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PLATO

CHARMIDES  ALCIBIADES I AND II
HIPPARCHUS  THE LOVERS
THEAGES    MINOS    EPINOMIS
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PREFACE

The Greek text in this volume is based on the recension of Schanz, except in the cases of the Minos and the Epinomis, where it follows in the main the text of C. F. Hermann. Emendations accepted from modern scholars are noted as they occur.

The special introductions are intended merely to prepare the reader for the general character and purpose of each dialogue.

W. R. M. LAMB.
Plato was born in 427 B.C. of Athenian parents who could provide him with the best education of the day, and ample means and leisure throughout his life. He came to manhood in the dismal close of the Peloponnesian War, when Aristophanes was at the height of his success, and Sophocles and Euripides had produced their last plays. As a boy he doubtless heard the lectures of Gorgias, Protagoras, and other sophists, and his early bent seems to have been towards poetry. But his intelligence was too progressive to rest in the agnostic position on which the sophistic culture was based. A century before, Heracleitus had declared knowledge to be impossible, because the objects of sense are continually changing; yet now a certain Cratylus was trying to build a theory of knowledge over the assertion of flux, by developing some hints let fall by its oracular author about the truth contained in names. From this influence Plato passed into contact with Socrates, whose character and gifts have left a singular impress on the thought of mankind. This effect is almost wholly due to Plato's applications and extensions of
his master's thought; since, fortunately for us, the pupil not only became a teacher in his turn, but brought his artistic genius into play, and composed the memorials of philosophic talk which we know as the Dialogues. Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Aeschines were other disciples of Socrates who drew similar sketches of his teaching: the suggestion came from the "mimes" of the Syracusan Sophron, —realistic studies of conversation between ordinary types of character. As Plato became more engrossed in the Socratic speculations, this artistic impulse was strengthened by the desire of recording each definite stage of thought as a basis for new discussion and advance.

When Plato was twenty years old, Socrates was over sixty, and had long been notorious in Athens for his peculiar kind of sophistry. In the Phaedo he tells how he tried, in his youth, the current scientific explanations of the universe, and found them full of puzzles. He then met with the theory of Anaxagoras,—that the cause of everything is "mind." This was more promising: but it led nowhere after all, since it failed to rise above the conception of physical energy; this "mind" showed no intelligent aim. Disappointed of an assurance that the universe works for the best, Socrates betook himself to the plan of making definitions of "beautiful," "good," "large," and so on, as qualities observed in the several classes of beautiful, good and large material things, and then employing these propositions, if they
appeared to be sound, for the erection of higher hypotheses. The point is that he made a new science out of a recognized theory of "ideas" or "forms," which had come of reflecting on the quality predicated when we say "this man is good," and which postulates some sure reality behind the fleeting objects of sense. His "hypothetical" method, familiar to mathematicians, attains its full reach and significance in the Republic.

The Pythagoreans who appear in the intimate scene of the Phaedo were accustomed to the theory of ideas, and were a fit audience for the highest reasonings of Socrates on the true nature of life and the soul. For some years before the master's death (399 B.C.) Plato, if not a member of their circle, was often a spell-bound hearer of the "satyr." But ordinary Athenians had other views of Socrates, which varied according to their age and the extent of their acquaintanceship with him. Aristophanes' burlesque in the Clouds (423 B.C.) had left a common impression not unlike what we have of the King of Laputa. Yet the young men who had any frequent speech with him in his later years, while they felt there was something uncanny about him, found an irresistible attraction in his simple manner, his humorous insight into their ways and thoughts, and his fervent eloquence on the principles of their actions and careers. He kept no school, and took no fees; he distrusted the pretensions of the regular sophists, with whom he was carelessly confounded; moreover, he professed
to have no knowledge himself, except so far as to know that he was ignorant. The earliest Dialogues, such as the Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Charmides, Laches, and Lysis, show the manner in which he performed his ministry. In rousing men, especially those whose minds were fresh, to the need of knowing themselves, he promoted the authority of the intellect, the law of definite individual knowledge, above all reason of state or tie of party; and it is not surprising that his city, in the effort of recovering her political strength, decided to hush such an inconvenient voice. He must have foreseen his fate, but he continued his work undeterred.

Though he seems, in his usual talk, to have professed no positive doctrine, there were one or two beliefs which he frequently declared. Virtue, he said, is knowledge; for each man's good is his happiness, and once he knows it clearly, he needs must choose to ensue it. Further, this knowledge is innate in our minds, and we only need to have it awakened and exercised by "dialectic," or a systematic course of question and answer. He also believed his mission to be divinely ordained, and asserted that his own actions were guided at times by the prohibitions of a "spiritual sign." He was capable, as we find in the Symposium, of standing in rapt meditation at any moment for some time, and once for as long as twenty-four hours.

It is clear that, if he claimed no comprehensive theory of existence, and although his ethical reliance xii
on knowledge, if he never analysed it, leaves him in a very crude stage of psychology, his logical and mystical suggestions must have led his favourite pupils a good way towards a new system of metaphysics. These intimates learnt, as they steeped their minds in his, and felt the growth of a unique affection amid the glow of enlightenment, that happiness may be elsewhere than in our dealings with the material world, and that the mind has prerogatives and duties far above the sphere of civic life.

After the death of Socrates in 399, Plato spent some twelve years in study and travel. For the first part of this time he was perhaps at Megara, where Eucleides, his fellow-student and friend, was forming a school of dialectic. Here he may have composed some of the six Dialogues already mentioned as recording Socrates' activity in Athens. Towards and probably beyond the end of this period, in order to present the Socratic method in bolder conflict with sophistic education, he wrote the Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, and Gorgias. These works show a much greater command of dramatic and literary art, and a deeper interest in logic. The last of them may well be later than 387, the year in which, after an all but disastrous attempt to better the mind of Dionysius of Syracuse, he returned to Athens, and, now forty years of age, founded the Academy; where the memory of his master was to be perpetuated by continuing and expanding the
Socratic discussions among the elect of the new generation. The rivalry of this private college with the professional school of Isocrates is discernible in the subject and tone of the *Gorgias*. Plato carried on the direction of the Academy till his death, at eighty-one, in 346; save that half-way through this period (367) he accepted the invitation of his friend Dion to undertake the instruction of the younger Dionysius at Syracuse. The elder tyrant had been annoyed by the Socratic freedom of Plato's talk: now it was a wayward youth who refused the yoke of a systematic training. What that training was like we see in the *Republic*, where true political wisdom is approached by an arduous ascent through mathematics, logic, and metaphysics. Plato returned, with less hopes of obtaining the ideal ruler, to make wonderful conquests in the realm of thought.

The *Meno* and *Gorgias* set forth the doctrine that knowledge of right is latent in our minds: dialectic, not the rhetoric of the schools, is the means of eliciting it. The method, as Plato soon perceived, must be long and difficult: but he felt a mystical rapture over its certainty, which led him to picture the immutable "forms" as existing in a world of their own. This feeling, and the conviction whence it springs—that knowledge is somehow possible, had come to the front of his mind when he began to know Socrates. Two brilliant compositions, the *Cratylus* and *Symposium*, display the strength of the conviction, and then, the noble fervour of the
feeling. In the latter of these works, the highest powers of imaginative sympathy and eloquence are summoned to unveil the sacred vision of absolute beauty. The *Phaedo* turns the logical theory upon the soul, which is seen to enjoy, when freed from the body, familiar cognition of the eternal types of being. Here Orphic dogma lends its aid to the Socratic search for knowledge, while we behold an inspiring picture of the philosopher in his hour of death.

With increasing confidence in himself as the successor of Socrates, Plato next undertook, in the *Republic*, to show the master meeting his own unsatisfied queries on education and politics. We read now of a "form" of good to which all thought and action aspire, and which, contemplated in itself, will explain not merely why justice is better than injustice, but the meaning and aim of everything. In order that man may be fully understood, we are to view him "writ large" in the organization of an ideal state. The scheme of description opens out into many subsidiary topics, including three great proposals already known to Greece,—the abolition of private property, the community of women and children, and the civic equality of the sexes. But the central subject is the preparation of the philosopher, through a series of ancillary sciences, for dialectic; so that, once possessed of the supreme truth, he may have light for directing his fellow-men. As in the *Phaedo*, the spell of mythical revelation is
brought to enhance the discourse of reason. The *Phaedrus* takes up the subject of rhetoric, to lead us allegorically into the realm of "ideas," and thence to point out a new rhetoric, worthy of the well-trained dialectician. We get also a glimpse of the philosopher's duty of investigating the mutual relations of the "forms" to which his study of particular things has led him.

A closer interest in logical method, appearing through his delight in imaginative construction, is one distinctive mark of this middle stage in Plato's teaching. As he passes to the next two Dialogues, the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*, he puts off the aesthetic rapture, and considers the ideas as categories of thought which require co-ordination. The discussion of knowledge in the former makes it evident that the Academy was now the meeting-place of vigorous minds, some of which were eager to urge or hear refuted the doctrines they had learnt from other schools of thought; while the arguments are conducted with a critical caution very different from the brilliant and often hasty zeal of Socrates. The *Parmenides* corrects an actual or possible misconception of the theory of ideas in the domain of logic, showing perhaps how Aristotle, now a youthful disciple of Plato, found fault with the theory as he understood it. The forms are viewed in the light of the necessities of thought: knowledge is to be attained by a careful practice which will raise our minds to the vision of all parti-
culars in their rightly distinguished and connected classes.

Plato is here at work on his own great problem:—If what we know is a single permanent law under which a multitude of things are ranged, what is the link between the one and the many? The *Sophist* contains some of his ripest thought on this increasingly urgent question: his confident advance beyond Socratic teaching is indicated by the literary form, which hardly disguises the continuous exposition of a lecture. We observe an attention to physical science, the association of soul, motion, and existence, and the comparative study of being and not-being. The *Politicus* returns to the topic of state-government, and carries on the process of acquiring perfect notions of reality by the classification of things. Perhaps we should see in the absolute "mean" which is posited as the standard of all arts, business, and conduct, a contribution from Aristotle. The *Philebus*, in dealing with pleasure and knowledge, dwells further on the correct division and classification required if our reason, as it surely must, is to apprehend truth. The method is becoming more thorough and more complex, and Plato's hope of bringing it to completion is more remote. But he is gaining a clearer insight into the problem of unity and plurality.

The magnificent myth of the *Timaeus*, related by a Pythagorean, describes the structure of the universe, so as to show how the One manifests
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

itself as the Many. We have here the latest reflections of Plato on space, time, soul, and many physical matters. In the lengthy treatise of the Laws, he addresses himself to the final duty of the philosopher as announced in the Republic: a long habituation to abstract thought will qualify rather than disqualify him for the practical regulation of public and private affairs. Attention is fixed once more on soul, as the energy of the world and the vehicle of our sovereign reason.

Thus Plato maintains the fixity of the objects of knowledge in a great variety of studies, which enlarge the compass of Socrates' teaching till it embraces enough material for complete systems of logic and metaphysics. How far these systems were actually worked out in the discussions of the Academy we can only surmise from the Dialogues themselves and a careful comparison of Aristotle; whose writings, however, have come down to us in a much less perfect state. But it seems probable that, to the end, Plato was too fertile in thought to rest content with one authoritative body of doctrine. We may be able to detect in the Timaeus a tendency to view numbers as the real principles of things; and we may conjecture a late-found interest in the physical complexion of the world. As a true artist, with a keen sense of the beauty and stir of life, Plato had this interest, in a notable degree, throughout: but in speaking of his enthusiasm for science we must regard him rather as a great inventor of
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

sciences than as what we should now call a scientist. This is giving him a splendid name, which few men have earned. Some of his inventions may be unrealizable, but it is hard to find one that is certainly futile. There are flaws in his arguments: to state them clearly and fairly is to win the privilege of taking part in a discussion at the Academy.

W. R. M. Lamb.

[Note.—Each of the Dialogues is a self-contained whole. The order in which they have been mentioned in this Introduction is that which agrees best in the main with modern views of Plato’s mental progress, though the succession in some instances is uncertain.]
The following give useful accounts of Socratic and Platonic thought:—


The following are important editions:—


" " *The Gorgias*. Bell, 1871.


" " *The Timaeus*. Macmillan, 1888.


INTRODUCTION TO THE CHARMIDES

The subject of this dialogue is the virtue whose various aspects we may approach in English with the words "temperance," "sobriety," "moderation," or "discretion," but for which our language, after centuries of analysis and definition have narrowed the application of ethical terms, has now no constant equivalent. The first of these words, "temperance," has been used throughout the present translation; but it is necessary to note that the intellectual element in the Greek virtue of "temperance" is not only recognizable from the beginning of the conversation, but increasingly prominent as the argument proceeds. The Greeks always tended to regard a moral quality as a state of the reasoning mind; and Socrates' particular treatment of "temperance" in this discussion implies that he and his circle were even inclined to identify it with a kind of practical wisdom or prudence.¹ An attentive reader will find no difficulty in perceiving the salient features of "temperance"—a distinct understanding of it as a whole is just what the speakers themselves are seeking—at each turn of the conversation.

¹ σωφροσύνη, indeed, though it came to mean something like our "temperance," originally meant "soundness of mind," "wholeness or health of the faculty of thought (φρονεῖν)."
PLATO

The handsome youth Charmides, whom Socrates meets in a wrestling-school at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (432 B.C.), traces his descent through his father Glaucon to Dropides, a friend and kinsman of Solon; his mother was a sister of Pyrilampes, who was noted for his stature and beauty. Critias, son of Glaucon's brother Callaeschrus, and thus first cousin to Charmides, is a man of mature age, for he appears as his cousin's guardian: he became famous, or rather infamous, later on as one of the Thirty Tyrants; and together with Charmides he fell fighting for despotism against democracy in 404 B.C. But of these grim and dismal doings, which filled Plato (then a youth of twenty-three) with a horror of Athenian politics as conceived and conducted at that time, there is no hint in this brilliant scene of healthful training and ingenuous debate. Plato's own mother, Perictione, was Charmides' sister, and he seems to record here with unmixed pride the goodly connexions of his family, from the standpoint of that earlier time of his childhood. He chooses his uncle Charmides as offering a likely instance, in the flower of his youth, of a healthy, well-conditioned mind in a handsome, well-developed body.

As soon as Socrates catches sight of the youth, he is fired with admiration of his grace. But the serious interest of Socrates is fixed, as ever, on the mind of this attractive person, and he proceeds at once to question him on the state of his "soul" and the nature of that "temperance" which is necessary for the well-being of the whole human organism. Two suggestions of Charmides—that temperance is a quiet or sedate kind of conduct,
and that it is a feeling of modesty—are in turn disproved by Socrates; a third definition, supported by and apparently derived from Critias—that it is doing one’s own business—leads Socrates to insist, in his habitual way, on the importance of knowing what one is doing, with the result that Critias gives a fourth definition—self-knowledge (164-5). Socrates tries to find out what exactly is the thing known by means of temperance, and so procured by it, as health is by medicine and buildings by architecture. Critias replies that temperance is distinguished from all other kinds of knowledge by being the science of all the sciences, including itself (166). But Socrates shows the difficulty of conceiving of any function or faculty as applied to itself; it seems to require some separate object (168-9). He doubts, therefore, if there can be such cognition of cognition; and even supposing this is possible, how about cognition of non-cognition, which was a part of the suggested nature of temperance (169)? But altogether this view of the matter is too aridly intellectual, and of no practical value, for it fails to include a knowledge of what will be beneficial or useful (172-3). We find that what we really require is a knowledge of good and evil (174), and it does not appear that temperance is anything like this at all. In the end, we are not only left without a satisfactory answer to our question, but have rashly hazarded some improbable statements by the way.

Such is the bare outline of this interesting, if inconclusive, discussion. Plato’s main object in composing the dialogue was to exhibit and recommend the process of attaining, or endeavouring to
attain, a clear notion of an ordinary moral quality; and as the difficulties accumulate, he takes the opportunity of enforcing his master's tenet that all human virtue and well-being must be based on knowledge. Our curiosity is first started in one direction, and then whetted and turned in another. The seemingly profitless search is so conducted that we are drawn, as audience of the little drama, to partake in a clarifying exercise of the mind, and we come away eager to analyse and refine our moral ideals. The need of understanding and coordinating the fundamental conceptions and conventions of society is the dominant theme of Plato's earlier writings: the scene and subject of each conversation are in effect quite casual, and the efforts of the speakers have no relation to what they may have said yesterday or may say to-morrow. Thus the suggestion (161 c), that temperance is "doing one's own business," is treated here as a puzzling riddle, and is lightly dismissed with some unfair play with the scope of the word "doing": whereas this very suggestion is seriously advanced in the Republic (433, 496, 550) as a definition of justice. In the same way "self-knowledge" (another definition of temperance) is here pronounced to be impossible, and even if possible, useless (166): but elsewhere we often find Plato insisting, with earnest eloquence, on the necessity and high value of self-knowledge. In the Charmides, however, Socrates does not stay to develop that familiar theme: for the moment he is only concerned to point out a difficulty involved in the suggestion as applied to temperance. Where he does come to an expectant pause, and hints at the
right direction for further progress in the search, is in the demand for a cognition of good and evil (174), although this happens to be outside the supposed limits of temperance. The train of reasoning here is briefly this: granted that knowledge must be a main constituent of the virtue of temperance, such knowledge cannot merely act or revolve upon itself; it must have relation to some external sphere, and what we require is a knowledge of good and evil in the ends or aims of our conduct, superior to any particular knowledge or science pursued in our ordinary practical life. This division of sciences into the theoretical and the practical is resumed in the Gorgias. It is only just mentioned here, and so far “the good” is nothing more august or important than the Socratic conception of “the useful.”

We may perhaps regret that in disposing of Charmides’ first suggestion Socrates commits the logical blunder of arguing that, because temperance and quickness are both honourable, therefore quickness is temperate (159 d). No doubt Charmides’ failure to protest at this point was brought out in discussion at the Academy. Plato would perhaps excuse himself by saying that when he wrote the Charmides he was more intent on intellectual drama than on logical accuracy. He has certainly displayed remarkable skill in bringing out the two characters of Charmides and Critias in the natural course of the conversation; and it is worth observing, besides, how the vividness of his portraiture serves to emphasize, by contrast, the impersonal, dispassionate nature of reason and truth (166 c, 175 d).
ΧΑΡΜΙΔΗΣ

[ Η ΠΕΡΙ ΣΩΦΡΟΣΥΝΗΣ· ΠΕΙΡΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ, ΚΡΙΤΙΑΣ, ΧΑΡΜΙΔΗΣ

St. Π. p. 153

"Ήκομεν τῇ πρωτεραίᾳ ἐσπέρας ἐκ Ποτειδαίας ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, οἶδον δὲ διὰ χρόνου ἀφιγμένος ἁμένως ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς συνήθεις διατριβὰς. καὶ δὴ καὶ εἰς τὴν Ταυρέου παλαιστραν τὴν καταντικρὺ τοῦ τῆς Βασίλης ἱεροῦ εἰσῆλθον, καὶ αὐτόθι κατέλαβον πάνω πολλοὺς, τοὺς μὲν καὶ ἀγνώτας ἐμοὶ, τοὺς δὲ πλείστους γνωρίμους. καὶ με ὡς Βείδου εἰσίωντα ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου, εὐθὺς πόρρουθεν ἡσπάζοντο ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν. Χαίρεφῶν δὲ, ἃτε καὶ μανικὸς ὡν, ἀναπηδήσας ἐκ μέσων ἔθει πρὸς με, καὶ μου λαβόμενον τῆς χειρὸς, Ἡ σῶκρατε, ἢ δ’ ὅσ, πῶς ἐσώζῃ ἐκ τῆς μάχης; ὁλίγον δὲ πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀπιέναι μάχη ἐγεγονεὶ ἐν τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ, ἣν ἀρτι ἦσαν οἱ τῇδε πεπυσμένοι."

1 A Corinthian colony in Chalcidice which was a tributary ally of Athens, and revolted from her in 433 B.C. In the next year an Athenian force met and fought a Peloponnesian force at Potidaea, and then laid siege to the city. Thus began the Peloponnesian War.
CHARMIDES
[or ON TEMPERANCE: TENTATIVE]

CHARACTERS
SOCRATES, CHAEREPHON, CRITIAS, CHARMIDES

We arrived yesterday evening from the army at Potidaea,1 and I sought with delight, after an absence of some time, my wonted conversations. Accordingly I went into the wrestling-school of Taureas,2 opposite the Queen’s shrine,3 and there I came upon quite a number of people, some of whom were unknown to me, but most of whom I knew. And as soon as they saw me appear thus unexpectedly, they hailed me from a distance on every side; but Chaerephon, like the mad creature that he is, jumped up from their midst and ran to me, and grasping me by the hand—

Socrates, he said, how did you survive the battle? (Shortly before we came away there had been a battle at Potidaea, of which the people here had only just had news.)

1 A professional trainer.
2 There was a shrine of Basile, or the Queen (of whom nothing is known), some way to the south of the Acropolis. Cf. Frazer, Pausanias, ii. p. 203.
PLATO

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Καὶ ἐγὼ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκρινόμενος, Οὐτωσί, ἔφην, ὡς σὺ ὄρας.

Καὶ μὴν ἦγγελται γε δεῦρο, ἔφη, ἢ τε μάχῃ πάνυ

C ἵσχυρὰ γεγονέναι καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ πολλοὺς τῶν γυνώριμων
tεθνάναι.

Καὶ ἐπιεικῶς, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἀληθῆ ἀπήγγελται.

Παρεγένου μὲν, ἢ δ’ ὅς, τῇ μάχῃ;

Παρεγενόμην.

Δεῦρο δὴ, ἔφη, καθεξήμονος ἠμῖν διήγησαι· οὐ
gάρ τι πως πάντα σαφῶς πεπύσμεθα. καὶ ἡμα με
καθιέραι ἄγων παρὰ Κριτίαν τὸν Καλλαίσχρον.

παρακαθεξήμονος οὖν ἡσπαζόμην τὸν τε Κριτίαν
cαι τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ διηγούμην αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀπὸ

στρατοπέδου, ὃ τι μὲ τις ἀνέροιτο· ἤρωτων δὲ

ἄλλος ἄλλο.

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D 'Εστι δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἢδην εἰχόμεν, αὐθίς
ἐγὼ αὐτοὺς ἀνηρῶτων τὰ τῇδε, περὶ φιλοσοφίας

ὅπως ἔχου τὰ νῦν, περὶ τε τῶν νέων, εἰ τίνες ἐν

αὐτοῖς διαφέροντες ἡ σοφία ἡ κάλλει ἡ ἀμφοτέρους

ἐγγεγονότες εἶν. καὶ ὁ Κριτίας ἀποβλέψας πρὸς

τὴν θύραν, ἰδὼν τινας νεανίσκους εἰσύντας καὶ

λοιδορομένους ἀλλήλους καὶ ἄλλον ὄχλον ὑποσθεν

ἐπόμενον. Περὶ μὲν τῶν καλῶν, ἔφη, Ὁ Σώκρατες,

αὐτίκα μοι δοκεῖς εἴσεσθαι· οὔτω γὰρ τυγχάνονον

οἱ εἰσώντες πρόδρομοι τε καὶ ἔρασται ὅντες τοῦ

δοκοῦντος καλλότοι εἶναι τὰ γε δὴ νῦν· φαίνεται

dὲ μοι καὶ αὐτῶς ἐγγὺς ἥδη που εἶναι προσιών.

'Εστι δὲ, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, τίς τε καὶ τοῦ;

Οἰσθά που σοῦ γε, ἔφη, ἀλλ’ οὕτω ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ἢν

πρὶν σὲ ἀπείναι, Χαρμίδην τὸν τοῦ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ

Β ἢμετέρου θείου νῦν, ἔμοι δὲ ἀνεφίον.

Οἰδα μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ· οὐ γάρ τι φαύλος
CHARMIDES

In the state in which you see me, I replied.
It has been reported here, you know, said he, that
the battle was very severe, and that many of our
acquaintance have lost their lives in it.
Then the report, I replied, is pretty near the truth.
You were present, he asked, at the fighting?
I was present.
Then sit down here, he said, and give us a full
account; for as yet we have had no clear report of
it all. And with that he led me to a seat by Critias,
son of Callaeschrus. So I sat down there and greeted
Critias and the rest, and gave them all the news from
the battlefield, in answer to their various questions;
each had his inquiry to make.
When we had had enough of such matters, I in
my turn began to inquire about affairs at home, how
philosophy was doing at present, and whether any of
the rising young men had distinguished themselves
for wisdom or beauty or both. Then Critias, looking
towards the door, for he saw some young fellows who
were coming in with some railing at each other, and
a crowd of people following on behind them, said—
Concerning the beauties, Socrates, I expect you will
get your knowledge at once: for these who are
coming in are in fact forerunners and lovers of the
person who is held, for the moment at least, to be the
greatest beauty; and he himself, I imagine, must
by now be nearly upon us.
Who is he, I asked, and whose son?
You must know, he replied, but he was not yet
grown up when you went away,—Charmides, son of
our uncle Glaucon, and my cousin.
I do know, to be sure, I said; for he was not to
 PLATO

οὔδ' τότε ἦν ἔτη παῖς ὄν, νῦν δ' οἷμαι ποιν εὖ μάλα ἀν ἴδῃ μειράκιον εἴη.

Αὐτίκα, ἔφη, εἰσει καὶ ἡλίκος καὶ οἷος γέγονε, καὶ ἀμα ταῦτ' αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὁ Χαμίδης εἰσἐρχεται.

'Εμοι μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἐταίρε, οὔδ' εἰσει σταθμητον· ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ λευκὴ στάθμη εἰμὶ πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς· σχεδόν γὰρ τί μοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καλοὶ φαίνονται· ἀτὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τότε ἐκείνος ἐμοὶ

C θαυμαστὸς ἐφάνη τό τε μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος, οἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι πάντες ἔριν ἔμοιγεν ἐδόκουν αὐτοῦ· οὔτως εἰκεπληγμένω τε καὶ τεθορυβημένων ἦσαν, ἥνικ' εἰσήμεν πολλοὶ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι ἐρασταί καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὀπισθεν εἰποντο. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἠμέτερον τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἤττον θαυμαστὸν ἦν· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ καὶ τοῖς παιοι προσέχον τὸν νοῦν, ὡς οὔδεὶς ἄλλοις ἐβλεπεν αὐτῶν, οὐδ' ὅστις σμικρότατος ἦν, ἀλλά

D πάντες ὀσπερ ἰγαλμα ἐθεώντο αὐτόν. καὶ ὁ Χαμεφών καλέσας με, Τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ νεανίσκος, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες; οὐκ εὐπρόσωπος;

'Ὑπερψυόω, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ.

Οὔτος μέντοι, ἔφη, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἀποδύναι, δόξει σοι ἀπρόσωπος εἶναι: οὔτως τὸ εἶδος πάγκαλος ἔστιν.

Συνέφασαν οὖν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ταῦτα ταῦτα τῷ Χαμεφώντι· κἀγὼ, Ἡράκλεις, ἔφην, ὡς ἄμαχον λέγετε τὸν ἀνδρα, εἰ ἔτι αὐτῷ ἐν δὴ μόνον τυχάνει προσὸν σμικρὸν τι.

Τί; ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας.

E Εἰ τήν ψυχήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τυχάνει εὖ πεφυκώς. πρέπει δέ ποι, ὁ Κριτία, τοιούτον αὐτὸν εἰναι τῆς γε ὑμετέρας ὄντα οἰκίας.

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1 A white or uncoloured line was proverbially useless for
be despised even then, when he was still a child, and now, I suppose, he will be quite a youth by this time.

You will know this moment, he said, both how much and to what purpose he has grown. And just as he spoke these words, Charmides entered.

Now I, my good friend, am no measurer: I am a mere "white line" in measuring beautiful people, for almost everyone who has just grown up appears beautiful to me. Nay and this time, moreover, the young man appeared to me a marvel of stature and beauty; and all the rest, to my thinking, were in love with him, such was their astonishment and confusion when he came in, and a number of other lovers were following in his train. On the part of men like us it was not so surprising; but when I came to observe the boys I noticed that none of them, not even the smallest, had eyes for anything else, but that they all gazed at him as if he were a statue. Then Chaerephon called me and said—How does the youth strike you, Socrates? Has he not a fine face?

Immensely so, I replied.

Yet if he would consent to strip, he said, you would think he had no face, he has such perfect beauty of form.

And these words of Chaerephon were repeated by the rest. Then,—By Heracles! I said, what an irresistible person you make him out to be, if he has but one more thing—a little thing—besides.

What? said Critias.

If in his soul, I replied, he is of good grain. And I should think, Critias, he ought to be, since he is of your house.

marking off measurements on white stone or marble: cf. Soph. fr. 306.
'Αλλ’, ἔφη, πάνυ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ταῦτα.
Τί οὖν, ἔφην, οὐκ ἀπεδύσαμεν αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα πρὸτερον τοῦ εἴδους; πάντως γὰρ ποὺ τηλικοῦτος ὁν ὶδὴ ἔθελε διαλέγεσθαι.
Καὶ πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας, ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ ἐστὶ 155 φιλόσοφὸς τε καὶ, ὡς δοκεῖ ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἐαυτῷ, πάνυ ποιητικὸς.
Τοῦτο μὲν, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, ὦ φίλε Κριτία, πόρρωθεν ὁμίν τὸ καλὸν ὑπάρχει ἀπὸ τῆς Σόλωνος συγγενείας. ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἐπέδειξάς μοι τὸν νεανίαν καλέσας δεύρο; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ποὺ εἰ ἐτί ἐτύγχανεν νεώτερος ὃν, αἰσχρὸν ἂν ἢν αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἤμιν ἐναντίον γε σοῦ, ἐπιτρόπου τε ἄμα καὶ ἀνεψιοῦ ὄντος.
'Αλλὰ καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, καὶ καλοῦμεν αὐτῶν. Β καὶ ἄμα πρὸς τὸν ἀκόλουθον, Παί, ἔφη, κάλει Χαρμίδην, εἰπὼν ὅτι βούλομαι αὐτὸν ἰατρῷ συν- στήσαι περὶ τῆς ἀσθενείας ἢς πρώην πρὸς μὲ ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἀσθενοῖ. πρὸς οὖν ἔμε ὁ Κριτίας, Ἕναγχός τοι ἔφη βαρύνεσθαι τι τήν κεφαλὴν ἐωθεν ἀνοισάμενος· ἀλλὰ τί σε κωλύει προσποιήσασθαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπισταθήσαι τι κεφαλῆς φάρμακον;
Οὐδὲν, ἢν δ’ ἔγω· μόνον ἐλθέτων.
'Αλλ’ ἤξει, ἔφη.
Ὁ οὖν καὶ ἐγένετο. ἢ ἂν γὰρ, καὶ ἐποίησε γέ- λωτα πολὺν· ἐκαστὸς γὰρ ἰμῶν τῶν καθημένων συγχωρῶν τὸν πλησίον ἔσθει2 σπουδῇ, ἵνα παρ’ αὐτῶ καθέξωτο, ἐως τῶν ἐπ’ ἐσχάτω καθημένων τῶν μὲν ἀνεσθήσαμεν, τῶν δὲ πλάγιων κατεβάλαμεν. ὁ δ’ ἔλθων μεταξὺ ἔμοι τε καὶ τοῦ Κριτίου ἐκαθέ-

1 ei ἐτί ἐτύγχανε Goldbacher: ἐτί τυγχάνει, ei ἐτύγχανε MSS.
2 ἐσθεὶ W. Dindorf: ἐσθεὶ MSS.
CHARMIDES

Ah, he said, he is right fair and good in that way also.

Why then, I said, let us strip that very part of him and view it first, instead of his form; for anyhow, at that age, I am sure he is quite ready to have a discussion.

Very much so, said Critias; for, I may say, he is in fact a philosopher, and also—as others besides himself consider—quite a poet.

That, my dear Critias, I said, is a gift which your family has had a long while back, through your kinship with Solon. But why not call the young man here and show him to me? For surely, even if he were younger still, there could be no discredit in our having a talk with him before you, who are at once his guardian and his cousin.

You are quite right, he said, and we will call him. Thereupon he said to his attendant,—Boy, call Charmides; tell him I want him to see a doctor about the ailment with which he told me he was troubled yesterday. Then, turning to me,—You know, he has spoken lately of having a headache, said Critias, on getting up in the morning: now why should you not represent to him that you know a cure for headache?

Why not? I said: only he must come.

Oh, he will be here, he said.

And so it was; for he came, and caused much laughter, because each of us who were seated made room for him by pushing hard at his neighbour so as to have him sitting beside himself, until at either end of the seat one had to stand up, and we tumbled the other off sideways; and he came and sat down between me and Critias. But here, my
ζητο. ἐνταύθα μέντοι, ὦ φίλε, ἐγὼ ἦδη ἢπόρον, καὶ μου ἡ πρόσθεν θρασύτης ἔξεκέκοπτο, ἣν εἶχον ἐγὼ ὡς πάνυ ραδίως αὐτῷ διαλεξόμενος· ἐπειδή δὲ, φράσαντος τοῦ Κριτίου ὧτι ἐγὼ εἶν τὸ τοῦ φάρμακον

D ἐπιστάμενος, ἐνέβλεψε τέ μοι τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμήχανόν τι οἴον καὶ ἀνήγετο ὡς ἐρωτήσων, καὶ οἰ ἐν τῇ παλαιότῃ ἀπάντησε περιέρρευοι ἡμᾶς κύκλῳ κομμῳδῇ, τότε δὴ, ὡ γεννᾶδα, εἶδον τε τὰ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἰματίου καὶ ἐφλεγόμην καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν ἐμαυτῷ ἢν καὶ ἐνόμισα σοφώτατον εἶναι τοῦ Κυδίαν τὰ ἑρωτικά, ὃς εἶπεν ἐπὶ καλοῦ λέγων παιδός, ἀλλω ὑποτιθέμενος, “ἐυλαβεῖσθαι μὴ κατέναντα λέοντος νεβρὸν ἐλθόντα μοίραν αἴρεισθαι κρεόν” αὐτὸς γάρ

Ε μοι ἐδόκουν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιοῦτοῦ θρέμματος ἐαλωκεόναί. ὅμως δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐρωτήσαντος, εἰ ἐπισταίμην τὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς φάρμακον, μόνος πως ἀπεκρινάμην ὦτι ἐπισταίμην.

Τί οὖν, ὃ δ' ὃς, ἑστίν;

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὦτι αὐτῷ μὲν εἶν φύλλον τι, ἐπωδὴ δὲ τις ἐπὶ τῷ φαρμάκῳ εἶν, ἣν εἴ μὲν τις ἐπάδου ἀμα καὶ χρῶτο αὐτῷ, παντάπασιν ὑμᾶ ποιοὶ τὸ φάρμακον· ἀνευ δὲ τῆς ἐπωδῆς οὐδεν ὀφελος εἴη τοῦ φύλλου.

156 Καὶ ὃς, Ἀπογράψομαι τοῖνυν, ἐφη, παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ἐπωδὴν.

Πότερον, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐάν με πείθης ἢ κὰν μή;

Γελάσασο οὖν, Ἐάν σε πείθω, ἐφη, ὥς Σώκρατες.

Εἰςεν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ· καὶ τούνομά μου σὺ ἀκριβοῖς;

Εἰ μὴ ἄδικῶ γε, ἐφη· οὐ γάρ τι σοῦ ὀλίγος λόγος

1 A poet classed with Minnemermus and Archilochus by Plutarch; cf. Bergk, Poet. Lyr.² p. 960.
friend, I began to feel perplexed, and my former confidence in looking forward to a quite easy time in talking with him had been knocked out of me. And when, on Critias telling him that it was I who knew the cure, he gave me such a look with his eyes as passes description, and was just about to plunge into a question, and when all the people in the wrestling-school surged round about us on every side—then, ah then, my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak and caught fire, and could possess myself no longer; and I thought none was so wise in love-matters as Cydias, who in speaking of a beautiful boy recommends someone to "beware of coming as a fawn before the lion, and being seized as his portion of flesh"; for I too felt I had fallen a prey to some such creature. However, when he had asked me if I knew the cure for headache, I somehow contrived to answer that I knew.

Then what is it? he asked.

So I told him that the thing itself was a certain leaf, but there was a charm to go with the remedy; and if one uttered the charm at the moment of its application, the remedy made one perfectly well; but without the charm there was no efficacy in the leaf.

Then I will take down the charm, said he, from you in writing.

Do you prefer, I asked, to get my consent first, or to do without it?

This made him laugh, and he said: To get your consent, Socrates.

Very well, I said; and are you certain of my name?

Unless I am at fault, he replied; for there is no
ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ἠμετέροις ἡλικιώταις, μέμνημαι δὲ ἔγωγε καὶ πάις ὑμὶν Κριτία τῶδε συνόντα σε.

Καλῶς γε σὺ, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, ποιῶν νὰ λάληῃ γάρ σοι

Β παρρησιασθῇ περὶ τῆς ἐπωδῆς, οἷα τυγχάνει ὁνομα· ἄρτι δ' ἥπορον, τίνι τρόπῳ σοι ἐνδεικτῇ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς. ἔστι γάρ, ὃ Ἱαρμίδη, τοιαῦτῃ οἷα μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον ὑγιὰ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἠσπερ ἑσὼς ἦδη καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰατρῶν, ἔπειδὰν τις αὐτοῖς προσέλθῃ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀλγῶν, λέγουσι ποι, ὅτι οὐκ οἶδον τε αὐτοὺς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἱάσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον εἰη ἀμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν,

C εἰ μέλλοι καὶ τὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων εὐ ἔχειν· καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν οἴσθαι ἄν ποτε θεραπεύεσθαι αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἐαυτῆς ἀνευ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος πολλῆς ἀνοιαν εἶναι.

ἐκ δὴ τούτου τοῦ λόγου διαίταις ἐπὶ πάν τὸ σῶμα τρειπόμενοι μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος ἐπιχειροῦσι θεραπεύειν τε καὶ ἱάσθαι· ἢ οὐκ ἥσθησαι ὅτι ταῦτα ὑπὸ λέγουσι τε καὶ ἔχει;

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι καὶ ἀποδέχῃ τὸν λόγον;

Πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη.

D Καγὼ ἀκούσας αὐτοῦ ἐπανέσαντος ἀνεθάρρησά τε, καὶ μοι κατὰ συμπρον πάλιν ἡ θρασύτης συνηγείρετο, καὶ ἀνεξωτυροῦμην· καὶ εἴπον· Τουοῦν τοῖνυν ἔστιν, ὃ Ἱαρμίδη, καὶ τὸ ταύτης τῆς ἐπωδῆς. ἐμάθων δ' αὐτὴν ἐγὼ ἔκει ἐπὶ στρατιάς παρὰ τινός τῶν Ἡρακλῶν τῶν Ζαλμόξιδος ἰατρῶν, οἱ λέγονται καὶ ἀπαθανατίζειν. ἔλεγε δὲ ὁ Ἡραξ οὕτος, ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν [ἰατροὶ]¹ οἱ Ἔλληνες, ἢ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ

¹ ἰατροὶ secl. Cobet.
CHARMIDES

little talk of you among the set of our age, and I remember as a mere child the sight of you in company with Critias here.

That is a good thing, I said: for I shall speak more freely to you about the charm, and its real nature; just now I was at a loss for the way to apprise you of its power. For it is of such a nature, Charmides, that it cannot cure the head alone; I daresay you have yourself sometimes heard good doctors say, you know, when a patient comes to them with a pain in his eyes, that it is not possible for them to attempt a cure of his eyes alone, but that it is necessary to treat his head too at the same time, if he is to have his eyes in good order; and so again, that to expect ever to treat the head by itself, apart from the body as a whole, is utter folly. And on this principle they apply their regimen to the whole body, and attempt to treat and heal the part along with the whole; or have you not observed that this is what they say, and is done in fact?

Certainly I have, he said.

And you consider it well said, and accept the principle?

Most assuredly, he said.

Then I, on hearing his approval, regained my courage; and little by little I began to muster up my confidence again, and my spirit began to rekindle. So I said,—Such, then, Charmides, is the nature of this charm. I learnt it on campaign over there, from one of the Thracian physicians of Zalmoxis,¹ who are said even to make one immortal. This Thracian said that the Greeks were right in

¹ A legendary hero of the Thracian race of the Getae; cf. Herodotus, iv. 94-6.
δέλεγον, καλὸς λέγουει· ἀλλὰ Ζάλμοξις, ἥφη, λέγει
Ε ὁ ἡμέτερος βασιλεὺς, θεὸς ὦν, ὅτι ὡσπερ ὀφθαλ-
µοὺς ἀνευ κεφαλῆς οὐ δεὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἱάσθαι οὐδὲ
κεφαλὴν ἀνευ σώµατος, οὕτως οὐδὲ σῶµα ἀνευ
ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ καὶ αὐτίον εἰη τοῦ διαφεύγειν
τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλησ πιατρούς τὰ πολλὰ νοσή-
µατα, ὅτι τοῦ ὅλου ἁµελοῦν οὐ δείο τὴν ἐπιµέλειαν
ποιεῖσθαι, οὐ µὴ καλὸς ἔχοντος ἀδύνατον εἰη τὸ
µέρος εὗ ἑχειν. πάντα γὰρ ἐφη ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς
ὁµηθοῦν καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῷ σώµατι
καὶ παντὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιρρεῖν ὡσπερ

157 ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπὶ τὰ ἀοµµατα· δεῖν οὖν ἐκείνῳ
καὶ πρῶτον καὶ µάλιστα θεραπεύειν, εἴ µέλλει καὶ
τὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἄλλου σώµατος καλῶς
ἐχειν. θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφη, ὃ µακάριε,
ἐπιφανεῖς τισιν· τὰς δὲ ἐπιφάνειας ταῦτας τοὺς λόγους
eῖναι τοὺς καλοὺς· ἔκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων εὖ
tαῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἢς ἐγγενο-
µένης καὶ παρούσης ῥάδιον ἢδη εἶναι τὴν ύγίειαν
καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώµατι πορίζειν.

Β διδάσκων οὖν µὲ τὸ τε φάρµακον καὶ τὰς ἐπιφάνειας,
ὅπως, ἐφη, τῷ φαρµάκῳ τούτῳ µηδείς σε πεσεί τὴν
αὐτοῦ κεφαλῆς θεραπεύειν, ὅς ἃν µὴ τὴν ψυχὴν
πρῶτον παράσχῃ τῇ ἐπιφάνῃ ὑπὸ σοῦ θεραπευθήναι.
καὶ γὰρ νῦν, ἐφη, τούτ᾽ ἔστι τὸ ἀµάρτηµα περὶ
tους ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι χωρὶς ἐκατέρου [σωφροσύνης
tε καὶ ύγιείας] 2 ἱατροῖς τινες ἐπιχειροῦσιν εἶναι·
καὶ µοι πάνω σφόδρα ἐνετέλλετο µῆτε πλούσιον
οὕτω µηδένα εἶναι µῆτε γενναίον µῆτε καλὸν, ὅς

1 τοῦ ὅλου Burnet: τὸ ὅλον ἁγνοοῦειν mss.: τοῦ ἄλλου ἁµελοῦειν
Stobaeus.
2 σωφροσύνης τε καὶ ύγιείας om. Laur. lxxxv. 6.
advising as I told you just now: "but Zalmoxis," he said, "our king, who is a god, says that as you ought not to attempt to cure eyes without head, or head without body, so you should not treat body without soul"; and this was the reason why most maladies evaded the physicians of Greece—that they neglected the whole, on which they ought to spend their pains, for if this were out of order it was impossible for the part to be in order. For all that was good and evil, he said, in the body and in man altogether was sprung from the soul, and flowed along from thence as it did from the head into the eyes. Wherefore that part was to be treated first and foremost, if all was to be well with the head and the rest of the body. And the treatment of the soul, so he said, my wonderful friend, is by means of certain charms, and these charms are words of the right sort: by the use of such words is temperance engendered in our souls, and as soon as it is engendered and present we may easily secure health to the head, and to the rest of the body also. Now in teaching me the remedy and the charms he remarked,—"Let nobody persuade you to treat his head with this remedy, unless he has first submitted his soul for you to treat with the charm. For at present," he said, "the cure of mankind is beset with the error of certain doctors who attempt to practise the one method without the other." And he most particularly enjoined on me not to let anyone, however wealthy or noble or handsome, induce me to disobey
όμωμοκα γάρ

καὶ μοι ἀνάγκη πείθεσθαι—πείσομαι οὖν,

καὶ σοὶ, ἐὰν μὲν βουλή κατὰ τὰς τοῦ ἔντολας

τὴν ψυχὴν πρῶτον παρασχεῖν ἐπάσαι ταῖς τοῦ

Θρακῶν ἐπωδαῖς, προσοίσω τὸ φάρμακον τῇ κεφα-

λῇ· εἰ δὲ μῆ, οὐκ ἂν ἐχομεν ὅ τι ποιοῖμεν σοι, ὁ

φίλε Χαρμίδη.

'Ακούσας οὖν μου ὃ Κριτίας ταῦτ' εἰπόντος,

"Ερμαιον, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατης, γεγονὸς ἂν εἰ τῇς

κεφαλῆς ἀσθένεια τῷ νεανίσκῳ, εἰ ἀναγκασθήσεται

καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν διὰ τὴν κεφαλὴν βελτίων γενέσθαι.

λέγω μέντοι σοι, ὅτι Χαρμίδης τῶν ἥλικωτῶν οὐ

μόνον τῇ ἱδέᾳ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἄλλα καὶ αὐτῷ

τούτῳ, οὐ σὺ φῆς τὴν ἔπωθην ἔχειν· φῆς δὲ

σωφροσύνης· ἴ γάρ;

Πάνυ γε, ἴν δ' ἐγώ.

Εἰ τοῖνυν ἱσθι, ἐφη, ὅτι πάνυ πολὺ δοκεῖ σω-

φρονεστατος εἶναι τῶν νυνί, καὶ τάλα πάντα, εἰς

ὀσον ἥλικιας ἥκει, οὐδενὸς χείρων ὄν.

Καὶ γάρ, ἴν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ δίκαιων, ὁ Χαρμίδη,

diapherein se tawn alloun paisi tois toioioutoios ou

E γάρ οἴμαι ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐνθάδε ῥαδίως ἂν

ἐχειν ἐπιδείξαι, ποιαὶ δυὸ οἰκίαι συνελθοῦσαι εἰς

tau'ton twn Ath'enhous ek twn eikōtwn kalliws ān

kai ameínw geiníseían hĕ̂ eʹ̂̂ όν su gegovas. h te

gar patra¿a ὑμᾶν οἰκία, h Kritious toû Drwptidou,

kai up' 'Anakréontos kai upò Solonov kai up' ἄλλων

pollów poutetoùn égikekumiasménh para-

dédoita ħmîn, ως diáphérousa kalie te kai ārētē

158 kai tῆ ἄλλη λεγομενῆ εὐδαιμονία: καὶ αὐ ἡ πρὸς

μητρος ὡσαύτως· Πυριλάμπους γὰρ τοῦ σοῦ θεί·
CHARMIDES

him. So I, since I have given him my oath, and must obey him, will do as he bids; and if you agree to submit your soul first to the effect of the Thracian charms, according to the stranger’s injunctions, I will apply the remedy to your head: otherwise we shall be at a loss what to do with you, my dear Charmides.

Then Critias, when he heard me say this, remarked,—This affection of the head, Socrates, will turn out to be a stroke of luck for the young man, if he is to be compelled on account of his head to improve his understanding also. However, let me tell you, Charmides is considered to excel his comrades not only in appearance, but also in that very thing which you say is produced by your charm: temperance you say it is, do you not?

Certainly, I replied.

Then be assured, he said, that he is considered to be far and away the most temperate person now alive, while in every other respect, for a youth of his age, he is second to none.

Why, yes, I said, and it is only right, Charmides, that you should excel the rest in all these respects; for I do not suppose there is anyone else here who could readily point to a case of any two Athenian houses uniting together which would be likely to produce handsomer or nobler offspring than those from which you are sprung. For your father’s house, which comes from Critias, son of Dropides, has been celebrated by Anacreon and Solon and many other poets, so that it is famed by tradition among us as pre-eminent in beauty and virtue and all else that is accounted happiness; and then, your mother’s house is famous in the same way, for of Pyrilampes,
ου ουδεις των ἐν τῇ ἡ πείρῳ λέγεται καλλίων καὶ
μείζων ἀνήρ δοξαί εἶναι, ὄσακις ἐκεῖνος ἡ παρὰ
μέγαν βασιλεὰ ἡ παρ' ἄλλον των ἐν τῇ ἡ πείρῳ
προσβευών ἀφίκετο, σύμπασα δὲ αὕτη ἡ οἰκία οὐδὲν
ἐν τῆς ἐτέρας ὑποδειστέρα. ἐκ δὴ τοιοῦτων γεγο-
νότα εἰκός σε εἰς πάντα πρῶτον εἶναι. τὰ μὲν οὖν
Β ὁρῶμενα τῆς ἱδέας, ὃ φίλε παῖ Γλαύκωνος, δοκεῖς
μοι ουδένα τῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἐν οὐδενὶ ὑποβεβηκέναι1.
εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνη καὶ πρὸς τάλλα
κατὰ τὸν τοῦδε λόγον ἰκανῶς πέφυκας, μακάριον σε,
ἂν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ φίλε Χαρμίδη, ἡ μήτηρ ἔτυκτεν. ἔχει
δ' οὖν οὕτως. εἰ μὲν σοι ἤδη πάρεστων, ὡς λέγει
Κριτίας ὡδε, σωφροσύνη, καὶ εἰ σωφρων ἰκανῶς,
ουδέν ἐτί σοι ἐδεί οὐτὲ τῶν Ζαλμόξιδος οὔτε
τῶν Ἀβάριδος τοῦ Ἐπερβορέου ἐπωδῶν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ
C σοι ἢν ἤδη δοτέον εἰη τὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς φάρμακον·
ei δ' ἐτί τοιτῶν ἐπιτηδεῖα εἶναι δοκεῖς, ἐπαστέον
πρὸ τῆς τοῦ φαρμάκου δόσεως. αὐτὸς οὖν μοι
eipè, πότερον ὁμολογεῖς τῶδε καὶ φης ἰκανῶς ἢδη
καὶ σωφροσύνης μετέχειν ἡ ἐνδεής εἶναι;
Ἄνερυθράσας οὖν ὁ Χαρμίδης πρῶτον μὲν ἐτὶ
καλλίων ἐφάνη καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀἰσχυνηλόν αὐτοῦ τῇ
ἡλικίᾳ ἐπρεπεν· ἐπετα καὶ οὐκ ἀγεννῶς ἀπεκρίνατο·
eipè γὰρ ὅτι οὐ βάδιον εἰη ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὐθ' ὁμολογεῖν οὐτε ἐξάρνον εἶναι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. εἶν
D μὲν γὰρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, μὴ φῶ εἶναι σώφρων, ἀμὰ μὲν
ἀτοπον αὐτοῦ καθ' ἐαυτοῦ τοιαῦτα λέγειν, ἀμὰ δὲ
καὶ Κριτίαν τῶδε ἱευδὴ ἐπιτείξω καὶ ἄλλους
πολλοὺς, οἷς δοκῶ εἶναι σώφρων, ὡς ὁ τοιτοῦ

1 ὑποβεβηκέναι Madvig: ὑπερβεβληκέναι mss.

1 A fabulous hero of the far north, to whom oracles and
charms were ascribed by the Greeks; cf. Herodotus, iv. 36.
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your uncle, it is said that no one in all the continent was considered to be his superior in beauty or stature, whenever he came as envoy to the great king or anyone else in Asia, and his house as a whole is no whit inferior to the other. Sprung from such people, it is to be supposed that you would be first in all things. And indeed, as regards your visible form, dear son of Glaucon, I consider that nowhere have you fallen behind any of your ancestors. But if your nature is really rich in temperance and those other things, as our friend here says, blessed is the son, dear Charmides, I exclaimed, that your mother has borne in you! However, the case stands thus: if you already possess temperance, as Critias here declares, and you are sufficiently temperate, then you never had any need of the charms of Zalmoxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean, and might well be given at once the remedy for the head; but if you prove to be still lacking that virtue, we must apply the charm before the remedy. So tell me yourself whether you agree with our friend, and can say that you are already sufficiently provided with temperance, or are deficient in it?

At this Charmides blushed and, for one thing, looked more beautiful then ever, for his modesty became his years; and then, too, he answered most ingenuously, saying it was no easy matter at the moment either to admit or to deny the words of the question. For if, he went on, I say I am not temperate, not only is it a strange thing to say against oneself, but I shall at the same time be taxing with untruth both Critias and many others who consider me to be temperate, as he gives out; while
λόγος· εάν δ' αὕ φῶ καὶ ἐμαυτὸν ἐπαινῶ, ἵσως ἐπαχθέως φανεῖται· ὡστε οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τί σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι.

Καὶ ἔγω εἶπον ὅτι μοι εἰκότα φαίνη λέγεω, ὁ Χαρμίδη. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἢν δ' ἔγω, κοινῷ ἂν εἶναι σκεπτέον, εἶτε κέκτησαι εἶτε μὴ δ' πυνθάνομαι, ἵνα Ε μήτε σὺ ἀναγκάζῃ λέγεω ὃ μὴ βούλει, μήτ' αὕ ἔγω ἀσκέπτεως ἐπὶ τὴν ιατρικὴν τρέπωμαι. εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον, ἑθέλω σκοπεῖν μετὰ σοῦ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἑὰν.

'Αλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα, ἐφη, φίλον· ὥστε τούτον γε ἑνεκα, ὅπῃ αὐτὸς οἰεὶ βέλτιον1 σκέφασθαι, ταύτη σκόπει.

Τῇδε τοίνυν, ἐφην ἔγω, δοκεῖ μοι βελτίστη εἶναι ἡ σκέψις περὶ αὐτοῦ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, εἰ σοι πάρεστι σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ που ἐνοῦσαι αὐτήν, εἴπερ ἐνεστιν, οἰσθησίν τινα παρέχειν, ἐξ ἃς δόξα ἂν τις σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εὐθ', ὃ τί ἐστι καὶ ὅποιον τι ἡ σωφροσύνη· ἡ οὐκ οἰεί:

'Εγώγε, ἐφη, οἶμαι.

Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ γε, ἐφην, δ' οἴει, ἐπειδήπερ ἐλληνὶζεν ἐπίστασαι, κἂν εἴποις δὴπον αὐτὸ δ' τί σοι φαίνεται.

'Ισωσ, ἐφη.

'Ινα τοῖνυν τοπάσωμεν εἴτε σοι ἐνεστιν εἴτε μὴ, εἰπέ, ἢν δ' ἔγω, τί φῆς εἶναι σωφροσύνην κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν.

Β Καὶ ὅσ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὄκνει τε καὶ οὐ πάνν ἧθελεν ἀποκρίνασθαι· ἐπειτα μέντοι εἶπεν ὅτι οἱ δοκοὶ σωφροσύνη εἶναι τὸ κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἴσωξη, ἐν τε ταῖς ὁδοῖς βαδίζειν καὶ δια-

1 βέλτιον Heindorf: βελτίω mss.
CHARMIDES

if, on the other hand, I say I am, and praise myself, it will probably be found distasteful; so that I cannot see what answer I am to give you.

Then I said: Your answer is a natural one, in my opinion, Charmides; and I think, I went on, that we must join in inquiring whether you possess the thing I am asking after, or not, in order that neither you may be forced to say what you do not wish, nor I on my part may recklessly try my hand at medicine. So if it is agreeable to you, I am ready to inquire with you; but, if it is not, to let it alone.

Why, nothing, he said, could be more agreeable to me: so far as that goes, therefore, inquire in whatever way you think we had better proceed.

Then this is the way, I said, in which I consider that our inquiry into this matter had best be conducted. Now, it is clear that, if you have temperance with you, you can hold an opinion about it. For being in you, I presume it must, in that case, afford some perception from which you can form some opinion of what temperance is, and what kind of thing it is: do you not think so?

I do, he replied.

And since you understand the Greek tongue, I said, you can tell me, I suppose, your view of this particular thought of yours?

I daresay, he said.

Then in order that we may make a guess whether it is in you or not, tell me, I said, what you say of temperance according to your opinion.

He at first hung back, and was not at all willing to answer: but presently he said that, to his mind, temperance was doing everything orderly and quietly—walking in the streets, talking, and doing
λέγεσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὑσαίτως ποιεῖν· καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, συλλήβδην ἥσυχίότης τις εἶναι ὁ ἐρωτᾶς.

'Ἀρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ δ' λέγεις; φασί γέ τοι, ὃ Χαρμίδη, τοὺς ἥσυχίους σωφρονάς εἶναι· ἰδομέν δὴ ἐν τῷ λέγονσιν. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, οὐ τῶν καλῶν
C μέντοι ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστί;

Πάνυ γε, ἐφη.

Πότερον οὖν κάλλιστον ἐν γραμματιστοῖς τὰ ὁμοῖα γράμματα γράφειν ταχῦ ὣ ἡ ἥσυχῆ; Ταχῦ.

Τί δ' ἀναγιγνώσκεις; ταχέως ὣ βραδέως; Ταχέως.

Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τὸ κυθαρίζειν ταχέως καὶ τὸ παλαίειν ὤξεως πολὺ κάλλιον τοῦ ἥσυχῆ τε καὶ βραδέως;

Ναι.

Τί δὲ πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν; οὐχ ὑσαίτως;

Πάνυ γε.

Θεῖν δὲ καὶ ἀλλεσθαί καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος

D ἄπαντα ἔργα, οὐ τὰ μὲν ὤξεως καὶ ταχὺ γεγυνό-

μένα τοῦ καλοῦ ἐστὶ, τα ὡς [βραδέα]¹ μόγις 

τε καὶ ἡςύχια τοῦ αἷσχροῦ;

Φαίνεται.

Φαίνεται ἄρα ἡμῖν, ἐφην ἐγώ, κατὰ γε τὸ σῶμα 

οὐ τὸ ἡςύχιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τάχιστον καὶ ὄξυτατον 

κάλλιστον ὃν. ἦ γάρ;

Πάνυ γε.

'Ἡ δὲ γε σωφροσύνη καλὸν τι ἦν;

Ναι.

¹ βραδέα secl. Heindorf.
CHARMIDES

everything else of that kind; and in a word, he said, I think the thing about which you ask may be called quietness.

Well, I said, are you right there? They do say, you know, Charmides, that quiet people are temperate: so let us see if there is anything in what they say. Tell me, is not temperance, however, among the honourable things?

To be sure, he said.

Well, which is most honourable at the writing-master's, to write the same sort of letters quickly or quietly?

Quickly.

And in reading, to do it quickly or slowly?

Quickly.

And so, in the same way, to play the lyre quickly, or to wrestle nimbly, is far more honourable than to do it quietly and slowly?

Yes.

And what of boxing, alone or combined with wrestling? Is it not the same there too?

To be sure.

And in running and leaping and all activities of the body, are not nimble and quick movements accounted honourable, while sluggish and quiet ones are deemed disgraceful?

Apparently.

So we find, I said, that in the body, at least, it is not quietness, but the greatest quickness and nimbleness that is most honourable, do we not?

Certainly.

And temperance was an honourable thing?

Yes.
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Οὐ τοῖνυν κατὰ γε τὸ σῶμα ἢ ἡ συνείσποντας ἢν ἄλλ’ ἢ ταχυτῆς σωφρονέστερον εἰ, ἐπειδὴ καλὸν ἢ σωφροσύνην.

"Εοικεν, ἔφη.

Ε Τί δέ; ὡς ἐγώ, εὐμαθία κάλλιον ἢ δυσμαθία; Εὐμαθία.

"Εστι δέ γ’, ἔφην, ἢ μὲν εὐμαθία ταχέως μανθάνει, ἢ δὲ δυσμαθία ἡ συνχῇ καὶ βραδέως; Ναὶ.

Διδάσκεων δὲ ἄλλου ὀὐ ταχέως κάλλιον καὶ σφόδρα μάλλον ἢ συνχῇ τε καὶ βραδέως; Ναὶ.

Τί δέ; ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι καὶ μεμνήσθαι ἡ συνχῇ τε καὶ βραδέως κάλλιον ἢ σφόδρα καὶ ταχέως;

Σφόδρ’, ἔφη, καὶ ταχέως.

160 Ἡ δ’ ἀγχίνοια οὐχὶ δεύτης τίς ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς, ἄλλ’ οὐχὶ ἡ συνχία;

’Αληθῆ.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ συνιέναι τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ ἐν γραμματιστοῦ καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ ἄλλοι πανταχόω, οὐχ ὡς ἡ συνχάτατα ἄλλ’ ὡς τάχιστα ἐστὶ κάλλιστα;

Ναὶ.

’ Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν γε ταῖς ζητήσεσι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῷ βουλεύσθαι οὐχ ὁ ἡ συνχώτατος, ἢ γι γώς οἶμαι, καὶ μόνος βουλευόμενος τε καὶ ἀνευρίσκων ἑπαίνου δοκεῖ ἄξιος εἶναι, ἄλλ’ ὁ ῥάστα τέ καὶ τάχιστα τοῦτο δρῶν.

Β ’Εστι ταῦτα, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν πάντα, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ Χαρμίδη, ἢμῖν καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, τὰ τοῦ

1 ἡ συνχώτατος Cobet: ἡ συνχώτατος mss.
CHARMIDES

Then in the body, at least, it is not quietness but quickness that will be the more temperate thing, since temperance is honourable.

So it seems, he said.

Well now, I went on; in learning, is facility the more honourable, or difficulty?

Facility.

And facility in learning, I said, is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly?

Yes.

And is it not more honourable to teach another quickly and forcibly, rather than quietly and slowly?

Yes.

Well now, is it more honourable to be reminded and to remember quietly and slowly, or forcibly and quickly?

Forcibly, he replied, and quickly.

And is not readiness of mind a sort of nimbleness of the soul, not a quietness?

True.

And to apprehend what is said, whether at the writing-master’s or the lyre-master’s or anywhere else, not as quietly as possible, but as quickly, is most honourable?

Yes.

Well, and in the searchings of the soul, and in deliberation, it is not the quietest person, I imagine, or he who deliberates and discovers with difficulty, that is held worthy of praise, but he who does this most easily and quickly.

That is so, he said.

Then in all, I said, Charmides, that concerns either our soul or our body, actions of quickness and
τάχους τε καὶ τῆς ὁξύτητος καλλίω φαίνεται ἡ τὰ τῆς βραδυτήτος τε καὶ ἴσουχίτητος;

Κωνδυνεύει, ἔφη.

Ὅυκ ἀρα ἴσουχίτητι τις ἡ σωφροσύνη ἀν εἶη, οὕτ᾽ ἴσουχιος ὁ σωφρων βίος, ἐκ γε τούτου τοῦ λόγου, ἐπειδὴ καλὸν αὐτὸν δεῖ εἶναι σωφρόνα ὄντα.

C δυνών γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἔτερα, ἡ οὐδαμοῦ ἡμῖν ἡ πάντων οὐν ὀλιγαχοῦ αἱ ἴσουχιοι πράξεις ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλλίου ἐφάνησαν ἢ αἱ ταχείαι τε καὶ ἴσχυραι. εἰ δ᾽ οὖν, ὡ φίλε, ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ἐλάττουσα αἱ ἴσουχιοι τῶν σφοδρῶν τε καὶ ταχείων πράξεων τυγχάνουσι καλλίους οὐσαί, οὔδε ταύτῃ σωφροσύνῃ ἀν εἰη μᾶλλον τι τὸ ἴσουχη πράστεω ἢ τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ ταχέως, οὔτε ἐν βαδισμῷ οὔτε ἐν λέξει οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὐδαμοῦ, οὔδε ὁ ἴσουχιος βίος [κόσμιος] τοῦ μὴ ἴσουχίου σωφρονεστερος ἀν εἰη, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῶν καλῶν τι ἡμῖν ἡ σωφροσύνη ὑπετέθη, καλὰ δὲ οὐχ ἤτον τὰ ταχέα τῶν ἴσουχῶν πέφανται.

Ὀρθῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὡ Σώκρατες, εἰρηκέναι.

Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὁ Χαρμύδη, μᾶλλον προσέχων τῶν νοῶν καὶ εἰς σεαυτὸν ἐμβλέψας, ἐννοῆσας ὅποιον τινά σε ποιεῖ ἡ σωφροσύνη παροῦσα καὶ ποία τις οὕσα τοιούτων ἀπεργάζοιτο ἂν, πάντα ταύτα συλλογισάμενος εἰπὲ εὖ καὶ ἄνδρεις, τὶ σοι φαίνεται εἶναι.

Ε Καὶ ὃς ἐπισχῶν καὶ πάνυ ἀνδρικῶς πρὸς ἐαυτὸν διασκεδάζειν, Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖν ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ αἰσχυνηλὸν τὸν ἀνθρωπον, καὶ εἶναι ὅπερ αἰῶν ἡ σωφροσύνη.

1 κόσμιος secl. Heindorf.
2 ἐμβλέψα Burnet: ἀπεμβλέψα, ἀποβλέψας mss.
CHARMIDES

nimbleness are found to be more honourable than those of slowness and quietness?

It looks like it, he said.

So temperance cannot be a sort of quietness, nor can the temperate life be quiet, by this argument at least; since, being temperate, it must be honourable. For we have these two alternatives: either in no cases, or I should think in very few, can we find that the quiet actions in life are more honourable than the quick and vigorous ones; or at all events, my friend, if of the more honourable actions there are absolutely as many quiet ones as forcible and quick, not even so will temperance be acting quietly any more than acting forcibly and quickly, either in walking or in talking or in any other sphere; nor will the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet; since in our argument we assumed that temperance is an honourable thing, and have found that quick things are just as honourable as quiet things.

Your statement, he said, Socrates, seems to me to be correct.

Once more then, I went on, Charmides, attend more closely and look into yourself; reflect on the quality that is given you by the presence of temperance, and what quality it must have to work this effect on you. Take stock of all this and tell me, like a good, brave fellow, what it appears to you to be.

He paused a little, and after a quite manly effort of self-examination: Well, I think, he said, that temperance makes men ashamed or bashful, and that temperance is the same as modesty.
Είτε, Ἰμ Δ' ἐγώ, οὐ καλὸν ἄρτι ὁμολογεῖς τὴν σωφροσύνην εἶναι;
Πάνυ γ', ἐφη.
Οὐκοίν καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες οἱ σωφρονεῖς;
Ναὶ.
'Αρ' οὖν ἂν εἰη ἀγαθόν, δ' ὡς ἄγαθος ἀπεργάζεται;
Οὐ δήτα.
Οὐ μόνον οὖν ἄρα καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.
'Εμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Τὶ οὖν; Ἰμ Δ' ἐγώ. 'Ομήρῳ οὖ πιστεύεις καλῶς λέγεις, λέγοντι ὅτι
αἴδως δ' οὐκ ἄγαθή κεχρημένῳ ἄνδρι παρεῖναι;
'Εγγυ', ἐφη.
'Εστιν ἄρα, ὃς ἐοικεν, αἴδως οὐκ ἄγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.
Φαίνεται.
Σωφροσύνη δὲ γε ἄγαθόν, εἰπέρ ἄγαθος ποιεῖ
οἷς ἂν παρῇ, κακοὺς δὲ μή.
'Αλλὰ μήν οὖτω γε δοκεῖ μοι ἐχεῖν, ὃς σὺ λέγεις.
Οὐκ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἂν εἰη αἴδως, εἰπέρ τὸ μὲν
Β' ἄγαθὸν τυγχάνει ὅν, αἴδως δὲ [μή]¹ οὖδέν μᾶλλον ἂγαθὸν ἥ καὶ κακὸν.
'Ἀλλ' ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι. τόδε δὲ σκέψαι τί σοι δοκεῖ
εἶναι περὶ σωφροσύνης. ἄρτι γὰρ ἀνεμνήσθην ὅ
ἡδη τοῦ ἥκουσα λέγοντος, ὅτι σωφροσύνη ἂν εἰη
τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττεν. σκόπει οὖν τοῦτο εἰ
ὅρθῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγειν ὁ λέγων.
Καὶ ἐγώ, Ὀ μιαρέ, ἐφην, Κριτίου τοῦτο ἀκήκοας
Σ αὐτῷ ἥ ἄλλου του τῶν σοφῶν.

¹ μή seecl. Ast.
CHARMIDES

Well now, I asked, did you not admit a moment ago that temperance is honourable?
Certainly I did, he said.
And temperate men are also good?
Yes.
Well, can that be good which does not produce good men?
No, indeed.
And we conclude that it is not only honourable, but good also.
I think so.
Well then, I said, are you not convinced that Homer\(^1\) is right in saying—

Modesty, no good mate for a needy man?

I am, he said.
Then it would seem that modesty is not good, and good.
Apparently.
But temperance is good, if its presence makes men good, and not bad.
It certainly seems to me to be as you say.
So temperance cannot be modesty, if it is in fact good, while modesty is no more good than evil.
Why, I think, he said, Socrates, that is correctly stated; but there is another view of temperance on which I would like to have your opinion. I remembered just now what I once heard someone say, that temperance might be doing one’s own business. I ask you, then, do you think he is right in saying this?
You rascal, I said, you have heard it from Critias here, or some other of our wise men!

\(^1\) *Od.* xvii. 347.
"Εοικεν, ἐφη ὃ Κριτίας, ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐμοῦ γε.
"Ἀλλὰ τί διαφέρει, ἢ δ’ ὦς, ὁ Χαρμίδης, ὁ
Σῶκρατες, ἰτοῦ ἰκουσα;
Οὐδὲν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ· πάντως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο σκεπτέον,
ostis αὐτὸ εἰπεν, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἄληθὲς λέγεται
ἡ οὖ.
Νῦν ὅρθως λέγεις, ἢ δ’ ὦς.
Νὴ Δία, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ· ἀλλ’ εἴ καὶ εὑρήσομεν αὐτὸ
ὅτη γε ἤχει, θαυμάζομι· ἀν’ αἰνύγματι γὰρ τιν
ἐοικεν.
"Οτι δὴ τί γε; ἐφη.
"Οτι οὗ δήπου, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἢ τὰ ρήματα ἐφθέγξατο,
ὄταν γάρ εν μὲν ἐν γάρ σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ
αὐτὸ πράττειν. ἡ σὺ οὔ οὐδὲν ἢ γαῖ πράττειν τὸν
γραμματιστήν, ὅταν γράφῃ ἢ ἀναγιγνώσκῃ;
"Εγώγε, ἤγομαι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.
Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι τὸ αὐτὸ όνομα μόνον γράφειν ὁ
γραμματιστής καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκειν, ἢ ύμᾶς τοὺς
παιδας διδάσκεις, ἢ οὐδέν ἦττον τὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν
ἐγράφετε ἢ τὰ υμέτερα καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων ονόματα;
Οὐδέν ἦττον.
"Ἥ οὖν ἐπολυπτραγμονεῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐσωφρονεῖτε
Ε τοῦτο δρῶντες;
Οὐδαμῶς.
Καὶ μὴν οὐ τὰ υμέτερά γε αὐτῶν ἐπράττετε,
eἴπερ τὸ γράφειν πράττειν τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἀναγιγνώ-
σκειν.
"Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐστίν.
Καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἰἀσθαι, ὠ ἐταῖρε, καὶ τὸ οἰκοδομεῖν
καὶ τὸ υφαίνειν καὶ τὸ ἤτυμον τέχνη ὅτι οὐν τῶν
téchnēs ἐργων ἀπεργάζεσθαι πράττειν δήπου τί
ἐστίν.
Seemingly, said Critias, from some other; for indeed he did not from me.

But what does it matter, Socrates, said Charmides, from whom I heard it?

Not at all, I replied; for in any case we have not to consider who said it, but whether it is a true saying or no.

Now you speak rightly, he said.

Yes, on my word, I said: but I shall be surprised if we can find out how it stands; for it looks like a kind of riddle.

Why so? he asked.

Because, I replied, presumably the speaker of the words "temperance is doing one's own business" did not mean them quite as he spoke them. Or do you consider that the scribe does nothing when he writes or reads?

I rather consider that he does something, he replied.

And does the scribe, in your opinion, write and read his own name only, and teach you boys to do the same with yours? Or did you write your enemies' names just as much as your own and your friends'?

Just as much.

Well, were you meddlesome or intemperate in doing this?

Not at all.

And you know you were not doing your own business, if writing and reading are doing something.

Why, so they are.

And indeed medical work, my good friend, and building and weaving and producing anything whatever that is the work of any art, I presume is doing something.
Πάνω γε.
Τι οὖν; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, δοκεῖ ἂν σοι πόλις εἰ δοκεῖθαί ὑπὸ τοῦτον τοῦ νόμου τοῦ κελεύοντος τὸ ἕαυτοῦ ἱμάτιον ἐκαστὸν ύφαίνει καὶ πλύνει, καὶ ὑποδήματα σκυτοτομεῖν, καὶ λήκυθον καὶ στλεγ-
162 γίδα καὶ τάλλα πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τῶν μὲν ἀλλοτρίων μὴ ἀπτεσθαί, τὰ δὲ ἕαυτοῦ ἐκαστὸν ἐργάζεσθαί τε καὶ πράττειν;
Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἦ δ’ ὦς.
'Αλλὰ μέντοι, ἕφην ἐγώ, σωφρόνως γε οἰκοῦσα εὗ ἃν οἰκοῖτο.
Πῶς δ’ οὐκ; ἔφη.
Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, τὸ τὰ τοιαύτα τε καὶ οὖτω τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν σωφροσύνη ἂν εὗ.
Οὐ φαίνεται.
'Ἡνίττετο ἄρα, ὡς ἐοικεν, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὁ λέγων τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν σωφροσύνην εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ποὺ οὖτω γε ἦν εὐήθης· ἦ τινος ἡλιθίον
Β ἡκουσας τοῦτῳ λέγοντος, ὃς Χαρμίδης;
'Ἡκιστά γε, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ πάνυ ἐδοκεῖ σοφὸς εἶναι.
Παντὸς τοῖνυν μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὕτων ἀυτὸ προοίμαλεν, ὡς ὄν χαλεπὸν τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν γνώναι ὃ τι ποτε ἐστιν.
'Ἰσως, ἔφη.
Τι οὖν ἃν εὖ ποτε τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν; ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;
Οὐκ οἶδα μᾶ Δι' ἐγώγε, ἦ δ’ ὦς· ἀλλ' ἵσως οὐδέν κωλυεῖ μηδὲ τὸν λέγοντα μηδὲν εἰδέναι ὃ τι ἐνόει. 38
Certainly.
Well then, I went on, do you think a state would be well conducted under a law which enjoined that everyone should weave and scour his own coat, and make his own shoes, and his own flask and scraper, and everything else on the same principle of not touching the affairs of others but performing and doing his own for himself?
I think not, he replied.
But still, I said, a state whose conduct is temperate will be well conducted.
Of course, he said.
Then doing one's own business in that sense and in that way will not be temperance.
Apparently not.
So that person was riddling, it seems, just as I said a moment ago, when he said that doing one's own business is temperance. For I take it he was not such a fool as all that: or was it some idiot that you heard saying this, Charmides?
Far from it, he replied, for indeed he seemed to be very wise.
Then it is perfectly certain, in my opinion, that he propounded it as a riddle, in view of the difficulty of understanding what "doing one's own business" can mean.
I daresay, he said.
Well, what can it mean, this "doing one's own business"? Can you tell me?
I do not know, upon my word, he replied: but I daresay it may be that not even he who said it knew

1 The flask contained oil for anointing the body before exercise, and the scraper was for scraping it afterwards, or at the bath.
καὶ άμα ταύτα λέγων ὑπεγέλα τε καὶ εἰς τὸν Κριτίαν ἀπέβλεπεν.

Καὶ ὁ Κριτίας δήλος μὲν ἦν καὶ πάλαι ἄγωνιῶν καὶ φιλοτήμως πρὸς τε τὸν Χαρμίδην καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ἦχων, μόνιμος δὲ ἐαυτὸν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν κατέχων τότε οὐχ ὦδος τε ἐγένετο· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι παντὸς μάλλον ἄληθὲς εἶναι, ὅ ἐγὼ ὑπέλαβον, τοῦ Κριτίου ἀκηκοέναι τὸν Χαρμίδην ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν περὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης. ὁ μὲν οὖν Χαρμίδης βουλόμενος μὴ αὐτὸς ὑπέχειν λόγον ἀλλ᾿ ἐκείνου τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ὑπεκίνει αὐτὸν ἐκείνου, καὶ ἐνεδείκνυτο ὡς ἐξεληλεγμένος εἰή· ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἥνέσχητο, ἀλλὰ μοι ἔδοξεν ὀργισθῆναι αὐτῷ ὑπὲρ ποιητῆς ὑποκρίτη κακῶς διατιθέντι τὰ ἐαυτοῦ ποιήματα· ὡςτ' ἐμβλέψας αὐτῷ εἶπεν, Οὔτως οἰεί, ὦ Χαρμίδη, εἰ σὺ μὴ οἴσθα τί ποτ' ἐνοί ὃς ἐφι σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τά ἐαυτοῦ πράττειν, οὐδὲ δὴ ἐκείνον εἰδέναι;

'Αλλ᾽, ὁ βέλτιστε, ἐφὶν ἐγὼ, Κριτία, τούτον μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἄγνοεῖν τηλικοῦτον οὔτα· σὲ δὲ Εἴπον εἰκός εἰδέναι καὶ ἡλικίας ἑνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ οὖν συγχωρεῖς τοῦτ' εἶναι σωφροσύνην ὑπὲρ οὕτως λέγει, καὶ παραδέχῃ τὸν λόγον, ἐγὼς πολὺ ἀν ἢδον μετὰ σοῦ σκοποῦμην, εἰτ' ἄληθὲς εἴτε μὴ τὸ λεγένη.

'Αλλὰ πάνω συγχωρῶ, ἐφή, καὶ παραδέχομαι. Καλῶς γε σὺ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ποιῶν. καὶ μοι λέγε, ἦ καὶ ὃ νῦν δὴ ἡρώτων ἐγὼ συγχωρεῖς, τοὺς δημιουργοὺς πάντας ποιεῖν τι;

"Εγὼγε.

"Ἡ οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι τὰ ἐαυτῶν μόνον ποιεῖν ἦ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων;
in the least what he meant. And as he said this he gave a sly laugh and glanced at Critias.

Now Critias for some time had been plainly burning with anxiety to distinguish himself in the eyes of Charmides and the company, and having with difficulty restrained himself heretofore, he now could do so no longer; for I believe that what I had supposed was perfectly true—that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias. And so Charmides, wishing him to make answer instead of himself, sought to stir him up in particular, and pointed out that he himself had been refuted; but Critias rebelled against it, and seemed to me to have got angry with him, as a poet does with an actor who mishandles his verses on the stage: so he looked hard at him and said: Do you really suppose, Charmides, that if you do not know what can have been the meaning of the man who said that temperance was doing one's own business, he did not know either?

Why, my excellent Critias, I said, no wonder if our friend, at his age, cannot understand; but you, I should think, may be expected to know, in view of your years and your studies. So if you concede that temperance is what he says, and you accept the statement, for my part I would greatly prefer to have you as partner in the inquiry as to whether this saying is true or not.

Well, I quite concede it, he said, and accept it.

That is good, then, I said. Now tell me, do you also concede what I was asking just now—that all craftsmen make something?

I do.

And do you consider that they make their own things only, or those of others also?
PLATO

163 Καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων.
Σωφρονοῦσιν οὖν οὐ τὰ ἐαυτῶν μόνον ποιοῦντες.
Τι γὰρ κωλύει; ἐφη.
Οὐδὲν ἐμὲ γε, ἐὰν δὲ ἐγώ· ἄλλ' ὥσ ὡς ἐκεῖνον
κωλύει, ὡς ὑποθέμενος σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ
ἐαυτοῦ πράττειν ἑπείτα οὐδέν φησι κωλύειν καὶ
τοὺς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντας σωφρονεῖν.
'Εγώ γὰρ ποι, ἢ δ' ὥσ, τοῦθ' ὡμολόγηκα, ὡς οἱ
τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες σωφρονοῦσιν, ἢ τοὺς
ποιοῦντας ὡμολόγησα;
Εἰπὲ μοι, ἐὰν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ ταύτων καλεῖς τὸ ποιεῖν
καὶ τὸ πράττειν;
B Οὐ μέντοι, ἐφη· οὐδὲ γε τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ
ποιεῖν. ἐμαθὼν γὰρ παρ' Ἡσίοδον, ὡς ἐφη, ἔργον
δ' οὐδὲν εἶναι ὦνείδος. οἴει οὖν αὐτόν, εἰ τὰ τοιαῦτα
ἔργα ἐκάλει καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν, οἷα νῦν
δὴ ὑπ' ἐλεγεῖς, οὐδειν ἄν ὦνείδος φάναι εἶναι σκυτο-
τομοῦντι ἢ ταριχοπωλοῦντι ἢ ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθ-
ημένῳ; οὐκ οἰσθάτι γε χρή, ὡς Ἡσίοδος ἀλλὰ καὶ
C ἐκεῖνος, οἷμαι, ποίησιν πράξεως καὶ ἐργασίας ἄλλο
ἐνόμιζε, καὶ ποίημα μὲν γίγνεσθαι ὦνείδος ἐνίοτε,
ὅταν μὴ μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ γίγνεται, ἔργον δὲ οὐδέ-
pote οὐδὲν ὦνείδος· τὰ γὰρ καλῶς τε καὶ ὡφελῶς
ποιούμενα ἔργα ἐκάλει, καὶ ἐργασίας τε καὶ πράξεις
tὰς τοιαῦτας ποιήσεις.
φάναι δὲ γε χρῆ καὶ οἶκεία
μόνα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἁγείσθαι αὐτόν, τὰ δὲ βλαβερὰ
πάντα ἄλλοτρια· ὡστε καὶ Ἡσίοδον χρῆ οἰσθάτι
καὶ ἄλλον, ὡστε φρόνυμος, τὸν τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττοντα
τούτων σωφρονα καλείν.

1 The Greek word ποιεῖν ("make") can also mean the same as πράττειν ("do").
CHARMIDES

Those of others also.
And are they temperate in not making their own things only?
Yes: what reason is there against it? he said.
None for me, I replied; but there may be for him who, after assuming that temperance is doing one's own business, proceeds to say there is no reason against those also who do others' business being temperate.

And have I, pray, he said, admitted that those who do others' business are temperate? Or was my admission of those who make things?
Tell me, I said, do you not call making and doing the same?

No indeed, he replied, nor working and making the same either: this I learnt from Hesiod, who said, "Work is no reproach." Now, do you suppose that if he had given the names of working and doing to such works as you were mentioning just now, he would have said there was no reproach in shoe-making or pickle-selling or serving the stews? It is not to be thought, Socrates; he rather held, I conceive, that making was different from doing and working, and that while a thing made might be a reproach if it had no connexion with the honourable, work could never be a reproach. For things honourably and usefully made he called works, and such makings he called workings and doings; and we must suppose that it was only such things as these that he called our proper concerns, but all that was harmful, the concerns of others. So that we must conclude that Hesiod, and anyone else of good sense, calls him temperate who does his own business.

3 Works and Days, 309.
D Ω Κριτία, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ εὐθὺς ἄρχωμένου σου σχεδόν ἐμάνθανον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι τὰ ὅικεῖα τε καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ καλοῖς, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄγαθῶν ποιήσεις πράξεις· καὶ γὰρ Προδίκου μυρία τινὰ ἀκηκοα περὶ ὀνομάτων διαρώνυμος. ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι τίθεσθαι μὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων δίδωμι ὧπῃ ἄν βούλῃ ἐκαστὸν· δὴ λοιπὸν ήε μόνον ἐφ' ὦ τι ἄν φέρῃς τούνομα ὦ τι ἄν λέγῃς. νῦν οὖν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς σαφέστερον
Ε ὁρίσατε: ἃρα τὴν τῶν ἄγαθῶν πράξεων ἢ ποιήσων ἢ ὅπως σοὶ βούλει ὀνομάζειν, ταῦτην λέγεις σὺ σωφροσύνην εἶναι;
'Εγώγε, ἐφη.
Οὐκ ἃρα σωφρονεῖ ὦ τὰ κακὰ πράττων, ἀλλ' ὦ τὰ ἀγαθά;
Σοὶ δὲ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ βέλτιστε, οὐχ οὕτω δοκεῖ;
'Εα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ· μὴ γάρ πω τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν σκοπῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὦ σὺ λέγεις νῦν.
'Αλλὰ μέντοι ἔγωγε, ἐφη, τὸν μὴ ἄγαθὰ ἀλλὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντα οὐ φημι σωφρονεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἄγαθὰ ἀλλὰ μὴ κακὰ σωφρονεῖν· τὴν γὰρ τῶν ἄγαθῶν πράξεων σωφροσύνην εἶναι σαφῶς σοι διορίζομαι.

164 Καὶ οὐδὲν γέ σε ἓσως κωλύει ἀληθῆ λέγειν· τὸδε γε μέντοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, θαυμάζω, εἰ σωφρονοῦντας ἀνθρώπους ἢγη σοὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι σωφρονοῦσω.
'Αλλ' οὐχ ἧγοῦμαι, ἐφη.
Οὐκ ὀλίγον πρότερον, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ, ὅτι τοὺς δημιουργοὺς οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ αὐ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ποιοῦντας σωφρονεῖν;
'Ελέγετο γάρ, ἐφη· ἀλλὰ τί τούτο;
Οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ λέγει εἰ δοκεῖ τίς σοι ἰατρός, ὑγία

1 "Names" here includes any substantive words such as πράξεις.
Ah, Critias, I said, you had hardly begun, when I grasped the purport of your speech—that you called one’s proper and one’s own things good, and that the makings of the good you called doings; for in fact I have heard Prodicus drawing innumerable distinctions between names. Well, I will allow you any application of a name that you please; only make clear to what thing it is that you attach such-and-such a name. So begin now over again, and define more plainly. Do you say that this doing or making, or whatever is the term you prefer, of good things, is temperance?

I do, he replied.

Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate?

And do not you, my excellent friend, he said, think so?

Leave that aside, I said; for we have not to consider yet what I think, but what you say now.

Well, all the same, I say, he replied, that he who does evil instead of good is not temperate, whereas he who does good instead of evil is temperate: for I give you “the doing of good things is temperance” as my plain definition.

And there is no reason, I daresay, why your statement should not be right; but still I wonder, I went on, whether you judge that temperate men are ignorant of their temperance.

No, I do not, he said.

A little while ago, I said, were you not saying that there was no reason why craftsmen should not be temperate in making others’ things as well?

Yes, I was, he said, but what of it?

Nothing; only tell me whether you think that a
Β ῥῶν, ὑφέλιμα καὶ ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖν καὶ ἑκεῖνῳ ὑπὸ ἱότο;

"Εμοίγε.

Οὐκοῦν τὰ δέοντα πράττει ὁ γε ταῦτα πράττων;

Ναί.

"Ο τὰ δέοντα πράττων οὐ σωφρονεῖ;

Σωφρονεῖ μὲν οὖν.

"Η οὖν καὶ γυγνώσκειν ἀνάγκη τῷ ἱατρῷ ὅταν τε ὑφελίμως ἴαται καὶ ὅταν μή; καὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὑμιουργῶν, ὅταν τε μέλλῃ ὑψίσεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔργου οὐ ἂν πράττῃ, καὶ ὅταν μή;

"Ισως οὖν.

"Ενίοτε ἄρα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὑφελίμως πράξας ἦν

C βλαβερῶς ὁ ἱατρὸς οὐ γυγνώσκει ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἐπραξέν· καίτοι ὑφελίμως πράξας, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, σωφρόνως ἐπραξέν· ἢ οὐχ οὔτως ἐλεγες;

"Εγώγε.

Οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἑοικεν, ἐνίοτε ὑφελίμως πράξας πράττει μὲν σωφρόνως καὶ σωφρονεῖ, ἄνγοιε δ' ἑαυτὸν ὁτὶ σωφρονεῖ;

"Αλλὰ τούτῳ μέν, ἑφη, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ γένοιτο, ἀλλ' εἴ τι σὺ οἶει ἐκ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν οὕτ' ἐμοὶ ὑμιουργεῖν εἰς τούτῳ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι

D συμβαίνειν, ἑκεῖνων ἂν τι ἐγώγε μᾶλλον ἀναθείμην,

καὶ οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνθῇν ὅτι μὴ οὐχὶ ὅρθως φάναι εἰρήκειν, μᾶλλον ἦ ποτε συγχωρήσαμ' ἂν ἀγνοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρωπὸν σωφρονεῖν. σχεδον γὰρ τι ἐγώγε αὑτῷ τούτῳ φημὶ εἶναι σωφροσύνην,

τὸ γυγνώσκειν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ συμφέρομαι τῷ ἐν

Δελφοῖς ἀναθέντι τὸ τοιοῦτον γράμμα. καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ τὸ γράμμα ἀνακείσθαι, ὡς ὡς πρόσρησις οὕσα τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν εἰσιόντων ἀντὶ τοῦ
CHARMIDÉS

doctor, in making someone healthy, makes a helpful result both for himself and for the person whom he cures.
I do.
And he who does this does his duty?
Yes.
Is not he who does his duty temperate?
Indeed he is.
Well, and must the doctor know when his medicine will be helpful, and when not? And must every craftsman know when he is likely to be benefited by the work he does, and when not?
Probably not.
Then sometimes, I went on, the doctor may have done what is helpful or harmful without knowing the effect of his own action; and yet, in doing what was helpful, by your statement, he has done temperately. Or did you not state that?
I did.
Then it would seem that in doing what is helpful he may sometimes do temperately and be temperate, but be ignorant of his own temperance?
But that, he said, Socrates, could never be: if you think this in any way a necessary inference from my previous admissions, I would rather withdraw some of them, and not be ashamed to say my statements were wrong, than concede at any time that a man who is ignorant of himself is temperate. For I would almost say that this very thing, self-knowledge, is temperance, and I am at one with him who put up the inscription of those words at Delphi. For the purpose of that inscription on the temple, as it seems to me, is to serve as the god’s salutation to those who
E. χαίρε, ὡς τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ὤρθού ὄντος τοῦ προσφη
ματος, τοῦ χαίρειν, οὐδὲ δεῖν τοῦτο παρακελευ
θειο ἀλλήλους ἀλλα σωφρονείν. οὕτω μὲν δὴ ὁ θεὸς
προσαγορεύει τοὺς εἰσιόντας εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν διαφέρον
tι ἢ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὡς διανοούμενοι ἀνέθηκεν ὁ
ἀναθεῖς, ὡς μοι δοκεῖ· καὶ λέγει πρὸς τὸν ἄει
eἰσιόντα οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ σωφρόνει, φησίν. αἰνιγμα-
tωδέστερον δὲ δὴ, ὡς μάντις, λέγει· τὸ γὰρ γνῶθι
σαυτὸν καὶ τὸ σωφρόνει ἐστι μὲν ταύτον, ὡς τὰ
165 γράμματα φησὶ καὶ ἐγώ, τάχα δ' ἂν τις οἰηθεὶς
ἄλλο εἶναι, ὁ δὴ μοι δοκοῦσι παθεῖν καὶ οἱ τὰ
ὑστερον γράμματα ἀναθέντες, τὸ τε μηδὲν ἄγων
καὶ τὸ ἐγγύῃ πάρα δ' ἁτῆ. καὶ γὰρ οὕτωι συμ-
βουλήν ἤχθησαν εἶναι τὸ γνῶθι σαυτὸν, ἀλλ' οὐ
tῶν εἰσιόντων [ἐνεκεν] 1 ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πρόσρησιν.
eἰθ' ῥνα δὴ καὶ σφεῖς μηδὲν ἦττον συμβουλάς
χρησίμους ἀναθείεν, ταῦτα γράψαντες ἀνέθεσαν.
οὐ δὴ οὐν ἐνεκα λέγω, ὡ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα πάντα,
tὸ δ' ἐστὶ· τὰ μὲν ἐμπροσθὲν σοι πάντα ἀφίμω.
Β' ἰσως μὲν γὰρ τι σὺ ἐλεγες περὶ αὐτῶν ὀρθότερον,
ίσως δ' ἐγώ, σαφές δ' οὐδὲν πάνυ ἢν ὃν ἐλέγομεν
νῦν δ' ἐθέλω τοῦτον σοι διδόναι λόγον, εἰ μὴ
ὀμολογεῖς σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ γνωσκέων αὐτὸν
ἐαυτὸν.
'Αλλ', ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὡ Κριτία, οὐ μὲν ὃς φάσκοντος
ἐμοῦ εἰδέναι, περὶ ὃν ἐρωτῶ, προσφέρῃ πρὸς μὲ,
kαὶ ἐὰν δὴ βούλωμαι, ὁμολογήσων κατ' δ' ὑπὸ
1 ἐνεκεν secl. Cobet.
2 ὁμολογήσων κατ' Ηeusde: ὁμολογήσων κατ' δ' miss.

1 Throughout this passage there is allusion to the thought
or wisdom implied in σωφρονείν, and here Critias seeks to
identify φρόνει (“think well,” “be wise”) with γνῶθι (“know,”
“understand”) in the inscription γνῶθι σαυτὸν at Delphi.
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enter it, instead of "Hail!"—this is a wrong form of greeting, and they should rather exhort one another with the words, "Be temperate!" And thus the god addresses those who are entering his temple in a mode which differs from that of men; such was the intention of the dedicator of the inscription in putting it up, I believe; and that he says to each man who enters, in reality, "Be temperate!" But he says it in a rather riddling fashion, as a prophet would; for "Know thyself!" and "Be temperate!" are the same, as the inscription 1 and I declare, though one is likely enough to think them different—an error into which I consider the dedicators of the later inscriptions fell when they put up "Nothing overmuch" 2 and "A pledge, and thereupon perdition." 3 For they supposed that "Know thyself!" was a piece of advice, and not the god's salutation of those who were entering; and so, in order that their dedications too might equally give pieces of useful advice, they wrote these words and dedicated them. Now my object in saying all this, Socrates, is to abandon to you all the previous argument—for, though perhaps it was you who were more in the right, or perhaps it was I, yet nothing at all certain emerged from our statements—and to proceed instead to satisfy you of this truth, if you do not admit it, that temperance is knowing oneself.

Why, Critias, I said, you treat me as though I professed to know the things on which I ask questions, and needed only the will to agree with you. But the

2 Μηδέν ἄγαν appears first in Theognis, 335.
3 Ἔγγυα πάρα δ' ἄη, an old saying on the rashness of giving a pledge, is quoted in a fragment of Cratinus, the elder rival of Aristophanes. Cf. Proverbs xi. 15—"He that is surety for a stranger shall smart for it."
οὐχ οὖτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ γὰρ μετὰ σοῦ ἄει τὸ προτιθέμενον διὰ τὸ μὴ αὐτὸς εἰδέναι: σκεφάμενος

C οὖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν εἰτε ὀμολογῶ εἰτε μὴ. ἀλλ' ἐπίσχες ἔως ἂν σκεφθώμαι.

Σκόπει δὴ, ἢ δ' ὁς.

Καὶ γὰρ, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, σκοπῶ. εἰ γὰρ δὴ γιγνώσκειν γέ τι ἐστιν ἡ σωφροσύνη, δήλον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τις ἂν εἰή καὶ τινός: ἢ οὔ;

'Εστιν, ἐφη, ἔαυτοῦ γε.

Οὐκόν καὶ ἰατρική, ἐφη, ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιείου;

Πάνυ γε.

Εἰ τοῖνυν με, ἐφη, ἔροισι σὺ, ἰατρικὴ ὑγιεινοῦ ἐπιστήμη οὐσα τί ἡμῖν χρησίμη ἐστὶ καὶ τί ἀπεργά-

ζεται, εἴπομι ἄν ὅτι οὐ σμικρὰν ὄφελειαν τὴν γὰρ ὑγίειαν καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται, εἰ ἀποδέχῃ τοῦτο.

'Αποδέχομαι.

Καὶ εἰ τοῖνυν με ἐροισι τὴν οἰκοδομικὴν, ἐπιστήμην οὐσαν τοῦ οἰκοδομεῖν, τί φημι ἔργον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, εἴπομι ἄν ὅτι οἰκήσεις: ὦ σαῦτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. χρὴ οὖν καὶ σὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἐπειδὴ φῆς αὐτήν ἕαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμην εἰναι, ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἑρωτηθέντα, ὦ Κριτία, σωφρο-

σύνη, ἐπιστήμη οὐσα ἕαυτοῦ, τί καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται καὶ ἅξιον τοῦ ὑνόματος; ἦθι οὖν, εἰπέ.

'Αλλ', ὦ Σώκρατε, ἐφη, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοία αὐτή πέφυκε ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις, οὕτως γε αἱ ἄλλαι ἄλλαις. ὥσ ὅς ὁμοίων οὕσον ποιῆ τὴν ζήτησιν. ἐπεὶ λέγει μοι, ἐφη, τῆς λογι-

στικῆς τέχνης ἢ τῆς γεωμετρικῆς τί ἐστι τοιοῦτον ἔργον οἷον οἰκία οἰκοδομικῆς ἢ ἰμάτιον υφαντικῆς

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fact of the matter is rather that I join you in the inquiry, each time that a proposition is made, because I myself do not know; I wish therefore to consider first, before I tell you whether I agree or not. Now, give me a moment to consider.

Consider then, he said.

Yes, and I am considering, I said. For if temperance is knowing anything, obviously it must be a kind of science, and a science of something, must it not?

It is, he replied, and of self.

And medicine, I said, is a science of health?

Certainly.

Then if you should ask me, I said, wherein medicine, as a science of health is useful to us, and what it produces, I should say it is of very great benefit, since it produces health; an excellent result, if you allow so much.

I allow it.

And so, if you should ask me what result I take to be produced by building, as the builder's science, I should say houses; and it would be the same with the other arts. Now it is for you, in your turn, to find an answer to a question regarding temperance—since you say it is a science of self, Critias—and to tell me what excellent result it produces for us, as science of self, and what it does that is worthy of its name. Come now, tell me.

But, Socrates, he said, you are not inquiring rightly. For in its nature it is not like the other sciences, any more than any of them is like any other; whereas you are making your inquiry as though they were alike. For tell me, he said, what result is there of the arts of reckoning and geometry, in the way that a house is of building, or a coat of
7 ἡ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἔργα, δὲ πολλὰ ἂν τις ἔχω πολλῶν
166 τεχνῶν δεῖξαι; ἔχεις οὖν μοι καὶ σὺ τούτων
tοιοῦτον τι ἔργον δεῖξαι; ἄλλ’ οὐχ ἔχεις.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἄλλα τόδε σου
ἔχω δεῖξαι, τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἐκάστη τούτων
tῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ὃ τυγχάνει ὃν ἄλλο αὐτῆς τῆς
ἐπιστήμης· οἶον ἡ λογιστική ἐστί ποι τοῦ ἀρτίου
καὶ τοῦ περιπτοῦ, πλήθους ὁπως ἔχει πρὸς αὐτὰ
καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἡ γάρ;

Πάνω γε, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἔτερον οὖντος τοῦ περιπτοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου
αὐτῆς τῆς λογιστικῆς;

Πῶς δ’ οὖ;  

B Καὶ μὴν αὐτ ἡ στατικὴ τοῦ βαρυτέρου καὶ κοιφο-
tέρου σταθμοῦ ἐστὶν [στατικὴ]· ἔτερον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ
βαρύ τε καὶ κοίφον τῆς στατικῆς αὐτῆς. συν-
χωρεῖς;

”Ἐγώγε.

Λέγε δὴ, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη,
ὁ τυγχάνει ἔτερον ὃν αὐτῆς τῆς σωφροσύνης;

Τούτῳ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο, ἔφη, ὡς Σωκράτης· ἐπ’ αὐτὸ
ηκεῖς ἑρευνῶν, ὅτι διαφέρει πασῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν
ἡ σωφροσύνη· σὺ δὲ ὁμοιότητα τῶν ζητείς αὐτῆς
C ταῖς ἄλλαις. τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἕστιν οὕτως, ἄλλ’ αἱ μὲν
ἄλλαι πᾶσαι ἄλλου εἰσὶν ἐπιστήμαι, ἑαυτῶν δ’ οὐ,
ἡ δὲ μόνῃ τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ
καὶ αὐτῇ ἑαυτῆς. καὶ ταῦτα σε πολλὸν δεῖ λελη-
θέναι, ἄλλα γάρ, οἴμαι, δ’ ἄρτι οὐκ ἔφησθα ποιεῖν,

1 στατικὴ secl. Heindorf.

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weaving, or other products of the sort that one might point to in various arts? Well, can you, for your part, point to any such product in those two cases? You cannot.

To this I replied: What you say is true; but I can point out to you what is the peculiar subject of each of these sciences, distinct in each case from the science itself. Thus reckoning, I suppose, is concerned with the even and the odd in their numerical relations to themselves and to one another, is it not?

Certainly, he said.

And you grant that the odd and the even are different from the actual art of reckoning?

Of course.

And once more, weighing is concerned with the heavier and the lighter weight; but the heavy and the light are different from the actual art of weighing: you agree?

I do.

Then tell me, what is that of which temperance is the science, differing from temperance itself?

There you are, Socrates, he said: you push your investigation up to the real question at issue—in what temperance differs from all the other sciences—but you then proceed to seek some resemblance between it and them; whereas there is no such thing, for while all the rest of the sciences have something other than themselves as their subject, this one alone is a science of the other sciences and of its own self. And of this you are far from being unconscious, since in fact, as I believe, you are doing the very thing you denied you were doing just now: for you are attempt-
τούτο ποιεῖς· ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ἐάσας περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστίν.

Ωκεύον, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, ποιεῖς ἡγούμενος, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα σὲ ἐλέγχω, ἀλλ' τινὸς ἐνεκα ἐλέγχειν ἢ οὔπερ

Δ ἐνεκα κἂν ἐμαυτὸν διερευνῶμην τί λέγω, φοβοῦμενος μή ποτε λάθω οἴόμενος μέν τι εἰδέναι, εἰδὼς δὲ μή. καὶ νῦν δὴ οὖν ἐγωγέ φημι τούτο ποιεῖν, τὸν λόγον σκοπεῖν μάλιστα μέν ἐμαυτοῦ ἐνεκα, ἵσως δὲ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστηδείων. ἢ οὐ κοινὸν οἷεὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι σχεδόν τι πάοιν ἀνθρώπους, γίγνεσθαι καταφανὲς ἐκαστοῦ τῶν ὧντων ὅτι ἔχει;

Καὶ μάλα, ἢ δ' ὦς, ἐγωγέ, ὡ Σώκρατες.

Θαρρῶν τοίνυν, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, ὡ μακάριε, ἀποκρυνόμενος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ὅτι σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν χαίρειν, Ε εἴτε Κριτίας ἐστὶν εἴτε Σωκράτης δ' ἐλεγχόμενος· ἄλλ' αὐτῷ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν τῷ λόγῳ σκόπειν ὅτι ποτὲ ἐκβήσεται ἐλεγχόμενος.

'Αλλά, ἔφη, ποιήσω οὕτω· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι μέτρια λέγειν.

Λέγε τοίνυν, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, περὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης πῶς λέγεις;

Λέγω τοίνυν, ἂν δ' ὦς, ὅσι μόνη τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αὐτῇ τε αὐτῆς ἐστι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη.

Οὐκοὖν, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη ἄν εἴῃ, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμης;

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

167 'Ο ἄρα σώφρων μόνος αὐτός τε ἑαυτὸν γνώσεται

1 σκόπει Heindorf: σκόπειν, σκόπειν mss.
ing to refute me, without troubling to follow the subject of our discussion.

How can you think, I said, if my main effort is to refute you, that I do it with any other motive than that which would impel me to investigate the meaning of my own words—from a fear of carelessly supposing, at any moment, that I knew something while I knew it not? And so it is now: that is what I am doing, I tell you. I am examining the argument mainly for my own sake, but also, perhaps, for that of my other intimates. Or do you not think it is for the common good, almost, of all men, that the truth about everything there is should be discovered?

Yes indeed, he replied, I do, Socrates.

Then take heart, I said, my admirable friend, and answer the question put to you as you deem the case to be, without caring a jot whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted: give the argument itself your attention, and observe what will become of it under the test of refutation.

Well, he said, I will do so; for I think there is a good deal in what you say.

Then tell me, I said, what you mean in regard to temperance.

Why, I mean, he said, that it alone of all the sciences is the science both of itself and of the other sciences.

So then, I said, it will be the science of the lack of science also, besides being the science of science? ¹

Certainly, he replied.

Then only the temperate person will know himself,

¹ Science or exact knowledge must be able to measure not only the field of knowledge, but also that of its negation, ignorance.
καὶ οἷός τε ἦσται ἐξετάσας τί τε τυγχάνει εἰδώς καὶ τί μή, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὡσαυτῶς δυνατὸς ἦσται ἐπισκοπεῖν, τί τις οἶδε καὶ οἶται, εἴπερ οἶδε, καὶ τί αὖ οἶται μὲν εἰδέναι, οἶδε δ’ οὖ, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδείς. καὶ ἦστι δὴ τούτῳ τὸ σωφρονεῖν τε καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν, τὸ εἰδέναι ἄ τε οἶδε καὶ ἀ μή οἶδεν. ἄρα ταῦτά ἦστιν ἄ λέγεις;

"Εγώγ’, ἐφη.

Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι,

Βῶσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπισκεψόμεθα, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δυνατὸν ἦστι τούτῳ εἶναι ἡ οὐ, τὸ δ’ οἶδε καὶ ἀ μή οἶδεν εἰδέναι ὅτι οἶδε καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν. ἐπειτα εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα δυνατὸν, τίς ἂν εἰ η ἡμῖν ὠφελίᾳ εἰδόσων αὐτό.

"Αλλὰ χρή, ἐφη, σκοπεῖν.

"Ιθι δὴ, ἐφην ἐγώ, ὡς Κρῖτια, σκέψαι, εὰν τι περὶ αὐτῶν εὑρομέτερος φαινήσῃ εἰμοῦ. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀπορῶ. ἢ δὲ ἀπορῶ, φράσω σοι;

Πάνυ γ’, ἐφη.

"Αλλο τι οὖν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, πάντα ταῦτ’ ἂν εἰη, εἰ ἦστιν ὅπερ οὐ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγες, μία τις ἐπιστήμη, ἢ

C οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἦστιν ἡ ἑαυτῆς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἡ αὐτῇ αὐτῇ;

Πάνυ γε.

"Ἰδὲ δὴ ὡς ἀτοπον ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ὡς ἐταῖρε, λέγειν· ἐν ἄλλους γὰρ ποὺ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐὰν σκοπῆς, δοξεῖ σοι, ὡς ἐγώμαι, ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

1 οὐ Bekker: οὐτίς mss.

1 It was the custom at banquets to dedicate a third and
and be able to discern what he really knows and
does not know, and have the power of judging what
other people likewise know and think they know, in
cases where they do know, and again, what they
think they know, without knowing it; everyone else
will be unable. And so this is being temperate, or
temperance, and knowing oneself—that one should
know what one knows and what one does not know.
Is that what you mean?
It is, he replied.
Once more then, I said, as our third offering to the
Saviour, let us consider afresh, in the first place,
whether such a thing as this is possible or not—to
know that one knows, and does not know, what one
knows and what one does not know; and secondly,
if this is perfectly possible, what benefit we get by
knowing it.
We must indeed consider, he said.
Come then, I said, Critias, consider if you can
show yourself any more resourceful than I am; for
I am at a loss. Shall I explain to you in what way?
By all means, he replied.
Well, I said, what all this comes to, if your last
statement was correct, is merely that there is one
science which is precisely a science of itself and of the
other sciences, and moreover is a science of the lack
of science at the same time.
Certainly.
Then mark what a strange statement it is that we
are attempting to make, my friend: for if you will
consider it as applied to other cases, you will surely
see—so I believe—its impossibility.

final wine-offering or toast to Zeus the Saviour. Cf. Pindar,
Isthm. v. initi.
Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῦ;
'Εν τοῖσδε, ἐννοεῖ γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ὁψις τις εἶναι, ἥ ὅν μὲν αἱ ἄλλαι ὁψεις εἰσὶν, οὔκ ἐστὶ τούτων ὁψις, ἐαυτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁψεων ὁψις ἐστὶ, δ καὶ μὴ ὁψεων ὁσαύτως, καὶ χρῶμα μὲν ὅρα ὄψειν ὁψις οὕσα, αὐτὴν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὁψεις· δοκεῖ τὸς σοι εἶναι τοιαύτη;
Μὰ Δ᾿ οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
Τὶ δὲ ἀκοῦν, ἢ φωνῆς μὲν οὐδεμᾶς ἀκοῦει, αὐτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀκοῶν ἀκούει καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀκοῶν;
Οὐδὲ τούτο.
Συλλήβδην δὴ σκόπει περὶ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, εἰ τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αἰσθήσεων μὲν αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἐαυτῆς, ὅν δὲ δὴ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνονται, μηδενὸς αἰσθανομένη;
Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
Ε ἁλλ' ἐπιθυμία δοκεῖ τὸς σοι εἶναι, ὡς ὡδονῆς μὲν οὐδεμᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία, αὐτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμίων;
Οὐ δὴτα.
Οὐδὲ μὴν βουλήσεις, ὡς ἐγέρμαι, ἢ ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὐδὲν βούλεται, αὐτὴν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας βουλήσεις βούλεται.
Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
"Ερωτα δὲ φαίης ἢν τῶν εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ὡς τυγχάνει ὃν ἐρως καλὸν μὲν οὐδενὸς, αὐτοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων;
Οὐκ, ἔφη, ἔγωγε.
Φόβοι δὲ ἡδὴ τῶν κατανενόηκας, ὡς ἐαυτὸν μὲν 168 καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους φόβους φοβεῖται, τῶν δεινῶν δ᾿ οὐδὲ ἐν φοβεῖται;
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How so? In what cases?
In the following: ask yourself if you think there is a sort of vision which is not the vision of things that we see in the ordinary way, but a vision of itself and of the other sorts of vision, and of the lack of vision likewise; which, while being vision, sees no colour, but only itself and the other sorts of vision. Do you think there is any such?
Upon my word, I do not.
And what do you say to a sort of hearing which hears not a single sound, but hears itself and the other sorts of hearing and lack of hearing?
I reject that also.
Then take all the senses together as a whole, and consider if you think there is any sense of the senses and of itself, but insensible of any of the things of which the other senses are sensible.
I do not.
Now, do you think there is any desire which is the desire, not of any pleasure, but of itself and of the other desires?
No, indeed.
Nor, again, is there a wish, I imagine, that wishes no good, but wishes itself and the other wishes.
Quite so; there is not.
And would you say there is any love of such a sort that it is actually a love of no beauty, but of itself and of the other loves?
Not I, he replied.
And have you ever observed any fear which fears itself and the other fears, but has no fear of a single dreadful thing?
Plato

Ou katanevóntka, éfêt.

Δόξαν δὲ δοξών δοξάν καὶ αὐτῆς, ὅν δὲ αἱ ἄλλαι δοξάζουσι μηδὲν δοξάζουσαν;

Οὐδαμῶς.

'Αλλ' ἐπιστήμην, ὡς ἔοικε, φαμέν τινα εἶναι τουιάτην, ἦτις μαθήματος μὲν οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, αὐτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη; εἰ:

Φαμὲν γὰρ.

Οὔκοιν ἄτοπον, εἰ ἁρα καὶ ἔστι; μηδὲν γὰρ πω δισχυριζόμεθα ὡς οὐκ ἔστων, ἀλλ' εἰ ἔστων ἐτι σκοπῶμεν.

Β 'Ορθῶς λέγεις.

Φέρε δὴ: ἔστι μὲν αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἔχει τινὰ τουιάτην δύναμιν ὥστε τινὸς εἶναι: ἡ γάρ;

Πάντως γέ.

Καὶ γάρ τὸ μειζὸν φαμὲν τουιάτην τινὰ ἔχειν δύναμιν, ὥστε τινὸς εἶναι μειζόν;

'Εχει γάρ.

Οὔκοιν ἐλάττονός τινος, εἴπερ ἔσται μειζόν.

'Ανάγκη.

Εἰ οὖν τι εὑρομεν μειζόν, ὁ τῶν μὲν μειζόνων ἐστὶ μειζόν καὶ ἑαυτῷ, ὅν δὲ τάλλα μειζὼ ἐστὶ μηδενός μειζόν, πάντως αὖ που ἐκεῖνό γ' αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, εἴπερ ἑαυτῷ μειζόν εἰη, καὶ ἐλάττον ἑαυτῷ εἶναι: ἡ οὖν;

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ὁ Σωκράτες.

Οὔκοιν καὶ εἰ τι διπλάσιον ἔστι τῶν τε ἄλλων

1 At this point Socrates adduces the relation of greater to smaller (τινὸς εἶναι μειζόν) to suggest a difficulty in conceiving a science to be a science of itself: in so doing he draws a
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No, I have not, he replied.
Or an opinion which is an opinion of opinions and
of itself, but without any opinion such as the other
opinions have?
By no means.
But it is apparently a science of this kind that we
are assuming—one that is a science of no branch of
study, but a science of itself and of the other sciences.
So we are.
And it is a strange thing, if it really exists? For
we should not affirm as yet that it does not exist,
but should still consider whether it does exist.
You are right.
Well now, this science is a science of something,
that is, it has a certain faculty whereby it can be a
science of something, has it not?
Certainly.
For, you know, we say the greater has a certain
faculty whereby it can be greater than something?¹
Quite so.
That is, than something smaller, if it is to be
greater.
Necessarily.
So if we could find a greater which is greater than
other greater things, and than itself, but not greater
than the things beside which the others are greater,
I take it there can be no doubt that it would be in
the situation of being, if greater than itself, at the
same time smaller than itself, would it not?
Most inevitably, Socrates, he said.
Or again, if there is a double of other doubles and
false analogy between two quite different uses of the genitive
in Greek, represented in English by the comparative “than”
and the objective “of.”
διπλασίων καὶ ἑαυτῶν, ἡμίσεος δήπον ὄντος ἑαυτῶν
tε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διπλάσιον ἂν εἰη· οὐ γάρ ἐστὶ
ποι ἄλλου διπλάσιον ἡ ἡμίσεος.
'Αληθῆ.
Πλέον δὲ αὐτῶν ὅν οὐ καὶ ἑλληττον ἔσται, καὶ
βαρύτερον ὅν κουφότερον, καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὅν
νεότερον, καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ὠσαύτως, ὃ τί περ ἂν
τὴν ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐχθή, οὐ καὶ ἐκεῖνην
ἐξεῖ τὴν οὐσίαν, πρὸς ἧν ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν ἡν;
λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· οἴον ἡ ἁκόη, φαμέν, οὐκ ἄλλου
τινὸς ἦν ἁκόη ἡ φωνής· ἡ γάρ;
Ναι.
Οὐκοὖν εἴπερ αὐτὴ ἡ ἁκόης ἀκούσεται, φωνὴν
ἐχούσης ἑαυτῆς ἀκούσεται· οὐ γάρ ἂν ἄλλως
ἀκούσειν.
Πολλῆ ἀνάγκη.
Καὶ ἡ ὄψις γε που, ὦ ἄριστε, εἴπερ ὄψεται αὐτῇ
ἐαυτῆς, χρώμα τι αὐτὴν ἀνάγκη ἐχειν· ἄχρων γάρ
Ε ὄψις οὐδέν [ἂν]¹ μὴ ποτε ἰδη.
Οὐ γάρ οὖν.
'Ορᾶς οὖν, ὥς Κριτία, ὅτι ὁσα διειληλύθαμεν, τὰ
μὲν αὐτῶν ἀδύνατα παντάπασι φαίνεται ἡμῖν, τὰ
δ' ἀπιστεῖται σφόδρα μὴ ποτ' ἂν τὴν ἑαυτῶν
δύναμιν πρὸς ἑαυτὰ σχεῖν; μεγέθη μὲν γὰρ καὶ
πλῆθη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα παντάπασι ἀδύνατον· ἡ
οὐχί;
Πάνω γε.
'Ακοὴ δ' αὖ καὶ ὄψις καὶ ἑτὶ γε κίνησις αὐτῇ
ἐαυτῆν κυμέν, καὶ θερμότης καλεῖν, καὶ πάντα αὖ
169 τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μὲν ἀπιστίαν <ἂν>² παράσχοι,
ἵσως δὲ τισιν οὐ. μεγάλον δὴ τινος, ὥς φίλε,
¹ ἀν seel. Stallbaum. ² ἀν add. Heindorf.
of itself, both it and the others must of course be
halves, if it is to be their double; for, you know, a
double cannot be "of" anything else than its half.

True.

And what is more than itself will also be less, and
the heavier will be lighter, and the older younger,
and so on with everything else: whatever has its
own faculty applied to itself will have also the
natural quality to which its faculty was applicable,
will it not? For instance, hearing is, as we say, just
a hearing of sound, is it not?

Yes.

So if it is to hear itself, it will hear a sound of its
own; for it would not hear otherwise.

Most inevitably.

And sight, I suppose, my excellent friend, if it is
to see itself, must needs have a colour; for sight can
never see what is colourless.

No more it can.

Then do you perceive, Critias, in the various cases
we have propounded, how some of them strike us as
absolutely impossible, while others raise serious
doubts as to the faculty of the thing being ever
applicable to itself? For with magnitudes, numbers,
and the like it is absolutely impossible, is it not?

Certainly.

But again, with hearing and sight, or in the further
cases of motion moving itself and heat burning itself,
and all other actions of the sort, the fact must appear
incredible to some, but perhaps not to others. So
what we want, my friend, is some great man who
ἀνδρὸς δεῖ, ὡστὶς τούτο κατὰ πάντων ἰκανῶς διαιρῆσεται, πότερον οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων τῇν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν αὐτὸ πρὸς ἐαυτῷ πέφυκεν ἐχεῖν [πλὴν ἐπιστήμης], ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλο, ἣ τα μέν, τὰ δ’ οὔ· καὶ εἰ ἐστιν αὐτ καὶ αὐτά πρὸς ἐαυτὰ ἐχεῖ, ἄρ’ ἐν τούτους ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ἣν δὴ ἥμεις σωφροσύνην φαμὲν εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ πιστεύω ἐμαυτῷ ἰκανὸς εἶναι τάυτα διελέσθαι· διὸ καὶ οὕτ’ εἰ δυνατόν ἔστι

Β τούτῳ γενέσθαι, ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, ἐχω δυσχυρίσασθαι, οὔτ’ εἰ ὦτι μάλιστα ἐστιν, σωφροσύνην ἀποδέχομαι αὐτὸ εἶναι, πρὶν ἂν ἐπισκέψωμαι, εἰτε τι ἀν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοὶ τουτόν ὄν, εἰτε μὴ. τὴν γὰρ οὖν δὴ σωφροσύνην ὠφέλιμον τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν μαντεύομαι εἶναι· σο οὖν, ὦ παῖ Καλλαίσχροι—

τίθεσαι γὰρ σωφροσύνην τοῦτ’ εἶναι, ἐπιστήμης καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης—πρῶτον μὲν τούτῳ ἐνδείξαι, ὅτι δυνατὸν [ἀποδείξαι] σε 2 δ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ἔπειτα πρὸς τῷ δυνατῷ ὦτι καὶ

C ὠφέλιμον· κἀμὲ τάξ’ ἂν ἀποτπληρώσασις, ὡς ὅρθως λέγεις περὶ σωφροσύνης, δ’ ἐστιν.

Καὶ ὁ Κριτίας ἀκούσας τάυτα καὶ ἰδὼν μὲ ἀποροῦντα, ὥσπερ οἱ τούς χασμωμένους καταντικρὺ ὁρὼντες ταύτον τοῦτο συμπάσχουσιν, κάκεινοι ἐδοξέ μοι ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ ἀποροῦντος ἀναγκασθῆναι καὶ αὐτὸς ἀλών ὑπὸ ἀπορίας. ἀτε οὖν εὐδοκίμων ἐκάστοτε, ἥσχυνετο τοὺς παρόντας, καὶ οὕτε συγχωρήσας μοι ὡθελεν ἀδύνατος εἶναι διελέσθαι

D ἡ προὔκαλομυ̣μὴν αὐτὸν, ἔλεγε τε οὐδὲν σαφές, ἐπικαλύπτων τὴν ἄπορίαν. καγὼ ἡμῖν ἣν ὁ λόγος προῖν, ἐφ’ Ἀλλ’ εἰ δοκεῖ, ὑ Κριτία, νῦν μὲν

1 πλὴν ἐπιστήμης secl. Schleiermacher.
2 ἀποδείξαι se cl. Heindorf.
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will determine to our satisfaction in every respect whether there is nothing in nature so constituted as to have its own faculty applicable to itself, and not only some other object, or whether there are some such, and others not such; and whether, again, if there are things that have such relation to themselves, they include a science which we assert to be temperance. For my part, I distrust my own competence to determine these questions, and hence I am neither able to affirm whether it is possible that there should be a science of science, nor willing, let it be ever so true, to acknowledge this to be temperance until I have made out whether such a thing as this would benefit us or not. For, you see, I have a presentiment that temperance is something beneficial and good; and you, therefore, son of Callaeschrus—since you lay it down that temperance is this very science of science, and moreover of the lack of science—shall first indicate the possibility, as I put it just now, and then the benefit added to the possibility, of such a thing; and perhaps you will then satisfy me that your definition of temperance is correct.

Now when Critias heard this and saw me in a difficulty, he seemed to me—just as the sight of someone yawning opposite causes people to be affected in the same way—to be compelled by the sense of my difficulty to be caught in a difficulty himself. And so, since he usually contrived to distinguish himself, he was too ashamed to bring himself to admit to me before the company that he was unable to determine the questions with which I challenged him, but made a very indistinct reply in order to conceal his difficulty. Then I, to forward the discussion, remarked: Well, if you prefer, Critias, let
τούτο συγχωρήσωμεν, δυνατόν εἶναι γενέσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης: αὕθις δὲ ἐπισκεφθόμεθα εἴτε οὕτως ἔχει εἰτε μή. ὥθι δὴ οὖν, εἰ ὦτι μάλιστα δυνατὸν τοῦτο, τί μᾶλλον οἶνον τέ ἐστιν εἰδέναι ἢ τέ τις οἶδε καὶ ἡ μή; τούτῳ γὰρ δήποτε ἐφαμεν εἶναι τὸ γυγνώσκειν αὐτὸν καὶ σωφρονεῖν ἢ γάρ;

Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὦς, καὶ συμβαίνει γε ποὺ, ὦ

Ε Ἐσώκρατες. εἰ γάρ τις ἔχει ἐπιστήμην ἢ αὕτη αὐτὴν γυγνώσκει, τοιοῦτος ἂν αὐτὸς εἰῃ οἴοντερ ἐστὶν δ' ἔχει. ὥστε ὅταν τάχος τις ἔχῃ, ταχὺς, καὶ ὅταν κάλλος, καλὸς, καὶ ὅταν γυγνῶσκων ὅταν δὲ δὴ γυγνῶσιν αὕτην αὐτὴς τις ἔχῃ, γυγνώσκων ποὺ αὐτὸς ἐαυτὸν τότε ἐσται.

Οὐ τούτω, ἥν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀμφισβητῶ, ὡς οὖχ ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γυγνώσκον τις ἔχῃ, αὐτὸς αὐτὸν γυγνῶσεται, ἀλλ' ἔχοντι τοῦτο τίς ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ἢ τε οἶδε καὶ ἡ μή οἶδεν;

170 Ὅτι, ὦ Ἐσώκρατες, ταύτων ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνον.

'Ἰσως, ἔφην, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ κυνικεύω ἃεὶ ὄμοιος εἰναι; οὐ γάρ αὐ μανθάνω ὡς ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡ οἶδεν εἰδέναι καὶ ἡ τις μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι.

Πῶς λέγεις, ἔφη;

'Ωδε, ἥν δ' ἐγώ. ἐπιστήμη ποὺ ἐπιστήμης οὐδα ἄρα πλείον τι ὦτα τ' ἐσται διαμερίστω, ἥ ὅτι τούτων τόδε μὲν ἐπιστήμη, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ;

Οὖκ, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον.

B Ταύτων οὖν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη υγιεινοῦ, καὶ ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη δικαίου;

Οὖδαμῶς.

'Αλλὰ τὸ μέν, ὀμαί, ἰατρικῆ, τὸ δ' πολιτικῆ, τὸ δ' οὐδὲν ἀλλο ἡ ἐπιστήμη.

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us concede for the moment that there may possibly be a science of science: some other time we shall consider whether such is the fact or not. Come then; suppose it is perfectly possible: how is one helped thereby to know what one knows and does not know? For this, you are aware, we said \(^1 \) was the meaning of self-knowledge and temperance, did we not?

Certainly, he said; and it must surely follow, Socrates; for if a man has a science which knows itself, he will be similar himself to that which he has. For instance, he who has swiftness will be swift, he who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has knowledge will know; and when he has knowledge that is of itself, he will then, surely, be in the position of knowing himself.

I do not dispute, I said, that when a man has that which knows itself he will know himself; but having that, how is he bound to know what he knows and what he does not know?

Because, Socrates, the two things are the same.

I daresay, I said; but I am afraid I am still my old self: I still do not see how knowing what one knows and does not know is the same as the other.

How do you mean? he asked.

In this way, I replied: will a science of science, if such exists, be able to do more than determine that one of two things is science, and the other is not science?

No, only that.

Now, is science or lack of science of health the same as science or lack of science of justice?

By no means.

For the one, I suppose, is medicine, and the other politics, while the thing in question is merely science.

\(^1\) 167 \(\alpha\).
Πώς γὰρ οὖ, ὦ
Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὴ προσεπιστήσηταί τις τὸ ὑγιεῖνον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἄλλ' ἐπιστήμην μόνον γυγνῶσκη ἄτε τοῦτο μόνον ἐχὼν ἐπιστήμην, ὅτι μὲν τι ἐπίσταται καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχει, εἰκότως ἂν γυγνῶσκοι καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἢ γὰρ;
Ναι.
C Ὡ τι δὲ γυγνῶσκει, ταύτη τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ πῶς εἶσεται; γυγνῶσκει γὰρ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὑγιεῖνον τῇ ἰατρικῇ ἄλλ' οὖ σωφροσύνῃ, τὸ δ' ἁρμονικὸν μουσικῇ ἄλλ' οὖ σωφροσύνῃ, τὸ δ' ὀικοδομικὸν οἰκοδομικῇ ἄλλ' οὖ σωφροσύνῃ, καὶ οὔτω πάντα· ἢ οὖ;
Φαίνεται.
Σωφροσύνη δὲ, εἴτερ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμην, πῶς εἶσεται ὅτι τὸ ὑγιεῖνον γυγνῶσκει ἢ ὅτι τὸ οἰκοδομικὸν;
Οὐδαμῶς.
Οὐκ ᾣρα εἶσεται ὅ οἴδεν ὁ τοῦτο ἄγνωσώ, ἄλλ' ὅτι οἴδε μόνον.
"Εοικεν.
D Οὐκ ᾣρα σωφρονεῖν τοῦτ' ἂν εἰή οὐδὲ σωφροσύνη, εἰδέναι ἂ τε οἴδε καὶ ἄ μὴ οἴδεν, ἄλλ', ὡς ἐοικεν, ὅτι οἴδε καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἴδε μόνον.
Κινδυνεύει.
Οὐδὲ ἄλλων ᾣρα οἶδος τε ἑσται οὗτος ἑξετάσαι φάσκοντα τι ἐπίστασθαι, πότερον ἐπίσταται ἢ φησιν ἐπίστασθαι ἢ οὐκ ἐπίσταται· ἄλλα τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὡς ἐοικε, γνώσεται, ὅτι ἔχει τινὰ ἐπιστήμην, ὅτου δὲ γε, ἢ σωφροσύνη οὐ ποιήσει αὐτὸν γυγνῶσκειν.
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Yes, to be sure.
And if a man has no added knowledge of health and justice, but knows only science, as having science of that alone, he will probably know that he has a certain piece of scientific knowledge about himself and about other people, will he not?
Yes.
But how will this science help him to know what he knows? For of course he knows health by means of medicine, not temperance, and harmony by means of music, not temperance, and building by means of the builder's art, not temperance; and so it will be in every case, will it not?
Apparently.
And how will temperance, supposing it is only a science of sciences, help him to know that he knows health, or that he knows building?
By no means.
Then he who is ignorant of all this will not know what he knows, but only that he knows.
So it seems.
Then being temperate, or temperance, will not be this knowledge of what one knows or does not know, but, it would seem, merely knowing that one knows or does not know.
It looks like it.
Then such a person will also be unable to examine another man's claim to some knowledge, and make out whether he knows or does not know what he says he knows: he will merely know, it would seem, that he has a certain knowledge; but of what it is, temperance will not cause him to know.
Οὐ φαίνεται.

Ε Ὡστε ἄρα τὸν προσποιούμενον ἰατρὸν εἶναι, ὡντα δὲ μὴ, καὶ τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὡντα οἷος ὑπ' ἐσταὶ διακρίνειν, ὡστε ἀλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐπιστημόνων καὶ μὴ. σκεφώμεθα δὲ ἐκ τῶν δι' εἰ μέλλει ὁ σώφρων ἡ στοιςοῦν ἄλλος τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν διαγνώσεσθαι καὶ τὸν μὴ, ἀρ' οὖχ ὡδε ποιήσει· περὶ μὲν ἰατρικῆς δήποτα αὐτῷ οὐ διαλέξεται· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπαθεί, ὡς ἐφαμεν, δ' ἰατρὸς ἄλλ' ἡ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ νοσῶδες· ἡ οὐ;

Ναι, οὔτως.

Περὶ δὲ γε ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ δὴ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ μόνῃ ἀπέδομεν.

Ναι.

Οὐδὲ περὶ ἰατρικῆς ἄρα οἶδεν ὁ ἰατρικός, ἐπεὶ-171 δήπερ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη οὔσα τυγχάνει.

'Αληθῆ.

"Ὅτι μὲν δὴ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχει, γνώσεται ὁ σώφρων τὸν ἰατρὸν· δέον δὲ πειραν λαβεῖν ἡτὶς ἔστιν, ἄλλο τι σκέφτεται ἀντινων; ἡ οὖ τούτῳ ἀρισταί ἐκάστη ἐπιστήμη μὴ μόνον ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τίς, τῶν τινῶν εἶναι;

Τούτῳ μὲν οὖν.

Καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὴ ἐτέρα εἶναι τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐπιστημονῶν ἀρίσθη τῷ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ εἶναι καὶ νοσῶδους ἐπιστήμης.

Ναι.

Οὐκοῦν εὼ τούτως ἀναγκαῖον σκοπεῖν τὸν βου-Β λόμενον ἰατρικὴν σκοπεῖν, ἐν οἷς ποτ' ἔστω· οὐ γὰρ δήποτα ἐν γε τοῖς ἔξω, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστων;

Οὐ δήτα.

1 δέον δὲ Goldbacher: δεὶ δὴ, δὲ δὴ miss.
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Apparently not.
So he will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is none, from the man who really is one, nor any other man who has knowledge from him who has none. But let us consider it another way: if the temperate man or anybody else would discriminate between the true doctor and the false, he will go to work thus, will he not? He will surely not talk to him about medicine; for, as we were saying, the doctor understands nothing else but health and disease. Is not that so?
Yes, it is.
But about science he knows nothing, for that, you know, we assigned to temperance alone.
Yes.
So the medical man knows nothing about medicine either, since medicine is, of course, a science.
True.
Then the temperate man will know, indeed, that the doctor has a certain science; but when he has to put its nature to the proof, must he not consider what its subjects are? Is not each science marked out, not merely as a science, but as a particular one, by the particular subjects it has?
It is, to be sure
And medicine is marked out as different from the other sciences by being a science of health and disease.
Yes.
And so anyone who wishes to inquire into medicine must make those things, whatever they may be, with which it is concerned, the matter of his inquiry; not those foreign things, I presume, with which it is not?
No, indeed.
Ἐν τοῖς ἔγονοις ἄρα καὶ νοσώδεσιν ἐπισκέψεται τὸν ἰατρόν, ἡ ἰατρικὸς ἑστιν, ὁ ὀρθῶς σκοποῦμενος. 

"Εοικεν.

Οὐκοίν ἐν τοῖς ὦτως ἡ λεγομένοις ἡ πραττομένοις τὰ μὲν λεγόμενα, εἰ ἁληθῆ λέγεται, σκοποῦμενος, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα, εἰ ὀρθῶς πράττεται;

'Ανάγκη.

'Ἡ οὖν ἄνευ ἰατρικῆς δύνατι ἂν τοὺς τούτων ποτέρους ἐπακολουθήσαι; 

Οὐ δήτα.

C Ουδέ γε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς, ὡς έοικε, πλὴν ἰατρός, οὔτε δὴ ὁ σώφρων ἰατρὸς γὰρ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

"Εστι ταῦτα.

Παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον, εἰ ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη μόνον ἑστὶ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης, οὔτε ἰατρὸν διακρίναι οἷα τε ἐσται ἐπιστάμενον τὰ τῆς τέχνης ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον, προσποιούμενον δὲ ἢ οἰόμενον, οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐπισταμένων καὶ οἰόμοιν, πλὴν γε τὸν αὐτοῦ ὁμότεχνον, ὧσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί.

Φαίνεται, ἑφη.

D Τὸς οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ὁ Κριτία, ὀψελία ἡμῶν έτι ἂν εἴη ἀπὸ τῆς σωφροσύνης τουαύτης οὕσης; εἰ μὲν γὰρ, ὦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπετιθέμεθα, ήδει ὁ σώφρων ἃ τε ήδει καὶ ἢ μὴ ήδει, τὰ μὲν ὦτι οἶδε, τὰ δ' ὦτι οὐκ οἶδε, καὶ ἄλλον ταυτὸν τούτῳ πεπονθότα ἐπισκέψασθαι οἷος τε ἢν, μεγαλώστι ἂν ἡμῖν, φαμέν, ὀψελίῳ ἢν σωφροσύνη εἶναι ἀναμάρτητοι γὰρ ἂν τὸν βίον διεξόμενα αὐτοὶ τε καὶ ἡμῖν σωφροσύνην ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι ὑφ' 

1 καὶ del. Heindorf.
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Then he who conducts his inquiry aright will consider the doctor, as a medical man, in connexion with cases of health and disease.

So it seems.

And will inquire whether, in what is said or done in such cases, his words are truly spoken, and his acts rightly done?

He must.

Well now, could anyone follow up either of these points without the medical art?

No, indeed.

Nobody at all, it would seem, but a doctor; and so not the temperate man either: for he would have to be a doctor, in addition to his temperance.

That is so.

Then inevitably, if temperance is only a science of science and of lack of science, it will be equally unable to distinguish a doctor who knows the business of his art from one who does not know but pretends or thinks he does, and any other person who has knowledge of anything at all: one will only distinguish one’s fellow-artist, as craftsmen usually can.

Apparently, he said.

Then what benefit, I asked, Critias, can we still look for from temperance, if it is like that? For if, as we began by assuming, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know, and that he knows the one and does not know the other, and if he were able to observe this same condition in another man, it would be vastly to our benefit, we agree, to be temperate; since we should pass all our lives, both we who had temperance and all the rest
Ε ἡμῶν ἡρχομαι. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν αὐτὸι ἐπεξερεύμεν
πράττειν ἃ μὴ ἡπιστάμεθα, ἀλλ' εξευρίσκουντε
τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἐκεῖνοι ἂν παρεδίδομεν, οὔτε
τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπετρέπομεν, ὡν ἡρχομεν, ἀλλο τι
πράττειν ἢ ὃ τι πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐμελλον πράξειν·
tούτο δ' ἦν ἂν, οὔ ἐπιστήμην εἰχον· καὶ οὔτω δὴ
ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης οἰκία τε ὀικουμένη ἐμελλε καλῶς
οἰκείσθαι, πόλις τε πολυτευμένη, καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν οὐ
172 σωφροσύνη ἄρχον· ἀμαρτίας γὰρ ἐξηρημένης, ὀρθό-
τητος δὲ ἡγουμένης, ἐν πάσῃ πράξει ἀναγκαῖον
καλῶς καὶ εὗ πράττειν τοὺς οὔτω διακεμένους,
toûς δὲ εὗ πράττοντας εὐδαίμονας εἶναι. ἄρ' οὖχ
οὗτως, ἢν δ' ἔγω, ὡς Κριτία, ἐλέγομεν περὶ σωφρο-
σύνης, λέγοντες δὲν ἄγαθον εἰ ὁ το εἰδέναι ἄ τε
οἴδε τις καὶ ἢ μὴ οἴδεν;
Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὖτως.
Νῦν δὲ, ἢν δ' ἔγω, ὥς ὁ οὐδαμον ἐπιστήμην
οὐδεμία τοιαύτη οὖσα πέφανται.
'Ορω, ἔφη.

Β ὃς οὖν, ἢν δ' ἔγω, τοῦτ' ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢν νῦν
εὐρίσκομεν σωφροσύνην οὖσαν, τὸ ἐπιστήμην ἐπί-
στασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ὅτι δ' ταύτην ἔχων,
δ' τι ἂν ἄλλο μανθάνῃ, ῥάον τε μαθήσεται καὶ ἐν-
αργέστερα πάντα αὐτῷ φανεῖται, ἀτε πρὸς ἐκάστῳ
ὡς ἂν μανθάνῃ προσκαθορῶντι τὴν ἐπιστήμην·
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δὴ κάλλιον ἔξετάσει περὶ δὲν ἂν
καὶ αὐτὸς μάθη, οἰ δὲ οὖν τοῦτο ἔξετάζοντες
ἀοδενέστερον καὶ φαυλότερον τοῦτο δράσουσιν;
 ἄρ', ὡ φίλε, τοιαύτ' ἀττα ἔστιν ἡ ἀπολαυσόμεθα
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who were governed by us, without error. For neither should we ourselves attempt to do what we did not know, instead of finding out those who knew and placing the matter in their hands, nor should we permit others under our governance to do anything but what they were likely to do aright; and they would do that when they had knowledge of it; and so it would be that a house which was ordered, or a state which was administered, as temperance bade, and everything else that was ruled by temperance, could not but be well ordered; for with error abolished, and rightness leading, in their every action men would be bound to do honourably and well under such conditions, and those who did well would be happy. Did we not so speak of temperance, I said, Critias, when we remarked how great a boon it was to know what one knows and what one does not know?

To be sure we did, he replied.

Whereas now, I went on, you see that nowhere can any such science be found.

I see, he said.

Then may we say, I asked, that there is this good point in the knowledge of knowledge and of lack of knowledge, which we now find to be what temperance is, that he who has it will not only learn more easily whatever he learns, but will perceive everything more plainly, since besides the particular things that he learns he will behold the science; and hence he will probe more surely the state of other men respecting the things which he has learnt himself, while those who probe without such knowledge will do it more feebly and poorly? Are these, my friend, the kind of advantages that we shall gain from temperance?
PLATO

C τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἡμεῖς δὲ μείζόν τι βλέπομεν καὶ ζητοῦμεν αὐτὸ μείζόν τι εἶναι ἡ ὄσον ἐστὶν;
Τάχα δ' ἄν, ἡφη, οὖτως ἔχοι.

*Ἰσως, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ· ἴσως δὲ γε ἡμεῖς οὐδὲν χρη- στὸν ἐξητήσαμεν. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ, ὅτι μοι ἀτοπ' ἀττα καταφαίνεται περὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰ τοιοῦτον ἐστιν. ἵδωμεν γάρ, εἰ βούλει, συγχωρήσαντες καὶ ἐπιστασθαί ἐπιστήμην δυνατὸν εἶναι [εἰδέναι],
καὶ δ' ἣ γε ἡ ἀρχή ἐπιθέμεθα σωφροσύνην εἶναι, τὸ εἰδέναι τ' ὑπὸ τὰ ὀφθαλμεν, ὁ ᾿Αλλὰ δώμεν· καὶ πάντα ταῦτα δόντες ἐτί βελτίων σκέψῳμεθα, εἰ ἄρα τι καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐνέσαι τοιοῦτον ὄν.
δ' ἵνα νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὡς μέγα ἢν εἰς ἀγαθὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη, εἰ τοιοῦτον ἐν, ἡγουμένη διικτήσεως καὶ οἰκίας καὶ πόλεως, ὅμοιοι δοκοῦμεν, ᾿Ω Κρίτια, καλῶς ὀμολογηκέναι.

Πῶς δή; ἢ δ' ὅσ.

"Οτι, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ῥαδίως ὀμολογήσαμεν μέγα τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, εἰ ἐκαστοὶ ἡμῶν, δὲ μὲν ἵσασι, πράστοιεν ταῦτα, δὲ μὴ ἐπίσταστο, ἄλλως παραδιδοῦεν τοῖς ἐπισταμένοις.

Ε Ὅνικ οὖν, ἡφη, καλῶς ὀμολογήσαμεν;
Οὐ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ.

"Ατοπα λέγεις ὡς ἀλήθῶς, ἡφη, ὃ Σώκρατες.

Νὴ τὸν κῦνα, ἡφην, καὶ ἐμοὶ τὸ δοκεῖ οὖτω· κανταύθα καὶ ἀρτι ἀποβλέψας ἀτοπά γ' ἡφην μοι προφαίνεσθαι, καὶ ἦτοι φοβοίμην μὴ οὖκ ὀρθῶς σκοποῦμεν. ὡς ἀλήθῶς γάρ, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τοιοῦτον ἐστιν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐδὲν μοι δῆλον 173 εἶναι δοκεί ὁ τι ἀγαθὸν ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάζεται.

1 εἰδέναι secl. Heusde.
But are we really looking at something greater, and requiring it to be something greater than it really is? Probably, he replied, that is so.

I daresay, I said; and I daresay also our inquiry has been worthless. And this I conclude, because I observe certain strange facts about temperance, if it is anything like that. For suppose, if you please, we concede that there may possibly be a science of science, and let us grant, and not withdraw, our original proposition that temperance is the knowledge of what one knows and does not know; granting all this, let us still more thoroughly inquire whether on these terms it will be of any profit to us. For our suggestion just now, that temperance of that sort, as our guide in ordering house or state, must be a great boon, was not, to my thinking, Critias, a proper admission.

How so? he asked.

Because, I replied, we too lightly admitted that it would be a great boon to mankind if each of us should do what he knows, but should place what he did not know in the hands of others who had the knowledge.

Well, was that, he asked, not a proper admission?

Not to my mind, I answered.

In very truth, your words are strange! he said, Socrates.

Yes, by the Dog, I said, and they strike me too in the same way; and it was in view of this, just now, that I spoke of strange results that I noticed, and said I feared we were not inquiring rightly. For in truth, let temperance be ever so much what we say it is, I see nothing to show what good effect it has on us.

\[2 \text{oūtōs kανταῦθα Hermann: oūtōs eι ενταῦθα, oūtōs, oūtωσι} \text{éntaúdo} \text{MSS.}\]
Πῶς δή; ἢ δ' ὦς. λέγε, ἵνα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰδώμεν ὁ τι λέγεις.

Οἴμαι μὲν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ληρεῖν με· ὃμως τὸ γε προφανομένου ἀναγκαῖον σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ εἰκῇ παρεῖναι, εἰ τίς γε αὐτοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν κηδεται.

Καλῶς γάρ, ἐφη, λέγεις.

"Ἀκούε δή, ἐφην, τὸ ἐμὸν ὄναρ, εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι’ ἐλέφαντος ἐλήλυθεν. εἰ γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα ἡμῶν ἀρχοὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὔσα οἷαν νῦν ὀριζόμεθα, 

Β ἀλλο τι κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας πάντ’ ἄν πράττοιτο, καὶ οὔτε τις κυβερνήτης φάσκων εἰναι, ὡν δὲ οὗ, ἔξαπατῶ ἢν ἡμᾶς, οὔτε ἱατρὸς οὔτε στρατηγὸς οὔτ’ ἀλλος οὐδεὶς, προσποιούμενος τι εἰδέναι δ’ ἡμ’ οἶδε, λανθάνοι ἃν· ἐκ δὴ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἄλλο ἢν ἡμῖν τι συμβαίνῃ ὃς ὑγιέσι τε τὰ σώματα εἰναι μᾶλλον ἡ νῦν, καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ κινδυνεύοντας καὶ ἐν πολέμω σωζέσθαι, καὶ τὰ σκεῦς καὶ τὴν ἀμπε-

C χόνην καὶ ύπόδεσσιν πᾶσαν καὶ τὰ χρήματα πάντα τεχνικῶς ἡμῖν εἰργασμένα εἰναι καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀληθινοῖς δημιουργοῖς χρῆσθαι; εἰ δὲ βούλοις γε, καὶ τὴν μαντικὴν εῖναι συγχωρήσωμεν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι, καὶ τὴν σωφρο-

σύνην, αὐτῆς ἐπιστατοῦσαν, τοὺς μὲν ἀλαζόνας ἀποτρέπειν, τοὺς δὲ ὅς ἀληθῶς μάντεις καθιστάναι ἢμῖν προφήτας τῶν μελλόντων. κατεσκευασμένον δὴ οὕτω τὸ ἀνθρώπον γένος ὅτι μὲν ἐπιστημόνως

D ἃν πράττοι καὶ ξώῃ, ἐπομαι· ἡ γὰρ σωφροσύνη φυλάττουσα οὐκ ἃν ἐνὶ παρεμπιπτοῦσαν τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην συνεργῆν ἠμῶν εἰναι· ὅτι δ’ ἐπιστημόνως ἃν πράττοιτε εἰ δ’ ἄν πράττοιμεν καὶ

1 πάντ’ ἄν Burnet: πάντα Stobaeus, ἄν mss.
2 ἢ add. Heindorf.
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How so? he asked: tell us, in order that we on our side may know what you mean.

I expect, I said, I am talking nonsense: but still one is bound to consider what occurs to one, and not idly ignore it, if one has even a little concern for oneself.

And you are quite right, he said.

Hear then, I said, my dream, whether it has come through horn or through ivory.¹ Suppose that temperance were such as we now define her, and that she had entire control of us: must it not be that every act would be done according to the sciences, and no one professing to be a pilot when he was not would deceive us, nor would a doctor, nor a general, nor anyone else pretending to know something he did not know, go undetected; and would not these conditions result in our having greater bodily health than we have now, safety in perils of the sea and war, and skilful workmanship in all our utensils, our clothes, our shoes, nay, everything about us, and various things besides, because we should be employing genuine craftsmen? And if you liked, we might concede that prophecy, as the knowledge of what is to be, and temperance directing her, will deter the charlatans, and establish the true prophets as our prognosticators. Thus equipped, the human race would indeed act and live according to knowledge, I grant you (for temperance, on the watch, would not suffer ignorance to foist herself in and take a hand in our labours), but that by acting according to knowledge we should do well and be happy—this is a

¹ Cf. Homer, Od. xix. 562 foll. Dreams are there described as issuing from two gates: dreams that come true are from the gate of horn; deceitful dreams are from the gate of ivory.
εὐδαίμονόμεν, τοῦτο δὲ οὕτω δυνάμεθα μαθεῖν, ὃ φίλε Κριτία.

'Αλλὰ μέντοι, ἦ δ' ὅσ, οὐ μιᾶς εὐρήσεις ἄλλο τι τελος τοῦ εὕ πράττειν, ἕαν τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἀτιμάσθης.

Σμικρὸν τοίνυν με, ἦν δ' ἔγω, ἔτι προσδίδαξον. τῶν ἐπιστημόνως λέγεις; ἡ σκυτῶν τομῆς;

Ε Ἔ Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

'Αλλὰ χαλκοῦ ἑργασίας;

Οὐδαμῶς.

'Αλλὰ ἐρίων ἡ ἕυλων ἡ ἄλλον τοῦ τῶν τοιούτων;

Οὐ δήτα.

Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἔγω, ἔτι ἐμμένομεν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ εὐδαιμόνα εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα. οὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντες οὐχ ὀμολογοῦνται παρὰ σοῦ εὐδαιμόνες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ τινῶν ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντας ὁ δοκεῖς μοι ἀφορίζεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμόνα. καὶ ἱσως λέγεις ὅν νῦν δὴ ἔγω ἐλεγον, τὸν εἰδότα

174 τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι πάντα, τὸν μάντιν. τοῦτον ἡ ἄλλον τινὰ λέγεις;

Καὶ τοῦτον ἔγωγε, ἔφη, καὶ ἄλλον.

Τίνα; ἦν δ' ἔγω. ἄρα μὴ τὸν τοιόνδε, εἰ τις πρὸς τοὺς μέλλουσι καὶ τὰ γεγονότα πάντα εἰδεῖς καὶ τὰ νῦν ὑπά, καὶ μηδὲν ἄγνοοὶ; θῶμεν γὰρ τίνα εἶναι αὐτὸν. οὐ γὰρ, οἶμαι, τοῦτον γ' ἔτι ἂν εἶποι οὐδένα ἐπιστημονέστερον ζῶντα εἶναι.

Οὐ δήτα.

Τόδε δὴ ἔτι προσποθῶ, τίς αὐτὸν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ποιεῖ εὐδαιμόνα; ἡ ἀπασαι ὦμοιως;

1 ζῶντα Schleiermacher; ζῶντων mss.

2 σὺ Bekker: εὖ mss.
point which as yet we are unable to make out, my dear Critias.

But still, he replied, you will have some difficulty in finding any other fulfilment of welfare if you reject the rule of knowledge.

Then inform me further, I said, on one more little matter. Of what is this knowledge? Do you mean of shoe-making?

Good heavens, not I!

Well, of working in brass?

By no means.

Well, in wool, or in wood, or in something else of that sort?

No, indeed.

Then we no longer hold, I said, to the statement that he who lives according to knowledge is happy; for these workers, though they live according to knowledge, are not acknowledged by you to be happy: you rather delimit the happy man, it seems to me, as one who lives according to knowledge about certain things. And I daresay you are referring to my instance of a moment ago, the man who knows all that is to come, the prophet. Do you refer to him or to someone else?

Yes, I refer to him, he said, and someone else too.

Whom? I asked. Is it the sort of person who might know, besides what is to be, both everything that has been and now is, and might be ignorant of nothing? Let us suppose such a man exists: you are not going to tell me, I am sure, of anyone alive who is yet more knowing than he.

No, indeed.

Then there is still one more thing I would fain know: which of the sciences is it that makes him happy? Or does he owe it to all of them alike?
"Οὐδαμῶς ὁμοίως, ἔφη.
'Ἀλλὰ ποῖα μάλιστα; ἢ τί οἶδε καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐσεσθαι; ἀρά
γε ἢ τὸ πεπτευτικόν;
Ποιοὺν, ἢ δ' ὡς, πεπτευτικόν;
'Ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ λογιστικόν;
Οὐδαμῶς.
'Ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ υγιεινόν;
Μάλλον, ἔφη.
'Εκείνῃ δ' ἦν λέγω μάλιστα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ τί;
'Ἡν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸ κακόν.
'Ὡ μιαρὲ, ἔφην ἐγώ, πάλαι με περιέλκεις κύκλω,
ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἦν ξῆν
τὸ εὗ πράττειν τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦν, οὐδὲ

C συμπασῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἄλλα μίας

οὖσας ταύτης μόνον τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν. ἔπει, ὦ Κριτία, εἴ θέλεις ἔξελειν ταύτην

τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἢττὸν τι

ἡ μὲν ἱατρικὴ ὑγιαίνειν ποιήσει, ἢ δὲ σκυτικὴ

ὑποδεδέσθαι, ἢ δὲ υφαντικὴ ἡμφιέσθαι, ἢ δὲ

κυβερνητικὴ κωλύσει ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ἀποθνήσκειν

καὶ ἡ στρατηγικὴ ἐν πολέμῳ;

Οὐδὲν ἢττον, ἔφη.

'Αλλ', ὦ φίλε Κριτία, τὸ εὗ γε τούτων ἕκαστα

D γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὠφελίμως ἀπολελοιπὸς ἡμᾶς ἐσται
tαὐτῆς ἀπούσης.

'Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Οὐχ αὕτη δὲ γε, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἔστων ἢ σωφροσύνη,

ἀλλ' ἢς ἔργον ἔστι τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἡμᾶς. οὐ γαρ

ἐπιστημῶν γε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη

ἔστων, ἀλλὰ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ· ὡστε εἰ αὐτη
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By no means to all alike, he replied.
But to which sort most? One that gives him
knowledge of what thing, present, past or future?
Is it that by which he knows draught-playing?
Draught-playing indeed! he replied.
Well, reckoning?
By no means.
Well, health?
More likely, he said.
And that science to which I refer as the most
likely, I went on, gives him knowledge of what?
Of good, he replied, and of evil.
Vile creature! I said, you have all this time been
dragging me round and round, while concealing the
fact that the life according to knowledge does not
make us do well and be happy, not even if it be know-
ledge of all the other knowledges together, but only
if it is of this single one concerning good and evil.
For, Critias, if you choose to take away this science
from the whole number of them, will medicine any
the less give us health, or shoemaking give us shoes,
or weaving provide clothes, or will the pilot’s art any
the less prevent the loss of life at sea, or the general’s
in war?

None the less, he replied.
But, my dear Critias, to have any of these things
well and beneficially done will be out of our reach if
that science is lacking.

That is true.

And that science, it seems, is not temperance, but
one whose business is to benefit us; for it is not a
science of sciences and lack of sciences, but of good
174 ἕστιν ὑφέλιμος, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη
[ἡ ὑφελίμη] τ' ἦμιν.

Τί δ', ἡ δ' ὅσ, οὐκ ἂν αὕτη ὑφέλοι; εἰ γὰρ ὅτι
μᾶλιστα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ἔστι ἡ σωφρο-
Εὐσύνη, ἐπιστατεῖ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις, καὶ
tαύτης δὴπο ἂν ἄρχουσα τῆς περὶ τάγαθον
ἐπιστήμης ὑφέλοι ἂν ἦμις.

'Ἡ καὶ υγιαίνων ποιοῖ, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, αὕτη, ἄλλ' οὐχ
ἡ ἰατρική; καὶ τάλα τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν αὕτη ἂν
ποιοῖ, καὶ οὐχ αἳ ἄλλαι τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον ἐκάστη;
ἡ οὐ πάλαι διεμαρτυρόμεθα, ὅτι ἐπιστήμης μόνον
ἔστι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλον δὲ
οὐδενὸς'. οὐχ οὕτως;

Φαίνεται γε.

Οὐκ ἄρα υγιείας ἔσται δημιουργός.
Οὐ δήτα.

175 Ἀλλ'ς γὰρ ἦν τέχνης υγίεια· ἦ οὖ;

'Ἀλλής.

Οὐδ' ἄρα ὑφελείας, ὡς ἐταὑρε· ἄλλη γὰρ αὐ
ἀπέδομεν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον τέχνη νῦν δὴ· ἦ γάρ;
Πάνυ γε.

Πῶς οὖν ὑφέλιμος ἔσται ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐδεμιᾶς
ὑφελίας οὖσα δημιουργός;
Οὐδαμῶς, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐοικε γε.

'Ορᾶς οὖν, ὡς Κριτία, ὡς ἐγὼ πάλαι εἰκότως
ἐδειδοίκη καὶ δικαίως ἐμαντῶν ἔτιώμην ὅτι οὐδὲν
χρηστόν περὶ σωφροσύνης σκοπῶ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν που
ὁ γε κάλλιστον πάντων ὁμολογεῖται εἶναι, τούτο
B ἦμιν ἀνωφελέσ ἐφάνη, εἰ τι ἐμοῦ ὀφελὸς ἦν πρὸς
τὸ καλῶς ζητεῖν. νῦν δὲ—πανταχῇ γὰρ ἡττώμεθα,
καὶ οὐ δυνάμεθα εὔρειν ἐφ' ὁτῳ ποτὲ τῶν ὄντων ὁ

1 ἡ ὑφελίμη secl. Madvig.
and evil: so that if this is beneficial, temperance must be something else to us.

But why, he asked, should not it be beneficial? For if temperance is above all a science of the sciences, and presides too over the other sciences, surely she will govern this science of the good, and so benefit us.

And give us health also? I asked: will she, and not medicine, do this? And will the several works of the other arts be hers, and not the particular works of each art? Have we not constantly protested that she is only knowledge of knowledge and of lack of knowledge, and of nothing else? Is not that so?

Apparently it is.

Then she will not be a producer of health?

No, indeed.

For health, we said, belongs to another art, did we not?

We did.

Nor of benefit, my good friend; for this work, again, we assigned to another art just now, did we not?

Certainly.

Then how will temperance be beneficial, if it produces no benefit?

By no means, Socrates, as it seems.

So do you see, Critias, how all the time I had good reason for my fear, and fair ground for the reproach I made against myself, that my inquiry regarding temperance was worthless? For I cannot think that what is admitted to be the noblest thing in the world would have appeared to us useless if I had been of any use for making a good search. But now, you see, we are worsted every way, and cannot discover what

1 Cf. 172 c.
νομοθέτης τούτο τούνομα ἢθετο, τῆν σωφροσύνην.
καίτιο πολλά γε συγκεχωρήκαμεν οὐ συμβαίνονθ' 
ήμιν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. καί γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης 
εἶναι συγκεχωρῆσαμεν, οὐκ ἐώντος τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲ 
φάσκοντος εἶναι· καὶ ταύτη αὐτῇ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὰ 
C τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἔργα γυγνῶσκεν συγκεχωρή-
χαμεν, οὐδὲ τούτ' ἐώντος τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα δὴ ἦμιν 
γένοιτο ὁ σώφρων ἐπιστήμης ὡν τε οἴδεν, οτι οἴδε, 
καὶ ὃν μὴ οἶδεν, ὁτι οὐκ οἴδε. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ 
pαντάπασι μεγαλοπρεπῶς συγκεχωρῆσαμεν, οὐδ' 
ἐπισκεψάμενοι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἃ τις μὴ οἴδε 
μηδαμῶς, ταῦτα εἰδέναι ἄμως γι' πως· οτι γὰρ οὐκ 
οἴδε, φησίν αὐτὰ εἰδέναι ἡ ἡμετέρα ὁμολογία. 
καίτιοι, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, οὐδένος ὅτου οὐχι ἀλογώτερον 
tοῦτ' ἀν φανεῖν. ἀλλ' οἷς οὕτως ἦμιν εὐθυκῶς
D τυχόνσα ἡ ἦτησι καὶ οὐ σκληρῶν, οὐδέν τι 
μᾶλλον εὑρέων δύναται τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον 
κατεγέλασεν αὐτής, ὥστε ὁ ἡμεῖς πάλαι συνομολο-
γοῦντες καὶ συμπλάττοντες ἐτιθέμεθα σωφροσύνην 
eῖναι, τοῦτο ἦμιν πάνυ ὑβριστικῶς ἀνωφελὲς ὄν 
ἀπέφαυνε. τὸ μὲν οὗν ἐμὸν καὶ ἢττον ἀγανακτῷ· 
ὑπέρ δὲ σοῦ, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ὃ Χαρμίδη, πάνυ ἀγα-
νάκτῳ, εἰ σοὶ τοσοῦτον ὄν τὴν ἱδέαν καὶ πρὸς 
Ε τούτῳ τὴν ψυχὴν σωφρονέστατος, μηδὲν ἄνησῃ 
ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σωφροσύνης μηδὲ τί σ' ωφελήσει 
ἐν τῷ βίῳ παροῦσα. ἐτὶ δὲ μᾶλλον ἀγανακτῷ 
ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐπωδῆς, ἦν παρὰ τοῦ Ὡρακός ἐμαθοῦν, εἰ 
μηδενὸς ἄξιον πράγματος οὕτων αὐτὴν μετὰ 
πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐμάνθανον. ταύτ' οὐν πάνυ μὲν
[oûn] 1 οὐκ οἴομαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐμὲ φαῦλον
1 oûn seel. Winckelmann.

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1 Cf. 156 D.
thing it can possibly be to which the lawgiver gave this name, temperance. And yet we have conceded many points which were not deducible from our argument. For you know we conceded that there was a science of science, when the argument was against it and would not agree; and we further conceded that this science could know the works also of the other sciences, when the argument was against this too, in order to make out that the temperate man had a knowledge of what he knew and did not know, so as to know that he knew the one and did not know the other. And we made this concession in a really magnificent manner, without considering the impossibility of a man knowing, in some sort of way, things that he does not know at all; for our admission says that he knows that he does not know them; and yet, in my opinion, there can be nothing more irrational than this. Nevertheless, although it has found us so simple-minded and tractable, the inquiry remains quite incapable of discovering the truth, but has utterly flouted it by most impudently showing us the inutility of that which we had been ever so long assuming, by our joint admissions and fictions, to be the meaning of temperance. Now, so far as I am concerned, I am not particularly distressed: but for your sake, I said, Charmides, I am seriously distressed to think that you, with your goodly form and most temperate soul besides, are to have no profit or advantage from the presence of that temperance in all your life. And I am still more distressed about the charm which I learnt from the Thracian,¹ that I should have spent so much pains on a lesson which has had such a worthless effect. Now I really do not think that this can be the case, but
εἰσι ζητητήν· ἐπεὶ τὰν γε σωφροσύνην μέγα τι ἀγαθὸν εἰσι, καὶ εἴπερ γε ἔχεις αὐτό, μακάριον
176 εἰσι σε. ἀλλ' ὥρα εἰ ἔχεις τε καὶ μηδὲν δέῃ τῆς ἐπωδῆς· εἰ γὰρ ἔχεις, μᾶλλον ἄν ἔγωγε σοι συμβουλεύσαμι ἐμὲ μὲν λήρον ἤγείσθαι εἰσι καὶ ἀδύνατον λόγῳ ὅτιον ζητεῖν, σεαυτόν δὲ, ὁσωπέρ σωφρονεστέρος εἰ, τοσοῦτῳ εἰσι καὶ εὐδαμιονέστερον.

Καὶ ὁ Ἑρμίδης, 'Αλλὰ μὰ Δ', ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε, ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐκ οἶδα οὔτε εἰ ἔχω οὔτε εἰ μὴ ἔχω. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἰδείην ὅ γε μηδ' ὑμεῖς οἷοί τε ἐστε

Β ἐξευρέσὶν ὁ τί ποτ' ἐστιν, ὡς φήσι σὺ; ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι, καὶ ἐμαυτόν, ὁ Σωκράτης, πάνυ οἶμαι δεῖσθαι τῆς ἐπωδῆς, καὶ τὸ γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐπάθεσθαι ὑπὸ σοῦ ὅσιν ἥμεραι, ἔως ἂν φήσι σὺ ἰκανῶς ἔχειν.

Εἰεν· ἀλλ', ἐφη ὁ Κριτίας, ὁ Ἑρμίδης, <ἡν> ὁ δρας τοῦτο ἐμοὺ γ' ἐσται τοῦτο τεκμῆριον ὅτι σωφρονεῖς, ἢν ἐπάθειν παρέχη Σωκράτει καὶ μὴ απολείπῃ τούτου μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν.

'Ως ἀκολουθήσωτος, ἐφη, καὶ μὴ ἀπολευθομένου·

C δεινὰ γὰρ ἂν ποιοῖν, εἰ μὴ πειθοῖν σοι τῷ ἐπιτρόπῳ καὶ μὴ ποιοῖν ᾧ κελεύεις.

'Αλλὰ μὴν, ἐφη, κελεύω ἔγωγε.

Ποιήσω τοῖνυν, ἐφη, ἀπὸ ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἀρξάμενος.

Οὐτοί, ἦν δ' ἔγω, τι βουλεύεσθον ποιεῖν;
Οὐδέν, ἐφη ὁ Ἑρμίδης, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύμεθα.

Βιάσῃ άρα, ἦν δ' ἔγω, καὶ οὔθ' ἀνάκρισιν μοι δώσεις;

1 ἦν add. Goldbacher.
rather that I am a poor hand at inquiring; for temperance I hold to be a great good, and you to be highly blessed, if you actually have it. See now whether you have it, and are in no need of the charm; for if it is yours, I should rather advise you to regard me as a babbler who is unable to argue out any subject of inquiry whatsoever, and yourself as advancing in happiness as you advance in temperance.

Then Charmides said: Why, upon my word, Socrates, I do not know at all whether I have it or have it not. For how can I know, when even you two are unable to discover what this thing is?—so you say, but of this you do not at all convince me—and I quite believe, Socrates, that I do need the charm, and for my part I have no objection to being charmed by you every day of my life, until you say I have had enough of the treatment.

Very well, said Critias: now, Charmides, if you do this, it will be a proof to me of your temperance—if you submit to be charmed by Socrates and do not forsake him through thick and thin. Count on me to follow, he said, and not forsake him; for it would ill become me to disobey you, my guardian, and refuse to do your bidding.

Well now, he said, I bid you.

Then I will do as you bid, he replied, and will start this very day.

There, there, I said, what are you two plotting to do?

Nothing, replied Charmides; we have made our plot.

So you will use force, I said, before even allowing me to make my affidavit?
'Ως βιασομένον, ἐφη, ἐπειδήπερ ὁδε γε ἐπιτάττειν πρὸς ταῦτα σὺ αὐ βουλεύον ὅ τι ποιήσεις.

D 'Ἀλλ' οὐδεμία, ἐφην ἐγὼ, λείπεται βουλή· σοὶ γὰρ ἐπιχειροῦντι πράττειν ὅτι οὗτοι καὶ βιαζομένων οὐδεὶς οἶος τ' ἔσται ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἀνθρώπων.

Μὴ τοίνυν, ἂ δ' ὦς, μηδὲ σὺ ἐναντιοῦ.
Οὐ τοίνυν, ἂν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐναντιώσομαι.
CHARMIDES

You must expect me to use force, he replied, since he gives me the command: take counsel, therefore, on your side, as to what you will do.

But that leaves no room, I said, for counsel; for if once you set about doing anything and use force, no man alive will be able to withstand you.

Then do not you, he said, withstand me.

Then I will not withstand you, I replied.
INTRODUCTION TO ALCIBIADES I

The First Alcibiades gives us a clear and useful, if rather inelegant, illustration of the ordinary teaching of Socrates. He accosts his young friend at a critical moment of opening manhood, and makes him admit, by willing replies to a series of carefully designed questions, that he is ignorant of the most important things which ought to be known by one about to enter upon a public career. In the first part (103–114) we are shown that Alcibiades is going to advise the state on questions of peace and war, and must therefore know what is just and what unjust: but he could only have acquired this knowledge from the multitude, whose perpetual quarrels seem to show that they lack it; and if he says that it is rather on the expedient and inexpedient that he proposes to advise them, we want to know in turn what these are. In the second part (115–127) we find that the just is the honourable, good and expedient; and Alcibiades is further humiliated by a sly use of the double meaning of "doing well"—acting aright, and prospering. Other Athenian statesmen, including even Pericles (who is supposed to be still alive), are just as ignorant as Alcibiades, and he may be at no disadvantage in competition with them: but his real competitors in the race for power and glory are persons like the kings of Sparta and Persia, whose
training, wealth, and authority are described at some length and in lively detail. For such a contest it is necessary that Alcibiades should avail himself of all the help that Socrates can give him. They must join equally in the inquiry—What is the goodness required in a statesman? It seems to have something to do with friendship and harmony among the people; and yet justice surely consists in everyone doing his own work, and this does not make for harmony. Alcibiades is sorely puzzled, but fortunately he is not too old to learn. The third and last section (128–135) deals with the Delphic maxim *Know thyself*, and what it may be supposed to mean. To know oneself is to know one's mind, and is true prudence or "temperance," which, with justice, is a necessary condition of happiness.

The imaginary time of the conversation is about 432 B.C., when Alcibiades was eighteen years old. He is now losing the extraordinary physical beauty of his boyhood, and is turning his mind to the political power whose attainment is the obvious aim of an able and ambitious man. It is at this moment that Socrates, an admirer who has held aloof from him till now, exposes by skilful questioning his false conceit of knowledge and his desperate need of knowing, in the first place, his own mind. The method of interrogation, and the language used by both speakers, are quite of a piece with those in other early dialogues of Plato. The somewhat lengthy speech of Socrates about the royal families of Persia and Sparta (121–124), though it has some pleasant touches of Socratic humour, is perhaps a little out of character in a scene where so much emphasis is laid on the point that all the positive statements come from Alcibiades and
none from Socrates; and the identification of soul with man (130 c) is a crude and unsatisfactory suggestion compared with the later theories of the Gorgias (464 a) and other dialogues. But on the whole there seems to be no sufficient reason for doubting, with some eminent scholars, the authenticity of this dialogue, if it be remembered that the work is probably one of Plato's earliest sketches, composed in the years immediately following the death of Socrates (399 B.C.); that from the third century A.D. it has been regarded and studied as an exemplary piece of Academic teaching; and that it is natural to suppose that the series of Plato's compositions would begin with some immature and relatively inartistic essays in dialogue-writing. When he came to conceive the Symposium, Plato was able to draw far fuller and finer portraits of both Socrates and Alcibiades, and to vivify their friendly converse by many a masterly stroke of dramatic art.
Socrates refers to the "spiritual sign" which occasionally warned him against an intended action: cf. Apol. 31 c d, 40 A B.
ALCIBIADES I

[OR ON THE NATURE OF MAN: "OBSTETRIC"]

CHARACTERS

Socrates, Alcibiades

soc. Son of Cleinias, I think it must surprise you that I, the first of all your lovers, am the only one of them who has not given up his suit and thrown you over, and whereas they have all pestered you with their conversation I have not spoken one word to you for so many years. The cause of this has been nothing human, but a certain spiritual opposition, of whose power you shall be informed at some later time. However, it now opposes me no longer, so I have come to you, as you see; and I am in good hopes that it will not oppose me again in the future. Now I have been observing you all this time, and have formed a pretty good notion of your behaviour to your lovers: for although they were many and high-spirited, everyone of them has found your spirit too strong for him and has run away. Let me explain the reason of your spirit being too much for them. You say you have no need of any man in any matter; for your resources are so great, beginning with the body and ending with the soul, that you lack nothing.
οἰεὶ γὰρ δὴ εἶναι πρῶτον μὲν κάλλιστός τε καὶ μέγιστος· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ παντὶ δῆλον ἵδειν ὅτι οὐ ψεύδη· ἐπειτα νεανικωτάτου γένους ἐν τῇ σεαυτοῦ πόλει, οὐσία μεγίστη τῶν Ἑλληνίδων, καὶ
Β ἐνταῦθα πρὸς πατρός τέ σοι φίλους καὶ συγγενεῖς πλείστους εἶναι καὶ ἁριστούς, οὖ εἰ τι δέοι ὑπηρετοῖεν ἄν σοι, τοῦτων δὲ τούς πρὸς μητρὸς οὐδὲν χείρους οὐδ' ἐλάττους· συμπάντων δὲ ὥς εἴποι
μεῖζω οἰεὶ σοι δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου, ἃν ὁ πατὴρ ἐπίτροπον κατέλιπε σοὶ τε καὶ τῷ ἀδελφῷ· δός οὐ μόνον ἐν τῇ δὲ ἐπὶ πόλει δύναται πράττειν ὃ τι ἄν δούληται, ἀλλ' ἐν πάσῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ
C μεγάλοις γένεσιν. προσθήσω δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῶν πλουσίων· δοκεῖς δὲ μοι ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἦκιστα μέγα φρονεῖν. κατὰ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα σὺ τε μεγαλαυχοῦμενοι κεκράτηκας τῶν ἑραστῶν ἐκεῖνοι τε ὑπὸδεέστεροι ὄντες ἐκρατηθήσαν, καὶ σε ταῦτ' οὖ λέληθεν· ὅθεν δὴ εἰδ' οἴδα ὅτι θαυμάζεις, τί διανοούμενός ποτε οὐκ ἀπαλλάττομαι τοῦ ἑρωτοῦ, καὶ ἡντιν' ἔχων ἐλπίδα ὑπομεῦν τῶν ἄλλων πεφευγότων. ἅλκ. Καὶ ἔσως γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι
D σμικρὸν μὲ ἐφθης. ἐγὼ γὰρ τοῦ ἐν νῷ εἰχὼν πρότερός σοι προσέλθων αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἔρεσθαι, τί ποτε βούλει καὶ εἰς τίνα ἐλπίδα βλέπων ἐνοχλεῖς με, ἁπ' ὅπου ἀν ὦ ἐπιμελέστατα παρών τῷ ἄντι γὰρ θαυμάζω, ὦ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ σὸν πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἡδοντ' ἀν πυθοῦμην.

ἐν. Ἀκούσῃ μὲν ἅρα μοι, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, προθύμως, εἰπερ, ὡς φῆς, ἐπιθυμεῖς εἰδέναι τί δια-
You think, in the first place, that you are foremost in beauty and stature—and you are not mistaken in this, as is plain for all to see—and in the second place, that you are of the most gallant family in your city, the greatest city in Greece, and that there you have, through your father, very many of the best people as your friends and kinsmen, who would assist you in case of need, and other connexions also, through your mother, who are not a whit inferior to these, nor fewer. And you reckon upon a stronger power than all those that I have mentioned, in Pericles, son of Xanthippus, whom your father left as guardian of you and your brother when he died, and who is able to do whatever he likes not only in this city but all over Greece and among many great nations of the barbarians. And I will add besides the wealth of your house: but on this, I observe, you presume least of all. Well, you puff yourself up on all these advantages, and have overcome your lovers, while they in their inferiority have yielded to your might, and all this has not escaped you; so I am very sure that you wonder what on earth I mean by not getting rid of my passion, and what can be my hope in remaining when the rest have fled.

**Alc.** Perhaps also, Socrates, you are not aware that you have only just anticipated me. For I, in fact, had the intention of coming and asking you first that very same question—what is your aim and expectation in bothering me by making a particular point of always turning up wherever I may be. For I really do wonder what can be your object, and should be very glad if you would tell me.

**Soc.** Then you will listen to me, presumably, with keen attention if, as you say, you long to know what
νοοῦμαι, καὶ ὃς ἀκουσμένῳ καὶ περιμενοῦντι λέγω.

Ἀλκ. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν· ἄλλα λέγε.

Εἰ ἐπὶ δὴ· οὐ γάρ τοι εἴη ἃν θαυμαστόν εἰ, ὥσπερ μόνις ἥρξάμην, οὔτω καὶ μόνις παυσαίμην.

Ἀλκ. Ὡς γαθὲ λέγε· ἀκούσομαι γάρ.

Εἰ. Δεκτέον ἂν εἴη. χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἄνδρα οὖν ἦττονα ἑραστῶν προσφέρεσθαι ἑραστῇ, ᾧ μως δὲ τολμητέον φράσαι τὴν ἐμὴν διάνοιαν. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὡ 'Ἀλκιβίαδῃ, εἰ μὲν σε ἑώρων ὁ νῦν δὴ διήλθων ἀγαπώντα τε καὶ οἴομενον δεῖν ἐν τούτοις καταβιώναι, πάλαι ἂν ἀπηλλάγημην τοῦ ἔρωτος, 105 ὃς γε δὴ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω· νῦν δὲ ἐτέρα αὖ καθηγορήσω διανοήματα σὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν σὲ, ὥ καὶ γνώσῃ, ὅτι προσέχων γε σοι τὸν νοῦν διατετελεκα. δοκεῖς γάρ μοι, εἰ τίς σοι εἴποι θεῶν· ὡ 'Ἀλκιβίαδη, πότερον βούλει ζῆν ἔχων ὁ νῦν ἔχεις, ἡ αὐτήνατεθνάναι, εἰ μὴ σοὶ ἐξέσται μεῖζω κτήσασθαι; δοκεῖς ἂν μοι ἔλεσθαι τεθνάναι· ἄλλα νῦν ἐπὶ τίνι δὴ ποτε ἐλπίδι ζῆς, ἐγὼ φράσω. ἤγη, ἐὰν θάττον εἰς τῶν 'Αθηναίων δῆμον παρέλθῃς· τοῦτο δὲ Β ἔσεσθαι μᾶλα ὀλίγων ἠμερῶν· παρελθὼν οὖν ἐν- δείξεσθαι 'Αθηναίοις, ὅτι ἄξιος εἰ τιμᾶσθαι ὃς οὔτε Περικλῆς οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πῶς τῆς γενομένων, καὶ τοῦτο ἐνδείξαμενος μέγιστον δυνήσεσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, εὰν δ' ἐνθάδε μέγιστος ἦσ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις 'Ελλησι, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐν ᾗ 'Ελλησιν ἄλλα καὶ ἐν τοῖς βασιλέσι, ὦσοι ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμῖν οἰκούσιν ἡπείρῳ. καὶ εἰ αὖ σοι εἴποι ὁ αὐτὸς οὔτος θεὸς ὅτι αὐτοῦ σε δεὶ δυναστεύειν ἐν τῇ
I mean, and I have in you a listener who will stay to hear me out.

Alc. Why, to be sure: only speak.

Soc. Look to it, then; for it would be no wonder if I should make as much difficulty about stopping as I have made about starting.

Alc. My good sir, speak; for I will listen.

Soc. Speak I must, I suppose. Now, although it is hard for a lover to parley with a man who does not yield to lovers, I must make bold nevertheless to put my meaning into words. For if I saw you, Alcibiades, content with the things I set forth just now, and minded to pass your life in enjoying them, I should long ago have put away my love, so at least I persuade myself: but as it is, I shall propound to your face quite another set of your thoughts, whereby you will understand that I have had you continually before my mind. For I believe, if some god should ask you: “Alcibiades, do you prefer to live with your present possessions, or to die immediately if you are not to have the chance of acquiring greater things?” I believe you would choose to die. But let me tell you what I imagine must be the present hope of your life. You think that if you come shortly before the Athenian Assembly—which you expect to occur in a very few days—you will stand forth and prove to the people that you are more worthy of honour than either Pericles or anyone else who has ever existed, and that having proved this you will have the greatest power in the state; and that if you are the greatest here, you will be the same among all the other Greeks, and not only Greeks, but all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if that same god should say to you again, that you are to
C Εὐρώτη, διαβάζεται δὲ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν οὐκ ἔξεσται σοι οὖν ἐπιθέσθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ πράγμασιν, οὐκ ἂν αὐτοὶ δοκεῖς θέλειν οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτως μόνοις ζῆν, εἰ μὴ ἔμπλήσεις τοῦ σοῦ ὄνοματος καὶ τῆς σῆς δυνάμεως πάντας, ὧς ἔποσ εἰπέν, ἀνθρώπους καὶ οἰμαὶ σε πλὴν Κύρου καὶ Ξέρξου ἤγείσθαι οὐδένα ἄξιον λόγου γεγονέναι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχεις ταυτήν τὴν ἐλπίδα, εἰς οἴδα καὶ οὐκ εἰκάζω. ἦσως ἂν οὖν εἴποις, ἀτε εἰδὼς ὅτι ἄλληθε λέγω· τί δή οὖν, δὸ
D Σώκρατες, τούτο ἐστί σοι πρὸς λόγον [ὅν ἔφησαν ἔρειν, δι’ ο’ ἐμοί οὖν ἀπαλλάττη] 1; ἐγὼ δὲ σοι γε ἔρω, δ’ φίλε παῦτι Κλεινίου καὶ Δευμομάχης. τούτων γάρ σοι ἀπάντων τῶν διανοημάτων τέλος ἐπιτεθῆναι ἄνευ ἐμοῦ ἀδύνατον· τοσαύτην ἔγω δύναμιν οἴμαι ἔχειν εἰς τὰ σὰ πράγματα καὶ εἰς σε’ διὸ δὴ καὶ πάλαι οἴμαι με τὸν θεόν οὐκ ἕαν διαλέγεσθαι σοι, ὅν ἐγὼ περιέμενον ὁπηνίκα εἶσαι. ὧσπερ γὰρ
Ε σὺ ἐλπίδας ἔχεις ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐνδείξασθαι ὧτι αὐτῆς παντὸς ἄξιος εἰ, ἐνδειξόμενος δὲ οὐδὲν ὧτι οὐ παραυτίκα δυνησθαι, οὕτω καίγω παρὰ σοι ἐλπίζω μέγιστον δυνησθαι ἐνδειξόμενος ὧτι παντὸς ἄξιός εἰμί σοι, καὶ οὔτ’ ἐπίτρεποσ οὔτε συγγενής οὔτε ἄλλοσ οἰκεῖς ἰκανῶς παραδοθόνι τὴν δύναμιν ἦς ἐπιθυμεῖς πλὴν ἐμοῦ, μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μέντοι. νεωτέρῳ μὲν οὖν ὤντι σοι καὶ πρὸς τοσαύτης ἐλπίδος γέμειν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ εὗρ ο’ θεὸς διαλέγεσθαι, ἢν μὴ μάτην διαλεγοίμην νῦν δὲ

1 ὧν . . . ἀπαλλάττη secl. Burnet.
hold sway here in Europe, but are not to be allowed to cross over into Asia and to interfere with the affairs of that region, I believe you would be equally loth to live on those sole conditions either—if you are not to fill, one may say, the whole world with your name and your power; and I fancy that, except Cyrus and Xerxes, you think there has never existed a single man who was of any account. So then that this is your hope, I know well enough; I am not merely guessing. And I daresay you will reply, since you know that what I say is true: "Well, Socrates, and what has that to do with your point?" I am going to tell you, dear son of Cleinias and Deinomache. Without me it is impossible for all those designs of yours to be crowned with achievement; so great is the power I conceive myself to have over your affairs and over you, and it is for this very reason, I believe, that the god has so long prevented me from talking with you, while I was waiting to see when he would allow me. For as you have hopes of proving yourself in public to be invaluable to the state and, having proved it, of winning forthwith unlimited power, so do I hope to win supreme power over you by proving that I am invaluable to you, and that neither guardian nor kinsman nor anyone else is competent to transmit to you the power that you long for except me, with the god's help, however. In your younger days, to be sure, before you had built such high hopes, the god, as I believe, prevented me from talking with you, in order that I might not waste my words: but now he has set me on; for now you will listen to me.

ALC. You seem to me far more extraordinary, Socrates, now that you have begun to speak, than before, when you followed me about in silence;
εἴπον· καίτων ὁφόδρα γε καὶ τὸτε τοιοῦτος. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ταῦτα διανοοῦμαι ἢ μὴ, ὡς ἐσοκε, διέγνωκας, καὶ ἔαν μὴ φῶ, οὐδὲν μοι ἐσται πλέον πρὸς τὸ πείθειν σε. εἴεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ ὅτι μάλιστα ταῦτα διανενόμημαι, πῶς διὰ σοῦ μοι ἐσται καὶ ἄνευ σοῦ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο; ἔχεις λέγειν; B ἦν. Ἄρα ἔρωτᾶς εἰ τινὰ ἐχὼ εἰπεῖν λόγον μακρόν, οἷος δὴ ἀκούειν εἴδοσαι; οὐ γὰρ ἐστι τοιοῦτον τὸ ἐμὸν· ἀλλ’ ἐνδείξασθαι μὲν σοι, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, οἴος τ’ ἂν εἴην ὅτι ταῦτα οὔτως ἔχει, ἐὰν ἐν μόνον μοι ἐθελήσῃς βραχὺ ὑπηρετήσαι.

ἀλκ. Ἀλλ’ εἰ γε δὴ μὴ χαλεπόν τι λέγεις τὸ ὑπηρέτημα, ἐθέλω.

ἐν. Ἡ χαλεπόν δοκεῖ τὸ ἀποκρίνασθαι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα;

ἀλκ. Οὐ χαλεπόν.

ἐν. Ἀποκρίνου δὴ.

ἀλκ. Ἐρωτά.

ἐν. Οὐκοῦν ὡς διανοομένου σου ταῦτα ἐρωτῶ,

C ἄ φημὶ σε διανοεῖσθαι;

ἀλκ. Ἐστω, εἰ βούλει, οὔτως, ἢν καὶ εἶδὼ ὅ τι ἐρεῖς.

ἐν. Φέρε δὴ· διανοή γάρ, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, παριέναι συμβουλεύσων Ἀθηναίως ἐντὸς οὐ πολλὸ δρόμον· εἰ οὖν μελλοῦσι σου ἔναι ἐτι τὸ βῆμα λαβόμενος ἐροίμην· ὁ Ἀλκιβίαδη, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τίνος Ἀθηναίων διανοοῦνται συμβουλεύσωσι, ἀνίστασαι συμβουλεύσωσιν· ἄρ’ ἐπειδὴ περὶ ὃν σὺ ἐπίστασαι βέλτιον ἡ οὔτοι· τί ἂν ἀποκρίναιο;

D ἀλκ. Εἰπομ’ ἂν δὴ που, περὶ ὃν οἶδα βέλτιον ἡ οὔτοι.

1 ἦ Buttmann: el mss.
though even then you looked strange enough. Well, as to my intending all this or not, you have apparently made your decision, and any denial of mine will not avail me to persuade you. Very good: but supposing I have intended ever so much what you say, how are you the sole means through which I can hope to attain it? Can you tell me?

soc. Are you asking whether I can make a long speech, such as you are used to hearing? No, my gift is not of that sort. But I fancy I could prove to you that the case is so, if you will consent to do me just one little service.

alc. Why, if you mean a service that is not troublesome, I consent.

soc. Do you consider it troublesome to answer questions put to you?

alc. No, I do not.

soc. Then answer.

alc. Ask.

soc. Well, you have the intentions which I say you have, I suppose?

alc. Be it so, if you like, in order that I may know what you will say next.

soc. Now then: you intend, as I say, to come forward as adviser to the Athenians in no great space of time; well, suppose I were to take hold of you as you were about to ascend the platform, and were to ask you: “Alcibiades, on what subject do the Athenians propose to take advice, that you should stand up to advise them? Is it something about which you have better knowledge than they?” What would be your reply?

alc. I should say, I suppose, it was something about which I knew better than they.
σημ. Περὶ δὲν ἂρ’ εἰδὼς τυγγάνεις, ἀγαθὸς σύμβουλος εἰ.

ἀλκ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; 
σημ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μόνον οἶσθα, ἀ παρ’ ἄλλων ἔμαθες ἢ αὐτὸς ἐξηγήσεις; 
ἀλκ. Ποῦα γὰρ ἄλλα; 
σημ. Ἐστιν οὖν ὅπως ἂν ποτὲ ἔμαθές τι ἡ ἐξηγήσεις μήτε μανθάνειν ἑθέλων μήτε αὐτὸς ζητεῖν; 
ἀλκ. Οὐκ ἔστιν. 
σημ. Τι δὲ; ἥθελησας ἂν ζητῆσαι ἡ μαθεῖν ἢ ἐπισταθαι ὅνως; 
ἀλκ. Οὐ δήτα.

Ε ἡ σημ. "Α ἄρα νῦν τυγγάνεις ἐπιστάμενος, ἢν χρόνος ὅτε οὐχ ἦγοι εἰδέναι; 
ἀλκ. Ἄναγκη.

σημ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἂ γε μεμάθηκας, σχεδόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα· εἰ δὲ τι ἐμὲ λέληθεν, εἰπέ. ἔμαθες γὰρ δὴ σὺ γε κατὰ μνήμην τὴν ἐμὴν γράμματα καὶ κυθαρίζεων καὶ παλαίειν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐλεῖν γε ἡθὲλες μαθεῖν· ταῦτ’ ἐστιν ἂ σὺ ἐπισταθαι, εἰ μὴ πού τι μανθάνων ἐμὲ λέληθας· οἴμαι δὲ γε, οὔτε νῦκτωρ οὔτε μεθ’ ἡμέραν ἐξωθῶν ἐνδοθεν.

ἀλκ. Ἀλλ’ οὐ πεφοίτηκα εἰς ἄλλων ἡ τοῦτον.

107 σημ. Πότερον οὖν, ὅταν περὶ γραμμάτων Ἀθηναίων βουλεύσεται, πῶς ἂν ὀρθῶς γράφοιεν, τότε ἀναστήσῃ αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύσων; 
ἀλκ. Μὰ Δι’ οὐκ ἔγωγε.

σημ. Ἀλλ’ ὅταν περὶ κρουμάτων ἐν λύρα; 
ἀλκ. Οὐδμαμώς.

σημ. Οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδὲ περὶ παλαισμάτων γε εἰώθασι βουλεύεσθαι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ. 
ἀλκ. Οὐ μέντοι.
soc. Then you are a good adviser on things about which you actually know.

ALC. To be sure.

soc. And you know only the things you have learnt from others or discovered yourself?

ALC. What could I know besides?

soc. And can it be that you would ever have learnt or discovered anything without being willing either to learn it or to inquire into it yourself?

ALC. No.

soc. Well then, would you have been willing to inquire into or learn what you thought you knew?

ALC. No, indeed.

soc. So there was a time when you did not think that you knew what you now actually know.

ALC. There must have been.

soc. Well, but I know pretty nearly the things that you have learnt: tell me if anything has escaped me. You learnt, if I recollect, writing and harping and wrestling; as for fluting, you refused to learn it. These are the things that you know, unless perhaps there is something you have been learning unobserved by me; and this you were not, I believe, if you so much as stepped out of doors either by night or by day.

ALC. No, I have taken no other lessons than those.

soc. Then tell me, will it be when the Athenians are taking advice how they are to do their writing correctly that you are to stand up and advise them?

ALC. Upon my word, not I.

soc. Well, about strokes on the lyre?

ALC. Not at all.

soc. Nor in fact are they accustomed to deliberate on throws in wrestling either at the Assembly.

ALC. No, to be sure.
"Όταν οὖν περὶ τίνος βουλεύωνται; οὐ γάρ
που ὅταν γε περὶ οἰκοδομίας.
ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

Β ΣΩ. Οἰκοδόμοις γὰρ ταύτα γε σοῦ βέλτιον
συμβουλεύσει.
ΑΛΚ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μήν ὅταν περὶ μαντικῆς βουλεύωνται;
ΑΛΚ. Οὐ.
ΣΩ. Μάντις γὰρ αὖ ταύτα ἀμεων ἦ σύ.
ΑΛΚ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Ἐὰν τέ γε σμικρὸς ἦ μέγας ἦ, ἐὰν τε καλὸς
ἡ αἰσχρός, ἔτι τε γενναίος ἦ ἀγεννής.
ΑΛΚ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
ΣΩ. Εἰδότος γὰρ, οἶμαι, περὶ ἐκάστου ἦ συμ-
βουλή, καὶ οὐ πλουτοῦντος.
ΑΛΚ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ἐάν τε πένης ἐάν τε πλοῦσιος ἦ ὁ
παραϊνών, οὐδὲν διοίσει 'Αθηναίοις, ὅταν περὶ τῶν
C ἐν τῇ πόλει βουλεύωνται, πῶς ἂν ὑμιάνοιει, ἄλλα
ζητοῦσιν ἰατρῷν εἶναι τὸν σύμβουλον.
ΑΛΚ. Εἰκότως γε.
ΣΩ. "Όταν οὖν περὶ τίνος σκοπῶνται, τότε σὺ
ἄνιστάμενος ὡς συμβουλεύσων ὅρθως ἀναστήσῃ;
ΑΛΚ. "Όταν περὶ τῶν ἐαυτῶν πραγμάτων, ὁ
Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Τῶν περὶ ναυπηγίας λέγεις, ὅποιας τω̣ι̣ς
χρή αὐτοὺς τὰς ναῦς ναυπηγεῖσθαι;
ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ ἔγγυε, ὁ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Ναυπηγεῖν γάρ, οἶμαι, οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. τοῦτ'
αὕτων ἦ ἄλλο τι;
ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ, ἄλλα τοῦτο.
soc. Then what will be the subject of the advice? For I presume it will not be about building.

ALC. No, indeed.

soc. For a builder will give better advice than you in that matter.

ALC. Yes.

soc. Nor yet will it be about divination?

ALC. No.

soc. For there again a diviner will serve better than you.

ALC. Yes.

soc. Whether he be short or tall, handsome or ugly, nay, noble or ignoble.

ALC. Of course.

soc. For on each subject the advice comes from one who knows, not one who has riches.

ALC. Of course.

soc. And whether their mentor be poor or rich will make no difference to the Athenians when they deliberate for the health of the citizens; all that they require of their counsellor is that he be a physician.

ALC. Naturally.

soc. Then what will they have under consideration if you are to be right in standing up, when you do so, as their counsellor?

ALC. Their own affairs, Socrates.

soc. Do you mean with regard to shipbuilding, and the question as to what sort of ships they ought to get built?

ALC. No, I do not, Socrates.

soc. Because, I imagine, you do not understand shipbuilding. Is that, and that alone, the reason?

ALC. That is just the reason.
PLATO

D ξν. 'Αλλά περὶ ποίων τῶν ἑαυτῶν λέγεις πραγμάτων ὅταν βουλεύωνται;
   Ἀλκ. Ὁταν περὶ πολέμου, ὥς Σωκράτες, ἢ περὶ εἰρήνης ἢ ἄλλου τοῦ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων.
   ξν. Ἀρα λέγεις, ὅταν βουλεύονται, πρὸς τίνας χρὴ εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τίσι πολεμεῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον;
   Ἀλκ. Ναί.
   ξν. Χρὴ δ’ οὐχ οἷς βέλτιον;
   Ἀλκ. Ναί.

Ε ξν. Καὶ τότε ὅποτε βέλτιον;
   Ἀλκ. Πάνυ γε.
   ξν. Καὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἁμείνον;
   Ἀλκ. Ναί.
   ξν. Εἰ οὖν βουλεύοντο Ἀθηναῖοι, τίσι χρὴ προσπαλαίειν καὶ τίσιν ἀκροχειρίζεσθαι καὶ τίνα τρόπον, οὐ ἁμείνον ἀν συμβουλεύοις ἢ δ’ παιδοτρίβης;
   Ἀλκ. Ὁ παιδοτρίβης δῆπον.
   ξν. Ἔχεις οὖν εἴπειν, πρὸς τί <ἂν>¹ βλέπων ὁ παιδοτρίβης συμβουλεύσειν οἷς δεῖ προσπαλαίειν καὶ οἷς μή, καὶ ὅποτε καὶ ὅτινα τρόπον; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε: ἀρα τοῦτοι δεῖ προσπαλαίειν, οἷς βέλτιον, ἢ οὐ;
   Ἀλκ. Ναί.

108 ξν. Ἀρα καὶ τοσαῦτα ὅσα ἁμείνον;
   Ἀλκ. Τοσαῦτα.
   ξν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόθ’ ὅτ’ ἁμείνον;
   Ἀλκ. Πάνυ γε.
   ξν. 'Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ ζῶντα δεῖ κιθαρίζειν ποτὲ πρὸς τὴν ὀδὴν καὶ βαίνειν;

¹ αὐ add. Burnet.
soc. Well, on what sort of affairs of their own do you mean that they will be deliberating?

alc. On war, Socrates, or on peace, or on any other of the state's affairs.

soc. Do you mean that they will be deliberating with whom they ought to make peace, and on whom they ought to make war, and in what manner?

alc. Yes.

soc. And on whom it is better to do so, ought they not?

alc. Yes.

soc. And at such time as it is better?

alc. Certainly.

soc. And for so long as they had better?

alc. Yes.

soc. Now if the Athenians should deliberate with whom they should wrestle close, and with whom only at arm's length, and in what manner, would you or the wrestling-master be the better adviser?

alc. The wrestling-master, I presume.

soc. And can you tell me what the wrestling-master would have in view when he advised as to the persons with whom they ought or ought not to wrestle close, and when and in what manner? What I mean is something like this: ought they not to wrestle close with those with whom it is better to do so?

alc. Yes.

soc. And so far as is better, too?

alc. So far.

soc. And at such time also as is better?

alc. Certainly.

soc. But again, when one sings, one has sometimes to accompany the song with harping and stepping?
αλκ. Δει γάρ.
σω. Οὐκοῦν τὸθ’ ὅποτε βέλτιον;
αλκ. Ναί.
σω. Καὶ τοσαῦτα ὅσα βέλτιον;
αλκ. Φημί.
σω. Τί οὖν; ἐπειδή βέλτιον μὲν ὅνωμαξες ἐπ’
Β ἀμφοτέρους, τῷ τε κιθαρίζειν πρὸς τὴν ὑδὴν καὶ
tῷ προσπαλαίειν, τί καλεῖς τὸ ἐν τῷ κιθαρίζειν
βέλτιον, ἀσπερ ἐγὼ τὸ ἐν τῷ παλαίειν καλῶν
γυμναστικῶν; σὺ δ’ ἐκείνο τί καλεῖς;
αλκ. Οὐκ ἐννοῶ.
σω. Ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ἐμὲ μυμείσθαι. ἐγὼ γάρ που
ἀπεκρινάμην τὸ διὰ παντὸς ὀρθῶς ἔχον, ὀρθῶς δὲ
δήποτε ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην γιγνόμενον· ἢ οὖ;
αλκ. Ναί.
σω. Ἡ δὲ τέχνη οὐ γυμναστικὴ ἢν;
αλκ. Πῶς δ’ οὖ;

C σω. Ἑγὼ δ’ εἶπον τὸ ἐν τῷ παλαίειν βέλτιον
γυμναστικῶν.
αλκ. Εἶπες γάρ.
σω. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς;
αλκ. Ἕμοιγε δοκεῖ.
σω. Ἦθι δὴ καὶ σὺ—πρέποι γάρ ἂν που καὶ σοὶ
tὸ καλῶς διαλέγεσθαι—ἐιπέ πρῶτον, τῖς ἡ τέχνη
ἡς το κιθαρίζειν καὶ τὸ ἄδειν καὶ τὸ ἐμβαίνειν
ὀρθῶς; συνάπασα τίς καλεῖται; οὕτω δύνασαι
eἰπεῖν;
αλκ. Οὐ δήτα.
σω. Ἀλλ’ ὥδε πειρῶ· τίνες αἴ θεαὶ ἄν ἡ τέχνη;

1 Socrates means by “better” or “the better way” the
general method of attaining excellence in any art.
2 Socrates here repeats καλῶς (which means “handsomely”

114.
ALCIBIADES I

ALC. Yes, one has.
soc. And at such time as is better?
ALC. Yes.
soc. And so far as is better?
ALC. I agree.
soc. Well now, since you applied the term "better" to the two cases of harping for accompaniment of a song and close wrestling, what do you call the "better" in the case of harping, to correspond with what in the case of wrestling I call gymnastic? What do you call the other?
ALC. I do not understand.
soc. Well, try to copy me: for my answer gave you, I think, what is correct in every instance; and that is correct, I presume, which proceeds by rule of the art, is it not?
ALC. Yes.
soc. And was not the art here gymnastic?
ALC. To be sure.
soc. And I said that the better ¹ in the case of wrestling was gymnastic.
ALC. You did.
soc. And I was quite fair?
ALC. I think so.
soc. Come then, in your turn—for it would befit you also, I fancy, to argue fairly ²—tell me, first, what is the art which includes harping and singing and treading the measure correctly? What is it called as a whole? You cannot yet tell me?
ALC. No, indeed.
soc. Well, try another way: who are the goddesses that foster the art?

as well as "correctly") in allusion to Alcibiades' good looks. 
Cf. 113 b.
ΑΑΚ. Τὰς Μούσας, ὁ Σώκρατης, λέγεις;  
ΣΠ. Ἔγωγε. ὅρα δὴ τίνα ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐπιωνυμίαν ἢ τέχνη ἔχει;  
ΑΑΚ. Μουσικήν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.  
ΣΠ. Λέγω γάρ. τί οὖν τὸ κατὰ ταύτῃ ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενον ἔστιν; ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐγὼ σοι τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς, τὴν γυμναστικήν, καὶ σὺ δὴ οὖν οὕτως ἐνταῦθα τί φήσ; πῶς γίγνεσθαι;  
ΑΑΚ. Μουσικῶς μοι δοκεῖ.  
ΣΠ. Εὐ λέγεις. ἢθι δὴ, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνῃ ἄγειν, τοῦτο τὸ Ἐ βέλτιον τί ὄνομάζεις; ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ [ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ] 1 ἔλεγες τὸ ᾧμενον, ὅτι μουσικώτερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐτέρῳ, ὅτι γυμναστικώτερον πειρῶ δὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα λέγειν τὸ βέλτιον.  
ΑΑΚ. 'Αλλ' οὐ πάνυ ἔχω.  
ΣΠ. 'Αλλὰ μέντοι αἰσχρὸν γε, εἰ μὲν τὸς σε λέγοντα καὶ συμβουλεύοντα περὶ συτίων, ὅτι βέλτιον τόδε τούδε καὶ νῦν καὶ τοσοῦτον, ἐπειτὰ ἐρωτήσειε, τί τὸ ᾧμενον λέγεις, ὡς Ἀλκιβιάδη; περὶ μὲν τούτων ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ ὑγιεινότερον, καίτοι οὐ προσποιῇ γε ἰατρὸς εἶναι· περὶ δὲ οὐ προσποίηται ἐπιστήμων εἶναι καὶ συμβουλεύσεις ἀνιστάμενος ὡς εἰδῶς, τούτου δὲ, ὡς ἑοικας, περὶ ἔρωτηθεῖς ἐὰν μὴ ἔχης εἰπεῖν, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ; ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φαίνεται;  
ΑΑΚ. Πάνυ γε.  

1 ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ seel. Schanz.
ALCIBIADES I

ALC. The Muses, you mean, Socrates?
soc. I do. Now, just think, and say by what name the art is called after them.

ALC. Music,¹ I suppose you mean.
soc. Yes, I do. And what is that which proceeds correctly by its rule? As in the other case I was correct in mentioning to you gymnastic as that which goes by the art, so I ask you, accordingly, what you say in this case. What manner of proceeding is required?

ALC. A musical one, I suppose.
soc. You are right. Come then, what is it that you term "better," in respect of what is better in waging war and being at peace? Just as in our other instances you said that the "better" implied the more musical and again, in the parallel case, the more gymnastical, try now if you can tell me what is the "better" in this case.

ALC. But I am quite unable.
soc. But surely that is disgraceful; for if you should speak to somebody as his adviser on food, and say that one sort was better than another, at this time and in this quantity, and he then asked you—What do you mean by the "better," Alcibiades?—in a matter like that you could tell him you meant the more wholesome, although you do not set up to be a physician; yet in a case where you set up to have knowledge and are ready to stand up and advise as though you knew, are you not ashamed to be unable, as appears, to answer a question upon it? Does it not seem disgraceful?

ALC. Very.

¹ "Music" with the Greeks included poetry and dancing as well as our "music."
Σν. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ προθυμοῦ εἰπεῖν, πρὸς τῷ τείνει τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνην τε ἀγεῖν ἀμεωνον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν οἷς δεῖ;

Ἀλκ. 'Ἀλλὰ σκοπῶν οὐ δύναμαι ἐννοῆσαι.

Σν. Οὔδ' οἶσθα, ἐπειδὰν πόλεμον ποιώμεθα, ὦ τι ἐγκαλοῦντες ἀλλήλοις πάθημα ἐρχόμεθα εἰς τὸ Β' πολεμεῖν, καὶ ὦ τι αὕτῳ ὀνομάζοντες ἐρχόμεθα;

Ἀλκ. 'Ἐγώγε, ὅτι γε ἐξαπατώμενοι τι ἡ βιαζό-μενοι ἡ ἀποστεροῦμενοι.

Σν. 'Εχε̇ πῶς ἔκαστα τοῦτων πάσχοντες; πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, τί διαφέρει τὸ ὦδε ἡ ὦδε.

Ἀλκ. 'Ἡ τὸ ὦδε λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δικαίως ἡ τὸ ἄδικως;

Σν. Αὐτὸ τοῦτο.

Ἀλκ. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γε διαφέρει ὦλον τε καὶ πᾶν.

Σν. Τι οὖν; 'Ἀθηναῖοις οὐ πρὸς ποτέρους συμ-βουλεύσεις πολεμεῖν, τοὺς ἄδικοῦντας ἡ τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας;

C Ἀλκ. Δεινὸν τοῦτο γε ἐρωτᾶς: εἰ γὰρ καὶ δια-νοεῖται τις ως δεῖ πρὸς τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας πολεμεῖν, οὐκ ἄν ὀμολογήσεις γε.

Σν. Οὐ γὰρ νόμομον τοῦθ', ως ἐοικεν.

Ἀλκ. Οὐ δῆτα: οὐδὲ γε καλὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι.

Σν. Πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀρα καὶ οὐ [τὸ δίκαιον]¹ τοὺς λόγους ποιήσῃ;

Ἀλκ. 'Ἀνάγκη.

Σν. 'Αλλο τι οὖν, ὦ νῦν δὴ ἔγω ἡρώτων βέλτιον πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν καὶ μὴ, καὶ οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς μὴ, ¹ τὸ δίκαιον seel. Nürnbergcr.
soc. Then consider and do your best to tell me the connexion of "better" in being at peace or at war with those to whom we ought to be so disposed.

ALC. Well, I am considering, but I fail to perceive it.

soc. But you must know what treatment it is that we allege against each other when we enter upon a war, and what name we give it when we do so?

ALC. I do: we say we are victims of deceit or violence or spoliation.

soc. Enough: how do we suffer each of these things? Try and tell me what difference there is between one way and another.

ALC. Do you mean by that, Socrates, whether it is in a just way or an unjust way?

soc. Precisely.

ALC. Why, there you have all the difference in the world.

soc. Well then, on which sort are you going to advise the Athenians to make war—those who are acting unjustly, or those who are doing what is just?

ALC. That is a hard question: for even if someone decides that he must go to war with those who are doing what is just, he would not admit that they were doing so.

soc. For that would not be lawful, I suppose?

ALC. No, indeed; nor is it considered honourable either.

soc. So you too will appeal to these things in making your speeches?

ALC. Necessarily.

soc. Then must not that "better" about which I was asking in reference to making or not making war, on those on whom we ought to or not; and
καὶ ὅποτε καὶ μῆ, τὸ δικαίωτερον τυγχάνει ὑν; ἦ οὖν;

ΑΛΚ. Φαινεταί γε.

Δ ΞΝ. Πῶς οὖν, ὥς φίλε ᾿Αλκιβιάδη; πότερον σαυτὸν λέληθας ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι τοῦτο, ἦ ἐμὲ ἐλάθες μανθάνων καὶ φοιτῶν εἰς διδασκάλου, ὡς σὲ ἐδίδασκε διαγιγνώσκει τὸ δικαίωτερον τε καὶ ἀδικώτερον; καὶ τίς ἐστὶν οὕτως; φράσον καὶ ἐμοί, ἵνα αὐτῶ φοιτητὴν προξενήσῃς καὶ ἐμὲ.

ΑΛΚ. Σκῶπτεις, ὁ Σωκράτης.

ΞΝ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Φίλιον τὸν ἐμὸν τε καὶ σὸν, ὅπως ἔγω Ἐηκιστ’ ἀν ἐπιορκήσαμι: ἀλλ’ εἴπερ ἔχεις, εἰπὲ τίς ἐστιν.

ΑΛΚ. Τί δ’, εἰ μὴ ἔχω; οὐκ ἂν οἶει με ἀλλως εἰδέναι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδικῶν;

ΞΝ. Ναι, εἰ γε εὑροῖς.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἂν εὐρεῖν με ἡγῆ

ΞΝ. Καὶ μάλα γε, εἰ ζητήσαις.

ΑΛΚ. Εἴτε ζητήσαι οὐκ ἂν οἶει με;

ΞΝ. �uations, εἰ οὐνθεῖς γε μὴ εἰδέναι.

ΑΛΚ. Εἴτε οὐκ ἂν ὅτ’ εἴχον οὕτως;

ΞΝ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἔχεις οὖν εἴπειν τοῦτον τὸν 110 χρόνον, ὅτε οὐκ ὡς εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀδικα; φέρε, πέρυσω εξήτεις τε καὶ οὐκ ὡς εἰδέναι; ὡς ἔδω; καὶ τάληθη ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα μὴ μάτηρ οἱ διάλογοι γίγνωσται.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλ’ ὥμην εἰδέναι.

ΞΝ. Τρίτον δὲ ἐτος καὶ τέταρτον καὶ πέμπτον οὐχ οὕτως;

ΑΛΚ. ᾿Ἔγωγε.

1 Cf. above, 106 ε.
when we ought to or not, be simply and solely the juster?

ALC. Apparently it is.

SOC. How now, friend Alcibiades? Have you overlooked your own ignorance of this matter, or have I overlooked your learning it and taking lessons of a master who taught you to distinguish the more just and the more unjust? And who is he? Inform me in my turn, in order that you may introduce me to him as another pupil.

ALC. You are joking, Socrates.

SOC. No, I swear by our common God of Friendship, whose name I would by no means take in vain. Come, if you can, tell me who the man is.

ALC. But what if I cannot? Do you think I could not know about what is just and unjust in any other way?

SOC. Yes, you might, supposing you discovered it.

ALC. But do you not think I might discover it?

SOC. Yes, quite so, if you inquired.

ALC. And do you not think I might inquire?

SOC. I do, if you thought you did not know.

ALC. And was there not a time when I held that view?

SOC. Well spoken. Then can you tell me at what time it was that you thought you did not know what is just and unjust? Pray, was it a year ago that you were inquiring, and thought you did not know? Or did you think you knew? Please answer truly, that our debates may not be futile.

ALC. Well, I thought I knew.

SOC. And two years, and three years, and four years back, were you not of the same mind?

ALC. I was.
μην τό γε πρό τούτου παίς ἰσθαν. ἢ γὰρ;

αλκ. Ναί.

συ. Τότε μὲν τοῦνν εὔ οἶδα ὅτι ὕφου εἰδέναι.

αλκ. Πώς εὖ οἴσθα;

B συ. Πολλάκις σοῦ ἐν διδασκάλων ἤκουν παίδος ὄντος καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ ὅποτε ἀπεραγαλίζοις ἢ ἄλλῃν τινα παιδιῶν παῖζοις, οὐχ ὡς ἀποροῦντος περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδικῶν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλα μέγα καὶ θαρρα- λέως λέγοντος περὶ ὅτου τύχοις τῶν παίδων, ὡς πονηρόσ τε καὶ ἀδικος εἶή καὶ ὡς ἀδικοι· ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω;

αλκ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἐμελλὼν ποιεῖν, ὡ Σῶκρατες, ὅποτε τίς μὲ ἀδικοί;

συ. Σὺ δὲ ἐὰν τύχοις ἁγνῶν εἴτε ἀδικοὶ εἴτε μὴ τότε, λέγεις, τί σε χρή ποιεῖν;

C αλκ. Μά Δι', ἀλλ' οὖκ ἡγνύειν ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς ἐγίγνωσκον ὅτι ἡδικοῦμην.

συ. Ὡμον ἀρα ἐπίστασθαι καὶ παῖς ὄν, ὡς ἐοικε, τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀδικα.

αλκ. Ἐγωγε· καὶ ἡπιστάμην γε.

συ. Ἐν ποῖω χρόνῳ ἐξευρών; οὐ γὰρ δήπον ἐν ὃ γε ὕφο εἰδέναι.

αλκ. Οὐ δῆτα.

συ. Πότε οὖν ἁγνοεῖν ἡγοῦ; σκόπεi· οὐ γὰρ εὐρήσεις τούτον τὸν χρόνον.

αλκ. Μᾶ τὸν Δί', ὡ Σῶκρατες, οὖκοιν ἐχω γ' εἴπειν.

D συ. Εὔρων μὲν ἀρα οὖκ οἴσθα αὐτά.

αλκ. Οὐ πάνυ φαινομαι.

συ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄρτι γε οὐδὲ μαθὼν ἔφησθα εἴδε-
socrates. But, you see, before that time you were a child, were you not?

Alcibiades. Yes.

socrates. So I know well enough that then you thought you knew.

Alcibiades. How do you know it so well?

socrates. Many a time I heard you, when as a child you were dicing or playing some other game at your teacher's or elsewhere, instead of showing hesitation about what was just and unjust, speak in very loud and confident tones about one or other of your playmates, saying he was a rascal and a cheat who played unfairly. Is not this a true account?

Alcibiades. But what was I to do, Socrates, when somebody cheated me?

socrates. Yet if you were ignorant then whether you were being unfairly treated or not, how can you ask — "What are you to do?"

Alcibiades. Well, but on my word, I was not ignorant: no, I clearly understood that I was being wronged.

socrates. So you thought you knew, even as a child, it seems, what was just and unjust.

Alcibiades. I did; and I knew too.

socrates. At what sort of time did you discover it? For surely it was not while you thought you knew.

Alcibiades. No, indeed.

socrates. Then when did you think you were ignorant? Consider; I believe you will fail to find such a time.

Alcibiades. Upon my word, Socrates, I really cannot say.

socrates. So you do not know it by discovery.

Alcibiades. Not at all, apparently.

socrates. But you said just now that you did not know it by learning either; and if you neither discovered
ναί: εί δὲ μηθ' ἡδρες μήτε ἐμαθές, πῶς οἶδα καὶ πόθεν;

αλκ. Ἀλλ' ἰσως τοῦτό σου οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρινάμην, τὸ φάναι εἰδέναι αὐτὸς ἐξευρών.

ση. Τὸ δὲ πῶς εἶχεν;

αλκ. Ἐμαθον, οἶμαι, καὶ ἐγὼ ὡσπέρ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

ση. Πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ἕκομεν λόγον. παρὰ τοῦ; φράζε κάμοι.

Ε ἀλκ. Παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν.

ση. Οὐκ εἰς σπουδαίους γε διδασκάλους καταφεύγεις εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀναφέρων.

ἀλκ. Τί δὲ; οὐχ ἵκανοι διδάξαι οὕτωι;

ση. Οὐκοιν τὰ πεπτευτικὰ γε καὶ τὰ μὴ καίτοι φαυλότερα αὐτὰ οἶμαι τῶν δικαίων εἰναι. τί δὲ; συ οὐχ οὕτως οἴει;

ἀλκ. Ναι.

ση. Εἰτα τὰ μὲν φαυλότερα οὐχ οἴοι τε διδάσκειν, τὰ δὲ σπουδαίοτερα;

ἀλκ. Οἶμαι ἐγώγε; ἄλλα γοῦν πολλὰ οἶοι τ' εἰσο διδάσκειν σπουδαίοτερα τοῦ πεπτεύειν.

ση. Ποία ταῦτα;

111 ἀλκ. ὘ουν καὶ τὸ ἐλληνίζειν παρὰ τούτων ἐγώγε ἐμαθον, καὶ οὐκ ἃν ἔχομι εἰπεῖν ἐμαντοῦ διδασκαλοῦ, ἀλλ' εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀναφέρω, οὓς σὺ φής οὐ σπουδαίους εἶπα διδασκάλους.

ση. Ἀλλ', ὡ γενναίε, τούτου μὲν ἁγαθοὶ διδασκαλοὶ οἱ πολλοὶ, καὶ δικαίως ἐπανωντ' ἂν αὐτῶν εἰς διδασκάλιαν.

ἀλκ. Τί δή;

ση. Ὕν ἐχονοι περὶ αὐτὰ ἃ χρὴ τους ἁγαθοὺς διδασκάλους ἐχειν.
nor learnt it, how do you come to know it, and whence?

**ALC.** Well, perhaps that answer I gave you was not correct, that I knew it by my own discovery.

**soc.** Then how was it done?

**ALC.** I learnt it, I suppose, in the same way as everyone else.

**soc.** Back we come to the same argument. From whom? Please tell me.

**ALC.** From the many.

**soc.** They are no very serious teachers with whom you take refuge, if you ascribe it to the many!

**ALC.** Why, are they not competent to teach?

**soc.** Not how to play, or not to play, draughts; and yet that, I imagine, is a slight matter compared with justice. What? Do you not think so?

**ALC.** Yes.

**soc.** Then if they are unable to teach the slighter, can they teach the more serious matter?

**ALC.** I think so: at any rate, there are many other things that they are able to teach, more serious than draughts.

**soc.** What sort of things?

**ALC.** For instance, it was from them that I learnt to speak Greek, and I could not say who was my teacher, but can only ascribe it to the same people who, you say, are not serious teachers.

**soc.** Ah, gallant sir, the many may be good teachers of that, and they can justly be praised for their teaching of such subjects.

**ALC.** And why?

**soc.** Because in those subjects they have the equipment proper to good teachers.
ΔΛΚ. Τί τούτο λέγεις;
ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἴσθ' ὅτι χρῆ τοὺς μέλλοντας διδάσκειν ὅτι οὖν αὐτοὺς πρῶτον εἰδέναι; ἢ οὐ;
Β ΔΛΚ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοὺς εἰδότας ὁμολογεῖν τε ἄλληλοις καὶ μὴ διαφέρεσθαι;
ΔΛΚ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Ἡν οὔ δ' ἄν διαφέρωνται, ταῦτα φήσεις εἰδέναι αὐτοὺς;
ΔΛΚ. Οὕτω δήτα.
ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν διδάσκαλοι πῶς ἄν εἶπεν;
ΔΛΚ. Οὐδαμῶς.
ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; δοκοῦσι σοι διαφέρεσθαι οἱ πολλοὶ ποτὸν ἔστι λίθος ἡ ἕνων; καὶ εάν τινα ἑρωτᾶς, ἢρ;
C Οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁμολογοῦσι, καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὀρμῶσιν, ὅταν βούλωται λαβεῖν λίθον ἡ ἕνων; ὡςαύτως καὶ πάνθ' ὡς τοιαῦτα. σχέδον γὰρ τι μανθάνω τὸ ἐλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι ὅτι τοῦτο λέγεις; ἢ οὐ;
ΔΛΚ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς μὲν ταῦθ', ὡσπερ εἴπομεν, ἄλληλοις τε ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἴδια, καὶ
δημοσίᾳ αἱ πόλεις πρὸς ἄλληλας οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν αἱ μὲν ταῦθ' αἱ δ' ἄλλα φάσκουσαι;
ΔΛΚ. Οὐ γὰρ.
D ΣΩ. Εἰκότως ἃν ἀρα τούτων γε καὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶεν ἀγαθοὶ.
ΔΛΚ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν βουλοίμεθα ποιῆσαι τινα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰδέναι, ὥρθως ἃν αὐτὸν πέμπομεν εἰς διδα-
σκαλίαν τούτων τῶν πολλῶν;

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ALC. What do you mean by that?
SOC. You know that those who are going to teach anything should first know it themselves, do you not?
ALC. Of course.
SOC. And that those who know should agree with each other and not differ?
ALC. Yes.
SOC. But if they differ upon anything, will you say that they know it?
ALC. No, indeed.
SOC. Then how can they be teachers of it?
ALC. By no means.
SOC. Well now, do you find that the many differ about the nature of stone or wood? If you ask one of them, do they not agree on the same answer, and make for the same things when they want to get a piece of stone or wood? It is just the same, too, with everything of the sort: for I am pretty nearly right in understanding you to mean just this by knowing how to speak Greek, am I not?
ALC. Yes.
SOC. And on these matters, as we stated, they not only agree with each other and with themselves in private, but states also use in public the same terms about them to each other, without any dispute?
ALC. They do.
SOC. Then naturally they will be good teachers of these matters.
ALC. Yes.
SOC. And if we should wish to provide anyone with knowledge of them, we should be right in sending him to be taught by "the many" that you speak of?
ΑΛΚ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΝ. Τί δ' εἰ βουληθείμεν εἰδέναι, μή μόνον ποίοι ἀνθρωποὶ εἰσὶν ἢ ποίοι ἵπποι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τίνες αὐτῶν δρομικοὶ τε καὶ μῆ, ἀρ' ἐτι οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦτο ἰκανοὶ διδάξαι;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΝ. Ἡκανόν δὲ σοι τεκμήριον, οὗτ ὁπίστανται Ε ὅπερ κρήγυοι διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν τούτων, ἐπειδή οὐδὲν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΝ. Τί δ' εἰ βουληθείμεν εἰδέναι, μή μόνον ποίοι ἀνθρωποὶ εἰσίν, ἀλλ' ὅποιοι ὑγιεῖνοι ἢ νοσώ- δεις, ἀρα ἰκανοὶ ἂν ἕμων ἦσαν διδάσκαλοι οἱ πολλοὶ;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΝ. Ἡν δ' ἃν σοι τεκμήριον ὡς μοχθηροὶ εἰσιν τούτων διδάσκαλοι, εἷς ἐώρας αὐτοὺς διαφερομένους;

ΑΛΚ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΝ. Τί δ' ἰ; νῦν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἀνθρώπων καὶ πραγμάτων οἱ πολλοὶ δοκοῦσι σοι ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοῖς ἑαυτοῖς ἢ ἀλλήλους;

ΑΛΚ. Ἡκιστα νη Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΝ. Τί δ' ἰ; μάλιστα περὶ αὐτῶν διαφέρεσθαι;

ΑΛΚ. Πολὺ γε.

ΣΝ. Οὔκουν οἴομαι γε πώποτε σε ἱδεῖν οὐδ' ἄκούσαι σφόδρα οὕτω διαφερομένους ἀνθρώπους περὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ μῆ, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα μάχεσθαι τε καὶ ἀποκτυπνύαι ἀλλήλους.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΝ. Ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἔγωγε Βοιδ' ὅτι, καὶ εἰ μῆ ἑώρακας, ἀκήκοας γοῦν ἄλλων
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ALC. Certainly.
soc. But what if we wished to know not only what men were like or what horses were like, but which of them were good runners or not? Would the many still suffice to teach us this?

ALC. No, indeed.
soc. And you have ample proof that they do not know this, and are not proficient teachers of it, in their not agreeing about it at all with themselves?

ALC. I have.
soc. And what if we wished to know not only what men were like, but what healthy or diseased men were like? Would the many suffice to teach us?

ALC. No, indeed.
soc. And you would have proof of their being bad teachers of that, if you saw them differing about it?

ALC. I should.
soc. Well then, do you now find that the many agree with themselves or each other about just and unjust men or things?

ALC. Far from it, on my word, Socrates.
soc. In fact, they differ most especially on these points?

ALC. Very much so.
soc. And I suppose you never yet saw or heard of people differing so sharply on questions of health or the opposite as to fight and kill one another in battle because of them.

ALC. No, indeed.
soc. But on questions of justice or injustice I am sure you have; and if you have not seen them, at any rate you have heard of them from many people,
τε πολλῶν καὶ ὁμήρου. καὶ Ὁδυσσείας γὰρ καὶ Ἰλιάδος ἀκήκοας.

Ἀλκ. Πάντως δῆπον, ὁ Σώκρατες.

Σὺ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα ποιήματά ἐστι περὶ διαφορᾶς δικαίων τε καὶ ἄδικων;

Ἀλκ. Ναί.

Σὺ. Καὶ αἱ μάχαι γε καὶ οἱ θάνατοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν διαφοράν τοῖς τε Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλους Ἰρρωσίν ἐγένοντο, καὶ τοῖς μνηστήριοι τοῖς τῆς Πηνελόπης καὶ τῷ Ὁδυσσεί.

C Ἀλκ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σὺ. Οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἔν Τανάγρα Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἀποθανοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς ύστερον ἐν Κορωνείᾳ, ἐν οἷς καὶ δ ὁ σὸς πατήρ [Κλεινίας] ἐτελευτησεν, οὐδὲ περὶ ἐνὸς ἄλλου ἢ διαφορὰ ἢ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἄδικου τοὺς θανάτους καὶ τὰς μάχας πεποίηκεν. ἢ γάρ;

Ἀλκ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

1 Σὺ. Τούτοις οὖν φῶμεν ἐπιστασθαι, περὶ δὲν ὁ οὕτω σφόδρα διαφέρονται, ὡστε ἀμφισβητοῦντες ἀλλήλους τὰ ἐσχάτα σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐργάζονται;

Ἀλκ. Οὐ φαίνεται γε.

Σὺ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς τοιούτους διαδασκάλους ἀναφέρεις, οὓς ὁμολογεῖς αὐτὸς μὴ εἰδέναι;

Ἀλκ. Ἕσουκα.

Σὺ. Πώς οὖν εἰκός σε εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, περὶ δὲν οὕτω πλανᾶ καὶ οὕτε μαθῶν φαῖνῃ παρ' οὐδενὸς οὕτε αὐτὸς ἐξευρήνων;

Ἀλκ. Ἕκ μὲν ὁν σὺ λέγεις οὐκ εἰκός.

1 Kleinius om. Proclus.
especially Homer. For you have heard the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad*

_ALC._ I certainly have, of course, Socrates.

_SOC._ And these poems are about a difference of just and unjust?

_ALC._ Yes.

_SOC._ And from this difference arose the fights and deaths of the Achaeans, and of the Trojans as well, and of the suitors of Penelope in their strife with Odysseus.

_ALC._ That is true.

_SOC._ And I imagine that when the Athenians and Spartans and Boeotians lost their men at Tanagra, and later at Coronea, among whom your own father perished, the difference that caused their deaths and fights was solely on a question of just and unjust, was it not?

_ALC._ That is true.

_SOC._ Then are we to say that these people understand those questions, on which they differ so sharply that they are led by their mutual disputes to take these extreme measures against each other?

_ALC._ Apparently not.

_SOC._ And you refer me to teachers of that sort, whom you admit yourself to be without knowledge?

_ALC._ It seems I do.

_SOC._ Then how is it likely that you should know what is just and unjust, when you are so bewildered about these matters and are shown to have neither learnt them from anyone nor discovered them for yourself?

_ALC._ By what you say, it is not likely.

1 *i.e.* at the recitations of rhapsodes; cf. the *Ion* of Plato.

2 457 B.C.

3 447 B.C.
ΣΩ. ὡς οὐ καλῶς εἶπες, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη;
ΑΛΚ. Τὸ ποῖον;
Ε ΣΩ. ὁτί ἐμὲ φῆς ταῦτα λέγειν.
ΑΛΚ. Τί δὲ; οὐ σὺ λέγεις, ὡς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδικών;
ΣΩ. ὰγιλέντοι.
ΑΛΚ. 'Ἀλλ' ἐγώ;
ΣΩ. Ναί.
ΑΛΚ. Πῶς δὴ;
ΣΩ. 'Ωδε εἰση. ἐὰν σε ἐρωμαι τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ δύο, πότερα πλείω ἐστί, φήσεις ὧτι τὰ δύο;
ΑΛΚ. Ἡγώγε.
ΣΩ. Πόσω;
ΑΛΚ. Ἐνί.
ΣΩ. Πότερος οὖν ἡμῶν ὁ λέγων, ὡτι τὰ δύο τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐνὶ πλείω;
ΑΛΚ. Ἡγώ.
ΣΩ. ὡσκοῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἡρωτών, σὺ δὲ ἀπεκρίνου;
ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

113 ΣΩ. Περὶ δὴ τούτων μῶν ἐγὼ φαίνομαι λέγων ὁ ἐρωτῶν, ἡ σὺ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;
ΑΛΚ. Ἡγὼ.
ΣΩ. ὡτι δὴ, ἐνὶ λόγῳ εἰπὲ· ὅταν ἐρωτήσῃς τε καὶ ἀπόκρισις γίγνηται, πότερος ὁ λέγων, ὁ ἐρωτῶν ἡ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;
ΑΛΚ. ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος, ἔμοι γε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατε.

1 ἐρωμαι Olympiodorus: ἐρῶ καὶ mss.
soc. There again, Alcibiades, do you see how unfairly you speak?

ALC. In what?

soc. In stating that I say so.

ALC. Why, do you not say that I do not know about the just and unjust?

soc. Not at all.

ALC. Well, do I say it?

soc. Yes.

ALC. How, pray?

soc. I will show you, in the following way. If I ask you which is the greater number, one or two, you will answer "two"?

ALC. Yes, I shall.

soc. How much greater?

ALC. By one.

soc. Then which of us says that two are one more than one?

ALC. I.

soc. And I was asking, and you were answering?

ALC. Yes.

soc. Then is it I, the questioner, or you the answerer, that are found to be speaking about these things?

ALC. I.

soc. And what if I ask what are the letters in "Socrates," and you tell me? Which will be the speaker?

ALC. I.

soc. Come then, tell me, as a principle, when we have question and answer, which is the speaker—the questioner, or the answerer?

ALC. The answerer, I should say, Socrates.
B  \(\text{σφ.} \) Οὐκοῦν ἄρτι διὰ παντὸς τοῦ λόγου ἐγώ μὲν ἢ ὁ ἐρωτῶν;

\(\text{ἀλκ.} \) Ναὶ.

\(\text{σφ.} \) Σὺ δὲ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;

\(\text{ἀλκ.} \) Πάνυ γε.

\(\text{σφ.} \) Τί οὖν; τὰ λεγόμενα πότερον ἡμῶν εὑρηκεν;

\(\text{ἀλκ.} \) Φαίνομαι μὲν, ὦ Σωκράτες, ἐκ τῶν ὑμολογημένων ἐγώ.

\(\text{σφ.} \) Οὐκοῦν ἐλέξθη περὶ δικαίων καὶ ἄδικων ὁτι Ἄλκibiάδης ἢ καλὸς ὁ Κλεινίου οὐκ ἔπισταίτο, οὔτοι δὲ, καὶ μέλλοι εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ἔλθων συμβουλεύσεως Ἀθηναίοις περὶ ὧν οὔδεν οἶδεν; οὐ ταῦτ' ἢ;

C  \(\text{ἀλκ.} \) Φαίνεται.

\(\text{σφ.} \) Τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἄρα συμβαίνει, ὡς Ἄλκibiάδης σοὶ τάδε κινδυνεύεις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀκηκοέναι, οὔτ' ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, ἀλλὰ σὺ, ἐμὲ δὲ αἰτιὰ μάτην. καὶ μέντοι καὶ εὑ λέγεις. μανικὸν γὰρ ἐν νῷ ἐχεῖς ἐπιχειρῆμα ἐπιχειρεῖν, ὡς βελτιστε, διδάσκειν ὁ οὐκ οἰσθα, ἀμελήσας μανθάνειν.

D  \(\text{ἀλκ.} \) Οἶμαι μὲν, ὦ Σωκράτες, ὅλιγάκις Ἀθηναίοις βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας, πότερα δικαιότερα ἢ ἄδικωτέρα. τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἥγουνται δὴν εἶναι: εἶσαντες οὖν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοποῦσιν ὑπότερα συνοίσει πράξασιν. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα, οἶμαι, ἐστὶ τὰ τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς δὴ ἐλυσιτέλησεν ἄδικήσασι μεγάλα ἀδικήματα, καὶ ἐτέροις γε, οἶμαι, δίκαια ἐργασαμένους οὐ συνήνεγκεν.

\(\text{σφ.} \) Τί οὖν; εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἑτέρα μὲν τὰ δίκαια

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1 Hippolytus, 352—σοῦ τάδ', οὐκ ἐμοῦ κλύεις.
ALCIBIADES I

soc. And throughout the argument so far, I was the questioner?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And you the answerer?

ALC. Quite so.

soc. Well then, which of us has spoken what has been said?

ALC. Apparently, Socrates, from what has been admitted, it was I.

soc. And it was said that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, did not know about just and unjust, but thought he did, and intended to go to the Assembly as adviser to the Athenians on what he knows nothing about; is not that so?

ALC. Apparently.

soc. Then, to quote Euripides,¹ the result is, Alcibiades, that you may be said to have "heard it from yourself, not me," and it is not I who say it, but you, and you tax me with it in vain. And indeed what you say is quite true. For it is a mad scheme this, that you meditate, my excellent friend—of teaching things that you do not know, since you have taken no care to learn them.

ALC. I think, Socrates, that the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks rarely deliberate as to which is the more just or unjust course: for they regard questions of this sort as obvious; and so they pass them over and consider which course will prove more expedient in the result. For the just and the expedient, I take it, are not the same, but many people have profited by great wrongs that they have committed, whilst others, I imagine, have had no advantage from doing what was right.

soc. What then? Granting that the just and the...
Ε τυχάνει ὄντα, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα, οὗ τί ποι ἄν 
σὺ οἷς ταῦτα εἰδέναι ἄ συμφέρει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, 
καὶ δι’ ὅ τι;

Ἀλκ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὃ Σῶκρατες; εἰ μὴ με αὐτὴ ἐρήσῃ παρ᾿ ὁτιν ἔμαθον ἡ ὁποῖς αὐτὸς ἦδρον.

ἐν. Οἶνον τοῦτο ποιεῖς· εἰ τί μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγεις, 
πολλάκια δὲ δυνατὸν ὁν ἀποδείξαι δι᾿ οὕτερ καὶ τὸ 
πρότερον λόγου, οἷς δὴ καινὰ ἄττα δεῖν ἀκούειν 
ἀποδείξεις τε ἐτέρας, ὡς τῶν προτέρων οἰον 
σκευαρίων κατατετριμμένων, καὶ οὐκέτι ἄν σὺ 
αὐτὰ ἀμπίσχοι, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι τεκμήριον καθαρὸν

καὶ ἀχραντὸν οἴσει. ἔγω δὲ χαίρειν ἐάσας τὰς σὰς 
προδρομᾶς τοῖ λόγου οὐδὲν ἦττον ἐρήσομαι, πόθεν 
μαθῶν αὐτὰ συμφέροντα ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὡς τῶν 
ἐστίν ὁ διδάσκαλος, καὶ πάντες ἀκοῦοι τὰ πρότερον 
ἐρωτῶ μιᾶ ἐρωτήσει· ἀλλὰ γὰρ δὴ λογοὶ ὡς εἰς ταὐ 
τὸν ἠξεις καὶ οὐχ ἠξεις ἀποδείξας οὐθ’ ὡς ἔξευρων 
οἶσθα τὰ συμφέροντα οὐθ’ ὡς μαθῶν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ 
τρυφᾶτε καὶ οὐκέτι ἄν ἠδείως τοῦ αὐτοῦ γεύσασί 
λόγου, τοῦτον μὲν ἔώ χαίρειν, εἴτε οἴσθα εἴτε μὴ 

Β ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίοις συμφέροντα· πότερον δὲ ταῦτα ἔστι 
δικαία τε καὶ συμφέροντα ἦ ἑτερα, τί οὐκ ἀπο 
ἐδείξας; εἰ μὲν βούλεις, ἐρωτῶς με ὠσπέρ ἔγω 
σὲ, εἰ δὲ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ λόγῳ διεξῆλθε.

Ἀλκ. Ἀλλ’ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ οἶός τ’ ἂν εἴην, ὃ Σῶ 
kraτες, πρὸς σὲ διελθέων.

ἐν. Ἀλλ’, ὃ γαθὲ, ἐμὲ ἐκκλησίᾳ νόμισον καὶ 
δήμον· καὶ ἐκεί τοῖ σε δεῖσε ἕνα ἔκαστον πείθεων. 
ἡ γὰρ;
expedient are in fact as different as they can be, you surely do not still suppose you know what is expedient for mankind, and why it is so?

ALC. Well, what is the obstacle, Socrates,—unless you are going to ask me again from whom I learnt it, or how I discovered it for myself?

soc. What a way of going on! If your answer is incorrect, and a previous argument can be used to prove it so, you claim to be told something new, and a different line of proof, as though the previous one were like a poor worn-out coat which you refuse to wear any longer; you must be provided instead with something clean and unsoiled in the way of evidence. But I shall ignore your sallies in debate, and shall none the less ask you once more, where you learnt your knowledge of what is expedient, and who is your teacher, asking in one question all the things I asked before; and now you will clearly find yourself in the same plight, and will be unable to prove that you know the expedient either through discovery or through learning. But as you are dainty, and would dislike a repeated taste of the same argument, I pass over this question of whether you know or do not know what is expedient for the Athenians: but why have you not made it clear whether the just and the expedient are the same or different? If you like, question me as I did you, or if you prefer, argue out the matter in your own way.

ALC. But I am not sure I should be able, Socrates, to set it forth to you.

soc. Well, my good sir, imagine I am the people in Assembly; even there, you know, you will have to persuade each man singly, will you not?
ΑΛΚ. Ναϊ.

ΣΠ. Οὕκοιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνα τε οἶν τε εἶναι κατὰ
μονὰς πείθειν καὶ συμπόλλους περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδὴ,
ὡσπερ ὁ γραμματιστὴς ἕνα τε ποιν πείθει περὶ
γραμμάτων καὶ πολλοὺς;

ΑΛΚ. Ναϊ.

ΣΠ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕνα τε
καὶ πολλοὺς πείσει;

ΑΛΚ. Ναϊ.

ΣΠ. Οὕτος δ' ἐσται ὁ εἰδώς, ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΠ. Οὕκοιν καὶ σὺ ἄπερ καὶ πολλοῦς οἶός τε
πείθειν εἰ, ταύτα καὶ ἕνα;

ΑΛΚ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΠ. Ἕστι δὲ ταύτα δῆλον ὅτι ὁ οἴσθα.

ΑΛΚ. Ναϊ.

ΣΠ. Ἀλλο τι οὖν τοσούτον μόνον διαφέρει τοῦ ἐν

Δ τῶ δῆμων ρήτορος ὁ ἐν τῇ τοιῇ συνουσίᾳ, ὅτι ὁ
μὲν ἄθροος πείθει τὰ αὐτὰ, ὁ δὲ καθ' ἕνα;

ΑΛΚ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΠ. Ἰθι νῦν, ἐπειδή τοῦ αὐτοῦ φαίνεται πολλοὺς
τε καὶ ἕνα πείθειν, ἐν ἔμοι ἐμμελέτησον καὶ ἐπι-
χείρησον ἐπιδείξαι ὡς τὸ δίκαιον ἐνίοτε οὐ συμ-
φέρει.

ΑΛΚ. Ὑβριστὴς εἴ, ὡ Σώκρατες.

ΣΠ. Νῦν γοῦν ὑφ' ὑβρεως μέλλω σε πείθειν
τάναντία σὺ σοὶ ἐμὲ οὐκ ἔθελεις.

ΑΛΚ. Λέγε δή.

ΣΠ. Ἀποκρίνου μόνον τὰ ἐρωτῶμενα.

Ε ἈΛΚ. Μή, ἀλλὰ σοὶ αὐτὸς λέγε.
ALCIBIADES I

ALC. Yes.

soc. And the same man may well persuade one person singly, and many together, about things that he knows, just as the schoolmaster, I suppose, persuades either one or many about letters?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And again, will not the same man persuade either one or many about number?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And this will be the man who knows—the arithmetician?

ALC. Quite so.

soc. And you too can persuade a single man about things of which you can persuade many?

ALC. Presumably.

soc. And these are clearly things that you know.

ALC. Yes.

soc. And the only difference between the orator speaking before the people and one who speaks in a conversation like ours is that the former persuades men in a number together of the same things, and the latter persuades them one at a time?

ALC. It looks like it.

soc. Come now, since we see that the same man may persuade either many or one, try your unpractised hand on me, and endeavour to show that the just is sometimes not expedient.

ALC. You are insolent, Socrates!

soc. This time, at any rate, I am going to have the insolence to persuade you of the opposite of that which you decline to prove to me.

ALC. Speak, then.

soc. Just answer my questions.

ALC. No, you yourself must be the speaker.
PLATO

σ. Τί δ'; οὖν ὁτι μάλιστα βούλει πεισθῆναι;

αλκ. Πάντως δῆπον.

σ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ λέγοις ὅτι ταῦτ' οὖτως ἔχει, μάλιστ' ἂν ἔχῃ πεπεισμένος;

αλκ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

σ. Ἀποκρίνου δή: καὶ εἶν μὴ αὐτὸς σοῦ ἀκούσῃς, ὅτι τὰ δίκαια συμφέροντά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ γε λέγοντι μὴ πιστεύσῃς.

αλκ. Οὖτοι, ἀλλ' ἀποκριτέον καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν οἶομαι βλαβήσεσθαι.

115 σ. Μαντικὸς γὰρ εἰ. καὶ μοι λέγε: τῶν δικαίων φής ἐνια μὲν συμφέρειν, ἐνια δ' οὐ;

αλκ. Ναί.

σ. Τί δέ; τὰ μὲν καλὰ αὐτῶν εἶναι, τὰ δ' οὐ;

αλκ. Πῶς τούτο ἔρωτάς; σ.

σ. Εἰ τις ἡδῆ σοι ἐδοξεῖν αἰσχρὰ μὲν, δίκαια δὲ πράττειν;

αλκ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

σ. Ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια καλά;

αλκ. Ναὶ.

σ. Τί δ' αὖ τὰ καλὰ; πότερον πάντα ἀγαθά,

ἡ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δ' οὐ;

αλκ. οἴομαι ἐγώγε, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐνια τῶν καλῶν κακὰ εἶναι.

σ. Ἡ καὶ αἰσχρὰ ἀγαθά;

αλκ. Ναί.

Β σ. Ἀρα λέγεις τὰ τοιάδε, οἶνον πολλοὶ ἐν πολέμω βοηθῶσαντες ἔταιρον ἡ οἰκείω τραύματα ἔλαβον καὶ ἀπέθανον, οἱ δ' οὐ βοηθῶσαντες, δέον, ὑμεῖς ἀπήλθοιν;

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soc. What? Do you not wish above all things to be persuaded?
   ALC. By all means, to be sure.
   soc. And you would best be persuaded if you should say "the case is so"?
   ALC. I agree.
   soc. Then answer; and if you do not hear your own self say that the just is expedient, put no trust in the words of anyone again.
   ALC. I will not: but I may as well answer; for I do not think I shall come to any harm.
   soc. You are quite a prophet! Now tell me, do you consider some just things to be expedient, and others not?
   ALC. Yes.
   soc. And again, some noble, and some not?
   ALC. What do you mean by that question?
   soc. I would ask whether anyone ever seemed to you to be doing what was base and yet just.
   ALC. Never.
   soc. Well, are all just things noble?
   ALC. Yes.
   soc. And what of noble things, in their turn? Are they all good, or some only, while others are not?
   ALC. In my opinion, Socrates, some noble things are evil.
   soc. And some base things are good?
   ALC. Yes.
   soc. Do you mean as in one of the many cases where men have gone to rescue a comrade or kinsman in battle, and have been either wounded or killed, while those who did not go to the rescue, as duty bade, have got off safe and sound?
ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν τοιαύτην βοήθειαν καλὴν μὲν λέγεις κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τοῦ σώσαι οὖς ἐδει. 

τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία, ἥ οὕς;
ΑΛΚ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Κακὴν δὲ γε κατὰ τοὺς θανάτους τε καὶ ἔλκη· ἥ γάρ;
ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

C ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἡ ἀνδρεία, ἄλλο δὲ ὁ 

θάνατος;
ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτὸν γέ ἔστι καλὸν καὶ 

κακὸν τὸ τοὺς φίλους βοηθεῖν;
ΑΛΚ. Οὐ φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. "Ορα τοῖνυν εἰ, ἥ γε καλὸν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν, 

ἀσπερ καὶ ἐνταῦθα· κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν γὰρ ὁμο- 

λόγεις καλὸν εἶναι τὴν βοήθειαν· τοῦτ’ οὖν αὐτὸ 

σκόπει, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ἀγαθὸν ἡ κακὸν; ὡδε δὲ 

σκόπει· πότερ’ ἂν δέξαιο σοι εἶναι, ἀγαθὰ ἡ κακά;
ΑΛΚ. 'Αγαθά.

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μέγιστα μάλιστα, καὶ ἦκιστα 

τῶν τοιούτων δέξαιο ἢν στέρεσθαι;
ΑΛΚ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖς;
ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν λέγεις περί ἀνδρείας; ἐπὶ πόσῳ 

ἄν αὐτοῦ δέξασθαὶ στέρεσθαι;
ΑΛΚ. Οúde δέ ζῆν ἂν ἑγὼ δεξαίμην δείλος ἢν.
ΣΩ. "Εσχατον ἄρα κακῶν εἶναι σοι δοκεῖ ἢ 

δειλία.
ΑΛΚ. "Ἐμοιγε.
ΣΩ. 'Εξ ὤςου τῷ τεθνάναι, ως ἔοικεν.
ΑΛΚ. Φημί.
ALCIBIADES I

ALC. Precisely.

soc. And such a rescue you call noble, in respect of the endeavour to save those whom it was one's duty to save; and this is courage, is it not?

ALC. Yes.

soc. But you call it evil, in respect of the deaths and wounds?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And is not the courage one thing, and the death another?

ALC. Certainly.

soc. Then it is not in the same respect that rescuing one's friends is noble and evil?

ALC. Apparently not.

soc. Then see if, inasmuch as it is noble, it is also good; for in the present case you were admitting that the rescue was noble in respect of its courage; now consider this very thing, courage, and say whether it is good or bad. Consider it in this way: which would you choose to have, good things or evil?

ALC. Good.

soc. And most of all, the greatest goods, and of such things you would least allow yourself to be deprived?

ALC. To be sure.

soc. Then what do you say of courage? At what price would you allow yourself to be deprived of it?

ALC. I would give up life itself if I had to be a coward.

soc. Then you regard cowardice as the uttermost evil.

ALC. I do.

soc. On a par with death, it seems.

ALC. Yes.
ΣΠ. Οὐκοῦν θανάτῳ τε καὶ δειλίᾳ ἐναντιώτατον ζωῇ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ;
ΑΛΚ. Ναὶ.
Ε ΣΠ. Καὶ τὰ μὲν μάλιστ' ἂν εἶναι βούλοιο σοι, τὰ δὲ ἴκιστα;
ΑΛΚ. Ναὶ.
ΣΠ. Ἄρ' ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀριστα ἡγή, τὰ δὲ κάκιστα;
<ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΠ. Ἔν τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἀρα σὺ ἡγή ἀνδρείαν εἶναι καί τοῖς κακίστοις θάνατον.  
ΑΛΚ. Ἐγώγε.
ΣΠ. Τὸ ἄρα βοηθεῖν ἐν πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις, ἢ μὲν καλόν, κατ' ἀγαθοῦ πρᾶξιν τὴν τῆς ἀνδρείας, καλὸν αὐτὸ προσεῖτας;
ΑΛΚ. Φαῖνομαι γε.
ΣΠ. Κατὰ δὲ κακοῦ πρᾶξιν τὴν τοῦ θανάτου κακὸν;
ΑΛΚ. Ναὶ.
ΣΠ. Οὐκοῦν ὡδὲ δίκαιον προσαγορεῦειν ἑκάστην τῶν πράξεων· εἶπερ ἢ κακὸν ἀπεργάζεται κακὴν 116 καλείς, καὶ ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὴν κλητέον.
ΑΛΚ. Ἐμοιυε δοκεῖ.
ΣΠ. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἢ ἀγαθὸν, καλὸν· ἢ δὲ κακὸν, αἰσχρὸν;
ΑΛΚ. Ναὶ.
ΣΠ. Τὴν ἄρα ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις βοηθείαν λέγων καλὴν μὲν εἶναι, κακῆν δὲ, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως λέγεις ἢ εἰ προσεῖπες αὐτὴν ἀγαθὴν μὲν, κακὴν δὲ.
ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ μοι δοκεῖσ λέγειν, ὡ Σώκρατες.
ΣΠ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν καλῶν, καθ' ὅσον καλὸν,  
1 πάνυ γε . . . θάνατον Stobaeus: om. mss., Proclus.
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soc. And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And you would most desire to have the former, and least the latter?

ALC. Yes.

soc. Is that because you think the former best, and the latter worst?

ALC. To be sure.

soc. So you reckon courage among the best things, and death among the worst.

ALC. I do.

soc. Then the rescue of one's friends in battle, inasmuch as it is noble in respect of the working of good by courage, you have termed noble?

ALC. Apparently.

soc. But evil, in respect of the working of evil by death?

ALC. Yes.

soc. So we may fairly describe each of these workings as follows: as you call either of them evil because of the evil it produces, so you must call it good because of the good it produces.

ALC. I believe that is so.

soc. And again, are they noble inasmuch as they are good, and base inasmuch as they are evil?

ALC. Yes.

soc. Then in saying that the rescue of one's friends in battle is noble and yet evil, you mean just the same as if you called the rescue good, but evil.

ALC. I believe what you say is true, Socrates.

soc. So nothing noble, in so far as it is noble, is
κακόν, οuplicate τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καθ' ὅσον αἰσχρόν, ἀγαθόν.

Β Ἀλκ. Ὡν φαίνεται.
    σο. Ἔτι τούνυν καὶ ὁδὲ σκέψαι. ὡστὶς καλῶς πράττει, οὐχί καὶ εὗ πράττει;
    Ἀλκ. Ναί.
    σο. Ὡς εὗ πράττοντες οὐκ εὐθαίμονες;
    Ἀλκ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
    σο. Οὔκοδιν εὐθαίμονες δι' ἀγαθῶν κτῆσιν;
    Ἀλκ. Μάλιστα.
    σο. Κτώνται δὲ ταῦτα τῷ εὗ καὶ καλῶς πράττειν;
    Ἀλκ. Ναί.
    σο. Τὸ εὗ ἄρα πράττειν ἀγαθόν;
    Ἀλκ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;
    σο. Οὔκοδιν καλὸν ἢ εὐπραγία;
    Ἀλκ. Ναί.

C σο. Ταῦτὸν ἄρα ἐφάνη ἢμῖν πάλιν αὖ καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν.
    Ἀλκ. Φαίνεται.
    σο. Ὅτι ἂν ἄρα εὑρωμεν καλὸν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν εὑρήσομεν ἐκ γε τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου.
    Ἀλκ. Ἄναγκη.
    σο. Τί δε; τὰ ἀγαθὰ συμφέρει ἃ οὔ;
    Ἀλκ. Συμφέρει.
    σο. Μνημονευεῖς οὖν περὶ τῶν δικαίων πῶς ὁμολογήσαμεν;
    Ἀλκ. Οἶμαι γε τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καλὰ πράττειν.
    σο. Οὔκοδιν καὶ τοὺς τὰ καλὰ ἀγαθά;
    Ἀλκ. Ναί.

D σο. Τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ συμφέρειν;
evil, and nothing base, in so far as it is base, is
good.

ALC. Apparently.
SOC. Now then, consider it again in this way:
whoever does nobly, does well too, does he not?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And are not those who do well happy?

ALC. Of course.

SOC. And they are happy because of the acquisition
of good things?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. And they acquire these by doing well and
nobly?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. So doing well is good?

ALC. Of course.

SOC. And welfare is noble?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Hence we have seen again that noble and
good are the same thing.

ALC. Apparently.

SOC. Then whatever we find to be noble we shall
find also to be good, by this argument at least.

ALC. We must.

SOC. Well then, are good things expedient or not?

ALC. Expedient.

SOC. And do you remember what our admissions
were about just things?

ALC. I think we said that those who do just things
must do noble things.

SOC. And that those who do noble things must do
good things?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And that good things are expedient?
ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δίκαια ἄρα, ὡς 'Αλκιβιάδη, συμφέροντα ἐστὶν.

ΑΛΚ. Ἑσουκεν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ταῦτα οὐ σὺ ὁ λέγων, ἐγὼ δὲ ὁ ἑρωτῶν;

ΑΛΚ. Φαύνομαι, ὡς ἑοικα.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν τις ἀνίσοταται συμβουλεύσων εἴτε Ἀθηναίοις εἴτε Πεπαρηθίοις, οἵμουν γεγυνώσκειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, φῇσε δ' εἶναι τὰ δίκαια κακὰ ἔνιοτε, ἀλλὸ τι ἡ καταγελώσης ἀν αὐτοῦ, ἐπειδὴ περ ὑπάτρεις καὶ εὖ λέγων ὦτι ταῦτα ἐστὶ Ε δίκαια τε καὶ συμφέροντα;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὡς Σωκράτης, οὐκ οἶδα ἐγώνει οὐδὲ ὁ τι λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἑοικά ἀτόπως ἑχοντι. τοτε μὲν γάρ μοι ἐτερα δοκεῖ σοῦ ἑρωτῶντος, τοτε δὲ ἄλλα.

ΣΩ. Εἴσα τούτο, ὦ φίλε, ἀγνοεῖς τὸ πάθημα τί ἐστιν;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οἴει ἄν οὖν, εἰ τις ἐρωτώτης σε, δύο ὀφθαλμοὺς ἡ τρεῖς ἔχεις, καὶ δύο χεῖρας ἡ τέτταρας, ἡ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, τοτε μὲν ἐτερ' ἀν ἀποκρύνασθαι, τοτε δὲ ἄλλα, ἡ ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτά;

117 ΑΛΚ. Δέδοικα μὲν ἐγώνει ἡδη περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, οἶμαι μεντοι τὰ αὐτὰ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτι οἴσθα; τοῦτ' αὕτιον;

ΑΛΚ. Οἶμαι ἐγώγει.

ΣΩ. Περὶ ὄν ἄρα ἄκων τᾶναντία ἀποκρίνη, δῆλον ὅτι περὶ τούτων οὐκ οἴσθα.

ΑΛΚ. Εἰκόσ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἄδικων
ALCIBIADES I

ALC. Yes.
soc. Hence just things, Alcibiades, are expedient.
ALC. So it seems.
soc. Well now, are not you the speaker of all this, and I the questioner?
ALC. I seem to be, apparently.
soc. So if anyone stands up to advise either the Athenians or the Peparethians,¹ imagining that he understands what is just and unjust, and says that just things are sometimes evil, could you do other than laugh him to scorn, since you actually say yourself that just and expedient are the same?
ALC. But by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I am saying, I feel altogether in such a strange state! For from moment to moment I change my view under your questioning.
soc. And are you unaware, my friend, what this feeling is?
ALC. I am, quite.
soc. Well, do you suppose that if someone should ask you whether you have two eyes or three, two hands or four, or anything else of that sort, you would answer differently from moment to moment, or always the same thing?
ALC. I begin to have misgivings about myself, but still I think I should make the same answer.
soc. And the reason would be, because you know?
ALC. I think so.
soc. Then if you involuntarily give contradictory answers, clearly it must be about things of which you are ignorant.
ALC. Very likely.
soc. And you say you are bewildered in answering

¹ Peparethus is a small island off the coast of Thessaly.
καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ μῆ ‹ποκρινόμενος φής πλανᾶσθαι; εἶτα οὐ δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ μῆ εἰδέναι περὶ αὐτῶν, διὰ ταῦτα πλανᾶ;

Β Ἀλκ. "Εμοιγε.

ἐπι. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἔχει: ἐπειδάν τίς τι μῆ εἰδή, ἀναγκαίον περὶ τούτου πλανᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχήν;

ἀλκ. Ὡς γὰρ οὖ;

ἐπι. Τί οὖν; οἶσθα οὕτω πρόπον ἀναβηγήθη εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν;

ἀλκ. Μὰ Δί οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ἐπι. Ἡ καὶ πλανᾶται σου ἡ δόξα περὶ ταῦτα;

ἀλκ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ἐπι. Τὸ δ’ αὐτίον οἷόθα ἦ ἐγὼ φράσω;

ἀλκ. Φράσον.

ἐπι. Ὡστὶ, ὥς φίλε, οὖκ οἴει αὐτὸ ἐπίστασθαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος.

C Ἀλκ. Πῶς αὕτω τούτῳ λέγεις;

ἐπι. Ὡρα καὶ οὐ κοινῆ. ἢ μῆ ἐπίστασαι, γινώσκεις δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι, πλανᾶ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

ἀλκ. Ὅσπερ περὶ ὅψου σκευασίας οἴσθα δήπου ὅτι οὐκ οἰσθα;

ἀλκ. Πάνυ γε.

ἐπι. Πότερον οὖν αὐτῶς περὶ ταῦτα δοξάζεις, ὅπως χρῆ σκευάζειν, καὶ πλανᾶ, ἡ τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ ἐπιτρέπεις;

ἀλκ. Οὕτως.

ἐπι. Τί δ’ εἰ ἐν νητί πλέοις, ἃρα δοξάζοις ἀν

D πότερον χρῆ τὸν οἴακα εἴσω ἄγειν ἡ ἔξω, καὶ ἄτε

1 The "tiller" was the handle of an oar at the side of the stern, and was moved towards or away from the centre of the ship.
about just and unjust, noble and base, evil and good, expedient and inexpedient? Now, is it not obvious that your bewilderment is caused by your ignorance of these things?

ALC. I agree.

SOC. Then is it the case that when a man does not know a thing he must needs be bewildered in spirit regarding that thing?

ALC. Yes, of course.

SOC. Well now, do you know in what way you can ascend to heaven?

ALC. On my word, not I.

SOC. Is that too a kind of question about which your judgement is bewildered?

ALC. No, indeed.

SOC. Do you know the reason, or shall I state it?

ALC. State it.

SOC. It is, my friend, that while not knowing the matter you do not suppose that you know it.

ALC. Here again, how do you mean?

SOC. Do your share, in seeing for yourself. Are you bewildered about the kind of thing that you do not know and are aware of not knowing? For instance, you know, I suppose, that you do not know about the preparation of a tasty dish?

ALC. Quite so.

SOC. Then do you think for yourself how you are to prepare it, and get bewildered, or do you entrust it to the person who knows?

ALC. I do the latter.

SOC. And what if you should be on a ship at sea? Would you think whether the tiller should be moved inwards or outwards, and in your ignorance bewilder
οὐκ εἰδῶς πλανῶ ἄν, ἡ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἐπιτρέψας ἄν ἥσυχιῶν ἄγοις;

ἈΛΚ. Τῷ κυβερνήτῃ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα περὶ ἄ μὴ οἰσθά πλανᾶ, ἀντερ εἰδῆς ὅτι οὐκ οἴσθα;

ἈΛΚ. Οὐκ ἔσοικα.

ΣΩ. Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἀμαρτήματα ἐν τῇ πράξει διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐστι, τὴν τῶν μὴ εἰδότα οἰσθαί εἰδέναι;

ἈΛΚ. Πῶς αὐ λέγεις τούτο;

ΣΩ. Τότε που ἐπιχειροῦμεν πράττειν, ὅταν οἰὼ-μεθα εἰδέναι ὄ τι πράττομεν;

Ε ἈΛΚ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. "Ὅταν δὲ γέ ποὺ τίνες μὴ οἴωνται εἰδέναι, ἄλλοις παραδιδόσων;

ἈΛΚ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ τοιούτοι τῶν μὴ εἰδότων ἀναμάρ-τητοι ζῶσι διὰ τὸ ἄλλοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιτρέπειν;

ἈΛΚ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Τίνες οὖν οἱ ἀμαρτάνοντες; οὐ γάρ που οἶ γε εἰδότες.

ἈΛΚ. Οὐ δήτα.

ΣΩ. Ἕπειδή δὲ οὔθ' οἱ εἰδότες οὔθ' οἱ τῶν μὴ εἰδότων εἰδότες ὅτι οὐκ ἱσασων, ἢ ἄλλοι λείπονται ἢ οἱ μὴ εἰδότες, οἴομενοι δ' εἰδέναι;

ἈΛΚ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Αὐτὴ ἄρα ἡ ἄγνοια τῶν κακῶν αἰτία καὶ ἡ ἐπονειδιστὸς ἀμαθία;

ἈΛΚ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν ἣ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα, τότε κακουργοτάτη καὶ αἰσχρότη;

ἈΛΚ. Πολὺ γε.
Alcibiades

yourself, or would you entrust it to the helmsman, and be quiet?

Alc. I would leave it to him.

Soc. So you are not bewildered about what you do not know, so long as you know that you do not know?

Alc. It seems I am not.

Soc. Then do you note that mistakes in action also are due to this ignorance of thinking one knows when one does not?

Alc. Here again, how do you mean?

Soc. We set about acting, I suppose, when we think we know what we are doing?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. But when people think they do not know, I suppose they hand it over to others?

Alc. To be sure.

Soc. And so that kind of ignorant person makes no mistakes in life, because they entrust such matters to others?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Who then are those who make mistakes? For, I take it, they cannot be those who know.

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. But since it is neither those who know, nor those of the ignorant who know that they do not know, the only people left, I think, are those who do not know, but think that they do?

Alc. Yes, only those.

Soc. Then this ignorance is a cause of evils, and is the discreditable sort of stupidity?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And when it is about the greatest matters, it is most injurious and base?

Alc. By far.
仿照柏拉图

Τί οὖν; ἔχεις μείζων εἰπεῖν δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμφερόντων;

Ἀλκ. Οὐ δῆτα.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ταύτα σὺ φῆς πλανᾶσθαι;

Ἀλκ. Ναὶ.

Σο. Εἰ δὲ πλανᾶ, ἢρ' οὐ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν B ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἄγνοεῖς τὰ μέγιστα, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐκ εἰδῶς οἶει αὐτὰ εἰδέναι;

Ἀλκ. Κινδυνεύων.

Σο. Βαβαί ἄρα, ὡς Ἀλκιβιάδη, οἶον πάθος πέπονθας. ὦ ἕγω ὦνομάζεων μὲν ὁκνῶ, ὅμως δὲ, ἐπειδὴ μόνω ἐσμέν, ῥητέον. ἀμαβίᾳ γὰρ συνοικεῖσ, ὦ βέλτιστο, τῇ ἐσχάτῃ, ὡς ὁ λόγος σου κατηγορεῖ καὶ σὺ σαυτοῦ: διὸ καὶ ἄττεις ἄρα πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ πρὶν παιδευθῆναι. πέπονθας δὲ τοῦτο οὐ σὺ μόνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πραττόντων τὰ τήσει τῆς C πόλεως, πλὴν ὄλιγων γε καὶ ἴσως τοῦ σοῦ ἐπιτρόπου Περικλέους.

Ἀλκ. Δέγεται γέ τοι, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου σοφὸς γεγονέναι, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς καὶ σοφοῖς συγγεγονέναι, καὶ Πυθοκλείδη καὶ Ἀναξι- 

αγόρα: καὶ νῦν ἔτι τηλικοῦτος ὡν Δάμωνι σύνεστιν 

αὐτοῦ τοῦτον ἐνεκα.

Σο. Τί οὖν; ἦδη τινὰ εἰδεῖς σοφὸν ὄστιον ἀδυνα- 

tοῦτα ποιήσαι ἄλλον σοφὸν ἄπερ αὐτός; ὥσπερ 

ὡς σε ἐδίδαξε γράμματα, αὐτός τε ἢν σοφὸς καὶ σὲ 

ἐποίησε τῶν τε ἄλλων ὀντων ἐβούλετο: ἡ γάρ;

Ἀλκ. Ναὶ.

1 A musician of Ceos (who was perhaps also a Pythagorean philosopher) who taught in Athens.
2 An Ionian philosopher who lived in Athens c. 480-430 B.C.
3 An Athenian musician and sophist.

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soc. Well then, can you mention any greater things than the just, the noble, the good, and the expedient?

    ALC. No, indeed.

    soc. And it is about these, you say, that you are bewildered?

    ALC. Yes.

    soc. But if you are bewildered, is it not clear from what has gone before that you are not only ignorant of the greatest things, but while not knowing them you think that you do?

    ALC. I am afraid so.

    soc. Alack then, Alcibiades, for the plight you are in! I shrink indeed from giving it a name, but still, as we are alone, let me speak out. You are wedded to stupidity, my fine friend, of the vilest kind; you are impeached of this by your own words, out of your own mouth; and this, it seems, is why you dash into politics before you have been educated. And you are not alone in this plight, but you share it with most of those who manage our city's affairs, except just a few, and perhaps your guardian, Pericles.

    ALC. Yes, you know, Socrates, they say he did not get his wisdom independently, but consorted with many wise men, such as Pythocleides and Anaxagoras; and now, old as he is, he still confers with Damon for that very purpose.

    soc. Well, but did you ever find a man who was wise in anything and yet unable to make another man wise in the same things as himself? For instance, the man who taught you letters was wise himself, and also made you wise, and anyone else he wished to, did he not?

    ALC. Yes.
D ξη. Ὅγκουν καὶ σὺ δ' ἐκείνου μαθῶν ἄλλον οἴσι τε ἔσῃ;
 Ἄλκ. Ναί.
 ξη. Καὶ δ' κιθαριστῆς δὲ καὶ δ' παιδοτρίβης ὀδαύτως;
 Ἄλκ. Πάνυ γε.
 ξη. Καλὸν γὰρ δὴπον τεκμήριον τοῦτο τῶν ἐπισταμένων οὕτων ὅτι ἐπιστανται, ἐπειδὰν καὶ ἄλλον οἰόι τε ὦσιν ἀποδείξαι ἐπιστάμενον.
 Ἄλκ. "Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.
 ξη. Τί οὖν; ἔχεις εἰπεῖν, Περικλῆς τίνα ἐποίησε σοφὸν, ἀπὸ τῶν νείων ἄρξ' ἀμένος;
 Ε Ἄλκ. Τί δ', εἰ τῷ Περικλέους νιεί ἥλιθιώ ἐγενέσθην, ὁ Σώκρατες;
 ξη. Ἄλλα Κλεινίαν τὸν σὸν ἄδελφόν.
 Ἄλκ. Τί δ' ἂν αὖ Κλεινίαν λέγοις, μανώμενον ἀνθρώπον;
 ξη. Ἐπειδὴ τοῖνυν Κλεινίας μὲν μαίνεται, τῷ δὲ Περικλέους νιεί ἥλιθιώ ἐγενέσθην, σοὶ τίνα αἰτίαν ἀναθώμεν, δι' ὃ τι σε οὔτως ἔχοντα περιορᾷ;
 Ἄλκ. Ἐγώ, οἴμαι, αὐτίοις οὐ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν.
 ξη. Ἄλλα τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἡ τῶν ξένων δούλων ἡ ἑλεύθερον εἰπέ, ὡστις αἰτίαν ἔχει διὰ τὴν Περικλέους συνουσίαν σοφῶτερος γεγονέναι, ὡσπερ ἐγώ ἔχω σοι εἰπεῖν διὰ τὴν Ζήνωνος Πυθόδωρον τὸν Ἰσολόχου καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάδον, ὧν ἑκάτερος Ζήνων ἐκατὸν μνᾶς τελέσας σοφὸς τε καὶ ἔλλογμος γέγονεν.
soc. And you too, who learnt from him, will be able to make another man wise?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And the same holds of the harper and the trainer?

ALC. Certainly.

soc. For, I presume, it is a fine proof of one's knowing anything that one knows, when one is able to point to another man whom one has made to know it.

ALC. I agree.

soc. Well then, can you tell me whom Pericles made wise? One of his sons, to begin with?

ALC. But what if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, Socrates?

soc. Well, Cleinias, your brother.

ALC. But why should you mention Cleinias, a madman?

soc. Well, if Cleinias is mad and the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what reason are we to assign, in your case, for his allowing you to be in your present condition?

ALC. I believe I am myself to blame for not attending to him.

soc. But tell me of any other Athenian or foreigner, slave or freeman, who is accounted to have become wiser through converse with Pericles; as I can tell you that Pythodorus, son of Isolochus, and Callias, son of Calliades, became through that of Zeno; each of them has paid Zeno a hundred minae, and has become both wise and distinguished.

1 About £1500-£2000, or the total expenses of three years at an English University (1964).
PLATO

αλκ. Ἄλλα μᾶ Δί οὐκ ἔχω.

σπ. Εἶξεν τί οὖν διανοῇ περὶ σαυτοῦ; πότερον ἐάν ὡς νῦν ἔχεις, ἡ ἐπιμέλειαν τινα ποιεῖσθαι;

Β αλκ. Κοινὴ βουλή, ὥ Σώκρατες. καίτοι ἐννοῶ σου εἰπόντος καὶ συγχωρῶ. δοκοῦσι γὰρ μοι οἱ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττοντες ἐκτὸς ὅλων ἀπαίδευτοι εἶναι.

σπ. Εἶτα τί δὴ τοῦτο;

αλκ. Ἐι μὲν ποὺ ἦσαν πεπαιδευμένοι, ἐδει ἃν τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα αὐτοῖς ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι μαθόντα καὶ ἀσκήσαντα ἴεναι ὡς ἐπ’ ἀθλητάς· νῦν δ’ ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἰδιωτικῶς ἐχοντες ἑληλύθασιν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, τί δεὶ ἀσκεῖν καὶ μανθάνοντα πράγματ’

C ἔχειν; ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι τούτων τῇ γε φύσει πάντα πολὺ περιέσομαι.

σπ. Βαβαί, οἶνον, ὥ ἄριστε, τοῦτ’ εἰρήκας· ὡς ἀνάξιον τῆς ἱδέας καὶ τῶν ἀλλών τῶν σοι ὑπαρχόντων.

αλκ. Τί μάλιστα καὶ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὥ Σώκρατες;

σπ. Ἀγανακτῶ ὑπέρ τε σοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἔρωτος.

αλκ. Τί δὴ;

σπ. Εἰ ἥξιωσας τὸν ἀγώνα σοι εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐνθάδε ἄνθρωποις.

ἀλκ. Ἄλλα πρὸς τίνας μὴν;

σπ. Ἀξίον τοῦτό γε καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἄνδρα οἶόμενον μεγαλόφρονα εἶναι.

D ἀλκ. Πῶς λέγεις; οὐ πρὸς τούτους μοι ὁ ἄγων;

σπ. Ἄλλα κἂν εἰ τριήρη διενοῦσιν κυβερνῶν μέλλουσαν ναυμαχεῖν, ἥρκει ἂν σοι τῶν συνναυτῶν
ALCIBIADES I

ALC. Well, upon my word, I cannot.
SOC. Very good: then what is your intention regarding yourself? Will you remain as you are, or take some trouble?
ALC. We must put our heads together, Socrates. And indeed, as soon as you speak, I take the point and agree. For the men who manage the city’s affairs, apart from a few, do strike me as uneducated.
SOC. Then what does that mean?
ALC. That if they were educated, I suppose anyone who undertook to contend against them would have to get some knowledge and practice first, as he would for a match with athletes: but now, seeing that these men have gone in for politics as amateurs, what need is there for me to practise and have the trouble of learning? For I am sure that my natural powers alone will give me an easy victory over them.
SOC. Ho, ho, my good sir, what a thing to say! How unworthy of your looks and your other advantages!
ALC. What is your meaning now, Socrates? What is the connexion?
SOC. I am grieved for you, and for my love.
ALC. Why, pray?
SOC. That you should expect your contest to be with the men we have here.
ALC. Well, but with whom is it to be?
SOC. Is that a worthy question to be asked by a man who considers himself high-spirited?
ALC. How do you mean? Is not my contest with these men?
SOC. Well, suppose you were intending to steer a warship into action, would you be content to be the best hand among the crew at steering or, while
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βελτίστω εἶναι τὰ κυβερνητικὰ, ἡ ταῦτα μὲν ᾧν ἀν δὲν ὑπάρχειν, ἀπέβλεπτες δ’ ἂν εἰς τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνταγωνιστάς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς νῦν εἰς τοὺς συναγωνιστάς; ἂν δὴπου περιγενέσθαι σε δεὶ τοσοῦτον, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιοιν ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ Εκαταφρονηθέντας συναγωνιζεσθαί σοι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, εἰ δὴ τῷ ὅντι γε καλὸν τι ἔργον ἀπο- δείξασθαι διανοῆ καὶ ἄξιον σαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῆς πόλεως.

ἀλκ. Ἐ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διανοοῦμαι γε.

ἐπ. Πάνω σοι ἄρα ἄξιον ἄγαπᾶν, εἰ τῶν στρατιω- τῶν βελτίων εἰ, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τοὺς τῶν ἀντιπάλων ἡγεμόνας ἀποβλέπτειν, εἰ ποτὲ ἐκείνων βελτίων γένους, σκοποῦντα καὶ ἄσκοποντα πρὸς ἐκεῖνους.

120 ἀλκ. Λέγεις δὲ τίνας τούτους, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ἐπ. Οὐκ οἴσθα ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν Λακεδαιμονίους τε καὶ τῶν μεγάλω βασιλεῖ πολεμοῦσαν ἐκάστοτε;

ἀλκ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ἐπ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἡγεμόνων εἶναι τῆς πόλεως, πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς καὶ τοὺς Περσῶν τὸν ἄγωνα ἡγοῦμενός σοι εἰσίν ὀρθῶς ἂν ἡγοῦο;

ἀλκ. Κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ἐπ. Οὐκ, ὦ γαθῆ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς Μειδίαν σε δεὶ τὸν Ἐ ὀρτυγοκόπον ἀποβλέπτειν καὶ ἄλλους τοιουτοὺς οἱ το τῆς πόλεως πράττειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, ἔτι τὴν ἀνδραποδώδη, φαίνει ἂν αἱ γυναίκες, τρίχα ἔχοντες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπ’ ἁμοσίας καὶ ὀὕπω ἀποβεβλη- κότες, ἔτι δὲ βαρβαρίζοντες ἐληλύθασι κολακεύ̇-

1 εὶ ποτὲ Burnet: ὅποτε mss.
regarding this skill as a necessary qualification, would you keep your eye on your actual opponents in the fight, and not, as now, on your fellow-fighters? These, I conceive, you ought so far to surpass that they would not feel fit to be your opponents, but only to be your despised fellow-fighters against the enemy, if you mean really to make your mark with some noble action that will be worthy both of yourself and of the city.

ALC. Why, I do mean to.

SOC. So you think it quite fitting for you to be satisfied if you are better than the soldiers, but neglect to keep your eye on the enemy's leaders with a view to showing yourself better than they are, or to plan and practise against them!

ALC. Of whom are you speaking now, Socrates?

SOC. Do you not know that our city makes war occasionally on the Spartans and on the Great King?

ALC. That is true.

SOC. And if you are minded to be the head of our state, you would be right in thinking that your contest is with the kings of Sparta and of Persia?

ALC. That sounds like the truth.

SOC. No, my good friend; you ought rather to keep your eye on Meidias the quail-filliper¹ and others of his sort—who undertake to manage the city's affairs, while they still have the slavish hair² (as the women would say) showing in their minds through their lack of culture, and have not yet got rid of it; who, moreover, have come with their out-

¹ Meidias is mentioned by Aristophanes (Av. 1297) for his skill in the game of filliping quails which were specially trained not to flinch.
² Slaves in Athens were largely natives of western Asia, and had thick, close hair, very different from the wavy locks of the Greeks.
σοντες τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀρξοντες—πρὸς τούτους σε δει, οὔσωτερ λέγω, βλέποντα σαυτοῦ δή ἀμελείν, καὶ μὴτε μανθάνειν ὁσα μαθήσεως ἔχεται, μέλληντα τοσοῦτον ἀγώνα ἀγωνίζεσθαι, μὴτε ἀσκεῖν
C ὁσα δεῖται ἀσκήσεως, καὶ πᾶσαν παρασκευὴν παρεσκευασμένον οὐτως ἵναι ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως.

ἀλκ. 'Αλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς μὲν μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν, οἴμαι μέντοι τοὺς τε Λακεδαμιονίων στρατηγούς καὶ τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων.

ζη. 'Αλλ', ὦ ἀριστε, τὴν οὔσην ταύτην σκόπει οἶον ἔχεις.

ἀλκ. Τοῦ πέρι;

ζη. Πρῶτον μὲν ποτέρως ἂν οἴει σαυτοῦ μάλλον

ι ἐπιμεληθήναι, φοβοῦμενός τε καὶ οἰόμενος δεινοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι, ἡ μὴ;

ἀλκ. Δὴλον ὅτι εἴ δεινοὺς οἰομήν.

ζη. Μῶν οὖν οἴει τι βλαβήσεσθαι ἐπιμεληθεὶς σαυτοῦ;

ἀλκ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγάλα οἰνήσεσθαι.

ζη. Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τοῦτο τοσοῦτον κακῶν ἔχει ἡ οὐ̂̄σαι αὐτη.

ἀλκ. 'Αληθῆ λέγεις.

ζη. Τὸ δεύτερον τοιῶν, ὅτι καὶ ψευδῆς ἐστὶν, ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων σκέψαι.

ἀλκ. Πῶς δή;

ζη. Πότερον εἰκὸς ἀμείνους γίγνεσθαι φύσεις ἐν Ε γενναίοις γένεσιν ἡ μὴ;

ἀλκ. Δὴλον ὅτι ἐν τοῖς γενναίοις.

ζη. Οὐκοῦν τοὺς εὑ φύντας, ἐὰν καὶ εὑ τραφῶσιν, οὕτω τελέους γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀρετήν;
landish speech to flatter the state, not to rule it—to these, I tell you, should your eyes be turned; and then you can disregard yourself, and need neither learn what is to be learnt for the great contest in which you are to be engaged, nor practise what requires practice, and so ensure that you are perfectly prepared before entering upon a political career.

**ALC.** Why, Socrates, I believe you are right; though I think neither the Spartan generals nor the Persian king are at all different from other people.

**soc.** But, my excellent friend, consider what this notion of yours means.

**ALC.** In regard to what?

**soc.** First of all, do you think you would take more pains over yourself if you feared them and thought them terrible, or if you did not?

**ALC.** Clearly, if I thought them terrible.

**soc.** And do you think you will come to any harm by taking pains over yourself?

**ALC.** By no means; rather that I shall get much benefit.

**soc.** And on this single count that notion of yours is so much to the bad.

**ALC.** True.

**soc.** Then, in the second place, observe the probability that it is false.

**ALC.** How so?

**soc.** Is it probable that noble races should produce better natures, or not?

**ALC.** Clearly, noble races would.

**soc.** And will not the well-born, provided they are well brought up, probably be perfected in virtue?

1 *i.e.* about the Spartan generals and the Persian king, 120 c.
Socrates' father, Sophroniscus, was a sculptor, and Daedalus was the legendary inventor of sculpture.

1 i.e., the kings of Sparta and Persia.

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ALC. That must be so.

soc. Then let us consider, by comparing our lot with theirs, whether the Spartan and Persian kings appear to be of inferior birth. Do we not know that the former are descendants of Hercules and the latter of Achaemenes, and that the line of Hercules and the line of Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?

ALC. Yes, and mine, Socrates, to Eurysaces, and that of Eurysaces to Zeus!

soc. Yes, and mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and Daedalus to Hephaestus, son of Zeus! But take the lines of those people, going back from them: you have a succession of kings reaching to Zeus—on the one hand, kings of Argos and Sparta; on the other, of Persia, which they have always ruled, and frequently Asia also, as at present; whereas we are private persons ourselves, and so were our fathers. And then, suppose that you had to make what show you could of your ancestors, and of Salamis as the native land of Eurysaces, or of Aegina as the home of the yet earlier Aeacus, to impress Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, how you must expect to be laughed at! Why, I am afraid we are quite outdone by those persons in pride of birth and upbringing altogether. Or have you not observed how great are the advantages of the Spartan kings, and how their wives are kept under statutory ward of the ephors, in order that every possible precaution may be taken against the king being born of any but the Heracleidae? And the Persian king is so pre-eminent that no one has a suspicion that an heir could have been born of anybody but the king; and hence the king's wife has nothing to guard her except fear. When
1 The saying, which became proverbial, is thought to have occurred in one of the (now lost) plays of Plato, the Athenian comic poet, who lived c. 460–389 B.C.
the eldest son, the heir to the throne, is born, first of all the king's subjects who are in his palace have a feast, and then for ever after on that date the whole of Asia celebrates the king's birthday with sacrifice and feasting: but when we are born, as the comic poet¹ says, "even the neighbours barely notice it," Alcibiades. After that comes the nurture of the child, not at the hands of a woman-nurse of little worth, but of the most highly approved eunuchs in the king's service, who are charged with the whole tendance of the new-born child, and especially with the business of making him as handsome as possible by moulding his limbs into a correct shape; and while doing this they are in high honour. When the boys are seven years old they are given horses and have riding lessons, and they begin to follow the chase. And when the boy reaches fourteen years he is taken over by the royal tutors, as they call them there: these are four men chosen as the most highly esteemed among the Persians of mature age, namely, the wisest one, the justest one, the most temperate one, and the bravest one. The first of these teaches him the magian lore of Zoroaster,² son of Horomazes; and that is the worship of the gods: he teaches him also what pertains to a king. The justest teaches him to be truthful all his life long; the most temperate, not to be mastered by even a single pleasure, in order that he may be accustomed to be a free man and a veritable king, who is the master first of all that is in him, not the slave; while the bravest trains him

² Zoroaster was the reputed founder of the Persian religion, of which the ministers were the Magi or hereditary priests.
δουλεύων· ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεύωτατος ἀφοβον καὶ ἀδεὰς παρασκευάζων, ὡς ὦταν δείση δοῦλον ὄντα. σοι
B ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Περικλῆς ἔπεστησε παιδαγωγὸν
tῶν οἰκετῶν τῶν ἄχρευτοταν ὑπὸ γήρως, Ζώππυρον
tῶν Ἐράκα. διήλθον δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἄν σοι τῶν
ἀνταγωνιστῶν τροφῆν τε καὶ παιδείαν, εἰ μὴ
pολὺ ἔργων ἦν· καὶ ἁμα ταῦθ' ἰκανὰ δηλώσαι καὶ
tάλλα ὅσα τούτων ἀκόλουθα. τῆς δὲ σῆς γενέ-
σεως, ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας, ἡ
ἄλλον ὁτοῦν Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐποσ εἰπεῖν, οὐδενὶ
mέλει, εἰ μὴ εἰ τις ἑραστής σου τυγχάνει ὄν. εἰ
δ' αὖ ἐθέλοις εἰς πλούτους ἀποβλέψαι καὶ τρυφᾶς
C καὶ ἔσθητας ἡματίων ὃ ἐλέεις καὶ μύρων ἀλοιφᾶς
καὶ θεραπόντων πλήθους ἀκολούθιας τήν τε ἄλλην
ἀβρότητα τίν Περσῶν, αἰσχυνθεῖς ἂν ἐπὶ σεαυτῷ,
αἰσθανόμενος ὅσον αὐτών ἐλλείπεις.
Εἰ δ' αὖ ἐθελήσεις εἰς σωφροσύνην τε καὶ
κοσμίωτητα ἀποβλέψαι καὶ εὐχέρειαν καὶ εὐκολίαν
καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνην καὶ εὐταξίαν καὶ ἄνδρειαν
καὶ καρτερίαν καὶ φιλοπονίαν καὶ φιλονικίαν καὶ
φιλοτιμίας τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων, παῖς ἂν ἡγήσαιο
D σαυτὸν πάσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοι. εἰ δ' αὖ τι καὶ πλούτῳ
προσέχεις καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο οὐεὶ τι εἶναι, μηδὲ τοῦτο
ἡμῖν ἄρρητον ἐστώ, εάν πως αἰσθῇ οὐ εἰ. τοῦτο
μὲν γὰρ εἰ ἐθέλεις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων πλούτους
ἰδεῖν, γνώσῃ ὅτι πολὺ τανθάδε τῶν ἐκεῖ ἐλλείπει.
γὴν μὲν γὰρ ὅσην ἐχουσι τῆς θ' ἔαυτῶν καὶ Μεσ-
σηνῆς, οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἀμφισβητῆσαι τῶν τῇδε πλήθει
οὐδὲ ἀρετῆ, οὐδ' αὖ ἀνδραπόδων κτῆσει τῶν τε
ἄλλων καὶ τῶν εἰλωτικῶν, οὐδὲ μὴν ἰππῶν γε, οὐδ'
to be fearless and undaunted, telling him that to be daunted is to be enslaved. But you, Alcibiades, had a tutor set over you by Pericles from amongst his servants, who was so old as to be the most useless of them, Zopyrus the Thracian. I might describe to you at length the nurture and education of your competitors, were it not too much of a task; and besides, what I have said suffices to show the rest that follows thereon. But about your birth, Alcibiades, or nurture or education, or about those of any other Athenian, one may say that nobody cares, unless it be some lover whom you chance to have. And again, if you chose to glance at the wealth, the luxury, the robes with sweeping trains, the anointings with myrrh, the attendant troops of menials, and all the other refinements of the Persians, you would be ashamed at your own case, on perceiving its inferiority to theirs.

Should you choose, again, to look at the temperance and orderliness, the forbearance and placidity, the magnanimity and discipline, the courage and endurance, and the toil-loving, success-loving, honour-loving spirit of the Spartans, you would count yourself but a child in all these things. If again you regard wealth, and think yourself something in that way, I must not keep silence on this point either, if you are to realize where you stand. For in this respect you have only to look at the wealth of the Spartans, and you will perceive that our riches here are far inferior to theirs. Think of all the land that they have both in their own and in the Messenian country: not one of our estates could compete with theirs in extent and excellence, nor again in ownership of slaves, and especially of those of the helot class, nor yet of horses, nor of all the flocks and herds
Ε ὅσα ἄλλα βοσκήματα κατὰ Μεσσήνην νέμεται, ἄλλα ταύτα μὲν πάντα ἔως χαίρειν, χρυσίον δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον οὐκ ἔστων ἐν πᾶσιν Ἐλλησίων ὅσον ἐν Δακεδαίμονι ἴδια: πολλὰς γὰρ ἡδὴ γενεὰς εἰσερχεται μὲν αὐτόσε εξ ἀπάντων τῶν Ἐλλήνων, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων, εξερχεται δὲ οὐδαμόσε, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸν Αἰσώπου μύθον, 123 ὁν ἡ ἀλώπηξ πρὸς τὸν λέοντα εἶπε, καὶ τοῦ εἰς Δακεδαίμονα νομίσματος εἰσιόντος μὲν τὰ ἱχνη τὰ ἠκείσε τετραμμένα ἡμά, εξιόντος δὲ οὐδαμῆ ἃν τις ἴδοι. ὅστε εὖ χρῆ εἰδέναι ὅτι καὶ χρυσῷ καὶ ἀργύρῳ οἱ ἐκεῖ πλουσιώτατοι εἰσὶ τῶν Ἐλλήνων, καὶ αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνων ὁ βασιλεὺς. ἐκ τε γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων μέγιστα λήψεις καὶ πλείσται εἰσὶ τοῖς βασιλεύσαι, ἐτι δὲ καὶ ὁ βασιλικὸς φόρος οὐκ ὅλιγος γίγνεται, ὅν τελοῦσιν οἱ Δακεδαίμονι τοῖς βασιλεύσαι. καὶ τὰ μὲν Δακεδαίμονίων ὡς πρὸς Ἐλληνικοὺς μὲν πλούτους μεγάλα, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Περσικοὺς καὶ τοῦ ἐκεῖνων βασιλέως οὐδέν· ἐπεὶ ποτ' ἐγὼ ἥκουσα ἄνδρος ἄξιοπιστοῦ τῶν ἀναβεβηκότων παρὰ βασιλέα, ὃς ἔφη παρελθεῖν χύραι πάνυ πολλῆν καὶ ἀγαθῆν, ἐγνὺς ἡμερησίαν ὁδὸν, ἢν καλεῖν τοὺς ἐπιχειρούς ζῶνην τῆς βασιλείας γυναικὸς· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ἢν αὐ καλεῖσθαι C καλύττρων, καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς τόπους καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἔξηρημένους τὸν τῆς γυναικός, καὶ ὅνοματα ἔχειν ἐκάστους τῶν τόπων ἀπὸ ἐκάστου τῶν κόσμων· ὅστε οἷμαι ἐγὼ, εἰ τις εἶποι τῇ βασιλέως μητρί, Ἐξέρξαν δὲ γυναικὶ, Ἀμήστριδί, ὅτι ἐν νῦ ἔχει σοῦ τῷ νεῖ εἰκτιτέτεσθαι ὁ Δευνομάχης νῦός, ἢ ἔστι κόσμος ἵσως ἄξιος μνῶν πεντήκοντα, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, τῷ δ' νεῖ 170
that graze in Messene. However, I pass over all these things: but there is more gold and silver privately held in Lacedaemon than in the whole of Greece; for during many generations treasure has been passing in to them from every part of Greece, and often from the barbarians also, but not passing out to anyone; and just as in the fable of Aesop, where the fox remarked to the lion on the direction of the footmarks, the traces of the money going into Lacedaemon are clear enough, but nowhere are any to be seen of it coming out; so that one can be pretty sure that those people are the richest of the Greeks in gold and silver, and that among themselves the richest is the king; for the largest and most numerous receipts of the kind are those of the kings, and besides there is the levy of the royal tribute in no slight amount, which the Spartans pay to their kings. Now, the Spartan fortunes, though great compared with the wealth of other Greeks, are nought beside that of the Persians and their king. For I myself was once told by a trustworthy person, who had been up to their court, that he traversed a very large tract of excellent land, nearly a day's journey, which the inhabitants called the girdle of the king's wife, and another which was similarly called her veil; and many other fine and fertile regions reserved for the adornment of the consort; and each of these regions was named after some part of her apparel. So I imagine, if someone should say to the king's mother Amestris, who was wife of Xerxes, "The son of Deinomache\(^1\) intends to challenge your son; the mother's dresses are worth perhaps fifty minae at the outside, while the son has under three hundred

\(^{1}\) The mother of Alcibiades.
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αὐτῆς γῆς πλέθρα Ἐρχίασιν οὐδὲ τριακόσια, θαυμάσαι ἄν ὅτω ποτὲ πιστεύσων ἐν νῷ ἔχει οὐτος
D ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης τῷ Ἀρτοζέρξῃ διαγωνίζεσθαι, καὶ οἴμαι ἄν αὐτήν εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσθ’ ὅτω ἄλλῳ πι-
στεύσων οὐτος ὁ ἄνήρ ἐπιχειρεῖ πλὴρ ἑπιμελεία τε καὶ σοφία ταῦτα γὰρ μόνα ἄξια λόγον ἐν Ἑλλησ,
ἐπεί εἰ γε πῦθοιτο, ὅτι ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης οὕτως νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ πρῶτον μὲν ἠτὴ οὐδέπω γεγονὼς σφόδρα
eἰκοσιν, ἐπείτα παντάπασιν ἀπαίδευτος, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς τού ἔραστοι αὐτῷ λέγοντος ὅτι χρή πρῶτον
μαθόντα καὶ ἑπιμεληθέντα αὐτῷ καὶ ἀσκήσαντα
E οὕτως ἕναι διαγωνιούμενον βασιλεῖ, οὐκ ἔθελεν, ἀλλὰ φήσιν ἔξαρκεῖν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, οἴμαι ἄν αὐτήν
θαυμάσαι τε καὶ ἐρέσθαι: τί οὖν ποτ’ ἔστιν ὅτω πιστεύει τὸ μειράκιον; εἰ οὖν λέγομεν ὅτι κάλλει
tε καὶ μεγέθει καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτω καὶ φύσει τῆς
ψυχῆς, ἤγησαί τι ἡμᾶς, ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, μαίνεσθαι

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τέρα, Ἀρχιδάμου δὲ γυναῖκα, Ἀγιδος δὲ μήτερα,
οἱ πάντες βασιλεῖς γεγόνασι, θαυμάσαι ἄν καὶ
ταύτην εἰς τὰ παρὰ σφίσων ὑπάρχοντα ἀπο-
βλέψασαν, εἴ οὖν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις τῷ νιεί αὐτῆς διαγωνί-
ζεσθαι οὕτω κακῶς ἡγμένος. κάτοι οὐκ ἀυτὸν

δοκεῖ εἰναι, εἰ αἱ τῶν πολέμων γυναῖκες βέλτιον

περὶ ἡμῶν διανοοῦνται, οἷοις χρὴ ὑντας σφίσων

ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἡ ἡμεῖς περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; ἀλλ', ὁ

μακάριε, πειθόμενος ἐμοὶ τε καὶ τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς

Β γράμματι, γνῶθι σαυτόν, ὅτι οὗτοι εἰσὶν ἀντίπαλοι,

ἀλλ' οὐχ οὐς σὺ οἷει· ὅν ἄλλω μὲν οὐδ' ἂν ἐνι

περιγενοίμεθα, εἰ μὴ περ ἑπιμελεία τε ἂν καὶ

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ACLIBIADES I

acres at Erchiae,¹” she would wonder to what on earth this Alcibiades could be trusting, that he proposed to contend against Artaxerxes; and I expect she would remark—“The only possible things that the man can be trusting to for his enterprise are industry and wisdom; for these are the only things of any account among the Greeks.” Whereas if she were informed that this Alcibiades who is actually making such an attempt is, in the first place, as yet barely twenty years old, and secondly, altogether uneducated; and further, that when his lover tells him that he must first learn, and take pains over himself, and practise, before he enters on a contest with the king, he refuses, and says he will do very well as he is; I expect she would ask in surprise, “On what, then, can the youngster rely?” And if we told her, “On beauty, stature, birth, wealth, and mental gifts,” she would conclude we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages of her own people in all these respects. And I imagine that even Lampido, daughter of Leotychides and wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, who have all been kings, would wonder in the same way, when she compared her people’s resources, at your intention of having a contest with her son despite your bad upbringing. And yet, does it not strike you as disgraceful that our enemies’ wives should have a better idea of the qualities that we need for an attempt against them than we have ourselves? Ah, my remarkable friend, listen to me and the Delphic motto, Know thyself; for these people are our competitors, not those whom you think; and there is nothing that will give us ascendancy over them save

¹ In Attica, about fifteen miles east of Athens.
téchnē. ὁν ὡς εἰ ἀπολειφθῆσθαι, καὶ τοῦ ὀνομαστοῦ γενέσθαι ἀπολειφθῆσθαι ἐν Ἠλησὶ τε καὶ βαρβάρους, οὐ μοι δοκεῖς ἐρὰν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἄλλον.

ademic. Τίνα οὖν χρῆ τὴν εἰπτεῖλειαν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ποιεῖσθαι; ἔχεις ἐξηγήσασθαι; παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον ἑοίκας ἀληθῆ εἰρηκότι.


academic. Τίνι;

student. Ὁ ἔπιτροπος ὁ ἐμὸς βελτίων ἔστι καὶ σοφότερος ἡ Περικλῆς ὁ σός.

academic. Τίς οὔτος, ὁ Σῶκρατες;

student. Θεός, ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὡσπερ σοὶ με οὐκ εἶα πρὸ τῆς τῆς ἡμέρας διαλέγηθηναι; ὃ καὶ πιστεύων λέγω, ὦτι ἡ ἐπιφάνεια δι’ οὐδένος ἄλλου σοι ἔσται ἡ δ’ ἐμοῦ.

D academic. Παιζεῖς, ὁ Σῶκρατες.

student. Ἰσως λέγω μέντοι ἀληθῆ, ὅτι ἐπιμέλειας δεόμεθα, μᾶλλον μὲν πάντες ἀνθρώποι, ἀτὰρ νῦ γε καὶ μάλα σφόδρα.

academic. ὃ ὅτι μὲν ἐγώ, οὐ ψεύδη.

student. Οὐδὲ μὴν ὅτι γ’ ἐγώ.

academic. Τί οὖν ἂν ποιοῖμεν;

student. Οὐκ ἀπορρητέου οὐδὲ μαλακιστέου, ὁ ἐταῖρε. academic. Οὕτοι δὴ τρέπει γε, ὁ Σῶκρατες.

student. Οὐ γὰρ, ἀλλὰ σκεπτεῖν κοινῆ. καὶ μοι λέγε·

1 Cf. above, 119 b.
only pains and skill. If you are found wanting in these, you will be found wanting also in achievement of renown among Greeks and barbarians both; and of this I observe you to be more enamoured than anyone else ever was of anything.

ALC. Well then, what are the pains that I must take, Socrates? Can you enlighten me? For I must say your words are remarkably like the truth.

SOC. Yes, I can: but we must put our heads together, you know, as to the way in which we can improve ourselves to the utmost. For observe that when I speak of the need of being educated I am not referring only to you, apart from myself; since my case is identical with yours except in one point.

ALC. What is that?

SOC. My guardian is better and wiser than your one, Pericles.

ALC. Who is he, Socrates?

SOC. God, Alcibiades, who until this day would not let me converse with you; and trusting in him I say that through no other man but me will you attain to eminence.

ALC. You are jesting, Socrates.

SOC. Perhaps; I am right, however, in saying that we need to take pains—all men rather badly, but we two very badly indeed.

ALC. As to me, you are not wrong.

SOC. Nor, I fear, as to myself either.

ALC. Then what can we do?

SOC. There must be no crying off or skulking, my good friend.

ALC. No, for that would indeed be unseemly, Socrates.

SOC. It would; so let us consider in common.
Φαμέν γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἄριστοι βουλεύσατε γενέσθαι. η γάρ;

Ἀλκ. Ναί.

Σν. Τίνα ἄρετήν;

Ἀλκ. Δὴ λον ὅτι ἥπερ οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἁγαθοὶ.

Σν. Οἱ τὶ ἁγαθοὶ;

Ἀλκ. Δὴ λον ὅτι οἱ πράττειν τὰ πράγματα.

Σν. Ποία; ἀρα τὰ ἵππικά;

Ἀλκ. Οὐ δῆτα.

Σν. Παρὰ τοὺς ἵππικοὺς γὰρ ἂν ἤμεν;

Ἀλκ. Ναί.

Σν. Ἄλλα τὰ ναυτικὰ λέγεις;

Ἀλκ. Οὐ.

Σν. Παρὰ τοὺς ναυτικοὺς γὰρ ἂν ἤμεν;

Ἀλκ. Ναί.

Σν. Ἄλλα ποία; ἀ τίνες πράττουσιν;

Ἀλκ. Ἀπερ Ἀθηναίων οἱ καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ.

Σν. Καλοὺς δὲ κάγαθοὺς λέγεις τοὺς φρονίμους ἢ τοὺς ἄφρονας;

Ἀλκ. Τοὺς φρονίμους.

Σν. Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἐκαστὸς φρόνιμος, τοῦτο ἁγαθός;

Ἀλκ. Ναί.

Σν. Ὁ δὲ ἄφρων, πονηρός;

Ἀλκ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; 

Σν. Ἄρ' οὖν ὁ σκυτοτόμος φρόνιμος εἰς ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίαιν;

Ἀλκ. Πάνυ γε.

Σν. Ἀγαθός ἄρα εἰς αὐτά;

Ἀλκ. Ἀγαθός.

Σν. Τί δὲ; εἰς ἓματίων ἐργασίαιν οὐκ ἄφρων ὁ σκυτοτόμος;

Ἀλκ. Ναί.
ALCIBIADES I

Now tell me: we say, do we not, that we wish to be as good as possible?

**ALC.** Yes.

**soc.** In what excellence?

**ALC.** Clearly that which is the aim of good men.

**soc.** Good in what?

**ALC.** Clearly, good in the management of affairs.

**soc.** What sort of affairs? Horsemanship?

**ALC.** No, no.

**soc.** Because we should apply to horsemen?

**ALC.** Yes.

**soc.** Well, seamanship, do you mean?

**ALC.** No.

**soc.** Because we should apply to seamen?

**ALC.** Yes.

**soc.** Well, what sort of thing? The business of what men?

**ALC.** Of Athenian gentlemen.

**soc.** Do you mean by "gentlemen" the intelligent or the unintelligent?

**ALC.** The intelligent.

**soc.** And everyone is good in that wherein he is intelligent?

**ALC.** Yes.

**soc.** And bad wherein he is unintelligent?

**ALC.** Of course.

**soc.** Then is the shoemaker intelligent in the making of foot-gear?

**ALC.** Certainly.

**soc.** So he is good in that article?

**ALC.** Good.

**soc.** Well now, is not the shoemaker unintelligent in the making of clothes?

**ALC.** Yes.
PLATO

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Β ξη. Κακὸς ἂρα εἰς τοῦτο;

ΑΛΚ. Ναι.

ΣΗ. Ὁ αὐτὸς ἂρα τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ κακὸς τε καὶ ἄγαθός.

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΗ. Ἡ οὖν λέγεις τοὺς ἄγαθοὺς ἄνδρας εἶναι καὶ κακοὺς;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δήτα.

ΣΗ. Ἀλλὰ τίνας ποτὲ τοὺς ἄγαθοὺς λέγεις;

ΑΛΚ. Τοὺς δυναμένους ἔγγειρε ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει.

ΣΗ. Οὐ δήτου ὑπ' ὑπών γε;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δήτα.

ΣΗ. Ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπων;

ΑΛΚ. Ναι.

ΣΗ. Ἄρα καρυόντων;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ.

ΣΗ. Ἀλλὰ πλεόντων;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ φημι.

ΣΗ. Ἀλλὰ θεριζόντων;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ.

C ΣΗ. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ποιοῦντων ἢ τι ποιοῦντων;

ΑΛΚ. Ποιοῦντων λέγω.

ΣΗ. Τί; πειρῶ καὶ ἐμοὶ δηλώσαι.

ΑΛΚ. Οὐκοῦν τῶν καὶ συμβαλλόντων ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χρωμένων ἀλλήλοις, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

ΣΗ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων λέγεις ἄρχειν ἀνθρώποις χρωμένων;

ΑΛΚ. Ναι.

ΣΗ. Ἄρα κελευστῶν χρωμένων ἐρέταις;

ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δήτα.

ΣΗ. Κυβερνητική γὰρ αὕτη γε ἀρετή;
ALCIBIADES I

soc. So he is bad in that?

ALC. Yes.

soc. Then, on this showing, the same man is both bad and good.

ALC. Apparently.

soc. Well, can you say that good men are also bad?

ALC. No, indeed.

soc. But whoever do you mean by the good?

ALC. I mean those who are able to rule in the city.

soc. Not, I presume, over horses?

ALC. No, no.

soc. But over men?

ALC. Yes.

soc. When they are sick?

ALC. No.

soc. Or at sea?

ALC. I say, no.

soc. Or harvesting?

ALC. No.

soc. Doing nothing, or doing something?

ALC. Doing something, I say.

soc. Doing what? Try and let me know.

ALC. Well, men who do business with each other and make use of one another, as is our way of life in our cities.

soc. Then you speak of ruling over men who make use of men?

ALC. Yes.

soc. Over boatswains who make use of rowers?

ALC. No, no.

soc. Because that is the pilot's distinction?
αλκ. Ναι.

σημ. 'Αλλ' ἀνθρώπων λέγεις ἀρχεῖν αὐλητῶν, ἢ ἡγουμένων ὑδῆς καὶ χρωμένων χορευταῖς;

αλκ. Οὐ δήτα.

σημ. Χοροδιδασκαλικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γ' αὖ;

αλκ. Πάντως γε.

σημ. 'Αλλὰ τί ποτε λέγεις χρωμένων ἀνθρώπων ὑδῆς; εἰναὶ ἀρχεῖν;

αλκ. Κοινωνοῦντων ἐγώνει λέγω πολιτείας καὶ συμβαλλόντων πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τούτων ἀρχεῖν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει.

σημ. Τίς οὖν αὕτη ἡ τέχνη; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σε ἐροῦμην πάλιν τὰ νῦν δὴ, κοινωνοῦντων ναυτιλίας ἐπιστασθαι ἁρχεῖν τίς ποιεῖ τέχνη;

αλκ. Κυβερνητική.

Ε σημ. Κοινωνοῦντων δὲ ὑδῆς, ὥς νῦν δὴ ἔλεγετο, τίς ἐπιστήμη ποιεῖ ἁρχεῖν;

αλκ. "Ηντερ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες, ἡ χοροδιδασκαλία. σημ. Τί δέ; πολιτείας κοινωνοῦντων τίνα καλεῖς ἐπιστήμην;

αλκ. Εὐβουλίαν ἐγώνει, ὡς Σώκρατες.

σημ. Τί δέ; μῶν ἄβουλία δοκεῖ εἰναι ἡ τῶν κυβερνητῶν;

αλκ. Οὐ δήτα.

σημ. 'Αλλ' εὐβουλία;

126 αλκ. "Εμοιγε δοκεῖ, εἰς γε τὸ σφῶςθαι πλέοντας.

σημ. Καλῶς λέγεις. τί δέ; ἢν σὺ λέγεις εὐβουλίαν, εἰς τί ἔστιν;

αλκ. Εἰς τὸ ἁμεινον τὴν πόλιν διοικεῖν καὶ σφῶςθαι.
ALCIBIADES I

ALC. Yes.

soc. Well, do you mean ruling over men who are flute-players, and who lead the singing and make use of dancers?

ALC. No, no.

soc. Because, again, that is the chorus-teacher’s function?

ALC. To be sure.

soc. But whatever do you mean by being able to rule over men who make use of men?

ALC. I mean ruling over men in the city who share in it as fellow-citizens, and do business with each other.

soc. Well, what art is this? Suppose I should ask you over again, as I did just now, what art makes men know how to rule over fellow-sailors?

ALC. The pilot’s.

soc. And what knowledge—to repeat what was said a moment ago—makes them rule over their fellow-singers?

ALC. That which you just mentioned, the chorus-teacher’s.

soc. Well now, what do you call the knowledge of one’s fellow-citizens?

ALC. Good counsel, I should say, Socrates.

soc. Well, and is the pilot’s knowledge evil counsel?

ALC. No, no.

soc. Rather good counsel?

ALC. So I should think, for the preservation of his passengers.

soc. Quite right. And now, for what is the good counsel of which you speak?

ALC. For the better management and preservation of the city.
σω. Ἀμεινον δὲ διοικεῖται καὶ σώζεται τίνος παραγιγνομένου ἤ ἀπογιγνομένου; ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ σὺ με ἔροιο· ἀμεινον διοικεῖται σῶμα καὶ σώζεται τίνος παραγιγνομένου ἤ ἀπογιγνομένου; εἶποιμ᾽ ἂν ὅτι ὑγιείας μὲν παραγιγνομένης, νόσου δὲ ἀπογιγνομένης. οὐ καὶ σὺ οἷει οὕτως;

B Ἀλκ. Ναί.

σω. Καὶ εἰ με αὕ ἔροιο· τίνος δὲ παραγιγνομένου ἀμεινον ὁμματα; ὡσαύτως εἶποιμ᾽ ἂν ὅτι ὰφεως μὲν παραγιγνομένης, τυφλότητος δὲ ἀπογιγνομένης. καὶ ὡτα δὲ κωφότητος μὲν ἀπογιγνομένης, ἀκοῆς δὲ ἐγγιγνομένης βελτίων τε γίγνεται καὶ ἀμεινον θεραπεύεται.

Ἀλκ. Ὠρθῶς.

σω. Τὶ δὲ δῆ; πόλις τίνος παραγιγνομένου καὶ ἀπογιγνομένου βελτίων τε γίγνεται καὶ ἀμεινον θεραπεύεται καὶ διοικεῖται;

C Ἀλκ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σωκράτες, ὅταν φιλία μὲν αὐτοῖς γίγνηται πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τὸ μυσεῖν δὲ καὶ στασιάζειν ἀπογιγνητῆς.

σω. Ἀρ' οὖν φιλίαν λέγεις ὁμόνοιαν ἤ διχόνοιαν;

Ἀλκ. Ὀμόνοιαν.

σω. Διὰ τίνα οὖν τέχνην ὁμονοοῦσον αἱ πόλεις περὶ ἀριθμοὺς;

Ἀλκ. Διὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν.

σω. Τὶ δὲ οἱ ἰδιώται; οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν;

Ἀλκ. Ναί.

σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἐκαστος;

Ἀλκ. Ναί.

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soc. And what is it that becomes present or absent when we get this better management and preservation? If, for example, you should ask me, "What is it that becomes present or absent when the body is better managed and preserved?"—I should reply, "Health becomes present, and disease absent." Do not you think so too?

_Alc._ Yes.

_soc._ And if, again, you asked me, "What becomes present in a better condition of the eyes?"—I should answer in just the same way, "Sight becomes present, and blindness absent." So, in the case of the ears, deafness is caused to be absent, and hearing to be present, when they are improved and getting better treatment.

_Alc._ Correct.

_soc._ Well then, what is it that becomes present or absent when a state is improved and has better treatment and management?

_Alc._ To my mind, Socrates, friendship with one another will be there, while hatred and faction will be absent.

_soc._ Now, by friendship do you mean agreement or disagreement?

_Alc._ Agreement.

_soc._ And what art is it that causes states to agree about numbers?

_Alc._ Arithmetic.

_soc._ And what of individuals? Is it not the same art?

_Alc._ Yes.

_soc._ And it makes each single person agree with himself?

_Alc._ Yes.
διὰ τίνα δὲ τέχνην ἐκαστος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ

Δὸμονοεῖ περὶ σπιθαμής καὶ πῆχεος, ὁπότερον

μεῖζον; οὐ διὰ τὴν μετρητικὴν;

ἀλκ. Τί μήν;

σο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἰδιώται ἄλληλοις καὶ αἱ

πόλεις;

ἀλκ. Ναί.

σο. Τί δὲ περὶ σταθμοῦ; οὐχ ὡσαύτως;

ἀλκ. Φημί.

σο. Ἡν δὲ δὴ σὺ λέγεις ὡμόνοιαν, τίς ἔστι καὶ

περὶ τοῦ, καὶ τίς αὐτὴν τέχνη παρασκευάζει; καὶ

ἄρα ἂπερ πόλει, αὐτὴ καὶ ἰδιωτὴ, αὐτῷ τε πρὸς

αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον;

ἀλκ. Εἰκός γε τοι.

σο. Τίς οὖν ἔστι; μὴ κάρμης ἀποκρινόμενος,

Ε ἄλλα προθυμοῦ εἰπεῖν.

ἀλκ. Ἔγω μὲν οἴμαι φιλίαν τε λέγειν καὶ ὡμό-

νοιαν, ἂντερ πατήρ τε νῦν φιλῶν ὡμονοεῖ καὶ

μήτηρ, καὶ ἄδελφος ἄδελφῳ καὶ γυνῆ ἄνδρι.

σο. Οἰει ἂν οὖν, ὡ 'Ἀλκεβιάδη, ἄνδρα γυναῖκι

περὶ ταλασιουργίας δύνασθαι ὡμονοεῖν, τὸν μὴ

ἐπιστάμενον τῇ ἐπισταμένῃ;

ἀλκ. Οὐ δήτα.

σο. Οὔδε γε δεὶ οὔδεν γυναίκειον γὰρ τοῦτο γε

μάθημα.

ἀλκ. Ναί.

127 σο. Τί δὲ; γυνὴ ἄνδρι περὶ ὀπλιτικῆς δύναιτ'

ἀν ὡμονοείν μὴ μαθοῦσα;

ἀλκ. Οὐ δήτα.

σο. Ἀνδρείον γὰρ τούτο γε ἵσως αὐτὰς αὐτὸς ἂν

εἶναι.

ἀλκ. Ἔγωγε.
soc. And what art makes each of us agree with himself as to which is the longer, a span or a cubit? Is it not mensuration?

ALC. Of course.

soc. And it makes both individuals and states agree with each other?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And what about the balance? Is it not the same here too?

ALC. It is.

soc. Then what is that agreement of which you speak, and about what? And what art secures it? And is it the same in an individual as in a state, when one agrees with oneself and with another?

ALC. Most likely.

soc. Well, what is it? Do not flag in your answers, but do your best to tell me.

ALC. I suppose I mean the friendship and agreement that you find when a father and mother love their son, and between brother and brother, and husband and wife.

soc. Then do you suppose, Alcibiades, that a husband can possibly agree with his wife about woolwork, when he does not understand it, and she does?

ALC. Oh, no.

soc. Nor has he any need, since that is a woman's accomplishment.

ALC. Yes.

soc. Or again, could a woman agree with a man about soldiering, when she has not learnt it?

ALC. Oh, no.

soc. Because, I expect you will say again, that is a man's affair.

ALC. I would.


Σ. Ἐστὶν ἄρα τὰ μὲν γυναικεῖα, τὰ δὲ ἀνδρεία μαθήματα κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

Ἀλκ. Πῶς ἰ' οὐ;

Σ. Όυκ ἄρα ἐν γε τούτοις ἐστὶν ὀμόνοια γυναικὲι πρὸς ἄνδρας.

Ἀλκ. Οὐ.

Σ. Οὐδ' ἄρα φιλία, εἴπερ ἡ φιλία ὀμόνοια ἤν.

Ἀλκ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

Σ. Ἡ ἄρα αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ αὐτῶν πράττονων, οὐ φιλοῦνται ὑπὸ τῶν ἄνδρῶν.

Β. Ἀλκ. Όυκ ἔοικεν.

Σ. Οὐδ' ἄρα οἱ ἄνδρες ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ἡ τὰ αὐτῶν.

Ἀλκ. Οὐ.

Σ. Οὐδ' εὖ ἅρ παύησεν οὐκοῦνταί αἱ πόλεις,

ὅταν τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκαστοι πράττονων;

Ἀλκ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σῶκρατες.

Σ. Πῶς λέγεις, φιλίας μὴ παρούσης, ἡς

φαίμεν γιγνομένης εὖ οἰκειόθαι τὰς πόλεις, ἄλλως
dὲ οὐ;

Ἀλκ. 'Αλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ καὶ κατὰ τούτο αὐτὸς

φιλία ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάτεροι πράττουσιν.

C. Σ. Όυκ ἄρτι γε' νῦν δὲ πῶς αὐ λέγεις; ὀμο-

νοίας μὴ ἐγγίγνομένης φιλία ἐγγίγνεται; ἡ οἴον

θ' ὀμόνοιαν ἐγγίγνεσθαι οὖν οἱ μὲν ἵσασι περὶ
tούτων, οἱ δ' οὐ;

Ἀλκ. 'Αδύνατον.

Σ. Δίκαια δὲ πράττουσιν ἡ ἄδικα, ὅταν τὰ αὐτῶν

ἐκαστοι πράττουσιν;

Ἀλκ. Δίκαια· πῶς γὰρ οὐ;


1 έν Olympiodorus: αὐ mss.
Then, by your account, there are some accomplishments belonging to women, and some to men?

ALC. Of course.

soc. So in these, at any rate, there is no agreement between men and women.

ALC. No.

soc. And hence no friendship either, if, as we said, friendship is agreement.

ALC. Apparently not.

soc. So women are not loved by men, in so far as they do their own work.

ALC. It seems not.

soc. Nor are men by women, in so far as they do theirs.

ALC. No.

soc. And states, therefore, are not well ordered in so far as each person does his own business? \(^1\)

ALC. I think they are, Socrates.

soc. How can you say that? Without the presence of friendship, which we say must be there if states are well ordered, as otherwise they are not?

ALC. But it seems to me that friendship arises among them just on that account—that each of the two parties does its own business.

soc. It was not so a moment since: but now, what do you mean this time? Does friendship arise where there is no agreement? And is it possible that agreement should arise where some know about the business, but others do not?

ALC. Impossible.

soc. And are they doing what is just or unjust, when each man does his own business?

ALC. What is just, of course.

\(^1\) Cf. Charm. 161 \(e\), Rep. i. 332 ff.
ση. Τὰ δίκαια οὗν πραττόντων ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν πολιτῶν φιλία οὐκ ἔγγίζεται πρὸς ἄλληλους;

ἀλκ. Ἄναγκη αὕτη μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὥς Σωκράτες.

ση. Τῶν οὖν ποτὲ λέγεις τῆν φιλίαν ἢ ὁμόνοιαν,

Δ περὶ ἃς δεὶ ἡμᾶς σοφοὺς τε εἶναι καὶ εὐβούλους,

ὑνα ἁγαθοί ἄνδρες ὄμεν; οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι μαθεῖν

οὐθ᾽ ἦτις οὔτ' ἐν οἴστισιν τοτε μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς

αὐτοῖς φαίνεται ἐνοῦσα, τοτε δ' οὔ, ὡς ἕκ τοῦ

σοῦ λόγου.

ἀλκ. Ἀλλὰ μᾶ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὥς Σωκράτες, οὐδ᾽

αὐτὸς οἶδα ὃ τι λέγω, κινδυνεύω δὲ καὶ πάλαι λελη-

θέναι ἐμαυτὸν οἰκίστα ἔχων.

ση. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ θαρρεῖν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ ἤδοθον

Ε πεπονθῶς πεντηκοντατρῆς, χαλεπὸν ἢν ἢν σοι ἐπι-

μεληθῆναι σαυτοῦ; νῦν δὲ ἢν ἔχεις ἥλικιαν, αὕτη

ἐστὶν ἐν ἡ δεὶ αὐτὸ αἰσθέσθαι.

ἀλκ. Τί οὖν τῶν αἰσθανόμενον χρῆ ποιεῖν, ὥς

Σωκράτες;

ση. Ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, ὥς Ἀλκι-

βιάδη καὶ εἶν τοῦτο ποιῆς, ἀν θεὸς θέλῃ, εἰ τι δεὶ

καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ μαντείᾳ πιστεύειν, σὺ τε καῖγω βέλτιον

σχῆσομεν.

ἀλκ. Ἔσται ταῦτα ἕνεκά γε τοῦ ἐμὲ ἀπο-

κρίνεσθαι.

ση. Φέρε δὴ, τί ἐστι τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖνται

128 —μὴ πολλάκις λάθωμεν οὗ τίμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπι-

μελοῦμενοι, οἰόμενοι δὲ—καὶ πότε ἄρα αὐτὸ ποιεῖ

ἀνθρωπος; ἄρα ὅταν τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐπιμεληθῇ, τότε

καὶ ἐαυτοῦ;

ἀλκ. Ἔμοι γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ση. Τί δὲ; ποδῶν ἄνθρωπος πότε ἐπιμελεῖται;

ἀρ' ὅταν ἐκείνων ἐπιμεληθῇ ἡ ἐστὶ τῶν ποδῶν;

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soc. And when the citizens do what is just in the city, does not friendship arise among them?

ALC. Again I think that must be so, Socrates.

soc. Then whatever do you mean by that friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and well-advised in order that we may be good men? For I am unable to learn either what it is, or in whom; since it appears that the same persons sometimes have it, and sometimes not, by your account.

ALC. Well, by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I mean myself, and I fear that for some time past I have lived unawares in a very disgraceful condition.

soc. But you must take heart. For had you perceived your plight at fifty, it would be hard for you to take pains with yourself; whereas here you are at the time of life when one ought to perceive it.

ALC. Then what should one do on perceiving it, Socrates?

soc. Answer the questions asked, Alcibiades: only do that, and with Heaven's favour—if we are to put any trust in my divination—you and I shall both be in better case.

ALC. That shall be, so far as my answering can avail.

soc. Come then, what is "taking pains over oneself"—for we may perchance be taking, unawares, no pains over ourselves, though we think we are—and when does a man actually do it? Does he take pains over himself at the same time as over his own things?

ALC. I at least believe so.

soc. Well now, when does a man take pains over his feet? Is it when he takes pains over what belongs to his feet?
ἈΛΚ. Ὡν μανθάνω.

ΣΩ. Καλεῖς δὲ τι χειρός; οἷον δακτύλιον ἕστω ὅτου ἄν ἄλλοι τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φαίης ἡ δακτύλου;

ἈΛΚ. Ὡν δὴτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οὖν καὶ ποδὸς ὑπόδημα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον;

ἈΛΚ. Ναί.

<ΣΩ. Καὶ ἰμάτια καὶ στρώματα τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος ὁμοίως;

Β ἈΛΚ. Ναί. — 1

ΣΩ. ᾿Αρ' οὖν ὅταν ὑποδημάτων ἐπιμελώμεθα, τότε ποδῶν ἐπιμελούμεθα;

ἈΛΚ. Ὡν πάνυ μανθάνω, ὡ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ, ὡ ᾿Αλκιβιάδη; ὃρθῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καλεῖς τι ὄστοιν πράγματος;

ἈΛΚ. ᾿Εγώγε.

ΣΩ. ᾿Αρ' οὖν ὅταν τίς τι βέλτιον ποιῆ, τότε ὅρθην λέγεις ἐπιμέλειαν;

ἈΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τέχνη ὑποδήματα βελτίων ποιεῖ;

ἈΛΚ. Σκυτική.

ΣΩ. Σκυτική ἀρα ὑποδημάτων ἐπιμελούμεθα;

ἈΛΚ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. ᾿Η καὶ ποδὸς σκυτική; ἡ ἐκείνη ἡ πόδας βελτίων ποιοῦμεν;

ἈΛΚ. ᾿Εκείνη.

ΣΩ. Βελτίως δὲ πόδας οὐχ ἦπερ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα;

ἈΛΚ. ᾿Εμοίγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Αὐτῇ δ' οὖ γυμναστική;

ἈΛΚ. Μάλιστα.

1 καὶ ἰμάτια . . . vel Stobaeus: om. mss.
ALCIBIADES I

ALC. I do not understand.
soc. Is there anything you can name as belonging to the hand? For instance, does a ring belong to any other part of a man but the finger?
ALC. No, indeed.
soc. And so the shoe also belongs to the foot, in the same way?
ALC. Yes.
soc. And likewise clothes and coverlets belong to the whole body?
ALC. Yes.
soc. Now when we take pains over our shoes, we take pains over our feet?
ALC. I do not quite understand, Socrates.
soc. Well, but, Alcibiades, you speak of taking proper pains over this or that matter, do you not?
ALC. I do.
soc. And do you call it proper pains when someone makes a thing better?
ALC. Yes.
soc. Then what art makes shoes better?
ALC. Shoe-making.
soc. So by shoe-making we take pains over our shoes?
ALC. Yes.
soc. And over our foot too by shoe-making? Or by that art whereby we make feet better?
ALC. By that art.
soc. And is it not the same one for making our feet as for making the whole body better?
ALC. I think so.
soc. And is not that gymnastic?
ALC. Certainly.
σω. Γυμναστικῇ μὲν ἄρα ποδὸς ἐπιμελούμεθα, σκυτικῇ δὲ τῶν τοῦ ποδὸς;

αλκ. Πάνυ γε.

σω. Καὶ γυμναστικῇ μὲν χειρῶν, δακτυλιογλυφίᾳ δὲ τῶν τῆς χειρός;

αλκ. Ναι.

σω. Καὶ γυμναστικῇ μὲν σῶματος, ὑφαντικῇ δὲ D καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τῶν τοῦ σῶματος;

αλκ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

σω. "Αλλή μὲν ἄρα τέχνη αὐτοῦ ἐκάστοι ἐπι- μελούμεθα, ἀλλή δὲ τῶν αὐτοῦ.

αλκ. Φαινεῖται.

σω. Οὐκ ἄρα ὅταν τῶν σαυτοῦ ἐπιμελῇ, σαυτοῦ ἐπιμελῇ.

αλκ. Οὐδαμῶς.

σω. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ τέχνη, ως ἔοικεν, ἢ τις ἂν αὐτοῦ τε ἐπιμελοῦτο καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ.

αλκ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

σω. Φέρε δὴ, ποία ποτ' ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπι- μεληθείημεν;

αλκ. Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

Ε σω. 'Αλλὰ τοσόνδε γε ὑμολόγηται, ὅτι οὐχ ἢ ἂν τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ οὕτων βέλτιον ποιοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἢ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς;

αλκ. 'Αληθῆ λέγεις.

σω. Ἡ οὖν ἐγνωμεν ἂν ποτε, τίς τέχνη υπόδημα βέλτιον ποιεῖ, μὴ εἰδότες υπόδημα;

αλκ. Ἀδύνατον.

σω. Οὐδὲ γε τίς τέχνη δακτυλίους βελτίους ποιεῖ, ἀγνοοῦντες δακτυλίου.

αλκ. Ἀληθῆ.
So by gymnastic we take pains over our foot, but by shoe-making over what belongs to our foot?  
Alc. Quite so.  
So. And by gymnastic over our hands, but by ring-engraving over what belongs to the hand?  
Alc. Yes.  
So. And by gymnastic over the body, but by weaving and the rest over what belongs to the body?  
Alc. Absolutely so.  
So. Then for taking pains over a thing itself and over what belongs to it we use different arts.  
Alc. Apparently.  
So. So when you take pains over your belongings you are not taking pains over yourself.  
Alc. Not at all.  
So. For the arts, it seems, that one used for taking pains over oneself and over one’s belongings would not be the same.  
Alc. Apparently not.  
So. Come then, whatever kind of art can we use for taking pains over ourselves?  
Alc. I cannot say.  
So. Well, so much at least has been admitted, that it is not one which would help us to make a single one of our possessions better, but one which would help to make ourselves so?  
Alc. That is true.  
So. Now, should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we had not known a shoe?  
Alc. Impossible.  
So. Nor could we know what art makes rings better, if we had no cognizance of a ring.  
Alc. True.
128  
ςω. Τι δε; της τεχνη βελτιων ποιει αυτων, αρ 
αν ποτε γνωμεν αγνουντες τι ποτε εσμεν αυτοι;  
129  
αλκ. ‘Αδυνατον.  
ςω. Ποτερον ουν δη ραδιων τυγχανει το γνωμεν 
εαυτων, και τις ην φαυλος ο τουτο αναθεις εις τον 
εν Πυθοι νεων, η χαλεπον τι και ουχι παντος;  
αλκ. 'Εμοι μεν, ο Σωκρατες, πολλακις μεν 
’εδοξε παντος ειναι, πολλακις δε παγχαλεπον.  
ςω. 'Αλλ, ω ‘Αλκιβιαδη, ειτε ραδιων ειτε μη 
εστιν, ομως γε ημων δη εχει γνωντες μεν αυτω 
ταχταν γνωμεν την επιμελειαν ημων αυτων, 
αγνουντες δε ουκ αν ποτε.  
αλκ. ‘Εστι ταυτα.  

B  
ςω. Φερε δη, τιν αν τροπον ευρεθη αυτω 
ταυτο; ουτω μεν γαρ αν ταχτα ευροιμεν τι ποτε 
εσμεν αυτοι, τουτον δε ετι οντες εν αγνοιι αδυνατοι 
ποι.  
αλκ. ‘Ορθως λεγεις.  
ςω. 'Εχε ουν προς Διως. τω διαλεγει συ νων;  
αλλο τι η εμοι;  
αλκ. Ναι.  
ςω. Ουκουν και εγω σοι;  
αλκ. Ναι.  
ςω. Σωκρατης αρα εστιν ο διαλεγομενος;  
αλκ. Πανυ γε.  
ςω. ‘Αλκιβιαδης δε ο οκουων;  
αλκ. Ναι.  
ςω. Ουκουν λογω διαλεγεται ο Σωκρατης;  
C  
αλκ. Τι μην;  

1 This seems to be a sudden adumbration of the Platonic “idea” or form which remains constant, and so “the same,”
ALCIBIADES I

soc. Well then, could we ever know what art makes the man himself better, if we were ignorant of what we are ourselves?

ALC. Impossible.

soc. Well, and is it an easy thing to know oneself, and was it a mere scamp who inscribed these words on the temple at Delphi; or is it a hard thing, and not a task for anybody?

ALC. I have often thought, Socrates, that it was for anybody; but often, too, that it was very hard.

soc. But, Alcibiades, whether it is easy or not, here is the fact for us all the same: if we have that knowledge, we are like to know what pains to take over ourselves; but if we have it not, we never can.

ALC. That is so.

soc. Come then, in what way can the same-in-itself be discovered? For thus we may discover what we are ourselves; whereas if we remain in ignorance of it we must surely fail.

ALC. Rightly spoken.

soc. Steady, then, in Heaven's name! To whom are you talking now? To me, are you not?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And I in turn to you?

ALC. Yes.

soc. Then the talker is Socrates?

ALC. To be sure.

soc. And the hearer, Alcibiades?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And Socrates uses speech in talking?

ALC. Of course.

behind the shifting objects of sense related to it through its influence or impress. Cf. below, 130 d.
Τὸ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ταυτὸν που καλεῖσ.

Πάνυ γε.

'Ο δὲ χρώμενος καὶ ὁ χρήται οὐκ ἄλλο; 

Πῶς λέγεις; 

"Ωσπερ σκυτοτόμος τέμνει που τομεὶ καὶ σμίλη καὶ ἄλλοις ὠργάνοις. 

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν ἄλλο μὲν ὁ τέμνων καὶ χρώμενος, ἄλλο δὲ οὐς τέμνων χρήται; 

Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; 

'Αρ' οὖν οὕτως καὶ οἰς ὁ κιθαριστῆς κιθαρίζει καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ κιθαριστῆς ἄλλο ἂν εἶη; 

Ναί.

Τούτο τοῖνυν ἄρτιως ἡρώτων, εἰ ὁ χρώμενος ὁ καὶ ὁ χρήται ἄει δοκεῖ ἐτερον εἶναι.

Δοκεῖ.

Τί οὖν φῶμεν τὸν σκυτοτόμον; τέμνειν ὠργάνοις μόνον ἢ καὶ χερσίν; 

Καὶ χερσίν.

Χρήται ἄρα καὶ ταύταις; 

Ναί.

Ἡ καὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς χρώμενος σκυτοτομεῖ; 

Ναί.

Τὸν δὲ χρώμενον καὶ οἷς χρήται ἐτερα ὁμολογοῦμεν; 

Ναί.

"Ετερον ἄρα σκυτοτόμος καὶ κιθαριστῆς ἐχειρῶν καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν οἷς ἐργάζονται;
soc. And you call talking and using speech the same thing, I suppose.

ALC. To be sure.

soc. But the user and the thing he uses are different, are they not?

ALC. How do you mean?

soc. For instance, I suppose a shoemaker uses a round tool, and a square one, and others, when he cuts.

ALC. Yes.

soc. And the cutter and user is quite different from what he uses in cutting?

ALC. Of course.

soc. And in the same way what the harper uses in harping will be different from the harper himself?

ALC. Yes.

soc. Well then, that is what I was asking just now—whether the user and what he uses are always, in your opinion, two different things.

ALC. They are.

soc. Then what are we to say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only, or with his hands as well?

ALC. With his hands as well.

soc. So he uses these also?

ALC. Yes.

soc. Does he use his eyes, too, in his shoe-making?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And we admit that the user and what he uses are different things?

ALC. Yes.

soc. Then the shoemaker and the harper are different from the hands and eyes that they use for their work?
ΛΑΚ. Φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ παντὶ τῷ σῶματι χρῆται ἄνθρωπος;
ΛΑΚ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. "Ετερον δ' ἦν τὸ τε χρώμενον καὶ ὧν χρῆται;
ΛΑΚ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. "Ετερον ἄρα ἄνθρωπος ἐστι τοῦ σῶματος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ;
ΛΑΚ. "Εοικεν.
ΣΩ. Τί ποτ' οὖν ὅ ἄνθρωπος;
ΛΑΚ. Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.
ΣΩ. "Εχεις μὲν οὖν, ὅτι γε τὸ τῷ σῶματι χρώμενον.
ΛΑΚ. Ναί.

130 ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλο τι χρῆται αὐτῷ ἡ ψυχή;
ΛΑΚ. Οὐκ ἄλλο.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἁρχουσα;
ΛΑΚ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν τόδε γε οἶμαι οὐδένα ἃν ἄλλως οἴηθηναι.
ΛΑΚ. Τὸ ποῖον;
ΣΩ. Μὴ οὖ τριῶν ἐν γε τι εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.
ΛΑΚ. Τίνων;
ΣΩ. Ψυχὴν ἡ σῶμα ἡ συναμφότερον, τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο.
ΛΑΚ. Τί μήν;
ΣΩ. Ἁλλὰ μήν αὐτό γε τὸ τοῦ σῶματος ἁρχὸν ὁμολογήσαμεν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι;
Β. ΛΑΚ. 'Ὡμολογήσαμεν.
ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν σῶμα αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἁρχεῖ;
ΛΑΚ. Οὐδαμῶς.
ΣΩ. Ἀρχεσθαι γὰρ αὐτῷ εἴπομεν.
ALCIBIADES I

ALC. Apparently.
soc. And man uses his whole body too?
ALC. To be sure.
soc. And we said that the user and what he uses are different?
ALC. Yes.
soc. So man is different from his own body?
ALC. It seems so.
soc. Then whatever is man?
ALC. I cannot say.
soc. Oh, but you can—that he is the user of the body.
ALC. Yes.
soc. And the user of it must be the soul?
ALC. It must.
soc. And ruler?
ALC. Yes.
soc. Now, here is a remark from which no one, I think, can dissent.
ALC. What is it?
soc. That man must be one of three things.
ALC. What things?
soc. Soul, body, or both together as one whole.
ALC. Very well.
soc. But yet we have admitted that what actually rules the body is man?
ALC. We have.
soc. And does the body rule itself?
ALC. By no means.
soc. Because we have said that it is ruled.
ΑΛΚ. Ναί.
ΣΠ. Οὐκ ἂν δὴ τοῦτο γε εἰπῇ δ ἡςπομεν.
ΑΛΚ. Οὐκ ἐσικεν.
ΣΠ. 'Αλλ' ἀρα το συναμφότερον τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει, καὶ ἐστὶ δὴ τοῦτο ἀνθρώπος;
ΑΛΚ. Ἡσως δῆτα.
ΣΠ. Πάντων γε ἡκιστα· μή γὰρ συνάρχοντος τοῦ ἑτέρου οὐδεμία ποὺ μηχανὴ τὸ συναμφότερον ἄρχειν.
ΑΛΚ. Ὅρθως.

ΣΠ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὔτε σῶμα οὔτε τὸ συναμφότερον ἑστὶν ἀνθρώπος, λείπεται, οἷμα, ἡ μηδὲν αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἡ ἐπερ τὶ ἐςτι, μηδὲν ἄλλο τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν συμβαίνειν ἡ ἰσχῦς.
ΑΛΚ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΠ. Ἐπὶ οὖν τι σαφέστερον δεῖ ἀποδειχθῆναι σοι, ὅτι ἡ ἰσχῦς ἑστὶς ἀνθρώπος;
ΑΛΚ. Μᾶ Δί', ἄλλα ἰκανῶς μοι δοκεῖ ἐξελε.
ΣΠ. Εἰ δὲ γε μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἄλλα καὶ μετρίως, ἐξαρκεῖ ἡμῖν· ἀκριβῶς μὲν γὰρ τότε εἰσόμεθα,

ΑΛΚ. Τί τοῦτο;
ΣΠ. Ὁ ἄρτι οὔτω πῶς ἐρρῆθη, ὅτι πρῶτον σκέπτεσέν εἰς αὐτό τὸ αὐτό· νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ἑκαστὸν ἐσκέμμεθα δ τι ἐςτί. καὶ Ἰσως ἐξαρκέσειν οὐ γὰρ ποὺ κυριώτερον γε οὐδεν ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν φήσαιμεν ἡ τὴν ἰσχῦς.
ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΠ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς ἔχει οὔτω νομίζεων, ἔμε καὶ

1 Cf. 129 b.
ALCIBIADES I

ALC. Yes.
soc. Then that cannot be what we are seeking.
ALC. It seems not.
soc. Well then, does the combination of the two rule the body, so that we are to regard this as man?
ALC. Perhaps it is.
soc. The unlikeliest thing in the world: for if one of the two does not share in the rule, it is quite inconceivable that the combination of the two can be ruling.
ALC. You are right.
soc. But since neither the body nor the combination of the two is man, we are reduced, I suppose, to this: either man is nothing at all, or if something, he turns out to be nothing else than soul.
ALC. Precisely so.
soc. Well, do you require some yet clearer proof that the soul is man?
ALC. No, I assure you: I think it is amply proved.
soc. And if it is tolerably, though not exactly, we are content; exact knowledge will be ours later, when we have discovered the thing that we passed over just now because it would involve much consideration.
ALC. What is that?
soc. The point suggested in that remark a moment ago,¹ that we should first consider the same-in-itself; but so far, instead of the same, we have been considering what each single thing is in itself. And perhaps we shall be satisfied with that: for surely we cannot say that anything has more absolute possession of ourselves than the soul.
ALC. No, indeed.
soc. And it is proper to take the view that you
σὲ προσομιλεῖν ἀλλήλοις τοῖς λόγοις χρωμένους
τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν;

Ἀλκ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Εἰς τὸν ἄρα ἢν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγῳ ἐμπροσθεν εἴπομεν,
ότι Σωκράτης Ἀλκibiάδη διαλέγεται λόγως χρώμενος,
οὐ πρὸς τὸ σὸν πρόσωπον, ὡς ἦοικεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν Ἀλκibiάδην ποιούμενος τοὺς λόγους· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή.

Ἀλκ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σὺν. Ψυχῆν ἄρα ἡμᾶς κελεύει γνωρίσαι ὅ ἐπιτάττων γνῶναι εάντον.

131 Ἀλκ. Ἐοικεῖν.

Σὺν. Ὅστις ἄρα τῶν τοῦ σώματός τι γιγνώσκει,
τὰ αὐτὸῦ ἄλλ᾽ οὐχ αὐτὸν ἐγνωκεν.

Ἀλκ. Οὖτως.

Σὺν. Οὐδὲισ ἄρα τῶν ιατρῶν ἔαντον γιγνώσκει,
καθ᾽ ὅσον ιατρός, οὐδὲ τῶν παιδοτριβῶν, καθ᾽ ὅσον παιδοτρίβης.

Ἀλκ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Σὺν. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δέουσιν οἱ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
δημιουργοὶ γιγνώσκειν εἀντοὺς. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ ἑαυτῶν οὗτοί γε, ὡς ἦοικεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐτί πορρωτέρω τῶν ἑαυτῶν κατὰ γε τὰς τέχνας ἂς ἦχουσι· τὰ γὰρ τοῦ
Β. σώματος γιγνώσκουσιν, οῖς τοῦτο θεραπεύεσται.

Ἀλκ. Ἀληθὴ λέγεις.

Σὺν. Εἰ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ γιγνώσκειν, οὐδεὶς τούτων σωφρῶν κατὰ τὴν τεχνήν.

Ἀλκ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

Σὺν. Διὰ ταύτα δὴ καὶ βάναυσοι αὕται αἱ τέχναι
dokoušin εἰναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνδρὸς ἁγαθὸν μαθήματα.

Ἀλκ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
and I are conversing with each other, while we make use of words, by intercourse of soul with soul?

**Alcibiades**

Quite so.

Socrates. Well, that is just what we suggested a little while ago—that Socrates, in using words to talk with Alcibiades, is holding speech, not with your face, it would seem, but with *Alcibiades*—that is, with his soul.

**Alcibiades**

I believe so.

Socrates. Then he who enjoins a knowledge of oneself bids us become acquainted with the soul.

**Alcibiades**

So it seems.

Socrates. And anyone who gets to know something belonging to the body knows the things that are his, but not himself.

**Alcibiades**

That is so.

Socrates. Then no physician, in so far as he is a physician, knows himself, nor does any trainer, in so far as he is a trainer.

**Alcibiades**

It seems not.

Socrates. And farmers, and craftsmen generally, are far from knowing themselves. For these people, it would seem, do not even know their own things, but only things still more remote than their own things, in respect of the arts which they follow; since they know but the things of the body, with which it is tended.

**Alcibiades**

That is true.

Socrates. So if knowing oneself is temperance, none of these people is temperate in respect of his art.

**Alcibiades**

None, I agree.

Socrates. And that is why these arts are held to be sordid, and no acquirements for a good man.

**Alcibiades**

Quite so.
Σν. Ούκοιν πάλιν ὡστις αὖ σώμα θεραπεύει, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἀλλ' οὖχ αὐτὸν θεραπεύει;

ΑΛΚ. Κινδυνεύει.

Σν. 'Ὅστις δὲ γε τὰ χρήματα, οὔθ' ἑαυτὸν οὔτε C τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι πορρωτέρω τῶν ἑαυτοῦ;

ΑΛΚ. 'Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σν. Οὐ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἄρα ἐτὶ πράττει ὁ χρηματιστής.

ΑΛΚ. Ὀρθῶς.

Σν. Εἴ ἄρα τις γέγονεν ἐραστῆς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου σώματος, οὐκ Ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἡράσθη, ἀλλ' τινος τῶν Ἀλκιβιάδου.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σν. 'Ὅστις δὲ σου τῆς ψυχῆς ἔρα;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀνάγκη φαίνεται ἐκ τοῦ λόγου.

Σν. Οὐκοίν δὲ μὲν τοῦ σώματος σου ἔρων,

ἐπειδὴ λύγει ἀνθοῦν, ἀπιδῶν οἴχεται;

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

Δ Σν. 'Ὁ δὲ γε τῆς ψυχῆς ἔρων οὐκ ἄπεισων, ἕως ἀν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἵῃ;

ΑΛΚ. Εἰκός γε.

Σν.: Οὐκοίν ἐγὼ εἰμί δ' οὐκ ἄπιδων ἀλλὰ παραμένων λύγοντος τοῦ σώματος, τῶν ἀλλων ἀπεληλυθότων.

ΑΛΚ. Εὖ γε ποιῶν, ὡς Σώκρατες· καὶ μὴ ἀπέλθοις.

Σν. Προθυμοῦ τοίνυν ὅτι κάλλιστος εἶναι.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ προθυμῆσομαι.

Σν. 'Ὡς οὔτω γέ σοι ἔχει· οὔτ' ἐγένεθ', ὡς Εἴοικεν, Ἀλκιβιάδη τῷ Κλεινίου ἔραστης οὔτ' ἔστιν
soc. Then once again, whoever tends his body tends his own things, but not himself?
ALC. It looks rather like it.
soc. But whoever tends his money tends neither himself nor his own things, but only things yet more remote than his own things?
ALC. I agree.
soc. So that the money-maker has ceased to do his own business.
ALC. Correct.
soc. And if anyone is found to be a lover of Alcibiades' body, he has fallen in love, not with Alcibiades, but with something belonging to Alcibiades?
ALC. That is true.
soc. Your lover is rather he who loves your soul?
ALC. He must be, apparently, by our argument.
soc. And he who loves your body quits you, and is gone, as soon as its bloom is over?
ALC. Apparently.
soc. Whereas he who loves your soul will not quit you so long as it makes for what is better?
ALC. So it seems.
soc. And I am he who does not quit you, but remains with you when your body's prime is over, and the rest have departed.
ALC. Yes, and I am glad of it, Socrates, and hope you will not go.
soc. Then you must endeavour to be as handsome as you can.
ALC. Well, I shall endeavour.
soc. You see how you stand: Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, it seems, neither had nor has any lover
ἀλλ' ἡ εἰς μόνος, καὶ οὕτος ἀγαπητός, Σωκράτης ὁ 
Σωφρονίσκοι καὶ Φαιναρέτης.

αλκ. 'Αληθῆ.

ζη. Οὕκοιν ἐφησθα σμικρὸν φθῆναι με προσελ-
θόντα σοι, ἐπεὶ πρότερος ἁν μοι προσελθεῖν, βου-
λόμενος πνεύσθαι, δι' ὁ τι μόνος οὐκ ἄπερχομαι;

αλκ. Ἡν γὰρ οὕτως.

ζη. Τούτο τούνων αἴτιον, ὅτι μόνος ἑραστῆς ἢν
σῶς, οἰ δ' ἄλλοι τῶν σῶν· τὰ δὲ σὰ λήγει ὠρας,

132 οὐ δ' ἀρχὴ ἀνθεῖν. καὶ νῦν γε ἂν μὴ διαφθαρῆς
ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ αὐχείων γένη, οὐ
μὴ σὲ ἀπολίπω. τούτῳ γὰρ δὴ μάλιστα ἑγὼ φο-
βοῦμαι, μὴ δημεραστῆς ἡμῖν γενόμενος διαφθαρῆς:
πολλοὶ γὰρ ἢδη καὶ ἀγαθοὶ αὐτὸ πεπόνθασιν Ἀθη-
ναίων. εὐπρόσωπος γὰρ ὁ τοῦ μεγαλίττορος δήμος
Ἐρεχθεώς: ἀλλ' ἀποδύντα χρῆ αὐτὸν θέασασθαι:
εὐλαβοῦ οὖν τὴν εὐλάβειαν ἢν ἑγὼ λέγω.

αλκ. Τίνα;

Β ζη. Γύμνασαι πρῶτον, ὦ μακάριε, καὶ μάθε ἃ
δεὶ μαθόντα ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, πρότερον δὲ
μῆ, ἵν' ἀλεξιφάρμακα ἐξων ἵης καὶ μηδὲν πάθης
dεινόν.

αλκ. Ἐν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὡ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ
πειρῶ ἐξηγεῖσθαι, ὡντιν' ἄν τρόπον ἐπιμεληθείμεν
ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

ζη. Οὐκοῦν τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν
πεπέρανται: ὁ γὰρ ἔσμεν, ἐπιεικῶς ὠμολογηταί·
ἐφοβούμεθα δὲ μὴ τοῦτο σφαλέντες λάθωμεν
ἐτέρου τῶν ἐπιμελόμενοι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡμῶν.

αλκ. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

1 ὡντιν' ἄν Bekker: ὡντινα mss.

1 Quoted from Homer, II. ii. 547.
except one only, and that a cherished one, Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.

ALC. True.

SOC. And you said that I only just anticipated you in coming to you, for otherwise you would have come to me first for the purpose of inquiring why I am the only one who does not leave you?

ALC. Yes, that was so.

SOC. Then the reason was that I was the only lover of you, whereas the rest were lovers of what is yours; and that is passing its prime, while you are beginning to bloom. So now, if you are not blighted and deformed by the Athenian people, I shall never forsake you. For my chiefest fear is of your being blighted by becoming a lover of the people, since many a good Athenian has come to that ere now. For fair of face is "the people of great-hearted Erechtheus"; but you should get a view of it stripped: so take the precaution that I recommend.

ALC. What is it?

SOC. Exercise yourself first, my wonderful friend, in learning what you ought to know before entering on politics; you must wait till you have learnt, in order that you may be armed with an antidote and so come to no harm.

ALC. Your advice seems to me good, Socrates; but try to explain in what way we can take pains over ourselves.

SOC. Well, we have made one step in advance; for there is a pretty fair agreement now as to what we are, whereas we were afraid we might fail of this and take pains, without knowing it, over something other than ourselves.

ALC. That is so.
C  ζω. Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο δὴ ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμελητέου καὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλεπτέον.
ΑΛΚ. Δῆλον.
ζω. Σωμάτων δὲ καὶ χρημάτων τήν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐτέρως παραδοτέον.
ΑΛΚ. Τί μήν;
ζω. Τίν' οὖν ἄν τρόπον γνωίημεν αὐτὸν ἐναργέστατα; ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γνώντες, ὡς ἐοικεν, καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς γνωσόμεθα. ἄρα πρὸς θεῶν εἰν λέγοντος οὐ νῦν δὴ ἐμνήσθημεν τοῦ Δελφικοῦ γράμματος οὐ συνιεμεν;
ΑΛΚ. Τὸ ποιὸν τί διανοούμενος λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης;

D  ζω. Ἐγὼ σοι φράσω, ὅ γε ὑποπτεύω λέγειν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἡμῖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα. κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐδὲ πολλαχοῦ εἶναι παράδειγμα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὁμιν μόνον.
ΑΛΚ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;
ζω. Σκόπει καὶ σύ. εἰ ἡμῶν τῷ ὀμματί ὡσπερ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβουλεύον εἰπεν ἵδε σαυτόν, πῶς ἂν ὑπελάβομεν τί παρανείπαι; ἄρα οὐχὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλέπειν, εἰς ὁ βλέπων ὁ ὑφαλμὸς ἐμέλλειν αὐτὸν ἴδειν;
ΑΛΚ. Δῆλον.
ζω. Ἐννοοῦμεν δὴ, εἰς τί βλέποντες τῶν ὄντων ἔκεινο τε ὀρῶμεν ἀμα ἄν καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;
ΑΛΚ. Δῆλον δὴ, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὅτι εἰς κάτοπτρά τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.
ζω. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ ὑφαλμῷ ὁ ὀρῶμεν ἐνεστὶ <τι> ὁμοῦ τῶν τοιούτων;
ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ γε.

1 αὐτὸ Schleiermacher: αὐτά mss.
soc. And the next step, we see, is to take care of the soul, and look to that.

ALC. Clearly.

soc. While handing over to others the care of our bodies and our coffers.

ALC. Quite so.

soc. Then how shall we obtain the most certain knowledge of it? For if we know that, it seems we shall know ourselves also. In Heaven's name, do we fail to comprehend the wise words of the Delphic inscription, which we mentioned just now?

ALC. With what intent do you say that, Socrates?

soc. I will tell you what I suspect to be the real advice which that inscription gives us. I rather think there are not many illustrations of it to be found, but only in the case of sight.

ALC. What do you mean by that?

soc. Consider in your turn: suppose that, instead of speaking to a man, it said to the eye of one of us, as a piece of advice—"See thyself."—how should we apprehend the meaning of the admonition? Would it not be, that the eye should look at something in looking at which it would see itself?

ALC. Clearly.

soc. Then let us think what object there is anywhere, by looking at which we can see both it and ourselves.

ALC. Why, clearly, Socrates, mirrors and things of that sort.

soc. Quite right. And there is also something of that sort in the eye that we see with?

ALC. To be sure.

2 τι add. F. A. Wolf.

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PLATO

σημ. Ἐννενόηκας οὖν ὅτι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος εἰς τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν τὸ πρόσωπον ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ καταντικρῷ ὀψεῖ ὀσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ, ὦ δὴ καὶ κόρην καλούμεν, εἶδωλὸν οὖν τι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος;

ἀλκ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

σημ. Ὅφθαλμος ἀρα ὀφθαλμὸν θεώμενος, καὶ ἐμβλέπων εἰς τοῦτο ὀπερ βέλτιστον αὐτοῦ καὶ ὥ ὀρᾶ, οὕτως ἀν αὐτῶν ἰδοι.

ἀλκ. Φαίνεται.

σημ. Εἰ δὲ γε εἰς ἄλλο τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου βλέποι ἢ τι τῶν ὄντων, πλὴν εἰς ἐκεῖνο ὦ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὁμοιον, οὐκ ὀψεῖται ἑαυτὸν.

B Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

σημ. Ὅφθαλμος ἀρα εἰ μέλλει ἰδεῖν ἑαυτὸν, εἰς ὀφθαλμὸν αὐτῶ βλέπτειν, καὶ τοῦ ὦμματος εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον, ἐν ὦ τυγχάνει ὃ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρέτη ἐγγίγνοικα ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο που ὰμις;

ἀλκ. Οὕτως.

σημ. Ἀρ' οὖν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ ψυχῇ εἰ μέλλει γνώσεσθαι αὐτήν, εἰς ψυχήν αὐτῆ βλέπτειν, καὶ μάλιστ' εἰς τοῦτον αὐτῆς τὸν τόπον, ἐν ὦ ἐγ-

γίγνεται ἡ ψυχῆς ἀρέτη, σοφία, καὶ εἰς ἄλλο ὦ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὁμοίοιον ὄν;

ἀλκ. Ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

C σημ. Ἐχομεν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ τι ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς θειότερον ἡ τοῦτο, περὶ ὦ τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐστίν;

ἀλκ. Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

σημ. Τῷ θεῷ ἀρα τοῦτ' ἐοικεν αὐτῆς, καὶ τὶς εἰς

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1 The Greek κόρη and the Latin pupilla both meant "little
soc. And have you observed that the face of the person who looks into another’s eye is shown in the optic confronting him, as in a mirror, and we call this the pupil,¹ for in a sort it is an image of the person looking?

ALC. That is true.

soc. Then an eye viewing another eye, and looking at the most perfect part of it, the thing wherewith it sees, will thus see itself.

ALC. Apparently.

soc. But if it looks at any other thing in man or at anything in nature but what resembles this,² it will not see itself.

ALC. That is true.

soc. Then if an eye is to see itself, it must look at an eye, and at that region of the eye in which the virtue of an eye is found to occur; and this, I presume, is sight.

ALC. That is so.

soc. And if the soul too, my dear Alcibiades, is to know herself, she must surely look at a soul, and especially at that region of it in which occurs the virtue of a soul—wisdom, and at any other part of a soul which resembles this?

ALC. I agree, Socrates.

soc. And can we find any part of the soul that we can call more divine than this, which is the seat of knowledge and thought?

ALC. We cannot.

soc. Then this part of her resembles God, and

girl” or “doll,” and were used to indicate the dark centre of the eye in which a tiny image can be seen reflected.

¹ i.e. it must look at the pupil of a man’s eye, or at what is comparable to that “perfect part” in other things.
τούτο βλέπων καὶ πάν τὸ θεῖον γνῶς,[θεόν τε καὶ
φρόνησιν],¹ οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτῶν ἂν γνοῖη μάλιστα.
Ἀλκ. Φαίνεται.
συ. Τὸ δὲ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν ὀμολογοῦμεν σω-
φροσύνην εἶναι;
Ἀλκ. Πάνυ γε.
συ. Ἀρ' οὖν μὴ γιγνώσκοντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς
μηδὲ σώφρονες ὄντες δυναίμεθ' ἂν εἰδέναι τὰ
ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν κακά τε καὶ ἄγαθά;
Ἀλκ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν τούτο γένοιτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;
δ συ. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ έσεις σοι φαίνεται μὴ γιγνώ-
σκοντα 'Ἀλκιβιάδην τὰ 'Ἀλκιβιάδου γιγνώσκειν ὁτι
'Αλκιβιάδου ἑστίν.
Ἀλκ. Ἀδύνατον μέντοι νὴ Δία.
συ. Οὐδ' ἁρα τὰ ἡμέτερα ὀτι ἡμέτερα, εἰ μηδ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς;
Ἀλκ. Πῶς γάρ;
συ. Εἴ δ' ἁρα μηδὲ² τὰ ἡμέτερα, οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν
ἡμετέρων;
Ἀλκ. Οὐ φαίνεται.
συ. Οὐκ ἁρα πάνυ τι ὀρθῶς ὀμολογοῦμεν ὀμολο-
γοῦντες ἁρτὶ εἶναι τινας, οἱ ἑαυτοὺς μὲν οὐ γιγ-
νώσκουσι, τὰ δὲ ἑαυτῶν, ἄλλους δὲ τὰ τῶν ἑαυτῶν
ἐσουκ γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι κατιδεῖν ἐνὸς τε καὶ
Ἐμᾶς τέχνης, αὐτῶν, τὰ αὐτοῦ, τὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ.
Ἀλκ. Κινδυνεύει.
συ. Ὑστερς δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἄγνοει, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων
που ἂν ἄγνοοι κατὰ ταῦτα.
Ἀλκ. Τῇ μην;

¹ θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν om. Olympiodorus.
² μηδὲ Stobaeus: om. miss.

¹ Above, 131 b.
ALCIBIADES I

whoever looks at this, and comes to know all that is divine, will gain thereby the best knowledge of himself.

ALC. Apparently.

soc. And self-knowledge we admitted to be temperance.¹

ALC. To be sure.

soc. So if we have no knowledge of ourselves and no temperance, shall we be able to know our own belongings, good or evil?

ALC. How can that be, Socrates?

soc. For I expect it seems impossible to you that without knowing Alcibiades you should know that the belongings of Alcibiades are in fact his.

ALC. Impossible indeed, upon my word.

soc. Nor could we know that our belongings are ours if we did not even know ourselves?

ALC. How could we?

soc. And so, if we did not so much as know our belongings, we could not know the belongings of our belongings either?

ALC. Apparently not.

soc. Then we were not quite correct in admitting just now that there are people who, without knowing themselves, know their belongings, while others know their belongings’ belongings. For it seems to be the function of one man and one art to discern all three—himself, his belongings, and the belongings of his belongings.

ALC. It looks like it.

soc. And anyone who is ignorant of his belongings will be similarly ignorant, I suppose, of the belongings of others.

ALC. Quite so.

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ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων ἀγνοήσαι.
ΑΛΚ. Ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἀν γένοιτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνήρ πολιτικὸς.
ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩ. Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' οἰκονομικὸς γε.
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ΑΛΚ. Οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩ. Οὔδε εἶσεται ὁ τι πράττει.
ΑΛΚ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
ΣΩ. 'Ο δὲ μὴ εἰδὼς οὐχ ἀμαρτήσεται;
ΑΛΚ. Πάνω γε.
ΣΩ. 'Εξαμαρτάνων δὲ οὐ κακῶς πράξει ἑδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ;
ΑΛΚ. Πῶς δ' οὖ; 
ΣΩ. Κακῶς δὲ πράττων οὐκ ἄθλιος; 
ΑΛΚ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Τί δ' οἷς οὖτος πράττει; 
ΑΛΚ. Καὶ οὖτοι.
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα οἰόν τε, ἐν μὴ τις σώφρων καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἢ, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.
ΑΛΚ. Οὐχ οἰόν τε.
Β ΣΩ. Οἱ ἄρα κακοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄθλιοι.
ΑΛΚ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ' ὁ πλούτησας ἀθλιότητος ἀπαλλάττεται, ἀλλ' ὁ σωφρονήσας.
ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τειχῶν οὐδὲ τρυπήρων οὐδὲ νεωρῶν δέονται αἱ πόλεις, ὥ 'Αλκιβιάδη, εἰ μέλλουσιν εὐδαίμονήσειν, οὐδὲ πλῆθος οὐδὲ μεγέθους άνευ ἀρετῆς.
ΑΛΚ. Οὐ μέντοι.
soc. And if ignorant of others' affairs, he will be ignorant also of the affairs of states.

**ALC.** He must be.

**soc.** Then such a man can never be a statesman.

**ALC.** No, indeed.

**soc.** No, nor an economist either.

**ALC.** No, indeed.

**soc.** Nor will he know what he is doing.

**ALC.** No, I agree.

**soc.** And will not he who does not know make mistakes?

**ALC.** To be sure.

**soc.** And when he makes mistakes, will he not do ill both in private and in public?

**ALC.** Of course.

**soc.** And doing ill he will be wretched?

**ALC.** Yes, very.

**soc.** And what of those for whom he is doing so?

**ALC.** They will be wretched also.

**soc.** Then it is impossible to be happy if one is not temperate and good.

**ALC.** Impossible.

**soc.** So it is the bad men who are wretched.

**ALC.** Yes, very.

**soc.** And hence it is not he who has made himself rich that is relieved of wretchedness, but he who has made himself temperate.

**ALC.** Apparently.

**soc.** So it is not walls or warships or arsenals that cities need, Alcibiades, if they are to be happy, nor numbers, nor size, without virtue.

**ALC.** No, indeed.
ς.ν. Εἰ δὴ μέλλεις τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράξειν ὀρθῶς καὶ καλῶς, ἀρετῆς σοι μεταδοτέον τοῖς πολίταις.

ἀλκ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

C ς.ν. Δύνατο δὴ ἄν τις μεταδίδοναι δὴ μὴ ἔχοι;

ἀλκ. Καὶ πῶς;

ς.ν. Αὐτῷ ἄρα σοι πρῶτον κτητέον ἀρετήν, καὶ ἀλλὰ ὃς μέλλει μὴ ἰδίᾳ μόνον αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ ἀρξεῖν καὶ ἐπιμελήσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πόλεως καὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως.

ἀλκ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ς.ν. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐξουσίαν σοι οὐδ' ἀρχὴν παρακευαστέον σαυτῷ ποιεῖν ὦ τι ἂν βουλῇ, οὐδὲ τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην.

ἀλκ. Φαίνεται.

D ς.ν. Δικαιῶς μὲν γὰρ πράττοντες καὶ σωφρόνως σύ τε καὶ ἡ πόλις θεοφιλῶς πράξετε.

ἀλκ. Εἰκός γε.

ς.ν. Καὶ ὁπερ γε ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, εἰς τὸ θεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν ὀρῶντες πράξετε.

ἀλκ. Φαίνεται.

ς.ν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐνταῦθα γε βλέποντες ὑμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα ἁγαθὰ κατόψεσθε καὶ γνώσεσθε.

ἀλκ. Ναι.

ς.ν. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὗ πράξετε;

ἀλκ. Ναι.

Ε ς.ν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω γε πράττοντας ὑμᾶς ἑθέλω εὐγνώσασθαι ὥ μὴν εὐδαμονήσεων.

ἀλκ. Ἀσφαλῆς γὰρ εἰ ἐγγυητής.

ς.ν. Ἀδίκως δὲ πράττοντες, εἰς τὸ άθεον καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν βλέποντες, ὡς τὰ εἰκότα, ὃμοια τούτοις πράξετε ἀγνοοῦντες ὑμᾶς αὐτούς.

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soc. And if you are to manage the city's affairs properly and honourably, you must impart virtue to the citizens.

ALC. Of course.

soc. But could one possibly impart a thing that one had not?

ALC. How, indeed?

soc. Then you or anyone else who is to be governor and curator, not merely of himself and his belongings in private, but of the state and its affairs, must first acquire virtue himself.

ALC. That is true.

soc. Hence it is not licence or authority for doing what one pleases that you have to secure to yourself or the state, but justice and temperance.

ALC. Apparently.

soc. For you and the state, if you act justly and temperately, will act so as to please God.

ALC. Naturally.

soc. And, as we were saying in what went before, you will act with your eyes turned on what is divine and bright.

ALC. Apparently.

soc. Well, and looking thereon you will behold and know both yourselves and your good.

ALC. Yes.

soc. And so you will act aright and well?

ALC. Yes.

soc. Well now, if you act in this way, I am ready to warrant that you must be happy.

ALC. And I can rely on your warranty.

soc. But if you act unjustly, with your eyes on the godless and dark, the probability is that your acts will resemble these through your ignorance of yourselves.
ΑΛΚ. ὁ Ἐοκεν.

سائر. Ὁμι γὰρ ἂν, ὡς φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἐξουσία μὲν ἂν ποιεῖν ὁ βουλεταί, νοῦν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃ, τί τὸ εἰκὸς συμβαίνειν, ἵδιώτη ἄν καὶ πόλει; οἰον νοσοῦντι ἐξουσίας οὐσίας δραίν ὁ βουλεταί, νοῦν ἰατρικὸν μὴ ἐχοντι, τυραννοῦντι δὲ ἃς μηδὲ ἑπιπλήττοι τις αὐτῷ, τί τὸ συμβησόμενον; ἄρ' οὐχ, ὃς τὸ εἰκὸς, διαφαρῆναι τὸ σῶμα;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

سائر. Τί δ' ἐν νητ', εἰ τῷ ἐξουσίᾳ εἰη ποιεῖν ὁ δοκεῖ, νοῦν τε καὶ ἀρετῆς κυβερνητικῆς ἐστημενήν, καθορᾶτ' ἂν συμβαίνῃ αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς συνυπάταις;

ΑΛΚ. Ἐγώγη, ὅτι γε ἀπόλουντο πάντες ἂν.

سائر. Οὐκοῦν ὡσαύτως ἐν πόλει τε καὶ πάσαις ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἐξουσίαις ἀπολειπομέναις ἀρετῆς ἐπεταί B τὸ κακῶς πράττειν;

ΑΛΚ. Ἀνάγκη.

سائر. Οὐκ ἂρα τυραννίδα χρῆ, ὡς ἀριστε Ἀλκιβιάδη, παρασκευάζεσθαι οὖθ' αὐτῷ οὔτε τῇ πόλει, εἰ μελλετε εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀρετῆν.

ΑΛΚ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

سائر. Πρὶν δὲ γε ἄρετῆν ἔχειν, τὸ ἀρχεσθαι ἀμεινον ὑπὸ τοῦ βελτίωνος ἂ τὸ ἀρχεῖν ἄνδρι, οὐ μόνον παυδί.

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.

سائر. Οὐκοῦν τὸ γε ἀμεινον καὶ κάλλιον;

ΑΛΚ. Ναί.

سائر. Τὸ δὲ κάλλιον πρεπωδέστερον;

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

C χάρι. Πρέπει ἂρα τῷ κακῶι δουλεῦνειν ἀμεινον γὰρ.
ALCIBIADES I

ALC. That is probable.

soc. For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, is at liberty to do what he pleases, but is lacking in mind, what is the probable result to him personally, or to the state as well? For instance, if he is sick and at liberty to do what he pleases—without a medical mind, but with a despot's power which prevents anyone from even reproving him—what will be the result? Will not his health, in all likelihood, be shattered?

ALC. That is true.

soc. Again, in a ship, if a man were at liberty to do what he chose, but were devoid of mind and excellence in navigation, do you perceive what must happen to him and his fellow-sailors?

ALC. I do: they must all perish.

soc. And in just the same way, if a state, or any office or authority, is lacking in excellence or virtue, it will be overtaken by failure?

ALC. It must.

soc. Then it is not despotic power, my admirable Alcibiades, that you ought to secure either to yourself or to the state, if you would be happy, but virtue.

ALC. That is true.

soc. And before getting virtue, to be governed by a superior is better than to govern, for a man as well as a child.

ALC. Apparently.

soc. And the better is also nobler?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And the nobler more becoming?

ALC. Of course.

soc. Then it becomes a bad man to be a slave, since it is better.
ΑΛΚ. Ναι.
σο. Δουλοπρεπὲς ἡ ἡ κακὶα.
ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.
σο. Ἐλευθεροπρεπὲς δὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ.
ΑΛΚ. Ναι.
σο. Οὐκοῦν φεύγειν χρῆ, ὡς ἔταïρε, τὴν δουλο-
πρέπειαν;
ΑΛΚ. Μάλιστα γε, ὡς Ὁσκρατεῖς.
σο. Αἰσθάνη δὲ νῦν πῶς ἔχεις; ἐλευθερο-
πρεπῶς ἡ οὐ;
ΑΛΚ. Δοκῶ μοι καὶ μάλα σφόδρα αἰσθάνεσθαι.
σο. Οἴσθα σὺν, πῶς ἀποφεύξῃ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ σὲ

νῦν; ἢν μὴ ὄνομάξωμεν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ καλῶ ἀνδρὶ.

D
σο. Πῶς;
ΑΛΚ. Ἐὰν βούλη σὺ, ὡς Ὁσκρατεῖς.
σο. Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὡς Ἀλκιβιάδη.
ΑΛΚ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς χρῆ λέγειν;
σο. Ὅστι ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.
ΑΛΚ. Δέγω δή. καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοι μέντοι τὸδὲ
λέγω, ὅτι κινδυνεύσομεν μεταβαλέω τὸ σχῆμα,
ὡς Ὁσκρατεῖς, τὸ μὲν σὸν ἑγὼ, σὺ δὲ τοῦμὸν: οὖ
γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅπως οὐ παιδαγωγήσω σε ἀπὸ τῆς
tῆς ἡμέρας, σὺ δ' ὑπ' ἐμοῦ παιδαγωγήσῃ.

Ε
σο. Ἡ γενναῖε, πελαργοῦ ἄρα ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρως οὐδὲν
dιώσει, εἰ παρὰ σοι ἐννεοτεύσας ἔρωτα ὑπόττερον

ὑπὸ τοῦτο πάλιν θεραπεύσεται.

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1 παιδαγωγεῖν is used here simply in the sense of "following about as personal attendant."
2 It was commonly believed that aged storks were fed by
ALCIBIADES I

alc. Yes.
soc. So vice is a thing that becomes a slave.
alc. Apparently.
soc. And virtue becomes a free man.
alc. Yes.
soc. And we should shun, my good friend, all slavishness?
alc. Most certainly, Socrates.
soc. And do you now perceive how you stand? Are you on the side of the free, or not?
alc. I think I perceive only too clearly.
soc. Then do you know how you may escape from the condition in which you now find yourself? Let us not give it a name, where a handsome person is concerned!
alc. I do.
soc. How?
alc. If it be your wish, Socrates.
soc. That is not well said, Alcibiades.
al. Well, what should I say?
soc. If it be God's will.
al. Then I say it. And yet I say this besides, that we are like to make a change in our parts, Socrates, so that I shall have yours and you mine. For from this day onward it must be the case that I am your attendant, and you have me always in attendance on you.¹

soc. Ah, generous friend! So my love will be just like a stork; for after hatching a winged love in you it is to be cherished in return by its nestling.²

younger storks which they had previously hatched and reared.

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ἀλκ. Ἄλλα οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄρξομαι γε ἐντεῦθεν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἐπιμέλεσθαι.

σω. Βουλοίμην ἄν σε καὶ διατελέσαι ὀρρωδῶ δέ, οὐ τι τῇ σῇ φύσει ἀπιστῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ὀρῶν ῥώμην, μὴ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ κρατήσῃ.
ALCIBIADES I

ALC. Well, that is the position, and I shall begin here and now to take pains over justice.

soc. I should like to think you will continue to do so; yet I am apprehensive, not from any distrust of your nature, but in view of the might of the state, lest it overcome both me and you.
ALCIBIADES II
INTRODUCTION TO ALCIBIADES II

This dialogue was included among the genuine works of Plato, about the beginning of our era, by Thrasyllus, the scholar and friend of Augustus; but there can be no doubt that it is one of the many imitations of Plato's writings which were composed in the third and second centuries B.C. Its subject—the importance of knowing what one ought to pray for—is Socratic enough; yet the reader who comes to it from an authentic work of Plato, though it be merely an immature study like the First Alcibiades, is soon aware of grievous defects in argumentative force and connexion, and must especially remark an utter absence of the play of humour with which Plato habitually and artfully relieves the onset of his master's questioning. The language also, while it shows that the author had a considerable knowledge of Plato, is in many points unplatonic. Its numerous lapses in structure and diction are well exhibited in Stallbaum's introduction and notes: as a few examples we may notice here the Greek phrases which correspond to "manifestation" (140 b), "and so, on the same lines, with the rest" (145 d), and "I shall be only too happy to accept" (151 b). Yet it is worth while to keep this work, provided that its secondary character is recognized, alongside the writings of Plato; for although its fitful light is
merely borrowed from Plato's and Xenophon's lively memorials of Socrates, it helps us to fix by contrast our conception of the matter and manner of those genuine representations.

The dialogue opens with the question whether Alcibiades, who is on his way to a temple, realizes the danger of prayer, when one may be unwittingly praying for quite the wrong thing, like a madman. But madness is only one of the several kinds of imprudence or unwisdom, which is the general cause of such mistakes, and of all misguided ambitions. In particular, and above all, "ignorance of the best" is the cause of human error. We find that all arts and accomplishments are useless or worse, unless they are accompanied by knowledge of their right and beneficial use; and, so far, only the few possess such helpful knowledge. Alcibiades begins to understand the perplexity of prayer, and Socrates illustrates with a story the reverent caution of the Spartans in the matter. Alcibiades then asks him to clear away the mist from his soul, and crowns him with a garland.
ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΙΔΗΣ ΔΕΤΤΕΡΟΣ
[Ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΣΕΤΧΗΣ· ΜΑΙΕΤΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΙΔΗΣ

St. II ξη. Ἡ 'Αλκιβιάδη, ἀρά γε πρὸς τὸν θεὸν προσευξόμενος πορεύη.

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὥ Σώκρατες.

ξη. Φαίνη γέ τοι ἐσκυθρωπακέναι τε καὶ εἰς ἤτοι βλέπειν, ὡς τι συννοούμενος.

ΑΛΚ. Καὶ τί ἄν τις συννοοῖτο, ὥ Σώκρατες; ξη. Τὴν μεγίστην, ὥ 'Αλκιβιάδη, σύννοιαν, Ἡ ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐπεὶ φέρε πρὸς Διὸς, οὐκ οἶει τοὺς θεοὺς, ὧ τυγχάνομεν εὐχόμενοι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἐνίοτε τούτων τὰ μὲν διδόναι, τὰ δ' οὖ, καὶ ἐστιν οἷς μὲν αὐτῶν, ἔστι δὲ οἷς οὖ;

ΑΛΚ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ξη. Οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι πολλῆς προμηθείας γε προσδείσθαι, ὡπως μὴ λήσει τις δ' αὐτὸν εὐχόμενος μεγάλα κακά, δοκῶν δ' ἀγαθά, οἰ δὲ θεοὶ τύχωσιν ἐν ταύτη ὡντες τῇ ἔξει, ἐν ἢ διδόσων αὐτοὶ δ' τις εὐχόμενος τυγχάνει; ὡσπερ τὸν Οἰδίπουν αὐτίκα Κ φασίν εὐξασθαι χαλκῷ διελέσθαι τὰ πατρώα τοὺς

1 λήσει τις Bekker: λήσεται mss.
ALCIBIADES II
[or ON PRAYER: "obstetric"]

CHARACTERS
Socrates, Alcibiades

soc. Alcibiades, are you on your way to offer a prayer to the god?

ALC. I am, certainly, Socrates.

soc. You seem, let me say, to have a gloomy look, and to keep your eyes on the ground, as though you were pondering something.

ALC. And what might one ponder, Socrates?

soc. The greatest of questions, Alcibiades, as I believe. For tell me, in Heaven's name, do you not think that the gods sometimes grant in part, but in part refuse, what we ask of them in our private and public prayers, and gratify some people, but not others?

ALC. I do, certainly.

soc. Then you would agree that one should take great precautions against falling unawares into the error of praying for great evils in the belief that they are good, while the gods happen to be disposed to grant freely what one is praying for? Just as Oedipus, they say, suddenly prayed that his sons might divide their patrimony with the sword: it
νίς: ἦδον αὐτῷ τῶν παρόντων αὐτῷ κακῶν ἀποτροπήν τινα εὐξασθαί, ἑτερα πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι κατηράτο· τοιγαροῦν ταῦτα τε ἕξετελέσθη, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ δεινά, ὃ τί δεῖ καθ' ἕκαστα λέγειν;

ἀλκ. Ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν, ὁ Σώκρατες, μανόμενον ἄνθρωπον εἰρήκας· ἐπεὶ τίς ἂν σοι δοκεῖ τολμήσαι υγιαίνων τοιαύτη εὐξασθαί;

ἑπ. Τὸ μαίνεσθαι ἄρα ὑπεναντίον σοι δοκεῖ τῷ φρονεῖν;

ἀλκ. Πάντω μὲν οὖν.

δ. Ἑπ. "Ἀφρονεῖς δὲ καὶ φρόνιμοι δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρω-

ποι εἶναι τινὲς σοι;

ἀλκ. Εἶναι μέντοι.

ἑπ. Φέρε δὴ, ἔπισκεψώμεθα τίνες ποτ' εἰσὶν

οὗτοι. ὅτι μὲν γάρ εἰσὶ τινὲς, ὑμολόγησαί, ἄφρονες

tε καὶ φρόνιμοι, καὶ μανόμενοι ἑτεροί.

ἀλκ. "Ωμολόγησαι γάρ.

ἑπ. "Ετι δὲ υγιαίνοντές εἰσὶ τινὲς;

ἀλκ. Εἰσὼν.

ἑπ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄσθενοῦντες ἑτεροί;

ἀλκ. Πάντα γε.

ἑπ. Οὐκοῦν οὐχ ὁι αὐτοῖ;

ἀλκ. Οὐ γάρ.

ἑπ. "Αρ' οὖν καὶ ἑτεροί τινὲς εἰσών, οἱ μηδέtero-

τούτων πεπόνθασιν;

ἀλκ. Οὐ δὴτα.

ἑπ. 'Ανάγκη γάρ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπον οὐντα ἡ νοσεῖν

ἡ μη νοσεῖν.

ἀλκ. "Εμοιγε δοκεῖ.
was open to him to pray that his present evils might by some means be averted, but he invoked others in addition to those which he had already. Wherefore not only were those words of his accomplished, but many other dread results therefrom, which I think there is no need to recount in detail.

**ALC.** But you have instanced a madman, Socrates: why, do you suppose that anyone could bring himself, while he was in a sound state, to utter such a prayer?

**SOC.** Do you regard madness as the opposite of wisdom?

**ALC.** Certainly I do.

**SOC.** And there are some men whom you regard as unwise, and others as wise?

**ALC.** Why, yes.

**SOC.** Come then, let us consider who these people are. We have admitted that some are unwise, some wise, and others mad.

**ALC.** Yes, we have.

**SOC.** And again, there are some in sound health?

**ALC.** There are.

**SOC.** And others also who are in ill-health?

**ALC.** Quite so.

**SOC.** And they are not the same?

**ALC.** No, indeed.

**SOC.** And are there any others besides, who are found to be in neither state?

**ALC.** No, to be sure.

**SOC.** For a human being must needs be either sick or not sick.

**ALC.** I agree.
Τι δε; περί φρονήσεως καὶ ἀφροσύνης ἀρά γε τὴν αὐτὴν ἐχεις σὺ γνώμην;  

ΑΛΚ. Πῶς λέγεις;  

ΣΩ. Εἰ δοκεῖ σοι οἶδι τε εἶναι ἡ φρονίμιον ἡ ἀφρονα, ἢ ἔστι τι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, δ' ουεὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρωπον μήτε φρονίμιον μήτε ἀφρονα;  

ΑΛΚ. Οὗ δῆτα.  

ΣΩ. Ἀνάγκη ἃρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐτερον τοῦτον πεπονθέναι.  

ΑΛΚ. Ἑμοιγε δοκεῖ.  

ΣΩ. Ὅδικον μέμνησαι ὑμολογήσας ὑπεναντίον εἶναι μανίαν φρονήσει;  

ΑΛΚ. Ἐγώγε.  

ΣΩ. Ὅδικον καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, δ' ουεὶ τὸν ἀνθρωπον μήτε φρονίμιον μήτε ἀφρονα εἶναι;  

ΑΛΚ. Ὑμολογήσας γάρ.  

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν δύο γε ὑπεναντία ἐνὶ πράγματι πῶς ἂν εἴη;  

ΑΛΚ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀφροσύνη ἃρα καὶ μανία κινδυνεύει ταῦτον εἶναι.  

ΑΛΚ. Φαίνεται.  

ΣΩ. Πάντας οὖν ἂν φάντες, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, τοὺς ἀφρόνας μαίνεσθαι ὀρθῶς ἄν φαίημεν· αὐτίκα τῶν σῶν ἡλικιωτῶν εἰ τινὲς τυγχάνουσιν ἄφρονες ὄντες, ὥσπερ εἰσὶ, καὶ τῶν ἐτί πρεσβυτέρων· ἐπεὶ φέρε πρὸς Διὸς, οὐκ οἱ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὀλίγους μὲν εἶναι τοὺς φρονίμους, ἄφρονας δὲ δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς, οὐς δὴ σὺ μανιμένους καλεῖς;  

ΑΛΚ. Ἐγώγε.  

ΣΩ. Οἱ εἰ δὲν οὖν χαίροντας ἡμᾶς εἶναι μετὰ τοσοῦ.
soc. Well then, do you hold the same view about wisdom and unwisdom?

Alc. How do you mean?

soc. Tell me, do you think it is only possible to be either wise or unwise, or is there some third condition between these, which makes a man neither wise nor unwise?

Alc. No, there is not.

soc. So he must needs be in one or the other of these two conditions.

Alc. I agree.

soc. And you remember that you admitted that madness is the opposite of wisdom?

Alc. I do.

soc. And further, that there is no third condition between these, which makes a man neither wise nor unwise?

Alc. Yes, I admitted that.

soc. Well now, can there possibly be two opposites of one thing?

Alc. By no means.

soc. Then it looks as though unwisdom and madness were the same.

Alc. Yes, apparently.

soc. So we shall be right, Alcibiades, in saying that all unwise persons are mad; for example, such of your contemporaries as happen to be unwise—some such there are—and of your elders, even: for tell me, in Heaven's name, do you not think that in our city the wise people are but few, whereas the majority are unwise, and these you call mad?

Alc. I do.

soc. Well, do you suppose we could safely live

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1 σὺ γνώμην Burnet: ἔχει συγγνώμην, ἔχεις γνώμην mss.
PLATO

D των μαίνομένων πολυτευμομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν παίο-
μένους καὶ βαλλομένους, καὶ ἄπερ εἰσόθασιν οἱ
μαίνομενοι διαπράττεσθαι, πάλαι δὴ δίκην δεδω-
κέναι; ἀλλ' ὁρα, ὃ μακάριε, μὴ οὐχ οὖτω ταῦτ' ἔχει.

ἀλκ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν ποτ' ἔχοι, ὁ Σώκρατες; κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὖχ οὕτως ἔχειν ὡσπερ χήθην.

σφ. ὡδ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ τῆδε τῇ ἀθρητέον.

ἀλκ. Πῇ ποτὲ λέγεις;

σφ. 'Εγώ δὴ σοὶ γε ἐρώ. ὑπολαμβάνομεν τινας
eῖναι νοσοῦντας. ἥ οὖ; 

ἀλκ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Ε σφ. 'Αρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἰναι τὸν νο-
σοῦντα ποδαγρᾶν ἡ πυρέττεων ἡ ὄφθαλμαῖν, ἡ οὖκ
ἀν δοκεῖ σοι καὶ μηδὲν τούτων πεπονθῶς ἔτεραν
νόσον νοσεῖν; πολλαὶ γὰρ δῆτον γε εἰσὶ, καὶ οὖχ
ἀδίκαι μόναι.

ἀλκ. 'Εμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.

σφ. Ὅφθαλμία οὖν σοι δοκεῖ πᾶσα νόσος εἰναι;

ἀλκ. Ναί.

σφ. 'Αρ' οὖν καὶ πᾶσα νόσος ὄφθαλμία;

ἀλκ. Οὐ δῆτα ἐμοιγε· ἀπορῶ μεντοί πῶς λέγω.

140 σφ. 'Αλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοιγε προσέχῃς τὸν νοῦν, σὺν τε
dύο σκεπτομένω τυχῶν εὐρήσομεν.

ἀλκ. 'Αλλὰ προσέχω, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰς δύναμιν

τὴν ἐμήν.

σφ. Οὐκοὖν ὠμολογήθη ἦμῖν ὄφθαλμία μὲν

πᾶσα νόσος εἰναι, νόσος μεντοί οὐκ εἰναι πᾶσα

ὄφθαλμία;

1 Cf. Homer, II. x. 224 σὸν τε δὺ' ἐρχομένω, καὶ τε πρὸ δ
tοῦ ἐνόθεσεν ὃπποις κέρδος ἐη, "if two go along together, then
one marks before the other how advantage may be had."
with so many madmen as our fellow-citizens, and should not long ago have paid the penalty for it in knocks and blows at their hands, and all the usual proceedings of madmen? Consider now, my wonderful friend, whether the case is not quite different?

_ALC._ Well, it must be, Socrates. For it looks as though it were not as I thought.

_soc._ And I think so too. But there is another way of regarding it.

_ALC._ I wonder what way you mean.

_soc._ Well, I will tell you. We conceive there are some who are sick, do we not?

_ALC._ We do, to be sure.

_soc._ And do you believe that a sick man must necessarily have the gout, or a fever, or ophthalmia? Do you not think that, although he may be afflicted in none of these ways, he may be suffering from some other disease? For surely there are many of them: these are not the only ones.

_ALC._ I agree.

_soc._ And is every ophthalmia, in your opinion, a disease?

_ALC._ Yes.

_soc._ And is every disease also ophthalmia?

_ALC._ No, I should think not: still, I am in doubt as to my meaning.

_soc._ Well, if you will attend to me, "two together" will be searching, and so mayhap we shall find what we seek.

_ALC._ Nay, but I am attending, Socrates, to the best of my power.

_soc._ Then we have admitted that while every ophthalmia is a disease, every disease, on the other hand, is not ophthalmia?
αὐ&. Ὠμολογήθη.

ση. Καὶ ὅρθως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ὦμολογηθήναι.
καὶ γὰρ οἱ πυρέττοντες πάντες νοσοῦσιν, οὐ μέντοι
οἱ νοσοῦντες πάντες πυρέττοσιν οὐδὲ ποδαγρῶσιν

Β οὐδὲ γε ὀφθαλμῶσιν, οἶμαι. ἀλλὰ νόσος μὲν πάν
tὸ τοιοῦτόν ἔστι, διαφέρειν δὲ φασίν οὐς δὴ κα-
λούμεν ἵατροὺς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν αὐτῶν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαι
οὐτε ὀμοίαν οὖτε ὀμοίως διαπράττοταν, ἀλλὰ
cατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν ἐκάστη· νόσοι μέντοι
πᾶσαι εἰσιν. ὥσπερ δημιουργοῦσ τινα ὑπολαμ-
βάνομεν· ἢ οὐ;

αὐ&. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ση. Όὐκοιν τοὺς σκυτοτόμους καὶ τέκτονας καὶ
ἀνδριαντοποιοὺς καὶ ἐτέρους παμπληθεῖς, οὓς τι
δεὶ καθ' ἐκαστα λέγειν; ἐχουσι δ' οὖν διειληφότες

C δημιουργίας μέρη, καὶ πάντες οὕτων εἰσὶ δημιουργοί,
οὐ μέντοι εἰσὶ τέκτονες γε οὐδὲ σκυτοτόμουι οὐδ' ἀνδριαντοποιοὶ, οἱ σύμπαντες εἰσὶ δημιουργοὶ.

αὐ&. Οὐ δήτα.

ση. Όὕτως μὲν τοῖνυ καὶ τὴν ἀφροσύνην δι-
ειληφότες εἰσὶ, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλείστον αὐτῆς μέρος
ἐχοντας μανομένους καλοῦμεν, τοὺς δ' ὀλίγον
ἐλαττὸν ἤλθίουσ τε καὶ ἐμβροντήτους· οἱ δὲ ἐν
ἐὐφημοτάτοις ὀνόμαι βουλόμενοι κατονομάζειν
οἱ μὲν μεγαλοψύχους, οἱ δὲ εὐθέεις, ἐτεροὶ δὲ

D ἀκάκους καὶ ἀπείρους καὶ ἐνεοὺς· εὐρίσεις δὲ
kαὶ ἑτερα πολλὰ ἀναλητῶν ὀνόματα. πάντα δὲ
tάδτα ἀφροσύνη ἔστι, διαφέρει δὲ, ὥσπερ τέχνη

1 ἀπεργασία here seems to be used for "effect produced" instead of its usual meaning, "fully effecting," "completion."
alc. We have.
soc. And our admission seems to me quite right. For everyone in a fever is sick, but yet not everyone who is sick has a fever or the gout or ophthalmia, I take it; though everything of the sort is a disease, but differs—to quote those whom we call doctors—in its manifestation. For they are not all alike, nor of like effect, but each works according to its own faculty, and yet all are diseases. In the same way, we conceive of some men as artisans, do we not?
alc. Certainly.
soc. That is, cobblerers and carpenters and statuaries and a host of others, whom we need not mention in particular; but any way, they have their several departments of craft, and all of them are craftsmen; yet they are not all carpenters or cobblers or statuaries, though these taken together are craftsmen.
alc. No, indeed.
soc. In the same way, then, have men divided un-wisdom also among them, and those who have the largest share of it we call "mad," and those who have a little less, "dolts" and "idiots"; though people who prefer to use the mildest language term them sometimes "romantic," sometimes "simple-minded," or again "innocent," "inexperienced," or "obtuse"; and many another name will you find if you look for more. But all these things are un-wisdom, though they differ, as we observed that one

2 μεγαλόφυσος has here declined from "high-souled" or "magnanimous" to something like "Quixotic."
3 εὔνοχος, even in Plato's time, varied between "good-hearted" and "silly."

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τέχνης ἡμῶν κατεφαίνετο καὶ νόσος νόσου· ἡ πώς σοι δοκεῖ;

ἀλκ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὗτος.

σπ. Οὐκοῦν ἀπ’ ἐκεῖνον πάλιν ἐπανέλθωμεν.

ἡ γὰρ δῆτο καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου, σκεπτέον ἐἶναι τοὺς ἀφρονὰς τε καὶ φρονίμους, τίνες ποτ’ εἰσίν. ὁμολόγητο γὰρ εἰναί τίνας· ἡ γὰρ οὐ;

ἀλκ. Ναὶ, ὁμολόγηται.

Ε σπ. Ἀρ’ οὖν τούτους φρονίμους ὑπολαμβάνεις, οἱ ἄν εἴδοσιν ἄττα δεὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν;

ἀλκ. Ἐγώγε.

σπ. Ἀφρονας δὲ ποτέρους; ἀρά γε τοὺς μηδέτερα τούτων εἰδότας;

ἀλκ. Τούτους.

σπ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ γε μη εἴδοτες μηδέτερα τούτων λήσουσιν αὕτους καὶ λέγοντες καὶ πράττοντες ἄττα μη δεὶ;

ἀλκ. Φαίνεται.

σπ. Τούτων μέντοι ἔλεγον, ὡ ’Αλκιβιάδη, καὶ τὸν Οἰδίπονν εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων’ εὐρήσεις δ’ ἔτι καὶ τῶν νῦν πολλοὺς οὐκ ὀργῇ κεχρημένους, ὦσπερ ἐκεῖνον, οὐδ’ οἴομένοις κακά σφίσιν ἐνέχεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀγαθά. ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὦσπερ οUid’ ἁχέτο, οὐδ’ ὦκετο· ἐτεροὶ δὲ τινὲς εἶσιν οἱ τάναντία τούτων πεπόθθασιν. ἔγω μὲν γὰρ οἴμαι σε πρῶτον, εἰ σοι ἐμφανὴς γενόμενος δ’ θεὸς πρὸς δι νυκχαῖνεις πορευόμενος, ἐρωτήσεις, πρὶν ὁτιοῦν εὐξασθαί σε, εἰ ἐξαρκέσθησει σοι τύραννου γενόμεναι τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο φαίλειν ἡγήσασθαι καὶ μὴ μέγα τι, προσθείη καὶ πάντων τῶν Ἐλλήνων· εἰ δὲ σε Β ὀρῷ ἔτι ἐλάπτον δοκοῦντα ἔχειν, εἰ μη καὶ πάσης Ἐυρώπης ὑποσταίη σοι, καὶ τοῦτο μη μόνον ὑπο-
art or one disease differs from another. Or how does it strike you?

_ALC._ That is my view.

_soc._ Then let us turn at this point and retrace our steps. For we said, you know, at the beginning that we must consider who the unwise can be, and who the wise: for we had admitted that there are such persons, had we not?

_ALC._ Yes, we have admitted it.

_soc._ Then you conceive those to be wise who know what one ought to do and say?

_ALC._ I do.

_soc._ And which are the unwise? Those who know neither of these things?

_ALC._ The same.

_soc._ And those who know neither of these things will say and do unawares what one ought not?

_ALC._ Apparently.

_soc._ Well, just such a person, as I was saying, Alcibiades, was Oedipus; and even in our time you will find many who do the same, not in a fit of anger, as he was: they think they pray not for something evil, but for something good. He neither prayed for that, nor thought he did, but there are others who are in the opposite case. For I imagine that if the god to whom you are now going should appear to you and first ask you, before you made any prayer, whether you would be content to become sovereign of the Athenian state and, on your accounting this as something poor and unimportant, should add "and of all the Greeks also"; and if he saw you were still unsatisfied unless he promised you besides the mastery of all Europe, and should not merely
σταίη, ἀλλ' αὐθῃμερόν σου βουλομένου ὡς πάντας αἰσθήσεσθαι, ὅτι Ἄλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίον τύραννός ἐστιν· αὐτὸν οὐμαι ἂν σε ἀπείναι περιχαρῆ γενόμενον, ὡς τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν κεκυρηκότα.

ἀλκ. Ἰηνδ' ὁμαι, ὁ Ὁσκρατες, κἂν ἄλλον ὄντων, εἴτε τοιαῦτα συμβαίνει αὐτῷ.

C ση. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀντὶ γε τῆς σῆς ψυχῆς οὐδ' ἂν τὴν πάντων Ἐλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων χώραν τε καὶ τυραννίδα βουληθείς σοι γενέσθαι.

ἀλκ. Οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε. πῶς γὰρ ἂν, μηθέν γε τι μέλλων αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι;

ση. Τί δ' εἰ μέλλως κακῶς τε καὶ βλαβερῶς χρῆσθαι; οὐδ' ἂν οὐτως;

ἀλκ. Οὐ δήτα.

ση. Ὄρασ όυν ὡς οὐκ ἀσφαλές οὔτε τὰ διδόμενα εἰκῇ δέχεσθαι γε οὔτε αὐτὸν εὔχεσθαι γενέσθαι, εἰ γέ τις βλάπτεσθαι μέλλοι διὰ ταῦτα ἢ τὸ παράπαν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλαγῆναι. πολλοὺς δ' ἂν

D έχομεν εἴπειν, ὅσοι τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμήσαντες ἢτοι καὶ σπουδάσαντες τοῦτ' αὐτοῖς παραγενέσθαι, ὡς ἀγαθὸν τι πράξαντες, διὰ τὴν τυραννίδα ἐπιβουλεῦστέντες τῶν βίων ἀφηρέθησαν. οἶμαι δὲ σε οὐκ ἀνήκουν εἶναι ἐνιά γε χθίζα τε καὶ πρῳζὰ γεγενημένα, ὅτε Ἄρχελαον τὸν Μακεδόνων τύραννον τὰ παιδικά, ἔρασθέντα τῆς τυραννίδος οὐθὲν ἦττον ἦπερ ἐκεῖνος τῶν παιδικῶν, ἀπέκτεινε τὸν

Ε ἐραστὴν ὡς τύραννός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἀνήρ ἐσόμενος· κατασχὰν δὲ τρεῖς ἢ τέταρτας ἡμέρας τὴν τυραννίδα πάλιν αὐτὸς ἐπιβουλευθεῖς ὑφ' ἐτέρων τινῶν

1 ἀλ' add. Dobree.

1 Quoted from Homer, Il. ii. 303.
promise you that, but on the self-same day a recognition by all men, if you so desired, of Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, as their sovereign—I imagine you would actually depart in a transport of delight, as having secured the greatest of goods.

**ALC.** So would anybody else, I imagine, Socrates, at such a stroke of luck!

**soc.** But still you would not wish to sacrifice your life even for the territory and sovereignty of all the Greeks and barbarians together.

**ALC.** I should think not. How could I, without a prospect of making any use of them?

**soc.** And what if you had a prospect of making an evil and injurious use of them? Not in this case either?

**ALC.** No, indeed.

**soc.** So you see it is not safe either to accept casually what one is given, or to pray for one’s own advancement, if one is going to be injured in consequence, or deprived of one’s life altogether. Yet we could tell of many ere now who, having desired sovereignty, and endeavoured to secure it, with the idea of working for their good, have lost their lives by plots which their sovereignty has provoked. And I expect you are not unacquainted with certain events “of a day or two ago,” when Archelaus, the monarch of Macedonia, was slain by his favourite, who was as much in love with the monarchy as Archelaus was with him, and who killed his lover with the expectation of being not only the monarch, but also a happy man: but after holding the monarchy for three or four days he was plotted against by others.

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2 This assassination occurred in 399 B.C., the year of Socrates’ death.
έτελεύησεν. ὁρᾶς δὴ καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων πολυτῶν—ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλων ἀκηκόαμεν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρόντες οὐδαμεν—ὅσοι στρατηγίας ἐπιθυμήσαν—

tes ἡδῆ καὶ τυχόντες αὐτής οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν φυγάδες τῆς τῆς πόλεως εἰσιν, οἳ δὲ τῶν βίων ἐτελεύησαν· οἳ δὲ ἄριστα δοκοῦντες αὐτῶν πράττειν διὰ πολλῶν κυδώνων ἐλθόντες καὶ φόβων οὐ μόνον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ στρατηγίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἔτει εἰς τὴν ἔαυτῶν κατῆλθον, ὑπὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν πολιορκούμενοι πολιορκίαν οὐδὲν ἐλάττω τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων διετέλεσαν, ὡστε ἐνίους αὐτῶν εὐχεσθαι

Β ἀστρατηγήτους εἶναι μᾶλλον ἡ ἀστρατηγηκέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ κύνδυνοι τε καὶ πόνοι φέροντες εἰς ωφέλειαν, εἰσεν ἃν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ καὶ πολὺ τούναντίον. εὐρήσεις δὲ καὶ περὶ τέκνων τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, εὐξαμένους τινὰς ἡδῆ γενέσθαι καὶ γενομένων εἰς συμφοράς τε καὶ λύπας τὰς μεγίστας καταστάντας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν διὰ τέλους ὄντων τῶν τέκνων ὅλων τὸν βίον λυπούμενοι δι-

ηγαγοῦν· τοὺς δὲ χρηστῶν μὲν γενομένων, συμφοραῖς

C δὲ χρησμαμένων ὡστε στερηθῆναι, καὶ τούτους οὐδὲν εἰς ἐλάττωνας δυστυχίας καθεστηκότας ἦπερ ἐκεῖνους, καὶ βουλομένους ἃν ἄγενητα μᾶλλον εἶναι ἡ γενέσθαι. ἀλλ' οἵμως τούτων τε καὶ ἑτέρων πολλῶν ὀμοιοτρόπων τούτως οὔτω σφόδρα καταδήλως ὄντων, σπάνιων εὐρεῖων ὅστις ἃν ἡ διδομένων ἀπόσχιστο ἡ μέλλων δι' εὐχῆς τεῦ-ξεσθαι παύσατο ἃν εὐχόμενος· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ οὔτε ἃν τυραννίδος διδομένης ἀπόσχιστο ἃν οὔτε στρατη-

D γίας οὐδ' ἑτέρων πολλῶν, ἃ παρόντα βλάπτει

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in his turn, and perished. You have only to look at some of our own citizens—and these are examples that we know, not by hearsay, but by personal observation—who in their time have desired to hold military command and have obtained it, and see how some to this very day are exiles from our city, while others have lost their lives. And even those who are deemed to be faring best have not only gone through many dangers and terrors in holding their command, but on returning home have continued to be as sorely besieged by informers as they were by the enemy, so that some of them wished to heaven that they had been anything but commanders rather than have held such appointments. Of course, if these dangers and toils were conducive to our advantage, there would be some reason for them; but the case is quite the contrary. And you will find it is just the same in regard to children: some people have been known to pray that they might have them, and when they have got them have fallen into the greatest disasters and pains. For some have had children that were utterly bad, and have spent their whole lives in vexation; while others, though they had good ones, were bereft of them by disasters that overtook them, and thus were cast into as great misfortune as the others, and wished that no children at all had been born to them. But nevertheless, with all this plain evidence, and a great deal more of a similar kind, before men's eyes, it is rare to find anyone who has either declined what was offered to him or, when he was likely to gain something by prayer, refrained from praying. Most men would not decline the offer of either a monarchy or a generalship or any of the various other things which bring with them harm
μάλλον ἡ ὠφελεῖ, ἀλλὰ κἂν εὐξαντὸ ἃν γενέσθαι, εἰ τῷ μὴ παρόντα τυγχάνειν. ὅλιγον δὲ ἐπισχόντες ἐνίοτε παλινωδοῦσιν, ἀνευχόμενοι ἀττ' ἂν τὸ πρῶτον εὐξεῖνται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἄπορῶ, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς μάτην θεούς ἀνθρωποί αἰτῶνται, εἰς ἐκείνων φάμενοι κακά σφισιν εἶναι. οἱ δὲ καὶ αὕτωι σφῆσιν εἴετε ἀτασθαλίασιν εἴετε ἀφροσύνας χρῆ
Ε εἰπεῖν, ὑπὲρ μόρον ἀλγε' ἔχουσι. κυνδυνεύει γοῦν, ὡς Ἀλκιβιάδη, φρόνιμος τίς εἶναι ἐκεῖνος ὁ ποιητής, ὃς δοκεῖ μοι φίλοις ἀνοῆτοι τισὶ χρησάμενος, ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ πράττοντας καὶ εὐχομένους ἀπέρ οὐ βέλτιον ἂν, εκεῖνοι δὲ ἐδόκει, κονὴ ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων αὐτῶν εὐχὴν ποιήσασθαι: λέγει δὲ πως ὀδί.

143 Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλά, φησι, καὶ εὐχομένους καὶ ἀνεύκτοις ἄμμι δίδου, τὰ δὲ δειλὰ1 καὶ εὐχομένους ἀπ-αλέξειν
κελεύει. ἔμοι μὲν οὖν καλῶς δοκεῖ καὶ ἄσφαλῶς λέγειν ὁ ποιητής: οὐ δ' εἰ τι ἐν νῷ ἔχεις πρὸς ταῦτα, μὴ σιώπα.

Ἀλκ. Χαλεπόν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐστὶν ἀντιλέγειν πρὸς τὰ καλῶς εἰρημένα: ἐκεῖνο δ' οὖν ἐννοῶ, ὅσων κακῶν αὐτία ἡ ἁγνοία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅποτε, ὡς ἐνικε, λεληθαμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διὰ ταῦτα καὶ
Β πράττοντας καὶ τὸ γ' ἐσχάτον εὐχόμενοι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τὰ κάκιστα. ὅπερ οὖν οὐδεὶς ἄν οἰηθεῖη, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γε πᾶς ἂν οἴοιτο ἰκανός εἶναι, αὐτός αὐτῷ τὰ βέλτιστα εὐξασθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ κάκιστα. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς κατάρα τινὶ ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐχὴ ὤμοιον ἂν εἴη.

1 δειλὰ Buttmann: δειλὰ mss.
rather than benefit, but would even pray to be granted them in cases where they were lacking: but after a little while they often change their tune, and retract all their former prayers. I question therefore if men are not really wrong in blaming the gods as the authors of their ills, when "they themselves by their own presumption"—or unwisdom, shall we say?—"have gotten them more than destined sorrows." 1 It would seem, at any rate, Alcibiades, that one old poet had some wisdom; for I conceive it was because he had some foolish friends, whom he saw working and praying for things that were not for their advantage, though supposed to be by them, that he made a common prayer on behalf of them all, in terms something like these:

King Zeus, give unto us what is good, whether we pray or pray not;
But what is grievous, even if we pray for it, do thou avert. 2

So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of an answer to his words, do not be silent.

**ALC.** It is difficult, Socrates, to gainsay what has been well spoken: one thing, however, I do observe—how many evils are caused to men by ignorance, when, as it seems, we are beguiled by her not only into doing, but—worst of all—into praying to be granted the greatest evils. Now that is a thing that no one would suppose of himself; each of us would rather suppose he was competent to pray for his own greatest good, not his greatest evil. Why, that would seem, in truth, more like some sort of curse than a prayer!

1 *Cf. Homer, Od. i. 32.*  
... ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑποταγματικῷ πρᾶξιν διήρκει, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τῇ πράξει. ἦν οὖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἡ πράξις καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἡ πράξις. Εἰ γε μὴ προσθέσῃς τοῦ ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐστὶν οἷς καὶ ἐχουσὶ πως ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος κακῶν.

Ἀλκ. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐστὶ γὰρ ὅτι οὐδὲν πράγμα ὅτι δὴ ὑποταγματικὸν ἔχουσιν ἀμείνων ἀγνοεῖν ἡ γνώσις.

... ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑποταγματικῷ πρᾶξιν διήρκει, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τῇ πράξει. Εἰ γε μὴ προσθέσῃς τοῦ ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐστὶν οἷς καὶ ἐχουσὶ πως ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος κακῶν.

Ἀλκ. Εὐφήμει, πρὸς Διὸς, ὡς Σώκρατες.

... ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑποταγματικῷ πρᾶξιν διήρκει, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τῇ πράξει. Εἰ γε μὴ προσθέσῃς τοῦ ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐστὶν οἷς καὶ ἐχουσὶ πως ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος κακῶν.

Ἀλκ. Εὐφήμει, πρὸς Διὸς, ὡς Σώκρατες.
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soc. But perhaps, my excellent friend, some person who is wiser than either you or I may say we are wrong to be so free with our abuse of ignorance, unless we can add that it is ignorance of certain things, and is a good to certain persons in certain conditions, as to those others it is an evil.

ALC. How do you mean? Can there be anything of which it is better for anybody, in any condition whatsoever, to be ignorant than cognisant?

soc. I believe so; and do not you?

ALC. No, indeed, upon my word.

soc. But surely I shall not have to tax you with an inclination to commit such an act against your own mother as Orestes and Alcmaeon, and any others who have followed their example, are said to have committed against theirs.

ALC. No unlucky words, in Heaven's name, Socrates!

soc. Why, it is not the person who says, Alcibiades, that you would not like to be guilty of such an act, whom you should bid avoid unlucky words, but much rather him who might say the contrary; since the act seems to you so very dreadful as to be unfit even for such casual mention. But do you think that Orestes, if he had had all his wits about him and had known what was best for him to do, would have brought himself to commit any act of the sort?

ALC. No, indeed.

soc. Nor would anyone else, I imagine.

ALC. No.

soc. Then it seems that ignorance of what is best, and to be ignorant of the best, is a bad thing.

ALC. I agree.
Σω. Ούκοιν καὶ ἐκεῖνῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν;
Ἀλκ. Φημί.
Σω. Ἐπὶ τοῖς καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψάμεθα· εἰ σοι αὐτίκα μάλα παρασταῖθ, οὐθέντι βέλτιον εἶναι, Περικλέα τὸν σεαυτοῦ ἐπίτροπον τε καὶ φιλον, ἐγχειρίδιον λαβόντα, ἐλθόντα ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας, εἴπειν εἰ ἐνδον ἑστὶ, βουλομένων ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτὸν ἐκείνον, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα· οἱ δὲ φαίεν ἐνδον εἶναι—καὶ οὐ λέγω ἐθέλειν ἃν σε τοῦτων τι πράττειν· ἀλλ' εἰ, οἷμαι, δόξει σοι, ὅπερ οὔθεν κωλύει δήπου τῷ γε ἀγνοοῦντι τὸ βέλτιστον παραστήναι ποτέ δόξαν, ὡστε οἰηθῆναι καὶ τὸ κάκιστον ποτε βέλ-τιστον εἶναι· ἡ οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι;
Ἀλκ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
Σω. Εἰ οὖν παρελθὼν εἴσω καὶ ἰδὼν αὐτὸν Β ἐκεῖνον ἀγνοήσαις τε καὶ οἰηθείης ἃν ἄλλον εἶναι των, ἀρ' εἴπι ἃν αὐτὸν τολμήσας ἀποκτεῖαι;
Ἀλκ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, οὐκ ἂν μοι δοκῶ.
Σω. Οὐ γὰρ δῆπον τὸν ἐντυχόντα, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἐκείνον ὃν ἢβουλοῦν. ἢ γὰρ;
Ἀλκ. Ναι.
Σω. Οὐκοίν καὶ εἰ πολλάκις ἐγχειροῖς, αἰεὶ δὲ ἀγνοοῖς τὸν Περικλέα, ὅποτε μέλλοις τοῦτο πράττειν, οὐποτε ἃν ἐπίθοιο αὐτῷ.
Ἀλκ. Οὐ δῆτα.
Σω. Τί δὲ; τὸν Ὀρέστην δοκεῖς ἃν ποτε τῇ μητρὶ ἐπιθέσθαι, εἰ γε ὡσαύτως ἠγνόησεν;
Σω. Οὐ γὰρ δῆπον οὔδ' ἐκεῖνος τὴν προστυχοῦ-
soc. And not only for the person himself, but for everyone else?

Alc. Yes.

soc. Then let us consider this further case. Suppose it should quite suddenly occur to your mind that you had better take a dagger and go to the door of Pericles, your own guardian and friend, and ask if he were at home, with the design of killing just him and no one else, and his servants said he was at home: now, I do not say you would be inclined to do any such thing, but I suppose, if you are under the impression which at some moment may well be present, surely, to the mind of a man who is ignorant of the best—that what is really the worst is best at some moment—or do you not agree?

Alc. Quite so.

soc. Well then, if you went indoors and saw Pericles himself, but did not know him, and thought he was somebody else, would you still venture to kill him?

Alc. No, upon my word, I should think not.

soc. For your man was, I presume, not anyone you met, but that particular person whom you wished to kill?

Alc. Yes.

soc. And although you might make a number of attempts, if you always failed to know Pericles when you were about to commit the act, you would never attack him.

Alc. No, indeed.

soc. Well now, do you suppose that Orestes would ever have attacked his mother if he had similarly failed to know her?

Alc. I do not think he would.

soc. For presumably he, too, had no intention
σαν γυναίκα ούδε την οτουν υμερέα διενειότο ἀποκτείναι, ἀλλὰ την αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ.

ἄλκ. Ἡ ἑστι ταῦτα.

σ. Ἀγνοεῖν ἄρα τὰ γε τοιαύτα βέλτιον τοῖς ὀὕτω διακειμένοις καὶ τοιαύτας δόξας ἔχουσιν.

ἄλκ. Φαίνεται.

σ. Ὅρας οὖν, ὡς ἡ ἑστιν ὀντι τε ἁγνοια καὶ ἑστιν οἷς καὶ ἔχουσί πως ἁγαθόν, ἀλλ' οὔ κακόν, ἄσπερ ἄρτι σοι ἐδόκει; ἄλκ. Ἡ Εὐικεν.

D σ. Ἔστι τοῖνυν εἰ βούλει τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀτοπον ἃν ἱσως σοι δόξειν εἶναι.

ἄλκ. Τί μάλιστα, ὃ Σώκρατεσ;

σ. Ὅτι, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, κινδυνεύει τὸ γε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστηµιών κτῆµα, ἐὰν τις ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου κεκτηµένος ἐ, ὅλυγάκις μὲν ωφελεῖν, βλάπτειν δὲ τὰ πλείω τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτό. ὁ σκόπει δὲ ωδε. ἄρ' οὔκ ἀναγκαῖον σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅταν τι μέλλωμεν ἦτοι πράττειν ἡ λέγειν, οὐκ ἂν δεῖν πρῶτον ἡµᾶς εἰδέναι ἡ τῷ οὕτι εἰδέναι τοῦθ' ὃ ἂν ἔπροχειροτέρως μέλλωμεν ἡ λέγειν ἡ πράττειν;

ἄλκ. Ἡ Ἐμογε δοκεῖ.

σ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ ρήτορες αὐτίκα ἦτοι εἰδότες συµβουλεύειν ἡ οὐθέντες εἰδέναι συµβουλεύουσιν ἡµῖν ἐκαστοτε, οἱ μὲν περὶ πολέµου τε καὶ εἰρήνης, οἱ δὲ περὶ τεῖχων οἰκοδοµίας ἡ λιµένων κατασκευῆς.

145 ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, ὥσα δὴ ποτε ἡ πόλις πράττει πρὸς ἄλλην πόλιν ἡ αὐτῆ καθ' αὐτὴν, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ρήτορων συµβουλῆς ἀπαντα γίγνεται.

ἄλκ. Ἡ Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

σ. Ὅρα τοῖνυν καὶ τὰ ἐπί τούτοις.

ἄλκ. Ἡ Ἀν δυνηθῶ.
of killing the first woman he met, or anybody else's mother, but only his own.

ALC. That is so.

soc. Then to be ignorant in such matters is better for those who are so disposed and have formed such resolves.

ALC. Apparently.

soc. So you see that ignorance of certain things is for certain persons in certain states a good, not an evil, as you supposed just now.

ALC. It seems to be.

soc. Then if you care to consider the sequel of this, I daresay it will surprise you.

ALC. What may that be, Socrates?

soc. I mean that, generally speaking, it rather looks as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, if it does not include possession of the science of the best, will in a few instances help, but in most will harm, the owner. Consider it this way: must it not be the case, in your opinion, that when we are about to do or say anything, we first suppose that we know, or do really know, the thing we so confidently intend to say or do?

ALC. I think so.

soc. Well, take the orators, for example: they either know, or think they know, how to advise us on various occasions—some about war and peace, and others about building walls or fitting up harbours; and in a word, whatever the city does to another city or within herself, all comes about by the advice of the orators.

ALC. That is true.

soc. Then observe the consequence.

ALC. If I am able.

1 aυρό Schneider, aυρά mss.
PLATO

σω. Καλείσ γάρ δήποι φρονίμουσ τε καὶ ἄφρονας;

ἀλκ. Ἔγωγε.

σω. Οὐκοῦν τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ἄφρονας, τοὺς δ’ ὀλίγους φρονίμουσ;

ἀλκ. Οὐτως.

σω. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς τι ἀποβλέπων ἀμφοτέρους;

ἀλκ. Ναί.

Β σω. Ἄρ’ οὖν τὸν τοιοῦτον συμβουλεύειν εἴδότα, χωρὶς τοῦ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ ὅτε βέλτιον, φρόνιμον καλεῖς;

ἀλκ. Οὐ δῆτα.

σω. Οὐδέ γε, οἴμαι, ὅστις τὸ πολεμεῖν αὐτὸ οἴδε χωρὶς τοῦ ὅπότε βέλτιον καὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον βέλτιον. ἡ γάρ;

ἀλκ. Ναί.

σω. Οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ εἰ τίς τών ἀποκτωνύναι οἶδεν οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι καὶ φυγάδα ποιεῖν τῆς πατρίδος, χωρὶς τοῦ ὅπότε βέλτιον καὶ ὀντινα βέλτιον;

ἀλκ. Οὐ μέντοι.

C σω. Ὅστις ἄρα τι τῶν τοιοῦτων οἶδεν, ἐὰν μὲν παρέπηται αὐτῷ ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη—ἀυτῇ δ’ ἢν ἡ αὐτῇ δήποι ἡπερ καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὠφελίμου· ἡ γάρ;

ἀλκ. Ναί.

σω. Φρόνιμον δὲ γε αὐτὸν φήσομεν καὶ ἀποχρώντα σύμβουλον καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ· τοῦ δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον1 τάναντια τοῦτων. ἡ πῶς δοκεῖ;

ἀλκ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὔτως.

σω. Τι δ’ εἰ τίς ἵππευεν ἡ τοξεύειν οἶδεν, ἡ ἀν πυκτεύειν ἡ παλαίειν ἡ τί τῆς ἄλλης ἀγωνίας

1 τοιοῦτον J. G. Schneider: ποιοῦντα mss.

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soc. Why, surely you call men either wise or unwise?

alc. I do.

soc. And the many unwise, and the few wise?

alc. Precisely.

soc. And in either case you name them in reference to something?

alc. Yes.

soc. Then do you call a man wise who knows how to give advice, without knowing whether and when it is better to act upon it?

alc. No, indeed.

soc. Nor, I conceive, a man who knows what war is in itself, without knowing when or for how long a time it is better to make war?

alc. Agreed.

soc. Nor, again, a man who knows how to kill another, or seize his property, or make him an exile from his native land, without knowing when or to whom it is better so to behave?

alc. No, to be sure.

soc. Then it is a man who knows something of this sort, and is assisted by knowledge of what is best,—and this is surely the same as knowledge of the beneficial, is it not?

alc. Yes.

soc. And we shall call him wise, and a competent adviser both of the city and of his own self; but a man not so qualified we shall call the opposite of these. How do you think?

alc. I agree.

soc. And what of a man who knows how to ride or shoot, or else to box or wrestle or contend in any
D ἡ καὶ ἄλλο τὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὅσα τέχνη οἴδαμεν, τί καλεῖς ὅσ ἂν εἰδή τὸ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν τέχνην βέλτιον γιγνόμενον; ἃρ' οὐ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἵππικήν ἰππικόν;

Ἀλκ. Ἕγωγε.

Ση. Τὸν δὲ γε, οἴμαι, κατὰ τὴν πυκτικὴν πυκτικόν, τὸν δὲ κατ’ αὐλητικὴν αὐλητικόν, καὶ τάλλα δῆπον ἀνὰ λόγον τούτου· ἡ ἄλλως πως; Ἀλκ. Όυκ, ἄλλ’ οὕτως.

Ση. Δοκεῖ ὁδν σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν περὶ τούτων τι ἐπιστήμων ὁντα ἃρα καὶ ἄνδρα φρόνιμον Ε εἶναι, ἡ πολλοῦ φῆσομεν ἐνδείω; Ἀλκ. Πολλοῦ μέντοι νη Δία.

Ση. Ποίον οὖν οἷς πολιτείαν εἶναι τοξοτῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ αὐλητῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀθλητῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν, ἀναμεμιγμένων δ᾿ ἐν τοιούτοις οὐς ἅρτε εἰρήκαμεν τῶν τε αὐτὸ τὸ πολεμεῖν εἰδότων καὶ αὐτό τὸ ἀποκτυνύναι, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἄνδρῶν ῥητορικῶν πολιτικῶν φύσημα φυσιώτων, ἀπάντων δὲ τούτων ὄντων ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος, ὅποτε βέλτιον ἐνὶ ἑκάστῳ τούτων 146 χρῆσθαι καὶ πρὸς τίνα;

Ἀλκ. Φαύλην τινὰ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Ση. Φαίης γε ἂν, οἴμαι, ὅποταν ὁρῶς ἕνα ἑκαστὸν αὐτῶν φιλοτιμούμενον τε καὶ νέμοντα τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς πολιτείας τούτω μέρος,

ιν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνῃ κράτιστος ὃν.

λέγω δὲ τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην βέλτιστον

1 ovis Dobree: ois mss.
other sport, or do anything that we know by rule of art? What do you call him who knows what is better done by rule of that particular art? Do you not say that he who goes by the rules of riding is a good rider?

ALC. I do.

SOC. And the rules of boxing, I suppose, make a good boxer, and those of flute-playing a good flute-player, and so, on the same lines, I presume, with the rest; or is there any difference?

ALC. No, it is as you say.

SOC. Then do you think it inevitable that he who has some knowledge about these things should also be a wise man, or shall we say he comes far short of it?

ALC. Far short of it, I declare.

SOC. Then what sort of state do you suppose it would be, where the people were good bowmen and flute-players, together with athletes and artists in general, and mingled with these the men whom we have just mentioned as knowing war in itself and slaughter in itself, and orator-windbags too with their political bluster, but all of them lacked this knowledge of the best, and none knew when or upon whom it was better to employ their respective arts?

ALC. A paltry one, I should call it, Socrates.

SOC. Yes, you would, I expect, when you saw each one of them vying with the other and assigning the largest part in the conduct of the state to that

Wherein himself is found most excellent,  

I mean, what is done best by rule of his particular

1 ἀνὰ λόγον occurs, with the genitive, in Tim. 29 c; the normal Platonic phrase for our passage is ὑπάρχον.

2 Cf. Gorg. 484 e (Eurip. Antiope, fr.).
γιγνόμενον τοῦ δὲ τῇ πόλει τε καὶ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ βελτίστου ὄντος τὰ πολλὰ διημαρτηκότα, ἀτε οἶμαι, ἀνευ νοῦ δόξῃ πεπιστευκότα. οὕτως δὲ 
Β τούτων ἔχοντων, ἃρ' οὐκ ἂν ὁρθῶς λέγομεν 
φάντες πολλῆς ταραχῆς τε καὶ ἀνομίας μεστῆν 
eῖναι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν;

Ἀλκ. Ὁρθῶς μέντοι νῆ Δία.

σφ. Ὅνυκον ἀναγκαῖον ήμῶν ἐδόκει οὐκ θηρίναι 
dein πρῶτον ήμᾶς εἰδέναι ἡ τῷ ὀντί εἰδέναι τοῦτο, 
do àn προχείρος μέλλωμεν ἡ πράττεων ἡ λέγεων;

Ἀλκ. Ἐδόκει.

σφ. Ὅνυκον καὶ μὲν πράττῃ ἡ τις οἴδειν ἡ δοκεῖ 
eιδέναι, παρέπηται δὲ τὸ ὄφελίμως, καὶ λυσι-
C τελούντως ήμᾶς ἐξειν καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν 
αὐτῶ;

Ἀλκ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; 

σφ. Ἐὰν δὲ γ', οἶμαι, τάναντια τούτων, οὔτε τῇ 
pόλει οὔτ' αὐτὸν αὐτῶ;

Ἀλκ. Οὐ δῆτα.

σφ. Τί δὲ; καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὡσαύτως σοι δοκεῖ ἡ 
ἀλλως πῶς;

Ἀλκ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὕτως.

σφ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐφησθα καλεῖν τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς 
αφρονας, τοὺς δ' ὀλίγους φρονίμους;

Ἀλκ. Ἐγώγε.

σφ. Ὅνυκον φαμεν πάλιν τοὺς πολλοὺς διημαρτη-
κέναι τοῦ βελτίστου, ὥς τὰ πολλὰ γε, οἶμαι, ἀνεu 
νοῦ δόξῃ πεπιστευκότας.

Δ Ἀλκ. Φαμὲν γάρ.

σφ. Λυσίτελει ἄρα τοῖς πολλοῖς μήτ' εἰδέναι 
μηδὲν μήτ' οἴσθαι εἰδέναι, εἴπερ γε μᾶλλον προ-
θυμήσονται πράττεων μὲν ταῦτα, ἀττ' ἂν εἰδώσων

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art—while he is generally off the track of what is best for the state and for himself, because, I conceive, he has put his trust in opinion apart from intelligence. In these circumstances, should we not be right in saying that such a state is one great mass of turmoil and lawlessness?

ALC. We should, upon my word.

soc. And we took it to be necessary that we should first think we know, or really know, anything that we intend either to do or to say with facility?

ALC. We did.

soc. And if a man does what he knows or thinks he knows, and is assisted by knowing how to make it beneficial, we shall find him profitable both to the city and to himself?

ALC. Certainly.

soc. But if, I suppose, he does the contrary, he will not be so either to the city or to himself?

ALC. No, indeed.

soc. Well then, do you still take the same view now as before, or do you think differently?

ALC. No, I take the same view.

soc. And you said you called the many unwise, and the few wise?

ALC. I did.

soc. So now we repeat our statement that the many have missed getting the best because in most cases, I conceive, they have put their trust in opinion apart from intelligence.

ALC. Yes.

soc. Then it is an advantage to the many neither to know nor to think they know anything, if they are going to be specially eager to do what they know or
ἡ οἰηθῶσιν εἰδέναι, πράττοντες δὲ βλάπτεσθαι τὰ πλεῖον μᾶλλον ἡ ὄφελείσθαι.

ἀλκ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

σω. Ὅρας οὖν, ὅτε ἐφην κινδυνεύειν τὸ γε 
Ε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν κτῆμα, ἐάν τις ἄνευ τῆς του βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης κεκτημένος ἢ, ἀλγάκις μὲν ὄφελεῖν, βλάπτειν δὲ τὰ πλεῖον τὸν ἑχοντ’ αὐτό, ἂρ’ οὗχι τῷ οντὶ ὀρθῶς ἐφαινόμην λέγων;

ἀλκ. Καὶ εἰ μὴ τότε, ἀλλὰ νῦν μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώ- 

κρατεῖ.

σω. Δεῖ ἂρα καὶ πόλιν καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν μέλλουσαν ὀρθῶς βιώσεσθαι ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης αντέχε- 

σθαι, ἀτεχνῶς ὡσπερ ἁσθενοῦντα ἰατρὸν ἢ τοὺς 

κυβερνήτου τὸν ἁφαλῶς μέλλοντα πλεῖν. ἄνευ 

147 γὰρ ταύτης, ὁσπερ ἢν λαμπρότερον ἐπουρίσῃ τὸ 

τῆς τύχης ἢ περὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν ἢ σώματος 

ῥώμην ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, τοσοῦτῳ 

μείζω ἀμαρτήματα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἔστων, ὡς 

ἐσου, γίγνεσθαι. ὅ δὲ ἡ τῆς καλομενῆς πολυ-

μαθίαν τε καὶ πολυτεχνίαν κεκτημένος, ὀρθακὸς δὲ 

ὁν ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ μιᾶς 

ἐκάστης τῶν ἄλλων, ἄρν οὖχι τῷ οντὶ δικαίως 

πολλώ χειμώνι χρήσεται, ἄτ’, οἷμαι, ἄνευ κυβερ-

νήτου διατελῶν ἐν πελάγει, χρόνον οὐ μακρὸν βίον 

Β θέων; ὅπετε συμβαίνειν μοι δοκεῖ ἐνταῦθα τὸ 

τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὅ λέγει κατηγορῶν ποῦ τῶν, ὡς 

ἄρα πολλὰ μὲν ἡπίστατο ἔργα, κακῶς δὲ, φησίν, 

ἡπίστατο πάντα.

ἀλκ. Καὶ τί δὴ ποτὲ συμβαίνει τὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ,

1 ἄνευ γὰρ ταύτης transp. Lennep: ante ἢ περὶ χρημάτων mss. 

2 λαμπρότερον Lennep: μὴ πρότερον mss. 

3 τύχης Stallbaum: ψυχῆς mss. 

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think they know, but are likely on the whole, in doing it, to be injured rather than benefited.

**ALC.** That is very true.

**soc.** So you see that when I said it looked as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, where it did not include the science of the best, in a few cases helped, but in most harmed the owner, I was evidently right in very truth, was I not?

**ALC.** Though I did not then, I think so now, Socrates.

**soc.** Hence the state or soul that is to live aright must hold fast to this knowledge, exactly as a sick man does to a doctor, or as he who would voyage safely does to a pilot. For without this, the more briskly it is wafted by fortune either to the acquisition of wealth or to bodily strength or aught else of the sort, the greater will be the mistakes in which these things, it would seem, must needs involve it. And he who has acquired the so-called mastery of learning and arts, but is destitute of this knowledge and impelled by this or that one among those others, is sure to meet with much rough weather, as he truly deserves; since, I imagine, he must continue without a pilot on the high seas, and has only the brief span of his life in which to run his course. So that his case aptly fits the saying of the poet, in which he complains of somebody or other that

> Full many crafts he knew: but still
> He knew them all so very ill.

**ALC.** Why, how on earth is the poet’s saying

1 Quoted from the mock-epic *Margites*, of which only this and five other lines have survived. The hero, Margites, became the proverbial type of a blundering idiot, and the poem was generally attributed to Homer.
ο Σωκράτης; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὔδ’ ὅτιοιν δοκεῖ πρὸς λόγον εἰρηκέναι.

Σω. Καὶ μᾶλα γε πρὸς λόγον· ἀλλ’ αἰνίττεται, ὃ βέλτιστο, καὶ οὗτος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δὲ ποιηταὶ σχεδὸν τι πάντες. ἔστι τε γὰρ φύσει ποιητικὴ ἡ σύμπασα

C αἰνιγματώδης καὶ οὐ τοῦ προστυχόντος ἄνδρὸς γνωρίσαι: ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τῷ φύσει τοιαῦτη εἶναι, ὅταν λάβηται ἄνδρὸς φθονεροῦ τε καὶ μὴ βουλομένου ἡμῶν ἐνδεικνύονται ἀλλ’ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι ὑπὸ μάλιστα τὴν αὐτοῦ σοφίαν, ὑπὲρφυῶς δὴ τὸ χρῆμα ὡς δύσ-γνωστον φαίνεται, ὅ τι ποτὲ νοοῦσον ἔκαστος αὐτῶν. 

οὔ γὰρ ὁποίῳ Ἄυμηρὸν γε τῶν θεώτατῶν τε καὶ σοφώτατον ποιητὴν ἀγνοεῖν δοκεῖς, ὡς οὐχ οἶδον τε ἣν ἐπίστασθαι κακῶς: ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἔστω ὁ λέγων τὸν Μαργίτην πολλὰ μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, κακῶς δὲ,

D φησὶ, πάντα ἡπίστατο1· ἀλλ’ αἰνίττεται, οἶμαι, παρ-άγων τὸ κακῶς μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἡπίστα- 

το αὐτό τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι· γίγνεται οὖν συντεθὲν ἐξω 

μὲν τοῦ μέτρου, ἔστι δ’ ὅ γε βουλεταί, ὡς πολλὰ 

μὲν ἡπίστατο ἐργα, κακὸν δὲ ἢν ἐπίστασθαι 

αὐτῷ πάντα ταῦτα. δὴ λοιπὸν νῦν ὅτι εἴπερ ἢν αὐτῷ 

κακὸν τὸ πολλὰ εἰδέναι, φαύλοις τις ὃν ἐτύγχανεν, 

εἴπερ γε πιστεύειν δεῖ τοὺς προειρημένους λόγους.

Ε Ἀλκ. Ἀλλ’ ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σωκράτης· ἢ 

χαλεπῶς γ’ ἂν ἄλλοις τισὶ πιστεύσαμι λόγους, 

eἴπερ μηδὲ τούτουσ.

Σω. Καὶ ὅρθως γε σοι δοκεῖ.

Ἀλκ. Πάλιν αὖ μοι δοκεῖ.

Σω. Ἀλλὰ φέρε πρὸς Δίος—δρᾶς γὰρ δῆπον 

tὴν ἀπορίαν ὡς τε καὶ οἷα· ταῦτης δὴ καὶ σὺ μοι

1 ἡπίστατο Bekker: ἐπίστασθαι mss.

1 This trick of twisting the words of a quotation into an

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apposite, Socrates? For to my mind it has nothing to do with the point.

soc. It is very much to the point: but he, good sir, like almost every other poet, speaks in riddles. For poetry as a whole is by nature inclined to riddling, and it is not every man who can apprehend it. And furthermore, besides having this natural tendency, when it gets hold of a grudging person who wishes not to show forth to us his own wisdom but to conceal it as much as possible, we find it an extraordinarily difficult matter to make out whatever this or that one of them may mean. For surely you do not suppose that Homer, divinest and wisest of poets, did not know it was impossible to know ill; for it is he who says of Margites that he knew many things, but knew them all ill: but it is a riddle, I think, in which he has made "ill" stand for "evil," and "knew" for "to know." So if we put it together, letting the metre go, indeed, but grasping his meaning, we get this: "Full many crafts he knew, but it was evil for him to know them all." Then clearly, if it was evil for him to know many things, he was in fact a paltry fellow, assuming we are to believe what we have previously argued.

ALC. But I think we may, Socrates: at least, if I cannot believe those arguments of ours, I shall find it hard to trust any others.

soc. And you are right in so thinking.

ALC. Then again, I think not.

soc. But come now, in Heaven's name—for I suppose you see how great and strange is our perplexity, in which you, as it seems to me, have your unnatural meaning is quite characteristic of Socrates. Cf. Protag. 343-7.
δοκεῖς κεκοιμωνήκεναι· μεταβαλλόμενος γέ τοι ἢνω καὶ κάτω οὐδ’ ὅτιοιν παῦη, ἀλλ’ ὃ τι ἂν μαλιστά σοι δόξῃ, τούτο καὶ έκδεδυκέναι αὖ καὶ

148 οὐκέτι ὃσαύτως δοκεῖν—εἰ οὖν σοι γ’ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμφανῆς γενόμενος ὁ θεός, πρὸς ὃν τυγχάνεις πορευόμενος, ἔρωτήσεις, πρὶν οτιοῦν εὐξασθαί σε, εἰ ἐξαρκέσει σοι ἐκεῖνοι τι γενέσθαι ὑπὲρ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγετο, εἰτε αὐτῷ σοι ἐπιτρέψεις εὐξασθαί, τί ποτ’ ἂν οἰεὶ ἡ τῶν παρ’ ἐκείνοιν διδομένων λαμβάνων ἡ αὐτός εὐξάμενος γενέσθαι τοῦ καροῦ τυχεῖν;

Ἀλκ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐθὲν ἂν ἔχομι σοι εἰπεῖν, ὃ Σωκρατεσ, οὐτως· ἀλλὰ μάργον τί μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολλῆς φυλακῆς, ὅπως μὴ λῆσει τις αὐτὸν εὐχόμενος μὲν κακά, δοκῶν δὲ τάγαθα, ἐπεῖτ’ ὀλίγον ἐπισχὼν, ὀπέρ καὶ σὺ ἐλεγες, παλινῳδῆ, ἀνευχόμενος ἄττ’ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον εὔχηται.

Σω. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐχὶ εἰδὼς τι πλέων ἠμῶν ὁ ποιητῆς, οὔ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου ἐπεμνήσθην, τὰ δειλὰ καὶ εὐχόμενοι ἀπαλέξεων ἐκέλευεν;

Ἀλκ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σω. Τοῦτον μὲν τοῖς, ὃ Αλκιβιάδη, καὶ Σ Ἀκαδαιμώνιοι τὸν ποιητήν ἐξηλωκότες, εἶτε καὶ αὐτόι οὕτως ἐπεσκεμένοι, καὶ ἰδίαι καὶ δημοσία ἐκάστοτε παραπλησίαν εὐχὴν εὐχονται, τὰ καλὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τοὺς θεοὺς διδόναι κελεύοντες αὖ σφίσων αὐτοῖς· πλεῖω 2 δ’ οúdeς ἂν ἐκείνων εὐξαμένων ἀκούσειεν. τοιγαροῦν εἰς τὸ παρῆκον τοῦ

1 δειλὰ Buttmann: δεινὰ, δήλα mss.
2 πλεῖω Burnet: πλέον, πλείων mss.
share; for you change about from this side to that without settling down for a moment, but as soon as you are firmly convinced of a thing you seem to slip out of it again and cease to hold the same view—well, if the god to whom you are going should even now appear to you and ask, before you uttered any prayer, whether you would be content to obtain one of those things which were mentioned at the beginning, or whether he should leave you to pray as you were, how do you suppose you would make the best of your chance—by accepting his offer, or by praying for something on your own account?

ALC. Well, by the gods, I could not answer your question, Socrates, offhand. Why, I take it to be a fatuous request, when it is really a case for great caution lest one pray unawares for what is evil while thinking it to be one's good, and then after a little while, as you were saying, one change one's tune and retract all one's former prayers.

soc. And did not the poet whom I quoted at the beginning of our discussion know more than we, when he bade us pray for the averting of what is grievous, even though we pray for it?

ALC. I think so.

soc. Then it is their admiration of this poet, Alcibiades, or perhaps the result of their own study, that causes the Spartans to offer a similar prayer whether the occasion be private or public—that the gods will give them for their own benefit the beautiful as well as the good: more than this no one can ever hear them pray for. The consequence is that to the

1 i.e., that I should answer offhand. The pun in μάργον, alluding to the "fatuous" Margites, cannot be rendered in English.
2 142 d.
3 143 a.
This seems to be the meaning of the Greek, which is certainly not Platonic. In Aristotle, *Phys. iv. 13. 5* ὁ παρῆκαν
χρόνος means "past time."
present time they have been just as fortunate as any other people; and if it has befallen them to be not invariably fortunate, it was anyhow not owing to their prayer. It rests with the gods, I conceive, to give us either what we may pray for or the reverse.

And I would like to give you an account of something else, which I once heard from some of my seniors. A quarrel having arisen between the Athenians and the Spartans, it befell our city to be always unsuccessful in every battle by land and sea, and she could never win a victory. So the Athenians, in their annoyance at this result, and at a loss for some means of finding a deliverance from the trouble they were in, took counsel together and decided that the best thing they could do was to send and inquire of Ammon; and moreover, to ask also for what reason the gods granted victory to the Spartans rather than to themselves: "for we"—such was the message—"offer up to them more and finer sacrifices than any of the Greeks, and have adorned their temples with votive emblems as no other people have done, and presented to the gods the costliest and stateliest processions year by year, and spent more money thus than all the rest of the Greeks together. But the Spartans have never taken any such pains, and indeed are so neglectful in their behaviour to the gods, that they make a practice of sacrificing defective victims, and generally are very much behind us in the honours that they pay, though the wealth they possess is quite equal to that of our city." When

2 An Ethiopian god whose cult spread over Egypt, and through Cyrene to various parts of Greece: he had temples at Thebes and Sparta, but the famous one in the Libyan desert is probably meant here.
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επερωτήσαι, τι χρή πράσσοντας αυτούς τῶν
παρόντων κακῶν ἀπαλλαγὴν εὑρεῖν, ἀλλο μὲν
Β οὐθὲν ἀποκριθήναι τὸν προφήτην—τὸν γὰρ θεόν
οὐκ ἐὰν δῆλον ὅτι—καλέσαντα δὲ αὐτὸν, Ἀθηναίοις,
φάναι, τάδε λέγει Ἀμμων. φησίν ἂν βούλεσθαι
αὐτῷ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων εὐφημίαν εἰναι μάλλον
ἡ τὰ σύμπαντα τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἑρά. τοσαῦτα
eἰπεῖν, οὐκέτι περαιτέρω. τὴν γ' οὖν εὐφημίαν οὐκ
ἀλλην τωά μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν ὁ θεὸς ἢ τὴν εὐχὴν
αὐτῶν. ἔστι γὰρ τῷ οὐτὶ πολὺ διαφέρουσα τῶν
C ἀλλων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι Ἑλλήνες οἱ μὲν χρυσό-
κερως βοῦς παραστησάμενοι, ἔτεροι δ' ἀναθήμασι
dωροῦμενοι τοὺς θεοὺς, εὐχοῦσαν ἄττ' ἂν τῆς
tαύτα, ἂν τε ἀγαθὰ ἂν τε κακά. βλασφημοῦντων
οὖν αὐτῶν ἀκούοντες οἱ θεοὶ οὐκ ἀποδέχονται τὰς
πολυτελεῖς ταυταὶ πομπᾶς τε καὶ θυσίας. ἀλλὰ
dοκεὶ μοι πολλὴς φυλακῆς δείσθαι καὶ σκέψεως, ὃ
tί ποτε βητέον ἔστι καὶ μή.

Εὐρήσεις δὲ καὶ παρ' Ὁμηρῷ ἔτερα παρα-
πλῆσια τούτοις εἰρημένα. φησὶ γὰρ τοὺς Τρώας
D ἔπαυλιν ποιομένους

ἔρδεν ἀθανάτοις τεληέσσας ἐκατόμβας·

τὴν δὲ κυῖαν ἐκ τοῦ πεδίου τοὺς ἀνέμους φέρειν
οὐρανὸν εἴσω

ηδείαν· τῆς δ' οὖ τι θεοῦς μάκαρας δατέέσθαι,
οὖδ' ἐθέλεων· μάλα γ' ἢρ σφὴν ἀπήχθετο Ἰλίος ἱρὴ
Ε καὶ Πρίαμος καὶ λάδος ἐυμμελεῖν Πριάμοιο.

ὡστε οὐδὲν αὐτῶς ἢν προὔργου θύειν τε καὶ δώρα

1 The use of ἀποκριθήναι for “answered” instead of the
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they had so spoken, and added the question, what they should do in order to find a deliverance from the trouble they were in, the prophet's only answer—evidently it was all that the god allowed—was to call them to him and say: "Thus saith Ammon to the Athenians: I would rather have the reverent reserve of the Spartans than all the ritual of the Greeks." So much he said, and not a word further. Now by "reverent reserve" I suppose the god could only mean their prayer, since in fact it differs greatly from those that are generally offered. For the Greeks in general either lead up bulls with gilded horns, or else present the gods with votive emblems, and pray for any odd thing, whether it be good or bad: so when the gods hear their irreverent speech they reject all these costly processions and sacrifices. Whereas I think we ought to be very cautious, and fully consider what is to be said and what is not.

And in Homer too you will find other tales of a similar sort. For he relates how the Trojans, in making their bivouac,

Sacrificed to the immortals perfect hecatombs,
and how the winds bore the sweet savour from the plain into heaven:

But the blessed gods partook not of it, nor would have it,
For deep was their hate against holy Ilium,
And Priam, and the folk of Priam of the good ashen spear.³

So it was nothing to their purpose to sacrifice and usual ἀποκρινασθαι is evidence for placing the writer a good deal later than Plato.
² εὐφημία means "avoidance of speech that may offend"—the opposite being βλασφημία.
³ The four lines directly quoted are not in our manuscripts of Homer, but have been inserted in modern texts as II. viii. 548, 550-2.
τελείων μάτην, θεοὶς ἀπηχθημένους. οὐ γὰρ, οἶμαι, τοιοῦτὸν ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν θεῶν, ὥστε ὕπο δύρων παράγεσθαι οἴνον κακοῦ τοκιστῆν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἥμείς εὐθῆ δόγον λέγομεν, ἀξιοῦντες Δακεδαιμονίων ταύτης περιείναι. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὸν εἴη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ δῶρα καὶ τὰς θυσίας ἀποβλέπουσιν ἥμων οἱ θεοὶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν, ἂν τις ὁσίος καὶ δίκαιος ὑπὸ τυγχάνῃ. πολλῷ γε μάλλον, οἶμαι, ἦ πρὸς τὰς πολυτελεῖς ταύτας πομπάς τε καὶ θυσίας, ἂς οὐδὲν κωλύει πολλὰ μὲν εἰς θεοὺς, πολλὰ δ’ εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἡμαρτηκότας καὶ ἰδιώτην καὶ πόλιν ἔχειν ἀν’ ἐκαστὸν ἐτος τελείων οἱ δὲ, ἄτε οὐ δωροδόκου οὕτωσις, καταφρονοῦσιν ἀπάντων τούτων, ὡς φησιν ὁ θεὸς καὶ θεών προφήτης. κυνικεύει γοῦν καὶ παρὰ θεοὺς καὶ παρ’ ἄνθρωποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ φρόνησις διαφερόντως τε-

Β τιμήθαι. φρόνιμοι δὲ καὶ δίκαιοι οὐκ ἄλλοι τινὲς εἰσιν [ἡ] 1 τῶν εἰδότων ἃ δεὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους. βουλομένη δ’ ἂν καὶ πυθέσθαι ὃ τί ποτε εἰν νῦ ἐχεις πρὸς ταῦτα.

αλκ. ’Αλλ’ ἐμοὶ, ὦ Σωκρατεῖς, οὐκ ἄλλη πη δοκεῖ ἡ ἢπερ σοι τε καὶ τῷ θεῷ οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν εἰκὸς εἰη ἀντίμηθον ἐμὲ τῷ θεῷ γενέσθαι.

ἐπ. Οὐκοῦν μέμνησαι ἐν πολλῇ ἀπορίᾳ φάσκων εἰναι, ὅπως μὴ λάθης σεαυτὸν εὐχόμενος κακά,

C δοκῶν δὲ ἀγαθά;

αλκ. ’Εγώγει.

ἐπ. Ὁρᾶς οὖν, ὡς οὖν ἀσφαλές σοι ἐστὶν ἐλθεὶν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὐχόμενος, ἵνα μηδ’ ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, βλασφημοῦντός σοι ἀκούων οὖθεν ἀποδέξηται τῆς θυσίας ταύτης, τυχόν δὲ καὶ ἑτέρον τι προσαπο-

1 ἦ del. Winckelmann.
pay tribute of gifts in vain, when they were hated by the gods. For it is not, I imagine, the way of the gods to be seduced with gifts, like a base usurer. And indeed it is but silly talk of ours, if we claim to surpass the Spartans on this score. For it would be a strange thing if the gods had regard to our gifts and sacrifices instead of our souls, and the piety and justice that may be found in any of us. Far rather at these, I believe, do they look than at those costly processions and sacrifices which are offered, it well may be, by individual and state, year in, year out, though they may have offended greatly against the gods, or as greatly against their neighbours. But the gods are not to be won by bribes, and so they despise all these things, as Ammon and the holy prophet say. Certainly it would seem that justice and wisdom are held in especial honour both by the gods and by men of intelligence; and wise and just are they alone who know what acts and words to use towards gods and men. But I should like now to hear what may be your opinion on the subject.

ALC. Why, Socrates, it in no wise differs from yours and the god’s; for indeed it would not be fitting for me to record my vote against the god.

SOC. And you remember you professed to be in great perplexity lest you should pray unawares for evil, while supposing it to be good?

ALC. I do.

SOC. You see, then, how unsafe it is for you to approach the god with your prayers, for it may chance that when he hears your irreverent speech he will reject your sacrifice altogether, and you may perhaps be accorded some other bad thing as well.
λαύσης. ἔμοι μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ βελτιστον εἶναι ἰδανίαν ἔχειν. τῇ μὲν γὰρ Δακεδαμονίων εὐχῇ διὰ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν—τοῦτο γὰρ κάλλιστον τῶν ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ γε ὀνομάτων—οὐκ ἂν οἴμαι σε ἐθέλειν 

D χρήσθαι. ἀναγκαίον οὖν ἔστι περιμένειν, ἐως ἂν τις μάθη, ὡς δεῖ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους διακείσθαι.

ἀλκ. Πότε οὖν παρέσται ὁ χρόνος οὗτος, ὡς Σώκρατες, καὶ τίς ὁ παιδεύσων; ἦδιστα γὰρ ἂν μοι δοκῶ ἵδειν τοῦτον τὸν ἀνθρώπον τίς ἔστιν.

ἐπ. Οὗτος ὃ μέλει περὶ σοῦ. ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μοι, ὡσπερ τῷ Διομήδει φησὶ τὴν Ἀθηναν Ὄμηρος ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀφελεῖν τὴν ἀχλὺν,

ὁφρ' εὗ γιγνώσκοι ἣμὲν θεοῦ ἣδε καὶ ἄνδρα,

Ε οὕτω καὶ σοὶ δεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πρῶτον τὴν ἀχλὺν ἀφελόντα, ἢ νῦν παροῦσα τυγχάνει, τὸ τηνικαῦτ' ἡδὴ προσφέρειν δι' ὅν μέλλεις γνώσεσθαι ἣμὲν κακοῦ ἣδε καὶ ἑσθλοῦ. νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν μοι δοκεῖς δυνηθῆναι.

ἀλκ. Ἀφαιρεῖτω, εἴτε βούλεται τῇ ἀχλὺν εἴτε ἄλλο τί; ὦς ἐγὼ παρεσκεύασμαι μὴθὲν ἂν φυγεῖν τῶν ὑπ' ἐκείνου προστατομένων, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπος, εἴ γε μέλλοιμι βελτίων γενέσθαι.

ἐπ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν κάκεινος θαυμαστήν ὅσην περὶ σὲ προθυμίαν ἔχει.

ἀλκ. Εἰς τότε τούντων καὶ τὴν θυσίαν ἀναβάλλεσθαι κράτιστον εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ.

ἐπ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε σοὶ δοκεῖ: ἀσφαλέστερον γάρ ἐστιν ἡ παρακινδυνεύειν τοσοῦτον καίνυνον.

ἀλκ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς, ὥς Σώκρατες; καὶ μὴν τουτοί

1 ἀνθρώπως Schanz: ἀνθρώπος, ὁ ἀνθρώπος mss.

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In my opinion, therefore, it is best to hold your peace: for I expect you will not consent to use the Spartan’s prayer, you have such a romantic spirit—to give it the fairest of folly’s names.\(^1\) It is necessary, therefore, to bide one’s time until one can learn how one should behave towards gods and men.

ALC. Well, when will that time arrive, Socrates, and who is to be my instructor? For I feel I should very much like to see who the man is.

SOC. It is he who is concerned about you. But I think, as Homer relates how Athena removed the mist from the eyes of Diomede,

That he might well discern both god and man,\(^2\) so you too must first have the mist removed which now enwraps your soul, and then you will be ready to receive the means whereby you will discern both evil and good. For at present I do not think you could do so.

ALC. Let him remove the mist or whatever else he likes to call it: for I am prepared to obey every one of his commands, without shirking, whoever the man may be, so long as I am to be the better for them.

SOC. I tell you, he on his part is prodigiously anxious to help you.

ALC. Then I think it best to defer the sacrifice also till the time comes.

SOC. And you are quite right: for that is safer than running so serious a risk.

ALC. But how say you, Socrates? Look now, I

\(^1\) Cf. 140 c.  \(^2\) Iliad v. 127.
τὸν στέφανον, ἐπειδὴ μοι δοκεῖς καλῶς συμβεβολευκέναι, σοὶ περιθῆσω· τοῖς θεοῖς δὲ καὶ
Β στεφάνους καὶ τάλα πάντα τὰ νομιζόμενα τότε δώσομεν, ὅταν ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐλθοῦσαν ἱδών.
ηξεὶ δ' οὖ διὰ μακροῦ τούτων θελόντων.

σο. Ἀλλὰ δέχομαι καὶ τούτο, καὶ ἄλλο δὲ ἂν τι τῶν παρὰ σοῦ δοθέντων ἴδεως ἱδομι δεξάμενον
ἐμαυτόν. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ δ' Κρέων Εὐριπίδη πεποίη-
tαι τὸν Τειρεσίαν ἰδὼν ἐχοντα τὰ στέφη καὶ ἀκούσας ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπαρχᾶς αὐτοῦ εἰδη-
φέναι διὰ τὴν τέχνην,

οἰωνὸν ἔθεμην, φησὶ, καλλίνικα <σὰ> 1 στέφη.
ἐν γὰρ κλυδωνι κείμεθ', ὥσπερ οἶσθα σοῦ.

C οὕτω δὲ κάγω παρὰ σοῦ τὴν δόξαν ταῦτην οἴων
τίθεμαι. δοκῶ δὲ μοι οὐκ ἐν ἐλάττωνι κλυδωνὶ
tοῦ Κρέοντος εἶναι, καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν καλλίνικος
γενέσθαι τῶν σῶν ἔραστῶν.

will crown you with this garland, as I consider you have given me such good advice; and to the gods we shall offer both garlands and all the other customary things when I see that day has come. And come it will ere long, if they are willing.

soc. Well, I accept this gift; and anything else besides, that you may give me, I shall be only too happy to accept.¹ And as Euripides has made Creon say when he sees Teiresias wearing his wreaths, and hears that he has obtained them, on account of his art, as first-fruits of the spoils of war:

As omen good I take thy victor’s wreaths;
For in the waves we labour, as thou knowest,—²

so do I take this opinion of yours as a good omen. For I consider I am no less wave-tossed than Creon, and would like to come off victorious over your lovers.

¹ The Greek here is literally—"I should gladly see myself to have accepted"—which seems very unplatonic.
² Eurip. Phoen. 858-9. The blind prophet Teiresias has been crowned by the Athenians for the aid he has given them in a successful war. Eteocles, the young king of Thebes, has left the city in charge of his uncle Creon while he is fighting his brother Polynices for the possession of the throne.
INTRODUCTION TO THE HIPPARCHUS

The Hipparchus is probably not a genuine work of Plato, who would surely have conducted the discussion with more grace and spirit and consecution. Nevertheless it is not without interest to the student of the Platonic dialogues. The subject—the meaning of the common phrase, "a lover of gain," and its general handling, are truly Socratic, and the language shows that the writer had a fairly close and accurate grasp of Platonic idiom. A series of definitions are suggested by Socrates' anonymous companion, and these are in turn exposed as conflicting with each other or the truth. After proving that gain is not made from worthless things, and that it is not the same as good, Socrates gives an account of the wise and beneficent rule of Hipparchus in Athens (527–514 B.C.), and of the cause of the conspiracy which brought about his death. This digression, although it gives its name to the whole dialogue, is connected with the conversation by but one flimsy thread—one of the maxims which Hipparchus inscribed by the roadside for the edification of the people: this maxim—"Deceive not a friend"—has a bearing, not on any subject of the debate, but only on a momentary difference between Socrates and his friend. Socrates then allows the friend to retract some of his previous statements.
and gets the reply that some gain is good, some evil. But we want to know what gain itself is, whether it be good or evil; it is not the same as an acquisition, for it is only when an acquisition is good that we call it gain. It seems, after all, that gain must be something good. The same result is reached, if we consider the relation of gain to value or worth; for the valuable is profitable, and the profitable is good. The conversation ends with a short recapitulation, showing how obscure the meaning of gain really is, and how unsafe it is to reproach anyone with being "a lover of gain."
ΙΠΠΑΡΧΟΣ Ἡ ΦΙΛΟΚΕΡΔΗΣ

[ἩΩΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ

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σημ. Τί γὰρ τὸ φιλοκερδῆς; τί ποτὲ ἐστὶ, καὶ τίνες οἱ φιλοκερδεῖς;

ἐτ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκοῦσιν, οἱ ἂν κερδαίνειν ἄξιωσιν ἀπὸ τῶν μηδὲν ἄξιων.

σημ. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσι γιγνώσκοντες, ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἐστιν ἄξια, ἢ ἀγνοοῦντες; εἰ γὰρ ἀγνοοῦντες, ἀνοίητους λέγεις τοὺς φιλοκερδεῖς.

ἐτ. Ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ἀνοίητους λέγω, ἀλλὰ πανούργους καὶ πονηροὺς καὶ ἦττους τοῦ κέρδους, γιγνώσκοντας ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξια ἐστὶν ἄφ᾽ ὧν τολμῶσι β κερδαίνειν, ὀμοί τολμᾶν φιλοκερδεῖν δι᾽ ἀναισχυντίαν.

σημ. Ἀρ᾽ οὖν τοιόνδε λέγεις τὸν φιλοκερδή, οἷον ἑαυτὸς γεωργικὸς ἄνηρ καὶ γιγνώσκων ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιον τὸ φυτὸν, ἄξιοι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐκτραφέντος κερδαίνειν; ἄρα τοιοῦτον αὐτῶν λέγεις;

ἐτ. Ἀπὸ παντὸς ὦ γε φιλοκερδῆς, ὡ Σώκρατες, οἴεται δεῖν κερδαίνειν.

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soc. And what is love of gain? What can it be, and who are the lovers of gain?

FR. In my opinion, they are those who think it worth while to make gain out of things of no worth.

soc. Is it your opinion that they know those things to be of no worth, or do not know? For if they do not know, you mean that the lovers of gain are fools.

FR. No, I do not mean they are fools, but rascals who wickedly yield to gain, because they know that the things out of which they dare to make their gain are worthless, and yet they dare to be lovers of gain from mere shamelessness.

soc. Well now, do you mean by the lover of gain such a man, for instance, as a farmer who plants something which he knows is a worthless herb, and thinks fit to make gain out of it when he has reared it up? Is that the sort of man you mean?

FR. The lover of gain, as such, Socrates, thinks he ought to make gain from everything.
π. Μη μοι ούτως εἰκή, ὡσπερ τι Ἡδικημένος
C ὑπὸ τινος, ἀλλὰ προσέχων ἐμοὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀπόκριναι,
ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἄρχης πάλιν ἡρώτων· οὐχὶ διμο-
λογεῖς τὸν φιλοκερδῆ ἐπιστήμονα εἰναι περὶ τῆς
ἀξίας τούτου, οἴην κερδαίνειν ἀξιοῖν;

ετ. Ἑγώγε.

π. Τίς οὖν ἐπιστήμων περὶ φυτῶν τῆς ἀξίας,
ἐν ὅποια ἀξία φυτευθήναι καὶ ὀρα καὶ χώρα;
ίνα τι καὶ ἡμεῖς τῶν σοφῶν ῥημάτων ἐμβάλωμεν,
ὅν οἱ δεξιοὶ περὶ τὰς δίκας καλλιεπούνται.

D

ετ. Ἑγὼ μὲν οἴμαι γεωργὸν.

π. Τὸ οὖν ἀξιοῦν1 κερδαίνειν ἀλλο τι λέγεις ἡ
οἰέσθαι δεῖν κερδαίνειν;

ετ. Τοῦτο λέγω.

π. Μη τούνν μὲ ἐπιχείρει ἐξαπατᾶν, ἄνδρα
226 πρεσβυτερον ἡδὴ οὔτω νέος ὅν, ἀποκρινόμενος
ὡσπερ νῦν δή, ἀ οὔδ' αὐτὸς οἴει, ἀλλὰ ὡς ἄληθῶς
εἰπέ· ἄρ' έστιν οὖτων οἴει γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα
γιγνόμενον, καὶ γιγνώσκοντα, ὅτι οὐδένος ἀξίουν
φυτεύει τὸ φυτὸν, οἴεσθαι ἀπὸ τούτου κερδαίνειν;

ετ. Μά Δ´ οὐκ ἔγωγε.

π. Τί δὲ; ἵππικον ἄνδρα γιγνώσκοντα, ὅτι
οὐδένος ἁξία αὐτία τῷ ἵππῳ παρέχει, ἀγνοεῖν αὐτὸν
οἴει, ὅτι τὸν ἵππον διαφθείρει;

ετ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

B

π. Οὐκ ἢρα οἴεται γε ἀπὸ τούτων κερδαίνειν
τῶν σιτίων τῶν μηδενὸς ἁξίων.

1 τῷ ἀξιοῦν Etwall: τῶν ἁξιοῦν mss.
2 εἰπέ· ἄρ' Boeckh: εἰπερ mss.

1 The “artful phrase” here is the jingling ὀρα καὶ χώρα,
soc. Please do not speak so recklessly, as though you had been wronged by someone, but give me your attention and answer just as you would if I were beginning my questions over again. Do you not admit that the lover of gain has knowledge of the worth of the thing from which he thinks it worth while to make gain?

FR. I do.

soc. Then who has knowledge of the worth of plants, and of the sort of season and soil in which they are worth planting—if we too may throw in one of those artful phrases which adroit pleaders use to trick out their speeches in the law courts?

FR. For my part, I should say a farmer.

soc. And by "think it worth while to make gain" do you mean aught but "thinking one ought to make gain"?

FR. I mean that.

soc. Then do not attempt to deceive me, who am now quite an elderly person, and you so young, by making, as you did just now, an answer that is not even your own thought; but tell me in all truth, do you suppose that any man who was taking up farming and who knew it was a worthless plant that he was planting, could think to make gain from it?

FR. Upon my word, I do not.

soc. Or again, take a horseman who knows that he is providing worthless food for his horse; do you suppose he is unaware that he is destroying his horse?

FR. I do not.

soc. So he does not think to make gain from that worthless food.

characteristic of the rhetoric taught by Gorgias and his followers.
et. Οὖχί.

ζην. Τι δέ; κυβερνήτην μηδενός αξία ἑστία καὶ πηδάλια τῇ νῃ παρεσκευασμένον ἄγνοεῖν οίει, ὅτι ξημιωθήσεται καὶ κινδυνεύσει καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπολέσθαι καὶ τὴν ναῦν ἀπολέσαι καὶ ἃ ἂν ἄγη πάντα;

et. Οὔκ ἔγγυε.

ζῆν. Οὔκ ἄρα οἴηται γε κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ὅσκευών τῶν μηδενός ἄξιών.

et. Οὔ γάρ.

ζην. Ἀλλὰ στρατηγὸς γυγνῶσκων, ὅτι ἡ στρατιὰ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἁξία ὑπλα ἐχεῖ, οἴηται ἀπὸ τοῦτων κερδαίνειν καὶ ἁξίοι κερδαίνειν;

et. Ὅφθαμοι.

ζην. Ἀλλ' αὐλητής αὐλοὺς οὐδενὸς ἁξίους ἐχων ἡ κυθαριστὴς λύραν ἡ τοξότης τόξου ἡ ἄλλος ὄστιςοιν συλλήβδην τῶν δημιουργῶν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐμφρόνων ἀνδρῶν μηδενὸς ἁξία ὀργάνα ἡ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἦντιναυὸν ἐχων ἀπὸ τοῦτων οἴηται κερδαίνειν;

D et. Οὔκοιν φαίνεται γε.

ζην. Τίνας οὖν ποτὲ λέγεις τοὺς φιλοκερδεῖς; οὗ γάρ ποι τοῦτοις γε, οὗς διεληλύθαμεν, ἄλλα' οὔτε γυγνῶσκοις τὰ οὐδενὸς ἁξία ἀπὸ τοῦτων οἴηται δεῖν κερδαίνειν; ἄλλα οὕτω μὲν, ὡς ἱσταμάσει, ὡς οὐ λέγεις, οὔκ ἔστε ἀνθρώπων οὐδεῖς φιλοκερδῆς.

et. Ἀλλ' ἔγω, ὃ Σῶκρατες, βούλομαι λέγειν τοῦτοις φιλοκερδεῖς εἶναι, οἳ ἐκάστοτε ὑπὸ ἀπληροτιας καὶ πάνυ σμικρὰ καὶ ὅλιγον ἁξία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἔγλισθαιν ὑπερφυῶς καὶ φιλοκερδοῦσιν.

ζῆν. Οὐ δῆτού, ὃ βέλτιστο, γυγνῶσκοις, ὅτι

1 ἄλλ' add. Apelt.
HIPPARCHUS

FR. No.
soc. Or again, take a navigator who has furnished his ship with worthless spars and ropes; do you think he is unaware that he will suffer for it, and will be in danger of being lost himself, and of losing the ship and all her cargo?

FR. I do not.
soc. So he does not think to make gain from that worthless tackle?

FR. No, indeed.
soc. But does a general, who knows that his army has worthless arms, think to make gain, or think it worth while to make gain, from them?

FR. By no means.
soc. Or does a flute-player who has worthless flutes, or a harper with a lyre, a bowman with a bow, or anyone else at all, in short, among ordinary craftsmen or sensible men in general, with any implement or other equipment of any sort that is worthless, think to make gain from it?

FR. To all appearance, no.
soc. Then whoever can they be, your lovers of gain? For I presume they are not the people whom we have successively mentioned, but people who know their worthless things, and yet think they are to make gain from them. But in that case, by what you say, remarkable sir, no man alive is a lover of gain!

FR. Well, Socrates, I should like to call those lovers of gain who from insatiable greed consumedly long for things that are even quite petty and of little or no worth, and so love gain, in each case.
soc. Not knowing, of course, my excellent friend,
οὐδενὸς ἡξιά ἐστι· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἴδη ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ ἐξηλέγξαμεν ὅτι ἀδύνατον.

ἐτ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

σν. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ γιγνώσκοντες, δῆλον ὅτι ἁγνοοῦντες, οἴομενοι δὲ τὰ οὐδενὸς ἡξία πολλοῦ ἡξία εἶναι.

ἐτ. Φανεται.

σν. Ἀλλο τι οὖν οὗ γε φιλοκερδεῖς φιλοῦσι τὸ κέρδος;

ἐτ. Ναί.

σν. Κέρδος δὲ λέγεις ἑναντίον τῇ ζημίᾳ;

ἐτ. Ἕγωγε.

σν. Ἑστιν οὖν ὅτι ἁγαθῶν ἐστὶ ζημιοῦσθαι;

ἐτ. Οὐδενί.

σν. Ἀλλὰ κακὸν;

ἐτ. Ναί.

σν. Βλάπτονται ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ἀρα ἄνθρωποι.

ἐτ. Βλάπτονται.

σν. Κακὸν ἀρὰ τῇ ζημίᾳ.

ἐτ. Ναί.

σν. Ἐναντίον δὲ τῇ ζημίᾳ τὸ κέρδος.

ἐτ. Ἐναντίον.

σν. Ἀγαθὸν ἀρὰ τὸ κέρδος.

ἐτ. Ναί.

σν. Τοὺς οὖν τὸ ἁγαθὸν φιλοῦντας φιλοκερδεῖς καλεῖς.

ἐτ. Ἕγωγε.

Β σν. Οὐ μανικοὺς γε, ὥ ἐταῖρε, λέγεις τοὺς φιλοκερδεῖς. ἀλλὰ σοὶ αὐτὸς πότερον φιλεῖς ὁ ἁν ἁγαθὸν ἡ, ἡ οὖ φιλεῖς;

ἐτ. Ἕγωγε.
that the things are worthless; for we have already convinced ourselves by our argument that this is impossible.

FR. I agree.
soc. And if not knowing this, clearly they are ignorant of it, but think that those worthless things are worth a great deal.

FR. Apparently.
soc. Now, of course lovers of gain must love gain?

FR. Yes.
soc. And by gain you mean the opposite of loss?

FR. I do.
soc. And is it a good thing for anyone to suffer loss?

FR. For no one.
soc. Rather an evil?

FR. Yes.
soc. So mankind are harmed by loss.

FR. They are harmed.
soc. Then loss is an evil.

FR. Yes.
soc. And gain is the opposite of loss.

FR. The opposite.
soc. So that gain is a good.

FR. Yes.
soc. Hence it is those who love the good that you call lovers of gain.

FR. So it seems.
soc. At least there is nothing mad, my friend, about lovers of gain, as you describe them. But tell me, do you yourself love, or not love, whatever is good?

FR. I love it.
κακών;

ετ. Μά Δι' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ἐπ. 'Αλλὰ πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἵσως φιλεῖς.

ἐτ. Ναί.

επ. 'Εροῦ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ, εἰ οὐ καὶ ἐγώ· ὁμολογήσω γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σοι φιλεῖν τὰ ἀγαθά. ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι ἀπαντεῖς οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι C τὰ ἀγαθὰ φιλεῖν, τὰ δὲ κακὰ μισεῖν;

ετ. Ἐμοιγε φαίνεται.

ἐπ. Τὸ δὲ κέρδος ἀγαθὸν ὁμολογήσαμεν;

ἐτ. Ναί.

ἐπ. Πάντες οὐ φιλοκερδεῖς φαίνονται τούτων τὸν τρόπον· δὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν, οὐδεὶς ἢν φιλοκερδῆς. ποτέρῳ οὖν ἂν τὶς τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος οὐκ ἂν ἔξαμαρτάνοι;

ἐτ. Εἴ τις, ὦ Σῶκρατε, οἶμαι, ὅρθως λαμβάνοι τὸν φιλοκερδῆ· ὅρθως δ' ἐστὶ τούτων ἥγεσθαι φιλοκερδῆ, ὅσ ἂν σπουδάζῃ ἐπὶ τούτοις D καὶ ἄξιοί κερδαίνειν ἀπ' αυτῶν, ἂφ' ὅν οἱ χρηστοὶ οὐ τολμᾶσι κερδαίνειν.

ἐπ. 'Αλλ' ὅρας, ὦ γλυκύτατε, τὸ κερδαίνειν ἄρτι ὁμολογήσαμεν εἴναι ωφελεῖσθαι.

ἐτ. Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο;

ἐπ. 'Οτι καὶ τὸδε αὐτῷ προσωμολογήσαμεν, βουλεύω τὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντας καὶ ἄει.

ἐτ. Ναί.

ἐπ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πάντα τὰ κέρδη βούλονται ἔχειν, εἴπερ ἀγαθὰ γέ ἔστιν.

Ε ἐτ. Οὐκ ἂφ' ὅν γε μέλλουσιν, ὦ Σῶκρατε, βλαβήσεσθαι τῶν κερδῶν.
soc. And is there anything good that you do not love, or must it then be evil?
FR. Upon my word, nothing.
soc. In fact, I expect you love all good things.
FR. Yes.
soc. Well now, ask me on my side whether I do not likewise: for I shall agree with you, for my part, that I love good things. But besides you and me, do you not think that all the rest of mankind love good things, and hate evil things?
FR. It appears so to me.
soc. And we admitted that gain is good?
FR. Yes.
soc. On this new showing, everyone appears to be a lover of gain; whereas, by our former way of arguing, no one was a lover of gain. So on which of the two arguments are we to rely, in order to avoid error?
FR. What has to be done, I think, Socrates, is to conceive the lover of gain rightly. The right view of the lover of gain is that he is one who concerns himself with, and thinks fit to make gain from, things from which honest men do not dare to make gain.
soc. But you see, my sweet sir, we have just admitted that making gain is being benefited.
FR. Well, what of that?
soc. There is the further point we have admitted in addition to this—that all men wish for good things always.
FR. Yes.
soc. Then good men likewise wish to have all gains, if these are good things.
FR. Not those gains from which they are bound, Socrates, to suffer harm.
227 δε λέγεις ζημιώσεσθαι ἡ ἄλλο τι;
ετ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ζημιώσεσθαι λέγω.
ετ. Ὡπὸ τοῦ κέρδους οὖν ζημιοῦνται ἢ ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ἀνθρώπου; Τι τοῦ ἀμφοτέρων καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ζημιοῦνται καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ κέρδους τοῦ πονηροῦ.
ετ. Ἡ δοκεῖ οὖν τί σοι χρηστὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν πράγμα πονηρὸν εἶναι;
ετ. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε.

228 Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογήσαμεν ὅλιγον πρότερον τὸ κέρδος τῇ ζημίᾳ κακῷ ὑπὲρ ἑναντίου εἶναι;
ετ. Ψημί.
ετ. Ἐναντίον δὲ ὃν κακῷ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι;
ετ. Ὁμολογήσαμεν γάρ.
ετ. Ὡρᾶς οὖν, ἐπίχειρεὶς μὲ ἑξαπατᾶν, ἐπίτηδες ἑναντία λέγων οἷς ἁρτὶ ὁμολογήσαμεν.
ετ. Οὐ μὰ Δία, ὥ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑναντίου σὺ μὲ ἑξαπατᾶς καὶ οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεις.

Β οὐ μεντ ἂν καλῶς ποιοῖς, οὐ πειθόμενος ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ σοφῷ.
ετ. Τίν τούτο; καὶ τί μάλιστα;
ετ. Πολίτῃ μὲν ἐμῷ τε καὶ σῷ, Πεισιστράτου δὲ νιεῖ τοῦ ἐκ Φιλαδήων, Ἰππάρχῳ, διὸ τῶν Πεισιστράτου παίδων ἦν πρεσβύτατος καὶ σοφύτατος, διὸ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐργα σοφίας ἀπεδείξατο, καὶ τὰ Ὀμήρου ἐπὶ πρῶτον ἐκόμισεν εἰς τὴν γην ταύτην, καὶ ἠγάκασε τοὺς ραψῳδοὺς Πάναθηναιούς εἰς ὑπολήψεως ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ διενέα, ὡσπερ ἐν ἐγνόμενι οἴδε ποιοῦσι καὶ ἐπ᾽ Ἀνακρέοντα τὸν
soc. By "suffer harm" do you mean "suffer loss," or something else?
FR. No, I mean just "suffer loss."
soc. Well, do men suffer loss from gain or from loss?
FR. From both; for they suffer loss from loss and from wicked gain.
soc. Pray now, do you consider that any useful and good thing is wicked?
FR. I do not.
soc. And we admitted a little while ago that gain is the opposite of loss, which is an evil.
FR. I agree.
soc. And that, being the opposite of an evil, it is good?
FR. That was our admission.
soc. So you see, you are attempting to deceive me, for you deliberately contradict what we agreed to just now.
FR. No, on my honour, Socrates; on the contrary, it is you who are deceiving me, by twisting this way and that so perplexingly in your talk!
soc. Hush, hush! Why, surely it would be wrong of me not to obey a good and wise person.
FR. Who is that? And to what are you referring now?
soc. I mean my and your fellow-citizen, Pisistratus's son Hipparchus, of Philaïdae, who was the eldest and wisest of Pisistratus's sons, and who, among the many goodly proofs of wisdom that he showed, first brought the poems of Homer into this country of ours, and compelled the rhapsodes at the Panathenaea to recite them in relay, one man following on another, as they still do now. He dispatched a fifty-oared
Τῇ ὁν πεντηκόντορον στείλας ἐκόμισεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν. Συμμωνίδην δὲ τὸν Κείον ἄεὶ περὶ αὐτὸν εἶχε, μεγάλους μυσθοίς καὶ δώρους πέθανεν. ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐποίει βουλόμενος παιδεύειν τοὺς πολίτας, ἵνα ως βελτίστων ὄντων αὐτῶν ἄρχοι, οὐκ οἰόμενον δεῖν οὐδεὶς σοφίας φθονεῖν, ἄτε ὧν καλὸς τε κἀκαθός. ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτῷ οἱ περὶ τὸ ἀστυ τῶν πολιτῶν πεπαιδευμένοι ἦσαν καὶ ἐθαύμαζον αὐτὸν ἐπὶ

D σοφία, ἐπιβουλεύων αὐ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἄγροις παιδεύσαντες ἔστησεν αὐτοῖς Ἐρμᾶς κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ ἄστεος καὶ τῶν δῆμων ἐκάστων, κατείπτα τῆς σοφίας τῆς αὐτοῦ, ἢν τ᾽ ἐμαθὲ καὶ ἦν αὐτός ἐξηγοῦν, ἐκλεξάμενος ἡ ἤγείτο σοφώτατα εἶναι, ταῦτα αὐτός ἐντείνας εἰς ἐλεγεῖν αὐτοῦ ποιήματα καὶ ἐπιδείγματα τῆς σοφίας ἐπέγραψεν, ἵνα πρῶτον

Ε μὲν τὰ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμματα τὰ σοφὰ ταῦτα μὴ θαυμάζοιεν οἱ πολίται αὐτοῦ, τὸ τε Γνώθι σαυτόν καὶ τὸ Μηδέν ἀγαν καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὰ Ἰππάρχου ρήματα μᾶλλον σοφὰ ἤγοιντο, ἔπειτα παριώντες ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκοντες καὶ γεύμα λαμβάνοντες αὐτοῦ τῆς σοφίας φρουρεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἄγρων καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παιδευθησόμενοι. ἐστον δὲ δύω τῶν γραμμάτων, ἐμὲν τοῖς ἐπ᾽ ἀριστερά τοῦ Ἐρμοῦ ἐκάστοι τῶν ἐπιγέγραπται λέγων 1 Ἐρμῆς, ὅτι ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ ἄστεος καὶ τοῦ δῆμου ἐστήκειν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπὶ δεξιά

μνήμα τοῦ Ἰππάρχου στείχε δίκαια φρονών φησίν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ ἄλλα ἐν ἄλλοις Ἐρμαῖσ πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπιγεγραμμένα. ἔστι δὲ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῇ Στειριακῇ ὁδῷ, ἐν δὲ λέγει

1 A town on the south-east coast of Attica.
galley for Anacreon of Teos, and brought him into our city. Simonides of Ceos he always had about him, prevailing on him by plenteous fees and gifts. All this he did from a wish to educate the citizens, in order that he might have subjects of the highest excellence; for he thought it not right to grudge wisdom to any, so noble and good was he. And when his people in the city had been educated and were admiring him for his wisdom, he proceeded next, with the design of educating those of the countryside, to set up figures of Hermes for them along the roads in the midst of the city and every district town; and then, after selecting from his own wise lore, both learnt from others and discovered for himself, the things that he considered the wisest, he threw these into elegiac form and inscribed them on the figures as verses of his own and testimonies of his wisdom, so that in the first place his people should not admire those wise Delphic legends of Know thyself and Nothing overmuch, and the other sayings of the sort, but should rather regard as wise the utterances of Hipparchus; and that in the second place, through passing up and down and reading his words and acquiring a taste for his wisdom, they might resort hither from the country for the completion of their education. There are two such inscriptions of his: on the left side of each Hermes there is one in which the god says that he stands in the midst of the city or the township, while on the right side he says:

The memorial of Hipparchus: walk with just intent.

There are many other fine inscriptions from his poems on other figures of Hermes, and this one in particular, on the Steiria road, in which he says:

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μνήμα τὸ δ’ Ἰππάρχου μὴ φίλον ἐξαπάτα.

ἐγὼ οὖν σὲ ἐμοὶ ὄντα φίλον οὐ δήπου τολμῶν ἄν ἐξαπατᾶν καὶ ἐκεῖνῳ τοιούτῳ ὄντι ἀπιστεῖν, οὐ καὶ ἀποθανόντος τρία ἔτη ἐπορευνεύθησαν Ἀθηναίοι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰππίου, καὶ πάντων ἄν τῶν παλαιῶν ἥκουσας, ὅτι ταύτα μόνον τὰ ἔτη τυραννίς ἐγένετο ἐν Ἀθηναῖς, τὸν δ’ ἄλλον χρόνον ἐγγὺς τι ἔξων Ἀθηναίοι ὑσπερ ἐπὶ Κρόνου βασιλεύσοντος. Λέγεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν χαριεστέρων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὁ θάνατος αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι οὐ δι’ ἀ οἱ πολλοὶ ψήθησαν, διὰ τὴν τῆς ἀδελφῆς ἀτμίαν τῆς κανηφορίας, ἐπεὶ τούτῳ γε εὔθες, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν Ἀρμόδιον γεγονέναι παιδικὰ τοῦ Ἀριστογείτων καὶ πεπαιδεύθη ὑπ’ ἐκείνου. μέγα δ’ ἐφρόνει ἄρα καὶ ὁ Ἀριστογείτων ἐπὶ τῷ παιδεύσαι ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ἀνταγωνιστὴν ἥγεστο εἶναι τὸν Ἰππάρχου. ἐν ἐκείνῳ δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ αὐτοῦ τὸν Ἀρμόδιον

tυγχάνειν ἐρῶντα τινος τῶν νέων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ γεναλίων τῶν τότε: καὶ λέγουσι τοῦνομα αὐτοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι· τὸν οὖν νεανίσκον τούτον τέως μὲν θαυμάζεων τὸν τε Ἀρμόδιον καὶ τὸν Ἀριστογείτονα ὡς σοφούς, ἐπειτα συγγενόμενον τῷ Ἰππάρχῳ καταφρονήσαι ἐκείνων, καὶ τοὺς περιαληθεύοντας ταύτη τῇ ἀτμίᾳ οὕτως ἀποκτείναι τὸν Ἰππάρχου.

1 On this point the writer agrees with Thuc. vi. 59, who gives what is now the accepted story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.
HIPPARCUS

The memorial of Hipparchus: deceive not a friend.

I therefore should never dare, I am sure, to deceive you, who are my friend, or disobey the great Hipparchus, after whose death the Athenians were for three years under the despotic rule of his brother Hippias, and you might have heard anyone of the earlier period say that it was only in these years that there was despotism in Athens, and that at all other times the Athenians lived very much as in the reign of Cronos. And the subtler sort of people say that Hipparchus's death was due, not to the cause supposed by most—the disqualification of the assassin's sister from bearing the basket, for that is a silly motive—but because Harmodius had become the favourite of Aristogeit on and had been educated by him. Thus Aristogeit on also prided himself on educating people, and he regarded Hipparchus as a dangerous rival. And at that time, it is said, Harmodius happened to be himself in love with one of the handsome and well-born youths of the day; they do tell his name, but I cannot remember it. Well, for a while this youth admired both Harmodius and Aristogeit on as wise men, but afterwards, when he associated with Hipparchus, he despised them, and they were so overcome with the pain of this “disqualification” that they slew Hipparchus.

² In the Panathenaic procession.

³ This curious version of the fall of the Pisistratid rulers (Hippias and Hipparchus) seeks to explain the conspiracy as due to a rivalry in a sort of pre-Socratic influence over young men which arose between the citizen Aristogeiton and the ruler Hipparchus.
et. Κωνδυνεύεις τούνν, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἢ οὐ
φίλον με ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ, εἰ ἡγῇ φίλον, οὐ πείθεσθαι
Ε Ἰππάρχω. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅπως οὐ σὺ ἔμε ἐξαπατᾶς,
οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ἄντωνα μέντοι τρόπον, ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὐ
δύναμαι πεισθῆναι.

ἐπ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὥσπερ πεπεέων ἔθελω σοι
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀναβέσθαι ὃ τι βουλεῖ τῶν εἰρημένων,
ῖνα μὴ οὐ ή ἐξαπατᾶσθαι. πότερον γὰρ τοῦτο σοι
ἀναθώμαι, ὡς οὐχὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν πάντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν
ἀνθρωποί;

ἐπ. Μή μοι γε.

ἐπ. Ἀλλ᾽ ὅσ τὸ ζημιοῦσθαι καὶ ἡ ζημία οὐ
κακῶν;

ἐπ. Μή μοι γε.

ἐπ. Ἀλλ᾽ ὅσ οὐ τῇ ζημίᾳ καὶ τῷ ζημιοῦσθαι τὸ
κέρδος καὶ τὸ κερδαίνειν ἕναντίον;

230 ἐπ. Μηδὲ τοῦτο.

ἐπ. Ἀλλ᾽ ὅσ ἕναντίον ὅν τῷ κακῷ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν
ἐστὶ τὸ κερδαίνειν;

ἐπ. Οὐτί πάν γε· τούτι μοι ἀνάθουν.

ἐπ. Δοκεὶ ἀρα σοι, ὡς ἐσικε, τοῦ κέρδους τὸ μέν
τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τι κακὸν.

ἐπ. ἐμοιγε.

ἐπ. Ἀνατίθεμαι τοίνυν σοὶ τοῦτο· ἔστω γὰρ ἡ
κέρδος τι ἀγαθόν καὶ ἑτέρων κέρδος τι κακὸν·
κέρδος δὲ γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν
ἡ τὸ κακὸν· ἡ γὰρ;

ἐπ. Πῶς με ἑρωτάς;

ἐπ. Ἐγὼ φράσω. σιτίον ἔστι τι ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ
κακὸν;

Β ἐπ. Ναί.

ἐπ. Ἀρ᾽ οὖν μᾶλλον τι αὐτῶν ἔστι τὸ ἑτέρων τοῦ
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FR. It would seem, then, Socrates, either that you do not regard me as your friend, or if you do, that you do not obey Hipparchus. For that you are not deceiving me—though I cannot tell how you contrive it—in your talk, is more than I can believe.

soc. Well now, as though we were playing draughts, I am willing to let you revoke, as you please, anything you have said in carrying on the discussion, in order that you may not think you are being deceived. So tell me, shall I revoke for you the statement that all men desire good things?

FR. No, thank you.

soc. Well, that suffering loss, or loss, is an evil?

FR. No, thank you.

soc. Well, that gain, or making gain, is the opposite of loss, or suffering loss?

FR. Nor that either.

soc. Well, that making gain, as the opposite of evil, is a good?

FR. No, not in every case: let me revoke this one.

soc. You think, then, it seems, that some gain is good, and some evil.

FR. I do.

soc. Well then, I revoke so much for you; so let us assume that some gain is good, and some other gain evil. But the good sort is no more gain than the evil sort, is it?

FR. What do you mean by this question?

soc. I will explain. Is there both good and evil food?

FR. Yes.

soc. And is the one sort more food than the other,
έτερον σιτίων, ἣ ὁμοίως τούτό γε, σιτία, ἐστὸν ἀμφότερα καὶ ταύτη γε οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὸ ἐτέρον τοῦ ἐτέρου, κατὰ τὸ σιτίων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἤ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν;

ἐτ. Ναι.

συ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ποτὸν καὶ τὰλλα πάντα, ὅσα τῶν ὄντων ταύτα ὃντα τὰ μὲν πέποθθὲν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κακὰ, οὐδὲν ἐκεῖνη γε διαφέρει τὸ ἐτέρον τοῦ ἐτέρου, ἤ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστιν; ὦσπερ ζ ἄνθρωπος δήπον ὁ μὲν χρηστὸς ἔστιν, ὁ δὲ πονηρός.

ἐτ. Ναι.

συ. Ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπός γε, οἴμαι, οὐδέτερος οὐδέτερος οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἤττον ἔστιν, οὔτε ὁ χρηστὸς τοῦ πονηροῦ οὔτε ὁ πονηρὸς τοῦ χρηστοῦ.

ἐτ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

συ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ κέρδους διανοώ-μεθα, ὡς κέρδος γε ὁμοίως ἔστι καὶ τὸ πονηρὸν καὶ τὸ χρηστὸν;

ἐτ. Ἀνάγκη.

συ. Οὐδὲν ἀρα μᾶλλον κερδαίνει ὁ τὸ χρηστὸν κέρδος ἔχων ἢ τὸ πονηρὸν. οὐκοῦν μᾶλλον γε η κέρδος φαίνεται οὐδέτερον ὁν, ὡς ὁμολογοῦμεν.

ἐτ. Ναι.

συ. Οὐδέτερω γὰρ αὐτῶν οὔτε τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτε τὸ ἤττον πρόσεστιν.

ἐτ. Ὁ γὰρ δὴ.

συ. Τῷ δὴ τοιούτῳ πράγματι πῶς ἄν τις μᾶλλον ἤ ἤττον ὁτιοῦ ἄν ποιοὶ ἢ πάσχοι, ὁ μυθέτερον τοῖτων προσείη;

ἐτ. Ἀδύνατον.

συ. Ἐπειδῆ τοῖνυν κέρδη μὲν ὁμοίως ἔστιν ἀμφότερα καὶ κερδαλέα, τούτι δὴ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ-296
HIPPARCHUS

or are they both similarly this same thing, food, and in this respect does the one differ no wise from the other, in being food, but only in the fact of the one being good and the other evil?

FR. Yes.

soc. And so with drink and every other class of things that exist, when some things in any class come to be good, and others evil, one thing does not differ from another in that respect whereby they are the same? For instance, one man, I suppose, is virtuous, and another wicked.

FR. Yes.

soc. But neither of them, I conceive, is more or less man than the other—neither the virtuous than the wicked, nor the wicked than the virtuous.

FR. What you say is true.

soc. Then are we to take the same view of gain also, that both the wicked and the virtuous sort are similarly gain?

FR. Necessarily.

soc. So he who has virtuous gain is no whit the more a gainer than he who has wicked gain: neither sort is found to be more gain, as we agree.

FR. Yes.

soc. For neither of them has addition of either more or less.

FR. No, indeed.

soc. And how could one do or suffer anything more or less with a thing of this sort, that had neither of these additions?

FR. Impossible.

soc. Since, therefore, both of these are gains and gain-making affairs, we must now consider what it
PLATO

σκέψασθαι, διὰ τί ποτὲ ἀμφότερα αὕτα κέρδος
Ε' καλεῖς, τί ταῦτον ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὅρων; ὡσπερ ἄν
εἴ [ἐδ]1 σὺ μὲ ἡρώτας τὰ νῦν δὴ, διὰ τί ποτε καὶ τὸ
ἀγαθὸν συτίον καὶ τὸ κακὸν συτίον ὀμοίως ἀμφότερα
συτία καλῶ, εἶπον ἄν σοι, διότι ἀμφότερα ξηρὰ
tροφῇ σώματός ἐστι, διὰ τοῦτο ἔγνωγε· τοῦτο γὰρ
ἐναι συτίον κἂν σὺ ποι ἡμῖν ὁμολογοῖς. ἢ γὰρ;
et. "Ἐγνωγε.

ζην. Καὶ περὶ ποτόν οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς ἄν τρόπος εἴη
tῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ὅτι τῆ τοῦ σώματος ύγρᾶ τροφῆ,
231 ἐάν τε χρηστῇ ἐάν τε πονηρᾶ ἦ, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα
ἐστὶ, ποτὸν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁσαύτως. πειρᾶ ὦν
καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ μμειθαί oὔτως ἀποκρινόμενον. τὸ
χρηστὸν κέρδος καὶ τὸ πονηρὸν κέρδος κέρδος φῆς
ἀμφότερον εἶναι τὸ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὅρων, ὅτι
δὴ καὶ τοῦτο κέρδος ἐστίν; εἰ δ' αὖ μὴ αὐτὸς
ἐχει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἄλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει,
ἀρα κέρδος λέγεις πάν κτήμα, ὃ ἄν τις κτήσῃ τα
ἱ μηδὲν ἀναλώσας, ἥ ἐλαττὸν ἀναλώσας πλέον
λάβῃ;

Β et. "Εμοιγε δοκῶ τοῦτο καλεῖν κέρδος.
ζην. Ἀρα καὶ τὰ τοιάδε λέγεις, ἐάν τις ἐστιαθεῖς,
μηδὲν ἀναλώσας ἄλλ' εὐωχθεῖς, νόσον κτήσῃ τα;
et. Μᾶ Δι' οὐκ ἔγνωγε.
ζην. 'Υγίειαν δὲ κτησάμενος ἀπὸ ἐστιάσεως
κέρδος ἂν κτήσαι τῇ ζημίᾳ;
et. Κέρδος.
ζην. Όὐκ ἄρα τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶ κέρδος, τὸ ὀτιόν
κτήμα κτήσασθαι.
et. Οὐ μέντοι.

1 a del. Schleiermacher.
HIPPARCHUS

can be that leads you to call both of them gain: what is it that you see to be the same in both? Suppose you were to ask me, in those instances that I gave just now, what it is that leads me to call both good food and evil food alike food, I should tell you—for this reason, because both are a dry sustenance of the body. For that, I am sure you would agree, is what food is, would you not?

FR. I would.

soc. And so too about drink the answer would be on the same lines, that the wet sustenance of the body, whether it be wholesome or pernicious, has this name of drink; and likewise with the rest. Try therefore on your part to imitate my method of answering. When you say that virtuous gain and wicked gain are both gain, what is it that you see to be the same in them, judging it to be the actual element of gain? And if again you are yourself unable to answer, just let me put it for your consideration, whether you describe as gain every acquisition that one has acquired either with no expense, or as a profit over and above one’s expense.

FR. I believe that is what I call gain.

soc. Do you include a case where, after enjoying a banquet at which one has had much good cheer without any expense, one acquires an illness?

FR. Upon my word, not I.

soc. And if one acquired health from attending a banquet, would one acquire gain or loss?

FR. Gain.

soc. Hence gain is not just acquiring any acquisition.

FR. No, indeed.
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ση. Πότερον οὖν, ἐὰν κακὸν; ἃ οὖδ᾽ ἀν ἀγαθὸν
diuiον κτῆσεται, οὐ κέρδος κτῆσεται;
et. Φαίνεται, ἐὰν γε ἀγαθὸν.
C ση. 'Εὰν δὲ κακὸν, οὐ ζημίαν κτῆσεται;
et. 'Εμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ση. Ὁρᾶς οὖν, ὡς πάλιν αὖ περιτρέχεις εἰς τὸ
αὐτό; τὸ μὲν κέρδος ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται, ἢ δὲ ζημία
κακὸν.
et. Ἀπορῶ ἐγώγε ὁ τι εἴπω.
ση. Οὐκ ἄδικως γε σὺ ἀπορῶν. ἔτι γὰρ καὶ
tὸδε ἀπόκρων. ἐὰν τις ἐλαττῶν ἀναλώσας πλέον
κτῆσεται, φής κέρδος εἶναι;
et. Οὔτι κακὸν γε λέγω, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν χρυσίων ἢ
ἀργύριον ἐλαττῶν ἀναλώσας πλέον λάβῃ.
ση. Καὶ ἐγὼ μέλλω τοῦτο ἐρήσεσθαι. φέρε
D γάρ, ἐὰν τις χρυσίου σταθμὸν ἡμιος ἀναλώσας
diπλάσιον λάβῃ ἀργυρίου, κέρδος ἢ ζημίαν εἴληφεν;
et. Ζημίαν δὴπου, ὡς Σωκρατείς· ἀντὶ δωδεκα-
stασίου γὰρ διος τίς στασιάκας αὐτὸ καθίσταται τὸ
χρυσίον.
ση. Καὶ μὴν πλέον γ᾽ εἴληφεν; ἢ οὐ πλέον ἐστὶ τὸ
diπλάσιον τοῦ ἡμίσεως;
et. Οὔτι τῇ ἄξιᾳ γε ἄργυριον χρυσίου.
ση. Δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔθικε, τῷ κέρδει τοῦτο προσεῖναι,
tῇ ἄξιαν. νῦν γοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀργύριον πλέον ὃν τοῦ
χρυσίου οὐ φής ἄξιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ χρυσίον ἐλαττῶν
ὁν ἄξιον φῆς εἶναι.
E et. Σφόδρα· ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως.
ση. Τὸ μὲν ἄξιον ἄρα κερδαλέον ἐστίν, ἐὰν
τε σμικρὸν ἢ ἐὰν τε μέγα, τὸ δὲ ἀνάξιον ἀκερδές.
et. Ναῖ.
soc. Do you mean, not if it is evil? Or will one acquire no gain even if one acquires something good?

FR. Apparently one will, if it is good.

soc. And if it is evil, will not one acquire loss?

FR. I think so.

soc. You see, then, how you are running round again to the same old point? Gain is found to be good, and loss evil.

FR. For my part, I cannot tell what to say.

soc. And not without good reason, sir. Now answer this further question: you say that if one acquires more than the amount one has spent, it is gain?

FR. I do not mean, when it is evil, but if one gets more gold or silver than one has spent.

soc. Now, I am just going to ask you about that. Tell me, if one spends half a pound of gold and gets double that weight in silver, has one got gain or loss?

FR. Loss, I presume, Socrates: for one's gold is reduced to twice, instead of twelve times, the value of silver.

soc. But you see, one has got more; or is double not more than half?

FR. Not in worth, the one being silver and the other gold.

soc. So gain, it seems, must have this addition of worth. At least, you now say that silver, though more than gold, is not worth as much, and that gold, though less, is of equal worth.

FR. Assuredly, for that is the case.

soc. Then the valuable is what produces gain, whether it be small or great, and the valueless produces no gain.

FR. Yes.
σημ. Τὸ δὲ ἄξιον λέγεις ἄξιον εἶναι ἂλλο τι ἡ κεκτήσθαι;
ετ. Ναι, κεκτήσθαι.
σημ. Τὸ δὲ ἄξιον αὐτὸ λέγεις κεκτήσθαι τὸ ἀνωφέλες ἡ τὸ ὑφέλιμον;
ετ. Τὸ ὑφέλιμον δῆπος.
σημ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ὑφέλιμον ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν;
ετ. Ναι.
232 σημ. Οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἀνδρείωτατε πάντων, οὐ τὸ κερδαλέον ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ πάλιν τρίτον ἡ τέταρτον ἦκε ἡμῖν ὁμολογούμενον;
ετ. "Εὐκής.
σημ. Μην μονεύεις οὖν, ὅθεν ἡμῖν οὖτος ὁ λόγος γέγονεν;
ετ. Οἶμαι γε.
σημ. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἐγὼ σε ὑπομνήσω. ἡμιφισβήτησάς μοι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς μὴ πάντα τὰ κέρδη βουλέσθαι κερδαίνειν, ἄλλα τῶν κερδῶν τάγαθά, τὰ δὲ πονηρὰ μή.
ετ. Ναίχι.
B σημ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν πάντα τὰ κέρδη ὁ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἡνάγκακε καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι;
ετ. 'Ἡνάγκακε γάρ, ὥς Σωκράτης, μάλλον ἐμέ γε ἢ πέπεικεν.
σημ. 'Αλλ᾽ ἵσως μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ πείσειν ἄν νῦν δ᾽ οὖν, εἰτε πέπεισαι εἰτε ὅπωσδή ἔχεις, σύμφης γοῦν ἡμῖν πάντα τὰ κέρδη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, καὶ σμικρά καὶ μεγάλα.
ετ. 'Ὅμολογῶ γάρ οὖν.
σημ. Τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς ἀνθρώπους βούλεσθαι τά- γαθὰ ὁμολογεῖς ἀπαντα ἀπαντᾶσα ἦ οὖ;
soc. And by the valuable you mean simply, valuable to possess?

FR. Yes, to possess.

soc. And again, by what is valuable to possess, do you mean the unprofitable or the profitable?

FR. The profitable, I presume.

soc. And the profitable is good?

FR. Yes.

soc. And so, most valiant of men, have we not here once more, for the third or fourth time, the admission that what produces gain is good?

FR. So it seems.

soc. Then do you remember the point from which this discussion of ours arose?

FR. I think I do.

soc. In case you do not, I will remind you. You maintained against me that good men do not wish to make all sorts of gain, but only those gains that are good, and not those that are wicked.

FR. Yes.

soc. And now the argument has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains, both small and great, are good?

FR. Yes, it has compelled me, at least, Socrates, rather than persuaded me.

soc. Well, later on, perhaps, it might also persuade you. Now, however, whether you are persuaded or whatever is your feeling, you at least agree with me that all gains are good, both small and great ones.

FR. Yes, I do admit it.

soc. And you admit that virtuous men all wish for all good things, do you not?
'Ομολογῶ.

οτύς γε πονηροὺς αὐτὸς εἶπες ὅτι καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα κέρδη φιλοῦσιν.

Εἰπὼν.

ὁκοῦν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον πάντες ἄνθρωποι φιλοκερδεῖς ἄν εἶεν, καὶ οἱ χρηστοὶ καὶ οἱ πονηροὶ.

Φαίνεται.

οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ὀνειδίζει, εἰ τίς τῶν ὀνειδίζει φιλοκερδεῖ εἶναι. τυγχάνει γὰρ καὶ ὁ ταύτα ὀνειδίζων αὐτὸς τουτοῦ ὅν.

1 αὐτὸς Bekker: αὐτοῦς MSS.
FR. I do.

soc. But, you know, you stated yourself that wicked men love both small and great gains.

FR. I did.

soc. And so, by your account, all men will be lovers of gain, whether they be virtuous or wicked.

FR. Apparently.

soc. Hence it is not right to reproach anybody with being a lover of gain: for he who makes this reproach is actually such an one himself.
THE LOVERS
The conversation here related by Socrates takes place in a school, where a number of boys and young men of good birth and looks have come to take the regular courses of reading, writing, recitation, and arithmetic, and to acquire the elements of geometry and astronomy. The scene in the school is swiftly and vividly described. Socrates soon finds himself talking with two young men of opposite character and training: like Amphion and Zethus in Euripides' Antiope (referred to in the Gorgias, 485-6), they have given their time, one to the humane studies of music, literature and rational debate (all of which were embraced by the Greeks under the general term "music"); and the other, who has turned his back on these refinements, to athletic exercise and prowess. Their antagonism is further sharpened by the fact that they are both ardent admirers of one of a pair of boys or striplings, who have been earnestly disputing over some astronomical theory, but who now turn their attention to the debate between Socrates and the two lovers.

Socrates raises the question of philosophy, which has been suggested by the sight of the two young astronomers. The athletic lover, of course, feels nothing but contempt for it; but his literary rival cannot commend it too highly, and describes it as
the lifelong acquisition of fresh knowledge (133 c). But if "much learning" is the meaning of philosophy, we must consider how much learning is good for us: we find, for instance, that a moderate or measured amount of exercise and food is best in athletics; and it would seem that a certain moderation in learning will be best for the soul (134 d, e). The trainer and the doctor will give us the right measure of exercise and food for a good condition of body, but who will fix it for the acquirements of the soul? This important question is left unanswered. But if we cannot tell exactly how much, let us see if we can say what the philosopher ought to learn. The youth suggests that he should learn just so much of each art or craft as will enable him, through his intelligent grasp of what is done in each, to impress people with his knowledge and cleverness (135 d). Socrates objects that, on this view, the philosopher will be like an all-round athlete who may be able to beat ordinary athletes, but must be only second-best when matched with anyone who specializes in one sort of contest. As the youth adheres to his statement, Socrates points out that a second-rate person must be useless and mischievous in any emergency, so long as a specialist is available (136 c). In fact, the philosopher must be something quite different from that (137 b).

At this point Socrates, rather abruptly, turns the talk on to the subject of right and wrong, with especial reference to the judge or governor who has to decide between them (137 d). The skill required for such decisions is the highest that we know of: it is the true state-craft, which should combine knowledge of human nature and of oneself,
"temperance" or reasoned self-control, and justice. Is the philosopher to be only second-rate, and so practically useless, in the all-important business of applying these arts or powers? Or is he, above all others, to undertake such work himself, as being his peculiar business? The youth agrees that he must; and Socrates ends by saying that philosophy is something quite different from erudition and theoretical knowledge of the arts.

The little drama of the dialogue is well conceived and conducted. From the pleasant scene of life in the fashionable school we pass to the contrast between the arrogant young votary of letters and the simple-minded sportsman, who has the amusement of seeing his disdainful rival humbled by the elucidating questions of Socrates. The easy grace of the narrative reminds one of the Charmides and the Lysis; and the search for the true content and meaning of philosophy might well be a resumption of the remark on the various learning of the sophist Hippias in the Protagoras (318 e). Conformably with Plato's early manner, the important question of the due measure in learning, as in all else, is just stated clearly, and then left for future investigation. The interesting conception of the philosopher as something like our newspaper critic, and indeed as little more than a smatterer in the arts, arose naturally from the distaste felt by the best Greek society for manual labour, and from the high value set on frequent and acute discussion of everything under the sun. The Athenians especially, as Thucydides tells us through the mouth of Pericles, believed in the utility of rational debate for the life of an enterprising people; and Socrates is hardly fair to the sophists, or to him-
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self, when he classes the man who cultivates this ability as useless. But his hasty condemnation of the ordinary critical observer is explained when we reach the concluding section. "Yes," we seem to be told, "philosophy is a kind of criticism or discrimination, but not the petty, meddling kind that you suppose. The philosopher must be supreme in a special sphere of his own, where he will be the one authority on good and evil, right and wrong."

The sudden, impatient manner in which this glimpse of the philosopher is given, and the guise in which he is shown, are not unplatonie: yet, apart from certain details of language, this last section has a clumsy abruptness which suggests that the whole piece may be the work of a skilful imitator, who is successful enough with the dramatic narrative, but cannot rise to the higher levels of Plato's thought and art; and it is to be noted that here the important work of distinguishing the true from the false is not included in the philosopher's business. We should have expected Plato to have either concealed the gaps and loose ends with some more playfulness, or to have more ably connected and sustained his treatment of so high and intimate a theme.
ΕΡΑΣΤΑΙ

[Ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ· ΗΘΙΚΟΣ]

St. I Εἰς Διονυσίου τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ εἰσήλθον, καὶ εἶδον αὐτόθι τῶν τε νέων τοὺς ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ πατέρων εὐδοκίμων, καὶ τούτων ἐραστάς. ἐπαγχανέτην οὖν δύο τῶν μειρακίων ἐρίζοντε, περὶ ὅστιν δέ, οὐ σφόδρα κατήκουν: ἐφαινόθην μέντοι ἢ περὶ Ἄναξαγόρου ἢ περὶ Οἰνοπίδου ἐρίζειν· κύκλους γοῦν γράφειν Β ἐφαινόθην καὶ ἐγκλίσεις τινὰς ἐμμοῦντο τοῖς χερῶν ἐπικλίνοντε καὶ μᾶλ' ἐσπουδακότε. καγώ—καθήμην γὰρ παρὰ τὸν ἔραστὴν τοῦ ἐτέρου αὐτῶν—κυνήσας οὖν αὐτὸν τῷ ἀγκώνι ἠρώμην, ὅ τι πολ' οὕτως ἐσπουδακότε τῷ μειρακίῳ εἶτην, καὶ εἶπον: 'Ἡ ποὺ μέγα τι καὶ καλὸν ἔστι, περὶ δο τοσαύτην σπουδὴν πεποιημένω ἐστὸν;

'Ὁ δ' εἴπε, Ποῖον, ἕφη, μέγα καὶ καλὸν; ἀδο-

λεσχοῦσι μὲν οὖν οὕτοι γε περὶ τῶν μετεώρων καὶ

φλυαροῦσι φιλοσοφοῦντες.

C Καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἰπον.

1 The Ionian philosopher who lived in friendship with Pericles at Athens.

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I entered the grammar school of the teacher Dionysius, and saw there the young men who are accounted the most comely in form and of distinguished family, and their lovers. Now it chanced that two of the young people were disputing, but about what, I did not clearly overhear: it appeared, however, that they were disputing either about Anaxagoras or about Oenopides; at any rate, they appeared to be drawing circles, and they were imitating certain inclinations with their arms, bending to it and taking it most earnestly. Then I—for I was sitting beside the lover of one of the pair—nudged him with my elbow and asked him what on earth the two youngsters were so earnest about, and I said: Is it then something great and fine, in which they are so earnestly immersed?

Great and fine, indeed! he replied: why, these fellows are prating about the heavenly bodies, and babbling philosophy.

Then I, surprised at his answer, said: Young man,

1 A philosopher of Chios, distinguished as a geometer and astronomer.
2 i.e. the slopes of the contours of the earth, and of the apparent course of the sun (ecliptic).
Ω νεανία, αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν; ἢ τί οὕτως χαλεπῶς λέγεις;

Καὶ ὁ ἐτερος—πλησίον γὰρ καθήμενος ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῦ, ἀντεραστὴς ὡν—ἀκούσας ἐμὸν τε ἐρομένου κάκεινου ἀποκρυμμένου, Οὐ πρὸς σοῦ γε, ἔφη, ὧ
Σώκρατες, ποιεῖς τὸ καὶ ἀνερέσθαι τοῦτον, εἰ αἰ-
σχρὸν ἤγείται φιλοσοφίαν εἶναι. ἢ οὐκ οἴσθα τοῦτον,
ὅτι τραχηλιζόμενος καὶ ἐμπυλάμενος καὶ καθ-
εύδων πάντα τὸν βίον διατετέλεκεν; ἢστε σὰ τί
αὐτὸν ὕστο ἀποκρυνεῖσθαι ἄλλη ἢ ὦτι αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ
φιλοσοφία;

D Ἡν δὲ οὕτος μὲν τοὺς ἐρασταῖς περὶ μουσικῆν
διατετριφῶς, ὁ δὲ ἐτερος, ὅν ἐλοιδόρει, περὶ γυμ-
ναστικῆν. καὶ μοι ἔδοξε χρῆναι τὸν μὲν ἐτερον
ἀφιέναι, τὸν ἐρωτώμενον, ὃτι οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς προσ-
εποιεῖτο περὶ λόγων ἐμπειρος εἶναι ἄλλα περὶ ἔργων,
τὸν δὲ σοφότερον προςποιούμενον εἶναι διερωτήσαι,
ἰνα καὶ εἰ τι δυναίμην παρ᾽ αὐτὸν ὠφεληθείνῃ.
ἐλπὸν οὖν ὦτι Εἰς κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἐρώτημα ἥρόμην;
εἰ δὲ σὺ οἴει τοῦτο κάλλιον ἃν ἀποκρύνασθαι, σὲ
ἐρωτῶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὀπερ καὶ τοῦτον, εἰ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ
φιλοσοφεῖν καλὸν εἶναι ἡ οὐ.

133 Σχεδὸν οὖν ταῦτα λεγόντων ἡμῶν ἐπακούσατε
τῷ μειράκιῳ ἐσιγνήσατην, καὶ αὐτῶ πανσαμένῳ
τῆς ἐριδος ἡμῶν ἀκροαταὶ ἐγενέσθην. καὶ ὁ τι μὲν
οἶ ἐρασταὶ ἐπαθὼν, οὐκ οἶδα, αὐτὸς δ᾽ οὐν ἐξ-
επλάγην· ἀεὶ γὰρ ποτὲ ὑπὸ τῶν νέων τε καὶ καλῶν
ἐκπλήττομαι. ἐδόκει μέντοι μοι καὶ ὁ ἐτερος οὐχ

1 ἐρωτώμενον Schleiermacher: ἐρώμενον mss.
do you consider philosophizing to be shameful? Else, why do you speak so sharply?

Then the other youth—for he chanced to be sitting near him, as his rival in love—when he heard my question and his rival’s answer, said: You do yourself no good, Socrates, by pressing this fellow with a further question, as to whether he considers philosophizing to be shameful. Do you not know that he has spent the whole of his life in practising the neckhold, and stuffing himself, and sleeping? So why did you suppose he would make any other reply than that philosophy is shameful?

Now this one of the two lovers had spent his time on humane studies, whereas the other, whom he was abusing, had spent his on athletics. So I decided that I had best relinquish the other, whom I had been questioning, since he did not even himself set up to be experienced in words, but only in deeds; and that I should interrogate the one who set up to be wiser, in order that so far as I was able I might get some benefit from him. I said therefore: I addressed my question to both in common; but if you think you could answer more creditably than he, I put the same question to you as I did to him: do you consider philosophizing to be honourable or not?

Then the two striplings, overhearing us speak somewhat like this, were silent, and ceasing from their own contention they became listeners to ours. What their lovers’ sensations were, I do not know, but I myself, at any rate, was staggered; for every time I am staggered by handsome young people. It seemed to me, however, that my young friend too

1 Literally, “on music,” which with the Greeks included poetry and general literature as well as music.
Ηππον ἐμοὶ ἀγωνιάν· οὔ μήν ἄλλ' ἀπεκρίνατό γε μοι καὶ μάλα φιλοτίμως. Ὅποτε γάρ τοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν αἰσχρόν ἡγησαίμην εἶναι, οὔδ' ἂν ἄνθρωπον νομίσαμι ἐμαυτὸν εἶναι,

Β οὐδ' ἄλλον τὸν οὕτω διακείμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενος εἰς τὸν ἀντεραστήν, καὶ λέγων μεγάλη τῇ φωνῇ, ἣν αὐτοῦ κατακούοι τὰ παιδικά.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπον, Καλὸν ἄρα δοκεῖ σοι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν, ἐγὼ ἔφην· ἦ δοκεῖ σοι οἶδον τε εἶναι εἰδέναι πράγμα ὅτι οὖν εἰτε καλὸν εἰτε αἰσχρὸν ἐστιν, ὦ μή εἰδεὶς τις τὴν ἄρχην ὃ τι ἐστιν;

Οὐκ ἔφη.

C Οἷσθ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ τι ἐστι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν;

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν ἐστιν; ἔφην ἐγώ.

Τί δ' ἄλλο γε, ἥ κατὰ τὸ Σόλωνος; Σόλων γάρ που εἴπε

γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος:

καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως αἰεὶ χρηναί ἐν γε τι μανθάνειν τὸν μέλλοντα φιλοσοφήσειν, καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα καὶ πρεσβύτερον, ἰν' ὡς πλείστα ἐν τῷ βίῳ μάθη, καὶ μοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔδοξε τὶ εἰπεῖν, ἐπειτὰ πὼς ἐννοήσας ἡρόμην αὐτόν, εἰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν πολυμαθίαν ἡγοῦτο εἶναι.

D Κακείως, Πάνυ, ἔφη.

'Ἡγῇ δὲ δὴ καλὸν εἶναι μόνον τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἥλι καὶ ἀγαθόν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἔφη, πάνυ.
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was in as great a flutter as myself; but nevertheless he answered me in a most ambitious spirit: Why, of course, Socrates, he said, if I should ever consider philosophizing to be shameful, I should not account myself so much as a man, nor anyone else either who was disposed to think so. Here he pointed to his rival lover, and spoke with a loud voice, in order that his favourite might hear every word.

Then I remarked: So philosophizing seems to you to be honourable?

Quite so, he said.

Well now, I said; does it seem to you possible to know whether anything is honourable or shameful without knowing what it is fundamentally?

No, he said.

Then do you know, I went on, what philosophizing is?

Certainly I do, said he.

Then what is it? I asked.

Why, just what Solon called it; you know it was Solon who said:

And ever, as I older grow, I learn yet more and more;— and I agree with him that a man who intends to philosophize should in this way be ever learning something or other, whether he be younger or older, in order that he may learn as many things as possible in his life. Now at first I felt there was something in his reply, but then, on second thoughts, I asked him whether he considered philosophy to be much learning.

To which he answered: Certainly.

And do you consider philosophy to be merely honourable, I asked, or good as well?

Good as well, he said: very much so.

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Πότερον οὖν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τι τόπτο ἔδιον ἐνορᾶς, ἡ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὕτω σου δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἷον φιλογυμναστίαν οὐ μόνον ἡγή καλὸν εἶναι, ἄλλα καὶ ἀγαθόν; ἡ οὖ; 'Ο δὲ καὶ μάλα εἰρωνικῶς ἐφη δύνο. Πρὸς μὲν τόνδε μοι εἰρήσθω, ὅτι οὐδέτερα: πρὸς δὲ σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑμολογῶ καὶ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθόν.

Ε ἡγούμαι γὰρ ὁρθῶς.

Ἡρώτησα οὖν ἐγώ, Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς γυμνα-
σίοις τὴν πολυποίκιαν φιλογυμναστίαν ἡγή εἶναι;

Κάκεϊνος ἐφη, Πάνυ γε, ὅσπερ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ
φιλοσοφεῖν τὴν πολυμαθίαν φιλοσοφίαν ἡγούμαι

εἶναι.

Κάγω εἶπον, 'Ἡγή δὲ δὴ τοὺς φιλογυμναστοῦντας ἄλλον τοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν ἡ τοῦτο, δ' ὅτι ποιήσει αὐτοῦς
eῦ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα;

Τούτον, ἐφη.

'Ἡ οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι τὸ σῶμα, ἥν δ' ἐγώ,
ποιοῦσιν εῦ ἔχειν;

134 Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἐφη, ἀπὸ γε ὀλίγων πόνων τὸ
σῶμα τις εὖ ἔχοι;

Καὶ μοι ἔδοξεν ἢδη ἐνταῦθα κινητέος εἶναι ὁ
φιλογυμναστὴς, ἵνα μοι βοηθήσῃ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν

τῆς γυμναστικῆς: κἀπεῖτα ἡρμῆν αὐτὸν, Σὺ δὲ
dη τι συγὰς ἡμῖν, ὦ λώστε, τούτου ταῦτα λέγοντος;

ἡ καὶ σοὶ δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ εὗ τὰ σώματα

ἔχειν ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν πόνων, ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν μετρίων;

'Εγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐφη, ὡμην τὸ λεγόμενον

Β δὴ τοῦτο κἂν ὑνι γνώναι, ὅτι οἱ μέτριοι πόνοι εὗ

ποιοῦσιν ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, πόθεν δὴ οὔχι ἄνδρα

γε ἀγρυπνῶν τε καὶ ἀσιτον καὶ ἀτριβή τὸν τράχηλον

κὰν ὑν Hermann: καὶ νῦν mss.
Then do you observe this as peculiar to philosophy, or do you find it similarly in everything else? For example, do you consider the love of athletics to be not merely honourable, but good as well, or do you not?

Whereupon he, most slyly, gave a double answer: To him my statement must be "neither"; but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both honourable and good: for I consider this the right view.

Then I asked him: Well now, in athletics, do you consider that much exercise is love of athletics?

To which he replied: Certainly, just as in philosophizing I consider much learning to be philosophy.

Then I said: And do you then consider that the lovers of athletics desire anything else than that which will cause them to be in good bodily condition?

Only that, he replied. And does much exercise, I asked, cause them to be in good bodily condition?

Yes, for how, he replied, could one be in good bodily condition through little exercise?

Here I felt it was time to stir up the lover of athletics, in order that he might give me the support of his athletic experience; so I proceeded to ask him: And you then, pray, why are you silent, excellent sir, while your friend here is speaking thus? Do you agree that men are in good bodily condition through much exercise, or is it rather through moderate exercise?

For my part, Socrates, he said, I thought even a pig—as the saying is—would have known that moderate exercise causes them to be in good bodily condition, so why should not a fellow who is sleepless and
έχοντα καὶ λεπτον ύπο μεριμνῶν; καὶ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα εἰπόντος ἦσθη τὰ μειράκια καὶ ἐπεγέλασεν, ὁ δὲ ἔτερος ἤρυθρίασε.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Τί οὖν; σὺ ζῆδη συγχωρεῖς μήτε πολλοὺς μήτε ὀλίγους πόνους εὖ ποιεῖν ἔχειν τὰ σῶματα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μετρίους; ἦ διαμάχη δυοίν ὄντοι νῦν περὶ τοῦ λόγου;

Κάκεινος, Πρὸς μὲν τούτον, ἐφη, κἂν πάνιν ἤδεως διαγωνισάμην, καὶ εὐ ὁδί ὅτι ἰκανὸς ἂν γενοῖμην βοηθήσαι τῇ ὑποθέσει, ἢν ὑπεθέμην, καὶ εἰ ταύτης ἐτί φαυλοτέραν ὑπεθέμην· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν πρὸς μέντοι σὲ οὐδὲν δέομαι παρὰ δόξαν φιλονικεῖν, ἀλλ᾿ ὁμολογῶ μη τὰ πολλὰ ἀλλὰ τὰ μέτρια γυμνάσια τὴν εὐεξίαν ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Τί δὲ τὰ συτία; τὰ μέτρια ἦ τὰ πολλὰ; ἐφην ἐγὼ.

Καὶ τὰ συτία ὁμολογεῖ.

"Ετι δὲ κἀγὼ προσηνάγκαζον αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν καὶ τὰλλα πάντα τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὡφελιμῶτατα εἰναι τὰ μέτρια, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ μηδὲ τὰ ὀλίγα· καὶ μοι ὁμολογεῖ τὰ μέτρια.

Τί δὲ, ἐφην, τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν; τὰ μέτρια ὡφελεί ἦ τὰ ἁμετρα τῶν προσφερομένων;

Τὰ μέτρια, ἐφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἐν τῶν προσφερομένων ψυχῇ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ μαθήματα.

'Ωμολογεῖ.

Καὶ τούτων ἀρα τὰ μέτρια ὡφελεί, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰ πολλά;

Συνέφη.
unfed, with unchafed neck and slender, care-worn frame! And when he had said this the boys were delighted and laughed their approval, while the other lover blushed.

Then I said to him: Well, do you now concede that it is neither much, nor little, but moderate exercise that causes men to be in good bodily condition? Or do you bid defiance to the two of us on this point?

To which he answered: Against him I should be only too glad to fight it out, and I am certain I should prove able to support the theory I have put forward, even had I put forward a weaker one; for he is naught. But with you I do not aim at winning an unscrupulous success; and so I admit that not a great but a moderate amount of athletics causes good condition in men.

And what of food? Moderate or much? I asked.

The same applied to food, he admitted.

Then I went on and sought to compel him also to admit that everything else connected with the body when most beneficial, was the moderate thing, not the much or the little; and he admitted that it was the moderate thing.

And now, I said, as regards the soul; are moderate or immoderate things beneficial, as adjuncts of it?

Moderate things, he replied.

And are studies among the adjuncts of the soul?

He admitted they were.

So among these also it is the moderate that are beneficial, and not the much?

He agreed.
Τίνα οὖν ἐρώμενοι ἂν δικαίως ἐροίμεθα, ὁποίοι μέτροι πόνοι καὶ συνία πρὸς τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν;
'Ωμολογοῦμεν μὲν τρεῖς ὄντες, ὅτι ἰατρὸν ἡ παιδοτρίβην.

Ε Τίνα δ' ἂν περὶ σπερμάτων σπορᾶς, ὅποσον μέτριον;
Καὶ τούτου τὸν γεωργὸν ωμολογοῦμεν.
Τίνα δὲ περὶ μαθημάτων εἰς ψυχὴν φυτεύσεως
tε καὶ σπορᾶς ἑρωτῶντες δικαίως ἂν ἐροίμεθα,
ὅποσα καὶ ὁποία μέτρια;
Τούντευθεν ἦδη ἀπορίας μεστοὶ ἦμεν ἄπαντες.

135 καὶ γὰρ προσπαίζων αὐτούς ἡρώμην, Βούλεσθε, ἔφην, ἔπειδὴ ἦμεὶς ἀν ἀπορία ἐσμὲν, ἐρώμεθα ταυτὶ τὰ μειράκια; ἢ ἰσως αἰσχυνόμεθα, ὥσπερ ἐφη τοὺς μνηστήρας Ὁμήρος, μὴ ἄξιοιτες\(^1\) εἰναι τινα ἅλλου, ὡστε ἐντενεῖ τὸ τόξον;
'Επειδὴ οὖν μοι ἔδοκον ἀθυμεῖν πρὸς τὸν λόγον,
ἀλλὰ ἐπειρώμην σκοπεῖν, καὶ εἶπον, Ποιὰ δὲ μάλιστα άττα τοπάζομεν εἰναι τῶν μαθημάτων,
ἀ δεὶ τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα μανθάνειν, ἔπειδη οὐχὶ
πάντα σοῦδε πολλά;

Β Ἐπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ σοφότερος εἶπεν ὅτι Κάλλιστα
tαῦτ' εἴη τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ προσήκοντα, ἂφ' ὅν ἂν πλεῖστην δοξαν ἔχοι τις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν·
πλεῖστην δ' ἂν ἔχοι δόξαν, εἰ δοκοῖ τῶν τεχνῶν
ἔμπειρος εἰναί πασῶν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὡς πλεῖστον γε καὶ
μάλιστα τῶν ἄξιολόγων, μαθῶν αὐτῶν ταῦτα, ᾧ
προσήκει τοῖς ἐλευθέροις μαθεῖν, ὡς συνέσεως
ἐχεται, μὴ ὡς ἱερουργίας.

\(^1\) ἄξιοιτες Cobet: ἄξιοιτων, ἄξιοιτας mss.

\(^1\) Od. xxi. 285 foll., where the suitors of Penelope are
Then whom should we be justified in asking what sort of exercise or food is moderate for the body?

The three of us agreed that it must be a doctor or a trainer.

And whom should we ask about the moderate measure in the sowing of seed?

In that matter, we agreed, it must be a farmer.

And whom should we be justified in asking as to the moderate degree and kind, in regard to the sowing and planting of studies in the soul?

At this point we all began to be full of perplexity; then I, mocking at them, asked: Do you mind, since we are in perplexity, if we ask these boys here? Or perhaps we are ashamed, as Homer said the suitors were, and do not think it fit there should be someone else who will string the bow?

Then, as it seemed to me that they were losing their zeal for the argument, I tried to pursue the inquiry in another way, and said: But what, as nearly as we can guess, are the kinds of learning which the philosopher should learn, since he is not to learn all things or many things?

At this the wiser one interjected: The finest and most suitable kinds of learning are those which will bring him the most reputation for philosophy; and he will get most reputation if he appears well versed in all the arts, or if not in all, in as many of them, and those the most considerable, as he can, by learning so much of them as befits a free man to learn, that is, what belongs to the understanding rather than the handiwork of each.

ashamed, after they have failed to string the great bow of Odysseus, to let its owner, disguised as a beggar, try his strength on it, and perhaps succeed.
"Αρ' οὖν οὖτω λέγεις, ἐφην ἐγώ, ὦσπερ ἐν τῇ τεκτονικῇ; καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τέκτονα μὲν ἄν πρῶιο
C πέντε ἦ ἦς μυκῶν, ἀκρον ἀρχιτέκτονα δὲ οὐδ' ἄν μυρίων δραχμῶν· ἀλάγοι γε μὴν κἂν ἐν πάσι τοῖς
'Ελλησι γίγνοντο. ἃρα μὴτι τοιοῦτον λέγεις; καὶ δὲ ἄκουσας μου συνεχώρει καὶ αὐτὸς λέγειν
tοιοῦτον.

Ἡρόμην δ' αὐτόν, εἰ οὖκ Ἀδύνατον εἴη δύο μόνας
tέχνας οὖτω μαθεῖν τὸν αὐτόν, μή ὅτι πολλὰς καὶ
μεγάλας· ὁ δὲ, Μη οὖτως μου, ἐφη, ὑπολάβης, ὁ
Σώκρατες, ὃς λέγοντος, ὅτι δεὶ ἐκάστην τῶν τεχνῶν
D τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα ἑπίστασθαι ἀκριβῶς, ὦσπερ
αὐτὸν τὸν τὴν τέχνην ἔχοντα, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰκὸς ἄνδρα
ἐλεύθερον τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένον, ἑπακολούθησαι τε
toῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ οἶον τ' εἶναι
diaφερόντως τῶν παρόντων, καὶ αὐτὸν συμβάλ-
λεσθαί γνώμην, ὡστε δοκεῖν χαρέστατον εἰναι καὶ
σοφώτατον τῶν ἄει παρόντων ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις
tε καὶ πραττομένοις περὶ τὰς τέχνας.

Κἀγώ, ἕτι γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἡμιφεγνόον τὸν λόγον ὅ τι
ἔβουλετο, 'Αρ' ἐννοῶ, ἐφην, οἴον λέγεις τὸν φιλό-
E σοφόν ἄνδρα; δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι λέγεων οἴον ἐν τῇ
ἀγωνίᾳ εἰςίν οἱ πένταθλοι πρὸς τοὺς δρομέας ἦ
tous παλαιστάς. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνοι τούτων μὲν
λείπονται κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἄθλα καὶ δεύτεροι εἰσὶ
πρὸς τούτους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἄθλητῶν πρῶτοι
καὶ νικῶσιν αὐτούς. τάχ' ἄν ἰσως τοιοῦτον τι
λέγοις καὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς

1 A mina (=100 drachmae) would be about £15-£20 in our
money to-day.
2 Literally, athletes trained for the contest of the five
exercises of leaping, running, disc-flinging, javelin-throwing,
and wrestling.

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Well now, do you mean, I asked, in the same way as in carpentry? For there, you know, you can buy a carpenter for five or six minae,¹ but a first-rate architect cannot be got for even ten thousand drachmae; few such, indeed, could be found throughout the whole of Greece. Is it something of this sort that you mean? When he heard me say this, he admitted that something like this was what he himself meant.

I next asked him if it was not impossible for the same person to learn in this way merely two of the arts, not to speak of many or the principal ones; to which he replied: Do not conceive me, Socrates, to be stating that the philosopher must have accurate knowledge of each of the arts, like the actual adept in any of them; I mean only so far as may be expected of a free and educated man: that is, he should be able to follow the explanations of the craftsman more readily than the rest of the company, and to contribute an opinion of his own which will make him appear the cleverest and most accomplished of the company who may at any time be present at some verbal or practical exposition of the arts.

Then, as I was still unsettled in my mind as to the drift of his words, I asked him: Do I quite grasp the sort of man whom you mean by the philosopher? For you seem to me to mean someone like the all-round athletes² in contest with the runners or the wrestlers: the former yield, you know, to the latter in their particular exercises, and are their inferiors in these, but are superior to the usual sort of athletes and beat them. I daresay it may be something of this sort that you would suggest as the effect produced by philosophy on those who

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135 ἐπιτηδεύοντας τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα: τῶν μὲν 
136 πρῶτων εἰς σύνεσιν περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐλλείπεσθαι, 
τὰ δὲντερεῖα δ’ ἔχοντας τῶν ἄλλων περιέχειν, καὶ 
ὁ ὁπῶς γίγνεσθαι περὶ πάντα ὑπακρών τίνα ἄνδρα 
τὸν πεφιλοσοφήκοτα: τοιοῦτόν τινά μοι δοκεῖσ 
ἐνδείκνυσθαί.

Καλῶς γέ μοι, ἔφη, ὁ Ὁμόκρατες, φαίνῃ ὑπολαμ-
βάνειν τὰ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, ἀπεικάσας αὐτὸν 
tῶν πεντάκλην. ἔστι γὰρ ἄτεχνῶς τοιοῦτος οἷς 
μὴ δουλεύειν μηδὲν πράγματι, μὴ εἰς τὴν 
ἀκρίβειαν μηδὲν διαπεπονηκέναι, ὡστε διὰ τὴν 
tοῦ ἐνὸς τοῦτού ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων 
Β ἀπολειψίθθαι, ὡσπερ οἱ δημιουργοί, ἀλλὰ πάντων 
μετρίως ἐφήθθαι.

Μετὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἑγὼ προθυμοῦ-
μενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὃ τι λέγοι, ἑπιθυμούμην αὐτὸν, 
tοὺς ἀγαθοὺς πότερον χρησίμους ἢ ἀχρήστους 
eίναι ὑπολαμβάνοι.

Χρησίμους δὴ ποιοῦ, ὁ Ὁμόκρατες, ἔφη.

·Αρ’ οὖν, εἴπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ χρήσιμοι, οἱ πονηροὶ 
ἀχρήστοι;

·Ωμολόγει.

Τί δὲ; τοὺς φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας χρησίμους ἢ ἢ 
ή οὐ;

·Ο δὲ ὡμολόγει χρησίμους, καὶ πρὸς γε ἔφη 
χρησιμωτάτος εἶναι ἤγεισθαι.

Φέρε δὴ γνῶμεν, εἰ τι ἄληθῆ λέγεις, τοὺ καὶ 
χρήσιμοι ἢμῖν εἰσίν οἱ ὑπακροὶ οὕτως; δήλον γὰρ 
ὅτι ἐκάστου γε τῶν τὰς τέχνας ἐχόντων φαυλότερος 
ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος.

·Ωμολόγει.

Φέρε δὴ σὺ, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, εἰ τύχοις ἡ αὐτὸς ἀσθενή-

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make it their pursuit: they yield to those who are first-rate in an understanding of the arts, but in taking the second place they surpass the rest; and in this way the man who has studied philosophy comes just next to the top in everything. That is the kind of person whom you appear to me to indicate.

You are quite right, it seems to me, Socrates, he said, in your conception of the philosopher’s position, with your comparison of him to the all-round athlete. For it is precisely his nature not to be enslaved to any business, or to work out anything exactly, so as to let his application to that one matter make him deficient in the rest, as the craftsmen do, but to have a moderate contact with all of them.

Well, after this answer I was eager to know clearly what he meant, so I inquired of him whether he conceived of good men as useful or useless.

Useful, I should say, Socrates, he replied.

Then if good men are useful, are wicked men useless?

He agreed that they were.

Again, do you consider that philosophers are useful persons or not?

He agreed that they were useful; nay, more, that he considered they were most useful.

Come now, let us make out, if what you say is true, where these second-best men are also useful to us: for clearly the philosopher is inferior to any particular adept in the arts.

He agreed.

Well now, I went on, if you yourself, or one of your
σας ἢ τῶν φίλων τις τῶν σών, περὶ δὲν αὐτοῦ σπουδήν μεγάλην ἔχεις, πότερον ὑγείαν βουλόμενος κτήσασθαι τὸν ὑπακρον ἐκεῖνον [τὸν φιλόσοφον] εἰσάγοις ἃν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ τὸν ἰατρὸν λάβοις;  

D Ἀμφοτέρους ἐγώγ’ ἃν, ἐφη.
Μὴ μοι, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀμφοτέρους λέγε, ἀλλ’ ὀπότερον μᾶλλον τε καὶ πρότερον.
Οὐδεὶς ἃν, ἐφη, τοῦτο γε ἀμφισβητήσειν, ὡς οὐχὶ τὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ πρότερον.
Τί δ’; ἐν νη ἱερομομενῃ ποτέρῳ ἃν μᾶλλον ἐπιτρέποις σαυτὸν τε καὶ τὰ σεαυτοῦ, τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἢ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ;
Τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἐγώγε.
Οὐκοίν καὶ τὰλλα πάνθ’ οὕτως, ἐως ἃν τις δημιουργὸς ἢ, οὗ χρήσιμος ἔστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος;
Φαίνεται, ἐφη.

E Οὐκοίν νῦν ἀχρηστός τις ἡμῖν ἔστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος; εἰσὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ2 ποὺ δημιουργοί ωμολογήσαμεν δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἁγαθοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ μοχθηροὺς ἀχρηστοὺς.
’Ηναγκάζετο ωμολογεῖν.
Τί οὖν μετὰ τούτο; ἔρωμαι σε ἡ ἀγροκότερον ἔστιν ἐρέσθαι;
’Ερόι δ’ τι βούλειν.
Οὐδὲν δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ζητῶ ἄλλο ἡ ἀνομολογή-

137 σασθαί τὰ εἰρημένα. ἔχει δὲ πως ὡδί. ωμολο-
γήσαμεν καλὸν εἰναι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν [καὶ αὐτοῖ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι],3 τοὺς δὲ φιλοσόφους ἁγαθούς, τοὺς δὲ ἁγαθοὺς χρησίμους, τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς ἀχρηστοὺς. αὕτης δ’ αὐ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ωμολογή-
σαμεν, ἐως ἃν οἱ δημιουργοὶ ὤσιν, ἀχρηστοὺς

1 τὸν φιλόσοφον secl. Cobet.
friends for whom you feel great concern, should have fallen sick, would you fetch that second-best man into the house with a view to obtaining health, or would you summon the doctor?

For my part, I should have both, he replied.

Please do not say "both," I said, but which of the two you would prefer and also summon first.

No one, he replied, would make any question but that the doctor should be preferred and also summoned first.

And again, if you were in a ship that was making rough weather, to which would you rather entrust yourself and yours, the pilot or the philosopher?

I should choose the pilot.

And so it will be in everything else: so long as there is some craftsman, the philosopher is not useful?

Apparently, he replied.

So now we find that the philosopher is a useless person? For I suppose we always have craftsmen; and we have agreed that good men are useful, and bad ones useless.

He was obliged to agree to this.

Then what follows? Am I to ask you, or will it be too ill-mannered?

Ask whatever you please.

Well, my aim, I said, is merely to recall our agreements upon what has been stated. The matter stands somewhat like this. We agreed that philosophy is an honourable thing, and that philosophers are good; and that good men are useful, and wicked men useless: but then again we agreed that philosophers, so long as we have craftsmen, are useless,
εἶναι, δημιουργοὺς δὲ ἀεὶ εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ὁμολόγηται;

Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ’ ὡς.

Ὡμολογοῦμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατά γε τὸν σὸν λόγον, εἴπερ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἑστὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐπιστήμωνας εἶναι ὁν ὑπὸ λέγεις τὸν τρόπον, πονηροὺς αὗτοὺς εἶναι καὶ ἀρχήστων, ἐως ἂν ἐν ἀνθρώποις τέχναι ὑσων. ἄλλα μὴ οὖν οὕτως, ὃ φίλε, ἐξωσί, μηδὲ ἢ τοῦτο φιλοσοφεῖν, περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐσπουδακέναι, οὐδὲ πολυπραγμονοῦντα κυπτάζοντα ζῆν οὐδὲ πολυμαθοῦντα, ἀλλ᾿ ἄλλο τι, ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ ὕμνην καὶ ὅνειδος εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ βαναυσοὺς καλεῖσθαι τοὺς περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐσπουδακότας. ὡδε δὲ σαφέστερον εἰσόμεθα, εἰ ἀρ’ ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἐὰν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνητι τίνες ἒππους ἐπίστανται κολάζειν ὀρθῶς; πότερον οἴπερ βελτίστους ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἄλλοι;

Οἴπερ βελτίστους.

Τι δὲ; κύνας οὖχ οἱ βελτίστους ἐπίστανται ποιεῖν, οὕτως καὶ κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπίστανται;

Ναὶ.

᾽Ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα τέχνη βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει ὀρθῶς;

Φαίνεται μοι, ἢ δ’ ὡς.

Τι δὲ; πότερον ἢπερ βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει ὀρθῶς, ἢ αὐτὴ δὲ καὶ γιγνώσκει τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ τοὺς μοχθηροὺς, ἢ ἑτέρα τις;

′Ἡ αὐτὴ, ἑφή.

῾Εθελήσεις οὖν καὶ κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπους τοῦθ’ ὁμο-

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1 βάναυσος expresses the peculiar contempt felt by Greek gentlemen for the work of artisans and even artists. Manual 330
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and that we always do have craftsmen. Has not all this been agreed?

Yes, to be sure, he replied.

Then we agreed, it seems, by your account—if philosophizing means having knowledge of the arts in the way you describe—that philosophers are wicked and useless so long as there are arts among mankind. But I expect they are not so really, my friend, and that philosophizing is not just having a concernment in the arts or spending one’s life in meddlesome stooping and prying and accumulation of learning, but something else; because I imagined that this life was actually a disgrace, and that people who concerned themselves with the arts were called sordid. But we shall know more definitely whether this statement of mine is true, if you will answer me this: What men know how to punish horses rightly? Is it those who make them into the best horses, or some other men?

Those who make them into the best horses.

Or again, is it not the men who know how to make dogs into the best dogs that know also how to punish them rightly?

Yes.

Then it is the same art that makes them into the best dogs and punishes them rightly?

It appears so to me, he replied.

Again, is the art that makes them into the best ones and punishes them rightly the same as that which knows the good and the bad ones, or is it some other?

The same, he said.

Then in the case of men also will you be prepared labour was the business of slaves and persons who were unfit for military and political life.
PLATO

Δ λογεῖν, ἥπερ βελτίστους ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ, ταύτην εἶναι καὶ τὴν κολάζουσαν ὀρθῶς καὶ διαγιγώνυσκούσαν τοὺς χρηστούς τε καὶ τοὺς μοχθηρούς;
Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἦτις ἕνα, καὶ πολλοὺς, καὶ ἦτις πολλούς, καὶ ἕνα;
Ναί.
Καὶ καθ' ἵππων δὴ καὶ τῶν ἀλλών ἀπάντων οὕτως;
Φημί.
Τίς οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἦτις τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀκολαστάωντας καὶ παρανομοῦντας ὀρθῶς κολάζει; οὐχ ἡ δικαστική;
Ναί.
Τῇ ἄλλῃ οὖν τινα καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἡ ταύτην;
Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ταύτην.
Ε ὁσκοῦν ἥπερ κολάζουσιν ὀρθῶς, ταύτη καὶ γιγνώσκοι τοὺς χρηστούς καὶ μοχθηρούς;
Ταύτη.
Ὅστις δὲ ἕνα γιγνώσκει, καὶ πολλοὺς γνώσεται;
Ναί.
Καὶ ὁστὶς γε πολλοὺς ἄγνοεῖ, καὶ ἑνὰ;
Φημί.
Εἰ ἄρα ἵππος ὃν ἄγνοεί τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς ἵπποι, κἀν αὐτὸν ἄγνοεί, ποτὸς τίς ἐστὶν;
Φημί.
Καὶ εἰ βοῦς ὃν ἄγνοεῖ των πονηρῶν καὶ χρηστῶν βοῦς, κἀν αὐτὸν ἄγνοεί, ποτὸς τίς ἐστὶν;
Ναί, ἔφη.
Οὕτω δὴ καὶ εἰ κύων;

1 boûs add. Bekker.
to agree that the art which makes them into the best men is that which punishes them rightly and distinguishes the good and the bad ones?

Certainly, he said.

And that which does this to one, does it also to many, and that which does it to many, does it also to one?

Yes.

And so it is also with horses and everything else?

I agree.

Then what is the knowledge which rightly punishes the licentious and law-breaking people in our cities?

Is it not judicature?

Yes.

And is it any other art than this that you call justice?

No, only this.

And that whereby they punish rightly is that whereby they know the good and bad people?

It is.

And whoever knows one will know many also?

Yes.

And whoever does not know many will not know one?

I agree.

Then if one were a horse, and did not know the good and wicked horses, would one not know which sort one was oneself?

I think not.

And if one were an ox and did not know the wicked and good oxen, would one not know which sort one was oneself?

That is so, he said.

And so it would be, if one were a dog?
'Ωμολόγει.

138 Τί δ'; ἐπειδὰν ἀνθρωπός τις ὁν ἀγνοεῖ τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ μοχθηροὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἃρ' οὖχ αὐτὸν ἀγνοεῖ, ποτέρον χρηστός ἔστιν ἢ πονηρός, ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀνθρωπός ἔστιν;

Συνεχώρει.

Τὸ δ' ἐαυτὸν ἀγνοεῖν σωφρονεῖν ἐστὶν ἢ μὴ σωφρονεῖν;

Μὴ σωφρονεῖν.

Τὸ ἐαυτὸν ἄρα γιγνώσκειν ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν;

Φημί, ἐφη.

Τοῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμμα παρακελεύεται, σωφροσύνην ἀσκεῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνην.

'Εουκεν.

Τῇ αὑτῇ δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ κολάζειν ὅρθως ἐπιστάμεθα;

Ναι.

Οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν κολάζειν ὅρθως ἐπιστάμεθα, 

Β δικαιοσύνη αὐτῇ ἐστὶν, ἢ δὲ διαγιγνώσκειν καὶ ἐαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους, σωφροσύνη;

'Εουκεν, ἐφη.

Ταυτὸν ἄρ' ἐστὶ καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη;

Φαίνεται.

Καὶ μὴν οὔτω γε καὶ αἱ πόλεις ἐδ οἰκοῦνται, ὅταν οἱ ἀδικοῦντες δίκην διδῶσιν.

'Αληθῆ λέγεις, ἐφη.

Καὶ πολιτικὴ ἄρα αὐτῇ ἐστὶν.

Συνεδόκει.

Τί δὲ ὅταν εἰς ἀνὴρ ὅρθως πόλιν διοικῆ, ὅνομά 

γε τούτῳ οὐ τύραννός τε καὶ βασιλεύς;
He agreed.

Well now, when one is a man, and does not know the good and bad men, one surely cannot know whether one is good or wicked oneself, since one is a man also oneself?

He granted this.

And is "not knowing oneself" being temperate, or not being temperate?

Not being temperate.

So "knowing oneself" is being temperate?

I agree, he said.

So this is the message, it seems, of the Delphic inscription—that one is to practise temperance and justice.

It seems so.

And it is by this same art that we know also how to punish rightly?

Yes.

Then that whereby we know how to punish rightly is justice, and that whereby we know how to distinguish our own and others' quality is temperance?

It seems so, he said.

Then justice and temperance are the same thing?

Apparently.

And further, it is thus, you know, that cities are well ordered—when the wrongdoers pay the penalty.

That is true, he said.

Hence this is also statecraft.

He concurred.

Again, when one man governs a city rightly, is he not called a despot and king?

1 Cf. Charmides (Introduction and 164) for the connexion in thought and language between temperance and self-knowledge.
Φημί.
Ούκοιν βασιλικῇ τε καὶ τυραννικῇ τέχνῃ διοικεῖ; 
Οὔτως.
Καὶ αὕταί ἂρ' αἱ αὕτα τέχναι εἰσὶν ἐκεῖναι;
Φαίνονται.
C Τί δὲ ὅταν εἰς ὃν ἀνήρ οἰκίαν διοικῇ ὁρθῶς, τί ὀνομα τούτῳ ἔστιν; οὐκ οἰκονόμος τε καὶ δε-
σπότης;
Ναί.
Πότερον κἂν καὶ οὕτως δικαιοσύνη εὖ ἂν τὴν 
οἰκίαν διοικοί ἡ ἄλλη των τέχνη;
Δικαιοσύνη.
"Εστιν ἀρα ταύτων, ὡς ἔοικε, βασιλεὺς, τύραν-
νος, πολιτικός, οἰκονόμος, δεσπότης, σώφρων,
δίκαιος. καὶ μιὰ τέχνῃ ἐστὶ βασιλικῇ, τυραννικῇ,
πολιτικῇ, δεσποτικῇ, οἰκονομικῇ, δικαιοσύνη, σω-
φροσύνη.
Φαίνεται, ἐφη, οὕτως.
D Πότερον οὖν τῷ ἕνως φιλοσόφῳ, ὅταν μὲν ἱατρὸς 
περὶ τῶν καμνόντων τι λέγῃ, αἰσχρὸν μὴ θ' ἔπεσθαι 
τοῖς λεγομένοις δύνασθαι μήτε συμβάλλεσθαι μηδὲν 
περὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἡ πραττομένων, καὶ ὅπως 
ἀλλος τις τῶν δημιουργῶν, ἱσαύτως. ὅταν δὲ 
δικαστὴς ἡ βασιλεὺς ἡ ἄλλος τις ὃν νῦν δὴ διελ-
λύθαμεν, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν περὶ τούτων μηθ' ἔπεσθαι 
δύνασθαι μήτε συμβάλλεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν;
Πῶς δ' οὖν αἰσχρὸν, ὡ Σώκρατες, περὶ γε 
τοσοῦτων πραγμάτων μηδὲν ἔχειν συμβάλλεσθαι;
E Πότερον οὖν καὶ περὶ ταῦτα λέγωμεν, ἐφην,
πέντε ἄυτὸν δεῖν εἶναι καὶ ὑπακρον, καὶ ταύτης 
μὲν τὰ δευτερεία ἔχοτα πάντων τὸν φιλοσόφον,
I agree.
And he governs by a kingly and despotic art?
That is so.
And these arts are the same as the former?
 Apparently.
Again, when a man singly governs a house aright, what is he called? Is he not a house-manager and master?
Yes.
Then would he also govern his house well by justice, or by some other art?
By justice.
Hence they are all the same, it seems,—king, despot, statesman, house-manager, master, and the temperate man and the just man; and it is all one art,—the kingly, the despotic, the statesman’s, the master’s, the house-manager’s, and justice and temperance.
It is so, apparently, he said.
Then, if it is disgraceful in the philosopher to be unable, when a doctor speaks about the sick, either to follow his remarks or to contribute anything of his own to what is being said or done, and to be in the same case when any other of the craftsmen speaks, is it not disgraceful that he should be unable, when it is a judge or a king or some other of the persons whom we have just instanced, either to follow their words or contribute anything to their business?
It must indeed be disgraceful, Socrates, to have nothing to contribute to subjects of such great importance!
Are we then to say, I asked, that in these matters also he is to be an all-round athlete, a second-rate man, taking the second place in all the subjects of
καὶ ἄχρείον εἶναι, ἕως ὅσ τοῦτων τις ἢ, ἢ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν ὅπερ ἄλλῳ ἐπιτρέπτειν οὐδὲ τὰ δευτερεῖα ἐν τούτῳ ἐκτέον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν κολαστεόν δικάζοντα ὀρθῶς, εἰ μέλλει εὗ οἰκεῖοθαί αὐτοῦ ἡ οἰκία;

Συνεχῶρει δὴ μοι.

"Επειτὰ γε δήποτε ἐάν τε οἱ φίλοι αὐτῶ διαίτας ἐπιτρέπωσιν, ἐάν τε ἡ πόλις τι προστάτη δια-
κρίνειν ἡ δικάζειν, αἰσχρὸν ἐν τούτοις, ὅ ἐταίρε, δεύτερον φαίνεσθαι ἡ τρίτον καὶ μὴ οὐχ ἥγεισθαι;

Δοκεῖ μοι.

Πολλοὶ ἄρα δεῖ ἢμῖν, ὅ βέλτιστε, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν πολυμαθία τε εἶναι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγ-
ματεία.

Εἰπόντος δ' ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ὁ μὲν σοφὸς αἰσχυνθεὶς τοῖς προειρημένοις ἐσίγησεν, ὁ δὲ ἀμαθὴς ἔφη ἐκεῖνως εἶναι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐπῆμεσαν τὰ εἰρημένα.
this art—he, the philosopher—and is to be useless so long as there is one of these persons; or that, first of all, he is to entrust his own house to nobody else and is not to take the second place in it, but is himself to judge and punish rightly, if his house is to be well managed?

He granted me that it must be so.

Secondly, I presume, whether his friends entrust him with an arbitration, or the state charges him to determine or judge any matter, it is disgraceful for him, my good friend, in such cases, to be found in the second or third place, and not to lead?

I agree.

Hence we see, my excellent sir, that philosophizing is very far from being much learning and that affair of busying oneself with the arts.

On my saying this the cultivated youth was silent, feeling ashamed for what he had said before, while the unlearned one said it was as I stated; and the rest of the company praised the argument.
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEAGES

The purpose of this short dialogue is to set forth the nature of the potent influence which the society of Socrates was observed to have on his young companions. The pronouncement which he makes (128 d—130 e) on the divine agency by which he is directed in his guidance of others is a confession intended, apparently, as a serious confirmation of Alcibiades' after-dinner sketch of him, in the Symposium, as the magically beguiling satyr, the great enchanter of young men. In the present scene he is approached by Demodocus, an elderly man who has held high offices in the state, and who has now come to Athens from his rural retreat in order to place his son Theages with some suitable professor of that higher knowledge, or "wisdom," which the young man is anxious to learn. Socrates puts some questions to Theages on the nature of the wisdom that he seeks to acquire, and obtains the statement in reply that what he desires is to govern free citizens with their consent, as Themistocles, Pericles, Cimon, and other Athenian statesmen have done before (126 a); but as soon as he is asked who is to teach him this sort of wisdom, he admits that statesmen themselves are useless as instructors in their art, and asks Socrates to be his teacher (127 a). Demodocus warmly supports his son's request; he will...
sacrifice everything for so great a boon: but Socrates denies his fitness for the task. Theages, however, protests that several of his young friends have gained great advantage by the instruction they have had from Socrates. This draws from Socrates a remarkable account of the spiritual voice which, from his earliest years, has forbidden certain actions proposed either by himself or by those who have consulted him (128 δ–129 ν); and he indicates, by the story of Aristeides (cf. Laches, 179 foll.), that his influence is not a matter of particular lessons or definite instruction, but the mysterious effect of close association, and especially of actual contact, with his person (130). The good or ill success of the pupil thus depends entirely on the decision of an inscrutable will which presides over both the master and his mission; and Theages hopes that, if it should not be propitious in his case, he may be able to conciliate it by some religious rite (131).

By thus declining to give any rational basis or meaning to his daily occupation, and referring its entire governance to that obscure supernatural sphere which he was willing to assume but not to discuss (cf. Phaedrus, 229, etc.), Socrates may be deemed less than faithful here to his general pursuit of accurate definition in the principles of ordinary affairs; and the turn which he gives to the talk when it touches himself certainly shows him, for the nonce, an obscurantist. But apart from the exaggerations of his ignorance and incompetence which were habitual to his modesty, it should be observed that there is nothing in this account of his reliance on a spiritual sign that does not agree with what we find recorded of him elsewhere. In the Apology he gives
a prohibition of the divine voice as the reason of his abstention from politics (31 c, d), and again, its silence as an indication that his defence in court was rightly conceived and conducted: hence the result—his death—must be for his good (40 a-c). There is mere irrational mystery in two instances which Plato gives of this strange intervention: the sign forbade Socrates to start on a walk until he had purified himself (Phaedrus, 242 b); and just as he was getting up from his seat in the dressing-room of a gymnasium it forbade him, and he had to sit down again (Euthyd. 272 e). "He forewarned many of his associates to do this or not to do that," says Xenophon (Mem. i. i. 4), "on the prognostication of the spiritual sign." There is nothing new, therefore, in his reference of all responsibility for his teaching and its results to the divine warning; though nowhere else in the Platonic writings do we find him dwelling on the matter at such length, and it is only in Xenophon that the intervention extends, as it does here, outside his own conduct to that of his companions. There is, it is true, a passage of the Theaetetus (150 d), occurring shortly before a mention of the "voice" as his guide in his dealings with young men (151 a), where he tells how those who associate with him, "if Heaven is kind to them, make amazing progress, as it seems to themselves and to others": but if we read the whole passage, and note the fine strength of its reasoning and expression, the awkward inconsequence of the Theages suggests that an imitator has tried to enlarge the mystical element in the Platonic Socrates at the expense of the intellectual process of his "midwifery."
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEAGES

Some part of the inferiority so apparent in the Theages might be explained by assuming that it is a work of Plato's immaturity: but it is hard to believe that he could at any time have made Socrates indulge in the relation of stories about his friends (128 foll.) which tend to prove, not his main point—that it depends on the spiritual sign whether they are to benefit or not from his society—but rather the great importance to them of associating with him and heeding his prophetic warnings. There seems also to be no connexion in his preceding remark (128 b)—that he knows nothing but the one little subject of love-matters (cf. Sympos. 177 e, etc.); and his account of the divine aid that he receives and gives is sadly lacking in the usual Socratic humour. On the whole it must be concluded that the Theages was composed, probably in the second century B.C., by a careful student of Plato's writings who wished to emphasize the mystical side of Socrates; that it found a place at the Academy and in the Alexandrian Library among other such exercises; and that by the time of Thrasyllus, who made the first complete collection of Plato's writings early in the first century A.D., it was generally regarded as an early sketch by Plato, and so was included in the canon with his genuine dialogues.

Theages is mentioned in the Republic (496 b) as "our comrade," whose delicate health restrained him, like a bridle, from politics, and kept him in the path of philosophy: in the Apology (33 e) we find that he has died before the trial of Socrates (399 B.C.).

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ΘΕΑΓΗΣ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΣΩΦΙΑΣ· ΜΑΙΕΥΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΔΗΜΟΔΩΚΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΘΕΑΓΗΣ

St. I  
p. 121

ΔΗ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐθεόμην ἅττα σοι ἱδιολογή-
σασθαι, εἰ σχολή· καὶ εἰ ἀσχολία δὲ μὴ πάνυ τις
μεγάλη, ὅμως ἔμοι ἐνεκεν ποίησαι σχολήν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλως τυγχάνω σχολάζων, καὶ δὴ
σοῦ γε ἐνεκα καὶ πάνω. ἀλλ' εἰ τι βουλεῖ λέγειν,
ἐξεστώ.

ΔΗ. Βουλεῖ οὖν δεύρο εἰς τὴν τοῦ Δίως τοῦ
ἐλευθερίου στοὰν ἐκποδῶν ἀποχωρήσωμεν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

Β  ΔΗ. Ἰωμεν δή. Ὄ Σώκρατες, πάντα τὰ φυτὰ
κυδυνεύει τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχειν, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς
γῆς φυώμενα καὶ τὰ ζώα τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ ἄνθρωπος.
καὶ γάρ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ῥᾶστον ἡμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεται,
ὅσοι τὴν γῆν γεωργοῦμεν, τὸ παρασκευάζομαι
πάντα τὰ πρὸ τοῦ φυτεύειν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ φυτεύσαι.
ἐπειδὰν δὲ τὸ φυτευθὲν βιῶ, μετὰ τοῦτο θεραπεία
τοῦ φύντος καὶ πολλῆ καὶ χαλεπῆ καὶ δύσκολος
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THEAGES
[OR ON WISDOM: “OBSTETRIC”]

CHARACTERS

Demodocus, Socrates, Theages

dem. Socrates, I was wanting to have some private talk with you, if you had time to spare; even if there is some demand, which is not particularly important, on your time, do spare some, nevertheless, for me.

soc. Why, in any case I happen to have time to spare, and for you, moreover, I have plenty. Well, you are free to say whatever you wish.

dem. Then do you mind if we step aside here from the street into the portico of Zeus the Liberator? 

soc. As you think best.

dem. Let us go, then. Socrates, it would seem that all growths follow the same course, both those that grow from the earth, and the animals, including man. In regard to the plants, as you know, we who cultivate the earth find it the easiest part of our work to make all our preparations that are needed before planting, and to do the planting itself; but when the plant begins to grow, thenceforward we have a great deal of difficult and vexatious business

1 This portico or colonnade was near that of the King Archon, close to the Agora.
C γίγνεται. οὖτω δὲ ἐξειν ἐσουκ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ ἐγὼ πραγμάτων τεκμαίρομαι καὶ ἐς τάλλα. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ἦ τοῦ υἱέos τούτου, εἰτε φυτείαν εἰτε παιδοποιιῶν δεῖ αὐτὴν ἕνομαζειν, πάντων βάστη γέγονεν, ἢ δὲ τροφὴ δύσκολός τε καὶ δεῖ ἐν φόβῳ περὶ αὐτοῦ δεδιότι. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα πολλὰ ἄν εὑρή λέγειν, ἢ δὲ νῦν παροῦσα ἐπιθυμία τούτων πάνω με φοβεῖ· ἐστι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἁγενής, σφαλερὰ δὲ· ἐπιθυμεῖ γὰρ δὴ οὗτος ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατε, ὦς φησί, σοφὸς D γενέσθαι. δοκῶ γὰρ μοι, τῶν ἥλικιωτῶν των αὐτοῦ καὶ δημοτῶν, εἰς τὸ ἀστυ καταβαίνοντες, λόγους των ἀπομνημονεύοντες διαταράσσουσιν αὐτόν· οὐς ἐξήλωκε καὶ πάλαι μοι πράγματα παρέχει, ἁξιῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι μὲ ἐαυτοῦ καὶ χρή- ματα τελέσαι τυὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν, ὡς ἐφ' αὐτόν σοφὸν ποιήσει. ἐμοὶ δὲ τῶν μὲν χρημάτων καὶ ἔλαττον μέλει, ἡγοῦμαι δὲ τούτων οὐκ εἰς μικρὸν 122 κίνδυνον ἴναι, οἱ σπεύδειν. τέως μὲν οὖν αὐτῶν κατείχον παραµυθοῦμενος· ἐπιδή δὲ οὐκέτι οἶδο τέ εἰμι, ἡγοῦμαι κράτιστον εἶναι πείθεσθαι αὐτῶ, ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις ἁνεῖ ἐμοῦ συγγενόμενός τω διαφθαρῆ. νῦν οὖν ἦκω ἐπ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα, ἵνα τῷ τούτων τῶν σοφιστῶν δοκοῦντων εἶναι συστήσω τούτοι. σὺ οὖν ἡμῖν εἰς καλὸν παρεφάνης, ὥ ἀν ἐγὼ μάλιστ' ἐβουλόμην περὶ τῶν τοιούτων μέλλων πράξειν συμβουλεύσασθαι, ἀλλ' εἰ τι ἔχεις συμ- B βουλεύειν ἐξ ὧν ἐμοὶ ἀκήκοας, ἐξεστὶ τε καὶ χρή.
in tending the new growth. Such, it seems, is also the case in regard to men: I take my own concerns as evidence for judging of the rest. For indeed I have found the planting, or the procreation—which ever one ought to call it—of this son of mine the easiest thing in the world; but his upbringing has been vexatious and a constant source of alarm, so great are my fears for him. Among the many instances that I could mention, the desire which occupies him at the moment is a thing that especially alarms me: for it is not an ill-bred desire, but a dangerous one, since here we have him, Socrates, as he says, desiring to become wise. My opinion is that some of his fellow-townsmen, about his own age, who pay visits to the city, excite him with accounts of certain discussions they have heard there; and in his envy of these he has long been pestering me with the demand that I should take due thought for his needs, and pay fees to some sophist or other who will make him wise. Now I do not mind so much about the fees, but I believe he is running into no slight danger where he is hastening. I did for a time restrain him with good advice; but since I am no longer able to do so, I believe my best course is to comply with his request, in order that he may not resort, perchance, behind my back to somebody who will corrupt him. So I have come now on this very business of placing this youth with one of these sophists, or purveyors of wisdom, as they are held to be. It is a happy chance, therefore, that has thrown you in our way, as I should be particularly glad, with this plan of action in my mind, to ask your advice. Come, if you have any advice to give on what you have heard from me, you not only may, but should, give it.
σημ. Ἄλλα μὲν δὴ, ὦ Δημόδοκε, καὶ λέγεται γε συμβουλή ἰερὸν χρῆμα εἶναι. εἴπερ οὖν καὶ ἄλλη ἡτανοῦν ἐστὶν ἱερά, καὶ αὕτη ἄν εἴη, περὶ ἢς οὐ νῦν συμβουλεύῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν περὶ ὅτου θειοτέρον ἂν ἀνθρωπός βουλεύσαιτο ἥ περὶ παιδείας καὶ C αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ οἰκείων. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ συνομολογήσωμεν, τί ποτε οἴομεθα τοῦτ’ εἶναι, περὶ οὐ βουλεύσωμεθα· μὴ γὰρ πολλάκις ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ ὑπολαμβάνω, οὐ δὲ ἄλλο, κάπετα πόρρω ποὺ τῆς συνουσίας αἰσθάμεθα γελοῖον ὄντες, ἐγὼ τε ὃ συμβουλεύων καὶ σὺ ὃ συμβουλεύόμενος, μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ἡγοῦμενοι.

δη. Ἄλλα μοι δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγεν, ὄ Σώκρατες, καὶ ποιεῖν χρῆ οὕτω.

σημ. Καὶ λέγω γε ὀρθῶς, οὐ μέντοι παντάπασι γε, σμικρὸν γάρ τι μετατίθεμαι. ἐνοῦ γὰρ, μὴ καὶ ὁ D μειρακίσκος οὗτος οὐ τοῦτον ἐπιθυμεῖ, οὐ ἡμεῖς αὐτοῦ οἴομεθα ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐτέρου, εἰτ’ ἂν ἡμεῖς ἐτι ἀτοπώτεροι ὃς ἐν περὶ ἄλλον τοῦ βουλευόμενοι. ὃθωτατον οὖν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἂν’ αὐτοῦ τοῦτον ἀρχεσθαι, διαπυθανομένους ὃ τι καὶ ἐστιν οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ.

δη. Κινδυνεύει γοῦν οὕτω βέλτιστον εἶναι ὡς σὺ λέγεις.

σημ. Εἰπὲ δὴ μοι, τί καλὸν ὄνομα τῷ νεανίσκῳ; τί αὐτῶν προσαγορεύωμεν;

δη. Θεάγης ὄνομα τοῦτο, ὄ Σώκρατες.

Ε σημ. Καλὸν γε, ὦ Δημόδοκε, τῷ νεεὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἔθου καὶ ἱεροπρεπὲς. εἰπὲ δὴ ἡμῖν, ὄ Θεάγης,

1 i.e. something above and apart from the adviser’s personal interests, and looking only to what is best.

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THEAGES

soc. Well, you know, Demodocus, they do say that advice is a holy thing.\(^1\) And so, if ever it is to be accounted holy, it must be in this instance, in which you now seek it. For there is no more divine matter on which a mortal could take counsel than the education either of himself or of his relations. Now, first of all, let you and me come to an agreement as to what we suppose that this thing can be, on which we are taking counsel; for it may happen that I conceive it to be one thing, and you another, and then when we have proceeded some little way in our conference, we may perceive how ridiculous we are, I the adviser and you the advised, in having no common ground in our notions.

dem. Why, I think you are right there, Socrates, and we should do as you suggest.

soc. Yes, I am right, but yet not entirely, because I have a slight change to make. For it occurs to me that this youngster may not be desiring the thing that we suppose him to desire, but something else, and there again we may be still more absurdly taking counsel on some other thing. Hence our properest course, it seems to me, is to begin with the youth himself, and inquire of him what it actually is that he desires.

dem. It does rather look, in fact, as though our best way would be thus, as you suggest.

soc. Then tell me, what is the young person's goodly name: how are we to address him?

dem. Theages is his name, Socrates.

soc. Goodly is the name, Demodocus, and holy-sounding,\(^2\) that you have bestowed on your son. Tell me, then, Theages, do you say you desire to become

\(^1\) "Theages" means "god-guided."
έπιθυμεύων φής σοφός γενέσθαι, καὶ ἄξιοις σου τὸν πατέρα τόνδε ἐξευρέως ἀνδρὸς τῶν συνουσίων τοιοῦτον, ὡστὶς σε σοφὸν ποιήσει;
θε. Ναι.
ση. Σοφοὺς δὲ καλεῖς πότερον τοὺς ἐπιστή-
μονας, περὶ ὅτου ἃν ἐπιστήμονες ὕσιν, ἢ τοὺς μή;
θε. Τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας ἔγωγε.
ση. Τι ὅδε; οὐκ ἐδιδάξατο σε ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἐπαί-
δευσεν ἄπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἄλλοι πεπαιδευταί, οἱ τῶν
καλῶν κἀγαθῶν πατέρων νυεῖς, οἶον γράμματα τε
καὶ κιθαρίζεων καὶ παλαίεων καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀγωνίαν;
θε. 'Εμεν γε.
ση. 'Ετι οὖν οἶει τινὸς ἐπιστήμης ἐλλειπεν,
ἡς προσήκει ὑπὲρ σοῦ τὸν πατέρα ἐπιμεληθήναι;
θε. 'Εγωγε.
ση. Τίς ἐστών αὕτη; εἰπὲ καὶ ἡμῖν, ὅλοι σοι χαρι-
σώμεθα.
θε. Οἴδε καὶ οὗτος, ὁ Σώκρατεσ· ἐπεὶ πολλάκις
ἐγὼ αὐτῷ εἰρήκας· ἄλλα ταῦτα ἐξεπίτηδες πρὸς σὲ
λέγει, ὡς δὴ οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐπιθυμῶ. τοιαῦτα
γὰρ ἐτερα καὶ πρὸς ἐμὲ μάχεσαι τε καὶ οὐκ ἔθελει
με ὀυδεὶς συστῆσαι.
θη. Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐμπροσθέν σοι ἢν πρὸς τοῦτον
ῥηθέντα ὅσπερ ἀνευ μαρτύρων λεγόμενα· νυνὶ δὲ
ἐμὲ ποιήσαι μάρτυρα, καὶ ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ κάτειπε,
τίς ἐστών αὕτη ἡ σοφία ἡ ἐπιθυμεῖς. φέρε γάρ,
εἰ ἐπεθύμεις ταύτης, ἢ οἱ ἀνθρώποι τὰ πλοῖα
κυβερνῶσι, καὶ ἐγὼ σε ἐτύγχανον ἀνερωτῶν ὁ
Θέαγες, τίνος ἐνδεής ὃν σοφίας μέμφη τῷ πατρί,
ὅτι οὐκ ἔθελει σε συνιστᾶναι παρ’ ὑν ἄν σὺ σοφὸς
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wise, and do you require your father here to find out a school of some man who is qualified to make you wise?

THE. Yes.

soc. And which sort of man do you call wise, those who have knowledge of such and such a thing, whatever it may be, or those who have not?

THE. Those who have knowledge, I say.

soc. Well now, has not your father taught and educated you in the subjects which form the education of everyone else here—all the sons of noble and honourable fathers—in letters, I mean, and harping and wrestling and the other sorts of contest?

THE. Yes, he has.

soc. And you think you are still lacking in some knowledge which it behoves your father to provide for you?

THE. I do.

soc. What knowledge is it? Tell us on our side, that we may oblige you.

THE. He knows it, as well as I, Socrates, since I have often told him; only he says this to you of set purpose, making as if he did not know what I desire. For he assails me too with other statements of the same sort, and refuses to place me with any instructor.

soc. Well, what you said to him before was spoken, as it were, without witnesses; but now you shall take me as a witness, and declare before me what is this wisdom that you desire. Come now; suppose you desired the wisdom whereby men steer a ship, and I happened to put this further question to you: Theages, what wisdom is it that you lack, when you blame your father for refusing to place you with people who would enable you to become wise?
γένοιο; τί ἂν μοι ἀπεκρίνω; τίνα αὐτὴν εἶναι, ἥρ' οὖν κυβερνητικὴν;

θε. Ναι.

C ἥν. Εἰ δὲ ἐπιθυμῶν ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν εἶναι σοφός, ἢ τὰ ἄρματα κυβερνῶσαν, ἐλτ' ἐμέμφοι τῷ πατρὶ, ἐμοῦ αὐτ' ἐρωτώντος τίς ἐστιν αὐτὴ ἡ σοφία, τίν' ἂν ἀπεκρίνω αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἥρ' οὖν ἡ λυκοχικὴν;

θε. Ναι.

 若要判断该文档的自然语言文本，可以使用分词工具和自然语言处理技术来解析。
THEAGES

What answer would you have given me? What wisdom would you name? The steersman's art, would you not?

THE. Yes.

soc. And if a desire to be wise in the wisdom whereby they steer chariots led you to blame your father, and I asked what wisdom this was, what would you name in reply? The charioteer's art, would you not?

THE. Yes.

soc. And is that which you happen to be desiring now a nameless one, or has it a name?

THE. I should say it has a name.

soc. Now do you know it, though not its name, or do you know its name as well?

THE. I know its name as well.

soc. Then what is it? Tell me.

THE. What other name, Socrates, can one give it but wisdom?

soc. And the driver's art too is wisdom? Or do you think it is ignorance?

THE. I do not.

soc. You call it wisdom?

THE. Yes.

soc. What use do we make of it? Is it not the art whereby we know how to govern a team of horses?

THE. Yes.

soc. And the steersman's art too is wisdom?

THE. I think so.

soc. Is not this the art whereby we know how to govern ships?

THE. Yes, it is.

soc. And the wisdom that you so desire, what is it? That whereby we know how to govern whom?
'Εμοί μὲν δοκεῖ, ἂ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
Μῶν ἂ τῶν καμνόντων;
Οὐ δῆτα.
'Ιατρικὴ γὰρ αὕτη ἐστίν. ἂ γάρ;
Ναί.
'Αλλ' ἂ τῶν ἄδοντων ἐπιστάμεθα ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ἄρχειν;
Οὐ.
Μουσικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γε;
Πάνυ γε.
'Αλλ' ἂ τῶν γυμναζομένων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν;
Οὐ.
Γυμναστικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γε;
Ναί.
'Αλλ' ἂ τῶν τὶ ποιοῦντων; προθυμοῦ εἰπέων, ὁσπερ ἐγὼ σοὶ τὰ ἐμπροσθεν.
"Η τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐμοίογε δοκεῖ.
Οὐκοῦν ἐν τῇ πόλει εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ κάμνοντες;
Ναί, ἀλλ' οὐ τούτων λέγω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει.
'Αρά γε μανθάνω ἂν λέγεις τέχνην; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν οὐχ ἂ τῶν θεριζόντων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν καὶ τρυγώντων καὶ τῶν φυτεύοντων καὶ σπειρόντων καὶ ἄλοιπῶν· αὕτη μὲν γὰρ γεωργικὴ ἂ τούτων ἄρχομεν· ἂ γάρ;
Ναί.
Οὐδὲ γε οἷμαι ἂ τῶν πριζόντων καὶ τρυπώντων καὶ ξεόντων καὶ τορνεύοντων συμπάντων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν, οὐ ταύτην λέγεις· αὕτη γὰρ οὐ τεκτονικὴ;
Ναί.
THE. To govern men, I imagine.
soc. Sick men, do you mean?
THE. Oh, no.
soc. For that is medicine, is it not?
THE. Yes.
soc. Well, that whereby we know how to govern the singers in a chorus?
THE. No.
soc. For that is music?
THE. To be sure.
soc. Well, that whereby we know how to govern men in gymnastic training?
THE. No.
soc. For that is gymnastics?
THE. Yes.
soc. Well, to govern people who do what? Endeavour your best to speak, as I have done for you in what preceded.
THE. To govern the people in the city, I imagine.
soc. And are the sick people also in the city?
THE. Yes, but I mean not these only, but all the rest who are in the city besides.
soc. Do I understand what art it is that you mean? For you strike me as meaning, not that whereby we know how to govern reapers and harvesters and planters and sowers and threshers, for it is the farmer's art whereby we govern these, is it not?
THE. Yes.
soc. Nor, I suppose, do you mean that whereby we know how to govern sawyers and borers and planers and turners, as a class together; for is not that carpentry?
THE. Yes.
1 In Aristophanes and Plato we find mention of only one “Sibyl”: later the name, like Bacis (an old Bocotian
soc. But perhaps it is that whereby we govern, not only all these, but farmers themselves also, and carpenters, and all craftsmen and ordinary people, whether men or women: that, perhaps, is the wisdom you mean.

THE. That, Socrates, is what I have been intending to mean all the time.

soc. Then can you tell me whether Aegisthus, who slew Agamemnon in Argos, governed all these people that you mean—craftsmen and ordinary people, both men and women, or some other persons?

THE. No, just those.

soc. Well now, did not Peleus, son of Aeacus, govern these same people in Phthia?

THE. Yes.

soc. And have you ever heard of Periander, son of Cypselus, and how he governed at Corinth?

THE. I have.

soc. Did he not govern these same people in his city?

THE. Yes.

soc. Or again, do you not consider that Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, who governed recently in Macedonia, governed these same people?

THE. I do.

soc. And who do you think were governed by Hippias, son of Peisistratus, who governed in this city? Were they not these people?

THE. To be sure they were.

soc. Now, can you tell me what appellation is given to Bacis and Sibyl and our native Amphilytus?1

prophet), was applied to several oracular persons in different places. Amphilytus seems to have come from Acarnania to Athens in the time of Peisistratus.
Τίνα γὰρ ἄλλην, ὥς Σωκράτης, πλὴν γε χρησμοδοί; 

Ε ἔν. 'Ορθῶς λέγεις. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούσδε μοι οὕτω περῶ ἀποκρίνασθαι, τίν' ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει Ἰππίας καὶ Περιανδρὸς διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρχήν; 

ΘΕ. 'Ομαι μὲν τύραννοι: τί γὰρ ἄλλο; 

ΣΗΝ. Οὕκοιν δόσις ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει συμπάντων ἀρχεὺν, τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς τούτοις ἐπιθυμεῖ, τυραννικῆς, καὶ τύραννος εἶναι; 

ΘΕ. Φαίνεται. 

ΣΗΝ. Οὕκοιν ταύτης ἐπιθυμεῖν σὺ φής; 

ΘΕ. 'Εσοίκε γε ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ εἶπον.

Ω μιαρέ, τυραννεῖν ἄρα ἡμῶν ἐπιθυμῶν πάλαι ἐμέμφου τῷ πατρὶ, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἐπεμπεν εἰς [διδασκάλου]² τυραννοδιδασκάλου τινός; καὶ σὺ, ὃ Δημόδοκε, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ πάλαι εἰδῶς οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ οὗτος, καὶ ἔχων δὲν πέμψας αὐτὸν δημιουργὸν ἃν ἐποίησας τῆς σοφίας ἥς ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἑπείτα φθονεῖς τε αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλεις πέμπεν; ἀλλὰ νῦν, ὅρας; ἑπειδὴ ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ κατείρηκε σου, κοινῇ βουλευόμεθα ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ, ἐς τίνος³ ἃν αὐτὸν πέμπομεν καὶ διὰ τὴν τίνος συνουσίαν σοφὸς ἃν γένοιτο τύραννος;

Β ΔΗ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὥς Σωκράτης, βουλευόμεθα δήτα, ὅσ δοκεῖ γε μοι βουλής δεῖν περί τούτου οὐ φαύλης.

ΣΗΝ. Ἐασον, ὥ γαθε. διαπυθώμεθα αὐτοὶ πρῶτον ἐκανός.

ΔΗ. Πυνθάνου δή.
THE. Why, soothsayers, of course, Socrates.

soc. That is correct. But try to answer me in that way regarding those others—Hippias and Periander: what appellation is given them on account of their government?

THE. Despots, I suppose; it must be that.

soc. And when a man desires to govern the whole of the people in his city, he desires the same government as those did—despotism, and to be a despot?

THE. Apparently.

soc. And it is this that you say you desire?

THE. It seems so, from what I have said.

soc. You scoundrel! So you were desiring to be a despot over us, all the time that you were blaming your father for not sending you to some seminary of despots! And you, Demodocus, are you not ashamed of having known all the time what he is desiring, and though you could have sent him where you would have made him an expert in the wisdom which he desires, actually grudging it to him and refusing to send him? But now, look here, as he has declared against you in my presence, shall you and I consult together on the question of whose school we shall send him to, and whose classes will help him to become a wise despot?

DEM. Yes, in faith, Socrates, let us certainly consult, as I feel this is a matter on which no slight counsel is needed.

soc. By and by, my good sir. Let us first cross-examine him thoroughly.

DEM. Examine him then.
Σω. Τί οὖν ἄν, εἰ Εὐριπίδης τι προσχρησαίμεθα, ὅ Θέαγες; Εὐριπίδης γάρ ποῦ φησι
σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνοιοί.
εἰ οὖν ἐροτώτο τις τὸν Εὐριπίδην· ὅ Εὐριπίδης, τῶν τί
σοφῶν συνοιοί φης σοφοὺς εἶναι τοὺς τυράννους;
ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ εἰπόντα
σοφοὶ γεωργοὶ τῶν σοφῶν συνοιοί,
ἡρόμεθα τῶν τί σοφῶν, τί ἄν ἡμῖν ἀπεκρίνατο; ἀρ
ἄν ἄλλο τι ἡ τῶν τὰ γεωργικά;
οὐκ. ἄλλα τοῦτο.
Σω. Τί δὲ; εἰ εἴπε
σοφοὶ μάγειροι τῶν σοφῶν συνοιοί,
εἰ ἡρόμεθα τῶν τί σοφῶν, τί ἄν ἡμῖν ἀπεκρίνατο;
οὐχ οὔτε τῶν τὰ μαγειρικά;
οὐκ. Ναί.
Σω. Τί δ’, εἰ
σοφοὶ παλαίσται τῶν σοφῶν συνοιοί.
εἴπεν, εἰ ἡρόμεθα τῶν τί σοφῶν, ἀρ’ οὐκ ἄν τῶν
D παλαίσται ἔφη;
οὐκ. Ναί.
Σω. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἴπε
σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνοιοί,
ἡμῶν ἐρωτώντων, τῶν τί σοφῶν λέγεις, ὅ Εὐριπίδης;
τί ἄν φαίη; ποία ἄν εἶναι ταῦτα;
οὐκ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί’ οὐκ οἶδ’ ἐγώγε.
Σω. Ἀλλὰ βούλει ἐγώ σοι εἴπω;

1 τῶν τὰ μαγειρικά Hirschig: τῶν μαγειρων, τῶν μαγειρικῶν

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1 This line, also quoted and attributed to Euripides in the
soc. Well now, what if we called in Euripides to our aid, Theages? For you know Euripides says:

Despots are wise by converse with the wise. ¹

Now, if someone should ask Euripides: Euripides, in what are these men wise, by whose converse you say that despots are wise? I mean, suppose he had said:

Farmers are wise by converse with the wise,
and we had asked him,—Wise in what?—what answer would he have given us? Surely none other than,—In farming.

the. That, and none other.
soc. Or again, if he had said:

Piemen are wise by converse with the wise,
and we had asked him,—Wise in what?—what answer would he have given us? He would have said,—In the pie-making business,—would he not?

the. Yes.
soc. Or again, if he had said:

Wrestlers are wise by converse with the wise,
and we had asked him,—Wise in what?—would he not reply,—In wrestling?

the. Yes.
soc. But as he said:

Despots are wise by converse with the wise,
and we ask him,—In what do you mean that the latter are wise, Euripides?—what will he reply? What sort of subjects will he mention here?

the. Why, upon my word, I for my part do not know.
soc. Well, do you mind if I tell you?

Republic (568 a), appears to belong really to Sophocles' lost tragedy The Locrian Ajax.
Ταύτ’ ἐστὶν ἂπερ ἑφη Ἀνακρέων τὴν Καλλικρίτην ἐπίστασθαι· ἦς οὔκ οἶοθα τὸ ἄσμα;

Ἐγγυε. Ἡ οὖν; τοιαύτης τινὸς καὶ σὺ συνουσίας ἐπιθυμεῖς ἀνδρός, ὅστις τυγχάνει ὁμότεχνος ὁν Καλλικρίτη τῇ Κυάνης καὶ ἐπίσταται τυραννικά, ὡστερ ἐκεῖνην ἔφη ὁ ποιητής, ἵνα καὶ σὺ ἡμῖν τύραννος γένη καὶ τῇ πόλει;

Πάλαι, ὁ Σώκρατες, σκόπτεις καὶ παίζεις πρὸς με.

Τί δὲ; οὐ ταύτης φής τῆς σοφίας ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἢ πάντων ἄν τῶν πολιτῶν ἄρχοις; τούτῳ δὲ ποιών ἄλλο τι ἢ τύραννος ἄν εἶης;

Ἐυξαίμην μὲν ἂν, οἶμαι, ἐγγυε τύραννος 126 γενέσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν πάντων ἀνθρώπων, εἰ δὲ μή, ὃς πλείστων· καὶ σὺ γ’ ἂν, οἶμαι, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἀνθρωποί· ἐτι δὲ γε ἵπσως μᾶλλον θεὸς γενέσθαι· ἄλλ’ οὐ τούτου ἐλεγον ἐπιθυμεῖν.

Τί δῆ ἢς τοτε οὖ ἐπιθυμεῖς; οὐ τῶν πολιτῶν φής ἄρχειν ἐπιθυμεῖν;

Οὐ βίᾳ γε οὐδ’ ὡσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἄλ’ ἐκόντων, ὡσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλλόγιμοι ἀνδρείς.

Ἀρά γε λέγεις ὡσπερ Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ Περικλῆς καὶ Κίμων καὶ οὗσι τὰ πολιτικὰ δεινοὶ γεγόνασιν;

Νὴ Δία τούτους λέγω.

Τί οὖν εἰ τὰ ἀπτικὰ ἐτύγχανες ἐπιθυμῶν σοφὸς γενέσθαι; παρὰ τίνας αὖ ἀφικόμενος φήθης

1 Nothing is known of this poem.
THEAGES

THE. If you do not mind.

soc. They are the same subjects that Anacreon said Callicrite understood; or do you not know the ode?¹

THE. I do.

soc. Well then, do you desire to partake in some instruction of that sort from any man who is a fellow-craftsman of Callicrite, daughter of Cyane, and knows all about despotism as she did, according to the poet, in order that you may become a despot over us and our city?

THE. You are joking all this time, Socrates, and making fun of me.

soc. Why, do you not say that you desire that wisdom which will enable you to govern all the citizens? And in doing that, will you be anything else but a despot?

THE. I should indeed pray, I imagine, that I might become a despot, if possible, over all men, and failing that, over as many as might be; so would you, I imagine, and everybody else besides: nay, even more, I daresay, that I might become a god; but I did not say I desired that.

soc. Well, what on earth then is it that you do desire? Do you not say you desire to govern the citizens?

THE. Yes, but not by force, or as despots do, but with their consent, as is done by all the other men of importance in the state.

soc. Do you mean, as by Themistocles and Pericles and Cimon, and by all those who have shown themselves able statesmen?

THE. Yes, in good earnest, I mean those people.

soc. Then what if you chanced to desire to become wise in horsemanship? To whom would you have

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δεινὸς ἐσεσθαὶ ἵππεὺς; ἢ παρ’ ἄλλους τινὰς ἢ τοὺς ἵππικοὺς;

θε. Μὰ Δ’ οὐκ ἐγγυε.

σφ. Ἀλλὰ παρ’ αὐτοὺς αὖ τοὺς δεινοὺς οὖντας ταῦτα, καὶ οἷς εἰσὶ τε ἵπποι καὶ χρώνται ἐκάστοτε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ ἀλλοτρίους πολλοῖς;

θε. Δῆλον ὅτι.

σφ. Τι δὲ εἰ τὰ ἀκοντιστικὰ σοφὸς ἐβούλου γενέσθαι; οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ἀκοντιστικοὺς ὄνοι αὖ ἑλθὼν σοφὸς ἐσεσθαὶ τούτους, οἷς ἑστὶ τε ἀκόντια ὁ καὶ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀλλοτρίοις καὶ οἰκείοις ἐκάστοτε χρώνται ἀκοντίοις;

θε. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

σφ. Λέγε δὴ μοι ἢ πεπε δὴ δὴ τὰ πολιτικὰ βούλει σοφὸς γενέσθαι, οἷς παρ’ ἄλλους τινὰς ἀφικόμενοι σοφὸς ἐσεσθαὶ ἢ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς τούτους, τοὺς αὐτοὺς τε δεινοὺς οὖντας τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ χρωμένους ἐκάστοτε τῇ τε αὐτῶν πόλει καὶ ἀλλαί πολλαῖς, καὶ Ἐλληνικαὶ προσομιλοῦντας πόλεσι καὶ βαρ-βάροις; ἢ δοκεῖς ἄλλοις τινὶ συγγενόμενοι σοφὸς ἐσεσθαὶ ταῦτα, ἀπερ οὗτοι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτοῖς τούτους;

θε. Ἀκήκοα γάρ, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐς σὲ φασὶ λέγεις τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τούτων τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν οἱ νεῖσι οὐδὲν βελτίως εἶσιν ἢ οἱ τῶν σκυτοτόμων καὶ μοι δοκεῖς ἀληθέστατα λέγειν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ δύναμαι αἰσθῆσθαι. ἀνόητος ἂν οὖν εἶχην, εἰ οἰοίμην τινὰ τούτων ἐμοὶ μὲν ἂν παραδούναι τὴν αὐτοῦ σοφίαν, τὸν δὲ νῦν τὸν αὐτοῦ μηδὲν ὁφελήσαι, εἰ τι οἷος τῇ ἡν εἰς ταῦτα ὁφελεῖν ἄλλον ὄντωσον ἀνθρώπων.

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1 Cf. Alcib. I. 118 e; Protag. 320 A, B.
THEAGES

had to resort before expecting to be a clever horse-
man? To whom else but the horse-masters?
THE. To none else, I am sure.
soc. And moreover, you would go to the actual
men who are clever at the business, and who have
horses and constantly use them in great numbers,
both their own and other people's?
THE. Obviously I should.
soc. And what if you wished to become wise in
javelin-throwing? Would you not expect to get this
wisdom by having resorted to those javelin-masters
who have javelins and who constantly use javelins,
both other people's and their own, in great numbers?
THE. I think so.
soc. Then pray tell me, since it is your wish to
become wise in state-matters, do you expect to get
your wisdom by resorting to any other persons than
those statesmen, who not only have their own ability
in state-matters, but have constant dealings with
other cities besides their own, by their intercourse
alike with Greek cities and with foreign peoples?
Or do you think to get wisdom in their business by
resorting to any other persons than these particular
men?
THE. Well, Socrates, I have heard of the argument
that you are said to put forward—that the sons of
those statesmen are no better men than the sons of
shoemakers; and in my opinion your words are very
true, from what I am able to gather. Hence I
should be an utter fool if I supposed that any of
these men would impart his wisdom to me when he
never was of any use to his own son, as he would
have been, if he were able to be of use in this
matter to anyone at all in the world.
Τι οὖν ἂν, ὧ βέλτιστε ἄνδρῶν, χρῆσαι σαντῷ, εἰ σοι ἐπειδὴ γένοιτο υἱὸς τοιαῦτα πράγματα παρέχει, καὶ φαίη μὲν ἂν ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι ζωγράφος, καὶ μέμφοιτο σοι τῷ πατρί, ὅτι οὐκ ἔθελεις ἀναλίσκειν εἰς αὐτῶν τούτων αὐτῶν ἔνεκα ἀργύριον, τοὺς δὲ δημιουργοὺς αὐτοῦ τούτου, τοὺς ζωγράφους, ἀτμαίζοι τε καὶ μὴ βούλοιτο παρ᾽ αὐτῶν μανθάνειν; ἡ τοὺς ἀὐλητᾶς, βουλόμενος ἀὐλητὴς γενέσθαι, ἡ τοὺς κιθαριστᾶς; ἔχοις ἂν αὐτῶ ὁ τί χρὴ καὶ ὁποί πέμποις ἄλλοσι μὴ ἐθέλοντα παρὰ τούτων μανθάνειν;

Ε. Μὰ Δ᾽ οὖν ἐγώγη.  

Νῦν οὖν ταῦτα ταῦτα αὐτῶς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ποιῶν θαυμάζεις καὶ μέμφῃς εἰ ἀπορεῖ ὁ τί σοι χρὴσται καὶ ὁποί πέμπῃ; ἔπει 'Αθηναίων γε τῶν καλῶν καγαθῶν τὰ πολιτικὰ ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ συστήσομεν σε, ὃς σοι προίκα συνέσταται καὶ ἁμα μὲν ἀργύριον οὐκ ἀναλώσεις, ἁμα δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμῆσεις παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλω τῶν συνῶν.

Ε. Τί οὖν, ὡ Σώκρατες; οὐ καὶ σὺ τῶν καλῶν καγαθῶν εἰ ἄνδρῶν; εἰ γὰρ σὺ μοι ἔθελοις συνείναι, ἔξαρκε καὶ οὐδένα ἄλλον ξητῶ.

Β. Τί τούτῳ λέγεις, Θέαγες;  

Δ. Ἡ Σώκρατες, οὐ μέντοι κακῶς λέγει, καὶ ἀμα μὲν ἐμοὶ χαρῆ; ὡς ἐγώ οὖν ἐσθ' ὁ τι τούτου μεῖζον ἂν ἐρμαινὼ ἡγησάμην, ἡ εἰ οὔτος τε ἄρεσκοι τῇ σῇ συννοσίᾳ καὶ σὺ ἔθελοις τούτω συνείναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ αἰσχύνομαι λέγειν ὅσ σφόδρα

1 πέμπῃ Bekker: πέμποι mss.

1 Cf. the passage in the Protagoras (320 a, b) which shows that young men of good family were often placed with older men.
soc. Then which way, most excellent sir, would you turn if, when you came to have a son, he should trouble you in the same manner, and tell you he desired to become a good painter, and should blame you, his father, for refusing to spend money on him for that very purpose, but at the same time should disregard the practitioners of that very thing, the painters, and decline to learn from them? Or the flute-players, when he wished to become a flute-player, or the harp-players? Would you know what to do with him, and where else you should send him if he refused to learn from these?

THE. Upon my word, I should not.

soc. And do you now, when you are behaving in just the same way to your father, feel surprised and blame him for being at a loss what to do with you and where to send you? Why, we are ready to place you with any well-bred Athenian statesman you may choose, who will train you free of charge; and so not only will you be at no expense of money, but will gain far greater commendation amongst the mass of men than if you studied with anyone else.

THE. But then, Socrates, are not you too one of our well-bred gentlemen? Indeed, if you will agree to instruct me, I am content and seek no other.

soc. What do you mean by that, Theages?

DEM. Nay, Socrates, there is nothing amiss in what he says, and you will oblige me at the same time; for I should count it the greatest possible stroke of luck if he should welcome your instruction and you also should consent to instruct him. Nay, indeed, I am quite ashamed to say how keenly I wish friends of standing and experience in order to prepare for public life. Cf. also Meno 94 d.
βούλωμαί  ἂλλ’ ἐγώ ἀμφοτέρων ὑμῶν δέομαι, σὲ τ’ ἐθέλειν τοῦτο συνεῖναι καὶ σὲ μὴ ξητεῖν ἄλλω μηδενὶ συγγενέσθαι ἢ Σωκράτει: καὶ με πολλῶν C καὶ φοβερῶν ἀπαλλάξετε φροντίδων. ὡς νῦν πάνυ φοβοῦμαι ὑπὲρ τούτου, μή τινι ἄλλῳ ἐντύχῃ οἷῳ τούτον διαφθείραι.

θε. Μηκέτι νῦν, ὃ πάτερ, ὑπὲρ γ’ ἐμοῦ φοβοῦ, εἴπερ οἶος τ’ εἰ πείσαι τούτον τὴν ἐμὴν συννοσίαν προσδέξασθαι.

ἀν. Πάνυ καλὸς λέγεις. ὃ Σωκράτες, πρὸς σὲ δ’ ἂν ἐδή εἴη ὁ μετὰ τοῦτο λόγος: ἐγὼ γὰρ σοι ἐτοιμός εἰμι, ὡς διὰ βραχέων εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ὦς οἶον τε οἰκείοτατα παρέχειν, ὅτου ἃν D δέῃ, ἐμβραχυ, ἐὰν Θεάγη τουτοῦ ἀσπάζῃ τε καὶ εὐεργετήσῃ τ’ τι ἂν οἶος τε ἢς.

ῥ. Ὅ Δημόδοκε, τὸ μὲν ἔσπουνδακέναι σε οὐ θαυμᾶζω, εἴπερ οἰεὶ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ μάλιστ’ ἂν σοι τούτον ὕφελεθηναι: οὐ γὰρ οἶδα ὑπὲρ ὅτου ἃν τις νοῦν ἔχων μᾶλλον σπουδάζου ἢ ὑπὲρ νεόν αὐτοῦ, ὅτες ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσται: ὃποθεν δὲ ἐδοξεῖ σοι τούτο, ὡς ἐγὼ ἂν μᾶλλον τὸν σὸν νῦν οἶος τ’ εὑρ’ ὕφελήσαι πρὸς τὸ πολίτην ἁγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἢ σὺ αὐτός, καὶ ὃποθεν οὕτος ὑπῆρ έμε μᾶλλον ἢ σὲ αὐτὸν ὕφελήσειν, τοῦτο πάνι θαυμᾶζω. σὺ γὰρ E πρῶτον μὲν πρεσβύτερος εἴ ἐμοῦ, ἐπειτα πολλὰς ἦδη ἄρχας καὶ τὰς μεγίστας Ἀθηναίοις ἥξεας, καὶ τιμᾶ ὑπὸ Ἀναγυρασίων τε τῶν δημοτῶν πολὺ μᾶλιστα καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδενός ἦττον: ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ἐνορᾶ οὐδέτερος ὑμῶν. ἐπειτα εἰ ἄρα τῆς μὲν τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν συννοσίας Θεάγης ὅδε καταφρονεῖ, ἄλλους

1 τ’ εὑρ’ Priscianus: τῇ τ’ ἦν, τε ἦν mss.
it; but I entreat you both—you, to consent to teach Theages, and you, to seek the teaching of no one else than Socrates; you will thus relieve me of a harassing load of anxiety. For just now I am sorely afraid of his falling in with some other person who is likely to corrupt him.

THE. Have no more fears for me now, father, so long as you are able to persuade him to receive me as his pupil.

DEM. Very rightly spoken. Socrates, from now onward we must address ourselves to you; for I am ready, in short, to place both myself and all that I hold dearest of what is mine in your hands—whatever you may require, absolutely—if you will open your arms to Theages here, and do him any service that you can.

SOC. Demodocus, your zeal is no wonder to me, if you suppose that I especially could be of use to your boy; for I know of nothing for which a sensible man could be more zealous than for his own son’s utmost improvement. But how you came to form this opinion, that I would be better able to be of use to your son in his aim of becoming a good citizen than you would yourself, and how he came to suppose that I rather than yourself would be of use to him—this does fill me with wonder. For you, in the first place, are my elder, and further, you have held in your time many of the highest offices in Athens, and are respected by the people of Anagyrus¹ far above all your fellow-townsmen, and by the whole state as much as any man, whereas neither of you can notice anything like this about me. And moreover, if Theages here does despise the instruction of our statesmen, and is look-

¹ A deme or township of Attica.
δὲ τών ξήτει, οἱ παί δεν εἰπαγγέλλονται οἱ οἱ τε εἶναι νέους ἀνθρώπους, ἐστὶν ἑνταῦθα καὶ Πρόδικος
ὁ Κέιος καὶ Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος καὶ Πάλος ὁ
128 Ἀκραγαντίνος καὶ ἀλλοι πολλοί, οἱ οὕτω σοφοὶ
eἴσπν, ὡστε εἰς τὰς πόλεις ἱόντες πείδουσι τῶν
νέων τοὺς γεννασαντάτους τε καὶ πλουσιωτάτους
οῖς ἔξεστι τῶν πολιτῶν ὦ ἄν βούλωνται προϊκα
συνεῖναι τούτους πείδουσι ἀπολείποντας τὰς
ἐκεῖνων συνουσίας αὐτοῖς συνεῖναι, προσκατα-
tιθέντας ἀργύριον πάνυ πολὺ μισθόν, καὶ χάριν
πρὸς τούτους εἰδέναι. τούτων τών εἰκὼς ἦν
προαιρεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν νυόν σου καὶ αὐτὸν σε, ἐμὲ δ' θε. Ὅρας, ὃ πάτερ; ὡ Ἁρκάτης οὐ πάνυ μοι
dοκεῖ ἐτὶ ἐθέλειν ἐμοὶ συνδιατρίβειν. ἐτεί τὸ γ'
C ἐμὸν ἑτομοῦν, ἐὰν οὔτος ἐθέλη ἀλλὰ ταῦτα παῖξων
πρὸς ἡμᾶς λέγει. ἐτεί ἐγὼ οἴδα τῶν ἐμῶν ἥλικιω-
tῶν καὶ ὀλίγων πρεσβυτέρων, οἳ πρὶν μὲν τούτῳ
συνεῖναι οὔδενός ἄξιοι ἦσαν, ἐπείδη δὲ συνεγένοντο
tούτῳ, ἐν πάνυ ὀλίγω χρόνῳ πάντων βελτίως
φαίνονται ὃν πρότερον χεῖρος.

ἐν. Οἴσθα οἴον οἶον τούτῳ ἑστὶν, ὃ παῖ Δημο-
dόκου;

θε. Ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἐγώγε, ὃτι, ἐὰν σὺ βούλῃ, καὶ

1 πολὺ Beck: πολὺν mss.
ing for some other persons who profess to be able to educate young people, we have here Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias of Leontini, Polus of Acragas, and many more, who are so wise that they go to our cities and persuade the noblest and wealthiest of our young men—who have the choice of learning from any citizen they choose, free of charge—they persuade them to abandon that instruction and learn from them, with a deposit, besides, of a large sum of money as their fee, and to feel thankful in addition. Some of these persons might naturally have been chosen both by your son and by yourself, in preference to me; for I have no knowledge of those fair and beatific subjects of study: I only wish that I had. But what I always say, you know, is that I am in the position of knowing practically nothing except one little subject, that of love-matters. In this subject, however, I claim to be skilled above anybody who has ever lived or is now living in the world.

THE. Do you see, father? Socrates does not seem to me to be at all willing now to spend his time on me; for there is readiness enough on my part, if he is willing. But he is only jesting in what he has just told us. For I know of some of my equals in age, and some a little older, who were of no account before they learnt from him, but after beginning to learn from him have in a very short time proved themselves superior to all whose inferiors they were before.

soc. And do you know what the meaning of it is, son of Demodocus?

THE. Yes, on my soul, I do—that, if it be your

* Ῥ Cobet: δτι mss. 373
εγὼ οἰός τ' ἐσομαι τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι, οὐδέπερ καὶ ἐκεῖνοι.

D ζω. Οὐκ, ὥς γαθε, ἄλλα σε λέληθεν, οἶον τοῦτ' ἐστιν, ἐγὼ δὲ σοι φράσω. ἐστι γὰρ τι θεία μοῖρα παρεπόμενον ἐμοὶ ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον δαιμόνιον· ἐστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή, ἢ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ μοι σημαίνει, ὃ ἄν μέλλω πράττειν, τούτου ἀποτροπὴν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε· καὶ ἐάν τίς μοι τῶν φίλων ἀνακοινώτα τ καὶ γένηται ἡ φωνή, ταῦταν τοῦτο, ἀποτρέπει καὶ οὐκ ἐὰν πράττειν. καὶ τούτων ύμῶν μάρτυρας παρέχομαι. Χαρμίδην γὰρ τούτον γνωσώσκετε τὸν καλὸν γενόμενον, τὸν Γλαύκωνος·

Ειδότος ποτε ἐτύγχανεν ἐμοὶ ἀνακοινούμενοι μέλλων ἀσκήσεων στάδιον εἰς Νεμέαν· καὶ εὐθὺς αὐτοῦ ἀρχομένου λέγειν, ὅτι μέλλοι ἀσκεῖν, ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή, καὶ ἐγὼ διεκόλυνον τε αὐτὸν καὶ εἶπον ὅτι λέγοντός σου μεταξὺ γέγονεν μοι ἡ φωνὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου· ἄλλα μὴ ἄσκει. ἵσως, ἐφη, σημαίνει σοι, ὅτι οὐ νικήσω· ἐγὼ δὲ κἂν μὴ μέλλω νικᾶν, γυμνασάμενος γε τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ὁφεληθήσομαι· ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἦσκει· ἄξιον οὖν πυθέσθαι αὐτοῦ, ὁ

129 αὐτῷ συνέβη ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσκήσεως. εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε, τὸν Τιμάρχου ἀδελφὸν Κλειτόμαχον ἔρεσθε, τί εἰπεν αὐτῷ Τιμάρχος ἥν ἡ ἀποθανούμενος ἦν εὐθὺ τοῦ δημοσίου, ἐκείνῳ τε καὶ Ἐὐαθλος ὁ σταδιοδρόμων, ὡς Τιμάρχον ὑπεδέξατο φέυγοντα· ἐρεῖ γὰρ ύμῖν ὅτι εἰπεν αὐτῷ ταῦτα.

Ω. Τί;

ζω. Ὅ Κλειτόμαχε, ἐφη, ἐγὼ μέντοι ἐρχομαι ἀποθανούμενος νυνί, διότι Σωκράτει οὐκ ἥθελον

1 δημοσίου Baiter: δαιμονίου mss.
pleasure, I too shall be able to become such as those others are.

soc. No, good sir, the meaning of it escapes you; but I will tell it you. There is something spiritual which, by a divine dispensation, has accompanied me from my childhood up. It is a voice that, when it occurs, always indicates to me a prohibition of something I may be about to do, but never urges me on to anything; and if one of my friends consults me and the voice occurs, the same thing happens: it prohibits, and does not allow him to act. And I will produce witnesses to convince you of these facts. You know our Charmides here, who has grown so handsome, the son of Glaucon: he once happened to be consulting me on his intention of training for the Nemean races, and he had no sooner begun to say that he intended to train than the voice occurred, and I tried to prevent him, saying—“Just as you were speaking my spirit-voice has occurred: no, you must not train.” “Perhaps,” said he, “it indicates to you that I shall not win; but even if I am not to win, at any rate the exercise I shall get in the meantime will do me good.” So saying, he went and trained; and so you may as well inquire of him as to the results he got from his training. Or if you like, ask Cleitomachus, brother of Timarchus, what Timarchus said to him when he was going straight to the prison to meet his death, he and Euathlus the racing runner, who had harboured Timarchus as a fugitive; for he will tell you that the words he spoke to him were these:

THE. What?

soc. “Cleitomachus,” he said, “I tell you I am going to my death now, because I would not take
3 409 B.C., when Thrasyllus succeeded in recovering Colophon for Athens. He was one of the commanders put 376
Socrates' advice." Now, why on earth did Timarchus say that? I will tell you. When Timarchus and Philemon, son of Philemonides, got up from the wine-party to kill Nicias, son of Heroscamandrus, those two alone had knowledge of the plot; and Timarchus, as he got up, said to me: "What say you, Socrates? Go on drinking, all of you; I have to get up and go somewhere, but I will join you a little later, if I get the chance." Then occurred that voice of mine, and I said to him: "No, no, do not get up; for my accustomed spiritual sign has occurred to me." So he stopped. Then after an interval of time he again started to go, and said: "Well, I am going, Socrates." Again the voice occurred, and so again I constrained him to stop. The third time, wishing to give me the slip, he got up without saying another word to me; he gave me the slip by watching until my attention was turned elsewhere. Thus it was that he went right off and committed the deed which was the cause of his going then to his death. And hence it was that he spoke those words to his brother which I quoted to you just now, that he was going to his death because he had not taken my advice. And moreover, in regard to the Sicilian business,¹ many will tell you what I said about the destruction of the army. As to bygones, you may hear from those who know: but there is an opportunity now of testing the worth of what the sign says. For as the handsome Sannio was setting out on campaign, the sign occurred to me, and he has gone now with Thrasyllus on an expedition bound for Ephesus and Ionia.² I accord-

to death by the Athenians after the battle of Arginusae, 406 B.C.
ἡ ἀποθανεῖσθαι ἢ ὁμοῦ τι τοῦτω γ' ἔλαν, καὶ περὶ γε τῆς στρατιᾶς τῆς ἄλλης πάνω φοβοῦμαι.

Ε Ἐκείνης δὴ πάντα εἰρηκά σοι, ὅτι ἡ δύναμις αὕτη τοῦ δαμονίου τοῦτο καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας τῶν μετ' ἐμοῦ συνδιατριβῶντων τὸ ἄπαν δύναται. πολλοὶς μὲν γὰρ ἐναντιοῦται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ὧφεληθῆναι μετ' ἐμοὶ διατρίβουσιν, ὥστε οὐχ οἶνον τέ μοι τούτοις συνδιατρίβειν. πολλοὶς δὲ συνεῖμαι μὲν οὐ διακωλύει, ὦφελοῦνται δὲ οὐδὲν συνόντες. οἴς δ' ἀν συλλάβηται τῆς συνουσίας ἡ τοῦ δαμονίου δύναμις, οὕτω εἰςών οὐ καὶ οὐ ᾧσθησαί ταχὺ γὰρ παραχρῆμα ἐπιδιδόασιν. καὶ τοῦτων αὖ τῶν ἐπι-

130 μόνῳ μον τὴν ὦφελειαν· πολλοὶ δὲ, ὅσον ἂν μετ' ἐμοῦ χρόνων ὡς, θαυμάσιων ἐπιδιδόασιν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ μου ἀπόσχωνται, πάλιν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ὡτονων. τοὐτὸ ποτε ἔπαθεν Ἀριστείδης ο Ἀριστείδου. διατρίβων γὰρ μετ' ἐμοὶ πάμπολυ ἐπεδεδώκει ἐν ὁλίγῳ χρόνῳ. ἐπειτα αὐτῷ στρατεία τις ἐγένετο καὶ ὥχετο ἐκπλέων· ἦκων δὲ κατελάμβανε μετ' ἐμοὶ διατρίβοντα Θουκυδίδην τὸν Μελησίου νῦν τοῦ Θουκυδίδου. ὁ δὲ Θουκυδίδης τῇ προτεραίᾳ μοι δὲ ἄπεξεθείας

Β ἐν λόγοις τισὶν ἐγενόει. ἦδον οὖν μὲ ὁ Ἀρι-

στείδης, ἐπειδὴ ἦσσαστό τε καὶ τὰλλα διελέχθη, Θουκυδίδην δὲ, ἐφη, ἄκοιν, ὡ Σώκρατες, σεμινύ-

νεσθαι ἀττα πρὸς σὲ καὶ χαλεπάνεων ὡς τὶ διντα.

1 γ' ἔλαν Hermann: γελάν, ἔλαν mss.

1 Cf. Theaet. 151a, from which this passage is derived. The Aristeides and Thucydides mentioned here were the grandsons respectively of Aristeides, the Athenian statesman of the time of the Persian wars, and of Thucydides, the
ingly expect him to be either killed or brought very near it, and I have great fears for our force as a whole.

Now I have told you all this, because this spiritual power that attends me also exerts itself to the full in my intercourse with those who spend their time with me. To many, indeed, it is adverse, and it is not possible for these to get any good by conversing with me, and I am therefore unable to spend my time in conversing with them. And there are many with whom it does not prohibit my intercourse, yet the intercourse does them no good. But those who are assisted in their intercourse by that spiritual power are the persons whom you have noticed; for they make rapid progress there and then. And of these, again, who make progress some find the benefit both solid and enduring; while there are many who, for as long a time as they are with me, make wonderful progress, but when they are parted from me relapse, and are no different from anybody else. This once befell Aristeides,\(^1\) son of Lysimachus, son of Aristeides. For by conversing with me he had made immense progress in a little time; and then he had to go on an expedition, and he went and sailed away. On his return he found that Thucydides, son of Melesias, son of Thucydides, had been conversing with me. Now Thucydides, the day before, had quarrelled with me over some arguments we had had. So when Aristeides saw me, after greeting me and talking of other affairs, he said: "But Thucydides, I hear, Socrates, is somewhat on his dignity with you, and is annoyed aristocratic opponent of Pericles. Their fathers Lysimachus and Melesias appear in the *Laches.*
'Εστι γὰρ, ἐφην ἐγώ, οὔτως. Τί δέ; οὔκ οἴδεν, ἐφη, πρὶν σοὶ συγγενέσθαι, οἴον ἦν τὸ ἀνδράποδον; Οὐκ ἐοικε γε, ἐφην ἐγώ, νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς. Ἄλλα μὴν καὶ αὐτὸς γε, ἐφη, καταγελάστως ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τί μάλιστα; ἐφην ἐγώ. Ὅτι, ἐφη, πρὶν μὲν ἐκπλεῖν, ὅτωσιν ἀνθρώπων οἴος τ' ἦν διαλέγεσθαι καὶ μηδενὸς χείρων φαίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ὥστε καὶ ἐδίωκον τὰς συνουσίας τῶν χαριστάτων ἀνθρώπων· νυνὶ δὲ τοῦνατίον φεύγω, ἂν τινα καὶ αἰσθάνομαι πεπαιδευμένον· οὕτως αἰσχύνομαι ἐπὶ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ φαυλότητι. Πότερον δέ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἐξαίφνης σε προὐλπειν αὑτὴ ἢ δύναμις ἢ κατὰ σμικρόν; Κατὰ σμικρόν, ἢ δ' ὦς. Ἡνίκα δέ σοι παρεγένετο, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, πότερον

D μαθόντι παρ' ἐμοῦ τι παρεγένετο, ἢ τινι ἀλλιν τρόπω; Ἐγώ σοι ἔρω, ἐφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπιστον μὲν νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀληθὲς δὲ· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐμαθον μὲν παρὰ σοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε, ὡς αὐτὸς οἰσθα· ἐπεδίδουν δὲ, ὅποτε σοι συνείην, κἂν εἰ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ μόνον οἰκίᾳ εἴην, μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ οἰκήματι, μᾶλλον δὲ ὅποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰκήματι· καὶ ἔμοι γε ἐδόκοιν πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰκήματι· ὅψ σου Βλέποιμι πρὸς σέ, μᾶλλον ἡ

E ὅποτε ἀλλοσε ὅρφην· πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ πλεῖστον ἐπεδίδουν, ὅποτε παρ' αὐτὸν σε καθοίμην ἔχο- μενός σου καὶ ἀπτόμενος. νῦν δέ, ἢ δ' ὦς, πάσα ἐκείνη ἡ ἐξις ἐξερρύηκεν.

'Εστων οὖν, ὦ Θέαγες, τοιαύτη ἡ ἡμετέρα συν- ουσία· ἐὰν μὲν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ἦ, πάνω πολὺ ἐπι- δώσεις καὶ ταχύ, εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. ὥρα οὖν μὴ σοι
as though he were somebody. "Yes, that is so," I replied. "Well, but does he not know," he said, "what a sad slave he was, before he associated with you?" "It seems not," I replied, "upon my soul." "But indeed I myself also," he said, "am in a ridiculous position, Socrates." "How exactly?" I asked. "Because," he replied, "before I sailed away, I was able to discuss things with anybody, and show myself inferior to none in argument, so that I even sought out the debates of the most accomplished people: but now, on the contrary, I shun them, wherever I notice there is anyone of education, so ashamed I am of my own ineptitude." "Tell me," I said, "did this power forsake you of a sudden, or little by little?" "Little by little," he replied. "And when it was present with you," I asked, "was it present through your having learnt something from me, or in some other way?" "I will tell you, Socrates," he said, "what is incredible, upon my soul, yet true. For I never yet learnt anything from you, as you know yourself: but I made progress, whenever I was with you, if I was merely in the same house, without being in the same room, but more progress, when I was in the same room. And it seemed to me to be much more when I was in the same room and looked at you as you were speaking, than when I turned my eyes elsewhere: but my progress was far the greatest and most marked whenever I sat beside you and held and touched you. Now, however," he said, "that condition has all oozed away."

Such then, Theages, is the intercourse you would have with me: if God so wills, you will make very great and rapid progress, but otherwise, you will
άσφαλέστερον ἦ παρ’ ἐκείνων των παιδεύεσθαι, οἱ ἐγκρατεῖς αὐτοὶ εἰσὶ τῆς ὑφελίας ἢν ὑφελοῦσι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, μᾶλλον ἦ παρ’ ἐμοὶ ὃ τι ἂν τύχῃ τούτο πράξαι.

130 ΘΕ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν τοὺς δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατε, ἡμᾶς οὔτωσι ποιῆσαι, ἀποπειραθήναι τοῦ δαμιονίου τούτου συνόντας ἄλληλοις. καὶ ἐὰν μὲν παρείκη ἡμῖν, ταῦτα βέλτιστα· εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἡδή παρα-χρήμα βουλευσόμεθα ὃ τι δράσομεν, εἴτε ἄλλω συνεσόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον τὸ σοὶ γιγνό-μενον πειρασόμεθα παραμυθεῖσθαι εὐχαίστε τε καὶ θυσίαις καὶ ἄλλω ὅτι ἂν οἱ μάντεις ἔξηγονται.

131 δὴ. Μηκέτι πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντείπῃς, ὦ Σώκρατε, τῷ μειρακίῳ· εὖ γὰρ λέγει Θεάγης.

ἘΝ. Ἔλλ’ εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆραι οὔτω ποιεῖν, οὔτω ποιῶμεν.
Consider, therefore, if it is not safer for you to be educated by one of those persons who have command themselves of the benefit which they bestow on mankind, rather than follow the course on which you may chance with me.

THE. Well then, I decide, Socrates, that our plan shall be to make trial of that spiritual sign by associating with each other. Thus, if it leaves us free, that will be best of all; if it does not, it will be time then for us to consider, at the moment, what we shall do—whether we shall associate with someone else, or try to conciliate the divine sign itself that occurs to you with prayers and sacrifices and anything else that the seers may indicate.

DEM. In view of this, Socrates, say no more in opposition to the lad; for Theages is right in what he says.

SOC. Well, if you consider that this is what we ought to do, let us do it.
This Dialogue may be classed with the _Hipparchus_ as a fairly able and plausible imitation of Plato's early work, but it is destitute of those graceful or lively touches of characterization which distinguish his first memorials of Socrates, while the sequence of thought is awkward and none too clear. Socrates asks his nameless companion for a definition of Law, and shows how the various answers he receives are unsound or inadequate. He then himself suggests (315) that it must be true opinion, or discovery of reality. His companion thereupon shows at some length how greatly laws differ among different communities. Socrates recalls him to the point that there must be something constant and the same in all that can be referred to as law, and cites medicine, agriculture, gardening, and cookery as giving instances of what he is seeking (316). His requirement of knowledge of what is right in every kind of artist or administrator leads him on to a consideration of lawgiving as a distributive skill \(^2\) which pervades all arts and functions (317–318), and he proceeds, with a somewhat laboured solemnity, to set forth

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1 Contrast the discussion in _Meno_, 97-8, where right opinion is clearly distinguished from knowledge.

2 See note on 317 d for this absurd forcing of the primitive notion of "distribution" or "apportionment" from the word _νόμος_.

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the merits of Minos, king of Cnossos in Crete, as a lawgiver (319–320): but, just as we are hoping to gain from this long exposition a little more light for our inquiry about the meaning of law, we are abruptly told that our ignorance is shameful, and the discussion is thus clumsily broken off.
ΜΙΝΩΣ Η ΠΕΡΙ ΝΟΜΟΤ

[ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ

Σημ. 'Ο νόμος ἡμῖν τί ἐστίν;
Ετ. Ποῖον καὶ ἐρωτᾶς τῶν νόμων;
Σημ. Τί δὲ; ἐστὶν ὁ τι διαφέρει νόμος νόμου κατὰ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, κατὰ τὸ νόμος εἶναι; σκόπει γὰρ δὴ ὁ τυγχάνω ἐρωτῶν σε. ἐρωτῶ γὰρ, ὥσπερ εἰ ἀνηρόμην, τί ἐστὶ χρυσός, εἰ μὲ ὠσαύτως ἀνήρου, ὅποιον καὶ λέγω χρυσόν, οὕμαί σε οὖκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔρεσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ποὺ διαφέρει οὔτε χρυσός ὁ χρυσός οὔτε λίθος λίθου κατὰ γε τὸ λίθος εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ χρυσός. οὔτω δὲ οὔδὲ νόμος ποὺ νόμου οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ πάντες εἰσὶ ταὐτόν. νόμος γὰρ ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ὁμοίως, οὐχ ὃ μὲν μάλλον, ὃ δὲ ἦττον τοῦτο δὴ αὐτὸ ἐρωτῶ, τὸ πᾶν τί ἐστὶ νόμος. εἰ οὖν σοι πρόχειρον, εἰπέ.
Ετ. Τί οὖν ἀλλο νόμος εἳ ἂν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἡ τὰ νομιζόμενα;

1 ποίον Hermann: ὁ ποίον mss.

1 νομιζόμενα in ordinary speech meant "accepted by custom"; "loyally" here attempts to preserve the connexion 388
MINOS or ON LAW
[political]

CHARACTERS
Socrates, Companion

soc. Tell me, what is law?
com. To what kind of law does your question refer?
soc. What! Is there any difference between law and law, in this particular point of being law? For just consider what is the actual question I am putting to you. It is as though I had asked, what is gold: if you had asked me in the same manner, to what kind of gold I refer, I think your question would have been incorrect. For I presume there is no difference between gold and gold, or between stone and stone, in point of being gold or stone; and so neither does law differ at all from law, I suppose, but they are all the same thing. For each of them is law alike, not one more so, and another less. That is the particular point of my question—what is law as a whole? So if you are ready, tell me.
com. Well, what else should law be, Socrates, but things loyalty accepted?  

with νόμος (“law” in this context, though sometimes “custom,” as below, 315 d).
μν. Ἡ καὶ λόγος σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα, ἡ ὤφις τὰ ὀρῶμενα, ἡ ἀκοὴ τὰ ἀκούομενα; ἡ ἄλλο

εἰ μὲν λόγος, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ λεγόμενα· καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ὤφις, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ ὀρῶμενα· καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ἀκοὴ, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ ἀκούομενα, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ νόμος, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ νομιζόμενα; οὔτως ἡ πῶς σοι δοκεῖ;

ετ. Ἀλλο μοι νῦν ἐφανῇ.

μν. Οὐκ ἀρα νόμος ἐστὶ τὰ νομιζόμενα.

ετ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

μν. Τί δήτ' ἂν εἰη νόμος; ἐπισκεψώμεθα αὐτὸ ὀδε. εἰ τις ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν δὴ λεγόμενα ἀνήρετο,

314 ἐπειδὴ ὤφει φατὲ τὰ ὀρῶμενα ὀρᾶσθαι, τίνι ὄντι τῇ ὤφει ὀρᾶται; ἀπεκρινάμεθ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὃτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δηλοῦσθαι τὰ πράγματα· εἰ δ' αὖ ἦρετο ἡμᾶς, τί δὲ; ἐπειδὴ ἀκοῆ τὰ ἀκούομενα ἀκούεται, τίνι ὄντι τῇ ἁκοῆ; ἀπεκρινάμεθ' ἂν αὐτῶ, ὃτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὦτων δηλοῦσθαι ἡμῖν τὰς φωνὰς. οὔτω τοῖνυν καὶ εἰ ἀνέροιτο ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ νόμῳ τὰ νομιζόμενα νομίζεται, τίνι ὄντι τῷ νόμῳ νομίζεται; πότερον

Β αἰσθῆσει τυλὶ ἡ δηλώσει, ὥσπερ τὰ μανθανόμενα μανθάνεται δηλοῦσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἡ εὐρέσει τυλὶ, ὥσπερ τὰ εὑρισκόμενα εὑρίσκεται, οἶνον τὰ μὲν ύμνεινα καὶ νοσώδη ἰατρικῇ, ἂ δὲ οἱ θεοὶ διανοοῦνται, ὡς φασίν οἱ μάντεις, μαντικῇ ἡ γὰρ ποὺ τέχνη ἡμῖν εὑρεσὶς ἐστὶ τῶν πραγμάτων· ἡ γὰρ;

ετ. Πάνῳ γε.

μν. Τί οὖν ἂν ταύτων ὑπολάβομεν μάλιστα τὸν νόμον εἶναι;

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soc. And so speech, you think, is the things that are spoken, or sight the things seen, or hearing the things heard? Or is speech something distinct from the things spoken, sight something distinct from the things seen, and hearing something distinct from the things heard; and so law is something distinct from things Loyally accepted? Is this so, or what is your view?

com. I find it now to be something distinct.

soc. Then law is not things Loyally accepted.

com. I think not.

soc. Now what can law be? Let us consider it in this way. Suppose someone had asked us about what was stated just now: Since you say it is by sight that things seen are seen, what is this sight whereby they are seen? Our answer to him would have been: That sensation which shows objects by means of the eyes. And if he had asked us again: Well then, since it is by hearing that things heard are heard, what is hearing? Our answer to him would have been: That sensation which shows us sounds by means of the ears. In the same way then, suppose he should also ask us: Since it is by law that Loyally accepted things are so accepted, what is this law whereby they are so accepted? Is it some sensation or showing, as when things learnt are learnt by knowledge showing them, or some discovery, as when things discovered are discovered—for instance, the causes of health and sickness by medicine, or the designs of the gods, as the prophets say, by prophecy; for art is surely our discovery of things, is it not?

com. Certainly.

soc. Then what thing especially of this sort shall we surmise law to be?
et. Τὰ δόγματα ταῦτα καὶ ψηφίσματα, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. τι γὰρ ἀν ἄλλο τις φαίη νόμον εἶναι; εἰς ταῦτα κινδυνεύει, δόγμα πόλεως εἰναι.

ἐπ. Δόξαν, ὃς ἐσκε, λέγεις πολιτικὴν τὸν νόμον.

ἐτ. Ὄγωγε.

ἐπ. Καὶ ὅσως καλῶς λέγεις: τάχα δὲ ὅδε ἀμείνον εἰσόμεθα. λέγεις τινὰς σοφοὺς;

ἐτ. Ὅγωγε.

ἐπ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ σοφοὶ εἰσι σοφία σοφοὶ;

ἐτ. Ναὶ.

ἐπ. Τί δὲ; οἱ δίκαιοι δικαιοσύνη δίκαιοι;

ἐτ. Πάνυ γε.

ἐπ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ νόμιμοι νόμῳ νόμιμοι;

ἐτ. Ναὶ.

ἐπ. Οἱ δὲ ἁνομοὶ ἁνομία ἁνομοὶ;

ἐτ. Ναὶ.

ἐπ. Οἱ δὲ νόμιμοι δίκαιοι;

ἐτ. Ἄδικοι.

ἐπ. Οὐκοῦν κάλλιστον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ὁ νόμος;

ἐτ. Οὔτως.

ἐπ. Αἰσχυστὸν δὲ ἡ ἄδικα τε καὶ ἡ ἁνομία;

ἐτ. Ναὶ.

ἐπ. Καὶ τὸ μὲν σώζει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰλλα πάντα, τὸ δὲ ἀπόλλυσι καὶ ἀνατρέπει;

ἐτ. Ναὶ.

ἐπ. Ἡς περὶ καλὸν ἀρὰ τινὸς ὄντος δεὶ τοῦ νόμου διανοοέσθαι, καὶ ὃς ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ ζητεῖν.

ἐτ. Πῶς δ’ οὐ;
com. Our resolutions and decrees, I imagine: for how else can one describe law? So that apparently the whole thing, law, as you put it in your question, is a city's resolution.

soc. State opinion, it seems, is what you call law.
com. I do.

soc. And perhaps you are right: but I fancy we shall get a better knowledge in this way. You call some men wise?
com. I do.

soc. And the wise are wise by wisdom?
com. Yes.

soc. And again, the just are just by justice?
com. Certainly.

soc. And so the law-abiding are law-abiding by law?
com. Yes.

soc. And the lawless are lawless by lawlessness?
com. Yes.

soc. And the law-abiding are just?
com. Yes.

soc. And the lawless are unjust?
com. Unjust.

soc. And justice and law are most noble?
com. That is so.

soc. And injustice and lawlessness most base?
com. Yes.

soc. And the former preserve cities and everything else, while the latter destroy and overturn them?
com. Yes.

soc. Hence we must regard law as something noble, and seek after it as a good.
com. Undeniably.
ευκούν δόγμα ἐφαμεν εἶναι πόλεως τὸν νόμον;

Ε ἐτ. "Εφαμεν γάρ.

ἐπ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἐστι τὰ μὲν χρηστὰ δόγματα, τὰ δὲ πονηρά;

ἐτ. "Εστι μὲν οὖν.

ἐπ. Καὶ μὴν νόμος γε οὐκ ἂν πονηρός.

ἐτ. Οὐ γάρ.

ἐπ. Οὐκ ἂρα ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἀποκρίνεσθαι οὕτως ἀπλῶς, ὥστε νόμος ἐστὶ δόγμα πόλεως.

ἐτ. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ἐπ. Οὐκ ἂρα ἀρμόττων ἂν τὸ πονηρὸν δόγμα νόμος εἶναι.

ἐτ. Οὐ δήτα.

ἐπ. Ἅλλα μὴν δόξα γε τις καὶ αὐτῷ μοι καταφαίνεται ὁ νόμος εἶναι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐχ ἂν πονηρὰ δόξα, ἂρα οὐκ ἂδη τούτο κατάδηλον, ὡς ἂν χρηστὴ, εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστίν;

ἐτ. Ναὶ.

ἐπ. Δόξα δὲ χρηστὴ τίς ἐστίν; οὐχ ἂν ἀληθῆς;

ἐτ. Ναὶ.

ο. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀληθῆς δόξα τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἐξεύρεσις;

ἐτ. "Εστι γάρ.

ἐπ. Ὡς οὖν, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰ ὁ νόμος τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἐξεύρεσις, οὐκ ἂεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρώμεθα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, εἰ τὰ ὄντα γε ἂμεν ἐξηύρηται;

ἐπ. Βούλεται μὲν οὐδεὶς ἄττον ὁ νόμος εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις. οἱ δ’ ἂρα μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἂεὶ 394
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soc. And we said that law is a city's resolution?
com. So we did.
soc. Well now, are not some resolutions good, and others evil?
com. Yes, to be sure.
soc. And, you know, law was not evil.
com. No, indeed.
soc. So it is not right to reply, in such downright fashion, that law is a city's resolution.
com. I agree that it is not.
soc. An evil resolution, you see, cannot properly be a law.
com. No, to be sure.
soc. But still, I am quite clear myself that law is some sort of opinion; and since it is not evil opinion, is it not manifest by this time that it is good opinion, granting that law is opinion?
com. Yes.
soc. But what is good opinion? Is it not true opinion?
com. Yes.
soc. And true opinion is discovery of reality?
com. Yes, it is.
soc. So law tends to be discovery of reality.
com. Then how is it, Socrates, if law is discovery of reality, that we do not use always the same laws on the same matters, if we have thus got realities discovered?
soc. Law tends none the less to be discovery of reality: but men, who do not use always the same
Β νόμοις χρώμενοι ἄνθρωποι, ὡς δοκοῦμεν, οὐκ ἄει
dύνανται ἐξευρίσκειν ὁ βουλεται ὁ νόμος, τὸ ὄν.
επει φέρε ἰδωμεν, ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε κατάδηλον γέ-
nηται, εἴτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἄει νόμοις χρώμεθα ἡ ἄλλοτε
ἄλλοις, καὶ εἰ ἀπαντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡ ἄλλοι ἄλλοις.

ετ. Ἀλλὰ τούτο γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐ χαλεπῶν
gνώναι, ὃτι οὔτε οἱ αὐτοὶ ἄει τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις
χρώνται ἄλλοι τε ἄλλοι. επεὶ αὐτίκα ἡμῖν μὲν
οὐ νόμος ἐστὶν ἄνθρωποι θύειν ἀλλ' ἀνόσιον,

C Καρχηδόνοι δε θύουσιν ὡς οἰσιν ὁν καὶ νόμιμον
αὐτοῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἔνιοι αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν
υεῖς τῷ Κρόνῳ, ὡς ἵσως καὶ οὐ ἀκήκοας. καὶ μὴ
ὅτι βάρβαροι ἄνθρωποι ἡμῖν ἄλλους νόμους χρώνται,
ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Λυκαίᾳ οὕτω καὶ οἱ του 'Αθάμαν-
toς ἔγκυοι οίας θυσίας θύουσιν 'Ελληνες οὐτες·
ἀστερ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οἴσθα ποιον καὶ αὐτοῦ
ἀκούων, οἰον νόμους ἐχρώμεθα πρὸ τοῦ περὶ τοὺς
ἀποθανόντας, ἱερείᾳ τε προσφάττοντες πρὸ τῆς

D ἐκφορᾶς τοῦ νεκροῦ καὶ ἐγχυτριστρίας μετα-
πεμπόμενοι· οἱ δ' αὐτ έκείνων ἐτὶ πρότεροι αὐτοῦ
καὶ ἔθαπτον ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τοὺς ἀποθανόντας· ἡμεῖς
dὲ τούτων οὔδεν ποιοῦμεν. μμῦρια δ' ᾧν τις ἐχοι
tοιαῦτα εἰπεῖν πολλῇ γὰρ εὐρυχωρία τῆς ἀπο-
δείξεως, ὡς οὔτε ἡμεῖς ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἄει κατὰ
tαῦτα νομίζομεν οὔτε ἄλληλοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι.

ζα. Οὔδεν τοι θαυμαστὸν ἔστιν, ὃ βέλτιστε,
eἰ σὺ μὲν ὁρθῶς λέγεις, ἐμὲ δὲ τούτο λέληθεν. ἀλλ'
ἔως ἂν σὺ τε κατὰ σαυτὸν λέγῃς ἂ σου δοκεῖ μακρῷ

1 Or Lycoa, a town in the Arcadian district Maenalia.
2 Cf. Herod. vii. 197. At Alus in Achaea Xerxes was
told of human sacrifices offered to purge the guilt of Athamas
in plotting the death of his son Phrixius.
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laws, as we observe, are not always able to discover what the law is intent on—reality. For come now, let us see if from this point onward we can get it clear whether we use always the same laws or different ones at different times, and whether we all use the same, or some of us use some, and others others.

com. Why, that, Socrates, is no difficult matter to determine—that the same men do not use always the same laws, and also that different men use different ones. With us, for instance, human sacrifice is not legal, but unholy, whereas the Carthaginians perform it as a thing they account holy and legal, and that too when some of them sacrifice even their own sons to Cronos, as I daresay you yourself have heard. And not merely is it foreign peoples who use different laws from ours, but our neighbours in Lycaea¹ and the descendants of Athamas²—you know their sacrifices, Greeks though they be. And as to ourselves too, you know, of course, from what you have heard yourself, the kind of laws we formerly used in regard to our dead, when we slaughtered sacred victims before the funeral procession, and engaged urn-women to collect the bones from the ashes. Then again, a yet earlier generation used to bury the dead where they were, in the house: but we do none of these things. One might give thousands of other instances; for there is ample means of proving that neither we copy ourselves nor mankind each other always in laws and customs.

soc. And it is no wonder, my excellent friend, if what you say is correct, and I have overlooked it. But if you continue to express your views after your own fashion in lengthy speeches, and I speak likewise, we
Ελόγω καὶ πάλιν ἐγώ, οὔδὲν μὴ ποτε συμβῶμεν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἷμαι· έὰν δὲ κοινὸν τεθή τὸ σκέμμα, τάχ' ἀν ὁμολογήσαμεν. εἰ μὲν οὖν βούλει, πυθανόμενός τι παρ' ἐμοὶ κοινὴ μετ' ἐμοὶ σκόπει· εἰ δ' αὐ βούλει, ἀποκρινόμενος.

ετ. 'Αλλ' ἐθέλω, ὅ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὦ τι αὖ βούλῃ.

ση. Φέρε δὴ, σὺ πότερα νομίζεις τὰ δίκαια ἀδικα εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἀδικα δίκαια, ἢ τὰ μὲν δίκαια δίκαια, τὰ δὲ ἀδικα ἀδικα;

ετ. 'Εγὼ μὲν τὰ τε δίκαια δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀδικα ἀδικα.

316 ση. Οὐκοῦν καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν οὖτως ὡς ἐνθάδε νομίζεται;

ετ. Ναί.

ση. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις;

ετ. Ἡ Καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις. 1

ση. 'Αλλ' ἄει δῆπον;

ετ. 'Αεὶ.

ση. Πότερον δὲ τὰ πλεῖον ἐλκοντα βαρύτερα νομίζεται ἐνθάδε, τὰ δὲ ἐλαττον κοιφότερα, ἢ τούναντίον;

ετ. Οὐκ, ἄλλα τὰ πλεῖον ἐλκοντα βαρύτερα, τὰ δὲ ἐλαττον κοιφότερα.

ση. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι καὶ ἐν Λυκαία;

ετ. Ναί.

ση. Τὰ μὲν καλά, ὡς ἑοικε, πανταχοῦ νομίζεται Β καλά καὶ τὰ άισχρά άισχρά, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰ άισχρά καλά οὔδε τὰ καλά άισχρά.

ετ. Οὔτως.

ση. Οὐκοῦν, ὡς κατὰ πάντων εἴπειν, τὰ ὄντα 1 καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις add. vulg.

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shall never come to any agreement, in my opinion: but if we study the matter jointly, we may perhaps concur. Well now, if you like, hold a joint inquiry with me by asking me questions; or if you prefer, by answering them.

com. Why, I am willing, Socrates, to answer anything you like.

soc. Come then, do you consider just things to be unjust and unjust things just; or just things to be just and unjust things unjust?

com. I consider just things to be just, and unjust things unjust.

soc. And are they so considered among all men elsewhere as they are here?

com. Yes.

soc. And among the Persians also?

com. Among the Persians also.

soc. Always, I presume?

com. Always.

soc. Are things that weigh more considered heavier here, and things that weigh less lighter, or the contrary?

com. No, those that weigh more are considered heavier, and those that weigh less lighter.

soc. And is it so in Carthage also, and in Lycaea?

com. Yes.

soc. Noble things, it would seem, are everywhere considered noble, and base things base; not base things noble or noble things base.

com. That is so.

soc. And thus, as a universal rule, realities, and

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1 The word νουλικεω here and in what follows is intended to retain some of the sense of νόμος as "accepted" law and custom which it had in what precedes; see note, 313 b.
νομίζεται εἶναι, οὐ τὰ μὴ ὄντα, καὶ παρ’ ἦμῖν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασών.

et. "Ἐμοιῇ ποθεῖ.

ἐπ. "Ὅς ἄν ἁρὰ τοῦ ὄντος ἄμαρτάνη, τοῦ νομίμου ἄμαρτάνει.

et. Οὕτω μὲν, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ταύτα φαίνεται νόμιμα καὶ ἦμῖν ἀεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις.

Ο ἑπειδὰν δ’ ἐννοῆσαι, ὡσι σὺδὲν πανόμεθα ἂνω κἀτω μετατιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους, οὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι.

ἐπ. "Ἰσως γὰρ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ταύτα μεταπεπτευόμενα ὧτι ταύτα ἐστιν. ἄλλ’ ὡδε μετ’ ἐμοῦ αὐτὰ ἀθρεί. ἦδη ποτὲ ἐνέτυχες συγγράμματι περὶ ὑγιείας τῶν καμνόντων;

et. "Ἐγωγε.

ἐπ. Ὄδοια οὖν, τίνος τέχνης τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ σύγγραμμα;

et. Οἶδα, ὧτι ἰατρικῆς.

ἐπ. Ὄυκοιν ἰατροῦς καλεῖσ τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας περὶ τούτων;

et. Φημί.

D ἐπ. Πότερον οὖν οἱ ἐπιστήμονες ταύτα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν νομίζουσιν ἢ ἄλλοι ἄλλα;

et. Ταύτα ἐμοιῇ δοκοῦσιν.

ἐπ. Πότερον οἱ "Ελληνες μόνοι τοῖς "Ελλησί. ἢ καὶ οἱ βαρβάροι αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς "Ελλησί, περὶ ὡν ἂν εἰδῶσι, ταύτα νομίζουσιν;

et. Ταύτα δήπου πολλῇ ἁνάγκῃ ἐστὶ τοὺς εἰδότας αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς συνομίζειν καὶ "Ελληνας καὶ βαρβάρους.

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not unrealities, are accepted as real, both among us and among all other men.

com. I agree.

soc. Then whoever fails to attain reality, fails to attain accepted law.

com. In your present way of putting it, Socrates, the same things appear to be accepted as lawful both by us and by the rest of the world, always: but when I reflect that we are continually changing our laws in all sorts of ways, I cannot bring myself to assent.

soc. Perhaps it is because you do not reflect that when we change our pieces at draughts they are the same pieces. But look at it, as I do, in this way. Have you in your time come across a treatise on healing the sick?

com. I have.

soc. Then do you know to what art such a treatise belongs?

com. I do: medicine.

soc. And you give the name of doctors to those who have knowledge of these matters?

com. Yes.

soc. Then do those who have knowledge accept the same views on the same things, or do they accept different views?

com. The same, in my opinion.

soc. Do Greeks only accept the same views as Greeks on what they know, or do foreigners also agree on these matters, both among themselves and with Greeks?

com. It is quite inevitable, I should say, that those who know should agree in accepting the same views, whether Greeks or foreigners.
Καλώς γε ἀπεκρίνω. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀεὶ;

Ναὶ καὶ ἀεὶ.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ συγγράφουσι περὶ Ἐὐγείας, ἀπερ καὶ νομίζουσι εἶναι;

Ναϊ.

Ἔτη τρικά ἀρα καὶ ἰατρικὸς νόμοι τἄτα τὰ συγγράμματα ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν.

Ναϊ.

'Αρ' οὖν καὶ τὰ γεωργικὰ συγγράμματα γεωργικοὶ νόμοι εἰσίν;

Ναϊ.

Τίνων οὖν ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ κήπων ἔργασίας συγγράμματα καὶ νόμιμα;

Κηπουρῶν.

Κηπουρικοὶ ἄρα νόμοι ἡμῖν εἰσίν οὕτωι.

Ναϊ.

Τῶν ἑπισταμένων κήπων ἄρχειν;

Πῶς δ' οὖ;

'Επιστανται δ' οἱ κηπουροί.

Ναϊ.

Τίνων δὲ τὰ περὶ ὅψου σκευασίας συγγράμματα τε καὶ νόμιμα;

Μαγείρων.

Μαγειρικὸς ἄρα νόμοι εἰσίν;

Μαγειρικὸς.

Τῶν ἑπισταμένων, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅψον σκευασίας ἄρχειν;

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'Επιστανται δ', ὡς φασίν, οἱ μάγειροι;

'Επιστανται γάρ.

Entered: τίνων δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ πόλεως διοικήσεως
soc. Well answered. And do they so always?
com. Yes, it is so always.
soc. And do doctors on their part, in their treatises on health, write what they accept as real?
com. Yes.
soc. Then these treatises of the doctors are medical, and medical laws.
com. Medical, to be sure.
soc. And are agricultural treatises likewise agricultural laws?
com. Yes.
soc. And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about garden-work?
com. Gardeners'.
soc. So these are our gardening laws.
com. Yes.
soc. Of people who know how to control gardens?
com. Certainly.
soc. And it is the gardeners who know.
com. Yes.
soc. And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about the confection of tasty dishes?
com. Cooks'.
soc. Then there are laws of cookery?
com. Of cookery.
soc. Of people who know, it would seem, how to control the confection of tasty dishes?
com. Yes.
soc. And it is the cooks, they say, who know?
com. Yes, it is they who know.
soc. Very well; and now, whose are the treatises
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συγγράμματά τε και νόμιμα ἔστων; ἂρ' οὐ τῶν ἑπισταμένων πόλεων ἄρχειν;

ἐτ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ἐπ. Ἐπιστανται δὲ ἄλλοι τινες ἢ οἱ πολιτικοὶ τε καὶ οἱ βασιλικοὶ;

ἐτ. Οὔτοι μὲν οὖν.

ἐπ. Πολιτικὰ ἁρὰ ταῦτα συγγράμματα ἔστων, οὐς οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμους καλοῦσι, βασιλέως τε καὶ Ἄνδρῶν ἄγαθῶν συγγράμματα.

ἐτ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ἐπ. Ἀλλο τι οὖν οἱ γε ἑπιστάμενοι οὐκ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα συγγράφουσι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν;

ἐτ. Οὔ.

ἐπ. Οὐδὲ μεταθήσονται ποτε περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἑτερα καὶ ἑτερα νόμιμα;

ἐτ. Οὐ δήτα.

ἐπ. Ἐὰν οὖν ὁρῶμεν τινὰς ὑπονοοῦν τοῦτο ποιοῦντας, πότερα φήσομεν ἑπιστήμονας εἶναι ἢ ἀνεπιστήμονας τοὺς τοῦτο ποιοῦντας;

ἐτ. Ἀνεπιστήμονας.

ἐπ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ δὲ μὲν ἂν ὀρθὸν ὧ, νόμιμον αὐτὸ φήσομεν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι, ἢ τὸ ἱστρικὸν ἢ τὸ μαγειρικόν ἢ τὸ κηπουρικόν;

ἐτ. Ναῖ.

C ἐπ. "Ο δ' ἄν μὴ ὀρθὸν ὧ, οὐκέτι φήσομεν τοῦτο νόμιμον εἶναι;

ἐτ. Οὐκέτι.

ἐπ. Ἀνομον ἀρα γίγνεται.

ἐτ. Ἀνάγκη.

ἐπ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασι τοῖς περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἄδικων καὶ ὅλως περὶ πόλεως
and accepted rules about the government of a state? Of the people who know how to control states, are they not?

com. I agree.
soc. And is it anyone else than statesmen and royal persons\(^1\) who know?

com. It is they, to be sure.
soc. Then what people call "laws" are treatises of state,—writings of kings and good men.

com. That is true.
soc. And must it not be that those who know will not write differently at different times on the same matters?

com. They will not.
soc. Nor will they ever change one set of accepted rules for another in respect of the same matters.

com. No, indeed.
soc. So if we see some persons anywhere doing this, shall we say that those who do so have knowledge, or have none?

com. That they have no knowledge.
soc. And again, whatever is right, we shall say is lawful for each person, whether in medicine or in cookery or in gardening?

com. Yes.
soc. And whatever is not right we shall decline to call lawful?

com. We shall decline.
soc. Then it becomes unlawful.

com. It must.
soc. And again, in writings about what is just and unjust, and generally about the government of a

\(^1\) Cf. Euthyd. 291 c, Politicus 266-7, where Plato identifies the statesman's and the king's art.

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διακοσμησεός τε καὶ περί τοῦ ὡς χρή πόλιν διοικεῖν, τὸ μὲν ὀρθὸν νόμος ἐστὶ βασιλικός, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθὸν οὐ, δὸ δοκεῖ νόμος εἶναι τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσων ἐστὶ γὰρ ἄνομον.

et. Ναί.

D Ἐν. Ὁ ὀρθὸς ἁρα ὄμολογήσαμεν νόμον εἶναι τοῦ έντος εὔρεσιν.

et. Φαίνεται.

ἐν. Ἐτε δὲ καὶ τόδε ἐν αὐτῷ διαθέωμεθα.¹ τίς ἐπιστήμων διανείμαι ἐπὶ γῆ τὰ σπέρματα;

et. Γεωργός.

ἐν. Οὕτως δὲ τὰ ἄξια σπέρματα ἐκάστη γῆ διανέμει;

et. Ναί.

ἐν. Ὁ γεωργός ἃρα νομεύσ ἁγαθὸς τούτων, καὶ οἱ τούτων νόμοι καὶ διανομαί ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὀρθαὶ εἰσιν;

et. Ναί.

ἐν. Τίς δὲ κρουμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ μέλη ἁγαθὸς νομεύσ, καὶ τὰ ἄξια νείμαι, καὶ οἱ τίνος νόμοι ὀρθοὶ εἰσιν;

E et. Οἱ τοῦ αὐλητοῦ καὶ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ.

ἐν. Ὁ νομικώτατος ἃρα ἐν τούτοις, οὕτως αὐλητικώτατος.

et. Ναί.

ἐν. Τίς δὲ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σώματα διανείμαι ἀριστος; οὐχ ὀσπερ τὴν ἄξιαν;

et. Ναί.

ἐν. Αἱ τούτων ἃρα διανομαὶ καὶ οἱ νόμοι βέλτιστοι, καὶ οὕτως περὶ ταῦτα νομικώτατος, καὶ νομεύς ἀριστος.

¹ διαθέωμεθα Hermann: διαθώμεθα, θεασώμεθα mss.

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state and the proper way of governing it, that which is right is the king's law, but not so that which is not right, though it seems to be law to those who do not know; for it is unlawful.

com. Yes.

soc. Then we rightly admitted that law is discovery of reality.

com. So it appears.

soc. Now let us observe this further point about it. Who has knowledge of distributing seed over land?

com. A farmer.

soc. And does he distribute the suitable seed to each sort of land?

com. Yes.

soc. Then the farmer is a good apportioner of it, and his laws and distributions are right in this matter?

com. Yes.

soc. And who is a good apportioner of notes struck for a tune, skilled in distributing suitable notes, and who is it whose laws are right here?

com. The flute-player and the harp-player.

soc. Then he who is the best lawyer in these matters is the best flute-player.

com. Yes.

soc. And who is most skilled in distributing food to human bodies? Is it not he who assigns suitable food?

com. Yes.

soc. Then his distributions and laws are best, and whoever is the best lawyer in this matter is also the best apportioner.

1 The words διανέμειν and νομεῖς in this passage introduce the primitive meaning of νόμος—"distribution" or "apportionment" of each person's status, property, rights, etc.
et. Πάνυ γε.

ἐν. Τίς οὖτος;

et. Παιδοτρίβης.

318 ἐν. Οὖτος τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀγέλην τοῦ σώματος νέμειν κράτιστος;

et. Ναί.

ἐν. Τίς δὲ τὴν τῶν προβάτων ἀγέλην κράτιστος νέμειν; τί ὄνομα αὐτῷ;

et. Ποιμήν.

ἐν. Οἱ τοῦ ποιμένος ἀρα νόμοι ἄριστοι τοῖς προβάτοις.

et. Ναί.

ἐν. Οἱ δὲ τοῦ βουκόλου τοίς βουσίν.

et. Ναί.

ἐν. Οἱ δὲ τοῦ τίνος νόμοι ἄριστοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων; οὐχ οἱ τοῦ βασιλέως; φάθι.

et. Φημὶ δή.

Β ἐν. Καλῶς τοῖνυν λέγεις. ἔχους ἄν οὖν εἴπειν, τίς τῶν πολλῶν ἀγαθὸς γέγονεν ἐν τοῖς αὐλητικοῖς νόμοις νομοθέτης; ἵσως οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ βούλει σε ὑπομνήσω;

et. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ἐν. 'Αρ' οὖν ὁ Μαρσύας λέγεται καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτοῦ 'Ολυμπὸς ὁ Φρύξ;

et. 'Αληθὴ λέγεις.

ἐν. Τούτων δὴ καὶ τὰ αὐλήματα θειότατά ἐστι, καὶ μόνα κινεῖ καὶ ἐκφάνει τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ἐν χρείᾳ ὄντας· καὶ ἔτι καὶ νῦν μόνα λοιπά, ὥς θεία ὄντα.

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1 Here νόμος is connected with a special use of νέμειν—"find appropriate pasture for"—derived from its original meaning of "apportion."
MINOS

com. Certainly.
soc. Who is he?
com. A trainer.
soc. He is the best man to pasture the human herd of the body?  
com. Yes.
soc. And who is the best man to pasture a flock of sheep? What is his name?
com. A shepherd.
soc. Then the shepherd's laws are best for sheep.
com. Yes.
soc. And the herdsman's for oxen.
com. Yes.
soc. And whose laws are best for the souls of men? The king's, are they not? Say if you agree.
com. I do.
soc. Then you are quite right. Now can you tell me who, in former times, has proved himself a good lawgiver in regard to the laws of flute-playing? Perhaps you cannot think of him: would you like me to remind you?
com. Do by all means.
soc. Then is it Marsyas, by tradition, and his beloved Olympus, the Phrygian?
com. That is true.
soc. And their flute-tunes also are most divine, and alone stir and make manifest those who are in need of the gods; and to this day they only remain, as being divine.

2 The awkward imagery of this sentence obviously cannot have come from Plato's mind or hand.
3 Cf. Sympos. 215 c (from which this allusion to Marsyas is feebly imitated) δηλοι τούς τῶν θεών τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένους, where "in need of the gods" seems to be a mystic phrase for "ready for divine possession" (ἐνθουσιασμὸς).
C ET. "Εστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ λέγεται τῶν παλαιῶν βασιλέων ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης γεγονέναι, οὐ ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὰ νόμιμα μένει ὡς θεία ὁντα;

ET. Οὐκ ἑννοῶ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶδα, τίνες παλαιοτάτους νόμους χρῶνται τῶν Ἑλλήνων;

ET. Ἀρα Λακεδαίμονίους λέγεις καὶ Δυκοῦργον τὸν νομοθέτην;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλα ταῦτά γε οὖδέπω ὅσως ἔτη τριακόσια ἡ ὀλίγῳ τούτων πλείω. ἄλλα τούτων τῶν νομίμων D τὰ βέλτιστα πόθεν ἦκεί; οἶδα;

ET. Φασί γ᾽ ἐκ Κρήτης.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτοι παλαιοτάτους νόμους χρῶνται τῶν Ἑλλήνων;

ET. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οἶδα οὖν, τίνες τούτων ἀγαθοὶ βασιλεῖς ἦσαν; Μίνως τε καὶ Ἄραδάμανθος, οἱ Διὸς καὶ Εὐρώπης παῖδες, ὦν οἶδε εἰσίν οἱ νόμοι.

ET. Ἀράδαμανθῷ γέ φασιν, ὦ Σῶκρατες, δίκαιον ἄνδρα, τὸν δὲ Μίνων ἀγριόν τινα καὶ χαλεπόν καὶ ἄδικον.

ΣΩ. 'Ἀττικόν, ὥ βέλτιστον, λέγεις μῦθον καὶ τραγικόν.

Ε ET. Τί δὲ; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεται περὶ Μίνω;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ γε 'Ομήρου καὶ 'Ησιόδου καὶ τοῦ γε πυθαγότεροι εἰσίν ἣ σύμπαντες οἱ τραγῳδοποιοὶ, ὥν σὺ ἄκουσθα ταῦτα λέγεις.

ET. Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν οὗτοι περὶ Μίνω λέγουσιν;

ΣΩ. 'Εγὼ δὴ σοι ἔρω, ἰνα μὴ καὶ σὺ ὦσπερ οἱ
MINOS

com. That is so.
soc. And who by tradition has shown himself a good lawgiver among the ancient kings, so that to this day his ordinances remain, as being divine?
com. I cannot think.
soc. Do you not know which of the Greeks use the most ancient laws?
com. Do you mean the Spartans, and Lycurgus the lawgiver?
soc. Why, that is a matter, I daresay, of less than three hundred years ago, or but a little more. But whence is it that the best of those ordinances come? Do you know?
com. From Crete, so they say.
soc. Then the people there use the most ancient laws in Greece?
com. Yes.
soc. Then do you know who were their good kings? Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons of Zeus and Europa; those laws were theirs.
com. Rhadamanthus, they do say, Socrates, was a just man; but Minos was a savage sort of person, harsh and unjust.
soc. Your tale, my excellent friend, is a fiction of Attic tragedy.
com. What! Is not this the tradition about Minos?
soc. Not in Homer and Hesiod; and yet they are more to be believed than all the tragedians together, from whom you heard your tale.
com. Well, and what, pray, is their tale about Minos?
soc. I will tell you, in order that you may not share the impiety of the multitude: for there cannot
πολλοὶ ἀσεβῆς. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ’ ὁ τι τούτου ἀσεβέστερον ἔστιν οὐδ’ ὁ τι χρὴ μᾶλλον εὑλαβείσθαι, πλὴν εἰς θεοὺς καὶ λόγω καὶ ἔργῳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν, δεύτερον δὲ εἰς τοὺς θείους ἀνθρώπους· ἀλλὰ πάνω πολλὴν χρὴ προμήθειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἢ, ὅταν μέλλης

319 ἀνδρὰ ψε修为 ἡ ἐπαινέσεσθαι, μὴ οὐκ ὅρθως εἴπης. τούτου καὶ ἕνεκα χρὴ μανθάνειν διαγγελνόσκειν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς ἀνδράς. νεμεσά γὰρ ὁ θεός, ὅταν τις ψέγη τὸν ἐαυτῷ ὁμοῖον ἡ ἐπαυνὴ τὸν ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίως ἔχοντα· ἐστὶ δ’ οὗτος ὁ ἄγαθός. μὴ γὰρ τι οἶνον λίθους μὲν εἶναι ἱεροὺς καὶ ξύλα καὶ ὀρνεά καὶ ὁφεῖς, ἀνθρώπους δὲ μὴ· ἀλλὰ πάντων τούτων ἱερότατον ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἄγαθός, καὶ μαρω-τατον ὁ πονηρός.

"Ἡνὴ οὖν καὶ περὶ Μίνω, ὃς αὐτὸν "Ομήρος τε Β καὶ �uations ἐγκωμίαζον, τούτων ἕνεκα φράσω, ἓνα μὴ ἀνθρωπος ὁ γὰρ ἀνθρώπος εἰς ἐκὰ θεὸς ὑιόν λόγω ἐξαμαρτάνης. "Ομήρος γὰρ περὶ Κρῆτης λέγων, ὅτι πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι ἐν αὐτῇ εἰσὶ καὶ ἐνενήκοντα πόλινες, τῇ δὲ, φησίν,

ἐνι Κνωσός μεγάλη πόλις, ἐνθα τε Μίνως ἐνεώρως βασίλευε Διὸς μεγάλου ὀριστής.

C ἔστων οὖν τούτῳ ὁ Ομήρου ἐγκωμίον εἰς Μίνων διὰ βραχέων εἰρημένου, οἴον οὖδ’ εἰς ἐνα τῶν ἠρών ἐποίησεν "Ομήρος. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς σοφιστής ἐστι καὶ ἡ τέχνη αὐτὴ παγκάλη ἐστί, πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἀλλοθὶ δηλοῖ, ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα. λέγει γὰρ τὸν Μίνων συγγίγγεσθαι ἐνάτῳ ἔστε τῷ Διῷ ἐν λόγοις καὶ φοιτᾶν παιδευθησόμενον ὡς ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν ὄντος τοῦ Διὸς. ὅτι οὖν τούτῳ τὸ γέρας οὐκ ἔστω

1 Minos and Rhadamanthus were sons of Zeus by Europa.
conceivably be anything more impious or more to be guarded against than being mistaken in word and deed with regard to the gods, and after them, with regard to divine men; you must take very great precaution, whenever you are about to blame or praise a man, so as not to speak incorrectly. For this reason you must learn to distinguish honest and dishonest men: for God feels resentment when one blames a man who is like himself, or praises a man who is the opposite; and the former is the good man. For you must not suppose that while stocks and stones and birds and snakes are sacred, men are not; nay, the good man is the most sacred of all these things, and the wicked man is the most defiled.

So if I now proceed to relate how Minos is eulogized by Homer and Hesiod, my purpose is to prevent you, a man sprung from a man, from making a mistake in regard to a hero who was the son of Zeus. For Homer, in telling of Crete that there were in it many men and "ninety cities," says:

And amongst them is the mighty city of Cnossos, where Minos was king, having colloquy with mighty Zeus in the ninth year.

Now here in Homer we have a eulogy of Minos, briefly expressed, such as the poet never composed for a single one of the heroes. For that Zeus is a sophist, and that sophistry is a highly honourable art, he makes plain in many other places, and particularly here. For he says that Minos consorted and discoursed with Zeus in the ninth year, and went regularly to be educated by Zeus as though he were a sophist. And the fact that Homer assigned this privilege of having been educated by Zeus to no one

\[2 \text{ Od. xix. 179.}\]

\[3 \text{ ἀπιστὴς means "one who has familiar converse" (ὑαρος).}\]
PLATO

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οὕτω ἀπένειμεν ὁμήρος τῶν ἡρώων, ὑπὸ Διὸς πεπαιδεύθαι, ἀλλὰ ἡ Μίνω, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔταυνος Δ θαυμαστός. καὶ Ἀδυσσείας ἐν Νεκυίᾳ δικάζοντα χρυσοῦν οἰκήτρρον ἔχοντα πεποίηκε τὸν Μίνων, οὐ τὸν Ὁδαμάνθιν. Ὁδαμάνθιν δὲ οὐτ' ἐνταῦθα δικάζοντα πεποίηκεν οὔτε συγγυγόμενον τῷ Διὶ οὐδαμοῦ. διὰ ταῦτα ϕημ. ἐγὼ Μίνων ἀπάντων μάλιστα ὑπὸ Ὅμηρον ἐγκεκωμιάσθαι. τὸ γὰρ Διὸς οὐντα παῖδα μόνον ὑπὸ Διὸς πεπαιδεύθαι οὐκ ἔχει ὑπερβολὴν ἔταυνον.

Τούτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ ἔπος τὸ ἐννέωρος βασίλευε Διὸς μεγάλου ὀαριστῆς,

Ε συνονοιστὴν τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι τὸν Μίνων. οἱ γὰρ ὄαροι λόγοι εἰσὶ, καὶ ὀαριστῆς συνονοιστῆς ἐστὶν ἐν λόγοις. ἐφούτα οὖν οὐ τ κ ἐνατοῦ ἐτους εἰς τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἀντρόν ὅ Μίνως, τὰ μὲν μαθησόμενοι, τὰ δὲ ἀποδειξόμενοι, ἀ τῆ προτέρα ἐννετηρίδι ἐμεμαθήκει παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὸν ὀαριστῆς συμπότην καὶ συμπαιστῆν εἶναι τοῦ Διὸς. ἀλλὰ τάδε ἀν τὶς τεκμηρίῳ χρώμα, ὅτι 320 οὐδὲν λέγουσιν οἱ οὕτοι ὑπολαμβάνοντες. πολλῶν γὰρ οὕτων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, οὐκ ἐστίν οὕτως ἀπέχονται συμποσίων καὶ ταύτης τῆς παιδίας, οὐ ἐστίν οἷος, ἀλλοι ἡ Κρήτης καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δεύτεροι, μαθόντες παρὰ Κρητῶν. ἐν Κρήτῃ δὲ εἰς οὕτος ἐστὶ τῶν ἄλλων νόμων, οὐς Μίνως ἐθηκε, μη συμπίνειν ἄλληλοι εἰς μέθην. καίτοι δῆλον ὅτι, ἃ ἐνόμιζε καλὰ εἶναι, ταύτα νόμμα ἐθηκε καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς πολίταις. οὐ γὰρ πον, ὥσπερ γε φαύλος ἀνθρώπος,

Β ὁ Μίνως ἐνόμιζε μὲν ἐτερα, ἐποίει δὲ ἀλλὰ παρ' ὅ
among the heroes but Minos makes this a marvellous piece of praise. And in the Ghost-raising in the *Odyssey* he has described Minos as judging with a golden sceptre in his hand, but not Rhadamanthus: Rhadamanthus he has neither described here as judging nor anywhere as consorting with Zeus; wherefore I say that Minos above all persons has been eulogized by Homer. For to have been the son of Zeus, and to have been the only one who was educated by Zeus, is praise unsurpassable.

For the meaning of the verse—"was king having colloquy with mighty Zeus in the ninth year"—is that Minos was a disciple of Zeus. For colloquies are discourses, and he who has colloquy is a disciple by means of discourse. So every ninth year Minos repaired to the cave of Zeus, to learn some things, and to show his knowledge of others that he had learnt from Zeus in the preceding nine years. Some there are who suppose that he who has colloquy is a cup-companion and fellow-jester of Zeus: but one may take the following as a proof that they who suppose so are babblers. For of all the many nations of men, both Greek and foreign, the only people who refrain from drinking-bouts and the jesting that occurs where there is wine, are the Cretans, and after them the Spartans, who learnt it from the Cretans. In Crete it is one of their laws which Minos ordained that they are not to drink with each other to intoxication. And yet it is evident that the things he thought honourable were what he ordained as lawful for his people as well. For surely Minos did not, like an inferior person, think one thing and do

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1 *Od. xi. 569.*
Talos, the brazen man who was given to Minos by Zeus, is described by Apoll. Rhod. iv. 1639 foll., and Apollodorus i. 9. 26 (where see Sir J. G. Frazer's note in this series).
MINOS

another, different from what he thought: no, this intercourse, as I say, was held by means of discussion for education in virtue. Wherefore he ordained for his people these very laws, which have made Crete happy through the length of time, and Sparta happy also, since she began to use them; for they are divine.

Rhadamanthus was a good man indeed, for he had been educated by Minos; he had, however, been educated, not in the whole of the kingly art, but in one subsidiary to the kingly, enough for presiding in law courts; so that he was spoken of as a good judge. For Minos used him as guardian of the law in the city, and Talos\(^1\) as the same for the rest of Crete. For Talos thrice a year made a round of the villages, guarding the laws in them, by holding their laws inscribed on brazen tablets, which gave him his name of "brazen." And what Hesiod\(^2\) also has said of Minos is akin to this. For after mentioning him by name he remarks—

Who was most kingly of mortal kings, and lorded it over more neighbouring folk than any, holding the sceptre of Zeus: therewith it was that he ruled the cities as king.

And by the sceptre of Zeus he means nothing else than the education that he had of Zeus, whereby he directed Crete.

com. Then how has it ever come about, Socrates, that this report is spread abroad of Minos, as an uneducated and harsh-tempered person?

soc. Because of something that will make both you,

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\(^1\) The metre of the first line would be improved if we could read \(\text{βασιλευτότατος}\), from the \(\text{βασιλευτός}\) used by Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} iii. 17. 1.
εὐλαβήσει καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς ἀνήρ, ὅτι μέλει τοῦ εὐδόκειν εἶναι, μηδέποτε ἀπεχθάνεσθαι ἀνδρὶ ποιητικῷ μὴδενί. οἱ γὰρ ποιηταὶ μέγα δύνανται εἰς δόξαν, ἐφ᾽ ὁπότερ ἄν ποιῶσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἡ εὐλογοῦντες ἡ κατηγοροῦντες. ὅ δέ καὶ ἔξήματεν ὁ Μίνως, πολεμήσας τῇ τῇ πόλει, ἐν ἡ ἄλλῃ τε πολλῇ σοφίᾳ ἐστὶ καὶ ποιηταὶ παντοδαποὶ τῆς τε ἄλλης ποιήσεως καὶ τραγῳδίας. ἡ δὲ τραγῳδία ἐστὶν παλαιὸν ἐνθάδε, οὐχ ὡς οἴονταί ἀπὸ Θέσπιδος ἀρξεμένη οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ Φρυνίχου, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ θέλεις ἐννοῆσαι, πάνυ παλαιὸν αὐτῷ εὑρήσεις ὃν τῆς τῆς πόλεως εὔρημα. ἐστὶ δὲ τῆς ποιήσεως δημοτερευτικῶν τε καὶ ψυχαγωγικῶτατον ἡ τραγῳδία: ἐν ἥ δὲ καὶ ἐντείνοντες ἡμείς τὸν Μίνων τιμωροῦμεθα ἀνθ᾽ ὑν ἡμᾶς ἡνάγκασε τοὺς δασμοὺς τελειώ ἐκεῖνος. τούτῳ οὖν ἔξήματεν ὁ Μίνως, ἀπεχθάμενος ἡμῖν, ὅθεν δὴ, δὲν ἐρωτᾶς, κακοδοξότερος γέγονεν. ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἄγαθός ἦν Β καὶ νόμιμος, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, νομεύς ἄγαθός, τούτῳ μέγιστον σημείον, ὅτι ἀκίνητοι αὐτοὶ οἱ νόμιμοι εἰσίν, ἅτε τοῦ ἄνθρωπος περὶ πόλεως οἰκήσεως ἐξευρόντος εὖ τῇ ἀλήθειαν.

ἐτ. Δοκεῖς μοι, ὅ Σώκρατε, εἰκότα τὸν λόγον εὐρηκέναι.

ἐν. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω, δοκοῦσι σοι παλαιοτάτοις Κρῆτες οἱ Μίνω καὶ Ἄδαμᾶνθος πολίται νόμοις χρήσαται;

1 This is the meaning most probably intended, from an imperfect understanding of ἐντείνεω ("put some story into verse, or accompany it with music") in Plato, Phaedo 60 b; Protag. 326 b. Minos was represented as a harsh despot in Euripides' Cretans, and probably also in other lost plays.

2 The legend was that Minos defeated the Athenians in
if you are wise, my excellent friend, and everybody else who cares to have a good reputation, beware of ever quarrelling with any man of a poetic turn. For poets have great influence over opinion, according as they create it in the minds of men by either commending or vilifying. And this was the mistake that Minos made, in waging war on this city of ours, which besides all its various culture has poets of every kind, and especially those who write tragedy. Now tragedy is a thing of ancient standing here; it did not begin, as people suppose, from Thespis or from Phrynichus, but if you will reflect, you will find it is a very ancient invention of our city. Tragedy is the most popularly delightful and soul-enthralling branch of poetry: in it, accordingly, we get Minos on the rack of verse, and thus avenge ourselves for that tribute which he compelled us to pay. This, then, was the mistake that Minos made—his quarrel with us—and hence it is that, as you said in your question, he has fallen more and more into evil repute. For that he was a good and law-abiding person, as we stated in what went before—a good apportioner—is most convincingly shown by the fact that his laws are unshaken, since they were made by one who discovered a right the truth of reality in regard to the management of a state.

com. In my opinion, Socrates, your statement is a probable one.

soc. Then if what I say is true, do you consider that the Cretan people of Minos and Rhadamanthus use the most ancient laws?

war and compelled them to send a regular tribute of seven youths and seven maidens to be devoured by the Minotaur in the Cretan labyrinth.
et. Φαίνονται.

ση. Όδη τῶν παλαιῶν ἁριστοὶ νομοθέται
σ' γεγονασί, νομῆς τε καὶ ποιμένες ἀνδρῶν, ὡσπερ καὶ Ὁμηρός ἐφ' ὑπὸ νομεύνα λαῶν εἶναι τοῖν ἀγαθῶν
στρατηγόν.

et. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ση. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Δίὸς φιλίου· εἰ τις ἡμᾶς
ἐροῦτο, ὅ τῷ σώματι ἁγαθὸς νομοθέτης τε καὶ

νομεὺς τί ἐστι ταῦτα ἀ διανέμων ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα

βέλτιον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, εἴπομεν ἂν καλῶς τε καὶ διὰ

βραχέως ἀποκρινόμενου, ὅτι τροφὴν τε καὶ πόνους,

τῇ μὲν αὐξῶν, τοὺς δὲ γυμνάζων καὶ συνιστάς [τὸ

σῶμα] ¹ αὐτό.

et. Ὄρθώς γε.

D ση. Εἰ οὖν δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐροῦτο ἡμᾶς, τί δὲ δὴ

ποτε ἐκεῖνα ἐστὶν ἁ. ² ὁ ἁγαθὸς νομοθέτης τε καὶ


νομεὺς διανέμων ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν βελτίω αὐτὴν ποιεῖ,

τί ἂν ἀποκρινόμενοι οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνθεῖμεν καὶ ὑπὲρ

ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς ἡλικίας αὐτῶν;

et. Οὐκέτι τοῦτ’ ἔχω εἰπεῖν.

ση. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι αἰσχρὸν γε τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν

ἐστὶν ἐκατέρου, τὰ μὲν ἐν αὐταῖς φαίνεσθαι μὴ

eἰδυίας, ἐν οἷς αὐταῖς ἔνεστι καὶ τὸ ἁγαθὸν καὶ τὸ

φλαύρον, τὰ δὲ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων

ἐσκέφθαι.

¹ τὸ σῶμα seclusi. ² ἃ om. mss.
MINOS

com. I do.
soc. So these have shown themselves the best law-givers among men of ancient times—apportioners and shepherds of men; just as Homer called the good general a "shepherd of the folk."

com. Quite so, indeed.
soc. Come then, in good friendship's name: if someone should ask us what it is that the good law-giver and apportioner for the body distributes to it when he makes it better, we should say, if we were to make a correct and brief answer, that it was food and labour; the former to strengthen, and the latter to exercise and brace it.

com. And we should be right.
soc. And if he then proceeded to ask us—And what might that be which the good lawgiver and apportioner distributes to the soul to make it better?—what would be our answer if we would avoid being ashamed of ourselves and our years?

com. This time I am unable to say.
soc. But indeed it is shameful for the soul of either of us to be found ignorant of those things within it on which its good and abject states depend, while it has studied those that pertain to the body and the rest.
The name of this short dialogue denotes that it was intended to serve as an appendix to Plato’s *Laws*. It is improbable, however, that Plato would have appended this scanty and unsatisfactory chapter to that comprehensive treatise, instead of correcting and expanding the latter in many places where it would apparently have benefited by the author’s revision. And when we consider the *Epinomis* in detail, we very soon become aware of contact with an inferior mind, which feebly strays and stumbles among the last physical and metaphysical speculations of Plato. The *Epinomis* appears to have been grouped with the *Laws* and the *Minos*, to form a set of three, by Aristophanes of Byzantium, the librarian at Alexandria, about 200 B.C. Already a number of dialogues had been attributed to Plato which by that time were commonly rejected as spurious: many forgeries were doubtless produced to meet the book-collecting zeal of the Ptolemies in the third century B.C., and the *Epinomis*, like the *Minos*, contrived to pass muster. Its inclusion here with the Platonic writings may be justified, partly as providing a curious illustration of such forgery, and of the superficial acquaintance with Plato’s genius and manner which must account for the mistake made by the Alexandrian scholars in accepting it as genuine; but it also has some undoubted merits of its own—in its treatment of astronomical and mathematical theories and its earnest, if rather vague, manner of exposition—which deserve the attention of Platonic students.
INTRODUCTION TO THE *EPINOMIS*

The primary object of the work is to supplement the passage at the end of the *Laws* (xii. 966-7), where the training of the Nocturnal Council is briefly sketched. The speakers are the same—the Athenian stranger, Megillus the Spartan, and Cleinias the Cretan—and they are continuing the conversation that they had the day before, as described at the beginning of the *Laws* (i. 625), on a walk from Cnossos to the temple of Zeus beneath Mount Ida in Crete. As before, the Athenian does most of the speaking. He expounds his scheme of education, consisting of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy: the last of these is to be a kind of theology, involving a study of the cosmic soul or life-principle, and of the various degrees of divine beings (973-983); the writer here seems to have had his eye on the *Timaeus*. We proceed to consider the special kind of mathematics recommended in *Laws*, vii. 818-820, under the heads of arithmetic and geometry as applied to astronomy (990-992).

Through the verbose and ill-connected exposition of the Athenian one impression emerges clearly enough—that the author is intent on urging the importance of astronomy as the means to true wisdom. We need only read with attention the concluding pages of the *Laws* to realize how much more profound and ample is the wisdom which Plato inculcates, and how far below even his last composition, betraying, as it does, some decline in his powers of reasoning and expression, is the hardy attempt of this zealous but small-minded imitator.

(*Note.*—The following version owes many improvements to the translation and commentary of J. Harward, Clarendon Press, 1928.)
EPINOMIS
[Ἡ ΝΥΚΤΕΡΙΝΟΣ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΟΣ Η ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΚΛΕΙΝΙΑΣ ΚΡΗΣ, ΑΘΗΝΑΙΟΣ ΞΕΝΟΣ, ΜΕΓΙΛΔΟΣ ΛΑΚΕΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΟΣ

ΚΛ. Πρὸς μὲν τὸ τῆς ὁμολογίας ἤκομεν ἀπαντεῖς ὅρθως, ὦ ξένε, τρεῖς ὄντες, ἐγώ καὶ σὺ καὶ Μέγιλλος ὃδε, τὸ τῆς φρονήσεως ἐπισκεψόμενοι τίνι ποτὲ χρὴ λόγῳ διεξελθεῖν, ὃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἔξων φαμέν, ὅταν διανοηθῇ, κάλλιστ’ ἔχειν ποιεῖν πρὸς φρόνησιν ὁσην δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπω σχεῖν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα, ὡς φαμεν, ἀπαντὰ διεξήλθομεν ὅσα ἦν Β περὶ νόμων θέσιν· ὃ δὲ μέγιστον εὑρεῖν τε καὶ εἰπέιν, τί ποτε μαθὼν θυντὸς ἀνθρωπος σοφὸς ἀν εἴη, τοῦτο οὔτε εἰπόμεν οὔτε θύρομεν. νῦν δὲ πειρώμεθα τοῦτο μὴ καταλυπεῖν· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἀτελὲς ἢν πράξαιμεν οὔ χάριν ἀπαντεῖς ὑρμήσαμεν, ὡς φανερὰ ποιήσωμετ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους.

ΑΘ. Ὁ φίλε Κλείνια, καλῶς μὲν λέγεις, ἀτοπον

1 i.e. describing the special training of the members of the Nocturnal Council of the Laws, xii. 961 ff.: this Council of the projected Cretan colony, corresponding to the Athenian 426
EPINOMIS
[or NOCTURNAL COUNCIL; or PHILOSOPHER]

CHARACTERS
Cleinias of Crete, Athenian Visitor,
Megillus of Sparta

cl. True to our agreement, good sir, we have come all three—you and I and Megillus here—to consider the question of wisdom, and in what terms we ought to describe that which we say produces, when comprehended, the most excellent disposition of the human being for as much wisdom as is possible for man. For we claim that we have described all the other matters connected with law-giving; but the most important thing for us to discover and state—what it is that mortal man should learn in order to be wise—this we have neither stated nor discovered. Let us, however, now try to make good this defect: else we shall practically leave incomplete the quest on which we all set out, with the purpose of making our subject clear from beginning to end.

ATH. My dear Cleinias, you are quite right, yet I

Areopagus, was to consist of high magistrates and retired officials, and hold its meetings at night. The characters and the scene (Crete) are the same as those of the Laws.
PLATO

μὴν ἀκούσεσθαι σε λόγον ὑμαί, καὶ τινὰ τρόπον οὐκ ἄτοπον αὖ. πολλοὶ γὰρ δὴ προστυχεῖσ τῷ βίῳ

C γνωρίμενοι τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον φέροντι, ώς οὐκ ἔσται μακάριον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος οὐδ᾽ εὐ-

dαμον. ἐπον δὴ καὶ σύνιε, ἃν σοι δοκῶ κἀγὼ 

μετ᾽ αὐτῶν καλῶς τοῦ τοιοῦτον πέρι λέγειν. οὐ

φημὶ εἶναι δυνατόν ἀνθρώποις μακάριοις τε καὶ 
eυδαίμοσι γενέσθαι πλὴν ὄλγων. μέχριτε ἂν 

ξῶμεν τοῦτο διορίζομαι. καλὴ δὲ ἐλπὶς τελευτή-

σαντι τυχεῖν ἄπαντων, ὅω ἔνεκά τις προθυμοὶτι 

ἀν ξῶν τε ὡς κάλλιστ᾽ ἂν ξῆν κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ 

teleυτῆσας τελευτῆς τοιαύτης τυχεῖν. λέγω δ᾽ 

D οὐδὲν σοφόν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ ἄπαντες “Ελληνές τε καὶ 

βάρβαροι γνωρίσκομεν τινα τρόπον, ώς ἐὰν ἀρχή 

το γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν ἄπαντι ξῶμ. πρῶτον μὲν 

τὸ μετασχεῖν τῆς τῶν κυνομένων ἔξεσι, ἐπεὶ ἂθ 

τὸ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὸ τρέφεσθαι καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, 

διὰ πόνων μυρίων τἄτα γίγνεσθαι σύμπαντα, ὡς 

973 φαμεν ἄπαντες. καὶ χρόνος βραχὺς ἂν τις εἰή 

πρὸς λογισμὸν μὴ τι τῶν μοχθηρῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅ πᾶς 

ἀν ὑπολάβοι μέτριον. οὕτος δὲ σχεδόν ἀναπνοὴν 

dοκεὶ ποιεῖν τινα κατὰ μέσον πῃ βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπι-

νον· ταχὺ γε μὴν ἐπιλαβόν γῆρας ὄντων πούσσει 

ἀν μῆποτ᾽ εἴθελησαι πάλιν ἄναβιζων, λογισάμενον 

tὸν βεβιωμένον ἑαυτῷ βίον, ὅστις μὴ τυγχάνει 

παιδικῆς δόξης μεστὸς ὡν. τούτων δὴ τὶ ποτὲ μοι 

tεκμῆριον; ὅτι πέφυκε ταύτῃ τὸ νῦν ξητούμενον 

B τῷ λόγῳ. ξητούμεν δὲ δὴ, τίνα τρόπον σοφὸι 

γενησόμεθα, ὡς οὕτως τινὸς ἕκαστος ταύτῃς 

τῆς δυνάμεως· ἡ δὲ φυγῆ φεύγει τότε, ὅταν τις 

1 τι cod. Voss.: τοι mss.
think you are about to hear a strange statement; and, in a sense, one that is not so strange either. For many on becoming acquainted with life have the same account to give—that the human race will not be blessed or happy. So follow me now and apprehend if you conceive me, as well as them, to be giving a proper account of this matter. I say it is impossible for men to be blessed and happy, except a few; that is, so long as we are living: I limit it to that. But one may rightly hope to attain after death all the things for whose sake one may strive both in life to live as nobly as one can and in death to find a noble end. What I say is no subtle doctrine, but a thing that all of us, Greeks and foreigners alike, in some way perceive—that from the beginning existence is difficult for every live creature: first, partaking of the state of things conceived, then again, being born, and further, being reared and educated—all these processes involve a vast amount of toil, we all agree. And our time must be a short one, I do not say by a reckoning of our miseries, but of any supposition of what is tolerable. This seems in a way to give some breathing-space about the middle of human life: yet swiftly old age is upon us, and must make any of us loth ever to come to life again, when one reckons over the life one has lived—unless one happens to be a bundle of childish notions. And what can be my evidence for this? It is that such is the nature of the matter now under inquiry in our discussion. We are inquiring, you know, in what way we shall become wise, presuming that each of us has this power in some sort or other: but it evades and escapes us as soon as

1 The translation does not attempt to reproduce the alliteration of the last four words of this sentence.
πρὸς τινὰ φρόνησιν ἕ τῶν λεγομένων τεχνῶν ἢ φρονήσεων ἕ τινων ἄλλων τοιούτων ὡς οἴομεθα ἐπιστημῶν, ὡς ἄξιας τούτων οὐδεμιᾶς οὔσης ἐπίκλησον ἤθηναι τῆς περὶ ταύτα σοφίας τάνθρωπων, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς σφόδρα πεποιθήσει καὶ μαν-τευμένης, ὡς οὔσης αὐτῇ κατὰ τινὰ φύσιν ταύτης,

C τέσ δ’ ἐστι καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς, οὐ πάνυ δυναμένης ἐξευρίσκειν. ἄρ’ οὐ τούτω σφόδρα προσέχοι ήμῶν ἢ περὶ σοφίαν ἀπορία καὶ ζήτησις, πλείων τῆς ἐλπίδος ἐκάστῳ γιγνομένη τῶν ὅσοι ἐν ἡμῖν δυνατοὶ γίγνονται φρονίμως αὐτοὺς ἄλλους τε ἐξετάσαι συμφώνως διὰ λόγων πάντων καὶ πάντη λεγομένων; ταύτῃ οὖν οὕτως ἡ ταύτη συμφήσομεν ἐχειν;

κλ. Συμφήσομεν ἐπ’ ἐλπίδι σοι ἰσως ταύτ’, ὥς

D ἔσε, τῇ μετὰ σοῦ κατὰ χρόνον ἄν γενομένη, δοξάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εἰσαύθη τὸ ἀληθέστατον.

α. Τὰς ἄλλας τοῖνυν, ὅσαι ἐπιστήμαι μὲν εἰςι λεγόμεναι, σοφῶν δὲ οὐκ ἀποτελοῦσι τὸν λαμβάνοντά τε αὐτᾶς καὶ ἔχοντα, πρῶτον διεξέτεον, ὅπως ταύτας ἐκποδῶν θέμενοι πειρώμεθα ἐκεῖνα ὃν δεόμεθα παραθέσαται τε καὶ παραθέμενοι μαν-θάνεν.

Πρῶτον μὲν τοῖνυν ὃν πρῶτον δεὶ θυητῷ γένει,

Ε’ ἐδώμεν ὡς εἰσὶ μὲν ἀναγκαῖοταται σχεδὸν ἀληθῶς τε πρῶται, ὡς ὑπό ἐπιστημῶν αὐτῶν γιγνόμενος, εἰ καὶ κατ’ ἄρχας ἐδοξέ τις εἰναι ποτε σοφός, οὐκομ υόν γε οὐτε σοφὸς εἰναι δοξάζεται οὐείδη τε ἱσχε 975 μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιστήμης. ἐροῦμεν δὴ αἴ τ’ εἰσὶ καὶ ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπός αὐτάς, σχεδον διος ἀγῶν πρόκειται τοῦ δοκείν ὡς ἀριστόν ἄνδρα συμβῆναι γενόμενον ἂν, φεύγει διὰ τὰς κτήσεις 430
we attempt any knowledge of reputed arts or knowledges or any of the ordinary sciences, as we suppose them to be; for none of them seems worthy to be called by the title of the wisdom that pertains to these human affairs. Yet the soul firmly believes and divines that somehow in nature she has it, but what it is that she has, or when, or how, she is quite unable to discover. Is not this a fair picture of our puzzle about wisdom and the inquiry that we have to make—a greater one than any of us could expect who are found able to examine ourselves and others intelligently and consistently by every kind and manner of argument? Shall we not agree that this, or the like, is the case?

CL. We shall probably agree with you on that, my good sir, in the hope which in time your aid will surely give us of forming hereafter the truest opinion on these matters.

ATH. Then first we must go through the other sciences, which are reputed as such, but do not render him wise who acquires and possesses them; in order that, having put them out of the way, we may try to bring forward those that we require, and having brought them forward, to learn them.

First, therefore, let us observe that while the sciences which are first needs of the human race are about the most necessary and truly the first, yet he who acquires a knowledge of them, though in the beginning he may have been regarded as wise in some sort, is now not reputed wise at all, but rather incurs reproach by the knowledge he has got. Now we will mention what they are, and that almost everyone who makes it his goal to be thought likely to prove himself in the end as good a man as possible avoids them, in order to gain the acquirements of under-
τῆς φρονήσεως τε καὶ ἑπιτηθίδευσεως. ἔστω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἢ τῆς ἄλληλοφαγίας τῶν ζῴων ἡμᾶς τῶν μὲν, ὡς ὁ μῦθός ἐστι, τὸ παράπαν ἀποστήσασα, τῶν δὲ εἰς τὴν νόμιμον ἐδωδὴν καταστήσασα.

δὲ καὶ ἐλέγομεν πρῶτοι χαιρέτωσαν· ἢ δ’ οὔν

Β ἀλφίτων τε καὶ ἀλεύρων ποίησις ἡμᾶς καὶ τροφὴ
calh μὲν καὶ ἄγαθη, σοφὸν δὲ ἄνδρα τελέως οὐκ
ἐθελήσει ποτὲ ἀπεργάσασθαι· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτό, ἢ
tῆς ποίησεως ἐπίκλησις, τῶν ποιουμένων αὐτῶν
dυσχέρειαν ἀπεργάζοιτ' ἄν. σχεδὸν δ’ οὔδε χώρας

C συμπάσης γεωργία: οὐ γὰρ τέχνη ἀλλὰ φύσει κατὰ
θέου πάντες φανόμεθα γῆν μετακεχειρίσθαι. καὶ
μὴν οὔδ’ ἢ τῶν οἰκήσεως γε συνυφή καὶ σύμπασα

οἰκοδομία καὶ σκευῶν πάντων ἀπεργαστική, χαλ-

D κεία τε καὶ ἢ τῶν τεκτονικῶν καὶ πλαστικῶν καὶ

πλεκτικῶν καὶ ἐτε συμπάντων ὅργάνων παρα-

σκευή, δήμω τὸ πρόσφορον ἐχουσα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐπ’

ἀρετῆς λεγομένη. καὶ μὴν οὔδ’ ἢ σύμπασα θηρευ-

τική, πολλή περ καὶ τεχνική γεωνύια, τὸ γε μεγα-

λοπρέπει σὺν τῷ σοφῷ οὐκ ἀποδίδωσιν. οὐ μὴν

οὔδε μαντική γε οὔδ’ ἐρμηνευτικὴ τὸ παράπαν·

πρῶτον μὲν τὸ λεγόμενον γὰρ οὔδε μόνον, εἰ δ’ ἀληθές, οὐκ

ἔμαθεν.

"Ὅτε δὴ τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὅρωμεν κτῆσιν διὰ

D τεχνῆς μὲν ἀπεργαζομένην, τούτων δὲ οὐδεμίαν

οὔδενα σοφὸν ποιοῦσαν, τὸ γε μετὰ τοῦτο πωδιὰ
tis ἄν λείποιτο, μμητικὴ μὲν τὸ πλείστον, ἀλλ’

1 ὅπε Stallbaum: οὔν mss.

1 "Some" means "men," and "others" means "other animals."
2 i.e. the first men who practised a selective eating of flesh.
standing and study. So first let us take that which removed us from the practice among animate beings of eating each other and, as the story goes, has made us refrain entirely from some, while it has settled us in the lawful eating of others. May the men of old time be gracious to us, as they are: for we must take our leave of whatever men were the first of those we were just mentioning; but at any rate the making of barley-meal and flour, with the sustenance thereof, is fine and good indeed, yet it is never like to produce a perfectly wise man. For this very name of making must produce an irksomeness in the actual things that are made. Nor can it well be husbandry of land in general: for it is not by art but by a natural gift from Heaven, it seems, that we all have the earth put into our hands. Nor again is it the fabrication of dwellings and building in general, nor the production of all sorts of appliances—smiths' work, and the supply of carpenters', moulders' and plaiters' work, and, in fine, all kinds of implements; for this is of advantage to the public, but is not accounted for virtue. Nor again the whole practice of hunting, which although grown extensive and a matter of skilled art, gives no return of magnificence with its wisdom. Nor surely can it be divination or interpretation as a whole; for these only know what is said, but have not learnt whether it be true.

And now that we see that the acquisition of necessaries is achieved by means of art, but that no such art makes any man wise, there may be some diversion remaining after this—imitative for the most part, but

3 The word "produce" is repeated here in a strained sense of "declare," "indicate," or the like. The very idea of "making" implies a certain annoyance incompatible with perfect wisdom.

4 *i.e.* of omens, heavenly signs, etc.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

οὐδαμῇ σπουδαίᾳ. πολλοῖς μὲν γὰρ ὄργανοις μι-
μοῦνται, πολλοῖς δ' αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων οὐ πάντως
εὐσχήμοσι μιμήμασι, τὰ τε κατὰ λόγους καὶ μοῦ-
σαν πᾶσαν, καὶ ὅσων γραφικὴ μήτηρ, πολλῶν καὶ
παντοίων ποικιλμάτων ἀποτελομένων ἐν πολλοῖς
ὕγροις καὶ ἁρπαῖς γένεσιν· ὃν σοφὸν οὐδένα εἰς
οὐδὲν σπουδῇ τῇ μεγίστῃ δημιουργοῦντα ἢ μμη-
τικῇ παρέχεται.

Ε Πάντων δ' ἔσευργασμένων τὸ λοιπὸν βοήθεια
gίγνοντ' ἂν μυρία μυρίοις, ἢ μὲν μεγίστῃ τε καὶ
eἰς πλείστα πολεμικὴ κληθείσα, στρατηγικὴ τέχνη,
eὐδοκιμωτάτη πρὸς χρείαν, εὐτυχίας πλείστης
dεομένη, μᾶλλον δὲ ἄνδρεία κατὰ φύσιν ἡ σοφία
dεδομένη. ἢν δὲ καλοῦσι μὲν ἰατρικῆν, βοὴθεια
dέ ποὺ καὶ αὐτὴ σχεδὸν ὅσων ὄραε ψύχει καὶ
καύματι ἀκαίρῳ καὶ πάσι τοῖς ποιοῦτοι ληξοῦται
tὴν τῶν ζώων φύσιν. εὐδόκιμον δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων
eἰς σοφίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην· ἀμέτρα γὰρ δόξας
φορεῖται τοπαζόμενα. βοηθοῦσι δὲ ποὺ καὶ τοὺς
κυβερνήτας ἁμα καὶ τοὺς ναύτας ἔρουμεν, καὶ
tούτων ἄνδρα σοφὸν μηδένα τις ἡμᾶς παραμυθούμε-
νος ἐξ ἀπάντων διαγγελλέτως· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδεῖ τις
Β πνεῦματος ὅργην οὐδὲ φιλίαν, δ' προσφιλές ἀπάση
κυβερνητικῆς. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπόσοι βοηθοὶ δίκαιος
ἐν τῇ τοῦ λέγειν ρώμη φασι γίγνεσθαι, μνήμη καὶ
τριβὴ δόξης ἡθεῖ προσέχοντες τῶν νοῶν, ἀληθείας
dὲ τῶν ὑπότις δικαίων ἐκτὸς παρεσφαλεῖνοι.

Δοιπῆ δ' ἐτι πρὸς δόξαν σοφίας ἐστὶ τις ἄτοπος
δύναμις, ἢν φύσιν ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον ἢ σοφίαν
ὀνομάσειαν, τότε ὅταν τῶν τις συννοῆ βαδίως μὲν

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in no way serious. For they imitate with many instruments, and with many imitative acts, not altogether seemly, of their very bodies, in performances of speech and of every Muse, and in those whereof painting is mother, and whereby many and most various designs are elaborated in many sorts, moist and dry; and though a man ply his craft in these with the greatest zeal, in nothing is he rendered wise by such imitation.

And when all these have been performed, there may yet remain assistance, in countless forms and countless cases: the greatest and most useful is called warfare, the art of generalship; most glorified in time of need, requiring most good fortune, but in nature assigned rather to valour than to wisdom. And that which they call medicine is likewise, of course, an assistance in almost every case towards things of which animal nature is deprived by seasons of untimely cold and heat and all such visitations. But none of these aids is of high repute for the truest wisdom: for they are borne along by opinion, as inaccurate matter of conjecture. We may, I suppose, speak of pilots and sailors also as giving assistance: yet you shall not report, to appease us, a single wise man from amongst them all; for none of them can know the wrath or amity of the wind, a desirable thing for all piloting. Nor again all those who say they can give assistance in law-suits by their powers of speech, men who by memory and skill in opinion pay attention to human character, but are far astray from the truth of what is really just.

There still remains, as a claimant to the name of wisdom, a certain strange power, which most people would call a natural gift rather than wisdom, appear-
δ' τί περ ἂν μανθάνῃ μανθάνοντα, μάλα δὲ πολλά
καὶ ἀσφαλῶς μνημονεύοντα, ὡταν τε τὸ πρόσφορον
ἐκάστῳ διαμνημονεύῃ τις, δ' τι γιγνόμενον ἄν
πρέποι, τούτῳ δὲ ταχὺ δρᾶ· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀπαντᾷ οἱ
μὲν φύσις, οἱ δὲ σοφίαν, οἱ δὲ ἀγχώνοιαν θήσονται
φύσεως· σοφὸν δὲ ὄντως οὐδεὶς τούτων οὐδεὶς τῶν
ἐμφρόνων ἑθελήσει ποτὲ καλεῖν.

'Αλλὰ μήν δεῖ φανήσαι γε τυχο ἐπιστήμην, ἂν
ἐχων σοφὸς γίγνοντ' ἂν δ' σοφὸς ὄντως ὅν καὶ
μὴ μόνον δοξαζόμενος. ὁδώμεν δ'· χαλεπώ μὲν
γὰρ λόγῳ παντάπασιν ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ἐτέραν πάρεξ
τῶν εἰρημένων εὑρεῖν, ἡ σοφία μὲν λέγοιτ' ἂν
ὄντως τε καὶ εἰκότως, ὃ δὲ λαβὼν οὔτε βάναυσος
οὔτ' ἥλίθιος ἐσταί, σοφὸς δ' καὶ ἀγαθός δι' αὐτήν
πολύτης [τε] καὶ ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος ἐνδίκως
[ἐσται]¹ πόλεως ἁμα καὶ ἐμμελής. κατίδωμεν δὴ
tαύτην πρώτην, τίς ποτ' ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης
φύσεως ἐπιστήμη μία διεξελθοῦσα ἡ μὴ παρα-
γενομένη τῶν νῦν παρουσίων ἀνοητότατον ἂν καὶ
ἀφρονέστατον παράσχοιτο ξύφων το τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

Ε' οὖ δ' τούτο γε πάνυ χαλεπὸν τὸ κατίδευν. μία γὰρ
وحدة εἰπέων πρὸς μίαν ὅ τὸν ἀριθμὸν δὸῦσα παντὶ
tῷ θυντῷ γένει τούτ' ἂν δράσειεν· θεὸν δ' αὐτὸν
μάλλον ἡ τυχαῖς ἡγούμαι δόντα ἡμῖν σώζειν
ἡμᾶς· δὲ θεὸν ἡγούμαι, φράζειν χρῆ, καίπερ
ἀτοπὸν ὄντα, καὶ πως οὐκ ἄτοπον αὖ πῶς γὰρ τὸ
977 ἀγαθῶν αὔτων ἡμῖν συμπάντων οὐ καὶ τοῦ πολὺ
μεγίστου, τῆς φρονήσεως, αὐτῶν ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ
γεγονέαν; τίνα δ' καὶ σεμνόνιν ποτὲ λέγω θεόν,

¹ τε et estat seecl. Stallbaum.

¹ Literally, "in tune," and hence "fitting in gracefully," "behaving with good taste," etc.
ing when one perceives someone learning this or that lesson with ease, and remembering a great many things securely; or when a man recalls what is suitable to each case, as what should properly be done, and does it quickly. Some people will describe all this as nature, others as wisdom, and others as a natural readiness of mind: but no sensible person will ever call a man really wise for any of these gifts.

But surely there must be found some science, the possession of which will cause the wisdom of him who is really wise and not wise merely in men's opinion. Well, let us see: for in this laborious discussion we are trying our hardest to find some other science, apart from those we have mentioned, which can really and reasonably be termed wisdom; such an acquirement as will not make one either a drudge or a willing, but will enable one to be a wise and good citizen,—just ruler and just subject—of his city, and also decorous.¹ So let us look for this one first, and see what single science it is of those that we now have which, by removing itself or being absent from human nature, must render mankind the most thoughtless and senseless of creatures. Well, there is no great difficulty in making that out. For if there is one more than another, so to speak, which will do this, it is the science which gave number to the whole race of mortals; and I believe God rather than some chance gave it to us, and so preserves us. And I must explain who it is that I believe to be God, though he be a strange one, and somehow not strange either: for why should we not believe the cause of all the good things that are ours to have been the cause also of what is far the greatest, understanding? And who is it that I magnify with the name of God, Megillus
ὁ Μέγιλλὲ τε καὶ Κλεωνία; σχεδὸν Οὐρανὸν, ὃν καὶ δικαίωτατον, ὡς σύμπαντες ἄλλοι δαίμονες ἁμα καὶ θεοί, τιμῶν τε καὶ εὐχεσθαί διαφερόντως αὐτῷ. τὸ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰτιῶν ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἡμῖν αὐτὸν γεγονέναι πάντες ἀν ὀμολογοῦμεν. δοῦναι δὲ ἁμα καὶ ἄριθμον ἡμεῖς γε ὅντως αὐτὸν φαμεν, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ δώσεων, εάν τις θέλῃ συν-

B ακολουθεῖν. ἐάν γὰρ ηῇ τις ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ὀρθὴν τὴν τοῦδε, εἴτε κόσμον εἴτε Ὀλυμπὸν εἴτε Οὐρανὸν ἐν ἡδονῇ τω λέγεων, λεγέτω μέν, ἀκολουθεῖτω δὲ, ὅτι ποικίλλων αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ στρέφων ἀστρα πάσας διεξόδους ὤρας τε καὶ τροφὴν πᾶσι παρέχεται. καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δὲ οὐν φρόνησιν, ὡς φαίμεν ἂν, σὺν ἄριθμῳ παντὶ, καὶ τὰλλ' ἀγαθα' τοῦτο δὲ μέγιστον, εάν τις τὴν ἄριθμῶν αὐτοῦ δόσων δεξάμενος ἐπεξέλθη πᾶσαν τὴν περίοδον.

"Ετι δὲ σμικρὸν ἐπανελθόντες πως τοῖς λόγοις C ἀναμνησθῶμεν, ὅτι καὶ μάλ' ὀρθῶς ἐνοίκαςμεν, ὡς, εἴτε τοιν ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἐξέλουμεν, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ τι φρόνημοι γενοἶμεθα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐτι ποτὲ ψυχῆ τοῦτον τοῦ ἔτου πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν λάβων σχεδὸν, ὅτου λόγος ἀπειτή· ζῶον δὲ, διὶ τι μὴ γιγνώ-

skoi διό καὶ τριὰ μηδὲ περιττὸν μηδὲ ἀρτιῶν, ἄγνοοι δὲ τὸ παράπαν ἄριθμον, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ δι-

δόναι λόγον ἔχοι περὶ δὲν αἰσθῆσεις καὶ μνήματι [ἐχοὶ] 1 μόνον εὑ ἐκκτημένον· τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἀρετὴν, D ἀνθρεῖαν καὶ σωφροσύνην, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει· στε-

ρόμενοι δὲ ἀληθῶς λόγου σοφὸς οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ γένοιτο, διω δὲ σοφία μὴ προσεῖτη, πάσης ἀρετῆς

1 ἔχοι om. vulg.

1 Apparently a metaphor from astronomy, meaning "the prescribed or proper course of study"; cf. Plato, Rep. 407 e. Or the word may refer to the actual scheme of the celestial order.
and Cleinias? It must be Heaven, which has full claim, no less than all other spirits and gods also, to our honour, and especially to our prayers. That it has been the cause of all the other good things we have, we shall all admit; that it really gave us number also, we assert, and that it will add to this gift, if we will but follow its lead. For if one enters on the right theory about it, whether one be pleased to call it World-order or Olympus or Heaven—let one call it this or that, but follow where, in bespangling itself and turning the stars that it contains in all their courses, it produces the seasons and food for all. And thence, accordingly, we have understanding in general, we may say, together with all number, and all other good things: but the greatest of these is when, after receiving its gift of numbers, one explores the whole circuit.

Moreover, let us turn back some little way in our discussion and recall how entirely right we were in conceiving that if we should deprive human nature of number we should never attain to any understanding. For then the soul of that creature which could not tell things would never any more be able, one may say, to attain virtue in entirety; and the creature that did not know two and three, or odd or even, and was completely ignorant of number, could never clearly tell of things about which it had only acquired sensations and memories. From the attainment of ordinary virtue—courage and temperance—it is certainly not debarred: but if a man is deprived of true telling he can never become wise, and he who has not the acquirement of wisdom

There is a curious play here on the two meanings of λόγος—"reckoning," and "description." (Cf. the like English meanings of "tale" or "account.")
τὸ µέγιστον µέρος, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τελέως ἀγαθὸς γενόμενος εὐδαίμων ποτὲ γένοιτο. οὕτως ἅριθµὸν µὲν ἀνάγκη πᾶσα ὑποτίθεσθαι· διότι δὲ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη, λόγος ἐτὶ πλείων πάντων γίγνοιτ' ἂν τῶν εἰρηµένων. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ νῦν ὁρθῶς ῥηθῆσεται, ὡτι καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν λεγόµενα, ἡ νῦν δὴ διήλθοµεν ἑώντες εἶναι πᾶσας τὰς τέχνας, οὐδὲ ἔτούτων ἐν οὐδὲν µένει, πάντα δὲ ἀπολείπεται τὸ παράπαν, ὅταν ἄριθµικὴν τις ἀνέλη.

Δόξηει δὲ ἃν ἱσως¹ τις βραχέως ἕνεκα ἄριθµοῦ δεῖσθαι τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος, εἰς τὰς τέχνας ἀποβλέψας: καὶτοι µέγα µὲν καὶ τοῦτο· εἰ δὲ τις ἱδοι τὸ θείον τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τὸ θυητόν, ἐν ὑ καὶ τὸ θεοσεβὲς γνωρισθῆσεται καὶ δ² ἄριθµὸς ὁντως,

978 οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πᾶς ἃν τις γνοῖη σύµπαντα ἄριθµῶν, ὅσης ἡµῖν δυνάµεως αὐτίος ἃν εἴη συγγυµνόμενος· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ κατὰ µουσικὴν πᾶσαν διαριθµοµµένων κωῆσεως τε καὶ φθόγγων δῆλον ὅτι δεὶ· καὶ τὸ µέγιστον, ἀγαθῶν ὡς πάντων αὐτίον· ὅτι δὲ κακῶν οὐδενός, εὗ τούτῳ γνωστέον, ὁ καὶ τάχα γένοιτ' ἃν. ἀλλ' ἡ σχεδὸν ἀλόγιστος τε καὶ ἄτακτος ἄσχήµων τε καὶ ἀρρυθµὸς ἀνάρµοστος τε φορά, καὶ πάνθε' ὀπόσα κακοῦ κεκουωνηκὴ τίνος, ἐπὶ-

Β λέειπται παντὸς ἄριθµοῦ, καὶ δεὶ τοῦθ' ὀυτὼ δια-
νοεῖσθαι τὸν µέλλοντα εὐδαίµονα τελευτήσειν· καὶ
tὸ γε δὴ δίκαιον τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ
πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδεὶς ποτὲ µὴ γυγνώσκων,

¹ ἱσως Theo: ikavós mss.
² ὁ Theo: om. mss.
the greatest part of virtue as a whole—can no more achieve the perfect goodness which may make him happy. Thus it is absolutely necessary to postulate number; but to show why this is necessary would need a still fuller argument than any that has been advanced. Yet here is one that will be particularly correct—that of the attributes of the other arts, which we granted them just now in going through the list of all the arts, not a single one can remain, but all of them are utterly discarded, when once you remove numeration.

And one may judge, perhaps, that the human race needs number for but slight uses, by glancing at the arts—and yet even that is a great matter—but if one could see the divinity of birth, and its mortality, in which awe of the divine will be taught, and number in its reality, still it is not anybody who could tell how great is the power we should owe to the accompaniment of number as a whole—for it is clear that everything in music needs a distinct numeration of movement and notes—and above all, how it is the cause of all good things; and that it is the cause of no evil thing that may haply befall is a point that must be well understood. Nay, the motion that we may call unreasoned and unordered, lacking grace and rhythm and harmony, and everything that has a share of some evil, is deficient in number altogether; and in this light must the matter be regarded by him who means to end his life in happiness. And no one who does not know the just, the good, the honourable and all the rest of such qualities will ever, by

1 i.e. our birth and death are alike under divine influence, and this means that they are governed by number—a Pythagorean argument.
The meaning obviously required—“shape” or “phase”—cannot be extracted from ἡμέραν, which is probably a copyist’s error for ἰδέαν.
grasping true opinion, number them off so as fully to persuade both himself and his neighbour.

Now let us go on to inquire into the actual question of how we learnt to count in numbers. Tell me, whence have we got the conception of one and two, a natural gift that we have from the All to enable us to conceive of such things? Then again, many other living creatures are not endowed by nature even to the mere point of being enabled by the Father to learn to count; whereas in us, in the first place, God implanted this very faculty, so that we might be equal to comprehending a thing shown to us, and in the second place, he showed, and shows. Among such things, what one more singularly beautiful can a man behold than the world of day? Then he comes to the province of night with his vision; and there he will find quite another sight before him. And so the heaven, revolving these very objects for many nights and many days, never ceases to teach men one and two, until even the most unintelligent have learnt sufficiently to number; for that there are also three and four and many, each of us must further conceive on seeing those objects. And among them God made one thing that he wrought, the moon, which shows herself at one time larger, at another smaller, and runs her course, showing ever a new shape, until fifteen days and nights are passed: this is her circuit, if one chooses to sum her orbit, as one and entire, in one; so that, we may say, even the least intelligent creature must learn it, among those on whom God has bestowed the natural gift of being

2 This seems to mean that the fifteen days from the new moon to the full moon give the basis for summing her whole thirty days' course—fifteen to the full, and fifteen back.
καὶ μέχρι μὲν τούτων τε καὶ ἐν τούτοις σύμπαν τὸ δυνατὸν τῶν ζώων μάλα ἀριθμητικὸν γέγονε, τὸ 979 καθ’ ἐν αὐτῷ σκοποῦν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἀλληλα πάντα ἀριθμὸν ἀεὶ λογίζεσθαι, δοκῶ μὲν μειζονὸς ἑνεκα, καὶ τούτου δὲ σελήνην, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, αὐξανο-μένην καὶ φθίνουσαν ἐμποιήσας, μὴνας πρὸς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν συνεστήσατο, καὶ πάντα ἀριθμὸν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἥρξατο συνορᾶν εὐδαιμονία τύχη. διὰ δὲ ταῦθ’ ἤμων καρποί τε καὶ ἐγκύμων ἢ γῆ γέγονεν, ὥστ’ εἶναι τροφὴν πάσι τοῖς ζώοις, ἀνέμων τε καὶ υετῶν γυγνομένων οὐκ ἔξασιν ὁμὸ ἀμέτρων· ἀλλ’ Β εἶ τι παρὰ ταῦτα γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ φλαῦρον, οὐ τὴν θείαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην αἰτιάσθαι χρῆ φύσιν, οὐκ ἐν δίκη διανέμουσαν τὸν αὐτῶν βίον. ἤμων δ’ οὖν ἡπτούσι περὶ νόμων σχεδὸν ἔδοξε τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ράδια τ’ εἶναι γνώναι τὰ βέλτιστα ἀνθρώ- ποις, καὶ πάς ἂν ἱκανὸς γίγνεσθαι καὶ συνεῖναι τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ ποιεῖν, εἰ γνοῖς, τί ποτ’ ἐστών δ’ συμφέρειν εἰκὸς καὶ τὶ τὸ μὴ συμφέρον’ ἔδοξε δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐπιτιθεύματα πάντα Μ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπά εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τίνα τρόπον χρῆ γίγνεσθαι χρηστοὺς ἀνθρώπους παγχάλεπον. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα αὖ πάντα κτάσθαι χρηστά, τὸ λεγόμενον [τε], καὶ δυνατὸν καὶ οὐ χαλεπόν, οὔσιαν τε ὅσην δεὶ καὶ μὴ δεὶ, καὶ σῶμα οἰδὸν τε δεὶ καὶ μὴ· καὶ ζυχῆν ὅτι μὲν ἀγαθὴν δεὶ, συγχωρεῖ πᾶς παντὶ, τὸ δ’ ὀντων τρόπον ἀγαθὴν, ὅτι μὲν αὖ δικαίως καὶ σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρείως, καὶ ταῦτα, ὅτι δὲ σοφὴν, 1 τε οἷον. Bekker.
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able to learn. Within these limits, and in this sphere, every creature so enabled has been made fully apt for numeration,—when it considers any unit by itself. But as to reckoning number, as they all do in their relations to each other, I think that God, not only for a greater reason, but to this end installed, as we mentioned, the waxing and waning of the moon, and combined the months to make up the year, and they all began to comprehend number in relation to number by a happy fortune. Hence it is that we have fruits and the teeming of the earth, so that there may be food for all creatures, with no inordinate or immoderate occurrences of winds and rains: but if in spite of this something does occur in an evil way, we ought not to charge it upon the divine but upon the human nature, for not disposing our own lives aright.

Now in our inquiry about laws, you know we decided that all other things that are best for men are easy to discover, and that everyone may become competent both to understand and to perform what he is told, if he discovers what is that which is likely to profit him, and what is not profitable: well, we decided, and we are still of the same mind, that all other studies are not very difficult, but that this of learning in what way we should become good men is one of the utmost difficulty. Everything else, again, that is good, as they say, is both possible and not difficult to acquire, and the amount of property that is wanted or not wanted, and the state of body that is wanted or not: everyone agrees that a good soul is wanted, and agrees, moreover, as to the manner of its goodness, that here again it must be just and temperate and brave; but whereas everyone
φησὶ μὲν πᾶς δεῖν, ἦντως δὲ σοφίαν, ὡς ἄρτι

D διεληλύθαμεν, οὔδεις οὖδενι τὸ παράπαν ἐτί συν-

ομολογεῖ τῶν πολλῶν. νῦν οὖν δὴ παρὰ πᾶσας

τὰς πρόσθεν σοφίας οὐ φαύλην τινὰ ἀνευρόκομεν

eis αὐτά γε ταῦτα, τὸ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι τὸν γε

μεμαθηκότα ἄπερ καὶ διεληλύθαμεν· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ

σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτ' ἐπιστήμων καὶ ἁγαθός, τούτου δὴ

πέρι λόγου δεὶ λαβεῖν.

κα. Ἡ ἔγεν, ὡς εἰκότως εἶπες, ὅτι περὶ μεγάλων

μεγάλα ἐπιχειρεῖς φράζειν.

Ε ἄθ. Όυ γὰρ σμικρά, Ὡ Κλεινία· τὸ δὲ χαλεπώ-

τερον, ὅτι παντάπασι καὶ πάντως ἀληθῆ.

κα. Σφόδρα γε, Ὡ ἔγεν· ἀλλ' ὁμως μὴ ἀποκάμης

λέγων δ' ὕψος.

ἄθ. Ναί, μηδὲ σφῶ τοίνυν ἀκούοντε.

κα. Ταῦτ' ἔσται· καὶ ὑπέρ ἁμφοῖν ἐγώ σοι

φράζω.

980 ἄθ. Καλῶς. ἦς ἄρχῆς δὴ ῥητέον ἀνάγκη1 πρῶτον,

ὡς φαίνεται, μαλίστα μὲν ἂν, εἰ δυνάμεθα ἐνὶ

λαβεῖν ὀνόματι, τίς ἐστιν ἢν οἰόμεθα σοφίαν εἶναι,

τούτο δ' εἰ σφόδρα ἀδυνατοῦμεν, τὸ δεύτερον, τίνες

eἰσὶ ποτε καὶ ὁπόσαι τινές, ὃς τισ λαβῶν σοφὸς ἂν

εἰη κατὰ τὸν ἰμέτερον μῦθον.

κα. Λέγουσιν ἂν.

ἄθ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ τούτο ἀνεμέσθην τῷ νομοθέτῃ

τὸ κάλλιον τῶν πρῶτερον εἰρημένων περὶ θεῶν καὶ

ἀμενών ἀπεικάζοντι λέγειν, οἶον παιδιά καλῇ

1 ἀνάγκη Schneider: ἀνάγκη mss.
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says it must be wise, no one any longer agrees at all with anyone else, in most cases—we have just now explained—as to what its wisdom should be. So now we are discovering, besides all those former kinds, a wisdom of no mean worth for this very purpose of showing how he is wise who has learnt the things that we have set forth. But whether he is wise who has knowledge of these things and is good at them, is what we must now examine.

CL. Good sir, how properly you said that you are undertaking to speak great things on great subjects!¹

ATH. Yes, for they are not small, Cleinias: but what is more difficult is to make sure that they are entirely and in every sense true.

CL. Very much so, good sir: but still, do not weary of the task of stating your views.

ATH. I will not, and therefore you two must not weary either of listening to me.

CL. Agreed: I give you my word for us both.

ATH. Thank you. To begin with, then, we must necessarily state first, it would seem—best of all, in a single word, if we are able so to put it—what is that which we suppose to be wisdom; but if we are utterly unable to do this, we must say in the second place what and how many kinds of it there are that a man must have acquired, if he is to be wise according to our story.

CL. Pray speak on.

ATH. And as to the next step, it will be no offence in the lawgiver that he speaks finer and higher things than have been previously said about the gods in his portrayal, making as it were a noble sport and

¹ This remark, however, does not appear to have been made.
Βχρωμένω καὶ τιμῶντι θεοὺς, ὑμνοὺς τε καὶ εὐδαι-
μονιά γεραιροντί διάγειν τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον.

κλ. Ἡ καλός, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις. εἰ γάρ σοι τούτο τέλος εἰὴ τῶν νόμων, θεοὺς προσπαίσαντι
καθαρώτερον τε διαγαγόντι τὸν βίον τῆς ἄμα
tελευτής ἄριστῃς τε καὶ καλλιστῆς τυχεῖν.

ἀ. Πῶς οὖν, ὦ Κλεινία, λέγομεν; ἢ δοκεῖ
tοὺς θεοὺς ὑμνοῦντες σφόδρα τιμῶμεν, εὐχόμενοι
tὰ κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπινέαν λέγειν
ημῖν; οὕτως ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

κλ. Θαυμαστῶς μὲν οὖν οὕτως. ἀλλ', ὦ δαι-
μόνιε, πιστεύσας τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχοῦν τε καὶ λέγε τὸν
ἐπιόντα σοι λόγον τῶν καλῶν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τε
cαὶ τὰς θεᾶς.

ἀ. Ἐσταὶ ταῦτα, ἂν αὐτός ὦ θεὸς ἦμῖν ψυ-
ηγήται. συνεύχου μόνον.

κλ. Λέγοις ἄν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο.

ἀ. Θεογονίαν τούνιν καὶ ζωογονίαν ἀναγκαῖον,
ὡς ἔοικε, πρῶτον μοι, κακῶς ἀπεικασάντων τῶν
ἐμπροσθεν, βέλτιον ἀπεικάσαί κατὰ τὸν ἐμπροσθεν
λόγον, ἀναλαβόντα διὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς ἐπι-

D κεχειρήκα λέγων,1 φράζων ὡς εἰσὶ θεοὶ ἐπιμελοῦ-
μενοι πάντων, σμικρῶν καὶ μείζονων, καὶ σχέδον
ἀπαραμύθητοι τῶν περὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰς πράγματα—
ei ἢ μέμνησθε γε, ὦ Κλεινία· ἐλάβετε μὲν γὰρ ἡ
καὶ ὑπομνήματα· καὶ γὰρ ἦν τὰ ῥηθέντα τότε καὶ
μάλα ἀληθῆ· τόδε δὲ αὐτῶν ἦν τὸ μέγιστον, ὅτι
πρεσβύτερον εἰῇ ψυχῆ σώματος ἄπασα παντός·

1 λέγων Euseb.: λόγους mss.

1 i.e. the statement made in Laws x., on the existence of the
gods, and the reverence due to them.

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honouring the gods, with high tribute of his hymns
and happiness throughout the period of his own life.

cl. Well spoken, indeed, good sir. Yes, may you
have this consummation of your laws, after making
fine sport in praising the gods and having passed a
purer life, to find thereby the best and fairest end!

ATH. Then how, Cleinias, do we mean it? Should
we honour the gods, think you, to the utmost with
our hymns, praying that we may be moved to speak
the fairest and best things about them? Do you
mean it so, or how?

cl. Nay, absolutely so. Now, my excellent friend,
pray to the gods with confidence, and utter the fine
specimen of a speech that you are moved to make
about the gods and goddesses.

ATH. It shall be done, if the god himself will be
our guide. Do but join in my prayer.

cl. Speak what follows next.

ATH. It is necessary, then, it seems, that I should
first portray in better terms, according to our previous
statement, the generation of gods and of living
creatures, which has been ill portrayed by those
before us; I must resume the statement which I have
attempted in speaking against the impious,\(^1\) declaring
that there are gods who have a care for all things,
small and greater, and who are well-nigh inexorable
in maintaining the claims of justice: that is, if you
remember, Cleinias; for you did take memoranda\(^2\)
besides, and indeed what then was spoken was very
true. And the most important part of it was that
eyery soul was senior to each body\(^3\): do you

\(^2\) There is no hint of this in the *Laws*.

\(^3\) Cf. *Laws*, x. 893-896.
αρα μέμνησθε; ἡ πάντως ποι τοῦτο γε; ὁ γὰρ ἄμεινον καὶ παλαιώτερον καὶ θεοειδέστερον, πιθανόν
Ε ὠτι τοῦ νέου† καὶ νεωτέρου καὶ ἀτιμοτέρου, παν-
tαχὴ τε ἄρχον ἄρχομένου πρεσβύτερον καὶ ἄγον ἄγομένου πάντη. λάβωμεν δὴ τοῦτο γε, ὡς ψυχὴν πρεσβύτερον ἐστὶ σώματος· εἰ δὲ ἐχει τοῦτο οὕτω, 981 τὸ γε πρῶτον ἡμῶν τοῦ πρώτου τῆς γενέσεως πιθανώτερον ἄν εἰ ἡ σχέδον ὑπηργεῖ ύμον· καὶ θώμεν δὴ τὴν ἄρχην τῆς ἄρχης εὐσχήμονέστερον ἐξεῖν, καὶ τῶν μεγίστων σοφίας περὶ θεῶν γενέσεως ὀρθότατα ἐπιβαίνειν ἡμᾶς.

κλ. Ἡ Ἑστω ταῦτα εἰς δύναμιν λεγόμενα.

α. Φέρε δὴ, ζῶον γε ἀληθέστατα λέγεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν φώμεν τοῦτό γε, ὅταν μία συνελθοῦσα σύστασις ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἀποτέκη μίαν μορφὴν; κλ. Ὄρθως.

Β α. Ζώον μὲν δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖται δικαιό-
tατα; κλ. Ναὶ.

α. Στερεὰ δὲ σώματα λέγεσθαι χρῆ κατὰ τὸν εἰκότα λόγον πέντε, εὲ ὃν κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα τις ἀν πλάττω, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο γένος ἀπαίν ἐκεῖ μορφὴν μίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀσώματον ὁ τί τ᾽ ἄλλο γίγνοιτ’ ἂν καὶ χρώμα οὐδέν οὐδαμῶς οὐδέποτ’ ἐχον, πλὴν τὸ θειότατον οὕτως ψυχῆς γένος. τοῦτο δ’ ἐτοί σχεδὸν ὃ μόνῳ πλάττει καὶ δημιουργεῖ προσῆκει,

C σώματι δὲ, ὃ λέγομεν, πλάττεσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι

1 νέου in the text is a corruption of a word not yet recovered.
2 i.e. the elements fire, water, air, earth, and ether. Plato (Tim. 40 α, 81 ε) does not allow ether as one of the elements: our author includes it, because he wishes to make it the source of δαιμόνες, or spirits that come midway between gods and men in the scale of existence; cf. 984 b, ε.
3 i.e. the generality of things that have come to be have
remember? Or in any case, surely, this must be so? For that which is better and more ancient and more godlike is credibly so in comparison with the . . ., the junior, and the less honoured; and everywhere, a thing governing is senior to a thing governed, and the driver every way senior to the driven. So much, then, let us conclude—that soul is senior to body; and if this is the case, our first of first things in creation may be taken as a more credible foundation. So let us take it that our beginning of the beginning is more appropriate, and that we are most correctly entering upon the principal parts of wisdom relating to the generation of the gods.

cl. Let this be so, in the best statement that we can give.

ATH. Come then, shall we say that a living creature is most truly described by its nature, as a case of one combination of soul and body so uniting as to beget one shape?

cl. Correct.

ATH. And such a thing is most justly called a living creature?

cl. Yes.

ATH. On the most likely account there are to be reckoned five solid bodies, from which one might fashion things fairest and best; but all the rest of creation has a single shape, for there is nothing that could come to be without a body and never possessing any colour at all, except only that really most divine creature, the soul. And this alone, one may say, has the business of fashioning and manufacturing, whereas the body, as we call it, has that assumed a unity of shape resulting from the afore-mentioned combination of soul and body.
καὶ ὅρασθαί· τῷ δὲ—λέγωμεν πάλιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀπαξ ῥητέον—ἀοράτῳ τε εἶναι καὶ γεγυνώσκοντι νοητῷ τε, μνήμης μεταλαβόντι λογισμῷ τε ἐν περιτταῖς τε καὶ ἀρτίαις ἁμα μεταβολαῖς. πέντε οὖν οὖν τῶν σωμάτων πῦρ χρή φάναι καὶ ὕδωρ εἶναι καὶ τρίτον ἀέρα, τέταρτον δὲ γῆν, πέμπτον δὲ αἰθέρα· τούτων δ' ἐν ἡγεμονίαις ἐκαστον ξώον πολὺ καὶ παντοδαπὸν ἀποτελεῖσθαι. μαθεῖν δὲ καθ' ἐν ὤδε·

D ἔστι χρεῶν. γῆνον μὲν τιθῶμεν τὸ πρῶτον ἡμῖν ἐν, πάντας μὲν ἀνθρώπους, πάντα δὲ ὅσα πολύποδα καὶ ἀπόδα, καὶ ὅσα πορεύσιμα καὶ ὅσα μόνιμα, διελημμένα ρίζαις· τὸ δὲ ἐν αὐτοῦ τὸδε νομίζειν δει, ὡς πάντα μὲν ἐξ ἀπάντων ταῦτ' ἔστι τῶν γενῶν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ τούτου γῆς ἔστι καὶ τῆς στερεμ-νίας φύσεως. ἀλλο δὲ χρῆ ξώον γένος θείναι δεύτερον γιγνόμενον ἁμα καὶ δυνατὸν ὅρασθαι. τὸ γὰρ πλείστον πυρὸς ἔχει, ἔχει μὴν γῆς τε καὶ

Ε ἀέρος, ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἀπάντων τῶν ἄλλων βραχέα μέρη, διὸ δὴ ξώα τε ἐξ αὐτῶν παντοδαπὰ γίγ-νεσθαι χρῆ φάναι καὶ ὁρώμενα, νομίζει δὲ δὴ δεί πάλιν τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν ξώων γένη, δ' δὴ πἀν χρῆ φάναι θείων γένοις ἀστρῶν γεγονεῖν, σώματος μὲν τυχὸν καλλίστου, ψυχῆς δὲ εὐφαινομενότητι τε καὶ ἀρίστης. δυοὶ δὲ αὐτοῖς μοιρῶν τὴν ἐτέραν χρῆ δόξῃ μεταδιδόναι σχεδόν· ἡ γὰρ ἀνάλεθρον τε καὶ ἄθανατον ἐκαστον αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ θείων τὸ παράπαν ἐξ ἀπάσης ἀνάγκης, ἡ τινα μακραίων μοιρῶν ἔχειν ἱκανὸν ἐκάστω ξώης, ἢς οὐδέν τι πλείονος ἡν προσδείσθαι ποτε.

Νοθήσωμεν οὖν πρῶτον, δ' λέγομεν, δύο τα τοιάτα

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1 Here the author agrees with Plato, Tim. 39 e ff.; Laws, x. 889 b.

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of being fashioned and created and seen. But the other—let us repeat it, for not once only be it said—has the properties of being unseen, of knowing and being thought, and of being endowed with memory and reckoning by alternations of odd and even.

The bodies, then, being five, we must name them as fire, water, and thirdly air, earth fourth, and ether fifth; and by predominance of these are each of the many varieties of creatures perfected. We should learn this by single instances in the following way. Let us take first the earthy as one sort—all men, all things that have many feet or none, and those that move along and that stay still, held in place by roots; but we must conceive its unity thus,—though all these things are the outcome of all kinds, yet for the most part it is of earth and of solid substance. And another kind of creature we must regard as second in birth as well as one that can be seen: for its greatest part is of fire, though it has some earth and air, and has slight portions of all the others also, wherefore we must say that all sorts of creatures are born of them, things that are seen, and these again we must conceive to be the heavenly kinds of creatures, which altogether, we must agree, have been born as the divine race of stars, endowed with the fairest body as also with the happiest and best soul.¹ One or other of two lots we may very well, in our opinion, assign to them: for each of them is either imperishable and immortal, and by all necessity wholly divine, or has a certain longevity sufficient for the life of each, such that nothing could ever require a longer one.

Let us therefore first observe that, as we state it,
εἰναι ζώα, πάλιν γὰρ λέγωμεν, ὅρατα μὲν ἀμφότερα, τὸ μὲν ἐκ πυρὸς, ὡς δόξειν ἀν, ὅλον, τὸ δ' ἐκ γῆς, καὶ τὸ μὲν γῆμον ἐν ἀταξίᾳ, τὸ δ' ἐκ πυρὸς ἐν τάξει πάση κινούμενον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀταξίᾳ κινούμενον ἄφρον χρή νομίζειν, ὅπερ ὡς τὸ

β πολὺ δρὰ τὸ περὶ ἡμᾶς ζώον, τὸ δὲ ἐν τάξει τε καὶ οὐρανῷ πόρον ἔχον μέγα τεκμήριον χρή ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ φρόνιμου εἶναι· κατὰ ταῦτα γὰρ ἄν καὶ ὁσαύτως πορευόμενον ἄει καὶ ποιοῦν καὶ πάσχον τεκμήριον ἵκανον τοῦ φρόνιμως ζῆν εὖ παρεχόμενον. ἡ ψυχὴς δὲ ἀνάγκη νοῦν κεκτημένης ἀπασῶν ἀναγκῶν πολὺ μεγίστη γίγνοντ' ἄν· ἄρχουσα γὰρ ἄλλ' οὐκ ἀρχομένη νομοθετεῖ. τὸ δὲ ἀμετάστροφον, ὅταν

ζ ψυχὴ τὸ ἅριστον κατὰ τὸν ἅριστον βουλεύσειται νοῦν, τὸ τέλεον ἐκβάινει τῷ ὄντι κατὰ νοῦν, καὶ οὐδὲ ἀδάμας ἄν αὐτοῦ κρείττον οὐδὲ ἀμεταστροφώτερον ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, ἄλλ' ὄντως τρεῖς Μοῖραι κατέχουσιν φυλάττουσι τέλεον εἶναι τὸ βελτίστη βουλὴ βεβουλευμένον ἐκάστοις θεῶν. τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρώποις ἔχρην τεκμήριον εἶναι τοῦ νοῦν ἔχειν ἀστρα τε καὶ σύμπασαν ταύτην τὴν διαπορείαν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἀεὶ πράττει διὰ τὸ βεβουλευμένα πάλαι πράττειν θαυμαστὸν τῶν χρόνων ὅσον, ἄλλ' οὐ μεταβουλευόμενον ἄνω καὶ κάτω, τοτε μὲν ἑτερα, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἄλλα πράττον, πλανᾶσθαι τε καὶ μετακυκλεῖσθαι. τοῦθ' ἡμῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς αὐτὸ τοιαντίον ἐδοξεῖν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὁσαύτως πράττει,¹ ψυχὴν οὐκ ἔχειν· οὕτω τοῖς ἄφροι συνεφέσπετο τὸ πλῆθος, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπων

¹ πράττει Stephanus: πράττεν mss.

¹ “Necessity” is used here in the old poetic sense of a compelling or overruling power; cf. the mention of the Fates below, and Laws, 818 a.
such creatures are of two sorts—for let us state it again—both visible, the one of fire, as would appear, entirely, and the other of earth; and the earthy moves in disorder, whereas that of fire has its motion in perfect order. Now that which has motion in disorder we should regard as unintelligent, acting like the animal creatures about us for the most part; but that which has an orderly and heavenly progress must be taken as strongly evincing its intelligence. For in passing on and acting and being acted upon always in the same respects and manner it must provide sufficient evidence of its intelligent life. The necessity of a soul that has acquired mind will prove itself by far the greatest of all necessities; for it makes laws as ruler, not as ruled; and this inalterable state, when the soul has taken the best counsel in accord with the best mind, comes out as the perfect thing in truth and in accord with mind, and not even adamant could ever prove stronger than it or more inalterable; but in fact the three Fates have taken hold, and keep watch that what has been decided by each of the gods with the best counsel shall be perfect. And men ought to have found proof of the stars and the whole of that travelling system being possessed of mind in the fact that they always do the same things because they do what has been decided long ago for an incalculable time, not deciding differently this way and that, and doing sometimes one thing, sometimes another, in wanderings and changes of circuit. Most of us have thought just the opposite—that because they do the same things in the same way they have no soul: the multitude followed the lead of the unintelligent so far as to suppose that, whereas humanity was intelligent and
982 ἐμφρον καὶ ξῶν ὦς κινούμενον ὑπολαβεῖν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον ἀφρον ὦς μένον ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς φοραῖς· ἐξήν δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ γε ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίω καὶ βελτίω καὶ Ἐφίλα τιθεμένω λαμβάνειν, ὡς διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐμφρον δεῖ νομίζειν τὸ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαυτός καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πράττον ἀεί· τοῦτο δ’ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἀστρῶν φύσιν, ἓδειν μὲν καλλίστην, πορειάν δεὶ καὶ χορεῖαν πάντων χορῶν καλλίστην καὶ μεγαλο-πρεπεστάτην χορεύοντα πάσι τοῖς ξώσι τὸ δέον ἀποτελεῖν. καὶ μὴν ὁτί γε δικαίως ἐμψυχα αὐτὰ
983 λέγομεν, πρῶτον τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν διανοηθόμεν. οὐ γὰρ, ὡς σμικρὰ φαντάζεται, τηλίκατα ὄντως ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ἀμήχανον ἐκατόν αὐτῶν τὸν ὄγκον, πιστεύσαι δ’ ἄξιον· ἀποδειξεῖν γὰρ ἴκαινας λαμ-βάνειν· τὸν γὰρ ἴλιον ὅλον τῆς γῆς ὅλης μείζων διανοηθήναι δυνατὸν ὄρθως, καὶ πάντα δὴ τὰ φερόμενα ἀστρα θαυμαστόν τι μέγεθος ἔχει. λάβωμεν δὴ, τὸς πρῶτος ὅν εἰθ’ τοσοῦτον περιφέρεστ’ ὄγκον τῷ ἄστρῳ πάντων ἄει ἱρών, ὅσον καὶ
Β νῦν περιφέρεται. θεον δὴ φημι τὸν αὐτῶν ἔσεσθαι, καὶ οὐποθ’ ἐτέρως εἶναι δυνατῶν· ἐμψυχὸν μὲν γὰρ οὔποτε γένοιτο· ἀν ἑτέρα πλὴρ διὰ θεοῦ, ὡς ἴμεις ἀπεφηνάμεθα· ὅτε δὲ τοῦτο οὗς τέ ἐστιν θεος, ἀπασα αὐτῷ βαστών γένοντο τοῦ πρώτον μὲν ξῶν γεγονέναι πάν σῶμα καὶ ὄγκον σύμπαντα, ἐπειτα, ἂπερ ἂν διανοηθῆ βέλτιστα, ταύτῃ φέρειν. νῦν δὴ περὶ ἀπάντων τοῦτων ἐνα λόγον λέγομεν ἀληθῆ· οὐκ ἐστι γῆν τε καὶ οὐρανόν ἀπαντάς τε
C αστέρας ὄγκους τε ἐκ τούτων σύμπαντας, μὴ ψυχῆς πρὸς ἕκαστῳ γενομένης ἦ καὶ ἐν ἕκαστοις, εἰτα εἰς ἀκρίβειαν κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν οὕτω πορεύεσθαι

1 Cf. Plato, Tim. 40 c.
living because it moved about, divinity was unintelligent because it abode in the same courses. But if man had sided with the fairer and better and friendly part, he might have concluded that he ought to regard as intelligent—and for this very reason—that which acts always in the same respects, in the same way, and from the same causes; and that this is the nature of the stars, fairest to see, and passing along, dancing the fairest and most magnificent of all dances in the world, they perform their service to all living creatures. And now, to see how justly we speak of their living spirit, let us first consider their great size. For they are not actually those small things that they appear to be, but each of them is immense in its bulk; we should do well to believe this, because there are ample proofs of such a conclusion. For we can rightly consider the whole of the sun as larger than the whole of the earth, and all the travelling stars are of amazing size. Let us conclude then how it can possibly be that any natural force revolves this great mass always in the same time as that in which it is now being revolved. God, then, I say, will be the cause, and never in any other way is it possible. For never can a thing get living spirit by any other means than by the act of God, as we have explained; and since God is able to do this, he has found it a perfectly easy matter, firstly that any body and a whole mass should be made a living creature, and secondly to move it in the course he considers best. So now I trust we may make one true statement about all these things: it cannot be that earth and heaven and all the stars and all the masses they comprise, without soul attached to each or resident in each, should pass along as they do, so
κατὰ μὴνάς τε καὶ ἡμέρας, καὶ σύμπαντα τὰ γεγονόμενα σύμπασιν ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ γίγνεσθαι.

Δεῖ δέ, ὅσω φλαυρότερον ἐστὶ ἄνθρωπος, μὴ τοι ληροῦντά γε, σαφῶς δὲ τὶ λέγοντα φαίνεσθαι. ῥώμας μὲν οὖν εἰ τὸς αὐτίας των ἐρεὶ σωμάτων ἕ

φύσεως ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲν σαφές ἐρεὶ· τὸ δὲ παρ’ ἡμῶν εἰρημένον σφόδρ’ ἀναλαβεῖν χρή, πότερον

D ἐχει λόγον ὁ λόγος ἢ πάντως ύστερεὶ, τὸ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ὄντα εἰναι δυό, τὸ μὲν ψυχήν, τὸ δὲ σώμα, καὶ πολλὰ ἐκατέρου, πάντα δὲ ἀλλήλων ἄλλα καὶ ἐκάτερα ἐκατέρων, καὶ τρίτον ἀλλο οὐδὲν κοινὸν οὐδενὶ, διαφέρειν δὲ ψυχὴν σώματος. ἐμφρον μὲν

που, τὸ δὲ ἄφρον θῆσομεν, ἀρχὸν δὲ, τὸ δὲ ἀρχό-

μενον, καὶ τὸ μὲν αἰτίων ἀπάντων, τὸ δὲ ἀναίτιων

πάσης πάθης· ὡστε τὰ γε δὴ κατ’ οὐρανὸν ὑπ’

Ε ἄλλου τοῦ φάναι γεγονέναι, καὶ μὴ ψυχῆς τε καὶ

σώματος οὕτως εἰναι γεννήματα, πολλὴ μωρία τε

καὶ ἀλογία.. εἰ δ’ οὖν δεῖ νυκάν τοὺς περὶ ἀπάντων

τῶν τοιοῦτων λόγους καὶ πιστῶς θεία φαίνεσθαι

γεγονέναι τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα, δυοῖν τοι θάτερα

θετέουν αὐτά· ἡ γὰρ θεοῦς αὐτοὺς ταῦτα ὑμνητέον

984 ορθότατα, ἡ θεῶν εἰκόνας ὡς ἁγάλματα ὑπολα-

βεῖν γεγονέναι, θεῶν αὐτῶν ἐργασαμένων· οὐ γὰρ

ἀνοίτων γε οὐδὲ βραχέος ἄξιων, ἀλλ’ ὀπερ εἰρή-

καμεν, τούτων ἡμῖν θάτερα θετέα, τὰ δὲ τεθέντα

1 Soul and body, in their respective spheres, cover or account for the whole of existent things, of whatever kind, from the astral to the inanimate.

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exactly to year and month and day, and that all
the good things that happen should happen for
us all.

And according as man is a meaner creature, he
should show himself, not a babbler, but a speaker of
clear sense. If, then, anyone shall speak of certain
onrushes or natural forces of bodies or the like as
causes, he will say nothing clear: but we must cer-
tainly recall what we have said, and see whether our
statement is reasonable or is utterly at fault—namely,
in the first place, that existence is of two kinds, the
one soul, and the other body, and that many things
are in either, though all are different from each other
and those of the one kind from those of the other,¹
and that there is no other third thing common to any
of them; and that soul excels body. Intelligent, of
course, we shall hold it to be, and the other un-
intelligent; the one governs, the other is governed;
and the one is cause of all things, while the other is
incapable of causing any of its experiences: so that
to assert that the heavenly bodies have come into
existence through anything else, and are not the
offspring, as we have said, of soul and body, is great
folly and unreason. However, if our statements on
all such existences are to prevail, and the whole order
of them is to be convincingly shown to be divine by
their origin, we must certainly class them as one or
the other of two things: either we must in all correct-
ness glorify them as actual gods, or suppose them to
be likenesses produced, as so many images, of the
gods, creations of the gods themselves. For they are
the work of no mindless or inconsiderable beings but,
as we have said, we must class them as one or other
of these things; and, if classed as the latter, we must

¹
τιμητέον πάντων ἀγαλμάτων διαφερόντως· οὗ γάρ μὴποτε φανῆ καλλίω καὶ κοινότερα συμπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀγάλματα, οὐδ' ἐν διαφέρουσι τόποις ἰδρυμένα, καθαριότητι καὶ σεμνότητι καὶ

Β συμπάσῃ ζωῆ διαφέροντα, ἣ ταύτη, ὡς πάντῃ ταύτῃ γεγένηται. νῦν οὖν δὴ περὶ θεῶν ἐγχειρώμεν τὸ γε τοσοῦτον, τὰ δύο κατιδόντες ζωὰ ὅρατα ἡμῖν, ἃ φαμεν ἀδάνατον, τὸ δὲ γῆνων ἀπαν θυητοῦ γεγονέναι, τὰ τρία τὰ μέσα τῶν πέντε τὰ μεταξὺ τούτων σαφέστατα κατὰ δόξαν τὴν ἐπεικὴ γεγονότα πειραθήναι λέγειν. αἰθέρα μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τὸ πῦρ θῶμεν, ψυχὴν δ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ τιθῶμεν πλάττεων ζώα δύναμιν ἔχοντα, ὡσπερ τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν, τὸ

C πολὺ μὲν τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα συνδέσμου χάρων ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν· μετὰ δὲ τὸν αἰθέρα ἐξ ἀέρος πλάττεων τὴν ψυχὴν γένος ἔτερον ζώων, καὶ τὸ τρίτον ἐξ ύδατος· πάντα δὲ δημιουργήσασαι ταῦτα ψυχὴν ζώων εἰκὸς ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἐμπλήσαι, χρησαμένην πᾶσι τοῖς γένεσι κατὰ δύναμιν, πάντων μὲν μετόχων τοῦ ζῆν γεγονότων· δεύτερα δὲ καὶ τρίτα καὶ τέταρτα καὶ πέμπτα, ἀπὸ θεῶν τῶν φανερῶν ἀρξάμενα γενέσεως,

D εἰς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀποτελευτῶν.

Θεοὺς μὲν δὴ, Δία τε καὶ Ἡραν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας, ὅπῃ τις ἑθέλει, ταύτη κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ τιθέσθω νόμον καὶ πάγιον ἐχέτω τούτον τὸν λόγον· θεοὺς δὲ δὴ τοὺς ὀρατοὺς, μεγίστους καὶ τιμω-

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1 i.e. fire, ether, air, water, earth; cf. 981 c.
2 First come the stars, or “manifest gods”; then the creatures of ether, air and water (the second, third or fourth kinds); and fifth and last, the creatures of earth or mankind.
3 i.e. the law governing the order or scale of animate creatures which has been described. The writer, like Plato 460
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honour them far above all images: for never will fairer or more commonly owned images be found among all mankind, none established in more eminent places, none more eminent in purity, majesty, and life altogether, than in the way in which their existence is altogether fashioned. Well then, for the present let us attempt so much in treating of the gods, as to try—after observing the two living creatures visible to us, of which we call one immortal, and the other, the earthy, all a mortal creation—to tell of the three middle things of the five,¹ which come most evidently, according to the probable opinion, between those two. For let us consider ether as coming next after fire, and let us hold that soul fashions from it live creatures with their faculties,—as in the creatures of the other kinds,—belonging for the most part to that one substance, but in the lesser parts derived from the other elements for the sake of combination. After ether, there is fashioned by soul another kind of creature from air, and the third kind from water; and by having produced all these it is likely that soul filled the whole heaven with creatures, having made use of all the kinds so far as it could, and all the creatures having been made participators in life; but the second, third, fourth, and fifth kinds, starting from the birth of the manifest gods, end finally in us men.²

Now the gods—Zeus and Hera and all the rest—each man must regard in what light he pleases, though according to the same law,³ and must take this account as reliable. But as our visible gods, greatest

(Tim. 40 δ-41 α), avoids any definite statement about the traditional deities: like Plato again (Tim. 41 α-42 ε), he is more concerned with the “visible gods,” or stars.
The daemons or divine spirits had their existence and activity "betwixt mortal and immortal," and they served as interpreters and conveyers of men's prayers and offerings to the gods, and of the god's behests and requitals to men (Plato, Sympos. 202 b). Good mortals might become daemons after death (Eurip. Ale. 1003; Plato, Cratyl. 398 b; Lucian, De morte Peregr. 36), and as such they were charged
and most honourable and having keenest vision every way, we must count first the order of the stars and all else that we perceive existing with them; and after these, and next below these, the divine spirits, and air-borne race, holding the third and middle situation, source of interpretation, which we must specially honour with prayers for the sake of an auspicious journey across. We must say of each of these two creatures—that which is of ether and, next to it, that of air—that it is not entirely plain to sight: when it is near by, it is not made manifest to us; but partaking of extraordinary intelligence, as belonging to an order which is quick to learn and strong in memory, we may say that they understand the whole of our thoughts, and show extraordinary kindness to anyone of us who is a good man and true, and hate him who is utterly evil, since they can have a feeling of pain. For we know that God, who has the privilege of the divine portion, is remote from these affections of pain and pleasure, but has a share of intelligence and knowledge in every sphere; and the heaven being filled full of live creatures, they interpret all men and all things both to one another and to the most exalted gods, because the middle creatures move both to earth and to the whole of heaven with a lightly rushing motion. The kind which is of water, the fifth, we shall be right in representing as a semi-divine product of that element, and it is with the guidance and care of mankind (Plato, *Laws* 713 d; Plutarch, *De genio Socr.* 588 c).

The "journey across" seems to refer to one part of the "conveying" that daemons performed—conducting the souls of deceased human beings from earth to the abode of the gods.

The nymphs.
άλλοτε δὲ ἀποκρυφθὲν ἁδηλον γιγνόμενον, θαῦμα κατ' ἀμυνδράν ὅψιν παρεχόμενον. τούτων δὴ τῶν
C πέντε ὄντως ὄντων ζῷων, ὅπως τινὲς ἐνέτυχον ἦμῶν, ἡ καθ' ὑπνον ἐν ὀνειροπολίᾳ προστυχόντες, ἡ κατὰ
φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας λεχθὲν τισιν ἐν ἀκοαῖς ὑγιαίνουσιν ἡ καὶ κάμνουσιν, ἡ καὶ τελευτὴ βίου
προστυχέσι γενομένοις, ἵδια τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ δόξας παραγενομένας, οἴθεν ἑρᾶ πολλὰ πολλῶν γέγονε,
τὰ δὲ γενήσεται, τούτων πάντων νομοθέτης, ὡστὶς
νοῦν κέκτηται καὶ τὸν βραχύτατον, οὕτως μὴ
τολμήσῃ κανονόμων ἐπὶ θεοσέβειαν, ἦτος μὴ
D σαφὲς ἔχει τι, τρέφαται πόλιν ἐαυτοῦ· καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἃν ὁ πάτριος νόμος εἴρηκε περὶ θυσίων ἀποκωλύσει,
μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν εἰδῶς, ὥσπερ οὖδ' ὃν δυνατὸν
εἰδέναι τῇ δυνητῇ φύσει τῶν τοιούτων πέρι. τοὺς
dὲ ὄντως ἦμῶν φανεροὺς ὄντας θεοὺς ἢρ' οὐχ αὐτῶς
λόγος ἔχει κακίστους εἶναι τοὺς μὴ τολμῶντας
λέγειν ἦμῶν καὶ φανεροὺς ποιεῖν ἀνοργιάστους τε
ὄντας ἑτέρους θεοὺς καὶ τιμᾶς μὴ δεχομένους τὰς
προσηκούσας αὐτοῖς; νῦν δὲ δὴ συμβαίνει γι-
Ε γιγνόμενον ἁμα τὸ τοιοῦτον· οἶον γὰρ εἰ ποτὲ τις
ἡμῶν ἤλιον ἡ σελήνην ἐωρακὼς ἦν γιγνομένους
ἐφορώντας ταὶ ἦμᾶς πάντας, καὶ μὴ ἐφράξειν
ἀδύνατος ὃν τῇ φράξειν, τιμῆς τε ἀμοίρους ὄντας
ἀμα καὶ μὴ προθυμοῖτο τὸ γε αὐτοῦ μέρος,
eἰς ἐντύμιον χώραν καταφανεῖς ἄγων αὐτοὺς,
ἔορτάς τε αὐτοῖς γίγνεσθαι ποιεῖν καὶ θυσίας,
ἀπολαμβανόμενον τε χρόνον ἐκάστως μειζόνων καὶ
ἐλαττῶν πολλάκις ἐνιαυτῶν ὄρας διανέμειν, ἢρ'
at one time seen, but at another is concealed through becoming obscure, presenting a marvel in the dimness of vision. So these five being really existent creatures, wherever any of us came upon them, either happening upon them in the dream-world of sleep, or by something spoken to persons listening in health, or equally in sickness, through ominous utterances and prophecies, or again when they have met them at the end of life—opinions that occur to us both in private and in public, whence many sanctities of many beings have arisen, and others shall arise—in regard to all these the lawgiver who possesses even the slightest degree of mind will never dare by innovations to turn his city to a divine worship which is lacking in certainty. Nor indeed will he hinder men from what ancestral custom has ordained regarding sacrifices, when he knows nothing at all of the matter, just as it is not possible for mortal nature to know about such things. But of the gods who are really manifest to us the same argument must surely hold—that those men are most evil who have not courage to tell us of them and make manifest that these are likewise gods, but without any frenzied rites, or any tribute of the honours that are their due. But as things are, we have a strange conjunction of proceedings: for suppose that one of us had seen the sun or moon being born and observing all of us, and uttered no word through some impotence of speech, and should not also at the same time be zealous, so far as in him lay, when they lacked their share of honour, to bring them in all evidence to an honoured place, and cause festivals and sacrifices to be offered to them, and apportion to each a reserved space of time for the greater or lesser length of its
986 οὐκ ἂν κακῶς ἐαυτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι
λεγόμενος ἐν δίκῃ συνεδόκει λέγεσθαι ποτ' ἂν;
κα. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ, ὦ ξένε; κάκιστος μὲν οὖν.
α. Τούτο τοίνυν, ὦ Κλεινία φίλε, περὶ ἐμὲ νῦν
γιγνόμενον ἵσθι φανερῶς.
κα. Πῶς λέγεις;
α. Ἡστε ὀκτὼ δύναμεις τῶν περὶ ὅλον οὐρανὸν
γεγονύσας ἄδελφας ἀλλήλων, ὡς καθεώρακα ἐγώ·
καὶ οὐδὲν μέγα διαπέραγμαι. βάδιον γὰρ καὶ
Β ἐτέρῳ. τούτων δ' εἰσὶ τρεῖς αὕται, μία μὲν ἥλιον,
μία δὲ σελήνης, μία δὲ τῶν τόπων [πλανητῶν] ἀστρῶν,
ὅν ἐμνήσθημεν ὅλων ἐμπροσθέν πέντε δὲ ἐτεραί.
ταῦτας δὴ πάσος καὶ τούτοις τοὺς ἐν ταύταισιν
eίτε αὑτοὺς ἱόντας εἴτε φερομένους ἐν ὀχήμασι
πορεύεσθαι ταῦτῃ, μηδείς ἀλλας ποτὲ νομίζῃ
πάντων ἡμῶν, ὡς οἱ μὲν θεοὶ εἰσὶν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ,
μηδ' ὡς οἱ μὲν γνήσιοι, οἱ δὲ τοιοῦτοι τινες,
οἷοι οὐδὲ θέμως εἰπέτω ἡμῶν οὐδενὶ, πάντες δὲ
dὴ πάντας λέγωμεν τε καὶ φῶμεν ἄδελφοις τ'
C εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἄδελφαῖς μοίραις, καὶ τιμᾶς ἀπο-
διδώμεν μὴ τῷ μὲν ἐναυτῷ, τῷ δὲ μήνα, τοῖς δὲ
μήτε τινὰ μοῖραν τάττωμεν μήτε τινὰ χρόνον, ἐν ὅ
διεξέρχεται τὸν αὐτοῦ πόλον, συναποτελέων κόσμου,
ὅν ἐταξὲ λόγος ὁ πάντων θειότατος ὀρατόν· ὅν δ' μὲν
ἐυδαίμων πρῶτον μὲν ἑδαίμοσεν, ἐπειτὰ δὲ
ἐρωτα ἐσχε τοῦ καταμαθεῖν ὁπόσα θυντῆ φύσει

1 πλανητῶν secl. Burnet.

1 “Year” is used here for “circuit.”
2 Cf. Plato, Tim. 38 ff, where God is said to have made,
besides the fixed stars, the sun, the moon, and the five
planets—Venus, Mercury, Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars—for
the generation of time.
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year,¹ as may happen: would it not be agreed both by himself and by another who observed it that he would justly be described as an evil man?

cL. To be sure he would, my good sir; nay, most evil.

ATH. Well then, this, my dear Cleinias, is what, you may take it, is evidently happening to me now.

cL. How do you mean?

ATH. Let me tell you, there are eight powers of those contained in the whole heaven which are cognate to each other: these I have observed, and it is no great achievement; for it is easy enough for anybody. Three of them are that of the sun, for one, that of the moon for another, and a third that of the stars which we mentioned a little while ago; and there are five others besides.² Now in regard to all these and those beings who either have their own motion in these, or are borne in vehicles so as to make their progress thus, let none of us all ever idly suppose that some of them are gods, while others are not, or that some are legitimate, while others are of a certain kind which it is not permissible to any of us even to express; but let us all declare and say that they are all cognate and have cognate lots, and let us render them due honour, and not, while giving to one a year, to another a month, to others appoint neither a certain lot nor a certain time in which each travels through its particular orbit, completing the system which the divinest reason of all ³ appointed to be visible. At this first the man who is blest marvels, and then he feels a passion for understanding so much as is possible for mortal nature, believing that thus he

¹ i.e. the supreme deity of Plato's Timaeus.
δυνατά, ἡγούμενος ἄρισθ' οὕτως εὐτυχέστατά τε
dιαξείων τὸν βίον τελευτήσας τε εἰς τόπους ἦξειν
προσήκοντας ἀρετῇ, καὶ μεμνημένος ἀληθῶς τε
cαι ὄντως, μεταλαβὼν φρονήσεως εἰς ὧν μᾶς,
tὸν ἐπιλοιπὸν χρόνον θεωρὸς τῶν καλλίστων
cενόμενον, ὥσα κατ' ὦμιν, διατελεῖ. νῦν δὴ τὸ
μετὰ τοῦθ' ἡμῶν λοιπὸν λέγειν ὅσοι τ' εἰσί, καὶ
Ετίνες: οὐ γὰρ μὴποτε φανῶμεν ἴσευδεῖς. βεβαιῶς
δὴ διασχυρίζομαι τὸ γε τοσσοῦτον. λέγω γὰρ
πάλιν ὡκτὼ μὲν εἶναι, τῶν δὲ ὡκτὼ τρεῖς μὲν
εἰρήσθαι, πέντε δ' ἐτὶ λοιπάς. η τετάρτῃ δὲ φορὰ
καὶ διέξοδος ἁμα καὶ πέμπτη τάχει μὲν ἤλιῳ
σχεδὸν ἥση, καὶ οὔτε βραδυτέρα οὔτε θάττων τὸ
γ' ἐπίπαν. δεῖ τούτων τριῶν οὖν τὸν νοῦν
ἰκανὸν ἔχοντα ἴσειθῖν. λέγωμεν δὴ ταῦτα ἴλιον
t' εἰναι καὶ ἐωσφόρου, καὶ τρίτου, ὡς μὲν ὀνόματι
φράζειν οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τὸ μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι, τούτων
d' αἴτιος δ' πρῶτος ταῦτα κατιδὼν βάρβαρος ὧν:
palaiός γὰρ δὴ τρόπος ἔθρεψε τοὺς πρῶτους
987 ταῦτα ἐννοήσαντας διὰ τὸ κάλλος τῆς θερψῆς
ἀπρα, ὡς Αἰγυπτός τε Συρία δ' ἱκανῶς κέκτηται,
φανεροὺς μὲν ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν ἀστέρας ἀεὶ σύμπαντας
καθορίωντας, ἀτε νέφων καὶ ὑδάτων ἀπόπροσθεν
ἀεὶ τοῦ κόσμου κεκτημένους· ὅθεν καὶ πανταχόσε
καὶ δεύρ' ἐξῆκε, βεβασιασμένα χρόνῳ μυρετεί τε
καὶ ἄπειρῳ· διὸ θαρροῦντα χρὴ ταῦτα εἰς νόμους
θέσθαι· τὸ γὰρ μὴ τίμια τὰ θεία εἶναι, τὰ δὲ τίμια,
Β σαφῶς οὐκ ἐμφρόνων· ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἔσχηκε,

1 δεῖ Burnet: del mss.

11.e. sun, moon, and fixed stars.
2 Venus (or Lucifer); cf. Plato, Tim. 33 D.
3 Mercury.

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will best and most happily pass through life, and at the end of his days will arrive at regions meet for virtue; and having been truly and really initiated, and, himself one, partaken of wisdom that is one, he will continue for the rest of time to be a spectator of what is fairest, so far as sight can go. And now after this it remains for us to say how many and who these beings are: for we shall never be found to be deceivers. So much, at least, I asseverate with certainty: I say, once more, that there are eight of them, and that while three\(^1\) of the eight have been told, five yet remain. The fourth\(^2\) motion and transit together with the fifth,\(^3\) are almost equal to the sun in speed, and on the whole are neither slower nor swifter. Of these three, the one who has sufficient mind must be leader. So let us speak of them as powers of the sun and of Lucifer, and of a third,\(^3\) which we cannot express in a name because it is not known; and he is to blame for this who first observed these things, since he was a foreigner: for it was an ancient custom that nurtured those who first remarked these things owing to the fairness of the summer season which Egypt and Syria amply possess, so that they constantly beheld the whole mass of stars, one may say, revealed to their sight, since they had got them continually without obstruction of clouds and rains in the sky; whence they have spread abroad in every direction and in ours likewise, after the testing of thousands of years, nay, of an infinite time. And therefore we should not hesitate to include them in the scope of our laws; for to say that some divine things should have no honour, while others should have it, is clearly a sign of witlessness; and as to their having got no names, the cause of it
τὴν γε αἰτίαν χρὴ λέγεσθαι ταύτην. ἄλλα γὰρ ἐπωνυμίαν εἰλήφασι θεῶν: ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐωσφόρος ἐστιν ὁ Ἀφροδίτης τε ὃν αὐτὸς Ἀφροδίτης εἶναι σχεδὸν ἔχει λόγον καὶ μᾶλλα Συνήθως νομοθέτη πρέπον, ὃ δ' ὀμόδρομος ἦλθε τε ἀμα καὶ τοῦτο σχεδὸν Ἐρμοῦ τρεῖς δ' ἔτι φοράς λέγομεν ἐπὶ δεξιὰ πορευομένων μετὰ σελήνης τε καὶ ἤλιου. ἔνα δὲ τὸν ὁγδοῦν χρὴ λέγειν, ὃν μᾶλλον τις ἄν κόσμον προσαγορεῖσθαι, ὃς ἐναντίον ἐκείνου σύμπασι πορεύεσθαι, οὐκ' ἄγων τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς γε ἀνθρώπους φαίνοντ' ἄν ὅλῳ τούτων εἰδόσων. ὥσα δὲ ἑκατον ὑσμεν,
should be stated as we have done. For indeed they have received titles of gods: thus, that Lucifer, or Hesperus (which is the same), should belong to Aphrodite,¹ we may take as reasonable, and quite befitting a Syrian lawgiver²; and that that which follows the same course as the sun and this³ together may well belong to Hermes.⁴ Let us also note three motions of bodies⁵ travelling to the right with the moon and the sun. One must be mentioned, the eighth,⁶ which we may especially address as the world-order, and which travels in opposition to the whole company of the others, not impelling them, as might appear to mankind who may have scant knowledge of these matters. But we are bound to state, and do state, so much as adequate knowledge tells us. For real wisdom shows herself in some such way as this to him who has got even a little share of right and divine meditation. And now there remain three stars, of which one is distinguished from the others by its slowness, and some speak of it under the title of Saturn; the next after it in slowness is to be cited as Jupiter; and the next after this, as Mars, which has the ruddiest hue of all. Nothing in all this is hard to understand when someone expresses it; but it is through learning, as we declare, that one must believe it.

But there is one point which every Greek should bear in mind—that of all Greeks we have a situation which is about the most favourable to human excellence.⁷ The praiseworthy thing in it that we have to

¹ Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn.
² Here, after the sun, moon, Venus, Mercury, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, we return to the sphere of the fixed stars (mentioned as the “third power” in 986 b).
⁷ Cf. Plato, Tim. 24 c.
αὐτοῦ χρῆ λέγειν ὃτι μέσος ἂν εἰη χειμώνων τε καὶ τῆς θερινῆς φύσεως, ἢ δ' ύστεροῦσα ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ θερινὸν φύσις τοῦ περὶ τὸν ἐκεί τόπον, ὅπερ εἴπομεν, ύστερον αὐτοῖς παραδέδωκε τὸ τούτων τῶν θεῶν τοῦ κόσμου κατανόημα. λάβωμεν δὲ ὦς

Ε ὦ τί περ ἃν "Ἑλλήνες βαρβάρων παραλάβωσι, κάλλιον τούτο εἰς τέλος ἀπεργάζονται· καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ταύτων δεὶ διανοηθήναι τούτο, ὡς χαλεπὸν μὲν πάντα τὰ τουαῦτα ἀναμφισβητήτως ἐξευρίσκειν, πολλὴ δ' ἐπὶς ἁμα καὶ

καλὴ κάλλιον καὶ δικαιότερον ὄντως τῆς ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων ἔλθουσις φήμης τε ἁμα καὶ θεραπείας πάντων τούτων τῶν θεῶν ἐπιμελήσεσθαι τοὺς "Ἑλλήνας, παιδείας τε καὶ ἐκ Δελφῶν μαντείας χρωμένους καὶ πάση τῇ κατὰ νόμους θεραπεία.

tόδε δὲ μηδείς ποτε φθηνὴ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὡς ὦ χρῆ περὶ τὰ θειά ποτε πραγματεύεσθαι θνητοῖς ὄντας, τάν δὲ τούτω διανοηθήναι τοῦλαντίον, ὡς οὔτε ἄφρον ἐστι τοτε τὸ θεῖον οὔτε ἀγνοεῖ ποι

Β τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν, ἀλλ' οἶδεν, ὃτι διδάσκοντος αὐτοῦ συνακολουθήσει καὶ μαθήσεται τὰ διδασκόμενα· ὃτι δὲ διδάσκει τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἡμᾶς, μανθάνομεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ἠριμῶν τε καὶ ἠριμικῶν, οἴδε ὄμηποι· πάντων γὰρ ἄφρονέστατον ᾧν εἰη τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦν· τὸ λεγόμενον γὰρ ἃν ὄντως αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἀγνοοῖ, χαλεπάνου τῶν δυναμένων μανθάνειν, ἀλλ' οὐ συγχαίρον ἄνευ φθόνου διὰ θεὸν ἀγαθῶ γενομένων. λόγον δὴ καὶ πολὺν καὶ καλὸν ἔχει, τότε

C μέν, ὅτε περὶ θεῶν ἢν ἀνθρώποις διανοήσατα πρώτα, ὡς τ' ἐγένοντο οἴοι τ' ἐγίγνοντο καὶ ὄθεν

1 αὖ Αστ.: αὐτοῖς μεγ. 2 οἴδεν Ηέρμανν: ὦ μὲν μεγ.
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mention is that it may be taken as midway between a wintry and a summery climate; and our climate, being inferior in its summer to that in the region over there,1 as we said, has been so much later in imparting the cognizance of the order of these deities. And let us take it that whatever Greeks acquire from foreigners is finally turned by them into something nobler; and moreover the same thing must be borne in mind regarding our present statements—that although it is hard to discover everything of this kind beyond dispute, there is hope, both strong and noble, that a really nobler and juster respect than is in the combined repute and worship which came from foreigners will be paid to all these gods by the Greeks, who have the benefit of their various education, their prophecies from Delphi, and the whole system of worship under their laws. And let none of the Greeks ever be apprehensive that being mortals we should never be concerned with divine affairs 2; they should rather be of the quite opposite opinion, that the divine is never either unintelligent or in any ignorance of human nature, but knows that if it teaches us we shall follow its guidance and learn what is taught us. That it so teaches us, and that we learn number and numeration, it knows of course: for it would be most utterly unintelligent if it were ignorant of this; since it would truly, as the saying is, be ignorant of itself, vexed with that which was able to learn, instead of whole-heartedly rejoicing with one who became good by God's help. And indeed there is much good reason to suppose that formerly, when men had their first conceptions of how the gods came to exist and with what qualities,


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These later people, instead of attributing the highest power to the divine stars, attributed it to the ordinary physical forces; cf. Plato, *Laws*, x. 888 ff.
and whence, and to what kind of actions they proceeded, they were spoken of in a manner not approved or welcomed by the prudent, nor were even the views of those who came later, among whom the greatest dignity was given to fire and water and the other bodies, while the wonderful soul was accounted inferior; and higher and more honoured with them was a motion assigned to the body for moving itself by heat and chills and everything of that kind, instead of that which the soul had for moving both the body and itself. But now that we account it no marvel that the soul, once it is in the body, should stir and revolve this and itself, neither does our soul on any reckoning mistrust her power of revolting any weight. And therefore, since we now claim that, as the soul is cause of the whole, and all good things are causes of like things, while on the other hand evil things are causes of other things like them, it is no marvel that soul should be cause of all motion and stirring—that the motion and stirring towards the good are the function of the best soul, and those to the opposite are the opposite—it must be that good things have conquered and conquer things that are not their like.

All this we have stated in accordance with justice, which wreaks vengeance on the impious: but now, as regards the matter under examination, it is not possible for us to disbelieve that we must deem the good man to be wise; and let us see if we may perhaps be able to perceive this wisdom which we have all this while been seeking in either education or some art, which if we fail to perceive among those that are just, our condition will be that of ignorant persons. We can

1 The evil soul is just hinted at; cf. Plato, Laws, x. 896-897.
εἶμεν οὖν τοιοῦτον. δοκοῦμεν δὴ, μοι, καὶ λεκτέον· ἀνω γὰρ καὶ κάτω ἔτηῶν, ἢ μοι καταφανῆς γέγονε, πειράσομαι δὴν, ὡμίν αὐτὴν ἀποτελεῖν. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἁρετῆς οὐ καλῶς πραττόμενον ἡμῖν γέγονεν αὐτίον, ὡς ἄρτι σημάινειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρήμενων μοι σφόδρα δοκεῖ. μείζον

Β μὲν γὰρ ἁρετῆς μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς ποτὲ πείσῃ τῆς εὐσεβείας εἶναι τῷ θνητῷ γένει: τοῦτο δ' ὅτι δι' ἀμαθίαν τὴν μεγίστην ἐν ταῖς ἁρίσταις φύσεων οὐ γέγονεν, λεκτέον. ἀρισταί δ' εἰσὶν αἱ χαλεπῶτατα μὲν ἂν γενόμεναι, μέγιστον δὲ ὀφελοῦσιν, ἃν γίγνωσται· τά τε γὰρ τῆς βραδείας τε καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας φύσεως μετρίως ἀποδεχομένη ψυχή καὶ πρῶς εὐκολῶς ἂν εἴη, τὴν τε ἀνδρείαν ἀγαμήνη, καὶ πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν εὐπειθῆς, καὶ τὸ γε μέγιστον, ἐν ταύταις

C ταῖς φύσεις δυναμένη μανθάνειν καὶ μνήμων οὖσα, εὐ μάλα χαίρειν τούτους αὐτοῖς δύναις ἂν φιλομαθῆς ὦστ᾽ εἶναι. ταύτα γὰρ οὔτε βάδια φύεσθαι, γενόμενά τε, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας τυχόντα, ἢς δὲ, τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν καὶ χείρους κατέχειν ὀρθότατα δύναις ἂν τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν περὶ θεοῦς ἕκαστα, ὦς δὲ τε καὶ ὅτε δὲ, περὶ θυσίας τε καὶ καθαρμοῦς τῶν περὶ θεοῦς τε καὶ ἄνθρωπους, οὐ σχήμασι τεχνά-

D ξοντας, ἀλλὰ ἀληθεία τιμῶντας ἁρετὴν, δι' δὴ καὶ μέγιστον ἐστὶ συμπάντων πάση τῇ πόλει. τούτο δὴ οὖν τὸ μέρος εἶναι φαμεν φύσει κυριώτατον

1 Cf. Plato, Politicus, 307 b ff., where the danger of an extreme development of such qualities as temperance, calmness, slowness, and of their opposites in the citizens of a state is expounded.
succeed, it seems to me, and I must say how: for I have sought this wisdom high and low, and so far as it has been revealed to me I will try to render it plain to you. Now the fact that the greatest part of virtue is not properly practised is the cause of our condition: this is just now indicated—it seems clear to me—by what has been said. For let no one ever persuade us that there is a greater part of virtue, for the race of mortals, than piety; and I must say it is owing to the greatest stupidity that this has not appeared in the best natures. And the best are they which can only become so with the greatest difficulty, but the benefit is greatest if they do become so: for a soul that admits of slowness and the opposite inclination moderately and gently will be good-tempered; and if it admires courage, and is easily persuaded to temperance, and, most important of all, in natures of this sort, has the strength to learn and a good memory, it will be able to rejoice most fully in these very things, so as to be a lover of learning. For these things are not easily engendered, but when once they are begotten, and receive due nourishment and education, they will be able to restrain the multitude of men, their inferiors, in the most correct way by their every thought, every action, and every word about the gods, in due manner and due season, as regards both sacrifices and purifications in matters concerning gods and men alike, so that men contrive no life of pretence, but truly honour virtue, which indeed is the most important matter of all for the whole state. That section\(^2\) of us, then, we say is naturally the most

\(^2\) i.e. those who possess the natures mentioned in 989 B.
καὶ δυνατὸν ὡς οἶν τε κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάσκοι τις· ἀλλ' οὔτε ἂν διδάξειεν, εἰ μὴ θεὸς υφηγοῦτο· εἰ δ' οὖν διδάσκοι, κατὰ τρόπον δὲ μὴ δρῶ τὸ τοιοῦτον, κρείττον μὴ μανθάνειν· ὅμως δ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀνάγκη μαθεῖν ταῦτα καὶ ἐμὲ λέγειν τὴν τοιαύτην τε καὶ ἀρίστην
Εφύσων. πειράμεθα δὴ τῷ τε λόγῳ διεξελθεῖν ἂ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ οία καὶ ὡς δεῖ μανθάνειν, κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν τ' ἐμὴν τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τὴν τῶν δυναμένων
990 εἰσακοῦσαι, θεοσεβείας ὅτινε τρόπῳ τις τίνα μαθήσεται. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἄτοπον ἀκουστεῖν· τὸ δ' ὁνόμα αὐτοῦ λέγομεν ἥμεις γε, δ' τις οὖκ ἂν ποτε δύσειε δ' ἀπειράν τοῦ πράγματος, ἀστρονομίαν, ἄγνοεῖ τε, ὡτὶ σοφώτατον ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀληθῶς ἀστρονόμον εἶναι, μὴ τὸν καθ' Ἑσίοδον ἀστρονομοῦντα καὶ πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους, οἷον δυσμᾶς τε καὶ ἀνατολᾶς ἐπεσκεμμένοι, ἀλλὰ τῶν τῶν ὅκτω περιόδων τὰς ἐπτὰ περιόδους, διεξιουσίας τῶν αὐτῶν κύκλοι ἐκάστης οὕτως ὡς οὐκ
Β ἂν ῥαδίως ποτὲ πᾶσα φύσις ἓκανθ γένουτο θεωρῆσαι, μὴ θαυμαστῆς μετέχουσα φύσεως. δ' νῦν εἰρήκαμεν ἐροῦμεν τε, ὡς φαμεν, ὡτὶ δὲ τε καὶ ὡς χρεῶν μανθάνειν· πρῶτον δ' ἥμιν τόδε λεγέσθων.
Σελήνη μὲν περίοδον τὴν αὐτῆς τάχιστα διεξεισείν, ἄγνοεις μήνα καὶ πανσέληνον πρώτην· δεύτερον δὲ κατανοεῖν δεῖ τῶν ἡλίουν, τροπὰς ἄγοντα διὰ πάσης τῆς αὐτοῦ περιόδου, καὶ τούτω τούς συν-δρόμους· ὥνα δὲ μὴ πολλάκις ταῦτα περὶ τῶν αὐ-

1 i.e. of the sun, the moon, and the five planets; cf. 987 B. With the astronomy and mathematics of the rest of the Epinomis cf. Plato, Laws, vii. 818-820.
sovereign, and supremely able to learn the best and noblest lessons that it may be taught: but it cannot get this teaching either, unless God gives his guidance. If, however, it should be so taught, but should fail to get the proper instruction, it were better for it not to learn. Nevertheless it follows of necessity from our present statements, that I also state that the nature which is of this kind—the best—should learn these things. Let us try, then, to set forth in our statement what things these are, and of what kind, and how one should learn them, so far as our ability permits both me the speaker and those who are able to hear in what manner one will learn the proper reverence of the gods. It is, indeed, a rather strange thing to hear; but the name that we, at any rate, give it—one that people would never suppose, from inexperience in the matter—is astronomy; people are ignorant that he who is truly an astronomer must be wisest, not he who is an astronomer in the sense understood by Hesiod and all the rest of such writers, the sort of man who has studied settings and risings; but the man who has studied the seven out of the eight orbits, each travelling over its own circuit in such a manner as could not ever be easily observed by any ordinary nature, that did not partake of a marvellous nature. As to this, we have now told it, and shall tell, as we propose, by what means and in what manner it ought to be learnt; and first let us make the following statement.

The moon travels through its orbit very swiftly, bringing the month and the full-moon first; and in the second place we must remark the sun, bringing his solstices as he travels the whole of his orbit, and with him his satellites. But to avoid repeating again and again the same things on the same subjects in
C τῶν διαλεγώμεθα, τὰς ἄλλας ὅσας ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν διεξήλθομεν ὥστε τούτων οὐ βίδιον συννοεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ ταῦτα παρασκευάζοντας φύσεις, οἷς δυνατὸν εἶναι, χρεών πολλὰ προδιάδασκοντα καὶ ἐθίζοντα ἀεὶ διαπονήσασθαι παῖδα ὄντα καὶ νεανίσκον. διὸ μαθημάτων δέον ἢν εἴη· τὸ δὲ μέγιστὸν τε καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ἁριθμῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' οὐ σώματα ἔχοντων, ἀλλὰ ὅλης τῆς τοῦ περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἁρτίου γενέσεως τε καὶ δυνάμεως, ὅσην παρέχεται πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν. ταῦτα

D δὲ μαθόντι τούτως ἐφεξῆς ἐστιν ὃ καλοῦσι μὲν σφόδρα γελοῖον ὅνομα γεωμετρίαν, τῶν οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ὁμοίων ἀλλήλων φύσει ἁριθμῶν ὁμοίωσις πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἔπιπέδων μοῦραν γεγονυῖα ἐστὶ διαφανῆς· δὲ δὴ θαῦμα οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον ἄλλα γεγονός θείον φανερὸν ἣν γίγνοιτο τῷ δυναμένῳ συννοεῖν. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην τοὺς τρίς ἡνυχήμενους καὶ τῇ στερεά φύσει ὁμοίους, τοὺς δὲ ἀνομοίους αὖ γεγονότας ἑτέρα τέχνη ὁμοίως, ταύτη ἢν δὴ στερεομετρίαν

Ε ἐκάλεσαν οἱ προστυχεῖσις αὐτῇ γεγονότες· δὲ δὲθεόν τ' ἐστὶ καὶ θαυμαστόν τοῖς ἐγκαθορωσί τε καὶ διανοούμενος, ὡς περὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἂεὶ στρεφομένης τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταυτῆ καθ' ἐκάστην ἀναλογίαν ἔδος καὶ γένος 991 ἀποτυπωθεῖ τὰσα ἡ φύσις. ἡ μὲν δὴ πρώτη

1 ἀεὶ Burnet: ἀεὶ mss. 2 τρὶς Bekker: τρεῖς mss.

1 Which means literally “measuring the earth”; this developed into the arithmetical calculation of squares, cubes, roots, etc. Cf. the account Plato gives (Theae. 147 ff.) of “quadrangular” and “equilateral” numbers, showing how the terms of geometry had to be used for arithmetic. As there was no number equal (or “like”) to the “square” root of 2, recourse was had to the geometrical symbol of the
our discussion, the other courses of these bodies that we have previously set forth are not easily understood: we must prepare our faculties, such as they may possibly be, for these matters; and so one must continually strive hard to teach the pupil many things beforehand, and habituate him in childhood and youth. And therefore there will be need of studies: the most important and first is, in fact, of numbers in themselves; not of those which are corporeal, but of the whole origin of the odd and the even, and the greatness of their influence on the nature of reality. When he has learnt these things, there comes next after these what they call by the very ridiculous name of geometry, when it proves to be a manifest likening of numbers not like one another by nature by reference to the province of planes; and this will be clearly seen by him who is able to understand it to be a marvel not of human, but of divine origin. And then, after that, the numbers thrice increased and like to the solid nature, and those again which have been made unlike, he likens by another art, namely, that which its adepts called stereometry; and a divine and marvellous thing it is to those who envisage it and reflect how the whole of nature moulds off species and class, as power and its opposite continually turn upon the double according to each analogy. Thus the first diagonal of a square whose side is 1; and similarly “cubic” roots were reckoned with the aid of stereometry.

1 “Likening” here means “comparing in an exact manner,” so as to obtain a ratio or proportion between numbers not directly commensurable; cf. Plato, Lawes, viii. 820.

2 “Power” is multiplication, its “opposite” is extension: 1 point doubled gives the beginning of a line; multiplying 2 by 2 gives 4 as a square surface, and by 2 again, 8 as the cube. So (see below) we proceed “from 1 to 8.”
toũ διπλασίου κατ' ἡριθμὸν ἐν πρὸς δύο κατὰ λόγον φερομένη, διπλάσιον δὲ ἡ κατὰ δύναμιν οὖσα· ἡ δ' εἰς τὸ στερεόν τε καὶ ἀπτὸν πάλιν αὖ διπλάσιον, ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἰς ὅκτω διαπορευθεῖσα· ἡ δὲ διπλάσιον μὲν εἰς μέσουν, ἵσως δὲ τοῦ ἐλάττωνος πλέον ἐλαττόν τε τοῦ μείζονος, τὸ δ' ἔτερον τῷ αὐτῷ μέρει τῶν ἀκρῶν αὐτῶν ὑπέρεχον τε καὶ ὑπερεχόμενον· ἐν μέσω δὲ τοῦ ἐξ πρὸς τὰ

Β δώδεκα συνέβη τὸ τῇ ἡμίολιον καὶ ἐπίτριτον· τοῦτων αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἐπὶ ἀμφότερα στρεφομένη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σύμφωνον χρείαν καὶ σύμμετρον ἀπενείματο παιδίας ρυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἀρμονίας χάριν, εὑδαίμονι χορεία Μουσῶν δεδομένη.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γιγνέσθω τε καὶ ἐχέτω σύμπαντα· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις τέλος, εἰς θείων γένεσιν ἅμα καὶ τὴν τῶν ὀρατῶν καλλιστὴν τε καὶ θειοτάτην φύσιν ἵτεον, ὡσην ἀνθρώποις θεὸς ἐδωκε κατιδείν, ἣν οὐποτε ἄνευ τῶν νῦν διειρημένων μὴ

C κατιδῶν ἐπευξεῖται τις ραστῶνῃ παραλαβεῖν. πρὸς τούτοις δὲ τὸ καθ' ἐν τῷ κατ' εἴδη προσακτέον ἐν ἐκάσταις ταῖς συνοψίαις, ἑρωτώντα τε καὶ ἐλεγχοῦσα τὰ μὴ καλῶς ῥήθεντα· πάντως γὰρ καλλιστὴ καὶ πρώτῃ βάσανος ἀνθρώποις ὀρθῶς γίγνεται, ὡσαι δὲ οὕκ οὖσαι προσποιοῦνται, ματαιώτατος πόνος ἀπάντων. ἐτι δὲ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τοῦ χρόνου ἡμῖν ληπτεόν, ὡς ἀκρίβῳς ἀποτελεῖ πάντα τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν γυγνόμενα, ἵν' ὁ πιστεύσας, ὡς

---

1 As between 3 and 6, 4 is greater than 3 by 1/3 of 3, and less than 6 by 1/3 of 6.
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analogy is of the double, passing by numerical scale in the proportion of one to two, and that which is according to power is double; that which passes to the solid and tangible is likewise again double, having proceeded from one to eight; but that passing to a mean of the double, as much more than the less as it is less than the greater, while the other mean 1 exceeds and is exceeded by the same portion of the extremes themselves—between six and twelve comes the whole-and-a-half \( (9 = 6 + 3) \) and whole-and-a-third \( (8 = 6 + 2) \)—turning between these very two, to one side or the other, this analogy assigned to men an accordant and proportioned use for the purpose of rhythm and harmony in their pastimes, and has been bestowed by the blessed dance of the Muses.

In this way then let all these things come to pass, and so let them be. But as to their crowning point, we must go to divine generation and therewith the fairest and divinest nature of visible things, so far as God has granted the vision of it to men; a vision that none of us may ever boast of having received at his ease without the conditions here laid down. And besides these requirements, one must refer the particular thing to its generic form in our various discussions, questioning and disproving what has been wrongly stated; for it 2 is rightly found to be altogether the finest and first of tests for the use of men, while any that pretend to be tests, without being so, are the vainest of all labours. And further, we must mark the exactness of the time, how exactly it completes all the processes of the heavens; for here he who is convinced of the truth of the statement

2 i.e. Plato’s method of dialectic; see General Introduction.

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Theo: om. mss.

1 i.e. we must become aware of a single, unifying scheme of proportion running through geometrical figures and proportions ("diagrams"), arithmetical proportions ("systems"

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EPINOMIS

which has been made—that the soul is at once older and more divine than the body—will hold it a most admirable and satisfactory saying that all things are full of gods, and that we have never been disregarded in the least by any forgetfulness or neglect in these our superiors. And our view about all such matters must be that, if one conceives of each of them aright, it turns out a great boon to him who receives it in a proper way; but failing this, he had better always call on God. The way is this—for it is necessary to explain it thus far: every diagram, and system of number, and every combination of harmony, and the agreement of the revolution of the stars must be made manifest as one through all\(^1\) to him who learns in the proper way, and will be made manifest if, as we say, a man learns aright by keeping his gaze on unity; for it will be manifest to us, as we reflect, that there is one bond naturally uniting all these things: but if one goes about it in some other way, one must call on Fortune, as we also put it. For never, without these lessons, will any nature be happy in our cities: no, this is the way, this the nurture, these the studies, whether they be difficult or easy, this is the path to pursue: to neglect the gods is not permissible, when the happiness that is properly referred to the fame of them all has been made manifest. And the man who has acquired all these things in this manner is he whom I account the most truly wisest: of him I also assert, both in jest and in earnest, that when one of his like completes his allotted span with

of number\(^\text{,}\) harmonic proportions ("combinations of harmony")—corresponding to square, line and cube referred to in 991 \(\Lambda\)—and the rotations of the stars.
αναπλήσει, σχεδόν εάντερ ἐτ' ἀποθανὼν ἥ, μήτε μεθέξειν ἐτι πολλῶν τότε καθάτερ νῦν αἰσθήσεων, μιᾶς τε μοίρας μετειληφότα μόνον καὶ ἕκ πολλῶν ἕνα γεγονότα, εὐδαίμονά τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ σοφώτατον ἁμα καὶ μακάριον, εἴτε τις ἐν ἡπείροις εἴτ' ἐν νήσοις μακάριος ὅν ἥ, κάκεινον μεθέξεων

C τῆς τοιαύτης ἀεὶ τύχης, κεῖτε δημοσία τις ἐπι- τηδεύοντα ταῦτα εἴτε ἱδία διαβιῶ, τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὁσαύτως αὐτὸν πράξεων παρὰ θεῶν. ὃ δὲ κατ' ἀρχάς τε ἐλέγωμεν, καὶ νῦν αὐτός¹ πάρεστι λόγοι ἀλήθης ὅντως, ὥς οὐ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώποις τελέως μακάριοι τε καὶ εὐδαίμοσι γενέσθαι πλῆν ὅλογων, ἔστι ταῦτα ὀρθῶς εἰρημένα· ὅποσοι γὰρ θεῖοι καὶ σώφρονες ἁμα τῆς ἁλλῆς τε μετέχοντες ἀρετῆς φύσει, πρὸς

D δὲ τούτοις ὅσα μαθήματος ἔχεται μακάριον πάντα εἰληφότες, ὃ δ' ἐστιν εἰρήκαμεν, τούτοις μόνοις τὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου σύμπαντα ἰκανῶς εἰληχὲ τε καὶ ἔχει. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὕτω διαπονήσασιν ἱδία λέγομεν καὶ δημοσία κατὰ νόμον τίθεμεν, εἰς προσβύτου τέλος ἀφικομένοις τὰς μεγίστας ἁρχὰς παραδίδοσθαι δεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἁλλους τούτοις συνεπομένους εὐφημεῖν πάντας θεόν ἁμα καὶ πάσας, καὶ τὸν νυκτερινὸν σύλλογον ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν ἰκανῶς γνώντας τε καὶ δοκιμάσαντας

Ε ἡμᾶς ὀρθότατα πάντας παρακαλεῖν.

¹ αὐτὸς Bekker: αὐτὸς mss.
death, let me say if he still exists, though dead, he will not partake any more of the many sensations then as he does now, but having alone partaken of a single lot and having grown from many into one, will be happy and at the same time most wise and blessed, whether one has a blessed life in continents or in islands; and that such a man will partake always of the like fortune, and whether his life be spent in a public or in a private practice of these studies he will get the same treatment, in just the same manner, from the gods. And what we said at the beginning stands now also unchanged as a really true statement, that it is not possible for men to be completely blessed and happy, except a few—this has been correctly spoken. For as many as are divine and temperate also, and partakers of the rest of virtue in their nature, and have acquired besides all that pertains to blessed study—and all this we have explained—are the only persons by whom all the spiritual gifts are fully obtained and held. Those then who have thus worked through all these tasks we speak of privately, and publicly establish by law, as the men to whom, when they have attained the powers of seniority, the highest offices should be entrusted, while the rest should follow their lead, giving reverent praise to all gods and goddesses; and ordain that we most rightly incite all the Nocturnal Council to this wisdom, as we have now sufficiently distinguished and approved it.
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