ εἰς τρίτην τεθνηκόν"· οὔτως οἷμαι δεῖν ὑποβάλλειν ἑαυτῷ τὸν σπεύδοντα δι' ὀργὴν ἐπὶ τὴν τιμωρίαν, "εἰ σήμερον οὔτος ἡδίκηκε, καὶ αὐριον ἔσται καὶ εἰς τρίτην

1 ἐκώλυσε] ἐκέλευε Madvig.  
2 τ'] δ' most mss.  

a Cf. 451 e, supra.
engendered the kind of fear that corrects behaviour, whereas continual and unmerciful beating produces, not repentance for wrongdoing, but rather the far-sighted cunning to do wrong without detection. In the third place, I always keep in mind and reflect in privacy that he who taught us the use of the bow did not forbid us to shoot, but only to miss the mark, and that the infliction of punishment will not be hindered by our teaching how to inflict it at the right time, with moderation, and in a useful and suitable manner; and, remembering these things, I try to get rid of my anger, if possible, by not depriving those who are to be punished of the right to speak in their defence, but by listening to their plea. For both the passage of time gives a pause to passion and a delay which dissolves it, and also the judgement discovers a suitable manner of punishment and an adequate amount; furthermore, the man who suffers punishment has no pretext left for opposing the correction if punishment is inflicted, not in anger, but after the accused has been proved guilty; and finally, the most shameful thing is avoided—that the slave should seem to be making a juster plea than his master.

And so, just as Phocion after Alexander’s death, trying to keep the Athenians from revolting prematurely or believing the report too quickly, said to them, “If, men of Athens, he is dead to-day, he will be dead to-morrow also, and the day after”; in like manner, I think, the man who, urged on by anger, is in a hurry for vengeance, should suggest to himself, “If this person is guilty of wronging you to-day, he will still be guilty to-morrow also, and the day after;

\[\text{b} \quad \text{When it is really deserved.}
\\[\text{Cf. Life of Phocion, xxii. (751 e); Moralia, 188 d.}\]
ηδικηκώς: καὶ δεινὸν οὐδέν, εἰ δώσει δίκην βράδιον, ἀλλ’ εἰ ταχὺ παθὼν ἄει φανεῖταί μὴ ἀδικών: ὅπερ ἡδη συμβέβηκε πολλάκις.” τὸς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὗτο δεινὸς ἔστιν, ὡστε μαστιγοῦν καὶ κολάζειν δοῦλον, 460 ὅτι πέμπτην ἥ δεκάτην ἡμέραν προσέκαυσε τούριν ἢ κατέβαλε τὴν τράπεζαν ἢ βράδιον ὑπῆκουσε; καὶ μὴν ταῦτ’ ἔστιν ἐφ’ οἷς εὐθὺς γενομένους καὶ προσφάτους οὕσι παρατόμεθα καὶ πικρῶς καὶ ἀ-παραίτήτως ἔχομεν. ὡς γὰρ δ’ ὁμίχλης τὰ σῶματα, καὶ δ’ ὀργῆς τὰ πράγματα μείζονα φαίνεται.

Διὸ δεῖ ταχὺ συμμηνίμονευεῖν τῶν ὁμοίων, καὶ τοῦ πάθους ἐξωθεῖν οὐντας ἀνυπόπτως, ἀν καθαρῷ τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ καθεστώτι φαίνεται μοχθηρόν, ἐπιστραφῆναι καὶ μῷ προέσθαι τότε μηδ’ ἀφεῖναι τὴν κόλασιν, ὡσπερ σπιτίου ἀνορέκτους γεγονότας. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως αὐτίον ἔστι τοῦ παροῦσης ὀργῆς Β κολάζεως, ὡς τὸ παυσαμένης μὴ κολάζειν ἀλλ’ ἐκκλεύσθαι, καὶ ταυτὸν πεπονθέναι τοῖς ἄργοις κωπηλάταις, οἱ γαλήνης ὀρμοῦσι εἶτα κινδυνεύουσιν ἀνέμου πλέοντες. καὶ γὰρ ημεῖς τοῦ λογιςμοῦ κατεγνωκότες ἀτονίαν καὶ μαλακίαν ἐν τῷ κολάζεως, σπεύδομεν παρόντι τῷ θυμῷ καθάπερ πνεύματι παραβόλως. τροφὴ μὲν γὰρ ὁ πεινῶν κατὰ φύσιν χρῆται, τιμωρία δ’ ὁ μὴ πεινῶν μηδὲ δυσμὸν αὐτῆς, μηδ’ ὡσπερ ὁψον πρὸς τὸ κολάζει τοῦ θυμοῦ δεόμενος, ἀλλ’ ὅταν πορρωτάτω τοῦ

1 ἄει φανεῖται] ἀναφανεῖται Madvig.
2 οὐντας Benseler: οὔτα.
3 σπιτίον] σπίτιον in some mss.
4 ὀρμοῦσι] ὀρμῶσι most mss.
5 δ’] δὲ δικαία Capps: “a just punishment is” etc.
no harm will be done if he shall be punished somewhat late, but if he is punished in haste he will always be thought to have suffered without offending; and this has happened many times in the past.” For which of us is so harsh that he scourges and chastises a slave because five or ten days ago he overroasted the meat or upset the table or came too slowly at our bidding? And yet these are the very things which cause us to be excited and in a cruel and implacable mood at the moment they happen and are still fresh in our memory. For as the shapes of persons seen through a fog, so things seen through a mist of rage appear greater than they are.

These are the reasons why we should immediately call to mind such instances and precepts; and when we are free from all suspicion of passion, if the offence still appears evil to the clear and settled judgement, we should attend to it then and not dismiss or abandon the punishment, as we leave food when we have lost our appetite. And nothing is so much the cause of our punishing in a rage as that, when our anger is over, we do not punish, but leave things alone. We are very much like lazy oarsmen, who during calm weather lie in port, and later, at the risk of their lives, avail themselves of a wind to go sailing. And so do we condemn reason for remissness and softness in punishment and hasten on to the deed rashly and to our peril when anger, like a gale, is upon us. For while a hungry man indulges in food as nature dictates, yet punishment is indulged in by one who is not hungry or thirsty for it, nor does he need anger as a relish to stimulate him to punish; on the contrary, when he finds himself very far removed from the desire to
(460) ὁρέγεσθαι γένηται προσάγων τὸν λογισμὸν ἀναγ-καίως. οὐ γάρ, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης ἱστορεῖ κατ’ αὐτὸν ἐν Τυρρηνίᾳ μαστιγοῦσθαι τοὺς οἰκέτας πρὸς αὐλόν, οὕτω πρὸς ἰδινὴν δεὶ καθάπερ ἀπολαύσματος ὁρέξει τῆς τιμωρίας ἐμφορεῖσθαι καὶ χαίρειν κολάξοντας, κολάσαντας δὲ1 μετανοεῖν: ὥν τὸ μὲν θηριώδες τὸ δὲ γυναικώδες· ἀλλὰ καὶ λύπης καὶ ἰδινῆς χωρίς εἰν τῷ τοῦ λογισμοῦ χρόνῳ τὴν δίκην κομίζεσθαι2 μὴ ὑπολείποντας3 τῷ θυμῷ πρόφασιν.

12. Αὐτῇ μὲν οὖν ἐκεῖ οὐκ ὄργης ἰατρεία φανεῖται, διάκρουσις δὲ καὶ φυλακὴ τῶν εἰν ὀργῇ τυφεῖς ἀμαρτημάτων. καὶ τοῖς καὶ σπλήνος οἴδημα σύμπτωμα μὲν ἐστὶ πυρετοῦ πραϋνόμενον δὲ κουφίζει D τὸν πυρετὸν, ὡς φησι ʼΙερώνυμος. ἀλλ’ αὐτῇς γε τῆς ὀργῆς ἀναθεωρῶν τὴν γένεσιν ἄλλους ὑπ’ ἄλλων αἰτιῶν ἐμπίπτοντας εἰς αὐτὴν ἐώρων, οἰς ἐπιεικῶς ἀπασὶ δόξα τοῦ καταφρονεῖσθαι καὶ ἀμελεῖσθαι παραγίνεται. διὸ καὶ τοῖς παραιτομένοις ὀργὴν δεὶ βοηθεῖν πορρωτάτῳ τῇ πράξει ὀλγωρίας ἀπ’ ἀγοντας καὶ θρασύτητος, εἰς ἀγνοιαν4 ἢ ἀνάγκην ἢ πάθος ἢ δυστυχίαν τιθεμένους: ὡς Σοφοκλῆς, ἀλλ’ οὐ γάρ,5 ὅναξ, οὐδ’ ὡς ἀν βλάστη μένει νοῦς τοῖς κακῶς πράξασιν,6 ἀλλ’ ἐξίσταται.

1 κολάσαντας δὲ Reiske, confirmed by the Syriac version: eīta or δὲ in some mss.; most omit.
2 κομίζεσθαι Reiske: κολάζεσθαι.
3 ὑπολείποντας Bernardakis: ὑπολείποντα or -ος.
5 ἀλλ’ οὐ γάρ] οὐ γάρ ποτ’ mss. of Sophocles.
6 πράξασιν] πράσσονσιν mss. of Sophocles.

* Frag. 608 ed. Rose.
* Cf. Moralia, 550 e, where the whole context may be
punish, he brings up reason to reinforce him and
punishes under compulsion. Aristotle\(^a\) relates that
in Etruria in his day slaves were scourged to the
music of pipes. But one should not, in that spirit,
through a craving for the punishment as for a kind of
enjoyment, gorge oneself with it, and rejoice while
inflicting chastisement and after inflicting it repent\(^b\)
—of these the first is bestial, the second womanish—
but without either sorrow or pleasure one should mete
out punishment in reason's own good time, leaving
anger no excuse.

12. However this, perhaps, will not appear to be a
cure for anger, but a temporary reprieve and prophy-
lactic\(^c\) against those errors which some men commit
in anger. And yet, though the swelling of the spleen
is but a symptom of fever, reducing it assuages the
fever, as Hieronymus says. But when I contem-
plated the origin of anger itself, I observed that
different persons are liable to anger from different
causes; yet in the case of practically all of them there
is present a belief that they are being despised or
neglected\(^d\). For this reason we should assist those
who endeavour to avoid anger, by removing as far as
possible the act that rouses wrath from any suspicion
of contempt or arrogance and by imputing it to
ignorance or necessity or emotion or mischance. So
Sophocles\(^e\):

O king, not even the reason Nature gives
Stays with the unfortunate, but goes astray;

compared with this chapter. See also Seneca, *De Ira*, i.
17-18.

\(^a\) For the phrase cf. *Moralia*, 420 ε.
\(^b\) Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, ii. 3 (1380 a 8 ff.).
\(^c\) Antigoné, 563-564; quoted with the same textual variants
in the *Life of Phocion*, i. (742 Α).
καὶ τῆς Βρυσιδίδος τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν εἰς τὴν "Αθη
Ε ἀναφέρων ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων, ὁμως

ἀψ ἐθέλων ἀρέσαι, δόμεναι τ᾽ ἀπερείσι ἀποινα.

καὶ γὰρ τὸ δεῖον τοῦ μὴ καταφρονοῦντος ἐστιν,
καὶ ταπεινὸς φανείς ὁ ἀδικήσας ἐλυσε τὴν τῆς
οὐραγορίας δόξαν. οὐ δὲ ἡ ταῦτα περιμένειν τὸν
ὀργιζόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Διογένους, "οὐτοῖς οὐ κατα
gαλωθῶν, ὁ Διόγενες"... "ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὐ κατα-
geλώμαι," λαμβάνει ἔαυτῷ, καὶ καταφρονεῖσθαι
μὴ νομίζειν ἀλλὰ μάλλον ἐκεῖνον καταφρονεῖν, ὡς
δὴ ἀσθενεῖαν ἡ ἡ προπέτειν ἡ ῥαθυμίαν ἡ ἀνελευ-
θερίαν ἡ γήρας ἡ νεότητα πλημμελοῦντος. οἰ-
kέταις δὲ καὶ φίλους ἀφετέον τὸ τοιοῦτο παντά-

πασιν. οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἀδυνάτων οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἀπράκτων,
ἀλλὰ δὴ ἐπιείκειαν ἡ δὴ εὐνοιαν οἱ μὲν ὡς χρηστῶν
οἱ δ᾽ ὡς φιλούντων καταφρονοῦσι. νυνὶ δ᾽ οὐ μόνον
πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ δούλους καὶ φίλους ὡς κατα-
φρονοῦμεν οἱ διαχέως ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παιδοκεῦσι
καὶ ναύταις καὶ ὀρεικώμοις μεθύοσι πολλάκις ὑπ᾽
ὁργῆς συμπίπτομεν οἴομενοι καταφρονεῖσθαι, καὶ

κυσίν ὕλακτοὺς καὶ ὅνοις ἔμβαλλουσι χαλεπαῖ-

νομεὼν ὡς ἑκεῖνος ὁ βουλόμενος τύπτειν τὸν ὄν-
ηλατήν, εἰτ᾽ ἀνακραγόντος ὅτι "Ἀθηναῖος εἰμι,
"οὐ δὲ γ' οὐκ εἰ Ἀθηναῖος," τὸν ὄνον λέγων,
ἐτυπτε καὶ πολλὰς ἐνεφόρει πληγάς.

1 ἐθέλω D: ἐθέλει or ἐθέλειν.
2 ἡ πλημμέλειαν before ἡ deleted by Stegmann, confirmed by one ms. and the Syriac version.
3 δὲ γ' Cobet and van Herwerden: μὲν, δὲ, or δὲ μὲν.

a Homer, Π., xix. 138.
ON THE CONTROL OF ANGER, 460–461

and so likewise Agamemnon ascribes the taking away of Briseis to divine infatuation:

I wish again to make amends, to give You countless ransom.

Supplication, indeed, is the act of one who does not despise; and when he that has done an injury shows himself humble, he removes all notion of contempt. But the man in a rage should not wait for such humility, but should take to himself the reply of Diogenes: when someone said to him, "They are laughing at you, Diogenes," he answered, "But I am not laughed down." Just so the angry man should not consider himself despised, but rather despise the man who gave the offence as acting from weakness or rashness, carelessness or illiberality, dotage or childishness. But such a notion must not on any account be entertained toward servants or friends; for our servants presume on our upright character, our friends on our affection, and both disregard us, not as being impotent or ineffectual, but because of our reasonableness or our goodwill. As it is, thinking ourselves despised, we not only treat harshly wife and slaves and friends, but also through rage often fall out with innkeepers and sailors and drunken muleteers; we even rage against dogs that bark at us and asses that jostle us, like the man who wished to beat the ass-driver, but when the driver cried out, "I am an Athenian," indicated the ass and said, "You at any rate are not an Athenian," and fell to beating it with many blows.

Cf. Life of Fabius Maximus, x. (179 r); Diogenes Laertius, vi. 54.

Cf. Plato, Republic, 563 c.
(461) 13. Καὶ μὴν τὰς γε συνεχεῖς καὶ πυκνὰς καὶ κατὰ μικρόν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ συνελεγμένας ὅργας μάλιστα φιλαυτία καὶ δυσκολία μετὰ τρυφῆς καὶ μαλακίας οἶον σμῆνος ἤ σφηκιάν ἤμιν ἐντύκτουσι. διὸ μείζον οὖθεν εὐκολίας καὶ ἀφελείας ἐφόδιον εἰς πραότητα πρὸς οἰκέτας καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ φίλους τῷ δυναμένῳ συμφέρεσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ μὴ δεο-

1 ἢρτυμένους ἔχαρεν Meineke: ἢρτυμένους χαῖρων.

2 οὖθεν Stegmann: οὔτε.

3 τοῖς... ὑπηρέταις in most mss.

4 φλεγμοναῖς Syriac version and some mss.: φλεγμαίνων ορ φλεγμονών.

5 ἦ before προσκρουμάτων deleted by Salmاسius.
ON THE CONTROL OF ANGER, 461

13. Furthermore it is especially selfishness and peevishness, together with luxury and softness, which beget in us those continuous or oft-recurring fits of anger that are gathered together in the soul little by little, like a swarm of bees or wasps. And so there is nothing more conducive to gentleness than graciousness and simplicity toward servants and wife and friends if a man is able to get along with what comforts he has and is in no need of many superfluities:

But he who liked his meat not overdone
Nor underdone, nor medium, nor boiled
Too much: and liked no food enough to praise a

who will drink no wine if there is no snow with it, b nor eat bread purchased in the market, nor touch food served on cheap or earthenware dishes, nor sleep upon a bed that does not billow like the sea stirred to its depths; he who with rods and blows makes his servants at table hasten about running and crying out and sweating as though they were bringing poultices for boils, c such a man is enslaved to an impotent, querulous, and discontented mode of life. His many shocks of anger are like a chronic cough by which he reduces himself to a condition where anger becomes a running sore. We must, therefore, accustom the body to contentment by plain living and to self-sufficiency, for those who need but little are not disappointed of much.

And, to begin with our food, it is no great hardship

 b Cf. Seneca, De Ira, ii. 25. 4.
 c A matter evidently requiring urgent haste.

dρδαμενος Reiske: dρδαμενον.
(461) σιωπη χρήσασθαι τοῖς παρατυχάνοντι, καὶ μὴ πολλὰ χολομένους¹ καὶ δυσκολαίνοντας ἀπερπε- 
στατον ὦφον ἐμβαλεῖν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ φίλους τὴν 
ὀργήν.

dόρπον δ' οὐκ αὖ πως ἀχαρίστερον ἀλλο γένοιτο,
διὰ πρόσκαμοιν ἥ καπνὸν ἥ ἄλων ἐνδειαν ἥ ψυχρό- 
tερον ἄρτον οἰκετῶν τυπτομένων καὶ λοιδορομε- 
μένης γυναικός.

D 'Αρκεσιλάοι δὲ μετὰ ξένων τινῶν ἐστιώντος τοὺς 
φίλους παρετέθη τὸ δείπνον, ἄρτοι δὲ οὐκ ἦσαν 
ἀμελησάντων πρίασθαι τῶν παιδῶν. ἐφ' ώ τίς οὐκ 
ἂν ἡμῶν διέστησε τοὺς τοίχους κεκραγὼς; ὁ δὲ 
μειδιάσας, "οἱν ἐστιν," ἐφη, "τὸ συμποτικὸν 
eἶναι τὸν σοφὸν."

Τοὺ δὲ Σωκράτους ἐκ παλαίστρας παραλαβόντος 
tὸν Εὐθύδημο, η Ἐανθίππη μετ' ὀργῆς ἐπιστάσα 
καὶ λοιδορηθεῖσα τέλος ἀνέτρεψε τὴν τράπεζαν, ὁ 
δ' Εὐθύδημος ἐξαναστάς ἀπῆι περίλυπος γενό- 
μενος· καὶ ο Σωκράτης, "παρὰ σοι δ'," εἶπεν, 
"οὐ πρώην ὃρνς τις ἐισπτάσα ταῦτα τοῦτ' 
ἐποίησεν, ἴμμεις δ' οὐκ ἤγανακτήσαμεν;"

Ε Δεὶ γὰρ σὺν εὐκολία καὶ γέλωτι καὶ φιλοφροσύνῃ 
tοὺς φίλους δέχεσθαι, μὴ τὰς ὁφρῶς συνάγοντας 
μηδὲ φρίκην καὶ τρόμον ἐμβάλλοντας τοῖς ὑπ- 
ηρετοῦσιν. ἔθιστεν δὲ καὶ σκεύεσιν εὐκόλους 
ὀμιλεῖν ἀπασί καὶ μὴ τῷ δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ τῷ δὲ χρήσαν· 
καθάπερ ἔνιοι πολλῶν παρόντων ἐν ἐξελόμενοι

¹ χολομένους] φοβουμένους many mss.; ἀσχολομένουs Madvig.
if we partake in silence of whatever is set before us and do not, by being repeatedly choleric and peevish, thrust upon ourselves and our friends the worst sauce for meat, anger.

No more unpleasant supper could there be than that wherein servants are beaten and wife is reviled because something is burned or smoked or not salted enough, or because the bread is too cold.

Arcesilaüs was once entertaining his friends and with them some foreign guests, and when dinner was served, there was no bread, since the slaves had neglected to buy any. In such a predicament which one of us would not have rent the walls asunder with outcries? But Arcesilaüs merely smiled and said, "How lucky it is that the wise man takes to the flowing bowl!"

Once when Socrates took Euthydemus home with him from the palaestra, Xanthippé came up to them in a rage and scolded them roundly, finally upsetting the table. Euthydemus, deeply offended, got up and was about to leave when Socrates said, "At your house the other day did not a hen fly in and do precisely this same thing, yet we were not put out about it?"

For we should receive our friends affably and with laughter and cheerful friendliness, not with frowning brows, or striking fear and trembling into our servants. We must, further, accustom ourselves to make cheerful use of any kind of table utensils and not to prefer this service to that, as some men do

— There being no bread for the deipnon, the symposium will come earlier.
— Cf. 471 b, infra, of Pittacus.
κανθάριον, ὡς Μάριον ἱστοροῦσιν, ἦ ῥυτὸν 1 οὐκ ἂν ἐτέρω πίοιεν. οὔτω δὲ καὶ πρὸς ληκύθους ἔχουσι καὶ πρὸς στλεγγίδας, ἀγαπῶντες ἐκ πασῶν μίαν· εὖδ’ οταν συντριβῇ τι τούτων ἦ ἀπόληται, βαρέως φέρουσι καὶ κολάζουσιν. ἀφεκτέον οὖν τῷ πρὸς ὀργὴν φαύλως ἔχοντι καὶ τῶν σπανίων καὶ περιττῶν, οἷον ἐκπωμάτων καὶ σφραγίδων καὶ λίθων Ρ' πολυτελῶν· ἐξίστησι γὰρ ἀπολλύμενα μᾶλλον τῶν εὐπορίστων καὶ συνήθων. διὸ καὶ τοῦ Νέρωνος ὁκτάγωνον τινα σκηνήν ὑπερφυὲς κάλλει καὶ πολυτελεῖα. θέαμα κατασκευάσαντος, " ἡλέγξας," ἐφη ὁ Σενέκας, "πένητα σεαυτόν· ἐὰν γὰρ ταύτην 462 ἀπολέσῃς, ἐτέραν οὐ κτήσῃ τοιαύτην." καὶ μέντοι καὶ συνέπεσε τοῦ πλοίου καταδύντος ἀπολέσθαι τὴν σκηνήν· ὦ δὲ Νέρων ἀναμνησθεὶς τοῦ Σενέκα μετριῶτερον ἦνεγκεν.

'Ἡ δὲ πρὸς τὰ πράγματ' εὐκολία καὶ πρὸς οἰκέτας εὐκολον ποιεὶ καὶ πρᾶον· εὶ δὲ πρὸς οἰκέτας, ἥδιον ὅτι καὶ πρὸς φίλους καὶ πρὸς ἀρχομένους. ὀρῷμεν δὲ καὶ δουλός νεωνήτους περὶ τοῦ πριαμένου πυθανομένους, οὐκ εἰ δεισιδαίμων οὐδ’ εἰ φθονερὸς ἄλλ’ εἰ θυμώδης· καὶ οἶλως σὺν ὀργῇ μηδὲ σωφροσύνην ἄνδρας γυναικῶν μηδ’ ἔρωτα γυναῖκας ἄνδρῶν ὑπομενειν δυναμένας μηδὲ συνήθειαν ἄλληλοιν φίλους. οὕτως οὔτε γάμος οὔτε φιλία μετ’ ὀργῆς

1 ἦ ῥυτὸν Basel ed.: νήρυτον.

who select one goblet or horn out of the many they have, and will drink from no other, as they relate of Marius. Some have this same feeling about oil-flasks and strigils, of which they have a liking for but one out of many; and so when one of these preferred objects is broken or lost, they take it hard and punish severely. Therefore anyone who is prone to anger should abstain from rare and curiously wrought things, like drinking-cups and seal-rings and precious stones; for their loss drives their owner out of his senses more than do objects which are easily procured and may be seen everywhere. This is the reason why, when Nero had had an octagonal tent built, a huge structure which was a sight to be seen because of its beauty and costliness, Seneca remarked, “You have proved yourself a poor man, for if you ever lose this you will not have the means to procure another like it.” And indeed it did so happen that the ship which conveyed it was sunk and the tent lost. But Nero remembered Seneca’s saying and bore his loss with greater moderation.

A cheerful behaviour toward the affairs of life makes a master cheerful and gentle toward his slaves also; and if to slaves, he will evidently be so to his friends as well as to those who are subject to his rule. And in fact we observe that newly purchased slaves inquire about their new master, not whether he is superstitious or envious, but whether he is ill-tempered; and, speaking generally, we see that if anger is present in a home, husbands cannot endure even their wives’ chastity, nor wives even their husbands’ love, nor friends even familiar intercourse with one another. Thus neither marriage nor friendship is tolerable if anger is there, but without anger even
14. Δει δὴ μήτε παίζοντας αὕτη διδόναι τόπον, εὔθραν γὰρ ἐπάγει τῇ φιλοφροσύνῃ. μήτε κοινολογομένους, φιλονεικίαν γὰρ ἐκ φιλολογίας ἀπεργάζεται. μήτε δικάζοντας, ὑβριν γὰρ τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ οὑς προστίθεναι. μήτε πάθεισθαι, ἀθυμίαν γὰρ ἐμποιεῖ καὶ μυσολογίαν ὡφτε ἐντυχοῦντας, αὔξει γὰρ τὸν φθόνον. μήτε δυστυχοῦντας, ἀφαιρεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἔλεον, όταν δυσκολαίνωσι καὶ μάχωται τοὺς συναχθόμενους. ὡς ὁ Πρίαμος

ἐρρετε, λωβητήρες, ἐλεγχέες· οὔ νῦ καὶ ύμῖν οἶκοι ἐστὶ γόος, ὅτι μὴ ἔλθετε κηδήσοντες;

ἡ δ' εὐκολία τοῖς μὲν βοηθεῖ τὰ δ' ἐπικοσμεῖ τὰ δὲ συνήδυνε, περιγίνεται δὲ τῇ πραότητι καὶ θυμῷ καὶ δυσκολίας ἀπάσης. ὡσπερ Εὐκλείδης, τοῦ ἅδελφου πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκ διαφορᾶς εἰπόντος, "ἀπολοίμην, εἰ μὴ σε τιμωρησαίμην," "ἐγὼ δὲ," φήσας, "ἀπολοίμην, εἰ μὴ σε πείσαιμι," διέτρεψε

D παραχρῆμα καὶ μετέθηκε. Πολέμων δὲ, λοιδοροῦντος αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπου φιλολόθου καὶ περὶ σφρα-

1 οἶκοι omitted by all mss. except G.
2 ἐστι] ἐνεστὶ most mss. of Homer.

a Choreius and Lyaeus, epithets of Dionysus.
b A town on the Corinthian Gulf in Phocis, famous for its hellebore; see Rolfe's note on Aulus Gellius, xvii. 15. 6 (L.C.L., vol. iii. p. 260).

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drunkenness is easily borne. For the wand of Dionysus suffices to punish the drunkard, unless hot temper is added and makes the undiluted drink a cause of savagery and madness instead of a dispeller of care and an inspirer of the dance.\(^a\) Madness pure and simple can indeed be cured by Anticyra\(^b\); but if madness is mingled with anger, it produces tragedies and tales of horror.

14. Surely we should allow no place to anger even in jest, for that brings enmity in where friendliness was; nor in learned discussions, for that turns love of learning into strife; nor when rendering judgement, for that adds insolence to authority; nor in teaching, for that engenders discouragement and hatred of learning; nor in prosperity, for that increases envy; nor in adversity, for that drives away compassion when men become irritable and quarrel with those who sympathize with them, as Priam\(^c\) did:

Be gone, you wretched, shameful men! Have you
No cause for grief at home that you have come
To trouble me?

But a cheerful disposition in some circumstances is helpful, others it adorns, and still others it helps to sweeten; by its gentleness it overcomes both anger and all moroseness. Thus Eucleides,\(^d\) when his brother said to him after a quarrel, "Damned if I don't get even with you!" answered, "But as for me, may I be damned if I don't convince you!" and so at once turned him from his purpose and won him over. And Polemon, when a man who was fond of precious stones and quite mad about expensive seal-

\(^a\) Homer, \textit{Il.}, xxiv. 239-240.
\(^b\) Cf. 489 \textit{d}, \textit{infra}.
(462) γίδια πολυτελῆ νοσοῦντος, ἀπεκρίνατο μὲν οὐδὲν τῶν σφραγιῶν δ' ἐνι προσεῖχε τὸν νοῦν καὶ κατεμάνθανεν· ἥσθεις οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, "μὴ οὕτως," εἶπεν "ὡς Πολέμων, ἀλλ' ὑπ' αὐγάς θεῶ, καὶ πολὺ σοι βέλτιον φανεῖται." ὁ δ' Ἀρίστιτππος, ὁργῆς αὐτῷ πρὸς Αἰσχύνην γενομένης καὶ τινὸς εἰπόντος, "ὡς Ἀρίστιππε, ποῦ ὑμῶν ἡ φιλία;" "καθεύδει," φησίν, "ἐγώ δ' αὐτήν ἐγερῶ"· καὶ τῷ Αἰσχύνη προσελθὼν εἶπεν, "οὕτω σοι δοκῶ παντάπασιν ἀτυχῆς τις εἶναι καὶ ἀνήκεστος, ὥστε Ε μὴ νοσθείας τυχεῖν;" ὁ δ' Αἰσχύνης, "οὐδὲν," ἔφη, "θαυμαστόν, εἰ πρὸς πάντα μου τῇ φύσει διαφέρων κάνταθα τὸ δέον πρότερος συνείδες."

καὶ γὰρ κάπροι φρίξαιχεν' οὐ μόνον γυνῆ, παῖς δ' ἂν νεογνός χειρὶ προσκήνηθων νέᾳ κλίνοι1 παλαιστοῖ παντὸς εὐμαρέστερον.

ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἀγριαίοντα τιθασεύομεν ζῶα καὶ πραφ- νομεν, λυκιδείς καὶ σκύμνους λεόντων ἐν ταῖς ἀγκάλαις περιφέροντες, εἰτα τέκνα καὶ φίλους καὶ συνήθεις ἐκβάλλομεν ὑπ' ὀργῆς· οἰκέτας δὲ καὶ πολίταις2 τὸν θυμὸν ὦσπερ θηρίον ἐφίεμεν· οὐ καλός Φ ὑποκοριζόμενοι μισοπονηρίαν, ἀλλ'3 ὦσπερ, οἴμαι, τῶν ἀλλῶν παθῶν τῆς4 ψυχῆς καὶ νοσημάτων τὸ μὲν πρόνοιαν τὸ δ' ἐλευθεριότητα τὸ δ' εὔσεβειαν καλοῦντες οὐδενός ἀπαλλαγῆναι δυνάμεθα.

15. Καίτοι, καθάπερ ὁ Ζήνων ἔλεγε τὸ σπέρμα

1 κλίνοι Nauck: κλίναι.
2 πελάταις Kronenberg.
3 ἀλλ'] Reiske would delete.
4 τῆς omitted in most mss.
rings reviled him. made no answer, but fixed his gaze on one of the seal-rings and eyed it closely. The man, accordingly, was pleased and said to him, "Do not look at it in this light, Polemon, but under the sun's rays, and it will appear to you far more beautiful." Aristippus, again, when anger had arisen between him and Aeschines and someone said, "Where now, Aristippus, is the friendship of you two?" replied, "It is asleep, but I shall awaken it"; and, going to Aeschines, he said, "Do I appear to you so utterly unfortunate and incurable as not to receive correction from you?" And Aeschines replied, "No wonder if you, who are naturally superior to me in all things, should in this matter also have discerned before I did the right thing to do."

For not a woman only, even a child,
Tickling the bristly boar with tender hand,
May throw him easier than a wrestler might.  

But we who tame wild beasts and make them gentle
and carry about in our arms young wolves and lions' cubs, then under the impulse of rage cast off children, friends, and companions and let loose our wrath, like some wild beast, on servants and fellow-citizens—we, I say, do not well to use a cozening word for our anger by calling it "righteous indignation," but it is with anger, I believe, as with the other passions and diseases of the soul: we can rid ourselves of none of them by calling one "foresight," another "liberality," another "piety."

15. And yet, as Zeno used to say that the seed

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b Cf. 482 c, infra.  
c Cf. 456 f, 449 A, supra.  
σύμμυγμα καὶ κέρασμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων ὑπάρχειν ἀπεσπασμένον, οὕτως ἐσικε τῶν παθῶν 463 πανσερμία τις ὁ θυμὸς εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ λύπης ἀπεσπασται καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ ὑβρεως, καὶ φθόνον μὲν ἔχει τὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν, φθόνου δὲ καὶ χείρων ἐστὶν· ἀγωνίζεται γὰρ, οὐχὶ μὴ παθεῖν αὐτὸς, ἄλλα παθεῖν κακῶς ἐπιτρύφας ἔτερον· ἐπιθυμίας δ' αὐτῷ τὸ ἀτερπέστατον ἐμπέθυκεν, εἴ γε δὴ τοῦ λυπεῖν ἔτερον ὀρεξίς ἐστιν. διὸ τῶν μὲν ἀσώτων ταῖς οἰκίαις προσώπεις αὐλητρίδος ἀκούομεν ἐωθινῆς, καὶ "πηλὸν," ὡς τις εἶπεν, "οἶνον καὶ σπαράγματα στεφάνων," καὶ κραπαλώντας ὀρῶμεν ἐπὶ θύραις ἀκολούθους· τὰ δὲ τῶν πικρῶν ἐκκαλύμβωμα² καὶ δυσκόλων ἐν τοῖς προσώποις τῶν οἰκετῶν ὦψει καὶ τοῖς στίγμασι καὶ ταῖς πέδαις·

ἀεὶ δ' ἀοιδῶν μοῦνος ἐν στέγαις ὀργίλου ἄνδρος

κωκυτῶς ἐμπέπτωκε,

μαστιγομένων ἐνδον οἰκονόμων καὶ στρεβλουμένων θεραπαινίδων, ὡστε τοῦ θυμοῦ τὰς λύπας ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς οἰκτίρειν ὀρώντας.

16. Οὔ μὴν ἀλλ' ὃς ὁ συμβαίνει διὰ μισοπονηρίαν ἀληθῶς ἀλίσκεσθαι πολλάκις ὑπ' ὀργῆς, τὸ ἁγαν ἀφαιρετέον αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ ἀκρατον ἀμα τῇ σφοδρᾷ πίστει περὶ τῶν συνόντων. αὐτῇ γὰρ αὔξει

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¹ φθόνου] most mss. have φόνον; G φόβον.

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ᵃ Cf. Sophocles, Frag. 783 ed. Pearson, with the notes ad loc.
ᵇ Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag.², p. 913, ades. 387; quoted more completely in 518 b-c, infra.

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was a mixture and compound drawn from all the faculties of the soul, so temper appears to be a mixture of seeds drawn from all the passions. For it is drawn from pain and pleasure, and from insolence; and although it has envy’s malicious joy in the ills of others, it is even worse than envy; for the object of its striving is, not that it may itself avoid suffering evil, but that at the cost of suffering evil, it may utterly ruin its antagonist; and the most unlovely kind of desire is innate in it, inasmuch as it is a craving to pain someone else. And that is why, when we approach the houses of profligates, we hear a flute-girl still playing in the early morning, and we see “muddy dregs of wine,” as someone has said, “and mangled fragments of garlands,” and tipsy servants reeling at the doors; but the tokens of savage and irascible men you will see on the faces of their servants and in the marks branded upon them and their fetters.

The only music heard within the house of an angry man

Is wailing cries,

as the stewards are being lashed within and the serving-maids being tortured, so that those who witness the anguish caused by anger in gratifying its desires and ministering to its pleasures must feel pity.

16. However, those of whom it is true that righteous indignation causes them frequently to be overwhelmed by anger should get rid of its excessive and violent form, together with their extreme confidence in those with whom they live. For such

* Cf. Plato, Phaedo, 89 d.
“Nothing fans the flame of human resentment so much as the discovery that one’s bosom has been utilized as a snake sanatorium.”—H. H. Monro.

"Epistle xiii. 360 c; cf. 474 e, infra, and Moralia, 533 b-c

dedwós dē légy tauta, óti úpér ánthrṓpov dóxan ápophaiôtmata, ou fainou lógu allo euμεταβολον: “This, however, I say with trepidation, since I am uttering an opinion about 152
confidence more than any other cause increases the
spirit of wrath, when, for example, one who has been
accounted honourable proves to be base, or one
whom we have supposed a true friend quarrels and
finds fault with us. As for my own temperament,
you doubtless know how strong are the impulses
which incline it to be of goodwill toward my fellow-
men and to trust them. Consequently, like men
who attempt to walk on empty air, the more I give
myself up to loving a person the more I go astray, and
when I stumble and fall, the greater my distress; and
although I may no longer be able to reduce my too
great propensity and eagerness to love, yet I may
perhaps be able to use Plato’s caution as a curb
against excessive trust. For Plato says that he praises
Helicon the mathematician in such terms as he uses because man is by nature an animal readily subject
to change; and that he does well to fear those who
have been educated in the city lest, being men and
the seeds of men, they may reveal somewhere the
weakness inherent in their nature. But when
Sophocles says

Search out most human traits; you’ll find them base,
he seems to go too far in trampling upon and belittling
us. This peevish and censorious judgement does,
however, tend to make us more considerate in our
outbursts of temper; for it is the sudden and the
unexpected that throw men off their bearings. a

a man, and man, though not a worthless, is an inconstant
creature.”—(Bury in L.C.L.)

d Cf. Plato, Laws, § 33 c.

e Frag. 533 ed. Pearson: Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. 2,
p. 311, Frag. 769; quoted again in 481 f, infra.

f Cf. 449 e, supra.
καὶ Παναίτιος ἔφη, χρήσθαι τῷ 'Αναξαγόρου,1 καὶ καθάπερ ἐκείνος ἐπὶ τῇ τελευτῇ τοῦ παιδὸς εἶπεν, "ἡδείν ὦτι θυητὸν ἐγέννησα," τούτῳ τοῖς παροξύνενοις ἐκάστοτε ἐπιφωνεῖν ἀμαρτήμασιν, "ἡδείν ὦτι σοφὸν οὐκ ἐπριάμῃ δοῦλον," "ἡδείν ὦτι ἀναμάρτητον φίλον3 οὐκ ἐκτησάμην," "ἡδείν ὦτι τὴν γυναῖκα γυναίκῃ εἶχον." ἄν δὲ κάκειν ὁι τοῖς ἐπιφθεγγόμενοι ἀεὶ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, "ἡ ποι ἄρ' ἐγὼ τοιοῦτος;" ἔξωθεν εἰσώ τὸν λογισμὸν ἀναστρέφῃ καὶ παρεμβάλλῃ ταῖς μέμψεις τὴν εὐλάβειαν, οὐ πολλῇ χρήσται μισοπονηρία πρὸς ἐτέρους πολλῆς ὀρῶν ἐαυτοῦ συγγνώμης δεόμενον. νῦν ὁ ἐκάστος ἡμῶν ὀργιζόμενος καὶ κολάζων 'Αριστείδου φωνὰς ἐπιφέρει καὶ Κάτωνος, "μὴ κλέπτε," "μὴ ψεύδο," "διὰ τὰ ῥαθυμεῖς;" καὶ ὁ δὴ πάντων αἰσχιστὸν ἔστιν, ὀργιζομένους ἐπιτιμώμεν μετ' ὀργής καὶ τὰ διὰ τυμὸν ἡμαρτημένα Θυμών κολάζομεν, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἰατροὶ

πικρῶ πικρὰν κλύζουσι φαρμάκων χολήν,

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐπιτείνοντες καὶ προσεκταράσσοντες.

"Ὅταν οὖν ἐν τούτοις γένωμαι τοῖς ἐπιλογισμοῖς, ἀμα τι πειρώμαι καὶ τοῦ πολυπράγμονος ἀφαιρεῖν. 464 τὸ γὰρ ἐξακριβῶν ἀπαντά καὶ φωρᾶν καὶ πᾶσαν

1 'Αναξαγόρος] ἀναξαγόρα all mss. but two.
2 ἐκάστοτε Stegmann: ἐκαστον.

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b Cf. Moralia, 40 d, 88 e, 129 d. Cf. Horace, Satires, i. 4. 136: numquid ego illi | imprudens olim faciam simile?; "There but for the grace of God go I."

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But we should, as Panaetius also has somewhere remarked, make use of the precept of Anaxagoras, and just as he, at the death of his son, said, "I knew that I had begotten a mortal"; so on each occasion we should remark with reference to the faults which exasperate us: "I knew that I had not bought a philosopher for a slave," "I knew that the friend I had made was not incapable of error," "I knew that my wife was a woman." And if we keep repeating to ourselves Plato's question, "Can it be that I am like that?" and turn our reason inward instead of to external things, and substitute caution for censoriousness, we shall no longer make much use of "righteous indignation" toward others when we observe that we ourselves stand in need of much indulgence. But as it is, everyone of us, when we are angry and inflicting punishment, brings out the injunctions of an Aristeides or a Cato: "Do not steal!" "Do not lie!" "Why are you so lazy?"; and—what is most disgraceful of all—while angry we chide others for being angry and punish by rage faults which have been committed in a rage, not like physicians, who

With bitter drugs can purge the bitter bile; but rather make more intense the malady and aggravate it.

Whenever, therefore, I have become engaged in these reflections, at the same time I try to do away with some part of my inquisitiveness. For to search out with great precision and detect and drag into the

\* Sophocles, Frag. 534 ed. Pearson, with the note; Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag.², p. 312, Frag. 770; quoted in a different form 468 b, infra, and Moralia, 923 r.
(464) ἐλκεῖν εἰς μέσον ἀσχολίαν οἰκήτου καὶ πράξεων φίλου καὶ διατριβήν υἱόν καὶ ψιθυρίσμων γυναικὸς ὄργανος φέρει πολλὰς καὶ συνεχεῖς καὶ καθημερινάς, ὡς δυσκολία τρόπου καὶ χαλεπότητα τὸ κεφάλαιον ἔστι. ὃ μὲν οὖν θεὸς, ὃς Εὐριπίδης φησί, τῶν ἄγαν ἀπτεται,

τὰ μικρὰ δὲ εἰς τύχην ἀφείς ἐὰ.

ἐγὼ δὲ τῇ τύχῃ μὲν οὐδὲν οἶμαι δεῖν ἐπιτρέπειν οὐδὲ παρορῶν τὸν νουν ἔχοντα, πιστεύειν δὲ καὶ χρήσθαι τὰ μὲν γυναῖκε τὰ δὲ οἰκέταις τὰ δὲ β φίλους οἴον ἄρχοντ' ἐπιτρόπους τισὶ καὶ λογισταῖς καὶ διουκηταῖς, αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων ὄντα τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ μεγίστων. ὡς γὰρ τὰ λεπτὰ γράμματα τὴν ὁμιλίαν, οὕτω τὰ μικρὰ πράγματα μᾶλλον ἐντείνοντα νῦτε καὶ ταράττει τὴν ὁργήν, ἐθος πονηρὸν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζονα λαμβάνονσαν.

Ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖνυν τὸ μὲν τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους μέγα καὶ θείον ἡγούμην, τὸ ''νηστεύσαι κακότητος''. ἐπήνουν δὲ κακείνας ὡς οὐκ ἀχαρίστους οὐδ' ἀφιλοσόφους ἐν εὐχαίς ὁμολογίας, ἀφροδισίων ἐνιαυτὸν ἀγνεύσαι καὶ οἶνου, τιμῶντας ἐγκρατείας τὸν θεόν. ἡ ψευδολογίας πάλιν ἀπέχεσθαι χρόνον ὁρισμένον, αὐτοῖς προσέχοντας πῶς ἀληθεύομεν

2 ἄρχοντ' Xylander and Hutten: ἄρχοντα (or ἄρχουσιν) ἄρχοντων.

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b Cf. Seneca, De Ira, ii. 26; i. 11.

c Erasmus, followed by Amyot, believed this concluding
light every little concern of a slave, every action of a
friend, every pastime of a son, every whisper of a wife,
produces frequent, or rather continual and daily, fits
of anger, of which the sum total is a morose and
intractable disposition. It may be, as Euripides a
says, that God

Will intervene in matters grown too great,
But small things he lets pass and leaves to Fate:

but I am of the opinion that a man of sense should
commit nothing to Fate, nor overlook anything at all,
but should trust and use for some things his wife, for
others servants, for others friends, as a ruler makes
use of overseers and accountants and administrators,
but himself keeps under his own control the most
important and weighty matters by the use of reason.
For as small writing strains the eyes, so do trifling
matters, by causing a greater strain, prick and stir up
anger, b which becomes a bad habit that affects more
important matters.

Accordingly, in addition to all these considerations, c
I have been wont to regard as great and divine that
saying of Empedocles, d "Fast from evil," and to
applaud also those other vows made in prayer as
being neither ungracious nor inappropriate to a
philosopher: to abstain from love and wine for a
year, honouring God by continence; or again to
refrain from lying for a stated time, paying close heed
to ourselves that we shall be truthful always whether

paragraph to be a Christian appendix added to Plutarch's
work. This is very unlikely.

a Diels, Frag. d. Vorsokratiker s, i. p. 369, Frag. 144; cf.
Herrick:

To starve thy sin, not bin,
That is to keep thy Lent.
C έν τε1 παιδιά καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς ἀπάσης. εἶτα (464) ταῦτας τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ παρέβαλλον εὐχὴν2 ὡς οὐχ ἦττον θεοφιλῇ καὶ ἱερὰν3. ἡμέρας πρῶτον ὄλιγας ἀοργήτους οἴον ἁμεθύστους καὶ ἀοίνους διαγαγεῖν ὥσπερ νηφάλια καὶ μελίσσονδα θύοντα· εἶτα μὴν ἕνα4 καὶ δύο, πειρώμενος ἐμαυτὸν κατὰ μικρὸν οὗτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ προύβαινον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τῆς ἀνεξικακίας, ἐγκρατῶς προσέχων καὶ διαφιλάττων μετ᾽ εὑρημίας ἔλεος καὶ ἀμήντον ἐμαυτόν, ἀγνεῦντα καὶ λόγων πονηρῶν καὶ πράξεων ἀτόπων καὶ D πάθους ἐφ᾽ ἡδονῇ μικρᾷ καὶ ἁχαρίστῳ ταραχᾶς τε μεγάλας καὶ μεταμέλειαν αἰσχίστην φέροντος. οὖν, οἴμαι, καὶ θεοῦ τι συλλαμβάνοντος, ἐσαφήνιζεν ἡ πείρα τὴν κρίσιν ἐκεῖνην, ὧτι τὸ ἔλεον τοῦτο καὶ πράον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον οὔδενὶ τῶν συνόντων εὔμενες ἐστὶν οὗτω καὶ φίλον καὶ ἄλυπον ὡς αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἑχουσιν.

1 τε] γε most mss.
2 εὐχὴν Wytenbach: ψυχὴν.
3 ἱερὰν Reiske: ἱερᾶς or ἱερὰς.
4 μὴν ἕνα van Herwerden: μὴνα.
ON THE CONTROL OF ANGER, 464

in jest or earnest. Then with these I compared my own vow, thinking it no less sacred and pleasant in the sight of God: first, to pass a few days without anger, sober and wineless days, as it were, as though I were offering a sacrifice of honey unmixed with wine; then I would do so for a month or two, and so, making trial of myself little by little, in time I made some progress in my forbearance, continently observing and keeping myself courteous in speech, placid, and free from anger, and pure of the taint of evil words and offensive actions and of passion which, at the price of a little unsatisfying pleasure, brings great perturbations of spirit and the most shameful repentance. By such means, I think—and God also gave me help—experience has shown the truth of that judgement: this placid and gentle and humane spirit is not so agreeable and pleasant and free from sorrow to any of those brought in contact with it as it is to those who themselves possess it.

a Like the offerings to the Eumenides, Aeschylus, Eumenides, 107; Sophocles, Oedipus Coloneus, 100, 481; cf. also Wyttenbach’s note on Moralia, 132 e.
ON TRANQUILLITY OF MIND
(DE TRANQUILLITATE ANIMI)
INTRODUCTION

It is only natural that this essay should have aroused curiosity and speculation about its sources, for Plutarch in the very first paragraph conveys the information that he has rummaged among his note-books (ὑπομνηματα) in great haste for the material necessary to help his friend Paccius to composure in the midst of a busy life. R. Hirzel (Hermes, xiv. 354 ff., especially 373 ff.) attempted to show that much was drawn from Democritus's Περὶ εὐθυμίας, some by way of the Stoic Panaetius, who, he thought, naturally opposed the Abderite's conclusions. R. Heinze (Rheinisches Museum, xlv. 497 ff.) emphasized the relation between De Tranquillitate and De Virtute et Vitio: both go back to a Stoic prototype and De Tranquillitate to a model which has some close relation to the Cynic Bion's methods of presentation, that is, probably, to Ariston of Chios. M. Pohlenz (Hermes, xl. 275 ff.), on the

Pohlenz and Siefert have at times insisted that in spite of the plural there is only one main source. This lacks all probability.

But Heinze (p. 507) admitted the possibility of some Epicurean excerpts also being used.

At the same time, O. Hense (Rheinisches Museum, xlv. 550 ff.) was attempting to trace De Curiositate to Ariston. Readers of the Jahresberichte should note that F. Bock (Jbb., clii. 1911, p. 334) has not read these articles and is, as often, a thoroughly untrustworthy guide.

See also Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie, xlviii. 95 and note.
other hand, found that the source of the essay was Epicurean,\(^a\) while admitting that Plutarch added a certain amount of original material to fit the personality and circumstances of the friend he was addressing. Finally, G. Siefert\(^b\) (*Plutarchs Schrift περὶ εὖθυμίας*, Progr. Pforta, Naumburg, 1908) reverts to Democritus and Panaetius, with particular emphasis on the material illustrative of Panaetius’s lost work to be found in Cicero’s *De Officiis* and in Seneca: Panaetius, who was following, not the Stoa, but Democritus, is the principal source of Plutarch, practically his only source.

Siefert’s discussion, in particular, is impressive as well as learned; but I would remark that all these authorities may well be right—and wrong. Some of them admit that portions, at least, of the essay were written, or adapted, especially to suit the particular occasion for which the essay was composed. Plutarch himself is not averse to naming authorities here and elsewhere; that he followed exclusively one, or even two, is made very unlikely by his own opening statement and by the very mixed nature of his philosophical terminology.\(^c\)

\(^a\) But now Pohlenz (in the Teubner ed., 1929) has become partially converted to Siefert’s views, while rightly continuing to maintain some Epicurean influence. The fact that Plutarch in the last part of his work follows the εὐχαριστία to the gifts of Fortune urged by Epicurus (Fragg. 435 and 491 ed. Usener) seems to me decisive, in spite of Siefert’s evasions.

\(^b\) For the structure of the essay see Siefert’s earlier work (*Commentationes Linenses*, vi. 1896, pp. 57-74), supplemented and corrected by Pohlenz, l.c.

\(^c\) This conclusion bears some resemblance to that reached by H. N. Fowler (*Harvard Stud. Cl. Phil.*, i. 149 ff.), whose work is called by Siefert “noch unergiebiger” than the
ON TRANQUILLITY OF MIND

Theological writers of all ages have made good use of this store-house of moral precepts. Many of the imitations in the works of St. Basil and of St. John Chrysostom will be found listed in the Teubner edition and discussed by Pohlenz (Zeit. f. wiss. Theologie, xlviii. 72-95). Jeremy Taylor, also, in Holy Living, ii. 6, has again made some pleasant borrowings and paraphrases.

Sir Thomas Wyat's interesting translation of 1528, made from the Latin of Budaeus, has been reprinted, with an excellent introduction from the pen of C. R. Baskervill, by the authorities of the Huntington Library (Harvard University Press, 1931).

The MS. tradition is not good. Many passages are probably hopelessly corrupt and the reconstructions offered in the Teubner text and here are, at the best, make-shifts. The work is No. 95 in the catalogue of Lamprias.

"Biomanie" of the Hense-Heinze school; but Fowler was inclined to stress too much the relation to Democritus and the parallels which Hirzel had urged between Seneca and Plutarch. That Seneca's De Tranquillitate Animi goes back to an immediate original common to Plutarch's work also is extremely unlikely. Only one anecdote, one quotation, and a dozen or so commonplaces are not nearly enough to show any close relationship. And how dissimilar the two works are in treatment, design, terminology, and form (pace Hirzel, Der Dialog, ii. p. 28, n. 1)!
Περί Ευθυμίας

Πλούταρχος Πακκίως εὑρίσκειν.

1. Ὅψε σοι τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐκομισάμην, ἐν ἡ παρεκάλεσε περὶ εὐθυμίας σοὶ τὰ γράφῃναι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Τιμαίῳ δεομένων ἐπιμελεστέρας ἐξηγῆσεως. ἀμα δὲ πως τὸν ἐταίρον ἡμῶν Ἡρωτα κατελάμβανεν αἰτία τοῦ πλεῖν εὐθὺς εἰς Ὁρώμην, παρὰ Φοινικάνου τοῦ κρατίστου γράμματα δεδεγμένον, θὸς ἐκείνος, ἐπιταχύνοντα. μὴτε δὲ χρόνον ἔχων, ὡς προηγοῦμην, γενέσθαι πρὸς οἷς ἐβούλου μὴν ὑπομένων κεναίς παντάπασι τὸν ἄνδρα χερσὶν ὀφθήναι σοὶ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀφιγμένοι, ἀναλεξάμην περὶ εὐθυμίας ἐκ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ὃν ἐμαυτῷ πεποιημένος ἐτύγχανον ἡγούμενοι καὶ σὲ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον οὐκ ἀκροάσεως ἔνεκα θηρωμένης καλλιγραφίαν 465 ἄλλα χρείας βοηθητικῆς ἐπιζητεῖν, καὶ συνηδόμενοι ὦτὶ καὶ φιλίας ἔχων ἡγεμονικὰς καὶ δόξαν οὐδενὸς

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\(^{a}\) All that is known of Paccius is inferred from the present essay.

\(^{b}\) We possess a work of Plutarch entitled De Animae
ON TRANQUILLITY OF MIND

From Plutarch to Paccius, a health and prosperity.

1. It was only very recently that I received your letter in which you urged me to write you something on tranquillity of mind, and also something on those subjects in the Timaeus b which require more careful elucidation. And at the same time it chanced that our friend Eros c was obliged to sail at once for Rome, since he had received from the excellent Fundanus d a letter, which, in his usual style, urged haste. But since I neither had the time I might have desired to meet your wishes nor could I bring myself to let the friend who came from me be seen arriving at your home with hands quite empty, I gathered together from my note-books those observations on tranquillity of mind which I happened to have made for my own use, believing that you on your part requested this discourse, not for the sake of hearing a work which would aim at elegance of style, but for the practical use in living it might afford; and I congratulate you because, though you have commanders as your friends and a reputation second to none of the forensic

Procreatione in Timaeo, but it is addressed by the writer to his sons, Autobulus and Plutarch (Moralia, 1012 ff.).

c See 453 c, supra.
d The principal speaker of De Cohibenda Ira, 452 f, supra.
(465) έλάττονα τῶν ἐν ἁγορᾷ λεγόντων τὸ τοῦ τραγικοῦ Μέροπος οὐ πέπονθας, οὐδ’ ὃς ἐκεῖνον
εὐδαιμονίζων ὁχλος¹ εξέπληξε σε²
tῶν φυσικῶν παθῶν· ἄλλα πολλάκις ἀκηκοοὺς μνη-
μονεύεις ὡς οὔτε ποδάγρας ἀπαλλάττει κάλτιος³
οὔτε δακτύλιος πολυτελῆς παρωνυχίας οὔτε διάδημα
κεφαλαλγίας. πόθεν γε ὅταν ἀλυπίαν ψυχῆς καὶ
βίον ἀκύμονα χρημάτων ὀφελος η δόξης η δυνάμεως
ἐν αὐλαῖς, ἂν μὴ τὸ χρώμενον εὐχάριστον η τοῖς
Β ἔχουσι καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀπόντων μὴ δεόμενον ἀεὶ παρ-
ακολουθῆ; τί δὲ τούτ’ ἐστὶν ἄλλο η λόγος εἰθαμένος
καὶ μεμελετηκὼς τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ἁλόγου τῆς
ψυχῆς ἐξισταμένον πολλάκις ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι ταχὺ
cαι μὴ περιορὰν ἀπορρέων καὶ καταφερόμενον ὑπὸ
tῶν ἀπόντων;⁴ ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Ξενοφῶν παρῆνε τῶν
θεῶν εὐτυχοῦντας μάλιστα μεμνῆθαι καὶ τιμᾶν,
ὅπως, ὅταν ἐν χρεία γενώμεθα, θαρροῦντες αὐτοὺς
παρακαλῶμεν ὡς εὐμενεῖς ὄντας ἢδη καὶ φίλους·
οὕτω καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὅσοι πρὸς τὰ πάθη βοηθοῦσιν,
δεὶ πρὸ τῶν παθῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας,
Ω ἐκ πολλῶν παρεσκευασμένοι μᾶλλον ὦφελῶσιν·
ὡς γὰρ οἱ χαλεποὶ κόνες πρὸς πᾶσαν ἐκταρατ-
tόμενοι βοην ὑπὸ μόνης καταπαραῖονται τῆς
συνήθους, οὕτω καὶ τὰ πάθη τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς διαγρα-
nόμενα καταπαύσαι μαδῶς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἂν μὴ λόγοι

¹ ὁχλος Meineke: ὁ ὁχλος.
² se added by Meziriacus.
³ κάλτιος Xylander: πατρίκιος or καλτίκιος.
⁴ ὑπὸ] ἀπὸ some mss.
⁵ ἀπόντων Capps: παρόντων.

a Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag.², p. 606, Euripides, Frag. 778. 168
ON TRANQUILLITY OF MIND, 465

speakers of our day, your experience has not been that of Merops in the play, and because it cannot be said of you, as of him, that

The plaudits of the mob have driven you from those emotions given us by nature; but you continue to remember what you have often heard, that an aristocratic shoe does not rid us of the gout, nor an expensive ring of a hangnail, nor a diadem of a headache. For what power is there in money or fame or influence at court to help us to gain ease of soul or an untroubled life, if it is not true that the use of them is pleasant to us when we have them and that we never miss them when we have them not? And how else can this be achieved except through reason, which has been carefully trained quickly to hold back the passionate and irrational part of the soul when it breaks bounds, as it often does, and not to allow it to flow away and be swept downstream because it does not have what it wants? Therefore, just as Xenophon advised that in prosperity we should be particularly mindful of the gods and should honour them, so that, when some need comes upon us, we may invoke them with the confidence that they are already well-disposed and friendly; so also with such reasonings as give help in controlling the passions: wise men should give heed to them before the passions arise in order that, being prepared far in advance, their help may be more efficacious. For as savage dogs become excited at every strange cry and are soothed by the familiar voice only, so also the passions of the soul, when they are raging wild, are not easily


c Cyropaedia, i. 6. 3.
(465) παρόντες οίκείοι καὶ συνήθεις ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῶν
ταραττομένων.

2. Ὁ μὲν οὖν εἶπών ὅτι "δεῖ τὸν εὐθυμεῖσθαι
μέλλοντα μὴ πολλὰ πρῆσσειν μὴτε ἰδίη μὴτε ἔσυνη,"
πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῖν πολυτελὴ τὴν εὐθυμίαν καθίστησι,
γινομένην ώνιν ἀπραξίας· οὖν ἀρρώστω παραινῶν
ἐκάστῳ

μὲν', ὁ ταλαίπωρ', ἀτρέμα σοῦ ἐν δεμνίοις.

Δ καίτοι κακῶν μὲν ἀναισθησίας σώματος φάρμακον
ἀπονοιάς· οὐδὲν δὲ βελτίων ψυχῆς ἰατρὸς ὁ Ῥάθυμια
καὶ μαλακία καὶ προδοσία φίλων καὶ οἰκείων καὶ
πατρίδος ἑξαιρῶν τὸ ταραχῶδες αὐτῆς καὶ λυπηρῶν.

'Επειτα καὶ ψεύδος ἐστὶ τὸ εὐθυμεῖν τοὺς μὴ
πολλὰ πράσσοντας. ἔδει γὰρ εὐθυμοτέρας εἶναι
γυναῖκας ἁνδρῶν οἰκουρία τὰ πολλὰ συνούσας· νυνὶ
δ' ὁ μὲν Βορέας

dιὰ παρθενικῆς ἀπαλόχροος οὐ διάησιν,

ὡς φησιν Ἡσίοδος, λῦται δὲ καὶ ταραχαὶ καὶ
κακοθυμίαι διὰ ζηλοτυπίας καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας καὶ
φιλοτιμίας καὶ κενῶν δοξῶν, ὅσα οὐκ ἂν εἶποι τις,

1 εὐθυμεῖσθαι εὐθυμεῖν most nss.
2 ἀναισθησία ... ἀπονοιάς Stobaeus: ἀναισθησία ... ἀπονοία.
3 σῶματος Capps: σῶματι.

a Democritus; Diels, Frag. d. Vorsokratiker⁵, ii. p. 132, Frag. 3; Marcus Aurelius, iv. 24; Seneca, De Tranquillitate Animi, xiii. 1, where the statement is made that these words form the beginning of Democritus's work (see especially Siefert, op. cit., p. 8); De Ira, iii. 6. 3. But Plutarch misunderstands the meaning; Democritus did not advise renouncing public life completely: cf. Moralia, 1100 b-c. 170
alayed, unless customary and familiar arguments are at hand to curb the excited passions.

2. Now he who said, "The man who would be tranquil in his mind must not engage in many affairs, either private or public," first of all makes our tranquillity very expensive if it is bought at the price of inactivity; it is as though he advised every sick man:

Lie still, poor wretch, and move not from your bed.

And yet it is true that a state of bodily stupor is a bad remedy for insanity; but no whit better as a physician of the soul is he who would relieve it of its disturbances and distress by prescribing idleness and softness and the betrayal of friends and family and country.

In the next place, it is also false that those who are not occupied with many things are tranquil in mind. For if that were true, women ought to be more tranquil than men, since for the most part they keep at home; but as it is, the North Wind

Blows not through the soft-skinned maid,
as Hesiod says, yet more pain and excitement and despondency than one could enumerate, caused by jealousy and superstitition and ambition and vain

Note also the word "many" in the present passage. (The following paragraph is cited by Stobaeus, vol. iii. pp. 651 f. ed. Hense.)

b Euripides, Orestes, 258; quoted again 501 c, infra, and in Moralia, 788 r, 901 a, 1126 a; the words are addressed by Electra to Orestes, delirious after the murder of his mother, and must be taken closely with the following clause.

c Cf. Moralia, 135 b.

d Works and Days, 519, where the poet adds "who stays indoors with her dear mother." Cf. 516 r, infra.
eis tìn γυναικωνίνυ υπορρέουσιν. ó de Laértis
Ε εἰκοσιν ἐτη καθ' αυτὸν ἐν ἀγρῷ διαίτωμενος
γρηγὸρα υἱὸς ἀμφιπόλως, ἢ οἱ βρῶσιν τε πόσων τε
παρτίθει,1

τὴν μὲν πατρίδα καί τὸν οίκον καί τὴν βασιλείαν
ἔφυγε,2 τὴν δὲ λύπην μετ' ἀπραξίας καί κατηφείας
ἀεὶ συνοικοῦσαν εἰχεν. ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ3
πράσσειν αὐτὸ πολλάκις εἰς ἀθυμίαν καθίστησιν,
ὡς τοῦτον.

αὐτὸρ ὁ μὴνιε νησί παρῆμενος ὡκυτῷροισι
Διογενῆς Πηλέως νύσα, ποδᾶς ὡκύς Ἀχιλλεὺς.
οὔτε ποτ' εἰς ἀγορὴν πωλέσκετο κυδίανεραν,
οὔτε ποτ' ἐς πόλεμον, ἀλλὰ φθανυῦθεσκε φίλον κηρ
αὕθι μένων, ποθέσκε δ' ἀυτήν τε πτόλεμον τε.

F καὶ λέγει περιπαθῶν ἑπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἀσχάλλων
αὐτῶς,

ἀλλ' ἦμαι παρὰ νησίων ἐτώσιων ἀχθος ἄροῦρης.

ὅθεν οὔδ' Ἐπίκουρος οἰεται δεῖν ἡσυχάζειν, ἀλλὰ
tῆς φύσει χρήσθαι πολιτευόμενοι καί πράσσοντας
tὰ κοινὰ τοὺς φιλοτίμους καὶ φιλοδόξους, ὡς μᾶλ-
466 λον ὑπ' ἀπραγμοσύνης ταράττεσθαι καὶ κακοῦσθαι
πεφυκότας, ἄν ὃν ὅργονται μὴ τυγχάνωσιν. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀτοπὸς οὐ τοὺς δυναμείνοις τὰ κοινὰ
πράσσειν προτρηπόμενος ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἡσυχάζαν ἄγειν

1 παρτίθει Cobet, confirmed by one ms. (παρτίθει edd. of
Homer): παρετίθει.
2 ἔφυγε] ἔφευγε Babbitt.
3 μή] μηδὲν Hartman.

a Homer, Od., i. 191.
ON TRANQUILLITY OF MIND, 465-466

imaginings, seep into the women's quarters. And though Laërtes a lived twenty years by himself in the country

With one old woman, who his food and drink
Would place beside him,

and abandoned his birthplace, b his home, and his kingship, yet he had grief as an ever-constant companion of his inactivity and dejection. And for some persons, even inactivity itself often leads to discontent, as in this instance:

The swift Achilles, Peleus' noble son,
Continued in his wrath beside the ships;
Nor would he ever go to council that
Ennobles men, nor ever go to war,
But wasted away his heart, remaining there,
And always longed for tumult and for war. c

And he himself is greatly disturbed and distressed at this and says:

But here I sit beside my ships,
A useless burden to the earth. d

For this reason not even Epicurus e believes that men who are eager for honour and glory should lead an inactive life, but that they should fulfil their natures by engaging in politics and entering public life, on the ground that, because of their natural dispositions, they are more likely to be disturbed and harmed by inactivity if they do not obtain what they desire. But he is absurd in urging public life, not on those who are able to undertake it, but on those who are unable

b That is, the town of Ithaca; he continued to live on the island.

c Homer, II., i. 488 ff.

d Ibid. xviii. 104.

(466) μὴ δυναμένουσ· δεῖ δὲ μὴ πλήθει μηδ’ ὀλυγότητι πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ αἰσχρῷ τὸ εὔθυμον ὄριζεν καὶ τὸ δύσθυμον τῶν γὰρ καλῶν ἡ παράλευψις οὐχ ἤττον ἡ τῶν φαίλων1 ἡ πράξεις ἀναρόν ἐστι καὶ παραχώδες, ὥς εἰρηται.

3. Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀφωρισμένως ἔνα βίον ἄλυπον νομίζοντας, ὡς ἐνιού τῶν γεωργῶν ἡ τῶν τῶν ἡθέων ἡ τῶν τῶν βασιλέων, ἰκανὸς ὁ Μένανδρος ὑπομιμησκει λέγων,

ἐίτα προσδιελθῶν,2 ὡς καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους ὀρὰ3 ταὐτὰ πάσχοντας τοῖς πένησιν,

ἀρ’ ἐστὶ (φησὶ) συγγενές τι λύπη καὶ βίος; τρυφερῷ βίῳ σύνεστιν, ἐνδοξῷ βίῳ πάρεστιν, ἀπορῷ συγκαταγηράσκει βίῳ.

ἄλλ’ ῥυσπερ οἶ δειλοὶ καὶ ναυτιῶντες ἐν τῷ πλεῦν, εἴτα ῥῶν οἴομενοι διάξειν εὰν εἰς γαύλων ἔξ ἀκά- ο τοῦ καὶ πάλιν ἐὰν εἰς τριήρῃ μεταβῶσιν, οὐδὲν περαινοῦσι τὴν χολὴν καὶ τὴν δειλίαν συμμετα- ϕέροντες ἐαυτοῖς: οὕτως αἱ τῶν βίων ἀντιμετα- λήψεις οὐκ ἔξαιρούσι4 τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ λυποῦντα καὶ

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1 φαίλων] βλαβερῶν Stobaeus.
2 προσδιελθῶν Reiske, confirmed by two mss.: προσελθῶν.
3 ὀρᾷ] εὐρα in most mss.
4 ἔξαιρουσι Dübner: ἔξαιρουσι.

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a Probably by Democritus (cf. Frag. 256), not Plutarch.
to lead an inactive life; tranquillity and discontent should be determined, not by the multitude or the fewness of one's occupations, but by their excellence or baseness; for the omission of good acts is no less vexatious and disturbing than the commission of evil acts, as has been said.

3. To those who believe that one quite special kind of life is free from pain, as some do the life of farmers, others that of bachelors, others that of kings, the words of Menander are a sufficient reminder:

I used to think the wealthy, Phanias,  
Who have no need to borrow, would not groan  
Of nights, nor tossing up and down would cry  
"Ah, woe is me!" but that they slept a sweet  
And tranquil sleep.

He then goes on to relate that he observes that even the wealthy fare the same as the poor:

Is there then kinship between life and grief?  
Grief's in a famous life; with a rich life  
It stays; with a mean life it too grows old.

But like people at sea who are cowardly and seasick and think that they would get through this voyage more comfortably if they should transfer from their little boat to a ship, and then again from the ship to a man-of-war; but they accomplish nothing by the changes, since they carry their nausea and cowardice along with them; so the exchange of one mode of life for another does not relieve the soul.


c The rest of this chapter and the beginning of the next is cited by Stobaeus, vol. iii. p. 249 ed. Hense. It is also imitated by St. Basil, Epistle ii. (vol. i. p. 8 ed. Deferrari, L.C.L.).
(466) ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ἀπειρία πραγμάτων, ἀλογιστία, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι μηδ’ ἐπιστασθαι χρη-θαί τοῖς παρούσιν ὀρθῶς. ταῦτα καὶ πλουσίους χειμάζει καὶ πένητας, ταῦτα καὶ γεγαμηκότας ἀνία καὶ ἁγάμους: διὰ ταῦτα φεύγουσι τὴν ἁγοράν, εἰτα τὴν ἱσυχίαν οὐ φέρουσι, διὰ ταῦτα προαγωγάς ἐν αἰῶλαῖς διώκουσι, καὶ παρελθόντες εὐθὺς βαρύνονται.

δυσάρεστον οἱ νοσοῦντες ἀπορίας ὑπὸ·
καὶ γὰρ ἡ γυνὴ λυπεῖ καὶ τὸν ιατρὸν αὐτίωνται καὶ
dυσχεραίνουσι τὸ κλινίδιον,

D φίλων δ’ ὁ τ’ ἐλθὼν λυπρὸς υπὸ τ’ ἀπιῶν βαρύς,
ὅς ὁ Ἰων φησίν. εἰτα τῆς νόσου διαλυθείσας καὶ
κράσεως ἐτέρας ἐγγενομένης, ἤθεν ἡ ύπερειμένη πάντα ποιοῦσα καὶ προσημῆ· ὃ γὰρ ἔχθις ὡς καὶ ἁμήλια καὶ σητάνειον ἄρτον διαπτύουν, τήμερον αὐτόπουρον ἐπ’ ἐλαίαις ἡ καρδαμίδι ουτείται προσ-φιλῶς καὶ προθύμως.

4. Τοιαύτῃ ὁ λογισμὸς εὐκολίαν καὶ μεταβολῆν ἐγγενόμενος ποιεῖ πρὸς ἐκαστὸν βίον. Ἀλέξανδρος Ἀναξάρχον περὶ κόσμων ἀπειρίας ἀκούων ἐδάκρυε, καὶ τῶν φίλων ἐρωτώντων ὃ τι πέπονθεν, “οὐκ ἀξίον,” ἔφη, “δακρύειν, εἰ κόσμων ὄντων ἀπείρων

1 λυπρὸς Grotius: λυπηρὸς.
2 ἐγγενομένης Meineke; ἐγγυγνομένης Stobaeus: γενομένης.
3 προσφιλῶς] omitted by most mss. and Stobaeus.
4 ποιεῖ Stegmann, confirmed by mss. of Stobaeus: μεταποιεῖ.

"Cf. Lucretius, iii. 1057 ff.: commutare locum quasi onus deponere possit; Seneca, De Tranquillitate Animi, ii. 13 f.
"Euripides, Orestes, 232.
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of those things which cause it grief and distress: these are inexperience in affairs, unreasonableness, the want of ability or knowledge to make the right use of present conditions. These are the defects which, like a storm at sea, torment rich and poor alike, that afflict the married as well as the unmarried; because of these men avoid public life, then find their life of quiet unbearable; because of these men seek advancement at court, by which, when they have gained it, they are immediately bored.

Through helplessness the sick are hard to please, for their wives are troublesome, they grumble at the doctor, they are vexed with the bed,

Each friend that comes annoys, that goes affronts, as Ion has it. But later, when the disease is over and a sounder disposition supervenes, health returns and makes everything pleasant and agreeable: he that yesterday loathed eggs and delicate cakes and fine bread to-day eats eagerly and willingly of a coarse loaf with olives and water-cress.

4. Such contentment and change of view toward every kind of life is created by reason when it has been engendered within us. Alexander wept when he heard Anaxarchus discourse about an infinite number of worlds, and when his friends inquired what ailed him, "Is it not worthy of tears," he said, "that, when the number of worlds is infinite, we have not

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*Cf. Moralia, 101 c-d.
+ Diels, Frag. d. Vorsokratiker, ii. p. 238, A 11; this Anaxarchus accompanied Alexander to India (Diogenes Laertius, ix. 61).
+ Cf. F. M. Cornford, Cl. Quart., xxviii. (1934), 1 ff. on "Innumerable Worlds in Presocratic Philosophy."
Ε ἐνὸς οὐδέπω κύριοι γεγόναμεν;’’ Κράτης δὲ πήραν ἔχων καὶ τρίβωνα¹ παιζὼν καὶ γελῶν ὡσπερ ἐν ἑορτῇ τὸν βίον² διετέλεσε. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸν 'Ἀγαμέμνονα τὸ πολλὸν βασιλεύειν ἐλύπει.

γνώσεαι 'Ατρεΐδην 'Ἀγαμέμνονα, τὸν περὶ πάντων

Ζεὺς ἐνέηκε πόνοις διαμπερέι.

Διογένης δὲ πωλούμενος ἐσκωπτε τὸν κήρυκα κατακείμενος· ἀναστήναι δ’ οὐκ ἐβούλετο κελεύοντος, ἀλλὰ παιζὼν καὶ καταγελῶν ἔλεγεν, ‘‘εἰ δ’ ἰχθύν ἐπίπρασκες;’’ καὶ Σωκράτης μὲν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ φιλοσοφῶν διελέγετο τοῖς ἑταῖροις· ὁ δὲ Φαεθὼν ἀναβᾶς εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔκλαιεν, εἰ μηδείς αὐτῷ τοὺς τοῦ πατρὸς ἱππους καὶ τὰ ἄρματα³ παραδίδωσιν.

‘‘ hWnd τὸ ὕπόθημα τῷ ποδὶ συνδιαστρέφεται καὶ οὐ τοῦναπτίον, οὕτω τοὺς βίους αἰ διαθέσεις συνεξομολούσῃ αὐταῖς. οὐ γὰρ ἡ συνήθεια ποιεῖ τοῖς ἐλομένοις τὸν ἀριστον βίον ἡδύν, ὡς τις εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν ἁμα τὸν αὐτὸν βίον ποιεῖ καὶ 467 ἀριστον καὶ ἡδίστον. διὸ τὴν πηγήν τῆς εὐθυμίας ἐν αὐτοῖς οὖσαν ἦμιν ἐκκαθαίρωμεν, ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἑκτὸς, ὡς οἶκεῖα καὶ φίλια, μὴ χαλεπῶς χρωμένοις συμφέρηταί·

¹ τρίβωνα] τριβάνον in two mss.
² τὸν βίον] τῷ βίῳ in many mss.
³ τὰ ἄρματα] τὸ ἄρμα Dübner.

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yet become lords of a single one?" But Crates, though he had but a wallet and a threadbare cloak, passed his whole life jesting and laughing as though at a festival. It was, indeed, burdensome to Agamemnon to be lord of many men:

Agamemnon you shall know, King Atreus' son, Whom, beyond all, Zeus cast into a mesh Of never-ending cares a;

but Diogenes, when he was being sold at auction, b lay down on the ground and kept mocking the auctioneer; when this official bade him arise, he would not, but joked and ridiculed the man, saying, "Suppose you were selling a fish?" And Socrates, c though in prison, discoursed on philosophic themes to his friends; but Phaëthon, when he had mounted up to heaven, wept because no one would deliver to him his father's horses and chariot.

So, just as the shoe is turned with the foot, and not the contrary, so do men's dispositions make their lives like themselves. For it is not, as someone d has said, habituation which makes the best life sweet to those who have chosen it, but wisdom which makes the same life at once both best and sweetest. Therefore let us cleanse the fountain of tranquillity that is in our own selves, in order that external things also, as if our very own and friendly, may agree with us when we make no harsh use of them:

a Homer, II., x. 88-89.  
b Cf. Diogenes Laertius, vi. 29.  
c Cf. Moralia, 607 r.  
d A Pythagorean precept, cf. Moralia, 602 b, 47 b-c, 123 c; probably not Democritus, as Hirzel (Hermes, xiv. 367) suggests, or Seneca, as Apelt in his translation of Plutarch supposes.
(467) τοὶς πράγμασιν γὰρ οὐχὶ θυμοῦσθαι χρεῶν·
μὲλεὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ὀὑντυγχάνων τὰ πράγματ' ὀρθῶς ἀν2 τιθη, πράξει3 καλῶς.

5. Κυβεία γὰρ ὁ Πλάτων τὸν βίον ἀπείκασεν,
ἐν ὧ καὶ βάλλειν δεὶ τὰ πρόσφορα, καὶ βαλόντα
χρῆσθαι καλῶς τοῖς πεσοῦσι. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν
βάλλειν2 οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ προσηκόντως5 δέχε-

Β σθαι τὰ γυνόμενα6 παρὰ τῆς τύχης καὶ νέμειν
ἐκάστω τόπον, ἐν ὧ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον ωφελῆσαι
μάλιστα καὶ τὸ ἀβουλήτου ἤκιστα λυπῆσει τοὺς
ἐπιτυγχάνοντας, ἠμέτερον ἐργον ἑστών, ἂν εὐθε
φρονῶμεν. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀτέχνους καὶ ἀνοήτους
περὶ τὸν βίον, ἄσπερ τοὺς νοσώδεις τοῖς σώμασι
μήτε καθια ψέρειν μήτε κρύος δυναμένους, ἔξιστησι
μὲν εὐτυχία συντέλλει δὲ δυστυχίᾳ. ταραττοῦνται δ' ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων, μᾶλλον δ' ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις
καὶ οὐχ ἢττον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγαθοῖς. Θεο-
δώρος μὲν γὰρ ὁ κληθεῖς ἄθεος ἐλεγε τῇ δεξιᾷ τοὺς
λόγους ὁρέγοντας αὐτοῦ τῇ ἀριστερᾷ δέχεσθαι τοὺς

C ἀκρωμένους: οἱ δ' ἀπαίδευτοι πολλάκις τὴν τύχην
dεξιὰν παρισταμένην ἐπαριστέρως μεταλαμβά-
nontes7 ἀσχημονοῦσιν. οἱ δὲ φρόνιμοι, καθάπερ ταῖς
μελίτταις μέλι φέρει τὸ δριμύτατον τῶν φυτῶν8 καὶ

1 οὐντυγχάνων Valckenaer (όν τυγχάνων Stobaeus): ο
τυγχάνων.
3 πράξει] πράσσει Stobaeus.
4 βαλλεῖν Dübner: βαλεῖν.
5 προσηκόντως] προσήκειν in most mss.
6 γυνόμενα] διδόμενα some mss., perhaps rightly.
7 μεταλαμβάνοντες] λαμβάνοντες most mss.

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It does no good to rage at circumstance; Events will take their course with no regard For us. But he who makes the best of those Events he lights upon will not fare ill.\(^a\)

5. Plato,\(^b\) for instance, compared life to a game of dice in which we must try, not only to throw what suits us best, but also, when we have thrown, to make good use of whatever turns up. But with circumstances, though it is not in our power to throw what we please, yet it is our task, if we are wise, to accept in a suitable manner whatever accrues from Fortune and to assign to each event a place in which both what suits us shall help us most and what is unwanted shall do least harm. For those who are without skill and sense as to how they should live, like sick people whose bodies can endure neither heat nor cold, are elated by good fortune and depressed by adversity; and they are greatly disturbed by both, or rather by themselves in both and as much in what is called good as in the bad. Theodorus,\(^c\) called the Atheist, used to say that he offered his discourses with his right hand, but his audience received them with their left; so uninstructed persons, when Fortune presents herself adroitly on their right, often gauchely substitute their left hands in receiving her and cut a sorry figure. But men of sense, just as bees extract honey from thyme, the most pungent and the driest

\(^a\) Euripides, Bellerophon, Frag. 287 (Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag.\(^2\), p. 446); quoted also in De Vita et Poesi Homeri, 153 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 424).
\(^b\) Republic, 604 c; quoted in Moralia, 112 E-F.
\(^c\) Cf. Moralia, 378 b, 5 a; Polybius, xxxviii. 2. 8-9; see also von Scala, Rheinisches Museum, xlv. 474 f.

\(^8\) \(\tauον\ φυτόν\ added by W.C.H., after Reiske.
(467) ξηρότατον ὁ θύμος, οὕτως ἀπὸ τῶν δυσχερεστάτων πολλάκις πραγμάτων ὁικείον τι καὶ ἠρήσιμον αὐτοῖς λαμβάνουσι.


D ἦρξατο γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν μετὰ τὴν φυγήν. Ζήνων τῷ Κιτιεῖ μία ναύς περιήν φορτηγὸς: πυθόμενος δὲ ταύτην αὐτόφορτον ἀπολωλέναι συγκλυσθέισαν, "εὔγ'", εἶπεν, "ὁ τύχη, ποιεῖς εἰς τὸν τρίβωνα συνελαύνουσα ἡμᾶς."

Τι οὖν κωρίει μιμεῖσθαι τούτους; ἀρχὴν τινα μετιων διήμαρτες; ἐν ἄγρῳ διάξεις ἐπιμελόμενος τῶν ἰδιῶν. ἀλλὰ φιλίαν μνώμενον ἤγεμόνος ἀπώσθης; ἀκινδύνως καὶ ἀπραγμόνως βιώσῃ. πάλιν ἐν πράγμασιν ἀσχολίας ἔχουσι καὶ φροντίδας γέγονας;

οὔδὲ θερμὸν ὑδρῷ τόσον γε τεῦξει μαλθακὰ γυνία,

1 δὲ] δὲ καὶ Reiske.
2 After τρίβωνα Sandbach deletes καὶ τὴν στοὰν.
3 τινα μετιων Cobet; παραγγέλλων Reiske: τινά τελῶν.
5 τεῦξει] τέγξει most mss.; τέγξει mss. of Pindar; τέγγει Heyne; τόσον γε μαλθακὰ τεῦξει γυνία Pindar.

a Cf. Moralia, 32 r, 41 r ; Porphyry, De Abstinentia, iv. 20 (p. 264 ed. Nauck).
b Cf. Moralia, 147 c.
c Cf. Diogenes Laertius, vi. 21.
d Ibid. vii. 5 ; cf. also Moralia, 87 λ, 603 π; Seneca, De Tranquillitate Animi, xiv. 3; Crates, Frag. 21 A (Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus, vol. ii. p. 66).
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of plants, often in like manner draw from the most unfavourable circumstances something which suits them and is useful.

6. This, then, we should practice and cultivate first of all, like the man who threw a stone at his dog, but missed her and hit his stepmother, whereupon he exclaimed, "Not so bad after all!" For it is possible to change the direction of Fortune when she has given us things we do not wish. Diogenes was driven into exile: "Not so bad after all!" for after his exile he began to lead the life of a philosopher. Zeno of Citium had one merchantman remaining; when he learned that this had been sunk at sea and lost with all its cargo, he cried, "Much obliged, Fortune! You also drive me to the philosopher's cloak."

What, then, prevents our imitating such men as these? Have you failed in your canvass for an office? You will be able to live in the country and look after your own affairs. Were you repulsed in wooing the friendship of some great man? Your life will be free from danger and trouble. Have you, again, become occupied with matters which take all your time and fill you with cares?

Nor shall hot water so soften the limbs,

* In the MSS. the words "and the Stoa" follow. F. H. Sandbach, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, Nov. 7, 1929, has shown that these words are interpolated by someone, who, "seeing that τὸν τριβωνα means the cynic's cloak, thought to air his knowledge that Zeno was not a Cynic but a Stoic." If Zeno had made the remark our MSS. credit him with, it would be "remarkable prescience on the part of the beginner in philosophy, who was to spend many years as a pupil first of the Cynic Crates and then of other philosophers before starting his own school in the Stoa!"
κατὰ Πίνδαρον, ὡς δόξα ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι μετὰ τινος δυνάμεως

πόνον ἢδύν

κάματόν τ’ εὐκάματον.

Ε ἀλλὰ τις ἀπήντησεν ἐκ διαβολῆς ἡ φθόνου δυσ-

ημερία καὶ σκορακισμός; ἐπὶ τὰς Μοῦσας οὐριον
tὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὴν Ἀκαδήμειαν, ὡσπερ Πλάτωνι
χειμασθέντι περὶ τὴν Διονυσίου φιλίαν.

Διὸ καὶ τούτο πρὸς εὐθυμίαν μέγα, τὸ τοὺς
ἐνδόξους ἀποθεωρεῖν, εἰ μηδὲν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν
πεπόνθασιν. οἶον ἀπαιδία τὸ λυποῦν ἐστὶ; τοὺς
Ῥωμαίων ὅρα βασιλείς, δὲν οὐδεὶς νῦν τὴν ἄρχην
ἀπέλιπε. πενίᾳ δυσφορεῖσ παροῦσῃ; καὶ τίς ἀν
ἐβούλου μᾶλλον εἶναι 1 Βοιωτῶν ἢ 'Επαμεινώνδας;
tίς δὲ 'Ῥωμαίων ἡ Φαβρίκιος; "ἀλλὰ διέφθαρται

μου" τὸ γύναιον." οὐκ ἀνέγνωκας οὖν τοῦτο-

γράμμα τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς,

F ὑγρᾶς καὶ τραφερᾶς βασιλεὺς Ἀγίς μ’ ἀνέθηκεν

οὗτ’ ἀκῆκας, ὅτι τοῦτον τὴν γυναίκα Τιμαίαν
’Ἀλκιβιάδης διεζεύγη, καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν ’Ἀλκι-

βιάδην ἐκάλει ψυχρίζουσα πρὸς τὸς θεραπανίδας;

ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’ Ἀγίν οὐκ ἐκώλυσεν ἐνδοξότατον Ἐλ-

1 μᾶλλον εἶναι Benseler, confirmed by mss.: εἶναι μᾶλλον.

2 μου] σου or σοι in many mss.

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a Nemean Odes, iv. 4.
b Euripides, Bacchae, 66; cf. Moralia, 758 c, 794 b;
Commentarii in Hesiodum, 48 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 75).
c The Academy was dedicated to the Muses.
d Cf. for example Diogenes Laertius, iii. 19-21. When
Dionysius had caused Plato to be sold into slavery, a friend
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as Pindar has it, since high repute and honour conjoined with a measure of power make

Labour pleasant and toil to be sweet toil.\(^b\)

Have you, by reason of slander or envy, become the butt of jeers and cat-calls? The breeze is favouring that bears you to the Muses and the Academy,\(^c\) as it was for Plato\(^d\) when he was buffeted by the storm of Dionysius's friendship.

For this reason it will also help greatly toward tranquillity of mind to observe that famous men have suffered nothing at all from evils the same as yours. Does childlessness, for example, vex you? Consider the kings\(^e\) of Rome, of whom not one was able to bequeath the kingdom to a son. Are you distressed by your present poverty? Well, what Boeotian rather than Epameinondas, what Roman rather than Fabricius, would you have preferred to be? "But my wife has been seduced." Have you, then, not read the inscription at Delphi,

The lord of land and sea, King Agis, put me here; and have you not heard that Alcibiades\(^g\) seduced Agis's wife, Timaea, and that, whispering to her handmaids, she called her child Alcibiades? But this did not prevent Agis from being the most celebrated and ransomed him and bought for him "the little garden in the Academy."

\(^b\) Others prefer to translate "Emperors," and regard the passage as proof that this essay was written during the reign of Vespasian, who was the first emperor to be succeeded by a son. I consider such an early date for this work altogether unlikely.


\(^d\) Cf. *Life of Alcibiades*, xxiii. 7 (203 v).
λήνων εἶναι καὶ μέγιστον· ὃσπερ οὐδὲ Στίλπωνα
468 τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν φιλοσόφων ἡλαρώτατα ζήν ἀκό-
λαστος οὖσ' ἣ θυγάτηρ· ἄλλα καὶ Μητροκλέους
ἀνεμίγαιος, "ἐμὸν οὖν," ἐφη, "ἀμάρτημα τοῦτ'
ἐστὶν ἢ ἐκείνης;" εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ Μητροκλέους,
"ἐκείνης μὲν ἀμάρτημα, σοὶ δ' ἀτύχημα"· "πῶς
λέγεις;" εἶπεν, "οὐχὶ τὰ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ δια-
πτώματ' ἐστίν;" "πάνι μὲν οὖν," ἐφη. "τὰ δὲ
dιαπτώματ' ὦν διαπτώματα καὶ ἀποτεύγ-
ματα;" συνωμολογήσειν ὁ Μητροκλῆς. "τὰ δ' ἀποτεύγ-
ματ' οὖν ὃν ἀποτεύγματα καὶ ἀτυχή-
ματα;"1 πράῳ λόγῳ καὶ φιλοσόφῳ κενὸν ἀπο-
δείξας ὠλαγμα τήν τοῦ κυνικοῦ βλασφημίαν.

Β 7. Τοὺς δὲ πολλούς οὐ μόνον τὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ
οἰκείων ἄλλα καὶ τὰ τῶν ἑχθρῶν ἄνια καὶ παροξύ-
νει κακά. βλασφημίαι γὰρ καὶ ὅργαι καὶ φθόνοι
καὶ κακοθήκειαι καὶ ζηλοτυπίαι μετὰ δυσμενείας
αὐτῶν μὲν εἰς τῶν ἑχθρῶν κῆρες, ἐνοχλοῦσι δὲ
καὶ παροξύνοντι τοὺς ἀνοητοὺς· ὃσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ
γειτόνων ἀκραχολίαι καὶ συνήθων δυσκολίαι καὶ
tῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις ὑπουργῶν μοχθηρίας τυνές.
ὑφ' ὃν οὐχ ἥκιστα μοι δοκεῖς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιταρατ-
tόμενος, ὃσπερ οἱ Σοφοκλέους ἰατροί

πικρὰν χολὴν κλύζουσι φαρμάκῳ πικρῷ,
οὐτῶς ἀντιγαλεπάινει καὶ συνεκπικραίνεσθαι τοῖς
C ἐκείνων πάθεσι καὶ νοσήμασιν, οὐκ εὐλόγως. ἄ
γὰρ πράττεις πράγματα πεπιστευμένος, οὐχ ἀπλοῖς
ἡθεσιν οὐδὲ χρηστοῖς ὃσπερ εὐφύεσιν ὄργανοι
1 καὶ ἀτυχήματα Stegmann, confirmed by two mss.: ἀτυχή-
ματα.

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1 Cf. Diogenes Laertius, ii. 114.
the greatest of Greeks. Just as the licentiousness of his daughter did not prevent Stilpo\(^b\) from leading the most cheerful life of all the philosophers of his time; on the contrary, when Metrocles reproached him, he asked, "Is this my fault or hers?" And when Metrocles replied, "Her fault, but your misfortune," he said, "What do you mean? Are not faults also slips?" "Certainly," said Metrocles. "And are not slips also mischances of those who have slipped?" Metrocles agreed. "And are not mischances also misfortunes of those whose mischances they are?" By this gentle and philosophic argument he showed the Cynic's abuse to be but idle yapping.

7. But most people are pained and exasperated by the faults, not only of their friends and relatives, but also of their enemies. For abuse and rage on their part, envy and malevolence and jealousy, coupled with ill-will, are the bane of those who are subject to these faults, but it is fools whom they trouble and exasperate—as, for example, neighbours' outbursts of temper and friends' peevishness, and certain acts of dishonesty on the part of state officials charged with administration. By these things you yourself seem to me to be disturbed as much as anybody, and like the physicians to whom Sophocles\(^b\) alludes—

With bitter drugs they purge the bitter bile—

so you become angry and bitter against these men and suffer from their passions and infirmities; but this is irrational. For even in the execution of matters committed to your personal care, most of them are in fact administered, not by simple and excellent natures,

\(^b\) Cf. 463 r, supra, and the note.
(468) ἄλλα καρχάρια τὰ πολλὰ καὶ σκολιῶς διακονεῖται. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀπευθύνειν ταῦτα μὴ νόμιζε σὸν ἔργον εἶναι μηδ' ἄλλως ράδιον. ἀν δ' ὦς τουτοῖς αὐτοῖς πεφυκόσι χρώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐπρὸς ὅλοντας καὶ ἀγκτήρων, ἦπιος φαίνῃ καὶ μέτριος ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, εὐφρανῆ τῇ σῇ διαθέσει μᾶλλον ἡ λυπήσῃ ταῖς ἐτέρων ἀγάλμασι καὶ μοχθηρίσι, ὥσπερ κύνας, ἂν ὑλακτώσι, τὸ προσήκον αὐτοῖς ἔκεινοις οἰόμενος περαινει, καὶ οὐκέτι λήσεις τολλά λυπρα
D συνεισάγων, ὥσπερ εἰς χωρίον κοίλον καὶ ταπεινὸν ἐπιρρέοντα, τὴν μικρομυζίαν ταῦτην καὶ τὴν ἀσθενείαν, ἀλλοτρίων ἀναπιελάμενοι κακῶν. ὅπου γὰρ ἐννοι τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ τῶν ἔλεος ψέγουσι πρὸς ἀτυχόντας ἀνθρώπους γηνόμενου, ὡς καλὸν τοῦ βοηθείν οὐ τοῦ συναλγείν καὶ συνειδοῦντα τοῖς πλησίον ὄντος. ὥς μετίζον ἔστιν, οὐδ' αὐτῶν ἀμαρτανόντων καὶ διακειμένων φαύλως τὸ ἱθος αἰσθανομένους ἀθυμεῖν καὶ δυσφορεῖν ἐώσιν, ἄλλα θεραπεύειν ἀνεν λύπης τὴν κακίαν ἣ δεῖ, σκόπει δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστι περιοράν αὐτοῦς, ὅτι μὴ πάντες εἰσὶν οἱ χρώμενοι καὶ προσιόντες ἡμῖν
Ε ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ χαριέντες, ἀχθομένους καὶ δυσκολαίνοντας; ἄλλ' ὅρα, φίλε Πάκκιε, μὴ λανθάνομεν ἔαυτοὺς ὁ τὸ καθόλου τῆς μοχθηρίας τῶν ἐντυγχανο

1 κύνας Stephanus: κύνες.
2 ἐκείνους Reiske: ἐκείνους.
3 καὶ οὐκέτι λήσεις Pohlenz: ἐπὶ (or ἐπεὶ) λήσεις (or λήση).
4 συνεισάγων Capps: συναγών.
5 ἀναπιελάμενος Wilamowitz: ἀναπιελάμενην.
6 αὐτῶν Reiske: αὐτῶν.
7 ἣ δεὶ Meziriacus, confirmed by mss.: ἡ δὲ.
8 δὴ added by W.C.H.
9 λανθάνομεν Bernardakis: λανθάνωμεν.

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men naturally suited to be another's instruments, as it were, but by jagged and crooked ones. Do not, therefore, consider it your business to straighten them out, and it would not in any case be easy to do so. But if—dealing with them as being what they are by nature, just as a physician uses forceps for teeth and clips for wounds—a—you show yourself as gentle and self-controlled as you can, you will have greater pleasure in your own state of mind than distress at the unpleasantness and villainy of those others, and you will think that they, like dogs when they bark, are but fulfilling their nature; and no longer will you unwittingly gather into this present captiousness or infirmity of yours many grievances, like offscourings which drain into some hollow and low-lying ground, thus letting yourself be infected with the vices of others. For since some of the philosophers censure even pity that is expended upon unfortunate persons, on the ground that it is good to give help to our neighbours, but not to participate in their sorrows nor give in to them; and, what is more important, since these philosophers do not allow us, when we perceive ourselves to be doing wrong and to be getting into a bad state of mind, to despair or be dejected, but bid us cure our vice painlessly, as we should: just consider, then—how can it be anything but irrational to allow ourselves to become vexed and troubled because not everyone who has dealings with us or approaches us is honourable and cultivated? No, my dear Paccius, you must see to it that we are not unwittingly taking a stand in alarm, not at the

a See J. S. Milne, Surgical Instruments in Greek and Roman Times, pp. 162-163.

b Cf. 479 B, infra.
νότων ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ φιλαυτίας τινὸς οὐ μυσοπονηρίας προβαλλόμενοι καὶ δεδοικότες. οἱ γὰρ σφοδράι περὶ τὰ πράγματα πτοίαν καὶ παρ’ ἀξίαν ἐφέσεις καὶ διώξεις ἡ πάλιν ἀποστροφάι καὶ διαβολαὶ τὰς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἐγγενώσιν ὑποφίας καὶ δυσκολίας, ύπ’ ἣν τὰ μὲν ἀποστερεῖσθαι τοῖς δὲ περιπτέτειν δοκοῦμεν· δ’ ὅ τοίς πράγμασιν ἐνισθεῖς ἐλαφρῶς συμπεριφέρεσθαι καὶ μετρίως Εὐκολώτατος ἀνθρώποις ὁμιλεῖν γίνεται καὶ πραό-

8. Ὄθεν ἐκείνοιν αὕτης τὸν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων λόγον ἀναλάβωμεν. ὡς γὰρ ἐν τῷ πυρέττειν πικρὰ πάντα καὶ ἀγηδὴ φαίνεται γενομένοις, ἀλλ’ ὅταν ὑδώμεν ἐτέρους ταύτα προσφερομένους καὶ μὴ δυσχεραίνοντες, οὐκέτι τὸ σιτίον οὐδὲ τὸ ποτὸν ἀλλ’ αὕτους αἰτιώμεθα καὶ τὴν νόσσον· οὕτως καὶ 469 τοῖς πράγμασι παυσόμεθα μεμφόμενοι καὶ δυσχε-

ραίνοντες, ἅν ἐτέρους ταύτα προσδεχόμενος ἀ-

λύπως καὶ ἱλαρός ὁρώμεν. ἀγαθὸν τόλμων ἐν τοῖς ἀβουλήτοις συμπτώμασι πρὸς εὐθυμίαν καὶ τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν ὁσα προσφιλὴ καὶ ἀστεία πάρεστιν ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ μιγνύτας ἐξαμαυρῶν τὰ χείρονα τοῖς βελ-

τίσι. νῦν δὲ τὰς μὲν ὁμηρίσ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαν λαμπρῶν τιτρωσκομένας ἀποστρέφοντες ταῖς ἀνθραίς καὶ ποώδει χροιαῖς παρηγοροῦμεν, τὴν δὲ διάνοιαν ἐνετίνομεν εἰς τὰ λυπηρὰ καὶ προσβιαζόμεθα τοῖς Β τῶν ἀνιαρῶν ἐνδιατρίβειν ἀναλογισμοῖς, μονονοῦ

1 ὑπὸ] ἀπὸ in most mss.

a Cf., for example, 456 f., supra.

b That is, the argument presented in chap. 4, supra.

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general wickedness of those we encounter, but at their particular wickedness to us; so our motive would be a selfish interest, not detestation of villainy.\(^a\)

For excessive apprehension about public affairs and unworthy appetites and desires, or, on the other hand, aversions and dislikes, engender suspicions and enmities toward persons who were, we think, the cause of our being deprived of some desirable things and of our encountering others which are unpleasant; it is the man who has become accustomed to adapt himself to public affairs easily and with self-control who becomes the most gracious and gentle in his dealings with his fellows.

8. Therefore let us resume our discussion of circumstances.\(^b\) For just as in a fever everything we eat seems bitter and unpleasant to the taste, and yet when we see others taking the same food and finding no displeasure in it, we no longer continue to blame the food and the drink, but accuse ourselves and our malady; so we shall cease blaming and being disgruntled with circumstances if we see others accepting the same events cheerfully and without offence. And so it is conducive to tranquillity of mind, in the midst of happenings which are contrary to our wishes, not to overlook whatever we have that is pleasant and attractive, but, mingling good with bad, cause the better to outshine the worse. But as it is, while we turn away our eyes\(^c\) when they are wounded by too dazzling a light and refresh them with the tints and hues of flowers and grass, yet we strain the mind toward painful things and force it to dwell on the consideration of disagreeable matters, all but

\(^a\) Cf. Moralia, 490 c-d, infra, 543 e-f, 854 b-c; Life of Demosthenes, xxii. (856 b).
PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

(469) βία τῶν βελτιώνων ἀποσπάσαντες. καίτοι τό γε πρὸς τόν πολυπράγμονα λελεγμένον οὐκ ἁηδῶς δεῦρ' ἔστι μετενεγκεῖν.

τι τάλλοτριον, ἀνθρωπε βασκανώτατε, κακόν δὲ αὐτοφόρκεις, τό δ' ἵδιον παραβλέπεις;

τι τό σεαυτοῦ κακόν, ὡ μακάρε, λίαν καταβλέπεις καὶ ποιεῖς ἐναργεῖς ἄει καὶ πρόσφατον, ἀγαθοῖς δὲ παροῦσιν οὐ προσάγεις τὴν διάνοιαν; ἄλλ' ὥσπερ αἰ σικύαι τὸ χείριστον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐλκοὺσιν, οὕτω τὰ κάκιστα τῶν ἱδίων1 συνάγεις ἐπὶ σαυτόν, οὐδὲν τι τοῦ Χίου βελτίων γυνόμενος2 ὡς παλαιὸν3 ὑπ' χρηστὸν οἶνον ἑτέροις πιπράσκων ἑαυτῷ πρὸς τὸ ἁριστον ὡξίνην ἐκῆτε διαγενόμενος, οἰκείης δὲ τις ἑρωτηθείς υφ' ἑτέρου τι ποιοῦντα τὸν δεσπότην καταλέλοιπεν, "ἀγαθῶν," ἐφη, "παρόντων, κακὸν ξητοῦντα." καὶ γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ πότιμα τῶν ἱδίων4 ὑπερβαίνοντες ἐπὶ τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ μοχθηρὰ τρέχουσιν. ὁ δ' Ἀριστίππος οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ἀγαθὸς, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ξυνοῦ, πρὸς τὰ βελτίωνα τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐξαναφέρει καὶ ἀνακούφιζεν αὐτὸν· χωρίον γοῦν ἀπολέσας καλὸν ἠρώτησεν ἕνα τῶν πάντων προσποιουμένων συνάχθεσθαι καὶ συναγα-

1 ἱδίων Meziriacus: ἰδέων.
2 γυνόμενος] γενόμενος in most mss.
3 παλαιὸν Kronenberg: πολύν.
4 ἱδίων Meziriacus: ἰδέων.
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dragging it by compulsion away from those which are better. And yet one might adapt here not inaptly the remark addressed to the meddlesome man a:

Why do you look so sharp on others' ills,
Malignant man, yet overlook your own?

Why do you scrutinize too keenly your own trouble, my good sir, and continue to make it ever vivid and fresh in your mind, but do not direct your thoughts to those good things which you have? But, just as cupping-glasses b draw the most virulent humour from the flesh, so you gather together against yourself the worst of your own conditions, proving yourself not a whit better than the man of Chios who sold excellent old wine to everyone else, but tried to find sour wine for his own luncheon; and when one of his slaves was asked by the other what he had left his master doing, he answered, "Hunting bad when good was at hand." Most persons, in fact, do pass by the excellent and palatable conditions of their lot and hasten to those that are unpleasant and disagreeable. Aristippus, c however, was not one of these, but was wise enough, like one who weighs things in a balance, by weighing the bad against the better, to rise above the conditions in which he found himself and thus to lighten his spirits. At any rate, when he had lost a fine estate, he asked one of those who made a great pretence of condoling with him and sharing in his ill humour at misfortune,

a Kock, Com. Att. Frag., iii. p. 476, ades. 359; cf. 515 d, infra. Cf. Horace, Sermones, i. 3. 25-27:
Cum tua pervideas oculis male lippus inunctis,
cur in amicorum vitis tam cernis acutum
quam aut aquila aut serpens Epidaurius?

b Cf. Moralia, 518 b, 600 c.

c Cf. Moralia, 330 c.
(469) νακτεῖν, "οὔχι σοι μὲν χωρίδιον ἐν ἔστιν, ἐμοὶ δὲ τρεῖς ἀγροὶ καταλεῖπονται;" συνομολογήσαντος Ὁ δ’ ἐκεῖνος, "τί οὖν," εἶπεν, "οὐ σοι μᾶλλον ἥμεις συναχθόμεθα;" μανικὸν γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις ἀνιᾶσθαι μὴ χαίρειν δὲ τοῖς σωζόμενοις, ἀλλ’ ὤσπερ τὰ μικρὰ παιδάρια, ἀπὸ πολλῶν παιγνίων ἄν ἐν τις ἀφελήται τι, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἀπορρίψαντα1 κλαίει καὶ βοᾷ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἥμας περὶ ἐν ὁχληθέντας ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης, καὶ τάλλα πάντα ποιεῖν ἀνόνητα ἐαυτοῖς ὀδυρομένους καὶ δυσφοροῦντα.

9. "Καὶ τί," φήσας τις ἄν, "ἔχομεν; τί δ’ οὐκ ἔχομεν;" ο μὲν δόξαν, ο δ’ οἰκον, ο δὲ γάμον, τῷ δὲ φίλος ἄγαθος ἐστιν. 'Αντίπατρος δ’ ὁ Ταρσεύς πρὸς τῷ τελευτάν ἀναλογιζόμενον ὃν ἔτυχεν ἄγαθῶν, οὐδὲ τὴν εὐπλοιαν παρέλπη τῇ ἐκ Εὐκλικίας αὐτῶ γενομένην εἰς 'Αλήγας. δεῖ δ’ καὶ τὰ κοινὰ μὴ παροῦν ἀλλ’ ἐν τινὶ λόγῳ τίθεσθαι καὶ χάριν ἔχειν2 ὅτι ζῶμεν, ὑγιαίνομεν, τὸν ἥλιον ὀρῶμεν: οὐτε πόλεμος οὔτε στάσις ἐστιν: ἀλλά καὶ ἡ γῆ παρέχει γεωργεῖν καὶ θάλασσα πλεῖν ἀδεώς τοὺς βουλομένους. καὶ λέγειν ἔξεστι καὶ πράττειν καὶ σωπᾶν καὶ σχολάζειν. εὐθυμήσομεν δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον παροῦσι, ἂν μὴ παρόντων αὐτῶν φαντασίαν λαμβάνωμεν: ἀναμμηνήσκοντες αὐτοὺς πολλάκις, ὥς ποθεινὸν ἐστιν ύγεία νοσοῦσι καὶ πολε-μουμένους εἰρήνη, καὶ κτήσασθαι δόξαν ἐν πόλει τηλικαύτη3 καὶ φίλους ἀγνώτι καὶ ξένων: καὶ τὸ

1 ἀπορρίψαντα W.C.H. after Fobes: προσρίψαντα.
2 χάριν ἔχειν] χαίρειν in most mss.
3 τηλικαύτη Reiske, confirmed by mss.: τηλικαύτην.
“Isn’t it true that you have only one small bit of land, while I have three farms remaining?” When the person agreed that this was so, Aristippus said, “Should I not then rather condole with you?” For it is the act of a madman to be distressed at what is lost and not rejoice at what is saved, but like little children, who, if someone takes away one of their many toys, will throw away all the rest as well and cry and howl; in the same way, if we are troubled by Fortune in one matter, we make everything else also unprofitable by lamenting and taking it hard.

9. “And what,” someone may say, “do we really have and what do we not have?” One man has reputation, another a house, another a wife, another a good friend. Antipater of Tarsus, on his deathbed reckoning up the good things that had fallen to his lot, did not omit even the fair voyage he had from Cilicia to Athens; so we should not overlook even common and ordinary things, but take some account of them and be grateful that we are alive and well and look upon the sun; that there is neither war nor factious strife among us, but that both the earth grants cultivation and the sea fair sailing to those who wish it; that we may speak or act, be silent or at leisure, as we choose. These things when they are present will afford us greater tranquillity of mind, if we but imagine them to be absent, and remind ourselves often how desirable is health to the sick, and peace to those at war, and, to an unknown stranger in so great a city, the acquisition of reputation and

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\[b\] Probably Rome.
στέρεσθαι γενομένων ὡς ἀνιαρόν. οὐ γὰρ τότε γίνεται μέγα καὶ τίμιον ἔκαστον ἡμῖν, ὅταν ἀπολήτως, σωζόμενον δὲ τὸ μηθὲν ἔστιν. οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἄξιαν τὸ μή εἶναι1 προστίθησιν, οὐδὲ δεὶ κτᾶσθαι μὲν ὡς μεγάλα καὶ τρέμειν αἰεὶ δεδιότας ὡς ὑπὲρ μεγάλων μὴ στερηθῶμεν, ἔχοντας δὲ παρορᾶν καὶ 470 καταφρονεῖν ὡς μηδενὸς ἄξιων, ἀλλὰ χρήσθαι μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῷ χαίρειν καὶ ἀπολαύειν αὐτῶν, ἣν καὶ τὰς ἀποβολάς, ἃν συντυχάνωσι, πραότερον φέρωμεν. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ποιήματα μὲν, ὡς ἐλεγεν ἹἈρκεσίλαος, ἀλλότρια καὶ γραφὰς καὶ ἀνδριάντας ὀioxidatai dein ἀκρίβως καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἔκαστον ἐπιπορεύμονε τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ τῇ ὑφει θεωρεῖν, τὸν δ' ἑαυτῶν βίον ἔχοντα πολλάς ὡς ἄτερπεις ἀναθεωρήσεις ἔωσιν, ἔξω2 βλέποντες ἀεὶ καὶ θαυμάζοντες ἀλλοτρίας δόξας καὶ τύχας ὡσπερ μοιχοὶ τὰς ἐτέρων γυναίκας, αὐτῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἴδιων καταφρονοῦντες.

10. Καὶ τοῦτο μέγα πρὸς εὐθυμίαν ἔστι, Β τὸ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὸν ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ τὰ καθ' αὐτόν, εἰ δὲ μή, τοὺς ὑποδεεστέρους ἀποθεωρεῖν καὶ μή, καθάπερ οἱ πολλοὶ, πρὸς τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ἀντιπαρεξάγειν.3 οἶον εὐθὺς οἱ δειδεμένοι εὐδαιμονίζουσι τοὺς λευμένους, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους, οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι τοὺς πολίτας, οὕτως δὲ πάλιν ὡς τοὺς πλουσίους, οἱ δὲ πλούσιοι τοὺς σατράπας, οἱ δὲ σατράπαι τοὺς βασιλεῖς, οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς τοὺς θεοὺς,

1 εἶναι] παρεῖναι Capps.
2 ἔξω] τὰ ἔξω Capps.
3 ἀντιπαρεξάγειν Reiske and Wytenbach; ἀντιπαρεξητάζειν van Herwerden: ἀντιπαρεξάγουσιν.

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friends; and how painful it is to be deprived of these things when we have once had them. For it will not then be the case that we find each one of these important and valuable only when it has been lost, but worthless while securely held. Our not possessing it does not add value to anything, nor should we acquire these things as though they were of great worth and live in fear and trembling as though for things of great moment, lest we be deprived of them, and yet while we have them overlook and despise them as of no value: we should above all take care to use them for our pleasure and enjoyment, in order that we may bear their loss, if that should happen, with greater moderation. But most people, as Arcesilaiis said, think it right to examine poems and paintings and statues of others with the eyes of both the mind and the body, poring over them minutely and in every detail, whereas they neglect their own life, which has many not unpleasing subjects for contemplation, looking ever to externals and admiring the repute and the fortunes of others, as adulterers do other men's wives, yet despising themselves and their own possessions.

10. And yet it is also highly conducive to tranquillity of mind to examine, if possible, oneself and one's fortunes, but if that is not possible, to observe persons of inferior fortune, and not, as most people do, compare oneself with those who are superior; as, for example, those in prison account fortunate those who have been set free; and they, men born free; and free men, citizens; and citizens, in their turn, the rich; and the rich, satraps; and satraps, kings; and kings, the gods, scarcely stopping short of

*a Cf. Teles, p. 43 ed. Hense.*
(470) μονονοχί βροντάν καὶ ἀστράπτειν ἐθέλοντες. εἰθ’ οὐτώς ἀεὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ έαυτοῦς ἐνδεεῖς οὔτε οὐδέποτε τοῖς καθ’ έαυτοῦς χάριν ἔχουσιν.

οὐ μοι ὑπὸ Γύγεω τοῦ πολυχρύσου μέλει,

C οὐδ’ εἰλε πώ με ἕηλος, οὐδ’ ἀγαίνωι
θεῶν ἔργα, μεγάλης δ’ οὐκ ἔρω τυραννίδος;
ἀπόπροδεν γάρ ἐστίν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐμῶν.

“Θάσιος γάρ ἦν ἐκεῖνος ’’. ἄλλος δὲ τις Χίος, ἄλλος
dὲ Γαλάτης ἦ Βιθυνὸς οὐκ ἀγαπῶν, εἰ τινὸς μερίδος
ἡ δόξαι ἡ δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς ἐαυτοῦ πολίταις εἴληχεν,
ἀλλὰ κλαῖων ὅτι μὴ φορεῖ πατρικῶς. εἶν δὲ καὶ
φορῇ, ὅτι μηδέπω στρατηγεῖ ’Ρωμαιῶν’ ἕαν δὲ καὶ
στρατηγῇ, ὅτι μὴ ὑπατεύει καὶ ὑπατεύων, ὅτι μὴ
πρῶτος ἄλλ’ ὑπερούσας ἀνηγορεύθη. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τί
ἄλλο ἡ συλλέγοντα προφάσεις ἀχαριστίας ἔπι τὴν
D τύχην αὐτοῦ ὑφ’ αὐτοῦ κολάζεσθαι καὶ διδόναι
dίκην; ἂλλ’ ὅ γε νοῦν ἔχων σωτηρία φρονοῦντα
τοῦ ἥλιου μυριάδας ἀνθρώπων ἀπείρους ἐφορῶντος
 euthedous ὁσι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός,
οὐκ εἰ τινῶν ἦττον ἐνδοξοῖς ἔστι καὶ πλούσιοι,
ὅπορόμενοι κάθηται καὶ ταπεινοῦμενοι, ἂλλ’ ὅτι

1 οὐδ’ Schneidewin, confirmed by mss. : καὶ οὐδ’.
2 φορῇ . . . στρατηγῇ] φορῶν . . . στρατηγῶν in most mss.
3 ἀπείρους] omitted in most mss.
4 euthedous Plato, Protag., 315 c: euthedous.


Aristotle (Rhetoric, iii. 17, 1418 b 31) says that Archilochus (who long resided in Thasos) speaks, not in propria persona, but through the mouth of Charon the carpenter. Charon is, then, the Thasian, if we can believe that Plutarch 198
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desiring the power to produce thunder and lightning. Thus, through being always conscious that they lack things which are beyond them, they are never grateful for what befits their station.

I want no wealth of Gyges rich in gold,
Nor have I ever envied him; I am
Not jealous of gods' works, nor love a great
Kingdom: such things are far beyond my ken.a

"But he was a Thasian," one may say.b Yet there are others, Chians, Galatians, or Bithynians, who are not content with whatever portion of either repute or power among their own fellow-countrymen has fallen to their lot, but weep because they do not wear the patrician shoe; yet if they do wear it, they weep because they are not yet Roman praetors; if they are praetors, because they are not consuls; and if consuls, because they were proclaimed, not first, but later.c What is this other than collecting excuses for ingratitude to Fortune in order to chastise and punish oneself? But he, at least, who has a mind filled with salutary thoughts, knowing that the sun looks down upon countless myriads of men,

As many of us as win the fruit of the spacious earth,d if he be less famous or wealthy than some others, does not sit down in sorrow and dejection, but since he knows that he lives ten thousand times better and

drew the quotation directly from Archilochus, and not from a florilegium (aliter, Fowler, Harv. Stud., i. p. 144). Plutarch probably means that one nationality is no more exempt from this vice than another, but the argument is very oddly stated.

c For the importance of being announced first in the renuntiatio, see, for example, Cicero, Pro Murena, viii. 18.

d Simonides, Frag. 5 ed. Bergk, 4 ed. Diehl, 19 ed. Edmonds, verse 17; quoted again in Moralia, 485 c, infra, 743 r.
(470) μυρίων μυριάκις ἐν τοσοῦτοις εὐσχημονέστερον ζη καὶ βέλτιον, ὃμιῶν τὸν ἐαυτοῦ δαίμονα καὶ τὸν βίον ὅδῳ πρόεισιν.

Ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶ νικάν ἐκλεγόμενον ἀντιπάλους, ἐν δὲ τῷ βίῳ τὰ πράγματα δίδωσι περιόντα πολλῶν μέγα φρονεῖν, καὶ ξηλωτὸν εἶναι Ἔμαλλον ἢ ξηλοῦν ἑτέρους, ἂν γε δὴ τοῦ Βριάρεω μηδὲ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ποιήσῃ σεαυτὸν ἀνταγωνιστὴν. ὅταν οὖν πάνυ θαυμάσῃ ώς κρείττονα τὸν ἐν τῷ φορεῖσι κομιζόμενον, ὑποκύψας θέασαι καὶ τοὺς βαστάζοντας: καὶ ὅταν διαβαίνοντα τῆν σχεδίαν μακαρίσῃς τὸν Ξέρξην ἑκεῖνον, ὡς ὡς Ἑλληςπόντιος, ὦδ' καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ μάστιξι διορύγγοντας τὸν Ἀθω καὶ τοὺς περικοπτομένους ὡτα καὶ δίνας ἐπὶ τῷ διαλυθῆναι τὴν γέφυραν ὑπὸ τοῦ κλῦσιν, ἀμα καὶ τὴν ἑκείνων ἀποθεωρόν διάνοιαν ὅτι τὸν σὸν βίον καὶ τὰ σὰ πράγματα μακαρίσουσι.

Ὁ Σωκράτης ἀκούσας τινὸς τῶν φιλῶν λέγοντος ὡς πολυτέλης ἡ πόλις, "μνᾶσ ὁ Χίος οἶνος, ἡ πορφύρα τριῶν μνῶν, τοῦ μέλιτος ἡ κοτύλη πέντε δραχμῶν," λαβὼν αὐτὸν προσήγαγε τοῖς ἀλφίτοις, "ὁμολοῦ τὸ ἡμέκτον, εὔτελής ἡ πόλις" έίτα ταῖς ἐλαιαῖς, " δυνεῖν χαλκὸν 2 ἡ χοῦν 3 " έίτα ταῖς ἐξωμίσι, "δέκα δραχμῶν, εὔτελής ἡ πόλις." ὅνυκοι καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὅταν ἀκούσωμεν ἑτέρου λέγοντος ὡς μικρὰ τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς πράγματα καὶ λυπρὰ δεινῶς,

1 ὅδῳ Cobet: ἐν ὅδῳ.
2 δυνεῖν χαλκὸν] δοῦι χαλκοῖς (ορ χαλκῶν) most mss.
3 After χοῦν some mss. add εὔτελής ἡ πόλις.

* Cf. Herodotus, vii. 56: "O Zeus, why have you taken the likeness of a Persian and changed your name to Xerxes, 200
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more suitably than tens of thousands in so great a number, he will go on his way praising his own guardian spirit and his life.

Now at Olympia you cannot win the victory by selecting competitors, but in this life circumstances permit you to take pride in your superiority to many, and to be an object of envy rather than envious of the others—unless, indeed, you make a Briareus or a Heracles your opponent. Whenever, then, you are lost in admiration of a man borne in his litter as being superior to yourself, lower your eyes and gaze upon the litter-bearers also; and whenever you account happy, as the man of Hellespont\(^a\) did, that famous Xerxes crossing his bridge, look also upon those who are digging through Athos\(^b\) beneath the lash, and those whose ears and noses are mutilated because the bridge was broken by the current. Consider also their state of mind: they account happy your life and your fortunes.

When Socrates\(^c\) heard one of his friends remark how expensive the city was, saying "Chian wine costs a mina, a purple robe three minae, a half-pint of honey five drachmas," he took him by the hand and led him to the meal-market, "Half a peck for an obol! the city is cheap"; then to the olive-market, "A quart for two coppers!"; then to the clothes-market, "A sleeveless vest for ten drachmas! the city is cheap." We also, therefore, whenever we hear another say that our affairs are insignificant and in a

and now lead the whole world with you in your desire to uproot Greece? Surely you might have done all this without these means."

\(^a\) Cf. 455 D, supra.

\(^b\) Cf. Teles, pp. 12-13 ed. Hense; Diogenes Laertius, vi. 35 (of Diogenes).
µὴ ὑπατευόντων μηδ' ἐπιτροπευόντων, ἔξεστιν 471 εἰπεῖν, "λαμπρὰ τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς πράγματα καὶ
ξηλωτὸς ἡμῶν ὁ βίος· οὐ προσαίτοϋμεν οὐκ
ἀχθοφοροῦμεν οὐκ κολυκεύομεν."

11. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔπει πρὸς ἐτέρους μᾶλλον ἢ
πρὸς αὐτούς ὑπ' ἀβελτερίας εἰθίσμεθα ζῆν, καὶ
πολὺ τὸ δύσζηλον ἡ φύσις ἤχουσα καὶ τὸ βάσκανον
οὐ χαίρε τοσοῦτον τοῖς ἰδίοις ὅσον ἀνάται τοῖς
ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς, μὴ μόνον ὅρα τὰ λαμπρὰ καὶ
tα περιβόητα τῶν ξηλουμένων ὑπὸ σοῦ καὶ θαυ-
μαζομένων, ἀλλ' ἀνακαλύψας καὶ διαστείλας ὠσπέρ
ἀνθρώπων παραπέτασμα τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν
ἐπιφάνειαν ἐντὸς γενοῦ, καὶ κατοψεῖ πολλὰ δυσ-
Β χερῆ καὶ πολλὰς ἀγδίας ἐνούσας αὐτοῖς. ὁ γοῦν
Πιττακὸς ἐκεῖνος, οὐ μέγα μὲν ἄνδρειας μέγα
de σοφίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης κλέος, εἰστία ξένους·
ἐπελθοῦσα δ' ἡ γυνὴ μετ' ὀργῆς ἀνέτρεψε τὴν τρά-
πεζαν· τῶν δὲ ξένων διατραπέντων, "ἐκάστω τι,"
ἐφη, "ἡμῶν κακὸν ἐστίν· ὃ δὲ τοῦμον,1 ἀριστα
πράττει."

οὗτος μακάριος ἐν ἀγορᾶ νομίζεται,
ὅταν2 δ' ἀνοίξῃ τὴν θύραν,3 τρισάθλιος·
γυνὴ κρατεῖ πάντων, ἐπιτάσσει, μάχετ' ἄει.
ἀπὸ πλειόνων ὀδυνᾶτ', ἐγὼ δ' ἀπ' οὐδενός.

τοιαῦτα πολλὰ καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ δόξῃ καὶ βασιλείᾳ
πρόσεσθιν ἀδήλα τοῖς πολλοῖς· ἐπιπροσθεὶ γὰρ ὁ
tύφος.

C ὁ μάκαρ 'Ατρεΐδη, μοιρηγενές, ἀλβιώδαιμον·

1 τοῦμον] τοῦτο μόνον in some mss.
2 ὅταν] ἐπάν Moralia, 100 ε.
3 τὴν θύραν] τὰς θύρας Moralia, 100 ε.

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woeful plight because we are not consuls or governors, may reply, “Our affairs are splendid and our life is enviable: we do not beg, or carry burdens, or live by flattery.”

11. Yet since, however, through our folly we have grown accustomed to live with eyes fixed on everyone else rather than on ourselves, and since our nature contains much envy and malice and does not rejoice so much in our own blessings as it is pained by those which other men possess, do not look only at the splendour and notoriety of those you envy and wonder at, but open and, as it were, draw aside the gaudy curtain of their repute and outward appearance, and get inside them, and you will see many disagreeable things and many things to vex them there. Thus, when that renowned Pittacus, whose fame for bravery and for wisdom and justice was great, was entertaining some guests, his wife entered in a rage and upset the table; his guests were dismayed, but Pittacus said, “Every one of us has some trouble. He that has only mine is doing very well indeed.”

This man's held happy in the market-place,
But when he enters home, thrice-wretched he:
His wife rules all, commands, and always fights.  
His woes are more than mine, for mine are none!

Many such evils attend wealth and repute and kingship, evils unknown to the vulgar, for ostentation hinders the vision.

O happy son of Atreus, child of destiny,
Blessed with a kindly guardian spirit!

*Cf. 461 d, supra, of Socrates.
*Homer, Il., iii. 182.
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(471) ἐξωθεν οὗτος δ’ μακαρισμός, ὄπλων καὶ ἔππων καὶ στρατιάς περικεχυμένης: αἱ δὲ τῶν παθῶν φωναὶ πρὸς τὴν κενὴν δόξαν ἐνδοθεν ἀντιμαρτυροῦσιν.

Ζεύς μὲ μέγα Κρονίδης ἄτη ἐνέδησε βαρεῖᾳ καὶ

ζηλῶ σε, γέρον,
ζηλῶ δ’ ἄνδρῶν ὃς ἀκίνδυνον
βίον ἐξεπέρασε ἄγνως, ἀκλεῆς.

ἐξεστιν οὖν καὶ τοῦτοι τοῖς ἐπιλογισμοῖς ἀπαρύτεων τοῦ πρὸς τὴν τύχην μεμψιμόρου καὶ διὰ τὸ θαυμάζειν τὰ τῶν πλησίων ἐκταπεινωθέντος τὰ οἰκεία καὶ καταβάλλοντος.

D 12. Οὖχ ἦκιστα τοιών εὐθυμίαν κολούει τὸ μὴ συμμέτροις χρήσασι πρὸς τὴν ὑποκειμένην δύναμιν ὁρμαῖς ὡσπερ ἵστησις, ἀλλὰ μειζόνων ἐφιμένους ταῖς ἐλπίσιν εἰτ’ ἀποτυγχάνοντας αὐτιᾶσθαι δαίμονα καὶ τύχην ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀβελτερίαν. οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ τοξέυειν τῷ ἀρότρῳ βουλόμενοι καὶ τῷ βοή τὸν λαγῶν 1 κυνηγεῖτεν δυστυχής ἐστιν οὐδὲ τῷ γρίφῳ καὶ σαγήναις ἐλάφους μὴ λαμβάνοντι μηδὲ ὃς 2 δαίμον ἐναντιοῦται μοχθηρός, ἀλλ’ ἀβελτερία καὶ μωρία τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις ἐπιχειροῦσι. αἰτιον δ’ ἡ φιλαυτία μάλιστα, φιλοπρόντως ποιοῦσα καὶ φιλονίκους 3 εὖ πάσι καὶ πάντων ἐπιδραττομένους Ἐ ἀπλήστωσ. οὐ γὰρ πλούσιοι μόνον ὁμοῦ καὶ λόγιοι καὶ ἰσχυροὶ καὶ συμποτικοὶ καὶ ἣδεις εἶναι καὶ

1 λαγῶν] λαγὼν, λαγῶν et sim. in most mss.
2 ὃς] most mss. have ὁς or εἰς. Some mss. rewrite the sentence completely, but their variants are too improbable to be cited in full.
3 φιλονίκους Dübner: φιλονείκους.
ON TRANQUILLITY OF MIND, 471

Such felicitation comes from externals only—for his arms and horses and far-flung host of warriors; but against the emptiness of his glory the voice of his sufferings cries out in protest from the very heart:

The son of Cronus, Zeus, entangled me
In deep infatuation,
a

and

I envy you, old man;
I envy any man whose life has passed
Free from danger, unknown and unrenowned.
b

By such reflections also, then, it is possible to reduce the violence of our fault-finding with fate, fault-finding which, through admiration of our neighbours’ lot, both debases and destroys our own.

12. Further, another matter which greatly interferes with tranquillity of mind is that we do not manage our impulses, as sailors do their sails, to correspond to our capacity; in our expectations we aim at things too great; then, when we fail, we blame our destiny and our fortune instead of our own folly. For he is not unfortunate who wishes to shoot with his plough and hunt the hare with his ox, nor does a malicious destiny oppose him who cannot capture deer or boar with fishing creels or drag-nets; it is through folly and stupidity that such men attempt the impossible. And self-love is chiefly to blame, which makes men eager to be first and to be victorious in everything and insatiably desirous of engaging in everything. For not only do men demand to be at the same time rich and learned and strong and con-

a Homer, II., ii. 111, ix. 18.
b Agamemnon to his old servant: Euripides, Iphigeneia at Aulis, 16-18.
φίλοι βασιλέων καὶ πόλεων ἄρχοντες ἡξιούσιν, ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ καὶ κύνας ἐξουσί πρωτεύουσας ἄρετή καὶ ἱπποὺς καὶ ὀρτυγας καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνας, ἠθυμοῖς.

Διοιόσιος ὁ πρεσβύτερος οὐκ ἠγάπα μέγιστος ὁν τῶν τότε τυράννων, ἀλλ’ ὅτι Φιλοξένου τοῦ ποιητοῦ μὴ βέλτιον ἥδε μηδὲ περιτὴν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι. Πλάτωνος, ὀργισθεὶς καὶ παροξυνθεὶς τὸν μὲν εἰς τὰς λατομίας ἐνέβαλε τὸν δ’ ἀπέδοτο πέμψας εἰς Ἀγίναν. οὐ τοιοῦτος ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, ἀλλ’ ἔπει Κρίσων ὁ σταδιοδρόμος ἀμιλλόμενος αὐτῷ περὶ τάχους ἐδοξεῖν ἐκὼν παρεῖναι, σφόδρα διηγανάκτησεν. εὐ δὲ καὶ ὁ ποιητικὸς Ἀχιλλεὺς ὑπειπών τοῖς ἑών ὦσι οὗ τὸν Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτῶν ἐπιλεγέκεν.

ἐν πολέμῳ ἄγορῇ δὲ τ’ ἀμείνονες εἰςι καὶ ἄλλοι.

Μεγαβυζοῦν δὲ τὸν Πέρσην εἰς τὸ ζωγραφεῖον 472 ἀναβάντα τὸ Ἀπελλοῦ καὶ λαλεῖν ἐπιχειρήσαντα περὶ τῆς τέχνης ἐπεστόμισεν ὁ Ἀπελλῆς εἰπὼν, “ἐώς μὲν ἰσοχών ἤγες, ἐδόκεις τις εἶναι διὰ τὰ χρυσία καὶ τὴν πορφύραν, νυνὶ δὲ καὶ ταυτὶ τὰ τρίβοντα τὴν ὑχραν παιδάρια καταγελά σου φλαραροῦντος.”

Ἀλλ’ ἐνιοῦ τοὺς μὲν Στωικοὺς οἴονται παίζειν, ὅταν ἀκούσωσι τὸν σοφὸν παρ’ αὐτοῖς μὴ μόνον φρόνιμον καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀνδρείον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτορα καὶ

1 ἥδε] ἥδει in most mss.
2 Κρίσων] βρίσων in most mss.

*Cf. Moralia, 334 c, and Nachstädts references ad loc.

Ibid. 58 f.
vivial spirits and good company, and friends of kings and magistrates of cities, but unless they shall also have dogs and horses and quails and cocks that can win prizes, they are disconsolate.

The elder Dionysius was not content with being the greatest tyrant of his age, but because he could not sing verses better than the poet Philoxenus or get the better of Plato in dialectic, enraged and embittered, he cast Philoxenus into the stone-quarries, and, sending Plato to Aegina, sold him into slavery. Alexander was not of this temper, but when Crison, the famous sprinter, ran a race with him and appeared to slacken his pace deliberately, Alexander was very indignant. And when the Homeric Achilles had first said,

Of the bronze-clad Achaean none is a match for me,

he did well to add,

In war; but in speaking others are better than I.

But when Megabyzus the Persian came up to the studio of Apelles and attempted to chatter about art, Apelles shut his mouth by saying, "As long as you kept still, you seemed to be somebody because of your gold and purple; but now even these lads who grind the pigments are laughing at your nonsense."

But some think that the Stoics are jesting when they hear that in their sect the wise man is termed not only prudent and just and brave, but also an

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\[ a \] II., xviii. 105-106.
\[ b \] Cf. Moralia, 58 п; Zeuxis, according to Aelian, Varia Historia, ii. 2.
(472) ποιητήν καὶ στρατηγὸν καὶ πλούσιον καὶ βασιλέα προσαγορεύμενον, αὐτούς δὲ πάντων ἀξιοῦσι τοῦτων, κἂν μὴ τυγχάνωσιν, ἀνιῶνται. καὶ τῶν Β θεῶν ἄλλος ἄλλην ἔχων δύναμιν, ὁ μὲν ἔνναλιος, ὁ δὲ μαντεῖος, ὁ δὲ κερδώφος ἐπονομάζεται· καὶ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην ὁ Ζεὺς, ὥσ ὦ μετὸν αὐτῇ πολεμικῶν ἔργων, ἐπὶ γάμους ἀποστέλλει καὶ θαλάμους.

13. Τινὰ γὰρ οὐδὲ συνυπάρχει ἅλλα μᾶλλον ὑπεναντιοῦσθαι πέφυκεν ἅλληλος τῶν σπουδαζομένων· ὁιὸν ἁσκησις λόγων καὶ μαθημάτων ἀνάληψις ἀπραγμοσύνης δεῖται καὶ σχολῆς, δυνάμεις δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φιλίαι βασιλέων οὐκ ἄνευ πραγμάτων οὐδὲ ἁσχολιῶν περιγίνονται. καὶ μὴν "οἴνος" τε καὶ σαρκῶν ἐμφορήσεις σῶμα μὲν ἴσχυρὸν ποιοῦσι καὶ ῥωμαλέον, ψυχὴν δὲ ἀσθενῆ"· καὶ χρημάτων οὐ καταλεῖπεν μὲν συνεχῆς καὶ τήρησις αὐξεῖ πλούτων, ὑπεροψία δὲ καὶ περιφρόνησις μέγα πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ἐφόδιον. ὅθεν οὐ πάντα πάντων ἔστιν, ἅλλα δεῖ τῷ Πυθικῷ γράμματι πειθόμενον αὐτὸν καταμαθεῖν, εἶτα χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἐν ὃ πέφυκε, καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἅλλον ἄλλοτε βίου ἥλιον ἔλκειν καὶ παραβιάζεσθαι τὴν φύσιν.

1 μαντεῖοι] μαντῶας (or -φος) in most mss.
2 οἴνος] οἴνοι Stobaeus.
3 ἐμφορήσεις Stobaeus: ἐμφόρησις.
4 ὑπεροψία δὲ καὶ περιφρόνησις] ἀνυπεροψία δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνη Stobaeus.
5 περιφρόνησις] παραφροσύνη many mss.
orator, a poet, a general, a rich man, and a king; and then they count themselves worthy of all these titles, and if they fail to get them, are vexed. Yet even among the gods different gods hold different powers: one bears the epithet “War-like,” another “Prophetic,” another “Gain-bringing”; and Zeus\(^a\) dispatches Aphroditē to marriages and nuptial chambers, on the ground that she has no part in deeds of war.

13. There are, indeed, some pursuits which cannot by their very nature exist together, but rather are by nature opposed to each other; for example, training in rhetoric and the pursuit of mathematics require a quiet life and leisure, while political functions and the friendship of kings cannot succeed without hard work and the full occupation of one’s time. And \(^b\) “wine and indulgence in meat” do indeed “make the body strong and vigorous, but the soul weak”\(^c\); and unremitting care to acquire and preserve money increases wealth, yet contempt and disdain for it is greatly conducive to progress in philosophy. Therefore not all pursuits are for everyone, but one must, obeying the Pythian\(^d\) inscription, “know one’s self,” and then use one’s self for that one thing for which Nature has fitted one and not do violence to nature by dragging one’s self towards the emulation of now one sort of life, now another.

\(^a\) Cf. Homer, \textit{Il.}, v. 428 ff.
\(^b\) This passage to the beginning of the quotation from Pindar below is quoted by Stobaeus, vol. iii. p. 559 ed. Hense.
\(^c\) Words of Androcydes: cf. Clement of Alexandria, \textit{Stromateis}, vii. 6 ed. Stählin; see also \textit{Moralia}, 995 e, Athenaeus, iv. 157 d.
\(^d\) Cf. \textit{Moralia}, 164 b.
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(472)

ἐν1 ἄρμασιν ἵππος
ἐν δ’ ἀρότρῳ βοῦς, παρὰ ναῦν δ’ ἵθει τάχιστα
dελφίς,
κάπρῳ δὲ βουλεύοντα2 φόνον κύνα χρὴ τλάθυμον
eξευρεῖν.

ὁ δ’ ἄσχάλλων καὶ λυπούμενος ὅτι μὴ καὶ λέων
ἐστὶν

ὄρεστροφος, ἀλκὶ πεποιθῶς,
ἀμα καὶ κυνίδιον Μελιταίον ἐν κόλπῳ χήρας γυναι-
D κός τιθηνούμενον, ἀπόπληκτος ἐστι. τούτου δ’
oὐδέν τι βελτίων ὁ βουλόμενος ἀμα μὲν Ἡ Ἐμπε-
dοκλῆς ἡ Πλάτων ἡ Δημόκρίτος εἶναι περὶ κόσμου
γράφων καὶ τῆς τῶν ὀντῶν ἀληθείας, ἀμα δὲ
πλούσια γραφ συγκαθεύδειν ὡς Εὐφορίων, ἡ τῶν
ἐπικώμων ὃν3 Ἀλεξάνδρῳ συμπίνειν ὡς Μήδιος·
ἀγανακτῶν δὲ καὶ λυπούμενοι εἰ μὴ θαυμάζεται
dιὰ πλοῦτον ὡς Ἰσμηνίας καὶ δ’ ἄρετη ὡς
'Επαμεινώνδας. οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ δρομεῖς, ὅτι μὴ τοὺς
tῶν παλαιστῶν φέρονται στεφάνους, ἄθυμον
ἀλλὰ τοῖς αὐτῶν ἀγάλλονται καὶ χαίρουσι.

Σπάρταν ἑλαχεῖς, ταύταν κόσμει.

καὶ γὰρ ὁ Σόλων,

1 εν] ύφ’ Moralia, 451 d, supra.
2 βουλεύοντα] βουλεύοντι in most mss.; cf. 451 d, supra.
3 τῶν ἐπικώμων ὃν Pohlenz: ἴδιν ἐπὶ κῶμον Reiske: τῶν ἐπὶ
kῶμον.

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ON TRANQUILLITY OF MIND, 472

The horse is for the chariot;
The ox for the plough; beside the ship most swiftly speeds the dolphin;
And if you think to slay a boar, you must find a stout-hearted hound.

But that man is out of his wits who is annoyed and pained that he is not at the same time both a lion

Bred on the mountains, sure of his strength,

and a little Maltese dog cuddled in the lap of a widow. But not a whit better than he is the man who wishes at the same time to be an Empedocles or a Plato or a Democritus, writing about the universe and the true nature of reality, and, like Euphorion, to be married to a wealthy old woman, or, like Medius, to be one of Alexander's boon companions and drink with him; and is vexed and grieved if he is not admired for his wealth, like Ismenias, and also for his valour, like Epameinondas. We know that runners are not discouraged because they do not carry off wrestlers' crowns, but they exult and rejoice in their own.

Your portion is Sparta: let your crowns be for her!

So also Solon:

a Pindar, Frag. 234; cf. 451 D, supra.
b Homer, Od., vi. 130.
c Cf. O. Hense, Rheinisches Museum, xlv. 549, note 1.
d Cf. Life of Alexander, lxxv. (706 c); Moralia, 65 c, 124 c; Arrian, Anabasis, vii. 225. 1.
f Frag. 4, verses 10-12 ed. Diehl; Frag. 15, verses 2-4 ed. Edmonds; cf. Moralia, 78 c, 92 e, Life of Solon, iii. (79 f).
E τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἐμπεδόν ἔστι, 2
χρήματα δ’ ἀνθρώπων ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.


473 Πρὸς δὲ τούτως καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὅρωμεν ὑπομμήσκουσαν ἡμᾶς. ὡς γὰρ τῶν θηρίων ἐτέροις ἅφ’ ἐτέρων παρεσκεύασε τὴν τροφήν εἶναι καὶ οὐ πάντα σαρκοφαγεῖν ἢ σπερμολογεῖν ἢ μιζωρυχεῖν ἐποίη-

1 αὐτοῖς] τούτοις Theognis, 316, Stobaeus.
2 ἔστι] aiē Theognis.
3 After λούσθαι some mss. add θέλοντες.
4 μὲν] in two mss. (G, W) only.
5 αὐτοῖς Bernardakis: αὐτοῖς.
But we shall not exchange with them our virtue
For their wealth, since virtue is a sure possession,
But money falls now to this man, now that.

And Strato, the natural philosopher, when he heard
that Menedemus had many more pupils than he
himself had, said, "Why be surprised if there are
more who wish to bathe than to be anointed for the
contest?" And Aristotle, writing to Antipater,
said, "It is not Alexander alone who has the right to
be proud because he rules over many men, but no less
right to be proud have they who have true notions
concerning the gods." For those who have such
lofty opinions of their own possessions will not be
offended by their neighbours' goods. But as it is,
we do not expect the vine to bear figs nor the olive
grapes, but, for ourselves, if we have not at one and
the same time the advantages of both the wealthy
and the learned, of both commanders and philo-
sophers, of both flatterers and the outspoken, of
both the thrifty and the lavish, we slander ourselves,
we are displeased, we despise ourselves as living an
incomplete and trivial life.

Furthermore, we see that Nature also admonishes
us; for just as she has provided different foods for
different beasts and has not made them all carni-
vorous or seed-pickers or root-diggers, so has she

\[\text{a Cf. the anecdote of Zeno, Moralia, 78 D-E, 545 f.}\]
\[\text{b Frag. 664 ed. V. Rose; cf. Moralia, 78 D, 545 A;}\]
\[\text{Julian's Letter to Themistius, 265 A (ii. p. 231 ed. Wright,}\]
\[\text{L.C.L.).}\]
\[\text{c "Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather}\]
\[\text{grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?"}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{6} eπελῶς Reiske: \dot{a}πελῶς.}\]
μηλοβότα τ' ἄροτα τ' ὄρνιχολόχωστ' τε καὶ ὁν
πόντος τρέφει.

dεί δὴ τὸ πρόσφορον ἑαυτοῖς ἐλομένους καὶ
dιαπονοῦντας ἕαν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μὴ τὸν
Ἑσίόδουν ἐλέγχειν ἐνδεέστερον εἰπόντα
καὶ κεραμεύς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτοιν τέκτων.

οὐ γὰρ μόνον τοὺς ὀμοτέχνους καὶ τοὺς ὀμοτρό-

1 ὄρνιχολόχω Pindar, Isthm., i. 48: ὄρνιθολόχῳ.
3 κειμένους] del. van Herwerden.
4 ὑπὸ] ὑπερ in most mss.
5 ὀντα] ὀντα in many mss.: perhaps a quotation from

poetry or Ionian philosophy.

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given to men a great variety of means for gaining a livelihood,

To shepherd and ploughman and fowler and to him whom the sea provides with sustenance. a

We should, therefore, choose the calling appropriate to ourselves, cultivate it diligently, let the rest alone, and not prove that b Hesiod spoke inexactley when he said,

Potter is angry with potter, joiner with joiner.

For not only are men jealous of fellow-craftsmen and those who share the same life as themselves, but also the wealthy envy the learned, the famous the rich, advocates the sophists, and, by Heaven free men and patricians regard with wondering admiration and envy successful comedians in the theatre and dancers and servants in the courts of kings; and by so doing they afford themselves no small vexation and disturbance.

14. But that every man has within himself the store-rooms of tranquillity and discontent, and that the jars containing blessings and evils are not stored "on the threshold of Zeus," c but are in the soul, is made plain by the differences in men's passions. For the foolish overlook and neglect good things even when they are present, because their thoughts are ever intent upon the future, but the wise by remembrance

a Pindar, Isthmian Odes, i. 48; cf. Moralia, 406 c.

b Works and Days, 25; the whole passage, to the end of the chapter, is quoted in the Munich scholia on this verse of Hesiod (Usener, Rheinisches Museum, xxii. 592).

c Cf. Homer, II., xxiv. 527; Moralia, 24 b and the note, 105 c and the note, 600 c; Plato, Republic, 379 d; Siefert, op. cit., pp. 37 f. and the notes.
(473) ἐναργῶς ὁντα ποιοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς. τὸ γὰρ παρὸν τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ τοῦ χρόνου μορίῳ θυγεῖν παρασχὼν εἰτά τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐκφυγὸν οὐκετί δοκεῖ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδ' ἡμέτερον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνοίητοις· ἀλλ’ ὠσπερ ὁ Ἠ Ἀιδοῦ ξωγραφούμενος σχοινοστρόφος ὦνῳ τῳ παρίσην ἐπιβοσκομένῳ καταναλίσκειν τὸ πλεκόμενον, οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν ἀναίσθητος καὶ ἀχάριστος ὑπολαμβάνουσα λήθη καὶ κατανεμομένη πραξῖν τε 

D πᾶσαν ἀφανίζουσα καὶ κατόρθωμα καὶ σχολὴν ἐπι- 
χαρίν καὶ συμπεριφοράν καὶ ἀπόλαυσιν, οὐκ ἐὰν τὸν 
βίον ἑνα γενέσθαι, συμπλεκομένων τοῖς παροῦσι 
τῶν παρωχημένων· ἀλλ’ ὠσπερ ἔτερον τὸν ἐχθές 
ὀντα τοῦ σήμερον καὶ τὸν αὐριον ὁμοίως ὑπὸ τὸν 
αὐτόν τῷ σήμερον διαιροῦσα, πάν τὸ γινόμενον 
εὐθὺς εἰς τὸ ἀγένητον τῷ ἀμνημονεύτῳ καθίστησιν. 
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς τὰς αὐξήσεις ἀναιροῦν- 
tes ὡς τῆς οὔσιας ἐνδελεχῶς ἰσος, λόγῳ 
ποιοῦσιν ἡμῶν ἐκαστὸν ἄλλον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἄλλον· οἱ 
δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ τὰ ὑπότερον μὴ στέγωντες μὴ ἀναλαμβάνοντες ἀλλ’ ὑπεκρεῖν ἐὼντες ἔργῳ ποιο-
σιν ἑαυτούς καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀποδεῖς καὶ κενούς καὶ 

Ε τῆς αὐριον ἐκκρεμαμένους, ὡς τῶν πέρυσι καὶ 
πρώην καὶ χθές οὐ πρὸς αὐτοὺς3 ὀντων οὕδ’ ὅλως 
αὐτοῖς γενομένων.4

15. Καὶ τούτ’ οὖν τὴν εὐθυμίαν ἐπιταράσσει·

1 ὦνῳ τῳ] ὦνῳ most mss.: ἐρπετῷ τῳ D.
2 τὰ] omitted in most mss.
3 αὐτοὺς Xylander: αὐτῶν or αὐτῶν.
4 γενομένων] γενομένου in most mss.
make even those benefits that are no longer at hand to be vividly existent for themselves. For the present good, which allows us to touch it but for the smallest portion of time and then eludes our perception, seems to fools to have no further reference to us or to belong to us at all; but like that painting of a man twisting rope in Hades, who permits a donkey grazing near by to eat it up as he plaits it, so insensible and thankless forgetfulness steals upon the multitude and takes possession of them, consuming every action and success, every pleasant moment of leisure and companionship and enjoyment; it does not allow life to become unified, when past is interwoven with present, but separating yesterday, as though it were different, from to-day, and to-morrow likewise, as though it were not the same as to-day, forgetfulness straightway makes every event to have never happened because it is never recalled. For those who in the Schools do away with growth and increase on the ground that Being is in a continual flux, in theory make each of us a series of persons different from oneself; so those who do not preserve or recall by memory former events, but allow them to flow away, actually make themselves deficient and empty each day and dependent upon the morrow, as though what had happened last year and yesterday and the day before had no relation to them nor had happened to them at all.

15. This, then, is a matter disturbing to tranquillity

* Ocnus or "Sloth"; the painting was by Polygnotus in the Leschê at Delphi: Pausanias, x. 29. 1. Cf. also Propertius, iv. 3. 21-22: dignior obliquo funem qui torqueat Ocno, aeternusque tuam pascat, aselle, famem; Diodorus, i. 97; Pliny, *Natural History*, xxxv. 137.

κάκεινο μᾶλλον, όταν, ὦσπερ αἱ μυῖα τῶν λείψιν τόπων ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις ἀποισθάνουσι ταῖς δὲ τραχύτησι προσέχονται καὶ ταῖς ἀμυχαίς, οὕτως ἀνθρωποὶ τῶν ἀφαρῶν καὶ προσηγών ἀπορρέοντες ἐμπλέκονται ταῖς τῶν ἀγήδων ἀναμνήσεις μᾶλλον δ’ ὦσπερ ἐν Ὁλύνθῳ τοὺς κανθάρους λέγουσιν, εἰς τι χωρίον ἐμβαλόντας ¹ δ’ καλεῖται “Κανθαρώλεθρον,” ἐκβήναι μὴ δυναμένους ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖ στρεφο-μένους καὶ κυκλοῦντας ἐναποθήσκειν, οὕτως εἰς τὴν τῶν κακῶν μνήμην ὑπορρυνόντας ἀνενεγκεῖν μὴ θέλωσι μηδ’ ἀναπνεῦσαι. δεὶ δ’ ὦσπερ ἐν πυνακίων χρωμάτων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ λαμπρὰ προβάλλοντας, ἀποκρύπτειν τὰ σκυθρωπὰ καὶ πιέζειν· ἐξαλείψαι γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι παντάπασιν οὐδ’ ἀπαλαγῆναι. “παλιντροπὸς” γὰρ 474 ἀρμονίη κόσμου, ὀκωσπερ λύρης καὶ τόξου,” καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων καθαρὸν οὐδὲν οὐδ’ ἀμυγές. ἀλλ’ ὦσπερ ἐν μουσικῇ βαρεῖς φθόγγοι καὶ ὄξεις ἐν δὲ γραμματικῇ φωνήνητα καὶ ἄμωνα γράμματα, μουσικὸς δὲ καὶ γραμματικός οὐχ ὁ θατέρα δυσχεραίνων καὶ ὑποψεύγων ἀλλ’ ὁ πάσι χρήσθαι καὶ μυγνύαι πρὸς τὸ ἄνειον ἐπιστάμενος, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀντιστοιχίας ἐχόντων (ἐπεί κατὰ τὸν Εὐριπίδην  

οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρίς ἐσθλὰ καὶ κακά,
ἀλλ’ ἔστι τις σύγκρασις, ὥστ’ ἔχειν καλῶς),

¹ ἐμβαλόντας Bernardakis: ἐμβάλλοντας.
² παλιντροπὸς] παλιντρόπος D and Moralia, 369 b.

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ᵃ Cf. Aristotle, De Mirabilibus Auseultationibus, 120 (842 a 5 f.); Pliny, Natural History, xi. 28. 99.
b Cf. Moralia, 599 f—600 a; 863 e.

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of mind; and another, even more disturbing, arises when, like flies which slip off the smooth surfaces of mirrors, but stick to places which are rough or scratched, men drift away from joyous and agreeable matters and become entangled in the remembrance of unpleasant things; or rather, as they relate that when beetles have fallen into a place at Olynthus which is called "Death-to-Beetles," they are unable to get out, but turn and circle about there until they die in that place, so when men have slipped into brooding upon their misfortunes, they do not wish to recover or revive from that state. But, like colours in a painting, so in the soul it is right that we should place in the foreground bright and cheerful experiences and conceal and suppress the gloomy; for to wipe them out and be rid of them altogether is impossible. "For the harmony of the universe, like that of a lyre or a bow, is by alternatives," and in mortal affairs there is nothing pure and unmixed. But as in music there are low notes and high notes, and in grammar there are vowels and consonants, yet a musician or a grammarian is not the man who dislikes and avoids the one or the other, but rather the man who knows how to use all and to blend them properly, so also in human affairs, which contain the principles of opposition to each other (since, as Euripides has it,

The good and bad cannot be kept apart,
But there's some blending, so that all is well),

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(474) οὐ δεῖ τοῖς ἑτέροις ἔξαθυμεῖν οὐδ’ ἀπαγορεύειν. Δὲ ὁ Μένανδρος φησιν, ἀπαντήσας ἀνδρὶ συμπαράσταται ἐνδικτὴς γενομένως, μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου ἄγαθος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, διτταὶ τινες ἐκάστος ἰμών γινόμενον παραλαμβάνουσι καὶ κατ- ἄρχονται μοῦραι καὶ δαίμονας.

16. "Ωστε τούτων ἐκάστου σπέρματο τῶν παθῶν ἀνακεκραμένα δεδεγμένης ἰμῶν τῆς γενέσεως καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν ἐχοῦσης, εὐχεταὶ μὲν ὁ νοῦν ἐχων τὰ βελτίωνα προσδοκά δὲ καὶ θάτερα, χρήται δ’ ἀμφοτέρους τὸ ἄγαν ἀφαιρῶν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον "ὁ τῆς αὐριοῦν ἥκιστα δεόμενος," ὡς φησιν Ἐπίκουρος, "ἡδίστα πρόσειει πρὸς τὴν αὐριον," ἀλλὰ καὶ πλοῦτος εὐφραίνει καὶ δόξα καὶ δύναμις καὶ ἀρχή μάλιστα τοὺς ἥκιστα τάναντια ταρβοῦν-
we should not be disheartened or despondent in adversity, but like musicians who achieve harmony by consistently deadening bad music with better and encompassing the bad with the good, we should make the blending of our life harmonious and conformable to our own nature.

For it is not true, as Menander a says, that

By every man at birth a Spirit stands,
A guide of virtue for life's mysteries;

but rather, as Empedocles b affirms, two Fates, as it were, or Spirits, receive in their care each one of us at birth and consecrate us:

Chthonia was there and far-seeing Heliopē,
And bloody Deris, grave-eyed Harmonia,
Callisto, Aeschra, Thoōsa, and Denaea,
Lovely Nemertes, dark-eyed Asaphia.

16. The result is that since we at our birth received the mingled seeds of each of these affections, and since therefore our nature possesses much unevenness, a man of sense prays for better things, but expects the contrary as well, and, avoiding excess, deals with both conditions. For not only does "he who has least need of the morrow," as Epicurus c says, "most gladly advance to meet the morrow," but also wealth and reputation and power and public office delight most of all those who least fear their


b Diels, Frag. d. Vorsokratiker6, i. pp. 360-361, Frag. 122. The names are intended to mean Earth-maiden, Sun-maiden; Discord, Harmony; Beauty, Ugliness; Swiftness, Slowness; Truth, Uncertainty.

c Usener, Epicurea, p. 307, Frag. 490 (p. 139 Bailey); cf Horace, Epistulae, i. 4. 13-14.
(474) ταν. ή γάρ σφοδρά περὶ ἐκαστὸν ἐπιθυμία
1) σφοδρότατον φόβον ἐμποιοῦσα τοῦ μὴ παραμενεῖν, ἀσθενὴ τὴν χάριν ποιεῖ καὶ ἀβέβαιον ὄσπερ φλόγα καταπνεομένην. ὡ δὲ δίδωσι πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἀδεῶς καὶ ἀτρόμως εἰπεῖν τὸ λογισμὸς,

ηδὺ μὲν ἄν τι φήρης, ὄλιγον δὲ ἄχος ἂν ἀπολείπης,

tοῦτον ἡδιστα ποιεῖ χρῆσθαι τοὺς παροῦς τὸ θαρραλέον καὶ μὴ δεδομὸς αὐτῶν τὴν ἀποβολὴν ὡς ἀδόρητον. ἔξεστι γάρ τὴν Ἐναξαγόρου διάθεσιν, ἀφ’ ἡς ἐπὶ τῇ τελευτῇ τοῦ παιδὸς ἀνεφώνησεν, "ἡδείν θνητὸν γεννήσας," μὴ θαυμάζοντας μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ μιμουμένους ἐπιλέγειν ἐκάστῳ τῶν τυχηρῶν," οἶδα τὸν πλοῦτον ἐφήμερον ἔχων καὶ οὐ Ε βέβαιον": "οἶδα τὴν ἁρχὴν ἀφελέσθαι δυναμένους τοὺς δεδωκότας". "οἶδα τὴν γυναίκα χρηστὴν γυναίκα δ’ οὐσαν καὶ τὸν φίλον ἀνθρωπον ὄντα, ἐνῶν φύσει εὐμετάβολον, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων εἶπεν." αἱ γὰρ τοιαῦται παρασκευάζει καὶ διαθέσεις, ἐάν τι συμβῇ τῶν ἀβουλήτων μὲν οὐκ ἀπροσδοκήτων δὲ, μὴ δεχόμεναι τὸ "οὗκ ἄν ὠμην" καὶ τὸ "ἀλλ’ ἠλπίζον" καὶ τὸ "ταύτ’ οὐ προσεόδοκων," οἶνον² πηδήματα καρδίας καὶ σφυγμοὺς ἀφαιροῦσι καὶ ταχὺ πάλιν τὸ μανωθὲς καὶ ταραττόμενον ἐδρύουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Καρνεάδης ἐπὶ πραγμάτων μεγάλων Φ ὑπεμίμηνσεν ὅτι πάν καὶ ὁλον ἐστὶν εἰς λύπην ἄγον³ καὶ ἀθυμίαν τὸ ἀπροσδόκητον. ἡ γὰρ

1 τὸ ἄλλα Meziriacus: πολλὰ. 2 οἶνον] ota Reiske. 3 ἄγον added by Capps.

* Perhaps a fragment of Callimachus (cf. Frag. Anon. 371 ed. Schneider); see also Seneca, De Tranquillitate Animi, xi. 3.
opposites. For the violent desire for each of these implants a most violent fear that they may not remain, and so renders pleasure in them weak and unstable, like a fluttering flame. But the man whom Reason enables to say to Fortune without fear and trembling,

Welcome to me if any good you bring;
But if you fail, the pain is very slight,\(^a\)

his confidence and the absence of fear that their loss would be unbearable cause him to make most pleasant use of present advantages. For it is possible not only to admire the disposition of Anaxagoras,\(^b\) which made him say at the death of his son, "I knew that my son was mortal," but also to imitate it and to apply it to every dispensation of Fortune: "I know that my wealth is temporary and insecure," "I know that those who bestowed my magistracy can take it away." "I know that my wife is excellent, but a woman, and that my friend is but a man, by nature an animal readily subject to change, as Plato\(^c\) said." For men of such preparedness and of such disposition, if anything unwished yet not unexpected happens, disdain sentiments like these: "I never should have thought it," or "I had hoped for other things," or "I did not expect this," and so do away with anything like throb-bings and palpitations of the heart, and speedily restore again to quiet the madness and disturbance of their minds. Carneades, indeed, reminded us that in matters of great importance it is the unexpected\(^d\) that is completely and wholly the cause of grief and

\(^a\) Cf. 463 d, \textit{supra}, and the note.
\(^b\) Cf. 463 d, \textit{supra}, and the note.
\(^c\) \textit{Epistle} xiii. 360 d; cf. 463 d, \textit{supra}, and the note.
\(^d\) Cf. 449 e, \textit{supra}.
Μακεδόνων βασιλεία τῆς 'Ρωμαίων ἡγεμονίας πολλοστημόριον ἢν· ἀλλά Περσεὺς μὲν ἀποβαλὼν Μακεδονίαν αὐτὸς τε κατεθρήνει τὸν έαυτοῦ δαιμόνα καὶ πάσιν ἔδοκει δυστυχέστατος ἀνθρώπων 475 γεγονόναι καὶ βαρυποτμότατος· δ' ἐδ τούτου κρατήσας Αἰμίλιος ἐτέρῳ παραδίδους τὴν όμοι τι γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἀρχοῦσαν δύναμιν ἐστεφανοῦτο καὶ ἔθνες εὐδαιμονίζόμενος, εἰκότως· οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἦδει λαμβάνων ἀρχήν ἀποδοθησομένην, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἀπέβαλε μὴ προσδοκήσας. εὐ δ' ἐκαὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οἰνόν ἔστι τὸ παρὰ προσδοκίαν ἐδίδαξεν· δ' γὰρ Ὅσιοστὸς τοῦ μὲν κυνὸς σαίνοντος1 ἐξεδάκρυσε, τῇ δὲ γυναικὶ κλαιούσῃ παρακαθήμενος οὐδὲν ἐπάθε τοιοῦτον· ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ ἀφίκτο τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ πάθος ὑποχείριον ἔχων καὶ προκατελημμένον, εἰς δ' ἐκεῖνο2 μὴ προσδοκήσας ἀλλ' ἔξαιφνης διὰ τὸ παράδοξον ἐνέπεσεν.

Β 17. Καθόλου δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν ἄβουλήτων τὰ μὲν φύσει τὸ λυποῦν καὶ βαρῶν ἐπιφέρει, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα δόξη δυσχεραίνειν ἐθιζόμεθα καὶ μανθάνομεν, οὐκ3 ἀχρηστόν ἔστι πρὸς ταῦτα μὲν4 ἔχειν ἀεὶ τὸ τοῦ Μενάνδρου πρόχειρον·

οὐδὲν πέπονθας δεινὸν ἂν μὴ προσποιή

1 σαίνοντος Hartman: θανάτως.
2 ἐκεῖνο Reiske, confirmed by mss.: ἐκεῖνον.
3 καὶ before οὐκ deleted by Stephanus and Hutten.
4 μὲν] omitted in most mss.

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a Cf., for example, Life of Aemilius Paulus, xxxiv. 1-2 (273 c-e).
b Od., xvii. 302-304: ἀπομόρφατο δάκρυ.
dejection. For example, the kingdom of Macedonia was infinitely smaller than the Roman dominion, yet when Perseus lost Macedonia, both he himself bewailed his own evil genius and every one thought that he had become the most unfortunate and ill-starred man in the world; but Aemilius, his conqueror, handed over to another his supreme command of practically the whole earth and sea, yet was crowned and offered sacrifice and was esteemed fortunate—and with good reason, for he knew that he had taken a command which would have to be relinquished again, whereas Perseus lost his kingdom when he had not expected to do so. And well has the Poet taught us how strong the effect of an unexpected happening is: Odysseus, for instance, shed a tear when his dog fawned upon him, yet when he sat beside his weeping wife, gave way to no such emotion; for into the latter situation he had come with his emotion under control and fortified by reason, but he had stumbled into the former without having expected it, and suddenly.

17. And, to speak generally, although some of the things which happen against our will do by their very nature bring pain and distress, yet since it is through false opinion that we learn and become accustomed to be disgruntled with the greatest part of them, it is not unprofitable to have the verse of Menander ever ready against the latter:

No harm's been done you, if you none admit

\[c\] Ibid. xix. 208 ff.; quoted in 442 \(v\), supra, where see the note.
(475) (τι γὰρ πρὸς σὲ ἐστι, φησίν; ἂν μὴτε σαρκὸς ἀπτηται μὴτε ψυχῆς, οἷον ἐστὶ δυσγένεια πατρὸς ἢ μοιχεία γυναικὸς ἢ στεφάνου τινὸς ἢ προεδρίας ἀφαίρεσις, ὡς οὐ κωλύεται παρόντων ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ σώμα βέλτιστα διακείμενον ἔχειν καὶ τὴν ψυχῆν;· πρὸς δὲ τὰ φύσει δοκοῦντα λυπεῖν, οἷα οὔσοι καὶ πόνοι καὶ θάνατοι φίλων καὶ τέκνων, ἐκεῖνο τὸ Εὐριπίδειον

οἶμοι· τί δ' οἶμοι; θυμᾶτα τοι πεπόνθαμεν.

οὔδεὶς γὰρ οὕτω τοῦ παθητικοῦ καταφερομένου καὶ ὀλισθάνοντος ἀντιλαμβάνεται λόγος, ὡς ο τῆς κοινῆς καὶ φυσικῆς ἀνάμνησιν ποιῶν ἀνάγκης, ἢ διὰ τὸ σώμα μεμιγμένος ὁ ἄνθρωπος μόνην ταύτην τῇ τύχῃ λαβὴν δίδωσιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κυριωτάτοις καὶ μεγίστοις ἀσφαλῆς ἐστηκεν.

'Ο Δημήτριος τὴν Μεγαρέων πόλιν καταλαβὼν ἠρώτησε τὸν Στίλπνα, μή τί τῶν ἐκείνου διήρπασται. καὶ ὁ Στίλπνος ἐφη μηδεν' ἵδειν "τἀμὰ" φέροντα. καὶ τοῖνυν τῆς τύχης πάντα τάλλα λεγαδούσης καὶ περιαιρουμένης, ἔχομεν τι τοιοῦ-Di τοῦ ἐν ἕαυτοις,

οἶόν κ' οὔτε φέροιεν 'Αχαϊοὶ οὔτ' ἂν ἅγοιεν.

1 φησίν] ϕασίν in some mss.; φημί or φήσομεν van Herwerden.
2 τάμα] τὰν ἐπιστάμαν Pohlens; ἐπιστάμαν Dübner.

a The προεδρία was the privilege of sitting in the front seats at public games, or the theatre, or public assemblies, granted to distinguished citizens, foreigners, or magistrates.

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(for what, he means, if they touch neither body nor soul, are such things to you as the low birth of your father, or the adultery of your wife, or the deprivation of a crown or of front seats, a since when these misfortunes are present a man is not prevented from having both body and soul in the best of condition ?) ; and against those things which seem to pain us by their very nature, as sicknesses, anxieties, and the death of friends and children, we should have ready that famous verse of Euripides b :

Alas!—Yet why alas? Our sufferings
Are but what we mortals must endure.

For no reasoning so effectively engages the emotional part of us, when it is being borne down and is slipping, as that which reminds us of the common and natural necessity to which man is exposed through his composite and corporeal nature: it is the only hold he gives to Fortune, while in his most vital and important parts he stands secure.

When Demetrius took the Megarians' city, he asked Stilpo if any of his possessions had been plundered. And Stilpo said, "I saw no one carrying off my property." c And therefore when Fortune plunders and strips us of everything else, we have something within ourselves of the sort that

Achaean: could never harry or plunder.4


c "Virtue" according to Moralia, 5 r; "knowledge" in the Life of Demetrius, ix. (893 A): οὐδένα γὰρ εἶδον ἐπιστάμαν ἀποφέροντα.

d Adapted from Homer, Il., v. 484
(475) ὁθεν οὗ δει παντάπασιν ἐκταπεινοῦν¹ οὔδε καταβάλλειν τὴν φύσιν, ὡς μηδὲν ἴσχυρὸν μηδὲ μόνιμον 
μηδ' ὑπὲρ τὴν τύχην ἔχουσαν, ἀλλὰ τούναντιον 
eιδότας ὅτι μικρόν ἐστι μέρος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ 
σαθρὸν² καὶ ἐπίκηρον,³ ὃ δέχεται τὴν τύχην, τῆς 
dὲ βελτίωνος μερίδος αὐτοὶ κρατοῦμεν, ἐν ᾗ 
tὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἱδρυθέντα, δόξαι τε χρησταὶ 
cαὶ μαθήματα καὶ λόγου τελευτώντες εἰς ἄρετήν, 
ἀναφαίρετον ἐχουσι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἀδιάφορον, 
ἀνεκπλήκτους⁵ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον εἶναι καὶ ϑαρραλέους,
Ε πρὸς⁶ τὴν τύχην λέγοντας, ἀ Σωκράτης δοκῶν πρὸς 
tὸν κατηγόροντα λέγειν πρὸς τὸν δικαστὰς ἔλεγεν, 
ὡς ἀποκτείναι μὲν Ἀνυτὸς καὶ Μέλητος δύνανται, 
βλάψει δ' οὖ δύνανται. καὶ γὰρ ἡ τύχη δύναται 
vόσῳ περιβάλειν, ἀφελέσθαι χρήματα, διαβάλειν 
πρὸς δὴμον ἡ τύραννον· κακὸν δὲ καὶ δελὸν καὶ 
tαπεινόφρονα καὶ ἀγεννὴ καὶ φθονερὸν οὐ δύναται 
pοιῆσαι τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀνδρώδη καὶ μεγαλόψυχον⁸ 
οὔδὲ παρελέσθαι τὴν διάθεσιν,⁹ ἢς ἂεὶ παρούσης 
πλέον ἡ κυβερνήτητος πρὸς θάλατταν ὀφελός ἐστι 
Ε πρὸς τὸν βίων. κυβερνήτητι γὰρ οὔτε κόμα πραδύναι 
τραχὺ καὶ πνεῦμα δυνατῶν ἐστιν, οὔθ' ὅποι βούλεται 
deομένῳ λυμένος τυχεῖν οὔτε ϑαρραλέως καὶ

¹ ἐκταπεινοῦν οὔδε καταβάλλειν] ταπεινοῦν Stobaeus; but cf.
⁴ 471 c, supra.
² τὸ σαθρὸν καὶ] σαθρὸν τε καὶ Stobaeus.
³ ἐπίκηρον Stobaeus and G: τὸ ἐπίκηρον.
⁴ ὃ] ὃ Leonicus and some mss.
⁵ ἀνεκπλήκτους Stobaeus: ἀηττητους.
⁶ πρὸς Madvig, confirmed by mss.: καὶ πρὸς.
⁷ κατηγόρους Stobaeus: κατηγόρους ἀνυτὸν καὶ μέλητον.
⁸ 228
Therefore we should not altogether debase and depreciate Nature in the belief that she has nothing strong, stable, and beyond the reach of Fortune, but, on the contrary, since we know that the corrupt and perishable part of man wherein he lies open to Fortune is small, and that we ourselves are masters of the better part, in which the greatest of our blessings are situated—right opinions and knowledge and the exercise of reason terminating in the acquisition of virtue, all of which have their being inalienable and indestructible—knowing all this, we should face the future undaunted and confident and say to Fortune what Socrates, when he was supposed to be replying to his accusers, was really saying to the jury, "Anytus and Meletus are able to take away my life, but they cannot hurt me." Fortune, in fact, can encompass us with sickness, take away our possessions, slander us to people or despot; but she cannot make the good and valiant and high-souled man base or cowardly, mean, ignoble, or envious, nor can she deprive us of that disposition, the constant presence of which is of more help in facing life than is a pilot in facing the sea. For a pilot cannot calm a savage wave or a wind, nor can he find a harbour wherever he wishes at need, nor can he await the event confidently and

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{a}} \text{The following passage is cited in Stobaeus, vol. ii. p. 161 ed. Wachsmuth, as from } \Pi\lambda\nu\tau\acute{a}ρ\chi\omicron\upsilon \Pi\epsilon\upsilon \phi\upsilon\lambda\iota\acute{a}\varsigma ; \text{ but Patzig (Quaest. Plutarch., p. 34) is doubtless right in thinking that } \phi\upsilon\lambda\iota\acute{a}\varsigma \text{ is a scribal error for } \epsilon\upsilon\theta\upsilon\mu\iota\acute{a}\varsigma. \]

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{b}} \text{Cf. Plato, Apology, 30 c-d; the same form of this statement with almost the same differences from Plato's words is found in Epictetus, i. 29. 18, and the } \textit{Encheiridion}, \text{ liii. 4.} \]

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{a}} \text{C. Wachsmuth would add } \kappa\alpha\iota \gamma\epsilon\nu\nu\nu\alpha\iota\upsilon \kappa\alpha\iota \epsilon\lambda\varepsilon\upsilon\theta\acute{e}r\acute{e}i\omicron\upsilon ; \text{ cf. 485 A, infra.} \]

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{b}} \text{διάθεσιν } \text{διάθεσιν } \tau\omicron \nu \kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron \nu \text{ Stobaeus.} \]
PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

άτρόμως υπομείναι τὸ συμβαίνον· ἀλλ' ἔως οὐκ ἀπέγνωκε τῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος,

φεύγει μέγα λαῖφος υποστολίσας eis¹ ἐνέρτερον ἱστον ἐρεβώδεος ἐκ θαλάσσης,

476 ἐπειδὰν δὲ τὸ πέλαγος² ὑπέρσχη, τρέμων κάθηται καὶ παλλόμενος. ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονίμου διάθεσις τοῖς τε σωματικοῖς παρέχει γαλήνην ἐπὶ πλείστον, ἐκλύουσα τὰς τῶν νόσων κατασκευὰς ἐγκρατεία καὶ διαίτῃ σῶφρον καὶ μετρίος πόνοις· κἂν τις ἐξωθεὶν ἀρχὴ πάθους ὑστερ διαδρομὴ γένηται σπιλάδος, "ἐνσταλεῖ καὶ κούφη κεραία παρῆνεγκεν," ὥς φησιν Ἀσκληπιάδης· παραλόγον δὲ τινὸς καὶ μεγάλου καταλαβόντος καὶ κρατήσαντος, ἐγγὺς ὁ λιμὴν καὶ πάρεστιν ἀπονήξασθαι τοῦ σώματος ὑστερ ἐφολκίου μὴ στέγοντος.

18. Τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀνόητον ὁ τοῦ θανάτου φόβος οὐχ ὁ τοῦ ζῆν πόθος ἐκκρέμασθαι τοῦ σώματος Β ποιεῖ, περιπεπλεγμένον ὑστερ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα τῷ ἐρινῷ δεδουκότα τῇ Χάρυβδιν ὑποκειμένην,

ἐνθ' οὔτε μίμνεων ἀνεμος οὔτε πλεῖν³ εἳ,

καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα δυσαρέστως καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα περι-

¹ eis] most mss. have ἔως or ἔστ'.
² ἐπειδὰν δὲ τὸ πέλαγος added by Pohlenz from Demosthenes, Third Philippic, 69.
³ οὔτε πλεῖν] οὔτ' ἐκπλεῖν Suidas and Diogenianus.

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without trembling; as long as he has not despaired, making use of his skill,

With the mainsail dropped to the lower mast
He flees from the murky sea,

whereas when the sea towers over him, he sits there quaking and trembling. But the disposition of the wise man yields the highest degree of calm to his bodily affections, destroying by means of self-control, temperate diet, and moderate exertion the conditions leading to disease; even if the beginning of some evil comes from without, "he rides it out with light and well-furled sail," as Asclepiades has it, just as one passes through a storm. But if some great unforeseen disaster comes upon him and masters him, the harbour is close at hand and he may swim away from his body, as from a leaky boat.

18. For it is the fear of death, not the desire for life, which makes the fool dependent on his body, clinging to it as Odysseus did to the fig-tree through fear of Charybdis below,

Where breezes let him neither stay nor sail,

so that he is displeased at this and fearful of that.

Moralia, 169 b, where the fragment is quoted in another form.

b Asclepiades of Samos; cf. Knox, Choliambica, p. 270, who rewrites the line.

c Apparently by suicide; cf. the admiration Plutarch expresses for Demosthenes' suicide (Comp. Cic. and Dem., v. 888 c); but his position is quite different in the polemic against Epicurus, Moralia, 1103 e.


(476) δεώς ἔχοντα. ὁ δὲ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν ἄμωσ-γέτως ἐπινοοῦν καὶ τὴν εἰς τὸ βέλτιον αὐτῆς ἢ μηθὲν κάκιον ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ μεταβολῆν ἐπιλογιζό-μενος, οὐ μικρὸν ἔχει τῆς πρὸς τὸν βίον εὐθυμίας ἐφόδιον τὴν πρὸς τὸν θάνατον ἀφοβίαν. ὃ γὰρ ἔξεστι τῆς μὲν ἁρετῆς2 καὶ οἰκείας μερίδος ἐπικρατοῦσης ἦδεως ξῆν, τῶν δ' ἄλλοτρίων καὶ παρὰ ψύσιν ὑπερβαλλόντων ἀδεώς ἀπελθεῖν εἰπόντα,

λύσει μ' ὁ δαίμον ων αὐτός, ὅταν ἐγὼ θέλω,

ἀν τούτω χαλεπὸν ἢ δύσκολον ἢ ταραχόδες ἐμπίπτον ἐπινοήσαμεν; ὃ γὰρ εἶπόν, "προ-κατελήμμαί σ', ὃ Τύχη, καὶ πάσαι τὴν σὴν ἀφήρημαι παρείσδυσιν," οὐ μοχλοῖς οὐδὲ κλεισὶν οὐδὲ τείχεσιν ἐθάρρυνεν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ δόγμασι καὶ λόγοις ὧν πάσι μέτεστι τοῖς βουλομένοις. καὶ δεῖ μηδὲν ἀπογνώσκειν μηδ' ἀπιστεῖν τῶν οὕτω λε-γομένων, ἀλλὰ θαυμάζοντα καὶ ξηλοῦντα καὶ συνενθυσώντα πειρᾶν ἀμα λαμβάνειν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατανόησαι ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττοσι πρὸς τὰ μείζονα, μὴ φεύγοντα μηδ' ἀπωθοῦντα τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ἐπιμέ-

D λειναν αὐτῶν μηδὲ διαδιδράσκοντ' εἰς τὸ3 'ἳ τάχα δ' οὐδὲν ἔσται δυσχερέστερον." ἀτονίαν4 γὰρ ἔμποιει καὶ μαλακίαν ἀγύμναστον ἡ περὶ τὸ ράστον ἀεὶ διατρίβουσα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἦδιον ἐκ τῶν ἀβουλήτων ἀναχωροῦσα γλυκυθυμία τῆς ψυχῆς. ἡ δὲ καὶ νόσου καὶ πόνου καὶ φυγῆς μελετῶσα φαντασίαν ὑφίστα-

1 ἐπινοοῦν] ὑπονοοῦν in all mss. except D.
2 ἁρετῆς Reiske: ἁρετῆς.
3 εἰς τὸ added by Meziriacus.
4 ἀτονίαν Reiske; ἄργιαν Dübner; ἄνιαν Xylander: ἀνίαν; cf. 460 b, supra.

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But he who understands somehow or other the nature of the soul and reflects that the change it undergoes at death will be for the better, or at least not for the worse, has no small provision to secure tranquillity of mind for facing life—fearlessness towards death. For he who can live pleasantly when the agreeable and congenial part of life is in the ascendant, but when alien and unnatural principles prevail, can depart fearlessly, saying,

The god himself shall free me, when I will, a

what can we imagine might befall such a man as this that would vex or trouble or disturb him? For he b who said, "I have anticipated you, Fortune, and taken from you every entry whereby you might get at me," encouraged himself, not with bolts or keys or battlements, but by precepts and reasoning in which everyone who desires may share. And one must not despair or disbelieve any of these arguments, but should admire and emulate them and, being filled with their inspiration, make trial of oneself and observe oneself in smaller matters with a view to the greater, not avoiding or rejecting from the soul the care of these things, nor taking refuge in the remark, "Perhaps nothing will be more difficult than this." For languor and flabby softness are implanted by that self-indulgence of the soul which ever occupies itself with the easiest way, and retreats from the undesirable to what is most pleasant. But the soul which endeavours, by study and the severe application of its

a Euripides, Bacchae, 498; cf. Horace, Epistulae, i. 16. 78-79:

"Ipse deus simul atque volunt me solvet." opinor
hoc sentit, "moriar." mors ultima linea rerum est.

b Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Frag. 49 ed. Körte.
(476) σθαί καὶ προσβιαζομένη τῷ λόγισμῷ πρὸς ἐκαστὸν εὐρήσει πολὺ τὸν κατεψυχμένον καὶ διάκενον καὶ σαθρὸν ἐν τοῖς δοκοῦσι χαλεποῖς καὶ φοβεροῖς, ὡς ὁ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἀποδείκνυσι λόγος.

19. Καίτοι πολλοὶ καὶ τὸ τοῦ Μενάνδρου πεφρίκασιν,

οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ζῶντα, "τοῦτ’ οὐ πείσομαι,"

ἀγνοοῦντες ὅσον ἔστι πρὸς ἀλυπίαν ἀγαθὸν τὸ

Ε μελετᾶν καὶ δύνασθαι πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἀνευγόσι

tοὺς ὁμμασὶν ἀντιβλέπειν καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ τὰς

φαντασίας "ἀτρίπτους ἀπαλὰς" ὁσπερ ἐνσκια-

τροφούμενον πολλαῖς ἐλπίσων ὑπεικούσαις οἰ καὶ

πρὸς μηθὲν ἀντιτεινούσαις. ἐκεῖνο μέντοι καὶ πρὸς

tὸν Μενάνδρον ἐξομεν εἰπεῖν,

οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ζῶντα, "τοῦτ’ οὐ πείσομαι,"

ἀλλ’ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ζῶντα, "τοῦτ’ οὐ ποιήσων οὐ

ψεύσομαι, οὐ ῥαδιουργησω, οὐκ ἀποστερήσω, οὐκ

ἐπιβουλεύσω." τούτῳ γὰρ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν κείμενον οὐ

μικρὸν ἀλλὰ μέγα πρὸς εὐθυμίαν πάρεστιν. ὁσπερ

αὐ τοῦναντίον

ἡ σύνεσις, ὅτι σύνοιδα δεῖν’ εἰργασμένος,

ὁ οἶνον ἑλκὸς ἐν σαρκὶ τῇ ψυχῆ ὑποτελεῖν

ἀιμάσσοντας οὐκ καὶ νῦσσον ἐναπολείπειν. τὰς

μὲν γὰρ ἄλλας ἀναρεῖ λύπας ὁ λόγος, τὴν δὲ

1 τὸ] omitted in most mss.
2 ἀπαλὰς] καὶ ἀπαλὰς in most mss.
3 οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν] omitted in most mss.
4 τῇ ψυχῇ] τῆς ψυχῆς in most mss.
powers of reasoning, to form an idea of what sickness, suffering, and exile really are will find much that is false and empty and corrupt in what appears to be difficult and fearful, as the reason shows in each particular.¹

19. And yet many shudder even at the verse of Menander,²

No man alive may say, "I shall not suffer this," since they do not know how much it helps in warding off grief to be able by practice and study to look Fortune in the face with eyes open, and not to manufacture in oneself "smooth, soft"³ fancies, like one reared in the shade of many hopes which ever yield and hold firm against nothing. We can, however, make this reply to Menander: "True,

No man alive may say, 'I shall not suffer this,' yet while still alive one can say, 'I will not do this: I will not lie nor play the villain nor defraud nor scheme.'” For this is in our power and is not a small, but a great help toward tranquillity of mind. Even as, on the contrary again,

My conscience, since I know I've done a dreadful deed,⁴ like an ulcer in the flesh, leaves behind it in the soul regret which ever continues to wound and prick it. For the other pangs reason does away with, but

¹ Cf. Cicero, Disputationes Tusculanae, iii. 81 f.
³ Probably a quotation of Od., xxi. 151.
⁵ The following passage is cited by Stobaeus, vol. iii. p. 604 ed. Hense.
μετάνοιαν αὐτὸς ἐργάζεται ἐνδοθεν ἐξ αὐτοῦ βαρύτερον ποιεῖ τῷ αἰσχρῷ τὸ ἀλγευόν. δὴν ἵκε τοίς ἀμαρταινόμενοι πολυτελῆς οὐτε χρυσίου πλῆθος οὐτ' ἄξιωμα γένοις οὕτε μέγεθος ἄρχης, οὔ λόγου χάρις οὐ δεινότης ευδίαι παρέχει βίω καὶ γαλήνην τοσαύτην, ὅσην ψυχῇ καθαρεύουσα πραγμάτων καὶ Β βουλευμάτων πονηρῶν καὶ τὴν τοῦ βίου πηγῆν τὸ ἦθος ἀτάραχον ἐχοῦσα καὶ ἀμάντων. ἂφ' ἢς αἰ καλαὶ πράξεις πέουσαι καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐνθουσιώδη καὶ ἱλαρὰν μετὰ τοῦ μέγα φρονεῖν ἐχουσι καὶ τὴν μνήμην ἡδίνονα καὶ βεβαιοτέραν τῆς Πινδαρικῆς γηροτρόφου ἐλπίδος. οὗ γὰρ "αἱ μὲν λυβαντρίδες," ὡς ἔλεγε Καρνεάδης, "κἀν ἀποκενωθῶσι,

1 ἐργάζεται] ἐνεργάζομαι G and Stobaeus, as Madvig had conjectured.
2 τῆς ψυχῆς] omitted in most mss.
3 δακνομένης . . . κολαζομένης] δακνομένην . . . κολαζομένην
most mss.
4 ταῦτα Gaisford: ταῦτα.
5 τῶν Schneider, confirmed by Teles' version: τῶν.

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regret is caused by reason itself, since the soul, together with its feeling of shame, is stung and chastised by itself. For as those who shiver with ague or burn with fevers are more distressed and pained than those who suffer the same discomforts through heat or cold from a source outside the body, so the pangs which Fortune brings, coming, as it were, from a source without, are lighter to bear; but that lament,

None is to blame for this but me myself, which is chanted over one’s errors, coming as it does from within, makes the pain even heavier by reason of the disgrace one feels. And so it is that no costly house nor abundance of gold nor pride of race nor pomp of office, no grace of language, no eloquence, impart so much calm and serenity to life as does a soul free from evil acts and purposes and possessing an imperturbable and undefiled character as the source of its life, a source whence flow fair actions which have both an inspired and joyous activity joined with a lofty pride therein, and a memory sweeter and more stable than that hope of Pindar’s which sustains old age. For do not censers, as Carneades said, even if they have been completely emptied, retain their

\[\text{\textsuperscript{a}}\] Assigned by Schneider to Callimachus (Frag. anon. 372); cf. also Teles, ed. Hense, p. 8; Sternbach, Gnomologicum Parisinum, 331 (Acad. Litt. Cracov., xx. 1893). The verse was perhaps suggested by Homer, \textit{Il.}, i. 335.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{b}}\] Cf. von Arnim, \textit{Stoic. Vet. Frag.}, i. p. 50, Zeno, Frag. 203; see also \textit{Moralia}, 56 b, 100 c.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{c}}\] Frag. 214 Bergk, 233 Boeckh; p. 608 ed. Sandys. See also Plato, \textit{Republic}, 331 a.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{d}}\] On the form λβαυωτρίδες see F. Solmsen, \textit{Rheinisches Museum}, liv. 347.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{e}}\] \textit{oj} \(\tilde{\eta}\) in some mss., as Pohlenz had conjectured (\textit{Zeit. f. wiss. Theol.}, l.c., p. 93, n. 1).
(477) τὴν εὐωδίαν ἔπι πολὺν χρόνον ἀναφέρουσιν,” ἐν
dὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ νοῦν ἐχόντος αἰ καλαί πράξεις οὐκ
ἀεὶ κεχαρισμένην καὶ πρόσφατον ἐναπολείποισιν
tὴν ἐπίνοιαν, ὡς ἂς τὸ χαῖρεν ἀρδεται καὶ τέ-
θηλε καὶ καταφρονεῖ τῶν ὀδυρομένων καὶ λοιδο-
C ροῦντων τὸν βίον, ὡς τινα κακῶν χωραν ἡ φυγα-
dικὸν τόπον ἐνταῦθα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀποδεδειγμένον;

20. Ἀγαμαὶ δὲ τοῦ 1 Διογένους, ὅς τὸν ἐν
Λακεδαίμονι ξένον ὅραν παρασκευαζόμενον εἰς
ἐορτήν τινα καὶ φιλοτιμούμενον, “ἀνὴρ δ’,” εἶπεν,
“ἀγαθὸς οὐ πάσαν ἡμέραν ἐορτὴν ἥγεται,” καὶ
πάνι γε λαμπράν, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν. ἵερον μὲν γὰρ
ἀγωτατον ὁ κόσμος ἑστὶ καὶ θεοπρεπέστατον· εἰς
dὲ τούτον ὁ ἀνθρωπός εἰσάγεται διὰ τῆς γενέσεως
οὐ χειροκυμήτων οὐδ’ ἀκινήτων ἀγαλμάτων θεατής,
ἀλλ’ οία νοῦς θείος αἰσθητὰ μμήματα 2 νητῶν,
φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, ἐμφυτόν ἀρχήν ζωῆς ἐχόντα καὶ
D κινήσεως ἐφημεν, ἥλιον καὶ σέλήνην καὶ ἀστρα καὶ
ποταμοὺς νέον ὕδωρ ἐξεῖντος 3 αἰ καὶ γῆν φυτοῖς τε
cαὶ ζώοις τροφᾶς 4 ἀναπέμπουσαν. ὃν τὸν βίον
μύησιν ὄντα καὶ τελετῆν τελειοτάτην εὐθυμίας 5 δεῖ
μεστὸν εἶναι καὶ γῆθουσι· οὐχ ὡσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ
Κρόνια καὶ Διάσια 6 καὶ Παναθήναια καὶ τοιαύτας
ἀλλας ἡμέρας περιμένουσιν, ἃς ἡθοποιο̄ καὶ ἀνα-
pνεύσωσιν, ὡντὸν γέλωτος 7 μίμους καὶ ὑρχηστᾱ
μισθοὺς τελέσαντες. εἰτ’ ἐκεῖ μὲν εὐφημοὶ 8 καθή-

1 τοῦ] τὸ Reiske: τὸ τοῦ Bernardakis.
2 μμήματα early editors: μμήματα.
3 ἐξεῖντος] ἐξοίντος most mss.
4 τροφᾶς] τροφᾶς most mss.
5 εὐθυμίας] εὐφημίας most mss.
6 Διάσια] διονύσια most mss.
7 ὡντὸν γέλωτος Wytenbach: ὡντὸν γέλωτα.
8 εὐφημοὶ] εὐθυμοὶ Meziriacus and some mss.

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fragrance for a long time, and in the soul of the wise man do not fair actions leave behind the remembrance of them eternally delightful and fresh, by which joy in them is watered and flourishes, and he comes to despise those who bewail and abuse life as a land of calamities or a place of exile appointed here for our souls?

20. And I am delighted with Diogenes, who, when he saw his host in Sparta preparing with much ado for a certain festival, said, "Does not a good man consider every day a festival?" And a very splendid one, to be sure, if we are sound of mind. For the universe is a most holy temple and most worthy of a god; into it man is introduced through birth as a spectator, not of hand-made or immovable images, but of those sensible representations of knowable things that the divine mind, says Plato, has revealed, representations which have innate within themselves the beginnings of life and motion, sun and moon and stars, rivers which ever discharge fresh water, and earth which sends forth nourishment for plants and animals. Since life is a most perfect initiation into these things and a ritual celebration of them, it should be full of tranquillity and joy, and not in the manner of the vulgar, who wait for the festivals of Cronus and of Zeus and the Panathenaea and other days of the kind, at which to enjoy and refresh themselves, paying the wages of hired laughter to mimes and dancers. It is true that we sit there on

a Cf. Horace, Epistulae, i. 2. 69:
quo semel est imbuta recens servabit odorem
testa diu.

b Cf. Timaeus, 92 c. Epinomis, 984 a.

c The Roman Saturnalia.

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(477) μεθα κοσμίως· οὐδείς γὰρ ὀδύρεται μνούμενος οὐδὲ ἀρηνεῖ Πύθια θεώμενος ἢ πίνων\footnote{πίνων Basel edition: πενών.} ἐν Κρονίοις· ἀσ δ’ Ε ὁ θεὸς ἦμιν ἑορτὰς χορηγεῖ καὶ μυσταγωγεῖ καταισχύνουσιν, ἐν ὀδυρμοῖς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ βαρυβυμλάς καὶ μερίμναις ἐπιπόνοις διαιτρίβοντες. καὶ τῶν μὲν ὀργάνων χαΐρουσι τοῖς ἐπιτερπέσες ἥχοισι καὶ τῶν ὀρνέων τοίς ἁδουσι, καὶ τὰ παίζοντα καὶ σκιρτῶντα τῶν ζῴων ἥδεως ὀρῶσι, καὶ τοῦνατιν ὠρυμένωι καὶ βρυχωμένωι καὶ σκυθρωπάξουσιν ἀναίνεται· τὸν δ’ ἑαυτών βίον ἀμειδὴ καὶ κατηφή καὶ τοῖς ἀτερπεστάτοις πάθει καὶ πράγμασι καὶ φροντίσι μηδὲν πέρας ἤχουσας πιεζόμενον ἀεί ἁ\footnote{και συνθλιβόμενον ὀρῶντες, οὐχ ὅπως\footnote{oυχ ὅπως] omitted in most mss.} αὐτοί μὲν\footnote{μὲν] omitted in a few mss.} ἐαυτοῖς ἀναπνοὴν τινα καὶ ῥαστάνιν πορίζουσιν\footnote{πόθεν; ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐτέρων παρακαλοῦντων προσδέχονται λόγον ὃ χρώμενοι καὶ τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀμέμπτως συνοίσονται καὶ τῶν γεγονότων εὐχαρίστως μνημονεύονται καὶ πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν ἰлей τὴν ἐλπίς καὶ φαιδρὰν ἔχοντες ἄδεως καὶ ἀνυπόπτως προσάξουσιν.} πόθεν; ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐτέρων παρακαλοῦντων προσδέχονται λόγον ὃ χρώμενοι καὶ τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀμέμπτως συνοίσονται καὶ τῶν γεγονότων εὐχαρίστως μνημονεύονται καὶ πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν ἰлей τὴν ἐλπίς καὶ φαιδρὰν ἔχοντες ἄδεως καὶ ἀνυπόπτως προσάξουσιν.
those occasions decorously in reverent silence, for no one wails while he is being initiated or laments as he watches the Pythian games or as he drinks at the festival of Cronus; but by spending the greater part of life in lamentation and heaviness of heart and carking cares men shame the festivals with which the god supplies us and in which he initiates us. And though men delight in sweetly sounding instruments and singing birds, and take pleasure in seeing animals romping and frisking, and, on the contrary, are displeased when they howl and bellow and look fierce; yet though they see that their own life is unsmiling and dejected and ever oppressed and afflicted by the most unpleasant experiences and troubles and un-ending cares, they not only do not provide themselves with some alleviation or ease—from what source could they do so?—but even when others urge them, they do not accept a word of admonition by following which they would acquiesce in the present without fault-finding, remember the past with thankfulness, and meet the future without fear or suspicion, with their hopes cheerful and bright.

4 πορίζουσιν] πορίζειν most mss.
5 συνολούνται] συνολούσι τι all mss. except G, S.
6 προσάξουσιν] πράξουσιν Meziriacus.
ON BROTHERLY LOVE
(DE FRATERNO AMORE)
INTRODUCTION

In this essay Plutarch has arranged his material somewhat more methodically than is his usual practice. In chaps. 1-7 he shows that Brotherly Love is in accordance with nature; in 9-19 he tells us how we should conduct ourselves toward a brother: (a) while our parents are alive, (b) when they are dead, (c) when the brother is our inferior, (d) when our superior; and also the reasons for quarrels and the treatment thereof. He closes with some pleasant tales of affection for brothers’ children.

That Plutarch wrote this work after De Adulatore et Amico, De Amicorum Multitudine, and the Life of Cato Minor was demonstrated by C. Brokate (De aliquot Plut. libellis, diss. Göttingen, 1913, pp. 17-24, 58; and see the excellent tables on pp. 47, 61). Plutarch appears to have retained a certain amount of more or less irrelevant material on friendship from his recent work on these treatises, and also to have drawn upon some portions of Theophrastus’s treatise On Friendship.

The essay is No. 98 in the Lamprias catalogue.

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This point was subsequently shown, but with much less care and detail, by G. Hein (Quaestiones Plut., diss. Berlin, 1916, p. 37), who seems to have been ignorant of Brokate’s far superior work.

ΠΕΡΙ ΦΙΛΑΔΕΛΦΙΑΣ

1. Τα παλαιά των Διοσκόρων ἀφιδρύματα Σπαρτιάται "δόκανα" καλοῦσιν ἐστὶ δὲ δύο ξύλα. Β' παράλληλα δυσὶ πλαγίοις ἐπεζευγμένα, καὶ δοκεῖ τῷ φιλαδέλφῳ τῶν θεῶν οἰκεῖον εἶναι τοῦ ἀναθήματος τὸ κοινὸν καὶ ἁδιαίρετον. οὕτω δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὑμῖν, ὁ Νιγρῖνε καὶ Κυήτε, τὸ σύγγραμμα τοῦτο περὶ φιλαδελφίας ἀνατίθημι, κοινὸν ἄξιοις οὕσι δῶρον. ἔφ' ἀ γὰρ προτρέπεται, ταῦτα πράττοντες ἵδη μαρτυρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἣ παρακαλεῖσθαι δόξετε· καὶ τὸ χαῖρον ὑμῖν ἔφ' οἷς κατορθοῦτε ποιήσει τῇ κρίσει τῆς ἐπιμονῆς βεβαιοτέραν, ᾠσπερ ἐν χρηστοῖς καὶ φιλοκάλοις θεατάις εὐημεροῦντων.

Ἀρισταρχος μὲν οὖν ὁ Θεοδέκτου πατήρ, ἐπὶ-κοκώπτων τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σοφιστῶν, ἔλεγε πάλαι

1 Διοσκόρων] διοσκόρων in most mss.
2 Κυήτε Patzig: Κύντε.

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b The identity of Avidius Nigrinus and Avidius Quietus is not certainly established; see Prosopographia Imp. Rom., i. pp. 189-190.
c Nauck, comparing Suidas, s.v. Theodectes, and Stephanus Byzantius, would correct "Aristarchus" to Aristandrus, the father of the tragic poet Theodectas of Phaselis.
ON BROTHERLY LOVE

1. The ancient representations of the Dioscuri are called by the Spartans "beam-figures"\(^a\): they consist of two parallel wooden beams joined by two other transverse beams placed across them; and this common and indivisible character of the offering appears entirely suitable to the brotherly love of these gods. In like manner do I also dedicate this treatise *On Brotherly Love* to you, Nigrinus and Quietus,\(^b\) a joint gift for you both who well deserve it. For as to the exhortations this essay contains, since you are already putting them into practice, you will seem to be giving your testimony in their favour rather than to be encouraged to perform them; and the pleasure you will take in acts which are right will make the perseverance of your judgement more firm, inasmuch as your acts will win approval before spectators, so to speak, who are honourable and devoted to virtue.

Now Aristarchus,\(^c\) the father of Theodectes, by way of jeering at the crowd of sophists, used to say that in the old days there were barely seven Sophists,\(^d\) but

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\(^a\) That is, the Seven Wise Men. Plutarch so uses σοφιστής (cf. *Moralia*, 96 ι, where all mss. but one read σοφιστόδ: 857 ρ); so also Aristotle, Frag. 5 ed. V. Rose. *Cf.* the earlier usage of Herodotus, i. 29 (where Wells's note is hopelessly wrong); ii. 49; iv. 95; Hippocrates, *De Vet. Med.*, 20.

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(178) μὲν ἐπτὰ σοφιστὰς¹ μόλις γενέσθαι, τότε δὲ μὴ ῥαδίως ἂν ἰδιώτας τοσούτους εὑρεθήναι: ἐγὼ δ' ὅρῳ καθ' ἡμᾶς τὴν φιλαδελφίαν ὅτως σπάνων οὕς τὸν μισαδελφίαν ἐπὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἢς γε τὰ φανέντα παραδείγματα πραγματίσαι καὶ θεάτροις ὁ βίος ἔξεσθη διὰ τὸ παράδοξον· οὐ δὲ νῦν ἄνθρωποί πάντες, ὅταν ἐντυγχάνωσι χρήσαις ἄδελφοις, θαυμάζουσιν οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ τούς Μολονίδας ἐκεῖνους, συμφερεῖς τοῖς σώμασι γεγονέναι δοκοῦντας, καὶ τὸ χρήσθαι κοινῶς τοῖς πατρώοις χρήσασι καὶ φίλοις καὶ δούλοις οὕτως ἀπιστών ἡγοῦνται καὶ 

D τερατώδεις, ὡς τὸ χρήσθαι μίαν ψυχὴν δυνεῖν σωμάτων χερᾶ καὶ ποσὶ καὶ ὀφθαλμοῖς.

2. Καίτοι τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς χρήσεως τῶν ἄδελφῶν ἢ φύσις οὐ μακρὰν ἔθηκεν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἁναγκαῖων διττά καὶ ἂδελφα καὶ δίδυμα μηχανησαμένη, χειρὰς πόδας ὁμματ' ὤτα ρίνας, ἐπίδαξαν ὅτι ταύτα² σωτηρίας ἐνεκα καὶ συμπράξεως κοινῆς οὐ διαφορᾶς καὶ μάχης οὕτως διέστησεν· αὐτὰς τὲ τὰς χειρὰς εἰς πολλοὺς καὶ ἀνύσους δακτυλόσ σχίσασα πάντων ὄργανων ἐμμελεστάτα καὶ τεχνικῶτα παρέσχεν,

Ε ὦστ' Ἀναξαγόραν τὸν παλαιὸν ἐν ταῖς χεραί τὴν αἰτίαν τίθεσθαι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας καὶ συν-έσεως· ἀλλὰ τούτου μὲν ἐοικεὶν ἄληθες εἶναι τούναντιον· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι χειρὰς ἔσχεν ἀνθρωπὸς σο-

¹ σοφιστὰς] σοφοῖς in some mss.
² ταύτα] ταύτα πάντα in some mss.

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¹ Cf. Moralia, 1083 c; Fraser's note on Apollodorus, ii. 7. 2 (L.C.L. vol. i. p. 249).

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that in his own day an equally large number of non-sophists could not easily be found. And according to my observation, brotherly love is as rare in our day as brotherly hatred was among the men of old; when instances of such hatred appeared, they were so amazing that the times made them known to all as warning examples in tragedies and other stage-performances; but all men of to-day, when they encounter brothers who are good to each other, wonder at them no less than at those famous sons of Molionê, who, according to common belief, were born with their bodies grown together; and to use in common a father's wealth and friends and slaves is considered as incredible and portentous as for one soul to make use of the hands and feet and eyes of two bodies.

2. And yet the illustration of such common use by brothers Nature has placed at no great distance from us; on the contrary, in the body itself she has contrived to make most of the necessary parts double and brothers and twins: hands, feet, eyes, ears, nostrils; and she has thus taught us that she has divided them in this fashion for mutual preservation and assistance, not for variance and strife. And when she separated the very hands into a number of unequal fingers, she supplied men with the most accurate and skilful of instruments, so that Anaxagoras of old assigned the reason for man's wisdom and intelligence to his having hands. The contrary of this, however, seems to be true: it is not because man acquired hands that he is wisest of animals;

\[\text{Cf. Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium, iv. 10 (687 a 17 ff.).}\]
φώτατον, ἀλλ' ὅτι φύσει λογικόν ἦν καὶ τεχνικόν, ὀργάνων φύσει τοιούτων ἔτυχεν. ἐκεῖνο δὲ παντὶ δήλου, ὥσ ἀπὸ σπέρματος ἐνὸς καὶ μᾶς ἀρχῆς ἡ φύσις ἄδελφοὺς δύο καὶ τρεῖς καὶ πλείονας ἐποίησεν οὐ πρὸς διαφορὰν καὶ ἀντίταξιν, ἀλλ' ὅπως χωρὶς ὄντες ἀλλήλους μᾶλλον συνεργῶσιν. οἱ γὰρ δὴ τρισώματοι καὶ ἐκατόγχειρες, εἴπερ ἐγένοντο, συμφωνεῖς ὄντες πάσι τοῖς μέρεσιν, οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς αὐτῶν

Fo ὄνδε χωρὶς ἐδύναντο ποιεῖν· δ' τοῖς ἄδελφοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ μένειν καὶ ἀποδημεῖν ἀμα καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ γεωργεῖν δυναμένους δ' ἀλλήλων, ἀντέρ ἢν ἡ φύσις ἐδυκεν εὐνοίας καὶ συμφωνίας ἀρχῆς φυλάττουσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, ποδῶν οὐθὲν, οὐμα, διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλους ὑποσκελιζόντων καὶ δακτύλων ἐμπλεκομένων καὶ διαστρεφομένων παρὰ φύσιν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. μᾶλλον δ' ὃσπερ ἐν ταύτῳ σώματι μᾶς κοινονοῦντα φύς
479 σεως καὶ τροφῆς τὰ ὑγρὰ καὶ ἕθρα καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ θερμὰ τῇ ὀμονοίᾳ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ ἡδόστην κράσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἀρμονίαν, ἦς χωρὶς οὔτε

πλοῦτου

φασίν οὔτε

tᾶς ἱσοδαίμονος ἄνθρω-
pοι βασιληίδος ἀρχᾶς

εἶναι τινα χάριν καὶ ὄνησιν· ἂν δὲ πλεονεξία καὶ στάσις αὐτοῖς ἐγγένηται, διέφθειρεν αὐσχυντα καὶ συνέχεε τὸ ξύον, οὔτως ἄδελφῶν ὀμοφροσύνη

1 αὐτῶν Bernardakis: αὐτῶν.

a Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia, ii. 3. 18-19.

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it is because by nature he was endowed with reason and skill that he acquired instruments of a nature adapted to these powers. And this fact is obvious to everyone: Nature from one seed and one source has created two brothers, or three, or more, not for difference and opposition to each other, but that by being separate they might the more readily co-operate with one another. For indeed creatures that had three bodies and an hundred hands, if any such were ever really born, being joined together in all their members, could do nothing independently and apart from one another, as may brothers, who can either remain at home or reside abroad, as well as undertake public office and husbandry through each other's help if they but preserve that principle of goodwill and concord which Nature has given them. But if they do not, they will differ not at all, I think, from feet which trip up one another and fingers which are unnaturally entwined and twisted by each other.a But rather, just as in the same body the combination of moist and dry, cold and hot, sharing one nature and diet, by their consent and agreement engender the best and most pleasant temperament and bodily harmony—without which, they say, there is not any joy or profit either "in wealth" or

In that kingly rule which makes men
Like to gods b—

but if overreaching and factious strife be engendered in them, they corrupt and destroy the animal most shamefully; so through the concord of brothers both

a From Ariphron's Paeon to Health: cf. 450 b, supra.
καὶ γένος καὶ οίκος ὑγιαίνει καὶ τέθηλε, καὶ φίλοι
καὶ συνήθεις ὃσπερ ἐμμελής χορὸς οὐθὲν οὔτε
πράσσουσιν ἐναντίον οὔτε λέγουσιν ἡ φρονούσιν

ἐν δὲ διχοστασίᾳ καὶ ὁ πάγκακος ἐμμορε τιμῆς,
oικέτης διάβολος ἡ κόλαξ παρενδύς θυραῖος ἡ
Β πολιτής βάσκανος. ὥς γὰρ αἱ νόσοι τοῖς σώμασι
μὴ προσιεμένοι τὸ οἰκείον πολλῶν ἐμποουόσιν ἀτόπων καὶ
βλαβερῶν ὀρέξεις, οὕτως ἡ πρὸς τὸ
συγγενὲς διαβολὴ καὶ υφόρασις ὀμιλίας ἐπάγε-
ται φαύλας καὶ πονηρᾶς εἰς τὸ ἐκλιπὲς εξωθεν
ἐπιρρεοῦσας.

3. 'Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἄρκαδικὸς μάντις ἀναγκαίως
πόδα ξύλινον προσεποιήσατο καὶ Ὅριοδοτον τοῦ
οἰκείου στερηθείς: ἀδελφὸς δὲ πολεμῶν ἀδελφῷ καὶ
κτώμενος θνειῶ ἐξ ἀγοράς ἡ παλαιόστας ἔταιρον
οὕθεν ἐοικεν ἀλλο ποιεῖν ἡ σάρκινον καὶ συμφυὲς
ἐκουσίως ἀποκόψας μέλος ἀλλότριον προστίθεσθαι
καὶ προσαρμόττειν. οὕτως ἀλλο προσδεχομένη καὶ
ζητοῦσα φιλίαν καὶ ὀμιλίαν χρεία διδάσκει τὸ συγ-
γενὲς τιμῶν καὶ περίπετων καὶ διαφυλάττειν, ὡς
ἀφίλους καὶ ἀμίκτους καὶ μονοτρόπους ἥν μὴ
dυναμένους μηδὲ πεφυκότας. οὖθεν ὥ Μέ να 

1 ἐκλιπές] ἐλλιπές some mss.
2 ἀναγκαίως] δικαίως Stobaeus.
3 μέλος] μέρος most mss.
4 προστίθεσθαι] προστίθεσθαι Stobaeus.

— Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec., iii. p. 690; Edmonds, Elegy 252
family and household are sound and flourish, and friends and intimates, like an harmonious choir, neither do nor say, nor think, anything discordant;

Even the base wins honour in a feud:

a slandering servant, or a flatterer who slips in from outside, or a malignant citizen. For as diseases in bodies which cannot accept their proper diet engender cravings for many strange and harmful foods, so slander and suspicion entertained against kinsmen ushers in evil and pernicious associations which flow in from outside to fill the vacant room.

3. It is true that the Arcadian prophet of necessity manufactured for himself, according to Herodotus, a wooden foot, deprived as he was of his own; but the man who quarrels with his brother, and takes as his comrade a stranger from the market-place or the wrestling-floor, appears to be doing nothing but cutting off voluntarily a limb of his own flesh and blood, and taking to himself and joining to his body an extraneous member. Indeed it is our very need, which welcomes and seeks friendship and comrade-ship, that teaches us to honour and cherish and keep our kin, since we are unable and unfitted by Nature to live friendless, unsocial, hermits' lives. Wherefore Menander rightly says,
PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

(479) οὐκ ἐκ πότων καὶ τῆς καθ' ἠμέραν τρυφῆς ἔχουσιν πιστεύσομεν τὰ τοῦ βίου (φησὶ), πάτερ. οὐ περιττὸν οἶετ' ἐξευρήκεναι ἀγαθὸν ἐκαστος, ἄν ἔχῃ φίλον σκιάν;

σκιὰν γὰρ εἶσιν ὄντως αἱ πολλαὶ φιλίαι καὶ μιμή-

D ματα καὶ εἰδωλα τῆς πρώτης ἐκείνης, ἣν παίσι τε

πρὸς γονεῖς ἡ φύσις ἄδελφοις τε πρὸς ἄδελφοις

ἐμπεποίηκε, κάκεινην ὁ μὴ σεβόμενος μηδὲ τιμῶν

ἀρὰ τινα πίστιν εὐνοίας τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις δῖδωσιν;

ἡ ποῦς τὴς ἐστὶ τὸν ἐταῖρον ἐν φιλοφροσύναις καὶ

γράμμασιν ἄδελφον προσαγορεύων, τῷ δ' ἄδελφῳ

μηδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ὀδὸν οἴόμενος δεῖν βαδίζειν; ὡς

γὰρ εἰκόνα κοσμεῖν ἄδελφον τὸ δὲ σῶμα τύπτεικ

καὶ ἀκρωτηριάζειν μανικόν, οὕτω τούνομα σέβε-

σθαι καὶ τιμᾶν ἐν ἐτέρωι αὐτῶν δὲ μισεῖν καὶ

φεύγειν οὕχ ὑγιαίνοντός ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἐν νῷ πώποτε

τὴν φύσιν ὡς ἀγαώτατον καὶ μέγιστον ἱερῶν

λαβόντος.

E 4. Οἴδα γοῦν ἐμαυτὸν ἐν Ἦρωμη δυνείν ἄδελφων

ἀναδεξάμενον δίατον, ὃν ἀτερος ἐδόκει φιλοσοφεῖν;

ἡν δ' ὃς ἔοικεν οὐ μόνον ἄδελφος ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλο-

σοφος ψευδεπίγραφος καὶ ψευδώνυμος· ἐμὸν γὰρ

ἀξιοῦντος αὐτῶν ὃς ἄδελφον ἄδελφῳ καὶ ἰδίωτη

φιλόσοφον προσφέρεσθαι, "ταῦτα," εἶπεν, "ὡς

πρὸς ἱδιώτην ἅλθος, ἐγὼ δ' οὐ σεμνὸν οὐδὲ μέγα

ποιοῦμαι τὸ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν μορίων ὀγκοῦναι·"

"οὐ μὲν," ἐφ' ἐνώ, "δῆλος εἴ μηδὲ τὸ ἐκ μορίων

1 τρυφῆς] one ms. has τροφῆς, Grotius's conjecture.
2 οἶετ' Xylander: οἰςι τ' or οἰς τ'.
3 ἐμπεποίηκε] πεποίηκε most mss.
4 ἄρα τινα] ἄρα (or ἄρα) τίνα (or τίνω); ἄρα Pohlenz.
5 ἱερῶν] ἱερὸν many mss.

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ON BROTHERLY LOVE, 479

Not from drink or from daily revelling
Do we seek one to whom we may entrust
Our life, father. Do we not think we’ve found
Great good in but the shadow of a friend?

For most friendships are in reality shadows and imitations and images of that first friendship which Nature implanted in children toward parents and in brothers toward brothers; and as for the man who does not reverence or honour this friendship, can he give any pledge of goodwill to strangers? Or what sort of man is he who addresses his comrade as “brother” in salutations and letters, but does not care even to walk with his own brother when they are going the same way? For as it is the act of a madman to adorn the effigy of a brother and at the same time to beat and mutilate the brother’s body, even so to reverence and honour the name “brother” in others, but to hate and shun the person himself, is the act of one who is not sane and has never yet got it into his head that Nature is the most holy and great of sacred things.\(^a\)

4. I remember, for instance, that in Rome I undertook to arbitrate between two brothers, of whom one had the reputation of being a philosopher. But he was, as it appears, not only as a brother but also as a philosopher, masquerading under a false name and appellation; for when I asked him to conduct himself as brother to brother and as philosopher to layman, “What you say,” said he, “as to his being a layman, is correct, but I account it no momentous or important matter to have sprung from the same loins.” “As for you,” said I, “it is obvious that you

\(^a\) For the hyperbole contrast 491 d, infra.

\(^6\) ἀδελφόν added by Stegmann.
γεγονέναι μέγα καὶ σεμνὸν ἠγούμενος.” ἀλλ’ οἱ

Γ γε ἄλλοι πάντες, εἰ καὶ μὴ φρονοῦσιν οὖτως, λέγοντι γοῦν καὶ ἄδουσιν, ὡς γονεῦσι τιμὴν μετὰ
θεοὺς πρῶτην καὶ μεγίστην ἢ τε φύσις ὁ τε τὴν
φύσιν σφῶν νόμος ἀπέδωκε· καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁ τι
μᾶλλον ἀνθρωποί κεχαρισμένον θεοὶς δρόσοιν ἡ
tοκεύσων αὐτῶν καὶ προφεύσι “παλαιὰς ἐπὶ νέοις”
dανεισθείσας” χάριτας εὐμενῶς καὶ προθύμως ἐκτίνοντες. οὐδ’ αὐτὸν μείζων ἐπίδειξις ἀθέου
γέγονε τῆς περὶ γονεῖς ὀλυγωρίας καὶ πλημμελείας:

480 διὸ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀπείρητοι, μητρὶ
δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ πατρὶ τὸ μὴ παρέχειν2 δρόντας ἀεὶ
καὶ λέγοντας ἀφ’ ὧν εὐφρανοῦνται, κἂν μὴ προσῇ
τὸ λυποῦν, ἀνόσιον ἠγοῦνται καὶ ἀθεσμον. τίς
οὖν ἐστὶ παρὰ παῖδων γονεῦσιν ἡ πρᾶξις ἡ χάρις
ἡ διάθεσις μᾶλλον εὐφραίνειν δυναμενὴ τῆς πρὸς
ἀδελφὸν εὐνοίας βεβαιοῦ καὶ φιλίας;

5. Καὶ3 τούτῳ γε ράδιον ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων
καταμαθεῖν. ὅπου γὰρ οἰκότριβα τιμώμενον ὑπὸ
μητρὸς ἡ πατρὸς νῦν προπηλακίζοντες καὶ φυτῶν
καὶ χωρίων οἰς ἔχαιρον ἀμελεύντες ἀνείροιν αὐτοὺς,
καὶ κύων τις οἰκογενῆς παρορώμενος καὶ ἔπτοσ

Β ἔπτεται φιλοστόργων καὶ φιλοτήμων γερόντων,
ἀχθοντι δὲ τοῖς παισίν ἀκροάματα καὶ θεάματα
καὶ ἀθλητὰς οὐσ4 ἐθαύμαζον αὐτοῖς διασύρουσι καὶ
καταφρονοῦσιν. ἦτον μετρίως ἐχουσι5 νὼς δια

1 νέοις Madvig: νέας or νέας.
2 προσέχειν some mss.; others add ἐαυτοῦς.
3 καὶ Reiske: ἦ.
4 οὕς Reiske: ὅους.
5 ἐχουσι] ἐχουσιν Xylander and Kronenberg.


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consider it no important or momentous matter to have sprung from any loins at all." But certainly all other philosophers, even if they do not think so, at least do affirm with constant iteration that both Nature and the Law, which upholds Nature, have assigned to parents, after gods, first and greatest honour; and there is nothing which men do that is more acceptable to gods than with goodwill and zeal to repay to those who bore them and brought them up the favours "long ago lent to them when they were young." Nor is there, again, a greater exhibition of an impious nature than neglect of parents or offences against them. Therefore, while we are forbidden to do wrong to all others, yet to our mother and father, if we do not always afford, both in deed and in word, matter for their pleasure, even if offence be not present, men consider it unholy and unlawful. Hence what deed or favour or disposition, which children may show toward their parents, can give more pleasure than steadfast goodwill and friendship toward a brother?

5. And surely this fact is quite easy to perceive from the contrary. For when we observe that parents are grieved by sons who maltreat a servant honoured by mother and father, and neglect plants or farm-lands in which their parents took delight, and that remissness in caring for some house-dog or horse hurts elderly persons who feel a jealous affection for them; and when, again, we observe that parents are vexed when their children disparage and hiss at concerts and spectacles and athletes all of which they themselves used to admire; when we observe these things, is it reasonable to suppose that parents are indifferent.

b Plato, Laws, 717 c; cf. 496 c, infra.
(480) φερομένους καὶ μυσοῦσιν ἀλλήλους καὶ κακῶς λέγουσι καὶ πρὸς ἑργα καὶ πράξεις ἀντιταττομένους ἀεὶ καὶ καταλυμένους ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων; οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τίς. οὐκοῦν τούναντίον ἔρωτες ἀλλήλων καὶ φιλοῦντες ἄδελφοι, καὶ ὅσον ἡ φύσις τοῖς σώμασι διέστησεν, ἐπὶ ταῦτα τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ λόγους κοινοὺς καὶ διατριβὰς ἀμα καὶ πανδίας μετ’ ἀλλήλων ἔχοντες, ἦδειαν οἳ καὶ μακαρίαν παρεσκευάσασι γηροτρόφου τοῖς γοινεύσι τὴν φιλαδελφίαν. οὔτε γὰρ φιλόλογος πατήρ οὕτως οὔτε φιλότιμος οὔτε φιλοχρήματος γέγονεν ὡς φιλότεκνος· διὸ τούς νῦν οὔτε οὔτε λέγοντας οὔτε πλουτοῦντας οὔτ’ ἀρχοντας ἦδεως οὕτως ὡς φιλοῦντας ἀλλήλους ὀρώσιν. Ἀπολλωνίδα γοῦν τὴν Κυζίκην, Εὐμένους δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως μητέρα καὶ τριῶν ἄλλων, Ἀττάλου καὶ Φιλεταίρου καὶ Ἁθηναίον, λέγοντι μακαρίζειν ἑαυτὴν ἀεὶ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς χάριν ἔχειν οὐ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον οὔδὲ διὰ τὴν ἣγεμονίαν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τοὺς τρεῖς νῦν ἐώρα τὸν πρεσβυτάταν δορυφοροῦντας κάκειν οὖν μέσοις Δ αὐτοῖς δόρατα καὶ ξύφη φοροῦσιν ἁδεὺς διαιτῶμεν. ὥσπερ αὖ τούναντίον, Ἀρταξέρξης ἁισθόμενος Ὀχον τὸν ἅν ἐπιβεβουλευκότα τοῖς ἄδελφοῖς ἀθυμήσας ἀπέθανεν.

χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἄδελφῶν,

ὡς Εὐριπίδης εἶρηκεν, ὄντες χαλεπώτατοι τοῖς

1 ἀποδιδόντες] ἐπιδιδόντες Wytenbach, which Rouse prefers.
2 Ἀρταξέρξης Palmerius: ξέρξης.

* Perhaps with a reference to Pindar, Frag. 214: cf. 477 b, supra, and the note.
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when sons quarrel, hate and malign each other, and array themselves ever against each other’s interests and activities, and are finally ruined by each other? No one can say that the parents are indifferent. Hence when, on the other hand, brothers love and feel affection for each other, and, in so far as Nature has made them separate in their bodies, so far do they become united in their emotions and actions, and share with each other their studies and recreations and games, then they have made their brotherly love a sweet and blessed "sustainer of old age" for their parents. For no father is so fond of oratory or of honour or of riches as he is of his children; therefore fathers do not find such pleasure in seeing their sons gaining a reputation as orators, acquiring wealth, or holding office as in seeing that they love one another. So they report of Apollonis of Cyzicus, mother of King Eumenes and three other sons, Attalus and Philetaerus and Athenaeus, that she always congratulated herself and gave thanks to the gods, not because of wealth or empire, but because she saw her three sons members of the body-guard of the eldest, who passed his days without fear surrounded by brothers with swords and spears in their hands. So again, on the contrary, when Artaxerxes perceived that his son Ochus had plotted against his brothers, he despaired and died.

For cruel are the wars of brothers, as Euripides says, and they are cruellest of all to

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b Cf. 489 d f., infra; Gnomologicum Vaticanum, 293 (Wiener Stud., x. p. 241).

c Cf. Life of Artaxerxes, xxx. (1027 b).

(480) γονεύον αὐτοῖς εἶσιν· ὃ γὰρ μισῶν τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ βαρυνόμενος οὐ δύναται μὴ τὸν γεννήσαντα μέμφεσθαι καὶ τὴν τεκοῦσαν.

6. 'Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πεισίστρατος ἑπιγαμῶν ἑνηλίκους οὖσι τοὺς νῦν ἔφη καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ἐκεῖνους ἠγούμενος ἐτί πλείονών ἐθέλειν τοιούτων πατηρ γενέσθαι. χρηστοὶ δὲ καὶ δίκαιοι παῖδες οὐ μόνον Ε διὰ τοὺς γονεῖς ἀγαπήσοντοι μᾶλλον ἄλληλους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς δι' ἄλληλους· οὕτως ἄει καὶ φρονοῦντες καὶ λέγοντες, ὅτι τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἀντὶ πολλῶν χάριν ὀφείλοντες μάλιστα διὰ τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς ὀφείλοντος, ὡς τοῦτο δὴ κτημάτων ἀπάντων τιμιώ- 

tatov καὶ ἡδιστὸν ἔχοντες παρ' αὐτῶν. εὖ γέ τοι καὶ "Ομηρος πεποίηκε Τηλέμαχον ἐν συμφορᾷ 

tανάδελφον τιθέμενον.

先进单位 γὰρ ἠμετέρην γενεὴν μοῦνωσε Κρονίων.

ὁ δ' Ἡσίοδος οὖκ εὖ παραινεῖ "μουνογενὴ παῖδα" 
τῶν πατρῶν ἐπίκληρον εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα τῶν 
Μούσων γεγονός μαθητής, ὃς ὁμοὶ δὲ εὖνοιαν ἄεί 

Ϝ καὶ φιλαδελφίαν οὐσας οὕτως ὡνόμαξον, μοῦσας.

Πρὸς μὲν οὖν γονεῖς ἡ φιλαδελφία τοιοῦτόν ἔστω, 

ὡς τὸ φιλεῖν ἀδελφὸν εὖθυς ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι τοῦ

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1 αὐτοῖς] αὐτῶν Hartman.

2 The mss. read τὸ ἀνάδελφον and τὸν ἀδελφὸν.

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ᵃ Perhaps this sentence is paraphrased by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 658 ed. Hense.

ᵇ Cf. Moralia, 189 d; related also of Cato Maior in Plutarch's Life, xxiv. (351 b).


ᵈ Od., xvi. 117.

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the parents themselves. For he that hates his own brother and is angry with him cannot refrain from blaming the father that begat and the mother that bore such a brother.

6. So Peisistratus, marrying for a second time when his sons were full grown, said that because he considered them to be honourable and good he wished to become the father of more children like them. Excellent and just sons will not only love each other the more because of their parents, but will also love their parents the more because of each other; so will they always both think and say that, though they owe their parents gratitude for many favours, it is most of all for their brothers that they owe it, since these are truly the most precious and delightful of all the possessions they have received from them. Well indeed has Homer also depicted Telemachus as reckoning his brotherless condition a misfortune:

The son of Cronus thus has doomed our race
To have one son alone.

But Hesiod does not well in advising "an only son" to inherit his father's estate—and that too when he was himself a pupil of the Muses, who, in fact, received this name just because they were "always together" (homou ousas) in concord and sisterly affection.

Now, as regards parents, brotherly love is of such sort that to love one's brother is forthwith a proof of love for both mother and father; and again, as

* Works and Days, 376; cf. the Commentarii in Hesiodum, 37 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 70).

† Theogony, 22.

‡ A fanciful derivation: Μοῦσα from ὀμοῦ oûs.

καὶ τὴν μητέρα φιλεῖν καὶ τὸν πατέρα, πρὸς δὲ παῖδας αὐτῶν οὖν φίλους παράδειγμα καὶ παράδειγμα φιλαδελφίας οἶνον οὐθέν ἄλλο, καὶ τοῦνατίον αὐτὸ πονηρὸν ὡσπερ ἡ κράφοι πατρώου τὴν μισαδελφίαν ἀναλαμβάνουσιν. ὁ γὰρ ἐν δίκαιι καὶ στάσει καὶ ἁγίῳ πρὸς ἀδελφοὺς ἐγγεγηρακὼς, εἶτα τοὺς νῖους ὀμονοεῖν παρακαλῶν,

ἀλλων ἱπτρός αὐτὸς ἐλκεσιν βρύων,

ἀσθενή ποιεῖ τοῖς ἐργοὶς τὸν λόγον. εἰ γοῦν ὁ Θηραίος Ἐπεοκλῆς πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν εἰρήκως,

ἀστρων ἐν ἔλθοιο ἡλίου πρὸς ἀνατολάς καὶ γῆς ἐνερθεί δυνατὸς ὡν δράσαι τάδε, τὴν θέων μεγίστην ὦστ' ἐχειν Τυραννίδα.

toῖς αὐτοῦ πάλιν παρεκελευστο τέκνων,

Ἰσότητα τιμᾶν, ἢ φίλους αἰὲν φίλοισ

πόλεως τε πόλεις συμμάχους τε συμμάχους

συνδεῖ: τὸ γὰρ ἵκον μόνιμον ἀνθρώποι ἐφι,

Β ὃς οὐκ ἂν αὐτοῦ κατεφράνης; ποιός δ' ἂν ἦν ὃ Ἅτρεύς, εἰ τοιαῦτα δειπνίσας τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐγνωμολόγει πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας,

φίλων γε μὲντοι χρήσις ἢ πρὸς αἵματος

μόνη κακοῦ πέοντος ὠφελεῖν φιλεῖ;

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1 αὐ] αὐτοῦ most mss.  
2 θεών] τῶν θεῶν most mss.  
3 αἰ] εἶναι most mss.  
4 μόνιμον] νόμιμον some mss. here and the mss. of Euripides, but cf. 484 B, infra.  
5 ρέοντος] παρόντος Nauck.

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Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag.², p. 703, Euripides, Frag. 262
regards children, for them there is no lesson and example comparable to brotherly love on their father’s part. And, on the other hand, the contrary is a bad example for children who inherit, as from a father’s testament, his hatred of brothers. For a man who has grown old in law-suits and quarrels and contentions with his brothers, and then exhorts his children to concord,

Healer of others, full of sores himself,

weakens the force of his words by his own actions. If, at any rate, Eteocles of Thebes had said with reference to his brother,

To where the sun and stars rise would I go,
And plunge beneath the earth—if this I could—
To hold Dominion, greatest of the gods,

and then had proceeded to exhort his own children,

Revere Equality, which ever binds
Friend to friend, state to state, allies unto
Allies: Nature made equal rights secure,

who would not have despised him? And what sort of man would Atreus have been, if, after serving his brother that dinner, he had then proceeded to preach to his own children:

And yet the use of friends, fast joined with ties
Of blood, alone brings help when troubles flow?

1086; quoted also in Moralia, 71 f, 88 d, 1110 e. Cf. Aeschylus, Prometheus, 473; and ἵαρὲ, θεράπευσον σεαυτόν.

b Euripides, Phoenissae, 504-506.

c Polyneices.

d Phoenissae, 536-538, but it is Jocasta who speaks here, exhorting Eteocles to concord: cf. Moralia, 643 f.

e Atreus served to his brother Thyestes Thyestes’ own children at a feast of pretended reconciliation.

7. Διὸ καὶ γονέων κακῆς γηροτρόφουν οὖσαν καὶ κακίωνα παιδοτρόφουν τέκνων ἐκκαθαίρειν προσήκει τὴν μυσαδελφίαν. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ πρὸς πολίτας διάβολος καὶ κατήγορος: οὐκοτίτις γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ἐκ τοιοῦτος συντρόφιας καὶ συνήθειας καὶ οἰκεῖοτητος ἥχθρούς καὶ πολεμίους γενέσθαι μή πολλά καὶ πονηρά συν-

C eidótaς ἀλλήλοις: μεγάλαι γὰρ αὐτίας μεγάλην διαλύουσιν1 εὐνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν. οἶτεν οὔδὲ δάδιως αὕτη ἐνδέχονται διαλύσεις: ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ συμπαγέντα, κἂν χαλάσῃ τὸ ἐχέκολλον, ἐνδέχεται πάλιν δεθῆναι καὶ συνελθεῖν, συμφυοὺς δὲ σώματος ῥάγεντος ἡ σχισθέντος ἔργον ἐστὶ κόλλησιν εὔρεσι καὶ σύμφυσιν οὔτως αἱ μὲν ὑπὸ χρείας συνημμέναι φιλίαι κἂν διαστῶσιν οὐ χαλεπῶς αὕτης ἀναλαμβάνουσιν, ἄδελφοι δὲ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκπεσόντες οὔτε ῥάδιως συνέρχονται, κἂν συνέλθωσι, ρυπαρὰν καὶ ὑποπτὸν οὐλὴν αἱ διαλύσεις ἐξέλκονται. πᾶσα μὲν

D οὖν ἥχθρα πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρώπῳ μετὰ τῶν μάλιστα λυποῦντων ἐνδυμαζέων παθῶν, φιλονεικίας ὀργῆς φθόνου μνησικακίας, ὀδυνηρὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ταραχόδες: ἡ δὲ πρὸς ἄδελφον, ὃς θυσίων τε κοινωνεῖν ἀνάγκη καὶ ἱερῶν πατρίων ὀμόταφον τε γενέοντα καὶ ποιν νοικοκ ἡ γείτονα χωρίων, ἐν ὀμμασιν

1 διαλύουσιν Kronenberg: διαλύουσιν.

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a Cf. 480 c, supra.
b Cf. Racine, La Thébaïde:

Mais, quand de la nature on a brisé les chaînes,
Cher Attale, il n'est rien qui puisse réunir
Ceux que des nœuds si forts n'ont pas seeu retenir.
L'on hait avec excès lorsque l'on hait un frère.

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7. Therefore it is fitting to cleanse away completely hatred of brothers, which is both an evil sustainer of parents in their old age and a worse nurturer of children in their youth. And it is also a cause of slander and accusations against such brothers; for their fellow-citizens think that, after having been so closely bound together by their common education, their common life together, and their kinship, brothers could not have become deadly enemies unless each were aware of many wicked deeds committed by the other. There must be, they infer, great reasons for the breaking-up of a great goodwill and affection. For this reason it is not easy to effect a reconciliation of brothers; for just as things which have been joined together, even if the glue becomes loose, may be fastened together again and become united, yet if a body which has grown together is broken or split, it is difficult to find means of welding or joining it; so friendships knitted together through long familiarity, even though the friends part company, can be easily resumed again, but when brothers have once broken the bonds of Nature, they cannot readily come together, and even if they do, their reconciliation bears with it a filthy hidden sore of suspicion. Or rather, every enmity between man and man which steals into the heart in company with the most painful emotions—contentiousness, anger, envy, remembrance of wrongs-causes pain and perturbation of mind; but when the enmity is toward a brother, with whom it is necessary to share sacrifices and the family's sacred rites, to occupy the same sepulchre, and in life, perhaps, the same or a neighbouring habitation—such an enmity keeps the painful situation ever before our
(481) ἔχει τὸ λυπηρὸν, ὑπομιμνήσκοντα καὶ ήμέραν τῆς ἀνοίας καὶ παραφροσύνης, δι᾽ ἣν τὸ ἦδιστον καὶ συγγενέστατον πρόσωπον ἰδεῖν¹ σκυθρωπότατον, ἥ τε προσφιλῆς ἐκ νέων φωνῆ καὶ συνήθης ἀκούσαι φοβερωτάτη γέγονε. πολλοὺς δὲ τῶν ἀλλων ἄδελφον ὀργώντες οἰκία μα τε χρωμένους καὶ τραπέζης καὶ χωρίοις ἀνεμήτοις καὶ ἀνδραπόδοις αὐτοῖ καὶ φίλους δηρήντας καὶ ξένους, ἐχθρὰ πάντα τὰ προσφιλῆ τοῖς ἄδελφοῖς νέμοντες· καὶ ταῦτα πᾶσιν ἐν μέσῳ λογίζεσθαι παρόντος, ὅτι "λῃστοὶ" μὲν τε φίλοι καὶ συμπόται," κτητοὶ" δὲ κηδεσταὶ καὶ συνήθεις, τῶν πρῶτων² ὀσπερ ὅπλων ἡ ὀργάνων διαφθαρέντων, ἄδελφοῦ δ' ἀντικτῆσις οὐκ ἔστων, ὀσπερ οὐδὲ χειρὸς ἀφαιρεθείσης οὕτ' οἴσεως ἐκκοπείσης· ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς ἡ Περσίς εἶπεν, ἀντὶ τῶν τέκνων ἔλομένη σώσαι τὸν ἄδελφον, ὃτι παίδας μὲν ἑτέρους κτήσασθαι δύναιν' ἀν, ἄδελφος δ' ἄλλος αὐτῇ, γονέων μὴ οὖντων, οὐκ ἄν γένοιτο.

8. "Τι δήτα χρή ποιεῖν," φαίη τις ἄν, "ὁτω βαῖλος ἄδελφος γένοιτο "; πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο μυθονεύειν, ὅτι παντὸς ἀπεται γένους φιλίας ἡ φαυλότης καὶ κατὰ τὸν Σοφοκλέα
tὰ πλεῖστα φωρῶν αἰσχρὰ φωράσεις βροτῶν.

οὔτε γὰρ τὸ συγγενικὸν οὔτε τὸ ἑταρικὸν οὔτε τὸ

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¹ ἰδεῖν Reiske: εἰδεῖν, εἰδεῖν, ορ βλέπεται.
² πρῶτων[ προτέρων Xylander.

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*With reference to Il., ix. 406-409:

λῃστοὶ μὲν γὰρ τε βόσκε καὶ ἱφια μῆλα,
κτητοὶ δὲ τριπόδες τε καὶ ἵππων ἔανθά κάρηνα 
ἀνδρός δὲ πονὴ πάλιν ἐλθέμεν οὔτε λειτή
οὐδ' ἐλείτη, ἐπει ἄρ κεν ἀμείψεται ἔρκος οἴδοντων.

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eyes, and reminds us every day of the madness and folly which has made the sweetest countenance of the nearest kinsman become most frowning and angry to look upon, and that voice which has been beloved and familiar from boyhood most dreadful to hear. And though they see many other examples of brothers using the same house and table and undistributed estates and slaves, yet they alone maintain different sets of friends and guests, considering as hostile everything dear to their brothers—and that too though all the world may readily reflect that while friends and boon-companions may be "taken as booty," and relatives by marriage and familiars may be "obtained" when the old ones, like arms or implements, have been lost, yet the acquisition of another brother is impossible, as is that of a new hand when one has been removed or that of a new eye when one has been knocked out; rightly, then, did the Persian woman declare, when she chose to save her brother in place of her children, that she could get other children, but not another brother, since her parents were dead.

8. "What then," someone will say, "must one who has a bad brother do?" We must remember this first of all: badness can lay hold on every kind of friendship; and, according to Sophocles,

Search out most human traits: you'll find them base.

For it is impossible to discover that our relations with

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b Cf. the passage of Sophocles, Antigoné, 905 ff., now accepted by most critics as genuine.

c Herodotus, iii. 119.


éρωτικον εἰλικρίνες καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ καθαρὸν ἐστιν εὐρείν κακίας. ο μὲν οὖν Λάκων μικρὰν γυναῖκα
γῆμας ἔφη τὰ ἐλάχιστα δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι τῶν κακῶν, ἀδελφοῖς δὲ σωφρόνως παρανέσειεν ἂν τις τὰ οἰ-
κειότατα τῶν κακῶν ὑπομένειν μᾶλλον ἥ πειράσθαι
τῶν ἀλλοτρίων· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνέγκλητον ὡς ἀναγ-
καίον, εἰκόνι δὲ πεικτὸν ὡς αὐθαίρετον. οὐ γὰρ ὁ
συμπότης οὐδ' ὁ συνεφήβος οὐδ' ὁ ξένος
αἰδώς ἄχαλκεύτοισιν ἔζευκται πέδαις,

"τούνεκά σ'" οὐ δύναμαι προλιπεῖν δύστην ἐόντα
καὶ φαῦλον καὶ ἀνόητον, μὴ καὶ λάθω τι πατρῶν
Β' ἡ μητρὶδι ἐνεσταγμένον ἀπὸ στέρματος νόσημα
χαλεπῶς καὶ πικρῶς τῶν μισεῖν ἐν σοὶ κολάξων.''

τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοτρίους, ὥς ἐλεγε Θεόφραστος, οὐ
φιλοῦντα δεῖ κρίνειν ἄλλα κρίναντα φιλεῖν· ὅποι δ' ἡ
φύσει ἀγεμονίαν τῇ κρίσει πρὸς εὔνοιαν οὐ δι-
δοὺς οὐδ' ἀναμένει τὸν θρυλούμενον τῶν ἀλῶν
μέδιμνον ἄλλα συγγεγενήνηκε τὴν ἄρχην τῆς φιλίας,

1 τὴν ἀρχήν Wilamowitz; τὴν ἀρετὴν οί τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων.
2 τούνεκά σ' τῷ σε καὶ Homer.

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a Cf. Moralia, 758 C; Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, viii. 12 (1161 b 12 ff.).
b Plutarch might aptly have quoted Aristophanes, Acharnians, 909: μικκός γα μάκος οὗτος.—ἀλλ' ἀπαν κακόν.
c Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. 2, p. 549, Euripides, Frag. 595, probably from the Peirithoüs; quoted again in Moralia, 96 c, 533 α, 763 f.

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relatives or comrades or lovers are unmixed with baseness, free from passion, or pure from evil. So the Spartan, when he married a little wife, said that of evils one should choose the least; but brothers one would prudently advise to put up with the evils with which they are most familiar rather than to make trial of unfamiliar ones; for the former procedure as being necessary brings no reproach, but the latter is blameworthy because voluntary. No boon-companion or comrade-in-arms or guest

Is yoked in honour’s bonds not forged by man,

but he is who is of the same blood and upbringing, and born of the same father and mother. For such a kinsman it is altogether fitting to concede and allow some faults, saying to him when he errs,

"I cannot leave you in your wretchedness

and trouble and folly, lest I might, unwittingly, punish harshly and bitterly, because I hate it, some ailment instilled into you from the seed of father or mother."

For, as Theophrastus said, we must not grow to love those not of our blood and then judge them, but judge them first and love them later; but where Nature does not commit the initiative to judgement in conceiving goodwill toward another nor wait for the proverbial bushel of salt, but has begotten with the child at its birth the principle of love, in that case

Adapted from Homer, Od., xiii. 331.
† That is, does not wait many years for the relationship to ripen into affection; cf. Moralia, 94 a, and the references there cited.
(482) ἐνταῦθα δὲὶ μη πικροὺς εἶναι μηδ’ ἀκριβεῖς τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων ἐξεταστάς. νυνὶ δὲ τί ἂν λέγοις, εἰ ξένων ἄνθρωπων καὶ ἀλλοτρίων ἐκ πότου τινὸς ἢ παιδιᾶς ἢ παλαιότερας προσφθαρέντων ἀμαρτήματα

C ῥαδίως ἔνιοι φεροῦντες καὶ ἴδομενοι, δύσκολοι καὶ ἀπαραίτητοι πρὸς τοὺς άδελφοὺς εἰσιν; ὅποι καὶ κύρια χαλέπους καὶ ἔππους, πολλοὶ δὲ λύγκας, αἰλουροὺς, πιθήκους, λέοντας τρέφοντες καὶ ἀγαπώντες, ἀδελφῶν οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν ἄργας ἢ ἄγνοιας ἢ φιλοτιμίας, ἔτεροι δὲ παλλακίσι καὶ πόρναις οἰκίαις καὶ ἄγροις καταγράφοντες ὑπὲρ οἰκοπέδου καὶ γυναῖς πρὸς ἀδελφοὺς διαμονογαζοῦσιν, εἰτα τῶ μισαδέλφῳ μισοπονηρίαιν ὄνομα θέμενοι περιστούσιν ἐν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς τὴν κακίαν προβαλλόμενοι καὶ λοιδοροῦντες, εἰν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις μὴ δυσχεραίνοντες ἀλλὰ χρώμενοι πολλῇ καὶ συνόντες.

D 9. Ταυτὶ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν προοίμια τοῦ λόγου παντὸς. ἄρχην δὲ τῆς διδασκαλίας μὴ τὴν νέμησιν τῶν πατρῴων, ὡσπερ ἔτεροι, λάβωμεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐτὶ ζώντων ἀμαρτανομένην τῶν γονέων ἀμιλλάν καὶ ζηλοτυπίαν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐφοροὶ, τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου τῶν ἀποδεικνυμένων ἢ γερόντων ἐκάστῳ βὸν ἀριστεῖον πέμποντος, ἐξημίωσαν αὐτοὺς αἰτίαν ὑπεπόντες ὅτι τοὺς κοινοὺς ἰδίους κτάται δημαγωγῶν καὶ χαριζόμενοι. νῦ ὅ ἂν τὶς παραινέσειες θεραπεύειν γονεῖς μὴ κτώμενον έαυτῷ μόνῳ μηδ’ εἰς

a Cf. Moralia, 94 a.
b Cf. 456 f and 462 f, supra.
c Cf. Life of Agesilaus, v. (598 b).
d The Spartan Council of Elders.
there should be no harsh nor strict censors of his faults. But as it is, what would you say of those who sometimes readily put up with the wrongdoings of strangers and men of no kin to themselves, men picked up at some drinking-bout or play-ground or wrestling-floor, and take pleasure in their company, yet are peevish and inexorable toward their own brothers? Why some even breed and grow fond of savage dogs and horses, and many people do so with lynxes and cats, monkeys and lions, yet cannot endure their brothers' rages or stupidities or ambitions; still others make over their houses and property to concubines and harlots, yet fight it out in a duel with their brothers over a site for a building or a corner of property; and finally, giving the name of "hatred of evil" to their hatred of their brothers, they stalk about pompously, accusing and reviling the wickedness in their brothers; yet in others they take no offence at this same quality, but frequently resort to them and are often in their company.

9. Let this, then, serve as a preamble to my whole discourse. But as the starting-point of my admonitions, let us take, not the division of the father's goods, as other writers do, but the misguided quarrels and jealousy of the children while the parents are yet alive. The ephors, when Agesilaüs used to send an ox as a mark of distinguished service to each member of the gerousia as he was appointed, fined him, alleging as their reason that by such demagogic means of gaining popular favour he was trying to acquire as his own personal followers men who belonged to the state; but one would advise a son to care for his parents, not with the design of acquiring their goodwill for himself alone or turning it away

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PLUTARCH’S MORALIA

"οὐτ' ὁκινω εἴκων οὐτ' ἀφραδήησι νόοιο,
ἀλλ' ἐμὲ τ' εἰσορόων" 

κάμοι τούτο παράδουσ τὸ καθῆκον." ἢδὲ ὡς δὲ καὶ
483 τῶν ὅνομάτων τὰς μεταθέσεις οἱ πατέρες προσδέχονται καὶ πιστεύουσι τοῖς νεοῖς ἀπλότητα μὲν τὴν ῥαθυμίαν τῶν ἀδελφῶν ὅνομάζουσιν, ὀρθότητα δὲ τὴν σκιαστῆτα, τὸ δὲ φιλόνεικον ἀκαταφρόνητον•

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1 κουφότεραν Reiske: κουφότερον.
2 ἡ added by Xylander.
3 ὡς] omitted in most mss.; some have ὡς μᾶλλον; none have ὡς alone.
4 ἀλλα] ἀληθεὶς most mss.
5 συνετωτέραν Apelt: σεμνωτέραν.
6 εἰσορόων] most mss. add καὶ ἐμὴν ποτιδέγμενος ὀρμήν from N., x. 123.

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from others to himself. It is in this way that many play the demagogue against their brothers, having a specious but unjust pretext for this rapacity; for they deprive them of the greatest and fairest of inheritances, their parents' goodwill, by servilely and unscrupulously cutting across their brothers' path, opportunely making their attacks when the parents are occupied and unsuspecting, and, in particular, showing themselves dutiful and obedient and prudent in those matters in which they perceive their brothers to be in error, or seeming to be so. But the right way, on the contrary, when a son sees that his father is angry with his brother, is to take his share of it and bear the brunt of it together with his brother, by such assistance making the anger lighter, and then by rendering services and favours to help somehow or other to restore his brother to his father's grace. If there is error of omission, he can allege in the brother's favour the absence of opportunity, or that he was engaged on some other work, or his very nature, as being more useful and more intelligent in other directions. The saying of Agamemnon also is admirable:

"Not to slackness does he yield or foolishness,
But looks to me,
and to me he has committed this duty." And fathers are very willing to accept even the substitution of other terms and to believe their sons when they call their brothers' carelessness "simplicity," their stupidity "straightforwardness," and their contentiousness "inability to endure contempt";

\[a\] On behalf of Menelaüs: \textit{Il.}, x. 122-123.

\[b\] That is, terms which excuse the fault; cf. \textit{Moria}, 56 c.
(433) ὡστε τῷ διαλλάσσοντι περίεστι τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ὀργῆν ἐλαττοῦν ἃμα καὶ τὴν πρὸς εαυτὸν εύνοιαν αὐξεῖν τοῦ πατρὸς.

10. Οὔτω δὲ ἀπολογησάμενον ἦδη πρὸς ἐκεῖνον δεί τρέπεσθαι καὶ καθάπτεσθαι σφοδρότερον, τὸ ἁμάρτημα καὶ τὸ ἐλλειμμα μετὰ παρρησίας ἐνδεικνύμενον. οὔτε γὰρ ἐφιέναι δει τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς οὔτ' αὐτῷ πάλιν ἐπεμβαίνει ἁμαρτάνουσιν αὐτοῖς (το μὲν γὰρ ἐπιχαίροντός ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ συνεξαμαρτάνοντος), ἀλλ' ὡς κηδομένῳ καὶ συναχθομένῳ χρησθαι τῇ νουθετήσει. ἦ γίνεται δὴ κατήγορος ἀδελφοῦ σφοδρότατος πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ συνήγορος πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς γενόμενος.

"Αυ δὲ μηδὲν ἁμαρτάνων ἀδελφὸς ἐν αἰτίᾳ γενηται, τάλλα μὲν ὑπουργεῖν γονεύσι καὶ φέρειν ὀργὴν τε πάσαν αὐτῶν καὶ δυσχέρειαν ἑπιεικέος· αἱ δ' ὑπὲρ ἀδελφοῦ παρ' ἄξιαν κακῶς ἀκούοντος ἕπεσχοντος ἀντιδικίαι καὶ δικαιολογίαι πρὸς αὐτοῦς ἀμέμπτοι καὶ καλαί· καὶ οὗ φοβητέον ἀκούσαι τοῦ Σοφόκλειου,

ὡ παῖ κάκιστος, διὰ δίκης ᾿ῳν πατρί,

1 Αποθανόντος γε μὴν πατρὸς ἐμφύεσθαι μᾶλ-

2 ἀλλ' ὡς Capps: ἀλλα.

3 τῇ νουθετήσει: ἦ γίνεται δὴ Capps: τῷ νουθετοῦντι γίνεται δὲ.

1 ἀντικήτης] παγκάκιστος mss. of Sophocles.

α Antigone, 742.
the result is that he who acts as mediator succeeds in lessening the anger against his brother, and at the same time he increases his father's goodwill toward himself.

10. Only after the erring brother has been defended in this manner should the other turn to him and rebuke him somewhat sharply, pointing out with all frankness his errors of commission and of omission. For one should neither give free rein to brothers, nor, again, should one trample on them when they are at fault (for the latter is the act of one who gloats over the sinner, the former that of one who aids and abets him), but should apply his admonition as one who cares for his brother and grieves with him. Otherwise he who has been the most zealous advocate before his parents becomes before the brother himself the most vehement of accusers.

But if a brother is guiltless when he is accused, though it is right to be subservient to parents in everything else and to endure all their wrath and displeasure, yet pleas and justifications offered to parents on behalf of a brother who is being undeservedly criticized or punished are honourable and not reprehensible; nor must one be afraid that the words of Sophocles will be addressed to him:

Most shameless son, who with his father dare
To litigate,

when one is speaking with all frankness on behalf of a brother who seems to be receiving unfair treatment. For to the parents themselves, when they are proved wrong, such a "litigation" makes defeat sweeter than victory.

11. After the father is dead, however, even more
(483) λοιρ πρότερον ὃρθως ἔχει τῇ εὐνοίᾳ τὸν ἀδελφόν, εὐθὺς μὲν ἐν τῷ συνδικρύνει καὶ συνάξχεσθαι κοινομένου τὸ φιλόστοργον, ὕπονοιας δὲ θεραπόντων καὶ διαβολας ἑταίρων οὐτούς προσνεμόντων ἄπωθομένον, καὶ πιστεύοντα τοῖς τ' ἀλλοις ά μυθολογοῦσι περὶ τῶν Διοσκόρων τῆς φιλαδελφίας, καὶ ὡς τὸ Πολυδεύκης τον καταψυχρίζωντα τάδελφον πρὸς αὐτὸν κονδύλῳ παίσας ἀπέκτεινεν.

D Ἔπι δὲ τὴν νέμησιν τῶν πατρῶν, μὴ καταγγείλαντας ἄλληλοις πόλεμον ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ,

κλῆ', 'Αλαλά, Πολέμον θύγατερ,

ἐκ παρασκευής ἀπαντῶν ἄλλα μάλιστα δὴ δεῖ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην φυλαττομένους, ως τοῖς μὲν ἐχθρασ ἀνηκέστων καὶ διαφορᾶς, τοῖς δὲ φιλίας καὶ ὑμονοίας οὖσαν ἄρχην, μάλιστα μὲν αὐτούς καθ' ἐαυτούς, εἰ δὲ μὴ, φίλου κοινοῦ παρόντος ἀμφοτέρως μάρτυρος εὐγνωμονοῦντος "δίκης κλῆρος," ἢ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, τὰ φίλα καὶ προσήκοντα λαμβάνοντας καὶ διδόντας οἰκεθαὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν νέμεσθαι καὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν, χρῆσιν δὲ καὶ κτήσιν

Ε ἐν μέσῳ κείσθαι κοινὴν καὶ ἀνέμητον ἀπάντων. οἱ δὲ καὶ τίτθας ἀποσπώντες ἄλληλοι καὶ συντρόφους

1 τῶν ἀδελφῶν] τῶν ἀδελφῶν or τούς ἀδελφοὺς in most mss.
2 ἑταίρων Reiske, confirmed by mss.: ἑτέρων.
3 ὑπέρων Pohlenz: ἑτέρως or ἑτέρους.
4 αὐτούς Bernardakis: αὐτούς.
5 δὴ δεῖ W.C.H.: δὴ or δεί.
6 εὐγνωμονοῦντος Pohlenz: εὐγνωμονοῦντων or εὐγνώμονος.

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than before it is right for the brother to cling fast
to his brother's goodwill, immediately sharing his
affection for the dead in tears and grief, rejecting
the insinuations of servants and the calumnies of
companions who range themselves on the other side,
and believing all the tales about the brotherly love
of the Dioscuri and in particular the one which re-
lates that Polydeuces killed with a blow of his
fist a man who whispered to him something against

And when they seek to divide their father's goods,
they should not first declare war on each other, as the
majority do, and then, shouting

\begin{quote}
\textit{Hearken, Alala, daughter of War,}\footnote{Cited by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 659 ed. Hense (cf. also
p. 675).}
\end{quote}
go out to meet each other ready armed, but they
must by all means be on their guard against that day
of the division, knowing that for some brothers it is
the beginning of implacable enmity and strife, but
for others the beginning of friendship and concord.
Let them preferably assemble alone by themselves;
otherwise, let there be present some common friend
as a witness equally friendly to both, and then "by
the lots of Justice," as \textit{Plato} says, let them, as they
give and take what is suitable to each and preferred
by each, be of the opinion that it is the care and ad-
ministration of the estate that is being distributed,
but that its use and ownership is left unassigned and
undistributed for them all in common. But those who
have outbidden their brothers by their shrewd cal-

\footnote{Pindar, \textit{Frag. 78}; cf. \textit{Moralia}, 349 c, with the note.}
\footnote{\textit{Critias}, 109 b.}
καὶ συνήθεις παῖδας υπερβαλόμενοι τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς, ἀπίσιν ἀνδραπόδου τιμή πλέον ἔχοντες, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ τιμιώτατον τῶν πατρῶν, φιλίαν ἀδελφοῦ καὶ πίστιν, ἀπολωλεκότες. 'Ενίοις δὲ καὶ ἀκερδῶς φιλονεικίας ἐνεκά χρησμένους τοῖς πατρῶις οὕθεν ἐπιεικέστερον ἡ λαφύροις ἔςμεν· ὥν καὶ Χαρικλῆς καὶ Ἀντίοχος ἦσαν οἱ Ὀπούντιοι· καὶ γὰρ ἐκπώμα διακόψαντες ἄργυρον καὶ ἰμάτιον διατεμόντες ἀπῆσαν, ὥσπερ ἐκ τραγικῆς τινος κατάρας θηκτῷ οἰδήρῳ δῶμα διαλαχόντες.

Οἱ δὲ καὶ δηγοῦνται πρὸς ἐτέρους γαυρωντες ὡς τῶν ἀδελφῶν πανουργία καὶ δριμύτητα καὶ παραλογισμῷ πλέον ἔχον ἐν τῷ νέμεσθαι, δέουν ἀγάλλεσθαι καὶ μέγα φρονεῖν ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ χάριτι καὶ ὑπείξει περιγενομένους. οἶδεν ἄξιον ἔστιν Ἀθηνοδώρου μεμνήσθαι, καὶ μέμνηται γε πάντες παρ' ἑμῖν. ἦν γὰρ ἀδελφὸς αὐτῷ πρεσβύτερος ὄνομα Ξένων, καὶ πολλά τῆς οὐσίας ἐπιτροπεύων διεφόρησε· τέλος δὲ ἀρτάσας γυναῖκα καὶ καταδικασθεὶς ἀπώλεσε τὴν οὐσίαν, εἰς τὸ Καίσαρος ταμιεῖον ἀναληθεύσαν. οὐ δὲ Ἀθηνοδώρος ἦν μὲν ἐτὶ μειράκιον οὐδέπω γενειῶν, ἀποδοθέντος δὲ τοῦ

1 υπερβαλόμενοι Capps, confirmed by mss.: υπερβαλόμενοι.
2 διαλογισµοῖς Emperius: διωγµοῖς.
3 τιμὴ H. Richards, confirmed by mss.: τιμή.
4 ἀπολωλεκότες Cobet, confirmed by one ms. (C): ἀποδεδωκότες.
5 ἔστιν omitted in most mss.

a Compare the Judgement of Solomon.
b Adapted from Euripides, Phoenissae, 68: the curse of 278
culations and then drag away from each other nurses and slave-boys, who have been brought up with their brothers and are their familiar companions, when they go away have got the better of their brothers by the value of a slave, but have lost the greatest and most valuable part of their inheritance, a brother’s friendship and confidence.

And some we know who, even with no thought of gain, but merely from the love of contention, deal with their father’s goods with no more decency than they would with spoils taken from an enemy. Of this number were Charicles and Antiochus the Opuntians, who would not part until they had split in two a silver cup and torn apart a cloak, as though driven on by some imprecation from a tragedy to

Divide with whetted sword their heritage.

Some even relate to outsiders boastfully how by knavery and craftiness and jugglery of accounts they have got the better of their brothers in the apportionment, when they ought rather to rejoice and to pride themselves on having surpassed their brothers in fairness and generosity and compliance. It is worth our while to illustrate this point by citing the case of Athenodorus, and indeed all my countrymen still speak of him. For he had an elder brother named Xenon, who, as administrator of Athenodorus’s estate, squandered a large part of his substance; at last Xenon raped a woman, was condemned in court, and lost the entire estate, made confiscate to the imperial treasury. But Athenodorus, although he was then still a beardless lad, yet when his portion of the

Oedipus on his sons, exemplified by the speech of Eteocles cited in 481 a, supra; and cf. Aeschylus, Septem, 789.
(484) μέρους αὐτῷ τῶν χρημάτων οὐ περιείδε τὸν ἀδελ-
φὸν ἀλλ’ εἰς μέσον ἅπαντα καταθεῖς ἐνεύματο, καὶ
πολλὰ περὶ τὴν νέμησιν ἀγνωμονοῦμενος’ οὐκ ἦγα-
B νάκτησεν οὐδὲ μετενόησεν, ἀλλὰ πράως καὶ Ἰλαρῶς
ήμεγκε τάδελφον τὴν ἄνουαν, περιβόητον ἐν τῇ
Ἑλλάδι γενομένην.

12. Ὅ μὲν οὖν Σόλων ἀποφηνάμενος περὶ πολι-
teίας, ὡς ἴσοτης στάσιν οὐ ποιεῖ, λίαν ἐδοξεῖν
οχλικῶς ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ δημοκρατικὴν ἐπεισάγεις
ἀναλογίαν ἀντὶ τῆς καλῆς γεωμετρικῆς. ὦ δ’ ἐν
οἰκίᾳ παραγών ἀδελφοῖς μάλιστα μὲν ὡς ο Ὀλίτων
παρήκει τοῖς πολίταις, ‘‘τὸ ἐμὸν’’ ἐξαιρεῖν ‘καὶ
τὸ οὐκ ἐμὸν,’’ εἴ δὲ μὴ, τὴν ἴσην ἀγαπάν καὶ τῆς
ἴσης περιέχεσθαι, καὶ2 καλὴν κρητίδα καὶ μόνιμων
όμονοιας καὶ εἰρήνης καταβαλλόμενος,3 χρήσθω
καὶ4 παραδείγμασιν ἐνδόξους οἶνον ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τοῦ
O Πιπτακοῦ πρὸς τὸν βασιλεὰ Λυδῶν πυνθανόμενον
εἰ χρήματ’ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, ‘‘διπλάσι,’’ εἶπεν, ‘‘ἡ
ἐβουλομένη, τάδελφοῦ τεθνηκότου.’’ ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐ
μόνον ἐν χρημάτων κτήσει καὶ μειώσει τῷ πλεῖον
πολέμιον καθίσταται τούλαθον, ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς, ἥ
φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, ἐν μὲν ἀνωμαλία κίνησιν ἐν δ’
ὀμαλότητι στάσιν ἐγγίνεσθαι καὶ μονήν, οὕτω πᾶσα

1 ἀγνωμονοῦμενος Wyttenbach: ἀγνωμονεῖμενος.
2 καὶ added by W.C.H.
3 After καταβαλλόμενος the mss. read αἰ or ἐστὶ; deleted
by W.C.H.
4 καὶ] δὲ καὶ some mss.
5 ἥ Casaubon: εἰ.

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a Cf. Life of Solon, xiv. (85 d).
b Cf. Moralia, 719 b, 643 c: that is, arithmetical, instead
of what Aristotle terms proportionate equality.
c Cf., for example, Plato, Gorgias, 508 a.

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money was restored to him, he did not neglect his brother, but put down all the money before them both and apportioned it; and even though he was being treated very unfairly in the division, he did not express indignation or change his mind, but calmly and cheerfully endured his brother's folly, which had become notorious throughout Greece.

12. When Solon, speaking of principles of government, said that equality does not create sedition, he was thought to be playing up too much to the crowd by introducing an arithmetical proportion, a democratic principle, instead of the sound geometrical proportion. As for a man who gives advice to brothers in the matter of a family estate after the manner of Plato's advice to the citizens of his state, to abolish, if possible, the notion of "mine" and "not mine," but if he cannot do this, to cherish equality and cling to it, and thus lays a fair and abiding foundation of concord and peace, let him also make use of eminent precedents, such as that reply of Pittacus to the king of Lydia who inquired if Pittacus had money: "Twice as much," said he, "as I would wish, now that my brother is dead." But since it is not only the getting of money and the losing of it that makes "less grow hostile to more," but in general, as Plato says, in inequality movement is produced and in equality rest and repose; thus all

*d Republic, 462 c; cf. Moralia, 140 d, 767 d, and Aristotle's attempted refutation, Politics, ii. 1. 8 (1261 b 16).
† Perhaps with a reference to Euripides, Phoenissae, 538 (cited 481 Α, supra).
‡ Croesus: cf. Diogenes Laertius, i. 75.
§ Euripides, Phoenissae, 539: τῷ πλέον δ' αἰκὶ πολέμιον καθισταῖ.
h Republic, 547 Α.
(484) μὲν ἀνισότης ἐπισφαλῆς ἐστὶ πρὸς διαφορὰν ἄδελφων, ἐν πάσι δ' ίσους γενέσθαι καὶ ὁμαλοὺς ἀδύνατον (τὰ μὲν γὰρ αἱ φύσεις εὐθὺς ἀνίσως νέμουσι, τὰ δ' ύστερον αἱ τύχαι φθόνους ἐμποιοῦσαι καὶ ξηλοτυπίᾳς, ἀδάχιστα νοσήματα καὶ κῆρας οὐκ ὀικίας μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεσιν ὀλθρίους), δει καὶ ταῦτα φυλάττεσθαι καὶ θεραπεύειν, ἂν ἑγγένηται. τῷ μὲν οὖν ύπερέχοντι παρανεύειν ἂν τις, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν oίς δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ταῦτα κοινὰ ποιεῖν τοῖς ἄδελφοῖς, συνεπικοσμοῦντα τῇ δόξῃ καὶ συνεισποιοῦντα ταῖς φιλίαις· καὶ λέγειν δευτέρους ἢ, χρῆσθαι παρέχοντα τὴν δύναμιν, ὡς ἐκείνων μηθὲν ἢττον οὔσαν· ἐπειτα μὴ' ὅγκον ἐμφαίνειν τινὰ μηθ' ύπεροβίαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐνδιδότα καὶ συγκαθιέντα τῷ ἢθει τὴν ύπεροχὴν ἀνεπίθεθον ποιεῖν καὶ τὴν τῆς τύχης ἀνωμαλίαν ἐπανισθοῦν, ὡς ἀνυστὸν ἐστι, τῇ μετριότητι τοῦ φρονήματος. ὃ γοῦν ὅλουκόλλος οὐκ ἢξίωσε τάδελφοι πρότερος τὴν ἁρχὴν λαβεῖν Ε' πρεσβύτερος ὁν, ἀλλὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ παρεῖς καίρον τὸν ἐκείνου περιέμενεν. ὃ δὲ Πολυδεύκης οὐδὲ θεὸς ἥθελῃσε μόνος ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡμίθεος σὺν τάδελφῳ γενέσθαι καὶ τῆς θυτῆς μερίδος μετασχεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ μεταδοῦναι τῆς ἀθανασίας ἐκείνω.

" Σοὶ δὲ," φαίη τις ἃν, "ὡ μακάριε, μηθὲν

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1 δ' ἵσως γενέσθαι ὁμαλοὺς? W.C.H.
2 ἐμποιοῦσαι ἐμποιοῦσαi most mss.
3 ἐν in G only.
4 ἐκείνων van Herwerden, confirmed by mss.: ἐκείνων.
5 γοῦν] μὲν οὖν most mss.

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a Cf., for example, 468 b, supra.
manner of inequality is dangerous as likely to foster brothers' quarrels, and though it is impossible for them to be equal and on the same footing in all respects (for on the one hand our natures at the very beginning make an unequal apportionment, and then later on our varying fortunes beget envies and jealousies, the most shameful diseases and baneful plagues,\(^a\) ruinous not only for private houses, but for whole states as well); against these inequalities we must be on our guard and must cure them, if they arise. One would therefore advise a brother, in the first place, to make his brothers partners in those respects in which he is considered to be superior, adorning them with a portion of his repute and adopting them into his friendships, and if he is a cleverer speaker than they, to make his eloquence available for their use as though it were no less theirs than his; in the next place, to make manifest to them neither haughtiness nor disdain, but rather, by deferring to them and conforming his character to theirs, to make his superiority secure from envy and to equalize, so far as this is attainable, the disparity of his fortune by his moderation of spirit. Lucullus,\(^b\) for instance, refused to hold office before his brother, older though he was, but forwent his own proper time for candidature and awaited his brother's. And Polydeuces\(^c\) refused to become even a god by himself, but chose rather to become a demigod with his brother and to share his mortal portion upon the condition of yielding to Castor part of his own immortality.

"But you, fortunate man," one might say, "are so

\(^a\) Quoted by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 659 ed. Hense, joined with the Polydeuces quotation in 483 c, *supra.*

\(^b\) *Cf. Life of Lucullus,* i. (492 \textit{b}).

\(^c\) Quoted by Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 659 ed. Hense, joined with the Polydeuces quotation in 483 c, *supra.*
ελαττοῦντι τῶν προσόντων ἀγαθῶν ὑπάρχει συνεξομολογίαν καὶ συνεπικοινωνία, ὥσπερ αὐγῆς ἀπολαύοντα τῆς περὶ τε δόξης ἡ ἀρετῆς ἡ εὐτυχίας. ὥσπερ Πλάτων τοὺς ἁδέλφους εἰς τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν αὐτοῦ συγγραμμάτων θέμενος ὀνομαστοὺς ἐποίησε, Ἡ Πλαύκωνα μὲν καὶ Ἀδείμαντον εἰς τὴν Πολιτείαν, Ἀντιφῶντα δὲ τὸν νεώτατον εἰς τὸν Παρμενίδην. (13.) ἐτί τοῖνυν ὥσπερ ἐγγύνονται ταῖς φύσει καὶ ταῖς τύχαις τῶν ἁδέλφων ἀνισότητες, οὕτως ἐν πάσι καὶ πάντως ὑπερέχειν τὸν ἔτερον ἀδύνατον ἔστι. τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα φασιν ἐκ μιᾶς ὑλῆς 485 γεγονέναι, τᾶς ἐναντιωτάτας ἔχοντα δυνάμεις· διεῖν ὁ ἁδέλφων ἐκ μιᾶς μητρὸς καὶ πατρὸς ταύτων γεγονότων, οὕτως εἷσώρακε τὸν μέν, ὡς τὸν εἰς τὴν Στοὰς σοφόν, ὡς μὲν καὶ καλὸν εὐχαριν ἐλευθέρων ἐνυμον πλοῦτων δεινὸν εἰπεῖν πολυμαθὴς φιλάνθρω- πον, τὸν, δ᾽ ἔτερον αἰσχρὸν ἁραμὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄτιμον ἀπορον ἀσθενῆ περὶ λόγον ἁμαθὴ μισάνθρωπον. ἀλλ' ἐνεστίν ἀμωσγέπως καὶ τοῖς ἀδοξετέροις καὶ ταπεινοτέροις μοῖρα τις χάριτος ἡ δυνάμεως ἡ πρὸς τι καλὸν εὐφύταια,

ὡς ἂν ἐχινόποδας καὶ ἀνὰ τρηχεῖαν ὄνωνον φύονται μαλακῶν ἀνθεα λευκώτων.

ταῦτα τοῖνυν ὁ δοκῶν πλεόν ἐχειν ἐν ἄλλως, ἄν μὴ Β κολούῃ μηδ' ἐπικρύπτῃ μηδὲ πάντων ὥσπερ ἐν

1 αὐγῆς Emperius: αὐτῆς.
2 εὐτυχίας] συντυχίας in most mss.
3 ὡς τὸν added by Reiske.
4 πολυμαθὴ Polus: φιλομαθὴ.
5 ἄτιμον ἀνελεύθερον all mss. but G.
6 ὄνων] most mss. have ὥδων ἵνα.

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situated that, without in the least diminishing your present blessings, you can make another an equal sharer in them and give him a portion of your adornment so that he may enjoy the radiance, as it were, of your reputation or excellence or prosperity.” Just so did Plato make his brothers famous by introducing them into the fairest of his writings, Glaucen and Adeimantus into the Republic, Antiphon the youngest into the Parmenides. (13.) And further, just as there exist inequalities in the natures and the fortunes of brothers, so it is impossible that the one brother should excel at all points and in all ways. They say that the elements come into being from one substance, yet possess the most opposite faculties; but of two brothers sprung from one mother and father, no one ever saw the one, like the wise man of the Stoics, at once handsome, gracious, liberal, eminent, rich, eloquent, learned, philanthropic, and the other ugly, graceless, illiberal, dishonoured, needy, a poor speaker, unlearned, misanthropic. Yet somehow or other there inheres, in even the more disreputable and humble creatures, some portion of grace or faculty or natural aptitude for some good thing:

As among urchin’s foot and rough rest-harrow
There grow the blossoms of soft snow-drops.

Therefore he who appears to have the better in other respects, if he does not try to curtail or conceal these

\(^{c}\) Cf. 472 a, supra, and the note; this Stoic paradox is parodied at length by Horace in Satires, i. 3.

\(^{b}\) A field shrub with tough roots, also called “cammock.”

\(^{c}\) Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec., iii. p. 689: Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus, ii. p. 282; quoted also in Moralia, 44 E. 621 E.
(485) ἀγὼν τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐξωθῆ τῶν πρωτείων, ἀλλ' ἀνθυπείκη καὶ ἀποφαίνη πρὸς πολλὰ βελτίω καὶ χρησιμώτερον ἐκείνον, ύφαιρῶν ἀεὶ τοῦ φθόνου τὴν πρόφασιν ὑσπερ ύλην τοῦ πυρὸς ἀποσβέσει, μᾶλλον δ' ὅλως οὐκ ἔάσει λαβεῖν γένεσιν οὐδὲ σύστασιν. ὁ δὲ καὶ συνεργόν, ἐν οἷς δοκεῖ κρείττων αὐτὸς εἶναι, ποιούμενος τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀεὶ καὶ σύμβουλον, οἶδον ἐν δίκαιος ἰητορικὸς ὅν, ἐν ἀρχαῖς πολιτευόμενος, ἐν πράξει φιλοπράγμων,1 συνελόντι δ' εἶπεῖν, μηδενὸς ἄξιολόγου καὶ τιμὴν φέροντος ἔργου περιορῶν Ὀ ἀπολειπόμενον, ἀλλὰ τῶν καλῶν πάντων κοινώνν ἀποφαίνων καὶ χρώμενος παρόντι καὶ περιμένων ἀπόντα, καὶ ὅλως συνεμφαίνων ὅτι πρακτικὸς μὲν οὐχ ἦττον αὐτοῦ, παραχωρητικὸς δὲ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ δόξης καὶ δυνάμεως, οὐθὲν ἑαυτοῦ παραροῦμενος ἐκεῖνῳ μεγάλα προστίθησι.

14. Τῷ μὲν οὖν ὑπερέχοντι τοιαύτα τις ἂν παραινέσεις τῷ δὲ λειπομένῳ πάλιν ἐνθυμητέον, ὡς οὐχ εἰς οὐδὲ μόνος αὐτοῦ πλουσιώτερος ἡ λογιώτερος ἡ λαμπρότερος εἰς δόξαν ὁ ἀδελφὸς ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις πολλῶν ἀπολείπεται καὶ μυριάκις μυρίων,

εὐρυνεός2 ὁσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονὸς.

εἴτε δὴ3 πάσι περινοστεὶ φθονῶν εἴτε μόνος αὐτὸν

D ἐν τοσούτοις εὐτυχοῦσιν ὁ φίλτατος ἀνίκα καὶ4 συγγενέστατος, ὑπερβολὴν ἐτέρῳ κακοδαιμονίας οὐ

1 φιλοπράγμων Capps: φιλικαῖς οῡ φιλικός.
2 εὐρυνεός Plato (Protag., 345 c): εὐρυνόδους.
3 δὴ G: δὲ.
4 καὶ G: ὃ.
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points of vantage in his brother or thrust him, as though in athletic competitions, from the first places always, but yields in his turn and reveals that his brother is better and more useful in many respects, by thus continually removing all ground for envy, fuel for fire, as it were, will quench the envy, or rather will not allow it to spring up or begin at all. And he who continually makes his brother a helper and adviser in matters in which he himself is supposed to be superior, as in law-suits, being himself a barrister; in the conduct of office, himself a politician; in practical affairs, himself being fond of such—in brief, he that permits his brother to be left out of no task that is worthy of notice and would bring honour, but makes him a sharer in all honourable enterprises and employs him when present, waits for him when absent, and, in general, by showing that his brother is no less a man of affairs than himself, but merely more inclined to shrink from fame and power—he deprives himself of nothing, but adds a great deal to his brother.

14. Such is the advice, then, which one would give to the superior brother. The inferior brother, on the other hand, must reflect that his brother is not the only one who is richer or more learned or more famous than himself, but that he is frequently inferior to many others—ten thousand times ten thousand,

As many as enjoy the fruit of spacious earth.a

whether, then, he envies every man as he walks about, or whether, among the vast number of fortunate beings, the only one that distresses him is his nearest and dearest, he has left no room for any other man

a Simonides, Frag. 5, v. 17; cf. 470 d, supra, and the note.
(485) λέοιτεν. ὡσπερ οὖν ὁ Μέτελλος ἔτεο δεῖν Ὄρμαιόν τοῖς θεοῖς χάριν ἔχειν ὅτι Σκιπίων ἐν ἑτέρᾳ πόλει τοιοῦτος ὅν ὁκ ἐγεννήθη, οὕτως ἑκαστὸς εὐχέσθω μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὸς εὐπραξίᾳ δια-φέρειν, εἰ δὲ μή, τὸν ἄδελφὸν αὐτοῦ τὴν ζηλούμενην ἔχειν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ δύναμιν. οἱ δ’ οὕτως πεφύκασιν ἄτυχεὶς1 πρὸς τὸ καλὸν, ὡστε φίλοις μὲν ἐνδόξοις ἀγάλλεσθαι καὶ μέγα φρονεῖν ἃν ξένους ἡγεμονικοὺς καὶ πλούσιους ἔχωσι, τὰς δὲ τῶν ἄδελφῶν λαμ-Ε πρότητας αὐτῶν ἀμαυρώσεις νομίζειν· καὶ πατέρων μὲν εὐτυχίας ἔπαρσεθαι καὶ στρατηγίαις προπά-πων λεγομέναι, ὃν οὐδὲν ἀπέλαυσαν οὔτε μετ-έσχος, ἄδελφῶν δὲ κληρονομίαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ γάμοις ἐνδόξοις ἀθυμεῖν καὶ ταπεινοῦσθαι. καίτοι μάλιστα μὲν ἐδει μηδ’ ἄλλω φθονεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρέπειν ἔξω καὶ πρὸς ἑτέρους ἀποχετευεῖν τὸ βά-σκανον, ὡσπερ οἱ τὰς στάσεις θύραζε τοῖς πολέμοις περιστώντες2.

πολλοί μὲν γὰρ ἐμοὶ Τρῶες κλειτοὶ τ’ ἐπίκουροι, πολλοί δ’ αὐθ’ σοὶ Ἀχαιοὶ

φθονεῖν πεφύκασι καὶ ζηλοτυπεῖν.

15. ’Αδελφῶ δὲ χρῆ μή καθάπερ πλάστιγγα ρέπειν ἐπὶ τούναντίον, υψομενοῦ ταπεινούμενον

1 ἄτυχεὶς] ἄτυχῶς some mss.
2 πολέμοις περιστώντες Pohlenz (περιστάντες Bernardakis): πολεμίους περιστάντες.

a Cf. Moralia, 202 a.
b Or perhaps “praetorships” (so Wyttenbach).
c Cf. Moralia, 91 f.
d Homer, Il., vi. 227, 229: Plutarch points the quotation
to surpass him in wretchedness. Just as Metellus,\(^a\) therefore, thought that Romans should be grateful to the gods because so great a man as Scipio was not born in any other city, so each one of us should pray that, if possible, he himself may succeed beyond all other men, yet if this cannot be, that his brother may have that superiority and influence so coveted by himself. But some are by nature so unfortunate in matters of right conduct that they exult in famous friends and are proud if they are on terms of hospitality with commanders and men of wealth, but consider that their brothers’ brilliance obscures their own; and that while they are elated by the narration of their fathers’ successes and their great-grandfathers’ high commands,\(^b\) matters from which they received no benefit and in which they had no share, yet they are depressed and dejected when their brothers inherit fortunes, are elected to office, or contract marriages with famous families. And yet they should by all means envy no one; if this is impossible, they should turn their malignancy outwards\(^c\) and drain it off on those not of their blood, just as men do who divert sedition from the city by means of foreign wars:

Many Trojans have I and famous allies,
And many Achaians have you \(^d\)—

by nature suitable objects for envy and jealousy.

15. But a brother should not, like the pan of a balance, incline the opposite way and be himself lowered when his brother is raised on high; but just with “envy” and so does not retain the Homeric context, in which Diomedes indicates the other Greeks for Glaucus, and the other Trojans for himself, “to kill.”
Γαυτόν, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ τῶν ἀριθμῶν οἱ ἐλάττωνες τοὺς μεῖζονας πολλαπλασιάζοντες καὶ πολλαπλασιαζό-
μενοι, συναύξεν ἁμα καὶ συναύξεσθαι τοῖς ἁγάθοις.
οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶν δακτύλων ἐλαττὸν ἔχει τοῦ γράφοντος ἡ ἑλλοντος ὁ μὴ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν μηδὲ
πεφυκός, ἀλλὰ συγκυνοῦνται καὶ συνεργοῦσιν ἀ-
486 παντες ἀμωσγήτως ἀλλήλοις, ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἄνισοι
γεγονότες καὶ τὸ συλληπτικὸν ἐξ ἀντιθέσεως πρὸς
tὸν μέγιστον καὶ ρωμαλεώτατον ἔχοντες.
Οὕτω καὶ Κρατερὸς 'Ἀντιγόνον βασιλεύοντος ἀδελφὸς ὥν καὶ Κασάνδρου Περίλαος ἐπὶ τὸ στρα-
tηγεῖν καὶ οἰκουρεῖν ἔταττον αὐτούς. 'Ἀντίοχοι
de καὶ Σέλευκου καὶ πάλιν Γρυποὶ καὶ Κυζικηνὶ
tὰ ἐπίτερα λέγειν 2 οὐ μαθόντες ἀδελφοῖς ἀλλὰ
πορφύρας καὶ διαδήματος ὀρεγόμενοι, πολλῶν μὲν
αὐτοὺς κακῶν καὶ ἀλλήλους, πολλῶν δὲ τὴν 'Ασίαν
ἐνέπλησαν.
'Επεὶ δὲ τοῖς φιλοτίμοις μάλιστα τῶν ἤθων
Β ἐμφύονται φθόνοι καὶ ξηλοτυπεῖ πρὸς τοὺς πλέον
ἔχοντας ἐν δόξῃ καὶ τιμῇ, χρησμώτατον ἐστὶ πρὸς
tοῦτο τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς τὸ μὴ κτάσθαι μήτε τὰς τιμὰς
μήτε τὰς δυνάμεις ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ἔτερον ἀφ' ἐτέρου. καὶ γὰρ τῶν θηρίων πόλεμος ἐστὶ πρὸς
ἀλληλα τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρεφομένοις, καὶ τῶν
ἀθλητῶν οἱ πρὸς ἐν ἀθλημα κάμνοντες ἀνταγωνισταῖ,
πύκται δὲ παγκρατιασταῖς φίλιοι καὶ δολιχοδρόμοι
παλαισταῖς εὐμενεῖς εἰς καὶ συναγωνισθοὶ καὶ σπου-

1 ῥωμαλεώτατον Reiske, confirmed by mss. ῥωμαλεώτερον.
2 λέγειν] φέρειν D.

a Half-brother of Antigonus Gonatas (see F. Jacoby and Schoch, Pauly-Wissowa, RE, xi. col. 1617, 1621).
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as lesser numbers multiply greater and are multiplied by them, so should he give increase to his brother and at the same time be increased along with him by their common blessings. For it is not true of the fingers, either, that the one which writes and plays musical instruments is superior to the one which cannot, by either nature or attainment, do so, but in some manner or other they all contrive to move together and assist each other, having been made unequal, as though of set purpose, and all deriving their power to grasp from the position of the others opposite the thumb, the largest and strongest of them.

In this spirit Craterus, the brother of King Antigonus, and Perilaüs, the brother of Cassander, assigned themselves to the management of their brothers’ military and domestic affairs; but men like Antiochus and Seleucus, and again Grypus and Cyzicenus, who had not learned to play parts secondary to their brothers, but yearned for the purple and the crown, infected themselves and each other with many horrors, and infected all Asia also.

But since envy and jealousy of those who surpass them in repute and honour are implanted by nature chiefly in men of ambitious character, to guard against these vices it is highly expedient that brothers should not seek to acquire honours or power in the same field, but in quite different fields. Wild beasts, to be sure, which depend for their food upon the same things, war against each other, and athletes who direct their efforts toward one and the same contest are rivals; whereas boxers are friendly to pancratiasts and long-distance runners are well disposed toward wrestlers, and they mutually assist and

\[\text{\textsuperscript{Antiochus, VIII and IX respectively.}}\]
(486) δάξουσιν ὑπὲρ ἄλληλων. διὸ καὶ τῶν Τυνδαρίδῶν πυξ μὲν ὁ Πολυδέυκης ἐνίκα δρόμον 1 δ' ὁ Κάστωρ. εὐ δὲ καὶ τὸν Τεῦκρον Ομήρος πεποίηκεν ἀπὸ Κτοξικῆς εὐδοκιμοῦντα τάδελφον πρωτεύοντος ἐν τοῖς ὁπλίταις:

ὅ δὲ μιν σάκεὶ κρύπτασκε φαευψ.

καὶ τῶν πολιτευμένων οἱ στρατηγοῦντες τοῖς δημαγωγοῦσιν οὐ πάνυ φθονοῦσιν, οὓδε γε τῶν ῥητόρων οἱ δικολόγοι τοῖς σοφιστεύουσιν οὐδὲ τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ περὶ δίαιταν τοῖς χειρουργοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμπαραλαμβάνουσι καὶ συνεπιμαρτυροῦσι. τὸ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης ἢ δυνάμεως ζητεῖν ἐνδοξον εἶναι καὶ περίβλεπτον οὐδὲν ἐν ἀδελφοῖς 2 διαφέρει τοῦ μᾶς ἑρώτας ἀμφότεροι βούλεσθαι πλέον ἔχειν καὶ μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμεῖν τοῦ ἐτέρου τὸν ἐτερον. οἱ μὲν οὖν καθ' ἑτέρας 3 οδοὺς βαδίζοντες οὐθὲν 

Δ ἄλληλοις ὑφελοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ βίοις χρώμενοι διαφόροις τὸν τε φθόνον ἐκτερέπονται καὶ συνεργοῦσιν ἄλληλοις μᾶλλον, ὡς Δημοσθένης καὶ Χάρης καὶ πάλιν Λισχύνης καὶ Εὐβουλος καὶ Ὑπερείδης καὶ Λεωσθένης, οἱ μὲν λέγοντες ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ γράφοντες, οἱ δὲ στρατηγοῦντες καὶ πράττοντες. οὖθεν ἀπωτάτω δεῖ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τρέπεσθαι καὶ ταῖς φιλοτιμίαις τῶν ἀδελφῶν τοὺς ἀφθόνως δόξης καὶ

1 δρόμον] δρόμῳ in many mss.
2 ἀδελφοῖς Schwartz: φαύλους.

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cheer for each other. This, in fact, is the reason why, of the two sons of Tyndareüs, Polydeuces won his victories in boxing and Castor in running. And Homer did well to represent Teucer as renowned in archery, while his brother was foremost among the heavy-armed:

And he covered Teucer with gleaming shield.\(^a\)

So, of those engaged in the service of the state, generals do not at all envy popular leaders; nor, among those occupied with the art of speaking, do barristers envy teachers of rhetoric; nor, among physicians, do dieticians envy surgeons; but they even call each other into consultation and commend one another. For brothers to seek eminence and repute from the same art or faculty is precisely the same as for both to fall in love with one woman and each seek to outstrip the other in her esteem. Those, indeed, who travel different roads afford each other no help, but those who follow different modes of life both strive to avoid envy and are of greater service to each other, as were Demosthenes and Chares,\(^b\) and again Aeschines and Eubulus, Hypereides and Leosthenes, of whom the former in each pair harangued the people and drew up laws, the latter commanded armies and translated words into action. Therefore those who cannot, by their very nature, share without envy their brothers' reputation and influence, should divert as far as possible from those of their brothers their own desires and

\(^a\) Ajax and Teucer: *Il.*, viii. 272.

\(^b\) Cf. Comp. of Demosthenes and Cicero, iii. (857 c); *Life of Phocion*, vii. (744 r).

\(^3\) καθ’ ἔτέρας] ἔτέρας? W.C.H.
δυνάμεως κοινωνείν μη' πεφυκότας, ὅπως εὐφραί

νωσιν εὐημεροῦντες ἀλλήλους ἀλλὰ μὴ λυπῶσι.

16. Παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα φυλακτέον ἐστὶ κη-

Ε δεστῶν καὶ οἰκείων καὶ γυναικὸς ἐστὶν ὅτε τῇ

φιλοδοξίᾳ συνεπιτιθημένης λόγους πονηροὺς, "ὁ

ἀδελφὸς ἄγει καὶ φέρει πάντα καὶ θαυμάζεται καὶ

θεραπεύεται, οὐ δ' οὐδεὶς πρόσεισιν οὖν ἔχεις

σεμνὸν οὐδέν." "ἔχω μὲν οὖν," φαίη τις ἄν1 εὖ

φρονῶν, "ἐδεξὶν εὐδοκιμοῦντα καὶ μέτεστι μοι

τῆς ἑκείνου δυνάμεως τὸ πλεῖστον." ὁ μὲν γὰρ

Σωκράτης ἔλεγε βούλεσθαι Δαρείον ἔχειν μᾶλλον

φίλον ἢ2 δαρεικόν, ἀδελφῷ δὲ νοῦν ἔχοντι καὶ

πλοῦτον καὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ λογιστήτος οὐκ ἑλαττον

ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ἄρχων ἀδελφὸς ἢ πλούτων ἢ λόγου

dυνάμει προήκων εἰς δόξαν.

"Αλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖτω μάλιστα τὰς ἀνωμαλίας

F παρηγορητέον· ἔτεραι δ' εὖθισ ἐγχύονται διαφοράι

περὶ τὰς ἡλικίας ἀπαιδεύτως ἀδελφοῖς. ἐπιεικῶς

γὰρ οἱ τὸ πρεσβύτεροι τῶν νεωτέρων ἄρχων

ἀξιοῦντες ἀεὶ καὶ προστασθαί καὶ πλέον ἔχειν ἐν

παντὶ δόξῃς καὶ δυνάμεως βαρεῖς εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖς,

οἱ τὸ νεωτέροι πάλιν ἀφηνάζοντες καὶ ὑπασυνόμενοι

catafroneῖν καὶ ὀλγυσρεῖν ἀσκοῦσιν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων

οἱ μὲν ὡς φθονοῦμενοι καὶ κολονύμενοι φεύγουσι

487 καὶ δυσχεραίνουσι τὰς νοηθεσίας, οἱ δ' ἀεὶ

τῆς ὑπεροχῆς γλυχόμενοι φοβοῦνται τὴν ἑκείνων

1 ἄν added by Reiske, confirmed by G.

2 τὸ after ἢ deleted by Wilamowitz (τὸν Bernardakis).

a With the substance of chapters 13-15 Cicero's remarks on inequality in friendship (Laelius, 19-20, 69-73) may be compared.

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ambitions, so that by their successes they may give pleasure to each other instead of pain.a

16. But, over and above these considerations, we should be on our guard against the pernicious talk of relatives, of members of our household, and sometimes even of a wife who joins the rest in challenging our ambition by saying: “Your brother carries all before him and is admired and courted, but you are not visited by anybody and enjoy no distinction at all.” “Not so,” a sensible man would reply. “I have a brother who is highly esteemed, and most of his influence is mine to share.” Socrates, for instance, remarked that he would rather have Darius than a daric as a friend, and for a brother who has good sense it is no less an advantage than the possession of wealth, high office, or eloquence, to have a brother who has attained to fame by virtue of office or wealth or eloquence.

But although these means are the best for smoothing away such inequalities, yet there are the other differences which naturally arise among brothers who lack the proper training, differences due to disparity in their ages. For, generally speaking, elder brothers, when they claim the right always to dominate and to have precedence over the younger and to have the advantage in every matter where reputation and influence are involved, are oppressive and disagreeable; and younger brothers, in turn, being restive under the curb and becoming fractious, make it their practice to despise and belittle the elder. The result is that while the younger, feeling that they are being treated despitefully and are discriminated against, resent and try to avoid their elders’ admonitions, the elder, ever clinging fast to their superiority, fear their brothers’
(487) αὐξήσων ὡς αὐτῶν κατάλυσιν. ὤσπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς χάριτος ἀξιωθοῦσα τοὺς λαμβάνοντας ἠγείρθαι μικροτέραν δὲ τοὺς διδόντας, οὗτως ἄν τις, τὸν χρόνον παρανύμπω τῷ μὲν πρεσβυτέρῳ μὴ μέγαν\(^1\) νομίζειν τῷ δὲ νεωτέρῳ μὴ μικρόν, ὑπεροψίας καὶ ἀμελείας καὶ τοῦ καταφρονεῖσθαι καὶ καταφρονεῖν ἀμφιστέρους ἀπαλλάξειν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῷ μὲν πρεσβυτέρῳ τῷ κηδεσθαί καὶ καθηγεῖσθαι καὶ νοοθετεῖν προσηκόν ἄστι, τῷ δὲ νεωτέρῳ τῷ τιμᾶν καὶ ζηλοῦν καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν, ἢ μὲν ἐκεῖνον κηδεμονία τὸ ἐταίβρικον μᾶλλον ἣ τὸ πατρικὸν ἐχέτω καὶ τὸ πειθὸν ἢ τὸ ἐπιτάττον καὶ τὸ χαίρον ἐπὶ τοῖς κατορθώμασι καὶ κατευθημον ὑπὸ ψεγοντός ἀν ἀμάρτη καὶ κολούντος, μὴ μόνον προβυμότερον ὁν\(^2\) ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλανθρωπότερον, τῷ δὲ τοῦ νεωτέρου ζήλῳ τὸ μιμοῦμενον ἐνέστω μὴ τὸ ἀμιλλόμενον. θαυμάζοντος γὰρ ἡ μύμησις, ἡ δ᾿ ἀμιλλα φθονοῦντος ἐστὶ. διὸ τοὺς μὲν ἐξομοιοῦσθαι βουλομένους ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς δ᾿ ἐξισοῦσθαι πιέζουσι καὶ χαλέπτουσι.\(^3\) εἰν πολλάς δὲ τιμᾶς ἄσ τοῦτον ἀποδίδοσθαι τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις, τὸ πειθαρχεῖν εὐδοκιμεῖ. C μάλιστα καὶ κατεργάζεται μετ’ αἰδοῖς εὐνοιαν ἵσχυραν καὶ χάριν ἀνθυπείκουσαν. ἦ καὶ Κάτων, τὸν Καπίωνα\(^4\) πρεσβυτέρον ὁντα θεραπεύων εὔθες ἐκ παῖδων εὐπειθεία καὶ πραότητι καὶ σιωπῇ, τέλος οὗτως ἐπ’ ἀνδράσιν ἐξειρώσατο καὶ τοσαυτῆς ἐν- ἐπλησεν αἰδοὺς πρὸς έαυτόν, ὡς μήτε πρᾶξαι τι μήτ’

\(^1\) μέγαν Pohlenz: μέγα.  \(^2\) ὁν added by Capps.  \(^3\) χαλέπτουσιν| χαλεπαίνουσιν in most mss.  \(^4\) Καπίωνα Reiske, here and below: καπίωνα.

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\(^a\) Cf. Life of Cato Minor, iii. (761 b-c). Q. Servilius Caepio was Cato’s half-brother.
augmentation as though it meant elimination for themselves. Just as, then, we think it right that those who receive a favour should look upon it as of greater, and those who bestow it as of lesser value, so, in regard to a difference in ages, if we advise the elder to regard it as no great matter and the younger to think it no slight thing, we should rid the one of arrogance and neglect, and the other of disdain and contempt. And since it is fitting that the elder should be solicitous about the younger and should lead and admonish him, and that the younger should honour and emulate and follow the older, let the solicitude of the former be rather that of a comrade than of a father, and of one who would persuade rather than command, and would rejoice in a brother's successes and applaud them rather than criticize him if he errs and restrain him—a spirit showing not only a greater desire to help, but also more kindness of heart. And in the emulation of the younger let imitation, not rivalry, be present; for imitation is the act of one who admires, but rivalry of one who envies. It is for this reason that men love those who wish to become like themselves, but repress and crush those who wish to become their equals. And among the many honours which it is fitting that the young render to their elders, obedience is most highly esteemed, and, together with respectfulness, brings about a staunch goodwill and favour which will in turn lead to concessions. Thus it was with Cato: he so won over his elder brother Caepio by obedience and gentleness and silence from his earliest childhood that finally, by the time they both were men, he had so subdued him and filled him with so great a respect for himself that Caepio would neither
(487) εἰπεῖν ἀγνοοῦντος ἐκεῖνον. μὴμονεύεται γοῦν, ὅτι μαρτυρίας ποτε γραμματείον ἐπισφραγισμένου τοῦ Καπίωνος ὁ Κάτων ὑστερος ἐπελθὼν ὡς ἡθέλησεν ἐπισφραγίσασθαι, καὶ ὁ Καπίων ἀπαιτήσας τὸ γραμματεῖον ἀφείλε τὴν αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα πρὶν ἢ πυθέσθαι τὶ παθὼν ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὡς ἐπίστευεν ἀλλ' 

D ὑπείδετο τὴν μαρτυρίαν. φαίνεται δὲ πολλῇ καὶ πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον αἰδῶς1 τῶν ἀδελφῶν δι' εὑνοιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ κηδεμονίαν εἰς τε τᾶλλα καὶ φιλοσοφίαν τὴν ἐκεῖνον συνενθουσιώντων· καὶ γὰρ εἰ διημάρτανον δόξης εὐθὺς ἐκ παῖδων πεπεισμένου καὶ λεγοντες ὡς οὐδέεις γέγονεν Ἐπίκουρον σοφώτερος, ἀξίων ἐστὶν θαυμάζειν καὶ τοῦ διαθέντος οὕτως καὶ τῶν διατεθέντων. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ τῶν νεωτέρων φιλοσόφων Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς ἦλεγξε τὸν εἰπόντα δόξαν ἀκοινώνητον εἶναι, Σωτίωνα νεώτερον ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ ποιήσας ἐνδοξότερον. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι πολλῶν ἄξιων χάριτος παρὰ τῆς τύχης 

Ε γεγονότων, ὣς Τίμωνος εὕνοια τάδελφον πρὸς ἀπαντα τᾶλλα καὶ2 γέγονε καὶ ἐστὶν, οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ τῶν ὁπωσοῦν ἐντευχηχκότων ἡμῖν, ἦκιστα δ' ὑμεῖς οἱ συνήθεις.

17. Ἐτερα τοίνυν ταῖς παραλλήλοις καὶ σύνεγγυς ἡλικίαις ἀδελφῶν φυλακτέον ἐστὶν πάθη, μικρὰ μὲν συνεχὴ δὲ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ πονηρὰν ποιοῦντα τὸν λυπεῖν καὶ παροξύνειν ἐαυτοὺς ἐπὶ πάσι μελέτην,

1 aídōs] ἡ aídōs in some mss.
2 καὶ] omitted in most mss.

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a Cf. Moralia, 1100 a; Epicurus, Frag. 178 (Usener, Epicurea, p. 155).
b Timon appears in the Quaest. Symp., i. 2 and ii. 5.
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do nor say anything without Cato’s knowledge. For example, it is said that on one occasion, when Caepio had affixed his seal to a deposition and Cato came up later and was unwilling to add his own seal, Caepio demanded that the document be returned and removed his seal before asking the reason why his brother had suspected the deposition instead of believing it to be true. In the case of Epicurus also his brothers’ respect for him was clearly great because of the goodwill and solicitude he had for them, inspired as they were with admiration both for his other attainments and especially for his philosophy. For even if they were mistaken in their opinion, yet since they were convinced and constantly declared from their earliest childhood that there was no one wiser than Epicurus, we may well admire both the man who inspired this devotion and also those who felt it. However, of the more recent philosophers, Apollonius the Peripatetic, by making Sotion, his younger brother, more famous than himself, refuted the man who asserted that fame could not be shared with another. And for myself, though I have received from Fortune many favours which call for gratitude, that my brother Timon’s affection for me has always transcended and still transcends all the rest, no one is unaware who has ever had any dealings whatever with me, and least of all you, my familiar friends.

17. Furthermore, there are other disturbances which brothers of nearly the same age must guard against; they are but small, to be sure, yet continuous and frequent, and create a vicious practice of offending and exasperating one another on all occa-

Nigrinus and Quietus; cf. 478 b, supra.
τελευτῶσαν εἰς ἀνήκεστα μίση καὶ κακοθυμίας. ἀρξάμενοι γὰρ ἐπὶ παιδιάς διαφέρεσθαι, περὶ τρο-
φάς ζώων καὶ ἀγώνας οἶον ὀρτύγων ἡ ἀλεκτρούων,
εἶται παιδῶν ἐν παλαιστραις καὶ κυνῶν ἐν θήραις

_F καὶ ἔπων ἐν ἀμίλλαις, οὐκέτι κρατεῖν ἐν τοῖς
μείζοσιν οὐδὲ καταπαύειν τὸ ψυλλευκὸν δύνανται
καὶ φιλότιμοι. ὥσπερ Ἕλληνων οἱ καθ’ ἡμᾶς
dυνατότατοι περὶ σπουδᾶς ὀρχηστῶν εἶτα κιθα-
ρωδῶν διαστάντες, ἐκ τούτου τὰς ἐν Αἰδηψῷ
κολυμβήθρας καὶ παστάδας καὶ ἀνδρῶν ἀντι-
παραβάλλοντες αἰὲ καὶ τοπομαχοῦντες καὶ ἀπο-
κόπτοντες χετοῦς καὶ ἀποστρέφοντες, οὕτως

488 ἐξηγρωθήσαν καὶ διεφθάρμησαν, ὅστε πάντων
ἀφαιρεθέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ τυράννου καὶ φυγάδες καὶ
πένητες καὶ ὅλιγου δεῶ λέγειν ἐτερα τῶν πρότε-
ρον γενόμενοι μόνῳ διέμειναν οἱ αὐτοὶ τῶν μυσεῖων
ἀλλήλους. ὦθεν οὐχ ἦκιστα δεῖ περὶ τὰ μικρὰ
καὶ πρώτα παραδυνομένη τῇ πρὸς τούς ἀδέλφους
ψυλλευκία καὶ ἔθλοτυπία διαμάχεσθαι, μελετών-
τας ἀνθυπείκειν καὶ ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ χαίρειν τῷ
χαρέεσθαι μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς ἢ τῷ νικάν. οὐ γὰρ
ἐτέραν οἱ πάλαι Καθεμέαν νίκην ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ
Θῆβας τῶν ἀδελφῶν ὡς αἰσχώστην καὶ κακίστην
προσηγόρευσαν.

Τί οὖν; οὐχὶ πολλὰς τὰ πράγματα καὶ τοῖς

1 Αἰδηψῷ Μεζιριακός: αἰδηψῷ ὥς εἰδηψῷ.
2 περὶ] παρὰ in most mss.
3 καὶ] omitted in most mss.

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4 Medicinal hot baths in Euboea; cf. Moralia, 667 c-d.
5 Probably Domitian, as Reiske conjectured.
6 Cf. Moralia, 10 Α, and the note; the expedition of the
sions, which at last ends in incurable hatred and malevolence. For having once begun to differ in childish matters, about the care of animals and their fights, as, for instance, those of quails or cocks, they then continue to differ about the contests of boys in the palaestra, of dogs on the hunt, and of horses at the races, until they are no longer able to control or subdue their contentious and ambitious spirit in more important matters. So the most powerful of the Greeks in my time, disagreeing first about rival dancers, then about harp-players, and afterwards by continually holding up to invidious comparison the swimming-baths and porticoes and banquet-halls at Aedepsus,\(^a\) and then manoeuvring for places and positions, and going on to cut off aqueducts and divert their waters, they became so savage and reckless that they were deprived of everything by the despot,\(^b\) and, becoming exiles and paupers and—I had almost said—something other than their former selves, they remained the same only in their hatred for one another. It is therefore of no slight importance to resist the spirit of contentiousness and jealousy among brothers when it first creeps in over trivial matters, practising the art of making mutual concessions, of learning to take defeat, and of taking pleasure in indulging brothers rather than in winning victories over them. For the men of old gave the name of “Cadmean \(^c\) victory” to no other than that of the brothers at Thebes, as being the most shameful and the worst of victories.

What then? Do not practical affairs bring many

Seven against Thebes, in which the two sons of Oedipus, Eteocles and Polyneices, died fighting against each other in single combat.
В επιεικῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦν καὶ πρᾶς φέρει προφάσεις (488) ἀντιλογιῶν καὶ διαφορῶν; καὶ μάλα ἀλλὰ κακεὶ φυλακτέον, ὅπως τὰ πράγματα μάχηται καθ' αὐτά, μηδὲν ἐκ φιλονεικίας μηδ' ὀργῆς πάθος οῖον ἁγκιστρον προσθέντας, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἐπὶ ξυγοῦ τοῦ δικαίου τὴν ῥοπὴν κοινῶς ἀποθεωροῦντας καὶ τάχιστα ταῖς κρίσει καὶ ταῖς διαίταις τὴν ἀμφιλογίαν παραδιόντας ἀποκαθήρα, πρὶν ἐνδύσαν ὡσπερ βαφῆν ἡ κηλίδα δευσοποίου γενέσθαι καὶ δυσέκπλησον· εἶτα μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς Πυθαγορικοὺς, οἱ γένει μηθὲν προσήκοντες ἀλλὰ κοινοῦ λόγου μετέχοντες, ε' ποτε προαχθείεν εἰς λουδορίαν ὑπ' ὀργῆς, πρὶν ἡ τὸν ἡλιον δύναι τὰς δεξιὰς ἐμβαλόντες ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἀσπασάμενοι διελύοντο. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ βουβῶν πυρετοῦ γενομένου δεινον οὐθέν ἔστω, ἢν δὲ παυσαμένου παραμένη, νόσος εἰναι δοκεῖ καὶ βαθυτέραν ἔχειν ἀρχῆν, οὕτως ἄδελφῶν ἡ μετὰ τὸ πράγμα παυσαμένη διαφορὰ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστι, τῆς δ' ἐπιμενούσης πρόφασις ἢν τὸ πράγμα μοχθηρὰν τινα καὶ ὑπολογ αἰτίαν ἔχον. 

18. "Αὔνοι δὲ πυθέσθαι βαρβάρων ἄδελφῶν διαδικασίαν, οὐ περὶ γηδίου μερίδος οὐδ' ἐπ' ἀνδρα- 

D πόδοις ἡ προβατίοις γενομένην ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς Περσῶν ἡγεμονίας. Δαρείου γὰρ ἀποθανόντος οἱ μὲν ἡξίουν Ἀριαμένην βασιλεὺν, προσβύτατον

1 μαχεῖται Bernardakis.
2 προσήκοντες] Stegmann would add ἀλλήλοις.
3 τινα Pohlenz: τε.
4 ἐπέχον? W.C.H.

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"No doubt the 'Ακροάματα of the Master: see Iamblichus, Vita Pythagorica, 82 ff. (Notopoulos).

"Cf. Ephesians, iv. 26-27: Let not the sun go down upon your wrath; neither give place to the devil.

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occasions for controversy and dissension even to those who have the reputation of being of an equitable and gentle disposition? Yes, certainly. But there also we must see to it that the affairs fight the battle quite by themselves, without our inserting into the contest, like a hook, as it were, any emotion arising from contentiousness or anger; but, keeping our eyes fixed impartially upon the swaying of Justice, as though we were watching a pair of balances, we should with all speed turn over the matter in dispute to the decision of a jury or of arbitrators, and cleanse its filth away before, like a dye or stain, it sinks into the fabric and its colours become fast and hard to wash out. We should next pattern ourselves after the Pythagoreans, who, though related not at all by birth, yet sharing a common discipline, if ever they were led by anger into recrimination, never let the sun go down before they joined right hands, embraced each other, and were reconciled. For just as it is nothing alarming if a fever attends a swelling in the groin, but if the fever persists when the swelling is gone, it is thought to be a malady and to have a deeper origin: so when the dissension of brothers ceases after the matter in dispute is settled, the dissension was caused by the matter; but if it remains, the matter was but a pretext and contained some malignant and festering reason.

18. It is worth our while to inquire into a dispute of brothers who were not Greeks, which arose, not about a little patch of land, nor over slaves or flocks, but about the empire of Persia. For when Darius died, some thought it right that Ariamenes should be king, being the eldest of his children; but others chose
(488) ὠντα τῆς γενεᾶς, οἱ δὲ Ἐρέξης, Ἀτόσσης τε μητρὸς ὠντα τῆς Κύρου θυγατρὸς ἐκ τε Δαρείου βασιλεύοντος ἢδη γεγενημένον. Ἀριαμένης μὲν οὖν κατέβαινεν ἐκ Μήδων οὐ πολεμικῶς ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ δίκην ἡσυχαῖος; Ἐρέξης δὲ παρὼν ἐπράττεν ἀπερ ἤν βασιλεῖ προσήκοντα. Ἑλθόντος δὲ τάδελφοι θεῖς τὸ διάδημα καὶ καταβάλων τὴν τιάραν, ἦν φοροῦν ὅρθην οἱ βασιλεύοντες, ἀπήνυσεν αὐτῷ καὶ ἰσπάσατο, καὶ δῶρα πέμπτων ἐκέλευσεν εἰπείν Εὐτοῦς κομίζοντας, "τούτους σε νῦν τιμᾷ Ἐρέξης ὁ ἀδελφός; ἂν δὲ βασιλεὺς κρίσει καὶ ψήφῳ Περσῶν ἀναγορευθῇ, διδωσί σοι δευτέρῳ μεθ' ἑαυτῶν εἶναι." καὶ ὁ Ἀριαμένης, "ἐγὼ δ', " ἐφη, "τὰ μὲν δῶρα δέχομαι, βασιλείαν δὲ τὴν Περσῶν ἐμαυτῷ νομίζω προσήκειν: τιμὴν δὲ τὴν μετ' ἔμε τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς φυλάξω, Ερέξη δὲ πρῶτω τῶν ἀδελφῶν." ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ κρίσις ἔνεσθι, Πέρσαι μὲν Ἀρτάβανον ἀδελφὸν ὠντα Δαρείου δυκαστὴν ἀπέφηναν, τὸ δὲ δόξαν αὐτοῖς Ἐρέξης ἐφευγεν ὑπ᾽ ἐκεῖνον κρυθήναι τῷ πλῆθει πεποιθώς. "Ατόσσα δ' ἡ μῆτηρ ἐπέπληξεν Φ αὐτῷ, "τὶ φεύγεις Ἀρτάβανον, ὃ παῖ, θεῖον ὄντα καὶ Περσῶν ἀριστον; τί δ' οὔτως τὸν ἀγώνα δεδοικας, ἐν ὧ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δευτερεία, Περσῶν βασιλέως ἀδελφόν κρυθήναι;" πεισθέντος οὖν Ἐρέξου καὶ γενομένων λόγων Ἀρτάβανος μὲν ἀπεφήνατο Ερέξη τὴν βασιλείαν προσήκειν, Ἀριαμένης δ' εὐθὺς ἀναπηδήσας προσεκύνησε τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ

1 ως] omitted in most mss.
2 ἡσυχαῖος] ἢσυχαῖος in some mss.
3 τὸ δὲ added by Capps, deleting δὲ after Ἐρέξης, with two mss.
4 ὑπ'] Reiske: ἐπ'.
Xerxes, as being the child of Atossa, the daughter of Cyrus, and born to Darius after he had come to the throne. Now Ariamenes came down from the country of the Medes in no hostile manner, but quietly, as though to a court of justice; and Xerxes was present and performing the functions of a king. But when his brother came, putting aside the diadem and pressing down the crest of his tiara, which reigning kings wear erect, he went to meet Ariamenes and embraced him, and, sending gifts, he bade the bearers say, "With these your brother Xerxes honours you now; but if he shall be proclaimed king by judgement and vote of the Persians, he grants to you the right of being second after himself." And Ariamenes said, "I accept the gifts, yet I believe the kingdom of the Persians to be mine by right. But I shall guard for my brothers their honour after my own, and for Xerxes as the first of my brothers." And when the day of judgement came, the Persians appointed as judge Artabanus, the brother of Darius; but Xerxes sought to evade their decision that the judgement should be made by Artabanus, since he put his faith in the people. But Atossa, his mother, chided him: "Why, my son, do you try to evade Artabanus, who is your uncle and the best of the Persians? Why do you so fear this contest in which even the second place is honourable—to be adjudged brother to the king of Persia?" Xerxes was therefore persuaded and when the pleas were made, Artabanus declared that the kingdom belonged by right to Xerxes; and Ariamenes at once leapt up and did obeisance to his

* Cf. *Moralia*, 173 b-c; Justin, ii. 10; the account in Herodotus, vii. 2-3, has scarcely anything in common with this story.

λαβόμενος τῆς δεξιᾶς εἰς τὸν θρόνον ἐκάθισε τῶν βασιλείων. ἐκ τούτου μέγιστος ἤν παρ' αὐτῷ καὶ παρείχεν εὖνοι εὐαυτόν, ὥστ' ἀριστεύον ἐν τῇ περὶ Σαλαμίνα ναυμαχίᾳ πεσεῖν ύπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνου δόξης. 489 τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ὡσπερ ἀρχέτυπον ἐκκείσθω καθαρῶν καὶ ἀμώμητον εὐμενείας καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνης.

'Αντιόχοι δὲ τῇ μὲν φιλαρχίαν ψέξειν ἂν τις, ὅτι δ' οὐ παντάπασιν αὐτῇ τὸ φιλάδελφον ἐνηφανίσθη, θαυμάσειν. ἔπολεμε γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῆς βασιλείας Σελευκείων νεώτερος ὃν ἀδελφός καὶ τὴν μητέρα συλλαμβάνουσαν εἶχεν; ἀκμάζοντος δὲ τοῦ πολέμου, μάχην ὁ Σελευκος Γαλάταις συνάψας καὶ ἠττηθείς, οὐδαμοῦ φανερὸς ἢν ἀλλ' ἐδοξε τεθνάναι, πάσης ὁμοὶ τῇ στρατιᾶς ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων κατακοπείσης. πυθόμενος οὖν ὁ 'Αντιόχος τὴν πορ- B φύραν ἔθηκε καὶ φαίνε τὸν ιμάτιον ἐλαβε, καὶ τὰ βασιλεία κλείσας ἐπένθες τὸν ἀδελφόν· ὅλως δ' ὡσπερ ἀκούσεις ὅτι σώζεται καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἔτεραν ἀθροίζει, τοῖς τε θεοῖς ἔθυσε προσελθὼν· καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ὃν ἢρχε θύειν καὶ στεφανηφορεῖν ἐπήγγειλεν.

'Αθηναίοι δὲ τὸν περὶ τῆς ἐρίδος τῶν θεῶν μύθον ἀτόπως πλάσαντες ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς ἀτοπίας οὐ φαινόν ἐνεμίξαν αὐτῷ· τὴν γὰρ δευτέραν ἐξαιροῦσιν ἀεὶ τοῦ Βοηθομιῶνος, ὅς ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῷ Ποσειδῶνι πρὸς τὴν 'Αθηνᾶν γενομένης τῆς διαφορᾶς. τό οὖν

1 προσελθὼν] προσελθὼν in most mss.

a Cf. Life of Themistocles, xiv. (119 D-E).
b Cf. Moralia, 184 A.  c Cf. 508 D, infra.

c Cf. Moralia, 740 f.—741 b (Quaest. Symp., ix. 6, which is unfortunately fragmentary); Frazer's note on Apollodorus, iii. 14. 1 (L.C.L., vol. ii. pp. 78 f.).

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brother and taking him by the hand set him upon the
ingly throne. From that time forth Ariamenes was
highest in honour with Xerxes and showed himself of
such loyalty toward the king that he fell in the sea-
fight at Salamis performing deeds of valour for his
brother's glory. Let this, then, be set forth as a
pure and blameless model of goodwill and high-
mindedness.

But Antiochus might be condemned because of
his lust for dominion, yet admired because his love
for his brother was not altogether extinguished
thereby. For he went to war against Seleucus for
the kingdom, though he was the younger brother and
had the aid of his mother. But when the war was at
its height, Seleucus joined battle with the Galatians
and was defeated; he disappeared and was thought
to be dead, since practically all his army had been
cut to pieces by the barbarians. So when Antiochus
learned this, he laid aside his purple and put on a
dark robe, and, shutting the gates of the palace, went
into mourning for his brother. But a little later,
when he heard that his brother was safe and was again
collecting another army, he came forth and sacrificed
to the gods, and made proclamation to the cities over
which he ruled that they should sacrifice and wear
garlands of rejoicing.

The Athenians, though they absurdly invented
the tale of the strife of the gods, yet inserted in it
no slight correction of its absurdity, for they always
omit the second day of Boedromion, thinking that
on that day occurred Poseidon's quarrel with Athena.

* That is, in Meton's scheme the day regularly became
an ἡμέρα ἐξαιρέσιμος to make the lunar year agree with the
solar.
(489) κωλύει καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐν διαφορᾷ ποτὲ πρὸς οἰκείους καὶ 
συγγενεῖς γενομένους ἐν ἀμνηστίᾳ τῆς ἡμέρας. 
C έκεινη τίθεσθαι καὶ μίαν τῶν ἀποφράδων νομίζειν, 
ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλῶν καὶ ἄγαθῶν ἐν αἰσ ὑπενικάθανε 
καὶ συνεβιώσαμεν ἡμερῶν διὰ μίαν ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι; 
ἡ γὰρ μάτην καὶ πρὸς οὕθεν ἡ φύσις ἡμῖν ἔδωκε 
πραότητα καὶ μετριοπαθεῖας ἐκγονὸν ἀνεξικακίαν, 
ἡ μάλιστα χρηστέους τούτους πρὸς συγγενεῖς καὶ 
οἰκείους. οὐχ ἤττον δὲ τοῦ διδόναι συγγνώμην 
ἄμαρτονσι τὸ αὐτείσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν αὐτοὺς ἄμαρ-
τόντας εὐνοιαν ἐμφαίνει καὶ φιλοστοργίαν. ὦθεν 
ἄργιζομένων τε δεὶ μὴ ἄμελεῖν καὶ παρακτομένοις 
μὴ ἀντιτείνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φθάνειν πολλάκις ἄμαρ-
τώντας αὐτοὺς τῇ παραίτήσει τῆς ὀργῆς ἀδικηθέντας 
τε πάλιν αὐ τῇ συγγνώμῃ τῆς παραίτησιν.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν Σωκρατικὸς Εὐκλείδης ἐν ταῖς σχο-
λαῖς περιβολής ἐστὶν ὅτι φωνὴν ἀκούσας ἀγνώμονα 
καὶ θηριώδη τάδελφον πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰπόντος, "ἀπο-
λοίμην, εἰ μὴ σε τιμωρησαίμην". "ἔγω δ'," εἶπεν, 
"εἰ μὴ σε πείσοιμι παύσασθαι τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ 
φιλεῖν ἡμᾶς ὡς πρῶτον ἐφίλεις."

Τὸ δ' Εὐμένους τοῦ βασιλέως ἔργον οὐ λόγος 
ὑπερβολὴν οὐδενὶ πραότητος ἀπολέσθαι. Περ-
σευς γὰρ δ' τῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλέως ἕχθρος ὄν 
αὐτῷ παρεσκεύασε τοὺς ἀποκτενοῦντας· οἱ δὲ περὶ 
Ἐ Δελφοῦς ἐνήδρευον αἰσθόμενοι βαδίζοντα πρὸς τὸν

1 οὐδὲν Pohlenz: οὐδὲν or οὐδὲν οὐδὲ.

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What, then, prevents us also from treating the day on which we have quarrelled with any of our family or relatives as one to be consigned to oblivion, and counting it one of the unlucky days, instead of forgetting because of one day the many good days in which we grew up and lived together? For either it is in vain and to no avail that Nature has given us gentleness and forbearance, the child of restraint, or we should make the utmost use of these virtues in our relations with our family and relatives. And our asking and receiving forgiveness for our own errors reveals goodwill and affection quite as much as granting it to others when they err. For this reason we should neither overlook the anger of others, nor be stubborn with them when they ask forgiveness, but, on the contrary, should try to forestall their anger, when we ourselves are time and again at fault, by begging forgiveness, and again, when we have been wronged, in our turn should forestall their request for forgiveness by granting it before being asked.

Eucleides,\textsuperscript{a} the Socratic, is famous in the schools because, when he heard an inconsiderate and brutal speech from his brother who said, "May I be damned if I don't get even with you," he replied, "And so will I, if I don't persuade you to stop your anger and love me as you used to do."

But in the case of King Eumenes\textsuperscript{b} it was not a mere word, but a deed, which revealed a gentleness that no one could surpass. For Perseus, the king of Macedonia, who was his enemy, procured men to kill him. These men set an ambush near Delphi, observing that he was coming on foot from the sea to the

\textsuperscript{a} Eucleides, the Socratic.

\textsuperscript{b} Eumenes II of Pergamum; and cf. Moralia, 184 B, 480 c, supra.

\textsuperscript{b} Eumenes II of Pergamum; and cf. Moralia, 184 B, 480 c, supra.
The other brothers are mentioned by name in 480 c, supra.

By the ceremony in which the father raises the child in his arms to acknowledge its legitimacy. Probably Attalus did not actually disown his children, but merely made it clear that he did not regard them as heirs to the throne.

Stratonice had been childless for over sixteen years; she
temple of the god. They came behind him and hurled great stones down upon his head and neck; these made him dizzy and he fell down and was thought to be dead. A report of his death spread far and wide, and some of his friends and servants came back to Pergamum, and were thought to bring their report as actual eye-witnesses of the calamity. Attalus, therefore, the eldest of the king's brothers, an honourable man and more loyal to Eumenes than any of the others, not only took the crown and was proclaimed king, but also married his brother's wife, Stratonice, and had intercourse with her. But when the news came that Eumenes was alive, and he himself was approaching, Attalus laid aside the crown, took his spears, as had been his custom before, and went with the other guardsmen to meet the king. And Eumenes not only cordially clasped his hand, but also embraced the queen, showing her honour and friendliness; and living a considerable time after his return, without giving a hint of blame or suspicion, he died, leaving to Attalus both his kingdom and his wife. And what did Attalus? When Eumenes was dead, he was unwilling to acknowledge as his own any of the children his wife had borne him, though they were many, but brought up and educated his brother's son and in his own life-time placed the crown upon his head and saluted him as king.

But Cambyses, frightened by a dream into the

now became pregnant and, in due course, bore a son, whom Eumenes, according to Polybius, xxx. 2, had not acknowledged at least five years later; but subsequently he succeeded his legal uncle, Attalus II, as Attalus III. See W. S. Ferguson, Class. Phil., i. 233 ff. Cf. also Livy, xlii. 15 and Pauly-Wissowa, RE, xi., col. 1099.

*Cf. Herodotus, iii. 30.
(490) λεύσοντα τῇς Ἀσίας τὸν ἀδελφὸν, οὐδεμίαν ἀπό- δειξιν οὐδ' ἐλεγχόν ἀναμείνας ἀπέκτεινεν. οἴδεν ἔξεπεσε τῇς Κύρου διαδοχῆς ἡ ἀρχὴ τελευτήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ Δαρείου γένος ἐβασιλεύσεν, ἀνδρός οὐ μόνον ἀδελφοῖς ἄλλα καὶ φίλοις ἐπισταμένον κοινωνεῖν πραγμάτων καὶ δυνάμεως.

19. Ἑτὶ τούν ἐκεῖνο δἐὶ μνημονεύειν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς διαφοραῖς καὶ φυλάττειν, τὸ Β τοῖς φίλοις αὐτῶν ὁμιλεῖν καὶ πλησιάζειν τότε μᾶλιστα, φεύγειν δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ μὴ προσ- δέχεσθαι, μιμούμενον αὐτὸ γοῦν τοῦτο τὸ Κρητῶν, οἱ πολλάκις στασιάζοντες ἀλλήλοις καὶ πολεμοῦντες, ἔξωθεν ἐπιστόμων πολεμίων διελύοντο καὶ συν- ἱσταντο· καὶ τούτῳ ἤν ὁ καλούμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν "συγκρητισμός." ἔνιοι γὰρ ὁσπερ ὕδωρ τοῖς χαλῶσι καὶ διυπαντόμοις ὑπορρέοντες ἀνατρέπουσιν οἰκειότητας καὶ φιλίας, μισοῦντες μὲν ἀμφοτέρους ἐπιτιθήμενοι δὲ τῷ μάλλον ὑπ' ἀσθενείας ἐνδιδόντι. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἔρωντι συνερώσων οἱ νεαροὶ καὶ ἀκακοὶ C τῶν φίλων, τῷ δ' ὅργιζομένῳ καὶ διαφερομένῳ πρὸς ἀδελφόν οἱ κακοθέστατοι τῶν ἐχθρῶν συν- αγανακτεῖν καὶ συνοργίζεσθαι δοκοῦσι. καθάπερ οὐν ἢ Ἀἰσιόπειος ἀλεκτορίς πρὸς τὴν αἴλουρον, ὡς δὴ κατ' εὔνοιαν αὐτής νοσοῦσθαι ὁπως ἔχει πυθανο- μένην, "καλῶς," εἶπεν, "ἀν σὺ ἀποστῆς," οὐτω πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον, ἐμβάλλοντα λόγον ὑπὲρ τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ πυθανόμενον καὶ ἀνορύττοντα1 τῶν ἀπορρήτων ἐνία χρὴ λέγειν, "ἀλλ' ἐμοιγε

1 ἀνορύττοντα Hartman: ὑπορύττοντα.
belief that his brother would be king of Asia, killed him without waiting for any evidence or proof. For this reason, when Cambyses died, the throne passed from the line of Cyrus and the kingship was gained by the family of Darius, a man who knew how to give, not only to brothers, but also to friends, participation in affairs of state and in power.

19. Then this further matter must be borne in mind and guarded against when differences arise among brothers: we must be careful especially at such times to associate familiarly with our brothers' friends, but avoid and shun all intimacy with their enemies, imitating in this point, at least, the practice of Cretans, who, though they often quarrelled with and warred against each other, made up their differences and united when outside enemies attacked; and this it was which they called "syncretism." For some there are, fluid as water, who, seeping through those who relax their hold and disagree, overturn affinities and friendships, hating indeed both sides, but attacking the one which yields more readily because of its weakness. For while it is true that when a man is in love his young and guileless friends share his love, it is also true that the most ill-disposed of enemies make a show of sharing the indignation and wrath of one who is angered and at variance with his brother. As, then, Aesop's hen said to the cat who inquired, with pretended solicitude, of the sick bird "How are you?" "Very well, if you keep away"; so one would say to the sort of person who brings up the subject of the quarrel and makes inquiries and tries to dig up some secrets, "But I shall

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*a* Cf. the *Etymologicum Magnum*, s.v. συγκρητίσαι.

*b* *Fabulae*, 16 and 16 b ed. Halm.
(490) πράγμα πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν οὐθὲν ἦσται, ἀν μήτ' ἔγω τοῖς διαβάλλουσι προσέχω μήτ' ἐκεῖνος. νυνὶ δ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ὀφθαλμῶντες μὲν οἰωμέθα δεῖν ἀποστρέφειν ἐπὶ τὰ μὴ ποιοῦντα πληγὴν μηδ'.

D ἀντιτυπῶν χρώματα καὶ σώματα τὴν ὀψιν, ἐν δὲ μέμψει καὶ ὀργαίς καὶ ὑπονοίαις πρὸς ἀδελφοὺς γενόμενοι καὶ προσαναρχομένοι τοῖς ἐκταράττουσιν, ὅτε καλῶς εἴχε τοὺς μὲν ἔχθροὺς καὶ δυσμενεῖς ἀποδιδόμεθα καὶ λαυθάνειν, συνεῖναι δὲ καὶ συνδημερεύειν ἀλώστα κηδεσταῖς ἐκείνων καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ πρὸς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν εἰσιόντας αἰτιᾶσθαι καὶ παρρησιάζεσθαι. καίτοι λίθον οὐ φασὶ χρήναι μέσον ἀδελφοὺς λαμβάνειν ὁδὸν βαδίζοντας, ἀχθοῦντα δὲ καὶ κυνὸς διεκδραμόντος, καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα δεδίων ἢν οὐδὲν ἔρριμον ιαμάρον ἀνθρώπους δὲ κυνικοὺς καὶ διαβόλους ἐν μέσῳ λαμβάνοντες αὐτῶν καὶ περιπταῖόντες οὐ συνορῶσι.

20. Διὸ τοῦ λόγου τὸ συνεχὲς ὑπαγορεύοντος, εὖ μὲν εἴπε Θεόφραστος ὡς "εἰ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἦστι, μάλιστα δεὶ κοινοῖς τῶν φίλων εἶναι τοὺς φίλους". οὐχ ἦκιστα δ' ἂν τὶς ἀδελφοῖς τούτο παρανέσειεν. αἱ γὰρ Ἰδία καὶ χωρὶς ὀμιλεῖ καὶ συνήθεια πρὸς ἄλλους² ἀποστρέφουσι καὶ ἀπάγουσιν ἀπ' ἄλληλους τῷ γὰρ φιλεῖν ἔτερους εὖθὺς ἔπεται τὸ χαίρειν ἔτερους καὶ ζηλοῦν ἔτερους καὶ ἀγεσθαί ύφ' ἐτέρων.

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¹ ἔσται W.C.H.: ἐστίν.
² ἄλλους Reiske, confirmed by mss.: ἄλληλους.

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a Cf. 469 A, supra, and the note. b Cf. 491 D, infra.

a Frag. 75 ed. Wimmer; cf. Moralia, 65 A.

a Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, viii. 9. 1 (1159 b 31); Kock, Com. Att. Frag., iii. p. 6, Menander, Frag. 9, from the Adelphoe.

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have no trouble with my brother if neither I nor he pay attention to slanderers." But as it is—I do not know the reason—although when we suffer from sore eyes, we think it proper to turn our gaze to colours and objects which do not beat against or offend the sight, yet when we are in the midst of fault-finding and bursts of anger and suspicion toward our brothers, we enjoy the company of those who cause the disturbance and we take on from them a false colouring, when it would be wise to run away from our enemies and ill-wishers and avoid their notice, and to associate and spend our days almost entirely with relatives and intimates and friends of our brothers, visiting their wives also and frankly telling them our reasons for complaint. And yet there is a saying that brothers walking together should not let a stone come between them, and some people are troubled if a dog runs between brothers, and are afraid of many such signs, not one of which ever ruptured the concord of brothers; yet they do not perceive what they are doing when they allow snarling and slanderous men to come between them and cause them to stumble.

20. And so the saying of Theophrastus,—its relevance is suggested by our very subject—is excellent: "If the possessions of friends are common, then by all means the friends of friends should be common"; and one should urge this advice upon brothers with special emphasis. For associations and intimacies which are maintained separately and apart lead brothers away from each other and turn them toward others, since an immediate consequence of affection for others is to take pleasure in others, to emulate others, and to follow the lead of others.
θοποιούσι γάρ αἱ φιλίαι, καὶ μείζον οὖθεν ἐστιν ἡθῶν διαφορὰς σημεῖον ἡ φίλων αἱρέσεις διαφερόντων. ὅθεν οὔτε τὸ συνεσθείν ἀδελφῷ καὶ συμπίνειν οὔτε τὸ συμπαίζειν καὶ συνδημερεύειν οὔτω συνεκτικοί ἐστιν ὁμοιός, ὡς τὸ συμφιλεῖ καὶ συνεχθραίνειν ἤδεσθαι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς συνόντα καὶ πάλιν βδελύττεσθαι καὶ φεύγειν. οὔδὲ γάρ διαβόλας αἱ κοινὲς φιλίαι φέρουσιν οὔδὲ συγκρούσεις· ἀλλὰ κἂν γένηται τις ὀργῇ καὶ μέμψις, ἐκλύεται διὰ μέσον τῶν φίλων ἐκδεχομένων καὶ διασκεδασμένων ἄντερ ἀμφοτέρους οἰκείως ἔχως καὶ πρὸς ἀμφο-τέρους ὅμοι τῇ εὑνοίᾳ συνεύσωσιν. ὡς γάρ ὁ κασσίτερος ῥαγεύτα τὸν χαλκὸν συναρμόττει καὶ συγκεράννυσι τῷ ψαύειν ἐκατέρου πέρατος οἰκείως ὁμοπαθῆς γινόμενος, οὔτω δὲ τὸν φίλον εὐάρμοστον ὄντα καὶ κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρους τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς προσκαταπυκνόν τὴν εὑνοίαν. οἱ δὲ ἀνυσοὶ καὶ ἅμικτοι καθάπερ ἐν διαγράμματι μουσικῷ φθόγγοι διαξενζών οὐ συναφὴν ποιοῦσι. ἐστιν οὖν διαπορίσαι πότερον ὀρθῶς ἡ τοῦνατιόν ὁ Ποιόδος ἐπὶ μηδὲ κασιγνητῷ ἰσον ποιεῖσθαι ἑταίρον· ὁ μὲν γάρ εὐγνώμων καὶ κοινός, ὡσπερ εἰρηταὶ, μάλλον ἐγκραθεὶς δι’ ἀμφοτέρων σύνδεσμος ἔσται Β τῆς φιλαδελφίας. ὁ δὲ Ἡσίοδος, ὃς ἐσκέφετο, ἐφο- βήθη τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ φαύλους διὰ τὸ δύσημον καὶ φίλαυτον.

"Ὁ δὴ καλῶς ἔχει φυλαττομένους, κἂν εὑνοιαν

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a More exactly, "the disjunction, not conjunction" of tetrachords.

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For friendships shape character and there is no more important indication of a difference in character than the selection of different friends. For this reason neither eating and drinking together nor playing and spending the day together can so firmly cement concord between brothers as the sharing of friendships and enmities, taking pleasure in the company of the same persons, and loathing and avoiding the same. For friendships held in common do not tolerate either slanders or conflicts, but if any occasion for wrath or blame arises, it is dissipated by the mediation of friends, who take it upon themselves and disperse it, if they are but intimate with both parties and incline in their goodwill to both alike. For as tin joins together broken bronze and solder it by being applied to both ends, since it is of a material sympathetic to both, so should the friend, well-suited as he is to both and being theirs in common, join still closer their mutual goodwill; but those who are uneven and will not blend, like false notes of a scale in music, create discord, not harmony. One may, then, be in doubt as to whether Hesiod was right or not in saying,

Nor should one make a friend a brother's peer.

For that man who is a considerate and a common friend to both brothers, as we have described him, compounded as he is of the natures of both, will the more readily be a bond of brotherly love between them. But Hesiod, it is likely, was afraid of the common run of friends who are evil because of their jealous and selfish natures.

But even if we feel an equal affection for a friend,
(491) ἵσην φίλω νέμη τις,1 ἀεὶ τὰ πρωτεία τάδελφῳ φυλάττειν ἐν ἀρχαῖς καὶ πολυτείας ἐν τε κλῆσει καὶ γνωρίσεσιν ἥγεμόνων καὶ ὡσα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐπιφανῇ καὶ πρὸς δόξαν ἔστι, τὸ προσήκον ἀξίωμα τῇ φύσει καὶ γέρας ἀποδιδόντας. οὐ γὰρ οὔτως τῷ φίλῳ τὸ πλέον ἐν τούτοις σεμνόν, ὡς ἀδελφῶ τούλαττον αὐξὼν γίνεται καὶ ἄδοξον.

'Αλλὰ περὶ ταύτης μὲν ἐτέρωθι τῆς γνώμης γέ-
C γραπται τὰ δοκοῦντα διὰ πλειόνων: τὸ δὲ Μενάν-
δρειον ὀρθῶς ἔχων, ὡς

οὐδεὶς2 ἀγαπῶν αὐτὸς ἀμελεῖθ' ἰδέως,

ὑπομιμήσκει καὶ διδάσκει τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἐπιμελεῖ-
σθαι καὶ μὴ τῇ φύσει πιστεύοντας ὀλγωρεῖν. καὶ
γὰρ ἵππος τῇ φύσει φιλάνθρωπον καὶ κύων φιλο-
δέσποτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ τυγχάνοντα θεραπείας μηδ' ἐπιμελείας ἀπόστροφα γίνεται καὶ ἀλλότρια· καὶ τὸ
σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς συγγενέστατον ἔστιν, ἀμελουμένον
dὲ καὶ παραρωμένον ὑπ' αὐτῆς οὐκ ἔθελε συνεργεῖν
ἀλλὰ λυμαίνεται καὶ προλείπει τὰς πράξεις.

D 21. Ἐπιμέλεια δὲ καλῆ μὲν αὐτῶν τῶν ἀδελφῶν,
ἐτὶ δὲ καλλίων πενθεροῖς καὶ γαμβροῖς τοῖς ἐκεῖνων
ἐυνοῦν ἀεὶ παρέχειν εἰς ἀπαντα καὶ πρόθυμον ἐαυ-
tόν, οἰκέτας τε φιλοδεσπότους ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ
φιλοφρονεῖσθαι καὶ χάριν ἔχειν ἱατροῖς θεραπεύ-
σασιν αὐτοὺς καὶ φίλοις πιστοῖς καὶ προθύμως

1 νέμη τις D: νέμηται τις.
2 οὐδεὶς] οὐδεὶς γὰρ Mor., 93 D.

The reference is perhaps to chap. 5, supra; Volkmann and Brokate are clearly wrong in assigning it to Περὶ φιλίας, which Patzig (Quaest. Plut., p. 34, cf. the note on 475 d. supra) has shown did not exist.

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we should always be careful to reserve for a brother the first place in public offices and administration, and in invitations and introductions to distinguished men, and, in general, whenever we deal with occasions which in the eyes of the public give distinction and tend to confer honour, rendering thus to Nature the appropriate dignity and prerogative. For undue precedence in such matters is not so grand a thing for the friend, as the slight is shameful and degrading for a brother.

But concerning this subject my opinions have been expressed more fully elsewhere. However, that verse of Menander, which is quite true,

No one that loves will gladly bear neglect,

reminds and teaches us to be considerate of our brothers and not, through trust in Nature’s influence, to slight them. It is true that a horse is by nature fond of man and a dog fond of his master, but if they do not meet with the proper tending or care, they grow estranged and alienated; and though the body is very closely related to the soul, yet if it is neglected and overlooked by the soul, it becomes unwilling to co-operate and even harms and abandons the soul’s activities.

21. But while care for brothers themselves is an excellent thing, yet even more excellent is it to show oneself always well-disposed and obliging in all matters to brothers’ fathers-in-law and brothers-in-law, to salute and treat kindly such of their servants as are loyal to their masters, and to be grateful to physicians who have restored brothers to health and to such

\[b\] Kock, Com. Att. Frag. iii. p. 213, Frag. 757; cf. Moralia, 95 D.
(491) συνδιενεγκούσιν ἀποδημίαν ὡς στρατείαν· γυναῖκα δ’ ἀδελφοὶ γαμετὴν ὡς ἀπάντων ἑρῶν ἀγιώτατον προσορώντα καὶ σεβόμενον, τιμῶντα μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα κατευφημεῖν, ἁμελουμένη δὲ συναγανάκτειν, χαλε-πανούσαν δὲ πραύνειν· ἢν δ’ ἀμάρτη τι τῶν μετρίων, συνδιαλλάττειν καὶ συμπαρακαλέων τὸν ἄνδρα. καὶ αὐτῷ τις ἱδία γένηται διαφορὰ πρὸς τὸν Ε ἀδελφόν, αἰτιᾶσθαι παρ’ ἐκείνη καὶ διαλύεσθαι τὴν μέμψιν. ἀγαμίαν δ’ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ ἀπαιδίαν μάλιστα δυσχεραίνει καὶ παρακαλοῦσα καὶ λοιδοροῦσα συνελαύνει πανταχόθεν εἰς γάμον καὶ συνειργύναι νομίμους κηδεύματι. κτησιμένου δὲ παῖδας ἐμ-φανέστερον χρῆσθαι τῇ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοία καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τιμῇ· τοῖς δὲ παισίν εὐνοῦν μὲν ὥσπερ ἵδιοι, ἥπιοι δὲ μάλλον ἐίναι καὶ μελίχιον; ὅπως ἀμαρτάνοντες οὐ πέμπει μὴ δραπετεύωσι μηδὲ καταδύωνται διὰ φόβον πατρὸς ἡ μητρὸς εἰς ὁμί-λιας φαύλας καὶ ὀλιγώρους, ἀλλ’ ἀποστροφὴν καὶ καταφυγὴν ἀμα νουθετοῦσαν εὐνοία καὶ παραιτοῦν-

Γ μένῃ ἑξωσὶν. οὐτω καὶ Πλάτων ἀδελφιδοῦν ὄντα Σπεύσππον ἐκ πολλῆς ἀνέσεως καὶ ἀκολασίας ἐπέστρεψεν, οὐδὲν οὔτ’ εἰπὼν ἀνιαρόν οὔτε ποιήσας πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντι τοὺς γονεῖς ἐλέγχοντας ἄεὶ καὶ λοιδοροῦσας ἐνιδίους ἐαυτὸν εὐμενή καὶ

1 τιμῶντα τὸν ἄνδρα κατευφημεῖν Madvig (μὲν added by W.C.H.): τιμῶν τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ εὐφημεῖν.
2 μελίχιον many mss.
3 καταδύωνται G and D: καταλύωνται.
4 ἄεἰ] αὐτὸν ἄεἰ in most mss.

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a Contrast 479 d, supra.  b Cf. 490 d, supra.
faithful friends as have rendered zealous and efficient service to them in sharing the hardships of some journey abroad or military expedition. But a brother’s wife should be esteemed and reverenced as the most holy of all sacred things; if her husband honours her, we should applaud him; if he neglects her, we should sympathize with her annoyance; when she grows angry, soothe her; if she commits some trifling fault, take part in urging her husband to a reconciliation; and if some private difference arise between yourself and your brother, bring your complaints to her and so do away with the reasons for complaint. But above all we should be troubled at a brother’s unmarried and childless state, and by exhortation and raillery take part in pressing him on every side into marriage and in getting him well fastened in the bonds of lawful matrimony. And when he gets children, we should make even more manifest our affection for him and the honour we pay to his wife; and to their children let us be as well-disposed as toward our own, but even more gentle and tender, so that when they err, as children will, they may not run away or, through fear of father or mother, enter into association with knaves or sluggards, but may have recourse and refuge which at once admonishes in a kindly way and intercedes for their offence. It was in this way that Plato reclaimed his nephew Speusippus from great self-indulgence and debauchery, not by either saying or doing to him anything that would cause him pain, but when the young man was avoiding his parents, who were always showing him to be in the wrong and upbraiding him,

This manner of education corresponds to that advocated in Ep., vii. (e.g. 343 e ff.).
492 ἀμήνιτον, αἶδὼ τε πολλὴν ἐνειργάσατο καὶ ζήλον ἐαυτοῦ καὶ φιλοσοφίας. καίτοι πολλοὶ τῶν φίλων ἐνεκάλουν ὡς μὴ νουθετοῦντι τὸ μειράκιον· ο̣ δὲ καὶ πάνυ νουθετεῖν ἔλεγε, τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῇ διαίτῃ τῆς πρὸς τὰ αἰσχρὰ τῶν καλῶν διαφορᾶς παρέχων κατανόησιν.

'Αλεύαν δὲ τὸν Θεσσαλὸν ο̣ μὲν πατὴρ ἀγέρωχον ο̣ντα καὶ ύβριστὴν ἐκόλουν καὶ χαλεπὸς ἦν, ο̣ δὲ θεῖος ἀνελάμβανε καὶ προσήγετο· πεμπόντων δὲ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν φρυκτοὺς περὶ βασιλέως πρὸς τὸν Β θεὸν εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐνέβαλε κρύφα τοῦ πατρὸς ο̣ θείος ὑπὲρ τοῦ 'Αλεύα· καὶ τῆς Πυθίας τοῦτον ἀνελούσης ο̣ τε πατὴρ ἀπέφησεν ἐμβεβληκέναι τὸν φρυκτόν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, καὶ πᾶσιν ἐδόκει πλάνη τις εν ταῖς καταγραφαῖς τῶν ὀνομάτων γεγονέναι. διὸ καὶ πέμψαντες αὐθις ἐπανήροντο τὸν θεον· ἢ δὲ Πυθία καθάπερ ἐκβεβαιομένῃ τὴν προτέραν ἀναγόρευσιν εἴπε τὸν πυρρόν τοι φημι, τὸν 'Αρχεδίκη τέκε παίδα.

καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ο̣ 'Αλεύας ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ βασιλεύς διὰ τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς ἄδελφον ἀποδεικθεῖς αὐτὸς τε πολὺ πάντων ἐπρώτευσε τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ1 καὶ τὸ ἔθνος εἰς δόξαν προήγαγε μεγάλην καὶ δύναμιν.

C 'Αλλὰ μὴν εὐπραξίαις τε καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἀρχαῖς παίδων ἄδελφοι χαίροντα καὶ σεμινυόμενον αὖξει προσήκει καὶ συνεξομμᾶν πρὸς τὰ καλὰ καὶ κατορ-

1 αὐτοῦ Bernardakis: αὐτοῦ.

a Cf. Moralia, 71 σ.

b With φρυκτοῦς the noun κυάμους is understood. The use of parched beans as lots seems to be known from this passage only.

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ON BROTHERLY LOVE, 492

Plato showed himself friendly and free from anger to Speusippus and so brought about in him great respect and admiration for Plato himself and for philosophy. Yet many of Plato's friends used to rebuke him for not admonishing the youth, but Plato would say that he was indeed admonishing him: by his own, the philosopher's, manner of life, showing him a way to distinguish the difference between what is shameful and what is honourable.

So Aleuas the Thessalian, who was an arrogant and insolent youth, was kept down and treated harshly by his father; but his uncle received him and attached him to himself, and when the Thessalians sent to the god at Delphi lots to determine who should be king, the uncle, without the father's knowledge, slipped in a lot for Aleuas. When the Pythian priestess drew the lot of Aleuas, his father denied that he had put in one for him, and to everyone it appeared that there had been some error in the recording of names. So they sent again and questioned the god a second time; and the prophetic priestess, as though to confirm fully her former declaration, answered:

It is the red-haired man I mean,  
The child whom Archedicè bore.

And in this manner Aleuas was proclaimed king by the god through the help of his father's brother, and himself surpassed by far his predecessors and advanced his race to great fame and power.

And indeed it is an uncle's duty to rejoice and take pride in the fair deeds and honours and offices of a brother's sons and to help to give them an incentive

Cf. Aristotle, Frag. 497 ed. Rose; that is, Pyrrhus, "the red-haired man."
(492) θουντας ἀφειδῶς ἐπαυνεῖν· αὐτοῦ γὰρ νῦν ἐπαχθές ἱσως ἐγκαμμάζεων, ἀδελφοῦ δὲ σεμνὸν καὶ οὐ φίλαυτον ἄλλα φιλόκαλον καὶ θεῖον ὡς ἀληθῶς· δοκεὶ γὰρ μοι καὶ τούνομα καλῶς ύφηγεῖσθαι πρὸς εὖνοιαν ἀδελφιδῶν καὶ ἀγάπησιν. δεὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν κρειττόνων ζηλοῦν. Ἡρακλῆς τε γὰρ δυεῖν δέοντας ἐβδομήκοντα γεννήσας παῖδας, οὐδενὸς ἦττον αὐτῶν τῶν ἀδελφιδῶν ἡγάπησεν· ἄλλα καὶ νῦν πολλαχοῦ σύμβωμος ἐστιν Ἰόλαος αὐτῷ, καὶ συγκατεύχονται παραστάτην Ἡρακλέους ὀνομά-τον. Ἡφικλέους δὲ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ πεσόντος ἐν τῇ περὶ Λακεδαίμονα μάχῃ, περίλυπος γενόμενος πᾶσαν ἔξελιπε Πελοπόννησον. ἡ τε Λευκοθέα τῆς ἀδελφῆς ἀποθανούσης ἔθρεψε τὸ βρέφος καὶ συν- ἐξεθείασεν· θευν αἱ Ρωμαίων γυναῖκες ἐν ταῖς τῆς Λευκοθέας ἑόρταις, ἥν Ματοῦταν ὀνομάζουσιν, οὐ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν παῖδας ἄλλα τοὺς τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἐναγκαλίζονται καὶ τιμῶσιν.

1 δοκεῖ] ἐδόκει in most mss.
2 ἀδελφιδῶν an early anonymous correction, confirmed by G: ἀδελφῶν.
3 δέοντας] δέοντα many mss.
4 ἡ τε Bernardakis: ἡ δὲ.

a θεῖος = "an uncle" and "divine."
b Heracles’ nephew, who helped him in his encounter with the Nemean lion.
to honourable achievement, and, when they succeed, to praise them without stint; for it is, perhaps, offensive to praise one’s own son, yet to praise a brother’s is a noble thing, not inspired by selfishness, but honourable and truly divine; for it seems to me that the very name admirably points the way to goodwill and affection for nephews. And one must also strive to emulate the deeds of those beings who are superior to man. So Heracles, though he begat sixty-eight sons, loved his nephew no less than any of them, and even to this day in many places Iolaüs has an altar in common with Heracles and men pray to them together, calling Iolaüs Heracles’ assistant. And when his brother Iphicles fell at the battle in Lacedaemon, Heracles was filled with great grief and retired from the entire Peloponnesus. And Leucothea, also, when her sister died, brought up her child and helped to have him consecrated together with herself as a god; whence it is that the women of Rome in the festival of Leucothea, whom they call Matuta, take in their arms and honour, not their own, but their sisters’ children.

\[c\] Twin-brother of Heracles, son of Alcmenê and Amphitryon; cf. Moralia, 285 f.

\[d\] Leucothea is the name of the deified Ino, wife of Athamas, who threw herself into the sea and was changed into a goddess; cf. Life of Camillus, v. (131 b-c); Moralia, 267 d-e. On the Matralia, celebrated in honour of Mater Matuta, see most recently H. J. Rose, Class. Quart., xxviii. 156 f.
ON AFFECTION FOR OFFSPRING
(DE AMORE PROLIS)
INTRODUCTION

This essay, or declamation, is clearly in an unfinished state throughout and a good deal is doubtless lost at the end, for the author has done little more with his subject than to show that φιλόσοφος ἡμᾶς is more complete in man than in beasts. The efforts of Döhner and Weissenberger to prove that the essay is not genuine have not been successful. Döhner is, further, quite wrong, as Patzig and Weissenberger have shown, in assuming the work to be an epitome.

a Volkmann reminds us that De Amore Prolis is a bad Latin translation for the title, but that there is no better: cf. Fronto, i. p. 280, ii. p. 154 ed. Haines (L.C.L.) for the statement that there is no such quality as τὸ φιλόσοφον at Rome and consequently no name for it. See also Marcus Aurelius, i. 11.

b Volkmann, Leben, Schriften, u. Philos. Plutarchos, ii. pp. 165-167, attempts to complete the thought of this treatise.

c Quaest. Plut., iii. pp. 26 ff.

d Die Sprache Plutarchs, ii. pp. 31-33. When Weissenberger attempts to find discrepancies between Plutarch’s thought here and elsewhere, he chooses examples in which he either misinterprets the meaning or else forgets that Plutarch is ironical and intends the opposite of what he says.

e Quaest. Plut., pp. 3-21: by far the most complete discussion of the vocabulary and syntax of this strange work. Patzig’s conclusion is that we have here a finished essay of Plutarch; this is untenable, but his arguments for genuineness are quite conclusive. None of his successors, not even Pohlenz, shows any knowledge of his valuable work.

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It is best regarded as an unfinished fragment, containing, so far as it goes, the rough and unrevised hand of Plutarch.

Dyroff's attempt to show that this work was composed before *De Esu Carnium*, *De Sollertia Animalium*, and *Gryllus* is not to be taken seriously: the grounds are too slight.

The text is very corrupt. The work is not listed in the Lamprias catalogue.

* Program Würzburg, 1896/7.
ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΑ ΕΓΓΟΝΑ\(^1\) ΦΙΛΟΣΤΟΡΓΙΑΣ

1. "Εκκλητοι κρίσεις καὶ ξενικῶν δικαστηρίων ἀγωγαὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τὸ πρῶτον ἄπιστὰ τῇ πρὸς ἁλλήλους ἐπενοηθήσαν, ἀλλοτρίας δικαίωσὺνς ὡσ-περ ἑτέρου τινὸς τῶν ἀναγκαίων μὴ φυμένου παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς δεηθείσων. ἂρ' οὖν καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι τῶν προβλημάτων ἔνια διὰ τὰς πρὸς ἁλλήλους διαφορὰς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἀλόγων φύσιν ξώων ὡσπερ ἀλλοδαπὴν τόλιν ἐκκαλοῦνται, καὶ τοῖς ἐκεῖνων πάθει καὶ ἡθείῳ ὡς ἀνεντεύκτοις καὶ ἀδεκάστοις ἐφιάσα τὴν κρίσιν; ἦ καὶ τοῦτο τῆς ἄνθρωπίνης κακίας ἐγκλημα κοινὸν ἐστὶ, τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαστάτων καὶ θεῶν ὑπὸ τῶν μεγίστων ἀμφιδοξοῦντας ἡμᾶς ξητεῖν ἐν ἱπποίς καὶ κυσὶ καὶ ὀρνισὶ, πῶς γαμῶμεν αὐτοὶ καὶ γεννῶμεν καὶ τεκνοτροφῶμεν\(^2\) (ὡς μηδὲν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς δηλώμα τῆς φύσεως ὄν) καὶ τὰ\(^3\) τῶν θηρίων ἦθη καὶ πάθη προσαγορεῦσαι καὶ καταμαρτυρῆσαι τοῦ βίου ἡμῶν πολλὴν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκδιαίτησιν καὶ παράβασιν,

1 έγγόνα\(^1\) probably the form preferred by Plutarch. But some mss. here and elsewhere read ἐγγόνα.
2 γαμῶμεν . . . τεκνοτροφῶμεν Hatzidakis: γαμοῦμεν . . . τεκνοτροφοῦμεν.
3 καὶ τὰ Reiske and two mss.: τὰ.

\(^{a}\) Plutarch is probably referring to the common practice of
ON AFFECTION FOR OFFSPRING

1. Trials of cases on appeal a before special arbitrators and the carrying of cases before foreign courts were first devised by the Greeks by reason of their mutual distrust, since they had need of the justice supplied by others than themselves, like any other non-indigenous necessity. Is it thus, then, that philosophers also, because of their disagreements with each other, refer some of their questions to the nature of irrational animals, as though to a foreign city, and submit the decision to the emotions and character and habits of these creatures as to a court that cannot be influenced or bribed? Or is this also a common charge against human depravity—that, being in doubt about the most necessary and important things, we seek among horses and dogs and birds how we ourselves should marry and beget and bring up children (as though we had no plain indication of Nature in ourselves); and that we term the traits which brute beasts have "characters" and "emotions," and accuse our life of a great deviation

small states appealing to the greater, Athens or Rhodes, to arbitrate in disputes; the distrust was thus not of all other Greeks but of fellow-citizens. Cf. Schwyzer, Dial. Gr. Exempla, 83 for an inscription in which Argos regulates the relations between Cnossus and Tyllissus circa 450 B.C.; see also M. N. Tod, International Arbitration among the Greeks (Oxford, 1913).
(493) εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ περὶ τὰ πρώτα συγχεομένων καὶ 
ταραττομένων; ἀκρατον γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνω ηὴ φύσις 
καὶ ἁμιγές καὶ ἀπλοῦν φυλάττει τὸ ὅδιον, ἐν δὲ 
ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς συνηθείας, ὁ 
τούλαιον ὑπὸ τῶν μυρεῖν πέπονθε, πρὸς πολλὰ 
μιγνυμένη δόγματα καὶ κρίσεις ἐπιθέτος ποικιλὴ 
γέγονε καὶ ἦδεια¹ τὸ δὲ οἰκεῖον ὑπὸ τετήρηκε. καὶ μὴ 
D θαυμάζωμεν, εἰ τὰ ἄλογα ϑῶα τῶν λογικῶν μᾶλλον 
ἐπεται τῇ φύσει καὶ γὰρ τὰ φυτὰ τῶν ζωῶν, οἷς 
οὔτε νομασίαν οὐθ' ὁμὴν ἐδωκεν ἡ ἐτέρων ὀρέξιν 
τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀποσαλεύουσαν, ἀλλ' ὁσπερ ἐν 
δεσμῷ συνεργιμένα μένει καὶ κεκράτηται, μίαν ἀεὶ 
πορείαν ἡν ἡ φύσις ἀγεὶ πορευόμενα. τοῖς δὲ 
θηρίοις τὸ μὲν πολύτροπον³ τοῦ λόγου καὶ περιττῶν 
καὶ φιλελεύθερον ἄγαν οὐκ ἐστὶν, ἄλογους δ' ὀρμαῖς 
καὶ ὀρέξεις ἔχοντα καὶ χρώμανα πλάνας καὶ περι-
δρομαῖς πολλάκις, οὐ μακρὰν ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπ' ἀγκύρας 
τῆς φύσεως σαλεύει ἡ καθάπερ ὁνήμονον ὑφ' ἡμῖν 
καὶ χαλινῶ βαδίζοντι⁵ δείκνυσι τὴν εὐθείαν. ὁ δὲ 
ἀδέσποτος⁷ εὖ ἀνθρώπω καὶ αὐτοκρατὴς λόγος⁸ 
Ε ἄλλας ἁλλοτε παρεκβάσεις⁹ καὶ καυνοτομιάς ἀν-
ευρίσκων οὐδέν ἤξον ἐμφανές οὐδὲ ἐναργῆς ἀπο-
λέλοιπε τῆς φύσεως. 

2. Ἡ ὄρα περὶ τοὺς γάμους ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς

² ἦ added by Bernardakis.
³ πολύτροπον Pohlenz, cf. Life of Alcibiades, xxiv. (204 b);
⁴ παράτροπον H. Richards: πρατροτοπον.
⁵ ἦ added by Capps.
⁶ ὅνω ... βαδίζοντι Capps: οὖν ... βαδίζοντα.
⁷ τὴν added by Capps.
⁸ ὁ δ' ἀδέσποτος Kronenberg, after Pohlenz: ὁ δεσπότης.
⁹ παρεκβάσεις] παρεμβάσεις most mss.

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and departure from Nature, confused and disordered as we are at the very beginning concerning even the first principles? For in dumb animals Nature preserves their special characteristics pure and un-mixed and simple, but in men, through reason and habit, they have been modified by many opinions and adventitious judgements so that they have lost their proper form and have acquired a pleasing variety comparable to the variety of perfumes made by the pharmacist on the basis of a single oil. And let us not wonder if irrational animals follow Nature more closely than rational ones; for animals are, in fact, outdone in this by plants, to which Nature has given neither imagination nor impulse, nor desire for something different, which causes men to shake themselves free from what Nature desires; but plants, as though they were fastened in chains, remain in the power of Nature, always traversing the one path along which Nature leads them. Yet in wild beasts versatility of reasoning and uncommon cleverness and excessive love of freedom are not too highly developed; and though they have irrational impulses and desires and often wander about on circuitous paths, they do not go far afield, but ride, as it were, at the anchor provided by Nature, who points out to them the straight way, as to an ass which proceeds under bit and bridle. But in man ungoverned reason is absolute master, and, discovering now one way of deviation and innovation and now another, has left no clear or certain vestige of Nature visible.\(^a\)

2. Observe to what extent there exists in animals

\(^a\) The text of this chapter is exceedingly corrupt: the restorations and suggestions adopted here claim only an approximation to the required thought.
PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

ζῶοις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν. πρῶτον οὐκ ἀναμένει νόμους
ἀγαμίον καὶ ὀψιγαμίον, καθάπερ οἱ Δυκούργου
πολίται καὶ Σόλωνος· οὐδ' ἀτιμίας ἀτέκνων δέ-
δοικεν, οὐδὲ τιμάς διώκει τριπαιδίας, ὡς Ῥωμαίων
πολλοὶ γαμοῦσι καὶ γεννώσιν, οὐχ ἤνα κληρονόμους
ἐξωσιν ἀλλ' ἤνα κληρονομεῖν δύνωνται. ἔπειτα
μύγνυται τῷ θήλει τὸ ἄρρεν οὐχ ἄπαντα χρόνον·
ἡδονῆν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει τέλος ἀλλὰ γέννησιν καὶ
F τέκνωσιν. δὶα τοῦτ' ἐτοὺς ὦρα, ἡ πνεάς τε γονί-
μους ἔχει καὶ πρόσφορον ὀχευομένους κράσιν, ἔλθεν
eἰς ταύτῳ τῷ ἄρρενι τὸ θῆλυ χειρόθεν καὶ ποθε-
νόν, ὑδεῖα μὲν ὀσμὴ χρωτὸς ἑδιὸς δὲ κόσμῳ σώμα-
τος ἀγαλλόμενον, δρόσου καὶ βοτάνης ἀνάπλεων
καθαρᾶς· αἰσθόμενον δ' ὅτι κύει καὶ πεπλήρωται,
κοσμίως ἀπεσι καὶ προνοεῖ περὶ τὴν κύησιν καὶ
σωτηρίαν τοῦ ἀποτεχθέντος. ἀξίως δ' οὐκ ἔστω
ἐπείν τὰ δρώμενα, πλὴν ὅτι γίνεται ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν
ἐν τῷ φιλοστόργῳ, ταῖς προνοίαις, ταῖς καρτερίαις,

1 ἀγαμίον καὶ ὀψιγαμίον Döhner: ἀγάμον καὶ ὀψιγάμον.
2 τριπαιδίας Döhner: τριπαιδίας.
3 ὀχευομένους Kronenberg: λοχευομένους.
4 ἔλθεν] συνῆλθεν Döhner.
5 ὑδεία] ἱδία Jacobs.
6 ἐν Emperius: ἐν.

a Cf. Life of Lysander, xxx. (451 a-b); Life of Lycurgus,
xv.1 (48 c); Moralia, 227 f.; Ariston in Stobaeus, vol. iv.
p. 497 ed. Hense (or von Arnin. Stoic. Vet. Frag., i. p. 89);
Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, ii. 141 (vol. ii. p. 191 ed.
Stählin).

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conformity to nature in regard to their marriages. In the first place, they do not wait for laws against celibacy or late wedlock, as did the citizens of Lycurgus\(^a\) and Solon,\(^b\) nor fear loss of civil rights because of childlessness, nor pursue the honours of the *ius trium liberorum,*\(^c\) as many Romans do when they marry and beget children, not that they may have heirs, but that they may inherit. In the next place, the male does not consort with the female during all seasons, for the end and aim is not pleasure, but procreation and the begetting of offspring; therefore it is in the season of spring, which has procreative breezes\(^d\) and a temperature suitable to intercourse,\(^e\) that the female, rendered submissive and desirable, comes to consort with the male, exulting, as she does, in the pleasing odour of her flesh and the peculiar adornment\(^f\) of her body, and filled with dew and clean grass\(^g\); but when she perceives that she is pregnant and sated, she modestly retires and takes thought for the birth and safety of her offspring. But it is impossible to recount the procedure in a manner worthy of the subject, except to say that each of the pair is as one in their affection for their offspring, in their forethought, their endurance, and

\(^{a}\) This is not true of Solon: cf. Stobaeus, vol. iv. p. 521 ed. Hense.

\(^{b}\) See, for example, Hardy's notes on Pliny, *Epistulae,* x. 2. Plutarch refers to a law of Augustus limiting the right of inheritance and the privileges of those who had less than three children.

\(^{c}\) Cf. Lucretius, i. 10-20: reserata viget genitabilis aura favoni, and the whole passage.

\(^{d}\) Cf. Aristotle, *Historia Animalium,* vi. 18 (573 a 27).


\(^{f}\) Cf. *Moralia,* 990 c ff.
(494) ταῖς ἐγκρατεῖαις. ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν¹ μέλιταν ἡμεῖς
σοφὴν καλοῦμεν καὶ νομίζομεν
ξανθὸν μὲλι μηδομέναν
κολακεύοντες τὸ ἢδυ καὶ γαργαλίζον ἡμᾶς τῆς γλυ-
κύτητος, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τὰς λοχείας καὶ
tὰς ἀνατροφὰς σοφίαν καὶ τέχνην παραφέμεν. οὖν
eὐθὺς, ἢ ἄλκυων κύουσα τὴν νεοτικὰν συντίθησιν,
συλλαμβάνουσα τὰς ἀκάνθας τῆς θαλαττίας βελόνης
cαὶ ταῦτας δὲ ἀλλήλων ἐγκαταπλέκουσα καὶ συν-
Β ἐἴρουσα, τὸ μὲν σχῆμα περιαγές ὡς ἀλιευτικὸς
κύρτου καὶ πρόμηκες ἀπεργάζεται, τῇ δ’ ἄρμονία
καὶ πυκνότητι συμφράζεσα τὰς ἀκάνθας² ἀκριβῶς
ὑπέθηκε τῷ κλύσματι τοῦ κύματος, ὡς τυπτόμενον
ῆσυχὴ καὶ πηγνύμενον τὸ πὸλιμμα τῆς ἐπιφανείας
στεγανὸν γένηται· γίνεται δὲ σωδήρῳ καὶ λίθῳ
δυσδιαίρετον. οὐτὸ τὸ
στόμα τῆς νεοτικᾶς συμμέτρως πέπλασται³ πρὸς τὸ
μέγεθος καὶ τὸ μέτρον τῆς ἄλκυνος, ὡστε ἡμὴν
μεῖζον ἄλλο μήτε μικρότερον ἐνδυσθαι ζῷον, ὡς δὲ
φασί, μηδὲ θαλάττης⁴ παραδεχέσθαι μηδὲ τὰ
ἐλάχιστα.

C Μάλιστα δ’ οἱ γαλεοὶ ζωογονοῦσι μὲν ἐν⁵ ἑαυτοῖς,
ἐκβαίνειν δὲ παρέχουσιν ἑκτὸς καὶ νέμεσθεν τοῖς
σκυμνίοις, ἐίτα πάλιν ἀναλαμβάνουσι καὶ περι-
πτύσσοντες ἐγκοιμώμενα τοῖς σπλάγχνοις.

¹ μὲν added by Wilamowitz.
² τὰς ἀκάνθας Reiske: τῆς ἀκάνθης.
³ πέπλασται Xylander: πεπλόθαι.
⁴ θαλάττης Pohlenz: θάλατταν.
⁵ ἐν] omitted in most mss.
⁶ σκυμνίοις] σκυμνοῖς most mss.


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their self-control. Further, though we call the bee wise and believe that it

    Makes the yellow honey its care, a
flattering the saccharine quality of its sweetness which tickles our palates, yet we overlook the wisdom and artifice of the other creatures which is manifested in the bearing and the nurture of offspring. As, for example, the king-fisher b after conception makes her nest by gathering the thorns of the sea-needle and interweaving and joining them together, and makes it round and oblong in form, like a fisherman’s creel; and, packing the thorns closely together with the most exact jointure and density, submits it to the dashing of the waves so that, being gradually beaten upon and riveted together, the hard-packed surface may become water-proof; and it does become hard to divide with iron or stone. And what is more wonderful, the mouth of the nest is so exactly fitted to the size and measure of the king-fisher that no other creature, either larger or smaller, may enter, and, so they say, that it will not admit even the most minute drops of sea-water. c

    And sea-dogs d are a very good example, for they bring forth their young alive within their bodies, e but permit their offspring to emerge and forage, and then take them back again and enfold them in their vitals and let them sleep there.

    b Cf. Moralia, 983 c-d; Aelian, De Natura Animalium, ix. 17.
    c In Moralia, 983 c (De sollertia animalium), Plutarch adds a few details to this description.
    d Aelian, op. cit., ii. 55: Moralia, 982 a; for the kinds of γαλεοί (a species of shark), see Mair’s note on Oppian, Halieutica, i. 379 (L.C.L.).
    e That is, they are viviparous.
'H δ' ἀρκτός, ἀγριώτατον καὶ σκυθρωπότατον θηρίον, ἀμορφα καὶ ἀναρθρα τίκτει, τῇ δὲ γλώσσῃ καθάπερ ἐργαλεῖα διατυποῦσα τοὺς ὑμένας 1 οὐ δοκεῖ γενινὰν μόνον ἄλλα καὶ δημιουργεῖν τὸ τέκνον.

'Ὁ δ' Ὁμηρικὸς λέων,

ὁ ρά τε νῆπι' ἁγοντι συναντῆσονται 2 ἐν ὑλῇ ἀνδρεῖς ἔπακτήρες, ὁ δὲ τε θενεῖ βλεμεαίνει,
pᾶν δὲ τ' ἐπισκύνιον κάτω ἑλκεται ὡςε καλύττον, 3

D ἀρ' 4 ὁμοίος ἐστὶ διανοομένῳ πρὸς τοὺς κυνηγοὺς σπένδεσθαι περὶ τῶν τέκνων; καθόλου γὰρ ἂ προς τὰ ἔγγονα φιλοστοργία καὶ τολμηρὰ τὰ δειλὰ 5 ποιεῖ, καὶ φιλόσοφον τὰ βάθυμα καὶ φείδωλά τὰ γαστρίμαργα. ὁσπερ 6 ὡς Ὁμηρικὴ ὄρνις προσφέρουσα τοῖς νεοττοῖς

μάστακ′, ἐπεί κε λάβησι, κακῶς δὲ τε οἱ πέλει αὐτῇ:

τῷ γὰρ αὐτῆς τρέφει λιμῷ τὰ ἔγγονα, καὶ τῆν τροφὴν τῆς γαστρὸς ἀποτελέμενη ἀποκρατεῖ καὶ πιέζει τῷ στόματι, μὴ λάθῃ καταπιόνσα.

ὡς δὲ κύων ἀμαλήσι περὶ σκυλάκεσσι βεβώσα ἀνδρ' ἁγνοῦσα 6 ὑλαὶ μέμονεν τε μάχεσθαι,

Ε τὸν περὶ τῶν τέκνων φόβον ὡς δεύτερον προσ-

λαβοῦσα θυμόν.

Αἰ δὲ πέρδικες ὅταν διώκονται μετὰ τῶν τέκνων,

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2 ὁ ρά τε νῆπι' ἁγοντι συναντῆσονται Homer: ὁν ρά τε νῆπια τέκνα ἁγοντα συναντῆσονται.
3 καλύττον] καλυπτών in some mss.
4 οὐχ after ἀρ' deleted by van Herwerden.
5 τολμηρὰ τὰ δειλὰ Emperius: τὰ τολμηρὰ δειλὰ.
6 καὶ before ὁσπερ deleted by Stegmann.
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And the she-bear, the most savage and sullen of beasts, brings forth her young formless and without visible joints, and with her tongue, as with a tool, she moulds into shape their skin; and thus she is thought, not only to bear, but to fashion her cub.

And in Homer the lion—

Whom hunters meet leading his young within
A wood; he glares with valour and draws down
His eye-lids till they hide his eyes—
does he look like a beast that has any notion of making terms with the hunters for his children’s lives? For, in general, the love of animals for their children makes the timid bold, the lazy energetic, the voracious sparing; like the bird in Homer which brings to her nestlings

Whatever morsels she can catch, though she
Fares ill herself,
for she feeds her young at the cost of her own hunger, and, though she has laid hold of food for her belly, she withholds it and presses it tightly with her beak, lest she gulp it down unawares; or

As a bitch bestrides her tender pups, and barks
At one she does not know, and longs to fight,
acquiring, as it were, a second courage in her fear for her young.

And partridges, when, accompanied by their

\( b \) Cf. Aulus Gellius, xvii. 10. 3. \( c \) II., xvii. 134-136.
\( d \) II., ix. 324; cf. Moralia, 80 A.
\( f \) Cf. Moralia, 971 c-d; Aelian, op. cit., iii. 16; Aristotle, Historia Animalium, ix. 8 (613 b 17); scholia on Aristophanes, Birds, 768.
ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἔδωσι προπέτεσθαι καὶ φεύγειν, αὐταίς δὲ μηχανώμεναι προσέχειν τοὺς θηρεύοντας ἐγγὺς κυλινδούμενα καὶ καταλαμβανόμεναι μικρὸν ὑπεκθέουσιν, εἶτα πάλιν ἵστανται καὶ παρέχουσιν ἐν ἐφικτῷ τῆς ἐλπίδος εὐαίσθα, ἀρχὴ ἄν οὕτω προκιν- 
δυνεύουσι τῶν νεοτῶν τῆς ἀσφαλείας προαγάγων-
tαι πόρρω τοὺς διώκοντας.

Τάς δ’ ἀλεκτορίδας ἐν τοῖς ὀμμασὶ καθ’ ἥμεραν ἔχομεν, ὅν τρόπον τὰ νεόττα περιέπουσι, τοῖς μὲν Γ’ ἐνδύουσι χαλώσας τὰς πτέρυγας, τὰ δ’ ἐπιβαίνοντα τῶν νυστῶν καὶ προστρέχοντα πανταχόθεν ἀναδεχό-
μεναι μετὰ τοῦ γεγονός τι καὶ προσφιλές ἐπι-
φθέγγεσθαι κύνας δὲ καὶ δράκοντας, ἂν περὶ 
αὐτῶν φοβηθῶσι, φεύγουσιν, ἂν δὲ περὶ τῶν τέ-
kων, ἀμύνονται καὶ διαμάχονται παρὰ δύναμιν.

Εἶτα ταῦτ’ οἰόμεθα τὰ’ πάλη τούτους ἐνειργά-
σθαι τήν φύσιν ἀλεκτορίδων ἐπιγονὴς καὶ κυνῶν 
καὶ ἄρκτων προνοοῦσαν, ἄλλ’ οὐχ ἡμᾶς δυσωποῦ-
σαν καὶ τιτρώσκουσαν ἐπιλογιζομένους ὅτι ταῦτα 
495 παραδείγματα τοῖς ἐπομένοις, τοῖς δ’ ἀναλγήτοις 
ονείδη περίεστι τῆς ἀπαθείας, δι’ ἄν κατηγοροῦσι 
τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως μόνης μὴ προῖκα το στέρ-
γεν ἐχούσης μηδ’ ἐπισταμένης φυλείν ἀνεν χρείας; 
θαυμάζεται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις ὁ εἰπών, 

μισθὸν γὰρ ἀνθρώπων τίς ἀνθρώπων φυλεῖ.

1 μικρὸν Capps: μικρῶν.
2 προστρέχοντα Döhner; προσέρχοντα Wytenbach: προσ-
έρχονται.
3 τι Reiske: η.
4 κύνας δὲ καὶ δράκοντας Xylander: κυνέας δὲ καὶ δρακόντιας.
5 τὰ added by Döhner.

a Cf. Aristotle, op. cit., ix. 8 (613 b 15); Anthologia Pala-
tina, ix. 95.
young, they are being pursued, allow the fledglings to fly ahead and attempt to escape, and contrive to fix the hunter’s attention on themselves by wheeling close and, when they are almost captured, fly off and away, then again remain at rest and place themselves within the reach of the hunter’s hope, until, by so exposing themselves to danger for their nestlings’ safety, they have led on the hunters to a considerable distance.

And we have before our eyes every day the manner in which hens care for their brood, drooping their wings for some to creep under, and receiving with joyous and affectionate clucks others that mount upon their backs or run up to them from every direction; and though they flee from dogs and snakes if they are frightened only for themselves, if their fright is for their children, they stand their ground and fight it out beyond their strength.

Are we, then, to believe that Nature has implanted these emotions in these creatures because she is solicitous for the offspring of hens and dogs and bears, and not, rather, because she is striving to make us ashamed and to wound us, when we reflect that these instances are examples to those of us who would follow the lead of Nature, but to those who are callous, as rebukes for their insensibility, by citing which they disparage human nature as being the only kind that has no disinterested affection and that does not know how to love without prospect of gain? In our theatres, indeed, people applaud the verse of the poet who said:

What man will love his fellow-man for pay?

\footnote{\textit{i.e.} the philosophers whose views Plutarch is criticizing.}
\footnote{Kock, \textit{Com. Att. Frag.}, iii. p. 450, ades. 218.}
(495) καίτοι1 κατ' Ἐπίκουρον ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ υἱόν, ἥ2 μήτηρ τὸ τέκνον, οἱ παῖδες τοὺς τεκόντας· ἀλλ' εἶ ὁ λόγου γένοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις σύνεσις, καὶ τοῦτο τις εἰς κοινὸν θέατρον συναγαγὼν ὕππους καὶ βόας καὶ κύνας καὶ ὀρνιθὰς ἀναφθέγξαιτο μεταγράφας, ὡς "οὔτε κύνες ἐπὶ μισθῷ σκύλακας φιλοῦσιν οὔθ'

Β ὕππου πῶλους οὔτ' ὀρνιθὲς νεοττοὺς ἀλλὰ προῖκα καὶ

φυσικῶς,” ἐπιγνωσθήσεται τοῖς ἀπάντων παθεσών ὡς εὗ καὶ ἀληθῶς λεγόμενον. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ, ὁ Ζεὺς, τὰς θηρίων γενέσεις καὶ λοχείας καὶ ὦδίνας καὶ τεκνοτροφίας φύσιν εἶναι καὶ χάριν, τὰς δὲ ἀνθρώ-

πων δάνεια καὶ μισθοὺς καὶ ἀρραβώνας ἐπὶ χρείασις
didoménon.

3. 'Ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀληθῆς ὁ λόγος οὔτ' ἄξιος3 ἀκούειν. ἢ γὰρ φύσις, ὀσπερ ἐν φυτοῖς ἀγρίοις, οἷον οἰνάν-

θαίς ἔρινες κοτίνοις, ἀρχαῖς ἀπεπτούσας καὶ ἀτελεῖς ήμέρων καρπῶν ενέφυσεν,4 οὕτω τοῖς μὲν ἀλόγοις τὸ πρὸς τὰ ἔγγονα 

φιλόστοργον ἀτελές καὶ οὗ

C διαρκὲς πρὸς δικαιοσύνην οὔδε τῆς χρείας πορρω-

tέρω προερχόμενον ἔδωκεν· ἀνθρωπον δέ, λογικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζώον, ἐπὶ δίκην καὶ νόμον εἰσάγουσα καὶ θεῶν τιμᾶς καὶ πόλεων ἐδρύσεις καὶ 

φιλοφρο-

σύνην, γενναία καὶ καλὰ καὶ φερέκαρπα τοῦτων 

στέρματα παρέσχε τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἔγγονα χάριν καὶ 

ἀγάπησιν, ἀκολουθοῦσαν5 ταῖς πρῶταις ἀρχαῖς· 

αὐταὶ δ' ἦσαν ἐν ταῖς τῶν σωμάτων κατασκευαῖς. 

πανταχοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἀκριβῆς καὶ φιλότεχνος6

1 καίτοι added by Pohlenz.
2 ἡ added by Reiske.
3 ἄξιος Reiske: ἄξιον.
4 ενέφυσεν Reiske: εἶναι φύσιν.
5 ἀκολουθοῦσαν Wilamowitz: ἀκολουθοῦσα.
6 φιλότεχνος Xylander: φιλότεχνος.
And yet, according to Epicurus, it is for pay that a father loves his son, a mother her child, children their parents; but if beasts could come to understand speech and someone should bring together to a common theatre horses and cows and dogs and birds and should revise this speech and say, "Dogs do not love their pups, nor horses their colts, nor birds their nestlings, for pay, but gratuitously and naturally," it would be recognized by the emotions of them all that this was well and truly spoken. For it is shameful—great Heaven!—that the begetting and the pains of travail and the nurture of beasts should be "Nature" and "a free gift," but that those of men should be loans and wages and caution-money, all given on condition of a return!

3. But such a statement is neither true nor worth the hearing. For just as in uncultivated plants, such as wild vines and figs and olives, Nature has implanted the principles, though crude and imperfect, of cultivated fruits, so on irrational animals she has bestowed a love of offspring, though imperfect and insufficient as regards the sense of justice and one which does not advance beyond utility; but in the case of man, a rational and social animal, Nature, by introducing him to a conception of justice and law and to the worship of the gods and to the founding of cities and to human kindness, has furnished noble and beautiful and fruitful seeds of all these in the joy we have in our children and our love of them, emotions which accompany their first beginnings; and these qualities are found in the very constitution of their bodies. For although Nature is everywhere exact and workman-


* Cf. 496 c, infra.
(495) καὶ ἀνελλυτὴς καὶ ἀπέριττος, \(1\) "οὐδὲν," ὡς ἐφησεν

Ἐρασίστρατος, \(2\) "ἐξουσιά ῥωπικὸν"· τὰ ἐν περὶ τὴν

γένεσιν ἀξίως οὐκ ἔστων εἰπεῖν οὐδ' εὐπρεπὲς  ὅσως

Δλιαν ἀκριβῶς τῶν ἀπορρήτων ἐμφύεσθαι τοῖς

όνομασι καὶ τοῖς ῥήμασι, ἀλλ' ἀποκεκλημένων καὶ

κεκρυμμένων ἐπινοεῖν τὴν πρὸς τὸ γεννάν καὶ

λοχεύεσθαι τῶν μορίων ἐκεῖνων εὐφύων. ἀρκεί \(3\)

ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος ἐργασία καὶ οἰκονομία τὴν πρόνοιαν

ἀυτῆς ἐμφήναι καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν. τοῦ γὰρ αἵματος

ὅσον περίττωμα τῆς χρείας ἐν ταῖς γυναιξί δι' ἀμβλυτήτα καὶ μικρότητα τοῦ πνεύματος ἐπι-

πολάξον ἐμπλανᾶται καὶ βαρύνει, τὸν μὲν ἄλλον

χρόνων εὑρίσκει καὶ μεμελέτηκεν ἐμμήνως ήμερῶν

περιόδους ὥχετος καὶ πόρους ἀυτῷ τῆς φύσεως

ἀναστομούσης ἀποχεόμενον τὸ μὲν ἄλλο σῶμα

Ε κουφίζειν καὶ καθαίρειν, τὴν \(4\) υστέραν οἶον ἄρότως

καὶ σπόρῳ γῆς \(5\) ὄργωσαν ἐν καιρῷ παρέχειν. ὅταν

ἦ τὴν γονὴν ἀναλάβῃ προσπεσοῦσαν \(6\) ἡ υστέρα καὶ

περιστείλῃ, ῥιζώσεως γενομένης ("ὁ γὰρ ὀμφαλὸς

πρῶτον ἐν μήτρῃσιν," ὡς φησι Δημόκριτος, "ἀγ-

κυρηβόλου σάλου καὶ πλάνης ἐμφύεται, πείσμα καὶ

κλήμα ἔγεννωμένοις καὶ μέλλοντι) τοὺς μὲν \(7\)

ἐμμήνως καὶ καθαριότας ἐκλείσειν ὥχετος ἢ

1 ἀπέριττος Paton: ἀπερίττως.
2 ἐμφύεσθαι Pohlenz: ἐφ' ἀ. φύεσθαι or ἐφάπτεσθαι.
3 ἄροτω Reiske: ἄροτρω.
4 ἐν φυτοῖς after γῆν deleted by Pohlenz (ἐμφύτως van Herwerden).
5 προσπεσοῦσα Wytenbach: προσπεσοῦσα.
6 γεγενωμένοι Xylander: γεγενωμένοι.
7 τοὺς μὲν Basel ed., confirmed by mss.: καὶ τοὺς μὲν.
like with no deficiency or superfluity, "and has," as Erasistratus \(^a\) said, "no trumpery about her"; yet when it comes to the processes of procreation, it is impossible to describe them in a fitting manner, and perhaps it would not be decent to fix our attention too precisely upon the names and designations of these forbidden topics, but it is proper that we should apprehend the admirable adaptation of those hidden and concealed parts to the functions of procreation and bringing to birth. However, the production \(^b\) and administering of milk is sufficient proof of Nature’s foresight and care. For in women the amount of blood exceeds the use for it because of the slowness and paucity of their breath and, coming to the surface, wanders at large and burdens them; at other times it is Nature’s custom and care to discharge the blood at monthly periods by opening canals and channels for it, to lighten and cleanse the rest of the body and in season to render the womb fertile ground for ploughing, as it were, and sowing. But when the womb receives the seed as it encounters it and enfolds it and it has taken root \(^c\) there ("for the umbilical cord grows at first in the womb," as Democritus \(^d\) says, "as an anchorage against the swell and drift, a cable and vine" for the fruit now conceived that is to be), Nature shuts the monthly

\(^a\) A famous physician at the court of Seleucus I and later at Alexandria; cf. Life of Demetrius, xxxviii. (907 a ff.).


\(^c\) Cf. Aristotle, 745 b 25: ἀφίησιν εὐθὺς οὖν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς τῷ ὀμφαλῷ εἰς τὴν ὑστέραν, and 493 a 18: (τῆς γαστρὸς) μίζα ὀμφαλὸς.

φύσις, τοῦ δὲ αἵματος ἀντιλαμβανόμενη φερομένου
τροφῆς χρήσι ταὶ καὶ κατάρδει τὸ βρέφος ἢ δὲ συνιστά-
μενον καὶ διαπλαττόμενον, ἄριστον ὅ τι τῶν προσ-
ήκοντας ἀριθμοὺς τῇ ἐντὸς αὐξήσει κυηθέν
έτερας
Γ ἀνατροφής καὶ χώρας δέχεται. τὸτ' οὖν τὸ αἷμα
παντὸς ἐμμελέτερον φυτουργοῦ καὶ ὀχετηγοῦ πρὸς
έτεραν ἄφ' ἐτέρας ἐκτρέπουσα καὶ μεταλαμβάνουσα
χρείαν, ἧ' έχει παρεσκευασμένας οἰνὸν ἐγγείοις
κρῆσις νάματος ἐπιρρεοντος, οὖν ἄργως οὖ' ἀπα-
496 θ' ως ὑποδεχομένας ἀλλὰ καὶ πνεύματος ἦπιώς θερ-
μότητι καὶ μαλακῆς θηλύτητι ἐκπέξαι καὶ λεύκαι καὶ
μεταβαλείν δυναμένας· τουαύτην γὰρ ὁ μαστὸς ἥ' ἔχει
ἐντὸς διάθεσιν καὶ κράσιν. ἔκροαι δὲ τοῦ γάλακτος
οὖν εἰσὶν οὖδὲ κρουνοὶ μεθεύτες ἅβρῶς, εἰς δὲ
σάρκα πιδακώδῃ καὶ πόροις ἀτρέμα λεπτοῖς δηθοῦ-
σαν ἀπολήγον, εὖμενες τῷ τοῦ νηπίου στόματι καὶ
προσφιλές ψαύσαι καὶ περιλαβείν ἐνδίδωσι ταμείων.
'Αλλὰ τούτων γε τῶν τοσοῦτων ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν
ἐργαλείων καὶ τοιοῦτων οἰκονομιῶν καὶ φιλοτιμίας
καὶ προνοιάς οὐδὲν ἤν ὄφελος, εἰ μὴ τὸ φιλόστοργον
ἡ φύσις καὶ κηδεμονικὸν ἐνειργάσατο ταῖς τε-
κούσαις.

Β οὐ μὲν γὰρ τί ποῦ ἐστὶν οἰξυρότερον ἄνδρὸς
πάντων ὅσα τε γαϊάν ἐπὶ πνείει
τούτῳ οὐ πεῦτε τε λέγων ἐπὶ ηπίου καὶ

1 κυηθέν Xylander: κυηθέν.
2 ἐγγείοις] ἐνεώς in some mss.; ἐνεώς Pohlenz.
3 τῖνας Reiske: ἦ τῖνας.
4 ἐντὸς ἔχει Benseler.
5 ἐπὶ πνείει Homer: ἐπὶ πνείει.
6 καὶ] Döhner would delete.
canals of purification and, taking the drifting blood, uses it for nourishment and irrigates the embryo, which already is beginning to be formed and shaped, until, having been carried the number of months proper to its growth within the womb, it needs other nourishment and abiding-place. At that time, then, Nature, more carefully than any gardener or irrigator, turns and changes the blood from one use to another and has in readiness subterranean springs, as it were, of a fresh-flowing stream; and the springs receive the blood in no perfunctory or unemotional manner, but are even able, by the gentle heat and soft womanliness of respiration, to digest, mollify, and change it; for such a disposition and temper does the breast have within it. Yet there are no outflowing streams of milk nor spouts which discharge it all at once, but the breast terminates in flesh that is full of springs and can filter the milk gently through minute passage-ways; and it thus gives a store of food that is comfortable for the infant's mouth and pleasant for it to touch and to grasp.

But there would be no benefit in these many kinds of equipment for procreation, or in such ways and means, such zeal and forethought, if Nature had not implanted in mothers affection and care for their offspring.

There is nothing more wretched than a man,

Of all that breathes and creeps upon the earth—

the poet tells no falsehood if it is about a new-born

\[\text{a Cf. Celsus, vii. 7. 17.} \]
\[\text{b See Aristotle, 745 b 28: διὰ τούτου (τοῦ ὄμφαλοῦ) λαμβάνει τροφήν αἰματικήν.} \]
\[\text{c Cf. Life of Aemilius Paulus, xiv. (262 b-d).} \]
\[\text{d Homer, Il., xvii. 446-447; cf. 500 b, infra.} \]
(496) οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὕτως ἀτελεῖς οὐδ’ ἀποροῦν οὐδὲ γυμνὸν οὐδ’ ἀμορφὸν οὐδὲ μιαρὸν ὡς ἀνθρωπός ἐν γυναικὶ δρόμενος· ὃ μόνῳ σχεδὸν οὐδὲ καθαρὰν ἐδωκεν εἰς φῶς ὃδὸν ἡ φύσις, ἀλλ’ αἰματί πεφυρ-μένος καὶ λύθρου περίπλεως καὶ φονευμένῳ μᾶλλον ἡ γεννωμένῳ ἑοὶκὼς οὐδενὸς ἐστιν ἡμασθαί καὶ ἀνελέθασαι καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι καὶ περιλαβεῖν ἢ τοῦ φύσει φιλούντος. διὸ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ζωῶν ὑπὸ θην γαστέρα τά οὐθατα χαλά, 1 ταῖς δὲ γυναιξὶν ἄνω γεγονασθεν περὶ τὸ στέρνον ἐν ἑφικτῷ τοῦ φιλῆσαι καὶ περιπτύξαι καὶ καταστάσασθαι τὸ νήπιον, ὡς τοῦ τεκεῖν καὶ θρέψαι τέλος οὐ χρείαν ἄλλα φιλίαν ἔχοντος.

4. Ἐπὶ τοὺς παλαίως ἀνάγαγε τῶν λόγων, ὅπε ταῖς μὲν τεκεῖν πρώταις, τοῖς δ’ ἰδεῖν συνεβη τικτόμενον βρέφος· οὔτε νόμος ἢν ἐκείνους τεκνο-трοφεῖν προστάττων οὔτε προσδοκία χάριτος ἢ τροφεῖων “ἐπὶ νέος δανειζομένων.” χαλαπᾶς δὲ μᾶλλον εἴπομι, ἅν εἶναι καὶ μνησικάκους τὰς τεκούσας τοῖς βρέφεσι, κινούν τε μεγάλων καὶ πόνων αὐταῖς γνομένων.

D ὡς δ’ ὅταν ὠδίνουσαν ἔχῃ βέλος ὦξυ γυναῖκα, δριμύ, τὸ τε προίαστι 2 μογοστόκοι Εἰλείθυιαι, Ἦρης θυγατέρες, πικρὰς ὀδίνας ἔχουσαι· ταῦτ’ οὖχ ὁμηρον αἱ γυναίκες ἄλλ’ ὁμηρίδα γράψαι λέγουσι τεκούσαν ἡ τίκτουσαν ἐτὶ καὶ τὸ

1 toús μαστοὺς after χαλά deleted by van Herwerden.
2 προίασι] προιάει Homer.

a But it is with reference to the dead Patroclus that Zeus speaks these lines.

b Cf. Moralia, 758 a.

c Plato, Laws, 717 c; cf. 479 r, supra.
babe that he speaks. For there is nothing so imperfect, so helpless, so naked, so shapeless, so foul, as man observed at birth, to whom alone, one might almost say, Nature has given not even a clean passage to the light; but, defiled with blood and covered with filth and resembling more one just slain than one just born, he is an object for none to touch or lift up or kiss or embrace except for someone who loves with a natural affection. Therefore, while the other animals have their dugs hanging loose beneath the belly, in women they grow above on the breast where mothers can kiss and embrace and fondle the infant, the inference being that the end and aim of bearing and rearing a child is not utility, but affection.

4. Carry the discussion back to primitive mankind, to those whose women were the first to bear, and whose men were the first to see a child born; they had neither any law which bade them rear their children, nor any expectation of gratitude or of receiving the wages of maintenance "lent to their children when they were young." Nay, I should rather be inclined to affirm that these mothers were hostile and malicious toward their children, since great dangers and travail had come to them from child-birth:

As when a sharp pang pierces a woman in labour,
A pang which the Eileithyiae of child-bed send,
The daughters of Hera, who bring the bitter pangs—

these lines, women tell us, were written, not by Homer, but by an Homerid after child-birth or

\(^{a}\) \(\text{II. xi. 269-271.}\)

\(^{b}\) The ancients used the term, not of women, but of a class of male bards. But Plutarch chooses to treat the word as a feminine noun, anticipating Samuel Butler's \textit{Authorress of the Odyssey}. 

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(4.6) νύγμα1 τῆς ἀλγηδώνος ὁμοῦ πειρόν καὶ ὑμνό-
μενον ἐν τοῖς σπλάγχνοις ἔχουσαι. ἀλλὰ τὸ φύσει
φιλόστοργον ἐκαμπτε2 καὶ ἤγεν3. ἔτι θερμὴ καὶ
dιαλυγῆς καὶ κραδαινομένη τοῖς πόνοις οὐχ ὑπερέβη
tὸ νήπιον οὐδ' ἐφυγεν, ἀλλ' ἐπεστράφη καὶ προσ-
εμειδίασε καὶ ἀνείλετο καὶ ἱπτάσατο, μηδὲν ἤδυ
Ε ἑκαμμόμενη μηδὲ χρήσμον ἀλλ' ἐπιπόνως καὶ
tαλαπτώρως4 ἀναδεχομένη, τῶν σταργάνων
ἐρειπίοις
θάλπουσα καὶ ψήχουσα,5 καὶ πόνω πόνον
ἐκ νυκτὸς ἀλλὰσσουσα τὸν μεθ'6 ἥμεραν.
tίνων ταῦτα μισθῶν ἢ χρειῶν ἔκεινος; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ
tοῖς νῦν· αἱ γὰρ ἐπιλίδες ἀδηλοὶ καὶ μακραί. ἀμ-
πελῶν7 ἰσημερίας ἥρπεν σκάψαις μετοπωρίνης
ἐπρύγησε, πυρὸν ἐσπειρε δυσμένης Πλειάδος εἰτ'
ἀνατελλοῦσης θερίζει, βόες καὶ ἦπτοι καὶ ὄρνιθες
ἐτοιμα τίκτουσιν ἐπί τὰς χρείας· ἀνθρώπου δ' ἢ μὲν
ἐκτροφῇ πολύπονος ἢ δ' αὐξήσις βραδεῖα, τῆς δ' ἄρετῆς
μακρὰν8 οὔσης προαποθνήσκουσιν οἱ πλεί-

Γ στοὶ πατέρες. οὐκ ἐπειδή τὴν Σαλαμίνα Νεοκλῆς
τὴν Θεμιστοκλέους οὐδὲ τὸν Εὐρυμέδοντα Μιλ-
τιάδης τὸν Κύμωνος, οὐδ' ήκουσε Περικλέους Εάν-
θιππος δημηγοροῦντος οὐδ' 'Αρίστων Πλάτωνος
φιλοσοφοῦντος, οὐδ' Εὐριπίδου καὶ Σοφοκλέους
νικᾶς οἱ πατέρες ἐγνωσαν· ψελλιζόντων καὶ συλ-

1 νύγμα Reiske: μύγμα.
2 ἐκαμπτε καὶ ἤγεν[ ἐλαμψε καὶ ἢ μὲν Patzig.
3 ἤγεν] ἤγεν Bernardakis.
4 ἐπιπόνως καὶ ταλαπτώρως] ἐτί πόνους καὶ ταλαπτώριας
Döhner.
5 ψήχουσα Wilamowitz: ψήχουσα. 6 μεθ' Cobet: καθ'.
7 ἀμπελῶν' Kronenberg, cf. 524 Λ, Diodorus, iv. 31. 7:
ἀμπελον.
8 μακρὰν Reiske: μακρᾶς.

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while she was still in the throes of it and had the pain of travail, alike bitter and sharp, actually present in her entrails. But even then the affection for offspring implanted by Nature would bend and lead the mother: still hot and suffering and shaken with her pangs, she did not neglect or avoid her child, but turned to it and smiled at it and took it up and kissed it, though she reaped nothing sweet or profitable therefrom, but received it with pain and suffering, and "with tatters" of swaddling-clothes

Thus warming and caressing it, both night And day she passes in alternate toil. 

For what pay or advantage were these services performed by those ancient parents? Nor is there any for those of our day, since their expectations are uncertain and far off. He that plants a vineyard in the vernal equinox gathers the grapes in the autumnal; he that sows wheat when the Pleiades set reaps it when they rise; cattle and horses and birds bring forth young at once ready for use; but as for man, his rearing is full of trouble, his growth is slow, his attainment of excellence is far distant and most fathers die before it comes. Neocles did not live to see the Salamis of Themistocles nor Miltiades the Eurymedon of Cimon; nor did Xanthippus ever hear Pericles harangue the people, nor did Ariston hear Plato expound philosophy; nor did the fathers of Euripides and Sophocles come to know their sons’ victories; they but heard them

^a From the Niobé of an unknown poet (cf. Moralia, 691 d), attributed by Valckenaer to Sophocles, and recently by A. Lesky (Wien. Stud., liri. 7; cf. also Pearson, Fragments of Sophocles, vol. ii. p. 98), to Aeschylus.
λαβιζόντων ἡκροιντο καὶ κώμους καὶ πότους καὶ ἔρωτας αὐτῶν οἶα νέοι1 πλημμελοῦντων ἐπείδον·

497 ὥστε ἐπανεῖσθαι καὶ μνημονεύσθαι τοῦ Εὐήνου τὸ τούτο μόνον ὁν ἐγραφεῖν,3

ἡ δέος ἡ λύτη παῖς πατρὶ πάντα χρόνον.

ἀλλ' ὡμως οὐ παύονται παίδας τρέφοντες, μάλιστα δ' οἷ παίδων ἡκιστα δεόμενοι. γελοιον γάρ, εἰ τις οἴεται τοὺς πλούσιους θύειν καὶ χαίρειν γενομένων αὐτοῖς τέκνων, ὅτι τοὺς θρέψοντας ἔξουσι καὶ τοὺς θάψοντας· εἰ μὴ νὴ Δία κληρονόμων ἀπορία παίδας τρέφουσιν· οὔ γάρ ἔστων εὑρεῖν οὐδ' ἐπιτυχεῖν τοῦ τάλλοτρια βουλομένου λαμβάνειν.

οὐ4 ψάμμος ἡ κόνις ἡ πτερὰ ποικιλοθρώων οἰωνῶν τόσσον ἂν χεύαιτ5 ἀριθμὸν

όσος ἔστω ὁ τῶν κληρονομοῦντων.

Δαναὸς δ' πεντήκοντα θυγατέρων πατήρ,

Β εἰ δ' ἀτεκνὸς ἢν, πλεῖονας ἄν εἰχε κληρονομοῦντας, καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίους.6 οἱ μὲν γὰρ παῖδες χάριν οὐδεμίᾶν ἔχουσιν οὐδ' ἑνέκα τοῦτον θεραπεύσουσιν οὐδὲ τιμώσιν, ὡς ὀφειλήμα7 τὸν κλήρον ἐκδεχόμενοι· τῶν δ' 1 οἰα νέοι Bernardakis: οί άνθρωποι.2 οὖ Πατζίγ: ὁς.

3 ἐγραφεῖν Reiske: ἐπέγραψεν.

4 οὐ added by Patzig from Mor., 1067 D.

5 ἂν χεύαιτ Patzig from Mor., 1067 D: ἄχλευταί.

6 ὁμοίους H. Richards and Hartman: ὁμοίως.

7 ὀφειλήμα] ὀφλήμα Patzig after Döhner.
ON AFFECTION FOR OFFSPRING, 496-497

lisping and learning to speak and witnessed their revellings and drinking-bouts and love-affairs, as they indulged in such follies as young men commit; so that of all Evenus a wrote the only line that is praised or remembered is

For fathers a child is always fear or pain.

Yet none the less fathers do not cease rearing children and, most of all, those who least need them. For it is ridiculous if anyone thinks that the rich sacrifice and rejoice when sons are born to them because they will have someone to support them and bury them—unless, by Heaven, it is for lack of heirs that they bring up children, since it is impossible to find or happen upon anyone willing to accept another's property!

Not sand or dust or feathers of birds of varied note
Could heap up so great a number b
as is the number of those seeking inheritances.c

The sire of fifty daughters, d Danaüs:

but if he had been childless, he would have had more heirs, and heirs unlike his own. For sons feel no gratitude, nor, for the sake of inheriting, do they pay court or show honour, knowing that they receive the inheritance as their due. But you hear the words of

a Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec., ii. p. 270; Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus, i. p. 472.
c For the plague of inheritance-seekers at Rome, see Roman Satire passim, especially Horace, Satires, ii. 5.
(497) ἀλλοτρίων περὶ τῶν ἀτεκνον φωνὰς ἀκούεις ταῖς κωμικαῖς ἑκεῖναις ὁμοίας,

ὁ Δῆμε, λούσαι ἐκδικάσας μίαν,

ἐνθοῦ, ῥόφησον, ἐντραγ', ἔχε τριώβολον.

τὸ δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἑὐρυπίδου λεγόμενον,

τὰ χρήματ' ἀνθρώπωσιν εὐρύσκειν φίλους
dύναμίν τε πλείστην τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἔχειν,

όχι οὖν ἀπλῶς ἀληθές, ἀλλ' ἔτι τῶν ἀτεκνῶν· τούτους
ioi πλούσιους δειπνίζουσιν, iοὶ ἡγεμόνες θεραπεύουσιν,
ioi ῥήτορες μόνοις τούτους προῖκα συνηγοροῦσιν.

ἰσχυρὸν ἔστι πλούσιος ἄγνοούμενον

ἔχων κληρονόμον.

πολλοὺς γοῦν πολυφίλους καὶ πολυτιμήτους οἴντας
ἐν παίδιον γενόμενον ἀφίλους καὶ ἀδυνάτους ἐποίησεν. οδ' ὃθεν οὐδὲ πρὸς δύναμιν οὐδὲν ἔστων ὀφέλιμον
ἀπὸ τῶν τέκνων, ἀλλὰ τῆς φύσεως τὸ πᾶν κράτος

οὗ ἦττον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἡ θερίος.

5. Ἐξαμαυρωταί γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπὸ τῆς κακίας, ὡσπερ λόχυμα ἡμέροις

ἐπέρμασι παραβλαστανοῦσα. ἡ μηδ' ἐαυτὸν φύσει

Δ στέργειν τὸν ἀνθρώπων λέγωμεν,3 ὅτι πολλοὶ

σφάττουσιν ἐαυτοὺς καὶ κατακρημνίζουσιν; δ' δὲ

Οἰδίποις

ὁρασείς περώναις4 βλέφαρα· φοίναι δ' ὀμοῦ

γλύναι γένει' ἑτέγγον·

1 ὁ Δῆμε, λούσαι and ἔχε Iunius from Aristophanes: ὁδ' μέλουσαι and ἔχε.

2 γὰρ] δὲ Amyot.

3 λέγωμεν Meziriacus: λέγομεν.

4 ὁρασε ἐρώταις Housman: ἕρας' ἐπαίρων with the mss. of Sophocles (all mss. of Plutarch but one omit some part of these lines).

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strangers clustering around the childless man, like those famous verses of the comic poet,\(^a\)

O Demos, judge one case, then to your bath;
Gorge, guzzle, stuff, and take three obols’ pay.

And the remark of Euripides,\(^b\)

Money it is that finds out friends for men
And holds the greatest power among mankind,
is not a simple and general truth, but applies to the childless: it is these whom rich men feast, whom great men court, for these alone do advocates plead gratis.

A rich man with an unknown heir’s a power.\(^c\)

Many, at any rate, who had many friends and much honour, the birth of one child has made friendless and powerless. Therefore not even toward the acquisition of power is there any aid to be derived from children, but the whole force of Nature exists no less in man than in beasts.\(^d\)

5. Now both this and many other excellences are obscured by vice, as a thicket springs up beside seeds planted in a garden. Or are we to say that man has no natural love for himself just because many men cut their throats or hurl themselves from precipices? And Oedipus\(^e\)

Smote his eyes with a brooch and at each blow
The bloody eye-balls wet his beard;

\(^a\) Aristophanes, Knights, 50-51.
\(^b\) Phoenissae, 439-440; but the first line is borrowed from Sophocles, Frag. 85. 1 (Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag.\(^2\), p. 148).
\(^d\) This closes Plutarch’s argument that man does not derive his love of offspring from any other source than do the brute beasts.
\(^e\) Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, 1276-1277.
(497) Ἡγεσίας δὲ διαλεγόμενος πολλοὺς ἐπεισεν ἀποκαρτερήσαι τῶν ἀκρωμένων.

πολλαὶ ὀρφαὶ τῶν δαμονίων:

ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ὦσπερ ἐκεῖνα νοσήματα καὶ πάθη ψυχῆς τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἔξιστάντας τὸν ἀνθρώπον, ὡς αὐτοὶ καταμαρτυροῦσιν ἑαυτῶν. ἢ γὰρ ἦν τεκοῦσα δελφάκιον ἢ κύων διασπαράξῃ σκυλάκιον, ἀθυμοῦσι καὶ ταράττονται καὶ θεοὶ ἀποτρόπαια θύουσι καὶ τέρας νομίζουσιν, ὡς πάσιν κατὰ φύσιν3 στέργεω τὰ τυχόμενα καὶ τρέφεων ὑπὰ ἀναίρειν προσήκον. οὐ δὲ ἀλλ’ ὦσπερ ἐν τοῖς μετάλλοις πολλῇ συμπεφυρμένοι γῇ καὶ κατακεχωσμένοι ὀμως διαστίλβει τὸ χρυσίον, οὕτως ἢ φύσις ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἦμαρτημένοις ἠθετει καὶ πάθεσιν ἐκφαινεῖ τὸ πρὸς τὰ ἐγγόνα φιλόστοργον. οἱ μὲν γὰρ πένητες οὐ τρέφοντε τέκνα, φοβοῦμενοι μὴ χείρον ἢ προσήκει τραφέντα δουλοπρεπῆ καὶ ἀπαίδευτα καὶ τῶν καλῶν πάντων ἐνδεὰ γένηται: τὴν γὰρ πενίαιν ἐσοχατον ἤγομενοι κακὸν ὑπὸ ὑπομένουσι μεταδοῦναι τέκνοις ὦσπερ τινὸς χαλέπου καὶ μεγάλου νοσήματος. . . .

1 δὲ added by Dübner.
2 ἔξιστάντας most mss.
3 κατὰ φύσιν Reiske: καὶ κατὰ (καὶ παρὰ in most mss.) φύσιν.

— Philosopher of Cyrenē, early third century B.C. Cf. Cicero, Tusc. Disp., i. 34. 83; Valerius Maximus, viii. 9, Ext. 3.
and Hesegias by the eloquence of his reasoning persuaded many of his hearers to starve themselves to death.

In many a guise the gods appear.

But these are like those diseases and morbid states of the soul which drive men from their natural condition, as they themselves testify against themselves. For if a sow tears to pieces her suckling pig, or a bitch her puppy, men grow despondent and disturbed and offer to the gods sacrifices to avert the evil, and consider it a portent on the ground that Nature prescribes to all creatures that they should love and rear their offspring, not destroy them. Moreover, as in mines the gold, though mingled and covered with much earth, yet gleams through, so Nature, even in characters and passions which are themselves perverted, reveals their love for their offspring. For when poor men do not rear their children it is because they fear that if they are educated less well than is befitting they will become servile and boorish and destitute of all the virtues; since they consider poverty the worst of evils, they cannot endure to let their children share it with them, as though it were a kind of disease, serious and grievous.

\[b\] From the stock lines at the end of the \textit{Alcestis, Andromaché, Helen, and Bacchae} of Euripides; cf. \textit{Moralia}, 58 Α.

\[c\] Contrast \textit{Moralia}, 8 Ε on the education of poor children.
WHETHER VICE BE SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE UNHAPPINESS

(AN VITIOSITAS AD INFELICITATEM SUFFICIAT)
INTRODUCTION

Again we have a fragment, mutilated at the beginning and the end.\textsuperscript{a} The attribution to Plutarch has been questioned by Dübner, Hense,\textsuperscript{b} Naber, and Hartman,\textsuperscript{c} but on insufficient grounds, which have, in the main, been explained away by Siefert,\textsuperscript{d} who has also analysed the structure of the work and the Plutarchean parallels. Wilamowitz,\textsuperscript{e} on the other hand, believed this and the following fragment to be scraps of the same dialogue: I follow Pohlenz in rejecting this view.\textsuperscript{f}

The text is not good, and the work is not mentioned in the Lamprias catalogue.

\textsuperscript{a} There may, in addition, be a lacuna between chapters 1 and 2.

\textsuperscript{b} Teletea, p. lxxxix., note.

\textsuperscript{c} De Plutarcho, pp. 249-253.

\textsuperscript{d} Commentationes lenenses, 1896, pp. 110-119.

\textsuperscript{e} Hermes, xl. 161-165.

\textsuperscript{f} Similarly Usener, Fleckeisens Jahrb., cxxxix. 381, believed this treatise to be a fragment of the work mentioned in the Lamprias catalogue as No. 84: ΄Αμμώνιος ἦ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἤδεσσε τῇ κακίᾳ συνεῖναι.
1. . . . . οὐχ ὑπομενεί 

πεπραμένον τὸ σῶμα τῆς φερνής ἔχων,

ὡς Εὐριπίδης φησίν, βραχέα δ’ ἔχει τὰ ζηλωτὰ καὶ Β ἄβεβαια. τῶδ’ οὐ “πολλῆς διὰ τέφρας,” ἀλλὰ “πυρκαῖας τενός” βασιλικῆς πορευομένως καὶ περι-

φλεγομένως, ἄσθματος καὶ φόβου μεστῶ καὶ ἵδρωτος 

dιόλυσθαι, τὸ πλοῦτὸν των προσθείσης. Ταντάλειον 

ἀπολαύσαν δι’ ἄσχολιαν οὐ δυναμένω. ό μὲν γὰρ 

Σικυώνιος ἐκεῖνος ἑποτρόφος εὗ φρονῶν ἐδωκε

---

1 οὐχ added by Capps.
2 ὑπομενεί Capps: ὑπομένει.
3 πεπραμένον τὸ σῶμα Nauck: τὸ σῶμα πεπραμένον.
4 δ’ ἔχει τὰ ζηλωτὰ Pohlenz; δὲ τὰ ζηλωτὰ Paton: δεδήλωται.
5 τῶδ’ Capps: τῶ δ’.
6 διόλυσθαι Capps: διαποντιόν or διακοντίον.
7 προσθείσης Capps: προσθείσα.

"This passage is tantalizing, not only because so much is lost of the text, and because the text is so corrupt, but chiefly because since the discovery of the Claremont fragments of Euripides’ Πχαθόν we may perceive that this play, of whose ingenious plot we now know a good deal, colours the whole of the opening passage. In the play Πχαθόν, declining to 362"
WHETHER VICE BE SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE UNHAPPINESS

1. . . . . a He will not submit to (such a marriage) b

His body bartered for the dower's sake,
as Euripides c says; but he has only a slight and precarious reason for being envied. For this man (it were better) b to make his journey, not "through heaps of hot cinders," but "through a royal conflagration," as it were, and surrounded by flames, panting and full of terror and drenched with sweat, and so to perish, though (his mother) b had offered to him such a wealth as Tantalus had, which he was too busy to enjoy. For while that Sicynonian horse-breeder was a wise man, who gave to the king accept marriage with the goddess to whom his mother Clymenê wished to marry him, speaks the first verse quoted; and there are probably further quotations from the play in the second sentence (πολλής διὰ τέφρας, ἀλλὰ πυρκαίας τῶν). It is quite possible that Phaëthon himself swears that he will go through "heaps of cinders" rather than marry the goddess; and in the play there is in fact a "royal conflagration" when the Sun's treasure-house burns (see Nauck, p. 601). But it cannot be too strongly insisted that the text is very corrupt and that the restorations here adopted can claim only an approximation to the truth.

b Conjecturally supplied.

(498) τῷ βασιλεῖ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν θήλειαν ἵππον δρομάδα δῶρον,

ίνα μὴ οἱ ἔποιθ’ ὑπὸ "Ἰλιον ἴνεμόεσσαι ἀλλὰ 1 τέρποιτο μένων,

εἰς βαθείαν εὐπορίαν καὶ σχολὴν ἄλυπον ἀνακλίνας ἑαυτόν· οἱ δὲ νῦν αὐλικοὶ, 2 πρακτικοὶ δοκοῦντες Κ εἶναι, μηδενὸς καλοῦντος ὠθοῦνται δὴ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τράχηλον εἰς αὐλᾶς καὶ προπομπᾶς καὶ θυραυλίας ἐπιτόνους, ἵνα ἵππον τινὸς ἡ πόρπης ἡ τοιαῦτης τινὸς εὐμερίας τύχωσι.

τοῦ δὲ καὶ ἀμφιδρυφής ἄλοχος Φυλάκη ἐλέλειπτο, καὶ δόμος ἡμιτελῆς.

σύρεται δὲ καὶ πλανᾶται τριβόμενος ἐλπίς εἰς ἐλπίδων 3 καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος· ἀν δὲ καὶ τύχη τινὸς ὁποθεῖ, περιενεχθεὶς καὶ σκοτοδινάσας πρὸς τὸν τῆς τύχης πεταυρισμὸν ἀπόβασιν ζητεῖ καὶ μακαρίζει τοὺς ἀδόξους 4 καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ζῶντας· οἱ δ’ ἐκεῖνοι πάλιν ἄνω βλέποντες ύπὲρ αὐτοὺς φερόμενον.

2. Παγκάκως 5 η κακία διατίθησι πάντας Ν ἀνθρώπους, αὐτοτελῆς τις οὗσα τῆς κακοδαιμονίας δημιουργός· οὔτε γὰρ ὄργανον οὐθ’ ὑπηρετῶν ἔχει χρείαν. ἄλλ’ οἱ μὲν 6 τύραννοι σπουδάζοντες οὐδ’ ἂν κολάξωσιν ἄθλιους ποιεῖν δημίους τρέφουσι καὶ βασανιστάς, ἡ καυτήρια καὶ σφήνας ἐπιμηκα-

1 ἀλλὰ] ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ Homer.
2 αὐλικοὶ Pohlenz, after Amyot: ἀλυποὶ καὶ.
3 ἐλπίσιν εἰς ἐλπίδων Kronenberg: ἐν τοῖς ἐλπὶς(εντευξιν ἐλπίςων Wytenbach; ἐν τοῖς ἐλπίςων Reiske).
4 ἀδόξους] ἀδόξους in all mss. but two.

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of the Achaeans, Agamemnon, a swift mare as a gift,

That he might not follow him to wind-swept Troy,
But stay at home and take his pleasure,\(^a\)
surrendering himself to the enjoyment of deep riches and to unmolested ease; yet modern courtiers who are looked upon as men of affairs, though no one summons them, of their own accord push their way headlong into courts and official escorts and toilsome bivouacs that they may get a horse or a brooch or some such piece of good fortune.

His wife, rending both cheeks, was left behind
In Phylacê, and his half-finished home,\(^b\)

while he himself is swept about and wanders afar, worn out by one hope after another and constantly insulted; and even if he obtains any of his desires, yet, whirled about and made giddy by Fortune's rope-dance, he seeks to make his descent and considers happy those who live in obscurity and safety, whereas they so regard him as they look up at him soaring above their heads.

2. Vice makes all men completely miserable, since as a creator of unhappiness it is clothed with absolute power, for it has no need of either instruments or ministers. But whereas despots, when they desire to make miserable those whom they punish, maintain executioners and torturers, or devise branding-irons

\(^{a}\) Adapted from Homer, \textit{Iliad}, xxiii. 297-298; Echepolus is the Sicyonian referred to. \textit{Cf.} \textit{Moralia}, 32 f.

\(^{b}\) Homer, \textit{Iliad}, ii. 700-701.
(498) νωνται, η δε κακια διχα πασης παρασκευης τη ψυχη συνελθουσα συνετρυψε και κατεβαλε, λυτης εν επιλησε θρηνων βαρυθυμιας μεταμελειας των άνθρωπων. τεκμηριον δε τεμνομενοι πολλοι σωπωσαι και μαστυγομενοι καρτεροουι, και σφηνομενοι υπο δεσποτων η τυραννων φωνην ουκ αφηκαν, οταν η Ε ψυχη μυσασα τω λογω των πονον2 ωσπερ χειρι πιεση και κατασχη θυμω δο ουκ ον εν επιταξειας ηνυχιαν ουδε πενθε σιωπην, ουτε φοβομενον στηναι πειειας, ουτε δυσφοροιντα μετανοια μη βοησαι μηδε των τριχων λαβεσθαι η των μηρων αλοησαι3 ουτω και πυρος εστιν η κακια και σιδηρου βιαιστερα.

3. Αι πολεις δηπουθεν, οταν έκδοσιν ναων η κολοσσων προγραφωσιν, άκροινται των τεχνιτων άμιλλωμενων περι της έργολαβης και λογους4 και παραδειγματα κομιζοντων ειτο αιρουνται των απ ελαττων δαπανης ταυτο πωοιντα και βελτιων και ταχιων. φερε δη και ημας έκδοσιν τινα βιον5 Ε κακοδαιμονος προκηρυσσειν, ειτα προσεναι τη έργολαβη την Τυχην και την Κακιαν διαφερομενας την μεν οργανων τε παντοδαπων καταπλεω και παρασκευης πολυτελους εις άπεργασιαν κακοδαιμονος ζωης και οικτρας ληστηρια δεινα και πολεμους και τυραννων μιαφονιας και χειμωνας εκ

1 αλογου ψυχης before η is corrupt, though probably not a gloss; it was deleted by Bernardakis.
2 πονον Reiske: τονον.
3 αλοησαι] κροησαι in all mss, but three.
4 λογους] λογιμων van Herwerden.
5 Pohlenz deletes και άνθρωπον after βιον.
and wedges; vice, without any apparatus, when it has joined itself to the soul, crushes and overthrows it, and fills the man with grief and lamentation, dejection and remorse. And this is the proof: many are silent under mutilation and endure scourging and being tortured by the wedge at the hands of masters or tyrants without uttering a cry, whenever by the application of reason the soul abates the pain and by main force, as it were, checks and represses it; but you cannot order anger to be quiet nor grief to be silent, nor can you persuade a man possessed by fear to stand his ground, nor one suffering from remorse not to cry out or tear his hair or smite his thigh. So much more violent is vice than either fire or sword.

3. Cities, as we know, when they give public notice of intent to let contracts for the building of temples or colossal statues, listen to the proposals of artists competing for the commission and bringing in their estimates and models, and then choose the man who will do the same work with the least expense and better than the others and more quickly. Come, then, let us suppose that we also give public proclamation of intent to contract for making a life wretched, and that Fortune and Vice come to get the commission in a rival spirit. Fortune is provided with all manner of instruments and costly apparatus to render a life miserable and wretched; she brings in her train frightful robberies and wars, the foul blood-

a Cf. Aeschylus, Prometheus, 64-65:

\[\text{άδαμαντίνον νῦν σφηνὸς αὐθάδη γνάθον}
\[\text{στέρνων διαμπάξ πασάλευ ἔρρωμένως.}


c Cf., for example, Richter, Greek Sculptors, p. 230: "A model of the pediment figures must have preceded the beginning of their execution."
θαλάττης καὶ κεραυνὸν ἐξ ἀέρος ἐφελκομένην καὶ
κόνεια τρίβουσαν καὶ ξίφη φέρουσαν καὶ συκοφάν-
tας ξενολογοῦσαν καὶ πυρετοὺς ἐξάπτουσαν καὶ
πέδας περικρούσαν καὶ περιοικοδομοῦσαν εἰρκτάς·
καίτοι τούτων τὰ πλείστα τῆς Κακίας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς
Τύχης ἐστίν· ἄλλα πάντ' ἐστώ τῆς Τύχης. ἥ δὲ
Κακία παρεστώσα γυμνὴ καὶ μηδενὸς δεομένη τῶν
ἐξωθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπον ἐρωτάτω τὴν² Τύχην πῶς
ποιήσει κακοδαίμονα καὶ ἀθυμὸν τὸν ἀνθρώπον.

"Τύχη,

πενίαν ἀπειλεῖς; καταγελᾷ σου Μητροκλῆς,

δὲ χειμῶνος ἐν τοῖς προβάτοις³ καθεύδων καὶ
θέρους ἐν τοῖς προπυλαίοις τῶν ἱερῶν τὸν ἐν
Βαβυλῶνι χειμάζοντα καὶ περὶ Μηδίαν θερίζοντα
Περσῶν βασιλέα περὶ εὐδαιμονίας εἰς ἀγώνα προ-
kαλεῖτο· δουλεῖαν καὶ δεσμά καὶ πρᾶσιν ἔπαγες;
καταφρονεῖ σου Διογένης, δὲ ύπὸ τῶν ληστῶν
πωλοῦμενος ἐκήρυττε, 'τῆς ὀνείσασθαι βουλέται
dεσπότην⁴; κύλικα φαρμάκον ταράττεις;⁵ οὐχὶ
kαὶ Σωκράτει ταύτην προὔπτες; ὁ δὲ ἰπειρός καὶ
πρᾶσι, οὐ τρέσασ ωδὲ διαφθείρας ωὔτε χρώματος
ωὐδὲν ωὔτε⁶ σχήματος μαλὰ εὐκόλως ἔξεπιεν, ἀπο-
θησθοῦσαν δ' αὐτὸν ἐμακάριζον οἱ ξώντες, ως οὖδὲ
ἐν "Ἀδιόν θείας ἄνευ μοίρας ἐσόμενον. καὶ μὴν τὸ
πῦρ σου Δέκιος ὁ 'Ρωμαιῶν" στρατηγὸς προέλαβεν

¹ πυρετοὺς] πυρὰς Pohlenz.
² τήν] καὶ τήν in most mss.
³ ἐν τοῖς προβάτοις Usener, "baths."
⁴ δεσπότην added by some inferior mss.; κύριον Bernardakis.
⁵ ταράττεις] ταράττουσα most mss.
⁶ ωὔτε . . . ωὔτε] ωὐδὲ . . . ωὐδὲ in all the better mss.
⁷ 'Ρωμαιῶν] ρωμαιῶν ὡν most mss.
thirstiness of tyrants, and storms at sea and thunder from the sky; she compounds hemlock, she carries swords, she levies informers, she kindles fevers, she claps on fetters, and builds prison-enclosures (and yet the greater part of these belong to Vice rather than to Fortune, but let us suppose them all Fortune's). And let Vice stand by quite unarmed, needing no external aid against the man, and let her ask Fortune how she intends to make man wretched and dejected:

"Fortune,

Do you threaten poverty? Metrocles laughs at you, a

Metrocles, who in winter slept among the sheep and in summer in the gateways of sacred precincts, yet challenged to vie with him in happiness the king of the Persians who winters in Babylon and summers in Media. b Do you bring on slavery and chains and the auction block? Diogenes c despises you, for when he was being sold by pirates, he cried out with the voice of an auctioneer, 'Who wants to buy a master?' Do you mix a cup of poison? Did you not present this to Socrates d also? And cheerfully and calmly, without trembling or changing either colour or posture, he drained it with great cheerfulness; and as he died the living esteemed him happy, e believing that 'not even in Hades would he be without some god-given portion.' f And as for your fire, Decius g the Roman general anticipated it, when he built a

a H. Richards has seen that this is probably a verse from comedy.

b Cf. Moralia, 604 c; Xenophon, Cyropædia, viii. 6. 22.
c Cf. Diogenes Laertius, vi. 29. 74; Epictetus, iv. 1. 116.
d Cf. Plato, Phædo, 117 b-c.
e Cf. Moralia, 607 f.
f Cf. Plato, Phædo, 58 e; Xenophon, Apology, 32.
g Cf. Moralia, 310 a-b.
C ὁτε τῶν στρατοπέδων ἐν μέσω πυρὰν νῦθας1 τῷ (499) Κρόνῳ κατ’ εὐχήν αὐτὸς ἔαυτὸν ἐκαλλιέρησεν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἤγεμονίας. Ἐνδῶν δὲ φίλανδροι καὶ σύμφρονες γυναῖκες ὑπὲρ τοῦ πυρὸς ἔριζον καὶ μάχονται πρὸς ἄλληλας, τὴν δὲ νυκτίσαν τεθηκότι τῶν ἀνδρόν συγκαταφλεγήναι μακαρίαν ἄδουσιν αἱ λοιπαὶ. τῶν δ’ ἐκεῖ σοφῶν οὐδεὶς ξηλωτὸς οὐδὲ μακαριστὸς ἔστιν, ἂν μὴ ξών ἔτι καὶ φρονῶν καὶ υγιαίνων τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχήν πυρὶ διαστήσῃ, καὶ καθαρὸς ἐκβῇ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐκνηφάμενος τὸ θνητόν. ἄλλ’ εὖ οὖσι λαμπρὰς καὶ οἴκου καὶ τραπέζης καὶ πολυτελείας εἰς τρίβωνα καὶ πήραν καὶ προσαίτησιν

D ἐφημέρου τροφῆς κατάξεις; ταῦτ’ εὐδαίμονίας ἀρχαί Διογένει, ταῦτ’ ἐλευθερίας Κράτητι καὶ δόξης. ἄλλ’ εἰς σταυρὸν καθηλώσεις ἢ σκόλου πῆξεις; καὶ τὰ θεοδώρῳ μέλει, πότερον ὑπὲρ γῆς ἢ ὑπὸ γῆς σήπεται; Σκυθῶν εὐδαίμονες ταφαὶ αὕται2. Ἰρκανῶν δὲ κύνες Βακτριανῶν δ’ ὀρνιθεὶς νεκροὺς ἐσθίουσι κατὰ νόμους, ὅταν μακαρίου τέλους τυχάνωσιν."

4. Τίνας οὖν ταῦτα κακοδαίμονας ποιεῖ; τοὺς ἀνάνδρους καὶ ἀλογίστους, τοὺς ἀτρίπτους3 καὶ ἀγμανάστους, τοὺς ἐκ νηπίων ἄς ἔχουσι δόξας φυλάττοντας. οὐκούν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ Τύχη κακοδαι-

1 πυρὰν νῦθας Xylander: τυραννῆσας.
2 ταφαὶ αὕται] αὕται ταφαὶ Pohlentz.
3 ἀτρίπτους Wyttchenbach: ἀθρέπτους.

"This reference to Suttee is of great interest. It is probably derived ultimately from Megasthenes’ account of the Maurya Empire of the 3rd century B.C. See, for example, Rawlinson, India and the Western World (Cambridge University Press, 1916), p. 59. 370
funeral pyre between the camps and, to fulfil a vow, sacrificed himself to Saturn on behalf of Rome’s supremacy. And among the Indians, loving and chaste wives strive and contend with one another for the fire, and the wife who wins the honour of being consumed together with her dead husband is hymned as happy by the others.\(^a\) And of the wise men in that part of the world, not one is considered enviable or happy, if, while he yet lives and is sane and healthy, he does not separate by fire his soul from his body and emerge pure from the flesh, with the mortal part washed away. Or will you reduce a man from splendid wealth and house and table and lavish living to a threadbare cloak and wallet and begging of his daily bread? These things were the beginning of happiness for Diogenes, of freedom and repute for Crates. But will you nail him to a cross or impale him on a stake? And what does Theodorus\(^b\) care whether he rots above ground or beneath? Among the Scythians\(^c\) such is the manner of happy burial; and among the Hyrcanians\(^d\) dogs, among the Bactrians birds, devour, in accordance with the laws, the bodies of men, when these have met a happy end.’

4. Whom, then, do these things make wretched? The unmanly and irrational, the unpracticed and untrained, those who retain from childhood their notions unchanged. Therefore Fortune is not a producer of

\(^a\) The Cyrenaic, called “The Atheist,” philosopher of the late 4th century B.C.; cf. *Moralia*, 606 b; Teles ed. Hense, p. 31; Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, i. 43. 102; Valerius Maximus, vi. 2, Ext. 3; Seneca, *De Tranquillitate*, xiv. 3; *Wien. Stud.*, ix. 204.

\(^b\) Cf. Herodotus, iv. 71-72.

PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

μονίας τελεσιουργός, ἄν μὴ Κακίαν ἔχῃ συνερ-

Ε γοῦσαν. ὡς γὰρ ἡ κρόκη τὸ ὀστέον πρέι τέφρα
καὶ δέξει διάβροχον γενόμενον, καὶ τὸν ἑλεφάντα τῷ
ζύθει μαλακὸν γενόμενον καὶ χαλάντα κάμπτουσι
καὶ διασχηματίζουσιν, ἀλλὰς δ' οὐ δύνανται, οὕτως
ἡ Τύχη τὸ πεπονθὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ μαλακὸν ἐκ
κακίας¹ προσπεσοῦσα κολαίνει καὶ τιτρώσκει. καὶ
καθάπερ ὁ Παρθικὸς² ἵος³ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὶ βλα-
βερὸς ὄν οὐδὲ λυπῶν ἀπτομένους καὶ περιφέρον-
tas.⁴ ἔαν τετρωμένωι⁵ ἐπεισενεχθῇ μόνον, εὑρὸς
ἀπόλυσι τῷ προπεπονθότι τὴν ἀπορροήν δεχο-
μένους,⁶ οὕτω τὸν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης συντριβήσεσθαι

Ε μελλοντα τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰδιον ἐλκος ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ κακῶν
ἐχειν δεῖ;" ὅπως τὰ προσπέπτοντα ἐξῴθεν οὐκτρά
καὶ ὄδυρτα ποιήσῃ.

5. Ἀρ' οὖν ἡ κακία τουοῦτον ὅστε τῆς τύχης
dεῖσθαι πρὸς κακοδαίμονιας ἀπεργασίαν; πόθεν; οὐ⁸ τραχύ καὶ δυσχείμερον ἐπαίρει² πέλαγος, οὐ
ληστῶν ἐνοδίως διαξώνυσιν ἐνέδρας ἐρήμους
ὑπωρείας, οὐ νέφη χαλαζόβολα πεδίοις περιπή-
γνυσι καρποφόρους, οὐ Μέλητον οὖθ' "Ἀντυν οὐδὲ
Καλλίξενον ἐπάγει"¹⁰ συκοφάντην, οὖκ ἀφαιρεῖται
500 πλοῦτον, οὖκ ἀπείρεις στρατηγίας, ἵνα ποιήσῃ
κακοδαίμονας· ἀλλὰ πτωεὶ¹¹ πλουτοῦντας, ἐυροοῦν-

¹ ἐκ κακίας Reiske: κακία (κακίας in three mss).
² Παρθικὸς du Soul: πάροικος.
³ ἵος added by Pohlenz; ὁπός du Soul.
⁴ περιφέροντας] περιχρώντας Blümner.
⁵ τετρωμένωι Reiske: τετρωμένων.
⁶ προπεπονθότι τὴν ἀπορροήν δεχομένους Wilamowitz: προ-

After δεῖ Bernardakis deletes ἐντὸς σαρκός.
⁷ οὐ] οὖν most mss.
⁸ ἐπαίρει Pohlenz: ἐπαίρεται.

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perfect unhappiness if she does not have Vice to co-operate with her. For as a thread saws through the bone that has been soaked in ashes and vinegar, and as men bend and fashion ivory when it has been made soft and pliable by beer, but cannot do so otherwise, so Fortune, falling upon that which is of itself ill-afflicted and soft as the result of Vice, gouges it out and injures it. And just as the Parthian poison, though harmful to no one else nor injurious to those who touch it and carry it about, if it is merely brought into the presence of wounded men, it straightway destroys them, since they receive its effluence because of their previous susceptibility; so he who is liable to have his soul crushed by Fortune must have within himself some festering wound of his own in order that it may make whatever befalls him from without pitiful and lamentable.

5. Is, then, Vice such a thing that it needs Fortune's help to produce unhappiness? How can that be? Vice does not raise up a rough and stormy sea, she does not gird the skirts of lonely mountains with ambushes of robbers along the way, she does not make clouds of hail to burst on fruitful plains, she does not bring in a Meletus or an Anytus or a Callixenus as accusers, she does not take away wealth, she does not debar from the praetorship, in order to make men unhappy. Yet she dismays men

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*a* Nothing is known about either a Parthian juice (ὀπός), or a Parthian poison (λός).

*b* Cf. 475 e, supra.

*c* Cf. Xenophon, Hellenica, i. 7. 8 ff.
(500) τας,¹ κληρονομοῦντας. ἐν γῇ διὰ θαλάττης ἐνδεδυκε, προσπέφυκεν, ἐκτήκουσα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, διακαίουσα τοῖς θυμοῖς, συντρίβουσα ταῖς δεισιδαιμονίαις, διασύρουσα τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς² . . .

¹ εὐροοῦντας Reiske: εὐφοροῦντας οἸ εὐφρονοῦντας.
² ὀφθαλμοῖς] φθόνοις Meziriacus.
who are rich, prosperous, and heirs to fortunes; on land and on sea she insinuates herself into them and clings to them, sinking deep into them through evil lusts, firing them with anger, crushing them with superstitious fears, shattering them with the eyes . . .

\* The interpretation of this last phrase is quite uncertain: perhaps "tearing them to pieces with envy," or "making them ridiculous with envy."
WHETHER THE AFFECTIONS OF THE SOUL ARE WORSE THAN THOSE OF THE BODY

(ANIMINE AN CORPORIS AFFEC-TIONES SINT PEIORES)
INTRODUCTION

This popular oration, or diatribe,\(^a\) was read by Plutarch\(^b\) in some city of Asia Minor: Volkmann\(^c\) thought Sardis, the capital of the province; Haupt\(^d\) thought Halicarnassus; Wilamowitz\(^e\) Ephesus. The occasion is clearly the consul’s yearly hearing of lawsuits from the whole province.

The proof that afflictions of the soul are worse than diseases of the body is treated in a popular and, in chapter 4, dramatic manner. The conclusion is lost.

The same subject was treated in his commonplace fashion by Maximus Tyrius,\(^f\) who shows no knowledge of Plutarch’s oration, nor any relation to his sources; Cicero, however, at the beginning of the third book of the Tusculan Disputations, exhibits some kinship with Plutarch’s argument. Siefert\(^g\) has twice elaborated his opinion that some of this work of

\(^a\) So Pohlenz, as I think, correctly: I therefore do not accept Wilamowitz’s combination of this and the preceding work as fragments of the same dialogue.

\(^b\) Xylander, practically alone, denies the genuineness—on what grounds he does not say.

\(^c\) Plutarch, vol. i. 62 f.

\(^d\) Opuscula, iii. 554 (Hermes, vi. 258).

\(^e\) Hermes, xl. 161 ff.

\(^f\) Orat. 7 ed. Hobein, 13 ed. Dübner.


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WHETHER THE AFFECTIONS . . .

Plutarch's was drawn from the ἴπόμνημα (I should prefer to say ἴπομνῆματα) which Plutarch used in writing De Tranquillitate.

The text is not good. The work is listed as No. 208 in the Lamprias catalogue.

a See the introduction to the De Tranquillitate.
ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΤΑ ΤΗΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ
Η ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΣΩΜΑΤΟΣ ΠΑΘΗ ΧΕΙΡΩΝΑ

1. "Ομηρος μὲν ἐπιβλέψας τὰ θυμα τῶν ζωῶν γένη
cαὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα συγκρίνας κατὰ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς
dιαιτήσεις, ἐξεφώνησεν ὡς οὐδέν ἔστιν

dιξυρώτερον ἄνδρός,
pάντων ὅσα τε γαίαν ἐπὶ πνείει τε καὶ ἔρπει·

πρωτεῖον οὐκ εὐτυχὲς εἰς κακῶν ὑπεροχήν ἀποδε-
C δοῦς τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ. ἡμεῖς δ’ ὃσπερ ἥδη νικῶντα
κακοδαμομνία τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀθλιῶ-
tatov ἔων ἀνηγορεμένον αὐτὸν αὐτῷ συγκρίνω-
μεν, εἰς ἱδίων κακῶν ἁγῶνα σώμα καὶ ψυχήν
diaροῦντες, οὐκ ἀρχήστως ἄλλα καὶ πάνυ δεόντως,
ίνα μάθωμεν πότερον διὰ τὴν τύχην ἢ δι’ ἐαυτοὺς
ἀθλιώτερον ἔωμεν. νόσος μὲν γὰρ ἐν σώματι φύε-
tαι διὰ φύσιν, κακία δὲ καὶ μοχθερία περὶ ψυχήν
ἔργον ἐστὶ πρῶτον εἶτα πάθος αὐτῆς. οὐ μικρὸν
dὲ πρὸς εὐθυμίαν ὀφελος, ἀν ἱάσμοιν ἢ τὸ χεῖρον,
cαὶ κουφότερον καὶ ἄσφυκτον ὑπν.

1 περὶ τοῦ πότερον τὰ ψυχῆς ἢ τὰ σώματος πάθη χείρων in
some mss., perhaps rightly.
2 συγκρίνωμεν Reiske: συγκρίνομεν.
3 τύχην] ψυχήν most mss.
4 αὐτῆς Reiske, confirmed by G: αὐτῆ.
5 ἄσφυκτον Salmasius, confirmed by one mss.: ἀφυκτον.
WHETHER THE AFFECTIONS OF THE SOUL ARE WORSE THAN THOSE OF THE BODY

1. Homer, having contemplated the mortal varieties of animals and having compared them with each other in respect to their lives and habits, cried out that nothing is more wretched than man,

Of all that breathes and creeps upon the earth, awarding to man an unfortunate primacy in excess of evils. But as for us, as though acknowledging that man has won the victory in wretchedness and has been proclaimed the most miserable of animals, let us compare him with himself, dividing body and soul for competition of their individual miseries, a task not unprofitable but even quite necessary, to the end that we may learn whether it is through Fortune or through ourselves that we live more wretchedly. For while disease grows in the body through Nature, vice and depravity in the soul are first the soul's own doing, and then its affliction. It will be no slight aid toward tranquillity of mind, if the worse condition be curable, being both lighter to bear and lacking intensity.

a Il., xvii. 446-447; cf. 496 b, supra.

"ov added by Capps.
2. Ἡ μὲν οὖν Αἰσώπειος ἀλώπηξ περὶ ποικιλίας

dικαζομένη πρὸς τὴν πάρδαλιν, ὥς εἰκεῖν τὸ σῶμα

καὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν εὐανθή καὶ κατάστικτον ἐπεδεί-
ξατο, τῆς δ' ἄν τὸ ἕανθον αὐχημόρον καὶ οὔχ ἢδυ

προσιδεῖν, "ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ τοι τὸ ἑντός," ἐφη, "σκο-

πῶν, ὁ δικαστά, ποικιλωτέραν με τήδ' ὄψιν,"

ἄγηλοῦσα τὴν περὶ τὸ ἰθος εὐτροπίαν ἐπὶ πολλὰ ταῖς
χρείασις ἀμειβομένην. λέγωμεν1 οὖν ἐν ἡμῖν ὦτι

πολλὰ μὲν, ὃ ἄνθρωπε, σοι2 καὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσήματα
cαὶ πάθη φύσει τ' ἀνίησιν εὖ ἐαυτοῦ καὶ προσ-

πίπτωντα δέχεται θύραβεν. ἂν δὲ σαυτὸν ἐνδοθεὶν ἄν-

οίξης, ποικίλον τι καὶ πολυπαθές κακῶν ταμείων

εὐρήσεις καὶ θηραύρισμα, ὡς φησὶ Δημόκριτος, οὖν

Ε ἐξωθεν ἐπιρρεότων, ἀλλ' ὀσπερ ἐγγείοντος καὶ

advertiones πηγὰς ἐχόντων, ἂς ἀνίησιν ἢ κακία

πολύχυντο καὶ δαμιλής οὔσα τοῖς πάθεσιν; εἶ δὲ
tὰ μὲν ἐν σαρκὶ νοσήματα σφυγμοῖς καὶ ὀξραῖς3

φωρᾶται καὶ θερμότητες αὐτὰ καὶ πόνοι προπετεῖς

ἐλέγχουσι, τὰ δ' ἐν ψυχῇ λανθάνει τοὺς πολλοὺς

κακά,4 διὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ κακίω, προσαφαιρούμενα τὴν

αὐτῶν5 τοῦ πάσχοντος αἰσθήσιν. τῶν μὲν γὰρ

περὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσημάτων ἐρρωμένος ὁ λογισμός

1 λέγωμεν] λέγομεν all mss. but two.
2 σοι] σοῦ all mss. but two.
3 ἐφθανόμενα after ὀξραῖς (χροῖας in some mss.) deleted by Wilamowitz.
4 ἀοτά after κακά deleted by Pohlenz.
5 αὐτῶν Capps: ἐπ' αὐτοῖς (omitted in a few mss.).

a Fable 42 ed. Halm; cf. Moralia, 155 b; Babrius, Fable 180 ed. Crusius; Siefert, Plutarchs Schrift Περὶ εὐθυμίας, pp. 27-28.

b ποικίλα when applied to an animal's skin refers to colour

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2. The fox in Aesop,\textsuperscript{a} disputing at law with the leopard concerning their claims to variety,\textsuperscript{b} when the leopard had shown her body with its glossy surface bright and spotted, and the fox's tawny skin was rough and unpleasant to the eye,

"But look at me within, sir judge," said she,
"And you will find me fuller far than she
Of fair variety,"\textsuperscript{c}

making manifest the versatility of her character which changes to many forms as necessity arises. Shall we, then, say in our own case, "Many of your diseases and affections, O man, your body naturally produces of itself, and it receives also many that befall it from without; but if you lay yourself open on the inside, you will find a storehouse and treasury, as Democritus\textsuperscript{d} says, of all manner of evils and many abnormal states, which do not flow in from outside, but have, as it were, subterranean and earth-born springs, which Vice, being widely diffused and abundantly supplied with those abnormal states, causes to gush forth"? And if the diseases in the flesh are detected by the pulse and biliousness, and temperatures and sudden pains confirm their presence, but the evils in the soul escape the notice of most men, they are for this reason worse evils, since they also deprive the sufferer of any awareness of themselves. For although the reason,\textsuperscript{e} if sound, perceives the diseases and markings, but when it is applied to the mind it means "subtlety" or "cunning."


\textsuperscript{e} Cf. Cicero, \textit{Tusc. Disp.}, iii. 1.
PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

aištháneTai, tois de tis psuchís synnosón autós ouk
échei krisin en ois pásochei, pásochei gar or krinei kai
dei tónn psuchikón prwton kai mégistòn aridméin tìn
F ánnoian,1 diá 3 anikhéstos h kakía tòs pollóis syn-
oikei kai sygkatatboi kai synapodhnískei. Árchi
gar apallagíhs nòsou mèn aiðshoi eis xreiaan
ánoosa tov bothóontos to pásochon ó 3 apsistia
tóv vosein ouk eídws ón deítai, kàv parh to
therapeuóv, árneita. Kái gar tónn peri to sòma
501 vosemátov tás met' anaisshias xeiropa, léthargoi
kefalalugiai epilhpiai ápplhèías2 autói te pup-
retoi oi3 synsteinantes4 eis parakoph to phleug-
maínon kai tìn aiðshsin ósper en órgávoc dia-
tarátantes

kinoúsi xordás tás akynhtous phrenwv.

3. Æiò paídes iatrów boúlonta mev me voseív
tón anbrwpon, voseunta dé mei ágnoeiv òti vosei-
dó tois psuchikoiis páthesi pasi symbébhken. ouте gar
áfrainontes ou't áselgáinontes ou't ádikoptopagou-
tes ámartaínev dokousin, all' ènvoi kai katórhovn.
pupetón mèn gar oudeis úgieian òvnomasev oude phí-
B svn evexían5 oude podáragan podókeian oud' óxhría-
swn èrúthma, thymon dé pollói kaloussin anbreian kai

1 ánnoian Wyttenbach: ánnoian.
2 ápplhèías pupetoi most mss.
3 ou added by Pohlenz.
4 synsteinantes synsteinontes most mss.
5 evexían] evexínav three good mss., as though Plutarch were
quoting an Ionic author (Democritus ?).
which affect the body, yet, being itself afflicted with those of the soul, it can form no judgement of its own afflictions, for it is affected in the very part by which it judges; and, of the soul’s diseases, one must account as first and greatest ignorance, which causes Vice beyond hope of cure to abide with most men, to cling to them through life, and to die with them. For the beginning of the riddance of disease is awareness which leads the ailing part to the use of what will relieve it; but the man who through disbelief in his ailment does not know what he needs, refuses the remedy, even if it be at hand. For it is true of the diseases of the body also that those are worse which are attended by inability to perceive the body’s condition: lethargies, migraine, epilepsies, apoplexies, and those very fevers which, raising inflammation to the pitch of delirium and confounding consciousness, as on a musical instrument, will touch the heart-strings never touched before.

3. Therefore professional physicians desire, in the first place that a man should not be ill; and next, if he is ill, that he should not be unaware that he is ill— which is the case with all the maladies which affect the soul. For when men act foolishly or licentiously or unjustly, they do not think that they are doing wrong, but some even think that they are doing right. For although no one has ever called a fever “health,” nor consumption “excellent condition,” nor gout “swiftness of foot,” nor sallowness a “fresh complexion,” yet many call hot temper

\(^a\) Cf. 456 c, supra.
\(^b\) Cf. Moralia, 102 d; Cicero, Tusc. Disp., iii. 6. 12.
\(^c\) Cf. Moralia, 81 f.
\(^d\) Cf. 462 f, supra.
(501) ἕρωτα φιλίαν καὶ φθόνον ἄμφιλλαν καὶ δειλίαν ἀσφάλειαν. ἐπὶ οἱ μὲν καλοῦσι τοὺς ἰατροὺς, αἰσθάνονται γὰρ ὅν δέονται πρὸς ὅ νοσοῦσιν· οἱ δὲ φεύγουσι τοὺς φιλοσόφους, οἴονται γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνειν ἐν οἷς διαμαρτάνουσιν. ἐπεὶ¹ τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενοι λέγομεν ὅτι κουφότερον ἔστιν ὀφθαλμία μανίας καὶ ποδάγρα φρενίτιδος, ὃ μὲν γὰρ² αἰσθάνεται καὶ καλεῖ τὸν ἰατρὸν κεκραγώς, καὶ παρόντι τὴν ὀψιν ἀλέιφαι, τὴν φλέβα τεμεῖν,³ παραδίδοσιν· τῆς δὲ Ὁ μαυνομένης Ἀγανίς ἀκούεις ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθος τὰ φιλτρατ᾽ ἡμοπυκνίας,

ἀγομεν⁴ ἕξ ὦρεος⁵
ELYKA νεότομον ἐπὶ μέλαθρα,
μακάριον θήραμα.⁶

Καὶ γὰρ ὃ μὲν τῷ σώματι νοσῶν εὐθὺς ἔνδους καὶ καθεῖς ἐὰντὸν εἶς τὸ κλινίδιον ἡσυχίαν ἀγεὶ θεραπεύομενος, ἃν δὲ που μικρὸν ἐξάξῃ καὶ διασκιρτήσῃ τὸ σῶμα φλεγμονής προσπεσούσης, εἰπὼν τις τῶν παρακαθημένων πρῶς,
μὲν', ὁ ταλαίπωρ', ἀτρέμα σοὶς ἐν δεμνίοις,
ἐπέστησε καὶ κατέσχεν. οἱ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ψυχικοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες τότε μάλιστα πράττονσι, τὸθ' ἦκισθ'⁷

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¹ ἐπεὶ Xylander, confirmed by two mss.; ἕτι Wytenbach: ἐπὶ.  
² γὰρ] omitted in all mss. but one.  
³ After τεμεῖν Pohlenz deleted τὴν κεφαλὴν (a gloss on the verses of Euripides).  
⁴ ἀγομεν] φέρομεν Euripides.  
⁵ ἕξ ὦρεον Euripides.  
⁶ μακαπλαν θήραν Life of Crassus, xxxiii.  
⁷ ἐξάξῃ Wytenbach; ἐξάξῃ.
WHETHER THE AFFECTIONS . . . , 501

"manliness," and love "friendship," and envy "emulation," and cowardice "caution." Again, while men sick in body send for a doctor, since they perceive whom they need to counteract their ailments, yet those that are sick in soul avoid philosophers, for they think that they are doing well in those very matters where they are at fault. The fact is that, if we follow on this line of reasoning, we maintain that defective eyesight is easier to bear than madness, and gout than inflammation of the brain! For a man that is sick in body perceives it and calls loudly for a physician, and when he comes, allows him to anoint the eyes or open the veins; but you hear the maddened Ágavê say, not recognizing her dearest by reason of her affliction:

From the mountain we bring
To the palace a fresh-cut tendril,
A fortunate capture.

It is true that one who is sick in body gives in at once and goes to bed and remains quiet while he is being cured, and if, perchance, when the fever comes upon him, he tosses a bit and tumbles his body about, one of those who sit by him will say to him gently,

Lie still, poor wretch, and move not from your bed, and so checks and restrains him; but those who suffer from diseases of the soul are then most active, then

a "Si on juge de l'amour par la plupart de ses effets, il ressemble plus à la haine qu'à l'amitié."—De la Rochefoucauld.

b Euripides, Bacchae, 1169-1171; cf. Life of Crassus, xxxiii. (564 f): Agavê, bearing the head of her son Pentheus, was a commonplace of philosophical rhetoric: see, for example, Horace, Sermones, ii. 3. 303.

c Euripides, Orestes, 258; cf. 475 d, supra.
(501) ἰσινχαζούσων· αἰ γὰρ ὤρμαι τῶν πράξεων ἀρχὴ, ¹ τὰ
Δ δὲ πάθη σφοδρόττετες ὁρμῶν. διὸ τὴν ψυχὴν
ήρεμεῖν οὐκ ἔωσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτε μάλιστα δείται μονῆς
καὶ σιωπῆς καὶ ὑποστολῆς ὁ ἀνθρώπος, τῶτ' αὐτῶν
εἰς ὑπαιθρὸν ἠλκουσί, τῶτ' ἀποκαλύπτουσιν οἱ θυ-
μοί, αἱ φιλονεικίαι, οἱ ἔρωτες, αἱ λύπαι, πολλὰ καὶ
δράν ἄνωμα καὶ λαλεῖν ἀνάρμοστα τοῖς καιροῖς
ἀναγκαζόμενον.

4. Ὡσπερ οὖν ἐπισφαλέστερος χειμῶν τοῦ πλείν
οὐκ ἔωντος ὁ κωλύων καθορμίσασθαι, οὕτως οἱ
catά ψυχὴν χειμῶnes βαρύτεροι στείλασθαι τὸν
ἀνθρωπὸν οὐκ ἔωντες οὐδ' ἐπιστῆσαι τεταραγμένον
tὸν λογισμὸν· ἀλλ' ἀκυβέρνητος καὶ ἀνερμάτιστος
ἐν ταραχῇ καὶ πλάνῃ δρόμοις λεχρίοις² καὶ παρα-

Ε φόροις διατραχηλιζόμενος εἰς τὶ νανάγων φοβερὸν
ἐξέπεσε καὶ συνέτρυψε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον. ὡστε καὶ
ταῦτα ³ χείρων νοσεῖν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἢ τοῖς σώμασιν·
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πάσχειν μόνον τοῖς δὲ καὶ πάσχειν καὶ
ποιεῖν κακῶς συμβέβηκε.

Καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ πολλὰ λέγειν τῶν παθῶν; αὐτὸς
ὁ καιρὸς ὑπόμνησις ἐστίν. ὅρατε τὸν πολὺν καὶ
παμμυγῆ τοῦτον τὸν⁴ ἐνταῦθα συνηραγμένον⁵ καὶ
κυκώμενον ὄχλον περὶ τὸ βῆμα καὶ τὴν ἄγοράν; οὐ
θύσοντες οὕτοι συνεληλύθασι πατρίδος θεοῖς οὐδ'
ὁμογνώις μεθέξοντες ἱερῶν ἀλλήλοις, οὐκ Ἀσκραίω

¹ ἀρχή] ἀρχαί in two mss.
² λεχρίοις Paton: ὀλεθρίοις.
³ ταῦτα Wyttenbach: τούτοις.
⁴ τὸν in a few mss. only.

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least at rest. For impulses are the beginning of action, and the soul's abnormal states are violent impulses. That is the reason why they do not allow the soul to be at rest, but just at the time when man most needs repose and silence and relaxation, then his fits of temper, of contentiousness, of love, of grief, drag him into the open air and strip him bare, and he is forced both to do many lawless things and to give tongue to many things unsuited to the occasion.

4. As, therefore, the storm that prevents a sailor from putting into port is more dangerous than that which does not allow him to sail, so those storms of the soul are more serious which do not allow a man to compose or to calm his disturbed reason; but pilotless and without ballast, in confusion and aimless wandering, rushing headlong in oblique and reeling courses, he suffers a terrible shipwreck, as it were, and ruins his life. Consequently for this reason also it is worse to be sick in soul than in body; for men afflicted in body only suffer, but those afflicted in soul both suffer and do ill. a

But why need I recount the multitude of the soul's maladies? The present occasion of itself brings them to mind. Do you see this vast and promiscuous crowd which jostles and surges in confusion here about the tribunal and the market-place? These persons have come together, not to sacrifice to their country's gods, not to share in each other's family rites, not bringing "to Ascræan Zeus" b the first-

a Cf. Cicero, Tusc. Disp., iii. 5. 10.

b For the cult of Ascræan Zeus at Halicarnassus cf. Apollonius, Historia Mirabilium, 13 (Keller, Rerum Naturalium Scriptores Graeci Minores, i. p. 47).
502 συμβάλλει· καὶ πλήθος ὦσπερ ῥευμάτων ἀθρόων εἰς μίαν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἁγοράν καὶ φλεγμαίνει καὶ συνέρρωγεν "ἀλλήλων τε καὶ ὀλλυμένων." ποιών ταῦτα πυρετών ἔργα, ποιῶν ἡπιάλων; τίνες ἐν-
στάσεις ἡ παρεμπτώσεις ἡ δυσκρασία θερμῶν ἡ ὑπέρχυσις ύγρῶν; ἄν ἐκάστην δίκην ὦσπερ ἀν-
θρωπον ἀνακρίνησις πόθεν πέφυκε πόθεν ἤκει, τὴν 
μὲν θυμὸς αὐθάδης γεγένηκε, τὴν δὲ μανιώδης 
φιλονεικία, τὴν δὲ ἄδικος ἐπιθυμία . . .

1 ὀργιάζοντες Bernardakis and one ms.; ὀργιάζοντες.
2 ἐκτραχύνουσα ἐκτραχύνασαι in three mss.
3 'Ἀσίαν' ὀσίαν most mss.
4 ἠκοῦσαν ἠκουσών most mss.
5 καὶ] omitted in all mss. but two.
WHETHER THE AFFECTIONS . . ., 501–502

fruits of Lydian harvests," a nor, in honour of Dionysus, to celebrate his mystic festival on sacred nights with common revellings, but, as it were, a mighty pestilence drives them together here with yearly visitations stirring up Asia, which must come for law-suits and litigation at certain stated times; and the overwhelming multitude, like streams flowing together, has inundated this one market-place and boils with fury and dashes together in a tumult "of destroyers and destroyed." b What fevers, what agues, have brought this about? What stoppages, or irruptions of blood, c or distemper of heat, or overflow of humours, have caused this? If you examine every law-suit, as though it were a person, to discover what gave rise to it and whence it came, you will find that obstinate anger begat one, frantic ambition another, unjust desire a third . . .

a Probably a quotation from a poet: Reiske thought Pindar; Haupt (Opuscula, iii. 554), an anonymous tragic poet (and cf. Wilamowitz, Hermes, xl. 163, 164, note 1).

b Homer, Il., iv. 451.

c Cf. Moralia, 129 d.
CONCERNING TALKATIVENESS
(DE GARRULITATE)
INTRODUCTION

This charming essay, by far the best in the volume, suffers from only one defect, its length. Though Plutarch again and again, by his narrative skill and naïve or unconscious humour, will delight even those who have hardened their hearts against him (I mean his editors), he cannot at last resist the temptation to indulge in what he considered scientific analysis and enlightened exhortation. He is then merely dull. But, taken as a whole, the essay is surely a success, and as organic and skilful a performance as any in the Moralia.

The work was written after De Curiositate and before De Tranquillitate, De Capienda ex Inimicis Utilitate, and De Laude Ipsius. It stands in the Lamprias catalogue as No. 92.

a I have thus combined the conclusions of Pohlenz, Brokate, and Hein.

b Mr C. B. Robinson’s translation, or paraphrase, of this and several other essays in this volume, arrived too late to be of service (see Plutarch, Selected Essays, Putnam, New York, 1937).
ΠΕΡΙ ΑΔΟΛΕΣΧΙΑΣ

1. Δύσκολον μὲν ἄναλαμβάνει θεράπευμα καὶ χαλεπῶν ἡ φιλοσοφία τὴν ἀδόλεσχιαν. τὸ γὰρ φάρμακον αὐτῆς, ὁ λόγος, ἀκούοντων ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ἀδόλεσχοι οὐδενὸς ἀκούονσιν· ἄεὶ γὰρ λαλοῦσι. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔχει πρῶτον κακὸν ἡ ἀσιγγησία, τὴν ἀνηκοίαν. κωφότης γὰρ αὐθαίρετός ἐστιν, ἀνθρώπων, οἴμαι, μεμφομένων τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι μίαν μὲν γιλίτταν δύο δ' ὤτ' ἔχουσιν. εἶπερ¹ οὖν ὁ Εὐριπίδης καλῶς εἶπε πρὸς τὸν ἀσιγγητον ἀκροατήν,

οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην μὴ στέγοντα πιμπλάναι,
σοφοὺς ἐπαντλῶν ἄνδρι μὴ σοφῷ λόγους·

δικαιότερον ἂν τις εἶποι πρὸς τὸν ἀδόλεσχον, μᾶλλον
dὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀδόλεσχου,²

οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην μὴ δεχόμενον πιμπλάναι,
σοφοὺς ἐπαντλῶν ἄνδρι μὴ σοφῷ λόγους,³

D μᾶλλον δὲ περιαντλῶν λόγους ἄνθρωπως λαλοῦντι

1 εἶπερ] ὁπερ Sieveking.
2 Stegmann followed by Pohlenz deleted μᾶλλον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀδόλεσχου.
3 Most mss. repeat ἄνδρι μὴ σοφῷ λόγους, Pohlenz omits.

a It suits Plutarch’s humour in this passage, in which he speaks of garrulity as a disease, to invent one, and possibly two, pseudo-medical terms, ἀσιγγησία, “inability to keep
CONCERNING TALKATIVENESS

1. It is a troublesome and difficult task that philosophy has in hand when it undertakes to cure garrulousness. For the remedy, words of reason, requires listeners; but the garrulous listen to nobody, for they are always talking. And this is the first symptom of their ailment: looseness of the tongue becomes impotence of the ears. For it is a deliberate deafness, that of men who, I take it, blame Nature because they have only one tongue, but two ears. If, then, Euripides was right when he said with reference to the unintelligent hearer,

    I could not fill a man who will not hold
    My wise words flooding into unwise ears,

it would be more just to say to the garrulous man, or rather about the garrulous man,

    I could not fill a man who will not take
    My wise words flooding into unwise ears,

or rather submerging, a man who talks to those silent,” and ἄγνωστα, “inability to listen.” The figure is maintained in διαρρέουσι at the end of section d. Rouse suggests: “And here is the first bad symptom in diarrhoea of the tongue—constipation of the ears.”


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(502) μὲν πρὸς τοὺς οὐκ ἀκούοντας, μὴ ἀκούοντι δὲ τῶν λαλοῦντων. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσῃ τι βραχύ, τῆς ἀδόλεσχίας ὦσπερ ἄμπωτιν λαβούσης, τοῦτο παραχρῆμα πολλαπλάσιον ἀνταποδίδωσι.

Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐν 'Ολυμπία στοὰν ἀπὸ μίᾶς φωνῆς πολλαῖς ἀντανακλάσεις ποιοῦσαν ἐπτάφωνον καλοῦσι: τῆς δ' ἀδόλεσχίας ὃν ἐλάχιστος ἦσσαν λόγος, εὐθὺς ἀντιπεριηχεῖ

κινοῦσα χορδᾶς τὰς ἀκινήτους φρενῶν.

μὴποτε γὰρ αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἄλλ' εἰς τὴν γλῶτταν ἠ ἀκοῇ συντετρηταί: διὸ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἐμμένουσιν οἱ λόγοι, τῶν δ' ἀδόλεσχων διαρρέουσιν.

Εἰ δ' ὦσπερ ἀγγεία κενοὶ φρενῶν ἦχου δὲ μεστοὶ περίπασιν.

2. Εἰ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ πείρας μηδὲν ἐλλειπέθαι, εἰπωμεν πρὸς τὸν ἀδόλεσχον,

ὡ πᾶι, σιωπα· πόλλ' ἔχει σιγή καλά,

dύο δὲ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα, τὸ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκουσθῆναι· ὃν οὐδετέρον τυχεῖν ἐγγίνεται τοῖς ἀδόλεσχοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀποδυσπετοῦσι. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοις νοσήμασι τῆς ψυχῆς, οἶνον φιλαργυρίας φιλοδοξίας βιληδονία, τὸ γοῦν τυγχάνειν ὑπὲρ ἐφείτως περίεστι, τοῖς δ' ἀδολέσχοις τοῦτο συμβαίνει χαλεπώτατον· ἐπιθυμοῦντες γὰρ ἀκροατῶν οὐ τυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ πᾶς

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a A portico on the east side of the Altis; cf. Pausanias, v. 21. 17, Pliny, Natural History, xxxvi. 15. 100.
b Cf. 456 c, 501 A, supra.

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who will not listen, and will not listen when others talk. For even if he does listen for a moment, when his loquacity is, as it were, at ebb, the rising tide immediately makes up for it many times over.

They give the name of Seven-voiced to the portico at Olympia which reverberates many times from a single utterance; and if but the least word sets garrulousness in motion, straightway it echoes round about on all sides,

Touching the heart-strings never touched before.

Indeed one might think that babbler's ears have no passage bored through to the soul, but only to the tongue. Consequently, while others retain what is said, in talkative persons it goes right through in a flux; then they go about like empty vessels, void of sense, but full of noise.

2. But if, however, we are resolved to leave no means untried, let us say to the babbler,

Hush, child: in silence many virtues lie,

and among them the two first and greatest, the merits of hearing and being heard; neither of these can happen to talkative persons, but even in that which they desire especially they fail miserably. For in other diseases of the soul, such as love of money, love of glory, love of pleasure, there is at least the possibility of attaining their desires, but for babblers this is very difficult: they desire listeners and cannot

\[d \text{ Cf. Philoxenus in } Gnomologium Vaticanum, 547 (Wiener Stud., xi. 234).\]
\[e \text{ Cf. the proverb: "Empty vessels make the loudest noise."} \]
\[f \text{ Nauck, } Trag. Grec. Frag. 2, p. 147, Sophocles, Frag. 78 (Frag. 81 ed. Pearson, vol. i. p. 50), from the Aeleadae.}\]
\[g \text{ Cf. 519 D, infra.}\]
Φεύγει προτροπάδην· καὶ ἐν ἡμικυκλώ τινι καθεξο-μενοι καὶ περιπατοῦντες ἐν ξυστῷ1 θεάσωντα προσ-φοιτώντα,2 ταχέως ἀνάξευξιν αὐτοὺς παρεγγυώσι, καὶ καθάπερ ὅταν ἐν συλλόγῳ τινι σιωπή γένηται, τὸν Ἑρμῆν ἐπεισελθήνει λέγοντιν, οὕτως ὅταν εἰς συμπόσιον ἢ συνεδρίον γνωρίμων λάλος εἰσέλθη, 503 πάντες ἀποσιωπώσι μὴ βουλόμενοι λαβὴν παρα-σχεῖν· ἀν δ᾿ αὐτὸς ἀρξηται διαίρειν τὸ στόμα,

πρὸ χείματος ὥστ᾿ ἀνὰ ποντίαν ἀκραν

βορρᾶ3 ζεόντος4

ὑφορώμενοι σάλον καὶ ναυτίαν ἔξανεστησαν. ὅθεν αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει μῆτε παρὰ δεῖπνον συγκλιτῶν5 μῆτε συσκῆνων τυγχάνειν προθύμων, ὅταν ὀδιπορῶσιν ἢ πλέωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαστῶν πρόσκειται γὰρ ἀπανταχοῦ, τῶν ἰματίων ἀντιλαμβανόμενος, ἀπτόμενος6 τοῦ γενείου, τὴν πλευρὰν θυροκοπῶν τῇ χειρί.

πόδες δὴ κεῖθι τιμωρτατοί,

κατὰ τὸν Ἀρχίλοχον, καὶ νη Ἀἴα κατὰ τὸν σοφὸν Ἀριστοτέλην. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐνοχλούμενος ὑπ’

Β ἀδολέσχου καὶ κοπτόμενος ἀτόποις τισὶ διηγήμασι, πολλάκις αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, "οὐ θαυμαστόν, Ἠρω-τότελες;" "οὐ τούτο," φησί, "θαυμαστόν, ἀλλ’ εἰ τις πόδας ἔχων σὲ ὑπομένει." ἔτερῳ δὲ τινὶ
tοιούτω μετὰ πολλῶς λόγους εἰπότοι, "κατηδο-

λέχηκα σου, φιλόσοφε" · "καὶ Δί," εἶπεν, "οὐ

1 ξυστῷ Pohlenz: ταυτῳ. 2 προσφοιτῶντας Reiske. 3 βορρᾶ] βορέου all mss. but G. 4 ζεόντος Crusius (cf. 129 A): πνέοντος or ζεόντος. 5 συγκλιτῶν Hutten: συγκλίτων or συγκλήτων. 6 ἀπτόμενος added by Stegmann.
CONCERNING TALKATIVENESS, 502-503

going them, since every one runs away headlong. If men are sitting in a public lounge or strolling about in a portico, and see a talker coming up, they quickly give each other the counter-sign to break camp. And just as when silence occurs in an assemblage they say that Hermes has joined the company, so when a chatterbox comes into a dinner-party or social gathering, every one grows silent, not wishing to furnish him a hold; and if he begins of his own accord to open his mouth,

As when the North-wind blows along
A sea-beaten headland before the storm, a

suspecting that they will be tossed about and sea-sick, they rise up and go out. And so it is a talker’s lot when travelling by land or sea, to find volunteer listeners neither as table-companions nor as tent-mates, but only conscripts; for the talker is at you everywhere, catching your cloak, plucking your beard, digging you in the ribs.

Then are your feet of the greatest value,
as Archilochus b says, and on my word the wise Aristotle will agree. For when Aristotle himself was annoyed by a chatterer and bored with some silly stories, and the fellow kept repeating, “Isn’t it wonderful, Aristotle?” “There’s nothing wonderful about that,” said Aristotle, “but that anyone with feet endures you.” To another man of the same sort, who said after a long rigmarole, “Poor philosopher, I’ve wearied you with my talk,” “Heavens, no!” said Aristotle, “I wasn’t listening.” In fact,

a Cf. 455 a, supra.
b Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus, ii. p. 182, Frag. 132.
(503) γὰρ προσεῖχον." καὶ γὰρ ἂν βιάσωνται λαλεῖν1 οἱ ἀδόλεσχοι, παρέδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὅτα περιαντλεῖν ἐξώθεν, αὐτή δὲ ἐντὸς ἐτέρας τινὰς ἀναπτύσσει καὶ διεξεισὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν φροντίδας: οἶδεν οὔτε προσεχόντων οὔτε πιπενόντων ἀκροατῶν εὔπορον. τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὰς συννοίας εὐκαταφόρων ἄγονον εἶναι τὸ σπέρμα λέγονσι, τῶν C δὲ ἀδόλεσχων ὁ λόγος ἀτελῆς καὶ ἀκαρπός ἐστι.

3. Καίτοι γ' οὐδέν οὕτως ἡ φύσις ἐβερκώς κεχαράκωκε τῶν εν2 ἡμῖν ὡς τὴν γλώτταν, βαλομένη φρουράν πρὸ αὐτῆς τοὺς ὁδόντας, ἵν', εάν ἐντὸς κατατείνοντος "ἡμία σιγαλόντα" τοῦ λογισμοῦ μὴ ὑπακούῃ μηδ' ἀνειλήται, δήγμασιν αὐτῆς κατέχωμεν τὴν ἀκρασίαν αἰμάττουτες. "ἀχαλίνων" γὰρ οὐ ταμιεῖσθαι οὐδ' οἰκημάτων ἄλλα "στομάτων τὸ τέλος δυστυχῶν" ὁ Ἐὐρυπίδης φησίν. οἱ δ' οἰκημάτων μὲν ἄθυρων καὶ βαλλαντίων ἀδέσμων μὴ δὲν ὁφελος οἴομενοι τοῖς κεκτημένοις εἶναι, στομάσι δ' ἀκλείστοις καὶ ἄθυροις ὁσπερ3 τὸ τοῦ D Πόντου διὰ παντὸς ἐξώ ρέουσιν χρώμενοι, πάντων ἀτιμότατον ἤγειρον ὁ λόγον ἐοίκακιν. οἴδεν οὐδὲ πίστιν ἔχουσιν ἡς πᾶς λόγος ἐφίεται τὸ γὰρ οἰκείον αὐτοῦ τέλος τοῦτο ἐστι, πίστιν ἐνεργάσασθαι τοῖς ἀκούσαυσι ἀπιστοῦνται δ' οἱ λάλοι, κἂν ἀληθεύσωσιν. ὁσπερ γὰρ οἱ πυρὸς εἰς ἀγγείον κατακλεισθεῖς τῷ μὲν μέτρῳ πλείων εὐρύσκεται τῇ δὲ

1 λαλεῖν] προσλαλεῖν Hartman.
2 εν] παρ' most mss.
3 ὁσπερ] καὶ ὁσπερ Stegmann.

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a Cf. Life of Lycurgus, xix. (51 e-f).
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if chatterers force their talk upon us, the soul surrenders to them the ears to be flooded from outside, but herself within unrolls thoughts of another sort and follows them out by herself. Therefore talkers do not find it easy to secure listeners who either pay attention or believe what they say; for just as they affirm that the seed of persons too prone to lusts of the flesh is barren, so is the speech of babblers ineffectual and fruitless.

3. And yet Nature has built about none of our parts so stout a stockade as about the tongue, having placed before it as an outpost the teeth, so that when reason within tightens "the reins of silence," if the tongue does not obey or restrain itself, we may check its incontinence by biting it till it bleeds. For Euripides says that "disaster is the end," not of unbolstered treasures or storerooms, but of "unbridled tongues." And those who believe that storerooms without doors and purses without fastenings are of no use to their owners, yet keep their mouths without lock or door, maintaining as perpetual an outflow as the mouth of the Black Sea, appear to regard speech as the least valuable of all things. They do not, therefore, meet with belief, which is the object of all speech. For this is the proper end and aim of speech, to engender belief in the hearer; but chatterers are disbelieved even if they are telling the truth. For as wheat shut up in a jar is found to have increased in quantity, but to have deteriorated

a Homer, Il., v. 226; σιγάλωεντα, of course, means "glossy" or "shining," but here it is probably used as a playful pun on σιγή.

b Adapted from Bacchae, 386, 388.

Cf. 519 b, infra.

f Or a "pit," perhaps; cf. Moralia, 697 d.

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(503) χρεία μονοθερότερος, ούτω λόγος εἰς ἀδόλεσχον ἐμπεσὼν ἀνθρωπον πολὺ ποιεῖ τοῦ ψεόδους ἐπίμετρον, ὦ διαφθείρει τὴν πίστιν.

4. Ἐτι τοῖνυν τὸ μεθύειν πᾶς ἀνθρωπος αἰδήμων καὶ κόσμιος, οἵματιν1 φυλάξατ' ἀν· μανία γὰρ ὁμό-Ετοιχος2 μὲν ἡ ὀργὴ κατ' ἐνίοισ, ἡ δὲ μέθη σύνοικος· μᾶλλον δὲ μανία τῷ μὲν χρόνῳ ἥττων, τῇ δ' αἰτία μείζων, ἵνα τὸ αὐθαίρετον αὐτῇ πρόσεστι. τῆς δὲ μέθης οὐθὲν οὔτω κατηγοροῦσιν ὡς τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἄκρατες καὶ ἀόριστον· οἷνος γάρ, φησίν,3

εφέκε πολύφρονά περ μάλ' ἀείσαι, καὶ θ' ἀπαλόν γελάσαι καὶ τ' ὀρχήσασθαι ἀνήκε. καὶ τί τὸ δεινότατον; ὃδη καὶ γέλως καὶ ὀρχησίς; ούδὲν ἄχρι τούτων.

καὶ τί ἔπος προέκειν, ὁπερ τ' ἀρρήτων ἀμεινον—τούτ' ἣδη δεινὸν καὶ ἐπικύδυνον. καὶ μὴποτε τὸ ἐκτούμενον παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις λύων ὁ ποιητὴς Φοινώσεως καὶ μέθης διαφοράν εἰρηκεν, οἰνώσεως μὲν ἄνεσιν, μεθῆς δὲ φλυαρίαν. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τοῦ νύφοντος ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττῃς ἐστὶ τοῦ μεθύοντος, ὡς οἱ παρομικζ̄μενοι φασίν. οἶδεν ὁ μὲν Βιας ἐν

1 οἶμα] omitted in most mss.
2 ὁμότοιχος one ms. of Stobaeus: ὁμόστοιχος.
3 φησίν] omitted in some mss.

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b Cf. Seneca, Epistulae Morales, lxxiii. 18.
c Homer, Od., xiv. 463-466; cf. Moralia, 645 Α; Athenaeus, v. 179 e-f.
in quality, so when a story finds its way to a chattering, it generates a large addition of falsehood and thereby destroys its credit.

4. Again, every self-respecting and orderly man would, I think, avoid drunkenness. For while, according to some, anger lives next door to madness, drunkenness lives in the same house with it; or rather, drunkenness is madness, shorter in duration, but more culpable, because the will also is involved in it. And there is no fault so generally ascribed to drunkenness as that of intemperate and unlimited speech. "For wine," says the Poet,

Urges a man to sing, though he be wise,  
And stirs to merry laughter and the dance.

And what is here so very dreadful? Singing and laughing and dancing? Nothing so far—

But it lets slip some word better unsaid:

this is where the dreadful and dangerous part now comes in. And perhaps the Poet has here resolved the question debated by the philosophers, the difference between being under the influence of wine and being drunk, when he speaks of the former as relaxation, but drunkenness as sheer folly. For what is in a man's heart when he is sober is on his tongue when he is drunk, as those who are given to proverbs say. Therefore when Bias kept silent at a


\(^{d}\) Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroemiographi Graeci, i. p. 313; ii. pp. 219, 687. "Nüchtern gedacht, voll gesagt."

\(^{e}\) Cf. the similar remark attributed to Demaratus in Moralia, 220 a-b and to Solon in Stobaeus, vol. iii. pp. 685-686 ed. Hense.
PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

tiν πότω σιωπών καὶ σκωπτόμενος εἰς ἄβελτερίαν 504 ὑπὸ τινὸς ἀδολέσχου, "καὶ τίς ἂν," ἐφη, "ἄνωτο μωρὸς ἐν οἴνῳ σιωπάν;" Ἀθήνηιοι δὲ τις ἐστίων πρέσβεις βασιλικοὺς ἐφιλοτιμήθη σπουδάζουσιν αὐτοῖς συναγαγεῖν εἰς ταὐτὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους· χρωμένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων κοινολογία καὶ τὰς συμβολὰς ἀποδιδόντων, τοῦ δὲ Ζήνωνος ἡσυχίαν ἄγωντος, φιλοφρονησάμενοι καὶ προπιόντες οἱ ξένοι, "περὶ σοῦ δὲ τί χρῆ λέγειν," ἐφασαν, "ὁ Ζήνων, τῷ βασιλεί;" κάκεινος, "ἀλλὸ μηδέν," εἶπεν, "ἡ ὁτι πρεσβύτης ἐστὶν" ἐν Ὁθήναις παρὰ πότων σιωπάν δυνάμενος.

Οὐτώ τι βαθὺ καὶ μυστηριώδες ἡ σιγή καὶ νη-φάλιον, ἢ δὲ μέθη λάλον· ἄνουν γὰρ καὶ ὀλιγόφρον, B διὰ τοῦτο καὶ πολύφωνον. οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι καὶ ὀριζόμενοι τὴν μέθην λέγουσιν εἶναι λήρησιν πάρουν· οὐτωσοῦ ὡς ψέγεται τὸ πίνειν, εἰ προσεῖη τῷ πίνειν τὸ σιωπᾶν· ἀλλ᾿ ἡ μωρολογία μέθην ποιεῖ τὴν οἴνωσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν μεθύων ληρεὶ παρ᾿ οίνον, ὁ δ᾿ ἀδολεσχος πανταχοῦ ληρεὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐν θεάτρῳ ἐν περιπάτῳ ἐν μέθη νήφων ημέραν νύκτωρ· ἐστὶ δὲ θεραπεύων τῆς νόσου βαρύτερος, συμπλέων τῆς ναυτίας ἀγδέστερος, ἐπαυγῶν τοῦ ψέγοντος ἐπαχθέ-στερος· ἦδιον γε τοῦ πονηροῦς ὀμιλούμενος ἐπιδεξίοις ἡ χρήστος ἀδολέσχαις. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Σοφοκλέους

1 ἐν] ὅν ἐν most mss.
2 ἐστιν] εἰς ἐστιν Tucker.
3 νήφων after ἐν μέθη added by Capps.
4 ὀμιλούμεν Wilamowitz: ὀμιλοῦσαν.

* Either Ptolemy Soter (Diogenes Laertius, vii. 24) or Antigonus (Stobaeus, iii. p. 680 ed. Hense).
* Frag. 284 (von Arnim, op. cit., i. p. 64).

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drinking-bout and was taunted with stupidity by a chatterer, "What fool," said he, "in his cups can hold his tongue?" And when a certain man at Athens was entertaining envoys from the king, a at their earnest request he made every effort to gather the philosophers to meet them; and while the rest took part in the general conversation and made their contributions to it, but Zeno b kept silent, the strangers, pledging him courteously, said, "And what are we to tell the king about you, Zeno?" "Nothing," said he, "except that there is an old man at Athens who can hold his tongue at a drinking-party."

Thus silence is something profound and awesome and sober, but drunkenness is a babbler, for it is foolish and witless, and therefore loquacious also. And the philosophers c even in their very definition of drunkenness say that it is intoxicated and foolish talking; thus drinking is not blamed if silence attends the drinking, but it is foolish talk which converts the influence of wine into drunkenness. While it is true that the drunken man talks foolishness in his cups, the chatterer talks foolishness on all occasions, in the market-place, in the theatre, out walking, drunk or sober, by day, by night. As your physician, he is worse than the disease; as your ship-mate, more unpleasant than sea-sickness; his praises are more annoying than another's blame: we certainly have greater pleasure in company with clever rascals than with honest chatterboxes. In Sophocles, d when Ajax

(504) Νέστωρ τοῦ Αἴαντα τραχυνόμενον τῷ λόγῳ πραῦνων ἡθικῶς τοῦτ’ εἶρηκεν,

Οι μέμφομαι σε· δρῶν γὰρ εὖ κακῶς λέγεις· πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀδολέσχην οὐχ οὕτως ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν ἔργον χάριν ἢ τῶν λόγων ἀκαρία διαφθείρει καὶ ἀπόλλυσι.

5. Λυσίας τινὶ δίκην ἔχοντι λόγον συγγράφας ἐδωκεν· ὁ δὲ πολλάκις ἀναγνοὺς ἵκε πρὸς τὸν Λυσίαν ἀθυμῶν καὶ λέγων τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτῷ διεξίοντι θαυμαστὸν φανήναι τὸν λόγον, αὕθις δὲ καὶ τρίτον ἀναλαμβάνοντι παντελῶς ἀμβλῦν καὶ ἀπρακτὸν· ὁ δὲ Λυσίας γελάσας, “τῷ οὖν,” εἶπεν, “οὐχ ἄπαξ μέλλεις λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστῶν;” καὶ σκόπει τὴν Λυσίον πειθῶ καὶ χάριν· κεῖνον¹ γὰρ ἐγὼ

D ἕφιμι ἰσπλοκάμων Μοισάν εὗ λαχείν.

τῶν δὲ περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ λεγομένων ἀληθέστατον ἐστὶν ὅτι μόνος ὁμήρος τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀμφικορίας περιγεγογενεῖ, ἀεὶ καυνὸς ὃν καὶ πρὸς χάριν ἀκμάζων· ἀλλ’ ὁμοὶ² εἰπὼν καὶ³ ἀναφωνήσας ἐκεῖνο περὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ

ἐχθρὸν δὲ μοί ἐστὶν

αὕθις⁴ ἀριζήλως εἰρημένα μυθολογεῖν,

φεύγει καὶ φοβεῖται τὸν ἐφεδρεύοντα παντὶ λόγῳ

¹ κεῖνον] κάκεινον some mss.
² ὁμοὶ] ἀμφωσγέπως Apelt; ὁμοὶ τὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως Tucker.
³ εἰπών καὶ] Stegmann would delete.
⁴ αὕθις] αὕτη the mss. of Homer.

An anonymous fragment, attributed to Sappho by 408
CONCERNING TALKATIVENESS, 504

uses boisterous language, Nestor, in soothing him, says in words which show his knowledge of character,

I blame you not: ill your words, but good your deeds.

But these are not our feelings toward the chatterer; on the contrary, the untimeliness of his words destroys and annuls all gratitude for any deed.

5. Lysias once composed a speech for a litigant and gave it to him. The man read it through a number of times and came to Lysias in despair and said that the first time he read it the speech seemed to him wonderfully good, but on taking it up a second and third time it appeared completely dull and ineffectual. "Well," said Lysias laughing, "isn't it only once that you are going to speak it before the jurors?" And consider the persuasiveness and charm of Lysias! For he is one who, for my part,

I say has a fair portion in the violet-tressed Muses. a

And of the things said about the Poet this is the truest—that Homer alone has survived the fastidiousness of men, b since he is ever new and his charm is ever at its best; yet none the less, he spoke and proclaimed that famous remark about himself,

I scorn to tell
A tale again that's once been clearly told c;

and he avoids and fears the satiety which lies in


b Cf. Pope's

Those oft are stratagems which error seem,  
Nor is it Homer nods, but we that dream,

with the judgement of Horace, Ars Poetica, 359.

c Od., xii. 452-453; cf. Moralia, 764 a.
κόρον, εἰς ἄλλα εἴς ἄλλων διηγήματα τὴν ἀκοήν ἀγχων καὶ τῇ καταστροφὴ τῆς πληγομένην αὐτῆς παραμυθημένον. οὐδὲ ἀποκαλύψας δήποτε τὰ ὅτα ταῖς ταυτολογίαις ὀσπερ παλύμψητα διαμολύνοντες.

6. Τὸ τοῦτο τοῦτον υπομνήμακομεν αὐτοὺς, 
Εἰς τοῦτον ἡδονῆς ἑνεκα καὶ φιλο- 
φροσύνης εὐρημένον οἱ προσβιαζόμενοι πολὺ πίνεν 
καὶ ἀκρατῶν ἐνίοις εἰς ἄγδιαν καὶ παραιτοῦν 
τρέπουσιν, οὕτω τὸν λόγον ἡδιστον ὄντα καὶ φιλαν-
θρωπότατον συμβόλαιον οἱ χρώμενοι κακῶς καὶ 
προχείρως ἀπάνθρωπον ποιοῦσι καὶ ἀμικτον, οἷς 
οἴσαι χαρίζεσθαι λυποῦντες καὶ ἄφι οὖν ταυτάκε-
σθαι καταγελάμενοι καὶ δὲ οὖν φιλεῖσθαι δυσχεραι-
νόμενοι. ὀσπερ οὖν ὁ τῶς κεστῶς όμολούντας 
ἀποστρέφων καὶ ἀπελαύνων ἀναφρόδιτος, οὕτως ὁ 
τῶς λόγου λυπῶν καὶ ἀπεχθανόμενος ἄμουσος τις καὶ 
ἀτεχνός ἕστιν.

7. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων παθῶν καὶ νοσημάτων τὰ μὲν 
Γ' ἐστιν ἐπικύΔυνα τὰ δὲ μισητὰ τὰ δὲ καταγέλαστα, 
τῇ δὲ ἀδουλεσία πάντα συμβέβηκε· χλενάζονται μὲν 
γάρ ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς διηγήσεσι, μισοῦνται δὲ διὰ 
τῶς κακῶν προσαγγελώς, κινδυνεύουσι δὲ τῶν 
ἀπορρήτων μὴ κρατοῦντες. ὁδε Άναγαργος ἔστιν-
505 θεὶς παρὰ Σόλωνι καὶ κοιμώμενος ὧφθη τὴν μὲν 
ἀριστερὰν χεῖρα τοὺς μορίους τὴν δὲ δεξιὰν τῷ στό-

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a Plutarch probably means that talkers wear out our ears by the repetitions of stale news, just as palimpsestes are worn out by constant erasure. But not all points of the comparison are clear; cf. Moralia, 779 c; Cicero, ad Fam., vii. 18. 2.

b Probably referring to the συμποσίαρχος (cf., for example, Moralia, 630 a ff.), or magister bibendi.
ambush for every tale, leading his hearers from one narrative to another and soothing away the ear’s surfeit by constant novelty. But babblers actually wear out our ears by their repetitions, just as though they were smudging palimpsests.\(^a\)

6. Let this, then, be the first thing of which we remind them—that just as wine, discovered for the promotion of pleasure and good fellowship, is sometimes misused to produce discomfort and intoxication by those\(^b\) who compel others to drink it undiluted in large quantities, so speech, which is the most pleasant and human of social ties, is made inhuman and unsocial by those who use it badly and wantonly, because they offend those whom they think they please, are ridiculed for their attempts at gaining admiration, and are disliked because of the very means they employ to gain affection. As, then, he can have no share in Aphrodite who uses her girdle to drive away and alienate those who seek his company, so he who arouses annoyance and hostility with his speech is no friend of the Muses and a stranger to art.

7. Now of the other affections and maladies some are dangerous, some detestable, some ridiculous; but garrulousness has all these qualities at once; for babblers are derided for telling what everyone knows, they are hated for bearing bad news, they run into danger since they cannot refrain from revealing secrets. So it is that Anacharsis,\(^c\) when he had been entertained and feasted at Solon’s house and lay down to sleep, was seen to have his left hand placed

\(^a\) A Scythian of high rank, who travelled widely in the pursuit of knowledge, and visited Athens in the time of Solon, circa 597 B.C.
(505) ματι προσκειμένην ἔχων· ἐγκρατεστέρον γὰρ ὥστε 
χαλινοῦ δεῖσθαι τὴν γλῶτταν, ὥρθῶς οἴομένος. οὐ 
gὰρ ἂν τις ἐξαιρήμασιν παρῆσιν ἄνδρας τοσούτους 
ἀφροδισίων ἀκρασία πεπτωκότας, ὡσας πόλεις καὶ 
ηγεμονίας λόγος ἐξενεχθεῖς ἀπόρρητος ἀναστάτους 
ἐποίησε. Σύλλας ἐπολιόρκηκε τὰς Ἀθῆνας, οὐκ ἔχον 
σχολὴν ἐνδιατρῆξαι χρόνον πολὺν,

ἐπεὶ πόνος ἄλλος ἐπειγεν,

ἡρπακότος μὲν Ἀσίαν Μιθριδάτου, τῶν δὲ περὶ 
Β Μάριον αὖθις ἐν 'Ῥώμη κρατοῦντων· ἀλλὰ πρεσ-
βυτῶν τινων ἐπὶ κουρεῖον διαλεγομένων ὡς οὐ 
φυλάττεται τὸ Ἑπτάχαλκον καὶ κινδυνεύει τὸ ἀστυ 
κατ' ἐκεῖνο ληφθῆναι τὸ μέρος, ἀκούσαντες οἱ κατα-
σκοποι πρὸς τὸν Σύλλαν ἐξῆγεσιν. ὦ δ' εὐθὺς 
τὴν δύναμιν προσαγαγὼν περὶ μέσας νύκτας εἰσ-
ήγαγε τὸ στράτευμα, καὶ μικροῦ μὲν κατέσκαψε τὴν 
πόλιν' ἐνέπλησε δὲ φόνου καὶ νεκρῶν, ὡστε τὸν 
Κεραμεικὸν αἵματι ῥυήναι. χαλεπῶς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς 
Ἄθηναίους ἔσχε διὰ τοὺς λόγους μᾶλλον ἡ διὰ τὰ 
έργα· κακῶς γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔλεγον καὶ τὴν Μέτελλαν 
ἀναπηδῶντες ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη καὶ σκώπτοντες,

οὐκάμινον ἐσθ' ὁ Σύλλας ἀλφίτῳ πεπασμένον,

C καὶ τοιαῦτα πολλὰ φλυαροῦντες ἐπεσπάσαντο "κοι-
φοτάτου πράγματος λόγων," ὡς φήσιν ὁ Πλάτων, 
"βαρυτάτην ζημίαν."

1 τὴν πόλιν added by early editors.
2 Μέτελλαν Hatzidakis: Μετέλλαν.

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a Cf. Life of Sulla, xiv. (460 c ff.). Athens was captured in 86 b.c.
b Homer, Od., xi. 54.
c The position of the Heptachalcon is thought to be near 412
upon his private parts, but his right hand upon his mouth; for he believed, quite rightly, that the tongue needs the stronger restraint. It would not be easy, for example, to enumerate as many men who have been ruined by incontinent lust as is the number of cities and empires which a secret revealed has brought to destruction. When Sulla was besieging Athens, he had very little time to waste in the operations

Since other labour was pressing, Mithridates having ravaged Asia, and the party of Marius being again masters in Rome. But spies heard some old men in a barber’s shop remarking to each other that the Heptachalcon was unguarded and that the city was in danger of being captured at that point; and the spies brought word of this to Sulla, who at once brought up his forces at midnight, led in his army, and almost razed the city to the ground, filling it with carnage and corpses so that the Cerameicus ran with blood. And Sulla’s anger with the Athenians was due more to their words than to their deeds; for they used to revile him and Metella, leaping upon the walls and jesting,

Sulla is a mulberry sprinkled with meal; and with much similar idle banter they drew upon themselves, as Plato says, “a very heavy penalty for the lightest of things, words.”

the Peiræaic Gate, near which was also the heroön of Chalcodon: see Judeich, Topographie von Athen, p. 368, note 8.

* Cf. Life of Sulla, xiii. (459 Ρ—460 Α).
* Sulla’s wife.
' Referring to his complexion: blotches of red interspersed with white; cf. Life of Sulla, ii. (451 Ρ).
* Laws, 935 Α and 717 Α; cf. the note on 456 Α, supra.
(505) Τὴν δὲ Ἦρωμαίων πόλιν ἐκώλυσεν ἑλευθέραν γενέσθαι Νέρωνος ἀπαλλαγείςαν ἐνὸς ἀνδρὸς ἀδολεσχία. μιὰ γὰρ ἦν νύξ, μεθ' ἦν ἐδει τὸν τύραννον ἀπολωλέναι, παρεσκευασμένων ἀπάντων: ὁ δὲ μέλλων αὐτὸν ἀποκτινώναι πορευόμενος εἰς τὸ θέατρον ἱδὼν τινά τῶν δεδεμένων ἐπὶ θύραις μέλλοντα προσάγεσθαι τῷ Νέρωνι καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ τύχην ἀποδυρμένην, ἐγγὺς προσήλθεν αὐτῷ καὶ προσψηφυρίσας, "εὐχοῦ," φησίν, "ὥ ἀνθρωπε, τῇν Δ οὐγμερον ἡμέραν παρελθείν μόνον, αὐριον δὲ μοι εὐχαριστήσεις." ἀρπάζας οὖν τὸ αἰνιχθὲν ἐκείνος καὶ νοῆσας, οἶμαι, ὅτι

νήπιος, ὃς τὰ ἐτοίμα λυπῶν ἀνέτοιμα διώκει, τὴν βεβαιοτέραν εἰλητο σωτηρίαν πρὸ τῆς δικαιοτέρας. ἐμήνυσε γὰρ τῷ Νέρωνι τὴν φωνήν τάνθρωπον κάκεινος εὐθὺς ἀνηρπαστο, καὶ βάσανοι καὶ τῦρ καὶ μάστιγες ἐπ' αὐτοῦ, ἄρνομενον πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγκην ἀ χωρίς ἀνάγκης ἐμήνυσε.

8. Ζήνων δ' ὁ φιλόσοφος, ὅνα μηδ' ἄκοντος αὐτοῦ πρόηταί τι τῶν ἀπορρήτων ἐκβιαζόμενον τὸ σῶμα ταῖς ἀνάγκαις, διαφαγὼν τὴν γλώτταν προσέπτυσε τῷ τυράννῳ καλὸν δὲ καὶ Λέανα τῆς ἐγκρατείας Εἶ ἐχει γέρας ἐταῖρα τῶν περὶ Ἀρμόδιον ἦν καὶ Ἀριστογεῖτον καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς τυράννους συνω-

1 τὸ] omitted in most mss.
2 τῷ] omitted in most mss.
3 ὃς τὰ] ὃς τὰς Gaisford.

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a This account differs in every way from the standard version in Tacitus, Annals, xv. 54 ff.
b Perhaps Subrius Flavus is meant (Annals, xv. 50).
c Hesiod, Frag. 219 (Frag. 18, p. 278 ed. Evelyn-White in 414
The loquacity of one man, again, prevented Rome from becoming free by the removal of Nero.\textsuperscript{a} For but one night remained, after which the tyrant was to die, and all preparations had been made; but the man \textsuperscript{b} who was to kill him saw at the palace gates when on his way to the theatre a prisoner about to be led before Nero and lamenting his evil fortune. He approached the prisoner and whispered to him, “Only pray, my good man, that to-day may pass by and to-morrow you will be thankful to me.” So the prisoner grasped the intended meaning, and reflecting, I suppose, that

He is a fool who leaves things close at hand
To follow what is out of reach,\textsuperscript{c}

chose the surer rather than the more just way of safety. For he revealed to Nero what had been said to him by the man, who was immediately seized, and tortures and fire and the lash were applied to the conspirator as he denied, in the face of constraint, what he had revealed without constraint.

8. Zeno\textsuperscript{d} the philosopher, in order that even against his will no secret should be betrayed by his body when under torture, bit his tongue through and spat it out at the despot.\textsuperscript{e} And Leaena\textsuperscript{f} also has a splendid reward for her self-control. She was a courtesan belonging to the group led by Harmodius and Aristogeiton and shared in the conspiracy against

\textsuperscript{a} Of Elea: cf. Moralia, 1126 ν, 1051 c; Diels, Frag. d. Vorsokrat.\textsuperscript{5}, i. p. 249, A 7; and Dougan’s note on Cicero, Tusc. Disp., ii. 22. 52.
\textsuperscript{b} Called by Plutarch Demylos of Carystus.
\textsuperscript{c} Cf. Pausanias, i. 23. 1; Athenaeus, 596 f; Leaena means “lioness.” She was Aristogeiton’s mistress.
PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

mosias ekouonive tais elpisein ws yunh: kai gar authe peri ton kalon ekhein ebaakeuse krathra tov 'Erotopos, kai kategriasasto dia tov theou tois aporritous. Ws oyn ekheinouptaiasthes anhrethin, anakrinoemeni kai kelevoimeni frasa toous eti lanhantonas oyn efrasein, alli enekartrerisein, epideixasa toous andreas oynen anaxion eauton patin- tas, ei toiautnin hgapthisan. Athnaioi de xalkin poihsamevnoi leainan aglwsson en pilais tis akropolews anethkai, tw mewn thmoeidei tov z Fiona F to aiptitoton autheis twi d' aglwsow to siwpihron kai mysthriwdes emfainontes.

Oudeis gar outw logos wfolhse rtheis ws pollloi siwpihenthes. Esto gar eipein pote to sigheven, ou mhn siwpihasi ge to lechven, alli ekkexuttai kai diapheoittken. Othei, oima, tou men legew anthropous tou de siwpan theous didaskalous exomein, ev teletais kai mysteriou siwphn paralambanontes.

506 de poiythi ton logiostaton 'Odyssaea siwphlol- tatou pepoikhe, kai ton viou autou kai twn yunakia kai twn trofou akouies gar legoihs,

exw d' hymte per krateiri drus2 he sidhros.

1 kelevoimeni] kolazoimeni several mss.
2 hymte .. drus] ws ete tis steref lidos mss. of Homer.

a Hippias and Hipparchus; cf. Thucydides, vi. 54-59; Aristotle, Ath. Pol., xviii. 2.
b The motive of Love runs through the entire story: Thetallas and Harmodius's sister, Aristogeiton and Har-
the tyrants— with her hopes, all a woman could do; for she also had joined in the revels about that noble mixing-bowl of Eros and through the god had been initiated into the secrets which might not be revealed. When, therefore, the conspirators failed and were put to death, she was questioned and commanded to reveal those who still escaped detection; but she would not do so and continued steadfast, proving that those men had experienced a passion not unworthy of themselves in loving a woman like her. And the Athenians caused a bronze lioness without a tongue to be made and set it up in the gates of the Acropolis, representing by the spirited courage of the animal Leaena's invincible character, and by its tonguelessness her power of silence in keeping a holy secret.

No spoken word, it is true, has ever done such service as have in many instances words unspoken; for it is possible at some later time to tell what you have kept silent, but never to keep silent what once has been spoken—that has been spilled, and has made its way abroad. Hence, I think, in speaking we have men as teachers, but in keeping silent we have gods, and we receive from them this lesson of silence at initiations into the Mysteries. And the Poet has made the most eloquent Odysseus the most reticent, and also his son and his wife and his nurse; for you hear the nurse saying, "I'll hold it safe like sturdy oak or iron.

modius, Leaena and Aristogeiton. This was Eros's mixing-bowl.

c See Judeich, op. cit., p. 231.

d Cf. Moralia, 10 e-f, 125 d; 515 a, infra.


f Cf. 442 d, 475 a, supra.

g Eurykleia; adapted from Od., xix. 494.
(506) αὐτὸς δὲ τῆς Πηνελόπης παρακαθήμενος

θυμῷ μὲν γοῦσαν ἐγνέασε γυναῖκα, ὁφθαλμοὶ δὲ ὡς εἰ κέρα ἔστασαν ἕε σίδηρος, ἀτρέμασ ἐν βλεφάροις.

οὕτω τὸ σῶμα μεστὸν ἦν αὐτῷ πανταχόθεν ἐγκρατείας, καὶ πάντες ἔχων ὁ λόγος εὐπειθῆς καὶ ὑπο-χείρια προσέταττε τοῖς ὀμμαῖς μὴ δακρύειν, τῇ Β γλώττῃ μὴ φθέγγεσθαι, τῇ καρδίᾳ μὴ τρέμειν μὴ ὑλακτεῖν.

τῷ δ' αὐτ' ἐν πείσῃ κραδίῃ μὲνε τετληνία,

μέχρι τῶν ἀλώνων κινημάτων διήκοντο σοῦ λογι-σμοῦ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ αἷμα πεπουμένου κατήκουν ἐαυτῷ καὶ χειρόθες. τοιούτοι δὲ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἑταίρων τὸ γὰρ ἐλκομένους καὶ προσ-ουδιζομένους ὑπὸ τοῦ Κύκλωπος μὴ κατειπέων τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως μηδὲ δείξαι τὸ πεπυρακτωμένον ἐκεῖνο καὶ παρεσκευασμένον ὀργανον ἐπὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ἀλλ' ὠμοὺς ἐσθίεσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ φράσαι τί τῶν ἀπορρήτων ὑπερβολὴν ἐγκρατείας καὶ πίστεως οὐκ ὁ ἀπολέοιτεν. 2 οθεν δ' Πιττακὸς οὐ κακῶς, τοῦ Αἰγυπτιῶν βασιλέως πέμψαντος ἱερεῖον αὐτῷ καὶ κελεύσαντος τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ 3 χείριστον ἐξελεῖν κρέως, ἐπεμψεν 4 ἐξελὼν τὴν γλώτταν ὡς ὀργανον μὲν ἀγαθῶν ὀργανον δὲ κακῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὕσαν.

1 δ' αὐτ'] ὑπὸ μᾶλ' Homer.
2 ἀπολέοιτεν Reiske: ἐκλέοιτεν; λέοιτεν G.
3 καὶ] καὶ τὸ most mss.
And Odysseus himself, as he sat beside Penelope,

Did pity in his heart his wife in tears,
But kept his eyes firm-fixed within their lids
Like horn or iron.\(^a\)

So full of self-control was his body in every limb, and
Reason, with all parts in perfect obedience and submission, ordered his eyes not to weep, his tongue not to utter a sound, his heart not to tremble or bark\(^b\):

His heart remained enduring in obedience,\(^c\)
since his reason extended even to his irrational or involuntary movements and made amenable and subservient to itself\(^d\) both his breath and his blood. Of such character were also most of his companions; for even when they were dragged about and dashed upon the ground by the Cyclops,\(^e\) they would not denounce Odysseus nor show that fire-sharpened instrument prepared against the monster’s eye, but preferred to be eaten raw rather than to tell a single word of the secret—an example of self-control and loyalty which cannot be surpassed. Therefore Pittacus\(^f\) did not do badly, when the king of Egypt sent him a sacrificial animal and bade him cut out the fairest and foulest meat, when he cut out and sent him the tongue, as being the instrument of both the greatest good and the greatest evil.

\(^a\) Od., xix. 210-212; cf. 442 D-E, supra.

\(^b\) Cf. Od., xx. 13, 16.

\(^c\) Od., xx. 23; cf. 453 D, supra.

\(^d\) Cf. 442 E, supra.

\(^e\) Cf. Od., ix. 289.

\(^f\) Cf. Commentarii in Hesiodum, 71 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 88); told also of Bias in Moralia, 38 B and 146 R.

\(^4\) ἐπεμψὲν] ἐξεπεμψὲν most mss.
'Η δ' Ἐὐριπίδειος Ἰνώ παρρησίαν ἄγουσα περὶ αὐτῆς εἰδέναι φησίν,

οἱ γὰρ εὐγενοῦς καὶ βασιλικῆς τῷ ὄντι παιδείας τυχόντες πρῶτον σιγάν εἶτα λαλεῖν μανθάνουσιν. Ἀντίγονος γοῦν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐκεῖνος, ἐρωτήσαντος αὐτὸν τὸν υἱὸν τηνίκα μέλλουσιν ἀναξεγνύσειν, ἔθεε̣ν, "τί δέδοικας;" εἶπε, "μή μόνος οὐκ ἀκούσῃς τής σάλπιγγος;" οὐκ ἄρα φωνὴν ἔπιστευν ἀπόρρητον ὡς τήν βασιλείαν ἀπολείπειν ἐμελλεν; ἐδιάδασκε μὲν οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγκρατῶς ἐχειν πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πεφυλαγμένωσι. Μέτελλος δ' ὁ γέρων ἐτέρον τι τοιοῦτον ἐπερωτώμενος ἐπὶ στρατείας, "εἰ," φησίν, "ἀφιήν τὸν χιτώνα μοι συνειδέναι τοῦτο τάπόρρητον, ἀποδυσάμενος ἄν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ἔθηκα." Εὐμένης δ' ἀκούσας ἐπέρχεσθαι Κρατερὸν οὐδενὶ τῶν φιλῶν ἐφρασεν, ἀλλ' ἐφεύσατο Νεοπτόλεμον εἶναι τοῦτον γὰρ οἱ στρατιώται κατεφρόνουν, ἐκεῖνον δὲ καὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐθαυμαζοῦν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἡγάπων. ἔγνω δ' οὐδείς ἀλ-Ελος, ἀλλὰ συμβαλόντες ἐκράτησαν καὶ ἀπέκτειναν αὐτὸν ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ νεκροὶ ἐπέγνωσαν. οὕτως ἐστρατήγησεν ἡ σωτικὴ τῶν ἄγωνα καὶ τηλικοῦτον ἀνταγωνιστὴν ἀπέκρυψεν ὡστὶ αὐτὸν τοὺς φίλους μὴ προειπότα θαυμάζεις μᾶλλον ἡ μεμψέσθαι καὶ μέμφηται δὲ τις, ἐγκαλεῖσθαι βέλτιον ἐστὶ σω-

1 ὁποίον Moralia, 606 Α and Stobaeus: ὁποίον.
2 γοῦν] οὖν most mss.
3 τάπόρρητον] Pohlenz would delete.
4 τὸ added from 202 Δ.
9. And Ino in Euripides, speaking out boldly concerning herself, says that she knows how to be silent in season, to speak where speech is safe.

For those who have received a noble and truly royal education learn first to be silent, and then to speak. For example, that famous king Antigonus, when his son asked him at what hour they were to break camp, said, "What are you afraid of? That you alone may not hear the trumpet?" This was not, surely, because he would not entrust a secret to the man to whom he intended to leave his kingdom? No, he was teaching his son to be self-controlled and guarded about such matters. And the old Metellus, when on a campaign he was asked some such question, said, "If I thought my shirt was privy to that secret, I would have stripped it off and put it in the fire." And Eumenes, when he heard that Craterus was advancing, told none of his friends, but pretended that it was Neoptolemus. For his soldiers despised Neoptolemus, but both respected the reputation of Craterus and admired his valour. No one else knew the truth, and they joined battle, won the victory, killed Craterus without knowing it, and only recognized him when he was dead. So successfully did silence manoeuvre the contest and keep hidden so formidable an opponent that his friends admired Eumenes for not forewarning them rather than blamed him. And even if some do blame you, it is better that men should criticize you when they are already saved through mistrust than

\[ a \text{ Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag.}^2, \text{ p. 486, Frag. 413. 2; cf. Moralia, 606 A.} \]
\[ b \text{ The One-eyed; cf. Moralia, 182 B; Life of Demetrius, xxviii. (902 b-c).} \]
\[ c \text{ Cf. Moralia, 202 A.} \]
\[ d \text{ Cf. Life of Eumenes, vi., vii. (586 b ff.).} \]
Plutarch's Moralia

θέντας¹ δι' ἀπιστίαν ἢ κατηγορεῖν ἀπολλυμένους² διὰ τὸ πιστεύσαι.

10. Τίς δ' ὀλως³ ἐαυτῷ παρρησίαν ἀπολέλοιπε κατὰ τοῦ μὴ σιωπήσαντος; εἰ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον ἔδει, κακῶς ἐλέχθη πρὸς ἄλλον: εἰ δ' ἀφεῖς ἐκ σεαυτοῦ κατέχεις ἐν ἐτέρῳ ταπόρρητον, εἰς θάλλοτριάν πίστιν καταπέφευγας τὴν σεαυτοῦ προ-έμενος. κἂν μὲν ἐκεῖνος⁴ ὀμοίος σοι γένηται, δικαίως ἀπόλωλας· ἅν δὲ βελτίων, σφίξῃ παράλογως ἐτερόν εὐρύν σοῦ⁵ ύπὲρ σεαυτοῦ⁶ πιστότερον.

"ἀλλὰ φίλος οὕτως ἐμοί." τούτω δ' ἐτερός τις, ὃς πιστεύει καὶ οὕτος ὡς ἐγὼ τούτω· κάκεινος ἄλλων πάλιν· εἰδ' οὕτως ἐπιγονήν λαμβάνει καὶ πολλαπλασιασμὸν, εἴρομένης τῆς ἀκρασίας, ὁ λόγος. ὡς γὰρ 507 ἡ μονὰς οὐκ ἐκβαίνει τὸν ἑαυτῆς ὅρον ἀλλ' ἀπαξ τὸ ἐν μένει, διὸ κέκληται μονάς· ἡ δὲ δυᾶς ἀρχή διαφόροις ἄριστοις· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἑαυτὴν ἐξίστησι τῷ διπλασιασμῷ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τρεπομένη· οὕτω λόγος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ καταμένων ἀπόρρητος ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐστιν· ἀν δ' εἰς ἐτερὸν ἐκβίθη φήμης ἑσχε τάξιν.

"ἐπεα" γὰρ "πτερόεντα," φησὶν ὁ ποιητής· οὕτε γὰρ πτηνῶν ἐκ τῶν χειρῶν ἀφέντα ράδιον ἐστὶν

¹ σωθέντας] σωθέντα most mss.
² ἀπολλυμένους] ἀπολλυμένον some mss.
³ ὀλως] ἀλλος most mss.; ἀλλως C.
⁴ ἐκεῖνος] omitted in most mss.
⁵ soū added by Capps.
⁶ σεαυτοῦ] σεαυτόν most mss.
⁷ καὶ] omitted in most mss.

ᵃ Cf. Moralia, 429 A, 1012 d-f. For the indeterminate dyad, see Aristotle, Met., 987 b 26 and 1081 a 14; A. E. 422
that they should accuse you when they are being destroyed because you did trust them.

10. Yet, speaking generally, who has left himself the right to speak out boldly against one who has not kept silent? If the story ought not to have been known, it was wrong for it to be told to another; and if you have let the secret slip from yourself and yet seek to confine it to another, you have taken refuge in another’s good faith when you have already abandoned your own. And if he turns out to be no better than yourself, you are deservedly ruined; if better, you are saved beyond all expectation, since you have found another more faithful on your own behalf than you yourself are. “But this man is my friend.” Yet he has another friend, whom he will likewise trust as I trust him; and his friend, again, will trust another friend. Thus, then, the story goes on increasing and multiplying by link after link of incontinent betrayal. For just as the monad a does not pass out of its own boundaries, but remains once and for all one (for which reason it is called a monad), and as the dyad is the indeterminate beginning of difference (for by doubling it at once shifts from unity to plurality), so a story confined to its first possessor is truly secret; but if it passes to another, it has acquired the status of rumour. The Poet, b in fact, says that “words” are “winged”: neither when you let go from your hands a winged thing is it easy to get

Taylor, Philosophical Studies, pp. 130 ff.; and for Plutarch’s understanding of the dyad see L. Robin, La Théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres, pp. 648-651 (Notopoulos and Fobes).

a Homer, passim; on the formula, see the most recent discussions in Classical Philology, xxx. 215 ff., xxxii. 59 ff., Classical Quart., xxx. 1-3.
(507) αὕτης κατασχεῖν, οὕτε λόγον ἐκ τοῦ στόματος προέμενον συλλαβεῖν καὶ κρατήσαι δυνατόν, ἄλλα φέρεται

λαυψηρά κυκλώσας πτερὰ
dι’ ἄλλων τ᾽ ἄλλους σκιδνάμενος. νεώς μὲν γὰρ ἀρπαγείσης υπὸ πνεύματος ἐπιλαμβάνονται, σπεῖ-βραίς καὶ ἀγκύραις τὸ τάχος ἀμβλύνοντες. λόγου δ᾽ ὠσπερ ἐκ λιμένων ἐκδραμόντος οὐκ ἔστιν ὄρμος οὐδ᾽ ἀγκυροβόλοιον, ἄλλα ψόφῳ πολλῷ καὶ ἦχῳ φερόμενος προσέρρηξε καὶ κατέδυσεν εἰς μέγαν τινὰ καὶ δεινὸν τῶν φθεγξάμενον κίνδυνον.

μικρὸν γὰρ ἐκ λαμπτήρος Ἱδαίον λέπας πρῆσειν ἂν τις· καὶ πρὸς ἀνδρὶ εἰπὼν ἕνα, πύθοιντ᾽ ἂν ἀστοὶ πάντες.

11. Ἡ Ἄρωμαῖων σύγκλητος ἀπόρρητον τινα βουλὴν ἐβουλεύετο καθ᾽ αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πολλὰς ἡμέρας. ἀσάφειαν δὲ πολλήν καὶ ὑπόνοιαν ἐχοντος τοῦ πράγματος, γυνὴ τάλα σώφρων, γυνὴ δὲ, προσέκειτο σε θαμάσει ἄνδρι λυπαρῶς δεομένη πυθόσθαι τά-πόρρητον· ὀρκοὶ δὲ καὶ κατάραι περὶ σιωπῆς ἐγί-νοντο καὶ δάκρυα ποτνιωμένης αὐτῆς, ὡς πίστων οὐκ ἐχούσης. δὲ δὲ Ἄρωμαῖος ἐξελέγξει βουλόμενος αὐτῆς τὴν ἀβελτερίαν, "νικᾶς, δὴ γύναι," εἶπεν, "ἀλλ᾽ ἄκουε φοβερὸν πράγμα καὶ τεράστιον· προσ-ήγγελται γὰρ ἦμιν υπὸ τῶν ἱερέων κόρυδων ὀφθαλμίων κράνος ἐχοντα χρυσοῦν καὶ ὀρφροςκεπτό-

1 δι’ ἄλλων] δι’ ἀμενῶν D, whence Bernardakis would correct δι’ ἀνέμων.
2 λόγου δ᾽] τοῦ δὲ λόγου most ms.


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it back again, nor when a word is let slip from the mouth is it possible to arrest and control it, but it is borne away

Circling on swift wings, and is scattered abroad from one to another. So when a ship has been caught by a wind, they try to check it, deadening its speed with cables and anchors, but if a story runs out of harbour, so to speak, there is no roadstead or anchorage for it, but, carried away with a great noise and reverberation, it dashes upon the man who uttered it and submerges him in some great and terrible danger.

With but a little torch one might set fire
To Ida's rock; and tell one man a tale,
Soon all the town will know.

11. The Roman Senate was once for many days debating in strict privacy a certain secret policy; and since the matter gave rise to much uncertainty and suspicion, a woman prudent in other respects, but yet a woman, kept pestering her husband and persistently begging to learn the secret. She vowed with imprecations upon herself that she would keep silent, and wept and moaned because she was not trusted. And the Roman, wishing to bring home her folly by proof, said, 'Wife, you have won; listen to a terrible and portentous matter. We have been informed by the priests that a lark has been seen flying about with a golden helmet and a spear; we

\[ b \text{ Cf. Moralia, 750 b; probably from the Epodes of Archilochus, cf. Eusebius, Praep. Evang., xv. 4. 5: Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus, ii. p. 142.} \]

\[ c \text{ Nauck, op. cit., p. 486, Euripides, Frag. 411, vv. 2-4, from the Ino; cf. St. James, iii. 5, 6.} \]

\[ d \text{ Cf. the tale of Papirius Praetextatus, Aulus Gellius, i. 23.} \]
(507) μεθα δὴ τὸ τέρας ἐπε χρηστοὶν ἐπετα φαύλον ἦστι, καὶ συνδιαπορούμεν τοῖς μάντεσιν· ἀλλὰ σιώπα."

ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ὢχετ' εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν· ὡς δὲ τῶν θερά-

πανίδων εὐθὺς ἐφελκυσμενή τὴν πρώτην εἰς-

D ελθοῦσαν, ἔπαιε τὸ στήθος αὐτῆς καὶ τὰς τρίχας ἐσπάραττεν, "οἶμοι," λέγουσα, "τάνδρος καὶ τῆς πατρίδος· τὶ πεισόμεθα;" βουλομένη καὶ διδά-

σκουσα τὴν θεράπαιναν εἰπεῖν, "τί γὰρ γέγονεν;"

ός δ' οὖν πυθομένης διηγήσατο καὶ προσέθηκε τὸν

κοινὸν ἀπάσης ἀδολεσχίας ἐπωδών, τὸ "ταῦτα μηδενὶ φράσης ἀλλὰ σιώπα," οὗ φθάνει τὸ θερα-

πανίδιον ἀποχωρήσαντι, καὶ τῶν ὁμοδούλων εὐθὺς ἦν

μάλιστ' εἰδε σχολάζουσαν ἐμβάλλει τὸν

λόγον· ἐκείνη δὲ τῷ ἐραστῇ παραγενομένῳ πρὸς

αὐτὴν ἐφρασεν. οὕτω δ' εἰς ἀγοράν τοῦ διηγήματος

Ε ἐκκυλοσθέντος ὡστε προδραμεῖν τὸν πλασάμενον

τὴν φήμην, ἀπαντήσας τις αὐτῷ τῶν γνωρίμων,

"ἀρτίως," εἶπεν, "οἶκοθεν εἰς ἀγορὰν κατα-

βαίνεις;" "ἀρτίως," ἐφη ἐκεῖνος. "οὐκοῦν

οὐδὲν ἀκήκοας;" "γέγονε γὰρ τι καῖνον;"

"ἀλλ' κόρυδος ὡπται πετόμενοι κράνος ἔχων

χρυσοὺν καὶ δόρυ, καὶ μέλλουσι περὶ τούτου σύγ-

κλητον ἔχειν οἱ ἄρχοντες." κάκεινοι γελάσας,

"εὕ̣ τοῦ τάχους," εἶπεν, "ὁ γὰρ, τὸ καὶ φθάσαι

με τὸν λόγον εἰς ἀγορὰν προελθόντα." τοὺς μὲν

οὕν ἄρχοντας ἐντυχὼν ἀπήλλαξε τῆς ταραχῆς· τὴν

dὲ γυναῖκα τιμωρούμενος, ὡς οἰκαὶ εἰσῆλθεν,

"ἀπώλεσά μ'," εἶπεν, "ὁ γὰρ ἀπόρρη-

τον ἐκ τῆς ἐμῆς οἰκίας πεφώραται δεδημοσιωμένον·

ὠστε μοι φενκτέον ἐστὶ τὴν πατρίδα διὰ τὴν σὴν

Γ ἀκρασίαν." τρεπομένης δὲ πρὸς ἀρνησιν αὐτῆς

καῖνον; ἀλλὰ Reiske: καῖνον ἄλλο. 2 eũ] feũ Cobet.

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are therefore examining the portent whether it be good or bad, and are in constant consultation with the augurs. But do you hold your tongue.” So saying he went off to the Forum. But his wife at once seized the first maid to come into the room and beat her own breast and tore her hair. “Alas,” she cried, “for my husband and my country! What will become of us?” wishing, and in fact instructing, the maid to ask, “Why, what has happened?” So when the maid asked the question, she told the tale and added that refrain common to every babbler, “Keep this quiet and tell it to no one!” The little maid had scarcely left her when she herself tells the tale to that fellow servant who, she saw, had least to do; and this servant, in turn, told it to her lover who was paying a visit. With such speed was the story rolled out a into the Forum that it preceded its inventor: he was met by an acquaintance who said, “Have you just now come down to the Forum from home?” “This very moment,” said he. “Then you have heard nothing?” “Why, is there any news?” “A lark has been seen flying about with a gold helmet and a spear and the magistrates are going to convene the senate about the matter.” And the husband laughed and said, “All praise to your speed, my wife! The story has even reached the Forum before me!” So he interviewed the magistrates and relieved them of their anxiety; but, by way of punishing his wife, as soon as he entered home, he said, “Wife, you have ruined me! The secret has been discovered to have been made public from my house; consequently I am to be exiled from my native land because you lack self-control.” When she denied it

a As by the eccyclema on the Greek stage.
καὶ λεγοῦσιν, "οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα μετὰ τριακοσίων ἦκουσας;" "ποίων," ἔφη, "τριακοσίων; σοῦ βιαζομένης ἐπλασάμην ἀποπειρώμενος." οὕτος μὲν οὖν ἀσφαλῶς πάνυ καὶ μετ' εὐλαβείας, ὥσπερ εἰς ἀγγείον σαθρὸν οὐκ οίνον οὐκ ἔλαιον ἀλλ' 508 ύδωρ ἑγχέας, ἑπείρασε τὴν γυναῖκα.

Φούλβιος¹ δ' ὁ Καίσαρος ἐταῖρος τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ γέροντος ἦδη γεγονότος ἀκούσας ὀδυρομένον τὴν περὶ τὸν οἶκον ἑρμίαν, καὶ ὅτι τῶν μὲν δυεῖν αὐτῶς² θυγατρίδων ἀπολωλότων Ποστούμιον³ δ' ὁς ἔτι λοιπὸς ἔστιν ἐκ διαβολῆς τινος ἐν φυγῇ ὄντος ἀναγκάζεται τὸν τῆς γυναίκος υἱόν ἐπεισάγειν τῇ διαδοχῇ τῆς ἠγεμονίας, καίπερ οἰκτίρων καὶ βουλευόμενος ἐκ τῆς ὑπεροπίας ἀνακαλείσθαι τὸν θυγατρίδουν· ταῦτ' ὁ Φούλβιος ἀκούσας ἐξήνεγκε πρὸς τὴν ἐαυτοῦ γυναῖκα, πρὸς δὲ Λιβίαν ἐκείνην, Β Λιβία δὲ καθήσατο πικρῶς Καίσαρος, εἰ πάλαι ταῦτ' ἑγνωκὼς οὐ μεταπέμπτει τὸν θυγατρίδουν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἐχθραν καὶ πόλεμον αὐτὴν τῷ διαδόχῳ τῆς ἀρχῆς καθίστησιν. ἐλθόντος οὖν ἔσθεν, ὡς εἴσωθει, τοῦ Φούλβιον πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ εἶπόντος, "χαίρε, Καίσαρ," "ὑγίαιν," εἶπε, "Φούλβιε." κάκεινος νοῆσας ὄχει' εὐθὺς ἀπὶ ὅλων οὐκαδὲ, καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα μεταπεμφάμενος, "ἐγνωκεν," ἔφη, "Καίσαρ, ὅτι τάπορρητον οὐκ ἐσιώτησα· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μέλλω

¹ Φούλβιος'] Φάβιος Μεζιριακός.
² αὐτῷ D: αὐτοῖ.
³ Ποστούμιον Wilamowicz.
and said, "What, didn’t you hear it in company with three hundred others?" "Three hundred, nonsense!" said he. "You made such a fuss that I had to invent the whole story to try you out." Thus this man made trial of his wife cautiously and in complete safety, pouring, as it were into a leaky vessel, not wine or oil, but water.

But Fulvius, the friend of Caesar Augustus, heard the emperor, now an old man, lamenting the desolation of his house: two of his grandsons were dead, and Postumius, the only one surviving, was in exile because of some false accusation, and thus he was forced to import his wife’s son into the imperial succession; yet he pitied his grandson and was planning to recall him from abroad. Fulvius divulged what he had heard to his own wife, and she to Livia; and Livia bitterly rebuked Caesar: if he had formed this design long ago, why did he not send for his grandson, instead of making her an object of enmity and strife to the successor to the empire. Accordingly, when Fulvius came to him in the morning, as was his custom, and said, "Hail, Caesar," Caesar replied, "Farewell, Fulvius." And Fulvius took his meaning and went away; going home at once, he sent for his wife, "Caesar has found out," he said, "that I have not kept his secret, and there-

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a Plutarch is probably quoting a verse, as Wilamowitz has seen:

\[ \text{ἐσ ἀγγείων σαθρόν} \\
\text{οὐκ οἶνον οὐδὲ ἐλαῖον ἀλλ' ὑδρῷ χέας.} \]

b Fabius Maximus in Tacitus, Annals, i. 5, who relates the story quite differently.

c Gaius and Lucius Caesar.

d Postumus Agrippa; cf. Tacitus, Annals, i. 3.

e Tiberius.

f "Ave, Caesar"; "Vale, Fulvi."

C 12. Ὁρθῶς οὖν Φιλιππίδης ὁ κωμωδιοποιὸς ἐφιλοφρονομένου τοῦ βασιλέως αὐτῶν Δανιμάχου καὶ λέγοντος, “τίνος σοι μεταδό τῶν ἐμῶν;” “οὐ βουλεῖ,” φησί, “ βασιλεῖ, πλῆν τῶν ἀπορρήτων.” τῇ δ’ ἁδόλεσχια καὶ η ἁπεργεῖα κακὸν οὐκ ἔλαττον πρόσεπτο. πολλὰ γὰρ ἀκούειν θέλουσιν, ἣν πολλὰ λέγειν ἔχωσι καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἀπορρήτους καὶ κεκρυμμένους τῶν λόγων περιώντες ἐξίχνευσον καὶ ἀνεφεύγουσι, ὥσπερ ὑλὴν παλαιὰν τινα φορτίων τῇ φλυαρίᾳ παρατιθεμένου, εἰθ’ ὥσπερ οἱ παιδες τὸν κρύσταλλον οὐτε δύνανται κατέχειν οὔτ’

D ἀθείναι θέλουσιν μᾶλλον δ’ ὥσπερ ἐρπετὰ τοὺς ἀπορρήτους λόγους ἐγκολπισάμενου καὶ συλλαβόντες οὐ κρατοῦσιν ἀλλὰ διαβιβρώσκονται ὑπ’ αὐτῶν. τὰς μὲν γὰρ βελόνας φασὶ ῥήγνυσθαι τικτούσας καὶ τὰς ἑξίδνας, οἱ δ’ ἀπόρρητοι λόγοι τοὺς μὴ στέγονται ἐκπίπτοντες ἀπολλύοντι καὶ διαφθείρουσι.

Σέλευκος ὁ Καλλίνικος ἐν τῇ πρὸς Γαλάτας μάχῃ πάν ἀποβαλὼν τὸ στρατεύμα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν,

1 κωμωδιοποιὸς Bernardakis: κωμωδιοποίος.
2 καὶ] πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ most mss.
3 παλαιὰν] πυλαιὰν Bernardakis.
4 φορτίων] φορτῶν Wytenbach.
5 δύνανται added by W.C.H. after Reiske.
6 κρατοῦσιν] συγκρατοῦσιν all mss. but two.

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a Cf. 517 b, infra; Moralia, 183 ε; Life of Demetrius, xii. (894 d).

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fore I intend to kill myself.” “It is right that you should,” said his wife, “since, after living with me for so long a time, you have not learned to guard against my incontinent tongue. But let me die first.” And, taking the sword, she dispatched herself before her husband.

12. Philippides, a the comic poet, therefore, made the right answer when King Lysimachus courteously asked him, “What is there of mine that I may share with you?” and he replied, “Anything you like, Sire, except your secrets.” And to garrulousness is attached also a vice no less serious than itself, inquisitiveness. b For babblers wish to hear many things so that they may have many things to tell. And they go about tracking down and searching out especially those stories that have been kept hidden and are not to be revealed, storing up for their foolish gossip, as it were, a second-hand stock of hucksters’ wares; then, like children with a piece of ice, c they are neither able to hold it nor willing to let it go. Or rather, the secrets are like reptiles d which they catch and place in their bosoms, yet cannot confine them there, but are devoured by them; for pipe-fish e and vipers, they say, burst in giving birth, and secrets, when they escape, destroy and ruin those who cannot keep them.

Seleucus f the Victorious lost his entire army and power in the battle against the Gauls; he tore off his

b Cf. 519 c, infra.

c Proverbia Alexandr., i. 19 (Paroemiographi Graeci, i. p. 324); cf. Pearson on Sophocles, Frag. 149 (153 ed. Nauck).

d Cf. Aesop, Fable 97 ed. Halm.

e Cf. Aristotle, Historia Animalium, vi. 13 (567 b 23); De Generatione Animalium, iii. 4 (755 a 33).

f Cf. 489 a, supra.
(508) αὕτως δὲ περισσάς τὸ διάδημα καὶ φυγῶν ἵππω
μετὰ τριῶν ή τεττάρων ἀνοδίαις καὶ πλάναις πολὺν
δρόμον, ἢδη δὲ ἐνδειαν ἀπαγορεύσων ἐπαυλίω τινὶ
προσήλθε, καὶ τὸν δεσπότην αὐτὸν εὗρὼν κατὰ
τύχην ἄρτον καὶ ὑδρῷ ἤτησεν. ὦ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ
Εὐτῶν ἄλλων ὁσα παρῆν ἐν ἄγρῳ δαμιλῶς ἐπιδιδοὺς
καὶ φιλοφρονοῦμενος ἐγνώρισε τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ
βασιλέως, καὶ περιχαρῆς γενόμενος της συντυχίᾳ
τῆς χρείας οὐ κατέσχεν οὔδε συνεφεύσατο βουλο-
μένῳ λανθάνειν, ἀλλ’ ἂχρι τῆς ὅδου προπέμψας καὶ
ἀπολυόμενος, "ὕγιαίς," εἶπεν, "ο βασιλεῦ Σέ-
λευκε." ἦκακείνος έκτείνας τὴν δεξίαν αὕτῳ καὶ
προσελκόμενος ὡς φιλήσων, ἐνευσεν ἐν πῶν μετ’
αὐτοῦ ἔσφει τὸν τράχηλον ἀποκόψαι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

φθεγγομένου δ’ ἀρα τοῦ γε κάρη κονίησον ἐμίθη.
εἰ δ’ ἔσιγνησε τότε καρπερῆσας ὅλιγον χρόνον,
Εὐτυχήσαντος ὑστερον τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ μεγάλου
γενόμενο μείζονας ἄν, ῥαμι, χάριτας ἐκομίσατ’
ἀντὶ τῆς σιωπῆς ἢ τῆς φιλοξενίας.

Οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἁμωσωγέτως ἐσχε πρόφασιν τῆς
ἀκρασίας τῆς ἐλπίδα καὶ τῆς φιλοφροσύνης, (13) οἰ
dε πλείστοι τῶν ἀδολέσχων οὔτ’ αἰτίαν ἔχοντες
ἀπολλύονσιν αὐτοὺς. οἰον ἐν κουρείῳ τινὶ λόγων
γνωμέων περὶ τῆς Διονυσίου τυραννίδος, ὡς
ἀδαμαντίνη καὶ ἄρρηκτός ἐστι, γελάσας ὁ κουρεύς,
"ταῦθ’ ὑμᾶς," ἐφη, "περὶ Διονυσίου λέγειν, οὐ

1 αὕτως δὲ Pohlenz: αὐτὸς or αὐτῷ δὲ.

a Homer, Il. ,x. 457.
crown with his own hands and fled on horseback with three or four companions. When he had travelled a long journey through winding ways and trackless wilds, at length becoming desperate from lack of food he approached a certain farmhouse. By chance he found the master himself and begged bread and water from him. And the farmer gave him lavishly both these and whatever else there was in a farmstead, and, while entertaining him hospitably, recognized the face of the king. In his joy at the fortunate chance of rendering service he could not restrain himself or dissemble as did the king, who wished to remain unknown, but he escorted the king to the highway and, on taking leave, said, "Fare well, King Seleucus." And Seleucus, stretching out his right hand to him and drawing him towards himself as though to kiss him, gave a sign to one of his companions to cut off the man's head with a sword:

Still speaking his head was mingled with the dust. But if the man had remained silent at that time and had mastered himself for a little while, when the king later won success and regained power, he would have earned, I fancy, an even larger reward for his silence than for his hospitality.

This man, it is true, had as something of an excuse for his incontinence his hopes and the friendly service he had rendered; (13) but most talkers do not even have a reason for destroying themselves. For example, people were once talking in a barber's shop about how adamantine \(^b\) and unbreakable the despotism of Dionysius was. The barber laughed and said, "Fancy your saying that about Dionysius, when I

\(^b\) Cf. Life of Dion, vii. (961 a), x. (962 b); Aelian, Varia Historia, vi. 12.
ἐγὼ παρ’ ἡμέρας ὀλίγας ἐπὶ τοῦ τραχήλου τὸ ἔξυρον ἤχω. ’Ταύτ’ ἀκούσας ὁ Διονύσιος ἀνεσταύρωσεν αὐτόν.

'Επιεικῶς δὲ λάλων ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν κουρέων γένος: οἱ γὰρ ἀδολεσχότατοι προσρέουσι καὶ προσκαθίζουσιν, ὡστ’ αὐτοὺς ἀναπήμπλασθαί τῆς συνθείας. χαριέντως γοῦν ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἀρχέλαος ἀδολέσχον κουρέως περιβαλόντος αὐτῷ τὸ ὕμολινον καὶ πυθομένου, "πῶς σε κείρω, βασιλεῦ;" "σιωπῶν," ἐφή. κουρεὺς δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων μεγάλην κακοπραγιάν ἀπήγγειλε πρῶτος, ἐν Πειραιᾷ πυθόμενος οἰκέτου τινὸς τῶν ἀποδεδρακότων ἐκείθεν. εἰτ’ ἀφεῖς τὸ ἐργαστήριον εἰς ἀστυ συνέτεινε δρόμω

μὴ τις κύδος ἄροιτο

Β τὸν λόγον εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐμβαλών,

ὁ δὲ δεύτερος ἔλθοι.

gενομένης δὲ ταραχῆς, οἶνον εἰκός, εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ἀθροισθεῖς ὁ δήμος ἐπὶ τὴν ἁρχὴν ἐβάδιζε τῆς φήμης. ἦγετ’ οὖν ὁ κουρεὺς καὶ ἀνεκρίνετο, μηδὲ τούνομα τοῦ φράσαντος εἰδὼς ἄλλ’ εἰς ἀνώνυμον καὶ ἄγνωστον ἀναφέρων τὴν ἁρχὴν πρόσωπον. ὁργὴ δὴ καὶ βοὴ τοῦ θεάτρου: "βασάνιζε καὶ στρέβλου τὸν ἀλάστορα: πέπλασται τάντα καὶ συντέθειες2: τίς δ’ ἄλλος ἥκουσε; τίς δ’ ἐπίστευσεν;" ἐκομίσθη τροχός, κατετάθη ὁ ἀνθρώπος.

Ο ἐν τούτῳ παρῆσαν οἱ τῆς συμφορὰν ἀπαγγέλλοντες,

1 δὴ Pohlenz: δὲ or οὖν (omitted in most mss.).
2 συντέθειε] συντέθειται or συντέθηκε most mss.
CONCERNING TALKATIVENESS, 508–509

have my razor at his throat every few days or so!" When Dionysius heard this, he crucified the barber.

It is not strange that barbers are a talkative clan, for the greatest chatterboxes stream in and sit in their chairs, so that they are themselves infected with the habit. It was a witty answer, for instance, that King Archelaüs a gave to a loquacious barber, who, as he wrapped his towel around him, asked, "How shall I cut your hair, Sire?" "In silence," said Archelaüs. And it was a barber b also who first announced the great disaster of the Athenians in Sicily, having learned it in the Peiraeus from a slave, one of those who had escaped from the island. Then the barber left his shop and hurried at full speed to the city,

Lest another might win the glory of imparting the news to the city,

and he come second. c

A panic naturally arose and the people gathered in assembly and tried to come at the origin of the rumour. So the barber was brought forward and questioned; yet he did not even know the name of his informant, but referred the origin to a nameless and unknown person. The assembly was enraged and cried out, "Torture the cursed fellow! Put him on the rack! He has fabricated and concocted this tale! Who else heard it? Who believed it?" The wheel was brought and the man was stretched upon it. Meanwhile there arrived bearers of the disas-

a Cf. Moralia, 177 A.

b Cf. Life of Nicias, xxx. (542 D-E).

c Homer, Il., xxii. 207.
(509) ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔργου διαπεφευγότες. ἐσκεδάσθησαν οὖν πάντες ἐπὶ τὰ οἴκεια πένθη, καταλιπόντες ἐν τῷ τροχῷ τὸν ἀθλιὸν ἐνδεδεμένον. ὲψὲ δὲ λυθεὶς ἦδη πρὸς ἐσπέραν ἡρώτα τὸν δημόσιον· εἰ καὶ περὶ Νικίου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ὃν τρόπον ἀπόλωλεν, ἀκη-κόασιν. οὔτως ἀμαχόν τι κακόν καὶ ἀνουθέτητον ἢ συνήθεια ποιεῖ τὴν ἁδολεσχίαν.

14. Καίτοι γ' ὠσπερ οἵ τὰ πικρὰ καὶ τὰ δυσώδη φάρμακα πιόντες δυσχεραίνουσι καὶ τὰς κύλικας, οὔτως οἵ τὰ κακὰ προσαγγέλλοντες ὑπὸ τῶν ἀκούόντων δυσχεραίνονται καὶ μισοῦνται. οὐδὲν2 χαριέντως ὁ Σοφοκλῆς δηιπόρηκεν,

Φ. ἐν τοῖς ὁσίων ἡ 'πι τῇ ψυχῇ δάκην;

Κ. τί δὲ ρυθμίζεις τὴν ἐμὴν λύπην ὅπου;3

Φ. ὁ δρῶν σ' ἀνιᾷ τὰς φρένας, τὰ δ' ὥτ' ἐγώ.

λυποῦνδ' οὖν ὠσπερ οἱ δρῶντες καὶ οἱ λέγοντες, ἀλλ' ὁμοία οὐκ ἐστὶ γλώσσης ῥεούσης ἐπίσχεσις οὐδὲ κολασμός.

Ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τῆς Χαλκιοίκου τὸ ἱερὸν ὁφθη σεσυλημένον, καὶ κεμένη ἐνδον κενὴ λάγυνος. τὸν οὖν ἀπορία πολλῶν συνδεδραμηκότων, καὶ τις τῶν παρόντων, "εἰ βουλεσθ', ἐγώ φράσω υμίν δ' μοι παρίσταται περὶ τῆς λαγύνον· νομίζω γάρ," ἐφη, "τοὺς ἑροσύλους ἐπὶ τηλικοῦτον ἐλθεῖν κύνδυνον

Εκ κοινεῖον ἐμπίοντας καὶ κομιζόντας οἶνον, ἵνα εἰ μὲν αὐτοῖς λαθεῖν ἐγγένοιτο, τὸ ἀκράτω ποθέντι σβέ- σαντες καὶ διαλύσαντες τὸ φάρμακον ἀπέλθοιεν ἀσφαλῶς· εἰ δ' ἀλίσκοιντο, πρὸ τῶν βασάνων ὑπὸ

1 δήμον G.
2 οὐδὲν] καίτοι (γε) most mss.
3 ὅπου] ὅτι or ὅπη most mss.
trous news, men who had escaped from the slaughter itself. All, therefore, dispersed, each to his private mourning, leaving the wretched fellow bound on the wheel. But when he was set free late in the day when it was already nearly evening, he asked the executioner if they had also heard “how the general, Nicias, had died.” Such an unconquerable and incorrigible evil does habit make garrulity.

14. And yet, just as those who have drunk bitter and evil-smelling drugs are disgusted with the cups as well, so those who bear ill tidings cause disgust and hatred in those who hear them. Therefore Sophocles has very neatly raised the question:

Gu. Is it in ear or soul that you are stung?—
Cr. But why seek to define where lies my pain?—
Gu. The doer grieves your heart, I but your ears.

Be that as it may, speakers also cause pain, just as doers do, but none the less there is no checking or chastening a loose tongue.

The temple of Athena of the Brazen House at Sparta was discovered to have been plundered, and an empty flask was found lying inside. The large crowd which had quickly formed was quite at a loss, when one of the bystanders said, “If you wish, I shall tell you what occurs to me about that flask. I think that the robbers, before undertaking so dangerous a task, drank hemlock and brought along wine, so that, if they should escape detection, by drinking the unmixed wine they might quench the poison and rid themselves of its evil effects, and so might get away safely; but if they should be caught, that they might

a Antigoné, 317-319: Creon and the Guard who brings news of the attempted burial of Polyneices are the speakers.
b Cf. Moralia, 61 b, 653 a.
τοῦ φαρμάκου ῥαδίως καὶ ἀνωδύνως ἀποθάνονεν." ταῦτ' εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ τὸ πράγμα πλοκήν ἔχον καὶ
περινόησιν τοσαύτην οὐχ ὑπονοοῦντος ἀλ' εἰδότος
ἐφαίνετο. καὶ περιστάντες αὐτὸν ἀνέκριναν ἅλ-
λαχόθεν' ἄλλος, "τίς εί;" καὶ "τίς σ' οἶδε;' καὶ
"πόθεν ἐπίστασαι ταῦτα;" καὶ τὸ πέρας
ἐλεγχόμενος οὔτως ὀμολογήσεν εἰς εἶναι τῶν ἱερο-
σύλων.

Οἱ δ' Ἰβύκον ἀποκτείναντες οὐχ οὔτως ἐάλωσαν,
Φ ἐν θεάτρῳ καθήμενοι2 καὶ γεράνων παραφανείσων
πρὸς ἄλληλος ἁμα γέλωτι ψιθυρίζοντες, ὡς αἰ
Ἰβύκον ἕκδικοι πάρεισιν; ἀκούσαντες γὰρ οἱ
καθεξόμενοι πλησίον, ἦδη τοῦ Ἰβύκον πολὺν
χρόνον οὖν ἀφανός καὶ ξητουμένου, ἐπελάβοντο
τῆς φωνῆς καὶ προσήγγειλαν τοῖς ἄρχουσιν. ἐλεγ-
χθέντες δ' οὔτως ἀπήχθησαν, οὐχ ὑπὸ τῶν γεράνων
510 κολασθέντες ἅλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτῶν γλωσσαλγίας
ὡσπερ Ἕρμνύος ἡ Ποινῆς βιασθέντες ἔξαγορεύσαι
tὸν φόνον. ὡς γὰρ ἐν τῷ σώματι πρὸς τὰ πε-
πονθότα μέρη καὶ ἀλγοῦντα γίνεται φορὰ καὶ ὀλκῇ
tῶν πλησίον, οὔτως ἡ γλῶττα τῶν ἀδολέσχων οἰ
φλεγμονὴν ἔχουσα καὶ σφυγμὸν ἔλκει τι καὶ συνάγει
tῶν ἀπορρήτων καὶ κεκρυμμένων ἐφ' ἑαυτήν. διὸ
δεῖ πεφράχθαι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ὡς πρόβολον ἐμ-
ποδῶν ἀεὶ τῇ γλώττῃ κείμενον ἐπίσχειν τὸ βέβαια
καὶ τὸν οἶλουσθον αὐτῆς, ἱνα μὴ τῶν χρημῶν ἀφρονέ-
στεροί εἶναι δοκῶμεν, οὐς φασίν, ὅταν ὑπερβάλλω-

1 ἅλλαχόθεν] ἅλλοθεν a few mss.
2 καθεξόμενοι most mss.

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die an easy and painless death from the poison before they should be put to the torture." When he had said this, the explanation appeared so very complicated and subtle that it did not seem to come from fancy, but from knowledge; and the people surrounded him and questioned him one after another, "Who are you?" "Who knows you?" "How did you come to know this?" and at last he was put through so thorough an examination that he confessed to being one of the robbers.

Were not the murderers of Ibycus a caught in the same way? They were sitting in a theatre, and when cranes came in sight, they laughed and whispered to each other that the avengers of Ibycus were come. Persons sitting near overheard them, and since Ibycus had disappeared and now for a long time had been sought, they caught at this remark and reported it to the magistrates. And thus the slayers were convicted and led off to prison, not punished by the cranes, but compelled to confess the murder by the infirmity of their own tongues, as it were some Fury or spirit of vengeance. For as in the body the neighbouring parts are borne by attraction toward diseased and suffering parts, so the tongue of babblers, ever inflamed and throbbing, draws and gathers to itself some portion of what has been kept concealed and should not be revealed. Therefore the tongue must be fenced in, and reason must ever lie, like a barrier, in the tongue's way, checking its flow and keeping it from slipping, in order that we may not be thought to be less sensible than geese, b of whom they relate that when from

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a The parallel accounts are collected by Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca*, ii. pp. 78 ff.  
b *Cf. Moralia*, 967 b.
15. Εἰ τοῖνυν ἔροιτό τις,

τὸν κάκιστον ὡστὶς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸν ἔξωλέστατον,

οὐδεὶς ἄν ἄλλον εἶποι τὸν ἐπὶ προδότην παρελθὼν.

Εὔθυκράτης μὲν οὖν " ἥρεφε τὴν οἰκίαν τοῖς ἐκ
Μακεδονίας ξύλοις," ὡς φησὶ Δημοσθένης: Φιλο-
κράτης δὲ χρυσίον πολὺ λαβὼν "πόρνας καὶ
ἱχθὺς ἥγοραζεν." Εὐφόρβω δὲ καὶ Φιλάγρῳ τοῖς
Ἐρέτριαν προδοσεὶ χύραιν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐδωκεν. ὁ
δὲ ἀδόλεσχος ἀμισθός ἐστὶ προδότης καὶ αὐτεπάγ-

C γελτος, οὐχ ἵππους οὐδὲ τείχη προδιδοὺς, ἀλλὰ
λόγους ἐκφέρων ἀπορρήτους ἐν δίκαις ἐν στάσεσιν
ἐν διαπολιτείαις, μηδὲνὸς αὐτῷ χάριν ἔχοντος ἀλλ' αὐτὸς, ἄν ἀκούνται, προσοφέιλων χάριν. ὡστε τὸ
λελεγμένον πρὸς τὸν ἐκή καὶ ἀκρίτως ἐκχέοντα τὰ
ἐαυτοῦ καὶ καταχαριζόμενον

οὐ φιλάνθρωπος σὺ γ' ἐσσ' ἐχεις νόσον, χαίρεις

didou's

ἐναρμόττει καὶ πρὸς τὸν φλύαρον: "οὐ φίλος εἰ σὺ

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1 ἐμβάλλοντας] ἐμβαλόντας most mss.
2 τὸν] ἦ τὸν most mss.
3 αὐτὸς, ἄν Pohl., ἄν αὐτός.
4 σὺ γ'] τῦ γ' Life of Publicola, xv.
Cilicia they cross Mt. Taurus, which is full of eagles, they take a great stone in their mouths to serve as a bolt or bridle for their scream, and pass over at night unobserved.

15. Now if anyone were to ask,

Who is the most wicked and the most abandoned man, no one would pass the traitor by and name anyone else. So Euthycrates ć "roofed his house with the timber he got from Macedon," e as Demosthenes d says, and Philocrates e received much money and "bought strumpets and fish"; and to Euphorbus and Philagrus, who betrayed Eretria, the king f gave land. But the babbler is a traitor who volunteers his services without pay: he does not betray horses g or city-walls, but divulges secrets connected with lawsuits, party strife, and political manoeuvres. No one thanks him, but he himself, if he can win a hearing, must owe thanks. The result is that the verse directed at the man who recklessly and injudiciously pours forth and squanders his own possessions,

You are not generous: it's your disease,
You love to give;¹

fits the foolish talker also: "You are no friend or

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² An error for Lasthenes; Plutarch mentions both traitors together in Moralia, 97 d.
³ For Macedonia as the source of timber supply, cf. Inscr. Graec., i 2. 105.
⁴ De Falsa Legatione, 265.
⁵ Ibid. 229; cf. Moralia, 668 a, 97 d.
⁶ Darius I; cf. Herodotus, vi. 101; Pausanias, vii. 10. 2.
⁷ Perhaps an allusion to Dolon's betrayal of the horses of Rhesus; cf. Il., x. 436 ff.
(510) ταῦτα μηνύων οὕτοι εὖνος: ἔχεις νόσου, χαίρεις λαλῶν καὶ φλυαρῶν.

16. Ταῦτα δ' οὐ κατηγορίαν ἡγητέον ἅλλ' ἱατρείαν τῆς ἄδολεσχίας· τῶν γὰρ παθῶν κρίσει καὶ ἀσκήσει περιγρώμεθα, προτέραν δ' ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν.

Δ' οὖν γὰρ ἐθίζεται φεύγειν καὶ ἀποτρίβεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ μὴ δυσχεραίνει, δυσχεραίνομεν δὲ τὰ πάθη, οταν τὰς βλάβας καὶ τὰς αἰσχύνας τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῷ λόγῳ κατανοῆσαι. ὃσπερ νῦν κατανοοῦμεν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄδολέσχων, ὃτι φιλείσθαι βουλόμενοι μισοῦνται, χαρίζεσθαι θέλοντες ἐνοχλοῦσι, θαυμάζεσθαι δοκοῦντες καταγελώνται, κερδαίνοντες οὐδὲν ἀναλίκουσιν, ἀδικοῦσι τοὺς φίλους, ὥφελουσι τοὺς ἔχθροὺς, ἐαυτοὺς ἀπολλύόμενοι. ὃστε τούτο πρώτον ἱαμα καὶ φάρμακόν ἐστι τοῦ πάθους, ὁ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γινομένων αἰσχρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν ἐπιλογισμός.

17. Δευτέρω δὲ χρηστεύον ἐπιλογισμῷ τῶν τῶν Ἐναντίων, ἀκούοντας ἀεὶ καὶ μεμνημένους καὶ πρόχειρ' ἐχοντας τὰ τῆς ἐχεμυθίας ἐγκώμια, καὶ τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ τὸ ἁγιὸν καὶ τὸ μυστηριῶδες τῆς σιωπῆς, καὶ ὃτι θαυμάζονται μᾶλλον καὶ ἀγαπῶνται καὶ σοφώτεροι δοκοῦσί τῶν ἐξήνων τούτων καὶ ἐκφερομένων· οἱ συγγύλιοι καὶ βραχυλόγουι, καὶ ὁν πολὺς νοῦς ἐν οὐλίγῃ λέξει συνεστάλται. καὶ γὰρ Πλάτων τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἐπαινεῖ, δεινοῖς ἄκον-

1 προτέρα D: πρότερον.
2 ἐκφερομένων Pohlenz: θερομένων.

* Cf. 504 ε, supra.
well-wisher in revealing this: it's your disease, you love to be babbling and prating."

16. But these remarks are not to be regarded as an accusation against garrulity, but an attempt to cure it; for we get well by the diagnosis and treatment of our ailments, but the diagnosis must come first; since no one can become habituated to shun or to eradicate from his soul what does not distress him, and we only grow distressed with our ailments when we have perceived, by the exercise of reason, the injuries and shame which result from them. Thus, in the present instance, we perceive in the case of babblers that they are hated when they wish to be liked, that they cause annoyance when they wish to please, that they are laughed at when they think they are admired, that they spend their money without any gain, that they wrong their friends, help their enemies, and destroy themselves. Consequently this is the first step in curing the disease—by the application of reason to discover the shameful and painful effects that result from it.

17. And the second is that we must apply our reasoning powers to the effects of the opposite behaviour, always hearing and remembering and keeping close at hand the praises bestowed on reticence, and the solemn, holy, and mysterious character of silence, remembering also that terse and pithy speakers and those who can pack much sense into a short speech are more admired and loved, and are considered to be wiser, than these unbridled and headstrong talkers. Plato, in fact, commends such pithy men, declaring that they are like skilful throwers

\[b\] Cf. 504 A, 505 F, supra.
\[c\] Cf. Protagoras, 342 F.
tistais èoukéna lègos, oûla kai pukvá kai svнестраммénva òhegygømenous. kai ó Lükourgos eis taúthn tìn deunóthta toùs politéas eùthús ék paídwn

F tí swosth pieçwv suvnige kai kataqynouv. katháper gáp oí Kéltibhres ék toû sýdôrou to stómmwma pouoúon, ótan katortzáantes eis tîn gîn tò polû kai kevódes áppokatháropwv, oûtôs ó Lákwnikós lógos ouk éxhe floulv, álly eis ávto tò drástîrion ãfairési tòp periíttoù dioukoúmenos1 stómmwta: tó gáp ápofthegmatikòn ávtois toû to kai tò met' 511 eýuntrófias òxì pros tás apantìseis ék tîs pollíhs periýnteta swosth.

Kai déi tâ toisáta máliota toûs ãdolésoùs prosbýllèiv2 òssthn á ARCHIE kai dínâmìn, oîn èstî tò "Lákedâmynoi Filîtrew. Dionússios eûn Kó-rínwv." kai pálw grápánntos ávtois toû Filîtrewv, "àv èmbálw eîs tîn Lákwnikh, ánanástatous ùmàs pouísw," ántegráfàn, "áika." Dhimntrión dé toû bâsiléwv áganaftóûntos kai boûntos, "'ènà proû èmè Lákedámynoi prosbévtîn ëpemíav:" ou kata-

plageîs ò prosbévtîs, "èv", èite, "potí èvà." 

Thumâxontai dé kai tûn palaióvn oí brachylógon, kai tû ìerô tòu Pûthiû 'Apólloûsov oû tîn 'Ilíáda B kai tûn Òdússesian oûdè toûs Ìphdárou pavânas èpêgrávían oí 'Ampfiktûones, àllâ tò "gñôthi sau-

1 dioukoûmenos Capps: diowkómenos.
2 prosbùllèiv] prosbùllèiv most mss.

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* That is, they speak, as the acontist throws, with the sure aim which puts the adversary to rout with a single cast.

b Cf. Life of Lycurgus, xix. (51 D-E).
of the javelin, for what they say is crisp, solid, and compact.\(^a\) And Lycurgus,\(^b\) constraining his fellow-citizens from their earliest childhood to acquire this clever habit by means of silence, made them concise and terse in speech. For just as the Celtiberians\(^c\) make steel from iron by burying it in the earth and then cleaning off the large earthy accumulation, so the speech of Spartans has no dross, but being disciplined by the removal of all superfluities, it is tempered to complete efficiency; for this capacity of theirs for aphoristic speech and for quickness and the ability to turn out a neat phrase in repartee is the fruit of much silence.

And we must be careful to offer to chatterers examples of this terseness, so that they may see how charming and how effective they are. For example: "The Spartans to Philip: Dionysius in Corinth."\(^d\) And again, when Philip wrote to them, "If I invade Laconia, I shall turn you out," they wrote back, "If." And when King Demetrius\(^e\) was annoyed and shouted, "Have the Spartans sent only one envoy to me?" the envoy replied undismayed, "One to one."

And among the men of old also sententious speakers are admired, and upon the temple of the Pythian Apollo the Amphictyons inscribed, not the Iliad and the Odyssey or the paeans of Pindar, but "Know thy-

\(^a\) Cf. Diodorus, v. 33. 4.

\(^b\) Cf. Tryphon apud Spengel, Rhetores Graeci, iii. p. 202; Quintilian, viii. 6. 52; Dionysius the Younger upon being expelled from Syracuse (cf. Moralia, 783 d) kept a school in Corinth. The expression is somewhat like saying, "Remember St. Helena."

\(^c\) Cf. Life of Demetrius, xlii. (909 c); Moralia, 233 e. In Moralia, 216 b, Agis (the Younger?) makes the remark to Philip.
PLUTARCH’S MORALIA

(511) τὸν” καὶ τὸ “μηδὲν ἄγαν” καὶ τὸ “ἔγγυα πάρα δ’ ἄτα,” θαυμάσατες τῆς λέξεως τὸ εὑογκον καὶ τὸ λιτὸν, ἐν βραχεὶ σφυρήλατον νοῦν περιεχούσης. οὐτὸς δ’ ὁ θεὸς οὐ φιλοσύντομός ἐστι καὶ βραχυλόγος ἐν τοῖς χρησμοῖς, καὶ Λοξίας καλεῖται διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ἀσάφειαν; οἱ δὲ συμβολικῶς ἄνευ φωνῆς ἢ δεῖ φράζοντες οὐκ ἐπαινοῦνται καὶ θαυμάζονται διαφερόντως; ὡς Ἡράκλειτος, ἄξιοντων αὐτῶν τῶν πολιτῶν γνώμην C τών εἰπεῖν περὶ ὁμονοίας, ἀναβάς ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα καὶ λαβόν τινα ψυχρὰ κύλικα καὶ τῶν ἀλφίτων ἔπιπάσας καὶ τῶν γλήξων κινήσας, ἐκπιόν ἀπῆλθεν, ἐπιδειξάμενος αὐτός ὅτι τὸ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν ἀρκεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ δεισθαι τῶν πολυτέλων ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ ὁμονοίᾳ διατηρεῖ τὰς πόλεις. Σκίλουρος δὲ καταλιπὼν ὁγονοκοντα πάτας, ὁ Σκυθῶν βασιλεὺς, ἢτησε δέσμην δοράτων, ὅτ᾽ ἀπέθησε, καὶ λαβόντας ἐκέλευσε καταβράσαι καὶ κατάξαι συνεδρεύειν καὶ ἀθρόαν· ως δ’ ἀπείπον, αὐτὸς ἔλκων ἐν καθ᾽ ἐν ἀπαντα βαδίως διέκλασε, τὴν συμφωνίαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ὁμόνοιαν ἰσχυρὸν ἀποφαίνων καὶ δυσκαθαίρετον, D ἀσθενεῖς δὲ τὴν διάλυσιν καὶ οὐ μόνιμον.

18. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα συνεχῶς τοῖς ἐπὶοι1 καὶ ἀναλαμβάνοι, παύσαιτ’ αὖν ἰδίος ἂδομενος τῷ φιλαρείν. ἐμὲ δὲ κάκεινος ὁ οἰκέτης εὐ μάλα δυσωπεῖ, τὸ προσέχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κρατεῖν προαι-

1 ἐπίοι Stegmann, confirmed by G: ἐπίοι οὗ σκοπεῖ.

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a Cf. Moralia, 408 e, 385 d, 164 b; Pausanias, x. 24. 1; Tryphphon, l.c.; Plato, Charmides, 165 A.

b Cf. Moralia, 164 b.

c As though derived from λοξός, “slanting,” “ambiguous”; and see Roscher, s.v.

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self” and “Avoid extremes” and “Give a pledge and mischief is at hand,” admiring, as they did, the compactness and simplicity of the expression which contains within a small compass a well-forged sentiment. And is not the god himself fond of conciseness and brevity in his oracles, and is he not called Loxias because he avoids prolixity rather than obscurity? And are not those who indicate by signs, without a word, what must be done, praised and admired exceedingly? So Heracleitus, when his fellow-citizens asked him to propose some opinion about concord, mounted the platform, took a cup of cold water, sprinkled it with barley-meal, stirred it with penny-royal, drank it up, and departed, thus demonstrating to them that to be satisfied with whatever they happen upon and not to want expensive things is to keep cities in peace and concord. And Scilurus, king of the Scythians, left behind him eighty sons; when he was dying, he asked for a bundle of spear-shafts and bade his sons take it and break it in pieces, tied closely together as the shafts were. When they gave up the task, he himself drew all the spears out one by one and easily broke them in two, thus revealing that the harmony and concord of his sons was a strong and invincible thing, but that their disunion would be weak and unstable.

18. If anyone will but review and recollect constantly these and similar instances, he may conceivably stop taking pleasure in foolish chatter. But as for me, that famous case of the slave puts me utterly to shame when I reflect what immense importance it

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*a* Cf. Diogenes Laertius, vii. 66.  
* Cf. *Moralia*, 174 f and Nachstädt’s note *ad loc.*
(511) ἰλίκον ἐστὶν ἐνθυμούμενον. Πούπιος Πει-σων ἄρχοντα δεξιώσασθαι βουλόμενος ἐνοχλεῖσθαι προσέταξε
τοῖς οἰκέταις πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτώμενα λαλεῖν καὶ μηδὲν
πλέον. ἔτα Κλώδιον ἄρχοντα δεξιώσασθαι βουλό-
μενος ἐκέλευσε κληθῆναι, καὶ παρεσκευάσατο λαμ-
πράν ὡς εἰκὸς ἐστίασιν. ἐνστάσης δὲ τῆς ὧρας,
οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι παρήσαν ὦ δὲ Κλώδιος προσεδοκάτο.
Ε καὶ πολλάκις ἐπεμπε τὸν εἰσβότα καλεῖν οἰκέτην
ἐπομόμενον εἰ πρόσευσιν. ὡς δ᾽ ἦν ἐσπέρα καὶ
ἀπέγνωστο, "τί δ᾽;" ἐφη πρὸς τὸν οἰκέτην,
"ἐκάλεσας αὐτόν;" "ἔγωγ᾽," εἶπε. "διὰ τί οὖν
οὐκ ἀφίκτατι;" κάκεινος, "Ὅτι ἡρυθήσατο." "πῶς
οὖν οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐφρασάς;" "Ὅτι τοῦτό μ᾽ οὐκ
ἡρωτήσας." οὕτως⁠¹ μὲν Ῥωμαίκος οἰκέτης, ὦ δ᾽
'Αττικὸς ἐρεὶ τῷ δεσπότῃ σκάπτων
ἐφ᾽ οἷς γεγόνασιν αἱ διαλύσεις.

οὕτως μέγα πρὸς πάνθ᾽ ὁ ἐθισμὸς ἐστι, καὶ περὶ
tοῦτον γ᾽ ἥδη λέγωμεν.

19. Οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὡς χαλινῶν ἐφαψαμένους ἐπι-
σχεῖν τὸν ἄδολεσχήν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐθεὶ δεὶ κρατήσαι τοῦ
νουσήματος. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τῶν πέλας
F ἑρωτήσεσιν ἔαυτὸν ἐθιζέτω² σιωπᾶν μέχρι ὦν
πάντες ἀπείπωνται τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.

οὐ γὰρ τι βουλῆς ταῦτό καὶ δρόμου τέλος,
ὡς φησὶ Σοφοκλῆς, οὐδὲ γε φωνῆς καὶ ἀποκρίσεως·

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¹ οὕτως G: οὕτος.
² ἐθιζέ σαυτὸν in some mss.

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⁠a Kock, Com. Att. Frag., iii. p. 473, ades. 347; cf. 518 F—
519 Α, infra.
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is to pay attention to what is said and to be master of our purpose. Pupius Piso, the orator, not wishing to be troubled, ordered his slaves to speak only in answer to questions and not a word more. Subsequently, wishing to pay honour to Clodius when he was a magistrate, Piso gave orders that he be invited to dinner and prepared what was, we may suppose, a sumptuous banquet. When the hour came, the other guests were present, but Clodius was still expected, and Piso repeatedly sent the slave who regularly carried invitations to see if Clodius was approaching. And when evening came and he was finally despaired of, Piso said to the slave, "See here, did you give him the invitation?" "I did," said the slave. "Why hasn't he come then?" "Because he declined." "Then why didn't you tell me at once?" "Because you didn't ask me that." So a Roman slave, but the Athenian slave while digging will tell his master

On what terms the truce is made, a

so great in all things is the force of habit. And of this let us now speak.

19. For it is impossible to check the babbler by gripping the reins, as it were; his disease must be mastered by habituation. In the first place, then, when questions are asked of neighbours, let him accustom himself to remaining silent until all have refused a response:

For counsel's aim is not that of a race, b

as Sophocles c says, nor, indeed, is this the aim of

b To see who can get to the goal first.

512 ἀνθρώπου λαβεῖν· ἔαν δὲ μὴ, τότε καὶ διδάξαι τὸ ἡγονημένον καὶ ἀναπληρώσαι τὸ ἐλλεῖπον ἀνεπι-φθονον καὶ οὐκ ἀκαίριον ἔστι. μάλιστα δὲ φυλάττω-μεν έαυτούς, ὅπως μὴ ἔτερον τινὸς ἐρωτηθέντος αὐτὸι προλαμβάνωμεν ὑποθάνοντες τὴν ἀπόκρισιν. ἵσως μὲν γὰρ οὐδ᾽ ἄλλοτε1 καλῶς ἔχον ἔστιν, αἰτηθέντος ἔτερον, παρωσιαμένους ἐκείνον αὐτούς ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι· δόξομεν γὰρ ἀμα καὶ τοῦτον ὡς παρασχεῖν δ αἰτεῖται μὴ δυνάμενον, κάκειν ὡς αἰτεῖν παρ᾽ ὃν δύναται λαβεῖν οὐκ ἐπιστάμενον ὀνειδίζειν· μάλιστα δ᾽ ὑβριν φέρει περὶ τὰς ἀπο-κρίσεις ἡ τοιαύτη προπέτεια καὶ θρασύτης. συν-

Β εμφαίνει γὰρ ὁ φθάνων ἐν τῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸν ἐρωτῶμεν τὸ· "τί τούτου δέγ;" καὶ "τί οὔτος οἶδε;" καὶ "ἐμοὶ παρόντος, περὶ τούτων οὐδένα δεὶ ἄλλον ἐρωτάν." καίτοι πολλάκις τινὰς ἐρωτῶ-μεν οὐ τοῦ λόγου δεόμενοι, φωνὴν δὲ τινα καὶ φιλοφροσύνην ἐκκαλοῦμενοι παρ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ προ-

αγαγεῖν εἰς ὀμιλίαν ἐθέλοντες, ὡς Σωκράτης Θεαίτητον καὶ Χαρμίδην. ὁμοίων οὖν τῷ τὸν ὑφ᾽ ἔτερου βουλόμενον φιληθῆναι προσδραμόντα2 φιλεῖν αὐτὸν ἡ τὸν ἐτέρω προσβλέποντα μεταστρέφειν εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὸ προλαμβάνειν τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ τὰ ὦτα μετάγειν, καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐλκείν καὶ ἀποστρέφειν Α πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁποῦ, κἂν ἀπείπηται τὸν λόγον ὁ

1 ἄλλοτε Pohlenz: ἄλλο (sic) τι.
2 προσδραμόντα Reiske, confirmed by mss.: προδραμόντα.
speaking and answering. For in a race the victory is his who comes in first; but here, if another makes a sufficient answer, it is proper to join in the approval and assent and so acquire the reputation of being a friendly fellow. But if such an answer is not made, then it is not invidious or inopportune both to point out the answer others have not known and thus to fill in the gap. And, in particular, let us be on our guard, when someone else has been asked a question, that we do not forestall him by taking the answer out of his mouth. For perhaps there are other times also when it is not seemly, another having been asked, to shoulder him aside and volunteer ourselves, since we shall seem to be casting a slur both on the man asked, as being unable to furnish what is demanded of him, and on the asker, as being ignorant of the source from which he can get help; and, in particular, such precipitancy and boldness in answering questions smacks of insolence. For one who tries to get in the answer ahead of the man who is questioned suggests, “What do you need him for?” or “What does he know?” or “When I am present, no one else should be asked about these matters.” And yet we often ask people questions, not because we need an answer, but to elicit some friendly word from them, and because we wish to draw them on to friendly converse, as Socrates did with Theaetetus and Charmides. So to take the answer out of another’s mouth, to divert another’s hearing and attract his attention and wrest it from some other, is as bad as to run up and kiss someone who wished to be kissed by somebody else, or to turn toward yourself someone who was looking at another; since, even if he who has been asked cannot give the

a Cf. Plato, Theaetetus, 143 d, Charmides, 154 e ff.
(512) αὐτηθείς, ἐπισχόντα καλῶς ἔχει καὶ πρὸς τὸ βουλόμενον τοῦ ἐρωτῶντος ἀρμοσάμενον ὡς ἐπὶ κλῆσιν ἀλλοτρίαν1 αἰδημόνως καὶ κοσμίως ἀπαντᾷν. καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἐρωτηθέντες, ἀν σφαλῶσιν ἐν τῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι, συγγνώμης δικαίας τυγχάνουσιν· οὖ γὰρ αὐθαίρετως ύψιστάμενος καὶ προλαμβάνων τὸν λόγον ἀγδῆς μὲν ἔστι καὶ κατορθῶν, διαμαρτάνων δὲ παντάπασιν ἐπίχαρτος γίνεται καὶ καταγέλαστος.

20. Δεύτερον τούτων ἀσκήσαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας ἀποκρίσεις ἕστιν, αἰς οὐχ ἤκιστα δεῖ προσέχειν τὸν ἸΔ ἀδόλεσχον· πρῶτον μὲν, ἵνα μὴ λάθῃ τοῖς ἐπὶ γέλωτι καὶ ὑβρεὶ προκαλούμενοι εἰς λόγους αὐτῶν ἀποκρινόμενος μετὰ σπουδῆς. ἔνοιο γὰρ οὐδὲν δεόμενοι διατρῆθησί δὲ καὶ παιδίας ἕνεκα συνθέντες τινὰς ἐρωτήσεις προβάλλουσι2 τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ ἀνακινοῦσιν αὐτῶν3 τὸν λόγον. οὗ δὲi φυλάττεσθαι, καὶ μὴ ταχὺ τῶν λόγων μὴδ’ ὡσπερ χάρων ἔχοντας ἐπιπηδῶν, ἄλλα καὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πυνθανομένου σκοπεῖν καὶ τὴν χρείαν. ὅταν δὲ φαίνεται τῷ ὁντὶ βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἐθιστέον ἐφιστάναι καὶ ποιεῖν τι διάλειμμα μεταξὺ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ἐν ὑπὸ προσθείναι μὲν ὁ ἐρωτῶν, εἰ τι βούλεται, δύναται, σκέψασθαι δ’ αὐτὸς περὶ ὁνὶν Ἐ ἀποκρινεῖται, καὶ μὴ κατατρέχειν μηδε καταχωνυνύαι τὴν ἐρωτήσεως, ἐτί πυνθανομένοις πολλάκις ὑπὸ σπουδῆς ἄλλας ἀντ’ ἄλλων ἀποκρίσεις διδόντα.4 ἦ μὲν γὰρ Πυθία καὶ πρὸ ἐρωτήσεως αὐθωρί

1 τὴν ἀπόκρισιν after ἀλλοτρίαν deleted by Pohlenz.
2 προβάλλουσι] προσβάλλουσι most mss.
3 αὐτῶν] αὐτῷ or αὐτὸς most mss.
4 διδόντα Reiske: διδόντα.
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information, it is proper to practise restraint and conform oneself to the wish of the asker and thus to encounter with modesty and decorum the situation, an invitation, as it were, given to another. And it is also true that if persons who are asked questions make mistakes in their answers, they meet with just indulgence; but he who voluntarily undertakes an answer and anticipates another is unpleasant even if he corrects a mistake, and if he makes a mistake himself, he affords a malicious joy to one and all, and becomes an object of ridicule.

20. Then the second matter for diligent practice concerns our own answers; to these the chatterer must pay very close attention: in the first place, that he may not inadvertently give a serious answer to those who provoke him to talk merely that they may insolently ridicule him.\(^a\) For some persons who require no information, but merely to divert and amuse themselves, devise questions and put them to men of this sort to set going their foolish twaddle. Against this talkers should be on their guard and not leap upon a subject quickly, or as though grateful that it is offered to them, but should first consider both the character of the questioner and the necessity for the question. And when it appears that the questioner is really anxious to learn, the babbler must accustom himself to stop and leave between the question and the answer an interval, in which the asker may add anything he wishes and he himself may reflect upon his reply instead of overrunning and obscuring the question by giving a long string of answers in a hurry while the question is still being asked. For although the Pythian priestess is accustomed to

\(^a\) Cf. Moralia, 547 c.
PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

χρησμοὺς εἰσθὲ τινας ἐκφέρειν ὁ γὰρ θεός, ὃ
λατρεύει,

καὶ κωφοὶ ξυνίσι καὶ οὐ λαλέοντος ἀκούει,
tὸν δὲ βουλόμενον ἐμμελῶς ἀποκρίνασθαι δεὶ τὴν
dιάνοιαν ἀναμεῖναι καὶ τὴν προαιρέσιν ἀκριβῶς
catamathēin τοῦ πυνθανομένου, μὴ γένηται τὸ κατὰ
tὴν παρομιῶν

ἀμας ἀπήτουν, οἱ δ' ἀπηρνοῦντο σκάφας.

F ἀλλὰς δὲ τὸ λάβρον τούτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους
dεύπεινον ἀνάκρουστέον, ἵνα μὴ δοκῇ καθάπερ
βεβαὶ ἡ γλώττῃ πάλαι προσιστάμενον ἀσμένως
υπὸ τῆς ἑρωτήσεως ἐξεράσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ Σω-
κράτης οὕτως ἐκἐλον τὴν δίψαν, ὡς ἐφεισὶς ἐαυτῷ
πιεῖν μετὰ γυμνάσιον, εἰ μὴ τὸν πρῶτον ἐκχέαι
κάδον ἀνυμήσας ὅπως ἔθιζηται τὸν τοῦ λόγου
κατὰ ἀναμένειν τὸ ἄλογον.

513 21. Ἔστι τοῖνυν τρία γένη τῶν πρὸς τὰς ἑρω-
tήσεις ἀποκρίσεως, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ δὲ φιλαν-
thrizontον τὸ δὲ περισσόν. οἱ οὖν πυθομένου τινὸς εἰ
Σωκράτης ἐνδόν, ὁ μὲν ἢσπερ ἄκων καὶ ἀπροθύμως
ἀποκρίνεται τὸ "οὐκ ἐνδόν" ἐὰν δὲ βούληται
λακωνίζειν, καὶ τὸ "ἐνδόν" ἄφελων αὐτῆς μόνην
φθέγχεται τὴν ἀπόφασιν ὡς ἐκεῖνον, Φιλίππου
γράφαντος εἰ δὲξονταὶ τῇ πόλει αὐτῶν, εἰς τὴν
χάρτην ΟΥ μέγα γράψαντες ἀπέστειλαν. ὁ δὲ
φιλανθρωπότερον ἀποκρίνεται, "οὐκ ἐνδόν ἀλλ'
ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις" κἂν βούληται προσεπιμετρή-

1 λαλέοντος] φωνεύτως Herodotus, i. 47, and C.I.G., i. 1724.
2 ἀμας] ἀλλὰς most mss., and they omit οἱ . . . σκάφας.
3 ἐξεράσθαι Emperius, confirmed by mss.: ἐξεράσθαι and ἐξαίρεσθαι.
4 δέξονται Richards: δέχονται.

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deliver some oracles on the instant, even before the question is put—for the god whom she serves

Understands the dumb and hears when no man speaks—a yet the man who wishes to make a careful answer must wait to apprehend exactly the sense and the intent of him who asks the question, lest it befall, as the proverb has it,

They asked for buckets, but tubs were refused.

In any case this ravenous hunger for talking must be checked so that it may not seem as though a stream which has long been pressing hard upon the tongue were being gladly discharged at the instance of the question. Socrates, in fact, used to control his thirst in this manner—he would not allow himself to drink after exercise until he had drawn up and poured out the first bucketful, so that his irrational part might be trained to await the time dictated by reason.

21. Furthermore, there are three kinds of answers to questions: the barely necessary, the polite, and the superfluous. For example, if someone asks, "Is Socrates at home?" one person may reply, as it were unwillingly and grudgingly, "Not at home." And if he wishes to adopt the Laconic style, he may omit the "At home" and only utter the bare negative. So the Spartans, when Philip wrote to ask if they would receive him into their city, wrote a large "No" on the paper and sent it back. Another will answer more politely, "He is not at home, but at the bank," and if he wants to give fuller measure may

\[a\text{ Cf. Herodotus, i. 47.}\]
\[b\text{ Paroemiographi Graeci, i. p. 28; Kock, Com. Att. Frag., iii. p. 494, ades. 454.}\]

\[5\text{ την added by Capps; χαρτην την αυτην Tucker.}\]
PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

(PLUTARCH'S MORALIA 513) σαι, "ξένους τινὰς ἐκεῖ περιμένων." ο δὲ περιττὸς Β καὶ ἀδολέσχης, ἀν γε δὴ τύχῃ καὶ τὸν Κολοφώνιον ἀνεγνωκὼς Ἀντίμαχον, "οὐκ ἔνδον," φησίν, "ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις, ξένους ἀναμένων Ἰωνας, ὑπὲρ ὁν αὐτῷ γέγραφεν Ἀλκιβιάδης περὶ Μίλητον ἡν καὶ παρὰ Τισσαφέρνει διατρίβων, τοῦ τοῦ μεγάλου σατράπη βασιλέως, δὲ πάλι καὶ ἐποίθει Λακεδαιμονίως, νῦν δὲ προστίθεται δι' Ἀλκιβιάδην Ἀθηναίοις. νή γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐπιθυμῶν κατελθεῖν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα τὸν Τισσαφέρνην μετατίθησι." καὶ ὅλως τὴν ὁγδόνθ Θουκυδίδου κατατεινάμενος ἐρεῖ καὶ κατακλύσει τὸν ἀνθρωπον, ἑως φθάσει καὶ Θ Μίλητος ἐκπολεμωθείσα καὶ φυγαδευθείσε τὸ δεύτερον Ἀλκιβιάδης.

Μάλιστα δὴ περὶ τούτο δεῖ τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν συνέχειν ὅσπερ εἰς ἰχνος ἐμβιβάζοντα τὴν ἑρώτησιν καὶ κέντρω καὶ διαστήματι τῇ χρείᾳ τοῦ πυνθανομένου περιγράφατα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν. Καρναδὴν μὲν γὰρ οὕτω μεγάλην ἑχοντα δόξαν ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ διαλεγόμενον πέμψας ὁ γυμνασίαρχος ἐκέλευσεν ὑφείναι τὸ μέγεθος τῆς φωνῆς (ὅν γὰρ μεγαλοφωνότατος). εἰπόντος δ' ἐκείνου, "ὅσος μοι μέτρον φωνῆς," οὐ φαύλως ὑπέτυχε, "δίδωμι τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον." τῷ δ' ἀποκρυμομένῳ μέτρου ἐστω ἡ τοῦ ἐρωτῶντος βούλησις.

1 φθάσει] φθάσῃ most mss.
2 ὑφείναι] ἀφείναι all mss. but two.
3 τὸ μέγεθος] τοῦ μεγέθους Reiske and two mss.
4 ὑπέτυχε] ἑπέτυχε most mss.
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add, "waiting there for some guests." But your over-officious and garrulous man, particularly if he happens to have read Antimachus of Colophon, will say, "He is not at home, but at the bank, waiting for some Ionian guests on whose behalf he has had a letter from Alcibiades who is near Miletus staying with Tissaphernes, the satrap of the Great King, who formerly used to help the Spartans, but now is attaching himself to the Athenians because of Alcibiades. For Alcibiades desires to be restored to his native country and therefore is causing Tissaphernes to change sides." And he will run on, reciting at full stretch the whole eighth book of Thucydides, and deluge the questioner until, before he has done, Miletus is at war again and Alcibiades exiled for the second time. Regarding this tendency especially, one must keep talkativeness within bounds by following the question step by step and circumscribing the answer within a circle to which the questioner's need gives the centre and the radius. So when Carneades, who had not yet acquired a great reputation, was disputing in a gymnasium, the director sent and bade him lower his voice, which was a very loud one. And when Carneades said, "Give me something to regulate my voice," the director aptly rejoined, "I am giving you the person conversing with you." So, in making an answer, let the wishes of the questioner provide the regulation.

The epic poet, a by-word for longwindedness: thus Catullus (95. 10) calls him "tumidus."

Cf. Life of Alcibiades, xxiv. (204 b-c).

Cf. Moralia, 524 E, 603 E, 776 F, 822 D, 1098 D.

Cf. Diogenes Laertius, iv. 63; for Carneades' noisiness cf. Moralia, 791 A-B.
22. Καὶ μὴν ὄσπερ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐκέλευεν φυλάττειν τοῖς συμβαίνονταίν ἀναπείθειν καὶ τῶν ποιμάτων ὅσα πάντως μὴ διψωνται, οὕτω χρὴ καὶ τῶν λόγων τοῦ ἀδολέσχην, οἷς ἦδεται μάλιστα καὶ κέχρηται κατακόρους, τούτους φοβεῖσθαι καὶ πρὸς τούτους ἐπιρρέωντας ἀντιβαινεῖν. οἴον οἱ στρατιωτικοὶ πολέμων εἰσὶ διηγηματικοί καὶ τὸν Νέστορα τοιοῦτον δ' ἐπιηθης εἰσάγειν, τὰς αὐτοὺς πολλάκις ἀριστείας καὶ πράξεις διηγούμενον. ἐπιεικῶς δὲ καὶ τοῖς περὶ δίκαι εὐστοχήσασιν ἡ παρὰ ἡγεμόνι καὶ βασιλείας ἀπροσδοκήτως εὐθυμερῆσασιν ὄσπερ νόησμα τι προσπίπτει καὶ παρεακολουθεῖ τὸ μεμνημένον καὶ διηγεῖσθαι πολλάκις, ὅτι τρόπον εἰσῆλθον προσῆκθησαν ἡγωνίσαντο διελέξθησαν, ἐξήλεγξαν ἀντιδίκους τινὰς ἢ κατηγόρους, ἐπηνεύθησαν. πολλῶ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ χαρὰ τῆς κωμικῆς ἐκεῖνης ἀγρυπνίας λαλόστερον, ἀναρριτεύουσα πολλάκις έαυτήν καὶ πρόσφατον ποιοῦσα τοῖς διηγήμασιν. οἵθεν ὀλίσθηροι πρὸς τοὺς τοιοῦτους τῶν λόγων εἰσιν ἐκ πάσης προφάσεως. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὅπου τις ἀλγεῖ, κείθι καὶ τὴν χεῖρ' ἐχει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἢδόμενον ἐλκεὶ τὴν φωνὴν ἐφ' ἐαυτῷ καὶ περιάγει τὴν γλώτταν ἐπερείδειν ἀεὶ τῇ μνήμῃ βουλόμενον. οὕτω καὶ τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς ἡ πλείστη

1 ἐσθίειν ἀναπείθει Bernardakis from Mor., 521 F, infra, 661 F: ἀναπείθει ἐσθίειν.
2 τὴν χεῖρ'] τὸν νοῦν Stobaeus.
3 ἐφ' ἐαυτῷ] ἐν ἐαυτῷ all mss. except GD.

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a Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia, i. 3. 6; Moralia, 124 d, 521 F, infra, 661 F.
b Cf. Moralia, 546 d, 630 F ff.
c For example, Homer, II., i. 269 ff.
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22. Moreover, just as Socrates \(^a\) used to urge men to be on their guard against those foods which induce us to eat when we are not hungry, and against those liquids which induce us to drink when we are not thirsty, so it is with the babbler as regards subjects for talk: those in which he takes most delight and employs *ad nauseam* he should fear and stoutly resist when they stream in upon him. For example, military men \(^b\) are great tellers of war-stories, and the Poet introduces Nestor \(^c\) in that character, often narrating his own deeds of prowess. Again, as one might expect, those who have scored a victory in the law-courts or have had some unexpected success at the courts of governors or kings are attacked, as it were, by a malady which never leaves them, by the desire to call to mind and tell over and over again how they made their entrance, how they were presented, how they argued, how they held forth, how they confuted some opponents or accusers, how they were applauded. For their delight is far more loquacious than that well-known insomnia in the comedy \(^d\): it often fans itself into new flame and makes itself ever fresh with each successive telling. They are, therefore, ready to slip into such subjects on any pretext. For not only

Where one feels pain, there will he keep his hand,\(^e\) but also what causes pleasure draws the voice toward itself and twists the tongue from a desire to dwell perpetually on the joys of remembrance. So also with lovers, who chiefly occupy themselves with con-

164 (p. 353 ed. Allinson): "Surely of all things insomnia is the most loquacious. At any rate, it has roused me and brings me here to tell my whole life from the very beginning."

\(^a\) A proverb, according to Stobaeus, vol. v. p. 860 ed. Hense, where see the note. "Ubi dolor, ibi digitus."
ΠΛΥΤΑΡΧΗΣ ΜΟΡΑΛΙΑ

Διατριβή περί λόγους μνήμην τινά τῶν ἐρωμένων ἀναδιδόντας· οἱ γε κἂν μὴ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, πρὸς ἄνυχα περὶ αὐτῶν διαλέγονται·

ὡς καὶ

Βακχίς θεόν σ’ ἐνόμισεν, εὐδαίμονι λύχνε· καὶ τῶν θεών μέγιστος, εἰ καὶ τεύτη δοκεῖς.

"Εστὶ μὲν οὖν ἄτεχνως ἡ λευκὴ στάθμη πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ὁ ἄδολεσχος, οὐ μὴν ἄλλ’ ὁ μᾶλλον ἑτέρων ἑτέρους προσπεπονθὸς ὀφείλει τούτους φυλάττεσθαι καὶ ἀνέχειν εαυτὸν ἀπὸ τούτων καὶ ἀνακρούειν ός πορρωτάτω προάγειν καὶ ἀπομη-κύνειν1 ἅπ' ἃν ἤδουν δυναμένων. το θ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἐκεῖνους πεπόνθασιν, ἐν οἷς κατ' ἐμπειρίαν ἢ ἔξω τινὰ τῶν ἄλλων δια-φέρειν νομίζουσι. φίλαντος γὰρ ὡς καὶ φιλόδοξος οἱ τοιοῦτος

νέμει τὸ πλείστων ἠμέρας τούτω μέρος, ἦν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει κράτιστος ὡς·

ἐν ἱστορίαις ὁ ἀναγνωστικός, ἐν τεχνολογίαις ὁ Β γραμματικός, ἐν διηγήμασι ξενικοὶς ὁ πολλὴν χώραν ἐπεληλυθὼς καὶ πεπλανημένος. ἢστε καὶ ταῦτα δεῖ φυλάττεσθαι· δελεάζομεν γὰρ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἡ ἄδολεσχία καθάπερ ζῷον ἐπὶ νομᾶς συνήθεις

1 εὐδαίμον Kock: εὐδαίμον.
2 εἰ] ἢ or ἢ some mss.
3 ἄλλ’ ὁ Reiske: ἄλλα.
4 προαγαγεῖν καὶ ἀπομηκύναι most mss.

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versation that recalls some memory of the objects of their love; and if they cannot talk to human beings, they will speak of their passion to inanimate things:

O dearest bed!

and

O blessèd lamp, Bacchis thought you a god,
And greatest god you are if she thinks so.\(^a\)

There is, however, really not a pin's difference \(^b\) to the chatterer what subjects may arise; nevertheless he that has a greater weakness for one class of subjects than for the other should be on his guard against these subjects and force himself to hold back and withdraw as far as possible from them, since they are always able, because of the pleasure they give, to lure him on to dilate upon them. And talkers have this same difficulty with those subjects in which they think that they surpass all others because of some experience or acquired habit. For such a person, being self-centred and vain,

Will give the chief part of the day to that
In which he chances to surpass himself \(^c\):

the great reader will spend it in narrating tales, the literary expert in technical discussions, the wide traveller and wanderer over the face of the earth in stories of foreign parts. We must, therefore, be on our guard against these subjects also, since garrulity is enticed by them, like a beast making for familiar


(514) πρόεισι. θανυμαστὸς δ' ὁ Κύρος, ὅτι καὶ τὰς ἁμιᾶλας ἐποιεῖτο πρὸς τοὺς ἡλικαῖς, ὅπερ ἐν οἷς κρείττων ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς ἀπειρότερος ἢν ἐκείνων, εἰς ταῦτα προκαλούμενος, ἵνα μήτε λυπῇ παρευδοκιμῶν καὶ μανθάνων ὡφελῆται. ὁ δ' ἀδολεσχίας τοῦναντίον, ὅν μὲν τις ἐμπέσῃ λόγος, εξ οὗ μαθεῖν τι δύναται καὶ πυθέσθαι τῶν ἀγνοουμένων, τούτων ἐξωθεὶ καὶ ἐκκρούει, μισθὸν οὗτω 1 βραχὺν δοῦναι τὸ 2 συωπῆσαι μὴ δυνάμενος: εἰς δὲ τὰς ἔωλους καὶ πολυπατήτους κύκλων περιων εἰσελαύνει ραβμωδίας τὸν λόγον. ὡς τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν τις κατὰ τύχην ἀνεγνωκὼς δύο τῶν Ἐφόρου βιβλίων ἢ τρία, πάντας ἀνθρώπους κατέτριβε καὶ πάν ἀνάστατον ἐποίει συμπόσιον, ἀεὶ τὴν ἐν Λεύκτρῳ μάχην καὶ τὰ συνεχὴ διηγούμενος ὀδεῖν Ἐπαμεινώνδας παρωνύμιον ἔσχεν.

23. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γε τῶν κακῶν ἐλάχιστὸν ἔστι, καὶ δεῖ παρατρέπειν εἰς ταῦτα τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν· ἢττον γὰρ ἄηδες ἔσται τὸ λάλον ἐν τῷ φιλολόγῳ πλεονάζον. ἔθιστέον δὲ καὶ γράφειν τι τοὺς τοιούθεν καὶ διαλέγεσθαι κατ' ἱδίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Στωικὸς Ἀντίπατρος, ὡς οὖκε, μὴ δυνάμενος μηδὲ βουλόμενος ὅμως χωρεῖν τῷ Καρνεάδῃ ἡμετὰ πολλοῦ ῥεύματος εἰς τὴν Στοάν φερομένω, γράφων δὲ καὶ πληρῶν τὰ βιβλία τῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀντιλογῶν, "καλαμοβόας" ἐπεκλῆθη· τὸν δ' ἀδολεσχὴν ἵσως

1 oυτω] αὐτῶ most mss.
2 τό Emperius, confirmed by mss.: τῷ.

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a Xenophon, Cyropaedia, i. 4. 4; cf. Moralia, 632 c.
b With this chapter cf. chapters 18 and 19 of De Laude 462
haunts. And Cyrus's conduct was admirable, because he challenged his mates to match themselves with him, not in those contests in which he was superior, but in those in which he was less skilled than they, so that he might cause no pain by surpassing them and might also have the advantage of learning something. But the chatterer, on the contrary, if some topic comes up from which he can learn and find out something he does not know, thrusts it aside and diverts it, being unable to give even so small a fee as silence, but he works steadily around until he drives the conversation into the stale and well-worn paths of twaddle. Just so, in my native town, there was a man who chanced to have read two or three books of Ephorus, and would always bore everybody to death and put every dinner-party to rout by invariably narrating the battle of Leuctra and its sequel; so he got the nickname of "Epameinondas." 23. Nevertheless, this is the least of the evils, and we should turn garrulity into these channels; for talkativeness will be less unpleasant when its excesses are in some learned subject. Yet such persons must accustom themselves to do some writing and so argue all by themselves. So Antipater the Stoic, since, as it seems, he could not and would not come to close quarters with Carneades and his violent attacks upon the Stoa, used to fill whole books with written disquisitions against him, and so earned the sobriquet of "Pen-valiant." But with the talker, such shadow-

Ipsi (Moralia, 546 b-e) and the first part of Quaestiones Conviv., ii. 1 (Moralia, 629 e—632 c).


Cf. Aulus Gellius, xvii. 15. 1.
Ἀν ἡ πρὸς τὸ γραφεῖον¹ σκιαμαχία καὶ βοή τοῦ πλήθους ἀπερύκουσα καὶ θρὴν ἢμέραν ἐλαφρότερων παρασκευάσει τοῖς συνούσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ κόινοι εἰς λίθους καὶ ἕλατα τὸν θυμὸν ἁφέντες ἤττον εἰς χαλεποὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ἀρμόσει δ' αὐτοῖς σφόδρα καὶ τὸ μετὰ κρειττόνων ἂεὶ καὶ πρεσβυτέρων Ε ὀμιλεῖν αἰσχυνόμενοι γὰρ αὐτῶν τὴν δόξαν ἐν ἔθει γενήσονται τοῖς σωτᾶν.

Τούτοις δ' ἂεὶ δεὶ καταμεμίχθαι καὶ συμπεπλε-χθαί τοῖς ἔθισμοῖς τὴν προσοχὴν ἐκεῖνην καὶ τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν, ὅταν τι μέλλωμεν λαλεῖν καὶ τὰ ῥήματα τῷ στόματι προστρέχῃ, "τὶς οὖτος ὁ λόγος ὁ ἐφεστώς καὶ καταβιαζόμενος; ἐπὶ τί δ' ἡ γλῶσσ' ἄσπαίρει;² τί δ' εἰπόντι περιγινέται καλὸν ἢ τὶ σιωπήσαντι δυσχερές;" οὗ γὰρ ως βάρος τι δεὶ πιέζον³ ἀποθέοθαι τὸν λόγον, ἔπει παραμένει γε καὶ ῥήθεις ὁμοίως· ἀλλ' ἢ δι' αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώποι δεόμενοι τίνος λαλοῦσιν ἢ τοὺς ἀκούντας ωφελοῦντες ἢ χάριν τινὰ παρασκευάζοντες ἀλλήλους ὧσπερ ἀλοί 

Φ τοῖς λόγοις ἐφηδύνουσι τὴν διατριβήν καὶ τὴν πράξιν ἐν ἢ τυγχάνουσιν ὑπότες. εἰ δὲ μήτε⁴ τῷ λέγοντι χρήσιμον μήτ' ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς ἀκούσων το λέγομενον ἡδονὴ δὲ⁵ καὶ χάρις οὗ πρόσεστι, διὰ τί λέγεται; τὸ γὰρ μάτην καὶ διακενῆς οὐχ ἦττον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἢ τοὺς ἐργοὺς ἔστιν.

Επὶ πάσι δὲ καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα δεὶ πρὸ-515 χειρον ἔχειν καὶ μημονεύειν τὸ Σιμωνίδειον ὅτι λαλήσας μὲν πολλάκις μετενόησε, σιωπήσας δ'

¹ γραφεῖον G: γράφειν.
² ἄσπαίρει] ἄσπαίρει most mss.
³ πιέζον Reiske, confirmed by G: πιέζοντα.
⁴ μήτε Reiske: οὔτε.
⁵ δὲ Wilamowitz: τε.
boxing with the pen and such alarums, by keeping him away from the multitude, may perhaps make him less of a daily burden to his associates, just as dogs that vent their anger on sticks and stones are less savage to men. And it will also be very advantageous for chatterers to frequent invariably the company of their superiors and elders, out of respect for whose opinion they will become accustomed to silence.

And with these exercises in habituation it is proper to intermix and entwine that well-known vigilance and habit of reflection, at the very moment when we are about to speak and the words are hurrying to our lips, “What is this remark that is so pressing and importunate? What object is my tongue panting for? What good will come of its being said or what ill of its being suppressed?” For it is not as though the remark were some oppressive weight which one ought to get rid of, since it stays by you all the same even if it is spoken; when men talk, it is either for their own sake, because they need something, or to benefit their hearers, or they seek to ingratiate themselves with each other by seasoning with the salt of conversation the pastime or business in which they happen to be engaged. But if a remark is neither useful to the speaker nor of serious importance to the hearers, and if pleasure or charm is not in it, why is it made? For the futile and purposeless can exist in speech as well as in deeds.

And over and above all else we must keep at hand and in our minds the saying of Simonides,* that he had often repented of speaking, but never of holding

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*b Cf. *Moralia*, 10 F, 125 D; 505 F, supra.
(515) ουδέποτε· καὶ τὴν ἁσκησιν, ὅτι πάντων ἐπικρατεῖ καὶ ἴσχυρότερον1 ἔστιν· ὅπου καὶ λυγμὸν καὶ βῆχ' ἀνθρωποι τῷ προσέχειν ἀποβιαζόμενοι, μετὰ πόνου καὶ ἀλγηδόνος ἐξεκρούσαντο. σιγή δ' οὐ μόνον ἄδυσον, ὡς φησιν Ἰπποκράτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλυπον καὶ ἀνώδυνον.

1 ἴσχυρότερον Pohlenz: ἴσχυρόν.
CONCERNING TALKATIVENESS, 515

his tongue. We must remember also that practice is master of all things and stronger than anything else; since people can even get rid of hiccoughs and coughs by resisting them resolutely and with much pain and trouble. But silence, as Hippocrates\textsuperscript{a} says, not only prevents thirst, but also never causes sorrow and suffering.

\textsuperscript{a} Cf. Moralia, 90 c-d.
ON BEING A BUSYBODY
(DE CURIOSITATE)
INTRODUCTION

This essay, which was apparently written only a short time before De Garrulitate, has much the same interest and charm as that pleasant work. The essays are akin in many ways; portions of the later treatise are merely a reshaping of ideas and commonplace which the earlier had adumbrated.

The source of much of this work has been traced to Ariston of Chios by O. Hense (Rhein. Mus., xlv. 541 ff.); and F. Krauss has shown with some success the relation to diatribe literature.

The essay was already known to Aulus Gellius (xi. 16), who speaks with feeling of the difficulty of rendering πολυπραγμοσύνη in Latin; nor has it been unknown to English moralists. Jeremy Taylor has again borrowed largely from it in his Holy Living, ii. 5.

In the translation of this and the preceding essay I am greatly indebted to Mr. Tucker's spirited version, from which I have taken numerous phrases and sometimes whole sentences.

The work is No. 97 in the Lamprias catalogue.

a And no doubt also before De Tranquillitate (so rightly Brokate).
b Die Rhetorischen Schriften Plutarchs, Munich Diss., Nürnberg, 1912, pp. 67 ff. See also the interesting table (p. 87) of rhetorical figures which places our essay in the very centre of Plutarch's literary activity.
c It is hard to render it in English also. The translator uses the word "curiosity"—Ed.
ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΛΥΠΡΑΓΜΟΣΥΝΗΣ

1. Ἄπνουν ἡ σκοτεινὴν ἡ δυσχείμερον οὐκίαν ἡ νοσώδη φυγεῖν μὲν ὡσις ἁριστον· ἂν δὲ φιλοχωρῆ τις ὑπὸ συνθείας, ἑστι καὶ φῶτα μεταθέντα καὶ κλίμακα μεταβαλόντα καὶ θύρας τινὰς ἀνοίξαντα τὰς δὲ κλείσαντα λαμπροτέραν εὐπνουστέραν ὑγιεινοτέραν μηχανήσασθαι. 1 καὶ πόλεις τινὲς οὕτως μεταθέντες ωφελήσαν· ὅσπερ τὴν ἐμὴν πατρίδα πρὸς ζέφυρον ἀνεμον κεκλιμένην καὶ τὸν ἧλιον ἐρέιδοντα δείλης ἀπὸ τοῦ Παρνασσοῦ δεχομένην ἐπὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς τραπῆναι λέγουσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Χαίρωνος. ὃ δὲ φυσικὸς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὄρους τινὰ διασφάγα βαρὺν καὶ νοσώδη κατὰ τῶν πεδίων τὸν νότον ἐμπνεοῦσαν ἑμφράξας, λοιμὸν ἔδοξεν ἐκκλείσαι τῆς χώρας.

Ἐπεὶ τούνν ἑστὶ τινὰ παθῆ νοσώδη καὶ βλαβερὰ καὶ χειμώνα παρέχοντα τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ σκότος, ἁριστόν μὲν ἐξωθεὶν ταῦτα καὶ καταλύειν εἰς ἔδαφος, αἰθρίαν καὶ φῶς καὶ πνεῦμα καθαρὸν διδόντας Ἰ ἑαυτοῖς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, μεταλαμβάνειν γε καὶ μεθαρμόττειν ἀμωσγέπως 3 περιάγοντας ἡ στρέψοντας.

1 μηχανήσασθαι] ἐργάσασθαι most mss.
2 ἐμπνεοῦσαν] ἐκπνεοῦσαν Reiske.
3 ἀμωσγέπως Reiske: ἄλλως γέ πως.

a Chaeroneia.
ON BEING A BUSYBODY

1. It is perhaps best to avoid a house which has no ventilation, or is gloomy, or cold in winter, or unhealthy; yet if familiarity has made you fond of the place, it is possible to make it brighter, better ventilated, and healthier by altering the lights, shifting the stairs, and opening some doors and closing others. Even some cities have gained by such changes. So in the case of my own town, a which used to face the west and receive the full force of the sun in the late afternoon from Parnassus, they say that it was turned by Chaeron to face the east. And Empedocles, b the natural philosopher, by blocking up a certain mountain gorge, which permitted the south wind to blow a dire and pestilential draught down upon the plains, was thought to have shut plague out of his country.

Since, then, there are certain unhealthy and injurious states of mind which allow winter and darkness to enter the soul, it is better to thrust these out and to make a clean sweep to the foundations, thus giving to ourselves a clear sky and light and pure air; but if that is impossible, it is best at least to interchange and readjust them in some way or other, turning or shifting them about.

(515) ὁδ' εὖθυς ἡ πολυπραγμοσύνη φιλομάθειά τίς ἐστιν ἄλλοτρών κακῶν, οὔτε φθόνον δοκοῦσα καθαρεύειν νόσος οὔτε κακοθείας.

τί τὰλλότριον, ἀνθρωπε βασκανώτατε, κακὸν ἵξυδορκεῖς τὸ δ' ἱδιον παραβλέπεις;

μετάθες ἐξωθεὶ διὰ και μετάστρεψον εἰςω τήν πολυ-

πραγμοσύνην· εἰ χαίρεις κακῶν μεταχειρίζομενοι ἰστορίαν, ἔχεις οὐκοι πολλὴν διατριβὴν·

ὀσον ὑδῷρ κατ' Ἀλιξόνος ἡ δρνὸς ἀμφὶ πέτηλα, ¹
tοσοῦτον πλῆθος εὐρήσεις ἀμαρτημάτων ἐν τῷ βίῳ Ἑ καὶ παθὼν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ παρορμάτων ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσιν.

Ὡς γὰρ ὁ Εννοφών λέγει τοῖς οἰκονομικοῖς ἱδιον
eἶναι τῶν ἀμφὶ θυσίαν σκευῶν, ἱδιον τῶν ἀμφὶ

dεῖπνα τόπον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν θύγητα τὰ γεωργικά, χωρὶς
tὰ πρὸς πόλιμον, οὔτω σοι τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀπὸ

φθόνον κακὰ κείμενα, τὰ δ' ἀπὸ θηλοτυπίας, τὰ δ' ἀπὸ

δειλίας, τὰ δ' ἀπὸ μικρολογίας· ταυτ' ἐπελθε, ταὐτ' ἀναθεώρησον· τὰς εἰς γειτόνων θυρίδας καὶ
tὰς παρόδους τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης ἔμφραξον,

ἐτέρας δ' ἀνοιξόν εἰς τὴν ἀνδρωνίτιν τὴν σεαιτοῦ φε-

ρούσας, εἰς τὴν γυναικωνίτιν, εἰς τὰς τῶν θεραπῶν-

F τῶν διαίτας· ἐνταῦθ' ἐχει διατριβᾶς οὐκ ἁχρήστους

¹ ὁδος ὑδῷρ καθ' ἀλὸς στόνος ἡ δρ. ἀμφὶ πέτ. Madvig.

Cf. Menander's typical curious slave, a πολυπράγμων, 474
Such a malady of the mind, to take the first instance, is curiosity, which is a desire to learn the troubles of others, a disease which is thought to be free from neither envy nor malice:

Why do you look so sharp on others' ills,
Malignant man, yet overlook your own? b

Shift your curiosity from things without and turn it inwards; if you enjoy dealing with the recital of troubles, you have much occupation at home:

Great as the water flowing down Alizon,
Many as the leaves around the oak, c

so great a quantity of transgressions will you find in your own life, of afflictions in your own soul, of oversights in the performance of your own obligations.

For as Xenophon d says that good householders have a special place for sacrificial utensils, and a special place for dinner-ware, and that farming implements should be stored elsewhere, and apart from them the weapons of war; even so in your own case you have one store of faults arising from envy, another from jealousy, another from cowardice, another from pettiness. Assault these, examine these! Block up the windows and the side-doors of your curiosity that open on your neighbours' property, and open up others leading to your own—to the men's quarters, to the women's quarters, to the living-rooms of your servants! Here this curiosity and meddlesomeness of yours will have an occupation not unhelpful or who says (Frag. 850 Kock): οὐδὲν γλυκύτερον ἐστιν ἡ πάντ' εἴδέναι.


c A verse of unknown origin; the text is probably corrupt.

d Oeconomicus, viii. 19, 20.
οὐδὲ κακοήθεις ἂλλ᾽ ὠφελίμους καὶ σωτηρίους τὸ
φιλοπευθὲς τούτῳ καὶ φιλόπραγμον, ἐκάστου πρὸς
ἐαυτὸν λέγοντος;

πὴ τραπόμην;¹ τί δὲ ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον οὐκ
ἐτελέσθη;

2. Νῦν δὲ ὁσπερ ἐν τῷ μῶθῳ τὴν Λάμιαν λέ-
gουσιν οίκοι μὲν εὑδέιν2 τυφλῆν, ἐν ἀγγείῳ τινὶ
516 τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἠχοῦσαν ἀποκειμένους, ἐξὼ δὲ
προϊόνσαν ἐντίθεσθαι3 καὶ βλέπειν, οὕτως ἦμῶν
ἐκαστὸς ἐξὼ καὶ πρὸς ἑτέρους τῇ κακονοίᾳ τῆς
περιεργίαν ὁσπερ ὀφθαλμὸν ἐντίθησι, τοῖς δὲ ἐαυ-
tῶν ἀμαρτήμασι καὶ κακοῖς πολλάκις περιπταλομεν
ὑπ᾽ ἀγνοίας, οὕνεπ' αὐτὰ καὶ φῶς οὐ ποριζόμενοι.
διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἔχθροῖς ωφελιμωτερός ἐστιν ὁ πολυ-
πράγμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνων ἔλεγχει καὶ προφέρεται
καὶ δεῖκνυσιν αὐτοῖς ὃ δεῖ φυλάξασθαι καὶ διορ-
θῶσαι, τῶν δ᾽ οὐκοι τὰ πλείστα παραρὰ διὰ τὴν
περὶ τὰ ἐξὼ πτόησιν. ὃ μὲν γὰρ Ἐνυσσεὺς οὐδὲ τῇ
μητρὶ διαλεχθήναι πρότερον ὑπέμενεν ἡ πυθέσθαι
παρὰ τοῦ μάντεως, ὃν ἔνεκ' ἦλθεν εἰς Ἀιδοῦ
Β πυθόμενος δὲ τούτῳ πρὸς τε ταύτῃν ἔστρεψεν αὐτόν,
καὶ τὰς ἄλλας γυναῖκας ἀνέκρινε, τῖς ἡ Τυρῶ καὶ τῖς
ἡ καλὴ Χλωρίς καὶ διὰ τή ⁴ Ἑπικάστη ἀπέθανεν
ἀψαμένη βρόχον αἰτῶν ἀφ' ύψηλοίο μελάθρον.⁵

¹ τραπόμην] παρέβην Mor., 168 b.
² εὑδεῖν Xylander: ἀδεῖν.
³ ἐντίθεσθαι Pohlenz: ἀποτίθεσθαι or περιτίθεσθαι.
⁴ τί ἦ] τῶν all mss. but two.
⁵ μελάθρον] omitted in all mss. except two.
ON BEING A BUSYBODY, 515–516

malicious, but useful and salutary if each one will but say to himself,

Where did I err? And what deed have I done? What duty neglected?

2. But as it is, like the Lamia in the fable, who, they say, when at home sleeps in blindness with her eyes stored away in a jar, but when she goes abroad puts in her eyes and can see, so each one of us, in our dealings with others abroad, puts his meddlesomeness, like an eye, into his maliciousness; but we are often tripped up by our own faults and vices by reason of our ignorance of them, since we provide ourselves with no sight or light by which to inspect them. Therefore the busybody is also more useful to his enemies than to himself, for he rebukes and drags out their faults and demonstrates to them what they should avoid or correct, but he neglects the greater part of his own domestic errors through his passionate interest in those abroad. So Odysseus refused to converse even with his mother until he had learned from the seer the matters by reason of which he had come to the House of Hades; and when he had his answer, he both turned to his mother and also made inquiries of the other women, asking who was Tyro, who the beautiful Chloris, why Epicastē met her death.

Tying a noose, sheer-hung, from the high roof.

a “Pythagoras,” Carmina Aurea, 42; cf. Moralia, 168 b.
b Cf. Moralia, 87 b-c.
d Teiresias.
e Od., xi. 229 ff.
f Ibid. 278; Epicastē is better known as Jocasta, the mother of Oedipus.

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(516) ἡμεῖς δὲ τὰ καθ' αὐτοὺς ἐν πολλῇ ραθυμίᾳ καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ θέμενοι καὶ ἀμελήσαντες ἐτέρους γενεαλογοῦμεν ὅτι τοῦ γείτονος ὁ πάππος ἢν Σύρος, Ὀρᾶττα δ' ἡ τίθη, ὁ δεῖνα δ' ὀφείλει τάλαντα τρία καὶ τοὺς τόκους ὅπω ἀποδέδωκεν. ἐξετάζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰ τουαῦτα, πόθεν ἡ γυνὴ τοῦ δείνος ἐπανήρχετο, C τί δ' ὁ δεῖνα καὶ ὁ δεῖνα καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐν τῇ γυνίᾳ διελέγοντο. Σωκράτης δὲ περιήγη διαπόρων τί Πυθαγόρας λέγων ἐπείδη· καὶ Ὅριστιππος Ὄλυμπιάσιον Ἰσχομάχῳ συμβαλὼν ἠρώτα τί Σωκράτης διαλέγομενος οὕτω τοὺς νέους διατίθηνε· καὶ μίκρ' ἀττα τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ σπέρματα καὶ δείγματα λαβὼν οὕτως ἐμπαθῶς ἐσχέν ὅστε τῶ σώματι συμπεσεῖν καὶ γενέσθαι παντάπασιν ἄχρος καὶ ἱσχύς· ἄχρις οὐ πλεῦσας Ἀθηναίζες δυνῶν καὶ διακεκαυμένος ἠρώσατο τῆς πηγῆς, καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆν φιλοσοφίαν ἱστόρησεν, ἴσι ἦν τέλος ἐπιγνώναι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ κακὰ καὶ ἀπαλαγήναι.

3. Ἀλλ' ἐνοὶ τὸν ὄνοι διών βίον ὡς ἀτερπέστατον D θέαμα προσιδεῖν οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν οὐδ' ἀνακλάσαι τὸν λογισμὸν ὡς φῶς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ περιαγαγεῖν, ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ γέμουσα κακῶν παντοδαπῶν καὶ φρίττουσα καὶ φοβομενή τὰ ἐνδον ἐκπήδα θύραζε καὶ πλανᾶται περὶ ταλλόρια, βόσκουσα καὶ πνεύμουσα τὸ κακόθες. ὡς γὰρ ὄρνις ἐν οἰκίᾳ πολλάκις τροφῆς παρακειμένης εἰς γυνίαν καταδύσα σκαλεύει

1 τίθη] τίθη most mss.
2 ἀποδέδωκεν] ἀπέδωκεν some mss.
3 νέους] θεοῦς, or 'Ἀθηναίοις, or θετάς various mss.
4 οἰκίᾳ] οἰκίσκῳ Valckenaer.
But we, while treating our own affairs with considerable laxity and ignorance and neglect, pry into the pedigrees of the rest of the world: our neighbour’s grandfather was a Syrian and his grandmother a Thracian; so-and-so owes three talents and has not paid the interest. We inquire also into such matters as where so-and-so’s wife was coming back from, and what A and B’s private conversation in the corner was about. Yet Socrates went about seeking to solve the question of what arguments Pythagoras used to carry conviction; and Aristippus, when he met Ischomachus at Olympia, asked him by what manner of conversation Socrates succeeded in so affecting the young men. And when Aristippus had gleaned a few odd seeds and samples of Socrates’ talk, he was so moved that he suffered a physical collapse and became quite pale and thin. Finally he sailed for Athens and slaked his burning thirst with draughts from the fountain-head, and engaged in a study of the man and his words and his philosophy, of which the end and aim was to come to recognize one’s own vices and so rid oneself of them.

3. Yet there are some who cannot bear to face their own lives, regarding these as a most unlovely spectacle, or to reflect and revolve upon themselves, like a light, the power of reason, but their souls, being full of all manner of vices, shuddering and frightened at what is within, leap outwards and prowl about other people’s concerns and there batten and make fat their own malice. For as a domestic fowl will often, though its own food lies near at hand, slip into a corner and there scratch

* That is, both were probably slaves.

b i.e., where she had been.
(516) ἔνθα γέ που¹ διαφαίνεθ' ἄτ' ἐν κοπρίη² μία κριθῇ
παραπλησίως οἱ πολυπράγμονες, ὑπερβάντες τοὺς
ἐν μέσῳ λόγους καὶ ἱστορίας καὶ ἀ μηδεὶς κωλύει
πυνθάνεσθαι μηδ' ἀχθεται πυνθανομένους, τὰ κρυπ-
Ετόμενα καὶ λανθάνοντα κακὰ πάσης οἰκίας ἐκ-
λέγουσι. καίτοι τὸ γε³ τοῦ Αἰγυπτίου χαρίεν πρὸς
τὸν ἑρωτῶντα τί φέρει συγκεκαλυμμένον, "διὰ
τοῦτο συγκεκάλυπται." καὶ σὺ δὴ τί πολυπραγ-
μονεῖς τὸ ἀποκρυπτόμενον; εἰ μὴ τὶ κακὸν ἢν, οὐκ
ἄν ἀπεκρύπτετο. καίτοι μὴ κόφαντα γε θύραν εἰς
οἰκίαν ἀλλοτρίαν οὐ νομίζεται παρελθεῖν. ἄλλα νῦν
μὲν εἰσὶ θυρωροί, πάλαι δὲ ῥόπτρα ἄ' κρονόμενα
πρὸς ταῖς θύρασι αἴσθησι παρεῖχεν, ἢν μὴ τὴν
οἰκοδέσποταν ἐν μέσῳ καταλάβῃ ὁ ἀλλότριος ἢ τὴν
παρθένον ἢ κολαξόμενον οἰκέτην ἢ κεκραγμένας τὰς
θεραπαινίδας. ὃ δὲ πολυπράγμων ἐπ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα
Γ παραδύτεις σώφρονος μὲν οἰκίας καὶ καθεστώσης
οὐδ' ἂν παρακαλῇ τις ἥδεως γινόμενος θεατής. ὅπως
ὁ ἔνεκα κλεῖς καὶ μοχλὸς καὶ αὐλείος, ταῦτ' ἀνακαλύπτων καὶ φέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον ἐτέρους.
καίτοι καὶ "τῶν ἀνέμων μάλιστα δυσχεραίνομεν,"
ὡς Ἀρίστων φησίν, "ὅσοι τὰς περιβολὰς ἀναστελ-
λουσιν ἡμῶν" ὁ δὲ πολυπράγμων οὐ τὰ ἴματια τῶν
πέλας οὐδὲ τοὺς χιτῶνας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῖχους
ἀπαμφιένυσι, τὰς θύρας ἀναπετάνυσι, καὶ "διὰ

1 ἐνθάδε καὶ most mss.
2 κοπρίη] κοπρία all mss. but G.
3 τὸ γε] γε τὸ most mss.
4 ἄ added by Capps.
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Where one sole barley grain perhaps appears
In the dung-heap, a

in the same way busybodies, passing over topics and narratives which are in plain view and matters concerning which no one prevents their inquiring or is vexed if inquiry is made, pick out the hidden and obscure troubles of every household. And yet it was surely a clever answer that the Egyptian gave to the man who asked him what he was carrying wrapped up: “That’s why it is wrapped up.” And why, if you please, are you inquisitive about what is concealed? If it were not something bad, it would not be concealed. Yet it is not customary to walk into the house of someone else without at least first knocking on the door; but nowadays there are doormen and formerly there were knockers to be struck at the door and give warning, so that the stranger might not catch the mistress of the house or the unmarried daughter unawares, or a slave being punished or the maid-servants screaming. But it is for these very things that the busybody slips in. A sober and respectable household he would not willingly enter as a spectator even if he were invited to come; but the matters to conceal which keys and bolts and street-doors are used—these are what he uncovers and communicates to outsiders. And yet “the winds with which we are most vexed,” as Ariston b says, “are those which pull up our garments,” but the busybody strips off not only the mantles and tunics of those near him, but also their very walls; he flings the doors wide open and makes his way, like

a Perhaps a verse of Callimachus (Frag. anon. 374 ed. Schneider).
παρθενικῆς ἀπαλόχροος" ὡς πνεῦμα διαδύται
517 καὶ διέρπει, βακχεία καὶ χοροῦς καὶ παννυχίδας
ἐξετάζων καὶ συκοφαντῶν.

4. Καὶ καθάπερ τοῦ κωμῳδουμένου Κλέωνος
tὸ χεῖρ’ ἐν Αἴτωλοῖς, ὁ νοῦς δ’

οὕτω τοῦ πολυπράγμωνος ὁ νοῦς ἂμ’ ἐν πλουσίων
οἴκοις ἔστιν, ἐν δωματίοις πενήτων, ἐν αὐλαῖς
βασιλέων, ἐν θαλάμοις νεογάμων· πάντα2 πράγματα
ζητεῖ, τὰ ξένων, τὰ ἥγεμόνων, οὐδ’ ἀκινδύνως
tαῦτα ζητῶν· ἀλλ’ οἶνον, εἴ τις ἄκοιντον γεύσιτο
πολυπραγμονῶν τὴν ποιότητα, φθάσειν ἀν3 τῆς
ἀισθήσεως προανελῶν τὸν αἰσθανόμενον,4 οὕτως οἱ
tὰ τῶν μειζόνων κακὰ ζητοῦντες προαναλίσκοντι

Β τῆς γνῶσεως ἐαυτοὺς. καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοῦ ἡλίου τὴν
ἀφθονὸν γε ταύτην καὶ κατακεχυμένην ἀπασιν
ἀκτίνα παρορώντες, αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν κύκλον ἀναιδῶς
καταβλέπειν καὶ διαστέλλειν τὸ φῶς εἰςω βιαζό-
μενοι καὶ τολμῶντες ἀποτυφλοῦνται. διὸ καλῶς
Φιλιππίδης ὁ κωμῳδοποιός, εἰπόντος αὐτῷ ποτε
Λυσιμάχου τοῦ βασιλέως, "τίνος σοι τῶν ἐμῶν
μεταδῷ; " "μόνον," εἶπεν, "ὁ βασιλεῦ, μὴ τῶν
ἀπορρητῶν." τὰ γὰρ ἦδιστα καὶ κάλλιστα τῶν
βασιλεῶν ἐξω πρόκειται, τὰ δεῖπνα, οἱ πλοῦτοι, οἱ
πανηγύρεις, αἱ χάριτες· εἴ δὲ τι ἀπόρρητον ἔστι,

1 νοὺς δ’] δὲ νοὺς most mss. of Plutarch and Aristophanes.
2 πάντα] παντοία Reiske.
4 τὸν αἰσθανόμενον W.C.H. after Madvig (who read τὸ):

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* Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 519; cf. 465 d, supra.

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a piercing wind, "through the maiden of tender skin," and creeps in, searching out with slanderous intent drunken revels and dances and all-night festivals.

4. And like Cleon in the comedy,

His hands in Beggar-town, his mind on Thefton,

so the mind of the busybody is at the same time in mansions of the rich, in hovels of the poor, in royal courts, and in bridal chambers of the newly-wed. He searches out everybody's business, that of strangers and that of rulers, nor is this search of his without danger; but just as though a man should taste aconite through curiosity about its properties, he would find that he had killed the taster before he had got his taste, so those who search out the vices of those more powerful than themselves destroy themselves before they acquire their knowledge. For instance those who scarcely glance at these sunbeams which have been poured down so lavishly upon us all, but recklessly dare to gaze upon the orb itself and to rend its radiance apart, striving to force their way within, are blinded. This is the reason why Philippides, the comic poet, made an excellent reply when King Lysimachus once said to him, "Which one of my possessions may I share with you?" "Anything, Sire," said Philippides, "except your secrets." For only the most pleasant and most decorous attributes of kings are displayed openly—their banquets and wealth and festivals and favours; but if there is any-

b Aristophanes, Knights, 79; Klopidai (Thief-deme) is a play upon the actual deme Kropidai.

c Or better, Theevingen.

d Cf. Moralia, 49 e.

 Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia, iv. 3. 14.

 Cf. 508 c, supra.

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(517) μὴ προσέλθης μηδὲ κινήσῃς. οὐ κρυπτεῖ ται χαρὰ
C βασιλέως εὐτυχοῦντος οὐδὲ γέλως παῖζοντος οὐδὲ
φιλανθρωπίας παρασκευή καὶ χάριτος· φοβερόν
έστι τὸ κρυπτόμενον, σκυθρωπὸν ἀγέλαστον δυσ-
πρόσιτον, ὄργῆς τυνος ὑπούλων θησαυρὸς ἡ τιμωρίας
βαρυθύμου σκέψεις ἡ ζηλοτυπία γυναικὸς ἡ πρὸς
νιῶν ὑποψία τις ἡ πρὸς φίλοι ἀπιστία. φεύγε τὸ
μελαίνον¹ τοῦτο καὶ συνιστάμενον νέφος· οὐ λήσεται
σε βροντήςαν οὐδ᾽ ἀστράφαν ὅταν ἐκραγῇ τὸ νῦν
κρυπτόμενον.

5. Τίς οὖν ἡ φυγή; περισσαμός, ὡς εἴρηται,
καὶ μεθολκή τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης μάλιστα μὲν ἐπὶ
tά βελτίω καὶ τά ἥδιω τρέφαντι τήν ψυχήν. τά ἐν
οὐρανῷ πολυπραγμόνει, τά ἐν γῇ, τά ἐν ἀέρι, τά ἐν
D θαλάττῃ. μικρῶν πέφικας ἡ μεγάλων φιλοθεάμων;
εἰ μεγάλων, ἡλιον πολυπραγμόνει ποῦ² κάτεισι καὶ
πόθεν ἄνεισι· ξήτει τάς ἐν σελήνῃ καθάπερ ἐν³
ἀνθρώπῳ μεταβολάς, ποῦ τοσοῦτον κατανήλωσε
φῶς, πόθεν αὕθις ἐκτήσατο, πῶς

ἐξ ἀδήλου πρῶτον ἔρχεται νέα
πρόσωπα καλλύνουσα καὶ πληρουμένη·
χωταν περ αὕτης εὐγανεστάτη⁴ φανῆ,
πάλιν διαρρέει κατι μηδὲν ἔρχεται.

καὶ ταῦτ' ἀπόρρητ' ἐστὶ φύσεως, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀχθεῖ
tοῖς ἑλέγχουσιν. ἀλλὰ τῶν μεγάλων ἀπέγνωκας;
πολυπραγμόνει τὰ μικρότερα, πῶς τῶν φυτῶν 

¹ μελαίνον] μελαίνον most mss.
² ποῦ] ποei Bernardakis.
³ ἐν] omitted in most mss.
⁴ εὐγανεστάτη Pohlernz; εὐγενεστάτη or εὐπρεπεστάτη.

a In 515 D, supra.
thing secret, do not approach it, but let it be! The joy of a prosperous king is not concealed, nor is his laughter when he is amused, nor his outlay on entertainment and favours; but it is time for alarm when something is hidden, something dark, unsmiling, unapproachable, a storehouse of festering wrath, or the meditation of a punishment indicative of sullen anger, or jealousy of a wife, or some suspicion against a son, or distrust of a friend. Beware of this darkening and gathering cloud! That which is now hidden will be disclosed to you when the cloud bursts forth amid crashes of thunder and bolts of lightning!

5. What escape is there, then, from this vice? By a process of shifting and diverting our inquisitiveness, as has been said, and, if possible, by turning the soul to better and more pleasant subjects. Direct your curiosity to heavenly things and things on earth, in the air, in the sea. Are you by nature fond of small or of great spectacles? If of great ones, apply your curiosity to the sun: where does it set and whence does it rise? Inquire into the changes in the moon, as you would into those of a human being: what becomes of all the light she has spent and from what source did she regain it, how does it happen that

When out of darkness first she comes anew,
She shows her face increasing fair and full:
And when she reaches once her brightest sheen,
Again she wastes away and comes to naught?

And these are secrets of Nature, yet Nature is not vexed with those who find them out. Or suppose you have renounced great things. Then turn your

\[ \text{Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag.}^2, \text{ p. 315, Sophocles, Frag. 787 (871 ed. Pearson); the full quotation may be found in Life of Demetrius, xlv. (911 c-d). Cf. also Moralia, 282 b.} \]
μὲν ᾧ ἡ θηλή καὶ ἱλασθείς καὶ ἀγαλλιάται παντὶ
Ε καὶ ὁ τὸν ἐστὶν ἔννοια τούτος, νῦν δ' ὁσπερ ἀνοικονομή-
τος ἀνθρώπος ἔκχειν' ἄθροώς τὴν περιουσίαν
γυμνὰ καὶ πτωχὰ καταλείπεσαι; διὰ τί δὲ τὰ μὲν
προμήκεις τὰ δὲ γωνιώδεις τὰ δὲ στρογγύλους καὶ
περιφερεῖς ἐκδίδωσι καρποὺς.

'Ἰσως δὲ ταῦτ' οὗ πολυπραγμονήσεις, ὅτι τούτος
οὔδὲν κακὸν ἔνεστιν. 1 ἀλλ' εἶ δὲ πάντως τὸ
περίεργον ἐν φαινοις τισίν, ὁσπερ ἔρπετον ἐν
θανασίμοις ὤλαις, ἀεὶ νέμεσθαι καὶ διατρίβειν, ἐπὶ
τὰς ἱστορίας ἀγάγομεν αὐτὸ καὶ παραβάλωμεν
ἀφθονίαν κακῶν καὶ περιουσίαν ἐνταῦθα γὰρ
ἔνεισι

πεσήματ' ἀνδρῶν κάπολακτισμοὶ 2 βίων, 3

Φθοραὶ γυναικῶν, ἐπιθέσεις οἰκετῶν, διαβολαὶ
φίλων, παρασκευὴ γαρμάκων, φθόνοι, ζηλοτυπίαι,
νανάγι' οἶκων, ἐκπτώσεις ἱγμονίῶν 3, εἰμίπλασο
καὶ τέρπε σαυτόν, ἐνοχλῶν μηδενὶ τῶν συνοντῶν
μηδε λυπῶν.

6. Ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ἡ πολυπραγμονή μὴ χαίρειν
eὔλοιος κακοὶς ἀλλὰ θερμοὶς καὶ προσφάτους· καὶ
518 καὶ νὰς τραγῳδίας ἠδὲως θεαθαι, τοῖς δὲ κωμικοῖς
καὶ ἱλαρωτέροις πράγμασιν οὐ μάλα προθύμως ὀμι-
λεῖν. διὸ γάμον μὲν τινὸς ἡ θυσίαν ἡ προπομπὴν
dιεξόντος ἀμελῆς ο πολυπράγμων καὶ ῥάθυμος
ἀκροατῆς ἐστὶ, καὶ προακηκοέναι τὰ πλειότα φησί
καὶ κελεύει ταῦτα συντέμενει καὶ παρέρχεσθαι τὸν

1 ἔνεστιν Pohlenz: ἔστιν.
2 πεσήματ' . . . κάπολακτισμοὶ Dübner: πεσήματα . . . καὶ
ἀπολακτισμοὶ.
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curiosity to smaller ones: how are some plants always blooming and green and rejoicing in the display of their wealth at every season, while others are sometimes like these, but at other times, like a human spendthrift, they squander all at once their abundance and are left bare and beggared? Why, again, do some plants produce elongated fruits, others angular, and still others round and globular?

But perhaps you will have no curiosity about these subjects since there is nothing evil in them. Yet if your zest for meddling must by all means be for ever feeding and dwelling on depraved things, like a maggot on dead matter, let us escort it to history and supply it with an unstinted abundance of evils. For there you will find

The deaths of men, the shufflings off of life, a

seductions of women, assaults of slaves, slanders of friends, compounding of poisons, envies, jealousies, shipwrecks of households, overthrow of empires. Glut and enjoy yourself and cause no trouble or pain to any of your associates!

6. But curiosity apparently takes no pleasure in stale calamities, but wants them hot and fresh; it enjoys the spectacle of novel tragedies and has not much zest for association with the comic and more cheerful side of life. Consequently when anyone tells the tale of a wedding or a sacrifice or a complimentary escort, the busybody is a careless and inattentive listener, and declares that he has already heard most of the details and urges the narrator to

a Aeschylus, Suppliants, 937; cf. Moralia, 937 r.

3 βίου Aeschylus. 4 ἡγεμόνων most mss.
(518) διηγούμενον· ἂν δ' ἡ φθοράν τις παρθένου παρακαθήμενος ἡ μοιχείαν γυναικὸς ἡ δίκης παρασκευὴν ἡ στάσις ἄδελφῶν διηγηται, οὔτε νυστάζει οὔτε ἀσχολεῖται,

ἀλλὰ τε διήγηται ἐπέων παρά τ' οὖντα βάλλει.

καὶ τὸ

οἵμοι, τὸ κακὸν τῆς εὐτυχίας

ωσ μάλλον ἐσ οὖς φέρεται θνητῶν

ἐπὶ τῶν πολυπραγμόνων ἐστὶν ἀληθῶς εἰρημένον.

Β' ὡς γὰρ αἱ σικὺαι τὸ χείριστον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐλκουσιν, οὔτω τὰ τῶν πολυπραγμόνων ὡστα τοὺς φαυλοτάτους λόγους ἐπιστάται. μάλλον δ', ὅσπερ αἱ πόλεις ἔχουσι τινας πύλας ἀποφράδας καὶ σκυθρωπάς, δι' ἃν ἔξαγοσι τοὺς θανατομένους καὶ τὰ λύματα καὶ τοὺς καθαρμοὺς ἐκβάλλουσιν, εὐαγές δ' οὔδὲν οὔδ' ἱερὸν εἴσειοι οὔδ' ἔξεισι δι' αὐτῶν. οὔτω καὶ τὰ τῶν πολυπραγμόνων ὡστα χρηστόν οὔδὲν οὔδ' ἀστείον ἀλλ' οἱ φονικοὶ λόγοι διέρχονται καὶ τρίβοσιν, ἐκθύσιμα καὶ μιαρὰ διηγημένα παρακομίζοντες.

ἀεὶ δ' ἄοιδὼν1 μοῦνος ἐν στέγαις ἐμαῖς

κωκυτὸς ἐμπέπτωκεν.

C αὐτὴ τοῖς πολυπράγμοσι μοῦσα καὶ σειρὴν μία,

τοῦθ' ἤδιστον ἀκουσμάτων αὐτοῖς.

"Ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ πολυπραγμοσύνη2 φιλοπευστία τῶν ἐν ἀποκρύψει καὶ λανθανόντων· οὔδεις δ' ἀγαθὸν ἀποκρύπτει κεκτημένος, ὅπου καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα

1 ἄοιδὼν] ἄείδων most mss.: ἄηδὼν Lumb.
2 φιλοπραγμοσύνη most mss.
cut them short or skip them. But if someone sitting near at hand narrates the seduction of a maiden or the adultery of a wife or the framing of a law-suit or a quarrel of brothers, the busybody neither dozes off to sleep nor pleads an engagement,

But asks more speech and proffers both his ears;

and that saying,

Alas!

How much more readily than glad events
Is mischance carried to the ears of men!

is spoken truly when applied to busybodies. For as cupping-glasses draw from the flesh what is worst in it, so the ears of busybodies attract the most evil stories. Or rather, as cities have certain unlucky and dismal gates through which they lead out condemned criminals and cast out the refuse and the scapegoats, while nothing undefiled or sacred either goes in or out through them, so also the ears of busybodies give passage and thoroughfare to nothing good or decent, but only to gruesome tales, serving, as they do, as conveyance for foul and polluted narratives.

The only song that's heard within my house
Is wailing cries.

This is the one Muse and Siren for busybodies, this is the sweetest of all music to their ears.

For curiosity is really a passion for finding out whatever is hidden and concealed, and no one conceals a good thing when he has it; why, people even pretend to have good things when they have them

\textsuperscript{a} Callimachus, Frag. anon. 375 ed. Schneider.
\textsuperscript{b} Nauck, \textit{Trag. Graec. Frag.}\textsuperscript{2}, p. 913, ades. 386.
\textsuperscript{c} Cf. 469 b, supra, and \textit{Moralia}, 600 c.
\textsuperscript{d} Cf. \textit{Moralia}, 271 \textit{a}.
\textsuperscript{e} Cf. 463 b, supra.
(518) προσποιοῦνται. κακῶν οὖν ἱστορίας ὁ πολυπράγμων ὄρεγόμενος, ἐπιχαιρεκακίας συνέχεται πάθει, φθόνον καὶ βασκανίας ἀδελφῶν. φθόνος μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ λύτη ἐπὶ ἄλλοτροις ἄγαθοῖς, ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἴδον ἐπὶ ἄλλοτροις κακοῖς. ἀμφότερα δὲ ἐκ πάθους ἀνημέρου καὶ θηριώδους γεγένται τῆς κακοπθείας.

7. Οὔτω δ’ ἐκάστῳ λυπηρόν ἐστιν ἡ τῶν περὶ D αὐτῶν κακῶν ἀνακάλυψις, ὅστε πολλοὺς ἀποθανεῖν πρότερον ἢ δεῖξαι τι τῶν ἀπορρήτων νοσημάτων ἰατρῶν. φέρε γὰρ Ἦροβιλον ὡς Ἐρασίστρατον ἢ τὸν Ἀσκληπιον αὐτόν, ὥστε ἤν ἀνθρωπος, ἐχοῦτα τὰ φάρμακα καὶ τὰ ῥυγάνα, καὶ οἶκιαν προσιτάμενον ἀνακρίνειν μὴ τις ἔχει σύριγγα παρὰ δακτύλιον ἡ γυνὴ καρκίνων ἐν ῥυσέρα; καὶ τοιούτῳ σωτήριον ἐστὶ τῆς τέχνης ταύτης τὸ πολυπράγμον. ἄλλα πᾶσαν ἢ τις, οἷμαι, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀπήλασεν, ὅτι τὴν χρείαν οὐ περιμένων ἀκλήτους ἐπὶ ἄλλοτρίων κακῶν ἔρχεται κατανόησιν. οἱ δὲ πολυπράγμονες αὐτὰ ταύτα καὶ E τὰ τούτων ἐπὶ χείρονα ζητοῦσιν, οὐθεραπεύουντες ἄλλα μόνον ἀνακαλύπτοντες. ο devez μισοῦνται δι- καίως. καὶ γὰρ τοὺς τελῶνας βαρυνόμεθα καὶ δυσ- χεραίνομεν, οὐχ ὅταν τὰ ἐμφανῆ τῶν εἰσαγομένων ἐκλέγωσιν, ἄλλοτροις σκεύεσι καὶ φορτίοις ἀναστρέφωνται. καίτοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν οὐ νόμος δίδωσιν αὐτοῖς, καὶ βλάπτονται μὴ ποιοῦντες. οἱ δὲ πολυπράγμονες

1 παριστάμενον some mss. 2 περὶ δακτύλιον most mss.

a A term better expressed by the German Schadenfreude.
b Cf. Moralia, 1046 b.
c Of Chalcedon, a great anatomist of the Alexandrian age (fl. circa 300 B.C.).

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not. Since, then, it is the searching out of troubles that the busybody desires, he is possessed by the affliction called "malignancy," a brother to envy and spite. For envy is pain at another's good, while malignancy is joy at another's evil; and both spring from a savage and bestial affliction, a vicious nature.

7. So painful for all of us is the revelation of our own troubles that many die rather than reveal to physicians some hidden malady. Just imagine Herophilus or Erasistratus or Asclepius himself, when he was a mortal man, carrying about their drugs and instruments, calling at one house after another, and inquiring whether a man had an abscess in the anus or a woman a cancer in the womb! And yet the inquisitiveness of this profession is a salutary thing. Yet everyone, I imagine, would have driven such a man away, because he does not wait to be sent for, but comes unsummoned to investigate others' infirmities. And busybodies search out these very matters and others still worse, not to cure, but merely to expose them. For this reason they are hated deservedly. For example, we are annoyed and displeased with customs-officials, not when they pick up those articles which we are importing openly, but when in the search for concealed goods they pry into baggage and merchandise which are another's property. And yet the law allows them to do this and they would lose by not doing so. But busybodies ruin and abandon

a Of Ceos, worked in Alexandria at the height of his fame (258 B.C.).

b Asclepius, the son of Apollo, was deified after death as the god of medicine.

c Since the collection of taxes and duties was farmed out to individuals, they would be the losers in failing to make a minute search for dutiable articles.
519 ἐίτα μοι σκάπτων ἐρεῖ ἐφ' οἷς γεγόνασιν αἱ διαλύσεις· ταῦτα γὰρ πολυπραγμονῶν νῦν ὁ κατάρατος περιπατεῖ.

8. Οἱ δὲ πολυπράγμονες ὡς ἐωλόν τι πράγμα καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἀτράγῳ δοὺν φεύγοντες τὴν ἁγροκίαιν, εἰς τὸ δείγμα καὶ τὴν ἁγοράν καὶ τοὺς λιμένας ὁδοῦνται: "μὴ τι καίνων;" "οὐ γὰρ ἦσ πρῶι καὶ ἁγοράν; τί οὖν; ἐν ὃραις τρισὶν οὐ εἰ τὴν πόλιν μετακεκοσμηθῶσα;" οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ἂν μὲν τὸς ἐχθτὶ τοιοῦτον εἴπειν, καταβάς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔπποι δεξιωσάμενος καταφιλῆς ἐστηκεν ἀκρωμ-Β μενος. ἐὰν δ' ἀπαντήσας ἐήπῃ τις ὅτι οὐθὲν καὶ νόν, ὡσπερ ἀχθώμενος, "τί λέγεις;" φησίν, "οὐ γέγονας καὶ ἁγοράν; οὐ παρελήλυθας τὸ στρατηγικον; οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐξ Ἰταλίας ἥκουσιν ἐντετυχήκας;" διὸ καλῶς οἱ τῶν Ἄκρων ἄρχοντες· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τις

1 πολυπραγμονῶν νῦν Emperius, confirmed by mss.: νῦν πολυπραγμονῶν.

2 μετακεκοσμῆθαι many mss.
their own interests in their excessive occupation with those of others. Only rarely do they visit the farm, for they cannot endure the quiet and silence of being alone. But if, after a long absence, they do chance to put in there, they have more of an eye for their neighbours' vines than for their own, and they ask how many of their neighbours' cattle have died, or how much of his wine has turned sour. But they are soon sated with such news and run away. Yet the true and genuine farmer does not care to hear even news that makes its own way from the city; he says

Then he will tell me while he digs
On what terms peace was made. The cursed scamp
Now strolls around and meddles with these things.

8. And the busybody, shunning the country as something stale and uninteresting and undramatic, pushes into the bazaar and the market-place and the harbours: "Is there any news?" "Weren't you at market early this morning? Well then, do you suppose the city has changed its constitution in three hours?" If, however, someone really does have something of that nature to tell him, he dismounts from his horse, grasps his informant's hand, kisses him, and stands there listening. But if someone meets him and tells him that there is no news, he exclaims as though he were annoyed, "What do you mean? Haven't you been at market? Didn't you pass the War Office? Didn't you interview the new arrivals from Italy either?" It is for this reason that the legislation of the Locrian magistrates was excellent. For if anyone who had been out of town came

* Kock, Com. Att. Frag., iii. p. 473, ades. 347; cf. 511 e, supra, where it is the typical Athenian slave of whom his farmer-master complains.
(519) έξ ἄποδημιας προσιῶν ἠρώτησε, "μή τι καινόν," ἐξημίωσαν αὐτόν. ὡς γὰρ οἱ μάγειροι φοράν εὔχοντας βοσκημάτων οἱ δὲ ἄλλες ἱχθύων, οὕτως οἱ πολυπράγμονες εὐχονταί φοράν κακῶν καὶ πλῆθος πραγμάτων καὶ καυνότητας καὶ μεταβολάς, ἵν’ ἄει τι θηρεύειν καὶ κατακόπτειν ἔχωσιν.

Εὖ δὲ καὶ ὁ τῶν Θουρίων νομοθέτης κωμωδεῖ-σθαι γὰρ ἐκώλυσε τοὺς πολίτας πλῆν μοιχοὺς καὶ πολυπράγμονας. ἔοικε γὰρ ἦ τε μοιχεία πολυπραγ-μοσύνη τὸς ἄλλοτριάς ἡδονῆς εἶναι καὶ ζήτησις καὶ ἔρευνα τῶν φυλαττομένων καὶ λανθανόντων τοὺς πολλοὺς. ἦ τε πολυπραγμοσύνη παράδυσις ἐστὶ καὶ φθορὰ καὶ ἀπογύμνωσις τῶν ἀπορρήτων.

9. Τῇ μὲν οὖν πολυμαθεία τὴν πολυλογίαν ἐπε-σθαί συμβαίνει (διὸ καὶ Πυθαγόρας ἔταξε τοὺς νεός πενταετῆ σωτῆν, ἐχεμυθίαν προσαγορεύσας), τῇ δὲ περιεργία τὴν κακολογίαν ἀνάγκη συνακολουθεῖν· ἃ γὰρ ἴδεως ἀκούονσιν ἴδεως λαλοῦσιν, καὶ ἂ παρ’ ἄλλων σπουδῆ συλλέγοντο πρὸς ἑτέρους μετὰ χαρᾶς ἐκφέρουσιν. ὃθεν αὐτοῖς μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τὸ ἔνοσθα καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαιν ἐμποδῶν ἐστὶ. πάντες γὰρ αὐτοὺς φυλάττονται καὶ ἀποκρύπτονται, καὶ οὕτε πρᾶξιν τι πολυπράγμονος ὅρωντος οὕτ’ εἰπεῖν ἀκούοντος ἴδεως ἔχουσιν, ἄλλα καὶ βουλάς ἀνατίθενται καὶ σκέψεις πραγμάτων ὑπερβάλλονται, μέχρι ἂν ἐκποδῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος γενηται· κἂν

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1 τὸς [ἡς] most mss.
2 παράδυσις] παράλυσις all mss. except G.

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a The professional cook was also a butcher.
b Charondas.

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up and asked, "Is there any news?" they fined him. Just as cooks\(^a\) pray for a good crop of young animals and fishermen for a good haul of fish, in the same way busybodies pray for a good crop of calamities, a good haul of difficulties, for novelties, and changes, that they, like cooks and fishermen, may always have something to fish out or butcher.

Another good law was that of the legislator of Thurii,\(^b\) for he forbade the lampooning on the comic stage of all citizens except adulterers and busybodies. And indeed adultery does seem to be a sort of curiosity about another's pleasure and a searching out and examination of matters which are closely guarded and escape general observation, while curiosity is an encroaching, a debauching and denuding of secret things.

9. Since a natural consequence of much learning is to have much to say (and for this reason Pythagoras\(^c\) enjoined upon the young a five years' silence which he called a "Truce to Speech"), a necessary concomitant of inquisitiveness is to speak evil.\(^d\) For what the curious delight to hear they delight to tell, and what they zealously collect from others they joyously reveal to everyone else. Consequently, in addition to its other evils, their disease actually impedes the fulfilment of their desires.\(^e\) For everyone is on his guard to hide things from them and is reluctant to do anything while a busybody is looking, or to say anything while one is listening, but defers consultation and postpones the consideration of business until such an inquisitive person is out of

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\(^a\) Cf. *Life of Numa*, viii. (65 b); *De Vita et Poesi Homerii*, 149 (Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 420); Lucian, *Vitarum Auctio*, 3.

\(^b\) Cf. 508 c, supra.

\(^c\) Cf. 502 e-f, supra.
(519) ἡ λόγου τινὸς ἀπορρήτου παρόντος ἡ πράξεως σπουδαίας περαινομένης ἀνὴρ πολυπράγμων ἐπιφανής, καθάπερ οἶμον γαλῆς παραδραμοῦσις αὐροῦσιν ἐκ μέσου καὶ ἀποκρύπτουσιν· ὥστε πολλάκις τὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ῥητά καὶ θεατά τούτοις μόνοις ἀρρητα καὶ ἀθέατα γίνεσθαι.

Διὸ καὶ πίστεως ἀπάσης ἔρημος ὁ πολυπράγμων ἔστὶν· οἰκέταις γοῦν καὶ ξένοις πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον ἐπιστολάς καὶ γράμματα καὶ σφραγίδας ἡ φίλοις καὶ οἰκείοις πολυπράγμωσιν. ὁ δὲ Βελλεροφόντης ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ γράμματα κομίζων ἔλυσεν, ἀλλ’ ἀπέσχετο τῆς ἐπιστολῆς τοῦ βασιλέως ὡς τῆς γυναικὸς διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐγκράτειαν. ἀκρασίας γὰρ τὸ πολυπράγμων ὡς καὶ τὸ μοιχεύων, καὶ πρὸς τῇ ἀκρασία δευτῆρας ἄνοιας καὶ ἀφροσύνης· τὸ γὰρ τοσαῦτας παρελθόντα κοινὰς καὶ δεδημοσιωμένας1 γυναικας ἑπὶ τὴν κατάκλειστον ὀθείσθαι καὶ πολυτελῆ, πολλάκις ἀν οὕτω τύχῃ καὶ ἀμορφον οὕσαν, Ἡ ὑπερβολὴ μανίας καὶ παραφροσύνης. ταῦτον δ’ οἱ πολυπράγμωνες ποιοῦσι· πολλὰ2 καὶ καλὰ θεάματα καὶ ἀκούσματα καὶ σχολαὶ καὶ διατριβὰς παρελθόντες, ἐπιστολὰ διορύττουσιν ἄλλοτρα καὶ παραβάλλουσι γειτόνων τοίχους τὰ ὡτα καὶ συμψιθυρίζουσιν οἰκέταις καὶ γυναικὶς, πολλάκις μὲν οὐδ’ ἀκινδύνως αἰὲ δ’ ἀδόξως.

10. Διὸ καὶ χρήσιμων ὡς ἐνι μάλιστα πρὸς τὴν3 ἀποτροπὴν τοῖς πολυπράγμωσιν ἡ τῶν προεγνωσμέ-

1 δημοσιωμένας many ms.
2 πολλὰ] πολλὰ γὰρ Stegmann.
3 τὴν] τὴν τοῦ πάθους Reiske.

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a Cf. 503 c-d, supra.
b Cf. II., vi. 168.
ON BEING A BUSYBODY, 519

the way. And if, when either some secret matter is under discussion or some important business is being transacted, a busybody comes on the scene, men drop the matter from the discussion and conceal it, as one does a tidbit when a cat runs by. Consequently these persons are often the only ones to whom those matters are not told or shown which everyone else may hear and see.

For the same reason the busybody is deprived of everybody’s confidence a: we should prefer, on any account, to entrust our letters and papers and seals to slaves and strangers rather than to inquisitive friends and relatives. That noble Bellerophon b did not break the seal even on a letter accusing himself which he was carrying, but kept his hands from the king’s letter by reason of that same continence which kept him from the king’s wife. Inquisitiveness, in fact, is indicative of incontinence no less than is adultery, and in addition, it is indicative of terrible folly and fatuity. For to pass by so many women who are public property open to all and then to be drawn toward a woman who is kept under lock and key and is expensive, and often, if it so happens, quite ugly, is the very height of madness and insanity. And it is this same thing which busybodies do: they pass by much that is beautiful to see and to hear, many matters excellent for relaxation and amusement, and spend their time digging into other men’s trifling correspondence, gluing their ears to their neighbours’ walls, whispering with slaves and women of the streets, and often incurring danger, and always infamy.

10. For this reason the most useful means possible for turning the busybody from his vice is for him to
520 νων ἀνάμνησις. ἄν γάρ, ὥσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης ἔλεγε τὰς κιβωτοὺς ἀνοίγων διὰ χρόνου τὴν μὲν τῶν μυσθῶν ἀεὶ μεστὴν τὴν δὲ τῶν χαρίτων εὐρίσκειν κενήν, οὕτως¹ τις² τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης τὴν ἀποθήκην ἀνοίγη διὰ χρόνου καὶ κατασκέπτηται πολλῶν ἀχρήστων καὶ ματαίων καὶ ἀτερπῶν γέμουσαν, ὡς ἂν αὐτῷ τὸ πράγμα³ προστάτη, φανεῖν ἄθεδες παντάπασι καὶ φλυαρώδες. θέρε γάρ, εἰ τις ἐπὶ τὰ συγγράμματα τῶν παλαιῶν ἐκλαμβάνοι τὰ κάκιστα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ βιβλίον ἔχοι συντεταγμένον, οἷον 'Ομηρικῶν στίχων ἀκεφάλων καὶ τραγικῶν σολοκισμῶν καὶ τῶν ὑπ' Ἀρχιλόχου Β πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπρεπῶς καὶ ἀκολάστως εἰρημένων, ἐαυτὸν παραδειγματίζοντος, ἄρ' οὐκ ἔστι τῆς τραγικῆς κατάρας ἄξιος,

ὅλου ἔκτιτῶν ἐκλέγων τὰ συμφοράς;
καὶ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς κατάρας ἀπρεπῆς καὶ ἀνωφελῆς ὁ θησαυρισμός αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀμαρτημάτων· ὥσπερ ἡ πόλις, ἡν ἐκ τῶν κακίστων καὶ ἀναγωγοτάτων κτίσας ὁ Φιλίππος Πονηρόπολιν προσηγόρευεν.

Οἱ τοῖν τινι πολυπράγμονες, οὐ στίχων οὐδὲ ποιημάτων, ἄλλα βίων ἀστοχήματα καὶ πλημμελήματα καὶ σολοκισμοὺς ἀναλεγόμενοι καὶ συνάγοντες, ἀμουσότατον καὶ ἀτερπέστατον κακῶν γραμματο-

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¹ All mss. but two add ἄν after οὕτως.
² τις added by Hutten.
³ πράγμα] πράγμ' αὐτὸ W.C.H.

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ᵃ With this chapter may be compared chapter 19 of De Vitoso Pudore (Moralia, 536 c-d).
ᵇ Cf. the same story, illustrating the avarice of Simonides, 498
remember what he has previously learned. For, as Simonides used to say that when he opened his boxes after some time, he always found the fee-box full, but the thanks-box empty, so if one opens from time to time the deposit-box of inquisitiveness and examines it, full as it is of many useless, futile, and unlovely things, perhaps this procedure would give sufficient offence, so completely disagreeable and silly would it appear. Suppose a man should run over the works of the ancients and pick out the worst passages in them and keep a book compiled from such things as "headless lines" in Homer and solecisms in the tragedians and the unbecoming and licentious language applied to women by which Archilochus makes a sorry spectacle of himself, would he not deserve that curse in the tragedy,

Be damned, compiler of men's miseries?

And even without this curse, such a man's treasure-house of other people's faults is unbecoming and useless. It is like the city populated by the vilest and most intractable of men which Philip founded and called Roguesborough.

Busybodies, however, by gleaning and gathering the blunders and errors and solecisms, not of lines or poems, but of lives, carry about with them a most in Moralida, 555 f; there the box containing his fees is full of silver.

* Lines which begin with a short syllable instead of the long one demanded by the metre: cf. Moralida, 397 d, 611 b; Athenaeus, xiv. 632 d.

* Cf. Moralida, 45 a.


(520) φυλακεῖον τὴν ἑαυτῶν μνήμην περιφέρουσιν. ὀσπερβάκειν ὑγιῆν, καὶ νὴ Δία τὰ κάλλη τῶν ὑώνων παῖδων καὶ γυναικῶν ἐν μηδείς λόγω τιθέμενοι περὶ τὴν τῶν τεράτων ἀγοράν ἀναστρέφονται, τοὺς ἀκνήμονας καὶ τοὺς γαλεάγκωνας καὶ τοὺς τριοφθάλμους καὶ τοὺς στρουθοκεφάλους καταμανθάνοντες καὶ ζητοῦντες εἴ τι γεγένηται

σύμμικτον εἶδος καὶ ἀποφάλλων τέρας,1

ἀλλ' ἐὰν συνεχῶς τις ἐπαγάγῃ τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτοὺς θεάμασι, ταχὺ πλησιμονήν καὶ ναυτίαν τὸ πράγμα παρέξει, οὕτως οἱ τὰ περὶ τὸν βίον ἀστοχήματα καὶ γενῶν αἰσχῆ καὶ διαστροφὰς τινὰς ἐν οἴκους ἀλλοτρίως καὶ πλημμελείας πολυπραγμονοῦντες τῶν

D πρώτων2 ἀναμμυνησκέτωσαν ἑαυτοὺς ὅτι χάριν καὶ ὀνησίων οὐδεμίαν ἦνεγκε.

11. Μέγιστον μέντοι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀποτροπὴν ὁ ἔθισμός, ἐὰν πόρρωθεν ἀρξάμενοι γυμνάζωμεν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ διδάσκωμεν ἐπὶ τάκτην τὴν ἐγκράτειαν καὶ γὰρ ἡ αὐξήσεις ἔθει γέγονε τοῦ νοσήματος κατὰ μικρὸν εἰς τὸ πρόσω χωροῦντος. ὅν δὲ τρόπον, εἰσόμεθα περὶ τῆς ἀσκήσεως ὁμοι διαλεγόμενοι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν βραχυτάτων καὶ ἐναλτατῶν ἀρξάμεθα. τί γὰρ χαλεπὸν ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς ὀδοῖς τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τάφων ἐπιγραφὰς μὴ ἀναγνώσκειν, ἢ τὶ δυσχερὲς ἐν τοῖς περιπάτοις τοῖς κατὰ τῶν τοῖχων γράμματα3 τῇ ὁφεὶ παρατρέχειν, ὑποβάλλοντας αὐτοῖς ὅτι χρήσιμον οὐθὲν

1 τέρας] βρέφος Life of Theseus, xv.
2 πρώτων] προτέρων Hartman.
3 γράμματα] ἐπιγράμματα Reiske.
inelegant and unlovely record-box of evils, their own memory. Therefore just as at Rome there are some who take no account of paintings or statues or even, by Heaven, of the beauty of the boys and women for sale, but haunt the monster-market, examining those who have no calves, or are weasel-armed,\(^a\) or have three eyes, or ostrich-heads, and searching to learn whether there has been born some

Commingled shape and misformed prodigy,\(^b\)

yet if one continually conduct them to such sights, they will soon experience satiety and nausea; so let those who are curious about life's failures, the blots on the scutcheon, the delinquencies and errors in other people's homes, remind themselves that their former discoveries have brought them no favour or profit.

11. The greatest factor, however, in ridding ourselves of this affliction is the habit of beginning early to train and teach ourselves to acquire this self-control. It is, in fact, by habituation that the disease has come to increase, advancing, as it does, little by little. How this habit is acquired, we shall learn when we discuss the proper training. So first let us begin with the most trifling and unimportant matters. What difficulty is there about refraining from reading the inscriptions on tombs as we journey along the roads? Or what is there arduous in just glancing at the writing on walls when we take our walks? We have only to remind ourselves that

\(^a\) That is, with exceptionally short arms.

οὐδ' ἐπιτερπεῖς ἐν τούτοις γέγραπται· ἀλλ' "ἐμνήσθη" ο δείνα τοῦ δείνος "ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ" καὶ "φίλων ἀριστος" οδε τις, καὶ πολλά τοιαύτης γέμοντα φλυαρίας; ἀ δοκεὶ μὲν οὐ βλάπτειν ἀναγινωσκόμενα, βλάπτει δὲ λεληθῶς τῷ μελέτην παρεμποιεῖν τοῦ ξητεῖν τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα. καὶ καθάπερ οἱ κυνηγοὶ τοὺς σκύλακας οὐκ ἔωσιν ἐκτρέπεσθαι καὶ διώκειν πᾶσαι δόμην, ἄλλα τοῖς ρυτῆροι έλκουσι καὶ ἀνακρούσουσι, καθαρὸν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀκρατον φυλαττόντες τὸ αἰσθητήριον ἔπι τὸ οὐκεῖον ἔργον, ἵνα εὐτονωτερον ἐμφύηται τοῖς ἰχνεύσι

F πέλματα¹ θηρείων μελέων μυκτήρων ἔρευνών·

οἷς δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ πάν θέαμα καὶ πάν ἄκουσμα τοῦ πολυπράγμονος ἐκδρομᾶς καὶ περιπλανήσεως αφαιρέων καὶ ἀντισταῦ ἐπὶ τὰ χρῆσιμα φυλάττοντας, ὅσπερ γὰρ οἱ ἄετοι² καὶ οἱ λέοντες ἐν τῷ περίπατείν συστρέφουσιν ἔσω τοὺς οὖν χασ, ἵνα μή τὴν ἄκμην αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν οξύτητα κατατρίβωσιν, οὖτω τὸ πολύπραγμον τοῦ φιλομαθοῦς ἄκμην τῶν καὶ στόμωμα νομίζοντες ἔχειν μὴ καταναλίσκωμεν μηδ' ἀπαμβλύωμεν ἐν τοῖς ἀχρήστοις.³

12. Δεύτερον τούτων ἐθιξώμεθα θύραν παρίντες ἀλλοτρίαν μὴ βλέπειν ἐσοῦ μηδὲ τῶν ἐντὸς ἐπιδράττεσθαι τῇ ὑπετε⁴ καθάπερ χειρὶ τῆς περιεργίας, ἄλλα τὸ τοῦ Σενοκράτους ἔχωμεν πρόχειρον, ὅς ἐφη

¹ πέλματα Emperius, confirmed by one ms.: τέρματα.
² ἄετοι] αἰλουροι Pohlenz.
³ ἀχρήστοις] χειρίστοις most mss.
⁴ Reiske would delete τῇ ὑπετε.
⁵ τῆς περιεργίας Babbitt: τῇ περιεργίᾳ.
nothing useful or pleasant has been written there: merely so-and-so "commemorates" so-and-so "wishing him well," and someone else is the "best of friends," and much twaddle of this sort. It may seem that no harm will come from reading these, but harm you it does by imperceptibly instilling the practice of searching out matters which do not concern you. And as hunters do not allow young hounds to turn aside and follow every scent, but pull them up and check them with the leash, keeping their sense of smell pure and untainted for their proper task in order that it may keep more keenly to the trail,

With nostrils tracking down the paths of beasts;

so one should be careful to do away with or divert to useful ends the sallies and wanderings of the busybody; directed as they are to everything that one may see and hear. For as eagles and lions draw in their claws when they walk so that they may not wear off the sharpness of the tips, so, if we consider that curiosity for learning has also a sharp and keen edge, let us not waste or blunt it upon matters of no value.

12. In the second place, then, let us accustom ourselves not to look inside when we pass another's door, nor with our curious gaze to clutch, as it were by main force, at what is happening within, but let us ever keep ready for use the saying of Xenocrates,

\[\text{\textit{I quote Shilleto's note:}}\] "Plutarch rather reminds one, in his evident contempt for Epitaphs, of the cynic who asked, 'Where are all the bad people buried?' Where indeed?"

\[\text{\textit{From an unknown poet: Empedocles? (cf. Diels, Hermes, xv. 176).}}\]

\[\text{\textit{Cf. Moralia, 966 c. "Eagles" is probably corrupt. Pohlenz suggests "cats."}}\]
(521) μηδέν διαφέρειν ἡ τοὺς πόδας ἡ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν οἰκίαν τιθέναι: οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὔτε καλόν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἦδυ τὸ θέαμα:

δύσμορφα μέντοι τάνδου εἰσίδεις, ξένε•

τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις, σκευάρια γειμενα καὶ θεραπαινίδια καθεξόμενα καὶ 2 οποιο- δαίον οὐδὲν οὖν ἐπιτερπέτες. ἡ δὲ συνδιαστρέφουσα τὴν ψυχὴν παράβλεψις αὐτὴ καὶ παρατόξευσις αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὸ ἔθος μοχθηρὸν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Διογένης θεασάμενος εἰσελαύνοντα τὸν ὀλυμπιο- νίκην Διώξιππον ἐφ' ἀρματος, καὶ γυναικὸς εὐ- μόρφου θεωμένης τὴν πομπῆν ἀποστάσας τὰς ὁψεὶς μὴ δυνάμενον ἀλλ' ὑποβλέποντα καὶ παρεπιστρέφο- μενον, "ὄρατ'." εἰπε, "τὸν ἀθλητὴν ὑπὸ παιδι- σκαρίου τραχηλιζόμενον;" τοὺς δὲ πολυπράγμονας ἴδοις ἀν ὑπὸ παντὸς ὠμοίως θεάματος τραχηλιζο- μένους καὶ περιαγομένους όταν ἔθος καὶ μελέτη γεννηται τῆς ὁψεως αὐτοῦ πανταχοῦ διαφορομένης. δει δ', ὡς οἴμαι, μὴ καθάπερ θεράπαιναν ἀνάγομεν ἐξω ρέμβεσθαι τὴν αἰσθήσιν, ἀλλ' ἀποπεμπομένην ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα συντυγχάνειν αὐτοῖς ταχὺ καὶ διαγγέλλειν εἴτ' πάλιν κοσμίως ἐντὸς εἶναι τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ προσέχειν αὐτῷ. νῦν δὲ συμβαίνει τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους.

1 ἡ omitted by some mss., but confirmed by Aelian. 2 καὶ[ καίτοι W.C.H.

Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag.2, p. 617, Euripides, Frag. 790, probably from the Philoctetes. 504
that it makes no difference whether it is the feet or the eyes that we set within another's house; for what the eyes behold is neither just nor honourable, and not even pleasant.

Unsightly, stranger, are the things within, since the greater part of what we see inside is of this sort—kitchen utensils lying about and servant-girls sitting in idleness, and nothing important or pleasant. And this practice of throwing sidelong and furtive glances, distorting the soul as it does, is shameful, and the habit it implants is depraved. For instance, when Diogenes saw the Olympic victor Dioxippus making his triumphal entry in his chariot and unable to tear his eyes away from a beautiful woman who was among the spectators of the procession, but continually turning around and throwing side-glances in her direction, "Do you see," said the Cynic, "how a slip of a girl gets a strangle-hold on our athlete?" And you may observe how every kind of spectacle alike gets a strangle-hold on busy-bodies and twists their necks round when they once acquire a habit and practice of scattering their glances in all directions. But, as I think, the faculty of vision should not be spinning about outside of us, like an ill-trained servant girl, but when it is sent on an errand by the soul it should quickly reach its destination and deliver its message, then return again in good order within the governance of the reason and heed its command. But as it is, the words of Sophocles come true:

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\(^b\) Cf. Aelian, *Varia Historia*, xii. 58.
\(^c\) That is, outside of the control of reason.
\(^d\) *Electra*, 724-725.
(521) ἢπεῖτα δ' Ἀινάνος ἀνδρὸς ἀστομοί πῶλοι βία φοροῦσιν.

αἱ μὴ τυχόσαε παιδαγωγίας ὄσπερ ἐλέγομεν ὅρθῆς μὴδ' ἀσκήσεως αἰσθήσεως προεκτέχουσαι καὶ συνεφελκόμεναι πολλάκις εἰς ἃ μὴ δεὶ καταβάλ- λουσι τὴν διάνοιαν. θὲν ἔκεινο μὲν ψεῦδός ἔστι,

D τὸ Δημόκριτον ἐκουσίως σβέσαι τὰς ὄψεις ἀπερεισάμενων εἰς ἐσοπτρὸν πυρωθέν καὶ τὴν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ3 ἀνάκλασιν δεξάμενον, ὅπως μὴ παρέχωσι θόρυβον τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξω καλοῦσαν πολλάκις, ἀλλ’ ἐώσιν ἔνδον οἰκουρεῖν καὶ διατίβειν πρὸς τοῖς νοη- τοῖς, ὀσπερ παρόδιοι θυρίδες ἐμφραγεῖσαι: τούτο μέντοι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀληθὲς ἔστιν, ὅτι τὴν αἰσθή- σιν ὀλγιστα4 κινοῦσιν οἱ πλείστα τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενοι. καὶ γὰρ τὰ μουσεῖα πορρωτάτω τῶν πόλεων ἱδρύσατο, καὶ τὴν νῦκτα προσεῖπον "ἐυφρόνην" μεγά πρὸς εὑρέσι τῶν ἐντομέμενων καὶ σκέψιν ἡγοῦμενοι τὴν ἱσυχίαν καὶ τὸ ἀπερί- σπαστον.

Ε 13. 'Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἔκεινο χαλεπὸν καὶ δύσκολον, ἀνθρώπων λοιδορομέμενων ἐν ἄγορᾷ καὶ κακῶς λεγόντων ἀλλήλους μὴ προσελθείν, ἡ συνδρομῆς ἐπὶ τι πλειόνων γενομένης μείναι καθήμενον· εὰν δ’ ἄκρατὸς ἐχής, ἀπελθεῖν ἀναστάτα. χρηστὸν μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲνος τοῖς πολυπραγμονοῦσιν ἀναμίξας σεαυ-

1 φέρουσι Sophocles.
2 ἐλέγομεν Reiske: ἐλέγομεν.
3 αὐτοῦ] αὐτῶν most ms.
4 ὀλγιστα Kronenberg: ὀλιγα.

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ON BEING A BUSYBODY, 521

Then the Aenianian's hard-mouthed yearlings break
From his control and bolt;

that is, the senses which have not received what we
called above right instruction and training run away,
dragging the intellect with them, and often plunge it
into deep disaster. Consequently, though that story
about Democritus is false, that he deliberately
destroyed his sight by fixing his eyes on a red-hot
mirror and allowing its heat to be reflected on his
sight, in order that his eyes might not repeatedly
summon his intellect outside and disturb it, but
might allow his mind to remain inside at home and
occupy itself with pure thinking, blocking up as it
were windows which open on the street; yet nothing
is more true than this, that those who make most
use of the intellect make fewest calls upon the senses.

We observe, for instance, that men have built their
sanctuaries of the Muses far from cities and that
they have called night "kindly" from a belief that
its quiet and absence of distraction is greatly con-
ducive to the investigation and solution of the pro-
blems in hand.

13. Yet truly, neither is this a difficult nor arduous
task: when men are reviling and abusing each other
in the market-place, not to approach them, or when a
crowd is running to see something or other, to remain
seated, or, if you are without self-control, to get up
and go away. For you will reap no advantage from
mixing yourself with busybodies, whereas you will

\* Plutarch is thinking of some such passage as Plato,
\* Phaedo, 66 A.
\* That is, halls devoted to learning, such as the Museion at
Alexandria and the Academy at Athens.
\* Cf. Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 265.
\* Cf. 520 d, supra.
τῶν ἀπολαύσεως, μεγάλα δ' ὠφεληθήση τὸ πολύ-
πραγμὸν ἀποστρέψας βία καὶ κολούσας ὑπακούειν
tῷ λογισμῷ συμβεβλήκετεν.

'Εκ δὲ τούτου μᾶλλον ἐπιτείνυτα τὴν ἁσκησιν
ὄρθως ἔχει καὶ θέατρον ἀκροάματος εὑμεροῦντος
παρελθεῖν, καὶ φίλους ἐπ' ὀρχηστοῦ τινος ἢ κοιμω-

F δοῦ θέαν παραλαμβάνοντας διώσασθαι καὶ βοῦς ἐν
οτάδιῳ γινομένης ἢ ἐπιστρέφομεν μὴ ἐπιστραφῆναι.
καθάτερ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης παρῆνε φυλάττεσθαι τῶν
βρωμάτων ὅσα μὴ πεινώντας ἐσθίειν ἀναπείθει καὶ
tῶν πομάτων ὅσα πίνειν μὴ διψῶντας, οὕτω χρή
cαὶ ἡμᾶς τῶν θεαμάτων καὶ ἀκουσμάτων φυλάττε-
σθαι καὶ φεύγειν ὅσα κρατεῖ καὶ προσάγεται τοὺς
μηδὲν δεομένους. ὁ γοῦν

1 Κύρος οὐκ ἐβούλετο τὴν
Πάνθειαν ἢ ἐδωκὼν ἡγε-

522 ἐφη, "διὰ τούτῳ μᾶλλον αὐτῆς ἀφεκτέον· εἰ γὰρ
ὑπὸ σοῦ πεισθεῖς ἀφικοίμην πρὸς αὐτήν, ἣν οὐκ ἐν με
πάλιν ἀναπείσθης αὐτή καὶ μὴ σχολάζοντας φοιτάν
καὶ θεάσθαι" καὶ παρακαθῆσθαι προεμενον πολλά
τῶν ὁποιῶν ἀξίων." ὁμοίως οὖν ὁ 'Αλέξανδρος
eἰς ὄψιν ἠλθε τῆς Δαρείου γυναικὸς ἐκτρεπτεστάτης
eῖναι λεγομένης, ἄλλα πρὸς τὴν μητέρα φοιτῶν
αὐτῆς προσβύτων οὖσαν, οὐχ ὑπεμενε τὴν νέαν καὶ
καλὴν ἢ ἐδωκὼν. ἡμεῖς δὲ τοὺς φορεῖς τῶν γυναικῶν
ὑποβάλλοντες τοὺς ὁφθαλμοὺς καὶ τῶν νυφῶν
ἐκκρεμανυίντες οὖσαν ἀμαρτάνειν ὁδοίμεν οὕτως
Β ὀλυσθηρᾶν καὶ ἰευστὴν εἰς ἀπαντα τὴν πολυπραγ-

μοσύνην ποιοῦντες.

1 γοῦν] δὲ all mss. except G.
2 καὶ θεάσθαι] θεάσθαι te most mss.
obtain great benefit from forcibly turning aside your curiosity and curtailing it and training it to obey reason.

And after this it is well to make our training more intensive and pass by a theatre where a successful performance is in progress; and, when our friends urge us to see a certain dancer or comedian, to thrust them aside; and, when shouts are heard on the race-course or in the circus, not to turn round. For as Socrates \(^a\) used to advise the avoidance of such foods as tempt us to eat when we are not hungry and such drinks as tempt us to imbibe when we are not thirsty, so we also should avoid and guard against such sights and sounds as master and attract us without fulfilling any need of ours. Thus Cyrus \(^b\) was unwilling to see Pantheia; and when Araspes declared that the woman’s beauty was worth seeing, Cyrus said, “Then this is all the more reason for keeping away from her. For if, persuaded by you, I should go to her, perhaps she herself might tempt me, when I couldn’t spare the time, to go to see her again and sit by her, to the neglect of many important matters.” So too Alexander \(^c\) would not go to see Darius’s wife who was said to be very beautiful, but although he visited her mother, an elderly woman, he could not bring himself to see the young and beautiful daughter. Yet we peep into women’s litters and hang about their windows, and think we are doing nothing wrong in thus making our curiosity prone to slip and slide into all kinds of vice.

\(^a\) Cf. 513 d, supra.
\(^b\) Cf. Xenophon, Cyropaedia, v. 1. 8; Moralia, 31 c.
\(^c\) Cf. Life of Alexander, xxii. (677 b); Moralia, 97 d, 338 e.
14. Ἐστι τοῖς καὶ πρὸς δικαιοσύνης ἀσκήσων ὑπερβῆναι ποτα λήμμα δίκαιον ἐνα πόρρω τῶν ἄδικων ἐθίσης σεαυτὸν εἶναι, καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνης ὁμοίως ἀποσχέσθαι ποτε γυναικὸς ἱδίας ἐνα μηδέποτε κινηθῆς ὑπ' ἄλλοτριάς. τούτῳ δὴ τὸ ἔθος ἐπάγων τῇ πολυπραγμοσύνη πειρῶ καὶ τῶν ἱδίων ἐνα παρακούσαι ποτα καὶ παριδεῖν καὶ βουλομένου τινὸς ἀγγείαι τι τῶν ἐπί τῆς οἰκίας ὑπερβαλέσθαι, καὶ λόγους περὶ σοῦ λελέχθαι δοκοῦνται ἀπώσασθαι. καὶ γὰρ τὸν Ὀἰδίποδα τοῖς μεγίστοις κάκοις ἡ περιεργία περιέβαλε. ξητῶν γὰρ Ο ἐαυτὸν ὡς οὔκ ὄντα Κορίνθιον ἄλλα ἔενον, ἀπήντησε τῷ Λαίῳ, καὶ τούτον ἀνελὼν καὶ τῇ μητέρᾳ λαβὼν ἐπὶ τῇ βασιλείᾳ γυναῖκα καὶ δοκοῦν εἶναι μακάριος πάλιν ἐαυτὸν ἐξῆτει. καὶ τῆς γυναικὸς οὔκ ἐώσης, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἥλεγχε τὸν συνειδότα γέροντα, πᾶσαν προσφέρων ἀνάγκην. τέλος δὲ τοῦ πράγματος ὧδη περιφέροντος αὐτὸν τῇ ὑπονολῇ καὶ τοῦ γέροντος ἀναβοήσαντος,

οἴμοι πρὸς αὐτῷ γ' εἰμὶ τῷ δεινῷ λέγειν,

ὁμοὶς ἔξημμένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους καὶ σφαδάξων ἀποκρίνεται,

κάγωγ' ἀκοῦειν· ἄλλ' ὁμοὶς ἀκουστέον.

οὕτω τὶς ἑστὶ γλυκύπτικρος καὶ ἀκατάσχετος ὃ τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης γαργαλισμός, ὥσπερ ἐλκος, αἰ- 

D μάσσων ἐαυτόν, οὖν ἀμύσσηται. ὃ δ' ἀπηλλαγ-

a The herdsman who had saved Oedipus on Cithaeron.

b Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, 1169.
14. Since, therefore, for the attainment of justice you may sometimes forgo an honest gain that you may accustom yourself to keep clear of dishonest profit, so likewise, for the attainment of continence, you may sometimes keep aloof from your own wife in order that you may never be stirred by another's. Then apply this habit to inquisitiveness and endeavour sometimes not to hear or see some of the things that concern you, and when someone wishes to tell you something that has happened in your house, put him off and refuse to hear words that are supposed to have been spoken about you. It was, in fact, curiosity which involved Oedipus in the greatest calamities. Believing that he was no Corinthian, but a foreigner, and seeking to discover his identity, he encountered Laius; and when he had killed Laius and had taken, in addition to the throne, his own mother to wife, though seeming to all to be blessed by fortune, he began again to try to discover his identity. And although his wife attempted to prevent him, all the more vigorously did he cross-examine the old man who knew the truth, bringing every form of compulsion to bear. And at last, when circumstances were already bringing him to suspect the truth and the old man a cried out,

Alas! I stand on the dread brink of speech, b
Oedipus was none the less so inflamed and maddened by his affliction c that he replied,

And I of hearing, and yet hear I must d; so bitter-sweet, so uncontrollable is the itching of curiosity, like the itching of a sore which gets bloody whenever we scratch it. But the man who has got

a Curiosity.

b Sophocles, l.c., 1170.

c Vol. vi

d R 3 511
(522) μένος τῆς νόσου ταύτης καὶ φύσει πράος ἁγνόησας τι τῶν δυσχερῶν εἴποι ἄν,

ὡς πότενα λήθη τῶν κακῶν, ὡς εἰ σοφή.

15. Διὸ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα συνεθιστέον αὐτοῦ, ἐπιστολὴν κομισθείσαν μὴ ταχὺ μηδὲ κατεσπευ-

σμένως λύσαι, καθάπερ οἱ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν, ἀν αἱ χεῖρες βραδύνωσι, τοῖς ὀδοὺσι τοὺς δεσμοὺς δια-

βιβρώσκοντες, ἀγγέλου ποθὲν ἢκοντος μὴ προσ-

δραμεῖν μηδ’ ἐξαναστῆναι, φίλου τινὸς εἰπόντος,

"ἐξω σοὶ τί καυνὸν εἰπένι πράγμα," "μᾶλλον,"

εἰπεῖν "εἰ τί χρήσιμον ἔχεις ἡ ὄφελιμον."

Ἐμοὶ ποτ’ ἐν Ἄριμη διαλεγομένον, Ὀροῦστικος

Ε ἔκεινος, ὃν ὁστερον ἀπέκτεινε Δομετιανὸς τῇ δόξῃ

φθονῆσας, ἱκροάτο, καὶ διὰ μέσου στρατιώτης

παρελθὼν ἑπιστολὴν αὐτῷ Καίσαρος ἐπέδωκε.1

γενομένης δὲ σιωπῆς κάμοι διαλυπτόντος, ὅπως

ἀναγνω τὴν ἑπιστολὴν, οὐκ ἥθελησεν οὐδ’ ἔλυσε

πρὸτερον ἡ διεξελθεῖν ἐμὲ τὸν λόγον καὶ διαλυθῆναι

τὸ ἀκροατήριον. ἐφ’ ὃ πάντες ἑθαύμασαν τὸ βάρος

τάνδρος.

"Ὅταν δὲ τις οἷς ἔξεστι τρέφων τὸ πολύπραγμον

ἰσχυρὸν ἀπεργάσοται καὶ βίαιν, οὐκέτι ραδίως

πρὸς ἀ κεκώλυται φερομένου διὰ συνήθειαν κρατεῖν

δυνατός ἐστιν· ἀλλ’ ἐπιστολὴ παραλύουσιν οὔτοι

φίλων, συνεδρίας ἀπορρήτους ἐαυτοὺς παρεμβάλ-

Ἐλουσιν,3 ἤρων ἃ μὴ θέμις ὅραν γίνονται θεαται,

1 εἰπεῖν added by Bernardakis.

2 ἐπέδωκε most mss.

3 παραβάλλουσιν most mss.

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1, 2 Euripides, Orestes, 213.
rid of this disease and is gentle by nature will say, if he is ignorant of something unpleasant,

Forgetfulness of evil, sovereign queen,
How wise you are! a

15. We must, therefore, also habituate ourselves to things like these: when a letter is brought to us, not to open it quickly or in a hurry, as most people do, who go so far as to bite through the fastenings with their teeth if their hands are too slow; when a messenger arrives from somewhere or other, not to rush up, or even to rise to our feet; when a friend says, "I have something new to tell you," to say, "I should prefer that you had something useful or profitable."

When I was once lecturing in Rome, that famous Rusticus, b whom Domitian later killed through envy at his repute, was among my hearers, and a soldier came through the audience and delivered to him a letter from the emperor. There was a silence and I, too, made a pause, that he might read his letter; but he refused and did not break the seal until I had finished my lecture and the audience had dispersed. Because of this incident everyone admired the dignity of the man.

But when one nourishes his curiosity upon permissible material until he renders it vigorous and violent, he is no longer able to master it easily, since it is borne, by force of habit, toward forbidden things. And such persons pry into their friends' correspondence, thrust themselves into secret meetings, become spectators of sacred rites which it is an impiety

b Probably Arulenus Rusticus, put to death in or after 93 A.D. for having in his biography of Paetus Thrasea called his subject sanctus (Dio, lxvii. 13. 2, cf. also Tacitus, Agricola, 2).
PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

tópous ἀβάτους πατοῦι, πράγματα καὶ λόγους
βασιλικοὺς ἀνερευνώσι.

16. Καίτοι τοὺς γε τυράννους, ὡς ἀνάγκη πάντα
gυνώσκειν, ἐπαχθεστάτους ποιεῖ τὸ τῶν λεγομένων
𝜔τῶν καὶ προσαγωγέων γένος. ὦτακουστάς μὲν
οὖν πρῶτος ἐσχεν ὁ νόθος¹ Δαρείος ἀπιστῶν ἕαυτῷ
καὶ πάντας ύφορώμενος καὶ δεδοκώς, τοῦς δὲ

523 προσαγωγίδας οἱ Διονύσιοι τοῖς Συρακοσίοις²
κατέμειν· ὅθεν ἐν τῇ μεταβολῇ τῶν πραγμάτων
τούτων πρῶτους οἱ Συρακόσιοι συλλαμβάνοντες
ἀπετυμπάνιζον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ τῶν συκοφάντων γένος
ἐκ τῆς τῶν πολυπραγμόνων φρατρίας καὶ ἐστίας
ἐστὶν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν συκοφάνται χητοῦσιν, εἰ τις³ ἢ
βεβούλευται κακὸν ἢ πεποίηκεν· οἱ δὲ πολυπράγ-
μονες καὶ τὰς ἀβουλίτους ἀτυχίας τῶν πέλας
ἐλέγχοντες εἰς μέσον ἐκφέρουσι. λέγεται δὲ⁴ καὶ
τὸν ἄλληριον ἐκ φιλοπραγμοσύνης κατονομασθήναι
tὸ πρῶτον· λιμοῦ γὰρ ὡς ἐουκεν Ἀθηναίος Ἰσχυρὸς

Β γενομένου, καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων πυρὸν εἰς μέσον οὕς
φερόντων ἀλλὰ κρύφα καὶ νύκτωρ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις
ἀλούντων, περιόντες ἐτήρουν τῶν μύλων τῶν ψόφων,
εἰτ' ἂν ἄλτηριοι prosothrethasan. ὀμοίως δὲ
καὶ συκοφάντη τούνομα γενέσθαι.⁵ κεκωλυμένου
γὰρ ἐκφέρειν τὰ σύκα, μηνύοντες καὶ φαίνοντες

¹ νόθος G] νέος or πρῶτος.
² Συρακοσίοις Bernardakis, confirmed by G: συρακοσίοις.
³ τις] τὶς Bernardakis.
⁴ δὲ omitted in most mss.
⁵ γενέσθαι] γεγενήθαι most mss.

ᵃ Cf. Aristotle, Politics, v. (viii.) 9. 3 (1313 b 12 ff.).

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for them to see, tread consecrated ground, investigate the deeds and words of kings.

16. And yet surely in the case of despots, who have to know everything, it is the tribe of so-called "Ears" and "Jackals" that makes them most detested. It was Darius Nothus, who had no confidence in himself and regarded everyone with fear and suspicion, who first instituted "Listeners"; and "Jackals" were distributed by the Dionysii among the people of Syracuse. Consequently when the revolution came, these were the first persons whom the Syracusans arrested and crushed to death. And in fact the tribe of informers is from the same clan and family as busybodies. But while informers search to see whether anyone has planned or committed a misdemeanor, busybodies investigate and make public even the involuntary mischances of their neighbours. And it is said that the person called aliterios first acquired his name from being a busybody. For it appears that when there was a severe famine at Athens and those who possessed wheat would not contribute it to the common stock, but ground it in their houses secretly by night, some persons went about listening for the noise of the mills, and so acquired the name aliterioi. It was in the same way, they say, that the sycophant won his name. Since the export of figs was prohibited, men who revealed and gave information against those

\[ b \text{ Cf. Life of Dion, xxviii. (970 b-c).} \]

\[ c \text{ Transgressor, or outlaw; Plutarch rejects this explanation in Moralia, 297 a.} \]

\[ d \text{ The verb } \dot{d}lείν, \text{ from which } \dot{d}lυτρός \text{ is here derived.} \]

\[ e \text{ Informer; cf. Life of Solon, xxiv. (91 e); Athenaeus, 74 e-f.} \]

\[ f \text{ οὐκα.} \]

\[ g \text{ φαίνειν, from which the noun } -φάντης. \]
(523) τοὺς ἐξάγοντας ἐκλήθησαν "συκοφάνται." καὶ
tοῦτ' οὖν οὐκ ἀχρηστὸν ἐστὶν ἐννοεῖν τοὺς πολυ-
πράγμονας, ὡς αἰσχύνωνται τῇ πρὸς τοὺς
μισομένους μάλιστα καὶ δυσχεραινομένους ὁμο-
ότητα καὶ συγγένειαν τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος.
who did export them were called *sycophants*. So it is well worth the while of busybodies to consider this fact also, that they may be ashamed of the resemblance and relationship of their own practice to that of persons who are very cordially hated and loathed.
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