EPICETETUS
THE DISCOURSES AS REPORTED
BY ARRIAN, THE MANUAL,
AND FRAGMENTS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
W. A. OLDFATHER
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. II
DISCOURSES, BOOKS III AND IV,
THE MANUAL, AND FRAGMENTS

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ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES
OF EPICTETUS
APPIANOY
ΤΩΝ ΕΠΙΚΤΗΤΟΥΔΙΑΤΡΙΒΩΝ
Α Β Γ Δ
Γ
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΑ ΤΟΥ Γ ΒΙΒΛΙΟΥ

α'. Περὶ καλλωπισμοῦ.
β'. Περὶ τίνα ἄσκεισθαι δεῖ τῶν προκόψοντα καὶ ὧτι τῶν κυριωτάτων ἀμελουμέν.
γ'. Τίς ὑλή τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πρὸς τί μάλιστα ἄσκητέον.
δ'. Πρὸς τὸν ἀκόσμως ἐν θεάτρῳ σπουδάσαντα.
ε'. Πρὸς τοὺς διὰ νόσουν ἀπαλλαττομένους.  
ζ'. Σποράδην τινά.
ζ'. Πρὸς τὸν διορθωθὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων πόλεων, Ἐπικούρειοι ἔντα.
η'. Πῶς πρὸς τὰς φαντασίας γυμναστέον;
θ'. Πρὸς τίνα ὑπτερὰ ἀνιώντα εἰς Ἄρωμην ἐπὶ δίκη.
ι'. Πῶς φέρειν δεῖ τὰς νόσους;
ια'. Σποράδην τινά.
ιβ'. Περὶ ἄσκησεως.
ιγ'. Τί ἔρημία καὶ ποῖος ἔρημος.
ιδ'. Σποράδην τινά.

1 s: πλαττομένους S.
2 The entire title supplied from Ch. X. by s.
ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES
OF EPICETETUS
IN FOUR BOOKS

BOOK III

Chapters of the Third Book

I. Of personal adornment.

II. The fields of study in which the man who expects to make progress will have to go into training; and that we neglect what is most important.

III. What is the subject-matter with which the good man has to deal; and what should be the chief object of our training?

IV. To the man who took sides, in an undignified manner, while in a theatre.

V. To those who leave school because of illness.

VI. Some scattered sayings.

VII. A conversation with the Imperial Bailiff of the Free Cities, who was an Epicurean.

VIII. How ought we to exercise ourselves to deal with the impressions of our senses?

IX. To a certain rhetorician who was going to Rome for a law-suit.

X. How ought we to bear our illnesses?

XI. Some scattered sayings.

XII. Of training.

XIII. The meaning of a forlorn state, and the kind of person a forlorn man is.

XIV. Some scattered sayings.
AKKIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Γ

a'. Περὶ καλλωπισμοῦ.

1 Εἰσιόντος τινὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν νεανίσκου ῥητορικοῦ περιεργότερον ἡρμοσμένου τὴν κόμην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην περιβολὴν κατακοσμοῦντος Εἰπέ μοι, ἐφη, εἰ οὐ δοκοῦσιν σοι κύνες τ' εἶναι καλοὶ τινες καὶ ἵπποι καὶ οὕτως τῶν ἄλλων ξόφων ἐκαστόν;—

2 Δοκοῦσιν, ἐφη.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀνθρώποι οἱ μὲν καλοὶ, οἱ δ' αἰσχροί;—Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;—Πότερον οὖν κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκαστα τούτων ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει καλὰ προσαγορεῦμεν ἢ ίδίως ἐκαστον;—

3 οὕτως δ' ὤψει αὐτό. ἐπειδὴ πρὸς ἀλλὸ μὲν ὅρῳ-μεν κύνα πεφυκότα, πρὸς ἀλλο δ' ἵππον, πρὸς
BOOK III. 1. 1-3

XV. That we ought to approach each separate thing with circumspection.

XVI. That one should enter cautiously into social intercourse.

XVII. Of Providence.

XVIII. That we ought not to allow any news to disturb us.

XIX. What is the position of the layman, and what that of the philosopher?

XX. That it is possible to derive advantage from everything external.

XXI. To those who enter light-heartedly upon the profession of lecturing.

XXII. On the calling of a Cynic.

XXIII. To those who read and discuss for the purpose of display.

XXIV. That we ought not to yearn for the things which are not under our control.

XXV. To those who fail to achieve their purposes.

XXVI. To those who fear want.

CHAPTER I

Of personal adornment

Once, when he was visited by a young student of rhetoric whose hair was somewhat too elaborately dressed, and whose attire in general was highly embellished, Epictetus said: Tell me if you do not think that some dogs are beautiful, and some horses, and so every other creature.—I do, said the young man.—Is not the same true also of men, some of them are handsome, and some ugly?—Of course.—Do we, then, on the same grounds, pronounce each of these creatures in its own kind beautiful, or do we pronounce each beautiful on special grounds? I shall show you what I mean. Since we see that a dog is born to do one thing, and a horse another, and, if you will, a nightingale for something else, in general
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICETUS

ἀλλ' δ' εἰ οὖτως τύχοι ἕγονα, καθόλου μὲν οὐκ ἀτόπως ἀποφημαίνετ' ἂν τις ἐκαστον τηνικάυτα καλὸν εἶναι, ὅποτε κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν κράτιον ἔχοι ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ φύσις ἐκάστον διάφορος ἔστιν, διαφόρως εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν καλὸν.

4 ἦ γὰρ οὖ; — Ὡμολογεὶ. — Οὐκ οὖν ὅπερ κύνα ποιεῖ καλὸν, τοῦτο ἵππον αἰσχρόν, ὅπερ δ' ἵππον καλὸν, τοῦτο κύνα αἰσχρόν, εἰ γε διάφοροι αἱ φύσεις εἰσὶν αὐτῶν; — Ἐοικεν. — Καὶ γὰρ τὸ παγκρατιαστὴν οἶμαι ποιοῦν καλὸν τοῦτο παλαιστὴν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ, δρομέα δὲ καὶ γελοιοτάτον καὶ ὁ πρὸς πενταθλιαν καλὸς ὁ αὐτὸς οὖτος πρὸς πάλην αἰσχυστὸς; — Οὔτως, ἐφη. — Τί οὖν ποιεῖ ἀνθρώπον καλὸν ὃ ὅπερ τῷ γένει καὶ κύνα καὶ ἵππον; — Τοῦτο, ἐφη. — Τί οὖν ποιεῖ κύνα καλὸν; ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ κυνὸς παροῦσα. τί ἵππον; ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἴππον παροῦσα. τί οὖν ἀνθρώπον; μὴ ποθ' ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἀνθρώπου παροῦσα; καὶ σὺ οὖν εἰ θέλεις καλὸς εἶναι, νεανίσκε, τοῦτο ἐκπονεῖ, τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν ἀνθρωπικὴν. — Τίς δ' ἐστὶν αὐτὴ; — Ὄρα, τίνας αὐτὸς ἐπαίνεις, ὅταν δίχα πάθους τινὰς ἐπαίνησις πότερα τοὺς δικαίους ἢ τοὺς ἀδίκους; — Τοὺς δικαίους. — Πότερον τοὺς σώφρονας ἢ τοὺς ἀκολάστους; — Τοὺς σώφρονας. — Τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς δ' ἡ τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς; — Τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς. — Οὐκοῦν τοιούτον τινα ποιῶν σαυτὸν ἵσθι ὅτι καλὸν

1 ἦ added by s.

One who specialized in the pancratium, a combination of boxing, wrestling, and plain “fighting.”
it would not be unreasonable for one to declare that each of them was beautiful precisely when it achieved supreme excellence in terms of its own nature; and, since each has a different nature, each one of them, I think, is beautiful in a different fashion. Is that not so?—He agreed.—Does it not follow, then, that precisely what makes a dog beautiful, makes a horse ugly, and precisely what makes a horse beautiful, makes a dog ugly, if, that is, their natures are different?—So it appears.—Yes, for, to my way of thinking, what makes a paneratiast\(^1\) beautiful does not make a wrestler good, and, more than that, makes a runner quite absurd: and the same man who is beautiful for the pentathlon\(^2\) is very ugly for wrestling?—That is so, said he.—What, then, makes a man beautiful other than just that which makes a dog or a horse beautiful in its kind?—Just that, said he.—What is it, then, that makes a dog beautiful? The presence of a dog's excellence. What makes a horse beautiful? The presence of a horse's excellence. What, then, makes a man beautiful? Is it not the presence of a man's excellence? Very well, then, young man, do you too, if you wish to be beautiful, labour to achieve this, the excellence that characterizes a man.—And what is that?—Observe who they are whom you yourself praise, when you praise people dispassionately; is it the just, or the unjust?—The just;—is it the temperate, or the dissolute?—The temperate;—and is it the self-controlled, or the uncontrolled?—The self-controlled.—In making yourself that kind of person, therefore, rest assured that you will be making your-

\(^1\) An all-round competition in running, jumping, wrestling, and hurling the discus and the javelin.
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ποιήσεις: μέχρις δ᾽ ἄν τούτων ἀμελής, αἷσχρόν σ᾽ εἶναι ἀνάγκη, κἂν πάντα μηχανᾶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι σὲ ¹ καλὸν.

10 Ἐπετεύθεν οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι πῶς εἴπως. ἂν τε γὰρ λέγω ἀ φρονῶ, ἀνωίσω σε καὶ ἐξελθὼν τάχα οὐδ’ εἰσελήφθης ἢ ἂν τε μὴ λέγω, ὅρα οἶνον ποιήσω, εἰ σὺ μὲν ἔρχῃ πρὸς ἐμὲ ὑφεληθησόμενος, ἐγὼ ῥ᾽ οὐκ ὑφεληθῆς σ᾽ οὔδεν, καὶ σὺ μὲν ὡς πρὸς φιλόσοφον, ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὔδεν ἔρω σοι ὡς φιλόσοφος.

11 πῶς δὲ καὶ οὐκ ῥ᾽ ὁμοῦ ἐστὶ πρὸς αὐτόν σε τὸ περιδείν ἀνεπανόρθωτον; ἂν ποθ᾽ ὅτερον

12 φρένας σχῆς, εὐλόγως μοι ἐγκαλέσεις: “τὶ εἴδεν ἐν ἐμοὶ ὁ Ἐπίκτητος, ἴνα βλέπων με τοιοῦτον εἰσερχόμενον πρὸς αὐτόν οὕτως αἷσχρῶς ἐχόντα περίδη καὶ ⁴ μηδέποτε μηδὲ ῥῆμα εἴπη; οὕτως μοῦ ἅπεν γω; νέος οὐκ ἡμην; οὐκ ἡμην λόγου ἀκουστικός; πόσοι δ᾽ ἄλλοι νέοι ἐφ᾽ ἡλικίας πολλὰ τοιαύτα διαμαρτάνονσιν; τινὰ ποτ᾽ ἀκούω Πολέμωνα ἐξ ἀκολαστοτάτου νεανίσκου τοσαύτην μεταβολὴν μεταβαλεῖν. ἐστω, οὐκ ἔτοι με Πολέμωνα ἐσέσθαι τῇ μὲν κόμην ἡδύνατο μου διορθῶσα, τὰ μὲν περιάμματά μου περιελεῖν, ψιλούμενον με παῦσαι ἡδύνατο, ἀλλὰ βλέπων με—τίνος εἴπω;—σχῆμα ἐχοντα ἐστιώπα.” ἐγὼ οὖν λέγω, τίνος ἐστὶ τὸ σχῆμα τούτο; σὺ δ᾽ αὐτὸ

¹ Or perhaps ye, Oldfather. ² s.: ἔργω: S. ³ οὐκ added by Koraes. ⁴ καὶ supplied by s.

¹ Once when drunk he burst in upon Xenocrates, but was converted by him and eventually succeeded him in the head-
self beautiful; but so long as you neglect all this, you must needs be ugly, no matter if you employ every artifice to make yourself look beautiful.

Beyond that I know not what more I can say to you; for if I say what I have in mind, I shall hurt your feelings, and you will leave, perhaps never to return; but if I do not say it, consider the sort of thing I shall be doing. Here you are coming to me to get some benefit, and I shall be bestowing no benefit at all; and you are coming to me as to a philosopher, and I shall be saying nothing to you as a philosopher. Besides, is it anything but cruel for me to leave you unreformed? If some time in the future you come to your senses, you will have good reason to blame me: "What did Epictetus observe in me," you will say to yourself, "that, although he saw me in such a condition and coming to him in so disgraceful a state, he should let me be so and say never a word to me? Did he so completely despair of me? Was I not young? Was I not ready to listen to reason? And how many other young fellows make any number of mistakes of the same kind in their youth? I am told that once there was a certain Polemo¹ who from being a very dissolute young man underwent such an astonishing transformation. Well, suppose he did not think that I should be another Polemo; he could at least have set my hair right, he could have stripped me of my ornaments, he could have made me stop plucking my hairs; but although he saw me looking like—what shall I say?—he held his peace." As for me, I do not say what it is you look

ship of the Academy. See below IV. 11, 30; Diogenes Laertius, 4, 16; and Horace, Sat. II. 3, 253–7.
정신의 조언에 따르면, 그는 자기 자신에게 '도덕적'을 바라보지 않았습니다. 그의 친구와 아저씨가 그를 동반할 수 있도록 할 수 없었습니다. 

16. 그는 오른쪽을 바라보며, '하나의 도덕은 인간의 삶을 다스립니다.' 

17. 그는 가십의 학문에 대해 말했다. 

18. 그는 그 котор로 전화를 받았고, 이에 대해 말했다. 

19. 그는 노인의 삶을 살펴보고, 그는 '자신의 삶의 계속'을 말했습니다. 

20. 그는 그의 삶의 연속을 말했다. 

1. 이는 s.에 의해 제공되었다. 
2. s: proσioντας or proσanότας S.
like, but you will say it, when you come to yourself, and will realize what it is and the kind of people those are who act this way.

If you bring this charge against me some day, what shall I be able to say in my own defence? Yes; but suppose I speak and he not obey. And did Laius obey Apollo? 1 Did he not go away and get drunk and say good-bye to the oracle? What then? Did that keep Apollo from telling him the truth? Whereas I do not know whether you will obey me or not. Apollo knew perfectly well that Laius would not obey, and yet he spoke.—But why did he speak?—And why is he Apollo? And why does he give out oracles? And why has he placed himself in this position, 2 to be a prophet and a fountain of truth, and for the inhabitants of the civilized world to come to him? And why are the words "Know thyself" carved on the front of his temple, although no one pays attention to them?

Did Socrates succeed in prevailing upon all his visitors to keep watch over their own characters? No, not one in a thousand. Nevertheless, once he had been assigned this post, as he himself says, by the ordinance of the Deity, 3 he never abandoned it. Nay, what does he say even to his judges? "If you acquit me," he says, "on these conditions, namely, that I no longer engage in my present practices, I will not accept your offer, neither will I give up my practices, but I will go up to young and old, and, in a word, to everyone that I meet, and put to him the same question that I put now, and beyond all others I will especially interrogate you," he says, "who are

2 For the expression compare II. 4, 3; IV. 10, 16.
3 Based upon the Apology, 28 E.
ARRIANS DISCOURSES OF EPICETETUS

1 Deleted by Kronenberg, and "nature" rather than "my nature" would seem to be more logical here (cf. Grant's note on Aristotle's Ethics, 2.1.3). But µon is supported by the precisely similar σου of § 30, which is if anything even more illogical. In the original remark of Diogenes, whom Epictetus is clearly quoting in § 30 (see the note at that point), ἐγκαλεῖν τῇ φύσει is used as it is normally in Greek. Apparently we have in these two locutions a form of expression peculiar to Epictetus.
my fellow-citizens, inasmuch as you are nearer akin to me." ¹ Are you so inquisitive, O Socrates, and meddlesome? And why do you care what we are about? "Why, what is that you are saying? You are my partner and kinsman, and yet you neglect yourself and provide the State with a bad citizen, and your kin with a bad kinsman, and your neighbours with a bad neighbour." "Well, who are you?" Here it is a bold thing to say, "I am he who must needs take interest in men." For no ordinary ox dares to withstand the lion himself; ² but if the bull comes up and withstands him, say to the bull, if you think fit, "But who are you?" and "What do you care?" Man, in every species nature produces some superior individual, among cattle, dogs, bees, horses. Pray do not say to the superior individual, "Well, then, who are you?" Or if you do, it will get a voice from somewhere and reply to you, "I am the same sort of thing as red in a mantle;" ³ do not expect me to resemble the rest, and do not blame my nature ⁴ because it has made me different from the rest."

What follows? Am I that kind of person? Impossible. Are you, indeed, the kind of person to listen to the truth? I would that you were! But nevertheless, since somehow or other I have been condemned to wear a grey beard and a rough cloak, ⁵ and you are coming to me as to a philosopher, I shall not treat you cruelly, nor as though I despaired of

¹ A free paraphrase of the Apology, 29 C, E, and 30 A. Compare also I. 9, 23.
² Compare I. 2, 30.
³ Compare I. 2, 17 (and note, where read "bright red") and 22; the reference is to the stripe in the toga praetexta.
⁴ See critical note.
⁵ External symbols of a philosopher.
ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICETUS

άλλ’ ἐρώτευτε νεανίσκε, τίνα θέλεις καλὸν ποιεῖν;

25 γνῶθι πρῶτον τίς εί δὴ καὶ οὔτως κόσμει σεαυτόν. ἄνθρωπος εἰ: τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶ θυμητὸν ξῦνον χρηστικὸν φαντασίαις λογικῶς. τὸ δὲ λογικῶς τί ἐστίν; φύσει ὁμολογουμένως καὶ τελέως.

26 τί οὖν ἐξαίρετον ἔχεις; τὸ ξῦνον; οὐ. τὸ θυμητὸν; οὐ. τὸ χρηστικὸν φαντασίαις; οὐ. τὸ λογικὸν ἔχεις ἐξαίρετον τούτῳ κόσμει καὶ καλλόπιζε τὴν κόμην δ᾽ ἀφεὶ τῷ πλάσαντι.

27 ὡς αὐτὸς ἡθέλησεν. ἄγε, τίνας ἄλλας ἔχεις προσηγορίας; ἀνὴρ εἴ ἡ γυνὴ;—Ἄνηρ.—"Ανδρά οὖν καλλόπιζε, μὴ γυναίκα. ἐκείνη φύσει λεία γέγονε καὶ τρυφερά κἂν ἔχῃ τρίχας πολλάς, τέρας ἐστὶ καὶ εἰ τοὺς τέρασιν εὐ Ρώμη δεῖκνυται.

28 ταῦτὸ 1 δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἄνδρός ἐστι τὸ μὴ ἔχειν κἂν μὲν φύσει μὴ ἔχῃ, τέρας ἐστίν, ἂν δ᾽ αὐτός ἐαυτοῦ ἐκκόπτῃ καὶ ἀποτίληθη, τί αὐτὸν ποιήσωμεν; ποὺ αὐτὸν δεῖξωμεν καὶ τί προγράψωμεν; "δείξω ὑμῖν ἄνδρα, ὅς θέλει μᾶλλον γυνῆ εἶναι ἡ ἀνὴρ.”

29 ὁ δεινὸς θεάματος· σοφεῖς οὐχὶ θαυμάσει τὴν προγραφὴν νὴ τὸν Δία, οἶμαι ὅτι αὐτὸι οἱ τιλ-λόμενοι οὐ παρακολουθοῦντες, ὅτι τούτ᾽ αὐτὸ ἐστιν, ὃ ποιοῦσιν, ποιοῦσιν. ἄνθρωπε, τί ἔχεις ἐγκαλέσαι σου τῇ φύσει; ὅτι σε ἄνδρα ἐγέννησεν; τί οὖν; πᾶσας ἐδει γυναίκας γεννήσαι; καὶ

1 Wolf and Blass: τοῦτο S.
you, but I shall say: Young man, whom do you wish to make beautiful? First learn who you are, and then, in the light of that knowledge, adorn yourself. You are a human being; that is, a mortal animal gifted with the ability to use impressions rationally. And what is "rationally"? In accordance with nature and perfectly. What element of superiority, then, do you possess? The animal in you? No. Your mortality? No. Your ability to use impressions? No. Your reason is the element of superiority which you possess; adorn and beautify that; but leave your hair to Him who fashioned it as He willed. Come, what other designations apply to you? Are you a man or a woman?—A man.—Very well then, adorn a man, not a woman. Woman is born smooth and dainty by nature, and if she is very hairy she is a prodigy, and is exhibited at Rome among the prodigies. But for a man not to be hairy is the same thing, and if by nature he has no hair he is a prodigy, but if he cuts it out and plucks it out of himself, what shall we make of him? Where shall we exhibit him and what notice shall we post? "I will show you," we say to the audience, "a man who wishes to be a woman rather than a man." What a dreadful spectacle! No one but will be amazed at the notice; by Zeus, I fancy that even the men who pluck their own hairs do what they do without realizing what it means. Man, what reason have you to complain against your nature? Because it brought you into the world as a man? What then? Ought it to have brought all persons into the world?

1 Compare the critical note on § 23.
2 An almost verbatim quotation from Diogenes the Cynic. See Athenaeus, XIII. 565 C.
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1 Compare I. 29, 16 together with note on that passage, and for a more extended discussion Trans. of the Amer. Philol. Assoc., 52 (1921), 46.

2 The interlocutor must have been a Corinthian.
as women? And if that had been the case, what good would you be getting of your self-adornment? For whom would you be adorning yourself, if all were women? Your paltry body doesn't please you, eh? Make a clean sweep of the whole matter; eradicate your—what shall I call it?—the cause of your hairiness; make yourself a woman all over, so as not to deceive us, not half-man and half-woman. Whom do you wish to please? Frail womankind? Please them as a man. "Yes, but they like smooth men." Oh, go hang! And if they liked sexual perverts, would you have become such a pervert? Is this your business in life, is this what you were born for, that licentious women should take pleasure in you? Shall we make a man like you a citizen of Corinth, and perchance a warden of the city, or superintendent of ephebi, or general, or superintendent of the games? Well, and when you have married are you going to pluck out your hairs? For whom and to what end? And when you have begotten boys, are you going to introduce them into the body of citizens as plucked creatures too? A fine citizen and senator and orator! Is this the kind of young men we ought to pray to have born and brought up for us?

By the gods, young man, may such not be your fate! But once you have heard these words go away and say to yourself, "It was not Epictetus who said these things to me; why, how could they have occurred to him? but it was some kindly god or other speaking through him. For it would not have occurred to Epictetus to say these things, because he is not in

3 Young men completing their education and serving their term in the army.
37 οὐκ εἰσελθότι λέγειν πρὸς οὖδένα. ἀγε οὖν τὸ θεῶ πεισθῶμεν, ὅτα μὴ θεοχόλωτοι ἡμεν." οὐ. ἀλλ. ἂν μὲν κόραξ κραυγάζων σημαίνῃ σοι τι, οὗχ ὁ κόραξ ἐστὶν ὁ σημαίνων, ἀλλὰ ὁ θεὸς δι' αὐτοῦ ἂν δὲ δὲ ἀνθρωπότητι φωνῆς σημαίνῃ τι, τὸν ἀνθρωπόν προσποιήσῃ λέγειν σοι ταῦτα, ἵν' ἀγνοῆς τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ δαιμονίου, ὡτι τοῖς μεν οὕτως, τοῖς δ' ἐκείνως σημαίνει, περι δὲ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ κυριωτάτων διὰ καλλίστου ἀγ- γέλου σημαίνει; τι ἐστὶν ἄλλο, ὁ λέγει ὁ ποιη- τῆς;

ἐπεὶ πρὸ οἱ εἰπομεν ημεῖς,

'Ερμείαν πέμψαντε διάκτορον ἀργειφόντην,

μητ' αὐτῶν κτείνων μητε μνάσσαθαι ἄκοιτων.

39 ο' Ερμῆς καταβὰς ἐμελλεν Ἀιγίσθῳ λέγειν ταῖ τα καὶ σοι νῦν λέγουσιν οἱ θεοὶ ταῦτα,

'Ερμείαν πέμψαντε διάκτορον ἀργειφόντην,

μη ἐκστρέφειν τὰ καλῶς ἔχουσα μηδὲ περιεργάζε- σθαι, ἀλλ' ἀφεῖναι τὸν ἀνδρα ἀνδρα, τὴν γυναίκα γυναίκα, τὸν καλὸν ὡς ἀνθρωπων καλὸν, τὸν αἰσχρὸν ὡς ἀνθρωπων αἰσχρον. οτι οὐκ εἰ κρέας οὐδὲ τρίχες, ἄλλα προαίρεσις ταύτην ἄν σχῆς καλῆν, τοτ' ἔσει καλός. μέχρι δὲ νῦν οὐ τοιμω

1 Blass: ποιητει S.
2 Blass: ἱερ γνωσис S.
3 δια supplied by Sb.
4 Upton from Homer: ἐπει οἱ πρεσπομεν S.
5 Oldfather: πέμψαντες εὐσκοπον S. The reading restored is that of Zenodotus and Aristophanes, which has left some traces in two MSS., one scholium, and a papyrus of the 3rd cent. after Christ, and especially in § 39 below. See my note in Class. Philol., vol. 22, for a full discussion of this passage.
6 Bentley: αὐτῶ S. For arguments in favour of Bentley's emendation see Trans. Am. Philol. Ass. 52 (1921) 49.
the habit of speaking to anyone. Come then, let us obey God, that we rest not under His wrath." Nay, but if a raven gives you a sign by his croaking, it is not the raven that gives the sign, but God through the raven; whereas if He gives you a sign through a human voice, will you pretend that it is the man who is saying these things to you, so that you may remain ignorant of the power of the divinity, that He gives signs to some men in this way, and to others in that, but that in the greatest and most sovereign matters He gives His sign through His noblest messenger? What else does the poet mean when he says:

Since ourselves we did warn him,
Sending down Hermes, the messenger god, the slayer of Argus,
Neither to murder the husband himself, nor make love to his consort?\(^1\)

As Hermes descended to tell Aegisthus that, so now the gods tell you the same thing,

Sending down Hermes, the messenger god, the slayer of Argus,

not to distort utterly nor to take useless pains about that which is already right, but to leave the man a man, and the woman a woman, the beautiful person beautiful as a human being, the ugly ugly as a human being. Because you are not flesh, nor hair, but moral purpose; if you get that beautiful, then you will be beautiful. So far I do not have the

\(^1\) Homer, *Odyssey*, a, 37-9.
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σοι λέγειν, ὅτι αἰσχρὸς εἰ· δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι πάντα θέλειν ἥκουσαι ἣ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' ὅρα, τί λέγει Σωκράτης τῷ καλλίστῳ πάντων καὶ ὑφαινότατῳ 'Αλκιβιάδη: "πειρῶ οὖν καλὸς εἶναι." τί αὐτῷ λέγει; "πλάσσε σου τὴν κόμην καὶ τίλλε σου τὰ σκέλη"; μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλὰ "κόψμει σου τὴν προαιρέσιν, έξαιρε τὰ φαύλα δόγματα." τὸ σωμάτιον οὖν πῶς; ὡς πέφυκεν. ἀλλ' τοῦτον ἐμέλησεν ἐκεῖνον ἐπίτρεψον.1—Τί οὖν; ἀκάθαρτον δεῖ εἶναι; —Μη γένοιτο· ἀλλ' ὃς εἰ καὶ πέφυκας, τοῦτον κάθαρε, ἀνδρὰ ὡς ἀνδρὰ καθάριον εἶναι, γυναῖκα ὡς γυναῖκα, παιδίον ὡς παιδίον. οὐ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ λέοντος ἐκτίλωμεν τὴν κόμην, ἵνα μὴ ἀκάθαρτος ἦ, καὶ τοῦ ἀλεκτρυνόνος τὸν λόφον· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτον καθάριον εἶναι. ἀλλ' ὡς ἀλεκτρυόνα καὶ ἐκείνον ὡς λέοντα καὶ τὸν κυνηγητικὸν κύνα ὡς κυνηγητικόν.

β. Περὶ τίνα ἄσκεισθαί δεῖ τὸν προκόψωντα καὶ ὅτι τῶν κυριωτάτων ἀμελοῦμεν.

1 Τρεῖς εἰσὶ τόποι, περὶ οὓς ἀσκηθήναι δεῖ τὸν ἐσόμενον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὁ περὶ τᾶς ὀρέξεις καὶ τᾶς ἐκκλίσεις, ἵνα μὴ ὁρεγόμενος ἀποτυγχάνῃ 2 μὴ ἐκκλίνων περιπτῆ γ' ὁ περί τᾶς ὀρμᾶς καὶ

1 ἐπίστρεψον S originally.

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1 An inexact quotation of Plato, Alcib. I. 131 D.
2 Compare I, 25, 13; 30, 1; II. 5, 22.
3 The implication is that the interlocutor's conception of "cleanliness" has to do merely with things external.
4 Compare II. 17, 15 ff. This triple division of philosophy is the one original element in the teaching of Epictetus, and even it is rather a pedagogical device than an innovation in
courage to tell you that you are ugly, for it looks to me as though you would rather hear anything than that. But observe what Socrates says to Alcibiades, the most handsome and youthfully beautiful of men: “Try, then, to be beautiful.” 1 What does he tell him? “Dress your locks and pluck the hairs out of your legs?” God forbid! No, he says, “Make beautiful your moral purpose, eradicate your worthless opinions.” How treat your paltry body, then? As its nature is. This is the concern of Another; 2 leave it to Him.—What then? Does the body have to be left unclean?—God forbid! but the man that you are and were born to be, keep that man clean, a man to be clean as a man, a woman as a woman, a child as a child. No, but let’s pluck out also the lion’s mane, so that he may not fail to be “cleaned up,” and the cock’s comb, for he too ought to be “cleaned up”! 3 Clean? Yes, but clean as a cock, and the other clean as a lion, and the hunting dog clean as a hunting dog!

CHAPTER II

The fields of study in which the man who expects to make progress will have to go into training; and that we neglect what is most important

There are three fields of study 4 in which the man who is going to be good and excellent must first have been trained. The first has to do with desires and aversions, that he may never fail to get what he desires, nor fall into what he avoids; the second thought. Compare Vol. I. p. xxi, and the literature there cited.
ἀφορμᾶς καὶ ἀπλῶς ὁ περὶ τὸ καθήκον, ἵνα τάξει, ἵνα εὐλογίστως, ἵνα μὴ ἀμελῶς τρίτος ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀνεξαπατησίαν καὶ ἀνεκκαιότητα καὶ ὅλως ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις. τοῦτων κυριώτατος καὶ μάλιστα ἐπείγων ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη πάθος γὰρ ἄλλως οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ ὀρέξεως ἀποτυγχανόσης ἣ ἐκκλίσεως περιπτούσης. οὕτως ἐστὶν ὁ ταραχᾶς, θορύβους, ἀτυχίας, ὁ δυστυχίας ἐπιφέρων, ὁ πένθη, οἴμωγάς, φθόνους, ὁ φθονερός, ὁ ζυλοτύπους ποιῶν, δι᾽ ὃν οὐδ' ἀκοῦσαι λόγον δυνάμεθα. δεύτερος ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τὸ καθήκον ὑπὲρ γὰρ με εἶναι ἀπαθή ὡς ἀνδριῶτα, ἀλλὰ τὰς σχέσεις τηροῦντα τὰς φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθέτους ως εὐσεβῆ, ως νίον, ως ἀδελφόν, ως πατέρα, ως πολίτην.

Τρίτος ἐστὶν ὁ ἡδῆ τοῖς προκόπτοις ἐπιβάλλων, ὁ περὶ τὴν αὐτών τούτων ἀσφάλειαν, ἵνα μηδ' ἐν ὑπνοῖς λάθη τις ἄνεξέταστος παρελθούσα φαντασία μηδ' ἐν οἰνώσει μηδ' μελαγχολῶντος.—Τοῦτο ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, φησίν, ἐστίν.—

Οἱ δὲ νῦν φιλόσοφοι ἀφέντες τὸν πρῶτον τόπον καὶ τὸν δεύτερον καταγίζονται περὶ τὸν τρίτον μεταπίπτοντας, τῷ ἡρωτησθαί περαιῶντας,

1 φόβους ("fears") conjectured by Reiske, very plausibly.
2 τῷ added by Oldfather after the similar correction by s in I. 7, 1 (where the fact that τῷ is due to s should have been recorded).

1 A briefer definition is given in I. 27, 10.
2 See critical note
3 The expression is not logical, for the field of study
with cases of choice and of refusal, and, in general, with duty, that he may act in an orderly fashion, upon good reasons, and not carelessly; the third with the avoidance of error and rashness in judgement, and, in general, about cases of assent. Among these the most important and especially pressing is that which has to do with the stronger emotions; for a strong emotion does not arise except a desire fails to attain its object, or an aversion falls into what it would avoid.\footnote{This is the field of study which introduces to us confusions, tumults, misfortunes and calamities; and sorrows, lamentations, envies;\footnote{and makes\footnote{us envious and jealous—passions which make it impossible for us even to listen to reason.} us envious and jealous—passions which make it impossible for us even to listen to reason.} The second field of study deals with duty; for I ought not to be unfeeling like a statue, but should maintain my relations, both natural and acquired, as a religious man, as a son, a brother, a father, a citizen.

The third belongs only to those who are already making progress; it has to do with the element of certainty in the matters which have just been mentioned, so that even in dreams, or drunkenness, or a state of melancholy-madness, a man may not be taken unawares by the appearance of an untested sense-impression.—This, says someone, is beyond us.—But philosophers nowadays pass by the first and second fields of study, and concentrate upon the third, upon arguments which involve equivocal premisses, which derive syllogisms by the process of interrogation, which involve hypothetical premisses,\footnote{obviously can do nothing of the kind, but the fault is probably not in the MS. tradition.}
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7 ὑποθετικοὺς, Ψευδομένους.1—Δεῖ γὰρ, φήσιν, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὠλαις ταύταις γενόμενον διαφυλάξας τὸ ἀνεξαπάτητον.—Τίνα;—τὸν καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν.—
8 σοὶ οὖν τούτῳ λείπει; τὰς ἄλλας ἐκπεπόνηκας; περὶ κερμάτων ἀνεξαπάτητος εἶ; ἐὰν ἐδῆς κοράσιον καλὸν, ἄντεχεις τῇ φαντασίᾳ; ἄν ο ἑστῶν σου κληρονομήσῃ, οὐ δάκυν; νῦν οὐδέν
9 ἄλλο σοι λείπει ἡ ἀμεταπτωσία; τάλας, αὕτα ταύτα τρέμων μανθάνεις καὶ ἀγωνίῶν, μὴ τίς σου καταφρονήσῃ, καὶ πυνθανόμενος, μὴ τίς τι περὶ σοῦ λέγει. κἂν τις ἐλθὼν εἶπη σοι ὅτι “λόγου

11 ἐδήξω, τίς εἰμὶ, ὅτι μέγας φιλόσοφος.” βλέπεται ἐξ αὐτῶν τούτων. τί θέλεις ἐξ ἄλλων δείξαι; οὐκ οἴδας, ὅτι Διογένης τῶν σοφιστῶν τινὰ οὕτως ἐδείξει ἐκτείνας τὸν μέσον δάκτυλον, εἶτα ἐκμανενέτος αὐτοῦ “Οὐτὸς ἔστιν,” ἐφι, “ὁ δείνα;

12 ἐδείξα ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ”; ἀνθρώπος γὰρ δακτύλῳ οὐ

1 Oldfather: ψευδομένους vulg. See explanatory note.

1 i.e., if a man says he is lying, is he really lying, or telling the truth? See II. 17, 34, and note. Ψευδομένους is used without the article, as in II. 21, 17.

2 Literally, “from a finger’s breadth (.7 in.) to two cubits.”

3 See Diogenes Laertius, 6, 34, who says that Demosthenes was the man thus pointed at.
and sophisms like *The Liar.*—Of course, he says, even when a man is engaged in subjects of this kind he has to preserve his freedom from deception.—But what kind of a man ought to engage in them?—Only the one who is already good and excellent.—Do you, then, fall short in this? Have you already attained perfection in the other subjects? Are you proof against deception in handling small change? If you see a pretty wench, do you resist the sense-impression? If your neighbour receives an inheritance, do you not feel a twinge of envy? And is security of judgement now the only thing in which you fall short? Wretch, even while you are studying these very topics you tremble and are worried for fear someone despises you, and you ask whether anybody is saying anything about you. And if someone should come and say, "A discussion arising as to who was the best of the philosophers, someone who was there said that So-and-so was the only real philosopher," immediately your poor little one-inch soul shoots up a yard high. But if another party to the discussion says, "Nonsense, it's a waste of time to listen to So-and-so. Why, what does he know? He has the rudiments, but nothing else," you are beside yourself, you grow pale, immediately you shout, "I'll show him who I am, that I am a great philosopher!" Yet we see what a man is by just such conduct. Why do you wish to show it by anything else? Do you not know that Diogenes showed one of the sophists thus, pointing out his middle finger at him, and then when the man was furious with rage, remarked, "That's So-and-so; I've pointed him out to you." For a man is not some-

4 Regarded in antiquity as an insulting gesture.
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dεικνυται ὡς λίθος ἢ ὡς ἔξυλον, ἀλλ' ὅταν τις τὰ
dόγματα αὐτοῦ δείξῃ, τότε αὐτὸν ὡς ἀνθρωπὸν
ἐδείξει.

13 Βλέπωμεν καὶ σοῦ τὰ δόγματα. μὴ γὰρ οὐ
dήλον ἔστιν, ὅτι σὺ τὴν προαιρέσιν τὴν σαυτοῦ
eν οὐδεὶς τίθεσαι, ἐξω δὲ βλέπεις εἰς τὰ ἀποροι-
ρετα, τί ἐρεῖ ὁ δείνα καὶ τὸς εἶναι δόξεις, εἰ
φιλόλογος, εἰ Χρύσιππον ἀνεγνωκὼς 1 ἦ Ἀντίπα-
τρον; εἰ μὲν γὰρ καὶ Ἀρχέδημον, ἀπέχεις
ἀπαντα. τί ἐστιν ἑγωνίας, μὴ οὐ δείξῃς ἡμῖν, τὸς
eἰ; θέλεις σοι εἰπω, τίνα ἡμῖν ἐδείξας; ἀνθρωπὸν
παριόντα 2 ταπεινόν, μεμψιμορὰν, ἀξίθυμον,
δειλὸν, πάντα μεμφόμενον, πᾶσιν ἐγκαλοῦντα,
μυδέποτε ἡσυχίαν ἀγουτα, πέρπερον ταῦτα
ἡμῖν ἐδείξας. ἀπελθεῖ νῦν καὶ ἀναγίνωσκε
Ἀρχέδημον εἰτα μὺς ἀν καταπέσῃ καὶ ὕσφηση,
ἀπέθανες. τοιοῦτοι γὰρ σὲ μένει θάνατος, οἷος 3
καὶ τὸν—τίνα ποτ' ἐκεῖνον;—τὸν Κρινυν. 4 καὶ
ἐκεῖνος μέγα ἐφρόνει, ὅτι ἐνοεῖ Ἀρχέδημον. τάλας
οὐ θέλεις αὕεινα ταῦτα τὰ μὴ δὲν πρὸς σὲ;
πρέπει ταῦτα τοῖς δυναμένοις ἐξίχα ταραχῆς αὐτὰ
μαυθάνειν, οἷς ἐξεστιν εἰπεῖν "οὐκ ὁργίζομαι, οὐ
λυποῦμαι, οὐ φθονώ, οὐ κωλύομαι, οὐκ ἀναγ-
κάζομαι. τί μοι λοιπόν; εὐσχολῶ, ἡσυχίαν

17 ἀγω. ἰδωμεν, πῶς περὶ τὰς μεταττώσεις τῶν

1 Kronenberg: ἄνέγνως S.
2 ἀνθρωπάριον ("a mean little person") very plausibly suggested by Reiske.
3 Menage: οὖν S.
4 Reiske: κρίνειν S.

1 See critical note.
2 A Stoic philosopher of no great prominence, who must be supposed to have died from an apoplectic stroke occasioned by
thing like a stone or a stick of wood to be pointed out with a finger, but when one shows a man's judgements, then one shows him as a man.

Let us take a look at your judgements too. Is it not evident that you set no value on your own moral purpose, but look beyond to the things that lie outside the province of the moral purpose, namely, what So-and-so will say, and what impression you will make, whether men will think you a scholar, or that you have read Chrysippus or Antipater? Why, if you have read them and Archedemus too, you have everything! Why are you any longer worried for fear you will not show us who you are? Do you wish me to tell you what kind of a man you have shown us that you are? A person who comes into our presence mean, hypercritical, quick-tempered, cowardly, finding fault with everything, blaming everybody, never quiet, vain-glorious; these are the qualities which you have exhibited to us. Go away now and read Archedemus; then if a mouse falls down and makes a noise, you are dead with fright. For the same kind of death awaits you that carried off—what's his name?—oh, yes, Crinus. He, too, was proud of himself because he could understand Archedemus. Wretch, are you not willing to let alone those things that do not concern you? They are appropriate for those who can study them without disturbance of spirit, who have the right to say, "I do not yield to anger, or sorrow, or envy; I am not subject to restraint, or to compulsion. What do I yet lack? I enjoy leisure, I have peace of mind. Let us see how we ought to deal with equivocal fright at a mouse falling down from the wall. See Von Arnim in the Real-Encyclopädie, s.v.
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λόγων δεὶ ἀναστρέφεσθαι. οἴδωμεν, πῶς ὑπόθεσίν τις λαβὼν εἰς οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ἀπαχθήσεται." 18 ἐκείνων ἔστι ταῦτα. τοῖς εὖ παθοῦσι πρέπει πῦρ καίειν, ἀριστᾶν, ἃν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ἄδειν καὶ ἱρχεῖσθαι. βυθίζομένου δὲ τοῦ πλοίου σὺ μοι παρελθὼν ἐπαίρεις τοὺς σιφάρους.

γ'. Τίς ὑλὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πρὸς τί μάλιστ' ἀσκητέον.

1 "Τλη τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἴδιον ἡγεμονικὸν, τὸ σώμα δ' ἱατροῦ καὶ ἱατραλείπτου, ὁ ἄγρος γεωργὸν ὑλή' ἔργον δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ 2 τὸ χρῆσθαι ταῖς φαντασίαις κατὰ φύσιν. πέφυ-κεν δὲ πᾶσα ψυχὴ ὡσπερ τῷ ἀληθεὶ ἐπινεύειν, πρὸς τὸ ψεῦδος ἀνανεύειν, πρὸς τὸ ἄδηλον ἐπέχειν, οὕτως πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὑρκετικῶς κινεῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ κακὸν ἑκκλητικῶς, πρὸς 3 δὲ τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτ' ἀγαθὸν οὐδετέρως. ὡς γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Καῖσαρος νόμισμα οὐκ ἐξεστὶν ἀπο- δοκιμάσαι τῷ τραπεζίτῃ οὐδὲ τῷ λαχανοπώλῃ, ἀλλ' ἀν δείξης, θέλει οὐ θέλει, προέσθαι αὐτὸν δεὶ τὸ ἀντ' αὐτοῦ πωλοῦμενον, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ 4 τῆς ψυχῆς. τὸ ἀγαθὸν φαίνει εὐθὺς ἐκίνησεν ἐφ' αὐτό, τὸ κακὸν ἀφ' αὐτοῦ. οὐδέποτε δ' ἀγαθοῦ φαντασίαν ἐναργῇ ἀποδοκιμάσει ψυχῇ, οὐ μᾶλ-

1 Schweighäuser: ἀπαλείπτου S.
premises in arguments; let us see how a person may adopt an hypothesis and yet not be led to an absurd conclusion." These things belong to men of that type. When men are prospering it is appropriate to light a fire, to take luncheon, and, if you will, even to sing and dance; but when the ship is already sinking you come up to me and start to hoist the topsails!

CHAPTER III

What is the subject-matter with which the good man has to deal; and what should be the chief object of our training?

The subject-matter with which the good and excellent man has to deal is his own governing principle, that of a physician and the masseur is the body, of a farmer is his farm; but the function of the good and excellent man is to deal with his impressions in accordance with nature. Now just as it is the nature of every soul to assent to the true, dissent from the false, and to withhold judgement in a matter of uncertainty, so it is its nature to be moved with desire toward the good, with aversion toward the evil, and feel neutral toward what is neither evil nor good. For just as neither the banker nor the greengrocer may legally refuse the coinage of Caesar, but if you present it, whether he will or no, he must turn over to you what you are purchasing with it, so it is also with the soul. The instant the good appears it attracts the soul to itself, while the evil repels the soul from itself. A soul will never refuse a clear sense-impression of good,
ΑΡΡΙΑΝ'S DISCOURSES OF EPICETETUS

λον ἦ τὸ Καίσαρος νόμισμα. ἐνθεν ἐξῆρτηται πάσα κίνησις καὶ ἀνθρώπου καὶ θεοῦ.

5 Διὰ τούτο πάσης οἰκείωτιτος προκρίνεται τὸ ἀγαθὸν. οὐδὲν ἐμοί καὶ τῷ πατρί, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀγαθῷ. "οὕτως εἰ σκληρὸς;" οὕτως γὰρ πέφυκα τούτῳ μοι τὸ νόμισμα δέδωκεν ὁ θεὸς.

6 διὰ τούτο, εἰ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔτερον ἔστιν, οἶχεται καὶ πατήρ καὶ ἀδελφὸς καὶ πατρὶς καὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τὸ ἐμὸν ἀγαθὸν ὑπερίδω, ἵνα σὺ σχῆσ, καὶ παραχωρήσω σοι; ἀντὶ τίνος; "πατήρ σου εἵμι." ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγαθὸν. "ἀδελφὸς σου εἵμι." ἀλλ'

8 οὐκ ἀγαθὸν. ἐὰν δ' ἐν ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει θώμεν, αὐτὸ τὸ 1 τηρεῖν τὰς σχέσεις ἀγαθὸν γίνεται καὶ λοιπὸν ὁ τῶν ἐκτὸς τινῶν ἐκχωρῶν, οὐτὸς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τυγχάνει. "αἰρεῖ τὰ χρήματα ὁ πατήρ." ἀλλ' οὗ βλάπτει. "ἐξεῖ τὸ πλέον τοῦ ἄγροι ὁ ἀδελφὸς." 2 ὅσον καὶ θέλει. μή τι οὖν τοῦ αἰδώμονος, μή τι τοῦ πιστοῦ, μή τι τοῦ φιλα-

10 δέλφου; ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας τίς δύναται ἐκβαλεῖν; οὐδ' ὁ Ζεύς. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἤθελησεν, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐμοὶ αὐτὸ ἐποίησεν καὶ ἐδώκεν οἶον εἴχεν αὐτός, ἀκώλυτον, ἀναγκαστόν, ἀπαραπό-

11 "Ὅταν οὖν ἄλλῳ ἄλλῳ τὸ νόμισμα ἦ, ἐκεῖνό τις 3 δείξας ἐξεῖ τὸ ἀντ' αὐτοῦ πιπρασκόμενον.

12 ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τὴν ἐπαρχίαν κλέπτης ἀνθύπατος. τῶν νομίσματι χρήται; ἀργυρίῳ. δείξον καὶ ἀπόφερε ὁ θέλεις. ἐλήλυθεν μοιχὸς. τίν νομίσ-

1 τὸ added by Reiske.
2 δ' ἀδελφὸς added by Schweighäuser.
3 Sb (or Sa): ἐκεῖνος S.
any more than a man will refuse the coinage of Caesar. On this concept of the good hangs every impulse to act both of man and of God.

That is why the good is preferred above every form of kinship. My father is nothing to me, but only the good. "Are you so hard-hearted?" Yes, that is my nature. This is the coinage which God has given me. For that reason, if the good is something different from the noble and the just, then father and brother and country and all relationships simply disappear. But shall I neglect my good, so that you may have it, and shall I make way for you? What for? "I am your father." But not a good. "I am your brother." But not a good. If, however, we define the good as consisting in a right moral purpose, then the mere preservation of the relationships of life becomes a good; and furthermore, he who gives up some of the externals achieves the good. "My father is taking away my money." But he is doing you no harm. "My brother is going to get the larger part of the farm." Let him have all he wants. That does not help him at all to get a part of your modesty, does it, or of your fidelity, or of your brotherly love? Why, from a possession of this kind who can eject you? Not even Zeus. Nay, nor did He even wish to, but this matter He put under my control, and He gave it to me even as He had it Himself, free from hindrance, compulsion, restraint.

When, therefore, different persons have different pieces of coinage, a man offers the coin and gets what is bought by it. A thief has come to the province as Proconsul. What coinage does he use? Silver. Offer it and carry away what you wish. An adulterer
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ματί χρήται; κορασίδιοις. "Λάβε," φησίν, "τὸ νόμισμα καὶ πώλησόν μοι τὸ πραγμάτιον." δός καὶ αὐγόραζε. ἄλλος περὶ παιδάρια ἐσπούδακεν. δός αὐτῷ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ λάβε ὁ θέλεις. ἄλλος φιλόθηρος. δός ἰππάριον καλὸν ἢ κυνάριον οἰμώξων καὶ στένων πωλήσει ἁντὶ αὐτοῦ ὁ θέλεις. ἄλλος γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀναγκάζει ἐσωθεν, ὁ τὸ νόμισμα τούτο τεταχὼς.

14 Πρὸς τούτο μάλιστα τὸ εἰδὸς αὐτῶν γνωμαστέον. εὐθὺς ὀρθροῦν προελθὼν ὃν ἄν ἵδης, ὃν ἄν ἰκουσίας, ἐξετάζε, ἀποκρίνου ὡς πρὸς ἐρωτήμα. τι εἰδες; καλὸν ἢ καλήν; ἔπαγε τὸν κανόνα. ἀπροαίρετον ἢ προαιρετικόν; ἀπροαίρετου αἰρε ἕξω. τί εἰδες; πενθοῦντ' ἐπὶ τέκνου τελευτή; ἔπαγε τὸν κανόνα. ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν ἀπροαιρετον αἰρε ἐκ τοῦ μέσου. ἀπήμνησέ σοι ὑπατος; ἔπαγε τὸν κανόνα. ὑπατεία ποίον τί ἐστιν; ἀπροαιρετον ἢ προαιρετικόν; ἀπροαιρετον αἰρε καὶ τούτο, οὐκ ἐστὶ δόκιμον ἀπόβαλε, οὐδέν πρὸς σέ. καὶ τούτο εἰ ἐποιοῦμεν καὶ πρὸς τούτο ἑκκούμεθα καθ' ἠμέραιν ἐξ ὀρθροῦ μέχρι νυκτός, εγένετο ἀν τι, νη τοὺς θεοὺς. νῦν δ' εὐθὺς ὑπὸ πάσης φαντασίας κεχυνότες λαμβανόμεθα καὶ μόνον, εἶπεν ἄρα, ἐν τῇ σχολῇ μικρὸν τι διεγερμέθα: εἴτ' ἐξελθοῦτες ἢν ἰδωμεν πενθοῦντα, λέγομεν "ἀπώλετο". ἀν ὑπατον, "μακάριος."

1 s: πενθοῦν §.

The reference is to God, who has ordained that every man should prefer what he regards as "good" to everything else. See § 5 above. The fault consists in making a wrong
has come. What coinage does he use? Frail wenches. "Take," says one, "the coin and sell me the little baggage." Give, and buy. Another is interested in boys. Give him the coin and take what you wish. Another is fond of hunting. Give him a fine horse or dog; with sighs and groans he will sell for it what you wish; for Another constrains him from within, the one who has established this currency.\(^1\)

It is chiefly with this principle in mind that a man must exercise himself. Go out of the house at early dawn, and no matter whom you see or whom you hear, examine him and then answer as you would to a question. What did you see? A handsome man or a handsome woman? Apply your rule. Is it outside the province of the moral purpose, or inside? Outside. Away with it. What did you see? A man in grief over the death of his child? Apply your rule. Death lies outside the province of the moral purpose. Out of the way with it. Did a Consul meet you? Apply your rule. What sort of thing is a consulship? Outside the province of the moral purpose, or inside? Outside. Away with it, too, it does not meet the test; throw it away, it does not concern you. If we had kept doing this and had exercised ourselves from dawn till dark with this principle in mind,—by the gods, something would have been achieved! But as it is, we are caught gaping straightway at every external impression that comes along, and we wake up a little only during the lecture, if indeed we do so even then. After that is over we go out, and if we see a man in grief, we say, "It is all over with him"; if we see a Consul, we say, "Happy choice of what is to be considered "good." For "Another" as a reverent form of reference to Zeus, see I. 25, 13 and note.
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ἀν ἐξωρισμένον, “ταλαίπωρος”. ἂν πένητα,

18 “ἄθλιος, οὖν ἔχει πόθεν φάγη.” ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐκκόπτειν δεῖ τὰ πονηρὰ δόγματα, περὶ τούτω συντετάσθαι. τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ κλαίειν καὶ οἰμώ-ζειν; δόγμα. τί δυστυχία; δόγμα. τί στάσεις, τί διχόνουι, τί μέμψις, τί κατηγορία, τί ἀσέβεια,

19 τί φλυαρία; ταῦτα πάντα δόγματα ἐστι καὶ ἄλλο οὖν καὶ δόγματα περὶ τῶν ἀπροαίρετων ὡς οὕτων ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ταῦτα τις ἐπὶ τὰ προαίρετικα μεταθέτω, κἂν ὁ αὐτὸν ἐγγυνόμαι οὕτι εὐσταθήσει, ὡς ἄν ἔχη τα περὶ αὐτῶν.

20 Οἶλον ἐστιν ἡ λεκάνη τοῦ ύδατος, τοιοῦτον ἡ ψυχή, οἶον ἡ αὐγή ἡ προσπίπτουσα τῷ ύδατι,

21 τοιοῦτον αἱ φαντασίαι. ὅταν οὖν τὸ ύδωρ κινηθῇ, δοκεῖ μὲν καὶ ἡ αὐγή κινεῖσθαι, οὐ μέντοι κινεῖται.

22 καὶ ὅταν τοῖςυν σκοτώθη τις, οὐχ αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ὑρεταὶ συγχέονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα, ἐφ’ οὖ εἰσὶν καταστάντως δὲ καθίσταται κἀκεῖνα.

δ’. Πρὸς τὸν ἀκόσμως ἐν θεάτρῳ σπουδάσαντα.

1 Τοῦ δ’ ἐπιτρόπου τῆς Ἡπείρου ἀκοσμότερον σπουδάσαντος κωμῳδῶ τινὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δημο-σίᾳ λοίδορηθέντος, εἴτε ἐξῆς ἀπαγγείλαντος πρὸς
man”; if we see an exile, “Poor fellow”; or a poverty-stricken person, “Wretched man, he has nothing with which to get a bite to eat.” These, then, are the vicious judgements which we ought to eradicate; this is the subject upon which we ought to concentrate our efforts. Why, what is weeping and sighing? A judgement. What is misfortune? A judgement. What are strife, disagreement, fault-finding, accusing, impiety, foolishness? They are all judgements, and that, too, judgements about things that lie outside the province of moral purpose, assumed to be good or evil. Let a man but transfer his judgements to matters that lie within the province of the moral purpose, and I guarantee that he will be steadfast, whatever be the state of things about him.

The soul is something like a bowl of water, and the external impressions something like the ray of light that falls upon the water. Now when the water is disturbed, it looks as though the ray of light is disturbed too, but it is not disturbed. And so, therefore, when a man has an attack of vertigo, it is not the arts and the virtues that are thrown into confusion, but the spirit in which they exist; and when this grows steady again, so do they too.

CHAPTER IV

To the man who took sides, in an undignified manner, while in a theatre

The Procurator of Epirus took the side of a comic actor in a somewhat undignified manner and was reviled by the people for doing so. Thereupon he brought word to Epictetus that he had been reviled,


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αὐτῶν, ὅτι ἐλοιδορήθη, καὶ ἀγανακτοῦντος πρὸς τοὺς λοιδορήσαντας Καὶ τί κακόν, ἔφη, ἐποίουν; 2 ἐσπούδαζον καὶ οὕτωι ὡς καὶ σὺ. εἰπόντος δὲ ἐκεῖνου Οὕτως οὖν τις σπουδάζει; Σέ, ἔφη, βλέποντες τὸν αὐτῶν ἄρχοντα, τοῦ Καίσαρος φίλου καὶ ἐπίτροπον, οὖτως σπουδάζοντα οὐκ ἔμελλον καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτως σπουδάζειν; εἰ γὰρ μὴ δεῖ οὕτως σπουδάζειν, μηδὲ σὺ σπουδάζει· εἰ δὲ δεῖ, τί χαλεπάνεις, εἴ σε ἐμιμήσαντο; τίνας γὰρ ἐχουσίν μιμήσασθαι οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ὑμᾶς; εἰς τίνας ἀπίδωσιν ἑλθόντες εἰς τὰ θέατρα 4 ἢ ὑμᾶς; “ὦρα πῶς ὁ ἐπίτροπος τοῦ Καίσαρος θεωρεῖ· κέκραγεν κάγω τοῖνυν κραυγάσω. ἀναπηδᾷ κάγω ἀναπηδῆσω. οἱ δοῦλοι αὐτοῦ διακάθησαν κραυγάζοντες· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ἔχω δούλους· ἀντὶ πάντων αὐτὸς ὅσον δύναμαι κραυγάσω.” 5 εἰδέναι σε οὖν δεῖ, ὅταν εἰσέρχῃ εἰς τὸ θέατρον, ὅτι κανὼν εἰσέρχῃ καὶ παράδειγμα τοῖς ἄλλοις, πῶς αὐτοὺς δεῖ θεωρεῖν. τί οὖν σε ἐλοιδόρουν; ὅτι πᾶς ἅνθρωπος μιςεῖ τὸ ἐμπόδιζον. ἐκεῖνοι στεφανωθῆναι ἤθελον τὸν δείνα, σὺ ἔτερον ἐκεῖνοι σοὶ ἑνεπόδιζον καὶ σὺ ἑκεῖνοι. σὺ εὐρίσκου ἵσχυρότερος· ἐκεῖνοι ὁ ἐδύναυτο ἐποίουν, ἐλοιδόρουν τὸ ἐμπόδιζον. τί οὖν θέλεις; ἢνα σὺ μὲν ποιῆς ὁ θέλεις, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ μηδ' εἶπωσιν ἐὰν σύ ἑλώσωι S.
and gave expression to his indignation at the men who had so reviled him. Why, what wrong were they doing? said Epictetus. They too were taking sides, just as you yourself were. But when the other asked, Is that the way, then, in which a man takes sides? he replied, Yes, they saw you, their Governor, the friend and Procurator of Caesar, taking sides in this way, and weren’t they likely to take sides themselves in the same way? Why, if people should not take sides in this way, you had better not do so yourself; but if they should, why are you angry if they imitated you? For whom have the people to imitate but you, their superior? Whom do they look to but you, when they go to the theatres? “See,” says one of them, “how the Procurator of Caesar acts in the theatre; he shouts; very well, I’ll shout too. He jumps up and down; I’ll jump up and down too. His claque of slaves sit in different parts of the house and shout, whereas I haven’t any slaves; very well, I’ll shout as loud as I can to make up for all of them.” You ought to know, then, that when you enter the theatre, you enter as a standard of behaviour and as an example to the rest, showing them how they ought to act in the theatre. Why, then, did they revile you? Because every man hates what stands in his way. They wanted So-and-so to get the crown, while you wanted the other man to get it. They were standing in your way, and you in theirs. You turned out to be the stronger; they did what they could, and reviled what was standing in their way. What, then, do you wish? That you should be able to do what you wish, but that they should not even say what they wish? And what is there
The word "school" does not, of course, appear in the Greek, but such was the nature of the educational institution which Epictetus conducted, and that is clearly what is meant here. See in particular Ivo Bruns: *De Schola Epicteti* (1897), 38.
surprising in all that? Don't the farmers revile Zeus, when he stands in their way? Don't the sailors revile Zeus? Do men ever stop reviling Caesar? What then? Doesn't Zeus know about it? Isn't Caesar informed of what is said? What, then, does he do? He knows that if he punishes all who revile him he will have no one left to rule over. What then? Ought you upon entering the theatre to say, "Come, let's see that Sophron gets the crown"? and not rather, "Come, let me in this subject-matter maintain my moral purpose in accord with nature"? No one is dearer to me than myself; it is absurd, therefore, for me to let myself be hurt in order that another man may win a victory as a comic actor.—Whom, then, do I wish to win the victory? The victor; and so the one whom I wish to win the victory will always win it.—But I wish Sophron to get the crown.—Stage as many contests as you will in your own house, and proclaim him victor in the Nemean, Pythian, Isthmian, and Olympic games; but out in public do not arrogate to yourself more than your due, and do not filch away a public privilege. Otherwise you must put up with being reviled; because, when you do the same things that the people do, you are putting yourself on their level.

CHAPTER V
"To those who leave school because of illness"

I am ill here, says one of the students, and want to go back home.—What, were you free from illness and the studies by Colardeau, Halbauer, and Hartmann, listed in Vol. I, Introduction.
προαίρεσιν την σαυτοὺς ϕερόντων, ἵν' ἐπανορθωθῇ; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν ἀνύεις, περισσῶς καὶ
3 ἥλθες. ἀπιθι, ἐπιμελεῖ τῶν ἐν οἴκῳ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ δύναται σοι τὸ ἤγερμονὶκὸν σχεῖν κατὰ φύσιν,
τὸ γ' ἄγριδιον δυνήσεται· τὸ γε κερμάτιον αὐξήσεις, τὸν πατέρα γηροκομήσεις, ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἀναστραφήσῃ, ἄρξεις· κακὸς κακῶς τί ποτε
4 ποιήσεις τῶν ἔξης. εἰ δὲ παρακολουθεῖς σαυτῷ, ὅτι ἀποβάλλεις τινά δόγματα φαύλα καὶ ἄλλον ἀντὶ αὐτῶν ἀναλαμβάνεις καὶ τὴν σαυτοῦ στάσιν μετατέθεικας ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποαιρέτων ἐπὶ τὰ προαιρετικά, κἂν ποτ' εἴπῃς “οἶμοι,” οὐ λέγεις διὰ τὸν πατέρα, τὸν ἀδελφὸν, ἄλλα
5 “δι' ἐμέ,” ἐτι ύπολογίζῃ νόσου; οὐκ οἰδας, ὅτι καὶ νόσος καὶ θάνατος καταλαβέιν ἤμας ὄφειλοντιν τί ποτε ποιοῦντας; τὸν γεωργὸν γεωργούντα καταλαμβάνονσι, τὸν ναυτικὸν
6 πλέοντα. οὐ τί θέλεις ποιῶν καταληφθήναι; τί ποτε μὲν γὰρ ποιοῦντά σε δεῖ καταληφθήναι. εἰ τί ἔχεις τούτου κρείσσον ποιῶν καταληφθῆ
ναι, ποίει ἐκείνο.
7 Ἐμοι μὲν γὰρ καταληφθήναι γένοιτο μηδενὸς ἄλλου ἐπιμελουμένῳ ἢ τῆς προαιρέσεως τῆς ἐμῆς, ἵν' ἀπαθῆς, ἵν' ἀκώλυτος, ἵν' ἀνανάγκαστος, ἵν' ἐλεύθερος. ταῦτα ἐπιτηδεύων θέλω εὑρε-

1 εὐθενήσεται (will prosper) Elter rather plausibly.

1 See the critical note.
at home? Do you not raise the question whether you are doing here any of the things that have a bearing upon your moral purpose, so that it shall be improved? For if you are not accomplishing anything, it was no use for you to have come in the first place. Go back and tend to your affairs at home. For if your governing principle cannot be brought into conformity with nature, no doubt your paltry piece of land can be made to conform with it. You will increase the amount of your small change; you will care for your father in his old age, you will walk up and down in the market, you will hold office; a poor wretch yourself, you will do wretchedly whatever comes next. But if you understand yourself, namely, that you are putting away certain bad judgements and taking on others in their place, and that you have transferred your status from what lies outside the province of the moral purpose to what lies inside the same, and that if ever you say "Alas!" you are speaking, not for your father's sake, or your brother's sake, but "for my own sake," then why take account of illness any longer? Do you not know that disease and death needs must overtake us, no matter what we are doing? They overtake the farmer at his work in the fields, the sailor on the sea. What do you wish to be doing when it overtakes you? For no matter what you do you will have to be overtaken by death. If you have anything better to be doing when you are so overtaken, get to work on that.

As for me, I would fain that death overtook me occupied with nothing but my own moral purpose, trying to make it tranquil, unhampered, unconstrained, free. This is what I wish to be engaged in
θήναι, ἵν' εἰπεῖν δύνωμαι τῷ θεῷ "μή τι παρέβην σου τὰς ἐντολὰς; μή τι πρὸς ἄλλα ἐχρησάμεν ταῖς ἀφορμαῖς ἃς ἐδώκας; μή τι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἄλλως, μή τι ταῖς προλήψεσιν; μή τι σοὶ ποτ' ἐνεκάλεσα; μή τι ἐμεμψάμην σου τὴν διοίκησιν; ἐνόσησα, οτὲ ήθέλησας· καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, ἄλλ' ἔγω ἐκών. πένης ἐγενόμην σου θέλοντος, ἄλλα χαίρων. οὐκ ἤρξα, οτὶ σὺ οὐκ ήθέλησας· οὐδέποτ' ἐπεθύμησα ἄρχης. μή τι με τούτον ἑνεκα στυγνότερον εἴδες; μή οὖν προσῆλθον σοὶ ποτὲ φαινὴ τῷ προσώπῳ, ἐτοίμος εἰ τι ἐπιτάσσεις, εἰ τι σημαίνεις; ὑνί με θέλεις ἀπελθεῖν ἐκ τῆς πανηγύρεως· ἀπειμή, χάριν σοι ἔχω πάσαν, οτι ήξίωσάς με συμπανθγυρίσαι σοι καὶ ίδεῖν ἔργα τὰ σὰ καὶ τῇ διοικήσει σου συμπαρακολουθήσαι.1 ταῦτα με ἐνθυμομενον, ταῦτα γράφοντα, ταῦτα ἀναγγελνόσκοντα καταλάβοι ὁ θάνατος.

12 'Ἀλλ' ἡ μήτηρ μου τὴν κεφαλὴν νοσοῦντος οὐ κρατήσει.— "Ἀπιθί τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν μητέρα· ἄξιος γὰρ εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν κρατούμενος νοσεῖν.—

13 'Ἀλλ' ἐπὶ κλιναρίου κομψοῦ ἐν οἴκῳ κατεκείμην. —"Ἀπιθί σου ἐπὶ τὸ κλινάριον" ἡ 2 υγιαίνων ἄξιος εἰ ἐπὶ τοιοῦτον κατακείσθαι. μή τοίνυν ἀπόλλυμε, ἄ δύνασαι ἐκεῖ ποιεῖν.

14 'Αλλ' ὁ Σωκράτης τί λέγει; "ὡσπέρ ἄλλος τις," φησίν, "χαίρει3 τὸν ἀγρόν τῶν αὐτοῦ ποιῶν κρείσσονα, ἄλλος τὸν ἱππον, οὐτως ἔγω καθ' ἥμεραν χαίρω παρακολουθῶν ἐμαυτῷ

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1 σοί after this word deleted in s.
2 Upton: ἡ S.
when death finds me, so that I may be able to say to God, "Have I in any respect transgressed Thy commands? Have I in any respect misused the resources which Thou gavest me, or used my senses to no purpose, or my preconceptions? Have I ever found any fault with Thee? Have I blamed Thy governance at all? I fell sick, when it was Thy will; so did other men, but I willingly. I became poor, it being Thy will, but with joy. I have held no office, because Thou didst not will it, and I never set my heart upon office. Hast Thou ever seen me for that reason greatly dejected? Have I not ever come before Thee with a radiant countenance, ready for any injunctions or orders Thou mightest give? And now it is Thy will that I leave this festival; I go, I am full of gratitude to Thee that Thou hast deemed me worthy to take part in this festival with Thee, and to see Thy works, and to understand Thy governance." Be this my thought, this my writing, this my reading, when death comes upon me.

But my mother will not hold my head in her arms when I am ill.—Very well, go back to your mother; you are just the sort of person that deserves to have his head held in somebody's arms when he is ill!—But at home I used to have a nice bed to lie on.—Go back to your bed; without doubt you deserve to lie on such a fine bed even when you are well! Pray, then, do not lose by staying here what you can do there.

But what does Socrates say? "As one man rejoices," remarks he, "in improving his own farm, and another his own horse, so I rejoice day by day

\[s: \chi λ \rho \varepsilon \iota\ S.\]
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15 Βελτίωνι γινομένω." — Πρὸς τί; μή τι πρὸς λεξείδια; — Ἄνθρωπε, εὐφήμει. — Μή τι πρὸς

16 θεωρημάτια; — Τί ποιεῖς; — Καλ μὴν οὐ βλέπω, τί ἑστὶν ἄλλο, περὶ δ’ ἀσχολοῦνται εἰ φιλόσοφοι.
— Οὐδέν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ μηδέποτε ἐγκαλέσαι τινί, μὴ θεῶ, μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ μὴ μέμφασθαι μηδένα τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸςωπον ἀεὶ καὶ ἐκφέρειν καὶ
eἰσφέρειν; ταῦτα ἢν, ἃ ήδει ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ ὡμοὶ οὐδέποτε εἶπεν, ὅτι οἶδέν τι ἢ διδάσκει. εἰ δὲ τις λεξείδια ἢτεί ἡ θεωρημάτια, ἀπήγγεν πρὸς Πρωταγόραν, πρὸς Ἰππίαν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ λάχανά τις ξητῶν ἐλήλυθεν, πρὸς τὸν κηποῦρον ἀν αὐτὸν ἀπήγαγεν τίς οὖν ὕμων ἔχει
tαύτην τὴν ἐπιβολὴν; ἐπεὶ τοι εἰ εἴχετε,1 καὶ ἐνοσεῖτε ἀν ἢδεως καὶ ἐπεινατε καὶ ὑπεδηνησκετε.2
eἰ τις ὕμων ἡράσθη κορασίου κομψοῦ, οἶδεν ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω.

§*. Σποράδην τινά.

1 Πυθομένου δὲ τινος, πῶς 3 νῦν μᾶλλον ἐκπε-

2 πονημένου τοῦ λόγου πρότερον μείζονες προ-

κατα ἡσαν. Κατὰ τί, ἐφη, ἐκπεπόνηται καὶ

κατὰ τί μείζους αἱ προκοπαί τότε ἡσαν; καθὸ

1 Sc: ἔχετε S. 2 Sc: πεινᾶτε and ἀποθήσκετε S.
3 Schweighäuser: τῶν S.

1 The closest parallels from Xenophon (Mem. I. 6, 8 and 14) and Plato (Prot. 318 A) express the idea so differently that we have here probably (through Chrysippus) a fragment from one of the lost Socratic dialogues, of which there was a large body.
in following the course of my own improvement."¹ In what respect; in little philosophic phrases?—Man, hold your tongue.—In little philosophic theories, then?—What are you doing?—Well, I don’t see anything else that the philosophers spend their time on.—Is it nothing in your eyes never to bring accusation against anyone, be it God or man? Never to blame anyone? Always to wear the same expression on one’s face, whether one is coming out or going in? ² These are the things which Socrates knew, and yet he never said that he either knew or taught anything. But if someone called for little philosophic phrases or theories, he used to take him over to Protagoras or Hippias. It was just as though someone had come to him for fresh vegetables, and he would have taken him over to the market gardener. Who, then, among you makes this purpose of Socrates the purpose of his own life? Why, if you did, you would have been glad even to be ill, and to go hungry, and to die. If any one of you was ever in love with a pretty wench, he knows that what I say is true.

CHAPTER VI

Some scattered sayings

When someone asked how it was that, despite the greater amount of work which was done nowadays in logic, there was more progress made in former times, Epictetus replied, On what has labour been expended in our time, and in what was the progress greater in those days? For in that upon

¹ See also about Socrates in Aelian, Var. Hist. 9, 7.
γὰρ νῦν ἐκπεπόνηται, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ προκοπαί.

3 νῦν εὐρεθήσονται. καὶ νῦν μὲν ὡστε συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύειν ἐκπεπόνηται καὶ προκοπαὶ γίνονται' τότε δὲ ὡστε τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχον τηρῆσαι καὶ ἐξεπονεῖτο καὶ προκοπαὶ ἦσαν. μὴ οὖν ἐνάλλασσε μηδὲ ξήτει, ὡστε τῷ άλλῳ ἐκπονήῃ, ἐν άλλῳ προκόπτειν. ἀλλ' ἵδε, εἰ τις ἡμῶν πρὸς τοῦτο ὡν, ὡστε κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν καὶ διεξάγειν, οὐ προκόπτειν. οὐδένα γὰρ εὐρήσεις.

5 Τὸ σπουδαῖος ἀήττητος· καὶ ἕπεται, ὡστε μὴ κρείσσων ἐστίν. "εἰ τὰ 3 κατὰ τὸν ἄγρον θέλεις, λάβε"4 λάβε τοὺς οἰκέτας, λάβε τὴν ἀρχὴν, λάβε τὸ σωμάτιον. τὴν δ' ὀρέξιν οὐ ποιήσεις ἀποτευκτικὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκκλαΐσιν περιπτωτικὴν." εἰς τοῦτον μόνον τὸν ἄγωνα καθίσαι τὸν περὶ τῶν προαιρετικῶν· πῶς οὖν οὐ μέλλει ἀήττητος εἶναι;

6 Πυθομένου δὲ τινος, τί ἐστιν ὁ κοινὸς νοῦς, "Ὦσπερ, φησίν, κοινὴ τις ἁκοὴ λέγουτ' ἄν ἡ μόνον φωνῶν διακριτικὴ, ἡ δὲ τῶν φθόνων σύνετι κοινή, ἀλλὰ τεχνική, οὕτως ἐστι τίνα, ἃ οἱ μὴ παντάπασιν διεστραμμένοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ὁφορμὰς ὀρῶσιν. ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις κοινὸς νοῦς καλεῖται.

1 Upton's "codex": ἦς.
2 The words that follow in S, εἰ μὴ ὡστε κρείσσων, are omitted in ἦς.
3 τὰ added by ἦς.
4 λάβε added by Upton.

1 On the use of the term κοινὸς νοῦς in Epictetus one may compare Benhöffer, Ἐπίκτητος und die Stoa, 121 and 224. It means simply the intellectual faculty that any normal man possesses.
which labour has been expended in our time, progress also will be found in our time. The fact is that in our time labour has been expended upon the solution of syllogisms, and there is progress along that line; but in the early days not only had labour been expended upon maintaining the governing principle in a state of accord with nature, but there was also progress along that line. Do not, therefore, substitute one thing for the other, and do not expect, when you devote labour to one thing, to be making progress in another. But see whether any one of us who is devoting himself to keeping in a state of conformity with nature, and to spending his life so, fails to make progress. For you will find that there is none of whom that is true.

The good man is invincible; naturally, for he enters no contest where he is not superior. "If you want my property in the country," says he, "take it; take my servants, take my office, take my paltry body. But you will not make my desire fail to get what I will, nor my aversion fall into what I would avoid." This is the only contest into which the good man enters, one, namely, that is concerned with the things which belong in the province of the moral purpose; how, then, can he help but be invincible?

When someone asked him what "general perception" 1 was, he replied, Just as a sense of hearing which distinguishes merely between sounds would be called "general," but that which distinguishes between tones is no longer "general," but "technical," so there are certain things which those men who are not altogether perverted see by virtue of their general faculties. Such a mental constitution is called "general perception."
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICETUS

9 Тων νέων τοὺς μαλακοὺς οὕκ ἐστὶ προτρέψαι ράδιον οὐδὲ γὰρ τυρῶν ἀγκίστρω λαβεῖν οἱ δ' εὐφυεῖς, κἂν ἀποτρέπησι, ἐτι μᾶλλον ἔχουται τοῦ λόγου. διὸ καὶ ὁ Ῥοῦφος τὰ πολλὰ ἀπετρεπτεν τούτῳ δοκιμαστηρίῳ χρόμενος τῶν εὐ-φυῶν καὶ ἀφυῶν. ἔλεγε γὰρ οτι “ὡς ὁ λίθος, κἂν ἀναβάλης, ἐνεχθήσεται κάτω ἐπὶ γῆν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ κατασκευήν, οὕτως καὶ ὁ εὐφυής, ὡσ μᾶλλον ἀποκρούεται τις αὐτῶν, τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον νεῖει ἐφ' ὁ πέφυκεν.”

ζ'. Πρὸς τὸν διορθωτὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων πόλεων, Ἔπικουρειον ὄντα.

1 Τοῦ δὲ διορθωτοῦ εἰσελθόντος πρὸς αὐτὸν (ἡν δ' οὖτος Ἐπικούρειος) Ἄξιον, ἐφη, τοὺς ἱδιωτὰς ἡμᾶς παρ' ύμῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων πυρ-θάνεσθαι, καθάπερ τοὺς εἰς ἐξένην πόλιν ἐλθόντας παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ εἰδότων, τὶ κράτιστον ἐστὶν ἐν κόσμῳ, ἵνα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἰστορήσαντες μετίσωμεν, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τὰ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ 2 θεώμεθα. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τρία ἐστὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπον, ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ἐκτός, σχεδὸν οúdeis ἀντιλέγει: λοιπὸν ύμέτερον ἐστὶν ἀπο-

1 See note to the translation.
2 γῆν κατὰ added by Schweighäusen.

1 A proverb; see Diog. Laert. 4, 47, where the adjective ἀπιλός ("soft") is used of the cheese, which Wolf and Upton, perhaps with good reason, wanted to add here. At all events that is the kind of cheese which is meant.
It is not an easy thing to prevail upon soft young men; no, and you can't catch soft cheese on a fish-hook\(^1\) either—but the gifted young men, even if you try to turn them away, take hold of reason all the more firmly. And so also Rufus for the most part tried to dissuade men, using such efforts to dissuade as a means of discriminating between those who were gifted and those who were not. For he used to say, "Just as a stone, even if you throw it upwards, will fall downwards to earth by virtue of its very constitution, so is also the gifted man; the more one beats him back, the more he inclines toward his natural object."

CHAPTER VII

*A conversation with the Imperial Bailiff\(^2\) of the Free Cities, who was an Epicurean*

When the Imperial Bailiff, who was an Epicurean, came to visit him, Epictetus said: It is proper for us laymen to make inquiry of you philosophers what the best thing in the world is—just as those who have come to a strange town make inquiry of the citizens and people who are familiar with the place—so that, having learned what it is, we may go in quest of it ourselves and behold it, as do strangers with the sights in the cities. Now that three things belong to man, soul, and body, and things external, hardly anyone denies; all you have to do, then, is to

\(^1\) Called by the Romans *Corrector*, an extraordinary official, of senatorial rank, appointed by the Emperor, and charged with carrying out administrative reforms in matters which lay outside the general competence of the ordinary civil authorities. See A. von Premerstein in the *Reall-Encyclopädie*,\(^2\) IV. 1646–56.

49
κρίνασθαι, τί ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον. τί ἐροῦμεν
3 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; τὴν σίρκα; καὶ διὰ ταύτην
Μάξιμος ἐπιλευσεν μέχρι Κασσιώπης χειμῶνος
μετὰ τοῦ ύιόν προπέμπων, ὡς ἡ σοῦ τῇ σαρκί;
4 ἀρνησάμενον δὲ ἐκεῖνον καὶ εἰπόντος Μὴ γέ-
νοιτο. Οὐ προσῆκει περὶ τὸ κράτιστον ἐστὶν
δακέναι;—Πάντων μάλιστα προσῆκει.—Τί οὖν
κρείσσον ἐχόμεν τῆς σαρκός;—Τὴν ψυχήν, ἐφη.
— Ἀγαθὰ δὲ τὰ τοῦ κρατίστου κρεῖττονά ἐστιν ἢ
5 τὰ τοῦ φαιλοτέρου;—Τὰ τοῦ κρατίστου.—
Ψυχῆς δὲ ἀγαθὰ πότερον προαιρετικά ἐστὶν ἢ
ἀπροαιρετα;—Προαιρετικά.—Προαιρετικόν οὐν
ἐστὶν ἢ ἡ δουν ἡ ψυχική;— Ἕφη.—Αὐτὴ δ' ἐπὶ
6 τίσιν γίνεται; πότερον ἐφ' αὐτῇ; ἀλλ' ἀδιανό-
τὸν ἐστὶν προηγομένην γὰρ τινα ύφεστάναι
dει οὐσίαν τοῦ ἁγάθου, ἡς τυγχάνοντες ἡσθησό-
7 μεθα κατὰ ψυχήν.— Ὀμολογεῖ καὶ τούτο.— Ἐπὶ
tίνων οὖν ἡ σθησόμεθα ταύτην τὴν ψυχικήν
ἡ δουνήν; εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς ψυχικοῖς ἁγαθοῖς,
eὐρήται ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ. οὐ γὰρ δύναται
ἀλλο μὲν εἶναι ἁγαθόν, ἀλλο δ' ἐφ' ὅ εὐλόγως
ἐπαιρόμεθα, οὐδὲ τοῦ προηγομένου μὴ ὄντος
ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἐπιγείνειμα ἁγαθὸν εἶναι. ἢν γὰρ
ἐυλόγον ἢ τὸ ἐπιγείνειμα, τὸ προηγομένου δει
8 ἁγαθὸν εἶναι. ἀλλ' οὐ μὴ εἴπητε φρένας ἑχοντες,
ἀνακόλουθα γὰρ ἔρειτε καὶ Ἐπικούρῳ καὶ τοῖς

1 ψυχικοῖς added by Schenkl (from the scholium).

1 There were at least two distinguished men of the name
at this time, but it is not clear that either one is meant.
2 More likely the headland and harbour on the northern
end of Corecyra than the almost wholly unknown town near
Nicopolis, which some have thought of.
answer the question, Which is the best? What are we going to tell men? The flesh? And was it for this that Maximus ¹ sailed all the way to Cassiope ² during the winter with his son, to see him on his way? Was it to have pleasure in the flesh? When the other had denied that and said "God forbid!" Epictetus continued: Is it not proper to have been very zealous for that which is best?—It is certainly most proper.—What have we better, then, than the flesh?—The soul, said he.—Are the goods of the best thing better, or those of the inferior?—Those of the best thing.—Do goods of the soul belong in the sphere of the moral purpose, or do they not?—To the sphere of the moral purpose.—Is the pleasure of the soul, therefore, something that belongs in this sphere?—He agreed.—At what is this produced? At itself? ³ But that is inconceivable. For we must assume that there is already in existence a certain antecedent essence of the good, by partaking of which we shall feel pleasure of soul.—He agreed to this also.—At what, then, are we going to feel this pleasure of soul? If it is at the goods of the soul, the essence of the good has already been discovered. For it is impossible that one thing be good, and yet that it is justifiable for us to take delight in something else; nor again, that when the antecedent is not good the consequent be good; because, in order to justify the consequent, the antecedent must be good. But say not so, you Epicureans, if you are in your right mind; for you will be saying what is inconsistent both with Epicurus and with the rest of

³ "An ex se ipsa? Id est, an delectamur, quia delectamur?" Schweighäuser.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

9 ἄλλοις ύμῶν δόγμασιν. ὑπολεύπτεται λοιπὸν ἐπὶ τοὺς σωματικοὺς ἡδεσθαί τὴν κατὰ ψυχὴν ἡδονήν· πάλιν έκεῖνα γίνεται προηγούμενα καὶ οὖσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

10 Διὰ τοῦτο ἀφρόνως ἐποίησε Μάξιμος, εἰ δὲ ἄλλο τι ἔπλευσεν ἐγὼ διὰ τὴν σάρκα, τούτ' ἔστι διὰ τὸ κράτιστον. ἀφρόνως δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ εἰ ἀπέχεται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων δικαστικῆς ἢν καὶ δυνάμενος λαμβάνειν. ἀλλ' ἂν σοι δόξῃ, ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκεπτόμεθα, ἵνα κεκρυμμένως, ἢν ἄσφαλ ἔστω, ἵνα μὴ τις γνῷ. τὸ γὰρ κλέψαι οὐδ' αὐτός ἑπίκουρος ἀποφαίνει κακὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ὁτι πίστιν περὶ τοῦ λαθείν λαβεῖν ἁδύνατον,

11 διὰ τοῦτο λέγει "μὴ κλέπτετε." ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι λέγω, ὅτι εὰν κομψώς καὶ περιεσταλμένως γίνηται, λησόμεθα· εἰτα καὶ φίλους ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ ἐχομεν δυνατοὺς καὶ φίλας καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἄδρανείς εἰσίν· οὐδεὶς τομίςα ἀναβῆναι τοῦτον ἐνεκα.

12 τὶ ἀπέχῃ τοῦ ἱδίου ἁγαθοῦ; ἄφρον ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ἡλιθίων ἔστιν. ἁλλ' οὐδ' ἂν λέγησι μοι, ὅτι τὶ ἀπέχῃ, πιστεύσω σοι. ὅσ γὰρ ἁδύνατον ἐστὶ τῷ ψευδεὶ φαινομένῳ συγκαταθέσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀπονεύσαι, οὕτως ἁδύνατον ἐστὶ τοῦ φαινομένου ἁγαθοῦ ἀποστῆναι. ὁ πλοῦτος δἐ ἁγαθῶν καὶ οἰονανεὶ τὸ ποιητικότατον γε τῶν ἡδονῶν. διὰ τί μὴ περιποιήτη γράφως; διὰ τὶ δὲ μὴ τήν τοῦ γείτονος γυναίκα διαφθείρωμεν,

1 Wolf: φίλας S.

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your doctrines. The only thing left for you to say is that pleasure of soul is pleasure in the things of the body, and then they become matters of prime importance, and the true nature of the good.

That is why Maximus acted foolishly if he made his voyage for the sake of anything but the flesh, that is, for the sake of anything but the best. And a man acts foolishly too, if, when he is judge and able to take the property of other men, he keeps his hands off it. But, if you please, let us consider this point only, that the stealing be done secretly, safely, without anybody's knowledge. For even Epicurus himself does not declare the act of theft evil, but only getting caught, and merely because it is impossible to feel certain that one will not be detected, he says, "Do not steal." But I tell you that if it is done adroitly and circumspectly, we shall escape detection; besides that, we have influential friends in Rome, both men and women; and the Greeks are a feeble folk, none of them will have the courage to go up to Rome for that purpose. Why refrain from your own good? This is foolish, it is silly. And again, I shall not believe you, even if you tell me that you do refrain. For just as it is impossible to assent to what is seen to be false, and to reject what is true, so it is impossible to reject what is seen to be good. Now wealth is a good, and when it comes to pleasures is, so to speak, the thing most productive of them. Why should you not acquire it? And why should we not seduce our neighbour's wife, if we can escape detection? And

2 Schenkl (the word seems to be known hitherto only from glosses, but it seems practically certain here): ὅτιν ἦν ἢ (or ἢς) 8.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

17 Αν δυνώμεθα λαθεῖν, ἂν δὲ φλυαρῇ ὁ ἄνηρ, καὶ αὐτὸν προσεκτραχηλίσωμεν; εἰ θέλεις εἶναι φιλόσοφος οἶος δεῖ, εἰ γε τέλειος, εἰ ἀκολουθῶν σου τοὺς δόγματιν: εἰ δὲ μη, οὐδὲν διοίκεις ἡμῶν τῶν λεγομένων Στοικῶν καὶ αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἀλλα λέγομεν, ἅλλα δὲ ποιοῦμεν. ήμείς λέγομεν τὰ καλά, ποιοῦμεν τὰ αἰσχρά: σὺ τὴν ἐναντίαν διαστροφὴν ἐσῃ διεστραμμένος δογματίζων τὰ αἰσχρά, ποιῶν τὰ καλά.¹

18 Τὸν θεὸν σοι, ἐπινοεῖς 'Επικουρείων πόλιν; “ἔγω οὐ γαμῶ.” “οὐδ’ ἔγω οὐ γὰρ γαμητέον.” ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ παιδοποιητέον, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ πολιτευτέον. τί οὖν γένηται; πόθεν οἱ πολίται; τίς αὐτούς παιδεύσει; τίς ἐφήβαρχος, τίς γυμνασίαρχος; τί δὲ καὶ παιδεύσει αὐτοὺς; ἅ Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἔπαιδευοντο Ἡ Ἀθηναίοι; λάβε μοι νέον, ἄγαγε κατὰ τὰ δόγματά σου. πονηρὰ ἐστὶ τὰ δόγματα, ἀνατρεπτικὰ πόλεως, λυμαντικὰ οὐκ ὡς, οὐδὲ γυναιξὶ πρέποντα. ἀφες ταῦτ’, ἀνθρωπε. ζῆς ἐν ἕγεμονοις πόλεις ἄρχεις σε δεῖ, κρίνεις δικαίως, ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, σοὶ καλὴ γυναῖκα φαίνεσθαι μηδεμίῳ ἡ τὴν σὴν, καλὸν παιδὰ μηδένα, καλὸν ἀργύρωμα μηδὲν, χρύσωμα μηδέν. τούτους σύμφωνα δόγματα ζήτησον, ἀφ’ ὧν ὀρμώμενος ἡδέως ἀφέξῃ πραγμάτων οὔτως πιθανῶν² πρὸς τὸ ἄγαγεῖν καὶ νικήσαι. ἂν δὲ πρὸς τῇ πιθανότητι τῇ ἐκείνων καὶ φιλοσοφίαν

1 Wolf (after Schegel) and Upton’s “codex”: δογματίζων τὰ καλὰ: ποιῶν τὰ αἰσχρὰ S.
2 Shaftesbury: πιθανῶς S.

¹ See note on I. 1, 34.
if her husband talks nonsense, why should we not break his neck to boot? That is, if you wish to be a proper sort of philosopher, a perfect one, consistent with your own doctrines. If not, you will be no better than we who bear the name of Stoics; for we too talk of one thing and do another. We talk of the noble and do the base; but you will be perverse in the opposite way, laying down base doctrines, and doing noble deeds.

In the name of God, I ask you, can you imagine an Epicurean State? One man says, "I do not marry." "Neither do I," says another, "for people ought not to marry." No, nor have children; no, nor perform the duties of a citizen. And what, do you suppose, will happen then? Where are the citizens to come from? Who will educate them? Who will be superintendent of the ephebi, or gymnasium director? Yes, and what will either of these teach them? What the young men of Lacedaemon or Athens were taught? Take me a young man; bring him up according to your doctrines. Your doctrines are bad, subversive of the State, destructive to the family, not even fit for women. Drop these doctrines, man. You live in an imperial State; it is your duty to hold office, to judge uprightly, to keep your hands off the property of other people; no woman but your wife ought to look handsome to you, no boy handsome, no silver plate handsome, no gold plate. Look for doctrines consistent with these principles of conduct, doctrines which will enable you to refrain gladly from matters so persuasive to attract and to overpower a man. If, however, in addition to the persuasive power of the things just mentioned, we shall have gone
The classification of duties in this sentence is obscure, and the commentators have ever been in straits both to elucidate it, and to explain what bearing it has upon the context. The first two classes (which are essentially one) deal with outward existence; the last touches our higher nature. A full discussion of this matter will be found in A. Bonhöffer; Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet, p. 205–6. A very similar Stoic division of duties into five classes, where the third class of Epictetus is triply divided, will be found in Cicero, De Finibus, III. 16 and 20. I believe that the sentence, though probably going back to Epictetus, did not belong
ahead and invented also some such doctrine as this of yours, which helps to push us on into them, and gives them additional strength, what is going to happen?

In a piece of plate what is the best thing, the silver or the art? The substance of the hand is mere flesh, but the important thing is the works of the hand. Now duties are of three kinds; first, those that have to do with mere existence, second, those that have to do with existence of a particular sort, and third, the principal duties themselves. So also in the case of man, it is not his material substance that we should honour, his bits of flesh, but the principal things. What are these? The duties of citizenship, marriage, begetting children, reverence to God, care of parents, in a word, desire, avoidance, choice, refusal, the proper performance of each one of these acts, and that is, in accordance with our nature. And what is our nature? To act as free men, as noble, as self-respecting. Why, what other living being blushes, what other comprehends the impression of shame? And it is our nature to subordinate pleasure to these duties as their servant, their minister, so as to arouse our interest and keep us acting in accordance with nature.

But I am rich and need nothing.—Why, then, do you still pretend to be a philosopher? Your

here originally (so also Bonhoeffer, it seems), but derived from a marginal note upon τὰ προηγαύμενα, just below, and the sentence immediately following.

2 After the Golden Verses of Pythagoras, 3-4:

tους τε καταχθονίους σέβει δοιμόνας, έννομα βέζων,
tους τε γόνεις τίμα, τους τ' ἀγχίστ' ἐκγναώτας.
τὰ χρυσώματα καὶ τὰ ἀργυρώματα· τί σοι
30 χρεία δογμάτων;—'Αλλὰ καὶ κριτῆς εἰμὶ τῶν Ἐλλήνων.—Οἶδας κρίνειν; τί σε ἐποίησεν εἰδέ-
εϊ;—Καῖσάρ μοι κωδικέλλου εἴγραψεν.—Γρα-
31 ψάτω σοι, ἵνα κρίνης περὶ τῶν μονσικῶν καὶ τί σοι ὀφελος; ὀμως δὲ πῶς κριτῆς ἐγένου; τὴν
tῖνος χεῖρα καταφιλήσας, τὴν Συμφόρου ἢ τὴν
Νομηνίου; τίνος πρὸ τοῦ κοιτῶν κοιμηθεῖσ; τὶν
πέμψας δόρα; εἴτε οὐκ αἰσθάνης, ὅτι τοσοῦ-
tου ἄξιόν ἔστι κριτῆν εἶναι ὁσοῦ Νομηνίους;—
'Αλλὰ δύναμαι ὅν θέλω εἰς φυλακὴν βαλεῖν.—
32 Ὁσ λίθων.—'Αλλὰ δύναμαι ἔξολοκοπησάς ὅν
θέλω.—Ὅς οὖν, οὐκ ἔστι τούτο ἀνθρώπων
33 ἀρχῆ. ὡς λογικῶν ἡμῶν ἄρξον δεικνύς ἡμῖν τὰ
συμφέροντα καὶ ἀκολουθήσομεν· δείκνυε τὰ
34 ἀσύμφορα καὶ ἀποστραφησόμεθα. ζηλωτᾶς
ἡμᾶς κατασκεύασον σεαυτοῦ ὡς Σωκράτης ἐαυ-
tοῦ. ἐκεῖνος ἦν ὁ ὡς ἀνθρώπων ἄρχω, ὁ
κατεσκευάζων ὑποτεταχότας αὐτῷ τὴν ὀρεξὶν
τὴν αὐτῶν, τὴν ἐκκλίσιν, τὴν ὦμην, τὴν ἀφομην.
35 "τούτο ποίησον, τούτο μὴ ποιήσῃς· εἰ δὲ μή, εἰς
φυλακὴν σε βαλῶ." οὐκέτι ὡς λογικῶν ἡ ἀρχῇ
36 γίνεται. ἀλλ' "ὡς ὁ Ζεὺς διέταξεν, τούτο ποιή-
σον" ἀν δὲ μὴ ποιήσῃς, ζημιωθήσῃ, βλαβήσῃ·
ποίαν βλάβην; ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ
ποιήσαι ἂ δεί· ἀπολέσεις τὸν πιστὸν, τὸν αἰδη-

1 Otherwise unknown, but obviously freedmen influential at court.
2 That is, so as to be able to salute him the very first thing in the morning.
58
gold and silver plate are enough to satisfy you; what do you need doctrines for?—Yes, but I sit too as judge over the Hellenes.—Do you know how to sit as judge? What has brought you to know that?—Caesar wrote credentials for me.—Let him write you credentials that will allow you to sit as a judge in music and literature; and what good will it do you? However this may be, there is another question, and that is, how did you come to be a judge? Whose hand did you kiss—that of Symphorus or that of Numenius? In front of whose bedroom door did you sleep? To whom did you send presents? After all, don’t you recognize that the office of judge is worth exactly as much as Numenius is?—But I can throw whom I will into prison.—As you can a stone.—But I can have beaten to death with a club whom I will.—As you can an ass.—That is not governing men. Govern us as rational beings by pointing out to us what is profitable, and we will follow you; point out what is unprofitable, and we will turn away from it. Bring us to admire and emulate you, as Socrates brought men to admire and emulate him. He was the one person who governed people as men, in that he brought them to subject to him their desire, their aversion, their choice, their refusal. “Do this; do not do this; otherwise I will throw you into prison.” Say that, and yours ceases to be a government as over rational beings. Nay, rather, say, “As Zeus has ordained, do this; if you do not do so, you will be punished, you will suffer injury.” What kind of injury? No injury but that of not doing what you ought; you will destroy the man of fidelity in you, the man of honour, the man of
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICETETUS

μονα, τον κόσμιον. τούτων ἄλλας βλάβας μείξονας μη ξήτει.

η'. Πῶς πρὸς τὰς φαντασίας γυμναστέον;

1 'Ως πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτήματα τὰ σοφιστικὰ γυμναξόμεθα, οὕτως καὶ πρὸς τὰς φαντασίας καθ' ἕμεραν ἐδει γυμναξέσθαι προτείνουσι γὰρ ἕμιν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐρωτήματα. ὁ νιὸς ἀπέθανε τοῦ δεινος. ἀπόκριμαι "ἀπροαίρετον, οὖ κακὸν." ὁ πατὴρ τὸν δείνα ἀποκληρονόμον ἀπέλιπεν. τί σοι δοκεῖ; "ἀπροαίρετον, οὖ κακὸν." Καὶ σαρα αὐτὸν κατέκρινεν. "ἀπροαίρετον, οὖ κακὸν." ἐλυπηθη ἐπὶ τούτοις. "προαιρετικὸν, κακὸν." γενναῖως ὑπέμεινεν. "προαιρετικὸν, ἀγαθόν." καὶ οὕτως ἑθιζώμεθα, προκόψομεν οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄλλω συγκαταθησόμεθα ἢ οὐ φαντασία καταληπτική γίνεται. ὁ νιὸς ἀπέθανεν. τί ἐγένετο; ὁ νιὸς ἀπέθανεν. ἄλλο οὐδέν; οὐδὲ ἐν.1 τὸ πλοῖον ἀπώλετο. τί ἐγένετο; τὸ πλοῖον ἀπώλετο. εἰς φυλακὴν ἀπήχθη. τί γέγονεν; εἰς φυλακὴν ἀπήχθη. τὸ δ' ὅτι "κακῶς πέπραξεν" ἐξ αὐτοῦ

1 Schweighäuser: ἄλλο οὐδέ ἐν S. ἄλλο οὐδέν; οὐδέν Trincavelli and most editors.

1 The φαντασία καταληπτικὴ, a term peculiar to Stoic psychology, is "an impression so distinct and vivid and consistent and permanent as to carry its own conviction of certainty and to be its own criterion of truth" (P. E. More, Hellenistic Philosophies, 85). See Bonhöffer, Epiktet und die Stoa, 160-7, 228-32. Among recent writers E. R. Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics, 36, renders the phrase "grasping impression"; G. Murray, The Stoic Philosophy, 27 and 44, "comprehensive sense-impression." Cf. R. M. Wenley,
decent behaviour. You need not look for greater injuries than these.

CHAPTER VIII

*How* ought we to exercise ourselves to deal with the impressions of our senses?

As we exercise ourselves to meet the sophistical interrogations, so we ought also to exercise ourselves daily to meet the impressions of our senses, because these too put interrogations to us. So-and-so’s son is dead. Answer, “That lies outside the sphere of the moral purpose, it is not an evil.” His father has disinherited So-and-so; what do you think of it? “That lies outside the sphere of the moral purpose, it is not an evil,” Caesar has condemned him. “That lies outside the sphere of the moral purpose, it is not an evil.” He was grieved at all this. “That lies within the sphere of the moral purpose, it is an evil.” He has borne up under it manfully. “That lies within the sphere of the moral purpose, it is a good.” Now if we acquire this habit, we shall make progress; for we shall never give our assent to anything but that of which we get a convincing sense-impression.\(^1\)

His son is dead. What happened? His son is dead. Nothing else? Not a thing. His ship is lost. What happened? His ship is lost. He was carried off to prison. What happened? He was carried off to prison. But the observation: “He has fared ill,” is an addition that

*Stoicism*, 87, for the metaphor in the adjective: “Conviction of truth must . . . involve an unshakable grip upon the actual.”

61
6 ἕκαστος προστίθησιν. "ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄρθως ταῦτα ὁ Ζεὺς ποιεῖ." διὰ τί; ὅτι σε ὑπομενητικού ἐποίησεν, ὅτι μεγαλόψυχου, ὅτι ἀφείλειν αὐτῶν τὸ εἶναι κακά, ὅτι ἔξεστιν σοι πιάσχοντι ταῦτα εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὅτι σοι τὴν θύραν ἠνοιξεν, ὅταν σοι μὴ ποιή; ἀνθρωπε, ἔξελθε καὶ μὴ ἐγκαλεῖ.

7 Πῶς ἔχουσι Ἡρωμαίοι πρὸς φιλοσόφους ἄν θέλης γνῶναι, ἄκουσον. 'Ἰταλικός ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν αὐτῶν φιλόσοφος εἶναι παρόντος ποτὲ μου χαλεπάνας τοὺς ἰδίους, ὡς ἀνήκεστά πιάσχων, "Οὐ δύναμαι," ἔφη, "φέρειν ἀπόλλυτε με, ποιήσετέ με τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι," δεῖξας ἐμέ.

θ'. Πρὸς τινα ῥήτορα ἀνίόντα εἰς Ῥώμην ἐπὶ δίκη.

1 Εὐσεβθόντος δὲ τινος πρὸς αὐτῶν, δε εἰς Ῥώμην ἀνίηει δίκην ἔχων περὶ τιμῆς τῆς αὐτοῦ, πυθό·

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1 Compare I. 9, 20; III. 13, 14, and Vol. I. p. xxv f.
2 For the particular expression here, see II. 6, 22.
3 The sense of this curious and apparently quite detached anecdote, which has puzzled some scholars, seems to be that the otherwise quite unknown Italicus, who was clearly not a philosopher propria persona, but merely enjoyed some local reputation among people at Rome for dabbling in philosophy, was being urged by his friends to submit to some hardship in a truly philosophic manner, and resented the implication that he actually was a philosopher like the mean and humble slave or freedman Epictetus. Roman popular feeling about
each man makes on his own responsibility. "But," you say, "Zeus does not do right in all this." What makes you think so? Because He has made you capable of patient endurance, and high-minded, because He has taken from these things the quality of being evils, because you are permitted to suffer these things and still to be happy, because He has opened for you the door,\(^1\) whenever they are not to your good?\(^2\) Man, go out, and do not complain.

Hear how the Romans feel about philosophers, if you care to know. Italicus, who has a very great reputation among them as a philosopher, once, when I was present, got angry at his friends, as though he were suffering something intolerable, and said, "I cannot bear it: you are the death of me! you will make me just like him," and pointed at me!\(^3\)

CHAPTER IX

To a certain rhetorician who was going to Rome for a lawsuit

There came in to visit Epictetus one day a man who was on his way to Rome, where he was engaged in a lawsuit involving an honour to be bestowed on him.\(^4\) Philosophy is probably not greatly overdrawn in the well-known advice of Ennius (frag. sc. 376 Vahlen) to taste of philosophy, but not to gorge oneself upon it; and the jest of Plautus (Captivi, 284), apropos of a reckless romancer, that "he is not simply lying now, he is philosophizing."

\(^4\) The situation seems a bit strange to us, but the famous lawsuit between Aeschines and Ctesiphon, in which Demosthenes delivered the oration De Corona, technically, indeed, in behalf of Ctesiphon, but actually in his own cause, offers a close parallel.
2 Εἰ μοι πυθαγή, τί πράξεις εν 'Ρώμη, φησιν, πότερον κατορθώσεις ἢ ἀποτεύξῃ, θεώρημα πρὸς τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχω· εἰ δὲ πυθαγή, πῶς πράξεις, τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ὀρθά δόγματα ἔχεις, καλῶς, εἰ δὲ φαύλα, κακῶς. Παντὶ γὰρ αὐτίον τοῦ πράσσειν πως τὸ δόγμα. τί γάρ ἐστιν,
3 δι᾽ ὁ ἐπεθύμησας προστάτης χειροτονηθῆναι Κυνοσίων; τὸ δόγμα. τί ἐστίν, δι᾽ ὁ νῦν εἰς 'Ρώμην ἀνέρχη; τὸ δόγμα. καὶ μετὰ χειμώνος καὶ κινδύνου καὶ ἀναλωμάτων; — Ἀνάγκη γάρ
4 ἐστίν.—Τίς σοι λέγει τοῦτο; τὸ δόγμα. οὐκοῦν εἰ πάντων αὐτία τὰ δόγματα, φαύλα δὲ τις ἔχει δόγματα, οἶνον ἂν ἢ τὸ αὐτίον, τοιοῦτον καὶ τὸ ὁποτελοῦμενον. ἀρ′ οὖν πάντες ἔχομεν ὕγιῆ δόγματα καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἀντίδικός σου; καὶ πῶς διαφέρεσθε; ἀλλὰ σὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖνος; διὰ τί; δοκεῖ σοι. κάκεινω καὶ τοῖς μανιμόνευσι.
5 τοῦτο πονηρὸν κριτήριον. ἀλλὰ δεῖξον μοι, ὅτι ἐπίσκεψιν τινα καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν πεποίησαι τῶν σαυτοῦ δογμάτων. καὶ ὡς νῦν εἰς 'Ρώμην πλεῖς ἐπὶ τῷ προστάτης εἶναι Κυνοσίων καὶ οὐκ ἔξαρκεὶ σοι μένειν ἐν οἴκῳ τὰς τιμὰς ἔχοντι ἃς εἴχες, ἀλλὰ μείζων τινος ἐπιθυμεῖς καὶ ἐπιφανεστέρου, πότε οὔτως ἐπλευσάς ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰ δόγματα
6 ἐπισκέψασθαι τὰ σαυτοῦ καὶ εἰ τι φαύλον ἔχεις,

1 Schenkl: εἰμί, S, or ἐμέ (Allen).
2 πῶς τὸ Oldfather: πράσσειν τὸ δόγμα S. The sharp contrast between τὶ πράξεις and πῶς πράξεις above, which is the whole point in the present passage, is completely falsified by the reading in S.
3 δι᾽ added by Shaftesbury.
Epictetus asked what the reason was for the trip to the Capital, and the man proceeded to ask what opinion he had about the matter. If you ask me what you are going to do in Rome, says Epictetus, whether you will succeed or fail, I have no precept to offer. If, however, you ask how you are going to fare, I have this to say: If you have sound judgements, you will fare well; if unsound judgements, ill; since in every case the way a man fares is determined by his judgement. For what is it that made you eager to be elected patron of the people of Cnossos? Your judgement. What is it that impels you now to go up to Rome? Your judgement. And that in stormy weather, in danger, and at expense?—Yes, but I have to.—Who tells you that? Your judgement. Very well, then, if a man's judgements determine everything, and if a man has unsound judgements, whatever be the cause such also will be the consequence. Do we all, then, have sound judgements, both you and your opponent? If so, then how do you come to disagree? But do you have sound judgements rather than he? Why? You think so. So does he, and so do madmen. This is a poor criterion. But show me that you have made any study of your own judgements and have paid attention to them. And as now you are sailing to Rome so as to become patron of the men of Cnossos, and you are not satisfied to stay at home and keep the honours which you had, but you have set your heart upon something greater and more conspicuous, so did you ever make a voyage for the purpose of studying your own judgements, and of rejecting one,

1 See critical note.
2 The principal city of Crete.
εκβαλεῖν; τίνι προσελήλυθας τούτου ἑνεκα; ποίον χρόνον ἑπέταξας σαυτῷ, ποίαν ἥλικίαν; ἐπελθέ σου τοὺς χρόνους, εἰ ἐμὲ αἰσχύνη, αὐτὸς
8 πρὸς σαυτόν. ὅτε παῖς ἦς, ἑξῆταξές τὰ σαυτοῦ δόγματα; οὐχὶ δ’ ὡς πάντα ποιεῖσ, ἐποίεις ἄ ἐποίεις; ὅτε δὲ μειράκιον ἤδη καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων ἡκουε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμελέτας, τί σοι λείπειν ἐφαν-
9 τάξον; ὅτε δὲ λεινίσκος καὶ ἢδη ἐπολιτεύου καὶ δίκας αὐτὸς ἑλεγε καὶ εὐδοκίμεις, τίς σοι ἔτι ἵσος ἐφαίνετο; ποὺ δ’ ἄν ἤνεσχὼν ύπὸ τινος
10 ἐξεταζόμενος, ὅτι πονηρὰ ἔχεις δόγματα; τί οὖν σοι θέλεις εἴπω; —Βοήθησόν μοι εἰς τὸ πράγμα. —Οὐκ ἔχω πρὸς τοῦτο θεωρῆματα. οὐδὲ σὺ, εἰ τοῦτο ἑνεκα ἑλήλυθας πρὸς ἐμέ, ὡς πρὸς φιλό-
σοφον ἑλήλυθας, ἀλλ’ ὡς πρὸς λαχανοπώλην, ἀλλ’ ὡς πρὸς σκυτεά.—Πρὸς τί οὖν ἔχουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι θεωρήματα; —Πρὸς τοῦτο, ὦ τι ἂν ἀποβῇ, τὸ ἤγεμονικὸν ἢμῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν καὶ διεξάγειν. μικρὸν σοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο; —Οὐ· ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγιστον.—Τί οὖν; ὀλίγου χρόνου χρείαν ἔχει καὶ ἐστὶ παρερχόμενον αὐτὸ λαβεῖν; εἰ δύνασαι, λάμβανε.
11 Ἐἰτ’ ἔρεις “συνεβάλον Ἐπικτήτῳ ὡς λίθῳ, ὡς ἀνδριάντι.” εἴδες γάρ με καὶ πλέον οὐδέν. ἀνθρώπῳ δ’ ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ συμβάλλει ὁ τὰ
12 Εἰτ’ ἔρεις “συνεβάλον Ἐπικτήτῳ ὡς λίθῳ, ὡς ἀνδριάντι.” εἴδες γάρ με καὶ πλέον οὐδέν. ἀνθρώπῳ δ’ ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ συμβάλλει ὁ τὰ
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BOOK III. ix. 7-12

if it is unsound? Whom have you ever visited for this purpose? What time have you set yourself, what period of your life? Review the periods of your life, all to yourself, if you are ashamed to do so before me. When you were a boy were you in the habit of examining your judgements? Did you not habitually do what you then did just as you do everything now? And when you grew to be a youth and were attending the lectures of the rhetoricians, and were yourself practising, what did you fancy that you yet lacked? And when you were a young man and began to take part in politics, and to plead cases yourself, and to have a good reputation, who any longer seemed in your eyes to be your equal? Would you under any circumstances have submitted to be put through an examination on the charge that you had wretched judgements? Very well then, what do you wish me to say to you?—Help me in this affair.—I have no precepts to offer for this; and you too, if you came to me for this purpose, have not come to me as to a philosopher, but as to a vegetable-dealer, as to a cobbler.—To what end, then, do philosophers have precepts to offer?—To this end, that whatever happen, our governing principle shall be, and abide to the end, in accord with nature. Do you regard that as a trifle?—No; it is of the utmost moment.—What then? Does this require only a little time, and is it possible to acquire it on a passing visit? Acquire it, then, if you can!

Then you will say, "When I met Epictetus it was like meeting a stone, a statue." Yes, for you took a look at me, and nothing more. The person who meets a man as a man is one who learns to
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dόγματα αυτοῦ καταμαρθάνων καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει
tὰ ἵδια δεικνύων. κατάμαθέ μοι τὰ δόγματα,
δειξόν μοι τὰ σὰ καὶ ὦτως λέγει συμβεβληκέναι
μοι. ἐλέγξουμεν ἀλλήλους· εἰ τι ἔχω κακὸν
dόγμα, ἀφελε αὑτό· εἰ τι ἔχεις, θές εἰς τὸ μέσον.
tοῦτὸ ἐστὶ φιλοσόφῳ συμβάλλειν. οὐ· ἀλλὰ
"πάροδὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ἔως τὸ πλοῦν μισθούμεθα,
δυνάμεθα καὶ Ἔπικτητον ἱδεῖν· ἱδωμεν, τί ποτε
λέγει;" εἰτ' ἔξελθων "οὐδὲν ἦν ὁ Ἔπικτητος,
ἐσολοίκιζεν, ἐβαρβάριζεν." τίνος γὰρ ἄλλου
κριταὶ εἰσέρχεσθε;

15 "Ἀλλὰ ἄν πρὸς τούτοις," φησίν, "ὥ, ἅγρον
οὐχ ἔξω ὡς ὦτε σὺ, ποτήρια ἄργυρα οὐχ
ἔξω ὡς ὦτε σὺ, κτήνη καλὰ ὡς ὦτε σὺ."
16 πρὸς ταύτα ἵσως ἀρκεῖ ἐκεῖνο εἴπειν ὅτι
"ἄλλα χρείαν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔχω· σὺ δ' ἄν πολλὰ
κτήσῃ, ἄλλων χρείαν ἔχεις, θέλεις οὐθ' θέλεις,
pτωχότερός μου."—Τίνος οὖν ἔχω χρείαν ;—Τοῦ
σοὶ μὴ παρόντος· τοῦ εὐσταθείν, τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν
18 ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν, τοῦ μὴ ταράττεσθαι. πά-
τρων, οὐ πάτρων, τί μοι μέλει; σοὶ μέλει. πλου-
σιώτερός σοῦ εἰμι· οὐκ ἄγωνιδ, τί φρονήσει περὶ
ἐμοῦ ὁ Καῖσαρ· οὐδένα κολακεύω τοῦτον ἐνεκα.
tαύτα ἔχω ἀντὶ τῶν ἀργυρωμάτων, ἀντὶ τῶν
χρυσωμάτων. σὺ χρυσὰ σκεύη, ὀστράκινοι τῶν
λόγων, τὰ δόγματα, τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, τὰς
ὁρμῖς, τὰς ὅρεξείς. ὅταν δὲ ταύτα ἔχω κατὰ
φύσιν, διὰ τὶ μὴ φιλοτεχνήσω καὶ περὶ τῶν
68
understand the other's judgements, and in his turn exhibits his own. Learn to know my judgements; show me your own, and then say you have met me. Let us put one another to the test; if I cherish any evil judgement, take it away; if you cherish one, bring it forward. That is what it means to meet a philosopher. Oh no; but your way is: "We are passing, and while we are hiring our ship, we have a chance to take a look at Epictetus; let's see what in the world he has to say." Then you leave with the remark: "Epictetus was nothing at all, his language was full of solecisms and barbarisms." What else were you capable of judging, when you came in like that?

"But," says someone, "if I devote myself to these things, I shall not own a farm any more than you do, I shall not have silver goblets any more than you, or fine cattle any more than you." To all this it is perhaps enough to answer: "I do not need them; but you, even if you acquire many possessions, need still others, and whether you will or not, are more poverty-stricken than I am."—What, then, do I need?—What you do not have; steadfastness, your mind in a state of conformity with nature, freedom from vexation of spirit. Patron or not patron, what do I care? But you care. I am richer than you are; I am not worried about what Caesar is going to think of me; I flatter no man for that purpose. All this is what I have as an offset to your silver plate, and your gold plate. You have furnishings of gold, but your reason, your judgements, your assent, your choice, your desire—of earthenware. But when I have these in a state of conformity with nature, why should I not take up logic also as a sort of hobby?
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λόγον; εὐσχολῶ γάρ· οὐ περισσάται μον ἡ διάνοια. τί ποιήσω μὴ περισσώμενος; τούτον τί ἀνθρωπικότερον ἔχω; ὡμεῖς ὅταν μηδὲν ἔχητε, 20 ταράσσεσθε, εἰς θέατρον εἰσέρχεσθε ἢ ἀναλύετε· διὰ τί ὁ φιλόσοφος μὴ ἐξεργάσηται τὸν αὐτοῦ

λόγον; σὺ κρυστάλλων, ἐγώ τὰ τοῦ Ψευδομένου· σὺ μούρρινα, ἐγώ τὰ τοῦ Ἀποφάσκοντος. σοὶ πάντα μικρὰ φαίνεται ἄ ἔχεις, ἐμοὶ τὰ ἐμὰ πάντα μεγάλα. ἀπλήρωτός σοῦ ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιθυμία, ἢ 22 ἐμὴ πεπλήρωται. τοὺς παιδίοις 1 εἰς στενό- βρογχον κεράμιοι καθιεσθιν τὴν χεῖρα καὶ ἐκφέρουσιν ἱσχαδοκάρυα ταῦτο· 2 συμβαίνει· ἀν πληρώσῃ τὴν χεῖρα, ἐξενεγκεῖν οὐ δύναται, εἶτα κλάει. ἄφες ὀλίγα ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐξοίσεις. καὶ σὺ ἄφες τὴν ὠρέξιν· μὴ πολλῶν ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ σῆσεις. 3

1. Πῶς φέρειν δεῖ τὰς νόσους;

1 Ἐκάστου δόγματος ὅταν ἡ χρεία παρῇ, πρόχει- ρον αὐτὸ ἔχειν δεῖ· ἐπὶ ἀρίστῳ τὰ περὶ ἀρίστου, ἐν βαλανείῳ τὰ περὶ βαλανείου, ἐν κοίτῃ τὰ περὶ κοίτης.

1 ταιδίως supplied by Wolf. 2 Capps: τοῦτο S. 3 Wolf plausibly suggested εὑροήσεις, "you will prosper," for this extremely abrupt and obscure locution.

1 See note in II. 17, 34. 2 Highly coloured and very expensive glass.
For, I have plenty of leisure; my mind is not being dragged this way and that. What shall I do, seeing there is nothing that disturbs me? What have I which more becomes a man than this? You and your kind when you have nothing to do are restless, go to the theatre, or wander up and down aimlessly. Why should not the philosopher develop his own reason? You turn to vessels of crystal, I to the syllogism called "The Liar"; you to myrrhine ware, I to the syllogism called "The Denyer." Everything that you already have seems small in your sight, but everything that I have seems important to me. Your strong desire is insatiate, mine is already satisfied. The same thing happens to the children who put their hand down into a narrow-necked jar and try to take out figs and nuts: if they get their hand full, they can't get it out, and then they cry. Drop a few and you will get it out. And so do you too drop your desire; do not set your heart upon many things and you will obtain.

CHAPTER X

How ought we to bear our illnesses?

When the need arises for each separate judgement, we ought to have it ready; at lunch our judgements about lunch, at the bath our judgements about a bath, in bed our judgements about a bed.

3 The exact nature of this argument is unknown, although Chrysippus wrote two works on the subject (Diog. Laert. 7, 197), and it is casually mentioned also by Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 5, 11.

4 See critical note.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICETUTUS

2 μηδ' ύπνον μαλακοίσιν ἐπ' ὀμμασι προσδέξασθαι,
πρὶν τῶν ἡμερινῶν ἔργων λογίσασθαι ἐκαστα.
3 "πὴ παρέβην; τί δ' ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον οὗ
tetέλεσται;" 2 ἀρξάμενοι δ' ἀπὸ τούτου 3 ἐπέξιθι· καὶ μετέπειτα
dειλὰ μὲν οὖν 4 ρέξας ἐπιπλήσσεο, χρηστὰ δὲ
tέρπου.

4 καὶ τούτους τους στίχους κατέχειν χρηστικῶς,
οὐχ ἤπα δ' αὐτῶν ἀναφωνῶμεν, ὡς διὰ τοῦ Παιὰν
5 Ἀπολλων. πάλιν ἐν πυρετῷ τὰ πρὸς τοῦτο-
μῆ, ἄν πυρέξωμεν, ἀφίεναι πάντα καὶ ἐπιλαμβά-
νεσθαι. "ἄν ἐγὼ ἔτι φιλοσοφήσω, ὃ θέλει
γνεῖσθω. ποὺ ποτ' ἀπελθόντα τοῦ σωματίου
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ." 5 εἴ γε 6 καὶ πυρετὸς οὐκ
6 ἐρχεται. τὸ δὲ φιλοσοφῆσαι τί ἐστίν; οὐχὶ
παρασκευάσασθαι πρὸς τὰ συμβαίνοντα; οὐ
παρακολούθεις οὖν, ὅτι τουιτῶν τι λέγεις: "ἄν
ἔτι ἐγὼ παρασκευάσωμαι πρὸς τὸ πρῶς φέρειν
tὰ συμβαίνοντα, ὃ θέλει γνεῖσθω"; οἶνον εἴ τις

1 Corrected from the ordinary text by Schweighäuser: ἡμερινῶν S.
2 C. Schenkl: ἐκτετέλεσται S; but the ordinary text οὐκ ἐτελέσθη appears also below in iv. 6, 35.
3 H. Schenkl: τοῦτο S: πρῶτον the ordinary text (and Bentley).
4 οὖν added by C. Schenkl: ἐκπρήξα the ordinary text (and Bentley).
"Also allow not sleep to draw nigh to your languorous eyelids,
Ere you have reckoned up each several deed of the daytime:
'Where went I wrong? Did what? And what to be done was left undone?'
Starting from this point review, then, your acts, and thereafter remember:
Censure yourself for the acts that are base, but rejoice in the goodly."\(^1\)

And keep these verses on hand to use, not by way of exclamations, as we cry, "Paean Apollo!" Again, in a fever have ready the judgements which apply to that. Let us not, if we fall into a fever, abandon and forget all our principles, saying: "If I ever study philosophy again, let anything happen that will! I'll have to go away somewhere and take care of my poor body." Yes indeed, if fever does not go there too!\(^2\) But what is philosophy? Does it not mean making preparation to meet the things that come upon us? Do you not understand, then, that what you are saying amounts to something like this: "If I ever again prepare to bear quietly the things that come upon me, let anything happen that will"?\(^3\)

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\(^{1}\) The *Golden Verses*, vulgarly ascribed to Pythagoras, 40-44, with several variations in detail.

\(^{2}\) The sense of this difficult and corrupt passage seems to be that Epictetus sarcastically approves the plan, with, however, the proviso, that there be no fever where his interlocutor plans to go; which was impossible, because there was no such place. In other words, one cannot avoid hardships by changing one's residence; therefore, prepare to meet them wherever you are.

\(^{3}\) \(\delta\epsilon\tau\) added by Upton. \(\text{Schweighäuser: } \tau\epsilon\ S.\)
πληγας λαβων ἀποσταιν του παγκρατιάζειν. 
7 ἀλλ’ ἐκεὶ μὲν ἔξεστι καταλύσαι καὶ μὴ δέρεσθαι,
ἐνθάδε δ’ ἀν καταλύσωμεν φιλοσοφοῦντες, τί ὀφελος; 
tι οὖν δεῖ λέγειν πρὸς αὐτοῦ ἐφ’ ἐκάστου τῶν τραχέων; ὅτι “ἔνεκα τούτου ἐγμ- 
8 ναζόμην, ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἥσκονυ.” ὁ θεός σοι λέγει
“δός μοι ἀποδείξειν, εἰ νομίμως ἠθλησας, εἰ
ἔφαγες ὡσα δεῖ, εἰ ἐγυμνάσθης, εἰ τοῦ ἀλείπτουν Ἰκουσας.” εἰτ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔργου καταμα-
λακίζῃ; νῦν τοῦ πυρέττειν καροῦς ἐστιν, τοῦτο
καλῶς γινέσθω τοῦ διψᾶν, δίψα καλῶς; τοῦ
9 πεινᾶν, πείνα καλῶς. οὐκ ἐστιν ἐπὶ σοί; τίς
σε κωλύσει; ἀλλὰ πεινὶ μὲν κωλύσει ο ἱατρός,
kαλῶς δὲ διψᾶν οὐ δύναται καὶ φαγεῖν μὲν
κωλύσει, πεινᾶν δὲ καλῶς οὐ δύναται.
10 Ἀλλ’ οὐ φιλολογῶ; — Τίνος δ’ ἔνεκα φιλο-
λογεῖς; ἀνδράποδον, οὐχ ἵνα εὐροῆς; οὐχ ἵνα εὐσταθῆς; οὐχ ἵνα κατὰ φύσιν ἔχης καὶ διεξά-
γγῆς; τί κωλυει πυρέσσοντα κατά φύσιν ἔχειν
τὸ ἡγεμονικόν; ἐνθαδ’ ὁ ἔλεγχος τοῦ πράγματος,
ἡ δοκιμασία τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος. μέρος γὰρ ἔστι
καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ βίου, ὡς περίπατος, ὡς πλοῦς, ὡς
11 ὀδοιπορία, οὔτως καὶ πυρετός, μὴ τι περιπατῶν
ἀναγυμνώσκεις; — Οὐ. — Οὔτως οὐδὲ πυρέσσων.
ἀλλ’ ἀν καλῶς περιπατῆς, ἔχεις τὸ τοῦ περιπα-

1 Kronenberg (after Schegk): λέγειν αὐ τῶν 8.

1 See note on III. 1, 5.
2 The same phrase appears in 2 Timothy ii. 5.
3 At Olympia, for example, men had to practise under supervision and observe a strict diet for one whole month before the games.
It is just as if a man should give up the pancratium because he has received blows. The only difference is that in the pancratium a man may stop, and so avoid a severe beating, but in life, if we stop the pursuit of philosophy, what good does it do? What, then, ought a man to say to himself at each hardship that befalls him? "It was for this that I kept training, it was to meet this that I used to practise." God says to you, "Give Me proof, whether you have striven lawfully, eaten what is prescribed, taken exercise, heeded your trainer." After that, do you flinch when the time for action arrives? Now it is time for your fever, let it come upon you in the right way; for thirst, bear your thirst in the right way; to go hungry, bear hunger in the right way. It is not in your power, you say? Who is there to prevent you? Nay, your physician will prevent you from drinking, but he cannot prevent you from thirsting in the right way; and he will prevent you from eating, but he cannot prevent you from bearing hunger in the right way.

But am I not a scholar?—And for what purpose do you devote yourself to scholarship? Slave, is it not that you may be happy? Is it not that you may be secure? Is it not that you may conform to nature and live your life in that way. What prevents you, when you have a fever, from having your governing principle conform with nature? Here is the proof of the matter, the test of the philosopher. For this too is a part of life; like a stroll, a voyage, a journey, such is also a fever. I presume you do not read while taking a stroll, do you?—No.—No more than when you have a fever. But if you stroll in the right way, you perform what is expected of a stroller;
toûnavos, àn kaló̂s πυρέξι̂s, ἐχεὶς τὰ τοῦ πυρέσσοντος. τί ἐστὶ καλῶς πυρέσσειν; μὴ θεοῦ μέμψασθαι, μὴ ἀνθρώπων, μὴ θλιβὴναι ὕπο τῶν γυνομένων, εὑ̂ καὶ καλῶς προσδέχεσθαι τὸν θάνατον, ποιεῖν τὰ προστασισόμενα; οταν ὁ ἰατρὸς εἰσέρχηται, μὴ φοβεῖσθαι, τί εἰπῇ, μηδὲ ἂν εἰπῇ “κομψῶς ἐχεῖς,” ὑπερχαίρειν τί γάρ σοι ἀγαθὸν εἰπεῖν; ὅτε γὰρ ὑγίαινες, τί σοι ἢν ἀγαθὸν; μηδὲ ἂν εἰπῇ “κακῶς ἐχεῖς,” ἄθυμεῖν τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ κακῶς ἐχεῖν; ἐγγίζειν τῷ διαλυθῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος. τί οὖν δεινὸν ἐστὶν; ἐὰν νῦν μὴ ἐγγίζης, ύστερον οὐκ ἐγγυίζεις; ἀλλὰ ὁ κόσμος μέλλει ἀνατρέπεσθαι σοῦ ἀποδανόντος; τί οὖν κολακεύεις τὸν ἰατρὸν; τί λέγεις “ἐὰν σὺ θέλῃς, κύριε, καλῶς ἐξω”; τί παρέχεις αὐτῷ ἀφορμὴν τοῦ ἑπάραι ὀφρύν; οὐχὶ δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἄξιαν αὐτῷ ἀποδίδως, ὡς σκυτεὶ περὶ τὸν πόδα, ὡς τέκτονι περὶ τὴν οἰκίαν, οὕτως καὶ τῷ ἰατρῷ περὶ τὸ σωμάτιον, τὸ οὐκ ἐμὼν, τὸ φύσει νεκρῶν; τοῦτων ὁ καιρὸς ἐστὶ τῷ πυρέσσοντι ἂν ταῦτα ἐκπληρώσῃ, ἐχεῖ τὰ αὐτοῦ. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσόφου ταῦτα τὰ ἐκτὸς τηρεῖν, οὔτε τὸ οἰνώριον οὔτε τὸ ἐλάδιον οὔτε τὸ σωμάτιον, ἀλλὰ τί; τὸ ἱδιον ἡγεμονικὸν. τὰ δ' ἐξω πῶς; μέχρι τοῦ μὴ ἀλογιστῶς κατὰ ταῦτα ἀναστρέφεσθαι. ποῦ οὖν ἐτί καιρὸς τοῦ

1 That is, matter which is only temporarily endowed with life by virtue of union for a short while with the soul.
if you have fever in the right way, you perform the things expected of the man who has a fever. What does it mean to have fever in the right way? Not to blame God, or man, not to be overwhelmed by what happens to you, to await death bravely and in the right way, to do what is enjoined upon you; when your physician comes to see you, not to be afraid of what he will say, and at the same time not to be carried away with joy, if he says, "You are doing splendidly"; for what good to you lay in that remark? Why, when you were well, what good was it to you? It means not to be downhearted, too, if he says, "You are in a bad way." For what does it mean to be in a bad way? That you are close to a separation of the soul from the body. What, then, is terrifying about that? If you do not draw near now, will you not draw near later? And is the universe going to be upset when you die? Why, then, do you wheedle your physician? Why do you say, "If you wish, Master, I shall get well"? Why do you give him occasion to put on airs? Why not give him just what is his due? As I give the shoemaker his due about my foot, the builder his due about my house, so also the physician his due about my paltry body, something that is not mine, something that is by nature dead. These are the things that the moment demands for a man who is in a fever; if he meets these demands, he has what properly belongs to him. For it is not the business of the philosopher to guard these external matters—neither his paltry wine, nor his paltry oil, nor his paltry body—but what? His own governing principle. And how treat externals? Only so far as not to act thoughtlessly about them. What proper occasion is
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ϕοβείσθαι; ποῦ ὦν ἐτὶ καιρὸς ὀργῆς; ποῦ φόβοι 18
περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, περὶ τῶν μηδενὸς ἁξίων; δύο γὰρ ταῦτα πρόχειρα ἐχειν δεῖ: ὅτι ἐξω τῆς
προαιρέσεως οὐδέν ἐστιν οὗτε ἀγαθὸν οὗτε κακὸν
καὶ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ προηγεῖσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἄλλο
ἐπακολούθειν. "οὐκ ἔδει οὕτως μοι προσε-
νεχθῆναι τὸν ἁδελφόν." οὐ ἄλλα τοῦτο μὲν ἐκείνος ὄφεται. ἐγὼ δ', ὡς ἂν προσενεχθῇ, αὐτὸς
19 ὁ δὲ χρῆσομαι τοῖς πρὸς ἐκείνον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο δ' ἀλλότριον; τοῦτο οὐδεὶς
κωλύσαι δύναται, ἐκεῖνο κωλύεται.

ia’. Σποράδην τινά.

1 Εἰσὶ τινες ὡς ἐκ νόμου διατεταγμέναι κολάσεις
2 τοῖς ἀπειθοῦσι τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει: "ὅς ἂν ἄλλο
τι ἡγησηται ἀγαθὸν παρὰ τὰ προαιρετικά, φθο-
νεῖτω, ἑπιθυμεῖτω, κολακενέτω, ταρασσέσθω: ὃς
ἀν ἄλλο κακὸν, λυπεῖσθω, πενθεῖτω, θρηνεῖτω,
3 δυστυχεῖτω." καὶ ὅμως οὕτως πικρῶς κολαζό-
μενοι ἀποστῆναι οὐ δυνάμεθα.

4 Μέμνησο, τι λέγει ὁ ποιητὴς περὶ τοῦ ξένου:
ξείν', οὗ μοι θέμις ἐστ', 1 οὐδ' εἰ κακίων σέθεν ἐλθοι,
ξείνων ἀτιμήσαι πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσιν ἀπαντες
η 2 ξείνοι τε πτωχοὶ τε.

1 καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἔστιν καὶ τὸ σεθντὲς καὶ Σ.
2 ἐλθοι . . . ἀπαντες supplied by Schenkl: σεθντες καὶ
there, then, any longer for fear? What proper occasion, then, any longer for anger? Or for fear about things that are not his own concern, worthless things? For here are the two principles that you ought to have ready at hand: Outside the sphere of the moral purpose there is nothing either good or bad; and, We ought not to lead events, but to follow them. "My brother ought not to have treated me so." No; but it is for him to look to that. As for me, no matter how he behaves, I shall observe all my relations to him as I ought. For this is my part, the other does not belong to me; in this nobody can hinder me, the other is subject to hindrance.

CHAPTER XI

Some scattered sayings

There are certain punishments, assigned as it were by law, for those who are disobedient to the divine dispensation. "Whoever shall regard as good anything but the things that fall within the scope of his moral purpose, let him envy, yearn, flatter, feel disturbed; whoever shall regard anything else as evil, let him sorrow, grieve, lament, be unhappy." Nevertheless, for all that we are so severely punished, we cannot desist.

Remember what the poet ¹ says about the stranger:

Stranger, I may not with right dishonour a stranger, not even
Worse man were he than art thou; for of God are all strangers and beggars.

¹ Homer (frequently so designated, especially in late antiquity), in the Odyssey, XIV. 56–8.
5 toúto ón kai ἔπι πατρὸς πρόχειρον ἔχειν· οὐ μοι θέμις ἔστιν οὐδέ εἰ κακίων σέθεν ἔλθοι, πατέρ' ἀτιμήσαι· πρὸς γὰρ Δίος εἰσιν ἄπαντες τοῦ Πα- 6 τρόπου· καὶ ἔπι ἀδελφῷ πρὸς γὰρ Δίος εἰσιν ἄπαντες τοῦ Ὀμογνίου. καὶ οὐτως κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας σχέσεις εὑρήσομεν ἐπόπτην τοῦ Δία.

i8'. Περὶ ἀσκησεως.

1 Τὰς ἀσκησεις οὐ δεῖ διὰ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ παραδόξων ποιεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ τοι τῶν θανματο- ποιῶν οὐδὲν διοίσομεν οἱ λέγοντες φιλοσοφεῖν.

2 δύσκολον γὰρ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ σχοινίων περι- πατεῖν καὶ οὐ μόνον δύσκολον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπι- κίνδυνον. τούτου ἔνεκα δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς μελετᾶν ἐπὶ σχοινίων περιπατεῖν ἢ φούνικα ἑστάνειν ἢ

3 ἀνδριάντας περιλαμβάνειν; οὐδὰμος. οὐκ ἔστι τὸ δύσκολον πἀν καὶ ἐπικίνδυνον ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς ἀσκησιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρόσφορον τῷ προκει- 4 μένῳ ἐκπονηθῆναι. τὸ δὲ ἔστι τὸ προκείμενον ἐκπονηθῆναι; ὃρεξει καὶ ἐκκλίσει ἀκωλύτως ἀναστρέφεσθαι. τούτῳ δὲ τί ἔστιν; μήτε ὄρε- γόμενον ἀποτυγχάνειν μήτ' ἐκκλίνοντα περιπτεῖν. πρὸς τούτῳ οὖν καὶ τὴν ἀσκησιν ἰσχεῖν

1 Schweighäuser: πατέρ S.

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1 For this aspect of Zeus see O. Gruppe, Griech. Mythol. etc., p. 1116; and especially A. B. Cook, Zeus (index).
2 “Setting up a palm” may possibly mean climbing a pole with only the hands and the feet, like the climbers of palms, as Upton and Schweighäuser (after Bulinger) suggest. There was 80
This, then, is what one should have ready to use in the case of a father: "I may not rightfully dishonour a father, not even if a worse man than art thou should come; for of Zeus, the God of Fathers,¹ are they all"; and so in the case of a brother: "For of Zeus, the God of Kindred, are they all." And similarly, in the other social relations, we shall find Zeus overseeing them all.

CHAPTER XII

Of training

We ought not to take our training in things that are unnatural or fantastic, since in that case we who profess to be philosophers will be no better than the mountebanks. For it is a hard thing also to walk a tight-rope, and not merely hard but dangerous too. Ought we also for this reason to practise walking a tight-rope, or setting up a palm, or throwing our arms about statues?² Not a bit of it. Not every difficult and dangerous thing is suitable for training, but only that which is conducive to success in achieving the object of our effort. And what is the object of our effort? To act without hindrance in choice and in aversion. And what does this mean? Neither to fail to get what we desire, nor to fall into what we would avoid. Toward this end, therefore, our

¹ "palm-bearer" (φοινεικοφόρος, or σπαδεικοφόρος) connected with the gymnasium at Tegea in Arcadia (I.G. V. 2, Nos. 47, 48, 50, 53), who possibly had charge of the exercise referred to here, whatever its exact character may have been. As for embracing statues, Diogenes was said to have done that nude in cold weather, so as to harden himself. Diog. Laert. 6, 23.
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5 deī. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναπότευκτον σχεῖν τὴν ὀρέξιν καὶ τὴν ἐκκλίσιν ἀπερίπτωτον ἀνευ μεγάλης καὶ συνεχοῦς ἀσκήσεως, ἵσθι ὅτι, ἐὰν ἔξω ἐάσης ἀποστρέφεσθαι αὐτὴν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀπροαίρετα, οὔτε τὴν ὀρέξιν ἐπιτευκτικὴν ἐξεῖς οὔτε τὴν ἐκκλίσιν ἀπερίπτωτον. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ έθος ἱσχυρὸν προηγήται πρὸς μόνα ταῦτα εἰθισμένων ἡμῶν χρῆσθαι ὀρέξει καὶ ἐκκλίσει, δεῖ τῷ ἔθει τούτῳ ἐναντίον ἔθος ἀντιθείναι καὶ ὁποῦ ὁ πολὺς ὀλίσθος τῶν φαντασιῶν, ἐκεῖ ἀντιτίθεναι τὸ ἀσκητικὸν.

6 Ἐπεροκλινόως ἔχω πρὸς ἱδονήν ἀνατοιχήσω ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ύπὲρ τὸ μέτρον τῆς ἀσκήσεως ἑνεκα. ἐκκλιτικῶς ἔχω πόνου· τρίψῳ μοι καὶ γυμνάσω πρὸς τοῦτο τὰς φαντασίας ύπὲρ τοῦ ἀποστήνα τὴν ἐκκλίσιν ἀπὸ παντὸς τοῦ τοιούτου. τὸι γὰρ ἔστιν ἀσκητής; οἱ μελετῶν ὀρέξει μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι, ἐκκλίσει δὲ πρὸς μόνα τὰ προαιρετικὰ χρῆσθαι, καὶ μελετῶν μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς δυσκαταπονήτοις. καθ’ ὁ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἀλλα μᾶλλον ἀσκητέον. τὶ οὖν ὅδε ποιεῖ τὸ φοίνικα στῆσαι ἢ τὸ στέγην δερματίνην καὶ ὄλμον καὶ ὑπερον περιφέρειν; ἀνθρωπε, ἀσκη-

1 Bentley (anticipating Schweighäuser): ἄν α. ἵστως S.
2 μὴ supplied by Gataker.

1 For the "palm tree," see above, note on § 2. As for the other items, it is conceivable that some Cynics may have carried about with them such equipment ostentatiously to indicate that they had all they needed for life; that is, shelter and the simplest utensils to prepare grain for food, somewhat as Diogenes was content with his pithos and a cup (although eventually he discarded even the latter). But it must be confessed that the passage is very obscure. Seneca, De ira, 2, 12, speaks somewhat disparagingly of ille qui
training also should tend. For since it is impossible without great and constant training to secure that our desire fail not to attain, and our aversion fall not into what it would avoid, be assured that, if you allow training to turn outwards, towards the things that are not in the realm of the moral purpose, you will have neither your desire successful in attaining what it would, nor your aversion successful in avoiding what it would. And since habit is a powerful influence, when we have accustomed ourselves to employ desire and aversion only upon these externals, we must set a contrary habit to counteract this habit, and where the very slippery nature of sense-impressions is in play, there we must set our training as a counteracting force.

I am inclined to pleasure; I will betake myself to the opposite side of the rolling ship, and that beyond measure, so as to train myself. I am inclined to avoid hard work; I will strain and exercise my sense-impressions to this end, so that my aversion from everything of this kind shall cease. For who is the man in training? He is the man who practises not employing his desire, and practises employing his aversion only upon the things that are within the sphere of his moral purpose, yes, and practises particularly in the things that are difficult to master. And so different men will have to practise particularly to meet different things. To what purpose is it, then, under these conditions, to set up a palm tree, or to carry around a leather tent, or a mortar and pestle? Man, practise, if you are

meditatus est . . . sarcinae ingenti cervices supponere (that is, "the man who has practised carrying about enormous burdens on his back"), pretty clearly in reference to this same custom, but without throwing much light upon it.
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σον, εἰ γοργὸς εἰ, λοιδοροῦμενος ἀνέχεσθαι, ἀτιμασθεὶς μὴ ἄρθεσθήμαι. ἐθ’ οὕτως προβησθήσῃ, ἢνα, καν πλῆξε σὲ τίς, εἰπῆς αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτόν ὅτι “δόξον ἀνδριάντα περειδηληφέναι.” εἰτὰ καὶ οὐναρίῳ κομψῷ χρῆσθαι, μὴ εἰς τὸ πολὺ πίνειν (καὶ γὰρ περὶ τοῦτο ἐπαρίστεροι ἀσκηταὶ εἰσίν), ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εἰς τὸ ἀποσχέσθαι, καὶ κορασιδίῳ ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ πλακονταρίου. εἰτὰ ποτὲ ὑπὲρ δοκιμασίας, εἰ ἁρὰ, καθῆσις εὐκαίρως αὐτός σαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ γυνῶν, εἰ ὀμοίως ἡπτώσιν σε αἱ φαντασίαι. τὰ πρῶτα δὲ φεύγε μακρὰν ἀπὸ τῶν ἱσχυρότερων. άνισος ἡ μάχη κορασιδίῳ κομψῷ πρὸς νέον ἀρχόμενον φιλοσοφεῖν χύτρα, φασί, καὶ πέτρα οὐ συμφωνεῖ.

13 Μετὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ τὴν ἐκκλίσιν δεύτερος τόπος ὁ περὶ τὴν ὀρμήν καὶ ἀφορμήν. ἦν εὔπειθής τῷ λόγῳ, ἦν μὴ παρὰ καριῶν, μὴ παρὰ τόπον, μὴ παρὰ ἀλλὴν τὴν τινὰ τοιαύτην συμμετρίαν.

14 Τρίτος ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, ὁ πρὸς τὰ πιθανὰ καὶ ἐλκυστικά. ως γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐλεγεν ἀνεξέταστον βίον μὴ ξῆν, οὕτως ἀνεξέταστον φαντασίαν μὴ παραδέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ λέγειν “ἐκδεξαί, ἄφες ὅδω, τίς εἰ καὶ πάθει ἔρχῃ,” ως οἱ νυκτοφύλακες “δειξόν μοι τὰ συνθήματα.”

1 S (but only the first letter is by the first hand; τρόπος, which was probably the original reading, s).
2 ἦν supplied by Shaftesbury.
3 Reiske: ἀσυμμετρίαν S.

1 Compare the fable about the earthenware pot and the bronze jar in Babrius 193 (Crusius) = Aesop 422 (Halm), Avianus 11, etc.
arrogant, to submit when you are reviled, not to be disturbed when you are insulted. Then you will make such progress, that, even if someone strikes you, you will say to yourself, "Imagine that you have thrown your arms about a statue." Next train yourself to use wine with discretion, not with a view to heavy drinking (for there are some clumsy fools who practise with this in mind), but first for the purpose of achieving abstention from wine, and keeping your hands off a wench, or a sweet-cake. And then some day, if the occasion for a test really comes, you will enter the lists at a proper time for the sake of discovering whether your sense-impressions still overcome you just as they did before. But first of all flee far away from the things that are too strong for you. It is not a fair match that, between a pretty wench and a young beginner in philosophy. "A pot," as they say, "and a stone do not go together." 1

After your desire and your aversion the next topic 2 has to do with your choice and refusal. Here the object is to be obedient to reason, not to choose or to refuse at the wrong time, or the wrong place, or contrary to some other similar propriety.

The third topic has to do with cases of assent; it is concerned with the things that are plausible and attractive. For, just as Socrates used to tell us not to live a life unsubjected to examination, 3 so we ought not to accept a sense-impression unsubjected to examination, but should say, "Wait, allow me to see who you are and whence you come" 4 (just as the night-watch say, "Show me your

2 Upon this division of the field of philosophy, which appears to be peculiar to Epictetus, see note on III. 2, 1.
3 See note on I. 26, 18. 4 Compare II. 18, 24.
"ἐχεις τὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως σύμβολον, ὦ δεῖ τὴν παραδεχθησομένην ἐχειν φαντασίαν;" καὶ λοιπὸν ὃσα τῷ σώματι προσάγεται ὑπὸ τῶν γυμναζόντων αὐτό, ἄν μὲν ὡδὲ ποὺ ῥέπη πρὸς ὅρεξιν καὶ ἐκκλησιν, εἰ θαν καὶ αὐτὰ ἀσκητικά; ἄν δὲ πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν, ἔξω νευευκότος 1 ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλο τι θηρῷμένου καὶ θεατὰς ξητοῦντος τοὺς ἔροντας.


16 "ὁ 2 μεγάλου ἀνθρώπου." διὰ τούτο καλῶς ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος ἔλεγεν ὅτι "ὅταν θέλησαν σαυτῷ ἀσκῆσαι, διψῶν ποτὲ καύματος ἔβελκυσαι βρόγχον ψυχροῦ καὶ ἐκπυτυσον καὶ μηδενὶ εἴπησ." 

υγ'. Τί ἐρημία καὶ ποίος ἔρημος.

1 Ἐρημία ἐστὶ καταστασίας τις ἀβοηθήτου. οὐ γὰρ ὁ μόνος ὅν εὐθὺς καὶ ἔρημος, ὡσπερ σὺ δ' ὁ 2 ἐν πολλοῖς ὅν οὐκ ἔρημος. ὅταν γοῦν ἀπολέσωμεν ἢ ἀδελφόν ἢ υἱὸν ἢ φίλου, ὃ προσαναπαυόμεθα, λέγομεν ἀπολελεῖφθαι ἔρημοι, πολλάκις ἐν Ῥώμη ὄντες, τοσούτου ὀχλοῦ ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶντος

1 Wolf: νευευκός S. 2 Wolf: ὡς S.

1 A token or mark of identification was frequently called for in ancient times by the police (especially at night), much as in some of the occupied and annexed districts of Europe since the Great War.
BOOK III. xii. 15–xiii. 2

tokens”).¹ “Do you have your token from nature, the one which every sense-impression which is to be accepted must have?” And, in conclusion, all the methods which are applied to the body by the persons who are giving it exercise, might also themselves be conducive to training, if in some such way as this they tend toward desire and aversion; but if they tend toward display, they are characteristic of a man who has turned toward the outside world, and is hunting for something other than the thing itself which he is doing, and is looking for spectators who will say, “Ah, what a great man!” It is this consideration which renders admirable the remark that Apollonius used to make: “When you wish to train for your own sake, then when you are thirsty some hot day take a mouthful of cold water, and spit it out—² and don’t tell anybody about it!”

CHAPTER XIII

The meaning of a forlorn state, and the kind of person a forlorn man is

A FORLORN state is the condition of one who is without help. For a man is not forlorn merely because he is alone, any more than a man in the midst of a crowd is necessarily not forlorn. At all events, when we have lost a brother, or a son, or a friend with whom we have shared the same bed, we say that we have been left forlorn, though often we are in Rome, with such large crowds meeting us in the streets, and so many people living in the same

² Something of the same sort is said, but upon somewhat dubious authority, to have been an exercise often practised by Plato (Stobaeus, Flor. III. 17, 35).
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καὶ τοσοῦτων συνοικούντων, ἐσθ' ὅτε καὶ ¹ πληθος δούλων ἔχουτε. θέλει γὰρ ὁ ἔρημος κατὰ τὴν ἑννοιαν ἀβοηθητός τις εἶναι καὶ ἐκκείμενος τοῖς βλάπτειν βουλομένους. διὰ τοῦτο, ὅταν ὀδεύωμεν, τότε μάλιστα ἐρήμους λέγομεν ἐαυτούς, ὅταν εἰς λήπτας ἐμπέσωμεν. οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὄψις ἐξαιρεῖται ἐρημίας, ἀλλὰ πιστοῦ καὶ αἰδήμονος καὶ ὕφελίμου. ἐπεὶ εἰ τὸ μόνον εἶναι ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἔρημον εἶναι, λέγει οτι καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς ἐν τῇ ἐκπυρώσει ἐρήμος ἐστὶ καὶ κατακλαίει αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ: "τάλας ἐγὼ, οὔτε τὴν Ὡμαν ἔχω οὔτε τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν οὔτε τοὺς Ἀπόλλωνα οὔτε ὅλως ἢ ἀδελφόν ἢ νίόν ἢ ἐγγονον ἢ συγγενὴ." ταῦτα καὶ λέγουσι τινὲς ὅτι ποιεῖ μόνον ἐν τῇ ἐκπυρώσει. οὐ γὰρ ἐπινοοῦσι διεξαγωγὴν μόνον ² ἀπὸ τινὸς φυσικοῦ ὁρμόμενοι, ἀπὸ τοῦ φύσει κοινωνικοῦ εἶναι καὶ φιλαλλῆλου καὶ ἱδέως 6 συναναστρέφεσθαι ἄνθρωποις. ἀλλ' οὔδὲν ἤττον δεὶ τινὰ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο παρασκευὴν ἔχειν τὸ δύνασθαι αὐτὸν ἐαυτῷ ἀρκεῖν, δύνασθαι αὐτὸν 7 ἐαυτῷ συνεῖναι. ὡς ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ σύνεστιν καὶ ἵπτυξιές ἐφ' ἐαυτοῦ καὶ ἐννοεῖ τὴν διοίκησιν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν ἐπινοίας γίνεται πρεποῦσαι ἐαυτῷ, οὕτως καὶ ἡμᾶς δύνασθαι αὐτοῦς ἑαυτοῖς λαλεῖν, μή προσδείσθαι ἄλλων, διαγωγῆς ¹ καὶ added by Schegk.
² καὶ after this word was deleted by Reiske.

1 The periodic consumption of the universe by fire, and its rebirth, a doctrine which the Stoics inherited from Heraclitus. Even the deities, with the exception of Zeus, succumb in the Götterdämmerung. Precisely the same situation as 88
house with us, and sometimes even though we have a multitude of slaves. For according to the nature of the concept the 'forlorn' means the person who is without help, and exposed to those who wish to injure him. That is why, when we go on a journey, we call ourselves forlorn most especially at the moment that we encounter robbers. For it is not the sight of a human being as such which puts an end to our forlorn condition, but the sight of a faithful, and unassuming, and helpful human being. Why, if being alone is enough to make one forlorn, you will have to say that even Zeus himself is forlorn at the World-Conflagration,¹ and bewails himself: "Wretched me! I have neither Hera, nor Athena, nor Apollo, nor, in a word, brother, or son, or grandson, or kinsman." There are even those who say that this is what he does when left alone at the World-Conflagration; for they cannot conceive of the mode of life of one who is all alone, starting as they do from a natural principle, namely, the facts of natural community of interest among men, and mutual affection, and joy in intercourse. But one ought none the less to prepare oneself for this also, that is, to be able to be self-sufficient, to be able to commune with oneself; even as Zeus communes with himself, and is at peace with himself, and contemplates the character of his governance, and occupies himself with ideas appropriate to himself, so ought we also to be able to converse with ourselves, not to be in need of others, not to be at a loss for

that described here is referred to by Seneca, Ep. Mor. 9,16: Qualis est Iovis (vita), cum resoluto mundo et dis in unum confusis paulisper cessante natura adquiescit sibi cogitationibus suis traditus.

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8 μὴ ἀπορεῖν· ἐφιστάνειν τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει, τῇ αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰλλα σχέσει· ἐπιβλέπειν, πῶς πρότερον εἴχομεν πρὸς τὰ συμβαίνοντα, πῶς ύπό τινα ἐστὶν ἐτί τὰ θλίβοντα· πῶς ἂν θεραπευθῇ καὶ ταύτα, πῶς ἐξαιρῆθῇ· εἰ τίνα ἐξεργασίας δεῖται τούτων,¹ κατὰ τὸν αὐτῶν ² λόγου ἐξεργάζεσθαι.

9 Ὄρατε γάρ, ὅτι εἰρήνην μεγάλην ὁ Καίσαρ ἡμῖν δοκεῖ παρέχειν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰσίν οὐκέτι πόλεμοι οὐδὲ μάχαι οὖν θετήρια μεγάλα οὖν πειρατικά, ἀλλ' ἐξέστιν πάση ὥρα ὀδευεῖν, πλείων ἀπ' ἀνατολῶν ἐπὶ δυσμάς. μὴ τι οὖν καὶ ἀπὸ πυρετοῦ δύναται ἡμῖν εἰρήνην παρασχεῖν, μὴ τι καὶ ἀπὸ ναναγίου, μὴ τι καὶ ἀπὸ ἐμπροσμοῦ ἡ ἀπὸ σεισμοῦ ἡ ἀπὸ κεραυνοῦ; ἀγε ἀπ' ἔρωτος; οὗ δύναται. ἀπὸ πένθους; οὗ δύναται. ἀπὸ φθόνου; οὗ δύναται. ἀπ' οὖνεδος ἀπλῶς τούτων. ο ὅ δὲ λόγος ο τῶν φιλοσόφων ὑπισχνεῖται καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων εἰρήνην παρέχειν. καὶ τί λέγει; "ἀν μοι προσέχητε, ὦ ἀνθρώποι, ὅτιν ἂν ἢτε, ὦ τι ἂν ποιήτε, οὐ λυπηθήσεσθε, οὐκ ὀργισθήσεσθε, οὐκ ἀναγκασθήσεσθε, οὐκ κωλυθήσεσθε, ἀπαθεῖς δὲ καὶ ἐλευθεροὶ διάξετε ἀπὸ πάντων."

10 ταῦτην τὴν εἰρήνην τις ἔχων κεκηρυγμεύην οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ Καίσαρος (πόθεν γὰρ αὐτῶ ταύτην κηρύξαι;) ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κεκηρυγμένην διὰ τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἀρκεῖται, ὅταν ἢ ³ μόνος, ἐπιβλέπων καὶ ἐνθυμούμενος "μὰν ἐμοὶ κακὸν οὐδὲν δύναται συμβήναι, ἐμοὶ ληστῆς οὐκ ἐστίν, ἐμοὶ σεισμὸς οὐκ ἐστίν, πάντα εἰρήνης μεστά, πάντα

some way to spend our time; we ought to devote ourselves to the study of the divine governance, and of our own relation to all other things; to consider how we used to act toward the things that happen to us, and how we act now; what the things are that still distress us; how these too can be remedied, or how removed; if any of these matters that I have mentioned need to be brought to perfection, to perfect them in accordance with the principle of reason inherent in them.

Behold now, Caesar seems to provide us with profound peace, there are no wars any longer, nor battles, no brigandage on a large scale, nor piracy, but at any hour we may travel by land, or sail from the rising of the sun to its setting. Can he, then, at all provide us with peace from fever too, and from shipwreck too, and from fire, or earthquake, or lightning? Come, can he give us peace from love? He cannot. From sorrow? From envy? He cannot—from absolutely none of these things. But the doctrine of the philosophers promises to give us peace from these troubles too. And what does it say? "Men, if you heed me, wherever you may be, whatever you may be doing, you will feel no pain, no anger, no compulsion, no hindrance, but you will pass your lives in tranquillity and in freedom from every disturbance." When a man has this kind of peace proclaimed to him, not by Caesar—why, how could he possibly proclaim it?—but proclaimed by God through the reason, is he not satisfied, when he is alone? When he contemplates and reflects, "Now no evil can befall me, for me there is no such thing as a brigand, for me there is no such thing as an earthquake, everything is full of peace, everything
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14 ἀταράξιας: πᾶσα ὁδὸς, πᾶσα πόλις, πᾶς ἁμονδός, γείτων, κοινωνίας ἀβλαβῆς. ἄλλος παρέχει τροφάς, ὥς μέλει, ἄλλος ἐσθήτα, ἄλλος αἰσθήσεις ἐδώκεστο, ἄλλος προλήψεις. οταν δὲ μὴ παρέχη τάναγκαία, τὸ ἀνακλητικὸν σημαίνει, τὴν θύραν ἦνουξεν καὶ λέγει σοι 'έρχον. ποῦ; εἰς οὐδὲν δεινόν, ἄλλ' οθεν ἐγένου, εἰς τὰ φίλα καὶ συγ-γενῆ, εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα. ὅσον ἦν ἐν σοι πυρὸς, εἰς πῦρ ἀπεισιν, ὅσον ἦν γηδίου, εἰς γηδίου, ὅσον πνευματίου, εἰς πνευματίου, ὅσον ύδατίου, εἰς ύδατίον. οὐδεῖς "Αἰδῆς οὐδ' Ἀχέρων οὐδὲ Κω-κυτος οὐδὲ Πυριφλεγέθων, ἀλλὰ πάντα θεῶν μεστὰ καὶ δαιμόνων." ταῦτα τις ἐνθυμεῖται ἔχων καὶ βλέπων τὸν ἦλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἀστρα καὶ γῆς ἀπολαυσών καὶ θαλάσσης ἐρημῶς ἔστιν οὗ μᾶλλον ἢ καὶ ἀβοῤήθητος. "τί οὖν; ἄν τις ἐπελθὼν μοι μόνῳ ἀποσφάξῃ με;" μωρέ, σὲ οὖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ σωμάτιον.

15 Ἐποίησε οὖν ἐτί ἐρημία, ποία ἀπορία; τί κειρονᾶς ἐαυτοὺς ποιῶμεν τῶν παιδαρίων; ἀ τινὰ ὅταν ἀπολειψθῇ μόνα, τί ποιεῖ; ἀραντα ὀστράκια καὶ σποδὸν οἰκοδομεῖ τί ποτε, εἰτα καταστρέφει καὶ πάλιν ἄλλο οἰκοδομεῖ. καὶ οὕτως οὐδέποτε ἀπο-ρεῖ διαγωγῆς. ἐγὼ οὖν, ἂν πλεύσητε ύμεῖς, μέλλω καθήμενος κλαίειν ὃτι μόνος ἀπελείφθην καὶ ἔρημος οὕτως; οὖκ ὀστράκια ἔξω, οὐ σποδὸν;

1 Schweighäuser (as in II. 14, 8; IV. 1, 97): πᾶσα S.

A A reverent expression for God. See note on III. 1, 43.
full of tranquillity; every road, every city, every fellow-traveller, neighbour, companion, all are harmless. Another,\(^1\) whose care it is, supplies food; Another supplies raiment; Another has given senses; Another preconceptions. Now whenever He does not provide the necessaries for existence, He sounds the recall; He has thrown open the door and says to you, "Go." Where? To nothing you need fear, but back to that from which you came, to what is friendly and akin to you, to the physical elements.\(^2\) What there was of fire in you shall pass into fire, what there was of earth into earth, what there was of spirit into spirit, what there was of water into water. There is no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus, nor Pyrithhegethon, but everything is filled with gods and divine powers."\(^3\) A man who has this to think upon, and who beholds the sun, and moon, and stars, and enjoys land and sea, is no more forlorn than he is without help. "Why, what then? What if someone should attack me when I am alone and murder me?" Fool, not murder you, but your trivial body.

What kind of forlornness is left, then, to talk about? What kind of helplessness? Why make ourselves worse than little children? When they are left alone, what do they do? They gather up sherds and dust and build something or other, then tear it down and build something else again; and so they are never at a loss as to how to spend their time. Am I, then, if you set sail, to sit down and cry because I am left alone and forlorn in that fashion? Shan't I have sherds, shan't I have dust? But they

\(^2\) Compare the Introduction, p. xxv f.

\(^3\) A doctrine ascribed to Thales, Diog. Laert. 1, 27.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

20 Πάσα μεγάλη δύναμις ἐπισφαλῆς τῷ ἀρχομένῳ. φέρειν οὖν δεῖ τὰ τοιαύτα κατὰ δύναμιν, ἄλλα κατὰ φύσιν . . . 1 ἄλλ' οὐχὶ τῷ φθισικῷ.

21 μελέτησον ποτε διαγωγήν ὡς ἄρρωστος, ὅν ποθ' ὡς υγιαίνων διαγάγης. ἀσίτησον, ὑδροπότησον· ἀπόσχου ποτὲ παντάπασιν ὀρέξεως, ὅν ποτὲ καὶ εὐλόγως ὀρεχῆς. εἰ δ' εὐλόγως, ὅταν ἔχεις τι

22 ἐν σεαυτῷ ἄγαθόν, εὖ ὀρεχθήσῃ. οὔτ' ἄλλ' εὐθέως ὡς σοφοὶ διάγειν ἑθέλομεν καὶ ὥθελεῖν ἀυθρόπους. ποιάν ὥθελεις; τί ποιεῖς; σαυτὸν ἐγὼ ὥθελησας; ἄλλα προτρέψαι αὐτοὺς θέλεις, σὺ ἐγὼ προτετρέψαι; θέλεις αὐτοὺς ὥθελήσαι;

23 δεῖξον αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ, οὕνει ποιεῖς φιλοσοφία, καὶ μὴ φλυάρει. ἐσθίων τοὺς συνεσθίοντας ὥθελει, πίνων τοὺς πίνοντας, εἰκὼν πᾶσι, παραχώρων, ἀνεχόμενος, οὕτως αὐτοὺς ὥθελει καὶ μὴ κατεξέρα αὐτῶν τὸ σαυτὸν φλέγμα.

1 Reiske indicated the lacuna.

1 The change in subject-matter is so abrupt that something may perhaps have fallen out in some ancestor of S, or perhaps the next chapter-heading has become displaced by a few lines. Yet there are similarly abrupt transitions in III. 8, 7 and III. 15, 14.

2 Something like "Give food (or wine) to the healthy man" (Reiske), or "Wrestling is very good for the healthy man" (Schenkl), has probably fallen out at this point.
BOOK III. xiii. 19-23

act thus out of folly, and are we miserable out of wisdom?

1 Great power is always dangerous for the beginner. We ought, therefore, to bear such things according to our power—nay, in accordance with nature . . . 2 but not for the consumptive. Practise at some one time a style of living like an invalid, that at some other time you may live like a healthy man. Take no food, drink only water; refrain at some one time altogether from desire, that at some other time you may exercise desire, and then with good reason. And if you do so with good reason, whenever you have some good in you, you will exercise your desire aright. 3 No, that's not our way, but we wish to live like wise men from the very start, and to help mankind. Help indeed! What are you about? Why, have you helped yourself? But you wish to help them progress. Why, have you made progress yourself? Do you wish to help them? Then show them, by your own example, the kind of men philosophy produces, and stop talking nonsense. As you eat, help those who are eating with you; as you drink, those who are drinking with you; by yielding to everybody, giving place, submitting—help men in this way, and don't bespatter them with your own sputum. 4

3 "It is one of the paradoxes of conduct that a man cannot will to do good until in a sense he has become good, but Epictetus would doubtless admit that the will must from the first have exercise." Matheson, I. 32.

4 Referring, no doubt, to the sputtering of excessively ardent lecturers.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

1. Ὄς οἱ καλοὶ ἑνδυναμώται, ἀλλὰ μετὰ πολλῶν, οὕτως ἐνιοί μόνοι περιπατοῦσιν ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ τις εἰ, καὶ μόνος περιπατήσῃ καὶ σαυτῷ λάλησιν καὶ μὴ ἐν τῷ χορῷ κρύπτων. σκώφθητι ποτε, περιβλεψαι, ἐνσέσθητι, ἦνα γνώσις, τίς εἰ.

4. "Οταν τις ὑδρα πίνῃ ἑνδυναμώται, ἐκ πάσης ἀφορμῆς λέγει αὐτὸ πρὸς πάντας "ἐγώ ὑδρα πίνω." διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο ὑδρα πίνεις, διὰ γὰρ τὸ ὑδρα πίνειν; ἀνθρώπος, εἰ σοι λυστελεῖ συμφέρει σοι καὶ πίνεις, σιώπα πρὸς τοὺς δυσαρεστοῦντας τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις. τί οὖν; αὐτοῖς τούτοις ἄρεσκειν θέλεις;

7. Ὁ τῶν πραττομένων τὰ μὲν προηγούμενως πράττεται, τὰ δὲ κατὰ περίστασιν, τὰ δὲ κατ' οἴκονομίαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμπεριφοράν, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐνστάσιν.

8. Δυὸ τάυτα ἐξελείν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐ̄ς εἰς καὶ ἀπιστίαν. οὐ̄ς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ δοκεῖν μηδενὸς προσδείσθαι, ἀπιστία δὲ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν μὴ

1 This has been read uniformly κακοὶ ever since the time of Wolf. But it is clear from Aristotle, Pol. 3. 13, 21 that superior solo voices were not used in the chorus, and it is a notorious fact that excellent choral effects are secured with voices which are not suitable for solo performance.

Meibom: τοῖς S.
CHAPTER XIV

Some scattered sayings

As the good chorus-singers in tragedy cannot render solos, but can sing perfectly well with a number of other voices, so some men cannot walk around by themselves. Man, if you are anybody, both walk around by yourself, and talk to yourself, and don't hide yourself in the chorus. Let yourself be laughed at sometimes, look about you, shake yourself up, so as to find out who you actually are.

Whenever a man drinks water only, or has some ascetic practice, he takes every opportunity to talk about it to everybody: "I drink water only." Why, do you drink water just for the sake of drinking water? Man, if it is good for you to drink water, drink it! Otherwise your conduct is absurd. But if it does you good and you drink water only, don't say a word about it to the people who are annoyed by such persons. Why, what's your object? Are these just the ones you wish to please? ¹

Among actions some are performed primarily on their own account, others on occasion, or as a matter of good management, or as required by tact, or as part of a formal plan.

Here are two things of which one must rid men, conceit and diffidence. Now conceit is to fancy that one needs nothing further. And diffidence is to assume that one cannot enjoy a life of serenity

¹ That is: If you drink water only, do it to please yourself, and not for the sake of impressing others; above all, not for the sake of trying to impress those who dislike teetotalers.

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δυνατὸν εἶναι εὕροεῖν τοσούτων περιεστηκότων.

9 τὴν μὲν οὖν οὗσιν ἔλεγχος ἐξαιρέθη, καὶ τοῦτο πρῶτον ποιεῖ Σωκράτης . . . ὡς οὗ ἀδύνατὸν ἐστὶ τὸ πράγμα, σκέψαι καὶ ζήτησον—οὐδέν

10 σε βλάψει ἡ ζήτησις αὕτη καὶ σχεδὸν τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν τούτ' ἐστι, ζητεῖν, πῶς ἐνδέχεται ἀπαραποδίστως ὅρεξει χρῆσθαι καὶ ἐκκλίσει.

11 "Κρείσσων εἰμὶ σοῦ· ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ μου ὑπατικὸς ἐστιν." Ἀλλος λέγει "ἐγὼ δεδημαρχηκα, σὺ δ' οὐ." εἰ δ' ὑπποι ἤμεν, ἔλεγες ἀν ὅτι "ὁ πατὴρ μου ὁκύτερος ἦν," ἣ ὡς ἐγὼ ἔχω πολλὰς κριθὰς καὶ χόρτον," ἢ ὅτι "κομψὰ περιτραχήλια." τί οὖν εἰ 4 ταῦτά σου λέγοντος εἴπον ὅτι

12 ἕστω ταῦτα, τρέχωμεν οὖν"; ἀγε, ἐπ' ἀνθρώποι οὖν οὐδέν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον οἴον ἐφ' ὑπποι δρόμος, ἐξ οὗ γνωσθῆσεται ὁ χείρων καὶ ὁ κρείττων; μῆποτ' ἐστὶν αἰδώς, πίστις, δίκαιο-

13 σύνη; τοῦτοις δείκνυε κρείττονα σεαυτῶν, ὅπ' ὡς ἀνθρώποις ἦς 5 κρείττων. ἂν μοι λέγης ὅτι "μεγάλα λακτίζω," ἐρῶ σοι κἀγὼ ὅτι "ἐπὶ οὖν ἔργῳ μέγα φρονεῖς."

1 Schenkl (after Wolf): ἐφεῖν σ S (mostly by Sc in an erasure).
2 Reiske observed the lacuna.
3 ἦ supplied by Hense.
4 τί οὖν εἰ Oldfather: εἰ οὖν S. εἰτ' οὖν or τί οὖν Reiske.

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under so many adverse circumstances. Now conceit is removed by cross-examination, and this is what Socrates starts with. . . . But that the matter is not impossible, consider and search—this kind of search will do you no harm; and, indeed, to philosophize practically amounts to this, that is, to search how it is possible to employ desire and aversion without hindrance.

"I am superior to you, for my father has consular rank." Another says, "I have been a tribune, and you have not." And if we were horses, you would be saying: "My sire was swifter than yours," or, "I have quantities of barley and fodder," or, "I have pretty neck-trappings." What then, if, when you were talking like this, I said, "Granted all that, let's run a race, then"? Come now, is there, then, nothing in man like running in the case of a horse, whereby the worse and the better will be recognized? Isn't there such a thing as reverence, faith, justice? Prove yourself superior in these points, in order to be superior as a human being. If you tell me, "I can deliver a mighty kick," I shall say to you in my turn, "You are proud over what is the act of an ass."

1 There is no clear connection here with the preceding, and the topic of the removal of diffidence could scarcely have been passed over.

2 The subject-matter of this is closely paralleled in frag. 18, Encheiridion 44, and in the florilegia. It was clearly a commonplace.

3 Much practised by the pancratiasts, who struck both with the heel and with the knee.

5 In Schweighäuser without comment, after Schegk: § S.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

1. "Oti dei perieskepménois érhexesawai éph' ékasta.

1 The text of the Encheiridion: ἀπλᾶς ιατρῷ γὰρ S (originally).
2 The text of the Encheiridion: ὁφρὸν S (originally), changed to ὅσφὸν.
3 Reiske: ὅταν S.

1 Repeated with slight variations in Encheiridion, 29.
2 See note on Ench. 29, 2.
3 A technical term (Diog. Laert. 6, 27) of somewhat uncertain meaning, but probably referring to a preliminary wallowing in dust or mud before the wrestling match at the pancratium.

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That we ought to approach each separate thing with circumspection

In each separate thing that you do consider the matters which come first, and those which follow after, and only then approach the thing itself. Otherwise, at the start you will come to it enthusiastically because you have never reflected upon any of the subsequent steps, but later on, when some of them appear, you will give up disgracefully. "I wish to win an Olympic victory." But consider the matters which come before that and those which follow after; and only when you have done that, then, if it profits you, put your hand to the task. You have to submit to discipline, follow a strict diet, give up sweet-cakes, train under compulsion, at a fixed hour, in heat or in cold; you must not drink cold water, nor wine just whenever you feel like it; you must have turned yourself over to your trainer precisely as you would to a physician. Then when the contest comes on, you have to "dig in" beside your opponent, sometimes dislocate your wrist, sprain your ankle, swallow quantities of sand, take a scourging; yes, and then sometimes get beaten along with all that. After you have counted up these points, go on into the games, if you still wish to; otherwise, I would have you observe that you will be turning back like children. Sometimes they play athletes, again gladiators, again they blow trumpets, and then act a play about anything that they have seen and admired. So you too are now

That is, for any foul committed.
Although the expression (lit. "with cold desire") seems a bit strange, because the fault seems to lie especially in the lack of forethought and circumspection, still it is supported by the version in the Encheiridion, and particularly by the phrase, "yet with your whole soul nothing," in §6 above. Mere desire, without reason and deliberation, is apparently regarded by Epictetus as a weak thing.
an athlete, now a gladiator, then a philosopher, after that a rhetorician, yet with your whole soul nothing, but like an ape you imitate whatever you see, and one thing after another is always striking your fancy, but what you are accustomed to bores you. For you have never gone out after anything with circumspection, nor after you have examined the whole matter all over and tested it, but you act at haphazard and half-heartedly.¹

In the same way, when some people have seen a philosopher and heard someone speaking like Euphrates² (though, indeed, who can speak like him?), they wish to be philosophers themselves. Man, consider first what the business is, and then your own natural ability, what you can bear. If you wish to be a wrestler, look to your shoulders, your thighs, your loins. For one man has a natural talent for one thing, another for another. Do you suppose that you can do the things you do now, and yet be a philosopher? Do you suppose that you can eat in the same fashion, drink in the same fashion, give way to anger and to irritation, just as you do now? You must keep vigils, work hard, overcome certain desires, abandon your own people, be despised by a paltry slave, be laughed to scorn by those who meet you, in everything get the worst of it, in office, in honour, in court. Look these drawbacks over carefully, and then, if you think best, approach philosophy, that is, if you are willing at the price of these things to secure tranquillity, freedom, and calm. Otherwise, do not approach; don't act like

² An eminent Stoic lecturer, highly praised by Pliny (Ep. I. 10), and a bitter enemy of Apollonius of Tyana. A specimen of his eloquence is given below, IV. 8, 17-20.
ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

παίδια νῦν μὲν φιλόσοφος, ύστερον δὲ τελώνης,
13 εἶτα ῥήτωρ, εἶτα ἐπίτροπος Καίσαρος. ταύτα οὖ
συμφωνεῖν ένα σε δεῖ ἀνθρωπον εἰναι ἣ ἀγαθὸν ἡ
κακον. ἢ το ἡγεμονικὸν σε δεῖ εξεργάζεσθαι τὸ
σαυτοῦ ἡ τὰ ἐκτός. ἢ περὶ τὰ ἔσω φιλοσοφεῖν ἡ
περὶ τὰ ἔξω τούτ’ ἐστι φιλοσόφον στάσιν ἐχειν
ἡ ἰδιώτου.

14 'Ροῦφῳ τις ἐλεγεν Γάλβα σφαγέντος ὅτι
"Νῦν προνοία ὁ κόσμος διοικεῖται;" ὁ δὲ "Μή
παρέργως τοτ’," ἔφη, "ἀπὸ Γάλβα κατεσκεῦσα,
ὅτι προνοία ὁ κόσμος διοικεῖται;"

15. "Ὅτι εὐλαβῶς δεῖ συγκαθιέναι εἰς
συμπεριφορὰν.

1 'Ανάγκη τὸν συγκαθιέντα τισίν ἐπιπλέον ἡ εἰς
λαλιαν ἡ εἰς συμπόσια ἡ ἀπλῶς εἰς συμβίωσιν ἡ
αὐτὸν ἐκείνοις ἐξομοιωθῆναι ἡ ἐκείνους μετα-
2 θεῖαι ἕπτε τὰ αὐτῶν. καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρακά ἀποσβέσ-
μένου ἀν θῇ παρὰ τὸν καιόμενον, ἡ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνον
3 ἀποσβέσει 2 ἢ ἐκείνος τοῦτον ἐκκαύσει. τηλι-
κούτον οὗ τοῦ κινδύνου ὁντος εὐλαβῶς δεῖ τοῖς
ἰδιώταις συγκαθίεσθαι εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας συμπερι-
φορὰς μεμημένους, ὃτι ἀμήχανον τὸν συνανατρι-

1 Meibom: φιλοσόφοι S.
2 ἀποσβέσει supplied by the Salamanca edition, after Schegk.

1 See note on III. 13, 20.
2 The Roman emperor; the incident took place in A.D. 69.
a child—now a philosopher, later on a tax-gatherer, then a rhetorician, then a procurator of Caesar. These things do not go together. You must be one person, either good or bad; you must labour to improve either your own governing principle or externals; you must work hard either on the inner man, or on things outside; that is, play the rôle of a philosopher, or else that of a layman.

When Galba\(^2\) was assassinated, someone said to Rufus,\(^3\) "Is the universe governed now by Providence?" But he replied, "Did I ever, even in passing, take the case of Galba as the basis for an argument that the universe is governed by Providence?"

**CHAPTER XVI**

*That one should enter cautiously into social intercourse*

The man who consorts frequently with one person or another either for conversation, or for banquets, or for social purposes in general, is compelled either to become like them himself, or else to bring them over to his own style of living; for if you put by the side of a live coal one that has gone out, either the dead coal will put the live one out, or the latter will kindle the former. Since the risk, then, is so great, we ought to enter cautiously into such social intercourse with the laymen, remembering that it is impossible for the man who brushes up against

\(^3\) Musonius Rufus, the distinguished philosopher and teacher of Epictetus, to whom the latter was greatly indebted. See the indices to the two vols. of this translation, and Vol. I, Introduction, p. viii.
βόμενον τῷ ἵσβολομένῳ μὴ καὶ αὐτόν ἀπολαύσαι
4 τῆς ἀσβόλης. τί γὰρ ποιήσεις, ἂν περὶ μονο-
μάχων λαλῇ,1 ἂν περὶ ἵππων, ἂν περὶ ἄθλητῶν, ἂν τὸ ἐτιτοῦτων χειρῶν περὶ ἀνθρώπων: "οὐ δεῖνα
κακός, οὔ δεῖνα ἀγαθός: τοῦτο καλῶς ἐγένετο,
tοῦτο κακῶς". ἐτί ἂν σκόπτῃ, ἂν γελοιαζῇ, ἂν
5 κακοποθίζηται; ἔχει τις ὑμῶν παρασκευήν οἷαν ὁ
κιθαριστικὸς τὴν λύραν λαβὼν, ὅστι περὶ ἀψί
ἀψίμενος τῶν χορδῶν γυνών τὰς ἀσυμφόνους
καὶ ἀρμόσασθαι τὸ ὀργανὸν; οἷαν εἰχεν δύναμιν
Σωκράτης, ὅστι  ἐν πάσῃ συμπεριφορᾷ.2 ἀγεῖν ἐπὶ
6 τὸ αὐτοῦ τοὺς συνόντας; πόθεν ὑμῖν; ἀλλά
ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὑμᾶς περιάγεσθαι.
7 Διὰ τί οὖν ἐκεῖνοι ὑμῶν ἰσχυρότεροι; ὅτι
ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τὰ σαπρὰ ταῦτα ἀπὸ δογμάτων
λαλοῦσιν, ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ κομψὰ ἀπὸ τῶν χειλῶν
διὰ τοῦτο ἄτονά ἐστι καὶ νεκρά, καὶ σιγχάναι
ἐστιν ἀκούοντα ὑμῶν τοὺς προτρεπτικοὺς καὶ τὴν
ἀρετὴν τὴν ταλαιπωροῦν, ή ἂνω κάτω θρυλεῖται.
8 οὕτως ὑμᾶς οἱ ἰδιώται νικῶσιν. πανταχόν γὰρ
9 ἰσχυρὸν τὸ δόγμα, ἀνίκητον τὸ δόγμα. μέχρις
ἀν οὖν παγόσιν ἐν υμῖν αἱ κομψὲ ὑπολήψεις
καὶ δύναμιν τινα περποιήσησθε πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν,
συμβουλεύω ὑμῖν εὐλαβῶς τοῖς ἰδιώταις συγ-
καταβαίνειν εἰ δὲ μή, καθ' ἡμέραν ὡς κηρὸς ἐν
ἤλιῳ διατακήσεται, υμῶν εἰ τινὰ ἐν τῇ σχολή
10 ἐγγράψετε. μακρὰν οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ποῦ ποτε
ὑπάγετε, μέχρις ἂν κηρίως τὰς ὑπολήψεις ἔχητε.
11 διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν πατρίδων συμβουλεύουσιν

1 Schweighhäuser: λαλῆς S.
2 Wolf, after Schegk: συμφόρα S.
the person who is covered with soot to keep from getting some soot on himself. For what are you going to do if he talks about gladiators, or horses, or athletes, or, worse still, about people: "So-and-so is bad, So-and-so is good; this was well done, this ill"; or again, if he scoffs, or jeers, or shows an ugly disposition? Has any of you the capacity of the expert lyre-player when he takes up his lyre, which enables him, the instant he touches the strings, to recognize the ones which are off pitch, and to tune the instrument? Or the power that Socrates had, which enabled him in every kind of social intercourse to bring over to his own side those who were in his company? How could you have? But you must necessarily be converted by the laymen.

Why, then, are they stronger than you are? Because their rotten talk is based on judgements, but your fine talk comes merely from your lips; that's why what you say is languid and dead, and why a man may well feel nausea when he hears your exhortations and your miserable "virtue," which you babble to and fro. And thus the laymen get the better of you; for everywhere judgement is strong, judgement is invincible. Therefore, until these fine ideas of yours are firmly fixed within you, and you have acquired some power which will guarantee you security, my advice to you is to be cautious about joining issue with the laymen; otherwise whatever you write down in the lecture-room will melt away by day like wax in the sun.¹ Retire, then, to some spot or other far away from the sun, so long as the ideas which you have are waxen. It is for this reason that the philosophers advise us to leave even

¹ Such lecture-notes were written on wax tablets.
ARRIANS DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

άποχωρεῖν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ὅτι τὰ παλαιὰ ἔθη περισσὰ καὶ οὐκ ἕξ ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι τινὰ ἄλλου ἐθισμοῦ, οὔτε φέρομεν τοὺς ἀπαντώντας καὶ λέγοντας "ἴδ' ὁ δεῖνα φιλόσοφει, ὁ τοῖος καὶ ὁ τοῖος."

12 οὕτως καὶ οἱ ἱατροὶ τοὺς μακρονοσοῦντας ἐκπέμπουσιν εἰς ἄλλην χώραν καὶ ἄλλα ἀέρα καλῶς ποιοῦντες. καὶ ύμεῖς ἀντεισαγόγετε ἄλλα ἔθη πήξατε ύμῶν τὰς υπολήψεις, ἐναθλεῖτε αὐταῖς.

13 οὖ· ἄλλα ἐνθεν ἐπὶ θεωρίαν, εἰς μονομαχίαν, εἰς ξυστόν, εἰς κύρκον· εἴτε ἐκείθεν ὅθε καὶ πάλιν εἴτε ἐκεῖ οἱ αὐτοὶ. καὶ ἔθος κομψὸν οὔθεν, οὕτε προσοχὴ οὔτε ἐπιστροφὴ ἐφ' αὐτὸν καὶ παρατήρησις "πῶς χρωμαι ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις; κατὰ φύσιν ή παρὰ φύσιν; πῶς ἀποκρίνωμαι πρὸς αὐτάς; ως δεὶ ή ως οὐ δεὶ; ἐπιλέγω τοῖς ἀπροαιρέτοις, ὅτι οὗθεν πρὸς ἐμὲ;"

15 εἰ γὰρ μῆπω οὕτως ἔχετε, φεύγετε ἔθη τὰ πρότερον, φεύγετε τοὺς ἱδιώτας, εἰ θέλετε ἀρξασθαί ποτέ τινες εἶναι.

16

ἐξ. Περὶ προνοίας.

1 Ὅταν τῇ προνοίᾳ ἐγκαλῆς, ἐπιστράφητι καὶ 2 γνώσῃ, ὅτι κατὰ λόγον γέγονεν. "ναι, ἄλλα ὁ

1 Where the athletes exercised in winter, or in bad weather.
our own countries, because old habits distract us and do not allow a beginning to be made of another custom, and we cannot bear to have men meet us and say, "Look, So-and-so is philosophizing, although he is this sort of a person or that." Thus also physicians send away to a different region and a different climate those who are suffering from chronic disorders, and that is well. Do you also introduce different habits; fix your ideas, exercise yourselves in them. But no, you go from the class-room to a show, a gladiatorial combat, a gymnasion-colonnade,¹ a circus; and then you come back here from these places, and you go back there again from here, and remain the same persons all the time.² And so you acquire no fine habit; you pay no regard or attention to your own self; you do not observe: "How do I deal with the external impressions which befall me? In accordance with nature, or contrary to it? How shall I respond to these impressions? As I should, or as I should not? Do I declare to the things which lie outside the sphere of my moral purpose that they mean nothing to me?" Why, if you have not yet acquired this state of mind, flee from your former habits, flee from the laymen, if you would begin to be somebody some time.

CHAPTER XVII

Of Providence

Whenever you find fault with Providence, only consider and you will recognize that what happens is in accordance with reason. "Yes," you say,

¹ Cf. "... But evermore came out by the same door where in I went."—Omar Khayyám (Fitzgerald), 27.
AHIUAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICETETUS

αδικος πλεον ἐχει." ἐν τινι; ἐν ἀργυρίω πρὸς γὰρ τοῦτο σου κρείττων ἐστιν, ὁτι1 κολακεύει,
3 ἁναίρχυντει, ἀγρυπνει. θαυμαστόν; ἀλλ' ἐκείνο βλέπε, εἰ ἐν τῷ πιστὸς εἰναι πλέον σου ἐχει, εἰ ἐν τῷ αἰδήμων. οὐ γὰρ εὐρήσεις; ἀλλ' ὅπου κρείττων, ἐκεῖ σαυτὸν εὐρήσεις πλέον
4 ἔχοντα. κἀγὼ ποτ' εἴπον τιν ἀγανακτοῦντι, ὅτι Φιλόστοργος εὐτυχεῖ, "Ἡθελες ἂν σὺ μετὰ Σοῦρα κοιμᾶσθαι;—"Μη γένοιτο," φησίν, "ἐ-
5 κεῖνη ἡ ἡμέρα."—Τί οὖν ἄγανακτεῖς, εἰ λαμβάνει τι ἄνθ' οὐ πωλεῖ; ἡ πῶς μακαρίζεις τὸν διὰ τοῦτον, ἂ σὺ ἀπευχῇ, κτώμενον ἐκεῖνα; ἢ τί κακὸν ποτεὶ ἡ πρόνοια, εἰ τοῖς κρείττουσι τὰ κρείττω δίδωσιν; ἢ οὐκ ἐστι κρείττον αἰδήμωνα
6 εἰναι ἡ πλούσιον; Ωμολόγει. Τί οὖν ἄγα-
νακτεῖς, ἀνθρωπε, ἔχων τὸ κρεῖττον; μέμνησθε οὖν ἀεὶ καὶ πρόχειρον ἔχετε, ὅτι νόμος οὗτος
φυσικὸς τὸν κρείττονα τοῦ χεῖρονος πλέον ἐχειν, ἐν ὧ κρείττων ἐστίν, καὶ οὐδέποτ' ἄγανακτήσετε.
7 "ἀλλ' ἡ γυνὴ μοι κακὸς χρήται." καλῶς. ἂν
tίς σου πυνθάνηται, τι ἐστὶ τοῦτο, λέγε "ἡ
gυνὴ μοι κακῶς χρήται." "ἀλλ' οὖν οὐδέν;"
8 οὔδεν. "ὁ πατήρ μοι οὐδέν διδωσιν." .. 2 ὅτι
dὲ κακὸν ἐστίν, τοῦτο ἐσώθειν αὐτῷ δεὶ προσ-

1 Wolf and Upton's "codex": § S.
2 Lacuna observed by Wolf.

1 Probably the Palfurius Sura who had been expelled from the Senate under the Flavian emperors. Suet. Dom. 13, 2.

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"but the wicked man is better off." In what respect? In money; for in respect to that he is superior to you, because he flatters, is shameless, lies awake nights. What is surprising in that? But look rather and see if he is better off than you are in being faithful, and considerate. For you will not find that to be the case; but where you are superior, there you will find that you are better off than he is. And so I once asked a man who was complaining about the prosperity of Philostorgus, "Would you have been willing to cohabit with Sura?"¹ "May that day never come!" said he. Why, then, are you indignant if he gets something for what he sells? Or how can you deem him blessed who acquires what he has by means which you abhor? Or what harm does Providence do if it gives the better thing to the better men? Or is it not better to be considerate than to be rich? He agreed that it was. Why, then, are you indignant, man, when you have the better part? I would have the rest of you always remember, then, and be ready to apply the following truth: That this is a law of nature for the superior to have the better of the inferior, in the respect in which he is superior; and then you will never be indignant. "But my wife treats me badly." Very well; if someone asks you what this amounts to, say, "My wife treats me badly." "Nothing else, then?" Nothing. "My father doesn't give me anything"...² But is it necessary in your own mind to add to the preceding statement, that to receive nothing from your father

² The lacuna is probably to be filled out thus: What does this amount to? Merely that your father doesn't give you anything.
9 θείναι καὶ προσκαταψεύσασθαι; διὰ τοῦτο οὐ δεὶ τὴν πενιάν ἐκβάλλειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ αὐτῆς, καὶ οὕτως εὐροίσομεν.

ιη'. "Οτι οὐ δεὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀγγελίας ταράσσεσθαι.

1 "Οταν σοὶ τι προσαγαγελθῇ ταρακτικόν, ἐκεῖνο ἐχε προχειρον, ὅτι ἀγγελία περὶ οὐδενὸς προαιρετικοῦ γίνεται. μή τι γὰρ δύναται σοὶ τις ἀγγείλαι, ὅτι κακῶς ὕπελαβες ἢ κακῶς ὥρεξθης; —Οὐδαμῶς.—'Αλλ' ὅτι ἀπεθανέν τις; τί οὖν πρὸς σέ; ὅτι σε κακῶς τις λέγειν τί οὖν πρὸς σέ; ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ τάδε τινὰ ἐτοιμάζεται: ἐπὶ τίνα; μή τι ἐπὶ τὴν προαιρεσίν; πόθεν δύναται; ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ σωμάτιον, ἐπὶ τὸ κτησείδιον.

2 ἐσώθησιν, οὐκ ἐπὶ σέ.1 ἀλλ' ὁ κρῖτης ἀποφαίνεται ὅτι ἡσέβησας. περὶ Σωκράτους δ' οὐκ ἀπεφήναντο οἱ δικασταί; μή τι σοῦ ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκείνον ἀποφήνασθαι; —Οὐ. —Τί οὖν ἐτί σοι μέλει; ἐστὶ τι τοῦ πατρὸς σου ἔργον, ὅ ἂν μὴ ἔκπληρώσῃ, ἀπώλεσεν τὸν πατέρα, τὸν φιλόντιον τὸν ἥμερον. ἄλλο δὲ μηδὲν ζήτει τούτου ἑνεκα αὐτὸν ἀπολέσαι.2 οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλω μέν τις ἀμαρτάνει, εἰς ἄλλο δὲ βλάπ-

1 οὐκουεν after σε is omitted in s.
2 Wolf: ἀπολέσθαι S.
is an evil, and at that to add a lie too? For this reason we ought not to cast out poverty, but only our judgement about poverty, and so we shall be serene.

CHAPTER XVIII

That we ought not to allow any news to disturb us

Whenever some disturbing news is reported to you, you ought to have ready at hand the following principle: News, on any subject, never falls within the sphere of the moral purpose. Can anyone bring you word that you have been wrong in an assumption or in a desire?—By no means.—But he can bring you word that someone is dead. Very well, what is that to you? That someone is speaking ill of you. Very well, what is that to you? That your father is making certain preparations. Against whom? Surely not against your moral purpose, is it? Why, how can he? But against your paltry body, against your paltry possessions; you are safe, it is not against you. But the judge condemns you on the charge of impiety. And did not the judges similarly condemn Socrates? Surely it is no concern of yours that the judge pronounced you guilty, is it?—No.—Why, then, are you any further concerned? Your father has a certain function, and if he does not perform it, he has destroyed the father in him, the man who loves his offspring, the man of gentleness within him. Do not seek to make him lose anything else on this account. For it never happens that a man goes wrong in one thing, but is injured in
6 tetai. πάλιν σὸν ἔργον τὸ ἀπολογηθῆναι εὐσταθῶς, αἰδημόνως, ἀφργήτως. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀπώλεσας καὶ σὺ τὸν υἱὸν, τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν
7 γενναίον. τί οὖν; ὁ κριτὴς ἀκίνδυνος ἐστιν; οὐν ἀλλὰ κάκεινῳ τὰ ἑσα κινδυνεῦται. τι οὖν ἔτι φοβῆτι, τί ἐκείνος κρινεῖ; 1 τί σοι καὶ τῷ
8 ἀλλοτρίῳ κακῷ; σὸν κακὸν ἐστὶ τὸ κακῶς ἀπολογηθῆναι. τοῦτο φυλάσσον μόνον κριθῆναι δ' ἢ μὴ κριθῆναι ὁσπερ ἄλλου ἐστὶν ἔργον,
9 οὕτως κακὸν ἄλλου ἐστίν. “ἀπειλεῖ σοὶ ὁ δείκνα.” ἐμοὶ; οὐ. “ψέγει σε.” αὐτὸς ὅψεται, πῶς ποιεῖ τὸ ἱδίον ἔργον. “μέλλει σε κατα-
κρινεῖν ἀδίκως.” ἀθλίος.

id'. Τής στάσις ἰδιώτου καὶ φιλοσόφου;

1 'Ἡ πρώτη διαφορὰ ἰδιώτου καὶ φιλοσόφου ὁ μὲν λέγει "οὐαί μοι διὰ τὸ παιδάριον, διὰ τὸν ἀδελφόν, οὐαί διὰ τὸν πατέρα," ὁ δ', ἂν ποτ' εἴπειν ἀναγκασθῇ, "οὐαί μοι" ἐπίστησας λέγει 2 "δι' ἐμέ." προσάρεσιν γὰρ οὐδὲν δύναται κωλύσαι
3 ἡ βλάψαι ἀπροαίρετον εἰ μὴ αὐτῇ ἑαυτῆ. ἂν οὖν ἐπὶ τούτῳ ρέψωμεν καὶ αὐτοῖ, ὥσθ' ὅταν

1 Koraes after Schegk: κρίνῃ S.

1 On this point see the Introduction, Vol. I, p. xx: "Every man bears the exclusive responsibility himself for his own good or evil, since it is impossible to imagine a moral order in which one person does the wrong and another, the innocent, suffers"; or, as here, where a person might do wrong in the moral sphere, and yet not suffer also in the moral sphere. Compare also the note on I. 28, 10, in Vol. I.
another. Again, it is your function to defend yourself firmly, respectfully, without passion. Otherwise, you have destroyed within you the son, the respectful man, the man of honour. What then? Is the judge secure? No; but he too runs just as great a risk. Why, then, are you afraid of what decision he is going to render? What have you to do with another man’s evil? Your own evil is to make a bad defence; only guard against that, but just as being condemned or not being condemned is another’s function, so it is another’s evil. “So-and-so threatens you.” Me? No. “He blames you.” He himself will attend to how he is performing his own proper function. “He is on the point of condemning you unjustly.” Poor devil!

CHAPTER XIX

What is the position of the layman, and what that of the philosopher?

The first difference between a layman and a philosopher: The one says, “Woe is me because of my child, my brother, woe because of my father”; and the other, if he can ever be compelled to say, “Woe is me,” adds, after a pause, “because of myself.” For nothing outside the sphere of the moral purpose can hamper or injure the moral purpose; it alone can hamper or injure itself. If, then, we too tend in this latter direction so that, whenever we go amiss,

This general position, which as an unverifiable postulate underlies the whole Stoic philosophy, and is the very starting-point of their whole system of thinking, is what might be styled the πράτον ψεύδος of Stoicism.
δυσοδώμεν, αὐτοὺς αἰτιάσθαι καὶ μεμνήσθαι, ὅτι
οὖν ἄλλο ταραχῆς ἢ ἀκαταστασίας αἰτίων
ἐστίν ἢ δόγμα, ὅμως ὑμῖν πάντας θεοὺς, ὅτι
4 προεκόψαμεν. 1 νῦν δὲ ἄλλην ὀδὸν ἐξ ἄρχῆς
ἐληλύθαμεν. εὐθὺς ἔτι παίδων ἡμῶν ὄντων ἢ
τιτθῆ, εἰ ποτε προσεπταίσαμεν χάσκοντες,
οὐχὶ ἢμῖν ἐπέπλησεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν λίθον ἔτυπτεν.
τί γὰρ ἐποίησεν ὁ λίθος; διὰ τὴν τοῦ παιδίου
5 σοῦ μορίαν ἔδει μεταβῆναι αὐτόν; πάλιν ἂν μὴ
eὐρωμεν φαγεῖν ἐκ βαλανείου, οὐδέποθεν ἡμῶν
καταστέλλει τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὁ παιδαγωγός, ἀλλὰ
dέρει τὸν μάγειρον. ἀνθρωπε, μὴ γὰρ ἐκεῖνον
σε παιδαγωγὸν κατεστήσαμεν; ἀλλὰ τοῦ παιδίου
6 ἡμῶν τούτῳ ἐπανόρθωσον, τούτῳ ὁφέλει. οὕτως
καὶ αὐξηθέντες φαινόμεθα παιδία. παῖς γὰρ ἐν
μούσικοις ὁ ἁμουσος, ἐν γραμματικοῖς ὁ ἀγράμ-
ματος, 2 ἐν βίῳ ὁ ἀπαίδευτος.

κ'. Ὡτι ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἐστὶν
ὡφελεῖσθαι.

1 Ἐπὶ τῶν θεωρητικῶν φαντασιῶν πάντες
σχεδὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀπέ-
2 λιποῦ, οὕτω δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός. οὐδεὶς λέγει
ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι, κακῶν τὸ νύκτα εἶναι,
μέγιστον δὲ κακῶν τὸ τρία τέσσαρα εἶναι.
3 ἀλλὰ τί; τὴν μὲν ἐπιστῆμην ἀγαθὸν, τὴν δ' ἀπάτην κακῶν, ὡστε καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ψεύδος
ἀγαθὸν 3 συνιστασθαί, τὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ ψεύδος

1 Wolf: προεκοψεν S. 2 s: ἀγραμμάτικος S.
we blame ourselves, and bear in mind that nothing but judgement is responsible for the disturbance of our peace of mind and our inconstancy, I swear to you by all the gods that we have been making progress. But as it is, we have taken a different course from the start. Even while we were still children, our nurse, if ever we bumped into something, when we were going along with our mouths open, did not scold us, but used to beat the stone. Why, what did the stone do? Ought it to have moved out of the road because of your childish folly? And again, if we when children don't find something to eat after our bath, our attendant never checks our appetite, but he cudgels the cook. Man, we didn't make you the cook's attendant, did we? but our child's. Correct him, help him. So, even when we have grown up, we look like children. For it is being a child to be unmusical in things musical, to be unlettered in things literary, to be uneducated in life.

CHAPTER XX

That it is possible to derive advantage from everything external

In the case of our intellectual impressions practically all men have agreed that the good and the evil are in ourselves, and not in externals. Nobody calls the statement that it is day, good, or that it is night, bad, and the greatest of evils, the statement that three is four. But what? They call knowledge good, and error evil; so that even in regard to what is false there arises a good, that is, the knowledge

8 Schweighäuser: ἀπάτην S.
4 εἰναι αὐτό. ἐδει οὖν οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ βίου. ὑγεία ἄγαθόν, νόσος δὲ κακόν; οὖ, ἀνθρωπε. ἀλλὰ τί; τὸ καλῶς ὑγιαίνειν ἄγαθόν, τὸ κακῶς κακόν.—"Ωστε καὶ ἀπὸ νόσου ἐστὶν ὑφεληθήναι;—Τὸν θεὸν σοι, ἀπὸ θανάτου γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶν; ἀπὸ πηρώσεως γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶν; μικρὰ σοι δοκεῖ ὁ Μενοίκεν ὑφεληθῆναι, ὅτε ἀπέθνησκεν;—Τοιαύτα τις εἶπον ὑφεληθείη 2 οἰα ἐκεῖνος ὑφεληθῆ. —Εα, ἀνθρωπε, οὐκ ἑτήρησεν τὸν φιλόπατριν, τὸν μεγαλόφρονα, τὸν πιστόν, τὸν γενναῖον; ἐπιζήσας δὲ οὐκ ἀν 3 ἀπώλλυεν
taúta pánta; οὐ περιεποιεῖτο τὰ ἐναντία; τὸν δειλὸν οὐκ ἀνελάμβανεν, τὸν ἁγεννη, τὸν μισό-πατριν, τὸν φιλόψυχον; ἄγε δοκεῖ σοι μικρά ὑφεληθῆναι ἀποθανών; οὐ. ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦ Ἀδμήτου πατὴρ μεγάλα ὑφεληθῆ ζῆσας οὕτως ἁγενιώδος
καὶ ἀθλίως; ύστερον γὰρ οὐκ ἀπέθανεν; παῦσασθε, τοὺς θεοὺς ύμῖν, 4 τὰς ὑλὰς θανμαζοντες, παῦσασθ' ἐαντοὺς δούλους ποιοῦντες πρῶτον τῶν πραγμάτων, εἰτα δι' αὐτὰ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ταύτα περιποιεῖν ἢ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι δυνα-μένον.

9 Ἐστὶν οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦτων ὑφεληθῆναι;—'Απὸ πάντων.—Καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ λοιδοροῦντος;—Τί δ' ὑφελεὶ τὸν ἁθλητὴν ὁ προσγυμναζόμενος; τὰ

1 Bentley: σοὺ S.
2 η after this word is deleted by s.
3 ἀν added by Upton, after Schegk.
4 Bentley and Shaftesbury, about the same time:

S.
that the false is false. So it ought to be, then, also with our life. Is health a good, and illness an evil? No, man. What then? To be well for a good end is good, to be well for an evil end is evil.—So that it is possible to derive advantage even from illness, you mean?—Why, I call God to witness, isn't it possible to derive advantage from death? Why, isn't it possible from lameness? Do you think that Menoeceus derived but little good when he died?—May the one who says anything like that derive the same sort of good that he did!—Ho, there, man, did he not maintain the patriot that he was, the high-minded man, the man of fidelity, the man of honour? And had he lived on, would he not have lost all these? Would he not have won the very opposite? Would he not have acquired the character of the coward, the ignoble man, the disloyal, the lover of his own life? Come now, do you think that Menoeceus derived but little good by his death? Oh, no! But the father of Admetus derived great good from living so ignobly and wretchedly, did he? Why, didn't he die later? Make an end, I adjure you by the gods, of admiring material things, make an end of turning yourselves into slaves, in the first place, of things, and then, in the second place, on their account, slaves also of the men who are able to secure or to take away these things.

Is it possible, then, to derive advantage from these things?—Yes, from everything.—Even from the man who reviles me?—And what good does his wrestling-companion do the athlete? The very

2 Who gave his life to save his native city, Thebes.
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μέγιστα. καὶ οὗτος ἐμοῦ προγυμναστῆς γίνεται: τὸ ἀνεκτικὸν μου γυμνιζεῖ, τὸ ἀόργητον, τὸ πρᾶον. ὥσπερ ἡ αὐτή, ὥσπερ ἡ ἀνθρώπων ὥφελεῖ με καὶ ἡ ἀλείπτης καλῶς ποιῶν λέγει "ἀρον ὑπέρον ἀμφοτέραις," καὶ ὅσῳ βαρύτερός ἐστιν ἐκείνος, τοσοῦτον μᾶλλον ὥφελοῦμαι ἐγώ· εἰ δὲ τις πρὸς ἀοργησίαν με γυμνιζεῖ, οὐκ ὥφελεῖ με; τούτ' ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ὥφελεῖσθαι. κακὸς γείτων; αὐτῷ ἄλλ' ἐμοὶ ἀγαθός· γυμνιζεῖ μου τὸ εὐγνωμον, τὸ ἐπτεικές. κακὸς πατήρ; αὐτῷ ἄλλ' ἐμοὶ ἀγαθός. τούτ' ἐστὶ τὸ τοῦ 'Ερμοῦ ῥαβδίον: "οὐ θέλεις," φασίν, "ἀγαι καὶ χρυσοῦν ἐσται." οὐ̣ ἄλλ' ὁ θέλεις φέρε κἀγὼ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ποιήσω. φέρε νόσον, φέρε θάνατον, φέρε ἀπορίαν, φέρε λοιπόν, δίκην τὴν περὶ τῶν ἐσχάστων· πάντα ταῦτα τῷ ῥαβδίῳ τοῦ 'Ερμοῦ ὥφελιμα ἐσται. "τον θάνατον τί ποιήσεις;" τί γὰρ ἄλλο ή ἦνα σε κοσμίζῃ ή ἦνα δείξῃ; έργῳ δι' αὐτοῦ, τί ἐστιν ἀνθρώπως τῷ βουλήματι τῆς φύσεως παρακολουθῶν; "τὴν νόσον τί ποιήσεις;" δείξω αὐτής τὴν φύσιν, διαπρέψω ἐν αὐτῇ, εὐσταθήσω, εὐφροσύνης, τὸν ἰατρὸν οὐ κολακεύσω, οὐκ εὔξομαι ἀποθανεῖν. τί ἔτι ἄλλο θείες; πάν ὁ ἂν δῆς, ἐγὼ αὐτὸ ποιήσω μακάριον, εὐδαιμονικον, σεμνὸν, ζηλωτόν.

1 Schweighäuser: ὑπὲρ ἀμφοτέρας S.
2 Upton: φασίν S. Cicero, Off. I. 158: Quod si omnia nobis · · quasi virgula divina, ut aiunt, suppedilarent, shows clearly that this is a proverbial saying.
3 Reiske: δείξῃ τε S.
greatest. So also my reviler becomes one who prepares me for my contest; he exercises my patience, my dispassionateness, my gentleness. You say: No. But the man who lays hold of my neck and gets my loins and my shoulders into proper shape helps me, and the rubber does well when he says, "Lift the pestle with both hands," and the heavier it is, the more good I get out of doing so; whereas, if a man trains me to be dispassionate, does he do me no good? Your attitude means that you do not know how to derive advantage from men. Is your neighbour bad? Yes, for himself; but for me he is good; he exercises my good disposition, my fair-mindedness. Is your father bad? Yes, for himself; but for me he is good. This is the magic wand of Hermes. "Touch what you will," the saying goes, "and it will turn into gold." Nay, but bring whatever you will and I will turn it into a good. Bring disease, bring death, bring poverty, reviling, peril of life in court; all these things will become helpful at a touch from the magic wand of Hermes. "What will you make of death?" Why, what else but make it your glory, or an opportunity for you to show in deed thereby what sort of person a man is who follows the will of nature. "What will you make of disease?" I will show its character, I will shine in it, I will be firm, I will be serene, I will not fawn upon my physician, I will not pray for death. What else do you still seek? Everything that you give I will turn into something blessed, productive of happiness, augest, enviable.

1 The physical exercise referred to in III. 12, 9.
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16 Οὐ̔ν ἀλλὰ "βλέπε μὴ νοσήσῃς· κακὸν ἔστιν." οἶον εἰ τὶς ἔλεγεν "βλέπε μὴ λάβῃς ποτὲ φαντασίαν τοῦ τὰ τρία τέσσαρα εἶναι· κακὸν ἔστιν." ἀνθρωπε, πῶς κακὸν; ἀν δὲ δεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπολάβω, πῶς ἔτι με βλάψει; ὦ χιλίδε μᾶλλον καὶ ὕφελήσει; ἀν οὖν περὶ πενίας ὀ δεὶ ὑπολάβω, ἀν περὶ νόσου, ἀν περὶ ἀναρχίας, οὐκ ἀρκεῖ μοι; οὐκ ὕφελίμα ἔσται; πῶς οὖν ἔτι ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς τὰ κακὰ καὶ τάγαθα δεῖ με ξητεῖν;

17 Ἀλλὰ τί; ταύτα μέχρι ὄδε, εἰς οἴκον δ' οὐδεὶς ἀποφέρει· ἀλλ' εὐθὺς πρὸς τὸ παιδάριον πόλεμος, πρὸς τοὺς γείτονας, πρὸς τοὺς σκώψαντας, πρὸς τοὺς καταγελάσαντας. καλὸς γένοιτο Δεσβίω, ὅτι με καθ' ἥμεραν ἐξελέγχει μηδὲν εἰδότα.

κα'. Πρὸς τοὺς εὐκόλως ἐπὶ τὸ σοφιστεύειν ἐρχομένους.

1 "Οτι οἰ ἡ τὰ θεωρήματα ἀναλαβόντες ψιλὰ εὐθὺς αὐτὰ ἐξεμέσαι τέλουσιν ὅς οἱ στομαχικοὶ
2 τὴν τροφὴν. πρῶτον αὐτὰ 2 πέψοι, εἴθ' οὕτως οὐ 3 μὴ ἐξεμέσης· εἰ δὲ μη, ἐμετος τῷ οὖντι
3 γίνεται, πράγμ' ἀκάθαρτον 4 καὶ ἀβρωτον. ἀλλ'

1 οἱ added by Schenkl.
2 Richards: αὐτὸ S.
3 Kronenberg: οὕτω μὴ S.
4 Wolf: καθαρὸν S. But possibly the reading can be retained (with Schegk) in the sense: "What was clean food becomes mere vomit and unfit to eat."

1 That is, no farther than the class-room.
2 Presumably some scoffer or irritating person known to the audience.

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Not so you; but, "Watch out that you don't get ill; it's bad." Just as if someone said, "Watch out that you never get the impression that three are four; it's bad." Man, how do you mean "bad"? If I get the right idea of it, how is it going to hurt me any more? Will it not rather even do me good? If, then, I get the right idea about poverty, or disease, or not holding office, am I not satisfied? Will they not be helpful to me? How, then, would you have me seek any longer amongst externals for things evil and things good?

But what? These things go thus far,¹ but nobody takes them home with him; nay, as soon as we leave here, there is war on with our slave attendant, our neighbours, those that mock, and those that laugh at us. Blessed be Lesbius,² because he convicts me every day of knowing nothing!

CHAPTER XXI
To those who enter light-heartedly upon the profession of lecturing

Those who have learned the principles and nothing else are eager to throw them up immediately,³ just as persons with a weak stomach throw up their food. First digest your principles, and then you will surely not throw them up this way. Otherwise they are mere vomit, foul stuff and unfit to eat. But after

¹ Compare Schiller:
"Was sie gestern gelernt, das wollen sie heute schon lehren;
Ach, was haben die Herrn doch für ein kurzes Gedärn."

² Compare Schiller:
"Was sie gestern gelernt, das wollen sie heute schon lehren;
Ach, was haben die Herrn doch für ein kurzes Gedärn."

³ Compare Schiller:
arrian's discourses of epictetus.

απ' αὐτῶν ἀναδοθέντων δείξων τινα ἦμιν μεταβολὴν τοῦ ἑγεμονικοῦ τοῦ σεαυτοῦ, ὥς οἱ ἀθληταὶ τοὺς ὦμους, ἀφ' ὄν ἐγγυμνίσθησαν καὶ ἔφαγον, ὥς οἱ τὰς τέχνας ἀναλαβόντες, ἀφ' ὄν ἔμαθον. 4 οὐκ ἔρχεται ο投保 τέκτων καὶ λέγει "ἀκούσατέ μου διαλεγομένου περὶ τῶν τεκτονικῶν," ἀλλ' ἐκμισθωσάμενος οἰκίαν ταύτην κατασκευάσας δείκνυσιν, ὅτι ἔχει τὴν τέχνην. τοιούτων τι καὶ σὺ ποίησον φάγε ὡς ἀνθρώπος, πιέ ὡς ἀνθρώπος, κοσμιήσητε, γάμησον, παιδοποίησον, πολίτευσαι ἀνάσχοι λοιδορίας, ἐνέγκε ἄδελφον ἀγνώμονα, 6 ἐνέγκε πατέρα, ἐνεγκε νιόν, γείτονα, σύνοδον, ταύτα ἦμιν δείξων, ἱ' ἰδωμεν, ὅτι μεμάθηκας ταῖς ἀληθείαις τι τῶν φιλοσοφών. οὐ' ἀλλ' "ἔλθοιν τες ἀκούσατε μου σχόλια λέγοντος." ὑπαγε, 7 ἐήτει τίνων κατεξεράσεις. "καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐξηγήσομαι τὰ Χρυσίσπεια ὡς οὐδεὶς, τὴν λέξιν διαλύσω καθαρώτατα, προσθήσω ἂν που καὶ 'Αντιπάτρου καὶ 'Ἀρχεδήμου φοράν." 8 Εἶτα τούτον ἑκέκα ἀπολύσασιν οἱ νέοι ταῖς πατρίδας καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς τοὺς αὐτῶν, ἱ' ἐλθόντες 9 λεξειδία σου ἔξηγομένου ἀκούσωσιν; οὐ δεῖ αὐτῶν ὑποστρέψατε ἀνεκτικοὺς, συνεργητικοὺς, ἀπαθεῖς, ἀταράχους, ἔχοντάς τι ἐφόδιον τοιούτων εἰς τὸν βίον, ἀφ' οὐ ὀρμώμενοι φέρειν δυνήσονται τὰ συμπίπτοντα καλῶς καὶ κοσμεῖσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν; καὶ πόθεν σου μεταδίδοναί τούτων ὄν οὐκ ἔχεις; αὐτὸς γὰρ ἀλλο τι ἐποίησας ἐξ ἀρχῆς 1

1 Called *principes dialecticorum* by Cicero, *Acad.* II. 143.
you have digested these principles, show us some change in your governing principle that is due to them; as the athletes show their shoulders as the results of their exercising and eating, and as those who have mastered the arts can show the results of their learning. The builder does not come forward and say, “Listen to me deliver a discourse about the art of building”; but he takes a contract for a house, builds it, and thereby proves that he possesses the art. Do something of the same sort yourself too; eat as a man, drink as a man, adorn yourself, marry, get children, be active as a citizen; endure revilings, bear with an unreasonable brother, father, son, neighbour, fellow-traveller. Show us that you can do these things, for us to see that in all truth you have learned something of the philosophers. No, but "Come and listen to me deliver my comments," you say. Go to! Look for people on whom to throw up! "Yes, but I will set forth to you the doctrines of Chrysippus as no one else can; his language I will analyse so as to make it perfectly clear; possibly I will throw in a bit of the vivacity of Antipater and Archedemus."¹

And then it's for this, is it, that the young men are to leave their fatherlands and their own parents, —to come and listen to you interpreting trifling phrases? Ought they not to be, when they return home, forbearing, ready to help one another, tranquil, with a mind at peace, possessed of some such provision for the journey of life, that, starting out with it, they will be able to bear well whatever happens, and to derive honour from it? And where did you get the ability to impart to them these things which you do not possess yourself? Why, from the first did

¹
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ἡ περὶ ταύτα κατετρίβης, πῶς οἱ συλλογισμοί ἀναλυθήσονται, πῶς οἱ μεταπίπτοντες, πῶς οἱ τῶν ἡρωτήσθαι περαιώντες; "Ἤλλʼ ὦ δεινα σχολήν ἔχει; διὰ τί μὴ καγώ σχῶ;" οὔκ εἰκὴ ταύτα γίνεται, ἀνδράποδον, οὐδ' ὡς ἐτυχεῖ, ἄλλα καὶ ἡλικίαι εἶναι δεῖ καὶ βίον καὶ θεὸν ἡγεμόνα. οὔ' ἄλλʼ ἀπὸ λιμένος μὲν οὔδεις ἀνάγεται μὴ θύσας τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ παρακαλέσας αὐτοὺς βοη-θοὺς οὐδὲ στείρουσιν ἄλλως οἱ ἀνθρωποί εἰ μὴ τὴν Δήμητρα ἐπικαλεσάμενοι τηλικοῦτον δʼ ἐργού ἀψάμενος τις ἄνευ θεῶν ἀσφαλῶς ἀψεταὶ καὶ οἱ τούτω προσεύμενες εὐτυχῶς προσελέφυσον-

tai; τί ἄλλο ποιεῖς, ἀνθρωπε, ἥ τὰ μυστήρια ἐξορχῇ καὶ λέγεις "οἰκημα ἐστί καὶ ἐν Ἑλευσίνι, ἱδον καὶ ἐνθάδε. ἐκεὶ ἱεροφάντης καὶ ἐγὼ ποιήσω ἱεροφάντην. ἐκεὶ κηρύξ; καγὼ κηρυκὰ καταστήσω. ἐκεὶ δαδοῦχος καγὼ δαδοῦχον. ἐκεὶ δάδες; καὶ ἐνθάδε. αἱ φωναί αἱ αὐταί; τὰ γινόμενα τὰ διαφέρει ταύτα ἐκεῖνων;"; ἀσε-βέστατε ἀνθρωπε, οὐδὲν διαφέρει; καὶ παρὰ τόπον ταύτα ὡφελεὶ καὶ παρὰ καιρόν; οὐ' ἄλλα καὶ μετὰ θυσίας δὲ καὶ μετ' εὐχῶν καὶ προηγυνοκότα καὶ προδιακείμενον τῇ γνώμῃ, ὅτι

1 Wolf: ἀπολιπθήμενον S.
2 Oldfather: καὶ παρὰ τόπον ταύτα ὡφελεὶ καὶ παρὰ καιρόν καὶ μετὰ θυσίας S and all editors, except Upton, who saw that the passage was corrupt, but not how to heal it. ταύτα is ambiguous and misses the obvious point. Besides, within eight lines, to have exactly the same phrases, παρὰ τόπον and παρὰ καιρόν, in a diametrically opposite sense, where the text is certainly sound, seems to me intolerable. The plain sense of the entire context appears to require these changes, the first of which is the slightest imaginable, and the second, not absolutely necessary perhaps, in the
you ever do anything but wear yourself out over the question how solutions can be found for syllogisms, for the arguments that involve equivocal premisses, and those which derive syllogisms by the process of interrogation? \(^1\) "But So-and-so lectures; why shouldn't I too?" Slave, these things are not done recklessly, nor at random, but one ought to be of a certain age, and lead a certain kind of life, and have God as his guide. You say: No. But no man sails out of a harbour without first sacrificing to the gods and invoking their aid, nor do men sow hit-or-miss, but only after first calling upon Demeter; and yet will a man, if he has laid his hand to so great a task as this without the help of the gods, be secure in so doing, and will those who come to him be fortunate in so coming? What else are you doing, man, but vulgarizing the Mysteries, and saying, "There is a chapel at Eleusis; see, there is one here too. There is a hierophant there; I too will make a hierophant. There is a herald there; I too will appoint a herald. There is a torch-bearer there; I too will have a torch-bearer. There are torches there; and here too. The words said are the same; and what is the difference between what is done here and what is done there?"? Most impious man, is there no difference? Are the same acts helpful, if they are performed at the wrong place and at the wrong time? Nay, but a man ought to come also with a sacrifice, and with prayers, and after a preliminary purification, and with his mind predisposed to the idea that he

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\(^1\) See note on I. 7, 1.
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ιεροὶς προσελεύσεται καὶ ιεροὶς παλαιοῖς. οὐτως

15 ὡφέλιμα γίνεται τὰ μυστήρια, οὕτως εἰς φαντα-

σίαν ἑρχόμεθα, ὅτι ἔπι παιδεία καὶ ἐπανορθώσει

tοῦ βίου κατεστάθη πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν πα-

λαίων. σὺ δ' ἐξαγγέλλεις αὐτὰ καὶ ἐξορχὴ παρὰ

καίρόν, παρὰ τόπου, ἀνευ θυμάτων, ἀνευ ἀγνείας; 1

όυκ ἐσθῆτα ἔχεις ἢν δεῖ τὸν ιεροφάντην, οὐ κόμην,

οὐ στρόφιον οἶον δεῖ, οὐ φωνῆν, οὐχ ἥλικιαν, οὐχ

ἡγνευκας ὡς ἐκεῖνος, ἀλλ' αὐτὰς μόνας τὰς φωνὰς

ἀνειληφὼς λέγεις. ιεραί εἰσίν αἱ φωναὶ αὐταὶ

καθ' αὐτὰς;

17 "Ἀλλον τρόπον δεῖ ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἐλθεῖν* μέγα

ἐστὶ τὸ πράγμα, μυστικὸν ἐστὶν, οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχεν

18 οὐδὲ τῷ τυχόντι δεδομένον. ἀλλ' οὔδ' σοφὸν

εἶναι τυχὸν ἔξαρκει πρὸς τὸ ἐπιμεληθῆναι νέων-

dεῖ δὲ καὶ προχειρότητα τινα εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτη-

dειότητα πρὸς τούτο, νη τὸν Δία, καὶ σῶμα ποιὸν καὶ

πρὸ πάντων τὸν θεὸν συμβουλεύειν ταῦτην

tὴν χώραν κατασχεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτει συνεβού-

λευν τὴν ἐλεγκτικὴν χώραν ἔχειν, ὡς Διογένει
tὴν βασιλικὴν καὶ ἐπιτηληκτικὴν, ὡς Ζήνων τὴν

20 διδασκαλικὴν καὶ δογματικὴν. σὺ δ' ἰατρείον

ἀνοίγεις ἀλλο οὐδ' ἔχων ἡ φάρμακα, ποῦ δὲ ἡ

πώς ἐπιτίθεται ταῦτα, μήτε εἰδὼς μήτε πολυ-

21 πραγμονήσας. "Ἤδον ἐκεῖνος ταῦτα τὰ 2 κολ-

λύρια· κἀγὼ ἔχω." μή τι οὖν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν
tὴν χρηστικὴν αὐτοῖς; μή τι οἴδας καὶ πότε

1 s (and Bentley): οὔγιεις 8.

2 τὰ added by Koraeas.
will be approaching holy rites, and holy rites of great antiquity. Only thus do the Mysteries become helpful, only thus do we arrive at the impression that all these things were established by men of old time for the purpose of education and for the amendment of our life. But you are publishing the Mysteries abroad and vulgarizing them, out of time, out of place, without sacrifices, without purification; you do not have the dress which the hierophant ought to wear, you do not have the proper head of hair, nor head-band, nor voice, nor age; you have not kept yourself pure as he has, but you have picked up only the words which he utters, and recite them. Have the words a sacred force all by themselves?

One ought to approach these matters in a different fashion; the affair is momentous, it is full of mystery, not a chance gift, nor given to all comers. Nay, it may be that not even wisdom is all that is needed for the care of the young; one ought also to have a certain readiness and special fitness for this task, by Zeus, and a particular physique, and above all the counsel of God advising him to occupy this office, as God counselled Socrates to take the office of examining and confuting men, Diogenes the office of rebuking men in a kingly manner, and Zeno that of instructing men and laying down doctrines. But you are opening up a doctor's office although you possess no equipment other than drugs, but when or how these drugs are applied you neither know nor have ever taken the trouble to learn. "See," you say, "that man has these eye-salves, and so have I." Have you, then, at all the faculty of using them aright? Do you know at all when and how and for
The Cynics were the intransigent and uncompromising moralists, resembling the holy men, ascetics, and dervishes of the Orient. Epictetus idealizes them somewhat in this discourse, regarding them as a kind of perfected wise men,
whom they will do good? Why, then, do you play at hazard in matters of the utmost moment, why do you take things lightly, why do you put your hand to a task that is altogether inappropriate for you? Leave it to those who are able to do it, and do it with distinction. Do not yourself by your own actions join the number of those who bring disgrace upon philosophy, and do not become one of those who disparage the profession. If, however, you find the principles of philosophy entertaining, sit down and turn them over in your mind all by yourself, but don’t ever call yourself a philosopher, and don’t allow anyone else to say it of you, but say, rather, “He is mistaken; for my desire is no different from what it used to be, nor my choice, nor my assent, nor, in a word, have I changed at all, in my use of external impressions, from my former state.” Think this and say this about yourself, if you wish to think aright. If not, keep on playing at hazard and doing what you are doing now; for it becomes you.

CHAPTER XXII

On the calling of a Cynic

When one of his acquaintances, who seemed to have an inclination to take up the calling of a Cynic, asked him what sort of a man the Cynic ought to be, and what was the fundamental conception of his calling, Epictetus said: We will consider it at leisure; but I can tell you this much, that the man who lays like some of the early Christian anchorites, but points out very clearly that their style of life was not practicable for every man, indeed not even for one so humble and frugal as he himself was.
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θεοῦ τηλικοῦτῳ πράγματι ἐπιβαλλόμενος θεο-
χόλωτός ἐστι καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δημοσία θέλει
3 ἁσχημονεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν οἰκία καλῶς οἰκουμένη
παρελθὼν τις αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ λέγει “ἐμὲ δεῖ οἰκο-
νόμον εἶναι.” εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπιστραφεῖς ὁ κύριος
καὶ ἱδὼν αὐτὸν σοβαρῶς διατασσόμενον, ἐλκύσας
4 ἔτεμεν. οὕτως γίνεται καὶ εἰ τῇ μεγάλῃ ταύτῃ
πόλει. ἐστὶ γὰρ τις καὶ ἐνθαῦτ' οἰκοδεσπότης
5 ἐκαστα ὁ διατάσσων. “σὺ ἡλίος εἰ: δύνασαι
περιερχόμενος ἐναυτὸν ποιεῖν καὶ ὥρας καὶ τοὺς
καρποὺς αὐξεῖν καὶ τρέφειν καὶ ἀνέμους κινεῖν
καὶ ἀνίεναι καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων θερ-
μαίνειν συμμέτρως: ὑπαγε, περιέρχου καὶ οὕτως
διακινεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν μεγίστων ἐπὶ τὰ μικρότατα.
6 σὺ μοσχάριον εἰ: ὅταν ἐπιφανῆ λέων, τὰ σαυτοῦ
πρᾶσσε· εἰ δὲ μή, οἰμωξεῖς. σὺ ταῦρος εἰ, προ-
σέλθων μάχον· σοὶ γὰρ τούτο ἐπιβάλλει καὶ
7 πρέπει καὶ δύνασαι αὐτὸ ποιεῖν. σὺ δύνασαι
ἡγεῖσθαι τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐπὶ "Ἰλιον" ἵσθι
Ἀγαμέμνονων. σὺ δύνασαι τῷ "Εκτορὶ μονο-
8 μαχῆσαι: ἵσθι Ἀχιλλεύς." εἰ δὲ Θερσίτης
παρελθὼν ἀντεποιεῖτο τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἢ οὐκ ἄν
ἔτυχεν ἢ τυχῶν ἄν ἡσχημονήσεν ἐν πλείοσὶ
μάρτυρι.
9 Καὶ σὺ βούλεσαι 1 περὶ τοῦ 2 πράγματος ἐπι-
10 μελῶς· οὐκ ἔστιν οἶλον δοκεῖ σοι. "κριβῶνον
καὶ νῦν φορῶ καὶ τὸθ' 3 ἔξω, 4 κοιμῶμαι καὶ νῦν
σκληρῶς καὶ τότε κοιμήσομαι, πηρίδιον προσ-
λήψομαι καὶ ἔυλον καὶ περιερχόμενος αἰτεῖν

1 Upton from his "codex" : συμβούλεσαι S.
2 τοῦ added by Reiske. 3 Schenkl: τόθ' S.
4 Salmasius: ἔξω S.
his hand to so great a matter as this without God, is hateful to Him, and his wish means nothing else than disgracing himself in public. For in a well-ordered house no one comes along and says to himself, "I ought to be manager of this house"; or if he does, the lord of the mansion, when he turns around and sees the fellow giving orders in a high and mighty fashion, drags him out and gives him a dressing down. So it goes also in this great city, the world; for here also there is a Lord of the Mansion who assigns each and every thing its place. "You are the sun; you have the power, as you make the circuit of the heavens, to produce the year and the seasons, to give increase and nourishment to the fruits, to stir and to calm the winds, and to give warmth in moderation to the bodies of men; arise, make the circuit of the heavens, and so set in motion all things from the greatest to the least. You are a calf; when a lion appears, do what is expected of you; otherwise you will smart for it. You are a bull; come on and fight, for this is expected of you, it befits you, and you are able to do it. You are able to lead the host against Ilium; be Agamemnon. You are able to fight a duel with Hector; be Achilles." But if Thersites came along and claimed command, either he would not have got it, or if he had, he would have disgraced himself in the presence of a multitude of witnesses.

So do you also think about the matter carefully; it is not what you think it is. "I wear a rough cloak even as it is, and I shall have one then; I have a hard bed even now, and so I shall then; I shall take to myself a wallet and a staff,\textsuperscript{1} and I shall

\textsuperscript{1} Quite like modern dervishes.
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άρξομαι τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας, λοιδορεῖν καὶ ἢδω τινὰ δρωπακιζόμενον, ἐπιτιμήσω αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ κόμιον πεπλακότα ἢ ἐν κοκκίνοις περιπα-

11 τοῦτα.” εἰ τοιούτῳ τι φαντάζη τὸ πράγμα, μακρὰν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ· μὴ προσέλθῃς, οὐδὲν ἐστι πρὸς σέ. εἰ δ' οἷον ἐστὶ φανταζόμενος οὐκ ἀπαξιοῖς σεαυτόν, σκέψαι ἥλικῳ πράγματι ἐπιχειρεῖς.

13 Πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς κατὰ σεαυτόν οὐκέτι δεῖ σε ὁμοιον ἐν οὐδενὶ φαίνεσθαι οἷς νῦν ποιεῖς, οὐ θεῷ ἐγκαλοῦντα, οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ· ὡρεξίν ἄραι σε1 δεῖ παντελῶς, ἐκκλίσιν ἐπὶ μόνα μεταθείναι τὰ προαιρετικὰ· σοι μή ὀργήν εἶναι, μή μὴν, μή φθόνον, μή ἔλεον· μή κοράσιον σοι φαίνεσθαι καλόν, μή δοξάριον, μή παιδάριον, μή πλακουν-

14 τάριον. ἐκεῖνο γὰρ εἰδέναι σε δεῖ, ὅτι οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι τοὺς τοῖχους προβέβληνται καὶ τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὸ σκότος, οταν τι τῶν τοιούτων ποιῶσιν, καὶ τὰ κρύψοντα πολλὰ ἔχουσιν. κέκλεικε τὴν θύραν, ἔστακέν2 τινα πρὸ τοῦ κοιτῶνος. “ἄν τις ἔλθῃ, λέγε ὅτι ἔξω ἐστίν, οὐ σχολάζει.” ὁ Κυνικὸς δ' ἀντὶ πάντων τούτων ὀφείλει τὴν αἰδῶ προβεβλήσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, γυμνὸς καὶ ἐν ῥυπαίθρῳ ἀσχημονίσει. τοῦτο οἰκία ἐστίν αὐτῷ, τοῦτο θύρα, τοῦτο οἱ ἐπὶ τοῦ κοιτῶνος, τοῦτο σκότος. οὔτε γὰρ θέλειν τι δεῖ ἀποκρύπτειν αὐτὸν τῶν έαυτοῦ (εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπῆλθεν, ἀπώλεσε

1 Wolf: ἀρέσαι S. 134

Wolf: ἔστακέν S.
begin to walk around and beg from those I meet, and revile them; and if I see someone who is getting rid of superfluous hair by the aid of pitch-plasters, or has a fancy cut to his hair, or is strolling about in scarlet clothes, I will come down hard on him.” If you fancy the affair to be something like this, give it a wide berth; don’t come near it, it is nothing for you. But if your impression of it is correct, and you do not think too meanly of yourself, consider the magnitude of the enterprise that you are taking in hand.

First, in all that pertains to yourself directly you must change completely from your present practices, and must cease to blame God or man; you must utterly wipe out desire, and must turn your aversion toward the things which lie within the province of the moral purpose, and these only; you must feel no anger, no rage, no envy, no pity; no wench must look fine to you, no petty reputation, no boy-favourite, no little sweet-cake. For this you ought to know: Other men have the protection of their walls and their houses and darkness, when they do anything of that sort, and they have many things to hide them. A man closes his door, stations someone at the entrance to his bedroom: “If anyone comes, tell him ‘He is not at home, he is not at leisure.’” But the Cynic, instead of all these defences, has to make his self-respect his protection; if he does not, he will be disgracing himself naked and out of doors. His self-respect is his house, his door, his guards at the entrance to his bedroom, his darkness. For neither ought he to wish to keep concealed anything that is his (otherwise he is lost, he has destroyed the Cynic
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τῶν Κυνικῶν, τῶν ὑπαιθρον, τῶν ἑλεύθερον, ἦρκται τι τῶν ἐκτὸς 1 φοβείσθαι, ἦρκται χρείαν ἐχειν τοῦ ἀποκρύψοντος) οὔτε ὅταν θέλη δύναται. ποῦ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀποκρύψη ἢ πῶς; ἂν δ' ἀπὸ τύχης 2 ἐμπέσῃ ὁ παιδευτὴς ὁ κοινὸς, ὁ παιδαγωγός, οὐά πάσι χείν ἀνάγκη; ταῦτ' οὖν δεδοικότα ἐπιθαρρεῖν οἷόν τ' ἐτὶ ἐξ ὀλης ψυχῆς ἐπιστατεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις; ἀμήχανον, ἀδύνατον.

19 Πρώτον οὖν τὸ ἤγερμοικὸν σὲ δεῖ τὸ σαυτοῦ καθαρῶν ποιήσαι καὶ τὴν ἐνστασιν ταύτην’ “νῦν ἐμοὶ ὑλή ἐστὶν ἡ ἐμὴ διάνοια, ὡς τῷ τέκτων τὰ ξύλα, ὡς τῷ σκυτε τὰ δέρματα· ἐργὼν δ’ ὀρθῇ χρήσις τῶν φαντασιῶν. τὸ σωμάτιον δὲ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμέ· τὰ τοῦτον μέρη οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμέ. θάνατος; ἐρχέσθω, ὅταν θέλῃ, εἴτε ὅλου εἴτε μέρους τινὸς. ψυγή; 3 καὶ ποῦ δύναται τις ἐκβαλεῖν; ἐξω τοῦ κόσμου οὐ δύναται. ὅπου δ' ἄν ἀπέλθω, ἐκεῖ ἡλιος, ἐκεῖ σελήνη, ἐκεὶ ἀστρα, ἐνύπνια, οἰωνοὶ, ἢ πρὸς θεοὺς ὀμιλία.”

23 Εἰδ' οὖτως παρασκευασάμενον οὐκ ἐστὶ τούτοις ἀρκεῖσθαι τὸν ταῖς ἀληθείας Κυνικών, ἀλλ' εἰδέναι δει, ὅτι ἄγγελος ἀπὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἀπέσταλται

1 Wolf: ἐκτὸς S. 2 τύχης S. 3 Upton: φεύγε S.

1 That is, the trusted servant who attended constantly the boys of the well-to-do families, and in particular watched over their deportment and morals.
2 ἐμπέσειν seems to me to be used as in III. 7, 12. This is a rare meaning, indeed, but supported to some extent also by the gloss in Hesychius: ἐμπέσειν εἰς δεσμωτήριον ἀχθηναί. The word is also used of getting caught in a trap, Xenophon Mem. II. 1, 4: τοῖς θηράτρωις ἐμπίπτουσι. That is probably the
within him, the man of outdoor life, the free man; he has begun to fear something external, he has begun to need something to conceal him), nor can he keep it concealed when he wishes to do so. For where will he conceal himself, or how? And if this instructor of us all, this "pedagogue,"¹ chance to get caught,² what must he suffer! Can, then, a man who is afraid of all this continue with all his heart to supervise the conduct of other men? It cannot be done, it is impossible.

In the first place, then, you must make your governing principle pure, and you must make the following your plan of life: "From now on my mind is the material with which I have to work, as the carpenter has his timbers, the shoemaker his hides; my business is to make the right use of my impressions. My paltry body is nothing to me; the parts of it are nothing to me. Death? Let it come when it will, whether it be the death of the whole or some part. Exile? And to what place can anyone thrust me out? Outside the universe he cannot. But wherever I go, there are sun, moon, stars, dreams, omens, my converse with gods."

In the next place, the true Cynic, when he is thus prepared, cannot rest contented with this, but he must know that he has been sent by Zeus to men,

original form of expression from which the intransitive use derives. Schenkl (not Schweighäuser, to whom I owe the above references to Hesychius and Xenophon) appears to me to be wrong in rendering the word "decipior," although Matheson is inclined to follow him. Capps suggests that "the κοινὸς παιδευτής is God," and that ἐμπέση means "break in upon." But that might be somewhat inconsistent with ἀπὸ τυχῆς, which seems hardly appropriate of an action on the part of God.

137
καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ὑποδείξων αὐτοῖς, ὅτι πεπλάνυνται καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ ξητοῦσι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, ὅποιον οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅποιον δὲ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἐνθυμοῦνται,

24 καὶ ὡς ὁ Διογένης ἀπαχθεῖς πρὸς Φίλιππον μετὰ τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχην κατάσκοπος εἶναι. τῷ γὰρ ὅντι κατάσκοπος ἐστὶν ὁ Κυνικὸς τοῦ τίνα

25 ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις φίλα καὶ τίνα πολέμια· καὶ δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀκριβῶς κατασκευάμενον ἔλθοντ' ἀπαγγείλαι τάληθη μῆθ' ὑπὸ φοβοῦ ἐκπλαγέντα, ὡστε τοὺς μὴ ὅντας πολεμίους δεῖξαι, μήτε τινὰ ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπὸ τῶν φαντασίων παραταραχθέντα ἢ συγχυθέντα.

26 Δεῖ οὖν αὐτὸν δύνασθαι ἀνατεινάμενον, ἂν οὔτως τύχῃ, καὶ ἐπὶ σκηνῆν τραγικὴν ἀνερχόμενον λέγειν τὸ τοῦ Ἀκράτους "ὡς ἄνθρωποι,1 ποὶ φέρεσθε; τί ποιεῖτε, ὦ ταλαίπωροι; ὡς τυφλοὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω κυλίσθε; ἀλλὰν ὅδον ἀπέρχεσθε τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολελοῦστε, ἀλλαχοῦ ξητεῖτε τὸ εὕρον καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονικόν,2 ὅποιον οὐκ

27 ἐστιν, οὖν ἄλλου δεικνύοντος πιστεύετε. τί αὐτὸ ἔξω ξητεῖτε; ἐν σώματι οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ ἀπιστεῖτε, ἱδεῖτε Μύρωνα, ἱδεῖτε Ὄφελλουν. ἐν κτήσει οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ ἀπιστεῖτε, ἱδεῖτε Κροῖσον, ἱδεῖτε τοὺς νῦν πλουσίους, οὕς οἰμωγῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν μεστὸς ἔστιν. ἐν ἀρχῇ οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ μὴ γε,

1 Schweighäuser: ἄνθρωποι S: ἄνθρωποι Leopold.
2 Shaftesbury: ἡγεμονικόν S.
partly as a messenger, in order to show them that in questions of good and evil they have gone astray, and are seeking the true nature of the good and the evil where it is not, but where it is they never think; and partly, in the words of Diogenes, when he was taken off to Philip, after the battle of Chaeroneia, as a scout.¹ For the Cynic is truly a scout, to find out what things are friendly to men and what hostile; and he must first do his scouting accurately, and on returning must tell the truth, not driven by fear to designate as enemies those who are not such, nor in any other fashion be distraught or confused by his external impressions.

He must, accordingly, be able, if it so chance, to lift up his voice, and, mounting the tragic stage, to speak like Socrates: "Alas! men, where are you rushing?² What are you doing, O wretched people? Like blind men you go tottering all around. You have left the true path and are going off upon another; you are looking for serenity and happiness in the wrong place, where it does not exist, and you do not believe when another points them out to you. Why do you look for it outside? It does not reside in the body. If you doubt that, look at Myron, or Ophellius.³ It is not in possessions. If you doubt that, look at Croesus, look at the rich nowadays, the amount of lamentation with which their life is filled. It is not in office. Why, if it

¹ Compare I. 24, 3–10. The philosopher is a sort of spy sent on in advance into this world, to report to the rest of us what things are good and what evil.
² [Plato], Cleitophon, 407 A–B.
³ Probably famous athletes or gladiators of the day; otherwise unknown.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICHTETUS

28 έδει τοὺς δίς καὶ τρίς ὑπάτους ευδαιμονας εἶναι. οὐκ εἰσὶν δὲ. τίσιν περὶ τούτου πιστεύσομεν; ύμῖν τοῖς ἐξωθεῖν τὰ ἑκεῖνων βλέπουσιν καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας περιλαμμομένους ἥ αὐτοῖς ἑκεῖνοις;
29 τί λέγουσιν; ἀκούσατε αὐτῶν, ὅταν οἰμῶξωσιν, ὅταν στένωσιν, ὅταν δ' αὐτὰς τὰς ὑπατείας καὶ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ἀθλιώτερον οἴσνται καὶ ἐπικινδυνότερον ἔχειν. ἐν βασιλείᾳ οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ μή, Νέρων ἄν εὐδαιμῶν ἐγένετο καὶ Σαρδανάπαλλος. ἀλλ' οὖν' Ἀγαμέμνων εὐδαιμῶν ἦν καὶ τοι κομψότερος ὁν Σαρδαναπάλλου καὶ Νέρωνος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων ῥεγκόντων ἑκεῖνος τί ποιεῖ;

30 πολλὰς ἐκ κεφαλῆς προθελύμνους ἐλκετο χαῖτας. καὶ αὐτὸς τί λέγει;

31 πλάζομαι οδὲ, φησίν, καὶ ἀλαλύκτημαι: κραδὶν δὲ μοι ἐξω στηθέων ἐκθράψκει.

32 τάλας, τὶ τῶν σῶν ἔχει κακῶς; ἡ κτῆσις; οὐκ ἔχει· ἀλλὰ πολύχρυσος εἰ καὶ πολύχαλκος. τὸ σῶμα; οὐκ ἔχει.1 τὶ ὅνων σοι κακῶν ἑστιν; ἑκεῖνο, ὁ τὲ ποτὲ ἡμέληται σου καὶ κατέφθαρται, ὃ ὀρεγόμεθα, ὃ ἐκκλίνομεν, ὃ ὀρμῶμεν καὶ ἀφορ- μῶμεν. πῶς ἡμέληται; ἀγνοεῖ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ

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1 Capps transfers to this position τὸ σῶμα; οὐκ ἔχει, which in S precede ἀλλὰ . . . πολύχαλκος.
2 τὸ τίποτε Blass, perhaps rightly.

1 Iliad, X. 15.
Book III. xxii. 27-32

were, then those who have been consul two or three times ought to be happy men, but they are not. Whom are we going to believe about this question? You who look upon their estate from the outside and are dazzled by the external appearance, or the men themselves? What do they say? Listen to them when they lament, when they groan, when they think that their condition is more wretched and dangerous because of these very consulships, and their own reputation, and their prominence. It is not in royalty. Otherwise Nero would have been a happy man, and Sardanapalus. Nay, even Agamemnon was not a happy man, though a much finer fellow than Sardanapalus or Nero; but while the rest are snoring what is he doing?

"Many a hair did he pluck, by the roots, from his forehead." 1

And what are his own words?

"Thus do I wander," 2

he says, and

"To and fro am I tossed, and my heart is Leaping forth from my bosom." 3

Poor man, what about you is in a bad state? Your possessions? No, it is not; rather you "are possessed of much gold and of much bronze." 4 Your body? No, it is not. What, then, is wrong with you? Why, this: You have neglected and ruined whatever that is within you by which we desire, avoid, choose, and refuse. How neglected? It remains ignorant of

2 v. 91. 3 v. 94 f.
4 Iliad, XVIII. 289.
άγαθον πρὸς ἢν πέφυκε καὶ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τί ἵδιον ἔχει καὶ τί ἀλλότριον. καὶ ὅταν τι τῶν ἀλλότριων κακῶς ἔχει, λέγει "οὐαὶ μοι, οἱ γὰρ Ἐλλήνες κινδυνεύουσι." ταλαίπωρον ἤγεμονικόν καὶ μόνον ἀτημέλητον καὶ ἀθεράπευτον. "μέλλουσιν ἀποθνῄσκειν ὑπὸ τῶν Τρῶων ἀναιρεθέντες." ἀν δ᾽ αὖτοις οἱ Τρῶες μὴ ἀποκτείνωσιν, οὐ μὴ ἀποθάνωσι; "ναί, ἀλλ᾽ οὖχ ὑφ᾽ ἐν πάντες." τι οὖν διαφέρει; εἰ γὰρ κακὸν ἔστι τὸ ἀποθανεῖν, ἂν τε ὡμοὶ ἂν τε καθ᾽ ἐνα ὀμοίως κακὸν ἔστων. μὴ τι ἄλλο τι μέλλει γίνεσθαι ἢ τὸ σωμάτιον χωρίζεσθαι καὶ ή ψυχὴ; "οὐδέν." σοὶ δὲ ἀπολλυμένων τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἡ θύρα κέκλεισται; οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἀποθανεῖν; "ἐξεστὶν." τι οὖν πενθεῖς; οὐαὶ, βασιλεὺς καὶ τὸ τοῦ Δίως σκῆπτρον ἔχων. ἀτυχὴς βασιλεὺς οὐ γίνεται οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀτυχὴς θεός. τί οὖν εἰ; ποιμὴν ταῖς ἀληθείαις; οὕτως γὰρ κλαίεις ὡς οἱ ποιμένες, ὅταν λύκος ἀρπάσῃ τι τῶν προβάτων αὐτῶν καὶ οὕτωι δὲ πρὸβατά εἰσιν οἱ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἥρχομενοι. τί δὲ καὶ

1 Specifically alluding to the position of Agamemnon in the situation referred to above.
2 This is a distinct over-statement of the case. Obviously it makes a great deal of difference for a State (and it is in his capacity as head of a State that Agamemnon is here appearing), whether its fighting men are killed all at once, or die one at a time in the course of nature.
3 Presumably a king is expected to commit suicide before becoming "unfortunate," as suggested in § 34. If he survived under the circumstances here described, he certainly must be "unfortunate," at least as a man, in any ordinary sense of the term. Capps, however, thinks the meaning of Epictetus to be that a king qua king, that is, while really holding the sceptre of Zeus, is blessed of fortune. If "unfortunate" he is simply not such a king. This refinement

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the true nature of the good, to which it was born, and of the true nature of the evil, and of what is its own proper possession, and what is none of its own concern. And whenever some one of these things that are none of its own concern is in a bad way, it says, "Woe is me, for the Greeks are in danger." 1 Ah, miserable governing principle, the only thing neglected and uncared for! "They are going to perish, slain by the Trojans." But if the Trojans do not kill them, will they not die anyway? "Yes, but not all at once." What difference does it make, then? For if death is an evil, whether they die all at once, or die one at a time, it is equally an evil. 2 Nothing else is going to happen, is it, but the separation of the paltry body from the soul? "Nothing." And is the door closed for you, if the Greeks perish? Are you not permitted to die? "I am." Why, then, do you grieve? "Woe is me, a king, and holding the sceptre of Zeus!" A king does not become unfortunate any more than a god becomes unfortunate. 3 What are you, then? Truly a shepherd! 4 for you wail as the shepherds do when a wolf carries off one of their sheep; and these men over whom you rule are sheep. But why did you come here 5 in the first

would be similar to the well-known argument concerning the "ruler qua ruler," in the first book of Plato's Republic. The more common-sense view of the case is well expressed by the Scholiast on Homer's Odyssey XI. 438, thus: "A king is unfortunate when his subjects fare ill."

4 Referring to the common Homeric designation of a ruler as the "shepherd of the folk."

5 Capps proposes the novel view that ἢρχειν is from ἢρχομαι, and "takes up ἢρχομενοι [35] ... Agamemnon, by allowing himself to be dominated by an ἀλλότριον πράγμα, has become a subject, a sheep."
ARRIANT'S DISCOURSES OF EPICURUS

"Ερχον; μή τι ορεξίς ύμων ἐκινδυνεύετο, μή τι ἕκκλησις, μή τι όρμη, μή τι ἀφορμή; "οὖ," φησίν, "ἄλλα τοῦ ἀδέλφον μου τὸ γυναικάριον ἦρπαγη.

37 οὐκ οὖν ἑκάστου μέγα στερηθήκαρα κοιχικῷ γυναικάριον; "καταφρονηθῶμεν οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν Τρώων;" τίνων ὄντων; φρονίμων ἡ ἀφρόνων; εἰ φρονίμων, τί αὐτοῖς πολεμεῖτε; εἰ ἀφρόνων, τί ύμων μέλει; "Εν τίνι οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄγαθόν, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν; εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, κύριε ἀγγέλε καὶ κατάσκοπε." "ὁποῦ οὗ δοκεῖτε οὔδε θέλετε ζητήσαι αὐτό. εἰ γὰρ ἥθελετε, εὑρεῖτε αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ὑμῖν διὸν οὐδ' ἀν ἔξω ἐπλάζεσθε οὐδ' ἀν ἔξητείτε τὰ

39 ἀλλότρια ὥς ἰδία. ἐπιστρέψατε αὐτοῖ ἔφ' εαυτούς, καταμάθετε τὰ προλήψεις ὡς ἔχετε. ποιῶν τι φαντάζεσθε τὸ ἄγαθόν; τὸ εὑροῦν, τὸ εὐδαιμονικόν, τὸ ἀπαραπόδιστον. ἀγε, μέγα ᵃ αὐτὸ φυσικῷ οὐ φαντάζεσθε; ξειόλογον οὐ φαντάζεσθε; ἄβλαβες οὐ φαντάζεσθε; ἐν ποίᾳ οὐν ὑλῇ δεῖ ζητεῖν τὸ εὑροῦν καὶ ἀπαραπόδιστον; ἐν τῇ δούλῃ ή ἐν τῇ ἐλευθερᾷ; "ἐν τῇ ἐλευθερᾷ. "τὸ σωμάτιον οὖν ἐλευθερον ἔχετε ἡ δοῦλον; "οὐκ ὑσμεν. "οὐκ ἵστε ὅτι πυρετοῦ δοῦλον ἐστιν, ποδάγρας, ὁφθαλμίας, δυσεντερίας, τυράννου, πυρός, σιδήρου, παντὸς τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου;" 41 "ναι δοῦλον." "πῶς οὖν ἔτι ἀνεμποδίστον ειναι τι δύναται τῶν τοῦ σώματος; πῶς δὲ μέγα η ἀξιόλογον τὸ φύσει νεκρόν, ἡ γῆ, ὁ πηλός; τί οὖν; 42 οὔδεν ἔχετε ἐλευθερον; "μὴ ποτε οὔδεν." "καὶ

1 οὐκοῦν S. 2 Wolf: μετὰ S.

1 See sections 24 and 25 above, and note there.
place? Your desire was not in danger, was it, or your avoidance, your choice, or your refusal? "No," he answers, "but my brother's frail wife was carried off." Was it not, then, a great gain to lose a frail and adulterous wife? "Shall we, then, be despised by the Trojans?" Who are they? Wise men or foolish? If wise, why are you fighting with them? If foolish, why do you care?

"In what, then, is the good, since it is not in these things? Tell us, Sir messenger and scout." \(^1\) "It is where you do not expect it, and do not wish to look for it. For if you had wished, you would have found it within you, and you would not now be wandering outside, nor would you be seeking what does not concern you, as though it were your own possession. Turn your thoughts upon yourselves, find out the kind of preconceived ideas which you have. What sort of a thing do you imagine the good to be? Serenity, happiness, freedom from restraint. Come, do you not imagine it to be something naturally great? Something precious? Something not injurious? In what kind of subject-matter for life ought one to seek serenity, and freedom from restraint? In that which is slave, or in that which is free?" "In the free." "Is the paltry body which you have, then, free or is it a slave?" "We know not." "You do not know that it is a slave of fever, gout, ophthalmia, dysentery, a tyrant, fire, iron, everything that is stronger?" "Yes, it is their servant." "How, then, can anything that pertains to the body be unhampered? And how can that which is naturally lifeless, earth, or clay, be great or precious? What then? Have you nothing that is free?"  

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tis υμᾶς ἀναγκάσαι δύναται συγκαταθέσθαι τῷ 
ψευδεὶ φαινομένω;” “οὐδεὶς.” “tis de μὴ συγκα-
tathēsai tō fainoménoi ἀληθεῖ;” “οὐδεὶς.” 
“ἐνθάδ᾽ οὐν ὁράτε, ὃτι ἐστι τι ἐν υμῖν ἔλευθερον 
φύσει. ὀρέγεσθαι δ᾽ ἡ ἐκκλίνειν ἡ ὀρμᾶν ἡ ἀφορ-
μαν ἡ παρασκευάζεσθαι ἡ προτίθεσθαι τίς υμῶν 
δύναται μὴ λαβῶν φαντασίαν λυσιτελοῦσ ἡ μὴ 
cαθόκοντος;” “οὐδεὶς.” “ἐχετε οὖν καὶ ἐν 
τούτοις ἀκώλυτοι τι1 καὶ ἔλευθεροι. ταλαῖπω-
ροι, τούτο ἐξεργάζεσθε, τούτον ἐπιμέλεσθε, ἐνταὐ-
θα ξητείτε τὸ ἀγαθόν.”

43 Καὶ πῶς ἐνδέχεται μὴ δέν ἔχοντα, γυμνόν, 
ἀοικόν, ἀνέστιον, αὐχμώντα, ἀδουλον,2 ἀπολιν 
dieξάγειν εὐρώς; ἰδοὺ ἀπέσταλκεν υμῖν ὁ θεὸς 
tον δείξοντα ἔργῳ, ὃτι ἐνδέχεται. “Ιδετε με, 
ἀοικός εἰμι, ἀπολιν, ἀκτήμων, ἀδουλος: χαμαι 
κοιμώμαι οὐ γυνῆ, οὐ παιδία, οὐ πραιτωρίδιον, 
ἀλλὰ γῆ μόνον καὶ οὐρανός καὶ ἐν τριβωνάριον.
44 καὶ τί μοι λείπει; οὐκ εἰμι ἄλυτος, οὐκ εἰμι 
ἀφοβος, οὐκ εἰμι ἔλευθερος; πότε υμῶν εἰδεν μὲ 
tis ἐν ὀρέξει ἀποτυγχάνοντα, πότ᾽ ἐν ἐκκλίσει 
περιπίπτοντα, πότ᾽ ἐμεμψάμην ἡ θεὸν ἡ ἀνθρω-
pou, πότ᾽ ἐνεκάλεσά τινι; μὴ τις υμῶν ἐσκυθρω-
pακότα με εἰδεν; πῶς δ᾽ ἐντυγχάνοι τούτοις, οὐς 
ὑμεῖς φοβεῖσθε καὶ θαυμάζετε; οὐχ ὡς ἀνδρα-
πόδιοις; τίς με ἱδών οὐχὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν ἑαυτοῦ 
ὁρῶν οἴεται καὶ δεσπότην;”

1 τι added by Wolf, after Schegk.
2 Upton: δούλον S.
haps nothing." "And who can compel you to assent to that which appears to you to be false?" "No one." "And who to refuse assent to that which appears to you to be true?" "No one." "Here, then, you see that there is something within you which is naturally free. But to desire, or to avoid, or to choose, or to refuse, or to prepare, or to set something before yourself—what man among you can do these things without first conceiving an impression of what is profitable, or what is not fitting?" "No one." "You have, therefore, here too, something unhindered and free. Poor wretches, develop this, pay attention to this, seek here your good."

And how is it possible for a man who has nothing, who is naked, without home or hearth, in squalor, without a slave, without a city, to live serenely? Behold, God has sent you the man who will show in practice that it is possible. "Look at me," he says, "I am without a home, without a city, without property, without a slave; I sleep on the ground; I have neither wife nor children, no miserable governor's mansion, but only earth, and sky, and one rough cloak. Yet what do I lack? Am I not free from pain and fear, am I not free? When has anyone among you seen me failing to get what I desire, or falling into what I would avoid? When have I ever found fault with either God or man? When have I ever blamed anyone? Has anyone among you seen me with a gloomy face? And how do I face those persons before whom you stand in fear and awe? Do I not face them as slaves? Who, when he lays eyes upon me, does not feel that he is seeing his king and his master?"
arrian's discourses of epictetus

50 Ἡδε κυνικαὶ φωναί, ἢδε χαρακτήρ, ἢδ ἐπιβολή. οὐ ἀλλὰ πηρίδιον καὶ ξύλον καὶ γνάθοι μεγάλαι. καταφαγεῖν πάν ὁ ἀν 1 δῶς ἡ ἀποθησαυρίσαι ἡ τοῖς ἀπαντῶσι λοιδορεῖσθαι ἀκαίρως ἡ καλὸν τὸν ὄμον δεικνύειν. τηλικοῦτοι πράγματι όρας πῶς μέλλεις ἐγχειρεῖν; ἔσοπτρον πρῶτον λάβε, ἢδε σοι τοὺς ὦμους, κατάμαθε τὴν ὀσφύν, τούς μηροὺς. Ὁλύμπια μέλλεις ἀπογράφεσθαι, ἀν-θρωπε, οὐχὶ τινὰ ποτε ἄγδινα ψυχρῶν καὶ ταλαι-πωρον. οὐκ ἐστῖν ἐν Ὁλυμπίοις νυκτθῆναι μόνον καὶ ἐξελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν ὅλης τῆς οἰκουμενῆς βλεποῦσης δὲ ἡ ἀσχημονήσαι, οὐχὶ ἀθναίων μόνων ἡ Δακεδαιμονίων ἡ Νικοπολιτῶν, εἴτε καὶ δέρεσθαι δεὶ τὸν εἰκῆ ἐξελθόντα, 2 πρὸ δὲ τοῦ δαρῆναι διψῆσαι, καυματισθῆναι, πολλὴν ἀφὴν καταπιεῖν.

51 Βούλευσαι ἐπιμελέστερον, γνώθι σαυτόν, ἀνάκρινον τὸ δαμόνιον, δίχα θεοῦ μὴ ἐπιχειρήσῃς. ἀν γὰρ συμβουλεύσῃς, ἵσθι ὅτι μέγαν σε θέλει γενέσθαι ἡ πολλὰς πληγὰς λαβεῖν. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο λίαν κομψὸν τὸ Κυνικῷ παραπέλεκται: δέρεσθαι αὐτὸν δεὶ ως ὄνον καὶ δερόμενον φιλεῖν αὐτοὺς τοὺς δέροντας ως πατέρα πάντων, ως ἀδελφῶν. οὐ ἀλλ᾽ ἀν τίς σε δέρη, κραύγαζέ στὰς ἐν τῷ μέσῳ "ο Καῖσαρ, ἐν τῇ σῇ εἰρηνή.

1 Schenkl: ἐὰν S.
2 εἰσελθόντα Meibom. Compare explanatory note.

1 Meibom's conjecture, εἰσελθόντα, which is sometimes accepted, would mean, "The man who carelessly enters the contest." But the punishment of flogging would probably be reserved for the person who failed to appear finally in the lists, since everyone had to have a month's preliminary
Lo, these are words that befit a Cynic, this is his character, and his plan of life. But no, you say, what makes a Cynic is a contemptible wallet, a staff, and big jaws; to devour everything you give him, or to stow it away, or to revile tactlessly the people he meets, or to show off his fine shoulder. Do you see the spirit in which you are intending to set your hand to so great an enterprise? First take a mirror, look at your shoulders, find out what kind of loins and thighs you have. Man, it's an Olympic contest in which you are intending to enter your name, not some cheap and miserable contest or other. In the Olympic games it is not possible for you merely to be beaten and then leave; but, in the first place, you needs must disgrace yourself in the sight of the whole civilized world, not merely before the men of Athens, or Lacedaemon, or Nicopolis; and, in the second place, the man who carelessly gets up and leaves\(^1\) must needs be flogged, and before he is flogged he has to suffer thirst, and scorching heat, and swallow quantities of wrestler's sand.

Think the matter over more carefully, know yourself, ask the Deity, do not attempt the task without God. For if God so advises you, be assured that He wishes you either to become great, or to receive many stripes. For this too is a very pleasant strand woven into the Cynic's pattern of life; he must needs be flogged like an ass, and while he is being flogged he must love the men who flog him, as though he were the father or brother of them all. But that is not your way. If someone flogs you, go stand in the midst and shout, "O Caesar, what do I training on the spot, during which time those who had entered would suffer the inconveniences described below.
ολα πάσχω; ἂνῳ λέγεις ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄνθυπατον."

56 Κυνικῷ δὲ Καίσαρ τί ἐστιν ἢ ἄνθυπατος ἢ ἄλλος ἢ ὁ καταπεπομφὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ὁ λατρεύει, ὁ Ζεὺς; ἄλλον τινὰ ἐπικαλεῖται ἢ ἑκείνου; οὗ πέπεισται δ', ὅ τι ἀν πάσχῃ τούτων, ὅτι ἑκείνος αὐτῶν γυμνάζει; ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν 'Ἡρακλῆς υπὸ Εὔφρονθέως γυμναζόμενος οὐκ ἐνομίζειν ἄθλιος εῖναι, ἀλλ' ἀόκυνως ἐπετέλει πάντα τὰ προστατ-τόμενα. ¹ οὕτως δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Δίως ἀθλούμενος καὶ γυμναζόμενος μέλλει κεκραγέναι καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν, ἄξιος φορεῖν τὸ σκῆπτρον τὸ Διογένους;

57 ἀκούει τί λέγειν ἑκείνους πυρέσσων πρὸς τοὺς παριόντας: "κακαί," ἐφη, "κεφαλαί, οὐ μενεῖτε; ἀλλ' ἀθλητῶν μὲν ὀλέθρων ἀμέν ὁμόμενοι ἀπίτε ὀδὸν τοσαῦτην εἰς 'Ολυμπίαν πυρετοῦ δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου μάχην ἰδείν οὐ βούλεσθε;" ταχὺ γ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐνεκάλεσεν τῷ θεῷ καταπεπομ-φότι αὐτὸν ὡς παρ' ἄξιαν αὐτῷ χρωμένω, ὃς γε ἐνεκαλλωπίζετο ταῖς περιστάσεσι καὶ θέαμα εῖναι ἡξίου τῶν παριόντων. ἐπὶ τίνα γὰρ ἐγκα-λέσει; ὅτι εὐσχημονεῖ; τί ³ κατηγορεῖ; ὅτι λαμπροτέραν ἐπιδείκνυται τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν ἐαυ-

1 Meibom: πραττόμενα S.
2 Blass: ὀλέθρων ἡ μάχην S.
3 Elter: δὴ S.

1 Referred to also by Jerome, Adv. Jovinianum, 2, 14.
2 An ancient scholiast, probably Arethas (cf. Schenkl², p. lxx), remarks at this point, that Epictetus had probably read the Gospels and Jewish literature. But this particular passage does not furnish any very cogent argument, for the evidence adduced, namely the injunctions about "turning the other cheek" and "loving your enemies" (Matth. 5, 39 and 44), has nothing in common with the somewhat vain-
have to suffer under your peaceful rule? let us go before the Proconsul." But what to a Cynic is Caesar, or a Proconsul, or anyone other than He who has sent him into the world, and whom he serves, that is, Zeus? Does he call upon anyone but Zeus? And is he not persuaded that whatever of these hardships he suffers, it is Zeus that is exercising him? Nay, but Heracles, when he was being exercised by Eurystheus, did not count himself wretched, but used to fulfil without hesitation everything that was enjoined upon him: and yet is this fellow, when he is being trained and exercised by Zeus, prepared to cry out and complain? Is he a man worthy to carry the staff of Diogenes? Hear his words to the passers-by as he lies ill of a fever: 1 "Vile wretches," he said, "are you not going to stop? Nay, you are going to take that long, long journey to Olympia, to see the struggle of worthless athletes; but do you not care to see a struggle between fever and a man?" 2 No doubt a man of that sort would have blamed God, who had sent him into the world, for mistreating him! Nay, he took pride in his distress, and demanded that those who passed by should gaze upon him. Why, what will he blame God for? Because he is living a decent life? What charge does he bring against Him? The charge that He is exhibiting his virtue in a more glorious speech of Diogenes. Probably, however, the scholium actually belongs at § 54, where there is, indeed, a certain resemblance. Fairly apposite, also, is the citation of James 1, 2: πάσαν χαράν ἥγησασθε, ἀδελφοί, ὅταν πειρασμοί περιτέσθη τούτοις, in connection with the next sentence. But even at the best, these words from the New Testament are only parallels, certainly not sources. On the general question, see Introd., Vol. I., p. xxvif.
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60 τοῦ; ἀγε, περὶ πενίας δὲ τί λέγει, περὶ θανάτου, περὶ πόνου; πῶς συνέκρινεν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν αὐτοῦ τῇ μεγάλῳ βασιλέως; μᾶλλον δ’ οὐδὲ συγκριτῶν φητο εἶναι. ὅπου γὰρ ταραχαὶ καὶ λύπαι καὶ φόβοι καὶ ὁρέξεις ἀτελεῖς καὶ ἐκκλίσεις περιπίπτουσαι καὶ φθόνοι καὶ ζηλοτυ-πίαι, ποῦ ἐκεῖ πάροδος εὐδαιμονίας; ὅπου δ’ ἂν ἡ σαπρὰ δόγματα, ἐκεῖ πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι ἀνάγκη.

62 Πυθομένου δὲ τοῦ νεανίσκου, εἰ νοσήσας ἄξιοῦν-τος φίλου πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν ὅστε νοσοκομηθῆναι ὑπακούσει, Ποῦ δὲ φίλου μοι δῶσεις Κυνικοῦ; ἐφη. δεὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἄλλον εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ἢ’ ἄξιος ἡ φίλος αὐτοῦ ἀριθμεῖσθαι. κοινονοῦν αὐτὸν εἶναι δεὶ τοῦ σκῆπτρου καὶ τῆς βασιλείας καὶ διάκονον ἄξιον, εἰ μέλλει φιλίας ἁξιωθῆ-σεσθαι, ὡς Διογένης Ἀντισθένους ἐγένετο, ὡς

63 Κράτης Διογένους. ἡ δ’ δοκεῖ σοι, ὅτι, ἂν χαίρειν αὐτῶ λέγῃ προσερχόμενος, φίλος ἐστὶν αὐτῶ κἀκεῖνος αὐτῶν ἄξιον ἡγισταὶ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτῶν εἰσελθεῖν; ὡστε ἂν σοι δοκῇ καὶ ἐνθυμηθῆς τί τοιοῦτον, κοπρίαν μᾶλλον περιβλέπειν κομψῆν, ἐν ἡ πυρέξεις, ἀποσκέπουσαν τὸν βορέαν, ἵνα μὴ περιψυχῆς. σὺ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς θέλειν εἰς οἶκον τινος ἀπελθῶν διὰ χρόνων χορτασθῆναι. τί οὖν σοι καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγματι τηλικοῦτῳ;

66 Γάμος δ’, ἐφη, καὶ παῖδες προηγομένως παρα-

1 Schegk: ἦ S. 2 Reiske: ἐνθυμήθητι S. 3 Schweighäuser: πῦρ ἔξεις S.

1 Of Persia.
2 The word means also “‘staff,” as in 57.
brilliant style? Come, what says Diogenes about poverty, death, hardship? How did he habitually compare his happiness with that of the Great King? Or rather, he thought there was no comparison between them. For where there are disturbances, and griefs, and fears, and ineffectual desires, and unsuccessful avoidance, and envies, and jealousies — where is there in the midst of all this a place for happiness to enter? But wherever worthless judgments are held, there all these passions must necessarily exist.

And when the young man asked whether he, as a Cynic, should consent, if, when he had fallen ill, a friend asked him to come to his house, so as to receive proper nursing, Epictetus replied: But where will you find me a Cynic's friend? For such a person must be another Cynic, in order to be worthy of being counted his friend. He must share with him his sceptre and kingdom, and be a worthy ministrant, if he is going to be deemed worthy of friendship, as Diogenes became the friend of Antisthenes, and Crates of Diogenes. Or do you think that if a man as he comes up greets the Cynic, he is the Cynic's friend, and the Cynic will think him worthy to receive him into his house? So if that is what you think and have in mind, you had much better look around for some nice dunghill, on which to have your fever, one that will give you shelter from the north wind, so that you won't get chilled. But you give me the impression of wanting to go into somebody's house for a while and to get filled up. Why, then, are you even laying your hand to so great an enterprise?

But, said the young man, will marriage and children
ληθησονται υπὸ τοῦ Κυνικοῦ ;—"Αν μοι σοφῶν, ἔφη, δῶς πόλιν, τάχα μὲν οὖν ὑπεὶ τις ράδιως ἐπὶ τὸ κυνίζειν. τίνων γὰρ ἐνεκα ἀναδεξηται

68 ταύτην τὴν διεξαγωγήν; ὦμως δὲ ἀν ὑποθώμεθα, οὐδὲν κωλύσει καὶ γήμαι αὐτὸν καὶ παϊδοποιήσασθαι. καὶ γὰρ ἡ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ ἔσται ἄλλη τοιαύτη καὶ ὁ πενθερὸς ἄλλος τοιοῦτος καὶ τὰ παιδία οὕτως ἀνατραφίσεται. τοιαύτης δ’ οὕσης καταστάσεως, οίᾳ νῦν ἔστιν, ὡς ἐν παρατάξει, μὴ ποτ’ ἀπερίσπαστον εἶναι δεὶ τὸν Κυνικὸν, ὅλων πρὸς τῇ διακονία τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐπιφοιτῶν ἀνθρώποις δυνάμενον, οὐ προσδεδεμένον καθήκουσιν ιδιωτικοῖς οὐδ’ ἐμπεπλεγμένον σχέσειν, ἃς παραβαίνων οὐκέτι σῶσει τὸ τοῦ καλῶν καὶ ἄγαθον πρόσωπον, τηρῶν δ’ ἀπολεί τὸν ἀγγελὸν καὶ κατάσκοπον καὶ κήρυκα τῶν θεῶν; ὥρα γὰρ, ὅτι αὐτὸν ἀποδεικνύναι δεὶ τῷ πενθερῷ, ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς ἄλλοις συγγενέσι τῆς γυναικὸς, αὐτῇ τῇ γυναικί: εἰς νοσοκομίας λοιπὸν ἐκκλείεται, εἰς πορισμὸν. ίνα τὰλλα ἄφω, δεὶ αὐτὸν κουκκούμιον, ὅπου θερμὸν ποιήσει τῷ παιδίῳ, ἵνα αὐτὸ λούσῃ εἰς σκάφην’ ἐρίδια τεκοῦσῃ τῇ γυναικὶ, ἐλαιον, κραβαττίον, ποτήριον (γίνεται ἣδη πλείω σκευάρια) τῇ ἀλλῃ ἀσχολίαν, τὸν περιπασμὸν. ποῦ μοι λοιπὸν ἐκεῖνος ὁ βασιλεὺς ὁ τοῖς κοινοῖς προσευκαίρων,

ὁ λαοὶ τ’ ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα μέμηλεν·

1 Schenkl : ἀν δὲπται Ἐρ.
2 δεὶ added by Schenkl : Sc (?) has it after δτί.

1 Homer, Iliad, II. 25.
be undertaken by the Cynic as a matter of prime importance?—If, replied Epictetus, you grant me a city of wise men, it might very well be that no one will lightly adopt the Cynic's profession. For in whose interest would he take on this style of life? If, nevertheless, we assume that he does so act, there will be nothing to prevent him from both marrying and having children; for his wife will be another person like himself, and so will his father-in-law, and his children will be brought up in the same fashion. But in such an order of things as the present, which is like that of a battle-field, it is a question, perhaps, if the Cynic ought not to be free from distraction, wholly devoted to the service of God, free to go about among men, not tied down by the private duties of men, nor involved in relationships which he cannot violate and still maintain his rôle as a good and excellent man, whereas, on the other hand, if he observes them, he will destroy the messenger, the scout, the herald of the gods, that he is. For see, he must show certain services to his father-in-law, to the rest of his wife's relatives, to his wife herself; finally, he is driven from his profession, to act as a nurse in his own family and to provide for them. To make a long story short, he must get a kettle to heat water for the baby, for washing it in a bath-tub; wool for his wife when she has had a child, oil, a cot, a cup (the vessels get more and more numerous); not to speak of the rest of his business, and his distraction. Where, I beseech you, is left now our king, the man who has leisure for the public interest,

Who hath charge of the folk and for many a thing must be watchful? 1
of, deit tovs allaous episkopein, tovs geganymekota, tovs pepaidopoimemous, tis kalwos xheri tay auton yunaiki, tis kakow, tis diaferei, poiia oikia eustachei, poiia ou, ow iatrein perierchomenon

73 kai twon syngymon aptomeinon; "su purpeteis, su kefalalgeis, su podagras, su anateinon, su fane, su aloutheinou se dei tmythenai, se dei kauthenai." poi sykoli to eis t a idiotikà kathkon eunedemwv; agoi, ou dei auton porisa imatidia tois paidiois; pro synarmatisth anpositheilain piakidia excunta, graphaia, titylaria, kata to toutoi krahaption estoimassai; ou gar ek tis koulias execlontata dynatai Kunika einai: ei debei, kreiisoun hny auta geenomeba ripsai

75 outwos aitokteinai. skopetei, poi katagome tov

76 Kunikon, povs auton tew basileian afairoymetha.
—Nai. allh Krateis egmen.—Periastasin moi legeis ex erwton genemewn kai yunaita theis allon Krateita. hemveis de peri tov kouvon gamon kai apeiristaton xhtoumen kai outw xhtoivtes onx euridesmen ev taunt tis katastasei praphoumenon to Kuniko to pragma.

77 Pws ouv eti, fhisin, diaswsei tewn koivnian;
—Twn theon sou meizona de euergetousin anbrow-

1 Transposed to this position by Upton from the beginning of the next sentence.
2 D Cange: tillaeria S.
3 Etler, after Schegk: kai S.
4 Ev added by Upton.
5 Upton: sou S.

1 That ancient marriages (which would appear to have been quite as successful as any other) were very seldom con-
Where, pray, is this king, whose duty it is to oversee the rest of men; those who have married; those who have had children; who is treating his wife well, and who ill; who quarrels; what household is stable, and what not; making his rounds like a physician, and feeling pulses? "You have a fever, you have a headache, you have the gout. You must abstain from food, you must eat, you must give up the bath; you need the surgeon's knife, you the cautery." Where is the man who is tied down to the duties of everyday life going to find leisure for such matters? Come, doesn't he have to get little cloaks for the children? Doesn't he have to send them off to a school-teacher with their little tablets and writing implements, and little notebooks; and, besides, get the little cot ready for them? For they can't be Cynics from the moment they leave the womb. And if he doesn't do all this, it would have been better to expose them at birth, rather than to kill them in this fashion. See to what straits we are reducing our Cynic, how we are taking away his kingdom from him.—Yes, but Crates married.—You are mentioning a particular instance which arose out of passionate love, and you are assuming a wife who is herself another Crates. But our inquiry is concerned with ordinary marriage apart from special circumstances, and from this point of view we do not find that marriage, under present conditions, is a matter of prime importance for the Cynic.

How, then, said the young man, will the Cynic still be able to keep society going?—In the name of God, sir, who do mankind the greater service? cerned with romantic passion, is well known, but seldom so explicitly stated as here.
ποις οἱ ἡ δύο ἡ τρία κακόρυγχα παιδία ἀνθ᾽ αὐτῶν εἰσάγοντες ἢ οἱ ἑπισκοποῦντες πάντας κατὰ δύναμιν ἀνθρώπους, τί ποιοῦσιν, πῶς διάγωσιν, τίνος ἐπιμελοῦνται, τίνος ἀμελοῦσι παρὰ τὸ προσήκον; καὶ Ἡθβαῖοις μείζονα ὁφε- λήσαν ὅσοι τεκνία αὐτοῖς κατέληπον Ἐπαμι- νώνδου τοῦ ἀτέκνου ἀποθανόντος; καὶ Ὄμηρου πλείονα τῇ κοινωνίᾳ συνεβάλετο Πρίαμος ὁ πεντήκοντα γεννήσας περικαθάρματα ἡ Δανάος

78 ἡ Λεῖόλος; εἶτα στρατηγία μὲν ἡ σύνταγμά τινα ἀπείρξει γάμου ἡ παιδοποιία καὶ οὐ δόξει οὕτως ἀντ᾽ οὐδενὸς ἡλλάξατι τὴν ἀτεκνίαν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ

80 Κυνικοῦ βασιλεία οὐκ ἔσται ἀνταξία; μὴ ποτε οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα τοῦ μεγεθοῦς αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φανταζόμεθα κατ᾽ ἄξιαν τὸν χαρακτῆρα τῶν Διογένους, ἀλλ' εἰς τοὺς νῦν ἀποβλέπομεν, τοὺς τραπεζήας ¹ πυλαώρους, οἱ οὐδὲν μιμοῦνται ἐκεῖνος ἢ εἰ τι ² ἀρα πόρδωνες γίνονται, ἀλλο

81 δ' οὐδέν; ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἐκάνει ταύτα οὐδ' ἂν ἐπεθαυμάζομεν, εἰ μὴ γαμήσει ἡ παιδοποίη- σεται. ἀνθρωπε, πάντας ἀνθρώπους πεπαιδο- ποίηται, τοὺς ἄνδρας υἱὸς ἔχει, τὰς γυναίκας θυγατέρας: πᾶσιν οὕτως προσέρχεται, οὕτως

82 πάντων κήδεται. ἡ σὺ δοκεῖς ὑπὸ περιεργίας λοιδορεῖσθαι τοῖς ἀπαντῶσιν; ὡς πατήρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, ὡς ἀδελφὸς καὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ πατρὸς ὑπηρέ- της τοῦ Διὸς.

83 "Ἀν σοι δόξη, πυθοῦ μου καὶ εἰ πολιτεύσεται.

¹ Upton: τραπεζήας S.
² Schenkl: ἦτι S.

1 Homer, Iliad, XXII. 69.
Those who bring into the world some two or three ugly-snouted children to take their place, or those who exercise oversight, to the best of their ability, over all mankind, observing what they are doing, how they are spending their lives, what they are careful about, and what they undutifully neglect? And were the Thebans helped more by all those who left them children than by Epaminondas who died without offspring? And did Priam, who begot fifty sons, all rascals, or Danaus, or Aeolus, contribute more to the common weal than did Homer? What? Shall high military command or writing a book prevent a man from marrying and having children, while such a person will not be regarded as having exchanged his childlessness for naught, and yet shall the Cynic’s kingship not be thought a reasonable compensation? Can it be that we do not perceive the greatness of Diogenes, and have no adequate conception of his character, but have in mind the present-day representatives of the profession, these “dogs of the table, guards of the gate,”¹ who follow the masters not at all, except it be in breaking wind in public, forsooth, but in nothing else? Otherwise such points as these you have been raising would never have disturbed us, we should never have wondered why a Cynic will never marry or have children. Man, the Cynic has made all mankind his children; the men among them he has as sons, the women as daughters; in that spirit he approaches them all and cares for them all. Or do you fancy that it is in the spirit of idle impertinence he reviles those he meets? It is as a father he does it, as a brother, and as a servant of Zeus, who is Father of us all.

If you will, ask me also if he is to be active in
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84 σαννίων, μείζονα πολιτείαν χιτείς, ἡς πολιτεύεται; η' ἐν Ἀθηναίοις παρελθὼν ἐρεί τις περὶ προσόδων ἡ πόρων, ὅν δεῖ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις διαλέγεσθαι, ἐπίσης μὲν Ἀθηναίοις, ἐπίσης δὲ Κορινθίοις, ἐπίσης δὲ Ρωμαίοις οὔ περὶ πόρων οὐδὲ περὶ προσόδων οὐδὲ περὶ εἰρήνης ἡ πολέμου, ἀλλὰ περὶ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ κακοδαιμονίας, περὶ εὐτυχίας καὶ δυστυχίας, περὶ δουλείας καὶ ἐλευθερίας; τηλικαύτην πολιτείαν πολιτευμένου ἀνθρώπου σὺ μου πυνθαίνῃ εἰ πολιτεύεσται; πυθοῦ μου καὶ, εἰ ἀρξεῖς πάλιν ἐρώ σοι μωρέ, ποιάν ἀρχὴν μείζονα, ἢς ἀρχει;

85 Χρεία μέντοι καὶ σώματος ποιοῦ ταῦ τοιούτω ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἁν φθισικός προέρχεται, λεπτός καὶ ὁχρός, οὐκέτι ὁμοίαν ἐμφασιν ἡ μαρτυρία αὐτοῦ ἐπειδή πιστεύει πως εἰς τὸ κείμενο παραφέρεται ἡ στηθοπτικὴ ἡ ἐνδείκνυσθαι παριστάνειν τοῖς ἰδίωταις ὅτι ἐνδεχεται διὰ τῶν θαυμαζομένων ὑπʼ αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ενδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀφελής καὶ λυτή καὶ υπαιθρός δίαιτα οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα λυμαίνεται:

86 "Ιδοὺ καὶ τούτων μάρτυς εἰμὶ ἐγὼ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμῶν." Ὅσος Διογένης ἐποίησεν στιλβών γὰρ περιήρχετο καὶ ἐπέστρεψε τοὺς πολλοὺς. ἐλευθερίας δὲ Κυκικὸς ἐπαίτησι

1 Schweighäuser: εἰ S.
2 The Salamanca ed., Wolf, and Salmasius: εἶναι ὑπʼ αὐτῶν S.
3 Wolf: καθ' S.

1 Said by the Scholiast to be a reference to the otherwise unknown philosopher Sannio; but this note certainly, as Capps suggests, belongs back at § 84, and is there a false
politics. You ninny, are you looking for any nobler politics than that in which he is engaged? Or would you have someone in Athens step forward and discourse about incomes and revenues, when he is the person who ought to talk with all men, Athenians, Corinthians, and Romans alike, not about revenues, or income, or peace, or war, but about happiness and unhappiness, about success and failure, about slavery and freedom? When a man is engaging in such exalted politics, do you ask me if he is to engage in politics? Ask me also, if he will hold office. Again I will tell you: Fool, what nobler office will he hold than that which he now has?

And yet such a man needs also a certain kind of body, since if a consumptive comes forward, thin and pale,¹ his testimony no longer carries the same weight. For he must not merely, by exhibiting the qualities of his soul, prove to the laymen that it is possible, without the help of the things which they admire, to be a good and excellent man, but he must also show, by the state of his body, that his plain and simple style of life in the open air does not injure even his body: “Look,” he says, “both I and my body are witnesses to the truth of my contention.” That was the way of Diogenes, for he used to go about with a radiant complexion,² and would attract the attention of the common people by the very appearance of his body. But a Cynic who excites pity is regarded as a beggar; inference from the word σαννίων, which is addressed to the young man. For a similar dislocation of a scholium, see the note on § 58.

¹ Due in part at least to his regular use of oil for anointing.

² Diogenes Laertius, 6, 81.
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90 Δεὶ δὲ καὶ χάριν πολλήν προσείναι φυσικήν τῷ Κυνικῷ καὶ ὅξυτητα (εἰ δὲ μὴ, μύξα γίνεται, ἄλλο δ' οὗδεν), ἵνα ἑτοίμως δύνηται καὶ παρακειμένως πρὸς τὰ ἐμπίπτοντα ἀπαντᾶν. ὥς Διογένης πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα "οὐ εἰ ὁ Διογένης ὁ μὴ οἴομενος εἶναι θεοῦ;" "καὶ πῶς," ἐφη, "σὲ θεοὶς ἐχθρὸν νομίζω;" πάλιν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐπιστάντι αὐτῷ κοιμωμένῳ καὶ εἰπόντι "οὐ χρὴ παννύχιον εὔδειν βουληθόρον ἄνδρα" ἐνυπνος ἔτι ὁν ἀπήντησεν "ὡ λασὶ τ' ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα μέμηλεν."

93 Πρὸ πάντων δὲ τὸ ἵγεμονικὸν αὐτοῦ καθαρώτερον εἶναι τοῦ ἱλίου· εἰ δὲ μὴ, κυβερνήτην ἀνάγκη καὶ βαδιούργον, ὡστις ἐνεχόμενος τινι αὐτὸς κακῶς ἐπιτιμήσει τοῖς ἄλλοις. ὃ ρα γάρ, ὁδὸν ἐστίν. τοῖς βασιλεύσαι τοῦτοι καὶ τυράννοις οἱ δορυφόροι καὶ τὰ ὀπλα παρεῖχε τὸ ἐπιτιμῶν

1 See Schweighäuser: πυρείχετο Σ. 

1 See Diogenes Laertius, 6, 42; the same joke appears already in Aristophanes (Eq. 32-4), as Capps remarks. 
2 The same account in Theon, Progymn. 5 (Stengel, II. p. 98). The famous meeting of these two men is pretty clearly apocryphal, at least in certain details. See Natorp in the Real-Encyclopädie², V. 767.
everybody turns away from him, everybody takes
offence at him. No, and he ought not to look dirty
either, so as not to scare men away in this respect
also; but even his squalor ought to be cleanly and
attractive.

Furthermore, the Cynic ought to possess great
natural charm and readiness of wit—otherwise he
becomes mere snivel, and nothing else—so as to be
able to meet readily and aptly whatever befalls;
as Diogenes answered the man who said: “Are you
the Diogenes who does not believe in the existence
of the gods?” by saying, “And how can that be?
You I regard as hated by the gods!”¹ Or again,
when Alexander² stood over him as he was sleeping
and said,

Sleeping the whole night through beseems not
the giver of counsel,

he replied, still half asleep,

Who hath charge of the folk, and for many a
thing must be watchful.³

But above all, the Cynic’s governing principle
should be purer than the sun; if not, he must
needs be a gambler and a man of no principle,
because he will be censuring the rest of mankind,
while he himself is involved in some vice. For see
what this means. To the kings and tyrants of this
world their bodyguards and their arms used to

³ Homer, Iliad, II. 24 and 25. The only point in the
anecdote seems to be that Diogenes could say something
more or less apposite even when only half awake; for the
completion of the quotation is in no sense a real answer to
the reproach.
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τισίν καὶ 1 δύνασθαι καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας καὶ αὐτοῖς οὐσὶ κακοῖς, τῷ δὲ 2 Κυνικῷ ἀντὶ τῶν ὀπλῶν καὶ τῶν δορυφόρων τὸ συνειδὸς τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταῦτην παραδίδωσιν. 95 ὅταν ἵθη, 3 ὅτι ὑπερηγρύπνηκεν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων καὶ πεπόνηκεν καὶ καθαρὸς καὶ κεκοίμηται, καθαρότερον δ' αὐτὸν ἔτι ὁ ὑπνὸς ἄφηκεν, ἐντεθύμηται δ', ὅσα ἐντεθύμηται ὡς φίλοι τοῖς θεοῖς, ὡς ὑπηρέτης, ὡς μετέχων τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ Διός, πανταχοῦ δ' αὐτῶ πρόχειρον τὸ ἄγου δὲ μ', ὁ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ γ' ἡ Πεπρωμένη, καὶ ὅτι εἰ ταῦτη τοῖς θεοῖς φίλοιν, ταῦτη γινέσθω· διὰ τί μὴ θαρρήσῃ παρρησιαζέσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ, πρὸς τὰ τέκνα, ἀπλῶς πρὸς τοὺς συγγενεῖς;

96 Διὰ τούτου οὕτε περίεργος οὕτε πολυπράγμων ἐστὶν ὁ οὕτω διακείμενος· οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα ῥηματα πολυπράγμονει, ὅταν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἐπισκόπη, ἄλλα τὰ ἴδια. εἰ δὲ μή, λέγει καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν πολυπράγμονα, ὅταν τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπισκόπη καὶ ἐξετάζῃ καὶ παραφυλάσσῃ καὶ τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας κολάζῃ, ἐὰν δ' ὑπὸ μάλης ἔχων πλακοντάριον ἐπιτιμᾶς ἄλλους, ἔρω σοι οὖθελεις μᾶλλον ἀπελθὼν εἰς γωνίαν καταφαγεῖν ἐκείνο δ' ἐκέλοφας; τί δὲ σοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοτρίους;

1 Blass very reasonably suspected this word, although the text as it stands can be translated after a fashion.

2 δὲ added by Upton from his "codex."

3 Upton from his "codex": ἵθη S.

1 The rather curious imperfect tense here (at which several scholars have taken offence) may be due to an attempt to
afford\(^1\) the privilege of censuring certain persons, and the power also to punish those who do wrong, no matter how guilty they themselves were; whereas to the Cynic it is his conscience which affords him this power, and not his arms and his bodyguards. When he sees that he has watched over men, and toiled in their behalf; and that he has slept in purity, while his sleep leaves him even purer than he was before; and that every thought which he thinks is that of a friend and servant to the gods, of one who shares in the government of Zeus; and has always ready at hand the verse

\[
\text{Lead thou me on, O Zeus, and Destiny,}^2 \\
\text{and "If so it pleases the gods, so be it,"}^3 \\
\text{why should he not have courage to speak freely to his own brothers, to his children, in a word, to his kinsmen?}
\]

That is why the man who is in this frame of mind is neither a busybody nor a meddler; for he is not meddling in other people’s affairs when he is overseeing the actions of men, but these are his proper concern. Otherwise, go call the general a meddler when he oversees and reviews and watches over his troops, and punishes those who are guilty of a breach of discipline. But if you censure other men while you are hiding a little sweet-cake under your arm, I’ll say to you: Wouldn’t you rather go off into a corner and eat up what you have stolen? What have you to do with other people’s business?

avoid the suggestion that the Roman emperors might also be evil men themselves.

\(^2\) See note on II. 23, 42, in Vol. I.
\(^3\) Plato, \textit{Crít}o, 43 D.
Τίς γὰρ εἰ; ο ὁταῖρος εἰ ἡ ἡ βασιλείσσα τῶν μελισσῶν; δεῖξον μοι τὰ σύμβολα τῆς ἁγεμονίας, οἷα ἐκείνη ἐκ φύσεως ἔχει. εἰ δὲ κηφήν εἰ ἐπιδικαζόμενος τῆς βασιλείας τῶν μελισσῶν, οὐ δοκεῖς ὅτι καὶ σὲ καταβαλοῦσιν οἱ συμπολιτεύόμενοι, ὥς αἱ μελισσαι τοὺς κηφήνας;

Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀνεκτικὸν τοσοῦτον ἔχειν δεὶ τὸν Κυνικόν, ὥστ' αὐτὸν ἀναίσθητον δοκεῖν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ λίθον οὐδεὶς αὐτὸν λοιδορεῖ, οὐδεὶς τύπτει, οὐδεὶς ύβρίζει: τὸ σωμάτιον δ' αὐτοῦ δέδωκεν αὐτὸς χρῆσθαι τῷ θέλοντι ὡς θεοῦλεται.

μέμνηται γὰρ, ὅτι τὸ χεῖρον ἀνάγκη νικᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ὅπου χεῖρον ἔστω, τὸ δὲ σωμάτιον τῶν πολλῶν χειρῶν, τὸ ἀσθενέστερον τῶν ἰχυροτέρων. οὐδὲποτ' ὅποι εἰς τοῦτον καταβαίνει τὸν ἀγώνα, ὅπου δύναται νικηθῆναι, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εὐθὺς ἔξισταται, τῶν δούλων οὐκ ἀντιποιεῖται. ὁποὺ δὲ προαιρέσεις καὶ χρήσεις τῶν φαντασιῶν, ἐκεῖ ὤψει, ὡσα ὄμματα ἔχει, ἵν' εἴπης, ὅτι "Ἀργὸς τυφλὸς ἦν πρὸς αὐτόν.

μὴ ποὺ συγκατάθεσις προπετής, μὴ ποὺ ὀρμὴ εἰκαία, μὴ ποὺ ὄρεξις ἀποτευκτική, μὴ ποὺ ἐκκλησὶς περιπτωτική, μὴ ποὺ ἐπιβολὴ ἀτελής, μὴ ποὺ μέμψις, μὴ ποὺ ταπείνωσις ἡ φθόνος; ὥδε ἡ πολλὴ προσοχῇ καὶ σύντασις, τῶν δ' ἀλλῶν ἑνεκὰ ὑπτίος ῥέγκει: εἰρήνη πᾶσα, λῆτης προαιρέσεως οὐ γίνεται, τύραννος οὐ γίνεται. σωματίου δὲ; ναλ. καὶ κτησειδίον;

1 μὴ ποὺ supplied by Schenkl.

1 That is, actually or effectually, for the mere act without any effect is as nothing.

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BOOK III. xxii. 99-106

Why who are you? Are you the bull in the herd, or the queen bee of the hive? Show me the tokens of your leadership, like those which nature gives the queen bee. But if you are a drone and lay claim to the sovereignty over the bees, don't you suppose your fellow-citizens will overthrow you, just as the bees so treat the drones?

Now the spirit of patient endurance the Cynic must have to such a degree that common people will think him insensate and a stone; nobody reviles him, nobody beats him, nobody insults him; but his body he has himself given for anyone to use as he sees fit. For he bears in mind that the inferior, in that respect in which it is inferior, must needs be overcome by the superior, and that his body is inferior to the crowd—the physically weaker, that is, inferior to the physically stronger. Therefore, he never enters this contest where he can be beaten, but immediately gives up what is not his own; he makes no claim to what is slavish. But in the realm of the moral purpose, and the use of his sense-impressions, there you will see he has so many eyes that you will say Argus was blind in comparison with him. Is there anywhere rash assent, reckless choice, futile desire, unsuccessful aversion, incompletely purpose, fault-finding, self-disparagement, or envy? Here is concentrated his earnest attention and energy; but, as far as other things go, he lies flat on his back and snores; he is in perfect peace. There rises up no thief of his moral purpose, nor any tyrant over it. But of his body? Certainly. And of his paltry possessions?

2 Like the body, his own or that of another. His rule is over the mind and the moral purpose.
ναὶ· καὶ ἄρχον καὶ τιμῶν. τί οὖν αὐτῷ τούτων μέλει; ὅταν οὖν τις διὰ τούτων αὐτῶν ἐκφοβήθη, λέγει αὐτῷ "ὑπαγε, ζήτει τὰ παιδία· ἐκεῖνοις τὰ προσωπεῖα φοβερά ἔστιν, ἐγὼ δὲ σίδα, ὅτι ὀστράκινα ἔστιν, ἐσώθεν δὲ οὐδὲν ἔχει."  

107 Περὶ τοιούτου πράγματος βουλεύῃ. ὃστε εἰςν σοι δόξη, τὸν θεόν σοι, ὑπέρθου καὶ ἰδοὺ σοι πρῶτον τὴν παρασκευὴν. ἰδοὺ γὰρ, τί καὶ ὁ "Ἐκτωρ λέγει τῇ 'Ανδρομάχῃ" "ὑπαγε," φησὶν, "μᾶλλον εἰς οἶκον καὶ υφαίνει· πόλεμος δὲ ἀνδρεσσι μελήσει πᾶσι, μάλιστα δὲ ἐμοί." 1  

108 οὕτως καὶ τῆς ἱδίας παρασκευῆς συνήσθετο καὶ τῆς ἐκείνης ἀδυναμίας.

κγ. Πρὸς τοὺς ἄναγγειλόμενους καὶ διαλεγομένους ἐπιδεικτικῶς.

1 Τὸς εἶναι θέλεις, σαυτὸ πρῶτον εἰπέ· εἴθ' οὕτως ποιεῖ ἡ ποιεῖς. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδόν ἀπάντων οὕτως ὀρθοὺς γινόμενα. οἱ ἀθλοῦντες πρῶτον κρίνουσιν, τίνες εἶναι θέλουσιν, εἴθ' οὕτως τὰ ἐξῆς ποιοῦσιν. εἰ δολιχοδρόμοις, τοιαύτη τροφή, τοιούτος περίπατος, τοιαύτη τρίψις, τοιαύτη γυμνασία· εἰ σταδιοδρόμοις, πάντα ταύτα ἄλλοια· εἰ πένταθλος, ἐτὶ ἄλλοιό·

1 πᾶσιν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μάλιστα the MSS. of Homer.

1 Homer, Ἰλιάδ, VI. 492-3.
Certainly; and of his offices and honours. Why, then, does he pay any attention to these? So when anyone tries to terrify him by means of these things, he says to him, "Go to, look for children; they are scared by masks; but I know that they are made of earthenware, and have nothing inside."

Such is the nature of the matter about which you are deliberating. Wherefore, in the name of God I adjure you, put off your decision, and look first at your endowment. For see what Hector says to Andromache. "Go," says he, "rather into the house and weave; but for men shall war be the business, Men one and all, and mostly for me."¹

So did he recognize not only his own special endowment, but also her incapacity.

CHAPTER XXIII

To those who read and discuss for the purpose of display

Tell yourself, first of all, what kind of man you want to be; and then go ahead with what you are doing. For in practically every other pursuit we see this done. The athletes first decide what kind of athletes they want to be, and then they act accordingly. If a man wants to be a distance-runner, he adopts a suitable diet, walking, rubbing, and exercise; if he wants to be a sprinter, all these details are different; if he wants to contend in the pentathlon, they are still more different

¹
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3 teva. ou'to's eur'hseis kai epi' to'n texv'n. ei' tektwn, tonauta exeis: ei' xalkeus, tonauta.

4 ef' o ehi dei, diephalmenos. loupou e f' eis kai kai the ean to'v

5 theiour. h d' idia pro's to epitevduma ekastou kai t'v pruaireiv.

6 o riptwv o ehi riptwv. sthn ou'n leug's "deunte kai

7 anafereis, skexai, ei' ef' o dei. ophelhisai

8 trip't. oukouv ophelhisai theleis; pro's ti; ei'pe kai ehi'min, iwa kai autoi trechowmen eis to'

9 Theleis ou'n ynovai, ei' ophelhisai; fere sou

1 See on I. 29, 59, in Vol. I.

1 eikh added by Reiske. Compare § 6.
2 Schenkl: probaton, eiphleikws kai epieikws, ws S.
You will find the same thing in the arts. If you want to be a carpenter, you will have such and such exercises; if a blacksmith, such and such other. For in everything that we do, if we do not refer it to some standard, we shall be acting at random; but if we refer it to the wrong standard, we shall make an utter failure. Furthermore, there are two standards to go by, the one general, the other individual. First of all, I must act as a man. What is included in this? Not to act as a sheep, gently but without fixed purpose; nor destructively, like a wild beast. The individual standard applies to each man's occupation and moral purpose. The citharoede is to act as a citharoede, the carpenter as a carpenter, the philosopher as a philosopher, the rhetor as a rhetor. When, therefore, you say, "Come and listen to me as I read you a lecture," see to it first that you are not acting without fixed purpose. And then, if you find that you are using a standard of judgement, see if it is the right one. Do you wish to do good or to be praised? you ask. Immediately you get the answer, "What do I care for praise from the mob?" And that is an excellent answer. Neither does the musician, in so far as he is a musician, nor the geometrician. Do you wish to do good, then? To what end? men reply. Tell us, also, that we too may run to your lecture-room. Now can anybody do good to others unless he has received good himself? No more than the non-carpenter can help others in carpentry, or the non-cobbler in cobbling.

Do you wish, then, to know whether you have received any good? Produce your judgements, philosopher. What does desire promise? Not to
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10 μὴ ἀποτυγχάνειν. τίς ἐκκλίσεως; μὴ περιπτειν. ἂγε, πληροῦμεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν; εἰπέ μοι τάληθή: ἂν δὲ ψεύσῃ, ἐρῶ σοι "πρῴην ψυχρότερον σοι τῶν ἄκροατῶν συνελθόντων καὶ μὴ ἐπιβοσάντων σοι τεταπεινωμένος ἐξῆλθες" πρῷην ἐπαινεθεὶς περιήρχου καὶ πᾶσιν ἔλεγες τί σοι ἔδοξα; 'θαυμαστῶς, κύριε, τὴν ἐμὴν σοι σωτηρίαν. 'πῶς δ' εἶπον ἐκεῖνο; 'τὸ ποῖον; 'ὀπον διέγραψα τὸν Πάνα καὶ τὰς 11 Νύμφας. 'ὑπερφυώς." εἰτά μοι λέγεις, ἐν ὄρεξε καὶ ἐκκλίσει κατὰ φύσιν ἀναστρέφῃ;

12 ὑπαγε, ἄλλον πείδε. τὸν δεῖνα δὲ πρῷην οὐκ ἐπῆνεις παρὰ τὸ σοὶ φαίνόμενον; τὸν δεῖνα δ' οὐκ ἐκολάκευες τὸν συνκλητικὸν; ἥθελες σοι τὰ παιδία εἶναι τοιαῦτα;—Μὴ γένοιτο.—Τίνος οὖν ἔνεκα ἐπῆνεις καὶ περιεῖπες αὐτὸν;—Εὐφυῆς νεανίσκος καὶ λόγων ἀκουστικός.—Πόθεν τούτο;—'Εμὲ θαυμάζει.—Εἰρήκας τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.

Εἰται τί δοκεῖ σοι; αὐτοὶ σοι οὐτοὶ οὐ κατα-

15 φρονοῦσιν λεληθότως; ὅταν οὖν ἄνθρωπος συνειδὼς ἐαυτῷ μηθὲν ἀγαθὸν μήτε πεποιηκότι μήτ' ἐνθυμομένῳ εὐρή φιλόσοφον τὸν λέγοντα "μεγαλοφυῖς καὶ ἀπλοῖς καὶ ἄκέραιοις," τί δοκεῖς ἄλλο αὐτῶν λέγειν ἢ "οὐτὸς τινὰ ποτὲ μου χρείαν ἔχει"; ἢ εἰπέ μοι, τί μεγαλοφυνὸς ἔργον ἐπιδέδεικται; ἴδοι σύνεστι σοι τοσοῦτοι χρόνῳ, διαλεγομένου σοι ἀκίκοου, ἀναγιγνώσ-
fail in getting. What does aversion? Not to fall into what we are avoiding. Well, do we fulfil their promise? Tell me the truth; but if you lie, I will say to you: "The other day, when your audience gathered rather coolly, and did not shout applause, you walked out of the hall in low spirits. And again the other day, when you were received with applause, you walked around and asked everybody, 'What did you think of me?' 'It was marvellous, sir, I swear by my life.' 'How did I render that particular passage?' 'Which one?' 'Where I drew a picture of Pan and the Nymphs?' 'It was superb.'" And after all this you tell me that you follow nature in desire and aversion? Go to; try to get somebody else to believe you! Didn't you, just the other day, praise So-and-so contrary to your honest opinion? And didn't you flatter So-and-so, the senator? Did you want your children to be like that?—Far from it!—Why then did you praise him and palaver over him?—He is a gifted young man and fond of listening to discourses.—How do you know that?—He is an admirer of mine.—There you gave your proof!

After all, what do you think? Don't these very same persons secretly despise you? When, therefore, a person who is conscious of never having either thought or done a good thing finds a philosopher who tells him, "You are a genius, straightforward and unspoiled," what else do you suppose the man says to himself but, "This man wants to use me for something or other"? Or else tell me; what work of genius has he displayed? Look, he has been with you all this time, he has listened to your discourse, he has heard you lecture.
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Probably the famous lecturer of the day, Dio Chrysostom, of Prusa.

2 To be taken as intended for a serious compliment, and probably a popular saying (as Upton suggested) like our “Music hath charms,” or, “The very stones would cry out.” The idea behind it would be familiar from the story of how the trees followed Orpheus, in order to hear his beautiful music, or the stones arranged themselves in the walls of Thebes, to the strains of Amphion. Capps, however, thinks
Has he settled down? Has he come to himself? Has he realized the evil plight in which he is? Has he cast aside his self-conceit? Is he looking for the man who will teach him?—He is looking, the man says.—The man who will teach him how he ought to live? No, fool, but only how he ought to deliver a speech; for that is why he admires even you. Listen to him, and hear what he says. "This fellow has a most artistic style; it is much finer than Dio's." That's altogether different. He doesn't say, does he, "The man is respectful, he is faithful and unperturbed"? And even if he had said this, I would have replied: "Since this man is faithful, what is your definition of the faithful man?" And if he had no answer to give, I would have added: "First find out what you are talking about, and then do your talking."

When you are in such a sorry state as this, then, gaping for men to praise you, and counting the number of your audience, is it your wish to do good to others? "To-day I had a much larger audience." "Yes, indeed, there were great numbers." "Five hundred, I fancy." "Nonsense, make it a thousand." "Dio never had so large an audience." "How could you expect him to?" "Yes, and they are clever at catching the points." "Beauty, sir, can move even a stone." There are the words of a philosopher for you! That's the feeling of one who is on his way to do good to men! There you have that "τὸ καλὸν" means 'honour'" here, and that the remark is "cynical." He would translate: "Talk of honour, sir," etc., adding the explanatory note: "That is, the speaker would have had no success with his audience if he had preached honour and virtue (as the true philosopher should)."
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λόγου, ἀνεγνωκὼς τὰ Σωκρατικὰ ὡς Σωκρατικά, οὐχὶ δ’ ὡς Λυσίου καὶ Ἰσοκράτους. "πολλάκις ἐθα'μασα, τίσιν ποτὲ λόγοις. οὐ’ ἀλλὰ τίνι ποτέ λόγῳ τοῦτ’ ἐκείνου λειώτερον." μὴ γὰρ ἀλλὰς αὐτὰ ἀνεγνώκατε ἢ ὡς ὀδάρια; ὡς εἰ γε ἀνεγιγνώσκετε ὡς δεῖ, οὐκ ἀν πρὸς τούτους ἐγίνεσθε, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἐβλέπετε "ἐμὲ δ’ Ἀντος καὶ Μέλητος ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν δύνανται, βλάψαι δ’ οὗ,” καὶ ὅτι “ὡς ἐγὼ ἄει τοιοῦτος οἶος μηδενι1 προσέχειν τῶν ἐμῶν ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, δι’ ἀν μοι σκοπουμένῳ βελτιστος φαίνηται.” διὰ τοῦτο τίς ἥκουσί ποτε Σωκρατοὺς λέγοντος ὅτι "οἰδά τι καὶ διδάσκω;” ἀλλὰ ἄλλον ἄλλαχον ἐπεμπεν. τοιγαροῦν ἥρχοντο πρὸς αὐτῶν ἄξιον-τες φιλοσόφοις ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ συστάθηναι κάκεινος ἀπῄγεν καὶ συνίστανεν. οὐ’ ἀλλὰ προσπέμπων ἐλεγεν “ἀκουσόν μου σήμερον διαλεγομένου ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ Κοδράτου."

Τί σου ἀκούσω; ἐπίδειξαι μοι θέλεις, ὅτι κομψός συντιθεῖς τὰ ὀνόματα; συντιθεῖς, ἄνθρωπε καὶ τί σοι ἀγαθὸν ἐστιν; "ἀλλ’ ἐπαί-

1 Wolf: μηδέν S.

1 The rhetors must have disputed whether the opening words of Xenophon’s Memorabilia might not have been improved upon by using the singular λόγῳ instead of the plural λόγοι.

2 Plato, Apol. 30 C.

3 Slightly modified from Plato, Crito, 46 B.

4 i.e. to different authorities on special subjects.

5 Actual instances of such introductions are recorded in the Protagoras, 310 E, and the Theaetetus, 151 B. Compare also Maximus Tyrius, 38, 4, b. The personal relations between Socrates and the Sophists in general were clearly not strained.

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a man who has listened to reason, who has read the accounts of Socrates as coming from Socrates, not as though they were from Lysias, or Isocrates! "'I have often wondered by what arguments ever'—no, but 'by what argument ever'—this form is smoother than the other!'"¹ You have been reading this literature just as you would music-hall songs, haven't you? Because, if you had read them in the right way, you would not have lingered on these points, but this is the sort of thing rather that would have caught your eye: "Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but they cannot hurt me";² and: "I have always been the kind of man to pay attention to none of my own affairs, but only to the argument which strikes me as best upon reflection."³ And for that reason who ever heard Socrates saying, "I know something and teach it"? But he used to send one person here and another there.⁴ Therefore men used to go to him to have him introduce them to philosophers,⁵ and he used to take them around and introduce them. But no, your idea of him, no doubt, is that, as he was taking them along, he used to say, "Come around to-day and hear me deliver a discourse in the house of Quadratus"!⁶

Why should I listen to you? Do you want to exhibit to me the clever way in which you put words together? You do compose them cleverly, man; and what good is it to you? "But praise me."

⁶ The practice of letting a popular or distinguished scholar lecture in one's house was particularly common in Greek and Roman times. Several distinguished persons by the name of Quadratus were contemporaries of Epictetus (Prosopographia Imperii Romani, Vol. III, nos. 600 ff.), but it is not certain that any one of them is meant, because they resided regularly at Rome, and this discourse was held at Nicopolis.
24 νεσόν με." τι λέγεις τὸ ἐπαινεσον; "εἰπέ μοι 'ονά' καὶ 'θαυμαστῶς.'" ἰδοὺ λέγω. εἰ δ' ἐστίν ἐπαινος ἐκεῖνο, ὁ τι ποτὲ λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι τῶν ἐν τῇ \(^1\) τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ κατηγορία, \(^2\) τι σε ἐχω ἐπαινέσαι; εἰ ἁγαθὸν ἐστὶ τὸ φράζειν ὀρθῶς, δίδαξον με καὶ ἐπαινέσω. τι οὖν; ἀνθὸς; δει τῶν τοιοῦτων ἄκουειν; μη γένοιτο. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδὲ κιθαρωδοῦ ἄνθως ἄκουων· μη τι οὖν τούτων ἔνεκα κιθαρωδεῖν με δεὶ στάντα; ἄκουσον, τι λέγει Σωκράτης: "οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν πρέποι, ὥς ἄνδρες, τῇ δὲ τῆς ἡλίκια ὅσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς υμᾶς εἰσίεναι." "ὅσπερ μειρακίων" φησίν.

25 \(\text{ἐστὶ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι κομψὸν τὸ τεχνίον ἐκλέξαι ὅνομάτια καὶ τάτα συνθεῖναι καὶ παρελθόντα εὐφυῶς ἀναγγώναι· ἐπὶ ἐπεῖν καὶ μεταξὺ ἀναγγώσκοντα ἐπιφθέγξασθαι· ὅτι τούτοις οὐ πολλοῖ δύνανται παρακολουθεῖν, μᾶ τὴν ὑμὲτέραν σωτηρίαν."

26 Φιλόσοφος δ' ἐπ' ἀκρόασιν παρακαλεῖ; — Ὁ νὺξ ὁμοίοις ἄγει αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἐαυτόν τὴν τροφήν, οὕτως δὲ καὶ οὕτως ἄγει τοὺς ὥφεληθησομένους; ποῖος ἰατρὸς παρακαλεῖ, ἵνα τις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ θεραπευθῇ; καὶ τις ὑπ' ἁγαθοῦ ἑκατοντοῖς· ὁμοίως οἱ ἰατροὶ παρακαλοῦσιν ἐν Ὥμης πλῆν ἐπ' \(^1\) ἐμοὶ παρεκαλοῦντο. "παρακαλῶ σε ἐλθόντα

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1 Upton (in part after Wolf): τῶν τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ S.
2 κατηγορία S.

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1 Plato, *Apology*, 17 C.
2 According to Stoic doctrine the so-called "rays" of the sun were thought to be lines of vapour drawn to the sun in order to feed its fires. Zeno, frag. 35; Cleanthes, frag. 501; 178
What do you mean by "praise"? "Cry out to me, 'Bravo!' or 'Marvellous!'" All right, I'll say it. But if praise is some one of those things which the philosophers put in the category of the good, what praise can I give you? If it is a good thing to speak correctly, teach me and I will praise you. What then? Ought one to take no pleasure in listening to such efforts? Far from it. I do not fail to take pleasure in listening to a citharoede; surely I am not bound for that reason to stand and sing to my own accompaniment on the harp, am I? Listen, what does Socrates say? "Nor would it be seemly for me, O men of Athens, at my time of life to appear before you like some lad, and weave a cunning discourse."¹ "Like some lad," he says. For it is indeed a dainty thing, this small art of selecting trivial phrases and putting them together, and of coming forward and reading or reciting them gracefully, and then in the midst of the delivery shouting out, "There are not many people who can follow this, by your lives, I swear it!"

Does a philosopher invite people to a lecture?—Is it not rather the case that, as the sun draws its own sustenance to itself,² so he also draws to himself those to whom he is to do good? What physician ever invites a patient to come and be healed by him? Although I am told that in these days the physicians in Rome do advertise; however, in my time they were called in³ by their patients. "I invite you to

Chrysippus, frags. 579, 652, 658-663, all in Von Arnim's Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta.

³ The three slightly varying translations for παρακάλειν, "invite," "advertize," and "call in," seem to be required by our idiom.
Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus

άκούσαι, ὅτι σοι κακῶς ἐστὶ καὶ πάντων μᾶλλον ἐπιμελή ἢ οὐ δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ὅτι ἀγνοεῖς τὰ ἁγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ κακοδαίμων εἰ καὶ δυστυχίς." κομψῇ παράκλησις. καὶ μὴν ἂν μὴ τάῦτα ἐμποιήν ὁ τοῦ φιλοσόφου λόγος, νεκρὸς ἐστι καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ λέγων. εἰώθεν λέγειν ὁ Ροῦφος "εἰ εὐσχολεῖτε ἐπανεῖσαι με, ἐγὼ δ' οὐδὲν λέγω." τοιγαροῦν οὔτως ἔλεγεν, ὡσθ' ἔκαστον ἡμῶν καθήμενον οἴεσθαι, ὅτι τίς ποτε αὐτῶν διαβέβληκεν: οὔτως ἦπτετο τῶν γυμνομένων, οὔτως πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐτίθει τὰ ἐκάστου κακά.

30 Ἰατρεῖόν ἐστιν, ἄνδρες, τὸ τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦ σχολεῖον οὐ δεῖ ἡσθέντας ἐξελθεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀληθινας. ἔρχεσθε γάρ οὐχ ὑγιεῖς, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν δύον ἐκβεβληκὼς, ὁ δ' ἀπόστημα ἔχων, ὁ δὲ σύριγγα, ὁ δὲ κεφαλαλγόν. εἰτ' ἐγὼ καθίσας ἡμῖν λέγω νοημάτια καὶ ἐπιφωνημάτια, ὅτι ὑμεῖς ἐπαινέσαντες με ἐξελθήτε, ὁ μὲν τὸν δύον ἐκφέρων οἷον εἰσήγαγεν, ὁ δὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀσάυτως ἔχουσαν, ὁ δὲ τὴν σύριγγα, ὁ δὲ τὸ ἀπόστημα; εἶτα τοῦτο ἐνεκα ἀποδημήσωσιν ἄνθρωποι νεώτεροι καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς τοὺς αὐτῶν ἀπολέσωσιν καὶ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς καὶ τὸ κτησίδιον, ἵνα σοι "οὐὰ" φῶσιν ἐπιφωνημάτια λέγοντι; τούτῳ Σωκράτης ἐποίηει, τούτῳ Ζήνων, τούτῳ Κλεάνθης;

1 Koraes: ἀπολείπονσιν S.

1 At greater length in Gellius, 5, 1, 1.
2 So it had, indeed, become in his time. Compare Introd. p. xxiv. Thus also one of the great libraries at Alexandria is said to have had over its portal: ἰατρεῖον τῆς ψυχῆς. If the
come and hear that you are in a bad way, and that you are concerned with anything rather than what you should be concerned with, and that you are ignorant of the good and the evil, and are wretched and miserable." That's a fine invitation! And yet if the philosopher's discourse does not produce this effect, it is lifeless and so is the speaker himself. Rufus used to say, "If you have nothing better to do than to praise me, then I am speaking to no purpose." Wherefore he spoke in such a way that each of us as we sat there fancied someone had gone to Rufus and told him of our faults; so effective was his grasp of what men actually do, so vividly did he set before each man's eyes his particular weaknesses.

Men, the lecture-room of the philosopher is a hospital; you ought not to walk out of it in pleasure, but in pain. For you are not well when you come; one man has a dislocated shoulder, another an abscess, another a fistula, another a headache. And then am I to sit down and recite to you dainty little notions and clever little mottoes, so that you will go out with words of praise on your lips, one man carrying away his shoulder just as it was when he came in, another his head in the same state, another his fistula, another his abscess? And so it's for this, is it, that young men are to travel from home, and leave their parents, their friends, their relatives, and their bit of property, merely to cry "Bravo!" as you recite your clever little mottoes? Was this what Socrates used to do, or Zeno, or Cleanthes?

story is true (which I very much doubt), the inscription surely belongs to the decadence, for such was clearly not the conception of science which prevailed in the great days of Alexandria.
33  Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁ προτρεπτικὸς χαρακτήρ; — Τίς γὰρ οὖν λέγει; ὥσ ὁ ἐλεγκτικὸς, ὥσ ὁ διδασκαλικὸς. τίς οὖν πῶς τοτε τέταρτον εἰπεν
34 μετὰ τούτων τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν; τίς γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ προτρεπτικὸς; δύνασθαι καὶ ἐνι καὶ πολλοῖς
dειξαι τὴν μάχην ἐν ἣ κυλίνται καὶ ὦτε μᾶλλον πάντων φροντίζονσιν ἢ δὲν θέλουσιν. θέλουσι
μὲν γὰρ τὰ πρὸς εὐθαυμονιαν φέροντα, ἄλλαχον
35 δ' αὐτὰ ἔριτοι. τούτο ἣν γένηται, δεῖ τεθηναι
χίλια βάθρα καὶ παρακληθῆναι τοὺς ἄκουσο-
mένους καὶ σε ἐν κομψῷ στολῷ ἢ τριβωναρίῳ
ἀναβάντα ἐπὶ πούλβιν διαγράφειν, πῶς Ἀχιλ-
λευς ἀπέθανεν; παῦσασθε, τοὺς θεοὺς ὑμῖν,
cαλὰ ὀνόματα καὶ πράγματα κατασχύνοντες,
36 ὅσον ἠφ' ἑαυτοῖς. οὐδὲν προτρεπτικώτερον ἢ
ὄταν ὁ λέγων ἐμφαίνῃ τοῖς ἄκουονσιν ὅτι χρείαν
37 αὐτῶν ἔχει. ἢ εἰπέ μοι, τίς ἄκουον ἀναγιγνώ-
kοντός σου ἢ διαλεγομένου περὶ αὐτοῦ ἡγώνιασεν
ἡ ἐπιστράφῃ εἰς αὐτοῦ ἢ ἐξελθῶν εἰπεν ὅτι
“καλῶς μου ἦσατο ὁ φιλόσοφος: οὐκέτι δεῖ
tαῦτα ποιεῖν”; οὐχὶ δ', ἄν λίαν εὐδοκιμῆς, λέγει
πρὸς τινα “κομψῷ ἐφρασεν τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἑρώτην;”
ἄλλος “οὐ; ἄλλα τὴν ἐπὶ Πύλαις μάχην”;
tοῦτο ἐστὶν ἄκροασις φιλοσόφου;

1 δ added by a modern hand in S.

1 That is, as a style appropriate to philosophers, for the epideictic, or style of display, was a well-recognized branch of oratory in general—and not entirely unknown, perhaps, among certain popular preachers even to-day.
2 As God needs the universe in which to exercise and display His power, so the teacher needs pupils, the speaker an audience. There is a mutual need, therefore, each of the other.

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BOOK III. xxiii. 33-38

Well! But isn't there such a thing as the right style for exhortation?—Why yes, who denies that? Just as there is the style for refutation, and the style for instruction. Who, then, has ever mentioned a fourth style along with these, the style of display? Why, what is the style for exhortation? The ability to show to the individual, as well as to the crowd, the warring inconsistency in which they are floundering about, and how they are paying attention to anything rather than what they truly want. For they want the things that conduce to happiness, but they are looking for them in the wrong place. To achieve that must a thousand benches be placed, and the prospective audience be invited, and you put on a fancy cloak, or dainty mantle, and mount the speaker's stand, and paint a word-picture of—how Achilles died? By the gods, I beseech you, have done with discrediting, as far as it is in your power to discredit, words and actions that are noble! There is nothing more effective in the style for exhortation than when the speaker makes clear to his audience that he has need of them. Or tell me, who that ever heard you reading a lecture or conducting a discourse felt greatly disturbed about himself, or came to a realization of the state he was in, or on going out said, "The philosopher brought it home to me in fine style; I must not act like this any longer"? But doesn't he say to a companion, if you make an unusually fine impression, "That was beautiful diction in the passage about Xerxes"; and doesn't the other answer, "No, I preferred the one about the battle of Thermopylae"? Is this what listening to a philosopher amounts to?

1 A typical rhetor um campus, as Cicero calls it (De Officiis, 1, 61).
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κδ’. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν προσπάσχειν τοῖς οὐκ ἐφ’ ἦμῖν.

1 Τὸ ἄλλου παρὰ φύσιν σοι κακὸν μὴ γινέσθων γὰρ συνταπεινοῦσθαι πέφυκας οὐδὲ συνα-
2 τυχεῖν, ἀλλὰ συνευτυχεῖν. ἂν δὲ τις ἄτυχή, μέμνησο, ὃτι παρ’ αὐτὸν ἄτυχεῖ. ὁ γὰρ θεὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἐπὶ τὸ 3 εὑσταθεῖν ἐποίησεν. πρὸς τούτο ἀφορμὰς ἐδωκεν, τὰ μὲν ἰδία δοὺς ἐκάστῳ, τὰ δ’ ἄλλοτρια: τὰ μὲν κωλυτὰ καὶ ἀφαίρετα καὶ ἀναγκαστὰ οὐκ ἰδία, τὰ δ’ ἀκώλυτα ἰδια: τὴν δ’ οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, ὅσπερ ἢν ἄξιον τὸν κηδόμενον ἦμῶν καὶ πατρικῶς προϊστάμενον, ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις.

4 “ἀλλ’ ἀποκεχώρηκα τοῦ δεινος καὶ ὀδυνᾶται.” διὰ τὶ γὰρ τὰ ἄλλοτρια ἰδια ἤγιςατο; διὰ τ’, ὅτε σε βλέπων ἔχαιρεν, οὐκ ἐπελογίζετο ὅτι θυντὸς εἰ, ἀποδημητικὸς εἰ; τοιγαροῦν τίνει 5 δίκας τῆς αὐτοῦ μωρίας. σῦ δ’ ἀντὶ τίνος; ἐπὶ τί κλάεις ¹ σεαυτόν; ἢ οὐδὲ σὺ ταῦτα ἐμελέτησας, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὰ γύναια τὰ οὐδενὸς ἄξια πᾶσιν οἷς ἔχαιρες ὡς ἄει συνεσόμενοι συνῆς, τοῖς τόποις, τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ταῖς διατριβάισ; καὶ νῦν κλαίων ἐκάθισας, ὅτι μὴ τοὺς αὐτοὺς βλέπεις καὶ ἐν τοῖς 6 αὐτοῖς τόποις διατρίβεις. τοῦτον γὰρ ἄξιος εἰ,

¹ Salmasius, after Schegk: κλαῖος S.

1 That is, is produced by himself, or is his own fault; and really affects no one but himself.

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CHAPTER XXIV

That we ought not to yearn for the things which are not under our control

Let not that which in the case of another is contrary to nature become an evil for you; for you are born not to be humiliated along with others, nor to share in their misfortunes, but to share in their good fortune. If, however, someone is unfortunate, remember that his misfortune concerns himself. For God made all mankind to be happy, to be serene. To this end He gave them resources, giving each man some things for his own, and others not for his own. The things that are subject to hindrance, deprivation, and compulsion are not a man’s own, but those which cannot be hindered are his own. The true nature of the good and the evil, as was fitting for Him who watches over and protects us like a father, He gave to man to be among his own possessions. “But I have parted from So-and-so, and he is stricken with grief.” Yes, but why did he regard what was not his own as his own? Why, when he was glad to see you, did he not reflect that you are mortal, and likely to go on a journey? And therefore he is paying the penalty for his own folly. But why are you bewailing yourself, and to what end? Or did you also neglect to study this matter, but, like worthless women, did you enjoy everything in which you took delight as though you were to enjoy it for ever, your surroundings, human beings, your ways of life? And now you sit and wail because you no longer lay eyes upon the same persons, and do not spend your life in the same places. Yes, for that’s what you
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 latina

utraque quorundam et quotannis absenteeors
his, ipsis eis existimus spectabili, quoniam spectantur, ut metoicodemein tacs neonostia kai tacs helogethia dia-
peran mh stenousin mide eidoivs tacs prwta.
7 Nau. all' upo touto ulogia einai paschei auta.

Hemun oux lognos ep' atychia kai kadaymia deditai upo touton theon, 1' 0thlai, ina penthontes

diatelewmen; h pautes esteosan athanatoi kai
mhedios apodemiitw, allla menwmen os tacs futa
proseriphwmenoi. an de tis apodemihtst tacs
synta, kathmenoi kloanomen kai palaip, an
elegi, orxwmedha kai krotomene os tacs paidea.
9 Ouk apogalaktisomene yndi pedo' eautous kai
meumisomede ouk houosame parata touton filo-
sophon; ei ge mh os einoedwv auton houosmen,
hti o kosmos outos mia polyt esti kai h ouxia, eix
h dekhmiourghetai, mia kai anagky periodon tina
einai kai paraaxhrihion alloi allois kai tacs men
diaxovsai, ta de epignvesi, ta men men ev

tou autw, tacs de kineisthai. paunta de filon
mesw, prwta men theon, eita kai anthropwv
fusiei pros allois wkeiwomen kai dei toux
mein paraeinai allois, toux de apallaptethai,
tois men synousi xairontas, tois de apallatteto-
menois mhe akthimewos. o de anthropos pros tou
fusiei megalofron einai kai pauntwv toutov aporai-
reton kataphronhtikos eti kakeino eschike tacs
mhe errixiwsthai mide prospefukvenai ti yh, allw

1 The clause, mhe' hmeis pou apodemiwmen, which follows
here in S, is deleted by Oldfather as a doublet of the pre-
ceding three words. It arose probably as a superfluous
attempt either to gloss or to emend.

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deserve, to be more wretched than crows and ravens, which can fly away wherever they please, and change
their nests, and cross the seas, without groaning or
longing for their first home.—Yes, but they feel that
way because they are irrational creatures.—Has,
then, reason been given us by the gods for misfortune
and misery, so that we may spend our lives in
wretchedness and mourning? Or shall all men be
immortal, and no one leave home, but shall we stay
rooted in the ground like the plants? And if any
one of our acquaintances leaves home, shall we sit
down and wail, and then again, if he comes back,
dance and clap our hands as the children do?

Shall we not wean ourselves at last, and call to
mind what we have heard from the philosophers?—
if, indeed, we did not listen to them as to enchanters
—when they said that this universe is but a single
state, and the substance out of which it has been
fashioned is single, and it needs must be that there
is a certain periodic change and a giving place of one
thing to another, and that some things must be
dissolved and others come into being, some things to
remain in the same place and others to be moved.
Further, that all things are full of friends, first gods,
and then also men, who by nature have been made
of one household with one another; and that some
men must remain with each other, while others
must depart, and that though we must rejoice in
those who dwell with us, yet we must not grieve at
those who depart. And man, in addition to being
by nature high-minded and capable of despising all
the things that are outside the sphere of his moral
purpose, possesses also this further quality, that,
namely, of not being rooted nor growing in the
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άλλοτ' ἐπ' ἄλλους ἦσθαι τόπους ποτὲ μὲν χρειῶν τινῶν ἐπειγούσων, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ αὐτὶς τῆς θέας ἔνεκα.

13 Καὶ τῷ Ὄδυσσεϊ τὸ συμβαν τοιοῦτον τι ἦν·
πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἀστεα καὶ νόον ἐγνω·
καὶ ἐτί πρόσθεν τῷ Ἡρακλεὶ περιελθεῖν τὴν
οἰκουμένην ὅλην

ἀνθρώπων ὑβριν τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἐφορῶντα,
καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐκβάλλοντα καὶ καθαίροντα, τὴν δ'
14 ἀντεισάγοντα. καίτοι πόσους οἱ θείοι φίλους ἔσχεν
ἐν Ὑβηθαις, πόσους ἐν Ἀθηναις, πόσους δὲ περιερ-
χόμενος ἐκτήσατο, ὃς γε καὶ ἐγάμει, ὅπου
καιρὸς ἐφάνη αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐπαιδοποιεῖτο καὶ τοὺς
παῖδας ἀπέλειπεν 1 οὐ στένον οὐδὲ ποθῶν οὐδ' ὡς
15 ὀρφανοὺς ἀφίεις; ἥδει γάρ, ὅτι οὔδεις ἐστιν
ἀνθρώπος ὀρφανός, ἀλλὰ πάντων ἂεὶ καὶ διηνε-
16 κὼς ὁ πατὴρ ἐστιν ὁ κηδόμενος. οὐ γὰρ μέχρι
λόγου ἤκηκαίς, ὅτι πατὴρ ἐστιν ὁ Ζεὺς τῶν
ἀνθρώπων, ὃς γε καὶ αὐτοῦ πατέρα φετο αὐτὸν
καὶ ἐκάλει καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀφορών ἔπραττεν ὁ
ἐπραττεν. τοιγάρτοι πανταχοῦ εἴξην αὐτῷ διὰγειν
17 εὐδαιμονίων. οὔδέποτε δ' ἐστὶν οἰὼν τ' εἰς τὸ
αὐτὸ ἐλθεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ πόθον τῶν οὐ παρόν-
των. τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονίουν ἀπέχειν δεὶ πάντα ἂ

1 Koraes: ἀπέλειπεν S.

1 Homer, Odyssey, I. 3.
2 Homer, Odyssey, XVII. 487 (slightly modified).
3 This is about the most drastic bit of idealisation of the
Heracles myths which the Stoics, for whom Heracles was a
kind of Arthurian knight, ever achieved. The comic poets
earth, but of moving now to one place and now to another, at one time under the pressure of certain needs, and at another merely for the sake of the spectacle.

Now it was something of this sort which fell to the lot of Odysseus:

Many the men whose towns he beheld, and he learned of their temper.¹

And even before his time it was the fortune of Heracles to traverse the entire inhabited world,

Seeing the wanton behaviour of men and the lawful,² casting forth the one and clearing the world of it, and introducing the other in its place. Yet how many friends do you suppose he had in Thebes, in Argos, in Athens, and how many new friends he made on his rounds, seeing that he was even in the habit of marrying when he saw fit, and begetting children, and deserting his children, without either groaning or yearning for them, or as though leaving them to be orphans? ³ It was because he knew that no human being is an orphan, but all men have ever and constantly the Father, who cares for them. Why, to him it was no mere story which he had heard, that Zeus is father of men, for he always thought of Him as his own father, and called Him so, and in all that he did he looked to Him. Wherefore he had the power to live happily in every place. But it is impossible that happiness, and yearning for what is not present, should ever be united. For happiness naturally presented this aspect of his career in a somewhat different light.
18 προσείναι αὕτω, οὐ λιμῶν.—’Ἀλλ’ ὁ Ὁδυσσεύς ἐπεπόνθησε πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ ἐκλαίη γῆπτερας καθεξόμενος.—Σὺ δ’ Ὅμηρῳ πάντα προσέχεις καὶ τοῖς μύθοις αὐτοῦ; ἦ ἐἰ ταῖς ἀλήθειας ἐκλαίη, τί ἄλλο ἣ ἐδυστύχει; τίς δὲ καλός τε καὶ ἄγαθὸς δυστυχεῖ; τῷ ὄντι κακῶς διοικεῖται τὰ ὅλα, εἰ μὴ ἐπιμελεῖται ὁ Ζεὺς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πολιτῶν, ὥσιν ὁμοίοι αὐτῷ, εὐδαιμονεῖ. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὐ θεμιτὰ οὐδ’ ὁσια ἐνθυμηθῆναι,

19 ἀλλ’ ὁ Ὁδυσσεύς, εἰ μὲν ἐκλαίη καὶ ὀδύρετο, οὐκ ἦν ἄγαθός. τίς γάρ ἄγαθός ἐστιν ὁ οὐκ εἰδῶς, ὅς ἐστιν; τίς δ’ οἴδεν ταῦτα ἐπιλελησμένος, ὅτι φθαρτα τὰ γενόμενα καὶ ἀνθρωπόν ἀνθρώπω.

20 συνεῖναι οὐ δυνατόν ἀεί; τί οὖν; τῶν μὴ δυνατῶν ἐφίεσθαι ἀνδραποδῶδες, ἡλίθιον, ἐξένου θεομαχοῦντος, ὡς μόνον οἶνον τε, τοῖς δόγμασι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ.

21 ’Ἀλλ’ ἣ μῆτηρ μου στενεὶ μὴ ὀρῶσά με.—Διὰ τί γάρ οὐκ ἐμαθεῖν τούτους τοὺς λόγους; καὶ οὐ τούτο φημι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελητέον τοῦ μὴ οἰμῶξειν αὐτήν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ θέλειν τὰ ἀλλότρια εξ άπαντος. λύπη δ’ ἢ ἄλλου ἀλλότριον ἐστίν, ἢ δ’ ἐμὴ ἐμὸν. ἐγὼ οὖν τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν παύσω εἰς άπαντος, ἐτ’ ἐμὸν γάρ ἐστιν: τὸ δ’ ἀλλότριον πειράσομαι κατὰ δύναμιν, εἰς άπαντος δ’ οὐ πειράσομαι. εἰ δὲ μὴ, θεομαχήσω, ἀντιθῆσον πρὸς τὸν

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1 ὁ added by Schenkl: ἀλλ’ Ὁδυσσεύς S.

1 Homer, Odyssey, V. 82.
must already possess everything that it wants; it must resemble a replete person: he cannot feel thirst or hunger.—Still, Odysseus felt a longing for his wife, and sat upon a rock and wept.\footnote{And do you take Homer and his tales as authority for everything? If Odysseus really wept, what else could he have been but miserable? But what good and excellent man is miserable? In all truth the universe is badly managed, if Zeus does not take care of His own citizens, that they be like Him, that is, happy. Nay, it is unlawful and unholy to think of such an alternative, but if Odysseus wept and wailed, he was not a good man. Why, what man could be good who does not know who he is? And who knows that, if he has forgotten that the things which come into being are corruptible, and that it is impossible for one human being always to live with another? What then? To reach out for the impossible is slavish and foolish; it is acting like a stranger in the universe, one who is fighting against God with the only weapons at his command, his own judgements. But my mother mourns because she does not see me.—Yes, but why did she not learn the meaning of these words of the philosophers? And I am not saying that you ought to take no pains to keep her from lamenting, but only that a person ought not to want at all costs what is not his own. Now another’s grief is no concern of mine, but my own grief is. Therefore, I will put an end at all costs to what is my own concern, for it is under my control: and that which is another’s concern I will endeavour to check to the best of my ability, but my effort to do so will not be made at all costs. Otherwise I shall be fighting against}
ARRIANS
DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Δία, ἀντιδιατάξομαι αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ὅλα. καὶ τὰ πίστειρα τῆς θεομαχίας ταύτης καὶ ἀπειθείας οὔ παϊδες παίδων ἐκτίσουσιν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἐγὼ μεθ' ἡμέραν, νυκτὸς διὰ τῶν ἐνυπνίων ἐκπηδῶν, ταρασσόμενος, πρὸς πάσαν ἀπαγγελίαν τρέμων, ἐξ ἐπιστολῶν ἄλλοτριῶν ήρτημένην ἔχων τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάθειαν. ἀπὸ Ὑάμης τῆς ἤκει. "μόνον μή τι κακὸν," τί δὲ κακὸν ἐκεῖ σοι συμβῆσαι δύναται, ὅπου μὴ εἴ; ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος. "μόνον μή τι κακὸν," οὕτως σοι πᾶς τόπος δύναται ἰστυχίας εἶναι αἴτιος. οὐχ ἰκανὸν ἐκεῖ σε ἀτυχεῖν, ὅπου αὐτὸς εἴ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πέραν θαλάσσης καὶ διὰ γραμμάτων; οὕτως ἀσφαλῶς σοι τὰ πράγματα ἐχεί;—Τί σοι, ἄν ἀποδάνωσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ φίλοι;—Τί γὰρ ἄν ἄλλο ἢ οἱ θυητοὶ ἀπέθανον; ἡ πῶς ἀμα μὲν γηρᾶσαι θέλεις, ἀμα δὲ μηδενὸς τῶν στεργομένων μη ἱδεῖν θάνατον; οὖκ οἰσθ', ὅτι ἐν τῷ μακρῷ χρόνῳ πολλὰ καὶ ποικίλα ἀποβαίνειν ἀνάγκη, τὸν μὲν πυρετὸν γενέσθαι κρείττοτα, τοῦ δὲ ληστῆν, τοῦ δὲ τύραννον; τοιοῦτο γὰρ τὸ περιέχον, τοιοῦτον οἱ συνόντες, ψύχῃ καὶ καύματα καὶ τροφαὶ ἀσύμμετροι καὶ ὀδυσσάοις καὶ πλοῦς καὶ ἀνεμοῖ καὶ περιστάσεις ποικίλαι τὸν μὲν ἀπώλεσαν, τὸν δ' ἐξώρισαν, τὸν δ' εἰς πρεσβείαν, ἄλλον δ' εἰς στρατείαν ἐνέβαλον. κάθησο τοίνυν πρὸς πάντα ταύτα ἐπτομένος, πενθῶν, ἀτυχών, δυστυχῶν, ἐξ ἄλλου ἠρτημένος

1 Schweighäuser: εὐπειθείαν S.

1 The phrase in quotation marks is a verbal reminiscence of Homer, Ἰλιαν, XX. 308.
God, I shall be setting myself in opposition to Zeus, I shall be arraying myself against Him in regard to His administration of the universe. And the wages of this fighting against God and this disobedience will not be paid by "children’s children,"¹ but by me myself in my own person, by day and by night, as I start up out of dreams and am disturbed, trembling at every message, with my own peace of mind depending upon letters not my own. Someone has arrived from Rome. "If only there is no bad news!" But how can anything bad for you happen in a place, if you are not there? Someone arrives from Greece. "If only there is no bad news!" In this way for you every place can cause misfortune. Isn’t it enough for you to be miserable where you are? Must you needs be miserable even beyond the seas, and by letter? Is this the fashion in which all that concerns you is secure? —Yes, but what if my friends over there die?—Why, what else than that mortal men died? Or how can you wish to reach old age yourself, and at the same time not behold the death of any that you love? Do you not know that in the long course of time many different things must needs happen; fever must overcome one man, a brigand another, a tyrant a third? Because such is the character of the air about us, such that of our associates; cold and heat and unsuitable food, and journeys by land and by sea, and winds and all manner of perils; this man they destroy, that man they drive into exile, another they send on an embassy, and yet another on a campaign. Sit down, therefore, and get all wrought up at each one of these events, mourning, unfortunate, miserable, depend on something other
καὶ τούτον οὖχ ἐνός, οὗ δυεῖν, ἄλλα μυρίων ἐπὶ μυρίων.

31 Ταῦτα ἕκονες παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ταῦτ' ἐμάνθανες; οὐκ οἶσθ', ὅτι στρατεία τὸ χρήμα ἐστιν; τὸν μὲν δὲν φυλάττειν, τὸν δὲ κατασκοπήσοντα ἐξείναι, τὸν δὲ καὶ πολεμήσοντα: οὖχ οἷον τ' εἶναι πάντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐδ' ἀμεινον.

32 οὐ δ' ἀφεῖς ἐκτελεῖν τὰ προστάγματα τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅταν τὶ σοι προσταχθῇ τραχύτερον, καὶ οὐ παρακολουθεῖς, οἷον ἀποφαίνεις, ὥσον ἐπὶ σοὶ, τὸ στράτευμα, ὅτι ἂν σε πάντες μιμήσονται, οὐ τάφρον σκάψεις, οὗ χάρακα περίβαλει, οὐκ ἀγρυπνήσει, οὐ κινδυνεύσει, ἄλλα ἄχρηστος

33 δόξει στρατεύεσθαι. πάλιν ἐν πλοίῳ ναῦτης ἃν πλέῃς, μίαν χώραν κάτεχε καὶ ταύτην προσλιπάρει· ἄν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἰστῶν ἀναβήναι δέη, μὴ θέλε, ἄν εἰς τὴν πρώτην διαδραμεῖν, μὴ θέλε. καὶ τὶς ἀνέξεται σοι κυβερνήτης; οὐχί δ' ὡς σκεύος ἄχρηστον ἐκβαλεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ ἐμπόδιον καὶ

34 κακὸν παράδειγμα τῶν ἄλλων ναυτῶν; οὕτως δὲ καὶ ἐνθάδε στρατεία τίς ἐστιν ὁ βίος ἐκάστου καὶ αὐτὴ μακρὰ καὶ ποικίλη. τηρεῖν σε δεὶ τὸ τοῦ στρατιώτου καὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πρὸς νεύμα

35 πράσσειν ἐκαστα· εἰ οἶον τε, μαντευόμενον δ' ἂθελε. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁμοίος ἐκεῖνος ὁ στρατηγὸς καὶ οὕτως οὗτε κατὰ τὴν ἵσχυν οὔτε κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἰθαυματιστὴν ὑπεροχὴν. τέταξαι ἐν πόλει ἡγεμόνι καὶ οὐκ ἐν ταπεινῇ τινὶ χώρᾳ, οὐκ ἐπτέτειος ἄλλῳ

1 Schweighäuser: στρατιώτου πρόσευμα. καὶ τοῦ στρατηγεῖν S.
2 Reiske: μαντευόμενος S.

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than yourself, and that not one thing or two, but tens upon tens of thousands of things!

Is that what you used to hear when you sat at the feet of the philosophers? Is that what you learned? Do you not know that the business of life is a campaign? One man must mount guard, another go out on reconnaissance, and another out to fight. It is not possible for all to stay in the same place, nor is it better so. But you neglect to perform the duties assigned you by your commanding officer, and complain when some rather hard order is given you, and fail to understand to what a state you are bringing the army, as far as in you lies; because, if they all imitate you, no one will dig a trench, no one construct a palisade, or watch through the night, or risk his life in fighting, but they will seem useless soldiers. Again, if you take ship as a sailor, take up one place and stick to that! and if you have to climb the mast, be unwilling; if you have to run to the bow, be unwilling! And what ship's captain will put up with you? Won't he throw you overboard like a piece of junk, nothing but a nuisance, and a bad example to the other sailors? So also in this world; each man's life is a kind of campaign, and a long and complicated one at that. You have to maintain the character of a soldier, and do each separate act at the bidding of the General, if possible divining what He wishes. For there is no comparison between this General and an ordinary one, either in His power, or in the pre-eminence of His character. You have been given a post in an imperial city, and not in some mean place; not for a

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3 C. Schenkl: ἡγεμονία S.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICETUS

eis 1 aei Bouleutis. Ouk ois6', oti tov toiouton oligna mev deiv oikonomieiv, ta polla d' upodhmeiv arxonta h arxomevov h uphretouin ta tivn arxh h stratenomevov h dikaizonta; eivta moi theleiv ois futon prosphetishai tois autois topois kai prosperizowthai; — 'Hdv gar esteiv. — Tis ou phi6iv; alla kai xwros hdis estei kai ynu kalh hdis esteiv. Ti alllo legoussin oi telos poioumenoi thv hdoniv;

37 Ouk aisdanh, tivon anbrowpon fowvnh afhkas; oti 'Epikeoureivn kai kinaidov; eita ta ekienov erga prassow kai ta doymata exovn touc logous hmin lgeivs touc Zihnovos kai Swkratous; ouk aporifies ws makrotatw tallotria, ois kosmiv mihen sou prosikhousin; h ti alllo bholousin ekienoi h kathvdeiv apastrapodistous kai ananagy-kastous kai anastantves ef' isvchias xasmh-sasvai kai to proswpon upoplinai, eita graphai kai anagynoiv a bholousin, eita phunarysai ti pot' epainoymevoi upo touc fivon, o ti an lgevoun, eita eis peripatoj proelonthcstes kai oligna peripatistesantoj logoussathai, eita fageiv, eita koimathnai, oivn d' koitn kathvdeiv touc toioutous eikos—ti an tiis lgevi; egeivtn gar tekmairhsthai.

38 Aghe, fer6 moj kai ou tih santoj diatribh, hiv poteis, xhlowta ths altheias kai Swkratous kai Diogenvous. Ti theleiv en 'Athnaii poi6iv;

1 eis added by Capps: xwpai allaei S. The senators at Athens, for example, served only one year.
short time either, but you are a senator for life. Do you not know that a man in such a post has to give only a little attention to the affairs of his own household, but for most of the time has to be away, in command, or under command, or serving some official, or in the field, or on the judge's bench? And then you want to be attached to the same spot and rooted in it like a plant?—Yes, it is pleasant.—Why deny it? But soup is pleasant too, and a pretty woman is a pleasant thing. What else do those say who make pleasure their end?

Do you not realize the kind of men they are whose language you have just uttered? That they are Epicureans and blackguards? And yet, while doing their deeds and holding their opinions, you recite to us the words of Zeno and Socrates? Will you not cast away from you, as far as you can fling them, these alien trappings with which you adorn yourself, although they do not at all become you? Or what else do these fellows want but to sleep without hindrance or compulsion, and after they have arisen, to yawn at their ease, and wash their faces; then to write and read what they please, then to babble something or other, to the applause of their friends, no matter what they say; then to go out for a stroll, and after a short walk to take a bath; then to eat, then to seek their rest, and sleep in such a bed as you might expect such persons to enjoy—why should I say the word? For you can infer what it is like.

Come now, do you also tell me your style of life, the one on which you have set your heart, you eager follower of the truth, and of Socrates, and of Diogenes! What do you want to do in Athens? Just what I
Because it was a disturbing passion which interfered with serenity.
have described? Nothing at all different? Why, then, do you call yourself a Stoic? Well, but those who falsely claim Roman citizenship are severely punished, and ought those who falsely claim so great and so dignified a calling and title to get off scot-free? Or is that impossible? whereas the divine and mighty and inescapable law is the law which exacts the greatest penalties from those who are guilty of the greatest offences. Now what are its terms? “Let him who makes pretence to things which in no wise concern him be a braggart, let him be a vainglorious man; let him who disobeys the divine governance be abject, be a slave, suffer grief, envy, pity,1—in a word, be miserable, and lament.”

Well, what then? Do you want me to pay court to So-and-so? go to his front-door?2—If reason so decides, for the sake of your country, your kinsmen, mankind in general, why not go? Why, you are not ashamed to go to the door of the cobbler when you need shoes, nor to that of the market-gardener when you need lettuce; and are you ashamed to go to the door of the rich when you want something that rich men have?—Very true, for as to the cobbler, I do not have to admire him.—Don’t admire the rich man, either.—And I shall not have to flatter the market-gardener.—Don’t flatter the rich man either.—How, then, shall I get what I need?—Am I telling you, “Go like a man who is certain to get what he wants,” and not simply, “Go in order to do what becomes you”?—Why, then, do I go at all?—So as to have gone, so as to have performed the function of the citizen that

1 The transition is most abrupt, but obviously the interlocutor has been expected by his friends to pay court to some rich and influential man.
τὰ τοῦ πολίτου ἔργα, τὰ ἀδελφοὶ, τὰ φίλοι.  
48 καὶ λοιπὸν μέμνησο, ὅτι πρὸς σκυτέα ἄφιξαι, πρὸς λαχανοπώλην, οὗθεν ὁ μεγάλου ἀμβлемον ἔχοντα τὴν ἐξουσίαν, κἂν αὐτὸ πολλοὶ πωλῆ. ὥς ἐπὶ τὰς θίδρακας ἀπέρχη· ὁμολογοῦ γὰρ εἰσὶν, ταλάντων δ᾽ οὐκ εἰσίν. οὔτως κανταύθα. τοὺ ἐπὶ θύρας ἐλθεῖν ἄξιον τὸ πράγμα· ἔστω, ἄφιξομαι. τοῦ διαλεξῆμαι οὔτως· ἔστω, διαλεξῆσομαι. ἄλλα καὶ τὴν χεῖρα δεὶ καταφιλήσαι καὶ ὑποτέθαι δι᾽ ἑπαίνου. ἀπαγε, ταλάντων ἐστίν· οὐ λυσιτελεῖ μοι οὐδὲ τῇ πόλει οὐδὲ τοῖς φίλοις ἀπολέσαι καὶ πολίτην ἁγαθὸν καὶ φίλον.  
50 Ἀλλὰ δόξεις μὴ προτεθνησθαι μὴ ἀνύσασθαι. πάλιν ἐπελάθον, τίνος ἑνεκα ἐλήλυθας; οὐκ οἰσθ', ὅτι ἁνήρ καλὸς καὶ ἁγαθὸς οὔδεν ποιεῖ τοῦ δόξας ἑνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πεπράχθαι καλῶς;—  
51 Τί οὖν ὄφελος αὐτῷ τοῦ πράξει καλῶς;—Τί δ᾽ ὄφελος τῷ γράφοντι τὸ Δίωνος ὄνομα, ὡς χρῆ γράφειν; αὐτὸ τὸ γράψαι.—"Επαθλον οὖν οὐδεν;—Σὺ δὲ ξητεῖς ἐπαθλον ἄνδρι ἁγαθῷ μεῖζον τοῦ  
52 τὰ καλὰ καὶ δίκαια πράττειν; ἐν Ὁλυμπία δὲ οὔδεις ἀλλο οὐδεν, ἀλλὰ ἀρκεῖν σοι δοκεῖ τὸ ἐστεφανόωσθαι Ὁλυμπία. οὔτως σοι μικρὸν καὶ οὕδεν ἄξιον εἶναι φαίνεται τὸ εἶναι καλὸν καὶ ἁγαθὸν καὶ εὐδαίμονα; πρὸς ταῦτα ὑπὸ  
53 θεῶν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ταύτην εἰσηγμένος καὶ ἡδή τῶν ἄνδρῶν ἔργων ὁ οἴκλων ἀπετεθαὶ τιτθᾶς

1 Schenkl: θρίδακας S.  
2 Wolf, after Schegk: ἄνδροϕργων S.  

1 i.e. the world.
you are, of a brother, of a friend. And furthermore, remember that you have come to see a cobbler, a vegetable-dealer, a man who has authority over nothing great or important, even if he sell it for a high price. You are going, as it were, for heads of lettuce; they are worth an obol, not a talent. So it is in our life also. The matter in hand is worth going to a person’s door about; very well, I will go. It is also worth an interview; very well, I will interview him about it. Yes, but I will have to kiss his hand also, and flatter him with words of praise. Go to! that is paying a talent for a head of lettuce! It is not profitable to me, nor to the State, nor to my friends, to ruin by so acting a good citizen and friend.

Yes, but if you fail, people will think that you didn’t try hard. Have you gone and forgotten again why you went? Don’t you know that a good and excellent man does nothing for the sake of appearances, but only for the sake of having acted right?—What good does he get, then, from acting right?—And what good does the person get for writing the name “Dio” as it ought to be written? The mere fact of writing it that way.—Is there, then, no further reward?—And are you looking for some further reward in the case of a good man, a reward which is greater than the doing of what is fine and right? At Olympia nobody wants anything else, but you feel content with having received an Olympic crown. Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be good, and excellent, and happy? Therefore, when you have been introduced into this city-state¹ by the gods, and find it now your duty to lay hand to the work of a man, do you
Ἀρριανος διαλεγμένων ἔν μᾶλλον Ἀρριανος ἐπιποθεῖς ἐπιποθεῖς καὶ μάμμην καὶ κάμπτει σε καὶ ἀποθηλύνει κλαίοντα γυναία μωρά; οὔτως οὐδέποτε παύει παιδίων ὅν νήπιον; οὐκ οἶσθ', ὅτι ὁ τὰ παιδίων ποιῶν ὅσω πρεσβύτερος τοσούτῳ γελοιότερος;

54 Ἐν Ἀδηνίας δ' οὐδένα ἑώρας εἰς οἴκον αὐτοῦ φοιτῶν;—'Ον ἐβουλόμην.—Καὶ ἐνθάδε τούτων θέλε ὀρᾶν καὶ ὃν βούλει όφει: μόνον μὴ ταπεινώς, μὴ μετ' ὀρέξεως ἤ ἐκκλίσεως καὶ ἔσται τὰ σὰ καλῶς. τούτο δ' οὖν ἐν τῷ ἐλθεῖν ἐστὶν οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἐπὶ θύραις στῆναι, ἀλλ' ἐνδοῦ ἐν τοῖς δόγμασιν. ὅταν τὰ ἐκτὸς καὶ ἀπροαίρετα ἡτιμακῶς ἢ καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῶν σὸν ἡγημένοι, μόνα δ' ἐκεῖνα σᾶ, τὸ κρίναι καλῶς, τὸ ὑπολαβεῖν, τὸ ὀρμῆσαι, τὸ ὀρεχθῆναι, τὸ ἐκκλίναι, ποῦ ἐτι κολακείας τόπος, ποῦ ταπεινοφοροῦν; τί ἐτι ποθεῖς τὴν ἱσυχίαν τὴν ἐκεῖ, τί τοὺς συνήθεις τόπους; ἐκδεξάι βραχὺ καὶ τούτους πάλιν ἔξεις συνήθεις. εἶτα ἀν οὖτως ἀγεννώς ἔχης, πάλιν καὶ τούτων ἀπαλλαττόμενος κλαίε καὶ στένε.

55 Πῶς οὖν γένωμαι φιλοστοργος;—'Ως γενναῖς, ὡς εὐτυχῆς· οὐδέποτε γὰρ αἴρει2 ὁ λόγος ταπεινῶν εἶναι οὖδὲ κατακλάσθαι οὐδ' ἐξ ἀλλου κρήμασθαι οὖδὲ μέμψασθαι ποτὲ θεὸν ἢ ἀνθρω-πον. οὔτως μοι γίνου φιλοστοργὸς ὡς ταύτα τηρήσων· εἰ δὲ διὰ τὴν φιλοστοργίαν ταύτην, ἤντινι3 ποτε καὶ καλεῖς φιλοστοργίαν, δούλος

1 Salmasius suggests ἐτὶ ποθεῖς.  
2 Upton: ἐρεῖ S.  
3 Upton's "codex": ταύτα· τὴν τινά S.
yearn for nurses and the breast, and does the weeping of poor silly women move you and make you effeminate? And so will you never get over being an infant? Don’t you know that, when a person acts like a child, the older he is the more ridiculous he is?

In Athens did you see nobody when you went to his house?—Yes, the man I wanted to see.—Here also make up your mind to see this man, and you will see the man you want; only do not go humbly, not with desire or aversion, and all will be well with you. But this result is not to be found by mere going, nor by standing at gates, but in one’s judgements within. When you have contemned things external and outside the province of your moral purpose, and have come to regard none of them as your own, but only the being right in judgement, in thinking, in choosing, in desiring, in avoiding,—where is there any longer room for flattery, where for an abject spirit? Why any longer yearn for the quiet you enjoyed there, or your familiar haunts? Wait a little while and you will find the places here familiar in their turn. And then, if you are so ignoble in spirit, weep and wail again when you leave these too!

How, then, shall I become affectionate?—As a man of noble spirit, as one who is fortunate; for it is against all reason to be abject, or broken in spirit, or to depend on something other than yourself, or even to blame either God or man. I would have you become affectionate in such a way as to maintain at the same time all these rules; if, however, by virtue of this natural affection, whatever it is you call by that name, you are going to be a
μέλλεις εἶναι καὶ ἀθλιος, οὐ λυσιτελεῖ γιλό-
στοργον εἰμαὶ. καὶ τί κωλύει φιλεῖν τινὰ ὡς
θυητὸν, ὡς ἀποδημητικὸν; ἢ Σωκράτης οὐκ
ἐφίλει τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ; ἄλλ᾿ ὡς ἐλεύ-
θερος, ὡς μεμνημένος, ὦτι πρότων δεὶ θεοῖς εἶναι
φίλου. διὰ τούτο οὐδὲν παρέβη τῶν πρεπόντων
ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ οὐτ᾿ ἀπολογούμενος οὐθ᾿ ὑποτι-
μώμενος οὐτ᾿ ἐτὶ πρόσθεν βουλεύων ἢ στρατευό-
μενος. ἢμεῖς δὲ πᾶσης προφάσεως πρὸς τὸ
ἀγεννεῖς εἶναι εὐποροῦμεν, οὶ μὲν διὰ παῖδα,
οὶ δὲ διὰ μητέρα, ἀλλοι δὲ δι᾿ ἄδελφοὺς. δι᾿,
οὐδένα δὲ προσήκει δυστυχεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐτυχεῖν
diὰ πάντας, μάλιστα δὲ διὰ τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐπὶ
tούτῳ ἡμᾶς κατασκευάσαντα. ἄγε, Διογένης δ᾿,
οὐκ ἐφίλει οὐδένα, ὃς οὕτως ἢμερος ἦν καὶ
φιλάνθρωπος, ὥστε ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώ-
πων τοσούτους πόνους καὶ ταλαίπωρίας τοῦ
σώματος ἄσμενος ἀναδέχεσθαι; ἄλλ᾿ ἐφίλει
πῶς; ὡς τοῦ Δίὸς διάκονον ἔδει, ἀμα μὲν κηδό-
μενος, ἀμα δ᾿ ὡς τῷ θεῷ ὑποτεταγμένος. διὰ
τούτῳ πᾶσα γῆ πατρίς ἦν ἐκεῖνῳ μόνῳ, ἐξαίρετος
δ᾿ οὐδεμίας καὶ ἀλοὺς οὐκ ἔποθεί τὰς Ἀθήνας
οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐκεῖ συνήθεις καὶ φίλους, ἄλλ᾿ αὐτοῖς
τοῖς πειραταισις συνήθης ἐγίνετο καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν
ἐπειρᾶτο. καὶ πραθεῖς ύστερον ἐν Κορίνθῳ
dιήγεν οὕτως ὡς πρόσθεν ἐν Ἀθήναις καὶ εἰς
Περραιβοῦς δ᾿ ἀν ἀπελθὼν ὡςαύτως εἴχεν.

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slave and miserable, it does not profit you to be affectionate. And what keeps you from loving a person as one subject to death, as one who may leave you? Did not Socrates love his own children? But in a free spirit, as one who remembers that it was his first duty to be a friend to the gods. That is why he succeeded in everything that becomes a good man, both in making his defence, and in assessing his own penalty, and before that time in his services as senator or soldier. But we abound in all manner of excuses for being ignoble; with some it is a child, with others a mother, and then again it is brothers. But it is not becoming for us to be unhappy on any person's account, but to be happy because of all, and above all others because of God, who has made us for this end. Come, was there anybody that Diogenes did not love, a man who was so gentle and kind-hearted that he gladly took upon himself all those troubles and physical hardships for the sake of the common weal? But what was the manner of his loving? As became a servant of Zeus, caring for men indeed, but at the same time subject unto God. That is why for him alone the whole world, and no special place, was his fatherland; and when he had been taken prisoner he did not hanker for Athens nor his acquaintances and friends there, but he got on good terms with the pirates and tried 1 to reform them. And later, when he was sold into slavery at Corinth he kept on living there just as he had formerly lived at Athens; yes, and if he had gone off to the Perrhaebians he would have acted in quite the same way. That is how

1 The humorous touch here in the word-jingle πειραταῖς and ἐπιράτο is worthy of note, but hard to reproduce. For the incident in question see IV. 1, 115 f.
67 ούτως ἔλευθερία γίνεται. διὰ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν ὅτι “ἐξ οὗ μ’ Ἀντισθένης ήλευθέρωσεν, οὐκέτι ἐδοῦ- 
68 λευσα.” πῶς ήλευθέρωσεν; ἀκούει, τί λέγει: “ἐδι- 
69 δαξέν με τὰ ἐμὰ καὶ τὰ οὐκ ἐμά. κτῆσις οὐκ ἐμή· 
συγγενεῖς, οἰκεῖοι, φίλοι, φίλημ, συνήθεις τόποι, 
θέλω. τίς οὖν ἔτι ἔχει μου ἔξονοιαν; Φίλιππος 
70 ἡ Ἀλέξανδρος ἡ Περδίκκας ἡ ὁ μέγας βασιλεύς; 
71 πάθεν αὐτοῖς; τὸν γὰρ ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπου μέλλοντα 
72 υποτέτακται; εἰ δ’ ἥδεως ἐν Ἀθηναίως διήγεν 
73 καὶ ἠττητο ταύτης τῆς διατριβῆς, ἐπὶ παυτὴ ἄν ἦν 
74 τὰ ἐκείνον πράγματα, ὁ ἵσχυρότερος κύριος ᾳν 
75 ποδοῦ; δοῦλος καὶ ταπεινὸς καὶ τί σοι ὄφελος; 
—Οὐ ’ ἀλλ’ ἔλευθερος.—Δείξοι, πῶς ἔλευθερος.

1 His teacher, the famous philosopher. 
2 Of Persia. 
3 Perhaps a reference to the story that Anaxarchus, when Nicoceocon ordered that his tongue be cut out, bit it off and spat it in the other’s face. Diogenes Laertius, 9, 59.
freedom is achieved. That is why he used to say, "From the time that Antisthenes set me free, I have ceased to be a slave." How did Antisthenes set him free? Listen to what Diogenes says. "He taught me what was mine, and what was not mine. Property is not mine; kinsmen, members of my household, friends, reputation, familiar places, converse with men—all these are not my own. 'What, then, is yours? Power to deal with external impressions.' He showed me that I possess this beyond all hindrance and constraint; no one can hamper me; no one can force me to deal with them otherwise than as I will. Who, then, has authority over me? Philip, or Alexander, or Perdiccas, or the Great King? Where can they get it? For the man who is destined to be overpowered by a man must long before that have been overpowered by things." Therefore, the man over whom pleasure has no power, nor evil, nor fame, nor wealth, and who, whenever it seems good to him, can spit his whole paltry body into some oppressor's face and depart from this life—whose slave can he any longer be, whose subject? But if he had gone on living pleasantly in Athens, and had been enamoured of his life there, his fortune would have been in every man's control, and the man who was stronger than he would have had power to cause him grief. How do you imagine he would have wheedled the pirates to sell him to some Athenian, so that he might some time see the beautiful Piraeus, and the Long Walls and the Acropolis! Who are you that you should see them, slave? A thrall and a person of abject spirit; and what good are they to you?—No, not a slave, but a free man.—Show me how you are free.
İRRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

76 μετέωρος πορεύη εἰς Ἀθήνας.” τί λέγεις πρὸς τούτον τὸν δουλαγωγοῦντά σε; ποιον αὐτῷ καρπιστήν δίδωσ; ἦ ὁμός ὅλως ἀντιβλέπεις, ἀλλ’ ἀφεῖς τοὺς πολλοὺς λόγους ἱκετεύεις, ἢν ἀφθηγής; ἀνθρωπε, εἰς φυλακὴν σε δεὶ χαίροντα ἀπίεναι, σπεύδοντα, φθάνοντα τοὺς ἀπάγοντας. εἰτά μοι σὺ μὲν ἐν 'Ῥώμη διάγειν ὅκνεις, τὴν Ἕλλαδα ποθεῖς; ὅταν δ’ ἀποθνῄσκειν δέη, καὶ τότε μέλλεις ἡμῶν κατακλαίειν, ὅτι τὰς Ἀθήνας οὐ μέλλεις βλέπειν καὶ ἐν Δυκεῖῳ οὐ περιπατήσεις;

77 ‘Επὶ τοῦτο ἀπεδήμησας; τούτου ἔνεκα ἐξήτησάς τινι συμβαλεῖν, ἵν’ ὥφεληθης ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ; ποίαν ὥφέλειαν; συλλογισμόν ἵν’ ἀναλύοντο ἔκτικωτερον ἢ ἐφοδεύοντο ὑποθετικοῦ; καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἀδελφὸν ἀπέλιπτες, πατρίδα, φίλους, οἰκείους, ἢν ταύτα μαθὼν ἐπανέλθης;

78 ὥστ’ οὐχ ὑπὲρ εὐσταθείας ἀπεδήμεις, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἀταραξίας, οὐχ ἵν’ ἀβλαβῆς γενόμενος μηκέτι μηδένα μέμφῃ, μηδενὶ ἐγκαλῆς, μηδείς σε ἁδικῇ καὶ οὕτως τὰς σχέσεις ἀποσωζῆς ἀπαραπατοδίστως; καλὴν ἐστείλω ταύτην τὴν ἐμπορίαν, συλλογισμοῦ καὶ μεταπίπτωντας καὶ ὑποθε-
See, some person or other has laid hands on you—the man who takes you away from your accustomed way of life, and says, "You are my slave; for it is in my power to prevent you from living as you will, it is in my power to lighten your servitude, or to humble you; whenever I wish, you can be happy again, and go off to Athens in high spirits." What do you say to this man who makes you his slave? Whom have you to offer him as your emancipator? Or do you not even look him in the face at all, but cutting all argument short do you implore him to set you free? Man, you ought to go gladly to prison, in haste, outstripping those who lead you away. And then, I do beseech you, are you loath to live in Rome, and do you yearn for Greece? And when you have to die, then also, I suppose, will you weep all over us, because you are never going to see Athens again or stroll in the Lyceum?

Was that what you went abroad for? Was it for this that you sought to meet someone—that he might do you good? Good indeed! That you might analyse syllogisms more readily, or run down hypothetical arguments? It was for this reason, was it, you left brother, country, friends, and those of your own household—so as to return with this kind of learning? And so you did not go abroad to acquire constancy of character, or peace of mind; not to become secure yourself and thenceforward blame and find fault with no man; not to make it impossible for another to do you wrong, and so maintain without hindrance your relations in society? A fine exchange of goods this which you have achieved, syllogisms, and arguments with equivocal and hypothetical premisses!
τικούς: καὶ σοι φανὴ, ἐν τῇ ἄγορᾷ καθίσας
81 πρόγραψον ὡς οἱ φαρμακοπόλαι. οὐκ ἀρνήσῃ
καὶ ὁσα ἐμαθες εἰδέναι, ἵνα μὴ διαβάλης τὰ
θεωρήματα ὡς ἀχριστα; τί σοι κακῶν ἐποίησεν
φιλοσοφία; τί σε ἡδίκησε Χρύσιππος, ἵνα αὐτοῦ
τοὺς πόνους ἔργῳ αὐτῶς ἀχριστοὺς ἐξελέγχης;
οὐκ ἦρκει σοι τὰ ἐκεῖ κακᾶ, ὅσα εἰχες αἰτία τοῦ
λυπεῖσθαι καὶ πενθεῖν, εἰ καὶ μὴ ὑπεδήμησας,
82 ἀλλὰ πλείω προσέλαβες; καὶ ἄλλους πάλιν
ἐχῆς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους, ἐξεις πλεῖονα τοῦ
οἰμώξεων αἰτία, καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην χώραν προσ-
παθής. τί οὖν ἦς; ἵνα λύπας ἄλλας ἐπ’ ἄλλαις
83 περιβάλῃ, δ’ ἂς ἀτυχεῖς; εἴτα μοι καλεῖς τοῦτο
φιλοστοργίαν; ποίαν, ἀνθρωπε, φιλοστοργίαν;
εἰ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὐδενὸς κακοῦ αἰτίων γίνεται· εἰ
κακὸν ἐστιν, οὐδέν μοι καὶ αὐτῇ. ἐγὼ πρὸς τὰ
άγαθά τα ἐμαυτοῦ πέφυκα, πρὸς κακὰ οὐ πέ-
φυκα.
84 Τὸι ὦν ἡ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀσκησις; πρὸτον μὲν ἡ
ἀνωτάτω καὶ κυριωτάτη καὶ εὐθὺς ὀσπερ ἐν
πύλαις, ὅταν τινὶ προσπάσχης, ὡς 1 οὐδενὶ τῶν
ἀναφαιρέτων, ἀλλὰ τινὶ τοιούτῳ γένει, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ
χύτρα, οὐδὲν υάλινον ποτήριον, ἵνα ὅταν καταγῇ,
85 μεμνημένος μὴ ταραχθῆς. οὔτως καὶ ἐνθάδ’, εἰάν
παδίον σαυτοῦ καταφίλης, εἰάν ἀδελφόν, εἰάν
φίλον, μηδέποτε ἐπίδος τὴν φαντασίαν εἰς ἅπαν
μηδὲ τὴν διάχυσιν εὕσης προελθεῖν ἐφ’ ὅσον αὐτὴ
θέλει, ἀλλ’ ἀντίσπασον, κῶλυσον, οἴον οἱ τοῖς

1 ὡς added by Sb.
Yes, and if you see fit, seat yourself in the marketplace, and hang out a sign, as the drug-peddlers do. Ought you not rather to deny that you know even all you have learned, so as not to bring your philosophical precepts into ill repute as being useless? What harm has philosophy done you? How has Chrysippus wronged you that you should prove by your own conduct his labours to be useless? Were not the ills at home enough for you, all that you had to cause you grief and sorrow, even if you had not gone abroad, but did you add yet others in addition to them? And if you get other intimates and friends again, you will have more reasons for lamentation, yes, and if you get attached to another land. Why, then, live? Is it to involve yourself in one grief after another that makes you miserable? And then, I ask you, do you call this natural affection? Natural affection forsooth, man! If it is good, it is the source of no evil; if it is evil, I have nothing to do with it. I am born for the things that are good and belong to me, not for things evil.

What, then, is the proper discipline for this? In the first place, the highest and principal discipline, and one that stands at the very gates of the subject, is this: Whenever you grow attached to something, do not act as though it were one of those things that cannot be taken away, but as though it were something like a jar or a crystal goblet, so that when it breaks you will remember what it was like, and not be troubled. So too in life; if you kiss your child, your brother, your friend, never allow your fancy free rein, nor your exuberant spirits to go as far as they like, but hold them back, stop them, just like those who
Among the means of warding off the evil eye from the triumphant was this, that a slave rode behind him in his triumphal car, and in the midst of the acclamations of the
stand behind generals when they ride in triumph, and keep reminding them that they are mortal. In such fashion do you too remind yourself that the object of your love is mortal; it is not one of your own possessions; it has been given you for the present, not inseparably nor for ever, but like a fig, or a cluster of grapes, at a fixed season of the year, and that if you hanker for it in the winter, you are a fool. If in this way you long for your son, or your friend, at a time when he is not given to you, rest assured that you are hankering for a fig in winter-time. For as winter-time is to a fig, so is every state of affairs, which arises out of the universe, in relation to the things which are destroyed in accordance with that same state of affairs.

Furthermore, at the very moment when you are taking delight in something, call to mind the opposite impressions. What harm is there if you whisper to yourself, at the very moment you are kissing your child, and say, "To-morrow you will die"? So likewise to your friend, "To-morrow you will go abroad, or I shall, and we shall never see each other again"?—Nay, but these are words of bad omen.—Yes, and so are certain incantations, but because they do good, I do not care about that, only let the incantation do us good. But do you call any things ill-omened except those which signify some evil for us? Cowardice is ill-omened, a mean spirit, grief, sorrow, shamelessness; these are words of ill-omen. And yet we ought not to hesitate to utter even these words, in order to guard people kept saying: "Look behind you, and remember that you are a mortal." For the evidence and literature, see J. Marquardt: Römische Staatsverwaltung, II. 568–9.
91 τῶν πραγμάτων. δύσφημον δέ μοι λέγεις ὅνομα  
ϕυσικοῦ τινὸς πρώγματος σημαντικόν; λέγε  
δύσφημον εἶναι καὶ τὸ θερισθῆναι τοὺς στάχνας:  
ἀπώλειαν γὰρ σημαίνει τῶν σταχύων· ἀλλ’  
oὐχὶ τοῦ κόσμου. λέγε δύσφημον καὶ τὸ φυλ-  
λορροεῖν καὶ τὸ ἵσχύα δίνεσθαι αὕτη σῦκον καὶ  
ἀσταφίδας ἢκ σταφυλῆς. πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν  
προτέρων εἶσιν εἰς ἕτερα μεταβολῆ; οὐκ ἀπώ-  
λεια, ἀλλὰ τεταγμένη τις οἰκονομία καὶ διοίκησις.  
92 τούτ’ ἔστιν ἀποδημία, μεταβολὴ¹ μικρά· τούτο  
θάνατος, μεταβολὴ μεῖζων ἢκ τοῦ νῦν δύντος οὐκ  
eἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ νῦν μὴ ὄν.—Οὐκέτι οὖν  
ἔσομαι;—Οὐκ ἔσευ· ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τι οὐ νῦν ὁ  
κόσμος χρείαν ἔχει. καὶ γὰρ σὺ ἐγένουσα οὐχ ὅτε  
σὺ ἡθέλησας, ἀλλ’ ὅτε ὁ κόσμος χρείαν ἔσχεν.  
93 Διὰ τοῦτο ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς μεμνημένος, τίς  
τ’ ἐστι καὶ πόθεν ἐξήλθεθεν καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος γέγονεν,  
πρὸς μόνῳ τούτῳ ἔστιν, πῶς τὴν αὐτοῦ χώραν  
ἐκπληρώσῃ εὐτάκτως καὶ εὐπειθῶς τῷ θεῷ.  
94 καὶ  με λέναι ³ θέλεις; ως ἐλεύθερος, ὡς  
γενναίος, ὡς σὺ ἡθέλησας· σὺ γὰρ με ἀκῶ-  
95 λυτον ἐποίησας ἐν τοῖς ἔμοις. ἀλλ’ οὐκέτι μοι  
χρείαν ἔχεις; καὶ μέχρι νῦν  
διὰ σὲ ἐμενοῦν, δι’ ἄλλον οὐδένα, καὶ νῦν σοι πει-  

1 kal before this word was deleted by Upton.  
2 οὐκ added by Sh, a correction supported by the para-  
phrase of this passage in Marcus Aurelius, 11, 35.  
³ Reiske: μ’ εἶναι S.  

This seems to me to be the most probable meaning of a  
vexed passage. If any change is needed, which I doubt  
(for ἄλλος with the simple genitive is abundantly attested,  
at least in other authors), I should prefer to read ἄλλο τι ἥ
against the things themselves. Do you tell me that any word is ill-omened which signifies some process of nature? Say that also the harvesting of ears of grain is ill-omened, for it signifies the destruction of the ears; but not of the universe. Say that also for leaves to fall is ill-omened, and for the fresh fig to turn into a dried fig, and a cluster of grapes to turn into raisins. For all these things are changes of a preliminary state into something else; it is not a case of destruction, but a certain ordered dispensation and management. This is what going abroad means, a slight change; this is the meaning of death, a greater change of that which now is, not into what is not, but into what is not now.—Shall I, then, be no more?—No, you will not be, but something else will be, something different from that of which the universe now has need. And this is but reasonable, for you came into being, not when you wanted, but when the universe had need of you.

For this reason the good and excellent man, bearing in mind who he is, and whence he has come, and by whom he was created, centres his attention on this and this only, how he may fill his place in an orderly fashion, and with due obedience to God. “Is it Thy will that I should still remain? I will remain as a free man, as a noble man, as Thou didst wish it; for Thou hast made me free from hindrance in what was mine own. And now hast Thou no further need of me? Be it well with Thee. I have been waiting here until now because of Thee and of none other, and now I obey Thee and depart.”

\[\text{où}, \text{ rather than to change où into } \text{ou, delete or transpose it, or take } \text{vuv in the sense of } \text{tôte}.\]
\[98\] θόμενος ἀπέρχομαι.” “πῶς ἀπέρχη;” “πάλιν ὡς σὺ ἥθελησας, ὡς ἐλεύθερος, ὡς ὑπηρέτης σὸς, ὡς ᾿σοθημένος σου τῶν προσταγμάτων καὶ ἀπαγορευμάτων. μέχρι δ’ ἂν σὺ διατρίβω ἐν τοῖς σοῖς, τίνα με θέλεις εἶναι; ἀρχοντα ἣ ᾿ιδιώτην, βουλευτὴν ᾿η δημότην, στρατιώτην ᾿η στρατηγόν, παιδευτὴν ᾿η οἰκοδεσπότην; ἦν ἂν χώραν καὶ τάξιν ἐγχειρίσης, ὡς λέγει ὁ Σωκράτης, μυριάκες ἀποθανοῦμαι πρῶτον ἢ ταῦτην ἐγκαταλείψω.

\[100\] ποῦ δὲ μ’ εἶναι θέλεις; ἐν ’Ρώμη ᾿η ἐν ’Αθηναῖς ᾿η ἐν Θῆβαις ᾿η ἐν Γυάροις; μόνον ἐκεῖ μου μέμνησο. ἂν μ’ ἐκεῖ πέμπτης, ὅπου κατὰ φύσιν διεξαγωγὴ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐ σοὶ ἀπειθῶν ἔξειμι, ἀλλ’ ὡς σοῦ μοι σημαίνοντος τὸ ἀνακλητικὸν οὐκ ἀπολείπω σε. μὴ γένοιτο ἀλλ’ αἰσθήματι, ὃτι μου χρείαν οὐκ ἔχεις. ἂν δὲ διδόται κατὰ φύσιν διεξαγωγὴ, οὐ ξητήσω ἀλλον τόπον ¹ ἢ ἐν ᾿ω εἰμὶ ᾿η ἀλλοὺς ἀνθρώπους ᾿η μεθ’ ὄν εἰμὶ.”

\[103\] Ταῦτα νυκτὸς, ταῦτα ᾿ημέρας πρόχειρα ἐστῶ. ταῦτα γράφειν, ταῦτα ἀναγιγνώσκειν περὶ τούτων τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς αὐτὸν, πρὸς ἐτερον “μή τι ἔχεις μοι πρὸς τὸ ὄντο βοηθήσαι;” καὶ πάλιν ἀλλω προσελθεῖν ² καὶ ἀλλω.

\[104\] εἰτα ἂν τι γένηταί τῶν λεγομένων ἀβουλιτῶν, εὐθὺς ἐκείνο πρῶτον ἐπικουφίσει σε, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπροσδόκητον. μέγα γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ “᾿δειν

¹ τόπον added by Schweighäuser, after Schegk.
² Wolf, after Schegk: ἀλθεῖν S.

¹ A very free paraphrase of Plato, Apology, 28 D–29 A.
"How do you depart?" "Again, as Thou didst wish it, as a free man, as Thy servant, as one who has perceived Thy commands and Thy prohibitions. But so long as I continue to live in Thy service, what manner of man wouldst Thou have me be? An official or a private citizen, a senator or one of the common people, a soldier or a general, a teacher or the head of a household? Whatsoever station and post Thou assign me, I will die ten thousand times, as Socrates says, or ever I abandon it. And where wouldst Thou have me be? In Rome, or in Athens, or in Thebes, or in Gyara? Only remember me there. If Thou sendest me to a place where men have no means of living in accordance with nature, I shall depart this life, not in disobedience to Thee, but as though Thou wert sounding for me the recall. I do not abandon Thee—far be that from me! but I perceive that Thou hast no need of me. Yet if there be vouchsafed a means of living in accordance with nature, I will seek no other place than that in which I am, or other men than those who are now my associates."

Have thoughts like these ready at hand by night and by day; write them, read them, make your conversation about them, communing with yourself, or saying to another, "Can you give me some help in this matter?" And again, go now to one man and now to another. Then, if some one of those things happens which are called undesirable, immediately the thought that it was not unexpected will be the first thing to lighten the burden. For in every case it is a great help to be able to say, "I knew that the son whom I had begotten was

\[^2\] See on I. 24, 19.
ARRIANS DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

1. Variously attributed to Solon (Diogenes Laertius, 2, 13), Anaxagoras (Cicero, Tusc. 3, 30; Diogenes Laertius, 2, 13), or Xenophon (Diogenes Laertius, 2, 13 and 55). Compare also Seneca, De Consol. ad Polyb. 11, 2, and Hierocles on the Golden Verses of Pythagoras, chap. 11 (p. 439 a, Mullach).
mortal."¹ For that is what you will say, and again, "I knew that I was mortal," "I knew that I was likely to leave home," "I knew that I was liable to banishment," "I knew that I might be sent off to prison." And in the next place, if you reflect with yourself and look for the quarter from which the happening comes, immediately you will be reminded of the principle: "It comes from the quarter of the things that are outside the sphere of the moral purpose, that are not mine own; what, then, is it to me?" Then comes the most decisive consideration: "Who was it that has sent the order?" Our Prince, or our General, the State, or the law of the State? "Give it to me, then, for I must always obey the law in every particular." Later on, when your imagination bites you (for this is something you cannot control), fight against it with your reason, beat it down, do not allow it to grow strong, or to take the next step and draw all the pictures it wants, in the way it wants to do. If you are at Gyara, don't picture the style of life at Rome, and all the relaxations a man had who was living there, as well as all that he might have upon his return; but since you have been stationed there, you ought to strive to live manfully at Gyara, as beseems the man whose life is spent in Gyara. And again, if you are in Rome, don't picture the style of life at Athens, but make your life in Rome the one object of your study and practice.

Then, in the place of all the other relaxations, introduce that which comes from the consciousness that you are obedient to God, and that you are playing the part of the good and excellent man, not ostensibly but in reality. For what a fine thing it
δύνασθαι εἰπεῖν "νῦν ἂ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς σεμνολογοῦσιν καὶ παραδοξολογεῖν δοκοῦσι, ταύτα ἐγὼ ἐπιτελῶ· κάκεινοι καθήμενοι τὰς ἐμὰς ἀρετὰς ἐξηγοῦνται καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ ζητοῦσιν καὶ ἐμὲ ὑμνοῦσιν· καὶ τούτοι με ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ λαβεῖν ἀπόδειξιν ἠθέλησεν καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ γνώναι, εἰ ἔχει στρατιώτην οἰον δεῖ, πολίτην οἰον δεῖ, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους προάγειν με μάρτυρα τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων. ἂδετε, ὅτι εἰκῆ φοβεῖσθε, μάτην ἐπιθυμεῖτε δὲν ἐπιθυμεῖτε. τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἔξω μὴ ζητεῖτε, ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ζητεῖτε· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐχ εὑρήσετε. ἐπὶ τούτοις με νῦν μὲν ἐνταῦθα ἄγει, νῦν δ' ἐκεῖ πέμπει, πένητα δείκνυσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, δίχα ἄρχης, νοσοῦντα· εἰς Γύαρα ἀποστέλλει, εἰς δεσμωτήριον εἰσάγει. οὐ μισῶν· μὴ γένοιτο· τίς δὲ μισεῖ τὸν ἄριστον τῶν ὑπηρετῶν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ; οὐδ' ἀμελῶν, ὅσ γε οὐδὲ τῶν μικροτάτων τινὸς ἀμελέω, ἀλλὰ γυμνάζων καὶ μάρτυρι πρὸς τοὺς ἀλλοὺς χρώμενος. εἰς τοιαύτην ὑπηρεσίαν κατατεταγμένος ἐτὶ φροντίζω, ποῦ εἰμὶ ἢ μετὰ τίνων ἢ τὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ λέγοντιν; οὐχὶ δ' ὅλος πρὸς τὸν θεόν τέταμαι καὶ τὰς ἐκεῖνον ἐντολὰς καὶ τὰ προστάγματα;" Ταύτα ἔχων ἄει ἐν χερσὶ καὶ τρίβων αὐτὸς παρὰ σαντῷ καὶ πρόχειρα ποιῶν οὐδέποτε δεήσῃ τοῦ παραμυθουμένου, τοῦ ἐπιρροούντος καὶ γὰρ αὐσχρὸν οὐ τὸ φαγεῖν μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ
is to be able to say to oneself, "Now I am actually performing what the rest talk solemnly about in their lectures, and are thought to be uttering paradoxes. Yes, they sit and expound my virtues, and study about me, and sing my praise. And of this Zeus wished me to get a demonstration in my own person, while at the same time He wished to know whether He has the right kind of soldier, the right kind of citizen, and to present me before all other men as a witness about the things which lie outside the sphere of the moral purpose. 'Behold,' says He, 'your fears are at haphazard, it is in vain that you desire what you desire. Do not look for your blessings outside, but look for them within yourselves; otherwise you will not find them.' These are the terms upon which now He brings me here, and again He sends me there; to mankind exhibits me in poverty, without office, in sickness; sends me away to Gyara, brings me into prison. Not because He hates me—perish the thought! And who hates the best of His servants? Nor because He neglects me, for He does not neglect any of even the least of His creatures; but because He is training me, and making use of me as a witness to the rest of men. When I have been appointed to such a service, am I any longer to take thought as to where I am, or with whom, or what men say about me? Am I not wholly intent upon God, and His commands and ordinances?"

If you have these thoughts always at hand and go over them again and again in your own mind, and keep them in readiness, you will never need a person to console you, or strengthen you. For disgrace does not consist in not having anything to
λόγον μὴ ἔχειν ἀρκοῦντα πρὸς ἀφοβίαν, πρὸς
117 ἀλυπίαν. ἀν δὲ ἀπαξ περιποίησθι τὸ ἀλυπον καὶ
ἀφοβον, ἔτι σοι τύραννος ἔσται τις ἡ δορυφόρος ἡ
Καισαριανοὶ ἡ ὁρδινατίων δήξεται σε ἡ οί ἐπι-
θύνοντες ἐν τῷ Καπιτωλίῳ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀπτικίοις τόν
τηλικαύτην ἄρχην παρὰ τοῦ Δίως εἰληφότα;
118 μόνον μὴ πόμπευε αὐτὴν μηδ’ ἀλάξωνεύου ἐπ’
αὐτῇ, ἀλλ’ ἔρημ δεικνυεί κἂν μηδεῖς αἰσθάνηται,
ἀρκοῦ αὐτὸς ὑγιαίνων καὶ εὐδαιμονῶν.

κε’. Πρὸς τοὺς ἀποπίπτοντας ὅν προέθεντο.

1 Σκέψαι, ὅψ προεθοῦ ἀρχόμενος, τίνοι μὲν
ἐκράτησας, τίνων δ’ οὐ, καὶ πῶς ἐφ’ οίς μὲν
ἐυφραίνη ἀναμμυνηκόμενος, ἐφ’ οίς δ’ ἄχθη, καὶ εἰ
2 δυνατόν, ἀνάλαβε κακεῖνα ὅν ἀπώλισθες. οὐ
γὰρ ἀποκυνητέου τὸν ἀγώνα τὸν μέγιστον ἀγώνιζο-
3 μένοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ πληγάς ληπτέου; οὐ γὰρ ὑπὲρ
πάλης καὶ παγκρατίου ὁ ἀγών πρόκειται, οὐ καὶ
τυχόντι καὶ μὴ τυχόντι ἐξεστιν μὲν πλείστον
ἀξίω, ἐξεστι δὲ ὄλγου εἶναι καὶ νὴ Δία ἐξεστιν
μὲν εὐτυχεστάτω, ἐξεστί δὲ κακοδαιμονεστάτῳ
eίναι, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εὐτυχίας καὶ εὐδαιμονίας.
4 τί οὖν; οὐδ’ ἂν ἀπαυδήσωμεν ἐνταῦθα, κωλύει

1 In this passage the words Caesariani and ordinatio have
been taken over direct from the Latin. In ὀπτικίοις, a word
which seems to occur nowhere else in Greek or in Latin, it
may be that the Latin auspicia (sacrifices at the inauguration
of some official enterprise) are meant, as Wolf suggested,
and so the passage is translated; but the word is very un-
eat, but in not having reason sufficient to secure you against fear and against grief. But if once you win for yourself security against grief and fear, will there any longer exist for you a tyrant, or a guardsman, or members of Caesar’s household; or will some appointment to office sting you with envy, or those who perform sacrifices on the Capitol in taking the auspices, you who have received so important an office from Zeus? Only make no display of your office, and do not boast about it; but prove it by your conduct; and if no one perceives that you have it, be content to live in health and happiness yourself.

CHAPTER XXV

To those who fail to achieve their purposes

Consider which of the things that you purposed at the start you have achieved, and which you have not; likewise, how it gives you pleasure to recall some of them, and pain to recall others, and, if possible, recover also those things which have slipped out of your grasp. For men who are engaged in the greatest of contests ought not to flinch, but to take also the blows; for the contest before us is not in wrestling or the pancratium, in which, whether a man succeeds or fails, he may be worth a great deal, or only a little,—yes, by Zeus, he may even be extremely happy or extremely miserable,—but it is a contest for good fortune and happiness itself. What follows? Why here, even if we give in for certain (Chinnock, *Class. Rev.* 3 (1889), 70, thinks it stands for *officia*), and several emendations have been proposed, of which *óφικλοις* (*officia*, Koraes) is perhaps the most plausible.
The comparison is brief, but I presume that a fighting quail, on once having submitted to defeat, became very ready to do so again, as is the case among ordinary chickens. One shouted into his ear in order to make him forget, as they said, the voice of the victor, and to restore his courage. Pollux, 9, 109.
the time being, no one prevents us from struggling again, and we do not have to wait another four-year period for another Olympic festival to come around, but the moment a man has picked himself up, and recovered himself, and exhibits the same eagerness, he is allowed to contest; and if you give in again, you can enter again; and if once you win a victory, you are as though you had never given in at all. Only don’t begin cheerfully to do the same thing over again out of sheer habit, and end up as a bad athlete, going the whole circuit of the games, and getting beaten all the time, like quails that have once run away. I am overcome by the impression of a pretty maid. Well, what of it? Wasn’t I overcome just the other day? I feel strongly inclined to censure somebody, for didn’t I censure somebody just the other day? You talk thus to us as though you had come off scot-free; just as if a man should say to his physician who was forbidding him to bathe, “Why, but didn’t I bathe just the other day?” If, then, the physician is able to say to him, “Very well, after you had bathed, then, how did you feel? Didn’t you have a fever? Didn’t your head ache?” So, too, when you censured somebody the other day, didn’t you act like an ugly-spirited man, like a silly babbler? Didn’t you feed this habit by citing the example of your own previous acts? And when you were overcome by the maid, did you escape scot-free? Why, then, do you talk about what you were doing just the other day? In my opinion, you ought to have remembered, as slaves remember their blows, and to have kept away from the same mistakes. But one case is not like the other; for with slaves it is
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γὰρ ὁ πόνος τῆς μνήμην ποιεῖ, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἁμαρτη-μάτων ποίες πόνος, ποία ξημία; πότε γὰρ εἰθίσθης φεύγειν τὸ κακός ἐνεργήσαι;

κε’. Πρὸς τοὺς τὴν ἀπορίαν δεδοικότας.

1 Ὅντι αἰσχύνῃ δειλότερος ὃν καὶ ἀγεννέστερος τῶν δραπετῶν; πῶς ἐκεῖνοι φεύγοντες ἀπολεῖπουσι τοὺς δεσπότας, ποίοις ἀγροῖς πεποιθότες, ποίοις οἰκέταις; οὐχὶ δ’ ὅλιγον ὅσον πρὸς τὰς πρώτας ἁμέρας ὑφελόμενοι εἰδ’ ὑπερῷον διὰ γῆς ἢ καὶ θαλάττης φέρουται ἀλλὴν εὖ ἀλλης ἀφορμὴν πρὸς τὸ διατρέφοσθαι φιλοτεχνοῦντες; καὶ τὶς πωποτε δραπέτης λιμῷ ἀπέθανεν; σὺ δὲ τρέμεις, μὴ σοι λείπῃ τὰ ἀναγκαία, καὶ τὰς νύκτας ἀγρυπνεῖς.

2 ταλαίπωρε, οὗτος τυφλὸς εἶ καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν οὐχ ὀρᾶς, ὅποιοι δέ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδειαὶ; ποῦ γὰρ φέρει; ὅπου καὶ ὁ πυρετός, ὅπου καὶ λίθος ἔπιπεσόν, εἰς θάνατον. τοῦτο 1 οὖν οὐ πολλάκις σὺ αὐτὸς 2 εἰπες πρὸς τοὺς ἐταῦρους, πολλὰ δ’ ἁνέγυνως τοιαῦτα, πολλὰ δ’ ἐγραφες; ποσάκις δ’ ἡλαξονεύσω, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἀπο-

3 ταλαίπωρε, οὗτος τυφλὸς εἶ καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν οὐχ ὀρᾶς, ὅποιοι δέ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδειαὶ; ποῦ γὰρ φέρει; ὅπου καὶ ὁ πυρετός, ὅπου καὶ λίθος ἔπιπεσόν, εἰς θάνατον. τοῦτο 1 οὖν οὐ πολλάκις σὺ αὐτὸς 2 εἰπες πρὸς τοὺς ἐταῦρους, πολλὰ δ’ ἁνέγυνως τοιαῦτα, πολλὰ δ’ ἐγραφες; ποσάκις δ’ ἡλαξονεύσω, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἀπο-

4 θανεῖν μετρίως ἔχεις;—Ναῦ ἄλλα καὶ οἱ ἐμοὶ πενηψουσίν.—Τί οὖν; μὴ τι καὶ ὁ ἐκείνων λιμὸς ἀλλαχοῦ πονόν φέρει; οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ αὐτῇ πον

5 καθοδος; τὰ κατὰ τὰ αὐτά; οὐ θέλεις οὖν ἐκεὶ βλέπειν ϑαρρῶν πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν καὶ ἐνδειαν, ὅπου καὶ τοὺς πλούσιωτάτους καὶ τὰς ἀρχαῖς τὰς

1 Meibom, after Wolf: τοῦτον S.
2 Reiske: δαυτός S.
the suffering which produces the memory, but in the case of your mistakes, what suffering is there, what penalty do you feel? Why, when did you ever acquire the habit of avoiding evil activities?

CHAPTER XXVI

To those who fear want

Aren't you ashamed to be more cowardly and ignoble than a runaway slave? How do they, when they run off, leave their masters? in what estates or slaves do they put their confidence? Don't they steal just a little bit to last them for the first few days, and then afterwards drift along over land or sea, contriving one scheme after another to keep themselves fed? And what runaway slave ever died of hunger? But you tremble, and lie awake at night, for fear the necessities of life will fail you. Wretch, are you so blind, and do you so fail to see the road to which lack of the necessities of life leads? Where, indeed, does it lead? Where also fever, or a stone that drops on your head, lead,—to death. Have you not, then, often said this same thing yourself to your companions, read much of the same sort, and written much? How many times have you boasted that, as far as death at least was concerned, you are in a fairly good state?—Yes, but my family too will starve.—What then? Their starvation does not lead to some other end than yours, does it? Have they not also much the same descent thereto, and the same world below? Are you not willing, then, to look with courage sufficient to face every necessity and want, at that place to which the
megistas arxantas kai autous tous basileis kai
turainous dei katalthein, kai 1 se peinvonta, an
outos tyxhi, ekainous de diaarragentas upo apo-
6 psion kai meibhs; tina piwopoi epaisthen radivos
eides mi yeroonta; tina de ouk eschathogheron;
alla mignontes tas nykatas kai tas imeiras kai
xamai errimeneoi kai ouson autou to anagkaiou
sitoymevoi engus hekousin to muh apothaneiv
7 dynasthetai, ou 2 de ollokleros antherwpos cheiras
exhoi kai podas peri lymo dedoikas ouwos; ouk
antleiv dynasai, ou grafein, ou paidegwgein, ou
thyran allotriain philatteiv; — 'All' aischros eis
tauten elthein ty anagkh. — Mabe ouv prwtou,
tina ta aischra estin, kai ousous hmiin lege
sauton philosophon. to vun de muh an alias tis
epi se, anexon.
8 Aischroen esti soi to mu soun egron, ou ouv autios
ouk e', de allous uphthtesin soui, wos kefalalgyia,
wos puritos; ei sou oj goueis peniotes hsaiv, h
ploousiou mewn hsaiv 3 allous de kleroumous
upelitou, kai zontes ouk eparkoudw ouveden, sou
9 tauta aischra estin; tauta emainthanes parh tois
philosophous; ouvedtote hekousas, oti to aischro
vekton estin, to de vektou axion esti tou
vegeosthai; tina de 4 epiti to mu autou egrw, de
10 autou ouk epoigesen; ou ouv epoigesas touto, ton

1 Meibom, after Wolf: ei S.
2 From here through dynasai the passage is written in the
margin by the first hand of S.
3 h ploousiou mewn supplied by Schweighauser, hsaiv by C.
Schenkl.
4 5 added by Schweighauser.

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wealthiest needs must go, and those who have held
the highest offices, and very kings and tyrants?
Only you will descend hungry, if it so happen, and
they bursting with indigestion and drunkenness. Did
you ever easily find a beggar who was not an old man?
Wasn't he extremely old? But though they are cold
night and day, and lie forlorn on the ground, and have
to eat only what is absolutely necessary, they approach
a state where it is almost impossible for them to
die;¹ yet you who are physically perfect, and have
hands and feet, are you so alarmed about starving?
Can't you draw water, or write, or escort boys to and
from school, or be another's doorkeeper?—But it is
disgraceful to come to such a necessity.—Learn,
therefore, first of all, what the disgraceful things are,
and after you have done that, come into our
presence and call yourself a philosopher. But as
the case stands now, do not even allow anyone else
to call you one!

Is anything disgraceful to you which is not your
own doing, for which you are not responsible, which
has befallen you accidentally, as a headache or a
fever? If your parents were poor, or if they were
rich but left others as their heirs, and if they give
you no help though they are living, is all this dis-
graceful to you? Is that what you learned at the
feet of the philosophers? Have you never heard
that the disgraceful thing is censurable, and the
censurable is that which deserves censure? And
whom do you censure for what is not his own doing,
which he didn't produce himself? Well, did you
produce this situation? did you make your father

¹ The argument is, one need hardly remark, quite
unsound, for the death-rate among the poor is unques-
tionably much higher than among the wealthy.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

πατέρα τοιούτου; ἥ ἐξεστίν σοι ἐπανορθώσαι αὐτὸν; δίδοταί σοι τὸ τοῦτο; τί οὖν; δεῖ σε θέλειν τὰ μὴ διδόμενα μὴ τυγχάνοντα αὐτῶν αἰσχύνεσθαι; οὕτως δὲ καὶ εἰθὶζου φιλοσοφῶν ἀφορᾶν εἰς ἄλλους καὶ μηδεῖν αὐτὸς ἑλπίζειν ἐκ σεαυτοῦ;

τοιγαροῦν οἶμοι καὶ στένει καὶ ἐσθίει δεδοκὼς, μὴ οὐ σχῆς τροφᾶς αὔριον περὶ τῶν δουλαρίων τρέμει, μὴ κλέψῃ τί, μὴ φύγῃ, μὴ ἀποθαίνῃ.

οὕτως σὺ ζηθῇ καὶ μὴ παύῃς μηδέποτε, ὅστις ὀνόματι μόνον πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν προσήλθες καὶ τὰ θεωρήματα αὐτῆς ὅσον ἐπὶ σοὶ κατησχύνας ἄχριστα ἐπιδείξας καὶ ἀνωφελῇ τοῖς ἀναλαμβάνονσιν οὐδέποτε ἐ' εὐσταθείας ὥρεχθης, ἀταραξίας, ἀπαθείας. οὐδὲνα τοῦτον ένεκα ἑθεράπευσας, συνλογισμὸν έ' ένεκα πολλοὺς. οὐδέποτε τούτων τινὰ τῶν φαντασιῶν διεβασάνυσας αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ "δύναμαι φέρειν ἢ οὐ δύναμαι; τί μοι τὸ λοιπὸν ἔστιν?", ἀλλ' ὡς πάντων ἔχοντων σοι καλῶς καὶ ἀσφαλῶς περὶ τὸν τελευταῖον καταγίνου τόπου, τὸν τῆς ἀμεταπτωσίας, ἐν ἀμετάπτωτα σχῆς τίνα; τὴν δειλίαν, τὴν ἀγέννειαν, τὸν θαυμασμὸν τῶν πλούσιων, τὴν ἀτελῆ ὀρέξιν, τὴν ἀποτευκτικὴν ἕκκλησιν. περὶ τῆς τούτων ἀσφαλείας ἐφρόντιζες.

Οὐκ ἐδει προσκῆσασθαι πρὸ ὑπὸν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, ¹

¹ See explanatory note.

¹ So the text as it stands in S, but the singular mixture of technical terms in ἀποτευκτικὴ ἕκκλησις is incredible. Elsewhere, and quite properly, it is desire that fails to get what it wills (ἀποτευκτικὴ), and aversion that falls into what it would avoid (see III. 6, 6 and especially IV. 10, 4). Hence there is great plausibility in Schenkl's suggestion (partly
what he is? Or is it in your power to reform him? Is that vouchsafed you? What follows? Ought you to wish for what is not given you, or to be ashamed when you fail to get it? And did you really, while studying philosophy, acquire the habit of looking to other persons, and of hoping for nothing yourself from yourself? Very well then, lament and groan, and eat in fear of not having food to-morrow; tremble about your paltry slaves, for fear they will steal something, or run away, or die! Live in this spirit and never cease to live so, you who in name only have approached philosophy, and, as far as in you lay, have discredited its principles by showing them to be useless and good for nothing to those who receive them! But you never desired stability, serenity, peace of mind; you never cultivated anybody's acquaintance for that purpose, but many persons' acquaintance for the sake of syllogisms; you never thoroughly tested for yourself any one of these external impressions, asking the questions: "Am I able to bear it, or am I not? What may I expect next?" but just as though everything about you were in an excellent and safe condition, you have been devoting your attention to the last of all topics, that which deals with immutability, in order that you may have immutable—what? your cowardice, your ignoble character, your admiration of the rich, your ineffectual desire, your aversion that fails of its mark! These are the things about whose security you have been anxious!

Ought you not, first, to have acquired something after Reiske), ὃρεξιν, τὴν ἀποτευκτικὴν, <τὴν περιπτωτικὴν> ἐκκλάσει: "desire, that fails to get what it wills, and aversion that falls into what it would avoid."
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICETUS

eîta toûtô peripouieîn tûn ùsphâleian; kai tînà pòpôtâ eîdes trignhôn peripoukodômouta ùmdêin teîxhî periballômènon autôn; 1 poînois dê thurwòdô
16 kathistatai eîpî ou'demîâ thûra; allâ sú me-
leitâs àpodeîknuîneîn dûnasthâi tînà; meîleitâs mî
àpôsaîleûseîthai dià soîphysmâtôn. ûpô tînôv;
17 deîxoutîn mou prôtoû, tî tîriêis, tî metreîs ò tî
îstânîeis. eîth' ou'tous epîdeîknuîneîn tûn xugôv ò tûn
18 mëdîmou. ò mékhrì tînûs metrîsthîs tûn spodôû;
ou taûta se àpodeîknuîneîn deî, â poieî touß
ànthrwîpou$$$$s eûdaîmônas, â poieî prôkoîreîn autôîs
tâ prágmata òs thélouîsin, di' â ou deî mëmfeîssthâi
oudeîn, ègkaleîn oudeîn, péîdeîsthâi tî$$$$ dioukîsthâi
19 tûn òlou$$; taûta moî deîknuîne. "îdou$$ deîknuîn,$$
phîsîn, "ânalûsou sou sullhlogiûsmous." touûto
 tô metropôû ëstìn, ândprâpodou to metropômènon
20 ò ouk êstinh. dià taûta vûn tîneis dîkas òn
hûmélêhshâs. 2 trêmeeîs, âgnûprîneis, metâ pàntou$$
bouleûh$$ kàn mî pàsîn ârëskêin mèllh tâ
bouleûmâta, kakôs oueî beîbouleûsthai.
21 Eîta foûbh lîmòn, òs dôkeîs. ou ò ou lîmòn
foûbh, allâ dédôikas mî ou $$xhîs mûgeîroû, mî
ou $$xhîs âlllon ôfouñhtîn, âlllon tôv ùpodî-
souta, âlllon tôv evûsouta, âllous tôus
22 trîûsoutas, âllous tôus àkôlouðhîsoutas, iû' ev

1 Sb (periballon Schenkl): ùmdêin teîxhî periballô-
mènon autô autô S. The correct form of the text is highly
uncertain, and the version in Sb is acceptable only as meeting
in a general way the requirement of the context.
2 filosofhias after hûmélâsas deleted by Schenkl.
from reason, and then to have made that something secure? Why, did you ever see anyone building a cornice all around without first having a wall about which to build it? And what kind of doorkeeper is placed on guard where there isn’t any door? But you practise to get the power to demonstrate; demonstrate what? You practise to avoid being shaken by sophisms; shaken from what? Show me first what you are maintaining, what you are measuring, or what you are weighing; and after that, and under those conditions, show me your scales or your bushel-measure. Or how long will you keep measuring ashes? Are not these what you ought to be demonstrating, the things, namely, that make men happy, that make their affairs prosper for them as they desire, that make it unnecessary for them to blame anybody, and to find fault with anybody, but to acquiesce in the government of the universe? Show me these. “See, I do show you,” a man says; “I will analyse syllogisms for you.” Slave, this is a mere measuring instrument, it is not the thing measured. That is why you are now being punished for what you neglected; you tremble, lie awake, take counsel with everyone, and, if your plans are not likely to win the approval of all men, you think that your deliberations have been faulty.

And then you fear hunger, as you fancy. Yet it is not hunger that you fear, but you are afraid that you will not have a professional cook, you will not have another servant to buy the delicacies, another to put on your shoes for you, another to dress you, others to give you your massage, others to follow at your heels, in order that when you have undressed

1 The figure is reminiscent of Plato, *Rep.* VII, 534 E.
τῷ βαλανεῶν ἐκδυσάμενος καὶ ἐκτείνας σεαυτοῦ ὅσι ὦι ἐσταυρωμένοι τρίβη ἐνθεν καὶ ἐνθεν, εἰδ’ ὁ ἀλείπτης ἐπιστάς λέγη “μετάβηθι, δος πλευρόν, κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ λάβε, παράθεσ τὸν ὦμον,” εἰτ’ ἐλθὼν ἐκ τοῦ βαλανεῶν εἰς οἴκον κραυγάσης “οὔδεις φέρει φαγεῖν;” εἰτ’ “Ἀρον
23 τὰς τραπέζας σπόγγισον.” τούτῳ φοβή, μὴ ὦ ὄν ἴδυν ζήν ἀρρώστου βίων, ἐπεί τοι τὸν τῶν ὑγιαινόντων μάθε, πῶς ὦι δούλοι ζῶσιν, πῶς ὦι ἐργάται, πῶς ὦι γυναῖκες μελανοφόντες, πῶς Σωκράτης ἔξησεν, ἐκείνος μὲν καὶ μετὰ γυναικὸς καὶ παύδων, πῶς Διογένης, πῶς Κλεάνθης ἀμα
24 σχολάζων καὶ ἀντλῶν. ταῦτα ἄνθελη ἔχειν, ἔξεις πανταχοῦ καὶ ζήσεις θαρρῶν, τίνι; ὥς μόνωθεν θαρρεῖν ἐνδεχεται, τῷ πιστῷ, τῷ ἀκωλύτῳ, τῷ ἀνυφαίρετῳ, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ
25 σεαυτοῦ. διὰ τὶ ὦ σύτως ἄχρηστον καὶ ἀνωφελῆ σαυτῶν παρεσκεύασας, ὡν μὴ δεῖς σε εἰς οἰκίαν θέλη δέξασθαι, μηδείς ἐπιμελήθηναι; ἀλλὰ σκέψοις μὲν ὀλόκληρον καὶ χρήσιμον ἔξω ἐρρυμέ-
νον πᾶς τις εὐρῶν ἀναρήσεται καὶ κέρδος ἴγνος εἰς τῇ σε ὦ σύτως, ἀλλὰ πᾶς ζημίαν.
26 σύτως σύτε κυνὸς δύνασαι χρείαν παρασχεῖν 

οὐδ’ ἀλεκτρυόνοις. τί ὦν ἔτι ζήν θέλεις τοιοῦτος ὄν; Φοβεῖται τῖς ἄνηρ ἁγαθὸς, μὴ λείπωσιν αὐτῷ τροφαί; τοὺς τυφλοὺς οὐ λείπουσιν, τοὺς χωλοὺς οὐ λείπουσιν λείψουσιν ἁνδρὶ ἁγαθῷ; καὶ στρατιώτη μὲν ἁγαθῷ οὐ λείπει ο μισθοδοτῶν

1 Diogenes Laertius, 7, 168.

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in a bath, and stretched yourself out like men who have been crucified, you may be massaged on this side and on that; and that then the masseur may stand over you and say, "Move over, give me his side, you take his head, hand me his shoulder"; and then, when you have left the bath and gone home, that you may shout out, "Is no one bringing me something to eat?" and after that, "Clear away the tables; wipe them off with a sponge." What you are afraid of is this—that you may not be able to live the life of an invalid, since, I tell you, you have only to learn the life of healthy men—how the slaves live, the workmen, the genuine philosophers, how Socrates lived—he too with a wife and children—how Diogenes lived, how Cleanthes, who combined going to school and pumping water. If this is what you want, you will have it everywhere, and will live with full confidence. Confidence in what? In the only thing in which one can have confidence—in what is faithful, free from hindrance, cannot be taken away, that is, in your own moral purpose. And why have you made yourself so useless and unprofitable, that no one is willing to take you into his house, no one willing to take care of you? But when a whole and useful implement has been thrown out, anyone who finds it will pick it up and count it gain; yet not when he picks up you, but everyone will count you a loss. You are so unable to serve the purpose of even a dog or a cock. Why, then, do you care to keep on living, if that is the sort of person you are?

Does a good man fear that food will fail him? It does not fail the blind, it does not fail the lame; will it fail a good man? A good soldier does not lack someone to give him pay, or a workman, or a
οὐδ' ἐργάτης οὐδὲ σκυτεῖ· τῷ δ' ἀγαθῷ λείψει;  
28 οὕτως ὁ θεὸς ἀμελεῖ τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐπιτευγμάτων, 
τῶν διακόνων, τῶν μαρτύρων, οἷς μόνοις χρῆται 
παραδείγμασιν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους, ὅτι καὶ 
ἐστι καὶ καλῶς διοικεῖ τὰ ὅλα καὶ οὐκ ἀμελεῖ 
tῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων καὶ ὅτι ἀνδρὶ ἀγα-
θῷ οὐδέν ἐστι κακὸν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτ' ἀποθανόντι;  
29 —Τί οὖν, ὅταν μὴ παρέχῃ τροφάς; —Τί γὰρ 
ἀλλο ἡ ὡς ἀγαθὸς στρατηγὸς τὸ ἀνακλητικὸν 
μοι σεσήμαγκεν· πείθομαι, ἀκολουθῶ, ἐπενυφ-
μῶν τὸν ἤγερμόνα, ὑμνῶν αὐτοῦ τὰ ἔργα. καὶ 
30 γὰρ ἦλθον, ὅτ' ἐκεῖνῳ ἐδοξέεν, καὶ ἀπειμὶ πάλιν 
ἐκεῖνῳ δοκοῦν καὶ ξόντος μου τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον 
ἐν, ὑμνεῖν τὸν θεὸν καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπ' ἐμαυτῷ καὶ 
31 πρὸς ἑνα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς· οὐ παρέχει μοι 
πολλά, οὐκ ἀφθονα, τρυφῶν με οὐ θέλει· οὐδὲ 
γὰρ τῷ Ἡρακλεὶ παρεῖχεν, τῷ νιεὶ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ, 
ἀλλ' ἄλλος ἐβασίλευεν Ἦραγος καὶ Μυκηνῶν, 
32 ὁ δ' ἐπετάσσετο καὶ ἐποίηει καὶ ἐγυμνάζετο. καὶ 
ἡν Ἔυρυσθεὺς μὲν, ὅς ἦν, οὔτε Ἀργοὺς οὔτε 
Μυκηνῶν βασιλεύσ, ὡς γ' οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ, ὁ 
δ' Ἦρακλῆς ὑπάσης γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἄρχον 
καὶ ἤγεμῶν ἦν, καθαρτὴς ἁδικίας καὶ ἀνομίας, 
eἰσαγωγεὺς δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ὀσιότητος· καὶ 
33 ταῦτα ἐποίει καὶ γυμνὸς καὶ μόνος. ὁ δ' 
Ὀδυσσεὺς ὅτε ναναγός ἐξερρήφη, μὴ τι ἐτα-
πείνωσεν αὐτοῦ ἡ ἀπορία, μὴ τι ἐπέκλασεν; 
ἀλλὰ πῶς ἀπήει πρὸς τὰς παρθένους αἰτήσων; 
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cobbler; and shall a good man? Does God so neglect His own creatures, His servants, His witnesses, whom alone He uses as examples to the uninstructed, to prove that He both is, and governs the universe well, and does not neglect the affairs of men, and that no evil befalls a good man either in life or in death?—Yes, but what if He does not provide food?—Why, what else but that as a good general He has sounded the recall? I obey, I follow, lauding my commander, and singing hymns of praise about His deeds. For I came into the world when it so pleased Him, and I leave it again at His pleasure, and while I live this was my function—to sing hymns of praise unto God, to myself and to others, be it to one or to many. God does not give me much, no abundance, He does not want me to live luxuriously; He did not give much to Heracles, either, though he was His own son, but someone else was king over Argos and Mycenae, while he was subject, and suffered labours and discipline. And Eurystheus, such as he was, was not king over either Argos or Mycenae, for he was not king even over himself; but Heracles was ruler and leader of all the land and sea, purging them of injustice and lawlessness, and introducing justice and righteousness; and all this he did naked and by himself. And when Odysseus was shipwrecked and cast ashore, did his necessity make abject his spirit, or break it? Nay, but how did he advance upon the maidens to ask for

1 The scholiast appropriately compares Matt. vi. 31 and 33: "Take no thought," and "Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and all these things shall be added unto you."

2 This last clause is slightly modified from Plato, Apol. 41 D.
tā ἀναγκαία, ὃν αἰσχιστὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι παρ’ ἄλλου;

ὅς τε λέων ὀρεσίτροφος.

34 τίνι πεποιθῶς; οὐ δοξῇ οὐδὲ χρήμασιν οὐδ’ ἀρχαῖς, ἄλλ’ ἀλή τῇ ἑαυτῷ, τοῖτ’ ἐστι δόγμαι
35 περὶ1 τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. ταύτα γὰρ ἐστι μόνα τὰ τους ἐλευθέρους ποιοῦντα, τὰ τοὺς ἀκωλύτους, τὰ τὸν τράχηλον ἐπαίροντα τῶν τεταπεινομένων, τὰ ἀντιβλέπειν ποιοῦντα ὀρθοὺς τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους,
36 πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους, καὶ τὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου δόρον τούτο ἢν, σὺ δ’ οὐκ ἔξελευσῃ θαρρῶν, ἄλλὰ περιτρέμουν τοῖς ἰματιδίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀργυροματίοις; δύστηνε, οὔτως ἀπώλεσας τὸν μέχρι νῦν χρόνον;
37 Τί οὖν, ἂν νοσήσω;—Νοσήσεις καλῶς.—Τίς με θεραπεύσει;—Ὁ θεός, οἱ φίλοι.—Σκληρῶς κατακείσομαι.—’Αλλ’ ὡς ἁγίρ.—Οἶκημα ἐπιτήδειον οὐχ ἔξω.—Ἐν ἀνεπιτηδείῳ οὖν 2 νοσήσεις.—Τίς μοι ποιήσει τὰ τροφεῖα;—Οἱ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιοῦντες; ὡς Μάνης νοσήσεις.—Τί δὲ καὶ τὸ
38 πέρας τῆς νόσου;—’Αλλο τι ἡ θάνατος; ἀρ’ οὖν ἐνθυμή, ὅτι κεφάλαιον τούτο πάντων τῶν κακῶν τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ καὶ ἴδεννείας καὶ δειλίας οὐ

1 περὶ supplied by Schenkl.
2 ἀνεπιτηδείῳ the Cambridge ed., after Wolf; οὖ supplied by Oldfather: ἐνεπιτηδείῳ νοσήσεις S.

1 Homer, Odyssey, VI. 130.
2 The text is very uncertain. Schenkl reads Ἐν ἐπιτηδείῳ οὖ νοσήσεις; which would appear to mean something like;
food, which is regarded as being the most disgraceful thing for one person to ask of another?

As a lion reared in the mountains.¹

In what did he trust? Not in reputation, or money, or office, but in his own might, that means, his judgements about the things which are under our control, and those which are not under our control. For these are the only things that make men free, that make men unhampered, that lift up the neck of those who have become abject, that make them look with level eyes into the faces of the rich, and the faces of tyrants. And all this was what the philosopher had to give, yet will you not come forth bold, instead of trembling for your paltry clothes and silver plate? Miserable man, have you so wasted your time down to the present?

Yes, but what if I fall ill?—You will bear illness well.—Who will nurse me?—God and your friends.—I shall have a hard bed to lie on.—But like a man.—I shall not have a suitable house.—Then you will fall ill in an unsuitable house.²—Who will prepare my food for me?—Those who prepare it for others also. You will be ill like Manes.³—And what is also the end of the illness?—Anything but death? Will you, then, realize that this epitome of all the ills that befall man, of his ignoble spirit, and his

"Will you not choose a suitable house in which to fall ill?"

But that sort of reply seems scarcely to fit the context.

¹ That is, like a slave, for this was a typical slave name, like "Sambo" among American negroes. In particular the reference seems to be to Zeno, who, when his physicians ordered him to eat young pigeons, insisted, "Cure me as you do Manes." Musonius, frag. 18 A (p. 98, 4 ff., Hense).
θάνατός ἐστίν, μᾶλλον δ' ὁ τοῦ θανάτου φόβος; 39 ἐπὶ τούτων οὖν μοι γυμνάζου, ἐνταῦθα νενε-
tωσαν οἱ λόγοι πάντες, τὰ ἀσκήματα, τὰ ἀναγνώσματα, καὶ εἰσή, ὁτι οὕτως μόνως ἐλευθε-
ροῦνται ἀνθρώποι.
cowardice, is not death, but it is rather the fear of death? Against this fear, then, I would have you discipline yourself, toward this let all your reasoning tend, your exercises, your reading; and then you will know that this is the only way in which men achieve freedom.
BOOK IV
Δ

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΑ ΤΟΥ Δ ΒΙΒΛΙΟΥ

α’. Περὶ ἐλευθερίας.

β’. Περὶ συμπεριφορᾶς.

g’. Τίνα τίνων ἀντικαταλαμβάνειν;

δ’. Πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὸ ἐν ἰσοχία διάγειν ἐσπουδαστάς.

e’. Πρὸς τοὺς μαχίμους καὶ θηριώδεις.

ζ’. Πρὸς τοὺς ἐπὶ τῷ ἐλεύσικαὶ ὀδυνώμενους.

ζ’. Περὶ ἀφοβίας.

η’. Πρὸς τοὺς ταχέως ἐπὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῶν φιλοσοφῶν ἐπιπηδῶντας.

θ’. Πρὸς τὸν εἰς ἀναίσχυνάν μεταβληθέντα.

ι’. Τίνων δεῖ καταφρονεῖν καὶ πρὸς τίνα διαφέρεσθαι;

ια’. Περὶ καθαριότητος.

ιβ’. Περὶ προσοχῆς.

ιγ’. Πρὸς τοὺς εὐκόλως ἐκφέρωντας τὰ αὐτῶν.

α’. Περὶ ἐλευθερίας.

1 'Ελευθερός ἐστιν ὁ ζῶν ὡς βούλεται, ἂν οὗτ ἀναγκάσαι ἐστιν οὔτε κωλύσαι οὔτε βιάσασθαι, οὐ αὐτῷ ἀνεμπόδιστοι, αἱ ὀμείλεις ἐπιτευκτικαῖ, ἀπερίπτωτοι. τίς οὖν θέλει 2 ζῆν ἀμαρτάνων;—Οὐδεὶς.—Τίς θέλει ζῆν ἐξαπατώμενος, προπίπτων, ἄδικος ὡν, ἀκόλαστος, 3 μεμψίμοιρος, ταπεινῶς;—Οὐδεὶς.—Οὐδεὶς ἀρα τῶν φαύλων ζῆν ὡς βούλεται οὐ τοῖνες οὔδεν 244
BOOK IV

*Chapters of the Fourth Book*

I. Of freedom.
II. Of social intercourse.
III. What things should be exchanged for what things?
IV. To those who have set their hearts upon living in peace.
V. Against the contentious and brutal.
VI. To those who are vexed at being pitied.
VII. Of freedom from fear.
VIII. To those who hastily assume the guise of the philosophers.
IX. To the man who had become shameless.
X. What ought we to despise and on what place a high value?
XI. Of cleanliness.
XII. Of attention.
XIII. To those who lightly talk about their own affairs.

**CHAPTER I**

*Of freedom*

He is free who lives as he wills, who is subject neither to compulsion, nor hindrance, nor force, whose choices are unhampered, whose desires attain their end, whose aversions do not fall into what they would avoid. Who, then, wishes to live in error?—No one.—Who wishes to live deceived, impetuous, unjust, unrestrained, peevish, abject?—No one.—Therefore, there is no bad man who lives as
4 ἐλεύθερος ἔστιν. τίς δὲ θέλει λυποῦμενος ξύν, φοβοῦμενος, φθονῶν, ἐλεῶν, ὀρεγόμενος καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων, ἐκκλίων καὶ περιπτώτων;—Οὐδὲ
5 εἰσ.—Εἴσομεν οὖν τινὰ τῶν φαύλων ἄλυπον, ἀφοβοῦν, ἀπερίπτωτον, ἀναπότευκτον;—Οὐδένα.
—Οὐκ ἀρα οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερον.
6 Ταῦτα ἂν τις ἀκούσῃ δισύπατος, ἂν μὲν προσθῆς ὅτι "ἅλλα σὺ γε σοφὸς εἰ, οὐδὲν πρὸς σὲ ταῦτα," συγγνώσεται σοι. ἂν δ' αὐτῷ τὰς
7 ἀληθείας εἴπης ὅτι "τῶν τρὶς πεπραμένων οὐδὲν διαφέρεις πρὸς τὸ μή καὶ αὐτὸς δοῦλος εἶναι," τί ἄλλο ἡ πληγας σε δεὶ προσδοκᾶν;
8 "πῶς γὰρ," φησίν, "ἐγὼ δοῦλος εἰμί; ὁ πατὴρ ἐλεύθερος, ἡ μήτηρ ἐλευθέρα, οὐ ἄνων οὐδεὶς ἐχει' ἄλλα καὶ συγκλητικὸς εἰμι καὶ Καίσαρος φίλος καὶ ὑπάτευκα καὶ δοῦλους πολλοὺς ἔχω."
9 πρὸτον μὲν, οὐ βέλτιστε συγκλητικέ, τάχα σου καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τὴν αὐτὴν δουλείαν δοῦλος ἢν καὶ ἡ μήτηρ καὶ ὁ πάππος καὶ ἐφεξῆς πάντες οἱ
10 πρόγονοι. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἦσαν ἐλεύθεροι, τί τοῦτο πρὸς σὲ; τί γὰρ, εἰ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γενναίοι ἦσαν, σὺ δ' ἀγεννής; ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἀφοβοῖ, σὺ δὲ δειλὸς; ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἐγκρατεῖς, σὺ δ' ἀκόλαστος;
11 Καὶ τί, φησί, τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ δοῦλον εἶναι;—Οὐδέν σοι φαίνεται εἶναι τὸ ἄκοντά τι ποιεῖν, τὸ ἀναγκαζόμενον, τὸ στένοντα πρὸς τὸ δοῦλον
12 εἶναι;—Τοῦτο μὲν ἕστω, φησίν. ἅλλα τίς μὲ δύναται ἀναγκάσαι, εἰ μὴ ὁ πάντων κύριος
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he wills, and accordingly no bad man is free. And who wishes to live in grief, fear, envy, pity, desiring things and failing to get them, avoiding things and falling into them?—No one at all.—Do we find, then, any bad man free from grief or fear, not falling into what he would avoid, nor failing to achieve what he desires?—No one.—Then we find no bad man free, either.

Now if some man who has been consul twice hear this, he will forgive you, if you add, "But you are a wise man; this does not apply to you." Yet if you tell him the truth, to wit: "In point of being a slave you are not a whit better than those who have been thrice sold," what else can you expect but a flogging? "Why, how am I a slave?" says he. "My father was free, my mother free; no one has a deed of sale for me. More than that, I am a member of the senate, and a friend of Caesar, and I have been consul, and I own many slaves." Now in the first place, most worthy senator, it is very likely that your father was the same kind of slave that you are, and your mother, and your grandfather, and all your ancestors from first to last. But even if they were free to the limit, what does that prove in your case? Why, what does it prove if they were noble, and you are mean-spirited? If they were brave, and you a coward? If they were self-controlled, and you unrestrained?

And what, says someone, has this to do with being a slave?—Doesn't it strike you as "having to do with being a slave" for a man to do something against his will, under compulsion?—Granted the point, he replies. But who can put me under compulsion, except Caesar, the lord of all?—There,
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13 Καίσαρ;—Οὐκοῦν ἐνα μὲν δεσπότην σαυτοῦ καὶ σὺ αὐτὸς ὠμολόγησας. ὅτι δὲ πάντων, ὡς λέγεις, κοινὸς ἐστιν, μηδὲν σε τούτο παραμυθέσθω, ἀλλὰ γίγνωσκε, ὅτι ἐκ μεγάλης οἰκίας δούλος εἰ. οὕτως καὶ Νικοπολῖται ἐπιβοάν εἰώθασι "νὴ τὴν Καίσαρος τύχην, ἐλεύθεροί ἐσμεν."

15 "Ομοι δ', εἰνσ σοι δοκῇ, τὸν μὲν Καίσαρα πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀφῶμεν, ἔκεινο δὲ μοι εἶπέ· οὐδέποτ' ἡράσθης τινός; οὐ παιδισκαρίου, οὐ παιδαρίου, οὐ δούλου, οὐκ ἐλευθέρου;—Τί οὖν τούτῳ πρὸς τὸ δούλου εἶναι ἢ ἐλευθέρου;—

17 Οὐδέποτ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐρωμένης ἐπετάγης οὐδὲν ὡς οὐκ ἠθελες; οὐδέποτε σου τὸ δουλάριον ἑκολάκευσας; οὐδέποτ' αὐτοῦ τοὺς πόδας κατεφίλησας; καίτοι τοῦ Καίσαρος ἂν σὲ τὶς ἀναγκάσῃ, ὑβριν αὐτὸ ἡγῇ καὶ ὑπερβολὴν τυραννίδος. τί οὖν ἄλλο ἐστὶ δουλεία; νυκτὸς οὐδέποτ'] ἀπῆλθες, ὅπου οὐκ ἠθελες; ἀνάλωσας, ὡς οὐκ ἠθελες; εἴπας τινα οἰμώξων καὶ στένων, ἡνέσχου λοιδορούμενος, ἀποκλείομενος;

19 ἀλλ' ἐς σὺ αἰσχύνῃ τὰ σαυτοῦ ὀμολογεῖν, ὡρα θέλει καὶ ποιεῖ ὁ Ὁρασιωνίδης, ὃς τοσαυτὰ στρατευσάμενος, ὅσα τάχα οὐδὲ σὺ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐξελήλυθε νυκτὸς, ὅτε ὁ Γέτας οὐ τολμᾶ ἐξέλθειν, ἀλλ' ἐς προσηναγκάζετο ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, πόλλα ἄν ἐπικραυγάσας καὶ τὴν πικράν δουλείαν ἀπολοφυράμενος ἐξῆλθεν. εἰτα, τί λέγει;
you have yourself admitted that you have one master. And let it not comfort you that he is, as you say, the common master of all men, but realize that you are a slave in a great house. So also the men of Nicopolis¹ are wont to shout: "Yea, by the fortune of Caesar, we are free men!"

However, let us leave Caesar out of account, if you please, for the present, but answer me this: Were you never in love with anyone, a pretty girl, or pretty boy, a slave, a freedman?—What, then, has that to do with being either slave or free?—Were you never commanded by your sweetheart to do something you didn’t wish to do? Did you never cozen your pet slave? Did you never kiss his feet? Yet if someone should compel you to kiss the feet of Caesar, you would regard that as insolence and most extravagant tyranny. What else, then, is slavery? Did you never go out at night where you didn’t want to go? Did you never spend more than you wanted to spend? Did you never utter words with groaning and lamentation, endure to be reviled, to have the door shut in your face? Well, if you are ashamed to admit such things about yourself, observe what Thrasonides says and does, a man who had served on so many campaigns—perhaps more even than you have. First, he went out at night when Geta hasn’t the courage to go abroad, but, if the latter had been compelled by him to do so, he would have gone out crying aloud and bewailing his bitter slavery. And then what does Thrasonides say? Says he,

¹ Where he was teaching. The very form of the oath contradicts the statement made.
ARRIANS DISCOURSES OF EPICETUS

παιδισκάριον με,
φησίν,
καταδεδουλωκ' ευτελές,
ὅν οὔδε εἰς τῶν πολεμίων οὐπόποτε.1
21 τάλας, ὅς γε καὶ παιδισκαρίου δοῦλος εἰ καὶ
παιδισκαρίου ευτελοῦς. τί οὖν ἔτι σαυτὸν
ἐλευθερον λέγεις; τί δὲ προφέρεις σοι τὰς
στρατείας; εἰτα ξίφος αἰτεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ὕπ'
εὐνοίας μὴ διδόντα χαλεπαίνει καὶ δῶρα τῇ
μισούσῃ πέμπτε καὶ δεῖται καὶ κλαίει, πάλιν
22 δὲ μικρὰ εὐμερήσας ἔπαιρεται: πλὴν καὶ τότε
πώς μηδὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ φοβεῖσθαι ἀπομαθῶν
οὗτος ἐλευθερίαν ἂν εἴχε; 2
23 Σκέψαι δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ξίφων, πῶς χρώμεθα τῇ
24 ἐννοίᾳ τῆς ἐλευθερίας. λέοντας τρέφουσιν ἡμέ-
ρους ἐγκλείσαντες καὶ σιτίζουσι καὶ κομίζουσιν
ἠνοὶ μεθ' αὐτῶν. καὶ τις ἔρει τὸ πονὸν τὸν
λέοντα ἐλευθερον; ὦχι δ' ὅσῳ μαλακώτερον
dieξάγει, τοσοῦτοι δουλικότερον; τις δ' ἂν λέων
αἰσθησιν καὶ λογισμὸν λαβὼν βούλοιτο τού-
25 των τις εἶναι τῶν λεόντων; ᾣς, τὰ δὲ πτηνά
ταύτα ὅταν ληφθῇ καὶ ἐγκεκλείμενα τρέφηται,
οὐ πάσχει κρίτων ἐκφυγεῖν; καὶ ἐνιά γε
αὐτῶν λιμῷ διαφθείρεται μᾶλλον ἢ υπομένει τὴν
26 τοιαύτην διεξαγωγήν, ὅσα δ' ἂν διασώζεται,
μόνης καὶ χαλεπῶς καὶ φθινοῦτα, κἂν ὅλως
27 τσατάν ἑαυτῆς, ὅταν λατρεύουσας τὸν κυβερνῆσαι
τὴν καταλείψειν τίν' ἀνθρώπουν πάθους.
A cheap little wench has made of me a perfect slave,
Of me, though never a one among all my foemen might.¹

Sad wretch, to be the slave of a wench, and a cheap one at that! Why, then, do you call yourself free any longer? And why do you talk of your campaigns? Then he calls for a sword, and gets angry at the man who refuses out of good-will to give it to him, and sends presents to the girl who hates him, and begs, and weeps, and again, when he has had a little success, he is elated. And yet even then, so long as he had not learned to give up passionate desire or fear, could this man have been in possession of freedom?

Consider now, in the case of the animals, how we employ the concept of freedom. Men shut up tame lions in a cage, and bring them up, and feed them, and some take them around with them. And yet who will call such a lion free? Is it not true that the more softly the lion lives the more slavishly he lives? And what lion, were he to get sense and reason, would care to be one of these lions? Why, yes, and the birds yonder, when they are caught and brought up in cages, what do they suffer in their efforts to escape? And some of them starve to death rather than endure such a life, while even such as live, barely do so, and suffer and pine away,

¹ From the Misoumenos of Menander: Koch 338; Körte², p. 129; Allinson, p. 412 (Loeb Classical Library).

φοβεῖσθαι οὔτ' ἐλευθερίαν Ἐ apparently at first; that is, ἀπομαθῶν and ἅν εἰχὲ are additions.
There is some uncertainty about the extent of the quotation from Diogenes. Capps extends it as far as this point, while Schenkl thought it stopped with ἰχθύες, three lines above.
and if ever they find any opening, make their escape. Such is their desire for physical freedom, and a life of independence and freedom from restraint. And what is wrong with you here in your cage? “What a question! My nature is to fly where I please, to live in the open air, to sing when I please. You rob me of all this, and then ask, ‘What is wrong with you?’"

That is why we shall call free only those animals which do not submit to captivity, but escape by dying as soon as they are captured. So also Diogenes says somewhere: 1 “The one sure way to secure freedom is to die cheerfully”; and to the Persian 2 king he writes: “You cannot enslave the Athenian State any more than you can enslave the fish.” “How so? Shall I not lay hold of them?” “If you do,” he replies, “they will forthwith leave you and escape, like the fish. And that is true, for if you lay hold of one of them, it dies; and if these Athenians die when you lay hold of them, what good will you get from your armament?” That is the word of a free man who has seriously examined the matter, and, as you might expect, had discovered truth about it. But if you look for it where it does not exist, why be surprised if you never find it?

It is the slave’s prayer that he be set free immediately. Why? Do you think it is because he is eager to pay his money to the men who collect ascribed to Diogenes than that which has survived to our time. See Schenkl’s note on §156 below.

Schenkl deletes the word, and Orelli conjectures Μακέδονος, making the reference to Philip or Alexander; but about 355 Artaxerxes Ochus seems actually to have threatened war against Athens. See Judeich in the Real-Encyclopädie 2, 2, 1319, 25 ff.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

34 ὅσω ὡς ἑπιστρέφομαι, πᾶσιν, "ἐνθὺς πᾶσα εὐροια, οὐδενὸς ἐπιστρέφομαι, πᾶσιν ὡς ἱεροὶ καὶ ὁμοίως λαλῶ, πορεύομαι ὑπὲρ Θέλω, ἐρχομαι ὁθεν θέλω καὶ ὑπὸν θέλω." εἶτα ἀπηλευθέρωται καὶ ἐνθὺς μὲν ὁχὴ ἔχων, ποὶς φάγῃ, ζητεῖ, τίνα κολακεῖσθη, παρὰ τίνι δειπνῆσθη, εἶτα ἡ ἐργάζεται τῷ σώματι καὶ πᾶσχε τὰ δεινότατα καὶ σχῆ τινὰ φάτνην, ἐμπέπτωκεν εἰς δουλείαν

35 πολὺ τῆς προτέρας χαλεπωτέραν ἦ καὶ εὐπορήσας ἀνθρωπὸς ἀπειρόκαλος πεφίληκε παιδισκάριον καὶ δυστυχῶν ἀνακλαίεται καὶ τὴν
douleivn pothei. "τί γὰρ μοι κακὸν ἦν; ἄλλος μ’ ἐνέδυεν, ἄλλος μ’ ὑπέδει, ἄλλος ἔτρεφεν, ἄλλος ἐνοσοκόμει, ὀλίγα αὐτῷ ὑπηρέτουν. νῦν δὲ τάλας οία πᾶσχω πλείοσι δουλεύων ἀνθ’

36 ἐνός; ὁμοίως δ’ ἐὰν δακτυλίους," φησίν, "λάβω, τότε γ’ εὐρούστατα διάξω καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατα." πρῶτον μὲν ἵνα λάβῃ, πᾶσχε δὲν ἐστὶν ἄξιος;

37 εἶτα λαβὼν πάλιν ταυτά. εἶτα φησίν "ἀν μὲν στρατεύσωμαι, ἀπηλλάγην πάντων τῶν κακῶν." στρατεύεται, πᾶσχε ὁσα μαστιγίας καὶ ὁμοίων ἦττον δευτέραν αἰτεῖ στρατεύαν καὶ τρίτην.

1 See note on II. 1, 26.
2 For the euphemistic phrase used in the Greek see Demosthenes, 59, 20.
3 The members of the Equestrian order at Rome had the right to wear a gold ring.
the five per cent. tax?¹ No, it is because he fancies that up till now he is hampered and uncomfortable, because he has not obtained his freedom from slavery. "If I am set free," he says, "immediately it is all happiness, I shall pay no attention to anybody, I talk to everybody as an equal and as one in the same station in life, I go where I please, I come whence I please, and where I please." Then he is emancipated, and forthwith, having no place to which to go and eat, he looks for someone to flatter, for someone at whose house to dine. Next he either earns a living by prostitution,² and so endures the most dreadful things, and if he gets a manger at which to eat he has fallen into a slavery much more severe than the first; or even if he grows rich, being a vulgarian he has fallen in love with a chit of a girl, and is miserable, and laments, and yearns for his slavery again. "Why, what was wrong with me? Someone else kept me in clothes, and shoes, and supplied me with food, and nursed me when I was sick; I served him in only a few matters. But now, miserable man that I am, what suffering is mine, who am a slave to several instead of one! However, if I get rings on my fingers,"³ he says, "then indeed I shall live most prosperously and happily." And so, first, in order to get them he submits to—what he deserves! Then when he has got them, you have the same thing over again. Next he says, "If I serve in a campaign, I am rid of all my troubles." He serves in a campaign, he submits to all that a jail-bird suffers, but none the less he demands a second campaign and a third.⁴

¹ Required of those who held the higher offices. See note on II. 14, 17.
40 εἰδ’ ὅταν αὐτὸν τὸν κολοφώνα ἐπιθῇ καὶ γένηται συγκλητικός, τότε γίνεται δούλος εἰς σύλλογον ἐρχόμενος, τότε τὴν καλλίστην καὶ λιπαρωτάτην δουλείαν δουλεύει.

41 "Ἰνα μὴ μορὸς ἡ, ἀγ’, ἣν μάθη, ἀ ἐλεγεν ὁ Σωκράτης, "τι ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐκαστῶν," καὶ μὴ εἰκὴ τὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζῃ ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτίον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάντων τῶν κακῶν, τὸ τὰς προλήψεις τὰς κοινὰς μὴ δύνασθαι ἐφαρμόζειν τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους. ἥμείς δ’ ἂλλοι ἂλλο οἴόμεθα. ὅ μὲν ὅτι νοσεῖ. οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὰς προλήψεις οὐκ ἐφαρμόζει. ὁ δ’ ὅτι πτωχὸς ἐστιν, ὁ δ’ ὅτι πατέρα χαλεπὸν ἔχει ἢ μητέρα, τῷ δ’ ὅτι ὁ Καῖσαρ οὐχ ἰλεώς ἐστιν. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστιν ἐν καὶ μόνον τὸ τὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν μὴ εἰδέναι. ἐπεὶ τίς οὐκ ἔχει κακὸν πρόληψιν, ὅτι βλαβερὸν ἐστιν, ὅτι φευκτὸν ἐστιν, ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀποικονόμητον ἐστιν; πρόληψις προληψεις οὐ μάχεσαι, ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἔλθῃ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐφαρμόζειν. τί οὖν τὸ κακὸν ἐστὶ τοῦτο καὶ βλαβερὸν καὶ φευκτὸν; λέγει τὸ Καῖσαρος μὴ εἶναι φίλουν ἀπήλθεν, ἀπέπεσεν τῆς ἐφαρμογῆς, θλίβεται, ζητεῖ τὰ μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον ὅτι τυχῶν τοῦ φίλος εἶναι Καῖσαρος οὐδὲν ἢττον τοῦ ζητομένου οὐ τέτευχεν. τί γὰρ ἐστιν, ὅ ζητεῖ πᾶς ἀνθρώπος; εὐσταθήσαι, εὐδαιμονήσαι, πάντα

1 Schweighäuser: καλλί (?) S. 2 Elter: ἄλλ’ S. 3 Wolf: ταίς S.

1 i.e. the finishing touch. See note on II. 14, 19.
After that, when he adds the very colophon,\(^1\) and becomes a senator, then he becomes a slave as he enters the senate, then he serves in the handsomest and sleekest slavery.

Come, let him not be a fool, let him learn, as Socrates used to say, "What each several thing means,"\(^2\) and not apply his preconceptions at random to the particular cases. For this is the cause to men of all their evils, namely, their inability to apply their general preconceptions to the particular instances. But some of us think one thing and some another. One man fancies he is ill. Not at all; the fact is that he is not applying his preconceptions. Another fancies he is a beggar; another that he has a hard-hearted father or mother; still another that Caesar is not gracious to him. But this means one thing and one thing only—ignorance of how to apply their preconceptions. Why, who does not have a preconception of evil, that it is harmful, that it is to be avoided, that it is something to get rid of in every way? One preconception does not conflict with another, but conflict arises when one proceeds to apply them. What, then, is this evil that is harmful and is to be avoided? One person says it is not to be Caesar's friend;\(^3\) he is off the course, he has missed the proper application, he is in a bad way, he is looking for what is not pertinent to the case in hand; because, when he has succeeded in being Caesar's friend, he has none the less failed to get what he was seeking. For what is it that every man is seeking? To live securely, to be happy, to do everything as he wishes to do,

\(^{2}\) Xenophon, *Mem. IV. 6, 1.*

\(^{3}\) That is, *persona grata* at court.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ως θέλει ποιεῖν, μή κωλύεσθαι, μή ἀναγκάζεσθαι. ὅταν οὖν γένηται Καῖσαρος φίλος, πέπαυται κωλυόμενος, πέπαυται ἀναγκάζομενος, εὐσταθεῖ, εὐροεῖ; τίνος πυθόμεθα; τίνα ἔχομεν ἀξιοπιστότερον ἢ αὐτόν τούτον τὸν γεγονότα φίλον;

47 ἐλθὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ εἰπὲ ἢμῖν, πότε ἀταραχῶτερον ἐκάθευδε, νῦν ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι φίλος τοῦ Καῖσαρος; εὐθὺς ἔκοιμες ὅτι "παῦσαι, τοὺς θεοὺς σοι, ἐμπαίζον μου τῇ τύχῃ" 1 οὐκ οἴδας, οἷα πάσχον τὰς συνοδεῖς σου ὕπνοι ἐπέρχεται μοι, ἀλλὰ ἄλλοι ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ 2 ἐλθὼν λέγει, ὅτι ἢ ἡ σοφία ἐγκυροποιεῖ, ἢ ἡ πρὸσευσίν ἑίτα ταραχαί, ἑίτα φροντίδες." ἀγε, ἐδείπνεις δὲ πότε ἐναρεστότερον, νῦν ἢ πρότερον; ἂκουσον αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ τούτων τι λέγει; ὅτι, ἄν μεν μὴ κληθῇ, 3 ὃν εὕραται, ἄν δὲ κληθῇ, ὡς δούλος παρὰ κυρίῳ δειπνεῖ μεταξὺ προσέχον, μὴ τί μικρὸν εἴπῃ ἡ ποιήσῃ, καὶ τὶ δοκεῖς φοβεῖται; μὴ μαστιγωθῇ ὡς δούλος; πόθεν αὐτῷ οὔτως καλῶς; ἀλλὰ ὡς πρέπει τηλικοῦτον ἀνδρα, Καῖσαρος φίλον, μὴ ἀπολέσῃ τὸν τράχηλον. ἔλουν δὲ πότ' ἀταραχώτερον; εὔμμιναξον δὲ πότε σχολαίτερον; τὸ σύνολον ποῖον μᾶλλον ἤθελες βιὸν βιοῦν, τὸν νῦν ἢ τὸν τότε; ὡμόσαι δύναμαι, ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὔτως ἐστὶν ἀναίσθητος ἢ ἀναλθής, 4 μὴ ἀποδύρασθαι τὰς αὐτοῦ συμφορὰς, ὡς ἄν ἢ φίλτερος.

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1 Schweighäuser: ψυχὴ S.
2 ἐπ’ ἀλλὰ added by Reiske.
3 κληθῇ repeated in S.
4 Oldfather: ἀναλθῆς S (and Scholiast).

1 Compare with this section the grave words of Francis Bacon: "Men in great place are thrice servants, servants to the sovereign or state, servants of fame, and servants of..."
not to be hindered, not to be subject to compulsion. When, therefore, he becomes a friend of Caesar, has he been relieved of hindrance, relieved of compulsion, does he live securely, does he live serenely? From whom shall we inquire? What better witness have we than this very man who has become Caesar's friend? Come into the midst and tell us. When did you sleep more peacefully, now or before you became Caesar's friend? Immediately the answer comes: "Stop, I implore you by the gods, and do not jest at my lot; you don't know what I suffer, miserable man that I am; no sleep visits me, but first one person comes in and then another and reports that Caesar is already awake, and is already coming out; then troubles, then worries!" Come, when did you dine more pleasantly, now or formerly? Listen to him and to what he has to say on this topic. If he is not invited, he is hurt, and if he is invited, he dines like a slave at a master's table, all the time careful not to say or do something foolish. And what do you suppose he is afraid of? That he be scourged like a slave? How can he expect to get off as well as that? But as befits so great a man, a friend of Caesar, he is afraid he will lose his head. When did you take your bath in greater peace? And when did you take your exercise at greater leisure? In a word, which life would you rather live, your present life or the old one? I can take oath that no one is so insensate or so incurable as not to lament his misfortunes the more he is a friend of Caesar.

business, so as they have no freedom, neither in their persons, nor in their actions, nor in their times." *Essays,* "Of Great Place."
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICETETS

51 "Оταν οὖν μήτε οἱ βασιλεῖς λεγόμενοι ζώσων ὡς θέλουσι μήθ', οἱ φίλοι τῶν βασιλέων, τίνες ἐτι εἰσιν ἐλεύθεροι;—Ζήτει καὶ εὐρήσεις. ἔξεις γὰρ ἀφορμᾶς παρὰ τῆς φύσεως πρὸς εὐρεσίν τῆς ἀληθείας. εἰ δ' αὐτὸς οὐχ οἶος τε εἰ κατὰ ταύτας

52 ψιλὰς πορευόμενος εὐρέιν τὸ ἕξις, ἀκούσον παρὰ τῶν ἔξειτηκότων, τί λέγουσιν; ἀγαθὸν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ἐλευθερία;—Τὸ μέγιστον.—Δύναται οὖν τις τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ τυγχάνων κακοδαιμονεῖν ἢ κακῶς πράσσειν;—Οὐ.—"Οσούς οὖν ἂν ὑδης κακοδαιμονοῦντας, δυσροοῦντας, πενθοῦντας, ἀποφαίων θαρρῶν μὴ εἶναι ἐλευθέρους.—Αποφαίωομαι.—Οὐκοῦν ἀπὸ μὲν οὖν καὶ πράσεως καὶ τῆς τοιαῦτης ἐν κτήσει κατατάξεως ὡδη ἀποκεχωρίκαμεν. εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ὑμολόγησας ταύτα, ἂν τε μέγας βασιλεῖς κακοδαιμονῆ, οὐκ ἂν ἐλεύθερος, ἂν τε μικρὸς, ἂν θυματικὸς, ἂν τε δισύπατος.—"Εστω.

53 "Ἐτι οὖν ἀπόκριναι μοι κάκεινοι: δοκεὶ σοι μέγα τι εἶναι καὶ γενναίον ἡ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἄξιόλογον;—Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;—"Εστιν οὖν τυγχάνωντα τινὸς οὕτως μεγάλου καὶ ἄξιολογον καὶ γενναίον τα-πευνὸν εἶναι;—Οὐκ ἔστιν.—"Οταν οὖν ὑδης τινὰ ὑποπεπτωκότα ἐτέρῳ ἢ κολακεύοντα παρὰ τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῶ, λέγε καὶ τοῦτο θαρρῶν μὴ εἶναι ἐλεύθερον καὶ μὴ μόνον, ἂν δειπναρίον ἐνεκά αὐτὸ ποιῆ, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἐπαρχίας ἐνεκα κἂν ὑπατείας. ἀλλ' ἐκείνους μὲν μικροδουλούς λέγε τοὺς μικρῶν τινῶν ἐνεκα ταύτα ποιούντας, τοῦ-

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1 The reference is to the ordinary method of acquiring slaves, since relatively few were ever bred.
When, therefore, neither those who are styled kings live as they will, nor the friends of these kings, what free men are left?—Seek and you will find. For nature has given you resources to find the truth. But if you are unable of yourself, by employing these resources alone, to find the next step, listen to those who have already made the search. What do they say? Does freedom seem to you to be a good?—Yes, the greatest.—Is it possible, then, for a man who has this greatest good to be unhappy, or to fare ill?—No.—When, therefore, you see men unhappy, miserable, grieving, declare confidently that they are not free.—I do so declare.—Very well, then, we have now got away from buying and selling\(^1\) and arrangements of that kind in the acquisition of property. For if you are right in agreeing to these propositions, whether it be the Great King\(^2\) who is unhappy, or a little king, whether it be a man of consular rank, or one who has been a consul twice, he could not be free.—Granted.

Answer me, then, this further question: Does freedom seem to you to be a great and noble thing, and precious?—Of course.—Is it possible, then, for a man who achieves a thing so great and precious and noble, to be of abject spirit?—It is not.—When, therefore, you see one man cringing before another, or flattering him contrary to his own opinion, say confidently of this man also that he is not free; and that not merely if he be doing so for the sake of a paltry meal, but even if it be for a governorship or a consulship. Call rather those who do these things for certain small ends slaves on a small scale, and

\(^1\) That is, of Persia.
56 τοὺς δ', ὡς εἰσὶν ἄξιοι, μεγαλοδούλους.—"Εστώ καὶ τάυτα.—Δοκεῖ δέ σοι ἡ ἑλευθερία αὐτεξούσιόν τι εἶναι καὶ αὐτόνομον;—Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;—"Ουτίνα οὖν ἐπ’ ἄλλῳ κωλύσαι ἐστι καὶ ἀναγκάσαι, θαρρῶν λέγε μὴ εἶναι ἑλευθερον. καὶ μὴ μοι πάππους αὐτοῦ καὶ προπάππους βλέπε καὶ ὤν ἡ ζήτει καὶ πρᾶσιν, ἀλλ’ ἂν ἰκούσῃς λέγοντος ἐσωθεν καὶ ἐκ πάθους "κύριε," κἀν δώδεκα ράβδοι προαγωσιν, λέγε δοῦλον καὶ ἰκούσῃς λέγοντος "τάλας ἑγώ, οἷα πάσχω," λέγε δοῦλον: ἂν ἀπλῶς ἀποκλαιόμενον ἰδῆς, μεμφό-μενον, δυσροοῦντα, λέγε δοῦλον περιπόρφυρον

57 ἔχοντα. ἂν οὖν μηδὲν τούτων ποιή, μήπως εὖπης ἑλευθερον, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ κατάμαθε, μὴ τι ἀναγκαστά, μὴ τι κωλυτικά, μὴ τί δυσροητικά κἀν εὖρης τοιοῦτον, λέγε δοῦλον ἀνοχὰς ἔχοντα ἐν Σατουρνιλίοις. λέγε, ὅτι ὁ κύριος αὐτοῦ ἀποδημεῖ. εἴθ’ ἦξι καὶ γνώση οἰα πάσχει.

58 —Τίς ἦξει;—Πᾶς δὲ ἂν ἐξουσίαν ἔχῃ τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τινὸς θελομενῶν πρὸς τὸ περποιῆσαι ταύτα ἡ ἀφελέσθαι.—Οὕτως οὖν πολλοὺς κυρίους ἔχομεν;—Οὕτως, τὰ γὰρ πράγματα προτέρους τούτων κυρίους ἔχομεν. ἔσκειν δὲ πολλὰ ἐστιν. διὰ ταύτα ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς τούτων τινὸς ἔχοντας

59 ἔξουσίαν κυρίους εἶναι. ἔπει τοι οὐδεὶς αὐτοῦ τῶν Καίσαρα φοβεῖται, ἀλλὰ θάνατον, φυγήν, ἀφαί-ρεσιν τῶν οὐτων, φυλακήν, ἀτιμίαν. οὐδὲ φιλεῖ τις τὸν Καίσαρα, ἂν μὴ τι ἦ πολλοῦ ἄξιος, ἀλλὰ

1 The number for a consul.
2 The robe worn by high officials at Rome. Cf. I. 2, 18.
3 When slaves had special liberties.
the others, as they deserve, slaves on a grand scale
—This also I grant.—And does freedom seem to you
to be something independent and self-governing?—
Of course.—When, therefore, it is in another's power
to put hindrances in a man's way and subject him to
compulsion, say confidently that this man is not free.
And please don't look at his grandfathers and great-
grandfathers, or look for a deed of sale or purchase,
but if you hear him say "Master," in the centre of his
being and with deep emotion, call him a slave, even if
twelve fasces \(^1\) precede him; and if you hear him say,
"Alas! What I must suffer!" call him a slave; and, in
short, if you see him wailing, complaining, in misery,
call him a slave in a toga praetexta.\(^2\) However, if he
does none of these things, do not call him free yet,
but find out what his judgements are, whether they
are in any respect subject to compulsion, to hindrance,
to unhappiness; and if you find him to be that kind
of a person, call him a slave on holiday at the
Saturnalia;\(^3\) say that his master is out of town;
later on he will return, and then you will learn what
the fellow suffers.—Who will return?—Anyone
who has control over the things which some man
wishes, to get these for him or to take them away.—
Have we, then, so many masters?—Yes, so many. For
even before these personal masters we have masters
in the form of circumstances, and these are many.
Hence, it needs must follow that those too who
have authority over some one of these circumstances
are our masters. Why, look you, no one is afraid of
Caesar himself, but he is afraid of death, exile, loss of
property, prison, disfranchisement. Nor does anyone
love Caesar himself, unless in some way Caesar
is a person of great merit; but we love wealth, a
The last eleven words are here wrongly repeated in S, as Schenkl observed; but he was mistaken in assuming that the repetition began immediately after ἔχει, whereas it probably was due to the eye going back to the wrong ωφελείας.

2 ἐπὶ added by Sh.
tribuneship, a praetorship, a consulship. When we love and hate and fear these things, it needs must be that those who control them are masters over us. That is why we even worship those persons as gods; for we consider that what has power to confer the greatest advantage is divine. And then we lay down the wrong minor premiss: "This man has power to confer the greatest advantage." It needs must be that the conclusion from these premisses is wrong too.¹

What, then, is it which makes a man free from hindrance and his own master? For wealth does not do it, nor a consulship, nor a province, nor a kingdom, but something else has to be found. What, therefore, is it which makes a man free from hindrance and restraint in writing?—The knowledge of how to write.—And what in playing on the harp?—The knowledge of how to play on the harp.—So also in living, it is the knowledge of how to live. Now you have already heard this, as a general principle, but consider it also in its particular applications. Is it possible for the man who is aiming at some one of these things which are under the control of others to be free from hindrance?—No.—Is it possible for him to be free from restraint?—No.—Therefore, it is not possible for him to be free, either. Consider then: Have we nothing which is under our own exclusive control, or is everything in that state; or are some things under our control and others under the control of others?—How do you mean?—When you want your body to be whole, is the matter under text; from which follows the conclusion: "Therefore, this man is divine," which is wrong because of the false minor premiss.
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67 Η οὐ; — Οὐκ ἐπ' ἐμοί.— "Οταν δ' ύμαινειν; — Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. — "Οταν δὲ καλὸν εἶναι; — Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. — Ζήν δὲ καὶ ἀποθανεῖν; — Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. — Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἄλλοτρον, ὑπεύθυνον παντὸς τοῦ ἱσχυροτέρου.— "Εστώ. — Τὸν ἀγρὸν δ' ἐπὶ σοὶ ἐστιν ἐχεῖν, όταν θέλησ καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον θέλεις καὶ οἶον θέλεις; — Οὐ. — Τὰ δὲ δουλάρια; — Οὐ. — Τὰ δ' ἰμάτια; — Οὐ. — Τὸ δὲ οἰκίδιον; — Οὐ. — Τοὺς δ' ἵππους; — Τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν. — Ἄν δὲ τὰ τέκνα σου ξῆν θέλησ εἴ ἀπαντός ἡ τὴν γυναικά η τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἡ τοὺς φίλους, ἐπὶ σοὶ ἐστιν; — Οὐδὲ ταύτα.

68 Πότερον οὖν οὐδὲν ἐχεῖς αὐτεξούσιοι, ὅ ἐπὶ μόνῳ ἐστὶ σοι, ἡ ἐχεῖς τι τοιοῦτον; — Οὐκ οἶδα.

69 — Ὄρα οὖν οὕτως καὶ σκέψαι αὐτό. μή τις δύναται σε ποιῆσαι συγκαταθέσθαι τῷ ψευδεῖ; — Οὐδείς. — Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῷ συγκαταθετικῷ τόπῳ ἀκώλυτος εἰ καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστος.— "Εστώ.—

70 Ἀγε, ὀρμησαί δέ σε ἐφ' ὅ μὴ θέλεις τις δύναται ἀναγκάσαι; — Δύναται. όταν γὰρ μοι θάνατον ἢ δεσμὰ ἀπειλῇ, ἀναγκάζει μ' ὀρμῆσαι.— "Αν οὖν καταφρονῆς τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν καὶ τοῦ δεδέσθαι,

71 ἐτι αὐτοῦ ἑπιστρέφῃ; — Οὐ. — Σὸν οὖν ἐστὶν ἔργον τὸ καταφρονεῖν θανάτου ἢ οὐ σῶν; — Εμὸν. — Σὸν ἄρα ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ὀρμῆσαι ἢ οὐ; — "Εστώ ἐμὸν.— Τὸ δ' ἀφορμῆσαι τίνος; σὸν καὶ τοῦτο.—

72 Τά οὖν, ἂν ἐμοὶ ὀρμησαντος περιπατήσαι ἐκεῖνός με κωλύσῃ; — Τά σου κωλύσει; μή τι τὴν συγκαταθέσειν; — Οὐ. ἀλλὰ τὸ σωμάτιον. — Ναί, ὥς λέθον. — "Εστώ. ἀλλ' οὐκέτι ἐγὼ περιπατῶ.—
your control, or not?—It is not.—And when you want it to be well?—Nor that, either.—And to live or to die?—Nor that, either.—Therefore, your body is not your own possession, it is subject to everyone who is stronger than you are.—Granted.—And your farm, is it under your control to have it when you want, and as long as you want, and in the condition that you want?—No.—And your paltry slaves?—No.—And your clothes?—No.—And your paltry house?—No.—And your horses?—None of these things.—And if you wish by all means your children to live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is the matter under your control?—No, nor that, either.

Have you, then, nothing subject to your authority, which is under your control and yours only, or do you have something of that sort?—I do not know.—Look, then, at the matter this way, and consider it. No one can make you assent to what is false, can he?—No one.—Well, then, in the region of assent you are free from hindrance and restraint.—Granted.—Come, can anyone force you to choose something that you do not want?—He can; for when he threatens me with death or bonds, he compels me to choose.—If, however, you despise death and bonds, do you pay any further heed to him?—No.—Is it, then, an act of your own to despise death, or is it not your own act?—It is mine.—So it is your own act to choose, or is it not?—Granted that it is mine.—And to refuse something? This also is yours.—Yes, but suppose I choose to go for a walk and the other person hinders me?—What part of you will he hinder? Surely not your assent?—No; but my poor body.—Yes, as he would a stone.—Granted that, but I do not proceed to take my walk.—But
73 Τίς δέ σοι εἶπεν "το περιπατήσαι σὸν ἔργου ἔστιν ἀκόλυτον"; ἐγώ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ ἔλεγον ἀκόλυτον μόνον τὸ ὀρμήσαι; ὅπου δὲ σῶματος χρεία καὶ τῆς ἐκ τοῦτον συνεργείας, πάλαι ἀκόλοχος, ὅτι οὐδέν ἔστι σὸν.—'Εστώ καὶ ταῦτα.—'Ὁρεγεσθαι δὲ σε οὐ μὴ θέλεις τὸς ἀναγκάσαι δύναται;—Οὐδεῖς.—Προθέσθαι δ' ἢ ἐπιβαλέσθαι τις ἢ ἀπλῶς χρησθαι ταῖς προσπιττούσαις φαντασίαις;—Οὐδεῖς τούτοι ἀλλὰ ὀρεγόμενοι μὲ κωλύσει τυχεῖν οὐ ὀρέγομαι.—'Αν τῶν σών τινὸς ὀρέγη καὶ τῶν ἀκόλυτων, πώς σε κωλύσει;—Οὐδαμῶς.—Τίς οὖν σοι λέγει, ὅτι ὁ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὀρεγόμενος ἀκόλυτος ἔστιν;

74 'Τυγείασ οὖν μὴ ὀρέγωμαι;—Μηδαμῶς, μηδ' ἀλλον ἀλλοτρίον μηδενός. ὃ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπὶ σοὶ παρασκευάσαι ἢ τηρήσαι οτὲ θέλεις, τούτῳ ἀλλότριῳ ἔστιν. μακρὰν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ οὐ μόνον τὰς χειρὰς, ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρότερον τὴν ὀρεξίν εἰ δὲ μὴ, παρέδωκας σαυτῶν δοῦλου, ὑπέθηκας τὸν τράχηλον, ὃ τὶ ¹ ἀν θαυμάσῃς τῶν μὴ σῶν, ὃ τιν ἄν τῶν ὑπευθύνων καὶ θυητῶν προσπαθήσῃς.—'Η χεῖρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμή;—Μέρος ἔστι σὸν, φύσει δὲ πήλος, κωλυτόν, ἀναγκαστόν, δοῦλον παντὸς τοῦ ἱσχυροτέρου. καὶ τὶ σοι λέγω χείρα; ὅλου τὸ σῶμα οὕτως ἐχειν σε δεί ὡς ὀνάριον ἐπισεσαγμένον, ἐφ' ὅσον ἂν οἴον τε ἢ, ἐφ' ὅσον ἂν διδόται ἣν δ' ἀγγαρεία ἢ καὶ στρατιώτης ἐπιλύβηται, ἀφες, μὴ ἀντίτεινε μηδὲ γόγγυζε. εἰ δὲ μὴ, πληγάς λαβῶν οὐδέν ἴττου ἄπολεις καὶ τὸ ὄνα-

1 ὃ τὶ added by Elter: τράχηλον, ἀν θαυμάσῃς τῶν τί (later erased) μὴ $S$. 268
who told you, "It is your own act to take a walk unhindered"? As for me, I told you that the only unhindered thing was the desire; but where there is a use of the body and its co-operation, you have heard long ago that nothing is your own.—Granted that also.—Can anyone force you to desire what you do not want?—No one.—Or to purpose or plan, or, in a word, to deal with the impressions that come to you?—No, nor that, either; but he will hinder me, when I set my desire upon something, from achieving what I desire.—If you desire something which is your own and not subject to hindrance, how will he hinder you?—Not at all.—Who, then, tells you that the man who sets his desire upon what is not his own is free from hindrance?

Shall I not, then, set my desire on health?—No, not at all, nor on anything else which is not your own. For that which is not in your power to acquire or to keep is none of yours. Keep far away from it not merely your hands, but above all your desire; otherwise, you have delivered yourself into slavery, you have bowed your neck to the burden, if you admire anything that is not your own, if you conceive a violent passion for anything that is in subjection to another and mortal.—Is not my hand my own?—It is a part of you, but by nature it is clay, subject to hindrance and compulsion, a slave to everything that is stronger than you are. And why do I name you the hand? You ought to treat your whole body like a poor loaded-down donkey, as long as it is possible, as long as it is allowed; and if it be commandeered and a soldier lay hold of it, let it go, do not resist nor grumble. If you do, you will get a beating and lose your little donkey just the same.
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80 ριον. ὅταν δὲ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα οὖτως ἔχειν σε δέη, ὁρὰ, τὶ ἀπολείπεται περὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὧσα τοῦ σῶματος ἕνεκα παρασκευάζεται. ὅταν ἐκείνο ὄναριον ἦ, τὰλλα γίνεται χαλινάρια τοῦ ὄναρίου, σαγμάτια, ὑποδημάτια, κριθαί, χόρτος. ἅφες κάκεινα, ἀπόλυε θάττον καὶ εὐκολώτερον ἦ τὸ ὄναριον.

81 Καὶ ταύτην τὴν παρασκευὴν παρασκευασάμενος καὶ τὴν ἀσκήσιν ἀσκήσας τὰ ἀλλότρια ὑπὸ τῶν ἱδίων διακρίνειν, τὰ κωλυτὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκωλύτων, ταῦτα πρὸς σαυτόν ὑγεῖσθαι, ἐκεῖνα μὴ πρὸς σαυτόν, ἐνταῦθα ἐπιστρόφως ἔχειν τὴν ὀρεξίν, ἐνταῦθα τὴν ἐκκλίσιν, μὴ τι ἔτι φοβή τινά;—

82 Οὐδένα.—Περὶ τίνος γὰρ φοβήσῃ; περὶ τῶν σεαυτοῦ, ὅπου σοι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ; καὶ τὶς τούτων ἐξουσίαν ἔχει; τὶς ἀφελέσθαι αὐτὰ δύναται, τὶς ἐμποδίσαι; οὐ μᾶλλον ἦ τὸν θεοῦ. ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ σῶματος καὶ τῆς κτήσεως; ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων; ὑπὲρ τῶν οὐδέν πρὸς σὲ; καὶ τί ἄλλο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμελέτας ἡ διακρίνειν τὰ σὰ καὶ οὐ σὰ, τὰ ἐπὶ σοὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ σοὶ, τὰ κωλυτὰ καὶ ἀκωλυτα; τίνος δὲ ἑνεκα προσήλθες τοῖς φιλοσόφοις; ῥνα μηδὲν ἦττον ἀτυχῆς καὶ δυστυχῆς; οὐκ οὖν ἐκεῖ καὶ ἀταραχος. λύπη δὲ τὶ πρὸς σὲ; οὐν

1 Elter: οὐκοῦν S.
But when this is the way in which you should act as regards the body, consider what is left for you to do about all the other things that are provided for the sake of the body. Since the body is a little donkey, the other things become little bridles for a little donkey, little pack-saddles, little shoes, and barley, and fodder. Let them go too, get rid of them more quickly and cheerfully than of the little donkey itself.

Once prepared and trained in this fashion to distinguish what is not your own from what is your own possession, the things which are subject to hindrance from those which are free from it, to regard these latter as your concern, and the former as no concern of yours, diligently to keep your desire fixed on the latter, and your aversion directed toward the former, then have you any longer anyone to fear?—No one.—Of course; what is there to be fearful about? About the things that are your own, wherein is the true nature of good and evil for you? And who has authority over these? Who can take them away, who can hinder them, any more than one can hinder God? But shall you be fearful about your body and your property? About the things that are not your own? About the things that are nothing to you? And what else have you been studying, from the very outset, but how to discriminate between what is your own and what is not your own, what is under your control and what is not under your control, what is subject to hindrance and what is free from it? For what purpose did you go to the philosophers? That you might no less than before be unfortunate and miserable? You will not, then, in that case, be free from fear and perturbation. And what has pain to
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γὰρ προσδοκωμένων φόβος, γίνεται 1 καὶ λύτη παρόντων. ἐπιθυμήσεις δὲ τίνος ἔτι; τῶν μὲν γὰρ προαιρετικῶν ἀτε καλῶν ὑπόκειναι καὶ παρόντων σύμμετρον ἔχεις καὶ καθισταμένη τὴν ὀρέξιν, τῶν δ' ἀπροαιρέτων οὐδενὸς ὀρέγη, ἵνα καὶ τίπον σχῆ τὸ ἀλογον ἐκεῖνο καὶ ὀστικὸν καὶ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα ἄπειγμένον.

85 Ὅταν οὖν πρὸς τὰ πράγματα ὑπόκειται, τὸν ἐκεῖνον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπάρχοντος δύναται φοβερὸς εἶναι; τί γὰρ ἔχει ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπων ὑπότιττοι φοβερὸν ἢ ὀβείες ἢ λαλήσας ἢ ὀλοὺς συναναστραφεῖς; οὐ μάλλον ἢ ἵππος ἢ παῖς ἢ κύων κυνή ἢ μέλισσα μελίσση. ἀλλὰ τὰ πράγματα ἐκάστῳ φοβερά ἐστιν' ταῦτα δ' ὅταν περιποίειν τις δύνηται τινὶ ἢ ἀφελέσθαι, τότε καὶ αὐτὸς φοβερὸς γίνεται.

86 Πῶς οὖν ἀκρόπολις καταλύεται; οὖ σιδήρῳ οὐδὲ πυρὶ, ἀλλὰ δόγμασιν. ἂν γὰρ τὴν οὖσαν ἐν τῇ πόλει καθέλωμεν, μή τι καὶ τὴν τοῦ πυρετοῦ, μή τι καὶ τὴν τῶν καλῶν γυναικῶν, μή τι ἀπλῶς τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν τυράννους ἀποβεβλήκαμεν, οὔς ἐφ' ἐκάστοις καθ' ἡμέραν ἔχομεν, ποτὲ μὲν τοὺς αὐτούς, ποτὲ δ' ἄλλους; ἀλλ' ἐνθεν ἄφθασθαι δεῖ καὶ ἐνθεν καθέλειν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ἐκβάλλειν τοὺς τυράννους: τὸ σωμάτιον ἀφεῖναι, τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ, τὰς

1 The punctuation is by Capps; φόβος γίνεται, καὶ is the ordinary reading.

1 Probably a reference to some proverb, or well-known saying, like that of Alcaeus, "Valiant men are the tower of a city" (Smyth, Greek Melic Poets, frag. 15).—The citadel is the keep, or tower, from which a tyrant is represented as overawing a city.
do with you? For fear of things anticipated becomes pain when these things are present. And what will you any longer passionately seek? For you possess a harmonious and regulated desire for the things that are within the sphere of the moral purpose, as being excellent, and as being within your reach; and you desire nothing outside the sphere of the moral purpose, so as to give place to that other element of unreason, which pushes you along and is impetuous beyond all measure.

Now when you face things in this fashion, what man can inspire fear in you any longer? For what has one human being about him that is calculated to inspire fear in another human being, in either his appearance, or conversation, or intercourse in general, any more than one horse, or dog, or bee inspires fear in another horse, or dog, or bee? Nay, it is things that inspire man with fear; and when one person is able to secure them for another, or to take them away, then he becomes capable of inspiring fear.

How, then, is a citadel destroyed? Not by iron, nor by fire, but by judgements. For if we capture the citadel in the city, have we captured the citadel of fever also, have we captured that of pretty wenches also, in a word, the acropolis within us, and have we cast out the tyrants within us, whom we have lording it over each of us every day, sometimes the same tyrants, and sometimes others? But here is where we must begin, and it is from this side that we must seize the acropolis and cast out the tyrants; we must yield up the paltry body, its members, the

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1 So Schweighäuser; but there is some uncertainty about the meaning of ἑν ἑκάστοις, which Schegk, Wolf, and Upton take to refer to matters, or affairs (πράγματα, as in § 85).

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The metaphor in this passage is complicated. I take it to mean, using wealth as a convenient example, something like this: The tyrant is a false judgement (δόγμα) about wealth; the acropolis and the bodyguard are wealth itself, which is dangerous only so long as the false judgement prevails. Once that is overthrown, actual wealth itself need not be destroyed, at least for the man who is freed from the false judgement about it, because wealth as such has no longer any power over him. Other people may be menaced by it, but every man has a ready means of defence, which is to secure a correct judgement about the thing itself. Many matters or affairs (πράγματα) like death and disease cannot,
faculties, property, reputation, offices, honours, children, brothers, friends—count all these things as alien to us. And if the tyrants be thrown out of the spot, why should I any longer raze the fortifications of the citadel, on my own account, at least? For what harm does it do me by standing? Why should I go on and throw out the tyrant's bodyguard? For where do I feel them? Their rods, their spears, and their swords they are directing against others. But I have never been hindered in the exercise of my will, nor have I ever been subjected to compulsion against my will. And how is this possible? I have submitted my freedom of choice unto God. He wills that I shall have fever; it is my will too. He wills that I should choose something; it is my will too. He wills that I should desire something; it is my will too. He wills that I should get something; it is my wish too. He does not will it; I do not wish it. Therefore, it is my will to die; therefore, it is my will to be tortured on the rack. Who can hinder me any longer against my own views, or put compulsion upon me? That is no more possible in my case than it would be with Zeus.

This is the way also with the more cautious among travellers. A man has heard that the road which he is taking is infested with robbers; he does not venture to set forth alone, but he waits for a company, either that of an ambassador, or of a quaestor, or of a proconsul, and when he has attached in any event, be destroyed. It is vain labour to try to destroy the things themselves, when it is only the false judgements that are dangerous, and these any man can himself overcome.
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92 κατατάξας ἕαυτον παρέρχεται ἀσφαλῶς. οὗτος καὶ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ποιεῖ ὁ φρόνιμος. "πολλὰ ληστήρια, τύραννοι, χειμώνες, ἀπορίαι, ἀποβολαὶ τῶν φιλτάτων. ποῦ τις καταφύγῃ; πῶς ἄλῃστευτος παρέλθῃ; ποιὰν συνοδιὰν περιμείνας ἀσφαλῶς διέλθη; τίνι προσκατατάξας ἕαυτον; τῷ δεῖν, τῷ πλούσιῳ, τῷ ὑπατικῷ; καὶ τῷ μοι ὀφελῶς; αὐτὸς ἐκδύτει, οἴμωζεί, πενθεί. τί δ', ἂν ὁ συνοδοιπόρος αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἐμὲ στραφεὶς ληστής μου γένηται; τί ποιήσω; φίλος ἐσομαι Καίσαρος: ἔκεινον με ὄντα ἐταίρον οὐδεὶς ἀδικήσει. πρῶτον μὲν, ἢνα γένωμαι, πόσα ¹ με δεῖ τλήναι καὶ παθεῖν, ποσάκις καὶ ὑπὸ πόσων ληστευθήμας εἶτα ἐὰν γένωμαι, καὶ οὗτος θυντός ἔστιν. ² ἂν δ' αὐτὸς ἐκ τινος περιστάσεως ἔχθρος μου γένηται, ἀναχωρήσαι ποὺ ποτε κρεῖσσον; εἰς ἐρημίαν; ἄγε, ἐκεῖ πυρετὸς οὐκ ἔρχεται; τί οὖν γένηται; οὐκ ἔστιν εὐρείν ἀσφαλῆ σύνοδον, πιστόν, ἰσχυρόν, ἀνεπιβούλευτον;" οὗτος ἐφίστησιν καὶ ἐννοεῖ, ὅτι, ἐὰν τῷ θεῷ προσκατατάξῃ ἕαυτόν, διελεύσεται ἀσφαλῶς.

93  "Ἰν', ὃ ἂν ἐκεῖνος θέλῃ, καὶ αὐτὸς θέλῃ, καὶ ὃ ἂν ἐκεῖνος μὴ θέλῃ, τοῦτο μὴ αὐτὸς θέλῃ.—Πῶς οὖν τοῦτο γένηται;—Πῶς γὰρ ἄλλως ἢ ἐπισκεψειμένῳ τὰς ὀρμᾶς τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὴν διοίκησιν; τί μοι δέδωκεν ἐμὸν καὶ αὐτεξούσιον, τί αὐτῷ κατέλυπεν; τὰ

1 Schenkl: πρόσα Σ.
2 After this word Σ repeats καὶ οὗτος θυντός.
himself to them he travels along the road in safety. So in this world the wise man acts. Says he to himself: "There are many robber-bands, tyrants, storms, difficulties, losses of what is most dear. Where shall a man flee for refuge? How shall he travel secure against robbery? What company shall he wait for that he may pass through in safety? To whom shall he attach himself? To So-and-so, the rich man, or the proconsul? And what is the good of that? He himself is stripped, groans, sorrows. Yes, and what if my fellow-traveller himself turn upon me and rob me? What shall I do? I will become a friend of Caesar; no one will wrong me if I am a companion of his. But, in the first place, the number of things I must suffer and endure in order to become his friend! and the number of times, and the number of persons by whom I must first be robbed! And then, even if I do become his friend, he too is mortal. And if some circumstance lead him to become my enemy, where indeed had I better retire? To a wilderness? What, does not fever go there? What, then, is to become of me? Is it impossible to find a fellow-traveller who is safe, faithful, strong, free from the suspicion of treachery?" Thus he reflects and comes to the thought that, if he attach himself to God, he will pass through the world in safety.

How do you mean "attach himself"?—Why, so that whatever God wills, he also wills, and whatever God does not will, this he also does not will.—How, then, can this be done?—Why, how else than by observing the choices of God and His governance? What has He given me for my own and subject to my authority, and what has He left for Himself? Everything
προαίρετικά μοι δέδωκεν, ἐπὶ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν, ἀνεμπόδιστα, ἀκώλυτα. τὸ σώμα τὸ πῆλινον πῶς ἐδύνατο ἀκώλυτον ποιῆσαι; ὑπέταξεν οὖν τῇ τῶν όλων περιόδῳ, τὴν κτῆσιν, τᾷ σκεύη, τῇν 101 οἰκίαν, τὰ τέκνα, τὴν γυναίκα. τί οὖν θεομα-χω; τί θέλω τὰ μὴ θελητά, τὰ μὴ δοθέντα μοι εξ ἀπαντος ἔχειν; ἄλλα πῶς; ὡς δέδοται καὶ ἐφ’ ἴσον δύναται.1 ἄλλ’ ὁ δοὺς ἀφαιρεῖται. τί οὖν ἀντίτεινο; οὐ λέγω, ὅτι ἡλίθιος ἔσομαι τὸν ἰσχυρότερον βιαζόμενος, ἄλλ’ ἐτι πρότερον 102 ἀδικος. πόθεν γὰρ ἔχων αὐτὰ ἤλθον; ὁ πατήρ μου αὐτὰ ἔδωκεν. ἐκεῖνο δὲ τίς; τὸν ἤλιον δὲ τίς πεποίηκε, τοὺς καρποὺς δὲ τίς, τὰς θ’ ὀρας τίς, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλους συμπλοκῆν καὶ κοινω-νίαι τίς; 103 Εἴτα σύμπαντα εἰληφὼς παρ’ ἄλλου καὶ αὐτοῦ σεαυτόν, ἀγανακτεῖς καὶ μέμψῃ τὸν δόντα, ἂν σοῦ 104 τι ἀφέληται; τίς ὦν καὶ ἐπὶ τί ἐληλυθὼς; οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνος σε εἰσῆγαγεν; οὐχὶ τὸ φῶς ἐκεῖνος σου ἐδείξεν; οὐ συνεργοῦς δέδωκεν; οὐ καὶ αἰσθήσεις; οὐ λόγον; ὡς τίνα δὲ εἰσῆγαγεν; οὐχὶ ὡς θυντόν; οὐχὶ μετὰ ὀλίγου σαρκίδιον ξῆσοντα ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ θεασόμενον τὴν διοίκησιν αὐτοῦ καὶ συμποι-πεύσοντα αὐτῷ καὶ συνεορτάσοντα πρὸς ὀλίγον; 1 δέδοται s. But cf. explanatory note.
within the sphere of the moral purpose He has given me, subjected them to my control, unhampered and unhindered. My body that is made of clay, how could He make that unhindered? Accordingly He has made it subject to the revolution of the universe—my property, my furniture, my house, my children, my wife. Why, then, shall I strive against God? Why shall I will what is not in the province of the will, to keep under all circumstances what has not been given me outright? But how should I keep them? In accordance with the terms upon which they have been given, and for as long as they can be given. But He who gave also takes away. Why, then, shall I resist? I do not say that I shall be a fool for trying to use force upon one who is stronger than I am, but before that I shall be wicked. For where did I get these things when I came into the world? My father gave them to me. And who gave them to him? Who has made the sun, who the fruits, who the seasons, who the union and fellowship of men one with another?

And so, when you have received everything, and your very self, from Another, do you yet complain and blame the Giver, if He take something away from you? Who are you, and for what purpose have you come? Did not He bring you into the world? Did not He show you the light? Did not He give you fellow-workers? Did not He give you senses also and reason? And as what did He bring you into the world? Was it not as a mortal being? Was it not as one destined to live upon earth with a little portion of paltry flesh, and for a little while to be a spectator of His governance, and to join with Him in His pageant and holiday?
105 οὖ θέλεις οὖν, ἔως δέδοται σοι, θεασάμενος τὴν πομπὴν καὶ τὴν πανήγυριν εἶτα, ὅταν τα' ἐξήγη, πορεύεσθαι προσκυνήσας καὶ εὐχαριστήσας ύπὲρ ὅν ἦκουσας καὶ εἶδες; "οὔ· ἀλλ' ἐτὶ εὐρτάζειν ἡθελον." καὶ γὰρ οἱ μῦσται μυεῖσθαι, τάχα καὶ οἱ ἔν ο Ὀλυμπία ἄλλοις ἀθλητὰς βλέπειν· ἄλλα ἡ πανήγυρις πέρας ἔχει· ἔξελθε, ἀπαλλάγηθι ὡς εὐχαρίστως, ὡς αἰδήμωι· δῶς ἄλλοις τόπου· δεῖ γενέσθαι καὶ ἄλλοις, καθάπερ καὶ σὺ ἐγένου, καὶ γενομένους ἔχειν χώραν καὶ οἰκήσεις, τὰ ἐπιτήδεια. ἀν δ' οἱ πρῶτοι μὴ υπεξάγωσιν, τί υπολείπεται; τί ἄπληστος εἰ; τί ἀνίκανος; τί στενοχωρεῖς τὸν κόσμον;

107 Ναὶ· ἀλλὰ τὰ τεκνία μετ' ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι θέλω καὶ τὴν γυναίκα. —Σὰ γὰρ ἔστιν; οὐχὶ τοῦ δόντος; οὐχὶ καὶ τοῦ σὲ πεποιηκότος; εἶτα οὐκ ἐκστήσῃ τῶν ἄλλοτρών; οὐ παραχωρήσεις τῷ κρείσσοιν;

108—Τί οὖν μ' εἰσήγην ἐπὶ τούτοις;—Καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιεῖ σοι, ἔξελθε· οὐκ ἔχει χρείαν θεατοῦ μεμψιμοίρου. τῶν συνεορταζόντων δεῖται, τῶν συγχρεοντων, ἢ̂ ἐπικροτῶσι μᾶλλον, ἐπιθελαξωσιν,

109 ὑμνῶσι δὲ τὴν πανήγυριν. τοὺς ἀταλαιπώρους δὲ καὶ δειλοὺς οὐκ ἀθάνος ὑπεται ἀπολείπεμένους τῆς πανηγύρεως. οὐδὲ γὰρ παρόντες ὡς ἐν ἐορτῇ διήγουν οὐδ' ἐξεπλήρουν τὴν χώραν τὴν πρέπουσαν, ἀλλ' ὁ δυνώντω, ἐμέμφοντο τὸν δαίμονα, τὴν τύχην, τοὺς συνόντας· ἀναίσθητοι καὶ ὃν ἐτυχον

1 Schweighäuser: ταλαιπώρους S.

1 Or possibly, “He does not suit you,” as Capps suggests.
you not willing, then, for so long as has been given you, to be a spectator of His pageant and His festival, and then when He leads you forth, to go, after you have made obeisance and returned thanks for what you have heard and seen? "No," you say, "but I wanted to go on with the holiday." Yes, and so do the initiates in the mysteries want to go on with the initiation, and no doubt the spectators at Olympia want to see still other athletes; but the festival has come to an end; leave, depart as a grateful and reverent spectator departs; make room for others; yet others must be born, even as you were born, and once born they must have land, and houses, and provisions. But if the first-comers do not move along, what is left for those who follow after? Why are you insatiate? Why never satisfied? Why do you crowd the world?

Yes, but I want my little children and my wife to be with me.—Are they yours? Do they not belong to Him who gave them? To Him who made you? Will you not, therefore, give up what is not your own? Will you not yield to your superior?—Why, then, did He bring me into the world on these conditions?—And if they do not suit you, leave; God has no need of a fault-finding spectator. He needs those who join in the holiday and the dance, that they may applaud rather, and glorify, and sing hymns of praise about the festival. But the peevish and the cowardly He will not be distressed to see left out of the festival; for when they were present they did not act as though they were on a holiday, nor did they fill the proper rôle; but they were distressed, found fault with the Deity, with fate, and with the company; insensible to what had been
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καὶ τῶν ἐαυτῶν δυνάμεων, ὥς εἰλήφασι πρὸς τὰ ἑνατία, μεγαλοφυχίας, γεναιότητος, ἀνδρείας,
110 αὐτῆς τῆς νῦν ξητουμένης ἐλευθερίας.—Ἐπὶ τί ὅνοι εἰλήφα ταῦτα;—Χρησόμενος.—Μέχρι τίνος;—Μέχρις ἂν ὁ χρήσας θέλη.—Ἄν οὖν ἀναγκαία μοι ἢ;—Μὴ πρόσπασχε αὐτοῖς καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. σὺ αὐτὰ αὐτῷ μὴ εὕπης ἀναγκαία καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν.

111 Ταῦτην τὴν μελέτην ἐσθεν εἰς ἐσπέραν μελετῶν ἔδει. ἀπὸ τῶν μικροτάτων, ἀπὸ τῶν εὐπηρεαστοτάτων ἀρξάμενος, ἀπὸ χύτρας, ἀπὸ ποτηρίου, εἴθ’ οὕτως ἐπὶ χιτωνάριον πρόσελθε, ἐπὶ κυνάριον, ἐπὶ ἰππάριον, ἐπὶ ἀγρίδιον ἐσθεν ἐπὶ σαυτόν, τὸ σῶμα, τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, τὰ τέκνα,

112 τὴν γυναῖκα, τοὺς ἁδελφοὺς. πανταχοῦ περιβλέψας ἀπόρριψον ἀπὸ σεαυτοῦ καθηρον τὰ δόγματα, μή τι προσήρχηται σοι τῶν οὐ σῶν, μή τι συμπέφυκεν, μή τι ὁδυνήσει σ’ ἀποσπᾶμενον.

113 καὶ λέγε γυμναζόμενος καθ’ ἡμέραν, ὡς ἑκεῖ, μή ὅτι φιλοσοφεῖς (ἔστω φορτικὸν τὸ ὄνομα), ἀλλ’ ὅτι καρπιστῆν δίδως· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ τὰς ἀληθείας ἐλευθερία. ταῦτην ἠλευθερώθη Διογένης παρ’ ’Αντισθένου καὶ οὐκέτι ἐφ’ ᾧ καταδουν.

115 λαθήναι δύνασθαι ὑπ’ οὐδένος. διὰ τοῦτο πῶς ἐάλω, πῶς τοῖς πειραταῖς ἔχριτο· μή τι κύριον

1 It is tempting to conjecture καρπιστῆαν, “making provision for your emancipation,” since every man must win his own freedom for himself. But Epictetus probably is thinking here of a man being won to freedom by following some great philosopher, who is his emancipator, as in the famous illustration in the next sentence. It is interesting to observe how, with all its insistence upon individual responsibility, even Stoicism at this time was becoming a religion of books, examples, and savours.
vouchsafed them, and to their own powers which they had received for the very opposite use—high-mindedness, nobility of character, courage, and the very freedom for which we are now seeking.—For what purpose, then, did I receive these gifts?—To use them.—How long?—For as long as He who lent them to you wills.—But what if they are necessary to me?—Do not set your heart upon them, and they will not be necessary to you. Do not say to yourself that they are necessary, and they will not be.

This is what you ought to practise from morning till evening. Begin with the most trifling things, the ones most exposed to injury, like a pot, or a cup, and then advance to a tunic, a paltry dog, a mere horse, a bit of land; thence to yourself, your body, and its members, your children, wife, brothers. Look about on every side and cast these things away from you. Purify your judgements, for fear lest something of what is not your own may be fastened to them, or grown together with them, and may give you pain when it is torn loose. And every day while you are training yourself, as you do in the gymnasium, do not say that you are "pursuing philosophy" (indeed an arrogant phrase!), but that you are a slave presenting your emancipator in court;¹ for this is the true freedom. This is the way in which Diogenes was set free by Antisthenes,² and afterwards said that he could never be enslaved again by any man. How, in consequence, did he behave when he was captured?³ How he treated the pirates!

¹ See III. 24, 67.
² A very famous incident in the life of the philosopher. See especially, Musonius frag. 9 (p. 49, 8 ff., Hense); Gellius, II, 18, 9–10; Lucian, Vit. Auct. 7; Diogenes Laertius, 6, 30; 36; 74; Ps.-Crates, Epist. 34; and above, III. 24, 66.
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εἰπέν τινα αὐτῶν; καὶ οὐ λέγω τὸ ὄνομα· οὐ γὰρ τὴν φωνὴν φοβοῦμαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀφ' οὐ ἦν

116 φωνὴ ἐκπέμπεται. πῶς ἐπιτιμᾶ αὐτοῖς, ὅτι κακῶς ἔτρεφον τοὺς ἐαλωκότας· πῶς ἐπραῤῥή·

μὴ τι κύριον ἐξήτει; ἀλλὰ δούλουν. πῶς δὲ πραθεὶς ἀνεστρέφετο πρὸς τὸν ἰστότητην εὐθὺς 

dιελέγετο πρὸς αὐτὸν, ὅτι οὐχ οὗτος ἐστολίσθαι 

dei αὐτόν, οὐχ οὗτος κεκάρθαι, περὶ τὸν νῦν,

117 πῶς δεῖ αὐτοὺς διάγειν. καὶ τί θαυμαστὸν; εἰ 

gὰρ παιδοτρίβην ἐώητο, ἐν τοῖς παλαιστρικοῖς 

υπηρέτη ἂν αὐτῷ ἐχρῆτο ἡ κύριώ; εἰ δ' ιατρόν, 

ὡσαντῶς, εἰ δ' ἀρχιτέκτονα. καὶ οὗτως ἐφ’ 

ἐκάστης ὕλης τὸν ἐμπειρὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου κρατεῖν

118 πάσα ἀνάγκη. ὡστις οὐν καθόλου τὴν περὶ βίου 

ἐπιστήμην κέκτηται, τί ἄλλο ἡ τοῦτον εἶναι δεῖ 

tὸν δεσπότην; τίς γὰρ ἐστιν ἐν νη ἱκυρίος;—Ὁ 

κυβερνήτης.—Διὰ τί; ὅτι ὁ ἀπείθῶν αὐτῷ ξη-

119 μιοῦται.—'Αλλὰ δεῖραί με δύναται.—Μὴ τι οὐν 

ἀξιμίως;—Οὕτως μὲν κἀγὼ ἐκρινον.—'Αλλ' ὅτι 

οὐκ ἀξιμίως, διὰ τὸ τοῦτο οὔκ ἐξεστὶν οὐδενὶ δ’

120 ἀξιμίων ἔστι τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἀδίκα.—Καὶ τίς ἡ 

ξημία τῷ δῆσαντι τὸν αὐτοῦ δοῦλον, ἢν δοκῇ; ¹

—Τὸ δῆσαι· τοῦτο δ' καὶ σὺ ὑμολογήσεις, ἂν 

θέλης σοφεῖν, ὅτι ἀνθρώπος οὐκ ἐστὶ θηρίον, ἀλλ’

121 ἡμερον ἡμῶν. ἐπεὶ πτῶτ’ ἀμπελος πράσσει κακῶς; 

ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν πράσση. ποτ’

¹ Matheson: ἦν δοκεῖς S.

¹ The phrase is from Plato, Sophistes, 222 B. See also IV, 5, 10.

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He called none of them master, did he? And I am not referring to the name! it is not the word that I fear, but the emotion, which produces the word. How he censures them because they gave bad food to their captives! How he behaved when he was sold! Did he look for a master? No, but for a slave. And how he behaved toward his master after he had been sold! He began immediately to argue with him, telling him that he ought not to dress that way, or have his hair cut that way, and about his sons, how they ought to live. And what is there strange about that? Why, if he had bought a gymnastic trainer, would he have employed him as a servant, or as a master, in the exercises of the palaestra? And if he had bought a physician, or a master-builder, the same would have been true. And thus in every subject-matter, it is quite unavoidable that the man of skill should be superior to the man without skill. In general, therefore, whoever possesses the science of how to live, how can he help but be the master? For who is master in a ship?—The helmsman.—Why? Because the man who disobeys him is punished.—But my master is able to give me a sound flogging.—He cannot do so with impunity, can he?—So I thought.—But because he cannot do so with impunity, therefore he has no authority to do it; no man can do wrong with impunity.—And what is the punishment that befalls the man who has put his own slave in chains, when he felt like it?—The putting of him in chains; this is something which you will admit yourself, if you wish to maintain the proposition that man is not a wild beast but a tame animal. For when is a vine faring badly? When it is acting contrary to its own
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122 ἀλεκτρυών; ὁσαύτως. οὐκόν καὶ ἀνθρωπος, τίς οὖν αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις; δάκνειν καὶ λακτίζειν καὶ εἰς φυλακήν βάλλειν καὶ ἀποκεφαλίζειν; οὐ· ἀλλ' εὖ ποιεῖν, συνεργεῖν, ἐπεύχεσθαι. τότ' οὖν κακῶς πράσσει, ἂν τε θέλησ ἂν τε μή, ὅταν ἀγνωμονή.

123 Ἡστε Σωκράτης οὐκ ἐπράξε κακῶς;—Οὐ, ἀλλ' οἱ δικασταί καὶ οἱ κατήγοροι.—Οὐδ' ἐν 'Ρώμη Ἑλουίδιος;—Οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁ ἀποκτεῖνας

124 αὐτῶν.—Πῶς λέγεις;—Ὡς καὶ σὺ ἀλεκτρυώνα οὐ λέγεις κακῶς πρᾶξαι τὸν νικήσαντα καὶ κατακοπέντα, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀπλήγα ἰττηθέντα; οὔδε κύνα εὐδαιμονίζεις τὸν μήτε διώκοντα μήτε ποιοῦντα, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἱδρώντα ἰδης, ὅταν ὅδυνώ-

125 μενον, ὅταν ὑγινύμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ δρόμου. τί παραδοξολογοῦμεν, εἰ λέγομεν παντὸς κακὸν εἶναι τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν; τοῦτο παράδοξον ἐστιν; σὺ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων οὐ λέγεις; διὰ τί ἐπὶ μόνον οὖν τοῦ

126 ἀνθρώπου ἄλλως φέρῃ; ἀλλ' ὅτι λέγομεν ἰμερον εἶναι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν φύσιν καὶ φιλάλληλον καὶ πιστιν, τοῦτο παράδοξον οὐκ

127 ἐστιν;—Οὐδὲ τούτο.—Πῶς οὖν ἐπὶ οὐ δερόμενος βλαπτεῖαι ἡ δεσμευόμενος ἡ ἀποκεφαλιζομενος; οὐχὶ οὖτως μὲν εἰ1 γενναίως πᾶσχει, καὶ προσκεδαίων καὶ προσωφελούμενος ἀπέρχεται, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ὁ2 βλαπτόμενος ἐστιν ὁ τὰ οικτρότατα πάσχον καὶ αἰσχιστα, ὁ ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου λύκος γινόμενος ἡ ἔχις ἡ σφίξ;

1  εἰ added by Schenkl (after Upton).  2 ὁ added by Blass.

1 A prominent Stoic senator at Rome. See I. 2, 19 ff.
nature. When is a cock faring badly? Under the same conditions. So also man. What, then, is his nature? To bite, and kick, and throw into prison, and behead? No, but to do good, to work together, and to pray for the success of others. Therefore, he is faring badly, whether you will or no, when he acts unfeelingly.

You imply, then, that Socrates did not fare badly?—He did not; it was his judges and accusers who fared badly.—Nor Helvidius at Rome?—No, but the man who put him to death.—How so?—Just as you too do not say that the cock which has won a victory, even though he be severely cut up, has fared badly, but rather the one who has been beaten without suffering a blow. Nor do you call a dog happy when he is neither in pursuit nor toiling hard, but when you see him sweating, suffering, bursting from the chase. What is there paradoxical in the statement, if we say that everything's evil is what is contrary to its own nature? Is that paradoxical? Do you not say it yourself in the case of everything else? Why, then, do you take a different course in the case of man alone? But our statement that the nature of man is gentle, and affectionate, and faithful, is this not paradoxical?—No, that is not paradoxical, either.—How, then, does it come about that he suffers no harm, even though he is soundly flogged, or imprisoned, or beheaded? Is it not thus—if he bears it all in a noble spirit, and comes off with increased profit and advantage, while the other man is the one who suffers harm, the man who is subjected to the most pitiful and disgraceful experience, who becomes a wolf, or a snake, or a wasp, instead of a human being?
128 ἂνε οὖν ἐπέλθωμεν τὰ ὁμολογημένα. ὁ ἀκόλυτος ἀνθρώπως ἐλεύθερος, ὡς πρόξειρα τὰ πράγματα ὡς Βουλεταί. ὅν δὲ ἔστιν ἢ κωδύσαι ἢ ἀναγκάσαι ἢ ἐμποδίσαι ἢ ἄκοντα εἰς τι ἐμβαλεῖν,

129 δούλος ἔστιν. τίς δὲ ἀκόλυτος; ὁ μηδενὸς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐφιέμενος. τίνα δ' ἀλλότρια; ἂ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὔτ' ἔχειν οὔτε μή ἔχειν οὔτε

130 ποιά ἔχειν ἡ πῶς ἔχοντα. οὐκοῦν τὸ σῶμα ἀλλότριον, τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἀλλότρια, ἡ κτησις ἀλλότρια. ἂν οὖν τινὶ τούτων ὡς ἰδίῳ προσπαθῆς, δώσεις δίκαιον ἃς ἄξιον τῶν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων

131 ἐφιέμενον. αὕτη ἡ ὁδὸς ἐπ' ἐλεύθερίαν ἀγεί, αὕτη μόνη ἀπαλλαγῇ δουλείας, τὸ δυνηθῆναι ποτ' εἰπεῖν ἐξ ὅλης ψυχῆς τὸ

ἀγοῦ δὲ μ', ὃς Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ γ' ἡ Πεπρωμένη, ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος.

132 Ἀλλὰ τί λέγεις, φιλόσοφε; καλεῖ σε ὁ τύραννος ἐρούντα τι ὅν οὐ πρέπει σοι. λέγεις ἢ οὖ λέγεις; εἰπέ μοι.—Ἀφες σκέψωμαι.—

Νῦν σκέψῃ; ὅτε δ' εὖ τῇ σχολῇ ἦς, τί ἐσκέπτουν; οὐκ ἐμελέτας, τίνα ἔστι τὰ ἄγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ

133 καὶ τίνα οὐδέτερα;—Ἐσκεπτόμην.—Τίνα οὖν ἡμέρας ὑμῖν;—Τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ ἄγαθὰ εἶναι, τὰ ἄδικα καὶ ἄισχρα κακά.—Μή τι τὸ ἥν ἄγαθὸν;—Οὐ.—Μή τι τὸ ἀπαθανεῖν κακὸν;

1 From the Hymn of Cleanthes. See on II. 23, 42.
Come, now, and let us review the points on which we have reached agreement. The unhampered man, who finds things ready to hand as he wants them, is free. But the man who can be hampered, or subjected to compulsion, or hindered, or thrown into something against his will, is a slave. And who is unhampered? The man who fixes his aim on nothing that is not his own. And what are the things which are not our own? All that are not under our control, either to have, or not to have, or to have of a certain quality, or under certain conditions. Therefore, the body is not our own, its members are not our own, property is not our own. If, then, you conceive a strong passion for some one of these things, as though it were your immediate possession, you will be punished as he should be who fixes his aim upon what is not his own. This is the road which leads to freedom, this is the only sure cease of slavery, to be able to say at any time with your whole heart,

Lead thou me on, O Zeus, and Destiny,
To that goal long ago to me assigned.  

But what say you, philosopher? The tyrant calls upon you to say something that is unworthy of you. Do you say it, or not say it? Tell me.—Let me think about it.—Think about it now? But what were you thinking about when you were attending lectures? Did you not study the questions, what things are good, and what bad, and what are neither good nor bad?—I did.—What conclusions were approved, then, by you and your fellows?—That things righteous and excellent were good, things unrighteous and disgraceful bad.—Life is not a good thing, is it?—No.—Nor death a bad thing?
Ωῦ.—Μὴ τι φυλακῇ;—Οὐ.—Δόγος δ’ ἀγεννῆς καὶ ἀπιστος καὶ φίλου προδοσία καὶ κολακεία

134 τυράννου τι ὑμῖν ἐφαίνετο;—Κακά.—Τί οὖν; οὐχὶ σκέπτη, οὐχὶ δ’ ἐσκέψαι καὶ βεβούλευσαι. ποία γὰρ σκέψις, εἰ καθήκει μοι δυναμένω τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ ἐμαυτῷ περιποιήσαι, τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ μὴ περιποιήσαι; καλὴ σκέψις καὶ ἀναγκαία, πολλῆς Βουλῆς δεσμένη. τί ὑμῖν ἐμπαιζεις, ἀνθρώπε; οὐδέποτε τοιαύτη σκέψις γίνεται.

135 οὖν εἰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις κακὰ μὲν ἐφαντάζον τὰ αἰσχρά, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα οὐδέτερα, ἦλθες ἂν ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπίστασιν, οὖν ἐγγύς· ἄλλ’ αὐτόθεν διακρίνειν εἰχες, ὀσπερ ὄψει, τῇ διανοίᾳ. πότε γὰρ σκέπτη, εἰ τὰ μέλανα λευκὰ ἔστιν, εἰ τὰ βαρέα κούφα; οὐχὶ δὲ τοῖς ἐναργῶς φαινομένοις ἐπακολούθεις; πῶς οὖν νῦν σκέπτεσθαι λέγεις, 136 διακρίνειν εἰχες, ὀσπερ ὄψει, τῇ διανοίᾳ. πότε γὰρ σκέπτη, εἰ τὰ μέλανα λευκὰ ἔστιν, εἰ τὰ βαρέα κούφα; οὐχὶ δὲ τοῖς ἐναργῶς φαινομένοις ἐπακολούθεις; πῶς οὖν νῦν σκέπτεσθαι λέγεις, 137 εἰ 1 τὰ οὐδέτερα τῶν κακῶν φευκτότερα; ἄλλ’ οὐκ ἔχεις τὰ δόγματα ταύτα, ἄλλα φαίνεται σοι οὔτε ταύτα οὐδέτερα, ἄλλα τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ, 138 οὔτ’ ἐκεῖνα κακὰ, 2 ἄλλ’ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. οὕτως γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰθίσας σεαυτὸν “ποῦ εἰμί; ἐν σχολῇ. καὶ ἀκούουσι μου τίνες; λέγω μετὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων. ἄλλ’ ἐξελήλυθα τῆς σχολῆς· ἀρον

1 εἰ added by Wolf. 2 κακά added by Upton.
—No.—Nor imprisonment?—No.—But ignoble speech and faithless, and betrayal of a friend, and flattery of a tyrant, what did you and your fellows think of these?—We thought them evil.—What then? You are not thinking about the question now, nor have you thought about it and considered it hitherto. Why, what kind of inquiry is it, to raise the question whether it is fitting, when it is in my power to get for myself the greatest goods, not to get for myself the greatest evils! A fine and necessary question, forsooth, that requires a great deal of deliberation. Why are you making fun of us, man? Such an inquiry is never made. Besides, if you had honestly imagined that disgraceful things were bad, and all else indifferent, you would never have approached this inquiry, no, nor anything near it; but you would have been able to settle the question on the spot, by intuition, just as in a case involving sight. Why, when do you stop to "think about it," if the question is, Are black things white, or, Are heavy things light? Do you not follow the clear evidence of your senses? How comes it, then, that now you say you are thinking it over, whether things indifferent are more to be avoided than things bad? But you do not have these judgements; on the contrary, imprisonment and death do not appear to you to be indifferent, but rather the greatest evils, and dishonourable words and deeds are not bad in your sight, but rather things that do not concern us. For that is the habit which you developed from the start. "Where am I?" you say. "In school. And who are listening to me?" I am talking in the company of philosophers. But now I have left the
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ἐκείνα τὰ τῶν σχολαστικῶν καὶ τῶν μωρῶν." οὖτως καταμαρτυρεῖται φίλος ὑπὸ φιλοσόφου, 
139 οὖτως παρασιτεί φιλόσοφος, οὖτως ἐπ’ ἀργυρῷ ἐκμισθοῖ ἔαυτόν, οὖτως ἐν συγκλήτῳ τις οὐ λέγει τὰ φαινόμενα· ἐνδοθεν τὸ δόγμα αὐτοῦ 
140 βοᾷ, οὐ¹ ψυχρὸν καὶ ταλαίπωρον ὑποληψείδιον ἐκ λόγων εἰκαίων ὡς ἐκ τριχὸς ἱρτημένον, ἀλλὰ ἱσχυρὸν καὶ χρηστικὸν καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ διὰ τῶν ἔργων γεγυμνώθαι μεμυμένον. 
141 παραφύλαξον σαυτόν, πῶς ἀκούεις· οὐ λέγω, ὅτι τὸ παιδίον σου ἀπέθανεν· πόθεν σοι; ἀλλ’ ὅτι σου τὸ ἑλαιον ἐξεχέθη, ὃ οἶνος ἐξεπόθη, 
142 ἢνα τις ἐπιστάς διατεινωμένω σοι τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ μόνων εἰπῇ "φιλόσοφε, ἀλλὰ λέγεις ἐν τῇ σχολῇ· τὶ ἡμᾶς ἐξαπατάς; τὶ σκώληξ ᾃν 
143 λέγεις, ὅτι ἄνθρωπος εἰ;" ἦθελον ἐπιστῆμα τινι αὐτῶν συνουσιάζοντι, ἢν ἴδω, πῶς τείνεται καὶ ποίας φωνᾶς ἀφίσιν, εἰ μέμηται τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ, τῶν λόγων οὖς ἀκούει ἢ λέγει ἢ ἀναγιγνώσκει. 
144 Καὶ τί ταῦτα πρὸς ἔλευθερίαν;—Οὐκ ἀλλα μὲν οὖν ἢ ταῦτ’, ἀν τε θέλητε ύμεῖς οἱ πλούσιοι 
145 ἀν τε μῆ;—Καὶ τί² σοι μαρτυρεῖ ταῦτα;—Τι γὰρ ἀλλο ἢ αὐτοὶ ύμεῖς οἱ τοῦ κύριον τὸν μέγαν ἐχοντες καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου νεῦμα καὶ κίνημα ἐχοντες, καν των ύμῶν ἰδὴ μόνον συνεστραμμένω βλέμματι, ἀποψυχόμενοι, τὰς γραῖς θεραπεύον·

¹ Schweighäuser: σοῦ S. ² Reiske: ei kal δέ S. ³ Schenkl: τίς S.

¹ Possibly an allusion to Egnatius Celer, who accused his friend, Barea Soranus, in the reign of Nero, A.D. 66, when
school; away with those sayings of pedants and fools!" That is how a friend is condemned on the testimony of a philosopher, that is how a philosopher turns parasite, that is how he hires himself out for money, that is how at a meeting of the senate a man does not say what he thinks, while within his breast his judgement shouts loudly, no cold and miserable remnant suspended from idle argumentations as by a hair, but a strong and serviceable judgement, and familiar with its business by having been trained in action. Watch yourself, and see how you take the word—I do not say the word that your child is dead; how could you possibly bear that?—but the word that your oil is spilled, or your wine drunk up. Well might someone stand over you, when you are in this excited condition, and say simply, "Philosopher, you talk differently in the school; why are you deceiving us? Why, when you are a worm, do you claim that you are a man?" I should like to stand over one of these philosophers when he is engaged in sexual intercourse, so as to see how he exerts himself, what manner of words he utters, whether he remembers his own name, or the arguments that he hears, or repeats, or reads!

And what has all this to do with freedom?—Nay, nothing but all this has to do with freedom, whether you rich people so wish or not.—And what is your witness to this?—Why, what else but you yourselves who have this mighty master, and live at his nod and gesture, who faint away if he but look at one of you with a scowl on his face, paying court to the

Epictetus was a boy. See Tacitus, *Annals*, 16, 32, and Juvenal, 3, 116f.

<i.e.>, the Emperor.
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tes kai tois gërontas kai légonotes òti "ou
146 duvamai touto poieïsav ouk eüestî mou"; dia
ti ouk eüestîn sou; ouk àrti emâxou moi légon
ëleuvêrosw einai; "alla "Aptrullâ me kékôlynu-
kev." Lége ouv tais álithèias, òuîle, kai më
drapètevè sou tois kürions mëd àparânu mëde
tôlma karpiaitai ðidònai tosoûton evxhov tis
147 douleias ëlégyvou. Kai tois tou mën ùp érwto
ëanagkaçómenvon ti poieîn parà tò fainômenv
kai àma mën ôrôvta tò àmeivn, àma d' ouk
ëxevtonouvta àkolouvì̆hsw aútw ètw màlloôn àn
tis syngynômhs àxion úppolâbôi, áth' ùpò tînos
bíaini kai tròpôn tina ðeión kataeskìîmenon.
148 sou dè tis ãnàsçwòto tòn grávôn èrówto
kai
tòn gérôntow kai èkeínav àpomýsstonos kai
àpoplúnontos kai dórôdokouvontos kai àma mën
vosoûsas ðérapeûontos òs òuîlou, àma d' àpò-
ðainèiv èuxomévon kai tois iatrous diakrinontos,
ei ëdè thanaòímos èxousin; ëi pávìn òtan ùpèr
tôn megálwv toûtow kai semvôn ðrìxwv kai
tîmôv tais ðeíras tîn àllôtrîwv òuîlouw kata-
149 filèjs, ëina mëd' èleuvèrôn òuîlów ës; èxta moi
semvòs periastæis ðraðègâv, ùpateuvn. ouk
oida, òws èstthngsws, pòðen tîn ùpateián
150 èlwsws, tis sou aútw ðèwkev; ëgv mën ouîde
ënôm ñèelou, eî dîa ðùlikînwa èdei ñèesi tîs
òfrîos aútw kai tòu ðoulîkou ðrefamátos
ànaxòmewn; òida xar, tî ëstî òuîlów èìntwêw
wè òokeî kai tênuwomèvōs.

1 Obviously some rich old woman.
2 See § 113 and note.
3 A freedman of Nero's. See I. 17, 19, 20 and 21.
old women and the old men, and saying, "I cannot do this; I am not allowed"? Why are you not allowed? Were you not just now arguing with me and claiming that you were free? "But Aprulla has prevented me." Tell the truth, then, slave, and do not run away from your masters, nor make denial, nor dare to present your emancipator, when you have so many proofs to convict you of slavery. And, indeed, when a man out of passionate love is under the compulsion to do something contrary to his opinion, all the time seeing the better thing but lacking the strength to follow, one might be all the more inclined to regard him as deserving pity, because he is in the grip of something violent, and, in a manner of speaking, divine. But who could endure you with your passion for old women and old men, wiping the noses and washing the faces of old women, corrupting them with presents, and all the while you are nursing them, like a slave, in some illness, praying for them to die, and asking the physicians if they are finally on their deathbed? Or again, when for the sake of these mighty and dignified offices and honours you kiss the hands of other men's slaves, so as to be the slave of men who are not even free? And then, God save the mark, you walk around in your dignity as a praetor or a consul! Don't I know how you came to be praetor, how you got your consulship, who gave it to you? As for me, I should not care even to live, if I had to owe my life to Felicio, putting up with his insolence and slavish arrogance; for I know what a slave is, who is prosperous as the world goes, and puffed up with pride.

4 A pretty clear reference to his experiences with his master, Epaphroditus, who had been a slave of Nero.
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151 Σὺ οὖν, φησίν, ἐλεύθερος εἰ; — Θέλω νῦν τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ εὐχομαι, ἀλλ’ οὐπώ δύναμαι ἀντι-βλέψαι τοῖς κυρίοις, ἐτι τιμῶ τὸ σωμάτιον, ὀλόκληρον αὐτὸ ἔχειν ἀντὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι.

152 καίτοι μηδ’ ὀλόκληρον ἔχων. ἀλλὰ δύναμαι σοι δείξαι ἐλεύθερον, ἵνα μηκέτι ξητῆς τὸ παρά-δειγμα. Διογένης ἦν ἐλεύθερος. πόθεν τούτο; οὐχ ὅτι ἐὰν ἐλεύθερον ἦν, οὐ γὰρ ἦν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἦν, ὅτι ἀποβεβλήκει πάσας τὰς τῆς δουλείας λαβᾶς1 οὐδ’ ἦν, ὅπως τις προσέλθῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐδ’ οθεν λάβηται πρὸς τὸ κατα-

153 δουλώσασθαι. πάντα εὐλυτα εἶχεν, πάντα μόνον προσηρτμένα. εἰ τῆς κτῆσεως ἐπελάβου, αὐτὴν ἀφίκειν ἄν σοι μᾶλλον ἣ ἱκολούθησεν δι’ αὐτὴν εἰ τοῦ σκέλος, τὸ σκέλος εἰ ὅλου τοῦ σωματίου, ὅλον τὸ σωμάτιον οἰκείους, φίλους, πατρίδα ὡσαυτός. ᾦδει, πόθεν ἔχει καί

154 παρὰ τίνος καὶ ἑπὶ τίσιν λαβῶν. τοὺς μὲν γ’ ἀληθινοὺς προγόνους, τοὺς θεοὺς, καὶ τὴν τῶν ὡντι πατρίδα οὐδεπῶπτον ἃν ἐγκατέλιπεν, οὐδὲ παρεχόρησεν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ ὑπακούειν, οὐδ’ ὑπεραπέθανεν ἃν εὐκολώτερον.

155 τῆς πατρίδος ἀλλος, οὐ γὰρ ἔξειτε ποτὲ δόξαι2 τι ποιεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων, ἀλλ’ ἐμέμνητο, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γενομένον ἐκείθεν ἔστιν καὶ ὑπὲρ3 ἐκείνης πράττεται καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ διοικοῦντος

1 Sb: βλαβᾶς S. 2 Meibom: δόξαι S. 3 Schweighäuser: ὑπ’ S.

1 Alluding to his lameness, as the Scholiast observes. See Vol. I, Introd., pp. ix–x.

2 That is, not grown to him so as to cause pain when torn loose, as in § 112.

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Are you, then, free, says someone?—By the gods I wish to be, and pray to be, but I am not yet able to look into the face of my masters, I still honour my paltry body, I take great pains to keep it sound, although it is not sound in any case. But I can show you a free man, so that you will never again have to look for an example. Diogenes was free. How did that come? It was not because he was born of free parents, for he was not, but because he himself was free, because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and there was no way in which a person could get close and lay hold of him to enslave him. Everything he had was easily loosed, everything was merely tied on. If you had laid hold of his property, he would have let it go rather than followed you for its sake; if you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let his leg go; if of his whole paltry body, his whole paltry body; and so also his kindred, friends, and country. He knew the source from which he had received them, and from whom, and upon what conditions. His true ancestors, indeed, the gods, and his real Country he would never have abandoned, nor would he have suffered another to yield them more obedience and submission, nor could any other man have died more cheerfully for his Country. For it was never his wont to seek to appear to do anything in behalf of the Universe, but he bore in mind that everything which has come into being has its source there, and is done on behalf of that Country, and is entrusted

3 Clearly, from what follows, the Universe.
4 Compare Marcus Aurelius, 7, 73: "When thou hast done well to another . . . why go on like the foolish to look for . . . the credit of having done well?" (Haines).
156 αὐτὸς καὶ γράφει: "διὰ τούτῳ σοι," φησίν, "ἐξεστιν, ὥς Διόγενες, καὶ τῷ Περσῶν βασιλεῖ καὶ Ἀρχίδάμῳ τῷ Λακεδαίμονίων ὡς βούλει.

157 διαλέγεσθαι." ἀρά γ' ὅτι ἐξ ἐλευθέρων ἦν; πάντες γὰρ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ πάντες Λακεδαίμονιοι καὶ Κορίνθιοι διὰ τὸ ἐκ δοῦλων εἶναι οὐκ ἦδύναντο αὐτοῖς ὡς ἦβούλοντο διαλέγεσθαι,

158 ἀλλὰ ἐδεδοίκεσαν καὶ ἔθεράπευον; διὰ τί οὖν, φησίν, ἐξεστιν; "ὅτι τὸ σωμάτιον ἐμὸν οὐχ ἠγούμαι, ὅτι οὐδενὸς δέομαι, ὅτι ὁ νόμος μοι πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλο οὐδέν." ταῦτα ἦν τὰ ἐλευθέρουν ἐκεῖνον ἐάσαντα.

159 Καὶ ἦνα μὴ δόξης, ὅτι παράδειγμα δεῖκνυμι ἀνδρὸς ἀπεριστάτου μήτε γυναικα ἔχοντος μήτε τέκνα μήτε πατρίδα ἡ φίλους ἡ συγγενεῖς, ὡς κάμπτεσθαι καὶ περιστάσθαι ἦδύνατο, λάβει Σωκράτη καὶ θέασαι γυναῖκα καὶ παιδία ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ ὡς ἀλλότρια,1 πατρίδα, ἐφ' ὅσον ἐδει καὶ ὡς ἐδει, φίλους, συγγενεῖς, πάντα ταῦτα ὑποτε- 

160 ταχότα τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς ἐκείνον εὐπειθείᾳ.

161 διὰ τούτῳ, στρατεύεσθαι μὲν ὅποτ' ἐδει, πρῶγοι ἀπ' ἑκατον ἐκινδύνευσαν ἀφειδέστατα· ἑπὶ Δέοντα δ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυράννων πεμφθείς, ὅτι αὐσχρὸν ἡγεῖτο, οὐδ' ἐπεβουλεύσατο εἰδὼς, ὅτι ἀποθανεῖν 1 δεῖσει, ἀν οὕτως τύχῃ. καὶ τί αὐτῷ διέφερεν;

1 Salmassius: ἀλλότριαν S.

1 A leader of the opposition, whom the Thirty Tyrants wished to murder. See Plato, Apology, 32 C.

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to us by Him who governs it. Therefore, see what he himself says and writes: "For this reason," he says, "you are permitted, O Diogenes, to converse as you please with the king of the Persians and with Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians." Was it, indeed, because he was born of free parents? No doubt it was because they were all the children of slaves that the Athenians, and Lacedaemonians, and Corinthians were unable to converse with these monarchs as they pleased, but were afraid of them and paid court to them! Why, then, someone asks, are you permitted? "Because I do not regard my paltry body as my own; because I need nothing; because the law, and nothing else, is everything to me." This it was which allowed him to be a free man.

And that you may not think I am showing you an example of a man who was solitary, and had neither wife, nor children, nor country, nor friends, nor kinsmen, who might have bent him and diverted him from his purpose, take Socrates and observe a man who had a wife and little children, but regarded them as not his own, who had a country, as far as it was his duty, and in the way in which it was his duty, and friends, and kinsmen, one and all subject to the law and to obedience to the law. That is why, when it was his duty to serve as a soldier, he was the first to leave home, and ran the risks of battle most ungrudgingly; and when he was sent by the Tyrants to fetch Leon,¹ because he regarded it as disgraceful, he never deliberated about the matter at all, although he knew that he would have to die, if it so chanced. And what difference did it make to him? For there was
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άλλα γάρ τι σφόξειν ἥθελεν οὖ τὸ σαρκίδιον, ἀλλὰ τὸν πιστὸν, τὸν αἰδήμονα. ταῦτα ἀπαρεγ-162 χείρητα, ἀνυπότακτα. εἴθ' ὅτ' ἀπολογεῖσθαι ἔδει υπὲρ τοῦ ζήν, μή τι ὑπὲρ τέκνα ἔχων ἀναστρέ-φεται, μή τι ὡς γυναῖκα; ἀλλ' ὡς μόνος. τί δ', ὅτε πιεῖν ἔδει τὸ φάρμακον, πῶς ἀναστρέφεται;
163 δυνάμενος διασωθῆμαι καὶ τοῦ Κρίτωνος αὐτῷ λέγοντος ὅτι "ἐξελθε διὰ τὰ παιδία" τί λέγει; ἐρμαίον ἤγείτο αὐτό; πόθεν; ἀλλὰ τὸ εὐσχημον σκοπεῖ, τάλλα δ' οὐδ' ὀρᾶ, οὐδ' ἐπιλογίζεται. οὐ γάρ ἡθελεν, φησίν, σῶσαι τὸ σωμάτιον, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, τὸ τῷ δικαίῳ μὲν αὐξεῖται καὶ σφίζεται, τῷ
164 δ' ἄδικῳ μειοῦται καὶ ἀπόλλυται. Σωκράτης δ' αἰσχρῶς ὑπὸ σφίζεται, ὁ μὴ ἐπιψηφίσας Αθηναίων κελευόντων, ὁ τοὺς τυράννους ὑπεριδὼν, ὁ τοιαῦτα περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ καλοκαγαθίας διαλεγόμενος:
165 τούτων οὐκ ἐστὶ σῶσαι αἰσχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἀποθνῄσκων σφίζεται, οὐ φεύγων. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ὑποκρίτης παυόμενος οτὲ δεὶ σφίζεται μᾶλλον ἡ ὑποκρινό-
166 μενος παρὰ καίρον. τι οὖν ποιήσει τὰ παιδία; "εἰ μὲν εἰς Θετταλίαν ὑπήειν, ἐπεμελήθητε αὐτῶν εἰς "Αἰδον δὲ μου ἀποδημήσαντος οὐδεὶς ἐσταὶ ὁ ἐπιμελησόμενος" ὁρᾶ, πῶς ὑποκρίζεται
167 καὶ σκώπτει τὸν θάνατον. εἰ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ

1 A free paraphrase of Plato, Crítto, 47 D.
2 In the illegal action of the assembly after the battle of Arginusae. See Xenophon, Memorabilia, I. 1, 18; Plato, Apology, 32 B.
3 A singular parallel to "He that loseth his life for my sake shall find it" (Matt. x. 39).
4 A paraphrase of Plato, Crítto, 54 A.
something else that he wished to preserve; not his paltry flesh, but the man of honour, the man of reverence, that he was. These are things which are not to be entrusted to another, not to be made subject. Later on, when he had to speak in defence of his life, he did not behave as one who had children, or a wife, did he? Nay, but as one who was alone in the world. Yes, and when he had to drink the poison, how does he act? When he might have saved his life, and when Crito said to him, “Leave the prison for the sake of your children,” what is his reply? Did he think it a bit of good luck? Impossible! No, he regards what is fitting, and as for other considerations, he does not so much as look at or consider them. For he did not care, he says, to save his paltry body, but only that which is increased and preserved by right conduct, and is diminished and destroyed by evil conduct. Socrates does not save his life with dishonour, the man who refused to put the vote when the Athenians demanded it of him, the man who despised the Tyrants, the man who held such noble discourse about virtue and moral excellence; this man it is impossible to save by dishonour, but he is saved by death, and not by flight. Yes, and the good actor, too, is saved when he stops at the right time, rather than the one who acts out of season. What, then, will the children do? “If I had gone to Thessaly, you would have looked after them; but when I have gone down to the house of Hades, will there be no one to look after them?” See how he calls death soft names, and jests at it. But if it

5 “I have been half in love with easeful Death, Call’d him soft names in many a musèd rime.”

Keats, Ode to a Nightingale.
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ημεν, ευθὺς ἂν καταφιλοσοφόσαντες ὤτι "τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας δεὶ τοὺς ἵσοις ἀμύνεσθαι" καὶ προσθέντες ὤτι "ὁφέλος ἐσομαι πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις σωθεῖς, ἀποθανὼν δ' οὐδενί," εἰ ἂρ' ἔδει διὰ τρώγλησ ἐκδύνατας, ἐξήλθομεν ἂν. καὶ πῶς ἂν ὕφελησαμέν τινα; τοῦ γὰρ ἂν, εἰ ἔτι ἐμενον ἐκεῖ; 2 ἢ εἰ 3 οἴντες Ἰμεν ὕφελμοι, οὐχὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀποθανότες ἂν ὅτε ἔδει καὶ ὡς ἔδει ὕφελησαμεν ἀνθρώποις; καὶ νῦν Σωκράτους ἀποθανόντος οὐθέν ἦττον ἢ καὶ πλεῖον ὑφέλιμος ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις ἢ μνήμη ὡν ἔτι ζῶν ἐπραξεν ἢ εἰπεν.

170 Ταῦτα μελέτα, ταῦτα τὰ δόγματα, τούτους τοὺς λόγους, εἰς ταῦτα ἀφόρα τὰ παραδείγματα, εἰ θέλεις ἐλεύθερος εἶναι, εἰ ἔπιθυμεις κατ' ἄξιαν

171 τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ τὶ θαυμαστὸν, εἰ τηλικοῦτο πράγμα τοσοῦτων καὶ τηλικοῦτων ὄνη; ὑπὲρ τῆς νομιζομένης ἐλευθερίας ταῦτης οἱ μὲν ἀπάγ- χονται, οὶ δὲ κατακρημνίζουσιν αὐτοὺς, ἐστι δ' ὅτε καὶ πόλεις ὀλαι ἀπόλοντο· ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀ- ληθινῆς καὶ ἀνεπιβουλευτοῦ καὶ ἀσφαλοῦς ἐλευθερίας ἀπαιτοῦντι τῷ θεῷ ἄ δέδωκεν οὐκ ἐκστήσῃ; 4 οὐχὶ, ὡς Πλάτων ἱέγει, μελετήσεις οὐχὶ ἀποθνῄσκειν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ στρεβλοῦσθαι καὶ φεύγει καὶ δέρεσθαι καὶ πάνθ' ἀπλώσ

173 ἀποδιδόναι τάλλοτρα; ἔσει τοίνυν δούλος ἐν δούλοις, καὶ μυριάκες ὑπατεύσεις, καὶ εἰς τὸ

1 Schenkl: γὰρ S. 2 Capps: ἀν ἐτι ἐμενον ἐκεῖνοi S.
3 Salmasius: **οι S.
Schenkl (apparently): οὐκ*στῆσηi S.

1 This is probably the best emendation that has been suggested for a corrupt passage, but I do not feel certain that it is what Epictetus actually said.
had been you or I, we should forthwith have fallen into the philosophic vein, and said, "One ought to repay evil-doers in kind," and added, "If I save my life I shall be useful to many persons, but if I die I shall be useful to no one"; yes, indeed, and if we had had to crawl out through a hole to escape, we should have done so! And how should we have been of use to anybody? For where could we have been of use, if the others still remained in Athens? Or if we were useful to men by living, should we not have done much more good to men by dying when we ought, and as we ought? And now that Socrates is dead the memory of him is no less useful to men, nay, is perhaps even more useful, than what he did or said while he still lived.

Study these things, these judgements, these arguments, look at these examples, if you wish to be free, if you desire the thing itself in proportion to its value. And what wonder is there if you buy something so great at the price of things so many and so great? For the sake of what is called freedom some men hang themselves, others leap over precipices, sometimes whole cities perish; for true freedom, which cannot be plotted against and is secure, will you not yield up to God, at His demand, what He has given? Will you not, as Plato says, study not merely to die, but even to be tortured on the rack, and to go into exile, and to be severely flogged, and, in a word, to give up everything that is not your own? If not, you will be a slave among slaves; even if you are consul ten thousand times, even if you go up to the

2 Phaedo, 64 A, and Republic, II. 361 E.
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παλάτιον ἀναβής, οὖνδὲν ἦττων καὶ αἰσθήσει, ὅτι παράδοξα μὲν ἵσως φασίν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Κλείνθης ἔλεγεν, οὐ μὴν παρά-
174 λογα. ἔργῳ γὰρ εἶσῃ, ὅτι ἀληθῇ ἐστὶ καὶ τού-
των τῶν θαυμαξομένων καὶ σπουδαζομένων ὀφελος οὖνδὲν ἐστὶ τοῖς τυχόντις τοῖς δὲ μηδεῖ τοῖς ἔσησιν ἐπίθυμον ἐπ᾿ αὐτῷ ἄπαντα παρέσται αὐτὸς τὰ ἀγαθά· εἰθ’ ὅταν παραγένηται, τὸ καῦμα ἵσω, ὁ ρυπτασμὸς ὁ αὐτὸς, ἡ ἀση, ἡ¹ τῶν οὐ παρόντων ἔπιθυμιά.
175 οὐ γὰρ ἐκπληρώσετι τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων ἐλευθερία παρασκευάζεται, ἀλλὰ ἀνασκευὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας.
176 καὶ ἐν ἔδης, ὅτι ἀληθῆ ταῦτά ἐστιν, ὡς έκείνων ἐνεκα πεπόνηκας, οὗτως καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα μετάθες τὸν πόνον· ἀγρύπνησον ἐνεκα τοῦ δόγμα περι-
177 ποιήσασθαι ἐλευθεροποιοῖν, θεράπευσον ἀντὶ γέροντος πλουσίου φιλόσοφον, περὶ θύρας ὁφθητὶ τὰς τούτου· οὐκ ἀσχημονήσεις ὁφθείς, οὐκ ἀπελεύσῃ κενὸς οὐδὲ ἀκερδής, ἀν ὡς δὲ προσέλθης. εἰ δὲ μή, πείρασον γ΄ οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσχρὰ ἡ πείρα.

Β’. Περὶ συμπεριφορᾶς.²

1 Τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ πρὸ πάντων σε δεῆ προσέχεων, μὴ ποτὲ ἀρα τῶν πρωτέρων συνηθῶν ἢ φιλῶν

¹ ἡ added by Wolf.
² Bentley (and the index of chapters): συμφορᾶς S here.

¹ A somewhat similar remark ascribed to Zeno (Gnomol. Vat., ed. Sternbach, 295) has in the second clause “contrary to law,” a much less pointed remark, and true only with important qualifications.
Palace—a slave none the less; and you will perceive that, as Cleanthes used to say, "Possibly the philosophers say what is contrary to opinion, but assuredly not what is contrary to reason." For you will learn by experience that what they say is true, and that none of these things which are admired and sought after are of any good to those who attain them; while those who have not yet attained them get an impression that, if once these things come to them, they will be possessed of all things good, and then, when they do come, the burning heat is just as bad, there is the same tossing about on the sea, the same sense of surfeit, the same desire for what they do not have. For freedom is not acquired by satisfying yourself with what you desire, but by destroying your desire. And that you may learn the truth of all this, as you have toiled for those other things, so also transfer your toil to these; keep vigils for the sake of acquiring a judgement which will make you free, devote yourself to a philosopher instead of to a rich old man, be seen about his doors; it will be no disgrace to be so seen, you will not retire thence empty and without profit, if you approach him in the right fashion. Anyway, try it at least; there is no disgrace in making the attempt.

CHAPTER II

Of social intercourse

To this topic you ought to devote yourself before every other, how, namely, you may avoid ever being so intimately associated with some one of your
Ἀνακραβῆς τινὶ οὕτως, ὡστε εἰς τὰ αυτὰ συγκατα-

2 βῆναι αὐτῷ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀπολεῖς σεαυτόν. ἂν δὲ σ' ὑποτρέχῃ ὅτι "ἀδέξιος αὐτῷ φανοῦμαι καὶ οὐχ ὀμοίως ἔξει ὡς πρότερον," μέμνησο, ὅτι προίκα οὐδὲν γίνεται οὐδ' ἐστὶ δυνατὸν μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ

3 ποιοῦντα τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ ποτὲ. ἐλοῦ οὖν πρότερον θέλεις, ὀμοίως φιλεῖσθαι ύφ' ὧν πρότερον ὀμοίως ὃν τῷ πρότερον σεαυτῷ ἡ κρείσσων ὃν

4 μὴ τυγχάνειν τῶν ἔσων. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο κρείσσον, αὐτόθεν ἀπόνευσον ἔτι τοῦτο μηδὲ σε περισσάτωσαν οἱ ἔτεροι διαλογισμοὶ οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐπαμφοτερίζων δύναται προκόψαι, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο πάντων προκέκρικας, εἰ πρὸς τοῦτῳ μόνῳ θέλεις εἶναι, εἰ τοῦτο ἐκπονῆσαι, ἄφες ἅπαντα τᾶλλα·

5 εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὕτος ὁ ἐπαμφοτερισμὸς ἀμφότερον 1 σοι ποιήσει, οὕτε προκόψεις κατ' ἄξιαν οὕτ' ἐκεῖνων

6 τεύξῃ, ὃν πρότερον ἐτύγχανες. πρότερον γὰρ εἰλικρινῶς ἐφίμενος τῶν οὐδενῶς ἄξιων ἥδυς

7 ἢς τοῖς συνοῦσιν. οὐ δύνασαι δ' ἐν ἀμφότερω τῷ εἴδει διενεγκείν ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη, καθόσον ἂν τοῦ ἔτερου κοινωνίας, ἀπολείπεσθαι σ' ἐν θατέρῳ. οὐ δύνασαι μὴ πίνων μεθ' ὃν ἔπινες ὀμοίως ἥδυς αὐτοῖς φαίνεσθαι: ἐλοῦ οὖν, πρότερον μεθυστῆς εἶναι θέλεις καὶ ἥδυς εκείνος ἡ νήφων ἁθής. οὐ δύνασαι μὴ ἄδων μεθ' ὃν ἥδες ὀμοίως φιλεῖσθαι

1 Oldfather: ἐκάτερον S. Cf. IV. 10, 25; Ench. 1, 4.

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acquaintances or friends as to descend to the same level with him; otherwise you will ruin yourself. But if there slips into your mind the thought, "He will think me unmannerly and will not be as friendly as he used to be," remember that nothing is done without paying for it, and that it is impossible for a man to remain the same person that he used to be, if he does not do the same things. Choose, therefore, which you prefer; either to be loved just as much as you used to be by the same persons, remaining like your former self, or else, by being superior to your former self, to lose the same affection. Because if this latter alternative is the better choice, turn forthwith in that direction, and let not the other considerations draw you away; for no man is able to make progress when he is facing both ways. But if you have preferred this course to every other, if you wish to devote yourself to this alone, and labour to perfect it, give up everything else. Otherwise this facing both ways will bring about a double result: You will neither make progress as you ought, nor will you get what you used to get before. For before, when you frankly aimed at nothing worth while, you made a pleasant companion. You cannot achieve distinction along both lines, but you must needs fall short in the one to the degree in which you take part in the other. If you do not drink with those you used to drink with, you cannot in their eyes be as pleasant a companion as you used to be; choose, therefore, whether you wish to be a hard drinker and pleasant to those persons, or a sober man and unpleasant. If you do not sing with those you used to sing with, you cannot be loved by them as you used to be; choose,
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υπ’ αὐτῶν· ἔλοι οὖν καὶ ἐνταῦθα, πότερον θέλεις.
8 εἰ γὰρ κρείσσον τὸ αἰδήμονα εἰναι καὶ κόσμων
tοῦ εἰπεῖν τινὰ “ἡδὸς ἀνθρωπος,” ἅφες τὰ ἔτερα,
ἀπόγνωθι, ἀποστράφηθι, μηδὲν σοὶ καὶ αὐτοῖς.
9 εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀρέσει ταύτα, ὅλος ἀπόκλινου ἐπὶ
tάναντι· γενοῦ εἰς τῶν κιναίδων, εἰς τῶν μοιχῶν,
kαὶ ποίει τὰ ἔξης καὶ τεύξῃ ὄν θέλεις. καὶ
10 ἀναπηδῶν ἐπικραύγαζε τῷ ὄρχηστῇ. διάφορα δ’
οὕτως πρόσωπα οὐ μὴντεῖ· οὐ δύνασαι καὶ
θερσίτην ὑποκρίνασθαι καὶ Ἀγαμέμνονα. ἄν
θερσίτης εἰναι θέλης, κυρτὸν σὲ εἶναι δεῖ,
φαλακρόν· ἄν Ἀγαμέμνων, μέγαν καὶ καλὸν καὶ
tοὺς ὑποτεταγμένους φιλοῦντα.

γ. Τίνα τίνων ἀντικαταλλακτέον;

1 Ἐκείνῳ πρόχειρον ἔχε, ὅταν τινὸς ἀπολείπῃ
tῶν ἐκτός, τί ἀντ’ αὐτοῦ περιποίη· καὶ ἢ πλεῖόνος
2 ἄξιον, μηδέποτ’ εἰπης ὅτι “ἐξημίωμαι”. οὐδ’ ἂν
ἀντ’ ὅνου ὑποῦν, οὐδ’ ἀντὶ προβάτου βοῦν οὐδ’
ἀντὶ κέρματος πρᾶξιν καλὴν, οὐδ’ ἀντὶ ψυχρο-
λογίας ἱσυχίαν οῖαν δεί, οὐδ’ ἀντὶ αἰσχρολογίας
3 αἰδῶ. τούτων μεμνημένος πανταχοῦ διασώσεις
tὸ σαυτοῦ πρόσωπον οἶον ἔχειν σὲ δεῖ. εἰ δὲ
μὴ, σκόπει, ὅτι ἀπόλλυνται οἱ χρόνοι εἰκῆ καὶ

1 ἂν added by Schweighäuser.
therefore, here also, which you wish. For if it is better to be a man of respectful and modest behaviour than for someone to say of you, "He is a pleasant fellow," give up all other considerations, renounce them, turn your back upon them, have nothing to do with them. But if that does not please you, turn about, the whole of you, to the opposite; become one of the addicts to unnatural vice, one of the adulterers, and act in the corresponding fashion, and you will get what you wish. Yes, and jump up and shout your applause to the dancer. But different characters do not mix in this fashion; you cannot act the part of Thersites and that of Agamemnon too. If you wish to be a Thersites, you ought to be humpbacked and bald; if an Agamemnon, you ought to be tall and handsome, and to love those who have been made subject to you.

CHAPTER III

What things should be exchanged for what things?

Here is a thought to keep ready at hand whenever you lose some external thing: What are you acquiring in its place? and if this be more valuable than the other, never say, "I have suffered a loss." You have lost nothing if you get a horse for an ass, an ox for a sheep, a noble action for a small piece of money, the proper kind of peace for futile discourse, and self-respect for smutty talk. If you bear this in mind you will everywhere maintain your character as it ought to be. If not, I would have you observe that your time is being
ὁσα νῦν προσέχεις σεαντώ, μέλλεις ἐκχεῖν
4 ἀπαντα ταῦτα καὶ ἀνατρέπειν. ὀλγοῦ δὲ χρεία ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπώλειαν τὴν πάντων καὶ ἀνατρο-
5 πὴν, μικράς ἀποστροφής τοῦ λόγου. ὥσα ὁ κυβερνήτης ἀνατρέψῃ τὸ πλοίον, οὐ χρείαν ἔχει τῆς αὐτῆς παρασκευῆς, ὅσης εἰς τὸ σῶσαι· ἄλλα μικρὸν πρὸς τὸν ἁνέμον ἄν ἐπιστρέψῃ, ἀπώλετο.
κἂν μὴ αὐτὸς ἐκών, ὑποπαρενθυμηθῆ δ’, ἀπώλετο.
6 τοιούτων ἐστὶ τι καὶ ἐνθάδε· μικρὸν ἂν ἀπονυσ-
τάξης, ἀπῆλθεν πάντα τὰ μέχρι νῦν συνείλεγ-
7 μένα. πρόσεχε σοὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις, ἐπαγρύπνεις. ὦ γὰρ μικρὸν τὸ τηρόμενον, ἄλλ’ αἰδώς καὶ
πίστις καὶ εὐστάθεια, ἀπάθεια, ἀλυπία, ἀφοβία,
8 ἀταραξία, ἀπλῶς ἐλευθερία. τίνων μέλλεις
ταῦτα πωλεῖν; βλέπε, πόσον ἄξιων.—’Ἀλλ’ οὐ
τεῦξομαι τοιοῦτον τινὸς ἀντ’ αὐτοῦ.—Βλέπε καὶ
τυγχάνων1 πάλιν ἔκεινον, τι ἀντ’ αὐτοῦ λαμβά-
9 νείς.2 ἐγὼ εὐκοσμίαν, ἔκεινος δημαρχίαν ἔκεινος
στρατηγίαν, ἐγὼ αἰδῶ. ἄλλ’ οὐ κραυγάζω, ὅπου
ἀπρεπές. ἄλλ’ οὐκ ἀναστήσομαι, ὅπου μὴ ἰεὶ.
ἐλευθερος γὰρ εἰμι καὶ φίλος τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥ’ ἐκὼν
10 πείθομαι αὐτῶ. τῶν δ’ ἄλλων οὐδενὸς ἀντι-
ποιεῖσθαι με δεί, οὐ σῶματος, οὐ κτήσεως, οὐκ
ἀρχῆς, οὐ φήμης, ἀπλῶς οὐδενὸς· οὐδὲ γὰρ

1 ἀποτυγχάνων Reiske: τυγχάνοντος Elter.
2 λαμβάνει Schweighäuser.

1 This sense may conceivably be contained in the MS. reading, but it seems more probable that the text is corrupt, although no convincing correction has yet been made.—Capps regards ἔκεινον and ἔκεινος (§ 9) as referring to the same person.—The quotation following is what Epictetus suggests as appropriate comment for the man who has made a wise choice.
spent to no purpose, and all the pains you are now taking with yourself you are sure to spill out utterly and upset. Little is needed to ruin and upset everything, only a slight aberration from reason. For the helmsman to upset his ship he does not need the same amount of preparation that he does to keep it safe; but if he heads it a little too much into the wind, he is lost; yes, even if he does nothing by his own deliberate choice, but merely falls to thinking about something else for a moment, he is lost. In life also it is very much the same; if you doze but for a moment, all that you have amassed hitherto is gone. Pay attention, therefore, to your sense-impressions, and watch over them sleeplessly. For it is no small matter that you are guarding, but self-respect, and fidelity, and constancy, a state of mind undisturbed by passion, pain, fear, or confusion—in a word, freedom. What are the things for which you are about to sell these things? Look, how valuable are they?—But, you say, I shall not get anything of that kind in return for what I am giving up.—Observe also, when you do get something in the exchange, just what it is you are getting for what you give up.1 "I have a modest behaviour, he has a tribuneship; he has a praetorship, I have self-respect. But I do not shout where it is unseemly; I shall not stand up where I ought not; for I am a free man and a friend of God,2 so as to obey Him of my own free will. No other thing ought I to claim, not body, or property, or office, or reputation—nothing, in short; nor does

2 Probably this was the phrase which suggested the point of the famous epigram: "... I, Epictetus, was the friend of God" (quoted Vol. I, Introd. p. vii).
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ἐκεῖνος βουλεταί μ’ ἀντιποιεῖσθαι αὐτῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἦθελεν, ἀγαθὰ πεποιήκει αὐτὰ ἂν ἐμοί. νῦν δ’ οὐ πεποιήκεν; διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν δύναμαι παραβῆναι τῶν ἐν τολῶν.” τίρει τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ σαυτοῦ ἐν παντὶ, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων κατὰ τὸ διδόμενον μέχρι τοῦ εὑλογιστεῖν ἐν αὐτοῖς, τούτῳ μόνῳ ἀρκοῦμενος. εἰ δὲ μή, δυστυχίσεις, ἀτυχίσεις, κωλυθῆσῃ, ἐμποδισθῆσῃ. οὕτω εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖθεν ἀπεσταλμένοι νόμοι, ταύτα τὰ διατάγματα τούτων ἐξηγητὴν δεῖ γενέσθαι, τούτως ὑποτεταγμένον, οὗ τοῖς Μασούριοι καὶ Κασσίοι.

δ’. Πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὸ ἡσυχία διάγειν ἐσπουδακότας.

1 Μέμνησο, ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐπιθυμία ἄρχης καὶ πλούτου ταπεινοὺς ποιεῖ καὶ ἄλλοις ὑποτεταγμένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡσυχίας καὶ σχολῆς καὶ ἀποδημίας καὶ φιλολογίας. ἀπλῶς γὰρ οἶνον ἀν 1 ή 2 τὸ ἐκτὸς, ἡ τιμὴ αὐτοῦ ὑποτάσσει ἄλλω. τί οὖν διαφέρει συγκλήτου ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι συγκλητικοῖν; τί διαφέρει ἄρχης ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ ἀναρχίας; τί διαφέρει λέγειν ὅτι "κακῶς μοι ἐστιν, οὐδὲν ἔχω τί πράξω, ἀλλὰ τοῖς βιβλίοις προσδέδεμαι ὡς νεκρός," ἡ λέγειν "κακῶς μοι 3 ἐστιν, οὐκ εὐσχολῶ ἀναγνώναι"; ὡς γὰρ ἀσπασ-

1 Upton from his "codex" (after Schegk and Meibom): ἐάν S.

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He wish me to claim them. Had He so desired He would have made them good for me. But as it is, He has not so made them; therefore I cannot transgress any of His commands." Guard your own good in everything you do; and for the rest be content to take simply what has been given you, in so far as you can make a rational use of it. If you do not, you will have bad luck and no good luck, you will be hampered and hindered. These are the laws that have been sent you from God, these are His ordinances; it is of these you ought to become an interpreter, to these you ought to subject yourself, not the laws of Masurius and Cassius.¹

CHAPTER IV

To those who have set their hearts upon living in peace

Remember that it is not merely desire for office and wealth which makes men abject and subservient to others, but desire also for peace, and leisure, and travel, and scholarship. For it makes no difference what the external object be, the value you set upon it makes you subservient to another. What difference, then, does it make for you to set your heart on the senate, or on not becoming a senator? What difference does it make to desire office or to desire not to hold office? What difference does it make to say, "I am in a bad way, I have nothing to do, but am tied to my books as though I were a corpse," or to say, "I am in a bad way, I have no leisure to read"? For just as salutations and office-
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4 μοι καὶ ἄρχῃ τῶν ἐκτός ἐστι καὶ ἀπροαίρετων, οὔτως καὶ βιβλίων. ἡ τινὸς ἐνεκα θέλεις ἀναγνώ-
ναι; εἰπε μοι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐτ᾽ αὐτὸν 1 καταστρέ-
φεις 2 τὸ ψυχαγωγηθῆναι ἢ μαθεῖν τι, ψυχρὸς εἰ καὶ ἀταλαίπτωρος. 3 εἰ δὲ ἐφ᾽ ὃ δεῖ ἀναφέ-
ρεις, τί τούτ᾽ ἐστιν ἄλλο ἡ έυροια; εἰ δὲ σοι τὸ ἀναγιγνώσκειν έυροιαν μὴ περιποιή, τί οἴκελος
5 αὐτοῦ; — Ἀλλὰ περιποιεῖ, φησίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀγανακτῶ ὡς ἀπολειπόμενος αὐτοῦ.—Καὶ τὸς αὐτὴν ἡ έυροια, ἢν ὁ τυχὼν ἐμποδίσαι δύναται, οὐ λεγὼ
Καίσαρ ἡ Καίσαρος φίλος, ἀλλὰ κόραξ, αὐλητῆς, πυρετός, ἀλλὰ πρισμύρμα; ἡ δ᾽ έυροια οὐδὲν οὕτως
ἐχει ὡς τὸ διηνεκὲς καὶ ἀνεμπόδιον.

6 Νῦν καλοῦμαι πράξων τι, ἀπεμι νῦν προσ-
έξων τοῖς μέτροις ἃ δεῖ τηρεῖν, ὅτι αἰδημονώς,
ὅτι ἀσφαλῶς, ὅτι δίχα ὅρεξεος καὶ ἐκκλίσεως
7 τῆς πρὸς τὰ ἐκτός, καὶ λοιπὸν προσέχω τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις, τίνα φασίν, πῶς κινοῦνται, καὶ τοῦτο
οὐ κακοῆθως οὐδ᾽ ἣν ἐχω ψέγειν ἡ καταγελῶ,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐτ′ ἐμαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφω, εἰ ταύτα κἀγὼ
ἀμαρτάνω. "πῶς οὖν παύσωμαι;" τότε καὶ ἐγὼ
ἵμαρτανον νῦν δ᾽ οὐκέτι, χάρις τῷ θεῷ. . . 4

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1 Reiske: αὐτοῦ S.
2 The words ἐτ′ αὐτὸ after this were deleted by Schweighäuser.
3 Schweighäuser: ταλαίπωρος S.
4 The lacuna marked by Oldfather. An answer to the question asked is obviously required.

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1 Answering the man who complains because he has "nothing to do" (§ 2).
2 So Horace, Sat. I. 4, 136 f.: . . . numquid ego illi imprudentis olim faciam simile? Both were following the custom of Plato as recorded by Plutarch, De capienda ex inimicis utilitate, 5.
holding are among things external and those which lie outside the province of the moral purpose, so also is a book. Or for what purpose do you wish to read? Tell me. If you turn to reading merely for entertainment, or in order to learn something, you are futile and lazy. But if you refer reading to the proper standard, what else is this but a life of serenity? However, if reading does not secure for you a life of serenity, of what good is it?—Nay, it does secure me serenity, one says, and that is why I am discontented because I am deprived of it.—And what kind of serenity is this which any chance comer can impede, not merely Caesar, or a friend of Caesar, but a crow, a flutist, fever, thirty thousand other things? But no feature of serenity is so characteristic as continuity and freedom from hindrance.

At this instant I am being called to do something; at this instant I shall go home with the purpose of observing the due measure which I ought to maintain, acting with self-respect, with security, apart from desire and avoidance of things external; and in the second place I observe men, what they say, how they move, and this in no malignant spirit, nor in order to have something to censure or ridicule, but I look at myself the while, to see if I too am making the same mistakes. "How, then, shall I cease to make mistakes?"

There was a time when I too made mistakes, but now no longer, thanks be to God. . . .

3 The exact connection of these two sentences is obscure. Matheson, with a certain degree of plausibility, divides them between the interlocutor and Epictetus, but they are generally assigned to one person.—See also the crit. note.
ALUAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICETERUS

8 Ἄγε, ταῦτα ποιήσας καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γενόμενος χεῖρον ἐργὸν πεποίηκας ἡ χείλες στίχους ἀναγνώσας ἡ γράφας ἀλλοὺς τοσούτους; ὅταν γὰρ ἐσθίης, ἀχθῇ, ὅτι μὴ ἀναγιγνώσκεις; οὔκ ἀρκῇ τῷ καθ' ἄνεγγυωκας ἐσθίειν; ὅταν λούῃ;
9 ὅταν γυμνάζῃ; διὰ τι οὖν ἐπὶ πάντων οὐχ ὁμαλίζεις, καὶ ὅταν Καίσαρι προσίης καὶ ὅταν τῷ δείνι; εἴ τὸν ἀπαθῆ τηρεῖς, εἴ τὸν ἀκατάπληκτον,
10 εἴ τὸν κατεσταλμένον, εἴ βλέπεις μᾶλλον τὰ γυμνόμενα ἡ βλέπῃ, εἴ μὴ φθονεῖς τοῖς προτιμώμενοι, εἰ μὴ ἐκπλήσσοντι σὲ αἳ ὦλαι, τί σοι
11 λείπει; βιβλία; πῶς ἢ ἐπὶ τί; οὖχι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ βιοῦν παρασκευὴ τίς ἐστὶν αὐτῇ; τὸ βιοῦν δ' ἐξ ἀλλών τινῶν ἢ τούτων συμπληροῦται. οἴον ἂν εἴ ὁ ἄθλητης κλαίῃ εἰς τὸ στάδιον εἰσιῶν,
12 ὅτι μὴ ἐξω γυμνάζεται. τούτων ἕνεκα ἐγυμνασίου, ἐπὶ τοῦτο οἱ ἀλτήρες, ἡ ἀφή, οἱ νεανίσκοι. καὶ
13 οἴον εἴ ἐπὶ τοῦ συγκαταθετικοῦ τόπου παριστάμενων φαντασιῶν τῶν μὲν καταληπτικῶν, τῶν δ' ἀκαταληπτῶν μὴ ταῦτας διακρίνεις θέλοιμεν, ἀλλ' ἀναγιγνώσκειν τὰ Περὶ καταληψεως.
14 Τί οὖν τὸ αἰτίου; ὅτι οὐδέποτε τούτου ἕνεκα ἀνέγγυωμεν, οὐδέποτε τούτου ἕνεκα ἐγράψαμεν,

1 In the absence of pages, as in the case of the papyrus roll, prose as well as poetry was counted by lines.
2 See III. 15, 4.
BOOK IV. IV. 8–14

Come, if you have acted like this and devoted yourself to these things, have you done anything worse than reading a thousand lines, or writing a thousand? For when you eat, are you annoyed because you are not reading? Are you not satisfied to be eating in accordance with the principles you learned by reading? And when you bathe and take exercise? Why, then, are you not consistent in everything, both when you approach Caesar, and when you approach So-and-so? If you are maintaining the character of a man of tranquillity, of imper- turbability, of sedateness, if you are observing what happens rather than being yourself observed, if you are not envying those who are preferred in honour above you, if the mere subject-matter of actions does not dazzle you, what do you lack? Books? How, or for what end? What, is not the reading of books a kind of preparation for the act of living? But the full measure of the act of living is made up of things other than books. It is as though the athlete on entering the stadium were to fall a-wailing because he is not exercising outside. This was what you exercised for, this is the purpose of your jumping-weights, your wrestler's sand, your young training partners. And are you now asking for these things, when the time for action is come? It is as if, when in the sphere of assent we were surrounded with sense-impressions, some of them convincing, and others not convincing, we should not wish to distinguish between them, but to read a treatise On Comprehension!

What, then, is the reason for this? It is because we have never read for this purpose, we have never written for this purpose—in our actions, to treat in
ἐν ἑπὶ τῶν ἔργων κατὰ φύσιν χρώμεθα ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ καταλήγομεν ἐν τῷ 1 μαθεῖν, τί λέγεται, καὶ ἀλλω δύνασθαι ἐξηγῆσασθαι, τῶν συνλογισμῶν ἀναλύσαι καὶ τῶν ύποθετικῶν ἐφοδεύσαι. διὰ τούτο ὅπως ἡ σπουδή, ἐκεί καὶ ὁ ἐμποδισμός. θέλεις τὰ μὴ ἑπὶ σοι ἕξ ἀπαντος; κωλύου τοῖνυν, ἐμποδιζούσος, ἀποτύγχανοι. εἰ δὲ τὰ Περὶ ὀρμῆς τούτου ἐνεκα ἀναγινώσκομεν, οὐχ ἦνα ἰδωμεν, τί λέγεται περὶ ὀρμῆς, ἀλλ' ἦνα εὑ ὀρμῶμεν.2 τὰ Περὶ ὀρέξεως δὲ καὶ ἐκκλίσεως, ἦνα μήποτ' ὀρεγόμενοι ἀποτυγχάνομεν μήτ' ἐκκλίνοντες περιτυπτωμεν· τὰ Περὶ καθήκοντος δ', ἦνα μεμνημένοι τῶν σχέσεων μηδὲν ἀλογίστως μηδὲ παρ' αὐτὰ ποιῶμεν. οὐκ ἂν ἠγανακτούμεν πρὸς τὰ ἀναγινώσκατα ἐμποδιζόμενοι, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὰ ἔργα ἀποδιδόναι τὰ κατάλληλα ἡρκούμεθα καὶ ἡρμημοῦμεν ἄν οὗ ταῦτα, ἃ μέχρι νῦν ἀριθμεῖν εἰδίσμεθα, "σήμερον ἀνέγνων στιχοὺς τοσοῦσδε, ἐγραφα τοσοῦσδε," ἀλλὰ "σήμερον ὀρμῇ ἐχρησάμην, ὡς παραγγέλλεται ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων, ὀρέξει οὐκ ἐχρησάμην, ἐκκλίσει πρὸς μόνα τὰ προαιρετικά, οὐ κατεπλάγην τὸν δείνα, οὐκ ἐδυσωπήθην ὑπὸ τοῦ δείνος, τὸ ἀνεκτικὸν ἐγύμνασα, τὸ ἄφεκτικον, τὸ συνεργητικὸν," καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἦν ἡχαριστούμεν τῷ θεῷ ἐφ̄ ὀις δὲι εὐχαριστεῖν.

19 Ἦν τοίδ' ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἰσμεν, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀλλοι τρόπον ὀμοιο τοῖς πολλοῖς γινόμεθα. ἀλλοις φοβεῖται, μὴ οὐκ ἄρξης σὺ, μηδὲν ἄρξης. μηδα-

1 ἐν τῷ added by Richards.
2 A late hand in S: ἦνα δ* ὀμεν S.
3 Wolf: μήσον S.
accordance with nature the sense-impressions which come to us; but we stop with having learned what is said, and with the ability to explain it to someone else, and with analysing the syllogism, and examining the hypothetical argument. That is why, where our heart is set, there also our impediment lies. Do you wish at any cost to have the things that are not under your control? Very well then, be hindered, be obstructed, fail. If we should read a treatise *On Choice*, not in order to know about the subject, but in order to make correct choices; a treatise *On Desire and Aversion*, in order that we may never fail in our desire nor fall into that which we are trying to avoid; a treatise *On Duty*, in order that we may remember our relations in society and do nothing irrationally or contrary to the principles of duty; we should not be vexed by being hindered in regard to what we have read, but we should find satisfaction in doing the deeds required by our mutual relations, and we should be reckoning, not the things which we have been accustomed hitherto to reckon: "To-day I have read so many lines, I have written so many," but, "To-day I made a choice in the way that the philosophers teach, I did not entertain desire, I avoided only those things that are in the sphere of the moral purpose, I was not overawed by So-and-so, I was not put out of countenance by So-and-so, I exercised my patience, my abstinence, my co-operation," and thus we should be giving thanks to God for those things for which we ought to give Him thanks.

But as it is, we do not realize that we ourselves, though in a different fashion, grow like the multitude. Another man is afraid that he will not have an office; you are afraid that you will. Do not so,
ARRIANS DISCOURSES OF EPICETUS

20 μῶς, ἀνθρωπε. ἀλλ' ὡς καταγελάς τοῦ φοβουμένου μὴ οὐκ ἄρξαι, οὕτως καὶ σαυτοῦ καταγέλα. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει ἡ διψὴν πυρέσσοντα ἡ ὡς
21 λυσσώδη ύδροφόβου εἶναι. ἡ πῶς ἔτι δυνήσῃ εἰπεῖν τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους "εἰ ταύτῃ φίλον τῷ θεῷ, ταύτῃ γινέσθω"; δοκεῖς, Σωκράτης εἰ ἐπεθύμει ἐν Λυκείῳ ἡ ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ σχολάζειν καὶ διαλέγεσθαι καθ' ἡμέραν τοῖς νέοις, εὐκόλως ἂν ἐστρατεύσατο ὅσαίς ἐστρατεύσατο; οὐχὶ δ' ὁδύρετ' ἢν καὶ ἐπετείνει "τάλας ἐγὼ, νῦν ἐνθάδ' ἀτυχώ ἄθλιος δυνάμενος ἐν Λυκείῳ ἡλιάζεσθαι";
22 τούτῳ γὰρ σου τὸ ἔργον ἢν, ἡλιάζεσθαι; οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ εὐροεῖν, τὸ ἀκόλυτον εἶναι, τὸ ἀπαραπόδιστον; καὶ πῶς ἂν ἔτι ἢν Σωκράτης, εἰ ταύτα ὁδύρετο; πῶς ἂν ἔτι ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ παίνας ἐγράφειν;
23 Ἀπλῶς οὖν ἐκείνου μέμνησο, ὅτι, παῦν δ' ἔξω τῆς προαιρέσεως τῆς σαυτοῦ τιμῆσεις, ἀπώλεσας τήν προαιρέσειν. ἔξω δ' ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον ἄρχῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀναρχία, οὐ μόνον ἁσχολία, ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολή. "νῦν οὖν ἐμὲ ἐν τῷ θορύβῳ τούτῳ διεξάγειν;" τι λέγεις θορύβῳ; ἐν πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις; καὶ τι χαλεπῶν; δόξων ἐν Ὁλυμπίᾳ εἶναι, πανήγυριν αὐτὸν ἡγησαί. κάκει ἄλλος ἄλλο τι κέκραγεν, ἄλλος ἄλλο τι πρᾶσσει, ἄλλος

1 oũk added by Schweighäuser.

1 Plato, Crito, 43 D (slightly modified). Compare I. 4, 24, where the quotation is exact.
2 Referring to the famous gymnasiums in these places.
3 Plato, Phaedo, 60 D, says that he translated some fables of Aesop into verse and composed a hymn (προοίμιον) to Apollo. This latter composition is called a paean by
BOOK IV. iv. 19–24

man! But just as you laugh at the man who is afraid he will not have an office, so also laugh at yourself. For it makes no difference whether a person is thirsty with fever, or is afraid of water like a man with the rabies. Or how can you any longer say with Socrates, “If so it please God, so be it”? 1 Do you suppose that, if Socrates had yearned to spend his leisure in the Lyceum or the Academy, 2 and to converse daily with the young men, he would have gone forth cheerfully on all the military expeditions in which he served? Would he not have wailed and groaned, “Wretched man that I am! here I am now in misery and misfortune, when I might be sunning myself in the Lyceum”? What, was this your function in life, to sun yourself? Was it not rather to be serene, to be unhampered, to be unhindered? And how would he have been Socrates any longer, if he had wailed like this? How would he have gone on to write paeans in prison? 3

In a word, then, remember this—that if you are going to honour anything at all outside the sphere of the moral purpose, you have destroyed your moral purpose. And outside the sphere of your moral purpose lie not merely office, but also freedom from office; not merely business, but also leisure. “Am I now, therefore, to pass my life in this turmoil?” What do you mean by “turmoil”? Among many people? And what is there hard about that? Imagine that you are in Olympia, regard the turmoil as a festival. There, too, one man shouts this and another that; one man does this and another

Diogenes Laertius, 2, 42, who professes to give the first line of it.
Referring clearly, I believe, to the baths at Olympia, where the accommodation seems to have been inadequate. See I. 6, 26.

Cf. "But when he saw the multitudes, he was moved with compassion on them" (Matt. ix. 36); and the remark attributed to Abraham Lincoln: "God must have loved the common people; He made so many of them." The characteristic emotions here indicated as arising at the con-
that; one man jostles another; there is a crowd in the baths.¹ And yet who of us does not take delight in the Olympic festival and leave it with sorrow? Do not become peevish or fastidious towards events. "The vinegar is rotten, for it is sour." "The honey is rotten, for it upsets my digestion." "I don't like vegetables." In the same fashion you say, "I don't like leisure, it is a solitude." "I don't like a crowd, it is turmoil." Say not so, but if circumstances bring you to spend your life alone or in the company of a few, call it peace, and utilize the condition for its proper end; converse with yourself, exercise your sense-impressions, develop your preconceptions. If, however, you fall in with a crowd, call it games, a festival, a holiday, try to keep holiday with the people. For what is pleasanter to a man who loves his fellow-men than the sight of large numbers of them?² We are glad to see herds of horses or cattle; when we see many ships we are delighted; is a person annoyed at the sight of many human beings? "Yes, but they deafen me with their shouting." Oh, well, it is your hearing that is interfered with! What, then, is that to you? Your faculty of employing external impressions is not interfered with, is it? And who prevents you from making natural use of desire and aversion, of choice and refusal? What manner of turmoil avails to do that?

templation of large numbers of one's fellow-men, though somewhat different in tone from that in Epictetus, as well as from one another, are still essentially at one with the Stoic ideal of sympathetic fellowship, and are fundamentally opposed to that selfish or snobbish aversion towards mankind, which became so prevalent, even in religious circles, during the great decadence of ancient civilization.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICETES

29 Σὺ μόνον μέμνησο τῶν καθολικῶν· "τί ἐμόν, τί οὐκ ἐμόν; τί μοι δίδοται; τί θέλει με ποιεῖν
30 ὁ θεὸς νῦν, τί οὐ θέλει;" πρὸ ὁλίγου χρόνου ἦθελένι σε σχολάζειν, σαντῷ λαλεῖν, γράφειν περὶ τοῦτον, ἀναγιγνώσκειν, ἀκούειν, παρασκευάζονται. ἔσχες εἰς τότο ἰκανὸν χρόνον. νῦν σοι λέγει "ἐλθὲ ἥδη ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγώνα, δείξον ἡμῖν, τί ἔμαθες, πῶς ἡθλησάς. μείχρι τίνος γυμνασθῆσῃ μόνος; ἥδη καιρὸς γυνώνα σε, πότερον τῶν ἀξιούνικων εἰ τίς ἀθλητῶν ἡ ἐκείνων, οὐ τὴν οἰκουμένην περιέρχονται νυκώμενοι." τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς; οὐδεὶς ἄγων δίχα ἰ δίχα θορύβου γίνεται. πολλοὺς δεὶ προγυμναστάς εἶναι, πολλοὺς τοὺς ἐπικραγαζόντας, πολλοὺς ἐπιστάτας, πολλοὺς
31 θειάς.—'Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἢθελον ἐφ' ἡσυχίας διάγειν. —Οἴμωξε τοῦν καὶ στένε, ὡςπερ ἄξιος εἰ. τίς γὰρ ἀλλῃ μείζων ταύτης ζημία τῷ ἀπαидеύτῳ καὶ ἀπειθοῦντι τοῖς θείοις διατάξμασιν ἢ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι, τὸ πειθεῖν, τὸ φθονεῖν, ἀπλῶς τὸ ἀτυχεῖν καὶ δυστυχεῖν; τούτων οὐ θέλεις ἀπαλλαξαῖ σεαυτὸν;
32 Καὶ πῶς ἀπαλλάξω;—Οὐ πολλάκις ἢκουσας, ὅτι ὀρέξειν ἄραι σε δεὶ παντελῶς, τὴν ἐκκλίσιν ἐπὶ μόνα τρέψαι τὰ προαιρετικά, ἀφεῖναι σε δεὶ πάντα, τὸ σῶμα, τὴν κτήσιν, τὴν φήμην, τὰ βιβλία, θόρυβον, ἀρχάς, ἀναρχίαν; ὁποὺ γὰρ ἄν κλίνῃς, ἐδούλευσας, ὑπετάγης, κωλυτῶς ἐγένοι,

1 Ed. of Salamanca, Bentley, and Upton's "codex" (after Schegk): διὰ S.

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Do but keep in remembrance your general principles: "What is mine? What is not mine? What has been given me? What does God will that I do now, what does He not will?" A little while ago it was His will for you to be at leisure, to converse with yourself, to write about these things, to read, to listen, to prepare yourself; you had time sufficient for that. Now God says to you, "Come at length to the contest, show us what you have learned, how you have trained yourself. How long will you exercise alone? Now the time has come for you to discover whether you are one of the athletes who deserve victory, or belong to the number of those who travel about the world and are everywhere defeated." Why, then, are you discontented? No contest is held without turmoil. There must be many training-partners, many to shout applause, many officials, many spectators.—But I wanted to live a life of peace.—Wail, then, and groan, as you deserve to do. For what greater penalty can befall the man who is uninstructed and disobedient to the divine injunctions than to grieve, to sorrow, to envy, in a word to have no good fortune but only misfortune? Do you not wish to free yourself from all this?

And how shall I free myself?—Have you not heard over and over again that you ought to eradicate desire utterly, direct your aversion towards the things that lie within the sphere of the moral purpose, and these things only, that you ought to give up everything, your body, your property, your reputation, your books, turmoil, office, freedom from office? For if once you swerve aside from this course, you are a slave, you are a subject, you have become liable to hindrance and to compulsion, you
Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus

34 ἀναγκαστός, ὃλος ἐπ' ἄλλους. ἀλλὰ τὸ Κλεάνθους πρόχειρον

ἀγων ἐς μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ γ' ἡ Πεπρωμένη.

θέλετ' εἰς Ἁρώμην; εἰς Ἁρώμην.1 εἰς Γύαρα; εἰς Γύαρα. εἰς Ἀθήνας; εἰς Ἀθήνας. εἰς φυλακήν; εἰς φυλακήν. ἄν ἀπαξ εἴπης "πότε τίς εἰς Ἀθήνας ἀπέλθη"; ἀπώλου. ἀνάγκη γε ταὐτὴν τὴν ὄρεξιν ἀτελῆ μὲν ὑσαν ἀτυχῇ σε ποιεῖν, τελειωθείσαι δὲ κενόν, ἐφ' οίς οὐ δεὶ ἐπαιρόμενον πάλιν ἄν ἐμποδισθῆ, δυστυχῆ, περὶ-35 πίπτοντα οἰς οὐ θέλεις. ἀφες οὖν ταύτα πάντα. "καλαί αἱ Ἀθήναι." ἀλλὰ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν κάλλιον πολύ, τὸ ἀπαθῆ εἰναι, τὸ ἀπάραξον, τὸ ἐπὶ
37 μηδενὶ κεῖσθαι τὰ σὰ πράγματα. "θόρυβος ἐν Ἁρώμῃ καὶ ἀσπασμοί." ἀλλὰ τὸ εὔροεῖν ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν δυσκόλων. εἰ οὖν τούτων καιρὸς ἐστιν, διὰ τί οὐκ αἴρεις αὐτῶν τὴν ἐκκλίσιν; τίς
38 ἀνάγκη ὡς ὄνοιν ἐνυδακοπούμενον ἀχθοφορεῖν; εἰ δὲ μῆ, ὥρα οτὶ2 δεὶ σε δουλεύειν αἰεὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ σοι διαπράξασθαι τὴν ἔξοδον, τῷ πάν ἐμποδίσαι δυναμένῳ, κάκεινον θεραπεύειν ὡς Κακοδαίμονα.

39 Μία όδος ἐπὶ εὐροιαν (τοῦτο καὶ ὀρθροῦ καὶ

1 The second eis Ἀρώμην is supplied in the margin by Sb.
2 Wolf (and Upton's "codex"): τῇ S.

1 From a celebrated hymn. See on II. 23, 42.
2 An island used as a place of exile. See on I. 25, 19.
3 There may be here an allusion (before Lucian and Apuleius) to the theme of a (bewitched) ass trying to escape from being an ass, and constantly being hindered. In the famous romance the ass is certainly often enough overloaded and soundly cudgelled.

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BOOK IV. iv. 33–39

are entirely under the control of others. Nay, the word of Cleanthes is ready at hand,

Lead thou me on, O Zeus, and Destiny.¹

Will ye have me go to Rome? I go to Rome. To Gyara? I go to Gyara.² To Athens? I go to Athens. To prison? I go to prison. If but once you say, "Oh, when may a man go to Athens?" you are lost. This wish, if unfulfilled, must necessarily make you unfortunate; if fulfilled, vain and puffed up over the wrong kind of thing; again, if you are hindered, you suffer a misfortune, falling into what you do not wish. Give up, then, all these things. "Athens is beautiful." But happiness is much more beautiful, tranquillity, freedom from turmoil, having your own affairs under no man's control. "There is turmoil in Rome, and salutations." But serenity is worth all the annoyances. If, then, the time for these things has come, why not get rid of your aversion for them? Why must you needs bear burdens like a belaboured donkey? Otherwise, I would have you see that you must be ever the slave of the man who is able to secure your release, to the man who is able to hinder you in everything,³ and you must serve him as an Evil Genius.⁴

There is but one way to serenity (keep this

¹ For this rare spirit of folk-lore, see Aristophanes, Equites, 111–12, where he is called the Δαίμων Κακοδαίμων. His counterpart is the much commoner Αγαθὸς Δαίμων. The Evil Genius, though seldom referred to (and in fact ignored by many, if not all the standard works of reference, I believe), is presupposed by the association of the Κακοδαίμωνισταλ (Lysias, frag. 53, 2, Thalheim), and by the very word κακοδαίμων itself. For similar devil-worship, cf. I. 19, 6, of the God Fever.
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40 οὕς καὶ ὁ Ζεῦς πεποίηκεν, αὐτὸν δὲ πρὸς ἐνὶ εἶναι μόνῳ, τῷ ἰδίῳ, τῷ ἀκωλύτῳ, καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκειν ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἀναφέροντα τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν καὶ γράφειν καὶ ἀκούειν. διὰ τούτῳ οὐ δύναμαι εἰπεῖν φιλόπονον, ἂν ἀκούσω τοῦτο μόνον, ὅτι ἀναγιγνώσκει ἡ γράφει, κἂν προσῆθῃ τις, ὅτι ὅλας τὰς νῦκτας, οὕπω λέγω, ἂν μὴ γυνῷ τὴν ἀναφοράν. οὐδὲ γὰρ σὺ λέγεις φιλόπονον τὸν διὰ παιδισκάριον ἀγνοπονοῦντα· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ' ἐγὼ. ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ἑνὲκα δόξης αὐτὸ ποιῇ, λέγω φιλόδοξον, ἂν δ' ἑνὲκα ἀργυρίου, φιλάργυρον, οὐ 43 φιλόπονον. ἂν δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἰδίον ἡγεμονικὸν ἀναφέρη τὸν πόνον, ἢν ἑκεῖνο κατὰ φύσιν ἔχῃ καὶ 44 διεξάγῃ, τότε λέγω μόνον φιλόπονον. μηδέποτε γάρ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν μήτ' ἐπαυείτε μήτε ψέγετε, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ δογμάτων. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ ἰδια ἕκαστον, τὰ καὶ τὰς πράξεις αὐσχράς ἡ καλὰς 45 ποιοῦντα· τούτων μεμνημένος χαίρε τοῖς παροδοῦντι καὶ ἀγάπα ταῦτα, δὲν καιρὸς ἐστὶν. εἴ τινα ὀρᾶς, ὃν ἔμαθες καὶ διεσκέψω, ἀπαντῶντά σοι εἰς τὰ ἔργα, εὐφραίνου ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. εἴ τὸ κακοθες καὶ λοίδορον ἀποτέθεισαι, μεμείωκας,
thought ready for use at dawn, and by day, and at night), and that is to yield up all claim to the things that lie outside the sphere of the moral purpose, to regard nothing as your own possession; to surrender everything to the Deity, to Fortune; to yield everything to the supervision of those persons whom even Zeus has made supervisors; and to devote yourself to one thing only, that which is your own, that which is free from hindrance, and to read referring your reading to this end, and so to write and so to listen. That is why I cannot call a man industrious, if I hear merely that he reads or writes, and even if one adds that he sits up all night, I cannot yet say that the man is industrious, until I know for what end he does so. For neither do you call a man industrious who loses sleep for the sake of a wench; no more do I. But if he acts this way for the sake of reputation, I call him ambitious; if for the sake of money, I call him fond of money, not fond of toil. If, however, the end for which he toils is his own governing principle, to have it be, and live continually, in accordance with nature, then and then only I call him industrious. For I would not have you men ever either praise or blame a man for things that may be either good or bad, but only for judgements. Because these are each man's own possessions, which make his actions either base or noble. Bearing all this in mind, rejoice in what you have and be satisfied with what the moment brings. If you see any of the things that you have learned and studied thoroughly coming to fruition for you in action, rejoice in these things. If you have put away or reduced a malignant disposition, and reviling, or impertinence, or foul language, or
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εἰ τὸ προπετές, εἰ τὸ αἰσχρολόγου, εἰ τὸ εἰκαίον, εἰ τὸ ἐπισευμένου, εἰ οὐ κινή ἐφ’ οἷς πρότερον, εἰ οὗχ ὀμοίως γ’ ὡς πρότερον, ἐορτὴν ἰγειν δύνασαι καθ’ ἕμεραν, σήμερον, ὅτι καλῶς ἀνεπιστράφης εἰν τῷ δέ τῷ ἔργῳ, αὐρίον, ὅτι ἐν ἔτερῳ.

47 πόσῳ μείζων αἰτία θυσίας ἡ ὑπατεία ἡ ἑπαρχία. ταῦτα ἐκ σοῦ αὐτοῦ γίνεται σοι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν. ἐκεῖνο μέμνησο, τίς ὁ διδοὺς ἔστι καὶ τά τιναι. τούτοις τοῖς διάλογισμοῖς ἐντεφόμενοι ἐτί διαφέρῃ, ποῦ ὁν εὐδαιμονίας, ποῦ ὁν ἀρέσεις τῷ θεῷ; οὐ πανταχόθεν τὸ ἱσον ἀπέχουσιν; οὐ πανταχόθεν ὀμοίως ὀρῶσιν τὰ γινόμενα;

ἐ’. Πρὸς τοὺς μαχίμους καὶ θηριώδεις.

1 'Ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς οὐτ’ αὐτὸς μάχεται τινι
2 οὐτ’ ἄλλον ἐὰν κατὰ δύναμιν. παράδειγμα δὲ καὶ τούτοις καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκκειται ἤμιν ὁ βίος ὁ Σωκράτους, ὁς οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς πανταχόην ἑξέφυγεν μάχην, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἄλλους μάχεσθαι εἴα.
3 ὅρα παρὰ Ξενοφώντι εὖ τῷ Συμποσίῳ πόσας μάχας λέλυκεν, πῶς πάλιν ἴνεσχέτο Θρασυμάχου, πῶς Πάλου, πῶς Καλλικλέους, πῶς τῆς γυναικὸς ἴνείχετο, πῶς τοῦ νιώθ ἐξελεγχόμενος

1 The first in Plato's Republic, Book I; the other two in his Gorgias.
recklessness, or negligence; if you are not moved by the things that once moved you, or at least not to the same degree, then you can keep festival day after day; to-day because you behaved well in this action, to-morrow because you behaved well in another. How much greater cause for thanksgiving is this than a consulship or a governorship! These things come to you from your own self and from the gods. Remember who the Giver is, and to whom He gives, and for what end. If you are brought up in reasonings such as these, can you any longer raise the questions where you are going to be happy, and where you will please God? Are not men everywhere equally distant from God? Do they not everywhere have the same view of what comes to pass?

CHAPTER V

Against the contentious and brutal

The good and excellent man neither contends with anyone, nor, as far as he has the power, does he allow others to contend. We have an example before us of this also, as well as of everything else, in the life of Socrates, who did not merely himself avoid contention upon every occasion, but tried to prevent others as well from contending. See in Xenophon's Symposium how many contentions he has resolved, and again how patient he was with Thrasyvachus, Polus, and Callicles, and habitually so with his wife, and also with his son when the latter tried to confute him with sophistical argu-
4 ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, σοφεῖόμενος. Λίαν γὰρ ἀσφαλῶς ἐμέμνητο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀλλοτρίου ἡγεμονικὸν κυριεύει. οὐδὲν οὖν ἀλλο ὤθελεν ἢ τὸ ἔδον. τί δ' ἐστὶ τούτο; οὐχ ἰκ... οὐσ οὗτος...

1 κατὰ φύσιν τοῦτο γὰρ ἀλλότριον ἀλλ' ὅπως ἐκείνων τὰ ἱδία ποιοῦντων, ὡς αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ, αὐτὸς μηδὲν ἤττον κατὰ φύσιν ἔξει καὶ διεξάζει 2 μόνων τὰ αὐτοῦ ποιῶν πρὸς τὸ κἀκεῖνος ἔχειν κατὰ φύσιν.

6 τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστιν, ὃ ἀεὶ πρόκειται τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ. στρατηγήσαι; οὐ' ἀλλ', ἂν δίδωται, ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς ὀλης τὸ ἱδίον ἡγεμονικὸν τηρῆσαι. γῆμαι; οὐ' ἀλλ', ἂν δίδωται γάμος, ἐν ταύτῃ

7 τῇ ὑλῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα αὐτοῦ τηρῆσαι. ἂν δὲ θέλῃ τὸν νῦν μὴ ἀμαρτάνειν ἢ τὴν γυναίκα, θέλει τὰ ἀλλότρια μὴ εἶναι ἀλλότρια. καὶ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι τοῦτ' ἐστιν, μανθάνειν τὰ ἱδία καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια.

8 Ποῦ οὖν ἔτι μάχης τόπος τῷ οὗτως ἔχοντι; μὴ γὰρ θαυμάζει τι τῶν γινομένων; μὴ γὰρ καίνων αὐτῷ φαίνεται; μὴ γὰρ οὐ χείρονα καὶ χαλεπότερα προσδέχεται τὰ παρὰ τῶν φαύλων ἡ ἀποβαίνει αὐτῷ; μὴ γὰρ οὐ κέρδος λογίζεται πάν ὁ τι ἀπολείπουσιν 3 τοῦ ἐσχάτου; "ἔλοι-

9 δόρισεν σε ο δεῖνα." πολλὴ χάρις αὐτῷ, ὅτι

1 Schenkl places a lacuna here: ἰκ... οὗτος κατὰ S.
2 Salmasius: ἐξάζει S.
3 Schenkl: ἀπολείπουσιν S.

1 This may be a reference to Xenophon, Memorabilia, II. 2, as is commonly supposed, but if so, it is a highly inadequate presentation of the case there described, where Socrates is the "confuter," and the son merely makes a few natural and quite conventional attempts to defend himself. I
BOOK IV. v. 3-9

ments.¹ For Socrates bore very firmly in mind that no one is master over another's governing principle. He willed, accordingly, nothing but what was his own. And what is that? [Not to try to make other people act²] in accordance with nature, for that does not belong to one; but, while they are attending to their own business as they think best, himself none the less to be and to remain in a state of harmony with nature, attending only to his own business, to the end that they also may be in harmony with nature. For this is the object which the good and excellent man has ever before him. To become praetor? No; but if this be given him, to maintain his own governing principle in these circumstances. To marry? No; but if marriage be given him, to maintain himself as one who in these circumstances is in harmony with nature. But if he wills that his son or his wife make no mistake, he wills that what is not his own should cease to be not his own. And to be getting an education means this: To be learning what is your own, and what is not your own.

Where, then, is there any longer room for contention, if a man is in such a state? Why, he is not filled with wonder at anything that happens, is he? Does anything seem strange to him? Does he not expect worse and harsher treatment from the wicked than actually befalls him? Does he not count it as gain whenever they fail to go to the limit? "So-and-so reviled you." I am greatly obliged to suspect that Epictetus was referring (following Chrysippus, probably) to some other incident recorded in the very large body of Socratic dialogues that once existed.

¹ This is probably the general sense of a passage where something has evidently been lost.

² This is probably the general sense of a passage where something has evidently been lost.
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10 πολλὴν χάριν, ὅτι μὴ ἀπέκτεινεν. πότε γὰρ ἐμαθεν ἢ παρὰ τίνι, ὅτι ἦμερὸν ἐστὶ ξώον, ὅτι φιλάλληλον, ὅτι μεγάλη βλάβη τῷ ἄδικοντι αὐτῇ ἡ ἄδικαι; ταῦτα οὖν μὴ μεμαθηκὼς μηδὲ πεπεισμένος, διὰ τί μὴ ἀκολουθήσῃ τῷ φαινο-μένῳ συμφέροντι; “βέβληκεν ὁ γείτων λίθους.“

12 κατεάγη.” σὺ οὖν σκευάριον εἶ; οὐ, ἀλλὰ προαιρέσις. τί οὖν σοι δίδοται πρὸς τοῦτο; ός μὲν λύκῳ ἀντιδάκκειν καὶ ἄλλους πλείονας λίθους βάλλειν: ἀνθρώπῳ δ’ ἔαν ξητῆς, ἐπὶ-σκεψαί σου τὸ ταμεῖον, ἢδε τίνας δυνάμεις ἔχων ἔληλυθας: μὴ τι τὴν θηριώδη; μὴ τι τὴν μησι-

13 κακητικήν; ἵππος οὖν πότ’ ἅθλιος ἐστιν; ὅταν τῶν φυσικῶν δυνάμεων στέρηται οὖχ ὅταν μὴ δύνηται κοκκύζειν, ἀλλ’ ὅταν μὴ τρέχειν

14 ο ὃ δὲ κύων; ὅταν πέτεσθαι μὴ δύνηται; ἀλλ’ ὅταν μὴ ἰχνεύειν. μὴ ποτ’ οὖν οὕτως καὶ ἀνθρώπος δυστυχῶς ἐστιν οὖχ ὃ μὴ δυνάμενος λέοντας πυγεῖν ἡ ἀνδριάντας περιλαμβάνειν (οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτο δυνάμεις τινὰς ἔχων ἐλήλυθεν παρὰ τῆς φύσεως), ἀλλ’ ο ἀπολολωλεκὼς τὸ

1 See IV. 1, 120.
2 A familiar idea in Plato, especially in the Crito, Gorgias, and Republic, but nowhere, as I recall, in exactly these words, though Crito 49 B and Republic 366 E and 367 D bear a close resemblance.

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him for not striking me. "Yes, but he struck you too." I am greatly obliged to him for not wounding me. "Yes, but he wounded you too." I am greatly obliged to him for not killing me. For when, or from what teacher, did he learn that man is a tame animal,\(^1\) that he manifests mutual affection, that injustice in itself is a great injury to the unjust man? \(^2\) If, therefore, he has never learned this, or become persuaded of this, why shall he not follow what appears to him to be his advantage? "My neighbour has thrown stones." You have not made a mistake, have you? "No, but my crockery is broken." Are you a piece of crockery, then? No, but you are moral purpose. What, then, has been given you with which to meet this attack? If you seek to act like a wolf, you can bite back and throw more stones than your neighbour did; but if you seek to act like a man, examine your store, see what faculties you brought with you into the world. You brought no faculty of brutality, did you? No faculty of bearing grudges, did you? When, then, is a horse miserable? When he is deprived of his natural faculties. Not when he can't sing "cuckoo!" but when he can't run. And a dog? Is it when he can't fly? No, but when he can't keep the scent. Does it not follow, then, that on the same principles a man is wretched, not when he is unable to choke lions,\(^3\) or throw his arms about statues\(^4\) (for no man has brought with him from nature into this world faculties for this), but when he has lost his kind-

\(^3\) That is, accomplish something almost superhuman, like Heracles.

\(^4\) That is, in cold weather, as Diogenes was able to do. See III. 12, 2.
15 εὐγνωμον, ὁ τὸ πιστὸν; τοῦτον ἐδει συνελθόντας θρηνεῖν, εἰς ὅσα κακὰ ἐλήλυθεν. οὐχὶ μᾶ Δία τὸν φύντα ἢ τὸν ἀποθανόντα, ἀλλ' ὃ ζωντι συμβεβήκει ἀπολέσαι τὰ ὦπευ, ὀὐ τὰ πατρῆα, τὸ ἀγρῦδιον καὶ τὸ οἰκίδιον καὶ τὸ παιδοκεῖον καὶ τὰ δουλάρια (τοῦτων γὰρ οὔδεν ὦπευ τὸ ἀνθρώπω εὔτιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀλλότρια, δοῦλα, ὑπεύθυνα ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις διδόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν κυρίων), ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀνθρωπικὰ, τοὺς χαρακτήρας, 16 οὐς ἔχων ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐλήλυθεν, οὕς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νομισμάτων ἥπτομέν, ἂν μὲν εὐρωμεν, δοκιμάζομεν, ἂν δὲ μὴ εὐρωμεν, ῥιπτοῦμεν. "τίνος 17 ἔχει τὸν χαρακτήρα τούτο τὸ τετράσσαρον; Τραίανοῦ; φέρε. Νέρωνος; ῥῆσον ἐξο, ἀδόκιμον ἔστιν, σαπρόν." οὔτως καὶ ἐνθάδε. τίνα

1 The quotations (slightly modified) are from a famous passage in Euripides, Cretspontes, frag. 449, Nauck: “For we ought rather to come together to mourn for the one who is born, because of all the evils into which he is coming; but, on the other hand, the one who has died, we ought with joy and words of gladness to send forth from his former abode.”

2 The gods.

3 This reference is most obscure, for the coins of Nero still preserved are numerous and excellent, and there was a great systematic reform of coinage in A.D. 64, which became "the most complete monetary system of ancient times" (Mattingly and Sydenham, The Roman Imperial Coinage (1923), I, 138). After the death of Caligula, indeed, the senate ordered all his bronze coinage to be melted down (Dio, L.X. 22, 3), but nothing of the sort is recorded, so far as I know, for Nero. There was, of course, a slight reduction in weight for the aureus and the denarius, and "the amount of alloy in the silver was increased from 5 to about 10 per cent.,” changes which have been regarded as the first step in the process of debasement that reached its climax in the third century.
ness, and his faithfulness? This is the kind of person for whom "men should come together and mourn, because of all the evils into which he has come"; not, by Zeus, "the one who is born," or "the one who has died," but the man whose misfortune it has been while he still lives to lose what is his own; not his patrimony, his paltry farm, and paltry dwelling, and his tavern, and his poor slaves (for none of these things is a man's own possession, but they all belong to others, are subservient and subject, given by their masters now to one person and now to another); but the qualities which make him a human being, the imprints which he brought with him in his mind, such as we look for also upon coins, and, if we find them, we accept the coins, but if we do not find them, we throw the coins away. "Whose imprint does this sestertius bear? Trajan's? Give it to me. Nero's? Throw it out, it will not pass, it is rotten." So also in the moral life. What imprint do his

See E. A. Sydenham, Num. Chron., ser. 4, vol. 16 (1916), 19. Nero's particular system of brass and copper coinage was also discontinued after his death (ibid. p. 28). Yet it is scarcely credible that Epictetus can have had any trifles like these in mind.—Of course the moral point here, which Dr. Page wishes to have emphasized, is that Trajan was the typically good man (felicior Augusto, melior Traiano was an acclamation in the Roman Senate for centuries after his death—Eutropius, 8, 5), and Nero the opposite. But the difficulty in the passage is to understand how it ever occurred to Epictetus to imply that people actually refused to take coins of Nero, simply because they bore the imprint of a morally bad man, when, as a matter of fact, it is extremely doubtful if any human being, except perhaps some hopeless fanatic, ever really did so refuse. A note by T. O. Mabbott, "Epictetus and Nero's Coinage", CP 36 (1941) 398-9, explains this perfectly.
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ε'χει χαρακτήρα τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ; "ἡμερον, κοινωνικόν, ἀνεκτικόν, φιλάλληλον." φέρε, παραδέχομαι, ποιῶ πολίτην τοῦτον, παραδέχομαι 18 γείτονα, σύμπλουν. ὥρα μόνον, μὴ Νερωνιανὸν ἔχει χαρακτήρα. μὴ τί ὤργίλος ἐστίν, μὴ τί μηνίτις, μὴ τί μεμψήμοιρος; "ἀν αὐτῷ φανῇ, 19 πατάσσει τὰς κεφαλὰς τῶν ἀπαντῶντων." τί οὖν ἔλεγε, ὅτι ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν; μὴ γὰρ ἐκ ψυλῆς μορφῆς κρίνεται τῶν οὐντῶν ἐκαστὸν; ἐπεὶ 20 οὖτως λέγει καὶ τὸ κήρυκνον μῆλον εἶναι. καὶ ὅδιμῃν ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ καὶ γεύσθων οὐκ ἀρκεῖ ἢ ἐκτὸς περιγραφῆ. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώ- πον ἢ ρίς ἐξαρκεῖ καὶ οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ, ἀλλ' ἃν τὰ 21 δόγματα ἔχη ἀνθρωπικά. οὖτος οὐκ ἀκούει λόγον, οὐ παρακολουθεῖ ἐλεγχόμενος· οἴνοι ἐστίν. τούτοις τὸ αἰδήμον ἀπονενέκρωται· ἀρχηγότος ἐστίν, πρόβατον, 1 πάντα μάλλον ἢ ἀνθρωπος. οὖτος ξητεί, τίνα ἀπαντήσας λακτίσῃ ἢ δάκη- ὡς τε οὐδὲ πρόβατον ἢ ὁνόμα, ἀλλὰ τί ποτε ἀγριον θηρίον. 22 Τί οὖν; θέλεις με καταφρονεῖσθαι; — Ἄπο τίνων; ὑπὸ εἰδότων; καὶ τῶς καταφρονησοῦσιν εἰδότες τοῦ πράον, τοῦ αἰδήμονος; ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγνοούντων; τί σοι μέλει; οὐ τινὶ γὰρ ἀλλω 23 τεχνίτη τῶν ἀτέχνων.—'Αλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον

1 πρόβατον added by C. Schenkl (after Salmasius).

1 Suetonius, Nero, 26.
2 It would seem that the beeswax used in leather sewing was familiarly called "the cobbler's apple," and when on sale may have been moulded in that shape. Such metaphors are common enough, as is also the habit of making things like
judgements bear? "He is gentle, generous, patient, affectionate." Give him to me, I accept him, I make this man a citizen, I accept him as a neighbour and a fellow-voyager. Only see that he does not have the imprint of Nero. Is he choleric, furious, querulous? "If he feels like it, he punches the heads of the people he meets."¹ Why, then, did you call him a human being? For surely everything is not judged by its outward appearance only, is it? Why, if that is so, you will have to call the lump of beeswax an apple.² No, it must have the smell of an apple and the taste of an apple; its external outline is not enough. Therefore, neither are the nose and the eyes sufficient to prove that one is a human being, but you must see whether one has the judgements that belong to a human being. Here is a man who does not listen to reason, he does not understand when he is confuted; he is an ass. Here is one whose sense of self-respect has grown numb; he is useless, a sheep, anything but a human being. Here is a man who is looking for someone whom he can kick or bite when he meets him; so that he is not even a sheep or an ass, but some wild beast.

What then? Do you want me to be despised?—By whom? By men of understanding? And how will men of understanding despise the gentle and the self-respecting person? No, but by men without understanding? What difference is that to you? Neither you nor any other craftsman cares about those who are not skilled in his art.—Yes, but they will fasten themselves upon me all the more.—What vases, cakes, candy, pincushions, soap, etc., in the shape of fruits or animals.
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ἐπιφυσισταὶ μοι.—Τί λέγεις τὸ ἐμοί; δύναται τις τὴν προαίρεσιν τὴν σὴν βλάψαι ἢ κωλύσαι ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις χρῆσθαι ὡς πέφυκεν;—Οὐ.—Τί οὖν ἔτι ταράσσῃ καὶ φοβερῶν σαυτῶν θέλεις ἐπιδεικνύειν; οὐχὶ δὲ παρελθὼν εἰς μέσον κηρύσσεις, ὃτι εἰρήνην ἄγεις πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, ὃ τι ἀν ἐκεῖνοι ποιῶσιν, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐκείνων καταγελᾶς, ὃτοι σὲ βλάπτειν δοκούσιν; "ἀνδράποδα ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδὲ τίς εἰμὶ οὐδὲ ποῦ μου τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν" οὐ ¹ πρόσοδος αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ ἐμά.

25 Οὖτως καὶ ἐχυρᾶν πόλιν οἱ ² οἰκοῦντες καταγελῶσι τῶν πολιορκούντων. "νῦν οὖτοι τί πράγμα ἔχουσιν ἐπὶ τῷ µηδείν; ἀσφαλές ἐστίν ἡµῶν τὸ τεῖχος, τροφαὶ ἔχομεν ἐπὶ πάµπολυν

26 χρόνου, τὴν ἀλλήν ἀπασαν παρασκευήν." ταῦτα ἔστι τὰ πόλιν ἐχυρᾶν καὶ ἀνάλωτον ποιῶντα, ἀνθρώπου δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ δόγματα. ποίον γὰρ τεῖχος οὔτως ἰσχυρὸν ἢ ποῖον σῶμα οὔτως ἀδαμάντινον ἢ ποία κτήσις ἀναφαίρετος ἢ

27 ποίον ἄξιόως οὔτως ἀνεπιβούλευτον; πάντα πανταχοῦ θυητα, εὐάλωτα, οἷς τισιν τῶν ὀπωσοῦν προσέχονται πάσα ἀνάγκη ταράσσεσθαι, κακελπιστεῖν, φοβεῖσθαι, πευθεῖν, ἀτελεῖς ἕχειν τὰς ὀρέξεις, περιπτωτικὰς ἔχειν τὰς ἐκκλίσεις. εἶτα οὐ θέλομεν τὴν μόνην δεδομένην ἡµῖν ἀσφαλείαν ἐχυρᾶν ποιεῖν; οὐδ' ἀποστάστες τῶν θυητῶν καὶ δούλων τὰ ἀθάνατα καὶ φύσει ἑλεύθερα ἐκπο-

¹ Schenkl: ὦτι S. ² οἴ added by Schenkl.

¹ Perhaps a reference to Xenophon, Cyropædeia, VII. 5, 13.

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do you mean by the word "me"? Can anyone hurt your moral purpose, or prevent you from employing in a natural way the sense-impressions which come to you?—No.—Why, then, are you any longer disturbed, and why do you want to show that you are a timid person? Why do you not come forth and make the announcement that you are at peace with all men, no matter what they do, and that you are especially amused at those who think that they are hurting you? "These slaves do not know either who 1 am, or where my good and my evil are; they cannot get at the things that are mine."

In this way also those who inhabit a strong city laugh at the besiegers:1 "Why are these men taking trouble now to no end? Our wall is safe, we have food for ever so long a time, and all other supplies." These are the things which make a city strong and secure against capture, and nothing but judgements make similarly secure the soul of man. For what manner of wall is so strong, or what manner of body so invincible, or what manner of possession so secure against theft, or what manner of reputation so unassailable? For all things everywhere are perishable, and easy to capture by assault, and the man who in any fashion sets his mind upon any of them must needs be troubled in mind, be discouraged, suffer fear and sorrow, have his desires fail, and his aversions fall into what they would avoid. If this be so, are we not willing to make secure the one means of safety which has been vouchsafed us? And are we not willing to give up these perishable and slavish things, and devote our labours to those which are imperishable and by
nev; ou'de mel vou'me, oti ou'te blaptei allos allov ou'te efielei, alla to peri eka'ston tou-twv dogma, tou'to esti to blapton, tou'to to anatrepou, tou'to makhe, tou'to stasis, tou'to 29 polemos; 'Eteokleia kai Polynike to pepeinikos ouk allho i touto, to dogma to peri turanyidos, to dogma to peri fnygis, oti to mev esxaton 30 tov kakow, to de megiston tov wgyathon. phusis de auti panto's, to diwkein to agathon, feugiein to kakon tov afairopumenon batoreou kai peri-
balloonta tw evanitw, tovton heieisbai polemenon,
epiboulou, kaw adelefos i, kaw vios, kaw patir'
31 tov gar agathou synygenesteron ou'den. louvon ei
tau'ta agath'a kai kak'a, ou'te patirh vios filos
ou'ti adelefos adelefwi, panta de pantachou metsta
32 polemion, epiboulon, sykofantow. ei de oia
dei proaireisis, tou'to monon agathon estin, kai oia
mhe de, tou'to monon kakon, pou eti makhe, pou
loidoria; peri twn; peri tov ou'den pros
hmis; pros tinas; pros tou's agnoontas, pros
tous dyustuxontas, pros tou's hpatimeinous peri
tov megistow;
33 Tou'ton Sowkatrai'menon twn oikian twn
autoi' ai kei yuvaikos anexomenos trachytath, viow agnovmonos. tracheia gar pros ti i'n; i'n

1 Famous enemy brothers: cf. II. 22, 13-14.
nature free? And do we not remember that no man either hurts or helps another, but that it is his judgement about each of these things which is the thing that hurts him, that overturns him; this is contention, and civil strife, and war? That which made Eteocles and Polyneices what they were was nothing else but this— their judgement about a throne, and their judgement about exile, namely, that one was the greatest of evils, the other the greatest of goods. And this is the nature of every being, to pursue the good and to flee from the evil; and to consider the man who robs us of the one and invests us with the other as an enemy and an aggressor, even though he be a brother, even though he be a son, even though he be a father; for nothing is closer kin to us than our good. It follows, then, that if these externals are good or evil, neither is a father dear to his sons, nor a brother dear to a brother, but everything on all sides is full of enemies, aggressors, slanderers. But if the right kind of moral purpose and that alone is good, and if the wrong kind of moral purpose and that alone is bad, where is there any longer room for contention, where for reviling? About what? About the things that mean nothing to us? Against whom? Against the ignorant, against the unfortunate, against those who have been deceived in the most important values?

All this is what Socrates bore in mind as he managed his house, putting up with a shrewish wife and an unkindly son. For to what end was she

2 Perhaps referring to Xenophon, Memorabilia, II. 2, where his son Lamprocles is represented as having lost his temper at the constant scolding of Xanthippe.
ΑΡΡΙΑΝ'S DISCOURSES OF EPICLEITUS

τὸ ὁδὸν καταχέψῃ τῆς κεφαλῆς ὁσον καὶ θέλει, ἵνα καταπατήσῃ τὸν πλακοῦντα· καὶ τὶ πρὸς ἐμὲ, ἀν ὑπολάβω, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐκ ἐστὶ πρὸς ἐμὲ; τοῦτο δ' ἐμὸν ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ οὔτε τῦραννος κωλύσει με θέλοντα οὔτε δεσπότης οὔτε οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν ἔνα οὐθ' ὁ ἱσχυρότερος τὸν ἀσθενέστερον τοῦτο γὰρ ἀκώλυτον δέδοται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκάστῳ. ταῦτα τὰ δόγματα ἐν οἰκία φιλίαν ποιεῖ, ἐν πόλει ὁμόνοιαν, ἐν ἐθνεσιν ἐδρήνην, πρὸς θεοὺς εὐχάριστον, πανταχοῦ θαρροῦντα, ὡς περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τρίων, ὡς περὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιων. ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς γράφαμε μὲν καὶ ἀναγράφομεν ταῦτα καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκομεν ἐπανεσάζω ἱκανοὶ, πεισθήναι δ' οὐδ' ἐγγύς. τοιγαροῦν τὸ περὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων λεγόμενον

οἴκοι λέοντες, ἐν 'Εφέσῳ δ' ἀλώπεκες καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἀρμόσει· ὡς σχολὴ λέοντες, ἔξω δ' ἀλώπεκες.

5'. Πρὸς τοὺς ἐπὶ τῷ ἐλεείσθαι ὀδυνωμένους.

1 Ἀνιδώμαι, φησίν, ἐλεούμενος.—Πάτερον οὖν σὸν ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐλεείσθαι σὲ ἥ τῶν ἐλεοῦντων; τί δ' ἐπὶ σοὶ ἐστι τὸ παῦσαι αὐτό;—Ἐπ' ἐμοὶ, ἄν

1 It was a present from Alcibiades. For the incidents here referred to see Seneca, De Constantia, 18, 5; Diogenes Laertius, 2, 36; Athenaeus, 5, 219 B and 14, 643 F; Aelian, Varia Historia, 11, 12.
shrewish? To the end that she might pour all the water she pleased over his head, and might trample underfoot the cake.¹ Yet what is that to me, if I regard these things as meaning nothing to me? But this control over the moral purpose is my true business, and in it neither shall a tyrant hinder me against my will, nor the multitude the single individual, nor the stronger man the weaker; for this has been given by God to each man as something that cannot be hindered. These are the judgements which produce love in the household, concord in the State, peace among the nations, make a man thankful toward God, confident at all times, on the ground that he is dealing with things not his own, with worthless things. We, however, although we are capable of writing and reading these things, and praising them when read, are nowhere near capable of being persuaded of them. Wherefore, the proverb about the Lacedaemonians,

Lions at home, but at Ephesus foxes,² will fit us too: Lions in the school-room, foxes outside.

CHAPTER VI

To those who are vexed at being pitied

I am annoyed, says one, at being pitied.—Is it, then, some doing of yours that you are pitied, or the doing of those who show the pity? Or again; is it in your power to stop it?—It is, if I can show

² Because of their ill-success in Asia Minor. See also the scholium on Aristophanes, Pax, 1189.
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deikynw autois mē áxiou éleou onta émautoν.—
2 Póteron ἰ̣ ἕ̣̣ ἁτο σοι υπάρχει τούτο, τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐλέουν ἀξίων ὅπως υπάρχει:—Δοκῶ ἐγώγε, ὅτι ὑπάρχει. ἀλλ' οὗτοι γ' οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐλεοῦσιν, ἐφ' οίς, εἴπερ ἀρα, ἢν ἀξίων, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀμαρτανομένοις, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πενίᾳ καὶ ἀναρχίᾳ καὶ νόσοις 3 καὶ θανάτοις καὶ ἀλλοίς τοιούτοις.—Πότερον οὖν πείθειν παρεσκευάσαι τοὺς πολλοὺς, ως ἁρα οὐδὲν τούτων κακόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἶνον τε καὶ πένητι καὶ ἀνάρχοντι καὶ ἀτίμῳ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἡ σαυτὸν ἐπίδεικνύειν αὐτοῖς πλουτοῦντα καὶ ἀρχοῦντα;
4 τοῦτων γὰρ τὰ μὲν δεύτερα ἀλαξόνοις καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίου. καὶ ἡ προσποίησις ὅρα δι' οἶνων ἀν γένοιτο· δουλαρία σε χρήσασθαι δείησι καὶ ἀργυρωμάτια ὠλγα κεκτήσατα καὶ ταῦτα ἐν φανερῶ δεικνύειν, εἰ οἶόν τε, ταῦτα πολλάκις καὶ λαυθάνειν πειρᾶσθαι ὅτι ταύτα ἐστὶν, καὶ ἱματιδία στιλπνὰ καὶ τὴν ἀλλήν πομπῆν καὶ τὸν τιμώμενον ἐπιφαίνειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων καὶ δειπνεῖν πειρᾶσθαι παρ' αὐτοῖς ἡ δοκεῖν γε, ὅτι δειπνεῖς, καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα δὲ τινα κακοτεχνεῖν, ὡς εὐμορφότερον φαίνεσθαι καὶ γενναιότε
5 ρον τοῦ ὄντος· ταῦτα σε δεὶ μηχανᾶσθαι, εἰ τὴν δευτέραν ὅδον ἀπιέναι θέλεις ὡςτε μὴ ἐλεεῖσθαι.

Ἡ πρώτη δὲ καὶ ἀνήνυτος καὶ μακρὰ, ὁ ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ἡδυνηθῇ ποιῆσαι, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν, πάντας ἀνθρώπους πεῖσαι, τίνα ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ καὶ

1 Upton's "codex": ἀρχοῦτι S.
2 Elter: ἐπιφανῶν τούτων S.
them that I do not deserve their pity.—And do you now possess the power of not being deserving of pity, or do you not possess it?—It seems to me, indeed, that I possess it. Yet these people do not pity me for what would deserve pity, if anything does, that is, my mistakes; but for poverty, and for not holding office, and for things like disease, and death, and the like.—Are you, then, prepared to convince the multitude that none of these things is bad, but that it is possible for a poor man, and one who holds no office or position of honour, to be happy; or are you prepared to show yourself off to them as a rich man and an official? Of these alternatives the second is the part of a braggart, and a tasteless and worthless person. Besides, observe the means by which you must achieve your pretence: You will have to borrow some paltry slaves; and possess a few pieces of silver plate, and exhibit these same pieces conspicuously and frequently, if you can, and try not to let people know that they are the same; and possess contemptible bright clothes, and all other kinds of finery, and show yourself off as the one who is honoured by the most distinguished persons; and try to dine with them, or at least make people think that you dine with them; and resort to base arts in the treatment of your person, so as to appear more shapely and of gentler birth than you actually are. All these contrivances you must adopt, if you wish to take the way of the second alternative and avoid pity. But the first way is ineffectual and tedious—to attempt the very thing which Zeus himself has been unable to accomplish, that is, to convince all men of what things are good, and what evil. Why, that
6 κακά. μὴ γὰρ δέδοται σοι τούτο; ἐκεῖνο μόνον σοι δέδοται, σαυτόν πείσαι. καὶ οὔτω πέπεικας· 7 εἰτά μοι νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς πείθειν τοὺς ἄλλους; καὶ τίς σοι τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ σύνεστιν ὡς σὺ σαυτῷ; τίς δὲ οὔτως πιθανός ἐστί σοι πρὸς τὸ πείσαι ὡς σὺ σαυτῷ; τίς δὲ εὐνοούστερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἔχον ἢ
8 σὺ σαυτῷ; πῶς οὖν οὔτω πέπεικας σαυτόν μαθεῖν; νῦν οὐχὶ ἄνω κάτω; τούτ’ ἐστι περὶ ὅ ἐσπούδακας; οὐ¹ μανθάνειν, ὡστε ἄλυπος εἶναι καὶ
9 ἀτάραχος καὶ ἀταπείνωτος καὶ ἐλεύθερος; πρὸς ταῦτα οὖν οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὅτι μία ἐστίν ἡ ὁδὸς ἡ φέρουσα, ἀφεῖναι τὰ ἀπροαιρετὰ καὶ ἐκστήναι
10 αὐτὸν καὶ ὁμολογήσαι αὐτὰ ἄλλοτρια; τὸ οὖν ἄλλον τι ὑπολαβεῖν περὶ σοῦ ποίον εἴδους ἐστίν;
—Τοῦ ἀπροαιρέτου.—Οὐκοῦν οὔδέν πρὸς σὲ;—Οὐδέν.—Ἐτι οὖν δακνόμενος ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ
ταρασσόμενος οὔει πεπείσθαι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ
κακῶν;
11 Οὐ θέλεις οὖν ἀφεῖς τοὺς ἄλλους αὐτὸς σαυτῷ γενέσθαι καὶ μαθητῆς καὶ διδάσκαλος; “ὁψονται
οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ αὐτοῖς παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν
καὶ διεξάγειν, ἐμοὶ δ’ οὔδεῖς ἐστίν ἐγγύων ἐμοῦ.
12 τί οὖν τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν λόγους ἀκήκοα
toὺς τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ συγκατατίθεμαι αὐτοῖς,

¹ οὗ added by Schenkl.
has not been vouchsafed to you, has it? Nay, this only has been vouchsafed—to convince yourself. And you have not convinced yourself yet! And despite that, bless me! are you now trying to convince all other men? Yet who has been living with you so long as you have been living with yourself? And who is so gifted with powers of persuasion to convince you, as you are to convince yourself? Who is more kindly disposed and nearer to you than you are to yourself? How comes it, then, that you have not persuaded yourself to learn? Are not things now upside down? Is this what you have been in earnest about? Not to learn how to get rid of pain, and turmoil, and humiliation, and so become free? Have you not heard that there is but a single way which leads to this end, and that is to give up the things which lie outside the sphere of the moral purpose, and to abandon them, and to admit that they are not your own? To what class of things, then, does another's opinion about you belong?—To that which lies outside the sphere of the moral purpose.—And so it is nothing to you?—Nothing.—So long, then, as you are stung and disturbed by the opinions of others, do you still fancy that you have been persuaded as to things good and evil?

Will you not, then, let other men alone, and become your own pupil and your own teacher? "All other men shall see to it, whether it is profitable for them to be in a state out of accord with nature and so to live, but as for me no one is closer to myself than I am. What does it mean, then, that I have heard the words of the philosophers and assent to them, but that in actual fact my burdens have
ἐργὸς ὤν οὐδὲν γέγονα κοουφότερος; μὴ τι οὗτως ἀφυῆς εἰμι; καὶ μὴν περὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἐβουλήθην, οὐ λίαν ἀφυῆς εὐρέθην, ἄλλα καὶ γράμματα ταχέως ἐμαθοῦν καὶ παλαίειν καὶ γεωμετρεῖν καὶ συνλογισμοὺς ἀναλύειν. μὴ τι οὖν οὐ πέπεικε μὲ ὁ λόγος; καὶ μὴν οὖκ ἄλλα τινὰ οὕτως ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐδοκίμασα ἢ εἰλόμην καὶ νῦν περὶ τούτων ἀναγιγνώσκω, ταύτα ἀκοῦω, ταύτα γράφω: ἄλλου οὖν εὐρήκαμεν μέχρι νῦν ἰσχυρὸτερον τούτου λόγου. τὶ οὖν τὸ λείτου μοι ἐστίν; μὴ οὖν ἐξήρηται τὰναντία δόγματα; μὴ αὐταὶ αἱ υπολήψεις ἀγύμναστοί εἰσιν οὖν εἰθισμέναι ἀπαντάν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐργά, ἄλλα ὡς ὁ πλάρια ἀποκείμενα κατίσται καὶ οὐδὲ περιαρμόσαι μοι δύναται; καὶ τοιο οὔτ' ἐπὶ τοῦ παλαίειν οὔτ' ἐπὶ τοῦ γράφειν ἢ ἀναγιγνώσκειν ἀρκούμαι τῷ μαθεῖν, ἄλλαν ἂνω κάτω στρέφω τοὺς προτεινομένους καὶ ἄλλους πλέκω καὶ μεταπίπτοντας ὡσαῦτως. τὰ δ' ἀναγκαία θεωρήματα, ἄφ' οὖν ἐστὶν ὀρμώμενον ἀλυποῦν γενέσθαι, ἄφοβον, ἀπαθῆ, ἀκώλυτον, ἐλεύθερον, ταύτα δ' οὐ γυμνάζω οὐδὲ μελετῶ κατὰ ταύτα τὴν προσήκουσαν μελέτην. εἰτά μοι μέλει, τί οἱ ἄλλοι περὶ ἐμοῦ ἐροῦσιν, εἰ φανοῦμαι αὐτοῖς ἄξιόλογος, εἰ φανοῦμαι εὐδαιμον;”

18 Ταλαιπωρε, οὐ θέλεις βλέπειν, τι σὺ λέγεις περὶ σαυτοῦ; τίς φαίνῃ σαυτῷ; τίς ἐν τῷ ὑπολαμβάνειν, τίς ἐν τῷ ὅργεσθαι, τίς ἐν τῷ ἐκκλησιείνει, τίς ἐν ὁρμῇ, παρασκευῇ, ἐπιβολῇ, τοῖς ἄλλοις

1 Reiske: ἐπικείμενα S.
become no lighter? Can it be that I am so dull? And yet, indeed, in everything else that I have wanted I was not found to be unusually dull, but I learned my letters rapidly, and how to wrestle, and do my geometry, and analyse syllogisms. Can it be, then, that reason has not convinced me? Why, indeed, there is nothing to which I have so given my approval from the very first, or so preferred, and now I read about these matters, and hear them, and write about them. Down to this moment we have not found a stronger argument than this. What is it, then, that I yet lack? Can it be that the contrary judgements have not all been put away? Can it be that the thoughts themselves are unexercised and unaccustomed to face the facts, and, like old pieces of armour that have been stowed away, are covered with rust, and can no longer be fitted to me? Yet in wrestling, or in writing, or in reading, I am not satisfied with mere learning, but I turn over and over the arguments presented to me, and fashion new ones, and likewise syllogisms with equivocal premisses. However, the necessary principles, those which enable a man, if he sets forth from them, to get rid of grief, fear, passion, hindrance, and become free, these I do not exercise, nor do I take the practice that is appropriate for them. After all that, am I concerned with what everyone else will say about me, whether I shall appear important or happy in their eyes?"

O miserable man, will you not see what you are saying about yourself? What sort of a person are you in your own eyes? What sort of a person in thinking, in desiring, in avoiding; what sort of a person in choice, preparation, design, and the other
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tois ἀνθρωπικοῖς ἔργοις; ἀλλὰ μέλει σοι, εἰ σε ἐλεοῦσιν οἱ ἄλλοι;—Ναί. ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν ἄξιαν ἐλεοῦμαι.—Οὐκοῦν ἔπι τούτῳ ὀδυνά; ὦ δὲ γε ὀδυνώμενος ἐλεεινὸς ἐστίν;—Ναί.—Πώς οὖν ἔτι παρὰ ἄξιαν ἐλεί; αὐτοῖς γὰρ οῖς περὶ τὸν ἐλεον πάσχεις κατασκευάζεις σεαυτὸν ἄξιον τοῦ ἐλεεί-

σθαί. τί οὖν λέγει Ἀντισθένης; οὐδέποτ᾿ ἦ-
kousas; "βασιλικόν, ὦ Κῦρε, πράπτειν μὲν εὖ,
κακῶς δ᾿ ἀκούειν." τὴν κεφαλὴν ἅγια ἐχὼ καὶ
πάντες οἴονται ὅτι κεφαλαλγῶ. τί μοι μέλει;
ἀπύρετος εἰμι καὶ ὡς πυρέσσοντι μοι συνάχουν-
tαι. "τάλας, ἐκ τοσοῦτον χρόνου οὐ διέλειπες
πυρέσσων." λέγω καὶ ἐγὼ σκυθρωπάσας ὅτι
"ναί: ταῖς ἀληθείαις πολὺς ἦδη χρόνος, ἓξ οὐ μοι
κακῶς ἐστίν." "τί οὖν γένηται;" ὡς ἂν ὁ
θεὸς θέλῃ. καὶ ἀμα ὑποκαταγελῶ τῶν οἰκτει-

ρῶντων με.

22 Τί οὖν κωλύει καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὅμοιώς; πένης
εἰμί, ἀλλὰ ὀρθὸν δόγμα ἐχὼ περὶ πενίας. τί οὖν
μοι μέλει, εἰ μ᾿ ἔπι τῇ πενίᾳ ἐλεοῦσιν; οὐκ ἄρχω,
άλλοι δ᾿ ἄρχουσιν. ἀλλ᾿ ὁ δεῖ ὑπειληφέναι,
ὑπείληφα περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ ἄρχειν.

23 ὁμοίως οἱ ἐλεοοῦντες με, ἐγὼ δ᾿ οὔτε πεινῶ οὔτε
dιψῶ οὔτε ῥυγῶ, ἀλλ᾿ ἀφ᾿ οὖν αὐτοὶ πεινῶσιν ἢ
dιψῶσιν οἴονται κιμέ. τί οὖν αὐτοῖς ποιήσω; 
περιερχόμενος κηρύσσω καὶ λέγω "μὴ πλα-

νάσθε, ἄνδρες, ἐμοὶ καλῶς ἐστίν· οὔτε πενίας

1 So also Marcus Aurelius, 7, 36; and cf. Diogenes
Laertius, 6, 3.
activities of men? Yet you are concerned whether the rest of mankind pity you?—Yes, but I do not deserve to be pitied.—And so you are pained at that? And is the man who is pained worthy of pity?—Yes.—How, then, do you fail to deserve pity after all? By the very emotion which you feel concerning pity you make yourself worthy of pity. What, then, says Antisthenes? Have you never heard? “It is the lot of a king, O Cyrus, to do well, but to be ill spoken of.” My head is perfectly sound and yet everybody thinks I have a headache. What do I care? I have no fever, and yet everybody sympathizes with me as though I had: “Poor fellow, you have had a fever for ever so long.” I draw a long face too, and say, “Yes, it truly is a long time that I have been in a bad way.” “What is going to happen, then?” As God will, I reply, and at the same time I smile quietly to myself at those who are pitying me.

What, then, prevents me from doing the same thing in my moral life also? I am poor, but I have a correct judgement about poverty. Why, then, am I concerned, if men pity me for my poverty? I do not hold office, while others do. But I have the right opinion about holding office and not holding it. Let those who pity me look to it, but as for myself, I am neither hungry, nor thirsty, nor cold, but from their own hunger and thirst they think I too am hungry and thirsty. What, then, am I to do for them? Shall I go about and make proclamation, and say, “Men, be not deceived, it is well with me.

2 As in IV. 7, 23, and 8, 24, and Acts xviii. 15. Probably ὅψει, in S, I. 4, 13, can be defended on the analogy of these other cases.
éπιστρέφομαι ούτε ἀναρχίας ούτε ἀπλῶς ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἢ δογμάτων ὀρθῶν· ταῦτα ἔχω ἀκόλυτα, οὐδενὸς πεφρόντικα ἔτι"; καὶ τίς αὕτη φιλοσοφία; πῶς ἔτι ὀρθὰ δόγματα ἔχω μὴ ἀρκούμενος τῷ εἶναι ὃς εἰμί, ἄλλ' ἐπτομένος ὑπὲρ τοῦ δοκεῖν;  

24 'Αλλ' ἄλλοι πλειόνων τεῦξονται καὶ προτιμήθησονται.—Τί οὖν εὐλογώτερον ἢ τοὺς περὶ τι ἐσποουδάκοτας εὖ ἐκεῖνω πλείον ἔχειν, εὖ δ' ἐσπουδάκασιν; περὶ ἀρχὰς ἐσποουδάκασιν, σὺ περὶ δόγματα· καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον, σὺ περὶ τὴν χρήσιν τῶν φαντασιῶν. ὃς, εἰ ἐν τούτῳ σοῦ πλέον ἔχουσιν, περὶ δ' σὺ μὲν ἐσποουδάκας, ἐκεῖνοι δ' ἀμελοῦσιν εἰ συγκατατίθενται μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φυσικὰ μέτρα, εἰ ὅργονται σοῦ ἀναποτευκτότερον, εἰ ἐκκλίνουσιν ἀπεριπτωτότερον, εἰ ἐν ἐπιβολῇ, ἐν προθέσει, εἰ ἐν ὅρμῃ μᾶλλον εὐστοχοῦσιν, εἰ τὸ πρέπον σφόζουσιν ὡς ἄνδρες, ὡς νεῖτο, ὡς γονεῖς, εἰδ' ἔξης κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν σχέσεων ὑπόμινα.  

25 εἰ δ' ἀρχοῦσιν ἐκεῖνοι, σὺ δ' 1 οὐ θέλεις σαυτῷ τὰς ἀληθείας εἰπεὶν, ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν τούτου ἐνεκα ποιεῖς, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ πάντα, ἀλογώτατον δὲ τὸν ἐπιμελουμένον τινος ἐλαττον θεραζαι ἢ τὸν ἀμελοῦντα;  

26 Οὔ, ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ φροντίζω ἕγω δογμάτων ὀρθῶν, εὐλογώτερον μὲ ἐστιν ἀρχεῖν.—Ἐν ψ  

27 Defended in apodosis by Reiske and Schenkl: Upton added ἀνα after δ' and Schweighäuser ὦ.  

28 Transferred to this position by s from before ἢ just above.
I take heed neither of poverty, nor lack of office, nor, in a word, anything else, but only correct judgements; these I possess free from hindrance, I have taken thought of nothing further"? And yet, what foolish talk is this? How do I any longer hold correct judgements when I am not satisfied with being the man that I am, but am excited about what other people think of me?

But others will get more than I do, and will be preferred in honour above me.—Well, and what is more reasonable than for those who have devoted themselves to something to have the advantage in that to which they have devoted themselves? They have devoted themselves to office, you to judgements; and they to wealth, you to dealing with your sense-impressions. See whether they have the advantage over you in what you have devoted yourself to, but they neglect; whether their assent is more in accord with natural standards, whether their desire is less likely to achieve its aim than is yours, whether their aversion is less likely to fall into what it would avoid, whether in design, purpose, and choice they hit the mark better, whether they observe what becomes them as men, as sons, as parents, and then, in order, through all the other terms for the social relations. But if they hold office, will you not tell yourself the truth, which is, that you do nothing in order to get office, while they do everything, and that it is most unreasonable for the man who pays attention to something to come off with less than the man who neglects it?

Nay, but because I greatly concern myself with correct judgements, it is more reasonable for me to
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φροντίζεις, ἐν δόγμασιν ἐν ὑ δ' ἄλλοι μᾶλλον σου πεφροντικασιν, ἐκείνος παραχώρει. οἴον εἰ διὰ τὸ δόγματα ἐχειν ὅρθα ἤξιος τοξεύων μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνειν τῶν τοξοτῶν ἡ χαλκεύων μᾶλλον
tῶν χαλκέων. ἀφες οὖν τὴν 1 περὶ τὰ δόγματα σπουδήν καὶ περὶ ἐκείνα ἀναστρέφουν, ἃ κτήσασθαι θέλεις, καὶ τότε κλαίε, εάν σοι μὴ προχωρῇ.

cλαίειν γὰρ ἄξιος εἰ. νῦν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι λέγεις, ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οἵ 2 πολλοὶ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγουσιν, ὅτι ἔργον ἔργῳ οὐ
cοινονεῖ. ὁ μὲν ἐξ ὀρθροῦ ἀναστὰς ζητεῖ, τίνα ἐξ οἴκου τοῦ Καίσαρος 3 ἀσπάσηται, τίνι κεχαρισμένον λόγον εἶπῃ, τίνι δῶρον πέμψῃ, πῶς τῷ ὀρχηστῇ ἀρέσῃ, πῶς κακοθεισάμενος ἄλλον
cλαίων χαρίσηται. ὅταν εὐχηταί, περὶ τούτων εὐχεταί: ὅταν θύῃ, ἐπὶ τούτοις θύει: τὸ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου

μὴ δ' ὑπνον μαλακοῖσιν ἐπὶ ὀμμασὶ προσ-

dέξασθαι

33 ἐνταῦθα παρατέθεικεν. "τὴν παρέβην" τῶν πρὸς κολακείαν; 'τι ἐρέξα; 4 μὴ τί ὡς ἐλεύθερος, μὴ τί ὃς γενναῖος;" κἂν εὐρη τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπιτιμᾶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖ, "τὶ γὰρ σοι καὶ

1 τὴν supplied by Sb.
2 Upton: καί S.
3 τοῦ Καίσαρος added by Wolf: ἐξιόντα suggested by Reiske.
4 Salmasius: ἐρέξα S.

1 Cf. IV. 10, 24.
2 Golden Verses, 40. See III. 10, 2.

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rule.—Yes, in what you greatly concern yourself with, that is, judgements; but in that with which other men have concerned themselves more greatly than you have, give place to them. It is as though, because you have correct judgements, you insisted that you ought in archery to hit the mark better than the archers, or to surpass the smiths at their trade. Drop, therefore, your earnestness about judgements, and concern yourself with the things which you wish to acquire, and then lament if you do not succeed, for you have a right to do that. But as it is, you claim to be intent upon other things, to care for other things, and there is wisdom in what common people say, "One serious business has no partnership with another." 1 One man gets up at early dawn and looks for someone of the household of Caesar to salute, someone to whom he may make a pleasant speech, to whom he may send a present, how he may please the dancer, how he may gratify one person by maliciously disparaging another. When he prays, he prays for these objects, when he sacrifices, he sacrifices for these objects. The word of Pythagoras, 2

Also allow not sleep to draw nigh to your languorous eyelids, he has wrested to apply here. "'Where did I go wrong—' 3 in matters of flattery? 'What did I do?' Can it be that I acted as a free man, or as a man of noble character?'" And if he find an instance of the sort, he censures and accuses himself: "Why, what

3 The single quotation-marks enclose famous phrases from the Golden Verses, which Epictetus, with bitter irony, represents such a self-seeker as employing in a sense appropriate to his own contemptible behaviour.
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τούτῳ εἴπεῖν; οὐ γὰρ ἐνῆν ψεύσασθαι; λέγουσιν καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ὅτι οὐδὲν κωλύει ψεύδος εἴπεῖν." σὺ δ' εἴπερ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ουδενὸς ἄλλου πεφρόντικας ἢ 1 χρήσεως οίας δεῖ φαντασιῶν, εὑρὺς ἀναστᾶς ἔωθεν ἐνθυμοῦν "τίνα μοι λειτεί πρὸς ἀπάθειαν; τίνα πρὸς ἀταραξίαν; τίς εἰμι; μή τι σωμάτιον, μή τι κτῆσιν, μή τι φύσι; οὐδὲν τούτων. ἀλλὰ τί; λογικόν εἴμι ξέφον." τίνα οὖν τὰ ἀπαιτήματα; ἀναπόλει τὰ πεπραγμένα. "'π' παρέβην τῶν πρὸς εὐροιαν; 'τί ἐρεξα' ἢ ἀφιλον ἢ ἀκοινώντων ἢ ἄγνωμον; 'τί μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη' πρὸς ταῦτα;"

36  Τοσαύτης οὖν διαφορὰς οὕσης τῶν ἐπιθυμομένων, τῶν ἐργῶν, τῶν εὐχῶν ἔτι θέλεις τὸ ἵσον ἔχειν ἐκεῖνος, περὶ ἀ σὺ μὲν οὐκ ἔσπουδακας, ἐκεῖνοι δ' ἐσπουδάκασιν; εἰτα θαυμάζεις, εἰ κ' ἐλεοῦσιν, καὶ ἄγανακτεῖς; ἐκεῖνοι δ' οὐκ ἄγανακτοῦσιν, εἰ σὺ αὐτοὺς ἔλεεις. διὰ τί; ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι μὲν πεπεισμένοι εἰσίν, ὅτι ἄγαθῶν τυγχάνουσιν, σὺ δ' οὐ πέπεισαι. διὰ τούτῳ σὺ μὲν οὐκ ἀρκῇ τοῖς σοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐφίσαι τῶν ἐκεῖνων· ἐκεῖνοι δ' ἀρκοῦνται τοῖς ἐαυτῶν καὶ οὐκ ἐφίένται τῶν σῶν. ἐπεί τοι εἰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἐπέπεισο, ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄγαθὰ σὺ ὁ ἐπιτυχεχάνων εἰ, ἐκεῖνοι δ' ἀποπεπλάνηται, οὐδ' ἄν ἐνεθυμοῦ, τί λέγουσι περὶ σοῦ.

1 ἢ supplied by s.

1 Cf. Stobaeus, Ecl. II. 7, 11m (vol. II. p. 111, 13 ff. Wachsmuth): “They (the Stoics) think that he (the wise man) will upon occasion employ falsehood in a number of different ways.”
business did you have to say that? For wasn’t it possible to lie? Even the philosophers say that there is nothing to hinder one’s telling a lie.”

But if in all truth you have concerned yourself greatly with nothing but the proper use of sense-impressions, then as soon as you get up in the morning bethink you, “What do I yet lack in order to achieve tranquillity? What to achieve calm? What am I? I am not a paltry body, not property, not reputation, am I? None of these. Well, what am I? A rational creature.” What, then, are the demands upon you? Rehearse your actions. “Where did I go wrong?” in matters conducive to serenity? “What did I do’ that was unfriendly, or unsocial, or unfeeling? “What to be done was left undone’ in regard to these matters?”

Since, therefore, there is so great a difference between the things which men desire, their deeds, and their prayers, do you still wish to be on an equal footing with them in matters to which you have not devoted yourself, but they have? And after all that, are you surprised if they pity you, and are you indignant? But they are not indignant if you pity them. And why? Because they are convinced that they are getting good things, while you are not so convinced in your own case. That is why you are not satisfied with what you have, but reach out for what they have. Because, if you had been truly convinced that, in the case of the things which are good, you are the one who is attaining them, while they have gone astray, you would not even have taken account of what they say about you.
1 Τι ποιεῖ φοβερὸν τῶν τύραννων; —Οἱ δορυφόροι, φησίν, καὶ αἱ μάχαιραι αὐτῶν καὶ ο̣ ἐπὶ τοῦ κοιτῶνος καὶ οἱ ἀποκλείοντες τοὺς εἰσίντας.
2 —Διὰ τι οὖν, ἂν παιδίον αὐτῷ προσαγάγῃς μετὰ τῶν δορυφόρων οὕτω, οὐ φοβεῖται; ἢ ὅτι οὐκ
3 αἰσθάνεται τούτων τὸ παιδίον; ἂν οὖν τῶν δορυφόρων τις αἰσθάνηται καὶ ὅτι μαχαίρας ἐχοὺσιν, ἐπ' αὐτὸ δὲ τούτῳ προσέρχεται αὐτῷ θέλων ἀποθανεῖν διὰ τινα περίστασιν καὶ ξητῶν ὑπ' ἀλλοῦ παθεῖν αὐτῷ εὐκόλως, μὴ τι φοβεῖται τοὺς δορυφόρους; —Θέλει γὰρ τούτο, δὲ ὁ φο-
4 βεροὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸ.— "Αν οὖν τις μήτ' ἀποθανεῖν μήτε ξὴν θέλων ἐξ ἀπαντος ἄλλῳ ὡς ἄν διδόται, προσέρχεται αὐτῷ, τι κωλύει μὴ δεδοικότα
5 προσέρχεσθαι αὐτῶν; —Οὔδεν.— "Αν τις οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὴν κτήσιν ὁσαύτως ἐκχα καθάπερ οὗτος πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, καὶ πρὸς τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὴν γυναίκα καὶ ἀπλῶς ὑπὶ τινος μανίας καὶ ἀπονοίας οὗτος ἣ διακείμενος, ὡστ' ἐν μηδενὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὸ ἔχειν ταῦτα ἢ μὴ ἔχειν, ἄλλῳ ὡς ὀστρακίοις τὰ παιδία παίζοντα περὶ μὲν τῆς παιδιᾶς διαφέρεται, τῶν ὀστρακίων ὃ οὐ πεφρονικεν, οὗτος δὲ καὶ οὗτος τὰς μὲν ὑλὰς παρ' οὔδεν ἢ πεποιημένοις, τὴν παιδιὰν δὲ τὴν περὶ αὐτᾶς καὶ ἀναστροφὴν ἀσπάζεται: ποίος ἔτι τούτῳ τύραννος φοβερὸς ἢ ποίοι δορυφόροι ἢ ποίαι μᾶχαιραι αὐτῶν;
BOOK IV. vii. 1–5

CHAPTER VII

Of freedom from fear

What makes the tyrant an object of fear?—His guards, someone says, and their swords, and the chamberlain, and those who exclude persons who would enter.—Why, then, is it that, if you bring a child into the presence of the tyrant while he is with his guards, the child is not afraid? Is it because the child does not really feel the presence of the guards? If, then, a man really feels their presence, and that they have swords, but has come for that very purpose, for the reason that he wishes to die because of some misfortune, and he seeks to do so easily at the hand of another, he does not fear the guards, does he?—No, for what makes them terrible is just what he wants.—If, then, a man who has set his will neither upon dying nor upon living at any cost, but only as it is given him to live, comes into the presence of the tyrant, what is there to prevent such a man from coming into his presence without fear?—Nothing.—If, then, a man feel also about his property just as this other person feels about his body, and so about his children, and his wife, and if, in brief, he be in such a frame of mind, due to some madness or despair, that he cares not one whit about having, or not having, these things; but, as children playing with potsherds strive with one another about the game, but take no thought about the potsherds themselves, so this man also has reckoned the material things of life as nothing, but is glad to play with them and handle them—what kind of tyrant, or guards, or swords in the hands of guards can any more inspire fear in the breast of such a man?
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6 Εἰτα ὑπὸ μανίας μὲν δύναται τις οὕτως διατεθῆναι πρὸς τάῦτα καὶ ὑπὸ ἐθους οἱ Γαλλαῖοι: ὑπὸ λόγου δὲ καὶ ἀποδείξεως οὐδεὶς δύναται μαθεῖν, ὅτι ὁ θεὸς πάντα πεποίηκεν τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν κόσμον ὅλον μὲν ἀκώλυτον καὶ αὐτοτελῆ, τὰ ἐν μέρει δ’ αὐτοῦ

7 πρὸς χρείαν τῶν ὅλων; τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα πάντα ἀπηλλακται τοῦ δύνασθαι παρακολουθεῖν τῇ διοικήσει αὐτοῦ· τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ξὼν ἀφορμὰς ἔχει πρὸς ἀναλογισμὸν τούτων ἀπάντων, ὅτι τε μέρος ἔστι καὶ ποιῶν τι μέρος καὶ ὅτι τὰ μέρη

8 τοῖς ὅλοις εἶκεν ἔχει καλῶς. πρὸς τούτοις δὲ φύσει γενναίον καὶ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ ἔλευθερον γενόμενον ἡρᾶ, διότι τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ τὰ μὲν ἀκώλυτα ἔχει καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, τὰ δὲ κωλυτὰ καὶ ἐπ’ ἄλλοις· ἀκώλυτα μὲν τὰ προαιρετικά, κωλυτὰ δὲ τὰ

9 ἀπροαιρέτα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὲν ἐν τούτοις μόνοις ἠγησηται τὸ ἁγαθὸν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ συμφέρων, τοῖς ἀκωλυτοῖς καὶ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ, ἔλευθερον ἔσται, εὐροῦν, εὐδαιμον, ἀβλαβές, μεγαλόφρον, εὔσεβες, χάριν ἔχον ὑπὲρ πάντων τῷ θεῷ, μηδαμοῦ μεμφόμενον μηδενὶ τῶν γενομένων,

10 μηδενὶ ἠγκαλοῦν· ἀν δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἑκτὸς καὶ ἀπροαιρέτοις, ἀνάγκη κωλύεσθαι αὐτῷ, ἐμποδίζεσθαι, δουλεύειν τοῖς ἑκείνων ἔχουσιν ἐξουσίαν,

1 Schweighäuser: μηδεν S.

1 Obviously referring to the Christians, as the Scholiast saw. Cf. also II. 9, 19–21 and note, and Introd. p. xxvi f.

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Therefore, if madness can produce this attitude of mind toward the things which have just been mentioned, and also habit, as with the Galilaeans,¹ cannot reason and demonstration teach a man that God has made all things in the universe, and the whole universe itself, to be free from hindrance, and to contain its end in itself, and the parts of it to serve the needs of the whole? Now all other animals have been excluded from the capacity to understand the governance of God, but the rational animal, man, possesses faculties that enable him to consider all these things, both that he is a part of them, and what kind of part of them he is, and that it is well for the parts to yield to the whole. And furthermore, being by nature noble, and high-minded, and free, the rational animal, man, sees that he has some of the things which are about him free from hindrance and under his control, but that others are subject to hindrance and under the control of others. Free from hindrance are those things which lie in the sphere of the moral purpose, and subject to hindrance are those which lie outside the sphere of the moral purpose. And so, if he regards his own good and advantage as residing in these things alone, in those, namely, which are free from hindrance and under his control, he will be free, serene, happy, unharmed, high-minded, reverent, giving thanks for all things to God, under no circumstances finding fault with anything that has happened, nor blaming anything; if, however, he regards his good and advantage as residing in externals and things outside the sphere of his moral purpose, he must needs be hindered and restrained, be a slave to those who have control over these things.
11 ἀ τεθαύμακεν καὶ φοβεῖται, ἀνάγκη δ’ ἀσεβὲς εἶναι ἄτε βλάπτεσθαι οἰόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ άνισον, αἰε αὐτῷ τοῦ πλείονος περιποιητικοῦ, ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ταπεινὸν εἶναι καὶ μικροπρεπὲς.

12 Ταῦτα τί κωλύει διαλαβόντα ζην κούφως καὶ εὐηνίως, πάντα τὰ 1 συμβαίνειν δυνάμενα πρῶς ἐκδεχόμενον, τά δ’ ἡδὴ συμβεβηκότα φέροντα;


15 “ἀλλ’ ἡδὴ καίρος ἀποθανεῖν.” τί λέγεις ἀποθανεῖν; μὴ τραγῳδεῖ τὸ πράγμα, ἀλλ’ εἰπὲ ὡς ἔχει “ἡδὴ καίρος τὴν ὑλήν, ἔξ’ ὄν συνήλθεν, εἰς ἐκεῖνα πάλιν ἀποκαταστήσω.” καὶ τί δεινόν; τί μέλλει ἀπολλυσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, τί γενέσθαι καίνον, παράλογον; τούτων ἐνεκα φοβερὸς ἔστιν ὁ τύραννος; διὰ ταῦτα οἱ δορυφόροι μεγάλας δοκοῦσιν ἐχειν τὰς μαχαίρας καὶ

1 τὰ supplied by Sb.

2 These last seven words (with the change of ἔχεις before ἀναρχίαν to θέλεις, by Schenkl) in the scholia a little below this point were seen by Lindsay to belong here.

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which he has admired and fears; he must needs be irreverent, forasmuch as he thinks that God is injuring him, and be unfair, always trying to secure for himself more than his share, and must needs be of an abject and mean spirit.

When a man has once grasped all this, what is there to prevent him from living with a light heart and an obedient disposition; with a gentle spirit awaiting anything that may yet befall, and enduring that which has already befallen? "Would you have me bear poverty?" Bring it on and you shall see what poverty is when it finds a good actor to play the part. "Would you have me hold office?" Bring it on. "Would you have me suffer deprivation of office?" Bring it on. "Well, and would you have me bear troubles?" Bring them on too. "Well, and exile?" Wherever I go it will be well with me, for here where I am it was well with me, not because of my location, but because of my judgements, and these I shall carry away with me; nor, indeed, can any man take these away from me, but they are the only things that are mine, and they cannot be taken away, and with the possession of them I am content, wherever I be and whatever I do. "But it is now time to die." Why say "die"? Make no tragic parade of the matter, but speak of it as it is: "It is now time for the material of which you are constituted to be restored to those elements from which it came." And what is there terrible about that? What one of the things that make up the universe will be lost, what novel or unreasonable thing will have taken place? Is it for this that the tyrant inspires fear? Is it because of this that his guards seem to have long and sharp
17 οὐχὶ τοῦ σώματός σου 1 κύριός εἰμι;”
18 “οὐχὶ τοῦ κτησιδίου;”
19 Τίνα οὖν ἐτι φοβηθήναι δύναμαι; τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ κοιτῶνος; μὴ τί ποιήσωσιν; ἀποκλείσωσι με; ἀν μὲ εὐρωσι θέλοντα εἰσέλθειν, ἀποκλεισάτωσαν.—Τί οὖν ἔρχη ἐπὶ θύρας;—"Οτι καθήκειν ἐμαυτῷ δοκῶ μενούσης τῆς παιδίας συμπαίξειν.—Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἀποκλεῖῃ;—"Οτι ἄν μὴ τίς με δέχηται, οὐ θέλω εἰσελθεῖν, ἄλλῃ ἄει μᾶλλον ἔκεινο θέλω τὸ γινόμενον. κρείττον γὰρ ἡγούμαι ὅ ὁ θέδος θέλει ἢ ὁ ἐγὼ. προσκείσομαι διάκονος καὶ ἄκολουθος ἔκεινο, συνορμῳ, συνορέγομαι,3 ἀπλῶς συνθέλω. ἀποκλεισμὸς ἐμοὶ οὖ γίνεται, ἄλλα τοῖς βιαζομένοις. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ βιαζομαι; οἶδα γὰρ, ὅτι ἔσω ἀγαθόν οὐδέν διαδίδοται τοῖς εἰσελθοῦσιν. ἄλλ’ ὅταν ἀκοῦσω

1 Schweighäuser (after Wolf): μουν and εἰ S.
2 s and Schenkl, who adds μοι: πειράσομαι σον τὴν ἀρχὴν S.
3 Wolf (after Schegk): ὀρέγομαι S.

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BOOK IV. VII. 16–21

swords? Let others see to that; I have considered all this, no one has authority over me. I have been set free by God, I know His commands, no one has power any longer to make a slave of me, I have the right kind of emancipator, and the right kind of judges. “Am I not master of your body?” Very well, what is that to me? “Am I not master of your paltry property?” Very well, what is that to me? “Am I not master of exile or bonds?” Again I yield up to you all these things and my whole paltry body itself, whenever you will. Do make trial of your power, and you will find out how far it extends.

Who is there, then, that I can any longer be afraid of? Shall I be afraid of the chamberlains? For fear they do what? Lock the door in my face? If they find me wanting to enter, let them lock the door in my face!—Why, then, do you go to the gate of the palace?—Because I think it fitting for me to join in the game while the game lasts.—How, then, is it that you are not locked out?—Because, if anyone will not receive me, I do not care to go in, but always I wish rather the thing which takes place. For I regard God’s will as better than my will. I shall attach myself to Him as a servant and follower, my choice is one with His, my desire one with His, in a word, my will is one with His will. No door is locked in my face, but rather in the face of those who would force themselves in. Why, then, do I not force myself in? Why, because I know that within nothing good is distributed among those who have entered. But when I hear someone called blessed,

1 That is, it cannot properly be said of a man that he is “locked out” if he does not “wish” to enter.


τιν'α μακαριζόμενον, ὅτι τιμᾶται ὑπὸ τοῦ Καί-
σαρος, λέγω "τί αὐτῷ συμβαίνει; μή τι οὖν
καὶ δόγμα, οἷον δεῖ ἐπαρχία; ἡ μή τι οὖν καὶ
tὸ χρῆσθαι ἐπιτροπῆ; τί ἐτί διωθοῦμαι; ἵσχα-

dοκάρνα τις διαρρήπτευ· τὰ παιδία ἀρπάζει καὶ
ἀλλήλοις διαμάχεται: οἱ ἀνδρεῖς οὖν, μικροῦ
γὰρ αὐτὸ ἤγονται. ἄν ὁ ὀστράκια διαρρήπτῇ

tis, οὐδὲ τὰ παιδία ἀρπάζει. ἐπαρχίαι διαδι-
δονται ὃφεται τὰ παιδία. ἁργυρίων ὃφεται
tὰ παιδία. στρατηγία, ὑπατεία διαρράξετω
tὰ παιδία· ἐκκλείσθω, τυπτέσθω, καταφίλετω

tὰς χείρας τοῦ διδόντος, τῶν δούλων ἐμοὶ δ'
ἰσχαδοκάρμου ἔστιν." τί οὖν, ἄν ἐπὸ τύχης
ῥιπτοῦντος αὐτοῦ ἐλθή εἰς τὸν κόλπου ἰσχαῖς;
ἀρας κατέφαγον ἄρας κατέφαγον

22 μέχρι τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἔστι καὶ
ἰσχάδα τιμῆσαι. ἢν δὲ κῦψω καὶ ἄλλον
ἀνατρέψω ὑπ' ἄλλου ἀνατραπῶ καὶ κολάκευσω
tοὺς εἰσείντας, ὅνκ ἄξια οὔτ' ἰσχαῖς οὔτ' ἄλλο τι
tῶν οὖν ἅγαθῶν, ἀ με ἀναπεπείκασιν οἱ φιλό-

23 σοφοὶ μη δοκεῖν ἅγαθὰ εἶναι.

24 Δείκνυε μοι τὰς μαχαίρας τῶν δορυφόρων.
"ἴδοι, ἥλικαι εἰσί καὶ πῶς ὀξείαι." τί οὖν
ποιοῦσιν αἱ μεγάλαι αὕται μάχαιραι καὶ ὀξείαι;

25 "ἀποκτενώνουσιν." πυρετὸς δὲ τὶ ποιεῖ; "ἄλλο

26 οὐδέν." κεραμίς δὲ τὶ ποιεῖ; "ἄλλο οὐδέν."

1 Schenkl: ἐπαρχίαν S. The passage is extremely condensed
if not actually lacunose. This comparatively simple change
enables one to secure the general sense required, whether
or not it was originally expressed in this form.

2 Bentley and Schenkl2: διαρρήπτῃ S. But cf. Trans. Amer.

2 Philol. Assoc. 52 (1921) 51.

3 ἅν added by Sc.

4 κατάφαγε s and Schenkl.

5 Wolf: κρύψω S.

6 Elter: εἰσόντας ("those who enter the palace") S.
because he is being honoured by Caesar, I say, "What is his portion? Does he, then, get also a judgement such as he ought to have for governing a province? Does he, then, get also the ability to administer a procuratorship? Why should I any longer push my way in? Somebody is scattering dried figs and nuts; the children snatch them up and fight with one another, the men do not, for they count this a small matter. But if somebody throws potsherds around, not even the children snatch them up. Governorships are being passed around. The children shall see to that. Money. The children shall see to that. A praetorship, a consulship. Let the children snatch them up; let the children have the door locked in their faces, take a beating, kiss the hands of the giver, and the hands of his slaves. As for me, it's a mere scattering of dried figs and nuts." But what, then, if, when the man is throwing them about, a dried fig chances to fall into my lap? I take it up and eat it. For I may properly value even a dried fig as much as that. But neither a dried fig, nor any other of the things not good, which the philosophers have persuaded me not to think good, is of sufficient value to warrant my grovelling and upsetting someone else, or being upset by him, or flattering those who have flung the dried figs among us.

Show me the swords of the guards. "See how large and how sharp they are!" What, then, do these large and sharp swords do? "They kill." And what does fever do? "Nothing else." And what does a tile do? "Nothing else." Do you

1 See note on IV. 6, 23.
θέλεις οὖν πάντα ταῦτα θαυμάζω καὶ προσκυνῶ καὶ δούλος πάντων περιέρχωμαι; μὴ γένοιτο:

27 ἀλλ᾽ ἀπαξ μαθὼν, ὅτι τὸ γενόμενον καὶ θαρηκόν ἔτι, ἵνα ὁ κόσμος μὴ ἵστηται μηδ᾽ ἐμποδίζῃται, οὐκετί διαφέρομαι, πότερον πυρετὸς αὐτὸ ποιήσει ἦ κεραμίς ἢ στρατιώτης, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δεὶ συγκρίναι, οὐδ᾽ ὅτι ἀποιωτέρον αὐτὸ καὶ ταχύτερον

28 ὁ στρατιώτης ποιήσει. ὅταν οὖν μήτε φοβῶμαι τι ὄν διαθεῖναι με δύναται μήτ᾽ ἐπιθυμῶ τινὸς ὄν παρασχεῖν, τί ἔτι θαυμάζω αὐτῶν, τί ἔτι τέθητα; τί φοβοῦμαι τοὺς δορυφόρους; τί χαίρω, ἂν μοι φιλανθρώπως λαλήσῃ καὶ ἀποδεξηταί με, καὶ ἄλλοις δηγοῦμαι, πῶς μοι

29 ἐλάλησεν; μὴ γὰρ Ἀχριδώτης ἐστίν, μὴ γὰρ Διογένης, ὅπιὸν ἐπαινοῖς αὐτοῦ ἀποδείξεις ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ; μὴ γὰρ τὸ ἱθὸς ἐξηλωκαί αὐτοῦ; ἀλλὰ τὴν παιδιὰν σῶζων ἔρχομαι πρὸς αὐτόν ἀλλὰ θανατικῶς μέχρις ἄν ὅτου μηδὲν ἀβελτήτερον κελεύῃ μηδ᾽ ἄρρυθμον. ἂν δὲ μοι λέγῃ “ἄπελθε ἐπὶ Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνων,” λέγω αὐτῷ “ζήτει ἄλλον” ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐκέτι παῖξον. “ἀπαγέ αὐτῶν.” ἀκολουθῶ ἐν παιδίᾳ, “ἀλλ᾽ ἀφαιρεῖται σοι ὁ τράχηλος.” ἐκείνῳ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἢϊ ἐπιμενεῖ, ὡμῶν δὲ τῶν πειθομένων; “ἀλλ᾽ ἀταφος ῥιφήσῃ.” εἰ ἐγὼ εἰμὶ ὁ νεκρός, ριφήσομαι εἰ δ᾽ ἄλλος

31 s: ἐμαυτόν S.

1 See note on IV. 1, 160.
2 As was sometimes done as a last insult to the dead. Epictetus may also have had in mind the celebrated remark of Diogenes before his death, who, when his friends protested against his request that he be thrown out unburied (Diogenes
want me, then, to respect and do obeisance to all these things, and to go about as the slave of them all? Far from it! But if once I have learned that what is born must also perish, so that the world may not stand still, nor be hampered, it makes no difference to me whether a fever shall bring that consummation, or a tile, or a soldier; but, if I must make a comparison, I know that the soldier will bring it about with less trouble and more speed. Seeing, therefore, that I neither fear anything of all that the tyrant is able to do with me, nor greatly desire anything of all that he is able to provide, why do I any longer admire him, why any longer stand in awe of him? Why am I afraid of his guards? Why do I rejoice if he speaks kindly to me and welcomes me, and why do I tell others how he spoke to me? He is not Socrates, is he, or Diogenes, so that his praise should be a proof of what I am? I have not been ambitious to imitate his character, have I? Nay, but acting as one who keeps the game going, I come to him and serve him so long as he commands me to do nothing foolish or unseemly. If, however, he says, "Go and bring Leon of Salamis," I reply, "Try to get someone else, for I am not playing any longer." "Take him off to prison," says the tyrant about me. "I follow, because that is part of the game." "But your head will be taken off." And does the tyrant’s head always stay in its place, and the heads of you who obey him? "But you will be thrown out unburied." If the corpse is I, then I shall be thrown out; but if I am something different from

Laertius, 6, 79), ironically suggested that his staff be laid by his side to keep away the dogs and carrion birds. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 1, 104; Ps.-Diog. Epist. 25.
32 eiμί τοῦ νεκροῦ, κομψότερον λέγε, ὡς ἔχει τὸ πράγμα, καὶ μὴ ἐκφοβεῖ με. τοῖς παιδίοις ταῦτα φοβερά ἔστι καὶ τοῖς ἀνοίγοις, εἰ δὲ τις εἰς φιλοσόφου σχολὴν ἀπαξ ἐισελθὼν οὐκ οἶเดν, τί ἔστιν αὐτὸς, ἀξίος ἔστι φοβεῖσθαι καὶ κολακεύειν οὐσπερ πρότερον ἔκολακενεν εἰ μὴ πο μεμάθηκεν. ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σάρξ οὐδ' ὡστὰ οὐδὲ νεῦρα, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦτος χρώμενον, τὸ καὶ διουκοῦν καὶ παρακολουθοῦν ταῖς φαντασίαις.

33 Ναι ἄλλ' οἱ λόγοι οὕτωι καταφρονητὰς ποιοῦσι τῶν νόμων.—Καὶ ποιοὶ μᾶλλον λόγοι πειθομένους παρέχουσι τοῖς νόμοις τοὺς χρωμένους; νόμος δ' οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ἐπὶ μωρῷ. καὶ ὁμως ὅρα, πῶς καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοὺς ὡς δεὶ ἔχουνα παρασκευάζουσιν, οἱ γε διδάσκουσιν μηδενὸς ἀντιποιεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτούς, ἐν οἷς ἂν ἦμας νικήσαι δύνωνται.3 περὶ τὸ σωμάτιον διδάσκοντι εἰςτασθαί, περί τὴν κτήσιν εἰςτασθαί, περὶ τὰ τέκνα, γονεῖς, ἀδελφοῦς, πάντων παραχωρεῖν, πάντα ἀφιέναι μόνα τὰ δόγματα ὑπεξαιροῦνται, ᾧ καὶ ο Ἑβως εἴσαρετα ἐκαστοῦ εἶναι ἠθέλησεν. ποία ἐνθάδε παρανομία, ποία ἄβελτερία; ὅπου κρέπτων εἰ καὶ ξυρότερος, ἐκεῖ σοι εἰςτασμαί ὅπου πάλιν ἐγώ κρέπτων, σὺ παραχώρει μοι. ἔμοι γὰρ μεμέληκεν, σοὶ δ' οὐ. σοὶ μέλει, πῶς ἐν ὀρθοστρώτοις οἰκῆς, ἔτι4 πῶς παίδες σοι καὶ πιλλάτοι διακονώσιν, πῶς

1 οὐσπερ Capps (Schweighäuser οὐσ), πρότερον Oldfather (in part after Page): ὃ θυσερον (sic) S. Capps would prefer οὐσπερ νῦν κολακεύεις.
2 Schenkl: S uncertain.
3 Schweighäuser: δύνωνται S.
4 Schenkl: οἰχήσεται S.
the corpse, speak with more discrimination, as the fact is, and do not try to terrify me. These things are terrifying to the children and the fools. But if a man who has once entered a philosopher's lecture does not know what he himself is, he deserves to be in a state of fear, and also to flatter those whom he used to flatter before;¹ if he has not yet learned that he is not flesh, nor bones, nor sinews, but that which employs these, that which both governs the impressions of the senses and understands them.

Oh yes, but statements like these make men despise the laws.—Quite the contrary, what statements other than these make the men who follow them more ready to obey the laws? Law is not simply anything that is in the power of a fool. And yet see how these statements make us behave properly even toward these fools, because they teach us to claim against such persons nothing in which they can surpass us. They teach us to give way when it comes to our paltry body, to give way when it comes to our property, to our children, parents, brothers, to retire from everything, let everything go; they except only our judgements, and it was the will of Zeus also that these should be each man's special possession. What do you mean by speaking of lawlessness and stupidity here? Where you are superior and stronger, there I give way to you; and again, where I am superior, you retire in favour of me. For I have made these matters my concern, and you have not. It is your concern how to live in marble halls,² and further, how slaves and freedmen are to

¹ That is, before he began to attend lectures in philosophy. But the text is highly uncertain.
² Strictly speaking, walls covered with a veneer of variegated marble.
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38 ἐσθήτα περίβλεπτον φορής, πῶς κυνηγοῦς πολ-

39 λούς ἔχης, πῶς κιθαρῳδοὺς, τραγῳδοὺς. μὴ τι ἀντιποιοῦμαι; μὴ τι οὖν δογμάτων σοι μεμέ-

ληκε; μὴ τι τοῦ λόγου τοῦ σεαυτοῦ; μὴ τι οίδας, ἐκ τίνων μορίων συνέστηκεν, πῶς συνά-

γεται, τίς ἡ διάρθρωσις αὐτοῦ, τίνας ἔχει
dυνάμεις καὶ ποιὰς τινὰς; τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς,
ei ἄλλος ἐν τούτοις σου πλέον ἔχει ὁ μεμελε-

τηκῶς;—'Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ μέγιστα.—Καὶ
tίς σε κωλύει περὶ ταύτ' ἀναστρέφεσθαι καὶ
tούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; τίς δὲ μείζονα ἔχει πα-

ρασκευὴν βιβλίων, εὐσχολίας, τῶν ὀφελησώντων;

40 μόνου ἀπόνευσον ποτὲ ἐπὶ ταύτα, ἀπόνειμον καὶν

ὀλίγον χρόνον τῷ σαυτῷ ἡγεμονικῷ· σκέψαι τί

πότ' ἔχεις τούτῳ καὶ πόθεν ἐληλυθός, τὸ πάσιν

tοῖς ἄλλοις χρόμενον, πάντα τάλλα δοκίμαζοι,

41 ἐκλεγόμενου, ἀπεκλεγόμενον. μέχρι δ' ἂν οὐ

περὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀναστρέφη, ἐκεῖνα ἔχεις οὐδὲν, τόῦτο δ' οἰον αὐτὸ ἔχειν θέλεις, ῥυπαρὸν καὶ

ἀτημέλητον.

η'. Πρὸς τοὺς ταχέως ἐπὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῶν

φιλοσόφων ἐπιπηδῶντας.

1 Μηδὲποτ' ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν τινὰ μὴτ ἐπαι-

νέσητε μήτε ψεξήτε μήτε τεχνην τινὰ ἡ ἀτεχ-

1 Those who sang to their own accompaniment on the harp.

2 See IV. 4, 44.
serve you, how you are to wear conspicuous clothing, how to have many hunting dogs, citharoedes,¹ and tragedians. I do not lay claim to any of these, do I? You, then, have never concerned yourself with judgements, have you? Or with your own reason, have you? You do not know, do you, what are its constituent parts, how it is composed, what its arrangement is, what faculties it has, and what their nature is? Why, then, are you disturbed if someone else, the man, namely, who has concerned himself with these matters, has the advantage of you therein? —But these are the most important things that there are.—And who is there to prevent you from concerning yourself with these matters, and devoting your attention to them? And who is better provided with books, leisure, and persons to help you? Only begin some time to turn your mind to these matters; devote a little time, if no more, to your own governing principle; consider what this thing is which you possess, and where it has come from, the thing which utilizes everything else, submits everything else to the test, selects, and rejects. But so long as you concern yourself with externals, you will possess them in a way that no one else can match, but you will have this governing faculty in the state in which you want to have it, that is, dirty and neglected.

CHAPTER VIII

To those who hastily assume the guise of the philosophers

Never bestow either praise or blame upon a man for the things which may be either good or bad,² nor
νίαν προσμαρτυρήσητε· καὶ ἀμα μὲν προπετείας
2 ἐαυτοὺς ἀπαλλάξετε, ἀμα δὲ κακοθείας. "οὔτος
tαχέως λούεται," κακῶς οὖν ποιεῖ; οὐ πάντως.
3 ἀλλὰ τί; ταχέως λούεται.—Πάντα οὖν καλῶς
γίνεται;—Οὔδαμὼς· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ δογμά-
tων ὀρθῶν καλῶς, τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ μοχθηρῶν μοχ-
θηρῶς. οὐ δὲ μέχρις ἀν καταμάθῃς τὸ δόγμα, ἥφ' 
οὔ τις ποιεῖ ἑκαστα, μήτ' ἐπαίνει τὸ ἔργον μήτε
4 ψέγε. δόγμα δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥαδίως κρίνεται.
"οὔτος τέκτων ἐστίν." διὰ τί; "χρήται σκε-
πάρμων." τί οὖν τούτο; "οὔτος μουσικός· ἢ
gύρ." καὶ τί τούτο; "οὔτος φιλόσοφος." διὰ
5 τί; "τρίβωνα γάρ ἔχει καὶ κόμην." οἱ δ' 
ἀγύρται τί ἔχουσιν; διὰ τούτο, ἀν ἀσχημο-
νοῦντα τις ἓδη τίνα αὐτῶν, εὐθὺς λέγει "ίδον 
ὁ φιλόσοφος τίνος ποιεῖ." ἐδεῖ δ' ἢφ' ὃν ἡσχη-
μόνει μᾶλλον λέγειν αὐτόν μή εἶναι φιλόσοφον.
6 εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου πρὸ-
ληψις καὶ ἐπαγγελία, ἔχειν τρίβωνα καὶ κόμην,
καλῶς ἀν ἔλεγον· εἰ δ' ἐκείνη μᾶλλον, ἀναμάρ-
tητον εἶναι, διὰ τί οὐχὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πληροῦν 
tὴν ἐπαγγελίαν ἀφαιροῦνται αὐτῶν τῆς προσηγορίας;
7 οὔτως γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. ὅταν
ἳδη τις κακῶς πελεκώντα, οὐ λέγει "τί ὄφελος 
tεκτονικῆς; ἰδοὺ οἱ τέκτονες οἷα ποιοῦσι κακά," 
アルバム τῶν τούπαντιον λέγει "οὔτος οὐκ ἐστὶ

1 τί added by Reiske.

1 That is, no conclusion about right or wrong can be drawn from an action, in itself indifferent, the moral purpose of which one does not know.
credit him with either skill or want of skill; and by so doing you will escape from both rashness and malice. "This man is hasty about bathing." Does he, therefore, do wrong? Not at all. But what is he doing? He is hasty about bathing.—Is all well, then?—That by no means follows; but only the act which proceeds from correct judgements is well done, and that which proceeds from bad judgements is badly done. Yet until you learn the judgement from which a man performs each separate act, neither praise his action nor blame it. But a judgement is not readily determined by externals. "This man is a carpenter." Why? "He uses an adze." What, then, has that to do with the case? "This man is a musician, for he sings." And what has that to do with the case? "This man is a philosopher." Why? "Because he wears a rough cloak and long hair." And what do hedge-priests wear? That is why, when a man sees some one of them misbehaving, he immediately says, "See what the philosopher is doing." But he ought rather to have said, judging from the misbehaviour, that the person in question was not a philosopher. For if the prime conception and profession of the philosopher is to wear a rough cloak and long hair, their statement would be correct; but if it is rather this, to be free from error, why do they not take away from him the designation of philosopher, because he does not fulfil the profession of one? For that is the way men do in the case of the other arts. When someone sees a fellow hewing clumsily with an axe, he does not say, "What's the use of carpentry? See the bad work the carpenters do!" but quite the contrary, he says, "This fellow is no
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8 τέκτων, πελεκά γὰρ κακῶς," ὁμοίως κἂν ἄδουτός τινος ἀκούσῃ κακῶς, οὐ λέγει "ιδοὺ πῶς ἄδουσιν οἱ μουσικοὶ," ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅτι "οὕτος ὃς ἐστὶ μουσικὸς." ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίας δὲ μόνης τοῦτο πᾶσχουσιν ὅταν τινὰ ὦσσι παρὰ τὸ ἐπάγγελμα τὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ποιοῦντα, οὐχὶ τῆς προσηγορίας ἀφαιροῦνται αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ θέντες εἶναι φιλόσοφοι, εἰτ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ γινομένου λαβόντες, ὃτι ἀσχημονεῖ, ἐπάγουσι μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν.

9 Τί οὖν τὸ αἵτιον; ὃτι τὴν μὲν τοῦ τέκτωνος πρόληψιν προσβεῦομεν καὶ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ καὶ ὀσαύτως τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, τῆς τοῦ φιλοσόφου δ' οὖ, ἀλλ' ἂν συγκεκριμένη καὶ ἀδιάρθρωτον ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς μόνον κρίνομεν. καὶ ποία ἄλλη τέχνη ἀπὸ σχήματος ἀναλαμβάνεται καὶ κόμης, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ θεωρήματα ἔχει καὶ ὕλην καὶ τέλος; τίς οὖν ὑλή τοῦ φιλοσόφου; μή τρίβων; οὐ, ἀλλὰ ὁ λόγος. τί τέλος; μή τι φορεῖν τρίβωνα; οὐ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. ποία θεωρήματα; μή τι τὰ περὶ τοῦ πῶς πῶς ὑπόθεσις γίνεται ἡ κόμη βαθεῖα; ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἃ Ζήτων λέγει, γνώσιν τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεία, ποιόν τι ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ καὶ πῶς ἀρμόττεται πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ ὀσά τούτως ἀκόλουθα ἐστιν. οὐ θέλεις οὖν ἰδεῖν πρῶτον, εἰ πληροὶ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν ἀσχημονοῦν,

10 1 s: οὕτως ὅτι S.

1 The technical terminology of syllogistic reasoning is employed. Men "assume" or "lay down" (θέντες) the general principle in the major premiss; "take" (λαβόντες) from 378
carpenter, for he hews clumsily with the axe.” And, similarly, if a man hears somebody singing badly, he does not say, “See how the musicians sing!” but rather, “This fellow is no musician.” But it is only in the case of philosophy that men behave like this; when they see somebody acting contrary to the profession of the philosopher, they do not take away from him the designation of philosopher, but, assuming that he is a philosopher, and then taking \(^1\) from what goes on that he is misbehaving, they conclude that there is no good in being a philosopher.

What, then, is the reason for this? It is because we respect the prime conception of the carpenter, and the musician, and so also of all the other artisans and artists, while we do not respect that of the philosopher, but as if it were confused and inarticulate in our minds we judge of it only from externals. And what other art is there that is acquired by guise and hair-dress, and does not have also principles, and subject-matter, and end? What, then, is subject-matter for the philosopher? It is not a rough cloak, is it? No, but reason. What is end for the philosopher? It is not to wear a rough cloak, is it? No, but to keep his reason right. What is the nature of his principles? They do not have to do with the question how to grow a long beard, or a thick head of hair, do they? Nay, rather, as Zeno says, to understand the elements of reason, what the nature of each one is, and how they are fitted one to another, and all the consequences of these facts. Will you not, therefore, observe first of all whether the philosopher fulfils his profession by misbehaving, observation or experience a fact as a minor premiss; and then “induce” or “conclude” (ἐπάγονσι).
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

καὶ οὕτως τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι ἐγκαλεῖν; νῦν δ', αὐτὸς ὅταν σωφρονίς, ἐξ ὧν ποιεῖν σοι δοκεῖ κακῶς, λέγεις "όρα τὸν φιλόσοφον" (ὡς 1 πρέποντος λέγειν τὸν τὰ τοιαύτα 2 ποιοῦντα φιλόσοφον) καὶ πάλιν "τούτο φιλόσοφός ἐστιν;" 3 "όρα" δὲ "τὸν τέκτονα" οὐ λέγεις, ὅταν μουχεύοντα τινὰ γνῶς ἢ λιχνεύοντα ἴδης, οὐδὲ "όρα τὸν μουσικόν." οὕτως ἐπὶ ποσὸν 4 αἰσθάνη καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τοῦ φιλοσόφου, ἀπολισθάνεις δὲ καὶ συγχέῃ ὑπὸ ἀμελητησίας.

14 'Ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸι οἱ καλοῦμενοι φιλόσοφοι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν τὸ πρᾶγμα μετίσαιν· εὐθὺς ἀναλαβόντες τρίβωνα καὶ πώγωνα καθέντες φασιν
"ἐγὼ φιλόσοφός εἰμι." οὐδεὶς δ' ἐρεῖ "ἐγὼ μουσικός εἰμι," ἃν πλήκτρον καὶ κιθάραν ἀγοράσῃ, οὐδ' "ἐγὼ χαλκεύς εἰμι," ἃν πιλίον καὶ περίζωμα περιθήται, ἀλλ' ἀρμόζεται μὲν τὸ σχῆμα πρὸς τὴν τέχνην, ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης δὲ τὸ ὄνομα, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ σχῆματος ἀναλαμβάνουσιν.

16 διὰ τούτῳ καλῶς Ἐυφράτης ἐλεγεν ὅτι "ἐπὶ πολὺ ἐπειρώμην λανθάνειν φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ἦν μοι," φησίν, "τούτῳ ωφέλιμοι. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἤδειν, ὅσα καλῶς ἐποίουν, ὅτι οὐ διὰ τοὺς θεατὰς ἐποίουν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐμαυτῶν ἦσθιον ἐμαυτῷ καλῶς, κατεσταλμένου εἴχον τὸ βλέμμα, τὸν

1 οὐ after ὡς deleted by Sb.
2 τοιαύτα added by Schenkl (after Wolf).
3 Elter's punctuation.
BOOK IV. viii. 13-17

and then, if that be the case, blame his way of acting? But as it is, when you yourself are behaving decently, you say, on the basis of the evil that he seems to you to be doing, "Look at the philosopher," just as though it were proper to call a man who acts like that a philosopher; and again, "Is that what a philosopher is?" But you do not say, "Look at the carpenter," when you know that a man is an adulterer, or see a man eating greedily, nor do you say, under similar circumstances, "Look at the musician." Thus to a certain degree you too realize what the philosopher's profession is, but you back-slide and get confused through carelessness.

But even those who are styled philosophers pursue their calling with means which are sometimes good and sometimes bad. For example, when they have taken a rough cloak and let their beards grow, they say, "I am a philosopher." But nobody will say, "I am a musician," if he buys a plectrum and a cithara; nor, "I am a smith," if he puts on a felt cap and an apron; but the guise is fitted to the art, and they get their name from the art, but not from the guise. That is why Euphrates\(^1\) was right when he used to say: "For a long time I tried not to let people know that I was a philosopher, and this," he says, "was useful to me. For, in the first place, I knew that whatever I did well, I did so, not on account of the spectators, but on my own account; it was for my own sake that I ate well, and kept my countenance

\(^1\) See on III. 15, 8, and compare for the uncertainty in men's minds how to classify Euphrates, Apollonius of Tyana, Epistles, 1.

\(^4\) Upton: πόσον S.
ARRIANS DISCOURSES OF EPICLETUS

18 περίπατον τάντα ἐμαντώ καὶ θεό. εἶτα ὦσπερ μόνος ἡγωνιζόμην, οὐτώς μόνος καὶ ἐκινδυνεύον, οὐδὲν ἐμοὶ δράσαντι τὸ αἰσχρόν ἢ ἀπρεπὲς τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐκινδυνεύετο, οὐδὲ ἐβλαπτον τούς πολλοὺς ὡς φιλόσοφος ἀμαρτάνων. διὰ τούτο οἱ μὴ εἰδότες μου τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἐθαύμαζον, πῶς πᾶσι φιλόσοφοις χρώμενος καὶ συζών αὐτὸς
19 οὐκ ἐφιλοσόφουν, καὶ τί κακὸν, ἐν οἷς ἐποίουν ἑπιγιγνώσκεσθαι τὸν φιλόσοφον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς συμβόλοις μὴ;

Βλέπε, πῶς ἐσθίω, πῶς πίω, πῶς καθεύδω, πῶς ἀνέχομαι, πῶς ἀπέχομαι, πῶς συνεργῶ, πῶς ὀρέξει χρώμαι, πῶς ἐκκλίσει, πῶς τὴρ χαῖς σχέσεις τὰς φυσικὰς ἢ ἐπιθέτους ἀσυγχύτως καὶ ἀπαραποδίστους ἐκεῖθεν με κρίνε, εἰ δύνασαι: εἰ δ' οὕτως κωφὸς εἰ καὶ τυφλός, ἢν μηδὲ τὸν Ἡφαιστόν ὑπολαμβάνῃς καλὸν χαλκέα, ἄν μὴ τὸ πιλόν ἑδο περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν περικείμενον, τί κακὸν ὑπ' οὕτως ἥλιθιον κριτοῦ ἀγνοεῖσθαι;

20 Οὕτως ἔλαυθανε 2 παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις Σωκράτης καὶ ἦρχοντο πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀξιούντες φιλο-

23 σόφοις συσταθῆμαι. μὴ τι οὖν ἡγανάκτει ὡς ἡμέις καὶ ἔλεγεν, ἡγὼ δὲ σοι οὐ φαίνομαι

24 φιλόσοφος; ἀλλ' ἀπῆγεν καὶ συνίστα ἐνί ἀρκούμενος τῷ εἶναι φιλόσοφος, χαίρων δὲ καὶ ὢτι μὴ δοκῶν οὐκ ἐθάνκετο' ἐμέμνητο γὰρ τοῦ ἠδίου ἐργον. τί ἐργον καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ; μα-

1 τῆς supplied by Reiske.
2 Sb in margin: ἔλαυθα S.

1 See note on III. 23. 21.

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BOOK IV. viii. 17-24

and gait composed; it was all for myself and for God. And, secondly, as the contest was mine alone, so also I alone ran the risks; in no respect through me, if I did what was disgraceful or unseemly, did the cause of philosophy come into danger, nor did I do harm to the multitude by going wrong as a philosopher. For that reason those who were ignorant of my purpose wondered how it was that, although I was familiar with all the philosophers and lived with them, I was myself not acting in the rôle of a philosopher. And what harm was there in having the philosopher that I was, recognized by what I did, rather than by the outward signs?"

See how I eat, how drink, how sleep, how endure, how refrain, how help, how employ desire and how aversion, how I observe my relationships, whether they be natural or acquired, without confusion and without hindrance; judge me on the basis of all this, if you know how. But if you are so deaf and blind as not to regard even Hephaestus as a good smith unless you see the felt cap resting on his head, what harm can come from passing unrecognized by a judge so foolish?

In this way the great majority of men failed to recognize Socrates, and so they used to come to him and ask to be introduced to philosophers! Was he, then, irritated as we are, and would he say, "And don't I look like a philosopher to you?" No, but he used to take them and introduce them, and was satisfied with one thing, that is, being a philosopher, and glad that he was not annoyed at not being taken for one; for he habitually bore in mind his own proper function. What is the function of a good and excellent man? To have many
θητὰς πολλοὺς ἔχειν; οὐδαμῶς. ὁφονται οἱ περὶ τοῦτο ἐσπουδακοτες. ἀλλὰ θεωρήματα δύσκολα ἀκριβοῦν; ὁφονται καὶ περὶ τοῦτων ἄλλοι. ποῦ οὖν αὐτὸς καὶ ἢν τις καὶ εἶναι ήθελεν; ὅπου βλάβη καὶ ὄφελεια. "εἰ μὲ τις," φησίν, "βλάψαι δύναται, ἐγὼ οὐδὲν ποιῶ. εἰ ἄλλον περιμένω, ἰνα με ὄφελίσῃ, ἐγὼ οὐδὲν εἰμι. θέλω τι καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἐγὼ ἄτυχής εἰμι."  

25 εἰς τοσοῦτο σκάμμα προεκαλεῖτο πάντα οὐσιναύν καὶ οὐκ ἂν μοι δοκεῖ ἐκστήναι οὐδενί—τι δοκεῖτε; καταγγέλλων καὶ λέγων "ἐγὼ τοιοῦτος εἰμι"; μὴ γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ ἄν τοιοῦτος.  

26 πάλιν γὰρ τοῦτο μωροῦ καὶ ἀλαζόνος "ἐγὼ ἀπαθής εἰμι καὶ ἀτάραχος μὴ ἀγνοεῖτε, ὡ ἀνθρωποι, ὦτι υμῶν κυκωμένων 1 καὶ θορυβούμενών περὶ τὰ μηδενὸς ἀξία μόνος ἐγὼ ἀπῆλλα λαγμαὶ πάσης παραχῆς." οὕτως οὐκ ἀρκεῖ σοι τὸ μηδὲν ἀλγεῖν, ἰν μὴ κηρύσσῃ "συνελθετε πάντες οἱ ποδαγρῶντες, οἱ κεφαλαλγοῦντες, οἱ πυρέσσοντες, οἱ χωλοί, οἱ τυφλοί, καὶ ἰδετε με ἀπὸ παντὸς πάθους ύγιὰ"; τοῦτο κενοῦ καὶ φορτικὸν, εἰ μὴ τι ὡς ὦ Ἀσκληπιίδος εὐθὺς ύποδεῖξαι δύνασαι, πῶς θεραπεύοντες αὐθίς 2 ἔσονται ἄνοσοι κάκεινοι, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο φέρεις παράδειγμα τὴν ύγείαν τὴν σεαυτοῦ.  

27 καὶ τοιοῦτοι γὰρ τίς ἐστιν ὁ Κυνικὸς τοῦ σκιήπτρου καὶ διαδήματος ἤξιωμένος παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ  

1 Reiske: κοιμώμενων S.  

2 Reiske: εὐθὺς S.  

1 See note on IV. 6, 23.  

2 Strictly speaking, the loosened and smoothed earth on 384
BOOK IV, VIII. 24–30

pupils? Not at all. Those who have set their hearts on it shall see to that. Well, is it to set forth difficult principles with great precision? Other men shall see to these things also. In what field was he, then, somebody, and wished so to be? In the field where there was hurt and help. "If," says he, "a man can hurt me, what I am engaged in amounts to nothing; if I wait for somebody else to help me, I am myself nothing. If I want something and it does not happen, it follows that I am miserable." This was the mighty ring to which he challenged every man whomsoever, and therein he would not, I believe, have given way before anyone in—what do you suppose?—in proclaiming and asserting "I am such and such a man"? Far from it! but in being such and such a man. For, again, it is the part of a fool and blowhard to say, "I am tranquil and serene; be not ignorant, O men, that while you are tossed about and are in turmoil over worthless things, I alone am free from every perturbation." So is it not enough for you yourself to feel no pain without proclaiming, "Come together, all you who are suffering from gout, headaches, and fever, the halt, and the blind, and see how sound I am, and free from every disorder"? That is a vain and vulgar thing to say, unless, like Asclepius, you are able at once to show by what treatment those others will also become well again, and for this end are producing your own good health as an example.

Such is the way of the Cynic who is deemed worthy of the sceptre and diadem of Zeus, and which wrestling matches were held, the ancient equivalent of our ring.
λέγων "ίν" ἱδητε, ὁ ἄνθρωποι, ὅτι τῆν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ ἀταραξίαν οὐχ ὅπου ἔστι ξητεῖτε,

31 ἀλλ' ὅπου μή ἔστιν, ἵδου ἐγὼ ὑμῖν παράδειγμα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀπέσταλμεν μήτε κτήσιν ἔχων 
μήτε οἶκων μήτε γνωκαίκα μήτε τέκνα, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὑπόστρωμα μηδὲ χιτώνα μηδὲ σκεύος· καὶ ἱδεῖτε, 
πῶς ὑγιαίων· πειράθητέ μου καὶ ἱδητε ἀτάραχον, 
ἀκούσατε τὰ φάρμακα καὶ ὑφ' ὃν ἐθεραπεύθην."

32 τούτῳ γὰρ ἦδη καὶ φιλάνθρωπον καὶ γενναίον. 
ἀλλ' ὄρατε, τίνος ἔργον ἔστιν· τοῦ Δίως ἡ ὁν ἄν ἐκείνος ἄξιον κρίνῃ ταύτης τῆς ὑπηρεσίας, 
ίνα μὴ δαμοῦ μηδὲν παραγμιμωσῆ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς, δι' οὗ τὴν μαρτυρίαν τὴν αὐτοῦ, ἢν 
τῇ ἀρετῇ μαρτυρεῖ καὶ τῶν ἑκτὸς καταμαρτυρεῖ, 
αὐτὸς ἄκυρον ποιήσῃ:

οὔτ' ὑχρήσαντα ¹ χρόα κάλλιμον οὔτε παρεῖδων 
δάκρυ' ὀμορξάμενον.

33 καὶ οὗ μόνου ταύτα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ποθοῦντα τι ἡ 
ἐπὶ ζητοῦντα, ἄνθρωπον ἡ τόπον ἡ διαγωγὴν, ως 
τὰ παιδία τῶν τρυγητῶν ἡ τὰς ἀργίας, αἰδοὶ 
πα. ταχοῦ κεκοσμημένον, ως οἱ ἄλλοι τοίχοις 
καὶ θύραις καὶ θυρωροῖς.

34 Νῦν ὁ αὐτὸ μόνον κινηθέντες πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, 
ὁς οἱ κακοστόμαχοι πρὸς τι βραμάτιον, ὁ μετὰ 
μικρὸν σικχαίνειν μέλλουσιν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ σκῆπ-

τρον, ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν, καθεῖκε τὴν κόμην, 
ἀνείληφε τρίβονα, γυμνὸν δεικνύει τὸν ὁμον, 
μάχεται τοῖς ἀπαντῶσιν κἂν ἐν φαίνολη τινὰ 

¹ Bentley: χαρῆσαντα S.

¹ Homer, Odyssey, XI. 529 f.
BOOK IV. viii. 30-34

says, "That you may see yourselves, O men, to be looking for happiness and serenity, not where it is, but where it is not, behold, God has sent me to you as an example; I have neither property, nor house, nor wife, nor children, no, not even so much as a bed, or a shirt, or a piece of furniture, and yet you see how healthy I am. Make trial of me, and if you see that I am free from turmoil, hear my remedies and the treatment which cured me." For this, at length, is an attitude both humane and noble. But see whose work it is; the work of Zeus, or of him whom Zeus deems worthy of this service, to the end that he shall never lay bare to the multitudes anything whereby he shall himself invalidate the testimony which it is his to give in behalf of virtue, and against externals.

"Never there fell o' er his beauteous features a pallor, nor ever
Wiped he the tears from his cheeks." 1

And not merely that, but he must neither yearn for anything, nor seek after it—be it human being, or place, or manner of life—like children seeking after the season of vintage, or holidays; he must be adorned on every side with self-respect, as all other men are with walls, and doors, and keepers of doors.

But, as it is, being merely moved towards philosophy, like dyspeptics who are moved to some paltry foods, which they are bound in a short while to loathe, immediately these men are off to the sceptre, to the kingdom. One of them lets his hair grow long, he takes up a rough cloak, he shows his bare shoulder, he quarrels with the people he meets, and if he sees somebody in an overcoat he quarrels
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

35 ἐδη, μάχεται αὐτῷ. ἄνθρωπε, χειμάσκησον πρῶτον. ἵδοι σου τὴν ὀρμήν, μὴ κακοστομάχον ἥ κισσώσης γυναικὸς ἑστιν. ἄγνοείσθαι μελέτησον πρῶτον, τὸς εἰς σαυτῷ φιλοσόφησον ὄλιγον χρόνου. οὐτως καρπὸς γίνεται: κατορυγήναι δὲ ἔις χρόνον τὸ σπέρμα, κρυφθῆναι, κατὰ μικρὸν αὐξηθῆναι, ἵνα τελεσφορίση. ἄν δὲ πρὸ τοῦ γόνου φύσαι τὸν στάχυν ἐξενέγκῃ, ἀτελὲς ἑστιν, ἐκ κήπου Ἀδωνιακοῦ. τοιοῦτον εἰ καὶ σὺ φυτάρμον. θάπτον τοῦ δέουντος ἡμῆς, ἀποκαύσει σε ὁ χειμών. ἵδοι, τί λέγουσιν οἱ γεωργοί περὶ τῶν σπερμάτων, ὅταν πρὸ ὀρας θερμασία γένονται; ἀγνωσίαν, μὴ ἔξυβρίσῃ τὰ σπέρματα, εἰτα αὐτὰ πάγος εἰς λαβὼν ἔξελενξη. ὅρα καὶ σὺ, ἄνθρωπος.

38 ἔξυβρικας, ἐπιπεπήδηκας δοξαρίῳ πρὸ ὀρας. δοκεῖς τις εἰναι, μωρὸς παρὰ μωροῖς. ἀποταγήσῃ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποτέπηγας ἣδη ἐν τῇ ρίζῃ κάτω, τὰ δὲ ἀνω σου μικρὸν ἐτι ἀνθεὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖς ἐτι ξῆν καὶ θάλλειν. ἄφες ἡμᾶς γε κατὰ φύσιν πεπαυθήναι. τὶ ἡμᾶς ἀποδεῖς, τὶ βιάζῃ; οὐτω δυνάμεσθα ἐνεγκείν τὸν ἀέρα. ἕανον τὴν ρίζαν

1 eis added by Schenkl.

1 Suggesting a very serious effort. See note on I. 2, 32.
2 Early spring house-gardens in honour of Adonis, where seeds were thickly planted in porous earthenware, sponges, and the like, sprouting luxuriantly, and of course quickly fading (cf. the reference to them in Isaiah, 1. 29: "Ye shall be confounded for the gardens that ye have chosen.") The expression became proverbial for incompleteness and early fading.
3 This metaphor is so preposterous, for it is always the extremities of plants which are the first to be frostbitten, and not the protected roots, that one is inclined to ask if the text

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with him. Man, take a winter's training first; look at your own choice, for fear it is like that of a dyspeptic, or a woman with the strange cravings of pregnancy. Practise first not to let men know who you are; keep your philosophy to yourself a little while. That is the way fruit is produced: the seed has to be buried and hidden for a season, and be grown by slow degrees, in order that it may come to perfection. But if it heads out before it produces the jointed stock, it never matures, it is from a garden of Adonis. That is the kind of plant you are too; you have blossomed prematurely, and the winter will blight you utterly. See what the farmers say about their seeds, when the hot weather comes before its proper time. They are in utmost anxiety lest the seeds should grow insolently lush, and then but a single frost should lay hold of them and expose their weakness. Man, do you also beware; you have grown insolently lush, you have leaped forward to occupy some petty reputation before its due time; you think yourself somebody, fool that you are among fools; you will be bitten by the frost, or rather, you have already been bitten by the frost, down at the root, while your upper part still blooms a little, and for that reason you seem to be still alive and flourishing. Allow us at least to ripen as nature wishes. Why do you expose us to the elements, why force us? We are not yet able to stand the open air. Let the root grow, next be sound. Clearly it is, since a whole series of corrections would have to be made in order to avoid the difficulty. Epictetus, a city dweller, probably knew little directly about the effects of frost on garden plants. The words "flower," "tree," and "herb" do not occur in his conversations at all, and even "plant" but rarely.—See note on IV. 11, 1.
αὐξηθήναι, εἶτα γόνυ λαβεῖν τὸ πρῶτον, εἶτα τὸ δεύτερον, εἶτα τὸ τρίτον· εἶθ᾽ οὕτως ὁ καρπὸς ἐκβιάσεται τὴν φύσιν, κἀν ἐγὼ μὴ θέλω.

41 Τίς γὰρ ἐγκύμων γενόμενος καὶ πλήρης τηλι-κούτων δογμάτων οὐχὶ αἰσθάνεται τε τῆς αὐτοῦ παρασκευῆς καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ κατάλληλα ἔργα ὀρμᾶ; ἀλλὰ ταύρος μὲν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν καὶ παρασκευῆν, ὅταν ἐπιφανῇ τι θηρίον, οὐδ᾽ ἀναμένει τὸν προτρεψόμενον, οὐδὲ κύων, ὅταν ἴδη τι τῶν ἀγρίων ξώων· ἐγώ δ᾽ ἂν ἵσχω τὴν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ παρασκευῆν, ἐκδέξομαι, ἵνα με σὺ παρα-σκευάσῃ ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔργα; τίν δ᾽ οὕτω ἔχω, πίστευσόν μοι. τί οὐν με πρὸ ὦρας ἀποξηράναι θέλεις, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐξηράνθης;

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θ᾽. Πρὸς τὸν εἰς ἀναισχυντίαν μεταβληθέντα.

1 "Ὅταν ἄλλου ἴδης ἀρχοντα, ἀντίθες, ὅτι σὺ ἔχεις τὸ μὴ δεῖσθαι ἀρχὴς· ὅταν ἄλλου πλου-2 τοῦτα, ἴδοι τί ἀντὶ τοῦτον ἔχεις. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν ἔχεις ἀντ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἄθλιος εἰ· εἰ δ᾽ ἔχεις τὸ μὴ χρείαν ἔχειν πλοῦτον, γίγνωσκε, ὅτι πλεῖον 3 ἔχεις καὶ πολλῷ πλείονος ἄξιον. ἄλλοις γυναῖκα εὐμορφον, σὺ τὸ μὴ ἔπιθυμεῖν εὐμόρφου γυναικὸς. μικρά σοι δοκεῖ ταῦτα; καὶ πόσον ἂν τιμή-4 σαιντο οὕτω αὐτοὶ οἱ πλουτοῦντες καὶ ἀρχοντες καὶ μετ᾽ εὐμόρφων διακτώμενοι δύνασθαι πλοῦτον καταφρονεῖν καὶ ἀρχὸν καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τῶν
let it acquire the first joint, and then the second, and then the third; and so finally the fruit will forcibly put forth its true nature, even against my will.

For who that has conceived and is big with such great judgements is not aware of his own equipment, and does not hasten to act in accordance with them? Why, a bull is not ignorant of his own nature and equipment, when some wild beast appears, nor does he hang back for someone to encourage him; neither does a dog, when he sees some wild animal; and shall I, if I have the equipment of a good man, hang back, so that you may encourage me to do what is my own proper work? But as yet I do not have the equipment, believe me. Why, then, do you wish to have me wither away before my time, as you yourself have withered?

CHAPTER IX

To the man who had become shameless

Whenever you see another person holding office, set over against this the fact that you possess the ability to get along without office; whenever you see another person wealthy, see what you have instead. For if you have nothing instead, you are wretched; but if you are capable of feeling no need of wealth, know that you are better off, and have something worth far more than wealth. Another has a comely wife, you the ability not to yearn for a comely wife. Is all this small in your eyes? Yet how much would these men give, who are rich and hold office, and live with beautiful women, to be able to despise wealth and offices, and these very same women whom they
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4 γυναικῶν, ὧν ἔρωσιν καὶ ὧν τυγχάνουσιν; ἄγνοεῖς
οἶνον τῇ ἐστὶ δίψος πυρέσσοντος; οὐδὲν ὤμοιον
ἔχει τῷ τοῦ υγιαίνοντος. ἐκείνος πῶς ὀποπέ-
παυταν. ὦ δὲ πρὸς ὁλίγον ἄσθεις ¹ ναυτῆ, χολῆν
αὐτὸ ποιεὶ ἀντὶ ὑδατος, ἑμεί, στροφοῦται, διψὴ

5 σφοδρότερον. τοιοῦτον ἐστὶ μετ’ ἐπιθυμίας πλού-
τειν, μετ’ ἐπιθυμίας ἁρχεῖν, μετ’ ἐπιθυμίας καλῆ
συγκαθεύδειν. ξηλοτυπία πρόσεστιν, φόβος τοῦ
στερηθῆναι, αἰσχρὸι λόγοι, αἰσχρὰ ἐνθυμήματα,
ἔργα ἀσχήμων.

6 Καὶ τί, φησίν, ἀπολλύω; — Ἀνθρωπε, ὑπήρξες
αἰδῆμων καὶ νῦν οὐκέτι εἰ: οὐδὲν ἀπολὼγεκες;
ἀντὶ Χρυσίππου καὶ Ζήμωνος Ἀριστείδην ἀνα-
γγειώσκεις καὶ Εὐηνόν. ² οὐδὲν ἀπολὼγεκας;
ἀντὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Διογένους τεθαυμάκας τὸν
πλείστας διαφθείραι καὶ ἀναπείσαι δυνάμενον.

7 καλὸς εἶναι θέλεις καὶ πλάσσεις σεαυτὸν μὴ ὅν
καὶ ἐσθήτα ἐπιδεικνύειν θέλεις στιλπνήν, ἵνα τὰς
γυναῖκας ἐπιστρέψης, κἂν ποὺ μυραφίον ἐπι-

8 τύχης, μακάριος εἶναι δοκεῖς. πρῶτερον δ’ οὐδὲ ³
ἐνεθυμοῦ τι τοῦτων, ἀλλὰ ποὺ ἐνσχήμων λόγος,
ἀνὴρ ἄξιόλογος, ἐνθύμημα γενναίον. τοιχαροῦν
ἐκάθευδε ως ἀνὴρ, προφεῖς ως ἀνὴρ, ἐσθήτα
ἐφόρεις ἀνδρικῆς, λόγους ἐλάλεις πρέποντας αἰδρὶ
passionately love and win? Do you not know what kind of thing the thirst of a man in fever is? It is quite unlike that of a man in health. The latter drinks and his thirst is gone, but the other gets a momentary satisfaction, and then becomes nauseated, turns the water into bile, throws up, has a pain in his bowels, and suffers more violent thirst than before. A similar thing it is to be rich and have strong desire, to hold office and have strong desire, to sleep by the side of a beautiful woman and have strong desire; jealousy is added to one's lot, fear of loss, disgraceful words, disgraceful thoughts, unseemly deeds.

And what do I lose? says somebody.—Man, you used to be modest, and are no longer so; have you lost nothing? Instead of Chrysippus and Zeno you now read Aristeides and Evenus;¹ have you lost nothing? Instead of Socrates and Diogenes you have come to admire the man who is able to corrupt and seduce the largest number of women. You wish to be handsome and make yourself up, though you are not handsome, and you wish to make a show of gay attire, so as to attract the women, and you think yourself blessed if perchance you light upon some trivial perfume. But formerly you used never even to think of any of these things, but only where you might find decent speech, a worthy man, a noble thought. Therefore you used to sleep as a man, to go forth as a man, to wear the clothes of a man, to utter the discourse that was suitable for a good man; and after all that do

¹ impurae conditor historiae, and mentions together with Aristeides, as here. On the question see Crusius, Real-Encyclopädie², 6, 850–51.
9. οὕτως οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ κέρμα ἀπολλύονσιν ἀνθρώποι; αἰδῶς οὐκ ἀπολλυται, εὐσχημοσύνη οὐκ ἀπολλυται; ἡ οὐκ ἐστὶ ξημιώθηνια ταῦτα.

10. ἀπολέσαντα; σοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ τὰχα τούτων οὐδὲν οὐκετί εἶναι ξημία· ἢν δὲ ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε μόνην αὐτὴν ὑπελογίζου καὶ ξημίαν καὶ βλάβην, ὅτε ἡγωνίας, μὴ τις ἐκσείσῃ σε τούτων τῶν λόγων καὶ ἑργον.

11. Ἰδοῦ, ἐκσέσεισαι ὑπ’ ἄλλου μὲν οὗτον ὑπὸ σαυτοῦ δὲ. μαχεσθητι σαυτῷ, ἄφελον σαυτὸν

12. εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην, εἰς αἰδῶ, εἰς ἑλευθερίαν. εἰ σοὶ τις ποὺ ἔλεγεν περὶ ἕμοι ταῦτα, ὅτι μὲ τις μοιχεύειν ἀναγκάζει, ὅτι ἑσθῆτα φορεῖν τοιαύτην, ὅτι μυρίζεσθαι, οὐκ ἄν ἀπελθὼν αὐτόχειρ ἐγένου τούτου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ οὕτως μοι παραχρώμενον μένου; νῦν οὖν οὐθεὶς σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι; καὶ πόσῳ ῥάων αὕτη ἡ βοήθεια; οὐκ ἀποκτείναι τῶν δεῖ, οὐ δῆται, οὐχ ὑβρίζει, οὐκ εἰς ἀγορὰν προελθεῖν, αὐλλ’ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ λαλῆσαι, τὸ μάλιστα πεισθησομένῳ, πρὸς ὅν οὐδεὶς ἐστὶ σου πιθανῶτερος. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν κατάγνωθι τῶν γυγομένων, εἰτα καταγνοῦσα μὴ ἀπογνώς σεαυτὸ μηδὲ πάθης τὸ τῶν ἁγενικῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐ ἀπαξ ἐνδόντες εἰςάπαν ἐπέδωκαν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ ὦς ὑπὸ βέματος παρεσύρησαν, ἀλλὰ μάθε τὸ τῶν παιδοτριβῶν. πεπτωκε τὸ παιδίον "ἀναστάς," φησίν, "πάλιν πάλαιε μέχρις ἃν ἱσχυροποιηθῆς." τοιούτων τι καὶ σοὶ πάθει ἵσθι γάρ, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστιν.
you still say, "I have lost nothing"? And is it nothing but small change that men lose in this way? Is not self-respect lost, is not decency lost? Or is it impossible that the loss of these things counts for anything? To you, indeed, the loss of none of these things, perhaps, seems any longer serious; but there once was a time when you thought it the only serious loss and harm, when you were in great anxiety lest anyone should dislodge you from these good words and deeds.

Behold, you have been dislodged, though by no one else but yourself. Fight against yourself, vindicate yourself for decency, for respect, for freedom. If anyone ever told you about me that someone was forcing me to commit adultery, to wear clothes like yours, or to perfume myself, would you not have gone and murdered the man who was so maltreating me? And now, therefore, are you not willing to come to your own rescue? Yet how much easier is the work of rescue in the latter case! It is not necessary to kill somebody, put him in bonds, or assault him; you do not have to come out into the market-place, but only to talk to yourself, the man most likely to be persuaded, to whom no one is more persuasive than yourself. And first of all condemn what you are doing; then, when you have passed your condemnation, do not despair of yourself, nor act like the spiritless people who, when once they have given in, surrender themselves completely, and are swept off by the current, as it were, but learn how the gymnastic trainer of boys acts. The boy he is training is thrown; "get up," he says, "and wrestle again, till you get strong." React in some such way yourself, for I would have
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ευαγωγότερον ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς. θελήσαι δὲ καὶ γέγονεν, διώρθωται ὡς πάλιν ἀπονυστάται καὶ ἀπόλολειν. ἔσωθεν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἀπόλεια καὶ 1 βοήθεια. — Εἴτε τί μοι ἁγαθόν; — Καὶ τί ξητείς τούτων μείζον; ἐξ ἀναισχύντων αἰδήμων ἔση, ἐξ ἀκόσμων κόσμιων, ἐξ ἀπίστου πιστῶς, ἐξ ἀκολάστου σώφρων. εἰ τίνα ἄλλα τούτων μείζον ξητείς, ποιεῖ ἀ ποιεῖς: οὔδε θεῶν σὲ τίς ἐτε σώσαι δύναται.

1. Τίνων δεῖ καταφρονεῖν καὶ πρὸς τίνα διαφέρεσθαι;

1 Ἀπορία πᾶσα ἐν 2 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς γίνεται, ἄμηχανία περὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς. "τί ποιήσω; πῶς γένηται; πῶς ἀποβῆ; μὴ τόδε ἀπαντήσῃ, μὴ τόδε." πᾶσαι αὐταί αἰ φωναὶ περὶ τὰ ἀπροαίρετα στρεφομένων εἰςὶν τίς γὰρ λέγει "πῶς μὴ συγκατατιθῶμαι τῷ ψεύδει; πῶς μὴ ἀπονεύσω ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς;" ἐὰν οὐτως ἦ εὐφυῆς, ὡστε περὶ τούτων ἀγωνιᾶν, ὑπομνήσω αὐτὸν ὅτι "τί ἀγωνιᾶς; ἐπὶ σοὶ ἐστιν ἀσφαλῆς ὑσθι: μὴ πρὸ τοῦ ἐπάγειν τὸν φυσικὸν κανόνα προπίδα ἐν τῷ συγκατατιθεσθαί;"

1 Schegk, and Upton's "codex": ὦ S.
2 Schenkl: πᾶσαν (apparently) S.

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you know that there is nothing more easily prevailed upon than a human soul. You have but to will a thing and it has happened, the reform has been made; as, on the other hand, you have but to drop into a doze and all is lost. For it is within you that both destruction and deliverance lie.—But what good do I get after all that?—And what greater good than this are you looking for? Instead of shameless, you will be self-respecting; instead of faithless, faithful; instead of dissolute, self-controlled. If you are looking for anything else greater than these things, go ahead and do what you are doing; not even a god can any longer save you.

CHAPTER X

What ought we to despise and on what place a high value?

Men find all their difficulties in externals, their perplexities in externals. "What shall I do? How is it to take place? How is it to turn out? I am afraid that this will befall me, or that." All these are the expressions of men who concern themselves with the things that lie outside the sphere of the moral purpose. For who says, "How am I to avoid giving assent to the false? How am I to refuse to swerve aside from the true?"? If a man is so gifted by nature as to be in great anxiety about these things, I shall remind him, "Why are you in great anxiety? It is under your own control; rest secure. Do not be in a hurry to give your assent before applying the rule of nature."
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4 Πάλιν ἄν περὶ ὁρέξεως ἁγωνιᾶς, μὴ ἀτελῆς
5 γένηται καὶ ἀποτευκτική, περὶ ἐκκλίσεως, μὴ περιπτωτική, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸν καταφιλήσω, ὡς ἄφεις περὶ ἃ ὦ ἄλλοι ἐπτόηνται καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖνοι φόβους περὶ τῶν ἱδίων ἔργων πεφρόν-
6 τικεῖν, ὅποι αὐτὸς ἐστίν εἶτα ἐρῶ αὐτῷ “εἰ μὴ θέλης ὁρέγεσθαι ἀποτευκτικὸς μὴ ἐκκλίνειν περιπτωτικῶς, μηδενὸς ὁρέγον τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, μηδὲν ἑκκλινε τῶν μὴ ἐπὶ σοὶ. εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ
7 ἀποτυχεῖν καὶ περιπέσειν ἀνάγκη.” ποία ἐνθάδ’ ἀπορία; ποῦ τόπον ἔχει “πῶς γένηται;” καὶ “πῶς ἀποβῆ;” καὶ “μὴ ἀπωντῆσῃ τόδε ἢ τόδε”;

8 Νῦν οὖχὶ τὸ ἐκβησόμενον ἀπροαίρετον;—Ναί.
—‘Η ὁ οὐσία τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ἐστὶν εἰν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖσ;—Ναί.—’Εξεστὶν οὖν σοι παντὶ τῷ ἀποβάντι χρῆσθαι κατὰ φύσιν; μὴ τις
9 σε κωλύσαι δύναται;—Οὐδεῖς.—Μηκέτι οὖν μοι λέγε “πῶς γένηται;” ὅπως γὰρ ᾧν γένηται, σὺ αὐτὸ θῆσεις καλῶς καὶ ἐσται σοι τὸ ἀποβάν
10 εὐτύχημα. ἦ τίς ἄν ἢν ὁ Ἡρακλῆς λέγων “πῶς μοι μὴ μέγας λέων ἐπιφανὴ μηδὲ μέγας σὺς μηδὲ θηριώδεις ἄνθρωποι;”; καὶ τί σοι μέλει; ᾧν μέγας σὺς ἐπιφανῆ, μεῖζον ἄθλον ἀθλήσεις ᾧν κακοὶ ἄνθρωποι, κακῶν ἀπαλλάξεις τὴν οἴκου-

1 μὴ before this word was deleted by Meibom.

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Again, if a man is in great anxiety about desire, for fear lest it become incomplete and miss its mark, or about aversion, for fear lest it fall into what it would avoid, I shall first give him a kiss of congratulation, because he has got rid of what the rest of mankind are excited about, and their fears, and has turned his serious thought to his own true business in the realm where he himself is. And after that I shall say to him, "If you do not wish to desire without failing to get, or to avoid without falling into the object of your aversion, desire none of those things which are not your own, and avoid none of those things which are not under your control. If not, you are of necessity bound to fail in achieving your desires, and to fall into what you would avoid." Where is there any difficulty in that case? What room is there to ask, "How is it to take place?" and "How is it to turn out?" and to say, "I am afraid that this will befall me, or that"?

Is not the future outside the sphere of the moral purpose now?—Yes.—And is not the true nature of the good and evil inside the sphere of the moral purpose?—Yes.—Are you permitted, then, to make a natural use of every outcome? No one can prevent you, can he?—No one.—Therefore, say no longer to me, "How is it to take place?" Because, whatever takes place, you will turn it to good purpose, and the outcome will be a blessing for you. Or what would Heracles have been had he said "How am I to prevent a great lion from appearing, or a great boar, or savage men?"? And what do you care for that? If a great boar appears, the struggle in which you are to engage will be greater; if evil men appear, you will clear the world of evil men.—
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11 μένην.—’Αν οὖν οὕτως ἀποθάνω; —’Αγαθὸς ὦν ἀποθανή, γενναίαν πρᾶξιν ἐπιτελῶν. ἐπει γὰρ δεῖ πάντως ἀποθανεῖν, ἀνάγκη τί ποτε ποιοῦντα εὑρεθῆναι, ἠ γεωργοῦντα ἡ σκάπτοντα ἡ ἐμπόρευμένον ἡ ὑπατεύοντα ἡ ἀπεπτοῦντα ἡ διαρ- 
12 ροιζόμενον. τί οὖν θέλεις ποιῶν εὑρεθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ θανάτου; ἐγὼ μὲν τὸ ἐμὸν μέρος ἔργον τί ποτε ἀνθρωπικόν, εὐεργετικόν, κοινωφελές, γεν-
13 ναίον. εἰ δὲ μὴ δύναμαι τὰ τηλικὰ τοιῶν εὑρεθῆναι, ἐκεῖνό γε τὸ ἀκόλυτον, τὸ διδόμενον, ἐμαυτὸν ἐπαυρωθῶν, ἐξεργαζόμενος τὴν δύναμιν 
14 τὴν χρηστικὴν τῶν φαντασιῶν, ἀπάθειαν ἐκπο-
15 νῶν, ταῖς σχέσεσι τὰ οἰκεία ἀποδίδοτοι1 εἰ οὕτως 
16 εὐτυχῆς εἰμι, καὶ τοῦ τρίτου τόπου παραπτόμενος, 
17 τοῦ περὶ τὴν τῶν κριμάτων ἁσφάλειαν.

1 Reiske: ἀποδίδοτον S.

1 See III. 2, 1, and note.
2 These imaginary last words of Epictetus have given much 
offence to Elizabeth Carter (author of the most famous 
of the English translations), and no doubt others, who find 
them ostentatious and lacking in humility. They represent, 
however, an ideal and not an actual condition, and as such are 
entirely innocent. Epictetus, who was in fact the most humble
But if I die in so doing?—You will die as a good man, bringing to fulfilment a noble action. Why, since you have to die in any event, you must be found doing something or other—farming, or digging, or engaged in commerce, or holding a consulship, or suffering with dyspepsia or dysentery. What is it, then, you wish to be doing when death finds you? I for my part should wish it to be some work that befits a man, something beneficent, that promotes the common welfare, or is noble. But if I cannot be found doing such great things as these, I should like at least to be engaged upon that which is free from hindrance, that which is given me to do, and that is, correcting myself, as I strive to perfect the faculty which deals with the external impressions, labouring to achieve calm, while yet giving to each of my human relationships its due; and, if I am so fortunate, striving to attain to the third field of study,¹ that which has to do with security in the formation of judgements.

If death finds me occupied with these matters, it is enough for me if I can lift up my hands unto God, and say,² "The faculties which I received from Thee to enable me to understand Thy governance and to follow it, these I have not neglected; I have not dishonoured Thee as far as in me lay. Behold how I have dealt with my senses, behold how I have dealt with my preconceptions. Have I ever blamed Thee? Have I been discontented with any of these things which happen, or wished it to have been otherwise? Have I at all violated my

of men (see Vol. I. pp. xviii–xx), does not say, "It is enough for me because I can lift up my hands unto God, and say," but, "if I can," which is a very different matter.

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16 τὰς σχέσεις παρέβην; ¹ χάριν ἔχω, ² ο με σὺ ἐγέννησας, χάριν ἔχω, διν ἐδωκας. εἴφ' ὧσον ἐχοθ- σάμην τοῖς σοῖς, ἀρκεῖ μοι. πάλιν αὐτὰ ἀπόλαβε καὶ κατάταξον εἰς ἦν θέλεις χώραν. σὰ γὰρ ἦν πάντα, σὺ μοι αὐτὰ δέδωκας. οὐκ ἀρκεῖ οὕτως ἔχουται ἐξελθεῖν; καὶ τίς βίων κρείττων ἡ εὐσχημονεστέρος τοῦ οὕτως ἔχοντος, ποία δὲ καταστροφὴ εὐδαιμονεστέρα;

18 "Ἰνα δὲ ταύτα γένηται, οὐ μικρὰ δέξασθαι οὐδὲ μικρῶν ἀποτυχεῖν. οὐ δύνασαι καὶ ὑπατεύσαι θέλειν καὶ ταύτα καὶ ἀγροὺς ἔχειν ἐσπουδακέναι καὶ ταύτα καὶ τῶν δουλαρίων φροντίζειν καὶ σεαυτοῦ. ἀλλ' ἂν τι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων θέλης, τὰ σὰ ἀπόλετο. αὐτὴ τοῦ πράγματος ἡ φύσις; προῖκα οὐδὲν γίνεται. καὶ τὶθαυμαστὸν; ἂν ὑπατεύσαι θέλης, ἀγρυπνησάι σε δεὶ, περιδραμεῖν, τὰς χεῖρας καταφίλησαι, πρὸς ταῖς ἀλλοτρίαις θύραις κατασαπήναι, πολλὰ μὲν εἴπειν, πολλὰ δὲ πράξαι ἀνελεύθερα, δῶρα πέμψαι πολλοῖς, ξένια καθ' ἠμέραν ἐνίοις καὶ τὶ τὸ γινόμενὸν ἔστιν;

20 διώδεκα δεσμὰ ράβδων καὶ τρὶς ἡ τετράκις ἐπὶ βῆμα καθίσαι καὶ κιρκῆσαι δοῦναι καὶ σπυρίσων δειπνίσαι. ³ ἡ δειξάτω χρόνος τοῖς, τὶ ἐστὶ παρὰ ταύτα. ὑπὲρ ἰπαθείας οὖν, ὑπὲρ ἰταραξίας, ὑπὲρ τοῦ καθεύδουτα καθεύδειν, ἐγρηγορώναι, μὴ φοβεῖσθαι μηδὲν, μὴ ἀγωνιῶν

1 Schweighäuser: παρέβην S.
2 χάριν ἔχω here added by Reiske.
3 Reiske: δειπνήσαι S.

¹ The consular fasces.
² The sportulae which were distributed at Rome by a patron among his clients.
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relationships with others? For that Thou didst beget me I am grateful; for what Thou hast given I am grateful also. The length of time for which I have had the use of Thy gifts is enough for me. Take them back again and assign them to what place Thou wilt, for they were all Thine, and Thou gavest them me." Is it not enough for a man to take his departure from the world in this state of mind? And what among all the kinds of life is superior to this, or more seemly than his who is so minded, and what kind of end is more fortunate?

But that this may take place a man must accept no small troubles, and must miss no small things. You cannot wish for a consulship and at the same time wish for this; you cannot have set your heart upon having lands and this too; you cannot at the same time be solicitous for your paltry slaves and yourself too. But if you wish for any one of the things that are not your own, what is your own is lost. This is the nature of the matter: Nothing is done except for a price. And why be surprised? If you wish to be consul you must keep vigils, run around, kiss men's hands, rot away at other men's doors, say and do many slavish things, send presents to many persons, and guest-gifts to some people every day. And what is the outcome of it all? Twelve bundles of rods,\(^1\) and the privilege of sitting three or four times on the tribune, and giving games in the Circus, and lunches in little baskets.\(^2\) Or else let someone show me what there is in it beyond this. For calm, then, for peace of mind, for sleeping when you are asleep, and being awake when you are awake, for fearing nothing, for being in great
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υπὲρ μηδενὸς οὐδὲν ἀναλῶσαι θέλεις, οὐδὲν
23 πονῆσαι; ἀλλ' ἂν τι ἀπόληται σου περὶ ταῦτα
γινομένου ἢ ἀναλωθῇ κακῶς ἢ ἀλλος τύχη ὁν
ἐδει σε τυχεῖν, εὗθυς 1 δηχθήσῃ ἐπὶ τῷ γενομένῳ;
24 οὐκ ἀντιθῆσεις, τι ἁντί τίνος λαμβάνεις, πόσου
ἀντὶ πόσου; ἀλλὰ προίκα θέλεις τὰ τηλικάυτα
λαβεῖν; καὶ πῶς δύνασαι; ἔργον ἔργῳ.
25 Οὐ δύνασαι καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἧχειν ἐπιμελείας
tετυχικότα καὶ τὸ σαυτοῦ ἡγεμονικόν. εἰ δ' ἐκεῖνα
θέλεις, τοῦτο ἀφεῖς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὔτε τοῦτο
ἐξεῖς οὔτ' ἐκεῖνα, περισπώμενοι ἐπ' ἀμφότερα.
26 εἰ τοῦτο θέλεις, ἐκεῖνά σε ἀφεῖναι δεῖ. ἐκχε-
θήσεται τὸ ἔλαιον, ἀπολεῖται τὰ σκευάρια, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἀπαθὴς ἐσομαι. ἐμπρησμός ἐσται ἐμοῦ μὴ
παρόντος καὶ ἀπολεῖται τὰ βιβλία, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ
χρήσομαι ταῖς φαντασίαις κατὰ φύσιν. ἀλλ'
27 οὐχ ἤξω φαγεῖν. εἰ οὔτως τάλας εἰμί, λιμὴν τὸ
ἀποθανεῖν. οὔτος δ' ἐστίν ὁ λιμὴν πάντων, ὁ
θάνατος, αὐτή ἡ καταφυγὴ. διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν τῶν
ἐν τῷ βίῳ χαλεπῶν ἐστίν. ὅταν θέλησ, ἐξήλθες
28 καὶ οὔ καπνίζῃ. τί οὖν ἄγωνιὰς, τί ἄγρυπνεῖς;
οὐχὶ δὲ εὗθυς ἀναλογισάμενος, ποῦ σου τὸ ἄγαθὸν
ἔστι καὶ τὸ κακὸν, λέγεις ὅτι 'ἐπ' ἐμοὶ ἀμφότερα;
οὔτε τούτου τις ἀφελέσθαι με δύναται οὔτ' ἐκεῖνῳ
29 ἄκοντα περιβαλεῖν. τί οὖν οὗ ἰέγχω βαλῶν;

1 μὴ after εὗθυς is deleted in S.

1 Supply: "has no partnership." See IV. 6, 30, where
the proverb is given in full.
2 The reference is to suicide. Cf. I. 25, 18 and 20.

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anxiety about nothing, are you unwilling to spend anything, to make any exertion? But if something that belongs to you be lost while you are engaged in these affairs, or be spent to no purpose, or someone else get what you ought to have got, are you going to be vexed immediately at what has happened? Will you not balance off what you are getting in return for what, how much in return for how much? Nay, do you wish to get such valuable things for nothing? And how can you? "One serious business with another."¹

You cannot be continually giving attention to both externals and your own governing principle. But if you want the former, let the latter go; otherwise you will have neither the latter nor the former, being drawn in both directions. If you want the latter, you must let the former go. The oil will be spilled, my paltry furniture will perish, but I shall be calm. There will be a fire when I am not at home, and my books will perish, yet I shall deal with my external impressions according to nature. But I shall have nothing to eat. If I am so badly off as all that, death is my harbour. And this is the harbour of all men, even death, and this their refuge. That is why no one of the things that befall us in our life is difficult. Whenever you wish, you walk out of the house, and are no longer bothered by the smoke.² Why, then, are you consumed with anxiety? Why do you keep vigils? And why do you not forthwith reckon up where your good and your evil lie, and say, "They are both under my control; no man can either rob me of the one, or plunge me in the other against my will? Why, then, do I not throw myself down and
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tà èmà ásφαλδως ἔχει· τὰ ἀλλότρια ὄφεται αὐτὰ ὃς ἄν φέρη, ὥς ἄν διδῶται παρὰ τοῦ ἐχοντος ἐξουσίαν. τις εἰμὶ ὁ θέλων αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἣν οὗτος; μὴ γάρ μοι δέδοται ἐκλογή αὐτῶν; μὴ γὰρ ἐμὲ τις αὐτῶν διοικήτην πεποίηκεν; ἀρκεῖ μοι ὅν ἔχω ἐξουσίαν. ταῦτα μὲ δεὶ κάλλιστα παρασκευάσαι, τὰ δ' ἀλλα ὡς ἄν θέλῃ ὁ ἐκείνων κύριος."

1 Oldfather: Μενέλαος S. See explanatory note.

1 Homer, Iliad, XXIV. 5, referring to Achilles on his bed when mourning for Patroclus.

2 Patroclus and Antilochus were well-known friends of Achilles, but "Menelaus" (the reading of S) must be wrong, partly because he was not in any way a special friend, and particularly because he was not killed, as the context requires. Some other friend of the hero, who was killed, must be supplied, and that can hardly be anyone but Protesilaus, who was one of his playmates under the tutelage of Cheiron. Philostratus, Her. 176 K. Achilles leaped on shore im-
snore? What is mine is safe. What is not mine shall be the concern of whoever gets it, according to the terms upon which it may be given by Him who has authority over it. Who am I to wish that what is not mine should be either thus or so? For it has not been given me to make a choice among these things, has it? For no one has made me an administrator of them, has he? I am satisfied with the things over which I have authority. These I ought to treat so that they may become as beautiful as possible, but everything else as their master may desire."

Does any man who has all this before his eyes keep vigils, and does he "toss hither and thither"? What does he wish, or what does he yearn for? For Patroclus, or Antilochus, or Protesilaus? Why, when did he regard any of his friends as immortal? Yes, and when did he not have before his eyes the fact that on the morrow or the day after either he or his friend must die? "Yes," he says, "but I had thought he was going to survive me, and bring up my son." No doubt, but then you were a fool, and were thinking of things that were uncertainties. Why, then, do you not blame yourself, instead of sitting and crying like little girls? "Nay, but he used to set my food before me." Yes, fool, for then he was alive; and now he cannot. But Automedon will set your food before you, and if Automedon too die, you will find somebody else.

Immediately after Protesilaus and avenged his death. See Escher in the Real-Encyclopädie, I. 229, 9 ff.

A kind of proverbial expression. Compare Marcus Aurelius, 4. 47.

Comrade and charioteer of both Patroclus and Achilles.
πρέπει σοι τὸ κρέας, καταγή, λιµῷ σὲ δεὶ ἀποθαυνεῖν, ὅτι μὴ ἔχεις τὴν συνήθη χύτραν; οὐ πέμπεις καὶ ἄλλην καίνην ἀγοράζεις;

οὔ μὲν γὰρ τι,

φησίν,

κακώτερον ἄλλο πάθοιμι.

tοῦτο γὰρ σοι κακὸν ἐστὶν; εἰτ’ ἀφεῖς τοῦτο ἐξελεῖν αἰτία τὴν μητέρα, ὅτι σοὶ οὐ προεῖπεν, ἵν’ ὀδυνώμενος ἐξ ἐκείνου διατελῆς;

Τῇ δοκεῖτε; μὴ ἐπίτηδες ταῦτα συνθείναι "Ὁμηροῦ, ἡν ἱδωμεν, ὅτι οἱ εὐγενεστατοι, οἱ ἵσχυρότατοι, οἱ πλουσιώτατοι, οἱ εὐμορφότατοι, ὅταν οία δεῖ δόγματο μὴ ἔχωσιν, οὔθεν κωλύονται ἀθλιώτατοι εἶναι καὶ δυστυχεστατοι;

ια’. Περὶ καθαριστητος.

1 'Αμφισβητοῦσί τινες, εἰ ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου περιέχεται τὸ κοινωνικὸν: ὁμως δ’ αύτοι οὔτοι οὐκ ἂν μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀμφισβητήσαι, ὅτι τὸ γε 2 καθάριον πάντως περιέχεται καὶ εἰ

2 τῳ ἄλλῳ καὶ τοῦτῳ τῶν ζώων χωρίζεται. ὅταν οὖν ἄλλο τι ζῷον ἱδωμεν ἀποκαθαίρον ἑαυτό, ἐπιλέγειν εἰσώθαμεν θαυμάζοντες ὅτι "ὡς ἀνθρω-

1 οἱ added by s.
2 τὸ γε Wolf: ποτέ S.

1 Homer, Iliad, XIX. 321.
2 The generalization is somewhat hasty. Many animals, like cats (and the felidae in general), moles, most birds, snakes, etc., are distinctly more cleanly than any but the
If the pot in which your meat used to be boiled gets broken, do you have to die of hunger because you do not have your accustomed pot? Won't you send out and buy a new one to take its place? He says,

Ill no greater than this could befall me.¹

Why, is this what you call an ill? And then, forbearing to get rid of it, do you blame your mother, because she did not foretell it to you, so that you might continue to lament from that time forth?

What do you men think? Did not Homer compose this in order for us to see that there is nothing to prevent the persons of highest birth, of greatest strength, of most handsome appearance, from being most miserable and wretched, when they do not hold the right kind of judgements?

CHAPTER XI

Of cleanliness

Some people raise the question whether the social instinct is a necessary element in the nature of man; nevertheless, even these people, as it seems to me, would not question that the instinct of cleanliness is most assuredly a necessary element, and that man is distinguished from the animals by this quality if by anything.² When, therefore, we see some other animal cleaning itself, we are in the habit of saying in surprise that it is acting "like a human most civilized men. Epictetus was clearly not strong in natural history. Cf. notes on II. 24, 16; IV. 8, 39; IV. 11, 32, and Ench. 33, 16.
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πος." καὶ πάλιν ἂν τις ἐγκαλῆ τινὶ ἥς, εὐθὺς εἰσώθαμεν ὡσπερ ἀπολογούμενοι λέγειν ὅτι "οὐ

3 δήπον ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν." οὕτως ἔξαιρετόν τι περὶ τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν εἶναι οἰόμεθα ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἀυτὸ πρῶτον λαμβάνοντες. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι φύσει καθαροὶ καὶ ἀκήρατοι, ἐφ’ ὦσον ἡγγίκασιν ἀυτοῖς οἱ ἀνθρωποί κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῦ καθαροῦ καὶ τοῦ καθάριον εἰσὶν ἀνθεκτικοί. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀμήχανον τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν πανταπασίν εἶναι καθαρὰν ἐκ τοιαύτης ὠλής κεκραμένην, ὁ λόγος παραληφθεῖς εἰς τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ταύτην καθάριον ἀποτελεῖν πειράται.

5 Ἡ′ πρώτη οὖν καὶ ἀνωτάτῳ καθαρότητι ἦ ἐν ψυχῇ γενομένη καὶ ὁμοίως ἀκαθαρσία. ψυχῆς δ’ ὡς σώματος μὲν ἀκαθαρσίαν οὐκ ἄν εὕροις,2 ὡς ψυχῆς δε τ’ ἄν ἀλλο εὕροις ἦ τὸ παρέχον αὐτὴν

6 ρυπαρὰν πρὸς τὰ ἑργα τὰ αὐτῆς; ἑργα δὲ ψυχῆς ὀρμῶν, ἀφορμῶν, ὀρέγεσθαι, ἐκκλίνειν, παρασκευάζεσθαι, ἐπιβάλλεσθαι, συγκατατίθεσθαι. τ’ ποτ’ οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἑργοῖς ρυπαρὰν παρέχον αὐτὴν καὶ ἀκάθαρτον; οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἦ τὰ

7 μοχθηρὰ κρίματα αὐτῆς. ὅστε ψυχῆς μὲν ἀκαθαρσία δόγματα πονηρά, καθαρσὶς δ’ ἐμποιήσις οἰῶν δεὶ δογμάτων, καθαρὰ δ’ ἦ ἐχοῦσα ολὰ δεὶ δόγματα: μόνη γὰρ αὐτή ἐν τοῖς ἑργοῖς τοῖς αὐτῆς ἀσύγχυτος καὶ ἀμόλυντος.

8 Δεῖ δε τῷ ἐοικὸς τούτῳ καὶ ἐπὶ σώματος φιλο-

1 ᾧ added by Upton. 2 Upton’s “codex”: εὐρής S.

1 Our idiom requires us to use both “clean” and “pure,” and their derivatives, for what in the Greek is expressed by a single word.

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being." And again, if one finds fault with some beast, we are in the habit of saying immediately, as though in apology, "Well, of course it isn't a human being." So true it is that we consider cleanliness to be a special characteristic of man, deriving it in the first instance from the gods. For since they are by nature pure and undefiled, in so far as men have approached them by virtue of reason, just so far are they attached to purity and cleanliness. But since it is impossible for the nature of men to be altogether pure, seeing that it is composed of such material as it is, the reason which they have received from the gods endeavours to render this material clean as far as is possible.

Therefore, the prime and highest purity is that which appears in the soul, and the same is true of impurity. But you would not find the same impurity in a soul as you would in a body, and as being soul, what else would you find impure about it than that which makes it dirty for the performance of its own functions? And the functions of a soul are the exercise of choice, of refusal, of desire, of aversion, of preparation, of purpose, and of assent. What, then, can that be which makes the soul dirty and unclean in these functions? Nothing but its erroneous decisions. It follows, therefore, that impurity of a soul consists of bad judgements, and purification consists in creating within it the proper kind of judgements; and a pure soul is the one which has the proper kind of judgements, for this is the only soul which is secure against confusion and pollution in its own functions.

Now one ought to be eager to achieve, as far
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texnein kata tò eudexeomou. amýxanov ãn mýzas ãn ðêin tòv ãnthrôpou toioûtou ãxoutos tò súgykrama. déi tòu tòutu xeiþas ëpoinýsæn ã fúsan kai autâs tás rínas ãs swléînas pròs tò ekðid-dóinai tâ ùgára. ãn òun ãnaráhrh òis autâs, léyô òti ou poiëi ërgon ãnthrôptikon. amýxanov ãn ãn òplouðsaic tòu ðôdaz ãnðë òlòs molúneiðsaic déi toioûtou toivn ãporoðmënu. déi toitou ùdòw pàreskeíanai déi toitou xeiðas. amýxanov ãn ãpò tòu prônyein ãn ðûpaparòt tì òprosmënei tois ãðouin déi toitou "plûnou, " ëphsín, " tòus ãðouinai." déi ti; iv ãnthrôptos ãs kai ãn ðêriðn ì mîðè suídiov. amýxanov ãn ãpò tòu ïððòtou kai tîs kàta tòu ësthità swìnoðs ùpolæíteðsaic tì peri tò ñwma ðûpaparon kai ðeòmèn ãpòkothàr-sëwos déi toitou ùdòw, ëlaiòn, xeiðres, ðôñion, ëxûþra, vîþron, ës ða ðî ãllh pàsa pàraðkevnì ò pròs tò kàðhìraic autò. ou. ãlì ò mèn xàlkèì 1 ëxíòseic tò sidhìron kai òrgana pròs tòutò ëxèi kateðkeúnaic ðëna, kai tò pìnàkion autòs ñù plû- neïs, òtòn mèllhì ësthìen, ëâw ãn ãs pàntëlòs ãkàðhàtòs kai ðûpapòs tò ðwìmatou ðò ñù plûneïs 2 ùðè kàðaròn poïèseis;—ðìà ti; ì phësîn.—Páliu ërów sou pròtòtò ñù ìnà tò ãnthrôpou poïës, èita ìnà ãn ãnìàs tòus ën-

1 The words ãs xàlkèìs following this word in ñ have been deleted in the MS.
2 C. Schenkl: plûneïs ñ.

1 A sort of scraper, generally of metal, much used by athletes.
2 The excesses, probably Oriental in origin, to which Christian ascetism soon went in regard to despising clean-
as may be, something similar to this in the case of the body also. It was impossible that there should be no discharge of mucus from the nose, since man's body has been composed as it is; for that reason nature made hands, and the nostrils like tubes to discharge the humours. If, therefore, a man snuffs back these discharges of mucus, I say that he is not acting as a human being should. It was impossible that the feet should not get muddy, nor dirty at all, when they pass through certain such substances; for that reason nature has provided water, for that hands. It was impossible that some impurity from eating should not remain on the teeth; for that reason nature says, "Wash your teeth." Why? In order that you may be a human being, and not a beast or a pig. It was impossible that something dirty and needing to be cleaned off should not be left on the person from our sweat and the pressure of our clothes; for that reason we have water, oil, hands, a towel, a strigil, nitre, and, on occasion, every other kind of equipment to cleanse the body. Not so you. But the smith will remove the rust from his iron tool, and will have implements made for this purpose, and you yourself will wash your plate when you are going to eat, unless you are utterly unclean and dirty; but will you not wash nor make clean your poor body?—Why? says someone.—Again I will tell you: First, so as to do what befits a man; and second, so as not to offend those liness, seem to have begun to manifest themselves already in the early second century among enthusiastic young Stoics and would-be Cynics. It is interesting to see how Epictetus, simple and austere as he was, vigorously maintained the validity of older Greek and Roman feeling in this regard.
15 τυγχάνοντας. τοιούτων τι καὶ ἐνθάδε ποιεῖς καὶ οὐκ αἰσθάνης. σαυτὸν ἄξιον ἡγη τοῦ ὦξειν· ἐστώ, ἱσθι ἄξιοι. μὴ τι καὶ τοὺς παρακαθίζοντας, μὴ τι καὶ τοὺς συγκατακλινομένους, μὴ τι καὶ τοὺς καταφιλοῦντας; ἐὰν ἁπελθ' εἰς ἐρημίαν ποὺ ποτε, ἦς ἄξιος εἰ, καὶ μόνος δίαγε κατόξων σεαυτοῦ. δίκαιον γὰρ ἐστὶ τῆς σῆς ἀκαθαρσίας σὲ μόνον ἀπολαύειν. ἐν πόλει δ' οὖντα οὕτως ἀπερισκέπτως καὶ ἀγνωμόνως ἀναστρέφεσθαι τίνος σοι φαίνεται;
16 εἰ δ' ἵππον σοι πεπιστεύκει ἡ φύσις, περιεφρας αὐτὸν καὶ ἀτημέλητον; καὶ νῦν οἶου σου τὸ σῶμα ὡς ἵππον ἐγκεχειρίσθαι· πλῦνον αὐτό, ἀπόσμηξον, ποίησον, ἵνα σε μηδεῖς ἀποστρέφηται, μηδεῖς ἐκτρέπηται. τὰς δ' οὐκ ἐκτρέπεται ῥυπαρὸν ἀνθρωπον, ἄξοντα, κακόχρουν μᾶλλον ἦ τὸν κεκοπτρωμένον; ἐκεῖνη ἡ ὀσμὴ ἐξωθέν ἐστιν ἐπίθετος, ἢ δ' ἢ ἀθεραπευσίας ἐσωθὲν καὶ οἰονεὶ διασεστπότος.
18 Ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης ὁ λυγάκις ἐλούετο.—'Ἀλλὰ ἐστιλβέν 2 αὐτοῦ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλ' ἦν οὔτως ἐπίχαρι καὶ ἤδυ, ὡστ' ἦρων αὐτοῦ οἱ ὅραιοτατοι καὶ εὐγενεστατοι καὶ ἐπεθύμουν ἐκεῖνῳ παρακατακλίνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἦ τοῖς εὐμορφοτάτοις. ἐξ' ἢν ἐκεῖνω μήτε λούεσθαι μήτε πλύνεσθαι, εἰ

1 Schenkl: ἦ S.
whom you meet. You are doing something of the sort even here, and do not realize it. You think that you are worthy of the smell.\(^1\) Very well, be worthy of it. Do you think, though, that those who sit by your side, those who recline beside you, those who kiss you, are worthy of it too?\(^2\) Bah, go away into a wilderness somewhere or other, a place worthy of you, and live alone, smelling of yourself! For it is only right that you should enjoy your uncleanliness all by yourself. But since you are living in a city, what kind of character do you fancy you are exhibiting, to behave so thoughtlessly and inconsiderately? If nature had committed to your care a horse, would you have utterly neglected it? And now I would have you think that your body has been entrusted to you like a horse; wash it, rub it down, make it so that nobody will turn his back on you or move aside. But who does not avoid a dirty fellow that smells and has an unsightly skin, even more than a man bespattered with dung? In this latter case the smell is external and acquired, in the other it comes from slovenliness that is internal, and is characteristic of one who has grown rotten through and through.

But Socrates bathed infrequently,\(^3\) says someone.—Why, his body was radiant; why, it was so attractive and sweet that the handsomest and most high-born were in love with him, and yearned to sit by his side rather than beside those who had the prettiest

\(^1\) That is, so good that his smell makes no real difference.

\(^2\) That is, bad enough to deserve such treatment (\&xi;os meaning both "good enough" and "bad enough").

\(^3\) Plato, Symposium, 174 A.

\(^2\) Sb in margin: \&epsilon;\iota\iota\iota \mu\iota\nu S.
Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus

20 Ἀλλὰ λέγει Ἀριστοφάνης
tous ὁχριῶντας, tous ἀνυποδήτους λέγω.—

Δέγει γὰρ καὶ ἀεροβατεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκ τῆς
παλαίστρας κλέπτειν τά ἱμάτια. ἔπει τοι πάντες
οἱ γεγραφότες περὶ Σωκράτους πάντα τὰναντία
αὐτῷ προσμαρτυροῦσιν, ὅτι ἡδὺς οὐ μόνον ἀκούσαι,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰδεῖν ἤν. πάλιν περὶ Διωγένους ταύτα
γράφουσι. δεῖ γὰρ μηδὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ
σώματος ἐμφασιν ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίαν ἀποσοβεῖν
tous πολλοὺς, ἀλλ’ ὡσπερ τὰ ἄλλα εὔθυμον καὶ
ἀτάραχον ἐπιδεικνύειν αὐτὸν οὕτως καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ
σώματος. “Ἅδετε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔχω,
οὔδενος δέομαι’ ἴδετε πῶς ἄικος ὡν καὶ ἀπολίς
καὶ φυγάς, ἃν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ἀνέστιος πάντων
tῶν εὐπατρίδων καὶ πλουσίων ἀταραχώτερον
diάγω καὶ εὐρούστερον. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σωμάτιον ἡ
ὁρᾶτε ὅτι οὐ κακοῦται ὑπὸ τῆς αὐστηρᾶς διαίτης.”

24 ἀν δὲ μοι ταύτα λέγη τις ἄνθρωπον σχίμα
καταδίκαν ἔχων καὶ πρόσωπον, τίς με πείσει θεῶν
προσελθεῖν φιλοσοφία, εἰ γἐ τοιούτους ποιεῖ;
μὴ γένοιτο οὐδ’, εἰ σοφοὶς ἐμελλον εἰναι, ἦθελον.

1 The words κὰν θεαμφυ μὴ θέλης, ψυχρῆ, here, I have transferred to § 32, where, as Schweighäuser saw, they clearly belong.
2 Wolf: ἵματιον S.
3 εἰ γἐ Reiske, after Schegk: ἔστε S.

1 Ibid., 217–18.
2 λούσεσθαι is properly of “bathing,” as in the public baths, especially, in this passage, the warm baths of Roman times, which are clearly in mind; πλούσεσθαι is properly of cleaning clothes, as in a laundry, which was generally done
forms and features. He might have neither bathed nor washed, had he so desired; yet even his infrequent bathings were effective.—But Aristophanes says,

The pallid men I mean, who shoeless go.—Oh, yes, but then he says also that Socrates "trod the air," and stole people’s clothes from the wrestling school. And yet all who have written about Socrates unite in bearing testimony to the precise opposite of this; that he was not merely pleasant to hear, but also to see. Again, men write the same thing about Diogenes. For a man ought not to drive away the multitude from philosophy, even by the appearance of his body, but as in everything else, so also on the side of the body, he ought to show himself cheerful and free from perturbation. "See, O men, that I have nothing, and need nothing. See how, although I am without a house, and without a city, and an exile, if it so chance, and without a hearth, I still live a life more tranquil and serene than that of all the noble and the rich. Yes, and you see that even my paltry body is not disfigured by my hard way of living." But if I am told this by a person who has the bearing and face of a condemned man, what one of all the gods shall persuade me to approach philosophy, if she makes people like that? Far be it from me! I shouldn’t be willing to do so, not even if it would make me a wise man.

in ancient Greece, as in modern, and in the Orient, with cold water. All that is meant, as far as Socrates is concerned, is that he generally washed at home in cold water, and very seldom used public baths or hot baths.

\(^3\) Clouds, 103, slightly modified.

\(^4\) Ibid., 179 and 225. The argument is that the evidence of Aristophanes is worthless anyway, because he also made these two preposterously false statements about Socrates.
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25 'Εγὼ μὲν νη τοὺς θεοὺς τὸν νέον τὸν πρώτως κυνούμενον θέλω μᾶλλον ἠλθεὶν πρὸς με πεπλασμένον τὴν κόμην η 1 κατεθηκηκότα καὶ ῥυπαρόν. Βλέπεται γὰρ τις ἐν ἐκείνῳ τοῦ καλοῦ φαντασία, ἐφεσὶς δὲ τοῦ εὐσχήμονος. ὅπου δ' αὐτὸ εἶναι φανταζέται, ἐκεῖ καὶ φιλοτεχνεῖ. Λοιπὸν ὑποδείξαι μόνον αὐτῷ δεὶ καὶ εἰπεῖν "νεανίσκε, τὸ καλὸν ζητεῖς καὶ εὐ ποιεῖς. ἵσθι οὖν, ὅτι ἐκεῖ φύται, ὅπου τὸν λόγον ἐχεῖς. ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ ζητεῖ, ὅπου τὰς ὀρμᾶς καὶ τὰς ἀφορμᾶς, ὅπου τὰς ὅρεξις, τὰς ἐκκλίσεις. τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχεις ἐν σεαυτῷ ἐξαίρετον, τὸ σωμάτιον δὲ φύσει πηλὸς ἐστιν. τὶ ποιεῖς εἰκὴ περὶ αὐτὸ; εἰ μὴ δὲν ἔτερον, τῷ χρόνῳ γνώσῃ, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστιν." ἀν δὲ μοι ἔλθῃ κεκοπρωμένος, ῥυπαρός, μόστακα ἔχων μέχρι τῶν γονάτων, τί αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν ἔχω, ἀπὸ ποίας αὐτὸν ὁμοιότητος ἐπαγαγεῖν; περὶ τι γὰρ ἐσπούδακεν ὀμοιον τῷ καλῷ, ἵνα αὐτὸν μεταθῶ καὶ εἶπον "οὐκ ἐστιν ἐνθάδε τὸ καλὸν, ἀλλὰ ἐνθάδε"; θέλεις αὐτῷ λέγω "οὐκ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ κεκοπρωσθαί τὸ καλὸν, ἀλλὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ"; ἐφίεται γὰρ τοῦ καλοῦ; ἐμφασιν γὰρ τινα αὐτοῦ ἔχει; ἀπελθε καὶ χοίρῳ διαλέγου, ἵνα ἐν βορβόρῳ μὴ κυλῆται. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ Πολέμωνος ἦπαυτο οἱ λόγοι οἱ Ἐνοκράτους ὡς φιλοκάλον νεανίσκον εἰσῆλθεν γὰρ ἔχων ἐναύσματα τῆς περὶ τὸ καλὸν σπουδῆς, ἀλλαχοῦ δ' αὐτὸ ζητῶν.

1 η added by Schenkl.

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1 See III. 1, 14, and note.
2 Much as Suetonius so admirably says of Nero (c. 55):
Erat illi aeternitatis perpetuaeque famae cupidō, sed inconsulta.

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As for me, by the gods, I should rather have the young man who was experiencing the first stirrings towards philosophy come to me with his hair carefully dressed, than with it in a state of desperate neglect and dirty. For the first case shows that there exists in the young man a sort of imaging of beauty, and an aiming at comeliness, and where he fancies it to be, there also he devotes his efforts. With that as a starting-point, all that it is necessary to do is to show him the way, and say, "Young man, you are seeking the beautiful, and you do well. Know, then, that it arises in that part of you where you have your reason; seek it there where you have your choices and your refusals, where you have your desires and your aversions. For this part is something of a special kind which you have within you, but your paltry body is by nature only clay. Why do you toil for it to no purpose? If you learn nothing else, time at least will teach you that it is nothing." But if he comes to me bespattered with dung, dirty, his moustache reaching down to his knees, what have I to say to him, from what point of resemblance can I start so as to prevail upon him? For what is there to which he is devoted, that bears any resemblance to the beautiful, so that I may turn him about and say, "Beauty is not there, but here"? Do you want me to say to him, "Beauty does not consist in being bespattered with dung, but in reason"? For is he aiming at beauty? Has he any manifestation of it? Go and talk to a pig, that he may wallow no more in mud! That is why the words of Xenocrates laid hold even of a Polemo, because he was a young man who loved beauty. For he came to Xenocrates with glimmerings of a zeal for the beautiful, but was looking for it in the wrong place.
31 'Επεί τοι οὖδὲ τὰ ξώα τὰ ἀνθρώπως σύντροφα ῥυπαρὰ ἐποίησεν ἢ φύσις. μὴ τι ἵππος κυλίεται ἐν βορβώρῳ, μὴ τι κύου γενναῖος; ἀλλ' ὁ ὦς καὶ τὰ σαπρὰ χνίδια καὶ σκώληκες καὶ ἀράχναι, τὰ μακροτάτω τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης συναναστροφῆς ἀπεληλαμένα. σὺ οὖν ἀνθρώπως ὅν οὔδε ξώοιν εἶναι θέλεις τῶν ἀνθρώπως συντρόφων, ἀλλὰ σκώληξ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀράχνιον; οὐ λούσῃ ποὺ ποτὲ ὡς θέλεις, οὐκ ὕποπτλυνεῖς σεαυτόν, καὶ θερμῷ μηθέλης, ψυχρῷ. σὺ οὖν ἥξεις καθαρός, ἕνα σοὶ χαίρωσιν οἱ συνόντες; ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ἱερά ἥμιν συνέχθη τοιοῦτος, ὅπου πτύσαι οὐ νεόμισται οὖν ἀπομύξασθαι, ὄλος ὃν πτύσμα καὶ μύξα.

32 Τί οὖν; καλλωπίζεσθαι τις ἀξιοὶ; μὴ γένοιτο, εἰ μηθεκεῖν ὁ πεφύκαμει, τὸν λόγον, τὰ δόγματα, τὰς ἐνεργείας, τὸ δὲ σῶμα μέχρι τοῦ καθαρίου, μέχρι τοῦ μη ἀποσκόπτειν. ἀλλ' ἄν ἀκούσῃς, ὃτι οὐ δὲι φορεῖν κόκκινα, ἀπελθὼν κόπρωσον σου τὸν τρίβωνα ἢ κατάρρηξον.—'Αλλὰ πόθεν ἔχω καλὸν τρίβωνα;—'Ἀνθρωπε, ὦδωρ ἔχεις, πλύνων αὐτῶν. ὦδον νέος ἀξιέραστος, ὦδον πρεσβύτης ἀξίους τοῦ ἐρᾶν καὶ ἀντερᾶσθαι, ὦ τις νιὸν αὐτῶν παραδώσει παίδευσθισόμενον, ὦ θυγατέρες,

1 ἡμίδια Σ.
2 These last five words, which appear in § 19, actually belong here, as Schweighäuser saw.
3 παραδώσει Kronenberg; παίδευσθισόμενον Schenkl: παρα-δοθησόμενον Σ.

1 Of course a spider is not ordinarily a dirty animal in its personal habits; the most that can be said is that it is frequently found in quiet and hence dusty spots. Cf. note on § 1.

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Why, look you, nature has not made dirty even the animals which associate with man. A horse doesn’t roll around in the mud, does he? or a highly bred dog? No, but the hog, and the miserable rotten geese, and worms, and spiders, the creatures farthest removed from association with human beings. Do you, then, who are a human being, wish to be not even an animal of the kind that associates with men, but rather a worm, or a spider? Will you not take a bath somewhere, some time, in any form you please? Will you not wash yourself? If you don’t care to bath in hot water, then use cold. Will you not come to us clean, that your companions may be glad? What, and do you in such a state go with us even into the temples, where it is forbidden by custom to spit or blow the nose, yourself being nothing but a mass of spit and drivel?

Well, what then? Is anyone demanding that you beautify yourself? Heaven forbid! except you beautify that which is our true nature—the reason, its judgements, its activities; but your body only so far as to keep it cleanly, only so far as to avoid giving offence. But if you hear that one ought not to wear scarlet, go bespatter your rough cloak with dung—or tear it to pieces! Yet where am I to get a rough cloak that looks well?—Man, you have water, wash it! See, here is a lovable young man, here an elderly man worthy to love and to be loved in return, to whom a person will entrust the education of his son, to whom daughters and young men will come, if it

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2 i.e. a man really is not body, which he has in common with other animals, but mind, reason, or moral purpose. Cf. such passages as I. 1, 23; III. 1, 25–6; 13, 17; IV. 5, 12 and 23; 7, 31 f.; and § 27 above.

3 That is, the young man carries the precept to extremes, the command being ironical.
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φ νέοι προσελεύσονται, ἃν οὖτως τύχῃ, ἵνα ἐν 36 κοπρῶνι λέγῃ τὰς σχολὰς. μὴ γένοιτο. πᾶσα ἐκτροπὴ ἀπὸ τινος ἀνθρωπικοῦ γίνεται, αὕτη ἐγγύς ἐστὶ τῷ μὴ ἀνθρωπικῇ εἶναι.

1β’. Περὶ προσοχῆς.

1 "Ὅταν ἀφῆς πρὸς ὀλίγου τὴν προσοχήν, μὴ τούτῳ φαντάζου, ότι, ὀπόταν θέλης, ἀναλήψῃ αὕτην, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο πρόχειρον ἐστώ σοι, ότι παρὰ τὸ σήμερον ἀμαρτηθέν εἰς τάλλα χεῖρον ἀνάγκη

2 σοι τὰ πράγματα ἔχειν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάντων χαλεπώτατον ἔθος τοῦ μὴ προσέχειν ἐγγίνεται, εἰτὰ ἔθος τοῦ ἀναβάλλεσθαι τὴν προσοχὴν, ἀεὶ δ' εἰς ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου χρόνον εἰσθανεῖ ὑπερτίθεσθαι τὸ εὐροεῖν, τὸ εὐσχημονεῖν, τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν καὶ διεξάγειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν λυσιτελῆς ἡ ὑπέρθεσις ἐστιν, ἡ παντελῆς ἀπόστασις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ λυσιτελεστέρα· εἰ δ' οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, τί οὐχὶ διηνεκῆ τὴν προσοχὴν φυλάσσεις; “σήμερον παῖξαι θέλω.” τί οὖν κωλύει 3 προσέχοντα; “ἄσαι.” τί οὖν κωλύει προσέχοντα; μὴ γὰρ ἐξαιρεῖται τι μέρος τοῦ βίου, ἐφ' οὐ οὐ διατείνει τὸ προσέχειν; χεῖρον γὰρ αὐτὸ προσέχων ποιήσεις, βέλτιον δὲ μὴ προσέχων; καὶ τί ἄλλο τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ κρείσσον ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ προσέχοντων γίνεται; ὁ τέκτων μὴ προσέχων τεκταίνει

1 Kronenberg (after Sb and s): φησί S.
2 Schenkl: ι*αθι (or ι*φεας) ὑπερτιθέμενος S.
3 κωλύει added by C. Schenkl.
so chance—all for the purpose of having him deliver his lectures sitting on a dunghill? Good Lord, no! Every eccentricity arises from some human trait, but this trait comes close to being non-human.

CHAPTER XII

Of attention

When you relax your attention for a little while, do not imagine that whenever you choose you will recover it, but bear this in mind, that because of the mistake which you have made to-day, your condition must necessarily be worse as regards everything else. For, to begin with—and this is the worst of all—a habit of not paying attention is developed; and after that a habit of deferring attention; and always you grow accustomed to putting off from one time to another tranquil and appropriate living, the life in accordance with nature, and persistence in that life. Now if the postponement of such matters is profitable, it is still more profitable to abandon them altogether; but if it is not profitable, why do you not maintain your attention continuously? "To-day I want to play." What is to prevent your playing, then,—but with attention? "I want to sing." What is to prevent your singing, then,—but with attention? There is no part of the activities of your life excepted, to which attention does not extend, is there? What, will you do it worse by attention, and better by inattention? And yet what other thing, of all that go to make up our life, is done better by those who are inattentive? Does the inattentive carpenter do his work more accur-
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ἀκριβέστερον; ο ὁ κυβερνήτης μὴ προσέχων
κυβερνᾷ ἀσφαλέστερον; ἀλλα δε τι τῶν μικρο-

7 Τίσιν οὖν δεὶ με προσέχειν;—Πρῶτον μὲν ἐκείνοις τοῖς καθολικοῖς καὶ ἐκεῖνα πρόχειρα
ἐχειν καὶ χωρὶς ἐκείνων μὴ καθεύδειν, μὴ ἀνύσ-
tασθαι, μὴ πίνειν, μὴ ἐσθίειν, μὴ συμβάλλειν
ἀνθρώποις; ὅτι προαιρέσεως ἀλλοτρίας κύριος
οὕδει, ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ μόνῃ τάγμαθον καὶ κακῶν.

8 οὕδεις οὖν κύριος οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν μοι περιποιῆσαι
οὔτε κακῶ με περιβαλεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ αὐτὸς ἐμαυτοῦ
κατὰ ταύτα ἐξουσίαν ἐχω μόνοις. ὅταν οὖν
ταύτα ἀσφαλῆ μοι ἥ', τί ἐχω περὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς
παράσσεσθαι; ποίος τύραννος φοβερός, ποία
νόσος, ποία πενία, ποῖον πρόσκρουσμα;—'Αλλ'

9 οὐκ ἡρεσα τῷ δείνι.—Μὴ οὖν ἐκείνος ἐμὸν ἐστὶν
ἐργον, μή τι ἐμὸν κρίμα;—Οὔ.—Τί οὖν ἔτι μοι
μελεῖ;—'Αλλὰ δοκεῖ τις εἶναι.—'Οψεται αὐτὸς

10 καὶ οἷς δοκεῖ, ἐγὼ δ' ἐχω, τίνι με δεὶ ἀρέσκειν,
tινι υποτετάχθαι, τινι πείθεσθαι; τῷ θεῷ καὶ

12 μετ' ἐκείνου ἐμοί.ἐμὲ ἐκείνως συνεστητεσεν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν προαίρεσιν ὑπέταξεν ἐμοὶ μόνω δους
cανόνας εἰς χρῆσιν αὐτὴς τὴν ὀρθήν, οἷς ὅταν

1 These last six words are added, to fill an obvious lacuna, in Upton's "codex." Something like them is certainly needed.
2 ἐμοί supplied by Diels.
ately? The inattentive helmsman steer more safely? And is there any other of the lesser functions of life which is done better by inattention? Do you not realize that when once you let your mind go wandering, it is no longer within your power to recall it, to bring it to bear upon either seemliness, or self-respect, or moderation? But you do anything that comes into your head, you follow your inclinations.

What are the things, then, to which I ought to pay attention?—First, these general principles, and you ought to have them at your command, and without them neither go to sleep, nor rise up, nor drink, nor eat, nor mingle with men; I mean the following: No man is master of another's moral purpose; and: In its sphere alone are to be found one's good and evil. It follows, therefore, that no one has power either to procure me good, or to involve me in evil, but I myself alone have authority over myself in these matters. Accordingly, when these things are secure for me, what excuse have I for being disturbed about things external? What kind of tyrant inspires fear, what kind of disease, or poverty, or obstacle?—But I have not pleased So-and-so.—He is not my function, is he? He is not my judgement, is he?—No.—Why, then, do I care any longer?—But he has the reputation of being somebody.—He and those who think so highly of him will have to see to that, but I have one whom I must please, to whom I must submit, whom I must obey, that is, God, and after Him, myself. God has commended me to myself, and He has subjected to me alone my moral purpose, giving me standards for the correct use of it; and when I follow
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katakoloubhēsōn, en sutlllogismoiōs ouk ēpistre-

fomai oudènōs tōn ālllo ti legoüntωn, ēn metapip-
tousin ou frountizō oudeños. dia ti ouν en tois
meiōsion anwōsi me oi ψέγοντεs; ti to aütiou
taúthēs tis tarachēs; oudeν ālllo η όti en tou-
tω tā tōtopω āgūmnastōs eiμ. ēpeī toī pāsa
ēpistēmē kataφranontikē ēstī tēs āγνoias kai
tōn āgououνtōn kai ou μōnon ai ēpistēmēai, āllā
kai ai téxvai. fēre ouν thēleis skuνtēa kai tōn
pŏllōn kataγελα περί tō aüτōu ērγον φέre ouν
thēleis tēktvna.

15 Πρωτων μεν ouν taúta ēxein prōχeira kai
muδēn dīχa tōutōn poiein, āllā tētāsθai tēn
ψυχην ēpiv tōutōn tōn skopōn, μuδēn tōn ēξω
diōkein, μuδēn tōn āllostrīn, āllē ώs diēstaxev
ō dūnāmevos, tā prōaīrētikā ēξ āpantōs, tā d'
āllē ώs āν dīdōtais. ēpiv tōutōs de meμvēsθai,
tvēnēs ēsmēn kai tī ήμwν ὰνομα, kai prōs tās
dūnāmeis tōn sχēseon pεirαsθai tā kαθήκοντα
ἀπευθύνειν. tīs kaiρōs q'dēs, tīs kaiρōs pαιδiās,1
tīnōn pαrōνtōn. tī ēstai āpō tōu prāγmatoς
μή tī kαtαφρονήσωσιν ήμων oī2 suνόντεs, μή tī
hμeis aυtōv. pōte skōψai kai tīnαs pοtē kαtα-
gelāsai kai ēpī tīnī pοtē sμπεριενεχθήναι kai
tīνi, kai loıpōν ēn tē sμπεριεφορά pōs tηρή
sai tō aυtōu. ὅπου d' ān ἀπονεύςηs āpō tīνos tōu-
tōn, ευθūs ήμwia, ouk ēξωθεν pοθεν, āllē ēξ
aυτής tēs énergēias.

1 Upton's "codex" and Wolf: pαιδiαs S.  
2 oī supplied by Sb.

1 See note on 1. 7, 1.

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these standards, I pay heed to none of those who say anything else; I give not a thought to anyone in arguments with equivocal premisses. Why, then, in the more important matters am I annoyed by those who censure me? What is the reason for this perturbation of spirit? Nothing but the fact that in this field I lack training. For, look you, every science is entitled to despise ignorance and ignorant people, and not merely the sciences, but also the arts. Take any cobbler you please, and he laughs the multitude to scorn when it comes to his own work; take any carpenter you please.

First, therefore, we ought to have these principles at command, and to do nothing apart from them, but keep the soul intent upon this mark; we must pursue none of the things external, none of the things which are not our own, but as He that is mighty has ordained; pursuing without any hesitation the things that lie within the sphere of the moral purpose, and all other things as they have been given us. And next we must remember who we are, and what is our designation, and must endeavour to direct our actions, in the performance of our duties, to meet the possibilities of our social relations. We must remember what is the proper time for song, the proper time for play, and in whose presence; also what will be out of place; lest our companions despise us, and we despise ourselves; when to jest, and whom to laugh at, and to what end to engage in social intercourse, and with whom; and, finally, how to maintain one's proper character in such social intercourse. But whenever you deviate from any one of these principles, immediately you suffer loss, and that not from anywhere outside, but from the very nature of the activity.
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19 Τι οὖν; δυνατὸν ἀναμάρτητον ἣδη εἶναι; ἄμηχανον, ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνο δυνατὸν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀμαρτάνειν τετάσθαι διηνεκῶς. ἀγαπητὸν γάρ, εἰ μηδέποτ' ἀνεύχετε ταύτην τὴν προσοχὴν ὅλιγων

20 γε ἀμαρτημάτων ἐκτὸς ἐσόμεθα. νῦν δ' ὅταν εἴπης "ἀπαύριον προσέξω," ἵσθι ὅτι τούτῳ λέγεις "σήμερον ἐσομαι ἀναίσχυντος, ἀκαίρος, ταπεινῶς· ἐπ' ἀλλοις ἔσται τὸ λυπεῖν με· ὀργισθήσομαι σήμερον, φθονήσω." βλέπε ὅσα κακὰ σεαυτῷ ἐπιτρέπεις. ἀλλ' εἰ σοι ἀὗριον καλῶς ἐχει, πόσῳ κρεῖττον σήμερον; εἰ αὐριον συμφέρει, πολὺ μᾶλλον σήμερον, ὡν καὶ αὕριον δυνηθῆς καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβάλῃ εἰς τρίτην.

νυ'. Πρὸς τοὺς εὐκόλως ἐκφέροντας τὰ αὐτῶν.

1 "Οταν τις ἡμῖν ἀπλῶς δόξῃ διειλέχθαι περὶ τῶν ἐαυτοῦ πραγμάτων, πῶς 2 ποτὲ ἐξαγόμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐκφέρειν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὰ ἐαυτῶν ἀπόρρητα καὶ τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν οἴόμεθα εἶναι:

2 πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἀνίσον εἶναι δοκεῖ αὐτὸν μὲν ἀκηκοέναι τὰ τοῦ πλησίον, μὴ μεντοὶ μεταδιδόναι κακείνῳ ἐν τῷ μέρει τῶν ἡμετέρων. εἰθ' ὅτι οἰόμεθα οὐχ ἄπλῶν ἀνθρώπων παρέξειν αὐτοῖς

3 φαντασίαν σιωπῶντες τὰ ἱδία. ἄμελει πολλάκις εἰώθασιν λέγειν "ἐγὼ σοι πάντα τὰμαυτοῦ εἰρήκα,  

1 Schenkl: εἰσ S.  2 Trincavelli: πῶς S.
What then? Is it possible to be free from fault altogether? No, that cannot be achieved, but it is possible ever to be intent upon avoiding faults. For we must be satisfied, if we succeed in escaping at least a few faults by never relaxing our attention. But now, when you say, "To-morrow I will pay attention," I would have you know that this is what you are saying: "To-day I will be shameless, tactless, abject; it will be in the power of other men to grieve me; I will get angry to-day, I will give way to envy." Just see all the evils that you are allowing yourself! But if it is good for you to pay attention to-morrow, how much better is it to-day! If it is to your interest to-morrow, it is much more so to-day, that you may be able to do the same to-morrow also, and not put it off again, this time to the day after to-morrow.

CHAPTER XIII

To those who lightly talk about their own affairs

When someone gives us the impression of having talked to us frankly about his personal affairs, somehow or other we are likewise led to tell him our own secrets, and to think that is frankness! The first reason for this is because it seems unfair for a man to have heard his neighbour's affairs, and yet not to let him too have, in his turn, a share in ours. Another reason, after that, is because we feel that we shall not give the impression to these men of being frank, if we keep our own private affairs concealed. Indeed, men are frequently in the habit of saying, "I have told you everything
4. τιτυίο; πρόσετη δὲ καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἀσφαλῶς πιστεύειν τῷ ἴδῃ τὰ αὐτοῦ πεπιστευκότιν ύπέρχηται γὰρ ἡμᾶς, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτε οὕτως ἔξειποι τὰ ἴμετερα εὐλαβοῦμενος, μῆποτε καὶ ἴμεις ἐξείπο-5. μεν τὰ ἐκεῖνοι. οὕτως καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἔν' Ῥώμῃ οἱ προπετεῖς λαμβάνονται. παρακεκάθικε σοι στρατιώτης ἐν σχήματι ἴδιωτικῷ καὶ ἀρξάμενος κακῶς λέγει τὸν Καίσαρα, εἴτε σὺ ὥσπερ ἐνέχυρον παρ' αὐτοῦ λαβὼν τῆς πίστεως τὸ αὐτὸν τῆς λοιδορίας κατηρχθαί λέγεις καὶ αὐτός 6. ὅσα φρονεῖς, εἴτε δεθείς ἀπιάγγ. τοιούτων τι καὶ ἐν τῷ καθόλου πάσχομεν. οὐ γὰρ ἡμοὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἀσφαλῶς πεπιστευκεν τά ἐσαυτοῦ, οὕτως κἀγὼ 7. τῷ ἐπιτυχόντι· ἄλλῳ ἐγὼ μὲν ἀκούσας σιωπῶ, ἂν γε ὁ τοιοῦτος, ὁ δ' ἔξειλθων ἐκφέρει προς πάντας εἰτ' ἄν γνῶ τὸ γενόμενον, ἂν μὲν δ' καὶ αὐτός ἐκεῖνῳ ὀμοίος, ἀμύνασθαι θέλων ἐκφέρω τὰ 8. ἐκεῖνοι καὶ φύρω καὶ φύρομαι. ἂν δὲ μνημονεύων, ὅτι ἄλλος ἄλλον οὐ βλάπτει, ἄλλα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἐργα ἐκαστὸν καὶ βλάπτει καὶ ὀφελεῖ, τούτου μὲν κρατῶ τοῦ μῆ ὀμοίον τι ποίησαι ἐκεῖνω, ὀμοίω δ' ὑπὸ φλυαρίας τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ πέπονθα ἄ πέπονθα. 9. Ναὶ· ἄλλῳ ἀνισόν ἐστὶν ἀκούσαντα τὰ τοῦ 1. Wolf: προσέτι S. 2. οὗ γὰρ Schenkl: αὐτάρ S.

1 It may possibly be, as Upton suggests, that this abuse led John the Baptist to warn soldiers specifically, "Neither accuse any falsely" (Luke iii. 14).
about myself, aren’t you willing to tell me anything about yourself? Where do people act like that?” Furthermore, there is also the thought that we can safely trust the man who has already entrusted knowledge of his own affairs; for the idea occurs to us that this man would never spread abroad knowledge of our affairs, because he would be careful to guard against our too spreading abroad knowledge of his affairs. In this fashion the rash are ensnared by the soldiers in Rome. A soldier, dressed like a civilian, sits down by your side, and begins to speak ill of Caesar, and then you too, just as though you had received from him some guarantee of good faith in the fact that he began the abuse, tell likewise everything you think, and the next thing is—you are led off to prison in chains.¹ We experience something of the same sort also in the general course of our life. For even though this particular man has safely entrusted knowledge of his own affairs to me, I do not myself in like manner tell my affairs to any chance comer; no, I listen and keep still, if, to be sure, I happen to be that kind of a person, but he goes out and tells everybody. And then, when I find out what has happened, if I myself resemble the other person, because I want to get even with him I tell about his affairs, and confound him and am myself confounded. If, however, I remember that one person does not harm another, but that it is a man’s own actions which both harm and help him, this much I achieve, namely, that I do not act like the other person, but despite that I get into the state in which I am because of my own foolish talking.

Yes, but it isn’t fair to hear your neighbour’s
πλησιόν ἀπόρρητα αυτῶν ἐν τῷ μέρει μηδενὸς
10 μεταδιδόναι αυτῷ.—Μὴ γὰρ σε παρεκάλουν, ἀνθρώπε; μὴ γὰρ ἐπὶ συνθήκαις τισὶν ἐξήνεγκας τὰ σαυτῶν, ἵνα ἄκοψης ἐν τῷ μέρει καὶ τὰ ἐμά; εἰ σὺ φλύρος εἰ καὶ πάντας τοὺς ὑπαντήσαντας φίλους εἶναι δοκεῖς, θέλει καὶ ἐμὲ ὁμοίον σοι γενέσθαι; τί δ’, εἰ σὺ καλῶς μοι πεπίστευκας τὰ σαυτῶν, σοὶ δ’ οὐκ ἔστι καλῶς πιστεῦσαι, θέλεις
12 με προπεσεῖν; οἶνον εἰ πίθουν εἰχὸν ἐγὼ μὲν στεγνῷ, σὺ δὲ τετρυπημένου καὶ ἐλθὼν παρακατέθου καὶ τὸν σαυτὸν οἶνον, ἵνα βάλω εἰς τὸν ἐμὸν πίθουν, εἰτ’ ἡγανάκτεις ὅτι μὴ κάιγὼ σοὶ πιστεύω τὸν ἐμαυτὸν οἶνον τοῦ γὰρ τετρυπημένου ἔχεις τὸν πίθουν. πῶς οὖν ἔτι ὄσων γίνεται; σὺ πιστῷ παρακατέθου, σὺ αἰδήμου, τὰς ἐαυτοῦ ἐνεργείας μόναις βλαβερὰς ἡγομένοι καὶ
14 ὕφελίμους, τῶν δ’ ἐκτὸς οὐδέν ἐγὼ μὲν θέλεις παρακαταθῶμαι, ἀνθρώπω τὴν ἐαυτοῦ προαιρεσίν ἤτιμαι, θέλοντι δὲ κερματίου τυχεῖν ἢ ἀρχῆς τινὸς ἢ προαιρωγῆς ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ, κἀν μέλλῃς τὰ τέκνα σου κατασφάξειν, ως ἢ Μήδεια; ποῦ τοῦτο ἤσων ἐστίν; ἀλλὰ δειξὼν μοι σαυτὸν πιστῶν, αἰδήμονα, βέβαιον, δείξων, ὅτι δόγματα ἔχεις φιλικά, δειξὼν σοι τὸ ἀγγείον ὅτι οὐ τετρητῇ καὶ ὅσει, πῶς οὖν ἀναμενῶ ἵνα μοι σὺ πιστεύσῃς τὰ σαυτῶν, ἀλλ’ αὐτῶς ἐλθὼν σὲ παρακαλῶ ἀκούσαι τῶν ἐμῶν, τίς γὰρ οὐ θέλει χρήσασθαι ἀγγείῳ καλῷ, τίς ἀτιμάζει σύμβουλον εὕνουν καὶ πιστῶν, τίς οὖν άσμενος δεξιται τῶν ὁσπερ φορτίου μεταληψόμενον τῶν αὐτοῦ περι—

1 Elter, after Wolf: ἄναμενω S.

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secrets and then give him no share of your own in return.—Man, I did not invite your confidences, did I? You did not tell about your affairs on certain conditions, that you were to hear about mine in return, did you? If you are a babbler, and think that every person you meet is a friend, do you also want me to be like yourself? And why, if you did well to entrust your affairs to me, but it is impossible for me to do well in trusting you, do you wish me to be rash? It is just as though I had a jar that was sound, and you one with a hole in it, and you came to me and deposited your wine with me, for me to store it in my jar; and then you complained because I do not entrust to you my wine also; why, your jar has a hole in it! How, then, is equality any longer to be found? You made your deposit with a faithful man, with a respectful man, with a man who regards only his own activities as either harmful or helpful, and nothing that is external. Do you wish me to make a deposit with you—a man who has dishonoured his own moral purpose, and wants to get paltry cash, or some office, or advancement at court, even if you are going to cut the throats of your children, as Medea did? Where is there equality in that? Nay, show yourself to me as a faithful, respectful, dependable man; show that your judgements are those of a friend, show that your vessel has no hole in it, and you shall see how I will not wait for you to entrust the knowledge of your affairs to me, but I will go of myself and ask you to hear about mine. For who does not wish to use a good vessel, who despises a friendly and faithful counsellor, who would not gladly accept the man who is ready to share his difficulties, as he would
Means of torture among the ancients. See also II. 6, 18.

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share a burden with him, and to make them light for him by the very fact of his sharing in them?

Yes, but I trust you, while you do not trust me. — First, you do not trust me, either, but you are a babbler, and that is the reason why you cannot keep anything back. Why, look you, if that statement of yours is true, entrust these matters to me alone; but the fact is that whenever you see anybody at leisure you sit down beside him and say, "Brother, I have no one more kindly disposed or dearer to me than you, I ask you to listen to my affairs"; and you act this way to people whom you have not known for even a short time. And even if you do trust me, it is clear you trust me as a faithful and respectful person, not because I have already told you about my affairs. Allow me also, then, to have the same thought about you. Show me that, if a man unbosoms himself to somebody about his own affairs, he is faithful and respectful. For if that were so, I should have gone about and told my own affairs to all men, that is, if that was going to make me faithful and respectful. But that is not the case; to be faithful and respectful a man needs judgements of no casual sort. If, therefore, you see someone very much in earnest about the things that lie outside the province of his moral purpose, and subordinating his own moral purpose to them, rest assured that this man has tens of thousands of persons who subject him to compulsion and hinder him. He has no need of pitch or the wheel to get him to speak out what he knows, but a little nod from a wench, if it so happen, will upset him, a kindness from one of those who frequent Caesar's court, desire for office, or an inheritance, and thirty thousand
23 τούτοις ὁμοία τρισμύρια. μεμνημέναι οὖν ἐν τοῖς καθόλου, ὧτι οἱ ἀπόρρητοι λόγοι πίστεως χρείαν ἔχουσι καὶ δογμάτων τοιούτων· ταύτα δὲ ποὺ νῦν εὑρεῖν βαθίως; ἡ δειξάτω μοί τις τὸν οὕτως ἑξούσια, ὥστε λέγειν "ἐμοὶ μόνων μέλει τῶν ἐμῶν, τῶν ἀκωλύτων, τῶν φύσει ἐλευθέρων. ταύτην οὕσις ἐχω τοῦ ἄγαθον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα γινέσθω ὡς ἂν διδώται· οὐ διαφέρομαι."
other things of the sort. Remember, therefore, in general, that confidences require faithfulness and faithful judgements; and where can one readily find these things nowadays? Or, let someone show me the man who is so minded that he can say, "I care only for what is my own, what is not subject to hindrance, what is by nature free. This, which is the true nature of the good, I have; but let everything else be as God has granted, it makes no difference to me."

1 Cf. "When the Son of man cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?" (Luke xviii. 8).
FRAGMENTS

Introductory Note

The genuine fragments of Epictetus are not very numerous, and since several of them are of unusual interest, it has seemed best to add them at this point. One fragment, No. 28 b, I have added to those listed by Schenkl, since its discovery was subsequent to his latest edition.

Earlier editions have included a large number of aphorisms gathered from Stobaeus, and from a gnomology purporting to contain excerpts from Democritus, Isocrates, and Epictetus. The researches of a group of scholars, principally H. Schenkl,1 R. Asmus,2 and A. Elter,3 have thrown such doubt upon the authenticity of these aphorisms that it would scarcely serve any useful purpose to reproduce them in the present work.

2 Quaestiones Epictetiae, Freiburg i. B., 1888.
3 Epicteti et Moschionis Sententiae, Bonn, 1892.
FRAGMENTA

1 (175\textsuperscript{1}). Stobaeus, Eclogae, 11. 1, 31

'Αρριανοῦ 'Επικτητείου πρὸς τὸν περὶ οὐσίας

πολυπραγμονοῦντα \textsuperscript{2}

Τί μοι μέλει, φησί, πότερον εὖ ἀτόμων ἢ εὖ ἀμερῶν ἢ ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς συνέστηκε τὰ ὄντα; οὐ γὰρ ἄρκει μαθεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῶν ὀρέξεων καὶ ἐκκλίσεων καὶ ἐτι ὀρμῶν καὶ ἄφορμῶν καὶ τούτων ὄστερ κανόνι χρόμενον διοικεῖν τὰ τοῦ βίου, τὰ δ’ ὑπὲρ ἓμας ταῦτα χαίρειν εὖν, ἃ τυχὼν μὲν ἀκατάληπτά ἐστι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ γνώμῃ, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα θείᾳ \textsuperscript{3} τις εἶναι καταλήπτα, ἀλλ’ οὐν τί ὀφελος καταληφθέντων; οὐχὶ δὲ διακενῆς πράγματα ἔχειν φατέον τοὺς ταῦτα ὡς ἀναγκαία τῷ τοῦ φιλοσόφου λόγῳ προσνέμοντας; Μή τι οὖν καὶ τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς παράγγελμα παρέλκον ἔστι, τὸ Γνώθι σαυτόν;—Γοῦτο δὲ μὲν οὖ, φησί.—

Τὸς οὖν ἦ δύναμις αὐτοῦ; εἰ χορευτῇ τις παρῆγγελλε τὸ γνῶναι ἑαυτὸν, οὐκοῦν ἄν τῇ προστάξει προσεῖχε τῷ ἐπιστραφῆναι καὶ τῶν συν-χορευτῶν καὶ τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς συμφωνίας;—

Φησίν.—Εἰ δὲ ναύτη; \textsuperscript{5} εἰ δὲ στρατιώτη; πό-

\textsuperscript{1} Numbers in parenthesis refer to Schweighäuser’s edition, which was followed by Long in his translation.

\textsuperscript{2} The final word of the title added by Wachsmuth.

\textsuperscript{3} Schweighäuser: θῆ MSS.

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From Arrian the pupil of Epictetus. To the man who was bothering himself about the problem of being

What do I care, says Epictetus, whether all existing things are composed of atoms, or of indivisibles, or of fire and earth? Is it not enough to learn the true nature of the good and the evil, and the limits of the desires and aversions, and also of the choices and refusals, and, by employing these as rules, to order the affairs of our life, and dismiss the things that are beyond us? It may very well be that these latter are not to be comprehended by the human mind, and even if one assume that they are perfectly comprehensible, well, what profit comes from comprehending them? And ought we not to say that those men trouble themselves in vain who assign all this as necessary to the philosopher's system of thought? Is, therefore, also the precept at Delphi superfluous, "Know thyself"?—That, indeed, no, the man answers.—What, then, does it mean? If one bade a singer in a chorus to "know himself," would he not heed the order by paying attention both to his fellows in the chorus and to singing in harmony with them?—Yes.—And so in the case of a sailor?

4 οὐκονν ἄν Schenkl (οὐκονν Wachsmuth): οὐκ ἄν ἐν MSS.
5 Canter and Wachsmuth: εἴδεν αὐτῇ(ν) MSS.
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terou oûn ὁ ἀνθρωπος αὐτὸς ἔφ' 1 αὐτοῦ πεποιήθαι σοι δοκεί ζῶων ἣ πρὸς κοινωνίαν;—Πρὸς κοινωνίαν.2—Τπὸ τίνος;—Τπὸ τῆς φύσεως.—Τίνος οὐσις καὶ πῶς διοικούσης τὰ δόλα καὶ πότερον οὕσης ἢ μή, ταῦτα οὐκέτι ἀναγκαῖον πολυπραγμονεῖν.

2 (135). Stobaeus, IV. 44, 65

'Αρριανοῦ 'Επικτητείου.  
Ο τοῖς παρούσι καὶ δεδομένοις ύπὸ τῆς τύχης δυσχεραίνων ἱδιώτης εὖ βίω, ὁ δὲ ταῦτα γενναίως φέρων καὶ εὐλογιστῶν πρὸς τὰ 3 ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἄξιος 4 νομίζεσθαι.

3 (136). Stobaeus, IV. 44, 66

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Πάντα ύπακούει τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ ύπηρετεῖ καὶ γῆ καὶ θάλασσα καὶ ἥλιος καὶ τὰ λυπά ἄστρα καὶ τὰ γῆς φυτὰ καὶ ξώα: ὑπακούει δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον σῶμα καὶ νοσοῦν καὶ ὑγιαίνον, ὅταν εἴκεινος θέλῃ, καὶ νέαξον καὶ γηρῶν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας διερχόμενοι μεταβολάς. οὐκοῦν εὐλογοῦν καὶ, ὃ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστί, τούτεστι τὴν κρίσιν, μὴ ἀντιτείνειν μονὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ γὰρ ἵσχυρὸς ἐστὶ καὶ κρείσσων καὶ ἄμεινον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν βεβούλευται

1 Cobet: ὑφ' MSS.  
2 πρὸς κοινωνίαν supplied by Heeren. 
3 Schenkl: εὐλογιστῶ τὰ MSS.  
4 Gesner: ἄξιος MSS.
or a soldier? Does it seem to you, then, that man has been made a creature to live all alone by himself, or for society?—For society.—By whom?—By Nature.—What Nature is, and how she administers the universe, and whether she really exists or not, these are questions about which there is no need to go on to bother ourselves.

2

From Arrian the pupil of Epictetus

He who is dissatisfied with what he has and what has been given him by fortune is a layman in the art of living, but the man who bears all this in a noble spirit and makes a reasonable use of all that comes from it deserves to be considered a good man.

3

From the same

All things obey and serve the Cosmos,¹ both earth, and sea, and sun, and the other stars, and the plants and animals of earth; obedient to it also is our body, both in sickness and in health, when the Cosmos wishes, both in youth and in old age, and when passing through all the other changes. Therefore it is reasonable also that the one thing which is under our control, that is, the decision of our will, should not be the only thing to stand out against it. For the Cosmos is mighty and superior to us, and has taken better counsel for us than we can, by uniting

¹ A pantheistic form of expression for God, common enough in Stoicism in general, but rare in Epictetus. Cf. also frag. 4, where, however, the expression may really belong to Rufus.
μετὰ τῶν ὁλων καὶ ἡμᾶς συνδιοικῶν. πρὸς δὲ
tούτως καὶ ἡ ἀντίπραξις μετὰ τοῦ ἄλογου καὶ
πλέον οὐδὲν ποιοῦσα πλὴν τὸ διακενῆς σπάσθαι
καὶ περιπίπτειν ὁδύναις καὶ λύπαις ποιεῖ.

38 (H.)

Ῥούφου ἐκ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου περὶ φιλίας.

Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἔθετο ο θεός, τὰ
δ’ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. ἐφ’ ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ
σπουδαιότατον, ὡ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς εὐδαίμων ἐστί,
tὴν χρῆσιν τῶν φαντασιῶν. τούτῳ γὰρ ὁρθῶς
γιγνόμενον ἐλευθερία ἔστιν, εὐροία, εὐθυμίᾳ,
eὐστάθεια, τούτῳ δὲ καὶ δίκη ἐστὶ καὶ νόμος καὶ
σωφροσύνῃ καὶ ξύμπασα ἀρετῇ. τὰ δ’ ἄλλα
πάντα οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐποιήσατο. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμᾶς
συμψήφουσι χρή τῷ θεῷ γενέσθαι καὶ ταύτη
διελόντας τὰ πράγματα τῶν μὲν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν πάντα
τρόπον ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέψῃ
τὸ κόσμῳ καὶ, εἴτε τῶν παίδων δεόντο εἴτε ἡς
πατρίδος εἴτε τοῦ σώματος εἴτε ὅτου οὖν,¹ ἀσμένους
παραχωρεῖν.

39 (H.)

Ῥούφου ἐκ τοῦ Ἐπικτήτου περὶ φιλίας.

Τὸ δὲ Δυκούργου τοῦ Δακεδαιμονίου τὶς ἡμῶν
οὐ θαυμάζει; πηρωθεὶς γὰρ ὑπὸ τινὸς τῶν

¹ Meineke: ὅτιονν MSS.

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us together with the universe under its governance. Besides, to act against it is to side with unreason, and while accomplishing nothing but a vain struggle, it involves us in pains and sorrows.

4

Rufus. From the remarks of Epictetus on friendship

Of things that are, God has put some under our control, and others not under our control. Under our control He put the finest and most important matter, that, indeed, by virtue of which He Himself is happy, the power to make use of external impressions. For when this power has its perfect work, it is freedom, serenity, cheerfulness, steadfastness; it is also justice, and law, and self-control, and the sum and substance of virtue. But all other things He has not put under our control. Therefore we also ought to become of one mind with God, and, dividing matters in this way, lay hold in every way we can upon the things that are under our control, but what is not under our control we ought to leave to the Cosmos, and gladly resign to it whatever it needs, be that our children, our country, our body, or anything whatsoever.

5

Rufus. From Epictetus on friendship

What man among us does not admire the saying of Lycurgus the Lacedaemonian? For when he had

The natural way to take this and the next few titles is to assume that Epictetus had quoted with approval a fairly long passage from his revered teacher Musonius Rufus.
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πολιτῶν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τῶν ἔτερον καὶ παραλαβὼν τῶν νεανίσκον παρὰ τοῦ δήμου, ἵνα τιμωρήσατο, ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸς βούληται, τούτου μὲν ἀπέσχετο, παιδεύσας δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀποφήνας ἀνδρα ἀγαθὸν παρήγαγεν εἰς τὸ θέατρον. θαυμαζόντων δὲ τῶν Λακεδαίμονίων "τούτου μέντοι λαβὼν," ἐφη, "παρ' ὑμῶν ύβριστήν καὶ βίαιον ἀποδίδωμι ὑμῖν ἐπιεικῆ καὶ δημοτικόν."

6 (69). Stobaeus, III. 20, 60. Musonius, frag. 40 (H.)

'Ρούφου ἐκ τοῦ 'Επικτήτου περὶ φιλίας.

'Αλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον τῆς μὲν φύσεως ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἔργον συνδήσαι καὶ συναρμόσαι τὴν ὁρμήν τῇ τοῦ προσήκοντος καὶ ὠφελίμου φαντασία. 2

7 (70). Stobaeus, III. 20, 61. Musonius, frag. 41 (H.)

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Τὸ δὲ οἰεσθαὶ εὐκαταφρονήτους τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐσεσθαί, ἐὰν μὴ τοὺς πρῶτους ἔχθροὺς παντὶ τρόπῳ βλάψωμεν, σφόδρα ἁγεννῶν καὶ ἁνοίγτων ἀνθρώπων. φαμὲν γὰρ τὸν εὐκαταφρόνητον νοεῖσθαι μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἄδυνατον εἶναι βλάψαι: ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον νοεῖται κατὰ τὸ ἄδυνατον εἶναι ὠφελεῖν.

1 ἂν added by C. Schenkl.
been blinded in one eye by one of his fellow-citizens, and the people had turned over the young man to him, to take whatever vengeance upon the culprit he might desire, this he refrained from doing, but brought him up and made a good man of him, and presented him in the theatre. And when the Lace-daemonians expressed their surprise, he said, "This man when I received him at your hands was insolent and violent; I am returning him to you a reasonable and public-spirited person."

6

Rufus. From Epictetus on friendship

But above all else this is the function of nature, to bind together and to harmonize our choice with the conception of what is fitting and helpful.

7

The same

To fancy that we shall be contemptible in the sight of other men, if we do not employ every means to hurt the first enemies we meet, is characteristic of extremely ignoble and thoughtless men. For it is a common saying among us that the contemptible man is recognized among other things by his incapacity to do harm; but he is much better recognized by his incapacity to extend help.

2 Bücheler: τῆς . . . φαντασίας MSS.
ARRIANN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICETUS

8 (134). Stobaeus, IV. 44, 60. Musonius, frag. 42 (H.)

'Ρούφον ἐκ τῶν Ἐπικητήτου περὶ φιλίας.

"Οτι τοιαύτη ἡ τοῦ κόσμου φύσις καὶ ἤν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται καὶ οὐχ οἶον τε ἄλλως γίγνεσθαι τὰ γιγνόμενα ἢ ὁς νῦν ἔχειν καὶ ὅτι ταύτης τῆς τροπῆς καὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς οὐ μόνον οἱ ἀνθρώποι μετειλήφασι καὶ τάλλα ξώα τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς, ἄλλα καὶ τὰ θεῖα καὶ νη Δίου αὕτα τὰ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα ἀνω καὶ κάτω τρέπεται καὶ μεταβάλλει καὶ γῆ τε ὑδωρ γίνεται καὶ ὑδωρ ἀήρ, οὗτος δὲ πάλιν εἰς αἰθέρα μεταβάλλειν καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς μεταβολῆς ἀνωθὲν κάτω. ἐὰν πρὸς ταύτα τις ἐπιχειρῇ ῥέπειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ πείθειν ἑαυτὸν ἕκοντα δέχεσθαι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, πάνυ μετρίως καὶ μουσικῶς διαβιώσεται τὸν βίον.

9 (180). Gellius, XIX. 1, 14–21

14 Philosophus in disciplina Stoica celebratus . . . ex sarcinula sua librum protulit Epicteti philosophi quintum Δαλέξεων, quas ab Arriano digestas congruere scriptis

15 Zenonis et Chrysippi non dubium est. in eo libro, graeca scilicet oratione scriptum ad hanc sententiam legimus: Visa animi (quas φαντασίας philosophi appellant), quibus mens hominis prima statim specie accidentis ad animum rei pellitur, non voluntatis

1 Also in abbreviated form (from Gellius) in Augustine, Civ. Dei, 9, 4 (cf. 9, 5), and Quaest. in Heptat. 1, 30.

1 That is, from the heavier to the lighter, and again from the lighter to the heavier.
Rufus. From the remarks of Epictetus on friendship

Such was, and is, and will be, the nature of the universe, and it is not possible for the things that come into being to come into being otherwise than they now do. And not only has mankind participated in this process of change and transformation, and all the other living beings upon earth, but also those which are divine, and, by Zeus, even the four elements, which are changed and transformed upwards and downwards, as earth becomes water, and water air, and air again is transformed into ether; and there is the same kind of transformation also downwards. If a man endeavours to incline his mind to these things, and to persuade himself to accept of his own accord what needs must befall him, he will have a very reasonable and harmonious life.

A philosopher who is well known in the Stoic school ... brought out of his handbag the fifth book of the Discourses of the philosopher Epictetus, which had been arranged by Arrian, and agree, no doubt, with the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus. In that book, written of course in Greek, we find a passage to this purport: Things seen by the mind (which the philosophers call \( \phi αυτας\)), whereby the intellect of man is struck at the very first sight of anything which penetrates to the mind, are not subject to his will, nor to his

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2 External impressions.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICETETUS

sunt neque arbitraria,\(^1\) sed vi quadam sua inferunt sese hominibus noscitanda;\(^2\) probationes autem (quas \(^{16}\) συγκαταθέσεις vocant), quibus eadim visa noscuntur, \(^{17}\) voluntariae sunt siuntque hominum arbitratu. propteret a cum sonus aliquis formidabilis aut caelo aut ex ruina aut repentinus nescio cuius \(^3\) periculi nuntius vel quid aliud est \(^4\) eiusmodi factum, sapientis quoque animum paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere necessum est, non opinione alicuius mali praecetpa, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis officium 18 mentis atque rationis praeventibis. mox tamen ille sapiens ibidem τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας (id est visa istaecc animi sui terrifica) non adprobat (hoc est οὖ συγκατατίθεται οὐδὲ προσεπιδοξάζει), sed abicit resputque nec ei metuendum esse in his quicquam 19 videtur. atque hoc inter insipientis sapientisque animum differe dicunt quod insipiens, qualia sibi esse primo animi sui pulsu visa sunt saeva et aspera, talia esse vero putat et eadem incepta, tamquam \(^5\) si iure metuenda sint, sua quoque adsensione adprobat 20 καὶ "προσεπιδοξάζει" (hoc enim verbo Stoici, cum super ista re disserunt, utuntur), sapiens autem, cum breviter et strictim colore atque vultu motus est, οὖ συγκατατίθεται, sed statum vigoremque sententiae suae retinet, quam de huiusceodi visis semper habuit, ut de

\(^{1}\) L. Carrio: arbitrariae MSS.
\(^{2}\) Salmasius: noscitandae MSS.
\(^{3}\) Ed. Greifswald 1537: nescius MSS.
\(^{4}\) J. Gronov: ex MSS (or omit)
\(^{5}\) Edd.: quamquam MSS.

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\(^1\) Does not assent or confirm by approval.
\(^2\) Such external impressions.
\(^3\) Also confirms by his approval.
\(^4\) The word seems to occur only here, and may be peculiar to Epictetus.

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control, but by virtue of a certain force of their own
thrust themselves upon the attention of men; but
the assents (which they call συγκαταθέσεις), whereby
these same things seen by the mind are recog-
nized, are subject to man's will, and fall under his
control. Therefore, when some terrifying sound
comes from the sky, or from the collapse of a build-
ing, or sudden word comes of some peril or other,
or something else of the same sort happens, the
mind of even the wise man cannot help but be
disturbed, and shrink, and grow pale for a moment,
not from any anticipation of some evil, but because
of certain swift and unconsidered motions which
foretell the action of the intellect and the reason.

Soon, however, our wise man does not give his
assent (this is, οὐ συγκατατίθεται οὐδὲ προσεπιδοξάζει)\(^1\)
to τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας\(^2\) (that is, these terrifying
things seen by his mind), but rejects and repudiates
them, and sees in them nothing to cause him fear.
And this, they say, is the difference between the
mind of the fool and the mind of the wise man, that
the fool thinks the cruel and harsh things seen by
his mind, when it is first struck by them, actually to
be what they appear, and likewise afterwards, just
as though they really were formidable, he confirms
them by his own approval also, καὶ προσεπιδοξάζει\(^3\)
(the word the Stoics use when they discuss this
matter);\(^4\) whereas the wise man, when his colour
and expression have changed for a brief instant,
οὐ συγκατατίθεται,\(^5\) but keeps the even tenor and
strength of the opinion which he has always had
about mental impressions of this kind, as things

\(^5\) Does not give his consent.
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minime metuendis, sed fronte falsa et formidine inani territantibus.

21 Haec Epictetum philosophum ex decretis Stoicorum sensisse atque dixisse, in eo, quo dixi, libro legimus.

10 (179). Gellius, XVII. 19

Favorinum ego audivi dicere Epictetum philosophum dixisse plerosque istos, qui philosophari viderentur, philosophos esse eiusmodi "âvev τοῦ πράττειν, μέχρι τοῦ λέγειν" (id significat "factis procul, verbis tenus").

iam illud est vehementius, quod Arrianus solitum eum dictitare in libris, quos de dissertationibus eius composuit, scriptum reliquit. nam, cum, inquit, animadverterat hominem pudore amisso, inportuna industria, corruptis moribus, audacem, confidentem lingua ceteraque omnia praeterquam animam procurantem, istiusmodi, inquit, hominem cum viderat studia quoque et disciplinas philosophiae contrectare et physica adire et meditari dialectica multaque id genus theorematas auspicari\(^1\) sciscitarique: inclamabat deum atque hominem fidem ac plerumque inter clamandum his eum verbis increpabat: "Ανθρώπε, τοῦ βάλλεις; σκέψαι, εἰ κεκάθαρται τὸ ἀγγείον. ἄν γὰρ εἰς τὴν οὖρον αὐτὰ βάλῃς,\(^2\) ἀπώλετο; ήν ἡ σαπῆ, οὐρον ἡ ὤνεσ ἐγένετο\(^4\) ή εἰ τι τούτων χειρον." nihil projecto his verbis gravius, nihil verius: quibus declarabat maximus philosophorum litteras atque doctrinas philosophiae, cum in hominem

\(^1\) Eussner: suspicari MSS. \(^2\) Usener: βάλλης MSS. \(^3\) H or HC the MSS. \(^4\) Usener: γένοιτο MSS.

\(^1\) Without doing, as far as speaking.

\(^2\) Man, where are you stowing all this? Look and see if the vessel has been cleansed. For if you stow it in the
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that do not deserve to be feared at all, but terrify only with a false face and a vain fear.

This is the sentiment and expression of the philosopher Epictetus, derived from the doctrines of the Stoics, that we have read in the book of which I spoke above.

I have heard Favorinus say that he had heard the philosopher Epictetus say, that most of those who gave the appearance of philosophizing were philosophers of this kind: ἀνευ τοῦ πράττειν, μέχρι τοῦ λέγειν (this means, "apart from deeds, as far as words"). There is a still more vigorous expression which he was accustomed to use, that Arrian has recorded in the books which he wrote about his discourses. For Arrian says that when Epictetus had noticed a man lost to shame, of misdirected energy, and evil habits, bold, impudent in speech, and concerned with everything else but his soul, when he saw a man of that kind, continues Arrian, handling also the studies and pursuits of philosophy, and taking up physics, and studying dialectics, and taking up and investigating many a theoretical principle of this sort, he would call upon gods and men, and frequently, in the midst of that appeal, he would denounce the man in these words: Ανθρωπε, τοῦ βάλλεις; σκέψαι, εἰ κεκάθαρται τὸ ἁγγείον. ἂν γὰρ εἰς τὴν οὐ̣ηςν αὐ̣τὰ βάλλῃς, ἀπόλετον ἡ σαπῆ, οὗτον ἡ δέξοσ ἐγένετο ἡ εἰ τι τούτων χείρον. Surely there is nothing weightier, nothing truer than these words, in which the greatest of philosophers declared that the writings and teachings of philosophy, when poured into a false and low-lived vessel of opinion, it is ruined; if it spoils, it turns into urine, or vinegar, or, it may be, something worse.
falsum atque degenerem tamquam in vas spurecum atque pollutum influxissent, verti, mutari, corrumpi et (quod ipse κυνικότερον αιτ) urinam fieri aut si quid est urina spurcius.

5 Praeterea idem ille Epictetus, quod ex eodem Favorino audivimus, solitus dicere est duo esse vitia multo omnium gravissima ac taeterrima, intolerantiam et incontinentiam, cum aut iniurias, quae sunt ferendae, non toleramus neque ferimus aut, a quibus rebus voluptatibusque nos tenere debemus, non tenemus.

6 "itaque," inquit, "si quis haec duo verba cordi habeat eaque sibi imperando atque observingo curet, is erit pleraque inepeccabilis vitamque vivet tranquilliissimam." verba haec duo dicebat: "ἀνέχου" et "ἀπέχου."

10a (181). Arnobius, Adversus Gentes, 2, 78

Cum de animarum agitur salute ac de respectu nostri, aliquid et sine ratione faciendum est, ut Epictetum dixisse adprobat Arrianus.

11 (174). Stobaeus, IV. 33, 28

Έκ τῶν 'Αρριανοῦ προτρπτικῶν ὀμιλίων.

'Αλλὰ δὴ Σωκράτης Αρχελάου μεταπεμπο-μένου αὐτὸν ὡς ποιήσοντος πλοῦσιον ἐκέλευσεν ἀπαγγέλαι αὐτῷ διότι ἀθήνησι τέσσαρες εἰσι χώνικες τῶν ἀλφίτων ὀβολοῦ ὄνυιοι καὶ κρηναι

1 Gesner: διὰ τὰ MSS.

1 Somewhat after the fashion of the Cynics.
person, as though into a dirty and defiled vessel, 
turn, change, are spoiled, and (as he himself says 
καταφθαρχεῖν) \(^1\) become urine, or something, it may be, 
dirtier than urine.

The same Epictetus, moreover, as we have heard 
from Favorinus, was in the habit of saying that there 
were two vices which are far more severe and 
atrocious than all others, want of endurance and 
want of self-control, when we do not endure or bear 
the wrongs which we have to bear, or do not abstain 
from, or forbear, those matters and pleasures which we 
ought to forbear. "And so," he says, "if a man should 
take to heart these two words and observe them in 
controlling and keeping watch over himself, he will, 
for the most part, be free from wrongdoing, and 
will live a highly peaceful life." These two words, 
he used to say, were ἀνέχειν and ἀπέχειν.\(^2\)

10 a (181)

When the salvation of our souls and regard for our 
true selves are at stake, something has to be done, 
even without stopping to think about it, a saying of 
Epictetus which Arrian quotes with approval.

11

From the homilies of Arrian, exhorting to virtue

Now when Archelaus \(^3\) sent for Socrates with 
the intention of making him rich, the latter bade 
the messenger take back the following answer: 
"At Athens four quarts of barley-meal can be 
bought for an obol,\(^4\) and there are running springs

\(^2\) Bear and forbear. \(^3\) The king of Macedon. 
\(^4\) A penny and a half, or three cents; in other terms, the 
sixth part of the day's wage of an ordinary labourer. 455
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICETETUS

"οὖδατος ρέουσιν." εἰ γάρ τοι μὴ ἵκανα τὰ ὄντα ἐμοὶ, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τούτοις ἵκανος καὶ οὐτω κάκεινα ἐμοὶ. ἢ οὐχ ὅρας, ὅτι οὐκ εὐφωνότερον οὐδὲ ἤδιον 1 ὁ Πῶλος τὸν τύραννον Ὀιδίποδα ύπεκρίνετο ἤ τὸν ἔπτι Κολωνίῳ ἀλήτην 2 καὶ πτωχον; εἰτα χεῖρον Πῶλου ὁ γενναίος ἀνήρ φανεῖται, ὃς μὴ πᾶν τὸ περιτεθὲν ἐκ τοῦ δαιμονίου πρόσω- πον ύποκρίνασθαι καλῶς; οὔδὲ τὸν 'Οδυσσέα μιμήσεται, δς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ράκεσιν οὐδὲν μείον διέπρεπεν ἢ ἐν τῇ οὐλῃ χλάινῃ τῇ πορφυρᾷ.

12 (note to frag. 71). Stobaeus, Ill. 20, 47

'Αρριανοῦ.

Μεγαλόθυμοι πράως εἰσὶ τινες ἡσυχῇ καὶ οἶνον ἀοργήτως πράττοντες ὅσα καὶ οἱ σφόδρα τῷ θυμῷ φερόμενοι. φυλακτέον οὖν καὶ τὸ τοῦτων ἀβλέπτημα ὡς πολὺ χεῖρον ὐν τοῦ διατεινόμενον ὀργίζεσθαι. οὔτοι μὲν γὰρ ταχὺ κόρον τῆς τιμωρίας λαμβανοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ εἰς μακρὸν παρατείνουσιν ὡς οἱ λεπτῶς πυρέττοντες.

13 (omitted). Stobaeus, I. 3, 50

'Εκ τῶν 'Επικτήτου ἀπομυημονευμάτων.

'Αλλ' ὥρῳ, φησὶ τις, τοὺς καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς καὶ λιμῷ καὶ ρίγει ἀπολλυμένους.—Τοὺς δὲ μὴ

1 Gaisford: δ' ὦν MSS.
2 Schweighäuser: ἀλέητην MSS.
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of water." For, look you, if what I have is not sufficient for me, still, I am sufficient for it, and so it too is sufficient for me. Or do you not see that Polus\(^1\) was not accustomed to act Oedipus the King with any finer voice or more pleasure to his audience than Oedipus at Colonus, the outcast and beggar? And then shall the man of noble nature make a poorer showing than Polus, and not play well any rôle to which the Deity assigns him? And will he not follow the example of Odysseus, who was no less pre-eminent in his rags than in his rich and purple cloak?

12

*From Arrian*

There are certain persons who exhibit their high spirit rather gently,\(^2\) and in a sort of passionless manner do everything that even those who are swept away by their anger do. We must be on our guard, therefore, against the error of these persons, as something much worse than violent anger. For those who give way to violent anger are soon sated with their revenge, but the others prolong it like men who have a light fever.

13

*From the Memorabilia of Epictetus*

But, says someone, I see the good and excellent perishing from hunger and cold.—And do you not see

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\(^2\) Capps suggests that \(\eta\sigma\upsilon\chi\dot{\eta}\) is used here as it is in Menander, *Hero*, 20.
14 (52). Stobaeus, III. 6, 57

'Εκ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου ἀπομνημονευμάτων.3

...4 τοὺς δυσχερεῖς δὲ φιλοσόφους εἰς μέσον ἀγονιμίτες, ὥσις οὐ δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ἥδονη εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐπιγίγνεσθαι τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, ἐλευθερία. τί ποτ' οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐτ' μὲν τοῖς τού σώματος ἀγαθοῖς μικροτέροισιν οὕσι χαίρει καὶ γαληνία, ὥσις φησιν Ἐπίκουρος, ἐτ' δὲ τοῖς αὐτὴς ἀγαθοῖς μεγίστοις οὕσιν οὐχ ἦδεται; καίτοι καὶ δεδώκει μοι ἡ φύσις αἰδῶ καὶ πολλὰ ύπερθυριῶ, ὅταν τι υπολάβω αἰσχρὸν λέγειν. τούτῳ μὲ τὸ κίνημα οὐκ ἔα τὴν ἥδουν θέσθαι ἄγαθόν καὶ τέλος τοῦ βίου.

1 ai (ἀν P2) after this word was deleted by Meineke.
2 Suggested by Schenkl: κακίς MSS.
3 The last word of the title added by Asmus.
4 Schenkl indicated the lacuna.
those who are not good and excellent perishing from luxury, and bombast, and vulgarity?—Yes, but it is disgraceful to be supported by another.—And who, O miserable fellow, is supported by himself alone, except the Cosmos? Whoever accuses Providence, therefore, because the wicked are not punished, and because they are strong and rich, is acting just as though, when the wicked had lost their eyes, he said they were not being punished because their finger-nails were in good condition. Now, as for me, I assert that there is much more difference between virtue and property than there is between eyes and finger-nails.

From the Memorabilia of Epictetus

... bring forward the ill-natured philosophers, who think that pleasure is not something natural, but a sequel of things that are natural, as justice, self-control, and freedom. Why indeed, then, does the soul take delight in the lesser goods of the body, and enjoy calm therein, as Epicurus says, and yet not find pleasure in its own goods, which are very great? Verily nature has also given me a sense of shame, and frequently I blush, when I feel that I am saying something disgraceful. It is this emotion which does not allow me to lay down pleasure as the good and end of life.

1 Or "morose," that is, from the point of view of the Epicureans. The reference is to the Stoics, who rejected the "pleasure" of Epicurus, and accepted only that which followed on virtuous conduct.

2 Frag. 425 (Usener).
15 (53). Stobaeus, III. 6, 58

'Εκ τῶν 'Επικτήτου ἀπομνήμονευμάτων.

'Εν 'Ρώμῃ αἱ γυναῖκες μετὰ χειρας ἔχουσι τῆν Πλάτωνος Πολιτείαν, ὅτι κοινὰς ἀξιοὶ εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας. τοῖς γὰρ ρήμασι προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν, οὐ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὰνδρός, ὅτι οὐ γαμεῖν κελεύων καὶ συνοικεῖν ἕνα μιὰ εἶτα κοινὰς εἶναι βούλεται τὰς γυναῖκας, ἀλλ' ἐξαιρῶν τὸν τοιοῦτον γάμον καὶ ἀλλο τὶ εἶδος γάμου εἰσφέρων. καὶ τὸ ὅλον οἱ ἀνθρώποι χαίρουσιν ἀπολογίας τοῖς ἐστῶν ἀμαρτίμασι πορίζοντες· ἐπεὶ τοι φιλοσοφία φησίν, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκτείνει εἰκῆ προσήκει.

16 (78). Stobaeus, III. 29, 84

'Εκ τῶν 'Επικτήτου ἀπομνήμονευμάτων.

Εἰδέναι χρῆ, ὅτι οὐ ράδιον δόγμα παραγενέσθαι ἀνθρώπῳ, εἰ μή καθ' ἐκάστην ἥμεραν τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ λέγοι τις καὶ ἀκούοι καὶ ἀμα χρύτο πρὸς τὸν βίον.

17 (15). Stobaeus, III. 4, 91

'Επικτήτου.

Εἰς συμπόσιον μὲν οὖν παρακληθέντες τῷ παρόντι χρώμεθα· εἰ δὲ τις κελεύοι τὸν ὑποδεχό-

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1 The community of women which Plato proposed was, first of all, restricted to a small, highly-trained, and devoted band of warrior-saints; and, second, such that no man and woman should pair off for more than a very temporary "marriage," all such matings being carefully supervised by the highest authorities. Instead of being more licentious than 460
15

From the Memorabilia of Epictetus

At Rome the women have in their hands Plato’s Republic, because he insists on community of women. For they pay attention only to the words, and not to the meaning of the man; the fact is, he does not bid people marry and live together, one man with one woman, and then go on to advocate the community of women, but he first abolishes that kind of marriage altogether, and introduces another kind in its place. And in general people delight in finding excuses for their own faults; for, indeed, philosophy says we ought not to stretch out even our finger at random.

16

From the Memorabilia of Epictetus

One ought to know that it is not easy for a man to acquire a fixed judgement, unless he should day by day state and hear the same principles, and at the same time apply them to his life.

17

From Epictetus

Now when we have been invited to a banquet, we take what is set before us; and if a person should ordinary monogamous marriage (which frequently deserves Bernard Shaw’s jibe, that it is popular largely because it combines the maximum of temptation with the maximum of opportunity), Plato’s proposal was relatively a denial of the flesh, and a marked move towards asceticism.

2 See II. 11, 17. The remark in this connection is no doubt ironical, mockingly justifying the process of “rationalization” just described.
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μενον ἴχθυς αὐτῷ παρατιθέναι ἢ πλακοῦντας, ἄτοπος ἂν δοξεῖν. ἐν δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ αὑτοῖμεν τοὺς θεούς, ἃ μὴ διδόσι, καὶ ταῦτα πολλῶν ὄντων, ἃ γε ἡμῖν δεδώκασι.

18 (16). Stobaeus, III. 4, 92

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.


19 (17). Stobaeus, III. 4, 93

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.¹

Τῷ μὲν ἰατρῷ μηδὲν συμβουλεύοντι ἀχθωνταὶ οἱ κάμνοντες καὶ ἡγοῦνται ἀπεγνώσθαι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ.

¹ σοι added here by Schenkl; after ἐγὼ A man. alt., and Gesner.
² ἔχω added by Gesner.

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bid his host to set before him fish or cakes, he would be regarded as eccentric. Yet in the world at large we ask the gods for things which they do not give us, and that too when there are many things which they actually have given us.

18

*From the same*

Those are amusing persons, he said, who take great pride in the things which are not under our control. A man says, "I am better than you; for I have many estates, and you are half-dead with hunger." Another says, "I am a consular." Another, "I am a procurator." Another, "I have thick curly hair." But one horse does not say to another horse, "I am better than you, for I have quantities of fodder, and a great deal of barley, and my bridles are of gold, and my saddle-cloths are embroidered," but "I can run faster than you can." And every creature is better or worse because of its own particular virtue or vice. Can it be, then, that man is the only creature without a special virtue, but he must have recourse to his hair, and his clothes, and his grandsires?

19

*The same*

When men are sick and their physician gives them no advice, they are annoyed, and think that

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1 The phrase is from Plato, *Symposium*, 207 B.

3 τὰς added by Meineke.

4 The superscription added by Gaisford.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICHTETUS

πρὸς δὲ τὸν φιλόσοφον διὰ τί̈ 1 οὖκ ἂν τις οὕτω διατεθεὶς, ὡστε οἴηθημαι ἀπεγνώσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ σωφρονίσειν, εἰ μηδὲν λέγοι ἔτι 2 πρὸς αὐτὸν τῶν χρησίμων;

20 (18). Stobaeus, III. 4, 94

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Οἵ το σῶμα εὖ διακείμενοι καὶ καυματα καὶ ψῦχη ὑπομένουσιν οὕτω δὲ καὶ οἵ τίνι ψῡχήν καλῶς διακείμενοι καὶ ὄργην καὶ λύπην καὶ περιχάρειαν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάθη φέρουσιν.

21 (56). Stobaeus, III. 7, 16

Ἐπικτήτου.

Διὰ τοῦτο ἔπαινειν Ἀγριππίνων δίκαιον, οἵτι πλεῖστον ἄξιος ἄνήρ γενόμενος οὐδεπώποτε ἐπήνεσεν εὐαυτόν, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἄλλος τις αὐτὸν ἐπήνει, ἡρυθρία. οὕτως δ', ἔφη, οὗ ἄνηρ τοιούτος ἦν, ὡστε τοῦ συμβαίνοντος αὐτῷ διαφορολογεῖν γράφειν: εἰ μὲν πρεττοὶ, πυρετοῦ: εἰ δὲ ἀδόξοι, ἀδόξιας: εἰ δὲ φεῦγοι, 3 φυγῆς. καὶ ποτε μέλλοντι, ἔφη, αὐτῷ 4 ἀριστήσειν ἐπέστη ὁ λέγων, ὅτι φεύγειν αὐτὸν κελεύει Νέρων, καὶ δ' 5 "οὐκοῦν," εἴπεν, "ἐν Ἀρικία ἀριστήσομεν."

1 διὰ τί Gesner: διότι MSS. 2 Bücheler: τί MSS.
3 Meineke: φυγοῖ MSS. 4 Gesner: των τοῦ τοῦ MSS.
5 ἔφη after this word deleted by Schow.

1 A distinguished Roman Stoic of the middle of the first century after Christ. See I. 1, 28-30; I. 2, 12-13; frag. 22.
he has given them up. And why should not a man feel that way toward the philosopher, and so conclude that he has given up hope of one's ever coming to a sound state of mind, if he no longer tells one anything that is of any use?

20

The same

Those whose bodies are in good condition can endure heat and cold; so also those whose souls are in an excellent condition can endure anger, and grief, and great joy, and every other emotion.

21

From Epictetus

For this reason it is right to praise Agrippinus, because, although he was a man of the very highest worth, he never praised himself, but used to blush even if someone else praised him. His character was such, said Epictetus, that when any hardship befell him he would compose a eulogy upon it; on fever, if he had a fever; on disrepute, if he suffered from disrepute; on exile, if he went into exile. And once, he said, when Agrippinus was preparing to take lunch, a man brought him word that Nero ordered him into exile; “Very well,” said he, “we shall take our lunch in Aricia.”

2 The first stop outside Rome for persons travelling south and east, the common direction, as in the well-known egressum magna me exceptit Aricia Roma (Horace, Sat. I. 5, 1). Compare the version of the same incident in I. 1, 30.
22. Stobaeus, IV. 7, 44

Ἀγριππίνου.¹

'Ὁ Ἀγριππίνος ἢγεμονεύων ἐπειράτο τοὺς καταδικαζομένους ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πείθειν, ὅτι προσήκει αὐτοῖς καταδικασθῆναι. οὐ γὰρ ὡς πολέμιος αὐτοῖς, ἔφη, οὐδ' ὡς ληστὴς καταφέρω τὴν ψήφου αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπιμελητὴς καὶ κηδεμὼν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ιατρὸς τὸν τεμνόμενον παραμυθεῖται καὶ πείθει παρέχειν εαυτῶν.

23 (94). Stobaeus, IV. 53, 29

'Επικτήτου.

Θανμαστῇ ἡ φύσις καὶ, ὡς φησιν ὁ Ξενοφῶν, φιλόξωσι. τὸ γοῦν σῶμα, τὸ πάντων ἀρεστάτον καὶ ῥυπαρώτατον, στέργομεν καὶ θεραπεύομεν· εἰ γὰρ ἔδει πέντε μόναι ἡμέραις θεραπεύσαι τὸ τοῦ γείτονος σῶμα, οὐκ ἂν ὑπεμείναμεν. ὥρα γὰρ οἶνον ἐστιν ἐωθεν ἀναστάντα τρίβειν τοὺς ὀδόντας τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους καὶ τὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ποιήσαντα ἀπονίξειν ἔκειν αὐτὰ μέρη, τὸ ὅτι θανμαστόν ἐστὶ φίλειν πρᾶγμα, ὃ τοσοῦτα λειτουργοῦμεν καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν. νάττω τούτοι τοὺς θύλακον· εἶτα κενῷ τῇ τοῦτον βαρύτερον; ἀλλὰ θεῷ δεῖ μὲ ὑπηρετεῖν. διὰ τοῦτο μένω καὶ ἀνέχομαι λούων τὸ δύστηνον

¹ See explanatory note.

¹ Ascribed to Epictetus by Gaisford and Asmus, but there is some doubt about the ascription, for the resemblance with I. 18 is not conclusive.
22

*From Agrippinus*¹

When Agrippinus was governor,² he used to try to persuade the persons whom he sentenced that it was proper for them to be sentenced. "For," he would say, "it is not as an enemy or as a brigand that I record my vote against them, but as a curator and guardian; just as also the physician encourages the man upon whom he is operating, and persuade him to submit to the operation."

23

*From Epictetus*

Nature is wonderful, and, as Xenophon ³ says, "fond of her creatures." At all events we love and tend our body, the most unpleasant and dirtiest thing that there is; why, if we had had to tend our neighbour's body for no more than five days, we could not have endured it. Just consider what a nuisance it is to get up in the morning and brush some other person's teeth, and then after attending to a call of nature to wash those parts. Truly it is wonderful to love a thing for which we perform so many services every day. I stuff this bag here;⁴ and then I empty it; what is more tiresome? But I must serve God. For that reason I remain, and endure to wash this miserable paltry body, and to

² He was proconsul of Crete and Cyrenaica under Claudius. For all that is known about him see *Prospopographia Imperii Romani*, III. p. 4, No. 16.

³ *Memorabilia*, I. 4, 7, where, however, the expression is used of a "wise Creator."

⁴ Pointing to his belly.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

tούτο σωμάτιον, χορτάζων, σκέπων: ὅτε δὲ νεώτερος ἦν, καὶ ἄλλο τι προσέταττέ μοι καὶ ὁμώς ἢνειχόμην αὐτοῦ. διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἀνέχεσθε, ὅταν ἡ δοῦσα ἡμῖν φύσις τὸ σῶμα ἀφαιρήται; — Φιλῶ, φησίν, αὐτό.—Οὐκ οὖν, ὦ νῦν ὁ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ φίλεῖν ἡ φύσις σου δέδωκεν; ἡ δ' αὐτή λέγει "άφες αὐτὸ ἡδή καὶ μηκέτι πράγμα ἔχε."
FRAGMENTS

feed and shelter it; and when I was younger, there was still another behest which it laid upon me, yet nevertheless I endured it. Why, then, when Nature, which gave us our body, takes it away, do you not bear it?—I love it, says somebody.—Well, but as I was just now saying, is it not Nature that has given you this very affection? But the same Nature also says, “Let it go now, and have no more trouble with it.”

24

The same

If a man dies young, he blames the gods because he is carried off before his time. But if a man fails to die when he is old, he too blames the gods, because, when it was long since time for him to rest, he has trouble; yet none the less, when death draws nigh, he wishes to live, and sends for the doctor, and implores him to spare no zeal and pains. People are very strange, he used to say, wishing neither to live nor to die.

25

From Epictetus

When you attack someone with vehemence and threatening, remember to tell yourself beforehand that you are a tame animal; and then you will never do anything fierce, and so will come to the end of your life without having to repent, or to be called to account.

1 See IV. 5, 10.
AKHIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

26 (176). Marcus Aurelius, 4, 41
Ψυχάριον εἶ βαστάζον νεκρόν, ὡς Ἡπικετητος ἔλεγεν.

27 (177). Marcus Aurelius, 11, 37
Τέχνην ἐφὶ δὲ περὶ τὸ συγκατατίθεσθαι εὑρεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ περὶ τὰς ὅρμας τῶν τὸ προσεκτικὸν φυλάσσειν, ἵνα μεθ᾽ ὑπεξαιρέσεως, ἵνα κοινώνικαί, ἵνα κατ᾽ ἀξίαν, καὶ ὅρεξεσι μὲν παντάπασιν ἀπέχεσθαι, ἐκκλίσει δὲ πρὸς μηδὲν τῶν οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν χρῆσθαι.

28 (178). Marcus Aurelius, 11, 38
Οὐ περὶ τοῦ τυχόντος οὖν, ἐφη, ἐστὶν ὁ ἁγών, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μαίνεσθαι ἢ μή.

28 a. Marcus Aurelius, 11, 39
'Ο Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν "τί θέλετε; λογικῶν ψυχῶν ἐχεῖν ἢ ἁλόγων;" "λογικῶν." "τίνων λογικῶν; ύγιῶν ἢ φαύλων;" "ψυχῶν." "τί οὖν οὐ χητείτε;" "ότι ἔχομεν." "τί οὖν μάχεσθε καὶ διαφέρεσθε;"

28 b. Marcus Aurelius, 4, 49, 2–6
""'Απαχήσ ἐγώ, ὅτι τοῦτο μοι σωνέβη, σωμενοῦν ἄλλ' ἑυτυχής ἐγώ, ὅτι τοῦτου μοι συμβε-

1 Ascribed to Epictetus by Leopold and Breihaupt.
2 Convincingly assigned to Epictetus for many reasons, chiefly lexicographical, by H. Fränkel, Philologus 80 (1924), 221. I give the text of Schenkl (1913), with the quotation marks adjusted to the new interpretation.
26
You are a little soul, carrying around a corpse, as Epictetus used to say.

27
We must discover, said he, an art that deals with assent, and in the sphere of the choices we must be careful to maintain close attention, that they be made with due reservations, that they be social, and that they be according to merit; and from desire we must refrain altogether, and must exercise aversion towards none of the things that are not under our control.

28
It is no ordinary matter that is at stake, said he, but it is a question of either madness or sanity.

28a
Socrates used to say, "What do you want? To have souls of rational or irrational animals?" "Of rational animals." "Of what kind of rational animals? Sound or vicious?" "Sound." "Why, then, do you not try to get them?" "Because we have them." "Why, then, do you strive and quarrel?"

28b
"Me miserable, that this has befallen me!" Say not so, but rather, "Fortunate that I am, because,

1 This whole passage is taken to be a direct quotation from Epictetus, with the exception of the first two lines in the second paragraph, where Marcus Aurelius applies the doctrine to himself, and the last two lines, in which he characteristically condenses and summarizes it.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICETETUS

βηκότος ἄλυτος διατελῶ οὕτε ὑπὸ παρόντος θραυσμένος, οὕτε ἐπὶ διόν φοβούμενος.' συμβήναι μὲν γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον παντὶ ἐδύνατο· ἄλυτος δὲ οὐ πάς ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἄν διετέλεσεν. διὰ τί οὖν ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἀτύχημα ἢ τοῦτο εὐτύχημα; λέγεις δὲ ὅλως ἀτύχημα ἀνθρώπου, ὃ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀπότευγμα τῆς φύσεως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου; ἀπότευγμα δὲ τῆς φύσεως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι δοκεῖ σοι, ὃ μὴ παρὰ τὸ βούλημα τῆς φύσεως αὑτοῦ ἐστὶ; τί οὖν; τὸ βούλημα μεμάθηκας. μή τι οὖν τὸ συμβεβηκός τοῦτο κωλύει σε δίκαιον εἶναι, μεγαλόψυχον, σώφρονα, ἐμφρονα, ἀπρόπτωτον, ἀδιάφευστον, αἰδήμονα, ἐλεύθερον, τάλλα, ὃν συμπαρόντων ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀπέχει τὰ ἓδια;'

Μέμνησο λοιπὸν ἐπὶ παντὸς τοῦ εἰς λύπην σε προαγομένου, τούτῳ χρησθαί τῷ δόγματι: "οὐχ ὅτι τούτῳ ἀτύχημα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φέρειν αὐτὸ γενναίως εὐτύχημα."

FRAGMENTA DUBIA ET SPURIA

29 (77). Stobaeus, III. 35, 10

Ἐκ τοῦ Ἐπικτῆτον ἐγχειρεῖσθαι.

Μηδενὸς οὔτως ἐν παντὶ προσόει, ὡς τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς: ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ τοῦ λέγειν τὸ σιγάν' ἐάν δὲ τὸ λέγειν, ὅσα διὰ ἐσται νοῦ καὶ ὕπογον μεστά.2

1 These words are not found in the Encheiridion, and may very possibly not be by Epictetus at all.
although this has befallen me, I continue to live untroubled, being neither crushed by the present nor afraid of the future." For something of this kind might have befallen anyone; but not everyone would have continued to live untroubled by it. Why, then, count the former aspect of the matter a misfortune, rather than this latter good fortune? And in general do you call a man's misfortune that which is not an aberration from man's nature? And does that seem to you to be an aberration from the nature of man which does not contravene the will of his nature? What then? This will of man's nature you have already learned; this, then, which has befallen you does not prevent you, does it, from being just, high-minded, self-controlled, self-possessed, deliberate, free from deceit, self-respecting, free, and everything else, the possession of which enables the nature of man to come into its own?

Remember for the future, whenever anything begins to trouble you, to make use of the following judgement: This thing is not a misfortune, but to bear it in a noble spirit is good fortune.

DOUBTFUL AND SPURIOUS FRAGMENTS

29

From the Encheiridion of Epictetus

Under all circumstances take thought of nothing so much as safety; for it is safer to keep silence than to speak; and refrain from saying what will be devoid of sense and full of censure.

2 Supplied by Hense.
ARRIANS DISCOURSES OF EPICETERUS

30 (89). Stobaeus, IV. 46, 22

[\'Επικητήτου.]

Οὔτε ναὶν ἐξ ἕνος ἄγκυρίον οὔτε βίον ἐκ μιᾶς ἐλπίδος ἀρμοστεόν.

31 (90). Stobaeus, IV. 46, 23

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Καὶ τοῖς σκέλεσι καὶ ταῖς ἐλπίσι τὰ δυνατὰ δεῖ διαβαίνειν.

32 (92). Stobaeus, IV. 53, 27

[\'Επικητήτου.]

Ψυχὴν σώματος ἀναγκαιότερον ἱάσθαι τοῦ γὰρ κακῶς ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι κρείσσον.


[Τοῦ αὐτοῦ (\'Επικητήτου)].

Τῶν ἡδέων τὰ σπανιῶτατα γινόμενα μάλιστα τέρπει.

34 (55). Stobaeus, III. 6, 60. Democritus, frag. 233 (Diels)

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Εἰ τις ὑπερβάλλοι τὸ μέτριον, τὰ ἐπιτερπέστατα ἀτερπέστατα ἄν γίνοιτο.¹

¹ This and the next fragment probably belong to the collection of Aristonymus.
² Variously ascribed elsewhere.
DOUBTFUL AND SPURIOUS FRAGMENTS

30

From Epictetus

We ought neither to fasten our ship to one small anchor nor our life to a single hope.

31

From the same

We ought to measure both the length of our stride, and the extent of our hope, by what is possible.

32

From Epictetus

It is much more necessary to cure the soul than the body; for death is better than a bad life.

33

From the same

Those of our pleasures which come most rarely give the greatest delight.

34

From the same

If a man should overpass the mean, the most delightful things would become least delightful.

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3 So in Florilegium, Cod. Paris. 1168 [500 E]. The fragment belongs to Democritus.
4 Burchard: γένοιτο or γένοιτο MSS. The fragment belongs to Democritus.
ARRIANS DISCOURSES OF EPICETETUS

Οὐδεὶς ἐλεύθερος ἑαυτῷ µὴ κρατῶν.¹

36 (140). Antonius, 1, 21²

Ἀθάνατον χρῆμα ἢ ἄληθεια καὶ ἄῤῥοι, παρέχει δὲ ἡµῖν οὐ κάλλος χρόνος µαρανύμενον οὔτε παρρησίαν ἀφαιρετήν³ ύπὸ δίκης, ἀλλὰ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ νόµιµα διακρίνουσα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τὰ ἄδικα καὶ ἀπελέγχουσα.

¹ In Stobaeus the maxim is ascribed to Pythagoras.
² The style of this fragment is alien to Epictetus.
³ Kronenberg: ἀφαίρετην MS.
Doubtful and Spurious Fragments

35

No man is free who is not master of himself.

36

The truth is something immortal and eternal, and does not present us with a beauty that withers from the passage of time, nor a freedom of speech which can be taken away by justice, but it presents us with what is just and lawful, distinguishing the unlawful therefrom, and refuting it.
THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL

This celebrated work is a compilation made by Arrian himself from the Discourses, and the great majority of those who know Epictetus at all have come to do so from this little book alone. That is a pity, because the necessary aridity and formalism of such a systematization obscure the more modest, human, and sympathetic aspects of the great teacher's character. Most of the unfavourable criticism which has been passed upon Epictetus—and there is some of this, although not much—is clearly based upon the occasionally somewhat inadequate impressions which any compendium must produce. For it may be doubted whether even so noble a statement as the Apostles' Creed has ever made a single convert.

Occasionally Arrian has modified to a slight degree the form of statement, as we may observe from the numerous instances, amounting to somewhat more than half of the book, where material from the first four books of the Discourses has been employed; but the substance seems to have been faithfully preserved, wherever it is possible to follow his procedure in detail.

The separate editions and translations of the Encheiridion¹ are extremely numerous. Few, how-

¹ Those who are curious about bibliographical information may be referred to a separate study, Contributions toward a Bibliography of Epictetus, Urbana, Illinois, 1927.
ever, have been of any notable value, except, perhaps, the celebrated translations by Politian and Leopardi, and Schweighäuser's separate edition of 1798,\(^1\) which is still the last independent critical text,\(^2\) and has been reprinted by most subsequent editors, even Schenkl, although the latter has added much useful critical material in his notes, especially those which indicate the probable sources of such passages as seem to be derived from the four books of the Discourses, and in particular has arranged the *apparatus criticus* in more convenient terms.

The *sigla* which Schenkl has devised for Schweighäuser's apparatus, and which may occasionally be employed below, are the following:

A MSS. in which portions of the *Encheiridion* precede the corresponding commentary of Simplicius.

V The ed. of 1528.

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\(^1\) For some unknown reason Schweighäuser in his *Epicteteeae Philosophiae Monumenta*, III. 1799, reproduced Upton's much less satisfactory text.

\(^2\) One reason for this delay is the extremely large number of MSS. involved, not merely of the work itself, but of the two Christian paraphrases and of the huge commentary by Simplicius, which is more than ten times the bulk of the original. The texts of these must first be critically determined before their value for the *Encheiridion* can be estimated, so that in reality four works instead of one have to be edited from the very foundations. Another is the very slight probability that any really notable contributions to knowledge might result therefrom. As an intellectual problem the preparation of a new edition of the *Encheiridion* presents certain interesting features, but as a practical undertaking it is outranked by a good many other possible investigations.
THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL

B MSS. in which the entire Encheiridion precedes the commentary of Simplicius.

C MSS. containing the Encheiridion alone.

v The edition of Trincavelli (1535).

D MSS. of Class B which exhibit the text of the Encheiridion (frequently abbreviated) as lemmata before the commentary of Simplicius.

un. unus.
noun. nonnulli.
sing. singuli.

Nil. The Encheiridion in the paraphrase of St. Nilus (Schweighäuser, V. 95–138).

Par. The Encheiridion in the anonymous Christian paraphrase (Schweighäuser, V. 1–94).
ΕΠΙΚΤΗΣΤΟΤ ΕΓΧΕΙΡΙΔΙΟΝ

1 c. 1. Τών οντων τα μεν έστιν έφ' ήμιν, τα δε ουκ έφ' ήμιν. έφ' ήμιν μεν υπόλυψις, όρμη, ορεξις, εκκλισις και ενι λόγῳ οσα ήμετέρα έργα: ουκ έφ' ήμιν δε το σώμα, ή κτήσις, δόξαι, άρχαι και ενι

2 λόγῳ οσα ουχ ήμετέρα έργα. και τα μεν έφ' ήμιν έστι φύσει ελεύθερα, άκώλυτα, άπαραπόδιστα, τα δε ουκ έφ' ήμιν άσθενη, δούλα, κωλυτά,

3 άλλόπτων. μέμνησο ουν, οτι, εαν τα φύσει δούλα ελεύθερα οιηθης και τα άλλότρια ίδια, εμποδισθησι, πενθήσεις, παραχθησι, μέμψη και θεους και άνθρωπος, εαν δε το σον μονον οιηθης σον ειναι, το δε άλλότριον, ωσπερ έστιν, άλλότριον, ουδεις σε άναγκαςει ουδέποτε, ουδεις σε κωλύσει, ου μέμψη ουδένα, ουκ έγκαλέσεις τινι, άκων πράξεις ουδε ειν, έχθρον ουχ έξεις,1 ουδεις σε βλάψει, ουδε γαρ βλαβερόν τι πείση.

4 Τηλικούτων ουν εφίμενον μέμνησο, οτι ου δει μετρίως κεκινημένον άπτεσθαι αυτων, άλλα τα

1 This is the order for the last phrase in Nil. All other authorities put it after βλάψει.
THE ENCHEIRIDION OF EPICETUS

1. Some things are under our control, while others are not under our control. Under our control are conception, choice, desire, aversion, and, in a word, everything that is our own doing; not under our control are our body, our property, reputation, office, and, in a word, everything that is not our own doing. Furthermore, the things under our control are by nature free, unhindered, and unimpeded; while the things not under our control are weak, servile, subject to hindrance, and not our own. Remember, therefore, that if what is naturally slavish you think to be free, and what is not your own to be your own, you will be hampered, will grieve, will be in turmoil, and will blame both gods and men; while if you think only what is your own to be your own, and what is not your own to be, as it really is, not your own, then no one will ever be able to exert compulsion upon you, no one will hinder you, you will blame no one, will find fault with no one, will do absolutely nothing against your will, you will have no personal enemy, no one will harm you, for neither is there any harm that can touch you.

With such high aims, therefore, remember that you must bestir yourself with no slight effort to lay hold of them, but you will have to give up some
AURIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICRTETUS

μὲν ἀφιέναι παντελῶς, τὰ δ’ ὑπερτίθεσθαι πρὸς τὸ παρόν. ἦδιν δὲ καὶ ταῦτ’ ἐθέλησι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλούτεων, τυχὸν μὲν οὕτ’ αὐτῶν τούτων τεύξῃ διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν προτέρων ἐφίεσθαι, πάντως γε μὴν ἐκείνων ἀποτεύξῃ, δι’ ὅν μόνων ἔλευθερία καὶ εὐδαιμονία περιγίνεται.

5 Εὔθυς οὖν πᾶση φαντασία τραχείᾳ μελέτα ἐπιλέγειν ὅτι “φαντασία εἰ καὶ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον.” ἐπείτα ἐξετάζει αὐτὴν καὶ δοκίμαζε τοῖς κανόσι τούτοις ὅσ’ ἐχεισ, πρότων δὲ τούτω καὶ μάλιστα, πότερον περὶ τὰ ἐφ’ ἥμιν ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ τὰ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἥμιν· κἂν περὶ τὶ τῶν οὐκ ἐφ’ ἥμιν ἢ, πρόχειρον ἔστω τὸ διότι “οὔδεν πρὸς ἐμὲ.”

1 c. 2. Μέμνησθο, ὅτι ὄρεξεως ἐπαγγελία ἐπιτυχία1 οὐ ὄρεγγ’, ἐκκλίσεως ἐπαγγελία τὸ μὴ περιπεσεῖν ἐκεῖνῳ ὃ ἐκκλίνεται, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐν ἐν2 ὄρεξε ἀποτυγχάνων ἀτυχία, ὃ δὲ ἐν ἐν3 ἐκκλίσει περιπίπτων δυστυχία. ἂν μὲν οὖν μόνα ἐκκλίνης τὰ παρὰ φύσιν τῶν ἐπὶ σοὶ, οὐδενὶ, ὃν ἐκκλίνεις, περιπεσῇ νόσου δὲ ἂν ἐκκλίνης ἢ θάνατον ἢ 2 πειναν, δυστυχίσεις. ἄρον οὖν τὴν ἐκκλίσιν ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν οὐκ ἐφ’ ἥμιν καὶ μετάθες ἐπὶ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν τῶν ἐφ’ ἥμιν. τὴν ὄρεξιν δὲ παντελῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀνέλει· ἂν τε γὰρ ὀρέγγ’ τῶν οὐκ ἐφ’ ἥμιν τινός, ἀτυχεῖν ἀνάγκη,

1 Nil. alone: ἐστὶν ἐπιτυχία AD, ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν C, τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν B (τυχεῖν Par., τὸ τυχεῖν Simpl.).
2 Nil. C un.
3 Nil. alone.

1 The remark, as many others of the admonitions, is addressed to a student or a beginner.

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things entirely, and defer others for the time being. But if you wish for these things also, and at the same time for both office and wealth, it may be that you will not get even these latter, because you aim also at the former, and certainly you will fail to get the former, which alone bring freedom and happiness.

Make it, therefore, your study at the very outset to say to every harsh external impression, "You are an external impression and not at all what you appear to be." After that examine it and test it by these rules which you have, the first and most important of which is this: Whether the impression has to do with the things which are under our control, or with those which are not under our control; and, if it has to do with some one of the things not under our control, have ready to hand the answer, "It is nothing to me."

2. Remember that the promise of desire is the attainment of what you desire, that of aversion is not to fall into what is avoided, and that he who fails in his desire is unfortunate, while he who falls into what he would avoid experiences misfortune. If, then, you avoid only what is unnatural among those things which are under your control, you will fall into none of the things which you avoid; but if you try to avoid disease, or death, or poverty, you will experience misfortune. Withdraw, therefore, your aversion from all the matters that are not under our control, and transfer it to what is unnatural among those which are under our control. But for the time being

\[1\] remove utterly your desire; for if you desire some one of the things that are not under our control you are bound to be unfortunate; and, at the
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tων τε ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὅσων ὀρέγεσθαι καλὸν ἂν, οὐδὲν οὐδέπω σοι πάρεστι. μόνῳ δὲ τῷ ὄρμαν καὶ ἄφορμᾶν χρῶ, κούφως μέντοι καὶ μεθ' ὑπεξαιρέσεως καὶ ἀνειμένως.

c. 3. Ἐφ' ἐκάστου τῶν ψυχαγωγοῦντων ἢ χρείαν παρεχόντων ἢ στεργομένων μέμησο ἐπιλέγειν, ὃποιον ἐστιν, ἀπὸ τῶν σμικροτάτων ἀρξάμενος. ἄν χύτραν στέργης, ὅτι "χύτραν στέργῳ": κατασχείν ηῆρ ἀυτῆς οὐ παραχθῆση. ἄν παιδίου σαυτοῦ καταφιλῆς ἢ γυναίκα, ὅτι ἀνθρώπων καταφιλεῖς: ἀποθανόντος γὰρ οὐ παραχθῆσῃ.

c. 4. "Οταν ἀπτεσθαί τινος ἔργου μέλλῃς, ὑπομίμησε κε σεαυτὸν, ὃποιον ἐστὶ τὸ ἔργον. ἐὰν λουσόμενος ἄπιθη, πρὸβαλλε σεαυτῷ τὰ γινόμενα ἐν βαλανείῳ, τοὺς ἀπορραίνοντας, τοὺς ἐγκρουμένους, τοὺς λοιδοροῦντας, τοὺς κλέπτουντας. καὶ οὕτως ἀσφαλέστερον ἄψη τοῦ ἔργου, ἐὰν ἐπιλέγης εὐθὺς ὅτι "λουσάσθαι θέλω καὶ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαν τηρῆσαι." καὶ ὁσαυτῶς ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἔργου. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν τι πρὸς τὸ λουσάσθαι γένηται ἐμποδῶν, πρόχειρον ἐσται διότι "ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἢθελον μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαν τηρῆσαι οὔ τηρήσω δὲ, ἐὰν ἀγανακτῶ πρὸς τὰ γινόμενα."

c. 5. Ταράσσει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων δόγματα.

1 See M. Aurelius, 1, 4, where Mr. Haines (in L.C.L.) suggests that the reference is to some such reservations as 486
same time, not one of the things that are under our control, which it would be excellent for you to desire, is within your grasp. But employ only choice and refusal, and these too but lightly, and with reservations, and without straining.

3. With everything which entertains you, is useful, or of which you are fond, remember to say to yourself, beginning with the very least things, "What is its nature?" If you are fond of a jug, say, "I am fond of a jug"; for when it is broken you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your own child or wife, say to yourself that you are kissing a human being; for when it dies you will not be disturbed.

4. When you are on the point of putting your hand to some undertaking, remind yourself what the nature of that undertaking is. If you are going out of the house to bathe, put before your mind what happens at a public bath—those who splash you with water, those who jostle against you, those who vilify you and rob you. And thus you will set about your undertaking more securely if at the outset you say to yourself, "I want to take a bath, and, at the same time, to keep my moral purpose in harmony with nature." And so do in every undertaking. For thus, if anything happens to hinder you in your bathing, you will be ready to say, "Oh, well, this was not the only thing that I wanted, but I wanted also to keep my moral purpose in harmony with nature; and I shall not so keep it if I am vexed at what is going on."

5. It is not the things themselves that disturb men, but their judgements about these things. For recommended in James iv. 15: "For that ye ought to say is, If the Lord will, we shall live, and do this, or that."
οιον ο θάνατος ουδεν δεινόν, ἐπεί καὶ Σωκράτει ἃν ἐφαίνετο, ἀλλὰ τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τοῦ θανάτου, διότι δεινόν, έκεινο τὸ δεινόν ἐστίν. ὅταν οὖν ἐμποδιζώμεθα ἢ ταρασσόμεθα ἢ λυπώμεθα, μηδέποτε ἄλλον αἰτιώμεθα, ἀλλ' εαυτοὺς, τούτ' ἐστι τὰ ἑαυτῶν δόγματα. ἀπαιδεύτου ἔργων τὸ ἄλλοις ἐγκαλεῖν, ἕφ' οἷς αὐτὸς πράσσει κακῶς· ἠργμένου παιδεύεσθαι τὸ ἑαυτῷ· πεπαιδευμένου τὸ μήτε ἄλλῳ μήτε ἑαυτῷ.

c. 6. Ἕπι μηδενὶ ἐπαρβής ἄλλοτρῷ προτερήματι, ἐν ὦ ἐποικὸς ἐπαιρόμενος ἐλεγεν ὅτι "καλὸς εἰμι," οἰστὸν ἄν ἤν· σὺ δὲ, ὅταν λέγης ἐπαιρόμενος ὅτι ἔποικον καλὸν ἔχω," ἵσθι, ὅτι ἐπὶ ἐποικὸν ἀγαθῶ ἐπαίρην. τί οὖν ἐστὶ σὸν; χρῆσις φαντασίων. ὥσθ', ὅταν ἐν χρῆσι φαντασίων κατὰ φύσιν σχῆς, τὴνικαῦτα ἐπάρθητι· τότε γὰρ ἐπὶ σῷ τοι ἀγαθῶ ἐπαρβήσῃ.

c. 7. Καθόπερ ἐν πλωτοῦ πλοίον καθορμισθέντος εἰ ἔξελθους ὑδρεύσασθαι, ὅδον μὲν πάρεργον καὶ κοχλίδιον ἀναλεξῆ καὶ βολβάριον, τετάσθαι δὲ δεὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπὶ τὸ πλοίον καὶ συνεχῶς ἐπιστρέφεσθαι, μὴ ποτὲ ὁ κυβερνήτης καλέσῃ, κἂν καλέσῃ, πάντα ἐκεῖνα ἀφύναι, ἵνα μὴ δεδεμένος ἐμβληθῆς ὡς τὰ πρόβατα· σῶτω καὶ ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἐὰν διδώται ἀντὶ βολβαρίου καὶ κοχλίδιου γυμναικάριον καὶ παιδίου, οὐδὲν κωλύσει· ἐὰν δὲ ὁ κυβερνήτης καλέσῃ, τρέχε ἐπὶ τὸ πλοῖον

1 Upton, after Simplicius: ἐποικ ἀρχαίον ἐπαρβήσῃ.
example, death is nothing dreadful, or else Socrates too would have thought so, but the judgement that death is dreadful, this is the dreadful thing. When, therefore, we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never blame anyone but ourselves, that means, our own judgements. It is the part of an uneducated person to blame others where he himself fares ill; to blame himself is the part of one whose education has begun; to blame neither another nor his own self is the part of one whose education is already complete.

6. Be not elated at any excellence which is not your own. If the horse in his elation were to say, "I am beautiful," it could be endured; but when you say in your elation, "I have a beautiful horse," rest assured that you are elated at something good which belongs to a horse. What, then, is your own? The use of external impressions. Therefore, when you are in harmony with nature in the use of external impressions, then be elated; for then it will be some good of your own at which you will be elated.

7. Just as on a voyage, when your ship has anchored, if you should go on shore to get fresh water, you may pick up a small shell-fish or little bulb on the way, but you have to keep your attention fixed on the ship, and turn about frequently for fear lest the captain should call; and if he calls, you must give up all these things, if you would escape being thrown on board all tied up like the sheep. So it is also in life: If there be given you, instead of a little bulb and a small shell-fish, a little wife and child, there will be no objection to that; only, if the Captain calls, give up all these things and run
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άφεις ἐκεῖνα ἀπαντα μηδε ἐπιστρέφόμενος. έαν δε γέρων ἦς, μηδε ἀπαλλαγης ποτε του πλοιου μακραν, μη ποτε καλοῦςτος ἠλλίπτησ.

c. 8. Μη ζητει τα γινόμενα γίνεσθαι ως θελεις, ἀλλη θελε τα γινόμενα ως γίνεται και ευρησεις.

c. 9. Νόσος σώματος ἐστιν ἐμπόδιον, προαιρεσεως δε ου, εαν μη αυτη θελη. χωλανσις σκέλους ἐστιν ἐμπόδιον, προαιρεσεως δε ου. και τουτο εφ' εκαστου των ἐμπιπτοντων ἐπιλεγει ευρησεις γαρ αυτο αλλου τινος ἐμπόδιον, σον δε ου.

c. 10. 'Εφ' εκαστον των προσπιπτοντων μεμνησο ἐπιστρέφων ἐπι σεαυτον ζητειν, τινα δύναμιν ἔχεις πρὸς τὴν χρησιν αυτον. εαν καλον ἴδης ἡ καλην, ευρησεις δύναμιν πρὸς ταῦτα ἐγκράτειαν. εαν πόνος προσφερηται, ευρησεις καρτεριαν ἀν λοιδορία, ευρησεις ἀνεξικακιαν. και ουτως εβιζομενον σε ου συναρπάσουσιν αι φαντασιαι.

c. 11. Μηδεποτε ἐπι μηδενος ειπης ωτι "ἀπώλεσα αυτο," ἀλλ' ωτι "ἀπέδωκα." το παιδιον ἀπέθανεν; ἀπεδόθη. ἦ γυνη ἀπέθανεν; ἀπεδόθη. "το χωριον ἀφηρέθην." ουκοιν και τοῦτο ἀπεδόθη. "ἀλλα κακος ο ἀφελόμενος." τι δε σοι μέλει, δια τίνος σε ὁ δους ἀπήτησε; μέχρι δ' ἄν διδω, ως ἀλλοτρίου αυτου ἐπιμελου, ως του πανδοχείου οι παριόντες.

c. 12. Ει προκόψαι θελεις, αφες τους τοιούτους
to the ship, without even turning around to look back. And if you are an old man, never even get very far away from the ship, for fear that when He calls you may be missing.

8. Do not seek to have everything that happens happen as you wish, but wish for everything to happen as it actually does happen, and your life will be serene.

9. Disease is an impediment to the body, but not to the moral purpose, unless that consents. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to the moral purpose. And say this to yourself at each thing that befalls you; for you will find the thing to be an impediment to something else, but not to yourself.

10. In the case of everything that befalls you, remember to turn to yourself and see what faculty you have to deal with it. If you see a handsome lad or woman, you will find continence the faculty to employ here; if hard labour is laid upon you, you will find endurance; if reviling, you will find patience to bear evil. And if you habituate yourself in this fashion, your external impressions will not run away with you.

11. Never say about anything, "I have lost it," but only "I have given it back." Is your child dead? It has been given back. Is your wife dead? She has been given back. "I have had my farm taken away." Very well, this too has been given back. "Yet it was a rascal who took it away." But what concern is it of yours by whose instrumentality the Giver called for its return? So long as He gives it you, take care of it as of a thing that is not your own, as travellers treat their inn.

12. If you wish to make progress, dismiss all


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ἐπιλογισμοὺς. "ἐὰν ἀμελήσω τῶν ἐμῶν, οὐχ ἐξω διατροφάς". "ἐὰν μὴ κολάσω τὸν παιδα, πονηρὸς ἦσται." κρείσσον γὰρ λιμῷ ἀποθανεῖν ἀλυπον καὶ ἀφοβον γενόμενον ᾧ ξῖν εὖ ἀφθόνιοις ταρασσόμενον. κρείττον δὲ τὸν παιδα κακὸν εἶναι ᾧ σὲ κακοδαιμόνα. ἀρξει τοιγαροῦν ἀπὸ 2 τῶν σμικρῶν. ἐκχεῖται τὸ ἐλάδιον, κλέπτεται τὸ οἰνάριον· ἐπίλεγε ὅτι "τοσοῦτον πωλεῖται ἀπάθεια, τοσοῦτον ἀταραξία". προίκα δὲ οὐδὲν περιγύνεται. ὅταν δὲ καλῆς τὸν παιδα, ἐνθυμοῦ, ὅτι δύναται μὴ ὑπακούσαι καὶ ὑπακούσας μηδὲν ποιῆσαι ὧν θέλεις· ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ἑστὶν αὐτῶ καλῶς, ἕνα ἐπτ' ἐκεῖνῳ ἥ το σὲ μὴ ταραχθῆναι.

c. 13. Ἐι προκοῦσαί θέλεις, υπόμεινον ἕνεκα τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀνόητος δόξας καὶ ἡλίθιος, μηδὲν βούλου δοκεῖν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δόξας τις εἶναι τισιν, ἀπίστει σεαυτῷ. ἵσθι γὰρ ὅτι οὐ ράδιον τὴν προαιρέσιν τὴν σεαυτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαν φυλάξαι καὶ τὰ ἐκτῶς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐπιμελοῦμενον τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀμελήσαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη.

c. 14. Ἐι δὲ θέλης τὰ τέκνα σου καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τοὺς φίλους σου πάντοτε ἔχω, ἡλίθιος εἰ· τὰ γὰρ μὴ ἐπὶ σοι θέλεις ἐπὶ σοὶ εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια σὰ εἶναι· οὕτω κἂν τὸν παιδα θέλης μὴ ἀμαρτάνειν, μωρὸς εἰ· θέλεις γὰρ τὴν κακίαν

1 That is, the slave-boy would be in a remarkable position of advantage if his master's peace of mind depended, not upon the master himself, but upon the actions of his slave-boy.

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reasoning of this sort: "If I neglect my affairs, I shall have nothing to live on." "If I do not punish my slave-boy he will turn out bad." For it is better to die of hunger, but in a state of freedom from grief and fear, than to live in plenty, but troubled in mind. And it is better for your slave-boy to be bad than for you to be unhappy. Begin, therefore, with the little things. Your paltry oil gets spilled, your miserable wine stolen; say to yourself, "This is the price paid for a calm spirit, this the price for peace of mind." Nothing is got without a price. And when you call your slave-boy, bear in mind that it is possible he may not heed you, and again, that even if he does heed, he may not do what you want done. But he is not in so happy a condition that your peace of mind depends upon him.1

13. If you wish to make progress, then be content to appear senseless and foolish in externals, do not make it your wish to give the appearance of knowing anything; and if some people think you to be an important personage, distrust yourself. For be assured that it is no easy matter to keep your moral purpose in a state of conformity with nature, and, at the same time, to keep externals; but the man who devotes his attention to one of these two things must inevitably neglect the other.

14. If you make it your will that your children and your wife and your friends should live for ever, you are silly; for you are making it your will that things not under your control should be under your control, and that what is not your own should be your own. In the same way, too, if you make it your will that your slave-boy be free from faults, you are a fool; for you are making it your will that vice be not
μὴ εἶναι κακίαν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι. ἔαν δὲ θέλης ὀρεγόμενος μὴ ἀποτυγχάνειν, τοῦτο δύνασαι. 2 τοῦτο οὖν ἄσκει, ὃ δύνασαι. κύριος ἐκάστου ἐστὶν ὁ τῶν ὑπ' ἐκείνου θελομένου ἡ μὴ θελομένων ἔχουν τήν ἔξουσίαν εἰς τὸ περιποίησαι ἢ ἀφελέσθαι. ὡστὶς οὖν ἐλεύθερος εἶναι δούλευται, μήτε θελέτω τι μήτε φευγέτω τι τῶν ἐπὶ ἄλλοις· εἴ δὲ μὴ, δουλεύειν ἀνάγκη.

c. 15. Μέμνησο, ὅτι ὡς ἐν συμποσίῳ σε δεὶ ἀναστρέφεσθαι. περιφερόμενον γέγονέ τι κατὰ σέ· ἐκτείνας τὴν χείρα κοσμίως μετάλαβε· παρέρχεται· μὴ κάτεχε. οὐπώ ἤκει· μὴ ἐπίβαλλε πόρρω τήν ὄρεξιν, ἄλλα περίμενε, μέχρις ἂν γένηται κατὰ σέ. οὗτω πρὸς τέκνα, οὗτω πρὸς γυναῖκα, οὗτω πρὸς ἀρχάς, οὗτω πρὸς πλοῦτον· καὶ ἔση ποτὲ ἄξιος τῶν θεῶν συμπότης. ἀν δὲ καὶ παρατεθέντων σοι μὴ λάβῃς, ἄλλ' ὑπερίδης, τότε οὐ μόνον συμπότης τῶν θεῶν ἔση, ἄλλα καὶ συνάρχων. οὗτω γὰρ ποιῶν Διογένης καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ οἱ ὁμοίοι ἄξιος θεῖοι τε ἢσαν καὶ ἐλέγοντο.

c. 16. "Ὅταν κλαίοντα ἴδης τινὰ ἐν πένθει ἢ ἀποδημοῦντος τέκνου ἢ ἀπολοκελότα τὰ ἐαυτοῦ, πρόσεχε μὴ σε ἡ φαντασία συναρπάσῃ ὡς ἐν κακοῖς ὄντος αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἐκτός, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἐστὶν πρόχειρον ὅτι "τοῦτον θλίβει οὐ τὸ συμβεβηκός (ἀλλον γὰρ οὐ θλίβει), ἀλλὰ τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ 494
vice, but something else. If, however, it is your will not to fail in what you desire, this is in your power. Wherefore, exercise yourself in that which is in your power. Each man's master is the person who has the authority over what the man wishes or does not wish, so as to secure it, or take it away. Whoever, therefore, wants to be free, let him neither wish for anything, nor avoid anything, that is under the control of others; or else he is necessarily a slave.

15. Remember that you ought to behave in life as you would at a banquet. As something is being passed around it comes to you; stretch out your hand and take a portion of it politely. It passes on; do not detain it. Or it has not come to you yet; do not project your desire to meet it, but wait until it comes in front of you. So act toward children, so toward a wife, so toward office, so toward wealth; and then some day you will be worthy of the banquets of the gods. But if you do not take these things even when they are set before you, but despise them, then you will not only share the banquet of the gods, but share also their rule. For it was by so doing that Diogenes and Heracleitus, and men like them, were deservedly divine and deservedly so called.

16. When you see someone weeping in sorrow, either because a child has gone on a journey, or because he has lost his property, beware that you be not carried away by the impression that the man is in the midst of external ills, but straightway keep before you this thought: "It is not what has happened that distresses this man (for it does not distress another), but his judgement about it."
τούτου." μέχρι μέντοι λόγου μη ὄκνει συμπερι-
φέρεσθαι αὐτῷ, κἂν οὔτω τύχῃ, καὶ συνεπιστευά-
ξαι: πρόσεχε μέντοι μη καὶ ἔσωθεν στενᾶξις.

c. 17. Μέμνησο, ὅτι ὑποκριτῆς εἶ δράματος,
οἶνον ἃν θέλῃ ὁ διδάσκαλος· ἂν βραχὺ, βραχέος·
ἀν μακρὸν, μακροῦ· ἂν πτωχὸν ὑποκρίνασθαι σε
θέλη, ἵνα καὶ τούτων εὐφυὸς ὑποκρίνη· ἂν χωλόν,
ἀν ἄρχοντα, ἄν ἰδιώτην. σὺν γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔστι, τὸ
δοθέν ὑποκρίνασθαι πρόσωπων καλῶς· ἐκλε-
ξασθαί δ' αὐτῷ ἄλλον.

c. 18. Κόραξ ὅταν μη αἰσιον κεκράγη, μη συν-
αρπαξέτω σε ἡ φαντασία· ἀλλ' εὐθὺς διαίρει
παρὰ σεαυτῷ καὶ λέγε ὅτι "τούτων ἐμοὶ οὔτε
ἐπισημαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ σωματίῳ μου ἢ τῷ
κτησειδῶ μου ἢ τῷ δοξαρίῳ μου ἢ τοῖς τέκνοις
ἡ τῇ γυναίκι. ἐμοὶ δὲ πάντα αἰσία σημαίνεται,
ἐὰν ἐγὼ θέλω· ὅ τι γὰρ ἃν τούτων ἄποβαίνῃ, ἐπ' ἐμοὶ ἔστιν ὁφεληθήναι ἅπ' αὐτοῦ."

1 c. 19. Ἀνίκητος εἶναι δύνασαι, ἐὰν εἰς μηδένα
ἀγώνα καταβαίνῃς, ὃν οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπι σοί νυκῆσαι.

2 ὃρα μὴποτε ἰδών τινα προτιμῶμενον ἢ μέγα
dυνάμενον ἢ ἄλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦντα μακρίσης, ὅπο
τῆς φαντασίας συναρπασθείς. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς
ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἢ οὐσία τού ἄγαθοῦ ἢ, οὐτε φθόνος οὔτε
ζηλοτυπία χώραν ἔχει· σὺ τε αὐτὸς ὃν στρα-
tηγός, οὐ πρύτανις ἢ ὑπατος εἶναι θελήσεις,
ἀλλ' ἐλεύθερος. μία δὲ ὁδὸς πρὸς τοῦτο, κατα-
φρόνησις τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.
not, however, hesitate to sympathize with him so far as words go, and, if occasion offers, even to groan with him; but be careful not to groan also in the centre of your being.

17. Remember that you are an actor in a play, the character of which is determined by the Playwright: if He wishes the play to be short, it is short; if long, it is long; if He wishes you to play the part of a beggar, remember to act even this rôle adroitly; and so if your rôle be that of a cripple, an official, or a layman. For this is your business, to play admirably the rôle assigned you; but the selection of that rôle is Another's.¹

18. When a raven croaks inauspiciously, let not the external impression carry you away, but straightway draw a distinction in your own mind, and say, "None of these portents are for me, but either for my paltry body, or my paltry estate, or my paltry opinion, or my children, or my wife. But for me every portent is favourable, if I so wish; for whatever be the outcome, it is within my power to derive benefit from it."

19. You can be invincible if you never enter a contest in which victory is not under your control. Beware lest, when you see some person preferred to you in honour, or possessing great power, or otherwise enjoying high repute, you are ever carried away by the external impression, and deem him happy. For if the true nature of the good is one of the things that are under our control, there is no place for either envy or jealousy; and you yourself will not wish to be a praetor, or a senator, or a consul, but a free man. Now there is but one way that leads to this, and that is to despise the things that are not under our control.
c. 20. Μέμνησο, ὅτι οὐχ ὁ λοιδορῶν ἡ ὁ τύπτων ὑβρίζει, ἀλλὰ τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τούτων ὡς υβριζόντων. ὅταν οὖν ἔρεθίσῃ σὲ τις, ἵσθι, ὅτι ἢ σή σὲ ὑπόληψις ἥρεθικε. τουγαροῦν ἐν πρώτοις πειρὼ ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας μὴ συναρπασθήναι ἂν γὰρ ἀπαξ χρόνου καὶ διατριβὴς τύχης, ρᾶον κρατήσεις σεαυτὸν.

c. 21. Θάνατος καὶ φυγὴ καὶ πάντα τὰ δεινὰ φαινόμενα πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐστώ σοι καθ’ ἥμεραν, μάλιστα δὲ πάντων ὁ θάνατος: καὶ οὐδὲν ουδὲποτε οὔτε ταπεινῶν ἐνθυμηθήσῃ οὔτε ἄγαν ἐπιθυμήσεις τινὸς.

c. 22. Εἰ φιλοσοφίας ἐπιθυμεῖς, παρασκευάζου αὐτόθεν ὡς καταγελασθησόμενος, ὡς καταμωκησομένων σου πολλῶν, ὡς ἐροῦντων ὅτι “ἀφὼ φιλόσοφος ἡμῖν ἐπανελήπθε” καὶ “πόθεν ἡμῖν αὐτῇ ἡ ὀφρὺς;” σὺ δὲ ὀφρὺν μὲν μὴ σχῆς τῶν δὲ βελτίστων σου φαινομένων οὔτως ἔχου, ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τεταγμένος εἰς ταύτην τὴν χώραν-μέμνησο τε διότι,1 εάν μὲν ἐμμείνῃς τῶν αὐτῶν, οἱ καταγελώντες σου τὸ πρότερον οὐτοὶ σε υστεροὶ θαυμᾶσονται, εάν δὲ ἒπτηθῆς αὐτῶν, διπλοὺν προσλήψῃ καταγέλωτα.

c. 23. Ἐάν ποτὲ σοι γένηται ἔξω στραφήναι πρὸς τὸ βουλεσθαί ἄρεσαι τινί, ἵσθι ὅτι ἀπώλεσας τὴν ἑυστασίαν. ἄρκοι οὖν ἐν παντὶ τῷ εἶναι φιλόσοφος, εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖν βούλεις,2 σαυτῷ φαίνου καὶ ἴκανος ἔσῃ.

1 c. 24. Οὐτοὶ σε οἱ διαλογισμοὶ μὴ θλιβέτωσαν

1 τε διότι Nil. : δὲ ὑπὶ Ench.
2 The words τῷ εἶναι at this point are omitted by Par.
20. Bear in mind that it is not the man who reviles or strikes you that insults you, but it is your judgement that these men are insulting you. Therefore, when someone irritates you, be assured that it is your own opinion which has irritated you. And so make it your first endeavour not to be carried away by the external impression; for if once you gain time and delay, you will more easily become master of yourself.

21. Keep before your eyes day by day death and exile, and everything that seems terrible, but most of all death; and then you will never have any abject thought, nor will you yearn for anything beyond measure.

22. If you yearn for philosophy, prepare at once to be met with ridicule, to have many people jeer at you, and say, "Here he is again, turned philosopher all of a sudden," and "Where do you suppose he got that high brow?" But do you not put on a high brow, and do you so hold fast to the things which to you seem best, as a man who has been assigned by God to this post; and remember that if you abide by the same principles, those who formerly used to laugh at you will later come to admire you, but if you are worsted by them, you will get the laugh on yourself twice.

23. If it should ever happen to you that you turn to externals with a view to pleasing someone, rest assured that you have lost your plan of life. Be content, therefore, in everything to be a philosopher, and if you wish also to be taken for one, show to yourself that you are one, and you will be able to accomplish it.

24. Let not these reflections oppress you: "I
That is, every man is exclusively responsible for his own
good or evil. But honour and the lack of it are things which
are obviously not under a man's control, since they depend
upon the action of other people. It follows, therefore, that
shall live without honour, and be nobody anywhere." For, if lack of honour is an evil, you cannot be in evil through the instrumentality of some other person, any more than you can be in shame. It is not your business, is it, to get office, or to be invited to a dinner-party? Certainly not. How, then, can this be any longer a lack of honour? And how is it that you will be "nobody anywhere," when you ought to be somebody only in those things which are under your control, wherein you are privileged to be a man of the very greatest honour? But your friends will be without assistance? What do you mean by being "without assistance"? They will not have paltry coin from you, and you will not make them Roman citizens. Well, who told you that these are some of the matters under our control, and not rather things which others do? And who is able to give another what he does not himself have? "Get money, then," says some friend, "in order that we too may have it." If I can get money and at the same time keep myself self-respecting, and faithful, and high-minded, show me the way and I will get it. But if you require me to lose the good things that belong to me, in order that you may acquire the things that are not good, you can see for yourselves how unfair and inconsiderate you are. And which do you really prefer? Money, or a faithful and self-respecting friend? Help me, therefore, rather to this end, and do not require me to do those things which will make me lose these qualities.

"But my country," says he, "so far as lies in me, lack of honour cannot be an evil, but must be something indifferent.
“ἀβοήθητος ἐσται.” πάλιν, ποίαν καὶ ταύτην 
βοήθειαν; στοὰς οὔχ ἔξει διὰ σὲ οὔτε βαλανεία. 
καὶ τὶ τοῦτο; οὔδε γὰρ ύποδήματα ἔχει διὰ τὸν 
χαλκέα οὔδ’ ὅπλα διὰ τὸν σκυτέα’ ἰκανὸν δὲ, ἐὰν 
ἐκαστὸς ἐκπληρώσῃ τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἔργον. εἰ δὲ ἄλλον 
tινὰ αὐτῇ κατεσκεύαζες πολίτην πιστὸν καὶ 
αἰδήμονα, οὔδὲν ἃν αὐτὴν ὅφελείς; “ναι.” 
οὐκοῦν οὔδε σὺ αὐτὸς ἀνωφελὴς ἃν εἴης αὐτῇ. 
“τίνα οὖν ἔξω,” φησί, “χώραν ἐν τῇ πόλει;” 
ἡν ἃν δύνῃ φυλάττων ἀμα τὸν πιστὸν καὶ 
αἰδήμονα. εἰ δὲ ἐκείνην ὅφελεῖν βουλόμενος 
ἀποβαλέις ταῦτα, τί ὁφέλοι ἃν αὐτῇ γένοιο 
ἀναιδῆς καὶ ἀπιστοῦς ἀποτελεσθείς;
1  c. 25. Προετιμήθη σοῦ τις ἐν ἐστιάσει ἢ ἐν 
προσαγορεύσει ἢ ἐν τῷ παραληφθῆναι εἰς συμ- 
βουλίαν; εἰ μὲν ἄγαθὰ ταῦτα ἐστὶ, χαίρειν σε 
δεῖ, ὅτι ἐτυχεὶν αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνοι· εἰ δὲ κακά, μὴ 
ἀχθου, ὥστε σὺ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐτυχεῖς· μέμνησο δὲ, ὅτι 
οὐ δύνασαι μὴ ταῦτα ποιῶν πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν 
2 τῶν οὐκ ἔφ’ ἡμῖν τῶν ἵσων ἄξιοῦσθαι. πῶς γὰρ 
ἰσον ἔχειν δύναται ὁ μὴ φοιτῶν ἐπὶ θύρας τινὸς 
τῷ φοιτῶν; ὁ μὴ παραπέμπων τῷ παραπέμ- 
pοτί; ὁ μὴ ἐπαινῶν τῷ ἐπαινοῦντι; ἄδικος οὖν 
ἐσῃ καὶ ἀπληστος, εἰ μὴ προϊέμενος ταῦτα, ἀνθ’ 
δὲν ἐκεῖνα πιπράσκεται, προῖκα αὐτὰ βουλήσῃ 
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will be without assistance." Again I ask, what kind of assistance do you mean? It will not have loggias or baths of your providing. And what does that signify? For neither does it have shoes provided by the blacksmith, nor has it arms provided by the cobbler; but it is sufficient if each man fulfil his own proper function. And if you secured for it another faithful and self-respecting citizen, would you not be doing it any good? "Yes." Very well, and then you also would not be useless to it. "What place, then, shall I have in the State?" says he. Whatever place you can have, and at the same time maintain the man of fidelity and self-respect that is in you. But if, through your desire to help the State, you lose these qualities, of what good would you become to it, when in the end you turned out to be shameless and unfaithful?

25. Has someone been honoured above you at a dinner-party, or in salutation, or in being called in to give advice? Now if these matters are good, you ought to be happy that he got them; but if evil, be not distressed because you did not get them; and bear in mind that, if you do not act the same way that others do, with a view to getting things which are not under our control, you cannot be considered worthy to receive an equal share with others. Why, how is it possible for a person who does not haunt some man's door, to have equal shares with the man who does? For the man who does not do escort duty, with the man who does? For the man who does not praise, with the man who does? You will be unjust, therefore, and insatiable, if, while refusing to pay the price for which such things are bought, you want to obtain them for
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3 λαμβάνειν. ἀλλὰ πόσου πιπράσκονται θρίδακες; ὀβολοῦ, ἂν οὗτῳ τύχῃ. ἂν οὖν τις προέμενος τὸν ὀβολὸν λάβῃ θρίδακας, σὺ δὲ μὴ προέμενος μὴ λάβῃς, μὴ οἷον ἔλαττον ἔχειν τοῦ λαβόντος. ὥς γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἔχει θρίδακας, οὕτω σὺ τὸν ὀβολόν, ὥν οὐκ ἐδωκας.

4 Τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐνταῦθα. οὐ παρεκλήθης ἐφ’ ἐστίσασιν τινὸς; οὐ γὰρ ἐδωκας τῷ καλοῦντι, ὅσου πωλεῖ τὸ δείπνου. ἐπαίνος δ’ αὐτὸ πωλεῖ, θεραπείας πωλεῖ. δὸς οὖν τὸ διάφορον, εἰ σοι λυσιτελεῖ, ὅσου πωλεῖται. εἰ δὲ κάκεινα θέλεις μὴ προϊσθαί καὶ ταύτα λαμβάνειν, ἀπληστος εἰ καὶ ἀβέλτερος. οὐδὲν οὖν ἔχεις ἀντὶ τοῦ δείπνου; ἔχεις μὲν οὖν τὸ μὴ ἐπαίνεσαι τούτον, ὅν οὐκ ἥθελες, τὸ μὴ ἄνασχέσθαι αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς εἰσόδου.

c. 26. Τὸ βούλημα τῆς φύσεως καταμαθεῖν ἔστιν ἔξ ὡν οὐ διαφερόμεθα πρὸς Ἀλληλους. οἶον, ὅταν ἄλλου παιδάριον κατεάξῃ τὸ ποτήριον, πρόχειρον εὐθὺς λέγειν ὅτι “τῶν γινομένων ἔστιν.” ἵσθι οὖν, ὅτι, ὅταν καὶ τὸ σοῦ κατεαγῇ, τοιοῦτον εἶναι σε δεῖ, ὅποιον ὅτε καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἄλλου κατεάγη. οὐτω μετατίθετι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ μεῖζονα. τέκνων ἄλλου τεθυγε κι ὕψη. οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὃς οὐκ ἂν εἴποι ὅτι “ἀνθρώπινον.” ἀλλ’ ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ τινὸς ἀποθάνῃ, εὐθὺς “οἴμοι, τάλας

1 See note on frag. 11.
nothing. Well, what is the price for heads of lettuce? An obol,\(^1\) perhaps. If, then, somebody gives up his obol and gets his heads of lettuce, while you do not give your obol, and do not get them, do not imagine that you are worse off than the man who gets his lettuce. For as he has his heads of lettuce, so you have your obol which you have not given away.

Now it is the same way also in life. You have not been invited to somebody's dinner-party? Of course not; for you didn't give the host the price at which he sells his dinner. He sells it for praise; he sells it for personal attention. Give him the price, then, for which it is sold, if it is to your interest. But if you wish both not to give up the one and yet to get the other, you are insatiable and a simpleton. Have you, then, nothing in place of the dinner? Indeed you have; you have not had to praise the man you did not want to praise; you have not had to put up with the insolence of his doorkeepers.

26. What the will of nature is may be learned from a consideration of the points in which we do not differ from one another. For example, when some other person's slave-boy breaks his drinking-cup, you are instantly ready to say, "That's one of the things which happen." Rest assured, then, that when your own drinking-cup gets broken, you ought to behave in the same way that you do when the other man's cup is broken. Apply now the same principle to the matters of greater importance. Some other person's child or wife has died; no one but would say, "Such is the fate of man." Yet when a man's own child dies, immediately the cry is, "Alas! Woe is me!" But we
c. 27. "Ὅσπερ σκοποῦσθ' πρὸς τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν οὐ
tίθεται, οὕτως οὐδὲ κακοῦ φύσις ἐν κόσμῳ γίνεται.

c. 28. Εἰ μὲν τὸ σώμα σοῦ τις ἐπέτρεπε τῷ ἀπαντήσαντι, ἡγανάκτεις ἂν· ὅτι δὲ σὺ τὴν γνώμην τὴν σεαυτὸν ἐπιτρέπεις τῷ τυχόντι, ὥστε, ἐὰν λοιπορισθήσεται σοι, ταραχθῇ ἐκείνῃ καὶ συνγχυθῇ, οὐκ ἀισχύνῃ τοῦτο τέκνα;

1 c. 29. Ἐκάστου ἔργου σκόπει τὰ καθηγούμενα καὶ τὰ ἀκόλουθα αὐτοῦ καὶ οὕτως ἔρχου ἐπ' αὐτὸ. εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὴν μὲν πρῶτην προθύμως ἥξεις ἀπ' ἡμὲν τῶν ἔξης ἐντευθυμημένος, ύστερον δὲ ἀναφανέντων δυσχερῶν τινῶν αἰσχρῶς ἀπο-

2 στήσῃ. θέλεις Ὀλύμπια νικήσαι; κἂν γω, νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς κομψὸν γάρ ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ σκόπει τὰ καθηγούμενα καὶ τὰ ἀκόλουθα καὶ οὕτως ἀπτοῦ τοῦ ἔργου. δεὶ σ' εὔτακτεῖν, ἀναγκοτροφεῖν, ἀπέχεσθαι περμάτων, γυμνάζεσθαι πρὸς ἀνάγκην, ἐν ὅρᾳ τεταγμένη, ἐν καύματι, ἐν ψυχῇ, μὴ ψυχρὸν πίνειν, μὴ οἶνον, ὡς ἐτυχεῖν, ἀπλῶς ὡς ἵατρῷ παραδεδωκέναι σεαυτὸν τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ, εἰτα ἐν τῷ ἀγὸνι παρορύσσεσθαι,

1 ἔστι δὲ οτε χεῖρα ἐκβαλεῖν, ὁ σφυρὸν στρέψαι, πολλὴν ἄφην κατα-

1 Upton from the Disc. : παρέχεσθαι or παρέχεσθαι MSS.
2 Upton from the Disc. : βαλεῖν, λαβεῖν, or βλαβεῖν MSS.

1 That is, it is inconceivable that the universe should exist in order that some things may go wrong; hence, nothing natural is evil, and nothing that is by nature evil can arise.—Thus in effect Simplicius, and correctly, it seems.

2 This chapter is practically word for word identical with III. 15. Since it was omitted in Par., and not commented on by Simplicius, it may have been added in some second edition, whether by Arrian or not.
ought to remember how we feel when we hear of the same misfortune befalling others.

27. Just as a mark is not set up in order to be missed, so neither does the nature of evil arise in the universe. ¹

28. If someone handed over your body to any person who met you, you would be vexed; but that you hand over your mind to any person that comes along, so that, if he reviles you, it is disturbed and troubled—are you not ashamed of that?

29. In each separate thing that you do, consider the matters which come first and those which follow after, and only then approach the thing itself. Otherwise, at the start you will come to it enthusiastically, because you have never reflected upon any of the subsequent steps, but later on, when some difficulties appear, you will give up disgracefully.

Do you wish to win an Olympic victory? So do I, by the gods! for it is a fine thing. But consider the matters which come before that, and those which follow after, and only when you have done that, put your hand to the task. You have to submit to discipline, follow a strict diet, give up sweet cakes, train under compulsion, at a fixed hour, in heat or in cold; you must not drink cold water, ² nor wine just whenever you feel like it; you must have turned yourself over to your trainer precisely as you would to a physician. Then when the contest comes on, you have to “dig in” ⁴ beside your opponent, and sometimes dislocate your wrist, sprain your ankle, swallow

¹ That is, cold water not at all; while wine may be drunk, but only at certain times, i.e., probably with one’s meals. Such prohibitions are still common in Europe, particularly in popular therapeutics.

² See note on III. 15, 4.
πιεῖν, ἕσθ' ὁτε μαστίγωθήναι, καὶ μετὰ τούτων

3 πάντων νικήθηναι. ταῦτα ἐπισκέψαμενος, ἂν ἔτι θέλης, ἔρχου ἐπὶ τὸ άθλεῖν. εἰ δὲ μῆ, Ὡς τὰ παιδία ἀναστραφήσῃ, ἂ νῦν μὲν παλαιστὰς παίζει, νῦν δὲ μονομάχους, νῦν δὲ σαλπίζει, εἶτα τραγῳδεῖ: οὕτω καὶ σὺ νῦν μὲν ἀθλητής, νῦν δὲ μονομάχος, εἶτα ρήτωρ, εἶτα φιλόσοφος, ὅλῃ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ οὐδείν ἀλλ' ὡς πίθηκος πᾶσαν θέαν, ἢν ἂν ἴδης, μιμῇ καὶ ἄλλο ἔξ ἄλλου σοι ἀρέσκει. οὐ γὰρ μετὰ σκέψεως ἥλθες ἐπὶ τι οὐδὲ περιοδεύσας, ἀλλ' εἰκῇ καὶ κατὰ ψυχρὰν ἐπιθυμίαν.

4 Οὕτω θεασάμενοι τινες φιλόσοφον καὶ ἀκούσαντες οὕτω τινὸς λέγοντος, ὡς Εὐφράτης λέγει (καίτοι τίς οὗτος δύναται εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἐκεῖνος ;)

5 θέλουσι καὶ αὐτοῦ φιλοσόφειν. ἀνθρωπε, πρῶτον ἐπίσκεψαι, ὁποίον ἕστι τὸ πράγμα: εἶτα καὶ τὴν σεαυτοῦ φύσιν κατάμαθε, εἰ δύνασαι βαστάσαι. πενταθλὸς εἶναι βούλει ἡ παλαιστῆς; ἢδε σεαυτοῦ τοὺς βραχίονας, τοὺς μηροὺς, τὴν ὁσφυν

6 κατάμαθε. ἄλλος γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλο πέφυκε. δοκεῖς, ὅτι ταῦτα ποιῶν ὁσαυτῶς δύνασαι εὐθείας, ὁσαυτῶς πίνειν, ὁμοίως ὀρέγεσθαι, ὁμοίως δυσαρεστεῖν; ἀγρυπνησάι δεῖ, πονῆσαι, ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἀπελθεῖν, ὑπὸ παιδαρίου καταφρονηθῆναι, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπαντῶντων καταγελασθῆναι, ἐν παντὶ ἥττον ἕχειν, ἐν τιμῇ, ἐν ἀρχῇ,

7 ἐν δίκῃ, ἐν πραγματίῳ παντί. ταῦτα ἐπίσκεψαι,

1 Nil. and the Discourses: τῶν Ἐνκ.
2 Wolf from the Discourses: ὁς εἰν Σακράτης Ἐνκ.; ὁς εἰν τίς σοφῶν Nil.
3 Nilus and the Discourses: ἄλλου Ἐνκ.
4 Schweighäuser from the Discourses: ἀπαντῶν A un., Nil.; the clause om. by other MSS.
quantities of sand, sometimes take a scourging, and along with all that get beaten. After you have considered all these points, go on into the games, if you still wish to do so; otherwise, you will be turning back like children. Sometimes they play wrestlers, again gladiators, again they blow trumpets, and then act a play. So you too are now an athlete, now a gladiator, then a rhetorician, then a philosopher, yet with your whole soul nothing; but like an ape you imitate whatever you see, and one thing after another strikes your fancy. For you have never gone out after anything with circumspection, nor after you had examined it all over, but you act at haphazard and half-heartedly.

In the same way, when some people have seen a philosopher and have heard someone speaking like Euphrates¹ (though, indeed, who can speak like him?), they wish to be philosophers themselves. Man, consider first the nature of the business, and then learn your own natural ability, if you are able to bear it. Do you wish to be a contender in the pentathlon, or a wrestler? Look to your arms, your thighs, see what your loins are like. For one man has a natural talent for one thing, another for another. Do you suppose that you can eat in the same fashion, drink in the same fashion, give way to impulse and to irritation, just as you do now? You must keep vigils, work hard, abandon your own people, be despised by a paltry slave, be laughed to scorn by those who meet you, in everything get the worst of it, in honour, in office, in court, in every paltry affair. Look these drawbacks over carefully, if you

¹ See note on III. 15, 8.
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ei ἑλεις ἀντικαταλλάξασθαι τούτων ἀπάθειαν, ἐλευθερίαν, ἀπαράξιαν. εἰ δὲ μή, μὴ προσάγαγε, μὴ ὡς τὰ παιδία νῦν φιλόσοφος, ὕστερον δὲ τελώνης, εἰτα ῥήτωρ, εἰτα ἐπίτροπος Καίσαρος. ταῦτα οὐ συμφωνεῖ. ἐνα σε δεὶ ἀνθρωπὸν ἦ ἀγαθὸν ἦ κακὸν εἶναι· ἢ τὸ ἴγεμονικὸν σε δεὶ ἐξεργάζεσθαι τὸ σαυτοῦ ἦ τὰ ἓκτὸς· ἢ περὶ τὰ ἐσω φιλοτεχνεῖν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἐξω. τοῦτ’ ἐστιν ἦ φιλόσοφον τάξιν ἐπέχειν ἢ ἰδιώτου.

c. 30. Τὰ καθῆκοντα ὡς ἐπίπαν ταῖς σχέσεις παραμετρεῖται. πατήρ ἐστιν ὑπαγορεύεται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, παραχωρεῖν ἀπάντων, ἀνέχεσθαι λοιδοροῦντος, παῖντος. “αὕλλα πατήρ κακός ἐστι.” μή τι οὖν πρὸς ἀγαθὸν πατέρα φύσει φιλεῖωθες; ἀλλὰ πρὸς πατέρα. “ὁ ἀδελφὸς ἀδικεῖ.” τὴν ημερῶν τὴν τάξιν τὴν σειαυτοῦ πρὸς αὐτοῦ μηδὲ σκόπει, τί ἐκεῖνος ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ τί σοι ποιήσαντι κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ση ἐξει προαιρεσις. σὲ γὰρ ἄλλος οὐ βλάψει, ἂν μὴ σὺ θέλης· τότε δὲ ἐσῃ βεβλαμμένος, ὅταν ὑπολάβης βλάπτεσθαι. οὕτως οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ γείτονος, ἀπὸ τοῦ πολίτου, ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τὸ καθήκον εὐρίσεις, ἐαν τὰς σχέσεις ἐδίξῃ θεωρεῖν.

1 c. 31. Τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεούς εὐσεβείας ὑσθι ὅτι τὸ κυριώτατον ἐκεῖνο ἐστίν, ὅρθας ὑπολήψεις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐχεῖν ὡς ὄντων καὶ διοικοῦντων τὰ ὅλα καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, καὶ σαυτῶν εἰς τοῦτο κατατεθέναι,1 τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ εἶκειν πάσι τοῖς γυνομένοις καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν ἐκόντα ὡς

1 κατατεθάτων suggested by Schweighäuser. The sense would then be: “and have appointed you to,” referring to the gods.

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are willing at the price of these things to secure tranquillity, freedom and calm. Otherwise, do not approach philosophy; don't act like a child—now a philosopher, later on a tax-gatherer, then a rhetorician, then a procurator of Caesar. These things do not go together. You must be one person, either good or bad; you must labour to improve either your own governing principle or externals; you must work hard either on the inner man, or on things outside; that is, play either the rôle of a philosopher or else that of a layman.

30. Our duties are in general measured by our social relationships. He is a father. One is called upon to take care of him, to give way to him in all things, to submit when he reviles or strikes you. "But he is a bad father." Did nature, then, bring you into relationship with a good father? No, but simply with a father. "My brother does me wrong." Very well, then, maintain the relation that you have toward him; and do not consider what he is doing, but what you will have to do, if your moral purpose is to be in harmony with nature. For no one will harm you without your consent; you will have been harmed only when you think you are harmed. In this way, therefore, you will discover what duty to expect of your neighbour, your citizen, your commanding officer, if you acquire the habit of looking at your social relations with them.

31. In piety towards the gods, I would have you know, the chief element is this, to have right opinions about them—as existing and as administering the universe well and justly—and to have set yourself to obey them and to submit to everything that happens, and to follow it voluntarily, in the
υπὸ τῆς ἄριστης γνώμης ἑπιτελομένους. οὕτω γὰρ οὐ μέμψη ποτὲ τοὺς θεούς οὐτε ἐγκαλέσεις
2 ὡς ἀμελοῦμενος. ἀλλὰς δὲ οὐχ οἶον τε τούτο γίνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ ἀρχὴ ἀπὸ τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ
ἐν τοῖς ἑφ' ἡμῖν μόνοις θῆς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ
κακὸν. ὡς, ἄν γέ τι ἐκεῖνων ὑπολάβης ἀγαθὸν
ἡ κακόν, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ἀποτυγχάνῃς δὲν
θέλεις καὶ περιπτύτης οῖς μὴ θέλεις, μέμψασθαί
3 σε καὶ μυσείν τοὺς αἰτίους. πέφυκε γὰρ πρὸς
tοῦτο πᾶν ἥμων τὰ μὲν βλαβερὰ φαινόμενα καὶ
tὰ αἰτία αὐτῶν φεύγειν καὶ ἐκτρέπεσθαι, τὰ δὲ
ἀφέλιμα καὶ τὰ αἰτία αὐτῶν μετιέναι τε καὶ
tεθητέναι.1 ἀμήχανον οὖν βλάπτεσθαί τινα
ioμενον χαίρειν τῷ δοκοῦντι βλάπτειν, ὥσπερ
4 καὶ τὸ αὐτῇ τῇ βλάβῃ χαίρειν ἀδύνατον. ἐνθὲν
cαι πατήρ υπὸ νιὸν λοιδορεῖται, όταν τῶν δο-
κοῦντων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τῷ παιδὶ μὴ μεταδίδῃ
καὶ Πολυνείκην καὶ Ἐτεοκλέα τοῦτ' ἐποίησε
πολεμίους ἀλλήλους τὸ ἀγαθὸν οἰεσθαι τὴν
tυραννίδα. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ γεωργὸς λοιδορεῖ
tους θεοὺς, διὰ τοῦτο ὁ ναύτης, διὰ τοῦτο ὁ
ἐμπόρος, διὰ τοῦτο οἱ τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ
tέκνα ἀπολλύντες. ὁποὺ γὰρ τὸ συμφέρον, ἐκεῖ καὶ
tὸ εὐσεβείς. ὥστε, ὅστις ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ὅρε-
γεσθαι ὡς δὲ καὶ ἐκκλίνειν, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ
5 εὐσεβείας ἐπιμελεῖται. ὀπένδειν δὲ καὶ θύειν

1 Vv: τεθαυμακέναι Ench. (Nil.; Simpl.).
belief that it is being fulfilled by the highest intelligence. For if you act in this way, you will never blame the gods, nor find fault with them for neglecting you. But this result cannot be secured in any other way than by withdrawing your idea of the good and the evil from the things which are not under our control, and placing it in those which are under our control, and in those alone. Because, if you think any of those former things to be good or evil, then, when you fail to get what you want and fall into what you do not want, it is altogether inevitable that you will blame and hate those who are responsible for these results. For this is the nature of every living creature, to flee from and to turn aside from the things that appear harmful, and all that produces them, and to pursue after and to admire the things that are helpful, and all that produces them. Therefore, it is impossible for a man who thinks that he is being hurt to take pleasure in that which he thinks is hurting him, just as it is also impossible for him to take pleasure in the hurt itself. Hence it follows that even a father is reviled by a son when he does not give his child some share in the things that seem to be good; and this it was which made Polyneices and Eteocles enemies of one another, the thought that the royal power was a good thing. That is why the farmer reviles the gods, and so also the sailor, and the merchant, and those who have lost their wives and their children. For where a man's interest lies, there is also his piety. Wherefore, whoever is careful to exercise desire and aversion as he should, is at the same time careful also about piety. But it is always appropriate to make libations, and sacri-
καὶ ἀπάρχεσθαι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια ἐκάστοτε προσίκει καθαρὸς καὶ μὴ ἐπισευμένως μηδὲ ἀμελῶς μηδὲ γε γλύσχρως μηδὲ ύπερ δύναμιν.

1 c. 32. "Ὅταν μαντικὴ προσίζης, μέμνησο, ὅτι, τί μὲν ἀποβηγησται, οὐκ οίδας, ἀλλὰ ἦκεις ὡς παρὰ τοῦ μάντεως αὐτὸ πευσόμενος, ὅποιον δὲ τὶ ἐστίν, ἐλῆλυθας εἰδὼς, εἴπερ εἰ φιλόσοφος. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τί τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη μήτε ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι μήτε 2 κακὸν. μὴ φέρε οὖν πρὸς τὸν μάντιν ὅρεξιν ἢ ἐκκλίσιν μηδὲ τρέμων αὐτῷ προσεί, ἀλλὰ διεγνωσκῶς, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἀποβηγησόμενον ἀδιάφορον καὶ οὐδὲν πρὸς σέ, ὁποίον δ' ἂν ἦ, ἔσται2 αὐτῷ χρήσασθαι καλῶς καὶ τοῦτο οὐδεὶς κωλύσει. θαρρῶν οὖν ὡς ἐπὶ συμβούλους ἔρχου τοὺς θεοῦς καὶ λοιπῶν, ὅταν τί σοι συμβούλευτή, μέμνησο τίνας συμβούλους παρέλαβες καὶ τίνων

3 παρακούσεις ἀπειθήσας. ἔρχου δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μαν- τεύεσθαι, καθάπερ ἦξιον Ἑυκράτης, ἐφ' ὅν ἦ πᾶσα σκέψις τὴν ἀναφορὰν εἰς τὴν ἐκβασιν ἐχει καὶ οὔτε ἐκ λόγου οὔτε ἐκ τέχνης τινὸς ἀλλὰ ἄφορμαι δίδονται πρὸς τὸ συνιδεῖν τὸ προκεί- μενον ὅστε, ὅταν δεισῃ συγκινδυνεῦσαι φίλω ἡ πατρίδι, μὴ μαντεύεσθαι, εἰ συγκινδυνευτέων. καὶ γὰρ ἄν προείπη3 σοι ὁ μάντις φαίλα γεγονέναι τὰ ιερά, δῆλον ὅτι θύματος σημαίνεται ἡ πύρωσις καὶ σέραντος τινὸς τοῦ σώματος ἡ φυγή.

1 C un.: εἰ δὲ μὴ Ἐνθ.  
2 C un.: ἐσσοὶ γὰρ MSS.  
3 C un.: προείπη or προείποι MSS.

1 See II. 7 where the principal points made here are illustrated at greater length.
fices, and to give of the firstfruits after the manner of our fathers, and to do all this with purity, and not in a slovenly or careless fashion, nor, indeed, in a niggardly way, nor yet beyond our means.

32. When you have recourse to divination, remember that you do not know what the issue is going to be, but that you have come in order to find this out from the diviner; yet if you are indeed a philosopher, you know, when you arrive, what the nature of it is. For if it is one of the things which are not under our control, it is altogether necessary that what is going to take place is neither good nor evil. Do not, therefore, bring to the diviner desire or aversion, and do not approach him with trembling, but having first made up your mind that every issue is indifferent and nothing to you, but that, whatever it may be, it will be possible for you to turn it to good use, and that no one will prevent this. Go, then, with confidence to the gods as to counsellors; and after that, when some counsel has been given you, remember whom you have taken as counsellors, and whom you will be disregarding if you disobey. But go to divination as Socrates thought that men should go, that is, in cases where the whole inquiry has reference to the outcome, and where neither from reason nor from any other technical art are means vouchsafed for discovering the matter in question. Hence, when it is your duty to share the danger of a friend or of your country, do not ask of the diviner whether you ought to share that danger. For if the diviner forewarns you that the omens of sacrifice have been unfavourable, it is clear that death is portended, or the injury of some member of your body, or exile;
Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus

άλλ' αἴρει ὁ λόγος καὶ σὺν τούτοις παρίστασθαι τῷ φίλῳ καὶ τῇ πατρίδι συγκινδυνεύειν. τουγαροῦν τῷ μείζονι μάντει πρόσεχε, τῷ Πυθίω, ὅσ ἐξέβαλε τοῦ ναοῦ τὸν ὦ βοηθήσαντα ἀναιρούμενῷ τῷ φίλῳ.

1. c. 33. Τάξου τινὰ ἣδη χαρακτῆρα σαυτῷ καὶ τύπον, ὅν φυλάξεις ἐπὶ τε σεαυτοῦ ὄν καὶ ἀνθρώποις ἐντυγχάνων. καὶ σιωπῇ τῷ πολὺ ἐστῶ ἡ λαλεῖσθω τὰ ἀναγκαία καὶ δι’ ὀλίγων. σπανίως δὲ ποτὲ καιροῖ παρακαλοῦντος ἐπὶ τὸ λέγειν λέξον μὲν, ἄλλα περὶ οὐδένος τῶν τυχόντων μὴ περὶ μονομαχίων, μὴ περὶ ἱπποδρομῶν, μὴ περὶ ἀθλητῶν, μὴ περὶ βρωμάτων ἡ πομάτων, τῶν ἑκασταχοῦ, μάλιστα δὲ μὴ περὶ ἀνθρώπων ψέγων ἡ ἐπαίνων ἡ συγκρίσεως.

3. ἂν μὲν οὖν οἶός τε ὑς, μετάγαγε τοῖς σοῖς λόγοις καὶ τοὺς τῶν συνόντων ἐπὶ τὸ προσήκον. εἰ δὲ ἐν ἄλλοφύλοις ἀπολυφθεῖσι τύχοις, σιώπα.

4. Γέλως μὴ πολὺς ἐστῶ μηδὲ ἐπὶ πολλοῖς μηδὲ ἀνειμένοις.

5. "Ορκοῦ παραίτησαι, εἰ μὲν οἶόν τε, εἰς ἀπαί, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐκ τῶν εὐνόντων.

6. 'Εστιάσεις τὰς ἐξω καὶ ἴδιωτικὰς διακρόνον ἑαυτε ἐπὶ ποτε γίνεται καιρός, ἐντετάσθω σοι ἡ

1 Salmasius and Schweighäuser: ἐρεῖ or ἐν MSS.
2 Salmasius and Schweighäuser: παρίσταται MSS.
3 Added by Salmasius and Schweighäuser.
4 Nil., Simplicius: ἑκασταχοῦ λεγομένων Ench.
5 C un.: τοὺς σοὺς λόγους MSS.

A few more unimportant details are given by Aelian, Varia Historia, 3, 44; and Simplicius in his commentary on this passage, p. 258 c ff. (Heinsius), or p. 411 (Schweighäuser).
yet reason requires that even at this risk you are to stand by your friend, and share the danger with your country. Wherefore, give heed to the greater diviner, the Pythian Apollo, who cast out of his temple the man who had not helped his friend when he was being murdered.1

33. Lay down for yourself, at the outset, a certain stamp and type of character for yourself, which you are to maintain whether you are by yourself or are meeting with people. And be silent for the most part, or else make only the most necessary remarks, and express these in few words. But rarely, and when occasion requires you to talk, talk, indeed, but about no ordinary topics. Do not talk about gladiators, or horse-races, or athletes, or things to eat or drink—topics that arise on all occasions; but above all, do not talk about people, either blaming, or praising, or comparing them. If, then, you can, by your own conversation bring over that of your companions to what is seemly. But if you happen to be left alone in the presence of aliens, keep silence.

Do not laugh much, nor at many things, nor boisterously.

Refuse, if you can, to take an oath at all, but if that is impossible, refuse as far as circumstances allow.

Avoid entertainments given by outsiders and by persons ignorant of philosophy; but if an appropriate occasion arises for you to attend, be on the

The point of the story is that a man does not need to go to a diviner in order to learn whether he should defend his country or his friends. That question was long ago settled by the greatest of diviners, Apollo at Delphi, who ordered to be cast out of his temple an inquirer that had once failed to defend his own friend.
προσοχή, μήποτε ἄρα ὑπορρητὴς εἰς ἰδιωτισμὸν. ἵσθι γάρ, ὅτι, ἐὰν οὗ ἐταῖρος ἢ μεμολυσμένος, καὶ τὸν συνανατριβόμενον αὐτῶν συμμολύνεσθαι ἀνάγκη, κἂν αὐτὸς ὁν τύχῃ καθαρός.

7 Τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα μέχρι τῆς χρείας ψυλῆς παραλάμβανε, ὅποιν τροφᾶς, πόμα, ἀμπεχώνην, οἰκίαν, οἰκετίαν τὸ δὲ πρὸς δόξαν ἢ τρυφὴν ἄπαν περίγραφε.

8 Περὶ ἀφροδίσια εἰς δύναμιν πρὸ γάμου καθαρευτέον ἀπτομένῳ δὲ ὑν νομίμων ἐστὶ μεταληπτέον. μὴ μέντοι ἐπαχθῆς γίνου τοῖς χρωμένοις μηδὲ ἐλεγκτικὸς· μηδὲ πολλαχοῦ τὸ ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁν χρῆ, παράφερε.

9 Ἐάν τίς σοι ἀπαγγεῖλῃ ὅτι οὐ δεῖνα σε κακῶς λέγει, μὴ ἀπολογοῦ πρὸς τὰ λεχθέντα, ἀλλὰ ἀποκρίνου διότι "ἡγνόει γάρ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ προσόντα μοι κακά, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἁν ταύτα μόνα ἔλεγεν."

10 Εἰς τὰ θέατρα τὸ πολὺ παριέναι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. εἰ δὲ ποτε καιρὸς εἰη, μηδὲνι σπουδάζων φαίνου ἢ σεαυτῷ, τοῦτ' ἔστι θέλε γίνεσθαι μόνα τὰ γινόμενα καὶ νικᾶν μόνον τὸν νικῶντα· οὔτω γάρ οὐκ ἐμποδισθήσῃ. Βοής δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἐπιγελᾶν τινὶ ἢ ἐπὶ πολὺ συγκινεῖσθαι παντελῶς ἀπέχου. καὶ μετὰ τὸ ἀπαλλαγῆναι μὴ πολλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων διαλέγου, ὡσα μὴ φέρει πρὸς τὴν σὴν ἐπανόρθωσιν ἐμφαίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτον, ὅτι ἐθαύμασας τὴν θέαν.

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alert to avoid lapsing into the behaviour of such laymen. For you may rest assured, that, if a man's companion be dirty, the person who keeps close company with him must of necessity get a share of his dirt, even though he himself happens to be clean.

In things that pertain to the body take only as much as your bare need requires, I mean such things as food, drink, clothing, shelter, and household slaves; but cut down everything which is for outward show or luxury.

In your sex-life preserve purity, as far as you can, before marriage, and, if you indulge, take only those privileges which are lawful. However, do not make yourself offensive, or censorious, to those who do indulge, and do not make frequent mention of the fact that you do not yourself indulge.

If someone brings you word that So-and-so is speaking ill of you, do not defend yourself against what has been said, but answer, "Yes, indeed, for he did not know the rest of the faults that attach to me; if he had, these would not have been the only ones he mentioned."

It is not necessary, for the most part, to go to the public shows. If, however, a suitable occasion ever arises, show that your principal concern is for none other than yourself, which means, wish only for that to happen which does happen, and for him only to win who does win; for so you will suffer no hindrance. But refrain utterly from shouting, or laughter at anyone, or great excitement. And after you have left, do not talk a great deal about what took place, except in so far as it contributes to your own improvement; for such behaviour indicates that the spectacle has aroused your admiration.
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

11 Εἰς ἄκροισεὶς τινῶν μὴ εἰκῇ μηδὲ ῥαδίως πάριθη: παριῶν δὲ τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ τὸ εὐσταθὲς καὶ ἀμα ἀνεπαχθὲς φύλασσε.

12 "Ὅταν τινὶ μέλλης συμβαλεῖν, μάλιστα τῶν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δοκοῦντων, πρόβαλε σαντῷ, τί ἂν ἐποίησεν ἐν τούτῳ Σωκράτης ἢ Ζήνων, καὶ οὐκ ἀπορήσεις τοῦ χρήσασθαι προσηκόντως τῷ ἐμπεσόντι. ὅταν φοιτᾶς πρὸς τινὰ τῶν μέγα δυναμένων, πρόβαλε, ὦτι οὐχ εὐρίσεις αὐτὸν ἐνδοῦ, ὦτι ἀποκλεισθῇ, ὅτι ἐντιναχθῇσονται 2 σοι αἰ θύραι, ὦτι οὐ φροντιεῖ σου. κἂν σὺν τούτοις ἐλθεῖν καθήκη, ἐλθὼν φέρε τὰ γινόμενα καὶ μηδέποτε ἐπὶ της αὐτὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὦτι "οὐκ ἤν τοσοῦτον": ἱδιωτικὸν γὰρ καὶ διαβεβλημένον πρὸς τὰ ἔκτος.

14 Ἔν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις ἀπέστω τὸ ἑαυτοῦ τινῶν ἔργων ἢ κινδύνων ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ ἀμέτρως μεμνήσθαι. οὐ γὰρ, ὡς σοὶ ἦδυ ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν σῶν κινδύνων μεμνήσθαι, οὔτω καὶ τοῖς ἅλλοις ἦδυ ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν σοὶ συμβεβήκότων ἀκούειν.

15 Ἀπέστω δὲ καὶ τὸ γέλωτα κινεῖν ὀλισθηρὸς γὰρ ὁ τρόπος 3 εἰς ἰδιωτισμὸν καὶ ἄμα ἰκανὸς τὴν αἰδώ τὴν πρὸς σὲ τῶν πλησίον ἀνιέναι.

16 ἐπισφαλεῖς δὲ καὶ τὸ εἰς αἰσχρολογίαν προελθεῖν. ὅταν οὖν τί συμβῇ τοιοῦτον, ἄν μὲν εὐκαιρον ᾗ,

1 In Nil. only.  2 Nil.: ἐκτιναχθῇσονται MSS.  3 C un., Nil., Simpl.: τόπος MSS.

1 A favourite way of introducing a new work of literature to the reading public, somewhat like our modern musical
Do not go rashly or readily to people's public readings, but when you do go, maintain your own dignity and gravity, and at the same time be careful not to make yourself disagreeable.

When you are about to meet somebody, in particular when it is one of those men who are held in very high esteem, propose to yourself the question, "What would Socrates or Zeno have done under these circumstances?" and then you will not be at a loss to make proper use of the occasion. When you go to see one of those men who have great power, propose to yourself the thought, that you will not find him at home, that you will be shut out, that the door will be slammed in your face, that he will pay no attention to you. And if, despite all this, it is your duty to go, go and take what comes, and never say to yourself, "It was not worth all the trouble." For this is characteristic of the layman, that is, a man who is vexed at externals.

In your conversation avoid making mention at great length and excessively of your own deeds or dangers, because it is not as pleasant for others to hear about your adventures, as it is for you to call to mind your own dangers.

Avoid also raising a laugh, for this is a kind of behaviour that slips easily into vulgarity, and at the same time is calculated to lessen the respect which your neighbours have of you. It is dangerous also to lapse into foul language. When, therefore, anything of the sort occurs, if the occasion be suitable, go even so far as to reprove the person recitals, or artists' exhibitions. See also III. 23 for similar public lectures given by a philosopher.
καὶ ἑπιπληξῶν τῷ προελθόντι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τῷ γε ἀποσιωπῆσαι καὶ ἐρυθραίσαι καὶ σκυθρωπᾶσαι
dῆλος γίνου δυσχεραίνων τῷ λόγῳ.

c. 34. "Οταν ἢδονῆς τινὸς φαντασίαν λάβης,
καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, φύλασσε σαυτόν, μὴ
sυναρπασθῆς ὑπ' αὐτῆς· ἀλλ' ἐκδεξάσθω σε τὸ
πράγμα, καὶ ἀναβολήν τινα παρὰ σεαυτοῦ λάβε.
ἐπειτα μνήσθητι ἀμφοτέρων τῶν χρόνων, καθ' ὅν
τε ἀπολαύσεις τῆς ἢδονῆς, καὶ καθ' ὅν ἀπολαύσας
ὕστερον μετανοήσεις καὶ αὐτὸς σεαυτῷ λοιδο-
ρήσῃ, καὶ τούτοις ἀντίθες ὅπως ἀποσχόμενος
χαιρήσεις καὶ ἐπαινέσεις αὐτὸς σεαυτοῦ.
δέν δὲ σοι καιρὸς φανή ἄψασθαι τοῦ ἔργον,
πρόσεχε, μὴ ἡττήσῃ σε τὸ προσηνέχ αὐτοῦ καὶ
ἡδὺ καὶ ἐπαγγεῖόν  ἀλλ' ἀντιτίθει, πόσῳ ἄμεινον
τὸ συνειδέναι σεαυτῷ ταύτην τὴν νίκην νεωκη-
κότη.

c. 35. "Οταν τι διαγνοὺς, ὅτι ποιητέον ἐστί,
ποιήσε, μηδέποτε φύγης ὀφθήναι πράσσων αὐτῷ,
καὶ ἄλλων τι μέλλωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ
ὕπολαμβάνειν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ποιεῖς,
αὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον φεύγε· εἰ δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὰ φοβή
tοὺς ἐπιπλήξοντας οὐκ ὀρθῶς;

c. 36. Ὡς τὸ "ἡμέρα ἐστὶ" καὶ "νῦξ ἐστί"
πρὸς μὲν τὸ διεξευγμένον μεγάλην ἔχει ἠξίαν,
πρὸς δὲ τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον ἀπαξίαν, οὕτω καὶ

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1 The ordinary person, to be sure, can no more call up a blush off-hand than he can a sneeze or a hiccup, and the observation of nature implied by the command is, therefore, imperfect (cf. note in IV. 11, 1). But all Epictetus means is that one should make no effort to conceal any natural expression of moral resentment under such circumstances.
who has made such a lapse; if, however, the occasion does not arise, at all events show by keeping silence, and blushing, and frowning, that you are displeased by what has been said.

34. When you get an external impression of some pleasure, guard yourself, as with impressions in general, against being carried away by it; nay, let the matter wait upon your leisure, and give yourself a little delay. Next think of the two periods of time, first, that in which you will enjoy your pleasure, and second, that in which, after the enjoyment is over, you will later repent and revile your own self; and set over against these two periods of time how much joy and self-satisfaction you will get if you refrain. However, if you feel that a suitable occasion has arisen to do the deed, be careful not to allow its enticement, and sweetness, and attractiveness to overcome you; but set over against all this the thought, how much better is the consciousness of having won a victory over it.

35. When you do a thing which you have made up your mind ought to be done, never try not to be seen doing it, even though most people are likely to think unfavourably about it. If, however, what you are doing is not right, avoid the deed itself altogether; but if it is right, why fear those who are going to rebuke you wrongly?

36. Just as the propositions, "It is day," and "It is night," are full of meaning when separated, but meaningless if united; so also, granted that for

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2 Compare I, 25, 11-13. It does not seem possible in our idiom to use the same expressions for ἄξια, "worth," or "value," which occurs three times in this section, and ἄπαξία, "lack of worth," or "lack of value," which occurs twice.
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to the meiōδω μερίδα ἐκλέξασθαι πρός μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐχέτω ἄξιαν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὸ κοινωνικόν ἐν ἐστιάσει, οἷον δεῖ, φυλάξαι, ἀπαξιαν ἔχει. ὅταν οὖν συνεσθῆς ἔτερο, μέμνησο, μὴ μονὸν τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ἄξιαν τῶν παρακειμένων ὅραν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἐστιάτορα αἰδῶ φυλάξαι.2

c. 37. 'Εὰν ύπέρ δύναμιν ἀναλάβῃς τὶ πρόσωπον, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ σκημώνησας καὶ, ἰδύνασο ἐκπληρώσαι, παρέλππες.

c. 38. 'Εν τῷ περιπατεῖν καθάπερ προσέχεις, μὴ ἐπιβῇς ἦλω ἡ στρέψης τῶν πόδα σου, οὕτω πρόσεχε, μὴ καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν βλάψης τὸ σεαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ἐφ’ ἐκάστου ἔργου παραφυλάσσωμεν, ἀσφαλέστερον ἀψόμεθα τοῦ ἔργου.

c. 39. Μέτρον κτήσεως τὸ σῶμα ἐκάστῳ ὡς ὁ ποὺς ὑποδήματος. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τούτῳ στῆς, φυλάξεις τὸ μέτρον’ ἐὰν δὲ ύπερβῇς, ὡς κατὰ κρήμνου λοιπὸν ἀνάγκη φέρεσθαι’ καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὑποδήματος, ἐὰν ύπὲρ τῶν πόδα ύπερβῆς, γίνεται κατάχρυσον ὑπόδημα, εἰτὰ πορφυροῖν, κεντητοῦ. τοῦ γὰρ ἀπαξ ύπὲρ τὸ μέτρον ὅρος οὐθεὶς ἔστιν.

c. 40. Αἱ γυναῖκες εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τεσσαρεσκάιδεκα ἐτῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄνδρῶν κυρία καλοῦνται. τοι-γαροῦν ὀρῶσαι, ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν οὖν οὖν αὐταὶς πρόσεστι, μόνον δὲ συγκοιμῶνται τοῖς ἄνδράσι, ἀρχονταὶ καλλωπίζεσθαι καὶ ἐν τούτῳ πᾶσαι

1 τὸ added by Schweighä use from Simplicius.
2 αἰδῶ φυλάξαι Schweighäuser: οἶδαν δεῖ φυλαχθῆναι MSS.

1 That is, property, which is of use only for the body, should be adjusted to a man’s actual bodily needs, just as a 524
you to take the larger share at a dinner is good for your body, still, it is bad for the maintenance of the proper kind of social feeling. When, therefore, you are eating with another person, remember to regard, not merely the value for your body of what lies before you, but also to maintain your respect for your host.

37. If you undertake a rôle which is beyond your powers, you both disgrace yourself in that one, and at the same time neglect the rôle which you might have filled with success.

38. Just as you are careful, in walking about, not to step on a nail or to sprain your ankle, so be careful also not to hurt your governing principle. And if we observe this rule in every action, we shall be more secure in setting about it.

39. Each man's body is a measure for his property, just as the foot is a measure for his shoe. If, then, you abide by this principle, you will maintain the proper measure, but if you go beyond it, you cannot help but fall headlong over a precipice, as it were, in the end. So also in the case of your shoe; if once you go beyond the foot, you get first a gilded shoe, then a purple one, then an embroidered one. For once you go beyond the measure there is no limit.

40. Immediately after they are fourteen, women are called "ladies" by men. And so when they see that they have nothing else but only to be the bedfellows of men, they begin to beautify themselves,
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ἐχειν τάς ἐλπίδας. προσέχειν οὖν ἀξίον, ἵνα αἰσθωνται, διὸτι ἐπὶ οὔδενι ἄλλῳ τιμῶνται ἢ τῷ κόσμῳ παῖνεσθαι καὶ αἰδήμονες. ¹

c. 41. Αφιάσ σημεῖον τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν τοῖς περὶ τὸ σῶμα, οἷν ἐπὶ πολὺ γυμνάζεσθαι, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἐσθίειν, ἐπὶ πολὺ πίνειν, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀπο-πατεῖν, ὁχεύειν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐν παρέργῳ ποιητέον· περὶ δὲ τὴν γυνώμην ἡ πᾶσα ἐστο ἐπιστροφή.

c. 42. Ὅταν σὲ τις κακῶς ποιή ἡ κακῶς λέγη, μέμνησο, ὅτι καθήκειν αὐτῷ οἴσκειν ποιεῖ ἡ λέγει. οὐχ οἶνον τε οὖν ἀκολουθεῖν αὐτὸν τῷ σοὶ φαινομένῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑαυτῷ, ὥστε, εἰ κακῶς αὐτῷ φαίνεται, ἐκεῖνος βλάπτεται, ὅστις καὶ ἔγχ-πάτηται. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀληθὲς συμπεπληγμένον ἣν τις ὑπολάβῃ ψεύδος, οὐ τό συμπεπληγμένον βέβλαπται, ἀλλ' ὁ ἐξαπατηθείς. ἀπὸ τοῦτων οὖν ὁμοφονοὺς πράσως ἔξεις πρὸς τὸν οἴκον ῥοῦντα. ἐπιθέγγου γὰρ ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ ὅτι "ἐδοξεῖν αὐτοῦ."

c. 43. Πάν πράγμα διὸ ἔχει λαβᾶς, τὴν μὲν φορητῆν, τὴν δὲ ἀφόρητον. ο ἀδελφός ἐὰν ἀδική, ἐντεῦθεν αὐτὸ μὴ λάμβανε, ὅτι ἄδικε (αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ λαβῇ ἐστίν αὐτοῦ οὐ φορητῆ), ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖθεν μᾶλλον, ὅτι ἀδελφός, ὅτι σύντροφος, καὶ λήψῃ αὐτὸ καθ' ὁ φορητόν.

¹ C un., Nil.: αἰδήμονες ἐν σωφρονή other MSS.
² C un., Nil. (ed. Rom.): om. other MSS.

¹ Two judgements connected with "and." Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, IV, III. 1 (1909), 106, and note 3. Compare also I. 26, 14; II. 9, 8. An example of an inconsistent composite judgment is given in Euch. 36.

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and put all their hopes in that. It is worth while for us to take pains, therefore, to make them understand that they are honoured for nothing else but only for appearing modest and self-respecting.

41. It is a mark of an ungifted man to spend a great deal of time in what concerns his body, as in much exercise, much eating, much drinking, much evacuating of the bowels, much copulating. But these things are to be done in passing; and let your whole attention be devoted to the mind.

42. When someone treats you ill or speaks ill of you, remember that he acts or speaks thus because he thinks it is incumbent upon him. That being the case, it is impossible for him to follow what appears good to you, but what appears good to himself; whence it follows, that, if he gets a wrong view of things, the man that suffers is the man that has been deceived. For if a person thinks a true composite judgement to be false, the composite judgement does not suffer, but the person who has been deceived. If, therefore, you start from this point of view, you will be gentle with the man who reviles you. For you should say on each occasion, "He thought that way about it."

43. Everything has two handles, by one of which it ought to be carried and by the other not. If your brother wrongs you, do not lay hold of the matter by the handle of the wrong that he is doing, because this is the handle by which the matter ought not to be carried; but rather by the other handle—that he is your brother, that you were brought up together, and then you will be laying hold of the matter by the handle by which it ought to be carried.
c. 44. Οὗτοι οί λόγοι ἀσύνακτοι: "ἐγώ σου πλουσιώτερός εἰμι, ἐγώ σου ἄρα κρεῖσσων". "ἐγώ σου λογιώτερος, ἐγώ σου ἄρα κρεῖσσων" ἐκεῖνοι δὲ μᾶλλον συνακτικοί: "ἐγώ σου πλουσιώτερός εἰμι, ἢ ἐμὴ ἄρα κτήσις τῆς σῆς κρεῖσσων". "ἐγώ σου λογιώτερος, ἢ ἐμὴ ἄρα λέξις τῆς σῆς κρεῖσσων." σὺ δέ γε οὔτε κτήσις εἰ οὔτε λέξις.

c. 45. Λούεται τις ταχέως: μὴ εἰπης ὅτι κακῶς, ἀλλ' ὅτι ταχέως. πίνει τις πολύν οἶνον' μὴ εἰπης ὅτι κακῶς, ἀλλ' ὅτι πολυν. πρὶν γὰρ διαγνώσαι τὸ δόγμα, πόθεν οἰσθα, εἰ κακῶς; οὔτως οὐ 1 συμβησται σοι ἄλλων 2 μὲν φαντασίας καταληπτικὰς λαμβάνεις, 3 ἄλλοις δὲ συγκατατίθεσθαι.

1 c. 46. Μηδαμοῦ σεαυτὸν εἰπης φιλόσοφον μηδὲ λάλει τὸ πολὺ ἐν ἰδιώταις περὶ τῶν θεωρημάτων, ἀλλὰ ποίει τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν θεωρημάτων ὅπως ἐν συμποσίῳ μὴ λέγε, πῶς δεῖ ἐσθίειν, ἀλλ' ἐσθίε, ὡς δεῖ. μέμνησο γὰρ, ὅτι οὕτως ἀφηρήκει πανταχόθεν Σωκράτης τὸ ἐπιδιεικτικόν, ὡστε 4 ἡρχοντο πρὸς αὐτὸν βουλόμενοι φιλοσοφοίς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συσταθῆναι, κακεῖνος ἀπῆγεν αὐτούς. οὕτως ἡνείχετο παρορόμενος. κἀν περὶ θεωρήματος τινὸς ἐν ἰδιώταις ἐμπίπτη λόγος, σιώπα τὸ πολύ μέγας γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος εὕθυς ἐξεμέσαι, ὁ οὗκ

1 Nil.: οὖν Ench.
2 C un., Nil., Simpl.: ἄλλας other MSS.
3 C un., Nil.: καταλαμβάνειν other MSS.
4 C un., Nil., Simpl.: om. here but placed before καν (below) by other MSS.

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44. The following statements constitute a *non sequitur*: "I am richer than you are, therefore I am superior to you"; or, "I am more eloquent than you are, therefore I am superior to you." But the following conclusions are better: "I am richer than you are, therefore my property is superior to yours"; or, "I am more eloquent than you are, therefore my elocution is superior to yours." But you are neither property nor elocution.

45. Somebody is hasty about bathing;¹ do not say that he bathes badly, but that he is hasty about bathing. Somebody drinks a good deal of wine; do not say that he drinks badly, but that he drinks a good deal. For until you have decided what judgement prompts him, how do you know that what he is doing is bad? And thus the final result will not be that you receive convincing sense-impressions of some things, but give your assent to others.

46. On no occasion call yourself a philosopher, and do not, for the most part, talk among laymen about your philosophic principles, but do what follows from your principles. For example, at a banquet do not say how people ought to eat, but eat as a man ought. For remember how Socrates had so completely eliminated the thought of ostentation, that people came to him when they wanted him to introduce them to philosophers, and he used to bring them along. So well did he submit to being overlooked. And if talk about some philosophic principle arises among laymen, keep silence for the most part, for there is great danger that you will spew up immediately what you have not digested.

¹ The implication must be that a hurried bath, like a hurried shave, is apt to leave something to be desired.
That is, in cold weather (see III. 12, 2 and 10), because this takes a person out of doors where people can see him.

2 See III. 12, 17, and note.
So when a man tells you that you know nothing, and you, like Socrates, are not hurt, then rest assured that you are making a beginning with the business you have undertaken. For sheep, too, do not bring their fodder to the shepherds and show how much they have eaten, but they digest their food within them, and on the outside produce wool and milk. And so do you, therefore, make no display to the laymen of your philosophical principles, but let them see the results which come from these principles when digested.

47. When you have become adjusted to simple living in regard to your bodily wants, do not preen yourself about the accomplishment; and so likewise, if you are a water-drinker, do not on every occasion say that you are a water-drinker. And if ever you want to train to develop physical endurance, do it by yourself and not for outsiders to behold; do not throw your arms around statues, but on occasion, when you are very thirsty, take cold water into your mouth, and then spit it out, without telling anybody.

48. This is the position and character of a layman: He never looks for either help or harm from himself, but only from externals. This is the position and character of the philosopher: He looks for all his help or harm from himself.

Signs of one who is making progress are: He censures no one, praises no one, blames no one, finds fault with no one, says nothing about himself as though he were somebody or knew something. When he is hampered or prevented, he blames himself. And if anyone compliments him, he smiles to himself at the person complimenting; while if anyone censures him, he makes no defence. He goes
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σι δὲ καθάπερ οἱ ἀρρωστοί, εὐλαβοῦμενός τι κινήσαι τῶν καθισταμένων, πρὶν πῆξιν λαβεῖν. 3 ὁρεῖν ἀπασαν ἤρκεν ἐξ ἕαυτοῦ· τὴν δ' ἐκκλίσιν εἰς μόνα τὰ παρὰ φύσιν τῶν ἑφ' ἡμῖν μετατέθεικεν. ὀρμὴ πρὸς ἀπαντὰ ἀνειμένη χρῆται. ἂν ἥλιθιος ἡ ἀμαθὴς δοκῇ, οὐ πεφρόντικεν. ἐνὶ τε λόγῳ, ὡς ἔχθρον ἕαυτὸν παραφυλάσσει καὶ ἐπιβουλοῦ.

c. 49. Ὁταν τις ἐπὶ τῷ νοεῖν καὶ ἔξηγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι τὰ Χρύσιτππον βιβλία σεμνύνηται, λέγει αὐτὸς πρὸς ἕαυτὸν ὅτι "εἰ μὴ Χρύσιτππος ἄσαφὸς ἐγεγράφει, οὐδὲν ἂν εἰχεν οὕτος, ἐφ' ὃ ἐσεμνύνετο."

'Εγὼ δὲ τί βούλομαι; καταμαθεῖν τὴν φύσιν καὶ ταύτη ἐπεσθαί. ξητῶ οὖν, τίς ἐστὶν ὁ ἔξηγούμενος· καὶ ἀκούσας, ὅτι Χρύσιτππος, ἔρχομαι πρὸς αὐτὸν. ἀλλ' οὐ νοῶ τὰ γεγραμμένα· ξητῶ οὖν τὸν ἔξηγοὺμενον. καὶ μέχρι τούτων οὕτω σεμνῶ σεμνῶν οὐδέν. ὅταν δὲ εὐρῶ τὸν ἔξηγούμενον, ἀπολείπεται χρῆσθαι τοῖς παρηγγελμένοις· τοῦτο αὐτὸ μόνον σεμνὸν ἐστὶν. ἂν δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ἔξηγεῖσθαι θαυμάσω, τί ἄλλο ἡ γραμματικὸς ἀπετελέσθην ἀντὶ φιλοσοφοῦ; πλὴν γε δὴ ὅτι ἀντὶ Ὁμήρου Χρύσιτππον ἔξηγούμενος. μᾶλλον οὖν, ὅταν τις εὐπη μοι "ἐπανάγωρθε μοι Ἐρνίαν Χρύσιτππον," ἐρυθρῶ, ὅταν μὴ δύνωμαι ὀμοίᾳ τὰ ἔργα καὶ σύμφωνα ἐπιδεικνύειν τοὺς λόγους.

c. 50. Ὅσα προτίθεται, τούτοις ὡς νόμοις, ὡς

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1 In A alone.
about like an invalid, being careful not to disturb, before it has grown firm, any part which is getting well. He has put away from himself his every desire, and has transferred his aversion to those things only, of what is under our control, which are contrary to nature. He exercises no pronounced choice in regard to anything. If he gives the appearance of being foolish or ignorant he does not care. In a word, he keeps guard against himself as though he were his own enemy lying in wait.

49. When a person gives himself airs because he can understand and interpret the books of Chrysippus, say to yourself, "If Chrysippus had not written obscurely, this man would have nothing about which to give himself airs."

But what is it I want? To learn nature and to follow her. I seek, therefore, someone to interpret her; and having heard that Chrysippus does so, I go to him. But I do not understand what he has written; I seek, therefore, the person who interprets Chrysippus. And down to this point there is nothing to justify pride. But when I find the interpreter, what remains is to put his precepts into practice; this is the only thing to be proud about. If, however, I admire the mere act of interpretation, what have I done but turned into a grammarian instead of a philosopher? The only difference, indeed, is that I interpret Chrysippus instead of Homer. Far from being proud, therefore, when somebody says to me, "Read me Chrysippus," I blush the rather, when I am unable to show him such deeds as match and harmonize with his words.

50. Whatever principles are set before you, stand fast by these like laws, feeling that it would be
άσεβήσων, ἂν παραβησε, ἐμενε. ὁ τι δ' ἂν ἐρή
tις περὶ σου, μὴ ἐπιστρέφου. τούτο γὰρ οὐκ ἐτ'
ἔστι σοῦ.

1 c. 51. Εἰς ποιον ἕτι χρόνον ἀναβάλλῃ τὸ τῶν
βελτίστων ἁξιῶν σεαυτὸν καὶ ἐν μηδεὶ παρα-
βαίνειν τὸν διαφοροῦντα λόγον; παρεῖληφας τὰ
θεωρήματα, οἷς ἐδει σε συμβάλλειν, καὶ συμβε-
βληκας. ποιον οὖν ἕτι διδάσκαλον προσδοκᾶς,
ίνα εἰς ἐκεῖνον ὑπερθῇ τὴν ἐπανόρθωσιν ποιήσαι
τὴν σεαυτοῦ; οὐκ ἔτι εἰ μειράκιον, ἀλλὰ ἀνὴρ
ἡδη τέλειος. ἄν νῦν ἀμελήσῃς καὶ ῥαθυμήσῃς
καὶ ἀεὶ προθέσεις ἐκ προθέσεως ποιήσαι καὶ
ἡμέρας ἀλλας ἐπ' ἀλλαις ὀρίζῃς, μεθ' ἂς προ-
σέεις σεαυτῷ, λήεις σεαυτὸν οὐ προκόψας,
ἀλλ' ἱδιώτης διατελέσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ ἀποθυμῆσκων.

2 ἡδη οὖν ἁξίωσον σεαυτὸν βιοῦν ὡς τέλειον καὶ
προκόπτοντα: καὶ πάν τὸ βέλτιστον φαινόμενον
ἐστω σοι νόμος ἀπαράβατος. καὶ ἐπίπονον τι
ἡ ἢδυ ἢ ἐνδοξον ἢ ἀδοξον προσάγηται, μέμνησο,
ὅτι νῦν ὁ ἄγων καὶ ἡδη πάρουτα τὰ Ὀλύμπια καὶ
οὐκ ἐστιν ἀναβάλλεσθαι οὐκέτι καὶ ὅτι
παρὰ μίαν ἡμέραν καὶ ἔν πρᾶγμα καὶ
ἀπόλλυται
3 προκοπὴ καὶ σφίζεται. Σωκράτης οὐτως ἀπε-
τελέσθη, ἐπι πάντων τῶν προσαγομένων αὐτῷ
μηδενὶ ἀλλῳ προσέχων ἢ τῶ λόγω. σὺ δὲ εἰ καὶ
μήπω εἰ Σωκράτης, ὡς Σωκράτης γε εἶναι βουλο-
μενος οφείλεις βιοῦν.

1 A un., Nil.: ὑπερθέσεις the other MSS.
2 A un., Nil.: ὑπερθέσεως (—εως) the other MSS.
3 Nil.: ποιής Ench.
4 C (several), Nil.: ἐτι the other MSS.
5 ἡμέραν καὶ ἐν πρᾶγμα Simpl.: ἡτταν καὶ ἐνδοσιν Ench.
6 C un., Nil., Simpl.: ἡ the other MSS. (except in the
second case ἡ καὶ B Δ sing.).
impiety for you to transgress them. But pay no attention to what somebody says about you, for this is, at length, not under your control.

51. How long will you still wait to think yourself worthy of the best things, and in nothing to transgress against the distinctions set up by the reason? You have received the philosophical principles which you ought to accept, and you have accepted them. What sort of a teacher, then, do you still wait for, that you should put off reforming yourself until he arrives? You are no longer a lad, but already a full-grown man. If you are now neglectful and easy-going, and always making one delay after another, and fixing first one day and then another, after which you will pay attention to yourself, then without realizing it you will make no progress, but, living and dying, will continue to be a layman throughout. Make up your mind, therefore, before it is too late, that the fitting thing for you to do is to live as a mature man who is making progress, and let everything which seems to you to be best be for you a law that must not be transgressed. And if you meet anything that is laborious, or sweet, or held in high repute, or in no repute, remember that now is the contest, and here before you are the Olympic games, and that it is impossible to delay any longer, and that it depends on a single day and a single action, whether progress is lost or saved. This is the way Socrates became what he was, by paying attention to nothing but his reason in everything that he encountered. And even if you are not yet a Socrates, still you ought to live as one who wishes to be a Socrates.

7 τῶν προσάγομένων αὐτῷ Meibom: προσάγων ἑαυτῶν Ench.
1. c. 52. 'Ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ἀναγκαίωτατος τόπος ἔστιν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ὁ τῆς χρήσεως τῶν θεωρημάτων, οἷον τὸ ¹ μὴ ψευδεσθαι: ὁ δεύτερος ὁ τῶν ἀποδείξεων, οἷον πόθεν ὦτι οὐ δεῖ ψευδεσθαι; τρίτος ὁ αὐτῶν τούτων βεβαιωτικὸς καὶ διαρθρωτικὸς, οἷον πόθεν ὦτι τούτο ἀποδείξεις; τί γὰρ ἔστιν ἀποδείξεις, τί ἀκολουθία, τί μάχη, τί ἀληθεία,
2. τί ψεύδος; οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν τρίτος τόπος ἀναγκαῖος διὰ τὸν δεύτερον, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος διὰ τὸν πρῶτον ὁ δὲ ἀναγκαίωτατος καὶ ὁποῖον ἀναπαύεσθαι δεῖ, ὁ πρῶτος. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐμπαλίν ποιοῦμεν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ τρίτῳ τόπῳ διατρίβομεν καὶ περὶ ἐκείνον ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἡ πάσα σπουδή· τοῦ δὲ πρῶτου παντελῶς ἀμελοῦμεν. τοιούτῳ ψευδόμεθα μὲν, πῶς δὲ ἀποδείκνυται ὦτι οὐ δεῖ ψευδεσθαι, πρόχειρον ἔχομεν.

1. c. 53. Ἐπὶ παντὸς πρόχειρα ἐκτέον ² ταῦτα: ἀγοῦ δὲ ³ μ', ὁ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ γ' ⁴ ἡ Πεπρωμένη, ὁποῖο ποθ' ἡμῖν εἰμί διαταγμένοι: ῥος ἐψομαί γ' ἄδοκνοι· ἤν δὲ γε μὴ θέλω, κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἤττον ἐψομαι.


"ἐμὲ δὲ "Ἀνυτός καὶ Μέλητος ⁶ ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν δύνανται, βλάψαι δὲ οὐ."  

¹ C un., and perhaps Simpl.: ὁ τοῦ the other MSS.
² C nonn., Par., Simpl.: εἰκτέον the other MSS.
³ Meibom (from the Disc.): ἀγε δὴ με Ench.
⁴ Meibom (from s in three of the four quotations in the Disc.): καί A un., and S generally. The other MSS. omit.
⁵ C nonn., Plutarch: θεῖα the other MSS. ⁶ Μέλητος MSS.
52. The first and most necessary division in philosophy is that which has to do with the application of the principles, as, for example, Do not lie. The second deals with the demonstrations, as, for example, How comes it that we ought not to lie? The third confirms and discriminates between these processes, as, for example, How does it come that this is a proof? For what is a proof, what is logical consequence, what contradiction, what truth, what falsehood? Therefore, the third division is necessary because of the second, and the second because of the first; while the most necessary of all, and the one in which we ought to rest, is the first. But we do the opposite; for we spend our time in the third division, and all our zeal is devoted to it, while we utterly neglect the first. Wherefore, we lie, indeed, but are ready with the arguments which prove that one ought not to lie.

53. Upon every occasion we ought to have the following thoughts at our command:

Lead thou me on, O Zeus, and Destiny,
To that goal long ago to me assigned.
I'll follow and not falter; if my will
Prove weak and craven, still I'll follow on.¹

"Whoso has rightly with necessity complied,
We count him wise, and skilled in things divine."²

"Well, O Crito, if so it is pleasing to the gods, so let it be."³

"Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but they cannot hurt me."⁴

¹ From Cleanthes. See note on II. 23, 42.
² Euripides, frag. 965 Nauck.
³ Plato, Crito, 43 D (slightly modified).
⁴ Plato, Apology, 30 C–D (somewhat modified).
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