PLATO'S REPUBLIC

II
PLATO
THE REPUBLIC
WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
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IN TWO VOLUMES
II
BOOKS VI–X

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**PREFATORY NOTE**

While actively engaged, so far as his failing strength would permit, in completing for publication this the second volume of his translation of the *Republic* of Plato, Professor Shorey passed away on April 24, 1934, in the seventy-eighth year of his life. In justice to him as well as to the many thousands of readers who will study and cherish this last and perhaps the greatest scholarly work of the distinguished Platonist, the Editors of the Loeb Classical Library desire to place on record here a brief statement of the pertinent facts relating to the composition and the proof-revision of this volume. Behind the bare narrative lies a record of unwavering courage in the face of fast-approaching death on the part of the veteran scholar and of dauntless determination both to achieve a long-cherished purpose and to fulfil an obligation entered into many years before with his friend Dr. James Loeb and his collaborators in the editing of the Library; and the Editors thought it right to offer this volume to the public as nearly as possible approximating to the condition in which the latest proofs passed under the author’s eye.

The translation had been finished and was in Professor Shorey’s hands in proof form for about two years and had been partially, though not finally, revised by him. The Introduction was dictated by him, paragraph by paragraph, in the scant hours of work permitted him by his physicians after his first break-down in December 1933. The same is true of those notes accompanying the translation which are of an interpretative, literary or philosophical character. The many notes on Platonic diction and on matters of Greek grammar and idiom were in large part compiled from Professor Shorey’s jottings on the well-filled margins of his desk-copy of the *Republic* by his research secretary, Miss Stella Lange, who had assisted
him in that capacity during the preparation of What Plato Said, to which important work she added many references in the notes of this volume. The critical notes under the text were added by Miss Lange during the revision of the proofs, often from notes made by Professor Shorey himself.

The assembling in the form of copy for the printer of all the material which is found in the Introduction and notes has been the work of Miss Lange, undertaken at the request of Mrs. Shorey; and she has read all the galley and page proofs of the volume in co-operation with Dr. Page and myself. Miss Lange's familiarity with her teacher's Platonic studies, his methods of work, his views on the interpretation of passages of peculiar difficulty has rendered her co-operation invaluable, and generous acknowledgements are due to her for her fidelity to the heavy task which she willingly undertook.

To the writer of these words it would have been a grateful task, had this been an appropriate place, to add a personal tribute to his colleague of many years at the University of Chicago. The familiar correspondence which grew out of their renewed relationship during the preparation of the two volumes of the Republic has illuminated for him in unexpected ways the life of tremendous and varied activities of the great scholar and humanist during the years which for the ordinary man would have been a period of decreasing labours. The literary and scholarly productivity of Professor Shorey in these later years fails little short of heroism. But the readers of this interpretation of the Republic who would know more about the remarkable man and his life are referred to the review of his career which introduces the July 1934 number of Classical Philology, the journal which he edited for twenty-five years, and especially to President George Norlin's eloquent appreciation of "Paul Shorey the Teacher," on pp. 188-191.

For the Editors

EDWARD CAPPS.

September 18, 1934.
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INTRODUCTION

There is a sufficient outline of the Republic in the introduction to the first volume. Here it remains to consider more argumentatively certain topics of the last five books which were treated summarily there. They may be listed as (1) the theory of ideas and the idea of good, (2) the higher education and Plato's attitude toward science, (3) some further details of Plato's political theories, (4) the logic and psychology of the main ethical argument of the Republic, (5) the banishment of poetry, (6) the concluding myth.

Regarded as metaphysics, Plato's theory of ideas is, technically speaking, the deliberate and conscious hypostatization of all concepts—the affirmation that every abstract general notion of the human mind is also somehow, somewhere, in some sense, an objective entity, a real thing, outside of any mind. Some philologians and some sensitive aesthetic critics object to the use of the words concept and hypostatization in this connexion. They have a right to their personal distaste, but it contributes nothing to the interpretation of Plato. Both words convey definite meanings to students of philosophy and there are no words that can replace them. The Socratic dialogues are in fact largely concerned with the definition of concepts, general or abstract ideas,
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general terms, Begriffe, call them what you will, and some convenient synonym for this meaning is indispensable in any rational discussion of Plato's philosophy. The Platonic word *eidos* may have retained some of the associations of physical form, and the modern psychology of the concept may involve in some cases a more developed logic than Plato possessed. The word *eidos* or *idea* in Herodotus, Thucydides, Democritus, the Hippocratic *corpus* and Isocrates* a* may show the meaning concept or Begriff imperfectly freed from the association of physical form, but that does not justify the inference that it was never so freed in Plato. The terminology of the transcendental idea is indistinguishable from the terminology of the concept and the definition.* b* It is impossible to say at what point the metaphysical doctrine emerges in the minor dialogues, or—on the, I believe, mistaken hypothesis that the later dialogues abandon it—just when the change took place. The logic of the definition in the minor dialogues implies a practically sufficient notion of the nature of a concept,* c* and it is sophistry


* c It is hard to understand the acceptance by several scholars of Stenzel's view that the concept and consequently the idea is a late discovery in the Platonic dialogues, a result in fact of the analyses of the *Sophist*. He must take concept
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to try to suppress so plain a fact by capitalizing the word Form and insisting that Plato always or till his latest works visualized the "Forms" as types. He did for some purposes and for others he did not, and he always knew what he was doing. The ideas, as I have often pointed out, are ideals, types, or hypostatized concepts or simply concepts according to the purpose and the context.a

Many interpreters of Plato seem to assume that philosophy is, like mathematics or chemistry, a pro-

in some very esoteric significance. For to common sense nothing can be plainer than that the concept is implied in Socrates' attempts to define ethical terms and that it distinctly emerges together with the terminology at least of the idea in the minor dialogues of Plato and especially in the Euthyphro. Stenzel's thought seems to be that the concept involves predication and that predication can be fully understood only after the analysis of sentence structure in the Sophist and the discovery of the meaning of "is." But surely the conscious analysis of sentence structure and the function of the copula is one thing and the correct use of predication, of propositions and the conversion of propositions and their combination in virtual syllogisms is another. All the elements of a sound logic are present in Plato's minor dialogues. They are correctly employed in inductive and deductive reasoning, in the quest for definitions and in the testing of them when found. If Stenzel means that the nature of the concept, of the general idea, of abstractions is not definitively understood in the minor dialogues his postulate proves or demands too much. The ultimate nature of the concept is still debated to-day. But for all practical purposes of common sense any one who consistently endeavours to define abstract and general terms and who applies a sound logic to the testing of the definitions proposed, has a sufficient notion of the concept. And anyone who apprehends the concept may go on to hypostatize it either by an instinctive tendency of human nature and speech, or with conscious metaphysics as Plato did.

a Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 27 ff.
gressive science; that Plato, though a great artist, was a primitive thinker whose methods and opinions have only an historical interest to-day; and that his doctrine of ideas is the endeavour of an immature mind to deal with a problem which modern psychology or the common sense of any dissertation-writing philologian can settle in a paragraph. These assumptions close the door to any real understanding of Plato’s philosophy. The ultimate nature of general ideas, of abstract and conceptual thought in relation both to the human mind and to the universe is as much a matter of debate to-day as it was in the age of the schoolmen. This plain fact of literary history is not affected by the opinion of a certain number of materialists and behaviourists that the matter is quite simple and that there is or ought to be no problem. They may or may not be right. But the discussion continues, as any bibliography of psychology and philosophy will show. The entire literature of the “meaning of meaning” and of “imageless thought” is a renewal of the controversy in other terms.

A great many thinkers are not satisfied with the simple evasion of Aristotle that the human mind is “such” as to be able to experience this, namely the separation in thought of things inseparable in experience. They cannot find any enlightenment in the modern tautology that a general idea is an image of a particular idea plus a feeling of generality. And they are not convinced that the movements of the body, even if we concede that they run exactly parallel to the movements of the mind, really explain them. And if we turn to the other side of the problem we find that many of the leaders of modern
physics and mathematics are unable to conceive and refuse to admit that there is nothing in the objective universe corresponding to the ideas, the concepts, the laws, the principles by which they get their results.

The Platonic theory of ideas is a convenient short-hand, symbolic expression of the opinions that I have thus summarized. If we disregard the rhetoric and physical imagery of the myths by which Plato exalts the importance of the doctrine or makes it the expression of the ideal for ethics, politics and aesthetics, all that it affirms is, first, that conceptual thought is a distinct and differentiated prerogative of man not sufficiently accounted for by the structure of his body and the sensations which he shares with the animals; and second, that there must be something in the universe, something in the nature of things, that corresponds to our concepts and our ideals—to the principles, for example, of ethics and mathematics. These affirmations of Plato are primitive animism only in the sense in which the same could be said of the beliefs of some of the greatest mathematicians and physicists of to-day or of Matthew Arnold when he talks of a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness. This is not reading modern philosophies into Plato. It is merely giving him credit for knowing and intending what he in fact says. The opposite interpretation underrates his intelligence and really does read into his writings modern ideas, the notions, namely, of modern anthropologists as to how savages think. Gomperz' comparison of the doctrine of ideas to Iroquois animism (iii. 323; cf. iii. 1-2), Ogden and Richards' designation of the ideas as "name-souls" (The Meaning xiii
of Meaning, p. 45), Jowett’s illustration of what he deems hair-splitting refinements in Plato by the “distinction so plentiful in savage languages,” Cornford’s fancy (From Religion to Philosophy, p. 254) that “the idea is a group-soul related to its group as a mystery-demon like Dionysus is related to the group of worshippers, his thiasos,” and all similar utterances are uncritical, whatever airs of science or pseudo-science they assume. The relevant illustrations of Plato’s doctrine of ideas are to be sought in the most subtle debates of the schoolmen, or in modern psychological and epistemological literature about the meaning of meaning.¹

There were, of course, some other more special considerations that determined Plato’s deliberate and defiant hypostatization of all concepts. It accepted a natural tendency of the human, and not merely of the primitive mind, and rendered it harmless by applying it consistently to everything. If all concepts are hypostatized, the result for practical logic and for everything except metaphysics and ultimate epistemological psychology is to leave concepts where they were, as indispensable instruments of human thinking. The hypostatization of abstractions operated practically as a short answer to the sophisms of crude nominalists who obstructed ordinary reasoning by raising ultimate objections to the validity of all abstractions or general terms. This motive is distinctly apparent in Plato’s writings and there is a strong presumption that he was conscious of it.

However that may be, Plato did in fact, partly as a matter of imaginative style, partly as a matter of

¹ See Shorey in Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, pp. 579-583.
metaphysics, speak of concepts as if they were real objects. He did, as his writings conclusively show, hypostatize all concepts, and all attempts to show that he hypostatized only a few of the sublimer or more dignified concepts are a priori improbable because they deprive the doctrine of all rational meaning and consistency, and they are also refuted by the incontrovertible evidence of the dialogues themselves. Plato affirms this monstrous paradox, not because he is a naïve thinker unacquainted with the elementary psychology of abstraction and generalization, but because, as we have said, he regards it as the most convenient expression of his rejection of all materialistic and relativistic philosophies and of all crude nominalism. He recognized that the doctrine is a paradox hard to accept but also hard to reject. But he deliberately affirmed it as the most convenient alternative to inacceptable or unworkable philosophies. He perhaps, as we have already suggested, justified this procedure to himself, and we may certainly justify it for him, by the reflection that the theory is no more of a paradox than that involved in every theology and ultimately in all science and philosophy except the crudest dogmatic materialism. And we may find further confirmation of this opinion in the fact that both the metaphysics and the transcendental physics of the past two decades discover

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a Cf. Aristot. Met. 1043 b 21 and 991 b 6; Ross, i. pp. 192 and 199; and What Plato Said, p. 584.
c Cf. Cratyl. 440 b-c.
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more helpful analogies in the Platonic theory of ideas and in Plato’s applications of it to the philosophy of nature than they do in any other philosophy of the past.

In disregard of these considerations many critics in every age, and notably Natorp and Stewart in ours, have tried to free Plato from the stigma of paradox or naïveté by trying to show that this uncompromising realism (in the proper medieval sense of the word) is not to be taken seriously, and that it was only a poetic and emphatic form of conceptualism. This, as we have seen, is at the best a half truth. All Platonic ideas are also concepts, but we cannot infer that they were only concepts. For many purposes of logic, ethics and politics Plato practically treats them as concepts. Why not? No reasonable writer obtrudes his ultimate metaphysics into everything. And Plato is always particularly careful to distinguish metaphysical hypotheses and their imaginative embodiments in myth and allegory from the simple truths of a working logic and a practical ethics which are all that he dogmatically affirms. But he always affirms the metaphysical idea when challenged. To this extent Natorp and those who agree with him are right. But they pay too high a price for their rightness on this point when they insist on deducing all Plato’s opinions from his ontology, and obtrude the metaphysical idea into passages where the doctrine at the most lends rhetorical and poetical colouring to the practical affirmation of the necessity of concepts and the value of ideals.


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An example will perhaps make these distinctions more plain. Plato in the Republic (501) says that his philosophic statesman will contemplate the divine pattern of justice as an artist looks away to his model, and that like the artist he will frequently glance from the copy that he is producing to the model and back again to the copy. This may reasonably be understood as only a heightened way of saying that the true statesman must be guided by definite conceptions and strive for the realization of clearly apprehended ideals. The fact that Plato, the metaphysician, believed the transcendental reality of the idea to be a necessary assumption of ultimate epistemology adds nothing to the practical meaning of this passage. When in the Phaedrus, however (247 d, 249 b-c), Plato says that every human soul has beheld the idea of justice in pre-natal vision, since otherwise it would not have the power to reduce the confused multiplicity of sensation to the unities of conceptual thought, he is clothing in mythical garb an epistemological argument for the reality of the transcendental idea, and he is not, as in the Republic passage, thinking mainly of the explicit affirmation that the true statesman must have submitted to a higher education in conceptual thinking and have thus framed in his mind ideals to guide his practice. The historian of philosophy who, without calling attention to this distinction, merely cites the two passages together in a footnote, only confuses the uncritical reader.


* Cf. What Plato Said, p. 458, on Euthyphro 6 e.
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613 on 28 a-b), there are passages in which, without mythical dress, and with no specific reference to the practical value of concepts and ideals, Plato postulates the transcendental ideas as an epistemological necessity, and the only escape from materialism and the flux of relativity. No legerdemain of interpretation or speculations about the chronology of the evolution of Plato's thought can explain away these passages, and the interpreter who realizes that some virtual equivalent of the Platonic idea is still to-day the alternative to thorough-going and unequivocal materialism will not desire to explain them away.

All that is needed in order to understand Plato and to do justice to him as a rational philosopher is to remember again\(^a\) that, though the doctrine of ideas is always in the background of his mind and would always be reaffirmed on a challenge, he is not always thinking explicitly of it when he is speaking of logic, ethics, or politics, and we need not think of it in order to enjoy his art or apprehend his meaning. The transcendental idea, for example, is not needed in the Republic except for the characterization of the philosophic mind and the higher education of the Platonic rulers.\(^b\) It is not indispensable even there. The concept will serve. The philosopher is he who can think and reason consecutively in abstractions.\(^c\)

\(^a\) See supra, p. xvi.
\(^b\) Cf. Vol. I. pp. xl-xl, and What Plato Said, pp. 226-227. It is also used in an intentionally crude form to confirm the banishment of the poets. The poet does not deal in essential truth, he copies the copy of the reality. Cf. infra, p. lxii, on 596 A ff. and What Plato Said, p. 249. Stenzel's justification of this (Platon der Erzieher, p. 175) by the consideration that good joiners' work involves mathematics seems fanciful and is certainly not in Plato's text.

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The curriculum of the higher education is designed to develop this faculty in those naturally fitted to receive it.* The thought and the practical conclusions will not be affected if we treat the accompanying symbolic rhetoric as surplusage. Such statements as that the philosopher is concerned with pure being, dwell in a world of light, is devoted to the most blessed part of reality, satisfies and fills the continent part of his soul, undoubtedly suggest the metaphysical background of Plato's thought and the emotional and imaginative connotations of his ideas. But in the context of the Republic they are little more than an expression of the intensity of Plato's feeling about his political and educational ideas.

It is obvious that the concept or idea is in many eloquent Platonic passages an ideal, a type, a pattern, to which aesthetic, moral and social experience may approximate but which they never perfectly realize, just as mathematical conceptions are ideals never actually met with in the world of sense.† It is possible, though not probable, that in some of the minor dialogues we get glimpses of a stage of Plato's youthful thought in which, though he already uses, in speaking of the concept or the definition, much of the terminology associated with the doctrine of ideas,

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*b 477 A ff., 479 E, 484 B, 486 A, 500 B.
*c 517 B, 518 A, 518 C, 520 D.
*d 526 E.
*e Rep. 586 B, Gorg. 493 B.
he has not yet consciously and systematically hypostatized the concept. These and similar qualifications and speculative possibilities do not in the least alter the fact that throughout the main body of his work Plato is ready to affirm the metaphysical theory of the hypostatized idea whenever the issue is raised, and there is not an iota of evidence in his own writings that he ever abandoned or altered the doctrine, however much he varied the metaphors and the terms in which he expressed it. It is quite certain that he did not, except in obviously mythical or poetical passages, say more of the ideas than that they exist and that they are in some sense real. He did not say that they are the thoughts of God. There is no indication in his writings that he said that they are numbers.

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b Cf. supra, pp. xvi and xviii.

c Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 28 and p. 29, n. 188.


e It is very difficult to argue with those who attribute this doctrine of ideas and numbers to Plato. Sometimes they seem to affirm it only on the authority of Aristotle, which they admit is in most cases hopelessly confused with his statements about Speusippus and Xenocrates and other members of the Academy. Sometimes they seem to admit that the doctrine is not to be found in Plato's extant writings. Sometimes they hint rather than say that certain passages of the Philebus
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And he never admitted that they are only thoughts in the human mind, though for practical purposes, as we have said, they may usually be treated as such when no metaphysical issue is involved.

It ought not to be necessary to debate these questions further. The only question open to debate is the extent of Plato’s consciousness of what some critics think the modern meanings that I have read into him. The question of course is not whether he and the Timaeus suggest that Plato’s mind was working in this direction, though they are usually too cautious now to affirm anything positive about Philebus 15-16 d, or Timaeus 53 b. I have more than once shown that there is no difficulty in treating numerical ideas precisely like other ideas in their relation to concretes. The number five is to five apples as redness is to red apples. It is present with them. I have repeatedly collected and interpreted the Platonic passages that probably misled uncritical students of the Academy (cf. What Plato Said, p. 605, and infra on 525 d, 526 a). And the distinction that there is only one idea while there are many numbers of the same kind is quite pointless. There is one idea of redness that is metaphysically or teleologically really present entire in many red things and there is one idea of five or fiveness which is similarly present in many groups of five. There is no more difficulty about the fives that are present as factors in ten, fifteen, twenty, and twenty-five than there is about any other ideas that may mingle with or enter into the definition of another idea. The whole theory is a piece of scholastic hair-splitting to which a sound interpretation of what Plato says lends no support. And there is no space and no need to transcribe here the exhaustive collections of Robin (La Théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres d’après Aristote) or Ross’s repeated summaries of them in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics.

If Plato’s mind was really working towards such conclusions, why is there no hint of them in his huge work of the Laws, or—if we grant them genuine for the sake of the argument—in the Epistles?

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could feel all the associations and connotations of the modern words in which we have to express his meaning, but whether his meaning is on the whole substantially that which I have attributed to him.

The obvious conclusion is that we can infer nothing as to the composition or date of the Republic from the fact that the ideas are not mentioned where there is no reason for mentioning them, and that all hypotheses that different stages of the evolution of Plato’s thought are indicated by the various aspects in which the ideas are presented when they are mentioned are uncritical. There is no occasion for the metaphysical doctrine of ideas in the first four books. But the general concept, the type, the ideal are referred to in language which could be understood of the ideas. The fact that it does not necessarily have to be so understood is no proof that the doctrine was not present to Plato’s mind at the time.

In the fifth, sixth, and seventh books the theory is explicitly enunciated, illustrated by imagery and applied to education. There is even a much disputed but certain anticipation of the later doctrine that while the idea is a unity its relation to things and to other ideas seems to break it up into a plurality.

The uncompromising statement of the subject in the tenth book is sometimes taken to represent an earlier and more naïve form of the doctrine. But the style of the passage is evidently that of a defiant affirmation of the whole length of the paradox, or rather perhaps of an expert explaining the matter to

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c Cf. 476 Α, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 34.
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laymen. The fact that the argument of the third man is distinctly mentioned in the same connexion is in itself evidence that the passage does not represent an earlier and more primitive stage of Plato's thought. For the third man is mentioned in the *Parmenides.*

But there would not be much profit in further discussion of hypotheses that have no basis in the text of Plato or in the philosophical probabilities of the case.

All that has been said of the ideas in general applies to the idea of good. It is the hypostatization of the concept "good." Its significance in the Platonic system is that of its importance in human thought. In ethics it is what modern ethical philosophy calls the sanction. In politics it is the ideal, whatever it may be, of social welfare. In theology and the philosophy of nature it is the teleological principle, the design that implies a designing mind in the universe.

The first of these meanings is predominant in the minor dialogues where all problems and all attempted definitions point to an unknown good so consistently and systematically that Plato must have been aware of the reference. The second meaning is most prominent in the *Republic,* but there is explicit reference to the first and to the discussions of the minor dialogues. In any case, ethical and social good are not sharply separable in Plato.

The idea of good is nowhere defined, but its supreme importance and all of its meanings are symbolized in the images of the sun and the cave. Its main mean-

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*a Cf. 597 A ὃς γ' ἀν δώξει τοῖς περὶ τούς τοιούτους λόγους διατρήσωσιν.

*b 132 E-133 A. Cf. *infra* on 597 c.

*c See *What Plato Said,* pp. 71-73, with marginal references there.
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ing for the Republic is the ideal of social welfare on which the statesman, as opposed to the opportunist politician, must fix his eye, and which he can apprehend only by a long course of higher education which will enable him to grasp it. Plato rightly feels that no other definition is possible or desirable unless the entire polity of the Republic was to be taken as its definition. The Timaeus is the poetical embodiment of the third meaning, though single phrases of the Republic glance at it. If there is a beneficent creator, his purpose, his idea of good, is the chief cause of the existence of the world and the best key to the understanding of it.

I am not attributing these three meanings of the good to Plato by an imposed symmetry of my own. It is what Plato himself says and the chief problem of my interpretation is not to understand Plato but to account for the failure to recognize his plain meaning.

In view of my repeated expositions of Plato's doctrine of the idea of good there would be little point in attempting here once more to set it forth in a smooth, consecutive, literary statement. It will be more to my purpose to enumerate in the briefest, baldest, most explicit fashion some of my reasons for feeling that I have been misunderstood, and that the definite issues raised by my arguments have never

\[ a \text{ Cf. infra, pp. xxv and 102.} \]
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been met. I have never intended to deny that Plato's language about the idea of good is in large part the language of poetry and religion, that he intends to suggest by it the ineffable and infinite unknowable beyond our ken, and that his eloquence has been a source of inspiration to many readers who care little for his dialectics and for the critical interpretation of his specific thought. What I have been trying to say is that the mere repetition of Plato's rhetoric or the attempt to better it in our own paraphrases will not contribute much to the interpretation of the precise meaning of the passages of the Republic in question, assuming that in addition to their inspirational value they are intended to convey some definite meaning and are not merely ejaculations thrown out at an infinite object.

In the first place, then, since all Platonic ideas are hypostatized concepts the hypostatization of the idea of good is presumably irrelevant to its main significance for the ethical and political thought of the Republic. It does, of course, suggest the metaphysical background of Plato's thought; there are a few sentences in which it involves the goodness which teleologists discover in the structure of the universe and in the designs of its creator, the theme of the Timaeus; and since goodness is the chief attribute of God in religious literature from the New Testament to Whittier's hymn, there is a certain plausibility in identifying it with God himself. But the text of Plato, and especially the text of the Republic, does not justify any of these extensions of the idea if taken absolutely. The idea of good is undoubtedly the most important of ideas, but it is

* Cf. on 508 b and 509 b; Zeller ii. 14, pp. 687-688.

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not true that it is the most comprehensive in the sense that all other ideas are deduced from it, as in some Platonizing pantheistic philosophies they are deduced from the idea of Being. There is no hint of such deduction in Plato's writings. It is only teleological ideas in ethics, politics and cosmogony that are referred to the idea of good as the common generalization or idea that includes them all. Even the ideas are not in Plato's own reasoning deduced from the idea of good. It is merely said that a scientific moralist, a true statesman, will be able so to deduce them, and that the higher education is designed to give him this ability. In Republic 534 b-c, the dialectician is he who is able ἐκάστον . . . λόγον . . . διδόναι and the idea of good is a special example of the ἐκάστον. It is not said that the man who does not know the idea of good does not know any other idea, but that he does not know ἄλλο ὑγαθὸν οὐδέν.

It is not even true that Plato's philosophic ethics is deduced from the idea of good. He only says that the ethics of the guardians will be so deduced. So far as Plato himself expounds a scientific ethics it rests on the preferability of the intellectual life and the comparative worthlessness of the pleasures of sense. The idea of good in the dialogues is a regulative not a substantive concept.

Whatever its religious suggestions it cannot in any metaphysical or literal sense be identified with the Deity. The idea of God was taken by Plato

\[ a \text{ Cf. my review of Paul Hinneberg, Die Kultur der Gegenwart, Class. Phil. vi. p. 108.} \\
\[ b \text{ Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 24, and infra, pp. lvi f.} \\
\[ c \text{ Cf. my Idea of Good, pp. 188-189, Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 94, What Plato Said, p. 231.} \\

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from the religion of the Greek people and purified by criticism. The idea of good came to him on an altogether different line of thought. It is the outcome of those Socratic quests for definitions of ethical virtues and social ends which always break down because the interlocutors are never able to discover the sanction which makes the proposed virtue or end a good and desirable thing.\(^a\)

When these misapprehensions are cleared away I trust that I shall not any longer be misunderstood if I say that the chief and essential meaning of the idea of good in the Republic is "precisely" that conception of an ultimate sanction for ethics and politics which the minor dialogues sought in vain. Plato does not profess to have discovered it in the Republic except so far as it is implied in the entire ethical, social and political ideals of his reformed state. He intentionally and wisely refuses to define it in a formula.\(^b\) He merely affirms that it is something which can be apprehended only by those who have received the training and the discipline of his higher education.


\(^b\) Cf. infra on 506 e, p. 95, note f.
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The consummation of this education is characterized briefly and soberly as a vision, just as in the Symposium the long ascent of the scale of beauty culminates in a vision which alone makes life worth living. This language expresses the intensity of Plato's feeling about the intellectual life and his own ethical and social ideals, but it does not make him a visionary or a mystic in the ordinary sense of the words.

If the interpretation here outlined is in itself a rational sequence of thought and makes sense of what Plato says, it surely creates a presumption which cannot be rebutted by evading issues and charging me with insensibility to Plato's deeper religious and mystic meanings. It can be refuted only by giving specific answers to specific arguments and testing them by the texts. The interpretation of the images, symbols, allegories (the synonym does not matter) of the sun, the divided line and the cave, provides the chief test, as the too literal acceptance of them is perhaps the main cause of misunderstanding.

The aptness of the sun as a symbol of Plato's idea of good might be illustrated by many quotations from modern poetry and from the literature of sun-worship. It would be interesting to compare what Plato says of the sun as the primal source of light, heat, life, growth, all things, with the language of modern science. Herbert Spencer, for example, innocently says (First Principles of a New System of Philos., 1865, Amer. ed. p. 454): "Until I recently


\[ b \text{ Cf. infra, pp. 100-101, on 508 A.} \]
consulted his *Outlines of Astronomy* on another question I was not aware that so far back as 1833 Sir John Herschel had enunciated the doctrine that 'the sun's rays are the ultimate source of almost every motion which takes place on the surface of the earth.' Another line of illustration would lead through the Latin poet Manilius and Plotinus to Goethe's "Wär' nicht das Auge sonnenhaft." This thought might be extended to include modern debates on the nice preadjustment of the eye to its function of vision. Does it, or does it not, imply a creator and a design? Lastly, Plato's statement that, as the sun is the source of light, but is not itself light (508 b), so the idea of good is not knowledge or being but the cause of both and something that is beyond and transcends being—this superhuman hyperbole (509 b-c) is the source of all so-called negative theologies and transcendental metaphysics from Philo and Plotinus to the present day.

But our present concern is not with these things but with the direct evidence that the idea of good is essentially for the interpretation of the *Republic* what modern ethical theory calls the sanction. One sentence I admit seems to identify the idea of good with God. The sun, it is said, is that which the Good created in the visible world to be its symbol and analogue. This would seem to identify the idea of good with the Demiurgos of the *Timaeus*, who is both the supreme God and a personification of the idea of good or the principle of teleology in nature. But we have already seen that it is uncritical to press Plato's language about God, a word which he accepts from traditional religion and employs as

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*a Cf. infra, p. 101, note c. on 508 b.*  

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freely for edification and the rejection of militant atheism as Matthew Arnold does. Moreover, there are other sentences in this part of the Republic which, if pressed, are irreconcilable with the identification of the idea of good with God. In any case, apart from one or two sentences of vague and disputable meaning, the acceptance of the idea of good as the sanction more nearly lends an intelligible and reasonable meaning to everything that Plato says than does any other interpretation. On this view, then, I repeat, the idea of good is simply the hypostatization of what the idea of good means for common sense in modern usage. It is the good purpose in some mind able to execute its purposes. It is what such a mind conceives to be the supreme end to which all other ends are subordinated and referred.

The divided line and the cave are also images and symbols employed to bring out certain other aspects of the theory of ideas and of the idea of good in particular. The main object common to both is to put the thought "Alles vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichnis" into a proportion. The four terms of such a proportion may be secured either by invention or by forcing special meanings on some of the terms. In the case of the cave, the cave itself, the fettered prisoners, the fire and the apparatus by which the shadows of graven images are cast on the wall of the cave are clearly inventions. There is a real analogy between the release of the prisoners with their ascent to the light of day (515 c ff.) and the Socratic elenchus which releases the mind and draws it up from a world of sense to the world of thought (517 b-c). But it is obvious that all the details of the imagery cannot be pressed and that we need not ask too curiously to
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what in Plato's serious thought every touch that fills out the picture corresponds.

On my interpretation critics have likewise erred by refusing to admit a similar qualification of their too literal acceptance of the image of the divided line. The proportion: ideas are to things as things are to their reflections in mirrors or in water, has only three terms. The fourth term is found in mathematical ideas, which in their use in education and in respect of the method by which the mind deals with them are in some sort intermediate between ideas and things. We thus get our proportion. But in the description of it Plato is careful to distinguish the mathematical ideas only by the method of their treatment in science, not in dialectics, and not as entities of another kind. This raises the presumption that Plato, as usual, knows what he is doing and does not intend to distinguish objectively mathematical ideas as ideas from other ideas. I support this presumption by pointing out that in the later and final interpretation of the line Plato names the objective correlates of the mental processes corresponding to three divisions of the line but omits the fourth on the pretext that it would take too long. (Cf. on 534 A.) He names the mathematical attitude of mind or method but does not name its objects as something distinct from ideas or a distinct kind of ideas. I go on to show that there is no evidence in the Platonic writings for the doctrine that mathematical ideas differ in themselves from other concepts, and that the testimony of Aristotle is too confused to prove anything. These assumptions raise a definite issue which can only be met by equally definite arguments. Instead of that

\[ a \] Cf. supra, pp. xx-xxi, Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 82 f.
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critics rebuke me for attributing insincerity to Plato, or at the best they ask, How could Aristotle be mistaken?

Plato himself regards all literature except dialectics as a form of play and much that passes for dialectics as conscious or unconscious jesting. Whenever he himself employs imagery, symbolism and myth or an eristic dialectic he is careful to warn us that it is not to be taken too literally or seriously,a and he usually points out just how much of his apparent conclusions it is necessary to accept for the carrying on of the argument. Now the particular synonyms I employ to describe this characteristic trait of Plato's method and style are obviously irrelevant to my main argument. Yet if in view of the frequency of the idea and word παίζειν in Plato I express the thought that the intermediate place of mathematical ideas in the proportion of the divided line is not to be taken literally and add that the ambiguous coinage έικασία, or conjecture, is a term of disparagement playfully thrown in to secure symmetry of subdivision in the two worlds and to suggest a depth below the lowest depth,b I am sternly told that "It is surely a strange reading of the character of Plato as a seeker after truth to maintain that in the very heart of his greatest work and at the very core of the problem of knowledge he should disturb and confuse those who are seeking to understand his doctrine with a little wholly uncalled-for 'playfulness,' even though it should be for the sake of 'symmetry.'"c Now I am quite willing to sub-

a Cf. infra on 539 c, p. 227, note d.
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stitute some other expression for "playfully thrown in." But my precise expression, I repeat, is not the point. Plato in fact does here, as elsewhere, resort to artificial constructions and inventions in order to express the relation between the ideas and what we call realities by proportion. The eikónes and eikasia are in fact introduced here to complete the symmetry of such a proportion and to suggest ironical disparagement of the inferior type of thought. They contribute nothing further to the solution of the "problem of knowledge." To recognize this plain fact is not to impugn the character of Plato, and to rebuke my frivolity with solemn eloquence is no answer to my argument. Plato himself never thinks it incompatible with a serious search for truth to mingle jest with earnest and seriousness with irony.

Similarly of the ἄνεπόθετον (510 b). It obviously suggests to modern interpreters the metaphysical first principle, the Unconditioned, the absolute ground, the nousmnon, call it what you will. Plato himself may have been willing to let the word convey such overtones, and those who are not interested in his precise meanings may stop there and cry with Rousseau, "O Mighty Being!" But it is also equally obvious that the ἄνεπόθετον has a definite and less purely emotional meaning in its context. It expresses Plato's distinction between the man of science, who starts from assumptions that he does not allow to be questioned (510 c-d), and the philosopher or Platonic dialectician, who is able and willing to carry the discussion back, not necessarily always to a metaphysical first principle, but at least to a proposition on which both parties to the argument agree and which therefore is not arbitrarily assumed as an hypothesis.
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by the questioner. This meaning could be illustrated by the Crito, in which it is said that all discussion is vain without such a starting-point of agreement.\textsuperscript{a} It is the essential meaning of the passage in the Phaedo (101 d-e), where \(i\kappa\alpha\nu\omicron\nu\), the adequate, the sufficient, is for all practical purposes a virtual synonym of the \(\delta\nu\nu\pi\omicron\theta\epsilon\tau\omicron\nu\), though it does not suggest the possible metaphysical connotations of the word.

Now this distinction between dialectics or philosophy and the sciences is repeatedly borrowed by Aristotle\textsuperscript{b} and even retains much of its validity under the changed conditions of modern thought. There will always be these two ways of thinking and these two types of mind. The passage, then, makes good sense so interpreted and lends a rational meaning to the \(\delta\nu\nu\pi\omicron\theta\epsilon\tau\omicron\nu\) without denying the mystic overtones which are all that seem to interest some interpreters of Plato.

To return to the political and social idea of good. Plato's conception of ultimate good in this sense must be gathered from his writings as a whole. Neither in the Republic nor elsewhere does he commit himself to a defining formula of social welfare. It is enough for his purpose to emphasize the distinction between the statesman and the politician and describe the education and the way of life that will produce the statesman and develop in him the ideals and the unity of purpose that distinguish him. But it would not be difficult to gather Plato's general conception of political and social good from the Republic and the Laws and certain passages of the Gorgias and Politicus. The true statesman's chief aim will be not

\textsuperscript{a} Crito 49 d, infra, p. 175, note e, on 527 e.
\textsuperscript{b} Cf. infra, p. 111.

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wealth and power and amusements, but the virtue of the citizens. A sober disciplined life is preferable to the unlimited license and expansiveness of an imperialistic and decadent democracy. The statesman's chief instruments for realizing his ideals will be the control of education and what to-day is called eugenics.

Is this plain common sense, then, all that is meant by Plato's idealistic eloquence and the imagery of the sun, the divided line and the cave? I never meant to say that it is all, but it is the central core of meaning without which Plato's transcendentalism is only a rhapsody of words. If nature is more than mechanism, if there is a God, as Plato himself believes and believes indispensable to morality and social order, his purposes, his idea of good, or, metaphysically or mythologically speaking, the idea of good which he contemplates as a pattern, becomes the first and chief cause of the ordered world, and such understanding of his purposes as is possible for us is a better explanation of things than the material instruments that serve his ends. This is the type of explanation that the Socrates of the Phaedo desires but cannot discover and that the Timaeus ventures to present only in mythical and poetical form. It has little place in the Republic, though we may suppose it to be in the background of Plato's mind and to be suggested by his allegories. The idea of good in

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\textsuperscript{a} Gorg. 513 e, 517 b-c, 504 d-e, Laws 705 d-e, 693 b-c, 770 d, 962 d, 963 a.


\textsuperscript{c} Cf. What Plato Said, p. 613 on Tim. 28 a-b.

\textsuperscript{d} Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 329, 346-347.

\textsuperscript{*} Cf. my Idea of Good, p. 232.
this sense, like the heat and light of the sun, is both
the cause of the things we think "real" and the con-
dition of our apprehension and understanding of
them. It is not the substance of things; it is not
their "being," but something apart from and tran-
scending "being" in the ordinary sense of the word
(509 b). But the allegory and the transcendental
language apply equally well to the ethical and poli-
tical ideas which are the chief theme of the Republic,
and it is not necessary to look further. The cause of
any political or social institution is the purpose or
idea of good in some controlling mind, and, as Cole-
ridge said and Mill repeated after him, the best way
to understand any human institution or contrivance
is to appreciate that purpose. That will throw a
flood of light on everything.\(^a\)

I have never meant to deny the mystic and meta-
physical suggestions of Plato's language. I have
merely tried to bring out the residuum of practical
and intelligible meaning for the political and ethical
philosophy of the Republic. It is a meaning that is
still true to-day, and it is the only interpretation that
makes intelligible sense of what Plato says. That
surely creates a presumption which can be met only
by definite arguments.

Whatever the more remote suggestions of the idea
of good for general or ethical philosophy, this its
simple practical meaning for the Republic is clearly
indicated by Plato himself. It symbolizes the distinc-
tion between the ideal statesman and the politician
of decadent Athens and marks the purpose and goal
of all the studies of the Platonic higher education.
The guardians have already received in a purified

\(^a\) Cf. my Idea of Good, p. 227.
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form the normal Greek education in gymnastics and "music," described in the *Protagoras*, 325 c ff., and virtually repeated in the education prescribed for the entire citizenship in the *Laws*. The product of this Platonic elementary and secondary education would be a band of healthy, wholesome, sunburnt boys and girls, who, in Ruskin's phrase, "have had all the nonsense boxed and raced and spun out of them." They would have dipped into fewer books than our graduates, but they would know a few of the world's greatest books by heart, they would have no theory of art or sentimentality about it, but their taste would have been refined, almost to infallibility, by hearing only the best music and seeing only the best statues. They would have heard of fewer things but would know what they did know perfectly. They would have never studied a text-book of civics, ethics, or "sociology," but the essential principles of obedience, patriotism, modesty, order, temperance, good manners, would have been so instilled into them that the possibility of violating them would hardly occur to their minds. They would not only be strong and healthy, but through gymnastics, choral singing and dancing, and military drill, would have acquired the mastery of their bodies and a dignified and graceful bearing.

But already in the age of the sophists Athens had become too sophisticated for her ambitious youth to remain content with this simple old Greek education however reformed and idealized. There was a demand for a higher university education, which was met first by the sophists, and then in the next generation by Plato himself and his great rival, the orator Isocrates, who conducted academies side by
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side in Athens for forty years. The content of this higher education is given in every age by the knowledge of that age. What else can it be? These Greek teachers did not offer "electives" in the chemistry of the carbon compounds, or the origin of Shintoism in Japan, or the evolution of the English novel from *Tom Jones* to *Ulysses*, for the simple reason that these interesting branches of study had not yet been developed. The sophists taught a practical theory of politics and business and the new art of rhetoric, promising to make their pupils effective speakers and shrewd men of affairs. The publicist Isocrates taught what he knew, the application of this sophistic doctrine to the composition of more serious political and ethical essays. Plato taught what we should call ethics, sociology and philosophy, but what he called dialectics—the closely reasoned argumentative discussion of problems of ethics, politics, social life, philosophy and religion.

But with wider experience Plato came to feel that the "Socratic method" of plunging mere lads directly into these difficult questions was unwise. It was doubtless stimulating; but it unsettled their moral faith, confused their minds, and converted them into pert and precocious disputants. Dialectics demanded a preparatory training in some simpler methods of close, consecutive, abstract thinking. This preparation Plato found in the new sciences of arithmetic and geometry and in the sciences which he was among the first to constitute or predict—the sciences of mathematical astronomy,

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b Cf. infra, p. 220, note a, on 537 d ff.

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physics, and acoustics. By these studies the youthful mind could be gradually lifted out of the region of loose pictorial thinking, habituated to the thin pure air of abstractions, taught the essential nature of definitions, axioms, principles, and rules of logic, and made capable of following with continuous attention long trains of reasoning. We value mathematics and the exact sciences largely for their practical applications. In the Republic Plato prized them as the indispensable preparation for equally severe abstract thinking about the more complex and difficult problems of life, morals and society. In his Republic he combines this idea drawn from the practice of his own school with his fundamental political and social ideal, the government of mankind by the really wise, and not by the politicians who happen to get the votes. We need not stop to ask whether a Utopia designed for a small Greek city is applicable to a democracy of 120 millions inhabiting a territory of three million square miles. We are concerned with the ideal and its embodiment in a theory of education.

The Platonic rulers are chosen by a process of progressive selection through ever higher educational tests applied to young men and women who have stood most successfully the tests of the lower education. Through arithmetic, geometry, and astro-

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a Cf. notes on Book vii. 521 ff., esp. on 521 c, 523 a, 527 a.
b Cf. on 525 c.
c Herbert Spencer speaks of "Social science ... the science standing above all others in subtlety and complexity; the science which the highest intelligence alone can master..." —the science now taught to undergraduates who have not received the Platonic preparation.
d Cf. 537 A, B, D.
nomy, mechanics and acoustics, so far as these admit of mathematical treatment, they are led up to the final test in ethics and sociology, which is not speech-making or slumming, or the running of university settlements, but the power of close, exact, consecutive reasoning about complex moral phenomena. It must not be forgotten, however, that this theoretical discipline is supplemented by many years of practical experience in minor offices of administration.\(^a\)

The consummation of it all is described poetically as the "vision of the idea of good" \((540\ \text{a})\)—which, however, as we have seen, turns out to mean for all practical purposes the apprehension of some rational unified conception of the social aim and human well-being, and the consistent relating of all particular beliefs and measures to that ideal—a thing which can be achieved only by the most highly disciplined intelligence. For in Plato's time as in ours the opinions of the average man are not so unified and connected, but jostle one another in hopeless confusion in his brain. Plato's conception of the higher education, then, may be summed up in a sentence: "Until a man is able to abstract and define rationally his idea of good, and unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections and is ready to meet them, not by appeals to opinion but to absolute truth, never faltering at any stage of the argument—unless he can do all this he knows neither the idea of good nor any other good. He apprehends only a shadow of opinion, not true and real knowledge." \(^b\)

Starting from the sound psychological principle that the old-fashioned rote recitation of a text-book

\(^a\) Cf. 539 e-540 a.

\(^b\) See Rep. 534 b-c and notes.
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is an abomination, that verbal knowledge is no knowledge, that the concrete must precede the abstract, that we must visualize before we theorize, and apprehend objects before we analyse relations, we have in practice abandoned altogether the attempt to teach young people hard consecutive abstract thinking. We scorn to drill them in the old-fashioned studies that developed this power, such as grammatical analysis, “parsing,” puzzling problems in arithmetic, algebra, or mechanics, elementary logic,—mental science, as it was called,—and the exact, if incomplete, methods of the orthodox political economy; and instead of this we encourage them to have and express opinions about large and vague questions of literary criticism, aesthetics, ethics and social reform. A true apprehension of Plato’s ideal of education would not swing the pendulum back again to the other extreme, but it would help us to realize that no multiplication of entertaining knowledge, and no refinements of the new psychology, can alter the fact that all instruction is wasted on a flabby mind, and that true education, while it will not neglect entertainment, useful knowledge, and the training of the eye and hand, will always consist largely in the development of firm, hard, intellectual muscle. The studies best adapted to this end will always retain a value independent of practical utility or superficial attractiveness; for to change the figure and adapt Plato’s own language: By such studies the eye of the mind, more precious than a thousand bodily eyes, is purged and quickened and made more keen for whatever truth higher education or life or business may present to it (527 d–e).
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Plato's own account of the curriculum of his higher education ought to be a sufficient answer to the charge that in the training of his guardians he manifests an anti-scientific spirit. It is only by wresting phrases from their context and refusing to make allowances for the quality of Plato's rhetoric that the imputation of hostility to modern experimental science can be fastened upon him.a As I have shown elsewhere and point out again in the notes, Plato is (1) using scientific studies to develop the faculty of abstract reasoning; (2) incidentally predicting the mathematical astronomy and physics of the future.b Both purposes tempt him to hammer his main point with Emersonian emphasis and to surprise attention with Ruskinian _boutades_ in order to mark more clearly the distinction between himself and contemporary empiricists. Hence his satire of the substitution of experiment for mathematics in acoustics (531 a-b), and the intentional epigrammatic extravagance of his "leave the stars alone" (530 b). It is uncritical to quote these sentences apart from their entire context and treat them as if they were a deliberate and systematic attack on modern experimental science.

The description of the four degenerate types of state in the eighth book relieves the strain of dialectics and the tedium of continuous argument by one of the most brilliant pieces of writing in Plato. Macaulay says it is "... beyond all criticism. I

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*a Cf. on 529 a, 530 b.
*c Cf. on 530 b.
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remember nothing in Greek philosophy superior to this in profundity, ingenuity and eloquence.” It serves further to lead up to the embodiment in the tyrant of the analogical argument that the unhappiness of the worst man matches the misery of the worst state. The objections to the book or to its place in the economy of the Republic raised by Aristotle and others are mostly captious irrelevances.

The transition from the ideal state is resumed at the point where it was interrupted at the beginning of the fifth book, and it is pretended that Books V., VI. and VII. are a digression, though they are obviously an indispensable part of the Republic. Matter-of-fact critics have argued that an ideal or perfect state would contain within itself no seeds of destruction and could not decay. But as Plato himself said, the philosophic state is a pattern or ideal which retains its value even if imperfectly realized. It is a fundamental Platonic principle that only the divine is eternal and unchangeable. All created and material things are subject to change. The universe itself is only as good as the Demiurgos was able to make it, and the created gods are preserved from destruction only by his sustaining will.

The riddle of the “nuptial” number that deter-

a Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1316 a 1 f. ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ λέγεται μὲν περὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὐ μέντοι λέγεται καλῶς, which is rather cool after all his borrowings from Rep. viii. in the preceding pages. And in 1286 b 15 ff. he seems to accept the development of Rep. viii. See also Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, p. 42.

b Cf. Vol. I. on 449 A-B.


d Cf. on 499 D and What Plato Said, p. 564.

e Cf. Symp. 207-208, Rep. vii. on the heavens, 530 B.

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mines the beginning of the decline has never been solved to the satisfaction of a majority of competent critics. The solution would contribute something to our knowledge of early Greek mathematical terminology but nothing to our understanding of Plato’s thought. Emerson’s definitive word about it is, “He (Plato) sometimes throws a little mathematical dust into our eyes.” The “meaning” of the number is simply Burke’s statement (iv. p. 312) in Regicide Peace, p. 2, “I doubt whether the history of mankind is yet complete enough, if ever it can be so, to furnish grounds for a sure theory on the internal causes which necessarily affect the fortune of a state.”

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generation escape our ken, Plato mentions a practical point that is of considerable significance to-day. Revolutions are due to the divisions and discords of the dominant and educated classes.\(^a\) The allegory of the four metals is kept up. The decline begins when the rulers no longer breed true and the gold is mixed with base alloy.\(^b\)

The limitation of the degenerate types of state to four is conscious and artistic. It should not be used to prove Plato's impatience of facts. There are endless minor varieties of social and political structure among the barbarians (544 c-d). Plato leaves it to Aristotle and the political and social science departments of the American universities to collect them.\(^c\) The sequence, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny does not always reproduce the actual history of cities of Greece, but it anticipates many of the vicissitudes of modern history more suggestively than Aristotle's laborious collection of instances.\(^d\) Plato occasionally forgets himself or lets himself go in contemporary satire or allusion that points to Athens


\(^b\) 547 b. Cf. 415 a-b.
\(^c\) Aristotle says that there are not only more kinds of government than these, but there are many sub-species of each. Cf. Aristot. Pol. vi., 1288 ff., 1279 b, 1229 a 8, 1289 a 8, Newman, vol. i. pp. 494 ff., and also Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 62-63.
\(^d\) The case of the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon is one of the most outstanding examples.

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rather than to any one of his four or five types. But the consistency of his hypothesis is sufficiently maintained to satisfy any reasonable reader. The individual types corresponding to the four political patterns are the earliest and among the best systematic character-sketches in extant European literature and may be counted among the sources of the *Characters* of Theophrastus and their successors.

Book IX. sums up and concludes the main ethical argument of the *Republic*. This is not the place for a systematic exposition of the Platonic ethics. Ethical philosophy as distinguished from exhortation and the code can always be stated in the form of a discussion of the validity of the moral law and the motives for obedience to it, in other words, the quest for the sanction. But this mode of statement is especially suited to ages of so-called enlightenment and transition when the very existence of a moral law or its binding force is challenged, whether seriously or as an intellectual game.

Such in Plato's opinion was the age in which he lived. The main drift of the speculations of the pre-Socratic philosophers had been in the direction of materialism if not exactly atheism. The populariza-

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*a* Cf., e.g., 549 c and 553 a with Adam's notes, 551 b, 556 e, 562 d, 563 c, 565 b.

*b* Cf. also Matthew Arnold's description of the Barbarians and the Philistines in *Culture and Anarchy*.

*c* Cf. Mill, *Diss. and Disc.* iii. p. 300 "The question concerning the *summum bonum* or what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality," etc.

*d* This has recently been denied. But the essential truth of the generalization is not appreciably affected by a few fragments whose religious, ethical and spiritual purpose is doubtful.

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Innovation of these ideas by the so-called sophists and their application to education, morals, politics and criticism of life had further tended to do away with all traditional moral and religious checks upon instinct and individualism. And the embittered class conflicts and the long demoralization of the thirty years' war had completed the work of moral and spiritual disintegration. The Greeks had lost their old standards and had acquired no new, more philosophic principles to take their place. Plato's ears were dinned, he said, by the negations of materialists, atheists, relativists, and immoralists. How to answer them was the chief problem of his ethical philosophy. To satirize these immoralists or to depict their defeat in argument was one of the main motives of his dramatic art.

The evidence in support of Plato's interpretation of contemporary Greek life and thought has been repeatedly collected from Aristophanes, Euripides, and Thucydides, the fragments of the sophists and the pre-Socratics and Plato's own writings. This conservative view of the Greek "enlightenment" has in turn often been challenged by modern historians of liberal or radical tendencies, a Grote, a


\[b\] Cf. Rep. 538 c-e.

\[c\] Cf. Rep. 358 c, Protag. 333 c, Euthydem. 279 b, Phileb. 66 e, Gorg. 470 d, Laws 662 c, 885 d, Soph. 265 c, Phaedo 92 d.


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Mill, a Gomperz, and their followers. The interpreter of the Republic need only note the sincerity and intensity of Plato's conviction and its effect upon the form of his presentation of ethics.

A complete study of the Platonic ethics would incorporate many other ideas drawn from the Protagoras, the Philebus, the Laws, the minor Socratic dialogues, and perhaps from the Phaedrus and Symposium. But the two chief ethical dialogues, the Gorgias and the Republic, are cast in the form of an answer to dogmatic and unabashed ethical nihilism. What is to be said to an uncompromising immoralist? Is it possible to convince him, or failing that, to refute or seem to refute him to the edification of the bystander? The serious aim of both Gorgias and Republic is to convince and refute, but there are parts of the Gorgias and of the first book of the Republic in which the chief dramatic purpose is the exhibition of Socrates' superiority in argument to the sceptic.

Many commentators ancient and modern object that Plato has not proved his case. They are not necessarily such immoralists as Plato had in mind. Such moralists as Grote, Mill and Leslie Stephen say that all men of goodwill would like to believe in the identity of virtue and happiness, but that the facts of experience are against it. It is at best a general

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a Cf., e.g., Greek Thinkers, vol. i. ch. iv., esp. pp. 403-411.


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tendency or probability, not an invariable rule. Dryden is not sure that the law can always be verified on individuals, but is half humorously certain that it infallibly applies to nations, because in their case Providence is too deeply engaged.

The problem is too large to be incidentally solved by a commentator on the Republic. It is, as Plato himself would admit, partly a question of faith, and partly of the kind of evidence that is admitted as relevant. "Do you ask for sanctions?" exclaims John Morley. "One whose conscience has been strengthened from youth in this faith can know no greater bitterness than the stain cast by a wrong act . . . and the discords that have become the ruling harmony of his days." That is the kind of evidence to which Plato appeals when he argues that his

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a Cf. Gorg. 526 d, Laws 728, 904 d-e, Crito 54 b-c; and Arnold, God and the Bible, chap. iii. p. 136: "These truths . . . are the matter of an immense experience which is still going forward. . . . But if any man is so entirely without affinity for them . . . for him Literature and Dogma was not written."

b Cf. also Morley, Rousseau, ii. 280, Voltaire, p. 293; Faguet, Pour qu'on lise Platon, pp. 99-101, 138; Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iv. 257-258, 293-294; Huxley, Science and Hebrew Tradition, p. 339, and the entire controversy arising out of his Evolution and Ethics; Arcesillas apud Brochard, Les Sceptiques grecs, p. 171. Cf. George Eliot's novels passim, and Mill's "Those whose conscientious feelings are so weak as to allow of their asking this question," which is practically equivalent to Shaftesbury's "If any gentleman asks why he should not wear a dirty shirt I reply that he must be a very dirty gentleman to ask the question." Cf. also Cicero, De officiis, iii. 29; Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, passim, e.g. 426 ff., and the arguments of Hazlitt, Macaulay and others against the Utilitarians. Such passages are a conclusive answer to the objection that Plato has not proved his case.
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guardians will find more happiness in duty fulfilled than they would by grasping at what are commonly thought the good things of life. It is an argument that will not appeal to men of stunted moral sensibilities. The issue is, as Plato says, whether they are the best judges. The question has always been debated and always will be debatable, and there is little to add to the considerations on either side which Cicero develops in his perpetual reargument of the Stoic paradox, that virtue alone suffices for a happy life, and that the sage will be happy on the rack. Matthew Arnold, Emerson and George Eliot are as fixed in the faith as Plato. Experience, says Arnold, is perpetually sending the denier who says in his heart, There is no God, back to school to learn his lesson better. The writers most in vogue to-day would agree with Mill and Leslie Stephen, if not with Thrasymachus and Callicles. It is not necessary to determine this controversy in order to justify the Republic. To condemn the Republic because it is not a demonstration that leaves no room for doubt is to affirm that the question is not worth discussing, or that Plato's treatment of it falls short of what could reasonably be expected. If it is not a proof, has any one come nearer to a demonstration?

c God and the Bible, p. xxxv.
d Brochard, La Morale de Platon, says: "Aucun moraliste moderne n'entreprendrait de défendre la doctrine de Platon, qui apparait comme une gageure." Cf. Westermarck, Origin and Development of Moral Ideas, i. pp. 17, 18, 321, and passim.
e Cf. Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 354: "Evolution implies that there must be at least an approximate coincidence, and there is no apparent a priori reason why the coincidence should not be indefinitely close."
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As to the desirability of the attempt, Plato thought that it is not safe to expose young minds to the unanswered propaganda of philosophies of immoralism and relativity. And recent experience of an amoral and irreligious education of the masses has not yet proved him wrong. He believed in his own arguments and in the doctrine which he taught. But apart from that he also believed that civilized society would disintegrate if morality were not effectively preached. The charge hinted by Aristotle (Eith. x., 1172 a 34-35) and often repeated that this implies the "economy of truth" and the inner or double doctrine is sufficiently refuted by the depth and intensity of Plato's own "adamantine" moral faith. But however that may be, the question which he asks in his Laws still brings heart-searchings to the parent who has inherited a conscience from a generation that had not been swept from its moorings: What is a father to tell his son? But I cannot give more space to these eternal controversies and must turn to the direct summing-up of Plato's argument in the ninth book.

Plato sums up the conclusions of the Republic in three formal arguments. The first is the broad

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\[\text{Cf.} \text{ Laws 890 d, 907 c, 718 d.}\]


\[\text{Cf.} \text{ Rep. 618 ε, Laws 662 b.}\]

\[\text{Cf.} \text{ Laws 662 d-663 a, What Plato Said, p. 364.}\]
analogy between the individual and the state, which runs through the entire work. Plato feels that here he is not only clinching the subject, but finally grappling with the problem debated in the *Gorgias* and to which he returns in the *Laws*. He is gathering up all his forces for a defiant reply to the immoralist and ethical nihilist. The result is an elaboration, an intensity, an insistency, a repetition that are offensive to readers who feel distaste for anything that savours of moral didacticism.

The argumentative force of such an analogy is the cumulative impression of the detail that makes it plausible. Plato points the application of this argument by a psychological portrait of the typical tyrannical man, developed out of the democratic man as the democrat was developed from the oligarch. The literary symmetry strains the logic a little, for while the democratic man is the typical citizen of a democracy, the typical citizen of a tyranny is not the tyrant himself, but any one of those whom he oppresses. But it does not matter. To heighten his effect Plato describes first the soul of the man destined to become a Greek tyrant, and then the intensification of all its defects and miseries by the actual possession and exercise of usurped power.

Latent in all men are lawless instincts and appetites which reason and disciplined emotion hold in check, but which are sometimes revealed in dreams (571 B f.). In the tyrannical soul these lower propensities are unleashed. The censor, to borrow the language of a fashionable modern psychology, is dethroned, all control is abolished and the soul is at the mercy of the instincts of the night. Plato depicts the rake's

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progress of what again in modern terminology we may call the typical gangster and boss in a lawless democracy. He is the son of a democratic father, but, unlike his father, does not settle down into a tolerable compromise between the caprices of unregulated desire and the principles of tradition (572 d). In him desire grown great, a monstrous Eros, a ruling passion with its attendant train of appetites, usurps the throne and seizes the empty citadel of the mind, vacant of the only true guardians, the precepts of culture and right reason (573 a). He wastes his portion of the family inheritance, encroaches on the portion of his brothers, and if further advances are refused him does not shrink from the last outrage that Greek conservatism attributed to the "younger generation"—and "strikes his father." a He becomes the chosen leader of a gang of like-minded roisterers from whom he is distinguished only by a more enterprising spirit and the greater strength of the principle of desire in his soul; and the gang, if few, terrorize the city with crime (575 A-B), if many, strike the father- and mother-land, overthrow the constitution and establish a tyranny (575 d).

A modern moralist might improve the text that the gangster lives in an atmosphere of greed, suspicion and fear, and is destined finally to be shot by an ambitious rival. Plato, speaking in terms of Greek experience, makes the "tyrannical man" fulfill his nature and perfect his type by becoming an actual tyrant of a Greek city. And he then describes, perhaps in reminiscence of his own observations at the court of Dionysius at Syracuse, and in

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prophetic anticipation of Caligula and Louis Napoleon, the hell of suspicion, fear and insatiate and unsatisfied desires in which such a tyrant lives. As the city which he misrules is, for all the splendour of the court and the courtiers, as a whole the most miserable of states, so is he, to the eye that can penetrate the dazzling disguise of pomp and power, “the farced title running ‘fore the king,” the most miserable of men (577-579).

It is obvious that Plato forces the note a little in the interest of his thesis. In actual history the tyrant need not be the sensualist of Plato’s description. He may be only a cold-blooded, hard-headed Machiavellian,—in Plato’s language a lover of honour and victory, not a lover of the pleasures that money purchases. But these cavils of a meticulous logic are beside the mark. The real argument, as we have said, is the psychological analysis and the facts of Greek experience that lend plausibility to the analogy. It prepares us to receive the more strictly philosophic and scientific arguments that are to follow.

The gist of the second argument is that the intellectual, the philosopher, has necessarily experienced all three kinds of pleasure in his life, while the representatives of the two other types have no experience of the pleasures of pure intelligence (581-582). To this is added the consideration that the organ or instrument of all such judgements, reason and rational

\[a\] Cf. Tacitus, Ann. vi. 6 “neque frustra praestantissimus sapientiae firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum mentes, posse aspici laniatus et ictus, quando ut corpora verberibus, ita saevitia, libidine, malis consultis animus dilaceretur.”
speech, is the special possession of the philosopher (582 A). This argument is never mentioned again by Plato and is by many critics, including Leslie Stephen, rejected as a fallacy. But John Stuart Mill accepts and makes use of it.

The issue thus raised is really the old question of a distinction of quality and value in pleasure. No one can judge or prescribe another's pleasure, it is argued; pleasure qua pleasure admits no differences. But is there any such thing as pleasure qua pleasure? Are there not always inseparable accompaniments and consequences? And though the hog may be sole judge of his own pleasures, is it on the whole as desirable or as pleasurable to be a hog as a man? There is room for interminable argument, for the entire problem of relativity is involved. If all judgments are relative, Plato elsewhere argues, we are committed to chaos. The dog-faced baboon, and not man or God, is the measure of all things. The very existence of the arts and the sciences presupposes that things are measured against standards and not merely against one another. Thus, though the argument is not repeated by Plato in this form, it suggests and implies most of the fundamental questions of his ethical philosophy.

"He calls it "a familiar short cut to the desired conclusion" (Science of Ethics, p. 399). Cf. also Sidgwick, Method of Ethics, p. 148.


" Cf. Phileb. 67 b, What Plato Said, p. 611. There is no space to repeat or quote here the arguments against the utilitarian point of view set forth by Macaulay and others. Cf. also Sidgwick, Method of Ethics, pp. 93-94, 121.

" Cf. Theaet. 161 c, Laws 716 c.

" Cf. Politicus 284 b-c, 285 a-b.
The third argument, drawn from the negativity of the pleasure of sense, is the basis of the Platonic ethics, so far as it is an arguable doctrine. It is necessary to dwell upon this point, for it is commonly said that Plato's ethical philosophy is deduced from the idea of good.\(^a\) That is true only from one quite special point of view. The idea of good, as we have seen, is a postulate of the logic of ethics and of the higher education of the philosopher. It is a blank cheque that supports the credit of the system but which is not filled in. No virtue and no particular "good" is adequately defined until it is explicitly related to an idea of good (505 A, 506 A). It may be defined provisionally and sufficiently for a given purpose in terms of psychology or tradition or with a tacit reference to an implied conception of good (504 A-B). But nowhere in Plato's writings are definite controversial arguments or substantive principles of ethical philosophy or rules of practice deduced from the idea of good. It is merely said that an ethical philosophy is not complete until we have decided what is our sanction.

But such principles are deduced from the negativity of the "lower" pleasures throughout Plato's writings.\(^b\) This supplies the missing link in the argument of the Protagoras that virtue and happiness depend on the correct estimate of pleasures and pains.\(^c\) The doctrine is implied in the Phaedo (83-84). It is distinctly suggested in the Gorgias (493 ff.). It crowns the


\(^b\) Cf. supra, p. xxvi.

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argument of the Republic (583 b ff.). It is elaborated in the Philebus in order to reach a final settlement of the controversy dramatized in the Gorgias. It is tacitly employed in the endeavour of the Laws (660 e-663 e) to attach a practicable edifying conclusion to the utilitarian arguments of the Protagoras. The statement of the doctrine in the Republic, though briefer than that of the Philebus, touches on all the essential points, as the notes will show. It cannot be proved to be either a résumé or an imperfect anticipation of the developed theory. It cannot be used to date the ninth book of the Republic relatively to the Philebus.a

I am not here speaking of the absolute truth of the doctrine, but only of its demonstrable relation to Plato's ethical philosophy. As I have elsewhere said, Plato teaches that sensuous pleasures are in their nature impure and illusory. They are preconditioned by, and mixed with, desire, want, pain. "Surgit amari aliquid" is ever true of them. They are the relief of an uneasiness, the scratching of an itch, the filling of a vacuum. To treat them as real, or to make them one's aim (except so far as our human estate requires), is to seek happiness in a pro-

a Though the Philebus is in fact later than the Republic, as Mill said long before style statistics were thought of.
b Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 24.
c Already in the Gorgias, 493 E, 494 C and the Phaedrus 258 E ὡν προλυπηθήναι δεὶ ἢ μηδὲ ἠσθήναι, etc.; Rep. 584 a-b. It has even been argued that the Phaedrus passage takes for granted the fuller discussion of the Philebus (W. H. Thompson, Phaedrus, ad loc.), and why not? Anything may be argued if the dialogues are supposed to grow out of one another and not out of Plato's mind.
cess rather than a state, in becoming rather than in being. It is to bind oneself to the wheel of Ixion and pour water into the bottomless jar of the Danaids. Far happier, far more pleasurable, is the life that consistently aims at few and calm pleasures, to which the sensualist would hardly give the name, a life which he would regard as torpor or death.

Both the physiology and the psychology of this doctrine have been impugned. It has been argued that, up to the point of fatigue, the action of healthy nerves involves no pain, and must yield a surplus of positive sensuous pleasure. It is urged that the present uneasiness of appetite is normally more than counterbalanced by the anticipation of immediate satisfaction. Such arguments will carry no weight with those who accept Plato's main contention, that the satisfactions of sense and ambition, however "necessary," have no real worth, and that to seek our true life in them is to weave and unweave the futile web of Penelope. Whatever qualifications modern psychology may attach to the doctrine, it is the logical basis of Plato's ethics. The unfeigned

\[a\] Phileb. 53 c ff., 54 e virtually = Gorg. 493 e. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 322-323. The literal-minded objection of Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1174 b, and some moderns, that pleasure is not literally = κινησις, is beside the point.

\[b\] Gorg. 493 θετερμένος πίθος, etc., Phaedo 84 Α ἀν- ἁντον ἔργον . . . Πεπελώπης ἵστον, Gorg. 507 e, Phileb. 54 e.

\[c\] Phaedo 64 b, Gorg. 492 e, Phileb. 54 e καὶ φασί χεῖν οὐκ ἀν δεξαθαι, etc. In Laws 733, 734 b, the hedonistic calculus of the Protagoras is retained, but is applied not directly to the individual acts, but to types of life. The life of moderate pleasures is a priori the more pleasurable because it necessarily yields a more favourable balance than the life of intense pleasures.
recognition of the inherent worthlessness of the lower pleasures removes at once the motive and the lures to evil. It is the chief link in the proof that virtue is happiness. It insures the domination of reason over feeling and appetite. It moulds man into that likeness to the divine pattern which is Plato's expression for the ethical ideal, for the divine life knows neither pleasure nor pain. It is the serious argument that explains Plato’s repudiation of the hedonistic formulas of the Protagoras and justifies the noble anti-hedonistic rhetoric of the Gorgias, the Phaedo, and the Philebus (in fine).

Regarded as a logical system, then, and metaphysics apart, the Platonic ethics is not to be deduced from the idea of good. It is best studied and expounded under a few simple heads: (1) illustrations in the minor dialogues of the necessity and the difficulty of defining ethical terms; (2) the search for arguments that will convince, or at least confute, the ethical nihilism of a war-weary, cynical and over-enlightened generation—for proof, in short, that virtue and happiness coincide; (3) the attempt to find a compromise between the necessity of acknowledging the truth in a certain sense of hedonistic utilitarianism and our justifiable idealistic distaste for that way of describing the moral life; (4) as an essential part of the argument of both (2) and (3), the principle of the comparative worthlessness of the

\[a \text{ Phaedo 66 c, Rep. 586 A-B, 588.}\]
\[c \text{ Phileb. 33 B.}\]
\[d \text{ Cf. What Plato Said, p. 500.}\]
\[e \text{ 512 D-E, What Plato Said, p. 149.}\]
\[f \text{ 69 A, What Plato Said, pp. 171 and 174.}\]
lower or sensual pleasures, which, except so far as necessary, are bought at too high a price, because they are preconditioned by pain.a

These categories are not of my invention. They are the topics on which ethical discussion actually turns in the dialogues. The Republic supplies ample illustration of all these topics. The first book, like the Gorgias, dramatizes Socrates’ dialectic superiority to the immoralist. The second book restates the issue in its most fundamental form. The fourth book resumes and for practical purposes provisionally solves the puzzles of the definition of the virtues in the minor Socratic dialogues. The allegory of the idea of good, rightly understood, shows what Plato meant in these minor dialogues by making the failure to define virtue always turn on the inability to discover the “good.” The ninth book, as we have seen, sums up the argument and adds a sufficiently explicit exposition of the doctrine of the negativity of pleasure, which, as the Philebus shows, is the indispensable basis of the scientific and calculating ethics postulated in the Protagoras.

But true virtue is something more than argument, and its mood, as an eloquent passage of the Phaedo protests, is not that of the prudential, calculating reason.b And so the argument of the ninth book, like that of the fourth, culminates in an appeal through imagery and analogy to the imaginative reason and the soul. There (444-445) it was urged that the health and harmony of the soul must be still more indispens-

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able to true happiness than that of the body. And we saw that the most scientific of modern ethical philosophies is finally forced back upon the same analogy.\(^a\) In the conclusion of the ninth book the motif recurs with still greater elaboration and in a more eloquent climax. Every animal of the barnyard, Plato says in anticipation of Emerson and Freud, has found lodgement within this external sheath of humanity. And the issue for every human soul is whether it chooses to foster the snake, the lion and the ape, or the man, the mind, and the god within the mind.\(^b\) Surely the wiser choice is that which values all the so-called goods, for which men scramble and contend, only as they tend to preserve or destroy the true constitution and health of the soul. This polity of the sober and righteous soul is the symbol of that City of God which may exist nowhere on earth but on which as a pattern laid up in heaven he who will may fix his eyes and constitute himself its citizen.\(^c\)

A characteristic feature of Plato's art both in great and little matters is the climax after the apparent climax.\(^d\) The tenth book of the Republic, which is in a sense an appendix, adds the climax of the originally disavowed religious sanction of immortality to that of the appeal to the imaginative reason. The intervening digression in defence of the banishment of the poets is in effect, if not in Plato's conscious intention, a relieving interval of calm between the two peaks of feeling. For the rest, the deeper psychology of the

\(^a\) Cf. Vol. I. p. xvi.
\(^b\) Rep. 589 d-e. Cf. Tim. 90 a-b.
philosophic books and the theory of ideas expounded there invited a reconsideration of the subject and provided arguments based, not on the content of the Homeric epic, but on the essential nature of poetry and its influence.

The two arguments that have exercised the defenders of poetry from Aristotle to Arnold are that poetry is not truth but imitation, a copy of a copy, and that poetry fosters emotion and so weakens the salutary control of feeling by the reason and the will. In support of the first the theory of ideas is invoked in a form so intentionally simplified that it has given rise to the fantastic hypothesis that this book must represent an earlier period of Plato's philosophy. God made one idea of a couch. The artisan copies it in many material couches. The artist with words or colours copies, not the idea, but the copy. This argument of course could be and has been answered in its own terms by the claim of Browning's *Fra Lippo Lippi* that the genius of the artist does directly apprehend the idea or essence of things and reveal it to those who can see only through his eyes. But the real question whether art deals with truth or appearance is independent of Plato's half-serious formulation of it in the language of the theory of ideas. It is still debated, and it is the business of the interpreters of Plato to understand, not necessarily to pronounce judgement.

The question whether poetry's chief function is to

a Sidney's *Defense of Poesy* is probably the most familiar.


c For, don't you mark, we're made so that we love First when we see them painted, things we have passed Perhaps a hundred times nor cared to see; And so they are better, painted—better to us.
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stimulate and exercise emotion, or to relieve, purge,\(^a\) refine, purify, sublimate and exalt it, likewise raises
an issue which still divides psychologists, educators
and critics. Its determination perhaps involves a
great and deliberate choice in the acceptance and
management of life as a whole. Plato's decision to
banish the honeyed Muse from his ideal city repres-
sents only one aspect of his many-sided nature. It is
obviously not, as is sometimes absurdly said, an
expression of his insensibility to Hellenic poetry and
art. It was his own sensitiveness that made him fear
its power. He himself wrote verse in youth.\(^b\) His
imagery, the invention of his myths and the poetic
quality of his prose rank him with the world's major
poets.\(^c\) He quotes poetry with exquisite and fond
aptness throughout his writings.\(^d\) And there are no
more wistful words than his reluctant dismissal of the
supreme poet, the author and source of all these
beauties of epic and tragedy, the Ionian father of the
rest—Homer.\(^e\) However, Plato's ethical convictions
gave him the courage of Guyon (Faery Queene, ii. xii.
83) in dealing with these enchantments:

\(^a\) Aristotle's doctrine of κάθαρσις. Cf. my review of
Finsler, "Platon und die aristotelische Poetik," Class. Phil.
iii. pp. 461-462; also The Nation, xc. (1910) p. 319; Sikes,
Greek View of Poetry, pp. 118-125.

\(^b\) Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 17 ff.

\(^c\) Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. pp. 196 and 200; Sidney, in
English Men of Letters, p. 150 "Of all the philosophers he
is the most poetical;" Chesterton, The Resurrection of Rome,
p. 57 "But when we remember that the great poet Plato (as
he must be called) banished poets from his Republic, we have
a glimmer of why the great Greek Emperor banished sculptors
from his empire."

\(^d\) Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 7-9; Unity of Plato's Thought,
pp. 81-82.

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But all those pleasaunt bowres and Pallace brave
Guyon broke downe with rigour pittilesse;
Ne ought their goodly workmanship might save
Them from the tempest of his wrathfulness.\(^a\)

The doctrine of Immortality.

The guerdons of righteousness, worldly or other-worldly, were explicitly excluded in the original formulation of the question whether justice is or is not intrinsically its own reward.\(^b\) But now, having proved his case independently of these, Plato thinks that no one can fairly object if he points out that in fact honesty is usually the best policy even in this world, and that there is good hope that the legends of a life and judgement to come are in essence true.\(^c\)

There are hints of a life after death earlier in the Republic.\(^d\) And nothing can be inferred from Glaucon’s perhaps affected surprise at Socrates’ offer to prove it. The immortality of the soul as an article of faith and hope, a sanction of moral law, an inspiration of poetry, will be treated lightly by no student of humanity. But there is a certain lack of intellectual seriousness in taking it seriously as a thesis of metaphysical demonstration.\(^e\) Plato’s belief in immortality was a conviction of the psychological and moral impossibility of sheer materialism, and a broad faith in the unseen, the spiritual, the ideal. The logical obstacles to a positive demonstration of personal immortality were as obvious to him as they are to his critics.\(^f\) The immortality of the individual soul

\(^{a}\) See also my review of Pater, Plato and Platonism in The Dial, xiv. (1893) p. 211.

\(^{b}\) Cf. Bk. ii., esp. 367 b-e.

\(^{c}\) Cf. What Plato Said, p. 251.

\(^{d}\) Cf. 330 d-e and Vol. i. p. 16.

\(^{e}\) Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 180, 177, 535.

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is for Plato a pious hope and an ethical postulate rather than a demonstrable certainty. He essays various demonstrations, but nearly always in connexion with a myth, and of all the proofs attempted but one is repeated. In the Apology Socrates, addressing his judges, affects to leave the question open. But we cannot infer from this that the Apology antedates Plato's belief in immortality, and Socrates' language in Crito 54 b is precisely in the tone of the Gorgias and the Phaedo.

Immortality was affirmed before Plato by Pythagorean and Orphic mystics, and in the magnificent poetry of Pindar's Second Olympian Ode it is distinctly associated with a doctrine of future rewards and punishments. But Plato was the first great writer to enforce it by philosophical arguments, or impress it upon the imagination by vivid eschatological myths. And the Platonic dialogues, as Rohde shows, remained the chief source of the hopes and aspirations of the educated minority throughout subsequent antiquity. Plato's name was the symbol and rallying point of the entire religious and philosophic

\[\text{Phaedo 114 D \chiρη τα τοιαυτα ωσπερ \epsilonπαδεω εαυτω, Gorg. 524 A-B, Phaedo 67 B.}\]

\[\text{Rep. 608 C ff., Laws 881 A, 967 D-E, 959 A-B; with των δε \etaυτα \etaμων \epsilonκαστου δυτως \alpha\deltaανατων [e\iναι] \psiυχην cf. Phaedo 115 D-E, and with the idea, 959 B, that the only \betaοηθεια at the bar of Hades is a just life in this world, cf. Gorg. 522 C-D, 526 E, Crito 54 B.}\]

\[\text{Phaedo 85 C το μεν \sigmaαφες ειδεναι \epsilonν τω νυ\nu βιω \eta \alpha\deltaανατων ειναι \eta \παγχαλε\pi\n\tau\nu. Cf. 107 A-B, Tim. 72 D, Meno 86 A-B, Phaedr. 265 C.}\]

\[\text{That based on the theory that the soul is the source of all motion, Phaedr. 245 C ff., Laws 893 B ff.}\]

\[\text{40 D. Cf. also Phaedo 91 B.}\]

\[\text{Cratylus 403 D-E implies the doctrine of Phaedo 67, 68.}\]

opposition to the dogmatic materialism of the Epicureans and of the positive wing of the Peripatetics. Cicero and Plutarch were in this his disciples. The more wistful and religious spirits of Stoicism—a Seneca, a Marcus Aurelius—came more and more to see in Platonism the hopeful "alternative" of the great perhaps. Neo-Platonists and Neo-Pythagoreans never grew weary of expanding and allegorizing the great myths of the Gorgias, Phaedo, and Republic. They were directly or indirectly the chief inspiration of the sixth book of the Aeneid, and in the majority of later sepulchral epigrams that express the hope of immortality a Platonic colouring is perceptible. All this was due far more to the spell of Plato's genius than to the force of his arguments. That the soul is the principle of motion (Phaedr. 245 c ff., Laws 893 b ff.), that it must have pre-existed because its apprehension of the ideas is reminiscence (Phaedo 72 e ff.), that it could be destroyed only by its own specific evil, injustice, which does not in fact destroy it (Rep. 608-611), that it cannot cease to exist because the idea of life which is essentially present with it will not admit its opposite (Phaedo 105 d-e)—these arguments may convince metaphysicians, but they will not stir the "emotion of conviction" that is fostered by the serene confidence of Socrates in the hour of death (Phaedo 114-118), by the vivid vision of the scarred and naked soul shivering at the bar of Rhadamanthus (Gorg. 524 d-e), by the detailed verisimilitude of the message brought back by the "Angel from there," Er, the son of Armenius (Rep. 614 b ff.).

The Epicureans and the more austere Stoics
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censured this mythological symbolism as unworthy of a philosopher; and Emerson contrasts Plato's license of affirmation with the self-restraint of the Author of Christianity, who refused to entertain the populace with that picture. But Plato has anticipated their criticism, saying in substance: No reasonable man will affirm that these things are precisely as I have described them. But since the soul is immortal, something of the kind must be true, and we ought to repeat and croon it over to ourselves in order to keep faith and hope alive (Phaedo 114 d). This plea could be rejected only by those who are willing to affirm that Plato's poetical imaginings have been more harmful in the encouragement of superstition than helpful in the maintenance of religious hope and moral faith.¹

But what of the metaphysical arguments? Did Plato himself take them seriously? And are they, therefore, to be taken seriously by the interpreters of his philosophy? Are they essential links in a system? Can we find in them clues to the progress and development of his thought and even date the dialogues with their aid? It is not necessary to answer these questions here. On the validity of the arguments it would be idle to waste words. Some of them, reinforced by the Theaetetus, may help to show the inadequacy of a dogmatic materialistic psychology. At the most they prove the eternity of something other than "matter" which may be called "soul." They do not prove the immortality of the individual soul, which is nevertheless plainly taken as proved in the eschatological myths and their ethical applica-

¹ Cf. my article in the June, 1934, number of the Atlantic Monthly, p. 721.
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tions. That the supreme dialectician, Plato, was himself unaware of that which is so readily perceived by every puny whipster who thinks to get his sword is to me unthinkable. A semblance of precedent proof was essential even to the literary effect of the concluding myths. And Plato himself in the Laws has warned us that an affirmative answer to some questions is required for the salvation of society and the moral government of mankind.a

But the myth itself is the really significant expression of Plato's hope and faith, and of its influence, hardly less than that of some national religions, upon the souls of men. After enumerating the blessings that normally attend the old age of the righteous man in this world, he says, we may fitly allow our imagination to dwell upon the rewards that await him in the world to come.

The enormous literature of the Platonic myths b deals partly with their conjectural sources, partly with their place and function in Plato's art and philosophy, and too little with the framework of definite meaning as distinguished from the remoter and more fanciful suggestions with which the ingenuity of commentators has sometimes obscured it. Leaving the translation and the notes to speak for themselves, I need here say only a few words on this last point.

a Cf. supra, p. li.
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If I may use without entirely adopting Professor Stewart's distinction between myth and allegory, the distinctive feature of the Platonic myth is that it embodies and reconciles the conflicting excellences of both—the transcendentalist feeling, the poetic mysticism of the true myth and the, to Professor Stewart, almost offensive lucidity of the allegory. In this it only exalts and intensifies a feature of Plato's style as a whole. He is unique in his power to reconcile formal dialectic and deliberate rhetoric with imagination and sincerity of feeling. He announces the effect that he intends to produce and produces it in defiance of the psychology of Goethe's "Da fühlt man Absicht und man wird verstimmt." He can pour his imagination, his poetry, his mysticism, his exhortation, and his edification into a pre-determined logical mould. He modulates from one chord to the other at the precise moment when satiety begins. He starts from a definition, proceeds by analysis and division through firstlies and secondlies to perorations that sweep the emotional reader off his feet and make him forget or deny the dialectic that conducted him to the mount of vision. As Emerson puts it, "He points and quibbles; and by and by comes a sentence that moves the sea and land." 

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\[a\] Cf., e.g., Phaedo 115 A, 77 e-78 A, Euthyphro 6 b-c, 11 b-c, Gorg. 507 e. The little sermons scattered through the Laws have the same effect. Cf. in Goethe's Faust the chorus of angels followed by the devil. Cf. Carl Vering, Platons Staat, p. 7 "Ein Dialog Platons wirkt niemals ermüdend; jedesmal greift der Dichter Platon sofort ein, wenn der Philosoph durch ein schweres Problem dem Leser hart zugesetzt hat." Cf. also Sikes, Greek View of Poetry, p. 128.

\[b\] Cf., e.g., Symp. 211-212, Gorgias, in fine, Phaedo 114 c, Rep., in fine.
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The definite thoughts embodied in the myth of Er the son of Armenius belong to Plato’s permanent stock of opinions and do not differ appreciably from those of his other myths or the implied conclusions of his arguments.\textsuperscript{a} The saving faith in immortality and judgement to come cannot rest on scientific demonstration only. It needs the confirmations of imagination, intuition, vision, revelation. The universe is a wonderful place whose structure is known to us only imperfectly and in part. Symbols are the fit expression of our dim apprehensions of its infinite possibilities. Heaven and hell are symbols of the most vital of all divisions, that which separates the virtuous from the vicious will. Purgatory may mark the distinction between remediable and curable wrong and that which admits of no pardon.\textsuperscript{b} They are perhaps states of mind rather than places, but imagination may use what our imperfect science knows or divines of the world beneath our feet or the universe above our heads to give them a local habitation and a name, and our fancy may play in like manner with the ultimate unanswerable questions of philosophy: Whence comes evil\textsuperscript{c}? and are our wills free\textsuperscript{d}? If the soul is immortal and lives through endless transformations and transmigrations, it may be that the evil which baffles us here had its origin in some defect of will in worlds before the man (Rep. 613 A). Perhaps a great choice was offered to us and we chose wrong under the influence of mistaken ideas acquired in a former misspent life (618-619). Whatever the

\textsuperscript{a} Cf. the notes on 614 ff.
\textsuperscript{b} Cf. What Plato Said, p. 536, on Phaedo 113 d and 113 e.
\textsuperscript{c} Cf. What Plato Said, p. 578, on Theaet. 176 a.
\textsuperscript{d} Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 644-645, on Laws 904 c.
measure of truth in these fancies two principles of religion and morals stand fast. God is blameless (617 E), and we must always blame rather ourselves.\(^a\) Our wills are somehow ours to make them his; though we must think of the sins of others as due solely to ignorance.\(^b\) It matters not that the Aristotelians will argue that this is reasoning in a circle.\(^c\) We know and must believe that virtue is free (617 E). And all the divinations of the soul and all the profounder interpretations of experience reiterate the lesson that the way of life that will present us fearless at the bar of eternal justice is the way that will yield the truest happiness here.\(^d\) If we hold to that faith, then both in our earthly pilgrimage and in all the adventures of the soul hereafter, with us it will be well.

**The Text**

As regards the text I have little to add to what was said in the first volume, except a few qualifications to avoid misunderstanding. I have tried to be a little more careful than I was in the first volume in correcting minor inconsistencies due to the reprinting of the Teubner text of Hermann. But the opportunities which these might afford to captious criticism do not in the least affect the main principle or its applications. That is simply that the variations between the

\(^a\) Cf. Laws 727 B, Rep. 619 c, Phaedo 90 D, Cratyl. 411 c, etc.

\(^b\) Cf. Protag. 345 D-E, 358 c-d, Laws 734 B, and *What Plato Said*, p. 640, on 860 D.

\(^c\) Cf. Aristot. Eth. 1114 b 19.

chief modern editions rarely make any difference for Plato's thought or even for his style, and that the decision between different readings in the case of Plato should usually turn, not on any scientific principle of text criticism, but on knowledge of Plato and knowledge of the Greek language. To put it drastically: for all practical purposes of the student of the Greek language, literature and philosophy, Hermann's text of the Republic is quite as good as the more scientific text of Burnet or the text that might be constructed from the critical notes in Wilamowitz' appendix. Hermann's judgement on questions of Greek idiom and Platonic usage was quite as good as theirs. This is not meant as an illiberal disparagement of the great and indispensable special disciplines of text criticism and palaeography. It is merely a commonsense vindication of the intellectual right of those who prefer to do so to approach the study of Plato from another point of view.

The Translation

As regards the translation, I impenitently reaffirm the principles that I stated in the preface to the first volume—whatever errors of judgement I may commit in their application. Much of the Republic can be made easy reading for any literate reader. But some of the subtler and more metaphysical passages can be translated in that way only at the cost of misrepresentation of the meaning. In order to bring out the real significance of Plato's thought it is sometimes necessary to translate the same phrase in two ways, sometimes to vary a phrase which Plato repeats or
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repeat a synonym which he prefers to vary. It is often desirable to use two words to suggest the two-fold associations of one. To take the simplest example, it is even more misleading to translate *eidos* "Form" than it is to translate it "idea"—"idea or form" (without a capital letter) is less likely to be misunderstood.

Again, Plato did not write in the smooth, even style which Dionysius of Halicarnassus admired in Lysias and Matthew Arnold in Addison, and it is not the business of the translator to clothe him in the garb of that style.

Provided the meaning is plain and the emphasis right, he allows himself unlimited freedom in anacoluthons, short cuts, sharp corners, ellipses and generally in what I have elsewhere called illogical idiom. Anyone who does not like that style should give his days and nights to the study of Isocrates and Lysias. According to his mood and the context Plato's style ranges from Attic simplicity to metaphysical abstraction, from high-flown poetical prose to plain colloquial diction. And his colloquialism, though usually kept within the bounds of Attic urbanity, is not lacking in Aristophanic touches which, if rightly rendered, shock the taste of critics who approach him with a stronger sense of the dignity of philosophy than they have of Greek idiom. In deference to friendly criticism I have generally suppressed or transferred to footnotes my attempts to reproduce this feature of Plato’s style. But I am not convinced. As Taine aptly says (*Life and Letters*, p. 53), "M. Cousin's elegant Plato is not at all like the easy . . . but always natural Plato of reality. He would shock us if we saw him as he is."

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PLATO
THE REPUBLIC
BOOKS VI—X
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ

[Ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥ, ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΥ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΓΛΑΥΚΩΝ, ΠΟΛΕΜΑΡΧΟΣ, ΘΡΑΣΤΜΑΧΟΣ,
ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ, ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ

St. T. II. p.

484 I. Οἱ μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφοι, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ Γλαύκων,
καὶ οἱ μὴ διὰ μακρὸν τινὸς διεξελθόντος1 λόγου
μόνις πως ἀνεφάνησαν οἱ εἰσών ἐκάτεροι. Ἡσυς
γὰρ, ἔφη, διὰ βραχέος οὐ βάδιον. Οὐ φαίνεται,
εἴπον· ἐμοὶ γοῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ ἀν βελτιώνως φανήναι εἰ
περὶ τούτον μόνου ἔδει ῥηθῆναι, καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τὰ
λοιπὰ διελθέων μέλλοντι κατόψεσθαι τί διαφέρει
Β βίος δίκαιος ἄδικον. Τι οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ μετὰ τούτο
ἀμιν; Τί δ’ ἄλλο, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἡ τὸ ἔξης; ἐπειδὴ
φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἄει κατὰ ταύτα ὀφθαλμῶς
ἐχόντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀλλ’ ἐν

1 διεξελθόντος ΑΔΜ, διεξελθόντες F.

a The argument is slightly personified. Cf. on 503 ι.
b It is captious to object that the actual discussion of the
philosopher occupies only a few pages.
c This is the main theme of the Republic, of which Plato
never loses sight.

2
I. "So now, Glaucon," I said, "our argument after winding a long b and weary way has at last made clear to us who are the philosophers or lovers of wisdom and who are not." "Yes," he said, "a shorter way is perhaps not feasible." "Apparently not," I said. "I, at any rate, think that the matter would have been made still plainer if we had had nothing but this to speak of, and if there were not so many things left which our purpose c of discerning the difference between the just and the unjust life requires us to discuss." "What, then," he said, "comes next?" "What else," said I, "but the next in order? Since the philosophers are those who are capable of apprehending that which is eternal and unchanging, d while those who are incapable of this, but lose themselves and

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*a* For κατὰ ταῦτα ὑσαύτως ἔχοντος cf. Phaedo 78 c, Soph. 248 a, Tim. 41 d, 82 b, Epin. 982 b and e.
πολλοῖς καὶ παντοῖς ἱσχοῦσι πλανώμενοι οὐ φιλόσοφοι, ποτέρους δὴ δεῖ πόλεως ἡγεμόνας εἶναι; Πῶς οὖν λέγοντες ἂν αὐτό, ἐφη, μετρίώς λέγομεν; 'Ὅποτεροι ἂν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, δυνατοὶ φαίνονται φυλάξαι νόμους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα πόλεων, Σ τοὺτος καθιστάναι φύλακας. Ὁρθῶς, ἐφη. Τόδε δὲ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἀρὰ δῆλον, εἴτε τυφλὸν εἴτε ὅξυ ὅρῶντα χρή φύλακα τηρεῖν ὅτιον; Καὶ πῶς, ἐφη, οὐ δῆλον; Ὡς οὖν δοκοῦσι τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὁντι τοῦ ὄντος ἐκάστου ἐστηριμένοι τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ μηδὲν ἐναργεῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα, μηδὲ δυνάμενοι ὅσπερ γραφεῖς εἰς τὸ ἀλήθεστατον ἀποβλέποντες κάκεισε ἀεὶ ἀναφέροντές τε καὶ θεώμενοι ὡς οἶδον τε ἀκριβεῖς.

᾿Οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα καλῶν τε πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἄγαθῶν τίθεσθαι τε, ἐὰν δὲν τίθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ κείμενα φυλάττοντες σώζειν; Οὔ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐ πολὺ τι διαφέρει. Τούτους οὖν μᾶλλον φύλακας στηρίζομεθα, ἥ τοὺς ἐγνωκότας μὲν ἐκαστὸν τὸ ὄν, ἐμπειρία δὲ μηδὲν ἐκείνων ἐλλείποντας μηδ' ἐν ἀλλῳ μηδὲν μέρει ἀρετῆς ὑστεροῦντας; "Ἀτοπον μέντ' ἂν, ἐφη, εἰ ἄλλους αἱρεῖσθαι, εἰ γε τάλλα μὴ ἐλλείποντο: τούτῳ γὰρ 485 αὐτῷ σχεδόν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ ἂν προέχοιεν. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ δὴ λέγομεν, τίνα τρόπον οἶδοι τ' ἐσονταί οἱ

a Cf. p. 89, note k, on 505 c.
c Cf. Polit. 277 b, 277 d f., etc., Soph. 226 c, Parmen. 132 d.
d ἀποβλέποντες belongs to the terminology of the ideas. Cf. supra 472 c, Cratyl. 389 a, Gorg. 503 c, Tim. 28 a, Prot. 354 c, and my What Plato Said, p. 458 on Euthyph. 6 e. 4.
wander\(^a\) amid the multiplicities of multifarious things, are not philosophers, which of the two kinds ought to be the leaders in a state?" "What, then," he said, "would be a fair statement of the matter?" "Whatever," I said, "appear competent to guard the laws and pursuits of society, these we should establish as guardians." "Right," he said. "Is this, then," said I, "clear, whether the guardian who is to keep watch over anything ought to be blind or keen of sight?" "Of course it is clear," he said. "Do you think, then, that there is any appreciable difference between the blind\(^b\) and those who are veritably deprived of the knowledge of the veritable being of things, those who have no vivid pattern\(^c\) in their souls and so cannot, as painters look to their models, fix their eyes\(^d\) on the absolute truth, and always with reference to that ideal and in the exactest possible contemplation of it establish in this world also the laws of the beautiful, the just and the good, when that is needful, or guard and preserve those that are established?" "No, by heaven," he said, "there is not much difference." "Shall we, then, appoint these blind souls as our guardians, rather than those who have learned to know the ideal reality of things and who do not fall short of the others in experience\(^e\) and are not second to them in any part of virtue?" "It would be strange indeed," he said, "to choose others than the philosophers, provided they were not deficient in those other respects, for this very knowledge of the ideal would perhaps be the greatest of superiorities." "Then what we have to say is how it would be possible for the same persons to have both qualifications,

\(^a\) Cf. infra 539 e, 521 b, Phileb. 62. Cf. Introd. p. xl; Apelt, Republic, p. 490.
αὐτοὶ κάκεινα καὶ ταῦτα ἐχεῖν; Ἡ' ἀνυ μὲν οὖν. ὁ τοῦν ἄρχομενοι τούτου τοῦ λόγου ἐλέγομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν πρῶτον δεῖν καταμαθεῖν· καὶ οἶμαι, εἰν ἐκείνην ἰκανῶς ὁμολογήσωμεν, ὁμολογήσεως καὶ ὅτι οἶοι τε ταῦτα ἐχεῖν οἱ αὐτοὶ, ὅτι τε οὐκ ἄλλους πόλεων ἡγεμόνας δεῖ εἶναι ἥ τούτους. Πῶς; 

II. Τούτο μὲν δὴ τῶν φιλοσοφῶν φύσεων πέρι ὁμολογήσθω ἡμῖν, ὅτι μαθήματός γε ἂεὶ ἔρωσιν, ὃ ἂν αὐτοῖς δηλοῖ ἐκεῖνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἂεὶ οὕσης καὶ μὴ πλανωμένης ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. Ὁ ὁμολογήσθω. Καὶ μὴν, ἢν ὃ ἐγὼ, καὶ ὅτι πάσης αὐτῆς, καὶ οὔτε σμικροῖς οὔτε μείζονοι οὔτε τιμωτέροι οὔτε ἀτιμοτέρου μέρους ἐκόντες ἀφιένται, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν περί τε τῶν φιλοτιμῶν καὶ ἔρωτικῶν διηλθομεν. Ὅρθως, ἐφή, λέγεις. Τόδε τοῖς μετὰ τούτο σκόπει εἰ ἀνάγκη ἐχεῖν πρὸς τούτῳ ἐν τῇ φύσει, οὐ ἂν μέλλωσιν ἐσεσθαι οἷος ἐλέγομεν. Τὸ ποιῶν; Τὴν ἀφευδειαν καὶ τὸ ἐκόντας εἶναι μηδαιμή προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος, ἀλλὰ μισεῖν, τὴν ὃ ἀλήθειαν στέργειν. Εἰκός γ', ἐφή. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὃ φίλε, εἰκός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάσα ἀνάγκη τοῦ ἔρωτικῶς τοῦ φύσει ἔχοντα πᾶν τὸ ἔγγενές τε καὶ οἰκεῖον τῶν παιδικῶν ἀγαπῶν. Ὅρθως, ἐφή. Ὡ οὖν οἰκείοτερον σοφία τι ἀληθείας ἂν εὑροῖς; Καὶ πῶς; ἢ δ' ὅσ. Ὡ οὖν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν φιλόσοφον τε καὶ

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a Lit. “is not made to wander by generation and decay.”
Cf. Crat. 411 c, Phaedo 95 v, whence Aristotle took his title.
b Supra 474 c-d.
c For similar expressions cf. 519 ν, Laws 656 ν, 965 σ, 
Symp. 200 λ.
d “This and many other passages prove Plato’s high regard
is it not?" "Quite so." "Then, as we were saying at the beginning of this discussion, the first thing to understand is the nature that they must have from birth; and I think that if we sufficiently agree on this we shall also agree that the combination of qualities that we seek belongs to the same persons, and that we need no others for guardians of states than these."

"How so?"

II. "We must accept as agreed this trait of the philosophical nature, that it is ever enamoured of the kind of knowledge which reveals to them something of that essence which is eternal, and is not wandering between the two poles of generation and decay."

"Let us take that as agreed." "And, further," said I, "that their desire is for the whole of it and that they do not willingly renounce a small or a great, a more precious or a less honoured, part of it. That was the point of our former illustration drawn from lovers and men covetous of honour." "You are right," he said. "Consider, then, next whether the men who are to meet our requirements must not have this further quality in their natures." "What quality?" "The spirit of truthfulness, reluctance to admit falsehood in any form, the hatred of it and the love of truth."

"It is likely," he said. "It is not only likely, my friend, but there is every necessity that he who is by nature enamoured of anything should cherish all that is akin and pertaining to the object of his love."

"Right," he said. "Could you find anything more akin to wisdom than truth?" "Impossible," he said. "Then can the same nature be a lover of for the truth. Cf. Laws 730 c, 861 d, Crat. 428 d, supra 382 A. In 389 b he only permits falsehood to the rulers as a drastic remedy to be used with care for edification. Cf. Vol. I. on 382 c and d.
D φιλοσευδή; Ούδαμώς γε. Τὸν ἄρα τῷ ὄντι φιλομαθή πάσης ἀληθείας δεῖ εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ὁ τι μάλιστα ὀρέγεσθαι. Παντελῶς γε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτω γε εἰς ἐν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ἰέπουσι, ἵσμεν πον ὅτι εἰς τάλα τοῦτω ἀσθενεστέρα, ὡσπερ ῥεῦμα ἐκεῖσε ἀπωχετευμένον. Τί μὴν; Ως δὲ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐρρυήκασι, περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, οἶμαι, ἥδονήν αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτὴν εἶεν ἄν, τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σῶματος ἐκλείποιεν, εἶ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς φιλο-Ε σοφός τις εὖ. Μεγάλη ἀνάγκη. Σώφρων μὴν ὦ γε τοιοῦτος καὶ οὐδαμῇ φιλοχρήματος· ὅν γὰρ ἔνεκα χρήματα μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης σπουδάζεται, ἀλλ' τινὶ μᾶλλον ἥ τούτῳ προσήκει σπουδάζειν. Οὔτως. Καὶ μὴν ποὺ καὶ τὸδε δεὶ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν 486 κρίνειν μέλλης φύσιν φιλόσοφον τε καὶ μή. Τὸ ποιοῦν; Μή σε λάθη μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας· ἐναντιώτατον γὰρ ποὺ σμικρολογία ψυχῆς μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντὸς ἀεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου. Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφη. Ἡ ὑπάρχει διανοία μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ σοφίας, οἷον τε οἷεὶ τοῦτω μέγα

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a For this figure cf. Laws 844 a and 736 b, Eurip. Suppl. 1111 παρεκτρέπωντες ὀχετῶν, Empedocles, Diels¹ 195 λόγον λόγον ἐξοχετεύων ἱ乳业τίου ii. 365 "derivare queunt animum"; and for the idea cf. also Laws 643 c-d.
c For πεπλασμένως cf. Soph. 216 c μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ' ὄντως φιλόσοφοι.
d Cf. Theaet. 144 ν χρημάτων ἐλευθεριστήτη.
Wisdom and of falsehood?" "By no means." Then the true lover of knowledge must, from childhood up, be most of all a striver after truth in every form." "By all means." "But, again, we surely are aware that when in a man the desires incline strongly to any one thing, they are weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been diverted into another channel." "Surely." "So, when a man's desires have been taught to flow in the channel of learning and all that sort of thing, they will be concerned, I presume, with the pleasures of the soul in itself, and will be indifferent to those of which the body is the instrument, if the man is a true and not a sham philosopher." "That is quite necessary." "Such a man will be temperate and by no means greedy for wealth; for the things for the sake of which money and great expenditure are eagerly sought others may take seriously, but not he." "It is so." "And there is this further point to be considered in distinguishing the philosophical from the unphilosophical nature." "What point?" "You must not overlook any touch of illiberality. For nothing can be more contrary than such pettiness to the quality of a soul that is ever to seek integrity and wholeness in all things human and divine." "Most true," he said. "Do you think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the contemplation of all time and all existence"  

*Cf. Goethe's "Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen resolut zu leben."


For πᾶς χρόνος cf. infra 498 b, 608 c, Phaedo 107 c, Gorg. 525 c, Apol. 40 E, Tim. 36 E, 47 b, 90 d. Cf. Isoc. i. 11, Pindar, Pyth. i. 46.
τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον; Ἅδυνατον, Β ἢ δ᾽ ὦς. Οὐκοῦν καὶ θάνατον οὐ δεινόν τι ἡγήσεται ὁ τουπότος; Ἡκιστὰ γε. Δειλῇ δὴ καὶ ἀνελευ-θέρῳ φύσει φιλοσοφίας ἅληθνης, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἄν μετείη. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. Τί οὖν; ὁ κόσμος καὶ μὴ φιλοχρήματος μηδἐ ἀνελεύθερος μηδὲ ἁλαζῶν μηδὲ δειλὸς ἔσθ᾽ ὅτι ἁν δυσσύμβολος ἡ ἄδικος γένοιτο; Οὐκ ἔστων. Καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψυχὴν σκοπῶν φιλόσοφον καὶ μὴ εὐθὺς νέου οντος ἐπισκέψει, εἰ ἄρα δικαῖα τε καὶ ἡμερας ἡ δυσκοινώνητος καὶ ἀγρία. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Οὐ μήν οὐδὲ τόδε παρα-σταίρεις, ὡς ἐγώμαι. Τὸ ποίον; Ἔμμαθης ἡ δυσ-μαθῆς. ἡ προσδοκᾶς ποτὲ τινὰ τι ικανῶς ἄν ἰστῇ, ὁ πράττων ἄν ἄλαγῶν τε πράττοι καὶ μόνης συμπυρὸν ἄντων; Οὐκ ἄν γένοιτο. Τί δ᾽; εἰ μηδὲν ὃν μάθοι σώζειν δύνατο, λήθης ὃν πλέως, ἄρ᾽ ἄν οἰδος τ᾽ εἰ ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι; Καὶ πῶς; Ἀνάνθητα δὴ πονῶν οὐκ, οἴει, ἀναγκασθῆ-σεται τελευτῶν αὐτόν τε μεσεῖν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑποτεynthesis; Πῶς δ᾽ οὖ; Ἐπιλήσμονα ἀρα ψυχὴν ἐν ταῖς ικανῶς φιλοσόφοις μὴ ποτὲ ἐγκρίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ μηνιμονικὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμης δεῖν εἶναι. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Ἀλλ᾽ οὖ μὴν τὸ γε τῆς ἀμοῦσιν τε καὶ ἀσχήμονοι φύσεως ἀλλοσσὲ ποι ἃν φαῖμεν ἐλκεῖν η

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For similar pessimistic utterances about human life and mankind cf. 604 b-c, 496 d-e, 500 b-c, 516 d, Laws 803 b. Cf. also Laws 708 e-709 b.

b Cf. Vol. I. pp. 200 f. on 386 b-c; Laws 727 d, 828 d, 881 a, Gorg. 522 e, Phaedo 77 e, Crito 43 b, Apol. 35 a, 10
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can deem this life of man a thing of great concern?" "Impossible," said he. "Hence such a man will not suppose death to be terrible? " "Least of all." "Then a cowardly and illiberal spirit, it seems, could have no part in genuine philosophy." "I think not." "What then? Could a man of orderly spirit, not a lover of money, not illiberal, nor a braggart nor a coward, ever prove unjust, or a driver of hard bargains?" "Impossible." "This too, then, is a point that in your discrimination of the philosophic and unphilosophic soul you will observe—whether the man is from youth up just and gentle or unsocial and savage." "Assuredly." "Nor will you overlook this, I fancy." "What?" "Whether he is quick or slow to learn. Or do you suppose that anyone could properly love a task which he performed painfully and with little result from much toil?" "That could not be." "And if he could not keep what he learned, being steeped in oblivion, could he fail to be void of knowledge?" "How could he?" "And so, having all his labour for naught, will he not finally be constrained to loathe himself and that occupation?" "Of course." "The forgetful soul, then, we must not list in the roll of competent lovers of wisdom, but we require a good memory." "By all means." "But assuredly we should not say that the want of harmony and seemliness in a nature conduces to anything else than the want of measure and propor-

40 c. Cf. Spinoza's "There is nothing of which the free man thinks so little as death."

 Cf. supra, Vol. I. on 442 e.

 Cf. Laches 180 λ-β ἄνδεις μανθάνων.

 Cf. Theaet. 144 B.

 Cf. Theaet. 144 B νηθὺς γέμοντες. Cf. Cleopatra's "Oh, my oblivion is a very Antony" (Ant. and Cleo. I. iii. 90).
eis ἁμετριάν. Τί μήν; Ἀλήθειαν δὲ ἁμετρία ἥγει ἀνυγγενή εἶναι ἡ ἁμετρία; Ἐμετρία. Ἐμετρὸν ἅρα καὶ εὐχαρίαν ζητώμεν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διάνοιαν φύσει, ἢν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέαν ἐκ-Ε στον τὸ αὐτοφυὲς εὐάγγελον παρέξει. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Τί οὖν; μή πη δοκοῦμεν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἐκαστά διεληλυθέναι καὶ ἐπόμενα ἀλλήλους τῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὄντος ἱκανῶς τε καὶ τελέως ὑψη 487 μεταληφήσει; Ἀναγκαἰότατα μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Ἐστιν οὖν ὅτι μέμψει τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα, δ μή ποτ' ἄν τις οἶδος τε γένοιτο ἱκανῶς ἐπιτηδεύσαι, εἰ μή φύσει εἴη μνήμων, εὐμαθῆς, μεγαλοπρεπῆς, εὐχαρίας, φίλος τε καὶ ἄνυγγες ἀληθείας, δικαιο-σύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης; Οὐδ' ἄν ὁ Μῶμος, ἐφη, τὸ γε τοιοῦτον μέμψατο. 'Άλλα', ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τελεωθήσει τοῖς τοιοῦτοις παιδεία τε καὶ ἡλικία ἁρα οὐ μόνοις ἃν τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρέπουσι; 

III. Καὶ ὁ 'Αδείμαντος, ὩΣ Σώκρατες, ἐφη, 
Β πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα σοι οὖθεν ἄν οἶδος τ' εἴη ἀντεπείν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιόνδε τι πᾶσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες

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b Lit. "following one upon the other." Cf. Tim. 27 c 

C. ἐπομένως, Laws 844 e.

c μεγαλοπρεπῆς is frequently ironical in Plato, but not here. For the list of qualities of the ideal student cf. also 503 c, Theaet. 144 a-b, and Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 418. Cf. Laws 709 e on the qualifications of the young tyrant, and Cic. Tusc. v. 24, with Renaissance literature on education.

d The god of censure, who finds fault with the gods in Lucian’s dialogues. Cf. Overbeck, Schriftquellen, p. 208, 12
"Certainly." "And do you think that truth is akin to measure and proportion or to disproportion?" "To proportion." "Then in addition to our other requirements we look for a mind endowed with measure and grace, whose native disposition will make it easily guided to the aspect of the ideal reality in all things." "Assuredly." "Tell me, then, is there any flaw in the argument? Have we not proved the qualities enumerated to be necessary and compatible with one another for the soul that is to have a sufficient and perfect apprehension of reality?" "Nay, most necessary," he said. "Is there any fault, then, that you can find with a pursuit which a man could not properly practise unless he were by nature of good memory, quick apprehension, magnificent, gracious, friendly and akin to truth, justice, bravery and sobriety?" "Momus himself," he said, "could not find fault with such a combination." "Well, then," said I, "when men of this sort are perfected by education and maturity of age, would you not entrust the state solely to them?"

III. And Adeimantus said, "No one, Socrates, would be able to controvert these statements of yours. But, all the same, those who occasionally hear you e n. 1091, Otto, p. 227, s.v. Momus. Cf. Callimachus, fr. 70; and Anth. Pal. xvi. 262. 3-4:

αὐτὸς ὁ Μῶμος

θέγεται, Ἄκρητος, Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἡ σοφία,

"Momus himself will cry out 'Father Zeus, this was perfect skill.'" (L.C.L. translation.) Stallbaum refers to Erasmus, Chilid, i. 5. 75 and interpreters on Aristaenet. Epist. i. 1, p. 239, ed. Boissonade.

*Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 35, n. 236, and What Plato Said, p. 468 on Crito 46 b. A speaker in Plato may thus refer to any fundamental Platonic doctrine. Wilamowitz' suggested emendation (Platon, ii. p. 205) & ἄν λέγετσ is due to a misunderstanding of this.
Plato

ékáste te á vón légeis· ἢγονται δι' ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτάν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ'
ékastou τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρῶν παραγόμενοι, ἀθροι-
σθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων
méga τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἑναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαί-
νεσθαί, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεπτεύων δεινῶν οἱ
μὴ τελευτώντες ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὔκ ἔχουσιν ὁ
C τι φέρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ σφεῖς τελευτώντες ἀποκλεί-
νεσθαί, καὶ οὔκ ἔχειν ο τι λέγοισιν ὑπὸ πεπτείας αὗ
ταύτης τινὸς ἑτέρας, οὔκ ἐν ψήφοις ἀλλ' ἐν λόγοις:
ἐπει τό γε ἀληθές οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ταύτῃ ἔχειν.
λέγω δ' εἰς τό παρόν ἀποβλέψας. νών γὰρ φαίν
ἀν τίς σοι λόγῳ μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν καθ' ἐκαστον τὸ
ἐρωτώμενον ἑναντιοῦσθαί, ἐργω δὲ ὅραν, ὅσοι ἀν

a A locus classicus for Plato's anticipation of objections. Cf. 475 B, Theaet. 166 A-B, Rep. 609 c, 438-439, and Apelt, Republic, p. 492. Plato does it more tactfully than Isocrates, e.g. Demoa. 44.
b Cf. Apelt, Aufsätzte, p. 73, Minto, Logic, Induction and Deduction, pp. 4 ff.; also Gorg. 461 B, 462 A, Soph. 230 B.
c Cf. Phaedrus 262 B.
e Cf. Phaedr. 262 B, Cleitophon 410 A, Gorg. 495 A, schol.,
tous πρῶτοι λόγους τοὺς ἐπιτι θηλωντὶ, Gorg. 457 E ἐἰς τὸ
πρῶτον ἔλεγες, and also Agathon in Symp. 201 B.
f For this figure cf. cf. Laws 739 A, 820 c-d, 903 D, Eryxias
Aristotle, Soph. El. 165 a 10 ff., borrows the metaphor, but
his ψήφοι are those of book-keeping or reckoning. Cf. also
Dem. De cor. 227 f.
g Cf. Hipp. Minor 369 B-C and Grote ii. p. 64 “Though
Hippias admits each successive step he still mistrusts the
conclusion”; also Apelt, p. 492, supra 357 A-B and Laws
903 B βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις, and also Hipparchus 232 B for

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argue thus feel in this way: They think that owing to their inexperience in the game of question and answer they are at every question led astray a little bit by the argument, and when these bits are accumulated at the conclusion of the discussion mighty is their fall and the apparent contradiction of what they at first said; and that just as by expert draught-players the unskilled are finally shut in and cannot make a move, so they are finally blocked and have their mouths stopped by this other game of draughts played not with counters but with words; yet the truth is not affected by that outcome. I say this with reference to the present case, for in this instance one might say that he is unable in words to contend against you at each question, but that when it comes to facts he sees that of those who turn to philosophy, the idea that dialectic constrains rather than persuades. In the Ion, 533 c, Ion says he cannot ἀντὶλέγειν, but the fact remains that he knows Homer but not other poets. Cf. also 536 d. The passage virtually anticipates Bacon’s Novum Organum, App. XIII. “(syllogismus) . . . assensum itaque constringit, non res.” Cf. Cic. De fin. iv. 3, Tusc. i. 8. 16, and the proverbial οὐ γὰρ πείλεις, οὐδ’ ἂν πείλης, Aristoph. Plutus 600.

See Soph. 234 e for a different application of the same idea. There is no change of opinion. The commonplace Greek contrast of word and deed, theory and fact, is valid against eristic but not against dialectic. See What Plato Said, p. 534 on Phaedo 99 e, and supra on 473 a; also What Plato Said, p. 625 on Laws 636 a.

A favourite formula of Aristotle runs, “This is true in theory and is confirmed by facts.” Cf. Eth. Nic. 1099 b 25, 1123 b 22, 1131 a 13, Pol. 1323 a 39-b 6, 1326 a 25 and 29, 1334 a 5-6.

Scholars in politics cut a sorry figure. For this popular view of philosophers cf. Theae. 173 c ff., 174 c-d, Gorg. 484-486 c, Phaedo 64 b. Cf. also Isoc. passim, e.g. Antid. 250, 312.
The perfect tense is ironical in Crat. 384 b, serious in Laws 670 a-b. In Gorg. 485 a it is replaced by ὅσον παιδείας χάριν.


c Cf. Euthydem. 306 b, Protag. 346 a, and for the idea without the word, Soph. 216 c.


e Cf. supra 487 a. In Euthydem. 307 b Plato uses both ἐπιτήδευμα and πράγμα.
not merely touching upon it to complete their education and dropping it while still young, but lingering too long in the study of it, the majority become cranks, not to say rascals, and those accounted the finest spirits among them are still rendered useless to society by the pursuit which you commend.” And I, on hearing this, said, “Do you think that they are mistaken in saying so?” “I don’t know,” said he, “but I would gladly hear your opinion.” “You may hear, then, that I think that what they say is true.” “How, then,” he replied, “can it be right to say that our cities will never be freed from their evils until the philosophers, whom we admit to be useless to them, become their rulers?” “Your question,” I said, “requires an answer expressed in a comparison or parable.” “And you,” he said, “of course, are not accustomed to speak in comparisons!”

IV. “So,” said I, “you are making fun of me after driving me into such an impasse of argument. But, all the same, hear my comparison so that you may still better see how I strain after imagery. For so cruel is the condition of the better sort in relation to the state that there is no single thing like it in nature. But to find a likeness for it and a defence for them one must bring together many things in such a com-

\[\text{\footnotesize Cf. Gorg. 517 d, Laws 644 c, Symp. 213 A with Bury’s note. Cf. the parable of the great beast infra 493, and of the many-headed beast, 588-589.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize a The word } \gamma\lambda\iota\sigma\chi\rho\omega\nu\text{ is untranslatable, and often misunderstood. In 553 c it means “stingily”; in Cratyl. 414 c it is used of a strained etymology, and so in 435 c, usually misunderstood; in Crito 53 e of clinging to life; cf. Phaedo 117 A; in Plutarch, De Is. et Osir. 28 of a strained allegory and } \text{ibid. 75 of a strained resemblance; in Aristoph. Peace 482 of a dog.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize b Cf. Laws 747 b.}\]
µενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, οἶνον οἱ γραφεὶς τραγελάφους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μιγνύτες γράφουσιν. νόησον γὰρ τοιούτου γενόμενον εἴτε πολλῶν νεών πέρι εἴτε μᾶς· ναύκληρον μεγέθει μὲν καὶ ρώμη ὑπὲρ τούς ὑπὲρ τῆς νηλί πάντας, ὑπόκωφον δὲ καὶ ὄρωντα ὀδι- αὔτως βραχύ τι καὶ γυγνόσκοντα περὶ ναυτικῶν ἐτερα τοιαῦτα, τοὺς δὲ ναύτας στασιάζοντας πρὸς ἄλληλους περὶ τῆς κυβερνήσεως, ἐκαστὸν οἴμενον δεῖν κυβερνῶν, μήτε μαθόντα πώποτε τὴν τέχνην μήτε ἔχοντα ἀποδεῖξαι διδάσκαλον ἔαυτον μηδὲ χρόνον ἐν ὃ ἐμάνθανε, πρὸς δὲ τούτους φάσκοντας μεδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λέγοντα ὦς ὅτι διδακτὸν ἑτοίμους κατατέμνειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ τῷ ναυκλήρῳ περικεχύσθαι δεομένους καὶ

a Cf. Horace, Ars Poetica, init.; What Plato Said, p. 550 on Phaedr. 229 d-e, and infra 588 c f. The expression is still used, or revived, in Modern Greek newspapers.

b The syntax of this famous allegory is anacoluthic and perhaps uncertain: but there need be no doubt about the meaning. Cf. my article in the Classical Review, xx. (1906) p. 247.

Huxley commends the allegory, Methods and Results, p. 313. Cf. also Carlyle’s famous metaphor of the ship doubling Cape Horn by ballot. Cf. Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 362.

c The Athenian demos, as portrayed e.g. in Aristophanes’ Knights 40 ff. and passim. Cf. Aristot. Rhet. 1406 b 35 καὶ ἴ eis τὸν δήμον, ὡς δὲ μοις ναυκλήρῳ ἵσχυρόν μὲν ὑποκόφῳ δὲ, Polyb. vi. 44 ἂεὶ γὰρ ποτε τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων δήμον παραπλησίων εἶναι τοῖς ἀδεσπότοις σκάφεσιν, etc. Cf. the old sailor in Joseph Conrad’s Chance, ch. i. “No ship navigated . . . in the happy-go-lucky manner . . . would ever arrive into port.”

For the figure of the ship of state cf. Polit. 302 a ff., 299 b, Euthydem. 291 π, Aesch. Seven against Thebes 2-3, Theognis 670-685, Horace, Odes i. 15 with my note, Urwick, 18
bination as painters mix when they portray goat-stags and similar creatures. Conceive this sort of thing happening either on many ships or on one: Picture a shipmaster in height and strength surpassing all others on the ship, but who is slightly deaf and of similarly impaired vision, and whose knowledge of navigation is on a par with his sight and hearing. Conceive the sailors to be wrangling with one another for control of the helm, each claiming that it is his right to steer though he has never learned the art and cannot point out his teacher or any time when he studied it. And what is more, they affirm that it cannot be taught at all, but they are ready to make mincemeat of anyone who says that it can be taught, and meanwhile they are always clustered about the shipmaster importuning him and sticking

The Message of Plato, pp. 110-111, Ruskin, Time and Tide, xiii: "That the governing authority should be in the hands of a true and trained pilot is as clear and as constant. In none of these conditions is there any difference between a nation and a boat's company." Cf. Longfellow's The Building of the Ship, in fine. Cf. Laws 758 ά, 945 c.

For the criticism of democracy by a figure cf. also Polit. 297 έ ff.

* Cf. Aristoph. Knights 42-44.
* Cf. 390 c, 426 δ, 498 β, Theaetet. 167 β, and Milton's "unknown and like esteemed," Comus 630.
* For this and similar checks on pretenders to knowledge cf. Laches 185 ε, 186 ά and c, Alc. I, 109 δ and Gorg. 514 β-c.
* Plato of course believed that virtue or the political art can be taught in a reformed state, but practically was not taught at Athens. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 14, infra on 518 δ, What Plato Said, pp. 70 and 511, Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. p. 397, Thompson on Meno 70 ά.
* A hint of the fate of Socrates. Cf. infra 517 ά, 494 ί, and Euthyphro 3 ε.
* The participle περικεκυμένους occurs in Polit. 268 c, but is avoided here by anacoluthon.
πάντα ποιοῦντας, ὅπως ἂν σφίσι τὸ πηδάλιον ἐπιτρέψῃ, ἐνίοτε δ' ἂν μὴ πείθωσιν ἄλλα ἄλλοι μᾶλλον, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἢ ἀποκτεινύντας ἢ ἐκβάλλοντας εἰκὼς νεώς, τὸν δὲ γενναίον ναύκληρον μανδραγόρα ἢ μέθη ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ ἐξυμποδίσαντας τῆς νεώς ἄρχειν χρωμένους τοὺς ἐνοῦσι, καὶ πίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐνοομένους πλεῖν ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς τοὺς τοιούτους, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἑπανοῦντας νεανικὸν

δ' μὲν καλοῦντας καὶ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ἑπιστάμενον τὰ κατὰ ναῦν, ὅς ἂν ἔμπλαμβάνειν δεινὸς ἢ, ὅπως ἀρξοῦσιν ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιαζόμενοι τὸν ναύκληρον, τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιούτον ψέγοντας ὡς ἀχρηστον, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθινοῦ κυβερνητίου πέρι μηδ' ἑπαίδευτος, ὃτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται ἐνιαυτῷ

1 ἑπαίδευτος α', ἑπαίδευτος ΛΦΔΜ.

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a For the idiom πάντα ποιεῖν cf. Euthyph. 8 c, infra 504 d-e, 571 c, 575 e, 494 e, Gorg. 479 c, Phaedr. 252 e, Apol. 39 a, and, slightly varied, Eurip. Heracleidae 841.

b The word ἐκβάλλοντας helps the obvious allegory, for it also means banish.

c Here figurative. Cf. Gorg. 482 e, Theaet. 165 e. Infra 615 e it is used literally.


f Cf. 407 d with Thucyd. iv. 26, vi. 69, vii. 25.

g Cf. 427 e, Laws 905 c, Eryx. 396 e, Aristoph. Knights 229.

h Neither here nor in d-e can ὅπως with the future mean "in what way," and all interpretations based on that assumption are plainly wrong. The expression in both cases refers to getting control. Cf. 338 e, Laws 757 d, 714 c, 962 d-e, Xen. Rep. Lac. 14. 5. Cf. Class. Phil. ix. (1914) pp. 358 and 362.

i For τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιούτον cf. Alc. II. 145 c.
at nothing a to induce him to turn over the helm to them. And sometimes, if they fail and others get his ear, they put the others to death or cast them out b from the ship, and then, after binding c and stupefying the worthy shipmaster d with mandragora or intoxication or otherwise, they take command of the ship, consume its stores and, drinking and feasting, make such a voyage e of it as is to be expected f from such, and as if that were not enough, they praise and celebrate as a navigator, a pilot, a master of shipcraft, the man who is most cunning to lend a hand g in persuading or constraining the shipmaster to let them rule, h while the man who lacks this craft i they censure as useless. They have no suspicion j that the true pilot must give his attention k to the time of the year,

a The ppl. must refer to the sailors; hence the acc. (see crit. note).

Whatever the text and the amount of probable anacoluthon in this sentence, the meaning is that the unruly sailors (the mob) have no true conception of the state of mind of the real pilot (the philosophic statesman), and that it is he (adopting Sidgwick's οἰσμένω for the ms. οἰσμενοι in ε) who does not believe that the trick of getting possession of the helm is an art, or that, if it were, he could afford time to practise it. Those who read οἰσμενοι attribute the idea of the incompatibility of the two things to the sailors. But that overlooks the points I have already made about δπως, and τέχνη and is in any case improbable, because the sentence as a whole is concerned with the attitude of the true pilot (statesman), which may be represented by the words of Burke to his constituents, "I could hardly serve you as I have done and court you too."


b For the force of the article cf. Thucyd. ii. 65 ὁ ἐπιφθονον λαμβάνει, and my article in T.A.P.A. 1893, p. 81, n. 6. Cf. also Charm. 156 e and Rep. 496 e.
PLATO

καὶ ὄρων καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἀστρων καὶ πνευμάτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τῇ τέχνῃ προσηκόντων, εἰ μέλει τῷ ὄντι νεῶς ἄρχικός ἔσεσθαι, ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει.

Ε ἐὰν τὲ τινες βούλωνται εάν τε μή, μήτε τέχνην τούτου μήτε μελέτην οἰομένως ἄνωτα εἶναι λαβεῖν ἄμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν. τοιούτων δὴ περὶ τὰς ναῦς γιγνομένων τὸν ὁς ἀληθῶς κυβερνητικὸν οὐχ ἠγεῖ ἃν τῷ ὄντι μετεωροσκόπον τε καὶ ἀδολέσχην 489 καὶ ἀχρηστόν σφίσι καλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς οὔτω κατεσκευασμέναις ναυσὶ πλωτῆρων; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη δ' Ἀδείμαντος. Ὁυ δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἶμαι δεῖσθαι σὲ ἐξεταζομένην τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδεῖν, ὅτι ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φιλοσόφους τὴν διάθεσιν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ μανθάνειν δέ λέγω. Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. Πρῶτον μὲν τοῖνυν ἐκείνον τὸν θαυμάζοντα, ὅτι οἱ φιλόσοφοι οὐ τιμῶνται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, δίδασκε τε τὴν εἰκόνα καὶ πειρῶ πείθειν, ὅτι πολὺ Β ἂν θαυμαστότερον ἦν, εἰ ἔτιμωντο. Ἀλλὰ διδάξω,

1 οἰομένῳ Sidgwick: οἰομένου mss.

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a ὅπως . . . κυβερνήσει. Cf. p. 20, note h.

b The translation gives the right meaning. Cf. infra 518 b, and the examples collected in my emendation of Gorgias 503 ν in Class. Phil. x. (1915) 325-326. The contrast between subjects which do and those which do not admit of constitution as an art and science is ever present to Plato's mind, as appears from the Sophist, Politicus, Gorgias, and Phaedrus. And he would normally express the idea by a genitive with τέχνη. Cf. Protag. 357 a, Phaedrus 260 ε, 22
the seasons, the sky, the winds, the stars, and all that pertains to his art if he is to be a true ruler of a ship, and that he does not believe that there is any art or science of seizing the helm with or without the consent of others, or any possibility of mastering this alleged art and the practice of it at the same time with the science of navigation. With such goings-on aboard ship do you not think that the real pilot would in very deed be called a star-gazer, an idle babbler, a useless fellow, by the sailors in ships managed after this fashion? " "Quite so," said Adeimantus. "You take my meaning, I presume, and do not require us to put the comparison to the proof and show that the condition we have described is the exact counterpart of the relation of the state to the true philosophers." "It is indeed," he said. "To begin with, then, teach this parable to the man who is surprised that philosophers are not honoured in our cities, and try to convince him that it would be far more surprising if they were honoured." "I

also Class. Rev. xx. (1906) p. 247. See too Cic. De or. i. 4 "neque aliquod praecipitum artis esse arbitrarentur," and infra 518 D.

c τὸ ὄντι verifies the allusion to the charge that Socrates was a babbler and a star-gazer or weather-prophet. Cf. Soph. 225 D, Polit. 299 B, and What Plato Said, p. 527 on Phaedo 70 C; Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 1480.

d Plato like some modern writers is conscious of his own imagery and frequently interprets his own symbols. Cf. 517 A-B, 531 B, 588 B, Gorg. 493 D, 517 D, Phaedo 87 B, Laws 644 C, Meno 72 A-B. Tim. 19 B, Polit. 297 E. Cf. also the cases where he says he cannot tell what it is but only what it is like, e.g. Rep. 506 E, Phaedr. 246 A, Symp. 215 A 5.

diaθεσις and ζίως are not discriminated by Plato as by Aristotle.

Cf. 476 D-E.
This passage illustrates one of the most interesting characteristics of Plato’s style, namely the representation of thought as adventure or action. This procedure is, or was, familiar to modern readers in Matthew Arnold’s account in God and the Bible of his quest for the meaning of God, which in turn is imitated in Mr. Updegraff’s New Word. It lends vivacity and interest to Pascal’s Provinciales and many other examples of it can be found in modern literature. The classical instance of it in Plato is Socrates’ narrative in the Phaedo of his search for a satisfactory explanation of natural phenomena, 96 a ff. In the Sophist the argument is represented as an effort to track and capture the sophist. And the figure of the hunt is common in the dialogues (cf. supra Vol. I, p. 365). Cf. also Rep. 455 a-b, 474 b, 588 c-d, 612 c, Euthyd. 291 a-b, 293 a, Phileb. 24 a ff., 43 a, 44 d, 45 a, Laws 892 d-e, Theaet. 169 d, 180 e, 196 d, Polit. 265 b, etc.  

Cf. 487 d. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 3
will teach him," a he said. "And say to him further: You are right in affirming that the finest spirits among the philosophers are of no service to the multitude. But bid him blame for this uselessness, b not the finer spirits, but those who do not know how to make use of them. For it is not the natural c course of things that the pilot should beg the sailors to be ruled by him or that wise men should go to the doors of the rich. d The author of that epigram e was a liar. But the true nature of things is that whether the sick man be rich or poor he must needs go to the door of the physician, and everyone who needs to be governed f to the door of the man who knows how to govern, not that the ruler should implore his natural subjects to let themselves be ruled, if he is really good for anything. g But you will make no mistake in likening our present political rulers to the sort of sailors we were just describing, and those whom these call useless

"I am not sure that I do not think this the fault of our community rather than of the men of culture."


e For Plato's attitude toward the epigrams of the Pre-Socratics cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 68-69.
f Cf. Theaet. 170 B and infra 590 c-d.
g For the idiom with δέθεν cf. 530 c, 567 B, Euthyphro 4 E, Apol. 36 c, Crito 46 A, Euthydem. 289 A, Soph. O.C. 259, where it is varied.
tois ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνήταις. Ὡρθότατα, ἔφη. Ἕκ τε τοινυν τούτων καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ρέδιον εὐδοκιμεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐπιτήδευμα ὑπὸ τῶν D τάναντία ἐπιτηδεύωντων, πολὺ δὲ μεγίστῃ καὶ ἱσχυρότατῃ διαβολῇ γίγνεται φιλοσοφία διὰ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα φάσκοντας ἐπιτηδεύειν, οὐ δὴ σὺ φῆς τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγειν ὡς παμπόνηροι οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἰῶντων ἐπ’ αὐτὴν, οἱ δὲ ἐπιεικέστατοι ἀχρηστοί, καὶ ἐγὼ συνεχώρησα ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν. ἦ γάρ; Ναι.

V. Οὐκοῦν τῆς μὲν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἀχρηστίας τῇν αἰτίαν διεληλύθαμεν; Καὶ μάλα. Τῆς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν πονηρίας τὴν ἀνάγκην βούλει τὸ μετὰ τούτο διέλθαμεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ τούτον φιλοσοφία Ἐ αἰτία, ἄν δυνώμεθα, πειραθῶμεν δεῖξαι; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ἀκούωμεν δὴ καὶ λέγωμεν ἐκείθεν ἀναμνησθέντες, ὅθεν διήμεν τὴν φύσιν, οἶον ἀνάγ-490 κη φύναι τὸν καλὸν τε κάγαθον ἐσόμενον. Ἡγεῖτο δ’ αὐτῷ, εἰ νῦ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἦν διόκειν αὐτὸν πάνως καὶ πάντῃ ἐδει ἡ ἀλαζόνον ὅτι μηδαμῇ μετείναι εἰς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς. Ἡν γάρ οὗτω λεγόμενον. Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τούτῳ σφόδρα οὔτω παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦ ἔκομενοις περὶ αὐτοῦ; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. ἂ ὅν δὴ οὐ μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὅ ὅν πεφυκὼς

a Cf. Theaet. 173 c, why speak of unworthy philosophers? and infra 495 c ff.

b Possibly “wooers.” Cf. 347 c, 521 b. Plato frequently employs the language of physical love in speaking of philosophy. Cf. infra 495-496, 490 b, Theaet. 148 e ff., Phaedo 66 e, Meno 70 b, Phaedr. 266 b, etc.

c Cf. Theaet. 169 d.
and star-gazing ideologists to the true pilots.”

“Just so,” he said. “Hence, and under these conditions, we cannot expect that the noblest pursuit should be highly esteemed by those whose way of life is quite the contrary. But far the greatest and chief disparagement of philosophy is brought upon it by the pretenders to that way of life, those whom you had in mind when you affirmed that the accuser of philosophy says that the majority of her followers are rascals and the better sort useless, while I admitted that what you said was true. Is not that so?”

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“Have we not, then, explained the cause of the uselessness of the better sort?” “We have.” “Shall we next set forth the inevitableness of the degeneracy of the majority, and try to show if we can that philosophy is not to be blamed for this either?” “By all means.” “Let us begin, then, what we have to say and hear by recalling the starting-point of our description of the nature which he who is to be a scholar and gentleman must have from birth. The leader of the choir for him, if you recollect, was truth. That he was to seek always and altogether, on pain of being an impostor without part or lot in true philosophy.” “Yes, that was said.” “Is not this one point quite contrary to the prevailing opinion about him?” “It is indeed,” he said. “Will it not be a fair plea in his defence to say that it was the nature of the real lover of knowledge to strive

4 The quality of the καλός κίγαθὸς gave rise to the abstraction καλοκάγαθία used for the moral ideal in the Eudemian Ethics. Cf. Isoc. Demon. 6, 13, and 51, Stewart on Eth. Nic. 1124 a 4 (p. 339) and 1179 b 10 (p. 460).

* For ἦ = “or else” cf. Prot. 323 a and c, Phaedr. 237 c, 239 a, 245 d, Gorg. 494 a, Crat. 426 b, etc.
Similar metaphors for contact, approach and intercourse with the truth are frequent in Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. For Plato cf. Campbell on Theaet. 150 b and 186 a. Cf. also supra on 489 d.

 Cf. Phaedo 65 e f., Symp. 211 e-212 a.
 Lit. "be nourished." Cf. Protag. 313 c-d, Soph. 223 e, Phaedr. 248 b.
 A Platonic and Neoplatonic metaphor. Cf. Theaet. 148 e ff., 151 a, and passim, Symp. 206 e, Epist. ii. 313 a, Epictet. Diss. i. 22. 17.
emulously for true being and that he would not linger over the many particulars that are opined to be real, but would hold on his way, and the edge of his passion would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he came into touch with the nature of each thing in itself by that part of his soul to which it belongs to lay hold on that kind of reality—the part akin to it, namely—and through that approaching it, and consorting with reality really, he would beget intelligence and truth, attain to knowledge and truly live and grow, and so find surcease from his travail of soul, but not before?

"No plea could be fairer." "Well, then, will such a man love falsehood, or, quite the contrary, hate it?" "Hate it," he said. "When truth led the way, no choir of evils, we, I fancy, would say, could ever follow in its train." "How could it?" "But rather a sound and just character, which is accompanied by temperance." "Right," he said. "What need, then, of repeating from the beginning our proof of the necessary order of the choir that attends on the philosophical nature? You surely remember that we found pertaining to such a nature courage, grandeur of soul, aptness to learn, memory. And when you interposed the objection that though everybody will be compelled to admit our statements, yet, if we abandoned mere words and fixed our eyes on the persons to whom the words referred, everyone would say that he actually saw some of them to be useless and most of them base with all baseness, it was in our search for the

* For the figurative use of the word χορός cf. 560 E, 580 B, Euthydem. 279 c, Theaet. 173 B.

† For the list of virtues cf. supra on 457 A.

‡ Cf. for the use of the dative Polit. 258 ά συγχωρεῖς οὖν ὡς λέγει, Phaedo 100 c τῇ τοιάδε αἰτίᾳ συγχωρεῖς, Horace, Sat. ii. 3. 305 "stultum me fateor, liceat concedere veris."
plato

πούντες ἐπὶ τούτῳ νῦν γεγόναμεν, τὶ ποθ' οἱ πολλοὶ κακοὶ, καὶ τούτου δὴ ἐνεκα πάλιν ἀνειλήφαμεν τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφων φύσιν καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης Ἐδρισάμεθα. Ἔστιν, ἔφη, ταῦτα.

VI. Ταύτης δὴ, ἢν δ᾿ ἐγώ, τῆς φύσεως δεῖ θεάσασθαι τὰς φθοράς, ὡς διόλυται ἐν πολλοῖς, σμικρὸν δὲ τι ἐκθεύγη, οὔς δὴ καὶ οὐ πονηροὺς, ἀχρήστους δὲ καλοῦσι· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ τὰς 491 μιμομένας ταύτην καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα καθιστα-μένας αὐτῆς, οὐαὶ οὕσαι φύσεις ψυχῶν εἰς ἀνάξιον καὶ μειζὸν ἐαυτῶν ἀφικνοῦμεν ἐπιτήδευμα, πολ-λαχῇ πλημμελοῦσαι, πανταχῆ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας δόξας οἶαν λέγεις φιλοσοφία προσῆπαν. Τίνας δὲ, ἔφη, τὰς διαφθορὰς λέγεις; Ἔγω σοι, ἐἴπον, ἂν οἶδο τε γένωμαι, πειράσομαι διελθεῖν τὸδε μὲν οὖν, οἷς, πᾶς ἡμῶν ὀμολογήσει, τοιαύτην φύσιν καὶ πάντα ἔχουσαι, οὐπα προσετάξαμεν νῦν δὴ, Βεί τελεώς μέλλοι φιλόσοφος γενέσθαι, ὀλιγάκης ἐν ἀνθρώποις φύσεθαι καὶ ὀλίγας· ή οὐκ οἶει; Σφάδρα γε. Τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων σκόπει ὡς πολλοὶ ὀλέθροι καὶ μεγάλοι. Τίνες δὴ; Ὁ μὲν πάντων θαυμαστότατον ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι ἐν ἐκαστὸν ὄν ἐπηνέσαμεν τῆς φύσεως ἀπόλλυσι τὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν καὶ ἀποστᾷ φιλοσοφίας· λέγω δὲ ἀνδρείαν, σωφροσύνην, καὶ πάντα ἀ διήλθομεν. ᾿Ατοπον, Κέφη, ἀκοῦσαι. Ἐτι τοίνυν, ἢν δ᾿ ἐγώ, πρὸς

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b For the Greek double use of ἀξιος and ἀράξιος cf. Laws 943 ε, Aesch. Ag. 1527. Cf. ‘How worthily he died who died unworthily’ and Wyatt’s line ‘Disdain me not without desert.”
cause of this ill-repute that we came to the present question: Why is it that the majority are bad? And, for the sake of this, we took up again the nature of the true philosophers and defined what it must necessarily be?'" "That is so," he said.

VI. "We have, then," I said, "to contemplate the causes of the corruption of this nature in the majority, while a small part escapes," even those whom men call not bad but useless; and after that in turn we are to observe those who imitate this nature and usurp its pursuits and see what types of souls they are that thus entering upon a way of life which is too high for them and exceeds their powers, by the many discord and disharmonies of their conduct everywhere and among all men bring upon philosophy the repute of which you speak." "Of what corruptions are you speaking?" "I will try," I said, "to explain them to you if I can. I think everyone will grant us this point; that a nature such as we just now postulated for the perfect philosopher is a rare growth among men and is found in only a few. Don't you think so?"

"Most emphatically."

"Observe, then, the number and magnitude of the things that operate to destroy these few." "What are they?"

"The most surprising fact of all is that each of the gifts of nature which we praise tends to corrupt the soul of its possessor and divert it from philosophy. I am speaking of bravery, sobriety, and the entire list." "That does sound like a paradox," said he. "Furthermore," said I,

Cf. Burton, Anatomy, i. 1 "This St. Austin acknowledged of himself in his humble confessions, promptness of wit, memory, eloquence, they were God's good gifts, but he did not use them to his glory."

Cf. Meno 88 a-c, and Seneca, Ep. v. 7 "multa bona nostra nobis nocent."
PLATO

tóútou ἀγαθόν πάντα φθείρει καὶ ἀποστᾶ, κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ὅσχυς σώματος καὶ ἔννεια ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτων οἰκεῖα. ἔχεις γάρ τὸν τύπον ὧν λέγω. Ἐχω, ἔφη, καὶ ἤδεως γ᾽ ἀν ἀκριβέστερον ἡ λέγεις πυθοῖμην. Λαβοῦ τούς, ἤν δ᾽ ἔγω, ὅλον αὐτοῦ ὅρθως, καὶ σοὶ εὐδηλόν τε φανεῖται καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπα διδεῖ τὰ προειρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν. Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἐκείνεις; Πάντος, ἤν δ᾽ ἔγω, σπέρματος πέρι ἡ φυτοῦ, εἶτε ἐγγείων εἶτε τῶν ζώων, ἦσμεν, ὅτι τὸ μὴ τυχὸν τροφῆς ἂς προσήκει ἐκάστῳ μηδ᾽ ὄρας μηδὲ τόπου, ὅσον ἄν ἐρρωμενέστερον ἢ, τοσοῦτω πλείονων ἐνδεῖ τῶν πρεπόντων· ἀγαθῷ γάρ που κακὸν ἐναντίωτερον ἢ τῷ μὴ ἀγαθῷ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὖ; Ἐχει δὴ, οἶμαι, λόγου, τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἐν ἀλλοτριωτέρα οὕσαν τροφὴ κἀκιον ἀπαλλάττειν τῆς φαύλης. Ἐχει. Οὐκοῦν, ἤν δ′ ἔγω, δ᾽ Ἀδεὶ-Εμαντε, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω φῶμεν τὰς εὐφυεστάτας κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχούσας διαφερόντως κακὰς γίγνεσθαι; ἢ οἴει τὰ μεγάλα ἄδικηματα καὶ τὴν ἀκρατον πονηρίαν ἐκ φαύλης, ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως τροφῆς διολομένης γίγνεσθαι.

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[a] Cf. What Plato Said, p. 479 on Charm. 158 a. For "goods" cf. ibid. p. 629 on Laws 697 b. The minor or earlier dialogues constantly lead up to the point that goods are no good divorced from wisdom, or the art to use them rightly, or the political or royal art, or the art that will make us happy. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 71.

[b] This is for Plato's purpose a sufficiently clear statement of the distinction between contradictory and contrary opposition. Plato never drew out an Aristotelian or modern logician's table of the opposition of propositions. But it is a misunderstanding of Greek idiom or of his style to say that he never got clear on the matter. He always understood
"all the so-called goods corrupt and divert, beauty and wealth and strength of body and powerful family connexions in the city and all things akin to them—you get my general meaning?" "I do," he said, "and I would gladly hear a more precise statement of it." "Well," said I, "grasp it rightly as a general proposition and the matter will be clear and the preceding statement will not seem to you so strange." "How do you bid me proceed?" he said. "We know it to be universally true of every seed and growth, whether vegetable or animal, that the more vigorous it is the more it falls short of its proper perfection when deprived of the food, the season, the place that suits it. For evil is more opposed to the good than to the not-good." "Of course." "So it is, I take it, natural that the best nature should fare worse than the inferior under conditions of nurture unsuited to it." "It is." "Then," said I, "Adeimantus, shall we not similarly affirm that the best endowed souls become worse than the others under a bad education? Or do you suppose that great crimes and unmixed wickedness spring from a slight nature and not from a vigorous one corrupted by its it. Cf. Symp. 202 A-B, and supra on 437 A-B, What Plato Said, p. 595 on Soph. 257 B, and ibid. p. 563 on Rep. 436 B ff. e "Corruptio optimi pessima." Cf. 495 A-B, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24, iv. 1. 3-4, Dante, Inferno, vi. 106:

Ed egli a me: Ritorna a tua scienza
Che vuol, quanto la cosa è più perfetta,
Più senta il bene e così la doglienza.

Cf. Livy xxxviii. 17 "generosius in sua quidquid sede gignitur: insitum alienae terrae in id quo alitur, natura vertente se, degenerat," Pausanias vii. 17. 3.

Cf. 495 B; La Rochefoucauld, Max. 130 "la faiblesse est le seul défaut qu'on ne saurait corriger" and 467 "la faiblesse est plus opposée à la vertu que le vice."
492 Ἡν τούτων ἔθεμεν τοῦ φιλοσόφου φύσιν, ἂν μὲν, οἵμαι, μαθήσεως προσηκούσης τύχη, εἰς πάσαν ἀρετὴν ἀνάγκη αὖξανομένην ἀφικνεῖσθαι, εὰν δὲ μὴ ἐν προσηκούσῃ σπαρεῖσα τε καὶ φυτευθεῖσα τρέφηται, εἰς πάντα τάναντα αὖ, εὰν μὴ τις αὐτῇ βοηθήσας θεῶν τύχη. ἣ καὶ σὺ ἤγει, ὡστερ οἱ πολλοὶ, διαφθειρόμενοι τυνάς εἶναι ύπὸ σοφιστῶν νέους, διαφθειροῦσας δὲ τινας σοφιστᾶς ἱδιωτικούς, ὑ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα 

β λέγοντας μεγίστους μὲν εἶναι σοφιστὰς, παιδεύειν δὲ τελεώτατα καὶ ἀπεργάζεσθαι οίους βούλονται εἶναι καὶ νέους καὶ προσβυτέρους καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; Πότε δὴ; ἢ δ' ὅσ. ὡταν, εἴπον, ἐνυκαθεζόμενοι ἄθροοι οἱ πολλοὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἢ τινα ἄλλον κοινὸν πλήθους ξύλλογον ἐξ οἱ πολλῷ θορύβῳ

1 οἱ πολλοὶ Hermann: πολλοὶ mss., οἱ secl. Cobet.

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a Cf. infra 497 b, Tim. 42 d.
b This is the βεία μοίρα of 493 a and Meno 99 e. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 517.
d ἱδιωτικοὺς refers to individual sophists as opposed to the great sophist of public opinion. Cf. 492 b, 493 a, 494 a.
e For καὶ ἄξιον λόγον cf. Euthydem. 279 c, Laches 192 a, Laws 908 b, supra 445 c, Thucyd. ii. 54. 5, Aristot. Pol. 1272 b 32, 1302 a 13, De part. an. 654 a 13, Demosth. v. 16, Isoc. vi. 56.
f Cf. Gorg. 490 b, Emerson, Self-Reliance: “It is easy . . . to brook the rage of the cultivated classes. . . . But . . . when the unintelligent brute force that lies at the
nurture, while a weak nature will never be the cause of anything great, either for good or evil?" "No," he said, "that is the case." "Then the nature which we assumed in the philosopher, if it receives the proper teaching, must needs grow and attain to consummate excellence, but, if it be sown\(^a\) and planted and grown in the wrong environment, the outcome will be quite the contrary unless some god comes to the rescue.\(^b\) Or are you too one of the multitude who believe that there are young men who are corrupted by the sophists,\(^c\) and that there are sophists in private life\(^d\) who corrupt to any extent worth mentioning,\(^e\) and that it is not rather the very men who talk in this strain who are the chief sophists and educate most effectively and mould to their own heart's desire young and old, men and women?" "When?" said he. "Why, when," I said, "the multitude are seated together\(^f\) in assemblies or in court-rooms or theatres or camps or any other public gathering of a crowd, bottom of society is made to growl and mow, it needs the habit of magnanimity and religion to treat it godlike as a trifle of no concernment," Carlyle, *French Revolution*: "Great is the combined voice of men. . . . He who can resist that has his footing somewhere beyond time."

For the public as the great sophist cf. Brimley, *Essays*, p. 224 (The Angel in the House): "The miserable view of life and its purposes which society instils into its youth of both sexes, being still, as in Plato's time, the sophist *par excellence* of which all individual talking and writing sophists are but feeble copies." Cf. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 1. 601 "Die sophistische Ethik ist seiner Ansicht nach die einfache Konsequenz der Gewöhnlichen." This is denied by some recent critics. The question is a logomachy. Of course there is more than one sophistic ethics. Cf. Mill, *Dissertations and Discussions*, iv. pp. 247 ff., 263 ff., 275. 

tā μὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγομένων ἡ πραττομένων, τὰ
de ἐπαίνωσι, ὑπερβαλλόντως ἐκάτερα, καὶ ἐκ-
C βοώντες καὶ κροτοῦντες, πρὸς δ' αὐτοῖς αἱ τε
πέτραι καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ὧ ἀν ὁσι ἐπηχοῦντες
dιπλάσιον θόρυβον παρέχωσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου. ἐν ὧ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τῷ νέον, τὸ λεγόμενον,
tίνα οἰεί καρδίαιν ἵσχεν; ἡ ποίαν ἂν αὐτῶ παι-
dεῖαν ἰδιωτικήν ἀνθέξειν, ἦν οὐ κατακλυσθέαν
ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιοῦτου ψόγου ἡ ἐπαίνου οἰχήσεσθαι
φερομένην κατὰ ροῦν, ἢ ἂν οὕτως φέρη, καὶ
φήσειν τε τὰ αὐτὰ τούτως καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι,
D καὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἀπερ ἂν οὕτοι, καὶ ἐσεθαῖ
tοιοῦτον; Πολλή, ἡ δ' ὁδὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀνάγκη.
VII. Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω τὴν μεγίστην
ἀνάγκην εἰρήκαμεν. Ποίαν; ἐφή. Ἡν ἐργῳ προσ-
tιθέασι, λόγῳ μὴ πείθοντες, οὗτοι οἱ παίδευται
τε καὶ σοφισταί. ἡ οὐκ οἰσθα, ὅτι τὸν μὴ πειθό-
μενον ἀτμίαις τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ θανάτοις
κολάζουσιν; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφή, σφόδρα. Τίνα οὖν
ἅλλον σοφιστήν οἰεί ἡ ποίους ἰδιωτικοὺς λόγους
Ε ἑναντία τούτως τείνοντας κρατήσειν; Οἱμαί μὲν
οὐδένα, ἡ δ' ὁδὲ. Οὐ γὰρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἅλλα καὶ τὸ
ἐπιχειρεῖν πολλὴ ἀνοια. οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε
gέγονεν οὐδὲ οὖν μὴ γένηται [ἄλλο η'] ἅλλοιον
ἥθος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν

1 ἄλλο] ἦν was added by Hermann, unnecessarily.

a Cf. Eurip. Orest. 901, they shouted ὡς καλῶς λέγοι,
also Euthydem. 303 b οἱ κίνοντες, 276 b and κίνοντες,
Shorey on Horace, Odes i. 20. 7 “datus in theatrocum tibi plausus,”
and also the account of the moulding process in Protag. 323-326.

b What would be his plight, his state of mind; how would
he feel? Cf. Shorey in Class. Phil. y. (1910) pp. 220-221,
Iliad xxiv. 367, Theognis 748 καὶ τίνα θυμὸν ἔχων; Symp.
36
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

and with loud uproar censure some of the things that are said and done and approve others, both in excess, with full-throated clamour and clapping of hands, and thereto the rocks and the region round about re-echoing redouble the din of the censure and the praise. In such case how do you think the young man’s heart, as the saying is, is moved within him? What private teaching do you think will hold out and not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure and applause, and borne off on its current, so that he will affirm the same things that they do to be honourable and base, and will do as they do, and be even such as they?” “That is quite inevitable, Socrates,” he said.

VII. “And, moreover,” I said, “we have not yet mentioned the chief necessity and compulsion.” “What is it?” said he. “That which these ‘educators’ and sophists impose by action when their words fail to convince. Don’t you know that they chastise the recalcitrant with loss of civic rights and fines and death?” “They most emphatically do,” he said. “What other sophist, then, or what private teaching do you think will prevail in opposition to these?” “None, I fancy,” said he. “No,” said I, “the very attempt is the height of folly. For there is not, never has been and never will be, a divergent type of character and virtue created by an education running

219 ν 3 τίνα ὀλεθέ με διάνοιαν ἔχειν; Eurip. I.A. 1173 τίν’ ἐν δόμοις με καρδίαν ἔχειν δοκεῖς;


† Cf. Protag. 317 a-b, Soph. 239 c, Laws 818 d.

*Cf. Od. xvi. 437. See Friedländer, Platon, ii. 386 n. who says ἀλλοιῶν γίγνεσθαι can only ἂλλοιούσθαι, “be made different.”
πεπαιδευμένον, ἀνθρώπειον, ὁ ἕτατε· θείον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παρομίαν ἔξαρφμεν λόγου· εἰ δ' γὰρ χρή εἰδέναι, ό̣ τί περ ἄν σωθῇ τε καὶ γένηται οἴον 493 δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει πολιτείων, θεοῦ μοῦραν αὐτὸ σώσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἔρεις. Οὐδ' ἐμοὶ ἄλλως, ἐφη, δοκεῖ. 'Ετι τοίνυν σοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τόδε δοξάτω. Τὸ ποιον; Ἔκα-

τος τῶν μισθαρμούντων ἱδιωτῶν, οὔς δὴ οὕτωι σοφιστὰς καλοῦσι καὶ ἀντιτέχνους ἤγονται, μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἡ ταύτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, ἤ δοξάζουσι οὕτων ἀθροισθώσι, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην καλεῖν· οἴονπερ ἄν εἰ θρέμματος μεγάλου καὶ ἴσχυροῦ τρεφομένου τὰς ὀργὰς τις καὶ ἔπιθυμίας

Β' κατεμάνθανεν, ὅτι τε προσελθεῖν χρή καὶ ὅτι ἅψασθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅποτε χαλέπωτατον ἡ πραδ-

τατον καὶ ἐκ τῶν γίγνεται, καὶ φωνὰς δὴ ἐφ' ὦς ἐκάστας εἰσωθε φθέγγεσθαι, καὶ οἶας αὖ ἄλλον φθεγγομένου ἠμεροῦται τε καὶ ἀγριαίνει, κατα-

μαθῶν δὲ ταύτα πάντα ἕνυνχις τε καὶ χρόνου τριβῆ σοφίαν τε καλέσειν καὶ ὅς τέχνην συστημά-

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a Cf. 529 c for the idiom, and Laws 696 A οὐ γὰρ μὴ ποτὲ γένηται πάις καὶ ἄνηρ καὶ γέρων ἐκ ταύτης τῆς τροφῆς διαφέρων πρὸς ἄρετὴν.

b Cf. Symp. 176 c (of Socrates), Phaedr. 242 b, Theaet. 162 d-e.

c Cf. supra on 492 A, Apol. 33 c, Phaedo 58 e, Protag. 328 e, Meno 99 e, Phaedr. 244 c, Laws 642 c, 875 c, Ion 534 c.

d Cf. Arnold, Preface to Essays in Criticism; Phaedo 60 d, Laws 817 b, On Virtue 376 b.

e Cf. Epist. v. 321 d ἔστων γὰρ δὴ της φωνῆ τῶν πολιτεἰων ἐκάστης καθάπερει των ὑφών Ἰσθον, "each form of government has a sort of voice, as if it were a kind of animal" (tr. L.A. Post), Hackforth says this is a clumsy imitation of the Republic which proves the letter spurious. Cf. Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, ii. 1 "If there be any among those common

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counter to theirs—a—humanly speaking, I mean, my friend; for the divine, as the proverb says, all rules fail.\footnote{See Strabo, i. 3, 1. 75, 11; and Cic. de Fin. i. 2, 3. 14, 15.}

And you may be sure that, if anything is saved and turns out well in the present condition of society and government, in saying that the providence of God preserves it you will not be speaking ill.\footnote{For the idea cf. also Gorg. 501 b-c ff., Phaedr. 260 c ἀδίκας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκός., "having studied the opinions of the multitude," Isoc. ii. 49-50.}

"Neither do I think otherwise," he said. "Then," said I, "think this also in addition." "What?" "Each of these private teachers who work for pay, whom the politicians call sophists and regard as their rivals,\footnote{See also Isoc. ii. 45, 49, 50, 52, 53.} inculcates nothing else than these opinions of the multitude which they opine when they are assembled and calls this knowledge wisdom.\footnote{For the idea cf. also Gorg. 501 b-c ff., Phaedr. 260 c ἀδίκας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκός., "having studied the opinions of the multitude," Isoc. ii. 49-50.} It is as if a man were acquiring the knowledge of the humours and desires of a great strong beast\footnote{For the idea cf. also Gorg. 501 b-c ff., Phaedr. 260 c ἀδίκας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκός., "having studied the opinions of the multitude," Isoc. ii. 49-50.} which he had in his keeping, how it is to be approached and touched, and when and by what things it is made most savage or gentle; yes, and the several sounds it is wont to utter on the occasion of each, and again what sounds uttered by another make it tame or fierce, and after mastering this knowledge by living with the creature and by lapse of time should call it wisdom, and should construct objects of hatred I do contemn and laugh at, it is that great enemy of reason, virtue, and religion, the multitude . . . one great beast and a monstrosity more prodigious than Hydra," Horace, Epist. i. 1. 76 "belua multorum es caputum." Also Hamilton's "Sir, your people is a great beast," Sidney, Arcadia, bk. ii. "Many-headed multitude," Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, p. 172 . . . like Plato's sophist is learning what the public is and is beginning to understand 'the passions and desires' of that 'huge and powerful brute,'" Shakes, Coriolanus iv. i. 2 "The beast with many heads Butts me away," \textit{ibid.} ii. iii. 18 "The many-headed multitude." For the idea cf. also Gorg. 501 b-c ff., Phaedr. 260 c ἀδίκας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκός., "having studied the opinions of the multitude," Isoc. ii. 49-50.
μενος ἐπὶ διδασκαλίαιν τρέποιτο, μηδὲν εἰδὼς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τοῦτων τῶν δογμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὁ τι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον

C ἡ ἄδικον, ὁνομάζοι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ μεγάλου ζῷου δόξαις, οἰς μὲν χαίροι ἐκείνο ἀγαθὰ καλῶν, οἰς δὲ ἀχθοιτο κακά, ἄλλων δὲ μηδένα ἔχοι λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἄλλα τάναγκαία δίκαια καλοί καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ὡς διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἐωρακώς εἰῃ μήτε ἄλλω δυνατὸς δείξαι. τοιοῦτος δὴ ὁ ὄν πρὸς Δίος οὐκ ἄτοπος ἄν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι παιδευτής; Ἑμοιγ', ἕφη. Ὡ οὖν τι τοῦτο δοκεῖ διαφέρειν ὅ τιν τῶν

D πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἐννοῶν ὀργῆν καὶ ἡδονᾶς κατανεοθηκέναι σοφίαν ἡγούμενος, εἴτ' ἐν γραφικῆν εἴτ' ἐν μουσικῇ εἴτε δὴ ἐν πολιτικῇ; ἂν μὲν γὰρ, ἐὰν τις τούτοις ὁμιλῇ ἐπιδεικνύμενος ἡ ποίησιν ἡ τῖνα ἄλλην δημιουργίαν ἡ πόλει διακονίαν, κυρίους αὐτοῦ ποιῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἡ Διομήδεια λεγομένη ἀνάγκη ποιεῖν αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν οὖντο ἐπαινῶσιν: ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ταῦτα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ἢδη

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thereof a system and art and turn to the teaching of it, knowing nothing in reality about which of these opinions and desires is honourable or base, good or evil, just or unjust, but should apply all these terms to the judgements of the great beast, calling the things that pleased it good, and the things that vexed it bad, having no other account to render of them, but should call what is necessary just and honourable, never having observed how great is the real difference between the necessary and the good, and being incapable of explaining it to another. Do you not think, by heaven, that such a one would be a strange educator?" "I do," he said. "Do you suppose that there is any difference between such a one and the man who thinks that it is wisdom to have learned to know the moods and the pleasures of the motley multitude in their assembly, whether about painting or music or, for that matter, politics? For if a man associates with these and offers and exhibits to them his poetry or any other product of his craft or any political service, and grants the mob authority over himself more than is unavoidable, the proverbial necessity of Diomede will compel him to give the public what it likes, but that what it likes is really good and honourable, have you ever heard an

\[\text{\textit{Cf. Laws} 659 b, 701 a, \textit{Gorg.} 502 b.}\]

\[\text{\textit{Cf.} 371 c, \textit{Gorg.} 517 b, 518 b.}\]

\[\text{\textit{Plato likes to qualify sweeping statements and allow something to necessity and the weakness of human nature. \textit{Cf. Phaedo} 64 e καθ’ ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, \textit{infra} 558 d-e, 500 d, 383 c.}}\]

\[\text{\textit{The scholiast derives this expression from Diomedes’ binding Odysseus and driving him back to camp after the latter had attempted to kill him. The schol. on Aristoph. \textit{Eccl.} 1029 gives a more ingenious explanation. See Frazer, \textit{Pausanias}, ii. p. 264.}}\]
πώποτέ τον ἡκουσας αὐτῶν λόγον διδόντος οὐ
Ε καταγέλαστον; Οἶμαι δὲ γε, ἢ δ' ὦς, οὖδ' ἀκούσομαι.

VIII. Ταῦτα τοίνυν πάντα ἐννοήσας ἐκεῖνο ἀναμνήσθητι: αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ καλά, ἢ αὐτὸ τι ἔκαστον καὶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἔκαστα, ἐοθ' ὅπως πλῆθος ἀνέξεται ἢ ἡγήσεται εἶναι; Ἡκιστά γ', ἐφη. Φιλόσοφον μὲν ἄρα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, 494 πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι. Ἀδύνατον. Καὶ τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ἄρα ἀνάγκη ψέγεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν. Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ὅσοι προσομιλοῦντες ὄχλῳ ἀρέσκειν αὐτῷ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. Δῆλον. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων τίνα ὀρᾶσ σωτηρίαν φιλοσοφός φύσει, ὡστ' ἐν τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι μεῖναι πρὸς τέλος ἐλθεῖν; ἐννοεῖ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐμ-
Β προσθεν. ὠμολόγηται γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν εὐμάθεια καὶ μνημή καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια ταῦτας εἶναι τῆς φύσεως. Ναι. Οὐκοῦν εὐθὺς ἐν παισίν ὁ τοιοῦτος πρῶτος ἔσται ἐν ἄπασιν, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ ἑάν τὸ σῶμα φυ̃η προσφερῆς τῇ φύχῃ; Τί δ' οὖ μέλλει; ἐφη. Βουλήσονται δὴ, οἶμαι, αὐτῷ χρή-

*καταγέλαστον is a strong word. “Make the very jackasses laugh” would give the tone. Cf. Carlyle, Past and Present, iv. “Impartial persons have to say with a sigh that . . . they have heard no argument advanced for it but such as might make the angels and almost the very jackasses weep.”

Cf. also Isoc. Panegyr. 14, Phil. 84, 101, Antid. 247, Peace 36, and καταγέλαστος in Plato passim, e.g. Symp. 189 B. a

* A commonplace of Plato and all intellectual idealists. Cf. 503 B, Polit. 292 Ε, 297 Β, 300 Ε.

Novotny, Plato’s Epistles, p. 87, uses this to support his view that Plato had a secret doctrine. Adam quotes Gorg. 474 α τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι, which is not quite 42
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attempted proof of this that is not simply ridiculous?" "No," he said, "and I fancy I never shall hear it either."

VIII. "Bearing all this in mind, recall our former question. Can the multitude possibly tolerate or believe in the reality of the beautiful in itself as opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful things, or can they believe in anything conceived in its essence as opposed to the many particulars?" "Not in the least," he said. "Philosophy, then, the love of wisdom, is impossible for the multitude." "Impossible." "It is inevitable, then, that those who philosophize should be censured by them." "Inevitable." "And so likewise by those laymen who, associating with the mob, desire to curry favour with it." "Obviously." "From this point of view do you see any salvation that will suffer the born philosopher to abide in the pursuit and persevere to the end? Consider it in the light of what we said before. We agreed that quickness in learning, memory, courage and magnificence were the traits of this nature." "Yes." "Then even as a boy among boys such a one will take the lead in all things, especially if the nature of his body matches the soul." "How could he fail to do so?" he said. "His kinsmen and relevant. Cf. Renan, Études d'histoire relig. p. 403 "La philosophie sera toujours le fait d'une imperceptible minorité," etc.

c It is psychologically necessary. Cf. supra, Vol. I. on 473 E. Cf. 527 A, Laws 655 E, 658 E, 681 c, 687 c, Phaedr. 239 c, 271 b, Crito 49 d.

d Cf. Gorg. 481 e, 510 d, 513 b.

e Cf. supra, Vol. I. on 487 A.

f Cf. 386 A. In what follows Plato is probably thinking of Alcibiades. Alc. 1. 103 A ff. imitates the passage. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24.
σθαι, ἐπειδ' ἂν προσβύτερος γιγνηται, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν πράγματα οἱ τε οἶκεῖοι καὶ οἱ πολίται. Πῶς δ' οὖ; Ὕποκείσονται ἃρα δεόμενοι καὶ τιμῶντες, προκαταλαμβάνοντες καὶ προκολακεύοντες τὴν μέλλουσαν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν. Φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἔφη, οὗτω γίγνεσθαι. Τί οὖν οἴει, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ποιήσεως, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν τύχῃ μεγάλης πόλεως ὦν καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλούσιος τε καὶ γενναῖος, καὶ ἐπὶ εὐειδῆς καὶ μέγας; ἢρ' οὖν πληρωθήσεθαι ἁμηχάνου ἐλπίδος, ἥγουμενοι καὶ τὰ τῶν 'Ελλήνων καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἰκανὸν ἔσεσθαι πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν αὐτὸν, σχηματισμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος κενοῦ ἀνευ νοῦ ἐμπιπλάμενον; Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Τῷ δ' οὖτω διατιθεμένῳ ἐὰν τις ἥρεμα προσελθὼν τάληθεν λέγη, ὅτι νοῦς οὐκ ἐνεστὶν αὐτῷ, δεῖται δὲ, τὸ δὲ οὗ κτητὸν μὴ δουλεύσαντι τῇ κτήσει αὐτοῦ, ἢρ' εὐπτετές οἴει εἶναι εἰσακούσαι διὰ τοσοῦτων κακῶν; Πολλοὶ γε δὲι, ἢ δ' ὅς. 'Εὰν δ' οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, διὰ τὸ εὖ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὸ ἔγγενες τῶν λόγων εἰς αὐσθάνηται τῇ καὶ κάμπτηται καὶ ἐλκηται πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, τῷ οἰόμεθα δράσειν ἐκείνους τοὺς ἠγουμένους ἀπολλύναι αὐτοῦ τὴν χρέιαν τε καὶ

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b i.e. endeavouring to secure the advantage of it for themselves by winning his favour when he is still young and impressionable.

c Cf. Alc. I. 104 b-c ff.


e ψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν, etc., seems to be a latent poetic quotation.
fellow-citizens, then, will desire, I presume, to make use of him when he is older for their own affairs.”

“Of course.” “Then they will fawn upon him with petitions and honours, anticipating and flattering the power that will be his.” “That certainly is the usual way.” “How, then, do you think such a youth will behave in such conditions, especially if it happen that he belongs to a great city and is rich and well-born therein, and thereto handsome and tall? Will his soul not be filled with unbounded ambitious hopes, and will he not think himself capable of managing the affairs of both Greeks and barbarians, and thereupon exalt himself, haughty of mien and stuffed with empty pride and void of sense?” “He surely will,” he said. “And if to a man in this state of mind some gently comes and tells him what is the truth, that he has no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way to get it is to work like a slave to win it, do you think it will be easy for him to lend an ear to the quiet voice in the midst of and in spite of these evil surroundings?” “Far from it,” said he. “And even supposing,” said I, “that owing to a fortunate disposition and his affinity for the words of admonition one such youth apprehends something and is moved and drawn towards philosophy, what do we suppose will be the conduct of those who think that they are

\[\text{FOOTNOTES}
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\[\text{f} \quad \text{Or perhaps “subject to these influences.” Adam says it is while he is sinking into this condition.}
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\[\text{a} \quad \text{Cf. supra Vol. I. on 476 E. Cf. 533 D, Protag. 333 E, Phaedo 83 A, Crat. 413 A, Theaet. 154 E.}
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\[\text{b} \quad \text{Cf. Phaedo 66 D, Symp. 184 C, Euthydem. 282 B.}
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\[\text{c} \quad \text{Cf. Epin. 990 A, Epist. vii. 330 A-B.}
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\[\text{d} \quad \text{Cf. Alc. I. 135 E.}
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έταιρείαν; ού πάν μὲν ἔργον, πάν δ' ἐπος λέ
γοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅπως
ἀν μὴ πεισθῇ, καὶ περὶ τὸν πείθοντα, ὅπως ἀν μὴ
οἶς τ' ἦ, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιβουλεύοντας καὶ δημοσίᾳ εἰς
495 ἀγώνας καθιστάντας; Πολλή, ἦ δ' ὦς, ἀνάγκη.
'Εστων οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος φιλοσοφήσει; Οὐ
πάνυ.

IX. Ὅργος οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐ κακῶς ἐλέ
γομεν ὡς ἀρα καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως
μέρη, ὅταν ἐν κακῇ τροφῇ γένηται, αὕτια τρόπον
tων τοῦ ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, καὶ τὰ
λεγόμενα ἀγαθά, πλούτοι τε καὶ πάσα ἡ τοιαύτη
παρασκευή; Οὐ γάρ, ἀλλ' ὅρθως, ἐφη, ἐλέχθη.
Οὕτος δὴ, εἶπον, ὃ θαυμάσει, ὀλέθρος τε καὶ
Β διαφθορά τοσαύτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς βελτίστης
φύσεως εἰς τὸ ἁριστὸν ἐπιτηδεύμα, ὀλίγης καὶ
ἀλλώς γιγνομένης, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν. καὶ ἐκ τού-
των δὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργα-
ζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίγνονται καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, καὶ
οἱ τάγαθα, οἱ ἄν ταύτῃ τύχωσι ρεύντες: σμικρὰ
de φύσις οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδέποτε οὐδένα οὐτε ἰδιώτην
οὔτε πόλιν δρά. Ἀληθέστατα, ἦ δ' ὦς. Οὕτοι
C μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐκπιπτοῦτε, οῖς μάλιστα προσήκει,
ἐρημον καὶ ἀτελὴ φιλοσοφίαν λείπουτε αὐτοὶ τε
βίον οὐ προσήκοντα οὐδ' ἀληθῆ ζῶσι, τὴν δὲ

\a For πὰν ἔργον cf. Sophocles, El. 615.
\b Cf. 517 A.
losing his service and fellowship? Is there any word or deed that they will stick at to keep him from being persuaded and to incapacitate anyone who attempts it, both by private intrigue and public prosecution in the court?" "That is inevitable," he said. "Is there any possibility of such a one continuing to philosophize?" "None at all," he said.

IX. "Do you see, then," said I, "that we were not wrong in saying that the very qualities that make up the philosophical nature do, in fact, become, when the environment and nurture are bad, in some sort the cause of its backsliding, and so do the so-called goods—riches and all such instrumentalities?" "No," he replied, "it was rightly said." "Such, my good friend, and so great as regards the noblest pursuit, is the destruction and corruption of the most excellent nature, which is rare enough in any case, as we affirm. And it is from men of this type that those spring who do the greatest harm to communities and individuals, and the greatest good when the stream chances to be turned into that channel, but a small nature never does anything great to a man or a city." "Most true," said he. "Those, then, to whom she properly belongs, thus falling away and leaving philosophy forlorn and unwedded, themselves live an unreal and alien life, while other unworthy wooers rush in and

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"For ἐκπεσεῖν cf. 496 c.
"Cf. supra on 491 c, p. 32, note a.
"Cf. Lysis 220 a; Arnold's "machinery," Aristotle's χρησιμοτυπία.
"Cf. 491 b-e, Laws 951 b ἀδιάφθαρτος, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24.
"For καὶ ἄλλως cf. II. ix. 699.
"Cf. on 485 b ὠφελέως ἔργα.
"Cf. on 491 e, p. 33, note d.
"Cf. on 489 n, and Theaet. 173 c.

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The text is not legible enough to be translated into English.
defile her as an orphan bereft of her kin, and attach to her such reproaches as you say her revilers taunt her with, declaring that some of her consorts are of no account and the many accountable for many evils." "Why, yes," he replied, "that is what they do say." "And plausibly," said I; "for other mannikins, observing that the place is unoccupied and full of fine terms and pretensions, just as men escape from prison to take sanctuary in temples, so these gentlemen joyously bound away from the mechanical arts to philosophy, those that are most cunning in their little craft. For in comparison with the other arts the prestige of philosophy even in her present low estate retains a superior dignity; and this is the ambition and aspiration of that multitude of pretenders unfit by nature, whose souls are bowed and mutilated by their vulgar occupations even as their bodies are marred by their arts and crafts. Is not that inevitable?" "Quite so," he said. "Is Plato as usual is generalizing. See What Plato Said, p. 593 on Soph. 242 c.

Cf. the different use of the idea in Protag. 318 e.

texnov is a contemptuous diminutive, such as are common in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Cf. also ἀνθρωπίσκοι in c, and ψυχάριον in 519 A.

Cf. infra 611 c-d, Theaet. 173 A-B.

For the idea that trade is ungentlemanly and incompatible with philosophy cf. infra 522 b and 590 c, Laws 919 c ff., and What Plato Said, p. 663 on Rivals 137 b. Cf. Richard of Bury, Philobiblon, Prologue, "Fitted for the liberal arts, and equally disposed to the contemplation of Scripture, but destitute of the needful aid, they revert, as it were, by a sort of apostasy, to mechanical arts." Cf. also Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 3, and Ecclesiasticus xxxviii. 25 f. "How can he get wisdom that holdeth the plough and glorieth in the goad... and whose talk is of bullocks?... so every carpenter and workmaster... the smith... the potter..."
ἐγὼ, διαφέρειν αὐτοὺς ἰδεῖν ἀργύριοι κτησαμένου χαλκέως φαλακροῦ καὶ σμικροῦ, νεοστὶ μέν ἐκ δεσμῶν λευμένου, ἐν βαλανείῳ δὲ λευμένου, νεουργὸν ὑμάτιον ἐχοντος, ὡς νυμφίου παρεσκευασμένου, διὰ πενιάν καὶ ἐρημίαν τοῦ δεσπότου τὴν θυγατέρα μέλλοντος γαμεῖν; Οὐ πάνυ, ἐφή, διαφέρει. Ποῖ ἀττα οὖν εἰκὸς γεννάν τοὺς τοιούτους; οὐ νόθα καὶ φαύλα; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Τί δαί; τοὺς ἀναξίους παιδεύσεως ὅταν αὐτῇ πλησίαζοντες ὁμιλῶσι μὴ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν, ποὺ ἀττα φῶμεν γεννᾶν διανοηματὰ τε καὶ δόξας; ἀρ’ οὐχ ὡς ἀληθῶς προσήκοντα ἀκούσαι σοφίσματα, καὶ οὐ δὲν γνήσιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον; Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἐφή.

Χ. Πάνομικρον δὴ τι, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὥ ’’Αδείμαντε, Β λείπεται τῶν κατ’ ἀξίαν ὁμιλοῦντων φιλοσοφία, ἦ ποὺ ὑπὸ φυγῆς καταληφθὲν γενναίον καὶ εὗ τεθραμμένον ᾦδος, ἀπορίᾳ τῶν διαφθεροῦντων κατὰ φύσιν μείναν ἐπ’ αὐτῇ, ἦ εὖ σμικρά πόλει ὅταν μεγάλη φυγῇ φυγῇ καὶ ἀτμάσασα τὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπερίδῃ βραχὺ δέ ποὺ τι καὶ ἀπ’ ἄλλης τέχνης δικαίως ἀτμάσαν εὐφυές ἐπ’ αὐτὴν ἄν ἔλθοι. εἰτ’ δ’ ἄν καὶ ὁ του ἠμετέρου ἑταῖρου Θεάγους χαλκὸς


a For a similar short vivid description cf. Erastae 134 B. Euthyphro 2 b. Such are common in Plautus, e.g. Mercator 639.

b It is probably fanciful to see in this an allusion to the half-Thracian Antisthenes. Cf. also Theaet. 150 c, and Symp. 212 Λ.

c Cf. Euthydem. 306 D.

d Cf. Phaedrus 250 A ἀλγαὶ δὴ λειπονται, and supra 494 A and on 490 ε.
not the picture which they present," I said, "precisely that of a little bald-headed tinker who has made money and just been freed from bonds and had a bath and is wearing a new garment and has got himself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry his master's daughter who has fallen into poverty and abandonment?" "There is no difference at all," he said. "Of what sort will probably be the offspring of such parents? Will they not be bastard and base?" "Inevitably." "And so when men unfit for culture approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily, what sort of ideas and opinions shall we say they beget? Will they not produce what may in very deed be fairly called sophisms, and nothing that is genuine or that partakes of true intelligence?" "Quite so," he said.

X. "There is a very small remnant, then, Aedimantus," I said, "of those who consort worthily with philosophy, some well-born and well-bred nature, it may be, held in check by exile, and so in the absence of corrupters remaining true to philosophy, as its quality bids, or it may happen that a great soul born in a little town scorns and disregards its parochial affairs; and a small group perhaps might by natural affinity be drawn to it from other arts which they justly disdain; and the bridle of our companion Theages also might operate as a restraint. For in the
The enormous fanciful literature on the daimonion does not concern the interpretation of Plato, who consistently treats it as a kind of spiritual tact checking Socrates from any act opposed to his true moral and intellectual interests. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 456-457, on Euthyphro 3 b, Jowett and Campbell, p. 285.

The irremediable degeneracy of existing governments is the starting-point of Plato’s political and social speculations. Cf. infra 497 b, Laws 832 c f., Epist. vii. 326 a; Byron, apud Arnold, Essays in Crit. ii. p. 195 “I have simplified my politics into an utter detestation of all existing governments.”

This passage, Apol. 31 e ff. and Gorg. 521-522 may be considered Plato’s apology for not engaging in politics. Cf. J. V. Novak, Platon u. d. Rhetorik, p. 495 (Schlieiermacher, Einl. z. Gorg. pp. 15 f.), Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 441-442 “Wer kann hier die Klage über das eigene Los überhören?”

There is no probability that, as an eminent scholar has maintained, the Republic itself was intended as a programme of practical politics for Athens, and that its failure to win popular opinion is the chief cause of the disappointed tone.
case of Theages all other conditions were at hand for his backsliding from philosophy, but his sickly habit of body keeping him out of politics holds him back. My own case, the divine sign, is hardly worth mentioning—for I suppose it has happened to few or none before me. And those who have been of this little company and have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of this possession and who have also come to understand the madness of the multitude sufficiently and have seen that there is nothing, if I may say so, sound or right in any present politics, and that there is no ally with whose aid the champion of justice could escape destruction, but that he would be as a man who has fallen among wild beasts, unwilling to share their misdeeds and unable to hold out singly against the savagery of all, and that he would thus, before he could in any way benefit his

of Plato’s later writings. Cf. Erwin Wolff in Jaeger’s Neue Phil. Untersuchungen, Heft 6, Platos Apologie, pp. 31-33, who argues that abstinence from politics is proclaimed in the Apology before the Gorgias and that the same doctrine in the seventh Epistle absolutely proves that the Apology is Plato’s own.

Cf. also Theaet. 173 c ff., Ilipp. Maj. 281 c, Euthydem. 306 b, Xen. Mem. i. 6. 15.

a Cf. supra 368 b, Apol. 32 e ei . . . ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις and 32 λ μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου.

b Cf. Pindar, Ol. i. 64. For the antithetic juxtaposition cf. also els πᾶσιν below; see too 520 b, 374 Α, Menex. 241 b, Phaedr. 243 c, Laws 906 b, etc.

More in the Utopia (Morley, Ideal Commonwealths, p. 84) paraphrases loosely from memory what he calls “no ill simile by which Plato set forth the unreasonableness of a philosopher’s meddling with government.”

Cf. Democrats fr. 38, Diels ii. 3 p. 73 καλὸν μὲν τὸν ἀδικεόντα κωλύειν· εἰ δὲ μῆ, μὴ ξυναδικεῖν, “it is well to prevent anyone from doing wrong, or else not to join in wrong-doing.”
πόλιν ἦ φίλους ὄνησαι προαπολόμενος ἀνωφελῆς αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀν γένοιτο—ταῦτα πάντα λογισμῷ λαβὼν ἔσυχιαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράτ-
tων, οἶον ἐν χειμώνι κοινορτοῦ καὶ ζάλης ὑπὸ πνεύματος φερομένου ὑπὸ τειχίων ἀποστάσ, ὅραν τοὺς ἄλλους καταπημπλαμένους ἀνομίας ἀγαπᾷ, εἰ
Επὶ αὐτῶς καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνοσίων ἔργων τὸν τε ἐνθάδε βίον βιώσεται καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτοῦ μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος ἔλεος τε καὶ εἰμενὶς ἀπαλλάξεται. 'Αλλά τοι, ἦ δ' ὦς, οὐ τὰ ἐλάχιστα 497 ἀν διαπραξάμενος ἀπαλλάττοιτο. Ὁδε γε, εἰποὺ, τά μέγιστα, μὴ τυχών πολυτείας προσηκούσης ἐν γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐτὸς τε μᾶλλον αὐξῆσεται καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἱδίων τὰ κοινὰ σώσει.

XI. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἃν ἐνεκα δια-
βολὴν εἶληφε καὶ ὅτι οὐ δικαίως, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ
μετρίως εἰρήνοι, εἰ μὴ ἔτ' ἄλλο λέγεις τι σὺ.
'Αλλ' οὔδεν, ἦ δ' ὦς, ἐτι λέγω περὶ τοῦτον ἀλλὰ
tὴν προσηκούσαν αὐτῇ τίνα τῶν νῦν λέγεις πολι-
Βειῶν; Οὔδ' ἤντινοιν, εἰποὺ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ

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b Cf. supra Vol. I. on 331 α, infra 621 c-d, Marc. Aurel. xii. 36 and vi. 30 in fine. See my article "Hope" in Hastings's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.

c Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1094 b 9 μεῖζον γε καὶ τελεότερον
tὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σῶξει, "yet the good of

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friends or the state come to an untimely end without doing any good to himself or others.—for all these reasons I say the philosopher remains quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under shelter of a wall in a storm and blast of dust and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content if in any way he may keep himself free from iniquity and unholy deeds through this life and take his departure with fair hope, serene and well content when the end comes."  "Well," he said, "that is no very slight thing to have achieved before taking his departure."  "He would not have accomplished any very great thing either," I replied, "if it were not his fortune to live in a state adapted to his nature. In such a state only will he himself rather attain his full stature and together with his own preserve the common weal.

XI. "The causes and the injustice of the calumnia- tion of philosophy, I think, have been fairly set forth, unless you have something to add." "No," he said, "I have nothing further to offer on that point. But which of our present governments do you think is suitable for philosophy?" "None whatever," I said; "but the very ground of my complaint is that no the state seems a grander and more perfect thing both to attain and to secure" (tr. F. H. Peters).

*a* For κηθεοεια cf. Theaet. 163 c ἢν καὶ κηθεία, and Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 68 "As the Christian is said to be complete in Christ so the individual is said by Aristotle to be complete in the πόλις," Spencer, Data of Ethics, xv. "Hence it is manifest that we must consider the ideal man as existing in the ideal social state." Cf. also infra 592 a-b, 520 a-c and Introd. Vol. I. p. xxvii.

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έπαιτιώμαι, μηδεμίαν ἀξίαν εἶνα τῶν νῦν κατά-
στασιν πόλεως φιλοσόφου φύσεως· διὸ καὶ στρέ-
φεσθαί τε καὶ ἀλλοιούσθαι αὐτὴν, ὦσπερ ξενικὸν
σπέρμα ἐν γῇ ἀλλη σπειρόμενον ἔξιτηλον eis τῷ
ἐπιχώριον φιλεῖ κρατούμενον ἵναι, οὔτω καὶ
tοῦτο τὸ γένος νῦν μὲν οὐκ ἵσχεν τὴν αὐτοῦ
dύναμιν, ἀλλ᾽ eis ἀλλότριον ἱθὸς ἐκπίπτεων· eì de

C λήψεται τῇν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, ὦσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ
ἀριστόν ἐστι, τότε δηλώσει, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν τῷ ὅντι
θείον ἂν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ τε τῶν φύσεων
καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηθευμάτων. δῆλος δὴ οὐν έλ ὅτι μετά
τοῦτο ἐρήσει τῖς αὐτὴ ἡ πολιτεία. Οὐκ ἔγνως,
έφη· οὗ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐμελλὼν, ἀλλ' εἰ αὐτῇ, ἂν ἡμείς
dιεληλύθαμεν οἰκίζοντες τὴν πόλιν ἢ ἀλλη. Τὰ
μὲν ἄλλα, ἂν δ' ἔγνω, αὐτή· τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ἐρήθη
μὲν καὶ τότε, ὅτι δεῖσοι τι ἀεί ἐνεώιν ἐν τῇ πόλει

D λόγον ἔχων τῆς πολιτείας τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες καὶ
οὐ δομοθέτης ἔχων τοὺς νόμους ἐπίθετι. Ἐρ-
ρήθη γὰρ, ἐφη. Ἄλλῳ οὐχ ἰκανώς, εἶπον, ἐδηλώθη,
φόβῳ ἃν ἡμεῖς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι δεδηλώκατε
μακρὰν καὶ χαλεπὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν· ἐπεῖ καὶ
τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ πάντως 1 μᾶςτον διελθείν. Τὸ ποιὸν:
Τίνα τρόπον μεταχειρίζομεν πόλις φιλοσοφιὰν οὐ
dιολεῖται. τὰ γὰρ δή μεγάλα πάντα ἐπίσφαλη, καὶ

1 πάντως ΑFDΜ: πάντων conj. Bekker.

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a κατάστασις = constitution in both senses. Cf. 414 Α, 425 δ, 464 Α, 493 Α, 426 c, 547 b. So also in the Laws. The word is rare elsewhere in Plato.

b For ἔξιτηλον cf. Critias 121 A.

c This need not be a botanical error. In any case the meaning is plain. Cf. Tim. 57 b with my emendation.

d For the idiom cf. αὐτὸ δεῖξε Phileb. 20 c, with Stallbaum's note, Theaet. 200 e, Hipp. Maj. 288 b, Aristoph. Wasps 56
polity of to-day is worthy of the philosophic nature. This is just the cause of its perversion and alteration; as a foreign seed sown in an alien soil is wont to be overcome and die out into the native growth, so this kind does not preserve its own quality but falls away and degenerates into an alien type. But if ever it finds the best polity as it itself is the best, then will it be apparent that this was in truth divine and all the others human in their natures and practices. Obviously then you are next going to ask what is this best form of government.” “Wrong,” he said; “I was going to ask not that but whether it is this one that we have described in our establishment of a state or another.” “In other respects it is this one,” said I; “but there is one special further point that we mentioned even then, namely that there would always have to be resident in such a state an element having the same conception of its constitution that you the lawgiver had in framing its laws.” “That was said,” he replied. But it was not sufficiently explained,” I said, “from fear of those objections on your part which have shown that the demonstration of it is long and difficult. And apart from that the remainder of the exposition is by no means easy.” “Just what do you mean?” “The manner in which a state that occupies itself with philosophy can escape destruction. For all great things are precarious and, as the proverb truly
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to legeōmenon tα kalα τω όντι χαλεπα. 'Αλλ' 
Ε'ομws, ἑφη, λαβέτω τελος ἡ ἀποδειξις τούτου 
φανεροῦ γενομένου. Ου τὸ μὴ βουλεσθαι, ἢν δ' 
ἐγώ, ἀλλ' εἰπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακωλύσει· 
παρὼν δὲ τὴν γ' εἵμην προδυμιαν εἴσει. σκόπει δὲ 
καὶ νῦν, ὡς προθύμως καὶ παρακινδυνευτικῶς 
μέλλω λέγεω, ὅτι τούναντίον ἢ νῦν δεὶ τοῦ ἐπιτη-
δεύματος τούτου πόλιν ἀπτεσθαι. Πῶς; Νῦν μὲν, 
498 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ καὶ ἀπότομοι μειράκια οντα ἀρτι έκ 
παιδων τὸ μεταξι oικονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ 
πλησιάσαντες αὐτοῦ τῷ χαλεπωτάτῳ ἀπαλλά-
stoται, οἱ φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιούμενοι: λέγω δὲ 
χαλεπώτατον τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἔπειτα, 
ἐὰν καὶ ἄλλων τούτο πραττόντων παρακαλούμενοι 
ἐθέλωσιν ἀκροασαί γίγνεσθαι, μεγάλα ἤγονται, 
pάρεργον οἰόμενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν πρὸς δὲ τὸ 
γῆρας ἐκτὸς δὴ τινῶν ὀλίγων ἀποσβέννυνται πολὺ 
Β μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἦρακλειτείου ἥλιου, ὅσον αὕθις οὐκ 
ἐξάπτονται. Δεὶ δὲ πῶς; ἑφη. Πάν τούναντίον· 
μειράκια μὲν οντα καὶ παιδας μειρακίωδη παιδείαν

a So Adam. Others take τω ὄντι with χαλεπά as part of 
the proverb. Cf. 435 c, Crat. 384 A-b with schol.
b For the idiomatic ἀλλ' εἰπερ cf. Parmen. 150 b, Euthydem. 
296 b, Thompson on Meno, Excursus 2, pp. 258-264, Aristot. 
An. Post. 91 b 33, Eth. Nic. 1101 a 12, 1136 b 25, 1155 b 30, 
1168 a 12, 1174 a 27, 1180 b 27, Met. 1028 a 24, 1044 a 11, 
Rhet. 1371 a 16.
c What Plato here deprecates Callicles in the Gorgias 
recommends, 484 c-d. For the danger of premature study 
of dialectic cf. 537 d-e ff. Cf. my Idea of Education in 
Plato's Republic, p. 11. Milton develops the thought with 
characteristic exuberance, Of Education: "They present 
their young unmatriculated novices at first coming with the 
most intellectual abstractions of logic and metaphysics . . . 
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says, fine things are hard. "All the same," he said, "our exposition must be completed by making this plain." | "It will be no lack of will," I said, "but if anything, a lack of ability, that would prevent that. But you shall observe for yourself my zeal. And note again how zealously and recklessly I am prepared to say that the state ought to take up this pursuit in just the reverse of our present fashion. " In what way? "At present," said I, "those who do take it up are youths, just out of boyhood, before they engage in business and money-making approach the most difficult part of it, and then drop it—and these are regarded forsooth as the best exemplars of philosophy. By the most difficult part I mean discussion. In later life they think they have done much if, when invited, they deign to listen to the philosophic discussions of others. That sort of thing they think should be by-work. And towards old age, with few exceptions, their light is quenched more completely than the sun of Heraclitus, inasmuch as it is never rekindled. "And what should they do? "he said. "Just the reverse. While they are lads and boys they should occupy to be tossed and turmoiled with their unballasted wits in fathomless and unquiet deeps of controversy," etc.

\[\text{a} \quad \text{Cf. 386 A, 393 C, 413 C, 485 D, 519 A, Demosth. xxi. 154, Xen. Ages. 10. 4, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1103 b 24, 1104 b 11, Isoc. xv. 289.}\]

\[\text{b} \quad \text{Cf. 450 c.}\]

\[\text{c} \quad \text{Cf. 475 D, Isoc. xii. 270 ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἄλλου δεικνύοντος καὶ πονησάντως ἥθελησεν ἀκροατής γενέσθαι, "would not even be willing to listen to one worked out and submitted by another" (tr. Norlin in L.C.L.).}\]

\[\text{d} \quad \text{Cf. Antiphon's devotion to horsemanship in the Parmenides, 126 c. For πρὸς τὸ γιγάντα cf. 352 D, Laws 653 A.}\]

\[\text{e} \quad \text{Diels i. p. 78, fr. 6. Cf. Aristot. Meteor. ii. 2. 9, Lucretius v. 662.}\]
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καὶ φιλοσοφίαν μεταχειρίζεσθαι, τῶν τε σωμάτων, ἐν ὦ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδροῦται, εὖ μάλα ἐπι-
μελεῖσθαι, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφία κτωμένους· προ-
ϊούσης δὲ τῆς ἥλικιας, ἐν ἑ ἡ ψυχὴ τελειοῦσθαι ἀρχεται, ἐπιτείνειν τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια· ὅταν δὲ

C λήγῃ μὲν ἡ ρώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ στρατεύων ἐκτὸς γίγνεται, τότε ἡδὴ ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι καὶ
μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττειν, ὃ τι μὴ πάρεργον, τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐδαιμόνως βιώσεσθαι καὶ τελευτή-
σαντας τῶ βίῳ τῶ βεβιωμένῳ τὴν ἑκεί μοῖραν ἐπιστῆσειν πρέπουσαν.

XII 612. ὄρηθὼς μοι δοκεῖς, ἐφη, λέγειν γε
προθύμως, ὃ Σῶκρατες· οἴμαι μὲντοι τοὺς πολλοὺς
tῶν ἀκοινότων προθυμότερον ἐτι ἀντιενεῖν οὐδ' ἐπωστιοῦν πεισομένους, ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρ-
ξαμένους. Μὴ διὰβαλλε, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐμὲ καὶ

D Θρασυμάχου ἀρτι φίλους γεγονότας, οῦδὲ πρὸ τοῦ
ἐχθροὺς ὄντας. πείρας γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀνήσμεν, ἐως
ἀν ἡ πείσωμεν καὶ τοῦτον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἡ
προοργον τι ποιήσωμεν εἰς ἐκείνον τὸν βίον, ὅταν
ἀὖθις γενόμενοι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐντύχοσι λόγοις.

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a Cf. 410 c and What Plato Said, p. 496 on Protag. 336 b-c.

b Like cattle destined for the sacrifice. A favourite figure with Plato. Cf. Laws 635 a, Protag. 320 a. It is used literally in Critias 119 d.

c Cf. infra 540 a-b, Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 329-330. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. 207-208, fancies that 498 c to 502 a is a digression expressing Plato’s personal desire to be the philosopher in Athenian politics.

d A half-playful anticipation of the doctrine of immortality reserved for Bk. x. 608 d ff. It involves no contradiction and justifies no inferences as to the date and composition of the Republic. Cf. Gomperz iii. 335.

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themselves with an education and a culture suitable to youth, and while their bodies are growing to manhood take right good care of them, thus securing a basis and a support for the intellectual life. But with the advance of age, when the soul begins to attain its maturity, they should make its exercises more severe, and when the bodily strength declines and they are past the age of political and military service, then at last they should be given free range of the pasture and do nothing but philosophize, except incidentally, if they are to live happily, and, when the end has come, crown the life they have lived with a consonant destiny in that other world.”

XII. “You really seem to be very much in earnest, Socrates,” he said; “yet I think most of your hearers are even more earnest in their opposition and will not be in the least convinced, beginning with Thrasymachus.” “Do not try to breed a quarrel between me and Thrasymachus, who have just become friends and were not enemies before either. For we will spare no effort until we either convince him and the rest or achieve something that will profit them when they come to that life in which they will be born again and meet with such discussions as these.” “A

Cf. Emerson, Experience, in fine, “which in his passage into new worlds he will carry with him.” Bayard Taylor (American Men of Letters, p. 113), who began to study Greek late in life, remarked, “Oh, but I expect to use it in the other world.” Even the sober positivist Mill says (Theism, pp. 249-250) “The truth that life is short and art is long is from of old one of the most discouraging facts of our condition: this hope admits the possibility that the art employed in improving and beautifying the soul itself may avail for good in some other life even when seemingly useless in this.”

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Eis σμικρόν γ', ἐβη, χρόνον εἱρήκας. Εἰς οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν, ἔφην, ὥς γε πρὸς τὸν ἀπαντά. τὸ μέντοι μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις τοὺς πολλοὺς θαύμα οὐδέν· οὐ γὰρ πώποτε εἴδον γενόμενον τὸ
Ενὼν λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τοιαῦτ' ἀττα ρήματα ἐξεπίτηδες ἀλλήλοις ὀμοωμένα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ὄσπερ νῦν ἔξυππεσόντα· ἀνάρε ἢ ἀρετής παρισομένον καὶ ὀμοιωμένον μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τελέως ἔργῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ, δυναστεύοντα ἐν πόλει ἑτέρα τοιαύτῃ, οὐ πώποτε
499 ἑωράκασιν οὔτε ἐνα οὔτε πλείον· ἦν οὔει; Οὐδαμῶς γε. Οὐδὲ γε αὖ λόγων, ὁ μακάριε, καλῶν τε καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἰκανῶς ἐπῆκοι γεγόνασιν, ὦν νεὴτειν μὲν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐνυπεταμένως ἐκ παντός τρόπου τοῦ γινώσκει χάριν, τὰ δὲ κομψὰ τε καὶ ἑριστικὰ καὶ μηδαμόσε ἀλλοσε τεύοντα ή πρὸς δόξαν καὶ ἔρω καὶ ἐν δίκαιοι καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις συνουσίαις πόρρωθεν ἀσπαζομένων. Οὐδὲ τούτων, ἐβη.
Β Τούτων τοι χάριν, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτα προορώμενοι ήμεῖς τότε καὶ δεδίότες ὅμως ἐλέγομεν, ὡπο

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b Cf. supra on 486 λ. See too Plut. Cons. Apol. 17. 111 c "a thousand, yes, ten thousand years are only an ἄφρατος point, nay, the smallest part of a point, as Simonides says." Cf. also Lyra Graeca (L.C.L.), ii. p. 338, Anth. Pal. x. 78.

c γενόμενον . . . λεγόμενον. It is not translating to make no attempt to reproduce Plato's parody of "polyphonic prose." The allusion here to Isocrates and the Gorgian figure of παρισώσις and παρομοίωσις is unmistakable. The subtility of Plato's style treats the "accidental" occurrence of a Gorgian figure in his own writing as a symbol of the difference between the artificial style and insincerity of the sophists and the serious truth of his own ideals.

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brief time your forecast contemplates,” he said. “Nay, nothing at all,” I replied, “as compared with eternity. However, the unwillingness of the multitude to believe what you say is nothing surprising. For of the thing here spoken they have never beheld a token, but only the forced and artificial chiming of word and phrase, not spontaneous and accidental as has happened here. But the figure of a man ‘equilibrated’ and ‘assimilated’ to virtue’s self perfectly, so far as may be, in word and deed, and holding rule in a city of like quality, that is a thing they have never seen in one case or in many. Do you think they have?” “By no means.” “Neither, my dear fellow, have they ever seriously inclined to hearken to fair and free discussions whose sole endeavour was to search out the truth at any cost for knowledge’s sake, and which dwell apart and salute from afar all the subtleties and cavils that lead to naught but opinion and strife in court-room and in private talk.” “They have not,” he said. “For this cause and foreseeing this, we then despite our fears declared under compulsion of the truth that

Cf. Isoc. x. 18 λεγόμενος... γενόμενος, What Plato Said, p. 544 on Symp. 185 c, F. Reinhardt, De Isocratis aemulis, p. 39, Lucilius, bk. v. init. “hoc ‘nolueris et debueris’ te si minu’ delectat, quod τεχνίαν Isocrateum est,” etc.

a As the Platonic dialectic does (Phileb. 58 c-d, cf. What Plato Said, p. 611) in contrast with the rhetorician, the lawyer (Theaet. 172 d-e) and the eristic (Euthydem. 272 b, Hipp. Maj. 288 ν).

b Cf. Eurip. Hippol. 102, Psalm cxxxviii. 6 “the proud he knoweth afar off.”

c Cf. Phaedrus 253 ν with Theaetet. 187 c, and Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 48.

d Cf. on 489 A.

τάληθος ἡναγκασμένοι, ὅτι οὔτε πόλις οὔτε πολιτεία οὔτε γ' ἀνήρ ὁμοίως μὴ ποτὲ γένηται τέλεος, πρὶν ἂν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλύοις καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς, ἄχρηστοις δὲ νῦν κεκλημένοις, ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλλῃ, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μὴ πόλεως ἐπιμεληθήναι, καὶ τῇ πόλει κατήκουν γενέσθαι, ἡ τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ἡ βασιλείαις ὅντων
C νιέσιν ἡ αὐτοῖς ἐκ τινος θείας ἐπιτυχοί οἰκῆν ἐλπίδας φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινὸς ἐρως ἐμπέσῃ. τούτων δὲ πότερα γενέσθαι ἡ ἀμφοτέρα ὅς ἀρα ἔστιν ἄδυνατον, ἐγὼ μὲν οὔδενα φημι ἔχειν λόγον. οὔτω γὰρ ἂν ἡμεῖς δικαίως καταγελώμεθα, ὥς ἀλλως εὐχαῖς ὀμοία λέγοντες. ἡ οὐχ οὔτως; Οὔτως. Εἰ τούτων ἄκρους εἰς φιλοσοφίαν πόλεως τις ἀνάγκῃ ἐπιμεληθήναι ἡ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῷ παρελθόντι χρόνῳ ἡ καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ἐν τοις βαρβαρίς.

D τόπῳ, πόρρῳ πον ἐκτὸς ὅντι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπι- όρεως, ἡ καὶ ἐπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου ἐτοιμοῦ τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχομαι, ὡς γέγονεν ἡ εἰρημένη πολιτεία καὶ ἐστὶ καὶ γενήσεται γε, ὅταν αὐτῇ ἡ μοῦσα πόλεως ἐγκρατῆς γενηται. οὐ γὰρ ἄδυνατος γενέσθαι, οὖν ἡμεῖς ἄδυνατα λέγομεν· χαλεπὰ δὲ καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν ὀμολογεῖται. Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη, οὔτω δοκεῖ. Τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ,

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a Cf. Laws 747 e. But we must not attribute personal superstition to Plato. See What Plato Said, index, s.v. Superstition.
b Cf. Laws 711 d, Thuc. vi. 24. 3; so iv. 4. 1 ὁμιλ ἐπέπεσε.
c We might say, "talking like vain Utopians or idle idealists." The scholiast says, p. 348, τοῦτο καὶ κενήν φασι μακαριαν. Cf. supra, Vol. I. on 458 a, and for εὐχαῖ on 450 d, and Novotny on Epist. vii. 331 d.
d Cf. Laws 782 Α, 678 Α-β, and What Plato Said, p. 627 on 64.
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

neither city nor polity nor man either will ever be perfected until some chance compels this uncorrupted remnant of philosophers, who now bear the stigma of uselessness, to take charge of the state whether they wish it or not, and constrains the citizens to obey them, or else until by some divine inspiration a genuine passion for true philosophy takes possession b either of the sons of the men now in power and sovereignty or of themselves. To affirm that either or both of these things cannot possibly come to pass is, I say, quite unreasonable. Only in that case could we be justly ridiculed as uttering things as futile as day-dreams are. c Is not that so? "It is." d If, then, the best philosophical natures have ever been constrained to take charge of the state in infinite time past, e or now are in some barbaric region f far beyond our ken, or shall hereafter be, we are prepared to maintain our contention g that the constitution we have described has been, is, or will be h realized i when this philosophic Muse has taken control of the state. j It is not a thing impossible to happen, nor are we speaking of impossibilities. That it is difficult we too admit." I also think so," he said. "But the multitude—are you going to say?

Laws 676 a-b; also Isoc. Panath. 204-205, seven hundred years seemed a short time. k Cf. Phaedo 78 a.

For the ellipsis of the first person of the verb cf. Parmen. 137 c, Laches 180 a. The omission of the third person is very frequent.

Cf. 492 e, Laws 711 e, 739 c, 888 e.


This is what I have called the ABA style. Cf. 599 e, Apol. 20 c, Phaedo 57 b, Laches 185 a, Protag. 344 c, Theaet. 185 a, 190 b, etc. It is nearly what Riddell calls binary structure, Apology, pp. 204-217.
It is uncritical to find "contradictions" in variations of mood, emphasis, and expression that are broadly human and that no writer can avoid. Any thinker may at one moment and for one purpose defy popular opinion and for another conciliate it; at one time affirm that it doesn’t matter what the ignorant people think or say, and at another urge that prudence bids us be discreet. So St. Paul who says (Gal. i. 10) "Do I seek to please men? for if I yet pleased men I should not be the servant of Christ," says also (Rom. xiv. 16) "Let not then your good be evil spoken of." Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 646 on Laws 950 b.

A recurrence to etymological meaning. Cf. ἀθυμον 66
does not think so," said I. "That may be," he said.
"My dear fellow," said I, "do not thus absolutely condemn the multitude." They will surely be of another mind if in no spirit of contention but soothingly and endeavouring to do away with the dispraise of learning you point out to them whom you mean by philosophers, and define as we recently did their nature and their pursuits so that the people may not suppose you to mean those of whom they are thinking. Or even if they do look at them in that way, are you still going to deny that they will change their opinion and answer differently? Or do you think that anyone is ungentle to the gentle or grudging to the ungrudging if he himself is ungrudging and mild? I will anticipate you and reply that I think that only in some few and not in the mass of mankind is so ungentle or harsh a temper to be found." "And I, you may be assured," he said, "concur." "And do you not also concur in this very point that the blame for this harsh attitude of the many towards philosophy falls on that riotous crew who have burst in where they do not belong, wrangling with one another, filled with spite."


5 For a similar teasing or playful repetition of a word cf. 517 c, 394 B, 449 C, 470 B-c.

4 For the figure of the κώμος or revel rout cf. Theaet. 184 A, Aesch. Ag. 1189, Eurip. Ion 1197, and, with a variation of the image, Virgil, Aen. i. 148 and Tennyson, "Lucretius": As crowds that in an hour Of civic tumult jam the doors.

6 For this term to himself; cf. Panath. 249, Peace 65, Lysias xxiv. 24 πολυπράγμων εἰμί καὶ θρασύς καὶ φιλατεχθῆμων, Demosth. xxiv. 6.
PLATO

ἀνθρώπων τοὺς λόγους ποιουμένους, ἣκιστα φιλοσοφία πρέπον ποιοῦντας; Πολύ γ', ἔφη.

XIII. Οὔδε γάρ ποι, ὦ 'Αδείμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ γε ὡς ἄληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς οὖσι τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι
κατ' ἐπέπεμεν εἰς ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας, καὶ 

μαχόμενοι αὐτοῖς φθόνον τε καὶ δυσμενείας ἐμπίπλασθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τεταγμένα ἀττα καὶ κατὰ ταυτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα ὀρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους οὖτ' ἄδικοντα οὔτ' ἄδικονμενα ὑπ' ἄλληλων, κόσμω δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταυτὰ μμείσθαι 

τε καὶ ὁ τι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. ἦ οἷε οὐν 

μηχανήν εἶναι, ὅτω τις ὡμελεὶ ἀγάμενος, μη 

μμείσθαι ἕκεινο; Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη. Θείῳ δὴ καὶ 

κοσμίῳ ὃ γε φιλόσοφος ὡμιλῶν κόσμῳ τε καὶ 

θείῳ εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπων γίγνεται: διαβολῇ δ' 

ἐν πᾶσι πολλῇ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. "Ἀν οὖν τις,

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a i.e. gossip. Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1125 a 5 οὖδ' ἀνθρωπο-

λόγος, Epictetus iii. 16. 4. Cf. also Phileb. 59 b, Theaet. 

173 d, 174 c.

b Cf. supra on 486 Α, also Phileb. 58 d, 59 Α, Tim. 90 d, 

and perhaps Tim. 47 Α and Phaedo 79.

This passage is often supposed to refer to the ideas, and ἕκει in 500 δ shows that Plato is in fact there thinking of 

them, though in Rep. 529 Α-Β ff. he protests against this 

identification. And strictly speaking κατὰ ταυτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα 

in c would on Platonic principles be true only of the ideas. 

Nevertheless poets and imitators have rightly felt that the 

dominating thought of the passage is the effect on the philos-

opher’s mind of the contemplation of the heavens. This 

confusion or assimilation is, of course, still more natural 

to Aristotle, who thought the stars unchanging. Cf. Mel. 

1063 a 16 ταυτὰ δ’ αἰεὶ καὶ μεταβολὴς οὐδεμιᾶς κοινωνίας. Cf. 

also Sophocles, Ajax 669 ff., and Shorey in Sneath, Evolution 

of Ethics, pp. 261-263, Dio Chrys. xl. (Teubner ii. p. 199), 

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and always talking about persons, a thing least befitting philosophy?" "Least of all, indeed," he said.

XIII. "For surely, Adeimantus, the man whose mind is truly fixed on eternal realities b has no leisure to turn his eyes downward upon the petty affairs of men, and so engaging in strife with them to be filled with envy and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the things of the eternal and unchanging order, and seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids, he will endeavour to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their likeness and assimilate c himself to them. Or do you think it possible not to imitate the things to which anyone attaches himself with admiration?" "Impossible," he said. "Then the lover of wisdom associating with the divine order will himself become orderly and divine in the measure permitted to man. d But calumny e is plentiful everywhere." "Yes, truly." "If, then," I said, "some

Boethius, Cons. iii. 8 “respice caeli spatium . . . et aliquando desinite vilia mirari," Dante, Purg. 14:

The heavens call you and o'er your heads revolving
Reveal the lamps of beauty ever burning;
Your eyes are fixed on earth and goods dissolving,
Wherefore He smites you, He, the all-discerning.

Cf. Arnold, "A Summer Night," in fine:

. . . you remain
A world above man's head to let him see
How boundless might his soul's horizons be, etc.


d Cf. on 493 d, and for the idea 383 c.

The philosopher unwillingly holds office. Cf. on 345 e.

The word πλάτευν used of the lawgiver cf. 377 c, Laws 671 c, 712 b, 746 a, 800 b, Rep. 374 a, 377 c, 420 c, 466 a, 588 c, etc.

For the idea that the ruler shapes the state according to the pattern cf. infra 540 a-b.

Plato applies the language of the theory of ideas to the "social tissue" here exactly as he applies it to the making of a tool in the Cratylus 389 c. In both cases there is a workman, the ideal pattern and the material in which it is more or less perfectly embodied. Such passages are the source of Aristotle's doctrine of matter and form. Cf. Met. 1014 a 25, De part. an. 639 b 25-27, 640 b 24 f., 642 a 10 ff., De an. 403 b 3, Zeller, Aristot. (Eng.) i. p. 357. Cf. also Gorg. 503 d-e, Polit. 306 c, 309 d and Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 31-32. Cf. Alcinous, Eἰσαγωγῆ ii. (Teubner vi. p. 153) ἀ κατὰ τὸν θεωρητικὸν βίον ὁρᾶται, μελετᾶται εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἡθον.

Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1329 a 21 ἀρετῆς δημιουργῶν. Cf. also
compulsion\(^a\) is laid upon him to practise stamping on the plastic matter of human nature in public and private the patterns that he visions there,\(^b\) and not merely to mould\(^c\) and fashion himself, do you think he will prove a poor craftsman\(^d\) of sobriety and justice and all forms of ordinary civic virtue\(^e\)?\(^f\) “By no means,” he said. “But if the multitude become aware that what we are saying of the philosopher is true, will they still be harsh with philosophers, and will they distrust our statement that no city could ever be blessed unless its lineaments were traced\(^f\) by artists who used the heavenly model?” “They will not be harsh,” he said, “if they perceive that. But tell me, what is the manner of that sketch you have in mind?” “They will take the city and the characters of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean—\(^g\) no easy task. But at any rate you know that this would be their first point of difference from ordinary


\(^a\) Cf. Laws 968 Α πρὸς ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς, Phaedo 82 Α and supra, Vol. I. on 430 c. Brochard, “La Morale de Platon,” L’Année Philosophique, xvi. (1905) p. 12 “La justice est appelée une vertu populaire.” This is a little misleading if he means that justice itself is “une vertu populaire.”

\(^f\) For διαγράψειαν cf. 387 Β and Laws 778 Α. See also Stallbaum ad loc.

\(^g\) Cf. Vol. I. on 426 Β. This is one of the passages that may be used or misused to class Plato with the radicals. Cf. 541 Α, Laws 736 Α-Β, Polit. 293 Β, Euthyphro 2 Β-3 Α. H. W. Schneider, The Puritan Mind, p. 36, says, “Plato claimed that before his Republic could be established the adult population must be killed off.”

The theory of ideas frequently employs this image of the artist looking off to his model and back again to his work. Cf. on 484 c, and What Plato Said, p. 458, Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 37.

i.e. the idea of justice. For φόσις and the theory of ideas cf. infra 597 c, Phaedo 103 b, Parmen. 132 d, Cratyl. 389 c-d, 390 e.

For ἄνθρωποις cf. Cratyl. 424 e.

II. i. 131, Od. iii. 416. Cf. 589 d, 500 c-d, Laws 818 b-c, and What Plato Said, p. 578 on Theaet. 176 b, Cic. Tusc. 72
reformers, that they would refuse to take in hand either individual or state or to legislate before they either received a clean slate or themselves made it clean.” "And they would be right,” he said. "And thereafter, do you not think that they would sketch the figure of the constitution?" "Surely." "And then, I take it, in the course of the work they would glance a frequently in either direction, at justice, beauty, sobriety and the like as they are in the nature of things, b and alternately at that which they were trying to reproduce in mankind, mingling and blending from various pursuits that hue of the flesh, so to speak, deriving their judgement from that likeness of humanity c which Homer too called when it appeared in men the image and likeness of God. d ” "Right,” he said. "And they would erase one touch or stroke and paint in another until in the measure of the possible e they had made the characters of men pleasing and dear to God as may be.” "That at any rate f would be the fairest painting.” "Are we then making any impression on those who you said g were advancing to attack us with might and main? Can we convince them that such a political artist of character and such a painter exists as the one we then were praising when our proposal to entrust the state to him angered them, and are they now in a gentler mood when they hear what we are now saying?" "Much gentler,” he said,

i. 26. 65 “divina mallem ad nos.” Cf. also Tim. 90 a, Phaedr. 249 c.

The modern reader may think of Tennyson, In Mem. cviii. “What find I in the highest place But mine own phantom chanting hymns?” Cf. also Adam ad loc.

a Cf. 500 d and on 493 d.

b For γοῦν cf. supra, Vol. I. on 334 a. 

c Cf. 474 a.
D polů ge, ἦ δ' ὡς, εἰ σωφρονοῦσιν. Πὴ γὰρ δὴ ἐξουσία ἀμφισβητήσαι; πότερον μὴ τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἐραστάς εἶναι τοὺς φιλοσόφους; 'Ατοπον μεντ ἄν, ἐφη, εἰ. Ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν εἶναι τοῦ ἄριστου, ἥν ἤμεις διῆλθομεν; Οὐδὲ τούτο. Τί δὲ; τὴν τοιαύτην τυχούσαν τῶν προσηκόντων ἐπιτηδευμάτων οὐκ ἀγαθὴν τελέως ἐξεσθαί καὶ φιλοσοφὸν εἰπερ τινὰ ἄλλην; ἡ ἐκείνους φήσεων μᾶλλον, οὐδέ ἤμεις ἀφωρίσαμεν;

Ε Οὐ δήποτε. Ὅτι οὐν ἄγριανοῦσι λεγόντων ἡμῶν, οὔτε, πρὶν ἀν πόλεως τοῦ φιλόσοφον γένος ἐγκρατέσ γένηται, οὐτε πόλει οὔτε πολίταις κακῶν παύλα ἔσται, οὔτε ἡ πολιτεία, ἡν μυθολογοῦμεν λόγω, ἔργω τέλος λήμπαται: Ἰσως, ἐφη, ἦττον. Βούλει οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ ἦττον φώμεν αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ παντάπασι πράσου γεγονέναι καὶ πεπείσθαι, ἢν, 502 εἰ μὴ τι, ἀλλὰ αἰσχυνθέντες ὁμολογήσωσιν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.

XIV. Οὕτω μὲν τοίνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τούτο πεπεισμένοι ἔστων τούδε δὲ πέρι τις ἀμφισβητήσει, ὡς οὐκ ἂν τύχοιεν γενόμενοι βασιλέων ἐκγονοι ἡ δυναστῶν τὰς φύσεις φιλόσοφοι; Οὐδ' ἄν εἰς, ἐφη. Τοιούτως δὲ γενομένους ὃς πολλὴ ἀνάγκη διαφθαρήναι, ἔχει τις λέγειν; ὡς μὲν γὰρ χαλεπῶν σωθῆναι, καὶ ἤμεις ἐγνωρισθέναι, ὡς δὲ ἐν παντὶ

Β τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν πάντων οὐδέποτ' οὔδ' ἄν εἰς σωθείν, ἐσθ' ὡστες ἀμφισβητήσει; Καὶ πῶς; 'Αλλὰ μὴν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς ικανὸς γενόμενος, πόλιν ἔχων

1 φήσεων ADM: Adam reads φήσει; see his note ad loc.

1 Cf. 591 a. This affirmation of the impossibility of denial or controversy is a motif frequent in the Attic orators. Cf. Lysias xxx. 26, xxxi. 24, xiii. 49, vi. 46, etc.

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"if they are reasonable." "How can they controvert it? Will they deny that the lovers of wisdom are lovers of reality and truth?" "That would be monstrous," he said. "Or that their nature as we have portrayed it is akin to the highest and best?" "Not that either." "Well, then, can they deny that such a nature bred in the pursuits that befit it will be perfectly good and philosophic so far as that can be said of anyone? Or will they rather say it of those whom we have excluded?" "Surely not." "Will they, then, any longer be fierce with us when we declare that, until the philosophic class wins control, there will be no surcease of trouble for city or citizens nor will the polity which we fable in words be brought to pass in deed?" "They will perhaps be less so," he said. "Instead of less so, may we not say that they have been altogether tamed and convinced, so that for very shame, if for no other reason, they may assent?" "Certainly," said he.

XIV. "Let us assume, then," said I, "that they are won over to this view. Will anyone contend that there is no chance that the offspring of kings and rulers should be born with the philosophic nature?" "Not one," he said. "And can anyone prove that if so born they must necessarily be corrupted? The difficulty of their salvation we too concede; but that in all the course of time not one of all could be saved, will anyone maintain that?" "How could he?" "But surely," said I, "the occurrence of one such is

\[\text{Cf. 376 d, Laws 632 e, 841 c, Phaedr. 276 e. Frutiger, Les Mythes de Platon, p. 13, says Plato uses the word \textit{mēthēs} only once of his own myths, Polit. 268 e.}\]

\[\text{Cf. Laws 711 d τὸ χαλεπῶν, and 495 a-b.}\]

\[\text{Cf. 494 a.}\]
Τρειοφιλή, θυβίνετος τούς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἀ διεληλύθαμεν, οὐ δὴν ἀδύνατον ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν τοὺς πολίτας. Οὐδ' ὀπωσδήποτε. Ἀλλὰ δὴ, ἂπερ ἦμιν δοκεῖ, δόξας καὶ ἄλλοις θαυμαστοῦ τι καὶ ἀδύνατον; Οὕκ οἷμην ἐγὼγε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Καὶ μὴν ἃτι γε βέλτιστα, εἴπερ δυνατά, Ἰκανῶς ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν, ως ἐγώμαι, δηλόθημον. Ἰκανῶς γάρ. Νῦν δὴ, ως έουκε, ἐξυμβαίνει ἦμιν περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας ἀριστα μὲν εἶναι ἀ λέγομεν, εἰ γένοιτο, χαλεπὰ δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατα γε. Εξυμβαίνει γάρ, ἔφη.

ΧV. Οὔκοιν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μόνις τέλος ἔσχε, τὰ ∆ ἐπίλογα δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο λεκτέων, τίνα τρόπον ἦμιν καὶ ἦκ τῶν μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων οἱ σωτηρίες ἐνέσονται τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ κατὰ ποιὰς ἡλικίας ἐκαστοῦ ἐκαστῶν ἀπτόμενοι; Δεκτέων μέντοι, ἔφη.1 Οὐδὲν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ σοφόν μοι ἐγένετο τὴν τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν τῆς κτήσεως δυσχέρειαν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παραλιπόντι καὶ παιδογονίαν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων κατάστασιν, εἰδότι ὡς ἐπίφθονός τε καὶ χαλεπὴ γίγνεσθαι η παιντελός Ε ἀληθῆς: νῦν γάρ οὖδέν ἤττον ἥλθε τὸ δεῖν αὐτὰ

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a Cf. Epist. vii. 328 c and Novotny, Plato's Epistles, p. 170. Plato's apparent radicalism again. Cf. on 501 Α. Cf. also Laws 709 Ε, but note the qualification in 875 C, 713 E-714 Α, 691 c-d. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. pp. 381-383 seems to say that the εἰς Ἰκανὸς is the philosopher—Plato.

b Note the different tone of 565 E λαβὼν σφίδρα πειθόμενον δχλον. Cf. Phaedr. 260 c λαβὼν πῶλων ὁσατῶς ἔχονσαν πειθή.

c Cf. on 499 ν, and Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, p. 43.

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enough, if he has a state which obeys him, to realize all that now seems so incredible." "Yes, one is enough," he said. "For if such a ruler," I said, "ordains the laws and institutions that we have described it is surely not impossible that the citizens should be content to carry them out." "By no means." "Would it, then, be at all strange or impossible for others to come to the opinion to which we have come?" "I think not," said he. "And further that these things are best, if possible, has already, I take it, been sufficiently shown." "Yes, sufficiently." "Our present opinion, then, about this legislation is that our plan would be best if it could be realized and that this realization is difficult yet not impossible." "That is the conclusion," he said.

XV. "This difficulty disposed of, we have next to speak of what remains, in what way, namely, and as a result of what studies and pursuits, these preservers of the constitution will form a part of our state, and at what ages they will severally take up each study." "Yes, we have to speak of that," he said. "I gained nothing," I said, "by my cunning in omitting heretofore the distasteful topic of the possession of women and procreation of children and the appointment of rulers, because I knew that the absolutely true and right way would provoke censure and is difficult of realization; for now I am none the less compelled

\* Cf. 502 a, Campbell’s note on *Theaet.* 144 a, and Wilmowitz, *Platon,* ii. p. 208.
\* Cf. on 412 a-b and 497 c-d, *Laws* 960 b. 463 b is not quite relevant.
\* Cf. 423 e.
διελθεῖν. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ
παιδῶν πεπέρανται, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων ὥσπερ ἐξ
ἀρχῆς μετέλθειν δεῖ. ἐλέγομεν δ', εἰ μνημονεύεις,
503 δεῖν αὐτοὺς φιλοπόλιδας τὰ φαίνεσθαι, βασανι-
ζομένους ἐν ἄδουνας τε καὶ λύπας, καὶ τὸ δόγμα
τούτο μὴ' ἐν πόνοις μὴ' ἐν φάβοις μήτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ
μηδεμα' μεταβολή φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας, ἢ τὸν
ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκρίνετον, τὸν δὲ πανταχοῦ ἀκί-
ρατον ἐκβαίνοντα, ὥσπερ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρὶ βασανιζό-
μενον, στατέον ἁρχοντα καὶ γέρα δοτέον καὶ ζώντι
καὶ τελευτήσαντι καὶ ἀθλα. τοιαύτ' ἀττα ἢν τὰ
λεγόμενα, παρεξίοντος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ
Β λόγου, πεφοβημένου κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν. 'Αληθε-
στατα, ἐφη, λέγεις' μέμνημαι γάρ. 'Οκνος γάρ,
ἐφην, ὁ φίλε, ἔγνω, εἰπεῖν τὰ νῦν ἀποτελομενα'ν
νῦν δὲ τούτῳ μὲν τετολμήσθω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοὺς
ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας φιλοσόφους δεῖ καθιστάναι.
Εἰρήσθω γάρ, ἐφη. Νόησον δή, ὥς εἰκότως ὀλίγον
ἔσονται σοι. ἢ γάρ διηλθομεν φύσιν δεῖν ὑπ’-
ἀρχειν αὐτοῖς, εἰς ταῦτα ἔμφυσεσθαι αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη

a In Bk. V.

b Cf. 412 δ-ε, 413 κ-414 Α, 430 Α-Β, 537, 540 Α, Laws 751 Α.

c Cf. on 412 Β, 413 Α, Soph. 230 Β.

d τὸ δόγμα τούτο is an illogical idiom. The antecedent is
only implied. Cf. 373 Α, 598 Α. See my article in Trans-

e Cf. Theognis 417-418 παρατρήσωμαι ὅστε μολιβδῳ χρυσῷ,

Cf. Zechariah xiii. 9 "I . . . will try them as gold is
tried," Job xxiii. 10 "When he hath tried me I shall come
forth as gold." Cf. also 1 Peter i. 7, Psalm xii. 6, lxvi. 10,
Isaiah xlviii. 10.

f The translation preserves the intentional order of the
Greek. For the idea cf. 414 Α and 465 δ-Ε and for ἄθλα cf.
460 Β. Cobet rejects καὶ ἄθλα, but emendations are needless. 78

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to discuss them. The matter of the women and children has been disposed of, but the education of the rulers has to be examined again, I may say, from the starting-point. We were saying, if you recollect, that they must approve themselves lovers of the state when tested in pleasures and pains, and make it apparent that they do not abandon this fixed faith under stress of labours or fears or any other vicissitude, and that anyone who could not keep that faith must be rejected, while he who always issued from the test pure and intact, like gold tried in the fire, is to be established as ruler and to receive honours in life and after death and prizes as well. Something of this sort we said while the argument slipped by with veiled face in fear of starting our present debate. "Most true," he said; "I remember." "We shrank, my friend," I said, "from uttering the audacities which have now been hazarded. But now let us find courage for the definitive pronouncement that as the most perfect guardians we must establish philosophers." "Yes, assume it to have been said," said he. "Note, then, that they will naturally be few, for the different components of the nature which we said their education presupposed rarely consent to

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\(^{b}\) Cf. 387 B.

\(^{c}\) Cf. the proverbial μη κυνέω τα άκινητα, do not move the immovable, "let sleeping dogs lie," in Laws 684 D-E, 913 B. Cf. also Phileb. 16 C, and the American idiom "start something."

\(^{d}\) Cf. 503 D, 341 B, 340 E, 342 D.

\(^{e}\) Cf. on 494 A
PLATO

ολιγάκις έθέλει, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ διεσπασμένη φύεται. Ο Πῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις; Εὑμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχύνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ὁσα ἀλλα τούτοις ἔπεται οὕσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἄμα φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοὶ τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας, οἴοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ ὀξύτητος φέρονται ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἄπαν αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν τὰ βέβαια αὐτα ἄλθη καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάβολα, οἷς ἂν τις μᾶλλον ὡς πιστοὶς

Δ χρήσαιτο, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τοὺς φόβους δυσκίνητα ὅντα, πρὸς τὰς μάθήσεις αὖ ποιεῖ ταῦταν· δυσκινήτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθῶς ὑσπερ ἀπονεναρκομένα, καὶ ὑπνον τε καὶ χάσμης ἐμπίπτεται, ὅταν τι δέ τοιοῦτον διαπονεῖ. "Εστι ταῦτα, ἐφη. Ἡμεῖς δὲ γ' ἐφαμεν ἀμφοτέρων δεῖν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς μετέχειν, ἢ μήτε παιδείας τῆς ἀκριβεστάτης δεῖν αὐτῶ μεταδιδόναι μήτε τιμῆς μήτε ἄρχῆς. Ὀρθῶς, ἢ δ' ὦς. Οὐκοῦν στάνουν αὐτὸ ὅιει

Ε ἔσεσθαι; Πῶς δ' οὗ; Βασιλιστέον δὴ ἐν τε οἷς τότε ἐλέγομεν πόνους τε καὶ φόβους καὶ ἡδονάις, καὶ ἐτι δὴ δ' τότε παρείμεν νῦν λέγομεν, ὡς καὶ ἐν

1 On the text see end of note a below.

a The translation is correct. In the Greek the anaclusthont is for right emphasis, and the separation of νεανικοὶ τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς from the other members of the list is also an intentional feature of Plato's style to avoid the monotony of too long an enumeration. The two things that rarely combine are Plato's two temperaments. The description of the orderly temperament begins with οἶοι and οἱ τοιοῦτοι refers to the preceding description of the active temperament. The mss. have καὶ before νεανικοὶ; Heindorf, followed by Wilamowitz, and Adam's minor edition, put it before οἶοι. Burnet follows the mss. Adam's larger edition puts καὶ νεανικοὶ τε 80
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grow in one; but for the most part these qualities are found apart.” “What do you mean?” he said. “Facility in learning, memory, sagacity, quickness of apprehension and their accompaniments, and youthful spirit and magnificence in soul are qualities, you know, that are rarely combined in human nature with a disposition to live orderly, quiet, and stable lives; but such men, by reason of their quickness, are driven about just as chance directs, and all steadfastness is gone out of them.” “You speak truly,” he said. “And on the other hand, the steadfast and stable temperaments, whom one could rather trust in use, and who in war are not easily moved and aroused to fear, are apt to act in the same way when confronted with studies. They are not easily aroused, learn with difficulty, as if benumbed, and are filled with sleep and yawning when an intellectual task is set them.” “It is so,” he said. “But we affirmed that a man must partake of both temperaments in due and fair combination or else participate in neither the highest education nor in honours nor in rule.” “And rightly,” he said. “Do you not think, then, that such a blend will be a rare thing?” “Of course.” “They must, then, be tested in the toils and fears and pleasures of which we then spoke, and we have also now to speak of a

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The right meaning can be got from any of the texts in a good viva voce reading.

Plato’s contrast of the two temperaments disregards the possible objection of a psychologist that the adventurous temperament is not necessarily intellectual. Cf. supra on 375 c, and What Plato Said, p. 573 on Theaet. 144 α-β, Cic. Tusc. v. 24. b Cf. Theaet. 144 α ff.

c A touch of humour in a teacher.

d For the figure cf. Meno 80 α, 84 β and c.


f In 412 c ff.
PLATO

μαθήμασι πολλοΐς γυμνάζειν δει, σκοποῦντας ει καὶ τὰ μέγιστα μαθήματα δυνατῇ ἐσται ἐνεγκεῖν, 504 εἰτε καὶ ἀποδειλιάσει, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἄθλοις ἀποδειλιώντες. Πρέπει γε τοι δή, ἡφη, οὕτω σκοπεῖν· ἄλλα ποιὰ δὴ λέγεις μαθήματα μέγιστα;
XVI. Μηνημονεύεις μὲν ποι, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ὅτι τριττὰ εἰδὴ ψυχῆς διαστησάμενοι ἠνεβιβάζομεν δικαιοσύνης τε πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σοφίας δ' ἐκαστὸν εἰ. Μὴ γὰρ μηνημονεύων, ἡφη, τὰ λοιπὰ ἂν εἴην δίκαιος μὴ ἀκοῦειν. Ἡ καὶ Ὁ τὸ προρρηθὲν αὐτῶν; Τὸ ποιὸν δὴ; 'Ελέγομεν ποι, ὅτι, ὡς μὲν δυνατὸν ἢν κάλλιστα αὐτὰ κατιδεῖν, ἀλλὰ μακροτέρα εἰη περίοδος, ἢν περιελθόντι καταφανῇ γίγνοιτο, τῶν μέντοι ἐμπροσθεὶν προειρημένων ἐπομένας ἀποδείξεις ὁδὸν τ' εἰη προσάψαι. καὶ ὡμὺς ἔξαρκεῖν ἔφατε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐρρήθη τὰ τότε τῆς μὲν ἀκριβείας, ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐφαίνετο, ἐλλπῆ, εἰ δὲ ύμίν ἄρεσκῶντως, ὡμὺς ἂν τοῦτο εἴποιτε. 'Αλλ' ἐμοιγε, ἡφη, μετρίως· ἐφαί- C νιοτο μήν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. 'Αλλ', ὃ φιλε, ἢν δ'

1 ἄθλοις Orelli: ἄλλοις mss.

* Cf. infra 535 b, Protag. 326 c.
* Cf. Vol. I. on 435 d, Phaedr. 274 a, Friedländer, Platon, ii. pp. 376-377, Jowett and Campbell, p. 300, Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, pp. 81 ff., and my Idea of Good in Plato's Republic (Univ. of Chicago Studies in Class. Phil. vol. i. p. 190). There is no mysticism and no obscurity. The longer way is the higher education, which will enable the philosopher not only like ordinary citizens to do the right from habit and training, but to understand the reasons for it. 82
point we then passed by, that we must exercise them in many studies, watching them to see whether their nature is capable of enduring the greatest and most difficult studies or whether it will faint and flinch as men flinch in the trials and contests of the body."

"That is certainly the right way of looking at it," he said. "But what do you understand by the greatest studies?"

XVI. "You remember, I presume," said I, "that after distinguishing three kinds in the soul, we established definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and wisdom severally." "If I did not remember," he said, "I should not deserve to hear the rest." "Do you also remember what was said before this?"

"What?" "We were saying, I believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer way was requisite which would make them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on this understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to me; but if it contented you it is for you to say."

"Well," he said, "it was measurably satisfactory to me, and apparently to the rest of the company."

The outcome of such an education is described as the vision of the idea of good, which for ethics and politics means a restatement of the provisional psychological definition of the cardinal virtues in terms of the ultimate elements of human welfare. For metaphysics and cosmogony the vision of the idea of good may mean a teleological interpretation of the universe and the interpretation of all things in terms of benevolent design. That is reserved for poetical and mythical treatment in the Timaeus. The Republic merely glances at the thought from time to time and returns to its own theme. Cf. also Introd., p. xxxv.
Note not only the edifying tone and the unctuous of the style but the definite suggestion of Plato's distaste for relativity and imperfection which finds expression in the criticism of the *homo mensura* in the *Theaetetus*, in the statement of the *Laws* 716 e, that God is the measure of all things (*What Plato Said*, p. 631), and in the contrast in the *Politicus* 283-284 between measuring things against one another and measuring them by an idea. *Cf. infra* 531 a.
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"Nay, my friend," said I, "a measure of such things that in the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything,\(^b\) though some people sometimes think that they have already done enough\(^b\) and that there is no need of further inquiry." "Yes, indeed," he said, "many experience this because of their sloth." "An experience," said I, "that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws." "That seems likely," he said. "Then," said I, "such a one must go around\(^c\) the longer way and must labour no less in studies than in the exercises of the body; or else, as we were just saying, he will never come to the end of the greatest study and that which most properly belongs to him." "Why, are not these things the greatest?" said he; "but is there still something greater than justice and the other virtues we described?" "There is not only something greater," I said, "but of these very things we need not merely to contemplate an outline\(^d\) as now, but we must omit nothing of their most exact elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve\(^e\) to attain to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the

\(^b\) Cf. Menex. 234\(^a\), Charm. 158\(^c\), Symp. 204\(^a\), Epist. vii. 341\(^a\).

From here to the end of this Book the notes are to be used in connexion with the Introduction, pp. xxiii-xxxvi, where the idea of good and the divided line are discussed.

\(^c\) Cf. Phaedr. 274\(^a\).

\(^d\) i.e. sketch, adumbration. The υπογραφή is the account of the cardinal virtues in Bk. iv. 428-433.

\(^e\) For πᾶν ποιεῖν cf. on 488\(^c\), for συντευομένος Euthydem. 288\(^d\).
αξιούν εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη, [ἀξιοῦν τὸ διανόημα]. οἱ μέντοι μέγιστον μάθημα καὶ
περὶ δὲ τι αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἶει τιν’ ἂν σε, ἐφη, ἀφεῖναι
μὴ ἐρωτῆσαντα τί ἔστων; Οὐ πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλγάκις
ἀκήκοας; νῦν δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ἢ αὖ διανοεῖ ἐμοὶ
505 πράγματα παρέχεις ἀντιλαμβανόμενος. οἶμαι δὲ
τοῦτο μᾶλλον· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴδεα
μέγιστον μάθημα, πολλάκις ἀκήκοας, ἢ δὴ δίκαια
καὶ τάλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὑφέλιμα
γίγνεται. καὶ νῦν σχεδὸν οἶσθ' ὅτι μέλλω τοῦτο
λέγειν, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ ὅτι αὐτὴν οὐχ ἰκανῶς
ισμεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἵσμεν, ἀνεν δὲ ταῦτης, εἰ δὲ
τι μάλιστα τάλλα ἐπισταίμεθα, οἰσθ' ὅτι οὐδὲν ἢμῶν
Β ὀφελος, ὡσπερ οὐδ' εἰ κεκτήμεθα τι ἀνεν τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ οἶει τι πλέον εἶναι πᾶσαν κτήςν ἐκτή-
σθαι, μὴ μέντοι ἀγαθὴν; ἢ πάντα τάλλα φρονεῖν

1 Bracketed by Scheiermacher, whom the Oxford text
follows. Cf. also Adam ad loc. Stallbaum ad loc. defends.

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a Such juxtaposition of different forms of the same word is
one of the most common features of Plato's style. Cf. 453 B
ἐνα ἐν, 466 D πάντα πάρτη, 467 D πολλὰ πολλοίς, 496 C οὐδὲν
οὐδὲν, Laws 835 C μὲν χ' μόνος, 958 B ἐκῶν ἐκῶν. Cf. also
Protag. 327 B, Gorg. 523 B, Symp. 217 B, Tim. 92 B, Phaedo
109 B, Apol. 32 C, and Laws passim.

b The answer is to the sense. Cf. 346 E, Crito 47 C, and D,
Laches 195 D, Gorg. 467 E. See critical note.

c Plato assumed that the reader will understand that the
unavailing quest for “the good” in the earlier dialogues is
an anticipation of the idea of good. Cf. supra Vol. I. on
p. 567, does not understand.

d Cf. 508 E, 517 C, Cratyl. 418 E. Cf. Phileb. 64 E and
What Plato Said, p. 534, on Phaedo 99 A.

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greatest matters?" "It would indeed," he said; "but do you suppose that anyone will let you go without asking what is the greatest study and with what you think it is concerned?" "By no means," said I; "but do you ask the question. You certainly have heard it often, but now you either do not apprehend or again you are minded to make trouble for me by attacking the argument. I suspect it is rather the latter. For you have often heard that the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good by reference to which just things and all the rest become useful and beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that this is what I am going to speak of and to say further that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of this we should know all other things never so well, you are aware that it would avail us nothing, just as no possession either is of any avail without the possession of the good. Or do you think there is any profit in possessing everything except that which is good, or in understanding all things else apart from the

Plato is unwilling to confine his idea of good to a formula and so seems to speak of it as a mystery. It was so regarded throughout antiquity (cf. Diog. Laert. iii. 27), and by a majority of modern scholars. Cf. my Idea of Good in Plato's Republic, pp. 188-189, What Plato Said, pp. 72, 230-231, Introd. Vol. I. pp. xl-xli, and Vol. II. pp. xxvii, xxxiv.

Lit. "the use of which," i.e. a theory of the cardinal virtues is scientific only if deduced from an ultimate sanction or ideal.

The omission of the article merely gives a vaguely generalizing colour. It makes no difference.

For the idiom ὁδὲν δῆλος cf. Euthyph. 4 e, Lysis 208 e, supra 365 b, Charm. 155 e, etc.

Cf. 427 A, Phaedr. 275 c, Cratyl. 387 a, Euthyd. 288 e, Laws 751 b, 944 d, etc.
ānev τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν φρονεῖν; Μᾶ Δί, οὐκ ἔγωγ’, ἔφη.

XVII. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονῇ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν, τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις φρόνησις. Πώς δ' οὖ; Καὶ ὅτι γε, ὃ φίλε, οἱ τοῦτο ήγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἢς φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι. Καὶ μᾶλα, ἔφη, γελοῖος. Πώς

C γὰρ οὐχὶ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ οὐνεῖδίζοντές γε ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν, λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἴδοσι; φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτὸ φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς αὐξω-ιεύτων ἡμῶν ὃ τι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὰν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φθέγξονται ὄνομα. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Τί δαί; οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν ὑριζόμενοι μῶν μὴ τι ἐλάττονος πλάνης ἐμπλεω τῶν ἐτέρων; ἦ οὐ καὶ οὗτοι ἀναγκάζονται ὁμολογεῖν ἡδονὰς εἶναι κακὰς;

a καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν suggests but does not mean καλοκαγαθὸν in its half-technical sense. The two words fill out the rhythm with Platonic fulness and are virtual synonyms. Cf. Phileb. 65 Α and Symp. 210-211 where because of the subject the καλὸν is substituted for the ἀγαθὸν.

b So Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias and later the Epicureans and Cyrenaics. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 131: Eurip. Hippol. 382 οἱ δ' ἡδονὴν προβέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, and supra on 329 Α-Β.

There is no contradiction here with the Philebus. Plato does not himself say that either pleasure or knowledge is the good.

c κομψοτέροις is very slightly if at all ironical here. Cf. the American "sophisticated" in recent use. See too Theaet. 156 Α, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1905 Α-Ε· 18 οἱ χαριέντες.

d Plato does not distinguish synonyms in the style of Prodicus (cf. Protag. 337 Α ff.) and Aristotle (cf. Eth. Nic. 1140-1141) when the distinction is irrelevant to his purpose. Cf. Euthyd. 281 Β, Theaet. 176 Β with 176 Σ.

e Cf. 428 Β-Δ, Euthydem. 288 Δ f., Laws 961 ε ὁ περὶ τί
good while understanding and knowing nothing that is fair and good?" "No, by Zeus, I do not," he said.

XVII. "But, furthermore, you know this too, that the multitude believe pleasure to be the good, and the finer spirits intelligence or knowledge." "Certainly." "And you are also aware, my friend, that those who hold this latter view are not able to point out what knowledge it is but are finally compelled to say that it is the knowledge of the good." "Most absurdly," he said. "Is it not absurd," said I, "if while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of the good, as if we understood their meaning when they utter the word 'good.'" "Most true," he said. "Well, are those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less confusion of thought than the others? Or are not they in like manner compelled to admit that there is no "the" in the Greek. Emendations are idle. Plato is supremely indifferent to logical precision when it makes no difference for a reasonably intelligent reader. Cf. my note on Phileb. 11 b-c in Class. Phil. vol. iii. (1908) pp. 343-345.

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A distinct reference to Callicles' admission in *Gorgias* 499 b τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἰδιώνας, τὰς δὲ χείρως, cf. 499 c, Rep. 561 c, and Phileb. 13 c πάσας ὅμοιας εἶναι. Stenzel's notion (Studien zur Entw. d. Plat. Dialektik, p. 98) that in the Philebus Plato “ist von dem Standpunkt des Staates 503 c weit entfernt” is uncritical. The Republic merely refers to the *Gorgias* to show that the question is disputed and the disputants contradict themselves.

b ἀμφισβητήσεις is slightly disparaging, cf. Theaet. 168 c, 158 c, 198 c, Sophist 233 b, 225 b, but less so than ἐρίζειν in Protag. 337 α.

c Men may deny the reality of the conventional virtues but not of the ultimate sanction, whatever it is. Cf. Theaet. 167 c, 172 α-β, and Shorey in Class. Phil. xvi. (1921) pp. 164-168.

d Cf. Gorg. 468 b τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἴρα διώκοντες, supra 505 α-β, Phileb. 20 d, Symp. 206 ά, Euthyd. 278 έ, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 90
are bad pleasures? " Most assuredly. " " The outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting the same things to be both good and bad, are they not? " " Certainly. " " Then is it not apparent that there are many and violent disputes about it? " " Of course. " " And again, is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the honourable many would prefer the semblance without the reality in action, possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance satisfies nobody here? " " Quite so, " he said. " That, then, which every soul pursues and for its sake does all that it does, with an intuition of its reality, but yet baffled and unable to apprehend its nature adequately, or to attain to any stable belief about it as about other things, and for that reason failing of any possible benefit from other things,—in a matter of this quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow a like blindness and obscurity in those best citizens

1173 a, 1094 a oū πάντα ἐφιέται, Zeller, Aristot. i. pp. 344-345, 379, Boethius iii. 10, Dante, Purg. xvii. 127-129.  
* Cf. Phileb. 64 α μαντευτέον. Cf. Arnold's phrase, God and the Bible, chap. i. p. 23 " approximate language thrown out as it were at certain great objects which the human mind augurs and feels after. "  
Because, in the language of Platonic metaphysics, it is the παρουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ that makes them good; but for the practical purpose of ethical theory, because they need the sanction. Cf. Introd. p. xxvii, and Montaigne i. 24 " Toute autrre science est dommageable à celuy qui n'a la science de la bonté. "  
§ As in the " longer way " Plato is careful not to commit himself to a definition of the ideal or the sanction, but postulates it for his guardians.
πόλει, οἷς πάντα ἐγχειριοῦμεν; "Ἡκιστά γ', ἔφη. Οἴμαι γοῦν, εἴπον, δίκαια τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοοὐμενα ὅτι ποτὲ ἀγαθὰ ἐστιν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινὸς ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτήσθαι ἣν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τούτῳ ἀγνοοῦντα, μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδένα αὐτὰ πρότερον γνώσεσθαι ἰκανῶς. Καλῶς γὰρ, ἔφη, μαντεύει. Οὐκοῦν ἢμῖν Β ἡ πολιτεία τελέως κεκοσμήσεται, ἕαν ὁ τοιοῦτος αὐτὴν ἐπισκοπῆ φύλαξ, ὁ τούτων ἐπιστήμων;

ΧVIII. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ σὺ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἐπιστήμην τὸ ἀγαθὸν φῆς εἶναι ἢ ἠδονῆν; ἦ ἄλλο τι παρὰ ταῦτα; Οὔτος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀνήρ, καλῶς ἦσθα καὶ πάλαι καταφανῆς ὅτι σοι οὐκ ἀποχρῆσοι τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦν περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἔχειν εἰπέων δόγματα, τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ μή, τοσοῦτον χρόνον περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευόμενον. Τί δαί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι περὶ ὧν τις μή οἴδε λέγειν ὡς εἰδώτα; Οὔδαμώς γ', ἔφη, ὡς εἰδότα, ὡς μέντοι οἴόμενον ταῦτ' ἀ οἴεται ἐθέλειν λέγειν. Τί δε; εἴπον οὐκ ἥσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραὶ; ἢν αἰ βέλτισται τυφλαί· η δοκοῦσι τί σοι τυφλῶν

a The personal or ab urbe condita construction. Cf. Thelas. 169 e.

b The guardians must be able to give a reason, which they can do only by reference to the sanction. For the idea that the statesman must know better than other men cf. Laws 968 a, 964 c, 858 d-e, 817 c, Xen. Mem. iii. 6. 8.

c For the effect of the future perfect cf. 457 b λελέξεται, 465 a προστετάξεται, Eurip. Heracleidae 980 πεπράξεται.
to whose hands we are to entrust all things?" 

"Least of all," he said. "I fancy, at any rate," said I, "that the just and the honourable, if their relation and reference to the good is not known, will not have secured a guardian of much worth in the man thus ignorant, and my surmise is that no one will understand them adequately before he knows this." "You surmise well," he said. "Then our constitution will have its perfect and definitive organization only when such a guardian, who knows these things, oversees it."

XVIII. "Necessarily," he said. "But you yourself, Socrates, do you think that knowledge is the good or pleasure or something else and different?" "What a man it is," said I; "you made it very plain long ago that you would not be satisfied with what others think about it." "Why, it does not seem right to me either, Socrates," he said, "to be ready to state the opinions of others but not one's own when one has occupied himself with the matter so long."

"But then," said I, "do you think it right to speak as having knowledge about things one does not know?" "By no means," he said, "as having knowledge, but one ought to be willing to tell as his opinion what he opines." "Nay," said I, "have you not observed that opinions divorced from knowledge are ugly things? The best of them are blind. Or do you think that those who hold some

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n. For the personal construction cf. 348 e, Isoc. To Nic. 1. καταφανής is a variation in this idiom for δῆλος. Cf. also Theaet. 189 c, Symp. 221 b, Charm. 162 c, etc.

o. Cf. 367 d-e.

r. This is not a contradiction of Meno 97 b, Theaet. 201 b-c, and Phileb. 62 a-b, but simply a different context and emphasis. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 47, nn. 338 and 339.

s. Cf. on 484 c, Phaedr. 270 e.
diapherein ódòν ὅρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἁληθές τι δοξάζοντες; Οὐδέν, ἔφη. Βούλει οὖν ὁ αἰσχρὰ θεάσασθαι τυφλὰ τε καὶ σκόλια, ἐξὸν παρ' ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανὰ τε καὶ καλὰ; Μὴ πρὸς Διός, ἡ δὲ ὦς, ὥς Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὧν ἄποστής. ἀρκέσει γὰρ ἢμῖν, κἂν ὥσπερ δικαιοσύνης πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διήλθες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ διελθῆς. Καὶ γὰρ ἐμοί, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὥς ἐταίρη, καὶ μάλα ἀρκέσει· ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἴος τ' ἐσομαι, προδυμούμενος δὲ ἀσχημονῶν γέλωτα ὀφλησθώ. ἀλλ', ὥς μακάριοι,

Ε αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τάγαθόν, ἐάσωμεν τὸ νῦν εἰναι· πλέον γὰρ μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παρούσαν ὁμὴν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ νῦν· ὅς δὲ ἐκγονός τε τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκεῖνῳ, λέγειν ἐθέλω, εἰ καὶ ὑμῖν φίλον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔ anv. 'Ἀλλ', ἔφη, λέγε· εἰσαύθις γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποτίσεις τὴν διήγησιν. Βου-507 λοίμην ἄν, εἴπον, ἐμὲ τε δύνασθαι αὐτὴν ἀποδοῦναι

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a Probably an allusion to the revelation of the mysteries. Cf. Phaedr. 250 c, Phileb. 16 c, Rep. 518 c, 478 c, 479 d, 518 a. It is fantastic to see in it a reference to what Cicero calls the lumina orationis of Isocratean style. The rhetoric and synonyms of this passage are not to be pressed.

b Cf. Phileb. 64 c ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἢδη προθύρωσι, "we are now in the vestibule of the good."

c καὶ μάλα, "jolly well," humorous emphasis on the point that it is much easier to "define" the conventional virtues than to explain the "sanction." Cf. Symp. 189 a, Euthydem. 298 d-e, Herod. viii. 66. It is frequent in the Republic. Ritter gives forty-seven cases. I have fifty-four! But the point that matters is the humorous tone. Cf. e.g. 610 ε.

d Excess of zeal, προθυμία, seemed laughable to the Greeks.
true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably from blind men who go the right way?" "They
do not differ at all," he said. "Is it, then, ugly things
that you prefer to contemplate, things blind and
crooked, when you might hear from others what is
luminous\(^a\) and 'fair'?" "Nay, in heaven's name,
Socrates," said Glaucon, "do not draw back, as it
were, at the very goal.\(^b\) For it will content us if
you explain the good even as you set forth the
nature of justice, sobriety, and the other virtues."
"It will right well\(^c\) content me, my dear fellow," I
said, "but I fear that my powers may fail and that
in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become
a laughing-stock.\(^d\) Nay, my beloved, let us dismiss
for the time being the nature of the good in itself;\(^e\) for
to attain to my present surmise of that seems a pitch
above the impulse that wings my flight to-day.\(^f\) But
of what seems to be the offspring of the good and
most nearly made in its likeness\(^g\) I am willing to
speak if you too wish it, and otherwise to let the
matter drop." "Well, speak on," he said, "for you
will duly pay me the tale of the parent another time."
"I could wish," I said, "that I were able to make
Cf. my interpretation of Iliad i. in fine, Class. Phil. xxii.
(1927) pp. 222-223.
\(^{*}\) Cf. More, Principia Ethica, p. 17 "Good, then, is
indefinable; and yet, so far as I know, there is only one
ethical writer, Professor Henry Sidgwick, who has clearly
recognized and stated this fact."
\(^{'}\) This is not superstitious mysticism but a deliberate
refusal to confine in a formula what requires either a volume
or a symbol. See Introd. p. xxvii, and my Idea of Good in
Plato's Republic, p. 212. \(\tau\alpha \nu\upsilon \nu\upsilon \epsilon \iota \nu\upsilon \epsilon \iota \sigma \alpha \omega \delta \iota \varsigma\) below sometimes lays the
topic on the table, never to be taken up again. Cf. 347 \(\epsilon\)
and 430 \(c.\)
\(^{*}\) Cf. Laws 897 \(d-e, Phaedr. 246 \alpha.\)
This playful interlude relieves the monotony of argument and is a transition to the symbolism. τόκος means both interest and offspring. Cf. 555 ε, Polit. 267 λ, Aristoph. Clouds 34, Thesm. 845, Pindar, Ol. x. 12. The equivocation, which in other languages became a metaphor, has played a great part in the history of opinion about usury. Cf. the article "Usury" in Hastings’s Encyclopaedia of Relig. and Ethics, and Antonio’s

... when did friendship take
A breed for barren metal of his friend?
and you to receive the payment and not merely as now the interest. But at any rate receive this interest and the offspring of the good. Have a care, however, lest I deceive you unintentionally with a false reckoning of the interest.” “We will do our best,” he said, “to be on our guard. Only speak on.” “Yes,” I said, “after first coming to an understanding with you and reminding you of what has been said here before and often on other occasions.” “What?” said he. “We predicate ‘to be’ of many beautiful things and many good things, saying of them severally that they are, and so define them in our speech.” “We do.” “And again, we speak of a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and merely good, and so, in the case of all the things that we then posited as many, we turn about and posit each as a single idea or aspect, assuming it to be a unity and call it that which each really is.” “It is so.” “And the one class of things we say can be seen but not thought, while the ideas can be thought but not seen.” “By all means.” “With which of the parts of ourselves, with which of our faculties, then, do we see visible things?” “With sight,” he said. “And do we not,” I said, “hear audibles with hearing, and perceive all sensibles with the other senses?” “Surely.” “Have you ever observed,” said I, “how much the

\[\text{Cf. Rep. 596 a ff., Phaedo 108 b ff.}\]

b Cf. 475 e f. Plato as often begins by a restatement of the theory of ideas, i.e. practically of the distinction between the concept and the objects of sense. Cf. Rep. 596 a ff., Phaedo 108 b ff.


d \(\delta\ \varepsilon\tau\iota\nu\) is technical for the reality of the ideas. Cf. Phaedo 75 b, d, 78 d, Parmen. 129 b, Symp. 211 c, Rep. 490 b, 532 a, 597 a.
Creator, δημοιοργός, God, the gods, and nature, are all virtual synonyms in such passages.

This is literature, not science. Plato knew that sound required a medium, Tim. 67 b. But the statement here is true enough to illustrate the thought.


Cf. Troland, The Mystery of Mind, p. 82: “In order that there should be vision, it is not sufficient that a physical object should exist before the eyes. There must also be a source of so-called ‘light.’” Cf. Sir John Davies’ poem on the Soul:
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

greatest expenditure the creator of the senses has lavished on the faculty of seeing and being seen?  
  "Why, no, I have not," he said.  "Well, look at it thus.  Do hearing and voice stand in need of another medium so that the one may hear and the other be heard, in the absence of which third element the one will not hear and the other not be heard?  "  
  "They need nothing," he said.  "Neither, I fancy," said I, "do many others, not to say that none require anything of the sort.  Or do you know of any?  "  
  "Not I," he said.  "But do you not observe that vision and the visible do have this further need?  "  
  "How?  "  
  "Though vision may be in the eyes and its possessor may try to use it, and though colour be present, yet without the presence of a third thing specifically and naturally adapted to this purpose, you are aware that vision will see nothing and the colours will remain invisible.  "  
  "What is this thing of which you speak?  "  
  "The thing," I said, "that you call light."  "You say truly," he replied.  "The bond, then, that yokes together visibility and the faculty of sight is more precious by no slight form than that which unites the other pairs, if light is not without honour."  "It surely is far from being so," he said.

But as the sharpest eye discerneth nought  
Except the sunbeams in the air do shine;  
So the best soul with her reflecting thought  
Sees not herself without some light divine.

* Plato would not have tried to explain this loose colloquial genitive, and we need not.

° The loose Herodotean-Thucydidean-Isocratean use of ἴδεα.  Cf. Laws 689 ἴδεατο ἑιδός.  "Form" over-translates ἴδεα here, which is little more than a synonym for γένος above.  Cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 250.
XIX. Τίνα οὖν ἔχεις αἰτιάσασθαι τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν τοῦτον κύριον, οὐ ἢμιν τὸ φῶς ὄψιν τε ποιεῖ ὁ ρόαν ὅ τι κάλλιστα καὶ τὰ ὀρώμενα ὀρᾶσθαι; Ὁντερ καὶ σὺ, ἐφη, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι· τὸν ἦλιον γὰρ ὁλιγον ὃτι ἐρωτάς. Ἄρ' οὖν ἀδε πέφυκεν ὄψις πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν θεόν; Πῶς; Ὡκ ἔστων ἦλιος ἢ ὄψις οὕτε αὐτῇ ὀὕτε ἐν ὃ ἐγγίγνεται, ο ὅ ὁ κα-β λούμεν ὄμμα. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Ἀλλ' ἠλιοειδέστατον γε οὕμαι τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων. Πολύ γε. Ὅνκοῦν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ην ἔχει, ἐκ τοῦτον ταμιευμομένην ὦσπερ ἐπάρρυτον κέκτηται; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ὁ ἦλιος ὄψις μὲν οὐκ ἔστων, αὐτίς ὃ ὁν ἀυτῆς ὀρᾶται ὑπ' αὐτῆς ταύτης;

— Plato was willing to call the stars gods as the barbarians did (Cratyl. 397 d, Aristoph. Peace 406 ff., Herod. iv. 188). Cf. Laws 821 b, 899 b, 950 d, Apol. 26 d, Epinomis 985 b, 988 b.


Yet, surely, O my people, did I deem
Man's justice from the all-just Gods was given;
A light that from some upper fount did beam,
Some better archetype, whose seat was heaven;
A light that, shining from the blest abodes,
Did shadow somewhat of the life of Gods.

Complete Poems of Henry More, p. 77:

Lift myself up in the Theologie
Of heavenly Plato. There I'll contemplate
The Archetype of this sunne, that bright Idee
Of steddie Good, that doth his beams dilate
Through all the worlds, all lives and beings
propagate . . .

. . . a fair delineament

Of that which Good in Plato's school is hight,
His T'agathon with beauteous rayes bedight.
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XIX. "Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen?" "Why, the one that you too and other people mean," he said; "for your question evidently refers to the sun." "Is not this, then, the relation of vision to that divinity?" "What?" "Neither vision itself nor its vehicle, which we call the eye, is identical with the sun." "Why, no." "But it is, I think, the most sunlike of all the instruments of sense." "By far the most." "And does it not receive the power which it possesses as an influx, as it were, dispensed from the sun?" "Certainly." "Is it not also true that the sun is not vision, yet as being the cause thereof

Mediaeval writers have much to say of Plato’s mysterious Tagathon. Aristotle, who rejects the idea of good, uses τάγαθω in much the same way.

It is naïve to take the language of Platonic unction too literally. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 394 ff.

Cf. 509 A, Plotinus, Enn. i. 6. 9 ου γὰρ ἀν πώποτε εἰδέν ὀφθαλμὸς ἡλιοειδῆ μὴ γεγενημένος and vi. 7. 19, Cic. Tusc. i. 25. 63 in fine “quod si in hoc mundo fieri sine deo non potest, ne in sphaera quidem eosdem motus Archimedes sine divino ingenio potuisset imitare,” Manilius ii. 115:

quis caelum posset nisi caeli munere nosse,
et reperire deum nisi qui pars ipse deorum?

Goethe’s

Wär’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,
Die Sonne könnt es nie erblicken,


Cf. Complete Poems of Henry More, p. 113:

Behold a fit resemblance of this truth,
The Sun begetteth both colours and sight . . . , etc.
Oûtôs, ἦ δ' ὁς. Τοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φάναι με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐκχονον, ὅν τάγαθον οὔτωσιν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, ὅ τι περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρὸς τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὀφρατῷ πρὸς τε ὁμαί καὶ τὰ ὀφρώμενα. Πῶς; ἔφη· ἔτι διελθέ μου. Ὅφθαλμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἶσθε ὅτι, ὅταν μηκέτι ἐπὶ ἐκεῖνα τις αὐτοὺς τρέπῃ ὃν ἂν τὰς χρόας τὸ ἠμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχη, ἀλλὰ ὃν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώττουσι τε καὶ ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαρᾶς ὀφέως; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ὅταν δὲ γ', δοίμαι, ὃν ὁ Ἑλίος καταλάμπει, σαφῶς ὅρωσι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὀμμασιν ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται. Τί μήν; Οὔτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁδε νοείν· ὅταν μέν, οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθεια τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερείσηται, ἐνόησε τε καὶ ἐγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται· ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳ κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενον τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον καὶ οὐκ έχοντι. ΕὐςΕὐκτικος γάρ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τήν ἀλήθειαν παρέχουν τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τήν

a i.e. creation was the work of benevolent design. This is one of the few passages in the Republic where the idea of good is considered in relation to the universe, a thesis reserved for poetical or mythical development in the Timaeus. It is idle to construct a systematic metaphysical theology for Plato by identification of τάγαθον here either with God or

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is beheld by vision itself?" "That is so," he said. "This, then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the good which the good begot to stand in a proportion with itself: as the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision." "How is that?" he said; "explain further." "You are aware," I said, "that when the eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose colours the light of day falls but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they appear almost blind, as if pure vision did not dwell in them." "Yes, indeed," he said. "But when, I take it, they are directed upon objects illumined by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears to reside in these same eyes." "Certainly." "Apply this comparison to the soul also in this way. When it is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality shine resplendent it apprehends and knows them and appears to possess reason; but when it inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, the world of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its edge is blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason." "Yes, it does." "This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing with the ideas as a whole. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 512.  


c Plato's rhetoric is not to be pressed. Truth, being, the good, are virtual synonyms. Still, for Plato's ethical and political philosophy the light that makes things intelligible is the idea of good, i.e. the "sanction," and not, as some commentators insist, the truth.
No absolute distinction can be drawn between eidos and idēa in Plato. But idēa may be used to carry the notion of "apprehended aspect" which I think is more pertinent here than the metaphysical entity of the idea, though of course Plato would affirm that. Cf. 369 a, Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 35, What Plato Said, p. 585, Class. Phil. xx. (1925) p. 347.

The meaning is clear. We really understand and know anything only when we apprehend its purpose, the aspect of the good that it reveals. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. The position and case of γνωσκομένης are difficult. But no change proposed is any improvement.

Plato likes to cap a superlative by a further degree of completeness, a climax beyond the climax. Cf. 405 b αἰσχιστον . . . αἰσχιον, 578 b, Symp. 180 a-b and Bury ad loc. The same characteristic can be observed in his method, e.g. in the Symposium where Agathon's speech, which seems the climax, is surpassed by that of Socrates; similarly in the Gorgias and the tenth book of the Republic. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 174, supra Introd. p. lxii.

This and the next half page belong, I think, to rhetoric rather than to systematic metaphysics. Plato the idealist uses transcendental language of his ideal, and is never willing
to the knower, you must say is the idea of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known. Yet fair as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be something fairer still than these you will think rightly of it. But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration it is right to deem light and vision sunlike, but never to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to consider these two their counterparts, as being like the good or boniform, but to think that either of them is the good is not right. Still higher honour belongs to the possession and habit of the good.” “An inconceivable beauty you speak of,” he said, “if it is the source of knowledge and truth, and yet itself surpasses them in beauty. For you surely cannot mean that it is pleasure.” “Hush,”

to admit that expression has done justice to it. But Plato the rationalist distinctly draws the line between his religious language thrown out at an object and his definite logical and practical conclusions. Cf. e.g. Meno 81 d-e.

— áγαθοειδή occurs only here in classical Greek literature.

Plato quite probably coined it for his purpose.

— There is no article in the Greek. Plato is not scrupulous to distinguish good and the good here. Cf. on 505 c, p. 89, note f.

— ‘είς is not yet in Plato quite the technical Aristotelian “habit.” However Protag. 344 c approaches it. Cf. also Phileb. 11 d, 41 c, Ritter-Preller, p. 285.

Plato used many words in periphrasis with the genitive, e.g. είς Laws 625 c, γένος Laws 691 b, Tim. 73 b, 76 e, μοίρα Phaedr. 235 b, 274 e, Menex. 249 b, φύσις Phaedo 109 e, Symp. 186 b, Laws 729 c, 845 d, 944 d, etc. He may have chosen ‘είς here to suggest the ethical aspect of the good as a habit or possession of the soul. The introduction of ήδονη below supports this view. Some interpreters think it = τό áγαθον ως ‘είς, which is possible but rather pointless.

— For οὐ γάρ ὀντου cf. Apol. 20 c, Gorg. 455 λ, Euthyph. 13 λ.
λέγεις. Εὐφήμεις, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ· ἀλλ’ ὅδε μᾶλλον
Β τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἐπισκόπει. Πῶς; Τὸν
ἡλιον τοῖς ὀρωμένοις οὐ μόνον, οἶμαι, τὴν τοῦ
ὀρᾶσθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν
γένεσιν καὶ αὐξήν καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτοῦ
ὀντα. Πῶς γάρ; Καὶ τοῖς γυγνωσκομένοις τοῖςν
μὴ μόνον τὸ γυγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ’
ἐκεῖνον αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας οὖν τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας προσβεία
καὶ δυνάμει ψυχεῖοισ.

C XX. Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων μᾶλα γελοῖος, Ἀπολλων,
ἐφη, δαιμονίας υπερβολῆσ! Σὺ γάρ, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ,
ἀίτιοι, ἀναγκάζων τὰ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ
λέγειν. Καὶ μηδαμίως γ’, ἐφη, παῦσον, εἰ μὴ τι
ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἡλιον ὀμοίωτητα αὐτί διεξύων, εἰ
τη ἀπολείπεις. Ἀλλὰ μήν, εἴπον, συχνά γε ἀπο-

\[\text{\textsuperscript{a}} \text{i.e. not only do we understand a thing when we know its purpose, but a purpose in some mind is the chief cause of its existence, God’s mind for the universe, man’s mind for political institutions. This, being the only interpretation that makes sense of the passage, is presumably more or less consciously Plato’s meaning. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi.}

Quite irrelevant are Plato’s supposed identification of the ἀγαθῶν with the ἐν, one, and Aristotle’s statement, Met. 988 a, that the ideas are the cause of other things and the one is the cause of the ideas.

The remainder of the paragraph belongs to transcendental rhetoric. It has been endlessly quoted and plays a great part in Neoplatonism, in all philosophies of the unknowable and in all negative and mystic theologies.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{b}} \text{It is an error to oppose Plato here to the Alexandrians who sometimes said ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. Plato’s sentence would have made ὄντος very inconvenient here. But εἶναι shows that οὐσίας is not distinguished from τοῦ ὄντος here. ἐπέκεινα became technical and a symbol for the transcendental}

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said I, "but examine the similitude of it still further in this way." "How?

"The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation." "Of course not." "In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power."

XX. And Glaucon very ludicrously said, "Heaven save us, hyperbole can no further go." "The fault is yours," I said, "for compelling me to utter my thoughts about it." "And don't desist," he said, "but at least expound the similitude of the sun, if there is anything that you are omitting." "Why, certainly," I said, "I am omitting a great deal." "Well, in Neoplatonism and all similar philosophies. Cf. Plotinus xvii. 1, Dionysius Areop. De divinis nominibus, ii. 2, Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 87.

* He is amused at Socrates' emphasis. Fanciful is Wilmowitz' notion (Platon, i. p. 209) that the laughable thing is Glaucon's losing control of himself, for which he compares Aristoph. Birds 61. Cf. the extraordinary comment of Proclus, p. 265.

The dramatic humour of Glaucon's surprise is Plato's way of smiling at himself, as he frequently does in the dialogues. Cf. 536 b, 540 b, Lysis 223 b, Protag. 340 E, Charm. 175 E, Cratyli. 426 b, Theaet. 200 b, 197 d, etc. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 172 on the Phaedo.

* "What a comble!" would be nearer the tone of the Greek. There is no good English equivalent for ἑπερβολή. Cf. Sir Thomas Browne's remark that "nothing can be said hyperbolically of God." The banter here relieves the strain, as is Plato's manner.

* Cf. 502 a, Symp. 222 e, Meno 86 e.
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λείπω. Μηδὲ σμικρὸν τοῖνυν, ἐφη, παραλίπης. Οὐμαι μὲν, ἂν δ' ἔγω, καὶ πολὺ ὅμως δὲ, ὥσα γ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι δυνατόν, ἐκών οὐκ ἀπολέιψω. Μή

D γάρ, ἐφη. Νόησον τοῖνυν, ἂν δ' ἔγω, ὀσπερ λέγομεν, δῦν αὐτῷ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεύειν τὸ μὲν νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δ' αὖ ὅρατο, ἣν μὴ οὕρανοι εἰπών δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ ἄνομα. ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔχεις ταῦτα διὰτᾶ εἴδη, ὅρατον, νοητόν; "Εχω. ὁμοιοί τοῖνυν γραμμὴν δίχα τετμημένην λαβὼν ἀνίσα τιμήματα, πάλιν τέμνεν ἐκατέρων τιμήμα ανὰ τὸν αὐτόν λόγον, τὸ τε τοῦ ὄρωμένου γένους καὶ τοῦ νοουμένου, καὶ σοι ἔσται σαφηνεία καὶ ἀσαφεία πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν μὲν

Ε τῷ ὄρωμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἐτερον τιμήμα εἰκόνες. λέγω

510 δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιάς, ἔπειτα τα' ἐν τοῖς ὑδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὡςα πυκνά τε καὶ λεία καὶ φανὰ ἐξυνέστηκε, καὶ πάν το τοιοῦτον, εἰ κατανοεῖς. Ἀλλὰ κατανοῶ. Τὸ τοι- νυν ἐτερον τίθει ὃ τοῦτο ἔοικε, τά τε περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῶα καὶ πάν το φυτεύτων καὶ το σκευαστὸν ὁλον γένος. Τίθημι, ἐφη. Ἡ καὶ ἐθέλοις ἂν αὐτῷ φάναι, ἂν δ' ἔγω, διηρηθοῦν ἀληθεία τε καὶ μή, ὥσ το δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστὸν, οὕτω τὸ ὄρουσθέν

Β πρὸς τὸ ὃ ὀμοιώθη; "Εγὼ', ἐφη, καὶ μάλα. Σκόπει δὴ ἂν καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ τομῆν ἢ τιμητέων.

1 ἀνίσα ADM Proclus, ἄν, ἱσα F, ἄν ὑσα Stallbaum.

a Cf. the similar etymological pun in Cratyl. 396 b-c. Here, as often, the translator must choose between over-translating for some tastes, or not translating at all.

b The meaning is given in the text. Too many commentaries lose the meaning in their study of the imagery. Cf. the notes of Adam, Jowett, Campbell, and Apelt. See Introd. p. xxxi for my interpretation of the passage.

c Some modern and ancient critics prefer ἄν ὑσα. It is a
don't omit the least bit," he said. "I fancy," I said, "that I shall have to pass over much, but nevertheless so far as it is at present practicable I shall not willingly leave anything out." "Do not," he said. "Conceive then," said I, "as we were saying, that there are these two entities, and that one of them is sovereign over the intelligible order and region and the other over the world of the eye-ball, not to say the sky-ball, but let that pass. You surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intelligible." "I do." "Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided into two unequal sections and cut each section again in the same ratio (the section, that is, of the visible and that of the intelligible order), and then as an expression of the ratio of their comparative clearness and obscurity you will have, as one of the sections of the visible world, images. By images I mean; first, shadows, and then reflections in water and on surfaces of dense, smooth and bright texture, and everything of that kind, if you apprehend." "I do." "As the second section assume that of which this is a likeness or an image, that is, the animals about us and all plants and the whole class of objects made by man." "I so assume it," he said. "Would you be willing to say," said I, "that the division in respect of reality and truth or the opposite is expressed by the proportion as is the opinable to the knowable so is the likeness to that of which it is a likeness?" "I certainly would." "Consider then again the way in which we are to make the division of the intelligible section." "In what way?"

little more plausible to make the sections unequal. But again there is doubt which shall be longer, the higher as the more honourable or the lower as the more multitudinous. Cf. Plut. Plat. Quest. 3.  

a Cf. supra 402 b, Soph. 266 b-c.  

b Cf. supra on 508 c, p. 103. note b.
Πη; Ἡ το μὲν αὐτὸν τοῖς τότε τιμηθεῖσιν ὡς εἰκόνι χρωμένη ψυχή ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ υποθέσεων, οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὴν πορευομένην, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τελευτήν, τὸ δ᾽ αὖ ἐτερον ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον ἐξ υποθέσεως ἰοῦσα καὶ ἀνει διὸντε κένιν εἰκόνων αὐτοῖς εἴδει δι᾽ αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιομένην. Ταῦτ᾽ ἐφη, ἃ λέγεις, οὐχ ἰκανῶς ἐμισθοῦν. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ οὖν δ᾽ ἑγὼς ὑπὸ γὰρ τούτων προειρημένων μαθήσει. οἶμαι γὰρ σε εἰδέναι, ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τὸ τε περιττόν καὶ τὸ ἁρτίον καὶ τὰ σχῆματα καὶ γωνίων τριτά εἰδή καὶ ἀλλὰ τούτων ἀδελφα καθ᾽ ἐκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλους ἐτὶ ἁξιοῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων δὲ ἁρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἢ ἡ διεξεύτε τελευτῶσιν ὀμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο, οὐ ἀν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὅμηρσαν. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, τοῦτο γε οἶδα. Οὐκ-

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1 τιμηθεῖσιν DM, μμηθεῖσιν Δ Proclus, τμηθείσιν Φ.

2 [τὸ] ἐπ᾽ Ast.

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a Cf. my Idea of Good in Plato's Republic, pp. 230-234, for the ἀνυπόθετον. Ultimately, the ἀνυπόθετον is the Idea of Good so far as we assume that idea to be attainable either in ethics or in physics. But it is the Idea of Good, not as a transcendent ontological mystery, but in the ethical sense already explained. The ideal dialectician is the man who can, if challenged, run his reasons for any given proposition back, not to some assumed axioma medium, but to its relation to ultimate Good. To call the ἀνυπόθετον the Unconditioned or the Absolute introduces metaphysical associations foreign to the passage. Cf. also Introd. pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.

b The practical meaning of this is independent of the disputed metaphysics. Cf. Introd. pp. xvi-xviii.
"By the distinction that there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends assumption, and in which it makes no use of the images employed by the other section, relying on ideas only and progressing systematically through ideas." "I don't fully understand what you mean by this," he said. "Well, I will try again," said I, "for you will better understand after this preamble. For I think you are aware that students of geometry and reckoning and such subjects first postulate the odd and the even and the various figures and three kinds of angles and other things akin to these in each branch of science, regard them as known, and, treating them as absolute assumptions, do not deign to render any further account of them to themselves or others, taking it for granted that they are obvious to everybody. They take their start from these, and pursuing the inquiry from this point on consistently, conclude with that for the investigation of which they set out." "Certainly," he said, "I know that."


* Aristot. Top. 100 b 2-3 ὤ δὲι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί, exactly expresses Plato's thought and the truth, though Aristotle may have meant it mainly for the principle of non-contradiction and other first principles of logic. Cf. the mediaeval "contra principium negantem non est disputandum." A teacher of geometry will refuse to discuss the psychology of the idea of space, a teacher of chemistry will not permit the class to ask whether matter is "real."
οὖν καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ὀρωμένοις εἶδεις προσχρώνται καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τοὺς διανοούμενοι, ἀλλ' εἰκένους πέρι, οἷς ταύτα ἐοικε, τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἑνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι καὶ διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτης ἂν
Ε γράφουσι, καὶ τάλλα οὕτως, αὐτὰ μὲν ταύτα, ἄπλάττουσί τε καὶ γράφοντος, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὑδάσιν εἰκόνες εἰσὶ, τούτως μὲν ὦς εἰκόνων αὐτῷ κρώμενοι, ζητοῦντες δὲ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν, ἀ οὐκ
511 ἀν ἄλλως ἰδοι τις ἡ τῇ διανοίᾳ. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

XXI. Τούτῳ τοῖνυν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ εἴδος ἐλεγον, ὑποθέσεσι δ' ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρησθαι περὶ τὴν ζητησιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐπ' ἄρχην ἱοῦσαν, ὡς οὖν δυναμένην τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνεν, εἰκότι δὲ κρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικοσθεῖσι καὶ ἐκεῖνοι πρὸς ἐκείνα ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετημημένοις. Μανθάνων,

Β ἔφη, ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετριαῖς τε καὶ ταῖς ταύτης ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις λέγεις. Τὸ τοῖνυν ἔτερον μάνθανε τμῆμα· οὐ νοητοῦ λέγοντα με τούτο, οὐ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἀπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει;

a Cf. 527 Α-Β. This explanation of mathematical reasoning does not differ at all from that of Aristotle and Berkeley and the moderns who praise Aristotle, except that the metaphysical doctrine of ideas is in the background to be asserted if challenged.

b i.e. a bronze sphere would be the original of its imitative reflection in water, but it is in turn only the imperfect imitation of the mathematical idea of a sphere.

c Stenzel, Handbuch, 118 “das er nur mit dem Verstande (διανοίᾳ) sicht” is mistaken. διανοίᾳ is used not in its special sense (“understanding.” See p. 116, note c), but generally for the mind as opposed to the senses. Cf. 511 c.

d For the concessive μὲν cf. 546 e, 529 d, Soph. 225 c.
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI

"And do you not also know that they further make use of the visible forms and talk about them, though they are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness, pursuing their inquiry for the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as such, and not for the sake of the image of it which they draw? And so in all cases. The very things which they mould and draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water, these things they treat in their turn as only images, but what they really seek is to get sight of those realities which can be seen only by the mind."

"True," he said.

XXI. "This then is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true, but with the reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation of it, not proceeding to a first principle because of its inability to extricate itself from and rise above its assumptions, and second, that it uses as images or likenesses the very objects that are themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below them, and that in comparison with these latter are esteemed as clear and held in honour." "I understand," said he, "that you are speaking of what falls under geometry and the kindred arts." "Understand then," said I, "that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics, treating its

* The loosely appended dative ἐκείνος is virtually a dative absolute. Cf. Phaedo 105 a. Wilamowitz' emendation (Platon, ii. p. 384) to πρὸς ἑκείνα, καὶ ἐκείνοις rests on a misunderstanding of the passage.

† The translation of this sentence is correct. But cf. Adam ad loc.

‡ λόγος here suggests both the objective personified argument and the subjective faculty.

§ Cf. 533 a. Phileb. 57 e.
tάς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἄρχας, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὀντὶ ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὅρμας, ἦν μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τῆν τοῦ παντὸς ἄρχην ἰῶν, ἄφάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνῃ. C αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος, ἀλλ' εἰδέσων αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτὰ, καὶ τελευταί εἰς εἰδὴ. Μανθάνω, ἕφη, ικανῶς μὲν οὐ—δοκεῖσ γὰρ μοι συχνόν ἔργον λέγειν—ὅτι μέντοι βούλει δι- ὁρίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλομένων, αἰς αἱ ὑπο- θέσεις ἄρχαι καὶ διἀνοίᾳ μὲν ἀναγκάζονται ἀλλὰ μὴ D αἰσθήσεσιν αὐτὰ θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπ' ἄρχην ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑπο- θέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ ἵσχεν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσι σοι,

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a τῷ ὀντὶ emphasizes the etymological meaning of the word. Similarly ὡς ἀληθῶς in 551 ε, Phaedo 80 n, Phileb. 64 ε. For hypotheses cf. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, p. 229, Thompson on Meno 86 ε. But the thing to note is that the word according to the context may emphasize the arbitrariness of an assumption or the fact that it is the starting-point—ἄρχη—of the inquiry.

b Cf. Symp. 211 c ὥσπερ ἐπαναδᾶσμαι, "like steps of a stair."

c παντὸς ἄρχην taken literally lends support to the view that Plato is thinking of an absolute first principle. But in spite of the metaphysical suggestions for practical purposes the παντὸς ἄρχην may be the virtual equivalent of the ικανὸν of the Phaedo. It is the ἄρχην on which all in the particular case depends and is reached by dialectical agreement, not by arbitrary assumption. Cf. on 510 ι, p. 110, note a. 114
assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all, and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.

"I understand," he said; "not fully, for it is no slight task that you appear to have in mind, but I do understand that you mean to distinguish the aspect of reality and the intelligible, which is contemplated by the power of dialectic, as something truer and more exact than the object of the so-called arts and sciences whose assumptions are arbitrary starting-points. And though it is true that those who contemplate them are compelled to use their understanding and not their senses, yet because they do not go back to the beginning in the study of them but start from assumptions you do not think they possess true

\[d\] This is one of the passages that are misused to attribute to Plato disdain for experience and the perceptions of the senses. Cf. on 530 b, p. 187, note c. The dialectician is able to reason purely in concepts and words without recurring to images. Plato is not here considering how much or little of his knowledge is ultimately derived from experience.

The description undoubtedly applies to a metaphysical philosophy that deduces all things from a transcendent first principle. I have never denied that. The point of my interpretation is that it also describes the method which distinguishes the dialectician as such from the man of science, and that this distinction is for practical and educational purposes the chief result of the discussion, as Plato virtually says in the next few lines. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 233-234.

\[\delta ἰαροῖα\] here as in 511 \(\alpha\) is general and not technical.
kaítoi nohtów óntwn metá ãrchiês. diânoiaν de kalèin moi dokèis têν têν γεωμετρικῶν te kai têν têν τοιούτων ἐξίν ἀλλ' ou noûν, ὡς μεταξύ τι δόξης te kai noû têν diânoiaν óðsaν. 'Ikanótata, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀπεδέξω. kai moi épi tois têttara πριήμασι têttara ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτῳ, E diânoiaν de épi τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ de πίστων ἀπόδοσ καὶ τῷ τελευταῖῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον, ὦσπερ ἐφ' οἷς ἔστων ἄληθεῖας μετέχειν, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφήνειας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν. Μανθάνω, ἐφη, καὶ ξυγχωρῶ καὶ τάττω ὡς λέγεις.

\[a\] νοῦν οἱκ ὦσχεῖν is perhaps intentionally ambiguous. Colloquially the phrase means "have no sense." For its higher meaning cf. Meno 99 c, Laws 962 a.

\[b\] Unnecessary difficulties have been raised about kaítoi and metá here. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 345 mistakenly resorts to emendation. The meaning is plain. Mathematical ideas are ideas or concepts like other ideas; but the mathematician does not deal with them quite as the dialectician deals with ideas and therefore does not possess νοῦς or reason in the highest sense.

\[c\] Here the word diânoia is given a technical meaning as a
intelligenceabout them although the things themselves are intelligibles when apprehended in conjunction with a first principle. And I think you call the mental habit of geometers and their like mind or understanding and not reason because you regard understanding as something intermediate between opinion and reason." "Your interpretation is quite sufficient," I said; "and now, answering to these four sections, assume these four affections occurring in the soul: intellection or reason for the highest, understanding for the second; assign belief to the third, and to the last picture-thinking or conjecture, and arrange them in a proportion, considering that they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality." "I understand," he said; "I concur and arrange them as you bid."

faculty inferior to νοέωs, but, as Plato says, the terminology does not matter. The question has been much and often idly discussed.

\[d\] For ἑπὶ cf. Polit. 280 a, Gorg. 463 b.

\[e\] πίστις is, of course not "faith" in Plato, but Neoplatonists, Christians, and commentators have confused the two ideas hopelessly.

\[f\] ἐικασία undoubtedly had this connotation for Plato.

\[g\] Cf. on 508 c, p. 103, note b.
The image of the cave illustrates by another proportion the contrast between the world of sense-perception and the world of thought. Instead of going above the plane of ordinary experience for the other two members of the proportion, Plato here goes below and invents a fire and shadows cast from it on the walls of a cave to correspond to the sun and the "real" objects of sense. In such a proportion our "real" world becomes the symbol of Plato's ideal world.

Modern fancy may read what meanings it pleases into the Platonic antithesis of the "real" and the "ideal." It has even been treated as an anticipation of the fourth dimension. But Plato never leaves an attentive and critical reader in doubt as to his own intended meaning. There may be at the most a little uncertainty as to which precise traits are intended to carry the symbolism and which are merely indispensable parts of the picture.

The source and first suggestion of Plato's imagery is an interesting speculation, but it is of no significance for the interpretation of the thought. Cf. John Henry Wright, "The Origin of Plato's Cave" in Harvard Studies in Class. Phil. xvii. (1906) pp. 130-142. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, pp. 89-90, thinks the allegory Orphic. Cf. also Wright, loc. cit. pp. 134-135. Empedocles likens our world
I. "Next," said I, "compare our nature in respect of education and its lack to such an experience as this. Picture men dwelling in a sort of subterranean cavern with a long entrance open to the light on its entire width. Conceive them as having their legs and necks fettered from childhood, so that they to a cave, Diels i. 269. Cf. Wright, loc. cit. Wright refers it to the Cave of Vari in Attica, pp. 140-142. Others have supposed that Plato had in mind rather the puppet and marionette shows to which he refers. Cf. Diès in Bulletin Budé, No. 14 (1927) pp. 8 ff.

The suggestiveness of the image has been endless. The most eloquent and frequently quoted passage of Aristotle's early writings is derived from it, Cic. De nat. deor. ii. 37. It is the source of Bacon's "idols of the den." Sir Thomas Browne writes in Urn Burial: "We yet discourse in Plato's den and are but embryo philosophers." Huxley's allegory of "Jack and the Beanstalk" in Evolution and Ethics, pp. 47 ff. is a variation on it. Berkeley recurs to it, Siris, § 263. The Freudians would have still more fantastic interpretations. Cf. Jung, Analytic Psych. p. 232. Eddington perhaps glances at it when he attributes to the new physics the frank realization that physical science is concerned with a world of shadows. Cf. also Complete Poems of Henry More (ed. Grossart), p. 44:

Like men new made contriv'd into a cave
That ne'er saw light, but in that shadowy pit
Some uncouth might them hoodwink hither drave, etc.

b Cf. Phaedo 111 c ἀναπεπταμένους.

c Cf. Phaedo 67 d.
καὶ τὰ σκέλη καὶ τοὺς αὐχένας, ὡστε μένειν τε
Β αὐτοῦ εἰς τε τὸ πρόσθεν μόνον ὅραν, κύκλῳ δὲ
tὰς κεφαλὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἀδυνάτους περιάγειν,
φῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς πυρὸς ἀνωθεν καὶ πόρρωθεν καό-
μενον ὁπισθεν αὐτῶν, μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ
tῶν δεσμωτῶν ἐπάνω ὅδον, παρ' ἢν ἰδὲ τειχίον
παρωκοδομημένον, ὡσπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς πρὸ
tῶν ἄνθρώπων πρὸκειται τὰ παραφράγματα, ὑπὲρ
ἂν τὰ θαύματα δεικνύασιν. Ἄρω, ἕφη. Ὅρα
tοῖςν παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ τειχίον φέροντας ἄνθρώπους
σκεύη τε παντοδαπὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ τειχίου καὶ
515 ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄλλα ζώα λίθων τε καὶ ξύλων καὶ
παντοῖα εἰργασμένα, οἶνον εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν φθεγ-
γομένους, τοὺς δὲ σιγῶντας τῶν παραφερόντων.
"Ατοπὸν, ἕφη, λέγεις εἰκόνα καὶ δεσμώτας ἀτό-
ποις. Ὅμοιος ἦμιν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ· τοὺς γὰρ τοιού-
τους πρῶτον μὲν ἐαυτῶν τε καὶ ἄλληλων οἷς ἂν τι
ἐωρακέναι ἄλλο πλήν τὰς σκιάς τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς
eἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ αὐτῶν τοῦ σπηλαίου προσ-
πιπτούσας; Πῶς γάρ, ἕφη, εἰ ἀκινήτους γε τὰς
Β κεφαλὰς ἔχειν ἡναγκασμένοι εἰεν διὰ βίον; Τὶ δὲ
tῶν παραφερομένων; οὐ ταύτον τοῦτο. Τὶ μὴν;
Εἰ οὐν διαλέγεσθαι οἶοί τ' εἰεν πρὸς ἄλληλους, οὐ
ταύτα ἤγει ἃν τὰ παριόντα αὐτοὺς νομίζειν ὅνομα-

1 αὐτοῦ Hischig: αὐτοῦ.
2 οὗ ταύτα D, οὐ ταύτα AFM, οὐκ αὐτά ci. Vermehren.
3 παριόντα ser. recce., παρόντα AFDM, οὕτα Iamblichus.
remain in the same spot, able to look forward only, and prevented by the fetters from turning their heads. Picture further the light from a fire burning higher up and at a distance behind them, and between the fire and the prisoners and above them a road along which a low wall has been built, as the exhibitors of puppet-shows \(^a\) have partitions before the men themselves, above which they show the puppets.” “All that I see,” he said. “See also, then, men carrying \(^b\) past the wall implements of all kinds that rise above the wall, and human images and shapes of animals as well, wrought in stone and wood and every material, some of these bearers presumably speaking and others silent.” “A strange image you speak of,” he said, “and strange prisoners.” “Like to us,” I said; “for, to begin with, tell me do you think that these men would have seen anything of themselves or of one another except the shadows cast from the fire on the wall of the cave that fronted them?” “How could they,” he said, “if they were compelled to hold their heads unmoved through life?” “And again, would not the same be true of the objects carried past them?” “Surely.” “If then they were able to talk to one another, do you not think that they would suppose that in naming the things

\(^a\) H. Rackham, Class. Rev. xxix. pp. 77-78, suggests that the \(\tau\omega\iota\upsilon\varepsilon\ \theta\alpha\nu\mu\mu\alpha\tau\omega\pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\iota\omicron\iota\) should be translated “at the marionettes” and be classed with \(\kappa\alpha\nu\iota\iota\iota\ \tau\rho\alpha\gamma\varphi\delta\omicron\iota\) (Pseph. ap. Dem. xviii. 116). For the dative he refers to Kuehner-Gerth, ii. i. p. 445.

\(^b\) The men are merely a part of the necessary machinery of the image. Their shadows are not cast on the wall. The artificial objects correspond to the things of sense and opinion in the divided line, and the shadows to the world of reflections, \(\epsilon\lambda\kappa\omicron\nu\epsilon\varsigma\).
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ζευν ἀπερ ὅρμεν; Ἄναγκη. Τί δ'; εἰ καὶ ἥχω τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἐκ τοῦ καταντικρύ ἔχοι, ὅποτε τις τῶν παριῶν φθεγγαίτο, οἴει ἄν ἄλλο τι αὐτοὺς ἥγειοθαί το φθεγγόμενον ἦ τὴν παριῶσαν σκιάν; Μά Δ' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Παντάπασι δή, ἦν δ' ἔγω,

C οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐκ ἄν ἄλλο τι νομίζοιεν τὸ ἄληθὲς ἢ τὰς τῶν σκευαστῶν σκιάς. Πολλή ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Σκόπει δή, ἦν δ' ἔγω, αὐτῶν λύσιν τε καὶ ἱσιν τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ τῆς ἀφροσύνης, οία τις ἄν εἴη, εἰ φύσει τοιάδε ἔμβαινοι αὐτοῖς: ὅποτε τις λυθεῖν καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἐξαιρήσης ἀνισταθεῖ τε καὶ περι-ἀγεῖν τῶν αὐχένα καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἀναβλέπειν, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ποιῶν ἄλγοι τε καὶ διὰ τὰς μαρμαρυγὰς ἀδυνατοὶ καθορᾶν ἔκεινα, ὅν

D τότε τὰς σκιὰς ἐώρα, τί ἄν οἴει αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν, εἰ τις αὐτῷ λέγοι, ὅτι τότε μὲν ἐώρα φλαγρίας, νῦν δὲ μᾶλλον τι ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸς μᾶλλον

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a Cf. Parmen. 130 δ, Tim. 51 β, 52 α, and my De Platonis Idearum doctrina, pp. 24-25; also E. Hoffmann in Wochenschrift f. klas. Phil. xxxvi. (1919) pp. 196-197. As we use the word tree of the trees we see, though the reality (αὐτὸ δ ἐστὶ) is the idea of a tree, so they would speak of the shadows as the world, though the real reference unknown to them would be to the objects that cause the shadows, and back of the objects to the things of the "real" world of which they are copies. The general meaning, which is quite certain, is that they would suppose the shadows to be the realities. The text and the precise turn of expression are doubtful. See crit. note. παριῶτα is intentionally ambiguous in its application to the shadows or to the objects which cast them. They suppose that the names refer to the passing shadows, but (as we know) they
that they saw they were naming the passing objects?" "Necessarily." "And if their prison had an echo from the wall opposite them, when one of the passers-by uttered a sound, do you think that they would suppose anything else than the passing shadow to be the speaker?" "By Zeus, I do not," said he. "Then in every way such prisoners would deem reality to be nothing else than the shadows of the artificial objects." "Quite inevitably," he said. "Consider, then, what would be the manner of the release and healing from these bonds and this folly if in the course of nature something of this sort should happen to them: When one was freed from his fetters and compelled to stand up suddenly and turn his head around and walk and to lift up his eyes to the light, and in doing all this felt pain and, because of the dazzle and glitter of the light, was unable to discern the objects whose shadows he formerly saw, what do you suppose would be his answer if someone told him that what he had seen before was all a cheat and an illusion, but that now, being nearer to reality really apply to the objects. Ideas and particulars are homonymous. Assuming a slight illogicality we can get somewhat the same meaning from the text ταύτα. "Do you not think that they would identify the passing objects (which strictly speaking they do not know) with what they saw?"

Cf. also P. Corssen, Philologische Wochenschrift, 1913, p. 286. He prefers οίκ αυτά and renders: "Sie würden in dem, was sie sähen, das Vorübergehende selbst zu benennen glauben."

b The echo and the voices (515 ά) merely complete the picture.

c Cf. Phaedo 67 ν ηεω, and 82 ν ηεσει τε και καθαρμ. λύσει became technical in Neoplatonism.

d Lit. "by nature." φύσις in Plato often suggests reality and truth.
The entire passage is an obvious allegory of the painful experience of one whose false conceit of knowledge is tested by the Socratic elenchus. Cf. Soph. 230 b-d, and for ἀπορεῶν Meno 80 a, 84 b-c, Theaet. 149 a, Apol. 23 d. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 513 on Meno 80 a, Eurip. Hippol. 247 τὸ γὰρ ὀφθαλμοῦν γνῶμαν ὠδυνᾶ, "it is painful to have one’s opinions set right," and infra 517 a, supra 494 d.

b Cf. Theaet. 175 b, Boethius, Cons. iii. 12 “quicunque in superum diem mentem ducere quaeritis”; infra 529 a, 521 c, and the Neoplatonists’ use of ἀνάγεων and their 124
and turned toward more real things, he saw more truly? And if also one should point out to him each of the passing objects and constrain him by questions to say what it is, do you not think that he would be at a loss \(^a\) and that he would regard what he formerly saw as more real than the things now pointed out to him?" "Far more real," he said.

II. "And if he were compelled to look at the light itself, would not that pain his eyes, and would he not turn away and flee to those things which he is able to discern and regard them as in very deed more clear and exact than the objects pointed out?" "It is so," he said. "And if," said I, "someone should drag him thence by force up the ascent \(^b\) which is rough and steep, and not let him go before he had drawn him out into the light of the sun, do you not think that he would find it painful to be so haled along, and would chafe at it, and when he came out into the light, that his eyes would be filled with its beams so that he would not be able to see \(^c\) even one of the things that we call real?" "Why, no, not immediately," he said. "Then there would be need of habituation, I take it, to enable him to see the things higher up. And at first he would most easily discern the shadows and, after that, the likenesses or reflections in water \(^d\) of men and other things, and later, the things themselves, and from these he would go on to contemplate the appearances in the heavens and heaven itself, more easily by night, looking at the light of the stars and the moon, than by day.


\(^a\) Cf. Laws 897 D, Phaedo 99 D.

\(^b\) Cf. Phaedo 99 D. Stallbaum says this was imitated by Themistius, Orat. iv. p. 51 b.
It is probably a mistake to look for a definite symbolism in all the details of this description. There are more stages of progress than the proportion of four things calls for. All that Plato's thought requires is the general contrast between an unreal and a real world, and the goal of the rise from one to the other in the contemplation of the sun, or the idea of good. Cf. 517 b-c.

i.e. a foreign medium.

Cf. 508 b, and for the idea of good as the cause of all things cf. on 509 b, and Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi.

P. Corssen, Philol. Wochenschrift, 1913, pp. 287-288, unnecessarily proposes to emend ὄν σφείς ἔφρων to ὄν σκιᾶς ἐ. or
the sun and the sun’s light." "Of course." "And so, finally, I suppose, he would be able to look upon the sun itself and see its true nature, not by reflections in water or phantasms of it in an alien setting, but in and by itself in its own place." "Necessarily," he said. "And at this point he would infer and conclude that this it is that provides the seasons and the courses of the year and presides over all things in the visible region, and is in some sort the cause of all these things that they had seen." "Obviously," he said, "that would be the next step." "Well then, if he recalled to mind his first habitation and what passed for wisdom there, and his fellow-bondsmen, do you not think that he would count himself happy in the change and pity them?" "He would indeed." "And if there had been honours and commendations among them which they bestowed on one another and prizes for the man who is quickest to make out the shadows as they pass and best able to remember their customary precedences, sequences and co-existences, and most successful in guessing at what was to come, do you think he would be very keen about such rewards, and that he would envy and emulate those who were honoured by these prisoners and lorded it among them, or that he would feel with Homer and greatly

\( \text{\textquotepercent}{\text{\textquotepercent}} \) Odyss. xi. 489. The quotation is almost as apt as that at the beginning of the Crito.
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έπάρουρον ἕόντα θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ παρʹ ἀκλήρῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἃν πεπονθέναι μᾶλλον ἡ 'κεῖνα

Ε τε δοξάζειν καὶ ἐκείνως ζῆν; Οὔτως, ἐφη, ἐγγυε ὁίμαι, πάν μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι ἃν δεξασθαι ἡ ζῆν ἐκείνως. Καὶ τόδε δὴ ἐννόησον, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. εἰ πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος καταβάς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν θάκον καθίζοιτο, ἄρ' οὐ σκότους ἃν πλέως¹ σχοῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς, ἐξαίφνης ἥκων ἐκ τοῦ ἠλίου; Καὶ μάλα γ', ἐφη. Τάς δὲ δὴ σκιὰς ἐκείνας πάλιν εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν γνωματεύοντα διαμιλλᾶσθαι τοῖς ἀεὶ 517 δεσμῶταις ἐκείνοις, εἶν ὡς ἀμβλυώττει, πρὶν καταστήναι τὰ ὀμματα, οὔτος δ' ὁ χρόνος μὴ πάνυ ὀλίγος εἰς τῆς συνθείας, ἄρ' οὐ γέλωτ' ἃν παράσχοι, καὶ λέγοιτο ἃν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὣς ἀναβάς ἄνω διεφθαρμένος ἥκει τὰ ὀμματα, καὶ ὧτι οὐκ ἄξιον οὔδὲ περάσθαι ἄνω ἵναι; καὶ τὸν ἐπίχειροντα λύειν τε καὶ ἀν-άγειν, εἰ πως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναντο λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀποκτείνυμαι ἃν; Σφόδρα γ', ἐφη.

III. Ταῦτην τούνν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν εἰκόνα, ὃ φίλε Γλαύκων, προσαπτέον ἀπασαν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν Β λεγομένοις, τὴν μὲν δ' ὀψεως φαινομένην ἔδραν τῇ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου οἰκήσει ἀφομοιοῦντα, τὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς τῇ τοῦ ἠλίου δυνάμει τὴν δὲ ἄνω ἀνάβασιν καὶ θέαν τῶν ἄνω τὴν εἰς τὸν νοητὸν

¹ ἃν πλέως Stallb., ἀνάπλεως mss., ἃν ἀνάπλεως Baiter. See Adam ad loc. on the text.


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¹ On the metaphor of darkness and light cf. also Soph. 254 a.

² Like the philosopher in the court-room. Cf. Theaet. 172 c, 173 c ff., Gorg. 484 d-e. Cf. also supra on 487 c-d. 515 d, infra 517 d, Soph. 216 d, Laches 196 b, Phaedr. 249 d.

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prefer while living on earth to be serf of another, a landless man, and endure anything rather than opine with them and live that life?" "Yes," he said, "I think that he would choose to endure anything rather than such a life." "And consider this also," said I, "if such a one should go down again and take his old place would he not get his eyes full of darkness, thus suddenly coming out of the sunlight?" "He would indeed." "Now if he should be required to contend with these perpetual prisoners in 'evaluating' these shadows while his vision was still dim and before his eyes were accustomed to the dark—and this time required for habituation would not be very short—would he not provoke laughter, and would it not be said of him that he had returned from his journey aloft with his eyes ruined and that it was not worth while even to attempt the ascent? And if it were possible to lay hands on and to kill the man who tried to release them and lead them up, would they not kill him?" "They certainly would," he said.

III. "This image then, dear Glaucon, we must apply as a whole to all that has been said, likening the region revealed through sight to the habitation of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power of the sun. And if you assume that the ascent and the contemplation of the things above is the soul's

An obvious allusion to the fate of Socrates. For other stinging allusions to this cf. Gorg. 486 b, 521 c, Meno 100 b-c. Cf. Hamlet's "Wormwood, wormwood" (III. ii. 191). The text is disputed. See crit. note. A. Drachmann, "Zu Platons Staat," Hermes, 1926, p. 110, thinks that an oie: or something like it must be understood as having preceded, at least in Plato's thought, and that αποκτείνειν can be taken as a gloss or variant of αποκτείνωναί and the correct reading must be λαβείν, καί αποκτείνωναί ἂν. See also Adam ad loc.
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tópop τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνοδον τιθεῖς οὐχ ἀμαρτήσει τῆς γ' ἐμῆς ἐλπίδος, ἔπειται ταύτης ἐπιθυμεῖς ἀκούειν· θεος δὲ ποιον οἴδεν, εἰ ἄληθης οὔσα τυγχάνει. τὰ δ' οὖν ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὖτω φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταίᾳ ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόνιμον ὅρασθαι, ὑπῆρέσι δὲ συλλογιστέα εἰναι ὡς ἀρα πάσι πάντων αὐτῇ ὀρθῶν τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία, ἐν τε ὀρατῷ φῶς καὶ τὸν τοῦτον κύριον τεκοῦσα, ἐν τε νοητῷ αὐτῇ κυρίᾳ ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη, καὶ ὦτε δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐμφρόνως πράξεω ἢ ἰδία ἢ δημοσία. Συνομοίαν, ἔφη, καὶ ἐγώ, ὦν γε ἔτος τρόπων δύναμαι. Ἰθι τούνων, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τόδε ξυνοικητὶ καὶ μήθαυμάσης ὅτι οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἔλθοντες οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράττειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω ἀεὶ ἐπείγον- 

D ταῖς αὐτῶν αἰ ψυχαὶ διατρίβειν· εἰκός γὰρ ποιον οὐτως, εἴπερ αὖ κατὰ τὴν προερημένην εἰκόνα τοῦτ' ἐχει. Εἰκός μέντοι, ἔφη. Τί δὲ; τόδε οἴει τι θαυμάστων, εἴ ἀπὸ θείων, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, θεωριῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων τίς ἔλθον κακὰ ἀσχημονεῖ τε καὶ φαίνεται σφόδρα γελοῖος ἐτὶ ἀμβλυώττων καὶ πρὶν ἰκανῶς συνῆθης

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a Cf. 508 b-c, where Arnou (Le Désir de dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin, p. 48) and Robin (La Théorie de l'amour, pp. 83-84) make τότος νοητός refer to the ciel astro-nomique as opposed to the υπερουράνιον τότος of the Phaedrus 247 Α-Ε, 248 b, 248 d-249 Α. The phrase νοητός κόσμος, often attributed to Plato, does not occur in his writings.

b Plato was much less prodigal of affirmation about metaphysical ultimates than interpreters who take his myths literally have supposed. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 515, on Meno 86 b.

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ascension to the intelligible region, you will not miss my surmise, since that is what you desire to hear. But God knows whether it is true. But, at any rate, my dream as it appears to me is that in the region of the known the last thing to be seen and hardly seen is the idea of good, and that when seen it must needs point us to the conclusion that this is indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful, giving birth in the visible world to light, and the author of light and itself in the intelligible world being the authentic source of truth and reason, and that anyone who is to act wisely in private or public must have caught sight of this. "I concur," he said, "so far as I am able." "Come then," I said, "and join me in this further thought, and do not be surprised that those who have attained to this height are not willing to occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and the yearning for that sojourn above. For this, I take it, is likely if in this point too the likeness of our image holds." "Yes, it is likely." "And again, do you think it at all strange," said I, "if a man returning from divine contemplations to the petty miseries of men cuts a sorry figure and appears most ridiculous, if, while still blinking through the gloom, and before he has become sufficiently accustomed

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\( ^{c} \) Cf. 506 \( \varepsilon \).

\( ^{d} \) This is the main point for the Republic. The significance of the idea of good for cosmogony is just glanced at and reserved for the Timaeus. Cf. on 508 \( \nu \), p. 102, note \( a \) and pp. 505-506. For the practical application cf. Meno 81 \( \delta \)-\( \varepsilon \). See also Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi.

\( ^{e} \) Cf. 521 \( \alpha \), 345 \( \varepsilon \), and Vol. I. on 347 \( \delta \), p. 81, note \( d \).

\( ^{f} \) Cf. 346 \( \varepsilon \).

\( ^{g} \) Cf. Theaet. 174 \( \varepsilon \) ἀναχνημοσίνη.
518 εἰ νοῦν γε ἐξοι τις, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, μεμνημένος ἦν, ὃτι διτταί καὶ ἀπὸ διττῶν γίγνονται ἐπιταραξίεις ὑμασίων, ἐκ τε φωτὸς εἰς σκότος μεθυσμένων καὶ ἐκ σκότους εἰς φῶς ταύτα δὲ ταύτα νομίσας γίγνεσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχήν, ὅποτε ἰδοὺ θορυβουμένη τινὰ καὶ ἀδυνατοῦσαν τι καθορᾶν, οὐκ ἀν ἀλογίστως γελῶ, ἀλλ' ἐπισκοποὶ ἄν πότερον ἐκ φανοτέρου βίου ἡκουσα ὑπὸ ἀθείας ἐσκότωταί ἡ

Β ἐξ ἀμαθίας πλεῖονος εἰς φανοτέρον ἠοῦσα ὑπὸ λαμπροτέρου μαρμαρυγῆς ἑμπέπλησται, καὶ οὕτω δή τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίσειεν ἃν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ βίου, τὴν δὲ ἑλείσειεν, καὶ εἰ γελᾶν ἐπὶ αὐτῆς βουλίστο, ἦττον ἃν καταγελαστὸς ὁ γελῶς αὐτῷ εἴη ἢ ὃ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνωθέν ἐκ φωτὸς ἡκουσθη. Καὶ μάλα, ἑφη, μετρίως λέγεις.

IV. Δεὶ δή, εἰπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόνδε νομίσας περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ, τὴν παιδείαν ὅν τοι ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπαγγελλόμενοι φασὶν εἶναι τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι.

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a For the contrast between the philosophical and the pettifogging soul cf. Theaet. 173 c-175 e. Cf. also on 517 a, p. 128, note b.

b For ἀγαλμάτων cf. my Idea of Good in Plato's Republic, p. 237, Soph. 234 c, Polit. 303 c.

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to the environing darkness, he is compelled in courtrooms\textsuperscript{a} or elsewhere to contend about the shadows of justice or the images\textsuperscript{b} that cast the shadows and to wrangle in debate about the notions of these things in the minds of those who have never seen justice itself?” “It would be by no means strange,” he said. “But a sensible man,” I said, “would remember that there are two distinct disturbances of the eyes arising from two causes, according as the shift is from light to darkness or from darkness to light,\textsuperscript{c} and, believing that the same thing happens to the soul too, whenever he saw a soul perturbed and unable to discern something, he would not laugh\textsuperscript{d} unthinkingly, but would observe whether coming from a brighter life its vision was obscured by the unfamiliar darkness, or whether the passage from the deeper dark of ignorance into a more luminous world and the greater brightness had dazzled its vision.\textsuperscript{e} And so he would deem the one happy in its experience and way of life and pity the other, and if it pleased him to laugh at it, his laughter would be less laughable than that at the expense of the soul that had come down from the light above.” “That is a very fair statement,” he said.

IV. “Then, if this is true, our view of these matters must be this, that education is not in reality what some people proclaim it to be in their profes-

\textsuperscript{a} Aristotle, De an. 422 a 20 f. says the over-bright is δόπατον but otherwise than the dark.
\textsuperscript{b} Cf. Theaet. 175 d-e.
\textsuperscript{c} Lit. “or whether coming from a deeper ignorance into a more luminous world, it is dazzled by the brilliance of a greater light.”
\textsuperscript{d} i.e. only after that. For οὔτω δή in this sense cf. 484 d, 429 d, 443 e, Charm. 171 e.
PLATO

C φαί δέ ποι οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης οφείς ἐντιθέναι, οἶον τυφλοῖς οφθαλμοῖς οὕν ἐντιθέντες. Φασὶ γὰρ οὐν, ἐφε. 'Ὁ δέ γε νῦν λόγος, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, σημαίνει, ταύτην τὴν ἐνούσαν ἐκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὀργανόν, ὥς καταμανθάνει ἐκαστός, οἶον εἰ ὃμμα μὴ δυνατὸν ἢν ἄλλως ἢ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους, οὕτω ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκ τοῦ γεγομένου περιακτέων εἶναι, ἐως ἂν εἰς τὸ ὄν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανώτατον δυνατη γένηται

D ἀνασχέσαται θεωμένη τούτῳ δ' εἶναι φαμεν τάγαθόν ἢ γάρ; Ναὶ. Τούτου τούν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοῦ τέχνη ἂν εἰ ἡ τῆς περιαγωγῆς, τίνα τρόπον ὡς βράστα τε καὶ ἀνωμιώτατα μεταστραφήσεται, οὐ τοῦ ἐμποίησαν αὐτῷ τὸ ὄραν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχοντι μὲν αὐτῷ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ τετραμμένῳ οὐδὲ βλέποντι οἱ ἐδει, τούτῳ διαμηχανήσασθαι. 'Εστικε γάρ, ἐφε.

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b Cf. Theognis 429 ff. Stallbaum compares Eurip. Hippol. 917 f. Similarly Anon. Theaet. Comm. (Berlin, 1905), p. 32, 48, 4 καὶ δεῖν αὐτῇ οὐκ ἐνθέσεως μαθημάτων, ἀλλὰ ἀναμνήσεως. Cf. also St. Augustine: “Nolite putare quemquam hominem aliquid discere ab homine. Admonere possimus per strepitum vocis nostrae;” and Emerson’s “Strictly speaking, it is not instruction but provocation that I can receive from another soul.”

c περιακτέων is probably a reference to the περιακτοί or triangular prisms on each side of the stage. They revolved on an axis and had different scenes painted on their three faces. Many scholars are of the opinion that they were not known in the classical period, as they are mentioned only by late 134.
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII

visions. What they aver is that they can put true knowledge into a soul that does not possess it, as if they were inserting vision into blind eyes. “They do indeed,” he said. “But our present argument indicates,” said I, “that the true analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eye that could not be converted to the light from the darkness except by turning the whole body. Even so this organ of knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul, like the scene-shifting periakτ in the theatre, until the soul is able to endure the contemplation of essence and the brightest region of being. And this, we say, is the good, do we not?” “Yes.” “Of this very thing, then,” I said, “there might be an art, an art of the speediest and most effective shifting or conversion of the soul, not an art of producing vision in it, but on the assumption that it possesses vision but does not rightly direct it and does not look where it should, an art of bringing this about.” “Yes, that seems likely,” he said. “Then writers; but others do not consider this conclusive evidence, as a number of classical plays seem to have required something of the sort. Cf. O. Navarre in Daremberg-Saglio s.v. Machine, p. 1469.

a Hard-headed distaste for the unctuous or seeming mysticism of Plato’s language should not blind us to the plain meaning. Unlike Schopenhauer, who affirms the moral will to be unchangeable, Plato says that men may be preached and drilled into ordinary morality, but that the degree of their intelligence is an unalterable endowment of nature. Some teachers will concur.

b Plato often distinguishes the things that do or do not admit of reduction to an art or science. Cf. on 488 ε, p. 22, note b. Adam is mistaken in taking it “Education (ἡ παίδεια) would be an art,” etc.
This then is Plato’s answer (intended from the first) to the question whether virtue can be taught, debated in the Protagoras and Meno. The intellectual virtues (to use Aristotle’s term), broadly speaking, cannot be taught; they are a gift. And the highest moral virtue is inseparable from rightly directed intellectual virtue. Ordinary moral virtue is not rightly taught in democratic Athens, but comes by the grace of God. In a reformed state it could be systematically inculcated and “taught.” Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 511-512 on Meno 70 a. But we need not infer that Plato did not believe in mental discipline. Cf. Charles Fox, Educational Psychology, p. 164 “The conception of mental discipline is at least as old as Plato, as may be seen from the seventh book of the Republic . . .”

the other so-called virtues of the soul do seem akin to those of the body. For it is true that where they do not pre-exist, they are afterwards created by habit and practice. But the excellence of thought, it seems, is certainly of a more divine quality, a thing that never loses its potency, but, according to the direction of its conversion, becomes useful and beneficent, or, again, useless and harmful. Have you never observed in those who are popularly spoken of as bad, but smart men, how keen is the vision of the little soul, how quick it is to discern the things that interest it, a proof that it is not a poor vision which it has, but one forcibly enlisted in the service of evil, so that the sharper its sight the more mischief it accomplishes? “I certainly have,” he said. “Observe then,” said I, “that this part of such a soul, if it had been hammered from childhood, and had thus been struck free of the leaden weights, so that all virtues except wisdom could be acquired habitually

Plato uses such synonyms as ἰδιόνοια, σοφία, νοῦς, δίάνοια, etc., as suits his purpose and context. He makes no attempt to define and discriminate them with impracticable Aristotelian meticulousness.

Cf. Theaet. 176 d, Laws 689 c-d, Cic. De offic. i. 19, and also Laws 819 a.

Cf. Theaet. 195 a, Ibid. 173 a σμικρὸι...τὰς ψυχὰς, Marcus Aurelius’ ψυχάριον εἰ βαστάζων νεκρὸν, Swinburne’s “A little soul for a little bears up this corpse which is man” (“Hymn to Proserpine,” in fine), Tennyson’s “If half the little soul is dirt.”

Lit. “Toward which it is turned.”

The meaning is plain, the precise nature of the image that carries it is doubtful. Jowett’s “circumcision” was suggested by Stallbaum’s “purgata ac circumcisa,” but carries alien associations. The whole may be compared with the incrustation of the soul, infra 611 c-d, and with Phaedo 81 v f.
PLATO

έωδοδαίς τε καὶ τοιούτων ἡδοναίς τε καὶ λιχνείαις προσφυεῖς γιγνόμεναι κάτω1 στρέφοντι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὀψιν: ὡν εἰ ἀπαλλαγέν περιεστρέφετο εἰς τάληθή, καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτό τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄξυτατα ἔωρα, ἄστερ καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἃ νῦν τέτραπται. Εἰκός γε, ἐφη. Τί δαί; τόδε οὐκ εἰκός, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρήμενων, μήτε τοὺς ἀπαθεύτους καὶ ἀληθείας ἀπείρους

ѣκανὼς ἂν ποτὲ πάλιν ἐπιτροπεῖσαι, μήτε τοὺς ἐν παιδείᾳ ἐωμένους διατρίβειν διὰ τέλους, τοὺς μὲν ὁτι σκοποῦν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἕνα, οὐ στοχαζο-

μένους δεὶ ἀπαντὰ πράττειν ἄ ἂν πράττοισιν ὕδα τε καὶ δημοσία, τοὺς δὲ ὁτι ἐκόντες εἶναι οὐ πράξοισιν, ἤγοιμενοὶ ἐν μακάρων νήσοις ζῶντες ἔτι ἀπωκίσθαι; Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη. Ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τῶν οἰκουσῶν τάς τε βελτίωτας φύσεις ἀναγκάσαι ἀφικέσθαι πρὸς τὸ μάθημα δ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐφαμεν εἰναι μέγιστον, ἰδεῖν τε τὸ

Δ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀναβηναι ἐκείνην τὴν ἀνάβασιν; καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀναβάντες ἰκανῶς ἰδοσι, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν αὐτοῖς δ νῦν ἐπιτρέπεται. Τὸ ποῦον δῆ; Τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καταμένειν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν πάλιν

1 κάτω Hermann: περὶ κάτω mss.: περὶ τὰ κάτω Iamblichus.

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a Or “eye of the mind.” Cf. 533 ν, Sym. 219 λ, Soph. 254 λ, Aristot. Eth. 1144 a 30, and the parallels and imitations collected by Gomperz, Apol. der Heilkunst, 166-167. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 534, on Phaedo 99 ε, Ovid, Met. xv. 64:

... quae natura negabat visibus humanis, oculis ea pectoris hausit.

Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. pp. 12-13, 15, and perhaps Odyssey, i. 115, Marc. Aurel. iv. 29 καταμένειν τῷ νοερῷ δρματι.

b For likely and necessary cf. on 485 c, p. 6, note c.

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to speak, of our birth and becoming, which attaching themselves to it by food and similar pleasures and gluttonies turn downwards the vision of the soul a —if, I say, freed from these, it had suffered a conversion towards the things that are real and true, that same faculty of the same men would have been most keen in its vision of the higher things, just as it is for the things toward which it is now turned.” “It is likely,” he said. “Well, then,” said I, “is not this also likely b and a necessary consequence of what has been said, that neither could men who are uneducated and inexperienced in truth ever adequately preside over a state, nor could those who had been permitted to linger on to the end in the pursuit of culture—the one because they have no single aim c and purpose in life to which all their actions, public and private, must be directed, and the others, because they will not voluntarily engage in action, believing that while still living they have been transported to the Islands of the Blest. d” “True,” he said. “It is the duty of us, the founders, then,” said I, “to compel the best natures to attain the knowledge which we pronounced the greatest, and to win to the vision of the good, to scale that ascent, and when they have reached the heights and taken an adequate view, we must not allow what is now permitted.” “What is that?” “That they should linger there,” I said, “and refuse

6 σκοτεῖν: this is what distinguishes the philosophic statesman from the opportunist politician. Cf. 452 e, Laws 962 a-b, d, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 18, n. 102.
4 Cf. 540 b, Corg. 526 c, infra 520 d ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ and Phaedo 114 c, 109 b. Because they will still suppose that they are “building Jerusalem in England’s green and pleasant land” (Blake).
PLATO

καταβαίνειν παρ’ ἐκεῖνος τοὺς δεσμώτας μηδὲ μετέχειν τῶν παρ’ ἐκεῖνοις πόλων τε καὶ τιμῶν, εἰτε φαυλότεραι εἰτε σπουδαιότεραι. "Επειτ’, ἕφη, ἀδικήσομεν αὐτούς, καὶ ποιήσομεν χείρον ζην, δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ὅν ἀμείνον;

Ε Ἡν ὑπελάθεις, ἵνα δ’ ἐγὼ, πάλιν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι νόμῳ οὐ τοῦτο μέλει, ὅπως ἐν τι γένος ἐν πόλει διαφέροντως εὐ πράξει, ἀλλ’ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει τοῦτο μηχανᾶται ἐγγενέσθαι, ἐξουσιώττων τοὺς πολίτας πειθῶ τε καὶ ἀνάγκῃ, ποιῶν μεταδιδόναι ἀλλήλους 520 τῆς ὁφελείας, ἤν ἂν ἐκαστὸ τὸ κοινὸν δυνατοὶ ὧσιν ὁφελεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμποίησιν τοιούτους ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ πόλει, οὐχ ἵνα ἄφη τρέπεσθαι ὅτι ἐκαστὸς βουλέται, ἀλλ’ ἵνα καταχρήσῃ πόλις αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν ἔνδεσμον τῆς πόλεως. "Ἀληθῆ, ἕφη: ἐπελαθόμην γὰρ. Σκέψαι τοινῦν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅτι οὐδ’ ἀδικήσομεν τοὺς παρ’ ἦμῖν φιλοσόφους γυνομένους, ἀλλὰ δίκαια πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔροιμεν, προσαναγκάζοντες τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τε καὶ Β φυλάττειν. ἔροιμεν γὰρ, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι τοιοῦτοι γυνώμενοι εἰκότως οὐ μετέχουσι τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς πόλων: αὐτόματος γὰρ ἐμφύσουσα ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἐκάστηθι πολιτείας, δίκην δ’ ἐχει τὸ γε αὐτοφύες, μηδὲν τροφὴν ὀφεῖλον, μηδ’ ἐκτίνειν

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a Cf. infra 539 ε and Laws 803 b-c, and on 520 c, Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, p. 53 "the hero of our story descended the bean-stalk and came back to the common world," etc.


c i.e. happiness, not of course exceptional happiness.

d Persuasion and compulsion are often bracketed or contrasted. Cf. also Laws 661 c, 722 b, 711 c, Rep. 548 b.

ε Cf. 369 c ff. The reference there however is only to the economic division of labour. For the idea that laws should
to go down again among those bondsmen and share their labours and honours, whether they are of less or of greater worth." "Do you mean to say that we must do them this wrong, and compel them to live an inferior life when the better is in their power?"

V. "You have again forgotten, my friend," said I, "that the law is not concerned with the special happiness of any class in the state, but is trying to produce this condition in the city as a whole, harmonizing and adapting the citizens to one another by persuasion and compulsion, and requiring them to impart to one another any benefit which they are severally able to bestow upon the community, and that it itself creates such men in the state, not that it may allow each to take what course pleases him, but with a view to using them for the binding together of the commonwealth." "True," he said, "I did forget it." "Observe, then, Glaucon," said I, "that we shall not be wronging, either, the philosophers who arise among us, but that we can justify our action when we constrain them to take charge of the other citizens and be their guardians. For we will say to them that it is natural that men of similar quality who spring up in other cities should not share in the labours there. For they grow up spontaneously from no volition of the government in the several states, and it is justice that the self-grown, indebted to none for its breeding, should not be zealous either to pay be for the good of the whole state cf. 420 b ff., 466 a, 341-342, Laws 715 b, 757 d, 875 a.

† Noblesse oblige. This idea is now a commonplace of communist orations.

§ αὐτόματος: cf. Protag. 320 a, Euthyd. 282 c. For the thought that there are a few men naturally good in any state cf. also Laws 951 b, 642 c-d.
των προθυμεῖσθαι τὰ τροφεῖα. ὅμως δ’ ἦμεισ ὑμῖν τε αὐτοῖς τῇ τε ἄλλῃ πόλει ὦστε εἰν σμῆνεσιν ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας ἐγεννῆσαιν, αμενόν τε καὶ τελεώτερον ἐκεῖνων πεπαιδευμένους καὶ μᾶλλον δυνατοὺς ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν. καταβατέον οὖν ἐν μέρει ἐκάστω εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἔννοικησιν καὶ ἐξυπνοιστέον τὰ σκοτεινὰ θεάσασθαι· ἐξυπνιζόμενοι γὰρ μυρίῳ βελτιῶν ὄψεσθε τῶν ἐκεῖ, καὶ γνώσεσθε ἐκαστα τὰ ἐϊδώλα ἀττὰ ἐστὶ καὶ ὄν, διὰ τὸ τάληθη ἐωρακέναι καλῶν τε καὶ δυκαίων καὶ ἁγαθῶν πέρι· καὶ οὕτω ὑπάρ ὑμῖν καὶ ὑμῖν ἡ πόλις οἰκὴσεται, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ὀναρ, ὡς νῦν αἱ πολλαὶ ὑπὸ σκιαμαχοῦν·

D τῶν τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιαζόντων περὶ τοῦ ἀρχεων οἰκοῦνται, ὡς μεγάλῳ τινὸς ἁγαθοῦ ἄντος. τὸ δὲ ποι ἄληθές ὄς’ ἔχει· ἐν πόλει ἦ ἦκιστα πρόθυμοι ἁρχεων οἱ μελλοντες ἀρχεων, ταύτην ἀριστα καὶ ἀστασιαστότατα ἀνάγκη οἰκεῖσθαι, τὴν δ’ ἐναντίον ἁρχοντας σχοῦσαν ἐναντίως. Πάννυ

a Cf. Isoc. Archidamus 108 ἀποδώμεν τὰ τροφεῖα τῇ πατρίδι. Stallbaum refers also to Phoenissae 44. For the country as τροφὸς see Vol. I. p. 303, note e on 414 e.

b Cf. Polit. 301 d-e, Xen. Cyr. v. 1. 24, Oecon. 7. 32-33.

c For τελεώτερον . . . πεπαιδευμένου cf. Prot. 342 ἐ τελέως πεπαιδευμένου.

d They must descend into the cave again. Cf. infra 539 e and Laws 803 b-c. Cf. Burnet, Early Greek Philos. pp. 89-90: “It was he alone, so far as we know, that insisted on philosophers descending by turns into the cave from which they had been released and coming to the help of their former fellow-prisoners.” He agrees with Stewart (Myths of Plato, p. 252, n. 2) that Plato had in mind the Orphic κατάβασις εἰς “Αἰδών τοῦ “rescue the spirits in prison.” Cf. Wright, Harvard Studies, xvii. p. 139 and Complete Poems of Henry More, pp. xix-xx “All which is agreeable to that opinion of Plato: That some descend hither to declare the Being and Nature of the Gods; and for the greater Health,
to anyone the price of its nurture. But you we have engendered for yourselves and the rest of the city to be, as it were, king-bees and leaders in the hive. You have received a better and more complete education than the others, and you are more capable of sharing both ways of life. Down you must go then, each in his turn, to the habitation of the others and accustom yourselves to the observation of the obscure things there. For once habituated you will discern them infinitely better than the dwellers there, and you will know what each of the ‘idols’ is and whereof it is a semblance, because you have seen the reality of the beautiful, the just and the good. So our city will be governed by us and you with waking minds, and not, as most cities now which are inhabited and ruled darkly as in a dream by men who fight one another for shadows and wrangle for office as if that were a great good, when the truth is that the city in which those who are to rule are least eager to hold office must needs be best administered and most free from dissension, and the state that gets the contrary type of ruler will be the opposite of this.”

Purity and Perfection of this Lower World.” This is taking Plato somewhat too literally and confusing him with Plotinus.

* i.e. images, Bacon’s “idols of the den.”
* Plato is fond of the contrast, ἐπαρ . . . ἐπαρ. Cf. 476 c, Phaedr. 277 d, Phileb. 36 e, 65 e, Polit. 277 d, 278 e, Theaet. 158 b, Rep. 574 d, 576 b, Tim. 71 e, Laws 969 b, also 533 b-c.
* Cf. on 586 c, p. 393; Shelley, Adonais st. 39 “keep with phantoms an unprofitable strife”; Arnold, “Dover Beach”:
  . . . a darkling plain . . .
  Where ignorant armies clash by night.
* Cf. on 517 c, p. 131, note e.
μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 'Απειθήσουσιν οὖν ἥμιν, οἴει, οἱ τρόφιμοι ταῦτ' ἀκούοντες, καὶ οὐκ ἐθελήσουσι ἐξυμπονεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐκαστοί ἐν μέρει, τὸν δὲ πολὺν χρόνον μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων οἰκεῖν ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ;

Ε Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη ἀδικαίος γὰρ δὴ δικαίως ἐπιτάξομεν. παντὸς μὴν μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαίων αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸς εἰς τὸ ἄρχειν, τοῦτοντιον τῶν νῦν ἐν ἐκάστῃ πόλει ἄρχοντων. Οὐτώ γὰρ ἔχει, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε: εἰ μὲν βίον ἐξευρήσεις ἀμείνω τοῦ ἄρχειν τοὺς μέλλουσιν ἄρξειν, ἔστι σοι δυνατὴ γενέσθαι πόλις εὐθομένη: ἐν μόνη γὰρ αὐτῇ ἄρξουσι οἱ τῷ οὐντι πλοῦσιοι, οὐ χρυσίοι, ἀλλ' οὐ δεῖ τὸν εὐδαίμονα πλουτεῖν, ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς τε καὶ ἐμφρονος. εἰ δὲ πτωχοὶ καὶ πεινώντες ἁγαθῶν ἱδίων ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ίασων, ἀντεῖθεν οἴμενοι τάγαθον δεῖν ἄρταξεν, οὐκ ἔστι: περιμάχητον γὰρ τὸ ἄρχειν γυγνόμενον, οἰκεῖος ὡς καὶ ἐνδὸν τοιοῦτος πόλεμος αὐτοὺς τε ἀπόλλυσε καὶ τὴν

Β ἀλλὰν πόλιν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. 'Εχεις οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, βίον ἄλλον των πολιτικῶν ἄρχων καταφρονοῦντας η τῶν τῆς ἀληθείας φιλοσοφίας; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἢ δ' ὡς. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε μὴ ἑραστᾶς τοῦ ἄρχειν ἴναι ἐπι αὐτό: εἰ δὲ μὴ, οἱ γε ἀντιρασταὶ μαχοῦνται. Πῶς δ' οὖ; Τίνας οὖν ἄλλους ἀναγκάσεις ἴναι ἐπὶ φυλακή τῆς πόλεως, η οἱ

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\[a\] The world of ideas, the upper world as opposed to that of the cave. Cf. Stallbaum [\textit{ad loc.}]

\[b\] Cf. supra Vol. I. p. 80, note b on 347 c.

\[c\] Cf. Phaedrus in fine, supra 416 \textit{e}-417 \textit{a}, \textit{infra} 547 \textit{b}.

\[d\] Stallbaum refers to Xen. Cyr. viii. 3. 39 ὁμοίως ὡς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἤδην πλουτεῖν, ὅτι πεινήσας χρημάτων πεπλούθηκας, "for you must enjoy your riches much more, I think, for the very reason that it was only after being hungry for wealth that you became rich." (Loeb tr.) Cf. also \textit{infra} 577 \textit{e}-578 \textit{a}, and Adam \textit{ad loc.} 144
"By all means," he said. "Will our alumni, then, disobey us when we tell them this, and will they refuse to share in the labours of state each in his turn while permitted to dwell the most of the time with one another in that purer world?" "Impossible," he said: "for we shall be imposing just commands on men who are just. Yet they will assuredly approach office as an unavoidable necessity, and in the opposite temper from that of the present rulers in our cities." "For the fact is, dear friend," said I, "if you can discover a better way of life than office-holding for your future rulers, a well-governed city becomes a possibility. For only in such a state will those rule who are really rich, not in gold, but in the wealth that makes happiness—a good and wise life. But if, being beggars and starvelings from lack of goods of their own, they turn to affairs of state thinking that it is thence that they should grasp their own good, then it is impossible. For when office and rule become the prizes of contention, such a civil and internecine strife destroys the office-seekers themselves and the city as well." "Most true," he said. "Can you name any other type or ideal of life that looks with scorn on political office except the life of true philosophers?" I asked. "No, by Zeus," he said. "But what we require," I said, "is that those who take office should not be lovers of rule. Otherwise there will be a contest with rival lovers." "Surely." "What others, then, will you compel to undertake the guardianship of the city

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*Cf. supra 347 d, Laws 715 a, also 586 c and What Plato Said, p. 627, on Laws 678 e, Isoc. Areop. 24, Pan. 145 and 146.

*Cf. Eurip. Heracleidæ 415 οίκειος ἢδη πόλεμος ἔκαστε 

*Cf. infra 580 d ff., pp. 370 ff.

*Cf. infra 580 d ff., pp. 370 ff.

*iēvai ेरि in erotic language means "to woo." Cf. on 489 d, p. 26, note b, also 347 c, 588 b, 475 c.
perὶ τοῦτων τε φρονιμώτατοι, δι' ὃν ἄριστα πόλις
οἰκεῖται, ἔχουσι τε τιμᾶς ἄλλας καὶ βίον ἀμείνω
τοῦ πολιτικοῦ; Οὐδένας ἄλλους, ἔφη.

C VI. Βούλει οὖν τοῦτ ἢδη σκοπῶμεν, τίνα τρόπον
οἱ τοιούτοι ἐγγενήσονται καὶ πῶς τις ἀνάξει αὐτοὺς
eis φῶς, ὥσπερ ἐξ "Αιδον λέγονται δὴ τινες εἰς
θεοὺς ἀνέλθειν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βουλομαι; ἔφη.
Τούτῳ δὴ, ὡς έοικεν, οὐκ ὀστράκου ἢν εἰς περι-
στροφὴ ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς περιαγωγῆ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινὸς
ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινὴν, τοῦ ὄντος οὐσα ἐπάνοδος, ἓν
δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἰναι. Πάνω μὲν
οὖν. Οὐκοῦν δει σκοπεῖσθαι τί τῶν μαθημάτων
D ἔχει τοιαύτην δύναμιν; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Τί ἂν οὖν
eἰς, ὦ Γλαύκων, μάθημα ψυχῆς ὁλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ
γυμνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν; τόδε δ' ἐννοῶ λέγων ἄμα:
οὐκ ἀληθῶς μέντοι πολέμου ἔφαμεν τοῦτοι

1 οὔσα ἐπάνοδος Hermann: οὔσαν ἐπάνοδον ΛΦΔΜ, λοίζης
ἐπάνοδον ser. rece.: οὔσαν ἐπάνοδος ci. Cobet.

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a Cf. on 515 e, p. 124, note b.
b This has been much debated. Cf. Adam ad loc. Professor Linforth argues from Pausanias i. 34 that Amphaiarua is meant.
c Cf. Phaedr. 241 b.; also the description of the game in Plato Comicus, fr. 153, apud Norwood, Greek Comedy, p. 167. The players were divided into two groups. A shell or potsherd, black on one side and white on the other, was thrown, and according to the face on which it fell one group fled and the other pursued. Cf. also commentators on Aristoph. Knights 855.
d Much quoted by Neoplatonists and Christian Fathers. Cf. Stallbaum ad loc. Again we need to remember that Plato’s main and explicitly reiterated purpose is to describe a course of study that will develop the power of consecutive consistent abstract thinking. All metaphysical and mystical suggestions of the imagery which conveys this idea are

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than those who have most intelligence of the principles that are the means of good government and who possess distinctions of another kind and a life that is preferable to the political life?" "No others," he said.

VI. "Would you, then, have us proceed to consider how such men may be produced in a state and how they may be led upward a to the light even as some b are fabled to have ascended from Hades to the gods?" "Of course I would." "So this, it seems, would not be the whirling of the shell c in the children's game, but a conversion and turning about of the soul from a day whose light is darkness to the veritable day—that ascension d to reality of our parable which we will affirm to be true philosophy." "By all means." "Must we not, then, consider what studies have the power to effect this?" "Of course." "What, then, Glaucon, would be the study that would draw the soul away from the world of becoming to the world of being? A thought strikes me while I speak e: Did we not say that these men in youth must be athletes secondary and subordinate. So, e.g. Urwick, The Message of Plato, pp. 66-67, is mistaken when he says "... Plato expressly tells us that his education is designed simply and solely to awaken the spiritual faculty which every soul contains, by 'wheeling the soul round and turning it away from the world of change and decay.' He is not concerned with any of those 'excellences of mind' which may be produced by training and discipline, his only aim is to open the eye of the soul ..." The general meaning of the sentence is plain but the text is disputed. See crit. note.

anagkaiou einaiv neous ontoas; "Ephamev gar. Dei
ara kal tou to prosekein to madhuma o zhtoymen,
pros ekew. To poion; Mh akhrstov poliem-
kois andrasin einaiv. Dei menoi, ephi, eiper oion

E te. Gumnastikhi mou kai mouistikhi ev ge tw proste
epaidevontro hmiw. *Hn tauta, ephi. Kai gumnas-
stikhi men pou peri gynomevou kai apollumevou
tetevtake1 somatos gar auqhs kai phisewos
episatei. Faivetai. Tou to men dh ouk av eph

522 o zhtoymen madhuma. Ov gar. 'Alla ara mouistik,
oshin to protero dynlthomev; 'Alla hnh ekewi y,
ephi, antistrophos tis gumnastikhs, ei mevmhisi,
thei paiadevousa tous philakas, kata te armonian
evarmosian twa, ouk episthmi, paradoxousa,
kai kata rythmon euryemian, ev te tois logois
etera toutwv adelph ephi2 allta exousa, kai osoi
muvdies twn logon kai osoi altheinwtero hsan
madhuma de pros toiovtov ti agadon,3 oion ou
B zhtveis, oudein hnh ev auti. 'Akribhestata, hnh dh
egi, anamimnikseis me tw gar onti toiovtov
oudein eixe. Alla, o deamwne Plaikous, ti an eph
toiovtov; aev te gar techi banausoi pou apasai
edozan einaiv. Pws dh ou; ka mouh ti et' all

1 tetevtake(\nu) ADM Euseb., teuhtake F, teuhte d vulg.
2 ephi F Euseb., ephi ADM.
3 agadon ADM, agon Euseb. et gr D, ag (sic) F.

a Cf. 416 D, 422 B, 404 A, and Vol. I. p. 266, note a, on
403 E.
b proseghein is here used in its etymological sense. Cf.
pp. 66-67 on 500 A.
c This further prerequisite of the higher education follows
naturally from the plan of the Republic; but it does not
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of war?" "We did." "Then the study for which we are seeking must have this additional qualification." "What one?" "That it be not useless to soldiers." "Why, yes, it must," he said, "if that is possible." "But in our previous account they were educated in gymnastics and music." "They were," he said. "And gymnastics, I take it, is devoted to that which grows and perishes; for it presides over the growth and decay of the body." "Obviously." "Then this cannot be the study that we seek." "No." "Is it, then, music, so far as we have already described it?" "Nay, that," he said, "was the counterpart of gymnastics, if you remember. It educated the guardians through habits, imparting by the melody a certain harmony of spirit that is not science, and by the rhythm measure and grace, and also qualities akin to these in the words of tales that are fables and those that are more nearly true. But it included no study that tended to any such good as you are now seeking." "Your recollection is most exact," I said; "for in fact it had nothing of the kind. But in heaven's name, Glaucon, what study could there be of that kind? For all the arts were in our opinion base and mechanical." "Surely; interest Plato much and is, after one or two repetitions, dropped.

\* Cf. supra 376 e ff.
\* For τετευτακε cf. Tim. 90 β τετευτακτί.
\* Cf. 376 e. This is of course no contradiction of 410 c.
\* The ordinary study of music may cultivate and refine feeling. Only the mathematics of music would develop the power of abstract thought.
\* Knowledge in the true sense, as contrasted with opinion or habit.
\* Cf. supra, p. 49, note e, on 495 ε. This idea is the source of much modern prejudice against Plato.
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λείπεται μάθημα, μουσικής καὶ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν τεχνών κεχωρισμένων; Φέρε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μηδὲν ἐτὶ ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐχομεν λαβεῖν, τῶν ἐπὶ οὗν τοῦτο τὸ κοινὸν, ὃ πάσα προσχρῶνται τέχναι τε καὶ διάνοιαι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι, δ' καὶ παντὶ ἐν πρώτοις ἀνάγκη μανθάνειν. Ποίον; ἐφη. Τὸ φαύλον τοῦτο, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ἐν τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία διαγγειωσκεῖν λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἀριθμῶν τε καὶ λογισμῶν. ἣ οὐχ οὕτω περὶ τούτων ἔχει, ὡς πάσα τέχνη τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀναγκάζεται αὐτῶν μέτοχος γίγνεσθαι; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. Οὐκ-οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ πολεμική; Πολλή, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη. Παγγέλοιον γοῦν, ἐφην, στρατηγόν Ἀγαμέμνονα ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις Παλαιός ἔκαστοτε ἀποφαίνει. ἡ οὔκ ἐννεόχασ αὐτοὶ φησίν ἀριθμῶν εὑρὼν τάς τε τάξεις τῷ στρατοπέδῳ καταστήσαι ἐν Ίλίῳ καὶ ἐξαριθμήσαι ναός τε καὶ τάλλα πάντα, ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀναρίθμητων ὄντων καὶ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ἢς ἐφαίνε, οὔδ' οὕσις πόδας εἶχεν εἴδότος, εἴπερ ἀριθμεῖν μὴ ἡπίστατο; καίτοι ποίον τιν' αὐτὸν οὐεὶ στρατηγὸν εἶναι; Ἀτοπὸν τιν', ἐφη, ἐγώγη, εἰ ἢν τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς.

Ε. Ἀλλο τι οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, μάθημα ἀναγκαίον πολεμικῷ ἀνδρὶ θήσομεν καὶ λογίζοιμαι τε καὶ

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α Cf. Symp. 186 β ἐπὶ πᾶν τείνει.
β διάνοιας is not to be pressed in the special sense of 511 d-e.
γ A playful introduction to Plato’s serious treatment of the psychology of number and the value of the study of mathematics.
and yet what other study is left apart from music, gymnastics and the arts?" "Come," said I, "if we are unable to discover anything outside of these, let us take something that applies to all alike." "What?" "Why, for example, this common thing that all arts and forms of thought and all sciences employ, and which is among the first things that everybody must learn." "What?" he said. "This trifling matter," I said, "of distinguishing one and two and three. I mean, in sum, number and calculation. Is it not true of them that every art and science must necessarily partake of them?" "Indeed it is," he said. "The art of war too?" said I. "Most necessarily," he said. "Certainly, then," said I, "Palamedes in the play is always making Agamemnon appear a most ridiculous general. Have you not noticed that he affirms that by the invention of number he marshalled the troops in the army at Troy in ranks and companies and enumerated the ships and everything else as if before that they had not been counted, and Agamemnon apparently did not know how many feet he had if he couldn't count? And yet what sort of a general do you think he would be in that case?" "A very queer one in my opinion," he said, "if that was true."

VII. "Shall we not, then," I said, "set down as a study requisite for a soldier the ability to reckon and

a Palamedes, like Prometheus, is a "culture hero," who personifies in Greek tragedy the inventions and discoveries that produced civilization. Cf. the speech of Prometheus in Aesch. Prom. 459 ff. and Harvard Studies, xii. p. 208, n. 2.

é Quoted by later writers in praise of mathematics. Cf. Theo Smyrn. p. 7 ed. Gelder. For the necessity of mathematics cf. Laws 818 c
PLATO

ἀριθμεῖν δύνασθαι; Πάντων γ', ἐφή, μάλιστα, εἰ καὶ ὅτιον μέλλει τάξεων ἐπάειν, μᾶλλον δ' εἰ καὶ ἀνθρωπος ἔσεσθαι. 'Εννοεῖς οὖν, εἶπον, περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα ὅπερ ἐγώ; Τὸ ποίον; Κινδυ-523 νεῦει τῶν πρὸς τὴν νόησιν ἁγόντων φύσει εἶναι ὤν ξητοὺμεν, χρησθαι δ' οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ ὅρθως, ἐλκτικῷ ὄντι παντάπασι πρὸς οὐσίαν. Πῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις; Ἡγω πειράσομαι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν δηλῶσαι. ἃ γὰρ διαιροῦμαι παρ' ἐμαυτῷ ἁγωγά τε εἶναι οἱ λέγομεν καὶ μή, ξυνθεσθής γενόμενος ξύμφαθί η ἀπειτε, ὡν καὶ τοῦτο σαφέστερον ὑδωμεν εἰ ἔστιν οἶον μαντεύομαι. Δείκνυ, ἐφη. Δείκνυμι δὴ, εἶπον, εἰ καθορᾶς, τὰ μὲν ἐν
Β ταῖς αἰσθήσεωι οὖ παρακαλοῦντα τὴν νόησιν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν, ὡς ἰκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεωι κρινόμενα, τὰ δὲ παντάπασι διακελευόμενα ἐκείνην ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν υγίες ποιούσης. Τὰ πόρρωθεν, ἐφη, φαινόμενα δὴλον ὅτι λέγεις καὶ τὰ ἐςκιαγραφημένα. Οὐ πάνυ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἑτυχεὶς οὐ λέγω. Ποία μήν, ἐφη, λέγεις; Τὰ μὲν οὖ παρακαλοῦντα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς μὴ

a Cf. Laws 819 d.
b Plato's point of view here, as he will explain, is precisely the opposite of that of modern educators who would teach mathematics concretely and not puzzle the children with abstract logic. But in the Laws where he is speaking of primary and secondary education for the entire population he anticipates the modern kindergarten ideas (819 b-c).
d Cf. Phileb. 38 c, Unity of Plato's Thought, n. 337.

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number?" "Most certainly, if he is to know anything whatever of the ordering of his troops—or rather if he is to be a man at all." "Do you observe then," said I, "in this study what I do?" "What?" "It seems likely that it is one of those studies which we are seeking that naturally conduces to the awakening of thought, but that no one makes the right use of it, though it really does tend to draw the mind to essence and reality." "What do you mean?" he said. "I will try," I said, "to show you at least my opinion. Do you keep watch and observe the things I distinguish in my mind as being or not being conducive to our purpose, and either concur or dissent, in order that here too we may see more clearly whether my surmise is right." "Point them out," he said. "I do point them out," I said, "if you can discern that some reports of our perceptions do not provoke thought to reconsideration because the judgement of them by sensation seems adequate, while others always invite the intellect to reflection because the sensation yields nothing that can be trusted." "You obviously mean distant appearances," he said, "and shadow-painting." "You have quite missed my meaning," said I. "What do you mean?" he said. "The experiences that do not provoke thought are those that do not at the same

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\[i\]kavôs is not to be pressed here.

\[f\] For oïôδεν ὑπές cf. 496 c, 554 a, 589 c, Phaedo 69 b, 89 e, 90 e, Gorg. 524 e, Laws 776 e, Theaet. 173 b, Eurip. Phoen. 201, Bacch. 262, Hel. 746, etc.

\[g\] The most obvious cause of errors of judgement. Cf. Laws 663 b.


\[i\] The dramatic misapprehension by the interlocutor is one of Plato's methods for enforcing his meaning. Cf. on 529 a, p. 180, note a, Laws 792 b-c.
C ἐκβαίνει εἰς ἐναντίαν αἰσθησιν ἁμα· τὰ δ’ ἐκβαίνοντα ὡς παρακαλοῦντα τίθημι, ἐπειδὰν ἡ αἰσθησις μηδὲν μάλλον τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ, εἴτ’ ἐγνώθεν προσπίπτουσα εἰτε πόρρωθεν. ὥδε δὲ ἥ λέγω σαφέστερον εἴσει. οὗτοι, φαμέν, τρεῖς ἂν εἶνεν δάκτυλοι, ὃ τε σμικρότατος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος καὶ ὁ μέσος. Πάνυ γ’, ἐφη. Ἡσ ἐγνώθεν τοῖνυν ὄρωμένους λέγοντός μοι διανοοῦ. ἀλλὰ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν τὸδε σκόπει. Τὸ ποιον; Δάκτυλος μὲν

D αὐτῶν φαίνεται ὅμοιως ἔκαστος, καὶ ταύτη γε οὐδὲν διαφέρει, εάν τε ἐν μέσῳ ὀρᾶται εάν τ’ ἐν ἐσχάτῳ, ἐάν τε λευκὸς ἐάν τε μέλας, εὰν τε παχὺς εάν τε λεπτός, καὶ πάν ὁ τι τοιοῦτον. ἐν πάσι γὰρ τούτοις οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται τῶν πολλῶν ἡ ψυχή τὴν νόησιν ἐπερέσθαι τί ποτ’ ἔστι δάκτυλος· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἡ υἱὸς αὐτῆς ἁμα ἐσήμηνε τὸν δάκτυλον τούναντιον ἢ δάκτυλον εἶναι. Οὔ γὰρ οὖν, ἐφη. Οὐκ- οὖν, ἣν δ’ ἐγώ, εἰκότως τὸ γε τοιοῦτον νοήσεως

Ε οὐκ ἂν παρακλητικὸν οὐδ’ ἐγερτικὸν εἴη. Εἰκότως. Τί δὲ δή; τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σμικρότητα ἡ υἱὸς ἁρα ἰκανώς ὅρα, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῆς διαφέρει ἐν μέσῳ τίνα αὐτῶν κεῖσθαι ἢ ἐπ’ ἐσχάτῳ; καὶ

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*a Cf. Jacks, *Alchemy of Thought*, p. 29: “The purpose of the world, then, being to attain consciousness of itself as a rational or consistent whole, is it not a little strange that the first step, so to speak, taken by the world for the attainment of this end is that of presenting itself in the form of contradictory experience?” αἰσθησις is not to be pressed. Adam’s condescending apology for the primitive character of Plato’s psychology here is as uncalled-for as all such apologies. Plato varies the expression, but his meaning is clear. Cf. 524 d. No modern psychologists are able to use “sensation,” “perception,” “judgement,” and similar terms with perfect consistency.

*b For προσπίπτουσα cf. Tim. 33 λ, 44 λ, 66 λ, Rep. 515 λ, 154*
time issue in a contradictory perception. Those that do have that effect I set down as provocatives, when the perception no more manifests one thing than its contrary, alike whether its impact comes from nearby or afar. An illustration will make my meaning plain. Here, we say, are three fingers, the little finger, the second and the middle." "Quite so," he said. "Assume that I speak of them as seen near at hand. But this is the point that you are to consider." "What?" "Each one of them appears to be equally a finger, and in this respect it makes no difference whether it is observed as intermediate or at either extreme, whether it is white or black, thick or thin, or of any other quality of this kind. For in none of these cases is the soul of most men impelled to question the reason and to ask what in the world is a finger, since the faculty of sight never signifies to it at the same time that the finger is the opposite of a finger." "Why, no, it does not," he said. "Then," said I, "it is to be expected that such a perception will not provoke or awaken reflection and thought." "It is." "But now, what about the bigness and the smallness of these objects? Is our vision's view of them adequate, and does it make no difference to it whether one of them is situated outside or in the middle; and similarly of the relation of 561 c, Laws 791 c, 632 A, 637 A, Phileb. 21 c; also accidere in Lucretius, e.g. iv. 882, ii. 1024-1025, iv. 236 and iii. 841, and Goethe's "Das Blenden der Erscheinung, die sich an unsere Sinne drängt."

This anticipates Aristotle's doctrine that "substances" do not, as qualities do, admit of more or less.

We should never press synonyms which Plato employs for ποικλία of style or to avoid falling into a rut of terminology.

κείσθαι perhaps anticipates the Aristotelian category.
ὅσαύτως πάχος καὶ λεπτότητα ἡ μαλακότητα καὶ 
σκληρότητα ἡ ἀφή; καὶ αἱ ἀλλαὶ ἀισθήσεις ἃρ', 
οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα δηλοῦσιν; ἦ δὲ ποιεῖ
524 ἐκάστη αὐτῶν· πρῶτον μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ τῷ σκληρῷ τε-
ταχθαι, καὶ παραγγέλλει τῇ ψυχῇ ὡς ταυτὸν 
σκληρόν τε καὶ μαλακὸν ἀισθανομένη; Ὅθως, 
ἐφη. Οὕκοιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς τοιού-
τοις αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπορεῖν, τί ποτε σημαίνει αὐτῇ 
ἡ αἰσθήσις τὸ σκληρόν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μαλακὸν 
λέγει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ κούφου καὶ ἡ τοῦ βαρέως, τί τὸ 
κούφον καὶ βαρύ, εἶ τὸ τε βαρὺ κούφον καὶ τὸ 
Β κούφον βαρύ σημαίνει; Καὶ γάρ, ἐφη, αὐτάι γε 
ἄτοποι τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ ἐρμηνεύει καὶ ἐπισκέπτεως 
δεόμεναι. Εἰκότως ἀρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦ-
τοις πρῶτον μὲν πειράται λογισμόν τε καὶ νόησιν 
ψυχῇ παρακαλοῦσα ἐπισκόπεῖν, εἴτε ἐν εἴτε δύο 
ἐστὶν ἐκαστὰ τῶν εἰσαγγέλλομένων. Πῶς δ' οὖ; 
Οὕκοιν ἐὰν δύο φαίνηται, ἐτερον τε καὶ ἐν ἐκά-

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a Cf. Theaet. 186 ff., Tim. 62 b, Taylor, Timaeus, p. 233 on 63 d-e, Unity of Plato’s Thought, nn. 222 and 225, Diels, Dialer. 5 (ii.a p. 341). Protag. 331 d anticipates this thought, but Protagoras cannot follow it out. Cf. also Phileb. 13 a-b. Stallbaum also compares Phileb. 57 d and 56 c f.

b Plato gives a very modern psychological explanation. Thought is provoked by the contradictions in perceptions that suggest problems. The very notion of unity is contradictory of uninterpreted experience. This use of ἀπορεῖν (cf. supra 515 d) anticipates much modern psychology supposed to be new. Cf. e.g. Herbert Spencer passim, and Dewey, How We Think, p. 12 “We may recapitulate by saying that the origin of thinking is some perplexity, confusion, or doubt”; also ibid. p. 72. Meyerson, Déduction relativiste
touch, to thickness and thinness, softness and hardness? And are not the other senses also defective in their reports of such things? Or is the operation of each of them as follows? In the first place, the sensation that is set over the hard is of necessity related also to the soft, and it reports to the soul that the same thing is both hard and soft to its perception.” “It is so,” he said. “Then,” said I, “is not this again a case where the soul must be at a loss as to what significance for it the sensation of hardness has, if the sense reports the same thing as also soft? And, similarly, as to what the sensation of light and heavy means by light and heavy, if it reports the heavy as light, and the light as heavy?” “Yes, indeed,” he said, “these communications to the soul are strange and invite reconsideration.” “Naturally, then,” said I, “it is in such cases as these that the soul first summons to its aid the calculating reason and tries to consider whether each of the things reported to it is one or two.” “Of course.” “And if it appears to be two, each of the two is a distinct unit.”

p. 142, says “Mais Platon... n'avait-il pas dit qu'il était impossible de raisonner si ce n'est en partant d'une perception?” citing Rep. 523-524, and Rodier, Aristot. De anima, i. p. 197. But that is not Plato’s point here. Zeller, Aristot. i. p. 166 (Eng.), also misses the point when he says “Even as to the passage from the former to the latter he had only the negative doctrine that the contradictions of opinion and fancy ought to lead us to go further and to pass to the pure treatment of ideas.”

For ἔρυμψεια cf. Theaet. 209 ἀ.

Cf. Parmen. 130 α τοῖς λογοσιμοῖς λαμβανομένοις.

Cf. Theaet. 185 β, Laws 963 c, Sophist 254 δ, Hipp. Major 301 δ-ε, and, for the dialectic here, Parmen. 143 δ.

PLATO

τερον φαίνεται; Ναὶ. Εἰ ἂρα ἐν ἑκάτερον, ἀμφό-
τερα δὲ δύο, τά γε δύο κεχωρισμένα νοῆσει· οὐ
C γάρ ἂν ἄχωριστά γε δύο ἐνδέ, ἀλλ’ ἐν. 'Ορθῶς.
Μέγα μὴν καὶ ὁψι καὶ σμικρόν ἐώρα, φαμέν,
ἀλλ’ οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι. ἥ
γάρ; Ναὶ. Διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφῆνειν μέγα αὖ
καὶ σμικρὸν ἡ νόησις ἡμαγκάσθη ἢδειν, οὐ συγ-
κεχυμένα ἀλλὰ διωρισμένα, τοῦναντίον ἡ ’κεῖνη.
'Αλῆθη. Οὕκοιν ἐνετεῦθεν ποθεν πρῶτον ἐπέρ-
χεται ἐρέσθαι ἡμῖν, τί οὖν ποτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα αὖ
καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Καὶ οὕτω
δὴ τὸ μὲν νοητὸν, τὸ δ’ ὁρατὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν.
D Ἦ ὦ Ὀρθότατ’, ἐφη.

VIII. Τάῦτα τούνων καὶ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν λέγειν,
ὡς τὰ μὲν παρακλητικὰ τῆς διανοίας ἐστὶ, τὰ δ’
οὖ, α μὲν εἰς τὴν αἰσθησιν ἀμα τοῖς ἐναντίον
ἐμπυτεύει, παρακλητικὰ ὀριζόμενος, ὀσα
δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἐγερτικὰ τῆς νοῆσεως. Μανθάνω
τούνων ἤδη, ἐφη, καὶ δοκεῖ μοι οὕτως. Τί οὖν;

a γε vi termini. Cf. 379 b, 576 c, Parmen. 145 a, Protag.
358 c.
b κεχωρισμένα and ἄχωριστα suggest the terminology of
Aristotle in dealing with the problem of abstraction.
c Plato’s aim is the opposite of that of the modern theorists
who say that teaching should deal integrally with the total
experience and not with the artificial division of abstrac-
tion.
d The final use of δία became more frequent in later Greek.
717 a 6, Poetics 1450 b 3, 1451 b 37. Cf. Lysis 218 d, Epin.
975 a, Olympiodorus, Life of Plato, Teubner vi. 191, ibid.
p. 218, and schol. passim, Apsines, Spengel i. 361, line 18.
e Plato merely means that this is the psychological origin

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"Yes." "If, then, each is one and both two, the very meaning of 'two' is that the soul will conceive them as distinct. For if they were not separable, it would not have been thinking of two, but of one." "Right." "Sight too saw the great and the small, we say, not separated but confounded. Is not that so?" "Yes." "And for the clarification of this, the intelligence is compelled to contemplate the great and small, not thus confounded but as distinct entities, in the opposite way from sensation." "True." "And is it not in some such experience as this that the question first occurs to us, what in the world, then, is the great and the small?" "By all means." "And this is the origin of the designation intelligible for the one, and visible for the other." "Just so," he said.

VIII. "This, then, is just what I was trying to explain a little while ago when I said that some things are provocative of thought and some are not, defining as provocative things that impinge upon the senses together with their opposites, while those that do not I said do not tend to awaken reflection." "Well, now I understand," he said, "and agree."

of our attempt to form abstract and general ideas. My suggestion that this passage is the probable source of the notion which still infests the history of philosophy, that the great-and-the-small was a metaphysical entity or principle in Plato's later philosophy, to be identified with the indeterminate dyad, has been disregarded. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 84. But it is the only plausible explanation that has ever been proposed of the attribution of that "clotted nonsense" to Plato himself. For it is fallacious to identify μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον in Philebus 24 c, 25 c, 27 e, and elsewhere with the μέγα καὶ σμικρόν. But there is no limit to the misapprehension of texts by hasty or fanciful readers in any age.
PLATO

Τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ ἄλλο τῷ ἂν ὁμολογεῖ λαμβάνεται τὸ ἐν, οὗκ αὐτῷ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἡ ἑαυτοφύλαξ, ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ τῷ ἀλλῷ ἡ ἑαυτοφύλαξ, οὗκ αὐτῷ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἡ ἑαυτοφύλαξ. "Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἐφη, τούτῳ γ' ἔχει οὐχ ἡμιστα ἡ περὶ αὐτοῦ ὦσι· ἀμα γὰρ ταύτων ὅσ ἐν στρόμεν καὶ ὡς ἀπειρά τὸ πλῆθος. Οὖκοιν εἰπέρ τὸ ἐν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ ἑύμπας ἀριθμὸς ταύτων πέποιντε τούτῳ; Πῶς δ' οὖ; Ἀλλὰ μὴν λογιστικὴ τε καὶ ἀριθμητικὴ περὶ ἀριθμὸν πᾶσα.

Β Καὶ μάλα. Ταῦτα δὲ γε φαίνεται ἀγωγὴ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν. Ἡπερφυώς μὲν οὖν. Ὡν ξηπούμεν ἃρα, ὡς ἔσοι, μαθημάτων ἂν εἰρ' πολεμικῷ μὲν ἂρα διὰ τὰς τάξεις ἀναγκαίων μαθεῖν ταύτα, φιλο-

1 αὐτὸ F Iamblichus, τὸ αὐτὸ AD.

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a To waive metaphysics, unity is, as modern mathematicians say, a concept of the mind which experience breaks up. The thought is familiar to Plato from the Meno to the Parmenides. But it is not true that Plato derived the very notion of the concept from the problem of the one and the many. Unity is a typical concept, but the consciousness of the concept was developed by the Socratic quest for the definition.

b Cf. 523 b. The meaning must be gathered from the context.

c See crit. note and Adam ad loc.
"To which class, then, do you think number and the one belong?" "I cannot conceive," he said.

"Well, reason it out from what has already been said. For, if unity is adequately seen by itself or apprehended by some other sensation, it would not tend to draw the mind to the apprehension of essence, as we were explaining in the case of the finger. But if some contradiction is always seen coincidentally with it, so that it no more appears to be one than the opposite, there would forthwith be need of something to judge between them, and it would compel the soul to be at a loss and to inquire, by arousing thought in itself, and to ask, whatever then is the one as such, and thus the study of unity will be one of the studies that guide and convert the soul to the contemplation of true being." "But surely," he said, "the visual perception of it does especially involve this. For we see the same thing at once as one and as an indefinite plurality." "Then if this is true of the one," I said, "the same holds of all number, does it not?" "Of course." "But, further, reckoning and the science of arithmetic are wholly concerned with number." "They are, indeed." "And the qualities of number appear to lead to the apprehension of truth." "Beyond anything," he said. "Then, as it seems, these would be among the studies that we are seeking. For a soldier must learn them in order to marshal his troops, and a philosopher, because he must rise out of

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a This is the problem of the one and the many with which Plato often plays, which he exhaustively and consciously illustrates in the Parmenides, and which the introduction to the Philebus treats as a metaphysical nuisance to be disregarded in practical logic. We have not yet got rid of it, but have merely transferred it to psychology.

b Cf. Gorg. 450 d, 451 b-c.
πάντως δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἅπτεον εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντω, ἢ μηδέποτε λογιστικῷ γενεσθαι. Ἑστὶ ταῦτ’, ἐφη. 'Ὁ δὲ γε ἡμέτερος φύλαξ πολεμικός τε καὶ φιλόσοφος τυγχάνει ὃν. Τί μήν; Προσήκον δὴ τὸ μάθημα ἂν εἴη, ὃ Γλαύκων, νομοθετήσαι καὶ πείθειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν. C μεγίστων μεθέξειν ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν ἱέναι καὶ ἀνθρώπος λαθεσθαι αὐτὴς μὴ ἰδιωτικῶς, ἀλλ' ἐως ἂν ἐπὶ θέαν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσεως ἀφίκωνται τῇ νοήσει αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἄνευ οὐδὲ πράσεως χάριν ὡς ἐμπόρους ἤ καπίλους μελετώντας, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα πολέμου τε καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ραστώνης μεταστροφῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ' ἀλήθειαν τε καὶ οὐσίαν. Κάλλιστ', ἐφη, λέγεις. Καὶ μὴν, ἢν δ' ἔγονό, νῦν καὶ ἐννοῶ βηθέντος τοῦ περὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς μαθήματος, ὡς κομιζόν ἑστι καὶ πολλαχῇ χρήσιμον ἡμῶν πρὸς ὁ δ' Βουλόμεθα, ἐὰν τοῦ γνωρίζειν ἕνεκά τις αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύῃ, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ καπηλεύειν.

α Cf. my review of Jowett, A.J.P. xiii. p. 365. My view there is adopted by Adam ad loc., and Apelt translates in the same way.

β It is not true as Adam says that “the nature of numbers cannot be fully seen except in their connexion with the Good.” Plato never says that and never really meant it, though he might possibly have affirmed it on a challenge. Numbers are typical abstractions and educate the mind for the apprehension of abstractions if studied in their nature, in themselves, and not in the concrete form of five apples. There is no common sense nor natural connexion between numbers and the good, except the point made in the Timaeus 53 b, and which is not relevant here, that God used numbers and forms to make a cosmos out of a chaos.

θ Instead of remarking on Plato’s scorn for the realities of experience we should note that he is marking the distinctive quality of the mind of the Greeks in contrast with the Egyptians and orientals from whom they learned and
the region of generation and lay hold on essence or he can never become a true reckoner." "It is so," he said. "And our guardian is soldier and philosopher in one." "Of course." "It is befitting, then, Glaucon, that this branch of learning should be prescribed by our law and that we should induce those who are to share the highest functions of state to enter upon that study of calculation and take hold of it, not as amateurs, but to follow it up until they attain to the contemplation of the nature of number, by pure thought, not for the purpose of buying and selling, as if they were preparing to be merchants or hucksters, but for the uses of war and for facilitating the conversion of the soul itself from the world of generation to essence and truth." "Excellently said," he replied. "And, further," I said, "it occurs to me, now that the study of reckoning has been mentioned, that there is something fine in it, and that it is useful for our purpose in many ways, provided it is pursued for the sake of knowledge and not for the Romans whom they taught. Cf. infra 525 δ κατήλεικαι, and Horace, Ars Poetica 323-332, Cic. Tusc. i. 2. 5. Per contra Xen. Mem. iv. 7, and Libby, Introduction to History of Science, p. 49: "In this the writer did not aim at the mental discipline of the students, but sought to confine himself to what is easiest and most useful in calculation, such as men constantly require in cases of inheritance, legacies, partition, law-suits, and trade, and in all their dealings with one another, or where the measuring of lands, the digging of canals, geometrical computation, and other objects of various sorts and kinds are concerned."

"Cf. on 521 d, p. 147, note e.

"Cf. Aristot. Met. 952 a 15 τοι ν ειδέναι χάρι, and Laws 747 c. Montesquieu apud Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 6: "The first motive which ought to impel us to study is the desire to augment the excellence of our nature and to render an intelligent being more intelligent."
Πη δή; ἔφη. Τούτο γε, δ νῦν δή ἐλέγομεν, ὡς σφόδρα ἀνώ ποι ἀγε τὴν ψυχήν καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἀναγκάζει διαλέγεσθαι, οὐδαμὴ ἀποδεχόμενον ἐάν τις αὐτῇ ὃρατὰ η ἀπτὰ σώματα ἔχοντας ἀριθμοὺς προτεινόμενος διαλέγηται. οἶσθα

Ε γάρ ποι τούς περὶ ταῦτα δεινοὺς ὡς, εάν τις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ἐπιχειρή τῷ λόγῳ τέμνειν, καταγελώσῃ τε καὶ οὐκ ἀποδεχόνται, ἀλλ' ἐὰν σὺ κεραμικώς αὐτὸ, ἐκεῖνοι πολλαπλασιωθοῦν, εὐλαβοῦμενοι μὴ ποτε φανῇ τὸ ἐν μὴ ἐν ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μόρια. Ἀληθέ-526 στάτα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Τί οὖν οἶει, ὃ Γλαῦκων, εἰ τις ἔροιτο αὐτοῦς, ὃ θαυμάσιοι, περὶ ποιῶν ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθε, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν οἷον ὑμεῖς ἀξιωτέ ἔστιν, ἴσον τε ἐκαστὸν πάν παντὶ καὶ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν διαφέρον, μορίων τε ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν; τί ἂν οἶει αὐτοὺς ἀποκρίνασθαι; Τούτο ἔγγυγε, ὅτι περὶ τούτων λέγουσιν, ὃν διανοηθήναι μόνον ἐγχωρεῖ,

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"I. iit. "numbers (in) themselves," i.e. ideal numbers or the ideas of numbers. For this and the following as one of the sources of the silly notion that mathematical numbers are intermediate between ideal and concrete numbers, cf. my De Platonis Idearum Doctrina, p. 33, Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 83-84, Class. Phil. xxii. (1927) pp. 213-218.

Cf. Meno 79 c κατακεραμικῖς, Aristot. Met. 1041 a 19 ἀδιάλερτον πρὸς αὐτὸ ἑκαστὸν τοῦτο δ' ἢν τὸ ἐνι ἐστι, Met. 1052 b 1 ff., 15 ff. and 1053 a 1 τῆν γάρ μονάδα τίθεαι πάντη ἀδιάλερτον. κεραμικῶς is also the word used of breaking money into small change.

Numbers are the aptest illustration of the principle of the Philebus and the Parmenides that thought has to postulate unities which sensation (sense perception) and also dialectics are constantly disintegrating into pluralities. Cf. my Idea of Good in Plato's Republic, p. 222. Stenzel, Dialektik, p. 32, says this dismisses the problem of the one and the many "das ihn (Plato) später so lebhaft beschäftigen 164"
huckstering.” “In what respect?” he said. “Why, in respect of the very point of which we were speaking, that it strongly directs the soul upward and compels it to discourse about pure numbers, a never acquiescing if anyone proffers to it in the discussion numbers attached to visible and tangible bodies. For you are doubtless aware that experts in this study, if anyone attempts to cut up the ‘one’ in argument, laugh at him and refuse to allow it; but if you mince it up, b they multiply, always on guard lest the one should appear to be not one but a multiplicity of parts.”

“Most true,” he replied. “Suppose now, Glaucon, someone were to ask them, ‘My good friends, what numbers d are these you are talking about, in which the one is such as you postulate, each unity equal to every other without the slightest difference and admitting no division into parts?’ What do you think would be their answer?” “This, I think—that they are speaking of units which can only be conceived by thought, and which it is not possible to deal with in sollte.” But that is refuted by Parmen. 159 c οὐδὲ μὴν μὴρά γε ἡξειν φαμέν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν. The “problem” was always in Plato’s mind. He played with it when it suited his purpose and dismissed it when he wished to go on to something else. Cf. on 525 A, Phaedr. 266 B, Meno 72 c, Laws 964 A, Soph. 251.

a This is one of the chief sources of the fancy that numbers are intermediate entities between ideas and things. Cf. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, i. p. 219: “Mathematical particulars are therefore not as Plato thought intermediate between sensible figures and universals. Sensible figures are only less simple mathematical ones.” Cf. on 525 b. Plato here and elsewhere simply means that the educator may distinguish two kinds of numbers,—five apples, and the number five as an abstract idea. Cf. Theaet. 193 ε: We couldn’t err about eleven which we only think, i.e. the abstract number eleven. Cf. also Berkeley, Siris, § 288.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

άλλως δ’ ούδαμως μεταχειρίζεσθαι δυνατόν. Ὅρασ
οὖν, ἣν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ὧτι τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαίον ἦμιν
Β κινδυνεύει εἰναι τὸ μαθήμα, ἐπειδή φαίνεται γε
προσαναγκάζων αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει χρήσθαι τὴν ψυχήν
ἐπ’ αὐτὴν τῇ ἀλήθειαν; Καὶ μὲν δή, ἐφη, σφόδρα
γε ποιεῖ αὐτό. Τι δαί; τόδε ἦδη ἐπεσκέψω, ὡς
οἱ τε φύσει λογιστικοὶ εἰς πάντα τὰ μαθήματα ὡς
ἐπος εἰπεῖν ὦξείς φύνται, οἱ τε βραδείς, ἂν ἐν
τούτῳ παιδευθοῦσι καὶ γυμνάσωρτε, κάν μηδὲν
ἀλλο ὥφεληθῶσιν, ὅμως εἰς γε τὸ δεύτεροι αὐτοὶ
αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι πάντες ἐπιστήδοσαν; Ὅστιν, ἐφη,
C οὖτως. Καὶ μὴν, ὡς ἐγώμαι, ἀ γε μείζω πόνον
παρέχει μαθήαντες καὶ μελετῶντες, οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως
οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὕροις ὡς τοῦτο. Οὔ γὰρ οὖν.
Πάντων δὴ ἔνεκα τούτων οὐκ ἀφετέον τὸ μάθημα,
ἀλλ’ οἱ ἀριστοὶ τὰς φύσεις παιδευτέοι ἐν αὐτῷ.
Ξύμφημι, ἣ δ’ ὦς.
IX. Τούτῳ μὲν τοῖνυν, εἶπον, ἐν ἡμῖν κεῖσθω,
δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐχόμενον τούτου σκεφτόμεθα ἄρα τι
προσήκει ἡμῖν. Τὸ ποίον; ἡ γεωμετρία, ἐφη,
λέγεις; Αὕτῳ τούτῳ, ἣν δ’ ἐγώ. Ὅσον μὲν, ἐφη,
D πρὸς τὰ πολεμικὰ αὐτοῦ τείνει, δῆλον ὅτι προσήκει
πρὸς γὰρ τὰς στρατοπεδεύσεις καὶ καταλήψεις

* Cf. Isoc. Antid. 267 αὐτοὶ δ’ αὐτῶν εὐμαθέστεροι. For
the idiom αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν cf. also 411 c, 421 b, 571 b, Prot.
350 a and b, Laws 671 b, Parmen. 141 a, Laches 182 c.
Plato of course believed in mental discipline or “spread.”
“Educators” have actually cited him as authority for the
opposite view. On the effect of mathematical studies cf.
also Laws 747 b, 809 c-d, 819 c, Isoc. Antid. 265. Cf. Max.
Tyr. 37 § 7 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰπ’ ἂν τί τῶν ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ τὸ
φαυλότατον. Mill on Hamilton ii. 311 “If the practice of
mathematical reasoning gives nothing else it gives wariness
of mind.” Ibid. 312.

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any other way." "You see, then, my friend," said I, "that this branch of study really seems to be indispensable for us, since it plainly compels the soul to employ pure thought with a view to truth itself." "It most emphatically does." "Again, have you ever noticed this, that natural reckoners are by nature quick in virtually all their studies? And the slow, if they are trained and drilled in this, even if no other benefit results, all improve and become quicker than they were?" "It is so," he said. "And, further, as I believe, studies that demand more toil in the learning and practice than this we shall not discover easily nor find many of them." "You will not, in fact." "Then, for all these reasons, we must not neglect this study, but must use it in the education of the best endowed natures." "I agree," he said.

IX. "Assuming this one point to be established," I said, "let us in the second place consider whether the study that comes next is suited to our purpose." "What is that? Do you mean geometry," he said. "Precisely that," said I. "So much of it," he said, "as applies to the conduct of war is obviously suitable. For in dealing with encampments and the occupation

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b The translation is, I think, right. Cf. A.J.P. xiii. p. 365, and Adam ad loc.


d Cf. *Basilicon Doron* (Morley, *A Miscellany*, p. 144): "I graunt it is meete yee have some entrance, specially in the Mathematickes, for the knowledge of the art militarie, in situation of Campes, ordering of battels, making fortifications, placing of batteries, or such like."
This was Xenophon’s view, *Mem.* vi. 7. 2. Whether it was Socrates’ nobody knows. *Cf. supra* pp. 162-163 on 525 c, *Epin.* 977 e, Aristoph. *Clouds* 202.

Because it develops the power of abstract thought. Not because numbers are deduced from the idea of good. *Cf.* on 525, p. 162, note b.

Once more we should remember that for the practical and educational application of Plato’s main thought and all similar expressions are rhetorical surplusage or “unction,” which should not be pressed, nor used *e.g.* to identify the idea of good with God. *Cf.* Introd. p. xxv.

Or “becoming.” *Cf.* 485 b, 525 b.

γε δὴ is frequent in confirming answers. *Cf.* 557 b, 517 c, *Symp.* 172 c, 173 e, *Gorg.* 449 b, etc.
of strong places and the bringing of troops into column and line and all the other formations of an army in actual battle and on the march, an officer who had studied geometry would be a very different person from what he would be if he had not." "But still," I said, "for such purposes a slight modicum of geometry and calculation would suffice. What we have to consider is whether the greater and more advanced part of it tends to facilitate the apprehension of the idea of good. That tendency, we affirm, is to be found in all studies that force the soul to turn its vision round to the region where dwells the most blessed part of reality, which it is imperative that it should behold." "You are right," he said. "Then if it compels the soul to contemplate essence, it is suitable; if genesis, it is not." "So we affirm." "This at least," said I, "will not be disputed by those who have even a slight acquaintance with geometry, that this science is in direct contradiction with the language employed in it by its adepts." "How so?"

Geometry (and mathematics) is inevitably less abstract than dialectics. But the special purpose of the Platonic education values mathematics chiefly as a discipline in abstraction. Cf. on 523 a, p. 152, note b; and Titchener, A Beginner's Psychology, pp. 265-266: "There are probably a good many of us whose abstract idea of 'triangle' is simply a mental picture of the little equilateral triangle that stands for the word in text-books of geometry." There have been some attempts to prove (that of Mr. F. M. Cornford in Mind, April 1932, is the most recent) that Plato, if he could not anticipate in detail the modern reduction of mathematics to logic, did postulate something like it as an ideal, the realization of which would abolish his own sharp distinction between mathematics and dialectic. The argument rests on a remote and strained interpretation of two or three texts of the Republic (cf. e.g. 511 and 533 a-d) which, naturally interpreted, merely affirm the general inferiority of the
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Πῶς; ἐφη. Λέγουσι μέν ποι μάλα γελοῖς τε καὶ ἀναγκαίως: ός γὰρ πράττοντες τε καὶ πράξεως ἕνεκα πάντας τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι λέγουσι τετραγωνίζειν τε καὶ παρατείνειν καὶ προστιθέναι καὶ πάντα οὔτω φθεγγόμενοι. τὸ δ' ἐστι ποι πάν τὸ μάθημα γνώσεως ἕνεκα ἐπι-
τηδευόμενον. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν τούτο ἐτὶ διομολογητέον; Τὸ πόιον; 'Ως τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁντος γνώσεως, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ποτὲ τὰ γιγνομένου καὶ ἀπολλυμένου. Εὐμολογητόν, ἐφη τοῦ γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁντος ἡ γεωμετρικὴ γνῶσις ἐστιν. 'Ολκὸν ἄρα, ὃ γενναῖε, ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀλῆθειαν εἰη ἂν καὶ

mathematical method and the intermediate position for education of mathematics as a propaedeutic to dialectics. Plato's purpose throughout is not to exhort mathematicians as such to question their initiatory postulates, but to mark definitely the boundaries between the mathematical and other sciences and pure dialectics or philosophy. The distinction is a true and useful one to-day. Aristotle often refers to it with no hint that it could not be abolished by a new and different kind of mathematics. And it is uncritical to read that intention into Plato's words. He may have contributed, and doubtless did contribute, in other ways to the improvement and precision of mathematical logic. But he had no idea of doing away with the fundamental difference that made dialectics and not mathematics the coping-stone of the higher education—science as such does not question its first principles and dialectic does. Cf. 533 b-
534 e.

a The very etymology of "geometry" implies the absurd practical conception of the science. Cf. Epin. 990 c γελοίων ὅνωμα.

b Cf. Polit. 302 e, Laws 757 e, 818 b, Phileb. 62 b, Tim. 69 d, and also on 494 a. The word ἀναγκαῖος has been variously misunderstood and mistranslated. It simply means that geometers are compelled to use the language

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he said. "Their language is most ludicrous," though they cannot help it, for they speak as if they were doing something and as if all their words were directed towards action. For all their talk is of squaring and applying and adding and the like, whereas in fact the real object of the entire study is pure knowledge. "That is absolutely true," he said. "And must we not agree on a further point?" "What?" "That it is the knowledge of that which always is, and not of a something which at some time comes into being and passes away." "That is readily admitted," he said, "for geometry is the knowledge of the eternally existent." "Then, my good friend, it would tend to draw the soul to truth, and would be

of sense perception though they are thinking of abstractions (ideas) of which sense images are only approximations.

Cf. Aristot. Met. 1051 a 22 εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργείας διαφοροῦντες γὰρ εὑρίσκοντιν, "geometrical constructions, too, are discovered by an actualization, because it is by dividing that we discover them." (Loeb tr.)

For φθεργόμενοι cf. on 503 c, p. 89, note 9.

Cf. Thompson on Meno 87 a.

E. Hoffmann, Der gegenwärtige Stand der Platonforschung, p. 1097 (Anhang, Zeller, Plato, 5th ed.), misunderstands the passage when he says: "Die Abneigung Platons, dem Ideellen irgendwie einen dynamischen Charakter zuzu- schreiben, zeigt sich sogar in terminologischen Andeutungen; so verbietet er Republ. 527 a für die Mathematik jede Anwendung dynamischer Termini wie τετραγωνίζειν, παρατείνειν, προστιθέναι." Plato does not forbid the use of such terms but merely recognizes their inadequacy to express the true nature and purpose of geometry.

Cf. Meyerson, De l'explication dans les sciences, p. 33: "En effet, Platon déjà fait ressortir que la géométrie, en dépit de l'apparence, ne poursuit aucun but pratique et n'a tout entière d'autre objet que la connaissance."

i.e. mathematical ideas are (Platonic) ideas like other concepts. Cf. on 525 b, p. 164, note a.
Plato smiles at his own Utopia. There were cities named Callipolis, e.g. in the Thracian Chersonese and in Calabria on the Gulf of Tarentum. Cf. also Herod. vii. 154. Fanciful is the attempt of some scholars to distinguish the Callipolis as a separate section of the Republic, or to take it as the title of the Republic.

Plato briefly anticipates much modern literature on the value of the study of mathematics. Cf. on 526 B, p. 166, note a. Olympiodorus says that when geometry deigns to enter into matter she creates mechanics which is highly esteemed.
productive of a philosophic attitude of mind, directing upward the faculties that now wrongly are turned earthward.” “Nothing is surer,” he said. “Then nothing is surer,” said I, “than that we must require that the men of your Fair City a shall never neglect geometry, for even the by-products of such study are not slight.” “What are they?” said he. “What you mentioned,” said I, “its uses in war, and also we are aware that for the better reception of all studies b there will be an immeasurable c difference between the student who has been imbued with geometry and the one who has not.” “Immense indeed, by Zeus,” he said. “Shall we, then, lay this down as a second branch of study for our lads?” “Let us do so,” he said.

X. “Shall we set down astronomy as a third, or do you dissent?” “I certainly agree,” he said; “for quickness of perception about the seasons and the courses of the months and the years is serviceable, d not only to agriculture and navigation, but still more to the military art.” “I am amused,” e said I, “at your apparent fear lest the multitude f may suppose you to be recommending useless studies.” g It is indeed no trifling task, but very difficult to realize that there is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge that is purified h and kindled afresh by such studies.

a For δλφ καὶ παντι cf. 469 c, Laws 779 b, 734 e, Phaedo 79 e, Crat. 434 Α.

b Xen. Mem. iv. 7. 3 ff. attributes to Socrates a similar purely utilitarian view of science.

c For ηδος εἰ cf. 337 δ, Euthydem. 300 Α, Gorg. 491 ε ηδιστε, Rep. 348 κ γλυκίς εἰ, Hipp. Maj. 288 Β.

f Cf. on 499 δ-Ε, p. 66, note a.

g Again Plato anticipates much modern controversy.

h Cf. Xen. Symp. 1. 4 ἐκκεκαθαρμένοις τὰς ψυχὰς, and Phaedo 67 β-ε.
Another instance of Plato's "unction." Cf. Tim. 47 A-B, Eurip. Orest. 806 μυρίων κρείσσων, and Stallbaum ad loc. for imitations of this passage in antiquity.


This is the thought more technically expressed in the "earlier" work, Crito 49 δ. Despite his faith in dialectics 174
when it has been destroyed and blinded by our ordinary pursuits, a faculty whose preservation outweighs ten thousand eyes; for by it only is reality beheld. Those who share this faith will think your words superlatively true. But those who have and have had no inkling of it will naturally think them all moonshine. For they can see no other benefit from such pursuits worth mentioning. Decide, then, on the spot, to which party you address yourself. Or are you speaking to neither, but chiefly carrying on the discussion for your own sake, without however grudging any other who may be able to profit by it?

"This is the alternative I choose," he said, "that it is for my own sake chiefly that I speak and ask questions and reply." "Fall back a little, then," said I; "for we just now did not rightly select the study that comes next after geometry." "What was our mistake?" he said. "After plane surfaces," said I, "we went on to solids in revolution before studying them in themselves. The right way is next in order after the second dimension to take the third. This, I suppose, is the dimension of cubes and of everything that has depth." "Why, yes, it is," he said; "but this subject, Socrates, does not appear to have been investi-

Plato recognizes that the primary assumptions on which argument necessarily proceeds are irreducible choices of personality. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 468, Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 352.

a Cf. Charm. 166 b, Phaedo 64 c, Soph. 265 a, Apol. 33 a.


Lit. "increase." Cf. Pearson, The Grammar of Science, p. 411: "He proceeds from curves of frequency to surfaces of frequency, and then requiring to go beyond these he finds his problem lands him in space of many dimensions."
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δοκεῖ οὕτω εὑρησθαι. Διιτὰ γὰρ, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, τὰ αὕτα: ὦτι τε οὐδεμία πόλις ἐντίμως αὕτα ἔχει, ἀσθενῶς ζητεῖται χαλέπα ὄντα, ἑπιστάτων τε δέονται οἱ ζητοῦντες, ἀνευ οὐκ ἂν εὑροίεν, διν πρῶτον μὲν γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν, ἐπειτα καὶ γενομένου, ὥς νῦν ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν πείθουντο οἱ περὶ ταύτα

C ζητητικοὶ μεγαλοφρονοῦμενοι. εἶ δὲ πόλις ὅλη ἐννεπιστατοῖ ἐντίμως ἄγουσα αὕτα, οὕτωι τε ἂν πείθουντο καὶ ἐννεχῶς τε ἂν καὶ ἐντόνως ζητοῦμενα ἐκφανὴ γένουτο ὅτι ἔχει· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀτμιαξόμενα καὶ κολουμένα

1 κολουμένα AD, κωλυμένα F.

2 ὑπὸ Madvig: ὑπὸ δὲ mss.

This is not to be pressed. Plato means only that the progress of solid geometry is unsatisfactory. Cf. 528 d. There may or may not be a reference here to the “Delian problem” of the duplication of the cube (cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, i.p. 503 for the story) and other specific problems which the historians of mathematics discuss in connexion with this passage. Cf. Adam ad loc. To understand Plato we need only remember that the extension of geometry to solids was being worked out in his day, perhaps partly at his suggestion, e.g. by Theactetus for whom a Platonic dialogue is named, and that Plato makes use of the discovery of the five regular solids in his theory of the elements in the Timaeus. Cf. also Laws 819 e ff. For those who wish to know more of the ancient traditions and modern conjectures I add references: Eva Sachs, De Theaeteto Ath. Mathematico, Diss. Berlin, 1914, and Die fünf platonischen Körper (Philolog. Untersuch. Heft 24), Berlin, 1917; E. Hoppe, Mathematik und Astronomie im klass. Altertum, pp. 133 ff.: Rudolf Ebeling, Mathematik und Philosophie bei Plato, Münden, 1909, with my review in Class. Phil. v. (1910) p. 115; Seth 176
"There are two causes of that," said I: "first, inasmuch as no city holds them in honour, these inquiries are languidly pursued owing to their difficulty. And secondly, the investigators need a director, who is indispensable for success and who, to begin with, is not easy to find, and then, if he could be found, as things are now, seekers in this field would be too arrogant to submit to his guidance. But if the state as a whole should join in superintending these studies and honour them, these specialists would accept advice, and continuous and strenuous investigation would bring out the truth. Since even now, lightly esteemed as they are by the multitude and hampered by the ignorance of their students as to the true reasons for pursuing them, they nevertheless in the face of all these obstacles force their way by their inherent charm and it would not surprise us


* b Plato is perhaps speaking from personal experience as director of the Academy. * Cf. the hint in *Euthydem.* 290 c.

* c i.e. the mathematicians already feel themselves to be independent specialists.

* d This interpretation is, I think, correct. For the construction of this sentence *cf.* Isoc. xv. 84. The text is disputed; see crit. note.

* e Lit. "in what respect they are useful." Plato is fond of the half legal *kai ò tai*. * Cf. Lysis* 210 c, *Polit.* 298 c.

* f An eminent modern psychologist innocently writes: "The problem of why geometry gives pleasure is therefore a deeper problem than the mere assertion of the fact. Furthermore, there are many known cases where the study of geometry does not give pleasure to the student." Adam seems to think it may refer to the personality of Eudoxus.
PLATO

D vetai, kai ouδεν θαυμαστὸν αυτὰ φανὴναι. Kai μὲν δή, ἐφη, τὸ γε ἐπίχαρι καὶ διαφερόντως ἔχει. ἀλλὰ μοι σαφέστερον εἰπὲ δ ἕν δῇ ἔλεγες. τὴν μὲν γάρ ποι τοῦ ἐπιπέδου πραγματείαν γεωμετρίαν ἑτίθεις. Ναὶ, ἦν δ᾿ ἑγώ. Εἰτὰ γ’, ἐφη, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀστρονομίαν μετὰ ταύτην, ὑστερον δ᾿ ἀνεχώρησας. Σπεῦδων γάρ, ἐφην, ταχὺ πάντα διεξελθεῖν μᾶλλον βραδύνω. ἐξῆς γὰρ οὐσαν τὴν βάθους αὐξῆς μέθοδον, ὅτι τῇ ζητήσει γελοίως ἔχει, ὑπερβας αὐτὴν μετὰ γεωμετρίαν ἀστρονομίαν. Ε ἔλεγον, φορὰν οὐσαν βάθους. Ὀρθὼς, ἐφη, λέγεις. Τέταρτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾿ ἑγώ, τιθῶμεν μάθημα ἀστρονομίαν, ὡς ὑπαρχοῦσης τῆς νῦν παραλειπομένης, ἐὰν αὐτὴν πόλις μετίῃ. Εἰκὸς, ἦ δ᾿ ὁς καὶ ὁ γε νῦν δὴ μοι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐπέπληξας περὶ ἀστρονομίας ὡς φορτικῶς ἐπανοῦντι, νῦν ἦ σὺ 529 μετέρχει ἐπανῶ. παντὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ δῆλον, ὅτι

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a πραγματείαν: interesting is the development of this word from its use in Phaedo 63 a ("interest," "zeal," "inquiring spirit." Cf. 64 e, 67 b) to the later meaning, "treatise." Cf. Aristot. Top. 100 a 18, Eth. Nic. 1103 b 26, Polyb. i. 1. 4, etc

b An obvious allusion to the proverb found in many forms in many languages. Cf. also Polit. 217 a-b, 264 b, Soph. Antig. 231 σχολὴ ταχὺς, Theognis 335, 401 μηδὲν ἄγον σπευδεῖν, Suetonius, Augustus 25, Aulus Gellius x. 11. 5, Macrob. Sat. vi. 8. 9, "festina lente," "hâtez-vous lentement" (Boileau, Art poétique, i. 171), "Chi va piano va sano e va lontano" (Goldoni, I volponi, i. ii.), "Eile mit Weile" and similar expressions; Franklin's "Great haste makes great waste," etc.

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if the truth about them were made apparent." "It is true," he said, "that they do possess an extraordinary attractiveness and charm. But explain more clearly what you were just speaking of. The investigation of plane surfaces, I presume, you took to be geometry?"
"Yes," said I. "And then," he said, "at first you took astronomy next and then you drew back."
"Yes," I said, "for in my haste to be done I was making less speed." For, while the next thing in order is the study of the third dimension or solids, I passed it over because of our absurd neglect to investigate it, and mentioned next after geometry astronomy, which deals with the movements of solids." "That is right," he said. "Then, as our fourth study," said I, "let us set down astronomy, assuming that this science, the discussion of which has been passed over, is available, provided, that is, that the state pursues it." "That is likely," said he; "and instead of the vulgar utilitarian commendation of astronomy, for which you just now rebuked me, Socrates, I now will praise it on your principles. For it is obvious to everybody,

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"μέθοδον: this word, like πραγματεία, came to mean "treatise."

"This is the meaning. Neither Stallbaum’s explanation, "quia ita est comparata, ut de ea quae rerum ridiculum sit," nor that accepted by Adam, "quia ridicule tractatur," is correct, and 529 e and 527 a are not in point. Cf. 528 b, p. 176, note a.

"Cf. Laws 822 a ff.

"i.e. "assuming this to exist," "vorhanden sein," which is the usual meaning of ἐπιρχεῖν in classical Greek. The science, of course, is solid geometry, which is still undeveloped, but in Plato’s state will be constituted as a regular science through endowed research.

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αὕτη γε ἀναγκάζει ψυχήν εἰς τὸ ἀνω ὅραν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνθέωδε ἐκείσε ἤγει. Ἡσώς, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, παντὶ δῆλον πλὴν ἐμοί· ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως. Ἀλλὰ πῶς; ἐφη. Ὡς μὲν νῦν αὕτην μεταχειρίζονται οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνάγοντες, πάνυ ποιεῖν κάτω βλέπειν. Πῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις; Οὐκ ἄγεννως μοι δοκεῖς, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τήν περὶ τὰ ἄνω μάθησιν λαμ.-

β βάνειν παρὰ σαυτῷ ἡ ἐστὶ ζινδυνεύεις γάρ, καὶ εἰ τις ἐν ὀροφῇ πουκίλματα θεώμενος ἀνακύπτων καταμαθάνοι τι, ἤγείσθαι ἂν αὐτὸν νοήσει ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄμμασι θεωρεῖν. Ἡσώς οὖν καλῶς ἤγει, ἐγὼ δ' εὐθύκως. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὕ οὐ δύναμαι ἀλλ' τι νομίσαι ἄνω ποιοῦν ψυχήν βλέπειν μάθημα ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἄν περὶ τὸ ὅν τε ἢ καὶ τὸ ἀδρατον· εάν

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a Cf. my review of Warburg, Class. Phil. xxiv. (1929) p. 319. The dramatic misunderstanding forestalls a possible understanding by the reader. Cf. supra on 523 b. The misapprehension is typical of modern misunderstandings. Glaucon is here the prototype of all sentimental Platonists or anti-Platonists. The meaning of “higher” things in Plato’s allegory is obvious. But Glaucon takes it literally. Similarly, modern critics, taking Plato’s imagery literally and pressing single expressions apart from the total context, have inferred that Plato would be hostile to all the applications of modern science to experience. They refuse to make allowance for his special and avowed educational purpose, and overlook the fact that he is prophesying the mathematical astronomy and science of the future. The half-serious exaggeration of his rhetoric can easily be matched by similar utterances of modern thinkers of the most various schools, from Rousseau’s “écarter tous les faits” to Judd’s “Once we acquire the power to neglect all the concrete facts . . . we are free from the incumbrances that come through attention to the concrete facts.” Cf. also on 529 b, 530 b and 534 a.

b ἀνάγοντες is tinged with the suggestions of supra 517 a, but
I think, that this study certainly compels the soul to look upward and leads it away from things here to those higher things." "It may be obvious to everybody except me," said I, "for I do not think so." "What do you think?" he said. "As it is now handled by those who are trying to lead us up to philosophy, I think that it turns the soul's gaze very much downward." "What do you mean?" he said. "You seem to me in your thought to put a most liberal interpretation on the 'study of higher things,'" I said, "for apparently if anyone with back-thrown head should learn something by staring at decorations on a ceiling, you would regard him as contemplating them with the higher reason and not with the eyes. Perhaps you are right and I am a simpleton. For I, for my part, am unable to suppose that any other study turns the soul's gaze upward than that which deals with being the meaning here is those who use astronomy as a part of the higher education. φιλοσοφία is used in the looser sense of Isocrates. Cf. A.J.P. xvi. p. 237.

For ὁυκ ἄγεννφς cf. Gorg. 462 d, where it is ironical, as here, Phaedr. 264 b, Euthyph. 2 c, Theaet. 184 c. In Charm. 158 c it is not ironical.

The humorous exaggeration of the language reflects Plato's exasperation at the sentimentalists who prefer stargazing to mathematical science. Cf. Tim. 91 d on the evolution of birds from innocents who supposed that sight furnished the surest proof in such matters. Cf. Walt Whitman:

When I heard the learned astronomer . . .
Rising and gliding out I wander'd off by myself
In the mystical moist night air, and from time to time
Look'd up in perfect silence at the stars.

Yet such is the irony of misinterpretation that this and the following pages are the chief support of the charge that Plato is hostile to science. Cf. on 530 b, p. 187, note c.

Cf. Theaet. 174 α ἀνω βλέποντα.
PLATO

dē tis ἀνω κεχηνῶς ἢ κάτω συμμεμφως τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπιχειρή τι μανθάνειν, οὔτε μαθεῖν ἀν
ποτὲ φημι αὐτόν — ἐπιστήμην γὰρ οὖδὲν ἐχειν
τῶν τοιούτων — οὔτε ἀνω ἀλλὰ κάτω αὐτοῦ
C βλέπειν τὴν ψυχῆν, κἂν εξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῇ ἢ
ἐν θαλάσσῃ μανθάνῃ.

XI. Δίκην, ἔφη, ἔχω· ὀρθῶς γάρ μοι ἐπέπληξας.
ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ ἔλεγες δεῖν ἀστρονομίαν μανθάνειν
παρὰ ἧν μανθάνουσιν, εἰ μέλλοιεν ὠφελίμως
πρὸς ἑνόμευν μαθήσεσθαι; 'Ωδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.
ταύτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα, ἐπείπερ
ἐν ὀρατῷ πεποίκλεται, κάλλιστα μὲν ἔγεισθαι καὶ
D ἄκριβέστατα τῶν τοιούτων ἐχειν, τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν
πολὺ ἐνδείκται, ἄς τὸ ὅν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὕσα βραδυτής

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b συμμέμφω probably refers to the eyes. But cf. Adam ad loc.

c Cf. Phaedr. 264 λ, and Adam in Class. Rev. xiii. p. 11.

d Or rather, "serves me right," or, in the American
language, "I've got what's coming to me." The expres-
sion is colloquial. Cf. Epist. iii. 319 ε, Antiphon cxxiv. 45.
But δίκην ἐχει in 520 b = "it is just."

e Cf. Tim. 40 λ κόσμον ἀληθινὸν αὐτῷ πεποίκιλμένον, Eurip.
Hel. 1096 ἀστέρων ποικίλματα, Critias, Sisyphus, Diels ii.3
p. 321, lines 33-34:

τὸ τ' ἀστερωτῶν οὐρανοῦ δέμας
χρόνων καλὸν ποικίλμα τέκτων σοφῶν.

Cf. also Gorg. 508 λ, Lucretius v. 1205 “stellis micanti-
bus aethera fixum,” ii. 1031 ff., Aeneid iv. 482 “stellis
ardentibus aptum,” vi. 797, xi. 202, Ennius, Ann. 372,
Shakes. Hamlet ii. ii. 313 “This majestical roof fretted with
golden fire,” Arthur Hugh Clough, Uranus:

Then Plato in me said,
'Tis but the figured ceiling overhead
With cunning diagrams bestarred . . .
Mind not the stars, mind thou thy mind and God

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and the invisible. But if anyone tries to learn about the things of sense, whether gaping up or blinking down, I would never say that he really learns—for nothing of the kind admits of true knowledge—nor would I say that his soul looks up, but down, even though he study floating on his back on sea or land.”

XI. “A fair retort,” he said; “your rebuke is deserved. But how, then, did you mean that astronomy ought to be taught contrary to the present fashion if it is to be learned in a way to conduce to our purpose?”

“Thus,” said I: “these sparks that paint the sky, since they are decorations on a visible surface, we must regard, to be sure, as the fairest and most exact of material things; but we must recognize that they fall far short of the truth, the movements, namely, of

The word τοικλματα may further suggest here the complication of the movements in the heavens.

The meaning of this sentence is certain, but the expression will no more bear a matter-of-fact logical analysis than that of Phaedo 69 a-b, or Rep. 365 c, or many other subtle passages in Plato. No material object perfectly embodies the ideal and abstract mathematical relation. These mathematical ideas are designated as the true, ἀληθεύων, and the real, ὕπ. As in the Timaeus (38 c, 40 a-b, 36 d-e) the abstract and ideal has the primacy and by a reversal of the ordinary point of view is said to contain or convey the concrete. The visible stars are in and are carried by their invisible mathematical orbits. By this way of speaking Plato, it is true, disregards the apparent difficulty that the movement of the visible stars then ought to be mathematically perfect. But this interpretation is, I think, more probable for Plato than Adam’s attempt to secure rigid consistency by taking τὸ ὕπ τάχος etc., to represent invisible and ideal planets, and τὰ ἔνοντα to be the perfect mathematical realities, which are in them. ἔνοντα would hardly retain the metaphysical meaning of ὕπα. For the interpretation of 529 d cf. also my “Platonism and the History of Science,” Am. Philos. Soc. Proc. lxvi. p. 172.
ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι σχήμασι φοράς τε πρὸς ἅλλα θέλεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα φέρει. ἀ δὴ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοια ληπτά, ὁψεϊ δ' οὖ. ἂ ὑ σὺ οὐι; Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, τῇ περὶ τὸν ὦρανον ποικιλία παραδείγμασι χρηστεύον τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα μαθήσεως ἑνεκα, ὁμοίως ὁσπερ ἕν ἀν εἰ τις ἐντύχοι ὑπὸ Δαιδάλου ἤ τινος ἄλλου δημιουργοῦ ἦ γραφέως διαφερόντως γεγραμμένος καὶ ἐκπεπονημένος διαγράμμασιν. ἡγήσατο γὰρ ἀν ποὺ τοὺς ἐμπεροὶ γεωμετρίας, ἱδὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα, κάλλιστα μὲν ἔχεις ἀπεργασία, γελοοίν μην ἐπισκοπεῖν αὐτὰ σπουδῆ, ὡς τὴν ἀληθείαν ἐν αὐτοῖς 530 λημόμενον ἰσων ἢ διπλασίων ἢ ἅλλης τινος συμμετρίας. Τῇ δ' οὖ μέλλει γελοοῖν εἶναι; ἐφη. Τῷ ὄντι δὴ ἀστρονομικῶν, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, ὡντα οὐκ οἰεὶ ταῦτα πείςτεσθαι εἰς τὰς τῶν ἄστρων φοράς ἀποβλέποντα; νομιών μὲν, ὡς οἴον τε κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα συστήσασθαι, οὕτω ἐννεστάναι τῷ τοῦ ὦρανοῦ δημιουργῷ αὐτῶν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ· τὴν δὲ νυκτός πρὸς ἡμέραν ἐξυμμετρίαν καὶ τοῦτων πρὸς μῆνα καὶ μῆνος πρὸς ἑνιαυτὸν καὶ Β τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων πρὸς τε ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἁλληλα, οὐκ ἄτοπον, οἰεὶ, ἡγήσεται τὸν νομίζοντα γίγνεσθαι τε ταῦτα ἂεὶ ὀσαύτως καὶ οὐδαμῷ οὐδὲν παραλλάττειν, σώμα τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὀρώμενα, καὶ

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a δημιουργῶς: an anticipation of the Timaeus.

b Cf. Bruno apud Höffding, History of Modern Philosophy, i. 125 and 128, and Galileo, ibid. i. 178; also Lucretius v. 302-305.

c Plato was right against the view that Aristotle imposed on the world for centuries. We should not therefore say with Adam that he would have attached little significance to the perturbations of Neptune and the consequent discovery of
real speed and real slowness in true number and in all true figures both in relation to one another and as vehicles of the things they carry and contain. These can be apprehended only by reason and thought, but not by sight; or do you think otherwise?" "By no means," he said. "Then," said I, "we must use the blazonry of the heavens as patterns to aid in the study of those realities, just as one would do who chanced upon diagrams drawn with special care and elaboration by Daedalus or some other craftsman or painter. For anyone acquainted with geometry who saw such designs would admit the beauty of the workmanship, but would think it absurd to examine them seriously in the expectation of finding in them the absolute truth with regard to equals or doubles or any other ratio." "How could it be otherwise than absurd?" he said. "Do you not think," said I, "that one who was an astronomer in very truth would feel in the same way when he turned his eyes upon the movements of the stars? He will be willing to concede that the artisan of heaven fashioned it and all that it contains in the best possible manner for such a fabric; but when it comes to the proportions of day and night, and of their relation to the month, and that of the month to the year, and of the other stars to these and one another, do you not suppose that he will regard as a very strange fellow the man who believes that these things go on for ever without change or the least deviation—though they possess of Uranus. It is to Plato that tradition attributes the problem of accounting by the simplest hypothesis for the movement of the heavenly bodies and "saving the phenomena." The alleged contradiction between this and _Laws_ 821 b ff. and _Tim._ 47 a is due to a misapprehension. That the stars in their movements do not perfectly express the exactness of mathe-
The meaning is not appreciably affected by a slight doubt as to the construction of ζητείν. It is usually taken with ἄτοπον (regarded as neuter), the meaning being that the philosophic astronomer will think it strange to look for the absolute truth in these things. This double use of ἄτοπον is strained and it either makes παντὶ τρόπῳ awkward or attributes to Plato the intention of decrying the concrete study of astronomy. I think ζητείν etc. are added by a trailing anacoluthon such as occurs elsewhere in the Republic. Their subject is the real astronomer who, using the stars only as "diagrams" or patterns (529 ν), seeks to learn a higher exacter mathematical truth than mere observation could yield. Madvig's ζητήσει implies a like view of the meaning but smooths out the construction. But my interpretation of the passage as a whole does not depend on this construction. If we make ζητείν depend on ἄτοπον (neuter) ἡγήσεται, the meaning will be that he thinks it absurd to expect to get that higher truth from mere observation. At all events Plato is not here objecting to observation as a suggestion for mathematical studies but to its substitution for them, as the next sentence shows.

That is just what the mathematical astronomy of to-day
bodies and are visible objects—and that his unremitting quest is the realities of these things?" "I at least do think so," he said, "now that I hear it from you." "It is by means of problems, then," said I, "as in the study of geometry, that we will pursue astronomy too, and we will let be the things in the heavens, if we are to have a part in the true science of does, and it is a πολλαπλάσιον ἔργον compared with the merely observational astronomy of Plato's day. Cf. the interesting remarks of Sir James Jeans, *apud* S. J. Woolf, *Drawn from Life*, p. 74: "The day is gone when the astronomer's work is carried on only at the eyepiece of a telescope. Naturally, observations must be made, but these must be recorded by men who are trained for that purpose, and I am not one of them," etc.

Adam's quotation of Browning's "Abt Vogler" in connexion with this passage will only confirm the opinion of those who regard Plato as a sentimental enemy of science.

Cf. also *Phileb. 59 Α., Aristot. Met. 997 b 35* οὐδὲ πέρι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡ ἀστρολογία τόνδε.

This intentional Ruskinian *boutade* has given great scandal. The Platonist, we are told *ad nauseam*, deduces the world from his inner consciousness. This is of course not true (cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 45). But Plato, like some lesser writers, loves to emphasize his thought by paradox and surprise, and his postulation and prediction of a mathematical astronomy required emphasis. *Cf. my* *Platonism and the History of Science*, pp. 171-174.

This and similar passages cannot be used to prove that Plato was unscientific, as many hostile or thoughtless critics have attempted to do. *Cf. e.g.* the severe strictures of Arthur Platt, *Nine Essays*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1927, pp. 12-16, especially p. 16: "Plato being first and foremost a metaphysician with a sort of religious system would not have us study anything but metaphysics and a kind of mystic religion." Woodbridge Riley, *From Myth to Reason*, p. 47: "... Plato ... was largely responsible for turning back the clock of scientific progress. To explain the wonders of the world he preferred imagination to observation." *Cf. also* Benn, *Greek Philosophers*, vol. i. pp. 173 and 327, Herrick,
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The Thinking Machine, p. 335, F. C. S. Schiller, Plato and his Predecessors, p. 81: “... that Plato’s anti-empirical bias renders him profoundly anti-scientific, and that his influence has always, openly or subtly, counteracted and thwarted the scientific impulse, or at least diverted it into unprofitable channels.” Dampier-Whetham, A History of Science, pp. 27-28: “Plato was a great philosopher but in the history of experimental science he must be counted a disaster.”

Such statements disregard the entire context of the Platonic passages they exploit, and take no account of Plato’s purpose or of other passages which counteract his seemingly unscientific remarks.

Equally unfair is the practice of comparing Plato unfavourably with Aristotle in this respect, as Grote e.g. frequently does (cf. Aristotle, p. 233). Plato was an artist and Aristotle an encyclopaedist; but Plato as a whole is far nearer the point of view of recent science than Aristotle. Cf. my Platonism and the History of Science, p. 163; also 532 a and on 529 a, p. 180, note a, and What Plato Said, p. 236. 188
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astronomy and so convert to right use from uselessness that natural indwelling intelligence of the soul." "You enjoin a task," he said, "that will multiply the labour of our present study of astronomy many times." "And I fancy," I said, "that our other injunctions will be of the same kind if we are of any use as lawgivers.

XII. "However, what suitable studies have you to suggest?" "Nothing," he said, "thus off-hand." "Yet, surely," said I, "motion in general provides not one but many forms or species, according to my opinion. To enumerate them all will perhaps be the task of a wise man, but even to us two of them are apparent." "What are they?" "In addition to astronomy, its counterpart," I replied. "What is that?" "We may venture to suppose," I said, "that as the eyes are framed for astronomy so the ears are framed for the movements of harmony; and these are in some sort kindred sciences, as the Pythagoreans affirm and we admit, do we not,

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a Cf. Phaedr. 272 β καίτοι οὐ σμικρὸν γε φαίνεται ἔργον.
b Plato here generalizes motion as a subject of science.
c The modesty is in the tone of the Timaeus.
d For πέπηγεν cf. 603 Α.
e The similar statement attributed to Archytas, Diels i. 3 p. 331, is probably an imitation of this.
f Pythagoras is a great name, but little is known of him. "Pythagoreans" in later usage sometimes means mystics, sometimes mathematical physicists, sometimes both. Plato makes use of both traditions but is dominated by neither. For Erich Frank’s recent book, Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer, cf. my article in Class. Phil. vol. xxiii. (1928) pp. 347 ff. The student of Plato will do well to turn the page when he meets the name Pythagoras in a commentator.
g For this turn of phrase cf. Vol. I. p. 333, 424 c, Protag. 316 Α, Symp. 186 ε.
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εύγχωρούμεν. ἦ πῶς ποιοῦμεν; Οὔτως, ἔφη. Εἰ Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ πολὺ τὸ ἔργον, ἐκεῖνων πευκόμεθα, πῶς λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ εἶ τι ἄλλο πρὸς τούτοις; ἡμεῖς δὲ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα φυλάξομεν τὸ ἥμετερον. Ποιοῦν; Μή ποτ' αὐτῶν τι ἀτελὲς ἐπιχειρῶσιν ἡμῖν μανθάνειν οὐς θρέψομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἔξηκον ἐκεῖσε ἅμα, οἱ πάντα δὲι ἀφῆκεν, οἱν ἄρτι περὶ τῆς ἀστρονομίας ἐλέγομεν. 531 ἦ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ περὶ ἀρμονίας ἐτερον τοιοῦτον ποιοῦσιν; τὰς γὰρ ἀκονομένας αὐτομαθώνιας καὶ φθόγγους ἀλλήλους ἀναμετρούντες ἀνήνυτα ὤσπερ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι ποιοῦσιν. Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἔφη, καὶ γελοίως γε, πυκνῶμι ἀττα ὀνομάζοντες καὶ παραβάλλοντες τὰ ὡτα, οἱν ἐκ γειτόνων φωνὴν θηρεύομενοι, οἱ μὲν φασιν ἔτι κατακουνεὶν ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ ἥχην καὶ σμικρότατον ἐναι τοῦτο διάστημα,

\[ \text{For the reference to experts cf. supra 400 b, 424 c. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 484, on Laches 184 d-e.} \]

\[ \text{παρά of course here means “throughout” and not “contrary.”} \]

\[ \text{I take the word ἀτελές etymologically (cf. pp. 66-67, note b, on 500 a), with reference to the end in view. Others take it in the ordinary Greek sense, “imperfect,” “incomplete.”} \]

\[ \text{This passage is often taken as another example of Plato’s hostility to science and the experimental method. It is of course not that, but the precise interpretation is difficult. Glaucon at first misapprehends (cf. p. 180, note a, on 529 λ) and gives an amusing description of the mere empiricist in music. But Socrates says he does not mean these, but those who try to apply mathematics to the perception of sound instead of developing a (Kantian) a priori science of harmony to match the mathematical science of astronomy. Cf. also p. 193, note g, on 531 b, W. Whewell, Transactions of the Cambridge Philos. Soc. vol. ix. p. 589, and for music A. Rivaud, "Platon et la musique,” Rev. d'Histoire de la Philos. 1929, 190} \]
Glaucon?" "We do," he said. "Then," said I, "since the task is so great, shall we not inquire of them what their opinion is and whether they have anything to add? And we in all this will be on the watch for what concerns us." "What is that?" "To prevent our fosterlings from attempting to learn anything that does not conduce to the end we have in view, and does not always come out at what we said ought to be the goal of everything, as we were just now saying about astronomy. Or do you not know that they repeat the same procedure in the case of harmonies? They transfer it to hearing and measure audible concords and sounds against one another, expending much useless labour just as the astronomers do." "Yes, by heaven," he said, "and most absurdly too. They talk of something they call minims and, laying their ears alongside, as if trying to catch a voice from next door, some affirm that they can hear a note between and that this is the least interval and the unit of measurement, while

pp. 1-30; also Stallbaum ad loc., and E. Frank, Platon u. d. sog. Pyth., Anhang, on the history of Greek music. He expresses surprise (p. 139) that Glaucon knows nothing of Pythagorean theories of music. Others use this to prove Socrates' ignorance of music.

* This hints at the distinction developed in the Politicus between relative measurement of one thing against another and measurement by a standard. Cf. Polit. 283 e, 284 b-c, Theat. 186 λ.

† πυκνώματα (condensed notes). The word is technical. Cf. Adam ad loc. But, as ἀττά shows, Plato is using it loosely to distinguish a measure of sense perception from a mathematically determined interval.

‡ Cf. Pater, Renaissance, p. 157. The phrase, ἐκ γείτόνων, is colloquial and, despite the protest of those who insist that it only means in the neighbourhood, suggests overhearing what goes on next door—as often in the New Comedy.
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ο μετρητέον, οί δὲ ἀμφισβητοῦντες ὡς ὄμοιον ἦδη.
Β ὑθεγομένων, ἀμφότεροι ὤτα τοῦ νοῦ προστησά-
μενοι. Σὺ μὲν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις
tοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς πράγματα παρέχοντας καὶ
βασανίζοντας, ἐπὶ τῶν κολλοπων στρέβλωντας·
ἵνα δὲ μὴ μακροτέρα ἡ εἰκὼν γίγνηται, πλήκτρω
τε πληγῶν γιγνομένων καὶ καταγορίας πέρι καὶ
ἐξαιρήσεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας χορδῶν, παύομαι τῆς
εἰκόνος καὶ οὐ φημὶ τοῦτοις λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους
οὐς ἔφαμεν νῦν δὴ περὶ ἁμονίας ἐρήσεσθαι.

C ταύτων γὰρ ποιοῦσι τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀστρονομίᾳ; τοὺς
γὰρ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς συμφωνίαις ταῖς ἀκονομέναις
ἀριθμοὺς ἔγεντον, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς προβλήματα
ἀνίασιν ἐπισκοπεῖν, τίνες ἐξίφωνοι ἀριθμοὶ καὶ
τίνες οὐ, καὶ διὰ τί ἐκάτεροι. Δαμόνον γὰρ, ἐφὴ,
πράγμα λέγεις. Χρῆσιμον μὲν οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, πρὸς

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a Cf. Aldous Huxley, Jesting Pilate, p. 152: "Much is enthusiastically taught about the use of quarter tones in Indian music. I listened attentively at Lucknow in the hope of hearing some new and extraordinary kind of melody based on these celebrated fractions. But I listened in vain," Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iii. pp. 334-335, n. 85, thinks that Plato "shrugs his shoulders at experiments." He refers to Plutarch, Life of Marcellus, xiv. 5, and Quaest. Conv. viii. 2. 1, 7, where Plato is represented as "having been angry with Eudoxus and Archytas because they employed instruments and apparatus for the solution of a problem, instead of relying solely on reasoning."

b So Malebranche, Entretiens sur la métaphysique, 3, x.: "Je pense que vous vous moquez de moi. C'est la raison et non les sens qu'il faut consulter."

c For χρηστός in this ironical sense cf. also 479 a, Symp. 177 b.

The language of the imagery confounds the torture of slaves giving evidence on the rack with the strings and pegs of a musical instrument. For the latter cf. Horace, A. P. 348, 192
others insist that the strings now render identical sounds, a both preferring their ears to their minds.b”  
“You,” said I, “are speaking of the worthies c who vex and torture the strings and rack them d on the pegs; but—not to draw out the comparison with strokes of the plectrum and the musician’s complaints of too responsive and too reluctant strings e—I drop the figure,f and tell you that I do not mean these people, but those others g whom we just now said we would interrogate about harmony. Their method exactly corresponds to that of the astronomer; for the numbers they seek are those found in these heard concords, but they do not ascend h to generalized problems and the consideration which numbers are inherently concordant and which not and why in each case.” “A superhuman task,” he said. “Say, rather, useful,” said I, “for the investigation of the

nam neque chorda sonum reddit quem vult manus et mens poscentique gravem persaepe remittit acutum.

Stallbaum says that Plato here was imitated by Aristaenetus, Epist. xiv. libr. 1 τι πράγματα παρέχετε χορδάις;

This also may suggest a reluctant and a too willing witness.

Cf. on 489 a, p. 23, note d.

He distinguishes from the pure empirics just satirized those who apply their mathematics only to the data of observation. This is perhaps one of Plato’s rare errors. For though there may be in some sense a Kantian a priori mechanics of astronomy, there can hardly be a purely a priori mathematics of acoustics. What numbers are consonantly harmonious must always remain a fact of direct experience. Cf. my Platonism and the History of Science, p. 176.


Cf. Tim. 47 c-d. Plato always keeps to his point—cf. 349 b-c, 564 a-b—or returns to it after a digression. Cf. on 572 b, p. 339, note e.
τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ζήτησιν, ἄλλως δὲ μεταδιωκόμενον ἀχρηστον. Εἰκός γ', ἐφη.

XIII. Οἶμαι δὲ γε, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἥττων ἐκ τῶν διεληλύθαμεν μέθοδος ἐὰν μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων κοινωνίαν ἀφίκηται καὶ ξυγγένειαν, καὶ ἐνελλογισθῇ ταῦτα ἦ ἐστὶν ἀλλήλως οἰκεία, φέρειν τι αὑτῶν εἰς ἀ βουλόμεθα τὴν πραγματείαν καὶ ὅπικ ἀνόνητα πονεῖσθαι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνόνητα. Καὶ ἐγώ, ἐφη, οὕτω μαντεύομαι. ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ ἐργον λέγεις, ὡς Σώκρατες. Τοῦτο προοιμίων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἦ τίνος λέγεις; ἦ οὐκ ἦσον ὅτι πάντα ταῦτα προοίμια ἐστὶν αὑτῶν τοῦ νόμου ὃν δὲι μαθεῖν; οὐ γὰρ πῶς δοκοῦσι τοί ναῦτα
Ε δεινοὶ διάλεκτικοι εἰναι. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δι', ἐφη, εἰ μὴ μάλα γε τινὲς οἴλιγοι ὃν ἐγώ ἐντετύχηκα. 'Ἀλλ' ἡδή, εἴπον, μὴ δυνατοὶ τινὲς οἴτες δοῦναι τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι λόγον εἰσεθαί ποτε τι ὃν φαμέν

1 ἀλλὰ ἡδή ADM, ἀλλὰ δὴ F.
2 μὴ δυνατοὶ τινὲς οἴτες A²FDM, οὐ μὴ δυνατοὶ τινὲς οἴτες A: μὴ δυνατοὶ οἴτες Burnet.

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a Cf. on 505 b, p. 88, note a.
b μέθοδος, like πραγματείαν in π, is used almost in the later technical sense of "treatise" or "branch of study." Cf. on 528 d, p. 178, note a.
c Cf. on 537 c, Lp. 991 e.
d Plato is fond of this image. It suggests here also the preamble of a law, as the translation more explicitly indicates. Cf. 532 d, anticipated in 457 c, and Laws 722 d-e, 723 a-b and e, 720 d-e, 772 e, 870 d, 854 a, 932 a and passim.
e Cf. Theaet. 146 b, and perhaps Euthyd. 290 c. Though mathematics quicken the mind of the student, it is, apart from metaphysics, a matter of common experience that mathematicians are not necessarily good reasoners on other subjects. Jowett's wicked jest, "I have hardly ever known a mathematician who could reason," misled an eminent 194
beautiful and the good, but if otherwise pursued, useless." "That is likely," he said.

XIII. "And what is more," I said, "I take it that if the investigation of all these studies goes far enough to bring out their community and kinship with one another, and to infer their affinities, then to busy ourselves with them contributes to our desired end, and the labour taken is not lost; but otherwise it is vain." "I too so surmise," said he; "but it is a huge task of which you speak, Socrates." "Are you talking about the prelude?" I said, "or what? Or do we not know that all this is but the preamble of the law itself, the prelude of the strain that we have to apprehend? For you surely do not suppose that experts in these matters are reasoners and dialecticians?" "No, by Zeus," he said, "except a very few whom I have met." "But have you ever supposed," I said, "that men who could not render and exact an account of opinions in discussion would ever know anything of the things professor of education who infers that Plato disbelieved in "mental discipline" (Yale Review, July 1917). Cf. also Taylor, Note in Reply to Mr. A. W. Benn, Mind, xii. (1903) p. 511; Charles Fox, Educational Psychology, pp. 187-188: "... a training in the mathematics may produce exactness of thought ... provided that the training is of such a kind as to inculcate an ideal which the pupil values and strives to attain. Failing this, Glaucon's observation that he had 'hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning' is likely to be repeated." On the text  of Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. pp. 384-385, and Adam ad loc.

λόγον ... δούναι. A commonplace Platonic plea for dialectics. Cf. 534 b, Prot. 336 c, Polit. 286 a, Theaet. 202 c, 175 c, 183 d, Soph. 230 a, Phaedo 78 c-d, 95 d, Charm. 165 b, Xen. Oecon. 11. 22. Cf. also λόγον λαβεῖν Rep. 402 a, 534 b, Soph. 246 c, Theaet. 208 d, and Thompson on Meno 75 d.
532 deīn eīdēnai; Oūδ' ād, ēfη, toûtô ge. Oūkōν, 
ēpou, ὥ Γλαύκων, οὖτος ὡθη αὐτὸς ἔστιν ὁ νόμος 
ὅν τὸ διαλέγεσθαι περαίνει; ὅν καὶ ὅντα νοητόν 
μιμοῦτ' ἂν ἦ τῆς ὁμοεις δύναμις, ἦν ἐλέγομεν πρὸς 
αὐτὰ ἦθη τὰ ζωὰ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς 
αὐτὰ ἀστρα πεται καὶ τελευταῖον ὡθ ὑπὸς αὐτὸν τὸν 
Ἠλιον. οὖτω καὶ ὅταν τὰ τῶ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπι- 
χειρῆ ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου 
ἔπ' αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστιν ἔκαστον ὅρμαν, ὅ καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ, 
Β πρὸν ἄν αὐτὸ ὁ ὕστιν ἄγαθον αὐτῇ νοῆσαι λάβῃ, ἔπ' 
αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῶ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ἀσπερ ἔκεινος 
τότε ἐπὶ τῶ τοῦ ὀρατοῦ. Παντάπαισι μὲν οὖν, ēfη. 
Τῇ οὖν; οὖ διαλεκτικὴν ταύτην τὴν πορείαν 
καλεῖς; Τῇ μὴ; Ἡ δὲ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, λύσις τε 
ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ μεταστροφὴ ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν 
ἐπὶ τὰ εἰδωλα καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καταγείον εἰς 
τὸν Ἡλιον ἐπάνωσος, καὶ ἐκεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ζωὰ τε 

1 ὅρμαν Clemens: ὅρμα AFDM.

a Cf. Phileb. 58 d, Meno 75 c-d, Charm. 155 λ, Cratyl 300 c, and on 533 b, pp. 200 f., note f.

b This is not a literal rendering, but gives the meaning.

c Cf. 516 a-b. Plato interprets his imagery again here and in b infra.

d Cf. supra p. 180, note a, and p. 187, note c. Cf. also 537 d, and on 476 a ff. Cf. Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 9: "Metaphysics, then, is the science which claims to dispense with symbols"; E. S. Robinson, Readings in General Psych. p. 295: "A habit of suppressing mental imagery must therefore characterize men who deal much with abstract ideas; and as the power of dealing easily and firmly with these ideas is the surest criterion of a high order of intellect . . ."; Pear, Remembering and Forgetting, p. 57: "He (Napoleon) is reported to have said that 'there are some who, from some physical or moral peculiarity of character, form a picture (tableau) of everything. No matter what knowledge, intellect, courage, or good qualities they may have, these men
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we say must be known?" "No is surely the answer to that too." "This, then, at last, Glaucon," I said, "is the very law which dialectics a recites, the strain which it executes, of which, though it belongs to the intelligible, we may see an imitation in the progress b of the faculty of vision, as we described c its endeavour to look at living things themselves and the stars themselves and finally at the very sun. In like manner, when anyone by dialectics attempts through discourse of reason and apart from all perceptions of sense d to find his way to the very essence of each thing and does not desist till he apprehends by thought itself the nature of the good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the intelligible, as the other in our parable came to the goal of the visible." "By all means," he said. "What, then, will you not call this progress of thought dialectic?" "Surely." "And the release from bonds," I said, "and the conversion from the shadows to the images e that cast them and to the light and the ascent f from the subterranean cavern to the world above, g and there the persisting are unfit to command"; A. Bain, Mind, 1880, p. 570: "Mr. Galton is naturally startled at finding eminent scientific men, by their own account, so very low in the visualizing power. His explanation, I have no doubt, hits the mark: the deficiency is due to the natural antagonism of pictorial aptitude and abstract thought"; Judd, Psychology of High School Subjects, p. 321: "It did not appear on superficial examination of the standings of students that those who can draw best are the best students from the point of view of the teacher of science."


b ἐπάνωδος became almost technical in Neoplatonism. Cf. also 517 A, 529 A, and p. 124, note b.

c Lit. "sun," i.e. the world illumined by the sun, not by the fire in the cave.
PLATO

καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ἐτὶ ἀδύναμια

C βλέπειν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐν ὑδασί φαντάσματα θεία καὶ σκιὰς τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰδόλων σκιὰς δι' ἔτερον τοιούτου φωτὸς ὡς πρὸς ἡλίον κρίνειν ἀποσκιαζομένας, πάσα αὐτὴ ἡ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν, ὃς διήλθομεν, ταύτῃ ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἐπαναγωγὴν τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἁρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θέαν, ὦσπερ τότε τοῦ σα-φεστάτου ἐν σώματι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ φανοτάτου ἐν

D τῷ σωματειδεῖ τε καὶ ὁρατῷ τόπῳ. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, ἀποδέχομαι οὕτω. καὶ τοι πανταπαί γε μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπά μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι εἶναι, ἀλλον δ' αὖ τρόπον χαλεπὰ μὴ ἀποδέχεσθαι. ὦμως δὲ—οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι μόνον ἀκούστεα, ἀλλὰ καὶ άθις πολλὰκις ἐπαντείον—ταύτα θέντες ἔχεν ὡς νῦν λέγεται, ἐπ' αὐτὸν δὴ τοῦ ἑμὸν ἰώμεν, καὶ διέλθωμεν οὕτως ὦσπερ τὸ προοίμιον διήλθομεν. λέγε ὦν, τίς δ' τρόπος τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμεως, καὶ κατὰ ποιὰ δὴ εἴδη διέστηκε, καὶ τίνες αὖ οὗτοί. αὐταί γὰρ ἄν ἡδῆ, ὡς ἔσοικεν, αἱ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἁγιοῦσαι εἶνεν, οἱ ἀφικομενῶς ὦσπερ ὁδοὺ ἀνάπαυλα ἄν εἴη καὶ τέλος τῆς πορείας. Οὐκέτι.

1 ἐτὶ ἀδύναμια Iamblichus: ἐπ' ἀδύναμιa ADM, ἀδύναμιa F.
2 θεία mss., bracketed by Stallbaum: θέα Ast and Apelt. Adam once proposed <καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὃσα πικνά τε καὶ λهة.>

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a See crit. note. The text of Iamblichus is the only reasonable one. The reading of the manuscripts is impossible. For the adverb modifying a noun cf. 558 ἐν ὑπὸ ὀπωστοῖν σμικρολογία, Laws 638 β σφόδρα γυναικῶν, with England’s note, Theaet. 183 ε τὰν πρεσβύτης, Laws 791 c παντελῶς παῖδων, 698 c σφόδρα φιλια, Rep. 564 λ ἄγαν δουλείαν, with Stallbaum’s note.

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inability\(^a\) to look directly at animals and plants and
the light of the sun, but the ability to see the phanta-
sms created by God\(^b\) in water and shadows of objects
that are real and not merely, as before, the shadows
of images cast through a light which, compared with
the sun, is as unreal as they—all this procedure of
the arts and sciences that we have described indicates
their power to lead the best part of the soul up to the
contemplation of what is best among realities, as in
our parable the clearest organ in the body was turned
to the contemplation of what is brightest in the
corporeal and visible region." "I accept this," he
said, "as the truth; and yet it appears to me very hard
to accept, and again, from another point of view, hard
to reject.\(^c\) Nevertheless, since we have not to hear
it at this time only, but are to repeat it often here-
after, let us assume that these things are as now has
been said, and proceed to the melody itself, and go
through with it as we have gone through the prelude.
Tell me, then, what is the nature of this faculty of
dialectic? Into what divisions does it fall? And what
are its ways? For it is these, it seems, that would
bring us to the place where we may, so to speak, rest
on the road and then come to the end of our journey-

\(^a\) \(\theta\varepsilon\alpha\) because produced by God or nature and not by man
with a mirror or a paint-brush. See crit. note and Class.
Review, iv. p. 480. I quoted Sophist 266 b-n, and Adam with
rare candour withdrew his emendation in his Appendix XIII.
to this book. Apelt still misunderstands and emends, p. 296
and note.

\(^b\) This sentence is fundamental for the understanding of
Plato's metaphysical philosophy generally. Cf. Unity of
Plato's Thought, p. 30, n. 192, What Plato Said, p. 268 and
p. 596 on Parmen. 135 c. So Tennyson says it is hard to
believe in God and hard not to believe.
This is not mysticism or secret doctrine. It is, in fact, the avoidance of dogmatism. But that is not all. Plato could not be expected to insert a treatise on dialectical method here, or risk an absolute definition which would only expose him to misinterpretation. The principles and methods of such reasoning, and the ultimate metaphysical conclusions to which they may lead, cannot be expounded in a page or a chapter. They can only be suggested to the intelligent, whose own experience will help them to understand. As the Republic and Laws entire explain Plato’s idea of social good, so all the arguments in the dialogues illustrate his conception of fair and unfair argument. Cf. What Plato Said, Index s.v. Dialectics, and note f below.


On Plato’s freedom from the dogmatism often attributed to him cf. What Plato Said, p. 515 on Meno 86 Β.

The mystical implications of φήμεν are not to be pressed. It is followed, as usual in Plato, by a matter-of-fact statement of the essential practical conclusion (γοῦν) that no man can be trusted to think straight in large matters who has not been educated to reason and argue straight.

Plato anticipates the criticism that he neglects experience.

i.e. dispute our statement and maintain. The meaning is plain. It is a case of what I have called illogical idiom.
ing.” “You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow me further, though on my part there will be no lack of goodwill. And, if I could, I would show you, no longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the very truth, as it appears to me—though whether rightly or not I may not properly affirm. But that something like this is what we have to see, I must affirm. Is not that so?” “Surely.” “And may we not also declare that nothing less than the power of dialectics could reveal this, and that only to one experienced in the studies we have described, and that the thing is in no other wise possible?” “That, too,” he said, “we may properly affirm.” “This, at any rate,” said I, “no one will maintain in dispute against us: that there is any other way of inquiry that attempts

Cf. T.A.P.A. vol. xlvi. pp. 205-234. The meaning is that of Philebus 58 e, 59 a. Other “science” may be more interesting or useful, but sound dialectics alone fosters the disinterested pursuit of truth for its own sake. Cf. Soph. 235 c, Phaedr. 265-266. Aristotle, Topics i. 2. 6, practically comes back to the Platonic conception of dialectics.

The full meaning of dialectics in Plato would demand a treatise. It is almost the opposite of what Hegelians call by that name, which is represented in Plato by the second part of the Parmenides. The characteristic Platonic dialectic is the checking of the stream of thought by the necessity of securing the understanding and assent of an intelligent interlocutor at every step, and the habit of noting all relevant distinctions, divisions, and ambiguities, in ideas and terms. When the interlocutor is used merely to relieve the strain on the leader’s voice or the reader’s attention, as in some of the later dialogues, dialectic becomes merely a literary form.

Cicero’s “via et ratione.” peri pantos is virtually identical with aorto gef kastou peri.

It is true that the scientific specialist confines himself to his specialty. The dialectician, like his base counterfeit the sophist (Soph. 231 a), is prepared to argue about anything, Soph. 232 c f., Euthyd. 272 a-b.
The interpreters of Plato must allow for his Emersonian habit of hitting each nail in turn as hard as he can. There is no real contradiction between praising mathematics in comparison with mere loose popular thinking, and disparaging it in comparison with dialectics. There is no evidence and no probability that Plato is here proposing a reform of mathematics in the direction of modern mathematical logic, as has been suggested. Cf. on 527 a. It is the nature of mathematics to fall short of dialectics.

a Cf. supra 525 c, 527 b.

The touch of humour in the expression may be illustrated by Lucian, *Hermodimus* 74, where it is used to justify Lucian's scepticism even of mathematics, and by Hazlitt's remark on Coleridge, "Excellent talker if you allow him to start from no premises and come to no conclusion."

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c Cf. Phileb. 20 b and on 520 c, p. 143, note g.

d Cf. supra on 531 e.

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f Or "admission." Plato thinks of even geometrical
systematically and in all cases to determine what each thing really is. But all the other arts have for their object the opinions and desires of men or are wholly concerned with generation and composition or with the service and tendance of the things that grow and are put together, while the remnant which we said did in some sort lay hold on reality—geometry and the studies that accompany it—are, as we see, dreaming about being, but the clear waking vision of it is impossible for them as long as they leave the assumptions which they employ undisturbed and cannot give any account of them. For where the starting-point is something that the reasoner does not know, and the conclusion and all that intervenes is a tissue of things not really known, what possibility is there that assent in such cases can ever be converted into true knowledge or science?" "None," said he.

XIV. "Then," said I, "is not dialectics the only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there? And it is literally true that when the eye of the soul is sunk in reasoning as a Socratic dialogue. Cf. the exaggeration of this idea by the Epicureans in Cic. De fin. i. 21 "quae et a falsis initiis profecta, vera esse non possunt: et si essent vera nihil afferunt quo iucundius, id est, quo melius viveremus."

Dialectic proceeds διὰ συγχωρήσεων, the admission of the interlocutor. Cf. Laws 957 d, Phaedr. 237 c-d, Gorg. 487 e, Lysis 219 c, Prot. 350 e, Phileb. 12 λ, Theaet. 162 λ, 169 d-e, 164 c, Rep. 340 b. But such admissions are not valid unless when challenged they are carried back to something satisfactory—ικανόν—(not necessarily in any given case to the idea of good). But the mathematician as such peremptorily demands the admission of his postulates and definitions. Cf. 510 b-d, 511 b.

*Cf. supra on 519 b, p. 138, note a.
Orphism pictured the impious souls as buried in mud in the world below; cf. 363 d. Again we should not press Plato’s rhetoric and imagery either as sentimental Platonists or hostile critics. See Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. p. 463, n. 3.

All writers and philosophers are compelled to “speak with the vulgar.” Cf. e.g. Meyerson, De l’explication dans les sciences, i. p. 329: “Tout en sachant que la couleur n’est pas réellement une qualité de l’objet, à se servir cependant, dans la vie de tous les jours, d’une locution qui l’affirme.”
the barbaric slough of the Orphic myth, dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up, employing as helpers and co-operators in this conversion the studies and sciences which we enumerated, which we called sciences often from habit, though they really need some other designation, connoting more clearness than opinion and more obscurity than science. 'Understanding,' I believe, was the term we employed. But I presume we shall not dispute about the name when things of such moment lie before us for consideration."

"No, indeed," he said. "Are you satisfied, then," said I, "as before, to call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth conjecture or picture-thought—and the last two collectively opinion, and the first two intellection, opinion dealing with generation, and intellection with essence, and this relation being expressed in the proportion: as essence is to generation, so is intellection to opinion; and as intellection is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to image-thinking or surmise? But the relation between their objective correlates and the division into two

Cf. on 511 d, pp. 116-117, note c.

This unwillingness to dispute about names when they do not concern the argument is characteristic of Plato. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 516 on Meno 78 b-c for numerous instances. Stallbaum refers to Max. Tyr. Diss. xxvii. p. 40 ἐγὼ γὰρ τούτων τὰ τε ἄλλα, καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐλευθερίᾳ πειθομαι Πλάτως.

The next sentence is hopelessly corrupt and is often considered an interpolation. The translation omits it. See Adam, Appendix XVI. to Bk. VII., Bywater, Journal of Phil. (Eng.) v. pp. 122-124.

Always avoid "faith" in translating Plato.

Cf. on 508 c, p. 103, note b.

That is the meaning, though some critics will object to the phrase. Lit. "the things over which these (mental states) are set, or to which they apply."
There are two probable reasons for this: (1) The objective classification is nothing to Plato's present purpose; (2) The second member of the proportion is lacking in the objective correlates. Numbers are distinguished from ideas not in themselves but only by the difference of method in dialectics and in mathematics. Cf. supra on 525 d, 526 a, Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 83-84, and Class. Phil. xxii. (1927) pp. 213-218. The explicit qualifications of my arguments there have been neglected and the arguments misquoted but not answered. They can be answered only by assuming the point at issue and affirming that Plato did assign an intermediate place to mathematical conceptions, for which there is no evidence in Plato's own writings.

b Cf. supra on 531 e, p. 195, note f.

c Cf. on 511 b, p. 116, note a.

This would be superfluous on the interpretation that the νοον must always be the idea of good. What follows distinguishes the dialectician from the eristic sophist. For the
parts of each of these, the opinable, namely, and the
intelligible, let us dismiss,\(^a\) Glaucon, lest it involve us
in discussion many times as long as the preceding.”
“Well,” he said, “I agree with you about the rest of
it, so far as I am able to follow.” “And do you not
also give the name dialectician to the man who is able
to exact an account \(^b\) of the essence of each thing?
And will you not say that the one who is unable to
do this, in so far as he is incapable of rendering an
account to himself and others, does not possess full
reason and intelligence \(^c\) about the matter?” “How
could I say that he does?” he replied. “And is not
this true of the good likewise \(^d\)—that the man who
is unable to define in his discourse and distinguish
and abstract from all other things the aspect or idea
of the good, and who cannot, as it were in battle,
running the gauntlet \(^e\) of all tests, and striving to
examine everything by essential reality and not by
opinion, hold on his way through all this without
tripping \(^f\) in his reasoning—the man who lacks this
power, you will say, does not really know the good
itself or any particular good; but if he apprehends
short cut, \(\text{kai . . . \(\omega \sigma a\tau\tau\))}\, cf. 523 E, 580 D, 585 D, 346 A, etc.

\(^a\) It imports little whether the objections are in his own
mind or made by others. Thought is a discussion of the soul
with itself (cf. Theaet. 189 E, Phileb. 38 E, Soph. 263 E), and
when the interlocutor refuses to proceed Socrates sometimes
continues the argument himself by supplying both question
and answer, e.g. Gorg. 506 C ff. Cf. further Phaedrus 278 C,
Parmen. 136 D-E, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 17.

\(^b\) Cf. Theaet. 160 D, Phileb. 45 A. The practical outcome
= Laws 966 A-B, Phaedr. 278 C, Soph. 259 B-C. Cf. Mill,
Diss. and Disc. iv. p. 283: “There is no knowledge and no
assurance of right belief but with him who can both confute
the opposite opinion and successfully defend his own against
confutation.”

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οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἐφάπτεσθαι, καὶ τὸν νῦν βίων ὀνειροπολοῦντα καὶ ὑπνώττοντα, πρὶν ἐνθαδ’ ἐξ- D εγρέσθαι, εἰς "Αἴδου πρότερον ἀφικόμενον τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθάνειν; Νή τὸν Δία, ἥ δ’ ὦς, σφόδρα
γε πάντα ταῦτα φήσω. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τούς γε σαντού
παίδας, οὐς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις τε καὶ παιδεύεις, εἴ
ποτε ἐργῶ τρέφοις, οὐκ ἂν ἐάσασι, ὡς ἐγώμαι,
ἄλογους οὖντας ὄσπερ γραμμάς ἄρχοντας ἐν τῇ
πόλει κυρίους τῶν μεγίστων εἶναι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν,
ἐφη. Νομοθέτησες δὴ αὐτοῖς ταύτης μάλιστα
τῆς παιδείας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, εἴ ἢς ἐρωτᾶν τε
καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστημονεύστατα οἴοι τ’ ἔσονται;
Ε Νομοθέτησω, ἐφη, μετά γε αὐτ. Ἄρ’ οὖν δοκεῖ
σοι, ἐφην ἐγώ, ὃσπερ θρυγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἢ
dialektikὴ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κείσθαι, καὶ οὐκετ’ ἄλλο
τούτοις μάθημα ἀνωτέρω ὥρθως ἂν ἐπιτίθεσθαι,
535 ἀλλ’ ἔχειν ἦδη τέλος τὰ τῶν μαθημάτων; Ἐμοιγ’,
ἐφη.

ΧV. Διανομὴ τοίνυν, ἥν δ’ ἐγώ, τὸ λοιπὸν σοι,
τίσι ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα δώσομεν καὶ τίνα τρόπον.
Δήλον, ἐφη. Μέμνησαι οὖν τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογὴν
tῶν ἄρχοντων, οὕτως ἐξελέξαμεν; Πῶς γὰρ, ἥ δ’
ὦς, οὐ; Ὁ μὲν ἄλλα τοίνυν, ἥν δ’ ἐγώ, ἐκείναις

a For eiδωλον cf. on 532 b, p. 197, note e. This may be one
of the sources of Epist. vii. 342 b.

b For Platonic intellectualism the life of the ordinary man
is something between sleep and waking. Cf. Apol. 31 A.
Note the touch of humour in τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθάνειν. Cf.
Bridges, Psychology, p. 382: "There is really no clear-cut
distinction between what is usually called sleeping and
waking. In sleep we are less awake than in the waking
hours, and in waking life we are less asleep than in sleep."

c Plato likes to affirm his ideal only of the philosophic
rulers.

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any adumbration of it, his contact with it is by opinion, not by knowledge; and dreaming and dozing through his present life, before he awakens here he will arrive at the house of Hades and fall asleep for ever? " "Yes, by Zeus," said he, "all this I will stoutly affirm." "But, surely," said I, "if you should ever nurture in fact your children whom you are now nurturing and educating in word, you would not suffer them, I presume, to hold rule in the state, and determine the greatest matters, being themselves as irrational as the lines so called in geometry." "Why, no," he said. "Then you will provide by law that they shall give special heed to the discipline that will enable them to ask and answer questions in the most scientific manner?" "I will so legislate," he said, "in conjunction with you." "Do you agree then," said I, "that we have set dialectics above all other studies to be as it were the coping-stone—and that no other higher kind of study could rightly be placed above it, but that our discussion of studies is now complete?" "I do," he said.

XV. "The distribution, then, remains," said I, "to whom we are to assign these studies and in what way." "Clearly," he said. "Do you remember, then, the kind of man we chose in our former selection of rulers?" "Of course," he said. "In most respects, then," said I, "you must suppose that we

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\(^a\) Cf. 376 D, 369 C, 472 E, Critias 106 A.

\(^b\) A slight touch of humour. Cf. the schoolgirl who said, "These equations are inconsiderate and will not be solved."

\(^c\) A frequent periphrasis for dialectics. Cf. τὸ ἐρωτάμενον ἄτοκρίνεσθαι, Gorg. 461 E, Charm. 166 D, Prot. 338 D, Alc. I. 106 B.


\(^e\) Cf. 541 B.

\(^f\) Cf. 412 D-E, 485-487, 503 A, C-E.

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τὰς φύσεις οἶνον δεῖν ἐκλεκτέας εἶναι· τοὺς τε γὰρ 
βεβαιοτάτους καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρειοτάτους προαιρετέον, 
καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τοὺς εὐειδεστάτους· πρὸς δὲ 
Β τούτους ζητητέον μὴ μόνον γενναῖους τε καὶ 
βλοσυροὺς τὰ ἥθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ παιδείᾳ 
τῆς φύσεως πρόσφορα ἐκτέον αὐτῶς. Ποία δὴ 
diaστέλλει; Δρμύττητα, ὃ μακάριε, ἐφην, δει αὐτοῖς 
πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα ὑπάρχειν, καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς 
μανθάνειν· πολὺ γὰρ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἀποδελίωσι 
ψυχαί ἐν ἰσχυρῷ μαθήμασιν ἢ ἐν γυμνασίοις· 
οἰκείοτερος γὰρ αὐτὰς ὁ τόνος, ἵδιος ἀλλ᾽ ὅ 
κοινός ὃν μετὰ τοῦ σῶματος. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη. Καὶ 
C μνήμονα δὴ καὶ ἀρρατον καὶ πάντη φιλόπονον 
ζητητέον. Ἡ των τρόπων οἷει τὰ τε τοῦ σῶματος 
ἐθελήσειν τινα διαποιεῖν καὶ τοσαῦτῃν μάθησιν τε 
καὶ μελέτην ἐπιτελεῖν· Οὐδένα, ἡ δ᾽ ὅς, εάν 
μὴ παντάπασι γ᾽ ἐς εὐφυῆς. Τὸ γοῦν νῦν ἀμάρ 
τημα, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ ἀτιμία φιλοσοφία διὰ 
ταῦτα προσπέπτωκεν, ὅ καὶ πρότερον εἶπον, ὅτι 
οὖ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν αὐτῆς ἄπτονται· οὐ γὰρ νόθους ἐδει 
ἀπτεσθαι, ἀλλὰ γυμνοῖς. Πῶς; ἐφη. Πρῶτον 
D μὲν, εἶπον, φιλόπονία οὐ χωλὸν δεὶ εἰναι τὸν 
ἄγιομενον, τὰ μὲν ἡμίσεια φιλόπονον, τὰ δ᾽ ἡμίσει 
ἄπονον· ἐστι δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν τις φιλογυμναστῆς μὲν 
καὶ φιλόθηρος ἢ καὶ πάντα τὰ διὰ τοῦ σῶματος 
φιλόπονη, φιλομαθῆς δὲ μὴ, μηδὲ φιλήκοος μήδε

a Intellectually as well as physically. Cf. 357 A, Prot. 350 b f.
c For βλοσυροὺς cf. Theaet. 149 a.
d Cf. 504 a, 374 e, Gorg. 480 c, Protag. 326 c, Euthyphro 15 c.
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have to choose those same natures. The most stable, the most brave and enterprising are to be preferred, and, so far as practicable, the most comely. But in addition we must now require that they not only be virile and vigorous in temper, but that they possess also the gifts of nature suitable to this type of education." "What qualities are you distinguishing?" "They must have, my friend, to begin with, a certain keenness for study, and must not learn with difficulty. For souls are much more likely to flinch and faint in severe studies than in gymnastics, because the toil touches them more nearly, being peculiar to them and not shared with the body." "True," he said. "And we must demand a good memory and doggedness and industry in every sense of the word. Otherwise how do you suppose anyone will consent both to undergo all the toils of the body and to complete so great a course of study and discipline?" "No one could," he said, "unless most happily endowed." "Our present mistake," said I, "and the disesteem that has in consequence fallen upon philosophy are, as I said before, caused by the unfitness of her associates and wooers. They should not have been bastards but true scions." "What do you mean?" he said. "In the first place," I said, "the aspirant to philosophy must not limp in his industry, in the one half of him loving, in the other shunning, toil. This happens when anyone is a lover of gymnastics and hunting and all the labours of the body, yet is not fond of learning or

\* The qualities of the ideal student again. Cf. on 487 A.
\* Cf. supra 495 c ff., pp. 49-51.
\* Montaigne, i. 24 (vol. i. p. 73), "les âmes boiteuses, les bastardes et vulgaires, sont indignes de la philosophie."
\* Cf. Laws 634 A, Tim. 44 c.
ζητητικός, ἀλλ' ἐν πάσι τούτοις μισοπονή· χωλὸς δὲ καὶ ὁ τάναντια τούτων μεταβεβληκὼς τὴν
φιλοπονίαν. Ἀληθεστάτα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὔκοιν καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ταυτὸν τούτῳ ἀνά-
Επηρον ψυχήν θήσομεν, ἦν τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον
ψεύδος μισῇ καὶ χαλεπῶς φέρῃ αὐτή τε καὶ ἐτέρων
ψευδομένων ὑπεραγανακτῆ, τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον εὐκόλως
προσδέχηται καὶ ἀμαθαίνουσά ποι ἀλυσκομένη μὴ
ἀγανακτῆ, ἀλλ' εὔχερὸς ὀσπερ θηρίων ὕειον ἐν
536 ἀμαθία μολύνητα; Παντάπασι μὲν ὄν, ἔφη.
Καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνδρείαν
καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς
μέρη οὐχ ἦκενα δεὶ φιλάττειν τὸν νόθον τε καὶ
tὸν γυνήσιον, ὅταν γὰρ τις μὴ ἐπίστηται τὰ τοιαῦτα
σκοπεῖν καὶ ἴδιώτης καὶ πόλεις, λανθάνουσι χωλοῖς
tε καὶ νόθους χρώμενοι, πρὸς δ' τι ἂν τύχωσι τοὔ-
tων, οἱ μὲν φίλοις, οἱ δὲ ἄρχουσι. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη,
οὕτως ἔχει. Ἡμῖν δὴ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα
Β διευλαβητέον, ὡς ἔαν μὲν ἀρτιμελεῖς τε καὶ ἀρτι-
φρονας ἐπὶ τοσαῦτην μάθησιν καὶ τοσαῦτην ἀσκησιν
κομίσαντες παιδεύωμεν, ἦ τε δίκη ἢμῖν
οὐ μέμισται αὐτῇ, τὴν τε πόλιν καὶ πολιτείαν
σώσομεν, ἀλλοίους δὲ ἄγοντες ἐπὶ ταῦτα τάναντια

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a  Cf. 548 ε, Lysis 206 c, Euthyd. 274 c, 304 c, and Vol. I.
p. 515, on 475 δ.  
b  Cf. supra 382 Α-Β-Γ.  
c  Cf. Laws 819 δ, Rep. 372 δ, Politicus 266 c, and my note
in Class. Phil. xii. (1917) pp. 308-310. Cf. too the proverbial
ὡς ὑπύψην, Laches 196 δ and Rivals 134 Α; and Apelt's
d  Cf. 487 Α and Vol. I. p. 261, note ε on 402 c. The
cardinal virtues are not rigidly fixed in Plato. Cf. on 427 ε,
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of listening or inquiring, but in all such matters hates work. And he too is lame whose industry is one-sided in the reverse way." "Most true," he said. "Likewise in respect of truth," I said, "we shall regard as maimed in precisely the same way the soul that hates the voluntary lie and is troubled by it in its own self and greatly angered by it in others, but cheerfully accepts the involuntary falsehood and is not distressed when convicted of lack of knowledge, but wallows in the mud of ignorance as insensitively as a pig." "By all means," he said. "And with reference to sobriety," said I, "and bravery and loftiness of soul and all the parts of virtue, we must especially be on our guard to distinguish the base-born from the true-born. For when the knowledge necessary to make such discriminations is lacking in individual or state, they unawares employ at random for any of these purposes the crippled and base-born natures, as their friends or rulers." "It is so indeed," he said. "But we," I said, "must be on our guard in all such cases, since, if we bring men sound of limb and mind to so great a study and so severe a training, justice herself will have no fault to find with us, and we shall preserve the state and our polity. But, if we introduce into it the other sort,
pánta kai prágömév kai φιλοσοφίας étí plevw
géwta kataantlísomev. Αἰσχρόν μέντ' ἂν εἴη,
η δ' ὧς. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, εἰπον· γελοιον δ' ἔγωγε
καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι έοικα παθεῖν. Το πούν; ἐφη.
C 'Επελαθόμην, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὦτι ἐπαίξομεν, καὶ μᾶλλον
ἐντεῦμαινεν εἰπον. λέγων γάρ ἀμα ἐβλεφα πρὸς
φιλοσοφίαν, καὶ ἑδών προπεπλακισμένην ἀναξίως
ἀγανακτήσας μοι δοκῶ καὶ ὡστερ θυμωθεῖσ τοῖς
αἵτίοις σπουδαίστερον εἰπεῖν δ' εἰπον. Οὐ μὰ τὸν
Δι', ἐφη, οὐκον ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ ἀκροατῇ. 'Ἀλλ' ὡς
ἐμοί, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ῥήτορι. τόδε δὲ μὴ ἐπιλανθανώ-
μεθα, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐκλογῇ πρεσβύτας
ἐξελέγομεν, ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐκ ἐγχωρήσεις. Σόλωνι
D γὰρ οὐ πειστεόν, ὡς γηράσκων τις πολλὰ δυνατός
μανθάνει, ἀλλ' ὅττον ἢ τρέχειν, νέων δὲ πάντες
οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι. Ἄναγκη, ἐφη.
ΧV. Τὰ μὲν τοῖνυν λογισμῶν τε καὶ γεω-
μετριῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς προπαείας, ἦν τῆς δια-
λεκτικῆς δεὶ προπαειδηθήναι, παισίν οὖσι χρὴ
προβάλλειν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπάναγκες μαθεῖν τὸ σχῆμα
τῆς διδαχῆς ποιομένους. Τῷ δή; ὅτι, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ,
Εὐστὴν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τόν ἐλεύθερον χρῆ

a καταντλήσομεν: cf. 344 D.

b Jest and earnest are never far apart in Plato. Fabling
about justice is an old man's game, Laws 685 A, 769 A. Life
itself is best treated as play, Laws 803 C. Science in Tim.
59 D is παιδία, like literature in the Phaedrus 276 D-E, ibid.
278 B. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. pp. 38 and 160, and What
Plato Said, pp. 553 and 601.

c For similar self-checks cf. Laws 804 B, 832 B, 907 B-C,
Clouds 969.

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the outcome will be just the opposite, and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule upon philosophy." "That would indeed be shameful," he said. "Most certainly," said I; "but here again I am making myself a little ridiculous." "In what way?" "I forgot," said I, "that we were jesting, and I spoke with too great intensity." For, while speaking, I turned my eyes upon philosophy, and when I saw how she is undeservedly reviled, I was revolted, and, as if in anger, spoke too earnestly to those who are in fault." "No, by Zeus, not too earnestly for me as a hearer." "But too much so for me as a speaker," I said. "But this we must not forget, that in our former selection we chose old men, but in this one that will not do. For we must not take Solon's word for it that growing old a man is able to learn many things. He is less able to do that than to run a race. To the young belong all heavy and frequent labours." "Necessarily," he said.

XVI. "Now, all this study of reckoning and geometry and all the preliminary studies that are indispensable preparation for dialectics must be presented to them while still young, not in the form of compulsory instruction." "Why so?" "Because," said I, "a free soul ought not to pursue any study slavishly; for

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*a Cf. Isoc. Busiris 49. Whatever the difficulties of the chronology it is hard to believe that this is not one of Isocrates' many endeavours to imitate Platonic effects.
*b Cf. Soph. 226 c, Sophocles, Ajax 397.
*d Cf. Theaet. 146 b. This has been misquoted to the effect that Plato said the young are the best philosophers.
*e This and παίδοντας below (537 a) anticipate much modern kindergarten rhetoric.
μανθάνειν. ο ι μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος πόνοι βία
πονούμενοι χείρον οὐδὲν τὸ σῶμα ἀπεργάζονται,
ψυχῇ δὲ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἐμμονὸν μάθημα. Ἀληθής,
ἐφη. Μὴ τοίνυν βία, εἰπον, ὦ ἀριστε, τοὺς παῖδας
537 ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἄλλα παίζοντας τρέφε, ἵνα καὶ
μάλλον οἶδος τ' ἣς καθοράν ἐφ' ὃ ἐκαστος πέφυκεν.
"Εχει δὲ λέγεις, ἐφη, λόγον. Οὐκοῦν μνημευεῖς,
ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἐφαμεν τοὺς
παῖδας εἶναι ἀκτέον ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων θεωροῦσι, καὶ
ἐὰν ποὺ ἀσφαλὲς ἢ, προσακτέον ἐγγὺς καὶ γενε-
στέον αὖματος, ὦσπερ τοὺς σκύλακας; Μέμνημαι,
ἐφη. Ἡν πάσι δὴ τούτοις, ἤν δ' ἐγώ, τοῖς τε
πόνοις καὶ μαθήμασι καὶ φόβοις, ὅσ ὑπερεξε-
στάτος ἂει φαύνηται, εἰς ἀριθμὸν τίνα ἐγκριτέον.

Β' Ἐν τῷ, ἐφη, ἥλικια; Ἡνίκα, ἤν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν
ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων μεθέληται. οὕτος γὰρ ὃ
χρόνος, ἐὰν τε δύο ἐὰν τε τρία ἐτῆ γίγνεται,
ἀδυνατός τι ἄλλο πράξαι. κόποι γὰρ καὶ ὑπνοι
μαθήμασι πολέμου· καὶ ἁμα μία καὶ αὐτῇ τῶν
βασάνων οὐκ ἐλαχίστη, τίς ἐκαστος ἐν τοῖς γυμ-
νασίοις φανεῖται. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἐφη. Μετὰ
δὴ τούτον τὸν χρόνον, ἤν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκ τῶν εἰκοσι-

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this distinction, Pol. 1338 b 40 μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἦβης κοιφότερα
γυμνάσια προσωτεῖν, τὴν βίαιον προφήν καὶ τοὺς πρός ἀνάγκην
πόνους ἀπειργοῦντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιοι ὃ πρὸς τὴν αὐξήσιν.

b Cf. 424 ε-425 Α, Laws 819 b-c, 643 b-d, 797 Α-Β, Polit.
308 Β.

Cf. the naïve statement in Colvin and Bagley, Human
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while bodily labours a performed under constraint do not harm the body, nothing that is learned under compulsion stays with the mind.” “True,” he said. “Do not, then, my friend, keep children to their studies by compulsion but by play. b That will also better enable you to discern the natural capacities of each.” “There is reason in that,” he said. “And do you not remember,” I said, “that we also declared c that we must conduct the children to war on horseback to be spectators, and wherever it may be safe, bring them to the front and give them a taste of blood as we do with whelps?” “I do remember.” “And those who as time goes on show the most facility in all these toils and studies and alarms are to be selected and enrolled on a list.” d ” “At what age?” he said. “When they are released from their prescribed gymnastics. For that period, whether it be two or three years, incapacitates them for other occupations. e For great fatigue and much sleep are the foes of study, and moreover one of our tests of them, and not the least, will be their behaviour in their physical exercises.” f ” “Surely it is,” he said. “After this period,” I said, “those who are given preference from the twenty-year class

Behaviour, p. 41: “The discovery [sic!] by Karl Groos that play was actually a preparation for the business of later life was almost revolutionary from the standpoint of educational theory and practice.”

d ἐγκριτέον: cf. 413 D, 377 C, 486 D, Laws 802 B, 820 D, 936 A, 952 A.
e Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1339 a 7 f. ἀμα γὰρ τὴν διάνοια καὶ τῶν σώμάτων διαπονεῖν οὐ δεῖ, etc.; Plut. De Ed. Puer. 11, De Tuenda San. c. 25, quoted by Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 359, are irrelevant to this passage, but could be referred to the balancing of music and gymnastics in 410-412.
f Cf. Laws 829 B-C.
etōn oἱ προκριθέντες τιμᾶς τε μείζους τῶν ἄλλων
C οὕσονται, τὰ τε χύδην μαθήματα παύσων ἐν τῇ
παιδείᾳ γενόμενα τούτοις συνακτέον εἰς σύνοψιν
οἰκειότητος ἀλλήλων τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ
ὄντος φύσεως. Μόνη γοῦν, εἶπεν, ἡ τοιαύτη
μάθησις βέβαιος ἐν οίς ἂν ἐγγένηται. Καὶ μεγίστη
γε, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, πείρα διαλεκτικῆς φύσεως καὶ μὴ;
ὸ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ οὐ.
Συνοίμαι, ἢ δ’ ὄς. Ταῦτα τοῖνυν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ,
D δεῖσθαι σὲ ἐπισκοποῦντα, οἳ ἂν μάλιστα τοιοῦτοι
ἐν αὐτοῖς ὅσι καὶ μόνιμοι μὲν ἐν μαθήμασι, μό-
νιμοι δ’ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις,
τούτους αὖ, ἐπειδὰν τὰ τριάκοντα ἐτη ἐκβαίνωσιν,
ἐκ τῶν προκρίτων προκριμάμενον εἰς μείζους τε
τιμᾶς καθιστάναι καὶ σκοπεῖν, τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι
δυνάμει βασανίζοντα, τίς ὁμάτων καὶ τῆς ἀλλῆς
αισθήσεως δυνατὸς μεθείμενος ἐπ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅν μετ’
ἀληθείας ἴναι. καὶ ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλῆς φυλακῆς

a σύνοψι: cf. 531 D. This thought is endlessly repeated
by modern writers on education. Cf. Mill, Diss. and Disc.
of concentration proposed by Ziller . . . seeks to organize
all the subject matter of instruction into a unified system,
the various units of which shall be consciously related to one
another in the minds of the pupils”; Haldane, The Philo-
sophy of Humanism, p. 94: “There was a conference attended
by representatives of various German Universities . . . which
took place at Hanstein, not far from Göttingen in May 1921.
. . . The purpose of the movement is nominally the establish-
ment of a Humanistic Faculty. But in this connexion
‘faculty’ does not mean a separate faculty of humanistic
studies. . . . The real object is to bring these subjects into
organic relation to one another.”

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will receive greater honours than the others, and they will be required to gather the studies which they dis-connectedly pursued as children in their former education into a comprehensive survey of their affinities with one another and with the nature of things."

"That, at any rate," he said, "is the only instruction that abides with those who receive it." "And it is also," said I, "the chief test of the dialectical nature and its opposite. For he who can view things in their connexion is a dialectician; he who cannot, is not."

"I concur," he said. "With these qualities in mind," I said, "it will be your task to make a selection of those who manifest them best from the group who are steadfast in their studies and in war and in all lawful requirements, and when they have passed the thirtieth year to promote them, by a second selection from those preferred in the first, to still greater honours, and to prove and test them by the power of dialectic to see which of them is able to disregard the eyes and other senses and go on to being itself in company with truth. And at this point, my friend, the greatest

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Cf. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, vol. i. p. 4 "So true is it that, as Plato puts it, the metaphysician is a 'synoptical' man." Cf. also Aristot. Soph. El. 167 a 38 dia τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνορᾶν τὸ παίτων και τὸ ἔτερον. Stenzel, Dialektik, p. 8, misuses the passage to support the view that Plato's dialectic still looks for unity and not for divisions and distinctions, as in the Sophist. Cf. also ibid. p. 72.

b For the technical meaning of the word προκρίτων cf. Laws 753 B-D.

c For this periphrasis cf. Phaedr. 246 D, Tim. 85 E. Cf. also on 509 A.

d The reader of Plato ought not to misunderstand this now. Cf. supra on 532 A, pp. 196 f., note d, and 530 B, p. 187, note c.
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"έργον, οὕτως εταίρε. Τί μάλιστα; ἡ δ' ὅσ. Οὐκ ἐν-

Ενοεῖς, ἢν δ' ἔγω, τὸ νῦν περὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι κακὸν

γιγνόμενον ὅσον γίγνεται; Τὸ ποίον; ἐφη. Παρα-

νομίας που, ἐφην ἔγω, ἐμπίπτανται. Καὶ μάλα,

ἐφη. Θαυμαστὸν οὖν τι οὔει, εἶπον, πάσχειν αὐ-

τούς, καὶ οὐ γιγαγγινώσκεις; Πὴ μάλιστα; ἐφη.

Οἶνον, ἢν δ' ἔγω, εἰ τις ὑποβολμαίοις τραφεί ἐν

πολλοῖς μὲν χρήμασι, πολλῷ δὲ καὶ μεγάλῳ γένει

538 καὶ κόλαξ πολλοῖς, ἀνὴρ δὲ γενόμενος αὐχθοίτο,

ὅτι οὐ τοῦτων ἐστὶ τῶν φασκόντων γονέων, τοὺς

dὲ τῷ ὄντι γεννήσαντας μὴ εὐροῦ, τοῦτον ἔχεις

μαντεύσασθαι, πῶς ἂν διατεθῇ πρὸς τοὺς κό-

λακας καὶ πρὸς τοὺς υποβαλμένους ἐν έκείνῳ τε

τῷ χρόνῳ, ὃ οὐκ ἦδει τὰ περὶ τῆς υποβολῆς, καὶ

eν ὃ αὖ ἦδει; ἦ θεολεῖ ἐμοῦ μαντευμένου ἀκόσια;

Βούλομαι, ἐφη.

XVII. Μαντεύομαι τούνν, εἶπον, μάλλον αὐτὸν

Βτύμαν ἂν τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ τοὺς

ἀλλοὺς οἴκειους δοκοῦντας ἢ τοὺς κολακεύοντας,

καὶ ἢττον μὲν ἂν περιοδεῖν ἐνδεεῖς τινός, ἢττον δὲ

a Plato returns to an idea suggested in 498 a, and warns

against the mental confusion and moral unsettlement that

result from premature criticism of life by undisciplined minds.

In the terminology of modern education, he would not

encourage students to discuss the validity of the Ten Com-

mandments and the Constitution of the United States before

they could spell, construe, cipher, and had learned to dis-

tinguish an undistributed middle term from a petitio

principii. Cf. Phaedo 89 d-e.

We need not suppose with Grote and others that this

involves any "reaction" or violent change of the opinion he

held when he wrote the minor dialogues that portray such

discussions. In fact, the still later Sophist, 230 b-c-d, is more

friendly to youthful dialectics.

Whatever the effect of the practice of Socrates or the

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"Care is requisite." "How so?" he said. "Do you not note," said I, "how great is the harm caused by our present treatment of dialectics?" "What is that?" he said. "Its practitioners are infected with lawlessness." "They are indeed." "Do you suppose," I said, "that there is anything surprising in this state of mind, and do you not think it pardonable?" "In what way, pray?" he said. "Their case," said I, "resembles that of a supposititious son reared in abundant wealth and a great and numerous family amid many flatterers, who on arriving at manhood should become aware that he is not the child of those who call themselves his parents, and should not be able to find his true father and mother. Can you divine what would be his feelings towards the flatterers and his supposed parents in the time when he did not know the truth about his adoption, and, again, when he knew it? Or would you like to hear my surmise?" "I would."

XVII. "Well, then, my surmise is," I said, "that he would be more likely to honour his reputed father and mother and other kin than the flatterers, and that there would be less likelihood of his allowing them to lack for anything, and that he would be less

Sophists, Plato himself anticipates Grote’s criticism in the Republic by representing Socrates as discoursing with ingenuous youth in a more simple and edifying style. Cf. Lysis 207 d ff., Euthydem. 278 e-282 c, 288 d-290 d. Yet again the Charmides might be thought an exception.

Cf. also Zeller, Phil. d. Griechen, ii. 1, p. 912, who seems to consider the Sophist earlier than the Republic.

b i.e. they call all restrictions on impulses and instincts tyrannical conventions. Cf. Gorg. 483-484, Aristoph. Clouds, passim, and on nature and law cf. Vol. i. p. 116, note a, on 359 c.

c Cf. on 494 a, p. 43, note c.
paránoymón tì drásai ἥ εἴπεῖν εἰς αὐτοὺς, ἆττον δὲ ἀπεθεῖν τὰ μεγάλα ἐκείνοις ἥ τοῖς κόλαξιν, ἐν ὧν χρόνῳ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὴ εἰδεῖν. Εὐκός, ἔφη. Αἰσθήμενον τούν τὸ ὁν μαντεύομαι αὕτη ἐπὶ μὲν τούτους ἀνείναι ἃν τὸ τιμᾶν τε καὶ σπουδάζειν, περὶ δὲ τοὺς κόλακας ἐπιτείναι, καὶ πείθεσθαι τε αὐτοῖς
C διαφέροντως ἡ πρότερον καὶ ζῆν ἃν ἡδῆ κατ' ἐκείνους, ξυνόντα αὐτοῖς ἀπαρακαλῦπτως, πατρὸς δὲ ἐκείνου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιουμένων οἰκείων, εἰ μὴ πάνω εἰς φύσει ἐπιεικῆς, μέλειν τὸ μηδέν. Πάντ' ἐφη, λέγεις οἶδα περ ἃν γένοιτο. ἄλλα πὴ πρὸς τούς ἀπτομένους τῶν λόγων αὐτὴ φέρει ἡ εἰκῶν; Τῆς. ἔστι που ἡμῖν δόγματα ἐκ ποιῶν περὶ δικαίων καὶ καλῶν, ἐν οἷς ἐκτεθράμμεθα ὡσπερ ὑπὸ γονέως, πειθαρχοῦντες τε καὶ τιμῶντες
D αὐτὰ. Ἐστι γάρ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλα ἐναντία τούτων ἐπιτηθεύματα ἦδονα ἔχοντα, ἀ κολακεύει μὲν ἡμῖν τὴν ὕμνην καὶ ἐλκεῖ ἐφ' αὐτὰ, πείθει δ' οὐ τοὺς καὶ ὄπισθεν μετρίους: ἀλλ' ἐκείνα τιμῶντα πάτρια καὶ ἐκείνοις πειθαρχοῦσι. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

a διαφέροντως ἡ πρότερον: cf. Phaedo 85 b.
b οἶδα περ ἃν γένοιτο is the phrase Aristotle uses to distinguish the truth of poetry from the facts of history.
c That is the meaning. Lit. "those who lay hold on discourse."
d Plato’s warning applies to our day no less than to his own. Like the proponents of ethical nihilism in Plato’s Athens, much of our present-day literature and teaching questions all standards of morality and aesthetics, and confuses justice and injustice, beauty and ugliness. Its gospel is expressed in Mr. Oppenheim’s lines: 222
inclined to do or say to them anything unlawful, and less liable to disobey them in great matters than to disobey the flatterers—during the time when he did not know the truth.” “It is probable,” he said. “But when he found out the truth, I surmise that he would grow more remiss in honour and devotion to them and pay more regard to the flatterers, whom he would heed more than before and would henceforth live by their rule, associating with them openly, while for that former father and his adoptive kin he would not care at all, unless he was naturally of a very good disposition.” “All that you say,” he replied, “would be likely to happen.” But what is the pertinency of this comparison to the novices of dialectic?” “It is this. We have, I take it, certain convictions from childhood about the just and the honourable, in which, in obedience and honour to them, we have been bred as children under their parents.” “Yes, we have.” “And are there not other practices going counter to these, that have pleasures attached to them and that flatter and solicit our souls, but do not win over men of any decency; but they continue to hold in honour the teachings of their fathers and obey them?” “It is

Let nothing bind you.
If it is duty, away with it.
If it is law, disobey it.
If it is opinion, go against it.
There is only one divinity, yourself,
Only one god, you.

For the unsettling effects of dialectic cf. Phaedo 90 b; also Chesterton, George Bernard Shaw, p. 249: “There may have been ages so sluggish . . . that anything that woke them up at all was a good thing. . . . No one . . . does any good to our age merely by asking questions unless he can answer the question.” Cf. also on 537 d, p. 220, note a.
The question is here personified, as the λόγος so often is, e.g. 503 a. Cf. What Plato Said on Protag. 361 α-β.

A possible allusion to the καταβάλλωντες λόγοι of the sophists. Cf. Euthydem. 277 d, 288 a, Phaedo 88 c, Phileb. 15 e and What Plato Said, p. 518, on Crito 272 b.

This is the moral counterpart of the intellectual scepti-
so." "Well, then," said I, "when a man of this kind is met by the question, \textit{What is the honourable?} and on his giving the answer which he learned from the lawgiver, the argument confutes him, and by many and various refutations upsets his faith and makes him believe that this thing is no more honourable than it is base, and when he has had the same experience about the just and the good and everything that he chiefly held in esteem, how do you suppose that he will conduct himself thereafter in the matter of respect and obedience to this traditional morality?" "It is inevitable," he said, "that he will not continue to honour and obey as before." "And then," said I, "when he ceases to honour these principles and to think that they are binding on him, and cannot discover the true principles, will he be likely to adopt any other way of life than that which flatters his desires?" "He will not," he said. "He will, then, seem to have become a rebel to law and convention instead of the conformer that he was." "Necessarily." "And is not this experience of those who take up dialectics in this fashion to be expected and, as I just now said, deserving of much leniency?" "Yes, and of pity too," he said. "Then that we may not have to pity thus your thirty-year-old disciples, must you not take every precaution when you introduce them to the study of dialectics?" "Yes, indeed," he said. "And is it not one chief safeguard not to suffer them to taste

\textit{cism or \mu\sigma\sigma\sigma\sigma\sigma\sigma\sigma of Phaedo 90 c-d. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 531, on Phaedo 89 d.}

\textit{d For \textit{okeia cf. supra 433 e, 443 d, and Class. Phil. xxiv. (1929) pp. 409-410.}}

\textit{e Cf. Laws 633 e and supra 442 \textit{a-b. Others render it, "than the life of the flatterers (parasites)." Why not both?}}
οντας αυτων γευσθαι: οίμαι γάρ σε ού λεληθέναι ὅτι οἱ μετακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γεύωνται, ὡς παιδα αυτοῖς καταχρόνται, ἄει εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρόμενοι, καὶ μμούμενοι τοὺς ἔξελέγχοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἔλεγχουσι, χαίροντες ὡσπερ σκυλάκια τῷ ἐλκεων τε καὶ σπαράττεων τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς πλησίων ἀεί. Ὕπερφυὼς μὲν οὖν ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δὴ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτοῖ ἔλεγξων, ὑπὸ C πολλῶν δὲ ἔλεγχθωσί, σφόδρα καὶ ταχὺ ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς τὸ μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ὄντερ πρότερον καὶ ἐκ τοῦτων δὴ αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους διαβῆληνται. Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφη. Ὡ δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερος, ᾗν δὲ ἐγὼ, τῆς μὲν τοι-αὐτῆς μανίας οὐκ ἄν ἔθελοι μετέχειν, τὸν δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἐθέλοντα καὶ σκοπεῖν τάληθες μάλλον μμήστητῃ ἢ τὸν παιδάς χάρων παλίγοντα καὶ D ἀντιλέγοντα, καὶ αὐτὸς τε μετρώτερος ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα τιμώτερον ἀντὶ ἀτιμοτέρου πονῆσει. Ὁρθῶς, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν καί τὰ προειρημένα τοῦτον ἐπ᾽ εὐλαβεία πάντα προείρηται, τὸ τὰς φύσεις κοσμίους εἶναι καὶ θαυμίσμοις οἷς τῶν μεταδώσει

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\(^a\) See on 498 a-b. Cf. Richard of Bury, Philobiblon (Morley, A Miscellany, pp. 49-50): "But the contemporaries of our age negligently apply a few years of ardent youth, burning by turns with the fire of vice; and when they have attained the acumen of discerning a doubtful truth, they immediately become involved in extraneous business, retire, and say farewell to the schools of philosophy; they sip the frothy must of juvenile wit over the difficulties of philosophy, and pour out the purified old wine with economical care."

\(^b\) Cf. Apol. 23 c, Phileb. 15 τ., Xen. Mem. i. 2. 46, Isoc. xii. 26 and x. 6; also Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 568.

\(^c\) But in another mood or from another angle this is the bacchic madness of philosophy which all the company in the 226
of it while young? a For I fancy you have not failed to observe that lads, when they first get a taste of disputation, misuse it as a form of sport, always employing it contentiously, and, imitating confuters, they themselves confute others. b They delight like puppies in pulling about and tearing with words all who approach them." "Exceedingly so," he said. "And when they have themselves confuted many and been confuted by many, they quickly fall into a violent distrust of all that they formerly held true; and the outcome is that they themselves and the whole business of philosophy are discredited with other men." "Most true," he said. "But an older man will not share this craze," c said I, "but will rather choose to imitate the one who consents to examine truth dialectically than the one who makes a jest d and a sport of mere contradiction, and so he will himself be more reasonable and moderate, and bring credit rather than discredit upon his pursuit." "Right," he said. "And were not all our preceding statements made with a view to this precaution—our requirement that those permitted to take part in such discussions must have orderly and stable natures,

Symposium have shared, 218 a-b. Cf. also Phaedr. 245 b-c, 249 c-e, Sophist 216 d, Phileb. 15 d-e, and What Plato Said, p. 493, on Protag. 317 d-e.

d Cf. Gorg. 500 b-c. Yet the prevailing seriousness of Plato's own thought does not exclude touches of humour and irony, and he vainly warns the modern reader to distinguish between jest and earnest in the drama of disputation in his dialogues. Many misinterpretations of Plato's thought are due to the failure to heed this warning. Cf. e.g. Gorgias 474 a (What Plato Said, p. 504), which Robin, L'Année Philos. xxi. p. 29, and others miss, Rep. 376 b, Symp. 196 c, Protag. 339 f., Theaet. 157 a-b, 160 b, 165 b, and passim. Cf. also on 536 c, p. 214, note b.

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τῶν λόγων, καὶ μὴ ὡς νῦν ὁ τυχῶν καὶ οὐδὲν προσήκων ἔρχεται ἐπ' αὐτῷ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

XVIII. Ἀρκεῖ δὴ ἐπὶ λόγων μεταλῆψει μενέιν εὐδελεχῶς καὶ ξυντόνως, μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττοντι, ἀλλ' ἀντιστρόφως γυμναζομένω τοῖς περὶ τὸ σώμα

Ε γυμνασίοις, ἐτη διπλάσια ἡ τότε; "Εξ, ἔφη, ἡ τέτταρα λέγεις; Ἀμέλει, εἰπον, πέντε θές. μετὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καταβιβαστέοι ἔσονταί σοι εἰς τὸ σπήλαιον πάλιν ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ἀναγκαστέοι ἄρχειν τά τε περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ὅσαι νέων ἄρχαί, ἵνα μηδ' ἐμπείρια ὑστερώσοι τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐν τούτωι βασανιστεόι, εἰ ἐμμενοῦσιν ἐλκόμενοι 540 πανταχόσε ἦ τι καὶ παρακινήσουσιν. Χρόνον δὲ, ἦ δ' ὅσ, πόσον τούτον τίθησ; Πεντεκαίδεκα ἐτη, ἦν δ' ἔγω. γενομένων δὲ πεντηκοντατῶν τοὺς διασωθέντας καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας πάντα πάντη ἐν ἔργοις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαις πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἀκτέον, καὶ ἀναγκαστέον ἀνακλίναντας τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγήν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀποβλέψαι τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον,


b It is very naïve of modern commentators to cavil at the precise time allotted to dialectic, and still more so to infer that there was not much to say about the ideas. Dialectic was not exclusively or mainly concerned with the metaphysics of the ideas. It was the development of the reasoning powers by rational discussion.

c Cf. 519 c ff., pp. 139-145.

d Xen. Cyrop. i. 2. 13 seems to copy this. Cf. on 484 d.
instead of the present practice \(^a\) of admitting to it any change and unsuitable applicant?"  "By all means," he said.

**XVIII.** "Is it enough, then, to devote to the continuous and strenuous study of dialectics undisturbed by anything else, as in the corresponding discipline in bodily exercises, twice as many years as were allotted to that?"  "Do you mean six or four?" he said. "Well," I said, "set it down as five.\(^b\) For after that you will have to send them down into the cave \(^c\) again, and compel them to hold commands in war and the other offices suitable to youth, so that they may not fall short of the other type in experience \(^d\) either. And in these offices, too, they are to be tested to see whether they will remain steadfast under diverse solicitations or whether they will flinch and swerve.\(^e\)"  "How much time do you allow for that?" he said. "Fifteen years," said I, "and at the age of fifty\(^f\) those who have survived the tests and approved themselves altogether the best in every task and form of knowledge must be brought at last to the goal. We shall require them to turn upwards the vision of their souls\(^g\) and fix their gaze on that which sheds light on all, and when they have thus beheld

Critics of Plato frequently overlook the fact that he insisted on practical experience in the training of his rulers. Newman, Aristot. *Pol.* i. p. 5, points out that this experience takes the place of special training in political science.


\(^b\) An eminent scholar quaintly infers that Plato could not have written this page before he himself was fifty years old.

\(^c\) Plato having made his practical meaning quite clear feels that he can safely permit himself the short cut of rhetoric and symbolism in summing it up. He reckoned without Neoplatonists ancient and modern. Cf. also on 519 b, p. 138, note \(a\).
PLATO

καὶ ἰδόντας τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, παραδείγματι χρω-
μένους ἐκείνω, καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτας καὶ ἑαυτὸς
Β κοσμεῖν τὸν ἐπιλογοῦν βίον ἐν μέρει ἐκάστους, τὸ
μὲν πολὺ πρὸς φιλοσοφία διατρίβοντας, ὅταν δὲ
τὸ μέρος ἤκη, πρὸς πολιτικοῖς ἐπιταλαιπωροῦντας
καὶ ἀρχοντας ἐκάστους τῆς πόλεως ἑνεκα, οὐχ ὡς
καλὸν τι ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον πράττοντας, καὶ
οὕτως ἄλλους ἀεὶ παρεξεύσαντας τοιοῦτος, ἀντι-
καταλιπόντας τῆς πόλεως φύλακας, εἰς μακάρων
νήσους ἀπίόντας οἰκεῖν· μνημεία δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ
C θυσίας τῆς πόλιν δημοσία ποιεῖν, ἐὰν καὶ ἡ Πυθία
ἐξουσία ἐξαγανάρη, ὡς δαίμοσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὡς ἐνδιαμοσί σε
καὶ θείοις. Παγκάλους, ἐφή, τοὺς ἀρχοντας, ὦ
Σῶκρατες, ὡσπερ ἀνδριαντόποιος ἀπείργασαι. Καὶ
τάς ἀρχούσας γε, ἢ μὴ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων· μηδὲν
γάρ τι οἶνον με περί ἀνδρῶν εἰρηκέναι μᾶλλον ἄ
εἰρηκα ἢ περὶ γυναικῶν, ὅσι πάντων ἰκαναί τὰς
φύσεις ἐγγίγνωνται. Ἄρθως, ἐφή, εἰπέρ ἵσα γε
πάντα τοῖς ἀνδράσι κοινωνήσουσιν, ἡς δυνὴθομεν.
D Τί οὖν; ἐφην· ἐννυχωρείτε περὶ τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ
πολιτείας μὴ παντάπασιν ἡμᾶς εὐχὰς εἰρηκέναι,
ἀλλὰ χαλεπὰ μὲν, δυνατὰ δὲ πη, καὶ οὐκ ἀλλ' ἦ

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a Cf. supra 500 d-e. For παράδειγμα cf. 592 b and What Plato Said, p. 458, on Euthyphro 6 e, and p. 599, on Polit. 277 d.

b Cf. 520 d.

c Cf. 347 c-d, 520 e.

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a Plato's guardians, unlike Athenian statesmen, could train their successors. Cf. Protag. 319 E-320 b, Meno 99 b. Also ἀλλος ποιεῖν Meno 100 1, Gorg. 449 b, 455 c, Euthyph. 3 c, Phaedr. 266 c, 268 b, Symp. 196 e, Protag. 348 e, Isoc. Demon. 3, Panath. 28, Soph. 13, Antid. 204, Xen. Oecon. 15. 10, and παρεξέτων ἀνθρώπον, generally used of the sophists, Gorg. 519 e, Protag. 317 b, Euthyd. 306 e, Laches 186 d, Rep. 600 c

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the good itself they shall use it as a pattern for the right ordering of the state and the citizens and themselves throughout the remainder of their lives, each in his turn, devoting the greater part of their time to the study of philosophy, but when the turn comes for each, toiling in the service of the state and holding office for the city’s sake, regarding the task not as a fine thing but a necessity; and so, when each generation has educated others like themselves to take their place as guardians of the state, they shall depart to the Islands of the Blest and there dwell. And the state shall establish public memorials and sacrifices for them as to divinities if the Pythian oracle approves or, if not, as to divine and godlike men.

“A most beautiful finish, Socrates, you have put upon your rulers, as if you were a statuary.” “And on the women too, Glaucon,” said I; “for you must not suppose that my words apply to the men more than to all women who arise among them endowed with the requisite qualities.” “That is right,” he said, “if they are to share equally in all things with the men as we laid it down.” “Well, then,” said I, “do you admit that our notion of the state and its polity is not altogether a day-dream, but that though it is difficult, it is in a way possible and in no other way

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† Cf. *Symp.* 209 e.

‡ For this caution cf. 461 e and Vol. I. p. 344, note c, on 427 c.

§ Plato plays on the words δαιμόν and εὐδαιμόν. Cf. also *Crat.* 398 b-c.

¶ Cf. 361 d. Lit. “female rulers.”

† Cf. on 450 d and 499 c.


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eirηται, οταν οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται, ἡ πλείους ἡ εἰς, ἐν πόλει γενόμενοι τῶν μὲν νόν τιμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν, ἡγησάμενοι ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς αξίας, τὸ δὲ ὀρθὸν περὶ πλείστου
Ε ποιησάμενοι καὶ τὰς ἁπτὸ τούτου τιμάς, μέγιστον
dὲ καὶ ἀναγκαίοτατον τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ ὑπηρετοῦντες τε καὶ αὐξοντες αὐτὸ διασκευω-
ρήσωντα τῷ ἑαυτῶν πόλιν; Πῶς; ἔφη. Ὅσοι
μὲν ἂν, ἦν δὲ ἐγὼ, πρεσβύτεροι τυγχάνοσι δεκέτων
541 ἐν τῇ πόλει, πάντας ἐκπέμψωσιν εἰς τους ἀγρούς,
tους δὲ παίδας αὐτῶν παραλαβόντες ἐκτὸς τῶν
νόν ἡθῶν, ἀ καὶ οἱ γονῆς ἔχοντες, βρέφωνται ἐν τοῖς
σφετέροις τρόποις καὶ νόμοις, οὐδὲν οἷος δι-
εληλύθαμεν τότε· καὶ οὕτω τάχιστα τε καὶ ράστα
πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν, ἦν ἐλέγομεν, καταστάσαν
αὐτὴν τε εὐδαιμονήσεως καὶ τὸ ἔθνος ἐν ὧν ἂν
Β ἐγγείηται πλείστα ὄνήσεως; Πολὺ γ', ἔφη· καὶ
ὡς ἂν γένοιτο, εἴπερ ποτὲ γίγνοιτο, δοκεῖς μοι, ὡ
Σώκρατες, εἴ εἰρηκέναι. Οὐκοῦν ἂδην ἦδη, εἶπον
ἐγὼ, ἔχουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι περὶ τῇ πόλεως
ταύτης καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου ταύτης ἀνδρός; δῆλος γὰρ που
καὶ οὕτως, οἷον φήσομεν δεῖν αὐτὸν εἶναι. Δῆλος,
ἔφη· καὶ ὅπερ ἐρωτᾶς, δοκεῖ μοι τέλος ἔχειν.

α Cf. 473 c-δ, 499 b-c.
b Cf. supra 521 b, 516 c-δ.
c τὸ ὀρθὸν: cf. Theaet. 171 c, Meno 99 Δ.
d This is another of the passages in which Plato seems to
lend support to revolutionaries. Cf. supra p. 71, note g. It
is what the soviets are said to be doing. Lowell points out
that it is what actually happened in the New England of
1630-1660.

Cf. Laws 752 c, where it is said that the children would
accept the new laws if the parents would not. Cf. supra
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than that described—when genuine philosophers, when many or one, becoming masters of the state scorn the present honours, regarding them as illiberal and worthless, but prize the right and the honours that come from that above all things, and regarding justice as the chief and the one indispensable thing, in the service and maintenance of that reorganize and administer their city?" "In what way?" he said. "All inhabitants above the age of ten," I said, "they will send out into the fields, and they will take over the children, remove them from the manners and habits of their parents, and bring them up in their own customs and laws which will be such as we have described. This is the speediest and easiest way in which such a city and constitution as we have portrayed could be established and prosper and bring most benefit to the people among whom it arises."

"Much the easiest," he said, "and I think you have well explained the manner of its realization if it should ever be realized." "Then," said I, "have we not now said enough about this state and the corresponding type of man—for it is evident what our conception of him will be?" "It is evident," he said, "and, to answer your question, I think we have finished."

415 d, and also What Plato Said, p. 625, on Laws 644 a and p. 638, on 813 d.

There is some confusion in this passage between the inauguration and the normal conduct of the ideal state, and Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 439 calls the idea "ein hingeworfener Einfall." But Plato always held that the reformer must have or make a clean slate. Cf. 501 a, Laws 735 e. And he constantly emphasizes the supreme importance of education; Rep. 377 a-b, 423 e, 416 c, Laws 641 b, 644 a-b, 752 c, 765 e-766 a, 788 c, 804 d.

543 I. Εἴεν' ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ωμολόγηται, ὡ Γλαύκων, 
τῇ μελλοῦσῃ ἄκρως οἰκεῖν πόλει κοινὰς μὲν 
γυναῖκας, κοινῶς δὲ παιδὰς εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν 
pαιδείαν, ὡσαύτως δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα κοινὰ ἐν 
πολέμῳ τε καὶ εἰρήνῃ, βασιλέας δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι 
toὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον γεγο-
νότας ἀρίστους. Ὡμολόγηται, ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν καὶ 
Β τάδε ξυνέχωρήσαμεν, ὥστεν δὴ καταστῶσιν οἱ 
ἀρχόντες, ἀγόνες τοὺς στρατιωτὰς κατουκιόσων 
eἰς οἰκήσεις οἷας προείπομεν, ἵδιον μὲν οὐδὲν 
οὐδὲν ἔχοντας, κοινῶς δὲ πᾶσιν πρὸς δὲ ταῖς 
τοιαύταις οἰκήσεις καὶ τὰς κτήσεις, εἴ μνημονεύεις, 
διωμολογησάμεθα που οἷα ἔσονται αὐτοῖς. Ἀλλὰ 
μνημονεύων, ἔφη, ὅτι γε οὐδὲν οὐδένα ψάμαθα δεῖν 
κεκτῆσθαι δὲν νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσπερ δὲ ἀθλητάς τε 
C πολέμου καὶ φύλακας, μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς δεχο-
μένους εἰς ἐναυτὸν τὴν εἰς ταῦτα τροφὴν παρὰ τῶν 
ἄλλων, αὐτῶν τε δεῖν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως

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a Strictly speaking, this applies only to the guardians, but cf. Laws 739 c ff. Aristotle, Pol. 1261 a 6 and 1262 a 41, like many subsequent commentators, misses the point.

b Cf. supra 445 ν and What Plato Said, p. 539, on Menex. 238 c-D.

c So Jowett. Adam ad loc. insists that the genitive is partitive, “those of their number are to be kings.”

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BOOK VIII

I. "Very good. We are agreed then, Glaucon, that the state which is to achieve the height of good government must have community of wives and children and all education, and also that the pursuits of men and women must be the same in peace and war, and that the rulers or kings over them are to be those who have approved themselves the best in both war and philosophy." "We are agreed," he said. "And we further granted this, that when the rulers are established in office they shall conduct these soldiers and settle them in habitations such as we described, that have nothing private for anybody but are common for all, and in addition to such habitations we agreed, if you remember, what should be the nature of their possessions." "Why, yes, I remember," he said, "that we thought it right that none of them should have anything that ordinary men now possess, but that, being as it were athletes of war and guardians, they should receive from the others as pay for their guardianship each year their yearly sustenance, and devote their entire attention to the

\[a\] Cf. 415 E.
\[\] Cf. 420 A.
\[\] Cf. on 403 E and 521 D. Polyb. i. 6. 6 ἀθληταὶ γεγονότες ἀληθινοὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐργαν.
\[\] Cf. 416 E.
επιμελείσθαι. Ὑρθῶς, ἔφην, λέγεις. ἂλλ᾽ ἂγε, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἀπετελέσαμεν, ἀναμνησθῶμεν, πόθεν δεύρο ἐξετραπόμεθα, ἵνα πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἱομεν. Οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη. σχεδὸν γάρ, καθάπερ νῦν, ὡς διεληλυθὼς περὶ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς λόγους ἐποιοῦ λέγων, ὡς ἁγαθὴν μὲν τὴν τοιαύτην, οὐαν τότε Δ ἔλθης, τιθεὶς πόλιν, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν ἐκείνη ὁμοίον, καὶ ταῦτα, ὡς έοικας, καλλίω ἐτί ἔχων εἰπεῖν πόλιν 544 τε καὶ ἄνδρα: ἂλλ᾽ οὖν δὴ τὰς ἄλλας ἡμαρτημένας ἑλεγες, εἰ αὐτὴ ὀρθή. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν ἐφησθα, ὡς μνημονεύω, τέτταρα εἰδὴ εἶναι, ὡς καὶ πέρι λόγον ἄξιον εἰὴ ἔχειν καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτῶν τὰ ἡμαρτήματα καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνας αὖ ὁμοίους, ἵνα πάντας αὐτοὺς ἱδόντες καὶ ὁμολογησάμενοι τὸν ἀριστον καὶ τὸν κάκιστον ἄνδρα ἐπισκεφαλίμεθα, εἰ ὁ ἀριστος εὐδαμονέστατος καὶ ὁ κάκιστος ἀθλιώτατος ἡ ἄλλως ἔχωι· καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρομένου, τίνας Ἐ λέγοις τὰς τέτταρας πολιτείας, ἐν τούτω ὑπέλαβε Πολέμαρχος τε καὶ Ἀδείμαντος, καὶ οὔτω δὴ σὺ

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Aristot. Pol. 1291-1292 censures the limitation to four. But cf. supra, Introd. p. xlv. Cf. Laws 693 n, where only two mother-forms of government are mentioned, monarchy and democracy, with Aristot. Pol. 1301 b 40 δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. Cf. also Eth. Nic. 1160 a 31 ff. The Politicus mentions seven (291 f., 301 f.). Isoc. Panath. 132-134 names three kinds—oligarchy, democracy, and monarchy—adding that others may say much more about them. See note ad loc. in Loeb Isocrates and Class. Phil. vol. vii. p. 91. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan 19 “Yet he that shall consider the particular commonwealths that have been and are in the world will not

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care of themselves and the state.’’ "That is right,’’ I said. "But now that we have finished this topic let us recall the point at which we entered on the digression that has brought us here, so that we may proceed on our way again by the same path.’’ "That is easy,’’ he said; "for at that time, almost exactly as now, on the supposition that you had finished the description of the city, you were going on to say that you assumed such a city as you then described and the corresponding type of man to be good, and that too though, as it appears, you had a still finer city and type of man to tell of; but at any rate you were saying that the others are aberrations, if this city is right. But regarding the other constitutions, my recollection is that you said there were four species worth speaking of and observing their defects and the corresponding types of men, in order that when we had seen them all and come to an agreement about the best and the worst man, we might determine whether the best is the happiest and the worst most wretched or whether it is otherwise. And when I was asking what were the four constitutions you had in mind, Polemarchus and Adeimantus thereupon broke in, and that was how you took up the discussion again and brought perhaps easily reduce them to three . . . as, for example, elective kingdoms,” etc.

* For ὃν καὶ πέρι λόγου ἄξιον εἰη cf. Laws 908 b ἀ καὶ δια-

† For the relative followed by a demonstrative cf. also 357 b.

‡ Plato's main point again. Cf. 545 a, 484 α-β and Vol. I. p. xii, note d.
άναλαβών τὸν λόγον δεῦρ' ἀφίξαι. Ὄρθοτατα, εἰπον, ἐμνημόνευσας. Πάλιν τοίνυν, ὥσπερ παλαιστῆς, τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν πάρεχε, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐμοῦ ἐρωμένου πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἀπερ τὸτε ἐμελλὲς λέγειν. Ἐάνπερ, ἢν δ᾿ ἐγὼ, δύνωμαι. Καὶ μὴν, ἢ δ᾿ ὦς, ἐπιθυμῶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκούσαι τίνας ἔλεγες τὰς C τέτταρας πολιτείας. Οὐ χαλεπῶς, ἢν δ᾿ ἐγὼ, ἀκούσει. εἰσὶ γὰρ ὃς λέγω, αὕτη καὶ ὅνόματα ἔχουσιν, ἢ τε ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαινομένη, ἡ Κρητικὴ τε καὶ Δακωνικὴ αὐτή· καὶ δευτέρα καὶ δευτέρως ἐπαινομένη, καλομένη δ᾿ ὀλιγαρχία, συχνῶν γέμουσα κακῶν πολιτεία· ἡ τε ταύτη διάφορος καὶ ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένη δημοκρατία, καὶ ἡ γενναία δὴ τυραννίς καὶ πασῶν τούτων διαφέρουσα, τέταρτον τε καὶ ἔσχατον πόλεως νόσημα.

D ἡ τυχα ἄλλην ἔχεις ἱδέαν πολιτείας, ἢτις καὶ ἐν εἴδει διαφανεὶ τυλί κεῖται; δυναστεῖαι γὰρ καὶ ὠνηταί βασιλεῖαι καὶ τουαταί τινες πολιτεῖαι μεταξύ τι τούτων ποῦ εἰσών, εὐροὶ δ᾿ ἁν τις αὐτὰς

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a Cf. on 572 b, p. 339, note e.
b Cf. Phileb. 13 d εἰς τὰς ὀμοίας, Phaedr. 236 b, Laws 682 e, Aristoph. Clouds 551 (Blaydes), Knights 841, Lysist. 672.
c Cf. What Plato Said, p. 596, on Sophist 267 d.
e ἢ . . . αὐτὴν, “ista.” Cf. Midsummer Night’s Dream, i. ii. ad fin. and Gorg. 502 b, 452 e.
f Of course ironical. Cf. supra 454 a, and What Plato Said, p. 592, on Soph. 231 b.
g Cf. 552 c, Protag. 322 ν, Isoc. Hel. 34, Wilamowitz on 238
to this point." "Your memory is most exact," I said. "A second time then, as in a wrestling-match, offer me the same hold, and when I repeat my question try to tell me what you were then about to say." "I will if I can," said I. "And indeed," said he, "I am eager myself to hear what four forms of government you meant." "There will be no difficulty about that," said I. "For those I mean are precisely those that have names in common usage: that which the many praise, your Cretan and Spartan constitution; and the second in place and in honour, that which is called oligarchy, a constitution teeming with many ills, and its consequent counterpart and opponent, democracy; and then the noble tyranny surpassing them all, the fourth and final malady of a state. Can you mention any other type of government, I mean any other that constitutes a distinct species? For, no doubt, there are hereditary principalities and purchased kingships, and similar intermediate constitutions which one


h ἰδέαν: cf. Introd. p. x.

i Cf. 445 c. For διαφανεῖ cf. Tim. 60 A, 67 A, Laws 634 c, and infra on 548 c, p. 253, note g.

j δυναστεία: cf. Laws 680 b, 681 d. But the word usually has an invidious suggestion. See Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1272 b 10. Cf. ibid. 1292 b 5-10, 1293 a 31, 1298 a 32; also Lysias ii. 18, where it is opposed to democracy, Isoc. Panath. 148, where it is used of the tyranny of Peisistratus, ibid. 43 of Minos. Cf. Panegyr. 39 and Norlin on Panegyr. 105 (Loeb). Isocrates also uses it frequently of the power or sovereignty of Philip, Phil. 3, 6, 69, 133, etc. Cf. also Gorg. 492 b, Polit. 291 d.

k Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1273 a 35 thinks that Plato may have been thinking of Carthage. Cf. Polyb. vi. 56. 4.
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οὐκ ἐλάττους περὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἡ τοὺς "Ελλήνας. Πολλαὶ γοῦν καὶ ἀτοποι, ἔφη, λέγονται.

II. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἴδη τοσάστα ἀνάγκη τρόπων εἶναι, οὐσαπερ καὶ πολιτείων; ἦ οἷοί ἐκ δρύνος ποθεν ἦ ἐκ πέτρας τᾶς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἥθων τῶν Ε ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἃ ἀν ἀσπερ ῥέσαντα τάλλα ἐφελκύσθηται; Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ἀλλοθεν ἦ ἐντευθεν. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πέντε, καὶ αἱ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κατασκευαὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε ἄν εἰεν. Τί μὴν; Ὑμν μὲν δὴ τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ὁμοιον διεληλύθαμεν ἡδῆ, διὰν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον ὀρθῶς 545 φαμέν εἶναι. Διεληλύθαμεν. "Ἀρ' οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο δυτέον τοὺς χεῖρος, τῶν φιλόνικον τε καὶ φιλότιμον, κατὰ τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἐστῶτα πολιτείαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὸν αὖ καὶ δημοκρατικὸν καὶ τῶν τυραννικῶν, ἵνα τὸν ἀδικώτατον ἴδοντες ἀντιθώμεν τῇ δικαιοτάτῳ καὶ ἡμῖν τελέα ἡ σκέψις ἦ, πῶς ποτὲ ἡ ἄκρατος δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἄδικον τὴν ἄκρατον ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας τε πέρι τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ

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a Plato, as often, is impatient of details, for which he was rebuked by Aristotle. Cf. also Tim. 57 d, 67 c, and the frequent leaving of minor matters to future legislators in the Republic and Laws, Vol. I. p. 294, note b, on 412 b.

b For the correspondence of individual and state cf. also 435 e, 445 c-d, 579 c and on 591 e. Cf. Laws 829 A, Isoc. Peace 120.

c Or "stock or stone," i.e. inanimate, insensible things. For the quotation ἐκ δρύνος-ποθεν ἦ ἐκ πέτρας cf. Odyssey xix. 163, Il. xxii. 126 aliter, Apol. 34 D and Thompson on Phaedrus 275 b; also Stallbaum ad loc.

d The "mores," 435 e, 436 a. Cf. Bagehot, Physics and Politics, p. 206: "A lazy nation may be changed into an industrious, a rich into a poor, a religious into a profane, 240
could find in even greater numbers among the barbarians than among the Greeks.\(^a\)" "Certainly many strange ones are reported," he said.

II. "Are you aware, then," said I, "that there must be as many types of character among men as there are forms of government? Or do you suppose that constitutions spring from the proverbial oak or rock\(^c\) and not from the characters\(^d\) of the citizens, which, as it were, by their momentum and weight in the scales\(^e\) draw other things after them?" "They could not possibly come from any other source," he said. "Then if the forms of government are five, the patterns of individual souls must be five also." "Surely." "Now we have already described the man corresponding to aristocracy\(^f\) or the government of the best, whom we aver to be the truly good and just man." "We have." "Must we not, then, next after this, survey the inferior types, the man who is contentious and covetous of honour,\(^g\) corresponding to the Laconian constitution, and the oligarchical man in turn, and the democratic and the tyrant, in order that,\(^h\) after observing the most unjust of all, we may oppose him to the most just, and complete our inquiry as to the relation of pure justice and pure injustice in respect of the happiness and unhappiness of the possessor, so that we may as if by magic, if any single cause, though slight, or any combination of causes, however subtle, is strong enough to change the favourite and detested types of character."

\(^a\) For the metaphor cf. also 550 \(\epsilon\) and on 556 \(\epsilon\).

\(^c\) ἀριστοκρατία is used by both Plato and Aristotle sometimes technically, sometimes etymologically as the government of the best, whoever they may be. Cf. 445 \(\delta\), and \textit{Mener}. 238 \(\alpha\)–\(\delta\) (\textit{What Plato Said}, p. 539).

\(^d\) Cf. \textit{Phaedr}. 256 \(\alpha\) 1, \textit{supra} 475 \(\lambda\), 347 \(\beta\).

\(^e\) Cf. on 544 \(\alpha\), p. 237, note \(g\).
In considering the progress of degeneration portrayed in the following pages, it is too often forgotten that Plato is describing or satirizing divergences from an ideal rather than an historical process. Cf. Rehm, *Der Untergang Roms im abendländischen Denken*, p. 11: "Plato gibt eine zum Mythos gesteigerte Naturgeschichte des Staates, so wie Hesiod eine als Mythos zu verstehende Natur-, d.h. Entartungsgeschichte des Menschengeschlechts gibt." Cf. Sidney B. Fay, on Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, in "Methods of Social Science," edited by Stuart A. Rice, p. 289: "... there was a widely spread belief in an earlier 'golden age' of simplicity, which had been followed by a degeneration and decay of the human race. Plato's theory of degradation set forth a gradual deterioration through the successive stages of timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and despotism. The Greek theory of 'cycles,' with its endless, monotonous iteration, excluded the possibility of permanent advance or 'progress.'"

Kurt Singer, *Platon der Gründer*, p. 141, says that the timocratic state reminds one of late Sparta, the democratic
either follow the counsel of Thrasymachus and pursue injustice or the present argument and pursue justice?"  "Assuredly," he said, "that is what we have to do."  "Shall we, then, as we began by examining moral qualities in states before individuals, as being more manifest there, so now consider first the constitution based on the love of honour? I do not know of any special name for it in use. We must call it either timocracy or timarchy. And then in connexion with this we will consider the man of that type, and thereafter oligarchy and the oligarch, and again, fixing our eyes on democracy, we will contemplate the democratic man; and fourthly, after coming to the city ruled by a tyrant and observing it, we will in turn take a look into the tyrannical soul, and so try to make ourselves competent judges of the question before us."  "That would be at least a systematic and consistent way of conducting the observation and the decision," he said.

of Athens after Pericles, the oligarchic is related to Corinth, and the tyrannical has some Syracusan features. Cicero, De div. ii., uses this book of the Republic to console himself for the revolutions in the Roman state, and Polybius's theory of the natural succession of governments is derived from it, with modifications (Polyb. vi. 4. 6 ff. Cf. vi. 9. 10 αὐτῇ πολιτείᾳ ἀνακύκλωσις). Aristotle objects that in a cycle the ideal state should follow the tyranny.

* Cf. on 544 c, p. 238, note b.

* In Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1160 a 33-34, the meaning is "the rule of those who possess a property qualification."

* Cf. 577 a-b.

* Cf. 582 a ff.

* For the qualified assent cf. Hamlet i. 1. 19 "What? is Horatio there? A piece of him." It is very frequent in the Republic, usually with γὰρ. Cf. 442 d, 469 b, 476 c, 501 c, 537 c, 534 a, 555 b, 604 d, and Vol. I. p. 30, note a, on 334 a; also 460 c and 398 b, where the interlocutor adds a condition, 392 b, 405 b, 556 ε, 581 b, and 487 a, where he uses the corrective μὲν ὅν.
III. Φέρε τούνων, ἢν δ' ἔγω, πειρώμεθα λέγειν, τίνα τρόπον τιμοκρατία γένοιτ' ἃν ε' ἀριστο-κρατίας. ἦ τόδε μὲν ἀπλοῦν, ὅτι πᾶσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐχοντος τὰς ἀρχὰς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσις ἐγχένηται ὁμονοοῦντος δὲ, κἂν πάνυ ὄλγον ἢ, ἀδύνατον κινηθῆναι; "Εστι γάρ οὕτως. Πῶς οὖν δή, εἶπον, οἱ Γλαύκων, ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν κινηθήσεται, καὶ πῇ στασιάσουσιν οἱ ἐπίκουροι καὶ οἱ ἀρχοντες πρὸς ἄλληλους τε καὶ πρὸς ἐαυτοὺς; ἥ βούλει, ὡσπερ "Ομηρος, εὐχώ-μεθα τὰς Μούσας εἶπεν ἡμῖν ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον ἔστασις ἔμπεσε, καὶ φῶμεν αὐτάς τραγικῶς ὡς πρὸς παίδας ἡμᾶς παιδύσασας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας, ὡς δὴ σπουδὴ λεγοὺσας, ψηλολογομενάς λέγειν; Πῶς; "Ωδὲ πως: χαλεπῶν μὲν κινηθῆναι πόλιν οὕτω ἔνοπλισάν τέλει φθορά ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἡ τουαύτῃ ἐξουσία τὸν ἀπάντα μενεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ λυθήσεται. λύσις δὲ ήδε. οὐ μόνον φυτοῖς ἐγχείοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιγείοις ζώοις φορά καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίγνονται, ὅταν περιτροπή ἐκάστοις κύκλων περιφορᾶς ἐναπτωσί, βραχυβίοις μὲν βραχυπόροις, ἐναντίοις δὲ ἐναντίας.

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a For the idea that the state is destroyed only by factions in the ruling class cf. also Laws 683 e. Cf. 465 b, Lysias xxv. 21, Aristot. Pol. 1305 b, 1306 a 10 ὀμονοοῦσα δὲ ὀλγαρχία οὐκ εὐδιάφθρος ἐξ αὐτῆς, 1302 a 10, Polybius, Teubner, vol. ii. p. 298 (vi. 57). Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 521, says that Aristotle "does not remark on Plato's observation ... though he cannot have agreed with it." Cf. Halévy, Notes et souvenirs, p. 153 "L'histoire est là pour démontrer clairement que, depuis un siècle, nos gouvernements n'ont jamais été renversés que par eux-mêmes"; Bergson, Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion, p. 303: "Mais
"Come, then," said I, "let us try to tell in what way a timocracy would arise out of an aristocracy. Or is this the simple and unvarying rule, that in every form of government revolution takes its start from the ruling class itself, when dissension arises in that, but so long as it is at one with itself, however small it be, innovation is impossible?"

"Yes, that is so." "How, then, Glaucon," I said, "will disturbance arise in our city, and how will our helpers and rulers fall out and be at odds with one another and themselves? Shall we, like Homer, invoke the Muses to tell 'how faction first fell upon them,' and say that these goddesses playing with us and teasing us as if we were children address us in lofty, mock-serious tragic style?" "How?" "Something in this fashion. Hard in truth it is for a state thus constituted to be shaken and disturbed; but since for everything that has come into being destruction is appointed, not even such a fabric as this will abide for all time, but it shall surely be dissolved, and this is the manner of its dissolution. Not only for plants that grow from the earth but also for animals that live upon it there is a cycle of bearing and barrenness for soul and body as often as the revolutions of their orbs come full circle, in brief courses for the short-lived and oppositely for the opposite; but the l'instinct résiste. Il ne commence à céder que lorsque la classe supérieure elle-même l'y invite."

b For the mock-heroic style of this invocation cf. Phaedr. 237 a, Laws 885 c.

c Cf. 413 b, Meno 76 e, Aristot. Meteorol. 353 b 1, Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 146.
d Cf. Alc. I. 104 e.
f Cf. Pindar, Nem. vi. 10-12 for the thought.
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gένος δὲ ύμετέρου εὐγονίας τε καὶ ἀφορίας, καίπερ
B ὁντες σοφοί, οὐς ἤγεμόνας πόλεως ἐπαιδεύσασθε, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον λογουμῷ μετ᾽ αὐθήσεως τεύξονται, ἀλλὰ πάρεισιν αὐτούς καὶ γεννήσουσι παιδάς ποτε οὐ δέον. ἦςτι δὲ θείως μὲν γεννητῷ περίδος, ἤν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλειος, ἀνθρωπεῖ ὡς ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναι τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι, τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὄρους λαβοῦσα ὀμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων, πάντα προσήγορα καὶ
C ῥήτα πρὸς ἅλληλα ἀπέφηγαν· ὃν ἐπίτριτοι πυθμην πεμπάδι συζυγεῖς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται τρίς αὐξήσεις, τὴν μὲν ἱστὴν ἱσάκις, ἐκατὸν τοσαυτάκις, τὴν δὲ ἱσομήκη μὲν τῇ, προμήκη δὲ, ἐκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν πεμπάδων, δεομένων ἐνὸς ἕκαστων, ἀρρήτων δὲ δυνῶ, ἐκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος. ξύμπας δὲ οὕτος ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικὸς τοιοῦτο κύριος, ἀμεινὸν τε καὶ χει-
D ρώνων γενέσεων, ἃς ὅταν ἀγνοήσαντες ὃμι στάλκες συνοικίζωσι νῦμφας νυμφίοις παρὰ καιρὸν, οὐκ εὐφυεῖς οὐδ᾽ εὐτυχεῖς παῖδες ἔσονται· ἦν καταστήσουσι μὲν τοὺς ἀρίστους οἱ πρότεροι, ὅμως δὲ ὦντες ἀνάξιοι, εἰς τὰς τῶν πατέρων αὐ δυνάμεις ἐλθόντες, ἤμων πρῶτων ἀρξόνται ἀμέλειν φύλακες ὄντες, παρ᾽ ἐλαττὸν τοῦ δέοντος ἡγησάμενοι τὰ μονοσκῆς, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς· οthane ἀ-

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a Cf. Tim. 28 a δέξη μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως.
c προσήγορα: cf. Theaet. 146 a.
d Cf. 534 ν; also Theaet. 202 Ῥητάς.
e Cf. 409 ν.
laws of prosperous birth or infertility for your race, the men you have bred to be your rulers will not for all their wisdom ascertain by reasoning combined with sensation, but they will escape them, and there will be a time when they will beget children out of season. Now for divine begettings there is a period comprehended by a perfect number, and for mortal by the first in which augmentations dominating and dominated when they have attained to three distances and four limits of the assimilating and the dissimilating, the waxing and the waning, render all things conversable and commensurable with one another, whereof a basal four-thirds wedded to the pempad yields two harmonies at the third augmentation, the one the product of equal factors taken one hundred times, the other of equal length one way but oblong,—one dimension of a hundred numbers determined by the rational diameters of the pempad lacking one in each case, or of the irrational lacking two; the other dimension of a hundred cubes of the triad. And this entire geometrical number is determinative of this thing, of better and inferior births. And when your guardians, missing this, bring together brides and bridegrooms unseasonably, the offspring will not be well-born or fortunate. Of such offspring the previous generation will establish the best, to be sure, in office, but still these, being unworthy, and having entered in turn into the powers of their fathers, will first as guardians begin to neglect us, paying too little heed to music and then to gymnastics, so that

2 This does not indicate a change in Plato's attitude toward music, as has been alleged.

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μουσότεροι γενήσονται ύμιν οἱ νέοι. ἐκ δὲ τούτων
Ε ἄρχοντες οὐ πάνυ φυλακικοὶ καταστήσονται πρὸς
547 τὸ δοκιμάζειν τὰ Ἡσιόδου τε καὶ τὰ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν γένη, χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἄργυροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν
καὶ σιδηροῦν ὑμοῦ δὲ μιγέντος σιδηροῦ ἄργυρῳ καὶ χαλκοῦ χρυσῷ ἀνομοιότης ἔγγενήσεται καὶ ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος, ἢ γενόμενα, οὐ ἂν ἐγγέννηται, ἄει τίκτει πόλεμον καὶ ἔχθραν. ταύτης τοι
γενεᾶς χρὴ φάναι εἶναι στάσιν, ὅπου ἂν γίγνηται ἄει. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ’, ἐφη, αὐτᾶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι φή-
σομεν. Καὶ γάρ, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη Μοῦσας γε
Β οὐσας. Τί οὖν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅσ, τὸ μετὰ τούτῳ λέγουσιν αἱ
Μοῦσαι; Στάσεως, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, γενομένης εἰδκήτην
ἀρα ἐκατέρω τῷ γένει, τὸ μὲν σιδηροῦν καὶ χαλ-
κοῦν ἐπὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ γῆς κτήσιν καὶ οἰκίας
χρυσίου τε καὶ ἄργυρου, τῶ δ᾽ αὖ, τὸ χρυσοῦν τε
καὶ ἄργυροῦν, ἄτε οὐ πενομένω, ἀλλὰ φύσει ὑντε
πλουσίω, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν
ἀρχαίαν καταστασιν ἡγέτην. βιαζομένων δὲ καὶ
ἀντιτεινόντων ἀλλήλους, εἰς μέσον ὁμολόγησαν
γῆν μὲν καὶ οἰκίας κατανειμαμένος ἰδιώσασθαι,
C τοὺς δὲ πρὶν φυλαττομένους ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὡς ἔλευθε-
ρους φίλους τε καὶ τροφέας δουλωσάμενοι τότε
περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας ἐχοντες αὐτὸς πολέμου
τε καὶ φυλακῆς αὐτῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. Δοκεὶ μοι,
ἐφη, αὐτὴ ἡ μετάβασις ἐντεῦθεν γίγνεσθαι. Οὐκ-
οὖν, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐν μέσῳ τις ἂν εἰς ἀριστοκρατίας

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a Cf. supra 415 A-B.  
b Cf. Theaet. 159 A.  
c Cf. Homer, Il. vi. 211.  
d γε τὰ τερμίνι. Cf. 379 A-B.  
e Cf. supra 416 E-417 A, 521 A, Phaedrus 279 B-C.
our young men will deteriorate in their culture; and the rulers selected from them will not approve themselves very efficient guardians for testing Hesiod's and our races of gold, silver, bronze and iron. And this intermixture of the iron with the silver and the bronze with the gold will engender unlikeness and an unharmonious unevenness, things that always beget war and enmity wherever they arise. "Of this lineage, look you, we must aver the dissension to be, wherever it occurs and always." "And rightly too," he said, "we shall affirm that the Muses answer." "They must needs," I said, "since they are Muses." "Well, then," said he, "what do the Muses say next?" "When strife arose," said I, "the two groups were pulling against each other, the iron and bronze towards money-making and the acquisition of land and houses and gold and silver, and the other two, the golden and silvern, not being poor, but by nature rich in their souls, were trying to draw them back to virtue and their original constitution, and thus, striving and contending against one another, they compromised on the plan of distributing and taking for themselves the land and the houses, enslaving and subjecting as perioeci and serfs their former friends and supporters, of whose freedom they had been the guardians, and occupying themselves with war and keeping watch over these subjects." "I think," he said, "that this is the starting-point of the transformation." "Would not this polity, then," said I, "be in some sort inter-

1 For *ei's *μεθον cf. Protag. 338 a; infra 572 d, 538 b.
3 Cf. 417 A-B.
te καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας αὐτῇ ἡ πολιτεία; Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

IV. Μεταβήσεται μὲν δὴ οὕτω· μεταβάσα δὲ D πῶς οἰκήσει; ἡ φανεροῖς ὅτι τὰ μὲν μιμήσεται τὴν προτέραν πολιτείαν, τὰ δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἀτ’ ἐν μέσῳ οὗτος, τὸ δέ τι καὶ αὐτῆς ἔξει ὁδὸν; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τῶν μὲν τιμῶν τοὺς ἀρχοντας καὶ γεωργίων ἀπέχεσθαι τὸ προπολεμοῦν αὐτῆς καὶ χειροτεχνῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλον χρηματισμοῦ, ξυστία δὲ κατεσκευάσθαι καὶ γυμναστικῆς τε καὶ τῆς τοῦ πολέμου ἀγωνίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πάσι τοῖς τοιούτοις τὴν προτέραν μιμήσεται; Ναί. Τῶ δὲ Ἐ γε φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τᾶς ἀρχάς ἄγειν, ἀτε οὐκετὶ κεκτημένην ἀπλοῦς τε καὶ ἀτενεῖς τοὺς τοιούτους ἀνδράς ἄλλα μικτούς, ἐπὶ δὲ θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ ἀπλουστέρους ἀποκλίνειν, τοὺς πρὸς πό- 548 λεμον μάλλον πεφυκότας ἢ πρὸς εἰρήνην, καὶ τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα δόλους τε καὶ μηχανὰς ἐντίμως ἔχειν, καὶ πολεμοῦσα τὸν ἀεῖ χρόνον διάγειν, αὐτῇ ἑαυτῆς αὖ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἴδια ἔξει; Ναί. Ἐπιθυμηταὶ δὲ γε, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, χρημάτων οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, καὶ τιμῶντες ἁγρίως ὑπὸ σκότου χρυσὸν τε καὶ ἄργυρον, ἀτε κεκτημένοι ταμιεία καὶ οἰκείους ἓθεαυρούς, οἱ θέμενοι ἄν αὐτὰ κρύψειαν, καὶ αὐτοὶ περιβόλους οἰκήσεων, ἀτεχνῶς νεοττιὰς ἴδιας,

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b Cf. supra 416 e, 458 c, Laws 666 b, 762 c, 780 a-b, 781 c, 806 e, 839 c, Critias 112 c.
c Cf. 397 e, Isoc. ii. 46 ἄπλοὺς δ’ ἠγοῦνται τοὺς νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντας. Cf. the psychology of Thucyd. iii. 83.
d This was said to be characteristic of Sparta. Cf. Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1270 a 13, Xen. Rep. Lac. 14. 2-3 250
mediate between aristocracy and oligarchy?" "By all means."

IV. "By this change, then, it would arise. But after the change what will be its way of life? Is it not obvious that in some things it will imitate the preceding polity, in some the oligarchy, since it is intermediate, and that it will also have some qualities peculiar to itself?" "That is so," he said. "Then in honouring its rulers and in the abstention of its warrior class from farming a and handicraft and money-making in general, and in the provision of common public tables b and the devotion to physical training and expertness in the game and contest of war—in all these traits it will copy the preceding state?" "Yes." "But in its fear to admit clever men to office, since the men it has of this kind are no longer simple c and strenuous but of mixed strain, and in its inclining rather to the more high-spirited and simple-minded type, who are better suited for war than for peace, and in honouring the stratagems and contrivances of war and occupying itself with war most of the time—in these respects for the most part its qualities will be peculiar to itself?" "Yes." "Such men," said I, "will be avid of wealth, like those in an oligarchy, and will cherish a fierce secret lust for gold d and silver, owning storehouses e and private treasuries where they may hide them away, and also the enclosures f of their homes, literal private love-nests g in which they can lavish


a Cf. 416 D.

b Cf. Laws 681 a, Theaet. 174 e.

c veoTTtis suggests Horace's "tu nidum servas" (Epist. i. 10. 6). Cf. also Laws 776 a.
Б вен аіс ἀναλίσκοντες γύναιξι τε καὶ οίς ἔθελοιν ἄλλοις πολλὰ ἀν δαπανῶντο. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. 
Οὐκοῦν καὶ φειδωλοί χρημάτων, ἄτε τιμῶντε καὶ οὐ φανερῶς κτώμενοι, 
φιλαναλώται δὲ ἄλλοτρῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ λάθρα τὰς ἴδονας καρπούμενοι,
ὡσπερ παῖδες πατέρα τοῦ νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντες, 
οὐχ ὑπὸ πείθος ἄλλ' ὑπὸ βίας πεπαιδευμένοι διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀληθνὴς Μοῦσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων 
τε καὶ 

C φιλοσοφίας ἡμεληκέναι καὶ προσβυτέρως γυμνα-

στικήν μουσικής τετμηκέναι. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη,
λέγεις μεμυγμένην πολιτείαν ἐκ κακοῦ τε καὶ ἄγαθοῦ. 
Μέμικται γάρ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ· διαφανέστατον 
δ' ἐν αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἐν τι μόνον ὑπὸ τοῦ 

θυμοειδοὺς 

κρατοῦντος, φιλονικίαι καὶ φιλοτιμίαι. Σφόδρα 

γε, ἢ δ' ὦς. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῇ μὲν ἡ 

πολιτεία οὕτω γεγονοῦσα καὶ τοιαύτῃ ἂν τις 

ἐίη, ὥσ 


Lόγω σχήμα 

πολιτείας ὑπογράψαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς 

ἀπεργάσασθαι, διὰ τὸ ἔξαρκεῖν μὲν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐκ 


τῆς ὑπογραφῆς τὸν 


τε 


δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικω-


τατον, ἀμήχανον δὲ μήκει ἔργον εἴναι πάσας 


μὲν


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b φιλαναλωται, though different, suggests Sallust’s “alieni appetens sui profusus” (Cat. 5). Cf. Cat. 52 “publice eges-

tatem, privatim opulentiam.”

c Cf. 587 Α, Laws 636 d, Symp. 187 e, Phaedr. 251 e.

d Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1270 b 34 with Newman’s note; and Euthyphro 2 c “tell his mother the state.”

e Cf. Laws 720 d-e. This is not inconsistent with Polit. 293 Α, where the context and the point of view are different.

f This is of course not the mixed government which Plato approves Laws 691-692, 712 d-e, 759 Β. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 629.

g For διαφανέστατον cf. 544 δ. The expression διαφανέστα-
their wealth on their women and any others they please with great expenditure." "Most true," he said. "And will they not be stingy about money, since they prize it and are not allowed to possess it openly, prodigal of others' wealth because of their appetites, enjoying their pleasures stealthily, and running away from the law as boys from a father, since they have not been educated by persuasion but by force because of their neglect of the true Muse, the companion of discussion and philosophy, and because of their preference of gymnastics to music?" "You perfectly describe," he said, "a polity that is a mixture of good and evil." "Why, yes, the elements have been mixed," I said, "but the most conspicuous feature in it is one thing only, due to the predominance of the high-spirited element, namely contentiousness and covetousness of honour." "Very much so," said he. "Such, then, would be the origin and nature of this polity if we may merely outline the figure of a constitution in words and not elaborate it precisely, since even the sketch will suffice to show us the most just and the most unjust type of man, and it would be an impracticable task to set forth all forms.

To ν . . . ἐν τὶ μόνον, misunderstood and emended by Apelt, is coloured by an idea of Anaxagoras expressed by Lucretius l. 877-878:

illud

apparere unum cuius sint plurima mixta.


There is no contradiction between this and Laws 870 c if the passage is read carefully.

Cf. on 544 ν, p. 240, note a.
πολιτείας, πάντα δὲ ἥθη μηδὲν παραλιπόντα διελθεῖν. Καὶ ὅρθως, ἐφη.

V. Τίς οὖν ὁ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν ἀνήρ; πῶς τε γενόμενοι ποιός τέ τις ᾐν; Οἶμαι μὲν, ἐφη ὁ 'Αδείμαντος, ἐγγὺς τι αὐτὸν Γλαύκωνος
Ε τοιοῦτοι τείνειν ἔνεκά γε φιλονικίας. "Ισωσ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο γε ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ τάδε οὐ κατὰ τοῦτον πεφυκέναι. Τὰ ποία; Ἀὐθαδέστερον τε δεῖ αὐτὸν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, εἶναι καὶ ὑποαμουσότερον, φιλόμουσον δὲ καὶ φιλήκουν μέν, ῥητορικόν δ' 549 οὐδαμῶς. καὶ δούλοις μέν τις ἀν ἄγριος εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος, οὗ καταφρονών δούλων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένος, ἐλευθέροις δὲ ἡμεροῖς, ἀρχόντων δὲ σφόδρα ὑπήκοος, φίλαρχοι δὲ καὶ φιλότιμοι, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν ἀξιών ἄρχειν οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδένος, ἄλλ' ἀπὸ ἐργών τῶν τε πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ πολεμικά, φιλογυμναστῆς τέ τις ᾐν καὶ φιλόθηρος. "Εστὶ γάρ, ἐφη, τοῦτο τὸ ἦθος ἐκείνης τῆς πολιτείας. Οὐκοῦν καὶ χρημάτων, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ τοιοῦτος νέος μὲν ᾗν καταφρονοῦ ἂν, ὅσω δὲ πρεσβύτερος γίγνοιτο, μᾶλλον ἀεὶ ἀσπάζοτο ἂν τῷ τε μετέχειν τῆς τοῦ φιλοχρημάτου φύσεως καὶ μη εἶναι εἰλικρινῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ

a Cf. Phaedo 65 a, Porphyry, De abst. i. 27, Teubner, p. 59 ἐγγὺς τείνειν ἀποστίας.

b αὐθαδέστερον. The fault of Prometheus (Aesch. P. V. 1034, 1037) and Medea must not be imputed to Glaucon.

c Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, who imitates or parodies Plato throughout, e.g. p. 83 "A little inaccessible to ideas and light," and pp. 54-55 "The peculiar serenity of aristocracies of Teutonic origin appears to come from their never having had any ideas to trouble them."

d Cf. 475 d, 535 d, Lysis 206 c.

e Cf. p. 249, note g, on 547 c, and Newman ii. p. 317. In
of government without omitting any, and all customs and qualities of men."  "Quite right," he said.

V. "What, then, is the man that corresponds to this constitution? What is his origin and what his nature?" "I fancy," Adeimantus said, "that he comes rather close to Glaucion here in point of contentiousness." "Perhaps," said I, "in that, but I do not think their natures are alike in the following respects." "In what?" "He will have to be somewhat self-willed and lacking in culture, yet a lover of music and fond of listening to talk and speeches, though by no means himself a rhetorician; and to slaves such a one would be harsh, not scorning them as the really educated do, but he would be gentle with the freeborn and very submissive to officials, a lover of office and of honour, not basing his claim to office on ability to speak or anything of that sort but on his exploits in war or preparation for war, and he would be a devotee of gymnastics and hunting." "Why, yes," he said, "that is the spirit of that polity." "And would not such a man be disdainful of wealth too in his youth, but the older he grew the more he would love it because of his participation in the covetous nature and because his virtue


2 Cf. the διώματα of Laws 690 a, Aristot. Pol. 1280 a 8 ff., 1282 b 26, 1283-1284.

3 Cf. Arnold on the "barbarians" in Culture and Anarchy, pp. 78, 82, 84.

the ἀπολευθήναι τοῦ ἀρίστου φύλακος; Τίνος; ἦ δ' ὁ δ' Ἀδείμαντος. Λόγου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μουσική κεκραμένου· ὅς μόνος ἐγγενόμενος σωτήρ ἀρετής διὰ βίου ἐνοκεὶ τῷ ἐχοντι. Καλῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις. Καὶ ἔστι μὲν γ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιοῦτος ὁ τιμο-
κρατικὸς νεανίας, τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει ἐοικώς. Πάνυ C μὲν οὖν. Γίγνεται δὲ γ', ἐίπον, οὕτος ὀδὲ πως· ἐνίοτε πατρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὃν νέος νίδος ἐν πόλει οἰκοντος οὐκ εὗ πολιτευμένη, φεύγοντος τὰς τε τυμὰς καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δίκας καὶ τὸν τοιαύτην πᾶσαν φιλοπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἑθέλοντος ἐλαττοῦσθαι, ὡστε πράγματα μὴ ἔχειν. Πὴ δὴ, ἐφη, γίγνεται; "Ὅταν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τῆς μητρὸς ἀκούῃ ἀχθομέ-
νης, οὗ τὸν ἀρχόντων αὐτῆς ἀνήρ ἔστι, καὶ ἐλαττομένης διὰ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις γυναιξῖν, ἕπειτα ὀρώσης μὴ σφόδρα περὶ χρήματα σπουδά-
ζοντα μηδὲ μαχόμενον καὶ λοιπονομένον ἴδια τε ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ ῥαθύμως πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα φέροντα, καὶ ἐαυτῷ μὲν τὸν νοῦν προσ-

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a The Greek words λόγος and μουσική are untranslatable. Cf. also 560 b. For μουσική cf. 546 D. Newman i. p. 414 fancies that this is a return to the position of Book IV. from the disparagement of music in 522 λ. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 4 on this supposed ABA development of Plato's opinions.

b ἐκ γ' marks the transition from the description of the type to its origin. Cf. 547 e, 553 b, 556 b, 557 b, 560 d, 561 e, 563 b, 566 e. Ritter, pp. 69-70, comments on its frequency in this book, but does not note the reason. There are no cases in the first five pages.

c Cf. Lysias xix. 18 ἐκεῖνο μὲν γάρ ἦν τὰ ἐαυτοῦ πράττεν, with the contrasted type ἀνήλωσεν ἐπιθυμῶν τιμᾶσθαι, Isoc. Antid. 227 ἀπραγμονετάτους μὲν ὅταν εὖ τῇ πόλει. Cf. πολυπραγμοσύνη 444 b, 434 b, Isoc. Antid. 48, Peace 108, 30, 256
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is not sincere and pure since it lacks the best guardian?" "What guardian?" said Adeimantus. "Reason," said I, "blended with culture, a which is the only indwelling preserver of virtue throughout life in the soul that possesses it." "Well said," he replied. "This is the character," I said, "of the timocratic youth, resembling the city that bears his name." "By all means." "His origin b is somewhat on this wise: Sometimes he is the young son of a good father who lives in a badly governed state and avoids honours and office and law-suits and all such meddle-someness c and is willing to forbear something of his rights d in order to escape trouble." "How does he originate?" he said. "Why, when, to begin with," I said, "he hears his mother complaining f that her husband is not one of the rulers and for that reason she is slighted among the other women, and when she sees that her husband is not much concerned about money and does not fight and brawl in private law-suits and in the public assembly, but takes all such matters lightly, and when she observes that he is self-

and 26, with Norlin's note (Loeb). Cf. also Aristoph. Knights 261.


c Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 434 with some exaggeration says that this is the only woman character in Plato and is probably his mother, Perictione. Pohlenz, Gött. Gel. Anz. 1921, p. 18, disagrees. For the complaints cf. Gerard, Four Years in Germany, p. 115 "Now if a lawyer gets to be about forty years old and is not some kind of a Rat his wife begins to nag him . . ."

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έχοντα αἱ αἰσθάνεται, ἑαυτὴν δὲ μὴτε πάνυ
tιμῶντα μήτε ἀτιμάζοντα: ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων
ἀχθομένης τε καὶ λεγοῦσης ὃς ἀναιδρός τε αὐτῷ
ὁ πατὴρ καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ ὅσα καὶ
Ε ὁ παίδευσεν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑμεῖν.
Καὶ μάλ’, ἔφη ὁ 'Αδείμαντος, πολλά τε καὶ ὅμως
ἑαυταῖς. Οἷςθα οὖν, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, ὅτι καὶ οἱ οἰκέται
τῶν τοιούτων ἐνίοτε λάθρα πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείς τοιαῦτα
λέγουσιν, οἱ δοκοῦντες εὐνοι εἶναι, καὶ εὰν τινὰ
ἰδωσιν ἡ οἴκειοντα χρήματα, ὥ μὴ ἐπεξέρχεται ὁ
πατήρ, ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀδικοῦντα, διακελεύονται ὅπως,
ἐπειδὰν ἁνὴρ γένηται, τιμωρῆσεται πάντας τους
550 τοιούτους καὶ ἁνὴρ ἄλλον ἔσται τοῦ πατρός καὶ
ἐξων ἐτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούει καὶ ὀρᾶ, τοὺς μὲν τὰ
αὐτῶν πράπτοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει ήλιθίοις τε καλού-
μένους καὶ ἐν σμικρῷ λόγῳ ὄντας, τοὺς δὲ μὴ τὰ
αὐτῶν τιμωμένους τε καὶ ἐπαινομένους. τότε δὴ
ὁ νέος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκούων τε καὶ ὀρῶν, καὶ
ἀφ’ τοῦ τοῦ πατρὸς λόγους ἀκούων τε καὶ ὀρῶν
tὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα αὐτοῦ ἐγγυθεὶν παρὰ τὰ τῶν
ἀλλων, ἐλκόμενος ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, τοῦ μὲν
Β πατρὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐν τῇ πυχῇ ἀρδοῦντὸς
tε καὶ αὐξοῦτος, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τὸ τε ἐπιθυμητικὸν

* Cf. the husband in Lysias i. 6.
* λίαν ἀνειμένος: one who has grown too slack or negligent.
  Cf. Didot, Com. Fr. p. 728 τίς ὥδε μῶρος καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος; Porphyry, De abst. ii. 58.
* Cf. Phaedo 60 λ. For Plato’s attitude towards women
* ἔμνειν. Cf. Euthydem. 297 d, Soph. Ajax 292. Com-
  mentators have been troubled by the looseness of Plato’s
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absorbed in his thoughts and neither regards nor disregards her overmuch, and in consequence of all this laments and tells the boy that his father is too slack and no kind of a man, with all the other complaints with which women nag in such cases." "Many indeed," said Adeimantus, "and after their kind." "You are aware, then," said I, "that the very house-slaves of such men, if they are loyal and friendly, privately say the same sort of things to the sons, and if they observe a debtor or any other wrongdoer whom the father does not prosecute, they urge the boy to punish all such when he grows to manhood and prove himself more of a man than his father, and when the lad goes out he hears and sees the same sort of thing. Men who mind their own affairs in the city are spoken of as simpletons and are held in slight esteem, while meddlers who mind other people's affairs are honoured and praised. Then it is that the youth, hearing and seeing such things, and on the other hand listening to the words of his father, and with a near view of his pursuits contrasted with those of other men, is solicited by both, his father watering and fostering the growth of the rational principle in his soul and the others the appetitive and the passionate;
καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ὀμιλίαις δὲ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων κακαῖς κεχρῆσθαι, εἰς τὸ μέσον ἐλκόμενος ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦτων ἔλθε, καὶ τὴν ἐν ἐαυτῷ ἁρχὴν παρέδωκε τῷ μέσῳ τε καὶ φιλονίκῳ καὶ θυμοειδεὶ, καὶ ἐγένετο ὑψηλόφρων τε καὶ φιλότιμος ἀνήρ. Κομιδή
μοι, ἐφη, δοκεῖς τὴν τούτου γένεσιν διεληλυθέναι.
C Ἐχομεν ἄρα, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, τὴν τε δεύτεραν πολιτείαν καὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἄνδρα. Ἐχομεν, ἐφη.

VI. Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο, τὸ τοῦ Ἀἰσχύλου, λέγωμεν ἄλλον ἄλλῃ πρὸς πόλει τεταγμένοι, μᾶλλον δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν προτέραν τὴν πόλιν; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Εἰπὶ δὲ γ’ ἄν, ὡς ἐγώμαι, οἶκωρχία ἢ μετὰ τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. Λέγεις δὲ, ἢ δ’ ὅσ, τὴν ποιάν κατάστασιν ὀικωρχίαν; Τὴν ἀπὸ τμημάτων, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, πολιτείαν, ἐν ἢ οἷο ἐμὲ

D πλούσιοι ἄρχοντες, πένητι δὲ οὐ μέτεστιν ἁρχῆς. Μανθάνω, ἢ δ’ ὅσ. Οὐκοῦν ὡς μεταβαίνει πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς τιμαρχίας εἰς τὴν οἰκωρχίαν, ῥητέον; Ναί. Καὶ μὴν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ τυφλώς γε δήλον ὡς μεταβαίνει. Πῶς; Τὸ ταμείον, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἐκεῖνο ἐκάστῳ χρυσίῳ πληρούμενον ἀπόλλυς τῇ τοιαύτῃ την πολιτείαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ δαπάνας αὐτοῖς ἐξευρίσκουσιν, καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐπὶ τοῦτο παρε

Ε ἄγονοι, ἀπειθοῦντες αὐτοῖ τε καὶ γυναικεῖς αὐτῶν. Εἰκός, ἐφη. Ἐπειτά γε, οἴμαι, ἄλλος ἄλλον ὅρων

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*a Cf. the fragment of Menander, φθείρωσιν ήθη χρησθ’ ὀμιλίαι κακαί, quoted in 1 Cor. xv. 33 (Kock, C.A.F. iii. No. 218). Cf. also Phaedr. 250 α ὑπὸ τινῶν ὀμιλιῶν, Aesch. Seven Against Thebes 599 ἐσθ’ ὀμιλίαις κακῆς κάκιον οὐδέν.
*b Cf. p. 249, note f.
*c Cf. infra 553 b-c, 608 b.
*d ὑψηλόφρων is a poetical word. Cf. Eurip. I.A. 919

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and as he is not by nature of a bad disposition but has fallen into evil communications, under these two solicitations he comes to a compromise and turns over the government in his soul to the intermediate principle of ambition and high spirit and becomes a man haughty of soul and covetous of honour. You have, I think, most exactly described his origin.

"Then," said I, "we have our second polity and second type of man." "We have," he said.

VI. "Shall we then, as Aeschylus would say, tell of another champion before another gate, or rather, in accordance with our plan, the city first?" "That, by all means," he said. "The next polity, I believe, would be oligarchy." "And what kind of a régime," said he, "do you understand by oligarchy?" "That based on a property qualification," said I, "wherein the rich hold office and the poor man is excluded." "I understand," said he. "Then, is not the first thing to speak of how democracy passes over into this?" "Yes." "And truly," said I, "the manner of the change is plain even to the proverbial blind man." "How so?" "That treasure-house which each possesses filled with gold destroys that polity; for first they invent ways of expenditure for themselves and pervert the laws to this end, and neither they nor their wives obey them." "That is likely," he said. "And then, I take it, by observing

6 Cf. p. 255, note f.
7 Seven Against Thebes 451 λέγει ἄλλον ἄλλας ἐν πυλαίς εἰληξώτα.
8 Cf. Laws 743 c, and Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 345.
10 Cf. 465 d, Soph. 241 d.
11 Cf. 548 a, 416 d.

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καὶ εἰς ζήλον ὑδὸν τὸ πλῆθος τοιοῦτον αὐτῶν ἀπειργάσαντο. Εἰκός. Τοῦτονεθεν τούς, εἶπον, προϊόντες εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τοῦ χρηματίζοσθαι, δόσω ἂν τοῦτο τιμώτερον ἦγουται, τοσούτω ἀρετὴν ἀτιμοτέραν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω πλοῦτον ἀρετή διέστηκεν, ὥσπερ ἐν πλάστηγι ζυγοῦ κειμένου ἑκατέρου ἀεὶ τοῦνατίν ἰέποντε; Καὶ μᾶλ’, ἐφη. Τιμωμένου δὴ πλοῦτον ἐν τολεὶ καὶ τῶν πλούσιων ἀτιμοτέρα ἀρετὴ τε καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ. Δῆλον. Ἀσκεῖται δὴ τὸ ἀεὶ τιμώμενον, ἀμελεῖται δὲ τὸ ἀτιμαζόμενον. Οὔτως. Ἀντὶ δὴ φιλονίκων καὶ φιλοτίμων ἀνδρῶν φιλοχρηματισταί καὶ φιλοχρήματος τελευτῶντες ἐγένοντο, καὶ τὸν μὲν πλοῦσιον ἐπαινοῦσί τε καὶ θαυμάζουσι καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀγούσι, τὸν δὲ πένητα ἀτιμάζουσιν. Πάνω γε. Οὐκοῦν τότε δὴ Ὑνόμον τίθενται ὅρον πολιτείας ὁλιγαρχικῆς ταξάμενοι πλῆθος χρημάτων, οὐ μὲν μᾶλλον ὁλιγαρχία, πλέον, οὐ δ’ ἤττον, ἐλαττον, προειπόντες ἀρχῶν μὴ μετέχειν, ὡ ἄν μὴ ἢ οὐσία εἰς τὸ ταχθὲν τίμημα, ταῦτα δὲ ἢ βία μεθ’ ὄπλων διαπράττονται, ἢ καὶ πρὸ τούτου φοβήσαντες κατεστήσαντο τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. ἢ οὐχ οὗτος; Οὔτω μὲν


c Cf. on 544 ε, Demosth. v. 12.

d This sentence has been much quoted. Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 2 "honos alit artes . . . iacentque ea semper, quae apud quosque inprobantur." Themistius and Libanius worked it into almost every oration. Cf. Mrs. W. C. Wright, The Emperor Julian, p. 70, n. 3. Cf. also Stallbaum ad loc. For ἀσκεῖται cf. Pindar, Ol. viii. 22.

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and emulating one another they bring the majority of them to this way of thinking.” “That is likely,” he said. “And so, as time goes on, and they advance in the pursuit of wealth, the more they hold that in honour the less they honour virtue. May not the opposition of wealth and virtue be conceived as if each lay in the scale of a balance inclining opposite ways?” “Yes, indeed,” he said. “So, when wealth is honoured in a state, and the wealthy, virtue and the good are less honoured.” “Obviously.” “And that which men at any time honour they practise, and what is not honoured is neglected.” “It is so.” “Thus, finally, from being lovers of victory and lovers of honour they become lovers of gain-getting and of money, and they commend and admire the rich man and put him in office but despise the man who is poor.” “Quite so.” “And is it not then that they pass a law defining the limits of an oligarchical polity, prescribing a sum of money, a larger sum where it is more of an oligarchy, where it is less a smaller, and proclaiming that no man shall hold office whose property does not come up to the required valuation? And this law they either put through by force of arms, or without resorting to that they establish their government by terrorization. Is not that the way of it?” “It is.” “The
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oùν. 'Η μὲν δὴ κατάστασις ώς ἐπος εἰπεῖν αὐτή. Ναί, ἐφη: ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ ὁ τρόπος τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ ποιά ἐστιν ὁ ἐφαμεν αὐτὴν ἀμαρτήματα

C ἔχειν;

VII. Πρῶτον μὲν, ἐφη, τούτο αὐτὸ, ὅρος αὐτῆς οἶδος ἐστιν. ἄθρει γάρ, εἰ νεῶν οὕτω τις ποιοῦσθε κυβερνήτας ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, τῷ δὲ πένητι, εἰ καὶ κυβερνητικῶτερος εἴη, μὴ ἐπιτρέποι. Πονηράν, ἢ δ' ὦς, τὴν ναυτιλίαν αὐτοὺς ναυτιλ- λεσθαι. ὔνκοιν καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οὕτως ὄτονοιν ἢ τυνος1 ἀρχῆς; Οἴμαι ἔγωγε. Πλὴν πόλεως, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ καὶ πόλεως πέρι; Πολὺ γ', ἐφη, μάλιστα, ὅσω χαλεπωτάτη καὶ μεγίστη ἡ ἀρχή.

D Ἔν μὲν δὴ τοῦτο τοσοῦτον ὀλιγαρχία ἢν ἔχοι ἀμάρτημα. Φαίνεται. Τί δαί; τόδε ἀρά τι τού- του ἔλαττον; Τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ μὴ μίαν ἀλλὰ δύο ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν τουαῦτὴν πόλιν, τὴν μὲν πενήτων, τὴν δὲ πλουσίων, οἰκούντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀεὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας ἀλλήλοις. Οὐδὲν μὰ Δι', ἐφη, ἔλαττον. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔδὲ τόδε καλὸν, τὸ ἀδύνα- τους εἶναι ἱσως πόλεμον τινα πολεμεῖν διὰ τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἡ χρωμένους τῷ πλήθει ὀπλι- 

E σμένῳ δεδεῖναι μᾶλλον ἡ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἢ μὴ

1 ἢ τυνος bracketed by Stallbaum, Burnet, and Hermann: ἡστινος ci. Ast.
establishment then, one may say, is in this wise."
"Yes," he said; "but what is the character of this constitution, and what are the defects that we said it had?"

VII. "To begin with," said I, "consider the nature of its constitutive and defining principle. Suppose men should appoint the pilots of ships in this way, by property qualification, and not allow a poor man to navigate, even if he were a better pilot." "A sorry voyage they would make of it," he said. "And is not the same true of any other form of rule?" "I think so." "Except of a city," said I, "or does it hold for a city too?" "Most of all," he said, "by as much as that is the greatest and most difficult rule of all." "Here, then, is one very great defect in oligarchy." "So it appears." "Well, and is this a smaller one?" "What?" "That such a city should of necessity be not one, but two, a city of the rich and a city of the poor, dwelling together, and always plotting against one another." "No, by Zeus," said he, "it is not a bit smaller." "Nor, further, can we approve of this—the likelihood that they will not be able to wage war, because of the necessity of either arming and employing the multitude, and fearing them more than the enemy, or else, if they do not make use of them, of finding themselves

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\* For the idea that a city should be a unity cf. *Laws* 739 d and *supra* on 423 a-b. Cf. also 422 e with 417 a-b, Livy ii. 24 "adeo duas ex una civitate discordia fecerat." Aristot. *Pol.* 1316 b 7 comments ἐτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι ὅντο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλυγαρχίκην, πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων... and tries to prove the point by his topical method.

\* Cf. 417 b.

\* For the idea that the rulers fear to arm the people cf. Thuc. iii. 27, Livy iii. 15 "consules et armare plebem et inermem pati timebant."
χρωμένους ὃς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικοὺς φανήναι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μάχεσθαι, καὶ ἁμα χρήματα μὴ ἐθέλειν εἰσφέρειν, ἄτε φιλοχρημάτους. Οὐ καλὸν. Τὶ δὲ; ὃ πάλαι ἐλοιδοροῦμεν, τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν γεωρ-552 γοῦντας καὶ χρηματιζομένους καὶ πολεμοῦντας ἁμα τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἢ δοκεῖ ὁρθῶς ἔχειν; Ὁυδ' ὀπωστιοῦν. Ἐφ' ὃ, τοῦτον πάντων τῶν κακῶν εἰ τὸδε μέγιστον αὐτῇ πρώτῃ παραδέχεται. Τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ ἐξεῖναι πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀποδόσθαι καὶ ἄλλη κτήσασθαι τὰ τούτου, καὶ ἀποδόμενον οἰκεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει μηδὲν ὄντα τῶν τῆς πόλεως μερῶν, μήτε χρηματιστήν μήτε δημουργόν μήτε ἵππεα μήτε ὀπλήτην, ἀλλὰ πένητα καὶ B ἀπορον κεκλημένον. Πρώτῃ, ἔφη. Οὐκον δια-κωλύεται γε ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις τὸ τοιοῦτον ὅ γαρ ἃν οἱ μὲν ὑπέρπλουτοι ἦσαν, οἱ δὲ παντάπασι πένητες. Ὅρθως. Τόδε δὲ ἄθρετον ἃρα ὅτε πλούσιος ὃν ἀνήλισκεν ὁ τοιοῦτος, μᾶλλον τι τότ' ἦν ὁφελος τῇ πόλει εἰς ἄ νῦν ὅ ἐλέγομεν; ἢ ἐδόκει μὲν τῶν ἄρχοντων εἶναι, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ οὔτε ἄρχων οὔτε ὑπηρέτης ἢν αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐτοίμων ἀναλωτῆς; Οὔτως, ἔφη· ἐδόκει, ἢν δὲ C οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ ἀναλωτῆς. Βούλεις οὖν, ἤν δ' ἐγώ,

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a He plays on the word. In 565 c ὃς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικοὺς is used in a different sense. Cf. Symp. 181 a ὃς ἀληθῶς πάνταμος, Phaedo 80 d εἰς Ἀλίθου ὃς ἀληθῶς.

b Cf. supra 374 b, 434 A, 443 D-E. For the specialty of function cf. What Plato Said, p. 480, on Charm. 161 E.


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on the field of battle, oligarchs indeed,\(^a\) and rulers over a few. And to this must be added their reluctance to contribute money, because they are lovers of money.” “No, indeed, that is not admirable.” “And what of the trait we found fault with long ago\(^b\) —the fact that in such a state the citizens are busy-bodies and jacks-of-all-trades, farmers, financiers and soldiers all in one? Do you think that is right?” “By no manner of means.” “Consider now whether this polity is not the first that admits that which is the greatest of all such evils.” “What?” “The allowing a man to sell all his possessions,\(^c\) which another is permitted to acquire, and after selling them to go on living in the city, but as no part of it,\(^d\) neither a money-maker, nor a craftsman, nor a knight, nor a foot-soldier, but classified only as a pauper\(^e\) and a dependent.” “This is the first,” he said. “There certainly is no prohibition of that sort of thing in oligarchical states. Otherwise some of their citizens would not be excessively rich, and others out and out paupers.” “Right.” “But observe this. When such a fellow was spending his wealth, was he then of any more use to the state in the matters of which we were speaking, or did he merely seem to belong to the ruling class, while in reality he was neither ruler nor helper in the state, but only a consumer of goods?\(^f\)” “It is so,” he said; “he only seemed, but was just a spendthrift.” “Shall we, then, say of him that as

\(^b\) Cf. Leslie Stephen, Util. ii. 111 “A vast populace has grown up outside of the old order.”  
\(^d\) \(\epsilon\rho\alpha\iota\mu\omicron\nu:\) “things ready at hand.” Cf. 573 a, Polyb. vi. (Teubner, vol. ii. p. 237); Horace Epist. i. 2. 27 “fruges consumere nati.”
φώμεν αυτόν, ὡς ἐν κηρίῳ κηφήν ἐγγίγνεται, σημήνοις νόσημα, οὖτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν οἴκία κηφήνα ἐγγίγνεσθαι, νόσημα πόλεως; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ὁ Σωκράτης. Οὐκοῦν, ὃ ᾧ Ἀδείμαντε, τοὺς μὲν πτηνοὺς κηφήνας πάντας ἀκέντρους ὁ θεὸς πετοίηκεν, τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς τούτους ἐνίους μὲν αυτῶν ἀκέντρους, ἐνίους δὲ δεινὰ κέντρα ἔχοντας; καὶ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀκέντρων πτωχοὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας D τελευτῶσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κεκεντρωμένων πάντες ὅσοι κέκληται κακοῦργοι; Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφη. Δῆλον ἄρα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν πόλει, οὐ ἄν ὅδε πτω- χούς, ὅτι εἰσὶν ποὺ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ἀποκεκρυμ- μένου κλέπται τε καὶ βαλαντιστομοί καὶ ἑρόσυλοι καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν δημουργοί. Δῆλον, ἐφη. Τί οὖν; ἐν ταῖς ὀλγαρχουμέναις πόλεσι πτωχοῖς οὐχ ὅρας ἐνότας; Ὀλίγου γ', ἐφη, πάντας τοὺς ἐκτὸς τῶν ἀρχόντων. Μὴ οὖν οἰό-

Ε μεθα, ἐφην ἐγώ, καὶ κακοῦργοις πολλοῖς ἐν αὐταῖς εἰναι κέντρα ἔχοντας, οὓς ἐπιμελείᾳ βία κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαῖ; Ὀλόμεθα μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ δι' ἀπαιδευσίαι καὶ κακὴν τροφὴν καὶ κατάστασιν τῆς πολιτείας φήσομεν τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτοὺς ἐγγίγνεσθαι; Φήσομεν. Ἄλλ' οὖν δὴ τοιαύτη γε τις ἂν εἰη ἢ ὀλγαρχουμένη πόλις καὶ τοσαῦτα κακὰ ἔχουσα, ἵσως δὲ καὶ πλείω. Σχεδὸν

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The sentence was much quoted. Stallbaum refers to Ruhnken on Tim. 157 ff. for many illustrations, and to Petavius ad Themist. Orat. xxiii. p. 285 v. Cf. Shelley, Song to the Men of England:

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the drone a springs up in the cell, a pest of the hive, so such a man grows up in his home, a pest of the state? " "By all means, Socrates," he said. "And has not God, Adeimantus, left the drones which have wings and fly stingless one and all, while of the drones here who travel afoot he has made some stingless but has armed others with terrible stings? And from the stingless finally issue beggars in old age, b but from those furnished with stings all that are denominated c malefactors? " "Most true," he said. "It is plain, then," said I, "that wherever you see beggars in a city, there are somewhere in the neighbourhood concealed thieves and cutpurses and temple-robbers and similar artists in crime." "Clearly," he said. "Well, then, in oligarchical cities do you not see beggars?" "Nearly all are such," he said, "except the ruling class." "Are we not to suppose, then, that there are also many criminals in them furnished with stings, whom the rulers by their surveillance forcibly d restrain?" "We must think so," he said. "And shall we not say that the presence of such citizens is the result of a defective culture and bad breeding and a wrong constitution of the state?" "We shall." "Well, at any rate such would be the character of the oligarchical state, and these, or perhaps even more than these, would be the evils that afflict

Wherefore, Bees of England, forge
Many a weapon, chain and scourge,
That these stingless drones may spoil
The forced produce of your toil?

b Cf. 498 a, Laws 653 a; also the modern distinction between defectives and delinquents.

c Κέκληρον: cf. 344 b-c.

d Βία is so closely connected with κατέχουσιν that the double dative is not felt to be awkward. But Adam takes ἐπιμελεία as an adverb.
553 τι, ἐφη. Ἀπειργάσθω δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτῇ, ἢν δ᾿ ἐγὼ, ἢ πολιτείᾳ, ἢν ὀλυγαρχίαν καλοῦσιν, ἐκ τιμημάτων ἔχουσα τοὺς ἀρχόντας. τὸν δὲ ταῦτα ὁμοιον μετὰ ταύτα σκοπῶμεν, ὡς τε γίγνεται οἶδος τε γενόμενος ἐστιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.

VIII. Ἂρ όν ὁδε μάλιστα εἰς ὀλυγαρχικὸν ἐκ τοῦ τιμοκρατικοῦ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλει; Πῶς; ὁταν αὐτοῦ παιὸς γενόμενος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔθνοι τε τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖνον ἔχιν διώκῃ, ἔπειτα Β αὐτὸν Ἰδῆ ἐξαίφνης πταίσαντα ὡσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι πρὸς τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐκχέαντα τὰ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἕαυτόν, ἡ στρατηγήσαντα ἡ τιν’ ἀλλὴν μεγάλην ἄρχὴν ἄρξαντα, εἶτα εἰς δικαστήριον ἐμπεσόντα, βλαπτόμενον ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν, ἡ ἀποθανόντα ἡ ἐκπεσόντα ἡ ἀτμιωθέντα καὶ τὴν ὀψίαν ἀπασαν ἀποβαλόντα. Εἰκὸς γ’, ἐφη. ᾿Ιδὼν δὲ γε, ὁ φίλε, ταύτα καὶ παθῶν καὶ ἀπολέσας τὰ ὅντα δείσας, οἴμαι, εὐθὺς ἐπι κεφαλὴν ὀθεῖ ἐκ τοῦ C θρόνου τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἔαυτος ψυχῆς φιλοτιμίαν τε καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ταπεινωθεῖς ὑπὸ πενίας πρὸς χρηματισμοῦν τραπόμενος γλύσχρως καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν φειδόμενος καὶ ἐργαζόμενος χρήματα

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a Cf. on 550 c, p. 261, note h.
b Cf. 410 b, Homer, Od. xix. 436 ἐχνη ἐρευνῶντος, ii. 406, iii. 30, v. 193, viii. 38 μετ’ ἐχνα βαίνε.
c For πταίσαντα cf. Aesch. Prom. 926, Ag. 1624 (Butl. emend.).
e Lit. “spilling,” Cf. Lucian, Timon 23, Shakes. Merchant of Venice, i. i. 31 ff.
it.” “Pretty nearly these,” he said. “Then,” I said, “let us regard as disposed of the constitution called oligarchy, whose rulers are determined by a property qualification.” And next we are to consider the man who resembles it—how he arises and what after that his character is.” “Quite so,” he said.

VIII. “Is not the transition from that timocratic youth to the oligarchical type mostly on this wise?” “How?” “When a son born to the timocratic man at first emulates his father, and follows in his footsteps; and then sees him suddenly dashed, as a ship on a reef, against the state, and making complete wreckage of both his possessions and himself—perhaps he has been a general, or has held some other important office, and has then been dragged into court by mischievous sycophants and put to death or banished or outlawed and has lost all his property—” “It is likely,” he said. “And the son, my friend, after seeing and suffering these things, and losing his property, grows timid, I fancy, and forthwith thrusts headlong from his bosom’s throne that principle of love of honour and that high spirit, and being humbled by poverty turns to the getting of money, and greedily and stingily and little by little by thrift and hard

... dangerous rocks
Would scatter all her spices on the stream,
Enrobe the roaring waters with my silks.

1 For ἐκπεσόντα cf. 560 A, 566 A. In Xen. An. vii. 5. 13 it is used of shipwreck. Cf. ἐξβάλλοντες 458 c.
3 Cf. Aesch. Ag. 983, Shakes. Romeo and Juliet v. i. 3:
My bosom’s lord sits lightly in his throne,
and supra 550 b.
ευλλέγεται. ἄρ' οὔκ οίει τὸν τοιοῦτον τότε εἰς μὲν τὸν θρόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν τε καὶ φιλοχρήματον ἐγκαθίστειν καὶ μέγαν βασιλέα ποιεῖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τιάρας τε καὶ στρεπτούς καὶ ἀκινάκας παραζωνύμνα; Ἑγωγ', ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ γε, οἴμαι, Λογιστικῶν τε καὶ θυμοειδές χαμαί ἐνθεῖν καὶ ἐνθεὶς παρακαθίσας ὑπ' ἐκεῖνῳ καὶ καταδουλωσάμενος, τὸ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο εἰς λογίζοντα οὐδ' σκοπεῖν ἄλλο ἢ ὁπόθεν εἴς ἐλαττόνων χρημάτων πλείω ἐσται, τὸ δὲ αὐθαυμάζει καὶ τιμᾶν μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πλοῦτον τε καὶ πλουσίους, καὶ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι μηδ' ἐφ' ἐνι ἄλλω ἢ ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτήσει καὶ εάν τι ἄλλο εἰς τούτο φέρη. Οὔκ ἐστ' ἄλλῃ, ἔφη, μεταβολή οὔτω ταχειά τε καὶ ἵσχυρα ἐκ φιλοτίμου νέου εἰς Φιλοχρήματον. Ἀρ' οὖν οὕτως, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὀλγαρχικὸς ἔστιν; Ὅ γοὺν μεταβολή αὐτοῦ εἰς ὁμοίον ἀνδρός ἐστι τῇ πολιτείᾳ, εἷς ἡς ἡ ὀλγαρχία 554 μετέστη. Σκοπῶμεν δὴ εἰ ὁμοίος ἂν εἴη. Σκο-
πῶμεν.

IX. Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν τῷ χρήματα περὶ πλείστον ποιεῖσθαι ὁμοίος ἂν εἴη; Πῶς δ' οὖ; Καὶ μὴν τῷ γε φειδωλὸς εἶναι καὶ ἐργάτης, τὰς ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας μόνον τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ ἀποστιμπλάς, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀναλώματα μὴ παρ-
εχόμενοι, ἄλλα δουλούμενοι τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ὡς ματαιόν. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ἀδυμηρός γέ τις, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὥν καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς περιουσίαν ποιούμενος,

a ἐνθεῖν καί ἐνθεὴν: cf. Protag. 315 b, Tim. 46 c, Critias 117 c, etc., Herod. iv. 175.

b Cf. 554 λ, 556 c, Xen. Mem. ii. 6. 4 μηδὲ πρὸς ἐν ἄλλο σχολὴν ποιεῖται ἢ ὁπόθεν αὐτὸς τι κερδανεί, and Aristot. Pol. 1257 b 4-7, and supra 330 c. See too Inge, Christian Ethics, 272
work collects property. Do you not suppose that such a one will then establish on that throne the principle of appetite and avarice, and set it up as the great king in his soul, adorned with tiaras and collars of gold, and girt with the Persian sword?" "I do," he said. "And under this domination he will force the rational and high-spirited principles to crouch lowly to right and left\(^a\) as slaves, and will allow the one to calculate and consider nothing but the ways of making more money from a little,\(^b\) and the other to admire and honour nothing but riches and rich men, and to take pride in nothing but the possession of wealth and whatever contributes to that?" "There is no other transformation so swift and sure of the ambitious youth into the avaricious type." "Is this, then, our oligarchical man?" said I. "He is developed, at any rate, out of a man resembling the constitution from which the oligarchy sprang." "Let us see, then, whether he will have a like character." "Let us see."

IX. "Would he not, in the first place, resemble it in prizing wealth above everything?" "Inevitably." "And also by being thrifty and laborious, satisfying only his own necessary\(^c\) appetites and desires and not providing for expenditure on other things, but subduing his other appetites as vain and unprofitable?" "By all means." "He would be a squalid\(^d\) fellow," said I, "looking for a surplus of

\(^{a}\) Cf. on 558 D, p. 291, note i.

\(^{b}\) αὐχαριστός: cf. Symp. 203 D.
PLATO

Β θησαυροποιός ἀνήρ· οὐς δή καὶ ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος; ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἂν εἰη ὁ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ ὀμοίως; Ἐμοὶ γοῦν, ἐφη, δοκεῖ· χρήματα γοῦν μάλιστα ἐντιμά τῇ τε πόλει καὶ παρὰ τῷ τοιούτῳ. Οὐ γάρ, οἷμαι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, παιδεία ὁ τοιούτος προσέχηκεν. Οὐ δοκῶ, ἐφη· οὐ γάρ ἂν τυφλὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ χοροῦ ἐστήσατο καὶ ἐτίμα μάλιστα.¹ Εὐ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. τόδε δὲ σκόπει· κηφηνώδεις ἐπιθυμίας ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν ἀπαίδευσιν μὴ φῶμεν ἐγγύνεσθαι, οὐ τὰς μὲν πτωχικάς, τὰς δὲ κακούργους, κατεχομένας βία υπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας; Καὶ μάλ', ἐφη· Οἴσθ' οὖν, εἶπον, οἱ ἀποβλέψας κατόφει αὐτῶν τὰς κακουργίας; Ποί; ἐφη· Εἰς τὰς τῶν ὀρφανῶν ἐπιτροπεύσεις καὶ εἰ ποῦ τι αὐτοῖς τοιούτον ξυμβαίνει, ὡστε πολλῆς ἐξουσίας λαβέσθαι τοῦ ἀδικεῖν. Ἀληθή· Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τούτω δήλον, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐξομβολαίοις ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἐν οἷς εὐδοκιμεὶ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι, ἐπιεἰκεῖ τωι

¹ ἐτίμα μάλιστα Schneider. The ἐτί μάλιστα of the mss. is impossible.


ᵇ Cf. Phaedr. 256 ε, Meno 90 α-β by implication. Numenius (ed. Mullach iii. 158) relates of Lacydes that he was "a bit greedy (ὑπογλυσχρότερος) and after a fashion a thrifty manager (οἰκονομικὸς)—as the expression is—the sort approved by most people." Emerson, The Young American, "They recommend conventional virtues, whatever will earn and preserve property." But this is not always true in an envious democracy: cf. Isoc. xv. 159-160 and America to-day.
profit in everything, and a hoarder, the type the multitude approves. Would not this be the character of the man who corresponds to such a polity?" 

"I certainly think so," he said. "Property, at any rate, is the thing most esteemed by that state and that kind of man." "That, I take it," said I, "is because he has never turned his thoughts to true culture." 

"I think not," he said, "else he would not have made the blind one leader of his choir and first in honour." "Well said," I replied. "But consider this. Shall we not say that owing to this lack of culture the appetites of the drone spring up in him, some the beggarly, others the rascally, but that they are forcibly restrained by his general self-surveillance and self-control?" "We shall indeed," he said. "Do you know, then," said I, "to what you must look to discern the rascalities of such men?" "To what?" he said. "To guardianships of orphans, and any such opportunities of doing injustice with impunity." "True." "And is it not apparent by this that in other dealings, where he enjoys the repute of a seeming just man, he by some better element in himself forcibly keeps down other evil desires dwelling...


† Cf. Herod. iii. 34, vii. 107.

‡ Cf. supra 552 ε ἐπιμελεία βία. For ἄλλης cf. 368 β ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου.

§ For the treatment of inferiors and weaker persons as a test of character cf. Laws 777 d-e, Hesiod, Works and Days, 330, and Murray, Rise of the Greek Epic, pp. 84-85, who, however, errs on the meaning of αἰῶν. For orphans cf. also Laws 926-928, 766 c, 877 c, 909 c-d.

¶ ἐπιμελεῖ is here used generally, and not in its special sense of "sweet reasonableness."
οὐ πείθων, ὃτι οὐκ ἁμείνον, οὔτε ἠμερῶν λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ φόβῳ, περὶ τῆς ἀλλης οὐσίας τρέμων; Καὶ πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Καὶ νὴ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ φίλε, τοῖς πολλοῖς γε αὐτῶν εὐρήσεις, ὅταν δὲ τάλλότρια ἀναλίσκειν, τὰς τοῦ κηφήνους ξυγ-γενεῖς ἐνούσας ἐπιθυμίας. Καὶ μάλα, ἢ δ' ὡς, σφόδρα. Οὐκ ἂρ', ἂν εἴῃ ἀστασίαστος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὔτε εἰς ἄλλα διπλοῦς τις, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ Ἐ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὡς τὸ πολὺ κρατοῦσας ἂν ἔχου βελτίους χειρόνων. "Ἐστὶν οὗτως. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ, οἷμαι, εὐσχημονέστερος ἀν πολλῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος εἰη' ὁμονοητικὴς δὲ καὶ ἡμοσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆ πόρρω ποτε ἐκφεύγοι ἂν αὐτὸν. Δοκεὶ μοι. Καὶ μὴν ἀνταγωνισθῆ περὶ ἢ ἀνδρον ἐν 555 πόλει ὁ φειδωλὸς φαύλος ἡ τυπος νίκης ἡ ἀλης φιλοτιμίας τῶν καλῶν, χρήματα τε οὐκ ἐθέλων εὐδοξίας ἐνεκα καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγώνων ἀναλίσκειν, δεδώς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἀναλωτικὰς ἐγείρειν καὶ ξυμπαρακαλεῖν ἔπι ξυμμαχίαν τε καὶ φιλονικίαν, ἀλιγοὺς τισὶν ἑαυτῷ πολεμῶν ὀλυγιαρχικῶς τὰ πολλὰ ἡττᾶται καὶ πλουτεῖ. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. "Ἐτὶ οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπιστοῦμεν, μὴ κατὰ τὴν ὀλυγιαρχομένην πόλιν ὀμοιότητι τὸν φειδωλὸν Β τε καὶ χρηματιστήν τετάχθαι; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη.

Χ. Δημοκρατίαν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, μετὰ τοῦτο

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a For ἐνούσας cf. Phileb. 16 ν, Symp. 187 ε.
c For the idea "at war with himself," cf. supra 440 β and ε (στάσις), Phaedr. 237 δ-ε, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1099 а 12 ф.
d Cf. 397 ε.
e Cf. on 443 δ-ε, Vol. I. p. 414, note e; also Phaedo 61 λ, and What Plato Said, p. 485, on Laches 188 δ.
f ὀλυγιαρχικὸς keeps up the analogy between the man and 276
within, not persuading them that it 'is better not' nor taming them by reason, but by compulsion and fear, trembling for his possessions generally.' "Quite so," he said. "Yes, by Zeus," said I, "my friend. In most of them, when there is occasion to spend the money of others, you will discover the existence of drone-like appetites." "Most emphatically." "Such a man, then, would not be free from internal dissension. He would not be really one, but in some sort a double man. Yet for the most part, his better desires would have the upper hand over the worse." "It is so." "And for this reason, I presume, such a man would be more seemly, more respectable, than many others; but the true virtue of a soul in unison and harmony with itself would escape him and dwell afar." "I think so." "And again, the thrifty stingy man would be a feeble competitor personally in the city for any prize of victory or in any other honourable emulation. He is unwilling to spend money for fame and rivalries of that sort, and, fearing to awaken his prodigal desires and call them into alliance for the winning of the victory, he fights in true oligarchical fashion with a small part of his resources and is defeated for the most part and—finds himself rich!" "Yes indeed," he said. "Have we any further doubt, then," I said, "as to the correspondence and resemblance between the thrifty and money-making man and the oligarchical state?" "None," he said.

X. "We have next to consider, it seems, the origin of the state. Cf. my "Idea of Justice," Ethical Record, Jan. 1890, pp. 188, 191, 195.

\[ i.e. \] he saves the cost of a determined fight. For the effect of surprise cf. on 544 c, p. 239, note f.

\[ \delta \mu \omega \iota \nu \tau \eta \tau i : \] cf. 576 c.
σκεπτέον, τίνα τε γίγνεται τρόπον γενομένη τε ποιόν τινα ἔχει, ἵν' ἂν τὸν τοῦ τοιούτου ἁνδρὸς τρόπον γνώντες παραστησόμεθ' αὐτὸν εἰς κρίσιν. 'Ομοίως γοῦν ἂν, ἐφη, Ἦμιν αὐτοῖς πορευόμεθα. Οὔκ οὖν, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, μεταβάλλει μὲν τρόπον τινὰ τοιόντες εἰς ὀλιγαρχίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν, δ' ἀπληστίαν τοῦ προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ ὡς πλουσιώτατον

C δεῖν γίγνεσθαι; Πῶς δή; "Ἄτε, οἶμαι, ἁρχοντες ἐν αὐτῇ οἱ ἁρχοντες διὰ τὸ πολλά κεκτήσατε, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν εἴργειν νόμων τῶν νέων ὅσοι ἂν ἁκόλαστον γίγνονται, μὴ εἴσείναι αὐτοῖς ἀναλίσκειν τε καὶ ἀπολλύναι τὰ αὐτῶν, ἵνα ἀνοιμένου τα τῶν τοιούτων και εἰσδανείζοντες ἐτὶ πλουσιώτεροι καὶ ἐντιμότεροι γίγνονται. Παντὸς γε μάλλον. Οὔκ οὖν δῆλον ἡδή τοῦτο ἐν πόλει, ὅτι πλούτου τιμᾶν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἄμα ἱκανῶς κτάσθαι ἐν τοῖς

D πολίταις ἁδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἦ τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀμελεῖν ἡ τοῦ ἐτέρου; Ἐπιεικῶς, ἐφη, δῆλον. Παραμελοῦντες δὴ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ ἐφιέντες ἀκολασταίνειν οὐκ ἀγεννέως ἐνίοτε ἄνθρώπους πένητας ἱνάγκασαν γενέσθαι. Μάλα γε. Κάθηται δὴ, οἶμαι, οὗτοι ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκεντρωμένοι τε καὶ ἐξωπλισμένοι, οἱ μὲν ὀφείλουτες χρέα, οἱ δὲ ἀτίμοι γεγονότες, οἱ δὲ ἀμφότερα, μισοῦντες τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς κτησαμένοις τὰ αὐτῶν

Ε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, νεωτερίσμου ἐρώτετε. "Εστι

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*a Cf. Phileb. 55 c εἰς τὴν κρίσιν, Laws 856 c, 943 c.
*b The skotós or ὁρός. Cf. on 551 a, p. 263, note e, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1094 a 2.

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and nature of democracy, that we may next learn the character of that type of man and range him beside the others for our judgement. " "That would at least be a consistent procedure." "Then," said I, "is not the transition from oligarchy to democracy effected in some such way as this—by the insatiable greed for that which it set before itself as the good, the attainment of the greatest possible wealth?" "In what way?" "Why, since its rulers owe their offices to their wealth, they are not willing to prohibit by law the prodigals who arise among the youth from spending and wasting their substance. Their object is, by lending money on the property of such men, and buying it in, to become still richer and more esteemed." "By all means." "And is it not at once apparent in a state that this honouring of wealth is incompatible with a sober and temperate citizenship, but that one or the other of these two ideals is inevitably neglected." "That is pretty clear," he said. "And such negligence and encouragement of licentiousness in oligarchies not infrequently has reduced to poverty men of no ignoble quality." "It surely has." "And there they sit, I fancy, within the city, furnished with stings, that is, arms, some burdened with debt, others disfranchised, others both, hating and conspiring against the acquirers of their estates and the rest of the citizens, and eager for revolution." "Tis so."


ταύτα. Οἱ δὲ δὴ χρηματισταί ἐγκυψαντες, οὐδὲ
dοκοῦντες τούτους ὁρᾶν, τῶν λαυπῶν τὸν ἀεὶ ὑπείκοντα ἐνεώτες ἀργύριον τυτράκισκοντες, καὶ τοῦ
πατρὸς ἐγκύονος τόκους πολλαπλασίους κομιζό-
μενοι, πολὺν τὸν κηφίνα καὶ πτωχὸν ἐμποιοῦσι τῇ
πόλει. Πῶς γάρ, ἐφη, οὐ πολὺν; Οὔτε γ' ἐκεῖνη,
ἡν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τοιοῦτον κακὸν ἐκκακάμενον ἐθέλουσιν
ἀποσβεβενύναι, εὐργοντες τὰ αὐτοῦ ὅποι τις βου-
λεται τρέπειν, οὔτε τῇ, ἢ ἂν κατὰ ἐτερον νόμον
τὰ τοιαῦτα λυτεῖ. Κατὰ δὴ τίνα; "Οὐ μὲτ'
ἐκεῖνων ἐστὶ δεύτερος καὶ ἀναγκάζετο ἀρετῆς
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς πολίτας. Εἰὰν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ
κυβύνῳ τὰ πολλὰ τις τῶν ἐκοσμίων ἐμπολλαίων
Β προστάτης ἐμβάλλειν, χρηματίζοντο μὲν ἂν
ήττον ἀναιδῶς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐλάττων δ' ἐν αὐτῇ
φύσει τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν, οὐδ' ἔν δὴ ἐπομεν.
Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἡ δ' ὅς. Νῦν δὲ γ', ἐφην ἐγώ, διὰ
πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς μὲν δὴ ἀρχομένους οὕτω
διατιθέασιν ἐν τῇ πόλει οἱ ἀρχοντες· σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς
καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν ἄρ' οὐ τρυφώντας μὲν τοὺς νέους
καὶ ἀτόνους καὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν σώματος καὶ πρὸς
C τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, μαλακοὺς δὲ καρτερεῖν πρὸς ἦδονάς

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a Cf. Persius, Sat. ii. 61 "o curvae in terras animae, et
caelestium inanes," Rossetti, Niniveh, in fine, "That set
gaze never on the sky," Dante, Purg. xix. 71-73:
Vidi gente per esso che piangea,
Giacendo a terra tutta volta in giuso.
Adhaesit pavimento anima mea, etc.

Cf. infra 586 Α κεκυψότες. Cf. also on 553 ν for the general
thought.

b Cf. Euthyph. 5 c, Polit. 287 Α, Aristoph. Peace 1051,
Hell. iv. 5. 6.

c Or, as Ast, Stallbaum and others take it, "the poison of

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"But these money-makers with down-bent heads, pretending not even to see them, but inserting the sting of their money into any of the remainder who do not resist, and harvesting from them in interest as it were a manifold progeny of the parent sum, foster the drone and pauper element in the state."

"They do indeed multiply it," he said. "And they are not willing to quench the evil as it bursts into flame either by way of a law prohibiting a man from doing as he likes with his own, or in this way, by a second law that does away with such abuses."

"What law?"

"The law that is next best, and compels the citizens to pay heed to virtue. For if a law commanded that most voluntary contracts should be at the contractor's risk, the pursuit of wealth would be less shameless in the state and fewer of the evils of which we spoke just now would grow up there." "Much fewer," he said. "But as it is, and for all these reasons, this is the plight to which the rulers in the state reduce their subjects, and as for themselves and their offspring, do they not make the young spoiled wantons averse to toil of body and mind, and too soft to stand their money."

\[\textit{πτῖρωσκόντες}\] suggests the poisonous sting, especially as Plato has been speaking of hives and drones. For \textit{ἐπιέντες} cf. Eurip. \textit{Bacchae} 851 \textit{ἐνείς . . . λύσαν}, "implanting madness." In the second half of the sentence the figure is changed, the poison becoming the parent, i.e. the principal, which breeds interest. cf. 507 A, p. 96.

\[\textit{Cf. on 552 A, Laws} 922 \textit{E-923 A}.\]


\[\textit{For refusing to enforce monetary contracts cf. Laws 742 c, 849 E, 915 E},\] and Newman ii. p. 254 on Aristot. \textit{Pol. 1263 b 21}.\]


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τε καὶ λύπας καὶ ἄργους; Τί μὴν; Αὕτως δὲ πλὴν χρηματισμοῦ τῶν ἄλλων ἥμεληκότας, καὶ οὐδὲν πλείω ἐπιμέλειαν πεπουμένους ἀρετῆς ἡ τοὺς πένητας; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι ὅταν παραβάλλουσιν ἄλληλοις οἱ τε ἄρχοντες καὶ οἱ ἄρχόμενοι ἢ ἐν ὑδάω πορείας ἢ ἐν ἄλλαις τισὶ κοινωνίαις, ἡ κατὰ θεωρίας ἡ κατὰ στρατείας, ἡ ξύμπλοι γιγνόμενοι ἡ συντρατιώταται, 

Οὐ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κινδύνοις ἄλληλοις θεώμενοι, μηδαμῇ ταὐτῇ καταφρούνται οἱ πένητες ὑπὸ τῶν πλουσίων, ἄλλα πολλάκις ἰσχυὸς ἀνὴρ πένης, ἡλιωμένος, παραταχθεῖς ἐν μάχῃ πλουσίω εἰκια-τροφηκότι, πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἄλλοτριὰς, ἴδῃ ἀσθματός τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν, ἄρ' οἴει αὐτῶν οὐχ ἤγεῖσθαι κακίᾳ τῇ σφετέρᾳ πλουτεῖν τοὺς τοιούτους, καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλω παραγγέλλειν, ὅταν 

Εἰδίᾳ ξυγγίγνωνται, ὅτι ἄνδρες ἥμετεροι εἰσὶν παρ' οὐδὲν; Ἐδ' οἶδα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐγώγε, ὅτι οὕτω ποιοῦσιν. Ὄνικοιν ὡσπερ σώμα νοσῶδες μικρὰς ῥοπῆς ἔξωθεν δεῖται προσλαβέσθαι πρὸς τὸ κάμνειν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασίας αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, οὐτω δὴ καὶ ἡ κατὰ ταύτῳ ἐκείνῳ διακειμένῃ πόλις ἀπὸ σμικρᾶς προφάσεως, ἔξωθεν ἐπαγομένων ἡ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐξ ὀλιγαρχούμενης 

1 ἄνδρες ἥμετεροι εἰσὶ παρ' οὐδὲν Baiter: γὰρ οὐδὲν AFDM: ἄνδρες ἥμετεροι. Adam.

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a Cf. 429 c-d, Laches 191 d-e, Laws 633 d.  
b Cf. Tucker on Aesch. Suppl. 726.  
c Cf. Soph. Ajax 758 περισσὰ κάνοντα σώματα.  
e The poor, though stronger, are too cowardly to use force. For κακίᾳ τῇ σφετέρᾳ cf. Lysias ii. 65 κακίᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν, Rhesus 282
up against pleasure and pain, a and mere idlers?"

"Surely." "And do they not fasten upon themselves the habit of neglect of everything except the making of money, and as complete an indifference to virtue as the paupers exhibit?" "Little they care."

"And when, thus conditioned, the rulers and the ruled are brought together on the march, in way-faring, or in some other common undertaking, either a religious festival, or a campaign, or as shipmates or fellow-soldiers or, for that matter, in actual battle, and observe one another, then the poor are not in the least scorned by the rich, but on the contrary, do you not suppose it often happens that when a lean, sinewy, sunburnt b pauper is stationed in battle beside a rich man bred in the shade, and burdened with superfluous flesh, c and sees him panting and helpless d—do you not suppose he will think that such fellows keep their wealth by the cowardice e of the poor, and that when the latter are together in private, one will pass the word to another 'our men are good for nothing'?"

"Nay, I know very well that they do," said he. "And just as an unhealthy body requires but a slight impulse f from outside to fall into sickness, and sometimes, even without that, all the man is one internal war, in like manner does not the corresponding type of state need only a slight occasion, g the one party bringing in h allies


g Cf. Polyb. vi. 57. Montaigne, apud Höfding, i. 30 "Like every other being each illness has its appointed time of development and close—interference is futile," with Tim. 89 b.

h Cf. Thuc. i. 3, ii. 65, iv. 64, Herod. ii. 108.
πόλεως ξυμμαχίαν ἡ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐκ δημοκρατουμένης, νοσεί τε καὶ αὐτῇ αὐτῇ μάχεται, ἐνίοτε δὲ 557 καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασιάζει; Καὶ σφόδρα γε. Δημοκρατία δὴ, οἴμαι, γίγνεται, ὅταν οἱ πενήτες νικήσαντες τοὺς μὲν ἀποκτείνωσι τῶν ἐτέρων, τοὺς δὲ ἐκβάλωσιν, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἐξ ἵσου μεταδῶσι πολιτείας τε καὶ ἄρχῶν καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἀπὸ κλήρων αἱ ἄρχαι ἐν αὐτῇ γίγνονται. "Εστι γὰρ, ἐφη, αὐτῇ ἡ κατάστασις δημοκρατίας, εάν τε καὶ δι' ὀπλῶν γένηται εάν τε καὶ διὰ φόβου ὑπεξελθόντων τῶν ἐτέρων.

XI. Τίνα δὴ οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτοι τρόπον Β οἶκοισι; καὶ ποία τις ἡ τοιαύτη αὖ πολιτεία; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος δημοκρατικός τις ἀναφανήσεται. Δῆλον, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν δὴ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἡ πόλις μεστή καὶ παρρησίας γίγνεται, καὶ ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν ὁ τί τις βούλεται; Λέγεται γε δὴ, ἐφη. "Οποιον δὲ γε ἐξουσία, δῆλον ὅτι ἰδιὰν ἕκαστος ἀν κατασκευήν τοῦ αὐτοῦ βίου κατασκευάζοιτο ἐν αὐτῇ.

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a στασιάζει is applied here to disease of body. Cf. Herod. v. 28 νοσήσασα ἐς τὰ μάλαστα στάσις, "grievously ill of faction." Cf. supra on 554 d, p. 276, note c.

b Cf. 488 c, 560 a, Gorg. 466 c, 468 d, Prot. 325 b. Exile, either formal or voluntary, was always regarded as the proper thing for the defeated party in the Athenian democracy. The custom even exists at the present time. Venizelos, for instance, has frequently, when defeated at the polls, chosen to go into voluntary exile. But that term, in modern as in ancient Greece, must often be interpreted cum grano salis.

c ἐξ ἵσου: one of the watchwords of democracy. Cf. 561 b
from an oligarchical state, or the other from a democratic, to become diseased and wage war with itself, and sometimes even apart from any external impulse faction arises? "Most emphatically." "And a democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the poor, winning the victory, put to death some of the other party, drive out others, and grant the rest of the citizens an equal share in both citizenship and offices—and for the most part these offices are assigned by lot." "Why, yes," he said, "that is the constitution of democracy alike whether it is established by force of arms or by terrorism resulting in the withdrawal of one of the parties."

XI. "What, then," said I, "is the manner of their life and what is the quality of such a constitution? For it is plain that the man of this quality will turn out to be a democratic sort of man." "It is plain," he said. "To begin with, are they not free? and is not the city chock-full of liberty and freedom of speech? and has not every man licence to do as he likes?" "So it is said," he replied. "And where there is such licence, it is obvious that everyone would arrange a plan for leading his

and c, 599 b, 617 c, Laws 919 d, Alc. I. 115 d, Crito 50 e, Isoc. Archid. 96, Peace 3.

But Isoc. Areop. 22-23 considers the lot undemocratic because it might result in the establishment in office of men with oligarchical sentiments. See Norlin ad loc. For the use of the lot in Plato cf. Laws 759 b, 757 e, 690 c, 741 b-c, 856 d, 946 b, Rep. 460 a, 461 e. Cf. Apelt, p. 520.


κατασκευὴ is a word of all work in Plato. Cf. 419 a, 449 a, 455 a, Gorg. 455 e, 477 b, etc.
"παντοδαπός usually has an unfavourable connotation in Plato. Cf. 431 b-c, 561 d, 567 e, 559 d, Symp. 198 b, Gorg. 489 c, Laws 788 b, etc. Isoc. iv. 45 uses it in a favourable sense, but in iii. 16 more nearly as Plato does.

For the mixture of things in a democracy cf. Xen. Rep. Ath. 2. 8 φωνή και διαίτη και σχήματι... 'Αδρφαίοι δὲ κεκραμένη εξ ἀπαντῶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων; and Laws 681 d. Libby, Introduction to History of Science, p. 273, says "Arnold failed in his analysis of American civilization to confirm Plato's judgement concerning the variety of natures to be found in the democratic state." De Tocqueville also, and many English observers, have commented on the monotony and standardization of American life.
own life in the way that pleases him." "Obvious."

"All sorts and conditions of men, then, would arise in this polity more than in any other?" "Of course." "Possibly," said I, "this is the most beautiful of polities; as a garment of many colours, embroidered with all kinds of hues, so this, decked and diversified with every type of character, would appear the most beautiful. And perhaps," I said, "many would judge it to be the most beautiful, like boys and women when they see bright-coloured things." "Yes indeed," he said. "Yes," said I, "and it is the fit place, my good friend, in which to look for a constitution." "Why so?" Because, owing to this licence, it includes all kinds, and it seems likely that anyone who wishes to organize a state, as we were just now doing, must find his way to a democratic city and select the model that pleases him, as if in a bazaar of constitutions, and after making his choice, establish his own." "Perhaps at any rate," he said, "he would not be at a loss for patterns." "And the freedom from all compulsion to hold office in such a

b For the idea that women and children like many colours cf. Sappho's admiration for Jason's mantle mingled with all manner of colours (Lyr. Graec. i. 196). For the classing together of women and boys cf. Laws 638 b, Shakes. As You Like It, iii. ii. 435 "As boys and women are for the most part cattle of this colour," Faguet, Nineteenth Century "Lamartine a été infiniment aimé des adolescents sérieux et des femmes distinguées."

c Cf. Plutarch, Dion 53. Burke says "A republic, as an ancient philosopher has observed, is no one species of government, but a magazine of every species." Cf. Laws 789 B for an illustration of the point. Filmer, Patriarcha, misquotes this, saying "The Athenians sold justice . . ., which made Plato call a popular estate a fair where everything is to be sold."
ἀν ἢς ἰκανὸς ἀρχεων, μηδὲ αὖ ἀρχεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ βούλη, μηδὲ πολεμεῖν πολεμοῦντων, μηδὲ εἰρήνην ἁγεων τῶν ἀλλων ἁγόντων, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιθυμῆς εἰρήνης, μηδ’ αὖ, ἐὰν τις ἀρχεων νόμος σε διακωλύῃ ἡ δικάζεων, μηδὲν ἦττον καὶ ἀρχεων καὶ 558 δικάζεων, ἐὰν αὐτῷ σοι ἐπίη, ἄρ’ οὐ θεσπεσία καὶ ἡδεία ἡ τοιαύτη διαγωγή ἐν τῷ παραντικα, Ἰσώς, ἠφή, ἐν γε τούτω. Ὁ δὲ; ἡ πραότης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή; ἡ οὖπω εἰδες ἐν τοιαύτη πολιτείᾳ, ἀνθρώπων καταφησιοθέντων θανάτων ἡ φυγῆ, οὐδὲν ἦττον αὐτῶν μενόντων τε καὶ ἀναστρεφομένων ἐν μέσῳ, καὶ ὡς οὔτε φροντίζοντος οὔτε ὁρώντος οὐδένος περινοστεὶ ὠπερ ἢρως; Καὶ πολλοὺς γ’, ἠφή. Ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη καὶ οὐδ’

Β ὁπωσιτοιον σμικρολογία αὐτής, ἀλλὰ καταφρόνησις ὅν ἦμεις ἐλέγομεν σεμνονόντες, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν ὁκίζομεν, ὃς εἰ μὴ τις ύπερβεβλημένην ψύσων ἔχοι, οὔποτ’ ἄν γένοιτο ἄνήρ ἄγαθος, εἰ μὴ παϊς ὁν εὐθὺς παῖζοι ἐν καλοῖς καὶ ἐπιτηδευοί τά τοιαύτα

b Cf. Laws 955 b-c, where a penalty is pronounced for making peace or war privately, and the parody in Aristoph. Acharn. passim.  
c διαγωγή: cf. 344 ε, where it is used more seriously of the whole conduct of life. Cf. also Theaet. 177 α, Polit. 274 ν, Tim. 71 ν, Laws 806 ε. Aristot. Met. 981 b 18 and 982 b 24 uses the word in virtual anaphora with pleasure. See too Zeller, Aristot. ii. pp. 307-309, 266, n. 5.
d Cf. 562 ν. For the mildness of the Athenian democracy cf. Aristot. Ath. Pol. 22. 19, Demosth. xxi. 184, xxii. 51, xxiv. 51, Lysias vi. 34, Isoc. Antid. 20, Areopagit. 67-68, Hel. 37; also Menex. 243 ε and also Euthydem. 303 δ ἰδιοτικοῦ

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city, even if you are qualified,\(^a\) or again, to submit to rule, unless you please, or to make war when the rest are at war,\(^b\) or to keep the peace when the others do so, unless you desire peace; and again, the liberty, in defiance of any law that forbids you, to hold office and sit on juries none the less, if it occurs to you to do so, is not all that a heavenly and delicious entertainment\(^c\) for the time being? " "Perhaps," he said, "for so long." "And is not the placability\(^d\) of some convicted criminals exquisite?\(^e\) Or have you never seen in such a state men condemned to death or exile who none the less stay on, and go to and fro among the people, and as if no one saw or heeded him, the man slips in and out like a revenant?\(^g\)" "Yes, many," he said. "And the tolerance of democracy, its superiority\(^h\) to all our meticulous requirements, its disdain for our solemn pronouncements\(^i\) made when we were founding our city, that except in the case of transcendent\(^k\) natural gifts no one could ever become a good man unless from childhood his play and all his pursuits were concerned with things

\(^{\text{a}}\) καὶ πράον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Here the word πράον is ironically transferred to the criminal himself.

\(^{\text{b}}\) κομψή: cf. 376 a, Theaet. 171 a.

\(^{\text{c}}\) For περινοστεῖ cf. Lucian, Bis Acc. 6, Aristoph. Plut. 121, 494, Peace 762.

\(^{\text{d}}\) His being unnoticed accords better with the rendering "spirit," "one returned from the dead" (a perfectly possible meaning for ἔρως. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 435 translates "Geist") than with that of a hero returning from the wars. Cf. Adam ad loc.

\(^{\text{e}}\) For ώστιον συµκροτητῶν συµµερολογία cf. on 532 b ἢτι ἀδύναμία.

\(^{\text{f}}\) σεμψόννυτες here has an ironical or colloquial tone—"high-brow," "top-lofty."

\(^{\text{g}}\) Cf. 401 b-c, 374 c and on 467 a, Laws 643 b, Delacroix, Psychologie de l'art, p. 46.


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πάντα, ὡς μεγαλοπρεπῶς καταπατήσασ' ἀπαντα ταύτα οὐδ' ἔφη, ἐξ ὁποίων ἂν τις ἐπιτη-
δεμιάτων ἐπὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ ἴων πράττῃ, ἀλλὰ τιμᾶ, C ἐὰν φῇ μόνον εὖνος εἰναι τῷ πλήθει. Πάνυ γ',
εἴρη, γενναία. ¹ Ταύτα τε δή, ἐφήν, ἔχου ἂν καὶ
tούτων ἄλλα ἄδελφα δημοκρατία, καὶ εἴη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἥδεια πολιτεία καὶ ἀναρχος καὶ ποικίλη, ἵστητα τινα ὁμοίως ἵσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις δια-
νέμουσα. Καὶ μᾶλ', ἐφή, γνώριμα λέγεις.

XII. Ἄθρει δή, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, τίς ὁ τοιοῦτος ἓδρα. ἦν πρώτον σκεπτέον, ὥσπερ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐσκεψά-
μεθα, τίνα τρόπον γίνεται; Ναι, ἐφή. Ἄρ' οὖν
οὐχ ὤδε; τοῦ φειδωλοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ὀλυγραχικοῦ

D γένοιτ' ἂν, οἶμαι, νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν πατρὶ τεθραμμένος
ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνου ἠθεσιν; Τί γὰρ οὐ; Βία δὴ καὶ
οὗτος ἄρχων τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἠθοῦν, ὅσοι ἀνα-
λωτικαὶ μὲν, χρηματιστικαὶ δὲ μή, αἱ δὴ οὐκ
ἀναγκαίαι κέκληται. Δῆλον, ἐφή. Βούλει οὖν,
ἂν δ' ἐγώ, ὅταν μὴ σκοτεινῶς διαλεγόμεθα, πρῶτον
ὀρισώμεθα τὰς τε ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τὰς
μή; Βούλομαι, ἂν δ' ὃς. Οὐκοῦν ἂς τε οὐκ ἂν οἰοί

¹ γενναία M, γενναία AFD.

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¹ μεγαλοπρεπῶς is often ironical in Plato. Cf. 362 c, Symp. 199 c, Charm. 175 c, Theaet. 161 c, Meno 94 b, Polit. 277 b, Hipp. Maj. 291 e.

² In Aristoph. Knights 180 ff. Demosthenes tells the sausage-seller that his low birth and ignorance and his trade are the very things that fit him for political leadership.

³ Cf. Aristoph. Knights 732 f., 741 and passim. Andoc. iv. 16 εὖνος τῷ δήμῳ. Émile Faguet, Moralistes, iii. p. 84, says of Tocqueville, “Il est bien je crois le premier qui ait dit que la démocratie abaisse le niveau intellectuel des gouvernements.” For the other side of the democratic shield see Thucyd. ii. 39.

⁴ For the ironical use of γενναία cf. 544 c, Soph. 231 b, Theaet. 209 e.

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fair and good,—how superbly it tramples under foot all such ideals, caring nothing from what practices and way of life a man turns to politics, but honouring him if only he says that he loves the people!"

"It is a noble polity, indeed!" he said. "These and qualities akin to these democracy would exhibit, and it would, it seems, be a delightful form of government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals alike!" "Yes," he said, "everybody knows that."

XII. "Observe, then, the corresponding private character. Or must we first, as in the case of the polity, consider the origin of the type?" "Yes," he said. "Is not this, then, the way of it? Our thrifty oligarchical man would have a son bred in his father's ways." "Why not?" "And he, too, would control by force all his appetites for pleasure that are wasters and not winners of wealth, those which are denominated unnecessary." "Obviously."

"And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first define our distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites?" "Let us do so." "Well,

* ἡδεία: cf. Isoc. vii. 70 of good government, τοῖς χρωμένοις ἡδοίς.


¶ Cf. 554 a, 571 b, Phaedo 64 d-e, Philib. 62 ε, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1147 b 29. The Epicureans made much of this distinction. Cf. Cic. De fin. i. 13. 45, Tusc. v. 33, 93, Porphyry, De abst. i. 49. Ath. xii. 511 quotes this passage and says it anticipates the Epicureans.
τ’ είμεν ἀποτρέψαι, δικαίως ἂν ἀναγκαίοις καλῶντο, τ’ είμεν ἀποτρέψαι, δικαίως ἂν ἀναγκαίοις καλῶντο, 
Ε καὶ ὁσιά ἀποτελούμεναι ὡφελοῦσιν ἡμᾶς; τούτων γὰρ ἀμφότεροι ἔφεσθαι ἡμῶν τῇ φύσει ἀνάγκη.
559 ἢ οὐ; Καὶ μάλα. Δικαίως δὴ τοῦτο ἐπ’ αὐταῖς ἐροῦμεν, τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. Δικαίως. Τί δαί; ἂς γε τις ἀπαλλάξειν ἂν, εἰ μελετῶ ἐκ νέου, καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐνοῦσαι δρῶσιν, αἰ δὲ καὶ τούναντίον, πάσας ταύτας εἰ μὴ ἀναγκαῖοις φαίμεν εἶναι, ἂρ’ οὐ καλῶς ἂν λέγομεν; Καλῶς μὲν οὖν. Προ-
ελώμεθα δὴ τι παράδειγμα ἐκατέρω, αἰ εἰσιν, ἵνα τύπω λάβωμεν αὐτάς; Οὐκοῦν χρή. Ἄρ’ οὖν οὐχ ἦ τοῦ φαγεῖν μέχρι ώραίας τε καὶ ἐνεξιᾶς καὶ ऑυτὸν σίτου τε καὶ ὄψιν ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη; Οἶμαι.
'Ἡ μὲν γε ποι τοῦ σίτου κατ’ ἀμφότερα ἀναγκαῖα, ἢ τε ὡφελίμοις ἢ τε παύσαι ζῶντα οὐ δυνατή.1 Ναὶ. 'Ἡ δὲ ὄψιν, εἰ πῇ τινα ὡφελεῖαν πρὸς εὐεξίαν παρέχεται. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ; ἢ πέρα τούτων καὶ ἄλλων ἐδεσμάτων ἢ τοιούτων ἐπιθυμία, δυνατή δὲ κολαξομένη ἐκ νέων καὶ παϊδευμένη ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, καὶ 
βλαβερὰ μὲν σώματι, βλαβερὰ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τε 
C φρόνησιν καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ἃρα γε ὅρθως οὐκ 
ἀναγκαία ἂν καλῶτο; Ὄρθότατα μὲν οὖν. Οὐκ-
οὖν καὶ ἀναλωτικὰς φῶμεν εἰναι ταύτας, ἐκείνας 
δὲ χρηματιστικὰς διὰ τὸ χρησίμους πρὸς τὰ ἔργα 
eίναι; Τί μήν; Ὀὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων 
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φήσομεν; Ὀὕτω. Ἄρ’ οὖν καὶ

1 παύσαι ζῶντα οὐ δυνατῆ Hermann, παύσαι ζῶντα δυνατῆ AFDM, μὴ παύσαι ζῶντα δυνατῆ Mon., Burnet, παύσαι πεινών-

tas Athenaeus, παύσασθαι ζῶντος ἄδνατε Wilamowitz (Platon, ii. pp. 385-386).
then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly called necessary, and likewise those whose satisfaction is beneficial to us, may they not? For our nature compels us to seek their satisfaction. Is not that so?" "Most assuredly." "Then we shall rightly use the word 'necessary' of them?" "Rightly." "And what of the desires from which a man could free himself by discipline from youth up, and whose presence in the soul does no good and in some cases harm? Should we not fairly call all such unnecessary?" "Fairly indeed." "Let us select an example of either kind, so that we may apprehend the type." "Let us do so." "Would not the desire of eating to keep in health and condition and the appetite for mere bread and relishes be necessary?" "I think so." "The appetite for bread is necessary in both respects, in that it is beneficial and in that if it fails we die." "Yes." "And the desire for relishes, so far as it conduces to fitness?" "By all means." "And should we not rightly pronounce unnecessary the appetite that exceeds these and seeks other varieties of food, and that by cor-
rection and training from youth up can be got rid of in most cases and is harmful to the body and a hindrance to the soul's attainment of intelligence and sobriety?" "Nay, most rightly." "And may we not call the one group the spendthrift desires and the other the profitable, because they help production?" "Surely." "And we shall say the same of sexual and other appetites?" "The same." "And were

a Or "grasp them in outline."

b For δ'ον cf. on 372 c, Vol. I. p. 158, note a.

c For καλαξαμένη cf. 511 b, Gorg. 505 b, 491 e, 507 d.

For the thought cf. also supra 519 a-b.

d Lit. "money-making." Cf. 558 d.
δὲ νῦν δὴ κηφήνα ὁνομάζομεν, τούτων ἐλέγομεν
tὸν τῶν τοιούτων ἣδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν γέμοντα
καὶ ἀρχόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, τὸν δὲ
D ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων φειδωλῶν τε καὶ ὀλγαρχικῶν.
'Αλλὰ τί μὴν;

XIII. Πάλιν τούντιν, ὃν δ' ἐγώ, λέγωμεν, ὡς εἰς
ὀλγαρχικὸν δημοκρατικὸς γίγνεται. φαίνεται δὲ
μοι τὰ γε πολλὰ ὤδε γίγνεσθαι. Πῶς; "Ὅταν
νέος τεθραμμένος ὃς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀπαιδεύτως
tε καὶ φειδωλῶς, γευόμεται κηφήνων μέλιτος καὶ
ξυγγένηται αὖθωσι θηροῖ καὶ δεινοῖς, παντοδαπᾶς
ἡδονᾶς καὶ ποικίλας καὶ παντοίως ἔχοισας δυνα-
μένοις σκενάζειν, ἐνταῦθα ποι ὅνω εἰναι ἀρχὴν
Ε αὐτῷ μεταβολῆς ὀλγαρχικῆς τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἰς
dημοκρατικὴν. 1 Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἐφή. "Αρ' ὅνυ,
ὡσπερ ἡ πόλις μετέβαλλε βοηθησάσης τῷ ἐτέρῳ
μέρει Ξυμμαχίας ἐξωθεὶν ὀμοίας ὀμοίως, ὤτω καὶ
ὁ νεανίας μεταβάλλει βοηθοῦντος αὐτοῖς ἐδοὺς
ἐπιθυμίων ἐξωθεὶν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῶν παρ' ἑκείνῳ
ξυγγενοῖς τε καὶ ὀμοίοις: Παντάπασι μὲν ὅνυ.
Καὶ ἐὰν μὲν, οἷμαι, ἀντιβοηθήσῃ τις τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ
ὀλγαρχικῷ Ξυμμαχίᾳ, ἢ ποθεὶ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς
560 ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκεῖων νοθετοῦντων τε καὶ
κακιζόντων, στάσις δὴ καὶ ἀντίστασις καὶ μάχη

1 So mss.: μεταβολῆς ... ὀλγαρχικῆς Burnet, μεταβολῆς ὀλ-
γαρχίας ... δημοκρατικῶν, or insert πολιτείας after ἑαυτῷ Adam.
Jowett and Campbell suggest inserting εἰ after μεταβολῆς.

a For γέμοντα cf. 577 D, 578 A, 603 D, 611 B, Gorg. 525 A, 522 E, etc.

b αὖθωσι occurs only here in Plato. It is common in Pindar
and tragedy. Ernst Maass, "Die Ironie des Sokrates," Sokrates, 11, p. 94 "Platon hat an jener Stelle des Staats,
von der wir ausgingen, die schlimmen Erzieher gefährliche
Fuchsbestien genannt." (Cf. Pindar, Ol. xi. 20.)
we not saying that the man whom we nicknamed the drone is the man who teems with such pleasures and appetites, and who is governed by his unnecessary desires, while the one who is ruled by his necessary appetites is the thrifty oligarchical man?" "Why, surely."

XIII. "To return, then," said I, "we have to tell how the democratic man develops from the oligarchical type. I think it is usually in this way." "How?" "When a youth, bred in the illiberal and niggardly fashion that we were describing, gets a taste of the honey of the drones and associates with fierce and cunning creatures who know how to purvey pleasures of every kind and variety and condition, there you must doubtless conceive is the beginning of the transformation of the oligarchy in his soul into democracy." "Quite inevitably," he said. "May we not say that just as the revolution in the city was brought about by the aid of an alliance from outside, coming to the support of the similar and corresponding party in the state, so the youth is revolutionized when a like and kindred group of appetites from outside comes to the aid of one of the parties in his soul?"

"By all means," he said. "And if, I take it, a counter-alliance comes to the rescue of the oligarchical part of his soul, either it may be from his father or from his other kin, who admonish and reproach him, then there arises faction and counter-

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*Cf. on 557 c, p. 286, note a.

* Cf. 554 d.

* For the metaphor cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24 ἐδυνάσθην ἐκεῖνω χρωμένω συμμάχω τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμίων κρατεῖν, "they [Critias and Alcibiades] found in him [Socrates] an ally who gave them strength to conquer their evil passions." (Loeb tr.)

* Cf. supra on 554 d, p. 276, note c.
ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν τότε γίγνεται. Τί μήν; Καὶ
ποτε μέν, οἶμαι, τὸ δημοκρατικὸν ὑπεχώρησε τῷ
ολιγαρχικῷ, καὶ τινὲς τῶν ἐπιθυμῶν αἱ μὲν
dιεφθάρησαν, αἱ δὲ καὶ ἔξεπεσον, αἰδοὺς τινὸς
ἐγγενομένης ἐν τῇ τοῦ νέου ψυχῇ, καὶ κατεκοσμῆθη
πάλιν. Γίγνεται γὰρ ἐνώτε, ἔφη. Αὕτις δὲ,
οἶμαι, τῶν ἐκπεσοῦσῶν ἐπιθυμῶν ἄλλαι ὑπο-
B τρεφόμεναι ἐγγενεῖς δι’ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τροφῆς
πατρὸς πολλαί τε καὶ ἵσχυραι ἐγένοντο. Φιλεῖ
γοῦν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν ἐξελκόμενοι
τῇ πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ὁμλίας, καὶ λάθρα ἐγγυγγυνόμεναι
πλῆθος ἐνέτεκον. Τί μήν; Τελευτῶσαι δὴ, οἶμαι,
κατέλαβεν τὴν τοῦ νέου τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρότοπλων,
αἰσθόμεναι κενὴν μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηθιδεμάτων
καλῶν καὶ λόγων ἀληθῶν, οἱ δὴ ἄριστοι φρουροὶ τε
C καὶ φύλακες ἐν ἀνδρῶν θεοφιλῶν εἰς διανοίας.
Καὶ πολύ γ’, ἔφη. Ψευδές δὴ καὶ ἀλαζόνες,
οἶμαι, λόγοι τε καὶ δόξαι ἄντ’ ἐκεῖνων ἀναδρα-
μόντες κατέσχον τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον τοῦ τοιοῦτου.
Σφόδρα γ’, ἔφη. Ἄρ’ οὖν οὐ πάλιν τε εἰς ἐκεῖνοὺς
τῶν λυτοφάγους ἑλθοῦν φανερῶς κατουκεῖ, καὶ
eὰν παρ’ οἰκείων της βοήθεια τῷ φειδωλῷ αὐτοῦ
τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφικνήται, κλῆσαντες οἱ ἀλαζόνες λόγοι
ἐκεῖνοι τὰς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τείχους ἐν αὐτῷ πύλας
D οὕτε αὐτὴν τῇ ἐνυμμαχίᾳ παριάσων οὕτε πρέσβεις

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a) τινὲς . . . αἱ μὲν . . . αἱ δὲ. For the partitive apposition
cf. 566 e, 584 d, Gorg. 499 c. Cf. also Protag. 330 a, Gorg.
450 c, Laws 626 e, Eurip. Hec. 1185-1186.
b) Cf. Tim. 90 a.
c) For the idea of guardians of the soul cf. Laws 961 d,
supra 549 b. Cf. also on Phaedo 113 d. What Plato said,
p. 536.
de) Cf. Phaedo 92 d.
Plato, like Matthew Arnold, liked to use nicknames for
faction and internal strife in the man with himself.” “Surely.” “And sometimes, I suppose, the democratic element retires before the oligarchical, some of its appetites having been destroyed and others expelled, and a sense of awe and reverence grows up in the young man’s soul and order is restored.” “That sometimes happens,” he said. “And sometimes, again, another brood of desires akin to those expelled are stealthily nurtured to take their place, owing to the father’s ignorance of true education, and wax numerous and strong.” “Yes, that is wont to be the way of it.” “And they tug and pull back to the same associations and in secret intercourse engender a multitude.” “Yes indeed.” “And in the end, I suppose, they seize the citadel of the young man’s soul, finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honourable pursuits and true discourses, which are the best watchmen and guardians in the minds of men who are dear to the gods.” “Much the best,” he said. “And then false and braggart words and opinions charge up the height and take their place and occupy that part of such a youth.” “They do indeed.” “And then he returns, does he not, to those Lotus-eaters and without disguise lives openly with them. And if any support comes from his kin to the thrifty element in his soul, those braggart discourses close the gates of the royal fortress within him and refuse admission to the auxiliary force itself, and will not grant audience as to envoys of people; cf. Rep. 415 δ ἄγγελος, Theaet. 181 α ἄδικος, Soph. 248 ἂ εἰδήν φίλους, Philib. 44 ε τοῖς δυσχερέσων. So Arnold in Culture and Anarchy uses Populace, Philistines, Barbarians, Friends of Culture, etc., Friends of Physical Science, Lit. and Dogma, p. 3.

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presbuteων λόγους ἴδιωτῶν εἰσδέχονται, αὐτοί τε κρατοῦσι μαχόμενοι, καὶ τὴν μὲν αἰών ἧλιοσμένα αὐρωπών ἔξω ἀτύμως φυγάδα, σωφροσύνης ἀναποδράσας εἰκάσατες ἐκβάλλουσι, μετριότητας δὲ καὶ κοσμίαν δαπάνην ὡς ἀγροκινών καὶ ἀνελευθερών οὕσαν πείθοντες ὑπερορίζουσι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν. Σφόδρα γε. Τούτων δὲ γέ ποιον κενώσαντες καὶ καθήμαντες τὴν τούτο κατεχόμενον τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τελούμένου ψυχήν μεγάλοις τέλεσι, τό μετὰ τούτο ᾗδη ὑβριν καὶ ἀναρχίαν καὶ ἀσωτίαν καὶ ἀναίδειαν λαμπρὰς μετὰ πολλοῦ χοροῦ κατάγουσι ἐστεφανωμένας, ἐγκωμιάζοντες καὶ ὑποκοριζόμενοι, ὑβριν μὲν εὐπάθεισιν καλοῦντες, ἀναρχίαν δὲ ἐλευθερίαν, ἀσωτίαν δὲ μεγαλότετεραι, ἀναίδειαν δὲ ἀνδρείαν. ἃρ' οὐκ οὕτω πῶς, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, νεός ὃν μεταβάλλει ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ἀναγκαίοις ἐπιθυμίαις τρεφομένου τὴν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλευθερώσας τε καὶ ἀνεσσόν; Καὶ μάλα γ', ἃ δ' ὧσ, ἐναργῶς. Ζῆ

1 Badham, followed by Apelt, reads δι ωτῶν. See Adam's note and Appendix IV. to Book VIII.

α Cf. 474 κ, Thucyd. iii. 82. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 435-436 says that Plato had not used Thucydides. But cf. Gomperz iii. 331, and What Plato Said, pp. 2-3, 6, 8. See Isoc. Antid. 284 σκότησαν καὶ μιμεῖσθαι δυναμένου εὐφυεῖς καλοῦσι, etc., Areop. 20 and 49, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1180 b 25, Quintil. iii. 7. 25 and viii. 6. 36, Sallust, Cat. c. 52 "iam pridem equidem nos vera vocabula rerum amimus," etc., Shakes., Sonnet lxvi., "And simple truth miscalled simplicity . . .;" Thomas Wyatt, Of the Courtier's Life:

As drunkenness good fellowship to call; . . .
Affirm that favel hath a goodly grace
In eloquence; and cruelty to name
Zeal of justice and change in time and place, etc.

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to the words of older friends in private life. And they themselves prevail in the conflict, and naming reverence and awe 'folly' "a thrust it forth, a dishonoured fugitive. And temperance they call 'want of manhood' and banish it with contumely, and they teach that moderation and orderly expenditure are 'rusticity' and 'illiberality,' and they combine with a gang of unprofitable and harmful appetites to drive them over the border." "They do indeed." "And when they have emptied and purged" e of all these the soul of the youth that they have thus possessed d and occupied, and whom they are initiating with these magnificent and costly rites, e they proceed to lead home from exile insolence and anarchy and prodigality and shamelessness, resplendent f in a great attendant choir and crowned with garlands, and in celebration of their praises they euphemistically denominate insolence 'good breeding,' licence 'liberty,' prodigality 'magnificence,' and shamelessness 'manly spirit.' And is it not in some such way as this," said I, "that in his youth the transformation takes place from the restriction to necessary desires in his education to the liberation and release of his unnecessary and harmful desires?" "Yes, your description is most vivid," said he. "Then, in his subsequent life,

b ῥπεροπίσςς: cf. Laws 855 c ῥπεροπίσςς φυγάδα, 866 d.

c Cf. 567 c and 573 b, where the word is also used ironically, and Laws 735, Polit. 293 d, Soph. 226 d.

d κατέχομαι: is used of divine "possession" or inspiration in Phaedr. 244 e, Ion 533 e, 536 b, etc., Xen. Symp. 1. 10.

f Plato frequently employs the language of the mysteries for literary effect. Cf. Gorg. 497 c, Symp. 210 a and 218 b, Theaet. 155 e-156 a, Laws 666 b, 870 d-e, Phaedr. 250 b-c, 249 c, Phaedo 81 a, 69 c, Rep. 318 a, etc., and Thompson on Meno 76 e.

f Cf. Eurip. fr. 628. 5 (Nauck), Soph. El. 1130.
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dή, οὖμαι, μετά ταύτα ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἰς ἀναγκαίους ἢ μὴ ἀναγκαίους ἡδονάς ἀναλίσκων καὶ χρήματα καὶ πόνους καὶ διατριβάς: ἀλλ’ εᾶν εὕτυχῆς ἢ καὶ μὴ πέρα ἐκβακχεύθη, ἀλλά τι καὶ B πρεσβύτερος γενόμενος, τοῦ πολλοῦ θορύβου παρελθόντος, μέρη τε καταδέχεται τῶν ἐκπεσόντων καὶ τοῖς ἐπεισελθοῦσι μὴ ὠλον ἐαυτὸν ἐνδώ, εἰς ᾗςον δὴ τι καταστήσας τὰς ἡδονὰς διάγει, τῇ παραπτυτούσῃ ἀεὶ ὡστερ λαχοῦσῃ τὴν ἕαυτον ἀρχήν παραδιδούσ, ἐως ἂν πληρωθῇ, καὶ αὕτης ἄλλης, ουδεμίαν ἀτμιμάζων, ἀλλ’ εἷς ἵσου τρέφων. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Καὶ λόγον γ’, ἃν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἀληθῆ οὐ προσδεχόμενος οὐδὲ παρεῖς εἰς τὸ φρούριον, εάν C τις λέγῃ ὡς αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ τῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἡδοναί, αἱ δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν χρή ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ κολάζειν τε καὶ δουλοῦσθαι: ἀλλ’ ἐν πᾶσι τοῦτοις ἀνανεύει τε καὶ ὀμοίας φησὶν ἀπάσας εἶναι καὶ τιμητείς εἷς ἵσου. Σφόδρα γάρ, ἐφ’ οὕτω διακείμενος τούτο δρά. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, καὶ διαλύῃ τὸ καθ’ ἰμέραν οὕτω χαριζόμενος τῇ προσπιτυτούσῃ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, τοτε μὲν μεθύων καὶ καταυλοῦμενοι, αὕτης δὲ ὑδροποτῶν

a For the ironical δή cf. 562 δ, 563 β, 563 δ, 374 β, 420 ε and on 562 ε, p. 307, note h.

b Cf. Phaedr. 241 ε μεταβαλὼν ἀλλον ἄρχοντα εν αὑτῷ.

For this type of youth cf. Thackeray’s Barnes Newcome.

For the lot cf. supra, p. 285, note d, on 557 α.

c Notice the frequency of the phrase εἷς οὖν in this passage.

Cf. 557 ε.


e The Greek says "threws back his head"—the character-
I take it, such a one expends money and toil and time no more on his necessary than on his unnecessary pleasures. But if it is his good fortune that the period of storm and stress does not last too long, and as he grows older the fiercest tumult within him passes, and he receives back a part of the banished elements and does not abandon himself altogether to the invasion of the others, then he establishes and maintains all his pleasures on a footing of equality, forsooth, and so lives turning over the guard-house of his soul to each as it happens along until it is sated, as if it had drawn the lot for that office, and then in turn to another, disdaining none but fostering them all equally. "Quite so." "And he does not accept or admit into the guard-house the words of truth when anyone tells him that some pleasures arise from honourable and good desires, and others from those that are base, and that we ought to practise and esteem the one and control and subdue the others; but he shakes his head at all such admonitions and avers that they are all alike and to be equally esteemed." "Such is indeed his state of mind and his conduct." "And does he not," said I, "also live out his life in this fashion, day by day indulging the appetite of the day, now wine-bibbing and abandoning himself to the lascivious pleasing of the flute and again drinking only water and dieting;
καὶ κατισχναινόμενος, τοτε δ' αὖ γυμναζόμενος, ἐστι δ' ὅτε ἀργῶν καὶ πάντων ἁμελῶν, τοτε δ' ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβων πολλάκις δὲ πολιτεύεται, καὶ ἀναπτῶν ὅ τι ἀν τύχῃ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει καν ποτε τινας πολεμικοὺς ζηλώσῃ, ταύτη δὲ πολιτεύεται, ἡ χρηματιστικοὺς, ἐπὶ τοῦτο αὖ, καὶ οὔτε τις τάξις οὔτε ἀνάγκη ἐπεστὶν αὐτοῦ τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλ' ἦδυν τε δὴ καὶ ἐλευθεριον καὶ μακάριον καλῶν τὸν βίον
Ε τούτον χρήται αὐτῷ διὰ παντός. Παντάπασιν, ἡ δ' ὅς, διειλήλθας βίων ἰσονομικοῦ τινὸς ἄνδρος. Οἴμαι δε γε, ἃν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ παντοδαπὸν τε καὶ πλείστων ήμῶν μεστόν, καὶ τόν καλὸν τε καὶ ποικίλον, ἄστερε ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν, τούτον τὸν ἁνδρά εἶναι. ἤν πολλοὶ ἄν καὶ πολλαὶ ζηλώσειν τοῦ βίου, παραδείγματα πολιτείων τε καὶ τρόπων πλείστα ἐν αὐτῷ ἱσχύτα. Οὔτω γάρ, ἐφή, ἐστιν.

562 Τί οὖν; τετάχθων ἡμῶν κατὰ δημοκρατίαν τοιοῦτος ἁνήρ, ὡς δημοκρατικὸς ὥρθος ἄν προσ- αγορεύομενος; Τετάχθω, ἐφή.

XIV. Ἡ καλλιστὴ δὴ, ἃν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτεία τε καὶ ὁ κάλλιστος ἁνήρ λοιπὰ ἄν ἡμῶν εἴη διελθεῖν, τυραννίσ τε καὶ τύραννος. Κομιδὴ γ', ἐφή. Φέρε δὴ, τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος, ὡς ἠκέταίρε, γίγνεται; ὅτι μὲν γάρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας μεταβάλλει, σχεδὸν δὴλον. Δήλον. Ἄρ' οὖν τρόπον τινὰ τὸν αὐτὸν

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\( a \) Cf. Protag. 319 d.


\( c \) παντοδαπὸν: cf. on 557 c.

\( d \) Cf. 557 D.

\( e \) For the irony cf. 607 ἐ τῶν καλῶν πολιτείων, supra 544 c γενεαῖα, 558 c ἠδεία.

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and at one time exercising his body, and sometimes idling and neglecting all things, and at another time seeming to occupy himself with philosophy. And frequently he goes in for politics and bounces up\(^a\) and says and does whatever enters his head.\(^b\) And if military men excite his emulation, thither he rushes, and if moneyed men, to that he turns, and there is no order or compulsion in his existence, but he calls this life of his the life of pleasure and freedom and happiness and cleaves to it to the end.” “That is a perfect description,” he said, “of a devotee of equality.” “I certainly think,” said I, “that he is a manifold\(^c\) man stuffed with most excellent differences, and that like that city\(^d\) he is the fair and many-coloured one whom many a man and woman would count fortunate in his life, as containing within himself the greatest number of patterns of constitutions and qualities.” “Yes, that is so,” he said. “Shall we definitely assert, then, that such a man is to be ranged with democracy and would properly be designated as democratic?” “Let that be his place,” he said.

XIV. “And now,” said I, “the fairest\(^e\) polity and the fairest man remain for us to describe, the tyranny and the tyrant.” “Certainly,” he said. “Come then, tell me, dear friend, how tyranny arises.” That it is an outgrowth of democracy is fairly plain.” “Yes, plain.” “Is it, then, in a sense, in the same

\(^a\) τις τρόπος . . . γιγνεται is a mixture of two expressions that need not be pressed. Cf. Meno 96 d, Epist. vii. 324 b. A. G. Laird, in Class. Phil., 1918, pp. 89-90 thinks it means “What τρόπος (of the many τρόποι in a democracy) develops into a τρόπος of tyranny; for that tyranny is a transformation of democracy is fairly evident.” That would be a recognition of what Aristotle says previous thinkers overlooked in their classification of polities.
Their idea of good. Cf. supra 555 b prokeiménou ágadóv. Cf. Laws 962 e with Aristot. Pol. 1293 b 14 ff. Cf. also Aristot. Pol. 1304 b 20 ai mév ón ádakekramatía máliosta meta-
basállosoi dià tìn tòv démokratía và méne diá chrámatismóv ún áptíllon. "Aléthí, éph. "Ar' oúv kai o démokratía dríztai gánathón, 
ì toúto ánplêtia kai vàvntin katakalúei; Légeis 
ì autínu tì drízésnav, Tìn éleuthérian, étoun. 
tòuto gáro pou ev démokratouménn péleis akósas

C án ós Ígei te kállystov kai dià vatai én mónh 
tagí aúswon oikeínu ústis fúsei éleútheros. Ëné-
getai gáro Íhu, éphnh, kai polu tòuto to démaa. "Ar' 
oúv, Íhu d' égáv, Íopér ña vóv Íhu èroíw, Í toú toú-
tov ánplêtia kai Í toú toú álloów áméleia kai vàv-
tin tìn poluteían meóspítisia te kai paraaskenvaz 
ytoprínwos déseínav; Pósw; éph. "Otan, õímai, 
ðemokratouménn pélos éleuthérias dhírfsasasa kakó

D oínwçówn proostatouýntovn túkhs, kai porrwteprw 
tòu déontov ákratov authis meýnasthí, toús árhocontov 
ðhu, án mú pánu prabó õwai kai polílln parékhosi

1 ploutóv G, úpérploutos ADM, pou ploutóv Campbell, 
eíper tì ploutóv Apelt, úpérploutos ploutóv Stallbaum.

a Their idea of good. Cf. supra 555 b prokeiménou ágadóv. Cf. Laws 962 e with Aristot. Pol. 1293 b 14 ff. Cf. also Aristot. Pol. 1304 b 20 ai mév oúv démokratía máliosta meta-
bállousoi dià tìn tòv démokratía và méne diá chrámatismóv ún áptíllon. Cf. also p. 263, 
note e on 551 b (ðóso) and p. 139, note c on 519 c (skoptós).
b Cf. 552 b, and for the disparagement of wealth p. 262, 
note b, on 550 e.
c Zeller, Aristot. ii. p. 285, as usual credits Aristotle with 
the Platonic thought that every form of government brings 
ruin on itself by its own excess.
d Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 43 "The central 
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way in which democracy arises out of oligarchy that tyranny arises from democracy?" "How is that?" "The good that they proposed to themselves and that was the cause of the establishment of oligarchy—it was wealth, was it not?" "Yes." "Well, then, the insatiate lust for wealth and the neglect of everything else for the sake of money-making was the cause of its undoing." "True," he said. "And is not the avidity of democracy for that which is its definition and criterion of good the thing which dissolves it too?" "What do you say its criterion to be?" "Liberty," I replied; "for you may hear it said that this is best managed in a democratic city, and for this reason that is the only city in which a man of free spirit will care to live." "Why, yes," he replied, "you hear that saying everywhere." "Then, as I was about to observe, is it not the excess and greed of this and the neglect of all other things that revolutionizes this constitution too and prepares the way for the necessity of a dictatorship?" "How?" he said. "Why, when a democratic city athirst for liberty gets bad cupbearers for its leaders and is intoxicated by drinking too deep of that unmixed wine, and then, if its so-called governors are not extremely mild and gentle with it idea of English life and politics is the assertion of personal liberty."

* Aristot. Pol. 1263 b 29 says life would be impossible in Plato’s Republic.
* * ηα . . . ερωτ: cf. 449 Α, Theaet. 180 c.
* Or "protectors," "tribunes," προστατούντων. Cf. infra on 565 c, p. 318, note d.
πήν ἐλευθερίαν, κολάζει αἰτιωμένη ὡς μιαροῦς τε καὶ ὀλυγαρχικὸς. Δρῶσι γὰρ, ἐφη, τοῦτο. Τοὺς δὲ γε, εἴπον, τῶν ἀρχόντων κατηκόουσι προ-
πηλακίζει ὡς ἐθελουθούς τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὄντας,
tους δὲ ἀρχόντας μὲν ἀρχομένους, ἀρχομένους δὲ ἀρχουσιν ὁμοίους ἴδια τε καὶ δημοσία ἐπινεῖ τε ἐκαὶ τιμᾶ. ἄρ' οὐκ ἄναγκη ἐν τοιαύτῃ πόλει ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἴναι; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Καὶ καταδύεσθαι γε, ἂν ὄ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, εἰς τε τὰς ἴδιας οἰκίας καὶ τελευτάν μέχρι τῶν θρήνων τὴν ἀναρχίαν ἐμφυομένην. Πῶς, ἂν ὄ' ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγομεν; Οἶον, ἐφη, πατέρα μὲν ἐθίζεσθαι παιδὶ ὁμοιον γίγνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς νιεῖς, νιόν δὲ πατρί, καὶ μήτε αἰσχύνεσθαι μήτε δεδέναι τοὺς 563 γονέας, ἦν δὴ ἐλεύθερος ἂν μέτουκον δὲ ἀστῷ καὶ ἄστον μετοικῷ ἐξισοδοσθαὶ, καὶ ἕξον ὡσαύτως. Γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτως, ἐφη. Ταῦτα τε, ἂν ὄ' ἐγώ, καὶ σμικρὰ τοιάδε ἄλλα γίγνεται· διδάσκαλος τε ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ φοιτητὰς φοβεῖται καὶ θωπεύει,

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a μιαροῦ is really stronger, "pestilential fellows." Cf. Apol. 23 ν, Soph. Antig. 746. It is frequent in Aristophanes.


c Cf. Symp. 184 c, 183 λ. Cf. the essay of Estienne de la Boétrie, De la servitude volontaire. Also Gray, Ode for Music, 6 "Servitude that hugs her chain."


f Cf. 563 c, Laws 942 ν.
and do not dispense the liberty unstintedly, it chastises them and accuses them of being accursed\(^9\) oligarchs.\(^b\)"

"Yes, that is what they do," he replied. "But those who obey the rulers," I said, "it reviles as willing slaves\(^c\) and men of naught,\(^d\) but it commends and honours in public and private rulers who resemble subjects and subjects who are like rulers. Is it not inevitable that in such a state the spirit of liberty should go to all lengths\(^e\)?" "Of course." "And this anarchical temper," said I, "my friend, must penetrate into private homes and finally enter into the very animals.\(^f\)" "Just what do we mean by that?" he said. "Why," I said, "the father habitually tries to resemble the child and is afraid of his sons, and the son likens himself to the father and feels no awe or fear of his parents,\(^g\) so that he may be forsooth a free man.\(^h\) And the resident alien feels himself equal to the citizen and the citizen to him, and the foreigner likewise." "Yes, these things do happen," he said. "They do," said I, "and such other trifles as these. The teacher in such case fears and fawns

\(^9\) A common conservative complaint. Cf. Isoc. Areop. 49, Aristoph. Clouds, 998, 1321 ff., Xen. Rep. Ath. 1. 10, Mem. iii. 5. 15; Newman i. pp. 174 and 339-340. Cf. also Renan, Souvenirs, xviii.-xx., on American vulgarity and liberty; Harold Lasswell, quoting Bryce, "Modern Democracies," in Methods of Social Science, ed. by Stuart A. Rice, p. 376: "The spirit of equality is alleged to have diminished the respect children owe to parents, and the young to the old. This was noted by Plato in Athens. But surely the family relations depend much more on the social, structural and religious ideas of a race than on forms of government"; Whitman, "Where the men and women think lightly of the laws . . . where children are taught to be laws to themselves . . . there the great city stands."

\(^b\) For the ironical ἵνα δὴ cf. on 561 b. Cf. Laws 962 ε ἐλεύθερον δὴ, Meno 86 δ and Aristoph. Clouds 1414.
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φοιτηταί τε διδασκάλων ὀλυγωροῦν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγοῦν· καὶ ὀλος οἱ μὲν νέοι πρεσβυτέρους ἀπευκάζονται καὶ διαμιλλᾶνται καὶ ἐν λόγοι καὶ ἐν ἔργοι, οἱ δὲ γέροντες ξυγκαθιέντες τοῖς νέοις Β ἐντραπελίας τε καὶ χαρίεντισμοῦ ἐμπίπτεται, μμούμενοι τούς νέους, ἣν δὴ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀνήδεις εἶναι μηδὲ δεσποτικοί. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Τὸ δὲ γε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἐσχατον, δ' ἐπὶ, τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῦ πλῆθους, ὀσον γίγνεται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει, ὅταν δὴ οἱ ἐωνημένοι καὶ αἱ ἐωνημέναι μηδὲν ἦττον ἐλευθεροὶ ὅσι τῶν πριαμένων. ἐν γυναιξὶ δὲ πρὸς ἀνδρας καὶ ἀνδράσι πρὸς γυναίκας ὡσθ' ἡ ἴσονομία καὶ ἐλευθερία γίγνεται, οἴγον ἐπελαθός-

C μεθ' εἰπεῖν. Ὀυκοῦν κατ' Λισχύλον, ἐφη, ἐροῦ-

μεν ὡ τι νῦν ἥλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα; Πάνω γε, ἐπον. καὶ ἐγώγε οὕτω λέγω· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν θηρίων τῶν ὑπὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώπως ὡσὶ ἐλευθερώτερα ἐστὶν ἐναύθα ἡ ἐν ἄλλῃ, οὐκ ἂν τις πείθοι ἀπειρος. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ αἱ τε κύνες κατὰ τὴν παρομίαν οἰαῖπερ αἱ δέσποιναι γίγνονται τε δὴ καὶ ἐποιοι καὶ ὕνοι, πάντα ἐλευθεροὺς καὶ σεμνῶς εἰθισμένοι πορεύ-

εσθαὶ, κατὰ τὰς ὄδους ἐμβάλλοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἀπαν-

τῶντι, εἰν μὴ ἐξίστηται καὶ τάλλα πάντα οὕτω

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*a Cf. Protag. 336 α, Theaet. 174 λ, 168 β.*

*b For ἐντραπελίας cf. Isoc. xv. 296, vii. 49, Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1108 a 24. In Rhet. 1389 b 11 he defines it as πεπαιδευ-

μένη ὑδρός. Arnold once addressed the Eton boys on the word.*


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upon the pupils, and the pupils pay no heed to the teacher or to their overseers either. And in general the young ape their elders and vie with them in speech and action, while the old, accommodating themselves to the young, are full of pleasantry and graciousness, imitating the young for fear they may be thought disagreeable and authoritative.” “By all means,” he said. “And the climax of popular liberty, my friend,” I said, “is attained in such a city when the purchased slaves, male and female, are no less free than the owners who paid for them. And I almost forgot to mention the spirit of freedom and equal rights in the relation of men to women and women to men.” “Shall we not, then,” said he, “in Aeschylean phrase, say ‘whatever rises to our lips’?” “Certainly,” I said, “so I will. Without experience of it no one would believe how much freer the very beasts subject to men are in such a city than elsewhere. The dogs literally verify the adage and ‘like their mistresses become.’ And likewise the horses and asses are wont to hold on their way with the utmost freedom and dignity, bumping into everyone who meets them and who does not step aside.” And so all things

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*e Cf. 562 ε, Julian, M. 355 β... μέχρι τῶν ὅνων ἐστὶν ἐλευθερία παρ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν καμήλων; ἀγοναῖ τοι καὶ ταύτας οἱ μαθωτοὶ διὰ τῶν στοίχων ὠσπέρ τὰς νύμφας, “... what great independence exists among the citizens, even down to the very asses and camels? The men who hire them out lead even these animals through the porticoes as though they were brides.” (Loeb tr.) Cf. Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. Teubner, p. 22, § 23 μέχρι καὶ τῶν ἄλογων ἰψῶν δικνεῖτο αὐτών ἡ νοοθέτησις.


g Eurip. Ion 635-637 mentions being jostled off the street by a worse person as one of the indignities of Athenian city life.
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D μεστὰ ἑλευθερίας γίγνεται. Τὸ ἔμον γ', ἐφη, ἐμοὶ λέγεις οὕνεπ. αὐτὸς γὰρ εἰς ἀγρὸν πορευόμενος 
θαμὰ αὐτὸ πάσχω. Τὸ δὲ δὴ κεφάλαιον, ἢν ὁ 
ἔγω, πάντων τούτων ξυνηθρουμένων ἐννοεῖς, ὡς 
ἀπαλὴν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν πολιτῶν ποιεῖ, ὡστε κἂν ὁ 
τιοῦν δουλείας τις προσφέρῃται, ἀγανακτεῖν καὶ 
μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι; τελευτῶντες γάρ ποὺ οἶδ' ὦτι 
οὐδὲ τῶν νόμων φροντύζουσι γεγραμμένων ἢ 
Ε ἀγράφων, ἢν δὴ μηδαμῇ μηδεις αὐτοὶς ἢ δεσπότης. 
Καὶ μάλ', ἐφη, οἶδα.

XV. Αὐτῇ μὲν τοίνυν, ἢν ὁ ἔγω, ὀ φίλε, ἢ 
ἀρχὴ οὐτωσὶ καλὴ καὶ νεανικὴ, ο𝜃ὲν τυραννὶς 
φύεται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. Νεανικὴ δῆτα, ἐφη· ἀλλὰ 
τί τὸ μετὰ τούτο; Ταῦταν, ἢν ὁ ἔγω, ὀπερ ἐν τῇ 
ἀληθεία νόσημα ἐγγενόμενον ἀπώλεσεν αὐτῆν, 
τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῦτῃ πλέον τε καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἐκ 
τῆς ἔξουσίας ἐγγενόμενον καταδουλοῦται δημο-
κρατίαν· καὶ τῷ ὑμνὶ τὸ ἀγαν τι ποιεῖν μεγάλην

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*a Cf. the reflections in Laws 698 f., 701 a-c, Epist. viii. 
354 d, Gorg. 461 e; Isoc. Areop. 20, Panath. 131, Eurip. 
Cyclops 120 ἀκούει δ' οὐδὲν οὐδεὶς οὐδένος, Aristot. Pol. 
1295 b 15 f.

Plato, by reaction against the excesses of the ultimate 
democracy, always satirizes the shibboleth "liberty" in the 
style of Arnold, Ruskin and Carlyle. He would agree with 
Goethe (Eckermann i. 219, Jan. 18, 1827) "Nicht das macht 
frei, das wir nichts über uns erkennen wollen, sondern eben, 
dass wir etwas verehren, das über uns ist."

Libby, Introd. to Hist. of Science, p. 273, not understanding 
the irony of the passage, thinks much of it the unwilling 
tribute of a hostile critic.

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everywhere are just bursting with the spirit of liberty. a” "It is my own dream b you are telling me,” he said; "for it often happens to me when I go to the country.” "And do you note that the sum total of all these items when footed up is that they render the souls of the citizens so sensitive c that they chafe at the slightest suggestion of servitude d and will not endure it? For you are aware that they finally pay no heed even to the laws e written or unwritten, f so that forsooth they may have no master anywhere over them.” “I know it very well,” said he.

XV. "This, then, my friend,” said I, “is the fine and vigorous root from which tyranny grows, in my opinion.” "Vigorous indeed,” he said; "but what next?" "The same malady,” I said, "that, arising in oligarchy, destroyed it, this more widely diffused and more violent as a result of this licence, enslaves democracy. And in truth, any excess is wont to

In Gorg. 484 a Callicles sneers at equality from the point of view of the superman. Cf. also on 558 c, p. 291, note f; Hobbes, Leviathan xxi. and Theopompos’s account of democracy in Byzantium, fr. 65. Similar phenomena may be observed in an American city street or Pullman club car.

b Cf. Callimachus, Anth. Pal. vi. 310, and xii. 148 μὴ λέγε
... τοὺμον διέρον εμοί, Cic. Att. vi. 9. 3, Lucian, Somnium seu Gallus 7 ἢσπερ γὰρ τούμον ἐνύπνιον ἰδὼν, Tennyson, “Lucretius”: “That was mine, my dream, I knew it.”

c This sensitiveness, on which Grote remarks with approval, is characteristic of present-day American democracy. Cf. also Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 51 “And so if he is stopped from making Hyde Park a bear garden or the streets impassable he says he is being butchered by the aristocracy.”


Cf. Laws 701 ἐὼμων ἐπειδή μὴ ὑπηκόοις εἶναι.

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ϕιλεῖ εἰς τοῦναντίον μεταβολὴν ἀνταποδιδόναι, ἐν 564 ὁραίας τε καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἦκιστα. Εἰκὸς, ἐφη. 'Η γὰρ ἄγαν ἐλευθερία ἐσκεφ οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι ἢ εἰς ἄγαν δουλεῖαν μεταβάλλει καὶ ἰδιωτὴ καὶ πόλει. Εἰκὸς γάρ. Εἰκὸτως τοῖνυν, εἴπον, οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης πολιτείας τυραννίς καθίσταται ἢ ἐκ δημοκρατίας, εξ οἷς τῆς ἀκροτάτης ἐλευθερίας δουλεία πλεῖστη τε καὶ ἀγριωτάτη. 'Εχει γὰρ, ἐφη, λόγον. 'Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτ', οἶμαι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἡρώτας, ἀλλὰ ποιον ὑν οὐσία ἐν ὀλίγαρχίᾳ τε φυσικοντιν καὶ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δουλοῦται αὐτήν. 'Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις. 'Εκεῖνο τοῖνυν, ἐφην, ἔλεγον, τὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν τε καὶ δαπανηρῶν ἄνδρῶν γένος, τὸ μὲν ἄνδρεότατον ἣγουμένον αὐτῶν, τὸ δ' ἄνανδρότερον ἐπόμενον· οὐς δ' ἀφωμοιοῦμεν κηφήσι, τοὺς μὲν κέντρα ἐχουσι, τοὺς δὲ ἀκέντρους. Καὶ ὅρθως γ', ἐφη. Τοῦτω τοῖνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ταράττετον ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐγγυνομένω, οἷον περὶ σώμα φλέγμα τε καὶ χολή· ὁ δ' καὶ δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἰατρόν τε καὶ νομοθέτην πόλεως μὴ ἦττον ἡ σοφὸν μελητουργὸν

— Cf. Lysias xxv. 27, Isoc. viii. 108, vii. 5, Cic. De rep. i. 44 “nam ut ex nimia potentia principum oritur interitus principum, sic hunc nimis liberum ...” etc.; Emerson, History, “A great licentiousness treads on the heels of a reformation.” Cf. too Macaulay on the comic dramatists of the Restoration; Arnold, Lit. and Dogma, p. 322 “After too much glorification of art, science and culture, too little; after Rabelais, George Fox;” Tennyson:

He that roars for liberty
Faster binds the tyrant's power.

See Coleridge's Table Talk, p. 149, on the moral law of
bring about a corresponding reaction to the opposite in the seasons, in plants, in animal bodies, and most especially in political societies." "Probably," he said. "And so the probable outcome of too much freedom is only too much slavery in the individual and the state." "Yes, that is probable." "Probably, then, tyranny develops out of no other constitution than democracy—from the height of liberty, I take it, the fiercest extreme of servitude." "That is reasonable," he said. "That, however, I believe, was not your question, but what identical malady arising in democracy as well as in oligarchy enslaves it?" "You say truly," he replied. "That then," I said, "was what I had in mind, the class of idle and spendthrift men, the most enterprising and vigorous portion being leaders and the less manly spirits followers. We were likening them to drones, some equipped with stings and others stingless." "And rightly too," he said. "These two kinds, then," I said, "when they arise in any state, create a disturbance like that produced in the body by phlegm and gall. And so a good physician and lawgiver must be on his guard from afar polarity. Émile Faguet says that this law of reaction is the only one in which he believes in literary criticism.

b For the generalization cf. Symp. 188 A-B.

c Cf. 565 D. The slight exaggeration of the expression is solemnly treated by Apelt as a case of logical false conversion in Plato.

d Plato keeps to the point. Cf. on 531 c, p. 193, note i.


f Cf. 555 D-E.

g Cf. the parallel of soul and body in 444 c f., Soph. 227 E, Crito 47 D f., Gorg. 504 B-C, 505 B, 518 A, 524 D.

For φλέγμα cf. Tim. 83 C, 85 A-B.
πόρρωθεν ευλαβείσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὅπως μὴ ἐγγενήσεσθον, ἂν δὲ ἐγγένησθον, ὅπως ὁ τι τάχιστα ξὺν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κηρίως ἐκτετμήσεσθον. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὦς, παντάπασι γε. Ὡδε τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λάβωμεν, ἵνα εὐκρινεστέρον ἱδωμεν ὁ βουλόμεθα. Πῶς; Τριχή διαστησόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ δημοκρατουμένην πόλιν, οὕσπερ οὖν καὶ ἔχει. ἐν

Ποὺς γὰρ ποῦ τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος ἐν αὐτῇ ἐμφύτευται δι' ἐξουσίαν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἤ ἐν τῇ ὀλυγαρχουμένῃ. "Εστιν οὕτως. Πολὺ δὲ γε δρυμύτερον ἐν ταύτῃ ἤ ἐν ἑκείνῃ. Πῶς; 'Εκεί μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐντιμον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀπελαύνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἀγύμναστον καὶ οὐκ ἐρρωμένον γίγνεται. ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δὲ τούτῳ ποῦ τὸ προεστός αὐτῆς, ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δρυμύτατον αὐτοῦ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει, τὸ δ' ἄλλο περὶ τὰ βήματα προσίζον βομβεῖ τε καὶ

Ε οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος, ὥστε πάντα ὅπο τοῦ τοιοῦτον διακεῖται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ χωρίς τινων ὀλίγων. Μάλα γε, ἦ δ' ὦς. "Αλλο τοῖνυν τοιόνδε αἰ ἀποκρίνεται ἐκ τοῦ πλῆθους. Τὸ ποίον; Χρηματιζομένων ποὺ πάντων ὁι κοσμώσαται φύσει ὡς τὸ πολὺ πλουσιώτατοι γίγνονται. Εἰκὸς. Πλεῖστον δὴ, οἷμαι, τοῖς κηφῆςι μέλι καὶ εὐπορώτατον ἐντεῦθεν βλίττεται. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἐφη, παρά γε τῶν σμικρὰ ἐχόντων

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a μάλιστα μὲν . . . ἂν δὲ: cf. 378 Α, 414 c, 461 c, 473 b, Apol. 34 Α, Soph. 246 d.

b For εὐκρινεστέρον cf. Soph. 242 c.

c Cf. Phileb. 23 c, which Stenzel says argues an advance 314
against the two kinds, like a prudent apiarist, first and chiefly a to prevent their springing up, but if they do arise to have them as quickly as may be cut out, cells and all." "Yes, by Zeus," he said, "by all means." "Then let us take it in this way," I said, "so that we may contemplate our purpose more distinctly."b "How?" "Let us in our theory make a tripartite division of the democratic state, which is in fact its structure. One such class, as we have described, grows up in it because of the licence, no less than in the oligarchic state." "That is so." "But it is far fiercer in this state than in that." "How so?" "There, because it is not held in honour, but is kept out of office, it is not exercised and does not grow vigorous. But in a democracy this is the dominating class, with rare exceptions, and the fiercest part of it makes speeches and transacts business, and the remainder swarms and settles about the speaker's stand and keeps up a buzzing d and tolerates e no dissent, so that everything with slight exceptions is administered by that class in such a state." "Quite so," he said. "And so from time to time there emerges or is secreted from the multitude another group of this sort." "What sort?" he said. "When all are pursuing wealth the most orderly and thrifty natures for the most part become the richest." "It is likely." "Then they are the most abundant supply of honey for the drones, and it is the easiest to extract."f "Why, yes," he said, "how could one squeeze it out of those who have over the Sophist, because Plato is no longer limited to a bipartite division.

a Cf. 573 a.

b Cf. Isoc. iii. 14 δυτι δημοκρατίας οθός οὐκ ἐστι παρηγορία, etc. For the word cf. Aristoph. Acharn. 305 οὐκ ἀναχάγομαι, Wasps 1337.

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τις βλίσευεν; Πλούσιοι δὴ, οἴμαι, οἱ τοιοῦτοι καλοῦνται, κηφήνων βοτάνη. Σχεδόν τι, ἐφη.

565 XVI. Δήμος δ' ἂν εἴη τρίτον γένος, οὗ οἱ αὐτουργοὶ τε καὶ ἀπράγμονες, οὔ πάνυ πολλὰ κεκτημένοι, ὃς δὴ πλείστον τε καὶ κυριώτατον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ, ὥστε περ ἀθροισθῇ. Ἐστὶ γάρ, ἐφη· ἀλλ' οὔθεν ἑθελεί ποιεῖν τοῦτο, ἕλη μὴ μέλιτος τι μεταλαμβάνῃ. Οὔκοιν μεταλαμβάνει, ὃν δ' ἐγὼ, αἲ, καθ' ὅσον δύνανται οἱ προεστῶτες, τοὺς ἔχοντας τὴν οὐσίαν ἀφαιροῦμενοι, διανέμοντες τῷ δήμῳ τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτοῦ ἑκείν. Μεταλαμβάνει Β γὰρ ὁ ὅν, ἄ θ' ὅς, οὕτως. Ἀναγκάζονται δὴ, οἴμαι, ἀμύνεσθαι, λέγοντες τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ πράττοντες ὅπη δύνανται, οὕτω δὴν ἀφαιροῦνται. Πώς γὰρ οὖ; Ἀιτίαν δὴ ἐσχον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτέρων, καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσι νεωτεριζεῖν, ἡς ἐπιβουλεύοντοι τῷ δήμῳ καὶ εἰσὶν ὀλυγαρχικοὶ. Τί μὴ; Οὔκοιν καὶ τελευτῶντες, ἐπειδὰν ὄρωσι τὸν δήμον

"That is the significance of πλούσιοι here, lit. "the rich."


e Cf. Isoc. viii. 13 τῶν τὰ τῆς πόλεως διανεμομένους.

little?” “The capitalistic class is, I take it, the name by which they are designated—the pasture of the drones.” “Pretty much so,” he said.

XVI. “And the third class, composing the 'people,' would comprise all quiet cultivators of their own farms who possess little property. This is the largest and most potent group in a democracy when it meets in assembly.” “Yes, it is,” he said, “but it will not often do that, unless it gets a share of the honey.” “Well, does it not always share,” I said, “to the extent that the men at the head find it possible, in distributing to the people what they take from the well-to-do, to keep the lion’s share for themselves?” “Why, yes,” he said, “it shares in that sense.

“And so, I suppose, those who are thus plundered are compelled to defend themselves by speeches in the assembly and any action in their power.” “Of course.” “And thereupon the charge is brought against them by the other party, though they may have no revolutionary designs, that they are plotting against the people, and it is said that they are oligarchs.” “Surely.” “And then finally, when they see the people, not of its own will but through


Whereto, when they shall know what men are rich.

They shall subscribe them for large sums of gold.

Cf. Inge, More Lay Thoughts of a Dean, p. 13.


Cf. Aristoph. supra on 562 b, p. 306, note b, Aeschines iii. 168, and 566 c μασοδημος. The whole passage perhaps illustrates the "disharmony" between Plato's upper-class sympathies and his liberal philosophy.

b i.e. reactionaries. Cf. supra on 562 b, p. 306, note b, Aeschines iii. 168, and 566 c μασοδημος. The whole passage perhaps illustrates the "disharmony" between Plato's upper-class sympathies and his liberal philosophy.

So the Attic orators frequently say that a popular jury was deceived. Cf. also Aristoph. Acharn. 515-516.
Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1110 a 1, in his discussion of voluntary and involuntary acts, says things done under compulsion or through misapprehension (δι' ἄγνωσιν) are involuntary.

For τὸν ἡδὴ cf. 569 a, Phaedo 87 e, Gorg. 527 d, Laches 181 d, 184 a, and on 550 a, p. 259, note i.

So Aristot. Pol. 1304 b 30 ἡμαγκάσθησαν συστατέας καταλύται τὸν δήμον, Isoc. xv. 318 ὀλυγαρχίαν ὀνειδίζωντες ... ἡμάγκασαν ὀμολόγου γενέσθαι ταῖς αἰτίαις.

Cf. 562 d, Eurip. Or. 772 προστάτας, Aristoph. Knights 1128. The προστάτης τοῦ δήμου was the accepted leader of the democracy. Cf. Dittenberger, S.I.G. 2nd ed. 1900, no. 476. 318
misapprehension, and being misled by the calumniators, attempting to wrong them, why then, whether they wish it or not, they become in very deed oligarchs, not willingly, but this evil too is engendered by those drones which sting them."

"Precisely." "And then there ensue impeachments and judgements and lawsuits on either side." "Yes, indeed." "And is it not always the way of a demos to put forward one man as its special champion and protector and cherish and magnify him?" "Yes, it is." "This, then, is plain," said I, "that when a tyrant arises he sprouts from a protectorate and from nothing else." "Very plain." "What, then, is the starting-point of the transformation of a protector into a tyrant? Is it not obviously when the protector's acts begin to reproduce the legend that is told of the shrine of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia?" "What is that?" he said. "The story goes that he who tastes of the one bit of human entrails minced up with those of other victims is inevitably transformed into a wolf. Have you not heard the tale?" "I have." "And is it not true that in like manner a leader of the people who, getting control of a docile mob, does not withhold his hand from the shedding of

The implications of this passage contradict the theory that the oligarchy is nearer the ideal than the democracy. But Plato is thinking of Athens and not of his own scheme. Cf. supra Introd. pp. xlv-xlvi.

* Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1310 b 14 ol πλείστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαρχών, etc., ibid. 1304 b 20 ff.


Note the difference of tone from 502 b. Cf. Phaedr. 260 c.
PLATO

ἐπαιτιώμενος, οία δὴ φιλοῦσιν, εἷς δικαστήρια ἀγων μαίνοντι, βίου ἀνδρὸς ἀφαιρήσων, γλώττῃ τε καὶ στόματι ἀνοσίω γενόμενος φόνον ἐγγενεύοις, 566 καὶ ἀναφηλατῇ καὶ ἀποκτυνὴ καὶ ὑποσημαίνῃ χρεῶν τε ἀποκοπᾶς καὶ γῆς ἀναδασμών, ἄρα τῶν τοιούτω ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἰμαρται ἡ ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἔχθρων ἡ τυραννεῖ καὶ λύκω ἐξ ἄνθρωπον γενέσθαι; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἐφη. Οὔτος δὴ, ἐφην, ὁ στασιάζων γίγνεται πρὸς τοὺς ἑχοντας τὰς οὐσίας. Οὔτος. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκπεσὼν μὲν καὶ κατελθὼν βία τῶν ἔχθρων τύραννοι ἀπειργασμένοις κατέρχεται; Δῆλον. Ἕαν δὲ ἀδύνατοι ἐκβαλλεῖν αὐτὸν ὡςν ἡ ἀποκτείναι διαβάλλοντες τῇ πόλει, βιαίῳ δὴ θανάτῳ ἐπιβουλεύοντο ἀποκτυνόναι λάθρα. Φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἡ δ' ὅσι, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι. Τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αὐτήμα τὸ πολυθρύλητον ἐπὶ τούτῳ πάντες οἱ εἰς τοῦτο προβεβηκότες ἐξευρίσκουσίν αὐτὲν τὸν δήμου φύλακάς τινας τοῦ σώματος, ἵνα σῶσ αὐτοῖς ἡ ὑ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός.

C Καὶ μάλ', ἐφη. Διδόσαι δὴ, οἴμαι, δείσαντες μὲν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου, θαρρήσαντες δὲ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν. Καὶ μάλα. Οὐκόν τοῦτο δὴν ἰδῇ ἀνὴρ χρήματα ἐχων

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a Cf. Pindar, Pyth. ii. 32; Lucan i. 331:
nullus semel ore receptus pollutas patitur sanguis mansuescere fauces.

b For ἀφανίζων cf. Gorg. 471 b.

c The apparent contradiction of the tone here with Laws 684 E could be regarded mistakenly as another “disharmony.” Grote iii. p. 107 says that there is no case of such radical measures in Greek history. Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. p. 374, says that the only case was that of Cleomenes at Sparta in the third century. See Georges Mathieu, Les Idées 320.
tribal blood, but by the customary unjust accusations brings a citizen into court and assassimates him, blotting out a human life, and with unhallowed tongue and lips that have tasted kindred blood, banishes and slays and hints at the abolition of debts and the partition of lands—is it not the inevitable consequence and a decree of fate that such a one be either slain by his enemies or become a tyrant and be transformed from a man into a wolf?" "It is quite inevitable," he said. "He it is," I said, "who becomes the leader of faction against the possessors of property." "Yes, he." "May it not happen that he is driven into exile and, being restored in defiance of his enemies, returns a finished tyrant?" "Obviously." "And if they are unable to expel him or bring about his death by calumniating him to the people, they plot to assassinate him by stealth." "That is certainly wont to happen," said he. "And thereupon those who have reached this stage devise that famous petition of the tyrant—to ask from the people a bodyguard to make their city safe for the friend of democracy." "They do indeed," he said. "And the people grant it, I suppose, fearing for him but unconcerned for themselves." "Yes, indeed." "And when he sees this, the man who has wealth and with his wealth...
καὶ μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων αὐτίαν μισόδημος εἶναι,
tότε δὴ οὕτως, ὥ ἔταϊρε, κατὰ τὸν Κροίσῳ
γενόμενον χρησμὸν

πολυψήφιδα παρ’ “Ερμον
φεύγει, οὔδε μένει, οὖθ’ αἰδεῖται κακὸς εἶναι.
Οὐ γὰρ ἄν, ἐφη, δεύτερον ἄθις αἰδεσθεὶ. Ὅ ὁ δὲ
γε, οἷμαι, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, καταληψθεὶς θανάτῳ δίδοται.
Ἀνάγκη. Ὅ δὲ δὴ προστάτης ἑκεῖνος αὐτὸς
dήλον δὴ ὅτι μέγας μεγαλωστὶ, οὐ κεῖται, ἀλλὰ
καταβαλὼν ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐστηκεν ἐν τῷ δίφρῳ
τῆς πόλεως, τῦραννος ἀντὶ προστάτου ἀποτετε-
λεσμένος. Τί δ’ οὐ μέλλει; ἐφη.

XVII. Διέλθωμεν δὴ τὴν εὐδαμονίαν, ἢν δ’
ἐγὼ, τοῦ τε άνδρός καὶ τῆς πόλεως, ἐν ἦ ἂν ὁ
τοιοῦτος βροτός ἐγγένηται; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη,
dιέλθωμεν. Ἄρ’ οὖν, εἴπον, οὐ ταῖς μὲν πρώταις
ἡμέραις τε καὶ χρόνῳ προσγελά τε καὶ ἀσπάζεται
πάντας, ὃ ἂν περιτυγχάνῃ, καὶ οὔτε τῦραννός
Εφησίων εἶναι, ὑπισχνεῖται τε πολλὰ καὶ ἱδία καὶ δη-
μοσία, χρεῶν τε ἡλευθέρωσε, καὶ γην διένειμε
δήμῳ τε καὶ τοῖς περὶ ἑαυτόν, καὶ πᾶσιν ἑλεώς τε
καὶ πρᾶος εἶναι προσποιεῖται; Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη.
Ὅταν δὲ γε, οἷμαι, πρὸς τοὺς ἑξω ἐχθροὺς τοῖς
μὲν καταλλαγῆ, τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρη, καὶ ἡσυχία
ἐκεῖνων γένηται, πρῶτον μὲν πολέμους τυνάς ἀεὶ
κινεῖ, ἦν ἐν χρείᾳ ἡγεμόνος ὁ δήμος ἃ. Εἰκός

3. 47, Andoc. iv. 16, and by contrast φιλόδημον, Aristoph.
Knights 787, Clouds 1187.
b Herod. i. 55.
c In II. xvi. 776 Cebriones, Hector’s charioteer, slain by
Patroclus, κεῖται μέγας μεγαλωστὶ, “mighty in his mightiness.”
(A. T. Murray, Loeb tr.)
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the repute of hostility to democracy, then in the words of the oracle delivered to Croesus,

By the pebble-strewn strand of the Hermos Swift is his flight, he stays not nor blushes to show the white feather.

"No, for he would never get a second chance to blush." "And he who is caught, methinks, is delivered to his death." "Inevitably." "And then obviously that protector does not lie prostrate, 'mighty with far-flung limbs,' in Homeric overthrow, but overthrowing many others towers in the car of state transformed from a protector into a perfect and finished tyrant." "What else is likely?" he said.

XVII. "Shall we, then, portray the happiness," said I, "of the man and the state in which such a creature arises?" "By all means let us describe it," he said. "Then at the start and in the first days does he not smile upon all men and greet everybody he meets and deny that he is a tyrant, and promise many things in private and public, and having freed men from debts, and distributed lands to the people and his own associates, he affects a gracious and gentle manner to all?"

"Necessarily," he said. "But when, I suppose, he has come to terms with some of his exiled enemies and has got others destroyed and is no longer disturbed by them, in the first place he is always stirring up some war so that the people may be in need of

a For the figure cf. Polit. 266 ε. More common in Plato is the figure of the ship in this connexion. Cf. on 488.

b Cf. Eurip. I.A. 333 ff., Shakes. Henry IV. Part I. i. iii. 246 "This king of smiles, this Bolingbroke."

Cf. my note on this passage in Class. Rev. xix. (1905) pp. 438-439, 573 δ έμοι άθεί, Theognis 56, Thuc. iv. 66 and viii. 64.

d Cf. Polit. 308 α, and in modern times the case of Napoleon.
567 ye. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἵνα χρήματα εἰσφέροντες πένητες
gυνόμενοι πρὸς τῷ καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀναγκάζωνται
εἶναι καὶ ἤττον αὐτῶ ἐπιβουλεύσων; Δήλον.
Καὶ ἂν γε τινας, οὕμαι, ὑποπτεύῃ ἐλεύθερα φρονή-
ματα ἔχοντας μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν αὐτῷ ἁρχεῖν, ὅπως
ἀν τούτοις μετὰ προφάσεως ἀπολλύῃ, ἐνδοὺς τοὺς
πολεμίους; τούτων πάντων ἕνεκα τυράννων ἂεὶ
ἀνάγκη πόλεμον ταράττειν; Ἀνάγκη. Ταῦτα δὴ
Β ποιοῦντα ἐτοιμον μᾶλλον ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς πολι-
ταῖς; Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; Οὐκοῦν καὶ τινας τῶν
ἐγκαταστησάντων καὶ ἐν δυνάμει ὄντων παρ-
ρησιάζεσθαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλους,
ἐπιπλήττοντας τοὺς γυνομένους, οἱ ἀν τυγχάνω-
σιν ἀνδρικότατοι ὄντες; Εἰκός γε. ᾿Υπεξιμεῦν
δὴ τούτοις πάντας δεῖ τὸν τύραννον, εἰ μέλλει
ἁρξεῖν, ἐως ἂν μὴτε φίλων μήτ᾽ ἐχθρῶν λίπη
μηδένα, ὅτου τι ὄφελος. Δήλον. ᾿Οξέως ἀρα δεῖ
C ὥσπερ αὐτὸν, τίς ἄνδρείος, τίς μεγαλόφρων, τίς
φρόνιμος, τίς πλούσιος· καὶ οὔτως εὐδαίμων ἐστίν,
ὡστε τούτοις ἄπασιν ἀνάγκη αὐτῶ, εἰτε βούλεται
εἰτε μή, πολεμίω εἶναι καὶ ἐπιβουλεῦειν, ἐως ἂν
καθήρη τῇ πόλιν. Καλὸν γε, ἔφη, καθαρμὸν:
Ναὶ, ἥν δ’ ἐγὼ, τὸν ἐναντίον ἣ οἱ ἰατροί τὰ σώματα·

\[\text{a} \quad \text{For ταράττειν in this sense cf. Dem. De cor. 151 ἐγκλήματα καὶ πόλεμος . . . ἐπαράξη, Soph. Antig. 795 νείκος . . . ταράξας.}

\[\text{b} \quad \text{ἐγκαταστησάντων is used in Aesch. Prom. 307 of those}

\[\text{who helped Zeus to establish his supremacy among the gods.}

\[\text{See also Xen. Ages. 2. 31, Isoc. Panegyr. 126.}

\[\text{c} \quad \text{Cf. Thucyd. viii. 70, Herod. iii. 80. ἄδη, as often in the}

\[\text{Timaeus, marks the logical progression of the thought. Cf.}

\[\text{Tim. 67 c, 69 a, 77 c, 82 b, and passim.}

\[\text{d} \quad \text{Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c. Aristotle says that in a}

\[\text{democracy ostracism corresponds to this. Cf. Newman i.}

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a leader.” “That is likely.” “And also that being impoverished by war-taxes they may have to devote themselves to their daily business and be less likely to plot against him?” “Obviously.” “And if, I presume, he suspects that there are free spirits who will not suffer his domination, his further object is to find pretexts for destroying them by exposing them to the enemy? From all these motives a tyrant is compelled to be always provoking wars?" “Yes, he is compelled to do so.” “And by such conduct will he not the more readily incur the hostility of the citizens?" “Of course.” “And is it not likely that some of those who helped to establish and now share in his power, voicing their disapproval of the course of events, will speak out frankly to him and to one another—such of them as happen to be the bravest?” “Yes, it is likely.” “Then the tyrant must do away with all such if he is to maintain his rule, until he has left no one of any worth, friend or foe.” “Obviously.” “He must look sharp to see, then, who is brave, who is great-souled, who is wise, who is rich; and such is his good fortune that, whether he wishes it or not, he must be their enemy and plot against them all until he purge the city. A fine purgation,” he said. “Yes,” said I, “just the opposite of that which physicians practise on our bodies. For

p. 262. For the idea that the tyrant fears good or able and outstanding men cf. Laws 832 c, Gorg. 510 b-c, Xen. Hiero 5. 1, Isoc. viii. 112, Eurip. Ion 626-628, Milton, Tenure of Kings, etc., init., Shakes., Richard II. iii. iv. 33 ff.:

Go thou, and like an executioner
Cut off the heads of too fast growing sprays
That look too lofty in our commonwealth.
All must be even in our government.

But cf. Pindar, Pyth. iii. 71, of Hiero, οὐ φθονέων ἄγαθοῖς.
oi μὲν γὰρ τὸ χείριστον ἀφαιροῦντες λείπουσι τὸ βέλτιστον, ὁ δὲ τοῦναντίον. Ὡς έοικε γὰρ, αὐτῷ, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, εἶπερ ἄρξει.

XVIII. Ἐν μακαρία ἀρα, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη δὲν ἔγερσεν, ἢ προστάττει αὐτῷ ἤ μετὰ φαύλων τῶν πολλῶν οἰκεῖν καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μισούμενον ἤ μὴ ἠξῆν. Ἐν τοιαύτῃ, ἢ δ' ὅσ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐχὶ, ὅσῳ ἄν μᾶλλον τοὺς πολίτας ἀπεχθάνηται ταῦτα δρῶν, τοσούτω πλείων καὶ πιστοτέρων δορυφόρων δείησαι; Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; Τίνες οὖν οἱ πιστοὶ, καὶ πόθεν αὐτοὺς μεταπέμψεται; Αὐτόματοι, ἔφη, πολλοὶ ἦξουσι πετόμενοι, εὰν τὸν μισθὸν διδό. Κηφήνας, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, νὴ τὸν κύνα, δοκεῖς αὐτὶ τινὰς Ἐ μοι λέγειν ξενικούς τε καὶ παντοδαποὺς. Ἀληθῆ γὰρ, ἔφη, δοκῶ σοι. Τι δέ; αὐτόθεν ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐθελήσεις; Πῶς; Τοὺς δούλους ἀφελόμενοι τοὺς πολίτας, ἐλευθερώσας, τῶν περὶ έαυτὸν δορυφόρων ποιήσασθαι. Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη· ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ πιστότατοι αὐτῷ οὔτοι εἰσών. Ἡ μακάριον, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις τυράννον χρήμα, εἰ τοιούτους φίλους τε καὶ 568 πιστοὺς ἀνδράσι χρήται, τοὺς προτέρους ἐκείνους ἀπολέσας. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, τοιούτους γε χρήται. Καὶ θαυμάζουσι δή, εἶπον, οὔτοι οἱ έταίροι αὐτὸν καὶ ξύνεισιν οἱ νέοι πολίται, οἱ δ' ἐπιεικεῖς μισοῦσι

1 τὶ δέ; αὐτόθεν Hermann, Adam: τὶς δὲ αὐτόθεν; AFDM: τὶ δὲ αὐτόθεν Mon. (without punctuation): τοὺς δὲ αὐτόθεν Stephanus.

ᵃ Cf. Laws 952 e, Rep. 467 d.
ᵇ Cf. the Scottish guards of Louis XI. of France, the Swiss guards of the later French kings, the Hessians hired by George III. against the American colonies, and the Asiatic in the Soviet armies.

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while they remove the worst and leave the best, he does the reverse." "Yes, for apparently he must," he said, "if he is to keep his power."

XVIII. "Blessed, then, is the necessity that binds him," said I, "which bids him dwell for the most part with base companions who hate him, or else forfeit his life." "Such it is," he said. "And would he not, the more he offends the citizens by such conduct, have the greater need of more and more trustworthy bodyguards?" "Of course." "Whom, then, may he trust, and whence shall he fetch them?" "Unbidden," he said, "they will wing their way to him in great numbers if he furnish their wage." "Drones, by the dog," I said, "I think you are talking of again, an alien and motley crew." "You think rightly," he said. "But what of the home supply, would he not choose to employ that?" "How?" "By taking their slaves from the citizens, emancipating them and enlisting them in his bodyguard." "Assuredly," he said, "since these are those whom he can most trust." "Truly," said I, "this tyrant business is a blessed thing on your showing, if such are the friends and 'trusties' he must employ after destroying his former associates." "But such are indeed those he does make use of," he said. "And these companions admire him," I said, "and these new citizens are his associates, while the better sort hate and avoid him."

c παντοδαπούς: cf. on 557 c.
a For αὐτόθεν cf. Herod. i. 64 τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στράτων, Thuc. i. 11, Xen. Ages. i. 28.
1 For the wretched lot of the tyrant cf. p. 368, note a.
te καὶ φεύγονσιν; Τί δ' οὗ μέλλουσιν; Οὐκ ἔτος,
ἡν δ' ἐγώ, ἥ τε τραγῳδία ὅλως σοφὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι
καὶ ὁ Ἐυριπίδης διαφέρων ἐν αὐτῇ. Τί δή; "Οτι
καὶ τούτῳ πυκνῆς διανοίας ἔχομενον ἐφθέγξατο,
Β ὁς ἅρα σοφοὶ τύραννοί εἰσι τῶν σοφῶν συνοισία.
καὶ ἔλεγε δῆλον ὅτι τούτους εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς οἶς
ξύνεστιν. Καὶ ὡς ισόθεον γ', ἐφη, τῆν τυραννίδα
ἐγκωμίζει, καὶ ἄτερα πολλά, καὶ οὕτος καὶ οἱ
ἀλλοί ποιηταί. Τοιγάρτοι, ἐφην, ἄτε σοφοὶ οὔτε
οἱ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιηταί ἔγγυγγυνόσκουσιν ἢμῶ
τε καὶ ἐκεῖνοι, ὥσοι Ἦμων ἔγγυς πολιτεύονται,
ὅτι αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ παραδεξόμεθα ὅτε
τυραννίδος ὑμνητάς. Οἶμαι ἔγωγ', ἐφη, ἔγγυγγω-
C σκουσιν ὅσοπερ γε αὐτῶν κομβοῖ. Εἰς δὲ γε,
οἶμαι, τὰς ἄλλας περιώντες πόλεις, ξυλλέγοντες
τοὺς όχλους, καλὰς φωνὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ πιθανὰς
μισθωσάμενοι εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ δημοκρατίας
ἔλκουσι τὰς πολιτείας. Μάλα γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ
προσέτι τούτων μισθούς λαμβάνουσι καὶ τιμῶνται,
μᾶλιστα μὲν, ὃσπερ τὸ εἰκός, ὑπὸ τυράννων,
δεύτερον δὲ ὑπὸ δημοκρατίας: ὅσω δ' ἂν ἀνωτέρω
ὡσι πρὸς τὸ ἀναντι τῶν πολιτεῶν, μᾶλλον
D ἀπαγορεύειν αὐτῶν ἡ τιμή, ὃσπερ ὑπὸ ἀσθματος
ἀδυνατοῦσα πορεύεσθαι. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

a For οὐκ ἔτος cf. 414 ε. The idiom is frequent in Aristoph.
Cf. e.g. Acharn. 411, 413, Birds 915, Thesm. 921, Plut. 404, 1166, Eccl. 245.
b This is plainly ironical and cannot be used by the
admirers of Euripides.
c Cf. πυκνὰὶ φρένες Iliad xiv. 294, πυκνὸς νῦσ xv. 41, etc.
d Cf. Theages 125 ν f. The line is also attributed to
Sophocles. Cf. Stemplinger, Das Plagiat in der griechi-
schen Literatur, p. 9; Gellius xiii. 18, F. Dümmler, Akademika, p. 16. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 119 thinks this an
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"Why should they not?" "Not for nothing," said I, "is tragedy in general esteemed wise, and Euripides beyond other tragedians." "Why, pray?" "Because among other utterances of pregnant thought he said, 'Tyrants are wise by converse with the wise.' He meant evidently that these associates of the tyrant are the wise." "Yes, he and the other poets," he said, "call the tyrant's power 'likest God's' and praise it in many other ways." "Wherefore," said I, "being wise as they are, the poets of tragedy will pardon us and those whose politics resemble ours for not admitting them into our polity, since they hymn the praises of tyranny." "I think," he said, "that the subtle minds among them will pardon us." "But going about to other cities, I fancy, collecting crowds and hiring fine, loud, persuasive voices, they draw the polities towards tyrannies or democracies." "Yes, indeed." "And, further, they are paid and honoured for this, chiefly, as is to be expected, by tyrants, and secondly by democracy. But the higher they go, breasting constitution hill, the more their honour fails, as it were from lack of breath unable to proceed." "Quite so."

allusion to Euripides and Agathon at the court of Archelaus of Macedon.

Isocrates ix. 40, like the poets, praises the tyrants, but ii. 3-5 contrasts their education unfavourably with that of the ordinary citizen. Throughout the passage he is plainly thinking of Plato.

* κοψοι is used playfully or ironically.
* Cf. Gorg. 502 b ff., Laws 817 c, and for the expression Protag. 347 D.
* Cf. Laches 183 A-B.
* Cf. Shakes. Ant. and Cleop. iii. x. 25 "Our fortune on the sea is out of breath."
XIX. Ἀλλὰ δὴ, εἶπον, ἑνταῦθα μὲν ἐξέβημεν· λέγωμεν δὲ πάλιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῦ τυράννου στρατόπεδον τὸ καλὸν τε καὶ πολὺ καὶ ποικίλον καὶ οὐδέποτε ταύτῶν, πόθεν θρέψεται. Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι, ἐάν τε ιερὰ χρήματα ἢ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ταῦτα ἀναλώσει ὅποι ποτέ ἀν ἄει ἔξαρκη, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀπολομένων,1 ελάττους εἰσφορᾶς ἀναγκάζων τὸν δῆμον Ἐ εἰσφέρειν. Τί δ' ὅταν δὴ ταύτα ἐπιλείπῃ; Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν πατρών θρέψεται αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ συμπόται τε καὶ ἑταῖροι καὶ ἑταῖραι. Μανθάνω, ἢν δ' ἔγω· ὅτι ὁ δῆμος ὁ γεννήσας τὸν τύραννον θρέψει αὐτὸν τε καὶ ἑταῖρους. Πολλὴ αὐτῷ, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη. Πῶς δὲ λέγεις; εἶπον· ἐὰν δὲ ἀγανακτῇ τε καὶ λέγῃ ὁ δῆμος, ὅτι οὔτε δίκαιον τρέφεσθαι ὑπὸ πατρὸς ὕδων ἤβαντα, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον ὑπὸ 569 υἱῶν πατέρα, οὔτε τούτου αὐτῶν ἔνεκα ἐγένησε τε καὶ κατέστησεν, ἡνα, ἐπειδὴ μέγας γένοιτο, τότε αὐτὸς δουλεύων τοῖς αὐτοῦ δούλοις τρέφοι ἐκεῖνὸν τε καὶ τοὺς δούλους μετὰ ἐξυγκλύδων ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἡνα ἀπὸ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλευθερωθεὶς ἐκεῖνον προστάντος, καὶ νῦν κελεύει ἀπιέναι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αὐτῶν τε καὶ τοὺς ἑταίρους, ὡσπερ πατήρ νῦν ἐξ οὐκίας μετὰ ὀχληρῶν ἐξυμπτών ἐξελαύνων; Γνώσεται γε, νη Δία, ἢ δ' ὡς, τὸτ' Β ἡδὴ ὁ δῆμος, οἶος οἰον θρέμα γεννῶν ἡστάξετο

1 καὶ τὰ Baiter, τὰ mss.; ἀπολομένων A2, ἀποδομένων AFDM, πωλουμένων ci. Campbell. See Adam, App. VI.

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a Cf. on 572 b, p. 339, note e.
b Cf. 574 d, Diels1 p. 578, Anon. Iambi. 3.
c Cf. Soph. O.T. 873 ὧβρις φυτεύει τύραννον.
"But this," said I, "is a digression. Let us return to that fair, multitudinous, diversified and ever-changing bodyguard of the tyrant and tell how it will be supported." "Obviously," he said, "if there are sacred treasures in the city he will spend these as long as they last and the property of those he has destroyed, thus requiring smaller contributions from the populace." "But what when these resources fail?" "Clearly," he said, "his father's estate will have to support him and his wassailers, his fellows and his she-fellows." "I understand," I said, "that the people which begot the tyrant will have to feed him and his companions." "It cannot escape from that," he said. "And what have you to say," I said, "in case the people protests and says that it is not right that a grown-up son should be supported by his father, but the reverse, and that it did not beget and establish him in order that, when he had grown great, it, in servitude to its own slaves, should feed him and the slaves together with a nondescript rabble of aliens, but in order that, with him for protector, it might be liberated from the rule of the rich and the so-called 'better classes,' and that it now bids him and his crew depart from the city as a father expels from his house a son together with troublesome revellers?" "The demos, by Zeus," he said, "will then learn to its cost what it is and what a creature it

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\(a\) For καλῶν κάγαθῶν cf. Aristoph. *Knights* 185, and Blaydes on 735. See also *supra* on 489 e, p. 27, note d.

\(b\) Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. *Clouds* 123.

\(c\) For the threatening \(γνώσεται\) cf. 362 a, 466 c, *Il.* xviii. 270 and 125, Theocr. xxvi. 19 \(τάχα γνώση\), and Lucian, *Timon* 33 \(εἰσεται\).

PLATO

te καὶ ἡγεῖ, καὶ ὅτι ἀσθενέστερος ὄν ἱσχυροτέρους ἐξελαίνει. Πῶς, ἢν δ' ἔγω, λέγεις; τολμήσει τὸν πατέρα βιαζοθαί, κἂν μὴ πείθηται, τόπτειν ὁ τύραννος; Ναὶ, ἔφη, ἀφελόμενός γε τὰ ὅπλα. Πατραλοίαν, ἢν δ' ἔγω, λέγεις τύραννον καὶ χαλεπὸν γηροτρόφον, καὶ ὡς ἐοικε τούτο δὴ ὁμολογομένη ἄν ἢδη τυραννὶς εἰη, καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον δὴμὸς φεύγων ἂν κατιόν δουλείας ἐλευθερών εἰς πῦρ δούλων δεσποτείας ἄν ἐμπετωτικῶς εἰη, ἀντὶ τῆς πολλῆς ἐκεῖνης καὶ ἀκαίρου ἐλευθερίας τὴν χαλεπωτάτην τε καὶ πικροτάτην δούλων δουλείαν μεταμπισχόμενος. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ταῦτα οὕτω γίγνεται. Τί οὖν; εἰπον· οὐκ ἐμμελῶς ἢμῖν εἰρήσεται, έάν φῶμεν ἰκανῶς διεληλυθέναι, ὡς μεταβαίνει τυραννίς ἐκ δημοκρατίας, γενομένη τε οἶα ἐστίν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἰκανῶς, ἔφη.

a Cf. infra on 574 c, pp. 346-347, note e.
begot and cherished and bred to greatness, and that in its weakness it tries to expel the stronger.” “What do you mean?” said I; “will the tyrant dare to use force against his father, and, if he does not yield, to strike him? ” “Yes,” he said, “after he has once taken from him his arms.” “A very parricide,” said I, “you make the tyrant out to be, and a cruel nurse of old age, and, as it seems, this is at last tyranny open and avowed, and, as the saying goes, the demos trying to escape the smoke of submission to the free would have plunged into the fire of enslavement to slaves, and in exchange for that excessive and unseasonable liberty has clothed itself in the garb of the most cruel and bitter servile servitude.” “Yes indeed,” he said, “that is just what happens.” “Well, then,” said I, “shall we not be fairly justified in saying that we have sufficiently described the transformation of a democracy into a tyranny and the nature of the tyranny itself?” “Quite sufficiently,” he said.

Library) εἰς δὲ μονάρχον δῆμος ἀνδρείᾳ δουλοσώφην ἐπέσευ, Herod. iii. 81 τυράννου ὕβριν φεύγοντας ἀνδρας ἐσ δήμου ἀκόλαστον ὕβριν πεσέων, and for the idea Epist. viii. 354 d.

Cf. Epist. viii. 354 d.

a For the rhetorical style cf. Tim. 41 ἀ θεοὶ θεῶν, Polit. 303 c σοφιστῶν σοφιστᾶς, and the biblical expressions, God of Gods and Lord of Lords, e.g. Deut. x. 17, Ps. cxxxvi. 2-3, Dan. xi. 36, Rev. xix. 16. Cf. Jebb on Soph. O.T. 1063 τρίδουλος.
571 I. Αὐτὸς δὴ λοιπὸς, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ τυραννικὸς ἀνὴρ σκέψασθαι, πῶς τε μεθίσταται ἐκ δημοκρατικοῦ, γενόμενός τε ποιῶς τίς ἐστι καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζῇ, ἀδιπτον ἢ μακάριον. Λοιπὸς γὰρ οὖν ἔτι οὗτος, ἐφη. Οἴοθ' οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ ποθῶ ἔτι; Τὸ ποίον; Τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, οἰαί τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰσίν, οὐ μοι δοκοῦμεν ἵκανῶς διηρήσθαι. τούτον δὴ Β ἐνδεὼς ἔχοντος, ἀσαφεστέρα ἐσται ἡ ζήτησις οὐ ζητοῦμεν. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅσ τ' ἐν καλῷ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν καὶ σκόπει γ' ὅ ἐν αὐταῖς βούλομαι ὕδειν. ἐστὶ δὲ τόδε. τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν δοκοῦσι τινὲς μοι εἶναι παράνομοι, αἱ κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ἐγγίγνεσθαι παντί, κολαζόμεναι δὲ ὑπὸ τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν βελτιών ἐπιθυμιῶν μετὰ λόγου ἐνίων μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἡ παντάπασιν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἢ ὀλύγα λείπεσθαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, C τῶν δὲ ἱσχυρότεραι καὶ πλείους. Λέγεις δὲ καὶ τίνας, ἐφη, ταύτας; Τὰς περὶ τὸν ὑπνόν, ἢν δ'


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b Cf. on 558 d.

c For κολαζόμεναι cf. on 559 b, p. 293, note c.

d Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1102 b 5 ff. ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς
BOOK IX

I. "There remains for consideration," said I, "the tyrannical man himself—the manner of his development out of the democratic type and his character and the quality of his life, whether wretched or happy." "Why, yes, he still remains," he said. "Do you know, then, what it is that I still miss?" "What?" "In the matter of our desires I do not think we sufficiently distinguished their nature and number. And so long as this is lacking our inquiry will lack clearness." "Well," said he, "will our consideration of them not still be opportune?" "By all means. And observe what it is about them that I wish to consider. It is this. Of our unnecessary pleasures and appetites there are some lawless ones, I think, which probably are to be found in us all, but which, when controlled by the laws and the better desires in alliance with reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of, or so nearly so that only a few weak ones remain, while in others the remnant is stronger and more numerous." "What desires do you mean?" he said. "Those," said I, "that are awakened in sleep when

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Hazlitt writes "We are not hypocrites in our sleep," a modern novelist, "In sleep all barriers are down."

The Freudians have at last discovered Plato's anticipation
of their main thesis. Cf. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, p. 74: “It has been perhaps Freud’s most remarkable thesis that dreams are manifestations of this emergence of desires and memories from the unconscious into the conscious field.” “The barriers of the Freudian unconscious are less tightly closed during sleep” senten-
tiously observes an eminent modern psychologist. Cf. Valentine, The New Psychology of the Unconscious, p. xiii. and ibid. p. 93: “Freud refers to Plato’s view that the virtuous man contents himself with dreaming that which the wicked man does in actual life, but I believe he nowhere shows a knowledge of the following passage in the Republic. . . .” Cf. ibid. p. 95: “The germ of several aspects of the Freudian view of dreams, including the characteristic doctrine of the censor, was to be found in Plato. The Freudian view becomes at once distinctly more respectable.”
the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavours to sally forth and satisfy its own instincts. a You are aware that in such case there is nothing it will not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of shame and all reason. It does not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother in fancy or with anyone else, man, god or brute. It is ready for any foul deed of blood; it abstains from no food, and, in a word, falls short of no extreme of folly b and shamelessness.” “Most true,” he said. “But when, I suppose, a man’s condition is healthy and sober, and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts, and attaining to clear self-consciousness, while he has neither starved nor indulged to repletion his appeti-

Many of the ancients, like some superstitious moderns, exalted the unconscious which reveals itself in dreams, and made it the source of prophecy. Cf. commentators on Aesch. Eumen. 104, Pindar, fr. 131 (96) Loeb, p. 589: εὖ δεὶ δὲ πρασόντων μελέων, ἀτὰρ εὐδόντεσσαν ἐν πολλοῖς ὄνειροι δείκυσι τέρπηνων ἐφέρσουσαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν, “but it sleepeth while the limbs are active; yet to them that sleep, in many a dream it giveth presage of a decision of things delightful or doleful.” (Sandys, Loeb tr.) Cf. Pausan. ix. 23, Cic. De div. i. 30, Sir Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, pp. 105-107 (ed. J. A. Symonds). Plato did not share these superstitions. Cf. the irony of Tim. 71 d-e, and my review of Stewart’s “Myths of Plato,” Journal of Philos. Psychol. and Scientific Methods, vol. iii., 1906, pp. 495-498.

a The Greeks had no good word for instinct, but there are passages in Plato where this translation is justified by the context for ἣθος, φύσις and such words.

b For the idiom οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει cf. Soph. Trach. 90, Demosth. liv. 34. Cf. also 602 ν and on 533 α, p. 200, note b.
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572 κομηθῇ καὶ μὴ παρέχῃ θόρυβον τῷ βελτίστῳ χαιρον ἣ λυπούμενον, ἀλλ' εὖ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μόνον καθαρὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ ὀρέγεσθαί του καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὁ μὴ οἶδεν, ἢ τι τῶν γεγονότων ἢ ὄντων ἢ καὶ μελλόντων, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς πραύνας καὶ μὴ τισιν εἰς ὀργὰς ἔλθων κεκυκνημένω τῷ θυμῷ καθεύδῃ, ἀλλ' ἑσυχάσας μὲν τῷ δύο εἴδη, τὸ τρίτον δὲ κινήσας, ἐν οὐ τὸ φρονεῖν ἐγγίγνεται, οὕτως ἀναπαύεται, οἷσθ' ὅτι τῆς τ' ἀληθείας ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ μάλιστα ἀπτεται καὶ Β ήκιστα παράνομοι τότε αἱ ὧσεις φαντάζονται τῶν ἐνυπνίων. Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, οἴμαι οὕτως. Ταύτα μὲν τοιύντι ἐπὶ πλέον εξῆκθημεν εἰπείν· ὁ δὲ βουλόμεθα γνώναι, τόδε ἔστιν, ὡς ἄρα δεινόν τι καὶ ἅγιον καὶ ἄνομον ἐπιθυμιῶν εἶδος ἐκάστῳ ἔνεστι, καὶ πάνυ δοκοῦσιν ἡμῶν ἐνίος μετρίως εἶναι τοῦτο δὲ ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοῖς γίγνεται ἐνδήλον. εἰ οὖν τί δοκῶ λέγειν καὶ ἐνυχωρεῖς, ἀθρεὶ. Άλλα ἐνυχωρῶ.

a Cf. Browning, Bishop Blougram's Apology, "And body gets its sop and holds its noise."

Plato was no ascetic, as some have inferred from passages in the Republic, Laws, Gorgias, and Phaedo. Cf. Herbert L. Stewart, "Was Plato an Ascetic?" Philos. Rev., 1915, pp. 603-613; Dean Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 90: "The asceticism of the true Platonist has always been sane and moderate; the hallmark of Platonism is a combination of self-restraint and simplicity with humanism."

b Cf. Ephesians iv. 26 "Let not the sun go down upon your wrath."

c έν τῷ τοιούτῳ: cf. 382 b, 465 λ, 470 c, 492 c, 590 λ, Lysis 212 c, Laws 625 d.

d This sentence contains 129 words. George Moore says, "Pater's complaint that Plato's sentences are long may be regarded as Pater's single excursion into humour." But 338
tive part, so that it may be lulled to sleep\(^a\) and not disturb the better part by its pleasure or pain, but may suffer that in isolated purity to examine and reach out towards and apprehend some of the things unknown to it, past, present or future; and when he has in like manner tamed his passionate part, and does not after a quarrel fall asleep\(^b\) with anger still awake within him, but if he has thus quieted the two elements in his soul and quickened the third, in which reason resides, and so goes to his rest, you are aware that in such case\(^c\) he is most likely to apprehend truth, and the visions of his dreams are least likely to be lawless."\(^d\) "I certainly think so," he said. "This description has carried us too far,\(^e\) but the point that we have to notice is this, that in fact there exists in every one of us, even in some reputed most respectable,\(^f\) a terrible, fierce and lawless brood of desires, which it seems are revealed in our sleep. Consider, then, whether there is anything in what I say, and whether you admit it." "Well, I do."

Pater is in fact justifying his own long sentences by Plato's example. He calls this passage Plato's evening prayer.

\(^a\) Plato always returns to the point after a digression. Cf. 543 c, 471 c, 544 b, 568 d, 588 b, Phaedo 78 b, Theaet. 177 c, Protag. 359 a, Crat. 438 a, Polit. 257 a-b, 263 c, 302 b, Laws 682 e, 697 c, 864 c, and many other passages. Cf. also Lysias ii. 61 ἀλλὰ τὰ υἱὰ μὲν ἐξήκοντα, Demosth. De cor. 211, Aristot. De an. 403 b 16, also p. 193, note i, and Plato's carefulness in keeping to the point under discussion in 353 c, Theaet. 152 c, 206 c, Meno 93 a-b, Gorg. 479 d-e, 459 c-d, etc.

\(^b\) For the irony of the expression cf. Laws 633 d, Aesch. Eumen. 373, and for the thought Othello iii. iii. 138:

who has a breast so pure
But some uncleanly apprehensions
Keep leets and law-days, and in session sit
With meditations lawful?
II. Τὸν τοίνυν δημοτικὸν ἀναμνήσθητι οἶνον

C ἐφαμεν εἶναι. ἢν δὲ ποι γεγονὼς ἐκ νέου ὑπὸ φειδωλῶ πατρὶ τεθραμμένος, τὰς χρηματιστικὰς ἐπιθυμίας τιμῶντι μόνας, τὰς δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίοις, ἀλλὰ παιδιὰς τε καὶ καλλωπισμοῦ ἕνεκα γεγονόμενα, ἀτμάζοντι. ἥ γὰρ; Ναὶ. Συγγενόμενος δὲ κομψότερος ἀνθράκι καὶ μεστὸς δὲν ἄρτι διήλθομεν ἐπιθυμίῶν, ὀρμήσας εἰς ύψιν τε πᾶσαν καὶ τὸ ἐκείνων εἶδος μίσει τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς φειδωλίας, φύσω δὲ τῶν διαφθειρόντων βελτίω ἔχων,

D ἀγόμενος ἀμφοτέρωσε κατέστη εἰς μέσον ἀμφοῖν τοῖς τρόποις, καὶ μετρίως δὴ, ὡς φέτο, ἐκάστων ἀπολαύων οὐτὲ ἀνελευθερον οὐτὲ παράνομον βίων ζῆ, δημοτικὸς εἰς ὀλγαρχικὸ γεγονός. Ἡν γὰρ, ἐφη, καὶ ἐστών αὐτή ἦ δόξα περὶ τὸν θουντον. Θέε τοίνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, πάλιν τοῦ τοιοῦτον ἄγ' προσβυτέρου γεγονότος νέον υἰόν ἐν τοῖς τούτοις αὐθ ἑδει τεθραμμένον. Τίθημι. Τίθει τοίνυν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα περὶ αὐτὸν γιγνόμενα, ἄπερ καὶ

Ε περὶ τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ, ἀγόμενον τε εἰς πᾶσαν παρανομίαν, ὁνομαζομένην δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγόντων ἐλευθερίαν ἄπασαν, βοηθοῦτα τε ταῖς ἐν μέσῳ ταύταις ἐπιθυμίασι πατέρα τε καὶ τούς ἄλλους οἰκείους, τοὺς δ' αὐθ ἐπαραβοηθοῦντας· ὅταν δ' ἐλπίσωσιν οἱ δεινοὶ μάγοι τε καὶ τυραννοποιοὶ στοι μὴ ἄλλως τὸν νέον καθέχειν, ἐρωτά τινα αὐτῷ μηχανωμένους ἐμπούησαι προστάτην τῶν

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a Cf. 559 d f.
b εἰς μέσον: cf. p. 249, note f.
c Ironical ὅ. See p. 300, note a. Cf. modern satire on "moderate" drinking and "moderate" preparedness.
d ὡς φέτο is another ironical formula like ἰνα ὅ, ὡς ἄρα, etc.

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II. "Now recall " our characterization of the democratic man. His development was determined by his education from youth under a thrifty father who approved only the acquisitive appetites and disapproved the unnecessary ones whose object is entertainment and display. Is not that so?" "Yes." "And by association with more sophisticated men, teeming with the appetites we have just described, he is impelled towards every form of insolence and outrage, and to the adoption of their way of life by his hatred of his father's niggardliness. But since his nature is better than that of his corrupters, being drawn both ways he settles down in a compromise between the two tendencies, and indulging and enjoying each in moderation, forsooth, as he supposes, he lives what he deems a life that is neither illiberal nor lawless, now transformed from an oligarch to a democrat." "That was and is our belief about this type." "Assume, then, again," said I, "that such a man when he is older has a son bred in turn in his ways of life." "I so assume." "And suppose the experience of his father to be repeated in his case. He is drawn toward utter lawlessness, which is called by his seducers complete freedom. His father and his otherkin lend support to these compromise appetites while the others lend theirs to the opposite group. And when these dread magi and king-makers come to realize that they have no hope of controlling the youth in any other way, they contrive to engender in

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* òtés: cf. Theaet. 191 c, Phileb. 33 d.
† This is the αβ of the succession of the generations. Cf. p. 247, note f.
‡ Cf. 539 E.
§ An overlooked reference to the Magi who set up the false Smerdis. Cf. Herod. iii. 61 ff.
573 ἀργῶν καὶ τὰ ἔτοιμα διανεμομένων ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὑπόπτερον καὶ μέγαν κηφήνα τινα. ἦ τὶ ἄλλο οἶει εἶναι τῶν τῶν τοιούτων ἔρωτα; Οὐδὲν ἔγνωγε, ἦ δὲ ὅς, ἄλλ' ἦ τοῦτο. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν περὶ αὐτῶν βομβοῦσαι ἀι ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμίαι, θυμιαμάτων τε γέμουσαι καὶ μύρων καὶ στεφάνων καὶ οἴνων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συνουσίαις ἡδονῶν ἀνειμένων, ἐπὶ τὸ ἐσχατον αὐξουσαι τε καὶ τρέφουσαι πόθου κέντρον ἐμπούσωσι τῷ κηφήνι, τότε δὴ Β δορυφορεῖται τε ὑπὸ μανιᾶς καὶ οἴστρα οὕτος ὁ προστάτης τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ἕαν τινας ἐν αὐτῷ δόξας ἡ ἐπιθυμίας λάβῃ ποιουμένας χρηστὰς καὶ ἐτὶ ἐπαισχυνομένας, ἀποκτείνει τε καὶ ἔξω ὡθεὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἐως ἢν καθήρη σωφροσύνης, μανιᾶς δὲ πληρώσῃ ἐπακτοῦ. Παντελῶς, ἐφη, τυραννικὸς ἄνδρος λέγεις γένεσιν. Ἀρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ πάλαι διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον τύραννος ὁ Ἐρως λέγεται: Κινδυνεύει, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν, ὃ φίλε, εἶπον, καὶ C μεθυσθείς ἀνὴρ τυραννικὸν τι φρόνημα ἠσχεῖ; Ἰσχει γάρ. Καὶ μὴν ὃ γε μανύμενος καὶ ὑποκεκυνηκὼς οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν ἐπιχειρεῖ τε καὶ ἐπὶ τίς δυνάτος εἶναι ἀρχεῖν. Καὶ μάλ', ἐφη. Τυραννικὸς δὲ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ

1 ή τι Λ: ή τι FDM. 2 μανίας FD: καὶ μανίας AM.

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*a Cf. Symp. 205 d.*
*b προστάτην: cf. 562 d and 565 c-d.*
*c For τὰ ἔτοιμα cf. 552 b, Symp. 200 d and e, and Horace, Odes i. 31. 17 "frui paratis."

τίς ἦν ὁ γράψας πρῶτον ἄνθρωπων ἀρα ἦ κηροπλαστήσας Ἐρωθ' ὑπόπτερον;

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his soul a ruling passion\(^a\) to be the protector\(^b\) of his idle and prodigal\(^c\) appetites, a monstrous winged\(^d\) drone. Or do you think the spirit of desire in such men is aught else?" "Nothing but that," he said. "And when the other appetites, buzzing\(^e\) about it, replete with incense and myrrh and chaplets and wine, and the pleasures that are released in such revelries, magnifying and fostering it to the utmost, awaken in the drone the sting of unsatisfied yearnings,\(^f\) why then this protector of the soul has madness for his bodyguard and runs amuck,\(^g\) and if it finds in the man any opinions or appetites accounted\(^h\) worthy and still capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges \(^i\) him of sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in from outside.\(^j\)" "A perfect description," he said, "of the generation of the tyrannical man." "And is not this analogy," said I, "the reason why Love has long since been called a tyrant?" "That may well be," he said. "And does not a drunken man,\(^l\) my friend," I said, "have something of this tyrannical temper?" "Yes, he has." "And again the madman, the deranged man, attempts and expects to rule over not only men but gods." "Yes indeed, he does," he said. "Then a man becomes

\(^a\) Cf. 564 D.
\(^b\) Cf. Phaedrus 253 E.
\(^c\) For οἰστρᾶ cf. Phaedr. 240 D.
\(^d\) For τοιούμενας in this sense cf. 538 C, 498 A, 574 D.
\(^e\) Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c.
\(^g\) Cf. 573 D, Eurip. Hippol. 538, Andromeda, fr. 136 (Nauck) θεών τύραννε . . . Ἐρως, and What Plato Said, p. 546 on Symp. 197 B.
\(^h\) For drunkenness as a tyrannical mood cf. Laws 649 B, 671 B, Phaedr. 238 B.
δαμόνε, ἀνὴρ ἀκριβῶς γίγνεται, ὅταν ἡ φύσει ἡ ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἡ ἀμφοτέρους μεθυστικός τε καὶ ἑρωτικὸς καὶ μελαγχολικὸς γένηται. Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.

ΠΛΑΤΟ

III. Γίγνεται μὲν, ὡς ἐσικερ, οὖτω καὶ τουοῦτος ἀνήρ. ζῆ δὲ δὴ πῶς; Τὸ τῶν παῖζοντων, ἐφη, 

D τοῦτο σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἔρεις. Λέγω δὴ, ἐφην. οἵμα 

γὰρ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἑορταί γίγνονται παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ κόμῳ καὶ θάλεια καὶ ἔταιραι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὅν ἂν "Ερως τύραννος ἐνδον οἰκῶν δια-

κυβερνᾷ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαντά. Ἄναγκη, ἐφη. 

"Αρ' οὖν οὐ πολλαὶ καὶ δεναὶ παραβλαστάνουσιν ἐπιθυμία ἡμέρας τε καὶ νυκτὸς ἐκάστης, πολλῶν δεόμεναι; Πολλαὶ μέντοι. Ταχὺ ἄρα ἀναλίσκον-

ται, ἕαν τινες ὅσι πρόσωδοι. Πῶς δ' οὖ; Καὶ μετὰ

Ε τοῦτο δὴ δανεισμοὶ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας παραρέσεις. 

Τι μὴν; "Ὅταν δὲ δὴ πάντ' ἐπιλείπῃ, ἄρα οὐκ 

ἀνάγκη μὲν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας βοῶν πυκνὰς τε καὶ 

σφοδρὰς ἐννεοτετευμένας, τοὺς δ' ὡσπερ ὑπὸ 

κέντρων ἑλαυνομένους τῶν τὲ ἄλλων ἐπιθυμῶν 

καὶ διαφερόντως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑρωτός, πάσαις ταῖς 

ἄλλαις ὡσπερ δορυφόρους ἤγουμένου, οὐστράν καὶ 

σκοπεῖν, τίς τι ἔχει, ὃν δυνατὸν ἀφελέσθαι ἀπατή-

574 σαντα ἡ βιασάμενον; Ἐρῳδρα γ', ἐφη. Ἀναγκαῖον 

δὴ πανταχόθεν φέρειν, ἡ μεγάλας ὁδίσι τε καί

a Cf. Adam ad loc., who insists it means his origin as well as that of others, and says his character is still to be described. But it has been in c and before.

b Cf. Phileb. 25 b and perhaps Rep. 427 e with 449 d. The slight jest is a commonplace to-day. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 351, says it is a fragment of an elegy. He forgets the Philebus.

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tyrannical in the full sense of the word, my friend," I said, "when either by nature or by habits or by both he has become even as the drunken, the erotic, the manical." "Assuredly."

III. "Such, it seems, is his origin and character, but what is his manner of life?" "As the wits say, you shall tell me." "I do," I said; "for, I take it, next there are among them feasts and carousals and revellings and courtesans and all the doings of those whose souls are entirely swayed by the indwelling tyrant Eros." "Inevitably," he said. "And do not many and dread appetites shoot up beside this master passion every day and night in need of many things?" "Many indeed." "And so any revenues there may be are quickly expended." "Of course." "And after this there are borrowings and levyings upon the estate?" "Of course." "And when all these resources fail, must there not come a cry from the frequent and fierce nestlings of desire hatched in his soul, and must not such men, urged, as it were by goads, by the other desires, and especially by the ruling passion itself as captain of their bodyguard—to keep up the figure—must they not run wild and look to see who has aught that can be taken from him by deceit or violence?" "Most certainly." "And so he is compelled to sweep it in from every

\[\text{Cf. Vol. I. p. 160, note a, on 373 a. Emendations are superfluous.}\]

\[\text{ Cf. Phaedr. 238 b-c.}\]

\[\text{ For παραπέσεις cf. Thuc. i. 122. 1, Aristot. Pol. 1311 a 12, 1315 a 38.}\]

οδύναις ευνέχεσθαι. Ἅναγκαίον. Ἄρ’ οὖν, ὡσπερ αἱ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδοναὶ ἐπιγιγνόμεναι τῶν ἀρχαίων πλέον εἰχον καὶ τὰ ἐκείνων ἀφηρούντο, οὖτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἀξίωσε νεώτερος ἃν πατρός τε καὶ μητρὸς πλέον ἔχειν καὶ ἄφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐὰν τὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος ἀναλώσῃ, ἀπονειμάμενος τῶν πατρών; Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; ἐφη. Ἀν δὲ δὴ αὐτῷ μὴ ἐπιτρέπωσιν, Β ἄρ’ οὐ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπιχειροῖ ἄν κλέπτειν καὶ ἀπατᾷν τοὺς γονέας; Πάντως. Ὅποτε δὲ μὴ δύνατο, ἀρπάζῃ ἄν καὶ βιάζοτο μετὰ τοῦτο; Οἴμαι, ἐφη. Ἀντεχομένων δὴ καὶ μαχομένων, ὃ θαυμάσθη, γέροντός τε καὶ γραῦς, ἄρ’ εὐλαβηθεὶς ἂν καὶ φείσατο μὴ τι δράσαι τῶν τυραννικῶν; Οὐ πάνυ, ἃ δ’ ὂς, ἔγωγε θαρρῶ περὶ τῶν γονέων τοῦ τοιούτου. Ἀλλ’, ὃ Ἀδείμαντε, πρὸς Δίος, ἐνεκα νεωστὶ φίλης καὶ οὐκ ἄναγκαίας ἑταίρας γεγονύιας C τὴν πάλαι φίλην καὶ ἄναγκαίαν μητέρα, ἢ ἐνεκα ὁφραίου νεωστὶ φίλου γεγονότος οὐκ ἄναγκαίον τὸν ἄωρόν τε καὶ ἄναγκαίον πρεσβύτην πατέρα καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀρχαίοτατον δοκεῖ ἂν σοι ὁ τοιοῦτος πληγαῖς τε δοῦναι καὶ καταδουλώσασθαι ἂν αὐτούς ὑπ’ ἐκείνους, εἰ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν οἰκίαν ἁγάγοιτο; Ναι μὰ Δί’, ἢ δ’ ὂς. Σφόδρα γε μακάριον, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἐοικεν εἶναι τὸ τυραννικὸν υἱὸν τεκεῖν. Πάνυ γ’, ἐφη. Τί δ’, ὅταν δὴ τὰ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς

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a Cf. Aesch. Eumen. 554.
b Cf. Gorg. 494 ο ὃ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυπώτα λυπᾶς.
d The word ἄναγκαίαν means both “necessary” and “akin.” Cf. Eurip. Androm. 671 τοιαύτα λάσκεις τοὺς ἄναγκαίους φίλους.
e For the idiom πληγαῖς . . . δοῦναι cf. Phaedr. 254 ε 346
source" or else be afflicted with great travail and pain." "He is." "And just as the new, upspringing pleasures in him got the better of the original passions of his soul and robbed them, so he himself, though younger, will claim the right to get the better of his father and mother, and, after spending his own share, to seize and convert to his own use a portion of his father's estate." "Of course," he said, "what else?" "And if they resist him, would he not at first attempt to rob and steal from his parents and deceive them?" "Certainly." "And if he failed in that, would he not next seize it by force?" "I think so," he said. "And then, good sir, if the old man and the old woman clung to it and resisted him, would he be careful to refrain from the acts of a tyrant?" "I am not without my fears," he said, "for the parents of such a one." "Nay, Adeimantus, in heaven's name, do you suppose that, for the sake of a newly found belle amie bound to him by no necessary tie, such a one would strike the dear mother, his by necessity and from his birth? Or for the sake of a blooming new-found bel ami, not necessary to his life, he would rain blows upon the aged father past his prime, closest of his kin and oldest of his friends? And would he subject them to those new favourites if he brought them under the same roof?" "Yes, by Zeus," he said. "A most blessed lot it seems to be," said I, "to be the parent of a tyrant son." "It does indeed," he said. "And again, when the resources of his father and mother are exhausted and

{o{d{na{c}s {e}d{a}kev} with Thompson's note. Cf. 566 c \thetaa\varpi\tau}\varphi {d\epsilon\deltaota\i}. For striking his father cf. supra 569 v, Laurence 880 ff., Aristoph. Clouds 1375 ff., 1421 ff.

\^ For \epsilonπιλειψη cf. 568 ε, 573 Ε.
D ἐπιλείπῃ τὸν τοιοῦτον, πολὺ δὲ ἦδη ἐξυνελεγμένον ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τὸ τῶν ἠδονῶν σμήνοις, οὐ πρῶτον μὲν οἰκίας των ἐφάνεται τοίχου ἢ τινος ὅψε νῦκτωρ ἱόντος τοῦ ἰματίου, μετά δὲ ταῦτα ἱερὸν τι νεωκορήσει; καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ πᾶσιν, ὅσ πάλαι εἶχε δόξας ἐκ παιδὸς περὶ καλῶν τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν, τὰς δικαίας ποιουμένας, αἰ νεωστὶ ἐκ δουλείας λειμέναι, δορυφοροῦσαι τὸν ἔρωτα, κρατήσουσι μετ' ἐκείνου, αἰ πρῶτοι μὲν ὄναρ ἐλύνετο ἐν ὑπνῷ. Ἐδὲ ἦν αὐτὸς ἐτὶ ὑπὸ νόμοις τε καὶ πατρὶ δημοκρατούμενος ἐν ἑαυτῷ· τυράννεθεῖς δὲ ὑπὸ ἐρωτὸς, οἷος ὀλιγάκις ἐγίγνετο ὄναρ, ὑπ' ὑπο τοιοῦτος ἄει γενόμενος, ὡς τῶν φόνου δεινοῦ ἀφεξεται οὕτε 575 βραβίας σωτ' ἐργο, ἀλλὰ τυραννικῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ ἔρως ἐν πάσῃ ἀναρχίᾳ καὶ ἀνομίᾳ ζῶν, ἀτε αὐτὸς ὁν μόνορχος, τὸν ἔχοντα τε αὐτὸν ὃσπερ πολὺν ἄξει ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τόλμαν, ὅθεν αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτὸν θόρυβον θρέψει, τὸν μὲν ἐξωθεὶν εἰσεληλυθότα ἀπὸ κακῆς ὁμιλίας, τὸν δ' ἐνδοθεὶν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἀνεθέντα καὶ ἐλευθερωθέντα. η ὤχ οὖτος ὁ βίος τοῦ τοιοῦτον; Οὖτος μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Καὶ ἂν μὲν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὀλίγοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι Β ἐν πόλει ὤσι καὶ τὸ ἄλλο πλῆθος σωφρονή.

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\(a\) Cf. Meno 72 ι, Cratyl. 401 ε, Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 297.
\(b\) He becomes a ταιχωρύχος or a λωποδύτης (Aristoph. Frogs 772-773, Birds 497, Clouds 1327). Cf. 575 β, Laws 831 ε.
\(c\) νεωκορήσει is an ironical litotes. So ἐφάνεται in the preceding line.
\(d\) For ποιουμένας cf. 573 β. For the thought cf. 538 c.

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fail such a one, and the swarm of pleasures collected in his soul is grown great, will he not first lay hands on the wall of someone's house or the cloak of someone who walks late at night, and thereafter he will make a clean sweep of some temple, and in all these actions the beliefs which he held from boyhood about the honourable and the base, the opinions accounted just, will be overmastered by the opinions newly emancipated and released, which, serving as bodyguards of the ruling passion, will prevail in alliance with it—I mean the opinions that formerly were freed from restraint in sleep, when, being still under the control of his father and the laws, he maintained the democratic constitution in his soul. But now, when under the tyranny of his ruling passion, he is continuously and in waking hours what he rarely became in sleep, and he will refrain from no atrocity of murder nor from any food or deed, but the passion that dwells in him as a tyrant will live in utmost anarchy and lawlessness, and, since it is itself sole autocrat, will urge the polity, so to speak, of him in whom it dwells to dare anything and everything in order to find support for himself and the hubbub of his henchmen, in part introduced from outside by evil associations, and in part released and liberated within by the same habits of life as his. Is not this the life of such a one? " "It is this," he said. "And if," I said, "there are only a few of this kind in a city, and the others, the multitude as a whole, are sober-

\* Cf. 567 \text{e}.
\* Cf. on 591 \text{e}.
\* τὸν ἕξοντα: cf. Phaedr. 239 \text{c}, Laws 837 \text{b}, Soph. Antig. 790 and also Rep. 610 \text{c} and \text{e}.
εξελθόντες άλλον τινα δορυφοροῦσι τύραννον ἡ μισθοῦ ἐπικουροῦσιν, ἐάν που πόλεμος ἦ· ἐάν δ' ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε καὶ ἴσης γένωνται, αὐτοῦ δὴ ἐν τῇ πόλει κακὰ δρῶσι σμικρὰ πολλά. Τὰ ποία δὴ λέγεις; Ὅλα κλέπτουσιν, τοιχωρυχοῦσι, βαλαντωτομοῦσι, λωποδυτοῦσιν, ἔροπολοῦσιν, ἀνδραποδίζονται· ἕστι δ' ὅτε συνοφαντοῦσιν, ἐὰν δυνατοὶ ὅσι λέγειν, καὶ ψευδομαρτυροῦσι καὶ δωροδοκοῦσιν. Σμικρά γ', ἔφη, κακὰ λέγεις, ἐὰν ὁλίγοι ύσων οἱ τοιοῦτοι. Τὰ γὰρ σμικρά, ἤν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ ἐστι, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα πρὸς τύραννον πονηρία τε καὶ ἀθλιότητι πόλεως, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐδ' ἕκταρ βάλλει. ὅταν γὰρ δὴ πολλοὶ ἐν πόλει γένωνται οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ ἕννεφόμενοι αὐτοῖς, καὶ αὐθωναὶ ἐναυτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, τότε οὕτωι εἰσώ οἱ τὸν τύραννον γεννώντες μετὰ δήμου ἄνοιας ἐκεῖνον, ὅσ ἂν αὐτῶν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτῷ μέγιστον καὶ πλεῖστον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τύραννον ἔχῃ. Εἰκότως γ', ἔφη: τυραννικῶτατος γὰρ ἂν εἶν. Οὕκοιν ἐὰν μὲν ἐκόντες ὑπείκωσιν· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπῃ η ἡ πόλις, ὅπερ τότε μητέρα καὶ πατέρα ἐκόλαξεν, οὕτω πάλιν τὴν πατρίδα, ἐὰν οἰός τ' ἦ, κολάσεται ἐπεισαγόμενος νέους ἑταίρους, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις δὴ δουλεύοισκαν τὴν πάλαι φίλην

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a Cf. the similar lists of crimes in Gorg. 508 ε, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 62.
b So Shaw and other moderns argue in a somewhat different tone that crimes of this sort are an unimportant matter.

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minded, the few go forth into exile and serve some tyrant elsewhere as bodyguard or become mercenaries in any war there may be. But if they spring up in time of peace and tranquillity they stay right there in the city and effect many small evils.” “What kind of evils do you mean?” “Oh, they just steal, break into houses, cut purses, strip men of their garments, plunder temples, and kidnap,” and if they are fluent speakers they become sycophants and bear false witness and take bribes.” “Yes, small evils indeed,” he said, “if the men of this sort are few.” “Why, yes,” I said, “for small evils are relatively small compared with great, and in respect of the corruption and misery of a state all of them together, as the saying goes, don’t come within hail of the mischief done by a tyrant. For when men of this sort and their followers become numerous in a state and realize their numbers, then it is they who, in conjunction with the folly of the people, create a tyrant out of that one of them who has the greatest and mightiest tyrant in his own soul.” “Naturally,” he said, “for he would be the most tyrannical.” “Then if the people yield willingly—’tis well,” but if the city resists him, then, just as in the previous case the man chastized his mother and his father, so now in turn will he chastize his fatherland if he can, bringing in new boon companions beneath whose sway he will hold and keep enslaved his once dear mother-

"οὐδ’ ἱκναρ βαλλει was proverbial, “doesn’t strike near,” “doesn’t come within range.” Cf. Aelian, N.A. xv. 29. Cf. also οὐδ’ ἐγείρει, Symp. 198 B, 221 D, Herod. ii. 121, Demosth. De cor. 97.

"In the Greek the apodosis is suppressed. Cf. Protag. 325 D. Adam refers to Herwerden, Mn. xix. pp. 338 f.
μητρίδα τε, Κρήτες φασί, καὶ πατρίδα ἐξεῖ τε καὶ
θρέψει: καὶ τούτο δὴ τὸ τέλος ἂν εἴη τῆς ἐπιθυμίας
Ε τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνδρός. Τούτο, ἢ δ' ὅς, παντάπασι
γε. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω γε τοιοῦτε γίγνονται
ιδία καὶ πρὶν ἄρχειν· πρῶτον μὲν οἷς ἀν ἔχοντων,
ἡ κόλαξιν ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντες καὶ πάν ἑτοίμως
576 ὑπηρετεῖν, ἢ εάν τοῦ τι δέωνται, αὑτοὶ ὑποτεσόν-
τες, πάντα σχήματα τολμῶντες ποιεῖν ὡς οἰκείοι,
διαπραξάμενοι δὲ ἄλλοτροι; Καὶ σφόδρα γε.
Ἐν παντὶ ἀρᾳ τῷ βίῳ ζῶσι φίλοι μὲν οὐδέποτε
οὐδενὶ, ἀεὶ δὲ τοῦ δεσπόζοντες ἡ δουλεύοντες
ἄλλω, ἐλευθερίας δὲ καὶ φιλίας ἄληθος τυραννικὴ
φύσις ἀεὶ ἀγευστος. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ἀρ' οὖν
οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν τοὺς τοιούτους ἀπίστους καλοῦμεν;
Πῶς δ' οὖ; Καὶ μὴν ἄδικος γε ὡς οἴον τε
Β μάλιστα, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὑμολο-
γήσαμεν περὶ δικαιοσύνης, οἶον ἑστίν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν,
ἡ δ' ὅς, ὀρθῶς γε. Κεφαλαιωσόμεθα τοῖσιν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ,
tὸν κάκιστον. ἔστι δὲ που, οἴον οὖν ἄτι-
ήλθομεν, δὲ ἂν ὑπαρ τοιοῦτος ἢ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
Οὐκοῦν οὕτως γίγνεται, δὲ ἂν τυραννικώτατος
φύσει ὡν μοναρχήσῃ, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν πλεῖον χρόνον ἐν
τυραννίδι βιῶ, τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον τοιοῦτος. Ἀνάγ-
κη, ἐφ' ἔθη διαδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον ὁ Γλαύκων.

* So also the Hindustan of Bengal, The Nation, July 13, 1911,
p. 28. Cf. Isoc. iv. 25 πατρίδα καὶ μητέρα, Lysias ii. 18
μητέρα καὶ πατρίδα, Plut. 792 e (An seni resp.) ἢ δὲ πατρίς
καὶ μητρίς ὡς Κρήτες καλοῦσι. Cf. Vol. I. p. 303, note e, on
414 e, Menex. 239 λ.
b Cf. the accidental coincidence of Swinburne's refrain,
"This is the end of every man's desire" (Ballad of Burdens).
c ὑποτεσόντες: cf. on 494 c ὑποκείσονται.
d σχήματα was often used for the figures of dancing. Cf.
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land—as the Cretans name her—and fatherland. And this would be the end of such a man's desire. "Yes," he said, "this, just this." "Then," said I, "is not this the character of such men in private life and before they rule the state: to begin with they associate with flatterers, who are ready to do anything to serve them, or, if they themselves want something, they themselves fawn and shrink from no contortion or abasement in protest of their friendship, though, once the object gained, they sing another tune." "Yes indeed," he said. "Throughout their lives, then, they never know what it is to be the friends of anybody. They are always either masters or slaves, but the tyrannical nature never tastes freedom or true friendship." "Quite so." "May we not rightly call such men faithless?" "Of course." "Yes, and unjust to the last degree, if we were right in our previous agreement about the nature of justice." "But surely," he said, "we were right." "Let us sum up," then," said I, "the most evil type of man. He is, I presume, the man who, in his waking hours, has the qualities we found in his dream state." "Quite so." "And he is developed from the man who, being by nature most of a tyrant, achieves sole power, and the longer he lives as an actual tyrant the stronger this quality becomes." "Inevitably," said Glaucon, taking up the argument.


Cf. Phaedr. 241 A ἄλλος γεγονός, Demosth. xxxiv. 13 ἐτερος ἡδη . . . καὶ οὐχ ὅ αὐτός.


Cf. Laws 730 c, 705 A.

Cf. Phaedr. 239 D ἐν κεφάλαιον.
IV. 'Αρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅς ἂν φαίνηται πονή- 
C ρότατος, καὶ ἀθλιώτατος φανήσεται; καὶ ὅς ἂν 
πλεῖστον χρόνον καὶ μάλιστα τυραννεύσῃ, μάλιστα 
τε καὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον τοιούτος γεγονός τῇ ἀλη-
θείᾳ; τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς πολλὰ καὶ δοκεῖ. Ἀνάγκη, 
ἔφη, ταῦτα γοῦν οὕτως ἔχειν. 'Ἀλλο τι οὖν, ἦν 
δ' ἐγώ, ὃ γε τυραννικός κατὰ τὴν τυραννουμένη 
πόλιν ἂν εἶχῃ ὁμοιότητι, δημοτικός δὲ κατὰ δημο-
kρατούμενην, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὕτως; Τῇ μή; Ὅπω-
σιν, ὃ τι πόλις πρὸς πόλιν ἄρετῇ καὶ εὐδαμονία, 
D τούτῳ καὶ ἀνήρ πρὸς ἄνδρα; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Τῇ 
οὖν ἄρετῇ τυραννουμένῃ πόλις πρὸς βασιλευομένην, 
οῖαν τὸ πρῶτον διήλθομεν; Πάν τούναντίον, ἔφη; 
ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρίστῃ, ἢ δὲ κακίστῃ. Οὐκ ἔρησομαι, 
ἐἶπον, ὅποτέραν λέγεις; δήλον γάρ; ἂλλ' εὐ-
dαμονίας τε αὕτη καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὤσαυτῷς ἢ ἄλλως 
κρίνεις; καὶ μὴ ἐκπληττόμεθα πρὸς τὸν τύραννον 
ἐνα ὄντα βλέποντες, μηδ' εἰ τινες ὀλίγοι περὶ 
ἐκεῖνον, ἂλλ' ὡς χρῆ ὀλην τὴν πόλιν εἰσελθόντας 
Εθεάσασθαι, καταδύντες εἰς ἄπασαν καὶ ἱδόντες 
οὕτω δόξαν ἀποφαινόμεθα. Ἀλλ' ὅρθως, ἔφη, 
προκαλεῖ; καὶ δήλον παντὶ, ὅτι τυραννουμένης μὲν 
οὐκ ἔστων ἀθλιωτέρα, βασιλευομένης δὲ οὖκ 

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a Cf. Gorgias 473 c-e.

b Cf. the defiance of 473 a and 579 ι καὶ εἶ μὴ τῷ δοκεῖ, 
Phaedr. 277 ε'o'd' ἂν ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος αὐτῷ ἐπανέσῃ, and Phileb. 
67 ν, also Gorg. 473 ε "you say what nobody else would 
say," and perhaps 500 δ διαβόλη δ' ἐν πάσι πολλῇ. Cf. 
Schopenhauer's "The public has a great many bees in its 
bonnet." 

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IV. "And shall we find," said I, "that the man who is shown to be the most evil will also be the most miserable, and the man who is most of a tyrant for the longest time is most and longest miserable a in sober truth? Yet the many have many opinions b."

"That much, certainly," he said, "must needs be true." "Does not the tyrannical man," said I, "correspond to the tyrannical state in similitude, the democratic to the democratic and the others likewise?" "Surely." "And may we not infer that the relation of state to state in respect of virtue and happiness is the same as that of the man to the man?"

"Of course." "What is, then, in respect of virtue, the relation of a city ruled by a tyrant to a royal city as we first described it?" "They are direct contraries," he said; "the one is the best, the other the worst." "I'll not ask which is which," I said, "because that is obvious. But again in respect of happiness and wretchedness, is your estimate the same or different? And let us not be dazzled d by fixing our eyes on that one man, the tyrant, or a few e of his court, but let us enter into and survey the entire city, as is right, and declare our opinion only after we have so dived to its uttermost recesses and contemplated its life as a whole." "That is a fair challenge," he said, "and it is clear to everybody that there is no city more wretched than that in which a tyrant rules, and none more happy than

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*a Tim. 75 d, Rep. 535 a, Parmen. 133 a. For the analogy of individual and state cf. on 591 e.
b Cf. 577 a, 591 d, 619 a áνέκπληκτος, Crat. 394 b, Gorg. 523 d, Protag. 335 b. Cf. also Epictet. iii. 22. 28 ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας περιλαμπουμένοις, and Shelley, "... accursed thing to gaze on prosperous tyrants with a dazzled eye."

c Cf. Tim. 75 d, Rep. 535 a, Parmen. 133 a. For the analogy of individual and state cf. on 591 e.
d Cf. 577 a, 591 d, 619 a áνέκπληκτος, Crat. 394 b, Gorg. 523 d, Protag. 335 b. Cf. also Epictet. iii. 22. 28 ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας περιλαμπουμένοις, and Shelley, "... accursed thing to gaze on prosperous tyrants with a dazzled eye."
e * ἐν τῖνες: cf. Gorg. 521 b ἐὰν τι ἔχω.
euδαιμονεστέρα. Ἄρι οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ περὶ 577 τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλούμενος ὀρθῶς ἄν προκαλοῦμην, ἀξίων κρίνειν περὶ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων, ὅσ δύναται τῇ διανοίᾳ εἰς ἀνδρὸς ἥθος ἐνδος διδεῖν, καὶ μὴ καθάπερ παῖς ἐξωθεὶν ὄροι ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν τυραννικῶν προστάσεως, ἢν πρὸς τοὺς ἐξω σχηματίζονται, ἀλλ' ἵκανως διορᾶ; εἰ οὖν οἰομμὴν δεῖν ἐκείνων πάντας ἥμας ἄκουειν, τοῦ δυνατοῦ μὲν κρίναι, ξυνωκηκότος δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ παραγεγονότος ἐν τε ταῖς κατ' οἰκίαν πράξεσιν, βῶς πρὸς ἐκάστους τοὺς οἰκείους ἔχει, ἐν οἷς μάλιστα γυμνὸς ἄν ὀφθείη τῆς τραγικῆς σκευής, καὶ ἐν αὖ τοῖς δημοσίοις κυνόνοις, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα ἰδόντα κελεύομεν ἐξαγέλλειν, πῶς ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὁ τύραννος πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους; Ὅρθοτατ' ἂν, ἐφή, καὶ ταῦτα προκάλοι. Βούλει οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, προσποιησώμεθα ἡμεῖς εἶναι τῶν δυνατῶν ἂν κρίναι καὶ ἑδη ἐντυχόντων τοιούτως, ἵνα ἔχωμεν ὅστις ἀποκρίνεται ὁ ἐρωτώμεν; Πάνυ γε.

C V. Ἡθὶ δή μου, ἐφήν, ὡδε σκόπει. τὴν ὅμοιο-

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*a* For the contrast of tyranny and kingdom cf. 587 b, Polit. 276 ε. It became a commonplace in later orations on the true king. *Cf.* Dümmler, Prolegomena, pp. 38-39.

*b* The word προστάσεως is frequent in Polybius. *Cf.* also Boethius iv. chap. 2. * Cf. 1 Maccabees xv. 32. *When he saw the glory of Simon, and the cupboard of gold and silver plate, and his great attendance [παράστασιν]."* *Cf.* also Isoc. ii. 32 ὅψων, and Shakes. Measure for Measure ii. ii. 59 “ceremony that to great ones 'longs," Henry V. iv. i. 280 “farced title running 'fore the king."


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that governed by a true king.⁴ "And would it not also be a fair challenge," said I, "to ask you to accept as the only proper judge of the two men the one who is able in thought to enter with understanding into the very soul and temper of a man, and who is not like a child viewing him from outside, overawed by the tyrants’ great attendance,⁵ and the pomp and circumstance which they assume in the eyes of the world, but is able to see through it all? And what if I should assume, then, that the man to whom we ought all to listen is he who has this capacity of judgement and who has lived under the same roof with a tyrant⁶ and has witnessed his conduct in his own home and observed in person his dealings with his intimates in each instance where he would best be seen stripped of his vesture of tragedy,⁷ and who had likewise observed his behaviour in the hazards of his public life—and if we should ask the man who has seen all this to be the messenger to report on the happiness or misery of the tyrant as compared with other men?" "That also would be a most just challenge," he said. "Shall we, then, make believe," said I, "that we are of those who are thus able to judge and who have ere now lived with tyrants, so that we may have someone to answer our questions?" "By all means."  

V. "Come, then," said I, "examine it thus. Re-

⁴ It is an easy conjecture that Plato is thinking of himself and Dionysius I. Cf. Laws 711 A.
⁵ Cf. Thackeray on Ludovicus and Ludovicus rex, Hazlitt, "Strip it of its externals and what is it but a jest?" also Gorg. 523 e, Xen. Ill. 52. 4, Lucian. Somnium seu Gallus 24 ἐν δὲ τὸν ῥήματος ἱδὼν τὰ γ’ ἐνδόν ..., Boethius. Cons. iii. chap. 8 (Loeb, p. 235), and for the thought Herod. i. 99.
PLATO

thta ánàmmunhstikómenos ths te póleos kai toû ándrós, oútw kath' ékaston en mérei áthrw, tâ plathmata ékateron lége. Tâ poia; éph. Prw- 
ton mév, ñn ð' égîw, wse pólon eîpeiv, éleuðeran h' 
doulh ùn tîn trpânnouménh ëreîs; 'Wz oîón t', éph, 
mâlìsta douîh. Kâi mîn õrâs ge en autih dêspó- 
tas kai éleuðérous. 'Orw, éph, sêmkrîn ge ti 
touto: to dê òlon, wse èpâs eîpeiv, en autih kai to 
épikeóstaton atimwse te kai áthlwos douîh. Ei 

Doûn, èîpou, ómouos ánêr tî pólê, ou kai en ékeîw 
ánâgkh tîn autîn tâzw èneînai, kai polîhîs mév 
doulieias te kai ánâleuðerías gémei thn ùsvkhî 
autou, kai taûta autîs tâ mërê doulieuev, ìpër 
hîn èpikeóstata, sêmkrîn dê kai to moxhîrótaton 
kai manikôtaton dêspôzewn; 'Anâgkh, éph. Tî 
ôun; doulhîn ñl éleuðeran tîn toiaûtîn phîseis 
eînai ùsvkhî; Doulhîn dê òn ìgomo. Ìnkoûn hî 
ge aî doulh kai trpânnoumênh pólîs ëkîosta poni 
a bouîleta; Polû ge. Kâi ël trpânnoumênh ãra 
E ùsvkhî ëkîosta poinseî à ãn boulhthî, wse peri òlhîs 
eîpeîn ùsvkhîs: ùpô dê òîtrou âei èlkîmênh bia ta- 
râkhîs kai metâmêleias mëstî ëstai. Pôs ãhô 
oû; Plousîan dê ël pênoumênh ánâgkh tîn tu- 
578 trpânnoumênh pólîn eînai; Pênoumênh. Kâi ùsvkhîn

a In Menex. 238 e Plato says that other states are com- 
posed of slaves and masters, but Athens of equals.
b For tàzw cf. 618 b ùsvkhî dê tàzw.
c gémei: cf. 544 c, 559 c, Gorg. 522 e, 525 a.
d Cf. 445 b, Gorg. 467 b, where a verbal distinction is

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call the general likeness between the city and the man, and then observe in turn what happens to each of them." "What things?" he said. "In the first place," said I, "will you call the state governed by a tyrant free or enslaved, speaking of it as a state?" "Utterly enslaved," he said. "And yet you see in it masters and freemen." "I see," he said, "a small portion of such, but the entirety, so to speak, and the best part of it, is shamefully and wretchedly enslaved." "If, then," I said, "the man resembles the state, must not the same proportion obtain in him, and his soul teem with boundless servility and illiberality, the best and most reasonable parts of it being enslaved, while a small part, the worst and the most frenzied, plays the despot?" "Inevitably," he said. "Then will you say that such a soul is enslaved or free?" "Enslaved, I should suppose." "Again, does not the enslaved and tyrannized city least of all do what it really wishes?" "Decidedly so." "Then the tyrannized soul—to speak of the soul as a whole—also will least of all do what it wishes, but being always perforce driven and drawn by the gadfly of desire it will be full of confusion and repentance." "Of course." "And must the tyrannized city be rich or poor?" "Poor." "Then the tyrant drawn with which Plato does not trouble himself here. In Laws 661β ἐπιβύμη is used. Cf. ibid. 688β τάναντια ταῖς βούλήσεις, and Herod. iii. 80.

* Cf. Cratyl. 392c ὡς τὸ δὲλον εἰπεῖν γένος.

† Cf. Julian, Or. ii. 50c. In the Stoic philosophy the stultus repents, and "omnis stultitia fastidio laborat sui." Cf. also Seneca, De bene/. iv. 34 "non mutat sapiens consilium . . . ideo numquam illum poenitentia subit," Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag. iii. 147. 21, 149. 20 and 33, Stob. Ec. ii. 113. 5, 102. 22, and my emendation of Eclogues ii. 104. 6 W. in Class. Phil. xi. p. 338.
ἀρα τυραννικὴν πειναρὰν καὶ ἀπληστὸν ἀνάγκη ἂεὶ εἶναι. Οὔτως, δὴ ὦς. Τί δέ; φόβου γέμειν ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὴν τε τοιαύτην πόλιν τὸν τε τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα; Πολλῆ γε. Ὅδυρμοις δὲ καὶ στεναγμοὺς καὶ θρήνους καὶ ἀλγηδόνας οἱ ἐν τινὶ ἄλλῃ πλείους εὐφήσειν; Ὅδαμώς. Ἐν ἄνδρὶ δὲ ἤρεῖ τὰ τοιαύτα ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ πλείῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ μανομένῳ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίων τε καὶ ἐρωτῶν τούτῳ τῷ τυραννικῷ; Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἐφη. Εἰς πάντα

Β δὴ, οἴμαι, ταῦτα τε καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα ἀποβλέψας τὴν γε πόλιν τῶν πόλεων ἀθλιωτάτην ἑκρυνας. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς; ἐφη. Καὶ μάλα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. ἄλλα περὶ τοῦ ἄνδρος αὐτοῦ τυραννικοῦ τί λέγεις εἰς ταῦτα ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων; Μακρῷ, ἐφη, ἀθλιωτατὸν εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. Τούτο, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκἐτ' ὀρθῶς λέγεις. Πῶς; ἢ δ' ὦς. Οὔπω, ἐφην, οἴμαι, οὕτως ἐστὶν ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα. Ἀλλὰ τὸς μὴν; Ὅδε ἢσως σοι ἔτι δόξει εἶναι

C τούτου ἀθλιώτερος. Ποίος; Ὅς ἄν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τυραννικὸς ὄν μὴ ἰδιωτὴν βίον καταβιῶ, ἄλλα δυστυχής ἢ καὶ αὐτῷ ὑπὸ τινὸς συμφορᾶς ἐκτορισθῇ ὡστε τυράννως γενέσθαι. Τεκμαίρομαι σε, ἐφη, ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Ναι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ· ἄλλ' οὐκ οἴσεις χρῆ τὰ τοιαύτα, ἄλλ' εὖ

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* Cf. Laws 832 a πεινῶσι τὴν ψυχήν, Xen. Symp. 4. 36 πεινῶσι χρημάτων, Oecon. xiii. 9 πεινῶσι γὰρ τοῦ ἐπαίνου, Aristot. Pol. 1277 a 24 "Jason said he was hungry when he was not a tyrant," Shakes. Tempest i. ii. 112 "so dry he was for sway." Cf. Novotny, p. 192, on Epist. vii. 335 b, also Max. Tyr. Diss. iv. 4 τι γὰρ ἄν εἰς πενιστερον ἄνδρος ἐπιθυμοῦντος διψεκὼς ...; Julian, Or. ii. 85 b, Teles (Hense), 360
soul also must of necessity always be needy and suffer from unfulfilled desire." "So it is," he said. "And again, must not such a city, as well as such a man, be full of terrors and alarms?" "It must indeed." "And do you think you will find more lamentations and groans and wailing and anguish in any other city?" "By no means." "And so of man, do you think these things will more abound in any other than in this tyrant type, that is maddened by its desires and passions?" "How could it be so?" he said. "In view of all these and other like considerations, then, I take it, you judged that this city is the most miserable of cities." "And was I not right?" he said. "Yes, indeed," said I. "But of the tyrant man, what have you to say in view of these same things?" "That he is far and away the most miserable of all," he said. "I cannot admit," said I, "that you are right in that too." "How so?" said he. "This one," said I, "I take it, has not yet attained the acme of misery." "Then who has?" "Perhaps you will regard the one I am about to name as still more wretched." "What one?" "The one," said I, "who, being of tyrannical temper, does not live out his life in private station but is so unfortunate that by some unhappy chance he is enabled to become an actual tyrant." "I infer from what has already been said," he replied, "that you speak truly." "Yes," said I, "but it is not enough to suppose such things. We must examine them thoroughly by pp. 32-33. For the thought see also Gorg. 493-494. Cf. also supra 521 a with 416 e, Phaedr. 279 c, and Epist. 355 c. 

*Cf. supra on 508 e, p. 104, note c.

*Cf. Protag. 355 a, Alc. I. 104 e, 579 c.

μάλα τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ σκοπεῖν. περὶ γάρ τοι
toι μεγίστου ἡ σκέψις, ἀγαθοῦ τε βίου καὶ κακοῦ.
'Ορθότατα, ἢ δ' ὅσ. Σκόπει δὴ, εἴ ἄρα τί λέγω.
D δοκεῖ γάρ μοι δεῖν ἐννοῆσαι ἐκ τῶν δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ
σκοποῦντας. 'Εκ τίνων; 'Εξ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου τῶν
ἰδιωτῶν, δόσι πλούσιοι ἐν πόλεσιν ἀνδράποδα
πολλὰ κέκτημεν. οὕτω γάρ τούτῳ γε προσόμοιον
ἐχονυ τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ πολλῶν ἀρχεῖν διαφέρει
δὲ τὸ ἐκείνου πλῆθος. Διαφέρει γάρ. Οἶσθ' οὖν
ὅτι οὕτω ἄδεις ἔχουσι καὶ οὐ φοβοῦνται τοὺς
οἰκέτας; Τί γάρ ἂν φοβοῦντο; Οὐδὲν, εἴπον·
ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτίνον ἐννοεῖς; Ναὶ, οὕτι γε πᾶσα ἡ πόλις
Ε ἐν ἐκάστῳ θοριθεῖ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν. Καλῶς, ἢν δ'
ἔγω, λέγεις. τί δὲ; εἴ τις θεών ἀνδρα ἐνα, ὅτω
ἐστιν ἀνδράποδα πεντήκοντα ἡ πλείω, ἄρας ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως αὐτῶν τε καὶ γυναίκα καὶ παῖδας θείας
ἐστίν ἐρμιαν μετὰ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τε καὶ τῶν
οἰκετῶν, ὅπως αὐτῷ μηδεὶς τῶν ἐλευθερων μέλλοι
θησείς, ἐν πολὺ ἂν τινι καὶ πόσῳ φόβῳ οἷει
γενέσθαι αὐτῶν περὶ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ παῖδων καὶ
γυναικὸς, μὴ ἀπόλοιπο υπὸ τῶν οἰκετῶν; 'Εν παντί, ἢ δ'
579 ὅσ, ἐγώγε. Οὐκοῦν ἀναγκάζοιτο ἂν τινας ἡδὴ
θυμεῖν αὐτῶν τῶν δουλῶν, καὶ ὑποσχεῖσθαι

1 On τῷ τοιούτῳ, the reading of the mss., see note a below.

a Adam ad loc. emends τῷ τοιούτῳ to τῷ τοιούτῳ, insisting that the ms. reading cannot be satisfactorily explained.


c Cf. Polit. 259 b. But Plato is not concerned with the question of size or numbers here.

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reason and an argument such as this. For our inquiry concerns the greatest of all things, the good life or the bad life.” “Quite right,” he replied. “Consider, then, if there is anything in what I say. For I think we must get a notion of the matter from these examples.” “From which?” “From individual wealthy private citizens in our states who possess many slaves. For these resemble the tyrant in being rulers over many, only the tyrant’s numbers are greater.” “Yes, they are.” “You are aware, then, that they are unafraid and do not fear their slaves?” “What should they fear?” “Nothing,” I said; “but do you perceive the reason why?” “Yes, because the entire state is ready to defend each citizen.” “You are right,” I said. “But now suppose some god should catch up a man who has fifty or more slaves and waft him with his wife and children away from the city and set him down with his other possessions and his slaves in a solitude where no free-man could come to his rescue. What and how great would be his fear, do you suppose, lest he and his wife and children be destroyed by the slaves?” “The greatest in the world,” he said, “if you ask me.” “And would he not forthwith find it necessary to fawn upon some of the slaves and make them

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d Plato’s imaginary illustration is one of his many anticipations of later history, and suggests to an American many analogies.

* Cf. Critias, fr. 37, Diels ii. p. 324, on Sparta’s fear of her slaves.

πολλὰ καὶ ἐλευθεροῦν οὐδὲν δεόμενος, καὶ κόλαξ
αὐτὸς ἂν θεραπόντων ἀναφανεῖ; Πολλὴ ἄναγκη,
ἐφη, αὐτῷ, ἥ ἀπολωλέναι. Τί δ’, εἰ καὶ ἄλλους,
ὅν δ’ ἐγὼ, οἱ θεὸς κύκλῳ κατοικίσεις γείτονας
πολλοὺς αὐτῷ, οἱ μὴ ἀνέχοντο, εἰ τις ἄλλος ἄλλον
dεσπόζετε αξιότε, ἀλλ’ εἰ ποὺ τών τοιοῦτον λαμ-
βάνοιεν, ταῖς ἐσχάταις τιμωροῦντο τιμωρίαις; "Ετι
Β ἂν, ἐφη, οἴμαι, μάλλον ἐν παντὶ κακοῦ εἰη, κύκλῳ
φρουροῦμενος ὑπὸ πάντων πολεμίων. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὖκ
ἐν τοιούτω μὲν δεσμωτηρίῳ δέδεται ὁ τύραννος,
φύσει ὁν οἰσι διεληλύθαμεν, πολλῶν καὶ παν-
tοδαπῶν φόβων καὶ ἔρωτων μεστός· λίχως δὲ
ὅτι αὐτῷ τῆς φυχῆς μόνῳ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖτε
ἀποδημήσαι ἔξεστιν οὐδαμῶς οὔτε θεωρῆσαι ὅσων
δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐλευθεροὶ ἐπιθυμηταὶ εἰςι, κατα-
dεδυκῶς δὲ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς γυνὴ ζῆ,
ὑπὸ φθονῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, εάν τις ἐξω
ἀποδημῇ καὶ τι ἀγαθὸν ὅρᾳ; Παντάπασι μὲν
οὖν, ἐφη.

VI. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς πλεῖώ καρ-
ποῦται ἀνήρ, δς ἂν κακῶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ πολιτευόμενος,
ὅν νῦν δὴ σὺ ἀθλιώτατον ἐκρίνας, τὸν τυραννικὸν,

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a For the idiom οὐδὲν δεόμενος cf. 581 ε, 367 λ-β, 410 β,
405 c, Prot. 331 c, and Shorey in Class. Journ. ii. p. 171.
b For ancient denials of the justice of slavery cf. Newman,
Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 140 ff., Philemon, fr. 95 (Kock ii. p. 508)
καὶ δούλοις ἐστ, σάρκα τήν αὐτήν ἔχει, φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δούλος
ἐγενήθην ποτέ. η δ’ αὖ τύχῃ τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο, and Anth.
Pal. vii. 553 with Mackail’s note, p. 415.
c Cf. p. 360, note a. For the tyrant’s terrors cf. Menander,
Ἄσσίς (fr. 74, Kock iii. p. 24), Tacitus, Ann. vi. 6, 579 ε
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many promises and emancipate them, though nothing would be further from his wish. And so he would turn out to be the flatterer of his own servants.”

“He would certainly have to,” he said, “or else perish.” “But now suppose,” said I, “that god established round about him numerous neighbours who would not tolerate the claim of one man to be master of another, but would inflict the utmost penalties on any such person on whom they could lay their hands.” “I think,” he said, “that his plight would be still more desperate, encompassed by nothing but enemies.” “And is not that the sort of prison-house in which the tyrant is pent, being of a nature such as we have described and filled with multitudinous and manifold terrors and appetites? Yet greedy and avid of spirit as he is, he only of the citizens may not travel abroad or view any of the sacred festivals that other freemen yearn to see, but he must live for the most part cowering in the recesses of his house like a woman, envying among the other citizens anyone who goes abroad and sees any good thing.” “Most certainly,” he said.

VI. “And does not such a harvest of ills measure the difference between the man who is merely ill-governed in his own soul, the man of tyrannical temper, whom you just now judged to be most miserable, and the man who, having this disposition,

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† C. Laws 781 c, Gorg. 485 d.

τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς is the measure of the excess of the unhappiness of the actual tyrant over that of the tyrannical soul in private life. Cf. my review of Jowett, A.J.P. xiii. p. 366.
PLATO

µή ὃς ἰδιώτης καταβιώ, ἄλλ' ἀναγκασθῇ ύπό τῶν τύχης τυραννεύσαι, καὶ ἔαυτον ὃν ἀκράτωρ ἄλλων ἐπιχειρήσῃ ἄρχειν, ὡσπερ εἰ τις κάμνοντι σώματι καὶ ἀκράτορι ἐαυτοῦ µή ἰδιωτεύων ἄλλ' ἀγωνιζό-

D μενὸς πρὸς ἄλλα σώματα καὶ µαχόμενος ἀναγκὰ-

ζουτο διάγειν τὸν βίον. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ὁµού-

τατά τε καὶ ἀληθεύτατα λέγεις, οὐ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ φίλε Γλαύκων, παντελῶς τὸ

πάθος ἀθλιον, καὶ τοῦ ύπο σοῦ κριθέντος χαλεπώ-

τατα ζήν χαλεπώτερον ἐτι ζῆ ὁ τυραννῶν; Κομιδὴ

γ', ἔφη. Ἡ Εστιν ἁρα τῇ ἀληθεία, καὶ εἰ µὴ τῷ

δοκεῖ, ο τῷ ὄντι τύραννος τῷ ὄντι δούλος τᾶς

Εμεγίστας θωπείας καὶ δουλείας καὶ κόλαζ τῶν

πονηροτάτων καὶ τᾶς ἐπιθυμίας οὐδ' ὀπωσδοῖν

ἀποσπασμάς, ἄλλα πλεῖστων ἐπιδεέστατος καὶ

πένης τῇ ἀληθείᾳ φαίνεται, ἐὰν τις ὀλην ψυχὴν

ἐπίστηται θεάσασθαι, καὶ φόβου γέμων διὰ παντὸς

tοῦ βίου, σφαδασμῶν τε καὶ ὀδυνῶν πλῆρης, εἴπερ

tῇ τῆς πόλεως διαθέσει ἦς ἀρχεῖ ἐσουκεν. ἐσουκε δὲ-

580 ἢ γάρ; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τού-

tοὺς ἐτι ἀποδώσομεν τῷ ἄνδρι καὶ ὁ τὸ πρότερον

eἰπομεν, ὥτι ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐτι µᾶλλον

γίνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ πρότερον διὰ τὴν ἄρχην φθο-

νερῷ, ἀπίστῳ, ἀδίκῳ, ἀφίλῳ, ἀνοσίῳ, καὶ πάσης

κακίας πανδοκεί τε καὶ τροφεῖ, καὶ ἕξ ἀπάντων

a Cf. infra 580 c and What Plato Said, p. 506, on Gorg. 491 d.

b For the analogy of soul and body cf. 591 b and on 564 b, p. 313, note g.

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does not live out his life in private station but is constrained by some ill hap to become an actual tyrant, and while unable to control himself\(^a\) attempts to rule over others, as if a man with a sick and incontinent body \(^b\) should not live the private life but should be compelled to pass his days in contention and strife with other persons? \(^c\) "Your analogy is most apt and true, Socrates," he said. "Is not that then, dear Glaucon," said I, "a most unhappy experience in every way? And is not the tyrant's life still worse than that which was judged by you to be the worst?" "Precisely so," he said. "Then it is the truth, though some may deny it,\(^d\) that the real tyrant is really enslaved to cringings and servitudes beyond compare, a flatterer of the basest men, and that, so far from finding even the least satisfaction for his desires, he is in need of most things, and is a poor man in very truth, as is apparent if one knows how to observe a soul in its entirety; and throughout his life he teems with terrors and is full of convulsions and pains, if in fact he resembles the condition of the city which he rules; and he is like it, is he not?" "Yes, indeed," he said. "And in addition, shall we not further attribute to him all that we spoke of before, and say that he must needs be, and, by reason of his rule, come to be still more than he was,\(^e\) envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, a vessel and nurse\(^f\) of all iniquity, and so in consequence be

\(^a\) Cf. Soph. 252 c ὅμοιον τε καὶ ἄληθές.
\(^b\) Cf. on 576 c, p. 354, note b.
\(^c\) Cf. 576 b-c.
\(^d\) Cf. Aristoph. Wasps 35 φαλαινα πανδοκείτρια, "an all-receptive grampus" (Rogers).
On the wretched lot of the tyrant cf. Xen. Hiero passim, e.g. 4. 11, 6. 4, 8, 15. The Hiero is Xenophon’s rendering of the Socratico-Platonic conception of the unhappy tyrant. Cf. 1. 2-3. See too Gerhard Heintzeler, Das Bild des Tyrannen bei Platon, esp. pp. 43 ff. and 76 f.; Cic. De amicit. 15, Isoc. Nic. 4-5, Peace 112, Hel. 32 ff. But in Euag. 40 Isocrates says all men would admit that tyranny “is the greatest and noblest and most coveted of all good things, both human and divine.” In Epist. 6. 11 ff. he agrees with Plato that the life of a private citizen is better than the tyrant’s. But in 2. 4 he treats this as a thesis which many maintain. Cf. further Gorg. 473 ε, Ale. I. 135 ϊ, Phaedr. 248 ε, Symp. 182 c, Eurip. Ion 621 ff., Suppl. 429 ff., Medea 119 ff., I.A. 449-450, Herodotus iii. 80, Soph. Ajax 1350 “not easy for a tyrant to be pious”; also Dio Chrys. 368
himself most unhappy and make all about him so?"

"No man of sense will gainsay that," he said. "Come then," said I, "now at last, even as the judge of last instance pronounces, so do you declare who in your opinion is first in happiness and who second, and similarly judge the others, all five in succession, the royal, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical man." "Nay," he said, "the decision is easy. For as if they were choruses I judge them in the order of their entrance, and so rank them in respect of virtue and vice, happiness and its contrary." "Shall we hire a herald, then," said I, "or shall I myself make proclamation that the son of Ariston pronounced the best man and the most righteous to be the happiest, and that he is the one who is the most kingly and a king over himself; and declared that the most evil and most unjust is the most unhappy, who again is the man who, having the most of the tyrannical temper in himself, becomes most of a tyrant over himself and over the state?" "Let it have been so proclaimed by you," he said. "Shall I add the clause 'alike whether their character

Or. iii. 58 f., Anon. Iambl. fr. 7. 12, Diels ii. p. 333, J. A. K. Thomson, Greek and Barbarian, pp. 111 ff., Dümmler, Prolegomena, p. 31, Baudrillart, J. Bodin et son temps, pp. 292-293 "Bodin semble ... se souvenir de Platon fiétrissant le tyran. . . ."

Adam has an exhaustive technical note on this.


Plato puns on the name Ariston. For other such puns cf. Gorg. 463 ɛ, 481 δ, 513 β, Rep. 600 β, 614 β, Symp. 174 β, 185 ɛ, 198 ɛ.


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πάντας ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ θεούς; Προσαναγόρευε, ἐφη.

VII. Ἐλευθήρως: 'Επειδή, ὃσπερ πόλις, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, διάρρηκται κατὰ τρία εἴδη, οὕτω καὶ ψυχή ἐνὸς ἐκάστου τριχῆ, [τὸ λογιστικὸν] ¹ δέξεται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔτεραν ἀπόδειξιν. Τίνα ταύτην; Τήνδε. τριών ὁντών τριτταί καὶ ἱδοναὶ μοι φαίνονται, ἐνὸς ἐκάστου μία ἱδία· ἐπιθυμίᾳ τε ὡσαύτως καὶ ἄρχαι. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐφη. Τὸ μὲν, φαμέν, ἢν ὁ μανθάνει ἀνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ ὁ θυμόντα, τὸ δὲ τρίτον διὰ πολυειδίαν ἐνὶ ὁυκ ἐσχομεν ὀνόματι προσειπεῖν ἱδίως αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ δ’ ἡγιστον καὶ ἅσχυρότατον εἰχεν ἐν αὐτῷ, τούτω ἐπώνομάσαςμεν· ἐπιθυμητικόν γὰρ αὐτὸ κεκληκαμεν διὰ σφοδρότητα τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐνωθήν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ πόσων καὶ ἄφροδισία καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτως ἀκόλουθα, καὶ φιλοχρήματον δή, ὅτι διὰ χρημάτων μάλιστα ἀποτελοῦνται αἱ τοιαῦται ἐπιθυμίαι. Καὶ ὁρθῶς γ’, ἐφη. ‘Αρ’ οὖν καὶ τῇν ἱδονήν αὐτοῦ καὶ φιλίαι εἰ φαίμεν εἰ νὰ εἰναι τοι ἔρευνος, μάλιστ’ ἀν εἰς

¹ δὲ ίδε Adam: δὲ δὲ AFDM: δὲ δὲ mss. recc.
² τὸ λογιστικὸν Α, λογιστικὸν Α²FDM, λογιστικὸν ἐπιθυμητικὸν θυμικὸν Par. 1642: omitted by more recent mss.

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is known to all men and gods or is not known?"
"Add that to the proclamation," he said.
VII. "Very good," said I; "this, then, would be one of our proofs, but examine this second one and see if there is anything in it." "What is it?"
"Since," said I, "corresponding to the three types in the city, the soul also is tripartite, it will admit, I think, of another demonstration also." "What is that?"
"The following: The three parts have also, it appears to me, three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each, and similarly three appetites and controls." "What do you mean?" he said. "One part, we say, is that with which a man learns, one is that with which he feels anger. But the third part, owing to its manifold forms, we could not easily designate by any one distinctive name, but gave it the name of its chief and strongest element; for we called it the appetitive part because of the intensity of its appetites concerned with food and drink and love and their accompaniments, and likewise the money-loving part, because money is the chief instrument for the gratification of such desires."
"And rightly," he said. "And if we should also say that its pleasure and its love were for gain or profit,


\[ e \] Here again the concept is implied (cf. supra on 564 b, p. 313, note e and Introd. pp. x-xi). Cf. Parmen. 132 c, 135 b, Phileb. 16 d, 18 c-d, 23 e, 25 c, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1130 b 2 ἐν ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν, and εἰς ἐν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδομέθα, 581 a, Schleiermacher's interpretation of which, "so würden wir uns in der Erklärung doch auf ein Hauptstück stützen," approved by Stallbaum, misses the point. For the point that there is no one name for it cf. What Plato Said, p. 596, on Soph. 267 d.

\[ f \] Vol. I. 439 d.

\[ g \] Cf. Vol. I. p. 380, note b.
Since there is no one specific name for the manifold forms of this part (580 d-e), a makeshift term is to be used for convenience’ sake. See also p. 371, note e.

Or “is bent on,” τεταται. Cf. 499 a ἤτειν . . . τὸ ἀληθὲς συντεταμένος, Symp. 222 a and Bury ad loc., Symp. 186 b ἐπὶ πάν ὁ θεὸς τεῖναι. For the thought cf. also Phileb. 58 d.

Cf. Phaedo 61 b τῶς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς.

Cf. 338 d, 342 c.

Cf. my review of Jowett in A.J.P. xiii. p. 366, which Adam quotes and follows and Jowett and Campbell (Republic) adopt. For the three types of men cf. also Phaedo 68 c, 82 c. Stewart, Aristot. Eth. Nic. p. 60 (1095 b 17), says, “The
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should we not thus best bring it together under one head in our discourse so as to understand each other when we speak of this part of the soul, and justify our calling it the money-loving and gain-loving part?" "I, at any rate, think so," he said. "And, again, of the high-spirited element, do we not say that it is wholly set on predominance and victory and good repute?" "Yes, indeed." "And might we not appropriately designate it as the ambitious part and that which is covetous of honour?" "Most appropriately." "But surely it is obvious to everyone that all the endeavour of the part by which we learn is ever towards knowledge of the truth of things, and that it least of the three is concerned for wealth and re-putation." "Much the least." "Lover of learning and lover of wisdom would be suitable designations for that." "Quite so," he said. "Is it not also true," I said, "that the ruling principle of men's souls is in some cases this faculty and in others one of the other two, as it may happen?" "That is so," he said. "And that is why we say that the primary classes of men also are three, the philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the lover of gain." "Precisely so." "And also that there are three forms of pleasure, corresponding respectively


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Oισθ' οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι εἰ θέλοις τρεῖς τοιούτους ἀνθρώπους ἐν μέρει ἐκαστὸν ἀνερωτάν, τίς τούτων τῶν βίων ἢδιστος, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἐκαστὸς μάλιστα ἐγκωμιάσεται; ὃ γε1 χρηματιστικὸς πρὸς

Πὸ κερδαίνεις τὴν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τοῦ μανθάνειν ὁδεγνός ἄξιαν φήσει εἶναι, εἰ μὴ εἰ τι αὐτῶν ἀργύριον ποιεῖ; Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Τι δὲ ὁ φιλότιμος; ἢν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ἡδονὴν φορτικὴν τυα ἥγεται, καὶ ἀδ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μανθάνειν, ὃ τι μὴ μάθημα τιμην φέρει, καπνὸν καὶ φλυαρίαν; Ὁυτως, ἔφη, ἔχει. Τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τι οἰώμεθα τὰς ἄλλας

Ε ἡδονὰς νομίζειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδέναι τάληθες ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἀεὶ εἶναι μανθάνοντα; τῆς ἡδονῆς2 οὐ πάνιν πόρρω, καὶ καλεῖν τῷ ὁντι

1 ὁ γε Hermann, followed by Adam, δ τε mss.
2 τῆς ἡδονῆς punctis notata in Α, secl. Baiter: ... μανθάνοντα τῆς ἡδονῆς; οὐ ... Adam.

* For εν μέρει cf. 468 b, 520 c and d, 577 c, 615 a, Gorg. 496 b, Laws 876 b, 943 a, 947 c, Polit. 265 a; contrasted with εν τῷ μέρει, Meno 92 ε, Gorg. 462 a, 474 a.

The two expressions, similar in appearance, illustrate how a slight change alters an idiom. So e.g. καὶνὸν οὐδὲν (Gorg. 448 a) has nothing to do with the idiom οὐδὲν καὶνὸν (Phaedo 100 b); τοῦ λόγου ἐνεκα (Rep. 612 c) is different from λόγου ἐνεκα (Theaet. 191 c—dicis causa); πάντα τάγαθα (Laws 631 b) has no connexion with the idiomatic πάντ' ἀγαθὰ (Rep. 471 c, cf. supra ad loc.); nor Pindar's πολλ' ἀνω τὰ δ' αὐ κάτω (Ol. xii. 6) with ἀνω κάτω as used in Phaedo 96 b, Gorg. 481 d, etc. Cf. also ἐν τέχνῃ Prot. 319 c with ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ 317 c, νῦ ἔχειν Rep. 490 a with ἐν νῦ ἔχειν 344 d, etc., τοῦ παντὸς ἡμάρτηκεν Phaedr. 235 ε with παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν 237 c. The same is true of words—to confuse καλλίχρωσις with καλλίχρωσις would be unfortunate; and the medieval debates about ὀμοιονσία and ὀμοιονσία were perhaps not quite as ridiculous as they are generally considered.

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to each?" "By all means." "Are you aware, then," said I, "that if you should choose to ask men of these three classes, each in turn, which is the most pleasant of these lives, each will chiefly commend his own? The financier will affirm that in comparison with profit the pleasures of honour or of learning are of no value except in so far as they produce money." "True," he said. "And what of the lover of honour?" said I; "does he not regard the pleasure that comes from money as vulgar and low, and again that of learning, save in so far as the knowledge confers honour, mere fume and moonshine?" "It is so," he said. "And what," said I, "are we to suppose the philosopher thinks of the other pleasures compared with the delight of knowing the truth and the reality, and being always occupied with that while he learns? Will he not think them far removed from true pleasure, and call them literally?"

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\( ^{b} \) Cf. *Laws* 658 on judging different kinds of literature.

\( ^{c} \) Cf. p. 255, note f, on 549 A. Xenophon is the typical φιλότιμος. In *Mem*. iii. 3. 13 he says that the Athenians "excel all others... in love of honour, which is the strongest incentive to deeds of honour and renown" (Marchant, Loeb tr.). *Cf. Epist*. 320 a, *Symp*. 178 d, and also Xen. *Cyrop*. i. 2. 1, *Mem*. iii. i. 10.

\( ^{d} \) Cf. *Aristot. Eth. Nic*. 1095 b 16, and *supra* on 528 e.


\( ^{f} \) Cf. *Phileb*. 58 c on dialectic.

\( ^{g} \) Cf. 598 b, *Epist*. iii. 315 c, Marc. Aurel. viii. 1 πόρος φιλοσοφίας. Hermann’s text or something like it is the only idiomatic one, and τῆς ἱδονῆς οὐ πάνω πόρος must express the philosopher’s opinion of the pleasurableness of the lower pleasures as compared with the higher. Cf. *A.J.P*. xiii. p. 366.

\( ^{h} \) For the infinitive cf. 492 c καὶ φήσειν, 530 b καὶ ἔστειν.

\( ^{i} \) τὸ δέντρο marks the etymological use of ἀναγκαίας. Cf. on 511 b and 551 e, p. 266, note a.
änagkaïas, ὡς οὗδὲν τῶν ἄλλων δεόμενοι, εἰ μὴ ἀνάγκη ἢ; Ἐκ, ἥφη, δεὶ εἰδέναι.

VIII. "Οτε δὴ οὖν, εἶπον, ἀμφισβητοῦνται ἑκά-στου τοῦ εἶδους αἱ ἡδοναί καὶ αὐτῶς ὁ βίος, μὴ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἰσχρόν ἔην μηδὲ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ ἁμείνον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἡδον καὶ ἀλυ-

582 πότερον, πῶς ἂν εἰδείμεν, τίς αὐτῶν ἁληθέστατα λέγει; Οὐ πάνυ, ἥφη, ἠγώγη ἢχῳ εἰπεῖν. 'Ἀλλ' ὥδε σκόπει. τίνι χρὴ κρίνεσθαι τὰ μέλλοντα καλῶς κριθήσεσθαι; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ
φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ; ἢ τούτων ἠχοι ἂν τὶς βέλτιον κριτήριον; Καὶ πῶς ἂν; ἥφη. Σκόπει δὴ· τριῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀνδρῶν τίς ἐμπειρότατος πασῶν ἢν εἴπομεν ἡδονῶν; πότερον ὁ φιλοκερδῆς, μανθάνων αὐτήν τὴν ἁλήθειαν οἷον ἔστιν, ἐμπειρότερος δοκεῖ
Β σοι εἶναι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡδονῆς, ἢ ὁ φιλό-
σοφος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κερδαίνει; Πολὺ, ἥφη, δια-
φέρει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη γεῦσθαι τῶν ἐτέρων ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξαμένης τῷ δὲ φιλοκερδεῖ, ὅπη πέ-
φυκε τὰ ὄντα μανθάνοντι, τῆς ἡδονῆς ταύτης, ὡς
γλυκεία ἔστω, οὐκ ἀνάγκη γεῦσθαι οὐδ' ἐμπειρῷ
gιγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ προθυμουμένως οὐ βάδιον.
Πολὺ ἀρα, ἢν δ' ἑγὼ, διαφέρει τοῦ γε φιλοκερ-
δοῦς ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐμπειρίᾳ ἀμφιτέρων τῶν ἡδονῶν.
C Πολὺ μέντοι. Τὶ δὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου; ἄρα μᾶλλον

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\(^{a}\) Cf. 558 d f.

\(^{b}\) This anticipates Laws 663 a, 733 a-b, 734 a-b.

\(^{c}\) i.e. what is the criterion? Cf. 582 d δ' οὖ, Sext. Empir. Bekker, p. 60 (Pyrhr. Hypotyp. ii. 13-14) and p. 197 (Adv. Math. vii. 35). Cf. Diog. L. Prologue 21, and Laches 184 e. For the idea that the better soul is the better judge cf. also Laws 663 c, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1176 a 16-19.

\(^{d}\) Cf. 582 d, On Virtue 373 d, Xen. Mem. iii. 3. 11.

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the pleasures of necessity, since he would have no use for them if necessity were not laid upon him?" "We may be sure of that," he said.

VIII. "Since, then, there is contention between the several types of pleasure and the lives themselves, not merely as to which is the more honourable or the more base, or the worse or the better, but which is actually the more pleasurable or free from pain, how could we determine which of them speaks most truly?" "In faith, I cannot tell," he said. "Well, consider it thus: By what are things to be judged, if they are to be judged rightly? Is it not by experience, intelligence and discussion? Or could anyone name a better criterion than these?" "How could he?" he said. "Observe, then. Of our three types of men, which has had the most experience of all the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think that the lover of gain by study of the very nature of truth has more experience of the pleasure that knowledge yields than the philosopher has of that which results from gain?" "There is a vast difference," he said; "for the one, the philosopher, must needs taste of the other two kinds of pleasure from childhood; but the lover of gain is not only under no necessity of tasting or experiencing the sweetness of the pleasure of learning the true natures of things, but he cannot easily do so even if he desires and is eager for it." "The lover of wisdom, then," said I, "far surpasses the lover of gain in experience of both kinds of pleasure." "Yes, far." "And how does he compare with the lover of honour? Is he more un-

άπειρός ἦστι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἠδονῆς ἢ ἐκεῖνος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν. Ἄλλα τιμῇ μὲν, ἐφη, ἕνανταν ἐξεργάζωνται ἐπὶ οὗ ἐκαστὸς ὄρμηκε, πάσιν αὐτοῖς ἔπεται καὶ γὰρ ὁ πλούσιος ὑπὸ πολλῶν τιμᾶται καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείας καὶ ὁ σοφός, ὡστε ἀπὸ γε τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οἷῶν ἦστι, πάντες τῆς ἠδονῆς ἐμπειροῦν. τῆς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος θέας, οἷῶν ἠδονὴν ἔχει, ἀδύνατον ἄλλως γεγενότας πλήρως τῷ φιλοσόφῳ.

D'Εμπειρίας μὲν ἄρα, εἶπον, ένεκα κάλλιστα τῶν ἀνδρῶν κρίνει οὖτος. Πολύ γε. Καὶ μὴν μετὰ γε φρονήσεως μόνον ἐμπειροὺς γεγονός ἦσται. Τί μὴν; Ἄλλα μὴν καὶ δ' οὗ γε δὲι ὀργάνου κρίνεσθαι, οὗ τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦστο τοῦτο ὀργανὸν οὐδὲ τοῦ φιλοτιμοῦν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ φιλοσόφου. Τὸ ποίον; Διὰ λόγων που ἐφαμεν δεῖν κρίνεσθαι. ἢ γὰρ; Ναι. Λόγοι δὲ τούτου μάλιστα ὀργανὸν. Πῶς δ' οὗ; Οὐκόν εἰ μὲν πλοῦτω καὶ κέρδει ἄριστα ἐκρίνετο

Ετὰ κρινόμενα, δ' ἐπήνει τὸ φιλοκερδῆς καὶ ἐφεσεν, ἀνάγκη ἄν ἦν ταύτα ἀληθεστάτα εἶναι. Πολλῆ γε. Εἴ δὲ τιμῇ τε καὶ νίκῃ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ, ἄρ' οὖχ αὐτὸς τὸ φιλότιμός τε καὶ τὸ φιλόνικος; Δήλον. 'Επειδὴ δ' ἐμπειρία καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγω; Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, δ' τὸ φιλόσοφὸς τε καὶ τὸ φιλόλογος ἔταμεν, 583 ἀληθεστάτα εἶναι. Τρίῳν ἄρ' οὐσῶν τῶν ἠδονῶν ἡ τούτου τοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς μανθάνομεν, ἡδίστη ἄν εἰῇ, καὶ ἐν ὃ ἦμῶν τοῦτο ἀρχεῖ, ὃ

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a For the periphrasis γεγονός ἦσται cf. Charm. 174 d ἀπολευκατός ἦσται.

b Cf. 508 b, 518 c, 527 d.

c Cf. on 582 a, p. 376, note d.

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acquainted with the pleasure of being honoured than that other with that which comes from knowledge?"

"Nay, honour," he said, "if they achieve their several objects, attends them all: for the rich man is honoured by many and the brave man and the wise, so that all are acquainted with the kind of pleasure that honour brings; but it is impossible for anyone except the lover of wisdom to have savoured the delight that the contemplation of true being and reality brings." Then," said I, "so far as experience goes, he is the best judge of the three." "By far." "And again, he is the only one whose experience will have been accompanied by intelligence." "Surely." "And yet again, that which is the instrument, or ὑπάρχων, of judgement is the instrument, not of the lover of gain or of the lover of honour, but of the lover of wisdom." "What is that?" "It was by means of words and discussion that we said the judgement must be reached; was it not?" "Yes." "And they are the instrument mainly of the philosopher." "Of course." "Now if wealth and profit were the best criteria by which things are judged, the things praised and censured by the lover of gain would necessarily be truest and most real." "Quite necessarily." "And if honour, victory and courage, would it not be the things praised by the lover of honour and victory?" "Obviously." "But since the tests are experience and wisdom and discussion, what follows?" "Of necessity," he said, "that the things approved by the lover of wisdom and discussion are most valid and true." "There being, then, three kinds of pleasure, the pleasure of that part of the soul whereby we learn is the sweetest, and the life of the man in whom that part dominates is the most pleasur-
The third cup of wine was always dedicated to Zeus the Saviour, and τρίτος σωτήρ became proverbial. Cf. Charm. 167 λ, Phileb. 66 δ, Laws 692 Α, 960 c, Epist. vii. 334 δ, 340 λ. Cf. Hesychius s.v. τρίτος κρατήρ. Brochard, La Morale de Platon, missing the point, says, "Voici enfin un troisième argument qui paraît à Platon le plus décisif puisqu’il l’appelle une victoire vraiment olympique." For the idea of a contest cf. Phileb. passim.


c Cf. Phileb. 52 καθαράς ἔδωκαί, and 53 καθαρά λύπης.
able.” “How could it be otherwise?” he said. “At any rate the man of intelligence speaks with authority when he commends his own life.” “And to what life and to what pleasure,” I said, “does the judge assign the second place?” “Obviously to that of the warrior and honour-loving type, for it is nearer to the first than is the life of the money-maker.” “And so the last place belongs to the lover of gain, as it seems.” “Surely,” said he.

IX. “That, then, would be two points in succession and two victories for the just man over the unjust. And now for the third in the Olympian fashion to the saviour and to Olympian Zeus—observe that other pleasure than that of the intelligence is not altogether even real or pure, but is a kind of scene-painting, as I seem to have heard from some wise man; and yet this would be the greatest and most decisive overthrow.” “Much the greatest. But what do you mean?” “I shall discover it,” I said, “if you will answer my questions while I seek.” “Ask, then,” he said. “Tell me, then,” said I; “do we not say that pain is the opposite of pleasure?” “We certainly do.” “And is there not such a thing as a neutral state?” “There is.” “Is it not intermediate be-

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4 Cf. Laws 663 c, Phaedo 69 v, supra 365 c, 523 v, 602 d, 586 b, Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 266.
5 One of Plato's evasions. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 513, on Meno 81 a, Phileb. 44 b. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 266 misses the point and says that by the wise man Plato means himself.
6 For this rhetorical kairos cf. 360 c, 376 b, 433 b, 440 d, Gorg. 452 e, Laws 663 e, 690 c.
8 If any inference could be drawn from the fact that in the Philebus 42 d ff. and 32 e the reality of the neutral state has to be proved, it would be that the Philebus is earlier, which it is not.
ταξύ τούτων ἀμφότην ἐν μέσῳ δὲν ἦσυχίαν τινὰ περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ψυχῆς; ἦ δ’ οὖχ οὕτως αὐτὸ λέγεις; Ὁυτώς, ἦ δ’ οὐς. 'Αρ’ οὐ μνημονεύεις, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τοὺς τῶν καμνώντων λόγους, οὐς λέγουσιν ὅταν καμνώσων; Ποίους; 'Ως οὐδέν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἢδιον τοῦ ὑγιαίνει, ἀλλὰ σφάς ἔλελήθηε, πρὶν κάμνων, ἢδιστον ὄν. Μέμνημαι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν περιμενία τινὶ ἐχομένων ἄκουεις λεγόντων, ὥσ οὐδέν ἢδιον τοῦ παύσασθαι ὄιδωμένοιν; Ἀκοῦω. Καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις γε, οἶμαι, πολλοὶς τοιοῦτοις αἰσθάνει γιγνομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἐν οἷς, ὅταν λυπώνται, τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἦσυχίαν τοῦ τοιοῦτον ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ὡς ἢδιστον, οὐ τὸ χαίρειν. Τούτῳ γάρ, ἔφη, τότε ἢδυ ίσως καὶ ἀγαπητὸν

Ε γίγνεται, ἦσυχία. Καὶ ὅταν παύσηται ἄρα, εἶπον, χαίρων τις, ἦ τῆς ἢδονῆς ἦσυχία λυπηρὸν ἐσται. Ἦιας, ἔφη. 'Ὁ μεταξύ ἄρα νῦν δὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἐφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἦσυχίαν, τούτο όποτε ἀμφότερα ἐσται, λύπη τε καὶ ἢδονή. Ἡ άρκ τοῦ ὑμάτον τὸ μιθέτρεα δὲν ἀμφότερα γίγνεσθαι; Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ἢδυ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενοι καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κινησίς τις ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν; 584 ἤ οὐ; Ναὶ. Τὸ δὲ μὴτε λυπηρὸν μὴτε ἢδυ οὐχ ἦσυχία μέντοι καὶ ἐν μέσῳ τούτων ἐφανῇ ἄρτη; Ἠφάνη γάρ. Πῶς οὖν ὅρθως ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν ἢδυ ἥγεισθαι ἢ τὸ μὴ χαίρειν ἀνιαρὸν; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄρα τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ φανεται, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ,

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a For ἐν μέσῳ cf. Phileb. 35 ε.
c Cf. Phileb. 43 ε, Hipp. Maj. 300 b f.

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between them, and in the mean, being a kind of quietude of the soul in these respects? Or is not that your notion of it?" "It is that," said he. "Do you not recall the things men say in sickness?" "What sort of things?" "Why, that after all there is nothing sweeter than to be well, though they were not aware that it is the highest pleasure before they were ill." "I remember," he said. "And do you not hear men afflicted with severe pain saying that there is no greater pleasure than the cessation of this suffering?" "I do." "And you perceive, I presume, many similar conditions in which men while suffering pain praise freedom from pain and relief from that as the highest pleasure, and not positive delight." "Yes," he said, "for this in such cases is perhaps what is felt as pleasurable and acceptable—peace." "And so," I said, "when a man's delight comes to an end, the cessation of pleasure will be painful." "It may be so," he said. "What, then, we just now described as the intermediate state between the two—this quietude—will sometimes be both pain and pleasure." "It seems so." "Is it really possible for that which is neither to become both?" "I think not." "And further, both pleasure and pain arising in the soul are a kind of motion, are they not?" "Yes." "And did we not just now see that to feel neither pain nor pleasure is a quietude of the soul and an intermediate state between the two?" "Yes, we did." "How, then, can it be right to think the absence of pain pleasure, or the absence of joy painful?" "In no way." "This is not a reality, then, but an illusion," said I; "in such case the quietude

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\[a\] Aristotle attacks this doctrine with captious dialectic in his *Topics* and *De anima*.
παρά τὸ ἀλγευὸν ἥδυ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἥδυ ἀλγευὸν τότε ἢ ἦσυχία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγίες τούτων τῶν ἁντασμάτων πρὸς ἢδονής ἀλλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις. Ὅσ γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἐφη, σημαίνει. ᾿Ιδὲ τούτων,

Β ἐφην ἔγω, ἢδονάς, αἴ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν εἰσίν, ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις οἰήθης ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὐτῳ τούτῳ πεφυκέναι, ἢδονή μὲν παῦλαν λύπης εἶναι, λύπην δὲ ἢδονής. Ποῦ δὴ, ἐφη, καὶ ποῖας λέγεις; Πολλαὶ μὲν, εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλαι, μάλιστα δ’ εἰ θέλεις ἐννοήσαι τὰς περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἢδονάς. αὕτα γὰρ οὐ προλυπηθέντες ἤξαίφνης ἁμήχανοι τὸ μέγεθος γίγνονται, πανσάμεναι τὲ λύπην οὐδεμίαν καταλείπουσιν. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἐφη. Μη ᾿άρα πειθώ.

C μεθα καθαρὰν ἢδονήν εἶναι τὴν λύπην ἀπαλαγήν, μηδὲ λύπην τὴν ἢδονής. Μη γὰρ. ᾿Αλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, αἴ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνουσαι καὶ λεγόμεναι ἢδοναί σχεδὸν αἴ πλείσται τε καὶ μέγισται τοῦτο τοῦ εἴδους εἰσὶ, λυπῶν τινὲς ἀπαλαγαί. Ἐἰσὶ γὰρ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἳ πρὸ μελλόντων τούτων ἐκ προσδοκίας γιγνόμεναι προσθήσεις τε καὶ προλυπήσεις κατὰ ταύτα ἔχουσιν; Κατὰ ταύτα.

D X. Οἶσθ’ οὖν, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, οἶαι εἰσὶ καὶ ᾿ο μάλιστα ἐοίκασιν; Τῷ; ἐφη. Νομίζεις τι, εἶπον, ἐν τῇ φύσει εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄνω, τὸ δὲ κάτω, τὸ δὲ

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*a* Cf. 586 c, and Phileb. 42 b and 41 ε.

*b* For οὐδὲν ὑγίες in this sense cf. on 523 ε.

*c* Cf. Phileb. 44 c-d, Xen. Ῥεονικ. 1. 20 προσποιοῦμεναι ἢδοναί εἶναι, etc.

*d* For the idea that smells are not conditioned by pain cf. Tim. 65 λ, Phileb. 51 b and ε, and Siebeck, Platon als Kritiker Aristotelischer Ansichten, p. 161.


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in juxtaposition with the pain appears pleasure, and in juxtaposition with the pleasure pain. And these illusions have no real bearing on the truth of pleasure, but are a kind of jugglery. So at any rate our argument signifies," he said. "Take a look, then," said I, "at pleasures which do not follow on pain, so that you may not haply suppose for the present that it is the nature of pleasure to be a cessation from pain and pain from pleasure." "Where shall I look," he said, "and what pleasures do you mean?" "There are many others," I said, "and especially, if you please to note them, the pleasures connected with smell. For these with no antecedent pain suddenly attain an indescribable intensity, and their cessation leaves no pain after them." "Most true," he said. "Let us not believe, then, that the riddance of pain is pure pleasure or that of pleasure pain." "No, we must not." "Yet, surely," said I, "the affections that find their way through the body to the soul and are called pleasures are, we may say, the most and the greatest of them, of this type, in some sort releases from pain." "Yes, they are." "And is not this also the character of the anticipatory pleasures and pains that precede them and arise from the expectation of them?" "It is."

X. "Do you know, then, what their quality is and what they most resemble?" "What?" he said. "Do you think that there is such a thing in nature?"

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3 Cf. Phileb. 44 B, 44 C λυπῶν ... ἀποφυγόν, Protag. 354 B.
4 For εὖ τὰ φύσει cf. Parmen. 132 D.
For the purposes of his illustration Plato takes the popular view of up and down, which is corrected in Tim. 62 c-d and perhaps by the ironical δη in Phaedo 112 c. Cf. Zeller, Aristotle (Eng.) i. p. 428.


The argument from the parallel of body and mind here belongs to what we have called confirmation. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 528, on Phaedo 78 b. The figurative use of repletion and nutrition is not to be pressed in proof of con-
as up and down and in the middle?" "I do."
"Do you suppose, then, that anyone who is transported from below to the centre would have any other opinion than that he was moving upward? And if he took his stand at the centre and looked in the direction from which he had been transported, do you think he would suppose himself to be anywhere but above, never having seen that which is really above?" "No, by Zeus," he said, "I do not think that such a person would have any other notion."
"And if he were borne back," I said, "he would both think himself to be moving downward and would think truly." "Of course." "And would not all this happen to him because of his non-acquaintance with the true and real up and down and middle?"
"Obviously." "Would it surprise you, then," said I, "if similarly men without experience of truth and reality hold unsound opinions about many other matters, and are so disposed towards pleasure and pain and the intermediate neutral condition that, when they are moved in the direction of the painful, they truly think themselves to be, and really are, in a state of pain, but, when they move from pain to the middle and neutral state, they intensely believe that they are approaching fulfilment and pleasure, and just as if, in ignorance of white, they were comparing grey with black, so, being inexperienced in true pleasure, they are deceived by viewing painlessness in its relation to pain?" "No, by Zeus," he said, "it would not surprise me, but far rather if it were not so." "In this way, then, consider it." Are not hunger and thirst and similar states inanitions or traditions with the Philebus or Gorgias. Cf. Matthew v. 6 "Hunger and thirst after righteousness."
'Aγνοια δὲ καὶ ἀφροσύνη ἄρ’ οὐ κενότης ἐστὶ τῆς περὶ ψυχῆς αὖ ἐξεως; Μάλα γε. Οὖκοιν πληροῖν ἂν ὁ τε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἵσχων; Πῶς δ’ οὐ; Πλήρωσις δὲ ἀληθεστέρα τοῦ ἢττον ἥ τοῦ μᾶλλον ὄντος; Δῆλον, ὦτι τοῦ μᾶλλον. Πότερα οὖν ἥγει τά γένη μᾶλλον καθαρὰς οὐσίας μετέχειν, τά οἶν σῖτου τε καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ ὄψιν καὶ ἐξωπάσης τροφῆς, ἥ το δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς εἰδος καὶ Σ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐυλλήβδην αὖ πάσης ἀρετῆς; ὡδε δὲ κρίνε: τό τοῦ ἂει ὅμοίον ἐχόμενον καὶ ἀθανάτου καὶ ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον ὅν καὶ ἐν τοιούτω γιγνόμενον, μᾶλλον εἶναι σοι δοκεῖ, ἥ το μηδέποτε ὅμοιον καὶ θυητοῦ, καὶ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτο καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον; Πολὺ, ἕφη, διαφέρει τό τοῦ ἂει ὅμοίον. Ἡ οὖν ἀνομοίου1 οὐσία οὕσιας τι μᾶλλον ἥ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δ’, ἀληθείας; Οὐδὲ τούτο. Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἢττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας; Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκ- 

D οὖν ὅλως τά περὶ τήν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν γένη τῶν γενῶν αὖ τῶν περὶ τήν τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν


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^ For κενότης cf. Phileb. 35 b, 42 c-d, Tim. 65 a.
^ For the figure of nourishment of the soul cf. Protag. 313 c, Phaedr. 248 b, and Soph. 223 ε.
emptinesses of the bodily habit?" "Surely." "And is not ignorance and folly in turn a kind of emptiness of the habit of the soul?" "It is indeed." "And he who partakes of nourishment and he who gets wisdom fills the void and is filled?" "Of course." "And which is the truer filling and fulfilment, that of the less or of the more real being?" "Evidently that of the more real." "And which of the two groups or kinds do you think has a greater part in pure essence, the class of foods, drinks, and relishes and nourishment generally, or the kind of true opinion, knowledge and reason, and, in sum, all the things that are more excellent? Form your judgement thus. Which do you think more truly is, that which clings to what is ever like itself and immortal and to the truth, and that which is itself of such a nature and is born in a thing of that nature, or that which clings to what is mortal and never the same and is itself such and is born in such a thing?" "That which cleaves to what is ever the same far surpasses," he said. "Does the essence of that which never abides the same partake of real essence any more than of knowledge?" "By no means." "Or of truth and reality?" "Not of that, either." "And if a thing has less of truth has it not also less of real essence or existence?" "Necessarily." "And is it not generally true that the kinds concerned with the service of the body partake less of truth and reality than

a Different kinds of intelligence are treated as synonyms because for the present purpose their distinctions are irrelevant. Cf. 511 A, C, and D diávoua. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 43 and p. 47, n. 339. Plato does not distinguish synonyms nor virtual synonyms for their own sake as Prodicus did. Cf. Protag. 358 A-B.

b Cf. Symp. 209 A φρόνησιν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν.
To dress, to call, to dine . . .
How many a soul for these things lives
With pious passion, grave intent . . .
And never even in dreams hath seen
The things that are more excellent.
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those that serve the soul?" "Much less." "And do you not think that the same holds of the body itself in comparison with the soul?" "I do." "Then is not that which is fulfilled of what more truly is, and which itself more truly is, more truly filled and satisfied than that which being itself less real is filled with more unreal things?" "Of course." "If, then, to be filled with what befits nature is pleasure, then that which is more really filled with real things would more really and truly cause us to enjoy a true pleasure, while that which partakes of the less truly existent would be less truly and surely filled and would partake of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure." "Most inevitably," he said. "Then those who have no experience of wisdom and virtue but are ever devoted to a feastings and that sort of thing are swept downward, it seems, and back again to the centre, and so sway and roam b to and fro throughout their lives, but they have never transcended all this and turned their eyes to the true upper region nor been wafted there, nor ever been really filled with real things, nor ever tasted c stable and pure pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon the earth d and heads bowed down over their tables they feast like cattle, e grazing and copulating, ever greedy for more


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πλεονεξίας λακτίζοντες καὶ κυρίττοντες ἀλλήλους σιδηροῖς κέρασί τε καὶ ὀπλαὶς ἀποκτινώσας δι᾽ ἀπληστίαν, ἀτε οὐχὶ τοῖς οὖσιν οὐδὲ τὸ ὅν οὐδὲ τὸ στέγον ἑαυτῶν πιμπλάντες. Παντελῶς, ἔφη οἱ Πλαύκων, τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν, οἱ Σώκρατες, χρησμω-δεῖς βίον. Ἀρ ὅῦν οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡδονάς ἐξη- εἰναι μεμιγμέναις λύπαις, εἰδώλους τῆς ἄληθος ἡ- δονῆς καὶ ἐσκιαγραφημέναις, ὅπο τῆς παρ᾽ Ἀρ ὅ-

C ἀλλήλας θέσεως ἀποχρωσμέναις, ὥστε σφοδροῖς έκατέρας φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἐρωταῖς ἑαυτῶν ξυπτόντας τοῖς ἀφροσίν ἐντίκτεων καὶ περιμαχήτους εἶναι, ὡσπερ τὸ τῆς Ἐλένης εἴδωλον ὅπο τῶν ἐν Τροίᾳ Στησίχορος φησὶ γενέσθαι περιμάχητον ἄγνοια τοῦ ἄληθος; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τοιοῦτον τι αὐτὸ εἶναι.

XI. Τί δὲ; περὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐχ ἔτερα τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ὅσ οὖν αὐτῷ τούτῳ διαπράττηται η φθονὸς διὰ φιλοτιμίαν η βία διὰ φιλονικίαν η θυμοῦ διὰ δυσκολίαν, πλησμονὴν τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης καὶ θυμοῦ διώκων ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ; Τοιαῦτα, ἦ δ’ οὐ, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τοῦτο εἶναι. Τί οὖν; ἦν δ’ ἐγὼς θαρροῦντες λέγωμεν,

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a Cf. supra 373 e, Phaedo 66 c ff., Berkeley, Siris 330
c Plato laughs at himself. Cf. supra 509 c and 540 b-c.
d The picturesque, allegorical style of oracles was proverbial.
e Cf. on 584 a, p. 384, note a.
g For the Stesichorean legend that the real Helen remained in Egypt while only her phantom went to Troy cf. Phaedr. 243 a-b, Eurip. Hel. 605 ff., Elect. 1282-1283, Isoc. Hel. 64, 392
of these delights; and in their greed a kicking and butting one another with horns and hooves of iron they slay one another in sateless avidity, because they are vainly striving to satisfy with things that are not real the unreal and incontinent part b of their souls.

“You describe in quite oracular style,” said Glaucon, “the life of the multitude.” “And are not the pleasures with which they dwell inevitably commingled with pains, phantoms of true pleasure, illusions of scene-painting, so coloured by contrary juxtaposition d as to seem intense in either kind, and to beget mad loves of themselves in senseless souls, and to be fought for, e as Stesichorus says the wraith of Helen f was fought for at Troy through ignorance of the truth?” “It is quite inevitable,” he said, “that it should be so.”

XI. “So, again, must not the like hold of the high-spirited element, whenever a man succeeds in satisfying that part of his nature—his covetousness of honour by envy, his love of victory by violence, his ill-temper by indulgence in anger, pursuing these ends without regard to consideration and reason?” “The same sort of thing,” he said, “must necessarily happen in this case too.” “Then,” said I, “may we


’Tis we who, lost in stormy visions, keep
With phantoms an unprofitable strife.

Arnold, “Dover Beach,” in fine:

And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night.
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"οτι και περι το φιλοκερδες και το φιλονικον οσαι επιθυμιαι εισιν, αι μεν αν τη επιστημη και λογος επομεναι και μετα τουτων τας ηδονας διωκουσαι, ας αν το φρονιμου εξηγηται, λαμβανωσι, τας αληθεστατας τε ληφονταi, ως οιον τε αυταις αληθεις λαβειν, ατε αληθεια επομενον, και τας Ε έαντων οικειας, εηπερ το βελτιστον εκαστω τοιτω και οικειοτατον; 'Αλλα μην, εφη, οικειοτατον γε. Τω φιλοσοφωφ αρα επομενης απασης της ψυχης και μη στασιαξουσης εκαστω τω μερει υπαρχει εισ τε ταλλα τα έαντων πραττει και δικαιω ειναι, και δη και τας ηδονας τας έαντων έκαστον και τας βελτιστας 587 και εις το δυνατων τας αληθεστατας καρποδουθαι. Κοµιδη μεν ουν. "Οταν δε αρα των έτερων τι κρατηση, υπαρχει αυτω μητε τη έαντων ηδονην εξευρισκειν, τα τε αλλ' αναγκαζεις αλλοτριαν και μη αληθη ηδονην διωκειν. Ουτως, εφη. Ουκοουν α πλειστον φιλοσοφιας τε και λογου αφεστηκε, μαλωστ' αν τοιαυτα εξεργαζοιτο; Πολυ γε. Πλειστον δε λογου αφισταται ουχ οπερ νομου τε και ταξεως; Δηλον δη. 'Εφανησαν δε πλειστον αφιστουσαι ουχ αι έρωτικαι τε και τυραννικαι επιθυμιαι;

"a Cf. Phaedo 69 b, and Theaet. 176 b μετα φρονησεως.  
b εξηγηται has a religious tone. See on εξηγητης 427 c.  
Cf. 604 b.

c Cf. on 583 b, p. 380, note b.  
e Cf. 352 λ, 440 b and ε, 442 δ, 560 λ, Phaedr. 237 ε.  
g For εις το δυνατων cf. 500 δ, 381 c, Laws 795 δ, 830 b,  
862 b, 900 c.  
h What follows (587 b-588 λ) is not to be taken too seriously. It illustrates the method of procedure by minute links, the satisfaction of Plato’s feelings by confirmations 394
not confidently declare that in both the gain-loving and the contentious part of our nature all the desires that wait upon knowledge and reason, and, pursuing their pleasures in conjunction with them,\(^a\) take only those pleasures which reason approves,\(^b\) will, since they follow truth, enjoy the truest\(^c\) pleasures, so far as that is possible for them, and also the pleasures that are proper to them and their own, if for everything that which is best may be said to be most its 'own'?\(^d\)"

"But indeed," he said, "it is most truly its very own." "Then when the entire soul accepts the guidance of the wisdom-loving part and is not filled with inner dissension,\(^e\) the result for each part is that it in all other respects keeps to its own task\(^f\) and is just, and likewise that each enjoys its own proper pleasures and the best pleasures and, so far as such a thing is possible,\(^g\) the truest." "Precisely so." "And so when one of the other two gets the mastery the result for it is that it does not find its own proper pleasure and constrains the others to pursue an alien pleasure and not the true." "That is so," he said. "And would not that which is furthest removed from philosophy and reason be most likely to produce this effect?\(^h\)" "Quite so," he said. "And is not that furthest removed from reason which is furthest from law and order?" "Obviously." "And was it not made plain that the furthest removed are the erotic and tyrannical appetites?" "Quite so." "And and analogies, and his willingness to play with mathematical symbolism. Cf. 546 b f. and William Temple, Plato and Christianity, p. 55: "Finally the whole thing is a satire on the humbug of mystical number, but I need not add that the German commentators are seriously exercised. . . ." See however A. G. Laird in Class. Phil. xi. (1916) pp. 465-468.
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Β Πολύ γε. ἔλαχιστον δὲ αἱ βασιλικαὶ τε καὶ κόσμιαι; Ναὶ. Πλείστον δὴ, οἷμαι, ἀληθοὺς ἡδονής καὶ οἰκείας ὁ τύραννος ἀφεστήξει, ὁ δὲ ὀλίγιστον. Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ ἀρδέστατα ἄρα, εἴπον, ὁ τύραννος βιώσεται, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἥδιστα. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἢν δ' ἔγω, ὅσω ἀγέρίστερον ζῇ τύραννος βασιλέως; Ἀν εἴπης, ἐφη. Τριῶν ἡδονῶν, ὃς ἔοικεν, οὐσῶν, μιᾶς μὲν γνησίας, δυοῖν

C δὲ νόθαι, τῶν νόθων εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα ὑπερβὰς ὁ τύραννος, φυγών νόμον τε καὶ λόγον, δούλαις τις δορυφόροις ἡδοναῖς ξυνοκεί, καὶ ὀπόσῳ ἑλαττοῦται οὐδὲ πάντων ράδιον εἰπείν, πλὴν ἰσως ὥδε. Πώς; ἐφη. Ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀλυγαρχικοῦ τρίτος ποὺ ὁ τύραννος ἀφεστήκει· ἐν μέσῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁ δημοτικὸς ἦν. Ναὶ. Οὕκονν καὶ ἡδονὴς τρίτω εἰδώλῳ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀπ' ἐκείνου ξυνοκικὸν ἄν, εἰ τὰ πρόσθεν ἀληθῆ; Οὕτως. Ὁ δὲ γε ὀλυγαρχικὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ

D βασιλικοῦ αὐτρίτος, ἐὰν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν τυθόμεν. Τρίτος γάρ. Τριπλασίου ἄρα, ἢν δ' ἔγω, τριπλάσιον ἀριθμῷ ἀληθοὺς ἡδονής ἀφεστήκε τύραννος. Φαίνεται. Ἐπίπεδον ἄρ', ἐφην, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ εἰδώλων κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκος ἀριθμὸν ἡδονῆς τυραννικῆς ἄν εἴη. Κομιδῇ γε. Κατὰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὖξην δήλου δὴ ἀπόστασιν ὅσην ἀφεστηκὼς γίγνεται. Δήλου, ἐφῃ, τῷ γε λογιστικῷ. Οὕκονν εἰὰν τύς

Ε μεταστρέψας ἁληθεία ἡδονῆς τὸν βασιλέα τοῦ τυράννου ἀφεστηκότα λέγῃ, ὅσον ἀφεστήκεν,

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a Cf. Polit. 257 b ἀφεστάσιν.
b Cf. Vol. I. p. 282, note a, on 408 d and supra p. 344, note b, on 573 d.
c For eis τὸ ἐπέκεινα cf. Phaedo 112 b and supra 509 b.
d Cf. Vol. I. p. 422, note b, on 445 d and Menex. 238 d.

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least so the royal and orderly?" "Yes." "Then the tyrant's place, I think, will be fixed at the furthest remove from true and proper pleasure, and the king's at the least." "Necessarily." "Then the tyrant's life will be least pleasurable and the king's most." "There is every necessity of that." "Do you know, then," said I, "how much less pleasurably the tyrant lives than the king?" "I'll know if you tell me," he said. "There being as it appears three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious, the tyrant in his flight from law and reason crosses the border beyond the spurious, cohabits with certain slavish, mercenary pleasures, and the measure of his inferiority is not easy to express except perhaps thus." "How?" he said. "The tyrant, I believe, we found at the third remove from the oligarch, for the democrat came between." "Yes." "And would he not also dwell with a phantom of pleasure in respect of reality three stages removed from that other, if all that we have said is true?" "That is so." "And the oligarch in turn is at the third remove from the royal man if we assume the identity of the aristocrat and the king." "Yes, the third." "Three times three, then, by numerical measure is the interval that separates the tyrant from true pleasure." "Apparently." "The phantom of the tyrant's pleasure is then by longitudinal mensuration a plane number." "Quite so." "But by squaring and cubing it is clear what the interval of this separation becomes." "It is clear," he said, "to a reckoner." "Then taking it the other way about, if one tries to express the extent of the interval between the king and the tyrant in respect of true

* Cf. Phaedo 66 c εἰδόλων, where Olympiodorus (Norvin, p. 36) takes it of the unreality of the lower pleasures.
έννεακαιεικοσικαιεπτακοσιοπλασιάκις ἦδιον αὐτὸν Ἵωντα εὐρήσει τελειωθείσῃ τῇ πολλαπλασιώσει, τὸν δὲ τύχανον ἀνιαρότερον τῇ αὐτῇ ταύτῃ ἀποστάσει. Ἀμήχανον, ἐφη, λογισμὸν καταπεφόρηκας τῆς διαφορότητος τοῖν ἀνδρῶν, τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ 588 τοῦ ἀδίκου, πρὸς ἦδονὴν τε καὶ λύπην. Καὶ μέντοι καὶ ἀληθῇ καὶ προσήκοντά γε, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, βίους ἀριθμόν, εἰπέρ αὐτοὺς προσήκουσιν ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες καὶ μῆνες καὶ ἐνναυτοὶ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφη, προσήκουσιν. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τοσοῦτον ἦδονὴ νυκὰ ὁ ἀγαθὸς τε καὶ δίκαιος τὸν κακὸν τε καὶ ἀδίκον, ἀμήχανω δὴ ὅσω πλεῖον νικήσει εὐ- σχημοσύνῃ τε βίου καὶ κάλλει καὶ ἀρετῆ; Ἀμη- χάνω μέντοι νή Δία, ἐφη.

XII. Εἴεν δὴ, εἶπον· ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα λόγον Β γεγόναμεν, ἀναλάβωμεν τὰ πρῶτα λεξθέντα, δι’ α δευρ’ ἦκομεν· ἢν δὲ που λεγόμενον, λυσιτελεῖν ἀδικεῖν τῷ τελέως μὲν ἀδίκω, δοξαζομένῳ δὲ δικαίῳ. ἡ οὐχ οὕτως ἐλέχθη; Οὕτω μὲν οὖν. Νῦν δὴ, ἐφην, αὐτῷ διαλεγόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ διωμο- λογησάμεθα τὸ τέ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ δίκαια πράττειν ἢν ἐκάτερον ἐχει δύναμιν. Πῶς; ἐφη. Εἰκόνα πλάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς λόγω, ὑπε ἐνδὴ ὁ ἐκεῖνα C λέγων οἰα ἐλεγεν. Ποίαν τινά; ἡ δὲ ὁς. Τῶν τοιοῦτων τινά, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, οἰαί μυθολογοῦνται παλαιαί γενέσθαι φύσεις, ἡ τε Χιμαῖρας καὶ ἡ

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\(^{a}\) Cf. Spencer, \textit{Data of Ethics}, p. 14 “Hence estimating life by multiplying its length into its breadth.” For the mathematical jest \textit{cf. Polit.} 257 \(\alpha\)-\(\beta\).

\(^{b}\) Humorous as in 509 \(\alpha\) \(\upsilon\)ἐρβολῆς.

\(^{c}\) Cf. \textit{Phileb.} 13 \(\alpha\), 14 \(\alpha\), \textit{Parmen.} 141 \(\alpha\), \textit{Theaet.} 209 \(\alpha\) and \(\delta\).

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pleasure he will find on completion of the multiplication that he lives 729 times as happily and that the tyrant's life is more painful by the same distance. " An overwhelming and baffling calculation," he said, "of the difference between the just and the unjust man in respect of pleasure and pain!" "And what is more, it is a true number and pertinent to the lives of men if days and nights and months and years pertain to them." "They certainly do," he said. "Then if in point of pleasure the victory of the good and just man over the bad and unjust is so great as this, he will surpass him inconceivably in decency and beauty of life and virtue." "Inconceivably indeed, by Zeus," he said.

XII. "Very good," said I. "And now that we have come to this point in the argument, let us take up again the statement with which we began and that has brought us to this pass." It was, I believe, averred that injustice is profitable to the completely unjust man who is reputed just. Was not that the proposition?" "Yes, that." "Let us, then, reason with its proponent now that we have agreed on the essential nature of injustice and just conduct." "How?" he said. "By fashioning in our discourse a symbolic image of the soul, that the maintainer of that proposition may see precisely what it is that he was saying." "What sort of an image?" he said. "One of those natures that the ancient fables tell of," said I, "as that of the Chimaera or Scylla or Cerberus, and

\(^a\) Plato keeps to the point. Cf. 472 b, Phileb. 27 c, and p. 339, note e, on 572 b. 
\(^b\) Cf. 348 b, 361 a. 
\(^c\) Cf. Homer, II. vi. 179-182, Phaedr. 229 d. 
\(^d\) Od. xii. 85 ff. 
\(^e\) Hesiod, Theog. 311-312.
Of the animal in man cf. Tim. 70 e, Charm. 155 d-e, Phaedr. 230 λ, 246 λ ff., Boethius, Cons. iv. 2-3, Horace, Epist. i. 1. 76, Iamblichus, Protrept. chap. iii., Machiavelli, Prince xvii. (La Bestia), Emerson, History: “Every animal in the barnyard . . . has contrived to get a footing . . . in some one or other of these upright heaven-facing speakers. Ah, brother, hold fast to the man and awe the beast,” etc. Cf. Tennyson, lines “By an Evolutionist”:

But I hear no yelp of the beast, and the Man is quiet at last.

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the numerous other examples that are told of many forms grown together in one.” “Yes, they do tell of them.” “Mould, then, a single shape of a manifold and many-headed beast that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause to spring forth from itself all such growths.” “It is the task of a cunning artist,” he said, “but nevertheless, since speech is more plastic than wax and other such media, assume that it has been so fashioned.” “Then fashion one other form of a lion and one of a man and let the first be far the largest and the second second in size.” “That is easier,” he said, “and is done.” “Join the three in one, then, so as in some sort to grow together.” “They are so united,” he said. “Then mould about them outside the likeness of one, that of the man, so that to anyone who is unable to look within but who can see only the external sheath it appears to be one living creature, the man.” “The sheath is made fast about him,” he said. “Let us,

“In Memoriam,” cxviii.:

Move upward, working out the beast,
And let the ape and tiger die.

A modern scientific man solemnly writes: “The theory of evolution has prepared us to acknowledge the presence of something of the ape and tiger in us.” For an example of modern nimity or too-muchness cf. Sandburg’s “There is a wolf in me . . . There is a fox in me . . . There is a hog in me . . . O, I got a zoo, I got a menagerie inside my ribs.” Cf. Brunetière, Questions actuelles, p. 114.

b Cf. 596 c.

c Cf. Cic. De or. iii. 45 “sicut mollissimam ceram . . . fingimus.” Otto, p. 80, says it is a proverb. For the development of this figure cf. Pliny, Epist. vii. 9 “ut laus est cerae, mollis cedensque sequatur.” For the idea that word is more precise or easy than deed cf. supra 473 a, Phaedo 99 e, Laws 636 a, 736 b, Tim. 19 e.

d Cf. 442 a.

" Cf. 577 a.
The whole passage illustrates the psychology of 440 n ff.


Perhaps a latent allusion to Hesiod, Works and Days 278.

Cf. "the inward man," Romans vii. 22, 2 Cor. iv. 16, Ephes. iii. 16.

Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 10 "Religion says: 'The kingdom of God is within you'; and culture, in 402
then say to the speaker who avers that it pays this man to be unjust, and that to do justice is not for his advantage, that he is affirming nothing else than that it profits him to feast and make strong the multifarious beast and the lion and all that pertains to the lion, but to starve the man and so enfeeble him that he can be pulled about whithersoever either of the others drag him, and not to familiarize or reconcile with one another the two creatures but suffer them to bite and fight and devour one another. " "Yes," he said, "that is precisely what the panegyrist of injustice will be found to say." "And on the other hand he who says that justice is the more profitable affirms that all our actions and words should tend to give the man within us complete domination over the entire man and make him take charge of the many-headed beast—like a farmer who cherishes and trains the cultivated plants but checks the growth of the wild—and he will make an ally of the lion's nature, and caring for all the beasts alike will first make them friendly to one another and to himself, and so foster their growth." "Yes, that in turn is precisely the meaning of the man who commends justice." "From every point of view, then, the panegyrist of justice speaks truly and the panegyrist of injustice falsely. For whether we consider pleasure, reputation, or profit, he who commends justice speaks the truth, while there is no soundness or real know-

like manner, places human perfection in an internal condition, in the growth and predominance of our humanity proper, as distinguished from our animality."

1 Cf. Gorg. 516 a-b.
3 Cf. 441 A.
eídoς ψέγει ὄ τι ψέγει. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ἂ δ' ὃς, οὐδαμῇ γε. Πείθωμεν τούνν αὐτὸν πράως, οὐ γὰρ ἐκών ἀμαρτάνει, ἔρωτάντες· ὥς μακάριε, οὐ καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ νόμιμα διὰ τὰ τουατ' ἀν

D φαίμεν γεγονότας· τὰ μὲν καλὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ θεῷ τὰ θηριώδῃ ποιοῦντα τῆς φύσεως, αἰσχρὰ δὲ τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ ἄγρῳ τὸ ἡμερον δουλουμένα; ἐμφήσει ἡ πῶς; Ἑὰν μοι, ἔφη, πείθηται. "Εστιν οὖν, εἶπον, ὅτι λυσιτελεῖ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου χρυσίν λαμβάνειν ἀ-δίκως, εἴπερ τοιόντες τι γίγνεται, λαμβάνων τὸ χρυσίν ἀμα καταδουλουθεῖ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐαυτοῦ τῷ

E μοχθηροτάτῳ; ἡ εἰ μὲν λαβὼν χρυσίν νιῶν ἡ θυγατέρα ἐδουλοῦτο, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς ἀγρίων τε καὶ κακῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐλυσιτελεί οὐδ' ἂν πάμπολυ ἐπὶ τούτῳ λαμβάνειν, εἴ δὲ τὸ ἐαυτοῦ θειότατον ὑπὸ τῷ ἀθεωτάτῳ τε καὶ μαρωτάτῳ δουλοῦται καὶ μηδὲν ἐλεεῖ, οὐκ ἁρὰ ἀθλίος ἐστι καὶ

590 πολὺ ἐπὶ δεινοτέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ χρυσῶν δωροδοκεῖ ἡ Ἐρμύλη ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ ἄνδρος ψυχῆ τῶν ὀρμὸν δεξαμένη; Πολὺ μέντοι, ἡ δ' ὃς ὁ Γλαύκων· ἓγὼ γὰρ σοι ύπὲρ ἑκείνου ἀποκρινοῦμαι.

XIII. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἀκολασταίνειν οἴει διὰ τοιαύτα πάλαι ψέγεσθαι, ὅτι ἀνίεται ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ

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a πράως: cf. the use of ἴρέμα 476 e, 494 d.
b Plato always maintains that wrong-doing is involuntary and due to ignorance. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 640, on Laws 860 d.
c Cf. supra 501 b, Tennyson, “Locksley Hall Sixty Years after,” in his, “The highest Human Nature is divine.”
d Cf. Matt. xvi. 26, Mark viii. 36, “What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?” A typical argumentum ex contrario. Cf. 445 a-b and 404
ledge of what he censures in him who disparages it." "None whatever, I think," said he. "Shall we then, try to persuade him gently,\(^a\) for he does not willingly err,\(^b\) by questioning him thus: Dear friend, should we not also say that the things which law and custom deem fair or foul have been accounted so for a like reason—the fair and honourable things being those that subject the brutish part of our nature to that which is human in us, or rather, it may be, to that which is divine,\(^c\) while the foul and base are the things that enslave the gentle nature to the wild? Will he assent or not?" "He will if he is counselled by me." "Can it profit any man in the light of this thought to accept gold unjustly if the result is to be that by the acceptance he enslaves the best part of himself to the worst? Or is it conceivable that, while, if the taking of the gold enslaved his son or daughter and that too to fierce and evil men, it would not profit him,\(^d\) no matter how large the sum, yet that, if the result is to be the ruthless enslavement of the divinest part of himself to the most despicable and godless part, he is not to be deemed wretched and is not taking the golden bribe much more disastrously than Eriphyle\(^e\) did when she received the necklace as the price\(^f\) of her husband's life?" "Far more," said Glaucon, "for I will answer you in his behalf."

XIII. "And do you not think that the reason for the old objection to licentiousness is similarly because

Vol. I. p. 40, note c. On the supreme value of the soul cf. Laws 726-728, 743 e, 697 b, 913 b, 959 a-b. Cf. supra 535 d.\(^a\) Cf. Od. xi. 326, Frazer on Apollodorus iii. 6. 2 (Loeb). Stallbaum refers also to Pindar, Nem. ix. 37 ff., and Pausan. x. 29. 7.\(^b\) For \(\varepsilon\nu\pi\iota\) in this sense cf. Thompson on Meno 90 d. Cf. Apol. 41 \(\varepsilon\nu\pi\iota\ \pi\omicron\sigma\omicron\nu\), Demosth. xlv. 66.\(^c\)\(^d\)\(^f\)
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tο δεινόν, το μέγα ἐκεῖνο καὶ πολυειδὲς θρέμμα πέρα τοῦ δέοντος; Δῆλον, ἔφη. Ἡ δ' αὐθάδεια
Β καὶ δυσκολία ψέγεται οὐχ ὅταν τὸ λεοντῶδὲς τε καὶ ὀφεέδες αὐξῆται καὶ συντείνηται ἀναμικτός; Πάντες μὲν οὖν. Τρυφή δὲ καὶ μαλακία οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῷ τούτω χαλάσει τε καὶ ἀνέσει ψέγεται, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ δελίαν ἐμποιή; Τί μήν; Κολακεία δὲ καὶ ἀνελευθερία οὐχ ὅταν τις τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τὸ θυμοειδὲς, ὑπὸ τῷ ὀχλώδει θηρίῳ ποιή, καὶ ἕνεκα χρημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀπληστίας προσπαθη-

κεζόμενον ἐθική ἐκ νέου ἀντὶ λέοντος πίθηκον

C γίγνεσθαι; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. Βανανοία δὲ καὶ χειροτεχνία διὰ τί, οὐ, ὤνειδος φερεί; ἂ δὲ ἄλλο τι φήσομεν ἂ ὅταν τις ἀθλητικὲς φύσει ψηθῇ τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἴδως, ὡστε μή ἂν δύνασθαι ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ θρεμμάτων, ἄλλα θεραπευέων ἐκεῖνα, καὶ τὰ θωπεύματα αὐτῶν μόνον δύνηται μανθάνειν;

"Εουκεν, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν οὐ καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ ὁμοίου ἄρχηται οἴοντες ὁ βελτίστως, δοῦλον αὐτὸν

D φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκεῖνον τοῦ βελτίστου, ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θείον ἄρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ δούλου

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*a* See Adam *ad loc.* on the asyndeton.
*αυθάδεια*: *cf. supra* 548 e.
*b* Not mentioned before, but, as Schleiermacher says, might be included in τὰ περὶ τῶν λέοντα. *Cf. Adam* *ad loc.*
Or Plato may be thinking of the chimæra (*Il. vi. 181*).

d See Adam 620 c.
*e* *Cf. p. 49, note e.*
*f* For the idea that it is better to be ruled by a better man
*Cf. Ruskin,* *Queen of the Air, p. 210* (Brantwood ed., 1891): "The first duty of every man in the world is to find his true master, and, for his own

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that sort of thing emancipates that dread, that huge and manifold beast overmuch?" "Obviously," he said. "And do we not censure self-will and irascibility when they foster and intensify disproportionately the element of the lion and the snake in us?" "By all means." "And do we not reprobate luxury and effeminacy for their loosening and relaxation of this same element when they engender cowardice in it?" "Surely." "And why do you suppose that 'base mechanic' handicraft is a term of reproach? Shall we not say that it is solely when the best part is naturally weak in a man so that it cannot govern and control the brood of beasts within him but can only serve them and can learn nothing but the ways of flattering them?" "So it seems," he said. "Then is it not in order that such an one may have a like government with the best man that we say he ought to be the slave of that best man who has within good, submit to him; and to find his true inferior, and, for that inferior's good, conquer him." Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 252: "It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free." Carlyle (apud M. Barton and O. Sitwell, Victoriana): "Surely of all the rights of man the right of the ignorant man to be guided by the wiser, to be gently or forcibly held in the true course by him, is the indisputablest." Plato's idea is perhaps a source of Aristotle's theory of slavery, though differently expressed. Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1254 b 16 f., Newman i. pp. 109-110, 144 f., 378-379, ii. p. 107. Cf. also Polit. 309 a f., Epist. vii. 335 d, and Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iii. p. 106.
oíμενοι δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι αὐτῶν, ὡσπερ Θρασύμαχος ὤετο τοὺς ἄρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὃς ἁμεινὸν ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἷκείον ἔχοντο ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐξωθεὶ ἐφ' ἐστώτος, ἵνα εἰς δύναμιν πάντες οἵμοιοι ὁμοι καὶ φίλοι τῷ αὐτῷ κυβερνώμενοι; Καὶ ὅρθως γ', ἐφη.

Ε Δηλοὶ δὲ γε, ἢν δ' ἔγα, καὶ νόμος, οτι τοιοῦτον βουλεύει, τὰς τοις ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐξύμμαχος ὡν καὶ τῶν παῦδων ἄρχη, τὸ μή ἐὰν ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, ἐως ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὡσπερ ἐν πόλει πολιτείαν καταστήσωμεν, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπεύσαντες 591 τῷ παρ' ἡμῖν τοιούτῳ ἀντικαταστήσωμεν φύλακα ὁμοιον καὶ ἄρχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τότε δὴ ἐλευθερον ἀφίέμεν. Δηλοὶ γὰρ, η δ' ὦς. Πη δὴ οὖν φήσομεν, οὐ Γλαύκων, καὶ κατὰ τίνα λόγον λυσιτελεῖν ἀδικείν ἡ ἀκολασταίνειν ἡ τι αἰοχρὸν ποιεῖν, εἴ δὲν πονηρότερος μὲν ἐσται, πλεῖω δὲ χρήματα ἡ ἅλλην τινα δύναμιν κεκτήσεται; Οὐδαμῇ, η δ' ὦς. Πη δ' ἀδικοῦντα λανθάνειν καὶ μὴ διδόναι δύκην

Β λυσιτελεῖν; ἡ οὔχ' ὃ μὲν λανθάνον ἐτι πονηρότερος γίγνεται, τοῦ δὲ μὴ λανθάνοντος καὶ κολαζομένου τὸ μὲν θηρίωδες κομίζεται καὶ ἡμεροῦται, τὸ δὲ ἡμερον ἐλευθεροῦται, καὶ ὅλη ἡ ψυχή εἰς τὴν βελτίστην φύσιν καθισταμένη τιμωτέραν ἔχειν

1 βουλεύεται Iamblichus and Stobaeus: βουλεύεται ADM. See Adam, ad loc.

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*a* Cf. supra 343 b-c.

*b* Cf. Lysis 207 e f., Laws 808 d, Isoc. xv. 290, Antiphon, fr. 61 (Diels ii.3 p. 303).

*c* Cf. on 591 e, p. 412, note d.

*d* Cf. on 501 d, p. 74, note a.

*e* The paradoxes of the Gorgias are here seriously reaffirmed. Cf. especially Gorg. 472 e ff., 480 a-b, 505 a-b, 408
himself the divine governing principle, not because we suppose, as Thrasydamachus did in the case of subjects, that the slave should be governed for his own harm, but on the ground that it is better for everyone to be governed by the divine and the intelligent, preferably indwelling and his own, but in default of that imposed from without, in order that we all so far as possible may be akin and friendly because our governance and guidance are the same? " "Yes, and rightly so," he said. "And it is plain," I said, "that this is the purpose of the law, which is the ally of all classes in the state, and this is the aim of our control of children, our not leaving them free before we have established, so to speak, a constitutional government within them and, by fostering the best element in them with the aid of the like in ourselves, have set up in its place a similar guardian and ruler in the child, and then, and then only, we leave it free." "Yes, that is plain," he said. "In what way, then, Glaucon, and on what principle, shall we say that it profits a man to be unjust or licentious or do any shameful thing that will make him a worse man, but otherwise will bring him more wealth or power?" "In no way," he said. "And how that it pays him to escape detection in wrongdoing and not pay the penalty? Or is it not true that he who evades detection becomes a still worse man, while in the one who is discovered and chastened the brutish part is lulled and tamed and the gentle part liberated, and the entire soul, returning to its nature at the best, attains to a much more precious condition in acquir-

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λαμβάνει, σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως κτωμένη, ἡ σῶμα ἵσχὺν τε καὶ κάλλος μετὰ υγιείας λαμβάνον, τοσούτω ὀσωπερ ψυχῇ σώματος τιμωτέρα; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.

C Οὐκοῦν ὃ γε νοῦν ἔχων πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ εἰς τοῦτο ξυντείνας βιώσεται, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ μαθήματα τιμῶν, ἃ τοιαύτῃν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπεργάσεται, τὰ δὲ ἀλλ' ἀτιμάζων; Δὴλον, ἐφη. "Ἐπειτὰ γ', εἴπον, τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἔξω καὶ τροφὴν οὐχ ὅπως τὴν θηριώδει καὶ ἁλόγω ἰδοὺ ἐπιτρέψας ἐνταῦθα τετραμμένος ζήσει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς υγίειαν βλέπων, οὐδὲ τούτῳ προσβεβὼν, ὅπως ἱσχυρὸς ἡ υγίης ἢ καλὸς ἐσται, ἐάν μιᾷ καὶ σωφρονήσειν μέλλῃ ἂν.

D αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἁρμονίαν τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἑνεκα ξυμφωνίας ἁρμοτόμημον φανεῖται. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ἐάντερ μέλλῃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μονοικὸς εἶναι. Οὐκοῦν, εἴπον, καὶ τὴν

1 φανεῖται Iamblichus: φανεῖται ADM, φανεῖται pr. F. Bracketed by Hermann.

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a The a fortiori argument from health of body to health of soul is one of the chief refutations of the immoralists. Cf. supra 445 d-e f., Gorg. 479 b, Crito 47 d-e. For the supreme importance of the soul cf. on 589 e.


c Health in the familiar skolion (cf. Gorg. 451 e, Laws 631 c, 661 a, 728 d-e, Euthydem. 279 a-b, Meno 87 e, Soph. frag. 356) is proverbially the highest of ordinary goods. Cf. Gorg. 452 a-b, Crito 47 d, Eryxias 393 c. In fact, for Plato as for modern "scientific" ethics, health in the higher sense—the health of the soul—may be said to be the ultimate sanction. Cf. Vol. I. Introd. pp. xvi and xxi, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 26, Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, pp. 192-194 f. But an idealistic ethics sometimes expresses itself in the paradox that "not even health," 410
ing sobriety and righteousness together with wisdom, than the body \(a\) does when it gains strength and beauty conjoined with health, even as the soul is more precious than the body?" "Most assuredly," he said. "Then the wise man will bend all his endeavours \(b\) to this end throughout his life; he will, to begin with, prize the studies that will give this quality to his soul and disprize the others." "Clearly," he said. "And then," I said, "he not only will not abandon the habit and nurture of his body to the brutish and irrational pleasure and live with his face set in that direction, but he will not even make health his chief aim,\(c\) nor give the first place to the ways of becoming strong or healthy or beautiful unless these things are likely to bring with them sobriety of spirit, but he will always be found attuning the harmonies of his body for the sake of the concord in his soul.\(d\)" "By all means," he replied, "if he is to be a true musician.\(e\)" "And will he not deal likewise highest of earthly goods, is of any value compared with the true interests of the soul. Cf. Laws 661 c-f ff., 728 d-e, 744 a, 960 d, Laches 195 c; and Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 17 "Bodily health and vigour . . . have a more real and essential value . . . but only as they are more intimately connected with a perfect spiritual condition than wealth and population are." This idea may be the source of the story from which the Christian Fathers and the Middle Ages derived much edification, that Plato intentionally chose an unhealthy site for the Academy in order to keep down the flesh. Cf. Aelian, Var. Hist. ix. 10, perhaps the first mention, Porphyry, De abstinentia i. 36, Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. ii. 1.\(^4\) 416, n. 2; Camden on Cambridge, Gosse, Gossip in a Library, p. 23, and Himerius, Ecl. iii. 18 (Diels ii.\(^5\) p. 18) ἐκών δὲ ἐνδοει σώμα Δημήκριτος, ἵνα ἴταινη τὰ κρείττονα.

\(a\) Cf. What Plato Said, p. 485, on Laches 158 d.

\(b\) Cf. Phaedo 61 a.
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ἐν τῇ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσει ξύνταξίν τε καὶ ἔμμισθίαν; καὶ τὸν ὅγκον τοῦ πλῆθους οὐκ ἐκπληττόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν μακαρισμοῦ ἀπειρον αὐξήσει, ἀπέραντα κακὰ ἔχων; Ὡ乌克 Ἐ οὐκομαὶ, ἔφη. 'Ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπτων γε, εἴτεν, πρὸς τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείαν καὶ φυλάττων, μὴ τι παρακινή αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐκεί διὰ πλῆθος οὐσίας ἢ δι' ὀλιγότητα, οὕτως κυβερνῶν προσθήσει καὶ ἀναλώσει τῆς οὐσίας καθ' ὅσον ἢν οἶος τ' ἤ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τιμᾶς γε, εἰς 592 ταὐτὸν ἀποβλέπτων, τῶν μὲν μεθέξει καὶ γεύσεται ἐκῶν, ἃς ἂν ἥγηται ἀμείνων αὐτῶν ποιήσεων, ἃς δ' ἂν λύσει τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐξίν, ψεύδεται ἰδία καὶ δημοσίᾳ. Ὡ乌克 ἀρα, ἔφη, τά γε πολιτικὰ ἑθελήσει πράττειν, εάνπερ τούτου κήδηται. Νη τὸν κύνα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν γε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει καὶ μάλα, οὗ

a Cf. p. 355, note d, on 576 D.
d This analogy pervades the Republic. Cf. 579 c and p. 240, note b, on 544 D-E, Introd. Vol. I. p. xxxv. Cf. ὃς οὐκ ἐν πόλει 590 E, 605 B. For the subordination of everything to the moral life cf. also 443 D and p. 509, note d, on 618 C.
e As in the state, extremes of wealth and poverty are to be avoided. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 645, on Laws 915 B.
f Almost Aristotle's use of ζης.
g Cf. pp. 52-55 on 496 D-E. The later schools debated the question whether the "sage" would take part in politics. Cf. Seneca, De otio, xxx. 2 f. and Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag. i. p. 62. 22 f.: "Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam (sapiens), nisi si quid impedierit;" ibid. iii. p. 158. 31 ff.: "consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rempublicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos;" ibid. p. 174. 32: "negant 412
with the ordering and harmonizing of his possessions? He will not let himself be dazzled by the felicitations of the multitude and pile up the mass of his wealth without measure, involving himself in measureless ills. " "No, I think not," he said. "He will rather," I said, "keep his eyes fixed on the constitution in his soul, and taking care and watching lest he disturb anything there either by excess or deficiency of wealth, will so steer his course and add to or detract from his wealth on this principle, so far as may be." "Precisely so," he said. "And in the matter of honours and office too this will be his guiding principle: He will gladly take part in and enjoy those which he thinks will make him a better man, but in public and private life he will shun those that may overthrow the established habit of his soul." "Then, if that is his chief concern," he said, "he will not willingly take part in politics." "Yes, by the dog," I said, in his own

nostri sapientem ad quamlibet rempublicam accessurum;"

ibid. 37 ff.: "praeterea, cum sapienti rempublicam ipso dignam dedimus, id est mundum, non est extra rempublicam, etiamsi recesserit;" ibid. iii. p. 157. 40 ff. ἐπόμενον δὲ τούτων ἐνάρξεων καὶ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ µάλιστ' ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφανούσαις τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας πολιτείας; ibid. 172. 18 f. δεύτερον δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύεσθαι γὰρ κατὰ τὸν προηγούµενον λόγον . . . ; ibid. 173. 19 ff. ἐφαµεν δ' ὅτι καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προηγούµενον λόγον οὖν ἐστὶ. µὴ πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ ἐάν τι <κωλύ> καὶ µάλιστ' <ἂν> μηδὲν ὑφελείν μέλη τὴν πατρίδα, κινδύνους δὲ παρακολουθεῖν ὑπολαµβάνῃ µεγάλους καὶ χαλεποὺς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας; ibid. p. 175. 3 f. πολιτεύεσθαι φασὶ τὸν σοφὸν ἀν µὴ τὴ κωλύ, ὥσ φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρωτῷ περὶ βίων; ibid. 6 ff. Χρύσιππος δὲ πάλιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς γράφων, οὕτω ῥητορεύειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν, ὡς καὶ τοῦ πλουτοῦ δυντὸς ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς ὁγείας.

h Cf. on 399 E, Phaedr. 228 B, Gorg. 466 C, 461 A, 482 B, Phaedo 98 E, supra 567 E.
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"All", ἂν

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a θεία ... τύχη. So θεία μούρα is often used to account for an exception, e.g. supra 493 A, Laws 875 c, 642 c, Meno 99 e, etc. Cf. θείον ... ἔχαρώμεν λόγον 492 e.

b Lit. "in words." This is one of the most famous passages in Plato, and a source of the idea of the City of God among both Stoics and Christians. Cf. Marc. Aurel. ix. 29 μὴ δὲ τὴν Πλάτωνος πολιτείαν ἐλπίζε, Justin Martyr's επὶ γῆς διατριβοῦσιν ἀλλ' ἐν οὐρανῷ πολιτεύονται, which recalls Philippians iii. 20 ἡμῶν δὲ τὸ πολιτεύμα ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐπάρχει, and also Heb. xii. 22, xi. 10 and 16, xiii. 14, Eph. ii. 19, Gal. iv. 26, Rev. iii. 12 and xxii. 2 ff. Ackermann, Das Christliche bei Platon, p. 24, compares Luke xvii. 21 "the kingdom of God is within you." Cf. also John xviii. 36. Havet, Le Christianisme et ses origines, p. 207, says, "Platon dit de sa République précisément ce qu'on a dit plus tard du royaume de Dieu, qu'elle n'est pas de ce monde." Cf. also Caird, Evolution of Theology in Greek Philosophy, ii. p. 170, Harnack, Hist. of Dogma (tr. Buchanan), vol. i. p. 332, ii. pp. 73-74 and 338, Proclus, Comm. § 352 (Kroll i. 16); Pater, Marius the Epicurean, p. 212 "Marcus Aurelius speaks often of that City on high, of which all other cities are but single habitations ...," p. 213 "... the vision of a reasonable, a divine order, not in nature, but in the condition of human affairs, that unseen Celestial City, Uranopolis, Callipolis. ..."; ibid. p. 158 "thou hast been a citizen in this wide city," and pp. 192-193. Cf. further Inge, Christian Ethics, pp. 104-105, "let us fly hence to our dear country, as the disciples of Plato have repeated one after another. There are a few people who are so well adjusted to their environment that they do not feel, or rarely feel, this nostalgia for the infinite ...". Lamartine, in his poem, "Isolement" (apud Faguet, Dix-Neuvième Siècle, p. 89) beautifully expresses this nostalgia for the home of the ideal:

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THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX

city he certainly will, yet perhaps not in the city of his birth, except in some providential conjuncture.\textsuperscript{a}”

“I understand,” he said; “you mean the city whose establishment we have described, the city whose home is in the ideal;\textsuperscript{b} for I think that it can be found nowhere on earth.”

“Well,” said I, “per-

Là, je m’enivrerais à la source où j’aspire;
Là, je retrouverais l’espoir et l’amour,
Et ce bien idéal que toute âme désire,
Et qui n’a pas de nom au terrestre séjour.

Likewise the lovely sonnet of Du Bellay which in an English version might run as follows:

If our brief life is to eternity
But as a span; if our ephemeral sun,
Gilding the shadows that before it flee,
Chases our days to darkness one by one,
Why, O my soul, pent in this prison obscure,
Wilt thou in these dim shadows take delight,
When to soar upward to the eternal pure
Luminous heavens thy wings are spread for flight?
There is the good for which all hearts do burn.
There is the peace for which all creatures yearn.
There is the love supreme without a stain.
There too is pleasure that is not bought with pain.
There upon heaven’s dome and outmost shore
Thou’lt know the ideas and recognize once more
The beauty whose image here thou must adore.


\textsuperscript{a} Cf. 499 c–d.

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δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἵσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ
βουλομένῳ ὄραν καὶ ὀρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν:
διαφέρει δὲ οὐδὲν, εἴτε που ἔστω εἴτε ἔσται· τὰ
γὰρ ταύτης μόνης ἂν πράξεις, ἄλλης δὲ οὐδεμίας.
Εἰκὸς γ', ἐφη.

a Cf. Theaet. 176 ε, which Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 179
says must refer to the Republic, Laws 739 δ-ε, 746 β, and
haps there is a pattern\(^a\) of it laid up in heaven for him who wishes to contemplate it and so beholding to constitute himself its citizen.\(^b\) But it makes no difference whether it exists now or ever will come into being.\(^c\) The politics of this city only will be his and of none other.” “That seems probable,” he said.


\(^c\) Cf. 499 c-d, 472 b-e, and What Plato Said, p. 564.
I

595 I. Кαὶ μὴν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα περὶ αὐτῆς ἐννοῶ, ὡς παντὸς ἁρὰ μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ὑπό-
ζομεν τὴν πόλιν, οὐχ ἦκιστα δὲ ἐνθυμηθεῖς περὶ ποιήσεως λέγω. Τὸ ποίον; ἐφη. Τὸ μηδαμὴ
παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση μυθητικὴ παντὸς γὰρ
μᾶλλον οὐ παραδεκτέα νῦν καὶ ἐναργέστερον, ὡς
Βέμοι δοκεῖ, φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ χωρὶς ἕκαστα δι-
ήρηται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰδή. Πῶς λέγεις; 'Ὡς μὲν
πρὸς ύμᾶς εἰρήσθαι—οὐ γὰρ μου κατερεῖτε πρὸς
τοὺς τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
ἀπαντας τοὺς μυθητικοὺς—λάβῃ ἐσικεν εἶναι
πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίας, ὅσον
μὴ ἔχουσιν φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ οὐ τυγχάνει
ὁντα. Πὴ δὴ, ἐφη, διανοούμενος λέγεις; 'Ῥητέον,
ἡν δ' ἐγὼ, καίτοι φιλία γε τίς με καὶ αἴδως ἐκ

a In Book III. On the whole question see Introd. pp. lx-
lxiii. Max. Tyr. Diss. 23 Εἰ καλῶς Πλάτων Ὀμηρὸν τῆς Πολιτείας
παρατήσατο, and 32 Εἰ ἐστι καθ' Ὀμηρὸν αἴρεσις. Strabo i.
2 § 3. Athenaeus v. 12. 187 says that Plato himself in the
Symposium wrote worse things than the poets whom he
banishes. Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 138, thinks that the
return to the poets in Book X. is intended to justify the
poetry of Plato's dialogues. On the banishment of the
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BOOK X

I. "And truly," I said, "many other considerations assure me that we were entirely right in our organization of the state, and especially, I think, in the matter of poetry." "What about it?" he said. "In refusing to admit at all so much of it as is imitative; for that it is certainly not to be received is, I think, still more plainly apparent now that we have distinguished the several parts of the soul." "What do you mean?" "Why, between ourselves—for you will not betray me to the tragic poets and all other imitators—that kind of art seems to be a corruption of the mind of all listeners who do not possess as an antidote a knowledge of its real nature." "What is your idea in saying this?" he said. "I must speak out," I said, "though a certain love and
PLATO

παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὄμηρον ἀποκωλύει λέγειν.
C έοικε μὲν γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπάντων τούτων τῶν τραγικῶν πρώτος διδάσκαλος τε καὶ ἦγεμών γενέσθαι. ἂλλ’ οὐ γὰρ πρὸ γε τῆς ἄληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ, ἂλλ’, ὁ λέγω, ῥητέων. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. ἂκοιε δὴ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποκρίνου. Ἐρώτα. Μίμησιν ὅλως ἔχοις ἂν μοι εἰπεῖν οὐ τί ποτ’ ἐστίν; οὐδὲ γὰρ τοι αὐτὸς πάνυ τι ἔννοιω, τί βούλεται εἰναι. Ἡ που ἃρ’, ἐφη, ἐγὼ συννοῦσοι. Οὐδὲν γε, ἃν δ’ ἐγώ, ἄτοπον, ἐπεὶ πολλὰ

596 τοι ἄνευτον βλεπόντων ἀμβλύτερον ὀρῶντες πρότεροι εἰδον. Ἐστιν, ἐφη, οὔτωσι οὖν παρόντος οὐδ’ ἀν προθυμηθήναι οἶος τε εἰγν εἰπεῖν, εἰ τί μοι καταφαίνεται οὐσ’ αὐτὸς ὥρα. Βούλευν ὅν τιν ἐνθέδε ἀρχώμεθα ἐπισκοποῦντες εἰ τῆς εἰ-ωθύμας μεθόδου; εἶδος γὰρ ποῦ τι ἐν ἐκαστὸν εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἐκαστα τα πολλά, οἷς

a Isoc. ii. 48-49 is perhaps imitating this. For Homer as a source of tragedy cf. also 598 d, 605 c-d, 607 λ, 602 b, Theaet. 152 e, schol. Trendelenburg, pp. 75 ff.; Dryden, Discourse on Epic Poetry: "The origin of the stage was from the epic poem . . . those episodes of Homer which were proper for the state the poets amplified each into an action," etc. Cf. Aristot. Poet. 1448 β 35 φ., Diog. Laert. iv. 20, and supra 393 λ ff.
c For ἃ που cf. Phaedo 84 δ.
d Perhaps a slight failure in Attic courtesy. Cf. Laws

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reverence for Homer that has possessed me from a boy would stay me from speaking. For he appears to have been the first teacher and beginner of all these beauties of tragedy. Yet all the same we must not honour a man above truth, but, as I say, speak our minds.” “By all means,” he said. “Listen, then, or rather, answer my question.” “Ask it,” he said. “Could you tell me in general what imitation is? For neither do I myself quite apprehend what it would be at.” “It is likely, then,” he said, “that I should apprehend!” “It would be nothing strange,” said I, “since it often happens that the dimmer vision sees things in advance of the keener.” “That is so,” he said; “but in your presence I could not even be eager to try to state anything that appears to me, but do you yourself consider it.” “Shall we, then, start the inquiry at this point by our customary procedure? We are in the habit, I take it, of positing a single idea or form in the case of the various multiplicities to


6 Cf. Phaedo 76 D, 100 B, Phileb. 16 D, supra 479 E, Thompson on Meno 72 D. See Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. ii. 1. p. 560. The intentional simplicity of Plato’s positing of the concept here (cf. 597 A), and his transition from the concept to the “idea,” has been mistaken for a primitive aspect of his thought by many interpreters. It is quite un-critical to use Aristot. Met. 991 b 6 ff. to prove that Plato’s “later” theory of ideas did not recognize ideas of artefacts, and therefore that this passage represents an earlier phase of the theory. He deliberately expresses the theory as simply as possible, and a manufactured object suits his purpose here as it does in Cratyl. 389. See also supra, Introd. pp. xxii-xxiii.

7 “Forms,” with a capital letter is even more misleading than “ideas.”
tauvton onoma epitphereomen. h' ou manthaneis; Manuel.

Θωμεν δη και νυν o ti bouleis tov polloin.

B oion, ei theleis, pollaic pou eisis klinai kai trapexai.
Pws 0' ou; 'Alla ideai ge pou peri tahta ta skheia duo, mia mou klinas, mia de trapexias. Nai.

Oukou kai eivathame legein, oti o dhemourogos ekaterou tov skheous pros thn idean blepwn ou tw poiexi o mev tas klinas, o de tas trapexas, ais hmeis chromega, kai talia kata tahta; ou gar pou thn ge idean autin dhemourogei oudeis tov dhemourovn. pws garp; Oudamow. 'All' opra de C kai tovde tina kalies tov dhemourogon. Toun poioun; 'Ois paonta poiexi, osaper eis ekastos tovn cheiro-
technwn. Deunon tna legies kai thauomastov anidra.

Oupw ge, alla tacha malalon fhesis. o autos gar
odtos cheirotexnhs ou mouon paonta oidos te skheia
pousai, alla kai ta ek ths yhis fvmemena apanta
poiexi kai xis paonta ergazetai, ta te alla kai
eauton, kai pros toutois yhin kai ouranon kai
theous kai paonta ta ev ouranov kai ta ev "Aidov
upo yhs apanta ergazetai. Panv thauomastov,

D ephi, legies sofisthn. 'Apisteis; hyn 0' egnw-
ka'i mou eipte to parapan ouk an sou dokei elvai

a Cf. Cratyl. 389 a-b. There is no contradiction, as
many say, with 472 d.

b Cf. Emerson, The Poet: "and therefore the rich poets—as
Homer, Chaucer, Shakespeare and Raphael—have no
limits to their riches except the limits of their lifetime, and
resemble a mirror carried through the streets ready to render
an image of every created thing." (Cf. 596 d-E katostron
periferein and Julian, Or. v. 163 d.) Empedocles, fr. 23
(Diels i.3 pp. 234-235):

ws 0' opostan graphees . . .
dentera te ktiotei kai aneras hde gammaikas . . .

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THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

which we give the same name. Do you not understand?” “I do.” “In the present case, then, let us take any multiplicity you please; for example, there are many couches and tables.” “Of course.” “But these utensils imply, I suppose, only two ideas or forms, one of a couch and one of a table.” “Yes.” “And are we not also in the habit of saying that the craftsman who produces either of them fixes his eyes on the idea or form, and so makes in the one case the couches and in the other the tables that we use, and similarly of other things? For surely no craftsman makes the idea itself. How could he?” “By no means.” “But now consider what name you would give to this craftsman.” “What one?” “Him who makes all the things that all handicraftsmen severally produce.” “A truly clever and wondrous man you tell of.” “Ah, but wait, and you will say so indeed, for this same handicraftsman is not only able to make all implements, but he produces all plants and animals, including himself, and thereto earth and heaven and the gods and all things in heaven and in Hades under the earth.” “A most marvellous sophist,” he said. “Are you incredulous?” said I. “Tell me, do you deny altogether the possibility

Climax beyond climax. Cf. on 508 r, p. 104, note c.
d It is a tempting error to refer this to God, as I once did, and as Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 604 does. So Cudworth, True Intel. System of the Universe, vol. ii. p. 70: “Lastly, he is called ὁ πάντα τά τε ἄλλα ἐργάζεται, καὶ ἐαυτόν, ‘he that causeth or produceth both all other things, and even himself.’” But the producer of everything, including himself, is the imitator generalized and then exemplified by the painter and the poet. Cf. Soph. 234 a-b.

e Eurip. Hippol. 921 δεινόν σοφιστήν εἶπας.
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touôtôs dêmuourygos, ἢ τινὶ μὲν τρόπω γενέσθαι ἄν τούτων ἀπάντων ποιητῆς, τινὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνει, ὅτι κἂν αὐτὸς οἶδος τ' εἴης πάντα ταῦτα ποιήσαι τρόπως γέ τινι; Καὶ τίς, ἐφη, ὁ τρόπος οὗτος; Οὐ χαλεπός, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ πολλαχὴ καὶ ταχὺ δημιουργοῦμενος: τάχιστα δὲ που, εἰ θέλεις λαβῶν κάτοπτρον περιφέρειν πανε-ταχῇ ταχὺ μὲν ἦλιον ποιήσεις καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ταχὺ δὲ γῆν, ταχὺ δὲ σαυτὸν τε καὶ τάλλα ζῶα καὶ σκεῦη καὶ φυτὰ καὶ πάντα ὅσα νῦν ὅ ἐλέγετο. Ναι, ἐφη, φανόμενα, οὐ μέντοι ὅντα γέ που τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. Καλῶς, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ εἰς δέον ἔρχει τῷ λόγῳ. τῶν τοιοῦτων γάρ, οἴμαι, δημιουργῶν καὶ ὁ ζωγράφος ἐστίν. ἢ γάρ; Πῶς γάρ οὕ; Ἄλλα φήσεις οὐκ ἄληθῆ, οἴμαι, αὐτὸν ποιεῖν ὅ ποιεῖ. καίτοι τρόπως γέ τινι καὶ ὁ ξω-

\[ a \] kal tís is sceptical as in Aristoph. Acharn. 86.

\[ b \] Art is deception. Diels ii. 3 p. 339, Dialex. 3 (10) ἐν γάρ τραγῳδοποια καὶ ζωγραφίᾳ ὅσις ὰργίσα ἐκαπατὴ ὰμοὶ τοῖς ἄληθινοις ποιεῖν, οὗτος ἄριστος, Xen. Mem. iii. 10. 1 γραφή ἐστιν εἰκασία τῶν ὤρωμενων. Cf. Plut. Quomodo adolescens 17 f-18 λ on painting and poetry. There are many specious resemblances between Plato's ideas on art and morality and those of the "lunatic fringe" of Platonism. Cf. Jane Harrison, Ancient Art and Ritual, pp. 21-22, Charles F. Andrews, Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas, p. 332. Cf. further R. G. Collingwood, "Plato's Philosophy of Art," Mind, 34, pp. 154-172. Stewart, Plato's Doctrine of Ideas, p. 60, fancifully says: "Between the lines of Plato's criticism of bad art here, as copying the particular, we must read the doctrine that true art copies or in some way sets forth the idea." But the defenders of poetry have always taken this line. Cf. Hartley Coleridge's sonnet:

The vale of Tempe had in vain been fair
. . . . . . if the sight inspired
Saw only what the visual organs show,
If heaven-born phantasy no more required

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of such a craftsman, or do you admit that in a sense
there could be such a creator of all these things, and
in another sense not? Or do you not perceive that
you yourself would be able to make all these things
in a way?" "And in what way, I ask you," he
said. "There is no difficulty," said I, "but it is
something that the craftsman can make everywhere
and quickly. You could do it most quickly if you
should choose to take a mirror and carry it about
everywhere. You will speedily produce the sun and
all the things in the sky, and speedily the earth and
yourself and the other animals and implements and
plants and all the objects of which we just now spoke."
"Yes," he said, "the appearance of them, but not the
reality and the truth." "Excellent," said I, "and
you come to the aid of the argument opportunely.
For I take it that the painter too belongs to this class
of producers, does he not?" "Of course." "But
you will say, I suppose, that his creations are not real
and true. And yet, after a fashion, the painter too

Than what within the sphere of sense may grow.
The beauty to perceive of earthly things
The mounting soul must heavenward prune her wings.

Mrs. Browning, "Aurora Leigh":

. . . Art's the nature of what is
Behind this show. If this world's show were all,
Then imitation would be all in art.

William Temple, *Plato and Christianity*, p. 89: "In the
tenth book of the Republic he says that, whereas the artificer
in making any material object imitates the eternal idea, an
artist only imitates the imitation (595 A-598 D); but in Book
v. he said that we do not blame an artist who depicts a face
more beautiful than any actual human face either is or ever
could be (472 D)." But this does not affect Plato's main
point here, that the artist imitates the "real" world, not
the world of ideas. The artist's imitation may fall short of
or better its model. But the model is not the (Platonic) idea.
γράφος κλίνην ποιεῖ. ἢ οὗ; Ναι, ἐφη, φαινομένην γε καὶ οὐτός.

597  II. Τί δὲ ὁ κλινοποιός; οὐκ ἀρτί μέντοι ἐλεγες, ὅτι οὗ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ, δ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι δ ἐστὶ κλίνη, ἀλλὰ κλίνην τινά; ᾿Ελεγον γάρ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ δ ἐστὶ ποιεῖ, οὐκ ἂν τὸ ὄν ποιοῖ, ἀλλὰ τι τοιοῦτον οἶον τὸ ὄν, ὅν δὲ οὐ· τελέως δὲ εἶναι οὖν τὸ τοῦ κλινοργοῦ ἔργον ἦ ἄλλου τυφύς χειροτέχνου εἰ τις φαίη, κυνωνεῖοι οὐκ ἂν ἄληθῇ λέγειν; Οὐκοῦν, ἐφη, ὡς γ ἂν δόξει τοῖς περὶ τοὺς τοιοῦσιφ λόγους διατρίβουσιν. Μηδὲν ἄρα θαυμάζωμεν, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ἀμυνόν τι τυγχάνει οὖν πρὸς Β ἀλῆθειαν. Μὴ γάρ. Βούλει οὖν, ἐφην, ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τούτων ξητήσομεν τὸν μμητὴν τοῦτον, τίς ποτ’ ἐστίν; Εἰ βούλει, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν τριτταί τινες κλίναι αὐταὶ γίγνονται: μία μὲν ἦ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὕσα, ἦν φαίμεν ἂν, ὡς ἐγώμαι, θεῶν ἐργασασθαί. ἦ τιν’ ἄλλον; Οὐδένα, οἴμαι. Μία δὲ γε ἦν ὁ τέκτων. Ναι, ἐφη. Μία δὲ ἦν ὁ ζωγράφος. ἦ γάρ; ᾿Εστώ. Ζωγράφος δὴ, κλινοποιός, θεός, τρεῖς οὖτοι ἐπιστᾶται τριών εἴδεσι κλινῶν. Ναι C τρεῖς. Ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, εἴτε οὖκ ἐβούλετο, εἴτε τις

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a δ ἐστὶ belongs to the terminology of ideas. Cf. Phaedo 74 d, 75 b, 75 d, Rep. 507 b.

b τελέως ... ὄν: cf. supra 477 a, and Soph. 248 ε παντελῶς ὄντι.

c An indirect reference to Plato and his school like the "friends of ideas" in Soph. 248 a.

d Cf. 597 c, 598 a, 501 b φύσει, Phaedo 103 b, Parmen. 132 d.
makes a couch, does he not?" "Yes," he said "the appearance of one, he too."

II. "What of the cabinet-maker? Were you not just now saying that he does not make the idea or form which we say is the real couch, the couch in itself, but only some particular couch?" "Yes, I was." Then if he does not make that which really is, he could not be said to make real being but something that resembles real being but is not that. But if anyone should say that being in the complete sense belongs to the work of the cabinet-maker or to that of any other handicraftsman, it seems that he would say what is not true." "That would be the view," he said, "of those who are versed in this kind of reasoning." "We must not be surprised, then, if this too is only a dim adumbration in comparison with reality." "No, we must not." "Shall we, then, use these very examples in our quest for the true nature of this imitator?" "If you please," he said. "We get, then, these three couches, one, that in nature, which, I take it, we would say that God produces, or who else?" "No one, I think." "And then there was one which the carpenter made." "Yes," he said. "And one which the painter. Is not that so?" "So be it." "The painter, then, the cabinet-maker, and God, there are these three presiding over three kinds of couches." "Yes, three." "Now God, whether because he so willed or because some compulsion was

* Proclus says that this is not seriously meant (apud Beckmann, Num Plato artifactorum Ideas statuerit, p. 12). Cf. Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. ii. 1, p. 666, who interprets the passage correctly; A. E. Taylor, in Mind, xii. p. 5 "Plato's meaning has been supposed to be adequately indicated by such half-jocular instances as that of the idea of a bed or table in Republic x.," etc.
In Tim. 31 a the same argument is used for the creation of one world ἵνα... κατὰ τὴν μόρφωσιν ὁμοίως ἦ τὸ παντελὲi ἥξων. See my De Plat. Idearum doct. p. 39. Cf. Renan, Dialogues Phil. p. 25: "Pour forger les premières tenailles, dit le Talmud, il fallut des tenailles. Dieu les créa."


Cf. Soph. 265 ἐθέσω τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι δὲια τέχνη, Hooker, Eccles. Pol. i. 3. 4 "those things which Nature is said to do are by divine art performed, using nature as an instrument," Browne, opud J. Texte, Études de littérature européenne, p. 65 "la nature est l'art de..."
laid upon him \(^a\) not to make more than one couch in nature, so wrought and created one only, \(^b\) the couch which really and in itself is. But two or more such were never created by God and never will come into being.” “How so?” he said. “Because,” said I, “if he should make only two, there would again appear one of which they both would possess the form or idea, and that would be the couch that really is in and of itself, and not the other two.” “Right,” he said. “God, then, I take it, knowing this and wishing to be the real author of the couch that has real being and not of some particular couch, nor yet a particular cabinet-maker, produced it in nature unique.” “So it seems.” “Shall we, then, call him its true and natural begetter, or something of the kind?” “That would certainly be right,” he said, “since it is by and in nature \(^c\) that he has made this and all other things.” “And what of the carpenter? Shall we not call him the creator of a couch?” “Yes.” “Shall we also say that the painter is the creator and maker of that sort of thing?” “By no means.” “What will you say he is in relation to the couch?” “This,” said he, “seems to me the most reasonable designation for him, that he is the imitator of the thing which those others produce.” “Very good,” said I; “the producer of the product three removes \(^d\) from nature you call the imitator?” “By all means,” he said.

\(^a\) Cf. 557 c, Phaedr. 248 e, where the imitator is sixth in the scale.
εφη. Τούτ’ άρα έσται καὶ ὁ τραγῳδοποιός, εἶπερ μυθητής έστι, τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας πεφυκώς, καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι μμηταῖ. Κινδυνεύει. Τὸν μὲν δή μυθητὴν ωμολογήκαμεν. 598 εἰπὲ δὲ μοι περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου τόδε: πότερα ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἐκαστὸν δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιχειρεῖν μμεῖσθαι ἣ τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργα; Τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν, ἔφη. ΄Αρα οἶδα ἐστιν ἢ οἶα φαίνεται; τούτο γὰρ ἐτί διόρισον. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. OMETRY
κλύνῃ, ἐάν τε ἐκ πλαγίου αὐτὴν θεᾶ ἐάν τε κατ- αντικρὺ ἢ ὀπηρῶν, μὴ τι διαφέρει αὐτῇ ἑαυτῆς, ἢ διαφέρει μὲν οὐδέν, φαίνεται δὲ ἄλλοια; καὶ τὰλλα ὡςαύτως; Όὕτως, ἔφη. φαίνεται, διαφέρει Ὂ δ’ οὐδέν. Τούτο δὴ αὐτὸ σκόπει: πρὸς πότερον ἡ
graphikê pepoîthai peri ekastôn; pôtera prós to
ǒn, ós êchei, μμησασθαι, ἢ prós to fainomenon, ós
faînetai, fantásmatos ἡ ἀληθείας οὔσα μίμησις;
Fantásmatos, ἔφη. Πόρρω ἀρα που τοῦ ἄληθος
ἡ μμητική ἐστι καὶ, ως ἐοίκη, διὰ τοῦτο πάντα
ἀπεργάζεται, ὅτι σμικρὸν τὶ ἐκάστου ἐφάπτεται,
καὶ τοῦτο εἴδωλον. οἶον ὁ ζωγράφος, φαμέν,
ζωγραφήσεi ἦμῖν σκυτοτόμου, τέκτων, τοὺς ἀλ-
cloous δημιουργοὺς, peri oúdenos toûtôn épatw
ťon tekwn' all' ómos pайдâs te kai áfronas
ánthrwpous, eî ágathos êî zôgrafous, γράφas ån
tekthos kai pórrwthen epideiKnûs éxapatîw än tû

\[\text{a} \quad \text{Cf. Gorg. 488 d, Soph. 222 c.}
\[\text{b} \quad \text{Cf. Soph. 263 b, Cratyl. 385 b, Euthydem. 284 c.}
\[\text{c} \quad \text{Cf. 599 A, Soph. 232 A, 234 E, 236 B, Prot. 356 D.}
\[\text{d} \quad \text{Cf. 581 E.}
\[\text{e} \quad \text{For eidwlon cf. p. 197, note e.}

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"This, then, will apply to the maker of tragedies also, if he is an imitator and is in his nature three removes from the king and the truth, as are all other imitators." "It would seem so." "We are in agreement, then, about the imitator. But tell me now this about the painter. Do you think that what he tries to imitate is in each case that thing itself in nature or the works of the craftsmen?" "The works of the craftsmen," he said. "Is it the reality of them or the appearance? Define that further point." "What do you mean?" he said. "This: Does a couch differ from itself according as you view it from the side or the front or in any other way? Or does it differ not at all in fact though it appears different, and so of other things?" "That is the way of it," he said; "it appears other but differs not at all." "Consider, then, this very point. To which is painting directed in every case, to the imitation of reality as it is or of appearance as it appears? Is it an imitation of a phantasm or of the truth?" "Of a phantasm," he said. "Then the mimetic art is far removed from truth, and this, it seems, is the reason why it can produce everything, because it touches or lays hold of only a small part of the object and that a phantom; as, for example, a painter, we say, will paint us a cobbler, a carpenter, and other craftsmen, though he himself has no expertness in any of these arts, but nevertheless if he were a good painter, by exhibiting at a distance his picture of a carpenter he would deceive children and

Commentators sometimes miss the illogical idiom. So Adam once proposed to emend τεχνάτων to τεχνείτων, but later withdrew this suggestion in his note on the passage. Cf. supra 373 c, Critias 111 e, and my paper in T.A.P.A. xlvi. (1916) pp. 205-234.
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dokeîn ὡς ἀληθῶς τέκτονα εἶναι. Τι δ' οὖ; Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, οἷμα, ὦ φίλε, τόδε δεῖ περὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων διανοεῖσθαι. ἐπειδὰν τις ἦμῖν ἀπ- αγγέλλῃ περὶ του, ὡς ἐνέτυχεν ἀνθρώπων πάσας ἐπισταμένῳ τὰς δημουργίας καὶ τάλλα πάντα, ὥσα

D εἰς ἐκαστὸς οἶδεν, οὐδὲν ὦ τι οὐχὶ ἀκριβεστέρον ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, ὅτι εὐθὺς τις ἄνθρωπος, καὶ, ὡς ἐοικεῖν, ἐντυχὼν γοητή τινι καὶ μυθήτι ἐξηστήθη, ὡστε ἠδοξεν αὐτῷ πάσοφος εἶναι, διὰ τὸ αὐτὸς μὴ οἷς τ' εἶναι ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην καὶ μίμησιν ἐξετάσαι. Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφ' Ἡ.

III. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, μετὰ τούτο ἐπισκέπτεον τὴν τε τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὀμηρον, ἐπειδὴ τινῶν ἀκούομεν, ὡτὶ οὐδοὶ πᾶσαι μὲν τέχνας ἔπιστανται, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἄνθρωπεια τα πρὸς ἀρετὴν

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a Cf. Soph. 234 b.

b So Dryden, Essay on Satire: "Shakespeare . . . Homer . . . in either of whom we find all arts and sciences, all moral and natural philosophy without knowing that they ever studied them," and the beautiful rhapsody of Andrew Lang, Letters to Dead Authors, p. 238: "They believe not that one human soul has known every art, and all the thoughts of women as of men," etc. Pope, pref. to his translation of the Iliad: "If we reflect upon those innumerable knowledges, those secrets of nature and physical philosophy which Homer is generally supposed to have wrapped up in his allegories, what a new and ample scene of wonder may this consideration afford us." Cf. Xen. Symp. 4. 6. Brunetière, Époques, p. 105, says: "Corneille . . . se piquait de connaître à fond l'art de la politique et celui de la guerre." For the impossibility of universal knowledge cf. Soph. 233 A, Charm. 170 B, Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 146 on Hipp. Min. 366 c ff. Cf. also Ion 536 e, 541 B, 540 B, and Tim. 19 D. Tate, "Plato and Allegorical Inter-
foolish men, and make them believe it to be a real carpenter." "Why not?" "But for all that, my friend, this, I take it, is what we ought to bear in mind in all such cases: When anyone reports to us of someone, that he has met a man who knows all the crafts and everything else that men severally know, and that there is nothing that he does not know more exactly than anybody else, our tacit rejoinder must be that he is a simple fellow, who apparently has met some magician or sleight-of-hand man and imitator and has been deceived by him into the belief that he is all-wise, because of his own inability to put to the proof and distinguish knowledge, ignorance and imitation." "Most true," he said.

III. "Then," said I, "have we not next to scrutinize tragedy and its leader Homer, since some people tell us that these poets know all the arts and all things human pertaining to virtue and vice, and all pretation," Class. Quarterly, Jan. 1930, p. 2 says: "The true poet is for Plato philosopher as well as poet. He must know the truth." This ignores the ἀρα in 598 ε. Plato there is not stating his own opinion but giving the arguments of those who claim omniscience for the poet. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 313 n. 1 completely misunderstands and misinterprets the passage. Cf. Class. Phil. xxvii. (1932) p. 85. E. E. Sikes, The Greek View of Poetry, p. 175, says Rymer held that "a poet is obliged to know all arts and sciences." Aristotle from a different point of view says we expect the wise man to know everything in the sense in which that is possible, Met. 982 a 8.

Cf. οὐδεπότε ὅταν οἱ χεῖρα Charm. 175 c, οὐδεν ὅτε οὐ Alc. I 105 ε, Phil. 54 b, Phaedo 110 ε, Euthyph. 3 c, Euthydem. 294 d, Isoc. Panegyr. 14, Herod. v. 97.


For ἀνεπιστημοσύνην cf. Theaet. 199 ε f.

For Homer as tragedian cf. on 595 β-ε, p. 420, note a.
καὶ κακίαν, καὶ τὰ γε θεῖα: ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, εἰ μέλλει περὶ ὅν ἂν ποιήσῃ, εἰδότα ἄρα ποιεῖν, ἢ μὴ οἶδον τε εἶναι ποιεῖν. δεῖ δὲ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον μμηταῖς τούτοις οὕτως ἐντυχόντες ἐξηπατήτηται καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὅρωντες οὐκ αἰσθάνονται τριττὰ ἀπέχοντα τοῦ ὅντος καὶ ῥάδια ποιεῖν μὴ εἰδότι τὴν ἀλήθειαν· φαντάσματα γάρ, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐντα ποιοῦσιν· ἢ τί καὶ λέγουσι καὶ τῷ ὅντι οὐ ἀγαθὸν ποιηταί ἵσασι περὶ ὅν δοκοῦσι τοῖς πολλοῖς εὐ λέγειν. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ἐξεταστέον. Οἶει οὖν, εἰ τις ἀμφότερα δύνατο ποιεῖν, τὸ τε μμηθησόμενον καὶ τὸ εἰσδωλον, ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν εἰδώλων δημιουργία ἐαυτὸν ἀφεῖναι ἄν σπουδάζειν καὶ τοῦτο προστήσασθαι

Β τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ βίου ὡς βελτιστον ἔχοντα; Οὐκ ἔγογγε. Ἄλλ' εἶπεν γε, οἴμαι, ἐπιστῆμων εἰη τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τούτων πέρι, ἀπερ καὶ μμείται, πολὺ πρότερον εὖ τοῖς ἔργοις ἢν σπουδάζειν ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς μμημασι, καὶ πειρᾶτο ἢν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἐαυτοῦ κατα- λιπεὶν μμημεία, καὶ εἶναι προβημοῖτ' ἢν μᾶλλον ὁ ἐγκωμιαζόμενος ἢ ὁ ἐγκωμιώμαζων. οἴμαι, ἐφή· οὐ γὰρ εἶ ἵσον ἢ τε τιμῇ καὶ ἢ ὑφέλεια. Τῶν μὲν τοιῶν ἄλλων πέρι μὴ ἀπαιτῶμεν λόγον ὁμηρον

C ἢ ἀλλον ὄντως τῶν ποιητῶν ἑρωτῶντες, εἰ ἰατρικός ἢν τις αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ μὴ μμητής μόνον ἰατρικῶν λόγων, τίνας ὑγιεῖς ποιητής τις τῶν παλαιῶν ἢ τῶν νέων λέγεται πεποιηκέναι, ὅσπερ

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a Cf. on 598 B.  
b Cf. 598 B.  
c Cf. Petit de Julleville, Hist. lit. française vii. p. 233, on the poet Lamartine’s desire to be a practical statesman, and ibid.: “Quand on m’apprendrait que le divin Homère a refusé les charges municipales de Smyrne ou de Colophon, 434
things divine? For the good poet, if he is to poetize things rightly, must, they argue, create with knowledge or else be unable to create. So we must consider whether these critics have not fallen in with such imitators and been deceived by them, so that looking upon their works they cannot perceive that these are three removes from reality, and easy to produce without knowledge of the truth. For it is phantoms, not realities, that they produce. Or is there something in their claim, and do good poets really know the things about which the multitude fancy they speak well?" "We certainly must examine the matter," he said. "Do you suppose, then, that if a man were able to produce both the exemplar and the semblance, he would be eager to abandon himself to the fashioning of phantoms and set this in the forefront of his life as the best thing he had?" "I do not." "But, I take it, if he had genuine knowledge of the things he imitates he would far rather devote himself to real things than to the imitation of them, and would endeavour to leave after him many noble deeds and works as memorials of himself, and would be more eager to be the theme of praise than the praiser." "I think so," he said; "for there is no parity in the honour and the gain." "Let us not, then, demand a reckoning from Homer or any other of the poets on other matters by asking them, if any one of them was a physician and not merely an imitator of a physician's talk, what men any poet, old or new, is reported to have restored to health as Asclepius je ne croirais jamais qu'il eût pu mieux mériter de la Grèce en administrant son bourg natal qu'en composant l'Iliade et l'Odyssée."  

But cf. Symp. 209 d.  

* For the challenge to the poet to specify his knowledge cf. Ion 536 e f.
'Ασκληπιός, ἡ τινας μαθητᾶς ίατρικῆς κατελίπτετο, ὦσπερ ἐκεῖνος τούς ἐγκόνους, μηδ’ αὖ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾶμεν, ἀλλ’ ἐώμεν. περὶ δὲ ὅν μεγίστων τε καὶ καλλίστων ἔπιχειρεὶ λέγειν Ὁμήρος, πολέμων τε πέρι καὶ στρατηγικῶν καὶ D διουκήσεων πόλεων καὶ παιδείας πέρι ἀνθρώπου, δίκαιον που ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν πυνθανομένους· ὃ φίλε Ὁμηρε, ἐümερ τῆς ἁληθείας εἰ ἀρετῆς πέρι, εἰδῶλου δημιουργός, ὃν δὴ μιμητὴν ὄργιαμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερος, καὶ οἶός τε ἱσόα γυγνώσκειν, ποῖα ἐπιτηθεύματα βελτίων ἡ χεῖρος ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ ἵδια καὶ δημοσίᾳ, λέγε ἡμῖν τίς τῶν πόλεων διὰ σε βέλτιον ὡξησεν, ὦσπερ διὰ Λυκοῦργον Λακεδαίμων καὶ δι’ ἄλλους πόλλους E πολλαί μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραί· σε δὲ τίς αἰτιᾶται πόλις νομοθέτην ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι καὶ σφάς ὥφεληκέναι; Χαράνδαν μὲν γὰρ Ἰταλία καὶ Σικελία, καὶ ἥμεις Σόλωνα· σε δὲ τίς; ἔξει τινὰ εἰπεῖν; Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἐφ’ ὁ Γλαύκων· οὐκον λέγεται γε οὐδ’ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν Ὁμηριδῶν. Ἀλλὰ 600 δὴ τις πόλεμος ἐπὶ Ὁμήρου ὑπ’ ἐκείνου ἀρχόντως ἡ ἐμποιεύμνοτος εἰς πολεμικῆς μυνημονεύεται; Οὐδείς. Ἀλλ’ οίδα δὴ εἰς τὰ ἔργα σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς πολλαὶ ἐπίνοιαι καὶ εὐμήχανοι εἰς τέχνας ἡ τινας ἄλλας πράξεις λέγονται, ὦσπερ αὖ Θάλεω τε πέρι

\[a\] Cf. Ion 541 a f.
\[b\] Cf. Gorg. 515 b, Laches 186 b.
\[c\] Cf. Laws 630 d, 632 d, 858 e, Symp. 209 d, Phaedr. 258 b, Minos 318 c, Herod. i. 65-66, Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 2 and passim, Plutarch, Life of Lycurgus.
\[d\] Cf. Symp. 209 d, Phaedr. 258 b, 278 c, Charm. 155 a, 436
did, or what disciples of the medical art he left after him as Aesclepius did his descendants; and let us dismiss the other arts and not question them about them; but concerning the greatest and finest things of which Homer undertakes to speak, wars and generalship and the administration of cities and the education of men, it surely is fair to question him and ask, 'Friend Homer, if you are not at the third remove from truth and reality in human excellence, being merely that creator of phantoms whom we defined as the imitator, but if you are even in the second place and were capable of knowing what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what city was better governed owing to you, even as Lacedaemon was because of Lycurgus, and many other cities great and small because of other legislators. But what city credits you with having been a good legislator and having benefited them? Italy and Sicily say this of Charondas and we of Solon. But who says it of you? Will he be able to name any?' "I think not," said Glaucon; "at any rate none is mentioned even by the Homerids themselves." "Well, then, is there any tradition of a war in Homer's time that was well conducted by his command or counsel?" "None." "Well, then, as might be expected of a man wise in practical affairs, are many and ingenious inventions for the arts and business of life reported of Homer as


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toû Μυλησίου καὶ Ἀναχάρσιος τοῦ Σκύθου; Οὐ-
δαμῶς τοιούτον οὐδὲν. Ἀλλὰ δὴ εἰ μὴ δημοσία,
ιδία τισὶν ἤγεμων παϊδείας αὐτὸς ξῶν λέγεται
"Ομηρος γενέσθαι, οἳ ἐκεῖνον ἡγάπων ἐπὶ συνοισία
Β καὶ τοῖς υστέροις οἴδον τινα παρέδοσαν βίου
'Ομηρικῆν, ὡσπερ Πυθαγόρας αὐτὸς τε διαφερόν-
tως ἐπὶ τούτων ἡγαπηθῆ, καὶ οἱ υστεροί ἐτί καὶ
νῦν Πυθαγόρειον τρόπον ἐπονομάζοντες τοῦ βίου
dιαφανεῖς τῇ δοκούσῳ εἶναι εἰς τοῖς ἄλλοις; Οὐδὲ
αὖ, ἔφη, τοιούτον οὐδὲν λέγεται. ὁ γὰρ Κρεώ-
ϕυλος, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὅσως, ὁ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἑταῖρος,
τοῦ ὀνόματος ἄν γελοιότερος ἐτί πρὸς παϊδείαν
φανεῖ, εἰ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀληθῆ.
λέγεται γὰρ, ὡς πολλή τις ἀμέλεια περὶ αὐτὸν ἡν
ὑπ' αὐτὸν1 ἐκεῖνου, ὅτε ἔξη.

C IV. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν, ἂν δ' ἐγώ. ἄλλ' οἶει, ὃ
Γλαύκων, εἰ τῶν ὄντων ἄν-θρωπος καὶ βελτίως ἄπεργαζομαι "Ομηρος, ἀτε
περὶ τούτων οὐ μμείσθαι ἄλλα γιγνώσκειν δυνά-
μενος, οὐκ ἂρ' ἄν πολλοῦς ἑταῖρους ἐποιήσατο καὶ
ἐτιμᾶτο καὶ ἡγαπάτω ὑπ' αὐτῶν; ἄλλα Πρωτ-
αγόρας μὲν ἄρα ὁ Ἀλκηνίτης καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ
Κέιος καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι δύνανται τοῖς ἐφ'
D ἑαυτῶν παριστάναι ιδία ἐγγυγνύμενοι, ὡς οὔτε

1 ὑπ' αὐτὸν Ast, Adam: ἐπ' αὐτὸν mss.

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a Diog. Laert. i. 23-27.
b Diog. Laert. i. 105 says he was reported to be the
inventor of the anchor and the potter's wheel.
c In the (spurious?) seventh epistle, 328 Α, Plato speaks
of the life and λόγος advocated by himself. Cf. Novotny,
Plato's Epistles, p. 168.
d Diels i.3 pp. 27 f.
e Cf. ὀρφικόι . . . βίοι Laws 782 c.

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they are of Thales\(^a\) the Milesian and Anacharsis\(^b\) the Scythian?" "Nothing whatever of the sort." "Well, then, if no public service is credited to him, is Homer reported while he lived to have been a guide in education to men who took pleasure in associating with him and transmitted to posterity a certain Homeric way of life\(^c\) just as Pythagoras\(^d\) was himself especially honoured for this, and his successors, even to this day, denoting a certain way of life the Pythagorean,\(^e\) are distinguished among their contemporaries?" "No, nothing of this sort either is reported; for Creophylos,\(^f\) Socrates, the friend of Homer, would perhaps be even more ridiculous than his name\(^g\) as a representative of Homeric culture and education, if what is said about Homer is true. For the tradition is that Homer was completely neglected in his own lifetime by that friend of the flesh."

IV. "Why, yes, that is the tradition," said I; "but do you suppose, Glaucon, that, if Homer had really been able to educate men\(^h\) and make them better and had possessed not the art of imitation but real knowledge, he would not have acquired many companions and been honoured and loved by them? But are we to believe that while Protagoras\(^i\) of Abdera and Prodicus\(^j\) of Ceos and many others are able by private teaching to impress upon their contemporaries the

\(^a\)See on 540 B, p. 230, note \(d\).
\(^b\)Cf. Prot. 315 A-B, 316 C.
\(^c\)See What Plato Said, p. 486, on Laches 197 D.
οἰκίαιν οὔτε πόλιν τὴν αὐτῶν διοικεῖν οἶοί τε ἔσονται, ἐάν μὴ σφείς αὐτῶν ἐπιστατήσωσι τῆς παιδείας, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτη τῇ σοφίᾳ οὗτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται, ὥστε μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ ἑταῖροι. "Ομηρον δ' ἀρα οἱ ἐπὶ ἐκείνου, εἴπερ οίος τ' ἦν πρὸς ἀρετήν οἴνων καὶ ἀνθρώποις, ἦ Ἡσίοδον ῥαψῳδεῖν ἂν περιόντας εἰσιν, καὶ οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτῶν ἀντ- εἴχοντο ἡ τοῦ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἡνάγκαζον παρὰ σφίοις Εὐκοῖ εἶναι, ἡ εἰ μὴ ὑπείρου, αὐτοῖ ἂν ἐπαιδεύοντο καὶ συγώνουν ὅτι ἔσαν, ἄκαν ἡ παιδείας μεταλάβοιες; Παντάπασιν, ἐφη, δοκεῖς μοι, ὥς Ὀμήρου ἀρέμοινος πάντας τοὺς ποιητικοὺς μυθῖτας εἰδώ- λων ἀρετής εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὁν ποιοῦσι, τῆς δὲ ἄληθείας οὐχ ἀπετεθαυ; ἄλλωσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὁ ζωγράφος σκυτοτόμον ποιήσει 601 δοκοῦντα εἶναι, αὐτῶς τε οὐκ ἐπαίων περὶ σκυτοτομίας καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐπαίωσιν, εἰκ τῶν χρωμάτων δὲ καὶ σχημάτων θεωροῦσι; Πάνη μὲν οὖν. Οὗτω δὴ, οἴμαι, καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν φήσομεν

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a For διοικεῖν cf. Protag. 318 e.  
b See Thompson on Meno 70 b.  
c On μόνον οὐκ cf. Menex. 235 c, Ax. 365 b.  
d Stallbaum refers to Themist. Oral. xxii. p. 254 a ὁ ἥμεις διὰ ταύτην τὴν φαντασίαν μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρομεν, Erasmus, Chil. iv. Cent. 7 n. 98 p. 794, and the German idiom "einen auf den Händen tragen."  
e Cf. Protag. 328 b.  

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conviction that they will not be capable of governing their homes or the city unless they put them in charge of their education, and make themselves so beloved for this wisdom that their companions all but carry them about on their shoulders, yet, forsooth, that Homer’s contemporaries, if he had been able to help men to achieve excellence, would have suffered him or Hesiod to roam about rhapsodizing and would not have clung to them far rather than to their gold, and constrained them to dwell with them in their homes, or failing to persuade them, would themselves have escorted them wheresoever they went until they should have sufficiently imbibed their culture?"

"What you say seems to me to be altogether true, Socrates," he said. "Shall we, then, lay it down that all the poetic tribe, beginning with Homer, are imitators of images of excellence and of the other things that they ‘create,’ and do not lay hold on truth? but, as we were just now saying, the painter will fashion, himself knowing nothing of the cobbler’s art, what appears to be a cobbler to him and likewise to those who know nothing but judge only by forms and colours?" "Certainly." "And similarly, I suppose, we shall say that the poet himself, knowing nothing

The article perhaps gives the word a contemptuous significance. So Meno 89 b to χρυσίον.


 Cf. 366 ε, Gorg. 471 c-d, Symp. 173 β.

 Or "about which they versify," playing with the double meaning of ποιεῖν.


c Cf. 607 c, Laws 840 c, Protag. 315 a-b.

but how to imitate, lays on with words and phrases the colours of the several arts in such fashion that others equally ignorant, who see things only through words, will deem his words most excellent, whether he speak in rhythm, metre and harmony about cobbling or generalship or anything whatever. So mighty is the spell that these adornments naturally exercise; though when they are stripped bare of their musical colouring and taken by themselves, I think you know what sort of a showing these sayings of the poets make. For you, I believe, have observed them." "I have," he said. "Do they not," said I, "resemble the faces of adolescents, young but not really beautiful, when the bloom of youth abandons them?" "By all means,"" he said. "Come, then," said I, "consider this point: The creator of the phantom, the imitator, we say, knows nothing of the reality but only the appearance. Is not that so?" "Yes." "Let us not, then, leave it half said but con-

Table Talk: "If you take from Virgil his diction and metre what do you leave him?"

Aristot. Rhet. 1406 b 36 f. refers to this. Cf. Tyrtaeus 8 (6). 28 ὁδὴ ἐρατῆς ἠμῆς ἀγλαὸν άνθος ἔχῃ, Mimnermus i. 4 ήμῆς άνθη γίγνεται ἀρπαλέα, Theognis 1305:

παίδειας πολυπάτου άνθος

ώκυτερον σταδίου,

Xen. Symp. 8. 14 τὸ μὲν τῆς ἄρας άνθος ταχῦ δῆπον παρακμάζει,

Plato, Symp. 183 Ε τὸ τοῦ σῶματος άνθεὶ λήγοντι, Spenser, "An Hymne in honour of Beautie":

For that same goodly hew of white and red
With which the cheekes are sprinckled shal decay,

Ségur’s refrain: "Ah! le Temps fait passer l'Amour,” Emerson, Beauty: “The radiance of the human form . . . is only a burst of beauty for a few years or a few months, at the perfection of youth, and, in most, rapidly declines.”

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αὐτὸ καταλίπωμεν ῥηθέν, ἀλλ' ἰκανὸς ἰδωμεν. Λέγε, ἔφη. Ζωγράφος, φαμέν, ἦνιας τε γράφει καὶ χαλινών; Ναί. Ποιήσει δὲ γε σκυτοτόμος καὶ χαλκεὺς; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐπαίει οῖας δεὶ τὰς ἦνιας εἶναι καὶ τὸν χαλινὼν ὁ γραφεὺς; ἡ οὖδ' ὁ ποιήσας, ὁ τε χαλκεὺς καὶ ὁ σκυτεὺς, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος, ὡσπερ τούτοις ἐπίσταται χρήσθαι, μόνος, ὁ ἱππικός; Ἀληθέστατα. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ

D πάντα οὖτω φήσομεν ἐχεῖν; Πῶς; Περὶ ἐκαστον ταύτας τινὰς τρεῖς τέχνας εἶναι, χρησομένην, ποιήσουσαν, μμησομένην; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν ἄρετή καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης ἐκάστου σκεύους καὶ ξύλου καὶ πράξεως οὐ πρὸς ἀλλο τι ἡ τὴν χρείαν ἐστὶ, πρὸς ἢν ἂν ἐκαστον ἢ πεποιημένον ἢ πεφυκός; Οὔτως. 

Πολλή ἄρα ἀνάγκη τοῦ χρώμενον ἐκάστῳ ἐμπειρότατον τε εἶναι, καὶ ἄγγελον γίγνεσθαι τῷ ποιητῇ, οἷα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ ὁ χρήται. 

Ε ὁιον αὐλητής που αὐλοποιῷ ἔξαγγέλλει περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν, οἴ ἂν ὑπηρετῶσιν ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν, καὶ ἐπιτάξει οἴους δὲι ποιεῖν, ὁ δ' ὑπηρετήσει. Πῶς δ' οὖ; Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν εἰδῶς ἔξαγγέλλει περὶ χρηστῶν καὶ πονηρῶν αὐλῶν, ὁ δὲ πιστεύων ποιήσει; Ναί. 

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρα σκεύους ὁ μὲν ποιητῆς πίστων

a The δέ γε has almost the effect of a retort.


c For the idea that the user knows best see Cratyl. 390 b, Euthydem. 289 b, Phaedr. 274 e. Zeller, Aristotle (Eng.) ii. p. 247, attributes this "pertinent observation" to Aristotle. Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1277 b 30 αὐλητής ὁ χρώμενος. See 1282 a 21, 1289 a 17. Coleridge, Table Talk: "In general 444
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sider it fully.” “Speak on,” he said. “The painter, we say, will paint both reins and a bit.” “Yes.” “But the maker  
a will be the cobbler and the smith.” “Certainly.” “Does the painter, then, know the proper quality of reins and bit? Or does not even the maker, the cobbler and the smith, know that, but only the man who understands the use of these things, the horseman? ” “Most true.” “And shall we not say that the same holds true of everything?” “What do you mean?” “That there are some three arts concerned with everything, the user’s art,  the maker’s, and the imitator’s.” “Yes.” “Now do not the excellence, the beauty, the rightness  of every implement, living thing, and action refer solely to the use  for which each is made or by nature adapted?” “That is so.” “It quite necessarily follows, then, that the user of anything is the one who knows most of it by experience, and that he reports to the maker the good or bad effects in use of the thing he uses. As, for example, the flute-player reports to the flutemaker which flutes respond and serve rightly in flute-playing, and will order the kind that must be made, and the other will obey and serve him.” “Of course.” “The one, then, possessing knowledge, reports about the goodness or the badness of the flutes, and the other, believing, will make them.” “Yes.” “Then in respect of the same implement the maker will have those who do things for others know more about them than those for whom they are done. A groom knows more about horses than his master.” But Hazlitt disagrees with Plato’s view.

So in Laws 669 a-b, Plato says that the competent judge of a work of art must know three things, first, what it is, second, that it is true and right, and third, that it is good.

* For the reference of beauty to use see Hipp. Maj. 295 c ff.
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ὁρθὴν ἐξει περὶ κάλλους τε καὶ πονηρίας, ξυνὸν τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀκούειν παρὰ τοῦ 602 εἰδότος; ὃ δὲ χρώμενος ἐπιστήμην. Πάνυ γε, ὃ δὲ μυμήτης πότερον ἐκ τοῦ χρησθαὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐξει ὃν ἄν γράφῃ, εἴτε καλὰ καὶ ὁρθὰ εἴτε μὴ, ἣ δόξαν ὁρθὴν διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεῖναι τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἐπιτάττεσθαι οἷα χρὴ γράφειν; οὐδὲ-έτερα. Οὐτε ἄρα εἰσεται οὐτε ὁρθὰ δοξάσει ὁ μυμήτης περὶ ὃν ἄν μυμηται πρὸς κάλλος ἢ πονηρίαν. Οὐκ ἔοικεν. Χαρίεις ἂν εἰὴ ὃ ἐν τῇ ποιῆσαι μυμητικὸς πρὸς σοφίαν περὶ ὃν ἄν ποιῇ. Οὐ πάνυ.

Β' Ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ὠμως γε μυμησται, οὐκ εἴδως περὶ ἐκάστου, ὁπη πονηρών ἡ χρηστόν· ἄλλ', ὃς ἔοικεν, οἶνον φαϊνεται καλὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ μηδὲν εἰδόσι, τοῦτο μυμησται. Τι γὰρ ἄλλο; Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ὡς γε φαίνεται, ἐπιεικὸς ἡμῖν διωμολόγησαι, τὸν τε μυμητικὸν μηδὲν εἰδέναι ἄξιον λόγου περὶ ὃν μυμεῖται, ἄλλ' εἶναι παιδιαν τινα καὶ οὐ σπουδὴν τὴν μίμησιν, τοὺς τε τῆς τραγικῆς ποιήσεως ἀπτομένους ἐν ἱαμβείοις καὶ ἐν ἔπεσι πάντας εἶναι μυμητικοὺς ὡς οἶνον τε μάλιστα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

C V. Πρὸς Δίος, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τὸ δὲ δὴ μμεῖσθαι τούτο οὐ περὶ τρίτον μὲν τί ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἁληθείας; ἢ γὰρ; Ναί. Πρὸς δὲ δὴ ποιόν τί ἐστι

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a πίστιν ὁρθὴν is used because of πιστεύων above. It is a slightly derogatory synonym of δόξαν ὁρθὴν below, 602 Α. Cf. 511 ε.

b This does not contradict Book v. 477-478. For right opinion and knowledge cf. 430 Β and What Plato Said, p. 517, on Meno 98 Α-Β.

c χαρίεισ is ironical like χαριέντως in 426 Α and καλῶν in Theaet. 183 Α, but Glaucon in his answer takes it seriously.

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right belief about its excellence and defects from association with the man who knows and being compelled to listen to him, but the user will have true knowledge. " "Certainly." " And will the imitator from experience or use have knowledge whether the things he portrays are or are not beautiful and right, or will he, from compulsory association with the man who knows and taking orders from him for the right making of them, have right opinion? " "Neither." "Then the imitator will neither know nor opine rightly concerning the beauty or the badness of his imitations." "It seems not." "Most charming, then, would be the state of mind of the poetical imitator in respect of true wisdom about his creations." "Not at all." "Yet still he will none the less imitate, though in every case he does not know in what way the thing is bad or good. But, as it seems, the thing he will imitate will be the thing that appears beautiful to the ignorant multitude." "Why, what else?" "On this, then, as it seems, we are fairly agreed, that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning of the things he imitates, but that imitation is a form of play, not to be taken seriously, and that those who attempt tragic poetry, whether in iambics or heroic verse, are all altogether imitators." "By all means."

V. "In heaven's name, then, this business of imitation is concerned with the third remove from truth, is it not?" "Yes." "And now again, to what

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*b* Cf. on 536 c, p. 214, note b.
*c* Cf. 608 a.
*d* For *ἐν ἔπεισι* cf. 607 a, 379 a, *Meno* 95 d.
The antithesis of περί and πρὸς marks the transition.

Cf. Protag. 356 c, supra 523 c.

Cf. Tennyson (“The Higher Pantheism”) “For all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool.” For the illusions of sense, and measurement as a means of correcting them cf. Phileb. 41 ε-42 ά f., 55 ε, Protag. 356 c-d, Euthyphro 7 c.

ἐπιθεμενή helps to personify σκιαγραφία. Cf. Gorg. 464 c.

Adam’s “leaves no magic art untried” is misleading. ἀπολείπεν is here used as in 504 c. For the idiomatic οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει see p. 200, note b, on 533 ά.
element in man is its function and potency related?"

"Of what are you speaking?" "Of this: The same magnitude, I presume, viewed from near and from far does not appear equal." "Why, no." "And the same things appear bent and straight to those who view them in water and out, or concave and convex, owing to similar errors of vision about colours, and there is obviously every confusion of this sort in our souls. And so scene-painting in its exploitation of this weakness of our nature falls nothing short of witchcraft, and so do jugglery and many other such contrivances." "True." "And have not measuring and numbering and weighing proved to be most gracious aids to prevent the domination in our soul of the apparently greater or less or more or heavier, and to give the control to that which has reckoned and numbered or even weighed?" "Certainly." "But this surely would be the function of the part of the soul that reasons and calculates." "Why, yes, of that." "And often when this has measured and declares that certain things are larger or that some are smaller than the others or equal, there is at the same time an appearance of the contrary." "Yes." "And did we not say that it is impossible for the same thing at one time to hold contradictory opinions about the same thing?" "And we were right in affirming that." "The part of the soul, then, that opines in

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1 Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 1. 9.
3 λογισάμενον: cf. Laws 644 μ, Crito 46 μ.
4 Cf. Vol. I. p. 36, note a. Of course some of the modern connotations of "function" are unknown to Plato.
5 For λογιστικων cf. on 439 μ.
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tὰ μέτρα ἀρα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κατὰ τὰ μέτρα οὐκ ἄν εἰὴ ταύτον. Οὗ γὰρ οὖν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ μέτρῳ γε καὶ λογισμῷ πιστεῦν βέλτιστον ἄν εἰῆ τῆς ψυχῆς. Τί μὴν; Τὸ ἀρα τούτῳ ἐναντιούμενον τῶν φαύλων ἄν τι εἰη ἐν ἧμῖν. Ἀνάγκη. Τοῦτο τοιών διομολογήσασθαι βουλὸ-μενός ἔλεγον, ὅτι ἡ γραφική καὶ ὅλως ἡ μιμητική πόρρω μὲν τῆς ἄλληθείας ὃν τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται, πόρρω δὲ αὐτ φρονήσεως οὔτε τῷ ἔν B ἦμῖν προσομιλεῖ τε καὶ ἑταῖρα καὶ φίλη ἐστίν ἐπ' οὕδεν ὑγείας οὖδ' ἀληθεῖ. Παντάπασι, ἡ δ' ὅσ. Φαύλη ἀρα φαύλῳ ἔνυγγυγνομένη φαύλα γεννᾷ ἡ μιμητική. Ὕσικεν. Πότερον, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὄφειν μόνον, ἢ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν, ἢν δὴ ποίησιν ὄνομαζομεν; Εἰκός γ', ἐφη, καὶ ταύτην. Μὴ τούτω, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τῷ εἰκότῳ μόνον πιστεύ-σωμεν ἐκ τῆς γραφικῆς, ἄλλα καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὸ αὐ C ἐλθωμεν τῆς διανοιας τούτο, ὅ προσομιλεῖ ἡ τῆς ποιήσεως μιμητική, καὶ ἴδωμεν, φαύλον ἡ σπου-δαῖον ἐστίν. Ἀλλὰ χρή. Ὑδὲ δὴ προθώμεθα-πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἄνθρωπος μιμεῖται ἡ μιμητικὴ βιαίους ἡ ἐκουσίας πράξεις, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πράττεν ἢ εὖ οἰομένους ἢ κακῶς πεπραγέναι, καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ πᾶσιν ἢ λυπουμένους ἢ χαίροντας. μὴ τι ἄλλο ἦν' παρὰ ταύτα; Οὐδὲν. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐν ἄπασι τούτοις D ὄμονοντικῶς ἄνθρωπος διάκειται; ἡ ὀσπερ κατὰ

1 ἡν Ast: ἢ AM, ἢ FD.

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a Cf. 604 d, Phaedr. 253 d and e.
b Cf. Lysias ix. 4 ἐπὶ μηδὲν ὑγεῖι and for the idiom οὕδεν ὑγεῖς supra on 523 b, p. 153, note f.
c Cf. 496 λ, and on 489 d, p. 26, note b.

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contradiction of measurement could not be the same
with that which conforms to it.” “Why, no.”
“But, further, that which puts its trust in measure-
ment and reckoning must be the best part of the soul.”
“Surely.” “Then that which opposes it must belong
to the inferior elements of the soul.” “Necessarily.”
“This, then, was what I wished to have agreed upon
when I said that poetry, and in general the mimetic
art, produces a product that is far removed from truth
in the accomplishment of its task, and associates with
the part in us that is remote from intelligence, and
is its companion and friend for no sound and true
purpose.” “By all means,” said he. “Mimetic art,
then, is an inferior thing cohabiting with an inferior
and engendering inferior offspring.” “It seems so.”
“Does that,” said I, “hold only for vision or does it
apply also to hearing and to what we call poetry?”
“Presumably,” he said, “to that also.” “Let us not,
then, trust solely to the plausible analogy from paint-
ing, but let us approach in turn that part of the mind
to which mimetic poetry appeals and see whether
it is the inferior or the nobly serious part.” “So
we must.” “Let us, then, put the question thus:
Mimetic poetry, we say, imitates human beings acting
under compulsion or voluntarily, and as a result of
their actions supposing themselves to have fared
well or ill and in all this feeling either grief or joy.
Did we find anything else but this?” “Nothing.”
“Is a man, then, in all this of one mind with himself,
or just as in the domain of sight there was faction

\[a\] Cf. Phaedo 92 d διὰ τῶν εἰκότων.
\[b\] Cf. supra 399 a-b, Laws 655 d, 814 e ff., Aristot. Poet.
1448 a 1-2 ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμῶταί εἰς μιμοῦμενον πράττοντας ἀνάγκη
dὲ τούτων ἡ σπουδαίους ἡ φαύλους εἶναι, ibid. 1449 b 36-37 f.
τὴν ὁψὶν ἑστασάζει καὶ ἑναντίας εἰχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ
doξας ἀμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ταῖς
πράξεσι στασιάζει τε καὶ μάχεται αὐτὸς αὐτῷ;
ἀναμμηνήσκομαι δε, ὦτι τοῦτο γε νῦν οὐδὲν δεί
ἡμᾶς διωμολογεῖσθαι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἄνω λόγοις
ικανῶς πάντα ταῦτα διωμολογησάμεθα, ὅτι μυρίων
tουοῦτων ἑναντιωμάτων ἀμα γιγανμένων ἦ ψυχῇ
γέμει ἡμῶς. Ὄρθως, ἐφη. Ὄρθως γάρ, ἦν δ' ἔγώ· ἂλλ' ὦ τότε ἀπελίπομεν, νῦν μοι δοκεῖ ἀναγ-
Ε καίον εἶναι διεξελθεῖν. Τὸ ποιον; ἐφη. Ἀνήρ,
ἡν δ' ἕγω, ἐπιεικῆς τοιᾶσθε τύχης μετασχῶν, ὅδι
ἀπολέσας ἤ τι ἄλλο ὅπερ πλείστου ποιεῖται,
ἐλέγομεν ποι καὶ τότε ὧτι ὑάπτα ὀισε τῶν ἄλλων.
Πάνω γε. Νῦν δέ γε τόδε ἐπισκεψόμεθα· πότερον
οὐδὲν ἀξιόσεται, ἤ τοῦτο μὲν ἀδύνατον, μετριάσει
dε πως πρὸς λύπην; Οὕτω μᾶλλον, ἐφη, τό γε
604 ἀληθές. Τόδε νῦν μοι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴπε· πότερον
μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ οἰεί τῇ λύπῃ μαχεῖται τε καὶ
ἀντιτείνειν, ὅταν ὅραται ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἦ ὅταν
ἐν ἑρμήμα μόνος αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτοῦ γίγνηται; Πολὺ
ποι, ἐφη, διοίσει, ὅταν ὅραται. Μονωθεῖς δέ γε,
οἷμα, πολλὰ μὲν τολμῆσι φθεγξασθαι, ἃ εἰ τις
αὐτοῦ ἄκουσι αἰσχῦνοι' ἃν, πολλὰ δὲ ποιήσει, ἃ
οὖκ ἦν δεξιότο τινα ἰδεῖν ὅρωντα. Οὕτως ἔχει,
ἐφη.

a See What Plato Said, p. 505, on Gorg. 482 a-b.
b Cf. 534 n, and p. 394, note e, on 586 e.
c 439 b ff.
d Plato sometimes pretends to remedy an omission or to
correct himself by an afterthought. So in Book v. 449 b-c
dff., and Tim. 65 c.
e 387 D-E.
f This suggests the doctrine of μετριοπάθεια as opposed
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and strife and he held within himself contrary opinions at the same time about the same things, so also in our actions there is division and strife of the man with himself? But I recall that there is no need now of our seeking agreement on this point, for in our former discussion we were sufficiently agreed that our soul at any one moment teems with countless such self-contradictions." "Rightly," he said. "Yes, rightly," said I; "but what we then omitted must now, I think, be set forth." "What is that?" he said. "When a good and reasonable man," said I, "experiences such a stroke of fortune as the loss of a son or anything else that he holds most dear, we said, I believe, then too, that he will bear it more easily than the other sort." "Assuredly." "But now let us consider this: Will he feel no pain, or, since that is impossible, shall we say that he will in some sort be moderate in his grief?" "That," he said, "is rather the truth." "Tell me now this about him: Do you think he will be more likely to resist and fight against his grief when he is observed by his equals or when he is in solitude alone by himself?" "He will be much more restrained," he said, "when he is on view." "But when left alone, I fancy, he will permit himself many utterances which, if heard by another, would put him to shame, and will do many things which he would not consent to have another see him doing." "So it is," he said.

to the Stoic ἀπαθεία. Joel ii. p. 161 thinks the passage a polemic against Antisthenes. Seneca, Epist. xcix. 15 seems to agree with Plato rather than with the Stoics: "inhumanitas est ista non virtus." So Plutarch, Cons. ad Apol. 3 (102 c f.). See also ibid. 22 (112 Ε-Φ). Cf. Horace, Odes ii. 3. 1 "aequam memento rebus in arduis servare mentem," and also Laws 732 c, 960 α.
VI. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀντιτείνειν διακελευόμενον
Βλόγος καὶ νόμος ἔστι, τὸ δὲ ἔλκον ἐπὶ τὰς λύπας
αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος; Ἄληθῆ. Ἔναντίας δὲ ἀγωγῆς
γιγνομένης ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀμα δύο
φαμέν αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. Πῶς δὲ οὖ; Οὐκοῦν
τὸ μὲν ἔτερον τῷ νόμῳ ἐτοιμὸν πείθεσθαι, ἢ δὲ
νόμος ἐξήγειται; Πῶς; Δέγει οὖν ὁ νόμος, ὅτι
κάλλιστον ὅ τι μάλιστα ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ἐν ταῖς
ξυμφοραῖς καὶ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὥστε οὐτέ ἐν ὁμοσ
ὀντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ τῶν τουοῦτων, οὐτε
εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν οὐδὲν προβαίνου τῷ χαλεπῶς
C φέροντι, οὔτε τῷ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἄξιον ὃν μεγάλης
σπουδῆς, ὃ τε δεῖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὃ τι τάχιστα, παρα-
γίγνεσθαι ἤμιν, τούτω ἐμποδῶν γιγνόμενον τὸ
λυπεῖσθαι. Τίν, ἢ δὲ ὅσ, λέγεις; Τῷ βουλεύεσθαι,
ὅν δ' ἐγὼ, περὶ τὸ γεγονός καὶ ὠσπερ ἐν πτώσει
κύβων πρὸς τὰ πεπτωκότα τίθεσθαι τὸ αὐτοῦ
πράγματα, ὅτι δ' ὁ λόγος αἴρει βέλτιστ' ἂν ἔχειν,
ἀλλ' μὴ προσπαίσαντας καθάπερ παίδας ἐχο-
μένους τοῦ πληγέντος ἐν τῷ βοῶν διατρίβειν, ἀλλ'
D ἀεὶ ἐδίειεν τὴν ψυχὴν ὃ τι τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι πρὸς
τὸ ἐὰς τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ πεσόν τε καὶ

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a Cf. Laws 645 λ, Phaedr. 238 c, and for the conflict in
the soul also Rep. 439 b ff.

b The conflict proves that for practical purposes the soul
has parts. Cf. 436 b ff.

c Cf. Apology, in fine.

d Cf. Laws 803 b and Class. Phil. ix. p. 353, n. 3, Fried-
länder, Platon, i. p. 143.

e Höfdding, Outlines of Psychology, p. 99, refers to Saxo's
tale of the different effect which the news of the murder of
Regner Lodbrog produced on his sons: he in whom the
emotion was weakest had the greatest energy for action.

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VI. "Now is it not reason and law that exhorts him to resist, while that which urges him to give way to his grief is the bare feeling itself?" "True."
"And where there are two opposite impulses\(^a\) in a man at the same time about the same thing we say that there must needs be two things\(^b\) in him." "Of course." "And is not the one prepared to follow the guidance of the law as the law leads and directs?"
"How so?" "The law, I suppose, declares that it is best to keep quiet as far as possible in calamity and not to chafe and repine, because we cannot know what is really good and evil in such things\(^c\) and it advantages us nothing to take them hard, and nothing in mortal life is worthy of great concern\(^d\) and our grieving checks\(^e\) the very thing we need to come to our aid as quickly as possible in such case." "What thing," he said, "do you mean?" "To deliberate,\(^f\)" I said, "about what has happened to us, and, as it were in the fall of the dice,\(^g\) to determine the movements of our affairs with reference to the numbers that turn up, in the way that reason indicates\(^h\) would be the best, and, instead of stumbling like children, clapping one's hands to the stricken spot\(^i\) and wasting the time in wailing, ever to accustom the soul to devote itself at once to the curing of the hurt and the raising up of what

\(\text{\textsuperscript{f}}\) Cf. Shakes. Richard II. iii. ii. 178:

My lord, wise men ne'er sit and wail their woes
But presently prevent the ways to wail,

Herod. i. 20 πρὸς τὸ παρέθυμ θουλεύσαι.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{g}}\) Cf. Eurip. Electra 639 and fr. 175 πρὸς τὸ πίπτον, Iph. Aul. 1343 and Hippol. 718 πρὸς τὰ νῦν πεπτωκότα, Epictet. ii. 5. 3. See also Stallbaum ad loc.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{h}}\) Cf. 440 B, 607 B, Herod. i. 132.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{i}}\) Cf. Demosthenes' description of how barbarians box iv. 40 (51), ἀεὶ τῆς πληγῆς ἔχεται.
νοσήσαν, ἰατρικὴ θρησδίαν ἀφαιτοῦντα. Ὁρθό-
tata γοῦν ἂν τις, ἔφη, πρὸς τὰς τύχας οὕτω
προσφέροντο. Οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, τὸ μὲν βέλτιστον
τοῦτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ ἔθελε ἐπεσθαί. Δῆλον δὴ.
Τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναμνήσεις τε τοῦ πάθους καὶ πρὸς
τοὺς ὄδυμοις ἄγων καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχον αὐτῶν
ἄρ’ οὐκ ἀλογιστὸν τὸ φήσομεν εἶναι καὶ ἀργόν καὶ
deiλίας φίλου; Φήσομεν μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν τὸ
Ε μὲν πολλὴν μίμησιν καὶ ποικίλην ἔχει, τὸ ἀγα-
νακτητικόν· τὸ δὲ φρόνημόν τε καὶ ἡσύχιον ἤθος
παραπλήσιον ὅν ἄεὶ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, οὔτε ράδιον μιμή-
σασθαι οὔτε μιμοῦμενον εὔπετές καταμαθεῖν, ἀλλος
tε καὶ πανηγύρει καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς
θέατρα ἐξηλλεγομένοις. ἀλλοτρίου γὰρ ποιν πάθους
605 ἡ μίμησις αὐτοῖς γίγνεται. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Ὑν δὴ μιμητικὸς ποιητὴς δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πρὸς τὸ
τοιοῦτον τῆς ψυχῆς πέφυκε γε καὶ ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ
tοῦτῳ ἄρεσκεν πέπηγεν, εἰ μέλλει εὐδοκιμήσειν
ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν τε
καὶ ποικίλον ἤθος διὰ τὸ εὐμίμητον εἶναι. Δῆλον.
Οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν αὐτοῦ ἤθη ἐπιλαμβανομέθα,
καὶ τιθείμεν ἀντίστροφον αὐτῶν τῷ ἐξωγράφῳ;
καὶ γὰρ τῷ φαῦλα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀλλήθειν ἔοικεν
αὐτῷ, καὶ τῷ πρὸς ἔτερον τοιοῦτον ὁμιλεῖν τῆς
Β ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, καὶ ταύτῃ
ἄμοιωται· καὶ οὕτως ἤθη ἂν ἐν δίκῃ οὐ παραδεχοί-

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*a Cf. Soph. Ajax 582 ῥηνεῖν ἐπιφῆς πρὸς τομῶν πήματι
with Ovid, Met. i. 190:
sed immedicabile vulnus
ense recidendum est.

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has fallen, banishing threnody\(^a\) by therapy.'" "That certainly," he said, "would be the best way to face misfortune and deal with it." "Then, we say, the best part of us is willing to conform to these precepts of reason." "Obviously." "And shall we not say that the part of us that leads us to dwell in memory on our suffering and impels us to lamentation, and cannot get enough of that sort of thing, is the irrational and idle part of us, the associate of cowardice\(^b\)?" "Yes, we will say that." "And does not the fretful part of us present\(^c\) many and varied occasions for imitation, while the intelligent and temperate disposition, always remaining approximately the same, is neither easy to imitate nor to be understood when imitated, especially by a nondescript mob assembled in the theatre? For the representation imitates a type that is alien to them." "By all means." "And is it not obvious that the nature of the mimetic poet is not related to this better part of the soul and his cunning is not framed\(^d\) to please it, if he is to win favour with the multitude, but is devoted to the fretful and complicated type of character because it is easy to imitate?" "It is obvious." "This consideration, then, makes it right for us to proceed to lay hold of him and set him down as the counterpart\(^e\) of the painter; for he resembles him in that his creations are inferior in respect of reality; and the fact that his appeal is to the inferior part of the soul and not to the best part is another point of resemblance. And so we may at last say that we should be

\(^a\) Cf. on 603 b, p. 450, note a.
\(^b\) \(\varepsilon \chi \varepsilon \) in the sense of "involves," "admits of," as frequently in Aristotle's Metaphysics.
\(^c\) For \(\pi \varepsilon \pi \gamma \gamma \varepsilon \) cf. 530 b.
\(^d\) \(\alpha \nu \tau \iota \iota \sigma \tau \rho \rho \rho \) is used as in Aristot. Rhet. 1354 a 1.
μεθα εἰς μέλλουσαν εὐνομεῖσθαι πόλιν, ὅτι τούτο ἐγείρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τρέφει καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ποιῶν ἀπόλλυσι τὸ λογιστικόν, ὥσπερ εἰν πόλει ὅταν τις μοχθηρὸς ἐγκρατεῖς ποιῶν παραδίδῃ τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ χαριστέρους φθείρῃ· ταύτων καὶ τῶν μυμητικῶν ποιητῶν φήσομεν κακὴν πολυτειάν ἴδια ἐκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ ἐμποιεῖν, τῷ ἀνοήτω αὐτῆς
C χαριζόμενον καὶ οὔτε τὰ μείζω οὔτε τὰ ἐλάττων διαγινώσκοντι, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοτέ μὲν μεγάλα ἡγομένως, τοτέ δὲ σμικρὰ, εἰδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθοῦς πόρρω πάνω ἀφεστῶτα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

VII. Οὐ μέντοι πω τὸ γε μέγιστον κατηγορήκαμεν αὐτῆς. τὸ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἔπειεκές ἰκανίν εἶναι λυβάσθαι, ἐκτὸς πάνω τινῶν διόγων, πάνθεων ποι. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλειν, εἴπερ γε δρά αὐτῷ; Ἀκούων σκόπει. οἱ γὰρ ποι βελτιστοὶ ἡμῶν ἀκρογόμενοι Ὁμήρου ἡ ἄλλον τινὸς τῶν τραγῳδό- Д ποιῶν μμομενένον τινά τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ρήσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς, ἣ καὶ ἄδοντας τε καὶ κοππομένους, οἷον ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπόμεθα ξυμπάχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπανομοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, ὁς ἄν ἡμᾶς ὸ τί μᾶλλον οὐτώ διαθή. Οἶδα· πῶς δ' οὖ· ὃν τοι δὲ οἰκεῖον τινι ἡμῶν κῆδος γένηται, ἔννοεὶς αὐτὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καλλωπιζόμεθα, ἄν ὄντως ἡμὰς ἄγειν καὶ Ε καρτερεῖν, ὡς τοῦτο μὲν ἄνδρος ὤν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ

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a Cf. p. 412, note d.  b Cf. p. 420, note a, on 595 B-c.

Cf. for ἐν πένθει cf. Soph. El. 290, 846, Herod. i. 46.

d Cf. Phileb. 48 A.

c See the description in Ion 535 ε, and Laws 800 d.

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justified in not admitting him into a well-ordered state, because he stimulates and fosters this element in the soul, and by strengthening it tends to destroy the rational part, just as when in a state one puts bad men in power and turns the city over to them and ruins the better sort. Precisely in the same manner we shall say that the mimetic poet sets up in each individual soul a vicious constitution by fashioning phantoms far removed from reality, and by currying favour with the senseless element that cannot distinguish the greater from the less, but calls the same thing now one, now the other.” “By all means.”

VII. “But we have not yet brought our chief accusation against it. Its power to corrupt, with rare exceptions, even the better sort is surely the chief cause for alarm.” “How could it be otherwise, if it really does that?” “Listen and reflect. I think you know that the very best of us, when we hear Homer or some other of the makers of tragedy imitating one of the heroes who is in grief, and is delivering a long tirade in his lamentations or chanting and beating his breast, feel pleasure, and abandon ourselves and accompany the representation with sympathy and eagerness, and we praise as an excellent poet the one who most strongly affects us in this way.” “I do know it, of course.” “But when in our own lives some affliction comes to us, you are also aware that we plume ourselves upon the opposite, on our ability to remain calm and endure, in the belief that this is the conduct of a man, and what we were praising in the theatre that of a woman.” “I do note that.” “Do you think, then,” said I, “that

1 This is qualified in 387 e-388 a by οὐδὲ ταύτας σπουδαίας. Cf. also 398 e.
γυναίκος, ὁ τότε ἐπηνοοῦμεν. Ἐννοο, ἔφη. Ἡ καλῶς ὁμν., ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οὗτος ὁ ἔπαινος ἔχει, τὸ ὀρῶντα τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα, οἷον ἑαυτὸν τις μὴ ἄξιοι εἶναι ἀλλ’ αἰσχύνοιτο ἃν, μὴ βδελύττεσθαι ἀλλὰ χαίρειν τε καὶ ἔπαινεν; Οὐ μά τὸν Δῆ, ἔφη, οὗκ 606 εὐλόγῳ ἔοικεν. Ναὶ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, εἰ ἐκείνη γ’ αὐτὸ σκοποῖς. Πῇ; Εἰ ἐνθυμοῦ, ὅτι τὸ βιά κατ- εχόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖσ οἰκείαις ἔμμορφαι καὶ πε- πεινηκὸς τοῦ δακρύσατε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι ἰκανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, φύσει ὁν τοιοῦτον οἷου τοῦτων ἐπιθυμεῖν, τότ’ ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πυμπλάμενον καὶ χαίρων· τὸ δὲ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν, ἄτε οὐχ ἰκανῶς πεπαιδευμένον λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἔθει, ἀνύμι τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ θρηνώδους τοῦτον, Βάτε ἄλλοτρια πάθη θεωροῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ οὔδ’ αἰσχρὸν ὄν, εἰ ἂλλος ἁνὴρ ἄγαθὸς φάσκων εἶναι ἀκαίρως πενθεῖ, τοῦτον ἔπαινει καὶ ἐλεεῖν· ἀλλ’ ἐκείνῳ κερδαίνειν ἤγείται, τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ οὐκ ἄν δεξαίτο αὐτῆς στερηθῆναι καταφρονήσας οἷον τοῦ ποιήματος. λογίζοικα γὰρ, οἶμαι, ὅλιγος τοι ἐκέεσθ’ ότι ἀπολαύειν ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ οἰκεία· θρέψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλεεινὸν οὐ ράδιον ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ


b Cf. Isoc. Panegyr. 168 for a different application.

this praise is rightfully bestowed when, contemplating a character that we would not accept but would be ashamed of in ourselves, we do not abominate it but take pleasure and approve?" "No, by Zeus," he said, "it does not seem reasonable." "Oh yes," said I, "if you would consider it in this way." "In what way?" "If you would reflect that the part of the soul that in the former case, in our own misfortunes, was forcibly restrained, and that has hungered for tears and a good cry and satisfaction, because it is its nature to desire these things, is the element in us that the poets satisfy and delight, and that the best element in our nature, since it has never been properly educated by reason or even by habit, then relaxes its guard over the plaintive part, inasmuch as this is contemplating the woes of others and it is no shame to it to praise and pity another who, claiming to be a good man, abandons himself to excess in his grief; but it thinks this vicarious pleasure is so much clear gain and would not consent to forfeit it by disdaining the poem altogether. That is, I think, because few are capable of reflecting that what we enjoy in others will inevitably react upon ourselves. For after feeding fat the emotion of pity there, it is not easy to restrain it in our own sufferings." "Most imperatively requiring awe and sorrow of some kind, for the noble grief we should have borne with our fellows, and the pure tears we should have wept with them, we gloat over the pathos of the police court and gather the night dew of the grave."

a This anticipates the idea of the "censor" in modern psychology.

Cf. τῆς ἀσφαλείας κερδανείς Eurip. Herc. Fur. 604, which is frequently misinterpreted; Herod. viii. 60. 3.

Cf. 442 a.
C πάθει κατέχειν. Ἄρνηστατα, ἔφη. Ἄρνοι, εἰς αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ γελοίου, ὅτι, ἄν αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοι γελωτοποιῶν, ἐν μιμήσει δὴ κωμωδικῇ ἥ καὶ ἱδίᾳ ἀκούων σφόδρα χαρῆς καὶ μὴ μισῆς ὡς πονηρά, ταύτων ποιεῖς ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέουσι; ὅ γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὶ κατείχες ἐν σαυτῷ βουλόμενον γελωτοποιεῖν, φοβοῦμενος δόξαν βωμολοχίας, τῷ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐκεῖ νεανικῶν ποιήσας ἔλαθες πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς οὐκείοις ἐξενεχθεῖς ὡστε

D κωμωδοποιῶς γενέσθαι. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων δὴ καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν τε καὶ λυπηρῶν καὶ ήδέων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἔφη, ἄρα ταύτα ἡμῖν πάση πράξει ἢμιν ἐπεσθαί, ὅτι τοιαύτα ἦμας ἡ ποιητικὴ μέμνησις ἐργάζεται; τρέφει γὰρ ταύτα ἀρδουσά, δέον αὐχμεῖν, καὶ ἀρχοντα ἢμιν καθίστησι, δέον ἀρχεσθαι αὐτά, ἣν βελτίων τε καὶ εὐδαμονέστεροι ἀντὶ χειρόνων καὶ ἀθλωτέρων γιγνώμεθα. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως φάναι,

Ε ἦ δ᾽ ὦς. Οὐκοῦν, εἰπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅταν Ὀμήρου ἐπαινέταις ἐντύχης λέγουσιν, ὡς τὴν Ἐλλάδα πεπαίδευκεν οὐτος ὁ ποιητής, καὶ πρὸς διοίκησιν τε καὶ παιδείαν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἄξιος ἀναλαβόντι μανθάνειν τε καὶ κατὰ

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*b* In the *Laws* 816 ἅ-ἔ Plato says that the citizens must witness such performances since the serious cannot be learned without the laughable, nor anything without its opposite; but they may not take part in them. That is left to slaves and foreigners. *Cf.* also Vol. I. p. 239, note b, on 396 ἔ.

*c* i.e. as opposed to public performances. *Cf.* Euthydem.
true," he said. "Does not the same principle apply to the laughable,\(^a\) namely, that if in comic representations,\(^b\) or for that matter in private talk,\(^c\) you take intense pleasure in buffooneries that you would blush to practise yourself, and do not detest them as base, you are doing the same thing as in the case of the pathetic? For here again what your reason, for fear of the reputation of buffoonery, restrained in yourself when it fain would play the clown, you release in turn, and so, fostering its youthful impudence, let yourself go so far that often ere you are aware you become yourself a comedian in private." "Yes, indeed," he said. "And so in regard to the emotions of sex and anger, and all the appetites and pains and pleasures of the soul which we say accompany all our actions,\(^d\) the effect of poetic imitation is the same. For it waters\(^e\) and fosters these feelings when what we ought to do is to dry them up, and it establishes them as our rulers when they ought to be ruled, to the end that we may be better and happier men instead of worse and more miserable." "I cannot deny it," said he. "Then, Glaucon," said I, "when you meet encomiasts of Homer who tell us that this poet has been the educator of Hellas,\(^f\) and that for the conduct and refinement\(^g\) of human life he is worthy of our study

\(^{305}\) \text{d} \epsilon ν dε τοὺς ἰδίους λόγους, \text{Theaet.} 177 \text{v}, \text{Soph.} 232 \text{c} \epsilon ν \gamma dε τοὺς ἰδίους συνουσίας, and \text{Soph.} 222 \text{c} \piροσομιλητικὴν \text{with Quintil. iii. 4. 4.}\) \text{Wilamowitz, Antigonos von Karystos, p. 285, fantastically says that it means prose and refers to Sophron. He compares 366 ε. But see \text{Laws} 935 \text{b-c.}}

\(^{d}\) \text{Cf. supra 603 ε.}

\(^{e}\) \text{Cf. 550 \text{v.}}

\(^{f}\) \text{Isocrates, \text{Panegyr.} 159, says Homer was given a place in education because he celebrated those who fought against the barbarians. \text{Cf. also Aristoph. \text{Frogs} 1034 ff.}}

\(^{g}\) \text{The same conjunction is implied in Protagoras's teaching, \text{Protag.} 318 \text{ε and} 317 \text{v.}}

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tοῦτον τὸν ποιητὴν πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν βίον κατα-
607 σκευασάμενον ζῆν, φιλεῖν μὲν χρῆ καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι
ὡς οὖντας βελτίστους εἰς οὕσον δύνανται, καὶ
συγχωρεῖν ὃμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶ-
tον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν, εἰδέναι δὲ, ὦτι οὕσον μόνον
ύμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς ποιήσεως
παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν· εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην
Μοῦσαν παραδέξει ἐν μέλεσιν ἡ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονῇ σοι
καὶ λύπῃ ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον ἀντὶ νόμου τε
καὶ τοῦ κοὐνη ἂεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου.
'Αληθέστατα, ἐφη.

Β VIII. Ταῦτα δὴ, ἐφην, ἀπολεογήσθω ἡμῖν
ἀναμνησθεὶς περὶ ποιήσεως, ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα
τότε αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπεστέλλομεν τοιαύτην
οὕσαν· ο γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἦρει. προσεῖπωμεν δὲ
αὐτῇ, μή καὶ τινα σκληρότητα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀγροικίαν
καταγνῷ, ὅτι παλαιὰ μὲν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίας
tε καὶ ποιητικῆ· καὶ γὰρ ἡ λακέρυξα πρὸς δε-
σπόταν κῶν ἐκείνη κραυγάζουσα, καὶ μέγας ἐν

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a For the μὲν cf. Symp. 180 e, Herod. vii. 102.
b The condescending tone is that of Euthydem. 306 c-d.
c Aristotle, Poet. 1453 a 29, says that Euripides is τραγικώ-
tatos of poets.
d Cf. 605 c, 595 b-c.
e Cf. Laws 801 d-e, 829 c-d, supra 397 c-d, 459 e, 468 d,
Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 142, and my review of Pater, Plato
and Platonism, in The Dial, 14 (1893) p. 211.
f Cf. Laws 802 c τῆς γλυκείας Μοῦσης. See Finsler,
g See on 604 c, p. 455, note h.
h For the quarrel between philosophy and poetry cf. Laws
967 c-d, Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 136. It still goes on in
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and devotion, and that we should order our entire lives by the guidance of this poet, we must love and salute them as doing the best they can, and concede to them that Homer is the most poetic of poets and the first of tragedians, but we must know the truth, that we can admit no poetry into our city save only hymns to the gods and the praises of good men. For if you grant admission to the honeyed muse in lyric or epic, pleasure and pain will be lords of your city instead of law and that which shall from time to time have approved itself to the general reason as the best.” “Most true,” he said.

VIII. “Let us, then, conclude our return to the topic of poetry and our apology, and affirm that we really had good grounds then for dismissing her from our city, since such was her character. For reason constrained us. And let us further say to her, lest she condemn us for harshness and rusticity, that there is from of old a quarrel between philosophy and poetry. For such expressions as ‘the yelping hound barking at her master and mighty in the idle babble of fools,’

Do not all charms fly
At the mere touch of cold philosophy?

Wordsworth, “A Poet’s Epitaph”:

Philosopher! a fingering slave,
One that would peep and botanize
Upon his mother’s grave.


W. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 252, conjectures that these quotations are from Sophron; cf. also ibid. ii. pp. 386-387.
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C ἄφρόνων κενεαγορίαις, καὶ ὁ τῶν διασόφων ὀχλὸς κρατῶν, καὶ οἱ λεπτῶς μεριμνῶντες ὃτι ἄρα πένονται, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία σημεία παλαιᾶς ἐναντίωσεως τούτων. ὄμως δὲ εἰρήσθω, ὃτι ἴμεις γε, εἰ τινὰ ἔχοι λόγον εἰπεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ ἡ μίμησις, ὥσ χρῆ αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐν πόλει εὐ
νομομεμένη, ἀσμενοὶ ἂν καταδεχομέθα. ὡς ξύνισμέν γε ἴμων αὐτοὺς κηλουμένους ὑπ' αὐτῆς· ἄλλα γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὁσιον προδίδοναι. 

D ἡ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, οὐ κηλεὶ ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ σὺ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν δι' Ὄμιρου θεωρῆσ αὐτὴν; Πολὺ γε. Ὅνικοῦν δικαίᾳ ἑστὶν ὤτῳ κατέναι, ἀπο
λογησαμένη1 ἐν μέλει ἡ τινὰ ἀλλὰ μέτρω; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Δούμεν δὲ γέ που ἄν καὶ τοῖς προστάταις αὐτῆς, ὅσοι μὴ ποιητικοί, φιλοποιηταί δέ, ἀνευ
μέτρου λόγον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐ μόνον ἡδεία ἄλλα καὶ ωφελίμη πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐστὶ καὶ εὐμενῶς ἄκουσο-

Ε μεθα. κερδανοῦμεν γὰρ ποιου, ἐὰν μὴ μόνον ἡδεία φανῇ ἄλλα καὶ ωφελίμη. Πῶς δ' ὦ μέλλομεν, ἐφη, κερδαίνειν; Εἰ δὲ γε μὴ, ὦ φίλε ἐταίρε, ὡσπερ οἱ ποτὲ τοῦ ἐρασθέντες, ἐὰν ἤγησώνται μὴ 
ωφελιμον εἶναι τὸν ἑρωτα, βία μὲν, ὄμως δὲ ἀπ-
έχονται, καὶ ἴμεις οὕτως, διὰ τὸν ἐγγεγονότα μὲν

1 ἀπολογησαμένη Α, ἀπολογησαμένη FD, ἀπολογησαμένη Α²Μ.

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a Cf. p. 420, note b, on 595 c.
b Cf. supra, Introd. p. lxiii.
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and 'the mob that masters those who are too wise for their own good,' and the subtle thinkers who reason that after all they are poor, and countless others are tokens of this ancient enmity. But nevertheless let it be declared that, if the mimetic and dulcet poetry can show any reason for her existence in a well-governed state, we would gladly admit her, since we ourselves are very conscious of her spell. But all the same it would be impious to betray what we believe to be the truth. a Is not that so, friend? Do not you yourself feel her magic b and especially when Homer c is her interpreter?" "Greatly." "Then may she not justly return from this exile after she has pleaded her defence, whether in lyric or other measure?" "By all means." "And we would allow her advocates who are not poets but lovers of poetry to plead her cause d in prose without metre, and show that she is not only delightful but beneficial to orderly government and all the life of man. And we shall listen benevolently, for it will be clear gain for us if it can be shown that she bestows not only pleasure but benefit." "How could we help being the gainers?" said he. "But if not, my friend, even as men who have fallen in love, if they think that the love is not good for them, hard though it be, e nevertheless refrain, so we,

a In Laws 658 d Plato says that old men would prefer Homer and epic to any other literary entertainment.

b This challenge was taken up by Aristotle (Poetics), Plutarch (Quomodo adolescens), Sidney (Defence of Poesie), and many others.

ἐρωτα τῆς τοιαύτης ποιήσεως ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν καλῶν 608 πολιτειῶν τροφῆς, εἰ δὲ μὲν ἐσόμεθα φανήναι αὐτὴν ὡς βελτίστην καὶ ἀληθεστάτην, ἦσω δ’ ἄν μὴ οὐ τ’ ἢ ἀπολογήσασθαι, ἀκροασόμεθ’ αὐτῆς ἐπάδοντες ἦμῖν αὐτοὺς τούτοις τῶν λόγου, ὅν λέγομεν, καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήν, εὐλαβοῦμενοι πάλιν ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς τὸν παιδικὸν τε καὶ τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἐρωτα. αἰσθόμεθα ἡ δ’ οὖν, ὡς οὐ σπουδαστεόν ἑπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ποιήσει ὡς ἀληθείας τε ἀπτομένη καὶ σπουδαῖα, ἀλλ’ εὐλαβητέον αὐτὴν. Β τῶ ἀκρωμένως, περὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείας δεδιότι, καὶ νομιστέα ἀπερ εὑρήκαμεν περὶ ποιήσεως. Παντάπασιν, ἡ δ’ οὐς, ξύμφημι. Μέγας γάρ, ἡφην, ὁ ἁγών, ὃ φίλε Γλαύκων, μέγας, οὐχ ὁσος δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι, ὥστε οὕτε τομῇ ἐπαρθέντα οὕτε χρήματοι οὕτε ἀρχῇ οὐδεμία οὐδὲ γε ποιητικὴ ἄξιον ἀμεληθαι δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς. Ξύμφημί σοι, ἡφη, ἓ ἡν διεληλύθαμεν οἴμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ὄντων.

C IX. Καὶ μὴν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, τά γε μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα ἀρετῆς καὶ προκείμενα ἅθλα οὐ διεληλύθαμεν Ἄμήχανον τι, ἡφη, λέγεις μέγεθος, εἰ τῶν εὑρήμε-

1 αἰσθόμεθα AFDM, εἰσόμεθα scr. Mon., ἄσωμεθα Madvig, followed by Burnet.
2 ADM have ὅν after αὐτὴν, Φ ὅν. More recent ms. omit it.

a Ironical, as καλλίστη in 562 Α.
owing to the love of this kind of poetry inbred in us by our education in these fine polities of ours, will gladly have the best possible case made out for her goodness and truth, but so long as she is unable to make good her defence we shall chant over to ourselves as we listen the reasons that we have given as a counter-charm to her spell, to preserve us from slipping back into the childish loves of the multitude; for we have come to see that we must not take such poetry seriously as a serious thing that lays hold on truth, but that he who lends an ear to it must be on his guard fearing for the polity in his soul and must believe what we have said about poetry." "By all means," he said, "I concur." "Yes, for great is the struggle," I said, "dear Glaucon, a far greater contest than we think it, that determines whether a man prove good or bad, so that not the lure of honour or wealth or any office, no, nor of poetry either, should incite us to be careless of righteousness and all excellence." "I agree with you," he replied, "in view of what we have set forth, and I think that anyone else would do so too."

IX. "And yet," said I, "the greatest rewards of virtue and the prizes proposed for her we have not set forth." "You must have in mind an inconceivable magnitude," he replied, "if there are other
Would she have heart to endure for the life of the worm
and the fly?
She desires no isles of the blest, no quiet seats of the just,
To rest in a golden grove, or to bask in a summer sky:
Give her the wages of going on, and not to die.

a Clement, Strom. iv. p. 496 b οὔνοικεν ἄφετη τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπων μόνη οὐκ ἐκ θυραίων τάπιξερα λαμβάνει, αὐτῇ δ' ἐαντὴν ἄθλα τῶν πόνων ἐχει. Tennyson, “Wages”:

. . . if the wages of Virtue be dust,

b Tennyson, “Locksley Hall Sixty Years After”:

Good, for Good is Good, he follow’d, yet he look’d beyond
the grave . . .

Truth for truth, and good for good! The Good, the True,
the Pure, the Just—
Take the charm “For ever” from them, and they crumble
into dust.

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things greater than those of which we have spoken." "What great thing," said I, "could there be in a little time? For surely the whole time from the boy to the old man would be small compared with all time." "Nay, it is nothing," he said. "What then? Do you think that an immortal thing ought to be seriously concerned for such a little time, and not rather for all time?" "I think so," he said; "but what is this that you have in mind?" "Have you never perceived," said I, "that our soul is immortal and never perishes?" And he, looking me full in the face in amazement, said, "No, by Zeus, not I; but are you able to declare this?" "I certainly ought to be," said I, "and I think you too can, for it is nothing hard." "It is for me," he said; "and I would gladly hear from you this thing that is not hard." "Listen," said I. "Just speak on," he replied. "You speak of good and evil, do you not?" "I do." "Is your notion of them the same as mine?" "What is it?" "That which destroys and corrupts in every case is the evil; that which preserves and benefits is the

\textit{Cf.} on 486 \textit{A}, p. 9, note \textit{f} and 498 \textit{D}.
\textit{d} For the colourless use of \textit{πράγμα} see What Plato Said, p. 497, on \textit{Protag.} 330 c-d. \textit{Cf.} Shakes. \textit{Hamlet}, i. iv. 67 "being a thing immortal as itself."
\textit{e} \textit{ἐμβλέψας: cf.} \textit{Charmides} 155 c.
\textit{f} Glaucón is surprised in spite of 498 \textit{D}. Many uncertain inferences have been drawn from the fact that in spite of the \textit{Phaedo} and \textit{Phaedrus} (245 c ff.) interlocutors in Plato are always surprised at the idea of immortality. \textit{Cf. supra, Introd.} p. lxiv.
\textit{g} For the idiomatic \textit{ἐλ ἐν ἀδικώ} \textit{cf.} 430 \textit{E}, \textit{Charm.} 156 \textit{A}, \textit{Menex.} 236 \textit{B}, \textit{infra} 612 \textit{D}.

\textit{h} \textit{Cf.} \textit{Protag.} 341 \textit{A} τὸ \textit{χαλεπόν} \textit{τούτο}, which is a little different, Herod. vii. 11 τὸ \textit{δεινόν} τὸ \textit{πείσομαι}.
εφη. Τί δέ; κακῶν ἐκάστῳ τι καὶ ἀγαθῶν λέγεις; 609 οἷον ὀφθαλμῶν ὀφθαλμίαι καὶ ξύμπαντι τῷ σώματι νόσον, σίτῳ τε ἐρυσίβην, σηπεδόνα τε ξύλους, χαλκῷ δὲ καὶ σιδήρῳ ἰόν, καὶ, ὅπερ λέγω, σχεδὸν πάσι ξύμφυτον ἐκάστῳ κακῶν τε καὶ νόσημα; 'Εγωγ' ἐφη. Οὐκόν ὅταν τῷ τι τούτων προσγένηται, πονηρὸν τε ποιεῖ ὃς προσεγένετο, καὶ τελευτῶν ὅλον διέλυσε καὶ ἀπώλεσεν; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Τὸ ξύμφυτον ἀρα κακῶν ἐκάστου καὶ ἡ πονηρία ἐκαστον ἀπόλλυσον, ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀπόλει, οὐκ ἂν Ὁ ἄλλο γε αὐτὸ ἐτί διαφθείρειεν. οὐ γὰρ τὸ γε ἀγαθὸν μὴ ποτὲ τι ἀπόλεσῃ, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τὸ μήτε κακῶν μὴτε ἀγαθὸν. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἐφη. Ἰαν ἀρα τι εὐρίσκωμεν τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἐστι μὲν κακῶν, ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὸ μοχθηρόν, τοῦτο μέντοι οὐχ οἶον τε αὐτὸ λύειν ἀπολλύσον, οὐκ ἢ ἡ ἐιςόμεθα, ὅτι τοῦ πεφυκότος ὄντως ὀλέθρος οὐκ ἵν; Οὔτως, ἐφη, εἰκός. Τί οὖν; ἢν δ' ἐγὼ· ψυχή ἀρ' οὐκ ἔστων ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὴν κακῆν; Καὶ μᾶλ', ἐφη, ἢ νῦν δὴ C διήμεν πάντα, ἀδικία τε καὶ ἀκολοσία καὶ δελία καὶ ἀμαθία. Ἡ οὖν τι τούτων αὐτήν διαλύει τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσι; καὶ ἐννόει, μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν οἰρθέντες τὸν ἅδικον ἀνθρώπον καὶ ἀνόητον, ὅταν ληφθῇ ἅδικῶν, τότε ἀπολλεῖν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, πονηρίας οὐσίας ψυχῆς; ἀλλ' ὅδε ποιεῖ· ωσπερ σῶμα ἡ σώματος πονηρία νόσος οὖσα τῆς καὶ διόλυσε καὶ ἀγεῖ εἰς τὸ μηδὲ σῶμα εἶναι, καὶ ἂ

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a Ruskin, *Time and Tide* § 52 (Brantwood ed. p. 68): “Every faculty of man's soul, and every instinct of it by which he is meant to live, is exposed to its own special form of corruption”; Boethius, *Cons.* iii. 11 (L.C.L. trans. p. 283), things are destroyed by what is hostile; Aristot. *Top.* 124 a 28 εἰ γὰρ τὸ φθαρτικὸν διαλυτικὸν.

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good.” “Yes, I think so,” he said. “How about this: Do you say that there is for everything its special good and evil, as for example for the eyes ophthalmia, for the entire body disease, for grain mildew, rotting for wood, rust for bronze and iron, and, as I say, for practically everything its congenital evil and disease?” “I do,” he said. “Then when one of these evils comes to anything does it not make the thing to which it attaches itself bad, and finally disintegrate and destroy it?” “Of course.” “Then the congenital evil of each thing and its own vice destroys it, or if that is not going to destroy it, nothing else remains that could; for obviously the good will never destroy anything, nor yet again will that which is neutral and neither good nor evil.” “How could it?” he said. “If, then, we discover anything that has an evil which vitiates it, yet is not able to dissolve and destroy it, shall we not thereupon know that of a thing so constituted there can be no destruction?” “That seems likely,” he said. “Well, then,” said I, “has not the soul something that makes it evil?” “Indeed it has,” he said, “all the things that we were just now enumerating, injustice and licentiousness and cowardice and ignorance.” “Does any one of these things dissolve and destroy it? And reflect, lest we be misled by supposing that when an unjust and foolish man is taken in his injustice he is then destroyed by the injustice, which is the vice of soul. But conceive it thus: Just as the vice of body which is disease wastes and destroys it so that it no longer is a body at all, in like manner in all the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{b} \gamma \epsilon \upsilon \text{ termini. \ Cf. 379 a, Phaedo 106 d.}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{c} See What Plato Said, p. 490, on Lysis 216 c.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{d} Cf. Vol. I. p. 529, note a, on 478 d.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{e} Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1309 b 28 μηδε \rhoινα \ ποιησει \ φαινεσθαι.}\]
The argument that follows is strictly speaking a fallacy in that it confounds the soul with the physical principle of life. Cf. on 335 c and on 352 e, Gorg. 477 b-c, and supra, Introd. p. lxvii. But Dean Inge, "Platonism and Human Immortality" (Aristot. Soc., 1919, p.288) says: "Plato's argument, in the tenth book of the Republic, for the immortality of the soul, has found a place in scholastic theology, but is supposed to have been discredited by Kant. I venture to
examples of which we spoke it is the specific evil which, by attaching itself to the thing and dwelling in it with power to corrupt, reduces it to nonentity. Is not that so?" "Yes." "Come, then, and consider the soul in the same way." Do injustice and other wickedness dwelling in it, by their indwelling and attachment to it, corrupt and wither it till they bring it to death and separate it from the body?" "They certainly do not do that," he said. "But surely," said I, "it is unreasonable to suppose that the vice of something else destroys a thing while its own does not." "Yes, unreasonable." "For observe, Glaucon," said I, "that we do not think it proper to say of the body either that it is destroyed by the badness of foods themselves, whether it be staleness or rottenness or whatever it is; but when the badness of the foods themselves engenders in the body the defect of body, then we shall say that it is destroyed owing to these foods, but by its own vice, which is disease. But the body being one thing and the foods something else, we shall never expect the body to be destroyed by their badness, that is by an alien evil that has not produced in it the evil that belongs to it by nature." "You are entirely right," he replied.

"On the same principle," said I, "if the badness of the body does not produce in the soul the

think that his argument, that the soul can only be destroyed by an enemy (so to speak) in pari materia, is sound. Physical evils, including death, cannot touch the soul. And wickedness does not, in our experience, dissolve the soul, nor is wickedness specially apparent when the soul (if it perishes at death) would be approaching dissolution." Cf. 610 c. Someone might object that wickedness does destroy the soul, conceived as a spiritual principle.

Plato generally disregards minor distinctions when they do not affect his point.

Cf. 610 d.
μή ποτε ἀξιώμεν ὕπ’ ἀλλοτρίου κακοῦ ἀνευ τῆς ἱδίας πονηρίας ψυχήν ἀπόλλυσθαι, τῷ ἔτερου κακῷ ἑτερον. Ἐχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον. "Ἡ τοινυν ταῦτα
Β εξειλέξωμεν ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν, ἵ ἔως ἂν ἣ ἀνελεγκτα, μή ποτε φῶμεν ὑπὸ πυρετοῦ μηδ’ αὐ ὑπ’ ἀλλής νόσου μηδ’ αὐ ὑπὸ σφαγῆς, μηδ’ εἰ τις ὁ τι σμικρότατα ὄλον τὸ σώμα κατατέμοι, ἕνεκα τούτων μηδὲν μᾶλλον ποτε ψυχήν ἀπόλλυσθαι, πρὶν ἂν τις ἀποδείξῃ, ὡς διὰ ταῦτα τὰ παθήματα τοῦ σώματος αὕτη ἐκεῖνη ἀδικωτέρα καὶ ἀνοσιώτερα γίγνεται: ἀλλοτρίῳ δὲ κακοῦ ἐν ἄλλῳ γιγνομένου, τοῦ δὲ ἱδίου ἐκάστῳ μή ἐγγυγυγομένου,
C μήτε ψυχήν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν ἐώμεν φάναι τινὰ ἀπόλλυσθαι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, τοῦτο γε οὐδεὶς ποτε δείξει, ὡς τῶν ἀποθνησκόντων ἀδικωτέρας αἱ ψυχαὶ διὰ τὸν βάνατον γίγνονται. Ἐὰν δὲ γε τις, ἔφην ἔγω, ὀμόσε τῷ λόγῳ τολμᾶ ἰέναι καὶ λέγειν, ὡς πονηρότερος καὶ ἀδικωτέρος γίγνεται ὁ ἀποθνησκόν, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἀναγκάζῃται ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχὰς ὀμολογεῖν, ἀξιώσομεν ποι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, τὴν ἀδικίαν εἶναι θανάσιμον
D τῷ ἔχοντι ὠσπερ νόσον, καὶ ὕπ’ αὐτοῦ τούτου ἀποκτινώντως τῇ ἐαυτῷ φύσει ἀποθνησκόν τῶν λαμβάνοντας αὐτό, τοὺς μὲν μάλιστα βάττον, τοὺς δὲ ἤτοι σχολαίτερον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὠσπέρ νῦν

1 τοὔτου scr. Mon. adopted by Hermann, Jowett and Campbell, and Adam: τοῦ AFDM, followed by Burnet.

a For the challenge to refute or accept the argument cf. Soph. 259 Α, 257 Α, Gorg. 467 b-c, 482 b, 508 Α-Β, Phileb. 60 D-E.

b Or “to take the bull by the horns.” For ὀμόσε ἰέναι see 476
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soul's badness we shall never expect the soul to be destroyed by an alien evil apart from its own defect—one thing, that is, by the evil of another." "That is reasonable," he said. "Either, then, we must refute this and show that we are mistaken, or, so long as it remains unrefuted, we must never say that by fever or any other disease, or yet by the knife at the throat or the chopping to bits of the entire body, there is any more likelihood of the soul perishing because of these things, until it is proved that owing to these affections of the body the soul itself becomes more unjust and unholy. But when an evil of something else occurs in a different thing and the evil that belongs to the thing is not engendered in it, we must not suffer it to be said that the soul or anything else is in this way destroyed." "But you may be sure," he said, "that nobody will ever prove this, that the souls of the dying are made more unjust by death." "But if anyone," said I, "dares to come to grips with the argument and say, in order to avoid being forced to admit the soul's immortality, that a dying man does become more wicked and unjust, we will postulate that, if what he says is true, injustice must be fatal to its possessor as if it were a disease, and that those who catch it die because it kills them by its own inherent nature, those who have most of it quickest, and those who have less more slowly, and not, as now


Herbert Spencer nearly does this: "Death by starvation from inability to catch prey shows a falling short of conduct from its ideal." It recalls the argument with which Socrates catches Callicles in Gorg. 498 ε, that if all pleasures are alike those who feel pleasure are good and those who feel pain are bad.
dia touto up' allow dikhn epitithentovn apothenev-skeousin oj adikoi. Ma Delta, he de ose, ouk ara pandeion faneita he adikia, ei thanasimou estai to lambanonti: apallaghe gar an eih kakaoun alla malloin oimi au'thn fanhsesthai pain tou-

Evantion tous allous apoktunysan, eipper oion te, ton de exeuta kai malal zwtikon parexousan, kai pro's g eti tw zwtiko agrypun. otiw porro

Kalew, he de egg, legies. optote gar dh me' ikani nh ge oikeia pohria kai to oikeio kakov apokteina kai apoleisa psikh. skhole to ge eti allon olithro tetagmenon kakov psikh nh ti allo apolei, plhn ef witektai. Skhole' g', efhi, wos ge to eiko. Oukoun optote me'de vph enos 611 apollutai kakov, mhte oikeio mhte allotrio, dehlon oti anagnk aito aei on einai, ei de' aei on, athanatou. 'Anagnk, efhi.

XI. Touito me'n toinwn, he de egg, oitwos exetw

ei de' exei, envoeis oti aei an ein av ai autai. ouste gar an tou elattous genovuto mthemiaas apollu-

menh, oitw a' plieous: ei gar otioin twv athanat-
twn plieon vgynoito, ois th oti ek tou thnetov an

gyvoito kai pant a an eih telenotwta athanata.

a For the future indicative after ei, usually minatory or


b Cf. Phaedo 107c, 84 b, Blaydes on Aristoph. Acharn. 757.

c malal is humorous, as in 506 d, Euthydem. 298 d, Symp.

189 a.

d Cf. Horace, Epist. i. 2. 32 "ut iugulent hominem

surgunt de nocte latrones."

e For the metaphor cf. Proverbs viii. 12 sophia katasekhywswa

bouliv. Plato personifies injustice, as he does justice in

612 b, skiaographia in 602 d, bravery in Laches 194 a, kolal-

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in fact happens, that the unjust die owing to this but
by the action of others who inflict the penalty.” “Nay,
by Zeus,” he said, “injustice will not appear a very
terrible thing after all if it is going to be a fatal to its
possessor, for that would be a release from all troubles. b
But I rather think it will prove to be quite the con-
trary, something that kills others when it can, but
renders its possessor very lively indeed, c and not only
lively but wakeful, d so far, I ween, does it dwell e from
deadliness.” “You say well,” I replied; “for when the
natural vice and the evil proper to it cannot kill and
destroy the soul, still less will the evil appointed for
the destruction of another thing destroy the soul or
anything else, except that for which it is appointed.” g
“Still less indeed,” he said, “in all probability.”
“Then since it is not destroyed by any evil whatever,
either its own or alien, it is evident that it must
necessarily exist always, and that if it always exists
it is immortal.” “Necessarily,” he said.

XI. “Let this, then,” I said, “be assumed to be so.
But if it is so, you will observe that these souls must
always be the same. For if none perishes they could
not, I suppose, become fewer nor yet more numerous. h
For if any class of immortal things increased you are
aware that its increase would come from the mortal
and all things would end by becoming immortal.” i

στιχί in Soph. 229 A, κολακευτική Gorg. 464 c, σμικρότης
Parmen. 150 A, πενηλία Apol. 39 A-B, and many other abstract
465 A-B, Laws 644 c, Cratyl. 438 d.

f σχολή: cf. 354 c, Phaedo 106 d.

 Cf. 345 d.

 h Cf. Carveth Read, Man and His Superstitions, p. 104:
“Plato thought that by a sort of law of psychic conservation
there must always be the same number of souls in the world.
There must therefore be reincarnation. . . .”

 i Cf. Phaedo 72 c-d.
The idea of self-contradiction is frequent in Plato. See What Plato Said, p. 505, on Gorg. 482 b-c.

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"You say truly." "But," said I, "we must not suppose this, for reason will not suffer it; nor yet must we think that in its truest nature the soul is the kind of thing that teems with infinite diversity and unlikeness and contradiction in and with itself." "How am I to understand that?" he said. "It is not easy," said I, "for a thing to be immortal that is composed of many elements not put together in the best way, as now appeared to us to be the case with the soul." "It is not likely." "Well, then, that the soul is immortal our recent argument and our other proofs would constrain us to admit. But to know its true nature we must view it not marred by communion with the body and other miseries as we now contemplate it, but consider adequately in the light of reason what it is when it is purified, and then you will find it to be a far more beautiful thing and will more clearly distinguish justice and injustice and all the matters that we have now discussed. But though we have stated the truth of its present appearance, its condition as we have now contemplated it resembles that of the sea-god Glaucus whose first nature can hardly be made out by those who catch glimpses of him, because the original members of his

γεώδες σκῆνος νοῦν πολυφροντίδα, "for the corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things."


Ah, Glaucus, soul of man!
Encrusted by each tide
That since the seas began
Hath surged against thy side.

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σώματος μέρη τά μεν ἐκκεκλάσθαι, τά δέ συντετρι-φθαι καὶ πάντως λελωβήσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κυμάτων, ἀλλὰ δὲ προσπεφυκέναι, ὀστρεά τε καὶ φυκία καὶ πέτρας, ὥστε παντὶ μᾶλλον θηρίῳ ἐουκέναι ἣ οἶος ἥν φύσει, οὔτω καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα διακεμένην ὑπὸ μυρίων κακῶν· ἀλλὰ δεῖ, ὡ Γλαύ-κων, ἐκείσε βλέπειν. Ποι; ἢ δ' ὦς. Εἰς τὴν Ἕφιλοσοφίαν αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐννοεῖν ὧν ἀπτεται καὶ οἷων ἐφίεται ὁμιλιών, ὡς εὐγγενὴς οὐδα τῷ τε θείῳ καὶ ἄθανάτῳ καὶ τῷ άεί οἰντι, καὶ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο τῷ τοιούτῳ πᾶσα ἐπισπομένη καὶ ὑπὸ ταῦτης τῆς ὀρμῆς ἐκκομισθείσα ἐκ τοῦ πόντου, ἐν ὧ νῦν ἐστὶ, καὶ περικρουθείσα πέτρας τε καὶ
612 ὀστρεά, ὧ νῦν αὐτή ἀτε γῆν ἐστιμένη γενρά καὶ πετρώδῃ πολλὰ καὶ ἄγρια περιπέφυκεν ὑπὸ τῶν εὐδαμόνων λεγομένων ἐστιάσεων. καὶ τότ' ἂν τις ἰδοι αὐτῆς τὴν ἀληθῆ φύσιν, εἰτε πολυεἰδῆς εἰτε μονοειδῆς εἰτε ὅτι ἔχει καὶ ὅπως νῦν δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ πάθη τε καὶ εἴδη, ὡς ἐγώμαι, ἐπιεικῶς αὐτῆς διεληλύθαμεν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἕφη.

ΧΙΙ. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τά τε ἄλλα ἀπελυσά-Β μεθα1 ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ οὐ τοὺς μισθοὺς οὐδὲ τὰς δόξας δικαιοσύνης ἐπηνέγκαμεν, ὡσπερ 'Ησίοδον

1 ἀπελυσάμεθα AFD Stobaeus: ἀπεδυσάμεθα M, defended by Stallbaum.

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a Cf. Tim. 42 c προσφίντα.
b Cf. Phaedr. 250 c ὀστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι, Phaedo 110 ά.
c Cf. Phaedo 79 ν, Laws 899 ν, and supra 494 ν τὸ συγγενὲς τῶν λόγων.
d Cf Phileb. 55 c περικρούμεν, supra 519 ά περιεκόπη.

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body are broken off and mutilated and crushed and in every way marred by the waves, and other parts have attached themselves\(^a\) to him, accretions of shells\(^b\) and sea-weed and rocks, so that he is more like any wild creature than what he was by nature—even such, I say, is our vision of the soul marred by countless evils. But we must look elsewhere, Glaucon."

"Where?" said he. "To its love of wisdom. And we must note the things of which it has apprehensions, and the associations for which it yearns, as being itself akin to the divine\(^c\) and the immortal and to eternal being, and so consider what it might be if it followed the gleam unreservedly and were raised by this impulse out of the depths of this sea in which it is now sunk, and were cleansed and scraped free\(^d\) of the rocks and barnacles which, because it now feasts on earth, cling to it in wild profusion of earthy and stony accretion by reason of these feastings that are accounted happy.\(^e\) And then one might see whether in its real nature\(^f\) it is manifold\(^g\) or single in its simplicity, or what is the truth about it and how.\(^h\) But for the present we have, I think, fairly well described its sufferings and the forms it assumes in this human life of ours." "We certainly have," he said.

XII. "Then," said I, "we have met all the other demands of the argument, and we have not invoked the rewards and reputes of justice as you said Homer

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\(^a\) Cf. Charm. 158 \(\alpha\), Laws 695 \(\alpha\), 783 \(\alpha\). See λεγήμενα αγαθά supra 491 \(c\), 495 \(\alpha\), Laws 661 \(c\).

\(^b\) Cf. Phaedo 246 \(\alpha\). In Tim. 72 \(\delta\) Plato says that only God knows the truth about the soul. See Laws 641 \(\nu\), and Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 42.

\(^c\) Cf. Phaedr. 271 \(\alpha\).

\(^d\) ὅτι καὶ ὅπως: cf. 621 \(B\), Phaedo 100 \(D\), Tim. 37 \(\alpha\) \(\beta\), Laws 652 \(\alpha\), 834 \(\epsilon\), 899 \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\).
τε καὶ ὁμορρὸν ὑμεῖς ἐφατε, ἄλλ' αὕτω δικαιοσύνην αὐτῇ ψυχῇ ἂριστον εὑρομεν, καὶ ποιητέον εἶναι αὐτῇ τὰ δίκαια, εάν τῇ ἔχῃ τὸν Γύγον δακτύλιον, εάν τε μή, καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτῳ δακτυλίῳ τὴν "Αϊδὸς κυνήν; Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφή, λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἢν δ' ἔγω, ὦ Γλαύκων, νῦν ἡδ' ἀνεπίθυμον ἐστι πρὸς ἐκείνους καὶ τοὺς μισθοὺς τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ

C τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀρετῇ ἀποδοῦναι, ὅσον τε καὶ οἴους τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει παρ' ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν, ζῶντος τε ἐτὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἢ δ' ὡς. Ἄρ' οὖν ἀποδώσετέ μοι ἡ ἐδανείασθε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ; Τί μάλιστα; Ἐδώκα ὑμῖν τὸν δίκαιον δοκεῖν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἄδικον δίκαιον. ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἤγείσθη, καὶ εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν εἰὼ ταῦτα λανθάνειν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ὦμως δοτέων εἶναι τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα, ἵνα αὕτη

D δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἄδικαν αὐτὴν κριθεῖν. ἢ οὐ μημονεύεις; Ἀδικοῖαν μὲντ' ἄν, ἐφη, εἰ μή. Ἐπειδὴ τούτων κεκριμέναι εἰσώ, ἦν δ' ἔγω, πάλιν ἀπαιτῶ ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης, ὀσπερ ἔχει δόξης καὶ

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a Supra 363 b-c.
 b 359 d f.
 c Cf. 367 e.
 d Iliad v. 845, Blaydes on Aristoph. Acharn. 390.
 e Cf. Soph. 243 a, Laws 801 e ἄνευ φθόνως, Eurip. Hippol. 497 οὐκ ἐπίθυμον, Aeschines, De falsa legatione 167 (49). Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 406 does object and finds the passage inconsistent with the idealism of 592 and with Laws 899 d ff. and 905 b. Cf. Renan, Averroes, pp. 156-157, Guyau, Esquisse d'une morale, pp. 140-141. See Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 80 and n. 612, Idea of Justice in Plato's Republic, pp. 197-198. Gomperz, ignoring this passage and interpreting the Republic wholly from 367 e, strangely argues that Phaedo 107 c proves that the Phaedo must have been composed at a time when Plato was less sure of the coincidence of justice and happiness.

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and Hesiod do, but we have proved that justice in itself is the best thing for the soul itself, and that the soul ought to do justice whether it possess the ring of Gyges or not, or the helmet of Hades to boot. "Most true," he said. "Then," said I, "Glauc on, there can no longer be any objection, can there, to our assigning to justice and virtue generally, in addition, all the various rewards and wages that they bring to the soul from men and gods, both while the man still lives and after his death?" "There certainly can be none," he said. "Will you, then, return to me what you borrowed in the argument?" "What, pray?" "I granted to you that the just man should seem and be thought to be unjust and the unjust just; for you thought that, even if the concealment of these things from gods and men was an impossibility in fact, nevertheless it ought to be conceded for the sake of the argument, in order that the decision might be made between absolute justice and absolute injustice. Or do you not remember?" "It would be unjust of me," he said, "if I did not." "Well, then, now that they have been compared and judged, I demand back from you in behalf of justice the repute

A religious thinker may in his theodicy justify the ways of God to man by arguing that worldly happiness is not the real happiness, and yet elsewhere remark that, as a rule, the righteous is not forsaken even in this world. Cf. Psalm xxxvii. 25 ff., Prov. x. 3 and passim. See Renan, Hist. du Peuple d'Israel, ii. p. 376: "Il en est de ces passages comme de tant de préceptes de l'Évangile, insensés si on en fait des articles de code, excellents si on n'y voit que l'expression hyperbolique de hauts sentiments moraux."

Cf. Polit. 267 A.

τοῦ λόγου ἐνέκα: not the same as νόμου ἐνέκα. See on 581 c, p. 374, note a.

Cf. η ἄθικω 608 D.
parà theòn kai par' anbropòwv, kai h'màs ómologewen peri autês dokéoðhthi ou'this, ìna kai ta nükhetîria koumîsthai, à ápto toû dokêion ktwmênh didosai tôs 'êchosu autîn, épeidh kai tà ápto toû ënai ágathà didoûsa ëfânh kai ouk ëxapatðwðsai tôus tô ònti laymbàantasa autîn. Dîkaia, ëphî.

E aitei. Óukou, ëî 'êgos, pròton mèn touto apôdòseste, òti theouς ge ou lánthânei ëkàteros autôn oîos ëstw; 'Apodòseìmen, ëphî. Ei ì de mú lánthàneton, ò mév theofîlîs ìn ëi, ì de theomîsîs, ùsper kai kai' ìrâxâs ómologîsoumen. 'Esti tauta. Tô ì de theofîleì oux ómologîsoumen, ðsa ge àpto 613 theòn gînvestai, pánta gînvesthai ùs oîon te ìrîsta, ei mú ti anagkaìon autîw kakkôn èk pîrotèras àmârtias ùpèrêxen; Pànu'mèn ouv. Oûtwos ára òpolîphêtêon peri toû dikaiou ànðrôs, èan T' ën pevîa gînvesha èan T' ën nòsoi ëi tîw ìllw tòn dokouîtwv kakkôn, ùs toutw tauta eis ògadôn tî teleusîseoi ëwnti ëi kai àpôthanônti. ou gâr òpî ge theôw pote àmêleîta, ðs ìn prôbâmêîsîsai ìbêlê dîkaioùs gîveshau kai èpitîdëwvûn ìrêsthôn eis B ðsou nûvatin ànðrôpwv ðmîouðhthi theôi. Eîkòs 'ù, ëphî, tòn tòuîton mú àmêleîsthau ùpô toû ðmîov. Óukou'n peri toû ìdîkou tânantîa toutwv deî diânoseîsthau; Ñfôdra ge. Tà mèn ì de parâ theîw

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For the idiom ùsper ëxei ðêxh ìs cf. 365 A òs . . . 'êchosu thû, 389 c òpòs . . . pràzevès ëxei, Thucyd. i. 22 òs . . . múñhês ëxou. For the thought cf. Isoc. viii. 33.

b Cf. Phileb. 22 A and E.

c ge vi termini. Cf. 379 A and Class. Phil. x. p. 335.

d Cf. 365 D. e Cf. Phileb. 39 E.

f Cf. 352 B.

g This recalls the faith of Socrates in Apol. 41 c-d and 486
that she in fact enjoys from gods and men, and I ask that we admit that she is thus esteemed in order that she may gather in the prizes which she wins from the seeming and bestows on her possessors, since she has been proved to bestow the blessings that come from the reality and not to deceive those who truly seek and win her.” “That is a just demand,” he said. “Then,” said I, “will not the first of these restorations be that the gods certainly are not unaware of the true character of each of the two, the just and the unjust?” “We will restore that,” he said. “And if they are not concealed, the one will be dear to the gods and the other hateful to them, as we agreed in the beginning.” “That is so.” “And shall we not agree that all things that come from the gods work together for the best for him that is dear to the gods, apart from the inevitable evil caused by sin in a former life?” “By all means.” “This, then, must be our conviction about the just man, that whether he fall into poverty or disease or any other supposed evil, for him all these things will finally prove good, both in life and in death. For by the gods assuredly that man will never be neglected who is willing and eager to be righteous, and by the practice of virtue to be likened unto god so far as that is possible for man.” “It is reasonable,” he said, “that such a one should not be neglected by his like.” “And must we not think the opposite of the unjust man?” “Most emphatically.” “Such then are the prizes of victory

Phaedo 63 b-c, and anticipates the theodicy of Laws 899 d ff., 904 d-e ff.

a Besides obvious analogies with Buddhism, this recalls Empedocles fr. 115, Diels i. p. 267.

Cf. ὑμοίωσις θεῶ Theaet. 176 b, and What Plato Said, p. 578, supra p. 72, note d. i Cf. Laws 716 c-d, 904 e.
toiaut' an eich nukhteria tw dikaiw. Kata' gov'n em'nh dogan, efh. Ti de, 'hn 6' egw, par' anvra-tw'w; ar' owh oide exe, ei dei to oin thenedai; oux o'i men deinoi te kai adikoi drw'sin oper o'i dromh's osoi an thewsw ev' apo to'w kaw, apo de to'n anw mh; to men prwton oxe'sw apopthdswi, telev-

C twntes de kataneglastoi g'yvontai, ta 7ta eti tw'w omow exeontes kai stefanwtoi apotrehontes' o'i de t' allotheia dromiko eis telos elvontes ta te athla lamyvontai kai stefanwontai. Owh outh kai peri tw'n dikaiw to polu xymbaive: pros telos ekasost praxeos kai omilias kai tou'w ev'dokmou'i te kai ta athla par'a tw'w anvrapwv ferontai; Kal malaria. 'Anexei a'ra legontos emou

D peri touton, ap'er aut'os elygeis peri tw'n adikwv; evw gar dh' oti o'i men dikaiou, epieid'v presebiv-teroi genwntai, evn t' a'uton polw arxousi te an boulwntai tas arxas, gamou'si te opwthev an boulwntai, ekidid'sai te eis ou's an ethelwou, kai pant'a, a su peri ekeivn, egw non lewn peri tw'nde' kai a'v kai peri tw'n adikwv, oti o'i polloi aut'wv, kai ean v'oi dntes lathswv, ep' telous tou'w dr'mou airevntes kataneglastoi eisai kai ferontes glyno-

menou athwv proptalakizontai upo xe'wnw te kai

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a For the order cf. Laws 913 B legamewen ev, Thucyd. i. 71. 7, Vahlen, Op. Acad. i. 495-496. For the figure of the race cf. Eurip. El. 955, 1 Corinthians ix. 24 f., Heb. xii. 1, Gal. ii. 2, v. 7, Phil. ii. 16.

b English idiom would say, “with their tails between their legs.” Cf. Horace, Sat. i. 9. 20 “dimitto auriculas.” For the idea cf. also Laws 730 c-d, Demosth. ii. 10, and for 488.
which the gods bestow upon the just.” “So I think, at any rate,” he said. “But what,” said I, “does he receive from men? Is not this the case, if we are now to present the reality? Do not your smart but wicked men fare as those racers do who run well from the scratch but not back from the turn? They bound nimbly away at the start, but in the end are laughed to scorn and run off the field uncrowned and with their ears on their shoulders. But the true runners when they have come to the goal receive the prizes and bear away the crown. Is not this the usual outcome for the just also, that towards the end of every action and association and of life as a whole they have honour and bear away the prizes from men?” “So it is indeed.” “Will you, then; bear with me if I say of them all that you said of the unjust? For I am going to say that the just, when they become older, hold the offices in their own city if they choose, marry from what families they will, and give their children in marriage to what families they please, and everything that you said of the one I now repeat of the other; and in turn I will say of the unjust that the most of them, even if they escape detection in youth, at the end of their course are caught and derided, and their old age is made miserable by the contumelies of strangers and townsfolk.

*eis τέλος, Laws 899 ε πρὸς τέλος, Hesiod, Works and Days 216 ἐς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα, Eurip. Ion 1621 εἰς τέλος γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἐσθλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ἀξιῶν, “for the good at last shall overcome, at last attain their right.” (Way, Loeb tr.)


* Cf. Macbeth v. iii. 24:

And that which should accompany old age,
As honour, love, obedience, troops of friends,
I must not look to have.
Ε ἀστῶν, μαστιγούμενοι καὶ ἀ γροικα ἑφήσα τα σὺ εἶναι, ἀληθῆ λέγων, [ἐιτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται;] 1 πάντα ἐκείνα οἶον καὶ ἐμοὶ ἀκηκοέναι ὡς πάσχουσιν. ἀλλ' ὁ λέγω, ὥρα εἰ ἀνέξει. Καὶ πάνυ, ἔφη δύκαια γὰρ λέγεις.

ΧΙΙ. "Α μὲν τοίνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ξῶντι τῷ δικαίῳ 614 παρὰ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀβλά τε καὶ μισθοί καὶ δῶρα γίγνεται πρὸς ἐκείνους τοῖς ἄγαθοῖς οἷς αὐτὴ παρεῖχετο ἡ δικαιοσύνη, τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, καλὰ τε καὶ βέβαια. Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πλήθει οὐδὲ μεγεθεὶ πρὸς ἐκείνα, ἀ τελευτήσαντα ἐκάτερον περιμένει. χρὴ δ' αὐτὰ ἀκοῦσαι, ἵνα τελέως ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν ἀπειλήφη τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ὑφειλόμενα ἀκοῦσαι. Λέγοις ἂν, B ἔφη, ὥς οὐ πολλὰ ἀλλ' ἤδιον ἀκούσαι. 'Αλλ' οὐ μέντοι σοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, 'Αλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον ἑρῶ, ἀλλ' ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός, 'Ηρός τοῦ 'Αρμενίου, τὸ γένος Παμφύλου ὃς ποτε ἐν πολέμῳ τελευτήσας, ἀναιρεθέντων δεκαταύων τῶν νεκρῶν ἡδη διεφθαρ-μένων, ὕψης μὲν ἀνηρέθη, κομισθεὶς δ' οἰκάδε

1 Ast, followed by Hermann and Stallbaum, omits εἰτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται, "then they will be racked and branded": Jowett and Campbell and Burnet keep it.

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a He turns the tables here as in Gorg. 527 a. The late punishment of the wicked became an ethical commonplace. Cf. Plutarch's De sera numinis vindicta 1, also Job and Psalms passim.

b Cf. 361 ε ἀγροικοτέρως, and Gorg. 473 c.

c i.e. the just and unjust man.

d τελέως: cf. 361 a.

e See Proclus, In Remp., Kroll ii. 96 ff., Macrob. in Somniun Scip. i. 2. The Epicurean Colotes highly dis-
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They are lashed and suffer all things which you truly said are unfit for ears polite.* Suppose yourself to have heard from me a repetition of all that they suffer. But, as I say, consider whether you will bear with me.” “Assuredly,” he said, “for what you say is just.”

XIII. “Such then while he lives are the prizes, the wages, and the gifts that the just man receives from gods and men in addition to those blessings which justice herself bestowed.” “And right fair and abiding rewards,” he said. “Well, these,” I said, “are nothing in number and magnitude compared with those that await both after death. And we must listen to the tale of them,” said I, “in order that each may have received in full what is due to be said of him by our argument.” “Tell me,” he said, “since there are not many things to which I would more gladly listen.” “It is not, let me tell you,” said I, “the tale to Alcinous told that I shall unfold, but the tale of a warrior bold, Er, the son of Armenius, by race a Pamphylian. He once upon a time was slain in battle, and when the corpses were taken up on the tenth day already decayed, was found intact, approved of Plato’s method of putting his beliefs in this form. See Chassang, Histoire du roman, p. 15. See also Dieterich, Nekyia, pp. 114 ff., and Adam ad loc.

* Odyssey ix.-xii. The term also became proverbial for a lengthy tale. See K. Tümpel, Ἀλκίνοος ἄπολογος, Philologus 52. 523 ff.

* Plato puns on the name Alcinous. For other puns on proper names see supra on 580 b. See Arthur Platt, “Plato’s Republic, 614 b,” Class. Review, 1911, pp. 13-14. For the ἄλλα μὲν without a corresponding δὲ he compares Aristoph. Acharn. 428 ὃς ἑλευροφύτης ἄλλα κάκεινος μὲν ἥ χαλάρως ... (which Blaydes changed to ἄλλα μὴν), Odyssey xv. 405 and Eryxias 398 b.

* Perhaps we might say, “of the tribe of Everyman.” For the question of his identity see Platt, loc. cit.

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Thomas Browne, *Ur Burial*, ch. iii., "Plato's historian of the other world lies twelve days incorrupted, while his soul was viewing the large stations of the dead." See also Rohde, *Psyche* ii.6 pp. 92-93.

Stories of persons restored to life are fairly common in ancient literature. There are Eurydice and Alcestis in Greek mythology, in the Old Testament the son of the widow revived by Elijah (1 Kings xvii. 17 ff. Cf. 2 Kings iv. 34 ff. and xiii. 21), in the New Testament the daughter of Jairus (Matt. ix. 23 f.), the son of the widow of Nain (Luke vii. 11 ff.), and Lazarus (John xi.). But none of these recount their adventures. Cf. Tennyson, "In Memoriam," xxxi.: Where wert thou, brother, those four days? . . .

The rest remaineth unreveal'd;

He told it not; or something seal'd

The lips of that Evangelist.

Cf. also Luke xvi. 31 "If they hear not Moses and the prophets neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead." But in that very parable Lazarus is shown in Abraham's bosom and the rich man in torment. See further, Proclus, *In Remp.* ii. pp. 113-116, Rohde, *Psyche* ii.6 p. 191.

For the indirect reflexive cf. p. 507, note f, on 617 e.

For the description of the place of judgement cf. also 492
and having been brought home, at the moment of his funeral, on the twelfth day as he lay upon the pyre, revived, and after coming to life related what, he said, he had seen in the world beyond. He said that when his soul went forth from his body he journeyed with a great company and that they came to a mysterious region where there were two openings side by side in the earth, and above and over against them in the heaven two others, and that judges were sitting between these, and that after every judgement they bade the righteous journey to the right and upwards through the heaven with tokens attached to them in front of the judgement passed upon them, and the unjust to take the road to the left and downward, they too wearing behind signs of all that had befallen them, and that when he himself drew near they told

Gorg. 524 a. Cf. Phaedo 107 d, 113 d, where there is no description but simply the statement that the souls are brought to a place and judged. On the topography of the myth in general cf. Bréhier, La Philos. de Plot. pp. 28-29: "Voyez, par exemple, la manière dont Numénius . . . interprète le mythe du Xe livre de la République, et comment il précise, avec la lourdeur d'un théologien, les traits que la poésie de Platon avait abandonnés à l'imagination du lecteur. Le lieu du jugement devient le centre du monde; le ciel platonicien devient la sphère des fixes; le 'lieu souterrain' où sont punies les âmes, ce sont les planètes; la 'bouche du ciel,' par laquelle les âmes descendront à la naissance, est le tropique du Cancer; et c'est par le Capricorne qu'elles remontent."

Cf. Gorg. 523 e f., 524 e-525 b, 526 b-c.

Cf. Gorg. 526 b, Dante, Inferno, v. 9 f.: E quel conoscitor delle peccata
vede qual luogo d' inferno è da essa;
cignesi con la coda tante volte
quantunque gradi vuol che giu sia messa.

Cf. Gorg. 525 a-b, 526 b. For "right" and "left" cf. the story of the last judgement, Matt. xxv. 33-34 and 41.


tos εἰπεῖν, ὅτι δέοι αὐτὸν ἁγγελον ἀνθρώπως
gενέσθαι τῶν ἔκει καὶ διακελεύουστοι οἱ ἄκουσέν τε
cαὶ θεᾶσθαι πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ: ὁρὰν ἃ ταῦτη
μὲν καθ' ἐκάτερον τὸ χάσμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ
tῆς γῆς ἀπιούσας τὰς θυγατέρας, ἐπειδὴ αὐτὰς δικα-
σθεὶς, κατὰ δὲ τῶν ἐτέρω ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἀνέναι ἐκ
tῆς γῆς μεστὰς αὐχμοῦ τε καὶ κόνεως, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
ἐτέρου καταβάινειν ἐτέρας ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καθαράς.

Εἰ καὶ τὰς ἄει ἀφικνομένας ὡσπερ ἐκ πολλῆς πορείας
φαίνεσθαι ἥκεν, καὶ ἄμενας εἰς τὸν λειμῶνα
ἀπιούσας οἶον ἐν πανηγύρει κατασκηνᾶσθαι, καὶ
ἀπόταξεςαὶ τε ἄλληλας ὅσα γνώριμαι, καὶ πυνθά-
νεσθαι τὰς τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἥκουσας παρὰ τῶν ἐτέ-
ρων τὰ ἔκει καὶ τὰς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ παρ'
ἐκεῖναις: διήγεισθαί δὲ ἄλληλας τὰς μὲν ὄδυ-
615 ρομένας τε καὶ κλαιούσας, ἀναμμηνησκομένας ὅσα
tε καὶ οὐ πάθοιν καὶ ἰδοιεν ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ γῆς πορείας
—ἐἰλαὶ δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλιέτη—τὰς δ' αὖ ἐκ
tοῦ οὐρανοῦ εὐπαθείας διήγεισθαί καὶ θέας ἀμηχά-
νους τὸ κάλλος. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλά, ὡ Γλαύκων,
pολλοὶ χρόνον διηγήσασθαι. τὸ δ' οὖν κεφάλαιον
ἐκτὸς τὸδε εἴναι, ὅσα πώποτε τυχα ἡδίκησαν καὶ
ὅσους ἐκαστοι, ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων δίκην διδωκέναι ἐν
μέρει, ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου δεκάκις, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι κατὰ
Β. ἐκατονταετηρίδα ἐκάστην, ὡς βίου ὅντος τοσοῦ-


a Cf. the rich man’s request that a messenger be sent to

b ἔκει: so in 330 D, 365 A, 498 C, Phaedo 61 E, 64 A,
67 B, 68 E, Apol. 40 E, 41 C, Crito 54 B, Symp. 192 E. In
500 V and Phaedr. 250 A it refers to the world of the ideas,
in 516 C and 520 C to the world of the cave.

c Cf. Gorg. 524 A.
him that he must be the messenger to mankind to tell them of that other world, and they charged him to give ear and to observe everything in the place. And so he said that here he saw, by each opening of heaven and earth, the souls departing after judgement had been passed upon them, while, by the other pair of openings, there came up from the one in the earth souls full of squalor and dust, and from the second there came down from heaven a second procession of souls clean and pure, and that those which arrived from time to time appeared to have come as it were from a long journey and gladly departed to the meadow and encamped there as at a festival, and acquaintances greeted one another, and those which came from the earth questioned the others about conditions up yonder, and those from heaven asked how it fared with those others. And they told their stories to one another, the one lamenting and wailing as they recalled how many and how dreadful things they had suffered and seen in their journey beneath the earth—it lasted a thousand years—while those from heaven related their delights and visions of a beauty beyond words. To tell it all, Glaucon, would take all our time, but the sum, he said, was this. For all the wrongs they had ever done to anyone and all whom they had severally wronged they had paid the penalty in turn tenfold for each, and the measure of this was by periods of a hundred years each, so that on the assumption

\[ a \text{ Cf. 621 A, 610 E, and John i. 14 ἐσκῆπωσεν.} \]
\[ b \text{ Cf. 421 B.} \]
\[ c \text{ Cf. Phaedr. 256 D, Epist. vii. 335 b-c.} \]
\[ d \text{ Phaedr. 249 A, Virgil, Aen. vi. 748.} \]
\[ e \text{ Cf. Phaedo 113 D-E.} \]
\[ f \text{ The ideal Hindu length of life is said to be 100 years.} \]
PLATO

tou toû ånthropînou, ëna dekaplásion toû ëktsima
tou ådikîmatos ëktnovev' kai oîon ei tines pol-
lîn' ëvanatîn ësan aítîou, ò ïôleis prodîntes ën
strapîpeda kai eis douleias èmbèbliktîtes, ën
tînos ìlîs kakouvîsias metaitîou, pánînton tònî
dekaplásias èlgyndónas ùpèr èkástou kolîsaintou,
kal ai ei tînas ènerygeias ènerygetiktîtes kai

C dikaimoi kai ðsiou gégunaîtes ès, kata taútâ tîn
âzîan kolîzontî. òwv de euvûs ègenvemîn kai
olîgon xronôn biouvînwn pèri ìlla èlegen ouk àzîa
muîmîs' eis de ðèous ðasebeias te kai ènsebeias
kai gouveas kai autóxeiros fônou meîzous êti tîn
muîthous diurîtîo. èphî gâr ðê pararkevenëthai
èrwotwemîn ètérw ùpò ètèrówn òpou ei ñ 'Arðiáios
ð mégas. ð ðe 'Arðiáios ñûtòs òðîs Pàmfulîas èn
tîn ïîleî tûrânîn ègègònî, ñðî ðîlîsotòn ñtòs
eis èkeînîn tîn xronîn, gêrîntâ te ðatéra âpò-
DKteînas kai prèvûteron ðdelefôn, kai ìlla dh
pôllâ te kai ãvôsia èirîgasemîn, ès ëlègëto.
èphî ouv tîn èrwotwemîn èîpèîn, oux ðkeî, fânai,
ouv âñ ñzei deûro.

XIV. Êðeasâmëtha gâr ouv dh kai toûto tîn
devnîn ðeumatîn. èpèdî ëngûs tîs ðeumî fìme
mèlîontes ânînai kai tàlla pánta pèpovîtôî.

1 ïôllôs scr. Ven. 184, Hermann and Adam: ïôllôs
D Stobaeus: ïôllô AFM.

¹ For the words cf. Tim. 76 e euvûs ñgenvemîn. Plato
does not take up the problem of infant damnation!
Warburton says, “and I make no doubt but the things not
worthy to be remembered was the doctrine of infants in
purgatory, which appears to have given Plato much scandal,
who did not at that time at least reflect upon its original
and use.” See also Mozley, Augustinian Doctrine of Pre-
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that this was the length of human life the punishment might be ten times the crime; as for example that if anyone had been the cause of many deaths or had betrayed cities and armies and reduced them to slavery, or had been participant in any other iniquity, they might receive in requital pains tenfold for each of these wrongs, and again if any had done deeds of kindness and been just and holy men they might receive their due reward in the same measure; and other things not worthy of record he said of those who had just been born and lived but a short time; and he had still greater requitals to tell of piety and impiety towards the gods and parents and of self-slaughter. For he said that he stood by when one was questioned by another 'Where is Ardiaeus the Great?' Now this Ardiaeos had been tyrant in a certain city of Pamphylia just a thousand years before that time and had put to death his old father and his elder brother, and had done many other unholy deeds, as was the report. So he said that the one questioned replied, 'He has not come,' said he, 'nor will he be likely to come here.

XIV. 'For indeed this was one of the dreadful sights we beheld; when we were near the mouth and about to issue forth and all our other sufferings were
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έκεινον τε κατείδομεν ἐξαίφνης καὶ ἄλλους, σχεδόν τι αὐτῶν τοὺς πλεῖστους τυράννους· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ
Ε ἰδιώται τινες τῶν μεγάλα ἡμαρτηκότων· οὓς οἴομένους ἦδη ἀναβῆσθαι οὐκ ἐδέχετο τὸ στόμιον, ἀλλ’ ἐμυκάτο, ὅποτε τις τῶν οὔτως ἀνάτως ἐχόντων εἰς πονηρίαν ἡ μὴ ἰκανῶς δεδωκὼς δίκην ἐπιχειροῖ ἀνέναι. ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄνδρες, ἤφη, ἄγριοι, διάπυροι ἱδεῖν, παρεστῶτες καὶ καταμανθάνοντες τὸ φθέγμα τοὺς μὲν διαλαβόντες ἣν, τὸν δὲ
616 Ἀρδιαῖον καὶ ἄλλους συμποδίσαντες ἱείρας τε καὶ πόδας καὶ κεφαλῆς, καταβαλόντες καὶ ἐκδεί-
ραντες, εἶλκον παρὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκτὸς ἐπ’ ἀσπαλάθων
κνάπτοντες καὶ τοὺς ἀεὶ παροῦσι σημαίνοντες, διὰ ἐνεκά τε καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸν τάρταρον ἐμπεσούμενοι
ἀγνοῦτο. ἐνθὰ δὴ φόβων, ἤφη, πολλῶν καὶ παντο-
δαπῶν σφίσι γεγονότων, τούτον ὑπερβάλλειν, μὴ
gένοιτο ἐκάστῳ τὸ φθέγμα, ὅτε ἀναβάινοι, καὶ
ἀσμενέστατα ἐκάστον συγήσαντος ἀναβήναι. καὶ
tὰς μὲν δὴ δίκας τε καὶ τιμωρίας τοιαύτας τινὰς
Β εἶναι, καὶ αὐτὰς ἐνεργεισίας ταῦτας ἀντιστρόφους·
ἐπειδῆ δὲ τοὺς ἐν τῷ λειμῶν ἐκάστους ἐπτὰ ἡμέραι
γένουτο, ἀναστάντας ἐνευθεῖν δεῖν τῇ ὕδος πο-

a Cf. Gorg. 525 d-526 a, Dante, Inferno xii. 100 ff., Spenser, F.Q. i. v. 51:
But most of all which in that dungeon lay
Fell from high Princes courtes or Ladies bowres.
Lang, “Helen of Troy”:
Oh, Paris, what is power? Tantalus
And Sisyphus were kings long time ago,
But now they lie in the Lake Dolorous;
The halls of hell are noisy with their woe.

b Cf. Gorg. 525 c, and What Plato Said, p. 536, on Phaedo
ended, we suddenly caught sight of him and of others, the most of them, I may say, tyrants. But there were some of private station, of those who had committed great crimes. And when these supposed that at last they were about to go up and out, the mouth would not receive them, but it bellowed when anyone of the incurably wicked or of those who had not completed their punishment tried to come up. And thereupon, 'he said, 'savage men of fiery aspect who stood by and took note of the voice laid hold on them and bore them away. But Ardiaeus and others they bound hand and foot and head and flung down and flayed them and dragged them by the wayside, carding them on thorns and signifying to those who from time to time passed by for what cause they were borne away, and that they were to be hurled into Tartarus.' And then, though many and manifold dread things had befallen them, this fear exceeded all —lest each one should hear the voice when he tried to go up, and each went up most gladly when it had kept silence. And the judgements and penalties were somewhat after this manner, and the blessings were their counterparts. But when seven days had elapsed for each group in the meadow, they were required to rise up on the eighth and journey on, and they came

113 E. Biggs, Christian Platonists, ii. p. 147: "At the first assize there will be found those who like Ardiaeus are incurable."

a This naturally suggests the devils of Dante (Inferno xxi. 25 ff.) and other mediaeval literature. See Dieterich, Nekyia, p. 4 and pp. 60 f.


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τεταρταίους οθεν καθοράν ἀνωθεν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς τεταμένον φῶς εὐθὺ, οἷον κίονα, μάλιστα τῇ ἵριδι προσφερῆ, λαμπρότερον δὲ καὶ καθαρώτερον. εἰς δ’ ἀφικέσθαι

C προελθόντας ἡμερησίαν ὅδον, καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτόθι κατὰ μέσον τὸ φῶς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ ἀκρα αὐτοῦ τῶν δεσμῶν τεταμένα· εἶναι γὰρ τούτῳ τὸ φῶς ξύν-
desmon τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οἷον τὰ ὑποζώματα τῶν τριήρων, οὔτω πάσαν ξυνέχον τὴν περιφοράν· ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἀκρων τεταμένον Ἀνάγκης ἀτρακτον, δι’
oὐ πάσας ἑπιστρέφεσθαι τὰς περιφοράς· οὔ τιν
μὲν ἡλακάτην τε καὶ τὸ ἀγκιστρον εἶναι ἐξ ἀδά-
mantos, τὸν δὲ σφόνδυλον μικτὸν ἐκ τε τούτοι καὶ ἀλλων γενὸν. τὴν δὲ τοῦ σφονδύλου φύσιν εἶναι

D τοιάνδε· τὸ μὲν σχῆμα οὔπερ ἢ τοῦ ἑνθάδε,
νοῆσαι δὲ δεῖ ἐξ ἃν ἔλεγε τοιόνδε αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ὡσπερ ἂν εἶ ἐν ἐν μεγάλῳ σφονδύλῳ κοίλῳ καὶ 
exegylymμένω διαμπερὲς ἀλλος τοιοῦτος ἐλάττων ἐγκέουτο ἀρμόττων, καθάπερ οἱ κάδοι οἱ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀρμόττοντες· καὶ οὔτω δὴ τρίτον ἀλλον καὶ τέταρτον καὶ ἀλλος τέταρας. ὅκτω γὰρ 
eiναι τοὺς ξύμπαντας σφονδύλους, ἐν ἀλλήλοις


“Mais (dira-t-on) rappelons-nous ‘le fuseau’; pour les

anciens, c’était un fuseau matériel que tourment en filant les

Moires; pour Platon, il représente le ciel des fixes; or les

Moires et la Nécessité, leur mère, en le faisant tourner, fi
tent le destin de chaque être à sa naissance; par elle, les êtres

gendrées arrivent à la naissance,” etc. St. Paulinus Nolanus
calls it a deliramentum. Tannery, Science hellène, p. 238,
thinks it alludes to the system of Parmenides. “Le fuseau
central de la Nécessité l’indique suffisamment; si la présence

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in four days to a spot whence they discerned, extended from above throughout the heaven and the earth, a straight light like a pillar, most nearly resembling the rainbow, but brighter and purer. To this they came after going forward a day's journey, and they saw there at the middle of the light the extremities of its fastenings stretched from heaven; for this light was the girdle of the heavens like the undergirders of triremes, holding together in like manner the entire revolving vault. And from the extremities was stretched the spindle of Necessity, through which all the orbits turned. Its staff and its hook were made of adamant, and the whorl of these and other kinds was commingled. And the nature of the whorl was this: Its shape was that of those in our world, but from his description we must conceive it to be as if in one great whorl, hollow and scooped out, there lay enclosed, right through, another like it but smaller, fitting into it as boxes that fit into one another, and in like manner another, a third, and a fourth, and four others, for there were eight of the whorls in all, lying within one another, showing their
des sirènes est une marque de pythagorisme, elle peut seulement signifier soit les relations de l'irménide avec l'école soit plutôt l'origine des déterminations particulières que donne Platon et qui évidemment ne remontent pas à l'Éléate." Cf. ibid. p. 246. For various details of the picture cf. Milton, the Genius's speech in "Arcades" (quoted and commented on in E. M. W. Tillyard, Milton, p. 376).
Cf. Burnet, Early Greek Philos. pp. 216-217 "In Plato's Myth of Er, which is certainly Pythagorean in its general character, we do not hear of spheres but of the 'lips' of concentric whorls fitted into one another like a nest of boxes ..." With 616-617 cf. Laws 822 a-b, Tim. 36 D, Dante, Convivio, ii. 3. 5 ff. The names of the planets occur first in Epinomis 987 b-c.
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Ε ἐγκεμένους, κύκλους ἄνωθεν τὰ χείλη φαίνοντας, νῦτον συνεχεῖς ἐνὸς σφονδύλου ἀπεργαζομένους περὶ τὴν ἡλακάτην· ἐκείνην δὲ διὰ μέσον τοῦ ὀγδόου διαμπερὲς ἐληλάθαι. τὸν μὲν ὅν πρῶτον τε καὶ ἔξωτάτω σφόνδυλον πλατύτατον τὸν τοῦ χείλους κύκλον ἔχειν, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἕκτου δεύτερον, τρίτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τετάρτου, τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ὀγδόου, πέμπτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ἐβδόμου, ἐκτὸς δὲ τὸν τοῦ πέμπτου, ἐβδομον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τρίτου, ὀγδοον δὲ τὸν τοῦ δευτέρου. καὶ τὸν μὲν τοῦ μεγίστου ποικίλον, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐβδομον λαμπρότατον, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ὀγδοον τὸ χρῶμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐβδομον ἔχειν προσ-λάμποντος, τὸν δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ πέμπτου παραπλήσια ἀλλήλους, ξανθότερα ἐκείνων, τρίτον δὲ λευκότατον χρῶμα ἔχειν, τέταρτον δὲ ὑπέρθρον, δεύτερον δὲ λευκότητι τὸν ἕκτον. κυκλείσθαι δὲ ὅσ' ὁπεφέρεσθαι τὸν ἀτρακτὸν ὅλον μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν φοράν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὅλῳ περιφερομένῳ τοὺς μὲν ἐντὸς ἐπτὰ κύκλους τὴν ἐναντίαν τῷ ὅλῳ ἡρέμα περιφέρεσθαι, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τάχιστα μὲν ἴναι τὸν

Β ὀγδοον, δευτέρους δὲ καὶ ἁμα ἀλλήλους τὸν τε ἐβδομον καὶ ἐκτὸς καὶ πέμπτον τρίτον δὲ φορᾷ ἴναι, ὡς σφίσσι φαίνεσθαι, ἐπανακυκλούμενον τὸν τέταρτον· τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τρίτον καὶ πέμπτον τὸν δεύτερον. στρέφεσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς Ἀνάγκης γόναις. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κύκλων αὐτοῦ ἄνωθεν ἔφ' ἐκάστου βεβηκέναι Σειρήνα συμπεριφερομένην, φωνὴν μίαν ἴησαν, ἐνα τόνων. ἐκ πασῶν

1 See note b, p. 503.
2 ἑνα τόνων ΛΜ Proclus: ἀνά τόνων D: ἀνατόνων F: ἀνάτονων

mss. recce.

a Burnet, op. cit. p. 123, says: “This view that the planets 502
rims as circles from above and forming the continuous back of a single whorl about the shaft, which was driven home through the middle of the eighth. Now the first and outmost whorl had the broadest circular rim, that of the sixth was second, and third was that of the fourth, and fourth was that of the eighth, fifth that of the seventh, sixth that of the fifth, seventh that of the third, eighth that of the second; and that of the greatest was spangled, that of the seventh brightest, that of the eighth took its colour from the seventh, which shone upon it. The colours of the second and fifth were like one another and more yellow than the two former. The third had the whitest colour, and the fourth was of a slightly ruddy hue; the sixth was second in whiteness. The staff turned as a whole in a circle with the same movement, but within the whole as it revolved the seven inner circles revolved gently in the opposite direction to the whole, and of these seven the eighth moved most swiftly, and next and together with one another the seventh, sixth and fifth; and third in swiftness, as it appeared to them, moved the fourth with returns upon itself, and fourth the third and fifth the second. And the spindle turned on the knees of Necessity, and up above on each of the rims of the circles a Siren stood, borne around in its revolution and uttering one sound, one note, and from all the eight there was had an orbital motion from west to east is attributed by Aetios ii. 16. 3 to Alkmaion (96), which certainly implies that Pythagoras did not hold it. As we shall see (152) it is far from clear that any of the Pythagoreans did. It seems rather to be Plato’s discovery.” Cf. ibid. p. 352.

b The best mss. have τὸν before τοῖτον. It is retained by some editors, but Schleiermacher rejected it and Adam and Burnet omit it.

Aristotle’s comment, De caelo 290 b 12 ff., is that the notion of a music of the spheres is pretty and ingenious, but not true. He reports the (Pythagorean?) explanation that we do not hear it because we have been accustomed to it from birth. See Carl v. Jan, “Die Harmonie der Sphären,” Philologus, liii. 13 ff. Cf. Shakes. Merchant of Venice, v. i. 60:

There’s not the smallest orb which thou behold’st
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young ey’d cherubims . . .

Milton, “Arcades” (Tillyard, p. 60. Ibid. p. 375, he says that Plato is referred to in Milton’s academic exercise De sphaerarum concentu); Pope, Essay on Man, i. 201-202:

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the concord of a single harmony." And there were other three who sat round about at equal intervals, each one on her throne, the Fates, daughters of Necessity, clad in white vestments with filleted heads, Lachesis, and Clotho, and Atropos, who sang in unison with the music of the Sirens, Lachesis singing the things that were, Clotho the things that are, and Atropos the things that are to be. And Clotho with the touch of her right hand helped to turn the outer circumference of the spindle, pausing from time to time. Atropos with her left hand in like manner helped to turn the inner circles, and Lachesis alternately with either hand lent a hand to each.

XV. "Now when they arrived they were straightway bidden to go before Lachesis, and then a certain prophet first marshalled them in orderly intervals, and thereupon took from the lap of Lachesis lots and patterns of lives and went up to a lofty platform and spoke, 'This is the word of Lachesis, the maiden

If Nature thundered in his opening ears
And stunned him with the music of the spheres.

Complete Poems of Henry More, p. 77. Addison rationalizes the thought:

The spacious firmament on high . . .
What though in solemn silence all
Move round the dark terrestrial ball:
What though no real voice or sound
Amidst their radiant orbs be found?
In reason's ear they all rejoice
And utter forth a glorious voice,
For ever singing as they shine:
The hand that made us is divine.


c See What Plato Said, p. 550, on Phaedr. 235 c.
ψυχαί ἐφήμεροι, ἀρχή ἀλλης περιόδου θνητοῦ
Εγένονς θανατηφόρουν. οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται,
ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε. πρῶτος δ' ὁ
λαχῶν πρῶτος αἱρείσθω βίον, ὥστιν εἰς ἀνάγκης.
ἀρετὴ δ' ἀδέσποτον, ἣν τιμῶν καὶ
ἀτυμάζων πλέον καὶ ἐλαττον αὐτῆς ἐκαστὸς ἐξει.
αὐτία ἐλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος. ταῦτα εἰπόντα
ῥύσαι ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς κλήρους, τὸν δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν
πεισόντα ἐκαστὸν ἀναρείσθαι, πλὴν οὐ· ἐ δὲ οὐκ
ἐὰν· τῷ δὲ ἀνελομένῳ δήλον εἶναι, ὅπωστος εἰλήχει.

618 μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ αὖθις τὰ τῶν βίων παραδείγματα
eἰς τὸ πρόσθεν σφῶν θεῖναι ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, πολὺ
πλείω τῶν παρόντων, εἶναι δὲ παντοδαπά· ζῶν πε
γὰρ πάντων βίους καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους
ἀπαντα, τυνανίδας τε γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι, τὰς
μὲν διατελεῖς, τὰς δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ διαφθειρομένας
καὶ εἰς πενίας τε καὶ φυγάς καὶ εἰς πτωχείας

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a Cf. Laws 923 ι, Pindar, Pyth. viii. 95, Aesch. Prom. 83, 547, Aristot. Hist. an. 552 b 18 f., Cic. Tusc. i. 39. 94, Plut. Cons. ad Apol. 6 (104 4) ἀνθρώπων . . . ἐφήμερα τὰ
σώματα, ibid. 27 (115 ν) ἐφήμερον σπέρμα. See also Stallbaum
ad loc., and for the thought Soph. Ajax 125-126, Iliad vi. 146, Minnemus ii. 1, Soph. fr. 12 and 859 (Nauck), Job
vii. 6, viii. 9, ix. 25, xiv. 2, xxi. 17, etc.

b Cf. Swinburne, “The Life of Man” (from Atalanta in
Calydon):

Life the shadow of death.

ibid.

With life before and after
And death beneath and above;
For a day and a night and a morrow,
That his strength might endure for a span.

and “The Garden of Proserpine”: “Here life hath death for
neighbour.”

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daughter of Necessity, "Souls that live for a day, now is the beginning of another cycle of mortal generation where birth is the beacon of death. No divinity shall cast lots for you, but you shall choose your own deity. Let him to whom falls the first lot first select a life to which he shall cleave of necessity. But virtue has no master over her, and each shall have more or less of her as he honours her or does her despite. The blame is his who chooses: God is blameless."

So saying, the prophet flung the lots out among them all, and each took up the lot that fell by his side, except himself; him they did not permit. And whoever took up a lot saw plainly what number he had drawn. And after this again the prophet placed the patterns of lives before them on the ground, far more numerous than the assembly. They were of every variety, for there were lives of all kinds of animals and all sorts of human lives, for there were tyrannies among them, some uninterrupted till the end and others destroyed midway and issuing in penuries and exiles and beg-

Zeller-Nestle, p. 166, says that this looks like intentional correction of Phaedo 107 d. Cf. Phaedo 113 d and Lysias ii. 78 ὃ τε δαίμων ὁ τῆς ἡμιτέραν μοίραν εἰληχὼς ἀπαρατητος. Arnobius, Adversus gentes, ii. 64, says that similarly Christ offers us redemption but does not force it upon us.

Cf. Milton's "Love Virtue; she alone is free" (Comus).


Cf. Symp. 175 c, where the words are the same but the construction different. For the indirect reflexive cf. 614 β ὃ ἐκβηναι, Symp. 176 d, Symp. 223 β ἐ δὲ ἐπτον λαβεῖν.

For διατέλεις cf. Laws 661 d τυραννίδα διὰ τέλους.
τελευτώσας: εἶναι δὲ καὶ δοκίμων ἀνδρῶν βίους, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ εἴδεσι καὶ κατὰ κάλλη καὶ τὴν ἄλλην
Β Ἰσχὼν τε καὶ ἀγωνίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ γένεσι καὶ προγόνων ἅρεταις, καὶ ἀδοκίμων κατὰ ταύτα, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γυναικῶν: ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν ὁδὸν ἐνείναι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖως ἔχειν ἄλλον ἐλομένην
βίον ἀλλοίαν γίγνεσθαι: τὰ δ' ἀλλα ἄλληλοις τε καὶ πλούτοις καὶ πενίαις, τὰ δὲ νόσους, τὰ δὲ ὡρίειας
μεμιχθαί, τὰ δὲ καὶ μεσοῦν τούτων. ἔνθα δή, ὡς ἐουκεν, ὃ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὃ πᾶς κίνδυνος ἄνθρωπων,
C καὶ διὰ ταύτα μάλιστα ἐπιμελητέον ὁπως ἐκαστὸς ἡμῶν τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀμελήσας τοὺτον
tοῦ μαθήματος καὶ ξητητῆς καὶ μαθητῆς ἔσται, εάν ποθεν οἷος τ' ἦ μαθεῖν καὶ ἐξευρεῖν, τίς αὐτὸν
ποιήσει δυνατὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, βίον καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ ποιηρὸν διαγιγνώσκοντα, τὸν βελτίων ἐκ τῶν
dυνατῶν ἀεὶ πανταχοῦ αἱρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀναλογι-
ζόμενον πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα, ξυντυθέμενα
ἄλληλοις καὶ διαιρούμενα πρὸς ἄρετήν βίον πῶς
ἔχει, εἰδέναι, τί κάλλος πενία ἡ πλούτων κραθὲν
D καὶ μετὰ ποιας τινὸς ψυχῆς ἔξεως κακὸν ἢ
ἀγαθὸν ἐργάζεται, καὶ τί εὐγένεια καὶ δυσγένεια
cαι ἰδιωτεία καὶ ἄρχαι καὶ ἰσχίες καὶ ἁθένεια
cαι εὐμάθεια καὶ δυσμάθεια καὶ πάντα τὰ
tοιαῦτα τῶν φύσει περὶ ψυχῆν οὕτων καὶ τῶν

a For the idiom ἀναγκαῖως ἔχειν cf. Phaedo 91 e, Laws 771 e, 928 e, Lysias vi. 35.
b μεσοῦν Phaedr. 241 d.
c Cf. Phaedo 107 c, 114 d, Gorg. 526 e, Eurip. Medea 235 508
garies; and there were lives of men of repute for their forms and beauty and bodily strength otherwise and prowess and the high birth and the virtues of their ancestors, and others of ill repute in the same things, and similarly of women. But there was no determination of the quality of soul, because the choice of a different life inevitably determined a different character. But all other things were commingled with one another and with wealth and poverty and sickness and health and the intermediate \textsuperscript{b} conditions.

—And there, dear Glaucon, it appears, is the supreme hazard\textsuperscript{c} for a man. And this is the chief reason why it should be our main concern that each of us, neglecting all other studies, should seek after and study this thing\textsuperscript{d} —if in any way he may be able to learn of and discover the man who will give him the ability and the knowledge to distinguish the life that is good from that which is bad, and always and everywhere to choose the best that the conditions allow, and, taking into account all the things of which we have spoken and estimating the effect on the goodness of his life of their conjunction or their severance, to know how beauty commingled with poverty or wealth and combined with what habit of soul operates for good or for evil, and what are the effects of high and low birth and private station and office and strength and weakness and quickness of apprehension and dullness and all similar natural and acquired habits of the soul, when

\textsuperscript{a} Cf. supra 443-444, 591 \textsuperscript{e}-592 \textsuperscript{a}, Gorg. 527 \textsuperscript{b} \textsuperscript{f.}, Laws 662 \textsuperscript{b} \textsuperscript{f.}, 904 \textsuperscript{a} \textsuperscript{f}.
The singular verb is used after plural subjects, because the subjects are united in the writer's mind into one general idea. Cf. Rep. 363 A, Laws 925 e, Symp. 188 b.

See Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 25, Laws 661-662, and for the word supra 360 b, Gorg. 509 a.
blended and combined with one another,\(^a\) so that with consideration of all these things he will be able to make a reasoned choice between the better and the worse life, with his eyes fixed on the nature of his soul, naming the worse life that which will tend to make it more unjust and the better that which will make it more just. But all other considerations he will dismiss, for we have seen that this is the best choice, both for life and death. And a man must take with him to the house of death an adamantine\(^b\) faith in this, that even there he may be undazzled\(^c\) by riches and similar trumpery, and may not precipitate himself into tyrannies and similar doings and so work many evils past cure and suffer still greater himself, but may know how always to choose in such things the life that is seated in the mean\(^d\) and shun the excess in either direction, both in this world so far as may be and in all the life to come; for this is the greatest happiness for man.

XVI. "And at that time also the messenger from that other world reported that the prophet spoke thus: 'Even for him who comes forward last, if he make his choice wisely and live strenuously, there is reserved an acceptable life, no evil one. Let not the foremost in the choice be heedless nor the last be discouraged.' When the prophet had thus spoken he said that the drawer of the first lot at once sprang to seize the greatest tyranny,\(^e\) and that in his folly and greed he chose it without sufficient examination, and failed to observe that it involved the fate of eating

\(^{a}\) Cf. 576 d.
\(^{c}\) Cf. Isoc. Epist. vi. 12, Xen. Hiero 7. 2 δμως προστᾶσ φέρεσθε εἰς αὐτὴν.
ἐνοῦσαν εἰμαρμένην, παίδων αὐτοῦ βρώσεις καὶ ἄλλα κακά· ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν σκέφασθαι, κόπτεσθαι τε καὶ ὁδύρεσθαι τὴν αἴρεσιν, οὐκ ἐμμένοντα τοῖς προρρηθείσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ προφήτου· οὐ γὰρ ἐαυτὸν αἰτιάσθαι τῶν κακῶν, ἄλλα τύχην τε καὶ δαίμονας καὶ πάντα μάλλον ἄνθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ. εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἥκοντων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα, 

Δ ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετεληφότα. ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἐλάττους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀλισκομένοις τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἥκοντας, ἀτε πόνων ἀγυμνάστους· τῶν δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἀτε αὐτοὺς τε πεπονυκότας ἄλλους τε ἐωρακότας, οὐκ ἔξ ἐπιδρομῆς τὰς αἰρέσεις ποιεῖσθαι. διὸ δὴ καὶ μεταβολήν τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πολλαῖς τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ κλήρου τύχην. ἔπει eι τις αἰεί, ὅποτε εἰς τὸν

Ε ἐνθάδε βίον ἀφικνοῖτο, ὑγιῶς φιλοσοφοῖ καὶ ὁ κλήρος αὐτῶ τῆς αἰρέσεως μὴ ἐν τελευταῖοις πίπτοι, κινδυνεύει ἐκ τῶν ἐκείθεν ἂπαγγελλομένων οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν, ἄλλα καὶ τὴν ἐνθέδε ἐκείσε καὶ δεύρῳ πάλιν πορείαν οὐκ ἂν χθονίαν καὶ τραχείαν πορεύεσθαι, ἄλλα λείαν τε καὶ οὐρανίαν. ταῦταν γὰρ δὴ ἐφ᾽ τὴν θέαν ἄξιαν εἶναι ἢδειν, ὡς ἐκαστὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἄροντο τοὺς 620 βίους· ἔλεεινὴν τε γὰρ ἢδειν εἶναι καὶ γελοιάν καὶ θαυμασίαν· κατὰ συνήθειαν γὰρ τοῦ προτέρου βίου τὰ πολλὰ αἴρεισθαι. ἢδειν μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴν ἐφ᾽ τὴν ποτὲ Ὄρφεως γενομένην κύκνου βίον αἰρομένην,

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b Phaedo 82 b.

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his own children, and other horrors, and that when he inspected it at leisure he beat his breast and bewailed his choice, not abiding by the forewarning of the prophet. For he did not blame himself for his woes, but fortune and the gods and anything except himself. He was one of those who had come down from heaven, a man who had lived in a well-ordered polity in his former existence, participating in virtue by habit and not by philosophy; and one may perhaps say that a majority of those who were thus caught were of the company that had come from heaven, inasmuch as they were unexercised in suffering. But the most of those who came up from the earth, since they had themselves suffered and seen the sufferings of others, did not make their choice precipitately. For which reason also there was an interchange of good and evil for most of the souls, as well as because of the chances of the lot. Yet if at each return to the life of this world a man loved wisdom sanely, and the lot of his choice did not fall out among the last, we may venture to affirm, from what was reported thence, that not only will he be happy here but that the path of his journey thither and the return to this world will not be underground and rough but smooth and through the heavens. For he said that it was a sight worth seeing to observe how the several souls selected their lives. He said it was a strange, pitiful, and ridiculous spectacle, as the choice was determined for the most part by the habits of their former lives. He saw the soul that had been Orpheus', he said, selecting the life of a

If Plato knew anything at all of Indian allegory, he must have known that the swan (Hamsa) is in Hinduism the invariable symbol of the immortal Spirit; and to say, as he does, that Orpheus chose the life of a swan, refusing to be born again of a woman, is just an allegorical way of saying that he passed on into the spiritual life. . . .” One is tempted to cap this with Donne:

Oh, do not die, for I shall hate
All women so when thou art gone
That thee I shall not celebrate
When I remember thou wert one.
swan, because from hatred of the tribe of women, owing to his death at their hands, it was unwilling to be conceived and born of a woman. He saw the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale; and he saw a swan changing to the choice of the life of man, and similarly other musical animals. The soul that drew the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion; it was the soul of Ajax, the son of Telamon, which, because it remembered the adjudication of the arms of Achilles, was unwilling to become a man. The next, the soul of Agamemnon, likewise from hatred of the human race because of its sufferings, substituted the life of an eagle. Drawing one of the middle lots the soul of Atalanta caught sight of the great honours attached to an athlete's life and could not pass them by but snatched at them. After her, he said, he saw the soul of Epeius, the son of Panopeus, entering into the nature of an arts and crafts woman. Far off in the rear he saw the soul of the buffoon Thersites clothing itself in the body of an ape. And it fell out that the soul of Odysseus drew the last lot of all and came to make its choice, and, from memory of its former toils having flung away ambition, went about for a long time in quest of the life of an ordinary citizen who minded his own business, and with difficulty found it lying in some corner disregarded by the others, and upon seeing it said

* Like Orpheus a singer. He contended with the Muses in song and was in consequence deprived by them of sight and of the gift of song. Cf. also Ion 533 b-c, Laws 829 d-e, Iliad ii. 595.

* Cf. Aesch. Ag. 114 ff.

* Who built the Trojan horse. See Hesychius s.v.

* Cf. Iliad ii. 212 ff.

* For ἀπράγμονος cf. on 565 a, p. 316, note b. 515
D ἄλλων, καὶ εἰπεῖν ἵδούσαν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἄν ἔπραξε καὶ πρώτη λαχώσα, καὶ ἀσμένην ἐλέσθαι. καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ θηρίων ὠσαύτως εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἴναι καὶ εἰς ἄλληλα, τὰ μὲν ἄδικα εἰς τὰ ἄγρια, τὰ δὲ δίκαια εἰς τὰ ἡμερα μεταβάλλοντα, καὶ πᾶσας μίξεις μύγνυσθαι. ἐπειδὴ δ’ οὖν πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς τοὺς βίους ἑρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ ἠλαχον, ἐν τάξει προσιέναι πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν· ἐκείνην δ’

Ε ἐκάστῳ, ὅν εἴλετο δαίμονα, τοῦτον φύλακα ξυμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἵρεθέντων. ὅτι πρωτον μὲν ἄγεων αὐτὴν πρὸς τὴν Κλωθῶ ὑπὸ τὴν ἐκείνης χειρά τε καὶ ἐπιστροφὴν τῆς τοῦ ἀτράκτου δινῆς, κυροῦντα ἡν λαχῶν εἴλετο μοῖραν· ταύτης δ’ ἐφαίσαμενον αὕθις ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς 'Ατρόπου ἄγεων νῆσιν, ἀμετάστροφα τὰ ἐπικλωσθέντα ποιοῦντα. ἐντεύθεν δὲ δὴ ἀμεταστρεπτὶ ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς

621 Ἀνάγκης ἴναι θρόνον, καὶ δ’ ἐκείνων διεξελθόντα, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι διήλθον, πορεύεσθαι ἀπαντάς εἰς τὸ τῆς Λήθης πεδίον διὰ καύματός τε καὶ πνύγους δενοῦ. καὶ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτὸ κενὸν δένδρων τε καὶ ὁσα γη φύει: σκηνάσθαι οὖν σφᾶς ἕδη ἐσπέρας γυγομένης παρὰ τὸν Ἀμέλητα ποταμὸν,

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a Phaedr. 249 specifies that only beasts who had once been men could return to human form.

b Cf. supra 617 e, and for daemons in Plato What Plato Said, pp. 546-547, on Symp. 202 e, Dieterich, Nekyia, p. 59.


d Cf. Laws 960 c.

e τὰ ἐπικλωσθέντα: cf. Laws 957 e, Theaet. 169 c, and the Platonic epigram on Dion, Anth. Pal. vii. 99 Μούραι ἐπέκλωσαν, 516
that it would have done the same had it drawn the first lot, and chose it gladly. And in like manner, of the other beasts some entered into men \(^a\) and into one another, the unjust into wild creatures, the just transformed to tame, and there was every kind of mixture and combination. But when, to conclude, all the souls had chosen their lives in the order of their lots, they were marshalled and went before Lachesis. And she sent with each, as the guardian of his life and the fulfiller of his choice, the genius \(^b\) that he had chosen, and this divinity led the soul first to Clotho, under her hand and her turning \(^c\) of the spindle to ratify the destiny of his lot and choice; and after contact with her the genius again led the soul to the spinning of Atropos \(^d\) to make the web of its destiny \(^e\) irreversible, and then without a backward look it passed beneath the throne of Necessity. And after it had passed through that, when the others also had passed, they all journeyed to the Plain of Oblivion, \(^f\) through a terrible and stifling heat, for it was bare of trees and all plants, and there they camped at eventide by the River of Forgetfulness, \(^g\)

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\(^a\) In later literature it is the river that is called Lethe. Cf. Aeneid vi. 714 f., Milton, Par. L. ii.: Lethe, the river of oblivion, rolls
Her wat'ry labyrinth, whereof who drinks,
Forthwith his former state and being forgets.

Keats, "Ode on Melancholy": "No, no! go not to Lethe,"
Tennyson, "The Two Voices":
As old mythologies relate,
Some draught of Lethe might await
The slipping thro' from state to state.
οὐ τὸ ὑδωρ ἀγγεῖον οὐδὲν στέγειν. μέτρον μὲν οὖν τι τοῦ ὑδατος πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φρονήσει μη σωζομένους πλέον πίνειν τοῦ μέτρου· τὸν δὲ αἱ πιόντα πάντων ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι.

Β ἐπειδὴ δὲ κοιμηθῆναι καὶ μέσας νύκτας γενέσθαι, βροντήν τε καὶ σεισμὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐξαπίνης ἀλλον ἀλλή φέρεσθαι ἢν εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, ἄπτοντας ὀσπερ ἀστέρας. αὐτὸς δὲ τοῦ μὲν ὑδατος κωλυθῆναι πιεῖν· ὅτι μέντοι καὶ ὅπως εἰς τὸ σώμα ἀφίκοιτο, οὐκ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ’ ἐξαίφνης ἀναβλέψας ἰδεῖν ἔσωθεν αὐτὸν κείμενον ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ. καὶ οὕτως, ὡ Γλαῦκων, μόθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ὁ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειν, ἂν πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸν τῆς Λήθης ποταμὸν εὕ διαβησόμεθα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ μιανθησόμεθα· ἀλλ’ ἂν ἐμοὶ πειθώμεθα, νομίζοντες ἀθάνατον ψυχήν καὶ δυνατὴν πάντα μὲν κακὰ ἀνέχεσθαι, πάντα δὲ ἀγαθά, τῆς ἢν ὁδοὶ ἂεὶ ἐξόμεθα καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπιτηδεύσομεν, ἵνα καὶ

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*a In *Tim.* 41 d-e each soul is given a star as its vehicle. *Cf.* Aristoph. *Peace* 833 f. ὥς ἀστέρες γιγνόμεθ' ὅταν τις ἀποθάνῃ . . . with the Platonic epigram to *Ἄστηρ: . . . νῦν δὲ θανὼν* 518
whose waters no vessel can contain. They were all required to drink a measure of the water, and those who were not saved by their good sense drank more than the measure, and each one as he drank forgot all things. And after they had fallen asleep and it was the middle of the night, there was a sound of thunder and a quaking of the earth, and they were suddenly wafted thence, one this way, one that, upward to their birth like shooting stars. Er himself, he said, was not allowed to drink of the water, yet how and in what way he returned to the body he said he did not know, but suddenly recovering his sight he saw himself at dawn lying on the funeral pyre.—And so, Glaucon, the tale was saved, as the saying is, and was not lost. And it will save us if we believe it, and we shall safely cross the River of Lethe, and keep our soul unspotted from the world. But if we are guided by me we shall believe that the soul is immortal and capable of enduring all extremes of good and evil, and so we shall hold ever to the upward way and pursue righteousness with wisdom always and ever,

λάμπεις Ἔσπερος ἐν φθιμένοις. There is an old superstition in European folklore to the effect that when a star falls a soul goes up to God. Cf. also Rohde, Psyche, ii. p. 131.

b Cf Phaedrus 243 b ἀνέβηλησεν.

c Cf Phileb. 14 a, Laws 645 b, Theaet. 164 d.

d Cf. Phaedo 58 b ἐκατε ἐκεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. σώζειν is here used in its higher sense, approaching the idea of salvation, not as in Gorg. 511 c f., 512 d-e, Laws 707 d, where Plato uses it contemptuously in the tone of “whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it.”

e Cf. James i. 27, Phaedo 81 b, 2 Peter iii. 14, and the Emperor Julian’s last speech “animum . . . immaculatum conservavi.” Cf. Marius the Epicurean, pp. 15-16: “A white bird, she told him once, looking at him gravely, a bird which he must carry in his bosom across a crowded public place—his own soul was like that.”

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PLATO

ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς φίλοι ὤμεν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, αὐτοῦ τε μένοντες ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἐπειδὰν τὰ ἄθλα αὐτῆς
D κομιζώμεθα, ὡσπερ οἱ νικηφόροι περιαγειρόμενοι,
καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τῇ χιλιετεί πορείᾳ, ἥν δι-
εληλύθαμεν, εὖ πράττωμεν.

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*a Cf. Laws 693 b ἐαυτῆς φίλην, Rep. 589 b, Horace, Epist. i. 3. 29 "si nobis vivere cari," Wordsworth:

Hence lives he to his inner self endeared.

Jowett's "dear to one another" misses the point. Cf. my review of Lemercier, Les Pensées de Marc-Aurèle, in Class. Phil. vii. p. 115: "In iii. 4, in fine, the words οὔγε οὔδέ αὐτοῖς ἐαυτοῖς ἀδέσκονται are omitted because 'les gens que méprise Marc-Aurèle sont loin de mépriser eux-mêmes.' This is to forget that Seneca's 'omnis stultitia fastidio laborat sui'
that we may be dear to ourselves and to the gods both during our sojourn here and when we receive our reward, as the victors in the games go about to gather in theirs. And thus both here and in that journey of a thousand years, whereof I have told you, we shall fare well."

is good Stoic doctrine, and that the idea that only the wise and good man can be dear to himself is found in the last sentence of Plato's Republic. Cf. also Soph. O.C. 309 τις γὰρ ἐσθλὸς οὗχ αὐτῷ φίλος;

\[\text{Cf. Vol. I. p. 480, note c, on 465 d.}\]

\[\text{Cf. Gorg. 527 c εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ζωὴν καὶ τελευτήσας. Cf. Vol. I. p. 104, note b, on 353 e. The quiet solemnity of } \varepsilon\varepsilonι\varepsilon\pi\varepsilon\pi\varepsilon \varepsilon\nu\varepsilonν \text{ illustrates the same characteristic of style that makes Plato begin his } \text{Laws with the word } \theta\varepsilon\varepsilon\sigma\text{, and Dante close each of the three sections of the } \text{Divine Comedy with } \text{"stelle."}\]
THE PRELIMINARY MEETING

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