ARISTOTLE

POLITICS
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"It is an amazing book. It seems to me to show a Shakespearean understanding of human beings and their ways, together with a sublime good sense."—Henry Jackson, Letters.
INTRODUCTION

1. PRACTICAL PROLEGOMENA

In this edition of Politics the Books are in the ms. order; the division into chapters and sections is that of Schneider (1809); also, to facilitate reference, there are indicated in the margin the pages, columns and lines of Bekker's Berlin text (1831), which with its volumes of scholia (1836) and Bonitz's index (1870) has rendered invaluable service to students (its lines are numbered, and its two columns denoted by later editors by a and b, so that it affords a reference to every line of the extant works of Aristotle except The Athenian Constitution, only rediscovered in 1890).

Some modern editors have rearranged the Books, placing the 7th and 8th as 4th and 5th, and the 4th, 5th and 6th either as 6th, 7th and 8th, or as 6th, 8th and 7th. Also some number them by the Greek alphabet, but others by the Greek numerals, using ς, ζ, η instead of Z, H, Θ to denote 6, 7, 8. Moreover, two modes of dividing the Books into chapters are in vogue, and with one of these two different divisions of the chapters into sections have been used. The result is that such a reference as 'Politics, Z, v. 6' might denote twelve different passages in twelve different editions.

The arguments for the two different rearrangements of the order of the Books are based on their contents, and editors have made conjectural alterations of the cross-references in the text to suit these
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rearrangements; but the reasons, based on these
cross-references and on the general contents, in
favour of retaining the traditional order seem to me
almost or quite as strong, while the reasons of con-
venience (vigorously stated by Immisch in his
edition, pp. vi f.) are overwhelming.

It also seems desirable to explain that this transla-
tion is designed primarily to serve as an assistance
to readers of the Greek, not as a substitute for it;
it aims at being explanatory, so far as is possible
without expanding into mere paraphrase. A version
intended to be read instead of the Greek might well
be on different lines. It might be quite literal and
non-committal, keeping as close as possible to the
form of the Greek and reproducing even its gaps of
expression and what are or seem to our ignorance
to be its ambiguities, and leaving the student to go
for explanation to the commentators; or, on the
other hand, it might render the meaning but ignore
the form, and substitute terse and finished English
for Aristotle's great variety of styles—for he ranges
from mere jottings and notes to passages of ample
discourse, not devoid of eloquence, though hardly
models of Attic distinction and grace.

A rendering on the latter lines was provided for
English readers once and for all by Jowett, whose
translation with notes and essays (1885) is an English
classic. This version, revised by Ross (1921), is of
the greatest service to the student who wants to
know the things that Aristotle said, but not the way
he had of saying them.

2. Mss. and Text of Politics

The mss. are not very old nor very good. The
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oldest evidence for the text is a translation in barbarous Latin by a Dominican monk of the thirteenth century, William of Moerbeke in Flanders. It is occasionally quoted here as Guil., and when the readings of its lost Greek original can be inferred from it, they are given as L. a The five best extant Greek copies are of the fifteenth century: one at Berlin, Hamiltonianus (H), one at Milan (M), and three at Paris (P₁, P₂, P₃). Of these H represents an older text than any other; M and P₁ form a family with L; P₂ and P₃ group with various inferior mss., and are usually considered less reliable than the other family. b The text of Politics is thus very uncertain in detail, although uncertainties affecting the meaning are fortunately not very numerous. Some inaccuracies of expression attested by all the mss. are precisely similar to inaccuracies in other places attested by some mss. and avoided by others; but as to how far the former inaccuracies are to be accredited to the author and how far to his transmitters, no two scholars will agree.

In this edition room has only been found for the most interesting variant readings.

3. Editions

The commentary of Newman on the whole work (4 vols., 1887–1902) and that of Susemihl and Hicks on five Books (1894) are most valuable collections of information. The Teubner edition of Susemihl revised by Immisch (2nd ed., 1929) gives a useful brief presentation of the evidence for the text.

a Also the version of Aretinus (Leonardo Bruno of Arezzo). 1438, is once or twice cited as Ar.
b Codd. cet. in the critical notes of this edition.
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4. Life of Aristotle

Diogenes Laertius’s *Lives of the Philosophers*, supplemented from other sources, gives us a fairly detailed knowledge of Aristotle’s life. His father was an hereditary member of the medical profession, and physician to the king of Macedon, Amyntas II. Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. at the little colonial city of Stagirus, on the Gulf of the Strymon, of which he remained a citizen all his life, although he passed half of it at Athens. Perhaps it is possible to find some trace of his northern origin in his writings; if in some details of his thought he is more Athenian than the Athenians, his style has little Attic neatness, fluency or grace, even though his vocabulary has no definitely non-Attic features. He came to Athens at the age of seventeen to pursue his education, and became a pupil of Plato, remaining a member of the Academy for twenty years, till Plato’s death. Speusippus then became head of the school, and Aristotle left Athens for Atarneus in Asia Minor, where his former fellow-pupil Hermeias was now ‘tyrant.’ He entertained Aristotle for three years, and gave him his niece as wife; but then he fell into the hands of the Persians. Aristotle fled to the neighbouring island of Lesbos, and in 342 was invited by King Philip to return to Macedon and become the tutor of Alexander, now thirteen years old. At sixteen the prince became regent, Philip being engaged in war with Byzantium. His tutor retired to Stagirus, which had been destroyed by Philip in the Olynthian war, but which Aristotle had been allowed to restore. But he returned to Athens when Alexander succeeded to his father’s
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throne in 336 B.C., and set up as a professor of philosophy, breaking away from the Academy and establishing a kind of college in the Lyceum. This was a precinct of Apollo and the Muses just outside the city, and its περιπατός or walks, in which Aristotle taught, gave the new school its name of Peripatetic; he equipped it with a large library and a natural history museum.

Aristotle's professorship lasted till 322 B.C., when on Alexander's death Athens led a Greek revolt against Macedon. Aristotle, an alien, a protégé of the court and friend of the viceroy Antipater, and a critic of democracy, fell a victim to anti-Macedonian feeling; like Socrates before him, he was prosecuted for impiety. Saying that he would not let Athens 'sin twice against philosophy,' he withdrew to his estate at Chalcis in Euboea, and died in the same year.

His body was taken to Stagirus for burial, and his memory was honoured there by a yearly festival. He left his library and the originals of his own writings to his pupil Theophrastus, who succeeded him as head of the Lyceum.

5. ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

Aristotle's writings were partly more or less popular works on philosophical subjects, and partly scientific treatises. The former were published (ἐκδομένοι λόγοι), and are doubtless included among the 'exoteric discourses' referred to in his extant works (e.g. Pol. 1323 a 32), though that term seems to cover the writings of other philosophers also. They are all lost, unless The Athenian Constitution
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is held to belong to this group. No doubt they had the charm and flow of style which Cicero and Quintilian praise in Aristotle. To the latter group belong the extant works, and these are for the most part singularly devoid of those qualities of style. They are called 'lectures' (ἀκροατικοὶ λόγοι), and in fact each consists of a collection of separate discourses on different parts of a subject, loosely put together to form a treatise on the whole, with transitional passages of summary and preface, and cross-references, often untraceable. Some passages are mere outlines of the argument, others set it out fully but baldly, and others are copious and even eloquent, as if written to be read by the professor to his class. Doubtless they are actual drafts for courses of lectures, put together by Aristotle or his pupils to form treatises, and kept in the library of the school as an encyclopaedia for the use of students. It is to them that Cicero refers when in another passage he speaks of Aristotle's writings as 'notes' (commentarii).

6. Politics and Ethics

For Aristotle Political Science is the second half of a subject of which Ethics is the first half; indeed in the opening chapters of The Nicomachean Ethics the term Politiké is applied to the whole subject. It is the science of human affairs, of man's happiness or good. This consists in a certain mode of life, and man's life is shaped for him by his social environment, the laws, customs and institutions of the community to which he belongs. Aristotle describes man in biological terms as 'by nature a political animal'; he only develops his capacities in society, rightly organ-
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ized for his welfare. The aim of Politiké is to discover first in what mode of life man's happiness consists, then by what form of government and what social institutions that mode of life can be secured. The former question requires the study of man's ethos or character, which occupies The Nicomachean Ethics; the latter is the subject of the constitution of the state, which is treated in Politics. Politics is a sequel to Ethics, the second half of a single treatise, although it bears the title that in the preface has been given to the whole subject; this subject is covered by Plato in the single dialogue of The Republic.

In Aristotle's whole scheme of science, Politiké belongs to the group of Practical Sciences, which seek knowledge as a means to action, whereas the Theoretic Sciences (such as theology, metaphysics, pure mathematics and astronomy) seek knowledge for its own sake. The Practical Sciences fall into two groups again; the 'Poietic' or Productive Sciences, which tell us how to make things, and the Practical Sciences in the narrower sense of the term, which tell us how to do things: the former aim at some product or result, of the latter the actual practice of the art is itself the end. The former include the professions and the handicrafts, the latter the fine arts, like dancing and music, which are pursued for their own sake (though in Greek the term τέχνη, 'art' or craft, is sometimes confined to the former group—compare the English word 'technology').

The supreme Practical Science is Politiké; it is the science of man's welfare or happiness as a whole. It is practical in the wider sense of the term, because it studies not only what happiness is (the topic of
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*Ethics*, but also how it is to be secured (that of *Politics*); and it is also practical in the narrower sense, because happiness is found (in *Ethics*) not to be a product of action but itself to consist in action of a certain sort.

7. **Other Aristotelian Works on Politics**

The short essay *Oeconomicus* included among the works of Aristotle is certainly by one or more Peripatetics of a later date. Other political works of Aristotle recorded are *Πολιτικός* (a dialogue), Ἡ Ρήτορος ἡ Πολιτικοῦ, Περὶ Βασιλείας, Ἦ Αλέξανδρος Ἡ Ὑπὲρ Ἀποικιῶν (a dialogue on colonization), *Δικαιώματα Πόλεων* (formal pleadings on points of difference submitted by the Greek states to the arbitration of Philip), *Νόμιμα* or *Νόμιμα Βαρβαρικά* (an account of the institutions of non-Hellenic peoples, including the Etruscans), and most important of all, *Πολιτείαι* (a series of accounts of the constitutions of a large number of Greek states, enlivened with legends, local proverbs, and even anecdotes). This last work, until the discovery of *The Athenian Constitution* in 1890, was only known to us from a number of quotations and references in later writers. It was a collection of materials upon which *Politics* was based, and is referred to as such at the conclusion of *The Nicomachean Ethics*.

8. **Date of Composition of Politics**

The latest event mentioned in *Politics* (V. viii. 10, 1311 b 2) is the death of Philip of Macedon, 336 B.C. The work is not finished, and Aristotle died in 322 B.C.

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9. Structure of the Work

Most of Aristotle’s extant works look like compilations of several logoi or discourses dealing with different parts of the subject, and somewhat loosely put together to form a treatise on the whole. This applies to Politics more than to any other; it seems to consist of three sets of lectures, not completely finished, not systematically connected, and partly overlapping: viz. (1) Books I.-III., Prolegomena—the theory of the state in general and a classification of the varieties of constitution; (2) Books IV., V., VI., Practical Politics—the nature of existing constitutions, and principles for their good government; (3) Books VII., VIII., Ideal Politics—the structure of the best state (unfinished).

A probable view is that the work was begun on one plan and later finished on another. Book I., a prefatory treatise on domestic economy, was probably written for the first plan; it is unfinished, and clumsily fitted on to its present sequel. Book II. also looks like part of the first plan, kept to form part of the second one; the same applies to Book III., perhaps the oldest part of all, which shows signs of incomplete revision to fit the new plan. Books IV., V., VI. are the newer work, and contemporary with the conclusion of The Nicomachean Ethics. Books VII., VIII., the Best State, are the earlier work, put aside unfinished when the plan was changed, and their substitute was never written.

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10. Outline of Contents

(1) Prolegomena, Books I., II., III.

Book I. The Family.—The state (c. i.) is not merely a large family (a retort to Plato's communism), but different in kind, yet it is a natural outgrowth from an aggregation of villages, as the village is from an aggregation of families. The family (c. ii.) is a partnership of master and slave, husband and wife, father and children; it involves the business of provision. Mastership (c. ii. continued): the slave is a live tool, and slavery is natural—the division into ruler and ruled permeates nature (soul and body, reason and appetites, man and animals, male and female), and some men have only bodily capacities. Criticism really hits 'legal slavery'; 'natural slavery' is recognized by common sense, and there is community of interest and friendship between master and slave. But the acquisition of slaves and the direction of their tasks are not part of mastership proper. The business of provision (c. iii.)—is it part of family economy, or subsidiary? Nature supplies food for animals, and animals for the food and service of man; so one kind of acquisition—the supply of the limited wealth needed for the good life—does belong to family economy. But another kind uses goods for exchange, aided by the invention of money, which led to commerce; hence the mistaken beliefs that money is the sole wealth and that the good life is bodily enjoyment. The natural and necessary art of provision is subsidiary to family economy; the other kind is justly disliked, especially usury—money breeding money. The branches of natural and unnatural provision are xvi
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outlined (c. iv.), with a third intermediate kind, the appropriation of the uncultivated gifts of the soil; and reference is made to former treatises, dealing in particular with monopoly. The relation of the head of the family (c. v.) to the wife resembles republican government, and that to the children royalty. All three classes of household subjects have their virtues, the slaves' imparted by the master's admonition, the women's and children's by education directed in the interest of the state.

Book II., The best Constitutions known, theoretical and actual (c. i.).—Plato's Republic aims at unity by communism; but complete unity of the state is not desirable, his system (c. ii.) will not produce it, his account is incomplete, and there are other minor objections. The communism of Laws (c. iii.) is less thorough-going. The equalitarian constitution of Phaleas and that of Hippodamus (cc. iv., v.) are criticized, with a short essay on the dangers of political innovation; then the constitution of Sparta (c. vi.), that of Crete, said to have been its model (c. vii.), and that of Carthage (c. viii.). There follow notes on Solon and a few other law-givers (c. ix.).

Book III., The Nature of the State.—Political Science (cc. i.-iii.) asks 'What is a citizen?' and 'Is the goodness of a citizen the same as the goodness of a man?' (in other words, What share in government constitutes citizenship and what classes should possess it? and in order to perform its duties, must one possess all the moral virtues or only special political abilities?). Citizenship means at least membership of the judiciary and the assembly, and therefore requires some property and leisure; and manual work and trade are incompatible with the necessary mental
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qualities. On this basis the forms of government are classified (cc. iv., v.). They vary according as the sovereign is one man or a few or the many, and according as these govern for the common good or for their own; this gives three Correct Constitutions—Royalty, Aristocracy, Constitutional Government; and three Deviations—Tyranny, Oligarchy, Democracy (i.e., essentially, the rule of the poor and un-leased, not the rule of the many). The distribution of power (c. vi.): the state is a partnership for the good life, and in principle those who contribute most to this have most right to power. In practice, perhaps, the laws should be sovereign; but they may be bad. The rule of the many is a simple solution—they have at least collective wisdom and wealth; but they should not share the highest offices, only elect to and control them. The subject is treated afresh (cc. vii., viii.): education and virtue are the best claims to power—wealth, birth and numbers have relative but not absolute claims. Supereminence puts a man or group of men above the law: hence the value of ostracism, for even in the ideal state supereminence would be dangerous—except supereminence in virtue, which should make a man monarch. Royalty (c.ix.)—Spartan, oriental, elective (the aesymnete), that of heroic times, and (c. x.) absolute monarchy. It calls for supreme virtue in an individual; but royalty passed into aristocracy as virtue spread, and aristocracy degenerated into oligarchy; this was overthrown by tyrants, and these put down by democracy. Truly (c. xi.) the law should rule, i.e. reason; and the monarch must have helpers, which points to aristocracy. But surpassing individual excellence does occur, and then absolute xviii
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monarchy is justified. Recapitulation on Royalty (c. xii.).

(Of the other five constitutions, four are treated, though not on a symmetrical plan, in Books IV., V., VI. Aristocracy was touched on as a variant to Royalty in III. x., xi., and actual cases of it are alluded to in IV. vii., but it is replaced by the Best Constitution, the unfinished essay on which forms Books VII. and VIII. The substitution of ἀριστητὴ πολιτεία as an equivalent for ἀριστοκρατία and βασιλεία is justified in IV. iii. 1 (1289 a 31 ff.): is this an interpolation?)

(2) Practical Politics, Books IV., V., VI.

Book IV. Existing Constitutions.—Science (c. i.) must study not only the ideally best form of state but the best under given conditions. Monarchy and Aristocracy (c. ii.) have been dealt with; there remain Constitutional Government, and the Deviations (in descending order of merit), Democracy, Oligarchy, Tyranny—their varieties and their suitability to various peoples, their establishment and their preservation against revolution (the contents of Books IV., V., VI). Constitutions (c. iii.) vary in the distribution of power according to rank and wealth. Democracy and Oligarchy are usually thought the chief forms; they really differ (c. iv.) not merely as the rule of the free and of the wealthy, but as that of the free majority and the wealthy minority. The necessary classes are farmers, artisans, shopkeepers, labourers, soldiers, councillors and judges, rich men, magistrates (Plato wrongly omitted the last three). Some may overlap, but rich and poor are distinct, so that Oligarchy and
INTRODUCTION

Democracy are the normal forms of government. Democracy (c. iv.) has four varieties, according as the qualifications of property and citizen-birth, and the supremacy of law over decrees of the assembly, are in force or are not. Oligarchy (c. v.) also has four varieties, according as power goes by a moderate or a high property-qualification, or by heredity, or is the arbitrary rule of powerful families called a Dynasty. The normal historical succession of the four varieties of Democracy and of Oligarchy are traced. Aristocracy, in a secondary sense, is a blend of these two, based on merit and numbers, or on merit, numbers and wealth. Constitutional Government (cc. vi., vii.) is also a blend of Oligarchy and Democracy (approximating more to the latter), being based on numbers and wealth; it is brought about by the institution of pay for service in the courts, and of either a moderate property-qualification for the assembly or else election without property-qualification of magistrates; it brings contentment, and so is stable. Tyranny (c. viii.) is monarchy based on force, irresponsible and selfish. Constitutional Government (c. ix.), based on the virtues of the middle class, is best on the average. But (c. x.) the best constitution for a given state depends on the relative numbers of the free, the middle class and the wealthy. Citizenship should be limited to those who bear arms, with a property-qualification admitting a majority. Classification of constitutions (cc. xi., xii.) is based on the distribution of deliberative, judicial and executive functions, the tenure and numbers of the executive, and their mode of election (fourteen modes are enumerated). The functions of the judiciary
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(c. xiii.), eight in number, are stated, and various modes of its appointment.

Book V. Revolutions—their causes and their prevention.—Revolution (c. i.) springs from a desire of the many or the rich for more power (though democracy is less liable to it than oligarchy). The various motives and circumstances that lead to it are set out (c. ii.), with historical instances of its arising from quite petty events (c. iii.); and special causes that operate in democracies, oligarchies and aristocracies (cc. iv., v., vi.). It is prevented (c. vii.) by the opposite causes and measures, which are discussed in general, and for oligarchy and democracy in particular, as well as (c. viii.) for monarchies, royalty and tyranny being contrasted: a variety of personal motives cause attacks on tyrants, but the monarchy of old days was only endangered by discord in the reigning house or by excessively harsh rule. Royalty is preserved (c. ix.) by moderation; tyranny by two opposite methods, harsh repression or conciliatory public spirit (historical examples). Criticism (c. x.) of Plato’s treatment of revolution in The Republic, with his theory of a regular cycle of constitutional changes.

Book VI. (a) Democracy and Oligarchy.—Democracy (c. i.) varies in form with the prevalent industries of the people, its basis being liberty and equality (not ‘proportional equality,’ balancing wealth against numbers). Agricultural democracy (c. ii.) is the best, pastoral next; traders and labourers are too fond of politics and a field for demagogy. Devices to safeguard democracy (c. iii.), especially colonization. Oligarchy (c. iv.)—the more tyrannical its form the more protection it needs, an elaborate
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military system and placation of the people by public benefactions. (b) The various Offices of Government are enumerated and discussed (c. v.).

(3) Ideal Politics, Books VII., VIII.

Book VII. The Best Constitution: external conditions, population.—The writer begins (cc. i.-iii.) with a résumé of Ethics: the best life for the state as for the man is the life of virtue with enough external goods for virtuous action; the highest form of this for a man is the inner life of thought, and similarly for the state external dominion is inferior to the internal activity of politics. The necessary conditions of the ideal but practicable state (iv., v.) are a population not too small nor too large for the best common life, a country large enough for the temperate maintenance of this population and easily defensible, a suitable city site (the advantages and disadvantages of a sea-port are set out). The citizens (c. vi.) should be of a race like the Greek, at once spirited and intelligent. Of the necessary classes (c. vii.), the artisans and farmers (c. viii.) are unfit for citizenship, which must carry military, political, judicial and priestly functions; they should be slaves or alien serfs. The history of the caste-system (c. ix.) is discussed. The land must be partly public, to support religion and the public meals, partly private; each citizen is to have one farm near the city and another near the frontier. The site and plan of the city (cc. x., xi.), water-supply, fortifications, temples, state agora, market agora, and guard-posts and shrines in the country. The discipline and education of the citizens xxii
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(c. xii.); to natural gifts must be added training of habit and reason (c. xiii.), the psychology and objects of which are discussed; and the life of leisure is the ultimate aim. To produce the finest human material (c. xiv.) the state must regulate marriage, and the training of infancy and childhood. Education proper (c. xv.) falls into two parts, for the ages 7 to 14 and 14 to 21.

Book VIII. The Best Constitution continued.—Education must be systematic, universal and public (c. i.). Studies (c. ii.) should be edifying, and useful studies should be pursued with a liberal tone. Gymnastics (c. iii.) are to train spirit; for children (cc. iv., v.) they should be gentle, then three years of study should follow, then a period of rigorous bodily training. Music is not merely a harmless amusement or a rational pastime; it is morally educative—it exercises and refines the emotions. Moderate skill in performance on the lyre (c. vi.) should be acquired, but the flute and cithara are too professional, and the flute too emotional; and so (c. vii.) is the Phrygian mode—the ethical Dorian mode is more suited for education.

(The treatise here breaks off.)
ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α

I. Ἐπειδῆ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὅρωμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ ὁδικὸν, καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἄγαθον τινὸς ἐνεκεν συνεστηκῆς (τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἄγαθον χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δὴ λοι ὡς πᾶσαι μὲν ἄγαθον τινὸς στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἡ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας· αὐτή δ' ἐστὶν ἡ καλουμένη πόλις καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική. ὅσοι 2 μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ ὁικονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν πλῆθει γὰρ καὶ ὁλογότητι νομίζουσι διαφέρειν ἀλλ' οὐκ εἴδει τούτων ἔκαστον, οἷον ἂν μὲν οὐκ, δεσπότην, ἂν δὲ πλείων, οἰκονόμον, ἂν δ' ἐτι πλείων, πολιτικὸν ἢ βασιλικόν, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσαν μεγάλην οἰκίαν ἢ μικρὰν πόλιν· καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ βασιλικόν, ὅταν μὲν αὐτὸς ἐφεστήκη, βασιλικόν, ὅταν δὲ

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a The Greek word had not acquired a specially political connotation as the English word 'community' has.
b Socrates and Plato.
I. Every state is as we see a sort of partnership, and every partnership is formed with a view to some good (since all the actions of all mankind are done with a view to what they think to be good). It is therefore evident that, while all partnerships aim at some good, the partnership that is the most supreme of all includes all the others does so most of all, and aims at the most supreme of all goods; and this is the partnership entitled the state, the political association. Those then who think that the natures of the statesman, the royal ruler, the head of an estate and the master of a family are the same, are mistaken; they imagine that the difference between these various forms of authority is one of greater and smaller numbers, not a difference in kind—that is, that the ruler over a few people is a master, over more the head of an estate, over more still a statesman or royal ruler, as if there were no difference between a large household and a small city; and also as to the statesman and the royal ruler, they think that one who governs as sole head is royal, and one who,

{oikovómas: denoting a higher grade than despotis is unusual. For their ordinary use see c. ii. § 1 fin.
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κατὰ λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τουαύτης κατὰ μέρος ἄρχων καὶ ἄρχόμενος, πολιτικόν· ταῦτα δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ. δὴ λοιπὸν δ’ ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθετον μέχρι τῶν ἀυπνοθέτων ἀνάγκη διαίρεται (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐλάχιστα μόρια τοῦ παντός), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν εξ ὧν σύγκειται σκοποῦντες ὁφόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον τί τε διαφέρουσιν ἄλληλων καὶ εἰ τι τεχνικὸν ἐν- δέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἐκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων.

Εἰ δὴ τις εξ ἄρχης1 τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα βλέ- ψειν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ’ ἄν οὕτω θεωρῆσειν. ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συν-4 δυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀνευ ἄλληλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γενέσεως2 ἐνεκεν (καὶ τούτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ξύνοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ 4 ἐφίεσθαι οἷον αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον καταλπεῖν ἔτερον), ἄρχον δὲ καὶ ἄρχόμενον φύσει,3 διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοια προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον τῷ σώματι ταῦτα ποιεῖν4 ἄρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δουλον· διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δουλω ταῦτο συμφέρει). φύσει 5 μὲν οὖν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσι ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον χαλκοτύπῳ τῆν Δελφικήν μάχαιραν πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ’ ἐν πρὸς ἐν-

1 ἄρχης <ELS> Richards.
2 γενέσεως Stobaeus.
3 φύσει ante καὶ codd. cet. et Ald.
4 ταῦτα ποιεῖν (ταῦτα ante τῷ σώματι MP): διαπονεῖν Gomperz.

a A probable emendation gives 'that can carry out labour.'
b A dagger and carving-knife or knife and spoon in one?
POLITICS, I. i. 2-5

while the government follows the principles of the science of royalty, takes turns to govern and be governed is a statesman; but these views are not true. And a proof of what we assert will appear if we examine the question in accordance with our regular method of investigation. In every other matter it is necessary to analyse the composite whole down to its uncompounded elements (for these are the smallest parts of the whole); so too with the state, by examining the elements of which it is composed we shall better discern in relation to these different kinds of rulers what is the difference between them, and whether it is possible to obtain any scientific precision in regard to the various statements made above.

In this subject as in others the best method of investigation is to study things in the process of development from the beginning. The first coupling together of persons then to which necessity gives rise is that between those who are unable to exist without one another, namely the union of female and male for the continuance of the species (and this not of deliberate purpose, but with man as with the other animals and with plants there is a natural instinct to desire to leave behind one another being of the same sort as oneself), and the union of natural ruler and natural subject for the sake of security (for one that can foresee with his mind is naturally ruler and naturally master, and one that can do these things with his body is subject and naturally a slave; so that master and slave have the same interest). Thus the female and the slave are by nature distinct (for nature makes nothing as the cutlers make the Delphic knife, in a niggardly way, but one thing for one
oútw gar ãn ápoteleîto kállista têw ñrganonw 5 èkastôn, ìn ñpóllois êrgous áll' éni ðouleîw). été tois bárbarois to ðêli kai to1 ðoulon tênu autênu êxei pâzen' aîton ñ' ðti to fûsei ãrchn ouk êxou- sîn, ìlalla ginetai ì kouïnîa autôn ðouîh kai ðouîon. diô fâsun ìi poîntai
bárbaron ñ' "Ellînas ãrchein èkôs,
ôs taûto fûsei bárbaron kai ðoulon õn. èk mên õ
10 ouîn taûton tôn ðûo kouïnîwî ìnkîa prôtîh, kai
ôrhoîs 'Hsiôdos ìîpê poînîas
òikôn mên prôtîsta gynaiîa te boûn ò' ãrotoîra:
o gar boûs ãnt' oîkêton toîs pênîsîn êstîn. ì
mên ouî eîs ðâsain ëmêran suvesthkia kouïnîa
kata fûsw înkîs êstîn, ouû Ïxarôûdâs mên kalêi
15 òmôsîtopûs, 'Epîmenîdhîs ñê ð' Krês ðmôkûpons.2

'Ì ñ' èk plêionwôs ìnkîwî kouïnîa prôtî 7
chîsewos ènêkêv ìn êfýmeûro kòmîh. málîsta ñê
kata fûsw êoîken ï kòmîh âpouikia3 ìnkîs ìnîa,
oûs kalôdôi tînês òmôgàlaktaî [pâiðâs te kai
pâiðwv pâiðâs].4 diô kai to prôtoûn èbasileûonî
20 ài pölêis kai vûn õtî tà êthnê. èk bâsileûomêvnon

1 to add. edd.  2 ðmôkûpons GMP1.
3 âpouikia ñ ed.  4 [pâiðâs te—pâiðâs] Susemîhl.

a Euripides, l.A. 1400.
b Works and Days 405.
c A lawgiver of Catana in Sicily, 6th century b.c. or earlier.
d A poet and prophet invited to Athens 596 b.c. to purify it of plague.
e Or Doric, ‘with a joint holding.’ The variant ðmôkûpons,
' smoke-sharers,' seems to mean 'hearth-fellows.'
f Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'consists of colonies from.'
POLITICS, I. I. 5–7

purpose; for so each tool will be turned out in the finest perfection, if it serves not many uses but one). Yet among barbarians the female and the slave have the same rank; and the cause of this is that barbarians have no class of natural rulers, but with them the conjugal partnership is a partnership of female slave and male slave. Hence the saying of the poets—

'Tis meet that Greeks should rule barbarians,—

implying that barbarian and slave are the same in nature. From these two partnerships then is first composed the household, and Hesiod was right when he wrote:

First and foremost a house and a wife and an ox for the ploughing—

for the ox serves instead of a servant for the poor. The partnership therefore that comes about in the course of nature for everyday purposes is the 'house,' the persons whom Charondas speaks of as 'meal-tub-fellows' and the Cretan Epimenides as 'manger-fellows.'

On the other hand the primary partnership made up of several households for the satisfaction of not mere daily needs is the village. The village according to the most natural account seems to be a colony from a household, formed of those whom some people speak of as 'fellow-nurslings,' sons and sons' sons. It is owing to this that our cities were at first under royal sway and that foreign races are so still, because they were made up of parts that were

'The words 'sons and sons' sons' are probably an interpolated note.
ARISTOTLE

1252 b

γὰρ συνήλθον, πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ
tοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, ὦστε καὶ αἱ ἀποκίαι διὰ τὴν
συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτ ἐστὶν ὁ λέγει Ἄμηρος,
θεμιστεύει δὲ ἐκαστὸς

παῖδων ἢδ' ἀλόχων·

σποράδες γὰρ· καὶ οὔτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἤκουσιν. καὶ
25 τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύεσθαι,
ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ μὲν ἑτὶ καὶ νῦν οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον
ἐβασιλεύοντο· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἰδὴ ἐαυτοῖς ἀφ-
ομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὔτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν
θεῶν.

'Ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνίᾳ τέλειος 8
πόλις, ἢδη πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐτάρκειας
80 ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γνωμένη 1 μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζήν ἐνεκεν,
οὔσα δὲ τοῦ εὗ ζήν. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστὶν,
εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι τέλος γὰρ αὐτη
ἐκεῖνων, ἢ δὲ φύσει τέλος ἐστὶν, οἷον γὰρ ἐκαστὸν
ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμέν
τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστοτε, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωποι, ἵπποι,
1253 a οἰκίας. ἔτι τὸ οὐ ἐνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον·
ἡ δ' αὐτάρκεια τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ τούτων 9
οὖν φανέρον ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅτι δὲ
ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ἥξων, καὶ ὃ ἀπολισ διὰ
φύσω καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἑτοὶ φαύλος ἐστὶν ἢ
6 κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος (ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ υἱ' Ὁμήρου
λοιδορθείς

αφρήτωρ, ἀθέμιστος, ἀνέστιος,

1 γενωμένη ? ed.

a Odyssey, ix, 114 f. of the Cyclopes: the passage goes on:
ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος | ὃς πολέμου ἐραται.
b A reminiscence of Xenophanes fr. 14.
o Iliad ix. 63.
under royal rule; for every household is under the royal rule of its eldest member, so that the colonies from the household were so too, because of the kinship of their members. And this is what Homer means:

And each one giveth law
To sons and eke to spouses—
for his Cyclopes live in scattered families; and that is the way in which people used to live in early times. Also this explains why all races speak of the gods as ruled by a king, because they themselves too are some of them actually now so ruled and in other cases used to be of old; and as men imagine the gods in human form, so also they suppose their manner of life to be like their own.

The partnership finally composed of several villages is the city-state; it has at last attained the limit of virtually complete self-sufficiency, and thus, while it comes into existence for the sake of life, it exists for the good life. Hence every city-state exists by nature, inasmuch as the first partnerships so exist; for the city-state is the end of the other partnerships, and nature is an end, since that which each thing is when its growth is completed we speak of as being the nature of each thing, for instance of a man, a horse, a household. Again, the object for which a thing exists, its end, is its chief good; and self-sufficiency is an end, and a chief good. From these things therefore it is clear that the city-state is a natural growth, and that man is by nature a political animal, and a man that is by nature and not merely by fortune citiless is either low in the scale of humanity or above it (like the 'clanless, lawless, hearthless' man reviled by Homer, for he is by nature citiless
ARISTOTLE

1253 a

άμα γὰρ φύσει τοιούτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμη
tῆς) ἀτε ὤν ὥσπερ ἄξενόν εἰν πεττοῖς. διότι δὲ 10
πολιτικόν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ζωούν πάσης μελίτης καὶ
παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζώου μάλλον, δῆλον. οὐθέν γὰρ,
10 ὃς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον δὲ μόνον
ἀνθρώπος ἔχει τῶν ζώων. ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνή τοῦ
λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς
άλλοις ὑπάρχει ζώοις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις
αὐτῶν ἐλήμυθεν, τοῦ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ
ἡδεός καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις), ὁ δὲ λόγος
ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν,
وفقτα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδικον· τοῦτο γὰρ 11
πρὸς τὰλα ζώα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον,
ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδικου καὶ τῶν
άλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν, ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ
οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.

Καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἡ οἰκία καὶ
20 ἐκαστὸς ἡμῶν ἐστῖν. τὸ γὰρ ὄλον πρότερον
ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ
ὄλου οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χεὶρ εἰ μὴ ὡμώνυμος,
ὡσπερ εἰ τις λέγει τὴν λυθήνην· διαφθαρείσα γὰρ
4 ἔσται τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὑποσται καὶ
τῇ δυνάμει, ὡστε μηκέτι τοιαύτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον
25 τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἄλλ' ὑμώνυμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις
καὶ φύσει πρότερον ἡ ἐκαστὸς, δήλον· εἰ γὰρ
μὴ αὐτάρκης ἐκαστὸς χωρισθεῖσ, ὡμοίως τοῖς
άλλοις μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ ὄλον, ὅ δὲ μὴ δυνά

1 sic ? Richards : ἀτε περ ἄξεν ὄν ὥσπερ.
4 γὰρ οὐκ Ἀχόλλ. 5 καὶ φύσει καὶ codd. plurimi.

* Or ‘a hand thus spoiled will not be a hand at all.’
and also a lover of war) inasmuch as he resembles an isolated piece at draughts. And why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well (for their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful and pleasant and to signify those sensations to one another), but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state.

Thus also the city-state is prior in nature to the household and to each of us individually. For the whole must necessarily be prior to the part; since when the whole body is destroyed, foot or hand will not exist except in an equivocal sense, like the sense in which one speaks of a hand sculptured in stone as a hand; because a hand in those circumstances will be a hand spoiled, and all things are defined by their function and capacity, so that when they are no longer such as to perform their function they must not be said to be the same things, but to bear their names in an equivocal sense. It is clear therefore that the state is also prior by nature to the individual; for if each individual when separate is not self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as other parts are to their whole, while a man who is
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μενος κοινωνεῖν ἥ μηθέν δεόμενος δι’ αὐτάρκειαν ούθεν μέρος πόλεως, ὡστε ἡ θηρίων ἡ θεός.

30 Φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὀρμή ἐν πάσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τουαύτην κοινωνίαν. οὶ δὲ πρῶτοι συστήσασις μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αὐτίος· ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθὲν βέλτιστον τῶν ζῴων ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὔτω καὶ χωρισθέν νόμον καὶ δίκης χείριστον πάντων. χαλεπωτάτη γὰρ ἄδικία ἑχουσα ὅπλα, οὗ δὲ ἀνθρωπος ὅπλα ἐξων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ ἁρετῇ οἷς ἐπὶ τάναντία ἐστι χρήσθαι μάλιστα. διὸ ἀνοσιώτατον καὶ ἀγριώτατον ἀνευ ἁρετῆς καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἐδωδὴν χείριστον. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν. ἡ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις.

1253 b Ἑπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν ἡς ὅ μορίων ἡ πόλις συν-1 ἐστικεῖν, ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰ-πεῖν. πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται πόλις ἡς οἰκίων. οἰко-νομίας δὲ μέρη ἡς ὅν πάλιν οἰκία συνεστηκεν οἰκία 5 δὲ τελείως ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων. Ἑπεὶ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις πρῶτον ἐκαστὸν ζητητέον, πρῶτα δὲ καὶ ἐλάχιστα μέρη οἰκίας δεσπότης καὶ δούλος, καὶ πόσις καὶ ἁλοχος, καὶ πατήρ καὶ τέκνα, περὶ τριῶν ὅν τούτων σκεπτέον εἰτ τὶ ἐκαστὸν καὶ πολὺν δεῖ εἶναι, ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ γαμικὴ.

1 τελεωθὲν secl. Jackson.
2 ὁ om. codd. cet. et Ald.
3 χωρισθέν—δίκης secl. Jackson.
4 ἁρετῇ <ἐπιτήδεια> ? Pearson.
5 τὸ γὰρ δικαίου Richards.

The Greek word properly denotes the marriage ceremony, not the married state.

12
incapable of entering into partnership, or who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part of a state, so that he must be either a lower animal or a god.

Therefore the impulse to form a partnership of this kind is present in all men by nature; but the man who first united people in such a partnership was the greatest of benefactors. For as man is the best of the animals when perfected, so he is the worst of all when sundered from law and justice. For unrighteousness is most pernicious when possessed of weapons, and man is born possessing weapons for the use of wisdom and virtue, which it is possible to employ entirely for the opposite ends. Hence when devoid of virtue man is the most unscrupulous and savage of animals, and the worst in regard to sexual indulgence and gluttony. Justice on the other hand is an element of the state; for judicial procedure, which means the decision of what is just, is the regulation of the political partnership.

II. And now that it is clear what are the component parts of the state, we have first of all to discuss household management; for every state is composed of households. Household management falls into departments corresponding to the parts of which the household in its turn is composed; and the household in its perfect form consists of slaves and freemen. The investigation of everything should begin with its smallest parts, and the primary and smallest parts of the household are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children; we ought therefore to examine the proper constitution and character of each of these three relationships, I mean that of mastership, that of marriage (there is no exact
1253 b

10 (ἄνώνυμον γὰρ ἡ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς σύζευξις) καὶ τρίτον τεκνοποιητική (καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ ἄνοιμασται ἵδιῳ ὄνοματι). ἠστώσαν δὴ αὕται τρεῖς ἃς εἴπομεν. ἐστὶ δὲ τῷ μέρος ὁ δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι οἰκονομία τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὕτης, ὃπως δ' ἔχει, θεωρητέουν. λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς καλούμενης χρηματιστικῆς.

15 Πρῶτον δὲ περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου εἴπωμεν, ἵνα τὰ τε πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρείαν ἰδωμεν, κἂν εἰ τι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι περὶ αὐτῶν δυναίμεθα λαβεῖν βέλτιον τῶν νῦν ὑπολαμβανομένων. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ 3 δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη τε τις εἶναι ἡ δεσποτεία, καὶ ἡ αὕτη οἰκονομία καὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ βασιλικῆ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἀρχόμενον· τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν, νόμω γὰρ τὸν μὲν δοῦλον εἶναι τὸν δ' ἐλεύθερον, φύσει δ' οὖθεν διαφέρειν, διόπερ οὐδὲ δίκαιον, βίαιον γὰρ.

14 Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας (ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον καὶ ζήν καὶ εἰδίζην), ὅπως 4 δὲ ταῖς ὀρυσμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἄν εἰ ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὤργανα εἰ μέλλει ἀποτελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ, τῶν δ' ὄργανων τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δ' ἐμψυχα (οὗν

1 τεκνοποιητικῆ: πατρικῆ Ar.
2 δὴ Susemihl: δ' codd.
3 ἐστὶ δ' ἐτί τέταρτον τι (i.e. δ' τί) Schmidt.
4 καὶ—οἰκονομίας secl. Susemihl.
5 [καὶ εἰδίζην] ? ed.; om. ΓΜΡ.
6 δὴ Susemihl.

a No English word covers all the associations of the Greeks, which means 'dealing in χρήματα,' 'things,'—goods, property, money—and so 'business.'
term denoting the relation uniting wife and husband), and thirdly the progenitive relationship (this too has not been designated by a special name). Let us then accept these three relationships that we have mentioned. There is also a department which some people consider the same as household management and others the most important part of it, and the true position of which we shall have to consider: I mean what is called the art of getting wealth.\(^a\)

Let us begin by discussing the relation of master and slave, in order to observe the facts that have a bearing on practical utility, and also in the hope that we may be able to obtain something better than the notions at present entertained, with a view to a theoretic knowledge of the subject. For some thinkers hold the function of the master to be a definite science, and moreover think that household management, mastership, statesmanship and monarchy are the same thing, as we said at the beginning of the treatise; others however maintain that for one man to be another man's master is contrary to nature, because it is only convention that makes the one a slave and the other a freeman and there is no difference between them by nature, and that therefore it is unjust, for it is based on force.

Since therefore property is a part of a household and the art of acquiring property a part of household management (for without the necessaries even life, as well as the good life,\(^b\) is impossible), and since, just as for the definite arts it would be necessary for the proper tools to be forthcoming if their work is to be accomplished, so also the manager of a household must have his tools, and of tools some are lifeless and

\(^a\) Mastership and Slavery.

\(^b\) "As well as the good life" is probably an interpolation.
This legendary sculptor first represented the eyes as open and the limbs as in motion, so his statues had to be
others living (for example, for a helmsman the rudder is a lifeless tool and the look-out man a live tool—for an assistant in the arts belongs to the class of tools), so also an article of property is a tool for the purpose of life, and property generally is a collection of tools, and a slave is a live article of property. And every assistant is as it were a tool that serves for several tools; for if every tool could perform its own work when ordered, or by seeing what to do in advance, like the statues of Daedalus in the story, or the tripods of Hephaestus which the poet says 'enter self-moving the company divine,'—if thus shuttles wove and quills played harps of themselves, master-craftsmen would have no need of assistants and masters no need of slaves. Now the tools mentioned are instruments of production, whereas an article of property is an instrument of action; for from a shuttle we get something else beside the mere use of the shuttle, but from a garment or a bed we get only their use. And also inasmuch as there is a difference in kind between production and action, and both need tools, it follows that those tools also must possess the same difference. But life is doing things, not making things; hence the slave is an assistant in the class of instruments of action.

And the term 'article of property' is used in the same way as the term 'part': a thing that is a part is not only a part of another thing but absolutely belongs to another thing, and so also does an article of property. Hence whereas the master is merely the slave's master and does not belong to the slave, chained to prevent them from running away (Plato, *Meno* 97 d).

* i.e. with it we do not make something but do something (e.g. wear a dress, lie in a bed).
εκεῖνον δ’ οὐκ ἐστὶν· ὁ δὲ δοῦλος οὐ μόνον δεσπότου δοῦλος ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἐκεῖνον.

Τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δοῦλου καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἕκ τούτων δήλον· ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἀλλ’ ἀλλοῦ ἄνθρωπος ὄν, οὗτος φύσει δοῦλος ἐστὶν, ἀλλοῦ δ’ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος ὃς ἂν κτήμα ἡ ἄνθρωπος ὄν, κτήμα δὲ ὀργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστὸν, πότερον δ’ ἐστὶ τις φύσει τοιοῦτος ἡ οὖ, καὶ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ δύκαιον τινὶ δουλεύειν ἡ οὖ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα δουλεία παρὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ, μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον. οὐ 8 χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν. τὸ γὰρ ἄρχει καὶ ἄρχεσθαι οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἐστὶ, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἕνα διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τὰ δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν. καὶ εἴδη 25 πολλὰ καὶ ἄρχοντων καὶ ἄρχομένων ἐστὶν (καὶ ἀεὶ βελτίων ἡ ἄρχη ἡ τῶν βελτίων ἄρχομένων, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἡ θηρίον, τὸ γὰρ ἀποτελοῦμενον ἀπὸ τῶν βελτίων βέλτιον ἔργον, ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει τὸ δ’ ἄρχεται, ἐστὶ τι τούτων ἔργον)· ὅσα 9 γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων συνέστηκε καὶ γίνεται ἐν τι 30 κοινῶν, εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἰτ’ ἐκ διηρημένων, ἐν ἄπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἄρχομενον, καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ἐμφύχοις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἐστὶ
the slave is not merely the slave of the master but wholly belongs to the master.

7 These considerations therefore make clear the nature of the slave and his essential quality: one who is a human being belonging by nature not to himself but to another is by nature a slave, and a person is a human being belonging to another if being a man he is an article of property, and an article of property is an instrument for action separable from its owner. But we must next consider whether or not anyone exists who is by nature of this character, and whether it is advantageous and just for anyone to be a slave, or whether on the contrary all slavery is against nature. And it is not difficult either to discern the answer by theory or to learn it empirically. Authority and subordination are conditions not only inevitable but also expedient; in some cases things are marked out from the moment of birth to rule or to be ruled. And there are many varieties both of rulers and of subjects (and the higher the type of the subjects, the loftier is the nature of the authority exercised over them, for example to control a human being is a higher thing than to tame a wild beast; for the higher the type of the parties to the performance of a function, the higher is the function, and when one party rules and another is ruled, there is a function performed between them)—because in every composite thing, where a plurality of parts, whether continuous or discrete, is combined to make a single common whole, there is always found a ruling and a subject factor, and this characteristic of living things is present in them as an outcome of the whole of nature, since even in things that do not partake of life there
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tis ἀρχή, οὖν ἀρμονίας. 1 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἵσως ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως. τὸ δὲ ζωὸν πρῶτον 10
35 συνεστηκένει ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δ’ ἀρχόμενον. δεὴ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὸ φύσει, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεθθαρμένοις. διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλτιστα διακείμενον καὶ κατὰ σώμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχῆν ἄν-
θρωπον θεωρητέον, ἐν ὧν τοῦτο δῆλον· τῶν γὰρ 1254 b μοχθηρῶν ἡ μοχθηρῶς 2 ἔχοντων δόξειν ἂν ἄρχειν
πολλάκις τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὸ φαύλως καὶ 3 παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν. ἐστὶ δ’ οὖν, ὡσπέρ λέγομεν, 11
πρῶτον ἐν ξώμι θεωρητέαι καὶ δεσποτικὴν ἄρχὴν
5 καὶ πολιτικήν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχή τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει δεσποτικὴν ἄρχην, ὦ δὲ νοῦς τῆς ὀρέξεως
πολιτικὴν καὶ βασιλικὴν· ἐν οἷς φανερῶν ἐστὶν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν καὶ 4 συμφέρον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τῷ σώματι
ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ
νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ λόγου ἐχοντος, τὸ δ’ ἐξ
10 ἵσου ἡ ἀνάπαλιν βλαβερὸν πᾶσιν. πάλιν ἐν 12
ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ὀσιάτωσι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμέρα τῶν ἀγρίων βελτίω τὴν φύσιν, τούτοις
de πάσι βέλτιον ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ’ ἄνθρωπον, τυγχάνει
γὰρ σωτηρίας ὀτέως. ἐτὶ δὲ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ
θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν κρείττον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, τὸ μὲν
15 ἄρχον τὸ δ’ ἀρχόμενον. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἄνθρωπον· ὃσοι 13
μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστάσιν ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος

1 ἀρμονίας vel ἐν ἀρμονίαις Richards.
2 μοχθηρῶς: φαύλως (Γ?) Buecheler.
3 φαύλως καὶ secl. idem. 4 ἡ ? Richards.

*: Each ‘ mode ’ (Dorian, the modern minor scale, Phrygian and Lydian, two forms of major) was ruled by its key-note.
POLITICS, I. ii. 9-13

is a ruling principle, as in the case of a musical scale. However, this matter perhaps belongs to an investigation lying somewhat outside our subject. But in the first place an animal consists of soul and body, of which the former is by nature the ruling and the latter the subject factor. And to discover what is natural we must study it preferably in things that are in a natural state, and not in specimens that are degenerate. Hence in studying man we must consider a man that is in the best possible condition in regard to both body and soul, and in him the principle stated will clearly appear,—since in those that are bad or in a bad condition it might be thought that the body often rules the soul because of its vicious and un-natural condition. But to resume—it is in a living creature, as we say, that it is first possible to discern the rule both of master and of statesman: the soul rules the body with the sway of a master, the intelligence the appetites with constitutional or royal rule; and in these examples it is manifest that it is natural and expedient for the body to be governed by the soul and for the emotional part to be governed by the intellect, the part possessing reason, whereas for the two parties to be on an equal footing or in the contrary positions is harmful in all cases. Again, the same holds good between man and the other animals: tame animals are superior in their nature to wild animals, yet for all the former it is advantageous to be ruled by man, since this gives them security. Also, as between the sexes, the male is by nature superior and the female inferior, the male ruler and the female subject. And the same must also necessarily apply in the case of mankind generally; therefore all men that differ as widely as the soul
καὶ ἄνθρωπος θηρίου (διάκεινται δὲ τούτον τὸν τρόπον ὅσων ἐστὶν ἔργον ἢ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις καὶ 
tοῦτ’ ἐστ’ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν βέλτιστον), οὕτωι μὲν εἰσι 
φύσει δούλοι, οἷς βέλτιστον ἐστὶν ἀρχεσθαι ταύτην 
tὴν ἄρχην, εἴπερ καὶ τοὺς εἰρημένους. ἔστι γὰρ 
φύσει δοῦλος ὃ δυνάμενος ἄλλον εἶναι (διὸ καὶ 
ἄλλου ἐστὶν) καὶ ὁ κοινώνων λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον 
αισθάνεσθαι ἄλλα μὴ ἔχειν: τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζωὰ 
οὐ λόγῳ αἰσθανόμενα ἄλλα παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ. 
καὶ ἡ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρὸν· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς 
tάναγκαια τῷ σώματι βοήθεια γίνεται παρ’ 
ἀμφοῖν, παρά τε τῶν δούλων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμέρων 
ζῶων. βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ 
σώματα διαφέροντα ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ 
tῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἱσχυρὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν 
χρῆσιν, τὰ δ’ ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀχρηστὰ πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας 
ἔργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρῆσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον (οὕτω 
δὲ καὶ γίνεται δυρχημένος εἰς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν 
χρείαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικῆν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις 
καὶ τοῦναντίον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματ’ ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων 
tοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς μόνον. ἔπει τοῦτο γε φανερόν, 
ὡς εἰ τοσοῦτον γένοιτο διάφοροι τὸ σῶμα ὅσον 
αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπολειπόμενους πάντες 
φαίνει ἄν αξίους εἶναι τοῖς δουλεύειν. εἰ δὲ 
ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτ’ ἀληθές, πολὺ δικαιό-
τερον ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τούτο διωρίσθαι· ἀλλ’ οὐχ 
ὅμοιως ῥᾴδιον ἰδεῖν τὸ τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ 
1255 ἀ τοῦ τοῦ σώματος. ὁτὶ μὲν τοῖνυν εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς 

1 πειθόμενα Richards. 
2 μόνον hic ed.; post σῶμα codd.
does from the body and the human being from the lower animal (and this is the condition of those whose function is the use of the body and from whom this is the best that is forthcoming)—these are by nature slaves, for whom to be governed by this kind of authority is advantageous, inasmuch as it is advantageous to the subject things already mentioned. For he is by nature a slave who is capable of belonging to another (and that is why he does so belong), and who participates in reason so far as to apprehend it but not to possess it; for the animals other than man are subservient not to reason, by apprehending it, but to feelings. And also the usefulness of slaves diverges little from that of animals; bodily service for the necessities of life is forthcoming from both, from slaves and from domestic animals alike. The intention of nature therefore is to make the bodies also of freemen and of slaves different—the latter strong for necessary service, the former erect and unserviceable for such occupations, but serviceable for a life of citizenship (and that again divides into the employments of war and those of peace); though as a matter of fact often the very opposite comes about—slaves have the bodies of freemen and freemen the souls only; since this is certainly clear, that if freemen were born as distinguished in body as are the statues of the gods, everyone would say that those who were inferior deserved to be these men's slaves; and if this is true in the case of the body, there is far juster reason for this rule being laid down in the case of the soul, but beauty of soul is not so easy to see as beauty of body. It is manifest therefore that there are cases of people of whom some are
οἱ μὲν ἔλευθεροι οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι, φανερὸν, οἷς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεύειν καὶ δίκαιον ἔστιν.

"Ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τάναντία φάσκοντες τρόπον τινὰ 16 λέγουσιν ὀρθῶς, οὐ χαλεπῶν ἰδείν. διότι γὰρ ἐλεύθεροι τὸ δουλεύειν καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ἐτέστι γὰρ τὸ καὶ κατὰ νόμον δοῦλος καὶ δουλεύων, ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογία τῆς ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ κατὰ πόλεμον κρατοῦμεν τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι φασίν. 2 τούτῳ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἦσπερ ἰδιότα γράφονται παρανόμως, ὥς δεινὸν εἰ τὸν βιάζομαι διαμένοι καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν κρείττονος ἐσταὶ δοῦλον καὶ ἀρχόμενον τὸ βιάζοντι καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὕτω δοκεῖ τοῖς δὲ εἰκοίς καὶ τῶν σοφῶν. αὕτων 17 ὥστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἀνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δίκαιου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβητήσεως, καὶ ὁ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴ τῆς γεν- χάνουσα χωρὶς καὶ βιάζονται δύναται μάλιστα, 15 καὶ ἐστιν αἰς τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἄγαθόν τινός, ὥστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἀνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δίκαιου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβητήσεως (διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῖς μὲν εὗροιν δοκεῖν 2 τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ αὐτὸ τούτῳ δίκαιον, τὸν κρείττονα ἄρχειν). ἐπεὶ διαστάτων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν 20 λόγων οὐτὶ ἱσχυρὸν οὐθὲν ἔχουσιν οὕτε πιθανὸν ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν. ἄλως δὲ ἀντεχόμενοι τινὲς 18 ως οἴον τε δικαίου τινός (ὁ γὰρ νόμος δίκαιον τι)

2 [φασίν] Bernays.
3 τὸ—εὗροιν δοκεῖν Ross : τούτῳ—εὗραν δοκεῖ codd.
4 οἴον τε ed. : οἴονται codd.

a The difficulty turns on the ambiguity of ἀρετὴ, (a) moral goodness, virtue, (b) goodness of any kind, e.g. strength.

24
freemen and the others slaves by nature, and for these slavery is an institution both expedient and just.

16 But at the same time it is not difficult to see that those who assert the opposite are also right in a manner. The fact is that the terms 'slavery' and 'slave' are ambiguous; for there is also such a thing as a slave or a man that is in slavery by law, for the law is a sort of agreement under which the things conquered in war are said to belong to their conquerors. Now this conventional right is arraigned by many jurists just as a statesman is impeached for proposing an unconstitutional measure; they say that it is monstrous if the person powerful enough to use force, and superior in power, is to have the victim of his force as his slave and subject; and even among the learned some hold this view, though others hold the other. But the reason of this dispute and what makes the theories overlap is the fact that in a certain manner virtue when it obtains resources has in fact very great power to use force, and the stronger party always possesses superiority in something that is good, so that it is thought that force cannot be devoid of goodness, but that the dispute is merely about the justice of the matter (for it is due to the one party holding that the justification of authority is good-will, while the other identifies justice with the mere rule of the stronger); because obviously if these theories be separated apart, the other theories have no force or plausibility at all, implying that the superior in goodness has no claim to rule and be master. But some persons, doing their best to cling to some principle of justice (for the law is a principle of justice), assert that the
τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν τιθέασι δικαίαιν· ἂμα
d' οὐ φασιν, τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δι-
καίαν εἶναι τῶν πολέμων καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δου-
λεύειν οὐδαμῶς ἂν φαίη τις δούλον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ
μὴ, συμβηστεί τοὺς εὐγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας
dούλους εἶναι καὶ ἐκ δούλων ἐὰν συμβῇ πραθήναι
ληφθεῖν. διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται λέγειν
dούλους, ἄλλα τοὺς βαρβάρους. καίτοι ὅταν τοῦτο
λέγωσιν, οὐθὲν ἄλλο ζητοῦσι ἥ το φύσει δούλον
ὀπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴπομεν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναι τινας
φάναι τοὺς μὲν πανταχοῦ δούλους τοὺς δ' οὐδαμοῦ.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τροπὸν καὶ περὶ εὐγενείας· αὐτοὺς μὲν 19
γὰρ οὐ μόνον παρ' αὐτοῖς εὐγενεῖς ἄλλα πανταχοῦ
νομίζοντο, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους οὐκοὶ μόνον, ὡς
ὁν τι τὸ μὲν ἄπλως εὐγενεῖς καὶ ἐλεύθερον τὸ δ'
οὐχ ἄπλως, ὥσπερ ἡ Θεοδέκτου 'Ελενη φησὶ
θείων δ' ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν ἐκγονον μιξωμάτων
τίς ἂν προσεπείν ἀξιώσειν λάτρην;
ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐθενὶ ἄλλο ἡ ἀρετῇ καὶ
κακία διορίζουσι τὸ δούλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τοὺς
eὐγενεῖς καὶ τοὺς δυσγενεῖς· ἀξιώσοι γὰρ, ὥσπερ
ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρωπόν καὶ ἐκ θηρίων γίνεσθαι
θηρίον, οὔτω καὶ εξ' ἁγαθῶν ἁγαθὸν· ἡ δὲ φύσις
βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν πολλάκις, οὐ μέντοι
dύναται.
"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ λόγον ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις,

a A tragic poet, a friend of Aristotle.
enslavement of prisoners of war is just; yet at the same time they deny the assertion, for there is the possibility that wars may be unjust in their origin and one would by no means admit that a man that does not deserve slavery can be really a slave—otherwise we shall have the result that persons reputed of the highest nobility are slaves and the descendants of slaves if they happen to be taken prisoners of war and sold. Therefore they do not mean to assert that Greeks themselves if taken prisoners are slaves, but that barbarians are. Yet when they say this, they are merely seeking for the principles of natural slavery of which we spoke at the outset; for they are compelled to say that there exist certain persons who are essentially slaves everywhere and certain others who are so nowhere. And the same applies also about nobility: our nobles consider themselves noble not only in their own country but everywhere, but they think that barbarian noblemen are only noble in their own country—which implies that there are two kinds of nobility and of freedom, one absolute and the other relative, as Helen says in Theodectes:

But who would dare to call me menial,  
The scion of a twofold stock divine?

Yet in so speaking they make nothing but virtue and vice the distinction between slave and free, the noble and the base-born; for they assume that just as from a man springs a man and from brutes a brute, so also from good parents comes a good son; but as a matter of fact nature frequently while intending to do this is unable to bring it about.

It is clear therefore that there is some reason for
5 καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ τινες 1 οἰ μὲν φύσει δούλοι οἱ δ’ ἐλεύθεροι, δὴ λοιπ. καὶ ὅτι ἐν τοις διώρισται τὸ 20 τοιοῦτον, ὡς συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ δουλεύειν τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν, καὶ δίκαιον καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ἀρχεσθαι τὸ δ’ ἀρχειν ἢν πεφύκασιν ἀρχὴν ἀρχειν, ὡστε καὶ δεσπόζειν τὸ δὲ κακώς ἀσυμφόρως ἔστιν 10 ἀμφότερον (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ σώματι καὶ ψυχῇ, ὦ δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἷον ἐμψυχόν τι τοῦ σώματος κεχωρισμένον δὲ μέρος· διὸ καὶ συμφέρον ἔστι 21 τι καὶ φιλία δούλως καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς φύσει τούτων ἡξιωμένως, τοῖς δὲ μὴ τούτων 15 τὸν τρόπον ἄλλα κατὰ νόμον καὶ βιασθείσι τοῦναντίον).

Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐ ταύτων ἐστι δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτικὴ οὐδὲ πάσαι ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρχαὶ, ὥσπερ τινες φασιν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθέρων φύσει ἢ δὲ δοῦλων ἔστιν, καὶ ἢ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ 20 μοναρχία (μοναρχεῖται γὰρ πᾶς οἶκος), ἢ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἵσων ἀρχή. ὥδ’ ἔστρα 22 της οὐ λέγεται κατ’ ἐπιστήμην ἄλλα τῷ τοιοῦτῳ εἶναι, ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέρος. ἐπιστήμη δ’ ἂν εἰη καὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ δουλικὴ,

1 εἰσὶ τινες ed.: εἰσίν codd.
this dispute, and that in some instances it is not the case that one set are slaves and the other freemen by nature; and also that in some instances such a distinction does exist, when slavery for the one and mastership for the other are advantageous, and it is just and proper for the one party to be governed and for the other to govern by the form of government for which they are by nature fitted, and therefore by the exercise of mastership, while to govern badly is to govern disadvantageously for both parties (for the same thing is advantageous for a part and for the whole body or the whole soul, and the slave is a part of the master—he is, as it were, a part of the body, alive but yet separated from it; hence there is a certain community of interest and friendship between slave and master in cases when they have been qualified by nature for those positions, although when they do not hold them in that way but by law and by constraint of force the opposite is the case).

And even from these considerations it is clear that the authority of a master over slaves is not the same as the authority of a magistrate in a republic, nor are all forms of government the same, as some assert. Republican government controls men who are by nature free, the master’s authority men who are by nature slaves; and the government of a household is monarchy (since every house is governed by a single ruler), whereas statesmanship is the government of men free and equal. The term ‘master’ therefore denotes the possession not of a certain branch of knowledge but of a certain character, and similarly also the terms ‘slave’ and ‘freeman.’ Yet there might be a science of mastership and a slave’s science—the latter being the sort of knowledge that
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1255b δούλική μὲν οἷαν περὶ δὲ ἐν Συρακούσαις ἔπαθενεν
25 (ἐκεῖ γὰρ λαμβάνων τις μιαθὸν ἐδιδασκε τὰ ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα τοὺς παιδας). εἰγ̄ δ' ἂν καὶ
ἐπὶ πλέον τῶν τοιούτων μάθησις, οἴον ὦροποικῆ
καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαύτα γένη τῆς διακονίας: ἐστὶ γὰρ
ἐτέρων τὰ μὲν ἐντιμότερα ἔργα τὰ δ' ἀναγ-
καϊότερα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν παρομίαι

30 δοῦλος πρὸ δοῦλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου.

αἱ μὲν οὖν τοιαύται πᾶσαι δουλικαὶ ἐπιστήματε, εἰς, 23
despotikē δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἢ χρηστική δούλων.
ο γὰρ δεσπότης οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτάσθαι τοὺς δοῦλους,
ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι δοῦλοις. ἐστὶ δ' αὕτη ἢ
ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα οὐδὲ σεμνόν· ἥ γὰρ
τὸν δούλον ἐπίστασθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἐκείνων δὲ
35 ταῦτα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιτάττειν. διὸ δοσις ἔξουσια
μὴ αὐτοὺς κακοπαθεῖν, ἐπίτροπος λαμβάνει ταῦτην
τὴν τυμῆν, αὐτοὶ δὲ πολιτεύονται ἢ φιλοσοφοῦν.
ἡ δὲ κτητικὴ ἐτέρα ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἡ δικαια,
οἷον πολεμικὴ τις ὀδύα ἡ θηρευτική. περὶ μὲν
οὖν δοὺλου καὶ δεσπότου τούτων διωρίσθω τὸν

40 τρόπον.

1256a III. Ὄλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρη-
1 ματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν υφηγημένον
τρόπον, ἐπειπέρ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος
τι ἦν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσευν ἢ τις πότερον
ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ αὐτὴ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ
μέρος τι ἡ ὑπηρετική, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετική, πότερον

1 Richards: οἶνον ἡ δικαία codd.

a Probably from a comedy of Aristotle's contemporary
Philemon.

30
used to be imparted by the professor at Syracuse (for there used to be a man there who for a fee gave lessons to servants in their ordinary duties); and indeed there might be more advanced scientific study of such matters, for instance a science of cookery and the other such kinds of domestic service—for different servants have different functions, some more honourable and some more menial, and as the proverb says,

Slave before slave and master before master.*

23 The slave's sciences then are all the various branches of domestic work; the master's science is the science of employing slaves—for the master's function consists not in acquiring slaves but in employing them. This science however is one of no particular importance or dignity: the master must know how to direct the tasks which the slave must know how to execute. Therefore all people rich enough to be able to avoid personal trouble have a steward who takes this office, while they themselves engage in politics or philosophy. The science of acquiring slaves is different both from their ownership and their direction—that is, the just acquiring of slaves, being like a sort of warfare or hunting. Let this then stand as our definition of slave and master.

III. But let us follow our normal method and investigate generally the nature of all kinds of property and the art of getting wealth, inasmuch as we saw the slave to be one division of property. In the first place therefore one might raise the question whether the art of getting wealth is the same as that of household management, or a part of it, or subsidiary to it; and if subsidiary, whether it is so in the sense in which
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΣ

1256 a

όση η κερκιδοποική τη ὑφαντική ή ως η χαλκοπ-
γική τη ἀνδριαντοποια (οὐ γὰρ ὠσαύτως ὑπηρε-
tοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν ὄργανα παρέχει, ἢ δὲ τὴν ὑλὴν-
λέγω δὲ ὑλὴν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐξ οὐ τι ἀποτελεῖται
έργον, οἶον ὑφάντη μὲν ἐρία, ἀνδριαντοποιῷ δὲ
χάλκον).

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ τῇ ἥρημ-2
ματιστικῇ, δῆλον, τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσασθαι, τῆς
dὲ τὸ ἤρημασθαι—τίς γὰρ ἔσται ἡ ἤρημομενὴ τοῖς
cατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν; πότερον
dὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἔστι τι ἢ ἔτερον ἐδος, ἔχει διαμι-
φισβήτησιν. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται τοῦ ἤρηματιστικοῦ θεω-
ρήσαλ πόθεν ἤρηματα καὶ κτῆσις ἔσται, . . . 1
ἡ δὲ κτῆσις πολλὰ περιέλθησε μέρη καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος,
ὡστε πρῶτον ἡ γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι τῆς
οἰκονομικῆς 2 ἢ ἔτερον τι γένος; καὶ καθόλου ἡ
περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ κτῆσις.

20 Ἄλλα μὴν εἴδη γε πολλὰ τροφῆς, διὸ καὶ βίοι 3
πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσίν.
οὐ γὰρ οἶνον τε ζῆν ἀνευ τροφῆς, ὥστε αἱ διαφοραὶ
tῆς τροφῆς τῶν βίους πεποιήκασι διαφέροντας
tῶν ζώων. τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἀγελαία
tὰ δὲ σποραδικά ἐστιν, ὅποτέρως συμφέρει πρὸς
tὴν τροφὴν αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν ζωοφάγα τὰ δὲ
καρποφάγα τὰ δὲ παμφάγα αὐτῶν εἶναι· ὥστε

1 lacunam ? Susemihl.
2 οἰκονομικῆς Garvey: ἤρηματιστικῆς codd.

a Some words seem to have fallen out in the Greek.
POLITICS, I. III. 1-3

the art of making shuttles is subsidiary to the art of weaving or in that in which the art of casting bronze is subsidiary to the making of statues (for the two are not subsidiary in the same way, but shuttle-making supplies tools whereas bronze-founding supplies material—and by material I mean the substance out of which certain work is produced, for example fleeces are material for a weaver and bronze for a statuary).

2 Now it is clear that wealth-getting is not the same art as household management, for the function of the former is to provide and that of the latter to use—for what will be the art that will use the contents of the house if not the art of household management? but whether wealth-getting is a part of the art of household management, or a different sort of science, is open to debate. For if it is the function of the getter of wealth to study the source from which money and property are to be procured, . . . a

But property and riches comprise many divisions; hence first of all is husbandry a division of the household art, or is it a different kind of science? and so in general of the superintendence and acquisition of articles of food.

3 But furthermore, there are many sorts of food, owing to which both animals and men have many modes of life; for it is impossible to live without food, so that the differences of food have made the lives of animals different. Among wild animals some are nomadic and others solitary, according to whichever habit is advantageous for their supply of food, because some of them are carnivorous, others graminivorous, and others eat all kinds of food; so that nature has differentiated

Food is provided by nature; Husbandry
Perhaps ‘slave-raiding,’ cf. § 9, the appropriation of the ‘live tools’ that are a part of nature’s supplies; but Thucydides (i. 5) speaks of brigandage and piracy as common in earlier times, and as still deemed respectable professions in Northern Greece.
their modes of life to suit their facilities and their predilection for those articles of food. And as different kinds of animals by nature relish different sorts of food, and not each kind the same, even within the classes of carnivorous and graminivorous animals their modes of life differ from one another. And similarly in the human race also, for there are wide differences of life among mankind. The idlest men are nomads (for to procure food from domesticated animals involves no toil or industry, but as it is necessary for the herds to move from place to place because of the pastures, the people themselves are forced to follow along with them, as though they were farming a live farm). Other men live from hunting, and different people from different kinds of hunting, for instance some from brigandage, others from fishing—these are those that dwell on the banks of lakes, marshes and rivers or of a sea suitable for fishing,—and others live on wild birds and animals. But the largest class of men live from the land and the fruits of cultivation. This then virtually completes the list of the various modes of life, those at least that have their industry sprung from themselves and do not procure their food by barter and trade—the lives of the herdsman, the husbandman, the brigand, the fisherman, the hunter. Others also live pleasantly by combining some of these pursuits, supplementing the more deficient life where it happens to fall short in regard to being self-sufficing: for instance, some combine a pastoral life and brigandage, others husbandry and hunting, and similarly with the others—they pass their time in such a combination of pursuits as their need compels. Property of this sort then seems to be
1256 b

οὖν τοιαύτη κτήσει ὑπ' αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως διδομένη πᾶσιν, ὡσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν ἐυθὺς, οὕτω καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνεκτίκτει τῶν ζών τοσαύτην τροφῆν ὡς ίκανὴν εἶναι μέχρις ὥσ ἄν δῦνηται αὐτὸ αὐτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθὲν, οἶον ὃσα σκωληκοκοκεῖ ἡ ἱωτοκεῖ· ὃσα δὲ ἱωτοκεῖ, τοῖς γεννωμένοις ἔχει τροφήν ἐν αὐτοῖς μέχρι τινός, τὴν τοῦ καλομένου γάλακτος φύσιν. ὡστε ὃμως δήλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις οὐητέον τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζών ἐνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τάλα ζώα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἑμέρα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρήσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφῆν, τῶν δὲ ἀγρών εἰ μὴ πάντα ἄλλα τὰ γε πλείστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοηθείας ἐνεκεν, ἢν καὶ ἐσθῆς καὶ ἄλλα ὀργανά γίνεται ἐξ αὐτῶν.

ἐἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μηθὲν μῆτε ἀτελές ποιεῖ μῆτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν. διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητικὴ πως ἐσται (ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς) ἡ δὲ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τε τὰ θηρία καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἀρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουσιν, ὡς φύσει δίκαιον τούτον ὄντα τῶν πόλεμων.

Ἐν μὲν οὖν εἰδὸς κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἐστίν, καθὸ δὲ δεῖ ἦτοι ὑπάρχειν ἡ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχη ἦν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς

1 γενομένοις codd. cet.
2 καθὸ Bernays: δ codd., ὥτι (quia) Richards, ἃ (et ἃ δὲι—ὑπάρχειν post 30 oikias tr.) Rassow.

Rassow would transpose the clause (with a slight alteration) to give of the household art, that is, the acquisition of those goods capable of accumulation that are necessary for life and useful for the community of city and household, a 36
POLITICS, I. iii. 6-8

bestowed by nature herself upon all, as immediately upon their first coming into existence, so also when they have reached maturity. For even at the original coming into existence of the young some kinds of animals bring forth with them at birth enough sustenance to suffice until the offspring can provide for itself, for example all the species that bear their young in the form of larvae or in eggs. The viviparous species have sustenance for their offspring inside themselves for a certain period, the substance called milk. So that clearly we must suppose that nature also provides for them in a similar way when grown up, and that plants exist for the sake of animals and the other animals for the good of man, the domestic species both for his service and for his food, and if not all at all events most of the wild ones for the sake of his food and of his supplies of other kinds, in order that they may furnish him both with clothing and with other appliances. If therefore nature makes nothing without purpose or in vain, it follows that nature has made all the animals for the sake of men. Hence even the art of war will by nature be in a manner an art of acquisition (for the art of hunting is a part of it) that is properly employed both against wild animals and against such of mankind as though designed by nature for subjection refuse to submit to it, inasmuch as this warfare is by nature just.

One kind of acquisition therefore in the order of nature is a part of the household art, in accordance with which either there must be forthcoming or else that art must procure to be forthcoming a supply of which must be forthcoming or else the art must procure it to be forthcoming.'
Fragment 13 l. 71.
POLITICS, I. iii. 8–11

of those goods, capable of accumulation, which are necessary for life and useful for the community of city or household. And it is of these goods that riches in the true sense at all events seem to consist. For the amount of such property sufficient in itself for a good life is not unlimited, as Solon says that it is in the verse

But of riches no bound has been fixed or revealed to men; for a limit has been fixed, as with the other arts, since no tool belonging to any art is without a limit whether in number or in size, and riches are a collection of tools for the householder and the statesman. Therefore that there is a certain art of acquisition belonging in the order of nature to householders and to statesmen, and for what reason this is so, is clear.

But there is another kind of acquisition that is specially called wealth-getting, and that is so called with justice; and to this kind it is due that there is thought to be no limit to riches and property. Owing to its affinity to the art of acquisition of which we spoke, it is supposed by many people to be one and the same as that; and as a matter of fact, while it is not the same as the acquisition spoken of, it is not far removed from it. One of them is natural, the other is not natural, but carried on rather by means of a certain acquired skill or art. We may take our starting-point for its study from the following consideration: with every article of property there is a double way of using it; both uses are related to the article itself, but not related to it in the same manner—one is peculiar to the thing and the other is not peculiar to it. Take for example a shoe—there is its wear as a shoe and there is its use
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1257a

10 τε ὑπόδεις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητικῆ· ἀμφότεραι γὰρ ὑποδήματος χρήσεις, καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττόμενος τῷ δεομένῳ ὑποδήματος ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἡ τροφῆς χρῆται τῷ ὑποδήματι ἡ ὑπόδημα, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν χρήσιν, οὐ γὰρ ἄλλαγης ἐνεκεν γέγονεν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων 15 κτημάτων · ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τῶ τὰ μὲν πλεῖον τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ἰκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἢ καὶ δὴλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς 12 χρηματιστικῆς ἡ κατηγορία ὅσον γὰρ ἰκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἁναγκαῖον ἢν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἄλλαγην. ἐν μὲν οὖν 20 τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ (τούτῳ δ’ ἔστιν οἰκίᾳ) φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἐργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλ’ ἢδη πλείονοι τῆς κοινωνίας οὐσίας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκοινώνουν πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἐτέρων, δῶν κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἁναγκαίων ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ἔστι πολλὰ 25 ποιεῖ καὶ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν ἑθῶν, κατὰ τὴν ἄλλαγήν· αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ χρῆσμα πρὸς αὐτὰ καταλλάττονται, ἐπὶ πλέον δ’ οὐθέν, οἶνον οἶνον πρὸς οἰκῆν διδόντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἑκαστον. ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβλητικὴ οὐτε παρὰ φύσιν οὐτε χρηματιστικῆς ἐστὶν 30 εἴδος οὐδέν, εἰς ἀναπληρωσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας ἢν· εκ μέντοι ταύτης ἐγένετ’ ἐκείνη

1 χρηματιστικῆς | μεταβλητικῆς Bernays.
2 πλείονοι Richards: πλεῖονος codd.
3 αὐτῶν Immisch: αὐτῶν codd.
4 κεχωρισμένοι Immisch.
5 ἁναγκαῖον <ἡ> Coraes.
as an article of exchange; for both are ways of using a shoe, inasmuch as even he that bargers a shoe for money or food with the customer that wants a shoe uses it as a shoe, though not for the use proper to a shoe, since shoes have not come into existence for the purpose of barter. And the same also holds good about the other articles of property; for all of them have a use in exchange related to them, which began in the first instance from the natural order of things, because men had more than enough of some things and less than enough of others. This consideration also shows that the art of trade is not by nature a part of the art of wealth-getting; for the practice of barter was necessary only so far as to satisfy men's own needs. In the primary association therefore (I mean the household) there is no function for trade, but it only arises after the association has become more numerous. For the members of the primitive household used to share commodities that were all their own, whereas on the contrary a group divided into several households participated also in a number of commodities belonging to their neighbours, according to their needs for which they were forced to make their interchanges by way of barter, as also many barbarian tribes do still; for such tribes do not go beyond exchanging actual commodities for actual commodities, for example giving and taking wine for corn, and so with the various other things of the sort. Exchange on these lines therefore is not contrary to nature, nor is it any branch of the art of wealth-getting, for it existed for the replenishment of natural self-sufficiency; yet out of it the art of business

a Perhaps Aristotle wrote 'of the art of exchange': see note 1 on opposite page.
κατὰ λόγον. ἣνικωτέρας γὰρ γενομένης τῆς
βοηθεῖας τῷ εἰςἀγέσθαι ὅν ἐνδεεὶς καὶ ἐκπέμπειν
ὡν ἐπλεόναξον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ τοῦ νομίματος
ἐπορίσθη χρῆσις. οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἐκαστὸν
35 τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀναγκαἰων· διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλαγὰς 14
tοιούτων τι συνέθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι
καὶ λαμβάνειν ὃ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτῷ ὅν εἰχε τὴν
χρείαν εὐμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ξῆν, οἷον σίδηροι
cαὶ ἄργυρος καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑτερον, τὸ μὲν πρῶ-
tον ἀπλῶς ὀρισθέν μεγέθει καὶ σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ
tελευταῖον καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβαλλόντων ἦν ἀπο-
λύσῃ τῆς μετρήσεως αὐτοῦς· ὃ γὰρ χαρακτήρ
1257 b ἐτέθη τοῦ ποσοῦ σημείων. πορισθέντοι οὖν ἦδη 15
νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἄλλαγῆς βάτερον
eἴδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικὸν,
tὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ὑσως γινόμενον, εἶτα δὲ
ἐμπειρίας ἦδη τεχνικότερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μετα-
5 βαλλόμενον πλείστον ποιήσει κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ
ὁ χρηματιστικὴ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι,
cαὶ ἔργον αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρῆσαι πόθεν
ἐσται πλῆθος, 2 ποιητικὴ γὰρ 3 εἶναι πλοῦτον 4 καὶ
χρημάτων· καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον πολλάκις τιθέασι 16
νομίσματος πλῆθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν
10 χρηματιστικῆς καὶ τῆς καπηλικῆς. ὅτε δὲ πάλιν
λήρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ νόμος παντάπασι
φύσει δ’ οὐδὲν, ὡς μεταθεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων
ουθένως ἁξίων, οὔτε χρῆσιμον πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν

1 γενομένης Coraes: γινομένης codd.
2 πλῆθος χρημάτων codd.: gloss. excisit Gifanius: πλῆθος
αὐτοῦ ? Richards.
3 γὰρ: δ’ Bernays. 4 πλοῦτον Μ, τοῦ πλοῦτον cet.
in due course arose. For when they had come to supply themselves more from abroad by importing things in which they were deficient and exporting those of which they had a surplus, the employment of money necessarily came to be devised. For the natural necessaries are not in every case readily portable; hence for the purpose of barter men made a mutual compact to give and accept some substance of such a sort as being itself a useful commodity was easy to handle in use for general life, iron for instance, silver and other metals, at the first stage defined merely by size and weight, but finally also by impressing on it a stamp in order that this might relieve them of having to measure it; for the stamp was put on as a token of the amount. So when currency had been now invented as an outcome of the necessary interchange of goods, there came into existence the other form of wealth-getting, trade, which at first no doubt went on in a simple form, but later became more highly organized as experience discovered the sources and methods of exchange that would cause most profit. Hence arises the idea that the art of wealth-getting deals specially with money, and that its function is to be able to discern from what source a large supply can be procured, as this art is supposed to be creative of wealth and riches; indeed wealth is often assumed to consist of a quantity of money, because money is the thing with which business and trade are employed. But at other times, on the contrary, it is thought that money is nonsense, and entirely a convention but by nature nothing, because when those who use it have changed the currency it is worth nothing, and because it is of no use for any of the necessary needs of life.
ARISTOTLE

1257b

ἀναγκαίων ἦστι καὶ νομίσματος πλουτών πολλάκις ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς, καὶ τοιοῦτον τοιοῦτον εἶναι πλουτὸν ὁδ εὐπορῶν λιμῷ ἀπολεῖται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μίδαν ἐκείνον μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς πάντων αὐτῶν γιγνομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. διὸ θητῶν ἔτερον τι τῶν πλουτῶν καὶ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, ὀρθῶς ἔτοιμως ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐτέρα ἢ χρηματιστικῆ

καὶ ὁ πλουτὸς ὁ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ αὐτῇ μὲν οἰκονομικῇ, ἡ δὲ κατηκρίκῃ, ποιητικῆ πλουτοῦν οὐ πάντως ἄλλα διὰ χρημάτων μεταβολῆς καὶ δοκεῖ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα αὐτῇ εἶναι, τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἦστιν. καὶ ἀπειρός δὴ οὗτος ὁ πλουτὸς ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ὃσπερ γὰρ ἡ ιατρικὴ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς ἀπειρὸν ἦστι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἀπειρὸν (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ ἐκείνο βούλονται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἀπειρὸν (πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις), οὐτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἦστι τοῦ τέλους πέρας,

τέλος δὲ τούτοις πλουτῶν καὶ χρημάτων κτῆσις. τῆς δ’ οἰκονομικῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἦστι πέρας οὐ γὰρ τούτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον. διὸ τῇ μὲν φαῖνεται ἀναγκαίον εἶναι παντὸς πλουτοῦ πέρας, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γιγνομένων ὄρῶν συμβαίνον τούτων


a e.g. on a desert island.
b i.e. a trader cannot get too much of his goods, any more than a doctor can make his patient too healthy.

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and a man well supplied with money may often be destitute of the bare necessities of subsistence, yet it is absurd that wealth should be of such a kind that a man may be well supplied with it and yet die of hunger, like the famous Midas in the story, when owing to the insatiable covetousness of his prayer all the viands served up to him turned into gold. Hence people seek for a different definition of riches and the art of getting wealth, and rightly; for natural wealth-getting and natural riches are different: natural wealth-getting belongs to household management, whereas the other kind belongs to trade, producing wealth not indiscriminately but by the method of exchanging goods. It is this art of wealth-getting that is thought to be concerned with money, for money is the first element and limit of commerce. And these riches, that are derived from this art of wealth-getting, are truly unlimited; for just as the art of medicine is without limit in respect of health, and each of the arts is without limit in respect of its end (for they desire to produce that in the highest degree possible), whereas they are not without limit as regards the means to their end (for with all of them the end is a limit to the means), so also this wealth-getting has no limit in respect of its end, and its end is riches and the acquisition of goods in the commercial sense. But the household branch of wealth-getting has a limit, inasmuch as the acquisition of money is not the function of household management. Hence from this point of view it appears necessary that there should be a limit to all riches, yet in actual fact we observe that the opposite takes place; for all
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1257b ναυτίον. πάντες γὰρ εἰς ἀπειρον αὐξοῦσιν οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι τὸ νόμισμα. αὔτιον δὲ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν. ἐπαλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρήσις τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁδὸν ἐκατέρας 1 τῆς χρηματιστικῆς τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ κτήσεως χρήσις, 2 ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταύταν, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἔτερον τέλος, τῆς δ' ἡ αὐξήσις. οὕτω δοκεὶ τισὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργου, καὶ διατελοῦσιν ἡ σάξεις οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἡ αὐξεῖν τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὐσίαν εἰς ἀπειρον. αὔτιον δὲ ταύτης 19 τῆς διαθέσεως τὸ σπουδάζειν περὶ τὸ ζῆν ἀλλὰ τῆς διαθέσεως τὸ σπουδάζειν περὶ τὸ ζῆν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ εὗ ζῆν· εἰς ἀπειρον οὖν ἑκεῖνης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὐσίας, καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀπειρῶν ἐπιθυμοὺσιν. οὐσιὲ δὲ καὶ τοῦ εὗ ζῆν ἐπιβάλλονται, τὸ πρὸς τᾶς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς ζητοῦσιν, ὡστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ κτήσει φαίνεται ὑπάρχειν, 3 πάσα ἡ διατριβὴ περὶ τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ ἔτερον εἰδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τοῦτ' ἐλήλυθεν. ἐν ὑπερβολῇ γὰρ οὕσης τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, τῆς τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς ὑπερβολῆς ποιητικῆς ζητοῦσιν· καὶ μὴ διὰ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς δύνανται πορίζειν, δι' ἀλλής αἰτίας τοῦτο πειρώνται, ἑκάστη χρώμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. ἀνδρείας γὰρ οὖ 20 χρήματα ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ θάρσος, οὐ δὲ στρατηγικῆς καὶ ἰατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δ' ὑγίειαν. οἱ δὲ πᾶσαι ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικάς, ὡς

1 ἐκατέρας Ar.: -τέρα cett.
2 κτήσεως χρήσις Goettling: χρήσεως κτήσις codd.
3 ὑπάρχειν Coraes.

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men engaged in wealth-getting try to increase their money to an unlimited amount. The reason of this is the close affinity of the two branches of the art of business. Their common ground is that the thing that each makes use of is the same; they use the same property, although not in the same way—the one has another end in view, the aim of the other is the increase of the property. Consequently some people suppose that it is the function of household management to increase property, and they are continually under the idea that it is their duty to be either safeguarding their substance in money or increasing it to an unlimited amount. The cause of this state of mind is that their interests are set upon life but not upon the good life; as therefore the desire for life is unlimited, they also desire without limit the means productive of life. And even those who fix their aim on the good life seek the good life as measured by bodily enjoyments, so that inasmuch as this also seems to be found in the possession of property, all their energies are occupied in the business of getting wealth; and owing to this the second kind of the art of wealth-getting has arisen. For as their enjoyment is in excess, they try to discover the art that is productive of enjoyable excess; and if they cannot procure it by the art of wealth-getting, they try to do so by some other means, employing each of the faculties in an unnatural way. For it is not the function of courage to produce wealth, but to inspire daring; nor is it the function of the military art nor of the medical art, but it belongs to the former to bring victory and to the latter to cause health. Yet these people make all these faculties means for the business of providing wealth, in the
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touto teles on, prods de to teles apanta deon apantaun.

16 Peri men on tis te mhe anagkaiais xrpomatistikhe, kai tis kai di aitian tina en xreia esmen autheis, eirhetai, kai peri tis anagkaiais, oti etera men autheis oikonomikhe de kata phusin he peri tih trophi, oux asper authe apieros all exousia oron.

Delon de kai to aporoumenon eis arkhis, potevov 21

20 ton oikonomikov kai politikov estin he xrpomatistikhe ou, alla dei touto men uparchein (asper gar kai anbrowpous ou poieth he politikhe alla laboisa parat tis phuseis xrpita autois, ouw kai
trophi2 tis phusin dei paradoynai yin he thalat-
tan he allo ti), ek de touton ois dei taouta diadeina
proshkei ton oikonomov. ou gar tis phantikhe
erma poihsai alla xrpasathai autois, kai gnavina
de to poion xrpston kai epitheiwein he faulo kai
aneptheiwein. kai gar asporhseiv an tis dia tii 22
he men xrpomatistikhe morion tis oikonomias he de

30 iatrike ou morion, katai dei yngaiwv touk kata
tin oikian, asper xin he allo ti ton anagkaivn.
epi de esti men ois to oikonov kai to oux

3 <estin> trophi Richds. 3 <estin> esti Welldon.
belief that wealth is the end and that everything must conspire to the end.

We have therefore discussed both the unnecessary branch of wealth-getting, defining it and also explaining the cause why we require it, and the necessary branch, showing that this branch which has to do with food is different from the unnecessary branch and is by nature a part of household management, not being like that branch unlimited but having a limit.

And we can also see the answer to the question raised at the beginning, whether the art of wealth-getting belongs to the householder and the statesman, or whether on the contrary supplies ought to be provided already, since just as statesmanship does not create human beings but having received them from nature makes use of them, so also it is the business of nature to bestow food by bestowing land or sea or something else, while the task of the householder is, starting with these supplies given, to dispose of them in the proper way. For it does not belong to the art of weaving to make fleeces, but to use them, and also to know what sort of fleece is good and suitable or bad and unsuitable. Otherwise the question might be raised, why the getting of wealth is a part of the household art whereas the art of medicine is not a part of it, although the members of the household ought to be healthy, just as they must be alive or fulfil any of the other essential conditions. But inasmuch as although in a way it does belong to the householder and the ruler to see even to health, yet in a way it does not belong to them but to the physician, so also with regard to wealth, although in a way it is the affair of the house-
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toù oίκονόμου, ἐστιν1 δ’ ὤς οü, ἀλλὰ τῆς υπηρετικῆς. 85 μᾶλλον δὲ, καθάπερ εἰρηται πρότερον, δεὶ φύσει τούτο ὑπάρχειν. φύσεως γάρ ἐστίν ἔργον τροφῆν τῷ γεννηθέντι παρέχειν· παντὶ γάρ, ἡ δὲ γίνεται, τροφῆ τὸ λειτομένον ἐστίν. διὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ πᾶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων.

Διπλῆς δ’ οὖσας αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ τῆς 23 40 μὲν κατηλυκῆς τῆς δ’ οἰκονομικῆς, καὶ ταύτης μὲν ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἐπαινομένης, τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψευδομένης δικαίως (οὐ γάρ κατὰ φύσιν ἄλλ’ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων ἐστίν), εὐλογούτατα μισεῖται ἡ ὅβολο-

1258b στικὴ διὰ τὸ ἀπ’2 αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν κτήσιν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ’ ὁπερ ἐπορίσθη· μεταβολῆς 
γὰρ ἐγένετο χάριν, δ’ ὅποιος αὐτὸ ποιεῖ πλέον (ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα τοῦτ’ εἴληφεν· ὁμοία γὰρ τὰ 
τικτομένα τοῖς γεννώσων αὐτά ἐστιν, ὃ δὲ τόκος 
gambar νόμισμα ἐκ νομίσματος)· ὡστε καὶ μά-

λιστα παρὰ φύσιν οὕτος τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστίν.

IV. Ἐπει δ’ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γνώσιν διωρίκαμεν 1 10 ἐκανὼς, τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν δεὶ διελθεῖν· πάντα δὲ 
τὰ τοιαύτα τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δ’ ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν. ἐστὶ δὲ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς 
μέρη χρήσιμα τὸ περὶ τὰ κτήματα3 ἐμπειρον εἶναι, 
pοιὰ λυσιτελέστατα καὶ ποι καὶ πῶς, οἶον ἢππων 
κτήσις ποιὰ τις ἥ βοῶν ἢ προβάτων, ὅμοιως δὲ

1 <ἐστίν,> ἐστὶ Welldon.
2 ὅτ’ Bekker: ἐν’ Jackson. 3 κτήσι Bernays.

a i.e. animals are made of earth and water and live on the products of earth and water.

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holder, in a way it is not, but is a matter for the subsidiary art. But best of all, as has been said before, this provision ought to be made in advance by nature. For it is the work of nature to supply nourishment for her offspring, since every creature has for nourishment the residue of the substance from which it springs. Hence the business of drawing provision from the fruits of the soil and from animals is natural to all.

But, as we said, this art is twofold, one branch being of the nature of trade while the other belongs to the household art; and the latter branch is necessary and in good esteem, but the branch connected with exchange is justly discredited (for it is not in accordance with nature, but involves men's taking things from one another). As this is so, usury is most reasonably hated, because its gain comes from money itself and not from that for the sake of which money was invented. For money was brought into existence for the purpose of exchange, but interest increases the amount of the money itself (and this is the actual origin of the Greek word: offspring resembles parent, and interest is money born of money); consequently this form of the business of getting wealth is of all forms the most contrary to nature.

IV. And since we have adequately defined the scientific side of the subject, we ought to discuss it from the point of view of practice; although, whereas the theory of such matters is a liberal study, the practical pursuit of them is narrowing. The practically useful branches of the art of wealth-getting are first, an expert knowledge of stock, what breeds are most profitable and in what localities and under what conditions, for instance what particular stock in
15 καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ζῷων (δεῖ γὰρ ἐμπειρὸν εἶναι πρὸς ἀλληλά τε τοῦτων τίνα λυσιτελέστατα, καὶ ποῦ ἐν ποίοις τόποις, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλαις εὔθυνει χώραις): εἶτα περὶ γεωργίας, καὶ ταύτης ἦδη ψυλῆς τε καὶ πεφυτευμένης, καὶ μελιτουργίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τῶν πλωτῶν ἢ πτηνῶν ἢφ’ ὅσων ἔστι τυχ-χάνειν βοηθείας. τής μὲν οὖν οἰκειοτάτης χρη-2 ματιστικῆς ταύτα μόρια καὶ πρῶτα1 τῆς δὲ μετα-βλητικῆς μέγιστον μὲν ἐμπορία (καὶ ταύτης μέρη τρία, ναυκληρία φορτηγία παράστασις· διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἔτερα ἔτερον τῷ τα μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἶναι 25 τὰ δὲ πλείω πορίζειν την ἐπικαρπίαν), δεύτερον δὲ τοκισμός, τρίτον δὲ μισθαρία (ταύτης δ’ ἢ μὲν τῶν βαναύσων τεχνῶν,2 ἢ δ’ τῶν ἀτέχνων καὶ τῷ σώματι μόνῳ χρησίμων)· τρίτον δὲ έιδος χρημα-τιστικῆς μεταξύ ταύτης καὶ τῆς πρώτης (ἐχει γὰρ καὶ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρος καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς), 30 οὐσά3 ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γενομένων ἀκάρτων μὲν χρησίμων δὲ, οἰνον ὑλοτομία4 τε καὶ πάσα μεταλλευτικὴ· αὕτη δὲ πολλά ἣδη περιελήφθη γενή, πολλὰ γὰρ εἶδη τῶν ἐκ γῆς μεταλλευμένων ἑστῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ5 τεχνικῶταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασίων ὅπου 3 ἐλάχιστον τῆς τύχης, βαναυσόταται δ’ ἐν αἷς τὰ

1 πρώτης (cf. 25) Ρ. Richards. 2 τεχνιτῶν Vermehren. 3 οὐσά Bernays. 4 ἡ λατομία Thomas Aquinas. 5 εἰσὶ δὲ—ἀρετῆς post 39 ἐνδιατριβέων codd.: tr. (et 33 δὴ pro δὲ) Montecatino auctore Susemihl.

1 Βάναυσος (said to be from βαῖνως ‘furnace,’ αὐω ‘to dry’), ‘artisan’ (ranged with farmers, traders, and labourers, as forming the common people 1321 a 6); it acquires the senses of ‘cramped in body’ (1341 a 7) and ‘vulgar in taste’ (1337 b 8).

A very probable variant gives ‘the quarrying of stone.’
horses or cattle or sheep, and similarly of the other animals also (for the farmer must be an expert as to which of these animals are most profitable compared with one another, and also as to what breeds are most profitable on what sorts of land, since different breeds thrive in different places); secondly, the subject of agriculture, and this again is divided into corn-growing and fruit-farming; also bee-keeping, and the breeding of the other creatures finned and feathered which can be used to furnish supplies.

2 These then are the branches and primary parts of wealth-getting in the most proper sense. Of the kind that deals with exchange, the largest branch is commerce (which has three departments, ship-owning, transport and marketing: these departments differ from each other in the fact that some are safer and others carry larger profits); the second branch is money-lending, and the third labour for hire, one department of which is that of the mechanic arts and the other that of unskilled labourers who are useful only for bodily service. And there is a third form of wealth-getting that lies between the latter and the one placed first, since it possesses an element both of natural wealth-getting and of the sort that employs exchange; it deals with all the commodities that are obtained from the earth and from those fruitless but useful things that come from the earth—examples are the felling of timber and all sorts of mining; and of mining itself there are many classes, since there are many sorts of metals obtained out of the earth. The most scientific of these industries are those which involve the smallest element of chance, the most mechanic those in which...
1258 b

σώματα λωβώνται μάλιστα, δουλικώταται δὲ ὅπου
tοῦ σώματος πλείσταν χρήσεις, ἀγεννέσταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεὶ ἄρετῆς. περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ
tοῦτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ
mέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐρ-
γασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν
4 ἐνίοις γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, οἷον Χαρνιήδη τῷ
1259 a Παρίῳ καὶ 'Απολλοδώρῳ τῷ Λημνίῳ περὶ γεωρ-
γίας καὶ ψιλῆς καὶ πεφυτευμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ἀλλοις περὶ ἄλλων, ταῦτα μὲν ἐκ τούτων θεωρεῖτω
ὅτω ἐπιμελεῖς· ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα σποράδην
δι' ἐνν ἐπιτετυχήσαν ἑνώι χρηματικόμενοι δεῖ
συλλέγειν· πάντα γὰρ ὁφέλεια ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τοῦσ
tιμῶσι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, οἷον καὶ τὸ Θάλεω τοῦ
5 Μιλησίου· τὸ τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ κατανόημα τι χρημα-
tιστικῶν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνω μὲν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν προσ-
ἀπτοῦσι, τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι όν. ὁνειδιζόμενων
10 γὰρ αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν πενίαν ὡς ἀνωφελοῦς τῆς
φιλοσφοφίας οὐσίς, κατανόησαντα φασίν αὐτοῦ
ἐλαιῶν φορὰν ἐσομένην ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας ἐτὶ
χειμῶνος οὖς, εὐπορήσαντα χρημάτων ὀλγῶν
ἀρραβώνας διαδοῦσι τῶν ἐλαιουργίων τῶν τ' ἐν
Μιλήτῳ καὶ Χίῳ πάντων, ἀλγοῦ μισθωσάμενον ἀτ'
15 οὐδενός ἐπιβάλλοντος· ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ καρπὸς ἤκε,
pολλῶν ξητουμένων ἀμα καὶ ἐξαίφνης, ἐκμισθοῦντα
ὅν τρόπον ἥβουλετο πολλά χρήματα συλλέξαντα,

a Otherwise unknown.
b Also mentioned by Varro and Pliny.
c The author of the Second Book of the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica seems to have taken this hint.
d The founder of Greek philosophy and mathematics, and one of the Seven Sages, 6th-5th cent. B.C.

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the operatives undergo the greatest amount of bodily degradation, the most servile those in which the most uses are made of the body, and the most ignoble those in which there is the least requirement of virtue as an accessory. But while we have even now given a general description of these various branches, yet a detailed and particular account of them, though useful for the practice of the industries, would be illiberal as a subject of prolonged study. There are books on these subjects by certain authors, for example Charetides of Paros and Apollodorus of Lemnos have written about both agriculture and fruit-farming, and similarly others also on other topics, so these subjects may be studied from these authors by anybody concerned to do so; but in addition a collection ought also to be made of the scattered accounts of methods that have brought success in business to certain individuals. All these methods are serviceable for those who value wealth-getting, for example the plan of Thales of Miletus, which is a device for the business of getting wealth, but which, though it is attributed to him because of his wisdom, is really of universal application. Thales, so the story goes, because of his poverty was taunted with the uselessness of philosophy; but from his knowledge of astronomy he had observed while it was still winter that there was going to be a large crop of olives, so he raised a small sum of money and paid round deposits for the whole of the olive-presses in Miletus and Chios, which he hired at a low rent as nobody was running him up; and when the season arrived, there was a sudden demand for a number of presses at the same time, and by letting them out on what terms he liked he realized a large sum of
The talent was about £240.

Dionysius the elder, tyrant of Syracuse 405-367 B.C.

Cf. Thucydides ὁ δὲ οὖκ ἐπελάβε ἐκατόν...
money, so proving that it is easy for philosophers to be rich if they choose, but this is not what they care about. Thales then is reported to have thus displayed his wisdom, but as a matter of fact this device of taking an opportunity to secure a monopoly is a universal principle of business; hence even some states have recourse to this plan as a method of raising revenue when short of funds: they introduce a monopoly of marketable goods. There was a man in Sicily who used a sum of money deposited with him to buy up all the iron from the iron foundries, and afterwards when the dealers came from the trading-centres he was the only seller, though he did not greatly raise the price, but all the same he made a profit of a hundred talents on his capital of fifty. When Dionysius came to know of it he ordered the man to take his money with him but clear out of Syracuse on the spot, since he was inventing means of profit detrimental to the tyrant's own affairs. Yet really this device is the same as the discovery of Thales, for both men alike contrived to secure themselves a monopoly. An acquaintance with these devices is also serviceable for statesmen, for many states need financial aid and modes of revenue like those described, just as a household may, but in greater degree; hence some statesmen even devote their political activity exclusively to finance.

V. And since, as we saw, the science of household management has three divisions, one the relation of master to slave, of which we have spoken before, one the paternal relation, and the third the conjugal—

* C. ii. init.  
* C. iii. fin., iv.  
* The construction of the sentence is interrupted, and never completed.
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1259 a 40 ἀρχεῖν καὶ τέκνων (ὡς ἐλευθέρων μὲν ἁμφοῖν, οὖ 2
1259 b τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ γυναικὸς μὲν
πολιτικῶς, τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς). τὸ τε γὰρ ἄρρεν
φύσει τοῦ θήλεως ἢγεμονικῶτερον (εἰ μή ποιν-
έστηκε παρὰ φύσιν) καὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον
τοῦ νεωτέρου καὶ ἀτελοῦς. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολι-
τικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς πλείσταις μεταβάλλει τὸ ἄρχον
καὶ τὸ ἄρχόμενον (ἐξ ᾗ οὖν γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται τὴν
φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηθεν), ὅμως δὲ οὕτως τὸ μὲν
ἄρχη τὸ δ᾽ ἄρχηται ξητεί διαφορὰν εἶναι καὶ
οὐκ ἡμών καὶ λόγοι καὶ τιμαῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀμασις
εἰπε τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποδαναπτήρος λόγον. τὸ δ᾽ ἄρρεν
10 αἱ πρὸς τὸ θηλυ τούτων ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. ἥ δὲ
τῶν τέκνων ἄρχη βασιλική. τὸ γὰρ γεννήσαν καὶ
κατὰ φιλίαν ἄρχον καὶ κατὰ πρεσβείαν ἑστών, ὥσπερ
ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς εἰδος ἄρχῆς (ὅπερ καλῶς Ὀμηρος
tὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπόν
πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε
15 τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἀπάντων). φύσει γὰρ τὸν
βασιλέα διαφέρειν μὲν δὲ, τῷ γένει δ᾽ εἶναι τὸν
αὐτῶν. ὡστε πέπονθε τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ
νεωτέρον καὶ δ᾽ γεννήσας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον.

Φανερὸν τούτων ὅτι πλείων ἡ σπουδὴ τῆς οἰκο-
3 νομίας περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἄιμῳ-
20 κτήσεως καὶ περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τούτων ἡ περὶ τὴν
τῆς κτήσεως, διὸ καλοῦμεν πλούτων, καὶ τῶν
ἐλευθέρων μᾶλλον ἡ δουλῶν.

a i.e. of the free and equal, 1255 b 20.
b Herodotus ii. 172. Amasis king of Egypt was despised
by his subjects for his low birth, so he had a statue made out
of a gold foot-bath and set it up for them to worship, after-
wards explaining to them its lowly origin.  e Il. i. 544.

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for it is a part of the household science to rule over wife and children (over both as over freemen, yet not with the same mode of government, but over the wife to exercise republican government and over the children monarchical); for the male is by nature better fitted to command than the female (except in some cases where their union has been formed contrary to nature) and the older and fully developed person than the younger and immature. It is true that in most cases of republican government the ruler and the ruled interchange in turn (for they tend to be on an equal level in their nature and to have no difference at all), although nevertheless during the period when one is ruler and the other ruled they seek to have a distinction by means of insignia and titles and honours, just as Amasis made his speech about the foot-bath; but the male stands in this relationship to the female continuously. The rule of the father over the children on the other hand is that of a king; for the male parent is the ruler in virtue both of affection and of seniority, which is characteristic of royal government (and therefore Homer finely designated Zeus by the words 'father of men and gods,' as the king of them all). For though in nature the king must be superior, in race he should be the same as his subjects, and this is the position of the elder in relation to the younger and of the father in relation to the child.

It is clear then that household management takes more interest in the human members of the household than in its inanimate property, and in the excellence of these than in that of its property, which we style riches, and more in that of its free members than in that of slaves.
ARISTOTLE

1259 b

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δοῦλων ἀπορήσειν ἂν τις, πότερον ἐστὶν ἁρετή τις δοῦλου παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἀλλή τιμωτέρα τούτων, οἴον σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τῶν ἀλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἔξεων, ἢ οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδεμία παρὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας. ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφοτέρως. εἶτε γὰρ ἐστὶ, τί διόισουσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων; εἶτε μὴ ἐστιν, οὐν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγου κοινωνοῦντων ἀτοπον. σχεδὸν δὲ ταύτὸν ἐστι τὸ 4

30 ξητοίμανον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδός, πότερα καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν ἁρεταὶ, καὶ δεὶ τὴν γυναίκα εἶναι σωφρόνα καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ παῖς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ σωφρόν, ἢ οὐ; καὶ καθόλου δὴ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἁρχοντος, πότερον ἡ αὐτὴ ἁρετὴ ἡ ἐτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλοκαγαθίας, διὰ τὶ τὸν μὲν ἁρχεῖν δεόι ἂν τὸν δὲ ἁρχεσθαι καθάπαξ; οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον οἶνον τε διαφέρει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁρχεσθαι καὶ ἁρχεῖν εἰδὲ διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον οὐδὲν. εἰ δὲ τὸν 5 μὲν δεῖ τὸν δὲ μὴ, θαυμαστὸν εἶτε γὰρ ὁ ἁρχων μὴ ἐσται σωφρόν καὶ δίκαιος, πῶς ἁρξεῖ καλῶς;

1260 a εἴθ’ ὁ ἁρχομένος, πῶς ἁρξῆσται καλῶς; ἀκόλαστος γὰρ ὁν καὶ δειλὸς οὐθὲν ποιήσει τῶν προσηκόντων. φανερὸν τοῖνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν ἀμφοτέρους ἁρετῆς, ταύτης δ’ εἶναι διαφοράς (ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἁρχομένων). 2

1 καὶ ἕκαστη > ? Spengel.
2 ὡσπερ—ἀρχομένων interpolatum ed. (φύσει ἁρχόντων καὶ ἁρχομένων cod. Oxon. marg.).

a Καλοκαγαθός, ‘fine gentleman,’ connotes social as well as moral distinction.

60
POLITICS, I. v. 3-5

First of all then as to slaves the difficulty might be raised, does a slave possess any other excellence, besides his merits as a tool and a servant, more valuable than these, for instance temperance, courage, justice and any of the other moral virtues, or has he no excellence beside his bodily service? For either way there is difficulty; if slaves do possess moral virtue, wherein will they differ from freemen? or if they do not, this is strange, as they are human beings and participate in reason. And nearly the same is the question also raised about the woman and the child: have they too virtues, and ought a woman to be temperate, brave and just, and can a child be intemperate or temperate, or not? This point therefore requires general consideration in relation to natural ruler and subject: is virtue the same for ruler and ruled, or different? If it is proper for both to partake in nobility of character, how could it be proper for the one to rule and the other to be ruled unconditionally? we cannot say that the difference is to be one of degree, for ruling and being ruled differ in kind, and difference of degree is not a difference in kind at all. Whereas if on the contrary it is proper for the one to have moral nobility but not for the other, this is surprising. For if the ruler is not temperate and just, how will he rule well? And if the ruled, how will he obey well? If intemperate and cowardly he will not perform any of the duties of his position. It is evident therefore that both must possess virtue, but that there are differences in their virtue (as also there are differences between those who are by nature ruled). And of this we

6 This clause seems to have been interpolated; one ms. has a marginal correction, 'by nature rulers and ruled.'
ARISTOTLE

5 καὶ τοῦτο εὖθὺς ψφήγηται περὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δὲ ἄρχο-
μενον, ὡς ἐτέραν φαινεῖ εἶναι ἁρέτην, οἷον τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. δῆλον τοῖς ὅτι τὸ
τὸν αὐτὸν ἅρπον ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὡστε
φύσει πλείω τὰ άρχοντα καὶ ἄρχομενα. ἄλλον γὰρ
τὸ ἅρπον τὸ ἑλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν
tοῦ θήλεως καὶ ἀνήρ παιδός. καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει
μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει δια-
φερόντως: δὲ μὲν γὰρ δούλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ
βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἀκυρον, δὲ
παῖς ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἀτέλες. διότι τὸν μὲν

15 ἐρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν διανοητικήν ἁρετήν
(τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, δὲ
λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἐκαστὸν ὅσον
ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς: ὁμοίως τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοις ἔχειν
καὶ περὶ τὰς ἑθικὰς ἁρετὰς ὑποληπτέον, δεῖν μὲν
μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἅρπον, ἀλλ'

20 ὅσον ἐκαστὸ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸν ἔργον. ὥστε φανε-
ρόν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἑθικὴ ἁρετή τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων,
καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς
οὐδ' ἁνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ψετο ἡμι-
κράτης, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἁρχικὴ ἁνδρεία, ἡ δ' ὑπηρετική,
ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. δῆλον δὲ τούτο

25 καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπισκοποῦσιν καθόλου γὰρ
οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν εὐαυτοὺς ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν

1 πλείω τὰ Ramus: τὰ πλείω codd.
2 διὸ—αὐτοίς hic Thuot, infra post τὸ αὐτὸν ἔργον codd.
3 διανοητικήν Thuot: ἑθικὴν codd.
4 αὐτοῖς ἢκανόν? Richards.

* In the mss. this sentence follows the next one, 'We must suppose—function,' and begins 'Hence the ruler must possess moral virtue.'
straightway find an indication in connexion with the soul; for the soul by nature contains a part that rules and a part that is ruled, to which we assign different virtues, that is, the virtue of the rational and that of the irrational. It is clear then that the case is the same also with the other instances of ruler and ruled. Hence there are by nature various classes of rulers and ruled. For the free rules the slave, the male the female, and the man the child in a different way. And all possess the various parts of the soul, but possess them in different ways; for the slave has not got the deliberative part at all, and the female has it, but without full authority, while the child has it, but in an undeveloped form. Hence the ruler must possess intellectual virtue in completeness (for any work, taken absolutely, belongs to the master-craftsman, and rational principle is a master-craftsman); while each of the other parties must have that share of this virtue which is appropriate to them. We must suppose therefore that the same necessarily holds good of the moral virtues: all must partake of them, but not in the same way, but in such measure as is proper to each in relation to his own function. Hence it is manifest that all the persons mentioned have a moral virtue of their own, and that the temperance of a woman and that of a man are not the same, nor their courage and justice, as Socrates thought, but the one is the courage of command, and the other that of subordination, and the case is similar with the other virtues. And this is also clear when we examine the matter more in detail, for it is misleading to give a general definition of virtue, as some do, who say that virtue is being in good condition as regards the

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8 Plato, *Meno* 74 b ff.
ARISTOTLE

1260 a

τὴν ψυχήν ἀρετή ἀ τό ὅρθοπραγεῖν ἂ τι τῶν
toιούτων πολὺ γὰρ ἀμενον λέγουσι οὐ ἐξαριθ-
mοῦντες τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὡσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως
όριζομένων. διὸ δεῖ, ὡσπερ ὁ ποιητὴς έιρηκε περὶ
30 γυναίκος, οὕτω νομιζειν ἑχειν περὶ πάντων.

γυναικί κόσμον ἡ σιγὴ φέρει—

ἀλλ' ἀνδρὶ οὐκέτι τούτο. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παῖς ἀτελῆς, 9
δῆλον ὅτι τούτου μὲν καὶ ἡ ἀρετή οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρὸς
αὐτὸν ἔστι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν τέλειον καὶ τὸν ἡγοῦ-
μενον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δούλου πρὸς δεσπότην.

Ἐθεμεν δὲ πρὸς τάναγκα δια χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸν
35 δούλου, ὡστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικρᾶς,
καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως μήτε δι' ἀκολασίαν μήτε διὰ
dειλίαν ἔλλειψε τῶν ἔργων. (ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, 10
tὸ νῦν εἰρημένον εἰ ἄλληθες, ἁρα καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας
dεήσει ἑχειν ἀρετῆν· πολλάκις γὰρ δι' ἀκολασίαν
ἔλλειποι τῶν ἔργων. ἦ διαφέρει τούτο πλεῖστον;
40 ὁ μὲν γὰρ δούλος κοινωνὸς ξωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορρώτερον,
καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπιβάλλει ἀρετῆς ὅσον περὶ καὶ
1260 b οὐκείας: ὁ γὰρ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἀφωρισμένην
tων ἑκεὶ δουλεῖαν, καὶ ὁ μὲν δοῦλος τῶν φύσει,
σκυτοτόμος δ' οὔθεις οὖθε τῶν ἄλλων τεχνίτων.)
φανερὸν τούτων ὧτι τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς αὐτῶν εἶναι 11

1 δεῖ τὸ δούλῳ τὸν δεσπότην, ἀλλ' οὖν τὴν διδα-
5 σκαλικὴν ἑχοντα τῶν ἔργων δεσποτικὴν. διὸ

1 οὐχ <ἡ> Richards.

a i.e. in Meno (vide § 7 above), where this sophist figures as a character in the dialogue; see also p. 178, note b.

b Sophocles, Ajax 293.

c i.e. his excellences as an artisan are the qualities of a subordinate (his virtues as a human being, apart from his trade, are not considered).
soul or acting uprightly or the like; those who enumerate the virtues of different persons separately, as Gorgias does, are much more correct than those who define virtue in that way. Hence we must hold that all of these persons have their appropriate virtues, as the poet said of woman:

Silence gives grace to woman—

though that is not the case likewise with a man.

Also the child is not completely developed, so that manifestly his virtue also is not personal to himself, but relative to the fully developed being; that is, the person in authority over him. And similarly the slave's virtue also is in relation to the master.

And we laid it down that the slave is serviceable for the mere necessaries of life, so that clearly he needs only a small amount of virtue, in fact just enough to prevent him from failing in his tasks owing to intemperance and cowardice. (But the question might be raised, supposing that what has just been said is true, will artisans also need to have virtue? for they frequently fall short in their tasks owing to intemperance. Or is their case entirely different? For the slave is a partner in his master's life, but the artisan is more remote, and only so much of virtue falls to his share as of slavery— for the mechanic artisan is under a sort of limited slavery, and whereas the slave is one of the natural classes, no shoemaker or other craftsman belongs his trade by nature.) It is manifest therefore that the master ought to be the cause to the slave of the virtue proper to a slave, but not as possessing that art of mastership which teaches a slave his tasks. Hence
λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ λόγου τοὺς δούλους ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ φάσκοντες ἐπιτάξει χρήσθαι μόνον νουθετητέον γὰρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παῖδας.

'Αλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον· περὶ δὲ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρός, τῆς τε περὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀρετής, καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφάς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλίας, τὶ τὸ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἔστι καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὐ διώκειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον ἐπελθεῖν, ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταύτα δ' οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὀλοῦ δεῖ βλέπειν ἁρετήν, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναίκας, εἴπερ τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίαν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαῖοι καὶ τὰς γυναίκας σπουδαίας. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ διαφέρειν· αἱ μὲν γὰρ γυναῖκες ἡμοῦ μέρος τῶν ἔλευθερων, ἣκ δὲ τῶν παῖδων οἱ κοινωνοὶ γίνονται τῆς πολιτείας. ὡστ' ἐπεὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων διώρισται, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐν ἄλλοις λεκτέον, ἀφέντες ὡς τέλος ἔχοντας τοὺς νῦν λόγους, ἀλλὰ ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι λέγωμεν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐπισκεψόμεθα περὶ τῶν ἀποφθηγμένων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης.

1 οἱ κοινωνοὶ: οἰκονόμοι Susemihl (dispensatores Guil.).

a Plato, Laws 777 e.
b As a matter of fact in Books VII., VIII. dealing with the best constitution this subject is not reached.
those persons are mistaken who deprive the slave of reasoning and tell us to use command only \(^a\); for admonition is more properly employed with slaves than with children.

But on these subjects let us conclude our decisions in this manner; while the question of the virtue severally belonging to man and woman and children and father, and of the right and wrong mode of conducting their mutual intercourse and the proper way of pursuing the good mode and avoiding the bad one, are matters that it will be necessary to follow up in the part of our treatise dealing with the various forms of constitution.\(^b\) For since every household is part of a state, and these relationships are part of the household, and the excellence of the part must have regard to that of the whole, it is necessary that the education both of the children and of the women should be carried on with a regard to the form of the constitution, if it makes any difference as regards the goodness of the state for the children and the women to be good. And it must necessarily make a difference; for the women are a half of the free population, and the children grow up to be the partners in the government of the state. So that as these questions have been decided, and those that remain must be discussed elsewhere, let us relinquish the present subjects as completed, and make a fresh start in our discourse, and first let us consider those thinkers who have advanced views about the Ideal State.
Β

1260 b

I. Ἐπεὶ δὲ προαιρούμεθα θεωρῆσαι περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡ κρατίστη πασῶν τοῖς δυναμένοις ζῆν ὅτι μάλιστα κατ’ εὐχήν, δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκέψεις αἱς τε χρώνται τινες τῶν πόλεων τῶν εὐνομεῖσθαι λεγομένων κἂν εἰ τινὲς ἔτεραι τυγχάνωσιν ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρημέναι καὶ δοκοῦσαι καλῶς ἔχειν, ἢν τὸ τ’ ὀρθῶς ἔχον ὀφθῇ καὶ τὸ χρῆσμον, ἐτι δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ’ αὐτὰς ἐτερον μὴ δοκῇ πάντως εἶναι σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν ταῦτας τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχοῦσας, διὰ τούτο ταύτην δοκῶμεν ἐπιβαλέσθαι τὴν μέθοδον.

Ἀρχῆν δὲ πρῶτον ποιητέον ἦπερ πέφυκεν ἀρχὴ 2 ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἦτοι πάντας πάντων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας, ἡ μηδενός, ἡ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ μή. τὸ μὲν οὖν μηδενὸς κοινωνεῖν φανερὸν ὡς ἀδύνατον (ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία κοινωνία τῆς ἐστι, καὶ πρῶτον ἀνάγκη τοῦ τόπου κοινωνεῖν, ὃ μὲν γὰρ τόπος εἰς ὃ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως, οὐ δὲ πολίται 1261 α’ κοινωνοὶ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως). ἀλλὰ πότερον οὖσων 68
I. And since we take for our special consideration the study of the form of political community that is the best of all the forms for a people able to pursue the most ideal mode of life, we must also examine the other constitutions actually employed by certain of the states said to be well governed, as well as any others propounded by certain thinkers and reputed to be of merit, in order that we may discern what there is in them that is right and expedient, and also in order that it may not be thought that to seek for something different from them springs entirely from a desire to display ingenuity, but that we may be thought to enter upon this inquiry because these forms of constitution that already exist are not satisfactory.

2. We must first adopt as a starting-point that which is the natural point of departure for this inquiry. There are three possible systems of property: either all the citizens must own everything in common, or they must own nothing in common, or some things must be common property and others not. To have nothing in common is clearly impossible; for the state is essentially a form of community, and it must at any rate have a common locality: a single city occupies a single site, and the single city belongs to its citizens in common. But is it better for a city
On the following criticisms see Grote, Plato, iii. pp. 211-223.

(1) §§ 3-7; (2) § 8-c. ii. § 11; (3) c. ii. §§ 11 mid.-13; also (4) other objections c. ii. §§ 15-16.
POLITICS, II. i. 2–4

that is to be well ordered to have community in everything which can possibly be made common property, or is it better to have some things in common and others not? For example, it is possible for the citizens to have children, wives and possessions in common with each other, as in Plato’s Republic, in which Socrates says that there must be community of children, women and possessions. Well then, which is preferable, the system that now obtains, or one conforming with the regulation described in The Republic?

Now for all the citizens to have their wives in common involves a variety of difficulties; in particular,¹ (1) the object which Socrates advances as the reason why this enactment should be made clearly does not follow from his arguments; also (2) as a means to the end which he asserts should be the fundamental object of the city, the scheme as actually set forth in the dialogue is not practicable; yet (3) how it is to be further worked out has been nowhere definitely stated. I refer to the ideal of the fullest possible unity of the entire state, which Socrates takes as his fundamental principle.

Yet it is clear that if the process of unification advances beyond a certain point, the city will not be a city at all; for a state essentially consists of a multitude of persons, and if its unification is carried beyond a certain point, city will be reduced to family and family to individual, for we should pronounce the family to be a more complete unity than the city, and the single person than the family; so that even if any lawgiver were able to unify the state, he must not do so, for he will destroy it in the process. And not only does a city consist of a multitude of human beings, it consists of human beings

¹ Unity of State not desirable because numerical plurality is essential,
ary évěn, 25 ἀλλ' εἶδει (βοσθείας γάρ χάριν ἢ συμμαχία πέφυκεν'), ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ σταθμὸς πλείων ἐλκύσεις, ἐξ δὲ δὲ δὲ ἐν γενέσθαι εἰδεὶ δεὶ διαφέρειν' (διοίσει δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλις ἐθνος ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κάμμας ὡσι κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλήθος ἀλλ' οἴον Ἀρκάδες). διόπερ τὸ ἱσον' τὸ ἀντιπεποιθοῦσα σώζει τὰς πόλεις, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς Ἡθικοῖς εἰρηται πρότερον. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑλευθεροῖς καὶ ἱσον ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' εἶναι· ἀμα γὰρ ὄθω ὦν τε πάντας ἀρχεῖν, ἀλλ' ἢ κατ' ἐναντίον ἢ κατά τινα ἀλλην τάξιν ἡ χρόνον· καὶ συμβαίνει δὴ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὡστε πάντας ἀρχεῖν, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ μετέβαλ- λον οἱ σκυτεῖς καὶ οἱ τεκτονες καὶ μὴ οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰει σκυτοτόμου καὶ τεκτονες ἦσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ βέλτιων οὔτως ἔχειν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν πολι- τικήν, δὴ λοι ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς αἰει βέλτιων ἀρχεῖν, εἰ δυνατον' ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ δυνατον διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν ἱσον εἶναι πάντας, ἀμα δὲ καὶ δικαιον, εἰτ' ἀγαθὸν εἶτε φαύλον τὸ ἀρχεῖν, πάντας αὐτοῦ μετέχειν, τοῦτο δὲ μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἱσον εἶκειν τὸ ἀν- ὁμοίους εἶναι ἐξ ἀρχῆς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχουσιν οἱ δ'
differing in kind. A collection of persons all alike does not constitute a state. For a city is not the same thing as a league; a league is of value by its quantity, even though it is all the same in kind (since the essential object of the league is military strength), just as a weight would be worth more if it weighed more, whereas components which are to make up a unity must differ in kind (and it is by this characteristic that a city will also surpass a tribe of which the population is not scattered among villages but organized like the Arcadians). Hence reciprocal equality is the preservative of states, as has been said before in Ethics. For even among the free and equal this principle must necessarily obtain, since all cannot govern at once: they must hold office for a year at a time or by some other arrangement or period; and in this manner it does actually come about that all govern, just as all shoemakers would be also carpenters if the shoemakers and the carpenters kept on changing trades instead of the same persons being shoemakers and carpenters always. But since such permanence of function is better for the political community also, it is clear that it is better for the same persons to govern always, if possible; and among peoples where it is impossible because all the citizens are equal in their nature, yet at the same time it is only just, whether governing is a good thing or a bad, that all should partake in it, then for equals thus to submit to authority in turn imitates their being originally dissimilar; for some govern and others are governed

a In the mss. of the Greek 'whereas—kind' comes below after 'Arcadian.'  
b See Additional Note, p. 170.  
c See Additional Note, p. 171.
ARISTOTLE

5 ἀρχονται παρὰ μέρος, ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἄρχοντων ἐτεροὶ ἑτέρας ἄρχοντων ἄρχας. φανερὸν τοίνυν ἐκ τοῦτων ὡς 7 οὖτε πέφυκε μίαν οὖτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ λέγουσι τινες, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν ὡς μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅτι τὰς πόλεις ἀναιρεῖ· καίτοι τὸ 10 γε ἐκάστοι ἄγαθον σώζει ἐκαστον.—ἐστι δὲ καὶ κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ λίνον ἕντειν τὴν πόλιν οὔκ ἔστι ἀμείωνον. οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αὐταρκέστερον ἐνὸς, πόλις δ᾽ οἰκίας, καὶ βούλεται γ’ ἧδη τὸτε εἶναι πόλις ὅταν αὐτάρκη συμβαίνῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλήθους· εἶπερ οὖν αἱρετ-τώτερον τὸ αὐταρκέστερον, καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐν τοῦ 15 μᾶλλον αἱρετώτερον.

'Αλλὰ μὴν οὖν ἐτι τοῦτο ἀριστον ἐστι, τὸ μίαν 8 ὅτι μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἀπο-δείκνυσθαι φαίνεται κατὰ τὸν λόγον 'ἐὰν πάντες ἀμα λέγωσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ μη ἐμὸν'· τούτο γὰρ 20 οἰκεῖαι ὁ Ζωκράτης σημεῖον εἶναι τοῦ τῆς πόλις 4 Τελεός εἶναι μίαν. τὸ γὰρ πάντες διττόν. εἰ μὲν 25 οὖν ὡς ἐκαστος, τάχθ' ἄν εἰς μᾶλλον ὁ βούλεται ποιεῖν ὁ Ζωκράτης (ἐκαστος γὰρ νῦν ἐαυτοῦ φήσει τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ γυναῖκα δὴ τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ περὶ ἐκάστοι δὴ τῶν συμβαίνοντων ὠσαύτως). νῦν δ’ οὖχ οὖτω φήσον οἱ κοιναὶς 9 χρόμενοι ταῖς γυναιξὶ καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις, ἀλλὰ πάν-τες μὲν, οὖχ ὡς ἐκαστος δ’ αὐτῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

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a The reference is to Plato, Republic 462 c. Unity is secured when everyone thinks that everything belongs equally to him and to everybody else, i.e. everything is common property.
by turn, as though becoming other persons; and also when they hold office in the same way different persons hold different offices. It is clear then from these considerations that it is not an outcome of nature for the state to be a unity in the manner in which certain persons say that it is, and that what has been said to be the greatest good in states really destroys states; yet surely a thing's particular good acts as its preservative.—Another line of consideration also shows that to seek to unify the state excessively is not beneficial. In point of self-sufficiency the individual is surpassed by the family and the family by the state, and in principle a state is fully realized only when it comes to pass that the community of numbers is self-sufficing; if therefore the more self-sufficing a community is, the more desirable is its condition, then a less degree of unity is more desirable than a greater.

Again, even granting that it is best for the community to be as complete a unity as possible, complete unity does not seem to be proved by the formula ‘if all the citizens say “Mine” and “Not mine” at the same time,’ which Socrates a thinks to be a sign of the city's being completely one. ‘All’ is an ambiguous term. If it means 'each severally,’ very likely this would more fully realize the state of things which Socrates wishes to produce (for in that case every citizen will call the same boy his son and also the same woman his wife, and will speak in the same way of property and indeed of everything that falls to his lot); but ex hypothesi the citizens, having community of women and children, will not call them 'theirs' in this sense, but will mean theirs collectively and not severally, and similarly they will call property

75
1261 b

τὴν οὐσίαν πάντες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἐκαστὸς δ' αὐτῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοῖς παραλογισμοῖς τίς ἔστι τὸ λέγειν πάντας, φανερὸν (τὸ γὰρ πάντες καὶ ἀμφότερα καὶ 
περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια διὰ τὸ διηττὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐριστικοῖς ποιεῖ συλλογισμοῦς). διὸ ἐστὶ τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὡδὲ μὲν καλὸν ἄλλ' οὐ δυνατὸν, ὡδὲ δ' οὐδὲν ὁμονοητικὸν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτέραν 10 ἔχει βλάβην τὸ λεγόμενον. ἦκιστα γὰρ ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνει τὸ πλεῖστων κοινῶν τῶν γὰρ ἰδίων 
μάλιστα φροντίζουσιν, τῶν δὲ κοινῶν ἦττον, ἢ ὅσον ἐκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει. πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς ἐτέρου 
φροντίζοντος ὀλγωροῦσι μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς οἰκετεωκαίς διακονίαις οἱ πολλοὶ θεράποντες ἐνίοτε 
χεῖρον ὑπηρετοῦσιν τῶν ἐλαττόνων. γίνονται δ' 11 ἐκάστῳ χίλιοι τῶν πολιτῶν νῦι, καὶ οὕτωι οὐχ 
1262 a ὡς ἐκάστου ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυχόντος ὁ τυχόν ὁμοίως 
ἔστι νῦς, ὥστε πάντες ὁμοίως ὀλγωρήσουσιν. 

"Ἐτὶ οὖτως ἐκαστὸς ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εὗ πράττοντα 
tῶν πολιτῶν ἢ κακῶς ὑπόστος τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθ-
μὸν ὦν, οἷον ἐμὸς ἢ τοῦ δείνος, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον 
λέγων καθ' ἐκαστὸν τῶν χιλίων ἢ ὅσων ἢ πόλις 
ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο διστάζων· ἀδηλον γὰρ ὧ συνεβῇ 
γενέσθαι τέκνον καὶ σωθήναι γενόμενον. καὶ τοι 12 
πότερον οὖτω κρείττον τὸ ἐμὸν λέγειν, ἐκαστὸν τὸ
'theirs' meaning the property of them all, not of each of them severally. We see then that the phrase 'all say' is equivocal (in fact the words 'all,' 'both,' 'odd,' 'even,' owing to their ambiguity, occasion argumentative quibbling even in philosophical discussions); hence really for 'all' to say the same thing is in one sense admirable, although impracticable, but in another sense is not at all a sign of concord. And furthermore, the proposal has another disadvantage. Property that is common to the greatest number of owners receives the least attention; men care most for their private possessions, and for what they own in common less, or only so far as it falls to their own individual share; for in addition to the other reasons, they think less of it on the ground that someone else is thinking about it, just as in household service a large number of domestics sometimes give worse attendance than a smaller number. And it results in each citizen's having a thousand sons, and these do not belong to them as individuals but any child is equally the son of anyone, so that all alike will regard them with indifference.

Again, each speaks of one of his fellow-citizens who is prospering or getting on badly as 'my son' only in the sense of the fractional part which he forms of the whole number, meaning 'mine or so-and-so's,' indicating by 'so-and-so' each of the thousand citizens or whatever the number be of which the state consists, and even this dubiously, for it is uncertain who has chanced to have had a son born to him and when born safely reared. Yet which is the better way to use the word 'mine'—this way, each of two thousand or ten
ARISTOTLE

1262 a

αὐτῷ ἐμὸν\(^1\) προσαγορεύοντα\(^2\) δυσχελών καὶ μυρίων, ἥ μᾶλλον ως νῦν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ ἐμὸν λέγουσιν;

10 ὃ μὲν γὰρ υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ὃ δ’ ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ προσ-

αγορεύει τὸν αὐτόν, ὃ δ’ ἀνεψιόν ἥ κατ’ ἄλλην τινά

συγγένειαν ἥ πρὸς αἵματος ἥ κατ’ οἰκείοτητα καὶ

κηδεῖαν αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἥ τῶν αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τούτους

ἐτεροῖ ἀδελφοὶ ἡ φιλέτην. κρείττον γὰρ ὃιν ἀνεψιόν

εἶναι ἡ τῶν τρόπων τούτων υἱόν. οὐ μὴν

15 ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ διαφυγεῖν δυνατόν τὸ μή τινα ὑπολαμ-

βάνειν εαυτῶν ἀδελφοὺς τε καὶ παῖδας καὶ πατέρας

καὶ μητέρας. κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ὁμοιότήτας αἱ γίνονται

τῶν τέκνων πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας ἁναγκαῖον λαμ-

βάνειν περὶ ἄλληλων τὰς πίστεις. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ

συμβαίνειν τινὲς τῶν τὰς τῆς γῆς περίοδους πραγ-

20 ματευμένων. εἶναι γὰρ τις τῶν ἄνω Δυβύων

κοινὰς τὰς γυναίκας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα\(^4\) τέκνα

diaireĩσθαι κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας. εἰσὶ δὲ τινὲς

cαὶ γυναῖκες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, οἶνον ἐποιεῖ καὶ

βοές, αἱ σφόδρα πεφύκασι ομοῖα ἀποδιδόναι τὰ

tέκνα τοῖς γονεῖσιν, ὡςπερ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ κληθεῖσα

Δικαία ἐποιεῖ.

25 Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δυσχερείας οὐ ράδιον

eυλαβηθῆναι τοῖς ταύτην κατασκεύαζοντι τῆν

cοινωνίαν, οἶνον αἰκίας καὶ φόνοις ἀκουσίους, τοὺς

dὲ ἐκουσίους, καὶ μάχας καὶ λοιδορίας. οὐν οὔτεν

ὁσίων ἐστὶ γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ

\(^1\) ἐμὸν Bornemann: ὅνωμα Bonitz, μὲν codd.

\(^2\) Bernays: -οτας codd.

\(^3\) ἐτεροῖ Lindau: ἐτεροῦ codd.

\(^4\) γενόμενα (cf. infra b 25) Richards: γενόμενα codd.
thousand people applying it to the same thing, or rather the way in which they say 'mine' in the actual states now? for the same person is called 'my son' by one man and 'my brother' by another, and another calls him 'nephew,' or by some other relationship, whether of blood or by affinity and marriage, the speaker's own in the first place, or that of his relations; and in addition someone else calls him 'fellow-clansman' or 'fellow-tribesman.' For it is better for a boy to be one's own private nephew than one's son in the way described. Moreover it would also be impossible to avoid men's supposing certain persons to be their real brothers and sons and fathers and mothers; for they would be bound to form their belief about each other by the resemblances which occur between children and parents. This indeed is said by some of those who write of travels round the world actually to occur; they say that some of the people of Upper Libya have their wives in common, yet the children born are divided among them according to their personal resemblances. And there are some females both of the human race and of the other animals, for instance horses and cattle, who have a strong natural tendency to produce offspring resembling the male parents, as was the case with the mare at Pharsalus named Honest Lady.

Moreover it is not easy for those who institute this communism to guard against such objectionable occurrences as outrage, involuntary and in some cases voluntary homicide, fights, abusive language; all of which are violations of piety when committed

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a Books of geography, founded on travellers' reports—a famous one by Hecataeus, scoffed at by Herodotus, iv. 36.  
b Or possibly 'Docile' (Jackson), cf. Xen. Cyneget. 7. 4.
ARISTOTLE

1262 a
tou's mē pórreω tῆς συγγενείας οὖτας ὁσπερ πρὸς
tou's ἀπωθεν· ἄλλα καὶ πλείον συμβαίνειν ἀναγ-
καίον ἀγνοοῦντων ἢ γνωριζόντων, καὶ γενομένων
τῶν μὲν γνωριζόντων ἐνδέχεται τὰς νομιζομένας
gίνεσθαι λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μηδεμίαν. ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ 15
tὸ κοινὸς ποιήσαντα τοὺς υἱοὺς τὸ συνεῖναι μόνον
ἀφελεῖν τῶν ἑρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἐραὶ μὴ κωλύσαι,
μηδὲ τὰς χρήσεις τὰς ἄλλας, ἃς πατρὶ πρὸς υἱον
eίναι πάντων ἐστὶν ἀπρεπεστατον καὶ ἀδελφῷ πρὸς
ἀδελφόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἑραὶ μόνον. ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ 30
tὸ τὴν συνουσίαν ἀφελεῖν δι' ἄλλην μὲν αἰτίαν
μηδεμίαν, ὡς λίαν δ' ἵσχυρᾶς τῆς ἡδονῆς γνω-
μένης· ὅτι δ' ὁ μὲν πατὴρ ἢ υἱὸς οἴ δ' ἀδελφοὶ
ἀλλήλων, μηθὲν οἴεσθαι διαφέρειν. ἐφικτὶ δὲ μᾶλλον
toῖς γεωργοῖς εἰναι χρήσιμον τὸ κοινὰς εἰναί τὰς
1262 b γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς παίδας ἢ τοῖς φύλαξι· ἦττον
γὰρ ἐσται ϕιλία κοινῶν ὁντων τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν
γυνακῶν, δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους
πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεωτερίζειν. ὅλως δὲ 40
συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη τοιναντιὸν διὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον
νόμον ὃν προσήκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους
αἰτίους γίνεσθαι, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ὁ Σωκράτης
οὔτως οἴεται δεῖν τάττειν τὰ περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ
tὰς γυναίκας. ϕιλίαν τε Γ' γὰρ οἶομεθα μέγιστον
εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεσιν (οὔτω γὰρ ἄν ἤκιστα
στασιάξοιει), καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ἐπαινεῖ
μάλιστ' ὁ Σωκράτης, δ' καὶ δοκεῖ κάκεινος εἶναι

1 te om. MP, quidem (? ye) Guil.
against fathers, mothers and near relatives as if they were not relatives; but these are bound to occur more frequently when people do not know their relations than when they do, and also, when they do occur, if the offenders know their relationship it is possible for them to have the customary expiations performed, but for those who do not no expiation is possible.

15 Also it is curious that a theorist who makes the sons common property only debars lovers from intercourse and does not prohibit love, nor the other familiar- ities, which between father and son or brother and brother are most unseemly, since even the fact of love between them is unseemly. And it is also strange that he deprives them of intercourse for no other reason except because the pleasure is too violent; and that he thinks it makes no difference that the parties are in the one case father or son and in the other case brothers of one another. And it seems more serviceable for the Farmers to have this community of wives and sons than the Guardians; for there will be less friendship among them if their children and women are in common, and unfriendliness in the subject classes is a good thing with a view to their being submissive to authority and not making revolution. But speaking generally such a law is bound to bring about the opposite state of things to that which rightly enacted laws ought properly to cause, and because of which Socrates thinks it necessary to make these regulations about the children and women. For we think that friendship is the greatest of blessings for the state, since it is the best safeguard against revolution, and the unity of the state, which Socrates praises most highly, both appears to be and is said by him to be

81
ARISTOTLE

1262 b

φησι τῆς φιλίας ἕργον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἵσμεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην ὡς τῶν ἐρώτων διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμοῦντων συμφώναι1 καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων ἀμφοτέρους ἔνα· ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρους ἐφθάρθαι ἦ 17

tὸν ἑνά, ἐν δὲ τῇ πόλει τὴν φιλίαν ἀναγκαῖον ὕδαρῃ γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν τουατη, καὶ ἡκιστα λέγειν2 τὸν ἐμὸν ἡ νῦν πατέρα ἡ πατέρα νῦν. ὡσπερ γὰρ μικρὸν γλυκὸ εἰς πολύ ὕδωρ μικθὲν ἀναίσθητον ποιεῖ τὴν κράσιν, οὐτω συμβαίνει καὶ3 τὴν οἰκεῖοτητα τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλους 20 ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ὄνοματων τοῦτων, διαφοροτίζειν ἡκιστα ἀναγκαῖον ὅν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ τουατη ἡ πατέρα ὡς νῦν ἡ νῦν ὡς πατρὸς ἡ ἡ ἀδελφοῦς ἄλληλων. δύο γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀ μάλιστα ποιεὶ κηδεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φιλεῖν, τὸ τε ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητὸν, ὅν οὐδέτερον οἶδον τε υπάρχει τοῖς οὕτω 25 πολιτευομένοις. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν τα γινόμενα τέκνα τα μὲν ἐκ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τεχνῶτων εἰς τοὺς φύλακας τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκείνους, πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν τίνα ἔσται τρόπον· καὶ4 γυνώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς διδόντας καὶ μεταφέροντας τίσι τίνας διδόσων. ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὰ πάλαι 80 λεχθέντα μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν, οἰον αἰκίας ἐρωτας φόνους· οὐ γὰρ ἐτί προσαγορεύσοισιν5 ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τέκνα καὶ πατέρας

1 συμφώναι MPH.
2 διόκειν H: an δὴ οἰκείοιν πρὸ λέγειν τὸν ἐμὸν ἦ Immisch.
3 κατὰ Lambinus, καὶ κατὰ Bernays.
4 καὶ <γὰρ> Bernays.
5 προσαγορεύσοισιν Coraes: -εύσωσιν codd.

a The comic poet, figuring as a character in Plato’s Symposium, see especially 192 c ff.
the effect of friendship, just as we know that Aristophanes \(^a\) in the discourses on love describes how the lovers owing to their extreme affection desire to grow together and both become one instead of being \(17\) two. In such a union both personalities, or at least one, would be bound to be obliterated; and in the state friendship would inevitably become diluted in consequence of such association, and the expressions 'my father' and 'my son' would quite go out. For just as putting a little sugar into a quantity of water makes the mixture imperceptible, so it also must come about that the mutual relationship based on these names must become imperceptible, since in the republic described by Plato there will be the least possible necessity for people to care for one another as father for sons or as son for father or as brother for brother. For there are two motives that most cause men to care for things and be fond of them, the sense of ownership and the sense of preciousness; and neither motive can be present with the citizens \(18\) of a state so constituted. Again, as to the transferring of some of the children at birth from the Farmers and Artisans to the Guardians \(^b\) and of others from the Guardians to the Farmers and Artisans, there is much confusion as to how it is to be done; and the parents who give the children and the officials who transfer them are bound to know which they give to whom. And again, the things spoken of above are bound to occur even more with these transferred children, such as outrage, love-making and murder; for the children of the Guardians transferred to the other citizens will no longer speak

\(^b\) The three classes in Plato's Republic.
ARISTOTLE

1226 b  
καὶ μητέρας οἴ τε εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας δοθέντες 
τοὺς φύλακας1 καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξιν τοὺς2 
ἄλλους πολίτας, ὥστε εὐλαβεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων 
τι πράττειν διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναίκας 
κοινωνίας διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον.

Π. Ἐχόμενον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι 1 
περὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τίνα τρόπον δεὶ κατασκευά-
ζεσθαι τοῖς μέλλουσι πολιτεύσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην 
πολιτείαν, πότερον κοινῆ ἢ μῆ κοινῆ εἶναι τὴν 
κτήσιν. τούτο δ' ἂν τις καὶ χωρίς σκέψαστο ἀπὸ 
tῶν περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναίκας νεομοθετη-
μένων. λέγω [δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν]3 πότερον, 
κἂν ἢ ἐκεῖνα χωρίς καθ' ὅν νῦν τρόπον ἔχει πάσι, 
tὰς τε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον καὶ τὰς 
χρήσεις . . .4 οἰον τὰ μὲν γῆπεδα χωρὶς τοὺς δὲ 
cαρποὺς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντας ἀναλίσκειν (ὅπερ 
5 ἐνια ποιεῖ τῶν ἔθνων), ἢ τοιναντίον τὴν μὲν γην 
κοινῆ εἶναι καὶ γεωργεῖν κοινῆ, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς 
dιαιρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας χρήσεις (λέγονται δὲ 
tινες καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κοινωνεῖν τῶν βαρ-
βάρων), ἢ καὶ τὰ γῆπεδα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς κοινοὺς. 
ἐτέρων μὲν οὖν ὅπως τῶν γεωργοῦντων ἄλλος ἂν 2 
eιθ' τρόποις καὶ ράων, αὐτῶν δ' αὐτοῖς διαπονοῦν-
tων τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις. πλείους ἂν παρέχοι 
dυσκολίας. καὶ γὰρ εν ταῖς ἀπολαύσεις καὶ εν τοῖς 
ἔργοις μὴ γυνομένων ἵσων ἀναγκαίον ἐγκλήματα

1 τοὺς φύλακας hic Guil.: ante oǐ τε codd. (om. MP).
2 τοὺς Γ᾿MP: εἰς τοὺς cet.
3 Susemihl.
4 lacunam Busse.

a Something has clearly been lost here, signifying 'or should there be some limited form of communism?'
of the Guardians as brothers and children and fathers and mothers, nor yet will those living among the Guardians so speak of the other classes, so as to be careful not to commit any such offence because of their relationship.

Such therefore may be our decision as to community of children and women.

II. In connexion with this we have to consider the due regulation of property in a community that is to have the best political institutions: should property be owned in common or privately? This question might indeed be considered separately from the system laid down by law with regard to the children and the women: I mean, even if there be separate families as is now the case with all nations, is it better for both the ownership and the employment of property to be in common . . ., for example, should the farms be separate property but the farm-produce be brought into the common stock for consumption (as is the practice with some non-Greek races); or on the contrary should the land be common and farmed in common, but the produce be divided for private use (and this form of communism also is said to prevail among some of the barbarians); or should both farms and produce be common property?

Now if the tillers of the soil be of a different class it would work differently and be easier, but if the citizens do the work for themselves, the regulations for the common ownership of property would give more causes for discontent; for if both in the enjoyment of the produce and in the work of production they prove not equal but unequal, complaints are

As in Plato's Republic, or like the Helots at Sparta.
ARISTOTLE

γίνεσθαι πρός τοὺς ἀπολαύοντας μὲν ἡ λαμβάνοντας πολλὰ ὀλίγα δὲ πονοῦντας τοὺς ἐλάττω

μὲν λαμβάνοντι πλείω δὲ πονοῦσιν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ 3

συζήν καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων

χαλεπῶν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων. δηλοῦσι δ′

αἱ τῶν συναποδήμων κοινωνίᾳ, ἱχθῶν γὰρ οἱ

πλείστοι διαφέρονται ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ

μικρῶν προσκρούντες ἀλλήλοις. ἔτι δὲ τῶν θερα-

πόντων τούτως μάλιστα προσκρούομεν οὐς πλείστα

προσχρέωμεθα πρὸς τὰς διακοινίας τὰς ἐγκυκλίους.

tὸ μὲν οὖν κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις ταύτας τε καὶ οἱ

άλλας τοιαύτας ἔχει δυσχερείας, ὅν δὲ νῦν τρόπουν

ἔχει καὶ ἡ ἐπικοσμήθεν ἥθει καὶ τάξει νόμων ἔρθων

οὐ μικρὸν ἄν διενέγκαι. ἔξει γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων

ἀγαθῶν, λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ἐκ τοῦ

κοινᾶς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἱδίας. δεῖ

gὰρ πῶς μὲν εἶναι κοινάς, ὅλως δ′ ἱδίας. αἱ μὲν

gὰρ ἐπιμέλειαι διηρημέναι τὰ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς

ἀλλήλους οὐ ποιήσουσιν, μᾶλλον δ′ ἐπιδώσουσιν

ὡς πρὸς ἱδίοιν ἐκάστου προσεδρεύοντος. δὴ ἀρετὴν

δ′ ἔσται πρὸς τὸ χρήσιμα κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν

κοινὰ τὰ φιλῶν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ νῦν τὸν τρόπον τούτον 5

ἐν εἰναις πόλεσιν οὐτως ὑπογεγραμμένον ὀς οὐκ

ὁν ἀδύνατον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς καλῶς οἰκου-

μέναις τὰ μὲν ἔστι τὰ δὲ γένοιτ' ἀν' ἰδιαν γὰρ

ἐκαστος τὴν κτήσιν ἔχων τὰ μὲν χρήσιμα ποιεῖ

τοῖς φιλοῖς τοῖς δὲ χρήται κοινοῖς, οἴον καὶ ἐν

1 διαφέρονται Coraes: διαφερόμενοι codd.

2 καὶ om. ἸΜΠΗ.

3 τε ? Suesemihi.

4 κοινοῖς cum 36 ἱδίοις transponendum ? Richards.

3 The saying was ascribed to Pythagoras.

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bound to arise between those who enjoy or take much but work little and those who take less but work more. And in general to live together and share all our human affairs is difficult, and especially to share such things as these. And this is shown in the partnerships of fellow-travellers, for it may be said that most of them quarrel because they come into collision with one another as a result of ordinary matters and trifles; and also we come into collision most with those of our servants whom we employ most often for ordinary attendance.

Community of property therefore involves these and other similar difficulties; and the present system, if further improved by good morals and by the regulation of correct legislation, would be greatly superior. For it will possess the merit of both systems, by which I mean the advantage of property being common and the advantage of its being private. For property ought to be common in a sense but private speaking generally. For the superintendence of properties being divided among the owners will not cause these mutual complaints, and will improve the more because each will apply himself to it as to private business of his own; while on the other hand virtue will result in making 'friends' goods common goods,' as the proverb goes, for the purpose of use. Such a system exists even now in outline in some states, so it is not deemed impracticable, and especially in the ones that are well-administered parts of it are realized already and parts might be realized; for individuals while owning their property privately put their own possessions at the service of their friends and make use of their friends' possessions as common property; for in-
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

1283 a  

Δακεδαίμονι τοῖς τε δουλοίς χρώνται τοῖς ἄλληλων ὡς εἴπειν ἴδιοις, ἑτὶ δὲ ἐπίποις καὶ κυσίν, καὶ δεηθῶσιν ἐφοδίων ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς1 κατὰ τὴν χώραν.2  

φανερῶν τούντων ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἴδιας τὰς κτήσεις τῇ δὲ χρῆσει ποιεῖν κοινάς· ὅπως δὲ  

40 γίνονται τοιοῦτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου τούτῳ ἐργον ἴδιόν ἐστιν. ἑτὶ δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀμύθητον ὃςον διαφέρει τὸ νομίζειν ἴδιόν τι· μὴ γὰρ οὐ  

1283 b μάτην τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὸς ἐχει φιλίαν ἐκαστὸς ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ τούτο φυσικόν. τὸ δὲ φίλαυτον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως· οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ φιλεῖν ἐαυτὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεὶ φιλεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ  

tὸν φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλοῦσι γε πάντες ὡς  

5 εἰπεῖν ἐκαστὸν τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ χαρίζοντα καὶ βοηθῆσαν φίλοις ἢ ἠένοις ἢ ἐταίροις ἢδιστον· δὲ γίνεται τῆς κτήσεως ἴδιας οὐσίας.  

tαῦτα τε δὴ οὐ συμβαίνει τοῖς λίαν ἐν ποιούσι τὴν 7  

tολίν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀναίρουσιν ἔργα δυοὶν ἀρεταῖν φανερῶς, σωφροσύνης μὲν τὸ περὶ τᾶς  

10 γυναίκας (ἔργον γὰρ καλὸν ἀλλοτρίας οὐσίας ἀπ-  

eχοῦσα διὰ σωφροσύνην), ἐλευθεροτητος δὲ τὸ  

περὶ τὰς κτήσεις (οὔτε γὰρ ἐσται φανερὸς ἐλευ-  

tέριος ὃν οὔτε πράξει πράξει ἐλευθερον οὐδεμίαν·  

ἐν γὰρ τῇ χρήσει τῶν κτημάτων τὸ τῆς ἐλευθεροτη-  

tος ἔργον ἐστίν).  

15 Ἐνπρόσωπος μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία, καὶ 8  

φιλανθρωπίς ἂν εἶναι δόξειν· δὲ γὰρ ἀκροώμενοι  

ἀσμενος ἀποδέχεται, νομιζόν ἔσσεθαι φιλίαν τινὰ  

θαυμαστήν πάσι πρὸς ἀπαντᾶς, ἀλλω δεὶ καὶ ὅταν  


1 ταῖς ἄγραισ Busse.  

2 θήραν Buecheler.
stance in Sparta people use one another's slaves as virtually their own, as well as horses and hounds, and also use the produce in the fields throughout the country if they need provisions on a journey. It is clear therefore that it is better for possessions to be privately owned, but to make them common property in use; and to train the citizens to this is the special task of the legislator. And moreover to feel that a thing is one's private property makes an inexpressibly great difference in one's pleasure; for the universal feeling of love for oneself is surely not purposeless, but a natural instinct. Selfishness on the other hand is justly blamed; but this is not to love oneself but to love oneself more than one ought, just as covetousness means loving money to excess—since some love of self, money and so on is practically universal. Moreover, to bestow favours and assistance on friends or visitors or comrades is a great pleasure, and a condition of this is the private ownership of property. These advantages therefore do not come to those who carry the unification of the state too far; and in addition to this they manifestly do away with the practice of two virtues, temperance in relation to women (for it is a noble deed to refrain from one through temperance when she belongs to another) and liberality in relation to possessions (for one will not be able to show one's liberality nor perform a single liberal action, since the active exercise of liberality takes place in the use of possessions).

Such legislation therefore has an attractive appearance, and might be thought to be humane; for he who is told about it welcomes it with gladness, thinking that it will result in a marvellous friendliness of everybody towards everybody, especially when
κατηγορητικά τις τῶν νῦν υπαρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακών ὡς γνωμένων διὰ τὸ μὴ κοινῆς εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκαια τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ ψευδομαρτυριῶν κρίσεις καὶ πλουσίων κολακείας. ὃν οὖν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μυθηρίαν, ἐπειδή καὶ τοὺς κοινὰς κεκτημένους καὶ κοινωνοῦντας πολλὰ διαφερομένους μᾶλλον ὅρωμεν ἥ τοὺς χωρίς τὰς οὖσιας ἔχοντας. ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν ὁλίγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοινωνιῶν διαφερομένους πρὸς πολλοὺς συμβάλλοντες τοὺς κεκτημένους ἵδια τὰς κτήσεις. ἐτι δὲ δίκαιων μὴ μόνον λέγειν ὅσων στερήσονται κακῶν κοινωνησαντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσων ἀγαθῶν φαίνεται δ’ εἶναι πάμπαν ἄδυνατος ὁ βίος.

Αὐτῶν δὲ τῷ Σωκράτει τῆς παρακρούσεως χρή νομίζειν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ οὖσαν ὅρθην. δει μὲν γάρ εἶναι πως μίαν καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πάντως. ἔστι μὲν γάρ ὡς οὐκ ἔσται προϊόντα πόλις, ἔστι δ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται μὲν, ἐγγὺς δ’ οὖσα τοῦ μὴ πόλις εἶναι1 χείρων πόλις, ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ τις τὴν συμφωνίαν ποιήσειν ὁμοφωνών ἥ τὸν δυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν. ἀλλὰ δεὶ πλῆθος οὖν, ὥσπερ 10 εἰρήνη συνεδρίαν, διὰ τὴν παιδείαν2 κοινῆς καὶ μίαν πολείν3 καὶ τὸν γε μέλλοντα παιδείαν εἰσάγειν, καὶ νομίζοντα διὰ ταύτης ἔσεσθαι τὴν πόλιν σπουδαίαν, ἀτοπον τοῖς τοιοῦτοις οἴεσθαι διορθοῦν.3

40 ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς ἑθεῖς καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Δακεδαίμονι

1 εἶναι <ἐσται> Victorius.
2 τῆς παιδείας (cf. 38)? Richards.
3 <δειν> διορθοῦν? Richards.
somebody denounces the evils at present existing in states as due to the fact that wealth is not owned in common—I mean lawsuits between citizens about breach of contract, and trials for perjury, and the flattery of the rich. But the real cause of all these evils is not the absence of communism, but wickedness, since we see far more quarrels occurring among those who own or use property in common than among those who have their estates separate; but we notice that those who quarrel as a result of their partnerships are few when compared with the total number of private owners. And again it is just to state not only all the evils that men will lose by adopting communism, but also all the good things; and life in such circumstances is seen to be utterly impossible.

The cause of Socrates' error must be deemed to be that his fundamental assumption was incorrect. It is certain that in a way both the household and the state should be a unit, but they should not be so in every way. For in one way the state as its unification proceeds will cease to be a state, and in another way, though it continues a state, yet by coming near to ceasing to be one it will be a worse state, just as if one turned a harmony into unison or a rhythm into a single foot. The proper thing is for the state, while being a multitude, to be made a partnership and a unity by means of education, as has been said before; and it is strange that the very philosopher who intends to introduce a system of education and thinks that this will make the city morally good should fancy that he can regulate society by such measures as have been mentioned instead of by manners and culture and laws, just as the legislator introduced
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1264 a καὶ Κρήτη τοῖς συσσιτίοις ἐκοίνωσεν. δεὶ δὲ μηδὲ τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἄγνοεῖν, ὅτι χρὴ προσέχειν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἑτέσιν, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἢν ἔλαθεν εἰ ταῦτα καλῶς εἶχεν· πάντα γὰρ σχεδὸν εὐρήται μὲν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνήκται τοῖς 5 δ᾽ οὐ χρώνται γινώσκοντες. μάλιστα δ᾽ ἂν γένοιτο φανερὸν εἰ τις τοῖς ἔργοις ἵδοι τὴν τοιαύτην πολι-τείαν κατασκευαζομένην· οὐ γὰρ δυνήσεται μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων ποιήσαι τὴν πόλιν, τὰ μὲν εἰς συσσίτια τὰ δὲ εἰς φρατρίας καὶ φυλάς. ὡστε οὐδὲν ἄλλο συμβῆσαι νεομοθετημένον πλήν 10 μὴ γεωργεῖν τοὺς φύλακας· ὀπερ καὶ νῦν Δακεδαι-μόνοι ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν.

Οὐ μὴν ἄλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας τῆς ἐσται τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν οὔτ᾽ εὑρήκεν ὁ Σωκράτης οὔτε ράδιον εἰπεῖν. καίτοι σχεδὸν τὸ γε πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως τὸ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν γίνεται πλῆθος, 15 περὶ δὲν οὐδὲν διώρισται, πότερον καὶ τοῖς γεωργοῖς κοινὰς εἰναι δεὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἥ καὶ ᾗ καθ᾽ ἑκατὸν ἴδιας, ἐτι δὲ καὶ γυναίκας καὶ παιδάς ἰδίους ἥ κοινοὺς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κοινὰ πάντα πάντων, τί διοίσωσιν οὕτω ἐκείνων τῶν φυλακῶν; ἢ τί πλείον αὐτοῖς ὑπομένουσι τὴν ἀρχὴν 20 αὐτῶν; ἢ τί μαθόντες ὑπομενοῦσι τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἐὰν

community of property in Sparta and Crete by the institution of public messes. And this very point also must not be ignored, that attention must be paid to length of time and to the long period of years, in which it would not have escaped notice if these measures were good ones; for nearly all of them have been discovered already, although some of them have not been collected together and others though brought to knowledge are not put into practice. And their value would become most manifest if one could see such a constitution in actual process of formation; for one will only be able to construct Plato's state by introducing its partitions and dividing up the community into common messes and also into brotherhoods and tribes. So that in the upshot no other regulation will have been enacted except the exemption of the Guardians from the work of agriculture, which is a measure that even now the Spartans attempt to introduce.

Moreover, the working of the constitution as a whole in regard to the members of the state has also not been described by Socrates, nor is it easy to say what it will be. Yet the general mass of the citizens of the other classes make almost the bulk of the state, and about these no definite regulations are laid down, as to whether the Farmers also are to have their property in common or to hold it in private ownership, and also whether community of wives and children is to apply to them or not. For if the Farmers are to have the same complete communism, what will be the difference between them and the Guardian class? or what advantage will they gain by submitting to their government? or what consideration will induce them to submit to the government, unless
μὴ τι σοφίζωνται τοιούτων οἷον Κρῆτες; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ τάλλα ταῦτα τοῖς δούλοις ἑφέντες μόνον ἀπειρήκασι τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων κτήσιν. εἰ δὲ καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι καὶ παρ' ἐκεῖνοις ἦσται τὰ τουαῦτα, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἦσται τῆς 25 κοινωνίας; ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ πόλει δύο πόλεις ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα ὑπεναντίας ἄλληλαις. ποιεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οἷον φρουρούς, τοὺς δὲ γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς¹ τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας. ἐγκλήματα δὲ καὶ δίκαι καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ταῖς πόλεσιν 13 ὑπάρχειν φησὶ κακὰ πάνθ' ὑπάρξει καὶ τούτοις. 30 καίτω λέγει ὁ Σωκράτης ὡς οὐ πολλῶν δεχόσχονται νομίμων διὰ τὴν παιδείαν οἷον ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορανομικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, ἀποδίδους μόνον τὴν παιδείαν τοῖς φύλαξιν. ἐτὶ δὲ κυρίους ποιεῖ τῶν κτημάτων τοὺς γεωργοὺς ἀποφορὰν φέροντας: ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς εἶναι 35 χαλεποὺς καὶ φρονημάτων πλήρεις ἡ τὰς παρ' ἐνίοις εἰλωτείας τε καὶ πενεστείας καὶ δουλείας. ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἰτ' ἀναγκαῖα ταῦθ' ὄμοιώς εἰτε μὴ, νῦν γ' οὐδὲν διώρισται, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων, τίς ἡ τούτων τε πολιτεία καὶ παιδεία καὶ νόμοι τίνες. ἦστι δ' οὔθ' εὑρεῖν ράδιον, οὔτε τὸ διαφέρον μικρόν, 40 τὸ ποιοῦσ τινας εἶναι² τούτους πρὸς τὸ σῳζεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν φυλάκων κοινωνίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ γε τὰς μὲν γυναίκας ποιήσει κοινὰς τὰς δὲ κτήσεις ἴδιας,

¹ [τοὺς] ed. ² ποιοὺς τινὰς εἶναι <δεὶ> Scaliger.

Or (omitting τοὺς before τεχνίτας) 'For Socrates makes one set of men guardians, a sort of garrison, and another set farmers and artisans and citizens of the other sorts.'
the Guardians adopt some clever device like that of the Cretans? These have conceded to their slaves all the same rights as they have themselves except that they are forbidden gymnastic exercises and the possession of arms. But if the family life and property of the Farmers are to be such as they are in other states, what will be the form of their community? There will inevitably be two states in one, and these antagonistic to one another. For Socrates makes the Guardians a sort of garrison, while the Farmers, Artisans and other classes are the citizens. But quarrels and lawsuits and all the other evils which according to Socrates exist in actual states will all be found among his citizens too. Yet he says that owing to their education they will not need many regulations such as city and market by-laws and the other regulations of that sort, although he assigns his education only to the Guardians. Again, he makes the Farmers the masters of the estates, for which they pay rent; but they are likely to be far more unmanageable and rebellious than the classes of helots, serfs and slaves in certain states to-day. However, whether this communism is to be compulsory for the Farmers in the same way as for the Guardians or whether it is not, has as a matter of fact not been definitely stated anywhere, nor is there any information about the connected questions, what are to be the political functions and the education of the lower classes, and the laws affecting them. But it is not easy to discover the answers to these questions, yet the character of the lower classes is of no small importance for the preservation of the community of the Guardians. But again, if Socrates intends to make the Farmers have their wives in
tis oikonomhasei epis taw aigroyn oi andres autwv; kavn ei kouvai ai kthseis kai ai twv geyrhyon gynaikes . . . .

"Atopon de kai to ek twv theriwn poiweisai tw th

5 parabolhn, sti de tw auta episthdeuen tws
gynaikes tois andrason, ois oikonomias oúdev met-
estin. epistrofes de kai tois arxontas wos kath-

istrosoi o Skwróteris: aei gar poiei tois autous
arxontas, touto de stássews auton ginetai kai
parà tois mhdèn axówma kektriménoi, h pou díthev

10 pará ge themeidei kai polemikoiw andrason. sti
d' anagkaiun autw poiei tois autous arxontas
fanerón, ou gar stè mèn állois stè de állois
mémiktai tois psychais o parà ton theou chrusos,
nll' aei tois autois, fhsi de tois mèn eth én kunei-
ménois míaì chrusón, tois d' argyron, xalkkon de

15 kai sidhron tois tekunias mellossen ésexhain kai
geowgois. eti de kai thn euðaimonían afairouménon to

wv phulákwn, olhn fhsi déin euðaimona poiein th
pólon ton nomothèthn. adýnaton de euðaimonein
olhn, mh twv pleiostow n. m' pántwv merwov n

twv èxontow thn euðaimonían. ou gar twn

20 autwv to euðaimonein oüster to àrtov. touto mèn

gar èndéxetai tw olw upárchiw twn de merwov
mhdeterw, to de euðaimonein adýnaton. allá mh

et oi phylakes mh euðaimones, tines èteroi; ou gar
dè oi ge tekuniai kai to plhthos to twn banaú-
sow.

1 lacunam Thurot.
2 h' pou díthev Goettling: ëpounèèn dè, èpounèèn dè codd.
3 ei Victorius.

A passage has been lost here.
common but their property private, who is to manage
the household in the way in which the women’s
husbands will carry on the work of the farms? And
if the property and the wives of the Farmers are to
be common . . . .

15 It is also strange that Socrates employs the com-
parison of the lower animals to show that the women
are to have the same occupations as the men, con-
sidering that animals have no households to manage.
Also Socrates’ method of appointing the magistrates
is not a safe one. For he makes the same persons
hold office always; but this occasions rebellion even
among people of no special distinction, much more so
then among high-spirited and warlike men. But it
is clear that he is compelled to make the same
persons govern always, for the god-given admixture
of gold in the soul is not bestowed on some at one
time and others at another time, but is always in the
same men, and Socrates says that at the moment of
birth some men receive an admixture of gold and
others of silver and those who are to be the
Artisans and Farmers an admixture of copper and
iron. And again, although he deprives the Guardians
of happiness, he says that it is the duty of the law-
giver to make the whole city happy. But it is not
possible for the whole to be happy unless most or all
of its parts, or some of them, possess happiness. For
happiness is not a thing of the same sort as being
an even number: that may belong to a whole but
not to either of its parts, but happiness cannot belong
to the whole and not to its parts. But yet, if the
Guardians are not happy, what other class is? For
clearly the Artisans and the general mass of the
vulgar classes are not.
ARISTOTLE

1264 b

‘H μὲν οὖν πολυτεία περὶ ἦς ὁ Σωκράτης εὑρηκεν ταῦτας τε τὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἐλάττους ἔτερας.

III. Σχεδὸν δὲ παραπλησίως καὶ περὶ τοὺς 1 Νόμους ἔχει τοὺς ύστερον γραφέντας, διὸ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα πολυτείας ἑπισκέψασθαι μικρὰ βέλτιον, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Πολυτείᾳ περὶ ὀλίγων πάμπαν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, περὶ τε γυναικῶν καὶ τέκνων κοινωνίας, πῶς ἔχειν δεῖ, καὶ περὶ κτῆσεως, καὶ τῆς πολυτείας τὴν τάξιν (διαφεύτα ταῦτα ἐς δύο μέρη τὸ πλῆθος τῶν οἰκούντων, τὸ μὲν εἰς τοὺς γεωργοὺς τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ προπολεμοῦν μέρος, τρίτων δὲ ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ κύριον τῆς πόλεως), περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν, πότερον οὐδεμιᾶς ἢ μετέχουσί τινος ἀρχῆς, καὶ πότερον ὀπλα δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ τούτως καὶ συμπολεμεῖν ἢ μή, περὶ τούτων οὐδὲν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας οἰσταὶ δεῖν συμπολεμεῖν καὶ παιδείας μετέχειν τῆς αὐτῆς τοῖς φυλαξίᾳ, τὰ δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐξωθεὶν λόγους πεπλήρωσεν τῶν λόγων καὶ 1 περὶ τῆς παιδείας, πολιάν τινά δεὶ γίνεσθαι τῶν φυλάκων. τῶν δὲ Νόμων τὸ μὲν 2 πλείστων μέρος νόμοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, ὀλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολυτείας εὑρηκεν, καὶ ταῦτην βουλομένης κοινοτέραν ποιεῖν ταῖς πόλεσι κατὰ μικρόν περιάγει 5 πάλιν πρὸς τὴν ἐτέραν Πολυτείαν. ἔξω γὰρ τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίας καὶ τῆς κτῆσεως, τὰ ἄλλα ταῦτα ἀποδίδοσιν ἁμφοτέρας ταῖς πολυτείαις.

1 καὶ—φυλάκων supra post 30 κτῆσεως Susemihl.

a The last clause, ‘and about—to have,’ has almost certainly been misplaced by a抄写员, and should come near the beginning of the sentence, after ‘about property.’
The republic discussed by Socrates therefore possesses these difficulties and also others not smaller than these.

1. III. And almost the same holds good of *Laws* also, which was written later, so that it will be advantageous to make some small examination of the constitution described in that book as well. For in *The Republic* Socrates has laid down details about very few matters—regulations about community of wives and children and about property, and the structure of the constitution (for the mass of the population is divided into two parts, one forming the Farmer class and the other the class that defends the state in war, and there is a third class drawn from these latter that forms the council and governs the state), but about the Farmers and the Artisans, whether they are excluded from government or have some part in it, and whether these classes also are to possess arms and to serve in war with the others or not, on these points Socrates has made no decision, but though he thinks that the women ought to serve in war with the Guardians and share the same education, the rest of the discourse he has filled up with external topics, and about the sort of education which it is proper for the Guardians to have. *Laws* on the other hand is mostly a collection of statutes, but the author has said a little about the form of the constitution, and though wishing to make this more suitable for adoption by actual states he brings it round by degrees back to the other form, that of *The Republic*. For except community in wives and property, he assigns all his other regulations in the same form to both states, for he prescribes for both
Aristotle

καὶ γὰρ παιδείαν τῇν αὐτῇν, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπεχομένους ζῆν, καὶ περὶ συστιῶν ἄσαυτως, πλὴν ἐν ταύτῃ φησὶ δὲν εἶναι συσσίτια καὶ γυναικῶν, καὶ τῇν μὲν χιλίων τῶν ὁπλα κεκτημένων, ταύτῃ δὲ πεντακισχίλιων.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σω-κράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ τὸ ἤτητικόν, καλῶς δὲ πάντα ἵσως χαλεπῶν ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον πλῆθος δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι χώρας δεῖσει τοῖς τοσούτοις Βαβυλωνίας ή τινος ἄλλης ἀπεράντου τὸ πλῆθος, ἐξ ἂς ἄργου πεντακισχίλιου θρέψονται καὶ περὶ τούτους γυναικῶν καὶ θεραπότων ἐτέρων ὡς χόλος πολλαπλάσιος. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι κατευχὴν, μὴ δὲν μέντοι αὐτῶν. λέγεται δ’ ὅσ δὲ τὸν νομοθέτην πρὸς 4

δὸς βλέποντα τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους, πρὸς τε τὴν χώραν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἐτὶ δὲ καλῶς ἐχει προσθεῖναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιῶτας τόπους, εἰ δεὶ τὴν πόλιν ζῆν βιόν πολιτικὸν (οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀναγκαίων ἐστιν αὐτῇν τοιοῦτοι χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὑπὸ λοις ἀ χρήσιμα κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν χώραν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς ἡ τοὺς πολέμους ἡ μὴ μονὴν ἐλθοῦσιν εἰς τὴν χώραν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπελθοῦσιν. 5

1 πολιτικὸν μὴ μονωτικὸν codd. plerique.

2 ἀπεθανω αὐτὸν Bender.

A euphemism for an aggressive policy, cf. 1327 b 5. Some mss. add 'not one of isolation'; this looks like an explanatory note interpolated.

Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'when they are away from it.'
the same scheme of education, and a life detached from menial tasks, and similarly as regards common meals, except that in the state described in *Laws* he says there are to be common meals for women also, and he makes the Republic consist of a class possessing arms that numbers a thousand, but the state of *Laws* has five thousand.

3 Now it is true that all the discourses of Socrates possess brilliance, cleverness, originality and keenness of inquiry, but it is no doubt difficult to be right about everything: for instance with regard to the size of population just mentioned it must not be overlooked that a territory as large as that of Babylon will be needed for so many inhabitants, or some other country of unlimited extent, to support five thousand men in idleness and another swarm of women and servants around them many times as numerous. It is proper no doubt to assume ideal conditions, but not to go beyond all bounds of possibility. And it is said that in laying down the laws the legislator must have his attention fixed on two things, the territory and the population. But also it would be well to add that he must take into account the neighbouring regions also, if the city is to live a life of active policy, as it will have to use for war not only such arms as are serviceable within its own territory but also such as are serviceable against places outside it; and if one does not accept such a description whether for the life of the individual or for the common life of the state, yet it is none the less necessary for the citizens to be formidable to their enemies not only when they have entered the country but also when they have left it.
πλήθος δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ὅραν δεῖ, μήποτε βέλτιον ἐτέρως διορίσαι τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον· τοσαύτην γὰρ εἶναι φησὶ δεῖν ὡστε ζῆν σωφρόνως, ὡστερ ἂν εἶ τις εἶπεν ὡστε ζῆν εὐ'· τούτο δ' ἀρ' ἕστι καθόλου μᾶλλον, ἐπειδή ἕστι σωφρόνως μὲν ταλαιπώρως δε ζῆν. ἀλλὰ βελτίων ὁρος τὸ σωφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθερίως (χωρὶς γὰρ ἐκάτερον τὸ μὲν τῷ τρυφῶν ἀκολουθήσει, τὸ δὲ τῷ ἐπιπόνως), ἐπεὶ μόναι γ' εἰσὶν ἕξεις ἀἱρέται· περὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας χρήσιν αὐταί, οἰον οὐσία πράως ἢ ἀνδρείως χρήσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν, σωφρόνως δε καὶ ἐλευθερίως ἔστιν, ὧστε καὶ τὰς ἕξεις ἀναγκαῖον περὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι ταύτας. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἱσάζοντα τὸ περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλ' ἀφεῖναι τὴν τεκνοποιάν ἁόριστον ὡς ἰκανὸς ἀνομαλισθησομένην εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πλῆθος διὰ τὰς ἀτεκνίας ὀσωνοῦν γεννωμένων, ὅτι δοκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν συμβαίνειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις. δεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐχ ὃμοιός ἄκριβῶς ἔχειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις τότε καὶ νῦν· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀπορεῖ διὰ τὸ μερίζεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας εἰς ὅποσονον πλῆθος, τότε δ' ἂδιαιρέτων οὐσῶν ἀνάγκη τοὺς παράξυνας μηδὲν ἔχειν, εάν τ' ἐλάττους ὡσὶ τὸ πλῆθος εάν τε πλείους. μᾶλλον δὲ δεῖν ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν 7 ὁρίσθαι τῆς οὐσίας τὴν τεκνοποίαν, ὡστε ἄριθμοι τινὸς μὴ πλείονα γεννῶν, τούτο δὲ τιθέναι τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντα πρὸς τὰς τὐχας, ἃν συμβαίνῃ·

1 δ' ἀρ' ed.: γὰρ codd.
2 ἐπειδή Susemihl: ἔτι δ' codd.
3 αἱρέται Vettori: ἀἱρέται codd.
4 ἕξεις Susemihl: χρήσεις codd.
5 [περὶ τὰς πόλεις] Bender.
the amount of property requires consideration: Wealth would it not perhaps be better to define it differently, by a clearer formula? The writer says that it ought to be sufficiently large for the citizens 'to live a temperate life'—as if one were to say 'to live a good life'; but really that phrase is too general, since it is possible to live temperately yet miserably. But a better definition would be 'to live temperately and liberally' (for if the two are separated a liberal mode of life is liable to slip into luxury and a temperate one into a life of hardship), since surely these are the only desirable qualities relating to the use of wealth—for instance you cannot use wealth gently or bravely, but you can use it temperately and liberally, so that it follows that these are the qualities that have to do with wealth. And it is also strange that although equalizing properties the writer does not regulate the number of the citizens, but leaves the birth-rate uncontrolled, on the assumption that it will be sufficiently levelled up to the same total owing to childless marriages, however many children are begotten, because this seems to take place in the states at present. But this ought to be regulated much more in the supposed case than it is now, for now nobody is destitute, because estates are divided among any number, but then, as division of estates will not be allowed, the extra children will necessarily have nothing, whether they are fewer in number or more. And one might think that restriction ought to be put on the birth-rate rather than on property, so as not to allow more than a certain number of children to be produced, and that in fixing their number consideration should be paid to the chances of its happening that some of the children born
10 τελευτάν τινὰς τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀτεκνίαν· τὸ δ’ ἀφεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι, πενίας ἀναγκαῖον αὐτίων γίνεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις, ἢ δὲ πενία στάσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ κακουργίαν. Φειδών μὲν οὖν ὦν ὦν Κορίνθιος, ὃν νομοθέτη τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς οἴκους Ἰσσοὺς ψήθη δεῖν διαμένειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν,
15 καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον τοὺς κληρους ἀνίσους εἶχον πάντες κατὰ μέγεθος· ἐν δὲ τοῖς Νόμοις τούτοις τούναντιον ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων πῶς οἰόμεθα βέλτιον ἄν ἔχειν, λεκτέον ἕστερον ἐλλειπται δὲ τοῖς Νόμοις τούτοις καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὅπως ἔσονται διαφέροντες τῶν ἄρχο-
20 μένων· φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν, ὃσπέρ ἕξ ἔτερον τὸ στημόνιον ἑρίου γίνεται τῆς κρόκης, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἔχειν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχομένους. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν πάσαν οὐσίαν ἐφίσας γίνεσθαι μείζων μέχρι πενταπλασίας, διὰ τί τοῦτ’ ὅτι ἂν εἴη ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς μέχρι τινὸς; καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκοπεδῶν δὲ
diaφέρουσι δεὶ σκοπεῖν, μή τοὺ οὐ συμφέρη πρὸς οἰκονομίαν· δύο γὰρ οἰκόπεδα ἐκάστω ἐνείμε διελὼν χώρας, χαλεπὸν δὲ οἰκίας δύο οἰκεῖν. ἢ δὲ 9 σύνταξις ὁλὴ βούλεται μὲν εἶναι μήτε δημοκρατία μήτε ὀλυγαρχία, μέσῃ δὲ τούτων ἢν καλοῦσιν πολιτείαν, ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὀπλιτευόντων ἐστίν. εἰ
25 μὲν οὖν ὡς κοινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκευάζει ταῖς
1 ed.: ἔχειν δεῖν aut δει codd.

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a Otherwise unknown.
b i.e. the estates are equal, and the number of households fixed, but not the number of citizens.
c Laws 734 e f. In weaving cloth the warp (the threads set up first) must be of strong wool, the woof (the threads woven across the warp) must be softer.
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may die, and to the absence of children in the other marriages; but for the matter to be left alone, as it is in most states, is bound to lead to poverty among the citizens, and poverty produces sedition and crime. The Corinthian Phidon in fact, one of the most ancient lawgivers, thought that the households and the citizen population ought to remain at the same numbers, even though at the outset the estates of all were unequal in size; but in Plato's *Laws* the opposite is the case. However, we must say later what we think would be a better system in these matters; but another question omitted in the *Laws* is how the rulers will be different from the classes ruled; the writer prescribes that the rulers are to stand in the same relation to the ruled as the warp of cloth stands to the woof by being made of different wool. And inasmuch as he allows a man's total property to be increased up to five times its original value, for what reason should not an increase in his landed estate be allowed up to a certain point? Also it must be considered whether the proposed separation of homesteads is not inexpedient for household economy—for the writer allotted two homesteads separate from one another to each citizen; but it is difficult to manage two households.

And the whole constitution is intended, it is true, to be neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but of the form intermediate between them which is termed a republic, for the government is constituted from the class that bears arms. If therefore he introduces this constitution as the one most commonly existing

\[d\] The object was to provide a separate establishment for a married son, *Laws* 776 \(a\).
πόλεσι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείαν, καλῶς εἶρηκεν ὡς, εἰ δὲ ὃς ἄριστην μετὰ τὴν πρῶτην πολιτείαν, οὐ καλῶς: τάχα γὰρ τὴν τῶν Λακώνων ἂν τις ἐπαινέσειε μᾶλλον, ἢ κἂν ἄλλην τινὰ ἀριστοκρατικῶτέραν. ἦν οὖν μὲν ὅσον λέγοντον ὡς δὲ τὴν ἄριστην πολιτείαν εξ ἀπασῶν εἶναι τῶν πολιτείων μεμημένην, διὸ καὶ τὴν τῶν Ἀκεδαμονίων ἐπαινοῦσιν (εἶναι γὰρ αὐτὴν οἱ μὲν εξ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μοναρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας φασιν, λέγοντες τὴν μὲν βασιλείαν μοναρχίαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, δημοκρατεῖσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι τοὺς ἐφόρους, οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐφορεῖαν εἶναι τυράννιδα, δημοκρατεῖσθαι δὲ κατὰ τα ὁσσία καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν καθ ἦμεραν): ἐν δὲ τοῖς Νόμοις εἰρηται τούτοις ὡς δεόν συγκείσθαι τὴν ἄριστην πολιτείαν ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος, ἃς ἡ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἂν τις θείᾳ πολιτείᾳ ἣ̄ χειρίστας πασῶν. βέλτιον οὖν λέγουσιν δὲ πλείους μεγεντεῖς. ἡ γὰρ ἐκ πλείων ὑπακοεμένη πολιτείᾳ βελτίων. ἐπειτ' οὖδ' ἔχομεν φαίνεται μοναρχικὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ὀλιγαρχικὰ καὶ δημοκρατικὰ, μᾶλλον δ' ἐγκλίνειν βουλεύειν πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. δῆλου δ' ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων καταστάσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εξ αἱρετῶν κληρωτοὺς

* Plato wrote 'monarchy,' Laws 693 d (cf. here § 13, l. 23).
of all forms of constitution in the actual states, he has perhaps made a good proposal, but if he introduces it as the next best to the first form of constitution, it is not a good proposal; for very likely one might approve the Spartan constitution more highly, or perhaps some other form nearer to an aristocracy. In fact some people assert that the best constitution must be a combination of all the forms of constitution, and therefore praise the constitution of Sparta (for some people say that it consists of oligarchy, monarchy and democracy, meaning that the kingship is monarchy and the rule of the ephors oligarchy, but that an element of democracy is introduced by the rule of the ephors because the ephors come from the common people; while others pronounce the ephorate a tyranny but find an element of democracy in the public mess-tables and in the other regulations of daily life). In Plato's *Laws* on the other hand it is stated that the best constitution must consist of a combination of democracy and tyranny, which one might refuse to count as constitutional governments at all, or else rank as the worst of all constitutions. A better theory therefore is put forward by those who intermingle a larger number of forms, for the constitution composed of a combination of a larger number of forms is better. In the next place, the constitution in the *Laws* proves as a matter of fact not to contain any element of monarchy at all, but its factors are taken from oligarchy and democracy, and for the most part it tends to incline towards oligarchy. This appears from the regulations for the appointment of the magistrates; for their selection by lot from a list previously elected by vote is a feature common to
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κοινών ἀμφοῖν, τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐπορωτέροις ἐπάναγκες ἐκκλησιάζειν εἶναι καὶ φέρειν ἀρχοντας ἢ τι ποιεῖν ἄλλο τῶν πολιτικῶν, τοὺς δ’ ἀφείσθαι, τούτο δ’ ὀλγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ πειράσθαι πλείους ἐκ τῶν εὐπόρων εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχοντας καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων. ὀλγαρχικῷ· 12

κὴν δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ τὴν τῆς βουλῆς αἰρέσων αἱροῦνται μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐπάναγκες, ἀλλὰ ἐκ τοῦ πρῶτου τιμήματος, εἶτα πάλιν ἵναν ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου, εἰτ’ ἐκ τῶν τρίτων, πλὴν οὐ πάσιν ἐπάναγκες ἢν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου μόνοις ἐπάναγκες τοῖς πρῶτοι καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις. εἰτ’ ἐκ τοῦτων ἵναν ἐκάστου τιμήματος ἀποδείξατι φησὶ δεῖν ἀριθμὸν. ἔσονται δὴ πλείους οἱ ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων καὶ βελτίως διὰ τὸ ἐνίους μὴ αἱρεῖσθαι τῶν δημοσικῶν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπάναγκες. ὡς μὲν οὖν 13 οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνιστάναι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν, ἐκ τοῦτων φανερὸν καὶ τῶν ὑστερον ἡθησομένων ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης πολιτείας ἢ σκέψις· ἔχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν αἱρέσιν τῶν ἀρχοντῶν τὸ εὖ αἱρετῶν αἱρετοὺς ἐπικίνδυνον, εἰ γάρ τινα συστήνα αἴλουσι καὶ μέτριο τὸ πλήθος, ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν τούτων αἱρεθήσονται βούλησιν.

Σὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις τούτων ἔχει τῶν τρόπων.

1 ἀλλὰ <πρῶτον> ἐκ Lambinus.

2 Engelhardt: τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων codd.

a i.e. a better elective body because representative of all classes.
b i.e. from voting for the preliminary list from the third and fourth classes.

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both oligarchy and democracy, but the compulsion put upon the richer citizens to attend the assembly and vote for magistrates or perform any other political function, while the others are allowed to do as they like, is oligarchical, as is the endeavour to secure that a majority of the magistrates shall be drawn from the wealthy and that the highest offices shall be filled from the highest of the classes assessed by wealth. But the writer also makes the election of the council oligarchical; for everybody is compelled to elect, but from the first property-class, and then again an equal number from the second class, and then from the members of the third class, except that it was not to be compulsory for all to vote for those to be elected from the members of the third or the fourth class, and to elect from the fourth class was only compulsory for the members of the first and second classes; and afterwards from those thus selected he says that they are to appoint an equal number from each class. Thus those who elect the members from the highest property classes will be more numerous and better,\(^a\) because some of the lower orders will abstain from voting\(^b\) as it is not compulsory. Accordingly that it is not proper to establish a constitution of this character from a blend of democracy and monarchy appears clearly from these considerations, and from what will be said later when our inquiry comes to deal with this class of constitution; also the provision for the election of the rulers from among candidates chosen at a preliminary election is dangerous, for if even a moderate number of people choose to combine into a party, the elections will always go according to their wish.

Such are the points as to the constitution in the *Laws*. 

\(^{12}\) 

\(^{13}\) Indirect election.
IV. Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες πολιτείαι καὶ ἄλλαι, αἱ μὲν ἴδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν, πᾶσαι δὲ τῶν καθεστηκμένων καὶ καθ’ ἀσ πολιτεύονται νῦν ἐγγύτερον εἰσι τούτων ἀμφοτέρων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὔτε τῆν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἄλλος κεκαινοτόμηκεν οὔτε περὶ τὰ συστήμα τῶν γυναικῶν, ἀλλʼ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀρχονται μᾶλλον. δοκεῖ γὰρ τοις τοῖς ὀψίσι εἶναι μέγιστον τετάχθαι καλῶς· περὶ γὰρ τούτων ποιεῖσθαι φασὶ τὰς στάσεις πάντας. διὸ Φαλέας ὁ

Χαλκηδόνιος τούτ’ εἰσήγηκε πρῶτος· φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἵσας εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν· τοῦτο δὲ κατοικιζομέναις μὲν εὐθὺς οὗ χαλεπῶν ὑπὸ ποιεῖν, τὰς δ’ ἣδη κατοικουμένας ἐργαζόμενον μὲν, ὅμως δὲ τάχιστ’ ἀν ὁμαλοθήναι τῷ τὰς προῖκας τοὺς μὲν πλούσιους διδόναι μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μῆ, τοὺς δὲ πένητας μή διδόναι μὲν λαμβάνειν. Πλάτων δὲ τοὺς Νόμους γράφων μέχρι μὲν τινος ὑπὸ δεῖν εὰν, πλεῖον δὲ τοῦ πενταπλασίαν εἶναι τῆς ἐλαχιστης μηδενὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξουσίαν εἶναι κτήσεισθαι, καθάπερ εὑρήται καὶ πρότερον.

Δεὶ δὲ μηδὲ τούτῳ λανθάνειν τοὺς οὕτω νομοθετοῦντας, ὁ λανθάνει νῦν, ὅτι τὸ τῆς οὐσίας τάττον· τας πλῆθος προσήκει καὶ τῶν τέκνων τὸ πλῆθος τάττειν· εὰν γὰρ ὑπεραίρῃ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μέγεθος ὁ τῶν τέκνων ἀριθμός, ἀνάγκη τὸν γε νόμον λύσθαι, καὶ χωρὶς τῆς λύσεως φαύλον τὸ πολλὸν ἐκ πλουσίων γίνεσθαι πένητας· ἔργον γὰρ μή

a Otherwise unknown.
IV. There are also certain other constitutional schemes, some drawn up by amateurs and others by philosophers and statesmen, but all of them are nearer to those which have been actually established and by which states are governed at present than are both of those which have been considered; for nobody else has introduced the innovation of community of children and women, nor that of public meals for the women, but they start rather with the absolute requisites. For some persons think that the right regulation of property is the most important; for the question of property, they say, is universally the cause of party strife. Therefore the Chalcedonian Phaleas \(^1\) was the first who introduced this expedient; for he says that the citizens’ estates ought to be equal, and he thought that this would not be difficult to secure at the outset for cities in process of foundation, while in those already settled, although it would be a more irksome task, nevertheless a levelling would most easily be effected by the rich giving dowries but not receiving them and the poor receiving but not giving them. Plato when writing *Laws* thought that up to a certain point inequality ought to be allowed, but that no citizen should be permitted to acquire more land than would make his estate five times the size of the smallest, as has also been said before. \(^2\)

But those who bring in legislation of this sort must also not overlook this point, which is overlooked at present, that when regulating the amount of property legislators ought also to regulate the size of the family; for if the number of children becomes too large for the total property, the law is quite sure to be repealed, and apart from the repeal it is a bad thing that many citizens who were rich should become poor,
νεωτεροποιοῦσι εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους. διότι μὲν οὖν 4
15 ἔχει τινὰ δύναμιν εἰς τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἡ
tῆς οὐσίας ὁμαλότητι, καὶ τῶν πάλαι τινὲς φαίνον-
tαι διεγνωκότες, οἶον καὶ Σόλων ἐνομοθέτησεν,
καὶ παρ’ ἄλλους ἔστι νόμος ὅσ κωλύει κτᾶσθαι
γῆν ὀπόσην ἀν βουληταὶ τις· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν
οὐσίαν πωλεῖν οἱ νόμοι¹ κωλύουσιν, ὡσπερ ἐν
20 Δοκράος νόμος ἔστι μὴ πωλεῖν εάν μὴ φανερὰν
ἀτυχίαν δεῖξῃ συμβεβηκόντα. ἔτι δὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς
κλήρους διασώζειν, τούτῳ δὲ λυθὲν καὶ περὶ
Λευκάδα δημοτικὴν ἐποίησε λίαν τὴν πολιτείαν
αὐτῶν, οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συνέβαινεν ἀπὸ τῶν ὄρισμένων
τιμημάτων εἰς τὰς ἄρχας βαδίζειν. ἀλλ’ ἔστι τὴν
5 ἰσότητα μὲν ὑπάρχειν τῆς οὐσίας, ταύτην δ’ ἡ
λίαν εἶναι πολλῆν, ὡστε τρυφάν, ἥ λίαν ὀλίγην,
ὡστε ζῆν γλῖσχρως· δῆλον οὖν ὡς οὐχ ἴκανον τὸ
tὰς οὐσίας ἱσας ποιῆσαι τὸν νομοθέτην, ἀλλὰ τοῦ
μέσου στοχαστέον. ἔτι δ’ εἰ τις καὶ τὴν μετρίαν
τάξειν οὐσίαν πᾶσιν, οὐδὲν ὀφελοῦσ’ μᾶλλον γὰρ
30 δεῖ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμαλίζειν ἡ τὰς οὐσίας, τούτῳ
δ’ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ παιδευομένοις ἴκανος ὑπὸ τῶν
νόμων. ἀλλ’ ἵσως εἴποι αὖν ὁ Φαλέας ὁτι ταύτα
τυγχάνει λέγων αὐτὸς· οἶεται γὰρ δυνῶ τούτων
ἰσότητα δεῖν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, κτῆσεις καὶ
35 παιδείας. ἀλλὰ τὴν [τε]² παιδείαν ἦτις ἔσται δεῖ
λέγειν, καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐδὲν
ὄφελος, ἔστι γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν μὲν εἶναι καὶ μίαν
ἀλλὰ ταύτην εἶναι τοιαύτην ἐξ ἦς ἔσονται προ-

¹ οἱ νόμοι: ἐνὶοι Buecheler: <ἐνλος> οἱ νόμοι Richards.
² ed.
for it is difficult for such men not to be advocates of a new order. That a level standard of property affects the community of the citizens in an important manner some men even in old times clearly have recognized; for example there is the legislation of Solon, and other states have a law prohibiting the acquisition of land to any amount that the individual may desire; and similarly there is legislation to prevent the sale of estates, as at Locri there is a law that a man shall not sell unless he can prove that manifest misfortune has befallen him; and also there is legislation to preserve the old allotments, and the repeal of this restriction at Leucas made the Leucadian constitution excessively democratic, for it came about that the offices were no longer filled from the established property-qualifications. But it is possible that equality of estates may be maintained, but their size may be either too large and promote luxury, or too small, causing a penurious standard of living; it is clear therefore that it is not enough for the law-giver to make the estates equal, but he must aim at securing a medium size. And again, even if one prescribed a moderate property for all, it would be of no avail, since it is more needful to level men’s desires than their properties, and this can only be done by an adequate system of education enforced by law. But perhaps Phaleas would say that he himself actually prescribes this, as he considers it fundamentally necessary for states to have equality in these two things, property and education. But the nature of the education needs to be defined: it is no use merely for it to be one and the same for all, for it is possible for all to have one and the same education but for this to be of such a nature as to
Aristotle

1266b αἱρετικὸν τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἡ χρημάτων ἡ τιμῆς ἡ 
συναμφοτέρων. ἔτι1 στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἄνισότητα τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν 
τιμῶν, τούναντίον δὲ περὶ ἑκάτερον: οἱ μὲν γὰρ 
1267a πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἁνυσον, οἱ δὲ 
χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν ἔαν ἦσαν ὅθεν καὶ 
ἐν δὲ ἴῃ τιμῆ ἢμὲν κακὸς ἢδὲ καὶ ἐσθλὸς. 

οὐ μόνον δ’ οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ διὰ τάναγκαία ἀδικοῦσιν, 
δὲν ἂκους εἶναι νομίζει τὴν ἵσοτητα τῆς οὐσίας, 
ὡςτε μὴ λωποδυτεῖν διὰ τὸ ῥίγον ἢ πεινῆ, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν. ἐὰν γὰρ 
μείζω ἐχώσων ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τὴν 
ταύτης ἱατρείαν ἀδικήσουσιν. οὐ τοῖνυν διὰ ταύτην 
μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ [ἂν ἐπιθυμοῖ]2 ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς 
ἀνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς. τί οὖν ἂκους τῶν τριῶν 
10 τούτων; τοῖς μὲν οὐσία βραχεία καὶ ἐργασία, τοῖς 
δὲ σωφροσύνη· τρίτον δ’, εἰ τῶνς βουλουτος δι’ 
αὐτῶν χαίρεσι, οὐκ ἂν ἐπιζητοῦν εἰ μὴ παρὰ 
φιλοσοφίας ἂκους, αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι ἀνθρώπων δέονται. 
ἔπει3 ἀδικοῦσί γε τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, 
ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαία (οἷον τυραννόσιν οὐχ 
ἔναι μὴ ῥίγωσιν, διὸ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ μεγάλαι ἡν ἀπο- 
κτείνῃ τις οὐ κλέπτην ἀλλὰ τύραννον). ὡστε πρὸς 
τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας βοηθητικὸς μόνον ὁ τρόπος 
τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας. ἔτι τὰ πολλὰ βούλεται 9 

1 ἔτι: ἔπει Spengel.
2 Bernays: ἀνεὶ ἐπιθυμῶν Bojesen.
3 ἔπει <δ’> vel ἔτι Rassow.

* Probably the Greek should be altered to give 'because' instead of 'moreover.'

b Iliad ix. 319.
make them desirous of getting more than their share of money or honour or both; moreover civil strife is caused not only by inequality of property, but also by inequality of honours, though the two motives operate in opposite ways—the masses are discontented if possessions are unequally distributed, the upper classes if honours are equally distributed, bringing it about that

Noble or base in the like honour stand.

Nor do men do wrong for the sake of the bare necessities only, the sort of wrongdoing for which Phaleas thinks that equality of substance is a cure—preventing highway robbery by removing the motive of cold or hunger; men also do wrong to gain pleasure and to satisfy desire. For if they have a desire above the bare necessities of existence, they will transgress to cure this desire; and moreover not because of desire only, but in order that they may enjoy the pleasures that are not associated with pains. What remedy then is there for these three classes of offences? For the first class, a modest competence and work; for the second, temperance; and as for the third sort, any people who desired pleasures depending on themselves could seek no cure for their desires save that which is derived from philosophy, for the other pleasures require the aid of fellow-creatures. Since clearly the greatest transgressions spring from a desire for superfluities, not for bare necessaries (for example, men do not become tyrants in order to avoid shivering with cold, and accordingly high honours are awarded to one who kills a tyrant, but not to one who kills a thief); so that the method of the constitution of Phaleas is efficacious only against the minor social disorders. Again, Phaleas desires to
κατασκευάζειν εξ  ὧν τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολιτεύονται καλῶς, δεὶ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιῶντας καὶ τοὺς εξωθεν πάντας. ἀναγκαίον ἄρα τὴν πολιτείαν συντετάχθαι πρὸς τὴν πολεμικὴν ἱσχὺν, περὶ ἢς ἐκείνος οὐδὲν εὑρηκεν. οἷον δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς κτήσεως· δεὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς χρήσεις ἰκανὴν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς εξωθεν κινδύνους· διόπερ οὔτε τοσοῦτον δεὶ πλῆθος ὑπάρχειν ὅν οἱ πλησίον καὶ κρείττους ἐπιθυμήσουσιν οἱ δὲ ἐχοιτες ἀμύνειν οὐ δυνήσονται τοὺς ἐπιόντας, οὔθ' οὔτως ὀλίγην ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι πόλεμον ὑπενεγκεῖν μηδὲ τῶν ἱσων καὶ τῶν ὀμοίων. ἐκείνος μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν διώρικεν, δεὶ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνειν ὃ τι συμφέρει πλῆθος ὑσίας.

ἲσως οὖν ἀριστος ὅρος τὸ μὴ λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς κρείττοσι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν πολεμεῖν, ἀλλ' οὔτως ὡς ἂν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων τοσαύτην ὑσίαν. οἷον Εὐβουλὸς Αὐτοφραδάτου μέλλοντος Ἀταρνέα πολυορκεῖν ἐκέλευσεν αὐτὸν σκεψάμενον ἐν πόσῳ χρόνῳ λήψεται τὸ χωρίον λογίσασθαι τοῦ χρόνου τοῦτον τὴν δαπάνην, ἐθέλειν γὰρ ἐλαττὸν τοῦτον λαβὼν ἐκλιπεῖν ἕδη τοῦ Ἀταρνέα· ταῦτα δ' ἐξιὼν ἐποίησε τὸν Αὐτοφραδάτην σύννοιν γενόμενον παύσασθαι τῆς πολυορκίας. ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν τὶ τῶν συμφερόντων τὸ τὰς ὑσίας εἶναι ἱσας τοῖς πολίταις πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ μὴν μὲγ' οὐδὲν

1 δ' τι Stahr: δτι codd.

A stronghold on the coast of Asia Minor acquired by Eubulus, a Bithynian banker, when the Persian empire was breaking up, middle 4th century B.C.; Autophradates was a Persian general.
frame institutions for the most part which will lead to
a right state of affairs in the internal relations of the
citizens, but the legislator should also have regard
to relations with the neighbouring peoples and with
all foreign nations. It is essential therefore for the
constitution to be framed with a view to military
strength, about which Phaleas has said nothing.
And the same is true also about property; for the
citizens should not only possess enough to meet their
requirements in civic life, but also to encounter the
perils that face them from outside; hence they
should possess neither so large an amount of wealth
that it will be coveted by their neighbours and by
stronger states while its possessors will be unable to
repel their assailants, nor yet so small an amount as
not to be capable of sustaining a war even against
equal and similar states. Phaleas, it is true, has laid
down no rule at all, but the question must not be
overlooked, what amount of wealth is advantageous.
Perhaps therefore the best limit to prescribe is that
it must not profit a stronger people to make war upon
the state because of its excessive wealth, but only
just as it might do even if the citizens had not got so
much property. For example, when Autophradates
was about to lay siege to Atarneus, Eubulus bade
him consider how long it would take him to capture
the place, and then calculate what his expenditure
would be for that period, for he himself was willing
for the payment of a smaller sum than that to
evacuate Atarneus at once; these words caused
Autophradates to ponder and led him to abandon the
siege. Now equality of property among the citizens
is certainly one of the factors that contribute to
the avoidance of party faction; it is not however

\textit{Riches tempt attack but poverty weakens defence.}
ARISTOTLE

1267 a 40 ὰς εἶπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οἱ χαρὰς ἅγαναστοὶ ἃς τοῦ ἰὸν ὄντες ἀξίων, διὸ καὶ φαίνονται πολ.

1267 b λάκις ἑπιτιθέμενοι καὶ στασίαζοντες. ἐπὶ δὲ ἡ πονηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπληστον, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἴκανὸν διωβολία μόνον, ὅταν δὲ ἤδη τοὺτ' ἢ πάτριον, ἀεὶ δέονται τοῦ πλείονος, ἐως εἰς ἀπειρὸν ἐλθον. ἀπειροὶ γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἑπίθυμίας φύσις, ἢς ἐκ τῆς ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ζῶσιν. τῶν οὖν 12 τοιοῦτων ἄρχη, μάλλον τοῦ τὰς οὐσίας ὁμαλίζειν, τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς τῇ φύσει τοιοῦτος παρασκευάζειν ὥστε μὴ βουλευθῇ πλεονεκτεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἃν ἄττους τε ὅσι καὶ μὴ ἀδικοῦνται. οὐ καλῶς δ' ὧν ἐν τῇ ἰσότητα τῆς οὐσίας εἰρήκεν· περὶ γὰρ τῆς τῆς γῆς κτήσιν ἰσάζει μόνον, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ δούλων καὶ βοσκημάτων πλοῦτος καὶ νομίσματος, καὶ κατασκευὴ πολλή τῶν καλομείνων ἐπίπλων. ἡ πάντων οὖν τούτων ἰσότητα ζητητέων ἡ τάξιν των μετρίαν, ἡ πάντα ἐστέον. φαίνεται δὲ ἐκ τῆς 13 νομοθεσίας κατασκευάζων τὴν πόλιν μικρὰν, εἰ γ' οἱ τεχνίται πάντες δημόσιοι ἔσονται καὶ μὴ πληρωμά τι παρέξονται τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλ' εἴπερ δεὶ δημοσίους εἶναι, τοὺς τα κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους δεῖ (καθάπερ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ τε καὶ ὡς3 Διόφαντός ποτε κατεσκευάζειν Ἀθηναίοι τούτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον. 20 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας σχεδὸν ἐκ

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1 ὦς MP: ἄν ὦς cet.
2 ἀκος Schneider: ἀφωγῇ Vermehren.
3 καὶ ὦς Morel: καὶ codd.

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a Twopence-halfpenny for a seat in the theatre at Athens paid for citizens by the State after the time of Pericles.

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a particularly important one. For the upper classes may resent it on the ground that their merits are not equal, owing to which we actually see them often attacking the government and rebelling; and also the baseness of human beings is a thing insatiable, and though at the first a dole of only two obols is enough, yet when this has now become an established custom, they always want more, until they get to an unlimited amount; for appetite is in its nature unlimited, and the majority of mankind live for the satisfaction of appetite. The starting-point in such matters therefore, rather than levelling estates, is to train those that are respectable by nature so that they may not wish for excessive wealth, and to contrive that the base may not be able to do so, and this is secured if they are kept inferior, while not unjustly treated. And also we cannot approve what Phaleas has said about equality of property, for he makes the citizens equal in respect of landed estate only, but wealth also consists in slaves and cattle and money, and there is an abundance of property in the shape of what is called furniture; we must therefore either seek to secure equality or some moderate regulation as regards all these things, or we must permit all forms of wealth. And it is clear from Phaleas's legislation that he makes the citizen-population a small one, inasmuch as all the artisans are to be publicly owned slaves and are not to contribute to the complement of the state. But if it is proper to have public slaves, it is the labourers employed upon the public works who ought to be of that status (as is the case at Epidamnus and as Diophantus once tried to institute at Athens).

These remarks may serve fairly well to indicate
ARISTOTLE

1267 b

toûtwn ãn tis thewôreiêne eî ti tughânei kalôs eîrêkwc ì mi kalôs.

V. 'Ippôdamos ðe Europôntos Mîlêcios (ðs kai 1
tên tôv pôlewv diârêsei eðre kai tôn Pêiraia
catêmeve, geômeves kai peri tôv Òllon blôi
25 periâtîtoperei diâ filotîmian oûtw ãste âokeîn
êniwz ënh periêrgôteron triâwv tê plîthei kai
kôsmw polûteleî,1 èti ðe èôsthîços2 èuteleûs ìnèn
âleciwês ðê ouk èn têv xêmîwn mônôn ìlalà kai
peri tôus Òerwvus xhronous, lôgous ðê kai peri
thèn òllhn fûsw ìnai boulômeves) ðrîtôs tôvû mi
20 polûtevoûmênov ëneîcihîsße ti peri politeiai èpteìn
thès ârîsthts. katêskeuaçê ðè tênh pòlîn têv plîthei 2
mèn mûrailânpron, eîs trîa ðè mérh diôrêmîni-
ëpôièi gâr èn mèn méros teçntas, èn de geôreugûs,
trîtôn ðè tô prôtopolêmou kai tà ðplâ êxon.
diîrîei ð' èiis trîa mérh tênh xwran, tênh mèn ìerân
85 tênh ðè dêmûsîan tênh ð' idianè òðên mèn tà noî-
zômena pûnûsouï prôs tôus theûs, ìerân, âî' ìn ð'
oi prôtopolêmûntê biâsmontai, kowîn, tênh ðè tôv
geôreugw idian. ïêtêo ð' ìîidh kai tôvû nômûn èiînai
trîa mônôn peri ð'ন gâr aî dîkai giônotai, trîa
taût' èiînai tôn ìrûmûn, ìbîrn blabhîn ðnaton.
40 èvnoûhêtêe ðê kai dikastîrîmôn ðè tô kûrîon eîs ð'3
pàsas anâgêsthai deîn tàs mi kalôs kekrîsîai
dokouas dîkâs, tôto ðè katêskeuaçên ek tîwv
1268 a

gereûntwn âîretwv. tàs ðè kriwseis èn tôs dikas-
sthîous ñ ðia ðphôfôfrias ïêtêo giônotai deîn,

1 kôsmw polûteleî codd. aliqui: kômhs RPM1.
2 èôsthîços <xhôseî>? Richards.

Æ Architect and town-planner (see 1330 b 24), s. 475 B.C.
This personal sketch anticipates the manner of Theophrastus.
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such merits and defects as may be contained in the
constitution of Phaleas.

I. V. Hippodamus, son of Euryphon, a Milesian
(who invented the division of cities into blocks and
cut up Piraeus, and who also became somewhat
eccentric in his general mode of life owing to a desire
for distinction, so that some people thought that he
lived too fussily, with a quantity of hair and expen-
sive ornaments, and also a quantity of cheap yet
warm clothes not only in winter but also in the
summer periods, and who wished to be a man of
learning in natural science generally), was the first
man not engaged in politics who attempted to speak
on the subject of the best form of constitution. His
system was for a city with a population of ten
thousand, divided into three classes; for he made
one class of artisans, one of farmers, and the third
the class that fought for the state in war and was the
armed class. He divided the land into three parts,
one sacred, one public and one private: sacred land
to supply the customary offerings to the gods, com-
mon land to provide the warrior class with food, and
private land to be owned by the farmers. He thought
that there are only three divisions of the law, since
the matters about which lawsuits take place are
three in number—outrage, damage, homicide. He also
proposed to establish one supreme court of justice,
to which were to be carried up all the cases at law
thought to have been decided wrongly, and this
court he made to consist of certain selected elders.
He held that the verdicts in the courts ought not to
be given by ballot, but that each juryman should

At Sparta men wore their hair long, but at Athens this
was the mark of a dandy.
ARISTOTLE

1268 a

άλλα φέρειν ἐκαστὸν πινάκιον, ἐν ὧν γράφειν, εἰ καταδικάζοι ἀπλῶς, τὴν δίκην, εἰ δ' ἀπολύοι ἀπλῶς, κενόν, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μὴ, τούτῳ διορίζειν· νῦν γὰρ οὐκ ἦντε νεομοθετήσθαι καλῶς, ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἐπιορκεῖν ἡ ταύτα ἡ ταύτα δικαί-ξοντας. ἔτθει δὲ νόμον περὶ τῶν εὐρισκόντων τις τῇ πόλει συμφέρον, ὡς τυγχάνωσι τιμῆς, καὶ τοῖς παισὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τελευτώντων ἐκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι τῇ τροφῆν, ὡς οὕτω τοῦτο παρ' ἄλλους νεομοθετημένον· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἀθηναίων οὕτως ὁ νόμος νῦν καὶ ἐν ἑτέραις τῶν πόλεων. τοὺς δ' ἁρχοντας αἰρετοὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι πάντας, δήμου δ' ἐποίει τὰ τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως τοὺς δ' αἱρεθέντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κοινῶν καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ ὅρφαινων. τὰ μὲν οὕν πλείστα καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἀξιόλογα τῆς Ἡπποδάμου τάξεως ταῦτ' ἔστιν. ἀπορήσεις δ' ἀν τις πρῶτον μὲν τὴν διαίρεσιν τοῦ πλῆθους τῶν πολιτῶν. οἱ τε γὰρ τεχνίται καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντες κοινοῖνοι τῆς πολιτείας πάντες, οἱ μὲν γεωργοὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅπλα, οἱ δὲ τεχνίται οὕτε γῆν οὕτε ὅπλα, ὥστε γίνονται σχεδὸν δοῦλοι τῶν τὰ ὅπλα κεκτημένων. μετέχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν ἀδύνατον (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντων καθίστασθαι καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πολιτοφύλακας καὶ τὰς κυριωτάτας ἄρχας ὡς εἶπεν). μὴ μετ- ἔχοντας δὲ τῆς πολιτείας πῶς οἴον τε φιλικὸς ἔχειν

1 κενὸν <ἐὰν> Meier.
bring a tablet on which if he found a simple verdict of guilty he should write the penalty, and if simply not guilty leave a blank, but if he found the prisoner guilty on some counts but not on others he should state this; for the present state of the law he thought unsatisfactory, since it forces jurors to commit perjury by giving either the one verdict or the other. He proposed a law that those who discovered something of advantage to the state should receive honour, and that the children of those who died in war should have their maintenance from the state, in the belief that this had never yet been provided by law among other people—but as a matter of fact this law exists at present both at Athens and in others of the cities. The governing officials were all to be chosen by the assembly of the people, and this he made to consist of the three classes of the city; and the officials elected were to superintend the business of the community and the affairs of foreign residents and of orphans. These then are the greatest number and the most noteworthy of the provisions in the system of Hippodamus. But doubt might be raised first of all about the division of the general mass of the citizens. The artisans, the farmers and the military class all participate in the government, though the farmers have not got arms and the artisans neither arms nor land, which makes them almost the slaves of those who possess the arms. Therefore for them to share in all the offices is impossible (for it is inevitable that both military commanders and civic guards and in general the most important offices should be appointed from those that have the arms); but if they do not share in the government of the state, how is it possible for them to be friendly towards the
As military posts must be filled by the military class, civilians will feel excluded and be disaffected; and the military class may not be strong enough to control them. Better, then, not to give full citizenship to civilians.
constitutions? But it may be said that the ruling class as possessing the arms is bound to be stronger than both classes. But this is not easy if they are not numerous; and if this be the case, why should the other classes participate in the government and control the appointment of the rulers? Again, what use are the farmers to the state? artisans there must necessarily be (for every state requires artisans), and they can make a living as in the other states from the practice of their craft; but as for the farmers, although it would have been reasonable for them to be a portion of the state if they provided the class possessing the arms with its food, as it is they have private land of their own and farm it for themselves.

And again, if the common land from which those who fight for the state are to have their food is to be farmed by themselves, the military class would not be different from the agricultural, but the legislator intends it to be; while if the cultivators of the common land are to be a different set of people from both those who cultivate the private farms and the soldiers, this will be yet a fourth section of the state, holding no part in it but quite estranged from the government. But yet if one is to make those who cultivate the private and the common land the same people, the amount of the produce from the farms which each man will cultivate will be scanty for two households, and moreover why are they not both to take food for themselves and to supply it to the soldiers direct from the land and from the same allotments? All these points therefore involve much confusion. Also the law about trials is unsatisfactory—the permission for a qualified verdict though the charge in the indict-
The mina, 100 drachmas, may be put at £4 (gold).
ment is unqualified, and the conversion of the juror into an arbitrator. A qualified verdict is practicable in an arbitration even when there are several arbitrators, for they confer with one another about their verdict; but it is not practicable in the law-courts, in fact the contrary to this is provided for by most lawgivers, who prohibit consultation between the jurymen. Then the verdict will inevitably be a confused one when the juror thinks that the defendant is liable for damages but not in so large an amount as the plaintiff claims; for the plaintiff will sue for twenty minae a and the juror will adjudge ten minae (or the former some larger and the latter some smaller sum), and another juror five minae, and yet another four (and they obviously make fractions like this), while others will award the whole sum, and others nothing; what then will be the method of counting the votes? Again, nobody compels the juror to commit perjury who, as the indictment has been drawn in simple form, gives a simple verdict of acquittal or condemnation, if he gives it justly; for the juror who gives a verdict of acquittal does not give judgement that the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not owe the twenty minae for which he is sued; it is only the juror who gives a verdict condemning the defendant when he does not think that he owes twenty minae who commits perjury. As for the view that an honour ought to be awarded to those who invent something advantageous to the state, legislation to this effect is not safe, but only specious to the ear; for it involves malicious prosecutions and, it may even happen, constitutional upheavals. And the matter leads to another problem and a different inquiry:

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reward for political inventions dangerous,

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1268 b

ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πότερον βλαβέρον ἡ συμφέρον
ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ κινεῖν τοὺς πατρίους νόμους ἂν ἢ
τις ἄλλος βέλτιων. διόπερ οὐ ράδιου τῷ λεχθέντι
30 ταχύ συγχωρεῖν, εἴπερ μὴ συμφέρει κινεῖν· ἐνδέ-
χεται δ’ εἰσηγεῖσθαί τινας νόμων λύσιν ἡ πολιτείας
ὡς κοινὸν ἀγαθόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πεποιήμεθα μνείαν, ἐτι 11
μικρὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ διαστείλασθαι βέλτιον, ἔχει γάρ,
ὡςπερ εἴπομεν, ἀπορίαν. καὶ δοξείειν ἂν βέλτιον
εἶναι τὸ κινεῖν· ἔτι γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν
35 τούτῳ συνενήροχεν, οἴον ιατρικὴ κυηθείσα παρὰ τὰ
πάτρια καὶ γυμναστικὴ καὶ ὅλως αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι
καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις· ὡστ’ ἐπεὶ μίαν τούτων θετέον
καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταύτην
ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοίως ἔχειν. σημεῖον δ’ ἂν γεγονέναι
φαίη τις ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐργῶν, τοὺς γὰρ ἀρχαίους
10 νόμους λίαν ἀπλοὺς εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικοὺς· ἐσι-
δηροφοροῦντό τε γὰρ οἱ "Ελληνες καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας
ἐωνοῦντο παρ’ ἀλλήλων, ὡςα τε λοιπὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων 12
1269 a ἐστὶ ποι νομίμων εὐθήνα πάμπαν ἐστὶν, οἴον ἐν
Κύμη περὶ τὰ φονικὰ νόμος ἐστίν, ἂν πλῆθος τι
παράσχηται μαρτύρων ὁ διώκων τῶν φόνων τῶν
αὐτοῦ συγγενῶν, ἐνοχὸν εἶναι τῷ φόνῳ τῶν φεύ-
γοντα. ἴητούσι δ’ ὅλως οὗ τὸ πάτριον ἄλλα
5 τάγαθὸν πάντες· εἰκὸς τε τοὺς πρώτους, εἴτε
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some persons raise the question whether to alter the traditional laws, supposing another law is better, is harmful or advantageous to states. Hence it is not easy to give a speedy agreement to the above proposal to honour reformers, if really it is disadvantageous to alter the laws; and a revolutionary legal or constitutional proposal in the interest of the community is quite possible. And since we have made mention of this question, it will be better if we set out a few further details about it, for, as we said, it involves difficulty. And it might be thought that it would be better for alteration to take place; at all events in the other fields of knowledge this has proved beneficial—for example, medicine has been improved by being altered from the traditional system, and gymnastic training, and in general all the arts and faculties; so that since statesmanship also is to be counted as one of these, it is clear that the same thing necessarily holds good in regard to it as well. And it might be said that a sign of this has occurred in the actual events of history, for (one might argue) the laws of ancient times were too simple and uncivilized: the Hellenes, for instance, used both to carry arms and to purchase their wives from one another, and all the survivals of the customs of antiquity existing anywhere are utterly foolish, as for example at Cyme there is a law relating to trials for murder, that if the prosecutor on the charge of murder produces a certain number of his own relatives as witnesses, the defendant is guilty of the murder. And in general all men really seek what is good, not what was customary with their forefathers; and it is probable that primitive mankind, whether sprung from the
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γηγενεῖς ἦσαν εἴτ' ἐκ φθορᾶς τινὸς ἐσώθησαν, ὡμοίους ἔλαβαν καί τοὺς τυχόντας καί τοὺς ἀνοάτους, ὡσπερ καί λέγεται κατὰ τῶν γηγενῶν, ὡστ' ἀτοποῦν τὸ μένειν ἐν τοῖς τούτων δόγμασιν. πρὸς δὲ τούτους οὐδὲ τοὺς γεγραμμένους ἐὰν ἀκνητός 
βέλτιον. ὡσπερ γὰρ καί περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, 
καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν ἄδυνατον ἀκριβῶς πάντα 
γραφὴν· καθόλου γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον γραφήναι, αἱ δὲ 
πράξεις περὶ τῶν καθ' ἐκαστὸν εἰσὶν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν 
τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι κυνητέοι καί τινὲς καί ποτὲ 
τῶν νόμων εἰσίν. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἐπισκοποῦσιν 
εὐλαβείας ἃν δόξειεν εἴναι πολλῆς. ὅταν γὰρ ἢ τὸ 
μὲν βέλτιον μικρὸν, τὸ δ' ἐθίζεων εὐχερῶς λύειν 
τοὺς νόμους φαύλον, φανερὸν ὡς ἐστεόν ἐνὶ 
ἀμαρτίας καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων 
οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὠφελήσεται κυνῆς ὃσον βλα 
βήσεται τοῖς ἀρχονσι ἀπειθεῖν ἐθισθείς. ἕσσος δὲ 
καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν· οὐ γὰρ 
ὁμοιοῦ τὸ κωνεῖν τέχνην καὶ νόμον· ὁ γὰρ νόμος 
ἰσχυρὶν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι πλῆθ 
τὸ ἔθος, τοῦτο δ' οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου 
πλήθος, ὡστε τὸ ῥαδίως μεταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν 
ὑπαρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἑτέρους νόμους καυνός 
ἀσθενὴ ποιεῖν ἐστὶ τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν. ἕτι 
δ' εἰ καὶ κυνητέοι, πότερον καὶ πάντες καὶ ἐν 
πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἡ οὔ; καὶ πότερον τῷ τυχόντι 
ἡ τισίν; τάυτα γὰρ ἔχει μεγάλην διαφοράν. διὸ

a So Hesiod, W.D. 108, Pindar, Nem. 6. 1.
b So Plato, Laws 676 ff., Timaeus 22 ff. Aristotle believed that man had existed for ever, and that the world had experienced only local cataclysms.
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earth a or the survivors of some destructive cataclysm, were just like ordinary foolish people, as indeed is actually said of the earth-born race, so that would be absurd for us to abide by their notions. Moreover even written codes of law may with advantage not be left unaltered. For just as in the other arts as well, so with the structure of the state it is impossible that it should have been framed aright in all its details; for it must of necessity be couched in general terms, but our actions deal with particular things. These considerations then do seem to show that it is proper for some laws sometimes to be altered. But if we consider the matter in another way, it would seem to be a thing that needs much caution. For in cases when the improvement would be small, while it is a bad thing to accustom men to repeal the laws lightly, it is clear that some mistakes both of the legislator and of the magistrate should be passed over; for the people will not be as much benefited by making an alteration as they will be harmed by becoming accustomed to distrust their rulers. Also the example from the case of the arts is fallacious, as to change the practice of an art is a different thing from altering a law; for the law has no power to compel obedience beside the force of custom, and custom only grows up in long lapse of time, so that lightly to change from the existing laws to other new laws is to weaken the power of the law. Again, even if alteration of the laws is proper, are all the laws to be open to alteration, and in every form of constitution, or not? and is any chance person to be competent to introduce alterations or only certain people? for there is a great difference between these alternatives. Therefore let us abandon this
νῦν μὲν ἄφωμεν ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν· ἄλλων γὰρ ἐστὶ καίρων.

VI. Περὶ δὲ τῆς Λακεδαίμονίων πολιτείας καὶ 1 τῆς Κρήτης, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείων, δύο εἰσὶν αἱ σκέψεις, μία μὲν εἰ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς πρὸς τὴν ἀρίστην νενομοθέτηται τάξιν, ἔτερα δ' εἰ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως1 τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείας.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν δεί τῇ μελλοῦσῃ καλῶς πολιτεύε- 2 σθαί τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν σχολὴν ὁμολογούμενον ἐστιν· τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὑπάρχειν, οὐβάδιον λαβεῖν. ἢ τε γὰρ Θετταλῶν πενεστείᾳ πολλάκις ἔπεθετο τοῖς Θετταλοῖς, ὅμως δὲ καὶ τοῖς Λάκωσιν οἱ Εἰλωτείς (ὡσπερ γὰρ ἔφεδροντες τοῖς ἀτυχήσαι διατελοῦσιν). περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρήτας 3 οὐδὲν πω τοιοῦτον συμβέβηκεν. αὐτίων δ' ἴσως τὸ τὰς γειτνίωσας πόλεις, καίπερ πολεμοῦσας ἀλλήλας, μηδεμίαν εἶναι σύμμαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ συμφέρει καὶ αὐταῖς κεκτημέναις περιοίκους· τοῖς δὲ Λάκωσιν οἱ γειτνιώτες ἔχθροι πάντες ἦσαν. 'Αργείοι καὶ Μεσσήνιοι καὶ 'Αρ- κάδες· ἔπει καὶ τοῖς Θετταλοῖς κατ' ἄρχας ἀφ- ἱσταντο διὰ τὸ πολεμεῖν ἐτὶ τοῖς προσχώροις, 'Αχαιοίς καὶ Περραιβοῖς καὶ Μάγυνσιν. έοικε δὲ 4 καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἔτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ γε τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἐργάδως εἶναι, τίνα δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλήσαι τρόπον ἀνεμένοι τε γὰρ ὑβρίζουσι καὶ τῶν ἴσων 10 ἀξιόζουσιν ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς κυρίοις, καὶ κακοπαθῶς

1 ὑπεναντίως Scaliger.
inquiry for the present, since it belongs to other occasions.

1 VI. On the subject of the constitution of Sparta and that of Crete, and virtually in regard to the other forms of constitution also, the questions that arise for consideration are two, one whether their legal structure has any feature that is admirable or the reverse in comparison with the best system, another whether it contains any provision that is really opposed to the fundamental principle and character of the constitution that the founders had in view.

2 Now it is a thing admitted that a state that is to be well governed must be provided with leisure from menial occupations; but how this is to be provided it is not easy to ascertain. The serf class in Thessaly repeatedly rose against its masters, and so did the Helots at Sparta, where they are like an enemy constantly sitting in wait for the disasters of the Spartiates. Nothing of the kind has hitherto occurred in Crete, the reason perhaps being that the neighbouring cities, even when at war with one another, in no instance ally themselves with the rebels, because as they themselves also possess a serf class this would not be for their interest; whereas the Laco-

3 nians were entirely surrounded by hostile neighbours, Argives, Messenians and Arcadians. For with the Thessalians too the serf risings originally began because they were still at war with their neighbours, the Achaeans, Perrhaebi and Magnesians. Also, apart from other drawbacks, the mere necessity of policing their serf class is a troublesome matter—the problem of how intercourse with them is to be carried on: if allowed freedom they grow insolent and claim to be as good as their masters, and if
άριστος ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μισοῦσιν. δήλον οὖν ὡς
οὐκ ἐξευρίσκουσι τὸν βέλτιστον τρόπον οἷς τοῦτο
συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν ἐιλωτείαν. ἔτι δ' ἢ περὶ τὰς 5
γυναικὰς ἀνέσις καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαιρέσιν τῆς
πολιτείας βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως.
όπερ γὰρ οὐκ ισός μέρος ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνὴ, δήλον ὅτι
καὶ πόλιν ἔγγυς τοῦ δίχα διηρήθαι δεῖ νομίζειν
εἰς τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν,
όπερ ἐν ὅσαις πολιτείαις φαύλως ἐχει τὸ περὶ τὰς
γυναικὰς τὸ ἡμῖν τῆς πόλεως εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν
ἀνομοθέτητον. ὅπερ ἐκεῖ συμβεβήκεν, ὅλην γὰρ
20 τὴν πόλιν οὐκονομητὴς εἶναι βουλόμενος καρτερικὴν,
κατὰ μὲν τοὺς ἀνδρὰς φανερὸς ἔστι τοιοῦτος ὁν,
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐξημελήκηκεν. ζῶσι γὰρ ἀκο-
λάστως1 πρὸς ἀπασαν ἀκολούθιαν καὶ τρυφερῶς.
όπερ ἀναγκαίον ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι 6
25 τοῖς πλοῦτον, ἀλλὰς τὲ κἂν τύχωσι γυναικοκρατοῦ
μενοι, καθάπερ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ
πολεμικῶν γενῶν, ἔξω Κελτῶν ἢ κἂν εἰ τῶς
ἐτεροί φανερῶς τετημήκασι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρρενας
συνουσίαν. ἐσοκε γὰρ οἱ μυθολογήσεας πρῶτος οὐκ
ἀλόγως συζεῦξε τὸν Ἄρη πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην.
70 ἢ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρρενῶν ὁμιλίαν ἢ πρὸς τὴν
τῶν γυναικῶν φαίνονται κατακώχυμα πάντες οἱ
τοιοῦτοι. διὸ παρὰ τοῖς Δάκωσι τοῦθεν ὑπῆρχεν, 7
καὶ πολλὰ διωκεῖτο ύπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς
ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν. καίτοι τί διαφέρει γυναικας ἀρχεῖν
ἡ τοὺς ἀρχοντας υπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἀρχεσθαι;

1 ἀνειμένως ? Richards.

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*The textual emendation giving 'live without restraint' is probably correct.*

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made to live a hard life they plot against them and hate them. It is clear therefore that those whose helot-system works out in this way do not discover the best mode of treating the problem. Again, the freedom in regard to women is detrimental both in regard to the purpose of the constitution and in regard to the happiness of the state. For just as man and wife are part of a household, it is clear that the state also is divided nearly in half into its male and female population, so that in all constitutions in which the position of the women is badly regulated one half of the state must be deemed to have been neglected in framing the law. And this has taken place in the state under consideration, for the law-giver wishing the whole community to be hardy displays his intention clearly in relation to the men, but in the case of the women has entirely neglected the matter; for they live dissolutely a in respect of every sort of dissoluteness, and luxuriously. So that the inevitable result is that in a state thus constituted wealth is held in honour, especially if it is the case that the people are under the sway of their women, as most of the military and warlike races are, except the Celts and such other races as have openly held in honour attachments between males. For it appears that the original teller of the legend had good reason for uniting Ares with Aphrodite, for all men of martial spirit appear to be attracted to the companionship either of male associates or of women. Hence this characteristic existed among the Spartans, and in the time of their empire many things were controlled by the women; yet what difference does it make whether the women rule or the rulers are ruled by the women? The result is

POLITICS, II. vi. 4-7
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

1269 b
ταύτῳ γὰρ συμβαίνει. χρησίμου δ' οὖσης τῆς
θρασύτητος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ἀλλ' εἶπερ,
πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, βλαβερώταται καὶ πρὸς ταῦθ
αἱ τῶν Λακώνων ἠσαν· ἐδήλωσαν δ' ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν
Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς, χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦσαν,
οὕσπερ ἐν ἔτεραις πόλεσιν, θόρυβον δὲ παρεῖχον
πλεῖον τῶν πολεμίων. ἔξω ἀρχῆς μὲν οὖν ἔοικε 8
συμβεβηκέναι τοῖς Λάκωσις εὐλόγως ἢ τῶν γυν
ναικῶν ἀνεσίς, ἔξω γὰρ τῆς οἰκείας διὰ τὰς
στρατείας ἀπεξενοῦντο πολὺν χρόνον, πολεμοῦντες
tὸν τε πρὸς 'Αργείους πόλεμον καὶ πάλιν τὸν πρὸς
'Αρκάδας καὶ Μεσσηνίους· σχολάσαντες δὲ αὐτοὺς
5 μὲν παρεῖχον τῷ νομοθετῷ προωδοποιοῦμένους
dιὰ τὸν στρατιωτικὸν βίον (πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει μέρη
tῆς ἀρετῆς), τὰς δὲ γυναικὰς φασὶ μὲν ἄγειν ἐπικεφαλής τὸν Ἀικούργον ὑπὸ τοὺς νόμους, ὡς δ' ἀντέκρονον, ἀποστῆναι πάλιν. αἰτία μὲν οὖν 9
εἰσὶν αὐτοὶ τῶν γενομένων, ὡστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
tαύτης τῆς ἀμαρτίας· ἀλλ' ἕμεις οὐ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν,
tίνι δὲι συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ
περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰς
γυναικὰς ἔχοντα μὴ καλῶς ἐοικεν, ὡσπερ ἐλέκχη
καὶ πρότερον, οὐ μόνον ἀπρεπεῖάν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς
πολιτείας αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ συμβάλλεσθαι
tὸ πρὸς τὴν φιλοχρηστίαν. μετὰ γὰρ τὰ νῦν 10
ῥηθέντα τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἁνωμαλίαν τῆς κτήσεως
ἐπιτιμήσειν ἀν τις. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν συμβεβηκέ
κεκτήσθαι πολλὴν λίων οὐσίαν, τοῖς δὲ
πάμπαν μικρὰν· διόπερ εἰς ὅληγος ἢκεν ἢ χώρα.

1 τῶν om. codd. plurimi.

a Under Epaminondas, 369 B.C.
the same. And although bravery is of service for none of the regular duties of life, but if at all, in war, even in this respect the Spartans' women were most harmful; and they showed this at the time of the Theban invasion, for they rendered no useful service, like the women in other states, while they caused more confusion than the enemy. It is true therefore that at the outset the freedom allowed to women at Sparta seems to have come about with good reason, for the Spartans used to be away in exile abroad for long periods on account of their military expeditions, both when fighting the war against the Argives and again during the war against the Arcadians and Messenians, and when they had turned to peaceful pursuits, they handed over themselves to the lawgiver already prepared for obedience by military life (for this has many elements of virtue), but as for the women, though it is said Lycurgus did attempt to bring them under the laws, yet since they resisted he gave it up. So the Spartan women are, it is true, to blame for what took place then and therefore manifestly for the present defect; although for our own part we are not considering who deserves excuse or does not, but what is right or wrong in the constitution as it is. But, as was also said before, errors as regards the status of women seem not only to cause a certain unseemliness in the actual conduct of the state but to contribute in some degree to undue love of money. For next to the things just spoken of one might censure the Spartan institutions with respect to the unequal distribution of wealth. It has come about that some of the Spartans own too much property and some extremely little; owing to which the land

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τούτο δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν νόμων τέτακται φαύλωσιν.

ἀνείσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἡ πωλεῖν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐποίησεν οὐ καλόν, ὅρθως ποιήσας, διδόναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν ἐξονσίαν ἐδωκε τοῖς βουλομένοις. καίτοι τούτο συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἔκεινος τε καὶ οὕτως. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν σχέδον τῆς πάσης χώρας τῶν πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο, τῶν τ’ ἐπικλήρων

πολλῶν γυνομένων καὶ διὰ τὸ προῖκας διδόναι μεγάλας καίτοι βέλτιον ἢ μηδεμίαν ἡ ὀλγηνὴ καὶ μετριὰν τετάχθαι. νῦν δ’ ἔξεστι δοῦναί τε τὴν ἐπικλήρον ὅτως αὐν βουληταί, καὶ ἀποθάνῃ μὴ διαθέμενος, δόν αὐν καταλήπη κληρονόμοι, οὗτος ὥ ὁ βεληνόδει συγκαροῦν δυναμένης τῆς χώρας χιλίου ἐπεῖθε τρέφειν καὶ πεντακοσίους καὶ ὀπλίτας τρισμυρίους ὥθησε καὶ θλίπθος ἤσαν. γέγονε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑργῶν αὐτῶν δῆλον ὅτι φαύλωσ αὐτῶς εἰχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπηνεγκεν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ’ ἀπώλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλγανθρωπίαν. λέγουσι δ’ ὅσ

ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτέρων βασιλέων μεταδίδοσαν τῆς πολιτείας, ὥστ’ οὐ γίνεσθαι τότε ὀλγανθρωπίαν πολεμοῦντων πολὺν χρόνον καὶ φασιν εἶναι ποτε τοῖς Σπαρτάταισ’ καὶ μυρίους. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ εἴτ’ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ ταῦτα εἴτε μή, βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῆς κτήσεως ὀμαλισμένης πληθυνὲν ἀνδρῶν τὴν πόλιν.

1 hic lacunam Buecheler.
2 τοὺς Σπαρτάτας Buecheler.

A clause seems to have been lost: ‘Also it would have been better to regulate by law the marriage of heiresses.’

b i.e. the consequent fall in the number of men rich enough
has fallen into few hands, and this has also been badly regulated by the laws; for the lawgiver made it dishonourable to sell a family's existing estate, and did so rightly, but he granted liberty to alienate land at will by gift or bequest; yet the result that has happened was bound to follow in the one case as well as in the other. And also nearly two-fifths of the whole area of the country is owned by women, because of the number of women who inherit estates and the practice of giving large dowries; yet it would have been better if dowries had been prohibited by law or limited to a small or moderate amount; whereas in fact he is allowed to give an heiress in marriage to whomever he likes, and if he dies without having made directions as to this by will, whoever he leaves as his executor bestows her upon whom he chooses. As a result of this although the country is capable of supporting fifteen hundred cavalry and thirty thousand heavy-armed troopers, they numbered not even a thousand. And the defective nature of their system of land-tenure has been proved by the actual facts of history: the state did not succeed in enduring a single blow, but perished owing to the smallness of its population. They have a tradition that in the earlier reigns they used to admit foreigners to their citizenship, with the result that dearth of population did not occur in those days, although they were at war for a long period; and it is stated that at one time the Spartiates numbered as many as ten thousand. However, whether this is true or not, it is better for a state's male population to be kept up by measures to equalize to keep a horse or even to provide themselves with heavy arms. 

\(^{\text{c}}\) The battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C.
The five Ephors, elected for a year by the people, were the real rulers of Sparta. The two kings were hereditary; the senate of twenty-eight nobles advised them, and the Ephors presided at the Assembly of citizens over thirty years old, who voted on the measures of the Kings and Ephors but
property. The law in relation to parentage is also somewhat adverse to the correction of this evil. For the lawgiver desiring to make the Spartiates as numerous as possible holds out inducements to the citizens to have as many children as possible: for they have a law releasing the man who has been father of three sons from military service, and exempting the father of four from all taxes. Yet it is clear that if a number of sons are born and the land is correspondingly divided there will inevitably come to be many poor men.

Moreover the regulations for the Ephorate are also bad. For this office has absolute control over their most important affairs, but the Ephors are appointed from the entire people, so that quite poor men often happen to get into the office, who owing to their poverty used to be easily bought. This was often manifested in earlier times, and also lately in the affair at Andros: for certain Ephors were corrupted with money and so far as lay in their power ruined the whole state. And because the office was too powerful, and equal to a tyranny, the kings also were compelled to cultivate popular favour, so that in this way too the constitution was jointly injured, for out of an aristocracy came to be evolved a democracy. Thus this office does, it is true, hold together the constitution—for the common people keep quiet because they have a share in the highest office of state, so that owing to the lawgiver's foresight, or else to accident, the Ephorate is advanta-
φερόντως ἔχει τοῖς πράγμασιν, δεὶ γὰρ τὴν
πολιτείαν τὴν μέλλουσαν σῴζεσθαι πάντα βού-
λεσθαι τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν
κατὰ ταύτα: οἱ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν
tιμὴν οὕτως ἔχουσιν, οἱ δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ διὰ τὴν
25 γεροοσίαν (ἄθλην γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ αὐτὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς
ἐστὶν), ο ὑπὲρ σᾶς διὰ τὴν ἐφορεῖαν καθίσταται
γὰρ εὖ ἀπάντων—ἀλλ᾽ αἱρεῖν οὐ θυμήθη τὴν ἁρχὴν
16 εἶναι ταύτην εὐ ἀπάντην μὲν, μὴ τὸν τρόπον δὲ
τοῦτον ὁν νῦν, παιδαριώδης γὰρ ἔστι λιαν. ἔστι
dὲ καὶ κρίσεων εἰσὶ μεγάλων κύριοι, ὑπὲρ οῖ
30 τυχόντες, διότι οὐκ ἀυτογενώμονα βέλτιον κρίνειν
ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ γράμματα καὶ τοὺς νόμους. ἔστι
dὲ καὶ ἡ διάτα τῶν ἐφόρων οὐχ ὁμολογουμενή
tῷ βουλήματι τῆς πόλεως. αὐτῇθ᾽ μὲν γὰρ ἀντι-
εμένῃ λιαν ἐστὶν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ὑπερ-
βάλλει ἐπι τὸ σκληρὸν, ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρ-
35 τερεῖν ἀλλὰ λάθρα τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντας
ἀπολαύειν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν. ἔχει δὲ καὶ 17
τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν γερόντων ἁρχὴν οὐ καλῶς αὐτοῖς.
ἐπιεικῶς μὲν γὰρ οὕτως καὶ πεπαιδευμένων ἱκανῶς
πρὸς ἀνδραγαθίαν τὰχ᾽ ἀν εἴπειε τις συμφέρειν τῇ
πόλει, καίτοι τὸ γε διὰ βίου κύριος εἶναι κρίσεων
40 μεγάλων ἀμφισβητήσιμον (ἔστι γὰρ, ὡστε καὶ
1271α σώματος, καὶ διανοίας γῆρας). τὸν τρόπον δὲ
τοῦτον πεπαιδευμένων ὡστε καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην
αὐτὸν ἀπιστεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἁγαθοὶ ἀνδράσιν, οὐκ
ἀσφαλεῖς. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ καταδωροδοκοῦμενοι 18
καὶ καταχαριζόμενοι πολλά τῶν κοινῶν οἱ κεκοι-

1 κατὰ ταύτα Bernays: ταύτα, ταύτα, αὐτά codd.
2 politeias Scaliger. 3 αὐτὴ ΓΜΡΗ.

a There is no clear evidence what the method was.
geous for the conduct of affairs; for if a constitution is to be preserved, all the sections of the state must wish it to exist and to continue on the same lines; so the kings are in this frame of mind owing to their own honourable rank, the nobility owing to the office of the Elders, which is a prize of virtue, and the common people because of the Ephorate, which is appointed from the whole population—but yet the Ephorate, though rightly open to all the citizens, ought not to be elected as it is now, for the method is too childish. And further the Ephors have jurisdiction in lawsuits of high importance, although they are any chance people, so that it would be better if they did not decide cases on their own judgement but by written rules and according to the laws. Also the mode of life of the Ephors is not in conformity with the aim of the state, for it is itself too luxurious, whereas in the case of the other citizens the prescribed life goes too far in the direction of harshness, so that they are unable to endure it, and secretly desert the law and enjoy the pleasures of the body.

Also their regulations for the office of the Elders are not good; it is true that if these were persons of a high class who had been adequately trained in manly valour, one might perhaps say that the institution was advantageous to the state, although their life-tenure of the judgeship in important trials is indeed a questionable feature (for there is old age of mind as well as of body); but as their education has been on such lines that even the lawgiver himself cannot trust in them as men of virtue, it is a dangerous institution. And it is known that those who have been admitted to this office take bribes and betray many of the public interests by favouritism; so that
nuvnikotes tis arxhys tautes: diopser beltiov autous mhe aneuthunous elinai, vin d' eisyn. doxei d' an h twn eforwv arxh pases euvynei tas arxas: touto de tis eforeia mega lian to diprow, ka ti ton trpov ou touton legomen didonai deiv tas euvynas. eti de kai tyn airesin hyn poiountau twn yeronton

kata te tyn krisin esti paiadariwdis, ka to auton aiteissantai ton azeinosismenon tis arxhis ouk orthis exei; dei gar ka bouloimenon kai mhe bouloimenon archein ton azein tis arxhis. vin d' operei ka peri 19 tyn allon politeian o nomothetes fainetai poiwn:

philotimous gar kataaskenaizon tois politeas toutw kehrhetai pros tyn airesin twn yeronton, oudeis gar an archein aithsaito mhe philotimos ou: kai to twn adikimatos twn g' ekousion ta pleista sympbaivei skedon dia philotimian kai dia filochrmatian tois anbrowpouis. peri de basileias, ei men mhe beltiov estin uparchein taiz poleisou h beltiov, allhos estw logos: allha mhe beltiov ge mhe kathaper vin, allha kata to autou bion ekaston krineshai twn basilewv. oti d' o nomothetes oud' autous oietai dynasthai poiein kalous kagathois, deillon: apistei gouin ws ouk odsin ikanwos agathois anbrosin: diopser ezepeimovn sympresbeutas tois exbepoys, kai swterian evomeizon tis polei elinai to stasiazesin tois basileis. ou kalow d' oude peri 21 ta syusitia ta kaloumene fiditia neumothetetai

1 ed.: ton g' adikimatos ton aut ton g' adikimatos codd.

a i.e. the Ephors, two of whom went with the Kings.
it would be better if they were not exempt from having to render an account of their office, but at present they are. And it might be held that the magistracy of the Ephors serves to hold all the offices to account; but this gives altogether too much to the Ephorate, and it is not the way in which, as we maintain, officials ought to be called to account. Again, the procedure in the election of the Elders as a mode of selection is not only childish, but it is wrong that one who is to be the holder of this honourable office should canvass for it, for the man worthy of the office ought to hold it whether he wants to or not. But as it is the lawgiver clearly does the same here as in the rest of the constitution: he makes the citizens ambitious and has used this for the election of the Elders, for nobody would ask for office if he were not ambitious; yet surely ambition and love of money are the motives that bring about almost the greatest part of the voluntary wrongdoing that takes place among mankind. As to monarchy, the question whether it is not or is an advantageous institution for states to possess may be left to another discussion; but at all events it would be advantageous that kings should not be appointed as they are now, but chosen in each case with regard to their own life and conduct. But it is clear that even the lawgiver himself does not suppose that he can make the kings men of high character: at all events he distrusts them as not being persons of sufficient worth; owing to which the Spartans used to send their enemies with them as colleagues on embassies, and thought that the safety of the state depended on division between the kings. Also the regulations for the public mess-tables called Phiditia have been badly
τῷ καταστήσαντι πρῶτον. ἔδει γὰρ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν σύνοδον, καθάπερ ἐν Κρήτῃ.

τοῖς Λάκωσι ἔκαστον δεῖ φέρειν, καὶ σφόδρα πενήντων ἐνίων ὄντων καὶ τούτο τὸ ἀνάλωμα οὐ δυναμένων δαπανᾶν, ὡστε συμβαίνειν τούναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τῆς προαιρέσεως. Βοῦλεται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρατικὸν εἶναι τὸ κατασκευασμα τῶν συστιτῶν, γίνεται δὲ ήκιστα δημο-

κρατικὸν οὔτω νεομοθετημένου. μετέχειν μὲν γὰρ οὐ βάδιον τοῖς λίαν πένησιν, ὁροὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας οὔτός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ πάτριος, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον τοῦτο τὸ τέλος φέρειν μὴ μετέχειν αὐτῆς. τῷ δὲ 22

περὶ τοὺς ναυάρχους νόμω καὶ ἐτεροὶ τινες ἐπιτετμηκασίων, ὅρθως ἐπιτιμῶντες· στάσεως γὰρ γίνεται αὐτίος, ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεύσιν οὐσὶ στρατηγοῖς ἀδίδος ἢ ναυαρχία σχεδὸν ἐτέρα βασιλεία καθέστηκεν. καὶ ὡδὶ δὲ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ νομο-

θέτου ἐπιτιμήσειν ἂν τις, ὅπερ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν
toῖς Νόμοις ἐπιτετμηκεν. πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἄρετῆς ἢ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ, τὴν πολεμικὴν·

αὐτὴ γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τουγαροῦν ἐσώζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλευντο δὲ ἀρξαντες

διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν μηδὲ ἠσκηκέναι μηδεμίαν ἁσκήσιν ἑτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολε-

μικῆς. τούτου δὲ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἔλαττον· νοµί- 23

ζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τὰγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα δι’ ἄρετῆς μᾶλλον ἢ κακίας, καὶ τούτο μὲν καλῶς,

ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κρείττω τῆς ἄρετῆς ύπολαμ-

βάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς. φαύλως δ’ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ

κοινὰ χρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ

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laid down by their originator. The revenue for these ought to come rather from public funds, as in Crete; but among the Spartans everybody has to contribute, although some of them are very poor and unable to find money for this charge, so that the result is the opposite of what the lawgiver purposed. For he intends the organization of the common tables to be democratic, but when regulated by the law in this manner it works out as by no means democratic; for it is not easy for the very poor to participate, yet their established regulation for citizenship is that it is not to belong to one who is unable to pay this tax. The law about the Admirals has been criticized by some other writers also, and rightly criticized; for it acts as a cause of sedition, since in addition to the kings who are military commanders the office of Admiral stands almost as another kingship. Another criticism that may be made against the fundamental principle of the lawgiver is one that Plato has made in the Laws. The entire system of the laws is directed towards one part of virtue only, military valour, because this is serviceable for conquest. Owing to this they remained secure while at war, but began to decline when they had won an empire, because they did not know how to live a peaceful life, and had been trained in no other form of training more important than the art of war. And another error no less serious than that one is this: they think that the coveted prizes of life are won by valour more than by cowardice, and in this they are right, yet they imagine wrongly that these prizes are worth more than the valour that wins them. The public finance of Sparta is also badly regulated: when compelled
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κοινῷ τῆς πόλεως ἐστὶν οὐδὲν πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένοις πολεμεῖν, εἰσφέρουσι τε κακῶς, διὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν εἶναι τὴν πλείστην γῆν ὡς ἐξετάζουσιν ἀλλήλων τὰς εἰσφοράς. ἀποβεβηκέ τε τοῦναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμφέροντος: τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς δὴ ὑιώτας φιλοχρημάτους.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄ μάλιστ' ἃν τις ἐπιτυμήσειν.

VII. Ἡ δὲ Κρητικὴ πολιτεία πάρεγγυς μὲν ἐστὶ ταύτης, ἔχει δὲ μικρὰ μὲν οὐ χειρὸν, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἦττον γλαφυρῶς. καὶ γὰρ ἐνεκε καὶ λέγεται δὲ τὰ πλείστα μεμιμηθαί τὴν Κρητικὴν πολιτείαν ἢ τῶν Λακώνων, τὰ δὲ πλείστα τῶν ἀρχαίων ἦττον διήρθωσαν τῶν νεωτέρων. φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Λυκοῦργον, ὅτε τὴν ἐπιτροπείαν τὴν Χαριλάου τοῦ βασιλέως καταλιπὼν ἀπεδήμησεν, τότε τὸν πλείστον διατρίβαι χρόνον περὶ τὴν Κρήτην διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν ἀποικιοὶ γὰρ οἱ Λύκτοι τῶν Λακώνων ἤσαν, κατέλαβον δὲ οἱ πρὸς τὴν ἀποικίαν ἔλθοντες τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων ὑπάρχουσαν ἐν τοῖς τότε κατοικοῦσιν· διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον χρώνται αὐτοῖς, ὡς κατασκευάσαντος Μίνω πρῶτον τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων. δοκεῖ δὴ ἢ νήσος 2 καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἐλληνικήν πεφυκέναι καὶ κείσθαι καλῶς· πάσῃ γὰρ ἐπικεῖται τῇ θαλάσσῃ.

1. Χαριλάου cod. inf., cf. 1316 a 34: Χαρίλαου hic cæt.
2. e.g. by Herodotus i. 65.
3. Posthumous son of Lycurgus's elder brother King Polydectes; cf. 1316 a 34.
4. Lyctus was an inland city in the east of Crete, not far from Cnossus.
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to carry on wars on a large scale she has nothing in the state treasury, and the Spartiates pay war taxes badly because, as most of the land is owned by them, they do not scrutinize each other's contributions. And the lawgiver has achieved the opposite result to what is advantageous—he has made the state poor and the individual citizen covetous.

So much for a discussion of the constitution of Sparta: for these are the main points in it for criticism.

1 VII. The Cretan constitution approximates to that of Sparta, but though in a few points it is not worse framed, for the larger part it has a less perfect finish. For the Spartan constitution appears and indeed is actually stated to have been copied in most of its provisions from the Cretan; and as a rule old things have been less fully elaborated than newer ones. For it is said that when Lycurgus relinquished his post as guardian of King Charilaus and went abroad, he subsequently passed most of his time in Crete because of the relationship between the Cretans and the Spartans; for the Lyctians were colonists from Sparta, and the settlers that went out to the colony found the system of laws already existing among the previous inhabitants of the place; owing to which the neighbouring villagers even now use these laws in the same manner, in the belief that

2 Minos first instituted this code of laws. Also the island appears to be designed by nature and well situated to be the imperial state, as it lies across the whole of the sea, round which almost

\[ a \] Legendary ruler of Crete, son of Zeus and Europa, and after death a judge in the lower world.
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1271 b 85 σχεδὸν τῶν Ἕλληνων ἵδρυμένων περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν
πάντων· ἀπέχει γὰρ τῇ μὲν τῆς Πελοποννήσου
μικρόν, τῇ δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας τοῦ περὶ Τριώποιον τόπου
καὶ Ῥόδου. διὸ καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάσσης ἀρχὴν
κατέσχεν ὁ Μίνως, καὶ τὰς νῆσους τὰς μὲν ἐχειρώ-
σατο τὰς δ' ὄψις, τέλος δὲ ἐπιθέμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ
τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησεν ἐκεῖ περὶ Κάμικον.

'Εχει δ' ἀνάλογον ἡ Κρήτηκὴ τάξεις πρὸς τὴν 3
1272 a Λακωνικὴν. γεωργοῦσι τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν οἱ ἐδωτέ
τοὺς δὲ Κρησίν οἱ περίστατοι, καὶ συσσίτια παρ' ἀμφότεροι ἐστὶν, καὶ τὸ γε ἄρχαίον ἐκάλουν οἱ Λάκωνες οὐ
φιδίτια ἀλλ' ἀνδρα, καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες, ἣ καὶ δήλον ὅτι ἐκείθεν ἠληλυθεν. ἔτι δὲ
5 τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐφοροὶ τὴν
αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλομένους κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἐφοροὶ πέντε τὸν ἄρι-
θμὸν οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰσίν· οἱ δὲ γέροντες τοῖς
γέρουσιν οὖς καλοῦσι οἱ Κρήτες βουλὴν ἰσομ.
βασιλεία δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἥν, εἶτα κατέλυσαν οἱ
10 Κρήτες, καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν οἱ κόσμοι τὴν κατὰ
πόλεμον ἔχουσιν· ἐκκλησίας δὲ μετέχουσι πάντες, 4
κυρία δ' οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἡ συνεπιστήμησιν τὰ
dόξαντα τοῖς γέρουσι καὶ τοῖς κόσμοις.
Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων ἔχει βέλτιον τοῖς
Κρησίν ἢ τοῖς Λάκωσιν· ἐν μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαιμονί
15 κατὰ κεφαλὴν ἐκαστος εἰσφέρει τὸ τεταγμένον,
eὶ δὲ μὴ, μετέχειν νόμος κωλυει τῆς πολιτείας,
καθάπερ εὑρηται καὶ πρῶτον, ἐν δὲ Κρήτῃ κοινο-
1 μὲν οι (vel μὲν Λάκωσιν οι) ed.; μὲν codd.
all the Greeks are settled; for Crete is only a short distance from the Peloponnese in one direction, and from the part of Asia around Triopium and from Rhodes in the other. Owing to this Minos won the empire of the sea, and made some of the islands subject to him and settled colonies in others, but finally when making an attack on Sicily he ended his life there near Camicus.

3 The Cretan institutions are on the same lines as those of Sparta: in Sparta the land is tilled by the Helots and in Crete by the serfs; and also both have public mess-tables, and in old days the Spartans called them not 'phiditia' but 'men's messes,' as the Cretans do, which is a proof that they came from Crete. And so also is the system of government; for the Ephors have the same power as the magistrates called Cosmi in Crete, except that the Ephors are five in number and the Cosmi ten; and the Elders at Sparta are equal in number to the Elders whom the Cretans call the Council; and monarchy existed in former times, but then the Cretans abolished it, and the Cosmi hold the leadership in war; and all are members of the Assembly, which has no powers except the function of confirming by vote the resolutions already formed by the Elders and the Cosmi.

Now the Cretan arrangements for the public mess-tables are better than the Spartan; for at Sparta each citizen pays a fixed poll-tax, failing which he is prevented by law from taking part in the government, as has been said before; but in Crete the system is more communal, for out of all the crops and cattle

* See Thucydides i. 4 and 8. The tradition of the wealth of Minos is supported by the recent excavations at Cnossus.
τέρως· ἀπὸ πάντων γὰρ τῶν γυνομένων καρπῶν
tε καὶ βοσκημάτων δήμοσίων καὶ ἐκ τῶν φόρων
οὐς φέρουσιν οἱ περίουκοι τέτακται μέρος τὸ μὲν
20 πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰς κοινὰς λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ
tοῖς συσσιτίοις, ὥστε ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέφεσθαι πάντας,
καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παιδὰς καὶ ἄνδρας· πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὧν ὄλγοσιτίαν ὡς ὀφελομένων πολλὰ πεφιλοσοφήκεν
ὁ νομοθέτης, καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάξευξιν τῶν γυναι-
κῶν ἵνα μὴ πολυτεκνώση, τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας
25 ποιήσας ὁμιλίαν, περὶ ἦς εἰ φαύλως ἡ μὴ φαύλως
ἐτέρος ἐσται τοῦ διασκέδασθαι καιρός. ὅτι δὴ
tὰ περὶ τὰ συσσιτία βέλτιον τέτακται τοῖς Κρησοῖς
ἡ τοῖς Λάκωσι, φανερῶν· τὰ δὲ περὶ τοὺς κόσμους
ἐτι χειρὸν τῶν ἐφόρων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει κακὸν τὸ
30 τῶν ἐφόρων ἄρχειν, ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῦτοι, γίνονται
γὰρ οἱ τυχόντες· δ’ ἐκεῖ συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν
πολυτείαν, ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἐστὶν. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ διὰ
tὸ τὴν αἰρέσιν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι μετέχων δὴ δῆμος
τῆς μεγίστης ἀρχῆς βούλεται μένειν τὴν πολυτείαν
ἐνταῦθα δ’ οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάντων αἱροῦντα τοὺς κόσμους
35 ἀλλ’ ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν, καὶ τοὺς γέροντας ἐκ τῶν
κεκοσμηκότων, περὶ ὧν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀν τις εἴπειε 6
λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γυνομένων·
tὸ γὰρ ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ τὸ διὰ βίου μείζον ἐστὶ
γέρας τῆς ἄξιας αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμ-
ματα ἄρχειν ἀλλ’ αὐτογνώμονας ἑπισφαλέως. τὸ δ’
40 ἡσυχάζειν μὴ μετέχοντα τὸν δῆμον οὐδὲν σημεῖον

1 ἐκ τῶν ante φόρων Richards, ante δήμοσίων codd.
2 δὴ Lambinus: δὲ codd. 3 γερώντων Congreve.

This promise is not fulfilled.
produced from the public lands, and the tributes paid by the serfs, one part is assigned for the worship of the gods and the maintenance of the public services, and the other for the public mess-tables, so that all the citizens are maintained from the common funds, women and children as well as men; and the law-giver has devised many wise measures to secure the benefit of moderation at table, and the segregation of the women in order that they may not bear many children, for which purpose he instituted association with the male sex, as to which there will be another occasion to consider whether it was a bad thing or a good one. That the regulations for the common mess-tables therefore are better in Crete than at Sparta is manifest; but the regulations for the Cosmi are even worse than those regarding the Ephors. For the evil attaching to the office of the Ephors belongs to the Cosmi also, as the post is filled by any chance persons, while the benefit conferred on the government by this office at Sparta is lacking in Crete. At Sparta, as the election is made from all the citizens, the common people sharing in the highest office desire the maintenance of the constitution, but in Crete they do not elect the Cosmi from all the citizens but from certain clans, and the Elders from those who have held the office of Cosmos, about which regulations the same comments might be made as about what takes place at Sparta: their freedom from being called to account and their tenure for life gives them greater rank than their merit deserves, and their administration of their office at their own discretion and not under the guidance of a written code is dangerous. And the fact that the common people quietly tolerate their exclusion is no proof that the
ARISTOTLE

1272a τοῦ τετάχθαι καλῶς· οὐδὲν γὰρ λῆμματος ἐστὶ
1272b τοῖς κόσμοις ὁσπερ τοῖς ἑφόροις, πόρρω γ’ ἀπ- 
οικοῦσιν ἐν νήσῳ τῶν διαφθεροῦντων. ἢν δὲ ποι-
οῦνται τῆς ἀμαρτίας ταύτης λατρείαν, ἀτόπος καὶ
οὐ πολιτικὴ ἀλλὰ δυναστευτικὴ· πολλάκις γὰρ τὸν
ἐκβάλλουσι συστάντες τινὲς τοὺς κόσμους ἢ τῶν
συναρχόντων αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν· ἐξεστὶ δὲ καὶ
μεταξύ τοῖς κόσμοις ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἄρχην. ταύτα
δὴ πάντα βέλτιον γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον ἢ κατ’
ἀνθρώπων βούλησιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλῆς ὁ κανῦν.
πάντων δὲ φαύλοτατον τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας, ἢν
καθιστάσαι πολλάκις οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ δικαία βούλωνται
dοῦναι τῶν δυνατῶν. ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὡς ἔχει τι
10 πολιτείας ἢ τάξεις, ἀλλ’ οὐ πολιτεία ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ
dυναστεία μᾶλλον. εἰώθασι δὲ διαλαμβάνοντες
τῶν δῆμων καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἀναρχίαν ποιεῖν καὶ
στασιάζειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. καίτοι 8
τὶ διαφέρει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ διὰ τῶν χρόνων μηκέτι
15 πόλιν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην, ἀλλὰ λύσοι τὴν πολι-
τικὴν κοινωνίαν;

"Εστι δ’ ἐπικύδωνος οὔτως ἔχουσα πόλις, τῶν
βουλομένων ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένων. ἀλλὰ
καθάπερ εἰρηται, σύζεται διὰ τῶν τόπων· ἐξενσάγιας
γὰρ τὸ πόρρω πεποίηκεν. διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιο-
kων μὲνετος τοῖς Κρησίσι, οἱ δ’ εἰλωτες ἀφίστανται
20 πολλάκις· οὔτε γὰρ ἐξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς κοινωνοῦσιν

1 Richards: λῆμματος τι codd.
2 οἱ ἄν Coraes: ὅταν codd.
3 τῶν δυνατῶν post 8 ἀκοσμίας codd. (alii hic sed δυναστῶν vel δικαστῶν.)
4 ἀναρχίαν Bernays: μοναρχίαν codd.

a i.e. the defect of the undue restriction of the office.
b See 1292 b 10 n.
c The mss. give 'bring about a monarchy.'

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arrangement is a sound one; for the Cosmi unlike the Ephors make no sort of profit, as they live in an island remote from any people to corrupt them. Also the remedy which they employ for this defect is a curious one, and less characteristic of a republic than of a dynasty: often the Cosmi are expelled by a conspiracy formed among some of their actual colleagues or the private citizens; also the Cosmi are allowed to resign during their term of office. Now it would be preferable for all these matters to be regulated by law rather than to be at the discretion of individuals, for that is a dangerous principle. And the worst expedient of all is that of the suspension of the office of Cosmi, which is often brought about by members of the powerful class who wish to escape being punished; this proves that the constitution has a republican element, although it is not actually a republic but rather a dynasty. And the nobles frequently form parties among the common people and among their friends and so bring about a suspension of government, and form factions and engage in war with one another. Yet such a condition of things really means that for a time such a state is a state no longer, but the bonds of civil society are loosened.

And it is a precarious position for a state to be in, when those who wish to attack it also have the power to do so. But, as has been said, it is saved by its locality; for distance has had the same effect as alien-acts. A result of this is that with the Cretans the serf population stands firm, whereas the Helots often revolt; for the Cretans take no part in foreign

\[\text{d} \] Aliens required special permission to reside at Sparta, and the ephors had powers to expel them for undesirable conduct.

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οΙ Κρήτες, νεωτί τε πόλεμος ξενικός διαβέβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον ὅσ πεποίηκε φανερῶν τὴν ἄσθενειαν τῶν ἐκεί νόμων.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτης εἰρήσθω τοσαύτ᾽ ἦμιν τῆς πολιτείας.

VIII. Πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ δοκοῦσι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι τὰς καλὰς καὶ πολλὰ περιττῶς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐνια παραπλησίως τοῖς Λάκωσιν. αὐταὶ γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τρεῖς ἀλλήλαις τε σύνεγγυς πῶς εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολὺ διαφέρουσιν, ἢ τε Κρητικῇ καὶ ἡ Λακωνικῇ καὶ τρίτη τούτων ἡ Καρχηδονίων. καὶ πολλὰ τῶν τεταγμένων ἔχει 30 παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς καλῶς σημεῖον δὲ πολιτείας συν- 
tεταγμένης τὸ τῶν δήμων ἐκουσίον ἀρχὴν ἀριστοτύδην, τοὺς δὲ βασιλεῖς καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ βασιλεῖσι καὶ γέρουσιν, καὶ βέλτιον δὲ τούς βασιλεῖς μὴτε κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος, μηδὲ 
τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν, εἴτε διαφέρου ἆτυχον . . . 4 ἐκ τούτων αἰρετοὺς μᾶλλον ἡ καθ᾽ ἥλικίαν ἠμέγαλων γὰρ 
1273 α κύριοι καθεστῶτες, ἃν εὐτελεῖς ὧσι μεγάλα βλα-

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1 ἐκουσίον Spengel: ἐχούσαν codd.
2 δ οὐ Bernays: οὐ codd. 3 μὲν γὰρ codd. cet. plurimi.
4 lacunam Conring.

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* Clauses seem to have been lost concluding the account.
empire, and also the island has only lately been invaded by warfare from abroad, rendering manifest the weakness of the legal system there.

Let this suffice for our discussion of this form of constitution.

1. VIII. Carthage also appears to have a good constitution, with many outstanding features as compared with those of other nations, but most nearly resembling the Spartan in some points. For these three constitutions are in a way near to one another and are widely different from the others—the Cretan, the Spartan and, thirdly, that of Carthage. Many regulations at Carthage are good; and a proof that its constitution is well regulated is that the populace willingly remain faithful to the constitutional system, and that neither civil strife has arisen in any degree worth mentioning, nor yet a tyrant.

2. Points in which the Carthaginian constitution resembles the Spartan are the common mess-tables of its Comradeships corresponding to the Phiditia, and the magistracy of the Hundred and Four corresponding to the Ephors (except one point of superiority—the Ephors are drawn from any class, but the Carthaginians elect this magistracy by merit); the kings and the council of Elders correspond to the kings and Elders at Sparta, and it is another superior feature that the Carthaginian kings are not confined to the same family and that one of no particular distinction, and also that if any family distinguishes itself . . . a the Elders are to be chosen from these rather than by age; for as they are put in control of important matters, if they are men of no value they do great of the appointment of the Kings and turning to the Elders and their selection on grounds of merit and wealth.
πτουσι, καὶ ἐβλαβαν ἡδὴ τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν Λακε-
δαιμονίων.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν πλείστα τῶν ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἂν διὰ τὰς παρεκβάσεις κοινὰ τυγχάνει πάσαις ὅντα ταῖς
eἰρημέναις πολιτείαις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν
τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας τὰ μὲν εἰς
dήμου ἐκκλίνει μᾶλλον τὰ δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. τοῦ
μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὲν προσάγειν τὸ δὲ μὴ προσάγειν πρὸς
tὸν δήμον οἱ βασιλείς κύριοι μετὰ τῶν γερόντων
ἀν ὄμογνωμονοι πάντες, εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ τούτων
ὁ δήμος· ὁ δὲ ἀν εἰσφέρωσιν οὕτωι, οὐ διακούσαι
μόνον ἀποδιδόσαι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς ἀρ-
χουσιν, ἄλλα κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσί, καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ
τοῖς εἰσφερομένους ἀντείπειν ἔξεστιν, ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς
ἐτέραις πολιτείαις οὐκ ἔστων. τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας
κυρίας οὕσας πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων ύφ’ αὐτῶν
αἱρετὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐκατὸν ταύτας αἱρεῖσθαι
τὴν μεγίστην ἀρχὴν, ἔτι δὲ ταύτας πλείονα ἀρχεῖν
χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων (καὶ γὰρ ἐξεληλυθότες ἀρχοῦσι
καὶ μέλλοντες) ὀλιγαρχικόν· τὸ δὲ ἀμίσθους καὶ
μὴ κληρωτάς ἀριστοκρατικὸν θετέον, καὶ εἰ τι
τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας υπὸ τῶν ἀρχείων
dικάζεσθαι πάσας (καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ’ ἄλλων καθάπερ
ἐν Λακεδαιμονίῳ). παρεκβαίνει δὲ τῆς ἀριστο-
κρατίας ἡ τάξις τῶν Καρχηδονίων μάλιστα πρὸς

1 ὅπερ—οὐκ ἔστι post δῆμος 10 tr. Wade-Gery.
2 τινῶν Coraes.

a i.e. both parties agree to refer or not to refer.
b i.e. even when the Kings only or the Elders only desire reference, it takes place.

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harm, and they have already injured the Spartan State.

3 Now most of the points in the Carthaginian system that would be criticized on the ground of their defects happen to be common to all the constitutions of which we have spoken; but the features open to criticism as judged by the principle of an aristocracy or republic are some of them departures in the direction of democracy and others in the direction of oligarchy. The reference of some matters and not of others to the popular assembly rests with the kings in consultation with the Elders in case they agree unanimously, but failing that, these matters also lie with the people; and when the kings introduce business in the assembly, they do not merely let the people sit and listen to the decisions that have been taken by their rulers, but the people have the sovereign decision and anybody who wishes may speak against the proposals introduced, a right that does not exist under the other constitutions.

4 The appointment by co-optation of the Boards of Five which control many important matters, and the election by these boards of the supreme magistracy of the Hundred, and also their longer tenure of authority than that of any other officers (for they are in power after they have gone out of office and before they have actually entered upon it) are oligarchical features; their receiving no pay and not being chosen by lot and other similar regulations must be set down as aristocratic, and so must the fact that the members of the Boards are the judges in all lawsuits, instead of different suits being tried by different courts as at Sparta. But the Carthaginian system deviates from aristocracy in the direction of oligarchy.
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΣΕΛ

1273 α

τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατά τινα διάνοιαν ἡ συνδοκεῖ
toῖς πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀριστίνδην ἀλλὰ καὶ
πλούτινδην οἴονται δεῖν αἴρεισθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας,

25 ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν ἀποροῦντα καλῶς ἄρχειν καὶ
σχολάζειν. εἰπέρ οὖν τὸ μὲν αἰρεῖσθαι πλούτινδην
ὀλιγαρχίκον τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἀριστοκρατικὸν,
αὐτὴ τις ἄν εἴη τάξις τρίτη καθ’ ἄντερ συντετακταὶ
cαι τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τὰ περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν·
αἱροῦνται γὰρ εἰς δύο ταῦτα βλέποντες, καὶ μά-

30 λιστα τὰς μεγίστας, τοὺς τε βασιλείς καὶ τοὺς
στρατηγοὺς. δεὶ δὲ νομίζειν ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτου
τὴν παρέκβασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ταύτην,
ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ τοῦθ’ ὅραν ἑστὶ τῶν ἀναγκαιότατων,
ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνανται σχολάζειν καὶ μηδὲν

35 ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον ἄρχοντες ἀλλὰ μὴ ἴδιω-
teύοντες. εἰ δὲ δεὶ βλέπειν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν
χάριν σχολής, φαίλον τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ὑνητάς
eῖναι τῶν ἄρχων, τὴν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν στρατη-

gίαν. ἐντιμον γὰρ ὁ νόμος οὗτος ποιεῖ τὸν πλοῦτον

40 μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην φιλοχρή-

ματον· ο τι δ’ ἂν ὑπολάβῃ τίμιον εἶναι τὸ κύριον, 7
ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δόξαν ἄκολου-
θεῖν τούτοις· ὅπου δὲ μὴ μάλιστα ἀρετὴ τιμᾶται,

1273 b ταύτην οὐχ οἶδον τ’ εἶναι βεβαιῶς ἀριστοκρατικὴν
πολιτείαν. ἐθίζεσθαι δ’ εὐλογον κερδάινει τοῦς

ωνομένους, ὅταν δαπανήσαντες ἄρχωσιν· ἄτοπον
gὰρ εἰ πένης μὲν ὡν ἐπιεικῆς δὲ βουλήσεται
cερδάινει, φαυλότερος δ’ ὅν οὐ βουλήσεται δα-
most signally in respect of a certain idea that is shared by most people; they think that the rulers should be chosen not only for their merit but also for their wealth, as it is not possible for a poor man to govern well—he has not leisure for his duties. If therefore election by wealth is oligarchical and election by merit aristocratic, this will be a third system, exhibited for instance in the constitution of Carthage, for there elections are made with an eye to these two qualifications, and especially elections to the most important offices, those of the kings and of the generals. But it must be held that this divergence from aristocracy is an error on the part of a lawgiver; for one of the most important points to keep in view from the outset is that the best citizens may be able to have leisure and may not have to engage in any unseemly occupation, not only when in office but also when living in private life. And if it is necessary to look to the question of means for the sake of leisure, it is a bad thing that the greatest offices of state, the kingship and the generalship, should be for sale. For this law makes wealth more honoured than worth, and renders the whole state avaricious; and whatever the holders of supreme power deem honourable, the opinion of the other citizens also is certain to follow them, and a state in which virtue is not held in the highest honour cannot be securely governed by an aristocracy. And it is probable that those who purchase office will learn by degrees to make a profit out of it, when they hold office for money spent; for it would be odd if a man of small means but respectable should want to make a profit but an inferior person when he has spent money to get elected should not want to.
πανήγισας. διὸ δὲ τοὺς δυναμένους ἀριστ' ἀρχεὶν, τοῦτοις ἀρχεὶν. βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἀλλ' ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς.

Φαύλον δ' ἂν δοξεῖεν εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλείον ἁρχᾶς τὸν αὐτὸν ἀρχεῖν, ὅπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ἐν γὰρ ύφ' ἐνός ἔργων ἀριστ' ἀποτελεῖται, δεὶ δ' ὅπως γίνηται τοῦθ' ὅραν τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ προστάτευς τὸν αὐτὸν αὐλεῖν καὶ σκυτοτομεῖν. ὅσθ' ὅπου μὴ μικρά πόλις, πολιτικότερον πλείονας μετέχει τῶν ἁρχῶν καὶ δημοτικότερον κοινότερον τε γὰρ καθάπερ ἐπο-

καὶ κάλλιον ἐκαστὸν ἀποτελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θάττον. δήλον δὲ τούτο ἐπὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἀμφοτέρους διὰ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν διελήλυθε τὸ ἀρχεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀρχεῖσθαι.

Ὀλυγαρχίκης δ' οὔσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀρισταADIUS 9 ἐκφεύγουσι τῷ πλούτειν, ἀεὶ τῷ τοῦ δήμου μέρος ἐΚΤΕΥΜΟΝΤΕΣ ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις· τούτῳ γὰρ ἰῶνται καὶ ποιοῦσι μόνυμον τὴν πολιτείαν. ἄλλα τούτι ἐστὶ τύχης ἐργὸν, δεὶ δὲ ἀστασιάστους εἰναι διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην. νῦν δ', ἂν ἀτυχία γένηται τις καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀποστῇ τῶν ἁρχομένων, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ φάρμακον διὰ τῶν νόμων τῆς Ἰταλίας.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας καὶ Κρητικῆς καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων, ἀιτέρ δικαίως εὐδοκιμοῦσι, τοῦτον ἑξεὶ τῶν τρόπων.


a Or 'functions remaining the same, each is done better and more quickly.'
Hence the persons who should be in office are those most capable of holding office. And even if the lawgiver neglected to secure comfortable means for respectable people, it would at all events be better that he should provide for their leisure while in office.

And it might also be thought a bad thing for the same person to hold several offices, which is considered a distinction at Carthage. One man one job is the best rule for efficiency, and the lawgiver ought to see that this may be secured, and not appoint the same man to play the flute and make shoes. Hence except in a small city it is better for the state for a larger number to share in the offices and more democratic, for it is fairer to all, as we said, and also functions are performed better and more quickly when separate than when in the same hands. This is clear in military and naval matters; for in both of these departments command and subordination penetrate throughout almost the whole body.

But the constitution being oligarchical they best escape the dangers by being wealthy, as they constantly send out a portion of the common people to appointments in the cities; by this means they cure this defect in their system and make it stable. However, this is the achievement of fortune, whereas freedom from civil strife ought to be secured by the lawgiver; but as it is, suppose some misfortune occurs and the multitude of the subject class revolts, there is no remedy provided by the laws to restore tranquillity.

This then is the character of the Spartan, Cretan and Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly famous.

\[\text{i.e. everyone in command (except the commander-in-chief) has someone of higher rank over him.}\]
ARISTOTLE

1273 b

IX. Τῶν δὲ ἀποφημαμένων τι περὶ πολιτείας ἐνιοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἐκοινώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδ’ ἀντικωνοῦν ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ἰδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον. περὶ ὧν εἰ τι ἀξιόλογον, εὑρήται σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων. ἐνιοῦ δὲ νομοθέται γεγόνασιν, οὐ μὲν ταῖς οἰκείαις πόλεσιν οὐ δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀδυνείων τισί, πολιτευθέντες αὐτοὶ καὶ τούτων οὐ μὲν νόμων ἐγένοντο δημιουργοὶ μόνον, οὐ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας, οἷον καὶ Λυκοῦργος καὶ Σόλων. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέστησαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων εὑρήται. Σόλωνα δ’ ἐνιοῦ μὲν 2 οὕσυν τοι νομοθέτων γενέσθαι σπουδαῖον, ὀλγαρχίαν τε γὰρ καταλῦσαι λίαν ἀκρατον οὐσαν καὶ δουλεύοντα τὸν δήμον παύσαι καὶ δημοκρατίαν καταστήσαι τὴν πάτριον μίξαντα καλῶς τὴν πολιτείαν. 40 εἰναι γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγω βουλήν ὀλγαρχικὸν, τὸ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς ἀριστοκρατικὸν, τὰ δὲ δικαστηρία δημοτικὸν. ἔστεκε δὲ Σόλων 1274 a έκείνα μὲν ὑπάρχοντα πρότερον οὐ καταλῦσαι, τὴν τε βουλήν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱρεσιν, τὸν δὲ δήμον καταστήσαι τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων. διὸ καὶ μέμφονται τινες αὐτῶ. λύσαι 3 γὰρ θάτερα,1 κύριον ποιήσαντα τὸ δικαστήριον πάντων, κληρωτόν ὄν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τούτ’ ἰσχυσεν, ὧσπερ τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ χαρίζομενοι τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν κατέστησαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλήν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουθε καὶ

1 Koraes: θάτεραν, θάτερον codd.
IX. Of those that have put forward views about politics, some have taken no part in any political activities whatever but have passed their whole life as private citizens; and something has been said about almost all the writers of this class about whom there is anything noteworthy. Some on the other hand have been lawgivers, either for their native cities or even for certain foreign peoples, after having themselves been actively engaged in government; and of these some have been framers of laws only, and others of a constitution also, for instance Solon and Lycurgus, who instituted both laws and constitutions. The Spartan constitution has been discussed.

As for Solon, he is considered by some people to have been a good lawgiver, as having put an end to oligarchy when it was too unqualified and having liberated the people from slavery and established our traditional democracy with a skilful blending of the constitution: the Council on the Areopagus being an oligarchic element, the elective magistracies aristocratic and the law-courts democratic. And although really in regard to certain of these features, the Council and the election of magistrates, Solon seems merely to have abstained from destroying institutions that existed already, he does appear to have founded the democracy by constituting the jury-courts from all the citizens. For this he is actually blamed by some persons, as having dissolved the power of the other parts of the community by making the law-court, which was elected by lot, all-powerful. For as the law-court grew strong, men courted favour with the people as with a tyrant, and so brought the constitution to the present democracy; and Ephialtes and Pericles docked the
1274 a

Περικλῆς, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε 10 Περικλῆς, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν προήγαγεν αὐξῶν εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν. φαίνεται δ’ οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνος γενέσθαι τοῦτο προαιρέσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμ-4 πτώματος (τῆς ναυαρχίας χὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δῆμος αἵτιν πεννέμενος ἐφρονηματίσθη καὶ δημα-10 γωγοὺς ἔλαβε φαύλους ἀντιπολιτευομένων τῶν ἐπιευκῶν). ἔπει Σόλων γε ἐσικε τὴν ἀναγκαστάτην ἀποδοδόναι τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τάς ἄρχας αἴρει- σθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν (μηδὲ γὰρ τούτου κύριος ὁ ὁ δῆμος δοῦλος ἀν εἰς καὶ πολέμους), τὰς δ’ ἄρχας ἐκ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων κατέστησε 20 πάσας, ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσιομεδίων καὶ ξενυγτῶν καὶ τρίτου τέλους τῆς καλουμένης ἐπικάδος. τὸ δὲ τέταρτον θητικὸν, οἷς οὐδεμιᾶς ἄρχής μετῆν.

Νομοθέται δ’ ἐγένοντο Ζάλευκός τε Λοκροῖς 5 τοῖς Ἐπιζεφυρίοις, καὶ Χαρώνδας ὁ Καταναῖος τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολίταις καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς Χαλκι-25 διαῖς πόλεις ταῖς περὶ Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν. πειρώνται δὲ τινὲς καὶ συνάγειν, ὡς Ὀμομακρίτου μὲν γενομένου πρώτου δευνὸ περὶ νομοθεσίαν, γυμνασθῆναι δ’ αὐτὸν ἐν Κρήτῃ Λοκρόν ὕντα καὶ ἐπιδειμοῦντα κατὰ τέχνην μαντικῆν, τοῦτο δὲ γενέσθαι Θάλητα ἔταιρον, Θάλητος δ’ ἀκροατὴν 30 Λυκοῦργον καὶ Ζάλευκον, Ζαλεύκον δὲ Χαρώνδαν.

1 ναυαρχίας Powell.

α Or 'of the sea-fight,' Salamis.

b For Solon's classification of the citizens by the annual income of their estates see Athenian Constitution, c. vii.

c Perhaps 664 b.c.

d Zephyrium, a promontory in S. Italy.

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power of the Council on the Areopagus, while Pericles instituted payment for serving in the law-courts, and in this manner finally the successive leaders of the people led them on by growing stages to the present democracy. But this does not seem to have come about in accordance with the intention of Solon, but rather as a result of accident (for the common people having been the cause of naval victory at the time of the Persian invasion became proud and adopted bad men as popular leaders when the respectable classes opposed their policy); inasmuch as Solon for his part appears to bestow only the minimum of power upon the people, the function of electing the magistrates and of calling them to account (for if even this were not under the control of the populace it would be a mere slave and a foreign enemy), whereas he appointed all the offices from the notable and the wealthy, the Five-hundred-bushel class and the Teamsters and a third property-class called the Knighthood; while the fourth class, the Thetes, were admitted to no office. Laws were given by Zaleucus to the Epizephyrian Locrians and by Charondas of Catana to his fellow-citizens and to the other Chalcidic cities on the coasts of Italy and Sicily. Some persons try to connect Zaleucus and Charondas together: they say that Onomacritus first arose as an able lawgiver, and that he was trained in Crete, being a Locrian and travelling there to practise the art of soothsaying, and Thales became his companion, and Lycurgus and Zaleucus were pupils of Thales, and Charondas of

5

Notes on various lawgivers.

6 See 1252 b 14.
7 Colonies from Chalcis in Euboea.
8 Or 'try to make a series of legislators.'
1274 a

αλλα ταυτα μεν λεγουσιν ἀσκεπτότερον ὑψον ἔχοντες.1 ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ὁ Κορίνθιος δ νομοθέτης Θηβαίοις. ἦν δὲ ὁ Φιλόλαος τὸ μὲν γένος τῶν Βακχιαδῶν, ἔραστὴς δὲ γενόμενος Διοκλέους τοῦ νικήσαντος Ὀλυμπίασιν, ὡς ἐκεῖνος

35 τὴν πόλιν ἔλιπε διαμισήσας τὸν ἔρωτα τὸν τῆς μητρὸς Ἀλκυόνης, ἀπῆλθεν εἰς Θῆβας, κὰκεὶ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησαν ἀμφότεροι. καὶ νῦν ἔτι δεικνύουσι τοὺς τάφους αὐτῶν, ἀλλήλως μὲν εὐσυνόπτους ὄντας πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν Κορινθίων χώραν τὸν μὲν σύνοπτον τὸν δ᾽ οὐ σύνοπτον.2 μυθολογοῦσι γὰρ 7

40 αὐτοὺς οὕτω τάξασθαι τὴν ταφῆν, τὸν μὲν Διοκλέα διὰ τὴν ἀπέχθεαν τοῦ πάθους ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐσταί ἡ Κορινθία ἀπὸ τοῦ χῶματος, τὸν δὲ Φιλόλαον ὡς ἀποστολοὺς. ὡσκοῦσαν μὲν οὐν διὰ τὴν τουαύτην αἰτίαν παρὰ τοὺς Θηβαίους, νομοθέτης δ᾽ αὐτοίς ἐγένετο Φιλόλαος περὶ τ᾽ ἄλλων τινῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς παιΔοποιίας, οἷς καλοῦσιν ἐκεῖνοι νόμους θετικοὺς· καὶ τούτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἰδίως ὑπ᾽ ἐκεῖνον

1274 b νεομοθετημένον, ὡς ὁ ἀριθμὸς σύζηται τῶν κλήρων. Χαράνδου δ᾽ ἰδιον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πλὴν 8 αἱ δικαὶ τῶν ψευδομαρτυριῶν (πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσκηψιν), τῇ δ᾽ ἄκριβεία τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρότερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν. (Φαλέου δ᾽ ἰδιον ἡ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀνομαλίαις, Πλάτωνος δ᾽

10 ἡ τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παιδών καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης καὶ τὰ συστήματα τῶν γυναικῶν, ἐτὶ δ᾽ ο περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος, τὸ τοῦτο νήφοντας συμποσιαρχεῖν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τούς πολεμικοῖς ἀσκησιν

1 τῶν χρόνων ἔχοντες Susemihl: τῶν χρόνων λέγοντες codd.
2 τοῦ—σύνοπτον bis Richards (duce partim Ross): τοῦ—
sύνοπτον bis codd.

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POLITICS, II. ix. 5-8

Zaleucus; but these stories give too little attention to the dates. Philolaus of Corinth also arose as lawgiver at Thebes. Philolaus belonged by birth to the Bacchiad family; he became the lover of Diocles the winner at Olympia, but when Diocles quitted the city because of his loathing for the passion of his mother Alcyone, he went away to Thebes, and there they both ended their life. Even now people still show their tombs, in full view of each other and one of them fully open to view in the direction of the Corinthian country but the other one not; for the story goes that they arranged to be buried in this manner, Diocles owing to his hatred for his misfortune securing that the land of Corinth might not be visible from his tomb, and Philolaus that it might be from his. It was due then to a reason of this nature that they went to live at Thebes; but Philolaus became the Thebans' lawgiver in regard to various matters, among others the size of families,—the laws called by the Thebans laws of adoption; about this Philolaus enacted special legislation, in order that the number of the estates in land might be preserved. There is nothing special in the code of Charondas except the trials for false witness (for he was the first to introduce the procedure of denunciation), but in the accuracy of his laws he is a more finished workman even than the legislators of to-day. (Peculiar to Phaleas is the measure for equalizing properties; to Plato, community of wives and children and of property, and the common meals for the women, and also the law about drunkenness, enacting that sober persons are to be masters of the drinking-bouts, and the regulation for military

* In 728 b.c.   * See c. iv.   * Above, cc. i.-iii.  

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ὅπως ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνονται κατὰ τὴν μελέτην, ὡς δέον μὴ τὴν μὲν χρήσιμων εἶναι τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν δέ ἄχρηστον.) Δράκωντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν εἰσί, πολιτείας δὲ ὑπαρχοῦση τοὺς νόμους ἐθηκέν, ἱδιον δὲ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις οὐδὲν ἐστιν ὃ τι καὶ μνείας ἄξιον, πλὴν ἡ χαλεπότητις διὰ τὸ τῆς ξημίας μέγεθος. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιττακὸς νόμων δημουργός ἄλλοι δὲ τοὺς μεθύοντας, ἀν τυπτήσωσι, πλεῖω ξημίαν ἀποτύνει τῶν νη-φόντων: διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλεῖον ὑβρίζειν μεθύοντας ἡ νήφοντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν συγγνώμην ἀπέβλεψεν, ὅτι δὲ θολοῦσιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον, ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Ἀνδροδάμας Ρηγίνος νομοθέτης Χαλκιδεύς τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης, οὐ τὰ περὶ τὰ φοινικὰ καὶ τὰς ἐπικλήρους ἐστιν οὐ μὴν ἄλλο ἱδιόν γε οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἔχου τις ἄν.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας τὰς τε κυρίας καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρημένας ἐστο τεθεωρημένα τοῦ τρόπου τούτου.

1 τὰ Η: om. cet.

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a Author of the first written code at Athens, 621 B.C. (though in the Athenian Constitution, c. iv., his legislation is hardly mentioned; he appears there as the framer of the constitution).

b Of Mitylene in Lesbos, one of the Seven Sages, dictator 589-579 B.C.

c Otherwise unknown.

d Chalcidice, the peninsula in the N. Aegean, was colonized from Chaleis in Euboea.

Additional Notes

II. i. 5, 1261 a 31. As the best state consists of different classes, its unity is secured by each citizen giving services to society and receiving in return benefits proportionate to his services. Probably τὸ ἵσον is an interpolation (though Newman explains it as 'the reciprocal rendering of an
training to make men by practice ambidextrous, on the ground that it is a mistake to have one of the
two hands useful but the other useless.) There are
laws of Draco, but he legislated for an existing con-
stitution, and there is nothing peculiar in his laws
that is worthy of mention, except their severity in
imposing heavy punishment. Pittacus also was a
framer of laws, but not of a constitution; a special
law of his is that if men commit an assault when
drunk they are to pay a larger fine than those who
offend when sober; because since more men are
insolent when drunk than when sober he had regard
not to the view that drunken offenders are rightly
held less guilty, but to expediency. Androdamas of
Rhegium also became lawgiver to the Chalcidians
in the direction of Thrace, and to him belong the
laws dealing with cases of murder and with heiresses;
however one cannot mention any provision that is
peculiar to him.

Let such be our examination of the constitutional
schemes actually in force and of those that have been
proposed by certain persons.

equal amount of dissimilar things'): omitting τὸ ἑον, we
render 'reciprocity' and not 'reciprocal equality'; cf. N.E.
1132 b 33, 'In the interchange of services Justice in the
form of Reciprocity is the bond that maintains the associa-
tion: reciprocity, that is, on the basis of proportion, not on
the basis of equality.'

II. i. 6, 1261 a 38 ff. The best form of constitution is
where there is a superior class that governs continuously
—an aristocracy; so where there are no class-distinctions,
the next best thing is for all the citizens to take turns in
governing and being governed, those in office for the time
being forming a sort of aristocracy. Richards's alteration
of the text gives 'to take turns to govern is an imitation of
original inequality and class-distinction.'
I. Τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοπούντι, καὶ τῖς ἐκάστη καὶ ποία τις, σχεδὸν πρώτη σκέψις περὶ πόλεως ἱδεῖν, τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἳ μὲν φάσκοντες τὴν πόλιν πεπραχέναι τῆν πρᾶξιν, οἳ δ’ οὐ τὴν πόλιν ἄλλα τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὸν τύραννον. τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου πᾶσαν ὀρῶμεν τὴν πραγματείαν οὕσαν περὶ πόλιν, ἢ δὲ πολιτεία τῶν τῆν πόλιν οἰκούντων ἐστὶ τάξις τις. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡ πόλις τῶν 2 συγκεκριμένων καθάπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὅλων μὲν συνεστῶτων δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων, δῆλον ὅτι πρότερον ὁ πολίτης ἕγχοτρός· ἢ γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν 35 τι πλήθος ἐστὶν, ὡστε τίνα χρή καλεῖν πολίτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολίτης ἐστὶ σκεπτέον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πολίτης ἀμφισβητεῖται πολλάκις· οὐ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ὀμολογοῦσι πάντες εἶναι πολίτην· ἐστὶ γὰρ ὅστις 40 ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολίτης ὁ ὑπὸ ὀλιγαρχίας πολλάκις ὁυκ ἐστὶ πολίτης. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλως πὼς τινι-3 χάνοντας ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, οἶον τοὺς ποιητοὺς πολίτας, ἀφετέον· ὁ δὲ πολίτης οὐ τῷ 1275 a

Γ

1274 b

1 Richards: γάρ τις ὅσ codd.

4 So we speak of an action planned and carried by the party in power as an Act of Parliament, and technically as an act of the sovereign.

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I. For the student of government, and of the nature and characteristics of the various forms of constitution, almost the first question to consider is in regard to the state: what exactly is the essential nature of a state? As it is, this is a matter of dispute: a public act is spoken of by some people as the action of the state, others speak of it as the action not of the state but of the oligarchy or the tyrant in power; and we see that the activity of the statesman and lawgiver is entirely concerned with a state as its object, and a constitution is a form of organization of the inhabitants of a state. But a state is a composite thing, in the same sense as any other of the things that are wholes but consist of many parts; it is therefore clear that we must first inquire into the nature of a citizen; for a state is a collection of citizens, so that we have to consider who is entitled to the name of citizen, and what the essential nature of a citizen is. For there is often a difference of opinion as to this: people do not all agree that the same person is a citizen; often somebody who would be a citizen in a democracy is not a citizen under an oligarchy. We need not here consider those who acquire the title of citizen in some exceptional manner, for example those who are citizens by adoption; and citizenship is not constituted by domicile in a
οἰκεῖν ποιν πολίτης ἐστίν (καὶ γὰρ μέτοικοι καὶ
dοῦλοι κοινωνοῦσι τῆς οἰκήσεως), οὔδ' οἱ τῶν δι-
καίων μετέχουντες οὕτως ὡστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν
10 καὶ δικαίωσθαι (τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει1 καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ
συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσιν, καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτους
ὑπάρχει—πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ τούτων τελέως
οἱ μέτοικοι μετέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ νέμειν ἀνάγκη προ-
στάτην, διὸ ἄτελῶς πως μετέχουσι τῆς τουιάτης
κοινωνίας), ἀλλὰ2 καθάπερ καὶ παῖδας τοὺς μήπω 4

dι' ἡλικίαν ἐγγεγραμμένους καὶ τοὺς γέροντας
τοὺς ἀφεμένους φατέον εἶναι μὲν πως πολίτας,
οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ λίαν ἀλλὰ προστιθέντας τοὺς μὲν
ἄτελείς τοὺς δὲ παρηκμακότας ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἔτερον
(οὔδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, δὴ λοις γὰρ τὸ λεγόμενον).
ζητοῦμεν γὰρ τὸν ἀπλῶς πολίτην καὶ μηδὲν ἐχοῦτα
20 τοιοῦτον ἐγκλήμα διορθώσεως δεόμενον, ἐπει καὶ
περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων καὶ φυγάδων ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ
dιαπορεῖν καὶ λύειν. πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν
ἀλλων ὁρίζεται μάλλον ἡ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ
ἀρχής. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν οἱ μὲν εἰσὶ διηρημέναι κατὰ
25 χρόνον, ὡστε ἐνίας μὲν ὀλος δίς τὸν αὐτὸν οὐκ
ἐξεστὶν ἀρχῶν, ἡ διὰ τινων ὑρισμένων χρόνων. δ'
ἀοριστος, οἷον ὁ δικαστής καὶ ἐκκλησιαστῆς.
tάχα μὲν οὖν ἃν φαίνει τοις οὖδ' ἀρχοντας εἶναι τοὺς 5

1 οὔτω γὰρ ἂν ὑπάρχει (sc. τὸ πολίτην εἶναι) Richards.

a This implies that aged citizens were excused attendance
at the assembly and law-courts, as well as military service.

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certain place (for resident aliens and slaves share the domicile of citizens), nor are those citizens who participate in a common system of justice, conferring the right to defend an action and to bring one in the law-courts (for this right belongs also to the parties under a commercial treaty, as they too can sue and be sued at law,—or rather, in many places even the right of legal action is not shared completely by resident aliens, but they are obliged to produce a patron, so that they only share in a common legal procedure to an incomplete degree), but these are only citizens in the manner in which children who are as yet too young to have been enrolled in the list and old men who have been discharged must be pronounced to be citizens in a sense, yet not quite absolutely, but with the added qualification of 'under age' in the case of the former and 'superannuated' or some other similar term (it makes no difference, the meaning being clear) in that of the latter. For we seek to define a citizen in the absolute sense, and one possessing no disqualification of this nature that requires a correcting term, since similar difficulties may also be raised, and solved, about citizens who have been disfranchised or exiled. A citizen pure and simple is defined by nothing else so much as by the right to participate in judicial functions and in office. But some offices of government are definitely limited in regard to time, so that some of them are not allowed to be held twice by the same person at all, or only after certain fixed intervals of time; other officials are without limit of tenure, for example the juryman and the member of the assembly. It might perhaps be said that such persons are not officials at all, and that the exercise
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toiou'tous, ou'de metechei de ta'th' arxh's. kai toiv
geloion toiv kuriwtatous aptostereiv arxh's.1
30 alla diaphretw mhd'en. peri onomatov gar o logos:
anównumon gar to kouvon ep'i dikastoiv kai ekklhsia-
stou ti dei ta'th' amfwh kalein. 'estw dei diorismou
charw aoristos arxh'. tîde mev de politas toiv
ou'to metehtontas.

'O mev oyn malist' an epharmosas poliths2 'epi
pantas toiv legeomenvous politas scheidon toioy'tos
'estiv. dei de m' lauhtanei oti tov pragmaton 6
en ois ta upokeimena diapherei to eidei, kai to
mewn autwv esti prwtov to de deuterov to d' 
exomevov, h to parapavan oud' enestiv,3 h toiwta,
to kouvon, h glisxrs. tas de politieias drwmev
eidei diapherousas al/lhwn, kai tâs mev uesteras

1275 b tas de proteras ou'sas: tas gar hmarthmenas kai
parkebhehkyiais anagkaion uesteras einai tov an-
armarthtwn (tas de parkebhehkyiais pws legeomven
uesteron estai faverovn). wste kai tov polithn
6 eteron anagkaion einai ton kai' ekasth politiean.
dioper o lexeis en mev demokratia malist' esti
poliths, en de taiv allais evdehetai mev, ou mhn 7
anagkaion. en enivais4 gar ouk esti dhmos, oud'
ekklhsian nomizounov allal5 svngklhtous, kai tâs

1 [arxh's]? (sc. toiv politas einai) ed. 2 diorismos Richards.
3 oud' enestiv Madvig: oud' estin.
4 en enivais Cornes: enivais codd. 5 all' h Richards.

a Or, amending the text, 'and yet that it is absurd to deny
the title of citizen to those—'

b The meaning of this abstract principle is most easily seen
from its application here: if states are generically different
from one another, membership of a state, citizenship, can
hardly be a single thing, and come under a single definition.

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of these functions does not constitute the holding of office; and yet it is absurd to deny the title of official to those who have the greatest power in the state. But it need not make any difference, as it is only the question of a name, since there is no common name for a juryman and a member of the assembly that is properly applied to both. For the sake of distinction therefore let us call the combination of the two functions 'office' without limitation. Accordingly we lay it down that those are citizens who 'participate in office' in this manner.

Such more or less is the definition of 'citizen' that would best fit with all of those to whom the name is applied. But it must not be forgotten that things in the case of which the things to which they are related differ in kind, one of them being primary, another one secondary and so on, either do not contain a common nature at all, as being what they are, or barely do so. Now we see that constitutions differ from one another in kind, and that some are subsequent and others prior; for erroneous and divergent forms are necessarily subsequent to correct forms (in what sense we employ the terms 'divergent' of constitutions will appear later). Hence the citizen corresponding to each form of constitution will also necessarily be different. Therefore the definition of a citizen that we have given applies especially to citizenship in a democracy; under other forms of government it may hold good, but will not necessarily do so. For in some states there is no body of common citizens, and they do not have the custom of a popular assembly but councils of specially convened members, and the
Aristotle, The negative is a conjectural insertion, cf. 1273 a 20. Sicilian orator and nihilistic philosopher, visited Athens 427 b.c.
office of trying law-suits goes by sections—for example at Sparta suits for breach of contract are tried by different ephors in different cases, while cases of homicide are tried by the ephors and doubtless other suits by some other magistrate. The same method is not followed at Carthage, where certain magistrates judge all the law-suits. But still, our definition of a citizen admits of correction. For under the other forms of constitution a member of the assembly and of a jury-court is not 'an official' without restriction, but an official defined according to his office; either all of them or some among them are assigned deliberative and judicial duties either in all matters or in certain matters. What constitutes a citizen is therefore clear from these considerations: we now declare that one who has the right to participate in deliberative or judicial office is a citizen of the state in which he has that right, and a state is a collection of such persons sufficiently numerous, speaking broadly, to secure independence of life.

But in practice citizenship is limited to the child of citizens on both sides, not on one side only, that is, the child of a citizen father or of a citizen mother; and other people carry this requirement further back, for example to the second or the third preceding generation or further. But given this as a practical and hasty definition, some people raise the difficulty: How will that ancestor three or four generations back have been a citizen? Gorgias of Leontini therefore, partly perhaps in genuine perplexity but partly in jest, said that just as the vessels made by mortar-makers were mortars, so the citizens made by the magistrates were Larisaeans, since some of the magistrates were actually larisae-
1275 b

ποιοῦσ. 1 ἔστι δ' ἀπλοῦν· εἰ γὰρ μετείχον κατὰ τὸν ῥηθέντα διορισμὸν τῆς πολιτείας, ἢσαν ἂν πολίται· καὶ γὰρ οὐ δυνατὸν ἐφαρμότειν τὸ ἐκ πολίτου ἢ ἐκ πολιτίδος ἐπὶ τῶν πρῶτων οἰκησάντων ἢ4 κτισάντων.

'Αλλ' ἵσως ἐκείνοι μᾶλλον ἔχουσιν ἀποριάν ὅσοι 10

35 μετέσχον μεταβολῆς γενομένης πολιτείας, οἴον3

'Ἁθήνησι ἐποίησε Κλεισθένης μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυραννῶν ἐκβολῆν· πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους. τὸ δ' ἀμφισβήτητιμα πρὸς τούτους ἐστὶν οὐ τίς πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἄδικως ἢ δικαίως. καίτοι κάν τοῦτο τίς ἐτί προσ-

1276 α απορήσειεν, ἄρ' εἰ μὴ δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης,

ὡς ταῦτο δυναμένου τοῦ τ' ἄδικον καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς.

ἐπεὶ δ' ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀρχοντάς τινας ἄδικως, οὐδὲ ἀρχεῖν μὲν φήσομεν ἀλλ' οὐ δικαίως, ὥς ἐπὶ καὶ πολίτης ἀρχή τινι διώρισμένοι ἐστὶν (ὁ γὰρ κοινωνὸν τῆς

5 τοιάσδε ἀρχῆς πολίτης ἐστίν, ὡς ἐφαμεν), δὴν δὲν ὅτι πολίτας μὲν εἶναι φατέον καὶ τούτους, περὶ δὲ

toῦ δικαίως ἢ μὴ δικαίως συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν

eirhēményn πρὸτερον ἀμφισβήτησιν. ἀπορούσι γὰρ

tunes πόθ' ἡ πόλις ἐπράξε καὶ πότε οὐχ ἡ πόλις,

οἴον οὖν ἐξ ὀλγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένεται

10 δημοκρατία. τότε γὰρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλα αὐτοῦ

βουλοῦνται διαλύειν (ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ

1 Larisa, a city in Thessaly, was famous for the manufacture of a kind of kettle called a ‘larisa.’

2 In 509 B.C.

3 The question, What is a state? 1274 b 34.

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makers. But it is really a simple matter; for if they possessed citizenship in the manner stated in our definition of a citizen, they were citizens—since it is clearly impossible to apply the qualification of descent from a citizen father or mother to the original colonizers or founders of a city.

But perhaps a question rather arises about those who were admitted to citizenship when a revolution had taken place, for instance such a creation of citizens as that carried out at Athens by Cleisthenes after the expulsion of the tyrants, when he enrolled in his tribes many resident aliens who had been foreigners or slaves. The dispute as to these is not about the fact of their citizenship, but whether they received it wrongly or rightly. Yet even as to this one might raise the further question, whether, if a man is not rightly a citizen, he is a citizen at all, as 'wrongly' means the same as 'not truly.' But we sometimes see officials governing wrongly, as to whom we shall not deny that they do govern, but shall say that they do not do it rightly, and a citizen is defined by a certain function of government (a citizen, as we said, is one who shares in such and such an office); therefore it is clear that even persons wrongly admitted to citizenship are to be pronounced to be citizens, although the question whether they are so rightly or not rightly is connected with the question that was propounded before. For some persons raise the question, When is an occurrence the act of the state and when is it not? for example, when the government has been altered from oligarchy or tyranny to democracy. In such circumstances some people claim that the new government should not discharge public debts, on the ground that the money
ARISTOTLE

1276 a

τυράννου λαβόντος) οὔτ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἑνὶς τῶν πολιτεῶν τῷ κρατεῖν οὕσας ἀλλ' οὖ διὰ τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον. εἴπερ οὖν καὶ δημοκρα-

15 τούνται τινες κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ὁμοίως τῇς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι ταύτης τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τύραννίδος. έοικε δ' οἶκεῖος οὗ λόγος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς ποτὲ ἡ χρή λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' εἴτεραν. ἡ

20 μὲν οὖν ἐπισυνακουστάτη τῆς ἀπορίας ἔστησις περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διάζευξηθῆναι τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους; καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐτέρων τοὺς δ' ἐτέρων οἰκήσαι τόπον. ταύτην μὲν οὖν πραοτέραν θετέον τὴν ἀπορίαν, πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως λεγομένης ἐστὶ πῶς

25 εἰμιάρεια τῆς τουιότης ἔστησις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων κατοικούντων ἀνθρώπων πότε δεὶ νομίζων μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς τείχεσιν, εἰ δ' γὰρ ἂν Πελοποννήσῳ περιβάλειν ἐν τείχος· τουιότης δ' ἱσως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλῶν καὶ πάσα ἡ ὑπὸ ἔχει περιγραφῆν μάλλον ἐθνος ἢ πόλεως: ἡ γε φασιν ἑλακυνίας τρίτην

30 ἡμέραν οὐκ ἀνθέσθαι τῷ μέρος τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τουιότης τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς ἄλλον καίρου χρήσιμος ἢ σκέψις (περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τὸ τε πόσον καὶ πότερον ἔθνος ἐν ἡ πλεῖω συμ-

1 οἰκεῖοι πῶς—ταύτης, ποτὲ Richards.
2 τὸν—ἀνθρώπουs secl. Susemihl.

a i.e. πόλις means both (1) 'city' (and also 'citadel') and (2) 'state,' a collection of citizens; and if the citizens divide and settle in two different 'cities' with different governments, they are clearly not the same 'state' as before.

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was borrowed by the tyrant and not by the state, and should repudiate many other similar claims also, because some forms of government rest upon force and are not aimed at the welfare of the community.

11 If therefore some democracies also are governed in that manner, the acts of the authorities in their case can only be said to be the acts of the state in the same sense as the public acts emanating from an oligarchy or a tyranny are said to be. Akin to this controversy seems to be the subject, What exactly is the principle on which we ought to pronounce a city to be the same city as it was before, or not the same but a different city? The most obvious mode of inquiring into this difficulty deals with place and people: the place and the people may have been divided, and some may have settled in one place, and some in another. In this form the question must be considered as easier of solution; for, as 'city' has several meanings, the inquiry so put is in a way not difficult. But it may similarly be asked, Suppose a set of men inhabit the same place, in what circumstances are we to consider their city to be a single city? Its unity clearly does not depend on the walls, for it would be possible to throw a single wall round the Peloponnesus; and a case in point perhaps is Babylon, and any other city that has the circuit of a nation rather than of a city; for it is said that when Babylon was captured a considerable part of the city was not aware of it three days later. But the consideration of this difficulty will be serviceable for another occasion, as the student of politics must not ignore the question, What is the most advantageous size for a city, and should its populations be of one
φέρει, δει μη λανθάνειν τὸν πολιτικὸν. Ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν
κατοικοῦντων τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων, πότερον
ἐως ἣ τὸ γένος ταῦτα τῶν κατοικοῦντων τὴν
αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ ἂεὶ τῶν μὲν
φθειρομένων τῶν δὲ γυνομένων, ὥσπερ καὶ ποτα-
μοὺς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ κρήνας
tὰς αὐτὰς καίπερ ἂεὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιγινομένου νάματος
tοῦ δ’ ὑπεξίοντος, ἡ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους φατέον
εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν τὴν δὲ
πόλιν ἐτέραν; εἴπερ γάρ ἐστι κοινωνία τῆς
πόλις, ἐστὶ δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, γιγ-

νομένης ἐτέρας τῷ εἴδει καὶ διαφεροῦσας τῆς
πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δόξειν ἃν καὶ τὴν πόλιν
εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ χρόνον ὅτε μὲν
κωμικόν ὅτε δὲ τραγικὸν ἐτέραν εἶναι φαμεν τῶν
πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὑπτῶν, ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ
πάσαι πάλιν κοινωνίας καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐτέραν ἃν
eἴδος ἐτέραν ἢ τῆς συνθέσεως, οἷον ἄρμοιναν τῶν
αὐτῶν φθόγγον ἐτέραν εἶναι λέγομεν ἃν ὅτε μὲν
ἡ Δώριος ὅτε δὲ Φρύγιος. εἰ δὴ τούτων ἔχει τῶν
τρόπων, φανερῶν ὅτι μάλιστα λεκτέων τὴν αὐτὴν
πόλιν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν ἁλέποντας. ὅνομα δὲ κα-
λεῖν ἐτέραν ἢ ταύτων ἐξεστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κατ-
οικοῦντων αὐτὴν καὶ πάμπαν ἐτέρων ἀνθρώπων.
eἰ δὲ δίκαιον διαλύειν ἢ μὴ διαλύειν ὅταν εἰς
ἐτέραν μεταβάλλῃ πολιτείαν ἢ πόλις, λόγος ἐτέρας.

II. Τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρημένων ἐχομένων ἐστὶν ἐπι-

1 ἀνθρώπων Richards.
2 πολιτεία Congreve.
3 λέγομεν Alb.: λέγοιμεν codd. (ἐτέραν ἢν εἶναι λέγομεν ?
Newman).
POLITICS, III. 1. 13—II. 1

13 race or of several? But are we to pronounce a city, where the same population inhabit the same place, to be the same city so long as the population are of the same race, in spite of the fact that all the time some are dying and others being born, just as it is our custom to say that a river or a spring is the same river or spring although one stream of water is always being added to it and another being withdrawn from it, or are we to say that though the people are the same people for the similar reason of continuity, yet the city is a different city? For inasmuch as a state is a kind of partnership, and is in fact a partnership of citizens in a government, when the form of the government has been altered and is different it would appear to follow that the state is no longer the same state, just as we say that a chorus which on one occasion acts a comedy and on another a tragedy is a different chorus although it is often composed of the same persons, and similarly with any other common whole or composite structure we say it is different if the form of its structure is different—for instance a musical tune consisting of the same notes we call a different tune if at one time it is played in the Dorian mode and at another in the Phrygian. Therefore if this is the case, it is clear that we must speak of a state as being the same state chiefly with regard to its constitution; and it is possible for it to be called by the same or by a different designation both when its inhabitants are the same and when they are entirely different persons. But whether a state is or is not bound in justice to discharge its engagements when it has changed to a different constitution, is another subject.

II. The next thing to consider after what has now
Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'possible': see Additional Note on p. 275.
been said is the question whether we are to hold that the goodness of a good man is the same as that of a good citizen, or not the same. However, if this point really is to receive investigation, we must first ascertain in some general outline what constitutes the excellence of a citizen. Now a citizen we pronounced to be one sort of partner in a community, as is a sailor. And although sailors differ from each other in function—one is an oarsman, another helmsman, another look-out man, and another has some other similar special designation—and so clearly the most exact definition of their excellence will be special to each, yet there will also be a common definition of excellence that will apply alike to all of them; for security in navigation is the business of them all, since each of the sailors aims at that.

Similarly therefore with the citizens, although they are dissimilar from one another, their business is the security of their community, and this community is the constitution, so that the goodness of a citizen must necessarily be relative to the constitution of the state. If therefore there are various forms of constitution, it is clear that there cannot be one single goodness which is the perfect goodness of the good citizen; but when we speak of a good man we mean that he possesses one single goodness, perfect goodness. Hence it is manifestly possible to be a good citizen without possessing the goodness that constitutes a good man. Moreover it is also feasible to pursue the same topic by raising the question in another manner in relation to the best form of constitution. If it is impossible for a state to consist entirely of good men, and if it is necessary for each person to perform well the work of his position, and
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1276 b  ἔργον εὗ ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δ' ἀπ' ἀρετῆς, ἐπειδὴ ἀδύνατον ἦμοιον εἰναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐκ
1277 a ἀν εἰδ' ἡμι ἀρετῆ πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός ἀγαθοῦ· τὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαιοῦ πολίτου δεῖ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχειν
(οὕτω γὰρ ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον εἰναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀδύνατον, εἴ μὴ πάντας
ἀναγκαῖον ἀγαθοὺς εἰναι τοὺς ἐν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ πόλει πολίτας. ἔτι ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἢ πόλις—
ὡσπερ ζῷον εὐθὺς ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, καὶ ψυχὴ ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως, καὶ οἰκία ἐξ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ κτῆσις
ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ πόλις ἐξ ἀπάντων τε τοῦτων καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐξ ἀλλων ἀνομοίων συνεστηκέν
εἴδῶν—, ἀνάγκη μὴ μίαν εἰναι τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων ἀρετῆν, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν χορευτῶν κορυ
φαίου καὶ παραστάτου. διότι μὲν τοῖνοι ἀπλῶς
οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων· ἀλλ' ἀρα ἐσταὶ
tuνὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τοῦ σπουδαιοῦ καὶ
ἀνδρὸς σπουδαιοῦ; φαμέν δὴ τὸν ἁρχοντα τὸν
σπουδαιον ἁγαθον εἰναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ 
pολιτικον ἀναγκαῖον εἰναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν
δ' εὐθὺς ἐτέραν εἰναι λέγουσι τινες τοῦ ἁρχοντος,
ὡσπερ καὶ φαίνονται οἱ τῶν βασιλέων υἱεὶς
ἐπικήν καὶ πολεμικὴν παιδεύομενοι, καὶ Εὐρι
πίδησ φησί

20 μὴ μοι τὰ κόμψ', ἀλλ' ἄν πόλει δεῖ,
ὡς οὐδὰν τινα ἄρχοντος παιδείαν. εἴ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ

1 ἐπειδὴ ΓΜ: ἐπειδὴ δὲ Ρ1: ἐπεὶ δὲ cet.: ἐπεὶ Spengel.
2 [κτῆσις] Bernays.

* These words in the Greek are probably an interpolation.

b Fragment 16, from Aeolus.
to do this springs from goodness, then because it is impossible for all the citizens to be alike, the goodness of a good citizen would not be one and the same as the goodness of a good man; for all ought to possess the goodness of the good citizen (that is a necessary condition of the state's being the best possible), but it is impossible that all should possess the goodness of a good man, if it is not necessary that all the citizens in a good state should be good men.

4 Again, since the state consists of unlike persons—just as an animal (to take this instance first) consists of soul and body, and a soul of reason and appetite, and a household of husband and wife and [ownership involves] a master and slave, in the same manner a state consists of all of these persons and also of others of different classes in addition to these,—it necessarily follows that the goodness of all the citizens is not one and the same, just as among dancers the skill of a head dancer is not the same as that of a subordinate leader. It is clear then from these considerations that the goodness of a good citizen and that of a good man are not the same in general; but will the goodness of a good citizen of a particular sort be the same as that of a good man? Now we say that a good ruler is virtuous and wise, and that a citizen taking part in politics must be wise. Also some people say that even the education of a ruler must be different, as indeed we see that the sons of kings are educated in horsemanship and military exercises, and Euripides says b

No subtleties for me, but what the state Requireth—

implying that there is a special education for a ruler.
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1277 a ἀρετὴ ἀρχοντός τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πολίτης δ' ἐστι καὶ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, οὐχ ἢ αὐτὴ ἀπλῶς ἃν εἰπὶ πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός, τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρχοντος καὶ πολίτου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ ἵσωσ Ἰάσων ἐφή πεινὴν ὅτε μὴ τυραννοί,
25 ὡς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενον ἰδιότης εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινείται γε τὸ δύνασθαι ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεῖσθαι, καὶ πολίτου δοκεὶ πον ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεῖσθαι καλῶς. εἰ οὖν τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἀρχικὴν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ πολίτου ἄμφω, οὐκ ἂν εἰῇ ἄμφω ἐπαινεῖτα ὁμοίως.
30 ἔπει οὖν ποτὲ δοκεὶ 2 ἄμφότερα, καὶ οὐ ταύτα δεῖν τὸν ἀρχοντα μανθάνειν καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἄμφότερ' ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἄμφοιν, . . . 4 καντεῦθεν ἂν κατίδοι τις ἐστὶ γὰρ ἄρχη δεσποτική· ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τάναγκαία 8 λέγομεν, ἄ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἀρχοντ' οὖκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ χρησθαί μᾶλλον θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδώδες, λέγω δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰς διακοινικὰς πράξεις. δούλου δ' εἰδὴ πλείω λέγομεν, οἱ γὰρ ἐργασίαι πλείους. ὅποι ἐν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χερνήτες· οὗτοι δ' εἰσίν, ὅσπερ 1277 b σημαίνει καὶ τούνομ' αὐτοῦς, οἱ ξώντες ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ βάναυσος τεχνώτης ἐστίν. διὸ

1 δοκεῖ πον Jackson: δοκίμων codd.
2 ποτὲ δοκεῖ corruptum: ἀποδέχεσθαι δεῖ Susemihl.
3 ἄμφω ἐπερα Bernays: ἐπερα Coraes.
4 lacunam Susemihl.
5 αὐτὸ Montecatinus.

a Tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly, assassinated 370 B.C.
b Some words seem to have been lost, conveying 'we must consider how this dual fitness can be acquired,' or possibly
And if the goodness of a good ruler is the same as the goodness of a good man, yet the person ruled is also a citizen, so that the goodness of a citizen in general will not be the same as that of a man, although that of a particular citizen will; for goodness as a ruler is not the same as goodness as a citizen, and no doubt this is the reason why Jason said that whenever he was not tyrant he felt hungry, meaning that he did not know the art of being a private person. Another point is that we praise the ability to rule and to be ruled, and it is doubtless held that the goodness of a citizen consists in ability both to rule and to be ruled well. If then we lay it down that the goodness of the good man is displayed in ruling, whereas that of the citizen is shown in both capacities, the two capacities cannot be equally laudable. Since therefore both views are sometimes accepted, and it is thought that the ruler and the subject do not have to learn the same arts but that the citizen must know both arts and share in both capacities, . . . . And it may be discerned from the following illustration: one form of authority is that of a master; by this we mean the exercise of authority in regard to the necessary work of the house, which it is not necessary for the master to know how to execute, but rather how to utilize; the other capacity, I mean the ability actually to serve in these menial tasks, is indeed a slave's quality. But we distinguish several kinds of slave, as their employments are several. One department belongs to the handcraftsmen, who as their name implies are the persons that live by their hands, a class that includes the mechanic artisan. considerably more. But the text at the beginning of the sentence is also corrupt.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΣ

1277b

παρ' ἐνίοις οὐ μετείχον οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ πολαίδου ἀρχῶν, πρὶν δὴμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον. τὰ μὲν ὅν ἐργα τῶν ἀρχομένων οὕτως οὐ δεῖ τὸν ἁγαθὸν 5 οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐδὲ τὸν πολίτην1 τὸν ἁγαθὸν μανθάνει, εἰ μὴ ποτὲ χρείας χάριν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν (οὗ γὰρ ἔτι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὸν2 μὲν δεσπότην τὸν2 δὲ δούλου). ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τις ἀρχή ἑκατέρα ἡ ἀρχή τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων (ταύτην γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὴν πολιτικήν ἀρχήν), ἣν δεῖ τὸν ἀρχοντα ἀρχόμενον μαθεῖν, οἰον ἐπαρχεῖν ἐπαρχηθέντα, στρατηγεῖν στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα. διὸ καὶ λέγεται καὶ τούτῳ καλώς, ὡς οὐκ ἔστω εὖ ἀρξαί μὴ ἀρχήσατα. τούτων δὲ ἁρέτη μὲν ἐτέρα,10 δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἁγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν, καὶ αὐτῇ ἁρέτῃ πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἁρχὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ' ἁμφότερα. καὶ ἀνδρός δὴ ἁγαθοῦ ἁμφώς, καὶ εἰ ἑτερον εἶδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἁρχικῆς καὶ γὰρ ἁρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δὲ δῆλον ὧτι οὐ μία ἂν εἶν τὸν ἁγαθοῦ ἁρέτη, οἰον δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' εἰδὴ ἐχουσά καθ' ἃ ἀρξαί καὶ ἁρξαίται, ὃσπερ ἀνδρός καὶ γυναικὸς ἑτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία (δὸξαι γὰρ ἂν εἶναι δειλὸς ἀνὴρ εἰ οὕτως ἀνδρείος εἶν ὃσπερ γυνὴ ἀνδρεία, καὶ γυνὴ λάλος3

2 τὸτε pro τὸν bis Riese, ὅτε Richards.
3 ἄλλος, ἀλαλος, ἄλλος codd. inf.: ἀκόλαστος Susemihl.

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Hence in some states manual labourers were not admitted to office in old times, before the development of extreme democracy. The tasks of those who are under this form of authority therefore it is not proper for the good man or the man fit for citizenship or the good citizen to learn, except for his own private use occasionally (for then it ceases to be a case of the one party being master and the other slave). But there exists a form of authority by which a man rules over persons of the same race as himself, and free men (for that is how we describe political authority), and this the ruler should learn by being ruled, just as a man should command cavalry after having served as a trooper, command a regiment after having served in a regiment and been in command of a company and of a platoon. Hence there is much truth in the saying that it is impossible to become a good ruler without having been a subject.

And although the goodness of a ruler and that of a subject are different, the good citizen must have the knowledge and the ability both to be ruled and to rule, and the merit of the good citizen consists in having a knowledge of the government of free men on both sides. And therefore both these virtues are characteristic of a good man, even if temperance and justice in a ruler are of a different kind from temperance and justice in a subject; for clearly a good man’s virtue, for example his justice, will not be one and the same when he is under government and when he is free, but it will be of different kinds, one fitting him to rule and one to be ruled, just as temperance and courage are different in a man and in a woman (for a man would be thought a coward if he were only as brave as a brave woman, and a woman a chatterer.
ARISTOTLE

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ei oútων κοσμία εἶη ἀσπερ ὁ ἀνήρ ὁ ἀγαθὸς· ἔπει καὶ οἰκονομία ἔτερα ἀνδρός καὶ γυναικός, τοῦ μὲν
25 γὰρ κτάσθαι τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἔργον ἔστιν). ἡ δὲ 11
φρόνησις ἀρχοντος ὕδιος ἄρετή μόνῃ· τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας
ἐοικεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ
tῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δὲ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρετή
φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἄληθής· ἄσπερ αὐλο-
80 ποίος γὰρ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ὃ δ' ἄρχων αὐλητής ὁ
χρώμενος.

Πότερον μὲν οὖν ἡ αὐτή ἄρετή ἄνδρος ἀγαθοῦ
καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίον ἡ ἔτερα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτή
cαὶ πῶς ἔτερα, φανερῶν ἐκ τούτων.

III. Περὶ δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐτί λειπεται τις τῶν 1
ἀποριῶν. ὡς ἄληθῶς γὰρ πότερον πολιτῆς ἔστιν
25 ὧ κοινωνεῖν ἐξεστιν ἀρχῆς, ἡ καὶ τοὺς βασιλέως
πολιτάς θετέον; εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτους θετέον οἷς
μὴ μέτεστιν ἄρχων, οὐχ ὅτι το τοτὸς εἶναι πολίτου
τὴν τοιαύτην ἄρετήν, οὔτως γὰρ πολιτῆς· εἰ δὲ
μηδείς τῶν τοιούτων πολίτης, ἐν τίνι μέρει θετέος
ἐκαστός; οὐδὲ γὰρ μέτοικος οὐδὲ ἕξειν. ἡ διά γε
1278 a τούτων τὸν λόγον οὐδὲν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν ἄτοπον;
οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ δουλοὶ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν, οὐδὲ οἱ
ἀπελευθεροί. τούτῳ γὰρ ἄληθες, ὡς οὐ πάντοις 2
θετεῖν πολίτας δὲν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἶη πόλις, ἐπεὶ
οὐδέ οἱ παῖδες ὁμαίως πολίται καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' 5
οἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς οἱ δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· πολίται μὲν
γὰρ εἴσιν, ἀλλ' ἀτελεῖς. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἄρχαιοις

1 ek prosbheasa Casaubon.

a Or perhaps 'for the working-man is a citizen': see Additional Note p. 275.
b Or, with Casaubon's probable correction of the Greek, 'only with a qualification.'
POLITICS, III. ii. 10—III. 2

if she were only as modest as a good man; since even the household functions of a man and of a woman are different—his business is to get and hers to keep).

11 And practical wisdom alone of the virtues is a virtue peculiar to a ruler; for the other virtues seem to be necessary alike for both subjects and rulers to possess, but wisdom assuredly is not a subject's virtue, but only right opinion: the subject corresponds to the man who makes flutes and the ruler to the flute-player who uses them.

The question whether the goodness of a good man is the same as that of a good citizen or different, and how they are the same and how different, is clear from these considerations.

1 III. But one of the difficulties as to what constitutes a citizen is still left. Is it truly the case that a citizen is a person who has the right to share office in the government, or are the working classes also to be counted citizens? If these persons also are to be counted who have no share in offices, it is not possible for every citizen to possess the citizen's virtue; for the true citizen is the man capable of governing.a

If on the other hand no one of the working people is a citizen, in what class are the various workers to be ranked? for they are neither resident aliens nor foreigners. Or shall we say that so far as that argument goes no inconsistency results? for slaves also are not in one of the classes mentioned, nor are freed-men. For it is true that not all the persons indispensable for the existence of a state are to be deemed citizens, since even the sons of citizens are not citizens in the same sense as the adults: the latter are citizens in the full sense, the former only by presumption—thely are citizens, but incomplete ones.

Therefore the working classes not citizens in the best state, as they do not hold office.
χρόνοις παρ’ εύιοις ἦν δοῦλον τὸ βάναυσον ἡ ἔνικόν, διόπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι καὶ νῦν. ἡ δὲ βελτίστη πόλις οὐ ποιήσει βάναυσον πολιτήν. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὕτος πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πολίτου ἀρετήν ἦν
10 εἴπομεν λεκτέον οὐ παντὸς, οὐδὲ ἑλευθέρον μόνον, ἀλλ’ ὁσοὶ τῶν ἔργων εἰσὶν ἀφειμένοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. τῶν δ’ ἀναγκαίων1 οἱ μὲν εἰνὶ λειτουργοῦντες τὰ 3
tοιαῦτα δοῦλοι, οἱ δὲ κοινοὶ βάναυσοι καὶ θήτες. φανερὸν δ’ ἐντεῦθεν μικρὸν ἐπισκεφθαμένοι πῶς ἐχει περὶ αὐτῶν[· αὐτὸ γὰρ φανὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ποιεῖ
15 δὴλον].2 ἐπεὶ γὰρ πλείους εἰσὶν αἱ πολιτείαι, καὶ εἰδὴ πολίτου ἀναγκαίου εἶναι πλεῖώ, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ ἄρχομένου πολίτου, ὥστε εἴ n μὲν τινὶ πολιτείᾳ τῶν βάναυσον ἀναγκαίου εἶναι καὶ τὸν θῆτα πολιτάς, εἰν τις δ’ ἀδύνατον, οἶνον εἰ τίς ἐστὶν ἦν καλοῦσιν
20 ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ ἐν ἦ κατ’ ἀρετὴν αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατ’ ἀξίαν· οὐ γὰρ οἶνον τε ἐπιτηδεύ-
25 σαι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ξόντα βίον βάναυσον ἡ θητικὸν. εἰν δὲ ταῖς ὀλυγαρχίαις θῆτα μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι 4
πολιτήν (ἀπὸ τιμημάτων γὰρ μακρὸν αἱ μεθέξεις τῶν ἄρχων), βάναυσον δ’ ἐνδέχεται πλουτοῦσι γὰρ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν. ἐν Θῆβαις δὲ νόμος ἦν τὸν διὰ3 δέκα ἑτῶν μὴ ἀπεσχημένου τῆς ἀγορᾶς
 muzzle ἄρχης. ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ πολιτείαις προσ-

1 ἀλλων Bernays.

a The ill-expressed clause ‘for what—clear’ seems almost certainly to be an interpolation.

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In ancient times in fact the artisan class in some states consisted of slaves or aliens, owing to which the great mass of artisans are so even now; and the best-ordered state will not make an artisan a citizen. While if even the artisan is a citizen, then what we said to be the citizen's virtue must not be said to belong to every citizen, nor merely be defined as the virtue of a free man, but will only belong to those who are released from menial occupations. Among menial occupations those who render such services to an individual are slaves, and those who do so for the community are artisans and hired labourers. The state of the case about them will be manifest from what follows when we consider it a little further, for what has been said when made known itself makes it clear. As there are several forms of constitution, it follows that there are several kinds of citizen, and especially of the citizen in a subject position; hence under one form of constitution citizenship will necessarily extend to the artisan and the hired labourer, while under other forms this is impossible, for instance in any constitution that is of the form entitled aristocratic and in which the honours are bestowed according to goodness and to merit, since a person living a life of manual toil or as a hired labourer cannot practise the pursuits in which goodness is exercised. In oligarchies on the other hand, though it is impossible for a hired labourer to be a citizen (since admission to office of various grades is based on high property-assessments), it is possible for an artisan; for even the general mass of the craftsmen are rich. At Thebes there was a law that no one who had not kept out of trade for the last ten years might be admitted to office. But under many
εφέλκεται καὶ τῶν ξένων ὁ νόμος· ὁ γὰρ ἐκ πολέτιδος ἐν τισὶ δημοκρατίαις πολιτῆς ἔστιν, τὸν 5 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόδους παρὰ πολλοῖς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ δι᾽ ἐνδειαν τῶν γυναικῶν πολιτῶν ποιοῦνται πολιτάς τοὺς τουιότους (διὰ γὰρ ὀλυγανθρωπίαν οὕτω χρῶνται τοῖς νόμοις), εὐποροῦντες δῆ 1 ὁχλοῦ κατὰ μικρὸν παραιροῦνται τοὺς ἐκ δούλου πρῶτον ἢ δούλης, εἴτε τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφότεροι ἀστῶν πολιτάς ποιοῦσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἶδος πλείω πολίτου, 6 φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι λέγεται μάλιστα πολιτῆς ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, ὁσπερ καὶ ὁ μηρός ἐποίησεν ὁσπὲρ τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην' ὅσπερ μέτοικος γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων. ἀλλ' ἔστιν 2 ὅπου τὸ τουιότου ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἔστιν ἀπάτης χάρω τῶν συνοικοῦντων.

1278 b Πάτερον μὲν οὖν ἔτεραν ἤ την αὐτὴν θετέον καθ' ἦν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἔστι καὶ πολιτῆς σπουδαῖος, δὴ λοι ἐκ τῶν εὑρημένων, ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς τινὸς δ' ἔτερος, κάκεινος οὐ πᾶς ἀλλ' ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ κύριος ἢ δυνάμενος εἶναι κύριος, ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ἢ μετ' ἄλλων, τῆς τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελείας. IV. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισται, τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα 1

1 δῆ Susemihl: δ' codd.
2 ἔστιν hic Welldon, post συνοικοῦντων codd.

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1 2 Iliad ix. 648, xvi. 59.
2 The mss. give 'But where such exclusion is disguised, it (this concealment) is for the purpose of deceiving' etc.
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constitutions the law draws recruits even from foreigners; for in some democracies the son of a citizen-mother is a citizen, and the same rule holds good as to base-born sons in many places. Nevertheless, inasmuch as such persons are adopted as citizens owing to a lack of citizens of legitimate birth (for legislation of this kind is resorted to because of under-population), when a state becomes well off for numbers it gradually divests itself first of the sons of a slave father or mother, then of those whose mothers only were citizens, and finally only allows citizenship to the children of citizens on both sides. These facts then show that there are various kinds of citizen, and that a citizen in the fullest sense means the man who shares in the honours of the state, as is implied in the verse of Homer:

Like to some alien settler without honour,—
since a native not admitted to a share in the public honours is like an alien domiciled in the land. But in some places this exclusion is disguised, for the purpose of deceiving those who are a part of the population.

The answer therefore to the question, Is the goodness that makes a good man to be deemed the same as that which makes a worthy citizen, or different? is now clear from what has been said: in one form of state the good man and the good citizen are the same, but in another they are different, and also in the former case it is not every citizen but only the statesman, the man who controls or is competent to control, singly or with colleagues, the administration of the commonwealth, that is essentially also a good man.

IV. And since these points have been determined,
σκεπτέον πότερον μίαν θετέον πολιτείαν ἡ πλείους,
κἂν εἰ πλείους, τίνες καὶ πόσαι καὶ διαφοραί τίνες
αὐτῶν εἰσίν. ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν
10 τε ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων.
κύριον μὲν γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ πολιτευμα τῆς πόλεως,
πολιτευμα δ’ ἔστιν ἡ πολιτεία. λέγω δ’ οὖν ἐν
μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατικαίς κύριος ὁ δήμος, οἱ δ’
ολίγοι τυναντίον ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις: φαμὲν δὲ
καὶ πολιτείαν ἐτέραν εἶναι τούτων. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ
15 τούτον ἐροῦμεν λόγον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
Ὑποθετέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνος χάριν συνέστηκε 2
πόλις καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἰδὴ πόσα τῆς περὶ ἀνθρωπον
καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς ζωῆς.
Εἰρηταὶ δὴ κατὰ τοὺς πρῶτους λόγους, ἐν οἷς
περὶ οἰκονομίας διωρίσθη καὶ δεσποτείας, ὅτι
20 φύσει μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπος ζώον πολιτικόν· διὸ καὶ
μηδὲν δεόμενοι τῆς παρ’ ἄλληλων βοηθείαις οὐκ
ἐλαττον ὀρέγονται τοῦ συζήν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ 3
τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ’ ὃσον ἐπιβάλλει
μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν
tοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τέλος, καὶ κοινῇ πάσι καὶ χωρίς·
συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἐνεκεν αὐτοῦ καὶ
25 συνέχουσι τῆν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν; ' ἦσος γὰρ ἐνεστὶ
tι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόνον·
ἀν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλλη
λίαν, δῆλον δ’ ὅσ καρτερούσι πολλὴν κακοπάθειαν

1 καὶ: κατὰ Bernays.
2 καὶ—κοινωνίαν post 26 μόριον codd. cet.

α 1253 a 1 foll.
the next question to be considered is whether we are to lay it down that there is only one form of constitution or several, and if several, what they are and how many and what are the differences between them. Now a constitution is the ordering of a state in respect of its various magistracies, and especially the magistracy that is supreme over all matters. For the government is everywhere supreme over the state and the constitution is the government. I mean that in democratic states for example the people are supreme, but in oligarchies on the contrary the few are; and we say that they have a different constitution. And we shall use the same language about the other forms of government also.

2 We have therefore to determine first the fundamental points, what is the object for which a state exists and how many different kinds of system there are for governing mankind and for controlling the common life.

Now it has been said in our first discourses, in which we determined the principles concerning household management and the control of slaves, that man is by nature a political animal; and so even when men have no need of assistance from each other they none the less desire to live together. At the same time they are also brought together by common interest, so far as each achieves a share of the good life. The good life then is the chief aim of society, both collectively for all its members and individually; but they also come together and maintain the political partnership for the sake of life merely, for doubtless there is some element of value contained even in the mere state of being alive, provided that there is not too great an excess on the side of the hardships of life, and it
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οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γλυχόμενοι τοῦ ζῆν, ὡς
30 ἐνοφής τινὸς εὑμεριάσ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκύττητος

φυσικῆς.

'Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους ῥᾴδιον διελείν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς

λόγοις διοριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις. ἦ μὲν

γὰρ δεσποτεία, καίτερ ὁντος καὶ ἀλήθειαν τῷ τε

φύσει δούλως καὶ τῷ φύσει δεσπότη ταύτῳ συμ-

φέροντος, ὡμως ἀρχεῖ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ δεσπότου συμ-

φέρον οὐδὲν ἤττον, πρὸς δὲ τοῦ δούλου κατὰ

συμβεβηκός, οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φθειρομένου τοῦ

δούλου σφίζεσθαι τῇ δεσποτείᾳ. ἦ δὲ τέκνων 5

ἀρχῇ καὶ γυναικός [καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης, ἦν δὴ

καλοῦμεν οἰκονομικήν] ἦτοι τῶν ἄρχομένων χάριν

40 ἐστὶν ἡ κοινὸς τινὸς ἀμφοῖν—καθ’ αὐτὸ μὲν τῶν

1279a ἄρχομένων, ἡσπερ ὅρωμεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας,

οίνον ἰατρικήν καὶ γυμναστικήν, κατὰ συμβεβηκός

δὲ καὶ αὐτῶν εἰεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸν παιδο-

τρίβην ἐνα τῶν γυμναζομένων ἐνιοτ’ εἶναι καὶ

αὐτὸν, ἡσπερ δ’ κυβερνήτης εἰς ἐστὶν ἀεὶ τῶν

5 πλωτῆρων· δ’ μὲν ὅσιν παιδοτρίβης ἡ κυβερνήτης

σκοπεῖ τὸ τῶν ἄρχομένων ἀγαθὸν, ὅταν δὲ τούτων

εἰς γένηται καὶ αὐτός, κατὰ συμβεβηκός μετέχει

τῆς ωφελείας, δ’ μὲν γὰρ πλωτήρ, δ’ δὲ τῶν γυμνα-

1 καὶ—πάσης seclusit, ἦν—οἰκονομικὴν suspexit Sussehml.

a Mentioned at 1323 a 22 (and also six times in other books); they are there appealed to for the tripartite classification of foods which in Ethics 1098 b 12 is ascribed to 'current opinion of long standing and generally accepted by students of philosophy.' The term may there predenote doctrines not peculiar to the Peripatetic school.

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is clear that the mass of mankind cling to life at the cost of enduring much suffering, which shows that life contains some measure of well-being and of sweetness in its essential nature.

4 And again, the several recognized varieties of government can easily be defined; in fact we frequently discuss them in our external discourses. The authority of a master over a slave, although in truth when both master and slave are designed by nature for their positions their interests are the same, nevertheless governs in the greater degree with a view to the interest of the master, but incidentally with a view to that of the slave, for if the slave deteriorates the position of the master cannot be saved from injury. Authority over children and wife [and over the whole household, which we call the art of household management] is exercised either in the interest of those ruled or for some common interest of both parties,—essentially, in the interest of the ruled, as we see that the other arts also, like medicine and athletic training, are pursued in the interest of the persons upon whom they are practised, although incidentally they may also be in the interest of the practitioners themselves; for nothing prevents the trainer from being on occasions himself also one of the persons in training, just as the pilot is always a member of the crew; so although the trainer or pilot studies the good of those under his authority, when he himself also becomes one among them he incidentally shares the benefit, for the pilot is a sailor in the ship and the trainer can become one of the persons in training

Varieties of authority in private life.

Aristotle can hardly have written this clause, as it includes mastership over slaves.
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ζοµένων εἰς γίνεται παιδοτρίβησιν ὡν. διὸ καὶ τὰς 6
πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς, ὅταν ἢ κατ’ ἰσότητα τῶν πολιτῶν

10 συνεστηκυῖα καὶ καθ’ ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος
ἀξιοῦσιν ἄρχειν, πρότερον μὲν, ἢ πέφυκεν, ἄξιοῦν-
tες ἐν μέρει λειτουργεῖν, καὶ σκοπεῖν τινὰ πάλιν
τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸν ὡςπερ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἄρχων
ἔσκοπει τὸ ἐκείνου συµφέρον· νῦν δὲ διὰ τὰς

15 ἀρχῆς βούλονται συνεχῶς ἄρχειν, οἶνον εἰ συνεβαινεν
ὑγιαίνειν ἀεὶ τοῖς ἄρχονσι νοσακεροῖς οὖσαι· καὶ
γὰρ ἰν οὕτως ἵσως ἐδίωκον τὰς ἀρχὰς.

Φανερὸν τοῖνυν ὡς ὅσαι μὲν πολιτείας τὸ κοινῆ 7
συµφέρον σκοποῦσιν, αὕται μὲν ὅρθαι τυγχάνουσιν
οὕσα ταύτα κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, ὅσαι δὲ τὸ σφέτερον

20 μόνον τῶν ἄρχοντων, ἡµαρτηµέναι πάσαι καὶ
παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὅρθων πολιτείων· δεσποτικαὶ
gάρ, ἦ δὲ τόλις κοινωνία τῶν ἑλευθέρων ἔστιν.

Διωρισµένων δὲ τούτων ἐχόµενον ἐστὶ τὰς
πολιτείας ἐπισκέψασθαι, πόσαι τῶν ἀριθµῶν καὶ
tίνες εἰσὶ, καὶ πρῶτον τὰς ὅρθὰς αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ

25 αἱ παρεκβάσεις ἔσονται φανερὰ τούτων διορι-
σθεισῶν. Ν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ πολίτευµα

1 σηµαινεῖ ταύτων, πολίτευµα δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν
πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ’ εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἕνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ

τούς πολλοὺς, ὡστε μὲν ὅ εἰς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ

30 πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συµφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας
μὲν ὅρθας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ

πρὸς τὸ ἱδιον ἢ τοῦ ἕνος ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ τοῦ
6 under his own direction. Hence in regard to the political offices also, when the state is constituted on the principle of equality and of similarity between the citizens, these claim to hold office by turn—in earlier times, under the natural system, claiming to do public services in turn, and for somebody in return to look after their own welfare just as previously they looked after his interest when in office themselves; but nowadays owing to the benefits to be got from public sources and from holding office people wish to be in office continuously, just as if it were the case that those in office although sickly people always enjoyed good health—in which case office would no doubt be much run after by invalids.

7 It is clear then that those constitutions that aim at the common advantage are in effect rightly framed in accordance with absolute justice, while those that aim at the rulers' own advantage only are faulty, and are all of them deviations from the right constitutions; for they have an element of despotism, whereas a city is a partnership of free men.

These matters having been determined the next step is to consider how many forms of constitution there are and what they are; and first to study the right forms of constitution, since the deviations will also become manifest when these are defined.

1 V. But inasmuch as 'constitution' means the same as 'government,' and the government is the supreme power in the state, and this must be either a single ruler or a few or the mass of the citizens, in cases when the one or the few or the many govern with an eye to the common interest, these constitutions must necessarily be right ones, while those administered with an eye to the private interest of either the one
πλήθους παρεκβάσεις. ἦ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φατέον εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἦ δέ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος. καλεῖν δὲ εἰώθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν πλειόνων δὲ ἐνὸς ἀριστοκρατίαν (ἡ δὲ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀρχεῖν ἦ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἀριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς), ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύτηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτεῶν, πολιτεία. (συμ-βαίνει δὲ εὐλόγως· ἐνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἦ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δὲ ἦδη χαλεπόν ἕκριβώθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικὴν, αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐν πλῆθει γίγνεται· διότι κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν, καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα.) παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τυραννῶν μὲν βασιλείας ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατία δημοκρατία δὲ πολιτείας· ἦ μὲν γὰρ τυραννώς ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, ἦ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἦ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων, πρὸς δὲ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν οὐδεμία αὐτῶν.

Δεῖ δὲ μικρῶ διὰ μακροτέρων εἰπεῖν τὶς ἑκάστη τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑστίν· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας, τῷ δὲ περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι

1 <μὴ> μετέχοντας Bernays.
or the few or the multitude are deviations. For either we must not say that those who are part of the state are citizens, or those who are part of the state must share in the advantage of membership.

2 Our customary designation for a monarchy that aims at the common advantage is ‘kingship’; for a government of more than one yet only a few ‘aristocracy’ (either because the best men rule or because they rule with a view to what is best for the state and for its members); while when the multitude govern the state with a view to the common advantage, it is called by the name common to all the forms of constitution, ‘constitutional government.’ (And this comes about reasonably, since although it is possible for one man or a few to excel in virtue, when the number is larger it becomes difficult for them to possess perfect excellence in respect of every form of virtue, but they can best excel in military valour, for this is found with numbers; and therefore with this form of constitution the class that fights for the state in war is the most powerful, and it is those who possess arms who are admitted to the government.) Deviations from the constitutions mentioned are tyranny corresponding to kingship, oligarchy to aristocracy, and democracy to constitutional government; for tyranny is monarchy ruling in the interest of the monarch, oligarchy government in the interest of the rich, democracy government in the interest of the poor, and none of these forms governs with regard to the profit of the community.

But it is necessary to say at a little greater length what each of these constitutions is; for the question involves certain difficulties, and it is the special mark of one who studies any subject philo-
καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν
οἰκεῖον ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ παρορᾷν μηδὲ τι καταλείπειν ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἐκαστὸν ἀλλήλων. ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ τυραννικὸν μὲν μοναρχία, καθάπερ εἰρήται, δησποτικὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας, ὁλυγαρχία δ᾽ ὅταν ὥσι κῦριοι τῆς πολιτείας οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες, δημοκρατία δὲ τοῦναντίον ὅταν οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι
πλῆθος οὐσίας ἀλλ᾽ ἀποροί. πρώτῃ δ᾽ ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμόν ἐστὶν. εἰ γὰρ εἶναι οἱ πλείους οίντες εὐποροί κῦριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὅταν ἡ κύριον τὸ πλῆθος, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν κἂν εἴ ποὺ συμβαῖνο1 τοὺς ἀπόρους ἐλάττους μὲν εἰναι τῶν εὐπορῶν κρείττους δ᾽ οὔτας κυρίου εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅπου δ᾽ ὅλγον κῦριον πλῆθος ὁλυγαρχίαν εἰναι φασιν, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς δοξεῖν διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν πολιτεῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἂν εἴ2 τις συνθεῖ τῇ μὲν εὐπορίᾳ τὴν ὁλυγότητα τῇ δ᾽ ἀπορίᾳ τὸ πλῆθος οὐτω προσαγορεύοι τὰς πολιτείας, ὁλυγαρχίαν μὲν ἐν ἡ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν οἱ εὐποροί ὅλγοι τὸ πλῆθος οίντες, δημοκρατίαν δὲ ἐν ἡ οἱ ἀποροί πολλοὶ τὸ πλῆθος οίντες, ἀλλην ἀπορίαν ἔχει. τίνας γὰρ ἐροῦμεν τὰς ἀρτὶ λεχθεῖσας πολιτείας, τὴν ἐν ἡ πλείους οἱ εὐποροὶ καὶ τὴν ἐν3 ἡ ἐλάττους οἱ ἀποροί, κῦριοι δ᾽ ἐκάτεροι τῶν πολιτεῶν, εἴπερ μηδεμία ἀλλή πολιτεία παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστὶν; ἐσκε τοῦν δ λόγος ποιεῖν ἡ δήλον ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅλγους ἡ πολλοὺς εἰναι κυρίους
1 Schneider: συμβαίνει, -η codd.
2 κἂν εἴ Susenmihl: κἂν codd. 3 τὴν ἐν ed.: ἐν codd.

a. i.e. it would be absurd to term government by the people democracy if the people happened to be very rich, or government by a few oligarchy if the few were poor and the many whom they governed rich.

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sophically, and not solely with regard to its practical aspect, that he does not overlook or omit any point, but brings to light the truth about each. Now tyranny, as has been said, is monarchy exerting despotic power over the political community; oligarchy is when the control of the government is in the hands of those that own the properties; democracy is when on the contrary it is in the hands of those that do not possess much property, but are poor. A first difficulty is with regard to the definition. If the majority of the citizens were wealthy and were in control of the state, yet when the multitude is in power it is a democracy, and similarly, to take the other case, if it were to occur somewhere that the poor were fewer than the rich but were stronger than they and accordingly were in control of the government, yet where a small number is in control it is said to be an oligarchy, then it would seem that our definition of the forms of constitution was not a good one. And once again, if one assumed the combination of small numbers with wealth and of multitude with poverty, and named the constitutions thus—one in which the rich being few in number hold the offices, oligarchy: one in which the poor being many in number hold the offices, democracy,—this involves another difficulty. What names are we to give to the constitutions just described—the one in which there are more rich and the one in which the poor are the fewer, and these control their respective governments—if there exists no other form of constitution beside those mentioned? The argument therefore seems to make it clear that for few or many to have power is an accidental feature
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συμβεβηκός ἐστιν, τὸ μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τὸ δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις, διὰ τὸ τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ὀλίγους πολλοὺς δὲ εἶναι τοὺς ἀπόρους πανταχοῦ (διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει τὰς ρήθεισας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφορᾶς), ὃ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἣ τε δημοκρατία καὶ 

1280 a ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων πενία καὶ πλοῦτος ἐστὶν· καὶ ἀναγκαίον μὲν ὅποιν ἂν ἄρχωσι διὰ πλοῦτον, ἂν τ' ἐλάττους ἂν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγ-

αρχίαν, ὅποιν δ' οἱ ἀπόροι, δημοκρατίαν, ἄλλα συμ-

βαίνει, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι 

5 τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς, εὐποροῦσι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγου τῆς δ' 

ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσι πάντες, δι' ἄς αἰτίας ἀμφι-

σβητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας.

Δηπτέον δὲ πρῶτον τῶν ὅρων λέγουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ 

tε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικὸν. πάντες γὰρ 

10 ἀπτοῦται δικαίου τινός, ἄλλα μέχρι τινός προ-

έρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον. 

ὁμοί δοκεῖ θ' οὖν τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ἐστὶν, ἄλλ' οὐ 

πᾶσιν ἄλλα τοῖς ἵσοισ· καὶ τὸ ἁνίσον δοκεῖ δίκαιον 

εἶναι, καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν, ἄλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν ἄλλα τοῖς 

ἀνίσοις· οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ ὅς, καὶ κρίνουσι 

15 κακῶς. τὸ δ' ἀιτίων ὃτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις, 

σχεδόν δ' οἱ πλεῖστοι φαύλοι κριταὶ περὶ τῶν 

οἰκείων. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τισὶν, καὶ δι- 

ἡρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων 

1 τὸ ὅσον δίκαιον Victorius.
of oligarchies in the one case and democracies in the other, due to the fact that the rich are few and the poor are many everywhere (so that it is not really the case that the points mentioned constitute a specific difference), but that the real thing in which democracy and oligarchy differ from each other is poverty and wealth; and it necessarily follows that wherever the rulers owe their power to wealth, whether they be a minority or a majority, this is an oligarchy, and when the poor rule, it is a democracy, although it does accidentally happen, as we said, that where the rulers hold power by wealth they are few and where they hold power by poverty they are many, because few men are rich but all men possess freedom, and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the two classes lay claim to the government.

8 And first we must ascertain what are stated to be the determining qualities of oligarchy and democracy, and what is the principle of justice under the one form of government and under the other. For all men lay hold on justice of some sort, but they only advance to a certain point, and do not express the principle of absolute justice in its entirety. For instance, it is thought that justice is equality, and so it is, though not for everybody but only for those who are equals; and it is thought that inequality is just, for so indeed it is, though not for everybody, but for those who are unequal; but these partisans strip away the qualification of the persons concerned, and judge badly. And the cause of this is that they are themselves concerned in the decision, and perhaps most men are bad judges when their own interests are in question. Hence inasmuch as 'just' means just for certain persons, and it is divided in the same way in relation to the
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1280 a

cαὶ οἶς, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς, τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἴσοτητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν 20 δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, μάλιστα μὲν διὰ τὸ λεχθὲν ἄρτι, διότι κρίνουσι τὰ περὶ αὐτούς κακῶς, ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τινὸς ἐκατέρους δίκαιον τι νομίζουσι1 δίκαιον λέγειν ἀπλῶς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν κατὰ τὶ ἀνισοὶ ὡσιν, οἰον χρήμασιν, ὅλως οἰ- ονται ἀνισοὶ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἂν κατὰ τὶ ἵσοι, οἰον ἑλευ- 25 θέρια,2 ὅλως ἵσοι. τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον οὐ λέγουσιν. 10 εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτημάτων χάριν ἐκοινωνησαν καὶ συνήλθον, τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι τῆς πόλεως ὅσον- περ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, ὡσθ' ὃ τῶν ὀλυγαρχικῶν λόγος δόξειν ἂν ἰσχύειν (οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἵσον μετέχειν τῶν ἐκατὸν μνῶν) τὸν εἰσενέγ- 80 καντα μίας μνᾶς τῷ δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἁρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγυμνόμενων. εἰ δὲ μῆτε τοῦ ζήν μόνον ἐνεκέν αλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ εὗ ζῆν (καὶ γὰρ ἂν δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἂν πόλις, νῦν δ' οὐκ ἐστι διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐθαμονίας μηδὲ τοῦ ζήν κατὰ προαίρεσιν), μῆτε συμμαχίας ἐνεκέν ὅπως ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικώντας, μῆτε διὰ τᾶς

1 νομίζουσι (τὸ) Spengel.
2 Sepulveda: ἑλεύθεροι, ἑλευθέρωι codd.
3 ἐκατὸν ταλαντῶν Γ.

b Sec 1268 b 14 n.; or read '100 talents,' say £24,000 (gold).

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things to be distributed and the persons that receive them, as has been said before in *Ethics,* the two parties agree as to what constitutes equality in the thing, but dispute as to what constitutes equality in the person, chiefly for the reason just now stated, because men are bad judges where they themselves are concerned, but also, inasmuch as both parties put forward a plea that is just up to a certain point, they think that what they say is absolutely just. For the one side think that if they are unequal in some respects, for instance in wealth, they are entirely unequal, and the other side think that if they are equal in some respects, for instance in freedom, they are entirely equal. But the most important thing they do not mention. If men formed the community and came together for the sake of wealth, their share in the state is proportionate to their share in the property, so that the argument of the champions of oligarchy would appear to be valid—namely that in a partnership with a capital of 100 minae it would not be just for the man who contributed one mina to have a share whether of the principal or of the profits accruing equal to the share of the man who supplied the whole of the remainder; but if on the other hand the state was formed not for the sake of life only but rather for the good life (for otherwise a collection of slaves or of lower animals would be a state, but as it is, it is not a state, because slaves and animals have no share in well-being or in purposive life), and if its object is not military alliance for defence against injury by anybody, and it does not exist for the

See 1260 a 12, and *N.E.* x. vi., 1177 a 8, 'but no one allows a slave any measure of happiness, any more than a life of his own.'
1280 a ἀλλαγάς καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καὶ γὰρ ἂν Ἀρυττηνοὶ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ πάντες οίς ἐστὶ σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὡς μιᾶς ἂν πολλαὶ πόλεως ἥσαν· εἰσὶ γοῦν αὐτῶς συνθῆκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγῶν καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας· ἀλλ' οὔτε ἀρχαὶ πάσιν επὶ τούτωι κοιναὶ καθεστάσιν, ἀλλ' ἐτεραὶ παρ' ἐκατέρως, οὔτε τοῦ ποίους τινὰς εἰναι δει φροντίζουσιν ἀτεροί τους ἐτέρους, οὔτ' ὅτις μηδεὶς ἄδικος ἐσται τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθῆκας μηδὲ μο- χθηρίαν ἔξει μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτις μηδὲν ἄδικησουσιν ἀλλήλους. περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς διασκοποῦσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας. ἃ καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι δει περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖ εἰναι τῇ γ' ὅσ ἀληθῶς ὀνομαζομένη πόλει, μὴ λόγου χάριν· γίνεται γὰρ ἡ κοινωνία συμμαχία, τῶν ἀλλων1 τόπω διαφέρουσα μόνον τῶν ἀποδεχεῖ συμ- μάχων.2 καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθῆκη καὶ, καθάπερ ἐφη λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιτῆς, ἐγνωρίσει ἀλλήλους τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷς ποιεῖν ἁγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας. ὅτι δὲ τούτων ἔχει τὸν τρόπον 12 φανερόν. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ συναγάγω τοὺς τόπους εἰς ἐν, ὡστε ἀπεπεθανεῖ τῇ Μεγαρέωι πόλιν καὶ 15 Κορυθέωι τοῖς τείχεσιν, ὃμως οὐ μία πόλις· οὔτ' εἰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπιγαμίας ποιήσαντο, καίτοι τοῦτο τῶν ἴδιων ταῖς πόλεσι κοινωνημάτων ἔστιν.

1 τῶν ἀλλών: ἀλλος? Immisch.  
2 συμμαχίων Conring.

a The sentence here breaks off; the inference that should have formed its conclusion is given in § 15.  
b Probably a pupil of Gorgias, see 1275 b 26 n.

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POLITICS, III. v. 10-12

sake of trade and of business relations—a—for if so, Etruscans and Carthaginians and all the people that have commercial relations with one another would be virtually citizens of a single state; at all events they have agreements about imports and covenants as to abstaining from dishonesty and treaties of alliance for mutual defence; but they do not have officials common to them all appointed to enforce these covenants, but different officials with either party, nor yet does either party take any concern as to the proper moral character of the other, nor attempt to secure that nobody in the states under the covenant shall be dishonest or in any way immoral, but only that they shall not commit any wrong against each other. All those on the other hand who are concerned about good government do take civic virtue and vice into their purview. Thus it is also clear that any state that is truly so called and is not a state merely in name must pay attention to virtue; for otherwise the community becomes merely an alliance, differing only in locality from the other alliances, those of allies that live apart. And the law is a covenant or, in the phrase of the sophist Lycophron, a guarantee of men's just claims on one another, but it is not designed to make the citizens virtuous and just. And that this is how the matter stands is manifest. For if one were actually to bring the sites of two cities together into one, so that the city-walls of Megara and those of Corinth were contiguous, even so they would not be one city; nor would they if they enacted rights of intermarriage with each other, although intermarriage between citizens is one of the elements of community which are characteristic of states. And similarly even if certain
1280 b

όμοίως δ' οὐδ' εἰ τινες οἰκοῖεν χωρίς μὲν, μὴ μὲντοι τοσοῦτον ἀποθεν ὡστε μὴ κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλ' εὑρον αὐτοῖς νόμοι τοῦ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν

20 περὶ τὰς μεταδόσεις—οἶον εἰ ὁ μὲν εἰη τέκτων ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς ὁ δὲ σκυτοτόμος ὁ δ' ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον—, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰεν μυρίοι, μὴ μὲντοι κοινωνοῦεν ἀλλον μηδενὸς ἦ τῶν τοιοῦτων οἰον ἄλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας, οὐδ' οὕτω ποι τόλις. διὰ τίνα δὴ 13 ποτ' αἰτίαν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς

25 κοινωνίας: εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνελθοῦει οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες (ἐκαστος μὲντοι χρῆτο τῇ ἰδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὡσπερ πόλει) καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπιμαχίας οὕση βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας μόνον, οὐδ' οὕτως ἄν εἶναι δόξει τοῖς τοῖς ἁκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν, εἰπερ ὀμοίως ὁμιλοῦεν συνελθοῦντες καὶ χωρίς.

30 φανερον τοῖνυν ὅτι ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν εἰπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπ' αρχῶν τοῦτων ἀπάντων ἑδη πόλις, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὐ ζήν κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν,

35 ζωῆς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους. οὐκ ἔσται 14 μὲντοι τούτο μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα κατοικοῦντων τόπου καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίαις: διὸ κηδεῖα τ' ἐγένοντο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φρατρίαι καὶ θυσίαι καὶ διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας

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people lived in separate places yet not so far apart as not to have intercourse, but had laws to prevent their wronging one another in their interchange of products—for instance, if one man were a carpenter, another a farmer, another a shoemaker and another something else of the kind,—and the whole population numbered ten thousand, but nevertheless they had no mutual dealings in anything else except such things as exchange of commodities and military alliance, even then this would still not be a state. What then exactly is the reason for this? For clearly it is not because their intercourse is from a distance; since even if they came together for intercourse of this sort (each nevertheless using his individual house as a city) and for one another’s military aid against wrongful aggressors only, as under a defensive alliance, not even then would they seem to those who consider the matter carefully to constitute a state, if they associated on the same footing when they came together as they did when they were apart. It is manifest therefore that a state is not merely the sharing of a common locality for the purpose of preventing mutual injury and exchanging goods. These are necessary pre-conditions of a state’s existence, yet nevertheless, even if all these conditions are present, that does not therefore make a state, but a state is a partnership of families and of clans in living well, and its object is a full and independent life. At the same time this will not be realized unless the partners do inhabit one and the same locality and practise intermarriage; this indeed is the reason why family relationships have arisen throughout the states, and brotherhoods and clubs for sacrificial rites and social recreations. But such organization is pro-
1280 b

ἐργον, ἢ γὰρ τοῦ συζήν προαιρεσις φιλία: τέλος
Μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὐ ζήν, ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους

1281 a χάριν. πόλις δὲ ἡ γενών καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία
ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκουσ; τούτο δ’ ἐστίν, ὡς
φαμέν, τὸ ζήν εὐδαιμονίας καὶ καλῶς: τῶν καλῶν
ἀρα πράξεων χάριν θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν
κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ συζήν: διόπερ ὁσοι συμ- λέβονται πλείστον εἰς τὴν τουαύτην κοινωνίαν,
τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλείον ἢ τοῖς κατὰ
μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ᾧσιν ἡ μείζον κατὰ δὲ
τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίσοις, ἡ τοῖς κατὰ πλουτὸν
ὑπερέχουσι κατ’ ἀρετὴν δ’ ὑπερεχομένοις.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν πάντες οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν

ἀμφισβητοῦντες μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου λέγουσιν,
φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

VI. Ἔχει δ’ ἀπορίαν τι δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς 1
πόλεως. ἡ γὰρ τού τὸ πλῆθος, ἡ τοὺς πλουσίους,
ἡ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς, ἡ τὸν βέλτιστον ἕνα πάντων, ἡ
tύραννον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκο-

15 λίαιν. τί γάρ; ἄν οἱ πένητες διὰ τὸ πλείους εἶναι
dιανέμωνται τὰ τῶν πλουσίων, τούτ’ οὐκ ἀδικόν
ἐστιν: ἐδοξε γὰρ νῆ Δία τῷ κυρίῳ δικαίως. τὴν
οὖν ἀδικίαν τί χρή λέγειν τὴν ἐσχάτην; πάλιν τε,
πάντων ληφθέντων, οἱ πλείους τὰ τῶν ἐλαττώνων
ἀν διανέμωνται, φανερὸν ὅτι φθείρουσι τὴν πόλιν.

20 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἡ γ’ ἀρετῆ φθέιρει τὸ ἐχον αὐτὴν,
οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν, ὥστε δῆλον
ὅτι καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον οὐχ οἶόν τ’ εἶναι δίκαιον.

1 αὐτάρκους <χάριν> Scaliger.
2 πράξεων om. ГМp1.
duced by the feeling of friendship, for friendship is
the motive of social life; therefore, while the object
of a state is the good life, these things are means to
that end. And a state is the partnership of clans and
villages in a full and independent life, which in our
view constitutes a happy and noble life; the political
fellowship must therefore be deemed to exist for
the sake of noble actions, not merely for living in
common. Hence those who contribute most to such
fellowship have a larger part in the state than those
who are their equals or superiors in freedom and birth
but not their equals in civic virtue, or than those who
surpass them in wealth but are surpassed by them
in virtue.

It is therefore clear from what has been said that
all those who dispute about the forms of constitution
assert a part of the just principle.

VI. But it is a matter of question what ought to be
the sovereign power in the state. Clearly it must
be either the multitude, or the rich, or the good, or
the one man who is best of all, or a tyrant. But all
of these arrangements appear to involve disagree-
able consequences. For instance, if the poor take
advantage of their greater numbers to divide up the
property of the rich, is not this unjust? No, it may
be said, for it was a resolution made by the supreme
authority in just form. Then what must be pro-
nounced to be the extreme of injustice? And again,
when everybody is taken into account, suppose the
majority share out among themselves the property
of the minority, it is manifest that they are destroy-
ing the state; but assuredly virtue does not destroy
its possessor, and justice is not destructive of the
state, so that it is clear that this principle also cannot
1281a ἐτι καὶ τὰς πράξεις ὁσαὶ δὲ τύραννος ἔπραξεν ἄναγκαιον εἶναι πάσας δικαιὰς, βιάζεται γὰρ ἂν κρείττων, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τοὺς πλουσίους. 25 ἀλλ᾽ ἀρα τοὺς ἐλάττους δίκαιον ἀρχεῖν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους; ἃν οὖν κάκεινοι ταῦτα ποιῶσι καὶ διαρπάζωσι καὶ ἀφαιρῶνται τὰ κτήματα¹ τοῦ πλῆθους, τοῦτο ἐστὶ δίκαιον; καὶ θάτερον ἀρα. ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς ὁτι πάντα φαύλα καὶ οὐ δίκαια φανερῶν. ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἀρχεῖν δεῖ καὶ κυρίους 30 εἶναι πάντων; οὐκόν ἂναγκή τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους εἶναι πάντας, μὴ τιμωμένους ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς· τιμᾶς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς, ἀρχόντων δὲ αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἄναγκαιον εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους. ἀλλ᾽ ἐνα τῶν σπουδαίωτατον ἀρχεῖν βέλτιον; ἀλλ᾽ ἐτι τούτο ὀλιγαρχικῶτερον, οἷ γὰρ ἄτιμοι πλείους. ἀλλ᾽ ἱσος φαίη τις ἂν τὸ κύριον ὅλως ἀνθρωπον εἶναι ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαύλον, ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἃν οὖν ἢ νόμος μὲν ὀλιγαρχικὸς δὲ ἢ δημοκρατικός, τί διοίσει περὶ τῶν ἡπορημένων; συμβήσεται γὰρ ὅμως τὰ λεγέντα πρότερον. 35 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἐστώ τις ἐτερος λόγος· ὅτι δὲ δεὶ κύριον εἶναι μάλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους μὲν ὀλίγους δε, δόξειν ἂν λέγεθαι καὶ τω ἐχειν ἀπορίαν, τάχα δὲ κἂν ἀλήθειαν. τοὺς γὰρ πολλούς, ἢν ἀκαστός ἐστιν οὐ σπουδαίος ἀνήρ, ὅμως εἰνέχεται συνελθόντας εἶναι βελτίους

¹ Richards: tα κτήματα ἀφαιρώντας.codd.  
² ἀν εὗ λέγεσθαι Richards.  
³ ἀπολογίαν Wilamowitz.

a Technical term for disfranchisement and loss of civic rights.
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It follows from it that all the actions done by a tyrant are just, for his use of force is based upon superior strength, as is the compulsion exerted by the multitude against the rich. But is it just that the minority and the rich should rule? Suppose therefore they also act in the same way and plunder and take away the property of the multitude, is this just? If it is, so also is the plunder of the rich by the multitude. It is clear therefore that all these things are bad and not just. But ought the good to rule, and be in control of all classes? If so, then it follows that all the other classes will be dishonoured, if they are not honoured by holding the offices of government; for we speak of offices as honours, and if the same persons are always in office the rest must necessarily be excluded from honour. But is it better for the most virtuous individual to be the ruler? But that is still more oligarchical, for the people excluded from honour will be more numerous. But perhaps some one would say that in any case it is a bad thing for a human being, having in his soul the passions that are the attributes of humanity, to be sovereign, and not the law. Suppose therefore that law is sovereign, but law of an oligarchic or democratic nature, what difference will it make as regards the difficulties that have been raised? For the results described before will come about just the same.

Most of these points therefore must be discussed on another occasion; but the view that it is more proper for the multitude to be sovereign than the few of greatest virtue might be thought to be explicable, and to raise some difficulty but probably to be true. For it is possible that the many, though not individually good men, yet when they come
ARISTOTLE.

1281 b  

ἐκείνων οὖν ὃς ἕκαστον ἀλλ' ὃς σύμπαντας, οὗν τὰ συμφορητὰ δεῖπνα τῶν ἐκ μιᾶς δαπάνης χορηγηθέντων πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἕκαστον μόριον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντας ὅσπερ ἕναν ἀνθρώπου τὸ πλῆθος πολύποδα καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλᾶς ἔχοντ' αἰσθήσεις, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἥθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ καὶ κρίνονσιν ἄμεινον οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰ τῆς μούσικῆς ἔργα καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀλλοι γὰρ ἄλλο τι μόριον, πάντα δὲ πάντες. ἀλλὰ τούτω διαφέρουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκάστου τῶν πολλῶν, ὅσπερ καὶ τῶν μη καλῶν τοὺς καλοὺς φασὶ καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῷ συνήχθαι τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρὶς εἰς ἐν, ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε κάλλιον ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τούτι μὲν τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐτέρου δὲ τινος ἐτερον μόριον. εἰ μὲν οὖν περὶ πάντα δήμον καὶ δὲ πάν πλῆθος ἐνδεχεται ταύτην εἶναι τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὀλίγους σπουδαίους, ἄδηλον, ίσως δὲ νη Δία δήλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον—ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἀρμόσειε λόγος, καίτοι τὶ διαφέρουσιν ἐνιοί τῶν θηρίων ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν;—ἀλλὰ περὶ τι πλῆθος οὐδὲν εἶναι κωλύει τὸ λεχθὲν ἀληθές. διὸ καὶ τὴν πρότερον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν λύσειν ἂν τις διὰ

1 καὶ ὅσπερ γίνεσθαι συνελθεῖν οἶον ἔνα Richards.
2 ἐκάστοι Thurot.

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together may be better, not individually but collectively, than those who are so, just as public dinners to which many contribute are better than those supplied at one man's cost; for where there are many, each individual, it may be argued, has some portion of virtue and wisdom, and when they have come together, just as the multitude becomes a single man with many feet and many hands and many senses, so also it becomes one personality as regards the moral and intellectual faculties. This is why the general public is a better judge of the works of music and those of the poets, because different men can judge a different part of the performance, and all of them all of it. But the superiority of good men over the mass of men individually, like that of handsome men, so it is said, over plain men and of the works of the painter's art over the real objects, really consists in this, that a number of scattered good points have been collected together into one example; since if the features be taken separately, the eye of one real person is more beautiful than that of the man in the picture, and some other feature of somebody else. It is not indeed clear whether this collective superiority of the many compared with the few good men can possibly exist in regard to every democracy and every multitude, and perhaps it may be urged that it is manifestly impossible in the case of some—for the same argument would also apply to animals, yet what difference is there, practically, between some multitudes and animals?—but nothing prevents what has been said from being true about some particular multitude. One might therefore employ these considerations to solve not only the previously stated
1281 b
tούτων καὶ τὴν ἐχομένην αὐτῆς, τίνων δὲ κυρίως εἶναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν
(τοιοῦτοι δ’ εἰσίν ὅσοι μήτε πλοῦσιοι μήτε ἀξίωμα ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς μηδέν). τὸ μὲν γὰρ μετέχειν
αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἄσφαλες (διὰ τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ δ’ ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν
ἀδικεῖν ἀνάγκη τὰ δ’ ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτούς), τὸ δὲ
μὴ μεταδίδοναι μηδὲ μετέχειν φοβερὸν ὅταν γὰρ
ἀτμοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ πένητες ὑπάρχωσι, πολεμίων
ἀναγκαίον εἶναι πληρῆ τὴν πόλιν ταύτην. λείτεται
δὴ τοῦ βουλευόμεθα καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτούς.
διόπερ καὶ Σόλων καὶ τῶν ἀλλων τινὸς νομοθετῶν 7
τάττουσι ἐπὶ τὲ τὰς ἀρχαίρεσις καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας
tῶν ἀρχιτων, ἀρχεῖν δὲ κατὰ μόνας οὐκ ἔως.
πάντες μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσι συνελθόντες ἰκανήν αἰσθησιν,
καὶ μιγνύμενοι τοῖς βελτίωσι τὰς πόλεις ὦφελοῦσιν,
καθάπερ ἡ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφή μετὰ τῆς καθαρᾶς
tὴν πᾶσαν ποιεῖ χρησιμωτέραν τῆς ὀλιγῆς· χωρίς
d’ ἐκαστὸς ἀτελῆς περὶ τὸ κρινεῖν ἐστὶν. ἔχειν 8
d’ ἡ τάξις αὐτῆ τῆς πολιτείας ἀπορίαν πρῶτην
μὲν ὅτι δόξειν ἃν τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ κρῖναι τῆς
όρθως ἰατρεύκεν ὅπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεύσαι καὶ
ποιῆσαι νῦνα τὸν κάμνοντα τῆς νόσου τῆς παρούσης,
οὕτος δ’ ἐστὶν ἰατρός· οἷοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ
tὰς ἀλλὰς ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. ὥσπερ οὖν ἰατρὸν
dεῖ διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἰατροῖς, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς

1 ἀνάγκη Rassow: ἂν codd.
2 ἐπὶ τε «ταύτα αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ» Wilamowitz.

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a Probably words meaning ‘these functions and to’ have fallen out.
b i.e., especially, bran mixed with pure flour.
POLITICS, III. vi. 6-8

difficulty but also the related question, over what matters is the authority of the freemen, the mass of the citizens, to extend (using that expression to denote those who are not rich nor possessed of any distinguishing excellence at all)? For it is not safe for them to participate in the highest offices (for injustice and folly would inevitably cause them to act unjustly in some things and to make mistakes in others), but yet not to admit them and for them not to participate is an alarming situation, for when there are a number of persons without political honours and in poverty, the city then is bound to be full of enemies. It remains therefore for them to share the deliberative and judicial functions. For this reason Solon and certain other lawgivers appoint the common citizens to the election of the magistrates and the function of calling them to audit, although they do not allow them to hold office singly. For all when assembled together have sufficient discernment, and by mingling with the better class are of benefit to the state, just as impure food mixed with what is pure makes the whole more nourishing than the small amount of pure food alone; but separately the individual is immature in judgement. This arrangement of the constitution is however open to question in the first place on the ground that it might be held that the best man to judge which physician has given the right treatment is the man that is himself capable of treating and curing the patient of his present disease, and this is the man who is himself a physician; and that this is the case similarly with regard to the other arts and crafts. Hence just as a court of physicians must judge the work of a physician, so also all other practitioners ought to be called
άλλους ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίους. ἰατρὸς δ’ ὅ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος
5 περὶ τὴν τέχνην (εἰσὶ γὰρ τινὲς τοιοῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὡς εἶπεῖν τὰς τέχνας, ἀποδίδομεν δὲ τὸ
κρίνειν οὐδὲν ἢττον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς εἰδόσιν). ἔπειτα καὶ περὶ τὴν αἴρεσιν τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν 9
δοξεῖν ἐχεῖν τρόπον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐλέσθαι ὅρθως
tῶν εἰδότων ἐργον ἐστίν, οἶνον γεωμέτρησεν τε τῶν
10 γεωμετρικῶν καὶ κυβερνήτην τῶν κυβερνητικῶν·
eἰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἐνίον ἐργον καὶ τεχνῶν μετέχουσι
καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τινές, ἀλλ’ οὖ τι τῶν εἰδότων γε
μάλλον. ὅστε κατὰ μὲν τούτον τὸν λόγον οὐκ
ἂν εἰθ’ τὸ πλῆθος ποιητέων κύριον οὔτε τῶν ἀρχ-
aíresiών οὔτε τῶν εὐθυνών. ἀλλ’ ἵππος οὐ πάντα 10
15 ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς διὰ τε τὸν πάλαι λόγον, ἂν
ἡ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδώδες (ἐσται γὰρ
ἐκαστὸς μὲν χεῖρων κρίτης τῶν εἰδότων, ἀπαντεῖ
δὲ συνελθόντες ἢ βελτίωσι ἢ οὐ χειροὺς), καὶ ὅτι
περὶ ἐνίον οὔτε μόνον ὁ ποιήσας οὔτ’ ἀριστ’ ἂν
κρίνειν, ὅσων τάργα γεγνώσκουσι καὶ οἶ μή
20 ἔχοντες τὴν τέχνην, οἰνοὶ οἰκίαν οὐ μόνον ἄστι
gnώναι τοῦ ποιῆσαις, ἀλλὰ καὶ βελτίων ὁ χρώ-
μενος αὐτῇ κρινεῖ (χρῆται δ’ ὁ ὀἰκονόμος), καὶ
πηδάλιον κυβερνήτης τέκτονος, καὶ θαύμην ὁ δαίτυ-
μών ἀλλ’ οὖχ ὁ μάγειρος.
Ταῦτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν τάχα δοξεῖ τις ἂν

a See § 4.
to account before their fellows. But 'physician' means both the ordinary practitioner, and the master of the craft, and thirdly, the man who has studied medicine as part of his general education (for in almost all the arts there are some such students, and we assign the right of judgement just as much to cultivated amateurs as to experts). Further the same might be thought to hold good also of the election of officials, for to elect rightly is a task for experts—for example, it is for experts in the science of mensuration to elect a land-surveyor and for experts in navigation to choose a pilot; for even though in some occupations and arts some laymen also have a voice in appointments, yet they certainly do not have more voice than the experts. Hence according to this argument the masses should not be put in control over either the election of magistrates or their audit. But perhaps this statement is not entirely correct, both for the reason stated above, in case the populace is not of too slavish a character (for although each individual separately will be a worse judge than the experts, the whole of them assembled together will be better or at least as good judges), and also because about some things the man who made them would not be the only nor the best judge, in the case of professionals whose products come within the knowledge of laymen also: to judge a house, for instance, does not belong only to the man who built it, but in fact the man who uses the house (that is, the householder) will be an even better judge of it, and a steersman judges a rudder better than a carpenter, and the diner judges a banquet better than the cook.

This difficulty then might perhaps be thought to be
οὗτω λύειν ἰκανός. ἀλλὰ δ’ ἐστὶν ἐχομένη ταύτης. 11

25 δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀτοπον εἶναι τὸ μειζόνων εἶναι κυρίους
tοὺς φαύλους τῶν ἐπιεικῶν, αἱ δὲ εὐθύναι καὶ αἱ
tῶν ἀρχῶν αἱρέσεις εἰσὶν μέγιστον, ὡς ἐν ἐνίασ
πολυτειαῖς, ὡσπερ εὑρηται, τοὺς δήμους ἀποδίδοσιν,
ἡ γὰρ ἐκκλησία κυρία πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἔστιν.

καίτοι τῆς μὲν ἐκκλησίας μετέχουσι καὶ βουλεύουσι
καὶ δικαίουσιν ἀπὸ μικρῶν τιμημάτων καὶ τῆς
tυχούσης ἕλκιας, ταμείουσι δὲ καὶ στρατηγοῦσι
καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχὰς ἀρχουσιν ἀπὸ μεγάλων.
ὅμως δὴ τις ὁμονόμασα καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν— 12

ἐσσις γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ταύτ’ ὀρθῶς, οὐ γὰρ ὁ δικαστὴς

35 οὐδ’ ὁ βουλευτὴς οὐδ’ ὁ ἐκκλησιαστὴς ἀρχῶν ἔστιν,
ἀλλὰ τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἡ βουλή καὶ ὁ δήμος,
tῶν δὲ ῥηθέντων ἐκαστὸς μόριον ἔστι τούτων
(λέγω δὲ μόριον1 τὸν βουλευτὴν καὶ τὸν ἐκκλησια-
στήν καὶ τὸν δικαστήν). ὡστε δικαίως κύριον μει-
ζόνων τὸ πλῆθος, ἐκ γὰρ πολλῶν ὁ δήμος καὶ ἡ

36 βουλή καὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ
πλείον τὸ πάντων τούτων ἡ τὸ τῶν καθ’ ἐνα καὶ
κατ’ ὀλίγους μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχόντων.

1282 b  Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν διωρίσσω τούτον τὸν τρόπον. ἡ 13
δὲ πρώτη λεχθείσα ἀπορία ποιεῖ φανερὸν οὐδὲν
οὕτως ἔπερον ὡς ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυρίους
κειμένους ὀρθῶς, τὸν ἀρχοῦτα δὲ, ἂν τε εἰς ἂν τε
πλείους ὅσι, περὶ τούτων εἶναι κυρίους περὶ

5 ὁσιῶν ἐξαδυνατοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ
τὸ μὴ ράδιον εἶναι καθόλου δηλώσαι περὶ πάντων.

1 [μόριον] : Richards.

* Viz. that under any plan some hardships will result, § 1.

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11 satisfactorily solved in this way. But there is another one connected with it: it is thought to be absurd that the base should be in control over more important matters than the respectable; but the audits and elections of magistrates are a very important matter, yet in some constitutions, as has been said, they are assigned to the common people, for all such matters are under the control of the assembly, yet persons of a low property-assessment and of any age take part in the assembly and the council and sit on juries, whereas treasury officials, generals and the holders of the highest magistracies are drawn from among persons of large property. Now this difficulty also may be solved in a similar way; for perhaps these regulations also are sound, since it is not the individual juryman or councillor or member of the assembly in whom authority rests, but the court, the council and the people, while each of the individuals named (I mean the councillor, the members of assembly and the juryman) is a part of those bodies. Hence justly the multitude is sovereign in greater matters, for the popular assembly, the council and the jury-court are formed of a number of people, and also the assessed property of all these members collectively is more than that of the magistrates holding great offices individually or in small groups.

12 Let these points therefore be decided in this manner. But the difficulty first mentioned proves nothing else so clearly as that it is proper for the laws when rightly laid down to be sovereign, while the ruler or rulers in office should have supreme powers over matters as to which the laws are quite unable to pronounce with precision because of the difficulty of making a general rule to cover all cases. We have
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οποίουσ μέντοι τινάς εἶναι δεὶ τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδὲν πω ἐλθον, ἀλλ' ἐτι μένει τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν· ἀμά γὰρ καὶ ὀμοίως ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπον- 

dαιόνος εἶναι καὶ δικαίους ἢ ἀδίκους (πλὴν τοῦτο γε φανερόν, ὅτι δεὶ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κείσθαι 
tους νόμους): ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, δὴλον ὅτι τους 

mὲν κατὰ τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι 
dικαίους τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς παρεκβεβηκυῖας οὐ 
dικαίους.

VII. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις 1 

cαὶ τέχναις ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ 

cάλιστα ἐν τῇ κυριωτάτῃ πασσών, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ 

politikή δύναμις, ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ2 πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν 

tο δίκαιον, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κοινή συμφέρων, δοκεῖ 

δὴ3 πᾶσιν ἵσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ μέχρι γε 

tων ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις ἐν 

οἷς διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν· τι γὰρ καὶ τις τὸ 

dίκαιον, καὶ δεῖν τοῖς ἵσοις ἵσον εἶναι φασιν. 

ποιῶν δ' ἴσωτης ἐστὶ καὶ ποιῶν ἁγιότης δεῖ μὴ 

λανθάνειν· ἄχει γὰρ τοῦτο ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν 

πολιτικήν. ἱσος γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις κατὰ παντὸς 2 

ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθὸν δεῖν ἁγιος νενεμίσθαι τὰς ἀρ- 

χὰς, εἰ1 πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ μηδὲν διαφέροιεν ἀλλ' 

1 ἀμα Bernays: ἀλλὰ codd., ἀλλὰ γὰρ ... ἀδίκουs post 12 
nόμουs Congreve.

2 δὲ τὸ Susemihl: δὲ codd.

3 δὴ Immisch: δὲ codd.

4 εἰ <καῖ> ? ed.

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a See 1281 a 36.

b Probably this clause should stand after the next, 'though 
—constitution' (which will be a parenthesis), and should run 
'but <the difficulty is there> for necessarily—states.'

c The usual rendering is 'perverted,' but the Greek term 
is more neutral.

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not however yet ascertained at all what particular character a code of laws correctly laid down ought to possess, but the difficulty raised at the start still remains; for necessarily the laws are good or bad, just or unjust, simultaneously with and similarly to the constitutions of states (though of course it is obvious that the laws are bound to be adapted to the constitution); yet if so, it is clear that the laws in conformity with the correct constitutions must necessarily be just and those in conformity with the divergent forms of constitution unjust.

VII. And inasmuch as in all the sciences and arts the End is a good, and the greatest good and good in the highest degree in the most authoritative of all, which is the political faculty, and the good in the political field, that is, the general advantage, is justice, it is therefore thought by all men that justice is some sort of equality, and up to a certain point at all events they agree with the philosophical discourses in which conclusions have been reached about questions of ethics; for justice is a quality of a thing in relation to persons, and they hold that for persons that are equal the thing must be equal. But equality in what characteristics does this mean, and inequality in what? This must be made clear, since this too raises a difficulty, and calls for political philosophy. For perhaps someone might say that the offices of state ought to be distributed unequally according to superiority in every good quality, even if the candidates in all other respects did not differ.

Claims to power are birth, wealth, freedom, and above all virtue;

a What follows is a summary of Nicomachean Ethics, I. cc. i., ii.  

See also N.E. V. c. iii.  

1 Literally, 'the just is (a just) something and (something just) for somebody.'
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\[1282\text{b}\]

\[\ddote\text{mos} \text{tυχάνονεν} \text{όντες}. \text{τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν}^1 \text{έτερον} \text{εἶναι} \text{τὸ δίκαιον} \text{καὶ τὸ κατ'} \text{άξιαν}. \text{ἀλλὰ μὴν} \text{εἰ} \text{τοῦτ'} \text{άληθές}, \text{ἔσται} \text{καὶ κατὰ} \text{χρώμα} \text{καὶ} \text{κατὰ} \text{μέγεθος} \text{καὶ καθ'} \text{ότιοῦν} \text{τῶν} \text{ἀγαθῶν} \text{πλεον-}

\[30\]

\[\text{εξία} \text{τις} \text{τῶν} \text{πολιτικῶν} \text{δικαίων} \text{τοῖς} \text{ὑπερέχουσιν}. \text{ἡ} \text{τούτο} \text{ἐπιτόλαιον} \text{τὸ} \text{ψεῦδος}; \text{φανερὸν} \text{δ'} \text{ἐπὶ} \text{τῶν} \text{ἀλλων} \text{ἐπιστημῶν} \text{καὶ} \text{δυνάμεων} \text{τῶν} \text{γὰρ} \text{όμοιων} \text{άιλητῶν} \text{τὴν} \text{téχνην} \text{οὗ} \text{δοτέου} \text{πλεονεξίαν} \text{τῶν} \text{αὐλών} \text{τοῖς} \text{εὐγενεστέροις}. \text{οὔδὲν} \text{γὰρ} \text{αὐλήσουσι} \text{βέλτιον}, \text{δεὶ} \text{δὲ} \text{τῷ} \text{κατά} \text{τὸ} \text{ἐργον} \text{ὑπερέχοντι} \text{διδόναι} \text{kαὶ} \text{τῶν} \text{οργάνων} \text{τὴν} \text{ὑπεροχήν}. \text{εἰ} \text{δὲ} \text{μήπω} \text{δὴλον} \text{τὸ} \text{λεγόμενον}, \text{ἐπὶ} \text{μᾶλλον} \text{αὐτὸ} \text{προαγαγοῦσι} \text{ἔσται} \text{φανερὸν}. \text{εἰ} \text{γὰρ} \text{εἰ} \text{τις} \text{ὑπερέχουσι} \text{μὲν} \text{κατὰ} \text{τὴν} \text{άιλητικὴν} \text{πολυ} \text{δ'} \text{ἐλλειπὼν} \text{κατ'} \text{εὐγενείαν} \text{ἡ} \text{κάλ-}

\[35\]


\[1283\text{a}\]

\[\text{λος}, \text{εἰ} \text{καὶ} \text{μείζων} \text{ἐκαστὸν} \text{ἐκεῖνων} \text{ἀγαθὸν} \text{ἐστὶ} \text{τῆς} \text{άιλητικῆς} \text{(λέγω} \text{δὲ} \text{τήν} \text{τ'} \text{εὐγενείαν} \text{καὶ} \text{τὸ} \text{kάλλος}) \text{καὶ} \text{κατὰ} \text{τὴν} \text{ἀναλογίαν} \text{ὑπερέχουσι} \text{πλέον} \text{τῆς} \text{άιλητικῆς} \text{ἡ} \text{ἐκεῖνος} \text{κατὰ} \text{τὴν} \text{άιλητικὴν}, \text{όμως} \text{τούτῳ} \text{δοτέου} \text{τοὺς} \text{διαφέροντας} \text{τῶν} \text{αὐλῶν}: \text{δεὶ} \text{γὰρ} \text{εἰς} \text{τὸ} \text{ἐργον} \text{συμβάλλεσθαι} \text{τὴν} \text{ὑπεροχήν} \text{καὶ} \text{τοῦ} \text{πλούτου} \text{καὶ} \text{τῆς} \text{εὐγενείας}, \text{συμβάλλονται} \text{δ'} \text{οὔδεν}. \text{ἐτὶ} \text{κατὰ} \text{γε} \text{τοῦτον} \text{τὸν} \text{λόγον} \text{πᾶν} \text{ἀγαθὸν} \text{πρὸς} \text{πᾶν} \text{ἀν} \text{ἐή} \text{συμβλητῶν}. \text{εἰ} \text{γὰρ} \text{μᾶλλον}^2 \text{τὸ} \text{τὶ}

\[40\]

\[5 \text{μέγεθος}, \text{kαὶ} \text{ὅλως} \text{ἀν} \text{τὸ} \text{μέγεθος} \text{ἐνάμιλλον} \text{εἴη} \text{kαὶ} \text{πρὸς} \text{πλούτον} \text{kαὶ} \text{πρὸς} \text{ἐλευθερίαν} \text{ὡς} \text{εἰ} \text{πλεῖον} \text{ὁδ'} \text{διαφέρει} \text{κατὰ} \text{μέγεθος} \text{ἡ} \text{ὁδ'} \text{κατ'} \text{ἀρετήν}, \text{kαὶ} \text{πλεῖον} \text{ὑπερέχει}^3 \text{ὅλως} \text{ἀρετῆς} \text{μέγεθος},

\[1 \text{<ἐδε}> \text{διαφέρουσι} \text{? ed.}

\[2 \text{ἐνάμιλλον} \text{Ingram: καλὸν} \text{Richards.}

\[3 \text{ὑπερέχειν} <\text{ἐνδέχεται}>? \text{Susemihl} (<\text{εἰ} \text{kαὶ} \text{πλεῖον} \text{ὑπερέχει} \text{ὅλως} \text{ἀρετῆς} \text{μεγέθους} \text{Bernays}).

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at all but were exactly alike, because men that are different have different rights and merits. Yet if this is true, those who are superior in complexion or stature or any good quality will have an advantage in respect of political rights. But surely the error here is obvious, and it comes out clearly if we consider the other sciences and faculties. Among flute-players equally good at their art it is not proper to give an advantage in respect of the flutes to those of better birth, for they will not play any better, but it is the superior performers who ought to be given the superior instruments. And if our meaning is not yet plain, it will become still clearer when we have carried the matter further. Suppose someone is superior in playing the flute but much inferior in birth or in good looks, then, even granting that each of these things—birth and beauty—is a greater good than ability to play the flute, and even though they surpass flute-playing proportionately more than the best flute-player surpasses the others in flute-playing, even so the best flute-player ought to be given the outstandingly good flutes; for otherwise superiority both in wealth and in birth ought to contribute to the excellence of the performance, but they do not do so at all. Moreover on this theory every good thing would be commensurable with every other. For if to be of some particular height gave more claim, then height in general would be in competition with wealth and with free birth; therefore if A excels in height more than B does in virtue, and speaking generally size gives more superiority than virtue,

* i.e. different in some good quality.

Perhaps we should rewrite the Greek to give 'even though speaking generally virtue gives more superiority than size.'
Doubtless the author meant the other way round, 'for the slow having less and the fast more political power.'
all things would be commensurable; for if such-and-such an amount of one thing is better than such-and-such an amount of another, it is clear that such-and-such an amount of the one is equal to that amount of another. But since this is impossible, it is clear that in politics with good reason men do not claim a right to office on the ground of inequality of every kind—if one set of men are slow runners and another fast, this is no good ground for the one set having more and the other less political power, but the latter's superiority receives its honour in athletic contests; but the claim to office must necessarily be based on superiority in those things which go to the making of the state. Hence it is reasonable for the well-born, free and wealthy to lay claim to honour; for there must be free men and tax-payers, since a state consisting entirely of poor men would not be a state, any more than one consisting of slaves. But then, granting there is need of these, it is clear that there is also need of justice and civic virtue, for these are also indispensable in the administration of a state; except that wealth and freedom are indispensable for a state's existence, whereas justice and civic virtue are indispensable for its good administration.

As a means therefore towards a state's existence all or at all events some of these factors would seem to make a good claim, although as means to a good life education and virtue would make the most just claim, as has been said also before. On the other hand since those who are equal in one thing only ought not to have equality in all things nor those unequal as regards one thing inequality in all, it follows that all these forms of constitution must be deviations. Now it has been said before that all make a claim.
pántes, ἀπλῶς δ' οὖ πάντες\(^1\) δικαίως, οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν ὅτι πλειον μέτεστι τῆς χώρας αὐτοῖς, ἥ δὲ χώρα κοινόν, ἔτι\(^2\) πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια πιστοὶ μᾶλ- λον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον, οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς

35 ὡς ἐγνὺς ἀλλήλων (πολίται γὰρ μᾶλλον οἱ γεν- ναιότεροι τῶν ἁγεννῶν, ἥ δ' εὐγενεία παρ' ἐκά- στοις οὐκοὶ τίμιος), ἔτι διότι βελτίως εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐκ βελτίωνων, εὐγενεία γὰρ ἐστὶν ἁρετή γένους· ὁμοίως δὲ\(^3\) φήσομεν δικαίως καὶ τὴν ἁρετὴν ἁμφι- σβητεῖν, κοινωνικὴ γὰρ ἁρετὴν εἶναι φαμεν τὴν
dικαιοσύνην, ἢ πάσας ἀναγκαίοις ἄκολουθείν τὰς ἄλλας· ἄλλα μὴν καὶ οἱ πλείους πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάτ- τους, καὶ γὰρ κρείττους καὶ πλουσιώτερους καὶ βελτίους εἰσὶν ὡς λαμβανομένων τῶν πλείόνων

1283 b πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάττους. ἀρ' οὖν εἰ πάντες εἶεν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει, λέγω δ' οἶνον οἱ τ' ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, ἔτι δὲ πλῆθος ἀλλο τι πολιτικόν, πότερον ἁμφισβήτητος ἔσται τὶνας ἁρχεῖν δεῖ ἢ οὐκ ἔσται; καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν
eιρημένων ἀναμφισβήτητος ἢ κρισίς τίνας ἁρχεῖν

10 δεῖ (τοὺς γὰρ κυρίους διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, οἶνον ἢ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἢ δὲ τῷ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον). ἄλλι' ὀμως σκοποῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ταύτῃ ὑπάρχῃ χρόνον, πῶς διοριστέον.

Εἰ δὲ τὸν ἄριθμὸν εἶεν ὀλίγοι πάμπαν οἱ τὴν ἁρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα δεῖ διελείν τὸν τρόπον; ἢ τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν εἰ δυνατοὶ

\(^1\) [πάντες] Richards. \(^2\) ἔτι <ὡ> ? ed. \(^3\) δὲ Γ: δὴ codd. 236
that is in a manner just, though not all a claim that is absolutely just; the rich claiming because they have a larger share of the land, and the land is common property, and also as being for the most part more faithful to their covenants; the free and well-born as being closely connected together (for the better-born are citizens to a greater degree than those of low birth, and good birth is in every community held in honour at home), and also because it is probable that the children of better parents will be better; 8

for good birth means goodness of breed; and we shall admit that virtue also makes an equally just claim, for we hold that justice is social virtue, which necessarily brings all the other virtues in its train; but moreover the majority have a just claim as compared with the minority, since they are stronger and richer and better if their superior numbers are taken in comparison with the others' inferior numbers. Therefore supposing all were in one city, I mean, that is, the good and the wealthy and noble and also an additional mass of citizens, will there be a dispute, 9

or will there not, as to who ought to govern? It is true that under each of the forms of constitution that have been mentioned the decision as to who ought to govern is undisputed (for the difference between them lies in their sovereign classes—one is distinguished by being governed by the rich men, one by being governed by the good men, and similarly each of the others); but nevertheless we are considering the question how we are to decide between these classes supposing that they all exist in the state at the same period.

If then the possessors of virtue should be quite few in number, how is the decision to be made? 10 ought we to consider their fewness in relation to the
διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἣ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὡστ’ εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν; ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία τις πρὸς ἀπαντας τοὺς διαμφισβητοῦντας περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν. δόξαν γὰρ ἃν οὐδὲν λέγειν δίκαιον οἱ διὰ τὸν πλουτὸν ἄξιοντες ἀρχεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ κατὰ γένος· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ τις πάλιν εἰς πλουσίωτερος ἀπάντων ἐστὶ, δηλόνοιτι κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον τοῦτον ἀρχεῖν τὸν ἔνα ἀπάντων δεήσει, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν εὐγενεία διαφέροντα τῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντων δι’ ἐλευθερίαν. ταύτῳ δὲ τούτῳ ἦσως συμβῆσεται καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς· εἰ γὰρ τις εἰς ἀμείων ἀνήρ εἰ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων ὄντων, τούτον εἶναι δεὶ κύριον κατὰ ταύτο δίκαιον. οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι γε2 δεὶ κύριον διότι κρείττους εἰσὶ τῶν ὀλίγων, κἂν εἰς ἡ πλείους μὲν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐλάττους δὲ τῶν πολλῶν κρείττους ὥσι τῶν ἄλλων, τούτους ἄν δεοι κύριος εἶναι μᾶλλον ἡ τὸ πλῆθος. πάντα δὴ ταύτ’ ἐοικε12 φανερὸν ποιεῖν ὅτι τούτων τῶν ὄρων οὕδεις ὀρθῶς ἐστὶ καθ’ ὃν3 ἄξιοντος αὐτοῦ μὲν ἀρχεῖν τοὺς. δ’ ἄλλους ὑπὸ σφῶν ἄρχεσθαι πάντας. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τῶν κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἄξιοντας κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ πλουτον, ἔχουσιν ἂν λέγειν τὰ πλῆθη λόγον τινὰ δίκαιον· οὐδὲν γὰρ καλύπτει ποτὲ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι βέλτιον τῶν ὀλίγων καὶ πλουσίωτερον, οὐχ ὡς καθ’ ἕκαστον ἄλλ’ ὥς ἀθρόους.

Διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν ἦν ζητοῦσι καὶ πρὸς

1 γὰρ ἃν Coraes: γὰρ codd.
2 ζ’ εἶναι (vel supra κατὰ γε) Richards.
3 οὐς ? ed.
task, and whether they are able to administer the state, or sufficiently numerous to constitute a state? And there is some difficulty as regards all the rival claimants to political honours. Those who claim to rule because of their wealth might seem to have no justice in their proposal, and similarly also those who claim on the score of birth; for it is clear that if, to go a step further, a single individual is richer than all the others together, according to the same principle of justice it will obviously be right for this one man to rule over all, and similarly the man of outstanding nobility among the claimants on the score of free birth. And this same thing will perhaps result in the case of aristocratic government based on virtue; for if there be some one man who is better than the other virtuous men in the state, by the same principle of justice that man must be sovereign. Accordingly if it is actually proper for the multitude to be sovereign because they are better than the few, then also, if one person or if more than one but fewer than the many are better than the rest, it would be proper for these rather than the multitude to be sovereign. All these considerations therefore seem to prove the incorrectness of all of the standards on which men claim that they themselves shall govern and everybody else be governed by them. For surely even against those who claim to be sovereign over the government on account of virtue, and similarly against those who claim on account of wealth, the multitudes might be able to advance a just plea; for it is quite possible that at some time the multitude may be collectively better and richer than the few, although not individually.

Hence it is also possible to meet in this way the
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1283 b ἑλλοῦσι τινες ἐνδέχεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν
(ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τινες πότερον τῷ νομοθέτῃ νομοθετήτεον, βουλομένω τίθεσθαι τοὺς ὅρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτίων συμφέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειόνων) ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθεῖν. τὸ δ’ ὅρθον ληπτέον ἵσως, τὸ δ’ ἵσως ὅρθον πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν· πολιτῆς δὲ κοινὴ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἀρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαί ἐστι, καθ’ ἐκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἔτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀριστήν ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαριστεύομενος ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ’ ἀρετήν.

VIII. Εἰ δὲ τίς ἐστιν εἰς τοσοῦτον διαφέρων κατ’ ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολῆν, ἡ πλείους μὲν ἐνὸς μῆ 5 μέντοι δυνατοὶ πλήρωμα παρασχέσθαι πόλεως, ὡστε μὴ συμβλητὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἀλλων ἁρετήν πάντων μηδὲ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων εἰ πλείους, εἰ δ’ εἰς τὴν ἐκείνου μόνον, οὐκέτι θετέον τούτως μέρος πόλεως· ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιομενοὶ τῶν ἵσων, ἀνισοὶ τοσοῦτον κατ’ ἁρετήν ὀντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν· ὡσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. οἶδον δὴλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν 2 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ τοὺς ἓσους καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιοῦτων οὐκ ἐστὶ νόμος, αὐτοί γὰρ εἰσὶ νόμος· καὶ γὰρ γέλοιος ἄν εἶ ἡ νομοθετεῖν τις πειρώμενος κατ’ αὐτῶν· λέγοιεν γὰρ ἂν ἵσως ἀπερ Ἀντισθένης ἐφη τοὺς λέοντας

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a At the end of the last sentence, § 12.
b Pupil of Socrates and founder of the Cynic sect of philosophers.
c ‘Where are your claws and teeth?’

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question which some persons investigate and put forward (for some raise the question whether the legislator desiring to lay down the rightest laws should legislate with a view to the advantage of the better people or that of the larger number) in cases when the situation mentioned occurs. And 'right' must be taken in the sense of 'equally right,' and this means right in regard to the interest of the whole state and in regard to the common welfare of the citizens; and a citizen is in general one who shares in governing and being governed, although he is different according to each form of constitution, but in relation to the best form a citizen is one who has the capacity and the will to be governed and to govern with a view to the life in accordance with virtue.

VIII. But if there is any one man so greatly distinguished in outstanding virtue, or more than one but not enough to be able to make up a complete state, so that the virtue of all the rest and their political ability is not comparable with that of the men mentioned, if they are several, or if one, with his alone, it is no longer proper to count these exceptional men a part of the state; for they will be treated unjustly if deemed worthy of equal status, being so widely unequal in virtue and in their political ability: since such a man will naturally be as a god among men. Hence it is clear that legislation also must necessarily be concerned with persons who are equal in birth and in ability, but there can be no law dealing with such men as those described, for they are themselves a law; indeed a man would be ridiculous if he tried to legislate for them, for probably they would say what in the story of Antisthenes the lions said when the hares made speeches in

The safety-value of Ostracism: its history, and prevalence in all the deviation-forms of state.
ARISTOTLE

1284 a
dημηγορούντων τῶν δασυπόδων καὶ τὸ ἱευν άξιούντων πάντας ἔχειν. διὸ καὶ τίθενται τῶν ὀστρακισμῶν αἱ δημοκρατούμεναι πόλεις διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· αὐτὰ γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν τὴν ἰσότητα μάλιστα πάντων, ὡστε τοὺς δοκοῦντας ὑπερέχειν δυνάμει διὰ πλούτου ἡ πολυφιλίαν ἡ τυχα ἀλλην πολιτικὴν ἵσχυν ὀστρακίζον καὶ μεθίστασαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως χρόνους ὁρισμένους. μυθολογεῖται 3 δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀργοναύτας τὸν Ἡμικλέα καταλείπειν διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐξελεῖν αὐτὸν ἄγειν τὴν Ἀργώ μετὰ τῶν πλωτηρίων τῶν ἀλλων ὡς ὑπερβάλλοντα πολύν. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ψέγοντας τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ τὴν Περιάνδρου Θρασυβούλω συμβούλιαν οὐχ ἀπλῶς οἰητέον ὅρθῶς ἐπιτυμᾶν (φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περιάνδρου εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πεμφθέντα κήρυκα περὶ τῆς συμβουλίας, ἀφ- αιροῦντα δὲ τοὺς υπερέχοντας τῶν σταχὺν ὑμανήν τὴν ἄροραν· οἶδαν ἀννοοῦντος μὲν τοῦ κήρυκος τοῦ γινομένου τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀπαγγελαν τὸ δὲ τὸ συμπεσόν, συννοῆσαι τὸν Θρασυβούλον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς υπερέχοντας ἀνδρᾶς ἀναιρεῖν·) τοῦτο γὰρ 4 οὐ μόνον συμφέρει τοῖς τυράννοις οὐδὲ μόνον οἱ τύραννοι ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τὰς δημοκρατίας. ὁ γὰρ ὀστρακισμὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν τρόπον τῶν κολούειν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας καὶ φυγαδεύειν. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη ποιοῦσιν οἱ κύριοι τῆς δυνάμεως, οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περὶ

1 τῶν πλωτήρων hic Richards, post polv codd.

1 Cf. Apollodorus, Bibliotheca i. 9. 19 τῆς Ἀργοῦς φθεγχαμένης μὴ διώκασθαι φέρειν τῷ τοῦτον βάρος. Ἀργο was a live creature, and Athena had built a 'talking timber' into her cutwater. 242
the assembly and demanded that all should have equality. This is why democratically governed states institute the system of ostracism, because of a reason of this nature; for these are the states considered to pursue equality most of all things, so that they used to ostracize men thought to be outrageously powerful on account of wealth or popularity or some other form of political strength, and used to banish them out of the city for fixed periods of time. And there is a mythical story that the Argonauts left Heracles behind for a similar reason; for the Argo\(^a\) refused to carry him with the other voyagers because he was so much heavier. Hence also those who blame tyranny and Periander’s advice to Thrasybulus\(^b\) must not be thought to be absolutely right in their censure (the story is that Periander made no reply to the herald sent to ask his advice, but levelled the corn-field by plucking off the ears that stood out above the rest; and consequently, although the herald did not know the reason for what was going on, when he carried back news of what had occurred, Thrasybulus understood that he was to destroy the outstanding citizens); for this policy is advantageous not only for tyrants, nor is it only tyrants that use it, but the same is the case with oligarchies and democracies as well; for ostracism has in a way the same effect as docking off the outstanding men by exile. And the same course is adopted in regard to cities and races by the holders of sovereign power, for example the Athenians so

\(^a\) Periander was tyrant of Corinth circa 626-585 B.C.; Thrasybulus was tyrant of Miletus. Herodotus v. 92 tells the story with their parts reversed.
σαμίους καὶ Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους (ἐπεὶ γὰρ θάττον ἐγκρατῶς ἔσχον τὴν ἄρχην, ἐταπείνωσαν αὐτούς παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας), ὁ δὲ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς Μήδους καὶ Βαβυλωνίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς πεφρονηματισμένους διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτ' ἐπ' ἄρχης ἐπέκοπτε πολλάκις. τὸ δὲ πρόβλημα καθόλου περὶ δὲ πάσας ἐστὶ τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς ὀρθὰς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ παρεκβεβηκύναι πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαν τοῦτο δρόσων, οἷς μὴν ἄλλα περὶ τὰς τὸ κοινὸν ἄγαθὸν ἐπισκοποῦσας τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον. δήλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν· οὔτε γὰρ γραφεὺς ἐάσειεν ἀν τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας ἔχειν τὸ ἐξόμοιον, οὐδὲ εἰ διαφέροι τὸ κάλλος, οὔτε ναυπηγὸς πρύμναν ἃ τῶν ἄλλων τι μορίων τῶν τῆς νεότητος ἄροι χοροῦ φθεγγόμενον ἐάσεις συγχορεύειν. ὥστε διὰ τὸ δέ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει τοὺς μονάρχους συμμετείχει ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἄρχης ὑφελίμου ταῖς πόλεσιν οὕτως τοῦτο δρόσων. διὸ κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογομένας ὑπεροχὰς ἔχει τὰ δίκαια πολιτικὸν ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ τὸν ὁστρακισμὸν. βέλτιον μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθετήν ἐξ ἄρχης οὕτω συστήσαι τὴν πολιτείαν ὥστε μὴ δείξῃ τοιαύτης ἀμείβεις· δεύτερον δὲ πλοῦς, ἀν συμβῇ, πειράσθαι τοιοῦτοι τῷ διορθώματι διορθοῦν. ὥστε οὐκ ἐγίγνετο περὶ τὰς πόλεις, οὐ γὰρ ἐβλεπόν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς

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a In 410, 424 and 427 B.C. respectively.

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POLITICS, III. VIII. 4–6

dealt with the Samians and Chians and Lesbians
(for no sooner did they get a strong hold of their empire than they humbled them in contravention of their covenants), and the king of the Persians frequently used to cut down the numbers of the Medes and Babylonians and the other races that had waxed proud because they had once been head of an empire. And the problem applies universally to all the forms of constitution, even the right forms; for while the divergent forms of government do this because their regard is fixed on their private advantage, nevertheless with the constitutions directed to the common good the same is the case. And this is also clear in the field of the other arts and sciences; a painter would not let his animal have its foot of disproportionately large size, even though it was an exceptionally beautiful foot, nor would a shipbuilder make the stern or some other part of a ship disproportionately big, nor yet will a trainer of choruses allow a man who sings louder and more beautifully than the whole band to be a member of it. Hence as far as this practice goes nothing prevents monarchs from being in harmony with the cities they rule, if they resort to it when their own personal rule is beneficial to the cities. Therefore in relation to acknowledged superiorities the argument for ostracism has a certain element of political justice. True, it is better for the lawgiver so to constitute the state at the outset that it does not need this medicine; but the next best course to steer, if occasion arises, is to endeavour to correct the constitution by some such method of rectification. But this was not what happened with the states, for they were not looking at what was advantageous for their proper constitu-
oikeias sympheron, alla staistasiwos ekrwnto
tois otrakismois. ev men onw tais parkekbebit-
kwias politeias oti men idia sympherai kai diakion
25 esti, fanerwn, 'iswes de kai oti oux aplous dikaion,
akai touto fanerwn. all' esti tis aristis politeias 7
'echi pollin aporian, ou kata twn allon agathon
tin uperokhin, ouin ischiois kai ploutou kai polu-
philies, all' an tis genetai diafereis kai' aretis,
ti chr paietin; ou gar di' faian an dein ekvalle
kai mejustanai ton touitous. all' mhn oud' archein
ge touto touitous, paraplaishion gar kai ei touto
Dieos archein aixios, meri'ontes tas arxas. leipetai
touvin, stper eouke pevkesai, peithesai tw tououto
pantas asmenos, woste basileas einai touto tououto
aidios eis tais poleis.

IX. 'Iswes de kalous 'echi metata toutous eirumeneus 1
logous metaibhnav kai skexasithai peri basileias.
Famven gar touton orhnon politeinon mian einai tautes.
skeptenov de poteron sympherai ti melloyn kalous
oikhesethai kai polei kai xwra basilewsethai, ti
ou, all' alli tis politeia mallon, ti toi men
sympherai toi di ou sympherai. deis de prwton
dielsethai poteron ev to genos estin autis ti

1285 a pleious 'echi diaforas.
'Pdion di touto ge kataamathenin, oui pleiw te 2
gene periexei kai tis arxh d tropos estin oux
elis paSON. ti gar en tis Laskynke politeia dokei

1 [oux] Bernays.

a Perhaps 'not' should be struck out; but if it stands, the
clause refers to § 5 init.—in these cases ostracism is practised
only in the interest of those in power.
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tion, but their acts of ostracism were done in a revolutionary spirit. In the divergent forms of constitution therefore it is evident that ostracism is advantageous and just under the special constitution, though perhaps it is also evident that it is not just absolutely; but in the case of the best constitution there is much doubt as to what ought to be done, not as regards superiority in the other things of value, such as strength and wealth and popularity, but in the case of a person becoming exceptionally distinguished for virtue. It certainly would not be said that such a man must be banished and got out of the way; yet nevertheless no doubt men would not think that they ought to rule over such a man, for that would be the same as if they claimed to rule over Zeus, dividing up his spheres of government. It remains therefore, and this seems to be the natural course, for all to obey such a man gladly, so that men of this sort may be kings in the cities for all time.

IX. And perhaps it is well after the subjects that have been discussed to pass over to consider royal government; for we pronounce this to be one of the correct constitutions. And it has to be considered whether it is advantageous for a city or a country that is to be well administered to be ruled by a king, or whether it is not so but some other constitution is more expedient, or whether royal rule is expedient for some states and not for others. But it is needful to decide first whether there is only one sort of kingship or whether it has several varieties.

Now it is at all events easy to discern that kingship includes several kinds, and that the mode of government is not the same in all. For the kingship in the Spartan constitution, which is held to be a typical
μὲν εἶναι βασιλεία μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ νόμον, οὐκ
€ 5 ἐστι δὲ κυρία πάντων, ἀλλ’ ὦταν ἐξέλθη τὴν χώραν
ηγεμών ἐστὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, ἔτι δὲ τὰ
πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποδέδοται τοῖς βασιλεύσιν.
αὐτῇ μὲν οὖν ἡ βασιλεία οἶον στρατηγία τις αὐτο-
κρατόρων καὶ ἀϊδίος ἐστὶν· κτείναι γὰρ οὗ κύριος,
εἰ μὴ ἐν τινὶ καιρῷ,1 καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων
€ 10 ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις ἐν χειρὸς νόμων· δῆλοι
d' ὁμηρος, ὥστε Ἀγαμέμνον κακῶς μὲν ἄκουόν
ημείχητο ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ
κτείναι κύριος ἡν· λέγει γοῦν
δόν δὲ κ’ ἐγών ἀπάνευθε μάχης . . .
. . . οὐ οἱ
ἀρκιον ἐσσείται φυγέεων κύνας ἠδ’ οἰνωνοῦς·
pάρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος.
€ 15 ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτ’ εἴδος βασιλείας, στρατηγία διὰ 3
βίου, τούτων δ’ αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσὶν αἱ δ’
αιρεταί· παρὰ ταύτην δ’ ἄλλο μοναρχίας εἴδος,
οἷοι παρ’ ἐνίοις εἰσὶ βασιλείαι τῶν βαρβάρων.
ἔχουσι δ’ αὐταὶ τὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαι παραπλησίαν
tυραννίσων, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατα νόμον καὶ πατρικαί·
€ 20 διὰ γὰρ τὸ δουλικώτεροι εἶναι τὰ ἥθη φύσει οἱ
μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν ‘Ελλήνων οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν ’Ασίαν
tῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν
ἄρχην οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες· τυραννικὰ μὲν οὖν
dία τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰσιν, ἀσφαλεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ πάτριαι

1 καιρῷ (vel ἀνάγκῃ) Richards: βασιλείᾳ (e βασιλεία supra)
codd. (non vertit Ar.).
2 τυραννίσων—καὶ Susemihl: lacunas et fragmenta varia
codd.
royalty of the kind guided by law, does not carry sovereignty in all matters, though when a king goes on a foreign expedition he is the leader in all matters relating to the war; and also matters relating to religion have been assigned to the kings. This kingship therefore is a sort of military command vested in generals with absolute powers and held for life; for the king has not authority to put a subject to death, except in some emergency, as in ancient times kings on their military expeditions could kill an offender out of hand, as Homer proves, for Agamemnon endured being reviled in the assemblies but when they were on an expedition had authority to put a man to death: at all events he says

But whomsoe'er I see far from the fray...
Shall have no hope to fly from dogs and vultures,
For death is in my hands! a

This then is one sort of kingship, a lifelong generalship, and some of the kingships of this kind are hereditary, others elective; and by its side there is another sort of monarchy, examples of which are kingships existing among some of the barbarians. The power possessed by all of these resembles that of tyrannies, but they govern according to law and are hereditary; for because the barbarians are more servile in their nature than the Greeks, and the Asiatics than the Europeans, they endure despotic rule without any resentment. These kingships therefore are for these reasons of a tyrannical nature, but they are secure because they are hereditary and

a Quoted from Iliad ii. 391, but the last line is not in our Homer.
καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ βασιλικὴ 
καὶ οὕτως τυραννικὴ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. οἱ γὰρ 
pολίται φυλάττουσιν ὁπλοὺς τοὺς βασιλεῖς, τοὺς δὲ 
tυράννους ἔπειτα, οἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον καὶ 
ἐκόντων οἱ δ' ἀκόντων ἄρχουσιν, ὡσθ' οἱ μὲν παρὰ 
tῶν πολιτών οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τοὺς πολίτας ἔχουσι τὴν 
φυλακὴν. δύο μὲν οὖν εἰδὴ ταύτα μοναρχίας. 5 ἔτερον δ' ὀπέρ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοις Ἑλλησπον, οὗ 
calo undert ἀσυμνήτας. ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο ὡς ἀπλῶς 
eiπεῖν αἱρετή τυραννία, διαφέροισα δὲ τῆς βαρ-
βαρικῆς οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ νόμον ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ πάτριος 
eῖναι μόνον. ἦρχον δ' οἱ μὲν διὰ βίου τῆν ἄρχην 
ταύτην, οἱ δὲ μέχρι τινῶν ὦρισμένων χρόνων ἡ 
πράξεων, οἴον εἶλοντο ποτὲ Μιτυληναίου Πυττα-
kῶν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας δῦν προειστήκεσαν Ἀντι-
μενίδης καὶ Ἀλκαίος ὁ ποιητής. δηλοὶ δ' Ἀλκαίος 6 
ὅτι τύραννον εἶλοντο τὸν Πυττακόν ἐν τινὶ τῶν 
σκολῶν μελῶν. ἐπιτιμᾶ γὰρ ὅτι

tὸν κακοπάτριδα1
Πυττακον πόλιος2 τάς ἄχολω3 καὶ βαρυδαίμονος 
ἐστάσαντο τύραννον μέγ' ἐπανέστηκες ἀναλλεῖς.

αὕται μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἦσαν διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτι-
καὶ εἶναι τυραννικαί,4 διὰ δὲ τὸ αἱρεταὶ καὶ ἐκόντων 
βασιλικαί· τέταρτον δ' εἰδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς 7
αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἠρώικοις χρόνοις ἐκοῦσαι τε καὶ
πάτριαι γεγονόμεναι κατὰ νόμον. διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς 
πρώτους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλῆθους εὑρεγέτας κατὰ

1 κακοπατριδα Wackernagel.
2 πόλιος Schneidewin: πόλεως codd.
3 διχόλω Schmidt.
4 τυραννικαί εἶναι δεσποτικαί codd.: tr. Sepulveda.

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rule by law. Also their bodyguard is of a royal and not a tyrannical type for the same reason; for kings are guarded by the citizens in arms, whereas tyrants have foreign guards, for kings rule in accordance with law and over willing subjects, but tyrants rule over unwilling subjects, owing to which kings take their guards from among the citizens but tyrants have them to guard against the citizens.

5 These then are two kinds of monarchy; while another is that which existed among the ancient Greeks, the type of rulers called *aesymnetae*. This, to put it simply, is an elective tyranny, and it differs from the monarchy that exists among barbarians not in governing without the guidance of law but only in not being hereditary. Some holders of this type of monarchy ruled for life, others until certain fixed limits of time or until certain undertakings were ended, as for example the people of Mitylene once elected Pittacus to resist the exiles under the leadership of Antimenides and the poet Alcaeus. That they elected Pittacus as tyrant is proved by Alcaeus in one of his catches; for he rebukes the people because

\[
\text{The base-born Pittacus they did set up} \\
\text{As tyrant of the meek and luckless city,} \\
\text{And all did greatly praise him.}
\]

These monarchies therefore now and in the past are of the nature of tyrannies because they are autocratic, but of the nature of kingships because they are elective and rule over willing subjects. A fourth class of royal monarchy consists of the hereditary legal kingships over willing subjects in the heroic period. For because the first of the line had been benefactors of

\[a\] Pittacus held the office 587-579 B.C. He was one of the Seven Sages. Antimenides and Alcaeus were brothers.
This ritual is mentioned in Iliad i. 234, vii. 412, x. 328.

The monarchy was reduced to a priesthood at Cyrene (Herod. iv. 161) and at Ephesus.

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the multitude in the arts or in war, or through having
drawn them together or provided them with land,
these kings used to come to the throne with the con-
sent of the subjects and hand it on to their successors
by lineal descent. And they had supreme command
in war and control over all sacrifices that were not
in the hands of the priestly class, and in addition to
these functions they were judges in law-suits; some
gave judgement not on oath and some on oath—the
oath was taken by holding up the sceptre. These
kings then of ancient times used to govern continu-
ously in matters within the city and in the country
and across the frontiers; but later on when gradually
the kings relinquished some of their powers and had
others taken from them by the multitudes, in the
cities in general only the sacrifices were left to the
kings, while where anything that deserves the name
of royalty survived the kings only had the command
in military expeditions across the frontiers.

There are then these kinds of kingship, four
in number: one belonging to the heroic times, which
was exercised over willing subjects, but in certain
limited fields, for the king was general and judge and
master of religious ceremonies; second, the barbarian
monarchy, which is an hereditary despotism govern-
ing in conformity with law; third, the rule of the
functionary called an aesymnetes, which is an elective
tyranny; and fourth among these is the Spartan
kingship, which may be described simply as an
hereditary generalship held for life. These kingships
then differ from one another in this manner. But a
fifth kind of kingship is when a single ruler is sovereign
over all matters in the way in which each race and
each city is sovereign over its common affairs; this

(5) absolute monarchy.
1285 b ωστερ γαρ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ βασιλεία τις οἰκίας ἑστών, οὕτως ἡ παμβασιλεία1 πόλεως καὶ ἐθνος ἐνὸς ἡ πλεύνων οἰκονομία.

Σχεδὸν δὴ δύο ἑστῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν εἴδη βασιλείας περὶ ὁν σκεπτέον, αὕτη τε καὶ ἡ Λακωνική. τῶν γαρ ἄλλων αἱ πολλαὶ μεταξὺ τούτων εἰσὶν: ἐλαττόνων μὲν γὰρ κύριοι τῆς παμβασιλείας, πλεύνων δ’ εἰσὶ τῆς Λακωνικῆς. ὡστε τὸ σκέμμα σχεδὸν περὶ δυοῖν ἑστῶν, ἐν μὲν πότερον συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσι στρατηγών ἀιδιῶν εἰναι, καὶ τούτων ἡ κατὰ γένος ἡ κατὰ μέρος, ἡ οὐ συμφέρει, ἐν δὲ πότερον ἐνα συμφέρει κύριον εἰναι πάντων ἡ οὔ συμφέρει. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπὶ 3 σκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἴδος ἡ πολιτείας (ἐν ἀπάσας γὰρ ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι τοῦτο ταῖς πολιτείαις), ὡστ’ ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην: ο δὲ λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασιλείας πολιτείας εἴδος ἑστὼ, ὡστε περὶ τούτων δεῖ θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπι- δραμεῖν τὰς ἐνούσας.

Ἀρχὴ δ’ ἑστὶ τῆς ζητῆσεως αὕτη, πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχεσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων. δοκοῦσι δὴ τοῖς νομί- 4 ζουσι συμφέρειν βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ καθόλου μόνον οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττεων: ὡστ’ ἐν ὀποιοῖς ἡμίκη τὸ κατὰ γράμματ’, ἀρχεῖν ἡλίθιον (καὶ3 ἐν Λιγύπτῳ μετὰ τὴν τετρήμερον κινεῖν ἐξεστὶ τοῖς ἱστροῖς, ἐὰν δὲ

1 παμβασιλεία Susemihl (cf. 36): βασιλεία codd.
2 μέρος: αἱρεσιν codd. aliqui (cf. a 16).
3 καὶ πως, καὶ ὡς codd. nonnulli (ἡλίθιον πως καὶ? Richards).

a Some mss. give ' or by election.'
b Cf. 1289 a 11 foll.; but the promise of a full discussion of law is not fulfilled.

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monarchy ranges with the rule of a master over a household, for just as the master's rule is a sort of monarchy in the home, so absolute monarchy is domestic mastership over a city, or over a race or several races.

There are therefore, we may say, virtually two kinds of kingship that have been examined, this one and the Spartan. For most of the others lie between these, since with them the king is sovereign over fewer things than under absolute monarchy, but over more than under the Spartan kingship. Hence our inquiry is virtually about two questions, one whether it is expedient or inexpedient for states to have a military commander holding office for life, and that either by descent or by class, and one whether it is expedient or inexpedient for one man to be sovereign over everything. Now the study of a military command of the kind mentioned has more the aspect of a legal than of a constitutional inquiry (for it is possible for this form of office to exist under all constitutions), so let it be dismissed at the first stage; but the remaining mode of kingship is a kind of constitution, so that it is necessary to consider this one and to run over the difficulties that it involves.

And the starting-point of the inquiry is the question whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best men or by the best laws. Those of the opinion that it is advantageous to be governed by a king think that laws enunciate only general principles but do not give directions for dealing with circumstances as they arise; so that in an art of any kind it is foolish to govern procedure by written rules (and indeed in Egypt physicians have the right to alter their prescription after four days, although if one of them alters it
πρότερον, ἐπὶ τῶι αὐτοῦ κωδύνωι· φανερῶν τοίνυν 15 ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους ἀρίστη
pολιτεία διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κάκεινον
dεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου τοὺς ἀρχουσ.
kρείττον δ' ὥς μὴ πρόσεστι τὸ παθητικὸν ὅλως ἢ
ὁ συμφυὲς· τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ τοῦτο οὖχ ὑπάρχει,
20 ὑπνήθην δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τούτ' ἐχειν πᾶσαν.
ἀλλ' ἰσως ἄν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτῳ βουλεύσεται 5
περὶ τῶν καθ' ἐκαστὰ κάλλιον. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν
ἀνάγκη νομοθέτην αὐτοῖν εἶναι, δῆλον, καὶ κεῖσαι
νόμους, ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ἢ παρεκβαίνουσιν, ἐπεὶ
περὶ τῶν γ' ἄλλων εἶναι δεὶ κυρίους· ὅσα δεὶ μὴ
25 δυνατῶν τὸν νόμον κρίνειν ἢ ὅλως ἢ εὖ, πότερον
ἐνα τὸν ἀριστον δεὶ ἀρχεῖν ἢ πάντας; καὶ γὰρ
νῦν συνιόντες δικάζουσι καὶ βουλεύονται καὶ κρί-
νουσιν, αὐταὶ δ' αἱ κρίσεις εἰσὶ πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν
καθ' ἐκαστὸν. καθ' ἔνα μὲν οὖν συμβαλλόμενος
ὀστισοῦν ἱσως χεῖρων· ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ
30 πολλῶν, ὡσπερ δ' ἐστις ὑμοῖος συμφορητὸς καλλίων
μᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆς, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἁμείνων
ὀχλὸς πολλὰ ἢ εἰς ὀστισοῦν. ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιά- 6
φθορὸν τὸ πολὺ—καθάπερ ὅ ὑπωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω
καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὄλγων ἀδιαφθορῶτερον· τοῦ
δ' ἔνος ὑπ' ὀργῆς κρατηθέντος ἢ τῶν ἐτέρου
35 πάθους τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαίον διεφθάρθαι τὴν κρίσιν,
ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον ἀμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν.

1 ὡσπερ δ' ed.: ὡσπερ codd.
2 καθάπερ <γὰρ> Bekker.

a i.e. unalterably binding, and not be set aside by special
dispensation of the ruler when deemed to be unjust in some
particular case.
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POLITICS, III. x. 4-6

before he does so at his own risk); it is clear therefore that government according to written rules, that is laws, is not the best, for the same reason. At the same time, however, rulers ought to be in possession of the general principle before mentioned as well. And a thing that does not contain the emotional element is generally superior to a thing in which it is innate; now the law does not possess this factor, but every human soul necessarily has it. But perhaps someone might say that in compensation for this a single ruler will decide better about particular cases. Therefore it is clear that on the one hand the ruler must necessarily be a legislator, and that there must be laws laid down, although these must not be sovereign\(^a\) where they go astray—admittedly in all other cases they ought to be sovereign; but on the other hand in matters which it is impossible for the law either to decide at all or to decide well, ought the one best man to govern or all the citizens? As it is, the citizens assembled hear lawsuits and deliberate and give judgements, but these judgements are all on particular cases. Now no doubt any one of them individually is inferior compared with the best man, but a state consists of a number of individuals, and just as a banquet to which many contribute dishes is finer than a single plain dinner, for this reason in many cases a crowd judges better than any single person. Also the multitude is more incorruptible—just as the larger stream of water is purer, so the mass of citizens is less corruptible than the few; and the individual's judgement is bound to be corrupted when he is overcome by anger or some other such emotion, whereas in the other case it is a difficult thing for all the people to be roused to anger and go

\(^a\) Law best applied by the collective wisdom of the noble or free.
1236 a ἐστω δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἔλευθεροι, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες ἂλλ' ἡ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸν. εἰ δὲ δὴ τοῦτο μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἰ πολλοίς, ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους εἰπὲν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολιταί, πότερον ο ἐστι ἀδιαφθορότερος ἁρχων ἡ

1236 b μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πάντες; ἡ δὴ λοι ὡς οἱ πλείους; ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν στασιάζουσιν, ὁ δ' εἰς ἀστασίαστος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀντιθετέον ἢσως ὅτι σπουδαίον τὴν ψυχὴν ὥσπερ κάκειον ὃ εἰς. εἰ δὴ τὴν μὲν τῶν πλείονων ἂν ἁρχήν ἀγαθῶν δ' ἄνδρῶν πάντων ἀριστοκρατίᾳ θετεόν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς βασιλείαν, αἱρετώτερον ἢν εἰπ' ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρίς δυνάμεως οὐσίας τῆς ἁρχῆς, ἂν ἡ λαβεῖν πλείους ὑμοίων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἢσως ἐβασιλεύοντο πρότερον, ὅτι σπάνιον ἢν εὑρέθην ἄνδρας πολὺ1 διαφέροντας κατ' ἀρετὴν, ἀλλως τε καὶ τὸτε μικρὰς οἰκούντας πόλεις. ἐτὶ δ' ἅπ' εὐεργεσίας καθίσταντα τοὺς βασιλείας, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔργον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄνδρῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συνέβαινε γίγνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὑμοίους πρὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐκέτι ὑπέμενον ἀλλ' εξήτουν κοινὸν τι καὶ πολιτείαν καθίστασαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ χείρους γιγνόμενοι ἔχρημα- 8 τίζουτο ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, ἐντεῦθεν ποθὲν εὐλογον γενέσθαι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας· ἐντιμὸν γὰρ ἐποίησαν

1 πολλοὺς (plures Ar.) Sylburg.

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wrong together. But the multitude must consist of the freemen, doing nothing apart from the law except about matters as to which the law must of necessity be deficient. And if this is not indeed easy to ensure in the case of many men, yet if there were a majority of good men and good citizens, would an individual make a more incorruptible ruler or rather those who though the majority in number yet are all good? The majority, is it not obvious? But it will be said that they will split up into factions, whereas with a single ruler this cannot happen. But against this must perhaps be set the fact that they are as virtuous in soul as the single ruler. If then the rule of the majority when these are all good men is to be considered an aristocracy, and that of the one man kingship, aristocracy would be preferable for the states to kingship, whether the royal office be conjoined with military force or without it, if it be possible to get a larger number of men than one who are of similar quality. And it was perhaps only owing to this that kingships existed in earlier times, because it was rare to find men who greatly excelled in virtue, especially as in those days they dwelt in small cities. Moreover they used to appoint their kings on the ground of public service, and to perform this is a task for the good men. But as it began to come about that many men arose who were alike in respect of virtue, they would no longer submit to royalty, but sought for some form of commonwealth, and set up a republican constitution. And as men becoming baser began to make money out of the community, it is reasonable to suppose that some such cause as this occasioned the rise of oligarchies; for they brought wealth into honour.
ARISTOTLE

1286 b
tōn plouton. ἐκ δὲ τούτων πρώτων εἰς τυραννίδας μετέβαλλον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τυραννιδῶν εἰς δημοκρατίαν: ἀεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες δι’ αἰσχροκέρδειαν, ἵσχυρότερον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ὡστ’ ἐπιθέσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι δημοκρατίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μειζονὶ εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς πόλεις, ἵσως οὑδὲ βάδιον ἐτί γίγνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἐτέραν παρὰ δημοκρατίαν. εἰ δὲ δὴ τις ἀριστον θείῃ τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι 9 ταῖς πόλεσιν, πῶς ἔξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων; πότερον καὶ τὸ γένος δεὶ βασιλεύειν; ἀλλὰ γιγνομένων ὅποιοί τινες ἔτυχον βλαβερόν. ἀλλ’ οὐ παραδώσει κύριοι ὡν τοῖς τέκνοις. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐτὶ τούτο βάδιον πιστεύσαι: χαλεπὸν γὰρ, καὶ μειζονὸς ἀρετῆς ἡ κατ’ ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν. ἔχει δ’ ἀπορίαν 10 καὶ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πότερον ἔχειν δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα βασιλεύειν ἰσχῦν τινα περὶ αὐτὸν ἢ δυνηστεῖ σαι μείζονθαι τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους πειθαρχεῖν; ἢ πῶς ἔνδεχεται τὴν ἁρχὴν διουκεῖν; εἰ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἰς κύριος, μηδὲν πράττων κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, ὅμως ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν ἢ φυλάξῃ τοὺς νόμους. τάχα μὲν οὖν τὰ περὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ 30 χαλεπὸν διορίσαι: δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν μὲν ἔχειν ἰσχῦν, εἰναι δὲ τοσαύτην τὴν ἰσχὺν ὡστε ἐκάστου μὲν καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω, τοῦ δὲ πλῆθους ἢττω, καθάπερ οὐ τ’ ἁρχαῖοι τὰς φυλακὰς ἐδίδοσαν

1 ἔχειν μὲν (vel ἰσχύν μὲν ἔχειν) Richards.

* i.e. more men of consideration went over to the opposition. 260
And from oligarchies they first changed to tyrannies, and from tyrannies to democracy; for by constantly bringing the government into fewer hands owing to a base love of gain, they made the multitude stronger, so that it set upon the oligarchs, and democracies came into existence. But now that the states have come to be even greater than they were, perhaps it is not easy for yet another form of constitution beside democracy to come into existence. And even if one held that royal government is best for states, what is to be the position as regards the king's children? Is the sovereignty to be hereditary? But this will be disastrous if the king's sons turn out to be like what some have been. It may be said that the king being sovereign will not in that case bequeath the throne to his children. But that is too much to be easy to believe: it would be difficult for a king to disinherit his sons, and an act of virtue above the level of human nature. And there is a difficulty also about the royal power: ought the man who is to reign as king to have an armed force about him, by means of which he will have power to compel those who may be unwilling to obey, or if not, how is it possible for him to administer his office? For even if he were a law-abiding sovereign and never acted according to his own will against the law, nevertheless it would be essential for him to have power behind him whereby to safeguard the laws. Probably therefore it is not difficult to define the regulations for a king of this sort: he must have a force of his own, but the force must be only so large as to be stronger than a single individual or even several individuals banded together, but weaker than the multitude, on the principle on which the men of old times used to assign bodyguards.
1286 b

οτε καθισταίεν τινα τῆς πόλεως ὅν ἐκάλουν αἰσιμνητη- 
tην ἡ τύραννον, καὶ Διονυσίω τις, ὅτε ἦτε τοὺς

40 φύλακας, συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακουσίοις διδόναι
tοσοῦτοι τοὺς φύλακας.

1287 a

XI. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ

βούλησαι πάντα πράττοντος ὃ τε λόγος ἐφέστηκε

νῦν καὶ ποιήτεον τὴν σκέψιν. ὥ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ

νόμον λεγόμενος βασιλεύς οὐκ ἦστιν εἰδοῖς, καθάπερ

ὁ εἰπομεν, πολιτείας (ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ὑπάρχει ἐν-

dέχεται στρατηγίαν ἀδίδου, οἷον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ

ἀριστοκρατίᾳ, καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσι ἕνα κύριον τῆς

διουκήσεως· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχή τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ

'Επιδαμνον, καὶ περὶ Ὀποῦντα δὲ κατὰ τι μέρος

ἐλαττον)· περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης, 2

10 αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἥν ἄρχει πάντων2 κατὰ τὴν

ἐαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεύς. δοκεῖ δὲ τιοι οὐδὲ

κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἑνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν

πολιτῶν ὅπου συνεστηκεν ἐξ ὁμοίων ἡ πόλις· τοῖς

γὰρ ὁμοίως φύσιν τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον ἀναγκαίον καὶ

tὴν αὕτην ἀξίαν κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, ὥστ' εἶπερ καὶ

15 τὸ ἔσην ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους τροφήν ἢ ἐσθήτα

βλαβερόν τοῖς σώμασιν, οὕτως ἔχειν3 καὶ τὸ περὶ

tὰς τιμάς· ὁμοίως τοῖνυν καὶ τὸ ἀνίσον τοὺς ἑαυτούς, 3

dιόπερ οὐδένα4 μᾶλλον ἄρχειν ἢ ἀρχεσθαι δίκαιον,

καὶ τὸ ἀνά μέρος τοῖνυν ὑσαύτως. τούτο δ' ἥδη

νόμος· ἡ γὰρ τὰς νόμος· τὸν ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν

1 [η τύραννον] Susemihl. 2 πάντων Jul.: πάντα codd.

3 ἔχειν Schneider: ἔχει codd.

4 οὐδένα Bernays: οὐδέν codd.

'a 'Or tyrant' looks like an incorrect note, see 1285 b 25.

b See 1259 a 39 n.  c See c. x. § 3.

d Durazzo, on the Adriatic.
whenever they appointed somebody as what they termed *aesymnetes* or tyrant of the state, and also, when Dionysius asked for his guards, somebody advised him to give the same number of guards to the citizens of Syracuse.

I XI. Our discussion has now reached the case of the king who acts in all matters according to his own will, and we must examine this type of royalty. For the so-called constitutional monarchy, as we said, is not a special kind of constitution (since it is possible for a life-long generalship to exist under all constitutions, for example under a democracy and an aristocracy, and many people make one man sovereign over the administration, for instance there is a government of this sort in Epidamnus, and also at Opus to a certain smaller extent); but we have now to discuss what is called Absolute Monarchy, which is the monarchy under which the king governs all men according to his own will. Some people think that it is entirely contrary to nature for one person to be sovereign over all the citizens where the state consists of men who are alike; for necessarily persons alike in nature must in accordance with nature have the same principle of justice and the same value, so that inasmuch as for persons who are unequal to have an equal amount of food or clothing is harmful for their bodies, the same is the case also in regard to honours; similarly therefore it is wrong for those who are equal to have inequality, owing to which it is just for no one person to govern or be governed more than another, and therefore for everybody to govern and be governed alike in turn. And this constitutes law; for regulation is law. Therefore

* Chief town of Locri, near the Straits of Euboea.
αἱ ἑρετῶτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἕνα τινὰ, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον τούτον, κἂν εἶ τινας ἄρχειν βέλτιον, τούτους καταστατέον νομοφύλακας καὶ ὑπηρέτας τοῖς νόμοις: ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναι τινας ἄρχας, ἀλλ' οὖχ ἐνα τούτον εἶναι φασὶ δίκαιον ὁμοίων γε ὁντων πάντων. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὥσα γε μὴν 4 δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὔτ' ἀνθρώπος ἂν δύνατο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ' ἐπιτήδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστηται τὰ λοιπά 'τή δικαιοτάτη γνώμη', κρύνει καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ἐπὶ δ' ἐπανορ-θοῦσαί δίδωσιν ὁ τι ἄν δοξῇ πειρωμένοις ἁμείνων εἶναι τῶν κεμένων. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νοῦν κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεόν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους,1 ὁ δ' ἀνθρώπον κελεύων προστίθησαι καὶ θηρίουν: ἦ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τους ἄριστους ἄνδρας. διὸπερ ἀνευ ὑρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστὶν. τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παραδειγμα ψεύδος, 5 ὅτι τὸ κατὰ γράμματα ἰατρεύεσθαι φαύλον, ἀλλ'2 αἱ ἑρετῶτερον χρήσθαι τοῖς ἔχουσι τὰς τέχνας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φιλίαν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἄρνονται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς κάμνοντας ὑγιά- σαντες, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἄρχαῖς πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάρων εἰώθαις πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς ἰατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύσωσι πιστευθέντας3 τοῖς ἐχθροῖς διαφθείρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν

2 ἀλλὰ καὶ codd. plurimi.
3 πεισθέντας Schneider.

a This formula came in the oath taken by the dicasts at Athens.
 b i.e. the practical sciences, of which medicine is taken as an example.

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it is preferable for the law to rule rather than any one of the citizens, and according to this same principle, even if it be better for certain men to govern, they must be appointed as guardians of the laws and in subordination to them; for there must be some government, but it is clearly not just, men say, for one person to be governor when all the citizens are alike. It may be objected that any case which the law appears to be unable to define, a human being also would be unable to decide. But the law first specially educates the magistrates for the purpose and then commissions them to decide and administer the matters that it leaves over 'according to the best of their judgement,' and furthermore it allows them to introduce for themselves any amendment that experience leads them to think better than the established code. He therefore that recommends that the law shall govern seems to recommend that God and reason alone shall govern, but he that would have man govern adds a wild animal also; for appetite is like a wild animal, and also passion warps the rule even of the best men. Therefore the law is wisdom without desire. And there seems to be no truth in the analogy which argues from the arts that it is a bad thing to doctor oneself by book, but preferable to employ the experts in the arts. For they never act contrary to principle from motives of friendship, but earn their fee when (for instance) they have cured their patients, whereas holders of political office usually do many things out of spite and to win favour; since when people suspect even the physicians of being in the confidence of their enemies and of trying to make away with them for gain, in that case they would sooner look up the treat-
ARISTOTLE

Aristotle, 6 1287 a

grāmmātων θεραπείαν ζητήσαιεν ἄν μᾶλλον. ἀλλὰ 6 1287 b μὴν εἰσάγονται γ' ἐφ' ἕαυτοις οἱ ἰατροὶ κἀμνοντες ἀλλοις ἰατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυμναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβαι, ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τε οἶκειν καὶ ἐν πάθει οἶντες. ῥώτε δὴλον ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ἡτοιμαστές τὸ μέσον ἢ ζητοῦσιν· ὃ γὰρ 1 νόμος τὸ μέσον. ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη εἰσίν, ὡστ' εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμματα ἀνθρώπως ἄρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἔθος. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ράδιον ἑφορᾶν πολλὰ τὸν 7 ἕνα δεῖξαι ἅρα πλείονας εἰναι τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἄρχοντας, ῥώτε τι διαφέρει τούτο ἐξ ἄρχης εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸν ἕνα καταστήσαι τούτον τὸν τρόπον; ἔτι, ὃ καὶ πρότερον εἰρημένον ἐστίν, εἴπερ ὁ ἀνήρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἄρχειν δίκαιον, τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίων· τούτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ σὺν τε δυ' ἐρχομένω καὶ ἡ εὐχὴ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, τοιοῦτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες. εἴσι δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἐνὶων αἱ ἄρχαὶ κύριαι κρίνειν, ἂσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ ὁν ὁ νόμος ἄδυνατεί διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ περὶ ὁν γε δυνατός, οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητεῖν περὶ τούτων ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἄριστα ὁ νόμος ἄρξειν 1 δὴ Thurot.

1 Perhaps this should be 'and.'
2 i.e. the rules of duty and of manners that are customary but not embodied in legislation: cf. 1319 b 40.
3 Iliad x. 224: the passage goes on καὶ τε πρὸ ὧ τοῦ ἐνόρσθεν ἐπὶ τῶν κέρδος ἢ, 'then one discerneth | Before the other how advantage lieth.'
4 Iliad ii. 372.
ment in the books. Yet certainly physicians themselves call in other physicians to treat them when they are ill, and gymnastic trainers put themselves under other trainers when they are doing exercises, believing that they are unable to judge truly because they are judging about their own cases and when they are under the influence of feeling. Hence it is clear that when men seek for what is just they seek for what is impartial; for the law is that which is impartial. Again, customary laws are more sovereign and deal with more sovereign matters than written laws, so that if a human ruler is less liable to error than written laws, yet he is not less liable to error than the laws of custom. But also it is certainly not easy for the single ruler to oversee a multitude of things; it will therefore be necessary for the officials appointed by him to be numerous; so that what difference does it make whether this has been the arrangement immediately from the outset or the single ruler appoints them in this manner? Again, a thing that has also been said before, if the virtuous man justly deserves to rule because he is better, yet two good men are better than one: for that is the meaning of the line:

When two together go—

and of the prayer of Agamemnon

May ten such fellow-councillors be mine.

And even now the magistrates, like the Athenian dicast, have power to judge certain cases about which the law is unable to give a clear declaration, since nobody disputes that in matters about which it can do so the law would be the best ruler and judge.
καὶ κρίνειεν. ἂλλ’ ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περὶ- 8
ληφθῆναι τοῖς νόμοις τὰ δ’ ἀδύνατα, ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἀ ποιεῖ διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν πάτερον τοῦ ἄριστον νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον ἡ τῶν ἄνδρα τῶν ἄριστον. περὶ δὲν γὰρ βουλεύονται νομοθετῆσαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶν. οὐ τοῖνυν τοῦτό γ’ ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι τὸν κρίνοντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἂλλ’ ὅτι οὐχ ἐνα μόνον ἄλλα πολλοὺς κρίνει γὰρ ἐκαστὸς ἄρχων πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἄτοπον δ’ ἰσως ἢν εἶναι δόξειν εἰ 9 βέλτιον ἵδοι τις δυνόν ὀμιασι καὶ δυσιν ἁκοίσι κρῖνων καὶ πράττων2 δυσὶ ποιᾷ καὶ χερσὶν ἡ πολλοὶ πολλοῖς, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὀφθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ μόναρχοι ποιοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ὅτα καὶ χειρας καὶ πόδας, τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἁρχῇ καὶ αὐτοῖς3 φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὀντες οὗ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαιρεσιν εἰ δὲ φίλοι κάκεινοι καὶ τῆς ἁρχῆς, ὅ γε φίλοι ἵσος καὶ ὁμοίως, ὥστ' εἰ τούτους οἴεται δεῖν ἁρχεῖν, τοὺς ὑσοὺς καὶ ὁμοίους ἁρχεῖν οἴεται δεῖν ὁμιώως.

''Α μὲν οὖν οἱ διαμφισητούντες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν λέγουσι, σχεδὸν ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν.

''Ἀλλ’ ἰσως ταῦτ’ ἐπὶ μὲν τινῶν ἔχει τὸν τρόπον ο 10 
τούτον, ἐπὶ δὲ τινῶν οὐχ οὕτως. ἐστι γὰρ τι φύσει δεσποτὸν καὶ ἄλλο βασιλευτὸν καὶ ἄλλο πολιτικόν, καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον ἄλλο ἄλλοις4. 

40 τυραννικὸν δ’ οὖν ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων

1 ἔχοι Susemihl.
2 πράττων Conring.
3 αὐτοῖς Mus.: αὐτοῖ, αὐτοῖς codd.
4 ἄλλο ἄλλοι add. Richards.
But since, although some things can be covered by the laws, other things cannot, it is the latter that cause doubt and raise the question whether it is preferable for the best law to rule or the best man. For to lay down a law about things that are subjects for deliberation is an impossibility. Therefore men do not deny that it must be for a human being to judge about such matters, but they say that it ought not to be a single human being only but a number. For the individual official judges well when he has been instructed by the law, and it would doubtless seem curious if a person saw better when judging with two eyes and two organs of hearing and acting with two feet and hands than many persons with many, since even as it is monarchs make many eyes and ears and hands and feet their own, for they adopt persons that are friendly to their rule and to themselves as their fellow-rulers. Although therefore if these assistants are not friendly they will not act in conformity with the monarch's policy, if they are friends of him and of his rule, well, a friend is one's equal and like, so that if the monarch thinks that his friends ought to rule he thinks that people who are equal to and like himself ought to rule like himself.

This then more or less is the case advanced by those who argue against kingship.

But perhaps, although this is a true account of the matter in some cases, it does not apply in others. For there is such a thing as being naturally fitted to be controlled by a master, and in another case, to be governed by a king, and in another, to exercise citizenship, and a different government is just and expedient for different people; but there is no such thing as natural fitness for tyranny, nor for any other...
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1287 b

πολιτείων ὃσα παρεκβάσεις εἰσίν, ταῦτα γὰρ γίγνεται παρὰ φύσιν. ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
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γε φανερὸν ὅσ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ὅσοις οὕτε συμφέρον ἐστὶν οὕτε δίκαιον ἐνα κύριον εἶναι
πάντων, οὕτε μὴ νόμων ὄντων, ἀλλ’ αὐτῶν ὡς ὀντα
νόμον, οὕτε νόμων ὄντων, οὕτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν
οὕτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθὸν, οὐδ’ ἀν κατ’ ἀρετὴν
5 ἀμείνων ἦ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τίς δ’ ὁ τρόπος,
λεκτέον εἰρήται δέ πως ἦδη καὶ πρότερον. πρῶτον 11
dὲ διοριστέον τί τὸ βασιλευτὸν καὶ τί τὸ ἀριστο-
κρατικὸν καὶ τί τὸ πολιτικὸν. βασιλευτὸν μὲν
ωᾶν τὸ τοιούτον ἐστὶ πλήθος δ’ πέφυκε φέρειν
γένος ὑπερέχων κατ’ ἀρετὴν πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν
10 πολιτικὴν, ἀριστοκρατικὸν δὲ¹ δ’ πέφυκε φέρειν
πλήθος ἀρχεσθαί δυνάμενον τῇ τῶν ἑλευθέρων
ἀρχῆν ὑπὸ τῶν κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς
πολιτικὴν ἀρχὴν, πολιτικὸν δὲ² ἐν ὦ πέφυκεν
ἐγγύεσθαι πλήθος πολεμικὸν δυνάμενον ἀρχεσθαί
καὶ ἀρχεῖ κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ’ ἀξίων δια-
15 νέμοντα τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχὰς. ὅταν οὖν ἦ¹
γένος ὅλον ἦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνα τινά συμβῆ
διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ’ ἀρετὴν τοσοῦτον ὡσθ’
ὑπερέχειν τῇ ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, τότε
dίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον
πάντων καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἐνα τοῦτον. καθάπερ γὰρ
20 εἰρήται πρότερον, οὐ μόνον οὕτως ἐχει κατὰ τὸ
dίκαιον δ’ προφέρειν εἰσώσαιν οἱ τὰς πολιτείας

¹ δὲ ed.: δὲ πλήθος codd. (δ—πλήθος secl. Victorius).

—a The clause translated 'that—populace' some editors excise as a superfluous insertion.
—b They also excise 'in which—populace.'

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of the forms of government that are divergences, for these come about against nature. But merely from what has been said, it is clear that among people who are alike and equal it is neither expedient nor just for one to be sovereign over all—neither when there are no laws, but he himself is in the place of law, nor when there are laws, neither when both sovereign and subjects are good nor when both are bad, nor yet when the sovereign is superior in virtue, except in a certain manner. What this manner is must be stated; and in a way it has been stated already even before. But first we must define what constitutes fitness for royal government, what fitness for aristocracy, and what for a republic. A fit subject for royal government is a populace of such a sort as to be naturally capable of producing a family of outstanding excellence for political leadership; a community fit for aristocracy is one that naturally produces a populace capable of being governed under the form of government fit for free men by those who are fitted by virtue for taking the part of leaders in constitutional government; a republican community, one in which there naturally grows up a military populace capable of being governed and of governing under a law that distributes the offices among the well-to-do in accordance with merit. When therefore it comes about that there is either a whole family or even some one individual that differs from the other citizens in virtue so greatly that his virtue exceeds that of all the others, then it is just for this family to be the royal family or this individual king, and sovereign over all matters. For, as has been said before, this holds good not only in accordance with the right that is usually brought forward by those
καθιστάντες οἱ τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς καὶ οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχικὰς, καὶ πάλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικὰς (πάντες γὰρ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν ἄξιούσιν ἀλλ’ ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν), ἀλλὰ ἢ καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον λεχθέν. οὐτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἃ φυγαδεύειν οὐδ’ ὁ στρατικός δὴ ποι τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἐστὶν, οὐτ’ ἄξιον ἀρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχει τοῦ παντός, τὸ δὲ τηλικάτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι τοῦτο συμβεβηκεν. ὡσεὶ λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος τοιοῦτον ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας, τίνας ἔχει διαφοράς, καὶ πότερον οὐ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ συμφερεὶ, καὶ τίσι, καὶ πῶς, διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον.

XII. 'Επει δὲ τρεῖς φαμεν εἶναι τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, τούτων δ’ ἄναγκαιον ἀρίστην εἶναι τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων οἰκονομομενήν, τοιαύτη δ’ ἐστὶν ἐν ἡ συμβεβηκεν ἢ ἑνα τινὰ συμπάντων ἢ γένος ὅλον ἡ πλήθος ὑπερέχον εἶναι κατ’ ἄρετήν, τῶν μὲν ἀρχεσθαι δυναμένων τῶν δ’ ἀρχεῖν πρὸς τὴν ἀρετωτάτην ζωήν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις ἐδείχθη λόγος ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἄναγκαιον ἀνδρὸς ἄρετήν εἶναι καὶ πολίτου τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλιν συστήσειν ἃν τις ἀριστοκρατομενήν η βασιλευομενήν, ὡστ’ ἐσται

1 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἢ Γ (immo Guil.).
2 (ἀριστή ἢ) ἀριστοκρατομενήν Buecheler.

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a i.e. the right of merit, c. viii. § 7.
b Bk. III. cc. ii., iii.
c Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'establish a

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who are founding aristocratic and oligarchic constitutions, and from the other side by those who are founding democratic ones (for they all make their claim on the ground of superiority, though not the same superiority), but it also holds good in accordance with the right spoken of before. For it is not seemly to put to death or banish, nor yet obviously to ostracize, such a man, nor is it seemly to call upon him to take his turn as a subject; for it is not in the order of nature for the part to overtop the whole, but the man that is so exceptionally outstanding has come to overtop the whole community. Hence it only remains for the community to obey such a man, and for him to be sovereign not in turn but absolutely.

Let this be our answer to the questions as regards kingship, what are its varieties, and whether it is disadvantageous for states or advantageous, and for what states, and under what conditions.

XII. And since we pronounce the right constitutions to be three, and of these the one governed by the best men must necessarily be the best, and such is the one in which it has come about either that some one man or a whole family or a group of men is superior in virtue to all the citizens together, the latter being able to be governed and the former to govern on the principles of the most desirable life, and since in the first part of the discourse it was proved that the virtue of a man and that of a citizen in the best state must of necessity be the same, it is evident that a man becomes good in the same way and by the same means as one might establish an aristocratically or monarchically governed state, so that it will be state governed in the best way by an aristocracy or a monarchy.
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καὶ παῖδεία καὶ ἐθη ταύτα σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαίον ἄνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν.

Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἦδη πειρατέον λέγει τῆς ἀρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς. [ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν σκέψιν. . . .]

1 partem exordii libri VII. admodum uariatam hoc tumulatur codd.

a The concluding sentence, by whomever written, clearly leads on to the Book that is No. VII. in the mss. and in this edition; and after it the mss. add half the first sentence of that Book, slightly altered. Some editors therefore transfer Books VII. and VIII. here and put Books IV., V. and VI. after them; opinions vary as to the proper order of Books IV., V. and VI. among themselves.
almost the same education and habits that make a man good and that make him capable as a citizen or a king.

These conclusions having been laid down, we must now endeavour to discuss the best form of constitution and to say in what way it is natural for it to come into existence and how it is natural for it to be organized.\footnote{\textsuperscript{a}}

\textbf{Additional Notes}

\textsuperscript{III}. \textsuperscript{ii}. \textsuperscript{3}, 1276 b 38. If we emend the text with Bernays to \textit{ei γὰρ δύνατον ἐξ ἀπάντων σπουδαῖων ὅτι ἐναι πόλιν}, the sense is: assuming the possibility of a perfect state, with all its factors the best of their kind, this means that all the population will be good citizens, not that they will all be perfect specimens of the human race, because the state needs citizens of the working classes, etc., and these cannot in the nature of things be perfect human beings.

\textsuperscript{III}. \textsuperscript{iii}. \textsuperscript{1}, 1277 b 38 \textit{οὖτος γὰρ πολίτης}. The translation takes \textit{πολίτης} as subject and \textit{οὖτος} as predicate (meaning \textit{ἔχων τὴν τοιαύτην ἄρετήν}, possessing capacity to govern). But possibly the predicate is \textit{πολίτης} and the subject \textit{οὖτος}, which then stands for \textit{ὁ βάναυσος}; if so, the whole sentence means that if the non-official classes are citizens, not all the citizens will possess civic virtue (which is capacity to govern), for the working-man will be a citizen (and he is not capable of governing).
I. Ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις 1 ταῖς μὴ κατὰ μόριον γινομέναις ἀλλὰ περὶ γένος ἐν τι τελείαις οὕσαις, μιᾶς ἐστὶ θεωρήσαι τὸ περὶ ἐκαστὸν γένος1 ἀρμόττον, οἰον ἀσκησις σώματι ποίᾳ τε ποίῳ συμφέρει καὶ τὶς ἀρίστη (τῷ γὰρ κάλλιστα πεφυκότι καὶ κεχορηγημένῳ τὴν ἀρίστην 15 ἀναγκαῖον ἀρμόττειν), καὶ τὶς τοῖς πλεῖστοις μᾶν πᾶσιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἔστιν), ἐτι δ’ ἐάν τις μὴ τῆς ὑκνομένης ἐπιθυμή μήθ’ ἐξεως μὴτ’ ἐπιστήμης τῶν περὶ τὴν ἁγωνίαν, μηδὲν2 ἢπτον τοῦ παιδοτρίβου καὶ τοῦ γυμναστικοῦ παρασκευάσαι γε3 καὶ ταύτην ἐστὶ τὴν δύναμιν ὁμοίως 20 δὲ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ ιατρικὴν καὶ περὶ ναυτηγιαν καὶ ἑσθῆτα καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην τέχνην ὑρόμεν συμβαίνον. ὡστε δήλον ὅτι καὶ πολιτείαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης τὴν ἀρίστην θεωρῆσαι τίς ἐστι καὶ ποία τις ἃν οὕσα μάλιστ’ εἰη κατ’ εὐχήν μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος τῶν ἐκτός, καὶ τὶς τίσων ἀρμότ- 276

1 γένος secl. Spengel.
2 οὔδὲν Bk2 (μηδὲν ἢπτον cum praecedentibus Immisch, tr. infra post δύναμιν Richards).
3 γε Coraes (tr. supra, τοῦ γε παιδοτρίβου Richards): τε codd.

Transposed as Book VI. by some editors: see p. 274 n.

Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'to each individual.'

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BOOK IVa

1. In all the arts and the sciences that are not merely sectional but that in relation to some one class of subject are complete, it is the function of a single art or science to study what is suited to each class, for instance what sort of gymnastic exercise is beneficial for what sort of bodily frame, and what is the best sort (for the best must naturally suit the person of the finest natural endowment and equipment), and also what one exercise taken by all is the best for the largest number (for this is also a question for gymnastic science), and in addition, in case someone desires a habit of body and a knowledge of athletic exercises that are not the ones adapted to him, it is clearly the task of the trainer and gymnastic master to produce this capacity also just as much; and we notice this also happening similarly in regard to medicine, and ship-building, and the making of clothes, and every other craft. Hence it is clear that in the case of the constitution as well it is the business of the same science to study which is the best constitution and what character it must have to be the most ideal if no external circumstance stands in the way, and what constitution is adapted to what

i.e. a bodily bearing and athletic skill that are not the ones most suited to the pupil’s particular physique.
The fourfold classification given just before is repeated in rather loose terms in this sentence.

The word originally denoted the duty of the wealthy citizen holding the office of Choregus to supply dresses, etc., for the chorus and actors in a drama.
people (since for many it is doubtless impossible to attain the best one, so that the good lawgiver and the true statesman must be acquainted with both the form of constitution that is the highest absolutely and that which is best under assumed conditions), and also thirdly the form of constitution based on a certain supposition (for he must be also capable of considering both how some given constitution could be brought into existence originally and also in what way having been brought into existence it could be preserved for the longest time: I mean for example if it has befallen some state not only not to possess the best constitution and to be unprovided even with the things necessary for it, but also not to have the constitution that is practicable under the circumstances but an inferior one); and beside all these matters he must ascertain the form of constitution most suited to all states, since most of those who make pronouncements about the constitution, even if the rest of what they say is good, entirely miss the points of practical utility. For it is proper to consider not only what is the best constitution but also what is the one possible of achievement, and likewise also what is the one that is easier and more generally shared by all states. But as it is, some students inquire which is the highest form of all even though requiring much material equipment, while those who rather state some general form sweep aside the constitutions actually existing and praise that of Sparta or some other; but the proper course is to bring forward an organization of such a sort that men will easily be persuaded and be able in the existing circumstances to take part in it, since to reform a constitution is no less a task than to frame
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1289 a 5 ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ μεταμανθάνειν τοῦ μανθάνειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· διὸ πρὸς τοὺς εἰρημένους καὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχοῦσαι πολιτείαις δεῖ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν τὸν πολιτικὸν, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρῶτερον. τούτῳ δὲ ἀδύνατον ἀγνοοῦντα πόσα πολιτείας ἐστὶν εἰδήν; νῦν δὲ μίαν δημοκρατίαν οἴνοντα τινὲς εἴναι καὶ μίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς. ὡστε δὲ ταῦτα 1 τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης καὶ νόμους τοὺς ἀρίστους Ἰδεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐκάστης τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀρμόττοντας. πρὸς γὰρ τὰς πολιτείας τοὺς νόμους δεῖ τίθεσθαι καὶ τίθενται πάντες, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς πολιτείας πρὸς τοὺς νόμους: πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηται, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστὶν, νόμοι δὲ κεχωρισμένοι τῶν δηλοῦντων τὴν πολιτείαν, καθ' οὐς δεῖ τοὺς ἀρχοῦτας ἄρχειν καὶ φυλάττειν τοὺς παραβαίνοντας αὐτούς. ὡστε δὴλον ὅτι τὰς δια- 6 φορὰς ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχειν τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν νόμων θέσεις, οὐ γὰρ οἶνον τε τοὺς αὐτούς νόμους συμβέβηκεν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐδὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις πάσαις, εἰπὲ δὴ πλείουσα 2 καὶ μὴ μία δημοκρατία μηδὲ ὀλιγαρχία 25 μόνον ἐστὶν.

II. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μεθόδῳ περὶ τῶν πολι-1
teiōn διειλόμεθα τρεῖς μὲν τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας,

1 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα anon. apud Stahr: μετὰ δὲ codd.
2 πλείω codd. cet. (eἰπὲ ρ η πλείω Spengel).

280 a Book III. c. v.
one from the beginning, just as to re-learn a science is just as hard as to learn it originally; in addition therefore to the things mentioned the student of politics must also be able to render aid to the constitutions that exist already, as was also said before. But this is impossible if he does not know how many kinds of constitution there are; but at present some people think that there is only one kind of democracy and one kind of oligarchy, but this is not true. Hence he must take in view the different varieties of the constitutions, and know how many there are and how many are their combinations. And after this it needs this same discrimination also to discern the laws that are the best, and those that are suited to each of the forms of constitution. For the laws should be laid down, and all people lay them down, to suit the constitutions—the constitutions must not be made to suit the laws; for a constitution is the regulation of the offices of the state in regard to the mode of their distribution and to the question what is the sovereign power in the state and what is the object of each community, but laws are distinct from the principles of the constitution, and regulate how the magistrates are to govern and to guard against those who transgress them. So that clearly it is necessary to be in possession of the different varieties of each form of constitution, and the number of these, even for the purpose of legislation; for it is impossible for the same laws to be expedient for all oligarchies or democracies if there are really several kinds of them, and not one sort of democracy or oligarchy only.

II. And inasmuch as in our first inquiry about the forms of the constitution we classified the right
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\[1289\text{a}\]

\[\text{βασιλείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν πολιτείαν, τρεῖς δὲ τὰς τούτων παρεκβάσεις, τυραννίδα μὲν βασιλείας ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας δημοκρατίαν δὲ πολιτείας, καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας εὑρήται (τὸ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας θεωρῆσαι ταύτό καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν τῶν ὄνομάτων, βούλεται γὰρ ἐκατέρα κατ’ ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην), ἢτι δὲ τὶ διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων ἀριστοκρατία καὶ βασιλεία καὶ πότε δεῖ βασιλείαν νομίζειν διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν περὶ πολιτείας διελθεῖν τῆς τῶν κοινῶν προσ- αγορευμένης ὀνόματι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλλών πολι- τειῶν, ὀλιγαρχίας τε καὶ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος. φανερὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τῶν παρεκ- βάσεων τὸς χειρίστη καὶ δευτέρα τῆς ἀνάγκη \\
\[1289\text{b}\]

γὰρ τὴν μὲν τῆς πρώτης καὶ θεωτάτης παρεκβασιν εἶναι χειρίστην, τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τοῦνομα μόνον ἐχειν οὐκ οὔσαν ἡ διὰ πολλῆς ὑπεροχὴν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ βασιλευόντος. ὡστε τὴν τυραννίδα χειρίστην οὔσαν πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν πολι- τείας, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν (ἡ γὰρ ἀριστο- κρατία διεστήκηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας), μετρωτάτην δὲ τὴν δημοκρατίαν. ἦδη μὲν οὖν 3 τις ἀπεφήνατο καὶ τῶν πρῶτον οὔτως, οὐ μὴν εἰς ταύτῳ βλέψας ἡμῖν ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἔκρινε πασῶν μὲν οὕσων ἐπιεικῶν, οἶον ὀλιγαρχίας τε

\[\text{a i.e. πολιτεία, 'polity,' which denotes not only a constitution of any form, but also (like our term 'constitutional government') a particular form, viz., a republic, cf. Bk. III. c. v. § 2.}

\[\text{b The three forms of constitution last mentioned.}

\[\text{c Corruptio optimi pessima, a Socratic notion: 'the men}

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constitutions as three, kingship, aristocracy and constitutional government, and the deviations from these as three, tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy and democracy from constitutional government, and about aristocracy and kingship we have spoken (for to study the best constitution is the same thing as to speak about the forms that bear those names, since each of them means a system based on the qualification of virtue equipped with means), and as also the question what constitutes the difference between aristocracy and kingship and when a royal government is to be adopted has been decided before, it remains to discuss the form of constitution designated by the name \(^a\) common to them all, and the other forms, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny. Now it is manifest also which of these deviations \(^b\) is the worst and which the second worst. For necessarily the deviation from the first and most divine must be the worst,\(^c\) and kingship must of necessity either possess the name only, without really being kingship, or be based on the outstanding superiority of the man who is king; so that tyranny being the worst form must be the one farthest removed from constitutional government, and oligarchy must be the second farthest (for aristocracy is widely separated from that constitution), while democracy must be the most moderate. An account of their relative merits has indeed already been given also by one of the former writers,\(^d\) though not on the same principle as ours; for he inclined to judge that there were good varieties of all the forms, of the best natural gifts, when uneducated, are the worst,\(^e\)

\(^a\) Plato, *Politics* 302 a ff.

\(^b\) Xen. *Mem.* iv. 1. 3.

\(^c\) Xen. *Mem.* iv. 1. 3.

\(^d\) Xen. *Mem.* iv. 1. 3.

\(^e\) Plato, *Politics* 302 a ff.
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χρήστης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, χειρόστην δημοκρατίαν, φαύλων δὲ ἀρίστην, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅλως ταύτας ἐξημαρτη- 4
10 μένας εἶναι φαμεν, καὶ βελτίω μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν1 λέγειν, ἤττον δὲ φαύλην. ἄλλα περὶ μὲν τῆς τουαύτης κρίσεως ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν· ἡμῖν δὲ πρῶτον μὲν διαιρετέον πόσαι δια- φοραί τῶν πολιτείων, εἴπερ ἐστὶν εἴδη πλείονα τῆς τε δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, ἐπειτὰ τῖς 15 κοινοτάτη, καὶ τῖς αἰρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἁρίστην πολιτείαν, κἂν εἰ τις ἄλλη τετύχηκεν ἀριστοκρατική καὶ συνεστώσα καλῶς, ἄλλ’ οὐ2 ταῖς πλείονες ἀρ- μοττοσα πόλεσι, τῖς ἔστιν, ἐπειτὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 5 τῆς τίσιν αἰρετῆ (τάχα γὰρ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαίᾳ δημο- κρατίᾳ μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχίας, τοῖς δ’ αὕτη μᾶλλον ἐκείνης), μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τίνα τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι τοῦ βουλόμενου ταύτας τὰς πολιτείας, λέγω δὲ δημοκρατίας τε καθ’ ἐκαστον εἶδος καὶ πάλιν ὀλιγ- αρχίας, τέλος δὲ, πάντων τούτων ὅταν ποιησόμεθα συντόμως τὴν ἐνδεχόμενην μνείαν, πειρατέον ἐπ- ελθεῖν τίνες φθοραί καὶ τίνες σωτηρία τῶν πολι- 25 τειών καὶ κοινῆ καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστης, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας ταῦτα μάλιστα γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν.

III. Τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι πλείους πολιτείας αἴτιων 1 ὅτι πάσης ἐστὶ μέρη πλείω πόλεως τὸν ἀριθμὸν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἴς οἴκιων συγκειμένας πάσας 30 ὃρῳμεν τὰς πόλεις, ἐπείτα πάλιν τούτων τοῦ πλῆθους τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τοὺς

1 Richards: ἔχει codd. 8 οὐ add. Coraes (cf. 1295 a 31 ff.).
for instance a good sort of oligarchy and so on, and that democracy was the worst among these, but the best among the bad varieties, whereas we say that the deviations are wholly wrong, and that it is not right to speak of one form of oligarchy as better than another, but only as less bad. But let us for the present dismiss the question of a classification of this nature. Our business is first to distinguish how many different forms of the constitutions there are, assuming that there do exist several kinds of democracy and of oligarchy; next, which form is most general, and which most desirable after the best constitution, and also if there exists some other form that is aristocratic in nature and well constructed but not fitted to the largest number of cities, which this is; next, which of the other forms too is desirable for what people (since probably for some democracy is necessary more than oligarchy, and for others oligarchy more than democracy); and after this, in what way should one proceed who wishes to set up these constitutions, I mean the various forms of democracy and of oligarchy; and finally, when as far as possible we have concisely touched upon all these questions, we must endeavour to review what are the agencies that destroy and what are those that preserve constitutions generally and each variety of constitution in particular, and what are the causes by which it is most natural for these events to be brought about.

1 III. Now the reason of there being several forms of constitution is that every city has a considerable number of parts. For in the first place we see that all the cities are composed of households, and then again that of this multitude some must necessarily

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1289 b δ' ἀπόρους τοὺς δὲ μέσους, καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων τὸ μὲν ὀπλιτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἄνοπλον. καὶ τὸν μὲν γεωργικὸν δῆμον ὅρμην ὅντα, τὸν δ' ἀγοραίον, τὸν δὲ βάναυσον. καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων εἰδι διαφορὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν πλούτον καὶ τὰ μεγέθη

35 τῆς οὐσίας (οἶνον ἐπιποτροφίας, τοῦτο γὰρ οὖ βάδιον μὴ πλουτοῦντας ποιεῖν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τῶν 2 ἀρχάιων χρόνων ὁσιάς πόλεων ἐν τοῖς ἑπτοἴς ἡ δύναμις ἤ, ὀλγαρχίᾳ παρὰ τούτοις ἡσαυ· ἐκροώντο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους1 ἐπιποιοῦσ πρὸς2 τοὺς ἀστυνείτονας, οἶνον Ἐρετρείεσ καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς καὶ

40 Μάγνητες οἱ ἐπὶ Μαίανδρῳ καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν πολλοὶ περὶ τὴν 'Ἀσίαν). ἔτι πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον δια-

1290 a φοραῖς ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἡ δὲ κατ' ἄρετήν, καὶ εἶ τι δὴ τοιοῦτον ἔτερον εὑρῆται πόλεως εἶναι μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ διειλόμεθα ἐκ πόσων μερῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ πάσα πόλις). τοῦτων γὰρ τῶν μερῶν ὅτε μὲν πάντα μετ-έχει τῆς πολιτείας ὅτε δ' ἐλάττων ὅτε δὲ πλείω. φανερῶν τοῖς ὅτι πλείους ἀναγκαίον εἶναι πολι-3 τείας εἰδεὶ διαφεροῦσας ἄλληλων· καὶ γὰρ ταὐτ' εἰδεὶ διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὐτῶν. πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξις ἐστί, ταῦτας3 δὲ διανεμοῦνται πάντες ἡ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων ἡ κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδιότητα κοινῆν, λέγω δ' οἶνον τῶν ἀπόρων ἡ τῶν εὐπόρων ἡ κοινὴν τῶν ἀμφοῖν.4 ἀναγκαίον ἀρα πολιτείας εἶναι τοσαύτας ὅσαι περ

1 πολέμους Γ' (cf. 1330 a 18): πολεμίους codd.
2 [πρὸς] Immisch (cf. ibid.).
3 Richards: ταύτην codd.
4 [ἡ—ἀμφοῖν] Ramus.

This clause looks like an interpolation.
be rich and some poor and some between the two, and also of the rich and the poor the former class is heavy-armed and the latter without armour. And we see that one portion of the common people is agricultural, another engaged in trade and another mechanic. And the upper classes have distinctions also corresponding to their wealth and the amounts of their property (for example in a stud of horses—for it is not easy to rear horses without being rich, and this is why in ancient times there were oligarchies in all the states whose strength lay in their cavalry, and they used to use horses for their wars against their neighbours, as for instance did the Eretrians and Chalcidians and the people of Magnesia on the Maeander and many of the other Asiatic peoples). Moreover in addition to differences in wealth there is the difference of birth, and that in regard to virtue, and indeed any other similar distinction that in the discussion of aristocracy has been stated to constitute a part of the state (for there we distinguished how many necessary parts there are of which every state must consist); for sometimes all of these parts participate in the constitution and sometimes a smaller or a larger number of them. It is clear therefore that there must necessarily be several forms of constitution differing in kind from one another, inasmuch as these parts differ in kind among themselves. For a constitution means the arrangement of the magistracies, and these all people distribute either according to the power of those who share political rights, or according to some common equality between them, I mean for example between the poor or between the rich, or some equality common to them both. It follows therefore that there are as many forms of
Aristotle refers to this view in Meteorologica 364 a 19, saying that west winds are classed with north and east winds with south, because wind from the setting sun is cooler and from the rising sun warmer. He notes that north and south
constitution as there are modes of arrangement according to the superiorities and the differences of the sections. But the forms mostly are thought to be two—just as in the case of the winds we speak of some as north and some as south and regard the rest as deviations from these, so also of constitutions there are held to be two forms, democracy and oligarchy; for men reckon aristocracy as a kind of oligarchy because it is oligarchy of a sort, and what is called constitutional government as democracy, just as in the case of the winds they reckon the west wind as a kind of north wind and the east wind as a kind of south wind. And the case is similar with musical modes, as some people say: for there too they posit two kinds, the Dorian mode and the Phrygian, and call the other scales some of them Dorian and the others Phrygian. For the most part therefore they are accustomed to think in this way about the constitutions; but it is truer and better to class them as we did, and assuming that there are two well-constructed forms, or else one, to say that the others are deviations, some from the well-blended constitution and the others from the best one, the more tense and masterful constitutions being oligarchic and the relaxed and soft ones demotic.

But it is not right to define democracy, as some people are in the custom of doing now, merely as the constitution in which the multitude is sovereign (for even in oligarchies and everywhere the majority is sovereign) nor oligarchy as the constitution in which a few are sovereign over the government. For if the whole number were thirteen hundred, and a thousand winds are the most frequent, ib. 361 a 6: this may have suggested the idea that they were the typical winds.
καὶ μὴ μεταδιδοίεν ἄρχης τοῖς τριακοσίοις καὶ πένθου εὐλευθέρως οὕσι καὶ τάλα ὁμοίους, οὔθεις ἂν φαίη δημοκρατεῖθαι τούτους· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ πένθηντες μὲν ὁλίγοι εἰεν, κρείττους δὲ τῶν εὐπόρων πλείονν όντων, οὔθεις ἂν ὁλιγαρχίαν προσαγορεύσειεν οὐδὲ τὴν τοιαύτην εἰ τοῖς ἄλλοις.  

οὔσι πλουσίους μὴ μετείη τῶν τιμῶν. μᾶλλον τοῖνυν λεκτέον ὅτι δήμος μὲν ἔστω ὅταν οἱ ἐλευθεροὶ κύριοι ὅσων ὁλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν οἱ πλουσίοι, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς εἰναι τοὺς δ' ὁλίγους, ἐλευθεροὶ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ πλουσίοι δ' ὁλίγοι. καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἰ κατὰ μέγεθος διενέμοντο τὰς ἀρχὰς, ὥσπερ ἐν Αἰθιοπίᾳ φασὶ τῖνες, ἡ κατὰ κάλλος, ὁλιγαρχία ἢν ἃν, ὁλίγον γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν καλῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν μεγάλων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὔδε τούτους μόνον ἱκανῶς ἔχει διωρίσθαι τὰς πολιτείας ταύτας· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πλείονα μόρια καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς ὁλιγαρχίας εἰσῶν, ἐτι διαλειπτέον ὡς οὔτ' ἂν οἱ ἐλευθεροὶ ὁλίγοι ὁντες πλείονων καὶ μὴ ἐλευθέρων ἄρχωσι δήμος, οἶον ἐν Ἀπολλωνίᾳ τῇ ἐν τῷ Ἰούνω καὶ ἐν Θῆρᾳ (ἐν τούτων γὰρ ἐκατέρα τῶν πόλεων ἐν ταῖς τιμαις ἢσαν οἱ διαφέροντες κατ' εὐγένειαν καὶ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας, ὁλίγοι ὁντες πολλῶν), οὔτ' ἂν οἱ πλουσίοι διὰ τὸ κατὰ πλῆθος ὑπερέχειν, δήμος, οἶον ἐν Κολοφώνι τὸ παλαιόν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἐκείνητο μακρὰν οὕσιάν οἱ πλείους πρῶι γενέσθαι τὸν πό-

1 πολλοῖς Richards.  
2 τῶν Ἀ. Susemihl.  
3 ὁλιγαρχία Bojesen.

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a e.g. Herodotus iii. 20.  
b i.e. those of citizen birth.
of these were rich and did not give the three hundred poor a share in the government although they were free-born and like themselves in all other respects, no one would say that this people was governed democratically; and similarly also if there were few poor, but these more powerful than the rich who were more numerous, no one would call such a government a democracy either, if the other citizens being rich had no share in the honours. Rather therefore ought we to say that it is a democracy when the free are sovereign and an oligarchy when the rich are, but that it comes about that the sovereign class in a democracy is numerous and that in an oligarchy small because there are many men of free birth and few rich. For otherwise, suppose people assigned the offices by height, as some persons say is done in Ethiopia, or by beauty, that would be an oligarchy, because both the handsome and the tall are few in number. Nevertheless it is not enough to define these constitutions even by wealth and free birth only; but inasmuch as there are more elements than one both in democracy and in oligarchy, we must add the further distinction that neither is it a democracy if the free being few govern the majority who are not of free birth, as for instance at Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf and at Thera (for in each of these cities the offices of honour were filled by the specially noble families who had been the first settlers of the colonies, and these were few out of many), nor is it a democracy if the rich rule because they are in a majority, as in ancient times at Colophon (for there the majority of the population owned large property

Perhaps the Greek should be altered here to give 'an oligarchy.'
λεμον τον προσ Ανδούσ), ἀλλ' ἐστὶ δημοκρατία μὲν ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἀποροι πλείους ὄντες κύριοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ὡσιν, ὀλυγαρχία δ' ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεστέροι ὄλγοι ὄντες.

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτείαι πλείους, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, 9 εἴρηται· διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τι, λέγωμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ οὐχ ἐν μέρος ἀλλὰ 25 πλεῖω πᾶσαν ἔχειν πόλιν. ὥστε διόν εἰ ζῷον προηρούμεθα λαβεῖν εἰδη, πρῶτον ἀν ἀποδιωρίζομεν ὅπερ ἀναγκαίον πᾶν ἔχειν ζῷον (οἷον ἑνώ τε τῶν αἰθητηρίων καὶ τὸ τῆς τροφῆς ἐργαστικὸν καὶ δεκτικὸν, οἷον στόμα καὶ κοιλίαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτως, οἷς κινεῖται μορίος ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), εἰ 10 δὲ 1 τοσαῦτα εἰν' μόνον, τούτων δ' εἰεν διαφορά (λέγω δ' οἶον στόματος των πλείω γένη καὶ κοιλίας καὶ τῶν αἰθητηρίων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν κινητικῶν μορίων), ὁ τῆς συζευξειος τῆς τούτων ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιήσει πλείω γένη ζῷων (οὐ γὰρ οἶον τε ταυτόν ζῷων ἔχειν πλείους στόματος διαφοράς, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ' ὁτῶν), ὥστε ὅταν λῃθώσι τούτων πάντες οἱ ἐνδεχόμενοι συνδυασμοί πουήσουσιν εἰδή ζῷου, καὶ τοσαῦτ' εἰδή τοῦ ζῷου ὀσαπερ αἱ συζευξειοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων μορίων εἰσίν—τῶν αὐτῶν 11 δὴ τρόπον καὶ τῶν εἰρημένων πολιτείων. καὶ γὰρ αἱ πόλεις οὐκ εἴ ἐνὸς ἀλλ' ἐκ πολλῶν σύγκεινται

1 δὲ Thurot: δὴ aut δὲ codd.
2 εἰὴ Newman: εἰδὴ codd. 3 δὴ Coraes: δὲ codd.

See § 1.
before the war against the Lydians took place), but it is a democracy when those who are free are in the majority and have sovereignty over the government, and an oligarchy when the rich and more well born are few and sovereign.

9 It has then been stated that there are several forms of constitution, and what is the cause of this; but let us take the starting-point that was laid down before a and say that there are more forms than those mentioned, and what these forms are, and why they vary. For we agree that every state possesses not one part but several. Therefore just as, in case we intended to obtain a classification of animals, we should first define the properties necessarily belonging to every animal (for instance some of the sense-organs, and the machinery for masticating and for receiving food, such as a mouth and a stomach, and in addition to these the locomotive organs of the various species), and if there were only so many necessary parts, but there were different varieties of these (I mean for instance certain various kinds of mouth and stomach and sensory organs, and also of the locomotive parts as well), the number of possible combinations of these variations will necessarily produce a variety of kinds of animals (for it is not possible for the same animal to have several different sorts of mouth, nor similarly of ears either), so that when all the possible combinations of these are taken they will all produce animal species, and there will be as many species of the animal as there are combinations of the necessary parts:—so in the same way also we shall classify the varieties of the constitutions that have been mentioned. For states also are composed not of one but of several parts, as
μερῶν, ὥσπερ εἰρήτατι πολλάκις. ἐν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν πλήθος, οἱ καλοῦμενοι γεωρ-

5 γοί, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καλοῦμενον βάναυσον (ἐστὶ δὲ τούτο περὶ τὰς τέχνας ὅν ἄνευ πόλιν ἄδυνατον οἰ-

κείσθαι, τούτων δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς μὲν ἐκ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὰς δὲ εἰς τροφὴν ἢ τὸ καλῶς ἥν),

τρίτον δ' ἀγοραίον (λέγω δ' ἀγοραίον τὸ περὶ τὰς πράσεις καὶ τὰς ὁνάς καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ

καπηλείας διατριβοῦν), τέταρτον δὲ τὸ θητικόν, πέμπτον δὲ γένος τὸ προπολεμήσον, δ' τούτων οὐθὲν ἢ
tτῶν ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν εἰ μέλλουσι μὴ
dουλεύσειν τοῖς ἐπιοῦσιν μὴ γὰρ ἐν τῶν ἄδυνάτων

ἡ πόλιν ἄξιον εἶναι καλεῖν τὴν φύσει δούλην,

10 αὐτάρκης γὰρ ἡ πόλις τὸ δὲ δούλον οὐκ αὐτάρκες.

διόπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κομψὸς τούτο, οὐχ ἰκανῶς 12
dὲ εἰρήται. φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐκ τεττάρων
tῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων πόλιν συγκείσθαι, λέγει δὲ
tούτους ὕφαντην καὶ γεωργον καὶ σκυτοτόμον καὶ

15 οἰκοδόμον πόλιν δὲ προστίθησιν, οὐκ οὐχ αὐτάρκων
tούτων, χαλκέα καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις

βοσκήμασιν, ἔτι δ' ἐμπορον τε καὶ κάπηλον. καὶ
tαῦτα πάντα γίνεται πλήρωμα τῆς πρώτης πόλεως,

ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων γε χάρων πᾶσαν πόλιν συν-
estηκυίαν ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ μᾶλλον, ἵσον τε
dεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν τὸ δὲ προ-

20 πολεμοῦν οὐ πρότερον ἀποδίδωσι μέρος πρῶν ἢ τῆς

χώρας αὐξομένης καὶ τῆς τῶν πλησίων ἀπτομένης

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a Plato, Rep. ii. 369 b-371 e.
b i.e. the first sketch of the City-state, loc. cit.

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has been said often. One of these parts therefore is the mass of persons concerned with food who are called farmers, and second is what is called the mechanic class (and this is the group engaged in the arts without which it is impossible for a city to be inhabited, and some of these arts are indispensably necessary, while others contribute to luxury or noble living), and third is a commercial class (by which I mean the class that is engaged in selling and buying and in wholesale and retail trade), and fourth is the class of manual labourers, and the fifth class is the one to defend the state in war, which is no less indispensable than the others if the people are not to become the slaves of those who come against them; for surely it is quite out of the question that it should be proper to give the name of state to a community that is by nature a slave, for a state is self-sufficient, but that which is a slave is not self-sufficient. Therefore the statement made in the Republic is witty but not adequate. For Socrates says that the most necessary elements of which a state is composed are four, and he specifies these as a weaver, a farmer, a shoemaker and a builder; and then again he adds, on the ground that these are not self-sufficient, a copper-smith and the people to look after the necessary live-stock, and in addition a merchant and a retail trader. These elements together constitute the full complement of his first city, implying that every city is formed for the sake of the necessaries of life and not rather for the sake of what is noble, and that it has equal need of both shoemakers and farmers; but the warrior class he does not assign to it until as the territory is increased and comes into contact with that of the neighbours they are brought into
eis pôlemon katabtôsow. állass mûn kai eîn toîs téttaros kai toîs ópposousoûn kouwenois ãnagkaion einai tina tòn ápodôsonta kai krinontta to dikaiou. eîper oûn kai pûkên aîn tis theîz ëîoun 25 mûrion mållon ã sóima, kai pôlewn tâ toiauta mållon thetêon tów eis tîn ãnagkaian chrêsan sun- tevontwn, tô polemiçon kai tô metêxion dikaiosûnhs dikastikhs, prôs ì dê touîtos tô boulevomenu, óper ëstî sunnesews politikhs èrghon. kai taût eîte kekwrismênes1 ùpàrxei touîn eîte toîs autoîs, 30 outheîn diapherei prôs tôn lògon kai gar óплitexev kai geowrygei smvbainei toîs autoîs pollassis. ëwste eîper kai taûta kai ëkeîna thetêa mûria tîs pôlews, fanevôn òti tô ge óplichikan ãnagkaion ëstî mûrion tîs pôlews. ëbdomôn dê tô taîs oujsias leitourgoûn, ð kaloumen evpotroûs. òugdôn dê tô 85 ðhmuourugikon kai tô peri tâs arxhas leitourgouîn, eîper aneu àrhxontwn adûnaton einai pôlwn ãnag- kaion ouîn einai tînas toîs dynamènous àrchein kai leitourgoûntas ñ sunexês ñ kata méros tîs pôlei taûtîn tîn leitourgian. loipâ dê peri òn tân- xânomev diworikotês àrtiw, tô boulevómênou kai 40 tô krîvon peri tôv dikaiów toîs ãmfisbhtosûn. eîper ouîn taûta deî gînesvai2 taîs pôleîs kai 1291 ã kalôs gînesvai3 kai dikaiûs, ãnagkaion kai met-

1 kekwrismênes? Richards. 2 kai tô ed.: kal eodd. 3 gînesvai ed.: ãgënesvai eodd.

* The first four classes and the military and judicial.
POLITICS, IV. iii. 13-14

war. But yet even among the four partners or whatever their number be there must necessarily be somebody to assign justice and to judge their claims; inasmuch therefore as one would count the soul of an animal to be more a part of it than the body, so also the factors in states corresponding to the soul must be deemed to be parts of them more than those factors which contribute to necessary utility,—the former being the military class and the class that plays a part in judicial justice, and in addition to these the deliberative class, deliberation being a function of political intelligence. And it makes no difference to the argument whether these functions are held by special classes separately or by the same persons; for it often happens for the same men to be both soldiers and farmers. Hence inasmuch as both groups of classes must be counted parts of the state, it is clear that the heavy-armed soldiery at any rate must be a part of the state. And a seventh class is the one that serves the community by means of its property, the class that we call the rich. And an eighth is the class of public servants, that is, those who serve in the magistracies, inasmuch as without rulers it is impossible for a city to exist; it is therefore necessary that there should be some men who are able to govern and who render this service to the state either continuously or in turn. And there remain the classes which we happen to have defined just before, the deliberative class and the one that judges the claims of litigants. If therefore it is proper for the states to have these functions performed, and well and justly performed, it is necessary

b Lower grades of the forces may be excluded from citizenship, e.g. the rowers of the triremes (see below, 1376 b 15).
έχοντας εἶναι τινὰς ἁρετῆς τῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἄλλας δυνάμεις τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν ἐνδεχομαι δοκεῖ πολλοῖς, οἴον τοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι τοὺς προπολεμοῦντας καὶ γεωργοῦντας καὶ τεχνώντας, ἐτί δὲ τοὺς βουλευομένους τε καὶ κρίνοντας, ἀντιποιοῦντα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἁρετῆς πάντες καὶ τὰς πλείστας ἀρχὰς ἀρχεῖν οἴονται δύνασθαι: ἄλλα πένευσθαι καὶ πλουτεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀδύνατον. διὸ ταῦτα μέρη μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ πόλεως, οἱ εὐποροὶ καὶ οἱ ἀποροὶ. ἐτί δὲ διὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοὺς μὲν οὐλόγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς, ταῦτα ἐναντία μέρη φαίνεται τῶν τῆς πόλεως μορίων· ὡστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τούτων καθιστάσι, καὶ δύο πολιτείαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, δημοκρατία καὶ ὀλυγαρχία.

IV. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολιτεῖαι πλείουσι, καὶ διὰ τὸν τινὰς αἰτίας, εἰρηταὶ πρῶτον· ὅτι δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ δημοκρατίας εἰδὴ πλείω καὶ ὀλυγαρχίας, λέγωμεν. φανερῶν δὲ τούτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. εἰδὴ γὰρ πλείω τοὺ τε δήμου καὶ τῶν λεγομένων γνωρίμων ἐστὶν, οἴον δήμου μὲν εἰδὴ ἐν μὲν οἱ γεωργοὶ, ἐτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, ἀλλο δὲ τὸ ἀγοραῖον τὸ περὶ ωνὴν καὶ πρᾶσιν διατρίβων, ἀλλο δὲ τὸ περὶ θαλατταν, καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν πολεμικὸν τὸ δὲ χρηματιστικὸν τὸ δὲ πορθμευτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἀλιευτικὸν (πολλαχοῦ γὰρ ἐκαστὰ τούτων πολύοχλα,

1 ἁρετῆς τῆς Richards: ἁρετῆς codd.
2 πολιτῶν ? Richards.
3 μόνα Wilamowitz.

* Cf. iii. 11, 12 fin.
for there also to be some men possessing virtue in the form of political excellence. Now as to the other capacities many people think that it is possible for them to be possessed in combination, for example, for the same men to be the soldiers that defend the state in war and the farmers that till the land and the artizans, and also the councillors and judges, and indeed all men claim to possess virtue and think themselves capable of filling most of the offices of state; but it is not possible for the same men to be poor and rich. Hence these seem to be in the fullest sense the parts of the state, the rich and the poor. And also the fact that the rich are usually few and the poor many makes these two among the parts of the state appear as opposite sections; so that the superior claims of these classes are even made the guiding principles upon which constitutions are constructed, and it is thought that there are two forms of constitution, democracy and oligarchy.

That there are then several forms of constitution, and what are the reasons for this, has been stated before; let us now say that there are several varieties both of democracy and of oligarchy. And this is clear even from what has been said already. For there are several classes both of the people and of those called the notables; for instance classes of the people are, one the farmers, another the class dealing with the arts and crafts, another the commercial class occupied in buying and selling and another the one occupied with the sea—and this is divided into the classes concerned with naval warfare, with trade, with ferrying passengers and with fishing (for each of these classes is extremely numerous in various places, for instance fishermen
οὸν ἄλιεὶς μὲν ἐν Τάραντι καὶ Βυζαντίῳ, τρυπηρικόν
de Ἄθηναν, ἐμπορικὸν ἑν Ἄγινη καὶ Χίῳ,
πορθμευτικὸν δ’ ἑν1 Τενέδῳ), πρὸς δὲ τούτων
tὸ χερνητικὸν καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ἔχον οὐσίαν ὡστε μὴ
dύνασθαι σχολάζειν, ἔτι τὸ μὴ ἕξ αἵμφοτέρων
πολιτῶν ἔλευθερον, κἂν εἰ τι τοιοῦτον ἔτερον2
πλήθους εἴδος τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια,
ἀρετή, παιδεία καὶ τὰ τούτων λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν
αὐτὴν διαφοράν.

Δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πρώτη μὲν ή λεγομένη 2
μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. ἴσον γὰρ φησιν ὁ νόμος
ὁ τῆς τουαύτης δημοκρατίας τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον
ὑπερέχειν3 τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους μηδὲ
κύριους εἰναι ὑποτερουσοῦν ἀλλ’ ὀμοίους ἀμφο-
tέρους. εἰτερ γὰρ ἐλευθερία μάλιστ’ ἐστίν ἐν
δημοκρατία, καθάπερ ὑπολαμβάνουσί τινες, καὶ
ἰσότης, οὕτως ἂν εἴη μάλιστα κοινωνούντων
ἀπάντων μάλιστα4 τῆς πολιτείας ὀμοίως. ἐπεὶ δὲ
πλείων ὁ δήμος, κύριον δὲ τὸ δόξαν τοῖς πλείοσιν,
ἀνάγκη δημοκρατίαν εἰναι ταύτην. ἐν μὲν οὖν 3
εἴδος δημοκρατίας τοῦτο, τὸ5 τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ
tιμημάτων εἰναι, βραχέων δὲ τοῦτων ὄντων. δεῖ
de τῶ κτωμένῳ εξουσίαι εἰναι μετέχειν καὶ

1 δ’ ἐν Susemihl (autem in Guil.): ἐν codd.
2 Sylburg: ἐτέρον codd.
3 ὑπάρχειν codd. plerique, ἄρχειν Victorius (cf. 1318 a 7).
4 secl. Coraees.
5 τὸ Schlosser (cf. 1318 b 6 seq., ed.): ἀλλ’ δὲ τὸ codd.

300
at Tarentum and Byzantium, navy men at Athens
the mercantile class at Aegina and Chios, and the
ferryman-class at Tenedos), and in addition to these
the hand-working class and the people possessing
little substance so that they cannot live a life of
leisure, also those that are not free men of citizen
parentage on both sides, and any other similar class
of common people; while among the notables
wealth, birth, virtue, education, and the distinctions
that are spoken of in the same group as these, form
the classes.

2. The first kind of democracy therefore is the one
which receives the name chiefly in respect of equality.
For the law of this sort of democracy ascribes equality
to the state of things in which the poor have no more
prominence than the rich, and neither class is sovereign,
but both are alike; for assuming that freedom is
chiefly found in a democracy, as some persons suppose,
and also equality, this would be so most fully when to
the fullest extent all alike share equally in the govern-
ment. And since the people are in the majority, and
a resolution passed by a majority is paramount, this
must necessarily be a democracy. This therefore is
one kind of democracy, where the offices are held on
property-qualifications, but these low ones, although
it is essential that the man who acquires the specified
amount should have the right to hold office, and the
man who loses it should not hold office. And another
kind of democracy is for all the citizens that are not
open to challenge \(^*\) to have a share in office, but for the
law to rule; and another kind of democracy is for all
to share in the offices on the mere qualification of

\(^*\) i.e. on the score of birth, cf. c. v. § 4.
ARISTOTLE

1292 a

eὰν μόνον ἡ πολίτης, ἀρχεῖν δὲ τὸν νόμον. ἔτερον
5 δ’ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τάλα μὲν εἶναι ταυτά, κύριον
d’ εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον. τούτο δὲ 4
γίνεται ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἢ ἄλλα μὴ ὁ
νόμος. συμβαίνει δὲ τούτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς.
ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημοκρατομέναις οὐ
gίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλ’ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν
10 εἰόντιν ἐν προεδρίᾳ· ὅπου δ’ οἱ νόμοι μὴ εἰσὶ κύριοι,
ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί· μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ
δήμος γίνεται σύνθετος εἰς ἐκ πολλῶν, οἱ γὰρ
πολλοὶ κύριοι εἰσὶν οὐχ ὡς ἐκαστὸς ἄλλα πάντες.
“Ομηρος δὲ πολιν λέγει οὐκ ἄγαθον εἶναι πολυ-
κορανίτην, πότερον ταύτην ἢ ὅταν πλείους ὄσιν
15 οἱ ἄρχοντες ὡς ἐκαστὸς, ἀδηλον. ὃ δ’ οὐν τοιούτος 5
δήμος ἀπε μόναρχος ὧν ἔχετι μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ
μὴ ἀρχεῖ οὗτος νόμου καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός,
ὡστε οἱ κόλακες ἐντιμοὶ. καὶ ἐστὶν ὁ τοιοῦτος
δήμος ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχῶν τῇ τυραννίδι,
διότι 1 καὶ τὸ ἢθος τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἀμφός δεσποτικά
20 τῶν βελτιώνων, καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα ὅσπερ ἐκεῖ τὰ
ἐπιτάγματα, καὶ ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ
αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον, καὶ μάλιστα δ’ ἐκατέροι παρ’
ἐκατέροις Ἰσχύσουσιν, οἱ μὲν κόλακες παρὰ τυράν-
νοις, οἱ δὲ δημαγωγοὶ παρὰ τοῖς δήμοις τοῖς τοιού-
τοις. αὐτοὶ δ’ εἰσὶ τοῦ ἐνναὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια
25 ἄλλα μὴ τούς νόμους οὕτω, πάντα ἀνάγοντες εἰς
tοῦ δήμου· συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι μεγάλους
διὰ τὸ τὸν μὲν δήμον πάντων εἶναι κύριον τῆς ὑπ’

1 ed.: δ’ codd.

a Iliad, ii. 204.
being a citizen, but for the law to rule. Another kind of democracy is where all the other regulations are the same, but the multitude is sovereign and not the law; and this comes about when the decrees of the assembly over-ride the law. This state of things is brought about by the demagogues; for in the states under democratic government guided by law a demagogue does not arise, but the best classes of citizens are in the most prominent position; but where the laws are not sovereign, then demagogues arise; for the common people become a single composite monarch, since the many are sovereign not as individuals but collectively. Yet what kind of democracy Homer a means by the words 'no blessing is the lordship of the many'—whether he means this kind or when those who rule as individuals are more numerous, is not clear. However, a people of this sort, as being monarch, seeks to exercise monarchic rule through not being ruled by the law, and becomes despotic, so that flatterers are held in honour. And a democracy of this nature is comparable to the tyrannical form of monarchy, because their spirit is the same, and both exercise despotic control over the better classes, and the decrees voted by the assembly are like the commands issued in a tyranny, and the demagogues and the flatterers are the same people or a corresponding class, and either set has the very strongest influence with the respective ruling power, the flatterers with the tyrants and the demagogues with democracies of this kind. And these men cause the resolutions of the assembly to be supreme and not the laws, by referring all things to the people; for they owe their rise to greatness to the fact that the people is sovereign over all things

Demagogy.
ARISTOTLE

1292 a
tou δήμου δόξης τούτους, πείθεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τούτους. ἐτὶ δ’ οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸν
dήμον φασὶ δεῖν κρίνειν, ὅ δὲ ἀσμένως δέχεται τὴν
30 πρόκλησιν, ὥστε καταλύονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαὶ.
eὐλόγως δὲ ἂν δόξειν ἐπιτιμᾶν ὁ φάσκων τὴν ἦ
touaú̂tην εἶναι δημοκρατίαν οὐ πολιτείαν. ὅπου
gάρ μὴ νόμοι ἀρχοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐστὶ πολιτεία, δεῖ γάρ
tὸν μὲν νόμον ἀρχεῖν πάντων1 τῶν δὲ καθ’ ἐκαστά
tὰς ἀρχὰς, καὶ ταύτην2 πολιτείαν κρίνειν· ὥστ’
35 εἰπερ ἐστὶ δημοκρατία μία τῶν πολιτειῶν, φανερὸν
ὡς ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις, ἐν ἡ ψηφίσμασι πάντα
dιουκεῖται, οὔτε δημοκρατία κυρίως, οὔτεν γὰρ
ἐνδέχεται ψῆφισμα εἶναι καθόλου.
Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατίας εἰδή διωρίσθω τὸν
τρόπον τούτον.

V. Ὄλιγαρχίας δὲ εἰδὴ ἐν μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων 1
40 εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς τηλικοῦτων ὥστε τοὺς ἅπορους μὴ
μετέχειν πλείους ὄντας, εξεῖναι δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ
1292 b μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας, ἄλλο δὲ ἄτιν ἀπὸ τιμημά-
tων μακρῶν ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἀἱρόνται αὐτοὶ
tοὺς ἐλλεῖποντας (ἀν μὲν οὖν ἐκ πάντων τούτων
tοῦτο ποιῶσιν, δοκεῖ τοῦτ’ εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀριστο-
κρατικὸν, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων, ὀλιγαρ-
5 χικὸν). ἐτερὸν δ’3 εἰδὸς ὀλιγαρχίας ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ
πατρὸς εἰσίγη, τέταρτον δ’ ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ τε τὸ4 νῦν

1 <τῶν καθολοὺν> πάντων Richards.
2 Madvig: τὴν codd.
3 ἐτερὸν ὃ ed.: ἐτερόν codd.
4 τε τὸ ed.: τὸ τε codd.
while they are sovereign over the opinion of the people, for the multitude believes them. Moreover those who bring charges against the magistrates say that the people ought to judge the suits, and the people receive the invitation gladly, so that all the magistracies are put down. And it would seem to be a reasonable criticism to say that such a democracy is not a constitution at all; for where the laws do not govern there is no constitution, as the law ought to govern all things while the magistrates control particulars, and we ought to judge this to be constitutional government; if then democracy really is one of the forms of constitution, it is manifest that an organization of this kind, in which all things are administered by resolutions of the assembly, is not even a democracy in the proper sense, for it is impossible for a voted resolution to be a universal rule.

Let this be our discussion of the different kinds of democracy.

V. Of the kinds of oligarchy, one is for the magistracies to be appointed from property-assessments so high that the poor who are the majority have no share in the government, but for the man who acquires the requisite amount of property to be allowed to take part in it; another is when the magistrates are filled from high assessments and the magistrates themselves elect to fill vacancies (so that if they do so from all the citizens of this assessment, this appears rather to be of the nature of an aristocracy, but if from a particular section of them, it is oligarchical); another variety of oligarchy is when son succeeds father in office; and a fourth kind is when the hereditary system just mentioned exists

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ARISTOTLE

1292 b

λεχθὲν καὶ ἀρχὴ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἄλλοι ἡ ἀρχοντες. καὶ ἐστὶν ἀντίστροφος αὐτὴ ἐν ταῖς ὀλυγαρχίαις ὡσπερ ἡ τυραννίς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις καὶ περὶ ἂς τελευταίας ἐπαρχεῖν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις,

καὶ καλοῦσι δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὀλυγαρχίαν δυναστείαν.

"Οὐκ ἡ δὴ τοσαῦτα καὶ δημοκρατίας. οὐ δὲ δὲ λανθάνειν ὅτι πολλαχοῦ συμβεβηκεν ὡστε τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους μὴ δημοτικὴν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν ἀγωγὴν πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικῶς, ὡμοίως δὲ πάλιν παρ’ ἄλλοις τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι πολιτείαν δημοτικωτέραν, τῇ δ’ ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς θεσιν ὀλυγαρχεῖσθαι μᾶλλον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλιστα μετὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πολιτείων· οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς μεταβαίνουσιν ἀλλ’ ἀγαπῶσι τὰ πρῶτα μικρὰ πλεονεκτοῦντες παρ’ ἀλλήλων, ὡσθ’ οἱ μὲν νόμοι διαμένουσιν οἱ προϋπάρχοντες κρατοῦσι δ’ οἱ μεταβάλλοντες τὴν πολιτείαν.

"Οτι δ’ ἐστὶ τοσαῦτα εἶδη δημοκρατίας καὶ ὀλυγαρχίας, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερὸν ἐστὶν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἡ πάντα τὰ εἰρημένα μέρη τοῦ δήμου κοινωνεῖν τῆς πολιτείας, ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μὴ. ὅταν μὲν οὖν τὸ γεωργικὸν καὶ τὸ κεκτημένον μετριάν οὖσιν κύριον ἢ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύονται κατὰ νόμους· ἐξουσία γὰρ ἐργαζόμενοι ζην οὖ δύνανται δὲ σχολάζειν, ὡστε τὸν νόμον ἑπιστήσαντες ἐκ-

1 Richards: μεταβάλλοντες.

a Government controlled by a few powerful families. Cf. Thuc. iii. 62. 4, where the Thebans say, 'In those days our state was not governed by an oligarchy that granted equal justice to all, nor yet by a democracy; the power was in the hands of a small cabal (δυναστεία ὀλιγῶν ἀνδρῶν), than which 306
and also the magistrates govern and not the law. This among oligarchies is the form corresponding to tyranny among monarchies and to the form of democracy about which we spoke last among democracies, and indeed oligarchy of this sort has the special name of dynasty.

So many therefore are the kinds of oligarchy and of democracy; but it must not escape notice that in many places it has come about that although the constitution as framed by the laws is not democratic, yet owing to custom and the social system it is democratically administered, and similarly by a reverse process in other states although the legal constitution is more democratic, yet by means of the social system and customs it is carried on rather as an oligarchy. This occurs chiefly after alterations of the constitutions have taken place; for the people do not change over to the new system immediately but are content at the first stages to gain small advantages from the other party, so that the previously existing laws continue although power is in the hands of the party that changed the constitution.

And that these various kinds of democracy and oligarchy exist is manifest from the actual things that have been said. For necessarily either all the parts of the population that have been mentioned must have a share in the government, or some and not others. When therefore the farmer class and the class possessed of moderate property is sovereign over the government, they govern according to laws; for they have a livelihood if they work, but are not able to be at leisure, so that they put the law in nothing is more opposed to law or to true political order, or more nearly resembles a tyranny' (Jowett).
κλησιάζουσι τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκκλησίας. τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μετέχειν ἐξεστίν ὅταν κτησωνται τὸ τίμημα τὸ διωρισµένον ὑπὸ τῶν νόµων, διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτησιµένοις ἐξεστὶ μετέχειν. ὅλως μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ὀλγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐξεῖναι σχολάζειν ἀδύνατον μὴ προσόδων οὐσῶν. τούτῳ μὲν οὖν εἶδος ἐν δημοκρατίας διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας. ἔτερον δὲ εἶδος διὰ τὴν ἐχοµένην διαίρεσιν. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ πᾶσιν ἐξεῖναι τοῖς ἀνυπεθύνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος, μετέχειν μέντοι δυναµένους σχολάζειν· διόπερ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ δηµοκρατίᾳ οἱ νόµοι ἀρχουσι, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόσοδον. τρίτον δὲ εἶδος τὸ πᾶσιν ἐξεῖναι ὅσοι ἀν ἐλεύθεροι ὅστις μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας, μὴ μέντοι μετέχειν διὰ τὴν προειρηµένην αἰτίαν, ὡστ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ἄρχειν τὸν νόµον. τέταρτον δὲ εἶδος δηµοκρατίας ἡ τελευταία δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεις γεγενηµένη. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μείζονς γεγονέναι πολὺ τὰς πόλεις τῶν ἐξ υπάρχης καὶ προσόδων υπάρχειν εὐπορίας, μετέχουσι μὲν πάντες τῆς πολιτείας διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλῆθους, κοινωνοῦσι δὲ καὶ πολιτεύονται διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι σχολάζειν καὶ τοὺς ἀπόρους λαµβάνοντας μισθῶν. καὶ μάλιστα δὲ σχολάζει τὸ τοιοῦτον πλῆθος· οὐ γὰρ ἐμποδίζει αὐτοὺς οὕθεν ἡ τῶν ἴδιων ἐπιµέλεια, τοὺς δὲ πλουσίους ἐμποδίζει,
control and hold the minimum of assemblies necessary; and the other persons have the right to take part when they have acquired the property-assessment fixed by the laws, so that to take part in the government is open to all who have got that amount of property; since for it not to be open to everybody on any terms at all is a characteristic of oligarchy, but then on the other hand it is impossible for it to be open to them to have leisure if there are no revenues. This then is one kind of democracy for these reasons. Another kind is due to the distinction that comes next: it is possible that all the citizens not liable to objection on the score of birth may have the right to take part in the assembly, but may actually take part only when they are able to be at leisure; hence in a democracy of this nature the laws govern because there is no revenue. A third kind is when all those who are free men have the right to take part in the government yet do not do so because of the aforesaid reason, so that it follows that in this form of democracy also the law governs. And a fourth kind of democracy is the one that has been the last in point of time to come into existence in the states. Because the states have become much greater than the original ones and possess large supplies of revenue, while all the citizens have a share in the government because of the superiority of the multitude, all actually take part in it and exercise their citizenship because even the poor are enabled to be at leisure by receiving pay. Indeed the multitude in this kind of state has a very great deal of leisure, for they are not hampered at all by the care of their private affairs, but the rich

*Cf. 1288 a 20 ff.*
ARISTOTLE

1293 a ὡστε πολλάκις οὐ κοινωνοῦσι τῆς ἐκκλησίας οὐδὲ τοῦ δικάζειν. διὸ γίνεται τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλήθος κύριον τῆς πολιτείας ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ νόμοι. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατίας εἶδη τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταύτας τὰς ἀνάγκας ἔστιν. τὰ δὲ τῆς ὁλιγαρχίας, ὥστε μὲν πλείους ἔχωσιν οὐσίαν, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ μὴ πολλήν λίαν, τὸ τῆς πρώτης ὁλιγαρχίας εἶδος ἐστιν: ποιοῦσι γὰρ ἔχουσιν μετέχειν τῷ κτωμένῳ, καὶ διὰ τὸ πλήθος εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἀνάγκη μὴ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ τὸν νόμον εἶναι κύριον (ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλείου ἀπέχωσι τῆς μοναρχίας, καὶ μὴ τοσαῦτην ἔχουσιν οὔσίαν ὡστε σχολάζειν ἀμελοῦντες1 μὴν οὕτως ὁλίγην ὡστε τρέφεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως, ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἡγούν αὐτοῖς ἁρχεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτοὺς). εἰ̣̊ν τὸ ἐλάττουσιν οἵ τις οὐσίας ἔχοντες ητὶ οἱ τὸ πρότερον, πλείω δὲ, τὸ τῆς δευτέρας ὁλιγαρχίας γίνεται εἶδος. μᾶλλον γὰρ ἰσχύστες πλεονεκτεῖν ἡγοῦν, διὸ αὐτοὶ μὲν αἱροῦνται ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς εἰς τὸ πολιτεύμα βαδίζοντας, διὰ δὲ τὸ μήπω οὕτως ἰσχυρὸι εἶναι ὡστ' ἄνευ νόμου ἁρχεῖν, τὸν νόμον τίθενται τοιοῦτον. εἰ̣̊ν δ' ἐπιτείνωσι τῷ ἐλάττουσι ὄντες μείζονας οὐσίας ἔχειν, ἡ τρίτη ἐπίδοσις γίνεται τῆς ὁλιγαρχίας, τὸ δὲ αὐτῶν μὲν τὰς ἁρχὰς ἔχειν, κατὰ νόμον δὲ τὸν κελεύοντα τῶν τελευτῶν διάδεχονται τοὺς υἱῶν. ὅταν δὲ ἡδὴ πολὺ ὑπερείνωσι ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς πολυφιλίαις, ἐγγὺς ἡ τοιαύτη δυναστεία μοναρχίας ἐστίν, καὶ κύριοι γίνονται οἱ ἀνθρώποι ἀλλ' οὐχ

1 ἀμελοῦντες Spengel: τὰς codd.

a i.e. they legalize the recruiting of the ruling class by co-optation; or the words may mean 'they make the law ruler.'
are, so that often they take no part in the assembly nor in judging lawsuits. Owing to this the multitude of the poor becomes sovereign over the government, instead of the laws. Such in number and in nature are the kinds of democracy that these causes necessarily bring into existence. To turn to the varieties of oligarchy, when more men possess property, but less of it and not a very large amount, this is the first form of oligarchy; for they allow the man that acquires property the right to participate, and because there is a large number of persons participating in the government it necessarily follows that not the men but the law is sovereign (for the farther removed they are from monarchy, and as they have not so much property as to be idle and neglect it, nor yet so little as to be kept at the expense of the state, they are compelled to call upon the law to rule instead of ruling themselves). But then if the owners of the properties are fewer than those who owned them previously, and own more, the second form of oligarchy comes into being; for as they become stronger they claim to have a larger share, and therefore they themselves select those from among the rest of the citizens who go into the government, but as they are not yet strong enough to rule without law they make the law conform with this. And if they carry matters further by becoming fewer and holding larger properties, there comes about the third advance in oligarchy, which consists in their keeping the offices in their own hands, but under a law enacting that they are to be hereditary. And when finally they attain very great pre-eminence by their wealth and their multitude of friends, a dynasty of this nature is near to monarchy, and men become
ο νόμος· καὶ το τέταρτον εἶδος τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τούτ' ἔστιν, ἀντίστροφον τῷ τελευταίῳ τῆς δημοκρατίας.

35 Ἔτι δ' εἰσὶ δύο πολιτείαι παρὰ δημοκρατίαν τε ἡ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅν τήν μὲν ἐτέραν λέγουσι τε πάντες καὶ εἰρήται τῶν τεττάρων πολιτείων εἶδος ἐν (λέγουσι δ' ἐτέταρας μονοχρίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν δημοκρατίαν τέταρτον δὲ τὴν καλουμένην ἀριστοκρατίαν); πέμπτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ προσαγορεύεται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πᾶσῶν (πολιτείαν γὰρ καλοῦσιν), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ πολλάκις γίνεσθαι λανθάνει τοὺς πειρωμένους ἄριστον τὰ τῶν πολιτείων ἐδη, καὶ χρώνται ταῖς τέτταροι μόνον (ὡςπέρ Πλάτων) ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις. ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλόσ 10 ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἥ διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις λόγοις (τὴν γὰρ ἑκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἅγαθῶν ἄνδρῶν μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορευέων ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνήρ καὶ πολίτης ἅγαθός ἐστιν, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς άλλαις ἅγαθοι πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσι τὴν αὐτῶν); οὐ μὴν άλλ' εἰσὶ τίνες αἰ πρὸς τε τὰς ὀλιγαρχομένες ἔχουσι διαφοράς [καὶ καλοῦνται ἀριστοκρατίαι] 1 καὶ πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην πολιτείαν, ὅπος γε μὴ μόνον πλουτώνθην ἄλλα καὶ ἀριστώνθην αἱροῦνται τὸ ἀρχάς: αὐτὴ ὡς πολιτεία διαφέρει τε ἀμφοῖν καὶ ἀριστοκρατικὴ καλεῖται. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μὴ 11 πολιομέμεναις κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς εἰσὶν ὄμοις

1 secl. Jackson.

* We now pass from the varieties of Oligarchy and of Democracy to those of the other actually existing constitutions, Aristocracy so-called and Constitutional Government.
supreme instead of the law; and this is the fourth kind of oligarchy, the counterpart of the last kind of democracy.

9 Furthermore a there are two constitutions by the side of democracy and oligarchy, one b of which is counted by everybody and has been referred to as one of the four forms of constitution (and the four meant are monarchy, oligarchy, democracy and fourth the form called aristocracy), but there is a fifth, entitled by the common name of them all (for it is called constitutional government), but as it does not often occur it is overlooked by those who try to enumerate the forms of constitution, and they use the four names only (as does Plato) in the list of constitutions. Now the name of aristocracy is indeed properly given to the constitution that we discussed in our first discourses c (for it is right to apply the name 'aristocracy'—'government of the best'—only to the constitution of which the citizens are best in virtue absolutely and not merely good men in relation to some arbitrary standard, for under it alone the same person is a good man and a good citizen absolutely, whereas those who are good under the other constitutions are good relatively to their own form of constitution); nevertheless there are also some constitutions that have differences both in comparison with oligarchically governed states and with what is termed constitutional government, inasmuch as in them they elect the officials not only by wealth but also by goodness; this form of constitution differs from both and is called aristocratic. For even in the states that do not pay any public attention to virtue there are nevertheless
tivēs οἱ εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἔπεικεῖσ.

15 ὅπου οὖν ἡ πολιτείᾳ βλέπει εἰς τε πλοῦτον καὶ ἀρετήν καὶ δήμον, οἴον ἐν Καρχηδόνι, αὐτῇ ἀριστοκρατικῆ ἐστιν· καὶ ἐν αἷς εἰς τὰ δύο μόνον, οἷον ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων, εἰς τε ἀρετὴν καὶ δήμον, καὶ ἔστι μίξις τῶν δύο τούτων, δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς. ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τῆς ἀριστήν πολιτείαν ταύτα δύο εἶδη, καὶ τρίτων οὗτοι τῆς καλομεῖνης πολιτείας ἥπαυσον πρὸς τὴν ὀλυγαρχίαν μᾶλλον.

VI. Λοιπὸν δ' ἐστὶν ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς ὅνομα-1 ζωμένης πολιτείας εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ τυραννίδος. ἐπάξαμεν δ' οὕτως οὐκ οὕσαν οὕτε ταύτην παρεκ-βασιν οὕτε τὰς ἀρτὶ ῥηθείον ἀριστοκρατίας, ὅτι 20 τὸ μὲν ἀλλῆλος πᾶσαι δημαρτήκασι τῆς ὀρθοτάτης πολιτείας, ἐπείτα καταρθημοῦνται μετὰ τούτων, εἰσί τ' αὐτῶν αὐτῇ παρεκβάσεις, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχήν εἴπομεν. τελευταῖον δὲ περὶ τυραννίδος εὔλογον ἐστὶ πονηραθαι μενείν διὰ τὸ πασῶν ημιστα ταύτην εἰναι πολιτείαν, ἡμῖν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας.

Δι' ἡμῖν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν τέτακται τὸν τρόπον τοῦ-τον, εἰρηται· νῦν δὲ δεικτέον ἡμῖν περὶ πολιτείας. φανερωτέρα γὰρ ὁ δύναμις αὐτῆς διωρισμένων τῶν 2 περὶ ὀλυγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας· ἐστι γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ὑπὸ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν μίξις ὀλυγαρχίας καὶ 35 δημοκρατίας. εἰσόθαι δὲ καλεῖν τὰς μὲν ἀπο-

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1 te post ἀρετῆν codd. cet. (sed cf. l. 14 et 1296 b 17).

* See 1279 b 4 ff. Actual aristocracies are a falling-off from the Aristocracy and Polity is a decline from Monarchy and Aristocracy; but they are not deviations in the technical sense.

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some men that are held in high esteem and are thought worthy of respect. Where then the constitution takes in view wealth and virtue as well as the common people, as for instance at Carthage, this is of the nature of an aristocracy; and so also are the states, in which the constitution, like that of Sparta, takes in view two of these things only, virtue and the common people, and there is a mingling of these two factors, democracy and virtue. These then are two kinds of aristocracy beside the first, which is the best constitution, and a third kind is those instances of what is called constitutional government that incline more in the direction of oligarchy.

1 VI. It remains for us to speak about what is termed constitutional government and also about tyranny. Though neither the former nor the aristocracies spoken of just now are really deviations, we have classed them thus because in actual truth they have all fallen away from the most correct constitution, and consequently are counted with the deviation-forms, and those are deviations from them, as we said in our remarks at the beginning. Tyranny is reasonably mentioned last because it is the least constitutional of all governments, whereas our investigation is about constitutional government.

Having then stated the reason for this mode of classification, we have now to set forth our view about constitutional government. For its meaning is clearer now that the characteristics of oligarchy and democracy have been defined; since constitutional government is, to put it simply, a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. But people customarily
κλινούσας ὡς πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν πολιτείας, τὰς
dὲ πρὸς τὴν ὀλυγαρχίαν μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατίας, διὰ
tὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν παιδείαν καὶ εὐγένειαν τοῖς
eὐπορωτέροις, ἔτι δὲ δοκοῦσιν ἔχειν οἱ εὐποροὶ
ὡν ἐνεκεν οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἀδικοῦσιν· ὅθεν καὶ καλὸς
κάγαθος καὶ γνωρίμους τούτους προσαγορεύουσιν.

ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ἀριστοκρατία βούλεται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν 3
ἀπονέμειν τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τὰς
ὀλυγαρχίας εἶναι φασιν ἐκ τῶν καλῶν κάγαθων

μᾶλλον. δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ ἐυ-
νομεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ ἀριστοκρατούμενην πόλιν ἄλλα
πονηροκρατούμενην, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατεῖ-
σθαι τὴν μὴ ἐυνομουμένην. οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ εὐνομία
tὸ ἐν κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους μὴ πείθομαι δὲ. διὸ

μὲν μὲν εὐνομίαν ὑποληπτέον εἶναι τὸ πείθομαι
τοῖς κειμένοις νόμοις, ἐτέραν δὲ τὸ καλὸς κεῖσθαι
tοὺς νόμους οἷς ἐμμένουσιν (ἐστὶ γὰρ πείθομαι
καὶ κακῶς κειμένοις). τοῦτο δ' ἐνδέχεται διχῶς·
ἡ γὰρ τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν ἐνδεχομένων αὐτοῖς ἡ τοῖς
ἀπλῶς ἀρίστοις. δοκεῖ δὲ ἀριστοκρατία μὲν εἶναι

μάλιστα τὸ τὰς τιμᾶς νεομῆσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν·
ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ὁρὸς ἀρετῆς, ὀλυγαρχίας δὲ
πλοῦτος, δήμου δ' ἐλευθερία (τὸ δ' ὃ τι ἄν δόξῃ
tοῖς πλείσοις ἐν πᾶσαις ὑπάρχει, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀλυ-
γαρχίᾳ καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἐν δήμοις δ' τι ἄν
δόξῃ τῷ πλείους μέρει τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς πολι-

τείας τοῦτ' ἐστὶ κύριον). ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πλείσταις

1 μὴ hic Thurot: post τὸ codd.
give the name of constitutional government only to those among such mixed constitutions that incline towards democracy, and entitle those that incline more towards oligarchy aristocracies, because education and good birth go more with the wealthier classes, and also the wealthy are thought to have already the things to get which wrongdoers commit wrong; owing to which people apply the terms 'gentry' and 'notabilities' to the rich. Since therefore aristocracy means the assignment of the highest place to the best of the citizens, oligarchies also are said to be drawn rather from the gentry. And it seems an impossibility for a city governed not by the aristocracy but by the base to have well-ordered government, and similarly also for a city that has not a well-ordered government to be governed aristocratically. But to have good laws enacted but not obey them does not constitute well-ordered government. Hence one form of good government must be understood to consist in the laws enacted being obeyed, and another form in the laws which the citizens keep being well enacted (for it is possible to obey badly enacted laws). And for laws to be well enacted is possible in two ways: they must either be the best laws possible for the given people or the best absolutely. But aristocracy in the fullest sense seems to consist in the distribution of the honours according to virtue; for virtue is the defining factor of aristocracy, as wealth is of oligarchy, and freedom of democracy (while the principle that a decision of the majority is supreme is found in them all: for in both oligarchy and aristocracy and democracies whatever the larger part of those who have a share in the government decides is supreme). In most
ΑΡΙΣΤΟTLΕ

πόλει τούτον τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος καλεῖται, μόνον γὰρ ἡ μίξις στοχάζεται τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πλοῦτου καὶ ἑλευθερίας (σχεδὸν γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις οἱ εὐπόροι τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν δοκοῦσι κατέχειν χώραν). ἔπει δὲ τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἀμφισβήτητα τῆς ἴσοτητος τῆς πολιτείας, ἑλευθερία πλοῦτος ἀρετή (τὸ γὰρ τέταρτον, δὲ καλοῦσιν εὐγένειαν, ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς δυσὶν, ἡ γὰρ εὐγένεια ἐστὶν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή), φανερὸν ὅτι τὴν μὲν τῶν δυὸν μίξιν, τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πολιτείαν λεκτέον, τὴν δὲ τῶν τριῶν ἀριστοκρατίαν μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων παρὰ τὴν ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρότην.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἑτέρα πολιτείας εἶδη παρὰ μοναρχίαν τε καὶ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν, εἰρήται, καὶ ποῖα ταῦτα, καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ τ' ἀριστοκρατίαι καὶ αἱ πολιτείαι [τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας]. καὶ ὅτι οὐ πόρρω αὐτὰ ἀλλήλων, φανερὸν.

VII. Τίνα δὲ τρόπον γίνεται παρὰ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἡ καλομένη πολιτεία, καὶ πῶς αὐτὴν ἰδί ταῦτα, λέγωμεν ἐφεξῆς τοῖς εἰρή-μένοις. ἀμα δὲ δήλων ἐσται καὶ οἶς ὀρίζονται τὴν δημοκρατίαν καὶ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ληπτέον γὰρ τὴν τούτων διάφερου, εἰσα ἐκ τούτων ἄφ' ἐκατέρα

υστέρω σύμβολον λαμβάνοντας συνθέτεον. εἰσι δὲ τρεῖς τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ μίξεως. ἡ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ληπτέον ὁμικράτει συνομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον

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1 τούτο ed. (cf. 1292 a 33): τὸ codd. 2 γὰρ: δὲ Immisch. 3 <τὴν> τῶν Coraes. 4 [τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας] ed.

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a i.e. in most states that are considered aristocracies.
b i.e. the more oligarchical form, 1293 b 36.
POLITICS, IV. vi. 4—vii. 2

states then the name of aristocracy is given to that form of constitutional government, for the combination aims only at the well-off and the poor, wealth and freedom (since in almost the largest number of states the rich seem to occupy the place of the gentry); but as there are three things that claim equal participation in the constitution, freedom, wealth and virtue (for the fourth, what is called nobility, accompanies the two latter—nobility means ancient wealth and virtue), it is manifest that the mixture of the two factors, the rich and the poor, ought to be termed constitutional government, while the mixture of the three factors deserves the name of aristocracy most of all the various forms of aristocracy beside the true and best form.

It has then been stated that other forms of constitution also exist besides monarchy, democracy and oligarchy, and what their characteristics are, and how the various sorts of aristocracy and of constitutional government differ from one another; and it is manifest that aristocracy and constitutional government are not widely apart from one another.

VII. Next to what has been said let us state the way in which what is called constitutional government comes into existence by the side of democracy and oligarchy, and how it is proper to establish it. At the same time the defining characteristics of democracy and oligarchy will also be clear; for we must grasp the distinction between these and then make a combination out of them, taking, so to say, a contribution from each. And there are three principles determining this combination or mixture. Under one plan we must adopt both features from the legis-

Loosely put for 'wealth and free birth.'
περὶ τοῦ δικάζειν—ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις τοῖς εὐπόροις ξημίαν τάπτουσιν ὅν μὴ δικάζωσι τοῖς δὲ ἀπόροις οὐδένα μισθόν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις τοῖς μὲν ἀπόροις μισθόν τοῖς δὲ εὐπόροις οὐδεμίαν ξημίαν, κοινὸν δὲ καὶ μέσον τούτων ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, διὸ καὶ πολιτικόν, μέμικται γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν.

eis μὲν οὖν οὗτος τοῦ συνδυασμοῦ τρόπος· ἄτερος δὲ τὸ μέσον λαμβάνειν ὅν ἐκάτεροι τάπτουσιν, οἷον ἐκκλησιάζειν οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τιμήματος οὐθένος ἢ μικροῦ πάμπαν, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ μακροῦ τιμήματος, κοινὸν δὲ γε οὐδετέρον ἄλλα τὸ μέσον ἐκατέρου τιμήματος τούτων. τρίτον δὲ ἐκ δυοῦν ταγμάτων, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ νόμου τὰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ δημοκρατικοῦ· λέγω δὲ οἶοι δοκεῖ δημοκρατικὸν μὲν εἰναι τὸ κληρωτὰς εἰναι τὰς ἀρχὰς τὸ δὲ αἱρετὰς ὀλιγαρχικὸν, καὶ δημοκρατικὸν μὲν τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος ὀλιγαρχικὸν δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τιμήματος· ἀριστοκρατικὸν τοῖνυν καὶ πολιτικὸν τὸ ἐξ ἐκατέρων ἐκάτερον λαβεῖν, ἐκ μὲν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τὸ αἱρετὰς ποιεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐκ δὲ τῆς δημοκρατίας τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος. οἱ μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς μίξεως οὗτος· τοῦ δ' εὖ μεμίκθαι δημοκρατίαν καὶ 1 ὀλιγαρχίαν ὅρος ὅταν ἐνδέχεται λέγειν τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο πάσχουσιν οἱ λέγοντες 1 διὰ τὸ μεμίκθαι


* Perhaps 'the speakers feel' should be excised.
relative schemes of the two different constitutions: for example, in regard to the administration of justice, in oligarchies they institute a fine for the rich if they do not serve on juries but no pay for the poor for serving, while in democracies they assign pay for the poor but no fine for the rich, but a common and intermediate principle is to have both payment and fine, and therefore this is a mark of a constitutional government, since it is a mixture of elements from both oligarchy and democracy. This then is one mode of combining the two. Another is to take the middle course between the regulations of each: for example, democracies permit membership of the assembly on no property-qualification at all or a quite small one, oligarchies on a large property-qualification, but the combination clearly is to have neither principle, but one which lies in the middle between either of these two qualifications. In the third place is a combination of the two systems, taking some features from the oligarchical law and some from the democratic; I mean, for example, that it is thought to be democratic for the offices to be assigned by lot, for them to be elected oligarchic, and democratic for them not to have a property-qualification, oligarchic to have one; therefore it is aristocratic and constitutional to take one feature from one form and the other from the other, from oligarchy that offices are to be elected, and from democracy that this is not to be on a property-qualification. This then is the mode of the mixture; and the mark of a good mixture of democracy and oligarchy is when it is possible to speak of the same constitution as a democracy and as an oligarchy; for manifestly the speakers feel this is so because the mixture is complete, and this is
ARISTOTLE

1294 b

καλῶς, πέπονθε δὲ τούτο καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἐμφαίνεται γὰρ ἐκάτερον ἐν αὐτῷ τῶν ἄκρων. ὅτερ συμ- 5 βαίνει περὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐγχειροῦσι λέγειν ὡς δημοκρατίας οὐσίας διὰ τὸ δημοκρατικὰ πολλὰ τὴν τάξιν ἐχειν, οἷον πρῶ- τον τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφῆν τῶν παίδων, ὃμοιος γὰρ οἱ τῶν πλουσίων ἑχονται τοῖς τῶν πενήτων, καὶ παιδεύονται τὸν τρόπον τούτον ὅν ἄν δύναντο καὶ τῶν πενήτων οἱ παίδες, ὃμοιος δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐξομήνης ἦλκιας, καὶ ὅταν ἄνδρες γένωνται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, οὐθὲν γὰρ διάδηλος ὁ πλουσίος καὶ ὁ πένης—οὕτω τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφῆν ταῦτα πάσιν ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις, καὶ τὴν ἔσθητα οἱ πλουσίοι τουαύτην οἶαν ἣν τὸς παρασκευάσας δύναντο καὶ τῶν πενήτων ὀστισοῦν, ἔτι τῷ δύο τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχὰς τὴν μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι τὸν δήμον, τῆς δὲ μετ- ἑχειν (τοὺς μὲν γὰρ γέροντας αἱροῦνται, τῆς δ’ ἐφορείας μετέχουσιν). οἱ δ’ ὀλιγαρχίαν, διὰ τὸ πολλὰ ἐχειν ὀλιγαρχικά, οἷον τὸ πάσας αἱρετὰς εἶναι καὶ μηδεμίαν κληρωτήν, καὶ ὀλίγους εἶναι κυρίους θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά. δεὶ δ’ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ μεμιμημένη καλῶς 6 ἀμφότερα δοκεῖν εἶναι καὶ μηδέτερον, καὶ σύ- ζεσθαι δι’ αὐτῆς καὶ μὴ ἐξωθεὶν, καὶ δι’ αὐτῆς μὴ τῶ πλείους ἐξωθεὶν εἶναι τοὺς βουλομένους (εἰ ὡς γὰρ ἄν καὶ πονηρᾶ πολιτεία τοῦθ’ ὑπάρχου) ἄλλα τῷ μηδ’ ἄν βούλεσθαι πολιτείαν ἐτέραν μηθὲν τῶν τῆς πόλεως μορίων ὀλως.

1 μηδέτερον: μὴ θάτερον Boltenstern. 2 [ἐξωθεῖν] Thurot.

a A conjectural emendation removes this mysterious epi- gram, giving 'and not one of the two (only).'
b Or, if ἐξωθείν is an interpolation, 'not merely because
the case with the form that lies in the middle, for each of the two extreme forms can be seen in it.  

This is the case with the constitution of Sparta. For many people endeavour to describe it as being a democracy, because its system has many democratic features, for instance first of all its regulation for the rearing of boys, since the sons of the rich are brought up in the same way as those of the poor, and are educated in a manner in which the sons of the poor also could be educated, and they are also treated similarly at the next age, and in the same manner when they are grown up, for there is nothing that distinguishes the rich man from the poor man—thus the arrangements for food are the same for all at the common messes, and the rich wear clothes such as even any poor man could procure, and also because of the two greatest offices the common people elect to one and share in the other (they elect the Elders and share in the Ephorate); but others call it an oligarchy, because it has many oligarchical features, for instance that all the offices are elective and none appointed by lot and few persons have the power to sentence to death and exile, and a number of other such matters. But in a well-constructed mixed constitution both of the two factors, and neither of them, should seem to be present, and it should be kept safe by its own means and not by outside aid, and by its own means not because those who desire its security are more numerous outside it (for even a bad constitution might possess this quality), but because no section of the state whatever would even wish for another constitution.

those (citizens) who wish it to survive are more numerous (than those who do not).
1294 b Τίνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον δει καθιστάναι πολιτείαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ὀνομαζομένας ἀριστοκρατίας, νῦν εἰρήται.

1295 a VIII. Περὶ δὲ τυραννίδος ἂν ἦμιν λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ἃς ἐνούσης πολυλογίας περὶ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ὅπως λάβῃ τῆς μεθόδου τὸ μέρος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτην τίθημεν τῶν πολιτειῶν τι μέρος. περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας διωρίσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις λόγοις, ἐν οἷς περὶ τῆς μάλιστα λεγομένης βασιλείας ἐποιούμεθα τὴν σκέψιν, πότερον ἁσύμφορον ἢ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν, καὶ τίνα καὶ πόθεν δει καθιστάναι. 2 καὶ τῶς τυραννίδος δ' εἴδη δύο μὲν διείλομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοπούμεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν, διὰ τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι ἁμφοτέρας ταῦτας τὰς ἀρχὰς (ἐν τε γὰρ τῶν βαρβάρων ποιῶν αἱροῦται αὐτοκράτορας μονάρχους, καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοι "Ελλησίων ἐγίγνοντο τινὲς μόναρχοι τὸν τρόπον τούτον, οὓς ἐκάλουν αἰσυμνήτας), ἔχουσι δὲ τιναὶ πρὸς ἄλληλας αὐταὶ διαφοράς, ὡςαν δὲ διὰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ νόμον βασιλικά καὶ διὰ τὸ μοναρχεῖν ἐκόντων, τυραννικά δὲ διὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸς ἄρχειν καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην. τρότων δὲ εἶδος 3 τυραννίδος ἦπερ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ τυραννίς, ἀντίστροφος οὖσα τῇ παμβασιλείᾳ· τοιαύτην δ' ἄναγκαιον εἶναι τυραννίδα τὴν μοναρχίαν ἦτις ἀνωπεύθυνος ἄρχει τῶν ὀμοίων καὶ βελτιῶνων

1 καὶ κατὰ Susenmihl (et secundum suam Guil.): κατὰ codd.
The proper way therefore to establish a constitutional government, and similarly also the governments named aristocracies, has now been stated.

1 VIII. It remained for us to speak of tyranny, not Tyranny, because there is much that can be said about it, but in order that it may receive its part in our inquiry, since we rank this also as one among the kinds of constitution. The nature of kingship we have defined in our first discourses, in which we examined the question in relation to the constitution most commonly denoted by the term 'kingship,' whether it is disadvantageous or an advantage to states, and what person ought to be set up as king, and from what source, and by what procedure; and in the passage in which we were considering kingship we distinguished two kinds of tyranny, because their power in a manner borders upon royalty, because both these forms of rule are in accordance with law (for among some of the barbarians they elect monarchic rulers with autocratic powers, and also in old times among the ancient Greeks some men used to become monarchs of this sort, the rulers called aesymnetae), but these two forms of tyranny have certain differences from one another, although they were on the one hand of the nature of royalty because they were in accordance with law and because they exercised monarchic rule over willing subjects, and on the other hand of the nature of a tyranny because they ruled despotically and according to their own judgment. But there is a third kind of tyranny which is thought to be tyranny in the fullest degree, being the counterpart of universal kingship; to this sort of tyranny must necessarily belong a monarchy that exercises irresponsible rule over

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1295 a  
πάντων πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῆς συμφέρον ἄλλα μὴ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. διὸ περ ἀκούσιος· 
οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐκὼν ὑπομένει τῶν ἐλευθέρων τὴν 
τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν.

Τυραννίδος μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα διὰ 
tὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας.

25  IX. Τίς δ’ ἀρίστη πολιτεία καὶ τίς ἀριστος βίος  
tαῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων, μήτε πρὸς ἁρετὴν συγκρίνουσιν τὴν ὑπὲρ 
tοὺς ἰδιώτας μήτε πρὸς παιδείαν ἢ φύσεως δεῖται 
καὶ χορηγίας τυχηρὰς μήτε πρὸς πολιτείαν τὴν κατ’ 
eὐχὴν γνωμομεχνὴν, ἀλλὰ βίον τε τὸν τοῖς πλείστοις 
κοινωνήσαι δυνατὸν καὶ πολιτείαν ἃς τὰς πλείστας 
πόλεις ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν; καὶ γὰρ ἢς καλοῦσιν 2 
ἀριστοκρατίας, περὶ ὄν νῦν εἰπομεν, τὰ μὲν ἐξωτέρω 
πίπτουσι ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων, τὰ δὲ γειτνιῶσι 
τῇ καλουμένῃ πολιτείᾳ, διὸ περὶ ἀμφοῖν ὡς μιᾶς 
λεκτέον. ἡ δὲ δὴ κρίσις περὶ ἀπάντην τοῦτων ἐκ 
tῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων ἐστὶν. εἰ γὰρ καλῶς ἐν τοῖς 
ἡθικοῖς εἰρήται τὸ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι τὸν κατ’ 
ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον, μεσοτῆτα δὲ τὴν ἁρετὴν, τὸν 
μέσον ἀναγκαίον βίον εἶναι βέλτιστον, τῆς ἐκάστοις 
ἐνδεχομένης τυχεῖν μεσοτητος. τοὺς δὲ αὐτοὺς 3 
τούτους ὅροις ἀναγκαίον εἶναι καὶ πόλεως ἁρετῆς 
1295 b καὶ κακίας καὶ πολιτείας, ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία βίος τῖς 
ἐστιν πόλεως. ἐν ἀπάσαις δὴ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐστὶ 
τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως, οἱ μὲν εὐποροὶ σφόδρα, οἱ

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1 συντείνουσι Richards.

a Or 'if we do not aim at.'
b See 1293 b 7-21, cf. ib. 36—1294 a 25.
c N.E. 1101 a 14.
subjects all of the same or of a higher class with a view to its own private interest and not in the interest of the persons ruled. Hence it is held against the will of the subjects, since no free man willingly endures such rule.

These then are the kinds of tyranny and such is their number, for the reasons stated.

IX. But what is the best constitution and what is the best mode of life for most cities and most of mankind, if we do not judge by the standard of a virtue that is above the level of private citizens or of an education that needs natural gifts and means supplied by fortune, nor by the standard of the ideal constitution, but of a mode of life able to be shared by most men and a constitution possible for most states to attain? For the constitutions called aristocracies, of which we spoke just now, in some cases fall somewhat out of the scope of most states, and in others approximate to what is called constitutional government, so that it is proper to speak of these two forms as if they were one. And indeed the decision in regard to all these questions is based on the same elementary principles. For if it has been rightly said in Ethics that the happy life is the life that is lived without impediment in accordance with virtue, and that virtue is a middle course, it necessarily follows that the middle course of life is the best—such a middle course as it is possible for each class of men to attain. And these same criteria must also necessarily apply to the goodness and badness of a state, and of a constitution—for a constitution is a certain mode of life of a state. In all states therefore there exist three divisions of the state, the very rich, the very poor, and thirdly those
1295 b
dē ἀποροι σφόδρα, οἱ δὲ τρίτοι οἱ μέσοι τούτων. ἐπεὶ τοῖνυν ὁμολογεῖται τὸ μέτριον ἄριστον καὶ τὸ μέσον, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων ἡ κτήσις ἡ μέση βελτίστη πάντων. βάστη γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχεῖν, ὑπέρκαλον δὲ ἡ ὑπερίσχυρον ἡ ὑπερευγενῆ ἡ ὑπερπλοῦσιν, ἡ τάναντια τούτοις, ὑπέρπτωχον ἡ ὑπερασθενῆ καὶ σφόδρα ἄτιμον, χαλεπῶν τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθεῖν γίγνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὑβρισταῖ 10 καὶ μεγαλοπονηροὶ μᾶλλον οἱ δὲ κακοῦργοι καὶ μικροπόνηροι λίαν, τῶν δ' ἄδικημάτων τὰ μὲν γίγνεται δὲ ὑβριν τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν. ἐτι δ' ἥκισθ' οὗτοι φυγαρχοῦσι 1 καὶ σπουδαρχοῦσι, 2 ταῦτα δ' ἀμφότερα βλαβερὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις 5 οἱ μὲν ἐν υπεροχαίς εὐτυχημάτων ὄντες, ἵσχυσι καὶ πλοῦτοι καὶ φίλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τουτῶν, ἀρχεσθαι οὔτε βούλονται οὔτε ἐπίστανται (καὶ τούτ' εὐθὺς οὐκοθεν ὑπάρχει παιων οὔσων, διὰ γὰρ τὴν τρυφήν οὔτ' ἐν τοῖς διδασκαλείοις ἀρχεσθαι σύνθεσις αὐτοῖς), οἱ δὲ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν ἐνδείᾳ τούτων ταπεινοὶ λίαν. ὡσθ' οἱ μὲν ἀρχεῖν οὐκ ἐπίστανται ἀλλ' ἀρχεσθαὶ δουλικὴν ἀρχὴν, οἱ δ' ἀρχεσθαι μὲν οὐδεμιά ἀρχὴ, ἀρχεῖν δὲ δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν. γίνεται οὖν καὶ δουλῶν καὶ δεσποτῶν 20 πόλεως, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐλευθέρων, καὶ τῶν μὲν φθονοῦντων τῶν δὲ καταφρονοῦντων. ἀ πλεῖστον ἀπέχει φιλίας, καὶ κοινωνίας πολιτικῆς, ἡ γὰρ κοινωνία φιλικῶν,

1 Bernays: φιλαρχοῦσι, φιλαρχοῦσι codd.
2 Coraes: βουλαρχοῦσι codd.

* The text is an emendation; some mss. give 'to rule the tribe and to rule the council,' but most have 'to love office and rule the council,' apparently thinking that the verb translated 'rule the council' meant 'wish office.'

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who are between the two. Since then it is admitted that what is moderate or in the middle is best, it is manifest that the middle amount of all of the good things of fortune is the best amount to possess. For this degree of wealth is the readiest to obey reason, whereas for a person who is exceedingly beautiful or strong or nobly born or rich, or the opposite—exceedingly poor or weak or of very mean station, it is difficult to follow the bidding of reason; for the former turn more to insolence and grand wickedness, and the latter overmuch to malice and petty wickedness, and the motive of all wrongdoing is either insolence or malice. And moreover the middle class are the least inclined to shun office and to covet office, and both these tendencies are injurious to states. And in addition to these points, those who have an excess of fortune's goods, strength, wealth, friends and the like, are not willing to be governed and do not know how to be (and they have acquired this quality even in their boyhood from their home-life, which was so luxurious that they have not got used to submitting to authority even in school), while those who are excessively in need of these things are too humble. Hence the latter class do not know how to govern but know how to submit to government of a servile kind, while the former class do not know how to submit to any government, and only know how to govern in the manner of a master. The result is a state consisting of slaves and masters, not of free men, and of one class envious and another contemptuous of their fellows. This condition of affairs is very far removed from friendliness, and from political partnership—for friendliness is an element
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1295 b 25 οὐδὲ γὰρ ὠδοῦ βούλονται κοινωνεῖν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. 
βούλεται δὲ γε ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων 
ὅτι μάλιστα, τούτῳ δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστα τοῖς μέσοις. 
ὡστε ἀναγκαίον ἁριστα πολιτεύσθαι ταύτην τὴν 
πόλιν ἑστὶν ἐξ ὧν φαμέν φύσει τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι 
τῆς πόλεως. καὶ σώζονται δ' ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὕτωι 7 
μάλιστα τῶν πολιτῶν: οὐτὲ γὰρ αὐτοὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων 
ὡσπερ οἱ πένητες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οὔτε τῆς τούτων 
ἐτεροί καθάπερ τῆς τῶν πλουσίων οἱ πένητες ἐπι- 
θυμοῦσιν. καὶ διὰ τὸ μήτ' ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι μήτ' 
ἐπιβουλεύεσαι ἀκινδύνως διάγομαι. διὰ τούτο καλῶς 
ηὔξατο Φωκυλίδης—

πολλὰ μέσουσιν ἁριστα: μέσος θέλω ἐν πόλει 
εἶναι.

85 δὴλον ἄρα ὅτι καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτικὴ ἁρίστη ἡ 8 
διὰ τῶν μέσων, καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐνέχεσθαι εἰ 
πολιτεύσθαι πόλεις ἐν αἷς δὴ πολὺ τὸ μέσον καὶ 
κρείττον μάλιστα μὲν ἁμφοῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, θατέρου 
μέρους, προστιθέμενοι γὰρ ποιεῖ ῥοπήν καὶ κυλύει 
γίνεσθαι τὰς ἐναντίας ὑπερβολὰς. διόπερ εὐτυχία

40 μεγίστη τοὺς πολιτευμένους οὐσίαν ἔχειν μέσην 
1296 a καὶ ἰκανὴν, ὥς ὅπου οἱ μὲν πολλὰ σφόδρα κέκτηται 
οί δὲ μηθέν, ἡ δὴ μος ἐσχάτως γίγνεται ἡ ὀλιγαρχία 
ἀκρατος ἡ τυραννίς δι' ἀμφότερας τὰς ὑπερβολάς: 
καὶ γὰρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας τῆς νεανικωτάτης καὶ ἐξ 
6 ὀλιγαρχίας γίγνεται τυραννις, ἐκ δὲ τῶν μέσων καὶ

1 ἑστὶν om. 1M: ἡ συνέστη Λαμβίνου.

a Probably Lambinus’s alteration of the Greek should be 
accepted, giving ‘hence that state will necessarily be best 
governed which consists of those elements—.’

b A gnomic poet of Miletus, born 560 B.C.

c i.e. extreme democracy and very limited oligarchy.
of partnership, since men are not willing to be partners with their enemies even on a journey. But surely the ideal of the state is to consist as much as possible of persons that are equal and alike, and this similarity is most found in the middle classes; therefore the middle-class state will necessarily be best constituted in respect of those elements of which we say that the state is by nature composed. 7 And also this class of citizens have the greatest security in the states; for they do not themselves covet other men's goods as do the poor, nor do the other classes covet their substance as the poor covet that of the rich; and because they are neither plotted against nor plotting they live free from danger. Because of this it was a good prayer of Phocylides—

In many things the middle have the best; Be mine a middle station.

8 It is clear therefore also that the political community administered by the middle class is the best, and that it is possible for those states to be well governed that are of the kind in which the middle class is numerous, and preferably stronger than both the other two classes, or at all events than one of them, for by throwing in its weight it sways the balance and prevents the opposite extremes from coming into existence. Hence it is the greatest good fortune if the men that have political power possess a moderate and sufficient substance, since where some own a very great deal of property and others none there comes about either an extreme democracy or an unmixed oligarchy, or a tyranny may result from both of the two extremes, for tyranny springs from both democracy and oligarchy of the most unbridled kind. but much less often from the middle forms of constitu-
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

1296α
tōn σύνεγγυς πολὺ ἢττον. τὴν δ’ αἰτίαν ὑστερον ἐν τοῖς περί τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πολιτείων ἐροῦμεν. ὅτι δ’ ἡ μέση βελτίστη, φανερὸν: μόνη γὰρ ἀστασίαστος, ὅπου γὰρ πολὺ τὸ διὰ μέσον, ἦκιστα στάσεις καὶ διαστάσεις γίγνονται τῶν πολιτείων. καὶ αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἀστασιαστότεραι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι πολὺ τὸ μέσον ἐν δὲ ταῖς μικραῖς ῥάδιον τε διαλαβεῖν εἰς δύο πάντας ὥστε μηθὲν καταλιπεῖν μέσον, καὶ πάντες σχέδον ἂποροί ἢ εὐποροὶ εἰσιν. καὶ αἱ δημοκρατίαι δὲ ἀσφαλέστεραι τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν εἰσὶ καὶ πολυχρονιώτεραι διὰ τοῦ μέσου (πλεῖστος τε γὰρ εἰσι καὶ μᾶλλον μετέχουσι τῶν τιμῶν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἢ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις), ἐπει δὴν ἄνευ τούτων τῷ πλῆθει ὑπέρτεινον οἱ ἂποροι, κακοπραγία γίνεται καὶ ἀπόλλυται ταχέως. σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τὸ τοὺς βελτίστους νυμοθέτας εἰναι τῶν μέσων πολιτῶν. Σόλων τε γὰρ ἦν τούτων (δηλοὶ δ’ ἐκ τῆς ποιήσεως) καὶ Λυκοῦργος (οὐ γὰρ ἦν βασιλεύς) καὶ Χαρώνδας καὶ σχέδον οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἄλλων.

Φανερὸν δ’ ἐκ τούτων καὶ διότι αἱ πλεῖσται πολιτείαι αἱ μὲν δημοκρατικαὶ εἰσιν αἱ δ’ ὀλιγαρχικαὶ. διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ταῦταις πολλάκις ὀλίγον εἶναι τὸ μέσον, αἱ οἱ ὑπότεροι ἂν ὑπερέχουσιν, εἰθ’ οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες εἰθ’ ὁ δήμος, οἱ τὸ μέσον ἐκ-βαίνοντες καθ’ αὐτοὺς ἀγούσι τὴν πολιτείαν, ὥστε ἡ δήμος γίγνεται ἡ ὀλιγαρχία. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις διὰ τὸ στάσεις γίνεσθαι καὶ μάχαις πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις, ὑποτέρους ἄν μᾶλλον.
tion and those near to them. The cause of this we will speak of later in our treatment of political revolutions. That the middle form of constitution is the best is evident; for it alone is free from faction, since where the middle class is numerous, factions and party divisions among the citizens are least likely to occur. And the great states are more free from faction for the same reason, because the middle class is numerous, whereas in the small states it is easy to divide the whole people into two parties leaving nothing in between, and also almost everybody is needy or wealthy. Also democracies are more secure and more long-lived than oligarchies owing to the citizens of the middle class (for they are more numerous and have a larger share of the honours in democracies than in oligarchies), since when the poor are in a majority without the middle class, adversity sets in and they are soon ruined. And it must be deemed a significant fact that the best lawgivers are from among the middle citizens; for Solon was of that class, as appears from his poetry, and so was Lycurgus (for he was not a king) and Charondas and almost the greatest number of the other lawgivers.

And these considerations also show the reason why the constitutions of most states are either democratic or oligarchical; owing to the middle class in these states being often a small one, the classes diverging from the middle status—whichever of the two, the owners of the estates or the people, from time to time has the upper hand—conduct the government on their own lines, so that it becomes either a democracy or an oligarchy. And in addition to this, because factions occur and fights between the people and the wealthy, whichever party happens
ARISTOTLE

30 συμβη κρατήσαι των ἑναντίων, οὐ καθιστάσι κοινὴν πολιτείαν οὔτε ἰσημ, ἀλλὰ τῆς νίκης ἂθλον τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῆς πολιτείας λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν δημοκρατίαι οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν ποιοῦσιν. ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων τῆς 'Ελλάδος πρὸς τὴν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐκάτεροι πολιτείαι ἀποβλέπουσες οἱ μὲν δημοκρατίαις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίστασαν οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίας, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πόλεων συμφέρον σκοποῦντες ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν. ἦστε 12 διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἡ μηδέποτε τὴν μέσην γίνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἡ ὀλιγάκις καὶ παρ' ὀλίγους: εἰς γὰρ ἀνὴρ συνεπείσθη μόνος τῶν πρότερον ἐφ' ἡγεμονία γενομένων ταύτην ἀποδοῦναι τὴν τάξιν, ἰδῇ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ἔθος καθέστηκε μηδὲ βούλευσθαι τὸ ἵσον, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀρχευν ζητεῖν ἡ κρατομένους ὑπομένειν.

13 Τὶς μὲν οὖν ἀρίστη πολιτεία, καὶ διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν, ἐκ τούτων φανερῶν τῶν δ' ἄλλων πολιτειῶν (ἐπειδὴ πλείους δημοκρατίας καὶ πλείους ὀλιγ- 5 ἄρχιάς φαμέν εἶναι) ποιῶν πρῶτην θετέον καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἔχομέν τῷ τὴν μὲν εἶναι βελτίω τὴν δὲ χείρω, διωρισμένης τῆς ἀρίστης οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. ᾖτι γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι βελτίω τὴν ἐγχύτατα ταύτης, χείρω δὲ τὴν ἀφεστηκυίαν τοῦ μέσου πλείου, ἀν μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν 10 κρίνῃ τις. λέγω δὲ τὸ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν, ὅτι πολλάκις

1 ᾖτι Spengel: ᾖτι codd.

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a It is quite uncertain who is meant, possibly Solon or Theramenes.

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to gain the upper hand over its opponents does not establish a common or equal government, but takes the superior share in the government as a prize of victory, and makes it a democracy in the one case and an oligarchy in the other. Moreover each of the two states that in the past held the leadership of Greece took as a pattern the form of government that existed among themselves and set up in the one case democracies and in the other oligarchies in the cities, not considering the interest of the cities but their own advantage. Hence owing to these causes the middle form of constitution either never comes into existence or seldom and in few places; for one man only among the states that have formerly held the leadership was induced to grant this form of organization, and by this time it has become a fixed habit with the people of the separate cities also not even to desire equality, but either to seek to rule or to endure being under a master.

These considerations therefore make it clear which is the best constitution, and why it is the best; and now that the best has been defined, it is not difficult to see, among the other forms of constitution (inasmuch as we pronounce that there are various forms of democracy and various oligarchies), what kind is to be placed first, what second, and what next in this order, by reason of one being better and another worse. For at each stage the form nearest to the best one must necessarily be superior, and the form that is more remote from the middle must be inferior —unless one is judging relatively to given conditions: I make this reservation because it is quite possible that although one form of constitution is
oūnhs ἄλλης πολιτείας αἱρετωτέρας ἐνίοις οὐθὲν κωλύσει συμφέρειν ἐτέραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν.

X. Τίς δὲ πολιτεία τίσι καὶ ποίᾳ συμφέρει ποίοις, 1 ἐχόμενον ἐστὶ τῶν εἰρημένων διελθεῖν. ληπτέον δὴ
15 πρῶτον περὶ πασῶν καθόλου ταύτων. δεῖ γὰρ κρείττον εἶναι τὸ βουλόμενον μέρος τῆς πόλεως τοῦ
μὴ βουλομένου μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν. ἔστι δὲ πᾶσα
πόλις ἐκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ. λέγω δὲ ποιοῦ
μὲν ἔλευθερίαν πλοῦτον παῖδεαν εὐγένειαν, ποσοῦ
δὲ τῆς τοῦ πλῆθους ὑπεροχῆν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ 2
μὲν ποιοῦ ὑπάρχειν ἐτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, εἰς ἀν
συνεστηκε μερῶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ δὲ μέρει τὸ
ποσόν, οἶνον πλείους τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν γενναίων
τοὺς ἀγεννεῖς ἢ τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς ἀπόρους, μὴ
μέντοι τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχειν τῷ ποσῷ ὅσον λείπεσθαι τῷ ποιῷ. διὸ τάυτα πρὸς ἅλλα συγκριτέον.

25 Ὄπου μὲν οὖν ὑπερέχει τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος
τῆς εἰρημένης ἀνάλογιαν, ἐνταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι
dημοκρατίαν, καὶ ἐκαστὸν εἴδος δημοκρατίας κατὰ
τὴν ὑπεροχῆν τοῦ δήμου ἐκαστοῦ, οἶνον ἐὰν μὲν τὸ
tῶν γεωργῶν ὑπερεινὴ πλῆθος, τὴν πρώτην
dημοκρατίαν, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ τῶν βαναύσων καὶ μισθο-
30 αρνοῦτων, τὴν τελευταίαν, ὅμως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
τὰς μεταξὺ τούτων. ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τὰ
γνωρίμων μᾶλλον ὑπερεῖνει τῷ ποιῷ ἢ λείπεται
tῷ ποσῷ, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὀλιγαρχίαν, καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας
tὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐκαστὸν εἴδος κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν

i.e. so as to outbalance their inferiority in quality.

i.e. superiority in quality.
preferable it may often be more advantageous for certain people to have another form.

X. The next thing after what has been said is to discuss which constitution is advantageous for which people, and what sort of constitution for what sort of people. Now we must first grasp a general principle that applies equally to all sorts of constitution: it is essential that the part of the state that wishes the constitution to remain should be stronger than the part that does not wish it. But every state consists of both quality and quantity: by quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, good birth, and by quantity the superior numbers of the multitude.

And it is possible that, while the quality of the state belongs to one among the parts of which the state consists and its quantity to another part—for example the low-born may be more numerous than the noble or the poor than the rich,—yet the more numerous class may not exceed in quantity as much as they fall behind in quality. Hence these two factors have to be judged in comparison with one another.

Where therefore the multitude of the poor exceeds in the proportion stated, here it is natural for there to be democracy, and each kind of democracy in accordance with the superior number of the common people of each sort, for example if the number of the farming class exceeds, the first sort of democracy, but if that of the common labourers and wage-earners, the last sort, and similarly also with the other sorts that lie between these two; but where the class of the well-to-do and notable exceeds in quality more than it falls behind in quantity, here it is natural for there to be an oligarchy, and likewise the various kinds of oligarchy according to the degree of superiority.
1296 b

35 τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλήθους. δεί δ’ ἀεὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ προσλαμβάνειν τοὺς μέσους· ἄν τε γὰρ ολιγαρχικοὺς τοὺς νόμους τιθῇ, στοχάζεσθαι χρὴ τῶν μέσων, ἕαν τε δημοκρατικοὺς, προσάγεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις τούτους. ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν μέσων 4 ὑπερτείνει πλῆθος ἡ συναμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων ἡ καὶ θατέρου μόνον, ἐνταῦθ’ ἐνδέχεται πολιτείαν εἶναι μόνιμον· οὐθὲν γὰρ φοβερὸν μὴ ποτὲ συμφωνήσων οἱ πλούσιοι τοῖς πένησιν ἐπὶ τούτους· οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἀτεροὶ βουλήσουνται δουλεύειν τοῖς ἑτέροις, κοινοτέραν δ’, ἂν ξητώσων, οὐδεμίαν εὐρήσουσιν ἀλλήν ταύτης, ἐν μέρει γὰρ ἀρχεῖν οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείνειαν διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους· πανταχοῦ δὲ πιστότατος ὁ διαιτητής, διαιτητής δ’ ὁ μέσος. ὅσω δ’ ἂν ἁμεινὸν ἡ πολιτεία μικρή, τοσοῦτῳ μονωμέτρᾳ· δια- 5 μαρτάνουσι δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν τᾶς ἀριστοκρατικῶν βουλομένων ποιεῖν πολιτείας οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ πλείων νέμειν τοῖς εὐπόροις ἅλλα καὶ ἐν τῷ παρακρούσθαι τὸν δῆμον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ χρόνῳ ποτὲ ἐκ τῶν ψευδῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀληθῶς συμβῆναι κακῶν, αἱ γὰρ πλεονεξία τῶν πλουσίων ἀπολλύουσι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν ἡ αἰ τοῦ δήμου.

"Εστι δ’ ὁσα προφάσεως χάριν ἐν ταῖς πολι- 15 τείαις σοφίζονται πρὸς τὸν δήμον πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν, περὶ ἐκκλησίαν, περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, περὶ δικαστήρια, περὶ ὁπλισμῷ, περὶ γυμνασίαν. περὶ ἐκκλησίαν μὲν τὸ ἐξείναι ἐκκλησιάζειν πάσιν, ξημίαν δὲ ἐπικεῖσθαι τοῖς εὐπόροις ἓν μὴ ἐκκλη- σιάζωσιν ἡ μόνοις ἡ μείζων πολλῷ· περὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὸ τοῖς μὲν ἑξουσί τίμημα μὴ ἐξείναι

a The word is loosely used of this small class.
of the oligarchical multitude. But the lawgiver in his constitution must always take in the middle class; if he is making the laws of an oligarchical character he must keep the middle class in view, and if democratic, he must legislate so as to bring them in.

And where the number of the middle class exceeds both the extreme classes together, or even one of them only, here it is possible for a constitutional government to be lasting; for there is no fear of the rich ever coming to terms with the poor against this numerous middle class; for neither class will ever wish to be subject to the other, and if they look for another constitution fairer to both than this they will not find one, for they would not endure to take turns to govern because they distrust each other: everywhere it is the arbitrator that is most trusted, and the man in the middle is an arbitrator. And the better the constitution is mixed, the more permanent it is; and many even of those who want to establish aristocratic forms of constitution make a great mistake not only in giving too large a share to the well-to-do but also in cheating the people; for false benefits inevitably result ultimately in true evil, as the encroachments of the rich ruin the constitution more than those of the people.

The artifices employed in constitutions as a pretext in regard to the people are five in number, and are concerned with the assembly, the magistracies, the law-courts, the bearing of heavy arms, and gymnastic exercises; in relation to the assembly, the granting to all of the right to attend but the imposition of a fine for non-attendance on the well-to-do only, or a much larger fine on them than others; in relation to the magistracies, the denial to the

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1297 \(a\) εξόμυνονται τοῖς \(d\) ἀπόροις ἐξεῖναι· καὶ περὶ τὰ
dικαστήρια τοῖς μὲν εὐπόροις εἶναι ζημίαν ἂν μὴ
dικάζωσι· τοῖς \(d\) ἀπόροις ἀδειαν, ἦ τοῖς μὲν
μεγάλην τοῖς δὲ μικράν, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς Χαρών-
dου νόμοις. ἐνίαχοι \(d\) ἐξείστι μὲν πάσιν ἀπο-

25 γραφαμένοις ἐκκλησιαζέων καὶ δικαζείν, ἐὰν δὲ ἀπο-
γραφάμενοι μὴ ἐκκλησιαζοῦσι μὴς δικάζωσιν
ἐπικειμένας μεγάλαν ζημίαν τούτοις, ἢν διὰ μὲν
τὴν ζημίαν φεύγωσι τὸ ἀπογράφεσθαι διὰ δὲ τὸ
μὴ ἀπογράφεσθαι μὴ δικάζωσι μηδὲ ἐκκλησιαζοῦσιν.
tὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑπλα κεκτηθαι

80 καὶ τοῦ γυμνάζοντα νομοθετοῦσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ
ἀπόροις ἐξείστι μὴ κεκτηθαι τοῖς \(d\) εὐπόροις
ἐπιφήμονοι μὴ κεκτηθέντοις, κἂν μὴ γυμνάζονται
tοῖς μὲν οὐδεμία ζημία τοῖς \(d\) εὐπόροις ἐπιφήμονοι,
ὅπως οἱ μὲν διὰ τὴν ζημίαν μετέχωσιν οἱ δὲ διὰ

85 τὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι μὴ μετέχωσιν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν
οἰκογενής σοφίσματα τῆς νομοθεσίας, ἐν δὲ εἰ
tαῖς δημοκρατίαις πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντισοφίζονται· τοῖς
μὲν γὰρ ἀπόροις μισθοῦν πορίζουσιν ἐκκλησιαζοῦσι
καὶ δικάζουσιν, τοῖς \(d\) εὐπόροις οὐδεμίαν τάττουσι
ζημίαν. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι εἰ τῆς βουλῆται μιγνύναι

40 δικαίως, δεῖ τὰ παρ’ ἑκατέρους συνάγειν καὶ τοῖς
μὲν μισθοῦν πορίζετε τοῖς \(d\) ζημίαιν· οὐτω γὰρ ἄν
κοινωνοῦσιν ἀπαντεῖς, ἐκεῖνος \(d\) ἡ πολιτεία γίγνεται
tῶν ἐτέρων μόνον. δεῖ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι μὲν

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owners of rated property of the right to swear off serving, while the poor have this right; in relation to the law-courts, the imposition of a fine on the well-to-do if they do not serve on a jury, but no penalty for the poor, or else a large fine for the one class and a small one for the others, as in the laws of Charondas. In some places all have the right to serve in the assembly and on juries after having their names put on a register, but large fines are imposed on those who after so registering fail to attend in either capacity, in order that the fine may cause them to avoid registration and that owing to their not registering they may not serve on juries or in the assembly. They also legislate in the same manner about owning heavy arms and engaging in gymnastic exercises: the poor are not allowed to possess arms, but the well-to-do are liable to a fine if they have not got them, and there is no fine for the former class if they abstain from gymnastics, but the well-to-do are liable to a fine, in order that the one class because of the fine may take part in them and the other because they have no penalty to fear may not. These artifices of legislation then are of an oligarchic nature; in democracies they introduce contrary devices in regard to these matters: they provide pay for the poor for serving in the assembly and on juries and impose no fine upon the well-to-do for abstaining. Hence it is manifest that if anybody wishes to make a just blend, he must bring together the regulations existing in each of the two forms of constitution, and provide pay for attendance and a fine for non-attendance; for thus all would participate, whereas in the other way the government comes to be in the hands of only one of the two classes. And
εκ τῶν τὰ ὀπλα ἐχόντων μόνων, τοῦ δὲ τιμήματος
tὸ πλῆθος ἀπλῶς μὲν ὀρισαμένους οὐκ ἔστιν
eἰπεὶν τοσοῦτον ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ σκεψαμένους τὸ
5 ποιοῦν ἐπιβάλλει μακρότατον ὡστε τοὺς μετέχοντας
τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι πλείους τῶν μὴ μετεχόντων,
tοῦτο τάττειν. ἔθελον γὰρ οἱ πένθες καὶ μὴ
mετέχοντες τῶν τιμῶν ἥσυχιάν ἔχειν εὰν μὴ
ὑβρίζῃ τις αὐτὸς μὴ τῷ ἀφαιρήται μηθὲν τῆς
οὐσίας. ἀλλὰ τούτο οὐ βάδιον, οὐ γὰρ οἷς συμβαί-
10 νει χαρίεντας εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας τοῦ πολιτεύμα-
tos. καὶ εἰώθαι δὲ ὅταν πόλεμος ἢ ὁκνεῖν ἃν μὴ
λαμβάνωσι τροφὴν ἀποροι ὃς ὅσιν· εὰν δὲ πορίζῃ
τις τροφὴν, βούλονται πολεμεῖν. ἐστὶ δ' ἡ πολιτεία 10
παρ' ἐνίοτοι οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῶν ὁπλιτευόντων ἀλλὰ
καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὁπλιτευκότων ἐν Μαλιεῦσι δὲ η μὲν
15 πολιτεία ἢν ἐκ τούτων τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς ἱροῦντο ἐκ
τῶν στρατευομένων. καὶ ἡ πρώτῃ δὲ πολιτεία ἐν
τοῖς Ἑλλησσιον ἐγένετο μετὰ τὰς βασιλείας ἐκ τῶν
πολεμοῦντων, ἡ μὲν εἰς ἀρχὴς ἐκ τῶν ἱππέων (τὴν
γὰρ ἱσχὺν καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν τὸ
20 πόλεμου εἶχεν, ἀνευ μὲν γὰρ συντάξεως ἄχρηστον
τὸ ὀπλιτικόν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων ἐμπερίᾳ
καὶ τάξεις ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοις οὐχ ὑπῆρχον, ὡστε ἐν
tοῖς ἱππεῦσιν εἶναι τὴν ἱσχὺν), αὐξανομένων δὲ
tῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὀπλοῖς ἱσχυσάντων
μᾶλλον πλείους μετείχον τῆς πολιτείας. διόπερ
25 ἃς νῦν καλοῦμεν πολιτείας οἱ πρότερον ἐκάλουν
1 πόσον Lindau.
although it is proper that the government should be drawn only from those who possess heavy armour, yet it is not possible to define the amount of the property-qualification absolutely and to say that they must possess so much, but only to consider what sort of amount is the highest that is compatible with making those who have a share in the constitution more numerous than those who have not, and to fix that limit. For those who are poor and have no share in the honours are willing to keep quiet if no one insults them or takes away any part of their substance; but this is not easy to secure, for it does not always happen that those who are in the governing class are gentlemen. Also people have a way of being reluctant to serve when there is a war if they do not get rations and are poor men; but if somebody provides food they want to fight. In some states the citizen-body consists not only of those who are serving as heavy-armed soldiers, but also of those who have so served; and at Malea the citizen-body consisted of these, while the magistrates were elected from those who were actually on service. And indeed the earliest form of constitution among the Greeks after the kingships consisted of those who were actually soldiers, the original form consisting of the cavalry (for war had its strength and its pre-eminence in cavalry, since without orderly formation heavy-armed infantry is useless, and the sciences and systems dealing with tactics did not exist among the men of old times, so that their strength lay in their cavalry); but as the states grew and the wearers of heavy armour had become stronger, more persons came to have a part in the government. Hence what we now call constitutional governments the men of
Διὰ τίνα μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἰτίαν αἱ πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τὶ παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας ἑτεραι (δημοκρατίας τε γὰρ οὐ μία τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅμοιως), ἔτι δὲ τίνες αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν συμβαίνει, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοι τῖς ἀρίστη τῶν πολιτειῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον εἴπειν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιοί ποίοις ἀρμόττει τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴρηται.

XI. Πάλιν δὲ καὶ κοινὴ καὶ χωρίς περὶ ἑκάστης λέγωμεν περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς, λαβόντες ἀρχὴν τῇ προσήκουσαν αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ τρία μόρια τῶν πολιτειῶν πασῶν περὶ ὧν δεῖ θεωρεῖν τὸν σπουδαῖον νομοθέτην ἑκάστη τοῦ συμφέρον· ὅπως ἔχοντων καλῶς ἀνάγκη τὴν πολιτείαν ἔχειν καλῶς, καὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν ἐν τῷ διαφέρειν ἑκαστὸν τούτων. ἔστι δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων ἐν μὲν τί τοῦ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν κοινῶν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἁρχὰς, τούτῳ δὲ ἔστι τίνας· ὅπως καὶ τίνων εἶναι κυρίας, καὶ ποῖον τίνα δεῖ γίγνεσθαι τὴν αἰρεσίν αὐτῶν, τρίτον δὲ τὶ τὸ δικάζον.

Κύριον δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ πολέμου

1 μὲν τί Congreve: μὲν τί, μὲν τοι codd.
2 ἐστὶ τίνας Wilson: ἐστίν ἐς codd.
3 δεῖ <εἶναι> καὶ ? ed.
former times called democracies; but the constitutional governments of early days were naturally oligarchical and royal, for owing to the smallness of the populations their middle class was not numerous, so that because of their small numbers as well as in conformity with the structure of the state the middle class more readily endured being in a subject position. It has then been said what is the reason of there being several forms of constitution, and why there are others besides those designated by name (for there is not one single democracy only, and similarly there are more than one of the other forms), and also what are the differences between them and what is the reason why these differences occur, and in addition to these points, which is the best of the constitutions speaking generally, and of the other constitutions which sort is suited to which sort of people.

And again, let us speak about the points that come next, both generally and with reference to each constitution separately, taking their appropriate starting-point. All forms of constitution then have three factors in reference to which the good lawgiver has to consider what is expedient for each constitution; and if these factors are well-ordered the constitution must of necessity be well-ordered, and the superiority of one constitution over another necessarily consists in the superiority of each of these factors. Of these three factors one is, what is to be the body that deliberates about the common interests, second the one connected with the magistracies, that is, what there are to be and what matters they are to control, and what is to be the method of their election, and a third is, what is to be the judiciary.

The deliberative factor is sovereign about war and
καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ συμμαχίας καὶ διαλύσεως, καὶ περὶ νόμων, καὶ περὶ θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς καὶ δημεύσεως, καὶ τῶν εὐθυνῶν. ἀναγκαῖον δ' ἦτοι 2 πᾶσι τοῖς πολίταις ἀποδεδόθαι πᾶσας ταύτας τὰς κρίσεις ἡ τισὶ πάσας (οἷον ἀρχῇ τυί μιὰ ἡ πλείοσιν) ἡ ἐτέραις ἐτέραις ἡ τινὰς μὲν αὐτῶν πᾶσι τινὰς δὲ τισὶν.

10 Τὸ μὲν οὖν πάντας καὶ περὶ ἀπάντων δημοτικὸν, τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ ἱσότητα ξητεῖ ὁ δήμος. εἰσὶ δὲ 3 οἱ τρόποι τοῦ πάντας πλέον, εἰς μὲν τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἄλλα μὴ πάντας ἀθρόους (ὡσπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Τῆλεκλέους ἐστὶ τοῦ Μιλησίου, καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις δὲ πολιτείαις βουλεύονται αἱ συναρχίαι συνιούσαι εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζουσι πάντες κατὰ μέρος ἐκ τῶν φυλῶν καὶ τῶν μορίων τῶν ἐλαχίστων παντελώς ἐναν διέλθη διὰ πάντων), συνιέναι δὲ μόνον περὶ τε νόμων θέσεως καὶ τῶν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ἀκοουσμένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων· ἀλλος δὲ τρόπος τὸ πάντας 4 ἀθρόος, συνιέναι δὲ μόνον πρὸς τε τὰς ἀρχαίρεσι αἰρεσίας· καὶ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας καὶ περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ πρὸς εὐθύνας, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰς ἀρχὰς βουλεύεσθαι τὰς ἐφ' ἐκάστους τεταγμένας, αἱρετας οὕτας εἰς ἀπάντων ἡ κληρω- 25 τάς· ἀλλος δὲ τρόπος τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας ἀπαντῶν τοὺς πολίτας, καὶ περὶ πολέμου

1 Susemihl.

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a Otherwise unknown.
peace and the formation and dissolution of alliances, and about laws, and about sentences of death and exile and confiscation of property, and about the audits of magistrates. And necessarily either all these decisions must be assigned to all the citizens, or all to some of them (for instance to some one magistracy or to several), or different ones to different magistracies, or some of them to all the citizens and some to certain persons.

For all the citizens to be members of the deliberative body and to decide all these matters is a mark of a popular government, for the common people seek for equality of this nature. But there are several modes of such universal membership. One is for the citizens to serve in rotation and not all in a body (as is enacted in the constitution of the Milesian Telecles, and in other constitutions also the boards of magistrates deliberate in joint assemblies but all the citizens enter into the magistracies from the tribes or from the very smallest sections of the citizen-body in rotation until office has gone through the whole body), and for there to be joint assemblies only to consider legislation and reforms of the constitution and to hear the reports submitted by the magistrates. Another mode is for all to assemble in a body, but only for the purpose of electing magistrates, enacting laws, considering the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace and holding the audit of magistrates, but for all other matters to be considered by the magistrates appointed to deal with each respectively and elected by suffrage or by lot from all the citizens. Another mode is for the citizens to meet about the magistracies and the audits and in order to deliberate about declaring war

(1) The Deliberative: its functions in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy and republican government.
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βουλευσομένους καὶ συμμαχίας, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα τὰς ἀρχὰς διοικεῖν αἱρετὰς οὕσας, ὅσας ἐνδέχεται, τοιαῦτα δ’ εἰσὶν ὅσα ἄρχειν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς ἐπισταμένους, τέταρτος δὲ τρόπος τὸ πάντας περὶ 5 πάντων βουλεύεσθαι συνιόντας, τὰς δ’ ἀρχὰς περὶ μηθενὸς κρίνειν ἄλλα μόνον προανακρίνειν, ὅπερ ἡ τελευταία δημοκρατία νῦν διοικεῖται τρόπον, ἣν ἀνάλογον φαμεν εἶναι ὀλιγαρχία τε δυναστευτικὴ καὶ μοναρχία τυραννική. οὔτοι μὲν οὖν οἱ τρόποι 10 δημοκρατικοὶ πάντες, τὸ δὲ τινὰς περὶ πάντων ὀλιγαρχικῶν. ἐχεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διαφορὰς πλείους. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μετρωτέρων αἱρετοὶ τε ὧσι καὶ πλείους διὰ τὴν μετριώτητα τοῦ τιμήματος, καὶ περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κινῶν ἄλλῳ ἀκολουθῶσι, καὶ ἐξή κτωμένῳ τὸ τίμημα μετέχειν, ὀλιγαρχία μὲν πολιτικὴ δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ 15 τοιαύτῃ διὰ τὸ μετριάζειν· ὅταν δὲ μὴ πάντες τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι μετέχοσιν ἄλλα πρόκριτοι,1 κατὰ νόμον δ’ ἀρχωσιν ὡσπερ καὶ πρότερον, ὀλιγαρχικῶν· ὅταν δὲ καὶ αἱρόονται αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ κύριοι τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, καὶ ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσὶν καὶ κύριοι τῶν νόμων ὧσιν, ὀλιγαρχικὴν2 20 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν τάξιν ταύτην. ὅταν δὲ τινῶν 7

1 ἄλλα πρόκριτοι Immisch: ἄλλ’ αἱρετοὶ codd.
2 ὀλιγαρχικωτέραν Garvey, <μᾶλλον> ὀλιγαρχικὴν Spengel.

a i.e. in an advanced democracy.
and concluding an alliance, but for all other matters to be dealt with by the magistrates, elected by suffrage in as many cases as circumstances allow, and such magistracies are all those which must of necessity be filled by experts. A fourth mode is for all to meet in council about all matters, and for the magistracies to decide about nothing but only to make preliminary decisions; this is the mode in which democracy in its last form is administered at the present day—the form of democracy which we pronounce to correspond to dynastic oligarchy and to tyrannical monarchy. These modes then are all of them democratic. On the other hand for some persons to deliberate upon all matters is oligarchic. But this also has several variations. For when the members of the deliberative body are elected on comparatively moderate property-qualifications, and the eligible persons are comparatively numerous because of the moderateness of the qualification, and when they do not make changes in things in which the law forbids it but follow the law, and when anybody acquiring the property-qualification is allowed to become a member, a constitution of this sort is indeed an oligarchy, but one of the nature of constitutional government, because of its moderation. When on the other hand not everybody thus qualified participates in deliberation but only certain persons previously chosen by election, and these govern in accordance with law as in the former case, this is oligarchical; and also when the deliberative officials are elected by co-optation, and when the office is hereditary and has supreme control over the laws, this system is bound to be oligarchical. But when certain persons control certain matters, for
τινές, 1 οἶνον πολέμου μὲν καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ εὐθυνῶν πάντες τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀρχοντες καὶ οὐτοί αἱρετοὶ 
μὴ κληρωτοὶ; 2 ἀριστοκρατία ἢ πολιτεία· ἐὰν 
δὲ ἐνων μὲν αἱρετοὶ ἐνών δὲ κληρωτοί, καὶ 
κληρωτοὶ ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκ προκρίτων, ἢ κοινῆ 
αἱρετοὶ καὶ κληρωτοὶ, τὰ μὲν πολιτείας ἀριστοκρα- 
tικῆς ἐστὶ τούτων, τὰ δὲ πολιτείας αὐτῆς.

Διήρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς 
pολιτείας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, καὶ διουκεῖ 3 ἐκάστη 
pολιτεία κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμὸν· συμφέρει δὲ 
δὴ δημοκρατία τῇ 4 μάλιστ' εἰναι δοκοῦση δημο-
κρατία νῦν (λέγω δὲ τοιαύτην ἐν ἣ κύριος ὁ δήμος 
καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐστίν) πρὸς τὸ βουλεύεσθαι βέλτιον 
tὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν ὑπὲρ ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων ἐν ταῖς 
ολιγαρχίαις (τάττουσι γὰρ ζημίαν τούτοις οὐσ 
βοήλονται δικαζοῦν ὑπὸ δικαζωμένων, οἴ δὲ δημοτικοὶ 
μισθὸν τοῖς ἄποροίς τούτοις, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς 
ἐκκλησίας ποιεῖν (βουλεύονται γὰρ βέλτιον κοινὴ 
βουλευόμενοι πάντες, ὁ μὲν δήμος μετὰ τῶν 
γνωρίμων, οὗτοι δὲ μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους). συμ-
φέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ αἱρετοὺς εἶναι τοὺς βουλευόμενους 
ἡ κληρωτοὺς ἵππους ἐκ τῶν μορίων, συμφέρει δὲ καὶ 
ὑπερβάλλοις πολὺ κατὰ τὸ πλήθος οἴ δημοτικοὶ 
tῶν πολιτικῶν 5 ἡ μὴ πᾶσι διδόναι μισθὸν ἀλλ' 

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1 τινές secl. Camerarius (cum Guilelmi codd. plerisque).
3 disponitur (διουκείται ?) Guil.: διουσε Congreve.
4 τῇ Coraes: τῇ τε codd.
5 πολιτῶν ? Richards.

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a The mss. give 'or by lot.'
instance when all the citizens control decisions as to war and peace and the audit of officials while everything else is controlled by magistrates and these are elected by vote, not by lot, the constitution is an aristocracy; while if some matters are controlled by magistrates elected by vote and others by magistrates chosen by lot, and this either directly or from a list previously selected by vote, or if magistrates elected by vote and by lot sit in a joint body, some of these regulations are features of an aristocratic constitution and others of constitutional government itself.

We have then in this way distinguished the different kinds of deliberative body in relation to the forms of constitution, and each form of constitution carries on the administration in accordance with the distinction stated. But for a democracy of the form that at the present day is considered to be democracy in the fullest degree (and I mean one of the sort in which the people is sovereign even over the laws) it is advantageous for the improvement of its deliberative function for it to do the same as is done in oligarchies in the matter of the law-courts (for they enact a fine to compel the attendance on juries of those whom they want to attend, whereas democratic states institute payment for attendance for the benefit of the poor), and also to do this in respect of the assemblies (for they will deliberate better when all are deliberating jointly, the common people when with the notables and these when with the masses), and it is also advantageous for those who deliberate to be elected by vote or by lot equally from the different sections, and, if the men of the people far exceed the political class in number, it is advantageous
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1298 b ὁσοὶ σύμμετροι πρὸς τὸ τῶν γνωρίμων πλήθος ἢ ἀποκληροῦν τοὺς πλείους. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις 9 ἢ προσαιρεῖσθαι1 τινας ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους, ἢ, κατα- σκευάσαντας ἀρχείον οἶνον ἐν ἐνίας πολιτείας ἐστὶν οὖς καλοῦσι προβούλουσι καὶ νομοφύλακας,2 περὶ τούτων χρηματίζειν περὶ ὧν ἂν οὖν προβουλεύσωσιν (οὔτω γὰρ μεθέξεις ὁ δήμος τοῦ βουλεύσωσι καὶ λύειν οὔθεν δυνήσεται τῶν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν), ἐτὸς ἡ ταυτὰ ψηφίζεσθαι τὸν δήμον ἢ μηθέν ἐναντίον τοὺς εἰσφερομένους, ἡ τῆς συμβουλῆς μὲν μεταδιδόναι πάσι βουλεύσωσι δὲ τούς ἀρχοντας. καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον δὲ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις γιγνομένου δεῖ ποιεῖν· ἀποψηφιζό- μενον μὲν γὰρ κύριον δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλήθος, κατα- ψηφιζόμενον δὲ μὴ κύριον, ἀλλ' ἐπαναγέσθω πάλιν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀρχοντας· ἐν γὰρ ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀντιστραμμένως ποιοῦσιν, οἱ γὰρ ὀλίγοι ἀπο- ψηφιζόμενοι μὲν κύριοι, καταψηφιζόμενοι δὲ οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ἐπανάγεται εἰς τοὺς πλείστους αἰεί.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ βουλευμένου καὶ τοῦ κυρίου δὴ τῆς πολιτείας τοῦτον διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον.

XII. Ἐρωμένῃ δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς διαίρεσις (ἐχεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς πολιτείας πολλὰς διαφοράς), πόσα τε ἀρχαὶ καὶ

1 Susemihl: προαιρ. codd.
2 Coraes: -κας καὶ codd.

a There were πρόβουλοι at Corinth as well as a βουλή and an ἐκκλησία; and νομοφύλακες at Sparta, Athens and elsewhere: at Athens they sat with the presidents of the βουλή and ἐκκλησία to check illegal procedure.

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either not to give pay to all but only to as many as are commensurate with the number of the notables, or to discard by lot those who exceed this number.

9 In oligarchies on the other hand it is advantageous either to co-opt some persons from the multitude, or to institute an office like the one that exists in certain constitutional governments under the name of Preliminary Councillors or Guardians of the Law, and deal with the matters about which these officials have held a preliminary deliberation (for thus the common people will have a share in deliberation and will not have the power to abolish any part of the constitution), and then for the people by their vote either to confirm or at all events not to pass anything contrary to the resolutions brought before them, or to allow all to take part in debate but only the 10 magistrates to frame resolutions; and in fact it is proper to do just the opposite of what takes place in constitutionally governed states; for the common people ought to be given power to vote the rejection of a measure, but not to vote its ratification, but it should be referred back to the magistrates. In constitutional governments the procedure is the reverse; the few are competent to vote the rejection of a resolution but are not competent to vote its ratification, this being always referred back to the most numerous body.

Let us then decide in this manner about the deliberative body, which in fact is the sovereign power in the constitution.

12 XII. Connected with this subject is the determination in regard to the magistracies (for this part of the constitution also has many varieties), how many magistracies there are to be, and what are to be their
κύριαι τίνων, καὶ περὶ χρόνου, πόσος ἐκάστης ἀρχής (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐξαμήνους, οἱ δὲ δὲ ἐλάττονος, οἱ δ' ἐναντίας, οἱ δὲ πολυχρονιστέρας ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχὰς), καὶ πότερον εἶναι δεὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπαξ μόνον. ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὴν κατάστασιν τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐκ τίνων δεὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ τίνων καὶ πῶς. περὶ πάντων γὰρ τούτων δεὶ δύνασθαι διελεῖν κατὰ πόσους ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι τρόπους, κάπετα προσ-αρμόσαι πολίαις ποιοὶ πολιτεῖαι συμφέρουσιν. ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο διορίσαι ῥᾴδιον, ποίας δεὶ καλεῖν ἀρχὰς: πολλῶν γὰρ ἐπιστατῶν ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία δεῖται, διὸπερ οὐ πάντας οὔτε τοὺς αἱρετοὺς οὔτε τοὺς κληρονομοὺς ἠρχοντας θετέον, οίνον τοὺς ἱερεῖς πρῶτον (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐτερὸν τι παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς θετεῖν), ἔτι δὲ χορηγοὶ καὶ κήρυκες, αἱροῦνται δὲ καὶ προσβεσταί. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν πολιτικαὶ τῶν ἐπιμελεῖν, ἡ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν πρὸς τινα πράξειν, οίον στρατηγὸς στρατευομένων, ἡ κατὰ μέρος, οίον ὁ γυναικονόμος ἡ παιδονόμος· αἱ δ' οἰκονομικαὶ (πολλάκις γὰρ αἱροῦνται σιτομέτρας)· αἱ δ' ὑπηρετικαὶ καὶ πρὸς ἂς, ἀν εὐπορῶσι, τάπτουσι δούλους. μάλιστα ὦδ' εἰπεῖν ἀρχὰς λεκτέον ταύτας ὀσαις ἀποδέδοται βουλεύοντας τε περὶ τινῶν καὶ κρῖναι

1 Ar.: ποίαι codd. (et nonnulli πολιτεῖαι).
2 οὐ suppleuit Rassow.

* Distributions of corn were made at times of scarcity, or when the state had received a present of corn.
powers, and what their various periods of tenure (for some people make their magistracies tenable for six months, others for less, others for a year and others for a longer period)—shall the magistracies be for life or for a long period, or if for a shorter term shall the same people be allowed to hold them several times or not the same man twice but once only? and also as to the appointment of magistrates, who shall be eligible, who the electors, and what the mode of election? For on all these points it is needful to be able to determine how many modes of procedure are possible, and then to settle what modes are expedient for what sorts of constitution. Nor is it easy to decide to what kinds of office the name of magistracy ought to be applied; for the political community requires a great many officials, owing to which it is not proper to reckon all of them magistrates, whether elected by vote or by lot,—for instance first the priests (for this office must be considered as something different from the political magistracies), and again there are leaders of choruses, and heralds, and persons are also elected as ambassadors. And of the offices exercising superintendence some are political, and are exercised either over the whole of the citizens in regard to some operation—for instance a general superintends them when serving as soldiers, or over a section—for instance the superintendent of women or of children; while others are economic (for states often elect officers to dole out corn a); and others are subordinate, and are the sort of services to which people when well off appoint slaves. But the title of magistracy, to put it simply, is chiefly to be applied to all those offices to which have been assigned the duties of deliberating about certain matters and of
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καὶ ἐπιτάξαι, καὶ μάλιστα τούτο, τὸ γὰρ ἐπι-
tάττειν ἄρχικώτερον ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διαφέρει
πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν (οὐ γὰρ πω
κρίσις γέγονεν ἁμφιβητούντων περὶ τοῦ ὅνοματος),
ἐχει δὲ τιν’ ἄλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν.
ποῖαι δ’ ἄρχαι καὶ πόσαι ἀναγκαῖαι εἰ ἐσται 4
πόλεις, καὶ ποῖαι ἀναγκαῖαι μὲν οὐ χρήσιμοι δὲ
πρὸς σπουδαίαν πολιτείαν, μάλλον ἂν τις ἀπορή-
σεις πρὸς ἀπασάν τε δὴ πολιτείαν καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς
μικρὰς πόλεις. ἐν μὲν γὰρ δὴ ταῖς μεγάλαις
ἐνδέχεται τε καὶ δὲι μίαν τετάχθαι πρὸς ἐν ἔργον
(πολλοὺς τε γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἄρχεια ἐνδέχεται βαδί-
ζειν διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας, ὡστε
τὰς μὲν διαλείπειν πολῶν χρώνον τὰς δ’ ἀπαξ
ἄρχειν, καὶ βελτιών ἐκαστον ἔργον τυγχάνει τῇς
ἐπιμελείας μονοπραγματούσης ἡ πολυπραγματο-
ῦσης). ἐν δὲ ταῖς μικραῖς ἀνάγκη συνάγειν εἰς 5
ολίγους πολλὰς ἄρχας (διὰ γὰρ ὀλγανθρωπίαν οὐ
ῥάδιον ἑστι πολλοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄρχαις εἶναι· τίνες
γὰρ τούτους ἑσονται διαδεξόμενοι πάλιν;)
δέονται δ’ ἐνίοτε τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρχων καὶ νόμων
αὐτὲς ταῖς μεγάλαις· πλην αἱ μὲν δέονται
πολλάκις τῶν αὐτῶν, ταῖς δ’ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ
τοῦτο συμβαίνει. διότερ οὐθὲν κωλυει πολλὰς
ἐπιμελείας ἀμα προστάτεων (οὐ γὰρ ἐμποδιοῦσιν
ἀλλήλαις), καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὀλγανθρωπίαν ἀναγκαῖον
τὰ ἄρχεια ὅπον ἄδηλωσκολύχνια ποιεῖν. ἐὰν οὖν 6

a An implement (its exact shape does not appear to be
known), used by soldiers on campaign, here mentioned as
an illustration of one tool serving two purposes, cf. 1252 b 1.
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acting as judges and of issuing orders, and especially the last, for to give orders is most characteristic of authority. But this question is of virtually no practical importance (for no decision has yet been given, our discussion being merely about the name), although it does admit of some further inquiry of a speculative kind. On the other hand the questions what kinds and what number of magistracies are necessary to constitute a state at all, and what kinds although not necessary are advantageous for a good constitution, are questions that might preferably be discussed, both indeed as regards every form of constitution and particularly in regard to the small states. For it is true that in the large states it is possible and proper for one magistracy to be assigned to one function (for the large number of the citizens makes it possible for many people to enter on an official career, so as to intermit their tenure of some offices for a long time and to hold others only once, and also every task is better attended to if the attention is directed to one thing only than if it is busy with many); but in the small states it is inevitable that many offices must be gathered into few hands (for owing to shortage of man-power it is not easy for many people to be in office, since who will take over the posts as their successors?). But sometimes small states require the same magistracies and laws as large ones; except that the latter require the same persons to serve often, but in the former this only occurs after a long interval. Hence it is possible to assign several duties to one man at the same time (since they will not interfere with one another), and to meet the shortage of man-power it is necessary to make the magistracies like spit-lampholders. If therefore we are able to
ěχωμεν λέγειν πόσας ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν πάσῃ πόλει καὶ πόσας οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν δεῖ δ' ὑπ'-
ἀρχεῖν, βάον ἂν τις εἴδως ταύτα συνίδοι 1 ποιας
ἀρμόττει συνάγειν ἀρχὰς εἰς μίαν ἀρχήν. ἀρ-
μόττει δὲ καὶ τούτο μή λειηθέναι, ποίων 2 δεῖ
15 κατὰ τόπον ἀρχεῖα πολλὰ 3 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ποιῶν
πανταχοῦ μίαν ἀρχήν εἶναι κυρίαν, οἶον εὐκοσμίας
πότερον ἐν ἀγορᾷ μὲν ἀγορανόμου ἄλλον δὲ κατ'
ἄλλον τόπον, ἣ πανταχοῦ τὸν αὐτὸν· καὶ πότερον
κατὰ τὸ πράγμα δεὶ διαιρεῖν ἣ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώ-
πους, λέγω δ' οἶον ἐνα τῆς εὐκοσμίας, ἣ παῖδων
20 ἄλλον καὶ γυναικῶν· καὶ κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας δὲ, 7
πότερον διαφέρει καθ' ἐκάστην καὶ τὸ τῶν ἁρχῶν
γένος ἡ οὐθέν, οἶον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ὁλιγαρχίᾳ
καὶ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ καὶ μοναρχίᾳ πότερον αἱ αὐταὶ
μὲν εἰςον ἁρχαί κύριαι, οὐκ ἔξ' ἴσων δ' οὐδ' ἔξ
25 ὁμοίων, ἀλλ' ἑτεραὶ ἐν ἑτέραις (οἶον ἐν μὲν ταῖς
ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων ἐν δὲ ταῖς
ὁλιγαρχίαις ἐκ τῶν πλουσίων ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημο-
κρατίαις ἐκ τῶν ἐλευθέρων) ἡ τυγχάνουσι μὲν τινὲς
οὔςαι καὶ κατ' αὐτὰς τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἁρχῶν,
ἔστι δ' ὅπου συμφέρουσιν αἱ αὐταὶ καὶ ὅπου
διαφέρουσιν (ἐνθά μὲν γὰρ ἀρμόττει μεγάλας,
30 ἐνθά δ' εἶναι μικρὰς τὰς αὐτὰς). οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ 8

1 Bojesen: συνάγοι codd. (συνάγοι οίς ? ed.).
2 Thurot: ποία codd.
3 Thurot: πολλῶν codd.
POLITICS, IV. xii. 6-8

say how many magistracies every state must necessarily possess and how many, though not absolutely necessary, it ought to possess, knowing these points one might more easily realize what kinds of magistracies are of a suitable nature to be combined into a single office. And it is suitable for the further question not to be overlooked, what kinds of matters ought to be attended to by a number of officials locally distributed and what ought to be under the authority of one magistrate for all localities, for example should good order be seen to in the market-place by a Controller of the Market and elsewhere by another official, or everywhere by the same one? and ought the offices to be divided according to the function or according to the persons concerned—I mean, for instance, should there be a single official in control of good order, or a different one for children and for women? and also under the various constitutions does the nature of the magistracies vary in accordance with each or does it not vary at all—for example in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy and monarchy are the magistracies the same in their powers, although they are not filled from equal ranks nor from similar classes but are different in different constitutions (for example in aristocracies drawn from the educated, in oligarchies from the wealthy, and in democracies from the free), or although some constitutions happen to be correspondent with the actual differences of their magistracies, yet in other cases are the same magistracies advantageous even where the constitutions differ (for in some places it is suitable for the same magistracies to have large functions and in other places small ones)? Not but what there are also some offices peculiar to special
ARISTOTLE

1299 b

ιδιαὶ τινὲς εἰσὶν, οἷον ἡ τῶν προβούλων. αὕτη
gὰρ οὐ δημοκρατικὴ, βουλὴ δὲ δημοτικὸν, δεὶ
μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τι τουοῦτον ὡς ἐπιμελὴς ἔσται τοῦ
dήμου προβουλεύειν, ὡς ὁ σχολῶν ἔσται· τοῦτο
δὲ, εὼν ὁλίγοι τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὁσοὶ, ὁλιγαρχικῶν,
tούς δὲ προβούλουσ ὁλίγους ἀναγκαίον εἰναι τὸ
πλήθος, ὡστ' ὁλιγαρχικὸν. ἀλλ' ὅπου ἀμφω
ἀταί αἱ ἁρχαῖ, οἱ πρὸβουλοι καθεστάσων ἐπὶ τοῖς
βουλευταῖς: ὁ μὲν γὰρ βουλευτὴς δημοτικὸς, δὲ
προβοῦλος ὁλιγαρχικὸν. καταλύεται δὲ καὶ

1300 a

τῆς βουλῆς ἡ δύναμις ἐν ταῖς τοιούταις δημο-
κρατίαις ἐν αἷς αὐτὸς συνιῶν ὁ δῆμος χρηματίζει
περὶ πάντων. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνειν εἰώθεν ὅταν
εὐπορία τις ἡ μισθοῦ τοῖς ἐκκλησίαζονσιν, σχολά-
ζοντες γὰρ συλλέγονται τε πολλάκις καὶ ἀπαντὰ
αὐτοὶ κρίνοντοι. παιδονόμος δὲ καὶ γυναικονόμος
καὶ εἰ τις ἀλλος ἁρχαῖ κύριος ἐστὶ τοιούτης
ἐπιμελείας ἀριστοκρατικῶν, δημοκρατικῶν δ' οὐ
(πῶς γὰρ οἶον τε κωλύειν εξιέναι ταῖς τῶν ἀπόρων;) ὁ
ὁλιγαρχικὸν (τρυφώσι γὰρ αἱ τῶν ὁλιγ-
αρχοῦντων). ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
εἰρήθων νῦν, περὶ δὲ ταῖς τῶν ἁρχῶν καταστάσεις
πειρατέου εἰς ἁρχῆς διελθεῖν. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ διαφοραὶ
ev τριῶν ὁρῶς, ὡν συνιδεμένων ἀναγκαῖον
πάντας εἰλῆθαι τοὺς τρόπους. ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν τριῶν
tαύτων ἐν μὲν τίνες οἱ καθιστάντες τὰς ἁρχὰς,
dεύτερον δ' ἐκ τῶν, λοιπὸν δὲ τίνα τρόπον.

1 μισθοῦ Spengel: ἡ μισθῶς codd.

a See 1298 b 29 n.
b Or possibly ‘from going in processions’: Solon made
regulations ταῖς ἐξόδοις τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ ταῖς
πένθεσι καὶ ταῖς

(Plutarch, Solon 21).

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POLITICS, IV. xii. 8–10

forms of constitution, for instance the office of Preliminary Councillors. This is undemocratic, although a Council is a popular body, for there is bound to be some body of this nature to have the duty of preparing measures for the popular assembly, in order that it may be able to attend to its business; but a preparatory committee, if small, is oligarchical, and Preliminary Councillors must necessarily be few in number, so that they are an oligarchical element. But where both of these magistracies exist, the Preliminary Councillors are in authority over the Councillors, since a councillor is a democratic official, but a preliminary councillor is an oligarchic one. Also the power of the Council is weakened in democracies of the sort in which the people in assembly deals with everything itself; and this usually happens when there is a plentiful supply of pay for those who attend the assembly, for being at leisure they meet frequently and decide all things themselves. But a Superintendent of Children and a Superintendent of Women, and any other magistrates that exercise a similar sort of supervision, are an aristocratic feature, and not democratic (for how is it possible to prevent the wives of the poor from going out of doors?) nor yet oligarchic (for the wives of oligarchic rulers are luxurious). But let the discussion of these matters go no further at present, and let us attempt to go through from the beginning the question of the ways of appointing the magistrates. The varieties here depend on three determinants, the combinations of which must give all the possible modes. One of these three determining points is, who are the persons who appoint the magistrates? the second is, from whom?
1300 a

ἐκάστου δὲ τῶν τριών τούτων διαφοράς τρεῖς

15 εἰσίν: ἥ γὰρ πάντες οἱ πολίται καθιστᾶσιν ἡ
twes, καὶ ἡ ἐκ πάντων ἡ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων
(οἷον ἡ τιμήματι ἡ γένει ἡ ἁρετῇ ἡ τινὶ τοιούτῳ
ἀλλὰ, ὡσπερ ἐν Μεγάροις ἐκ τῶν συγκατελθόντων
καὶ συμμαχεσαμένων πρὸς τὸν δήμου), καὶ ταῦτα

20 ἡ αἴρεσι ἡ κλήρῳ· πάλιν ταῦτα συνδυαζόμενα, 11
λέγω δὲ τὰς μὲν τινὲς τὰς δὲ πάντες, καὶ τὰς
μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ’ ἐκ τινῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν
αἴρεσι τὰς δὲ κλήρω. τούτων δ’ ἐκάστης
ἔσονται τῆς διαφορᾶς τρόποι τέσσαρες: ἡ γὰρ
πάντες ἐκ πάντων αἴρεσι, ἡ πάντες ἐκ πάντων

25 κλήρῳ—καὶ [ἡ] 2 ἐξ ἀπάντων ἡ ὡς ἀνὰ μέρος, οἷον
κατὰ φυλάς καὶ δήμοις καὶ φρατρίας ἡ ἐὰν
diélθῃ διὰ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, 3 ἡ ἀεὶ ἐξ ἀπαντῶν,
—ἡ καὶ 4 τὰ μὲν οὖτω τὰ δὲ ἑκείνως. πάλιν εἰ
tinēs οἱ καθιστάντες, ἡ ἐκ πάντων αἴρεσι ἡ ἐκ
πάντων κλήρῳ, ἡ ἐκ τινῶν αἴρεσι ἡ ἐκ τινῶν

30 κλήρῳ, ἡ τὰ μὲν οὖτω τὰ δ’ ἑκείνως, λέγω δὲ τὰ
μὲν [ἐκ πάντων] 5 αἴρεσι τὰ δὲ κλήρῳ. ὥστε
dwèdēca οἱ τρόποι γίνονται χωρὶς τῶν δύο συν-
dυσσαιρῶν. τούτων δ’ αἱ μὲν δύο καταστάσεις 12
δημοτικαὶ, τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων 6 αἴρεσι ἡ κλήρῳ
[γίνεσθαι] 7 ἡ ἀμφότερος, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ’
aíresis taw aρχῶν τὸ δὲ μὴ πάντας ἀμα μὲν

1 1300 a 23-b 5 locum vertiginosum viri docti ad libidinem quisque suam rescripserunt.
2 Thurot.
3 πολιτῶν Ἀγ.: πολιτικῶν.
4 ἡ καὶ Rabe: καὶ ἡ, καὶ codd.
5 Hayduck.
6 post πάντων add. καὶ τὸ πάντας ἐκ τινῶν Rabe.
7 Thurot.

* It is quite uncertain when this event took place and
and last, in what manner? And of each of these three determinants there are three variations: either all the citizens appoint or some, and either from all or from a certain class (defined for instance by property-assessment or birth or virtue or some other such qualification, as at Megara only those were eligible who returned in a body from exile and fought together against the common people), and the mode of appointment may be either by vote or by lot; and again, these systems may be coupled together—I mean that some citizens may appoint to some offices but all to others, and to some offices all citizens may be eligible but to others only a certain class, and to some appointment may be by vote but to others by lot. And of each variation of these determinants there will be four modes: either all citizens may appoint from all by vote, or all from all by lot—and from all either section by section, for instance by tribes or demes or brotherhoods until the procedure has gone through all the citizens, or from the whole number every time,—or else partly in one way and partly in the other. Again, if the electors are some of the citizens, they must either appoint from all by vote, or from all by lot, or from some by vote, or from some by lot, or partly in one way and partly in the other—I mean partly by vote and partly by lot. Hence the modes prove to be twelve, apart from the two combinations. And among these, two ways of appointment are democratic—for all to appoint from all by vote, or by lot, or by both—some offices by lot and others by vote; but for not all to be the electors and for them to appoint simultaneously, and either whether it is the same as those referred to at 1302 b 30 ff. and 1304 b 34 ff.
καθιστάναι, εξ ἀπάντων δ' ἡ ἐκ τινῶν, ἡ κλήρῳ ἡ αἰρέσει ἡ ἁμφοῖν, ἡ τάς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τάς δ' ἐκ τινῶν ἁμφοῖν (τὸ δὲ ἁμφοῖν λέγω τάς μὲν κλήρῳ τάς δ' αἰρέσει) πολιτικῶν. καὶ τὸ τινᾶς ἐκ πάντων τάς μὲν αἰρέσει καθιστάναι τάς δὲ κλήρῳ ἡ ἁμφοῖν (τάς μὲν κλήρῳ τάς δ' αἰρέσει) ὀλιγαρχικῶν· ὁλιγαρχικότερον δὲ καὶ τὸ εξ ἁμφοῖν. τὸ δὲ τάς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τάς δ' ἐκ τινῶν πολι-13

1300 b τικόν ἀριστοκρατικῶς, ἡ τάς μὲν αἰρέσει τάς δὲ κλήρῳ. τὸ δὲ τινᾶς ἐκ τινῶν <αἰρέσει> ὀλιγαρχικῶν, καὶ τὸ τινᾶς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ (μὴ γενόμενον δ' ὅμως), καὶ τὸ τινᾶς ἐκ τινῶν ἁμφοῖν. τὸ δὲ τινᾶς εξ ἀπάντων τότε2 δὲ ἐκ τινῶν αἰρέσει πάντας ἀριστοκρατικῶν.

Οἱ μὲν οὖν τρόποι τῶν περὶ τὰς ἁρχὰς το-σοῦτοι τὸν ἁριθμὸν εἰσὶ, καὶ διήρηνται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας οὕτως· τίνα δὲ τίσι συμφέρει καὶ πῶς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὰς καταστάσεις ἀμα ταῖς δυνάμεις τῶν ἁρχῶν [καὶ]3 τίνες εἰσίν ἐσται φανερῶν. λέγω δὲ δύναμιν ἁρχῆς οἵν τὴν κυρίαν τῶν προσόδων καὶ τὴν κυρίαν τῆς φυλακῆς· ἀλλό γὰρ εἴδος δυνάμεως οἵν στρατηγικὰς καὶ τῆς τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγορᾶν συμβολαίῶν κυρίας.

XIII. Δοιπότις δὲ τῶν τριῶν τὸ δικαστικὸν εἰσεῖν, ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τούτων τοὺς τρόπος κατὰ τὴν

1 Lambinus. 2 τότε P2: τὸ cet. 3 [καὶ] om. ΓΜΠ1.

* Perhaps the Greek should be rewritten to give ' for some to appoint from all either by vote or by lot or by both.'

* This insertion by Lambinus seems certain.

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from all or from some either by lot or by vote or by both, or some offices from all and others from some by both (by which I mean some by lot and others by vote) is constitutional. And for some to appoint from all, to some offices by vote and to others by lot or by both \(a\) (to some by lot and to others by vote) is oligarchical; and it is even more oligarchical to appoint from both classes. But to appoint some offices from all and the others from a certain class is constitutional with an aristocratic bias; or to appoint some by vote and others by lot. And for a certain class to appoint from a certain class \(b\) is oligarchical, and so it is for a certain class to appoint from a certain class by lot (although not working out in the same way), and for a certain class to appoint from a certain class by both methods. And for a certain class to make a preliminary selection from the whole body and then for all to appoint from among certain persons (thus selected) is aristocratic.

So many in number therefore are the modes of appointing to the magistracies, and this is how the modes are classified according to the different constitutions; and what regulations are advantageous for what people and how the appointments ought to be conducted will be made clear at the same time as we consider what are the powers of the offices. By the power of an office I mean for instance the control of the revenues and the control of the guard; since a different sort of power belongs for example to a generalship and to the office that controls market contracts.

XIII. Of the three factors of a constitution it remains to speak of the judiciary, and of judicial bodies also we must consider the various modes, in
ARISTOTLE

1300 b

15 αὑτὴν ὑπόθεσειν. ἔστι δὲ διαφορὰ τῶν δικαστηρίων ἐν τρισίν ὀροις, εξ ὧν τε καὶ περὶ ὧν καὶ πώς. λέγω δὲ ἐξ ὧν μὲν, πότερον ἐκ πάντων ἢ ἐκ τινῶν· περὶ δὲ ὧν δὲ, πόσα εἰδῆ δικαστηρίων· τὸ δὲ πώς, πότερον κλήρω ἢ αἰρέσει. πρῶτον οὖν διαιρείσθω πόσα εἰδῆ δικαστηρίων. ἔστι δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὀκτὼ, ἐν μὲν εὐθυντικόν, ἄλλο δὲ εἰ τίς τι τῶν κοινῶν ἁδικεί, ἐπερον ὅσα εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει, τέταρτον καὶ ἄρχουσι καὶ ἰδιώταις ὅσα περὶ ζημιώσεων ἀμφισβητοῦσι, πέμπτον τὸ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων καὶ ἑξάτων μέγεθος, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ τε φονικὸν καὶ τὸ ἔξιντόν

20 (φονικοῦ μὲν οὖν εἰδῆ, ἀν τ’ ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῖς δικαίως σταῖς ἂν τ’ ἐν ἀλλοις, περὶ τε τῶν ἐκ προνοίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκουσίων καὶ ὅσα ὀμολογεῖται μὲν ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου, τέταρτον δὲ ὅσα τοῖς φεύγουσι φόνου εἴπὶ καθόδω ἐπιφέρεται, οἷον Αθήνης λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐν Φρεαττοῖ δικαίωστίριον, συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ ἀλίγα καὶ ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις πόλεσιν τοῦ δὲ ἔξιντοι ἐν μὲν ἔρθει πρὸς ἔρθεις, ἄλλο δὲ ἔρθει πρὸς ἀστοὺς). ἔτι δὲ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μικρῶν συναλλαγμάτων, ὅσα δραχμαία καὶ πεντάδραχμα καὶ μικρῶ πλεῖνοις· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτων γίνεσθαι κρίσιν, ὡς ἐπιτίπτει δὲ εἰς δικαστῶν πλῆθος. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων

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1 <τῶν> καὶ Richards. 2 ἄλλο δὲ Richards: ἄλλο codd.

a i.e. men that had been allowed to flee the country when charged with accidental homicide, and on their return were accused of another homicide, a wilful murder.
accordance with the same plan. And a difference among judicial courts rests upon three determinants—constituents, sphere of action, and mode of appointment. As to their constituents I mean are the courts drawn from all the citizens or from a certain class? as to sphere of action, how many kinds of courts are there? and as to mode of appointment, are they appointed by lot or by vote? First then let us distinguish how many kinds of courts there are. They are eight in number, one a court of audit, another to deal with offenders against any public interest, another with matters that bear on the constitution, a fourth for both magistrates and private persons in disputes about penalties, fifth the court dealing with private contracts that are on an important scale, and beside these there is (6) the court that tries homicide, and (7) that which hears alien suits (of courts of homicide there are four kinds, whether the jury is the same or different—namely, for cases of deliberate homicide, of involuntary homicide, of homicide admitted but claimed to be justifiable, and fourth to deal with charges of homicide brought against men that have fled from the country for homicide, upon their return, such as at Athens for instance the Court at Phreatto is said to be, although such cases are of rare occurrence in the whole course of history, even in the great states; and of the aliens’ court one branch hears suits of aliens against aliens and another of aliens against citizens); and also beside all of these there are (8) courts to try cases of petty contracts, involving sums of one drachma, five drachmas or a little more—for even these cases have to be tried, though they are not suitable for a numerous jury. But let us dismiss the subject of these petty
1300 b  
άφείσθω καὶ τῶν φονικῶν καὶ τῶν ξενικῶν, περὶ
dὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν λέγωμεν, περὶ δὲν μὴ γινομένων
καλῶς διαστάσεις γίνονται καὶ τῶν πολιτείων αἱ
κυνήσεις. ἀνάγκη δ’ ἦτοι πάντας περὶ πάντων

40 κρίνειν τῶν διηρημένων αἱρέσει ἡ κλήρῳ, ἡ
πάντας περὶ πάντων τὰ μὲν κλήρῳ τὰ δ’ αἱρέσει,
ἡ περὶ ἐνίων τῶν αὐτῶν τὸς μὲν κλήρῳ τοὺς δ’

1301 a αἱρετοὺς. οὕτως μὲν οὐν οἱ τρόποι τέτταρες τῶν
ἀριθμῶν, τοσοῦτοι δ’ ἑτεροί καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος
τάλιν γὰρ ἐκ τινῶν καὶ οἱ δικάζοντες περὶ πάντων
αἱρέσει, ἡ ἐκ τινῶν περὶ πάντων κλήρῳ, ἡ τὰ μὲν

κλήρῳ τὰ δ’ αἱρέσει, ἡ ἐνία δικαστήρια περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν ἐκ κληρωτῶν καὶ αἱρετῶν. οὕτως μὲν οὖν,
ὡσπερ ἔλεχθησαν, οἱ τρόποι ἀντὶστροφοι1 τοῖς
eἰρημένοις. ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ συνιδωξόμενα, λέγω δ’
oίον τὰ μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰ δ’ ἐκ τινῶν τὰ δ’ ἐξ
ἀμφοῖν, ὀνοματίκα, ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δικαστήριοι εἰδοὶ οἱ μὲν

10 ἐκ πάντων οἱ δ’ ἐκ τινῶν, καὶ ἡ κλήρῳ ἡ αἱρέσει

η ἀμφοῖν. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται τρόπους εἶναι
tὰ δικαστήρια, εἰρηταὶ: τοῦτον δὲ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα
dημοτικά, ὃσα ἐκ πάντων περὶ2 πάντων, τὰ δὲ
deύτερα ὀλιγαρχικά, ὃσα ἐκ τινῶν περὶ πάντων, τὰ
dὲ τρίτα ἀριστοκρατικά καὶ πολιτικά, ὃσα τὰ μὲν

15 ἐκ πάντων τὰ δ’ ἐκ τινῶν.

1 ἀντὶστροφοι suppleuit Newman.
2 περὶ Susemihl: ἡ περὶ codd.
suits, and the courts for homicide and those for aliens, and let us speak about political trials, which when not well conducted cause party divisions and revolutionary disturbances. And necessarily either all the judges of all the cases that have been classified will be appointed by vote, or by lot, or all in all cases partly by lot and partly by vote, or in some cases some judges will be appointed by lot and others by vote for the same case. These modes then are four in number, and the sectional modes also make as many others; for here again the judges for all cases may be drawn by vote from a certain class, or for all cases by lot from a certain class, or some courts may be appointed by lot and others by vote, or some courts may be composed of judges chosen by lot and by vote for the same cases. These then are the modes, as was said, corresponding to those mentioned. And there are also the same courts in combination—I mean for example some drawn from the whole body and some from a class and some from both, as for instance if the same court contained some members from the whole body and others from a class, and appointed either by lot or by vote or both. We have then stated all the modes in which it is possible for the courts to be composed; and of these the first set, drawn from all the citizens and dealing with all cases, are popular, the second, drawn from a certain class to deal with all cases, are oligarchic, and the third, drawn partly from all and partly from a certain class, are suited to an aristocracy and to a constitutional government.
Ε

1. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ὃν προειλόμεθα 1

σχέδου εἰρηταὶ περὶ πάντων· ἐκ τίνων δὲ μεταβάλλουσιν αἵ πολιτείαι καὶ πόσων καὶ πολύ, καὶ τίνες ἐκάστης πολιτείας φθοραὶ, καὶ ἐκ πολύν εἰς πολύ μάλιστα μεθίστανται, ἢτι δὲ σωτηρία τίνες καὶ κοινὴ καὶ χωρίς ἐκάστης εἰσὶν, ἢτι δὲ διὰ τίνων ἃν μάλιστα σφύζοιτο τῶν πολιτείων ἐκάστη,

σκεπτέον ἐφεξῆς τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

Δεὶ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν, ὅτι πολλαὶ 2

γεγένηται πολιτείαι πάντων μὲν ὁμολογοῦντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν ἵσον τούτου δ’ ἀμαρτανόντων (ἀστερ ἐφεξῆς καὶ πρότερον).

δήμος μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἵσου τοῦν ὅρτας

οἰκεῖθαν ἀπλῶς ἵσους εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ὁμοίως, ἀπλῶς ἵσοι εἶναι νομίζουσιν), ὁλιγαρχία δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἁπλούς ἐν τῷ ὅτασ ὀλοὶς εἶναι ἁπλοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν (κατ᾽ ὅσιάν γὰρ ἁπλοὶ ὅρτες ἁπλῶς ἁπλοὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι). εἰτὰ οἱ μὲν 3

ὅσοι ὅρτες πάντων τῶν ἵσων ἁξιοῦσι μετέχειν,

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a Book V. is placed as Book VII. by some editors, as Book VIII. by others, see Book III. fin. note.

b For this distinction between broad methods of guarding against revolution and the practical means by which those methods can be put into effect Newman compares c. ix. §§ 2 f., 10 f., iv. ii. 5 fin., vi. i. 1.

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BOOK V

I. Almost all the other subjects which we intended to treat have now been discussed. There must follow the consideration of the questions, what are the number and the nature of the causes that give rise to revolutions in constitutions, and what are the causes that destroy each form of constitution, and out of what forms into what forms do they usually change, and again what are the safeguards of constitutions in general and of each form in particular, and what are the means by which the safeguarding of each may best be put into effect.

2. And we must first assume the starting-point, that many forms of constitution have come into existence with everybody agreeing as to what is just, that is proportionate equality, but failing to attain it (as has also been said before). Thus democracy arose from men's thinking that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely (for they suppose that because they are all alike free they are equal absolutely), oligarchy arose from their assuming that if they are unequal as regards some one thing they are unequal wholly (for being unequal in property they assume that they are unequal absolutely); and then the democrats claim as being equal to participate in all things in equal
ARISTOTLE

1301 a

οἱ δ’ ὡς ἀνίσου ὄντες πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦσιν, τὸ γὰρ
πλεῖον ἀνίσουν. ἔχουσι μὲν οὖν τι πᾶσαι δίκαιον,
ἡμαρτημέναι δ’ ἀπλῶς εἰσίν· καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν
αὐταί, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἢν ἐκάτεροι
τυγχάνουσιν ἔχουσι μετέχωσι τῆς πολιτείας,
στασιάζουσι. πάντων δὲ δικαιότατα μὲν ἂν στα-
σιάζοιεν, ήκιστα δὲ τοῦτο πράττουσιν, οἱ κατ’

1301 b

ἀρετὴν διαφέροντες· μάλιστα γὰρ εὐλογον ἀνίσους
ἀπλῶς εἰναι τούτους μόνον¹. εἰσὶ δὲ τυνε οἱ κατὰ
γένος ὑπερέχουσεν οὐκ ἄξιον οὕτως τῶν ἱσων αὐτοὺς
diὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα ταύτην· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἰναι
dοκοῦσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος.

5 Ἀρχαὶ μὲν οὖν ὡς εἰπεῖν² αὐταί καὶ πηγαί τῶν στά
σεων εἰσιν οἴδεν στασιάζουσιν (διὸ καὶ αἱ μετα-
βολαὶ γίγνονται διχως· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὴν
πολιτείαν, ὅπως ἐκ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἀλλην μετα-
στήσωσιν, οἶον ἐκ δημοκρατίας ὀλιγαρχίαν ἡ
dημοκρατίαι ἡ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἡ πολιτείαν καὶ

10 ἀριστοκρατίαι ἐκ τούτων, ἡ ταύτας ἐξ ἔκεινων·
ὅτε δ’ οὗ πρὸς τὴν καθεστηκυίαν πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ
tὴν μὲν κατάστασιν προσαιροῦν τὴν αὐτήν, δι’
αὐτῶν δ’ εἶναι βούλονται ταύτην, οἶον τὴν ὀλι-
γαρχίαν ἡ τὴν μοναρχίαν. ἔτι περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ 5
بطلον, οἶον ἡ ὀλιγαρχίαν οὖσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον

15 ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι ἡ εἰς τὸ ἡττον, ἡ δημοκρατίαν
οὐσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον δημοκρατεῖσθαι ἡ εἰς τὸ
بطلον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λουπῶν πολιτεῶν, ἡ

¹ μόνον ἐν ed.
² <πασῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν vel ὡς εἰπεῖν post πηγαί Richards.

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shares, while the oligarchs as being unequal seek to have a larger share, for a larger share is unequal. All these forms of constitution then have some element of justice, but from an absolute point of view they are erroneous; and owing to this cause, when each of the two parties has not got the share in the constitution which accords with the fundamental assumption that they happen to entertain, class war ensues. And of all men those who excel in virtue would most justifiably stir up faction, though they are least given to doing so; for they alone can with the fullest reason be deemed absolutely unequal. And there are some men who being superior in birth claim unequal rights because of this inequality; for persons who have ancestral virtue and wealth behind them are thought to be noble.

4 These then roughly speaking are the starting-points and sources of factions, which give rise to party strife (and revolutions due to this take place in two ways: sometimes they are in regard to the constitution, and aim at changing from the one established to another, for instance from democracy to oligarchy, or to democracy from oligarchy, or from these to constitutional government and aristocracy, or from those to these; but sometimes the revolution is not in regard to the established constitution, but its promoters desire the same form of government, for instance oligarchy or monarchy, but wish it to be in their own control. Again it may be a question of degree; for instance, when there is an oligarchy the object may be to change to a more oligarchical government or to a less, or when there is a democracy to a more or to a less democratic government, and similarly in the case of the remaining constitutions.
This ethical arithmetic is helped out in Greek by the fact that, even without the qualification κατ' ἄξιαν, ἴσος often means 'equal to desert,' fair, just.

See 1301 a 27 ff. and note.
the aim may be either to tighten them up or to relax them. Or again the aim may be to change a certain part of the constitution, for example to establish or abolish a certain magistracy, as according to some accounts Lysander attempted to abolish the kingship at Sparta and the king Pausanias the ephorate; and also at Epidamnus the constitution was altered in part, for they set up a council instead of the tribal rulers, and it is still compulsory for the magistrates alone of the class that has political power to come to the popular assembly when an appointment to a magistracy is put to the vote; and the single supreme magistrate was also an oligarchical feature in this constitution). For party strife is everywhere due to inequality, where classes that are unequal do not receive a share of power in proportion (for a life-long monarchy is an unequal feature when it exists among equals); for generally the motive for factious strife is the desire for equality. But equality is of two kinds, numerical equality and equality according to worth—by numerically equal I mean that which is the same and equal in number or dimension, by equal according to worth that which is equal by proportion; for instance numerically 3 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1 by an equal amount, but by proportion 4 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1 equally, since 2 and 1 are equal parts of 4 and 2, both being halves. But although men agree that the absolutely just is what is according to worth, they disagree (as was said before) in that some think that if they are equal in something they are wholly equal, and others claim that if they are unequal in something they deserve an unequal share of all things. Owing to this two principal varieties of constitution
That is, numbers and wealth.

Perhaps the text should be emended to give 'there are many rich men and poor men in many places.'
come into existence, democracy and oligarchy; for noble birth and virtue are found in few men, but the qualifications specified in more: nowhere are there a hundred men nobly born and good, but there are rich men in many places. But for the constitution to be framed absolutely and entirely according to either kind of equality is bad. And this is proved by experience, for not one of the constitutions formed on such lines is permanent. And the cause of this is that it is impossible for some evil not to occur ultimately from the first and initial error that has been made. Hence the proper course is to employ numerical equality in some things and equality according to worth in others. But nevertheless democracy is safer and more free from civil strife than oligarchy; for in oligarchies two kinds of strife spring up, faction between different members of the oligarchy and also faction between the oligarchs and the people, whereas in democracies only strife between the people and the oligarchical party occurs, but party strife between different sections of the people itself does not occur to any degree worth mentioning. And again the government formed of the middle classes is nearer to the people than to the few, and it is the safest of the kinds of constitution mentioned.

II. And since we are considering what circumstances give rise to party factions and revolutions in constitutions, we must first ascertain their origins and causes generally. They are, speaking roughly, three in number, which we must first define in outline separately. For we must ascertain what state of affairs gives rise to party strife, and for what

Viz. the material, final and efficient causes of revolutions (Jowett).
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

1392α

ἐνεκέν καὶ τρίτων τίνες ἀρχαὶ γίνονται τῶν πολιτικῶν ταραχῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλους στάσεων.

Τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν πως πρὸς τὴν μεταβολὴν αἰτίαν καθόλου μάλιστα θετέων περὶ ἥς ἴδῃ τυγχάνομεν εἰρηκότες. οὐ μὲν γὰρ ἵσοτῆτος ἐφείμενοι στασιάζομεν ἂν νομίζωσιν ἐλαττον ἔχειν ὄντες ἵσοι τοῖς πλεονεκτοῦσιν, οὐ δὲ τῆς ἀνισότητος καὶ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς ἂν ὑπολαμβάνωσιν ὄντες ἄνισοι μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀλλ' ἵσον ἢ ἐλαττον (τούτων δ' ἐστι 2 μὲν ὅρεγεοθαι δικαίως, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἀδίκως). ἐλάττουσι τε γὰρ ὅντες ὅπως ἵσοι διήσετε στασιάζομεν, καὶ ἵσοι ὅντες ὅπως μείζοντες. πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες στασιάζομεν, εἰρήται.

Περὶ δὲν δὲ στασιάζομεν, ἐστὶ κέρδος καὶ τιμή, καὶ τάναντια τούτοις, καὶ γὰρ ἀτιμίαν φεύγοντες καὶ ζημίαν ἡ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἡ τῶν φίλων στασιάζουσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

Ἄι δ' αἰτίαι καὶ ἄρχαί τῶν κινήσεων, οὗν αὐτοὶ 3 τε διατίθενται τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων, ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἑστὲν τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, ἐστὶ δ' ὡς πλείουσ. ὁν δύο μὲν ἐστὶ ταυτὰ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁσαύτως· διὰ κέρδος γὰρ καὶ διὰ τιμήν καὶ παροξύνονται πρὸς ἄλληλους οὐχ ἵνα κτῆσωνται σφίσιν αὐτοῖς.

1392b ὄσπερ εἰρηται πρότερον, ἀλλ' ἐτέρους ὀρέωντες τοὺς μὲν δικαίως τοὺς δ' ἀδίκως πλεονεκτοῦντας τούτων. ἐτὶ διὰ ύβριν, διὰ φόβον, διὰ ὑπεροχήν,

1 καὶ suppleuit Immisch.
objects it is waged, and thirdly what are the origins of political disorders and internal party struggles.

Now the principal cause, speaking generally, of the citizens being themselves disposed in a certain manner towards revolution is the one about which we happen to have spoken already. Those that desire equality enter on party strife if they think that they have too little although they are the equals of those who have more, while those that desire inequality or superiority do so if they suppose that although they are unequal they have not got more but an equal amount or less (and these desires may be felt justly, and they may also be felt unjustly); for when inferior, people enter on strife in order that they may be equal, and when equal, in order that they may be greater. We have therefore said what are the states of feeling in which men engage in party strife.

The objects about which it is waged are gain and honour, and their opposites, for men carry on party faction in states in order to avoid dishonour and loss, either on their own behalf or on behalf of their friends.

And the causes and origins of the disturbances which occasion the actual states of feeling described and their direction to the objects mentioned, according to one account happen to be seven in number, though according to another they are more. Two of them are the same as those spoken of before although not operating in the same way: the motives of gain and honour also stir men up against each other not in order that they may get them for themselves, as has been said before, but because they see other men in some cases justly and in other cases unjustly getting a larger share of them. Other causes are insolence, fear, excessive
The four causes now mentioned are those alluded to just above (a 38) as in addition to the seven enumerated above, a 38-b 5.

Cf. 1284 a 18.

Perhaps in 390 B.C., cf. l. 32 f. and 1304 b 27 ff.
predominance, contempt, disproportionate growth of power; and also other modes of cause\(^a\) are election intrigue, carelessness, pettiness, dissimilarity. Among these motives the power possessed by insolence and gain, and their mode of operation, is almost obvious; for when the men in office show insolence and greed, people rise in revolt against one another and against the constitutions that afford the opportunity for such conduct; and greed sometimes preys on private property and sometimes on common funds. It is clear also what is the power of honour and how it can cause party faction; for men form factions both when they are themselves dishonoured and when they see others honoured; and the distribution of honours is unjust when persons are either honoured or dishonoured against their deserts, just when it is according to desert. Excessive predominance causes faction, when some individual or body of men is greater and more powerful than is suitable to the state and the power of the government; for such are the conditions that usually result in the rise of a monarchy or dynasty. Owing to this in some places they have the custom of temporary banishment,\(^b\) as at Argos and Athens; yet it would be better to provide from the outset that there may be no persons in the state so greatly predominant, than first to allow them to come into existence and afterwards to apply a remedy. Fear is the motive of faction with those who have inflicted wrong and are afraid of being punished, and also with those who are in danger of suffering a wrong and wish to act in time before the wrong is inflicted, as the notables at Rhodes banded together\(^c\) against the people because of the law-suits that were
ARISTOTLE

1302 b

25 δίκας. διὰ καταφρόνησιν δὲ καὶ στασιάζουσι καὶ θ ἐπιτίθενται, οἷον ἐν τε ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὅταν πλείους ὤσιν ὦ μὴ μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας (κρείττους γὰρ ὤνται εἶναι), καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἵ εὐποροὶ καταφρονήσαντες τῆς ἀταξίας καὶ ἀναρχίας, οἷον καὶ ἐν Θῆβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν

30 Οίνοφύτος μάχην κακῶς πολιτευμένων ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη, καὶ ἡ Μεγαρέων δι' ἀταξίαν καὶ ἀναρχίαν ἦττηθέντων, καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνος τυραννίδος, καὶ ἐν 'Ρόδῳ ὁ δῆμος πρὸ τῆς ἐπαναστάσεως. γίνονται δὲ καὶ δὴ αὔξησιν 7 τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεταβολαι τῶν πολιτευμῶν.

35 ὥσπερ γὰρ σῶμα ἐκ μερῶν σύγκειται καὶ δὲι αὐξάνεσθαι ἀνάλογον ἢν μὲν συμμετρία, εἰ δὲ μὴ, φθείρεται, ὅταν ὁ μὲν ποὺς τεττάρων πηχῶν ἢ τὸ δ' ἄλλο σῶμα δυνοῖ σπιθαμαῖν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶν εἰς ἄλλου ξύλον μεταβάλλου μορφὴν εἰ μὴ μόνον κατὰ τὸ ποσόν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν αὐξάνουτο

1303 a παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, οὕτω καὶ πόλις σύγκειται ἐκ μερῶν, ὅν πολλάκις λανθάνει τι αὐξανόμενον, οἷον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρουν πλῆθος ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις καὶ πολιτείαις. συμβάινει δ' ἐνίοτε τούτο καὶ διὰ 8 τύχας, οἷον ἐν Τάραντι ἦττηθέντων καὶ ἀπολο-5 μένων πολλῶν γυνώριμων ὑπὸ τῶν Ἰαπύγων μικρῶν ύπερον τῶν Μηδικῶν δημοκρατία ἐγένετο ἐκ πολιτείας, καὶ ἐν ᾽Αργεί τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐβδόμῃ ἀπ-

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a Against Athens, 456 b. c.

b See 1300 a 18 n.

c 485 b. c.

d See 1. 23 n.

e It is not clear whether what follows refers to a work of art (cf. 1284 b 8) or is an exaggerated account of a disease; Galen describes one called σατυρίας, in which the bones of the temple swell out like satyrs' horns.

f i.e. if, for example, the foot became as hard as a hoof.
being brought against them. Contempt is a cause of faction and of actual attacks upon the government, for instance in oligarchies when those who have no share in the government are more numerous (for they think themselves the stronger party), and in democracies when the rich have begun to feel contempt for the disorder and anarchy that prevails, as for example at Thebes the democracy was destroyed owing to bad government after the battle of Oenophyta, and that of the Megarians was destroyed when they had been defeated owing to disorder and anarchy, and at Syracuse before the tyranny of Gelo, and at Rhodes the common people had fallen into contempt before the rising against them. Revolutions in the constitutions also take place on account of disproportionate growth; for just as the body is composed of parts, and needs to grow proportionately in order that its symmetry may remain, and if it does not it is spoiled, when the foot is four cubits long and the rest of the body two spans, and sometimes it might even change into the shape of another animal if it increased disproportionately not only in size but also in quality, so also a state is composed of parts, one of which often grows without its being noticed, as for example the number of the poor in democracies and constitutional states. And sometimes this is also brought about by accidental occurrences, as for instance at Tarentum when a great many notables were defeated and killed by the Iapygians a short time after the Persian wars a constitutional government was changed to a democracy, and at Argos when those in the seventh
ARISTOTLE

ολομένων ὑπὸ Κλεομένους τοῦ Δάκωνος ἡγαγκά-
σθησαν παραδεξασθαί τῶν περιοίκων τινῶς, καὶ ἐν
᾿Αθήναις ἀτυχούντων πεζῇ οἱ γνώριμοι ἐλάττους
10 ἑγένοντο διὰ τὸ ἐκ καταλόγου στρατεύεσθαι ὑπὸ
tὸν Δακωνικὸν πόλεμον. συμβαίνει δὲ τούτο καὶ
ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις, ἢττον δὲ· πλεῖον γὰρ τῶν
eὐπόροιν γυνομένων ἡ τῶν οὐσίων αὐξανομένων
μεταβάλλουσι εἰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δυναστείας.
μεταβάλλουσι δὲ αἱ πολιτείαι καὶ ἀνευ στάσεως 9
15 διὰ τὰς ἑριθείας, ὦσπερ ἐν Ῥηαίᾳ (ἐξ αἱρετῶν
γὰρ διὰ τούτο ἐποίησαν κληρωτὰς ὡς ἦροῦντο τοὺς
ἑριθενομένους), καὶ δι’ ὀλιγωρίαν, ὅταν ἔσωσον
eἰς τὰς ἄρχας τὰς κυρίας παριέναι τοὺς μὴ τῆς
πολιτείας φίλους, ὦσπερ ἐν Ὀμέω κατελύθη ἡ
ὀλιγαρχία τῶν ἀρχόντων γενομένου Ῥακλεοδόρου,
20 ὡς εἶ ὀλιγαρχίας πολιτείαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν κατ-
εσκένασεν. ἔτι διὰ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν· λέγω δὲ
παρὰ μικρῶν, ὅτι πολλὰς καὶ λανθάνει μεγάλη γνω-
μένη μετάβασις τῶν νομίμων, ὅταν παρορώσι τὸ
μικρὸν, ὦσπερ ἐν Ἀμβρακία μικρὸν ἢ τὸ τίμημα
tέλος δὲ ἀπ' οὖθεν ἢ ἥρχον, ὥς ἔγγυον ἢ μηθὲν
25 διαφέρον τοῦ μηθὲν τὸ μικρὸν. στάσιστικῶν δὲ 10
καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀμόφυλον, ἐώς ἄν συμπνεύσῃ· ὦσπερ
γὰρ οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος πλῆθους πόλεις γίγνεται,
1 καὶ τοῦτο Susemihl. 
2 ἀπ' ὅρων Γ'Μ.
3 δ’ ἀπ' Aretinus: δ’ codd.
4 ἔγγυον ἢ? vel ἔγγυον? Immisch (tanquam propinquum
sit Guil.).

a The word to be understood here may be φυλή, or possibly ἡμέρα: the seventh day of the month was sacred to Apollo, especially at Sparta, and one account assigns Cleomenes' victory to that day, in which case the casualties may well have been known afterwards as 'those who fell on the seventh.'

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tribe had been destroyed by the Spartan Cleomenes the citizens were compelled to admit some of the surrounding people, and at Athens when they suffered disasters by land the notables became fewer because at the time of the war against Sparta the army was drawn from a muster-roll. And this happens also in democracies, though to a smaller extent; for when the wealthy become more numerous or their properties increase, the governments change to oligarchies and dynasties. And revolutions in constitutions take place even without factious strife, owing to election intrigue, as at Heraeae (for they made their magistrates elected by lot instead of by vote for this reason, because the people used to elect those who canvassed); and also owing to carelessness, when people allow men that are not friends of the constitution to enter into the sovereign offices, as at Oreus oligarchy was broken up when Heracleodorus became one of the magistrates, who in place of an oligarchy formed a constitutional government, or rather a democracy. Another cause is alteration by small stages; by this I mean that often a great change of institutions takes place unnoticed when people overlook a small alteration, as in Ambracia the property-qualification was small, and finally men hold office with none at all, as a little is near to nothing, or practically the same. Also difference of race is a cause of faction, until harmony of spirit is reached; for just as any chance multitude of people does not form a state, so a state is not

\[\textit{i.e.} \text{ was made up of citizens and not of mercenaries.}\]

\[\text{See 1292 b 10 n.}\]

\[\text{On the Alpheus, in Arcadia.}\]

\[\text{In Euboea; its secession from Sparta to Athens, 377 B.C., was perhaps the occasion of this revolution.}\]

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ούτως οὔδ' ἐν τῷ τυχόντι χρόνῳ. διὸ ὅσοι ἦδη συνοίκους ἐδέξαντο ἡ ἑποίκους οἱ πλείστοι ἐστασίασαν, οὐν Τροιζηνίως Ἀχαιοὶ συνήκησαν Σὔβαρν, εἰτὰ πλείους οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ γενόμενου ἐξεβαλον τοὺς Τροιζηνίους, θεν τὸ ἁγὸς συνέβη τοῖς Σύβαρταις· καὶ ἐν Θουρίως Σύβαρται τοῖς συνοικίσασιν, πλεονεκτεῖν γὰρ ἄξιοντες ὡς σφετέρας τῆς χώρας ἐξέπεσον· καὶ Βυζαντίως οἱ ἑποίκοι ἐπιβουλεύοντες φωραθέντες ἐξέπεσον διὰ μάχης· καὶ Ἀντισαῦοι τοὺς Χίων φυγάδας εἰσδεξάμενοι διὰ μάχης ἐξεβαλον· Ζαγκλαιοὶ δὲ Σαμίων ὑποδεξάμενοι ἐξέπεσον καὶ αὐτοῖ· καὶ Ἀπολλωνίαται οἱ ἐν τῷ Εὐξεῖνῳ πόντῳ ἑποίκους ἐπαγαγόμενοι ἐστασίασαν· καὶ Συρακούσιοι μετὰ τὰ τυραννικά τοὺς ἔξους καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους πολίτας ποιησάμενοι ἐστασίασαν καὶ εἰς μάχην ἧλθον· καὶ Ἀμφιπολίται δεξάμενοι Χαλκιδῶν ἑποίκους ἐξέπεσον ὑπὸ τούτων οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν.

(Στασιάζουσι δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οἱ τολλοὶ, ὡς ἀδικοῦμενοι ὅτι οὐ μετέχουσι τῶν ἱσων, καθάπερ εἰρηταί πρότερον, ἵσοι ὄντες, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ γνώριμοι, ὅτι μετέχουσι τῶν ἱσων οὐκ ἵσοι ὄντες.)

1 Spengel: ἑποίκους codd.

a i.e. colonists not from the mother-city, admitted either at the foundation of the colony or later.
b Sybaris, founded 720 B.C., became very wealthy. The Troezenian population when expelled were received at Croton, which made war on Sybaris and destroyed it 510 B.C. To what exactly τὸ ἁγὸς refers is unknown.
c In Lesbos.
d Later Messana, Messina.
e Thrasybulus succeeded his brother Hiero as tyrant in 467 B.C. and fell within a year.

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formed in any chance period of time. Hence most of the states that have hitherto admitted joint settlers or additional settlers have split into factions; for example Achaeans settled at Sybaris jointly with Troezenians, and afterwards the Achaeans having become more numerous expelled the Troezenians, which was the cause of the curse that fell on the Sybarites; and at Thurii Sybarites quarrelled with those who had settled there with them, for they claimed to have the larger share in the country as being their own, and were ejected; and at Byzantium the additional settlers were discovered plotting against the colonists and were expelled by force of arms; and the people of Antissa after admitting the Chian exiles expelled them by arms; and the people of Zancle after admitting settlers from Samos were themselves expelled; and the people of Apollonia on the Euxine Sea after bringing in additional settlers fell into faction; and the Syracusans after the period of the tyrants conferred citizenship on their foreign troops and mercenaries and then faction set in and they came to battle; and the Amphipolitans having received settlers from Chalcis were most of them driven out by them.

(And in oligarchies civil strife is raised by the many, on the ground that they are treated unjustly because they are not admitted to an equal share although they are equal, as has been said before, but in democracies it begins with the notables, because they have an equal share although they are not equal.)

*Cf. 1306 a 2. The exact circumstances are unknown; Amphipolis was colonized from Athens 437 B.C.

*This sentence is out of place here, and would fit in better if placed (as it is by Newman) above at 1301 a 39, after στασιάζουσι, or (with other editors) *ib. b 26.
ARISTOTLE

1303 b

Στασιάζουσι δὲ ενίοτε αἱ πόλεις καὶ διὰ τοὺς τόπους, ὅταν μὴ εὐφυῶς ἔχῃ ἡ χώρα πρὸς τὸ μίαν εἶναι πόλιν, οἷον ἐν Κλαζομεναῖς οἱ ἐπὶ Χύτρῳ; 1

10 πρὸς τοὺς ἐν νῆσοι, καὶ Κολοφώνιοι καὶ Νοτιεῦς· καὶ Ἀθηναίοις οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰσὶν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δημοτικοὶ οἱ τῶν Πειραιῶν οἰκοῦντες τῶν τὸ ἀδυν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις αἱ διαβάσεις τῶν ὁχέτων, καὶ τῶν πάνω σμικρῶν, διασπάσοι τὰς φάλαγγας, οὕτως ἔοικε πᾶσα διαφορὰ ποιεῖν διάστασιν. μεγίστη μὲν οὖν ἴσως διάστασις ἁρετὴ καὶ μοιχηρία, εἰτα πλοῦτος καὶ πενία, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐτέρα ἐτέρας μᾶλλον, ὥν μία καὶ ἡ εἰρημένη ἐστίν.

III. Γίγνονται μὲν οὖν αἱ στάσεις οὐ περὶ μικρῶν ἀλλὰ ἐκ μικρῶν, στασιάζουσι δὲ περὶ μεγάλων. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ αἱ μικραὶ ἱσχύουσιν 20 ὅταν ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις γενονται, οἷον συνεβὴ καὶ ἐν Συρακοῦσαι ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοις χρόνοις. μετέβαλε γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ἐκ δύο νεανίσκων στασιασάντων, τῶν2 ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖοι ὄντων, περὶ ἐρωτικὴν αὐτίαν· βατέρου γὰρ ἀποδημοῦντος ἄτερος3 ἐταῖρος ὥν τὸν4 ἐρώμενον αὐτοῦ ὑπενόησατο, πάλιν δὲ 25 ἔκεινος τούτων χαλεπήν τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ ἀνεπίησεν ὥς αὐτὸν ἔλθεῖν· ὅθεν προσλαμβάνοντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι διεστασίασαν πάντας.

1 Χυτῷ Sylburg. 2 τῶν suppleuit Richards. 3 ἄτερος suppleuit Coraes. 4 τοῦ Coraes: τις τοῦ codd.

a Topography uncertain: Clazomenae near Smyrna was partly on a small island, which Alexander joined to the mainland with a causeway.

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Also states sometimes enter on faction for geographical reasons, when the nature of the country is not suited for there being a single city, as for example at Clazomenae the people near Chytrum are in feud with the inhabitants of the island, and the Colophonians and the Notians; and at Athens the population is not uniformly democratic in spirit, but the inhabitants of Piraeus are more so than those of the city. For just as in wars the fording of water-courses, even quite small ones, causes the formations to lose contact, so every difference seems to cause division. Thus perhaps the greatest division is that between virtue and vice, next that between wealth and poverty, and so with other differences in varying degree, one of which is the one mentioned.

III. Factions arise therefore not about but out of small matters; but they are carried on about great matters. And even the small ones grow extremely violent when they spring up among men of the ruling class, as happened for example at Syracuse in ancient times. For the constitution underwent a revolution as a result of a quarrel that arose between two young men, who belonged to the ruling class, about a love affair. While one of them was abroad the other who was his comrade won over the youth with whom he was in love, and the former in his anger against him retaliated by persuading his wife to come to him; owing to which they stirred up a party struggle among all the people in the state, enlisting them on

b Notium was the port of Colophon.

c i.e. difference of locality.

d Perhaps under the oligarchy of the Gamori, overthrown by the people and followed by Gelo's tyranny, 485 B.C.
dióper ἀρχομένων εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεί τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ διαλύειν τὰς τῶν ἣγεμόνων καὶ δυναμένων στάσεις· ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ ἀμάρτημα, ἡ δ’ ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἡμισυνεπῆς καὶ πάντος, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ μικρὸν ἀμάρτημα ἀνάλογον ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν. ὅλως δὲ αἱ τῶν γνωρίμων στάσεις συναπελαίωσε ποιοῦσι καὶ τὴν ὅλην πόλιν, ὅπως ἐν Ἑστιαίᾳ συνέβη μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά, δύο ἀδελφῶν περὶ τῆς πατρίδας¹ νομής διενεχθέντων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπορώτερος, ὡς οὐκ ἀποφαίνοντος ἑκάτερον τὴν οὐσίαν οὐδὲ τὸν θησαυρὸν ὅπως ἐδρευεν ὁ πατήρ, προσηγάγετο² τοὺς δημοτικοὺς, ὁ δ’ ἔτερος ἐξ’ οὐσίαν πολλὴν τοὺς εὐπόρους. καὶ ἐν 3 Δελφοῖς ἐκ κηδείας γενομένης διαφοράς ἀρχῆς πασῶν ἐγένετο τῶν στάσεων τῶν υπερούν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ, οἰωνισάμενός τι σύμπτωμα ὡς ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν νύμφην, οὔ λαβὼν ἀπῆλθεν, οἱ δ’ ὡς υβρισθέντες ἐνέβαλον τῶν ἰερῶν χρημάτων θύουτος κάπετα ὡς ἰερόσυλον ἀπέκτειναν. καὶ περὶ Μυτυλήνης δὲ 5 ἐξ ἐπικλήρων στάσεως γενομένης πολλῶν ἐγένετο ἀρχῆς κακῶν, καὶ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐν ὧδε Πάχης ἔλαβε τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν. Τιμοφάνους γὰρ τῶν εὐπόρων τωδές καταλιπόντος δύο θυγατέρας, ὁ περιωσθεὶς καὶ οὔ λαβὼν τοῖς νιέσων αὐτοῦ Δόξανδρος ἦρξε τῆς στάσεως καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους

¹ πατρίδων codd. cet. (τῶν π., Victorius).
² ed.: προσήγετο codd.

* i.e. the ratio of being a half to the whole: a bad start does as much harm as all the later mistakes put together.
their sides. On account of this it is necessary to guard against such affairs at their beginning, and to break up the factions of the leaders and powerful men; for the error occurs at the beginning, and the beginning as the proverb says is half of the whole, so that even a small mistake at the beginning stands in the same ratio\(^a\) to mistakes at the other stages. And in general the faction quarrels of the notables involve the whole state in the consequences, as happened at Hestiaea\(^b\) after the Persian wars, when two brothers quarrelled about the division of their patrimony; for the poorer of the two, on the ground that the other would not make a return of the estate and of the treasure that their father had found, got the common people on his side, and the other possessing much property was supported by the rich. And at Delphi the beginning of all the factions that occurred afterwards was when a quarrel arose out of a marriage; the bridegroom interpreted some chance occurrence when he came to fetch the bride as a bad omen and went away without taking her, and her relatives thinking themselves insulted threw some articles of sacred property into the fire when he was performing a sacrifice and then put him to death as guilty of sacrilege. And also at Mitylene\(^c\) a faction that arose out of some heiresses was the beginning of many misfortunes, and of the war with the Athenians in which Paches captured the city of Mitylene: a wealthy citizen named Timophanes left two daughters, and a man who was rejected in his suit to obtain them for his own sons, Doxander, started the

\(^a\) Also called Oreus, see a 18.
\(^b\) The revolt of Mitylene 428 B.C. is ascribed to purely political causes by Thucydides (iii. 1-30).
ARISTOTLE

1304a 10 παρώξυνε, πρόξενος ὁν τῆς πόλεως. καὶ ἐν 4
Φωκέσων ἐξ ἐπικλῆρου στάσεως γενομένης περὶ
Μνασέαν τὸν Μνάσωνος πατέρα καὶ Εὐθυκράτη
τὸν Ὄνομάρχου, ἢ στάσις αὐτῆ ἄρχῃ τοῦ ἱεροῦ
πολέμου κατέστη τοῖς Φωκέσων. μετέβαλε δὲ
καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνω ἢ πολιτεία ἐκ γαμικῶν. ὑπο-
μηνευσάμενος γάρ τις θυγατέρα, ὡς ἐξημώσεν
αὐτὸν ὁ τοῦ ὑπομηνευθέντος πατήρ γενόμενος
τῶν ἄρχοντων, ἄτερος συμπαρέλαβε τοὺς ἐκτὸς
τῆς πολιτείας ὡς ἐπηρεασθεὶς. μεταβάλλοντο δὲ
καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ εἰς δήμον καὶ εἰς πολιτείαν
ἐκ τοῦ εὐδοκιμῆσαι τι ἢ αὐξηθῆναι ἢ ἀρχεῖν ἢ
μόριον τῆς πόλεως. οἶον ἢ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλή
εὐδοκιμήσασα ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ἔδοξε συντονω-
τέραν ποιῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς
ὄχλος γενόμενος αἰτίος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης
καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλα-
ταν δύναμιν τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἱσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν:
καὶ ἐν "Ἀργεῖ οἱ γνώριμοι εὐδοκιμήσαντες περὶ τὴν
ἐν Μαντινεία μάχην τὴν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίοις
ἐπεχείρησαν καταλῦειν τὸν δήμον. καὶ ἐν Συρα-
κούσαις ὁ δήμος αἰτίος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ
πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς
dημοκρατίαι μετέβαλεν καὶ ἐν Χαλκίδι Φόξον
τὸν τύραννον μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων ὁ δήμος ἀνέλων
eὐθὺς εἴχετο τῆς πολιτείας. καὶ ἐν Ἀμβρακία
πάλιν ὁσαύτως Περίανδρον συνεκβαλὼν τοῖς ἐπί-

1 θυγατέρα om. codd. fere omnes.

a i.e. the fathers of the two suitors for the heiress’s hand
turned the quarrel into a faction fight.

b Perhaps the same event as that referred to 1301 b 21.

c Unknown.

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faction and kept on stirring up the Athenians, whose consul he was at Mitylene. And among the Phocians when a faction arising out of an heiress sprang up in connexion with Mnaseas the father of Mnason and Euthykrates the father of Onomarchus, this faction proved to be the beginning for the Phocians of the Holy War. At Epidamnus also circumstances relating to a marriage gave rise to a revolution in the constitution; somebody had betrothed his daughter, and the father of the man to whom he had betrothed her became a magistrate, and had to sentence him to a fine; the other thinking that he had been treated with insolence formed a party of the unenfranchised classes to assist him. And also revolutions to oligarchy and democracy and constitutional government arise from the growth in reputation or in power of some magistracy or some section of the state; as for example the Council on the Areopagus having risen in reputation during the Persian wars was believed to have made the constitution more rigid, and then again the naval multitude, having been the cause of the victory off Salamis and thereby of the leadership of Athens due to her power at sea, made the democracy stronger; and at Argos the notables having risen in repute in connexion with the battle against the Spartans at Mantinea took in hand to put down the people; and at Syracuse the people having been the cause of the victory in the war against Athens made a revolution from constitutional government to democracy; and at Chalcis the people with the aid of the notables overthrew the tyrant Phoxus and then immediately seized the government; and again at Ambracia similarly the people joined with the adversaries and from party predominance. 415 B.C. and 415 B.C. and 412 B.C. and 412 B.C.
ARISTOTLE

1304 a

θεμένοις ὁ δήμος τῶν τύραννων εἰς ἑαυτὸν περι-
κατάστησε τὴν πολιτείαν. καὶ ὅλως δὴ δεῖ τοῦτο μὴ 7
λανθάνειν, ὡς οἱ δυνάμεως αὐτοὶ γενόμενοι, καὶ
идιώται καὶ ἀρχαί καὶ φυλαὶ καὶ ὅλως μέρος καὶ
ὀποιονοῦν πλῆθος, στάσιν κυνοῦσιν ἢ γὰρ οἱ τού-
τοις φθονοῦντες τιμωμένοις ἀρχοντὶ τῆς στάσεως,
ἡ οὖν διὰ τὴν ἁπεροχήν οὐθένοι μένειν ἐπὶ
tῶν ἰσον. κυνοῦνται δ' αἱ πολιτείαι καὶ ὅταν
tάναντία εἶναι δοκοῦντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἰσάζεται
ἀλλήλοις, οἷον οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ ὁ δήμος, μέσον δ' ἢ
μηθεν ἢ μικρὸν πάμπαν ἀν γὰρ πολὺ ἁπερέχῃ
ὀποτερονοῦν τῶν μερῶν, πρὸς τὸ φανερῶς κρεῖττον
tὸ λοιπὸν οὐθέν κινδυνεύειν. διὸ καὶ οἱ κατ' 5
ἀρετὴν διαφέροντες οὐ ποιοῦσι στάσιν ὡς ἐπείν,
ὅλοι γὰρ γίγνονται πρὸς πολλοὺς. καθόλου μὲν
οὐν περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰτία
tῶν στάσεων καὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν τούτων ἔχουσιν
tῶν τρόπων.

Κυνοῦσι δὲ τὰς πολιτείας ὅτε μὲν διὰ βίας ὅτε 8
δὲ δι' ἀπάτης: διὰ βίας μὲν ἡ εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς
10 ἡ ύστερον ἀναγκάζοντες: καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπάτη διττῆ.
ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐξαπατηθάσατε τὸ πρῶτον ἐκόν-
tῶν μεταβάλλοντες τὴν πολιτείαν, εἰθ' ύστερον βίᾳ
κατέχουσιν ἀκόντων, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων
τῶν δήμων ἐξηπάτησαν φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλέα

1 ὄποιονοῦν Richards.

a 580 B.C.; cf. 1311 a 39 ff.

b The oligarchy at Athens 411 B.C.
of the tyrant Periander in expelling him and then brought the government round to themselves.\textsuperscript{a}  

7 And indeed in general it must not escape notice that the persons who have caused a state to win power, whether private citizens or magistrates or tribes, or in general a section or group of any kind, stir up faction; for either those who envy these men for being honoured begin the faction, or these men owing to their superiority are not willing to remain in a position of equality. And constitutions also undergo revolution when what are thought of as opposing sections of the state become equal to one another, for instance the rich and the people, and there is no middle class or only an extremely small one; for if either of the two sections becomes much the superior, the remainder is not willing to risk an encounter with its manifestly stronger opponent. Owing to this men who are exceptional in virtue generally speaking do not cause faction, because they find themselves few against many. Universally then in connexion with all the forms of constitution the origins and causes of factions and revolutions are of this nature.  

8 The means used to cause revolutions of constitutions are sometimes force and sometimes fraud. Force is employed either when the revolutionary leaders exert compulsion immediately from the start or later on—as indeed the mode of using fraud is also twofold: sometimes the revolutionaries after completely deceiving the people at the first stage alter the constitution with their consent, but then at a later stage retain their hold on it by force against the people's will: for instance, at the time of the Four Hundred,\textsuperscript{b} they deceived the people by saying
χρήματα παρείχεν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς
15 Λακεδαιμονίους, ψευσάμενοι δὲ κατέχεν ἐπειρῶντο
τὴν πολιτείαν· ὅτε δὲ ἔξ ἀρχῆσ τε πεισάντες καὶ
ὕστερον πάλιν πεισθέντων ἐκόπτων ἀρχουσιν αὐτῶν.
'Απλῶς μὲν ὅπη περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας ἐκ
τῶν εἰρημένων συμβέβηκε γίγνεσθαι τὰς μεταβολάς:

IV. Καθ' ἐκαστον ὅ' εἴδος πολιτείας ἐκ τούτων 1
20 μερίζοντας τὰ συμβαίνοντα δεῖ θεωρεῖν. αἱ μὲν
οὖν δημοκρατίαι μᾶλιστα μεταβάλλουσι διὰ τὴν
τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἰδίᾳ
συνοφαντοῦντες τοὺς τὰς οὐσίας ἑχοντας συστρε-
φοντιν αὐτούς (συνάγει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐχθρίστους
ὁ κοώς φόβος), τὰ δὲ κοώῃ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπάγοντες.
25 καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἀν τις ἴδοι γυγνομένοι οὕτως,
καὶ γὰρ ἐν Κῷ ἡ δημοκρατία μετέβαλε ποιηρῶν 2
ἐγγενομένων δημαγωγῶν, οἱ γὰρ γνώριμοι συν-
ἐστησαν· καὶ ἐν ἹῬόδῳ, μισθοφοράν τε γὰρ οἱ
dημαγωγοὶ ἐπορίζον καὶ ἐκώλυν ἀποδίδοναι τὰ
ὀφειλόμενα τοῖς τρηπάρχοις, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερο-
μένας δῖκας ἤναγκάσθησαν συντάντες καταλύσαι
tὸν δῆμον. κατελῦθη δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ ὁ
27 δῆμος μετὰ τὸν ἀποκεισμὸν εὐθὺς διὰ τοὺς δημ-
αγωγοὺς· ἀδικούμενοι γὰρ ὕπ' αὐτῶν οἱ γνώριμοι
ἐξεπιττον, ἐπειτὰ ἀθροισθέντες οἱ ἐκπίπτοντες
καὶ κατελθόντες κατέλυσαν τὸν δῆμον. παρα-

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\[\text{b} \quad \text{See 1302 b 23 n.}
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\[\text{c} \quad \text{i.e. owed for repairs to the ships, and perhaps also for}
\quad \text{advances of pay to the crews.}
\]
\[\text{d} \quad \text{Probably the Pontic Heraclea (cf. 1305 b 5, 36, 1306 a}
\quad \text{37), founded middle of 6th century B.C., not the Trachinian.}
\]
\[\text{396}\]
that the Persian King would supply money for the war against the Spartans, and after telling them this falsehood endeavoured to keep a hold upon the government; but in other cases they both persuade the people at the start and afterwards repeat the persuasion and govern them with their consent.

Speaking generally therefore in regard to all the forms of constitution, the causes that have been stated are those from which revolutions have occurred.

1 IV. But in the light of these general rules we must consider the usual course of events as classified according to each different kind of constitution. In democracies the principal cause of revolutions is the insolence of the demagogues; for they cause the owners of property to band together, partly by malicious prosecutions of individuals among them (for common fear brings together even the greatest enemies), and partly by setting on the common people against them as a class. And one may see this taking place in this manner in many instances. In Cos the democracy was overthrown when evil demagogues had arisen there, for the notables banded themselves together; and also in Rhodes, for the demagogues used to provide pay for public services, and also to hinder the payment of money owed to the naval captains, and these because of the lawsuits that were brought against them were forced to make common cause and overthrow the people. And also at Heraclea the people were put down immediately after the foundation of the colony because of the people's leaders; for the notables being unjustly treated by them used to be driven out, but later on those who were driven out collecting together effected their return and put down the
πλησίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν Μεγάροις κατελύθη δημοκρατία: οἱ γὰρ δημαγωγοὶ, ἵνα χρήματα ἔχωσι δημοσίεως, ἐξεβάλλον πολλοὺς τῶν γνωρίμων, ἔως πολλοὺς ἐποίησαν τοὺς φεύγοντας, οἱ δὲ κατιόντες ἐνίκησαν μαχόμενοι τὸν δῆμον καὶ κατέστησαν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. συνέβη δὲ ταύτων καὶ περὶ

Κύμην ἐπὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας ἦν κατέλυσε Θρασύμαχος. σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀν τις ἴδοι θεωρῶν τὰς μεταβολὰς τούτων ἐχούσας τὸν τρόπον. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἵνα χαρίζωνται ἀδικοῦντες τοὺς

γνωρίμους συμπτάσιν, ἦ τὰς ὀνύσια ἀναδάστους ποιοῦντες ἦ τὰς προσόδους ταῖς λειτουργίαις, ὅτε δὲ διαβάλλοντες, ἢ ἔχωσι δημοσίεων τὰ κτήματα τῶν πλουσίων. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχαῖων, ὡτε γένοιτο 4 ὁ αὐτὸς δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγός, εἰς τυραννίδα μετέβαλλον. σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀρχαίων

τυράννων ἐκ δημαγωγῶν γεγόνασιν. αὐτίον δὲ τοῦτο τὸτε μὲν γίγνεσθαι νῦν δὲ μή, ὅτι τὸτε μὲν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἤσαν ἐκ τῶν στρατηγοῦντων (οὐ γὰρ πω δεινοὶ ἤσαν λέγειν), νῦν δὲ τῆς ῥήτορικῆς ηὐζημένης οἱ δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγοῦσι μὲν, δι’ ἀπερίαν δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν οὐκ ἔπιτιθενται,

πλὴν εἰ ποι βραχὺ τι γέγονε τοιοῦτον. ἐγίγνοντο 5 δὲ τυραννίδες πρῶτον μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν καὶ διὰ τὸ μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἐγχειρίζεσθαι τισυν, ὡσπερ ἐν Μιλήτῳ ἐκ τῆς πρυτανείας (πολλῶν γὰρ ἤν καὶ

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a See 1300 a 18 ff. n.

b An event otherwise unknown.

c Perhaps that of Thrasybulus (Hdt. i. 20), 612 B.C.
3 people. And also the democracy at Megara was put down in a similar manner; the people's leaders in order to have money to distribute to the people went on expelling many of the notables, until they made the exiles a large body, and these came back and defeated the people in a battle and set up the oligarchy. And the same thing happened also at Cyme in the time of the democracy which Thrasy-machus put down, and in the case of other states also examination would show that revolutions take place very much in this manner. Sometimes they make the notables combine by wringing them in order to curry favour, causing either their estates to be divided up or their revenues by imposing public services, and sometimes by so slandering them that they may have the property of the wealthy to confiscate. And in old times whenever the same man became both leader of the people and general, they used to change the constitution to a tyranny; for almost the largest number of the tyrants of early days have risen from being leaders of the people. And the reason why this used to happen then but does not do so now is because then the leaders of the people were drawn from those who held the office of general (for they were not yet skilled in oratory), but now when rhetoric has developed the able speakers are leaders of the people, but owing to their inexperience in military matters they are not put in control of these, except in so far as something of the kind has taken place to a small extent in some places. And tyrannies also used to occur in former times more than they do now because important offices were entrusted to certain men, as at Miletus a tyranny arose out of the presidency (for the president...
ARISTOTLE

1305 a

megálou kúrios o prútanis). ēti de dīa to 'h
megálas éinai tòte tás pòleis all' ēpl tòw angròv
oikeiv tòv dèmou àskholon óneta pró tois èrgous,
oi proostatói toû dèmou, óste polèmikoî gènovto,
turainídi ēpetíthevto. pàntes òe toutò èdrwv
ùpò toû dèmou pisteuithèntes, ò òe pòstis òn ò
àpècxhèia ò prois toûs plousíous, ónon 'Athanà

tè Peisístratos stasanásas pró toûs pediakous,
25 kai Theagénevth ev Megárois tòw eutórov tâ kthì
àpohúfèzes, labwv parà tòv potamow épínevontas,
kaî Dionýsios kategorwv Dafnavi kai tòw
plousíwv ñxîdèth tòs turainídos, diá tòn èxhrah
pisteuèthèis ówç dèmòtikôs òwn. metabálloûai de 6
kai êk tís patrías dèmokratias eis tòn ñwstàthn.
òpoon gáre aiçetai mèn ai àrchi, ìa òpò tímímatwn
de, aiç étai de ò dèmos, dèmawhýwntes oí spoud-
àrchiwntes eis toutò kathìstasw óstte1 kúrion
eînai tòn dèmou kai tòw nòmow. ìkonò de toutò ò
ìa gînêsthai ò toû gînêsthai òtì tò tás phìlás
férein toûs àrchiwntas allâ ìa pànta tòn dèmow.
35 Tòv mèn oðn dèmokratiwv ai metabòlai gînôntai
pàsai schèdon dìa tátas tás aútìas.

V. Aî de òlìgarchiai metabálloan dià2 dîo 1
málistà tròpǒs toûs fànerwttovs, ènà mèn èn
à dikósw tò plèthos. pàs gâr ikanòs gînetai pro-
stàthèis, málistà de òtaw èx aútìs symèî tòs
òlìgarchías gînêsthai tòn ñgeimônà, kathàper ev
Náxìs Lìgdamis, òs kai ètwranèsthèun ùsteron tòw
1305 b Náxìwv. éxev de kai ò èx álloan àrchi tw tòs ñstàsewv 2

1 óstte ed. : òs codd. 2 katà Richards.

a Dionysius the elder, see 1259 a 29 n.
POLITICS, V. iv. 5—v. 2

had control of many important matters). And moreover, because the cities in those times were not large but the common people lived on their farms busily engaged in agriculture, the people’s champions when they became warlike used to aim at tyranny. And they all used to do this when they had acquired the confidence of the people, and their pledge of confidence was their enmity towards the rich, as at Athens Pisistratus made himself tyrant by raising up a party against the men of the plain, and Theagenes at Megara by slaughtering the cattle of the well-to-do which he captured grazing by the river, and Dionysius a established a claim to become tyrant when he accused Daphnaeus and the rich, since his hostility to them caused him to be trusted as a true man of the people. And revolutions also take place from the ancestral form of democracy to one of the most modern kind; for where the magistracies are elective, but not on property-assessments, and the people elect, men ambitious of office by acting as popular leaders bring things to the point of the people’s being sovereign even over the laws. A remedy to prevent this or to reduce its extent is for the tribes to elect the magistrates, and not the people collectively. These then are the causes through which almost all the revolutions in democracies take place.

1 V. Oligarchies undergo revolution principally through two ways that are the most obvious. One is if they treat the multitude unjustly; for anybody makes an adequate people’s champion, and especially so when their leader happens to come from the oligarchy itself, like Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterwards actually became tyrant of the Naxians. c. 540 B.C.

2 Faction originating with other people also has
The contrasted case, of dissolution of oligarchy arising from the people, should follow, but is omitted.

Cf. 1321 a 29 ff.

Near the mouth of the Danube.  

Perhaps not the same as the one mentioned at 1306 b 3.

Just west of Smyrna. The family name implies a claim to royal ancestry.

This sentence is interrupted by a parenthesis and is resumed in § 6, 'And revolutions in oligarchy also—'.

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various ways of arising. Sometimes when the
honours of office are shared by very few, dissolution
originates from the wealthy themselves, but not
those that are in office, as for example has occurred
at Marseilles, at Istrus, at Heraclea, and in other
states; for those who did not share in the magis-
tracies raised disturbances until as a first stage the
older brothers were admitted, and later the younger
ones again (for in some places a father and a son
may not hold office together, and in others an elder
and a younger brother may not). At Marseilles
the oligarchy became more constitutional, while at
Istrus it ended in becoming democracy, and in
Heraclea the government passed from a smaller
number to six hundred. At Cnidus also there was a
revolution of the oligarchy caused by a faction formed
by the notables against one another, because few
shared in the government, and the rule stated held,
that if a father was a member a son could not be, nor if
there were several brothers could any except the
closest; for the common people seized the oppor-
tunity of their quarrel and, taking a champion from
among the notables, fell upon them and conquered
them, for a party divided against itself is weak.
Another case was at Erythrae, where at the time
of the oligarchy of the Basilidae in ancient days,
although the persons in the government directed
affairs well, nevertheless the common people were
resentful because they were governed by a few, and
brought about a revolution of the constitution.

On the other hand, oligarchies are overthrown

(2) arising from within, owing to

(3) number

(4) revolution of the oligarchy

(5) members against one another

(6) shared in the government

(7) a son could not be, nor if

(8) several brothers could any except the
closest; for the common people seized the oppor-
tunity of their quarrel and, taking a champion from
among the notables, fell upon them and conquered
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of the oligarchy of the Basilidae in ancient days,
although the persons in the government directed
affairs well, nevertheless the common people were
resentful because they were governed by a few, and
brought about a revolution of the constitution.

On the other hand, oligarchies are overthrown

(2) arising from within, owing to
demagogy.
ARISTOTLE

1305 b

dittē, ἢ μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς τῶν ὀλίγοις, ἐγγίνεται γὰρ
dημαγωγοὺς καὶ πάνυ ὀλίγοι ὤσιν—οὖν ἐν τοῖς
tριάκοντα Ἀθήνης οἱ περὶ Χαρικλέα ἱσχυσάν
tοὺς τριάκοντα δημαγωγοῦντες, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τετρα-
κοσίοις οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον—, ἡ δὲ
5 οταν τὸν ὀχλον δημαγωγώσω οἱ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ
οίντες, οἴνον ἐν Λαρίσῃ οἱ πολυτοφύλακες διὰ τὸ
80 αἱρεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ τὸν ὀχλον ἐδημαγώγουν, καὶ ἐν
ὄσαι ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐχ οὔτοι αἴροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς
ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἀρχοντές εἰσίν ἀλλ᾽ αἱ μὲν ἀρχαὶ ἕκ
τιμημάτων μεγάλων εἰσίν ἡ ἔταιριῶν αἴροῦνται
δ᾽ οἱ ὄπληται ἡ ὁ δήμος, ὀπερ ἐν Ἡμιδώ συν-
ἐβαίνειν, καὶ ὄποι τὰ δικαστήρια μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πολι-
teúματος ἐστὶν—δημαγωγοῦντες γὰρ πρὸς τὰς
κρίσεις μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν
Ἡρακλεία ἐγένετο τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ—, ἔτι δ᾽ 6
οταν ἔνοι εἰς ἐλάττους ἔλκωσι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν,
οί γὰρ τὸ ἵσον ἔτους ἑλκοῦσι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν,
καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ οὐτομεῖν 
ξέτους, καὶ ἡ τυραννίδες ἐπιτίθεται αὐτοὶ ἡ

1306 a
catakeunáxovon ἑτερον (ὡσπερ Ἰππαρίνος Διο-
vúsoi en Σύρακοσιασ, καὶ ἐν Ἡμιδῷ ὁδι
νόμο ἡν Κλεότωμος τοὺς ἐποίκους τοὺς Χαλκιδεῶν
ηγαγε καὶ ἐλθόντων διεστασίασαν αὐτοὺς πρὸς
tοὺς εὐπόρους, καὶ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ὁ τὴν πράξιν τὴν
1 ἡ ὁ ed.: ἡ codd. 2 αὐτοὶ ? Richards.

See 1304 b 12 n. b See 1275 b 29 n.
See 1304 b 31 n. c i.e. (apparently) where membership is not confined to the
class eligible for the magistracies. d See 1303 b 2 n.
e See 1259 a 29 n.
agogy is of two sorts, one among the oligarchs themselves, for a demagogue can arise among them even when they are a very small body,—as for instance in the time of the Thirty at Athens, the party of Charicles rose to power by currying popularity with the Thirty, and in the time of the Four Hundred the party of Phrynicus rose in the same way,—the other when the members of the oligarchy curry popularity with the mob, as the Civic Guards at Larisa courted popularity with the mob because it elected them, and in all the oligarchies in which the magistrates are not elected by the class from which the magistrates come but are filled from high property-grades or from political clubs while the electors are the heavy-armed soldiers or the common people, as used to be the case at Abydos, and in places where the jury-courts are not made up from the government—for there members of the oligarchy by courting popular favour with a view to their trials cause a revolution of the constitution, as took place at Heraclea on the Euxine; and a further instance is when some men try to narrow down the oligarchy to a smaller number, for those who seek equality are forced to bring in the people as a helper.) And revolutions in oligarchy also take place when they squander their private means by riotous living; for also men of this sort seek to bring about a new state of affairs, and either aim at tyranny themselves or suborn somebody else (as Hipparinus put forward Dionysius at Syracuse, and at Amphipolis a man named Cleotimus led the additional settlers that came from Chalcis and on their arrival stirred them up to sedition against the wealthy, and in Aegina

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1306 a
5 prothora praxes enveirhse metabalein tyn politeian dia toiautin aitian,  
oute men oyn epitei xeiropoi ti kinein,  
oute de kleptousoi ta kouva,  
thev prois autous stasisazouni oui ouetoi oui prois tou-  
tous mauxemenoi kleptonetai,  
opere en Apolloniia  
sunebh tie en tiv Ponw.  
omonoousa de oligarchia  
oi eudaiaphoros exe authe.  
simeion de he en Phar-  
saliw politeia,  
ekaino gar olignoi  
nites pollaw  
kurioi eisi dia to xrhosbai  
phosiis autois kalaw.  
katalunontai de  
outhe en tie oligarchia etepan  
oligarchian empoidaou.  
touto de estin outhat  
pantos politeiamatos  
olignou dintos tons megistwv  
archon mi metexwsoi  
olignoi pantes.  
opere en  
'Helei sunebh potete,  
tie politeias gar di olignwv  
oonis ton xerontwv  
olignoi paimpan  
egwunto dia  
to aidioue  
einai enenikhonta  
ontas,  
tie de airos  
dunasteutikh einai kal  
omioan tie toon  
en Lakedaimonia  
xerontwv.
20 Ginetai de metaboli twn oligarchikon  
kal en polwv  
en eirhnh.  
en mev polwv  
dia tie pro  
ton deimnon  
apistian  
stratiotaas  
anagkaizomenon  
xrhosbaie  
(gar av en xheirhsw,  
outhe pollakias  
ginetai peraisos,  
outhe en Korinthi Timophanes,  
av de pleious,  
outhe autous peripoiountai  
dunastean),  
outhe de taute dediotes  
metadidasa tie

1 othenv h aoutoi prois autous stasisazousin  
h Richards.

a i.e. he had squandered his fortune in riotous living; this deal with the Athenian general may have been in 367 b.c.
b i.e. both of the lower classes and of the subject cities.
c i.e. the small governing body.
d i.e. like a dynasteia, favourable to the interest of a few very wealthy families; see 1292 b 10 n.
e Corinth was at war with Argos c. 350 b.c. Timophanes
the man who carried out the transactions with Chares attempted to cause a revolution in the constitution for a reason of this sort); so sometimes they attempt at once to introduce some reform, at other times they rob the public funds and in consequence either they or those who fight against them in their peculations stir up faction against the government, as happened at Apollonia on the Black Sea. On the other hand, harmonious oligarchy does not easily cause its own destruction; and an indication of this is the constitutional government at Phar-salus, for there the ruling class though few are masters of many men because on good terms with one another. Also oligarchical governments break up when they create a second oligarchy within the oligarchy. This is when, although the whole citizen class is small, its few members are not all admitted to the greatest offices; this is what once occurred in Elis, for the government being in the hands of a few, very few men used to become members of the Elders, because these numbering ninety held office for life, and the mode of election was of a dynastic type and resembled that of the Elders at Sparta.

Revolutions of oligarchies occur both during war and in time of peace—during war since the oligarchs are forced by their distrust of the people to employ mercenary troops (for the man in whose hands they place them often becomes tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth, and if they put several men in command, these win for themselves dynastic power), and when through fear of this they give a share in the constitution to the multitude, the oligarchy falls was killed by his brother the famous Timoleon, in order to restore constitutional government.
plēbei tῆς πολιτείας, dia tō ἀναγκάζεσθαι τῷ δῆμῳ χρῆσθαι. en de tῇ εἰρήνῃ dia tῆν ἀπιστίαν tῆν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐγχειρίζουσι τῆν φυλακήν στρατιώταις καὶ ἄρχοντι μεσιδίων, ὁς εἰσέστε γίνεται κύριος ἀμφοτέρων, ὀπερ συνέβη ἐν Δαρίῳ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀλευδῶν ἀρχῆς τῶν, περί Σίμων καὶ ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐταιρῶν ὃν ἥν μία ἡ Ἰφιάδουν. γίνονται δὲ στάσεις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ περιστείραθαι 10 ἐτέρους ὑφ' ἐτέρων τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλυγαρχίᾳ αὐτῶν καὶ καταστασιάζεσθαι κατὰ γάμους ἡ δίκας, οἷον ἐκ γαμικῆς μὲν αἰτίας αἱ εἰρημέναι πρότερον, καὶ τὴν ἐν Ἐρετρίᾳ δ' ὀλυγαρχίαν τὴν τῶν ἱππεῶν Διαγόρας κατέλυσαν ἀδικηθεὶς περὶ γάμουν, ἐκ δὲ δικαστηρίου κρίσεως ἡ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ στάσις ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ ἐν Ἡθίασι, ἐπ' αἰτία μοιχείας δικαίως μὲν στασιστικῶς δὲ ποιησαμένων τὴν κόλασιν τῶν μὲν ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ κατ' Ἑὐρυτίωνος τῶν δ' ἐν Ἡθίασι κατ' Ἀρχίον. ἐφιλονείκησαν γὰρ αὐτοὺς 3 οἱ ἔχθροι ὥστε δεθήναι ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐν τῷ κύρῳ. πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγαν δεσποτικὰς 11 εἶναι τὰς ὀλυγαρχίας υπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ των ἐν δυσχερανάντων κατελύθησαν, ὡσπερ ἡ ἐν Κνίδῳ καὶ ἡ ἐν Χίῳ ὀλυγαρχία. γίγνονται δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μεταβολαὶ καὶ τῆς καλουμένης πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ὀλυγαρχῶν ἐν ὀσαῖς ἀπὸ τιμή-

1 τῶν non vertit Guil.: τοῖς Niemeyer.

A probable emendation of the Greek gives 'happened at Larisa to Simus and his party at the time of the government of the Aleuadæ.' This family were hereditary rulers of Larisa (see also 1275 b 29 ff. n., and 1305 b 29 ff.).

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because they are compelled to make use of the common people; during peace, on the other hand, because of their distrust of one another they place their protection in the hands of mercenary troops and a magistrate between the two parties, who sometimes becomes master of both, which happened at Larisa in the time of the government of the Aleuadæ led by Simus, a and at Abydos in the time of the political clubs of which that of Iphiades was one. And factions arise also in consequence of one set of the members of the oligarchy themselves being pushed aside by another set and being driven into party strife in regard to marriages or law-suits; examples of such disorders arising out of a cause related to marriage are the instances spoken of before, and also the oligarchy of the knights at Eretria was put down b by Diagoras when he had been wronged in respect of a marriage, while the faction at Heraclea and that at Thebes arose out of a judgement of a law-court, when the people at Heraclea justly butfactiously enforced the punishment against Eurytion on a charge of adultery and those at Thebes did so against Archias; for their personal enemies stirred up party feeling against them so as to get them bound in the pillory in the market-place. Also many governments have been put down by some of their members who had become resentful because the oligarchies were too despotic; this is how the oligarchies fell at Cnidus c and at Chios. And revolutions also occur from an accident, both in what is called a constitutional government and in those oligarchies in

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b Possibly before the Persian wars. See 1289 b 36 ff. The two following cases are unrecorded elsewhere.

c See 1305 b 13 n.
ματος θουλεύουσι καὶ δικάζουσι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχοντιν. πολλάκις γὰρ τὸ ταχθὲν πρὸτον τίμημα πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας καρφώσ, ὥστε μετέχειν ἐν μὲν τῇ ὀλυγαρχίᾳ ὀλῖγους ἐν δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοὺς μέσους, ἐνετηρίας2 γιγνομένης δι᾽ εἰρήνην ἢ δι᾽ ἄλλην τῶν εὐτυχίαν συμβαίνει πολλαπλασίου γίγνεσθαι τιμήματος ἄξιας τὰς αὐτὰς κτήσεις, ὥστε πάντας πάντων μετέχειν, ὅτε μὲν ἐκ πρὸς·

15 αγωγῆς καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν γιγνομένης τῆς μεταβολῆς καὶ λανθανοῦσης, ὅτε δὲ καὶ βάττων.

Αἱ μὲν οὖν ὀλυγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι καὶ στασιά-12 ζουσι διὰ τουαύτας αἰτίας (ὧς δὲ καὶ αἱ δημοκρατίαι καὶ ὀλυγαρχίαι εξίστανται ἐνίοτε οὐκ εἰς τὰς ἐναντίας πολιτείας ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὰς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, 20 οἶνον ἕκ τῶν ἐννόμων δημοκρατιῶν καὶ ὀλυγαρχιῶν εἰς τὰς κυρίους καὶ ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκεῖνας).

VI. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις γίγνονται αἱ 1 στάσεις αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ ὀλῖγους τῶν τιμῶν μετέχειν (ὀπερ εἰρήνητα κνεῖν καὶ τὰς ὀλυγαρχίας, διὰ τὸ 25 καὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ὀλυγαρχίαν εἶναι πῶς, ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ ὀλίγοι οἱ ἀρχοντεῖς—οὔ μὲν τοῖς διὰ ταυτῶν ὀλίγοι—ἔπει δοκεῖ γε διὰ ταὐτα καὶ ἡ ἀριστοκρατία ὀλυγαρχία εἶναι). μάλιστα δὲ τούτο συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ὅταν ἢ τὶ3 πλῆθος τῶν πεφρονηματισμένων ὃς ὁμοίων4 κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν (οἶνον 80 ἐν Δακεδαλίμων οἱ λεγόμενοι Παρθενίαι—ἐκ τῶν

1 γὰρ <εἰ καὶ ικανὸν> Richards.
2 εὐτηρίας <δὲ> Immisch.
3 τὶ Congreve: τὸ codd.
4 ὁμοίων Lambinus: ὁμοίων codd.

* See 1306 a 13 ff.
which membership of the council and the law-courts and tenure of the other offices are based on a property-qualification. For often the qualification first having been fixed to suit the circumstances of the time, so that in an oligarchy a few may be members and in a constitutional government the middle classes, when peace or some other good fortune leads to a good harvest it comes about that the same properties become worth many times as large an assessment, so that all the citizens share in all the rights, the change sometimes taking place gradually and little by little and not being noticed, but at other times more quickly.

12 Such then are the causes that lead to revolutions and factions in oligarchies (and generally, both democracies and oligarchies are sometimes altered not into the opposite forms of constitution but into ones of the same class, for instance from legitimate democracies and oligarchies into autocratic ones and from the latter into the former).

VI. In aristocracies factions arise in some cases because few men share in the honours (which has also been said to be the cause of disturbances in oligarchies, because an aristocracy too is a sort of oligarchy, for in both those who govern are few—although the reason for this is not the same in both—since this does cause it to be thought that aristocracy is a form of oligarchy). And this is most bound to come about when there is a considerable number of people who are proud-spirited on the ground of being equals in virtue (for example the clan called the Maidens' Sons at Sparta—for

\[a\] Said to be descended from irregular unions authorized in order to keep up the population during the First Messenian War. They founded Taranto 708 B.C.

\[b\]
1306 b ὁμοίων γὰρ ἦσαν,—όδοι φωρᾶσαντες ἐπιθουλεύσαν
tας ἀπέστειλαν Τάραντος οἰκιστάς). ἦ ὅταν τινὲς 2
άτιμάζονται μεγάλου ὄντες καὶ μηθενὸς ἦττονσ
καὶ ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τινῶν ἐντιμοτέρων (οἷον Λύσανδρος
ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων). ἦ ὅταν ἀνδρῶθης τις ὃν μὴ
μετέχῃ τῶν τιμῶν (οἷον Κινάδων ὁ τῆν ἐπ' Ἀγη-
sιλάον1 συντήσας ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας).
ἐτι ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἀπορῶσι λίαν οἱ δ' εὐπορῶσι
καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τοῦτο γίνεται,
συνήβη δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ὑπὸ τὸν
Μεσσηνιακὸν πόλεμον—δῆλον δὲ [καὶ τοῦτο]2 ἐκ
τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς καλουμένης Εὐνομίας.
θελῆσον γὰρ τινες διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἥξιον
ἀνάδαστον ποιεῖν τὴν χώραν). ἔτι εὰν τὶς μέγας
ἡ καὶ δυνάμενος ἔτι μεῖζων εἶναι, ὡς μοναρχὴ
(ὡσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι δοκεῖ Παυσανίας ὃ στρα-
tήγησας κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον καὶ ἐν
Καρχηδόνι Ἰωάννη).

Δύονται δὲ μάλιστα αἱ τε πολιτείαι καὶ αἱ 3
ἀριστοκρατίαι διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦ
dικαίου παρέκβασιν. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ μὴ μεμίκθαι
καλῶς ἐν μὲν τῇ πολιτείᾳ δημοκρατίαι καὶ ὅλιγ-
αρχίαι ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ταυτά τε καὶ τῆν
ω ἀρετῆν, μάλιστα δὲ τὰ δύο (λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο δῆλον

1 Ἀγησιλάον Schneider: -λῶ codd.
2 Verrall (καὶ non vertit Guil.).

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a King Pausanias II. checked Lysander after his conquest of Athens in 403 B.C., and King Agesilaus thwarted him on the expedition into Asia Minor in 396.

b His conspiracy against the Ὀμοίων in 398 B.C. was discovered and he was executed.
they were descended from the Equals—whom the Spartans detected in a conspiracy and sent away to colonize Tarentum); or when individuals although great men and inferior to nobody in virtue are treated dishonourably by certain men in higher honour (for example Lysander by the kings); or when a person of manly nature has no share in the honours (for example Cinadon, who got together the attack upon the Spartans in the reign of Agesilaus). Faction in aristocracies also arises when some of the well-born are too poor and others too rich (which happens especially during wars, and this also occurred at Sparta at the time of the Messenian War—as appears from the poem of Tyrtaeus entitled Law and Order; for some men being in distress because of the war put forward a claim to carry out a re-division of the land of the country). Also if a man is great and capable of being yet greater, he stirs up faction in order that he may be sole ruler (as Pausanias who commanded the army through the Persian war seems to have done at Sparta, and Hanno at Carthage).

3 But the actual overthrow of both constitutional governments and aristocracies is mostly due to a deviation from justice in the actual framework of the constitution. For what starts it in the case of a constitutional government is that it does not contain a good blend of democracy and oligarchy; and in the case of an aristocracy it is the lack of a good blend of those two elements and of virtue, but chiefly of the two elements (I mean popular government and

\( ^{2} \) or of wealth,

\( ^{3} \) or one man aiming at monarchy.

\( ^{1} \) or

\( ^{4} \) or

\( ^{5} \) or

\( ^{6} \) or
ARISTOTLE

καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν, ταῦτα γὰρ οἱ πολιτείαι τε πειρῶνται μιγνύναι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἀριστοκρατῶν. διαφέρουσι γὰρ τῶν ὄνομαζο-μένων πολιτεἰῶν οἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι τοῦτος, καὶ διὰ τούτου εἰσὶν οἱ μὲν ἤτον οἱ δὲ μᾶλλον μόνιμοι 15 αὐτῶν. τὰς γὰρ ἀποκλινοῦσας μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀριστοκρατίας καλοῦσιν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος πολιτείας, διότι ἀσφαλέστερα αἱ τοιαύτα τῶν ἑτέρων εἰσὶν, κρείττον τε γὰρ τὸ πλείον καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσιν ἵσον ἔχοντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς εὐπορίαις, ἂν η ἡ πολιτεία διδὼ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, 20 υβρίζειν ζητοῦσι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν. ὅλως δὲ ἐφ' ὁπότερον ἢν ἐγκλίνῃ ἡ πολιτεία, ἐπὶ τούτοις μεθίσταται ἐκατέρων τὸ σφέτερον αὐξανόντων, οἷον η ἡ μὲν πολιτεία εἰς δῆμον ἀριστοκρατία δ' εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἡ εἰς τάναντια, οἷον η ἡ μὲν ἀριστοκρατία εἰς δῆμον (ὡς ἀδικούμενοι γὰρ περιπτῶσιν 25 εἰς τούναντίον οἱ ἀπορώτεροι) αἱ δὲ πολιτείαι εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν (μοῦνον γὰρ μόνιμον τὸ κατ' ἄξιον ἵσον καὶ τὸ ἐχειν τὰ αὐτῶν). συνεβη δὲ τὸ 6 εἰρημένον ἐν Θουρίοις: διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀπὸ πλεῖον τιμήματος εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς ἑλλαττὸν μετέβη καὶ 80 εἰς ἀρχεῖα πλείω, διὰ δὲ τὸ τὴν χώραν ὅλην τοὺς γνωρίμους συγκτήσασθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον (ἡ γὰρ

toûto (uel ὁπότερα) Spengel: ταῦτα codd.

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a i.e. their mode of blending oligarchy and democracy.
b The writer loosely speaks of aristocracies and polities as a single class, differing only in degree of concentration of power in the hands of the upper classes.
c i.e. from aristocracy to democracy. Possibly these events occurred after the defeat of Athens at Syracuse in 413 B.C., when the Athenian party at Thurii was banished 414
oligarchy), for both constitutional governments and most of the constitutions that are called aristocracies aim at blending these. For this is the point of distinction between aristocracies and what are called constitutional governments, and it is owing to this that some of them are less and others more stable; for the constitutions inclining more towards oligarchy men call aristocracies and those inclining more to the side of the multitude constitutional governments, owing to which those of the latter sort are more secure than the others, for the greater number is the stronger, and also men are more content when they have an equal amount, whereas the owners of wealthy properties, if the constitution gives them the superior position, seek to behave insolently and to gain money. And speaking broadly, to whichever side the constitution leans, that is the side to which it shifts as either of the two parties increases its own side—a constitutional government shifts to democracy and an aristocracy to oligarchy, or to the opposite extremes, that is, aristocracy to democracy (for the poorer people feeling they are unjustly treated pull it round to the opposite) and constitutional governments to oligarchy (for the only lasting thing is equality in accordance with desert and the possession of what is their own). And the change mentioned came about at Thurii, for because the property-qualification for honours was too high, the constitution was altered to a lower property-qualification and to a larger number of official posts, but because the notables illegally bought up the whole of the land (for the constitution (Lysias 835 ν). The events in § 8 were perhaps in the fourth century.
1307 a

πολιτεία ὀλιγαρχικωτέρα ἦν, ὥστε ἐδύναντο πλεονεκτεῖν). . . ὁ δὲ δήμος γυμνασθεῖς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν φρουρῶν ἐγένετο κρέιττων, ἕως ἀφείσαν τῆς χώρας ὥσις πλεῖο ἦσαν ἔχοντες.

"Ετὶ διὰ τὸ πᾶσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας 7

ολιγαρχικὰς εἶναι μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν οἱ γνώριμοι (οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμον εἰς ὀλίγους αἰ oυσίαι ἔρχονται) καὶ ἕξεστι ποιεῖν ὁ τι ἄν θέλωσι τοῖς γυμνίμοις μᾶλλον, καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτι θέλωσιν (διὸ καὶ ἡ Λακρῶν πόλις ἀπώλετο ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας, ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ἐν μεμγυμένη). 40

μάλιστα δὲ λανθάνουσιν αἱ ἄριστοκρατίαι μεταβάλλουσι τῷ λύεσθαι κατὰ μικρὸν, ὅπερ εὐρήται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καθόλου κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, ὧτι αὐτῶν τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ἐστὶν· ὅταν γὰρ τι προϊόνται τῶν πρὸς 5 τὴν πολιτείαν, μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἄλλο μικρῷ μεῖζον εὐχερέστερον κινοῦσιν, ἕως ἂν πάντα κινήσωσι τὸν κόσμον. συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Θουρίων πολιτείας. νόμοι γὰρ ὅντος διὰ πέντε ἐτῶν στρατηγεῖν, γενόμενοι τινὲς πολεμικοὶ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ παρὰ τῷ πλήθει τῶν φρουρῶν εὐδοκιμοῦντες, καταφρονήσαντες τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ νομίζοντες ῥαδίως κατασχῆσειν, τοῦτον τὸν νόμον λύειν ἐπεχειρήσαν πρῶτον, ὡστε ἔξειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς συνεχῶς στρατηγεῖν, ὄραντες τὸν δήμον αὐτοὺς χειροτονήσοντα προθύμως. οἱ δὲ

1 lacunam vel vitium Schneider.

a Probably a clause meaning 'civil strife ensued' has been lost.
was too oligarchical, so that they were able to grasp at wealth) . . . " And the people having been trained in the war overpowered the guards, until those who were in the position of having too much land relinquished it.

7 Besides, as all aristocratic constitutions are inclined towards oligarchy, the notables grasp at wealth (for example at Sparta the estates are coming into a few hands); and the notables have more power to do what they like, and to form marriage connexions with whom they like (which was the cause of the fall of the state of Locri, as a result of the marriage with Dionysius, which would not have taken place in a democracy, nor in a well-blended aristocracy). And aristocracies are most liable to undergo revolution unobserved, through gradual relaxation, just as it has been said in what has gone before about all forms of constitution in general, that even a small change may cause a revolution. For when they give up one of the details of the constitution, afterwards they also make another slightly bigger change more readily, until they alter the whole system. This occurred for instance with the constitution of Thurii. There was a law that the office of general could be held at intervals of four years, but some of the younger men, becoming warlike and winning high repute with the mass of the guards, came to despise the men engaged in affairs, and thought that they would easily get control; so first they tried to repeal the law referred to, so as to enable the same persons to serve as generals continuously, as they saw that the people would vote for themselves with enthusiasm.

b See 1259 a 28 n. He married in 397 B.C. the daughter of a Locrian citizen, who bore him the younger Dionysius.
ARISTOTLE

1807 b

ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ καλούμενοι
15 σύμβουλοι, ὁρμήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἐναντιοῦσθαι συνεπείσθησαν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τούτον κινήσαν-
tας τὸν νόμον ἐάσειν τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν,
ὔστερον δὲ βουλόμενοι κωλύειν ἄλλων κινουμένων
οὐκέτι πλέον ἐποίουν οὔθεν, ἀλλὰ μετέβαλεν ἡ
tάξις πᾶσα τῆς πολιτείας εἰς δυναστείαν τῶν
ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτέριζεν.
20 Πάσαι δ’ αἱ πολιτείαι λύνονται ὅτε μὲν ἐξ 9
αὐτῶν ὅτε δ’ ἔξωθεν, ὅταν ἐναντία πολιτεία ἢ ἢ
πλησίον ἢ πόρρω μὲν ἔχουσα δὲ δύναμιν. ὅπερ
συνέβαινεν ἐπ’ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων· οἱ
μὲν γὰρ Ἀθηναίοι πανταχοῦ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας οἱ
δὲ Λάκωνες τοὺς δήμους κατέλυον.
25 “Ὅθεν μὲν οὖν αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται τῶν
πολιτειῶν καὶ αἱ στάσεις, εἴρηται σχεδόν.
VII. Περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας καὶ κοινῆ καὶ χωρὶς 1
ἐκάστης πολιτείας ἐχομενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον
μὲν οὖν δῆλον ὅτι εἴπερ ἔχομεν δι’ ὧν φθειροῦται
αἱ πολιτείαι ἔχομεν καὶ δι’ ὧν σύζονται. τῶν γὰρ
30 ἐναντίων τάναντια ποιητικά, φθορὰ δὲ σωτηρία
ἐναντίων. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς εὐ κεκραμέναις πολι-
teiαis, εἴπερ1 ἀλλο τι δεὶ τηρεῖν ὅπως μηθὲν
παρανομώσι, καὶ μάλιστα τὸ μικρὸν φυλάττειν·
λανθάνει γὰρ παραδυνομένη ἡ παρανομία, ὡσπερ 2
τὰς οὐσίας αἱ μικραὶ δαπάναι δαπανῶσι πολλάκις
35 γινόμεναι· λανθάνει γὰρ ἡ δαπάνη 3 διὰ τὸ μὴ

1 εἴπερ Richards: ὡσπερ codd.
2 παραδυνομένη ἡ παρανομία (ex Plat. de rep. 424 d) M4P1:
ὑπεισόδουσα ἡ παράβασις cet.
3 δαπάνη: ἀπάτη M3, μετάβασις Par.

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And though the magistrates in charge of this matter, called the Councillors, at first made a movement to oppose them, they were won over, believing that after repealing this law they would allow the rest of the constitution to stand; but later, though they wished to prevent them when other laws were being repealed, they could no longer do anything more, but the whole system of the constitution was converted into a dynasty of the men who had initiated the innovations.

And constitutions of all forms are broken up sometimes from movements initiating from within themselves, but sometimes from outside, when there is an opposite form of constitution either near by or a long way off yet possessed of power. This used to happen in the days of the Athenians and the Spartans; the Athenians used to put down oligarchies everywhere and the Spartans democracies.

We have then approximately stated the causes that give rise to revolutions in the constitutions of states and to party factions.

VII. The next thing to speak about is security both in general and for each form of constitution separately. First then it is clear that if we know the causes by which constitutions are destroyed we also know the causes by which they are preserved; for opposites create opposites, and destruction is the opposite of security. In well-blended constitutions therefore, if care must be taken to prevent men from committing any other breach of the law, most of all must a small breach be guarded against, for transgression of the law creeps in unnoticed, just as a small expenditure occurring often ruins men's estates; for the expense is not noticed because it
1307 b ἀθρόα γίγνεσθαι, παραλογίζεται γάρ ἡ διάνοια ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὡσπερ δ' σοφιστικὸς λόγος 'εἰ ἔκαστον μικρόν, καὶ πάντα, τούτο δ' ἐστι μὲν ὡς, ἐστι δ' ὡς οὐ̣ τὸ γὰρ ὅλον καὶ τὰ πάντα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ σύγκειται ἐκ μικρῶν, μίαν μὲν οὖν φυλα-
κὴν πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ τὰ πολλά εἰς κέρδος, πρὸς αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας τῷ χρήσθαι ἀλλήλους δημοτικῶς. οἱ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πλῆθους ἐξήνετον ὁ δημοτικὸς τὸ ἱσον, τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων οὐ μόνον δίκαιον ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστὶν. διὸ ἐὰν πλείον ὃσον ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι, πολλὰ συμφέρει τῶν δημοτικῶν νομοθετημάτων, οἰον τὸ ἐξαρμόνει τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, ἵνα πάντες οἱ ὁμοίοι μετέχωσιν. ἐστὶ γὰρ ὅπερ δῆμος ἦδη οἱ ὁμοίοι (διὸ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐνγιγνονται δημαρχοὶ πολλάκις, ὡσπερ εἰρηται πρῶτον), ἐπειδ' ἦττον εἰς δυναστείας ἐμπιπτοῦσιν αἱ ὀλυγ-

\[\text{a See Additional Note on p. 483.}\]
POLITICS, V. VII. 2-4

does not come all at once, for the mind is led astra\textsuperscript{1}y
by the repeated small outlays, just like the sophistic
puzzle, ‘if each is little, then all are a little.’ This is
true in one way but in another it is not; for the
whole or total is not little, but made up of little
parts. One thing therefore that we must guard
against is this beginning; and the next point is that
we must not put faith in the arguments strung to-
gether for the sake of tricking the multitude, for they
are refuted by the facts (and what sort of constitutional
sophistries we refer to has been said before). And
again we must observe that not only some aristo-
cracies but also some oligarchies endure not because
the constitutions are secure but because those who
get in the offices treat both those outside the con-
stitution and those in the government well, on the
one hand by not treating those who are not members
of it unjustly and by bringing their leading men into
the constitution and not wronging the ambitious
ones in the matter of dishonour or the multitude in
the matter of gain, and on the other hand, in relation
to themselves and those who are members, by treating
one another in a democratic spirit. For that equality
which men of democratic spirit seek for in the case
of the multitude is not only just but also expedient
in the case of their compeers. Hence if there are
a greater number in the governing class, many of
the legislative enactments of a democratic nature
are advantageous, for example for the offices to be
tenable for six months, to enable all the compeers to
participate in them; for the compeers in this case are
as it were the people (owing to which demagogues often
arise even among them, as has been said already),
and also oligarchies and aristocracies fall into dyn-
αρχίαι καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαι (οὐ γὰρ ὀμοίως ράδιον
cακουργήσαι ὁλίγον χρόνον ἀρχοντας καὶ πολῶν,
ἔτει διὰ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς ὀλυγαρχίαις καὶ δημο-
κρατίαις γίγνονται τυραννίδες. ἢ γὰρ οἱ μέγιστοι
ἐν ἑκατέρα ἐπιτίθενται τυραννίδι, ἔνθα μὲν οἱ δημ-
αγωγοὶ ἔνθα δὲ οἱ δυνάσται, ἢ οἱ τὰς μεγίστας
ἐχοντες ἀρχας, ὅταν πολῶν χρόνων ἀρχωσιν). σώ- 5
ζουται δὴ αἱ πολιτεῖαι οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ πόρρω
εἶναι τῶν διαφθειρόντων ἀλλ' ἐνίστε καὶ διὰ τὸ
ἔγγυς, φοβοῦμενο γὰρ διὰ χειρῶν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον
tὴν πολιτείαν. ὡστε δεῖ τοὺς τῆς πολιτείας
φροντίζοντας φόβους παρασκευάζειν, ἵνα φυλά-
tωσι καὶ μὴ καταλύσωσι ὥσπερ νυκτερινήν φυλα-
kὴν τὴν τῆς πολιτείας τῆρησιν, καὶ τὸ πόρρω
ἔγγυς ποιεῖν. ἔτι τὰς τῶν γνωρίμων φιλονεκίας
καὶ στάσεις καὶ διὰ τῶν νόμων πειρᾶσθαι δεῖ
φυλάττειν, καὶ τοὺς ἔξω τῆς φιλονεκίας ὅντας
πρὶν παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτούς, ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ
gινόμενον κακὸν γνώναι οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀλλὰ
πολιτικοῦ ἀνδρός. πρὸς δὲ τὴν διὰ τὰ τιμήματα 6
γιγνομένην μεταβολὴν ἐξ ὀλυγαρχίας καὶ πολιτείας,
ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τοῦτο μενόντων μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν
τιμημάτων εὐπορίας ἃ νομίσματος γιγνομένης,
συμφέρει τοῦ τιμήματος ἐπισκοπεῖν τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ
πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ παρελθόν, ἐν ὅσιοι μὲν πόλεσι
τιμῶνται κατ' ἑναυτοῦ, κατὰ τοῦτο τὸν χρόνον,
ἐν δὲ ταῖς μείζοις διὰ τριετηρίδος ἤ πενταετηρίδος,
καὶ ἤ πολλαπλάσιον ἤ πολλοστημόριον τοῦ πρό-
tερον ἐν ὧ δὲ τιμήσεις κατέστησαν τῆς πολι-
asties less (for it is not so easy to do wrongs when in office for a short time as when in for a long time, since it is long tenure of office that causes tyrannies to spring up in oligarchies and democracies; for either those who are the greatest men in either sort of state aim at tyranny, in the one sort the demagogues and in the other the dynasts, or those who hold the greatest offices, when they are in office for a long time).

5 And constitutions are kept secure not only through being at a distance from destroyers but sometimes also through being near them, for when they are afraid the citizens keep a closer hold on the government; hence those who take thought for the constitution must contrive causes of fear, in order that the citizens may keep guard and not relax their vigilance for the constitution like a watch in the night, and they must make the distant near. Again, they must also endeavour to guard against the quarrels and party struggles of the notables by means of legislation, and to keep out those who are outside the quarrel before they too have taken it over; since to discern a growing evil at the commencement is not any ordinary person’s work but needs a statesman.

6 And to deal with the revolution from oligarchy and constitutional government that arises because of the property-qualifications, when this occurs while the rates of qualification remain the same but money is becoming plentiful, it is advantageous to examine the total amount of the rated value of the community as compared with the past amount, in states where the assessment is made yearly, over that period, and three years or five years ago in the larger states, and if the new total is many times larger or many times smaller than the former one at the time when
1308 b

τείας, νόμον εἶναι καὶ τὰ τιμῆματα ἐπιτείνειν ἢ
5 ἀνίναι, ἐὰν μὲν ὑπερβάλλῃ ἐπιτείνωτας κατὰ τὴν
πολλαπλασίωσιν, ἐὰν δ' ἐλλειπῇ ἀνίνας καὶ
ἐλάττω ποιοῦντας τὴν τίμησιν. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἡ
ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις μὴ ποιοῦντων,
οὔτως μὲν ἐνθα μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐνθα δὲ δυναστείαν
gίγνεσθαι συμβαίνει, έκείνως δὲ εκ μὲν πολιτείας
10 δημοκρατίαιν ἐκ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαις πολιτείαιν ἡ δήμον.
κοινὸν δὲ καί ἐν δήμω καὶ ὀλιγαρχία [καὶ ἐν
μοναρχίᾳ] καὶ πάση πολιτεία μὴ τ' αὐξάνειν4 λίαν
μηθένα παρὰ τὴν συμμετρίαν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πει-
ράσθαι μικρὰς καὶ πολυχρονίους διδόναι τιμᾶς ἡ
ταχύ5 μεγάλας (διαφθείρονται γάρ, καὶ φέρειν οὐ
παντὸς ἀνδρός εὐτυχίαιν), εἰ δὲ μή, μή τοί γ' ἀθρόας
dόντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι πάλιν ἀθρόας ἀλλ' ἐκ
προσαγωγῆς καὶ μάλιστα μὲν πειρᾶσθαι τοῖς
νόμοις οὔτως ἄγειν ὡστε μηθένα ἐγγίγνεσθαι πολὺ
ὑπερέχοντα δυνάμει μῆτε φίλων μῆτε χρημάτων,
eἰ δὲ μή, ἀποδημητικὰς ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παραστάσεις
20 αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ ὅσοι βίους νεωτερί-
ζουσιν, δεῖ ἐμποιεῖν ἀρχήν τινα τὴν ἐποιημένην
τοὺς ζύντας ἀσυμφόρος πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐν
μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἐν δὲ
ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ
tῶν ἄλλων πολιτείων ἐκάστη. καὶ τὸ εὐθύμερον

1 ἐν Susemihl: ἐν μὲν codd.
2 Niemeyer: μὲν οὔτως codd.
3 om. codd. cet.
4 αὐξάνειν <δεῖν> ? ed.
5 ταχύ vix sanum: breviter et Guil., βραχῦ kai Susemihl, βραχυχρονίους kai Sepulveda.

a i.e. if the total valuation has decreased.
b i.e. if the total has increased.
c Some mss. and many editors omit these words.

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the rates qualifying for citizenship were fixed, it is advantageous that there should be a law for the magistrates corresponding to tighten up or to relax the rates, tightening them up in proportion to the ratio of increase if the new total rated value exceeds the old, and relaxing them and making the qualification lower if the new total falls below the old. For in oligarchies and constitutional states, when they do not do this, in the one case a the result is that in the latter an oligarchy comes into existence and in the former a dynasty, and in the other case b a constitutional government turns into a democracy and an oligarchy into a constitutional government or a government of the people. But it is a policy common to democracy and oligarchy [and to monarchy], c and every form of constitution not to raise up any man too much beyond due proportion, but rather to try to assign small honours and of long tenure or great ones quickly d (for officials grow corrupt, and not every man can bear good fortune), or if not, at all events not to bestow honours in clusters and take them away again in clusters, but by a gradual process; and best of all to try so to regulate people by the law that there may be nobody among them specially pre-eminent in power due to friends or wealth, or, failing this, to cause their periods out of office to be spent abroad. And since men also cause revolutions through their private lives, some magistracy must be set up to inspect those whose mode of living is unsuited to the constitution—unsuited to democracy in a democracy, to oligarchy in an oligarchy, and similarly for each of the other forms of constitution.

d The text should probably be emended 'with a short tenure.'
1308 b 25 δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἀνὰ μέρος φυλάττεσθαι διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας: τοῦτον δ᾽ ἄκος τὸ αἰεὶ τοῖς ἀντικει-
μένοις μορίοις ἐγχειρίζειν τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς
(λέγω δ᾽ ἀντικείσθαι τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς τῷ πλήθει
καὶ τοὺς ἀπόρους τοῖς εὐπόροις), καὶ τὸ πει-
ράσθαι ἢ συμμιγνύναι τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλήθος
καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων ἢ τὸ μέσου αὐξεῖν (τοῦτο
γὰρ διαλύει τὰς διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα στάσεις).
μέγιστον δὲ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ τὸ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ
τῇ ἀλλῃ οἰκονομίᾳ οὕτω τετάχθαι ὡστε μὴ
εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς κερδαίνειν. τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα ἐν
tαις ὀλυγαρχικαῖς δεὶ τηρεῖν: οὔ γὰρ οὕτως ἀγάπα-
κτούσιν εἰργόμενοι τοῦ ἀρχεῖν οἱ πολλοὶ (ἀλλὰ
καὶ χαίρουσιν εάν τις ἐὰν πρὸς τοὺς ἱδίους σχολά-
ζειν) ὡς εάν αἰσθάνεται τὰ κοινὰ κλέπτειν τοὺς
ἀρχοντας, τότε δ᾽ ἀμφότερα λυπεῖ, τὸ τε τῶν
τιμῶν μὴ μετέχειν καὶ τὸ τῶν κερδῶν. μοναχῶς δὲ
καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα εἶναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ
1309 a δέχονται γὰρ ἃν καὶ τοὺς γυνώρίμους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος
ἐχεῖν ἃ βουλοῦνται ἀμφοτέρους: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξεῖναι
πᾶσιν ἀρχεῖν δημοκρατίκην τὸ δὲ τοὺς γυνώρίμους
eἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατίκην, τοῦτο δ᾽
ἐσται όταν μὴ ἢ κερδαῖνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν: οἱ
5 γὰρ ἀπόροι οὐ βουλήσουσιν ἀρχεῖν τῷ μηδὲν
κερδαίνειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἱδίους εἶναι μᾶλλον, οἱ
δ᾽ εὐπόροι δυνήσουσιν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν προσδείσθαι
τῶν κοινῶν: ὡστε συμβῆσεται τοῖς μὲν ἀπόροις γι-

a i.e. render it impossible to make money out of office.
And also sectional prosperity in the state must be guarded against for the same reasons; and the way to avert this is always to entrust business and office to the opposite sections (I mean that the respectable are opposite to the multitude and the poor to the wealthy), and to endeavour either to mingle together the multitude of the poor and that of the wealthy or to increase the middle class (for this dissolves party factions due to inequality). And in every form of constitution it is a very great thing for it to be so framed both by its laws and by its other institutions that it is impossible for the magistracies to make a profit. And this has most to be guarded against in oligarchies; for the many are not so much annoyed at being excluded from holding office (but in fact they are glad if somebody lets them have leisure to spend on their own affairs) as they are if they think that the magistrates are stealing the common funds, but then both things annoy them, exclusion from the honours of office and exclusion from its profits.

And indeed the sole way in which a combination of democracy and aristocracy is possible is if someone could contrive this arrangement; for it would then be possible for the notables and also the multitude both to have what they want; for it is the democratic principle for all to have the right to hold office and the aristocratic one for the offices to be filled by the notables, and this will be the case when it is impossible to make money from office; for the poor will not want to hold office because of making nothing out of it, but rather to attend to their own affairs, while the wealthy will be able to hold office because they have no need to add to their resources from the public funds; so that the result will be that the poor


10 τοῦ μὲν οὖν μὴ κλέπτεσθαι τὰ κοινὰ ἡ παράδοσις γυνέσθω τῶν χρημάτων παρόντων πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ ἀντίγραφα κατὰ φρατρίας καὶ λόχους καὶ φυλὰς τιθέσθωσαν· τοῦ δὲ ἀκερδῶς ἄρχειν τιμᾶς εἶναι δὲι νενομοθετημένας τοῖς εὐδοκιμοῦσιν.

15 δὲ οὖν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις τῶν εὐπόρων φείδεσθαι, μὴ μόνον τῷ τὰς κτήσεις μὴ ποιεῖν ἄναδάστους, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς καρποὺς (ὅ ἐν ἐνίας τῶν πολιτείων λανθάνει γυνόμενον), βέλτιον δὲ καὶ βουλομένους κωλύειν λειτουργεῖν τὰς δαπανήρας μὲν μὴ χρησίμους δὲ λειτουργίας, οἷον χορηγίας καὶ λαμπαδαρχίας καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαύτα· ἐν

12 δὲ ὀλυγαρχίᾳ τῶν ἀπόρων ἐπιμελείαν ποιεῖσθαι πολλήν, καὶ τᾶς ἀρχὰς ἀφ’ ὧν λήμματα τούτων ἀπονεμεῖν, κἂν τις ὑβρίση τῶν εὐπόρων εἰς τούτους, μείζω τὰ ἐπιτήμια εἶναι ἢ ἃν σφῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τᾶς κληρονομίας μὴ κατὰ δόσιν εἶναι ἀλλὰ κατὰ γένος, μηδὲ πλειώνων ἢ μᾶς τῶν αὐτῶν κληρονομεῖν, ὡς γὰρ ἂν ὁμαλωτεραί αἱ οὕσιαι εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων εἰς εὐπορίαν ἀν καθίσταντο πλείους. συμφέρει δὲ καὶ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἐν ὀλυγαρχίᾳ τῶν ἀλλων ἢ ἰσότητα ἢ προεδρίαν νέμειν τοῖς ἦττον κοινονοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας, ἐν

20 μὲν δήμῳ τοῖς εὐπόροις ἐν δὲ ὀλυγαρχίᾳ τοῖς ἀπόροις, πλὴν ὅσαι ἄρχαί κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας,

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a Groups of citizens normally three to a tribe, supposed to be based on relationship.

b Originally a military, later a civil classification.
will become well-off through spending their time upon their work, and the notables will not be governed by any casual persons. Therefore to prevent peculation of the public property, let the transfer of the funds take place in the presence of all the citizens, and let copies of the lists be deposited for each brotherhood,* company b and tribe; and to get men to hold office without profit there must be honours assigned by law to officials of good repute. And in democracies it is necessary to be sparing of the wealthy not only by not causing properties to be divided up, but not incomes either (which under some constitutions takes place unnoticed), and it is better to prevent men from undertaking costly but useless public services like equipping choruses and torch-races c and all other similar services, even if they wish to; in an oligarchy on the other hand it is necessary to take much care of the poor, and to allot to them the offices of profit, and the penalty if one of the rich commits an outrage against them must be greater than if it is done by one of themselves, d and inheritance must not go by bequest but by family, and the same man must not inherit more than one estate, for so estates would be more on a level, and more of the poor would establish themselves as prosperous. And it is expedient both in a democracy and in an oligarchy to assign to those who have a smaller share in the government—in a democracy to the wealthy and in an oligarchy to the poor—either equality or precedence in all other things excepting the supreme offices of state; but

* Equipping the chorus and actors for tragedies and comedies and providing for the ceremonial torch-races were public services borne by individuals at Athens.

d Or possibly ' than if he does it against one of his own class.'
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taútas dé toîs èk tîs politeías èγχειρίζειν μόνοις ή pλείοσιν.

Τρία δὲ τινα χρὴ ἔχειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀρξεῖν 14 tās κυρίας ἀρχάς, πρῶτον μὲν φιλίαν πρὸς τὴν 35 καθεστῶσαν πολιτείαν, ἔπειτα δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς, τρίτον δὲ ἀρετήν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἑκάστη πολιτείᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν (εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταύτον τὸ δίκαιον κατὰ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶναι διαφοράς). ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν, ὅταν μὴ συμβαίνῃ 40 ταῦτα πάντα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, πῶς χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἱρέσιν1. οἶον εἰ στρατηγικὸς μὲν τις εἰη ποιηρὸς δὲ καὶ μὴ τῇ πολιτείᾳ φίλος, δὲ δίκαιος καὶ φίλος,2 πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἱρέσιν; ἔνοικε 15 δὲ δεῖν βλέπειν εἰς δύο, τῶν πλείον μετέχουσι πάντες καὶ τίνος ἔλαττον. διὸ ἐν στρατηγίᾳ μὲν 5 εἰς τὴν ἐμπειρίαν μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔλαττον γὰρ στρατηγίας μετέχουσι, τῆς δὲ ἐπιεικείας πλεῖον· ἐν δὲ φυλακῇ καὶ ταμείᾳ τάναντια, πλείονος γὰρ ἀρετῆς δεῖται ἡ ὁσην οἱ πολλοὶ ἔχουσιν, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη κοινῇ πάσιν. ἀπορήσαει δὲ ἂν τις κἂν 10 δύναμις ὑπάρχῃ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας3 φιλία, τί δεῖ τῆς ἀρετῆς; ποιησει γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ δύο. ἡ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τοὺς τὰ δύο ταῦτα ἔχοντα ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι, ὡστε καθάπερ καὶ αὐτοῖς οὐχ υπηρετοῦσιν εἰδότες καὶ φιλοῦντες αὐτοὺς, οὕτω

1 αἱρέσιν corr. cod. inferior: διαιρέσιν cet.
2 φίλος μὴ στρατηγικὸς δὲ codd. nonnulli.
3 καὶ post πολιτείας codd., tr. Stahr.
these should be entrusted to those prescribed by the constitution exclusively, or to them for the most part.

There are some three qualities which those who are to hold the supreme magistracies ought to possess, first, loyalty to the established constitution, next, very great capacity to do the duties of the office, and third, virtue and justice—in each constitution the sort of justice suited to the constitution (for if the rules of justice are not the same under all constitutions, it follows that there must be differences in the nature of justice also). It is a difficult question how the choice ought to be made when it happens that all these qualities are not found in the same person; for instance, if one man is a good military commander but a bad man and no friend of the constitution, and the other is just and loyal, how should the choice be made? It seems that two things ought to be considered, what is the quality of which all men have a larger share, and what the one of which all have a smaller share? Therefore in the case of military command one must consider experience more than virtue, for men have a smaller share of military experience and a larger share of moral goodness; but in the case of a trusteeship or a stewardship the opposite, for these require more virtue than most men possess, but the knowledge required is common to all men. And somebody might raise the question, why is virtue needed if both capacity and loyalty to the constitution are forthcoming, as even these two qualities will do what is suitable? May not the answer be, because those who possess these two qualities may possibly lack self-control, so that just as they do not serve themselves well although they know how to and
καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν οὔθεν κωλύει ἔχειν ἐνίους, ἀπλῶς δὲ, ὅσα ἐν τοῖς νόμοις οὐς συμφέροντα λέει· 16
15 γομεν ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἀπαντά ταῦτα σφάζει τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον μέγιστον
στοιχεῖον, τὸ τηρεῖν ὅπως κρεῖττον ἔσται τὸ βουλόμενον τὴν πολιτείαν πλῆθος τοῦ μὴ βουλο-
μένου. παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα δεὶ μὴ λανθάνειν,
δὲ νῦν λανθάνει τὰς παρεκβεβηκυίας πολιτείας, τὸ
20 μέσον· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν δοκοῦτων δημοτικῶν λύει
tὰς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν τὰς ὀλιγ-
αρχίας. οἱ δὲ, οἵονει ταῦτην εἶναι μίαν ἁρετήν, 17
ἐλκοσοῦν εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, ἀγνοοῦντες οτι
cαθάπερ ἥστι εὐστὶ παρεκβεβηκυῖα μὲν τὴν εὐθύτητα
tὴν καλλίστην πρὸς τὸ γρυπὸν ἢ τὸ σιμὸν ἄλλ' 25
ὁμως ἕτι καλὴ καὶ χάριν ἑχοῦσα πρὸς τὴν ὅριν,
oυ μὴν ἄλλας ἕως ἐπιτεινῇ τις ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰς τὴν
ὑπερβολὴν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀποβαλεὶ τὴν μετριώτητα
tοῦ μορίου τέλος δὲ οὕτως ὡστε μηδὲ ῥῦνα
ποιήσῃ φαίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν
ἐλλευψιν τῶν ἐναντίων (τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει
30 καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μορίων), συμβαίνει δὴ τοῦτο
cαὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείαις· καὶ γὰρ ὀλιγαρχίαν 18
καὶ δημοκρατίαν ἔστιν ὡστ' ἔχειν ἰκανῶς, καίπερ
ἐξετηκυῖας τῆς βελτίστης τάξεως, ἕαν δὲ τις
ἐπιτείνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκατέραν αὐτῶν, πρῶτον μὲν
χείρῳ ποιήσῃ τὴν πολιτείαν, τέλος δὲ οὐδὲ πολι-
tereίαν. διὸ δεὶ τοῦτο μὴ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν νομοθέτην

a See 1279 a 20.
although they love themselves, so possibly in some cases they may behave in this way in regard to the community also? And broadly, whatever provisions in the laws we describe as advantageous to constitutions, these are all preservative of the constitutions, and so is the supreme elementary principle that has been often stated, that of taking precautions that the section desirous of the constitution shall be stronger in number than the section not desirous of it. And beside all these matters one thing must not be overlooked which at present is overlooked by the deviation-forms of constitution—the middle party; for many of the institutions thought to be popular destroy democracies, and many of those thought oligarchical destroy oligarchies.

But the adherents of the deviation-form, thinking that this form is the only right thing, drag it to excess, not knowing that just as there can be a nose that although deviating from the most handsome straightness towards being hooked or snub nevertheless is still beautiful and agreeable to look at, yet all the same, if a sculptor carries it still further in the direction of excess, he will first lose the symmetry of the feature and finally will make it not even look like a nose at all, because of its excess and deficiency in the two opposite qualities (and the same is the case also in regard to the other parts of the body), so this is what happens about constitutions likewise; for it is possible for an oligarchy and a democracy to be satisfactory although they have diverged from the best structure, but if one strains either of them further, first he will make the constitution worse, and finally he will make it not a constitution at all. Therefore the legislator and the statesman must not fail to
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1309 b καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, ποία σῶζει τῶν δημοτικῶν καὶ ποία φθείρει τὴν δημοκρατίαν, καὶ ποία τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν· οὐδετέραν μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ἀνευ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους, ἀλλὰ ὅταν ὦμαι ἡμείς, ἄλλη ἀνάγκη εἶναι ταύτην

1310 a τὴν πολιτείαν, ὦστε φθείροντες τοῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν νόμοις φθείροντες τὰς πολιτείας. ἀμαρτάνουσι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ δημαργοὶ, ὅπου τὸ πλῆθος κύριον τῶν νόμων· δύο γὰρ ποιοῦσιν αἱ τὴν πόλιν μαχόμενοι τοῖς εὐπόροις, δεὶ δὲ τοῦναντίον αἱ δοκεῖν λέγειν ὑπὲρ εὐπόρων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικοὺς, καὶ τοὺς ὀρκους ἐναντίον ἢ νῦν ὀμνύναι τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικοὺς, νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐνίας ὀμνύοντο "καὶ τῶ δήμῳ κακονοὺς ἔσομαί καὶ βουλεύομαι ὅ τι ἂν ἐχω κακόν," χρή δὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ὑποκρίνεσθαι τοῦναντίον, ἐπισημανομένους ἐν τοῖς ὀρκους ὡς "οὐκ ἂδικήσω τὸν δήμου." μέγιστον δὲ πάντων τῶν εἱρμενῶν πρὸς τὸ διαμένειν τὰς πολιτείας, οὐ νῦν ὀλιγωρούσι πάντες, τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας. ὁφελος γὰρ οὕθεν τῶν ὑφελμωτάτων νόμων καὶ συνδεδοξασμένων ὕπο πάντων τῶν πολιτευομένων, εἰ μὴ ἔσονται εἰθισμένοι καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, εἰ μὲν οἱ νόμοι δημοτικοὶ, δημοτικῶς, εἰ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ,

1 τῶν εὐπόρων cod. inferior.

*The scoffing anapaestic cadence* of this oath has been noted. In 411 B.C. the democratic reaction at Athens swore 434
know what sort of democratic institutions save and what destroy a democracy, and what sort of oligarchical institutions an oligarchy; for neither constitution can exist and endure without the well-to-do and the multitude, but when an even level of property comes about, the constitution resulting must of necessity be another one, so that when men destroy these classes by laws carried to excess they destroy the constitutions. And a mistake is made both in democracies and in oligarchies—in democracies by the demagogues, where the multitude is supreme over the laws; for they always divide the state into two by fighting with the well-to-do, but they ought on the contrary always to pretend to be speaking on behalf of men that are well-to-do, while in democracies the oligarchical statesmen ought to pretend to be speaking on behalf of the people, and the oligarchies ought to take oath in terms exactly opposite to those which they use now, for at present in some oligarchies they swear, "And I will be hostile to the people and will plan whatever evil I can against them," but they ought to hold, and to act the part of holding, the opposite notion, declaring in their oaths, "I will not wrong the people." But the greatest of all the means spoken of to secure the stability of constitutions is one that at present all people despise: it is a system of education suited to the constitutions. For there is no use in the most valuable laws, ratified by the unanimous judgement of the whole body of citizens, if these are not trained and educated in the constitution, popularly if the laws are popular, oligarchically if they are oligarchical; 'to be enemies of the Four Hundred and to hold no parley with them.'
1310 a

ολιγαρχικῶς· εἴπερ γάρ ἐστὶν ἐφ’ ἐνός ἀκρασία,
20 ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπὶ πόλεως. ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ πεπαιδεύσθαι 21
πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ τούτο, τὸ ποιεῖν οἷς χαίρουσιν
οἱ ολιγαρχοῦντες ἢ οἱ δημοκρατίαις βουλόμενοι,
ἀλλ’ οίς δύνασθαι οἱ μὲν οἱ ολιγαρχεῖν οἱ δὲ δημο-
κρατεῖσθαι. νῦν δ’ ἐν μὲν ταῖς ολιγαρχίαις οἱ
tῶν ἀρχόντων νεἰοὶ τρυφῶσιν, οἱ δὲ τῶν ἀπόρων
25 γίγνονται γεγυμνασμένοι καὶ πεπονηκότες, ὡστε
καὶ βούλονται μᾶλλον καὶ δύνανται νεωτέρες·
ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῖς μάλιστα εἶναι 22
δοκούσαι δημοκρατικάς τούναντι τοῦ συμ-
φέροντος καθέστηκεν. αὐτὸν δὲ τούτον ὅτι κακῶς
ὁρὶζονται τὸ ἐλευθερον (δύο γάρ ἐστιν οἷς ἡ
dημοκρατία δοκεῖ ὁρίσθαι, τῷ τὸ πλεῖον εἶναι
20 κύριον καὶ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ): τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἰδιαίον
ἰσον1 δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἰσον δ’ ὅ τι ἄν δόξῃ τῷ πλήθει
tούτ’ εἶναι κύριον, ἐλευθερον δὲ [καὶ ἰσον]2 τὸ ὅ τι
ἀν βουληταί τις ποιεῖν· ὡστε θη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις
dημοκρατίαις ἐκαστὸς ὡς βουλεῖται, καὶ εἰς ὁ
χρήζων, ως φησίν Ἑὐριπίδης. τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶ
35 φαινον· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ οἰεσθαι δουλεῖαν εἶναι τὸ θη
πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν ἀλλὰ σωτηρίαν.

Ἐξ ὅν μὲν οὖν αἱ πολιτείαι μεταβάλλουσι καὶ
φθειροῦνται καὶ διὰ τῶν σφηκών σφιζοῦσι καὶ διαμένουσιν,
ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπείν τοσαῦτά ἐστιν.

VIII. Λείπεται δ’ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας, 1
40 ἐξ ὅν τε φθειρεῖται καὶ δι’ ὅν σώζεσθαι πέφυκεν.
1310 b σχεδὸν δὲ παραπλήσια τοῖς εἰρημένοις περὶ τὰς
πολιτείας ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τὰς

1 ἰσον ante δικαιον Richards.
2 Spengel.
for there is such a thing as want of self-discipline in a state, as well as in an individual. But to have been educated to suit the constitution does not mean to do the things that give pleasure to the adherents of oligarchy or to the supporters of democracy, but the things that will enable the former to govern oligarchically and the latter to govern themselves democratically. But at present in the oligarchies the sons of the rulers are luxurious, and the sons of the badly-off become trained by exercise and labour, so that they are both more desirous of reform and more able to bring it about; while in the democracies thought to be the most democratic the opposite of what is expedient has come about. And the cause of this is that they define liberty wrongly (for there are two things that are thought to be defining features of democracy, the sovereignty of the majority and liberty); for justice is supposed to be equality, and equality the sovereignty of whatever may have been decided by the multitude, and liberty doing just what one likes. Hence in democracies of this sort everybody lives as he likes, and 'unto what end he listeth,' as Euripides says. But this is bad; for to live in conformity with the constitution ought not to be considered slavery but safety.

This therefore, speaking broadly, is a list of the things that cause the alteration and the destruction of constitutions, and of those that cause their security and continuance.

1 VIII. It remains to speak of monarchy, the causes that destroy it and the natural means of its preservation. And the things that happen about royal governments and tyrannies are almost similar to those that have been narrated about constitu-
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βασιλείας καὶ τὰς τυραννίδας. ἥ μὲν γὰρ βασιλεία κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐστὶν, ἥ δὲ τυραννίς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ὑστάτης σύγκειται καὶ δημοκρατίας,
5 διὸ δὴ καὶ βλαβερωτάτη τοῖς ἄρχομένους ἐστὶν, ἀτε ἐκ δυνῶν συγκειμένη κακῶν καὶ τὰς παρεκβάσεις καὶ τὰς ἀμαρτίας ἔχουσα τὰς παρ' ἀμφοτέρων. ὑπάρχει δ' ἡ γένεσις εὐθὺς 2 ἐξ ἑναντίων ἐκατέρα τῶν μοναρχῶν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ βασιλεία πρὸς βοηθειαν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου1 τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι γέγονεν, καὶ καθίσταται βασιλεύς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἁρετῆς ἡ πράξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἁρετῆς, ἡ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν τοιούτου γένους, ὁ δὲ τύραννος ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους ἐπὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους, ὅπως ὁ δήμος ἀδικηθαὶ μηθὲν ὑπ' αὐτῶν. φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν συμβεβηκότων. 3
15 σχεδον γὰρ οἱ πλείστου τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν ὥσ εἰπεῖν, πιστευθέντες ἐκ τοῦ διαβάλλειν τοὺς γνωρίμους. αἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κατέστησαν τῶν τυραννίδων ἢδη τῶν πόλεων ἡξημένων, αἱ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἐκ [τε]2 τῶν βασιλέων παρεκβαίνοντων τὰ πάτρια καὶ δεσποτικῶτερας ἀρχῆς ὄρεγομένων, αὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν αἱρετῶν ἐπὶ τὰς κυρίας ἀρχὰς (τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον οἱ δήμου καθίστασαν πολυχρονίους τὰς δημιουργίας καὶ τὰς θεωρίας), αἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν ὀλιγαρχῶν αἱρομένων ἐνα τινὰ κύριον ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἁρχὰς. πάσι γὰρ ὑπήρχε τοῖς τρόποις τούτοις τὸ κατεργά- 4 ἢ ἐσθαὶ βαδίως, εἰ μόνον βουληθεῖν, διὰ τὸ δύναμιν

1 ἐπὶ τὸν δήμου Rassow. 2 [τε] om. cod. inferior.

a Cf. 1296 a 3, 1312 b 35.

b Here δημιουργία means 'magistracy' generally; δημιουργός was the title of a special officer in some Peloponnesian states.

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tional governments. For royal government corre-
sponds with aristocracy, while tyranny is a combina-
tion of the last form of oligarchy and of democracy; and for that very reason it is most harmful to its subjects, inasmuch as it is a combination of two bad things, and is liable to the deviations and errors that spring from both forms of constitution. And these two different sorts of monarchy have their origins from directly opposite sources; royalty has come into existence for the assistance of the distinguished against the people, and a king is appointed from those distinguished by superiority in virtue or the actions that spring from virtue, or by superiority in coming from a family of that character, while a tyrant is set up from among the people and the multitude to oppose the notables, in order that the people may suffer no injustice from them. And this is manifest from the facts of history. For almost the greatest number of tyrants have risen, it may be said, from being demagogues, having won the people's confidence by slandering the notables. For some tyrannies were set up in this manner when the states had already grown great, but others that came before them arose from kings departing from the ancestral customs and aiming at a more despotic rule, and others from the men elected to fill the supreme magistracies (for in old times the peoples used to appoint the popular officials and the sacred embassies for long terms of office), and others from oligarchies electing some one supreme official for the greatest magistracies. For in all these methods they had it in their power to effect their purpose easily, if only they wished, because they already

\[\text{Official missions to religious games and to oracles.}\]
προϋπάρχειν τοῖς μὲν βασιλικῆς ἀρχῆς τοῖς δὲ τῇ τῆς τιμῆς, οἶνον Φείδων μὲν περὶ "Ἀργος καὶ ἑτεροι τύραννοι κατέστησαν βασιλείας ὑπαρχοῦσας, οἶ δὲ περὶ τῇ 'Ἰωνίαν καὶ Φάλαρις ἐκ τῶν τιμῶν, Παναίτιος δὲ ἐν Λεοντίνοις καὶ Κύβελος ἐν Κορίνθῳ καὶ Πεισίστρατος Ἀθηναίοι καὶ Διονύσιος ἐν Συρακούσαις καὶ ἑτεροι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐκ δημαγωγίας. καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, ἡ βασιλεία τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν· κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ κατ' ἰδίαιν ἄρετὴν ἡ κατὰ γένους ἡ κατ' εὐφρασίαν ἡ κατὰ ταύτα τε καὶ δύναμιν.

ἀπαντες γάρ εὐφρασίαν ἡ δυνάμενοι τὰς πόλεις ἡ τὰ ἔθνη εὐφρασίαν ἐτύγχανον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης, οἱ μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον κωλύσαντες δούλευεν, ὥσπερ Κόδρος, οἱ δ' ἑλευθερώσαντες, ὥσπερ Κύρος, ἡ κτίσαντες ἡ κτησάμενοι χώραν, ὥσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλείς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ Μολοττῶν. βούλεται δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶναι φύλαξ, 6

ὅπως οἱ μὲν κεκτημένοι τὰς οὐσίας μηθέν ἄδικον πάσχωσιν ὁ δὲ δήμος μὴ υβρίζηται μηθεν, ἡ δὲ τυραννίς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, πρὸς οὖν ἀποβλέπει κοινὸν εἰ μὴ τῆς ἱδίας ἡφελείας χάριν· ἐστι δὲ σκοπός τυραννίκος μὲν τὸ ἦδυ βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ κολόν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλεονεκτημάτων τὰ μὲν χρήματα1 τυραννίκα τὰ δ' εἰς τιμήν βασιλικά μᾶλλον καὶ φυλακὴ βασιλικὴ μὲν πολιτική, τυραν-

1 χρήματων Γ: <eis> χρήματα ? Susemihl.
possessed the power of royal rule in the one set of cases and of their honourable office in the other, for example Phidon in Argos and others became tyrants when they possessed royal power already, while the Ionian tyrants and Phalaris rose from offices of honour, and Panaetius at Leontini and Cypselus at Corinth and Pisistratus at Athens and Dionysius at Syracuse and others in the same manner from the position of demagogue. Therefore, as we said, royalty is ranged in correspondence with aristocracy, for it goes by merit, either by private virtue or by family or by services or by a combination of these things and ability. For in every instance this honour fell to men after they had conferred benefit or because they had the ability to confer benefit on their cities or their nations, some having prevented their enslavement in war, for instance Codrus, others having set them free, for instance Cyrus, or having settled or acquired territory, for instance the kings of Sparta and Macedon and the Molossians. And a king wishes to be a guardian, to protect the owners of estates from suffering injustice and the people from suffering insult, but tyranny, as has repeatedly been said, pays regard to no common interest unless for the sake of its private benefit; and the aim of tyranny is what is pleasant, that of royalty what is noble. Hence even in their requisitions money is the aim of tyrants but rather marks of honour that of kings; and a king’s bodyguard consists of citizens, a tyrant’s of foreign

The usual tradition was that Codrus was already king when he saved Athens by sacrificing his life.

Cyrus liberated Persia from the Median empire 559 B.C.

Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, conquered the Molossi and became their king.
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νική δὲ διὰ ξένων. ὅτι δὲ ἡ τυραννίς ἔχει κακὰ 7 καὶ τὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τὰ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας,

10 φανερῶν· ἐκ μὲν ὀλιγαρχίας τὸ τὸ τέλος εἶναι πλοῦτον (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ διαμένειν ἀναγκαῖον μόνως τὴν τε φυλακὴν καὶ τὴν τρυφὴν) καὶ τὸ τῷ πλῆθει μηδὲν πιστεύειν (διὸ καὶ τὴν παραίρεσιν ποιοῦντα τῶν ὁπλών, καὶ τὸ κακοῦν τὸν ὄχλον καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος ἀπελαύνει καὶ διοικίζειν ἀμφοτέρων 15 κοινῶν, καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος), ἐκ δημοκρατίας δὲ τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῖς γνωρίμοις καὶ διαφθείρειν λάθρα καὶ φανερῶς καὶ φυγαδεύειν ὡς ἀντιτέκνους καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐμποδίους. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐπιβούλας, τῶν μὲν ἄρχειν αὐτῶν βουλομένων, τῶν δὲ μὴ δουλεύειν. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Θρασύ-

20 βουλον συμβούλευμα ἐστὶν, ἢ τῶν ὑπερεχόντων σταχύων κόλουσιν, ὡς δέον ἄει τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν πολιτῶν ἀναιρεῖν. καθάπερ οὖν σχεδὸν 8 ἑλέχθη,1 τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρχὰς δεῖ νομίζειν περὶ τε τὰς πολιτείας εἶναι τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ περὶ τὰς 25 μοναρχίας· διὰ τὸ γὰρ ἄδικιαν καὶ διὰ φοβὸν καὶ διὰ καταφρόνησιν ἐπιτίθενται πολλοὶ τῶν ἀρχο-

mένων ταῖς μοναρχίαις, τῆς δὲ ἄδικίας μάλιστα2 δι’ ὑβριν, ἐνίστε δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἴδιων στέρησιν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τέλη ταύτα καθάπερ κάκει καὶ περὶ 30 τᾶς τυραννίδας καὶ τὰς βασιλείας· μέγεθος γὰρ ὑπάρχει πλοῦτον καὶ τιμῆς τοῖς μοναρχοῖς, ὡν

1 σχεδὸν post ἑλέχθη Spengel (om. ΓΜΠ1).
2 μάλιστα <μέν> ? ed.

a See 1284 a 26 n.

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mercenaries. And it is manifest that tyranny has the evils of both democracy and oligarchy; it copies oligarchy in making wealth its object (for inevitably that is the only way in which the tyrant's body-guard and his luxury can be kept up) and in putting no trust in the multitude (which is why they resort to the measure of stripping the people of arms, and why ill-treatment of the mob and its expulsion from the city and settlement in scattered places is common to both forms of government, both oligarchy and tyranny), while it copies democracy in making war on the notables and destroying them secretly and openly and banishing them as plotting against it and obstructive to its rule. For it is from them that counter-movements actually spring, some of them wishing themselves to rule, and others not to be slaves. Hence comes the advice of Periander to Thrasybulus, his docking of the prominent corn-stalks, meaning that the prominent citizens must always be made away with.

Therefore, as was virtually stated, the causes of revolutions in constitutional and in royal governments must be deemed to be the same; for subjects in many cases attack monarchies because of unjust treatment and fear and contempt, and among the forms of unjust treatment most of all because of insolence, and sometimes the cause is the seizure of private property. Also the objects aimed at by the revolutionaries in the case both of tyrannies and of royal governments are the same as in revolts against constitutional government; for monarchs possess great wealth and great honour, which are

\[b\] This has not been stated, but can be inferred from what precedes.
1311a ἐφίενται πάντες. τῶν δ᾽ ἐπιθέσεων αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ σῶμα γίγνονται τῶν ἄρχοντῶν αἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. αἱ μὲν οὖν δὲ ὑβριν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα· τῆς δ᾽ ὑβρεως οὐσίς πολυμεροῖς, ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν αὐτίον γίγνεται τῆς ὀργῆς, τῶν δ᾽ ὀργιζομένων σχεδὸν οἱ πλείστοι τιμωρίας χάριν ἐπιτίθενται ἅλλ᾽ οὐχ ὑπεροχῆς· οίον ἢ μὲν τῶν Πεισοτρατιδῶν διὰ τὸ προπηλακίσαι μὲν τὴν Ἀρμοδίων ἀδελφήν, ἐπιθέσει δ᾽ Ἀρμοδίων (ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀρμόδιος διὰ τὴν ἀδελφήν δ᾽ Ἀρμοτείτων διὰ τῶν Ἀρμοδίων, ἐπεβουλεύσαν δὲ καὶ Περιάνδρῳ τῷ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ τυράννῳ διὰ τὸ συμπίνοντα μετὰ τῶν παιδικῶν ἔρωτῆσαι αὐτὸν εἰ ἦδη ἐξ αὐτοῦ κύριον, δὲ Φιλίππου υπὸ Παυσανίου διὰ τὸ ἐάσαι ὑβρισθῆναι αὐτὸν υπὸ τῶν περὶ Ατταλοῦ, καὶ ἢ Αμύντου τοῦ μικροῦ υπὸ Δέρδα² διὰ τὸ καυχήσασθαι εἰς τὴν ἤλικίαν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἢ τοῦ εὐνοίχου Εὐαγόρᾳ τῷ Κυπρίῳ, διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναικα παρελέσθαι τὸν ὑδὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμένους. τολλαί δ᾽ ἐπιθέσεις γεγένηται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχύνεσθαι τῶν μονάρχων τινάς· οίον καὶ ἢ Κραταίου εἰς Ἀρχέλαου· αἰε γὰρ βαρέως εἰχε πρὸς τὴν ὀμίλιαν, ὥστε ἰκανὴ καὶ ἐλάττων ἐγένετο πρόφαισις, η διότι τῶν θυγατέρων οὐδεμιᾶν ἐδωκεν ὀμολογήσας αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν προτέραν κατεχόμενος υπὸ πολέμου πρὸς Σιρραν³ καὶ Ἀρράβαιον ἐδωκε τῷ βασιλεῖ τῷ τῆς Ἐλιμείας, τὴν δὲ νεω-

¹ μὲν om. mg. H.

² Ἀμύντου υπὸ Δέρδα [τοῦ μικροῦ] Thompson.

³ Ἰρραν Paton (sic Plutarchus et Strabo).

See 1304 a 31 n.

A Macedonian youth of family, who murdered Philip 336 B.C. Attalus was the uncle of Philip’s wife Cleopatra.

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9 desired by all men. And in some cases the attack is aimed at the person of the rulers, in others at their office. Risings provoked by insolence are aimed against the person; and though insolence has many varieties, each of them gives rise to anger, and when men are angry they mostly attack for the sake of revenge, not of ambition. For example the attack on the Pisistratidae took place because they outraged Harmodius’s sister and treated Harmodius with contumely (for Harmodius attacked them because of his sister and Aristogiton because of Harmodius, and also the plot was laid against Periander the tyrant in Ambracia because when drinking with his favourite he asked him if he was yet with child by him), and the attack on Philip by Pausanias was because he allowed him to be insulted by Attalus and his friends, and that on Amyntas the Little by Derdas because he mocked at his youth, and the attack of the eunuch on Evagoras of Cyprus was for revenge, for he murdered him as being insulted, because Evagoras’s son had taken away his wife.

10 And many risings have also occurred because of shameful personal indignities committed by certain monarchs. One instance is the attack of Crataeas on Archelaus; for he was always resentful of the association, so that even a smaller excuse became sufficient, or perhaps it was because he did not give him the hand of one of his daughters after agreeing to do so, but gave the elder to the king of Elimea when hard pressed in a war against Sirras and Arrabaeus, and

c Perhaps the adjective should be transferred to Derdas and expunged as an interpolated note. The persons referred to are uncertain.

d King of Macedon 413-399 B.C. Euripides went to reside at his court 408 B.C. and died there 406 B.C. at the age of 75.
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τέραν τῷ υἱὶ 'Αμύντα οἴόμενος οὕτως ἂν ἐκεῖνον

ηκιστα διαφέρεσθαι καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῆς Κλεοπάτρας·

άλλα ςις γε ἀλλοτριῶτης ὑπήρχεν ἀρχὴ τὸ

βαρέως φέρειν πρὸς τὴν ἀφροδισιαστικὴν χάριν.

συνεπέθετο δὲ καὶ 'Ελλανοκράτης ὁ Λαρισαίος 12

diὰ τὴν αὐτῆν αἰτίαν· ὡς γὰρ χρώμενος αὐτοῦ τῇ

ἡλικία οὐ κατήγεν ὑποσχόμενος, δὲ ὑβριν καὶ οὐ

δι᾽ ἐρωτικὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢτε εἶναι τὴν γεγενημένην

ὁμιλίαν. Πῦθων δὲ καὶ Ἡρακλείδης οἱ Αἰνωι

Κότυν διέφθειραν τῷ πατρὶ τιμωροῦντες, Ἀδάμας

δὲ ἀπέστη Κότυνος διὰ τὸ ἐκμηθῆναι παῖς ὑν ὑπ᾽

αὐτοῦ, ὡς ὑβρισμένος. πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς 13

tὸ σώμα αἰκισθῆναι πληγαῖς ὀργισθέντες οἱ μὲν

διέφθειραν οἱ δὲ ἐνεχείρησαν ὡς ὑβρισθέντες, καὶ

τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ βασιλικὰς δυναστείας, οἷον

ἐν Μιτυλήνῃ τοὺς Πενθιλίδας Μεγακλῆς περιοῦντας

καὶ τύπτοντας ταῖς κορώναις ἐπιθέμενος μετὰ τῶν

φίλων ἄνειλεν, καὶ ὠστερὸν Σμέρδις Πένθιλον

πληγὰς λαβὼν καὶ παρὰ τῆς γυναικὸς ἐξελκυσθεὶς

διέφθειρεν. καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δὲ ἐπιθέσεως

Δεκάμυχος ἡγεμῶν ἐγένετο, παροξύνων τοὺς

ἐπιθεμένους πρῶτον· αὐτοῦ δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς ὁτι

αὐτὸν ἐξέδωκε μαστγώσαι Εὔριπίδη τῷ ποιητῇ·

ὁ δὲ Εὔριπίδης ἐξαλέπαυεν εἰπόντος τι αὐτοῦ εἰς

δυσωδίαν τοῦ στόματος. καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ διὰ 14

tοιαύτας αἰτίας οἱ μὲν ἀνηρέθησαν οἱ δὲ ἐπεβου-

λεύθησαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διὰ φόβον· ἐν γὰρ τι

1 πολλοὺς Richards.

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a King of Thrace 382–358 B.C.

b The ruling family in the early oligarchy there, claiming descent from Penthilus, an illegitimate son of Orestes.

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the younger to his son Amyntas, thinking that thus Amyntas would be least likely to quarrel with his son by Cleopatra; but at all events Crataeas's estrangement was primarily caused by resentment because of the love affair. And Hellanocrates of Larisa also joined in the attack for the same reason; for because while enjoying his favours Archelaus would not restore him to his home although he had promised to do so, he thought that the motive of the familiarity that had taken place had been insolence and not passionate desire. And Pytho and Heraclides of Aenus made away with Cotys to avenge their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys because he had been mutilated by him when a boy, on the ground of the insult. And also many men when enraged by the indignity of corporal chastisement have avenged the insult by destroying or attempting to destroy its author, even when a magistrate or member of a royal dynasty. For example when the Penthilidae at Mitylene went about striking people with their staves Megacles with his friends set on them and made away with them, and afterwards Smerdis when he had been beaten and dragged out from his wife's presence killed Penthilus. Also Decamnichus took a leading part in the attack upon Archelaus, being the first to stir on the attackers; and the cause of his anger was that he had handed him over to Euripides the poet to flog, Euripides being angry because he had made a remark about his breath smelling. And many others also for similar reasons have been made away with or plotted against. And similarly also from the motive of fear; for this was one of the
ARISTOTLE

1311 b  
τοῦτο τῶν αἰτίων ἢν, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ περὶ τὰς μοναρχίας· οἶον Σέρξην Ἀρταπάνης φοβούμενος τὴν διαβολὴν τὴν περὶ Δαρείου, ὅτι ἐκρέμασεν οὐ κελεύσαντος Σέρξου ἄλλ' οἰόμενος συγγνώσεσθαι ὡς ἀμιμονοῦντα διὰ τὸ δευτερείν. αἴ δὲ διὰ καταφρόνησιν, ὥσπερ Σαρδανάπαλλος ἰδών τις ξαίνοντα μετὰ τῶν γυναικῶν (ἐἰ ἀληθῆ ταῦτα οἱ μυθολογοῦντες λέγουσιν, ἐἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνου, ἄλλ' ἐπ' ἄλλου γε ἃν γένοιτο ἀληθῆς), καὶ Διονυσίω τῷ ὀστέρῳ Δίων ἐπέθετο διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν, ὅρων τοὺς τε πολίτας οὕτως ἔχοντας καὶ αὐτὸν ἀεὶ μεθύοντα. καὶ τῶν φίλων δὲ τινὲς ἐπιτίθενται διὰ καταφρόνησιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πιστεύεσθαι καταφρονοῦσιν ὡς λήσοντες. καὶ οἱ οἰόμενοι δύνασθαι κατασχεῖν τὴν ἁρχὴν τρόπον τινὰ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν ἐπιτίθενται· ὡς δυνάμενοι γὰρ καὶ καταφρονοῦντες τοῦ κινδύνου διὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπιχειροῦσι βαδίως, ὥσπερ οἱ στρατηγοῦντες τοῖς μονάρχοις, οἶον Κύρος Ἀστυάγη καὶ τοῦ βίου καταφρονῶν καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν ἐξηρηγήκειν αὐτὸν δὲ τρυφάν, καὶ Σεύθης ὁ Θρᾶξ Ἀμαδόκης στρατηγὸς ὃν. οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ πλείω τούτων ἐπιτίθενται, οἰον καὶ καταφρονοῦντες καὶ διὰ κέρδος, ὥσπερ Ἄριοβαρζάνη

1 καὶ περὶ ed.: καὶ codd.

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a Captain of Xerxes’ body-guard.
b Last king of the Assyrian empire at Nineveh.
c Tyrant of Syracuse 367-356 and 346-343 b.c., cf. 1312 a 34 ff.
d The last king of Media, reigned 594-559 b.c.
causes we mentioned in the case of monarchies, § 6, as also in that of constitutional governments; c. ii. § 5, for instance Artapanes⁴ killed Xerxes fearing the charge about Darius, because he had hanged him when Xerxes had ordered him not to but he had thought that he would forgive him because he would forget, as he had been at dinner. And other attacks on monarchs have been on account of contempt, as somebody killed Sardanapallus⁵ when he saw him combing his hair with his women (if this story told by the narrators of legends is true—and if it did not happen with Sardanapallus, it might quite well be true of somebody else), and Dion attacked the younger Dionysius⁶ because he despised him, when he saw the citizens despising him and the king himself always drunk. And contempt has led some even of the friends of monarchs to attack them, for they despise them for trusting them and think they will not be found out. And contempt is in a manner the motive of those who attack monarchs thinking that they are able to seize the government; for they make the attempt with a light heart, feeling that they have the power and because of their power despising the danger, as generals commanding the armies attack their monarchs; for instance Cyrus attacked Astyages⁷ when he despised both his mode of life and his power, because his power had waned and he himself was living luxuriously, and the Thracian Seuthes attacked Amadocus⁸ when his general. Others again attack monarchs for more than one of these motives, for instance both because they despise them and for the sake of gain, as

⁴ Both these Thracian kings became allies of Athens 390 B.C., but the event referred to may be later.
Mιθριδάτης. μάλιστα1 δε δια ταύτην την αιτίαν ἐγχειροῦσιν οἱ τὴν φύσιν μὲν θρασεῖς τιμήν δ’ ἔχοντες πολεμικὴν παρὰ τοὺς μονάρχους. ἀνδρεία
20 γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχουσα θράσος ἐστίν, δι’ ἂς ἀμφοτέρας ὡς ῥάδιως κρατήσουσι τοιοῦται τὰς ἐπιθέσεις. τῶν δὲ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἐπιτιθεμένων ἄτερος τρόπος 16 ἐστὶ τῆς αἰτίας· παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους πρότερον· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἔννοι τοὺς τυπάννοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν ὁρῶντες κέρδη τε μεγάλα καὶ τιμᾶς μεγάλας οὕσας
25 αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ τῶν διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἐπιτιθεμένων ἐκαστὸς προσαρέσται κινδυνεύει· ἀλλ’ ἐκείνῳ μὲν διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν, οὕτω δ’, ὥσπερ κἂν ἀλλὰς τυνὸς γενομένης πράξεως περιτής καὶ δι’ ἕν δομαστοί γίγνονται καὶ γνώριμοι τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς μονάρχοις ἐγχειροῦσιν οὐ κτήσασθαι
30 βουλόμενοι μοναρχίαν ἅλλα δόξαν. οὐ μην ἄλλ’ 17 ἐλάχιστοι γε τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἰσιν οἱ δια ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὁρμῶντες· ὑποκείσαται γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τοῦ σωθῆναι μηδὲν φροντίζειν ἃν μὴ μέλλῃ κατασχῆσει τὴν πράξιν· οἰς ἀκολουθεῖν μὲν δεὶ τὴν Δίωνος ὑπόλημιν, οὐ ράδιον δ’ αὐτὴν ἐγγενέσθαι
35 πολλοῖς· ἐκείνος γὰρ μετ’ ὀλίγων ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ Διονύσιον οὕτως ἐχειν φάσκων ὡς ὅποι2 περ ἃν δύνηται προελθεῖν ἵκανον αὐτῷ τοσοῦτον μετασχέιν τῆς πράξεως, οἶν οἱ μικρὸν ἐπιβάντα τῆς γῆς εὔθυς συμβαίη τελευτᾷ τοῦτον3 καλῶς ἐχειν αὐτῷ τὸν θάνατον.

40 Φθείρεται δὲ τυραννὶς ἕνα μὲν τρόπον, ὥσπερ 18

1 μάλιστα—20 ἐπιθέσεις post 6 μεθύοντα. traicienda Newman.
2 ὅποι Thompson: ὅποι codd.
3 τὸν βίον, τοῦτον P1.

* Perhaps Mithridates II., who succeeded his father Ariobarzanes as satrap of Pontus 336 B.C.
POLITICS, V. viii. 15–18

Mithridates a attacked Ariobarzanes. b And it is men of bold nature and who hold a military office with monarchs who most often make the attempt for this reason; for courage possessing power is boldness, and they make their attacks thinking that with courage and power they will easily prevail. But with those whose attack is prompted by ambition the motive operates in a different way from those spoken of before; some men attack tyrants because they see great profits and great honours belonging to them, but that is not the reason that in each case leads the persons who attack from motives of ambition to resolve on the venture; those others are led by the motive stated, but these attack monarchs from a wish to gain not monarchy but glory, just as they would wish to take part in doing any other uncommon deed that makes men famous and known to their fellows. Not but what those who make the venture from this motive are very few indeed in number, for underlying it there must be an utter disregard of safety, if regard for safety is not to check the enterprise; they must always have present in their minds the opinion of Dion, although it is not easy for many men to have it; Dion marched with a small force against Dionysius, saying that his feeling was that, whatever point he might be able to get to, it would be enough for him to have had that much share in the enterprise—for instance, if it should befall him to die as soon as he had just set foot in the country, that death would satisfy him. 17 And one way in which tyranny is destroyed, as is

b This sentence may have been shifted by mistake from the end of § 14 above.

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1312 b καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη πολιτείων, ἐξωθεῖν, ἐὰν ἐναντία τις ἡ πολιτεία κρείττων (τὸ μὲν γὰρ βούλεσθαι δῆλον ὡς ὑπάρξει διὰ τὴν ἐναντίοτητα τῆς προαιρέσεως, ἢ δὲ βούλονται, δυνάμενοι πράττοντι πάντες), ἐναντίαι δὲ οἱ πολιτείαι, δῆμος μὲν 5 τυραννίδι καθ’ Ἡσίόδον ὡς ’’κεραμεῖ κεραμεύς’’ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ δημοκρατία ἡ τελευταία τυραννίς ἐστιν), βασιλεία δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατία διὰ τὴν ἐναντίοτητα τῆς πολιτείας (διὸ Λακεδαίμονι πλείστος κατέλυσαν τυραννίδας καὶ Συρακούσοι κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ὧν ἐπολιτεύοντο καλῶς): ἕνα δὲ ἐξ 19

αὐτῶν, ὅταν οἱ μετέχοντες στασιάζωσιν, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν περὶ Γέλωνα καὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν περὶ Διονύσιον, ἡ μὲν Γέλωνος Ὀρασυβούλου τοῦ Ἰέρωνος ἀδελφοῦ τῶν νῦν τοῦ Γέλωνος δημαγωγοῦντος καὶ πρὸς ἡδονᾶς ὁμοίως ὑπὸ αὐτὸς ἀρχηγῶν τῶν δὲ οικείων συστησάντων 1 ἵνα μὴ ἡ 2 τυραννίς ὅλως καταλυθή. 15 ἄλλα Ὀρασυβούλος, οἱ δὲ συστάντες αὐτῶν 3 ὡς κατείχον ἔχοντες εξειθοῦν ἀπαντάς αὐτοὺς. Διονύσιον δὲ Δίων στρατεύσας κηδεσθή ὑπὸ καὶ προσλαβοῦν τὸν δημοῦ, ἐκείνον ἐκβαλὼν διεφθάρη. δυὸ δὲ 20 οὐσῶν αὐτῶν δὲ ἢ τὰς μάλιστ’ ἐπιτίθεται ταῖς τυραννίσι, μίσους καὶ καταφρονήσεως, βατερὸν μὲν ἢ τούτων ὑπάρχει 4 τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ μίσος,

1 συστάτων ΓΜΠ 2: στασιασάτων Richards.
2 μὴ ἡ ed.: μὴ codd.
3 <μετ’> αὐτῶν Susemihl: tr. post 13 <ἡ> τυραννίς Richards.
4 ἢ τούτων ὑπάρχει Richards: δὲ τ. ὑπάρχειν codd.

a Works and Days 25 καὶ κεραμεῖς κεραμεῖ κοτεῖ καὶ τέκτων τέκτων, ‘two of a trade never agree.’
b Tyrant of Syracuse 485-478 B.C., succeeded by his 452
each of the other forms of constitution also, is from without, if some state with an opposite constitution is stronger (for the wish to destroy it will clearly be present in such a neighbour because of the opposition of principle, and all men do what they wish if they have the power)—and the constitutions opposed to tyranny are, on the one hand democracy, which is opposed to it as (in Hesiod's phrase a) "potter to potter," because the final form of democracy is tyranny, and on the other hand royalty and aristocracy are opposed to tyranny because of the opposite nature of their constitutional structure (owing to which the Spartans put down a very great many tyrannies, and so did the Syracusans at the period when they were governed well). But one way is from within itself, when the partners in it fall into discord, as the tyranny of the family of Gelo b was destroyed, and in modern times c that of the family of Dionysius d—Gelo's, when Thrasybulus the brother of Hiero paid court to the son of Gelo and urged him into indulgences in order that he himself might rule, and the son's connexions banded together a body of confederates in order that the tyranny might not be put down entirely but only Thrasybulus, but their confederates seizing the opportunity expelled them all; Dionysius was put down by Dion, his relative, who got the people on to his side and expelled him, but was afterwards killed. There are two causes that chiefly lead men to attack tyranny, hatred and contempt; the former, hatred, attaches to tyrants always, but it is brother Hiero who died 467. Gelo's son is unknown. Cf. 1315 b 35 ff.

c 356 B.C., a good many years before this book was written.

d See 1312 a 4 n.
ARISTOTLE

1312 b

εκ δὲ τοῦ καταφρονεῖσθαι πολλαὶ γίνονται τῶν καταλύσεων. σημείων δὲ τῶν μὲν γὰρ κτησα-
μένων οἱ πλείστοι καὶ διεφύλαξαν τὰς ἀρχὰς, οἱ
dὲ παραλαβόντες εὐθὺς ὃς ἐπείν ἀπολλύσαι
pάντες, ἀπολαυστικῶς γὰρ ζῶντες ἐυκαταφρόνητοι
tε γίνονται καὶ πολλοὺς καυροὺς παραδίδοσι τοῖς
ἐπιτηθεμένοις. μόριον δὲ τι τοῦ μίσους καὶ τὴν 21
ὄργην δὲι τιθέναι, τρόπον γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν
αἰτία γίνεται πράξεων. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πρακτικώ-
tερον τοῦ μίσους· συντονώτερον γὰρ ἐπιτίθενται
dιὰ τὸ μὴ χρησθαι λογισμῷ τὸ πάθος (μάλιστα
dὲ συμβαίνει τοῖς θυμοῖς ἀκολουθεῖν διὰ τὴν ὑβρίν,
δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίαι τοῖς Πεισιστράτιδῶν κατελύθη
tυραννίς καὶ πολλαὶ τῶν ἄλλων), ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ
μίσος· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀργή μετὰ λύπης πάρεστιν, ὡστε
οὐ διάδινον λογίζεσθαι, ἢ δὲ ἔχθρα ἀνευ λύπης. ὡς
δὲ ἐν κεφαλαίοις εἰπεῖν, ὡσας αἰτίας εἰρήκαμεν
τῆς τε ὀλυγαρχίας τῆς ἀκράτου καὶ τελευταίας καὶ
τῆς δημοκρατίας τῆς ἐσχάτης, τοσαύτας καὶ τῆς
tυραννίδος θετέον· καὶ γὰρ αὐταὶ τυγχάνουσιν
οὐσα διαφέρεται1 τυραννίδες. βασιλεία δ᾽ ὑπὸ μὲν 22
τῶν ἐξωθεῖν ἦκιστα φθείρεται, διὸ καὶ πολυχρόνος
ἔστων: ἐξ αὐτῆς δὲ αἱ πλείσται φθοραὶ συμβαίνουσιν.
1313 a φθείρεται δὲ κατὰ δύο τρόπους, ἕνα μὲν στα-
σιασάντων τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς βασιλείας, ἄλλον
dὲ τρόπον τυραννικὸν πειραμένων διοικεῖν,
ὅταν εἶναι κύριοι πλείσων αξιόσι καὶ πολρὰ τῶν
νόμων. οὐ γίνονται δὲ ἐτί βασιλείαι νῦν, ἄλλ
ἀν περ γίνονται μοναρχίαι,2 τυραννίδες μᾶλλον,

1 αἰρεται codd. nonnulli.
2 μοναρχίαι Spengel: μοναρχίαι καὶ codd.

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their being despised that causes their downfall in many cases. A proof of this is that most of those that have won tyrannies have also kept their offices to the end, but those that have inherited them almost all lose them at once; for they live a life of indulgence, and so become despicable and also give many opportunities to their attackers. And also anger must be counted as an element in the hatred felt for them, for in a way it occasions the same actions. And often it is even more active than hatred, since angry men attack more vigorously because passion does not employ calculation (and insolence most frequently causes men to be led by their angry tempers, which was the cause of the fall of the tyranny of the Pisistratidae and many others), but hatred calculates more; for anger brings with it an element of pain, making calculation difficult, but enmity is not accompanied by pain. And to speak summarily, all the things that we have mentioned as causing the downfall of unmixed and extreme oligarchy and of the last form of democracy must be counted as destructive of tyranny as well, since extreme oligarchy and democracy are in reality divided* tyrannies. Royal government on the other hand is very seldom destroyed by external causes, so that it is long-lasting; but in most cases its destruction arises out of itself. And it is destroyed in two ways, one when those who participate in it quarrel, and another when the kings try to administer the government too tyrannically, claiming to exercise sovereignty in more things and contrary to the law. Royal governments do not occur any more now, but if ever monarchies

* i.e. divided among several persons, 'put into commission.'
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

1313 α
dià τὸ τὴν βασιλείαν ἐκουσιον μὲν ἀρχὴν εἶναι μειζόνων δὲ κυρίαν, πολλοὺς δ' εἶναι τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ μηδένα διαφέροντα τοσοῦτον ὡστε ἀπαρτίζειν πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς. ὡστε διὰ μὲν τούτῳ ἐκόντες οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν, ἀν δὲ δι' ἀπάτης ἀρξῆ τις ἡ βίας, ἡδὲ δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι τυραννίς. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ γένος βασιλείας τιθέναι 23 δεῖ τῆς φθορᾶς αὐτίαν πρὸς ταῖς εἰρημέναις καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς εὑκαταφρονήτους καὶ τὸ δύναμιν μὴ κεκτημένους τυραννικὴν ἄλλα βασιλικὴν τιμὴν ύβριζειν. βαδία γάρ ἐγίνετο ἡ κατάλυσις, μὴ 15 βουλομένων γὰρ εὐθὺς οὐκ ἔσται βασιλεύς, ἀλλ' ὁ τύραννος καὶ μὴ βουλομένων.

Φθείρονται μὲν οὖν αἱ μοναρχίαι διὰ ταύτας καὶ τοιαύτας ἐτέρας αἰτίας.

ΙΧ. Σώζονται δὲ δῆλον1 ὡς ἀπλῶς μὲν εἶπεῖν 1 ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὡς δὲ καθ' ἐκαστὸν, τῷ τὰς μὲν 20 βασιλείας ἅγεων ἐπὶ τὸ μετριώτερον. ὅσῳ γὰρ ἄν ἐλαττόνων ὤσι κύριοι, πλεῖοι χρόνον ἀναγκαίοι μὲνεν πάσαν τὴν ἀρχὴν, αὐτοὶ τε γὰρ ἤττον γίνον- ται δεσποτικοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ᾦσοι μᾶλλον καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων φθονοῦνται ἤττον. διὰ γὰρ τούτο καὶ ἡ περὶ Μολοπτοὺς πολὺν χρόνον βα- σιλεία διέμεινεν, καὶ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων διὰ τὸ ἐξ

1 δῆλον <ὅτε> Vahlen.

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do occur they are rather tyrannies, because royalty is government over willing subjects but with sovereignty over greater matters, but men of equal quality are numerous and no one is so outstanding as to fit the magnitude and dignity of the office; so that for this reason the subjects do not submit willingly, and if a man has made himself ruler by deception or force, then this is thought to be a tyranny.

23 In cases of hereditary royalty we must also set down as a cause of their destruction, in addition to those mentioned, the fact that hereditary kings often become despicable, and that although possessing not the power of a tyrant but the dignity of a king they commit insolent outrages; for the deposition of kings used to be easy, since a king will at once cease to be king if his subjects do not wish him to be, whereas a tyrant will still be tyrant even though his subjects do not wish it.

These causes then and others of the same nature are those that bring about the destruction of monarchies.

1 IX. On the other hand it is clear that monarchies, speaking generally, are preserved in safety as a result of the opposite causes to those by which they are destroyed. But taking the different sorts of monarchy separately—royalties are preserved by bringing them into a more moderate form; for the fewer powers the kings have, the longer time the office in its entirety must last, for they themselves become less despotic and more equal to their subjects in temper, and their subjects envy them less. For this was the cause of the long persistence of the Molossian royalty, and that of Sparta has continued because the office was from the beginning divided
1313 a ἀρχῆς τε εἰς δύο μέρη διαιρεθῆναι τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ πάλιν Θεοτόκισμον μετριάσαντος τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἁρχήν ἐπικαταστήσαντος· τῆς γὰρ δυνάμεως ἀφελῶν ηὔξησε τῷ χρόνῳ τὴν βασιλείαν, ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ ἐποίησεν οὐκ ἐλάττωνα ἄλλα μείζονα αὐτήν. ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα ἀποκρίνασθαι φασιν αὐτὸν, εἰποῦσαν εἰ μηδὲν αἰσχύνεται τὴν βασιλείαν ἐλάττων παραιτοῦσ τοῖς νιέσιν ἡ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβεν. "οὐ δῆτα" φάναι. "παραδίδωμι γὰρ πολυχρωμώτατα."

Αἱ δὲ τυραννίδες σώζονται κατὰ δύο τρόπους 2
tous ἐναντιωτάτους. ἢν ἀτέρος ἐστιν ὁ παραδεδο-
μένος καὶ καθό ὅν διοικοῦσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυ-
ράνων τὴν ἁρχήν· τούτων δὲ τὰ πολλά φασὶ
καταστήσαι Περίανδρον τὸν Κορίνθιον, πολλὰ δὲ
καὶ παρὰ τῆς τῶν Περσῶν ἁρχῆς ἔστι τοιαῦτα
λαβεῖν. ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ τέ ή τάλαι λεχθέντα πρὸς
40 σωτηρίαν, ὡς οἶον τε, τῆς τυραννίδος, τὸ τὸ
ὑπερέχωντα κολούειν καὶ τὸν φρονηματίας ἀν-

1313 b αἰρεῖν, καὶ μῆτε συστίται ἐάν μῆτε ἔταρικὴν μῆτε
παιδείαν μῆτε ἄλλο μηθὲν τοιοῦτον, ἄλλα πάντα
φυλάττειν ὅθεν εἰσίν, καὶ τίσιν γίνεσθαι δύο, φρονημάτι
καὶ πίστις, καὶ μῆτε σχολαῖς μῆτε ἄλλους συλλόγους
ἐπιτρέπειν γίνεσθαι σχολαστικοῖς, καὶ πάντα
5 ποιεῖν ἐξ ὧν οἱ μάλιστα ἄγνωτες ἄλληλοι ἐσούνται
πάντες (ἡ γὰρ γνώσις πίστιν ποιεῖ μᾶλλον πρὸς
ἀλλήλους· καὶ τὸ τὸν ἐπιδημοῦντας ἂεὶ φανεροῦς 3

1 ὡς οἴονται? Bekker (ὡς οἴον τε post 41 ὑπερέχουν τα vel alio transp. Richards).

* King of Sparta c. 770-720 B.C.
* See 1284 a 26 n.
* The phrases cover Plato’s gatherings in the Academy, Aristotle’s in the Peripatos of the Lyceum, and other meet-
into two halves, and because it was again limited in various ways by Theopompus, in particular by his instituting the office of the ephors to keep a check upon it; for by taking away some of the kings’ power he increased the permanence of the royal office, so that in a manner he did not make it less but greater. This indeed as the story goes is what he said in reply to his wife, when she asked if he felt no shame in bequeathing the royal power to his sons smaller than he had inherited it from his father: “Indeed I do not,” he is said to have answered, “for I hand it on more lasting.”

2 Tyrannies on the other hand are preserved in two extremely opposite ways. One of these is the traditional way and the one in which most tyrants administer their office. Most of these ordinary safeguards of tyranny are said to have been instituted by Periander of Corinth, and also many such devices may be borrowed from the Persian empire. These are both the measures mentioned some time back to secure the safety of a tyranny as far as possible—the lopping off of outstanding men and the destruction of the proud,—and also the prohibition of common meals and club-fellowship and education and all other things of this nature, in fact the close watch upon all things that usually engender the two emotions of pride and confidence, and the prevention of the formation of study-circles and other conferences for debate, and the employment of every means that will make people as much as possible unknown to one another (for familiarity increases mutual confidence); and for the people in the city to be always

ings for the intellectual use of leisure in gymnasia, palaestrae and leschae.
eînai kai diatrébeiv peri thúras (ouòtw gar òn
hêkosta la nthánoin tì pràttouai, kai frōneîn òn
éthiçouneto mikron aiei doulleûontes). kai tâllla òsa
toiadta Periakà kai bárbara tyrannikà èstw
(pánta gar taútôn dúvatai) kai tò ìh la nthánewn
peirásakai òsa twn lègwn òn práttou tòn
árkhoménon, ìlh eînai katastóspou, òíon peri
Suryakoúsa aì potagwýides kaloumenai, kai ou's
óttakoustás exèsteimpev Iérwv òpou tis eîh sòu-
ousía kai sûllogos (parrhasisáçontai te gar ìttov
foberômenoi tòus toútous, kai parrhasisáçontai
la nthánoun ìttov). kai tò diabálleiv ìlhíloud
kai súngkrouen kai filous filous kai tòn ìttmon
tòis gnwrîmous kai tòus plousíous éautois. kai
tò pèntasa pouîn tòus ìrkhomévous tyranników,
òpou mìtei phulakí trèfhtai kai prôs tò kai'
hàmevan òntes òsgoloi òwai èmboulèvous. para-
deyma dé toútou aì te pyramídes aì peri Aîngupton
kai tò ìanáthìmata tòw Kynfelidw kai tòu
'Olumpieion òi oikodómîsis ùpò tòn Peias-
stratidwv, kai tòn peri Sámov, érga Polukráteia
(pánta gar taútâ dúvatai taútov, òsgolían kai
peniân tòn ìrkhoménn) kai òh eîsfora tòn telwv, ò
òíov èn Suryakoúsaìs (èn pèntte gar òteisîn ìpî

1 ou's Coraes: tôus codd. (óttakoustat's ou's M1).
2 mìte: ìh te Victorius (mìte—kai secl. Richards).
3 phulakí: déwamis Thuorot.
4 tò ìanáthìmà tò Cobet.
5 'Olumpieion anonymus: 'Olumpieion codd.
6 érgov tò Coraes.

a Apparently this means a citizen force side by side with
the tyrant's mercenaries; a variant gives 'in order that the
(tyrant's) guard may be kept.'

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visible and to hang about the palace-gates (for thus there would be least concealment about what they are doing, and they would get into a habit of being humble from always acting in a servile way); and all the other similar devices of Persian and barbarian tyranny (for all have the same effect); and to try not to be uninformed about any chance utterances or actions of any of the subjects, but to have spies like the women called ‘provocatrices’ at Syracuse and the ‘sharp-ears’ that used to be sent out by Hiero wherever there was any gathering or conference (for when men are afraid of spies of this sort they keep a check on their tongues, and if they do speak freely are less likely not to be found out); and to set men at variance with one another and cause quarrels between friend and friend and between the people and the notables and among the rich. And it is a device of tyranny to make the subjects poor, so that a guard a may not be kept, and also that the people being busy with their daily affairs may not have leisure to plot against their ruler. Instances of this are the pyramids in Egypt and the votive offerings of the Cypselids, b and the building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Pisistratidae c and of the temples at Samos, works of Polycrates d (for all these undertakings produce the same effect, constant occupation and poverty among the subject people); and the levying of taxes, as at Syracuse (for in the

b Cypselus and his son Periander (1310 b 29 n., 1284 a 26 n.) dedicated a colossal statue of Zeus at Olympia and other monuments there and at Delphi.

c Pisistratus is said to have begun the temple of Olympian Zeus at Athens, not finished till the time of Hadrian.

d Tyrant of Samos, d. 522 B.C.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΣ

1313 b Διονύσιου τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπασαν εἰσενηροχέναι συνέβαινεν). ἔστι δὲ καὶ πολεμοποιοῦσ στύραννος, ὡσπος ἀσχολοὶ τε ὅσι καὶ ἕγεμόνος ἐν χρείᾳ διατελῶσιν ὄντες. καὶ ἣ μὲν βασιλεία σύζεται διὰ τῶν φίλων, τυραννικῶν δὲ τὸ μάλιστ' ἀπιστείν τοῖς φίλοις, ὡς βουλομένων μὲν πάντων δυναμένων δὲ μάλιστα τούτων. ¹ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν καὶ γιγνόμενα τὴν τελευταίαν τυραννικά πάντα, γυναικοκρατίᾳ τὲ περὶ τὰς οἰκίας ἧν ἔξαγγέλλωσι

κατὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων ἄνεσι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αὐτίαν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν οἱ δοῦλοι καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τοὺς τυράννους, εὐθαρκνητὰς τε ἀναγκαίωσι εὔνους εἰσίν καὶ ταῖς τυραννίσι καὶ τοῖς δημοκρατίαις (καὶ γὰρ ὁ δῆμος εἰσὶν βουλεύσι μόναρχοι). διὸ καὶ ὁ κόλαξ παρ' ἄμφοτέρους ἔντιμος, παρὰ μὲν τοὺς δήμους ὁ δημαγωγὸς (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ δημαγωγὸς τοῦ δῆμου κόλαξ), παρὰ δὲ τοῖς τυράννοις οἱ ταπεινῶς ὁμλοῦντες, ὅπερ ἔστω ἔργον κολακείας. καὶ γὰρ διὰ τὸ τοῦτο πονηρόφιλον ἡ τυραννίς Κολακεύομενοι γὰρ χαίρουσιν, τοῦτο δ' οὖν ἂν εἰς ποιήσεις φρονήματα ἔχων ἐλεύθερον, ἀλλὰ φιλοῦσιν οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς, ἥ οὐ κολακεύουσιν. ⁵ καὶ χρήσιμοι οἱ πονηροὶ εἰς τὰ πονηρά, ἦλθεν γὰρ ὁ ἔλος, ὡσπερ ἡ παροιμία. καὶ τὸ μηδενὶ χαίρειν ⁷ σεμνῶς μηδ' ἐλευθέρω τυραννικῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ εἶναι μόνον ἁξίοι τοιοῦτον ὁ τύραννος, δ' ἀντισεμνυ-

¹ τούτων αὐτῶν καθελεῖν codd. nonnulli.
² φιλοπόνηρον Immisch.

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¹ See 1259 a 28 n.
² Cf. 1309 b 27 ff.
³ The proverb ἥλπ ἢλος ἐκκρούεται usually meant driving out something by a thing of the same kind ('set a thief to
reign of Dionysius the result of taxation used to be that in five years men had contributed the whole of their substance). Also the tyrant is a stirrer-up of war, with the deliberate purpose of keeping the people busy and also of making them constantly in need of a leader. Also whereas friends are a means of security to royalty, it is a mark of a tyrant to be extremely distrustful of his friends, on the ground that, while all have the wish, these chiefly have the

power. Also the things that occur in connexion with the final form of democracy are all favourable to tyranny—dominance of women in the homes, in order that they may carry abroad reports against the men, and lack of discipline among the slaves, for the same reason; for slaves and women do not plot against tyrants, and also, if they prosper under tyrannies, must feel well-disposed to them, and to democracies as well (for the common people also wishes to be sole ruler). Hence also the flatterer is in honour with both—with democracies the demagogue (for the demagogue is a flatterer of the people), and with the tyrants those who associate with them humbly, which is the task of flattery. In fact owing to this tyranny is a friend of the base; for tyrants enjoy being flattered, but nobody would ever flatter them if he possessed a free spirit—men of character love their ruler, or at all events do not flatter him. And the base are useful for base business, for nail is driven out by nail, as the proverb goes. And it is a mark of a tyrant to dislike anyone that is proud or free-spirited; for the tyrant claims for himself alone the right to bear that character, and the man who catch a thief”), not as here the execution of evil designs by appropriate agents.
νόμενος καὶ ἐλευθεριάζων ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ δεσποτικὸν τῆς τυραννίδος. μισοῦσιν οὖν
10 ὁσπερ καταλύοντας τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι συσσίτοις καὶ συνημερευταῖς ξενικοῖς μᾶλλον ἡ
πολιτικοῖς τυραννικόν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους τοὺς δ' οὐκ ἀντιποιοῦμένους. ταῦτα καὶ τὰ
toιαῦτα τυραννικά μὲν καὶ σωτηρία τῆς ἀρχῆς,
οὐθέν δ' ἐλλεῖπει μοχθηρίας. ἔστι δ' ὡς εἶτείν
8 πάντα ταῦτα περιελήμμενα τρισὶν εἴδεσιν· στο-
χάζεται γὰρ ἡ τυραννὶς τριῶν, ἐνὸς μὲν τοῦ μικρὰ
φρονεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους (οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἂν μικρό-
ψυχος ἑπιβουλεύσει), δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ διαπιστεύν
άλληλοι οὐ καταλύεται γὰρ πρότερον τυραννὶς
πρὶν ἡ πιστεύσουσί τινες αὐτοῖς, διὸ καὶ τοῖς
20 ἐπιεικέσι πολεμοῦσιν ὡς βλαβεροῖς πρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν
οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄξιοιν ἀρχεθαί δεσποτικῶς
ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πιστοὺς καὶ ἕαυτοὺς καὶ τοῖς
ἀλλοίς εἶναι καὶ μὴ καταγορεύειν μὴτε ἐαυτῶν μὴτε
τῶν ἀλλων)· τρίτον δ' ἰδιωμάτι τῶν πραγμάτων
(οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἰδιωμάτοις, ὡστε οὐδὲ
tυραννίδα καταλύειν μὴ δυνάμεως ὑπαρχοῦσης).
ei5s οὐς μὲν οὖν ὤρους ἄναγεται τὰ βουλεύματα1 τῶν
9 τυράννων, οὕτως τρεῖς τυγχάνουσιν ὁντες· πάντα
γὰρ ἄναγάγου τις ἂν τὰ τυραννικὰ πρὸς ταῦτα
tὰ ὑποθέσεις, τὰ μὲν ὀπως μὴ πιστεύσουσιν ἀλλη-
λοις, τὰ δ' ὀπως μὴ δύνωνται, τὰ δ' ὀπως μικρὸν
φρονεῖν.
25 'Ο μὲν οὖν εἰς τρόπος δ' οὐ γίνεται σωτηρία 10
taῖς τυραννίσι τουιότός ἐστιν. ὃς' ἐτερος σχεδὸν
ἐξ ἐναντίας ἔχει τοῖς εἰρημένοι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν.

1 Richards: βουλήματα codd.

a i.e. do not claim to be respected as his equals.
meets his pride with pride and shows a free spirit robs tyranny of its superiority and position of mastery; tyrants therefore hate the proud as undermining their authority. And it is a mark of a tyrant to have men of foreign extraction rather than citizens as guests at table and companions, feeling that citizens are hostile but strangers make no claim against him. These and similar habits are characteristic of tyrants and preservative of their office, but they lack no element of baseness. And broadly speaking, they are all included under three heads; for tyranny aims at three things, one to keep its subjects humble (for a humble-spirited man would not plot against anybody), second to have them continually distrust one another (for a tyranny is not destroyed until some men come to trust each other, owing to which tyrants also make war on the respectable, as detrimental to their rule not only because of their refusal to submit to despotic rule, but also because they are faithful to one another and to the other citizens, and do not inform against one another nor against the others); and the third is lack of power for political action (since nobody attempts impossibilities, so that nobody tries to put down a tyranny if he has not power behind him). These then in fact are the three aims to which the plans of tyrants are directed; for all the measures taken by tyrants one might class under these principles—some are designed to prevent mutual confidence among the subjects, others to curtail their power, and others to make them humble-spirited.

Such then is the nature of one method by which security is obtained for tyrannies. The other tries to operate in a manner almost the opposite of the...
1314 a ἔστι δὲ λαβεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς φθορᾶς τῆς τῶν βασιλεῶν. ὡσπερ γὰρ τῆς βασιλείας εἶς τρόπος τῆς φθορᾶς τὸ ποιεῖν τῷ ἄρχῃν τυραννικώτεραν, οὕτω τῆς τυραννίδος σωτηρία ποιεῖν αὐτὴν βασιλικώτεραν, ἐν φυλάττοντα μόνον, την δύναμιν, ὡσπερ ἄρχῃ μὴ μόνον βουλομένων ἄλλα καὶ μὴ βουλομένων· προϊέμενος γὰρ καὶ τούτο προϊέται καὶ τὸ τυραννεῖν. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ μὲν ὡσπερ ὑπόθεσαι δεῖ μένειν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δοκεῖν ἑποκρινόμενον τὸ βασιλικὸν καλῶς. πρῶτον μὲν 11 [τοῦ δοκείν] φροντίζειν τῶν κοινῶν, μήτε δαπανώντα δωρεάς τοιαύτας ἐὰν τὰ πλήθη χαλεπαίνουσιν, ὅταν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν μὲν λαμβάνωσιν ἐργαζομένων καὶ ποιοῦντων γλύσχως, διδῶσι δὲ ἑταίραις καὶ ξένοις καὶ τεχνίταις ἀφθόνως, λόγον τε ἀποδιδόντα τῶν λαμβανομένων καὶ δαπανωμένων, ὅπερ ἢδη πεποιηκασί τινς τῶν τυράννων (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν τις διοικῶν οἰκονόμος ἄλλ’ οὗ τύραννος εἶναι δόξειν, οὐ δεῖ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι μὴ ποτε ἀπορήσθη χρημάτων κύριος ὡν τῆς πόλεως· ἀλλὰ τοῖς γ’ 12 ἐκτοπίζουσι τυράννους ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας καὶ συμφέρει τούτῳ μᾶλλον ἡ καταληπτικὰ ἀθροίσαται, ήττον γὰρ ἂν οἱ φυλάττοντες ἐπισυμείντο τοῖς πράγμασιν· εἰσὶ δὲ φοβερῶτεροι τῶν τυράννων τοῖς ἀποδημούσι οἱ φυλάττοντες τῶν πολιτῶν, οἱ μὲν γὰρ συναποδημούσιν οἱ δὲ ὑπομένουσιν· ἐπείτα 15 τὰς εἰσφορὰς καὶ τὰς λειτουργίας δεῖ φαίνεσθαι τῆς τε οἰκονομίας ἐνεκα συνάγοντα κἂν ποτε δεηθῇ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς καυροὺς, ὃλως τε

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1 τὸ ΠΗ: τὸν cet.
2 Spengel (δοκείν codd. nonnulli).
devices mentioned. And it can be ascertained from considering the downfall of royal governments. For just as one mode of destroying royalty is to make its government more tyrannical, so a mode of securing tyranny is to make it more regal, protecting one thing only, its power, in order that the ruler may govern not only with the consent of the subjects but even without it; for if he gives up this, he also gives up his position as tyrant. But while this must stand as a fundamental principle, in all his other actions real or pretended he should cleverly play the part of royalty. The first step is to be careful of the public funds, not squandering presents such as the multitudes resent, when tyrants take money from the people themselves while they toil and labour in penury and lavish it on mistresses and foreigners and craftsmen, and also rendering account of receipts and expenditure, as some tyrants have done already (for this careful management would make a ruler seem a steward of the state and not a tyrant, and he need not be afraid of ever being at a loss for funds while he is master of the state; on the contrary, for those tyrants who go abroad on foreign campaigns this is actually more expedient than to leave their money there collected into one sum, for there is less fear of those guarding it making an attempt on power; since for tyrants campaigning abroad the keepers of the treasury are more to be feared than the citizens, for the citizens go abroad with him but the others stay at home). Secondly he must be seen to collect his taxes and benevolences for purposes of administration and to meet his occasional requirements for military emergencies, and generally must pose as
ARISTOTLE

1314 b

αὐτὸν παρασκευάζειν φύλακα καὶ ταμίαν ὡς κοινῶν ἄλλα μὴ ὡς ἰδίων. καὶ φαίνεσθαι μὴ 13 χαλέπτων ἄλλα σεμνῶν, ἐτὶ δὲ τοιουτὸν ὅστε μὴ 20 φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας ἄλλα μᾶλλον αἴδειςθαί, τοῦτο μεντο πυγχάνειν οὐ βάδισον ὄντα εὐκαταφρόνητον, διὸ δεῖ κἂν μὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἁρετῶν ἑπιμέλειαν ποιῆται ἄλλα τῆς πολέμικῆς, 1 καὶ δόξαν ἐμποιεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην. ἐτὶ δὲ μὴ μόνων αὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι μηθένα τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑβρίζοντα, 25 μήτε νέον μήτε νέαν, ἄλλα μὴ ἄλλων μηθένα τῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς οἰκείας ἐχειν γυναῖκας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας, ὡς καὶ διὰ γυναικῶν ὑβρεῖς πολλαὶ τυραννίδες ἀπολάλασιν. περὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς τούναντιον ποιεῖν ἡ νῦν τινὲς τῶν τυράννων ποιοῦσιν (οὐ γὰρ μόνον εὐθὺς ἐωθὲν τοῦτο δρᾶσιν καὶ συνεχῶς πολλὰς ἡμέρας, ἄλλα καὶ φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις βούλονται τοῦτο πράττοντες ἢ ὡς εὐδαιμονὶ καὶ μακαρίως θαυμάσωσιν), ἄλλα μάλιστα μὲν μετριάζειν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὸ γε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις διαφεύγειν (οὔτε γὰρ εὐπτίθετος οὔτε εὐκατά- 35 φρόνητος ὁ νήφων ἄλλος ο μεθύων, οὐδὲ ὁ ἄγρυπνος ἄλλος ὁ καθεύδων). τούναντιον τε ποιητέον τῶν 15 πάλαι λεχθέντων σχεδὸν πάντων, κατασκευάζειν γὰρ δὲι καὶ κοσμεῖν τὴν πόλιν ὡς ἐπιτροπον ὄντα καὶ μὴ τύραννον. ἐτὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φαίνε- 40 σθαι ἀεὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερόντως (ἡττον τε γὰρ φοβοῦνται τὸ παθεῖν τα παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιοῦ- 1315 των, ἐὰν δεισιδαίμων νομίζωσιν ἐναι τὸν ἁρχοντα καὶ φροντίζειν τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἡττον ὡς συμμάχους ἐχοντι καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς), δεῖ δὲ ἂνευ

1 πολέμικῆς Madvig: πολιτικῆς codd.

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guardian and steward as it were of a public fund and not a private estate. And his bearing must not be harsh but dignified, and also such as to inspire not fear but rather respect in those who encounter him, though this is not easy to achieve if he is a contemptible personality; so that even if he neglects the other virtues he is bound to cultivate military valour, and to make himself a reputation as a soldier. And furthermore not only must he himself be known not to outrage any of his subjects, either boy or girl, but so also must everybody about him, and also their wives must similarly show respect towards the other women, since even the insolences of women have caused the fall of many tyrannies. And in regard to bodily enjoyments he must do the opposite of what some tyrants do now (for they not only begin their debaucheries at daybreak and carry them on for many days at a time, but also wish to be seen doing so by the public, in order that people may admire them as fortunate and happy), but best of all he must be moderate in such matters, or if not, he must at all events avoid displaying his indulgences to his fellows (for not the sober man but the drunkard is easy to attack and to despise, not the wakeful man but the sleeper). And he must do the opposite of almost all the things mentioned some time back, for he must lay out and adorn the city as if he were a trustee and not a tyrant. And further he must be seen always to be exceptionally zealous as regards religious observances (for people are less afraid of suffering any illegal treatment from men of this sort, if they think that their ruler has religious scruples and pays regard to the gods, and also they plot against him less, thinking that he has even the gods as allies), though
ARISTOTLE

1315 a

άβελτρηίας φαίνεσθαι τοιούτον· τούς τε ἁγαθούς 5
περὶ τι γιγνομένους τιμᾶν οὕτως ὅστε μὴ νομίζειν
ἀν ποτε τιμηθήναι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν
αὐτονόμων ὄντων· καὶ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας τιμὰς
ἀπονέμειν αὐτοῖν, τὰς δὲ κολάσεις δι’ ἐτέρων
ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων.1 κοινὴ δὲ φυλακὴ
pάσης μοναρχίας τὸ μηθένα ποιεῖν ἐνα μέγαν, ἀλλ’
10 εἶπερ, πλείους (τηρήσοισι γὰρ ἄλληλους), ἕνα δ’
ἄρα τινὰ δὲ γη ποιῆσαι μέγαν, μὴ τοι τὸ γε ἢθος
θρασύν (ἐπιθετικώτατον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢθος
περὶ πάσας τὰς πράξεις). καὶ τῆς δύναμεως τινα
δοκῇ παραλύειν, ἐκ προσαγωγῆς τούτο δρᾶν καὶ
μὴ πάσαν ἀθρόαν2 ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν ἐξουσίαν. ἐτι 17
15 δὲ πάσης μὲν ἄβρεως εὐργεσθαί, παρὰ πάσας δὲ
δυοῖν, τῆς τε εἰς τὰ σώματα κολάσεως3 καὶ τῆς
εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν. μάλιστα δὲ ταύτην ποιητέον τὴν
εὐλάβειαν περὶ τοὺς φιλοτίμους· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εἰς
τὰ χρήματα ὁλιγωρίαν οἶ φιλοχρήματοι φέρουσι
βαρέως, τὴν δ’ εἰς4 ἀτιμίαν οἱ τε φιλότιμοι καὶ οἱ
20 ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων. διὸπερ ἦ μὴ χρῆσθαι
dεῖ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἦ τὰς μὲν κολάσεις πατρικῶς
φαίνεσθαι ποιούμενον καὶ μὴ δι’ ὁλιγωρίαν, τὰς δὲ
πρὸς τὴν ἡλικίαν ὁμιλίας δι’ ἐρωτικάς αἰτίας ἀλλὰ
μὴ δι’ ἐξουσίαν, ὅλως δὲ τὰς δοκούσας ἀτιμίας
ἐξωνείσθαι μείζονι τιμῆς. τῶν δ’ ἐπιχειροῦντων 18
25 ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος διαφθοράν οὕτω φοβερώτατοι
καὶ δεόνται πλείστης φυλακῆς ὅσοι μὴ προαιροῦνται

1 ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων secl. Oncken.
2 ed.: ἀθρόαν codd.
3 κολάσεως secl. Schneider.
4 εἰς secl. Spengel.
16 he should not display a foolish religiosity. And he must pay such honour to those who display merit in any matter that they may think that they could never be more honoured by the citizens if they were independent; and honours of this kind he should bestow in person, but inflict his punishments by the agency of other magistrates and law-courts. And it is a protection common to every sort of monarchy to make no one man great, but if necessary to exalt several (for they will keep watch on one another), and if after all the ruler has to elevate an individual, at all events not take a man of bold spirit (for such a character is most enterprising in all undertakings); and if he thinks fit to remove somebody from his power, to do this by gradual stages and not take away the whole of his authority at once. And again he should carefully avoid all forms of outrage, and two beyond all, violent bodily punishments and outrage of the young. And this caution must especially be exercised in relation to the ambitious, for while to be slighted in regard to property annoys the lovers of wealth, slights that involve dishonour are what men of honourable ambition and high character resent. Hence the tyrant should either not consort with men of this kind, or appear to inflict his punishments paternally and not because of contempt, and to indulge in the society of the young for reasons of passion, not because he has the power, and in general he should buy off what are thought to be dishonours by greater honours. And among those who make attempts upon the life of a ruler the most formidable and those against whom the greatest precaution is needed are those that are ready to
The natural philosopher of Ephesus, fl. c. 513 B.C., known as ὁ σκοτεινός for his epigrammatic obscurity.
sacrifice their lives if they can destroy him. Hence the greatest care must be taken to guard against those who think that insolent outrage is being done either to themselves or to those who happen to be under their care; for men attacking under the influence of anger are reckless of themselves, as Heraclitus a also observed when he said that anger is hard to combat because it buys its wish with life.  

19 And since states consist of two parts, the poor people and the rich, the most important thing is for both to think that they owe their safety to the government and for it to prevent either from being wronged by the other, but whichever class is the stronger, this must be made to be entirely on the side of the government, as, if this support for the tyrant's interests is secured, there is no need for him to institute a liberation of slaves or a disarming of the citizens, for one of the two parts of the state added to his power will be enough to make him and them stronger than their attackers. But to discuss each of such matters separately is superfluous; for the thing to aim at is clear, that it is necessary to appear to the subjects to be not a tyrannical ruler but a steward and a royal governor, and not an appropriator of wealth but a trustee, and to pursue the moderate things of life and not its extravagances, and also to make the notables one's comrades and the many one's followers. For the result of these methods must be that not only the tyrant's rule will be more honourable and more enviable because he will rule nobler subjects and not men that have been humiliated, and will not be continually hated and feared, but also that his rule will endure longer, and moreover that he himself in his personal character...
1315 b
10 καλῶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἡ ἡμιχρηστον ὄντα, καὶ μὴ πονηρὸν ἀλλ' ἡμιπόνηρον.

Καίτοι πασῶν ὀλιγοχρονιώτεραι τῶν πολι-21
teiów εἰσὶν ὀλιγαρχία καὶ τυραννίς. πλειστον γὰρ
ἐγένετο χρόνον ἡ περὶ Σικυώνα τυραννίς, ἡ τῶν
Ὀρθαγόρου παιδῶν καὶ αὐτοῦ Ὀρθαγόρου, ἔτη
15 δ' αὐτὴ διέμεινεν ἐκατόν. τούτων δ' αὔτιον ὅτι
toῖς ἀρχομένων ἔχρωντο μετρίως καὶ πολλαῖς ὁσοῖς
νόμοις ἔδουλευον, καὶ διὰ τὸ πολεμικὸς γενε-
σθαί Κλεισθένης οὐκ ἦν εὐκαταφρόνητος, καὶ τὰ
πολλὰ ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις ἔδημαγώγουν. λέγεται γοῦν
Κλεισθένης τὸν ἀποκρίναντα τῆς νίκης αὐτὸν ὃς
20 ἐστεφάνωσεν· ἐνιοί δ' εἰκόνα φασὶν εἶναι τοῦ κρι-
ναντὸς αὕτω τοῖς ἀνδριάντα τὸν ἐν τῇ ἄγορᾷ καθ-
ήμενον. φασὶ δὲ καὶ Πεισιστρατὸν ὑπομείναι ποτε
προσκληθέντα δίκην εἰς 'Ἀρειον πάγον. δευτέρα 22
de ἡ5 περὶ Κόρινθου ἡ τῶν Κυψελίδων· καὶ γὰρ
αὕτη διετέλεσεν ἐτη τριά καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα καὶ έξ
25 μηνας, Κύψελος μὲν γὰρ ἐτυράννησεν ἐτη τριά-
κοντα, Περίανδρος δὲ τετταράκοντα καὶ τεττάρα,4
Ψαμμήτιχος δ' ὁ Γορδίου5 τριά ἐτη. τὰ δ' αὕτη
ταῦτα καὶ ταύτης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κύψελος δημ-
αγωγὸς ἦν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄρχην διετέλεσεν ἀδορο-
φόρητος, Περίανδρος δ' ἐγένετο μὲν τυραννικός,
30 ἀλλὰ πολεμικὸς. τρίτη δ' ἡ τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν 23

1 ἡ ἵως? Richards.
2 καὶ διὰ—εὐκαταφρόνητος infra post 23 πάγον Richards.
3 δὲ ἡ ed.: δὲ codd.
4 τεττάρα: ἡμιαν edd. arithmetices gratia.
5 Γόργου Susemihl.

* Oligarchy is not mentioned in what follows, and the context deals with the forms of monarchy. Tyranny is included among the constitutions at 1312 a 40, but not else-

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POLITICS, V. ix. 20–23

will be nobly disposed towards virtue, or at all events half-virtuous, and not base but only half-base.

21 Nevertheless oligarchy and tyranny are less Historical examples.

lasting than any of the constitutional governments. For the longest-lived was the tyranny at Sicyon, that of the sons of Orthagoras and of Orthagoras himself, and this lasted a hundred years. The cause of this was that they treated their subjects moderately and in many matters were subservient to the laws, and Cleisthenes because he was a warlike man was not easily despised, and in most things they kept the lead of the people by looking after their interests. At all events it is said that Cleisthenes placed a wreath on the judge who awarded the victory away from him, and some say that the statue of a seated figure in the market-place is a statue of the man who gave this judgement. And they say that Pisistratus also once submitted to a summons for trial before the Areopagus. And the second longest is the tyranny at Corinth, that of the Cypselids, for even this lasted seventy-three and a half years, as Cypselus was tyrant for thirty years, Periander for forty-four, and Psammetichus son of Gordias for three years. And the reasons for the permanence of this tyranny also are the same: Cypselus was a leader of the people and continuously throughout his period of office dispensed with a bodyguard; and although Periander became tyrannical, yet he was warlike. The third longest tyranny is that of

where in this Book. Some editors bracket ll. 19-29 as spurious or out of place.

b i.e. descendants; Cleisthenes was his grandson.
c From 670 B.C. d See 1305 a 23 n. e From 655 B.C.
f The Greek may be corrected to ‘forty and a half’ to give the stated total.
Αθήνησον, οὐκ ἐγένετο δὲ συνεχῆς: διὸ γὰρ ἐφυγε Πεισιστρατός τυραννῶν, ὥστ' ἐν ἐτέσι τριάκοντα καὶ τρισών ἐπτακαίδεκα ἔτη τούτων ἑτυράννευσεν, ὀκτωκαίδεκα δὲ οἱ παῖδες, ὥστε τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο ἔτη τριάκοντα καὶ πέντε. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἡ περὶ Ἰέρωναι καὶ Γέλωνα, περὶ Συρακούσαι, ἔτη δ' οὖδ' αὐτὴ πολλὰ διέμενεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ σύμπαντα δυοῖν δέοντα εἰκοσι. Γέλων μὲν γὰρ ἐπτα τυραννεύσας τῷ ὅγδῳ τῶν βίων ἔτελεύτησεν, δέκα δ' Ἰέρων, Θρασύβουλος δὲ τῷ ἐνδεκάτῳ μηνὶ ἔξεπεσεν. αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ τῶν τυραννίδων ὀλυγοχρόνιαι πάσαι γεγόνασι παντελῶς.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς μοναρχίας, ἐξ ὧν τε φθείρονται καὶ πάλιν σφόζονται, σχεδὸν εἰρήνη περὶ πάντων.

X. Ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ λέγεται μὲν περὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἱωκράτους, οὐ μέντοι λέγεται καλῶς: τῆς τε γὰρ ἀριστης πολιτείας καὶ πρῶτης οὐσίας οὐ λέγει τὴν μεταβολὴν ἔδως. ὁ δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι τὸ μὴ μένειν μηθέν ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν μεταβάλλων, ἀρχὴ δ' εἶναι τούτων ὅν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν περιτάδι συγγεῖς δύο ἀρμονίας παρέχεται, λέγων ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός, ὥς τῆς φύσεως ποτὲ φυσικὸς ἄλλως καὶ κρείττους τῆς παιδείας, τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ λέγων ἵσως οὐ κακῶς (ἐνδεχεται γὰρ εἶναι τώς οὐς παιδευθήναι

1 ἡ <τῶν> περὶ Bojesen.
2 ἐν Συρακούσαις Schneider: παρὰ Συρακούσαις Sylburg.

See 1305 a 23 n.  
See 1312 b 12 n.  
Plato, Republic, Bks. VIII., IX. init.; the mathematical
the Pisistratidae at Athens, but it was not continuous; for while Pisistratus was tyrant he twice fled into exile, so that in a period of thirty-three years he was tyrant for seventeen years out of the total, and his sons for eighteen years, so that the whole duration of their rule was thirty-five years. Among the remaining tyrannies is the one connected with Hiero and Gelo at Syracuse, but even this did not last many years, but only eighteen in all, for Gelo after being tyrant for seven years ended his life in the eighth, and Hiero ruled ten years, but Thrasybulus was expelled after ten months. And the usual tyrannies have all of them been of quite short duration.

The causes therefore of the destruction of constitutional governments and of monarchies and those again of their preservation have almost all of them been discussed.

1 X. The subject of revolutions is discussed by Socrates in the Republic, but is not discussed well. For his account of revolution in the constitution that is the best one and the first does not apply to it particularly. He says that the cause is that nothing is permanent but everything changes in a certain cycle, and that change has its origin in those numbers whose basic ratio $4:3$ linked with the number $5$ gives two harmonies,—meaning whenever the number of this figure becomes cubed,—in the belief that nature sometimes engenders men that are evil, and too strong for education to influence—speaking perhaps not ill as far as this particular dictum goes (for it is possible that there are some

formula for the change from Aristocracy to Timocracy quoted here occurs at 546 c—see Adam's note there.
καὶ γενέσθαι σπουδαίους ἀνδρας ἅδυνατον), ἀλλ’ αὕτη τί ἂν ἰδιος εἰς μεταβολὴ τῆς ὑπ’ ἐκείνων λεγομένης ἀρίστης πολιτείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἄλλων πασῶν καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων πάντων; καὶ διὰ γε' 2
15 τοῦ' χρόνου, δι’ ὅν λέγει πάντα μεταβάλλειν, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἀμα ἀρξάμενα γίγνεσθαι ἀμα μεταβάλλει, οἷον εἰ τῇ προτέρᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγένετο τῆς τροπῆς, ἀμα ἄρα μεταβάλλει; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις διὰ τιν’ αἰτίαν ἐκ ταύτης εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν μεταβάλλει; πλεονάκις γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν μεταβάλλουσι πᾶσαι
20 αἱ πολιτείαι ἡ τῆς σύνεγγυς. δ’ δ’ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταβολῶν. ἑκ γὰρ τῆς Λακωνικῆς, φησί, μεταβάλλει εἰς τὴν ὀλυγαρχίαν, ἑκ δὲ ταύτης εἰς δημοκρατίαν, εἰς τυραννίδα δὲ ἑκ δημοκρατίας. καίτοι καὶ ἀνάπαυσι μεταβάλλουσι, οἷον ἑκ δήμου εἰς ὀλυγαρχίαν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ εἰς μον
25 αρχίαν. ἔτι δὲ τυραννίδος οὐ λέγει οὔτ’ εἰ ἐσταὶ μεταβολὴ οὔτ’ εἰ μὴ ἐσταί, <οὔτ’ εἰ ἐσταί,>² διὰ τιν’ αἰτίαν καὶ εἰς πολιτείαν τούτου δ’ αἰτίου ὅτι οὐ ραδίως ἄν εἰχε λέγειν, ἀὁριστον γὰρ, ἐπεὶ κατ’ ἐκείνων δεῖ εἰς τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην, οὔτω γὰρ ἄν ἐγύγνετο συνεχές καὶ κύκλος, ἀλλὰ 80 μεταβάλλει καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα τυραννίς, ὡσπερ ἡ Σικυώνος ἐκ τῆς Μύρωνος εἰς τὴν Κλεισθένους,

1 γε corr. cod. inf.: τε codd.
2 <τό> τοῖ Thompson.
3 Casaubon (potius οὗ ed.).

a Timocracy, Plato, Republic 545 a.
b See 1315 b 13 n.
persons incapable of being educated and becoming men of noble character), but why should this process of revolution belong to the constitution which Socrates speaks of as the best, more than to all the other forms of constitution, and to all men that come into existence? and why merely by the operation of time, which he says is the cause of change in all things, do even things that did not begin to exist simultaneously change simultaneously? for instance, if a thing came into existence the day before the completion of the cycle, why does it yet change simultaneously with everything else? And in addition to these points, what is the reason why the republic changes from the constitution mentioned into the Spartan form? For all constitutions more often change into the opposite form than into the one near them. And the same remark applies to the other revolutions as well. For from the Spartan constitution the state changes, he says, to oligarchy, and from this to democracy, and from democracy to tyranny. Yet revolutions also occur the other way about, for example from democracy to oligarchy, and more often so than from democracy to monarchy. Again as to tyranny he does not say whether it will undergo revolution or not, nor, if it will, what will be the cause of it, and into what sort of constitution it will change; and the reason for this is that he would not have found it easy to say, for it is irregular; since according to him tyranny ought to change into the first and best constitution, for so the process would be continuous and a circle, but as a matter of fact tyranny also changes into tyranny, as the constitution of Sicyon passed from the tyranny of Myron to that of Cleisthenes, and into
καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Χαλκίδι ἡ Ἄντι-
λέοντος, καὶ εἰς δημοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν
Γέλωνος ἐν Συρακούσαις, καὶ εἰς ἀριστοκρατίαν,
 createState: 1316a ὥσπερ ἡ Χαριλάου ἐν Λακεδαίμονι [καὶ ἐν Καρχη-
δόνι]. ¹ καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα μεταβάλλει ἡ ὀλιγαρχίας, ⁴
ὡσπερ ἐν Σικελία σχεδὸν αἰ πλείσται τῶν ἀρχαῖων,
ἐν Λεοντῖνοι εἰς τὴν Παναυτίον τυραννίδα καὶ ἐν
Γέλα εἰς τὴν Κλεάνδρου καὶ ἐν Ὡργώ εἰς τὴν
Ἀναξιλάου καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς πόλεσιν ὁσαύτως.

ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ οὐέσται εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν διὰ τοῦτο
μεταβάλλειν ὃτι φιλοχρήματοι καὶ χρηματίσται ²
οἴ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ότι οἴ πολὺ ὑπερ-
έχοντες ταῖς οὐσίαις οὐ δίκαιον οἴονται εἰναι ὰιν
μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως τοὺς κεκτημένους μηθὲν τοῖς
κεκτημένοις ἐν πολλαῖς τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας οὐκ ἔξεστι
χρηματίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ νόμοι εἰσὶν οἴ κωλύοντες, ἐν
Καρχηδόνι δὲ δημοκρατουμένη ³ χρηματίζονται καὶ
οὕτω μεταβεβλήκασιν. ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι ⁵
dύο πόλεις εἶναι τῆς ὀλιγαρχικῆς, πλουσίων καὶ
πενήτων. τι γὰρ αὐτή ⁴ μᾶλλον τῆς Λακωνικῆς
πέπονθεν ἡ ὁποιασθοῦν ἄλλης οὐ μὴ πάντες κέκτη-
µαί ἵνα μὴ πάντες ὁμοίως εἰσὶν ἁγαθοὶ ἄνδρες;
οὐδενὸς δὲ πενεστέρου γενομένου ἡ πρότερον
οὐθὲν ἤπτον μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς δῆμον ἢ ὀλυ-

¹ secl. ? Susemihl: om. cod. inferior.
² <φιλο>χρηματισται e Platone Spengel.
⁴ αὐτή <τοῦτο> Richards.

a Unknown, cf. 1304 a 29 n.
b See 1302 b 33 n.
c See 1271 b 26 n.
oligarchy, as did that of Antileon \(a\) at Chalcis, and into democracy, as that of the family of Gelo \(b\) at Syracuse, and into aristocracy, as that of Charilaus \(c\) at Sparta \([\text{and as at Carthage}].\)

4 And constitutions change from oligarchy to tyranny, as did almost the greatest number of the ancient oligarchies in Sicily, at Leon-tini to the tyranny of Panaetius, \(e\) at Gelo to that of Cleander, at Rhegium to that of Anaxilaus, \(f\) and in many other cities similarly. And it is also a strange idea that revolutions into oligarchy take place because the occupants of the offices are lovers of money and engaged in money-making, but not because owners of much more than the average amount of property think it unjust for those who do not own any property to have an equal share in the state with those who do; and in many oligarchies those in office are not allowed to engage in business, but there are laws preventing it, whereas in Carthage, which has a democratic government, \(g\) the magistrates go in for business, and they have not yet had a revolution.

5 And it is also a strange remark \(h\) that the oligarchical state is two states, one of rich men and one of poor men. For what has happened to this state rather than to the Spartan or any other sort of state where all do not own an equal amount of wealth or where all are not equally good men? and when nobody has become poorer than he was before, none the less revolution takes place from oligarchy to democracy

\(a\) This clause seems an interpolation; \(\text{cf.}\) b 6.

\(b\) See 1310 b 29 n.

\(c\) Unknown. Reggio is situated in relation to Sicily as Calais is to England.

\(e\) Apparently this clause also is an interpolation, or 'democratic' is a抄ist's mistake for 'oligarchic' or 'timocratic,' see 1272 b 24 ff.

\(f\) Plato, Republic 551 d.
ARISTOTLE

αρχίας ἄν γενόνται πλείους οἱ ἄποροι, καὶ έκ δήμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἔαν κρείττον ἢ τοῦ πλήθους τὸ εὑπόρον καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀμελῶσιν οἱ δὲ προσέχωσι τὸν νοῦν. πολλῶν τε οὐσῶν αἰτιῶν δι' ἄν γίγνονται οἱ μεταβολαί, οὐ λέγει ἄλλ' ἢ μίαν, στὶ ἀσωτευνόμενοι κατατοκίζομενοι γίγνονται πέντεσ, ὡς εξ ἀρχῆς πλουσίων ὄντων πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων. τούτο δ' εστὶ ψεύδος, ἄλλ' ὅταν μὲν τῶν ἡγεμόνων των ἀπολέσωσι τὰς οὐσίας, καὶοτομοσοῦν, ὅταν δὲ τῶν ἀλλῶν, οὐθὲν γίγνεται δεινών καὶ μεταβάλλουσιν οὐθὲν μᾶλλον οὐδὲ τότε εἰς δήμου ἢ εἰς ἄλλην πολιτείαν. ἔτι δὲ κἂν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχωσιν, κἂν ἀδικώνται ἢ ὑβρίζονται, στασιάζουσι καὶ μεταβάλλουσι τὰς πολιτείας, κἂν μὴ καταδαπανήσωσι τὴν οὐσίαν . . . διὰ τὸ εξείναι ὃ τι ἄν βούλωνται πονεῖν οὐ αἰτίαν τὴν ἄγαν ἔλευθερίαν εἶναι φησιν. πλειόνων δ' οὐσῶν ὀλιγαρχίων καὶ δημοκρατίων, ὡς μιᾶς οὐσίας ἐκατέρας λέγει τὰς μεταβολὰς ὅ Σωκράτης.

1 ἄλλ' ἢ Richards: ἄλλα codd.
2 <καὶ> κατατοκίζομενοi Lambinus.
3 οὔδὲ τότε Camotius: οὔδέποτε.
4 lacunam Schneider.

* Some words appear to be lost here; what follows refers to democracy, cf. Plato, Republic 587 b.
if the men of no property become more numerous, and from democracy to oligarchy if the wealthy class is stronger than the multitude and the latter neglect politics but the former give their mind to them. And although there are many causes through which revolutions in oligarchies occur, he mentions only one—that of men becoming poor through riotous living, by paying away their money in interest on loans—as if at the start all men or most men were rich. But this is not true, but although when some of the leaders have lost their properties they stir up innovations, when men of the other classes are ruined nothing strange happens; and even when such a revolution does occur it is no more likely to end in a democracy than in another form of constitution. And furthermore men also form factions and cause revolutions in the constitution if they are not allowed a share of honours, and if they are unjustly or insolently treated, even if they have not run through all their property . . . because of being allowed to do whatever they like; the cause of which he states to be excessive liberty. And although there are several forms of oligarchy and of democracy, Socrates speaks of the revolutions that occur in them as though there were only one form of each.

Additional Note

V. vii. 2, 1307 b 37 (p. 421). This is the sorites fallacy; add to one stone another, and another, and another—when do they make a heap (σωρός)? and take away stone after stone—when do they cease to be a heap? Horace's 'ratio ruentis acerui' (Epistles ii. 1. 47).
1316 b

I. Πόσαι μὲν οὖν διαφοραί καὶ τίνες τοῦ τε βουλευτικοῦ καὶ κυρίου τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τάξεως καὶ περὶ δικαστηρίων, καὶ ποία πρὸς ποίαν συντετακταί πολιτείαν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φθορὰς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκ ποίων τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἰρήται πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τετύχηκεν εἴδη πλείω δημοκρατίας ὁντα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως πολιτειῶν, ἀμα τε περὶ ἐκείνων εἰ τι λοιπὸν οὐ χεῖρον ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἑκάστην. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς συναγωγὰς αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπισκεπτέον πάντων τῶν τρόπων· ταῦτα γὰρ συνδυαζόμενα ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἐπαλλάττεων, ὅποτε ἀριστοκρατίας τοῦ ὀλυγαρχίας εἶναι καὶ πολιτείας δημοκρατικωτέρας. λέγω δὲ τοὺς συνδυασμοὺς οὓς δὲ μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν οὐκ ἐσκεμμένοι δ’ εἰσὶ νῦν, ὅπερ αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιοστοιείς ὃς συντεταγμένον τὰ δὲ περὶ

1 τὸ μὲν <περὶ τὸ> Spengel.

*a* Book VII. in some editions, Book VIII. in others.
*b* Book IV., 1297 b 35 ff.
*c* Book V.
*d* 1318 b—1319 a 6.
*e* These topics do not occur in the extant work.

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BOOK VI

1. We have already discussed how many and what are the varieties of the deliberative body or sovereign power in the state, and of the system of magistracies and of law-courts, and which variety is adapted to which form of constitution, and also the destruction of constitutions and their preservation, from what sort of people they originate and what are their causes. But as a matter of fact since there have come into existence several kinds of democracy and similarly of the other forms of constitution, it will be well at the same time to consider any point that remains about these varieties, and also determine the mode of organization appropriate and advantageous for each. And further we must also investigate the combinations of all the modes of organizing the actual departments of state that have been mentioned, for these modes when coupled together make the constitutions overlap, so as to produce oligarchical aristocracies and republics inclining towards democracy. I refer to the combinations which ought to be investigated but have not at present been studied, for example if the deliberative body and the system of electing magistrates are organized oligarchically i.e. the deliberative, executive and judicial, see 1297 b 41 ff.
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

1317 a
tὰ δικαστήρια ἀριστοκρατικῶς, ἦ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ τὸ
περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον ὀλιγαρχικῶς ἀριστοκρατι-
κῶς δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιεσίας, ἦ κατ' ἄλλον
10 τινὰ τρόπον μὴ πάντα συντεθῇ τὰ τῆς πολιτείας
οἶκεία.

Ποία μὲν οὖν δημοκρατία πρὸς ποίαν ἄρμόττει 3
πόλιν, ὃσαύτως δὲ καὶ ποία τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν
ποίῳ πλήθει, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ πολιτείων τίς
συμφέρει τίσων, εἰρηται πρῶτον· ὅμως δ' ἐπεὶ
dei γενέσθαι δῆλον μὴ μόνον ποία τούτων τῶν
15 πολιτείων ἀρίστη ταῖς2 πόλεσιν ἄλλα καὶ πῶς
dei κατασκευάζειν καὶ ταύτας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας, ἐπ-
ἐλθωμεν συντόμως. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ δημοκρατίας
eἰπωμεν· ἀμα γὰρ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀντικειμένης
πολιτείας φανερόν, ἀυτὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἡν καλοῦσι τινες
ὀλιγαρχίαν.

Δηπτέον δὲ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν μέθοδον πάντα τὰ
20 δημοτικὰ καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ταῖς δημοκρατίαις
ἀκολουθεῖν· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συντιθεμένων τὰ τῆς
dημοκρατίας εἰδῆ γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει, καὶ πλείους
dημοκρατίας μᾶς εἶναι καὶ διαφόρους. δύο γὰρ
eἰσων αἰτίαι δ' ἀσπερ αἱ δημοκρατίαι πλείους
εἰσὶ, πρῶτον μὲν η λεχθεισα πρῶτον, ὅτι διά-
25 φοροὶ οἱ δημοι (γίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν γεωργικὸν πλῆθος
tὸ δὲ βάναυσον καὶ θητικόν, ὃν τοῦ πρῶτον τῷ
dευτέρῳ προσλαμβανομένου καὶ τοῦ τρίτου πάλιν
tοῖς ἀμφοτέροις οὐ μόνον διαφέρει τῷ βελτίων

1 δ' ἐπεὶ δει duce Lambino ed.: δ' δεi codd.
2 ἀρίστη ταῖς: aírēth poiás Spengel.

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a 1296 b 13—1297 a 13.
but the regulations as to the law-courts aristocratically, or these and the structure of the deliberative body oligarchically and the election of magistracy aristocratically, or if in some other manner not all the parts of the constitution are appropriately combined.

3 Now it has been stated before what kind of democracy is suited to what kind of state, and similarly which of the kinds of oligarchy is suited to what kind of populace, and also which of the remaining constitutions is advantageous for which people; but nevertheless since it must not only be made clear which variety of these constitutions is best for states, but also how both these best varieties and the other forms must be established, let us briefly pursue the subject. And first let us speak about democracy; for at the same time the facts will also become clear about the opposite form of constitution, that is, the constitution which some people call oligarchy.

4 And for this inquiry we must take into view all the features that are popular and that are thought to go with democracies; for it comes about from combinations of these that the kinds of democracy are formed, and that there are different democracies and more than one sort. In fact there are two causes for there being several kinds of democracy, first the one stated before, the fact that the populations are different (for we find one multitude engaged in agriculture and another consisting of handicraftsmen and day-labourers, and when the first of these is added to the second and again the third to both of them it not only makes a difference in that the

b 'Rule of the few,' i.e. the few rich, but the name is not exact, for in aristocracy also the rulers are few.
καὶ χείρω γίνεσθαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν), δευτέρα δὲ περὶ ἃς νῦν λέγομεν.

5 τὰ γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ δοκοῦντα εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας οἰκεία ταύτης ποιεῖ συντιθέμενα τὰς δημοκρατίας ἑτέρας. τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἐλάττω τῇ δ' ἀκολουθήσει πλείονα τῇ δ' ἀπαντα ταύτα. χρήσιμον δ' ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν γνωρίζειν πρὸς τὸ κατασκευάζειν ἢν ἂν τις αὐτῶν τύχῃ βουλόμενος, καὶ πρὸς τὰς διορθώσεις. ξητοῦν μὲν γὰρ οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες ἀπαντά τα ὁικεία συναγαγεῖν πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ἀμαρτάνονσι δὲ τούτο ποιοῦντες, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς φθοράς καὶ τὰς σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτεῶν εἰρήται πρότερον. νυνὶ δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ τὰ ἡθη καὶ ὅν ἐφίεναι λέγομεν.

40 Ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἑλευθερία· τούτω γὰρ λέγειν εἰσώθασιν, ὡς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ μετέχοντα ἑλευθερίας, τούτων γὰρ στοχάζονται φασὶ πᾶσαι δημοκρατίαν. ἑλευθερίας δὲ ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐν μέρει ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὸν τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἐστὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν, τούτων δ' οὕτως τοῦ δικαίου τὸ πλῆθος ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κύριον καὶ ὅ τι ἂν δόξη τοῖς πλείστοις πάσοις ὑπολογίζει τούτῳ εἶναι τέλος καὶ τούτῳ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον, φασί γὰρ ἐν μὲν ἴσον ἔχειν ἐκαστὸν τῶν πολιτῶν· ὡστε ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις συμβαίνει κυριωτέρους εἶναι τοὺς ἀπόρους τῶν εὐπόρων, πλείους γὰρ εἰσὶ κύριον δὲ τὸ τοῖς

1 εἶναι καὶ τέλος codd. cett.
2 καὶ τούτῳ εἶναι post 7 πολιτῶν Richards.
quality of the democracy becomes better or worse but also by its becoming different in kind); and the second cause is the one about which we now speak.

For the institutions that go with democracies and seem to be appropriate to this form of constitution make the democracies different by their combinations; for one form of democracy will be accompanied by fewer, another by more, and another by all of them. And it is serviceable to ascertain each of them both for the purpose of instituting whichever of these kinds of democracy one happens to wish and for the purpose of amending existing ones. For people setting up constitutions seek to collect together all the features appropriate to their fundamental principle, but in so doing they make a mistake, as has been said before in the passage dealing with the causes of the destruction and the preservation of constitutions. And now let us state the postulates, the ethical characters and the aims of the various forms of democracy.

Now a fundamental principle of the democratic form of constitution is liberty—that is what is usually asserted, implying that only under this constitution do men participate in liberty, for they assert this as the aim of every democracy. But one factor of liberty is to govern and be governed in turn; for the popular principle of justice is to have equality according to number, not worth, and if this is the principle of justice prevailing, the multitude must of necessity be sovereign and the decision of the majority must be final and must constitute justice, for they say that each of the citizens ought to have an equal share; so that it results that in democracies the poor are more powerful than the rich, because there are more of them and whatever is decided by the majority
ARISTOTLE

1317 b

πλείοσι δόξαν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐλευθερίας σημεῖον τοῦτο ὄν τίθενται πάντες οἱ δημοτικοὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρων, ἐν δὲ τὸ ζῆν ὡς βουλεῖται τις· τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἔργον εἶναι φασιν, εἴπερ τὸ δούλου ὄντος τὸ ζῆν μὴ ὡς βουλεῖται. τῆς μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας ὁροι οὖτοι δεύτεροι· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἐλήλυθε τὸ μὴ ἀρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ μηθενὸς, εἰ δὲ μὴ, κατὰ μέρος· καὶ συμβάλλεται ταύτη πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἱσον. τούτων δὲ ὑποκειμένων καὶ τοιαύτης οὕτης τῆς ἄρχης, τὰ τοιαῦτα δημοτικά· τὸ αἱρέσθαι τὰς ἄρχας πάντας ἐκ πάντων, τὸ ἄρχειν πάντας μὲν ἐκάστοτον ἐκαστον δὲ ἐν μέρει πάντων, τὸ κληρωτᾶς εἶναι τὰς ἄρχας ἡ πάσας ἡ ὀσαί μὴ ἐμπερίας δέονται καὶ τέχνης, τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος μηθενὸς εἶναι τὰς ἄρχας ἡ ὁμία μικροτάτοι, τὸ μὴ δὶς τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρχειν μηδεμιᾶν ἡ ὀλυγάκις ἡ ὀλύγας ἐξω τῶν κατὰ πόλεμοιν, τὸ ὀλυγοχρονίως τὰς ἄρχας ἡ πάσας ἡ ὀσαί εὑδέχεται, τὸ δικαζεῖν πάντας καὶ ἐκ πάντων, καὶ περὶ πάντων ἡ περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν μεγάτων καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων, οὗ τοιούτων καὶ πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων, τὸ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κυρίαν εἶναι πάντων ἄρχην δὲ μηδεμιᾶν μηθενὸς ἡ ὁτι ὀλυγίστων, ἡ τῶν μεγίστων βουλὴν κυρίαν (τῶν δὲ ἄρχων δημοτικῶτατον ἤ βουλὴ) ὅπου μὴ μισθῳ εὐπορία πᾶσιν· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἀφαίρονται καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἄρχης τὴν δύναμιν, εἰς αὐτὸν γὰρ ἀνάγει τὰς κρίσεις πάσας ὁ δῆμος

1 v.1. τὸ ἔργον: τοῦτον; ed. et ὅρον Richards.
5 Βουλήν κυρίαν Immisch: κυρίαν codd.

a This clause is obscure: perhaps it is an interpolation.

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7 is sovereign. This then is one mark of liberty which all democrats set down as a principle of the constitution. And one is for a man to live as he likes; for they say that this is the function of liberty, inasmuch as to live not as one likes is the life of a man that is a slave. This is the second principle of democracy, and from it has come the claim not to be governed, preferably not by anybody, or failing that, to govern and be governed in turns; and this is the way in which the second principle contributes to equalitarian liberty. And these principles having been laid down and this being the nature of democratic government, the following institutions are democratic in character: election of officials by all from all; government of each by all, and of all by each in turn; election by lot either to all magistracies or to all that do not need experience and skill; no property-qualification for office, or only a very low one; no office to be held twice, or more than a few times, by the same person, or few offices except the military ones; short tenure either of all offices or of as many as possible; judicial functions to be exercised by all citizens, that is by persons selected from all, and on all matters, or on most and the greatest and most important, for instance the audit of official accounts, constitutional questions, private contracts; the assembly to be sovereign over all matters, but no official over any or only over extremely few; or else a council to be sovereign over the most important matters (and a council is the most democratic of magistracies in states where there is not a plentiful supply of pay for everybody—for where there is, they deprive even this office of its power, since the people draws all the trials to itself when it has plenty
ἐν πορὼν μισθοῦ, καθάπερ εὑρηταὶ πρότερον ἐν τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ πρὸ ταῦτης), ἔπειτα τὸ μισθοφορεῖν μάλιστα μὲν πάντας, ἐκκλησίαν δικαστήρια ἀρχὰς, εἰ δὲ μη, τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τὴν βουλὴν καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας τὸς κυρίας, ἢ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἃς ἀνάγκη συστητεῖν μετ’ ἀλλήλων. ἔτι ἐπειδὴ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλοῦτω καὶ παιδείᾳ ὁρίζεται, τὰ δημοτικὰ δοκεῖ τάναντία τούτων εἶναι, ἀγένεια πενία βαναυσία. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ μηδεμίαν ἄδιδν εἶναι· εάν δὲ τὶς καταλειφθῇ ἡ ἀρχαίας μεταβολή, τὸ γε’ περιμερισθαι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς καὶ ἐξ αἱρετῶν κληρονόμοις ποιεῖν.

Τὰ μὲν ὁμοίον κοινὰ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῦτ’ ἐστί· συμβαίνει δ’ ἐκ τούτου δικαίουτος ὁμο- λογουμένου εἶναι δημοκρατικοῦ (τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἱσον ἐχειν ἀπαντας κατ’ ἀριθμὸν) ἡ μάλιστ’ εἶναι δοκοῦσα δημοκρατία καὶ δῆμος. ἢσον γὰρ τὸ μηθὲν μάλλον ἀρχεῖν τοὺς ἄπορους ἢ τοὺς εὑρόρους, μηδὲ κυρίους εἶναι μόνους ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐξ ἱσον [κατ’ ἀριθμὸν]’ ὁμοίως γὰρ ἐν ὑπάρχειν νομίζων τὴν τῇ ἱσότητα τῇ πολιτείᾳ καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπορεῖται, πῶς ἐξουσι ἱσον; πότερον δεῖ τὰ τιμῆμα ταῦτα διείλειν χιλίοις τὰ τῶν πεντακοσίων καὶ τοὺς χιλίους ἱσον δύνασθαι τοῖς πεντακοσίοις; ἢ ὅνχ ὁμοίως δεῖ τιθέναι την

1 τὸ γε Coraes: τότε codd.
2 τὰ μὲν—b 5 φροντίζουσιν secl. Susenmihl.
3 ed.
4 διείλειν ἵσον τοῖς χιλίοις? Richards.

a Book IV. 1299 b 38 ff. (Books IV. and V. are regarded as forming one treatise).
b i.e. owing to the nature of their duties, and by general custom.
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of pay, as has been said before in the treatise preceding this one\(^a\); also payment for public duties, preferably in all branches, assembly, law-courts, magistracies, or if not, for the magistracies, the law-courts, council and sovereign assemblies, or for those magistracies which are bound\(^b\) to have common mess-tables. Also inasmuch as oligarchy is defined by birth, wealth and education, the popular qualifications are thought to be the opposite of these, low birth, poverty, vulgarity. And in respect of the magistracies it is democratic to have none tenable for life, and if any life-office has been left after an ancient revolution, at all events to deprive it of its power and to substitute election by lot for election by vote.

These then are the features common to democracies. But what is thought to be the extreme form of democracy and of popular government comes about as a result of the principle of justice that is admitted to be democratic, and this is for all to have equality according to number. For it is equality for the poor to have no larger share of power than the rich, and not for the poor alone to be supreme but for all to govern equally; for in this way they would feel that the constitution possessed both equality and liberty.

But the question follows, how will they have equality? are the property-assessments of five hundred citizens to be divided among a thousand and the thousand to have equal power to the five hundred\(^d\)? or is

\(^a\) The rest of the chapter is most obscure, and its authenticity is questioned.

\(^b\) *i.e.* two groups of voters, with equal total wealth and total voting-power, but one group twice as numerous as the other, so that a man in the rich group has two votes and one in the poor group one, the former being on the average twice as rich as the latter.
κατὰ τοῦτο ἴσότητα, ἄλλα διειλεῖν μὲν οὕτως, ἑπείτα ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἵσους λαβόντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν χιλίων, τούτους κυρίους εἶναι τῶν αἱρέσεων καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων; πότερον οὖν αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία δικαιοτάτη κατὰ τὸ δημοτικὸν δίκαιον, ἦ μᾶλλον ἡ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος; φασὶ γὰρ οἱ δημοτικοὶ τοῦτο δίκαιον ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείσσιν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τῇ πλείον ὀψία, κατὰ πλῆθος γὰρ ὀψίας φασὶ κρίνεσθαι δεῖν. ἔχει δ' ἀμφότερα ἰσότητα καὶ ἄδικιαν· εἶ μὲν γὰρ ὅ τι ἂν οἱ ὀλίγοι, τυραννίς, καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν εἰς ἐχθρὶς πλείω τῶν ἄλλων εὐπόρων, κατὰ τὸ ὀλιγαρχικὸν δίκαιον ἄρχειν δίκαιος μόνος· εἰ δ' ὅ τι ἂν οἱ πλείοις κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἄδικησον δημεύοντες τὰ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ἑλαττῶνων, καθάπερ εὑρηται πρότερον. τίς ἂν οὐν εἰς ἰσότης ἢν ὀμολογήσουσιν ἀμφότεροι, σκεπτέον εἴ όν ὀρίζονται δικαίων ἀμφότεροι. λέγοντι γὰρ ὡς ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείσσι τῶν πολιτῶν τοῦτ' εἶναι δεῖ κύριον. ἔστω δὴ τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι πάντως, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ δὺν μέρη τετύχκενεν εἴ όν ἡ πόλις, πλουσίοι καὶ πένητες, ὅ τι ἂν ἀμφότεροι δόξῃ ἢ τοῖς πλείσσι τοῦτο κύριον ἔστω, ἐὰν δὲ τανάντια δόξῃ, ὅ τι ἂν οἱ πλείοις καὶ ὧν τὸ

1 aἱρέσεων Camotius: διαἱρέσεων codd.
equality on this principle\(^a\) not to be arranged in this manner, but the division into classes to be on this system, but then an equal number to be taken from the five hundred and from the thousand and these to control the elections and the law-courts? Is this then the justest form of constitution in accordance with popular justice, or is it rather one that goes by counting heads?\(^b\) For democrats say that justice is whatever seems good to the larger number, but advocates of oligarchy think that it is whatever seems good to the owners of the larger amount of property, for they say that the decision 12 ought to go by amount of property. But both views involve inequality and injustice; for if the will of the few is to prevail, this means a tyranny, since if one man owns more than the other rich men,\(^c\) according to the oligarchic principle of justice it is just for him to rule alone; whereas if the will of the numerical majority is to prevail, they will do injustice by confiscating the property of the rich minority, as has been said before.\(^d\) What form of equality therefore would be one on which both parties will agree must be considered in the light of the principles of justice as defined by both sets. For they say that whatever seems good to the majority of the citizens 13 ought to be sovereign. Let us then accept this principle, yet not wholly without qualification, but inasmuch as fortune has brought into existence two component parts of the state, rich and poor, let any resolution passed by both classes, or by a majority of each, be sovereign, but if the two classes carry opposite resolutions, let the decision of the majority, in the sense of the group whose total property-assessment is the larger, prevail: for instance, if
If the rich citizens are on the average twice as wealthy as the poor (§ 11), and therefore a rich man has two votes to a poor man’s one, when 6 rich and 5 poor vote one way, and 15 poor and 4 rich the other, the division is 17 to 23, and the view of the latter party, which is carried, represents a larger total of wealth but a larger proportion of poor men.
there are ten rich citizens and twenty poor ones, and opposite votes have been cast by six of the rich on one side and by fifteen of the less wealthy on the other, four of the rich have sided with the poor and five of the poor with the rich; then the side that has the larger total property when the assessments of both classes on either side are added together carries the voting. But if the totals fall out exactly equal, this is to be deemed an impasse common to both sides, as it is at present if the assembly or law-court is exactly divided; either a decision must be made by casting lots or some other such device must be adopted. But on questions of equality and justice, even though it is very difficult to discover the truth about them, nevertheless it is easier to hit upon it than to persuade people that have the power to get an advantage to agree to it; equality and justice are always sought by the weaker party, but those that have the upper hand pay no attention to them.

II. There being four kinds of democracy, the best is the one that stands first in structure, as was said in the discourses preceding these; it is also the oldest of them all, but by first I mean first as it were in a classification of the kinds of common people. The best common people are the agricultural population, so that it is possible to introduce democracy as well as other forms of constitution where the multitude lives by agriculture or by pasturing cattle. For owing to their not having much property they are busy, so that they cannot often meet in the assembly, while owing to their having the necessaries of life they pass their time attending to their

\[497\] The mss. give 'not having,' but editors do not explain how in that case people would avoid starvation.
πρὸς τοὺς ἔργοις διατρίβουσι καὶ τῶν ἀλλυτρίων
οὐκ ἔπιθυμοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἤδιον τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι τοῦ
πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, ὅπου ἂν μὴ ἦ λήμματα
μεγάλα ἀπὸ τῶν ἄρχων· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ μάλλον
ὁρέγονται τοῦ κέρδους ἢ τῆς τιμῆς. σημεῖον δὲ· 2
καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἄρχαιας τυραννίδας ὑπέμενον καὶ τὰς
οἰκονομίας ὑπομένουσιν, εάν τις αὐτοῦς ἐργά-
ζεσθαι μὴ κωλύῃ μηδ' ἀφαιρήται μηθέν· ταχέως
γὰρ οἱ μὲν πλουτοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἱ δ' οὐκ ἀποροῦσιν.
ἐτὶ δὲ τὸ κυρίον εἶναι τοῦ ἐλέσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν
ἀναπληροῖ τὴν ἐνδειαν εἰ τι φιλοτημίας ἔχουσιν,
ἐπεὶ παρ' ἐναί δήμοις, καὶ μὴ μετέχωσι τῆς
αἱρέσεως τῶν ἄρχων ἀλλὰ τινες αἱρετοὶ κατὰ
μέρος ἐκ πάντων, ὦσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ, τοῦ δὲ
βουλεύεσθαι κύριοι δῶσι, ἵκανος ἔχει τοῖς πολλοῖς
(καὶ δὲι νομίζειν καὶ τούτ' εἶναι σχήμα τι δημο-
κρατίας, ὦσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ποτ' ἐν). διὸ δὴ καὶ 3
συμφέρον ἐστὶ τῇ πρότερον ῥηθείσῃ δημοκρατίᾳ
καὶ ὑπάρχειν εὐσθεν, αἱρεῖσθαι μὲν τὰς ἄρχας καὶ
εὐθύνειν καὶ δικαίως πάντας, ἄρχειν δὲ τὰς
μεγίστας αἱρετοὺς καὶ ἀπὸ τυμημάτων, τὰς
μείζους ἀπὸ μειζόνων, ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ τυμημάτων
μὲν μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς δυναμένους. ἀνάγκη δὲ
πολιτευομένους οὔτω πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς (αἳ τε
γὰρ ἄρχαι ἄδια διὰ τῶν βελτίστων ἔσονται τοῦ
δήμου βουλομένου καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν οὐ φθονοῦν-
tos), καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι καὶ γνωρήμοις ἄρκοῦσαν

1 τε ante καλῶs transposuit Richards.
farmwork and do not covet their neighbours’ goods, but find more pleasure in working than in taking part in politics and holding office, where the profits to be made from the offices are not large; for the mass of mankind are more covetous of gain than of honour.

And this is indicated by the fact that men endured the tyrannies of former times, and endure oligarchies, if a ruler does not prevent them from working or rob them; for then some of them soon get rich and the others free from want. And also, if they have any ambition, to have control over electing magistrates and calling them to account makes up for the lack of office, since in some democracies even if the people have no part in electing the magistrates but these are elected by a special committee selected in turn out of the whole number, as at Mantinea, yet if they have the power of deliberating on policy, the multitude are satisfied. (And this too must be counted as one form of democracy, on the lines on which it once existed at Mantinea.) Indeed it is for this reason that it is advantageous for the form of democracy spoken of before, and is a customary institution in it, for all the citizens to elect the magistrates and call them to account, and to try law-suits, but for the holders of the greatest magistracies to be elected and to have property-qualifications, the higher offices being elected from the higher property-grades, or else for no office to be elected on a property-qualification, but for officials to be chosen on the ground of capacity. And a state governed in this way is bound to be governed well (for the offices will always be administered by the best men with the consent of the people and without their being jealous of the upper classes), and this arrangement is certain to be satis-
1318 b εἰναι ταύτην τήν τάξιν, ἀρξονταί γὰρ οὐχ ὑπ’ ἄλλων χειρόνων, καὶ ἀρξονσι δικαίως διὰ τὸ τῶν εὐθυνῶν εἶναι κυρίους ἑτέρους: τὸ γὰρ ἐπανα- 4 κρέμασθαι καὶ μὴ πάν εξείναι ποιεῖν ὁ τι ἀν δόξη συμφέρον ἐστίν, ἥ γὰρ ἐξουσία τοῦ πράττειν ὁ τι ἀν ἑθέλῃ τις οὐ δύναται φυλάττειν τὸ ἐν ἕκαστῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαύλον. ὡστε ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁφελημότατον ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἀρχεῖν τοὺς ἐπιεικές ἀναμαρτήτους ὁντας μηδὲν ἐλαττουμένου τοῦ πλῆθους. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὐτὴ τῶν 5 δημοκρατίων ἀρίστη, φανερόν, καὶ διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ποιῶν τινα εἶναι τοῦ δήμου.

Πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν γεωργίαν1 τὸν δήμον 5 τῶν τε νόμων τινές τῶν παρὰ2 πολλοῖς κειμένων τὸ ἄρχαίον χρήσιμοι πάντως,3 ἡ τὸ ὅλως μὴ ἐξεῖναι κεκτηθαί πλείω γῆν μέτρου τυνὸς ἡ 10 ἀπὸ τινὸς τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἧν δὲ τὸ γε ἄρχαίον ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεις νεομοθετημένον μηδὲ πωλεῖν εξεῖναι τοὺς πρώτους κλήρους. ἔστι δὲ καὶ δὲν λέγουσιν Ὁξύλου νόμον εἶναι τοιούτὸν τι δυνάμενος, τὸ μὴ δανείζειν εἰς τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἕκαστῳ γῆς), νῦν δὲ 6 δεὶ διορθοῦν καὶ τῷ Ἀφυταίων νόμῳ, πρὸς γὰρ ὁ λέγομεν ἐστὶ χρήσιμοι· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ καίπερ ὡντες πολλοὶ κεκτημένοι δὲ γῆν ὀλίγην ὁμως πάντες γεωργίαν, τιμῶνται γὰρ οὐχ ὅλας τὰς

1 γεωργικὸν Richards.
2 παρὰ Madvig: παρὰ τοῖς codd.
3 Coraes: πάντες codd.

* Leader of the Heraclidae in their invasion of the Peloponnese, and afterwards king of Elis.
* Aphýtis was on the Isthmus of Pallene in Macedonia.

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POLITICS, VI. II. 3-6

factory for the upper classes and notables, for they will not be under the government of others inferior to themselves, and they will govern justly because a different class will be in control of the audits—since it is expedient to be in a state of suspense and not to be able to do everything exactly as seems good to one, for liberty to do whatever one likes cannot guard against the evil that is in every man's character. Hence there necessarily results the condition of affairs that is the most advantageous in the government of states—for the upper classes to govern without doing wrong, the common people not being deprived of any rights. It is manifest therefore that this is the best of the forms of democracy, and why this is so—namely, because in it the common people are of a certain kind.

5 For the purpose of making the people an agricultural community, not only were some of the laws that were enacted in many states in early times entirely serviceable, prohibiting the ownership of more than a certain amount of land under any conditions or else of more than a certain amount lying between a certain place and the citadel or city (and in early times at all events in many states there was even legislation prohibiting the sale of the original allotments; and there is a law said to be due to Oxylus with some similar provision, forbidding loans secured on a certain portion of a man's existing estate), but at the present day it would also be well to introduce reform by means of the law of the Aphytaeans, as it is serviceable for the purpose of which we are speaking; the citizens of Aphytis although numerous and possessing a small territory nevertheless are all engaged in agriculture, for they
κτήσεις, ἀλλά κατὰ τηλικά μόρια διαιροῦντες ὡστ' ἔχειν ὑπερβάλλειν ταῖς τιμήσεις καὶ τοὺς πένητας.

20 Μετὰ δὲ τὸ γεωργικὸν πλῆθος βέλτιστος δῆμος ἢ

25 πλήθη πάντα σχεδὸν ἐξ' ὅνιν αἱ λοιπαὶ δημοκρατίαι συνεστάσαι πολλὰ φαιλότερα τούτων· ὁ γὰρ βίος φαύλος, καὶ οὐθέν ἐργὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς ὁν μεταχειρίζεται τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τε τῶν βαναισσῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὸ θητικόν, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀγοράν καὶ τὸ ἀστυ κυ

30 λίσθαι πάν τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος ὡς εἰπεῖν ῥᾴδιως ἐκκλησίαζεν· οἱ δὲ γεωργοῦντες διὰ τὸ διεσπάρθαι κατὰ τὴν χώραν οὔτ' ἀπαντῶσιν οὔθ' ὁμοίως δέονται τῆς συνόδου ταύτης. ὅπου δὲ καὶ συμ-

35 βαίνει τὴν χώραν τὴν θέσιν ἔχει τοιαύτην ὡστε τὴν χώραν πολὺ τῆς πόλεως ἀπηρτήθηκεν, ῥᾴδιων καὶ δημοκρατίαις ποιεῖσθαι χρηστήν καὶ πολιτείαν, ἀναγκάζεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τῶν ἄγρων ποιεῖται τὰς ἀποκιάζῃ· ὡστε δὲ, κἂν ἀγοραῖος ὀχλος γ', μὴ ποιεῖν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκ-

40 κλησίαις γ' ἀνευ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλῆθους. Πῶς μὲν οὖν δεῖ κατασκευάζειν τὴν βελτίστην

1 ἐπιτολάζειν vel πλεονάζειν Immisch.
2 Lambinus: δημοκρατικάς ἐκκλησίαις codd.

* No satisfactory explanation seems to have been suggested of what this means.
* i.e. in a largely agricultural democracy, even though
POLITICS, VI. ii. 6–8

are assessed not on the whole of their estates, but on divisions of them so small that even the poor can exceed the required minimum in their assessments.  

7 After the agricultural community the best kind of democracy is where the people are herdsman and get their living from cattle; for this life has many points of resemblance to agriculture, and as regards military duties pastoral people are in a very well trained condition and serviceable in body and capable of living in the open. But almost all the other classes of populace, of which the remaining kinds of democracy are composed, are very inferior to these, for their mode of life is mean, and there is no element of virtue in any of the occupations in which the multitude of artisans and market-people and the wage-earning class take part, and also owing to their loitering about the market-place and the city almost all people of this class find it easy to attend the assembly; whereas the farmers owing to their being scattered over the country do not attend, and have not an equal desire for this opportunity of meeting.  

8 And where it also happens that the lie of the land is such that the country is widely separated from the city, it is easy to establish a good democracy and also a good constitutional government, for the multitude is forced to live at a distance on the farms; and so, even if there is a crowd that frequents the market-place, it is best in democracies not to hold assemblies without the multitude scattered over the country.  

It has then been stated how the best and first there may be a considerable idle population, which would attend frequent assemblies, it is best to hold them infrequently, so as to secure the attendance of the farmers.
In Book V. 

The text discusses a revolution in Egypt in 401 B.C., where five hundred rich people were put to death and others fled, but after a battle a compromise was arranged. 

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kind of democracy is to be organized, and it is clear how we ought to organize the other kinds also. For they must diverge in a corresponding order, and at each stage we must admit the next inferior class. The last kind of democracy, because all the population share in the government, it is not within the power of every state to endure, and it is not easy for it to persist if it is not well constituted in its laws and customs (but the things that result in destroying both this state and the other forms of constitution have been nearly all of them spoken of before⁴). With a view to setting up this kind of democracy and making the people powerful their leaders usually acquire as many supporters as possible and admit to citizenship not only the legitimate children of citizens but also the base-born and those of citizen-birth on one side, I mean those whose father or mother is a citizen; for all this element is specially congenial to a democracy of this sort. Popular leaders therefore regularly introduce such institutions; they ought however only to go on adding citizens up to the point where the multitude outnumbers the notables and the middle class and not to go beyond that point; for if they exceed it they make the government more disorderly, and also provoke the notables further in the direction of being reluctant to endure the democracy, which actually took place and caused the revolution at Cyrene⁵; for a small base element is overlooked, but when it grows numerous it is more in evidence. A democracy of this kind will also find useful such institutions as were employed by Cleisthenes⁶ at Athens when he wished to increase the power of the democracy, and by the party setting

⁴ See 1275 b 36 n.
1319 b

οἱ τῶν δήμων καθιστάντες· φύλαὶ τε γὰρ ἔτεραι
ποιητέαι πλείους καὶ φρατρίαι, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἴδιων
ιερῶν συνακτέον εἰς οὐίγα καὶ κοινά, καὶ πάντα
σοφιστέον ὅπως ἂν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀναμιχθῶσι
πάντες ἀλλήλοις αἳ δὲ συνήθειαι διαζευγθῶσιν
αἳ πρότερον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ τυραννικὰ κατα-
σκευάσματα δημοτικὰ δοκεῖ πάντα, λέγω δ’ οἶον
ἀναρχία τε δούλων (αὕτη δ’ ἂν εἴη μέχρι του
συμφέρουσα) καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ παιδῶν, καὶ τὸ
ξῆν ὅπως τις βουλεὐταὶ παροφᾶν· πολὺ γὰρ ἔσται
τὸ τῇ τουαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ βοηθοῦν, ἦδον γὰρ τοῖς
πολλοῖς τὸ ξῆν ἀτάκτως ἢ τὸ σωφρόνως.

III. Ἐστὶ δὲ [ἔργον]¹ τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ τῶν 1
βουλομένων συνιστάναι τινὰ τουαύτην πολιτείαν
οὐ τὸ καταστῆσαι μέγιστον ἔργον οὐδὲ μόνον, ἀλλ’
ὅπως σώζῃται μᾶλλον· μίαν γὰρ ἡ δύο ἡ τρεῖς
ἡμέρας οῦ χαλεπὸν μεῖναι πολιτευμένους ὅτι
διὸ δεῖ περὶ ᾧν τεθεώρηται πρότερον, τίνες σωτη-
ρίαι καὶ φθοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ τούτων πειρά-
σθαι κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, εὐλαβομέ-
νους μὲν τὰ φθείροντα, τιθεμένους δὲ τοιούτους

1320 a

νόμους καὶ τοὺς ἄγραφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους
οἱ περιλήμβονται μάλιστα τὰ σώζοντα τὰς πολι-
τείας, καὶ μὴ νομίζειν τούτ’ εἶναι δημοτικὸν μηδ’
ὄλιγαρχικόν ὃ ποιήσει τὴν πόλιν ὅτι μάλιστα
dημοκράτεισθαι ἢ ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαί, ἀλλ’ ὃ πλείστον
χρόνον. οἱ δὲ νῦν δημαγωγοὶ χαριζόμενοι τοῖς 2

¹ Scaliger.

a Book V.

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up the democracy at Cyrene; different tribes and brotherhoods must be created outnumbering the old ones, and the celebrations of private religious rites must be grouped together into a small number of public celebrations, and every device must be employed to make all the people as much as possible intermingled with one another, and to break up the previously existing groups of associates. Moreover the characteristics of a tyranny also are all thought to be democratic, I mean for instance licence among slaves, which may really be advantageous for the popular party up to a point, and among women and children, and indulgence to live as one likes; a constitution of this sort will have a large number of supporters, as disorderly living is pleasanter to the mass of mankind than sober living.

1 III. But it is not the greatest or only task of the legislator or of those who desire to construct a constitution of this kind merely to set it up, but rather to ensure its preservation; for it is not difficult for any form of constitution to last for one or two or three days. We must therefore employ the results obtained in the inquiries that we have made already into the causes of the preservation and the destruction of constitutions, and attempt in the light of those results to establish the safety of the state, carefully avoiding the things that cause destruction, and enacting such laws both written and unwritten as shall best compass the results preservative of constitutions, and not think that a measure is democratic or oligarchic which will cause the state to be democratically or oligarchically governed in the greatest degree, but which will cause it to be so governed for the longest time. But the demagogues
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΣ

1320 a δήμους πολλά δημεύουσι διὰ τῶν δικαστηρίων. διὸ δεῖ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιπράττειν τοὺς κηδομένους τῆς πολιτείας, νομοθετοῦντας μηδὲν εἰναι δημό-
σιον τῶν καταδικαζομένων καὶ φερόμενον1 πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν, ἀλλὰ ἐφοῦ οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄδικοντες
10 οὐδὲν ἤττον εὐλαβεῖς ἔσονται (ἐξαιροῦσαι γὰρ ὁμοίως), δ' ὁ χλος ἤττον καταψηφιεῖται τῶν
κρινομένων λήψεσθαι μηθὲν μέλλων. ἔτι δὲ τὰς γνωμώνας δημοσίας δίκαια ός ὀλιγίστας ἄει ποιεῖν,
μεγάλους ἐπιτιμίους τοὺς εἰκῇ γραφομένους κωλύον-
tας· οὐ γὰρ τοὺς δημοσικούς ἀλλὰ τοὺς γνωρίμους
15 εἰσώθαιν εἰσάγειν, δεὶ δὲ καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ2 πολιτείᾳ
πάντας μάλιστα μὲν εὑνοὺς εἶναι τοὺς πολιτὰς, εἰ
dὲ μὴ, μὴ τοῖς ως πολεμίους νομίζειν τοὺς
κυρίους. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ τελευταῖαι δημοκρατίαι πολυ-
3 ἀνθρωποί τε εἰσὶ καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκκλησιάζειν ἀμίσθους,
tοῦτο δ' ὅποι πρόσοδοι μὴ τυγχάνουσιν οὐσιν
πολέμου τοὺς γνωρίμους (ἀπὸ τε γὰρ εἰσφορὰς καὶ
dημεόςεως ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι καὶ δικαστηρίων
φαύλων, ἃ πολλὰς ὑδὴ δημοκρατίας ἀνέτρεπεν)—
ὅποι μὲν οὐν πρόσοδοι μὴ τυγχάνουσιν οὐσιν,
dεὶ ποιεῖν ὀλίγας ἐκκλησιᾶς, καὶ δικαστήρια
πολλῶν μὲν ὀλίγας δ' ἡμέρας (τοῦτο γὰρ φέρει μὲν
25 καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ φοβείσθαι τοὺς πλούσιους τὰς
dαπάνας καὶ οἱ μὲν εὑποροὶ μὴ λαμβάνωσι δικα-
stiκοῦν οἱ δ' ἀποροί, φέρει δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κρίνε-

1 Bernays: φερομένων ГР1: φερόντων cet.
2 ταύτῃ τῇ Immisch: τῇ codd.
3 καὶ Immisch: ἕαυ.
of to-day to court the favour of the peoples often use the law-courts to bring about confiscations of property. Hence those who are caring for the safety of the constitution must counteract this by enacting that nothing belonging to persons condemned at law shall be confiscated and liable to be carried to the public treasury, but that their property shall be consecrated to the service of religion; for malefactors will be no less on their guard, as they will be punished just the same, while the mob will less often vote guilty against men on trial when it is not going to get anything out of it. Also they must always make the public trials that occur as few as possible, checking those who bring indictments at random by big penalties; for they do not usually indict men of the people but notables, whereas even with this form of constitution it is desirable for all the citizens if possible to be friendly to the state, or failing that, at all events not to think of their rulers as enemies. And inasmuch as the ultimate forms of democracy tend to have large populations and it is difficult for their citizens to sit in the assembly without pay, and this in a state where there do not happen to be revenues is inimical to the notables (for pay has to be obtained from a property-tax and confiscation, and from corruption of the law-courts, which has caused the overthrow of many democracies before now),—where therefore there happen to be no revenues, few meetings of the assembly must be held, and the law-courts must consist of many members but only sit a few days (for this not only contributes to the rich not being in fear of the cost of the system even if the well-off do not take the pay and only the poor do, but also leads to far greater efficiency in the
The fifty daughters of Danaus were married to their cousins, and all but one murdered their husbands on the bridal night, and were punished in Hades by having to pour water into the jar described.
trial of law-suits, for the well-to-do, though not wishing to be away from their private affairs for many days, are willing to leave them for a short time), while where there are revenues men must not do what the popular leaders do now (for they use the surplus for doles, and people no sooner get them than they want the same doles again, because this way of helping the poor is the legendary jar with a hole in it a), but the truly democratic statesman must study how the multitude may be saved from extreme poverty; for this is what causes democracy to be corrupt. Measures must therefore be contrived that may bring about lasting prosperity. And since this is advantageous also for the well-to-do, the proper course is to collect all the proceeds of the revenues into a fund and distribute this in lump sums to the needy, best of all, if one can, in sums large enough for acquiring a small estate, or, failing this, to serve as capital for trade or husbandry, and if this is not possible for all, at all events to distribute the money by tribes or some other division of the population in turn, while in the meantime the well-to-do must contribute pay for attendance at the necessary assemblies, being themselves excused from useless public services. By following some such policy as this the Carthaginians have won the friendship of the common people; for they constantly send out some of the people to the surrounding territories and so make them well-off. And if the notables are men of good feeling and sense they may also divide the needy among them in groups and supply them with capital to start them in businesses. It is also a good plan to imitate the policy b of the Tarentines. They

a Cf. 1263a 35.
ARISTOTLE

This seems to mean that the land was in private ownership, but that there was some system of poor-relief, to provide for the destitute out of the produce.

In contrast with the first and best form of democracy, c. ii. init.

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get the goodwill of the multitude by making property communal for the purpose of use by the needy; also they have divided the whole number of their magistracies into two classes, one elected by vote and the other filled by lot,—the latter to ensure that the people may have a share in them, and the former to improve the conduct of public affairs. And it is also possible to effect this by dividing the holders of the same magistracy into two groups, one appointed by lot and the other by vote.

We have then said how democracies should be organized.

IV. It is also fairly clear from these considerations how oligarchies ought to be organized. We must infer them from their opposites, reasoning out each form of oligarchy with reference to the form of democracy opposite to it, starting with the most well-blended and first form of oligarchy—and this is the one near to what is called a constitutional government, and for it the property-qualifications must be divided into one group of smaller properties and another of larger ones, smaller properties qualifying their owners for the indispensable offices and larger ones for the more important; and a person owning the qualifying property must be allowed to take a share in the government,—introducing by the assessment a large enough number of the common people to secure that with them the governing class will have a majority over those excluded; and persons to share in the government must constantly be brought in from the better class of the common people. And the next form of oligarchy also must be constructed in a similar way with a slight tightening up of the qualification. But the form of oligarchy that stands


1320 b
dυναστικωτάτη καὶ τυραννικωτάτη τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν, ὁσων περ χειρόστη τοσούτω δεῖ πλείονος φυλακῆς. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ μὲν σώματα εἴ διακείμενα πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῖα τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν καλῶς ἔχοντα τοὺς πλωτήρων ἑπιδέχεται πλείους ἁμαρτίας ὡστε μὴ φθείρεσθαι δι’ αὐτάς, τὰ δὲ νοσερῶς ἔχοντα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὰ τῶν πλοίων ἐκλελυμένα καὶ πλωτήρων τετυχηκότα φαινον οὐδὲ τὰς μικρὰς δύναται φέρειν ἁμαρτίας, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν

1321 a αἱ χειρισταὶ πλείστης δέονται φυλακῆς. τὰς μὲν 3 οὐν δημοκρατίας ὡς ἡ πολυναυτρεία σώζει, τούτο γὰρ ἀντίκειται πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὴν δ’ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἔλθην ὅτι τούναντίον ὑπὸ τῆς εὐταξίας δεὶ τυχχάνει τῆς σωτηρίας.

5 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα μὲν ἔστι μέρη μάλιστα τοῦ πλῆθους, γεωργικὸν βάναυσον ἀγοραῖον θητικὸν, τέτταρα δὲ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πόλεμον, ἵππικον ὀπλιτικὸν ψιλὸν ναυτικόν, ὅπου μὲν συμβέβηκε τὴν χώραν εἶναι ἐπισάμιον, ἐνταῦθα μὲν εὐφύεως ἔχει κατασκευάσειν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσχυρὰν (ἣ γὰρ σωτηρία τοῖς οὐκοῦσι διὰ ταύτης ἔστι τῆς δυνάμεως, αἱ δ’ ἐπιτροφίαι τῶν μακρὰς οὐσίας κεκτημένων εἰσὶν), ὅπου δ’ ὀπλίτων, 1 τὴν ἐχομένην ὀλιγαρχίαν (τὸ γὰρ ὀπλιτικὸν τῶν εὐπόρων ἔστι μᾶλλον ἤ τῶν ἀπόρων), ἥ δὲ ψυλὴ δύναμις καὶ ναυτικὴ δημοκρατικὴ 2 πάμπαν. νῦν μὲν οὖν ὅπου 4 τοιοῦτον πολὺ πλῆθὸς ἔστων, ὅταν διαστῶσι, πολ-

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1 Lamblinus: ὀπλίτην codd.  
2 cod. inf.: δημοτικὴ cett.
opposite to the last form of democracy, the most autocratic and tyrannical of the oligarchies, in as far as it is the worst requires a correspondingly great amount of safe guarding. For just as human bodies in a good state of health and ships well equipped with their crews for a voyage admit of more mistakes without being destroyed thereby, but bodies of a morbid habit and vessels strained in their timbers and manned with bad crews cannot endure even the smallest mistakes, so also the worst constitutions need the most safe-guarding. Democracies therefore generally speaking are kept safe by the largeness of the citizen-body, for this is the antithesis of justice according to desert; but oligarchy on the contrary must manifestly obtain its security by means of good organization.

And since the mass of the population falls principally into four divisions, the farming class, artisans, retail traders and hired labourers, and military forces are of four classes, cavalry, heavy infantry, light infantry and marines, in places where the country happens to be suitable for horsemanship, there natural conditions favour the establishment of an oligarchy that will be powerful (for the security of the inhabitants depends on the strength of this element, and keeping studs of horses is the pursuit of those who own extensive estates); and where the ground is suitable for heavy infantry, conditions favour the next form of oligarchy (for heavy infantry is a service for the well-to-do rather than the poor); but light infantry and naval forces are an entirely democratic element. As things are therefore, where there is a large multitude of this class, when party strife occurs the oligarchs often get the worst of
λάκις ἀγωνίζονται χείρον. δεί δὲ πρὸς τούτο φάρ-
μακον παρὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν λαμβάνει στρατηγῶν,
οἱ συνυδαίωσι πρὸς τὴν ἑπτικὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν
ὀπλιτικὴν τὴν ἀρμοττουσαν τῶν ψυλῶν. ταύτῃ
δὲ ἐπικρατοῦσαν ἐν ταῖς διαστάσεσιν οἱ δήμοι τῶν
eὐπόρων, ψυλοὶ γὰρ ὄντες πρὸς ἑπτικὴν καὶ ὀπλι-
tικὴν ἀγωνίζονται ῥαδίως. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων 5
καθιστάναι ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοὺς ἐστὶ
καθιστάναι, δεὶ δὲ διηγημένης τῆς ἡλικίας, καὶ τῶν
μὲν ὄντων προσβυτέρων τῶν δὲ νέων, ἐτὶ μὲν
ὄντας νέους τοὺς αὐτῶν νεῖσι διδάσκεσθαι τὰς
κούφας καὶ τὰς ψυλὰς ἐργασίας, ἐκκεκριμένους δὲ
ἐκ παιδῶν ἀθλητὰς εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῶν ἐργῶν. τὴν
δὲ μετάδοσιν γίνεσθαι τῷ πλῆθει τοῦ πολιτεύματος
ητοῦ καθάπερ εἰρηταὶ πρότερον, τοῖς τὸ τίμημα
κτωμένος, ἡ καθάπερ θεβαϊσι, ἀποσχομένοις
χρόνον τινὰ τῶν βαναύσων ἐργῶν, ἡ καθάπερ ἐν
Μασσαλία, κρίσιν ποιομένους τῶν ἄξιων τῶν 1
ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι καὶ τῶν ἐξωθην. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταῖς
ἀρχαῖς ταῖς κυριωτάταις, ἃς δεὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ
πολιτείᾳ κατέχειν, δεὶ προσκείσθαι λειτουργίας,
ἐν γὰρ ὁ δήμος μὴ μετέχῃ καὶ συγγνώμην ἔχῃ
τοῖς ἀρχοῦσιν ὡς μισθὸν πολὺν διδοῦσι τῆς ἀρχῆς.
ἀρμόττει δὲ θυσίας τε εἰσιόντας ποιεῖσθαι μεγαλο-
πρεπεῖς καὶ κατασκευάζειν τι τῶν κοινῶν, ἣν
τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐστιάσεις μετέχων ὁ δήμος καὶ τὴν
πόλιν ὅρων κοσμομυνήν τα μὲν ἀναθήμασα τὰ δὲ

1 τοὺς Niemeyer.

a i.e. by superior mobility.  b § 1, 1320 b 25 ff.  c If the text is correct it seems to mean that the list was revised from time to time and some old names taken off and new ones put on.

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the struggle; and a remedy for this must be adopted from military commanders, who combine with their cavalry and heavy infantry forces a contingent of light infantry. And this is the way in which the common people get the better over the well-to-do in outbreaks of party strife: being unencumbered they fight easily against cavalry and heavy infantry. Therefore to establish this force out of this class is to establish it against itself, but the right plan is for the men of military age to be separated into a division of older and one of younger men, and to have their own sons while still young trained in the exercises of light and unarmed troops, and for youths selected from among the boys to be themselves trained in active operations. And the bestowal of a share in the government upon the multitude should either go on the lines stated before, and be made to those who acquire the property-qualification, or as at Thebes, to people after they have abstained for a time from mechanic industries, or as at Marseilles, by making a selection among members of the governing classes and those outside it of persons who deserve inclusion. And furthermore the most supreme offices also, which must be retained by those within the constitution, must have expensive duties attached to them, in order that the common people may be willing to be excluded from them, and may feel no resentment against the ruling class, because it pays a high price for office. And it fits in with this that they should offer splendid sacrifices and build up some public monument on entering upon office, so that the common people sharing in the festivities and seeing the city decorated both with votive offerings and with buildings
The phrase suggests that in a democracy public duties are chiefly undertaken for their emoluments.

b Book IV. 1297 b 35 ff., 1299 a 3 ff.

c Cf. c. iv. § 1.

d Book IV. 1299 b 30 ff.
may be glad to see the constitution enduring; and an additional result will be that the notables will have memorials of their outlay. But at present the members of oligarchies do not adopt this course but the opposite, for they seek the gains of office just as much as the honour; hence these oligarchies are well described as miniature democracies.a

Let this then be a description of the proper way to organize the various forms of democracy and of oligarchy.

1 V. As a consequence of what has been said there follow satisfactory conclusions to the questions concerning magistracies—how many and what they should be and to whom they should belong, as has also been said before.b For without the indispensablec magistracies a state cannot exist, while without those that contribute to good order and seemliness it cannot be well governed. And furthermore the magistracies are bound to be fewer in the small states and more numerous in the large ones, as in fact has been said befored; it must therefore be kept in view what kinds of magistracies it is desirable to combine and what kinds to keep separate. First among the indispensable services is the superintendence of the market, over which there must be an official to superintend contracts and good order; since it is a necessity for almost all states that people shall sell some things and buy others according to one another’s necessary requirements, and this is the readiest means of securing self-sufficiency, which seems to be the reason for men’s having united into a single state. Another superintendency connected very closely with this one is the curatorship of public and private properties in the city, to secure good
πιπτόντων οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ ὅδιν εὐτηρία καὶ διόρθωσις, καὶ τῶν ὀρίων τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅπως ἄνεγκλήτως ἔχωσιν, καὶ ὅσα τούτως ἀλλα τῆς ἐπιμελείας ὁμοιότροπα. καλοῦσι δ᾽ ἀστυνομιὰν οἱ πλείστοι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν, ἔχει ὅμως καὶ μόρια
πλεῖον τῶν ἀρίθμων, ὅπως ἐτέρους ἐφ᾽ ἐτερα καθ-
ιστάσιν ἐν ταῖς πολυανθρωποτέραις πόλεσιν, οἰον 
τειχοποιοῦσι καὶ κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητὰς καὶ λιμένων 
φύλακας. ἄλλη δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖα τε καὶ παραπλησία ταῦτη. περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μὲν γὰρ, ἄλλα περὶ τὴν 
χώραν ἑστὶ καὶ [τὰ] ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ ἀστεοῦ.
καλοῦσι δὲ τούς ἀρχοντας τούτους οἱ μὲν ἀγρο-
νόμους οἱ δ᾽ ὑλωροῦσ. αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιμελεῖαι 
eἰς τούτων τρεῖς, ἄλλη δ᾽ ἀρχὴ πρὸς ἥν αἱ πρό-
σοδοι τῶν κοινῶν ἁναφέρονται, παρ᾽ ὅν φυλαττόν-
των μερίζονται πρὸς ἐκάστην διοικησιν. καλοῦσιν 
δ᾽ ἀποδέκτας τούτους καὶ ταμίας. ἐτέρα δ᾽ ἀρχὴ 
πρὸς ἥν ἀναγράφεσθαι δεῖ τὰ τε ἁδια συμβολαία 
καὶ τὰς κρίσεις τὰς ἐκ τῶν δικαστηρίων. παρὰ 
δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους καὶ τὰς γραφὰς τῶν δικῶν 
γίνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ τὰς εἰςαγωγὰς. ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν οὖν 
μερίζουσι καὶ ταῦτην εἰς πλείους, ἑστὶ δ᾽ οὐδὲ 
μία κυρία τούτων πάντων. καλοῦνται δὲ ἱερο-
μνήμονες καὶ ἐπιστάται καὶ μνήμονες καὶ τούτοις 
ἄλλα ὁνόματα σύνεγγυς. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἑχομενὴ 
μὲν ἀναγκαιοτάτη δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ χαλεπώτατη τῶν 
ἀρχῶν ἑστὶν ἡ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τῶν καταδικασθέν-

1 om. Γ. 2 τὰς inseruit Wilamowitz. 3 δ᾽ οὗ Thurot: δὲ codd.
order and the preservation and rectification of falling buildings and roads, and of the bounds between different persons' estates, so that disputes may not arise about them, and all the other duties of superintendence similar to these. An office of this nature is in most states entitled that of City-controller, but it has several departments, each of which is filled by separate officials in the states with larger populations, for instance Curators of Walls, Superintendents of Wells, Harbours-guardians. And another office also is indispensable and closely akin to these, for it controls the same matters but deals with the country and the regions outside the city; and these magistrates are called in some places Land-controllers and in others Custodians of Forests. These then are three departments of control over these matters, while another office is that to which the revenues of the public funds are paid in, the officials who guard them and by whom they are divided out to the several administrative departments; these magistrates are called Receivers and Stewards. Another magistracy is the one that has to receive a written return of private contracts and of the verdicts of the law-courts; and with these same officials the registration of legal proceedings and their institution have also to take place. In some states this office also is divided into several, but there are places where one magistracy controls all these matters; and these officials are called Sacred Recorders, Superintendents, Recorders, and other names akin to these. And after these is the office connected with it but perhaps the most indispensable and most difficult of all, the one concerned with the execution of judgement upon persons cast in suits and those posted as de-
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1322 a των καὶ τῶν προτεθεμένων κατὰ τὰς ἔγγραφὰς καὶ περὶ τὰς φυλακὰς τῶν σωμάτων. χαλεπῇ μὲν ὡς ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν ἔχειν ἀπέχθειαν, ὡστε ὅπου μη μεγάλα ἐστι κερδαίνειν, οὔτ’ ἀρχεῖν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτήν οὔθ’ ὑπομεύναντες ἐθέλουσιν πράττειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους· ἀναγκαία δ’ ἐστὶν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄμηλος γίνεσθαι μὲν δίκας περὶ τῶν δικαίων ταύτας δὲ μὴ λαμβάνειν τέλος, ὡστ’ εἰ μὴ γιγνομένων κοινωνεῖν ἀδύνατον ἄλληλοις, καὶ πράξεων μὴ γιγνομένων. διὸ βέλτιον μη μίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν ἄλλ’ ἄλλους εἰς ἄλλων δικαστηρίων, καὶ περὶ τὰς προθέσεις τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων ὀς αὐτῶς πειράσθαι διαιρεῖν, ἐτὶ δ’ ἐνα πράττεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀρχάς τὰς τε ἄλλας καὶ τὰς τῶν ἔνων μᾶλλον τὰς νέας, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνεστῶτων ἐτέρας καταδικασάσης ἐτέραν εἶναι τὴν πραττομένην, οἷον ἀστυνόμους τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἄγορανόμων, τὰς δὲ παρὰ τούτων ἐτέρους. οἷον γὰρ ἂν ἐλάττων ἀπέχθεια ἐνὶ τοῖς πραττομένοις, τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον λήμβονται τέλος αἱ πράξεις· τὸ μὲν οὐν τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς καταδικάσαντας καὶ πραττομένους ἀπέχθειαν ἔχει διπλήν, τὸ δὲ περὶ πάντων τοὺς αὐτοὺς πολεμίους πᾶσιν ποιεῖν. πολλαχοῦ δὲ διηρρηταὶ καὶ ἦ φυλάττουσα πρὸς τὴν πραττομένην, οἷον Ἀθήνης ἤ τῶν ἐνδέκα

1 quater pro τὰς Niemeyer τὰ.
2 ἔνων Scaliger: νέων codd.
3 ποιεῖ inscrui mg. cod. inf. (post αὐτοὺς Welldon).
4 ἤ inscrui Coraes.

a This example looks like a mistaken note interpolated in the text. The Eleven had both functions.
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faulters according to the lists, and with the custody of prisoners. This is an irksome office because it involves great unpopularity, so that where it is not possible to make a great deal of profit out of it men will not undertake it, or when they have undertaken it are reluctant to carry out its functions according to the laws; but it is necessary, because there is no use in trials being held about men's rights when the verdicts are not put into execution, so that if when no legal trial of disputes takes place social intercourse is impossible, so also is it when judgements are not executed. Hence it is better for this magistracy not to be a single office but to consist of several persons drawn from different courts, and it is desirable similarly to try to divide up the functions connected with the posting up of people registered as public debtors, and further also in some cases for the sentences to be executed by magistrates, especially by the newly elected ones preferably in suits tried by the outgoing ones, and in those tried by men actually in office for the magistrate executing the sentence to be different from the one that passed it, for instance the City-controllers to execute the judgements passed on from the Market-controllers and other magistrates those passed on by the City-controllers. For the less odium involved for those who execute the judgements, the more adequately the judgements will be carried out; so for the same magistrates to have imposed the sentence and to execute it involves a twofold odium, and for the same ones to execute it in all cases makes them the enemies of everybody.

And in many places also the office of keeping custody of prisoners, for example at Athens the office of the magistrates known as the Eleven, is separate from
At Athens and elsewhere young citizens from eighteen to twenty were enrolled in training corps for military instruction; these served as police and home troops.
the magistracy that executes sentences. It is better therefore to keep this also separate, and to attempt the same device with regard to this as well. For though it is no less necessary than the office of which I spoke, yet in practice respectable people avoid it most of all offices, while it is not safe to put it into the hands of the base, for they themselves need others to guard them instead of being able to keep guard over others. Hence there must not be one magistracy specially assigned to the custody of prisoners nor must the same magistracy perform this duty continuously, but it should be performed by the young, in places where there is a regiment of cadets or guards, and by the magistrates, in successive sections.

8 These magistracies therefore must be counted first as supremely necessary, and next to them must be put those that are not less necessary but are ranked on a higher grade of dignity, because they require much experience and trustworthiness; in this class would come the magistracies concerned with guarding the city and those assigned to military requirements. And both in peace and in war it is equally necessary for there to be magistrates to superintend the guarding of gates and walls and the inspection and drill of the citizen troops. In some places therefore there are more magistracies assigned to all these duties, and in others fewer—for instance in the small states there is one to deal with all of them. And the officers of this sort are entitled Generals or War-lords. And moreover if there are also cavalry or light infantry or archers or a navy, sometimes a magistracy is appointed to have charge of each of these arms also, and they carry the titles

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1322 b ναναρχίαι καὶ ἐπιπαρχίαι καὶ ταξιαρχίαι, καὶ κατὰ μέρος δὲ αἱ ὑπὸ ταύτας τριημαρχίαι καὶ λοχαγίαι ν καὶ φιλαρχίαι καὶ ὅσα τούτων μόρια. τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἐν τι τούτων ἔστιν εἶδος, ἐπιμελείας¹ πολεμικῶν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τούτον ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάσαι, διαχειρίζοντα πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν, ἀναγκαῖον ἐτέραν εἶναι τὴν ληψομένην λογισμὸν καὶ προσευθυνοῦσαν, αὐτὴν μὴθὲν διαχειρίζοσαν ἐτέρων· καλοῦσι δὲ τούτους οἱ μὲν εὐθύνουσι οἱ δὲ λογιστὰς οἱ δὲ ἔξεταστάς οἱ δὲ συνηγόρουσι παρὰ πάσας δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ μάλιστα κυρία πάντων ἔστιν· ἢ γὰρ αὐτὴ πολλάκις ἔχει τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν εἰσφοράν, ἢ προκάθηται τοῦ πλήθους ὅπων κύριός ἐστιν ὁ δήμος· δεὶ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ συνάγων τὸ κύριον κύριον τῆς πολιτείας. καλεῖται δὲ ἐνθα μὲν⁵ πρόβουλοι διὰ τὸ προβουλεύειν, ὅπων δὲ πλῆθος ἕστι, βουλὴ μάλλον. αἱ μὲν οὖν πολιτικαὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν σχεδὸν τοσοῦτοι τινὲς εἰσών· ἄλλο δὲ εἶδος ἐπιμελείας ἢ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς, οἷον ἱερεῖς τε καὶ ἐπιμεληται τῶν περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τοῦ σώζεσθαι τε τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἀνορθοῦσθαι τὰ πίπτοντα τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἔναται πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς. συμβαίνει δὲ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ταύτην ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν εἶναι μίαν, ὅπως ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς

¹ ἐπιμελεία Lambinus. ² ἔφορελαν GMP. ³ ἢ Μ; ἢ cet. ⁴ κύριον κύριον ed.; κύριον codd. ⁵ μὲν <νομοφύλακες ἐνθα δὲ> Schneider.

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of Admiral, Cavalry-commander and Taxiarch, and also the divisional commissions subordinate to these of Captains of Triremes, Company-commanders and Captains of Tribes, and all the subdivisions of these commands. But the whole of this sort of officers constitute a single class, that of military command.

This then is how the matter stands in regard to this office; but inasmuch as some of the magistracies, if not all, handle large sums of public money, there must be another office to receive an account and subject it to audit, which must itself handle no other business; and these officials are called Auditors by some people, Accountants by others, Examiners by others and Advocates by others. And by the side of all these offices is the one that is most supreme over all matters, for often the same magistracy has the execution of business that controls its introduction, or presides over the general assembly in places where the people are supreme; for the magistracy that convenes the sovereign assembly is bound to be the sovereign power in the state. It is styled in some places the Preliminary Council because it considers business in advance, but where there is a democracy it is more usually called a Council. This more or less completes the number of the offices of a political nature; but another kind of superintendence is that concerned with divine worship; in this class are priests and superintendents of matters connected with the temples, the preservation of existing buildings and the restoration of those that are ruinous, and the other duties relating to the gods. In practice this superintendence in some places forms a single office, for instance in

\[\text{Cf. 1323 a 9 below. Apparently } \pi\lambda\theta\omicron\; \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota \text{ stands for } \tau\omicron \pi\lambda\theta\omicron\; \kappa\omicron\rho\iota\omicron\nu \; \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota, \text{ but editors quote no parallel.}\]
πόλεσιν, ἔνιαχον δὲ πολλὰς καὶ κεχωρισμένας τῆς
25 ἱερωσύνης, οἷν ἱεροποιοῦσα καὶ ναοφιλακας καὶ
tαμίας τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων. ἐξομήνη δὲ ταύτης
ἡ πρὸς τὰς θυσίας ἀφωρισμένη τὰς κοινὰς πάσας
όσας μὴ τοῖς ἱερεύσιν ἀποδίδοσιν ὁ νόμος ἀλλ’
ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἐστὶς ἔχουσι τὴν τιμὴν. καλοῦσι
δ’ οἱ μὲν ἄρχονται τούτοις οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς οἱ δὲ
90 πρυτάνεις. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαίοι ἐπιμέλειαι εἰς 12
περὶ τούτων, ὡς εἶπεῖν συγκεφαλαίωσαμένους, περὶ
tε τὰ δαμόνια καὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς
προσόδους καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀναλυσκόμενα, καὶ περὶ
ἀγορὰν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἅστυ καὶ λιμένας καὶ τὴν
χώραν, ἦτι τὰ περὶ τὰ δικαστηρία καὶ συναλλαγ-
μάτων ἀναγραφὰς καὶ πράξεις καὶ φυλακάς, καὶ
ἐπὶ λογισμοὺς1 τε καὶ ἐξετάσεις, καὶ πρὸς εὐθύνας
τῶν άρχοντων, καὶ τέλος αἱ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον
ἐἰσι περὶ τῶν2 κοινῶν. ἰδία δὲ ταῖς σχολαστὶ-
13 κωτέραις καὶ μᾶλλον εὐκερούσαις πόλεσιν, ἐτὶ
dὲ φροντιζούσαις εὐκοσμίας, γυναικονομίᾳ νομο-
6 φυλακία παιδονομίᾳ γυναικαρχίᾳ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
περὶ ἁγώνας ἐπιμέλεια γυμνικοὺς καὶ Διονυσια-
κούς κἀν εἰ τινὰς ἐτέρας συμβαίνει τουαύτως
γίνεσθαι θεωρίας. τούτων δ’ ἐνιαὶ φανερῶς εἰσὶν
οὐ δημοτικαὶ τῶν ἁρχῶν, οἰον γυναικονομίᾳ καὶ
5 παιδονομίᾳ. τοῖς γὰρ ἀπόροις ἀνάγκη χρήσθαι καὶ
gυναῖξι καὶ παισίν ὥσπερ ἄκολουθοις διὰ τὴν
ἀδουλίαν. τριῶν δ’ οὐσῶν ἁρχῶν καθ’3 ἃς αἱροῦν-
tαί τινες ἁρχὰς τὰς κυρίους, νομοφιλάκων προ-

1 πι λογισμούς Spengel (circa ratiocinationes Guil.): ἐπιλογισμοῖς codd.
2 περὶ τῶν Richards: τῶν codd. 3 [καθ’] Heinsius.
the small cities, but in others it belongs to a number of officials who are not members of the priesthood, for example Sacrificial Officers and Temple-guardians and Stewards of Sacred Funds. And connected with this is the office devoted to the management of all the public festivals which the law does not assign to the priests but the officials in charge of which derive their honour from the common sacrificial hearth, and these officials are called in some places Archons, in others Kings and in others Presidents. To sum up therefore, the necessary offices of superintendence deal with the following matters: institutions of religion, military institutions, revenue and expenditure, control of the market, citadel, harbours and country, also the arrangements of the law-courts, registration of contracts, collection of fines, custody of prisoners, supervision of accounts and inspections, and the auditing of officials, and lastly the offices connected with the body that deliberates about public affairs. On the other hand, peculiar to the states that have more leisure and prosperity, and also pay attention to public decorum, are the offices of Superintendent of Women, Guardian of the Laws, Superintendent of Children, Controller of Physical Training, and in addition to these the superintendence of athletic and Dionysiac contests and of any similar displays that happen to be held. Some of these offices are obviously not of a popular character, for instance that of Superintendent of Women and of Children; for the poor having no slaves are forced to employ their women and children as servants. There are three offices which in some states supervise the election of the chief magistrates—Guardians of the Laws, Preliminary Councillors and Council; of
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βούλων βουλής, οί μὲν νομοφύλακες ἀριστοκρατικόν, ὀλιγαρχικὸν δ’ οἱ πρόβουλοι, βουλὴ δὲ δημοτικὸν. περὶ μὲν ὁυν τῶν ἀρχῶν ὡς ἐν τούτῳ σχεδὸν εἰρηται περὶ πασῶν.
these the Guardians of the Laws are an aristocratic institution, the Preliminary Councillors oligarchic, and a Council democratic.

We have now therefore spoken in outline about almost all the offices of state.
I. Peri politēias ἀρίστης τῶν μέλλοντα ποιήσα - 1
15 σθαί τὴν προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκη διορίσασθαι
πρῶτον τὶς αἰρετῶτατος βίος. ἀδήλου γὰρ οὖν τοῦτο
καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἄδηλον εἶναι
πολιτείαν, ἀριστα γὰρ πράττειν προσήκει τοὺς
ἀριστα πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς,
ἐὰν μὴ τι γίγνηται παράλογον. διὸ δὲι πρῶτον
20 ὀμολογεῖσθαι τὸς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεὶν αἰρετῶτατος
βίος, μετὰ δὲ τούτο πότερον κοινὴ καὶ χωρίς ὁ
αὐτὸς ἤ ἐτερος. νομίσαντας οὐν ἰκανώς πολλὰ
λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ
tῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς.
ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφι-
25 σβητῆσειν ἃν ὡς οὐ τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν
τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ
ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μακάριοις χρή.
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίη μακάριον τὸν μηθὲν μόριον
ἐχοντα ἀνδρείας μηδὲ σωφροσύνης μηδὲ δικαιο-
σύνης μηδὲ φρονήσεως, ἀλλὰ δεδιότα μὲν τὰς
80 παραπετομένας μυίας, ἀπεχόμενον δὲ μηθένος, ἂν
1 δὲι Victorius.

a Book IV. in some editions.
b Cf. c. iii. § 6. It is debated whether the phrase refers to Aristotle's own popular writings, or to those of other
BOOK VII

1 I. The student who is going to make a suitable investigation of the best form of constitution must necessarily decide first of all what is the most desirable mode of life. For while this is uncertain it is also bound to be uncertain what is the best constitution, since it is to be expected that the people that have the best form of government available under their given conditions will fare the best, exceptional circumstances apart. Hence we must first agree what life is most desirable for almost all men, and after that whether the same life is most desirable both for the community and for the individual, or a different one. Believing therefore in the adequacy of much of what is said even in extraneous discourses on the subject of the best life, let us make use of these pronouncements now. For as regards at all events one classification of things good, putting them in three groups, external goods, goods of the soul and goods of the body, assuredly nobody would deny that the ideally happy are bound to possess all three. For nobody would call a man ideally happy that has not got a particle of courage nor of temperance nor of justice nor of wisdom, but is afraid of the flies that flutter by him, cannot refrain from any of the most philosophers, or to discussions of the subject in ordinary intercourse.
1323a

\[\text{επιθυμήσῃ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἡ πιεῖν, τῶν ἐσχάτων.} \]

\[\text{ἐνεκα δὲ τεταρτημορίου διαφθείροντα τοὺς φιλτά-} \]

\[\text{τους [φίλους], ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν} \]

\[\text{oὔτως ἄφρονα καὶ διεφευγμένον ὧσπερ τι παιδίον} \]

\[\text{ἡ μανώμενον. Ἀλλὰ τάτα μὲν λεγόμενα [ὠσπερ] \(2\)} \]

\[\text{πάντως ἄν συνηχρήσειαν, διαφέρονται δὲ ἐν τῷ} \]

\[\text{ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.} \]

\[\text{ἡς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἐχεῖ ικανὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν ὧποσονῦν, πλούτου} \]

\[\text{δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης καὶ} \]

\[\text{πάντων τῶν τουούτων εἰς ἀπειρον ξητοῦν τὴν} \]

\[\text{ὑπερβολήν. ᾿ήμεις δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν ὃτι ῥάδιον} \]

\[\text{μὲν περὶ τούτων καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔργων λαμβάνειν, τῆς} \]

\[\text{πίστιν, ὅρωντας ὃτι κτῶνται καὶ φυλάττουσιν} \]

\[\text{οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοὺς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνα ταῦτας,} \]

\[\text{kαὶ τὸ ᾿ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, εἴτ’ ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εἴτ’} \]

\[\text{ἐν ἀρετῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἴτ’ ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὃτι μᾶλλον} \]

\[\text{ὑπάρχει τοῖς τὸ ἡθος μὲν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν κεκο-} \]

\[\text{σμημένους εἰς ὑπερβολήν περὶ δὲ τὴν ἔξω κτῆσιν} \]

\[\text{τῶν ἁγαθῶν μετριάζουσιν ἡ τοῖς ἐκεῖνα μὲν} \]

\[\text{κεκτημένους πλείω τῶν χρησίμων ἐν δὲ τούτοις} \]

\[\text{ἐλλείπουσιν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον} \]

\[\text{σκοπουμένους εὐσυνοπτούν ἐστιν.} \]

\[\text{τὰ μὲν γὰρ} \]

\[\text{ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρας, ὧσπερ ὀργανόν τι (πῶν δὲ} \]

\[\text{τὸ χρήσιμον εἰς τί), ὃν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἥ} \]

\[\text{βλάπτειν ἀναγκαῖον ἥ μηθὲν ὀφέλος εἶναι τοῖς} \]

\[\text{ἔχουσιν τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆν ἐκαστὸν ἁγαθῶν,} \]

\[\text{ὅσῳ περ ἀν ὑπερβάλλη, τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον} \]

\[\text{χρήσιμων εἶναι,} \]

\[\text{εἰ δὲ καὶ τούτως ἐπιλέγειν μὴ μόνον τὸ} \]

1 Coraes.
2 Richards: ἀπλῶς Bernays.
3 Vahlen: διαβαίνειν ΓΜΡ1: διαλαμβάνειν cet.
4 εἰς τί Vahlen: ἐστὶν codd. (<ἀλλήλων> ἐστὶν Richards).
5 εἶναι ΓΜΡ1: εἶναι αὐτῶν cet.
outrageous actions in order to gratify a desire to eat or to drink, ruins his dearest friends for the sake of a farthing, and similarly in matters of the intellect also is as senseless and mistaken as any child or lunatic. But although these are propositions which when uttered everybody would agree to, yet men differ about amount and degrees of value. They think it is enough to possess however small a quantity of virtue, but of wealth, riches, power, glory and everything of that kind they seek a larger and larger amount without limit. We on the other hand shall tell them that it is easy to arrive at conviction on these matters in the light of the actual facts, when one sees that men do not acquire and preserve the virtues by means of these external goods, but external goods by means of the virtues, and that whether the life of happiness consists for man in enjoyment or in virtue or in both, it is found in larger measure with those who are of surpassingly high cultivation in character and intellect but only moderate as regards the external acquisition of goods, than with those who own more than they can use of the latter but are deficient in the former. Not but what the truth is also easily seen if we consider the matter in the light of reason. For external goods have a limit, as has any instrument (and everything useful is useful for something), so an excessive amount of them must necessarily do harm, or do no good, to its possessor; whereas with any of the goods of the soul, the more abundant it is, the more useful it must be—if even to goods of the soul not only the term ‘noble’ but

6 χρήσιμον [ei̱nai], ἡρήσιμον ei̱nai, χρήσιμον esti edd. (sed fortasse ἀναγκαῖον intelligendum).
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1823 b

καλὸν ἄλλα καὶ τὸ χρῆσιμον. ὅλως τε δήλον ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπερ- 
15 οχὴν ἣντερ εἴληφε διάστασιν ὃν φαμὲν αὐτὰς εἴναι διαθέσεις ταύτας. ὡστ' εἴπερ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχή καὶ τῆς κτῆσεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος τιμώτερον καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐκάστου ἀνάλογον τούτων ἔχειν. ἐτὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεκεν ταύτα πέφυκεν αἱρέτὰ καὶ δεῖ 20 πάντας αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς εὗ φρονοῦντας, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνων ἐνεκεν τὴν ψυχὴν. ὡστι μὲν οὖν ἐκάστω 5 τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταῦ- 
τας, ἐστω συνυσόλογομένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, ὅσ εὐδαιμώνοι μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μακάριοι, 25 δὲ οὐθὲν δὲ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ἁγαθῶν ἄλλα δι' 
αὐτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιός τις εἴναι τὴν φύσιν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ ταῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐτέραν εἴναι, τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἁγαθῶν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῶν ταυτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχῃ, 
δικαίως δ' οὖνδε οὐδὲ σώφρων ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην ἔστιν. ἔχομενοι δ' ἔστι καὶ τῶν 
αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονα τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσιν καλῶς. ἀδύνατον 
δὲ καλῶς πράττειν τοὺς μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσιν ὃθὲν δὲ καλὸν ἐργον οὕτ' ἄνδρος οὕτε πόλεως

\[\text{a e.g. the finest man excels the finest monkey to the degree in which the species man excels the species monkey.}
\[\text{b Aristotle taught that some events are the result of the undesigned interaction of two lines of causation in nature's design: he denoted this (1) in general, by 'the automatic' or self-acting (represented in Latin by \textit{sponte, spontaneous}), (2) as concerning man, by 'fortune.'}
\]

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also the term ‘useful’ can be properly applied. And broadly, it is clear that we shall declare that the best condition of each particular thing, comparing things with one another, corresponds in point of superiority to the distance that subsists between the things of which we declare these conditions themselves to be conditions.\(^a\) Hence inasmuch as our soul is a more valuable thing both absolutely and relatively to ourselves than either our property or our body, the best conditions of these things must necessarily stand in the same relation to one another as the things themselves do. Moreover it is for the sake of the soul that these goods are in their nature desirable, and that all wise men must choose them, not the soul for the sake of those other things. Let us then take it as agreed between us that to each man there falls just so large a measure of happiness as he achieves of virtue and wisdom and of virtuous and wise action: in evidence of this we have the case of God, who is happy and blessed, but is so on account of no external goods, but on account of himself, and by being of a certain quality in his nature; since it is also for this reason that prosperity is necessarily different from happiness—for the cause of goods external to the soul is the spontaneous and fortune,\(^b\) but nobody is just or temperate as a result of or owing to the action of fortune. And connected is a truth requiring the same arguments to prove it, that it is also the best state, and the one that does well,\(^c\) that is happy. But to do well is impossible save for those who do good actions, and there is no good action either of a

\(^{a}\) The common play on the ambiguity of ‘do well,’ meaning either ‘prosper’ or ‘act rightly.’
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χωρὶς ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως· ἀνδρεία δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις¹ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ μορφὴν ὅπερ μετασχῆν ἔκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σωφρων.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔστω πεφρονυνται μιασμένα τῷ λόγῳ· οὔτε γὰρ μὴ θυγγάνειν αὐτῶν δυνατόν, οὔτε πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους ἐπεξελθεῖν ἐνδεχεται λόγους, ἑτέρας γὰρ ἐστὶν ἔργον σχολῆς ταῦτα. νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἀριστος, καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὅ μετὰ ἀρετῆς κεχορηγημένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὦστε μετέχειν τῶν καὶ ἀρετῆς πράξεων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἔσαστας ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου, διασκεπτέον ὡστερον, εἰ τις τοῖς εἰρήμενοις τυγχάνει μη πειθόμενοι.

II. Πότερον δὲ τὴν ευδαιμονίαν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον ἐνός τε ἐκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ἡ μή τὴν αὐτὴν λοιπὸν ἐστὶν εἰπείν. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τούτο. πάντες γὰρ ἂν ὄμολογησείαν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν· ὁσοὶ γὰρ ἐν πλούτῳ τὸ ἕξον εὖ τίθενται ἐφ' ἐνός, οὕτω καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην ἐὰν ἥ πλονσία μακαρίζουσιν, ὅσοι τε τὸν τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τιμῶσιν, οὕτω καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἄρχουσαν εὐδαιμονεστάτην ἂν εἶναι φαίεν· εἰ τε τις τῶν ἑνά δι' ἀρετῆς ἀποδέχεται, καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιότεραν. ἅλλα 2 ταύτ' ἡδὸν δύο ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖται σκέψεως, ἐν μὲν πότερος αἱρετῶτερος βίος, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύε-

¹ φρόνησις (καὶ σωφροσύνη) Coraes.
² καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ Coraes.

α Eth. Nic. i. 1099 a 32, x. 1179 a 4 ff.

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man or of a state without virtue and wisdom; and courage, justice and wisdom belonging to a state have the same meaning and form as have those virtues whose possession bestows the titles of just and wise and temperate on an individual human being.

6 These remarks however must suffice by way of preface to our discourse: for neither is it possible to abstain from touching on these subjects altogether, nor is it feasible to follow out all the arguments that are germane to them, for that is the business of another course of study. For the present let us take it as established that the best life, whether separately for an individual or collectively for states, is the life conjoined with virtue furnished with sufficient means for taking part in virtuous actions; while objections to this position we must pass over in the course of the present inquiry, and reserve them for future consideration, if anyone is found to disagree with what has been said.

1 II. On the other hand it remains to say whether the happiness of a state is to be pronounced the same as that of each individual man, or whether it is different. Here too the answer is clear: everybody would agree that it is the same; for all those who base the good life upon wealth in the case of the individual, also assign felicity to the state as a whole if it is wealthy; and all who value the life of the tyrant highest, would also say that the state which rules the widest empire is the happiest; and if anybody accepts the individual as happy on account of virtue, he will also say that the state which is the better morally is the happier. But there now arise these two questions that require consideration: first, which mode of life is the more desirable, the life of active citizenship and participation in politics,
σθαι καὶ κοινωνεὶν πόλεως ἡ μᾶλλον δὲ ἐνικός καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος, ἐτι δὲ τίνα πολιτείαν θετέον καὶ ποιῶν διάθεσιν πόλεως ἀρίστην, εἰτε πᾶσιν ὅντος αἰρετοῦ κοινωνεὶν πόλεως εἴτε καὶ τις ἕμεν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις.  

ἔπει δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τούτη ἐστὶν ἐργον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ περὶ ἐκαστὸν αἰρετόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προηγήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν, ἐκείνο μὲν ἑν' πάρεργον ἄν εἰς τοῦτο δ' ἐργον τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείαν ἀρίστην 3 ταύτην καθ' ἣν τάξιν κἀν ὅσιστον ἀρίστα πράττοι καὶ ἡμιορίως φαινόν ἐστιν· ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ὁμολογοῦντων τὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον αἰρετώτατον πότερον ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος αἰρετὸς ἡ μᾶλλον ὁ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος, οἷον θεωρητικός τις, δὲν μόνον τινὲς φασιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον. σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτος τάξιν δῶρ βίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ φιλοτιμότατοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν φαίνονται προαιρομένοι καὶ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τῶν νῦν, λέγω δὲ δύο τὸν τε πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ μικρὸν 4 ποτέρως ἔχει τὸ ἀληθὲς· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν γε' εὐ φρονοῦντα πρὸς τὸν βελτίων σκοποῦν συντάττεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκαστὸν καὶ κοινῇ τήν πολιτείαν. νομίζοι δ' οἱ μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἀρχεῖν δεσποτικῶς μὲν γιγνόμενον μετ' ἀδικίας τευκρὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον 1 μὲν γὰρ κοδ. plurimi.  

2 φιλόσοφοι Jackson: φιλοσόφοι Richards.  

3 γε Spengel: τε κοδ.  

* Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'which alone is said to be desirable by some philosophers.'
or rather the life of an alien and that of detachment from the political partnership; next, what constitution and what organization of a state is to be deemed the best,—either on the assumption that to take an active part in the state is desirable for everybody, or that it is undesirable for some men although desirable for most. But as it is the latter question that is the business of political study and speculation, and not the question of what is desirable for the individual, and as it is the investigation of politics that we have now taken up, the former question would be a side issue, and the latter is the business of political inquiry.

3 Now it is clear that the best constitution is the system under which anybody whatsoever would be best off and would live in felicity; but the question is raised even on the part of those who agree that the life accompanied by virtue is the most desirable, whether the life of citizenship and activity is desirable or rather a life released from all external affairs, for example some form of contemplative life, which is said by some to be the only life that is philosophic. For it is manifest that these are the two modes of life principally chosen by the men most ambitious of excelling in virtue, both in past times and at the present day—I mean the life of politics and the life of philosophy. And it makes no little difference which way the truth lies; for assuredly the wise are bound to arrange their affairs in the direction of the better goal—and this applies to the state collectively as well as to the individual human being. Some persons think that empire over one's neighbours, if despottically exercised, involves a definite injustice of the greatest kind, and if constitutionally, although
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1324 a ὤκ ἔχειν, ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν εὐημερία. τούτων δ᾽ ύστερ ἐξ ἐναντίας ἔτεροι
tυγχάνουσι δοξάζοντες, μόνον γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τὸν πρακτικὸν εἶναι βίον καὶ πολιτικόν, ἐφ' ἐκάστης
gὰρ ἀρετῆς ὤκ εἶναι πράξεις μᾶλλον τοῖς ἰδιώταις
1324 b ἦ τοῖς τὰ κοινὰ πράττουσι καὶ πολιτευομένους.
oἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῶν δὲ
 δεσποτικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας
eἶναι μόνον εὐδαιμονά φασιν. παρ' ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ
tῆς πολιτείας οὗτος ὅρος καὶ τῶν νόμων ὅπως
despolōzousi tōn pēlas. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων
νομίμων χύδην ὡς εἶπεν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς
πλείστοις, ὡμοὶ εἰ ποὺ τι πρὸς ἐν οἱ νόμοι βλέπουσιν,
tοῦ κρατεῖν στοχάζουσι πάντες, ύστερ ἐν Δακε-
dαιμονι καὶ Κρήτη πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντετακ-
tαι σχεδὸν ἢ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλήθος.

10 ἐτὶ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι πᾶσι τοῖς δυναμένοις πλεον-
ekteῖν ἢ τοιαύτη τετίμηται δύναμις, οἴον ἐν Σκύ-
θαις καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ Θρακί καὶ Κελτοῖς. ἐν 6
ἐνίοις γὰρ καὶ νόμοι των εἰσὶ παροξύνουσι πρὸς
tὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην, καθάπερ ἐν Καρχερὸν φασὶ
tὸν ἐκ τῶν κρικῶν κόσμων λαμβάνειν ὦς ἂν
στρατεύσωσι στρατεῖας· ἢν δὲ ποτὲ καὶ περὶ
Μακεδονίαν νόμος τὸν μηθένα ἀπεκταγκότα πολέ-
μον ἀνδρὰ περιεξάωσθαι τὴν φορβείαν. ἐν δὲ
Σκύθαις οὐκ ἔξην πίνειν ἐν ἐόρτῃ τῶν σκύφων
περιφερόμενον τῷ μηθένα ἀπεκταγκότι πολέμουν·
ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἰβηροῖν, ἔθνει πολεμικῷ, τοσοῦτος τὸν

1 ἀφ' Richards.
2 καὶ τῶν Congreve (δ' οὕτως καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρος ΠΜ, et sic cum παιδείας pro πολιτείας Busse): τῶν codd.
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it carries no injustice, yet is a hindrance to the ruler's own well-being; but others hold almost the opposite view to these—they think that the life of action and citizenship is the only life fit for a man, since with each of the virtues its exercise in actions is just as possible for men engaged in public affairs and in politics as for those who live a private life. Some people then hold the former view, while others declare that the despotic and tyrannical form of constitution alone achieves happiness; and in some states it is also the distinctive aim of the constitution and the laws to enable them to exercise despotic rule over their neighbours. Hence even though with most peoples most of the legal ordinances have been laid down virtually at random, nevertheless if there are places where the laws aim at one definite object, that object is in all cases power, as in Sparta and Crete both the system of education and the mass of the laws are framed in the main with a view to war; and also among all the non-Hellenic nations that are strong enough to expand at the expense of others, military strength has been held in honour, for example, among the Scythians, Persians, Thracians and Celts. Indeed among some peoples there are even certain laws stimulating military valour; for instance at Carthage, we are told, warriors receive the decoration of armlets of the same number as the campaigns on which they have served; and at one time there was also a law in Macedonia that a man who had never killed an enemy must wear his halter instead of a belt. Among Scythian tribes at a certain festival a cup was carried round from which a man that had not killed an enemy was not allowed to drink. Among the Iberians, a warlike race, they
ἀριθμὸν ὀβελίσκους καταπηγνύουσι περὶ τὸν τάφον ὅσους ἂν διαφθείρῃ τῶν πολεμίων· καὶ ἔτερα δὴ παρ’ ἔτεροις ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα πολλά, τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατειλημμένα τὰ δὲ ἔθεσιν.

Καὶ τοι δόξειν ἃν ἄγαν ἄτοπον ἴσως εἶναι τοῖς 7 βουλομένοις ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἴ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἔργον τοῦ 25 πολιτικοῦ, τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἀρχῃ καὶ δεσπόζῃ τῶν πλησίων καὶ βουλομένων καὶ μὴ βουλομένων. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἰ ἃπτο τοῦτο πολιτικὸν ἢ νομοθετικὸν ὃ γε μηδὲ νόμιμον ἐστιν; οὐ νόμιμον δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίως ἄλλα καὶ ἄδικως ἀρχεῖν, κρατεῖν δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ μὴ δικαίως. ἄλλα μὴν οὖν 8 ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις τοῦτο ὀρωμένοις ὠυτε γὰρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ ὀυτε τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἡ πεῖσαι ἢ βιάσασθαι τοῦ μὲν τοὺς θεραπευομένους τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πλωτῆρας. ἄλλ’ ἐπικαίων οἱ πολλοὶ τῆς δεσποτικῆς πολιτικῆς οἱ εἰσθαί εἶναι, καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοῖς ἔκαστοι οὐ φασίν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐδὲ συμφέρον, τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἀισχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἄσκουντες· αὐτοῖς μὲν γὰρ παρ’ αὐτοῖς τὸ δικαίως ἀρχεῖν ζητοῦσι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐδὲν μέλει τῶν δικαίων. ἄτοπον δὲ εἴ μὴ φύσει τὸ μὲν 9 δεσποστῶν ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ οὐ δεσποστῶν, ὡστε εἶπερ ἔχει τον τρόπον τοῦτον, οὐ δὲ πάντων πειρᾶσθαι δεσπόζειν, ἄλλα τῶν δεσποστῶν, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ 40 θηρεύειν ἐπὶ θνητὴν ἢ θυσίαν ἄνθρωπος, ἄλλα τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτὸν· ἐστὶ δὲ θηρευτὸν δ’ ἂν ἄγριον ἔδεστον λέγων. ἄλλα μὴν εἴῃ γ’ ἂν καὶ καθ’

1 τῆς πολιτικῆς δεσποτικῆς? Richards.
2 δεσποστῶν (bis) Stahr: δεσπόζον (bis) codd.
3 Lambinus: δεσποστῶν codd.

a Or perhaps ‘pointed stones.’
POLITICS, VII. ii. 6-9

fix small spits\textsuperscript{a} in the earth round a man's grave corresponding in number to the enemies he has killed. So with other races there are many other practices of a similar kind, some established by law and others by custom.

7 Nevertheless those who wish to examine the matter closely might perhaps think it exceedingly strange that it should be the business of a statesman to be able to devise means of holding empire and mastery over the neighbouring peoples whether they desire it or not. How can that be worthy of a statesman or lawgiver which is not even lawful? and government is not lawful when it is carried on not only justly but also unjustly—and superior strength may be unjustly exercised. Moreover we do not see this in the other sciences either: it is no part of a physician's or ship-captain's business to use either persuasion or compulsion upon the patients in the one case and the crew\footnote{Or perhaps 'the passengers.'} in the other. Yet most peoples seem to think that despotic rule is statesmanship, and are not ashamed to practise towards others treatment which they declare to be unjust and detrimental for themselves; for in their own internal affairs they demand just government, yet in their relations with other peoples they pay no attention to justice. Yet it is strange if there is not a natural distinction between peoples suited to be despotically ruled and those not suited; so that if this is so, it is not proper to attempt to exercise despotic government over all people, but only over those suited for it, just as it is not right to hunt human beings for food or sacrifice, but only the game suitable for this purpose, that is, such wild creatures as are good to eat. And more-
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εαυτήν μία πόλις ευδαιμων, ἣ πολιτεύεται δηλον- ὅτι καλῶς, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται πόλιν οἰκεῖσθαι που καθ᾽ εαυτήν νόμους χρωμένην σπουδαίοις, ἢς τῆς πολιτείας ἢ σύνταξις οὐ πρὸς πόλεμον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ἐσται τῶν πολεμίων μηθὲν γὰρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιοῦτον. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι πάσας τὰς 10 πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείας καλὰς μὲν θετέον, οὐχ ὡς τέλος δὲ πάντων ἀκρόταταν ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνου χάριν ταῦτας. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶ τὸ θεάσασθαι πόλιν καὶ γένος ἁνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαι ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, ζωῆς ἁγαθῆς πῶς μεθ- ἐξουσι καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομενής αὐτοῖς ευδαιμονίας. διοίσει μέντοι τῶν ταττομένων ἕνα νομίμως· καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, ἐάν τινες ὑπ- ἀρχωσι γευτιώντες, ποία πρὸς ποῖους ἁσκητέον ἦ· πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἐκάστους χρηστέον.

'Αλλὰ τούτῳ μὲν καὶ ὑστερον τύχοι τῆς προσ- 15 ἡκουσίας σκέψεως, πρὸς τὶ τέλος δεῖ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν συντείνειν.

III. Ἡρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας μὲν τὸν μετ᾽ ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον αἱρετώτατον διαφερομένους δὲ περὶ τῆς χρήσεως αὐτοῦ, λεκτέον ἢ μὲν πρὸς ἀμφο- τέρους αὐτοὺς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκιμαζοῦσι τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς, νομίζοντες τὸν ἐλευθέρον 20 βίον ἕτερον των εἶναι τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ πάντων αἱρετώτατον, οἱ δὲ τούτον ἁριστον, ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μηθὲν πράττοντα πράττειν εῦ, τὴν δ᾽ εὐπρα- γίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι ταῦτον), ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀμφότεροι λέγουσιν ὅρθως τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ ὅρθως, οἱ μὲν

1 ἦ: καὶ Richards. 2 Spengel: τὸν τε codd.

a See cc. xiii., xiv.

b On the ambiguous use of 'do well' see 1323 b 32 n.

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over it is possible even for a single state in isolation to be happy, that is one that is well governed, inasmuch as it is conceivable that a state might be carried on somewhere in isolation, enjoying good laws, and in such a state the system of the constitution will not be framed for the purpose of war or of overpowering its enemies—for we are to suppose everything to do with war to be excluded. It is evident therefore that while all military pursuits are to be deemed honourable, they are not so as being the ultimate end of all things but as means to that end. And it is the business of the good lawgiver to study how a state, a race of men or any other community is to partake of the good life and the happiness possible for them. Some however of the regulations laid down will vary; and in case there exist any neighbour peoples, it is the business of the legislative art to consider what sort of exercises should be practised in relation to what sort of neighbours or how the state is to adopt the regulations that are suitable in relation to each.

But this question of the proper end for the best constitutions to aim at may receive its due consideration later.\(^a\)

III. We turn to those who, while agreeing that the life of virtue is the most desirable, differ about the way in which that life should be pursued. Some disapprove of holding office in the state, thinking that the life of the free man is different from the life of politics and is the most desirable of any; whereas others think the political life the best life, for they argue that it is impossible for the man who does nothing to do well, and doing well and happiness are the same thing.\(^b\) To these two parties we must reply that both are partly right and partly wrong. The
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οτι δ' του ἐλευθέρου βίος του δεσποτικοῦ ἀμείων.

25 τούτο γάρ ἀληθές, οὐθέν γάρ τὸ γε δούλω, ἢ δούλος, χρήσθαι σεμνόν, ὡ γάρ ἐπίταξες ἢ περὶ
tῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδενὸς μετέχει τῶν καλῶν· τὸ 2
μέντοι νομίζειν πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δεσποτείαν
οὐκ ὀρθόν, οὐ γὰρ ἐλαττον διέστηκεν ἢ τῶν ἐλευ-
thέρων ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν δούλων ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ φύσει

30 ἐλεύθερον τοῦ φύσει δούλου. διώρισται δὲ περὶ
αὐτῶν ἴκανως ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις. τὸ δὲ
μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν τὸ ἀπρακτεῖν τῶν πράττεων οὐκ
ἀληθές· ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πράξεις ἔστων, ἔτι δὲ πολ-
λῶν καὶ καλῶν τέλος ἔχουσιν αἰ τῶν δικαίων καὶ
σωφρόνων πράξεις. καίτοι τάχι ἂν ὑπολάβοι τις 3

35 τούτων οὐτω διωριγμένων ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι
πάντων ἀριστον, οὔτω γὰρ ἂν πλείστων καὶ
καλλίστων κύριος εἰπ' πράξειν· ὡστε οὐ δειν" τὸν
dυνάμενον ἀρχεῖν παρέναι τῷ πλησίουν, ἄλλα
μᾶλλον ἀφαίρεσθαι, καὶ μὴτε πατέρα παῖδων μὴτε
παῖδας πατρός μήθ' ὁλως φίλον φίλον μηθένα

40 ὑπόλογον ποιεῖσθαι 2 μηδὲ πρὸς τούτο φροντίζειν·
τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον αἱρετώτατον, τὸ δ' ἐν πράττεων
ἀριστον. τούτο μὲν οὖν ἀληθῶς ἵσως λέγουσιν. 4

1325 b εἶπερ ὑπάρξει τοῖς ἀποστεροῦσι καὶ βιαζόμενοις το

tῶν οὕτων αἱρετώτατον. ἀλλ' ἵσως οὐχ οἶον τε
ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' ὑποτιθέναι τοῦτο ψεῦδος. οὐ γὰρ
ἔτι καλὰς τὰς πράξεις ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τῷ μή
dιαφέροντι τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἀνήρ γυναικὸς ἢ πατήρ

1 Susemihl: δει codd.
2 ὑπόλογον ποιεῖσθαι Madvig: ὑπολογεῖν codd. (v.l., ὑπο-

λογεῖν, ὑπολογίζειν).

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former are right in saying that the life of the free man is better than the life of mastership, for this is true—there is nothing specially dignified in employing a slave, as a slave, for giving orders about menial duties has in it nothing of nobility; yet to think that all government is exercising the authority of a master is a mistake, for there is as wide a difference between ruling free men and ruling slaves as there is between the natural freeman and the natural slave themselves. But these things have been adequately decided in the first discourses. But to praise inaction more highly than action is an error, for happiness is an activity, and further the actions of the just and temperate have in them the realization of much that is noble. Yet on the strength of these decisions somebody might perhaps suppose that the highest good is to be the master of the world, since thus one would have the power to compass the greatest number and the noblest kind of actions, and therefore it is not the duty of the man that is capable of ruling to surrender office to his neighbour, but rather to take it from him, and no account must be taken by father of sons nor by sons of father nor in general by one friend of another, and no heed must be paid to them in comparison with this; for the best thing is the most to be desired, and to do well is the best thing. Now this statement is perhaps true if it is the case that the most desirable of existing things will belong to men that use robbery and violence. But perhaps it cannot belong to them, and this is a false assumption. For a man's acts can no longer be noble if he does not excel as greatly as a man excels a woman or a father his children or

\[ i.e. \ Book I. \]
τέκνων ἦ δεσπότης δούλων, ὥστε ὁ παραβαίνων οὐθέν ἂν τηλικοῦτον κατορθώσειν ὑστερον ὄσον ἤδη παρεκβεβήκε τῆς ἀρετής· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίως τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ ἐν¹ μέρει, τούτῳ γὰρ ἦσον καὶ ὁμιοίων, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἦσον τοῖς ἦσοι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁμιοίων τοῖς ὁμοίως παρὰ φύσιν, οὐθέν δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καλὸν. διὸ καὶ ἄλλος τις ἢ κρείττων κατ’ ἀρετήν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τῆς πρακτικῆ τῶν ἄριστων, τούτω καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τούτῳ πεῖθεσθαι δίκαιον: δὲι δ’ οὐ μόνου ἀρετῆν ἄλλα καὶ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν καθ’ ἦν ἔσται πρακτικός. ἀλλ’ εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τῆν 5 εὐθαμονίαιν εὐπραγίαν θετεόν, καὶ κοινὴ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εὑρ’ καὶ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἀριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. ἀλλὰ τῶν πρακτικῶν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἐτέρους, καθάπερ οἴονται τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας εἶναι μόνος ταῦτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβαίνοντων χάριν γινομένας ἐκ τοῦ 20 πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἐνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὥστε καὶ πράξεις τις. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πράξεων τούς ταῖς διανοίας ἀρχιτέκτονας. ἀλλὰ 6 μὴν οὐδ’ ἀπρακτεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς καθ’ αὐτὰς πόλεις ἐδρυμένας καὶ ζῆν οὕτω προηρημένας· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν, πολλαὶ γὰρ κοινωνία πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς μέρεσι τῆς πόλεως εἰσων. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ

¹ τῷ ἐν Thurot: τῷ codd.

a Cf. 1323 b 32 n., 1325 a 21.

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a master his slaves, so that one who transgresses cannot afterwards achieve anything sufficient to rectify the lapse from virtue that he had already committed; because for equals the noble and just consists in their taking turns, since this is equal and alike, but for those that are equal to have an unequal share and those that are alike an unlike share is contrary to nature, and nothing contrary to nature is noble. Hence in case there is another person who is our superior in virtue and in practical capacity for the highest functions, him it is noble to follow and him it is just to obey; though he must possess not only virtue but also capacity that will render him capable of action. But if these things are well said, and if happiness is to be defined as well-doing, the active life is the best life both for the whole state collectively and for each man individually. But the active life is not necessarily active in relation to other men, as some people think, nor are only those processes of thought active that are pursued for the sake of the objects that result from action, but far more those speculations and thoughts that have their end in themselves and are pursued for their own sake; for the end is to do well, and therefore is a certain form of action. And even with actions done in relation to external objects we predicate action in the full sense chiefly of the master-craftsmen who direct the action by their thoughts. Moreover with cities also, those that occupy an isolated situation and pursue a policy of isolation are not necessarily inactive; for state activities also can be sectional, since the sections of the state have many common relations with one another. And this is also possible similarly in the...
1325 b

καθ' ἐνὸς ότονοῦν τῶν ἄνθρωπων· σχολή γὰρ ἂν ὁ θεὸς εἴχεν καλῶς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος, οἷς οὐκ εἰσῖν
30 ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις παρὰ τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν τὸν αὐτὸν βίον ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τὸν ἀριστον ἐκάστῳ τε τῶν ἄνθρωπων καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς ἄνθρωποις, 2 φανερὸν ἐστὶν.

IV. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πεφρομίασται τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα 1 περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀλλὰς πολιτείας ἥμιν
tetheōrhtai πρότερον, ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν εἰσεῖν
prōton poia s tina s dei tais upotheses ei n peri
tis melloùsias kai eixhen syne stanai polw s. ou
gar oion te politeian genesthai tis aristh an eun
summetron xorhi gias. did dei polla proypo-
tedeisai kathapere evxomennous, ei nai metoi mevhe
40 toûtwn adynaton. lewyn dei oion peri te plithous
politow kai xwras. oster ghar kai tois allous 2
dhimounrois, oion ufanthi kai kuanthi, dei tih
1326 a uln uparxhein epi tidein oðsavn prois tis erga-
ssian (osw gar an auti thnkh an parakynasi en
betaion, anagkhi kai to ginonomeno upo tis techhiph
ei nai kalhion), ouw kai to politikw kai to
5 nomotheh dei tih oikeian ulnh uparxhein epi-
ti deis e xousan. esti dei politikis xorhngias
prōton to te plithos tōn ānthropōn, pósous te
cαι poios tina uparxhein dei fushe, kai kata tihn
xwran wsoauths, posthn te ei nai kai poia tina
tauthn. oïontai mev oion o plieistoi prosithkeiv
3 megalhn ei nai tihn evdaimona polw. ei dei tovt'
10 alithes,agnousoi poia megalh kai poia mikra

1 ed: exo codd.

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a This seems to refer to Books IV.-VI.  b Cf. 1288 b 39 n.
case of any individual human being; for otherwise God and the whole universe could hardly be well circumstanced, since they have no external activities by the side of their own private activities.

It is therefore manifest that the same life must be the best both for each human being individually and for states and mankind collectively.

1 IV. And as we have prepared the way by this prefatory discussion of the subject, and have previously studied all the other forms of constitution, the starting-point for the remainder of our subject is first to specify the nature of the conditions that are necessary in the case of the state that is to be constituted in the ideally best manner. For the best constitution cannot be realized without suitable equipment. We must therefore posit as granted in advance a number of as it were ideal conditions, although none of these must be actually impossible. I mean for instance in reference to number of citizens and territory. All other craftsmen, for example a weaver or a shipwright, have to be supplied with their material in a condition suitable for their trade, for the better this material has been prepared, the finer is bound to be the product of their craft; so also the statesman and the lawgiver ought to be furnished with their proper material in a suitable condition. Under the head of material equipment for the state there first come the questions as to a supply of population—what precisely ought to be its number and what its natural character? and similarly in regard to the territory, what is to be its particular size and nature? Most people imagine that the prosperous state must be a great state; but granted the truth of this, they fail to realize in what quality the
πόλις· κατ’ ἀριθμοῦ γὰρ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνοικοῦντων κρίνουσι τὴν μεγάλην, δεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος εἰς δὲ δύναμιν ἀποβλέπειν. ἐστὶ γὰρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργον, ὡστε τὴν δυναμένην τοῦτο μάλιστ’ ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἴητέον εἶναι μεγίστην, οίον Ἰπποκράτην οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἄλλ’ ἰατρὸν εἶναι μείζων φύσεων ἂν τις τοῦ διαφέροντος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα κἂν εἰ δὲὶ δὲν κρίνειν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέπειντας, οὐ κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλῆθος τοῦτο ποιητέον (ἀναγκαίον γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεοις ἱσως ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ἐκεῖνων), ἀλλ’ ὡς τι πόλεως εἰςο μέρος καὶ εἰς δὲν συνισταῖ τοῖς πολίς οἰκείων πολίων μοιρῶν· ὡς γὰρ τούτων ὑπεροχὴ τοῦ πλῆθους μεγάλης πόλεως σημεῖον, εἰς ἃς δὲ βάναυσοι μὲν ἐξερχόνται πολλοὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὁπλίται δὲ ὀλίγοι, ταύτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι μεγάλην.

ου γὰρ ταύτων μεγάλη τε πόλις καὶ πολυάνθρωπος. ἄλλα μὴν καὶ τοῦτο γε ἐκ τῶν ἐργῶν φανερὸν, ὅτι χαλιπόν, ἵσως δ’ ἀδύνατον, εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν λίαν πολυάνθρωπον. τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν πολιτευόμεθα καλῶς οὐδέμιαν ὀρώμεν οὐσάν ἀνεμένην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος. τοῦτο δὲ δήλον καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων πίστεως. οὶ ταῖς νόμος τάξις τις ἐστι, καὶ τῇ εὐνομίᾳ ἀναγκαίον εὐταξίαν εἶναι· οὶ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλων ἀριθμῶς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξεως, θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἔργον, ἡτὶς καὶ τὸ δέ συνέχει τὸ πᾶν. ²διὸ καὶ πόλιν ἦς μετὰ μεγέθους

1 Camerarius: οἰητέον codd. (cf. 14).
2 διὸ—ἀναγκαίον infra post ἐπεὶ—γίνεσθαι codd.: transp. Boecker.

a In the mss. this clause follows the next.
greatness or smallness of a state consists: they judge a great state by the numerical magnitude of the population, but really the more proper thing to look at is not numbers but efficiency. For a state like other things has a certain function to perform, so that it is the state most capable of performing this function that is to be deemed the greatest, just as one would pronounce Hippocrates to be greater, not as a human being but as a physician, than somebody who surpassed him in bodily size. All the same, even if it be right to judge the state by the test of its multitude, this ought not to be done with regard to the multitude of any and every class (for states are doubtless bound to contain a large number of slaves and resident aliens and foreigners), but the test should be the number of those who are a portion of the state—the special parts of which a state consists. It is superiority in the number of these that indicates a great state; a state that sends forth to war a large number of the baser sort and a small number of heavy-armed soldiers cannot possibly be a great state—for a great state is not the same thing as a state with a large population. But certainly experience also shows that it is difficult and perhaps impossible for a state with too large a population to have good legal government. At all events we see that none of the states reputed to be well governed is without some restriction in regard to numbers. The evidence of theory proves the same point. Law is a form of order, and good law must necessarily mean good order; but an excessively large number cannot participate in order: to give it order would surely be a task for divine power, which holds even this universe together. a Hence that state also must
ARISTOTLE

1326 a

ο λεγθείς ὁ ρός υπάρχει, ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀναγκαίον· ἐπεὶ τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ ἰ
μεγέθει εἴσθε γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τι καὶ πόλεις
μεγέθους μέτρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων,
ξών φυτῶν ὁργάνων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἐκαστον
οὔτε λίαν μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον
ἐξει τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν ὅλως
ἐστερημένων ἐσται τῆς φύσεως, ὅτε δὲ φαινός
ἐχον, οἷον πλοίον σπιθαμαίοιν μὲν οὐκ ἑσται
πλοίων ὅλως, οὔτε δυοῖν σταδίων, εἰς δὲ τι μέγεθος
ἐλθὼν ὅτε μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα φαινόν ποιήσει τὴν
ναυτιλίαν ὅτε δὲ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολήν. ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ 7
πόλις ἢ μὲν ἐξ ὁλίγων λίαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης (ἡ δὲ
πόλις αὐτάρκης), ἢ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἄγαν ἐν τοῖς μὲν
ἀναγκαίοις αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ <δ'> ἔθνος, ἀλλ' οὐ
πόλις, πολιτείαν γὰρ οὐ ῥάδιον ὑπάρχειν—τίς γὰρ
στρατηγός ἐσται τοῦ λιαν ὑπερβάλλοντος πλῆθος;
ἡ τίς κηρύξ μη Στεντόρειος; διὸ πρώτην μὲν
eῖναι πόλιν ἀναγκαίον τὴν ἐκ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος
ὁ πρώτων πλῆθος αὐτάρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ἵνα ἐστὶ
kατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ
τὴν ταύτης ὑπερβάλλουσαν κατὰ πλῆθος εἶναι
μείζων πόλιν· ἀλλὰ τοῦτ οὐκ ἐστιν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν,
ἀόριστον, τίς δ' ἐστιν ὁ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ὅρος, ἐκ
τῶν ἐργῶν ἰδεῖν ῥάδιον. εἰς γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς
πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων τῶν δ' ἀρχομένων,

1 ὥσπερ <δ'> vel <αὐτάρκης δ'> ὥσπερ Jackson.

* i.e. presumably an Ethnos in the usual sense, a community composed of villages loosely bound together by relationship and trade, and united for defence, but not for political life; not an Ethnos of associated cities.

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necessarily be the most beautiful with whose magni-
tude is combined the above-mentioned limiting
principle; for certainly beauty is usually found in
number and magnitude, but there is a due measure
of magnitude for a city-state as there also is for all
other things—animals, plants, tools; each of these
if too small or excessively large will not possess its
own proper efficiency, but in the one case will have
entirely lost its true nature and in the other will be in
a defective condition; for instance, a ship a span
long will not be a ship at all, nor will a ship a quarter
of a mile long, and even when it reaches a certain size,
in the one case smallness and in the other excessive
largeness will make it sail badly. Similarly a state
consisting of too few people will not be self-sufficing
(which is an essential quality of a state), and one
consisting of too many, though self-sufficing in the
mere necessaries, will be so in the way in which a
nation a is, and not as a state, since it will not be easy
for it to possess constitutional government—for who
will command its over-swollen multitude in war?
or who will serve as its herald, unless he have the
lungs of a Stentor? It follows that the lowest limit
for the existence of a state is when it consists of a
population that reaches the minimum number that
is self-sufficient for the purpose of living the good
life after the manner of a political community. It is
possible also for one that exceeds this one in number
to be a greater state, but, as we said, this possi-
bility of increase is not without limit, and what the
limit of the state's expansion is can easily be seen
from practical considerations. The activities of the
state are those of the rulers and those of the persons
ruled, and the work of a ruler is to direct the ad-
This promise is not fulfilled in the work as it has come down to us.

The distinction seems to be between owning (or perhaps getting) wealth and using it; but a probable emendation of the Greek gives 'how we ought to stand in relation to its employment.'
ministration and to judge law-suits; but in order to decide questions of justice and in order to distribute the offices according to merit it is necessary for the citizens to know each other's personal characters, since where this does not happen to be the case the business of electing officials and trying law-suits is bound to go badly; haphazard decision is unjust in both matters, and this must obviously prevail in an excessively numerous community. Also in such a community it is easy for foreigners and resident aliens to usurp the rights of citizenship, for the excessive number of the population makes it not difficult to escape detection. It is clear therefore that the best limiting principle for a state is the largest expansion of the population with a view to self-sufficiency that can well be taken in at one view.

Such may be our conclusion on the question of the size of the state.

V. Very much the same holds good about its territory. As to the question what particular kind of land it ought to have, it is clear that everybody would command that which is most self-sufficing (and such is necessarily that which bears every sort of produce, for self-sufficiency means having a supply of everything and lacking nothing). In extent and magnitude the land ought to be of a size that will enable the inhabitants to live a life of liberal and at the same time temperate leisure. Whether this limiting principle is rightly or wrongly stated must be considered more precisely later on, when we come to raise the general subject of property and the ownership of wealth,—how and in what way it ought to be related to its actual employment; about this question there are many
γὰρ περὶ τὴν σκέψιν ταύτην εἰσὶν ἀμφισβητήσεις
diὰ τοὺς ἐλκοντας ἐφ' ἐκατέραν τοῦ βίου τὴν ὑπερ-
βολὴν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν γλυσχρότητα τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ
tὴν τρυφὴν. τὸ δ' εἶδος τῆς χώρας οὐ χαλεπον 2
eἰπεῖν (δεῖ δὲ ἐνα πείθεσθαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν
στρατηγίαν ἐμπείρους), ὅτι χρὴ μὲν τοῖς 1 πολεμίοις
εἶναι δυσέμβολον αὐτοῖς δ' εὐέξοδον, ἐτὶ δ',
ἀπεὶ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐσύνοπτον
ἐφαμεν εἶναι δεῖν, οὔτω καὶ τὴν χώραν, τὸ δ'
eὐσύνοπτον τὸ εὐβοήθητον εἶναι τὴν χώραν ἔστιν.
tῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν εἰ χρὴ ποιεῖν κατ' εὐχὴν,
5 πρὸς τε τὴν θάλατταν προσήκει κεῖσθαι καλῶς
πρὸς τε τὴν χώραν. εἰς μὲν ὁ λεγθὲις ὅρος, δεὶ
γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἐκβοηθείας κοινὴν εἶναι τῶν τόπων
ἀπάντων· ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν γυνομένων
καρπῶν παραπομπάς, ἐτὶ δὲ τῆς περὶ ἕιλα ὕλης
καὶ εἰ τινὰ ἄλλην ἐργασίαν ἡ χώρα τυγχάνοι
10 κεκτημένη τοιαύτην, εὐπαρακόμιστον. 3
Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κοινωνίας, 3
πότερον ὧφελίμως ταῖς εὐνομομένοις πόλεσιν ἡ
βλαβερά, πολλὰ τυγχάνουσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντες· τὸ
tε γὰρ ἐπιζευγνοῦσθαι τινὰς ἐν ἄλλοις τεθραμμένοις
15 νόμοις ἀσύμφορον εἶναι φασὶ πρὸς τὴν εὐνομίαν,
καὶ τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν, γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ
χρήσθαι τῇ θαλάσσῃ διαπέμποντας καὶ δεχομένοις
ἐμπόρων πλῆθος, ὑπεναντίαν δ' εἶναι πρὸς τὸ
πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ 4
συμβαίνει, βέλτιον καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς

1 τοῖς μὲν Richards.
2 (τὸ) εὐπαρακόμιστον ? Immisch.

a At the beginning of § 2.
controversies, owing to those that draw us towards either extreme of life, the one school towards parsimony and the other towards luxury. The proper configuration of the country it is not difficult to state (though there are some points on which the advice of military experts also must be taken): on the one hand it should be difficult for enemies to invade and easy for the people themselves to march out from, and in addition, on the other hand, the same thing holds good of the territory that we said about the size of the population—it must be well able to be taken in at one view, and that means being a country easy for military defence. As to the site of the city, if it is to be ideally placed, it is proper for it to be well situated with regard both to the sea and to the country. One defining principle is that mentioned above—a—the city must be in communication with all parts of the territory for the purpose of sending out military assistance; and the remaining principle is that it must be easily accessible for the conveyance to it of the agricultural produce, and also of timber-wood and any other such material that the country happens to possess.

As to communication with the sea it is in fact much debated whether it is advantageous to well-ordered states or harmful. It is maintained that the visits of persons brought up under other institutions are detrimental to law and order, and so also is a swollen population, which grows out of sending out abroad and receiving in a number of traders, but is unfavourable to good government. Now it is not difficult to see that, if these consequences are avoided, it is advantageous in respect of both security and the supply of necessary commodities
αὐτοῖς

&

πάσιν ἄγορᾶν προσόδου χάριν ταῦτα πράττονυν, ἣν δὲ μὴ δεῖ πόλιν τοιαύτης μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, οὐδὲ ἐμπόριον δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι τοιοῦτον. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὅρωμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχοντα καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεως ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας εὐφυὸς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὡστε μὴτε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἀστυ

μὴτε πόρρω λίαν ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι τεῖχεοι καὶ τοιοῦτοις ἀλλοὶς ἐρύμασι, φανερὸν ὡς εἰ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τι συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῇ πόλει τούτῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, εἰ δὲ τὶ βλαβερὸν, φυλάξασθαι ῥάδιον τοῖς νόμοις φράξοντας καὶ διορίζοντας τίνας οὐ δεῖ καὶ τίνας ἐπί-

μίσονεσθαι δεῖ πρὸς ἀλλήλους. περὶ δὲ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, ὦτι μὲν βέλτιστον ὑπάρχειν μέχρι τῶν ὑπό πλήθους, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὗ γὰρ μόνον αὐτοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πλησίον τισὶ δεῖ καὶ φοβεροὺς εἶναι καὶ

that the city and the country should have access to the sea. With a view to enduring wars more easily people that are to be secure must be capable of defensive operations on both elements, land and sea, and with a view to striking at assailants, even if it be not possible on both elements, yet to do so on one or the other will be more in the power of people that have access to both. And the importation of commodities that they do not happen to have in their own country and the export of their surplus products are things indispensable; for the state ought to engage in commerce for its own interest, but not for the interest of the foreigner. People that throw open their market to the world do so for the sake of revenue, but a state that is not to take part in that sort of profit-making need not possess a great commercial port. But since even now we see many countries and cities possessing sea-ports and harbours conveniently situated with regard to the city, so as not to form part of the same town and yet not to be too far off, but commanded by walls and other defence-works of the kind, it is manifest that if any advantage does result through the communication of city with port the state will possess this advantage, and if there is any harmful result it is easy to guard against it by means of laws stating and regulating what persons are not and what persons are to have intercourse with one another.

On the question of naval forces, there is no doubt that to possess them up to a certain strength is most desirable (for a state ought to be formidable, and also capable of the defence of not only its own people

\[\textit{Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'part of the town itself.'}\]
δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν, ὡσπερ κατὰ γῆν, καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν: περὶ δὲ πλήθους ἡδὴ καὶ μεγέθους τῆς
dυνάμεως ταύτης πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀποσκεπτέον τῆς
πόλεως· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν
ξῆσται βίον, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν
ὑπάρχειν πρὸς τὰς πράξεις σύμμετρον. τὴν δὲ
pολυανθρωπίαν τὴν γεγονόμενη περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν
όχλον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσι· οὔθεν
gὰρ αὐτοῖς μέρος εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πόλεως. τὸ μὲν
γὰρ ἑπιβατικὸν ἐλεύθερον καὶ τῶν πεζευόντων
ἔστιν, ὅ κύριον ἔστι καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς ναυτικᾶς·
πλῆθος δὲ ὑπάρχοντος περιοικῶν καὶ τῶν τῆς
χώραν γεωργούντων, ἀφθονίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
καὶ ναυτῶν. ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τούτο καὶ νῦν ὑπ-
άρχων τισίν, οἶδον τῇ πόλει τῶν Ἡρακλειστῶν.
pολλὰς γὰρ ἐκπληροῦσι τριήρεις κεκτημένοι τῷ
μεγέθει πόλιν ἐτέρων ἐμμελεστέραν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ λιμένων τῶν πόλεων
καὶ θαλάττης καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως
ἔστω διωρισμένα τὸν τρόπον τούτον.

VI. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους, τίνα μὲν ὁ
ὁρον ὑπάρχειν χρή πρότερον εἴπομεν, ποιοὺς δὲ
tινας τὴν φύσιν εἶναι δεῖ νῦν λέγωμεν. σχεδὸν
dὴ κατανοῆσιν ἄν τις τοῦτό γε βλέψας ἐπὶ τὲ
tὰς πόλεις τὰς εὐδοκιμούσας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ
πρὸς πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην ὑς διείληπται τοῖς
ἐθνεσιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχρῷς ὁποῖος ἑθνὴ
cαι τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἑλεύθερην ἠμοια μὲν ἐστὶ πλήρη,
dιανοίας δὲ ἐνδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης, διόπερ ἐλεύθερα
μὲν διατελεῖ μᾶλλον, ἀπολύτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν

1 τῶν ed.: καὶ codd.
but also some of its neighbours, by sea as well as by land; but when we come to the question of the number and size of this force, we have to consider the state’s manner of life: if it is to live a life of leadership and affairs, it must possess maritime as well as other forces commensurate with its activities. On the other hand it is not necessary for states to include the teeming population that grows up in connexion with the sailor crowd, as there is no need for these to be citizens; for the marines are free men and are a part of the infantry, and it is they who have command and control the crew; and if there exists a mass of villagers and tillers of the soil, there is bound to be no lack of sailors too. In fact we see this state of thing existing even now in some places, for instance in the city of Heraclea; the Heracleotes man a large fleet of triremes, although they possess a city of but moderate size as compared with others. Let such then be our conclusions about the territories and harbours of cities, and the sea, and about naval forces.

VI. About the citizen population, we said before what is its proper limit of numbers. Let us now speak of what ought to be the citizens’ natural character. Now this one might almost discern by looking at the famous cities of Greece and by observing how the whole inhabited world is divided up among the nations. The nations inhabiting the cold places and those of Europe are full of spirit but somewhat deficient in intelligence, so that they continue comparatively free, but lacking in political

\[ \text{i.e. active interference with other states—a broader term than hegemony, leadership of an alliance: cf. 1265 a 23 n.} \]

\[ \text{c. iv. fin.} \]
πλησίον ἀρχεῖν οὔ δυνάμενα· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἀθυμα δὲ, διόπερ ἄρχομενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεῖ· τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ὥσπερ μεσεῦει κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἁμφοῖν μετέχει, καὶ γὰρ ἐνθύμον καὶ διανοητικὸν ἔστιν, διόπερ ἐλευθερόν τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλτιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἀρχεῖν πάντων, μᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας. τὴν αὐτὴν δ' ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη πρὸς ¹ ἀλληλα. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει 2 τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον, τὰ δὲ εὖ² κέκραται πρὸς ἁμφοτέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας. φανερὸν τοῖς ὅτι δεὶ διανοητικοὺς τε εἶναι καὶ θυμοειδεῖς τὴν φύσιν τοὺς μέλλοντας ευαγώγους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν. ὅπερ γὰρ φασὶ τινὲς δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικὸς μὲν εἶναι τῶν γνωρίμων πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἁγνωτας ἁγρίους, ὅ θυμός ἐστιν ὅ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικὸν· αὐτὴ γὰρ ³ εἶναι τῶν γνωρίμων πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἁγνωτας ἁγρίους, ὅ θυμός ἐστιν ὅ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικὸν· αὐτὴ γὰρ

1328 a ἔστιν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις ἡ φιλοῦμεν. σημεῖον ³ δὲ πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους ὅ θυμὸς ἀφέταν μᾶλλον ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ἁγνωτας, ὅλιγοίρεσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχιλοχος προσηκοῦντες τοὺς φίλους ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμὸν.

οὐ ³ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχει. καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης ὑπάρχει πάσιν· ἀρχικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀήτητον ὁ θυμὸς. οὔ καλῶς δ' ἔχει λέγειν

¹ πρὸς ΓΠ¹: καὶ πρὸς cett. ² εὖ ΓΜΠ¹: εὖ τε cett. ³ οὐ Schneider: οὐ codd.

ᵃ i.e. intelligence and high spirit, capacity for self-government and capacity for empire.
ᵇ The ruling class in Plato’s Ideal State, Republic 375 c.
organization and capacity to rule their neighbours. The peoples of Asia on the other hand are intelligent and skilful in temperament, but lack spirit, so that they are in continuous subjection and slavery. But the Greek race participates in both characters, just as it occupies the middle position geographically, for it is both spirited and intelligent; hence it continues to be free and to have very good political institutions, and to be capable of ruling all mankind if it attains constitutional unity. The same diversity also exists among the Greek races compared with one another: some have a one-sided nature, others are happily blended in regard to both these capacities. It is clear therefore that people that are to be easily guided to virtue by the lawgiver must be both intellectual and spirited in their nature. For as to what is said by certain persons about the character that should belong to their Guardians—they should be affectionate to their friends but fierce towards strangers—it is spirit that causes affectionateness, for spirit is the capacity of the soul whereby we love.

A sign of this is that spirit is more roused against associates and friends than against strangers, when it thinks itself slighted. Therefore Archilochus for instance, when reproaching his friends, appropriately apostrophizes his spirit:

For 'tis thy friends that make thee choke with rage. Moreover it is from this faculty that power to command and love of freedom are in all cases derived; for spirit is a commanding and indomitable element.

Archilochus of Paros (one of the earliest lyric poets, fl. 600 B.C., the inventor of the iambic metre, which he used for lampoons), fr. 61 Bergk, 676 Diehl, 67 Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus, ii. 133.
χαλεποὺς εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνώτας. πρὸς οὖθεν 10 γὰρ εἶναι χρή τοιοῦτον, οὐδ’ εἰσὶν οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τὴν φύσιν ἁγριοὶ πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, τοῦτο δὲ μᾶλλον ἐτὶ πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις πάσχουσιν, ὅπερ εἰρήται πρότερον, ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι νομίσωσιν. καὶ 4 τοῦτο συμβαίνει κατὰ λόγουν παρ’ οἷς γὰρ ὁφείλεσθαι τὴν 1 εὐεργεσίαν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, πρὸς τῷ βλάβει καὶ ταύτῃς ἀποστερεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν· ὅθεν εἰρήται 15 χαλεπόν γάρ πόλεμοι ἄδελφῶν καὶ
οἱ τοι πέρα στέρξαντες, οὶ δὲ καὶ πέρα μισοῦν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευμένων, πόσους τε ὑπάρχειν δεὶ καὶ ποίους τινὰς τὴν φύσιν, ἐτὶ δὲ τὴν χώραν πόσην τέ τινα καὶ πολίαν τινά, διώρισται 20 σχεδὸν. οὐ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεὶ ἐγγεί διὰ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως.

VII. Ἔπει δ’, ὕστερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν 1 συνεστῶτων οὐ ταῦτά3 ἐστι μόρια τῆς ὅλης συν- 25 στάσεως ὧν ἀνευ τὸ ὄλον οὐκ ἂν εἰη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγ- καίον ὑπάρχειν (οὐδ’ ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὔδεμας, εξ ἧς ἐν τι τὸ γένος, ἐν γάρ τι καὶ κοινὸν εἶναι δεὶ καὶ ταύτῳ τοῖς κοινωνίς, ἂν τε ἵσον ἂν τε ἕνοισιν

1 τὴν Schneider: δεῖν (vel δεῖ, δέ) τὴν codd. 2 ἐπὶ Richards. 3 ταῦτα cod. inf.: πάντα Wyse.

4 Euripides fr. 965.
But it is a mistake to describe the Guardians as cruel towards strangers; it is not right to be cruel towards anybody, and men of great-souled nature are not fierce except towards wrongdoers, and their anger is still fiercer against their companions if they think that these are wronging them, as has been said before. And this is reasonable, because they think that in addition to the harm done them they are also being defrauded of a benefit by persons whom they believe to owe them one. Hence the sayings

For brothers' wars are cruel, a

and

They that too deeply loved too deeply hate. b

We have now approximately decided what are the proper numbers and the natural qualities of those who exercise the right of citizens, and the proper extent and nature of the territory (for we must not seek to attain the same exactness by means of theoretical discussions as is obtained by means of the facts that come to us through sense-perceptions).

But since, just as with all other natural organisms those things that are indispensable for the existence of the whole are not parts c of the whole organization, it is also clear that not all the things that are necessary for states to possess are to be counted as parts of a state (any more than this is so with any other association that forms something one in kind, for there must be something that is one and common and the same for the partners, whether the shares that they take be equal or unequal:


a Trag. incert. fr. 78 Nauck.

b i.e. they are not all of them parts: the 'parts' of a thing are among the 'indispensable conditions' of its existence, but there are others also.
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1328 a

μεταλαμβάνωσιν, οίον εἶτε τροφῇ τοῦτο ἐστὶν εἶτε χώρας πλήθος εἰτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶν)—

όταν δ' ἥ το μὲν τοῦτο ἔνεκεν τὸ δ' οὗ ἐνεκὲν, 2

οὐθὲν ἐν γε τοῦτοι κοινὸν ἀλλ' ἥ τῷ μὲν ποιῆσαι τῷ δὲ λαβεῖν· λέγω δ' οἶον ὅργανω τε παντὶ πρὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον ἔργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς· οἰκία γάρ πρὸς οἰκοδόμον οὐθέν ἐστιν ὁ γίνεται κοινὸν, ἀλλ' ἐστι τῆς οἰκίας χάριν ἡ τῶν οἰκοδόμων τέχνη.

διὸ κτῆσεως μὲν δεὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστίν

ἡ κτήσεις μέρος τῆς πόλεως. πολλά δ' ἐμπυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεως ἐστὶν. ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐνεκέν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐν-

δεχομένης ἀριστης. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστίν εὐδαιμονία τὸ 3

ἀριστον, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρήσις τις τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως ὡστε τοὺς μὲν

ἐνδέχεσθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς, τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν ἢ μηδὲν,

δῆλον ὅσ τοῦτ' αἰτιον τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πόλεως εἰδὴ καὶ διαφοράς καὶ πολιτείας πλείους· ἄλλον γάρ

τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων ἠκαστοι τοῦτο θηρεύοντες τοὺς τε βίους ἐτέρους ποιοῦντα καὶ τὰς πολιτείας.

ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταυτὶ ἐστὶν ὃν ἄνευ τοῖς οὐκ ἄν εἰη· καὶ γάρ ἂ λέγομεν εἰναι μέρη πόλεως, ἐν τοῦτοι ἄν εἰη, διὸ ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν.

ληπτέον τοῖνυν τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἄριθμον· εκ τοῦτων 4

γάρ ἐσται δήλον. πρῶτον μὲν οὐν ὑπάρχειν δεί

1 παθεῖν Postgate.

2 διὸ om. codd. cet.: διὰ τὸ Γ.

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a The sentence is unfinished.

b Possibly the words from the beginning of § 2 'But when' to this point should be transferred below to § 3 mid. after 'different constitutions.'
for example this common property may be food or an area of land or something else of the same sort)—but when of two related things one is a means and the other an end, in their case there is nothing in common except for the one to act and the other to receive the action. I mean for instance the relation between any instrument or artificer and the work that they produce: between a house and a builder there is nothing that is produced in common, but the builder’s craft exists for the sake of the house. Hence although states need property, the property is no part of the state. And there are many living things that fall under the head of property. And the state is one form of partnership of similar people, and its object is the best life that is possible. And since the greatest good is happiness, and this is some perfect activity or employment of virtue, and since it has so come about that it is possible for some men to participate in it, but for others only to a small extent or not at all, it is clear that this is the cause for there arising different kinds and varieties of state and several forms of constitution; for as each set of people pursues participation in happiness in a different manner and by different means they make for themselves different modes of life and different constitutions. And we must also further consider how many there are of these things referred to that are indispensable for the existence of a state; for among them will be the things which we pronounce to be parts of a state, owing to which their presence is essential. We must therefore consider the list of occupations that a state requires: for from these it will appear what the indispensable classes are. First then a state must have a supply of food;
trophēn, ἐπειτα τέχνας (πολλῶν γὰρ ὀργάνων δεῖται
tο ζῆν), τρίτον δὲ ὀπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοινωνοῦταις
ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν ὀπλα πρὸς τε τὴν
άρχην, τῶν ἀπειθοῦντων χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς
ὲξωθεν ἀδικεῖν ἐπιχειροῦντας), ἐτὶ χρημάτων τινὰ
evπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχωσι καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ' αὐτοὺς
χρείας καὶ πρὸς πολεμικά, πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον
tὴν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἐπιμέλειαν, ἣν καλοῦσιν ἱερά-
tείαν, ἔκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πάντων ἀναγκαίω-
tατον κρίσιν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν
δικαίων τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα
ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὅν δεῖται πᾶσα πόλις ὡς εἰπεῖν (ἡ γὰρ
πόλις πλῆθος ἐστὶν οὐ τὸ τυχόν, ἄλλα πρὸς ζωῆν
αὐτάρκεια, ὡς φαμέν, ἐὰν δὲ τῇ τυγχάνῃ τοῦτων
ἐκλείπων, ἀδύνατον ἀπλῶς αὐτάρκη τήν κοινωνίαν
εἶναι ταύτην). ἀνάγκη τοῖςν κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας
ταῦτας συνεστάναι πόλιν: δεῖ ἄρα γεωργῶν τ'
eἶναι πλῆθος οἱ παρασκευάσουσι τὴν τροφήν, καὶ
tεχνίτας, καὶ τὸ μάχιμον, καὶ τὸ εὔπορον, καὶ
ἰερεῖς, καὶ κρίτας τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμ-
φερόντων.

VIII. Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λοιπὸν σκέψασθαι

pότερον πάσι κοινωνητέου πάντων τούτων (ἐνδὲ-
χεται γὰρ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄπαντας εἶναι καὶ γεωργοὺς
καὶ τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς βουλευμένους καὶ δικά-
ζοντας), ἣ καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων
ἄλλους ὑποθετέον, ἣ τὰ μὲν ἵδια τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τούτων

1 δικαίων Lambinus.

*Cf. ii. i. 7, iii. i. 8, v. ii. 10.*
secondly, handicrafts (since life needs many tools); third, arms (since the members of the association must necessarily possess arms both to use among themselves and for purposes of government, in cases of insubordination, and to employ against those who try to molest them from without); also a certain supply of money, in order that they may have enough both for their internal needs and for requirements of war; fifth, a primary need, the service of religion, termed a priesthood; and sixth in number and most necessary of all, a provision for deciding questions of interests and of rights between the citizens. These then are the occupations that virtually every state requires (for the state is not any chance multitude of people but one self-sufficient for the needs of life, as we say, and if any of these industries happens to be wanting, it is impossible for that association to be absolutely self-sufficient).

It is necessary therefore for the state to be organized on the lines of these functions; consequently it must possess a number of farmers who will provide the food, and craftsmen, and the military class, and the wealthy, and priests and judges to decide questions of necessity and of interests.

VIII. These matters having been settled, it remains to consider whether everybody is to take part in all of these functions (for it is possible for the whole of the people to be at once farmers and craftsmen and the councillors and judges), or whether we are to assume different classes corresponding to each of the functions mentioned, or whether some of them must necessarily be specialized and others combined.

Perhaps the text should be altered to give ‘matters of justice.’


ARISTOTLE

1328 b

εἰς ἀνάγκης ἐστίν. οὐκ ἐν πᾶσῃ δὲ ταῦτα¹ πολιτεῖα.
καθάπερ γὰρ εὔπομεν, ἐνδέχεται καὶ πάντας κοι-
νωνεῖν πάντως καὶ μὴ πάντας πάντως ἂλλα τινὰς
τινῶν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἐτέρας·
ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσι πάντες
πάντως, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλυγαρχίαις τοῦναντίον. ἐπεὶ 2
δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολι-
τείας, αὐτὴ δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἂν ἡ πόλις ἂν εἰη μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων,
τὴν δ' εὐδαμονίαν ὅτι χωρίς ἄρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εὐρήται πρότερον,
βανερὸν ἂν τούτων ὡς ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτευμένῃ πόλει,
καὶ τῇ κεκτημένῃ δυκαίοις ἀνδρας ἀπλῶς ἄλλα μὴ
πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οὔτε βάναυσον βίον οὔτ' 3
ἀγοραῖον δεῖ ξὴν τοὺς πολίτας (ἀγεννη ὡς ἂν ὃ
τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς ἄρετην ὑπεναντίος), οὔδε
dὴ γεωργοὺς εἰναι τοὺς μέλλοντας ἔσεσθαι² (δεὶ
γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν τῆς ἄρετῆς καὶ
πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικὰς). ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ 3
πολέμικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμ-
φερόντων καὶ κρίνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐνυπάρχει
καὶ μέρη φαῖνεται τῆς πόλεως μάλιστα ὄντα,
πότερον ἐτέρα³ καὶ ταῦτα θετέον ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς
ἀποδοτέον ἄμφω; βανερὸν δὲ καὶ τούτῳ, διὸτι
τρόπον μὲν τινὰ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, τρόπον δὲ τινὰ καὶ
ἐτέροις. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐτέρας ἀκμῆς ἐκάτερον τῶν
ἐργῶν, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῖται φρονῆσεως τὸ δὲ δυνά-

1 ταῦτα Spengel: τοῦτο codd.
2 [τοὺς] μέλλοντας ἔσεσθαι supra post ξὴν τοὺς 40 Richards.
3 ἐτέρα <ἐτέροις> Coraes.

⁴ Cf. iv. iv. and xiv. ⁵ c. i. § 5.

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But it will not be the same in every form of constitution; for, as we said, it is possible either for all the people to take part in all the functions or for not all to take part in all but for certain people to have certain functions. In fact these different distributions of functions are the cause of the difference between constitutions: democracies are states in which all the people participate in all the functions, oligarchies where the contrary is the case. But at present we are studying the best constitution, and this is the constitution under which the state would be most happy, and it has been stated before that happiness cannot be forthcoming without virtue; it is therefore clear from these considerations that in the most nobly constituted state, and the one that possesses men that are absolutely just, not merely just relatively to the principle that is the basis of the constitution, the citizens must not live a mechanic or a mercantile life (for such a life is ignoble and inimical to virtue), nor yet must those who are to be citizens in the best state be tillers of the soil (for leisure is needed both for the development of virtue and for active participation in politics). And since the state also contains the military class and the class that deliberates about matters of policy and judges questions of justice, and these are manifestly in a special sense parts of the state, are these classes also to be set down as distinct or are both functions to be assigned to the same persons? But here also the answer is clear, because in a certain sense they should be assigned to the same persons, but in a certain sense to different ones. Inasmuch as each of these two functions belongs to a different prime of life, and one requires wisdom, the other strength,
10 μεως, ἑτέρως: ἣ δὲ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τοὺς δυναμένους βιώσεσθαι καὶ καλῶν, τούτους ὑπομένειν ἀρχομένους ἄεὶ, ταύτη δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς: οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὁπλων κύριοι καὶ μένειν ἡ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν. λέιπεται τοιῶν τοῖς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἀμφοτέρους ἀποδιδόναι τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην,

15 μὴ ἀμα δὲ, ἀλλ᾽, ὥσπερ πέφυκεν ἡ μὲν δύναμις ἐν νεωτέροις ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐν πρεσβυτέροις εἶναι, ἐσκεν οὖτως ἀμφὸν νενεμήθησαι συμφέρειν καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι: ἔχει γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατίσιαν. ἄλλα μὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεὶ εἶναι περὶ τούτοις: ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εὐπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολίται δὲ οὕτως. τὸ γὰρ βάναυσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως, οὔτ' ἀλλο οὕθεν γένος δ μὴ τῆς ἁρετῆς δημιουργὸν ἔστων. τούτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως: τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἁρετῆς, εὐδαιμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέπαντας δεὶ λέγειν αὐτῆς ἀλλ᾽

20 εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι δεὶ τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων, εἴπερ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους περιοίκους. λοιπὸν δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν καταρθημηθέντων τὸ τῶν ἱερῶν ἢ γένος βαρβαρά δὲ καὶ ἡ τούτων τάξις. οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν οὔτε βάναυσον ἱερέα καταστατέον, ὑπὸ

1 ἀμφότερα? Susemihl. 2 ταῦτα? Susemihl.
3 εἶναι ἐσκεν ... συμφέρει Immisch: ἐστίν: ὅπως ... συμφέρει codd. (sed pro εἶναι esse videtur Guil.).
4 εἴπερ Hayduck. 5 ὅτι Hayduck.
6 βαρβάρους Susemihl: βαρβάρους ἢ codd.

a Or, amending this curious Greek, 'for the constitution to assign both these functions to the same people.'
b A Platonic phrase, Republic 500 d.
they are to be assigned to different people; but inasmuch as it is a thing impossible that when a set of men are able to employ force and to resist control, these should submit always to be ruled, from this point of view both functions must be assigned to the same people; for those who have the power of arms have the power to decide whether the constitution shall stand or fall. The only course left them is to assign this constitutional function to both sets of men without distinction, yet not simultaneously, but, as in the natural order of things strength is found in the younger men and wisdom in the elder, it seems to be expedient and just for their functions to be allotted to both in this way, for this mode of division possesses conformity with merit. Moreover the ownership of properties also must be centred round these classes, for the citizens must necessarily possess plentiful means, and these are the citizens. For the artisan class has no share in the state, nor has any other class that is not 'an artificer of virtue.' And this is clear from our basic principle; for in conjunction with virtue happiness is bound to be forthcoming, but we should pronounce a state happy having regard not to a particular section of it but to all its citizens. And it is also manifest that the properties must belong to these classes, inasmuch as it is necessary for the tillers of the soil to be slaves, or serfs of alien race. There remains of the list enumerated the class of priests; and the position of this class also is manifest. Priests must be appointed neither from the tillers of the soil nor from the artisans, for it is seemly that the gods should be

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\(^{6}\) As this is a new point, perhaps we should transpose 'inasmuch as' (ἐν ὁμοίωσι) and 'that' (ὅτι) in the line above.
ARISTOTLE

1329 a

γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεούς:

30 ἐπεὶ δὲ διήρηται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς δύο μέρη, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικὸν, πρέπει δὲ τὴν τεθεραπεῖαν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας, τούτοις ἂν εἰθ' τὰς ἐρωσύνας ἀπο-

35 δοτέον.

IX. Ἐσσικε δ' οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ τούτ' εἶναι γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ὅτι

32 ὧν μὲν τοῖνυν ἄνευ πόλις οὐ συνισταται καὶ ὃσα μέρη πόλεως εὑρηται: γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τεχνιται καὶ πᾶν τὸ θητικὸν ἀναγκαῖον [ὑπάρχειν] ταῖς πόλεωι, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὸ τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικὸν καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ τούτων ἕκαστον, τὸ μὲν άει, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος.

40 IX. 'Εσσικε δ' οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ τούτ' εἶναι γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ὅτι

1329 b δεὶ διηρήσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη τήν πόλιν καὶ τὸ τε μάχημον ἑτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν. ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τε γὰρ ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τούτον ἔτι καὶ

35 νῦν τὰ τε περὶ τῆν Κρήτην, τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Αἰγύπτου Σεσώστριος, ὡς φασὶν, οὕτω νομοθετῆ-

40 σαντος, Μίνῳ δὲ τὰ περὶ Κρήτην. ἀρχαία δ' ἐσσικεν εἶναι καὶ τῶν συςστῶν ἢ τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα περὶ τήν Μίνῳ βασιλείαι, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆν Ἰταλίαν πολλῆ παλαιότερα τούτων, φασὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τῶν ἔκει κατοικοῦντων Ἰταλόν τυν γενέσθαι βασιλεία τῆς Οἰνωτριάς, ἀφ' οὗ τὸ

10 τὸ ὄνομα μεταβαλόντας Ἰταλός ἀντ' Οἰνωτρών κληθήναι καὶ τὴν ἀκτὴν ταῦτην τῆς Εὐρώπης

1 v.l. τών.

3 Spengel.

a i.e. the 'appurtenances' are permanently separate from the army and the deliberative, which are the 'parts,' and

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worshipped by citizens; and since the citizen body is divided into two parts, the military class and the councillor class, and as it is seemly that those who have relinquished these duties owing to age should render to the gods their due worship and should spend their retirement in their service, it is to these that the priestly offices should be assigned.

We have therefore stated the things indispensable for the constitution of a state, and the things that are parts of a state: tillers of the soil, craftsmen and the labouring class generally are a necessary appurtenance of states, but the military and deliberative classes are parts of the state; and moreover each of these divisions is separate from the others, either permanently or by turn.  

1 IX. And that it is proper for the state to be divided up into castes and for the military class to be distinct from that of the tillers of the soil does not seem to be a discovery of political philosophers of to-day or one made recently.  

In Egypt this arrangement still exists even now, as also in Crete; it is said to have been established in Egypt by the legislation of Sesostris and in Crete by that of Minos.

2 Common meals also seem to be an ancient institution, those in Crete having begun in the reign of Minos, while those in Italy are much older than these. According to the historians one of the settlers there, a certain Italus, became king of Oenotria, and from him they took the name of Italians instead of that of Oenotrians, and the name of Italy was given to all which are separate from each other only 'by turn,' i.e. a citizen passes on from one to the other.  

Perhaps to be read as denying the originality of Plato's Republic.
ARISTOTLE

1329b Ἰταλίαν τοῦνομα λαβεῖν ὡσθε τετυχηκεν ἐντὸς οὖσα τοῦ κόλπου τοῦ Σκυλλητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ Λαμητικοῦ· ἀπέχει δὲ ταῦτα ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων οὐδὲν ἡμισειάς ἡμέρας. τούτον δὴ λέγουσι τὸν Ἰταλὸν νομάδας 3 τῶν Οἰνωτρούς ὄντας πούσασι γεωργοὺς, καὶ νόμους ἄλλους τε αὐτοῖς θέσθαι καὶ τὰ συσσίτια καταστήσαι πρῶτον· διὸ καὶ νῦν ἐτὶ τῶν ἀπ’ ἐκεῖνον τινὲς χρῶνται τοὺς συσσίτιοις καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐνίοις. ἵκουν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρηνίαν Ὄπικοι καὶ πρὸτέροι καὶ νῦν καλομενοι τὴν 20 ἐπωνυμίαν Ἀὔσονες, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰατυνίαν καὶ τοῦ Ἰόνιον Χώνες, τὴν καλομενήν Σύρτιν. ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χώνες Οἰνωτροῖ τὸ γένος. ἦ μὲν οὖν 4 τῶν συσσίτων τάξις ἐνεύθεν γέγονε πρῶτον, δὲ χωριμός ὃ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους εἶναι Λιγύπτου· πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτείνει τοῖς χρόνοις 25 τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν ἡ Σεσώστριος. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεὶ νομίζειν εὐρηθαίοι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, μᾶλλον δ’ ἀπειράκις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαία τὴν χρείαν διδάσκειν εἰκὸς αὐτῆν, τὰ δ’ εἰς εὐφανειμόσυνην καὶ περιουσίαν ὑπαρχόντων ἡδὴ τούτων εὐλογον λαμβάνειν τὴν αὐξήσων· ὡστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶς πολιτείας οἴσθαι δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχειν τρόπον. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαία, σημεῖον τὰ 5 περὶ Λιγύπτου ἐστιν· οὕτω γὰρ ἀρχαίοτατοι μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, νόμων δὲ τετυχήκασιν ἄεις καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς μὲν εὐρημένοις

1 Σιρίτιν Goettling.  
2 Bernays et Susemihl.  
3 Lambinus: εἰρημένοι codd.

a i.e. the south-west peninsula or toe of Italy.  
b i.e. the Gulfs of Squillace and Eufemia.
that promontory \(a\) of Europe lying between the Gulfs of Scylletium and of Lametus,\(b\) which are half a day's journey apart. It was this Italus then who according to tradition converted the Oenotrians from a pastoral life to one of agriculture and gave them various ordinances, being the first to institute their system of common meals; hence the common meals and some of his laws are still observed by certain of his successors even to-day. The settlers in the direction of Tyrrhenia \(c\) were Opicans, who to-day as in former times bear the surname of Ausonians; the region towards Iapygia \(d\) and the Ionian Gulf, called Syrtis, was inhabited by the Chones, who also were Oenotrians by race. It is from this country that the system of common meals has its origin, while the division of the citizen-body by hereditary caste came from Egypt, for the reign of Sesostris long antedates that of Minos. We may almost take it therefore that all other political devices also have been discovered repeatedly, or rather an infinite number of times over, in the lapse of ages; for the discoveries of a necessary kind are probably taught by need itself, and when the necessaries have been provided it is reasonable that things contributing to refinement and luxury should find their development; so that we must assume that this is the way with political institutions also. The antiquity of all of them is indicated by the history of Egypt; for the Egyptians are reputed to be the oldest of nations, but they have always had laws and a political system. Hence we should use the results of previous dis-

\(c\) The modern Tuscany, \textit{i.e.} the people of Lucania, Campania and Latium.

\(d\) The south-east promontory or heel of Italy.
This vague phrase (based on the proverb κοινά τὰ τῶν φίλων, ‘friends’ goods are common property’) seems to denote some sort of customary communism in the cultivation of the land and enjoyment of the produce, combined with private ownership of the freehold.
covery when adequate, while endeavouring to investigate matters hitherto passed over.

It has been stated before that the land ought to be owned by those who possess arms and those who share the rights of the constitution, and why the cultivators ought to be a different caste from these, and what is the proper extent and conformation of the country. We have now to discuss first the allotment of the land, and the proper class and character of its cultivators; since we advocate not common ownership of land, as some have done, but community in it brought about in a friendly way by the use of it, and we hold that no citizen should be ill supplied with means of subsistence. As to common meals, all agree that this is an institution advantageous for well-organized states to possess; our own reasons for sharing this view we will state later. But the common meals must be shared by all the citizens, and it is not easy for the poor to contribute their assessed share from their private means and also to maintain their household as well. And moreover the expenses connected with religion are the common concern of the whole state. It is necessary therefore for the land to be divided into two parts, of which one must be common and the other the private property of individuals; and each of these two divisions must again be divided in two. Of the common land one portion should be assigned to the services of religion, and the other to defray the cost of the common meals; of the land in private ownership one part should be the district near the frontiers, and another the district near the city, in order that

\[\text{NOTE: This promise is not fulfilled.}\]
στὶς νεμηθέντων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τόπων πάντες μετέχοντες. τὸ τε γὰρ ἵσον οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὁ καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας πολέμους ὁμονοητικοῦτον. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ τούτων ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οἳ μὲν ὀλιγορροῦσι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὀμόρους ἔχθρας οἳ δὲ λίαν φροντίζουσι καὶ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν. διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις νόμοις ἔστι τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τοὺς ὀμόρους μὴ συμμετέχειν βουλής τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, ὡς δὲ τὸ ἴδιον οὐκ ἀν δυναμένους βουλεύσασθαι καλῶς. τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν ἀνάγκη διηρήσαθαι τὸν τρόπον τούτων διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας.

Τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας μάλιστα μὲν, εἰ δὲι κατ' εὐχῆν, δούλους εἰναι, μὴτε ὀμοφύλων πάντων μὴτε θυμοειδῶν (οὕτω γὰρ ἄν πρὸς τε τὴν ἐργασίαν εἶνεν κρήσιμοι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν νεωτερίζειν ἀσφαλείς), δεύτερον δὲ βαρβάρους περιοίκους παραπλησίους τοὺς εἰρημένους τὴν φύσιν. τούτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἰδίους ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι τῶν κεκτημένων τὰς ὦσιάς, τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ γῇ κοινοῖς. τίνα δὲ δεὶ τρόπον κρῆσθαι δούλους, καὶ διότι βέλτιων πάσι τοῖς δούλοις ἀθλον προκεῖσθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ύστερον ἑροῦμεν.

Χ. Τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅτι μὲν δεὶ κοινῇ εἰναι τῆς ἡπείρου τε καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῆς χώρας ἀπάσης ὀμοίως ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, εἰρήνα πρότερον αὐτῆς δὲ προσάντη τὴν θέσιν εὐχεσθαι δεὶ κατα-

1 βουλής <περί> Richards. 2 πάντων <ὅντων> Richards. 3 Βαρβάρους <ἡ> Schneider (cf. 1329 a 27). 4 om. cod. deterior. 5 Immisch: πρὸς αὐτὴν εἰναι codd. 584
two plots may be assigned to each citizen and all
may have a share in both districts. This arrange-
ment satisfies equity and justice, and also conduces
to greater unanimity in facing border warfare. Where this system is not followed, one set of people
are reckless about quarrelling with the neighbouring
states, and the other set are too cautious and neglect
considerations of honour. Hence some people have
a law that the citizens whose land is near the frontier
are not to take part in deliberation as to wars against
neighbouring states, on the ground that private
interest would prevent them from being able to
take counsel wisely. The land must therefore be
divided up in this manner because of the reasons
aforesaid.

Those who are to cultivate the soil should best of
all, if the ideal system is to be stated, be slaves, not
drawn from people all of one tribe nor of a spirited
character (for thus they would be both serviceable
for their work and safe to abstain from insurrection),
but as a second best they should be alien serfs of a
similar nature. Of these labourers those in private
employment must be among the private possessions
of the owners of the estates, and those working on
the common land common property. How slaves
should be employed, and why it is advantageous
that all slaves should have their freedom set before
them as a reward, we will say later.  

X. It has been said before that the city should so
far as circumstances permit be in communication
alike with the mainland, the sea and the whole of its
territory. The site of the city itself we must pray
that fortune may place on sloping ground, having

* This promise is not fulfilled.
ARISTOTLE

1330 a
tυγχάνειν πρός τέτταρα βλέποντας, πρώτον μέν, ὡς αναγκατον, πρός ύγίειαν (αἱ τε γὰρ πρός
40 ἐω τὴν ἐγκλισυν ἔχουσαι καὶ πρός τὰ πνεύματα τὰ
πνέοντα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνατολῆς ύγιεινότεραι, δεύτερον
δὲ κατὰ βορεάν, εὐχείμεροι γὰρ αὐτὰι μᾶλλον).
1330 b τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πρός τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ
2 πολεμικὰς καλῶς ἔχει.¹ πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολε-
μικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εὐθείων εἶναι χρή, τοῖς δὲ
ἔναντίοις δυσπρόσοδοι καὶ δυσπερίληπτοι, ὑδάτων
τε καὶ ναμάτων μάλιστα μὲν ὑπάρχειν πλῆθος
5 οἰκεῖον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τούτῳ γ' εὐρηται διὰ τοῦ κατα-
σκευάζειν ύποδοχὰς ὀμβρίοις ὕδασιν ἀφθόνους καὶ
μεγάλας, ὅστε μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἰργομένους
τῆς χώρας διὰ πόλεμον. ἔπει δὲ δεὶ περὶ ύγιείας
3 φροντίζειν τῶν ἐνοικοῦντων, τούτῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ
10 κείσθαι τὸν τόπον ἐν τῇ τοιούτῳ καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον
καλῶς, δεύτερον δὲ ύδασιν ύγιεινοῖς χρήσθαι, καὶ
τούτῳ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν μὴ παρέργως. ὅσ
gὰρ πλείστους χρώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πλει-
στάκις, ταῦτα πλεῖστον συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν
ὑγιείαν. ἥ δὲ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος
15 δύναμιν τουαύτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν. διὸτερ ἐν ταῖς
ev φρονούσαις δεὶ διωρίσθαι πόλεσιν, εὰν μὴ πάνθ' ὅμως μὴδ'² ἀφθονία τούτων ἡ ναμάτων, χωρὶς
tὰ τε εἰς τροφὴν ὕδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην
χρείαν. περὶ δὲ τῶν ὑδάτων ἐρμούν τις πάσαις
ἐξεὶ τὸ συμφέρον ταῖς πολιτείαις. οἶτον
20 ἀκρόπολις ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ μοναρχικὸν, δημο-

¹ Immisch: ἔχειν codd.
² Coraes: μὴ codd.

* Apparently (1) fresh air, (2) water supply, (3) administration, (4) military requirements.
586
regard to four considerations: first, as a thing essential, the consideration of health (for cities whose site slopes east or towards the breezes that blow from the sunrise are more healthy, and in the second degree those that face away from the north wind, for these are milder in winter); and among the remaining considerations, a sloping site is favourable both for political and for military purposes. For military purposes therefore the site should be easy of exit for the citizens themselves, and difficult for the adversary to approach and to blockade, and it must possess if possible a plentiful natural supply of pools and springs, but failing this, a mode has been invented of supplying water by means of constructing an abundance of large reservoirs for rain-water, so that a supply may never fail the citizens when they are debarred from their territory by war.

And since we have to consider the health of the inhabitants, and this depends upon the place being well situated both on healthy ground and with a healthy aspect, and secondly upon using wholesome water-supplies, the following matter also must be attended to as of primary importance. Those things which we use for the body in the largest quantity, and most frequently, contribute most to health; and the influence of the water-supply and of the air is of this nature. Hence in wise cities if all the sources of water are not equally pure and there is not an abundance of suitable springs, the water-supplies for drinking must be kept separate from those for other requirements. As to fortified positions, what is expedient is not the same for all forms of constitution alike; for example, a citadel-hill is suitable

\[\text{Literally, 'in the direction in which the north wind blows.'}\]
κρατικὸν δ’ ὀμαλότητς, ἀριστοκρατικὸν δ’ οὐδέτερον ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἰσχυρὸι τότε πλείουσ. ἦ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οἰκήσεων διάθεσις ἦδιον μὲν νομίζεται καὶ χρησιμωτέρα πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις ἂν εὔτομος ἦ καὶ κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τὸν Ἰπποδάμειον τρόπον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς ἀσφαλείας τούναντιόν ὡς εἰχον κατὰ τὸν ἄρχαίον χρόνον· δυσεἰσοδος\(^1\) γὰρ ἐκείνῃ τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσεξερεύνητος τοῖς\(^2\) ἐπιτιθεμένοις. διὸ δεῖ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν ὅ (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἂν τὶς οὕτως κατασκευάζῃ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς γεωργοῖς\(^3\) ἂς καλοῦσι τινες τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας) καὶ τὴν μὲν ὅλην μὴ ποιεῖν πόλιν εὐτομον, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τόπους· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον ἔξει καλῶς.

Περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν ἔχειν τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιουμένας πόλεις λίαν ἄρχαιος ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὀρῶντες ἐλεγχομένας ἐργῷ τὰς ἐκείνως καλλωπισμένας. ἔστι δὲ πρὸς 6 μὲν τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ μὴ πολὺ τῷ πλήθει διαφέροντας οὐ καλὸν τὸ πειράσθαι σφαζεῖν διὰ τῆς τῶν τειχῶν ἐρυμνότητος· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἐνδέχεται\(^4\) πλεῖώ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἐπιοῦτων τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης\(^5\) τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρετῆς, εἰ δὲ σφαζεῖθαι καὶ μὴ πάσχειν κακῶς

\(^1\) δυσεἰσοδος ed. (sic Jackson transpositis δυσεἰσοδος et δυσεξερεύνητος): δυσεξοδος codd.
\(^2\) [τοῖς] Immisch, et ἐπιτιθεμένουs supra post ξενικοῖς tr. Richards.
\(^3\) γεωργοῖς Scaliger.
\(^4\) sic ? Richards: δὲ (aut δὲ καὶ) συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται codd.
\(^5\) τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης Spengel: καὶ τῆς ἀνθ., καὶ codd.

\(^a\) See II. v.
\(^b\) i.e. an enemy’s mercenaries; but the mss. give 'difficult for foreign troops to make sorties from' [i.e. presumably presumably 588
for oligarchy and monarchy, and a level site for
democracy; neither is favourable to an aristocracy,
but rather several strong positions. The arrange-
ment of the private dwellings is thought to be more
agreeable and more convenient for general purposes
if they are laid out in straight streets, after the
modern fashion, that is, the one introduced by
Hippodamus a; but it is more suitable for security in
war if it is on the contrary plan, as cities used to be
in ancient times; for that arrangement is difficult
for foreign troops b to enter and to find their way
about in when attacking. Hence it is well to com-
bine the advantages of both plans (for this is possible
if the houses are laid out in the way which among
the farmers some people call 'on the slant' c in the
case of vines), and not to lay out the whole city in
straight streets, but only certain parts and districts,
for in this way it will combine security with beauty.

As regards walls, those who aver that cities which
pretend to valour should not have them hold too old-
fashioned a view—and that though they see that the
cities that indulge in that form of vanity are refuted
by experience. It is true that against an evenly
matched foe and one little superior in numbers it is
not honourable to try to secure oneself by the strength
of one's fortifications; but as it may possibly happen
that the superior numbers of the attackers may be
too much for the human valour of a small force, if
the city is to survive and not to suffer disaster or
to find their way out when once they have got in, cf. Thuc.
i. 4. 2] and for attackers to find their way about in.

a The Roman quincunx, each plant of one row being in
line with the gap between two plants of the next row,
thus: . . . . . . .

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μηδὲ υβρίζεσθαι, τὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρυμνότητα
tῶν τειχῶν οὐκέτεον εἶναι πολεμικωτάτην, ἄλλως
te καὶ νῦν εὐρημένων τῶν περὶ τὰ βέλη καὶ
tὰς μηχανὰs εἰς ἀκριβείαν πρὸς τὰς πολυρκίας.
ὀμοίων γὰρ τὸ τεῖχη μὴ περιβάλλειν ταῖς πόλεσιν 7
ἀξίοιν καὶ τὸ τῆς χώραν εὐέμβολον ζητεῖν1 καὶ
5 περιαρεῖν τοὺς ορεινοὺς τόπους, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ
tαῖς οἰκήσεις ταῖς ἱδίαις μὴ περιβάλλειν τοῖχος
ὡς ἀνάδρων ἐσομένων τῶν κατοικοῦντων. ἀλλὰ
μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτό γε δεὶ λανθάνειν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν
περιβεβλημένοις τεῖχῃ περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔξεστιν
ἀμφότερως χρῆσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, καὶ ὡς ἔχουσιν
10 τεῖχη καὶ ὡς μὴ ἔχουσαι, ταῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημέναις
οὐκ ἔξεστιν. εἰ δὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οὐχ
ὅτι τεῖχῃ μόνον περιβλητέον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων
ἐπιμελητέον ὅπως καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔχῃ τῇ πόλει
πρεπόντως καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας, τὰς τε
ἀλλὰς καὶ τὰς νῦν ἐπεξευρημένας. ὃσπερ γάρ τοῖς
15 ἐπιτυθεμένοις ἐπιμελεῖς ἐστὶ δὲ ὅν τρόπων πλεονεκ-
τήσουσιν, οὔτω τὰ μὲν εὑρηταί τὰ δὲ δεὶ ζητεῖν καὶ
φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ τοὺς φυλαττομένους· ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδὲ
ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἐπιτίθεσθαι τοῖς εὐ παρεσκευασμένοις.
'Επεὶ δὲ δεὶ τὸ μὲν πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν
20 συσσιτίοις κατανεμηθῆσαι, τὰ δὲ τεῖχῃ διειλήφθαι
φυλακτηρίοις καὶ πῦργοις κατὰ τόπους ἐπικαίρους,
δὴ οἷς αὐτὰ προκαλεῖται παρασκευάζειν ἐνα
τῶν συσσιτίων ἐν τούτοις τοὺς φυλακτηρίους. καὶ
ταύτα μὲν δὴ τοῦτον ἄν τις διακοσμήσει τὸν
τρόπον· XI. τὰς δὲ τοῖς θείοις ἀποδεδομένας οἰκή-
25 σεις καὶ τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχείων συσσίτια

1 ζητεῖν <ποιεῖν>? ed.

* Perhaps a word should be added to the Greek giving
insult, the securest fortification of walls must be deemed to be the most warlike, particularly in view of the inventions that have now been made in the direction of precision with missiles and artillery for sieges. To claim not to encompass cities with walls is like desiring a the country to be easy to invade and stripping it of hilly regions, and similarly not surrounding even private dwellings with house-walls on the ground that the inhabitants will be cowardly. Another point moreover that must not be forgotten is that those who have walls round the city can use their cities in both ways, both as walled cities and as open ones, whereas cities not possessing walls cannot be used in both ways. If then this is so, not only must walls be put round a city, but also attention must be paid to them in order that they may be suitable both in regard to the adornment of the city and in respect of military requirements, especially the new devices recently invented. For just as the attackers of a city are concerned to study the means by which they can gain the advantage, so also for the defenders some devices have already been invented and others they must discover and think out; for people do not even start attempting to attack those who are well prepared.

And since the multitude of citizens must be distributed in separate messes, and the city walls must be divided up by guard-posts and towers in suitable places, it is clear that these facts themselves call for some of the messes to be organized at these guard-posts. These things then might be arranged in this manner. XI. But it is fitting that the dwellings assigned to the gods and the most important of the

‘desiring to make the country easy to invade, and to strip it—’.
ARISTOTLE

1831a ἀρμόττει τόπον ἐπιτήδειον τε ἔχειν καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν, ὡσα μὴ τῶν ἱερῶν ὁ νόμος ἀφορίζει χωρὶς ἢ τι μαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθόχρηστον. εἰ ὑ' ἣν τοιοῦτος ὁ τόπος ὅστις ἐπιφανείαν τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς θέσεως ἀρετῆς 1 ἱκανός καὶ πρὸς τὰ γενικῶτα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρυμνοτέρως. πρέπει δ' ὑπὸ μὲν 2 τούτον τὸν τόπον τοιαύτης ἄγορας εἶναι κατασκευὴν σιὰν καὶ περὶ Θεσσαλίαν νομίζουσιν 3 ἢν ἑλευθέραν καλουσίν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἢν δεῖ καθαρὰν εἶναι τῶν ὡνίων πάντων καὶ μήτε βάναυσον μήτε γεωργὸν μῆτ' ἄλλον υἱόθεν τοιοῦτον παραβάλλειν μὴ καλοῦμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων. εἰ ὑ' ἣν εὐχαρις ὁ τόπος εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἔχοι τὴν τάξιν ἑνταῦθα: πρέπει γὰρ διηρήσαται κατὰ τὰς ἥλικιας καὶ τούτον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς νεωτέροις ἀρχοντάς τυχὸς διατρίβειν, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχονσίν· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων παροσια μάλιστα ἐμποτεῖ τὴν ἀληθινὴν αἰδὼ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἑλευθέρων φόβον. τὴν δὲ τῶν ὡνίων ἄγοραν ἐτέραν τε δεὶ ταύτης εἶναι καὶ χωρίς, ἔχοσαν τόπον εὐσυνάγωγον τοῖς τε ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης πεμπομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας πάσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλήθος 4 διαιρεῖται τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἱερεῖς 3 καὶ εἰς 4 ἀρχοντας, πρέπει καὶ τῶν ἱερέων συνήθετα περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν. τῶν δ' ἀρχεῖων ὅσα περὶ τὰ συμβόλα ας ποιεῖται τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, περὶ τὸ γραφάς δικών καὶ

1 Lambinus: ἀρετῆς θέσιν codd. (ἱερετείασ θέσιν Jackson).
2 Lambinus: ὄνομαίζουσι codd.
3 προεστὸς Newman.
4 καὶ εἰς Thomas Aquinas: εἰς codd.

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official messes should have a suitable site, and the
same for all, excepting those temples which are
assigned a special place apart by the law or else by
some utterance of the Pythian oracle. And the site
would be suitable if it is one that is sufficiently
conspicuous in regard to the excellence of its position,
and also of superior strength in regard to the adjacent
parts of the city. It is convenient that below this
site should be laid out an agora of the kind customary
in Thessaly which they call a free agora, that is, one
which has to be kept clear of all merchandise and
into which no artisan or farmer or any other such
person may intrude unless summoned by the magis-
trates. It would give amenity to the site if the
gymnasia of the older men were also situated here—
for it is proper to have this institution also divided
according to ages,\(^a\) and for certain magistrates to pass
their time among the youths while the older men
spend theirs with the magistrates; for the presence
of the magistrates before men’s eyes most engenders
ture respect and a freeman’s awe. The agora for
merchandise must be different from the free agora,
and in another place; it must have a site convenient
for the collection there of all the goods sent from the
seaport and from the country. And as the divisions
of the state’s populace include\(^b\) priests and magistrates,
it is suitable that the priests’ mess-rooms also should
have their position round that of the sacred buildings.
And all the magistracies that superintend contracts,
and the registration of actions at law, summonses

\(^a\) Or ‘for in this noble practice different ages should be
separated’ (Jowett).

\(^b\) Perhaps the Greek should be altered to τὸ προεστὸς, ‘as
the governing class is divided into.’


ARISTOTLE

1331 b
tάς κλήσεις καὶ τήν ἄλλην τήν τοιαύτην διοίκησιν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τήν ἄγορανόμιαν καὶ τήν καλομένην ἀστυνομίαν, πρὸς ἄγορὰ μὲν δεῖ καὶ συνόδῳ τοῖς κοινῆς κατεσκευάσθαι, τοιοῦτος δ’ ὅ περὶ τήν ἀναγκαίαν ἄγοραν ἔστι τόπος· ἐνσχολάζειν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἀνω τίθεμεν, ταύτην δὲ πρὸς τάς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις.

Μεμιμηθοῦσα1 δὲ χρῆ τὴν εἰρημένην τάξιν καὶ τὰ 4 περὶ τὴν χώραν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τοῖς ἁρχοῦσιν οὐς καλοῦσιν οἱ μὲν ὑλωροὺς οἱ δὲ ἁγρονόμους καὶ φυλακτήρια καὶ συσσίτια πρὸς φυλακήν ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν, ἔτι δὲ ίερά κατὰ τὴν χώραν εἶναι νεομημένα, τὰ μὲν θεός τὰ δὲ ἱρωσιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν νῦν ἀκριβολογομένους καὶ λέγοντας 20 περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἁργὸν ἑστὶ. οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν ἑστὶ τὰ τοιαύτα νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ποιῆσαι μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν εὐχῆς ἔργον ἑστὶ, τὸ δὲ συμβηνεῖν τύχης. διὸ περὶ μὲν τῶν τοιούτων τὸ γε ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἀφεῖσθω τὰ νῦν.

XII. Περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ἐκ τίνων καὶ 1 ἐκ ποίων δὲι συνεστάναι τὴν μέλλουσαν ἐσεσθαὶ πόλιν μακαρίαν καὶ πολίτευσθαι2 καλώς, λεκτέων. ἐπεὶ δὲ δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν ὀσὶς γίγνεται τὸ εὖ πάσι, τούτων δ’ ἐστὶν ἐν μὲν ἐν τῷ τῶν σκοπῶν κείσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὅρθως, ἐν δὲ τᾶς πρὸς τὸ τέλος 80 φεροῦσας πράξεις εὐρίσκειν (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ διάφωνεῖν ἀλλήλους καὶ συμφωνεῖν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοπὸς ἐκκενται καλῶς ἐν δὲ τῷ πράττειν τοῦ τυχεῖν αὐτοῦ διαμαρτάνουσιν, ἐνίοτε δὲ τῶν

1 νεομημήθαι ΓΜΠ. 2 Coraes: πολιτευσθαι codd.

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and other such matters of administration, and also those that deal with the control of the markets and with what is termed policing the city, should have buildings adjacent to an agora or some public place of resort, and such a place is the neighbourhood of the business agora, for we assign the upper agora as the place in which to spend leisure, and this one for necessary business.

4 The arrangements in the country also should copy the plan described; there too the magistrates called in some states Wardens of the Woods and in others Land-superintendents must have their guard-posts and mess-rooms for patrol duty, and also temples must be distributed over the country, some dedicated to gods and some to heroes. But to linger at this point over the detailed statement and discussion of questions of this kind is waste of time. The difficulty with such things is not so much in the matter of theory but in that of practice; to lay down principles is a work of aspiration, but their realization is the task of fortune. Hence we will relinquish for the present the further consideration of matters of this sort.

1 XII. We must now discuss the constitution itself, and ask what and of what character should be the components of the state that is to have felicity and good government. There are two things in which the welfare of all men consists: one of these is the correct establishment of the aim and end of their actions, the other the ascertainment of the actions leading to that end. (For the end proposed and the means adopted may be inconsistent with one another, as also they may be consistent; sometimes the aim has been correctly proposed, but people fail to achieve it in action, sometimes they achieve all
1331 b

µὲν πρὸς τὸ τέλος πάντων ἐπιτυγχάνονσιν ἄλλα τὸ τέλος ἔθεντο φαύλον, ὅτε δὲ ἐκατέρου διαμαρτανοῦσιν, οὗν ἐπὶ ἰατρικὴν—οὕτε γὰρ ποιῶν τι ἰατὴ τὸ ὑγιαῖν εἴναι σώμα κρύνουσιν ἐνίοτε καλῶς ὑπέρ τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὅρον τυγχάνουσι τῶν ποιητικῶν· δεῖ δ' ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμαις ταύτα ἀμφότερα κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις; ὅτι µὲν οὖν τοῦ τ' εὖ 2

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ξῆν καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφίενται πάντες φανερῶν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτων τοῖς µὲν ἐξουσία τυγχάνειν, τοῖς δὲ οὖν, διὰ τινὰ τύχην ἡ φύσις (δεῖται γὰρ καὶ χορηγίας τινὸς τὸ ξῆν καλῶς, τούτου 1 δὲ ἐλάττωνος µὲν τοῖς ἀµεινὸν διακειµένους πλείουνος δὲ τοῖς χείρον), οἳ δ' εὐθὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ξητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιµονίαν ἐξουσία ὑπαρχοῦσης. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ προκείµενον ἐστὶ 5 τὴν ἄριστην πολιτείαν ἰδεῖν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἄριστ' ἄν πολιτεύοντο πόλις, ἄριστα δ' ἄν πολιτεύοντο καθ' ἣν εὐδαιµονεῖν μάλιστα ἐνδέχεται τὴν πόλιν, δὴν δὲ τὴν εὐδαιµονίαν δὲ τί ἐστι µὴ λαυθάνειν. φαµὲν δὲ (καὶ διωρίσµεθα ἐν τοῖς 3 ἥθικοις, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὄφελος) ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καὶ χρῆσιν ἂρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ ταύτην 2 οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλώς. λέγω δὲ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τάναγκαία, τὸ δ' ἀπλῶς τὸ καλῶς· οἰον τὰ περὶ τὰς δικαίας πράξεις, αἱ 3 δίκαιαι τιµωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις ἀπ' ἂρετῆς µὲν εἶσιν, ἀναγκαῖαι δὲ, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαῖως ἔχουσιν (ἀἱρετῶτερον µὲν 5

1 ταύτης Schneider.

2 ταύτης? Stahr. 3 ai ἄγαρ Reiz.
4 πράξεις διὰ τὰς τιµωρίας Jackson. 5 [µὲν] Coraes.

a i.e. they misconceive the nature of happiness and select the wrong thing to aim at. 

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the means successfully but the end that they posited was a bad one, and sometimes they err as to both—for instance, in medicine practitioners are sometimes both wrong in their judgement of what qualities a healthy body ought to possess and unsuccessful in hitting on effective means to produce the distinctive aim that they have set before them; whereas in the arts and sciences both these things have to be secured, the end and the practical means to the end.) Now it is clear that all men aim at the good life and at happiness, but though some possess the power to attain these things, some do not, owing to some factor of fortune or of nature (because the good life needs also a certain equipment of means, and although it needs less of this for men of better natural disposition it needs more for those of worse); while others, although they have the power, go wrong at the start in their search for happiness. But the object before us is to discern the best constitution, and this is the one under which a state will be best governed, and a state will be best governed under the constitution under which it has the most opportunity for happiness; it is therefore clear that we must know what happiness is. The view that we maintain (and this is the definition that we laid down in Ethics, if those discourses are of any value) is that happiness is the complete activity and employment of virtue, and this not conditionally but absolutely. When I say 'conditionally' I refer to things necessary, by 'absolutely' I mean 'nobly': for instance, to take the case of just actions, just acts of vengeance and of punishment spring it is true from virtue, but are necessary, and have the quality of nobility only in a limited manner (since it would be preferable that
Aristotle

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15 γὰρ μηθενοῦσα δεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων μήτε τὸν ἄνδρα μήτε τὴν πόλιν), αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς ευπορίας ἀπλῶς εἰσὶ κάλλισται πράξεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐτερον κακοῦ τυγίς ἀναίρεσις ἐστιν, αἱ τοιαύται δὲ πράξεις τούναντίον, κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ γεννήσεις. χρήσατο δὲ ἄν τὸ σπουδαῖος 4 ἀνὴρ καὶ πενία καὶ νόσω καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς φαύλαις καλῶς, ἄλλα τὸ μακάριον ἐν τοῖς ἑναντίοις ἑστίν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διώρισται κατὰ τοὺς ἥθικους λόγους, ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἑστὶν ὁ σπουδαῖος) δ'' διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά, δὴ λοι ὅτι καὶ τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαίον σπουδαίας καὶ καλὰς εἶναι ταύτας ἀπλῶς). διὸ καὶ νομίζουσιν ἄνθρωποι τῆς εὐδαμονίας αὐτὰ τὰ ἑκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὡσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμπρὸν καὶ καλῶς ἀιτιώντο 5 τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης. ἀναγκαῖον τούνων ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν τὰ δὲ παρασκευάσαι τὸν νομοθέτην.

30 διὸ κατατυχεῖν εὐχόμεθα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστα-συν δὲν ἡ τύχη κυρία (κυρίαι γὰρ αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν τίθεμεν): τὸ δὲ σπουδαίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν οὐκέτι τύχης ἔργον, ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως. ἀλλά μὴν σπουδαία πόλις ἐστὶ τῷ τούς πολῖτας τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίους:

35 ἡμῖν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολίται μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας. τοιτ' ἄρα σκεπτόν, πῶς ἀνὴρ γίνεται σπουδαῖος. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαῖους εἶναι μὴ 1 προεδρίας Jackson. 2 ἀναίρεσις Schneider: αἴρεσις codd. 3 Reiz: τὰ ἀγαθά codd. 4 Muret: αἰτιώτῳ codd. 5 Coraes: κατ' εὐχήν codd.

a A conjectural emendation gives 'distinctions.'
b This is a conjectural emendation; the mss. give 'the adoption.'
c Eth. Nic. 1113 a 15 ff.

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neither individual nor state should have any need of such things), whereas actions aiming at honours and resources are the noblest actions absolutely; for the former class of acts consist in the removal of something evil, but actions of the latter kind are the opposite—they are the foundation and the generation of things good. The virtuous man will use even poverty, disease, and the other forms of bad fortune in a noble manner, but felicity consists in their opposites (for it is a definition established by our ethical discourses that the virtuous man is the man of such a character that because of his virtue things absolutely good are good to him, and it is therefore clear that his employment of these goods must also be virtuous and noble absolutely); and hence men actually suppose that external goods are the cause of happiness, just as if they were to assign the cause of a brilliantly fine performance on the harp to the instrument rather than to the skill of the player. It follows therefore from what has been said that some goods must be forthcoming to start with and others must be provided by the legislator. Hence we pray that the organization of the state may be successful in securing those goods which are in the control of fortune (for that fortune does control external goods we take as axiomatic); but when we come to the state’s being virtuous, to secure this is not the function of fortune but of science and policy. But then the virtue of the state is of course caused by the citizens who share in its government being virtuous; and in our state all the citizens share in the government. The point we have to consider therefore is, how does a man become virtuous? For even if it be possible for the citizens to be virtuous...
καθ' ἐκαστὸν δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἱρετῶτερον· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθ' ἐκαστὸν καὶ τὸ πάντας. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθῶς γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίγνονται διὰ τῶν ταῦτα ἐστι φύσις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φῶναι δεῖ πρῶτον οἷον ἀνθρωπων ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῶντα, εἶτα καὶ ποιῶν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἔνα τε οὐθὲν ὁφέλος φῶναι, τὰ γὰρ ἔθη μεταβαλέτων ποιεῖ· ἔνα γὰρ ἐστὶ διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ἐπί τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῴων μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει ζῇ, μικρὰ δ' ἐνια καὶ τοῖς ἐθέσεων, ἀνθρωπος δὲ καὶ λόγῳ, μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγον· ὅπερ δὲ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἄλληλοις· πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς καὶ τὴν φύσιν πράττουσι διὰ τῶν λόγων, εὰν πεισθῶσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον.

Τὴν μὲν τοῖνυν φύσιν οἰνος εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐχειρότοτοις ἐσεσθαί τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρότερον, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἤργον ἤδη παιδείας· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθισόμενοι μανθάνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες.

XIII. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συν-έστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων, τούτο δὴ σκέπτεσθαι, εἰ ἐτέρους εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς ἀρχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχωμένους ἢ τοὺς αὐτούς διὰ βίου· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην. εἰ μὲν τοῖνυν εἴησαν τοσοῦτον

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1 mg. cod. inferior: οὕτως cet.
2 ἤδη Γ' Μ.

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a In c. vi.
collectively without being so individually, the latter is preferable, since for each individual to be virtuous entails as a consequence the collective virtue of all. But there are admittedly three things by which men are made good and virtuous, and these three things are nature, habit and reason. For to start with, one must be born with the nature of a human being and not of some other animal; and secondly, one must be born of a certain quality of body and of soul. But there are some qualities that it is of no use to be born with, for our habits make us alter them: some qualities in fact are made by nature liable to be modified by the habits in either direction, for the worse or for the better. Now the other animals live chiefly by nature, though some in small degrees are guided by habits too; but man lives by reason also, for he alone of animals possesses reason; so that in him these three things must be in harmony with one another; for men often act contrary to their acquired habits and to their nature because of their reason, if they are convinced that some other course of action is preferable.

Now we have already defined the proper natural character of those who are to be amenable to the hand of the legislator; what now remains is the task of education, for men learn some things by practice, others by precept.

XIII. But since every political community is composed of rulers and subjects, we must therefore consider whether the rulers and the subjects ought to change, or to remain the same through life; for it is clear that their education also will have to be made to correspond with this distribution of functions. If then it were the case that the one class differed from
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1332b διαφέροντες ἄτεροι τῶν ἀλλων ὅσον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἡρωας ἡγούμεθα τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, εὑρὺς πρῶτον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πολλὴν ἔχοντες.  
20 ὑπερβολὴν, εἰτα κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡστε ἀναμφισ-βήτητον εἶναι καὶ φανερὰν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, δῆλον ὅτι βέλτιον ἄει τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δὲ ἀρχεσθαι καθάπαξ: ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐ ράδιον λαβέων οὐδ' ἔστων ἤστερ ἐν Ἰνδοῖς φησὶ Σκύλαξ εἶναι τοὺς βασιλέας τοσούτων διαφέροντας τῶν ἀρχομένων, φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας ἀναγκαῖον πάντας ὁμοίως κοινωνεῖν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι. τὸ τε γὰρ ἵσον ταῦτον τοῖς ὁμοίως, καὶ χαλεπῶν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συνεστηκών παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον. μετὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑπάρχουσιν νεωτερίζειν βουλόμενοι πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν χώραν, τοσούτωσι τε εἶναι τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύ-ματι τὸ πλῆθος ὡστ' εἶναι κρείττους πάντων τοῦ- 

tων ἐν τὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι τῇ 3 
δεῖ τοὺς ἀρχοντας διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀναμ-
μοβισθητην πῶς οὖν ταῦτ' ἔσται καὶ πῶς μεθ-

35 έξουσι δεῖ σκέψασθαι τὸν νομοθέτην. εἰρήται δὲ 

πρότερον περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἡ γὰρ φύσις δεδωκε τὴν 


diaφεσιντ ποιήσασα αὐτῷ τῷ γένει ταὐτὸ τὸ μὲν 

νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ἄρ-

χεσθαι πρέπει, τοῖς δὲ ἄρχειν ἀγανακτεῖ δὲ οὐδὲίς 

καθ' ἥλικιαν ἀρχόμενος, οὐδὲ νομίζει εἶναι κρεῖτ-

των, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ μέλλων ἀντιλαμβάνειν τούτον 

1 Richards: ἔχοντας codd. 

2 ἵσον <δίκαιον καί> Richards. 

3 Aretinus: αἱρεσιν codd. 

4 τότε μὲν—τότε δὲ MP1. 

a The emendation suggested by Richards gives 'For
the other as widely as we believe the gods and heroes to differ from mankind, having first a great superiority in regard to the body and then in regard to the soul, so that the pre-eminence of the rulers was indisputable and manifest to the subjects, it is clear that it would be better for the same persons always to be rulers and subjects once for all; but as this is not easy to secure, and as we do not find anything corresponding to the great difference that Scylax states to exist between kings and subjects in India, it is clear that for many reasons it is necessary for all to share alike in ruling and being ruled in turn. For equality means for persons who are alike identity of status, and also it is difficult for a constitution to endure that is framed in contravention of justice. For all the people throughout the country are ranged on the side of the subject class in wishing for a revolution, and it is a thing inconceivable that those in the government should be sufficiently numerous to overpower all of these together. But yet on the other hand that the rulers ought to be superior to the subjects cannot be disputed; therefore the lawgiver must consider how this is to be secured, and how they are to participate in the government. And this has been already discussed. Nature has given the distinction by making the group that is itself the same in race partly younger and partly older, of which two sets it is appropriate to the one to be governed and for the other to govern; and no one chafes or thinks himself better than his rulers when he is governed on the ground of age, especially as he is going to get back what he has thus contributed to the common equality and identity (of status) are just for persons who are alike, and it is difficult,' etc.

\[\text{c. viii. § 3, 1329 a 4 ff.}\]

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tὸν ἔρανον ὅταν τῶν ὑποκαμένης ἠλικίας. ἔστι μὲν ἀρα ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι 4
1333 a φατέον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἐτέρους. ζωτε καὶ τὴν παϊδείαν ἔστιν ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἐτέραν εἶναι. τὸν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχηγὸν ἐφανεὶ δεῖν πρῶτον (ἔστι δ' ἄρχη, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐξηταῖ λόγους, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἄρχοντος 5 χάριν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἄρχομενον. τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν δεσποτικὴν εἶναι φαινεῖ, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐλεύθερων.

. . . 1 διαφέρει δ' ἐνα τῶν ἐπιστατομένων οὐ τοῖς 5 ἔργοις ἀλλὰ τῷ τίνος ἐνεκε. διὸ πολλὰ τῶν εἶναι δοκοῦντων διακοινκῶν ἐργῶν καὶ τῶν νέων τοῖς ἐλευθεροῖς καλὸν διακοινεῖν πρὸς γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ 10 τὸ μῆ καλὸν οὐχ οὕτω διαφέρουσιν αἱ πράξεις καθ' αὐτὰς ὡς ἐν τῷ τέλει καὶ τῷ τίνος ἐνεκείν). ἐπεὶ δὲ πολίτου2 καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἰναί φαινε καὶ τοῦ ἄριστου ἀνδρός, τὸν δ' αὐτὸν ἄρχομενον τε δείν γίνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄρχοντα ὑστερον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἰς τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευτέον, 15 ὅπως ἀνδρεῖς ἀγαθοὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, καὶ τί τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀριστοτης ἔως.

Διήρηται δὲ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅν τὸ μὲν ἔχει 6 λόγον καθ' αὐτό, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔχει3 μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ λόγον δ' ὑπακούειν δυνάμενον. ἦν φαμέν τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι καθ' ἂς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς λέγεται πως. 20 τούτων δ' ἐν ποτέρῳ μάλλον τὸ τέλος, τοῖς μὲν

1 lacunam Conring.
2 πολίτου <τοῦ ἄριστου> ὑποκαμένης ἠλικίας. ἔστι μὲν ἀρα ὡς τοὺς αὐτούς ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι 4
3 ἔχον? Richards.

a The sentence here breaks off into a long parenthesis, after which it is not resumed.

b Book III. vi. §§ 6-12, 1278 b 30 ff.

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stock when he reaches the proper age. In a sense therefore we must say that the rulers and ruled are the same, and in a sense different. Hence their education also is bound to be in one way the same and in another different. For he who is to be a good ruler must have first been ruled, as the saying is (and government, as has been said in the first discourses, is of two sorts, one carried on for the sake of the ruler and the other for the sake of the subject; of these the former is what we call the rule of a master, the latter is the government of free men. . . .

But some of the commands given differ not in nature of the services commanded but in their object. Hence a number of what are thought to be menial services can be honourably performed even by freemen in youth; since in regard to honour and dishonour actions do not differ so much in themselves as in their end and object). But since we say that the goodness of a citizen and ruler are the same as that of the best man, and that the same person ought to become a subject first and a ruler afterwards, it will be important for the legislator to study how and by what courses of training good men are to be produced, and what is the end of the best life.

The soul is divided into two parts, of which one is in itself possessed of reason, while the other is not rational in itself but capable of obeying reason. To these parts in our view belong those virtues in accordance with which a man is pronounced to be good in some way. But in which of these two parts the end of man rather resides, those who define the

The aim of education (c. xv. mid.)

Psychology.

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One sentence or more has been lost here.

Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'of the best citizen.'
οὕτω διαιροῦσιν ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν ὡς ἄδηλον πῶς λεκτέον. αἰεὶ γάρ τὸ χείρον τοῦ βελτίωνός ἐστιν ἐνεκέν, καὶ τούτῳ φανερῶν ὁμοίως ἐν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν βελτίων δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον. διήρηται τε δικῆ, καθ' ὀπτερ εἰσώθημεν 1

25 τρόπον διαίρειν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρακτικὸς ἐστὶ λόγος ὁ δὲ θεωρητικὸς· ὁσαῦτως οὐν ἀνάγκη διηρήσθαι καὶ τούτο τὸ μέρος ἰδιοῦ ὅτι, καὶ τὰς πράξεις δ' ἀνάλογον ἐροῦμεν ἔχειν, καὶ δεῖ τὰς τοῦ φύσει βελτίωνος αἵρετωτέρας εἶναι τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγ-χάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τῶν δυνών· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τοῦθ' αἵρετωτατον οὖ τυχεῖν ἐστὶν ἀκροτάτων. διήρηται δὲ καὶ πᾶς ὁ βίος εἰς ἀσχολίαν καὶ εἰς 8 σχολὴν καὶ πόλεμον καὶ εἰρήνην, καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰς ἀναγκαίας καὶ χρήσμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰς καλὰς. περὶ δὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν αἵρεσιν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξι- 

30 σιν αὐτῶν, πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν, ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολῆς, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαία καὶ χρήσμα τῶν καλῶν ἐνεκέν. πρὸς πάντα μὲν τούς τῶν πολι-9 τικῶ βλέποντι νομοθετήσεων, καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις αὐτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ 40 πρὸς τὰ βελτίων καὶ τὰ τέλη. τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων αἵρεσις. δὲν μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολεῖν δύνασθαι καὶ πόλεμεῖν, μᾶλλον δ' εἰρήνην ἄγειν καὶ σχολάζειν·

1 [eis τὰ] Bonitz.
2 Coraes: διαιρέσεις codd.

*a i.e. the two lower ones, the three being the activities of the theoretic reason, of the practical reason, and of the passions that although irrational are amenable to reason.
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parts of the soul in accordance with our view will have no doubt as to how they should decide. The worse always exists as a means to the better, and this is manifest alike in the products of art and in those of nature; but the rational part of the soul is better than the irrational. And the rational part is subdivided into two, according to our usual scheme of division; for reason is of two kinds, practical and theoretic, so that obviously the rational part of the soul must also be subdivided accordingly. A corresponding classification we shall also pronounce to hold among its activities: the activities of the part of the soul that is by nature superior must be preferable for those persons who are capable of attaining either all the soul’s activities or two out of the three; since that thing is always most desirable for each person which is the highest to which it is possible for him to attain. Also life as a whole is divided into business and leisure, and war and peace, and our actions are aimed some of them at things necessary and useful, others at things noble. In these matters the same principle of preference that applies to the parts of the soul must apply also to the activities of those parts: war must be for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things necessary and useful for the purpose of things noble. The statesman therefore must legislate with all these considerations in view, both in respect of the parts of the soul and of their activities, and aiming more particularly at the greater goods and the ends. And the same principle applies in regard to modes of life and choices of conduct: a man should be capable of engaging in business and war, but still more capable of living in peace and leisure; and he should do what is neces-
καὶ τάναγκαία καὶ τὰ χρῆσμα δὲ¹ πράττεω, τὰ δὲ καλὰ δεῖ μᾶλλον. ὡστε πρὸς τούτους τοὺς σκοποὺς καὶ παιδάς ἔτι οὖντας παιδευτέον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας ὅσαι δέονται παιδείας. οἱ δὲ νῦν ἀριστα δοκούντες πολιτεύοσθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ ταύτας καταστήσαντες τὰς πολιτείας, οὗτο πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τέλος φαίνονται συντάξαντες τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οὔτε πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν πρὸς τὰς χρησίμους εἶναι δοκοῦσας καὶ πλεονεκτικωτέρας. παραπλησίως δὲ τούτους καὶ τῶν ύστερον τινὲς γραφάντων ἀπεφήναντο τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν. ἔπαινοντες γὰρ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν ἄγαντα τοῦ νομοθέτου τὸν σκοπὸν ὅτι πάντα πρὸς τὸ κράτειν καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν. ἐμ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐστὶν εὐέλεγκτα καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξεληλεγκτα νῦν. ὡσπερ γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπηύδυοι τὸ πολλῶν δεσπόζειν ὅτι πολλῆς χορηγία γίγνεται τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, οὕτω καὶ Θίβρων ἀγάμενος φαίνεται τῶν τῶν Λακώνων νομοθέτην καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστὸς τῶν γραφόντων περὶ τῆς² πολιτείας αὐτῶν ὅτι διὰ τὸ γεγυμνάσθαι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους πολλῶν ἥρχον. καὶ τοὺς δήλων ὡς ἐπειδὴ νῦν 12 γε οὐκέτι υπάρχει τοῖς Λάκωσι τὸ ἄρχειν, οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, οὔτ' ὁ νομοθέτης ἄγαθός. ἔστιν³ δὲ τούτο γελοίον, εἰ μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποβεβλήκασι τὸ ζῆν καλῶς. οὐκ ὅρθως

¹ om. GMP¹: δεῖ? Stahr.
² peri tῆς Schneider: peri codd.
³ Congreve: ἐτι codd.
sary and useful, but still more should he do what is noble. These then are the aims that ought to be kept in view in the education of the citizens both while still children and at the later ages that require education. But the Greek peoples reputed at the present day to have the best constitutions, and the lawgivers that established them, manifestly did not frame their constitutional systems with reference to the best end, nor construct their laws and their scheme of education with a view to all the virtues, but they swerved aside in a vulgar manner towards those excellences that are supposed to be useful and more conducive to gain. And following the same lines as they, some later writers also have pronounced the same opinion: in praising the Spartan constitution they express admiration for the aim of its founder on the ground that he framed the whole of his legislation with a view to conquest and to war. These views are easy to refute on theoretical grounds and also have now been refuted by the facts of history. For just as most of mankind covet being master of many servants because this produces a manifold supply of fortune’s goods, so Thibron and all the other writers about the Spartan constitution show admiration for the lawgiver of the Spartans because owing to their having been trained to meet dangers they governed a wide empire. Yet it clearly follows that since as a matter of fact at the present day the Spartans no longer possess an empire, they are not happy, and their lawgiver was not a good one. And it is ridiculous that although they have kept to his laws, and although nothing hinders their observing the laws, they have lost the noble life. Also

\[a\] Or possibly, ‘covet a wide empire.’  \[b\] Unknown.

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ARISTOTLE

1333 b

δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἢν δεῖ τιμῶντα φαίνεσθαι τὸν νομοθέτην τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς ἀρχεῖν ἢ τῶν ἑλευθέρων ἀρχῆς καλλίων καὶ μάλλον μετ’ ἀρετῆς. ἔτι δ’ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τὴν 13 πόλιν εὐδαίμονα νομίζειν καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι κρατεῖν ἥσκησεν ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν πέλας ἀρχεν. ταῦτα γὰρ μεγάλην ἦχε βλάβην, δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ δυναμένῳ τούτῳ πειρατέων διώκειν, ὅπως δύνηται τῆς σικείας πόλεως ἀρχεῖν. ὅπερ ἐγκαλοῦσιν οἱ Λάκωνες Παυσανία.

85 τῷ βασιλεί, καίπερ ἔχοντι τηλικαύτην τιμήν. οὔτε δὴ πολιτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων λόγων καὶ νόμων οὐθεὶς οὔτε ὦφελιμος οὔτε ἀληθῆς ἐστίν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἀριστα καὶ ἱδιὰ καὶ κοινῆ, τὸν τε νομοθέτην ἐμποιεῖν δεὶ ταῦτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων. 14 τὴν τε τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀσκησιν οὐ τούτον χάριν δεὶ μελετᾶν, ἵνα καταδουλώσωσιν τοὺς ἀναξίους, ἀλλ’ ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοῖς μη δουλεύσωσιν ἔτεροις,

1334 a ἔπειτα ὅπως ἐγνώσῃ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς ὦφελειᾶς ἕνεκα τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντων δεσποτείας: τρίτων δὲ τὸ δ’ δεσπόζειν τῶν ἀξίων δουλεύειν. ὅτι δὲ δεὶ τὸν νομοθέτην μᾶλλον σπουδάζειν ὅπως καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὴν ἀλλῆς νομοθεσίαν 15 τοῦ σχολάζειν ἕνεκεν τάξη καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γυγνόμενα τοῖς λόγοις. αἱ γὰρ πλείσται τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσι μὲν σώζονται, κατακτησάμενα δὲ τὴν ἀρχήν ἀπολλυνται. τὴν

1 [κρατεῖν] Reiz. 2 τῶν τε Thurot: τῶν codd. 3 τοῦ Victorius: τοῦ Coraes.
writers have a wrong conception of the power for which the lawgiver should display esteem; to govern freemen is nobler and more conjoined with virtue than to rule despotically. And again it is not a proper ground for deeming a state happy and for praising its lawgiver, that it has practised conquest with a view to ruling over its neighbours. This principle is most disastrous; it follows from it that an individual citizen who has the capacity ought to endeavour to attain the power to hold sway over his own city; but this is just what the Spartans charge as a reproach against their king Pausanias, although he attained such high honour. No principle therefore and no law of this nature is either statesmanlike or profitable, nor is it true; the same ideals are the best both for individuals and for communities, and the lawgiver should endeavour to implant them in the souls of mankind. The proper object of practising military training is not in order that men may enslave those who do not deserve slavery, but in order that first they may themselves avoid becoming enslaved to others; then so that they may seek suzerainty for the benefit of the subject people, but not for the sake of world-wide despotism; and thirdly to hold despotic power over those who deserve to be slaves. Experience supports the testimony of theory, that it is the duty of the lawgiver rather to study how he may frame his legislation both with regard to warfare and in other departments for the object of leisure and of peace. Most military states remain safe while at war but perish when they have won their empire; in peace-time they lose

\[a\] A probable emendation gives 'that he has trained it with a view to ruling.'
ΑΡΙΣΤΟTLΕ

1834 a

γὰρ βαφθὴν ἁφίασιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἀγοντες. αὐτοὶ δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας
dύνασθαι σχολάζειν.

"Επεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινῇ 16
καὶ ἵδια τοῖς ἄνθρωποις, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τῷ τε ἀρίστῳ ἄνδρὶ καὶ τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ, φανερὸν ὅτι δὲί τας εἰς τὴν
σχολὴν ἁρετὰς ὑπάρχειν1 τέλος γάρ, ὥσπερ εἰρήται
πολλάκις, εἰρήνη μὲν πολέμου, σχολὴ δὲ ἁσχολίας.
χρήσιμοι δὲ τῶν ἁρετῶν εἰσὶ πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν 17
καὶ διαγωγὴν ὅτι τἐ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ τὸ ἔργον καὶ
ὅν ἐν τῇ ἁσχολίᾳ. δεὶ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν ὅπως εἴξῃ σχολάζειν. διὸ σώφρονα2 τὴν
πόλιν εἶναι προσήκει καὶ ἄνδρείαν καὶ καρτερικήν·
kata γὰρ τὴν παρομίαν, ὦ σχολὴ δουλοῖς, οἱ
de μὴ δυνάμενοι κυνδυνεύειν ἄνδρεώς δουλοὶ τῶν ἐπιόντων εἰςίν. ἄνδριας μὲν οὖν καὶ καρτερίας 18
dεί πρὸς τὴν ἁσχολίαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν
σχολὴν, σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐν ἀμ-
φοτέροις τοῖς χρόνοις, καὶ μάλλον εἰρήνην ἀγονυς
καὶ σχολάζουσιν. οὐ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει
dικαίους εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ᾧ τῇς εὐτυχίας
ἀπόλαυσις καὶ τὸ σχολάζειν μετ’ εἰρήνης ὑβριστὰς
ποιεῖ μάλλον. πολλῆς οὖν δεί δικαιοσύνης καὶ
πολλῆς σωφροσύνης3 τοὺς ἁριστα δοκοῦντας πράτ-
τειν καὶ πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαῦσας,
οἶν εἰ τινὲς εἰςών, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ φασίν, ἐν
μακάρων νῆσοις. μάλιστα γὰρ οὗτοι δεήσονται
φιλοσοφίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὅσω

1 ὑπερέχειν Susemihl.
2 [σώφρονα] Susemihl.
3 σωφροσύνης <μετέχει> Coraes, <τυγχάνειν> Richards.

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their keen temper, like iron. The lawgiver is to blame, because he did not educate them to be able to employ leisure.

16. And since it appears that men have the same end both collectively and individually, and since the same distinctive aim must necessarily belong both to the best man and to the best government, it is clear that the virtues relating to leisure are essential; since, as has been said repeatedly, peace is the end of war, leisure of business. But the virtues useful for leisure and for its employment are not only those that operate during leisure but also those that operate in business; for many of the necessaries must needs be forthcoming to give us opportunity for leisure. Therefore it is proper for the state to be temperate, brave and enduring; since, as the proverb goes, there is no leisure for slaves, but people unable to face danger bravely are the slaves of their assailants. Therefore courage and fortitude are needed for business, love of wisdom for leisure, temperance and justice for both seasons, and more especially when men are at peace and have leisure; for war compels men to be just and temperate, whereas the enjoyment of prosperity and peaceful leisure tend to make them insolent. Therefore much justice and much temperance are needed by those who are deemed very prosperous and who enjoy all the things counted as blessings, like the persons, if such there be, as the poets say, that dwell in the Islands of the Blest; these will most need wisdom, temperance and

\[\text{i.e. an iron blade when not used loses keenness and has to be re-tempered.}\]
\[\text{i.e. to the state as well as to the individual.}\]
\[\text{Hesiod, } \textit{Works and Days} \text{ 170 ff.}\]
μᾶλλον σχολάζονσιν ἐν ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν. διότι μὲν οὖν τὴν μέλλουσαν εὐδαιμονή-
σειν καὶ σπουδαίαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν τούτων δεῖ τῶν ἀρετῶν μετέχειν, φανερῶν· αὐτχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος μὴ
δύνασθαι χρήσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἔτι μᾶλλον μὴ
dύνασθαι ἐν τῷ σχολάζειν χρήσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἄσχολοῦν-
tας μὲν καὶ πολεμοῦντας φαίνεσθαι ἁγαθοῖς,
eἰρήνην δὲ ἄγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀνδραποδώ-
δεις. διὸ δεῖ μὴ καθάπερ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλις 20
τὴν ἀρετὴν ἁσκεῖν. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ οὗ ταύτη
διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν ταῦτα
τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γίνεσθαι
ταῦτα μᾶλλον διὰ τινὸς ἀρετῆς· ἐπεὶ δὲ μεῖζον τε
ἀγαθά ταῦτα καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων ἡ
tὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν . . .
5 . . 3 καὶ ὅτι δι’ αὐτὴν, φανερῶν ἐκ τοιούτων· πῶς 21
δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον.
tυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως
καὶ ἑθους καὶ λόγου δεῖ· τούτων δὲ ποίους μὲν
τινας εἶναι χρή τὴν φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον,
λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρήσαι πότερον παιδευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ
10 πρότερον ἡ τοῖς ἑθεσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ δεῖ πρὸς
ἀλλήλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίᾳ τὴν ἁριστὴν· ἐν-
δέχεσθαι γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς βελ-
τίστης ὑποθέσεως καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὄμοιως ἥχθαι.
φανερῶν δὴ τούτῳ γε πρῶτον μὲν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς
22 ἄλλοις, ὥς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τέλος

1 <τοῖ> μὴ Richards. 2 Schneider: γενέσθαι codd. 3 lacunam Camerarius. 4 ἡ <τε> Richards. 5 esti<ν> ante ἀλλον tr. ? Richards.

a The end of this sentence and the beginning of the next appear to have been lost.

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justice, the more they are at leisure and have an abundance of such blessings. It is clear therefore why a state that is to be happy and righteous must share in these virtues; for if it is disgraceful to be unable to use our good things, it is still more disgraceful to be unable to use them in time of leisure, and although showing ourselves good men when engaged in business and war, in times of peace and leisure to seem no better than slaves. Therefore we must not cultivate virtue after the manner of the state of Sparta. The superiority of the Spartans over other races does not lie in their holding a different opinion from others as to what things are the greatest goods, but rather in their believing that these are obtained by means of one particular virtue; yet because they both deem these things and their enjoyment to be greater goods than the enjoyment of the virtues...a

... and that it is to be practised for its own sake is manifest from these considerations; but it must now be considered how and by what means this will come about. Now we have indeed previously decided that it requires nature and habit and reason, and among these, what particular quality of nature men ought to possess has been defined previously; but it remains to consider whether men ought to be educated first by means of the reason or by the habits. For between reason and habit the most perfect harmony ought to exist, as it is possible both for the reason to have missed the highest principle and for men to have been as wrongly trained through the habits. This therefore at all events is clear in the first place, in the case of men as of other creatures, that their engendering to start with and the end
Aristotle

1334 b 15 ἀπὸ των ἀρχῆς ἀλλοῦ τέλους, οὐ δὲ λόγος ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, ὡστε πρὸς τούτους τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἑθῶν δεῖ παρασκευάζειν μελέτην. ἐπειτα ὡσπερ ψυχῆ καὶ σῶμα δυ’ ἐστίν, εἰς τὸ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀρώμεν δύο μέρη, τὸ τε ἀλογον καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, καὶ τὰς ἐξεις τὰς τούτων δύο τὸν ἁριμόν, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἐστίν ὑρέξις τὸ δὲ νοὺς. ὡσπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα προτέρων τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, ὀυτὶ καὶ τὸ ἀλογον τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. φανερῶν δὲ καὶ τούτοι θυμὸς γάρ καὶ βούλησις, ἐτι δὲ ἐπιθυμία, καὶ γενομένους ἐνθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς παιδίως, οὐ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ νοῦς προϊόνθων ἐγγίνεσθαί πέφυκεν. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι προτέραν ἡ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐπειτα τῆς τῆς ὑρέξεως, ἐνεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοὸ τῆ τῆς ὑρέξεως, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς.

XIV. Εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὅραν 1 δεὶ ὅπως βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα γένηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιμελητέους περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ ποιοὺς των ὄντας χρή ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμμήν ὁμιλίαν. δεὶ δ’ ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετέως ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τε καὶ τοῦ τοῦ ζῆν χρόνου, ἦν συγκαταβαίνοντος ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ διαφωνάσων αἰ δυνάμεις τοῦ μὲν ἐτι δυναμένου γενναν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης, ἦ

1 ἀρχῆς ἀρχῆς Θουροτ.

*a i.e. every process and partial end are means to an ultimate end. A conjecture gives 'the end to which a beginning leads is itself the beginning of another end.' The active reason is the completion and purpose of human birth and growth."
from any beginning is relative to another end, and that reason and intelligence are for us the end of our natural development, so that it is with a view to these ends that our engendering and the training of our habits must be regulated. And secondly, as soul and body are two, so we observe that the soul also has two parts, the irrational part and the part possessing reason, and that the states which they experience are two in number, the one being desire and the other intelligence; and as the body is prior in its development to the soul, so the irrational part of the soul is prior to the rational. And this also is obvious, because passion and will, and also appetite, exist in children even as soon as they are born, but it is the nature of reasoning and intelligence to arise in them as they grow older. Therefore in the first place it is necessary for the training of the body to precede that of the mind, and secondly for the training of the appetite to precede that of the intelligence; but the training of the appetite must be for the sake of the intellect, and that of the body for the sake of the soul.

XIV. Inasmuch therefore as it is the duty of the lawgiver to consider from the start how the children reared are to obtain the best bodily frames, he must first pay attention to the union of the sexes, and settle when and in what condition a couple should practise matrimonial intercourse. In legislating for this partnership he must pay regard partly to the persons themselves and to their span of life, so that they may arrive together at the same period in their ages, and their powers may not be at discord through the man being still capable of parentage and the wife

These three emotions are subdivisions of 'desire' above.
Some editors write θηλύτοκα and interpret ‘more likely to be born females.’ (θηλύτοκα, ‘likely to bear females,’ is applied to the young parents themselves in Hist. An. iv. 766 b 29.)
incapable, or the wife capable and the man not (for this causes differences and actual discord between them), and also he must consider as well the succession of the children, for the children must neither be too far removed in their ages from the fathers (since elderly fathers get no good from their children’s return of their favours, nor do the children from the help they get from the fathers), nor must they be too near them (for this involves much unpleasantness, since in such families there is less respect felt between them, as between companions of the same age, and also the nearness of age leads to friction in household affairs); and in addition, to return to the point from which we began this digression, measures must be taken to ensure that the children produced may have bodily frames suited to the wish of the lawgiver.  

These results then are almost all attained by one mode of regulation. For since the period of parent-age terminates, speaking generally, with men at the age of seventy at the outside, and with women at fifty, the commencement of their union should correspond in respect of age with these times. But the mating of the young is bad for child-bearing; for in all animal species the offspring of the young are more imperfect and likely to produce female children, and small in figure, so that the same thing must necessarily occur in the human race also. And a proof of this is that in all the states where it is the local custom to mate young men and young women, the people are deformed and small of body. And again young women labour more, and more of them die in childbirth; indeed according to some accounts such was the reason why the oracle was given to the

\[\text{politics, VII. xiv. 1-4}\]

\[\text{Μὴ τέμνε νέαν ἄλοκα (‘cut not a new furrow’) schol.}\]
Τροιζηνίως, ὥσ πολλῶν διαφθειρομένων διὰ τὸ γαμίσκεσθαι τὰς νεωτέρας, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν τῶν καρπῶν κομιδήν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην ἡ συμφέρει τὰς ἔκδοσεις ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέραις, ἀκολαστότεραι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι νέαι χρησάμεναι ταῖς συνονοσίαις. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων δὲ σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὐξήσιν εὰν ἔτι τοῦ σπέρματος1 αὐξανομένου ποιῶνται τὴν συνονοσίαν: καὶ γὰρ τούτου τις ωρισμένος χρόνος, δὲν οὐχ ὑπερβαίνει πληθὺν ἔτι. διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττει περὶ τὴν β οὐκτωκαίδεκα ἐτῶν ἡλικίαν συζευγνύναι, τοὺς δ' ἐπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα, ἡ μικρὸν πρότερον2· ἐν τοσούτῳ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσι τε τοῖς σώμασιν ἡ σύζευξις ἔσται καὶ πρὸς τὸν παύλαν τῆς τεκνοποίας συγκαταβήσεται τοῖς χρόνοις εὐκαίρως. ἔτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοὺς μὲν ἀρχομένης ἐσται τῆς ἁκμῆς, εάν γίγνηται κατὰ λόγον εὕθὺς ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἡ δη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἔβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμόν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ 7 ποτε δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν σύζευξιν, εἰρηταὶ, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν ὑπαν χρόνους ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χρῶνται, καλῶς καὶ νῦν ὁρίζοντες χειμῶνος τὴν συναυλίαν ποιεῖσθαι ταύτην. δεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦς ἡ ἑδή θεωρεῖν 40 πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποίαν τὰ τε παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν φυσικῶν οἱ τε γὰρ ἰατροὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τῶν σωμάτων ἱκανῶς λέγοντι, καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οἱ φυσικοὶ, τὰ βόρεια τῶν

1 σώματος Γ.
2 μικρὸν πρότερον Immisch (paulo anto Ramus): μικρὸν codd., μικρὸν <παραλλάσσουται> Richards (plus minusve Vittori).
3 ἡ add. Richards.

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people of Troezen, because many were dying owing to its being their custom for the women to marry young, and it did not refer to the harvest. And again it also contributes to chastity for the bestowal of women in marriage to be made when they are older, for it is thought that they are more licentious when they have had intercourse in youth. Also the males are thought to be arrested in bodily growth if they have intercourse while the seed is still growing; for this also has a fixed period after passing which it is no longer plentiful. Therefore it is fitting for the women to be married at about the age of eighteen and the men at thirty-seven or a little before— for that will give long enough for the union to take place with their bodily vigour at its prime, and for it to arrive with a convenient coincidence of dates at the time when procreation ceases. Moreover the succession of the children to the estates, if their birth duly occurs soon after the parents marry, will take place when they are beginning their prime, and when the parents' period of vigour has now come to a close, towards the age of seventy. The proper age therefore for union has been discussed; as to the proper times in respect of the season we may accept what is customary with most people, who have rightly decided even as it is to practise marital cohabitation in winter. And people should also study for themselves, when their time comes, the teachings of physicians and natural philosophers on the subject of the procreation of children; the suitable bodily seasons are adequately discussed by the physicians, and the question of weather by the natural philosophers, who say that north winds are more favour-

* The word 'before' is a conjectural insertion.
νοτίων ἐπαινοῦντες μᾶλλον. ποιῶν δὲ τινών τῶν σωμάτων ὑπαρχόντων μᾶλιστ' ἂν ὄφελος εἴῃ τοῖς γεννωμένοις, ἐπιστήσασι μὲν μᾶλλον λειτέον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας, τύπῳ δὲ ἱκανόν εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν. οὔτε γὰρ ἢ τῶν ἀθλητῶν χρῆσιμος ἐξη πρὸς πολιτικήν ευεξίαν οὐδὲ πρὸς υγίειαν καὶ τεκνοποίησιν, οὔτε ἡ θεραπευτικὴ καὶ κακοπονητικὴ λίαν, ἀλλ' ἡ μέση τούτων. πεπονημένην μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἐξην, πεπονημένην δὲ πόνοις μὴ βιαίοις, μηδὲ πρὸς ἐνα ἡμέραν, ὥσπερ ἢ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἐξη, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἐλευθερίων πράξεις. ομοίως δὲ δεῖ ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν ἀνδράσι καὶ γυναιξίν. χρῆ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐγκύους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, μὴ ῥαθυμοῦσας μηδ' ἀραια τροφὴ χρωμένης τοῦτο δὲ ράδιον τῷ νομοθέτῃ ποιῆσαι προστάζαντι καθ' ἡμέραν τωσ ποιεῖσθαι πορείαν πρὸς θεών ἀποθεοποιεῖν τῶν εἰληχῶτων τῆν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμὴν. τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν τού ναντίον τῶν σωμάτων ραθυμοτέρως ἀρμόττει διάγειν· ἀπολαῦντα γὰρ φαίνεται τὰ γεννώμενα τῆς ἐχούσης ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα τῆς γῆς. περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ τροφῆς τῶν γεννωμένων ἐστὶν νόμος μηδὲν πεπηρωμένον τρέψειν· διὰ δὲ πλήθος τέκνων, εἰς ἡ τάξιν τῶν ἔθων κολύη μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γεννωμένων, ὥρισθαι δεῖ τῆς τεκνοποίας τὸ πλήθος, εἰς δὲ τις γίγνεται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὸν αὐτοῦ πομ ἐγγενεσθαι καὶ ζωὴν

1 Μ : μάλιστα cet.
2 ἐν Schneider.
3 πόνον ? Immisch.
4 ταῖς εἰληχῶιαις Γ.
5 τέκνων ἡ τάξις—κολύη P1: τέκνων (ἡ γὰρ τάξις—γεγομένων) Wallies.

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able than south. The particular kind of bodily constitution in the parents that will be most beneficial for the offspring must be dwelt on more in detail in our discussion of the management of children; it is sufficient to speak of it in outline now. The athlete's habit of body is not serviceable for bodily fitness as required by a citizen, nor for health and parentage, nor yet is a habit that is too valetudinarian and unfit for labour, but the condition that lies between them. The bodily habit therefore should have been trained by exercise, but not by exercises that are violent, and not for one form of labour only, as is the athlete's habit of body, but for the pursuits of free men. And these arrangements must be provided alike for men and women. And pregnant women also must take care of their bodies, not avoiding exercise nor adopting a low diet; this it is easy for the lawgiver to secure by ordering them to make a journey daily for the due worship of the deities whose office is the control of childbirth. As regards the mind, however, on the contrary it suits them to pass the time more indolently than as regards their bodies; for children before birth are evidently affected by the mother just as growing plants are by the earth. As to exposing or rearing the children born, let there be a law that no deformed child shall be reared; but on the ground of number of children, if the regular customs hinder any of those born being exposed, there must be a limit fixed to the procreation of offspring, and if any people have a child as a result of intercourse in contravention of these regulations, abortion must be practised on it before it has developed sen-

* This was never written, or has been lost.
1335 b 25 ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἀμβλώσων· τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ διωρισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ᾿ζην ἔσται. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡ μὲν ἄρχη τῆς ἡλικίας ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ 11 διώρισται πότε άρχεσθαι χρὴ τῆς συζεύξεως, καὶ πόσον χρόνον λειτουργεῖν ἀρμόττει πρὸς τεκνοποιιὰν ὑρίσθω. τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐκγόνα, καθάπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων, ἀτελῆ γίνεται καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ ταῖς διανοίασι, τὰ δὲ τῶν γεγηρακότων ἀσθενῆ. διὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀκμῆν· αὐτῇ δ’ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πλείοσοι ἦπερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινὸς εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες ταῖς ἐβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πεντηκοντά ἑτῶν. ὥστε 12 τέτταρσιν ἡ πέντε ἔτεσιν ὑπερβάλλοντα τὴν ἡλικίαν ταύτην ἀφεῖσθαι δεῖ τῆς εἰς τὸ πανερόν γεννήσεως, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ύψειας χάριν ἡ τινὸς ἄλλης τοιαύτης αὐτίας φαίνεσθαι δεῖ ποιουμένους τὴν ὁμιλίαν. περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην ἡ πρὸς ἄλλον, ἐστω μὲν ἀπλώς μὴ καλὸν ἀπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὅταν ἡ 1 καὶ προσαγορευθῇ πόσις, περὶ δὲ τοῦ χρόνου τὸν τῆς 1336 a τεκνοποιιῶς εάν τις φαίνῃται τοιούτον τι δρῶν, ἀτιμία ζημιούσθω πρεποῦσι πρὸς τὴν ἀμαρτίαν.

XV. Γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων οἴεσθαι δεῖ 1 μεγάλην εἶναι διαφορὰν πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δύναμιν τὴν τροφὴν, ὅποια τις ἂν ἤ. φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τε τῶν ἄλλων ζωῶν ἐπισκοποῦσι καὶ διὰ τῶν ἑθοῦν ὁις ἐπιμελεῖς ἐστιν ἁγειν εἰς 3 τὴν πολεμικὴν

1 ὅταν ᾿ἄνηρ ἤ? Richards.
2 οἴεσθαι δεὶ Spengel: οἴεσθαι. codd.
3 ἁγειν εἰς Richards: ἁγειν ΓΜΠ1: εἰςἀγειν cet.: ἀσκεῖν Coraes.
sation and life; for the line between lawful and unlawful abortion will be marked by the fact of having sensation and being alive. And since the beginning of the fit age for a man and for a woman, at which they are to begin their union, has been defined, let it also be decided for how long a time it is suitable for them to serve the state in the matter of producing children. For the offspring of too elderly parents, as those of too young ones, are born imperfect both in body and mind, and the children of those that have arrived at old age are weaklings. Therefore the period must be limited to correspond with the mental prime; and this in the case of most men is the age stated by some of the poets, who measure men’s age by periods of seven years,\(^a\)—it is about the age of fifty. Therefore persons exceeding this age by four or five years must be discharged from the duty of producing children for the community, and for the rest of their lives if they have intercourse it must be manifestly for the sake of health or for some other similar reason. As to intercourse with another woman or man, in general it must be dishonourable to be known to take any part in it in any circumstances whatsoever as long as one is a husband and bears that name, but any who may be discovered doing anything of the sort during the period of parentage must be punished with a loss of privilege suited to the offence.

1 XV. When the children have been born, the particular mode of rearing adopted must be deemed an important determining influence in regard to their power of body. It appears from examining the other animals, and is also shown by the foreign races that make it their aim to lead to the military habit of
1336a ἐξιν ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος πληθύνουσα τρόφη μάλιστ' οἰκεία τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀουστέρα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα.

10 ἐτι δὲ καὶ κινήσεις ὅσα ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖσθαι τῇ τηλικοῦτῳς συμφέρει. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι τὰ μέλη δὴ ἀπαλότητα χρῶναι καὶ νῦν ἐνα τῶν ἔθνων ὀργάνους τισὶ μηχανικοῖς δὲ τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖ τῶν τοιούτων ἀστράβεσ. συμφέρει δ' εὑρίσκει καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψυχὴ συνεθίζειν ἐκ μικρῶν παιδών, τούτο γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὸς πράξεις εὐχρηστότατον. διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖσ' ἐστὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἔθος τοῖς μὲν εἰς ποταμὸν ἀποβάπτειν τὰ γυνόμενα ψυχρῶν, τοὺς δὲ σκέπτασμα μικρόν ἀμπίσχειν, οἷον Κέλτως. πάντα γὰρ ὁσα 3 δυνατῶν [ἐθίζεων] 1 εὑρίσκει ἀρχομένων βέλτιον εὐθείαν μέν, ἐκ προσαγωγῆς δ' ἐθίζεων· εὐφυῆς δ' ἡ τῶν παιδῶν ἐξει διὰ θερμότητα πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψυχρῶν ἀσκησίν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρώτην συμφέρει ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιαύτῃ τε καὶ τὴν ταύτην παραπλησίαν· τὴν δ' ἐχωμένην ταύτης ἡλικίαν μέχρι πέντε ἐτῶν, ἣν οὖτε πω πρὸς μάθησιν καλῶς ἔχει προσάγειν οὐδεμίαν οὖτε πρὸς ἀναγκαίας πόνους, ὅπως μὴ τὴν αὐξησι ἐμποδίζωσιν, δεῖ τοσάτης τυγχάνειν κινήσεως ὡστε διαφεύγειν τὴν ἀργίαν τῶν σωμάτων· ἦν χρῆ παρασκευάζειν καὶ δὲ ἄλλων πράξεων καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδιᾶς. δεὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς εἶναι μήτε ἀνελευθέρους μήτε ἐπιπόνους μήτε ἀνεμεμένας. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, ποῖος τινὰς ἀκούειν δεὶ τοὺς τηλικοῦτους, ἐπιμελῆς ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀρχουσιν οὖς καλούσι παιδονόμους. πάντα γὰρ

1 Richards. 2 Richards: μὲν ἐθίζεων codd. 3 δεὶ δὲ codd. cet.

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body, that a diet giving an abundance of milk is most suited to the bodies of children, and one that allows rather little wine because of the diseases that it causes. Moreover it is advantageous to subject them to as many movements as are practicable with children of that age. To prevent the limbs from being distorted owing to softness, some races even now employ certain mechanical appliances that keep the bodies of infants from being twisted. And it is also advantageous to accustom them at once from early childhood to cold, for this is most useful both for health and with a view to military service. Hence among many non-Greek races it is customary in the case of some peoples to wash the children at birth by dipping them in a cold river, and with others, for instance the Celts, to give them scanty covering.

For it is better to inure them at the very start to everything possible, but to inure them gradually; and the bodily habit of children is naturally well-fitted by warmth to be trained to bear cold. In the earliest period of life then it is expedient to employ this or a similar method of nursing; and the next period to this, up to the age of five, which it is not well to direct as yet to any study nor to compulsory labours, in order that they may not hinder the growth, should nevertheless be allowed enough movement to avoid bodily inactivity; and this exercise should be obtained by means of various pursuits, particularly play. But even the games must not be unfit for freemen, nor laborious, nor undisciplined. Also the question of the kind of tales and stories that should be told to children of this age must be attended to by the officials called Children's Tutors. For all such
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1336a δεῖ τὰ τοιαύτα προοδοποιεῖν πρὸς τὰς ὑστερον διατριβάς· διὸ τὰς παραδίας εἶναι δεῖ τὰς πολλὰς μυηήσεις τῶν ὑστερον σπουδαζομένων. τάς δὲ ὑστερον διατάσεις τῶν παίδων καὶ κλαυθμοῦς οὐκ ὥρθως ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις· συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὐξήσει· γίνεται γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ γυμνασία τοῖς σώμασιν, ἢ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις ποιεῖ τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, δ συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διαιτεινομένοις. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τοῖς παιδονόμοις τήν τούτων διαγωγήν τήν τῇ ἄλλῃ καὶ ὅπως ὁτί ἥκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται.

1336b ταῦτῃ γὰρ τὴν ήλικίαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ ἑτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ οἶκοι τῆς τροφῆς ἐχεῖν· εὐλογον οὐν ἂπολαύειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων καὶ τῶν ὁραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλικούτους όντας. ὅλως μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὅσπερ ἀλλο τι, δεῖ τὸν νομιμότητα ἐξορίζειν (ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὅτι οὖν τῶν αἰχρῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς), μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἂν ἐκ τῶν νέων, ὅπως μήτε λέγωσι μήτε ἀκούσωι μὴδὲν τοιοῦτον· ἐδὲ τις φαίνεται τι λέγων ἡ πράττων τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων, τῶν ἐλεύθερον μὲν μήτω δε κατα-

κλίσεως ἡξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσστῖσις ἀτιμίας κολάζει καὶ πληγαίς, τὸν δὲ προσβύτερον τῆς ἡλικίας ταύτης ἀτιμίας ἀνελευθέρως ἀνδραπο-

δωδεκάς χάριν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι τῶν τοιούτων εξορίζομεν, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἡ γραφάς ἡ λόγους ἀσχήμονας. ἐπιμελεῖς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τοῖς 1 καὶ τοὺς ΜΡ1: κατὰ τοὺς Γ. 2 ἀπελαύνειν codd. cet. 3 εἰπερ Lambinus. 4 μέντοι ῥ Richards. 5 μὲν hic Richards, ante ἐλεύθερον codd. 6 [ἀτιμίας] Buecheler, ὅνειδει ο Richards.

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amusements should prepare the way for their later pursuits; hence most children’s games should be imitations of the serious occupations of later life. The legislators in the *Laws* forbid allowing children to have paroxysms of crying, but this prohibition is a mistake; violent crying contributes to growth, for it serves in a way as exercise for the body, since holding the breath is the strength-giving factor in hard labour, and this takes place also with children when they stretch themselves in crying. The Tutors must supervise the children’s pastimes, and in particular must see that they associate as little as possible with slaves. For children of this age, and up to seven years old, must necessarily be reared at home; so it is reasonable to suppose that even at this age they may acquire a taint of illiberality from what they hear and see. The lawgiver ought therefore to banish indecent talk, as much as anything else, out of the state altogether (for light talk about anything disgraceful soon passes into action)—so most of all from among the young, so that they may not say nor hear anything of the sort; and anybody found saying or doing any of the things prohibited, if he is of free station but not yet promoted to reclining at the public meals, must be punished with marks of dishonour and with beating, and an older offender must be punished with marks of dishonour degrading to a free man, because of his slavish behaviour. And since we banish any talk of this kind, clearly we must also banish the seeing of either pictures or representations that are indecent. The officials must therefore be

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*Laws* vii. 792 a. Plato merely says that a child’s crying shows it to be annoyed, and that it ought to have as little pain as possible or else it will grow up morose.
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1336 b

15 ἀρχουσι μὴθὲν μήτε ἀγαλμα μήτε γραφὴν εἶναι τοιούτων πράξεων μύμησιν, εἰ μὴ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τοιούτως οἷς καὶ τὸν τωθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος· πρὸς δὲ τοιτοὺς ἀφήσων ὁ νόμος τοὺς τὴν ἥλικιαν ἐχοντας ἔτι τὴν ἱκονομένην καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τμιαλφεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς. τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους οὔτ' ἰάμβων οὔτε 9 κωμῳδίας θεατὰς ἑστέον,3 πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἥλικιαν λάβωσιν ἐν ἑ καὶ κατακλίσεως ὑπάρξει κοινωνείν ἕδη καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων γυνομένης βλάβης ἀπαθείς ἡ παιδεία ποιήσει πάντας. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδρομῇ τοῦτον πεποιήμεθα τὸν λόγον· ὑστερον δ' ἐπιστήσαται δεὶ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἰτε μὴ δεὶ πρῶτον εἰτε δεὶ διαπορήσαται, καὶ πῶς δεί· κατὰ δὲ τὸν παρόντα καὶ οὖν ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς4 ἀναγκαῖον. ὡς γάρ οὐ κακώς ἔλεγε5 το 10 τοιούτων Θεόδωρος ὁ τῆς τραγῳδίας ὑποκριτής· οὕθεν γὰρ πώποτε παρῆκεν ἐαυτόν προεισάγειν οὐδὲ τῶν εὐτελῶν ὑποκρίτων, ὡς οἰκειομένων τῶν θεατῶν ταῖς πρῶταις άκοαίς· συμβαίνει δε ταυτὸ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων συμβαίνει καὶ πρὸς τὰς πραγμάτων πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον. διὸ δεὶ τοῖς νέοις πάντα 35 ποιεῖν ξένα τὰ φαύλα, μάλιστα δ' αὐτῶν ὡς ἐχει ἡ μοχθηρίαν ἡ δυσμένειαν.

1 τοῖτοι Reiz: τοῖτοι codd. 2 [ἔτι Welldon. 3 ἑστέον Immisch (einae ἑστέον Jackson): ὑστερον, ὑστητέον, νομοθετήτεον codd. 4 ὡς Richards. 5 ἔλεγε Newman.

a The ms. text gives ' and in addition to these ' ; and the word ' still ' may be an interpolation.

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careful that there may be no sculpture or painting that represents indecent actions, except in the temples of a certain class of gods to whom the law allows even scurrility; but in regard to these the law permits men still of suitable age to worship the gods both on their own behalf and on behalf of the children and women. But the younger ones must not be allowed in the audience at lampoons and at comedy, before they reach the age at which they will now have the right to recline at table in company and to drink deeply, and at which their education will render all of them immune to the harmful effects of such things. For the present therefore we have merely mentioned these matters in passing, but later we must stop to settle them more definitely, first discussing fully whether legislation prohibiting the attendance of the young is desirable or not, and how such prohibition should be put in force; but on the present occasion we have touched on the question only in the manner necessary. For perhaps the tragic actor Theodorus used to put the matter not badly: he had never once allowed anybody to produce his part before him, not even one of the poor actors, as he said that audiences are attracted by what they hear first; and this happens alike in regard to our dealings with people and to our dealings with things—all that comes first we like better. On this account we ought to make all base things unfamiliar to the young, and especially those that involve either depravity or malignity.

b Iambic verses, often abusive and indecent, recited at festivals of Dionysus.

c A great Athenian performer of Sophocles; he took the part of Antigone.

d Loosely put for 'to appear on the stage.'
1386 b  
Διελθόντων δὲ τῶν πέντε ἐτῶν τὰ δύο μέχρι τῶν ἐπτά δὲ ἔνειν ἡ νηγνεσθαι τῶν μαθήσεων ὡς δεήσει μανθάνειν αὐτούς. δύο δὲ εἰσίν. ἡ λίκια 11 πρὸς ἄς ἀναγκαίον διηρῆσθαι τὴν παιδείαν, μετὰ 1 τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπτὰ μέχρι ἡ βης καὶ πάλιν μετὰ τὴν 40 ἀφ’ ἡ βης μέχρι τῶν ἐνὸς καὶ εἰκοσιν ἐτῶν. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἐβδομάδι διαιροῦντες τὰς ἡ λικίας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 1387 a πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ κακῶς, 2 δὲὶ δὲ τῇ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν. πάσα γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσλείπον βούλεται τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον εἰ ποιητέον τάξιν τινὰ περὶ τοὺς παίδας, ἐπειτα πότερον συμφέρει κοινῇ 5 ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν ἢ κατ’ ἱδιον τρόπον, ὁ γίνεται καὶ νῦν ἐν ταῖς πλείστασι τῶν πόλεων, τρίτον δὲ ποιαν τινὰ δεὶ ταύτην.

1 μετὰ—μετὰ: κατὰ—κατὰ Richards.
2 Muretus: καλῶς codd.
But when the five years from two to seven have passed, the children must now become spectators at the lessons \(^a\) which they will themselves have to learn.

And there are two ages corresponding to which education should be divided—there must be a break after the period from seven to puberty, and again after that from puberty to twenty-one. For those who divide the ages by periods of seven years are generally speaking not wrong,\(^b\) and it is proper to follow the division of nature, for all art and education aim at filling up nature's deficiencies. First therefore we must consider whether some regulation in regard to the boys ought to be instituted, next whether it is advantageous for their supervision to be conducted on a public footing or in a private manner as is done at present in most states, and thirdly of what particular nature this supervision ought to be.

\(^a\) _i.e._ in gymnastics and music.

\(^b\) The mss. give 'not right.'
1. "Οτι μὲν οὖν τῷ νομοθέτῃ μάλιστα πραγματεύοντα περὶ τὴν τῶν νέων παιδείαν, οὔδεις ἂν ἀμφισβητήσειν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ γιγνόμενον τούτο βλάπτει τὰς πολιτείας. δει γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύουσαν, τὸ γὰρ ἢθος τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ φυλάττειν εἰσόδου τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐφ᾽ ἀρχῆς, οἰνοῦ τὸ μὲν δημοκρατικὸν δημοκρατίαν, τὸ δ᾽ ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀει δὲ τὸ βέλτιον ἢθος βελτίωνος αὐτιον πολιτείας. ὡτι δὲ πρὸς πάσας δυνάμεις καὶ 2 τέχνας ἐστιν διὰ τὴν προπαιδεύονσαι καὶ προειδοθεθεῖν πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστων ἐργασίας, ὡστε δὴλον ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ἄρετῆς πράξεις. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ τέλος τῆς πόλεως πάσης, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι κοινήν καὶ μὴ κατ᾽ ἱδίαι, ὅτι τρόπον νῦν ἐκαστος ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων ἑδὶ τε καὶ μάθησιν ἱδίαι ἢν ἢν δόξη διδάσκων. δὲὶ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν κοινὴν ποιεῖον καὶ τὴν ἀσκησιν ἂμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρῆ νομίζειν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ τινὰ εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως, μόριον

1 Susemihi (disciplinam accommodari Aretinus): πολιτεύουσαν codd. 2 βέλτιον Μ, βέλτιστον vulg.
BOOK VIII

1. Now nobody would dispute that the education of the young requires the special attention of the lawgiver. Indeed the neglect of this in states is injurious to their constitutions; for education ought to be adapted to the particular form of constitution, since the particular character belonging to each constitution both guards the constitution generally and originally establishes it—for instance the democratic spirit promotes democracy and the oligarchic spirit oligarchy; and a better spirit always produces a better constitution. Moreover in regard to all the faculties and crafts certain forms of preliminary education and training in their various operations are necessary, so that manifestly this is also requisite in regard to the actions of virtue. And inasmuch as the end for the whole state is one, it is manifest that education also must necessarily be one and the same for all and that the superintendence of this must be public, and not on private lines, in the way in which at present each man superintends the education of his own children, teaching them privately, and whatever special branch of knowledge he thinks fit. But matters of public interest ought to be under public supervision; at the same time also we ought not to think that any of the citizens belongs to himself, but that all belong to the

a Book V. in some editions.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΣ

1337 a γὰρ ἐκαστὸς τῆς πόλεως, ἡ δ’ ἐπιμέλεια πέφυκεν ἐκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὁλου ἐπι-
μέλειαν. ἐπαινέσειε δ’ ἂν τις κατὰ τοῦτο Δακέ-
δαμονίους· καὶ γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῦνται οπουδήν
περὶ τοὺς παίδας καὶ κοινὴ ταύτην.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν νομοθετητέον περὶ παιδείας καὶ
tαύτην κοινὴν ποιητέον, φανερὸν· τίς δ’ ἔστιν ἡ
παιδεία καὶ πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν.

νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖται περὶ τῶν ἔργων· οὐ γὰρ
tαυτὰ πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσι δεῖν μανθάνειν τοὺς
νέους οὐτε πρὸς ἄρετὴν οὐτε πρὸς τὸν βίου τὸν
ἀριστον, οὐδὲ φανερὸν πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν
πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἱθος. ἐκ τε 4

τῆς ἐμποδῶν παιδείας ταραχώδης ἡ σκέψις, καὶ
δὴλον οὐδὲν πότερον ἄσκειν 2 δεῖ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς
τὸν βίου ἢ τα τείνοντα πρὸς ἄρετὴν ἢ τὰ περιττά·

1337 b πάντα γὰρ εὐληφε ταύτα κριτᾶς τινας. περὶ τε
tῶν πρὸς ἄρετὴν οὕθεν ἐστὶν ὁμολογοῦμεν· καὶ
γὰρ τὴν ἄρετὴν οὗ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντες τιμῶ-
σιν, ὡστε εὐλόγως διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν
ἀσκησιν αὐτῆς.

Π. "Οτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεῖ διδάσκεσθαι 1
tῶν χρησίμων, οὐκ ἁδηλον· ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα,
dιηρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθέρων ἔργων καὶ τῶν
ἀνελευθέρων, φανερὸν, καὶ ὃτι 3 τῶν τοιούτων
dεῖ μετέχειν ὡσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετ-

1 Sylburg: καὶ codd.
2 <δἰδ>άσκειν Busse.
3 καὶ ὃτι Richards: ὃτι codd.

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state, for each is a part of the state, and it is natural for the superintendence of the several parts to have regard to the superintendence of the whole. And one might praise the Spartans in respect of this, for they pay the greatest attention to the training of their children, and conduct it on a public system.

It is clear then that there should be legislation about education and that it should be conducted on a public system. But consideration must be given to the question, what constitutes education and what is the proper way to be educated. At present there are differences of opinion as to the proper tasks to be set; for all peoples do not agree as to the things that the young ought to learn, either with a view to virtue or with a view to the best life, nor is it clear whether their studies should be regulated more with regard to intellect or with regard to character. And confusing questions arise out of the education that actually prevails, and it is not at all clear whether the pupils should practise pursuits that are practically useful, or morally edifying, or higher accomplishments—for all these views have won the support of some judges; and nothing is agreed as regards the exercise conducive to virtue, for, to start with, all men do not honour the same virtue, so that they naturally hold different opinions in regard to training in virtue.

II. It is therefore not difficult to see that the young must be taught those useful arts that are indispensably necessary; but it is clear that they should not be taught all the useful arts, those pursuits that are liberal being kept distinct from those that are illiberal, and that they must participate in such among the useful arts as will not render the person
 squeezes on the other. Nevertheless, since the same is true for all the other parts of the argument and since, moreover, the notion of a complete and rigorous argument is an absolute necessity for the purpose of the present discussion, I am of the opinion that the best way to approach the problem is to consider the different parts of the argument in isolation and then to examine the relationship between them. This is the method that I propose to employ in the following pages.

ARISTOTLE

1337 b

έχοντα μή βάναυσον. βάναυσον δ’ έργον είναι δεί τούτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν

οσαὶ πρός τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀξιοποιοῦσι τὸ σώμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχήν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ τὰς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὀσαὶ τὸ σώμα παρασκευάζουσι χειρον διακείσθαι βαναύσους καλοῦμεν καὶ τὰς μυσθαρικὰς ἐργασίας· ἀσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν
diánοιαν καὶ ταπεινήν. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερίων ἐπιστημῶν μέχρι μὲν τῶν ἐνιῶν μετέχειν ὑπὸ ἀνελεύθερον, προσεδρεῦσι δὲ λίαν πρὸς τὸ ἐντελὲς ἐνοχὸν ταῖς εἰρημέναις βλάβαις. ἔχει δὲ πολλὴν διαφορὰν καὶ τὸ τῶν χάριν πράττει τις ἢ μανθάνει· αὐτοῦ μὲν γὰρ χάριν ἢ φίλων ἢ δι’ ἀρετῆς ὑπὸ ἀνελεύθερου, δ’ δὲ ταύτῃ τούτω πράττοιν δι’ ἄλλους πολλάκις θητικῶν καὶ δουλικῶν δόξειν ἁν πράττειν.

Λέ μὲν οὖν καταβεβλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις, καθάπερ ἐλέγχθη πρότερον, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν. ἐστὶ δὲ τέτταρα σχέδαν ὧν παιδεύειν εἰσόθαι, γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικὴν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ τέσταρτον ἐνιῶν γραφικήν, τὴν μὲν γραμματικήν καὶ γραφικήν ὡς χρησίμως πρὸς τὸν βίον οὕσας καὶ πολυχρῆστους, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν ὡς συντείνουσαν πρὸς ἀνδριάν· τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἢδη διαπορήσειν ἄν τις. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδονής χάριν οἱ πλείστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς·

οἱ δ’ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐταξαν ἐν παιδεία διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς ἔτειν, ὁπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται, μὴ μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὥρθῳς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς· αὐτῇ γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων, ἢν καὶ πάλιν εἰπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἄμφω μὲν δεῖ, μᾶλλον

1 Richards: αὐτὸ codd.
who participates in them vulgar. A task and also an art or a science must be deemed vulgar if it renders the body or soul or mind of free men useless for the employments and actions of virtue. Hence we entitle vulgar all such arts as deteriorate the condition of the body, and also the industries that earn wages; for they make the mind preoccupied and degraded. And even with the liberal sciences, although it is not illiberal to take part in some of them up to a point, to devote oneself to them too assiduously and carefully is liable to have the injurious results specified. Also it makes much difference what object one has in view in a pursuit or study; if one follows it for the sake of oneself or one's friends, or on moral grounds, it is not illiberal, but the man who follows the same pursuit because of other people would often appear to be acting in a menial and servile manner.

The branches of study at present established fall into both classes, as was said before. There are perhaps four customary subjects of education, reading and writing, gymnastics, music, and fourth, with some people, drawing; reading and writing and drawing being taught as being useful for the purposes of life and very serviceable, and gymnastics as contributing to manly courage; but as to music, here one might raise a question. For at present most people take part in it for the sake of pleasure; but those who originally included it in education did so because, as has often been said, nature itself seeks to be able not only to engage rightly in business but also to occupy leisure nobly; for—to speak about it yet again—this is the first principle of all things.

For if although both business and leisure are Use of leisure.

\[ a \text{ c. i. } \S 4. \]

\[ b \text{ Cf. VII., 1334 a 2-10.} \]
ARISTOTLE

1337 b
dė aîtreton to σχολάζεων τῆς ἁσχολίας καὶ τέλος,
ζητητέον τι ποιούντας δεί σχολάζεων. οὐ γὰρ δὴ
paίζοντας· τέλος γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν1 τοῦ βίου
τὴν παιδιὰν ἦμιν. εἰ δὲ τούτο ἄδυνατον, καὶ
μᾶλλον εὖ ταῖς ἁσχολίαις χρηστέον ταῖς παιδιαῖς
(ὅ γὰρ ποιῶν δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως, ἦ δὲ παιδιὰ
χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἐστίν, τὸ δ’ ἁσχολεῖν συμβαίνει
μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας), διὰ τούτο δεὶ παιδιὰς
eἰςάγεσθαι καιροφυλακτοῦντας τὴν χρήσιν, ὡς
προσάγοντας φαρμακείας χάριν· ἄνεις γὰρ ἥ
1338 a τοιαύτη κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἱδονὴν
ἀνάπαυσις. τὸ δὲ σχολάζεων ἔχειν αὐτὸ δοκεῖ τὴν 5
ἱδονήν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ ἐξί μακαρίως.
tούτο δ’ οὐ τοῖς ἁσχολοῦσιν ὑπάρχει ἄλλα τοῖς
σχολάζουσι· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἁσχολῶν ἐνεκά τινος
ἁσχολεῖ τέλους ὑς οὐχ ὑπάρχοντος, ἢ δ’ εὐδαιμονία
tέλος ἐστίν, ἢν οὐ μετὰ λύπης ἄλλα μεθ’ ἱδονῆς
οἴονται πάντες εἰναι. ταῦτα μέντοι τὴν ἱδονήν
οὐκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν τιθέασιν, ἄλλα καθ’ ἐαυτοὺς
ἐκαστος καὶ τὴν ἔξω τὴν αὐτῶν, δ’ δὲ ἀριστος τὴν
ἀρίστην καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων. ὥστε
10 φανερὸν ὅτι δεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ
[σχολῆν]2 μανθάνειν ἄττα καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, καὶ
tαῦτα μὲν τὰ παιδεύματα καὶ ταῦτα τὰς μαθήσεις
ἐαυτῶν εἶναι χάριν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἁσχολίαν ὡς
ἀναγκαῖας καὶ χάριν ἄλλων. διὸ καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν 6
οἱ πρότερον εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν οὐχ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον
15 (οὕτων γὰρ ἐξει τοιούτων) οὐδ’ ὡς χρήσιμον (ὡσπερ

1 <ἡ> εἶναι Spengel.

2 Jackson.
necessary, yet leisure is more desirable and more fully an end than business, we must inquire what is the proper occupation of leisure. For assuredly it should not be employed in play, since it would follow that play is our end in life. But if this is impossible, and sports should rather be employed in our times of business (for a man who is at work needs rest, and rest is the object of play, while business is accompanied by toil and exertion), it follows that in introducing sports we must watch the right opportunity for their employment, since we are applying them to serve as medicine; for the activity of play is a relaxation of the soul, and serves as recreation because of its pleasantness. But leisure seems itself to contain pleasure and happiness and felicity of life. And this is not possessed by the busy but by the leisured; for the busy man busies himself for the sake of some end as not being in his possession, but happiness is an end achieved, which all men think is accompanied by pleasure and not by pain. But all men do not go on to define this pleasure in the same way, but according to their various natures and to their own characters, and the pleasure with which the best man thinks that happiness is conjoined is the best pleasure and the one arising from the noblest sources. So that it is clear that some subjects must be learnt and acquired merely with a view to the pleasure in their pursuit, and that these studies and these branches of learning are ends in themselves, while the forms of learning related to business are studied as necessary and as means to other things. Hence our predecessors included music in education not as a necessity (for there is nothing necessary about it), nor as useful (in the way in which reading
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕ

1338 a
tά γράμματα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν καὶ πρὸς οἰκονομίαν καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν καὶ πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις πολλάς, δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ γραφική χρήσιμος εἶναι πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔργα κάλλιον), συν' αὐτῷ καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστική πρὸς ἔγειραν καὶ ἀλκήν (οὐδέτερον γὰρ τούτων ὁρῶμεν γυγόμενον ἐκ τῆς μουσικῆς). λειτεται τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν, εἰς ὅπερ καὶ φαίνονται παράγοντες αὐτὴν, ἢν γὰρ οἴονται διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθερῶν, ἐν ταύτῃ τάττουσιν. διόπερ "Ομηρος οὗτος ἐποίησεν".

25 ἀλλ' οἶον¹ μέν² ἐστί καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαίτα θαλείν· καὶ οὕτω προειπών ἐτέρους τυνὰς οἱ καλέουσιν ἀοιδὸν φησιν,

ο κεν τέρπησιν ἀπαντας.

καὶ ἐν ἄλλως δὲ φησιν Ἑὐδοσσεὶς ταύτην ἀρίστην εἶναι διαγωγήν, ὅταν εὐφραυμομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων δαιμονόντες δ' ἀνὰ δόματ' ἀκουάζωνται ἀοιδοῦ ἦμενοι ἑξείης.

III. Ὁτι μὲν τοίνυν ἐστὶ παιδεία τις ἢν οὐχ ὡς 1 χρησίμην παιδεύουσιν τοὺς νεότερον δεδομένοι οὐδ' ὡς ἀναγκαίαν ἀλλ' ὡς ἐλευθεροῦν καὶ καλήν, φανερῶν ἐστιν πότερον δὲ μία τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ πλείους, καὶ τίνες αὐταὶ καὶ τῶς, ὑστερον λειτέον περὶ αὐτῶν, νῦν δ' εἰς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν ἄλλον γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οἱ δημοσεργοὶ ἔστι, μαίτιν ἢ ἱηθῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτων δοῦρων, ἢ καὶ βέσπιν ἀοιδόν, δ' κεν τέρπησιν ἀείδων:

¹ Schneider: oivov codd. ² θέμη Ellis.

This line is not in our Odyssey, but apparently followed xvii. 383. The passage runs (382 ff.):

τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν ἄλλον γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οἱ δημοσεργοὶ ἔστι, μαίτιν ἢ ἱηθῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτων δοῦρων, ἢ καὶ βέσπιν ἀοιδόν, δ' κεν τέρπησιν ἀείδων;
and writing are useful for business and for household management and for acquiring learning and for many pursuits of civil life, while drawing also seems to be useful in making us better judges of the works of artists), nor yet again as we pursue gymnastics, for the sake of health and strength (for we do not see either of these things produced as a result of music); it remains therefore that it is useful as a pastime in leisure, which is evidently the purpose for which people actually introduce it, for they rank it as a form of pastime that they think proper for free men. For this reason Homer wrote thus:

But him alone
'Tis meet to summon to the festal banquet⁶;

and after these words he speaks of certain others

Who call the bard that he may gladden all.⁷

And also in other verses Odysseus says that this is the best pastime, when, as men are enjoying good cheer,

The banqueters, seated in order due
Throughout the hall, may hear a minstrel sing.⁸

III. It is clear therefore that there is a form of Liberal education in which boys should be trained not because it is useful or necessary but as being liberal and noble; though whether there is one such subject of education or several, and what these are and how they are to be pursued, must be discussed later,⁴ but as it is

⁶ The third line quoted corresponds to this, but not exactly.
⁷ Odyssey, ix. 5 f.
⁸ This promise is not fulfilled.
1338a 35 τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸ ὡςοῦ γέγονεν, ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἔχομεν τινα μαρτυρίαν ἐκ τῶν κατα-βεβλημένων παιδευμάτων. ἡ γὰρ μουσικὴ τούτῳ ποιεῖ δῆλον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὅτι δεῖ τινὰ παιδεύεσθαι τούς παῖδας οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον, οἰον τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πολλὰς ἐνδέχεσθαι γίγνεσθαι δι’ αὐτῶν μαθή-σεις ἑτέρας. ὡμοὶς δὲ καὶ τὴν γραφικὴν οὐχ ἢ ἡν τοῖς ἱδίοις ὁνίοις μὴ διαμαρτάνωσιν ἀλλ’ ὅσιν ἀνεξαπάτητοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν σκευῶν ὠνήν τε καὶ πράσιν, ἀλλὰ 1 μᾶλλον ὅτι ποιεῖ θεωρητικὸν τοῦ περὶ τὰ σῶματα κάλλους. τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρῆσιμον ἢκιστα ἀρμόττει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις. ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν πρότερον 2 τοῖς ἐθεσιν ἡ τῶν λόγω παιδευτέου εἶναι, καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον ἡ τὴν διάνοιαν, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦτων ὅτι παραδοτέον τοὺς παιδᾶς γυμναστικὴ καὶ παιδο-τριβικὴ τούτων γὰρ ἡ μὲν πολλὰ τινὰ ποιεῖ τὴν ἐξώ τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ τὰ ἐργα.

Νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσα τῶν πόλεων 3 ἐπιμελείσθαι τῶν παιδῶν αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἐξώ ἐμποιοῦν, λαβώμενα τὰ τε εἴδη καὶ τὴν αὐξησιν τῶν σωμάτων, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἢμαρτον τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, θηριώδεις δὲ ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίν μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι, καθάπερ εἰρηται πολλάκις, οὔτε πρὸς μίαν οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην βλέποντα

1 ἀλλὰ Thurot: ἡ codd. (μᾶλλον ἡ Postgate).
2 Demetrius: πότερον codd.

a i.e. premature and disproportinate muscular development, directed to some particular competition. Cf. 1288 b 12 ff.

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we have made this much progress on the way, that we have some testimony even from the ancients, derived from the courses of education which they founded—for the point is proved by music. And it is also clear that some of the useful subjects as well ought to be studied by the young not only because of their utility, like the study of reading and writing, but also because they may lead on to many other branches of knowledge; and similarly they should study drawing not in order that they may not go wrong in their private purchases and may avoid being cheated in buying and selling furniture, but rather because this study makes a man observant of bodily beauty; and to seek for utility everywhere is entirely unsuited to men that are great-souled and free. And since it is plain that education by habit must come before education by reason, and training of the body before training of the mind, it is clear from these considerations that the boys must be handed over to the care of the wrestling-master and the trainer; for the latter imparts a certain quality to the habit of the body and the former to its actions.

Now at the present time some of the states reputed to pay the greatest attention to children produce in them an athletic habit to the detriment of their bodily form and growth, while the Spartans although they have avoided this error yet make their boys animal in nature by their laborious exercises, in the belief that this is most contributory to manly courage. Yet, as has often been said, it is not right to regulate education with a view to one virtue only, or to this one most of all; indeed they do not even investigate the question.
ποιήτεον τῆν ἐπιμέλειαν· εἰ τε καὶ πρὸς ταύτην, οὔτε τοῦτο ἐξευρίσκουσιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἵνα ὑπερτάσσομεν τὴν ἁμερίαν ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἥθεσιν. πολλὰ δ’ ἐστὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ἀ πρὸς τὸ κτείνεν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωποφαγίαν εὔχερῷς ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περί τῶν Πόντων Ἀχαιοὶ τε καὶ Ἡνίοχοι, καὶ τῶν ἡπείρωτικῶν ἐθνῶν ἔτερα, τὰ μὲν ὀμοίως τούτους τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἀ ληστικὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνδρείας δ’ οὐ μετεληφασιν. ἔτι δ’ αὐτοὺς τοὺς Λάκκωνας ἵσμεν, ἕως μὲν αὐτοὶ1 προσῆδρευον ταῖς φιλοπονίαις, ὑπερ- ἔχοντας τῶν ἄλλων, νῦν δὲ καὶ τοῖς γυμνασίοις καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀγώσι λειτουργούν ἐτέρων· οὐ γὰρ τῶν τοὺς νέους γυμνάζειν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διέφερον, ἀλλὰ μόνον τῷ πρὸς μὴ2 ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν. ὥστε τὸ καλὸν ἄλλ’ οὐ τὸ θηριώδες δεῖ πρωτ- 5 αγωνιστεῖν. οὐ γὰρ λύκος οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων τι ἄγωνίσαιτο ἀνουθένα3 καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἄνηρ ἀγαθός. οἱ δὲ λίαν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνέντες τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ἀπαιδαγωγητέοις ποι- ὑσαντες βαναύσους κατεργάζονται κατὰ γε τὸ 35 ἀληθές, πρὸς ἐν τε4 μόνον ἔργον τῇ πολιτικῇ χρη- σίμους καὶ ποιήσαντες καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο χείρον, ὡς φησίν ὁ λόγος, ἐτέρων. δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργων κρίνειν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἄνταγωγιστάς γὰρ τῆς παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσιν, πρότερον δ’ οὐκ εἰχον.

114. ὂτι μὲν οὖν χρηστεόν τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ 1

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1 αὐτοὶ <μόνον> Eucken.
2 μόνον τῷ? Reize et pròs μη ed.: τῷ μόνον μη πρὸς codd.
3 οὔθὲν Goettling.
4 εἰν τι? ed.
5 δεὶ δεὶ—εἰχον ante 29 ὥστε transp. Bekker.
whether this virtue is to be had in view at all. For neither in the lower animals nor in
the case of foreign races do we see that courage goes with the wildest, but rather with the gentler
and lion-like temperaments.\(^a\) And there are many foreign races inclined to murder and cannibalism,
for example among the tribes of the Black Sea the Achaeans and Heniochi, and others of the mainland
races, some in the same degree as those named and some more, which although piratical have got no share
of manly courage. And again we know that even the Spartans, although so long as they persisted by
themselves in their laborious exercises they surpassed all other peoples, now fall behind others both in
gymnastic and in military contests; for they used not to excel because they exercised their young men
in this fashion but only because they trained and their adversaries did not. Consequently honour and
not animal ferocity should play the first part; for it is not a wolf nor one of the other wild animals that will
venture upon any noble hazard, but rather a good man. But those who let boys pursue these hard exercises
too much and turn them out untrained in necessary things in real truth render them vulgar, making them
available for statesmanship to use for one task only, and even for this task training them worse than
others do, as our argument proves. And \(^b\) we must not judge them from their former achievements but
from the facts of to-day; for they have rivals in their education now, but they used to have none before.

IV. It is therefore agreed that we should employ Periods of

\(^a\) Hist. An. 629 b 8 (the lion is gentle except when hungry);
Plato, Soph. 231 a (the dog the gentlest of animals).

\(^b\) This sentence would come better at the end of § 4.
πῶς χρηστεύον, ὁμολογούμενον ἔστων. μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἡβης κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσομετέχον, τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους ἀπείρογοντας, ὅνα μηθὲν ἐμπόδιον ἡ πρὸς τὴν αὐξήσιν. οὐ μικρὸν ὅτι δύναται τούτο παρασκευάζειν, ἐν γὰρ τοὺς ὀλυμπιονικὰς δύο τις ἂν ἡ τρεις εὐρότοι συνεκκότας ἄνδρας ὡς καὶ παιδες διὰ τὸ νέους ἀσκοῦντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων. ὅταν δ'] ἤφι ἡβής ἡ τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήματι γένονται, τότε ἀρμόττει καὶ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγκοφαγίαις καταλαμβάνει τὴν ἔχομεν ἡλικίαν. ἃμα γὰρ τῇ τε διανοίᾳ καὶ τῷ σώματι διαπονεῖν οὐ δεῖ, τούτων γὰρ ἐκάτερος ἀπεργάζεσθαι πέφυκε τῶν πόνων, ἐμποδίζων ὅ μὲν τοῦ σώματος πόνος τῇ διάνοιᾳ δὲ ταυτῆς τὸ σῶμα.

Περί δὲ μονουκῆς ἐνα μὲν διηπορήσαμεν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ πρώτων, καλῶς δὲ ἔχει καὶ νῦν ἀναλαβόντας αὐτὰ προαγαγεῖν, ὅπα ὀφθαλμὸν γενῆται τοῖς λόγοις οὐς ἂν τοὺς ἐπειδὴ ἀποφαινόμενοι περὶ αὐτῆς. οὔτε γὰρ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν ράδιον περὶ αὐτῆς διελεῖν, οὔτε τίνος δεὶ χάριν μετέχειν αὐτὴς, πότερον παιδίας ἑνεκα καὶ ἀναπάύσεως, καθάπερ ὑπὸν καὶ μεθῆς (ταῦτα γὰρ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν οὕτως τῶν σπουδαίων, ἀλλ' ἤδεα, καὶ ἀναπαύει μέριμναν, τῆς φησὶν Ἑὐριπίδης, διὸ καὶ τάττοςιν αὐτὴν καὶ χρῶται πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμοίως,

1 Goettling: ἃμα παθεὶ μέριμναν aut ἃμα μέριμναν τοιε codd.
2 πράττουσιn Richards.

* i.e. compulsion to eat very large rations of prescribed food—the Greek way of training.

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For until puberty we should apply lighter exercises, forbidding hard diet and severe exertions, in order that nothing may hinder the growth; for there is no small proof that too severe training can produce this result in the fact that in the list of Olympic victors one would only find two or three persons who have won both as men and as boys, because when people go into training in youth the severe exercises rob them of their strength. But when they have spent three years after puberty upon their other studies, then it is suitable to occupy the next period of life with laborious exercises and strict training diet; for it is wrong to work hard with the mind and the body at the same time, for it is the nature of the two different sorts of exertion to produce opposite effects, bodily toil impeding the development of the mind and mental toil that of the body.

About music on the other hand we have previously raised some questions in the course of our argument, but it is well to take them up again and carry them further now, in order that this may give the key so to speak for the principles which one might advance in pronouncing about it. For it is not easy to say precisely what potency it possesses, nor yet for the sake of what object one should participate in it—whether for amusement and relaxation, as one indulges in sleep and deep drinking (for these in themselves are not serious pursuits but merely pleasant, and 'relax our care,' as Euripides says; owing to which people actually class music with them and employ

\[a \text{ Bacchae } 378 (\text{Bromios}) \delta ς τάδ' \varepsilonχει, \ | \ \thetaιασεύειν \ \tauε \ χόροις \\
| \ μετά \ τ' αἰλών \ γελάσαι | \ \ἀναπαυθοί τε μερίμνας. \]

\[b \text{ Or ' and it is owing to this that people perform music.'} \]

\[c \text{ Music in education:} \]
1839 a \\nνπν znal καὶ μέθη καὶ μουσική, τιθέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὀρχήσιν ἐν τούτοις). ἡ μᾶλλον οὐητέον πρὸς ἀρετήν 25 τι τείνει τὴν μουσικὴν (ὡς δυναμένην, καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστική τὸ σῶμα ποιόν τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τὸ ὄθος ποιόν τι ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσαν δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὑρθώς). ἡ πρὸς διαγωγὴν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τρίτον θετέον τῶν εἱρμένων). ὧτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τοὺς νέους μή παιδίας ἕνεκα παιδεύειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· οὐ γὰρ παίζουσι μανθάνοντες, μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ μάθησις. ἄλλα μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγὴν γε παιοὶ ἀρμοττει καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδιδόναι ταῖς τοιαύταις· οὐθενὶ γὰρ ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος. ἄλλη ἵσως ἂν δόξειν 30 ἢ τῶν παιδῶν σπουδὴ παιδίας εἶναι χάρων ἀνδράσι γενομένου καὶ τελεωθέειν. ἄλλ᾽ εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τῶν ἃν ἑνεκα δέοι μανθάνειν αὐτοῖς, ἄλλα μὴ, καθάπερ οἱ τῶν Περσῶν καὶ Μήδων βασιλεῖς, ἄλλων αὐτὸ ποιοῦντων μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς ἡδωνῆς καὶ τῆς μαθήσεως; καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαίον βέλτιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεποιημένους έργον καὶ τέχνην τῶν τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἐπιμελομένων ὅσον πρὸς μάθησιν μόνον. εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὰ τοιαύτα διαποιεῖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὰ 35 περὶ τὴν τῶν ὀφεί πραγματείαν αὐτοῖς ἃν δέοι παρασκευάζειν· ἄλλ᾽ ἄτοπον. τὴν δ᾽ αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν 40 ἐχει καὶ εἰ δύναται τὰ ἡθη βελτίων ποιεῖν· ταῦτα

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1 τπνψ Aretinus: οινψ codd.
2 ἀναπαύσεως Richards.
3 τα Argyriades: om. codd.

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a The term διαγωγή, 'pastime,' is idiomatically used of the pursuits of cultured leisure—serious conversation, music, the drama.

b Or, altering the text, 'relaxation.'
all of these things, sleep, deep drinking and music, in the same way, and they also place dancing in the same class); or whether we ought rather to think that music tends in some degree to virtue (music being capable of producing a certain quality of character just as gymnastics are capable of producing a certain quality of body, music accustoming men to be able to rejoice rightly); or that it contributes something to intellectual entertainment and culture (for this must be set down as a third alternative among those mentioned). Now it is not difficult to see that one must not make amusement the object of the education of the young; for amusement does not go with learning—learning is a painful process. Nor yet moreover is it suitable to assign intellectual entertainment to boys and to the young; for a thing that is an end does not belong to anything that is imperfect. But perhaps it might be thought that the serious pursuits of boys are for the sake of amusement when they have grown up to be men. But if something of this sort is the case, why should the young need to learn this accomplishment themselves, and not, like the Persian and Median kings, participate in the pleasure and the education of music by means of others performing it? for those who have made music a business and profession must necessarily perform better than those who practise only long enough to learn. But if it is proper for them to labour at accomplishments of this sort, then it would also be right for them to prepare the dishes of an elaborate cuisine; but this is absurd. And the same difficulty also arises as to the question whether learning music can improve their characters; for why should they learn to per-
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1339 b γὰρ τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὑτούς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἐτέρων ἀκούοντας ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, ὥσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὁμοῖς δύνανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὡς φασί, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν. ὃ δ’ αὐτὸς λόγος 5 κἂν εἰ πρὸς εὐθειαῖς καὶ διαγωγὴν ἐλευθερίων χρηστῶν αὐτῆς τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἐτέρων χρωμένων ἀπολαύειν; σκοπεῖν δ’ ἔξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν; οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἁδεὶ καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς. ἀλλὰ καὶ βαναύσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὸ 10 πράττειν οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παιζοντος.

V. Ἄλλ’ ἵσως περὶ μὲν τούτων ὑστερον ἐπισκεπτέουν: ἡ δὲ πρώτη ἑτησία ἐστὶ πότερον οὐθετέον εἰς παιδείαν τὴν μουσικὴν ἡ θετέον, καὶ τὶ δύναται τῶν διαπορηθέντων τριῶν, πότερον παιδείαν ἡ παιδιάν ἡ διαγωγὴν. εὐλόγως δ’ εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἡ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἐστὶ, τὴν δ’ ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαίον ἔστι οἷον (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ιατρεία τίς ἐστιν), καὶ τὴν διαγωγῆν ὁμολογούμενος δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν (τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐξ ἀμφότερων τούτων ἑστίν). τὴν δὲ μουσικῆν πάντες εἶναι φαμεν τῶν ἤδιστων, καὶ ψιλὴν ὄνταν καὶ μετὰ μελωδίας (φησὶ γοῦν καὶ Μουσαίος εἶναι βροτοῖς ἡδίστον 20 ἄεὶδεν, διὸ καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγὰς εὐλόγως παραλαμβάνουσιν αὐτὴν ὡς δυναμένην

a A semi-legendary bard, to whom a number of oracular verses that were current were attributed.

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form edifying music themselves, instead of learning to enjoy it rightly and be able to judge it when they hear others performing, as the Spartans do? for the Spartans although they do not learn to perform can nevertheless judge good and bad music correctly, so it is said. And the same argument applies also if music is to be employed for refined enjoyment and entertainment; why need people learn to perform themselves instead of enjoying music played by others? And we may consider the conception that we have about the gods: Zeus does not sing and harp to the poets himself. But professional musicians we speak of as vulgar people, and indeed we think it not manly to perform music, except when drunk or for fun.

1 V. But perhaps these points will have to be considered afterwards; our first inquiry is whether music ought not or ought to be included in education, and what is its efficacy among the three uses of it that have been discussed—does it serve for education or amusement or entertainment? It is reasonable to reckon it under all of these heads, and it appears to participate in them all. Amusement is for the sake of relaxation, and relaxation must necessarily be pleasant, for it is a way of curing the pain due to laborious work; also entertainment ought admittedly to be not only honourable but also pleasant, for happiness is derived from both honour and pleasure; but we all pronounce music to be one of the pleasantest things, whether instrumental or instrumental and vocal music together (at least Musaeus according to Plato's Republic, where he says, 'Song is man's sweetest joy,' and that is why people with good reason introduce it at parties and entertainments, for its exhilarating effect), so that for this purpose music is of great moral value.
ευφραίνειν), ὡστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι

25 παιδεύεσθαι δεῖν αὐτὴν τοὺς νεωτέρους. ὃσα γὰρ
ἀβλαβὴ τῶν ἡδέων, οὐ μόνον ἀρμόττει πρὸς τὸ
tέλος ἄλλα καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν
μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁλιγάκις
gίγνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ ἀναπαύονται καὶ χρῶνται

30 ταῖς παιδιαῖς οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλέον ἄλλα καὶ διὰ τὴν
ἡδονήν, χρήσιμον ἂν εὖ διαναπαύειν ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ
tαύτης ἡδοναῖς. συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις 3
ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος· ἔχει γὰρ ἵσως ἡδονήν
tινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλὰ ὦ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, ξητούντες
dὲ ταύτην λαμβάνουσιν ὡς ταύτην ἔκεινην διὰ

35 τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν πράξεων ἔχειν ὁμοιώμα τι. τὸ τε
γὰρ τέλος οὐθενὸς τῶν ἐσομένων χάριν αἴρετον,
καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἡδονῶν οὐθενὸς εἰσὶ τῶν
ἐσομένων ἕνεκεν, ἄλλα τῶν γεγονότων, οἰον πόνων
καὶ λύπης. δὲ ἦν μὲν οὖν αὐτίαν ξητούσι τὴν
εὐδαιμονίαν γίγνεσθαι διὰ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν,

40 ταύτην ἂν τὶς εἰκότως ὑπολάβοι τὴν αὐτίαν· περὶ 4
dὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν τῆς μουσικῆς, οὗ διὰ ταύτην
μόνην, ἄλλα καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὰς
ἀναπαύσεις, ως ἔοικεν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα ξητητέον μὴ

1340 a ποτε τούτο μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμωτέρα δ' αὐτῆς ἡ
φύσις ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρείαν, καὶ δεῖ
μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς,

ης ἔχουσι πάντες αἰσθηθοῦσιν (ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μουσική τὴν

5 ἡδονήν φυσικῆν, διὸ πάσαις ἥλικίαις καὶ πᾶσιν
ἡδειν ἡ χρήσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφιλῆς), ἀλλ' ὄραν

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reason also one might suppose that the younger men ought to be educated in music. For all harmless pleasures are not only suitable for the ultimate object but also for relaxation; and as it but rarely happens for men to reach their ultimate object, whereas they often relax and pursue amusement not so much with some ulterior object but because of the pleasure of it, it would be serviceable to let them relax at intervals in the pleasures derived from music.  

3 But it has come about that men make amusements an end; for the end also perhaps contains a certain pleasure, but not any ordinary pleasure, and seeking this they take the other as being this because it has a certain resemblance to the achievement of the end of their undertakings. For the end is desirable not for the sake of anything that will result from it, and also pleasures of the sort under consideration are not desirable for the sake of some future result, but because of things that have happened already, for instance labour and pain. One might then perhaps assume this to be the reason which causes men to seek to procure happiness by means of those pleasures; but in the case of taking part in music, this is not because of this reason only, but also because performing music is useful, as it seems, for relaxation. But nevertheless we must examine whether it is not the case that, although this has come about, yet the nature of music is more honourable than corresponds with the employment of it mentioned, and it is proper not only to participate in the common pleasure that springs from it, which is perceptible to everybody (for the pleasure contained in music is of a natural kind, owing to which the use of it is dear to those of all ages and characters), but to see if its influence
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1e' pí kai prós tò ἰθὸς συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν. τούτῳ δ' ἄν εἰη δῆλον εἰ ποιοὶ τίνες τὰ ἰθή γιγνόμεθα δι' αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γιγνόμεθα δ' ποιοὶ τίνες, φανερῶν διὰ πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἐτέρων,

10 οὖχ ἦκιστα δ' καὶ διὰ τῶν Ὄλυμπου μελῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογούμενως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικὰς, δ' ἐνθουσιασμὸς τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν ἰθῶς πάθος ἐστὶν. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίγνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρίς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν. ἔπει δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἴδεων, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν, δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθείσθαι μηθὲν οὕτως ὡς τὸ κράνευν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικεσίν ἰθεῖ καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· ἐστὶ δ' ὁμοώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ρυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς καὶ πραότητος, ἔτι δ' ἀνδρίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰθικῶν (δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι τοιούτων). ὁ δ' ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίως ἐθυμοῦ τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ χαίρειν ἔγγυς ἐστὶ τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον (οἶον εἰ τις χαίρει τὴν εἰκόνα τινὸς θεώμενος μὴ δ' ἅλλην αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μορφήν αὐτῆς, ἀναγκαίον τοῦτω καὶ αὐτὴν ἐκείνην τὴν θεωρίαν ὅτι τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ ἰθὲιαν εἶναι). συμβέβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν 7 τοῖς ἄλλοις μηδὲν υπάρχειν ὁμοίωμα τοῖς ἰθεῖσιν,

1 hic lacunam Γ: <τῶν λόγων διὰ> Susemihl.
2 ἰθῶν Richards.

A Phrygian composer of the seventh century B.C.
Music dramatically expressing various states of emotion.

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reaches also in a manner to the character and to the soul. And this would clearly be the case if we are affected in our characters in a certain manner by it. But it is clear that we are affected in a certain manner, both by many other kinds of music and not least by the melodies of Olympus; for these admittedly make our souls enthusiastic, and enthusiasm is an affection of the character of the soul. And moreover everybody when listening to imitations is thrown into a corresponding state of feeling, even apart from the rhythms and tunes themselves. And since it is the case that music is one of the things that give pleasure, and that virtue has to do with feeling delight and love and hatred rightly, there is obviously nothing that it is more needful to learn and become habituated to than to judge correctly and to delight in virtuous characters and noble actions; but rhythms and melodies contain representations of anger and mildness, and also of courage and temperance and all their opposites and the other moral qualities, that most closely correspond to the true natures of these qualities (and this is clear from the facts of what occurs—when we listen to such representations we change in our soul); and habituation in feeling pain and delight at representations of reality is close to feeling them towards actual reality (for example, if a man delights in beholding the statue of somebody for no other reason than because of its actual form, the actual sight of the person whose statue he beholds must also of necessity give him pleasure); and it is the case that whereas the other objects of sensation contain no representation of

\[ a \] A probable correction of the Greek gives 'by the rhythms and tunes themselves, even apart from the words.'
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οἶνον ἐν τοῖς ἀπτοῖς καὶ τοῖς γενυτοῖς (ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς ὀρατοῖς ἣρέμα, σχῆματα γάρ ἐστὶ τοιαύτα, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μικρὸν, κοῦν πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσιν· ἐτί δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ ταῦτα ὀμοιῶματα τῶν ἡθῶν ἄλλα σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰ γιγνόμενα σχῆματα καὶ χρώματα τῶν ἡθῶν, καὶ ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν· οὐ μὴν ἄλλ’ ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ περὶ τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν, δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς νέους ἄλλα τὰ Πολυγνώτου κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γραφέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστὶν ἡθικός), ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ μμιμήματα τῶν ἡθῶν· καὶ τοὐτ’ ἐστὶ φανερὸν, εὖθυς γάρ ἢ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλωσ διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἄλλα πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὀδυρτικότερος καὶ συνεπτικότερος μᾶλλον, οἶνον πρὸς τὴν μιξολυδιστὶ καλουμένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακώτερας τὴν διάνοιαν, οἶνον πρὸς τὰς ἀνεμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστικότως μᾶλιστα πρὸς ἐτέραν, οἶνον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δωριστὶ μόνη τῶν ἀρμονιῶν, ἐνθυσιαστικοὺς δ’ ἡ φυγιστὶ· ταῦτα 9 γὰρ καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὴν παιδείαν ταῦτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες, λαμβάνουσι γὰρ τὰ μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων εἰς αὐτῶν τῶν ἐργῶν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ρυθμούς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἠθος ἐχουσι στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις

1 κοῦ Μueller: καὶ codd.

a ‘Not’ is a conjectural insertion.

b i.e. these visual impressions do vary to some extent in moral effect.

c Pauson is a painter otherwise little known. Polygnotus decorated the Stoa Poikile and other famous public buildings
character, for example the objects of touch and taste (though the objects of sight do so slightly, for there are forms that represent character, but only to a small extent, and not all men participate in visual perception of such qualities; also visual works of art are not representations of character but rather the forms and colours produced are mere indications of character, and these indications are only bodily sensations during the emotions; not but what in so far as there is a difference even in regard to the observation of these indications, the young must not look at the works of Pauson but those of Polygnotus, and of any other moral painter or sculptor), pieces of music on the contrary do actually contain in themselves imitations of character; and this is manifest, for even in the nature of the mere melodies there are differences, so that people when hearing them are affected differently and have not the same feelings in regard to each of them, but listen to some in a more mournful and restrained state, for instance the mode called Mixolydian, and to others in a softer state of mind, but in a midway state and with the greatest composure to another, as the Dorian mode alone of tunes seems to act, while the Phrygian makes men enthusiastic; for these things are well stated by those who have studied this form of education, as they derive the evidence for their theories from the actual facts of experience. And the same holds good about the rhythms also, for some have a more stable and others a more emotional character, and of the latter some are more vulgar in their

at Athens, in the middle of the 5th century B.C. 'Polygnotus represented men as better than they really were, Pauson as worse' (Poetics 1448 a 5).
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1840 b

οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι δύναται ποιῶν τι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἱθος ἡ μουσικὴ παρασκευάζειν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι προσακτέον καὶ παιδευτέον ἐν αὐτῇ τούς νέους.

15 καὶ τὴν ἡ διδασκαλία τῆς μουσικῆς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ νέοι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀνήδυντον οὐδὲν ὑπομένουσιν ἐκόντες, ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν ἠδυμένων ἐστὶ. καὶ τὶς ἐσκε συγγενεῖα ταῖς ἁρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς μυθμοῖς εἶναι. διὸ πολλοὶ φασί τῶν σοφῶν οἱ μὲν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν οἱ δὲ ἔχειν ἁρμονίαν. VI. Πότερον δὲ δεῖ μανθάνειν αὑτούς ἔδωτάς τε καὶ χειρουργοῦντας ἡ μῆ, καθάπερ ἡπορήθη πρότερον, νῦν λεκτέον. οὔκ ἄδηλον δὲ ὅτι πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ γίγνεσθαι ποιούσι τινας, ἐάν τις αὐτὸς κοινωνὴ τῶν ἔργων ἐν γὰρ τί τῶν αὖν ἀνυνάτων ἡ χαλεπῶν ἐστὶ μῆ κοινωνήσαντας τῶν ἔργων κριτὰς γενέσθαι σπουδαίουσιν. ἀμα δὲ καὶ δεῖ τοὺς παιδας ἔχειν των διατριβήν, καὶ τῇ Ἀρχύτου πλαταγήν οἴεσθαι γενέσθαι καλῶς, ην διδόσι τοῖς παιδίοις ὅπως χρώμενοι ταύτῃ μηδὲν καταγνύσωσι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἰσχύσειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τοῖς νηπίοις ἁρμοττουσα τῶν παιδίων, ἡ δὲ παίδεα πλαταγῆ τοῖς μείζοσι τῶν νέων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν παιδευτέον τὴν μουσικὴν οὐτως ὡστε καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν

1 ἠδυμένων? Bywater.
2 ἡμῖν εἶναι Aretinus: ἐπὶ ἡμᾶς εἶναι Reiz.

a The former doctrine is Pythagorean, the latter is stated by Plato, Phaedo 93.

b Archytas a Pythagorean philosopher, mathematician, 660
emotional effects and others more liberal. From these considerations therefore it is plain that music has the power of producing a certain effect on the moral character of the soul, and if it has the power to do this, it is clear that the young must be directed to music and must be educated in it. Also education in music is well adapted to the youthful nature; for the young owing to their youth cannot endure anything not sweetened by pleasure, and music is by nature a thing that has a pleasant sweetness. And we seem to have a certain affinity with tunes and rhythms; owing to which many wise men say either that the soul is a harmony or that it has harmony.

VI. We ought now to decide the question raised earlier, whether the young ought to learn music by singing and playing themselves or not. It is not difficult to see that it makes a great difference in the process of acquiring a certain quality whether one takes a part in the actions that impart it oneself; for it is a thing that is impossible, or difficult, to become a good judge of performances if one has not taken part in them. At the same time also boys must have some occupation, and one must think Archytas's rattle a good invention, which people give to children in order that while occupied with this they may not break any of the furniture; for young things cannot keep still. Whereas then a rattle is a suitable occupation for infant children, education serves as a rattle for young people when older. Such considerations therefore prove that children should be trained in music so as actually
It is difficult not to think that either the nouns or the adverbs in the Greek have been erroneously transposed, and that we should translate 'either for learning them now or for practising them later on.'
2 to take part in its performance; and it is not difficult to distinguish what is suitable and unsuitable for various ages, and to refute those who assert that the practice of music is vulgar. For first, inasmuch as it is necessary to take part in the performances for the sake of judging them, it is therefore proper for the pupils when young actually to engage in the performances, though when they get older they should be released from performing, but be able to judge what is beautiful and enjoy it rightly because of the study in which they engaged in their youth.

3 Then as to the objection raised by some people that music makes people vulgar, it is not difficult to solve it by considering how far pupils who are being educated with a view to civic virtue should take part in the actual performance of music, and in what times and what rhythms they should take part, and also what kinds of instruments should be used in their studies, as this naturally makes a difference. For the solution of the objection depends upon these points, as it is quite possible that some modes of music do produce the result mentioned. It is manifest therefore that the study of music must not place a hindrance in the way of subsequent activities, nor vulgarize the bodily frame and make it useless for the exercises of the soldier and the citizen, either for their practical pursuit now or for their scientific study later on. And this would come about in respect of their study if the pupils did not go on toiling at the exercises that aim at professional competitions, nor the wonderful and elaborate performances which have now entered into the competitions and have passed from the competitions into
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τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τουαύτα μέχρι περ ἀν δύνανται χαίρειν τοὺς καλοὺς μέλεσι καὶ
15 ὑπόθμοις, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῶν κοινῶν τῆς μουσικῆς, ὁπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐννα χῶν, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ πλῆθος ἀνδραπόδων καὶ παιδίων. δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τούτων 5 καὶ ποιούς ὀργάνους χρηστέον. οὔτε γὰρ αὐλοὺς εἰς παιδείαν ἀκτέον οὔτ' ἄλλο ὀχυρών ὀργανοῦ, οὔτ' κιθάραν ἀλλ' τι τοιοῦτον ἑτερόν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' 20 ὅσα ποιήσει αὐτῶν ἀκροατ吸附 ἀγαθοὺς ἡ τῆς μουσικῆς παιδείας ἡ τῆς ἄλλης. ἐτὶ δ' οὖν ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἡθικὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργαστικὸν, ὡςτε πρὸς τοὺς τοιοῦτους αὐτῷ καιροὺς χρηστέον εὖ ὅσ ἡ θεωρία καθαρων μᾶλλον δύναται ἡ μάθησιν. προσθάμεν δὲ ὅτι συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ 3 ἑννέαν 25 πρὸς παιδείαν καὶ τὸ κωλύειν τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι τὴν αὐλήν. διὸ καλῶς ἀπεδοκίμασαν αὐτοῦ οἱ πρὸτερον τὴν χρῆσιν ἐκ τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, καίπερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῷ. σχολαστικότερον γὰρ γινόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπορίας καὶ μεγαλομυχότερον πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἐτὶ τε
30 πρῶτον καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ προνομισθέντες ἐκ τῶν ἐργῶν, πάσης ἡπτοντο μαθήσεως, οὐδὲν διακρίνοντες ἀλλ' ἐπιξητοῦντες. διὸ καὶ τὴν αὐλητικὴν ἡγαγον πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τις χορηγὸς αὐτὸς ἡμίσει τῷ χορῷ, καὶ περὶ Ἀθηναίων οὕτως ἑπεχωρίασεν ὡστε σχεδὸν

1 τὰ μὴ Immisch: τὰ codd.

See 1341 b 33 ff.
A wealthy citizen who undertook the duty of equipping
education, but also only practised exercises not of that sort until they are able to enjoy beautiful tunes and rhythms, and not merely the charm common to all music, which even some lower animals enjoy, as well as a multitude of slaves and children. And it is also clear from these considerations what sort of instruments they should use. Flutes must not be introduced into education, nor any other professional instrument, such as the harp or any other of that sort, but such instruments as will make them attentive pupils either at their musical training or in their other lessons. Moreover the flute is not a moralizing but rather an exciting influence, so that it ought to be used for occasions of the kind at which attendance has the effect of purification rather than instruction. And let us add that the flute happens to possess the additional property telling against its use in education that playing it prevents the employment of speech. Hence former ages rightly rejected its use by the young and the free, although at first they had employed it. For as they came to have more leisure because of their wealth and grew more high-spirited and valorous, both at a still earlier date and because after the Persian Wars they were filled with pride as a result of their achievements, they began to engage in all branches of learning, making no distinction but pursuing research further. Because of this they even included flute-playing among their studies; for in Sparta a certain chorus-leader played the flute to his chorus himself and at Athens and training a chorus for a religious celebration (especially the production of a drama at Athens) usually had an assistant of lower station to supply the instrumental music. The office of choregus is not elsewhere referred to as existing at Sparta.
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35 oí polloi tōn eleuthērōn meteîchon autēs· dēlouv
dê ek toû πίνακος dēn anéthēke Thrássippou 'Ek-
fantidē xorhēgēsas. òsteron d' ápdekoimásth th dìa tῆs
peîras autēs, bēltoun dynaménon kriîneîn to
prōs āretēn kai to μῆ πρὸs āretēn sunteînon.
dîmôis dê kai pollâ tōn orgánōn tōn ārhkaiōn,
oîn tēktidēs kai bárbitou kai tâ prōs ήδονήn
sunteîonta tôn akouousi tōn charmēnωn,1 ἐπτά-

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gwâna kai trîgwna kai sambôkai, kai pánâ tâ
dĕômena ħeirourghikῆs épistēmῆs. eûlógenj d' ēkheî
tâ peri tôw aûlôw ὑπὸ tôw ārhkaiōn memvtho-
lôgwnēn. fâsi gâr ñtû 'Athyânâv eûroûsan
âpobaleîn tôw aûlôs. ou kakkôs mên ouî ēkheî
5 fânaî kai diâ tῆs âskhēsûnῆs tôw prōsôpou
touto poûsai dûskherássan tûn theûn· ou mîn
âllâ mâllôn eîkôs ñtû prôs tûn diânousan ouîân
éstin h paideia tῆs aûlîsēps, tû dê 'Athyânâ tûn
âpistēmîn peritîthêmên kai tûn têkhnîn.

VII. 'Épei dê tôw' te orgânôw kai2 tûs ἐργασίαs 1

10 âpodoimâzômen tûn tekhnikûn paideían (tekhnikûn
dê tîthêmên tûn prôs tôus âgônas, ên tâúth gâr ñ
prâttôn ou tûs aûtûs metaskeîrîstai xârîn āretêhs,
âllâ tûs âkouûntôs âdônhîs, kai tâúthâs
forîkîs, ñwîper ou tôs elenîthêrôn krîmûmen êînai
tûn érgasîas, âllâ thêtikôterâs kai baînûsoûs

15 ñtî suîmbâiîne gînvesiâi, poînerôs gâr ñ skopôs

1 χρωμάτων ? Immisch. 2 <ἐνω> kai Immisch.

a Ephantides was one of the earliest comic poets; Thras-
ippus is not elsewhere recorded. Who the flute-player was
is unknown.

b These were old-fashioned forms of the lyre.

c A possible emendation of the Greek gives ' those who
listen to their modulations.'
it became so fashionable that almost the majority of freemen went in for flute-playing, as is shown by the tablet erected by Thrasippus after having provided the chorus for Ecphantides. But later on it came to be disapproved of as a result of actual experience, when men were more capable of judging what music conduced to virtue and what did not; and similarly also many of the old instruments were disapproved of, like the pectis and the barbitos and the instruments designed to give pleasure to those who hear people playing them, the septangle, the triangle and the sambyc and all the instruments that require manual skill. And indeed there is a reasonable foundation for the story that was told by the ancients about the flute. The tale goes that Athene found a flute and threw it away. Now it is not a bad point in the story that the goddess did this out of annoyance because of the ugly distortion of her features; but as a matter of fact it is more likely that it was because education in flute-playing has no effect on the intelligence, whereas we attribute science and art to Athene.

VII. And since we reject professional education in the instruments and in performance (and we count performance in competitions as professional, for the performer does not take part in it for his own improvement, but for his hearers’ pleasure, and that a vulgar pleasure, owing to which we do not consider performing to be proper for free men, but somewhat menial; and indeed performers do become vulgar, since the object at which they aim

* Three different stringed instruments, the last having four strings stretched in a triangular frame.

* The Greek should probably be altered to give ‘reject some instruments and professional education in performance.’
πρὸς δὲν ποιοῦται τὸ τέλος, οὐ γὰρ θεατής φορτικὸς ὑμενετίσει τὴν μουσικήν, ὡστε καὶ 
τοὺς τεχνώτας τοὺς πρὸς αὐτὸν μελετῶντας αὐτοὺς 
τε ποιοὺς ἕνας ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὰς 
κινήσεις) σκέπτετον δὴ τινί περὶ τε τὰς ἀρμονίας καὶ 
τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς, καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν πότερον πάσαις 
χρησάντω ὑπὸ ἀρμονίας καὶ πᾶσι τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς ἢ 
διαίρεσιν, ἐπειτά τοὺς πρὸς παιδείαν διαποναύσι 
πότερον τὸν αὐτὸν διορισμὸν θησομεν ἢ τρίτον 
δε τυν ἐτέρων (ἐπειδὴ τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὅρωμεν 
διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὕσαν, τούτων δὲ 
ἐκάτερον οὐ δεὶ λειτήσασθαί τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν πρὸς 
παιδείαν), καὶ πότερον προοφείτειν μᾶλλον τὴν 
εὑρισκε σή μοι ῥυθμόνοι τοὺς καὶ τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ὅσοι 
τὴν 
χάνουσιν ἐμπερίως ἔχοντες τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν 
παιδείας, τὴν μὲν καθ' ἐκαστον ἀκριβοδολογίαν 
ἀποδούσομεν ἣτεν τοὺς βουλομένους παρ' ἐκείνων, 
νῦν δὲ νομικῶς διέλωσιν, τοὺς τύπους μόνον 
ἐπιόντες περὶ αὐτῶν. ἐπει δὲ τὴν 
διαίρεσιν ἀποδεχόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαίρουσί 
τινες τῶν 
ἐν 
φιλοσοφία, τὰ μὲν ἡθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δὲ 
ἐνθοισαστικὰ τιθέντες, καὶ τῶν ἀρμονίων τὴν 
φύσιν πρὸς ἐκαστο τούτων οἰκεῖαν ἀλλὴν πρὸς 
ἄλλο μέρος τιθέσαι, φαμὲν δ' οὖ μᾶς ἔνεκεν 
ὡφελείας τῇ μουσικὴν χρήσθαι δεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ 
πλείω 
νων χάριν (καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἐνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—
is a low one, as vulgarity in the audience usually influences the music, so that it imparts to the artists who practise it with a view to suit the audience a special kind of personality, and also of bodily frame because of the movements required)—we must therefore give some consideration to tunes and rhythms, and to the question whether for educational purposes we must employ all the tunes and all the rhythms or make distinctions; and next, whether for those who are working at music for education we shall lay down the same regulation, or ought we to establish some other third one (inasmuch as we see that the factors in music are melody and rhythm, and it is important to notice what influence each of these has upon education), and whether we are to prefer music with a good melody or music with a good rhythm. Now we consider that much is well said on these matters by some of the musicians of the present day and by some of those engaged in philosophy who happen to be experienced in musical education, and we will abandon the precise discussion as to each of these matters for any who wish it to seek it from those teachers, while for the present let us lay down general principles, merely stating the outlines of the subjects. And since we accept the classification of melodies made by some philosophers, as ethical melodies, melodies of action, and passionate melodies,* distributing the various harmonies among these classes as being in nature akin to one or the other, and as we say that music ought to be employed not for the purpose of one benefit that it confers but on account of several (for it serves the purpose both of education and of pur-

* i.e. representative of character, of action and of emotion.
ARISTOTLE

1341b  
tί δέ λέγομεν τήν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν
40 δ’ ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἔροιμεν σαφέστερον,—
τρότων δὲ πρὸς διαγωγῆν, πρὸς ἀνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς
1342α τήν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν, φανερῶν ὅτι χρηστέον 5
μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἁρμονίαις, οἶδα τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρότον
πάσαις χρηστέον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς
ἡθικῶτάταις, πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἑτέρων χειρουρ-
γούντων καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἑνθουσια-
5 στικαῖς (ὁ γάρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχῆς
ἰσχυρὸς, τούτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἤτον
διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον—οἶδαν ἔλεος καὶ φόβος,
ἐτι δ’ ἑνθουσιασμός, καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταῦτης τῆς
κινήσεως κατακώχιμοι τινὲς εἰσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἱερῶν
μελῶν ὀρώμεν τούτους ὅταν χρήσωται τοῖς
10 εξοργιάζουσι τὴν ψυχήν μέλει καθισταμένους
ἀσπερ ἑταρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως· ταυτὸ 6
δὴ τούτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν καὶ τοὺς ἔλεγχοις
καὶ τους φοβητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὀλωσ παθητικοὺς
tους1 ἄλλους καθ’ ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων
ἐκάστω, καὶ πᾶσι γίγνεσθαι τινὰ κάθαρσιν καὶ
15 κοινοῦσθαι μεθ’ ἡδονῆς ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη
τὰ καθαρτικὰ παρέχει χαράν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἀν-
θρώποις). διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἁρμονίαις καὶ
toῖς τοιούτοις μέλεις θετέον2 τοὺς τὴν θεατρικὴν
μουσικὴν μεταχειριζομένους ἀγωνισταῖς (ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁ 7
θεατὴς διττός, ὁ μὲν ἔλευθερος καὶ πεπαίδευμένος,
20 ὁ δὲ φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων
τοιούτων συγκείμενος, ἀποδοτέον ἁγώνας καὶ
θεωρίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν εἰσὶ

1 τοὺς Immisch: τοὺς δ’ eodd.
2 παιδευτέον Jebb: εὐατέον ἄρχεσθαι> Richards.
POLITICS, VIII. vii. 4-7

gation—the term purgation we use for the present without explanation, but we will return to discuss the meaning that we give to it more explicitly in our treatise on poetry—and thirdly it serves for amusement, serving to relax our tension and to give rest from it), it is clear that we should employ all the harmonies, yet not employ them all in the same way, but use the most ethical ones for education, and the active and passionate kinds for listening to when others are performing (for any experience that occurs violently in some souls is found in all, though with different degrees of intensity—for example pity and fear, and also religious excitement; for some persons are very liable to this form of emotion, and under the influence of sacred music we see these people, when they use tunes that violently arouse the soul, being thrown into a state as if they had received medicinal treatment and taken a purge; the same experience then must come also to the compassionate and the timid and the other emotional people generally in such degree as befalls each individual of these classes, and all must undergo a purgation and a pleasant feeling of relief; and similarly also the purgative melodies afford harmless delight to people). Therefore those who go in for theatrical music must be set to compete in harmonies and melodies of this kind (and since the audience is of two classes, one free-men and educated people, and the other the vulgar class composed of mechanics and labourers and other such persons, the latter sort also must be assigned competitions and shows for relaxation; and just as

In Poetics c. vi. tragedy is said to purge the emotion of pity and fear by giving them an outlet: the reference here is probably to the lost Second Book of Poetics.

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ARISTOTLE

1342 a ἤις ὁστερ αὐτῶν αἱ ὕψχαι παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωμένα, ποιεὶ δὲ τῇν ἡδονὴν ἐκάστοις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεῖον, διόπερ ἀποδοτέον εξουσίαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις πρὸς τὸν θεατὴν τὸν τοιοῦτον τοιούτω τινὶ χρήσθαι τῷ γένει τῆς μουσικῆς. πρὸς δὲ παιδείαν, ὡσπερ εὑρήται, τοῖς ἤθικοῖς τῶν 8 μελῶν χρηστέον καὶ ταῖς ἀρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις.

1342 b τοιαύτη δ' ἡ δωριστί, καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον· δέχεσθαι δὲ δεὶ κἂν τινὰ ἄλλην ἡμῖν δοκιμάζωσιν οἱ κοινοῖ τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβής καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας. ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ Πολυτείᾳ Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τὴν φρυγιστὶ μόνῃ καταλείπει μετὰ τῆς δωριστῆς, καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδοκιμάσας τῶν ὀργάνων τὸν αὐλόν. ἔχει γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἡ φρυγιστὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν ἐνπερ αὐλὸς ἐν τοῖς ὀργάνοις· ἁμφοὶ γὰρ ὀργιαστικὰ καὶ παθητικά. δηλοῖ δ' ἡ ποίησις· πᾶσα γὰρ βακχεία καὶ πᾶσα 9 ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις μάλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς αὐλοῖς, τῶν ὀργάνων ἐν τοῖς φρυγιστὶ μέλεσι λαμβάνει ταῦτα τὸ πρέπον, οἷον ὁ διθύραμβος ὀμολογομένως εἶναι δοκεῖ Φρῦγιον, καὶ τούτῳ πολλὰ παραδείγματα λέγομαι οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνεσιν ταῦταν ἄλλα τε, καὶ διότι Φιλόζενος ἐγχειρῆσας ἐν τῇ δωριστῇ ποιήσαι διθύραμβον τοὺς Μύσους1 οὐχ οἶος τ' ἡν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως

1 Reiz: μῦθοι codd.

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a Said to mean divergent from the regular scale in having smaller intervals.

b 1342 a 2.

c 1343 b 3 ff.

d 399 a.

e Or perhaps βακχεία and κίνησις denote bodily movement.

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their souls are warped from the natural state, so those harmonies and melodies that are highly strung and irregular in coloration are deviations, but people of each sort receive pleasure from what is naturally suited to them, owing to which the competitors before an audience of this sort must be allowed to employ some such kind of music as this); but for education, as has been said, the ethical class of melodies and of harmonies must be employed. And of that nature is the Dorian mode, as we said before; but we must also accept any other mode that those who take part in the pursuit of philosophy and in musical education may recommend to us. Socrates in the Republic does not do well in allowing only the Phrygian mode along with the Dorian, and that when he has rejected the flute among instruments; for the Phrygian mode has the same effect among harmonies as the flute among instruments—both are violently exciting and emotional. This is shown by poetry; for all Bacchic versification and all movement of that sort belongs particularly to the flute among the instruments, and these metres find their suitable accompaniment in tunes in the Phrygian mode among the harmonies: for example the dithyramb is admittedly held to be a Phrygian metre, and the experts on this subject adduce many instances to prove this, particularly the fact that Philoxenus when he attempted to compose a dithyramb, The Mysians, in the Dorian mode was unable to do so, accompanying the song; or they may denote the emotional frenzy expressed and stimulated by it. The dithyramb was a form of poetry of this class, originally celebrating the birth of Dionysus. Philoxenus, one of the most famous dithyrambic poets, 435-380 B.C., lived at Athens, and later at the court of Dionysius of Syracuse.
αὐτής ἔξεπεσεν εἰς τὴν φρυγιστὶ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἄρμονιαν πάλιν. περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες 10 ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὖσας καὶ μάλιστ' ήθους ἐχούσης ἀνδρείων. ἔτι δὲ ἐπει τὸ μέσον μὲν 15 τῶν ὑπερβολῶν ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ χρῆμα διώκειν φαμέν, ἢ δὲ δωριστὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἄρμονιας, φανερόν ὅτι τὰ Δώρια μέλη πρέπει παιδεύεσθαι μάλλον τοῖς νεωτέροις. εἰσὶ δὲ δύο σκοποῖ, τὸ τε δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον· καὶ γὰρ τὰ δυνατὰ δεῖ μεταχειρίζεσθαι μάλλον καὶ τὰ 20 πρέποντα ἐκάστοις· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταύτα ὁρισμένα ταῖς ἡλικίαις, οἷον τοῖς ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ χρόνον οὐ βάδιον ἄδειν τὰς συντόνους ἄρμονίας, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνειμένας ἡ φύσις ὑποβάλλει τοῖς τηλικούτοις. διὸ καλῶς ἐπιτιμῶσι καὶ τοῦτο Σωκράτει τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τινὲς, ὅτι τὰς ἀνειμένας ἄρμονίας 25 ἀποδοκιμάσεις εἰς τὴν παιδίαν, ὡς μεθυστικάς λαμβάνων αὐτὰς, οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μέθης δύναμιν, βακχειτικόν γὰρ ἡ γε μέθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον, ἀλλ' ἀπειρηκυίας. ὦστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐσομένην ἡλικίαν, τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, δεῖ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἄρμονιῶν ἀπετέθαι καὶ τῶν μελῶν τῶν τοιούτων, 30 ἔτι δ' εἰ τίς ἐστὶ τοιαύτη τῶν ἄρμονιῶν ἡ πρέπει τῇ τῶν παιδῶν διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμουν τῇ ἔχειν ἅμα καὶ παιδείαν, οἶον ἡ λυδιστὶ φαίνε- ται πεπονθέναι μάλιστα τῶν ἄρμονίων. δὴ λοιπὸν 2  ὅτι τούτους ὄρους τρεῖς ποιητέων εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, τὸ τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον. 3

1 Immisch olim: παιδείαν codd.
2 δὴ λοιπὸν οὖν Schneider: δὴ λοιπὸν codd., ὡς δὴ λοιπὸν Goettling.
3 Reliqua huius operis in Graeco nondum inueni Gufl.
but merely by the force of nature fell back again into the suitable harmony, the Phrygian. And all agree that the Dorian mode is more sedate and of a specially manly character. Moreover since we praise and say that we ought to pursue the mean between extremes, and the Dorian mode has this nature in relation to the other harmonies, it is clear that it suits the younger pupils to be educated rather in the Dorian melodies. But there are two objects to aim at, the possible as well as the suitable; for we are bound rather to attempt the things that are possible and those that are suitable for the particular class of people concerned; and in these matters also there are dividing lines drawn by the ages—for instance, those whose powers have waned through lapse of time cannot easily sing the highly strung harmonies, but to persons of that age nature suggests the relaxed harmonies. Therefore some musical experts also rightly criticize Socrates \(^a\) because he disapproved of the relaxed harmonies for amusement, taking them to have the character of intoxication, not in the sense of the effect of strong drink, for that clearly has more the result of making men frenzied revellers, but as failing in power. Hence even with a view to the period of life that is to follow, that of the comparatively old, it is proper to engage in the harmonies and melodies of this kind too, and also any kind of harmony that is suited to the age of boyhood because it is capable of being at once decorous and educative, which seems to be the nature of the Lydian mode most of all the harmonies. It is clear therefore that we should lay down these three canons to guide education, moderation, possibility and suitability.

\(^a\) Republic 338 e.
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