ARISTOTLE

THE "ART" OF RHETORIC
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WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

THE "ART" OF RHETORIC

BY

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INTRODUCTION

The beginnings of rhetoric—the Homeric poems—Themistocles and Pericles—the influence of the Sophists—Sicily
the birthplace of rhetoric as an art—the Western or Sicilian school (Corax—Tisias—Gorgias—Agathon—Polus—Lycymnious—Evenus—Alcidamas—Lycophron—Polycrates—Callippus—Pamphilus)—Thrasymachus—the Eastern or
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Aristotle and Demosthenes—Aristotle and Isocrates—the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum—text of the Rhetoric.

Rhetoric, in the general sense of the use of language in such a manner as to impress the hearers and influence them for or against a certain course of action, is as old as language itself and the beginnings of social and political life. It was practised and highly esteemed among the Greeks from the earliest times. The reputation of Odysseus and Nestor as speakers, the reply of Achilles to the embassy entreating him to take the field again, the trial-scene represented on the shield of Achilles, bear witness to this, and justify the opinion of the ancient Greeks that Homer was the real father of oratory. After the age of Homer and Hesiod and the establishment of democratic institutions, the development of industry and commerce and the gradually increasing naval power of
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Athens compelled statesmen to become orators. Themistocles and Pericles were the foremost statesmen of their time. The former, although not specially distinguished for eloquence, was regarded as a most capable speaker; the latter was a great orator. It is much to be regretted that none of his speeches has survived; but some idea of their lofty patriotism may be gained from those put into his mouth by Thucydides, while the genuine fragments, several of which have been preserved in Aristotle, are characterized by impressive vividness.

The next step in the development of Greek prose and Rhetoric must be set down to the credit of the Sophists. Whatever opinion may be held, from a moral standpoint, of the teaching of these much-discussed professors of wisdom and of its effects on the national life and character, it is generally conceded that they have a claim to be considered the founders of an artificial prose style, which ultimately led to the highly-finished diction of Plato and Demosthenes. It is usual to make a distinction between eastern (Ionic) and western (Sicilian) sophistical rhetoric, the representatives of the former paying attention chiefly to accuracy (ὀρθοπεδία), those of the latter to beauty (ευπορία), of style.

The birthplace of Rhetoric as an art was the island of Sicily. According to Cicero, Aristotle, no doubt in his lost history of the literature of the subject (Συναγωγὴ τεχνοτροπία), gives the following account of its origin. After the expulsion of the "tyrants" (467 B.C.), a number of civil processes were insti-

\[a\] Cicero, *Brutus*, xii. 46.
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tuted by citizens, who had been previously banished and then returned from exile, for the recovery of property belonging to them which had been illegally confiscated by the tyrants. This made it necessary for the claimants to obtain assistance from others, and the Sicilians, "an acute people and born controversialists," supplied the want in the persons of Corax and Tisias (both of Syracuse), who drew up a system which could be imparted by instruction, and a set of rules dealing with such questions as were likely to arise. These two may therefore claim to have been the founders of technical Rhetoric, although Aristotle, in an early lost work called the Sophist, gives the credit to the philosopher Empedocles, whose pupil Gorgias is said to have been.

Corax was the author of the first of the numerous "Arts" (τέχναι, handbooks of Rhetoric), and to him is attributed the definition of it as "the artificer of persuasion" (πειθων δημιουργός). The speech was divided into three parts—exordium (προφυμον), arguments constructive and refutative (ἄγωνες), and epilogue (ἐπίλογος), or into five, with the addition of narrative (διήγησις), which followed the exordium, and παρεκβάσεις. It may be assumed that he also wrote speeches for his clients to learn and deliver in the courts, as it was no doubt the rule in

a The sophists and rhetoricians here mentioned are limited (with the exception of Demetrius of Phalerum) to those whose names actually occur in the Rhetoric.

b Apparently not to be understood in the more usual senses of "perversions" (of forms of government), or "digressions" (in a book or speech), but in that of "auxiliaries," subsidiary aids to the speech (πρὸς ἑπικουρίαν τῶν λεγομένων, quoted in Stephanus, Thesaurus, from the Prolegomena to Hermogenes).

c Such writers were called "logographers" (see ii. 11. 7).
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Syracuse, as at Athens, that the litigant should at least create the impression that he was conducting his own case.

His pupil Tisias, also the author of an "Art," is said to have been the tutor of Gorgias, Lysias, and Isocrates, and to have accompanied the first-named on his embassy to Athens. He laid even greater stress than his master on the argument from probability (ἐἰκός) which he regarded as more valuable than truth.

Gorgias of Leontini (c. 483–375 B.C.) first attracted the attention of Greece proper when he visited Athens as an ambassador (427 B.C.) from his native place, with the object of obtaining assistance against Syracuse. His view of rhetoric was that it was only a means of persuasion, and he was careful to explain that his only object was to make his pupils skilful rhetoricians, able to speak on every subject, either for or against, and not, like certain other sophists, to teach them virtue or wisdom. This made him pay greater attention to the style than to the subject matter of his discourses. In addition to fragments of these, from which there are several quotations preserved in the Rhetoric, two extant orations (Encomium of Helen and Defence of Palamedes) are now generally considered to be his. An "Art" of Rhetoric has also been assigned to him. Regarded as the creator of artificial Greek prose, his writings were distinguished by flowery ornamentation, poetical colouring, unusual phraseology (as shown in the use of rare, compound, and poetical words), and many

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\(a\) On the relation of a fragment in Doric (Oxyrhynchus Papyri, iii. p. 27) to the τέχναι of Corax and Tisias see W. R. Roberts in Classical Review, Feb. 1904.
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new rhetorical figures, for the employment of which the contemptuous term "to gorgiaze" was invented. He further introduced an artificial and symmetrical structure of sentences and periods, which gave the impression of metre. According to Diodorus Siculus (xii. 53), the Athenians were astounded at his uncommon style, his use of antitheses, his evenly balanced clauses of equal length, and the similarity of the (beginnings or) endings of words. Gomperz remarks that the English counterpart of the style of Gorgias is euphuism. In the Platonic dialogue, in the first part of which Gorgias takes a prominent part, it is noticeable that he is treated more leniently than might have been expected, considering Plato's opinion of rhetoric as taught and practised by him and his successors.

Agathon (c. 447–401 B.C.), an Athenian, was by profession a tragedian. His beauty and affected manners made him the butt of the comic poets. A pupil of Gorgias, he imitated the flowery language, antitheses, and parallelisms of his master, and was fond of using the rhetorical figure antonomasia, the use of an epithet or patronymic instead of the name of a person. His first victory with a tragedy at the Lenaea is celebrated in the Platonic dialogue Symposium, in which he is one of the interlocutors.

Polus, of Agrigentum, the favourite pupil of Gorgias, is one of the interlocutors in the Platonic Gorgias. In this he is attacked by Socrates, and the special attention paid by him to the ornamentation of his speeches and his affected style are severely criticized. He was the author of an "Art," of

\[ a \] Greek Thinkers, i. 478 (Eng. tr.).
\[ b \] Aristophanes, Thesmophoriazusae, 100.
which some fragments are preserved in Plato and Aristotle.

Licymnius, pupil of Gorgias and a dithyrambic poet, was the author of an "Art." He invented a number of unnecessary technical terms, and classified nouns under the heads of the proper, compound, synonymous or quasi-synonymous, and single words or periphrases intended to take the place of nouns (κύρια, σύνθετα, ἄδελφα, ἐπίθετα). By some he is considered to be a different person from the dithyrambic poet.

Evenus, of Paros, elegiac poet and sophist, contemporary of Socrates, wrote an "Art" and rhetorical rules or examples in verse.

Alcidamas, of Elaea in Aeolis in Asia Minor, was the pupil and successor of Gorgias, the chief and last representative of his rhetorical school. A rival and opponent of Isocrates, against whom his treatise On the Sophists (now generally accepted as genuine), is directed, he lays stress upon the superiority of extempore speeches to those written out. His writings are characterized by a bombastic style, excessive use of poetical epithets and phrases, and far-fetched metaphors. They are drawn upon in the Rhetoric (iii. 3. 1) to illustrate the "frigid" or insipid style.

Another critic describes his style as rather coarse and commonplace (κοινότερον). He was also the author of an "Art" and of a show-speech Messeniacus, a reply to the Archidamus of Isocrates.

Lycophron, pupil of Gorgias, and, like Aleidamas, condemned in the Rhetoric for the frigidity of his style.

\[a\] Rhetoric, iii. 12. 2; Plato, Phaedrus, 267 c.
\[b\] Phaedrus, 267 b.
\[c\] Dion. Halic., De Isaeo, xix. (v.l. κοινότερον, "emptier").
\[d\] Rhetoric, i. 13. 2.
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He appears to have specially affected the use of periphrases. He declared that the accident of noble birth was utterly valueless, and described law as merely a compact, "a mutual guarantee among men that justice will be preserved." a

Polycrates, of Athens, sophist and rhetorician, contemporary of Isocrates, whose displeasure he incurred by his Defence of Busiris and Accusation of Socrates. The former is criticized by Isocrates in his Busiris and its defects pointed out. A Panegyric on Helen, formerly attributed to Gorgias, is by some considered the work of Polycrates. He also wrote eulogies on such trifling subjects as mice (Rhetoric, ii. 24. 6), pots, salt, pebbles. He appears to have at one time enjoyed a certain reputation as an orator, but Dionysius of Halicarnassus severely censures his style, describing him as "empty in things that matter, frigid and vulgar in epideictic oratory, and without charm where it is needed." b

Of Callippus and Pamphilus, each the writer of an "Art," nothing more seems to be known than the reference to them in the Rhetoric. c They are said to have paid special attention to skill in drawing conclusions.

Thrasymachus, of Chalcedon (c. 457–400 B.C.), sophist and rhetorician, was regarded as the inventor of the "mixed" style of oratory, half-way between the varied and artificially-wrought style of Antiphon and Thucydides and the plain and simple style of Lysias. Its excellence consisted in condensing the ideas and expressing them tersely, which was especially necessary in genuine rhetorical contests. Although he rounded off his sentences in periods,

a Politics, iii. 9. 8.  
b De Isaeo, 20.  
c ii. 23. 21.
marked by a paeanic rhythm\(^a\) at the beginning and the end, he by no means favoured the reduction of prose to rhythmical verse. He was the first to direct attention to the importance of delivery (ὑπόκρισις). In addition to an "Art," and a work on commonplaces (ἀφορμαί, starting-points; or, resources), he wrote "Compassion speeches,"\(^b\) intended to excite the emotions of the hearers, a method of persuasion to which he attached great importance.

The rhetoricians mentioned above, with the exception of Thrasymachus, may be regarded as representatives of the Sicilian or western school. A brief account may here be given of the best known sophists (the name by which they distinguished themselves from the mere rhetorician) belonging to Greece proper and the eastern colonies.

**Protagoras** (c. 485–415 B.C.), of Abdera, was a frequent visitor to Athens and a friend of Pericles. He was the author of the famous dictum, "Man is the measure of all things," that is, there is no such thing as absolute truth, but things are such as they appear to one who perceives them. He was the first to enter upon the scientific study of language, and wrote on accuracy of style (ὀρθοεπίευσις)\(^c\); he also distinguished the genders of nouns,\(^d\) the tenses and moods of verbs, and the various modes and forms of address (interrogation, response, command, entreaty). He taught his pupils to discuss commonplaces from

\(^a\) See *Rhetoric*, iii. 8. 4–6.

\(^b\) *Rhetoric*, iii. 1. 7; cp. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 267 c.

\(^c\) Others take this to mean that he adopted a simple or straightforward style as contrasted with the affected Sicilian rhetoric (Thompson on *Phaedrus*, 267 c).

\(^d\) See iii. 5. 5 note.
opposite points of view and the art of making the weaker (worse) cause appear the stronger, by which success in a case which otherwise appeared hopeless was frequently attained. The first to call himself a sophist, he was the first teacher who demanded a fee for his instruction. His character is severely handled in the Platonic dialogue called after him, and his theory of knowledge attacked in the *Theaetetus*.

Prodicus, of Ceos, an island in the Aegean, is best known for his moral apologue of the Choice of Hercules (between virtue and vice). The date of his birth and death is uncertain, but he was at any rate junior to Protagoras. He paid special attention to the use of synonyms and the accurate distinction of words of kindred meaning.

Hippias, of Elis, depicted in the two Platonic dialogues (of doubtful genuineness), was a veritable polymath. His numerous studies embraced grammar and the cultivation of a correct and elevated style of expression. He also interested himself in political matters, and, by comparing the forms of government and institutions of different states, laid the foundation of political science.

Theodorus (fl. c. 412 B.C.), of Byzantium, is mentioned by Plato as a most excellent "tricker-out" of speeches (λογοδαίδαλος). He was the author of an "Art," and invented a number of new terms or "novelties" (καινά), introducing additional divisions of the speech. According to Cicero, Lysias once gave lessons in rhetoric, but abandoned it for writing forensic speeches for others, on the ground that

*a* Phaedrus, 266 e; Cicero, Orator, xii. 39.

*b* Brutus, xii. 48.
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Theodorus was more subtle than himself in technicalities, although feeble in oratory.

Theodectes (c. 380–344 B.C.), of Phaselis in Pamphylia, Greek tragic poet and rhetorician, was the pupil of Isocrates and an intimate friend of Aristotle. He at first wrote speeches for litigants, but later turned his attention to tragedy. He is said to have written at least fifty dramas. The Mausolus was written at the request of Artemisia, widow of the prince of Caria, to be recited at his funeral. Theodectes was the author of an "Art" in both prose and verse, and is coupled by Dionysius of Halicarnassus a with Aristotle as the author of the division of the parts of speech into nouns, verbs, and connecting particles (conjunctions). He agreed with Aristotle as to the use of the paeanic rhythm, and supported the view that prose should be rhythmical, but not metrical. b His extraordinary memory and skill in solving puzzles were celebrated.

After Greece had lost her freedom and Athens her independence as the result of the battle of Chaeronea (338), political oratory gradually declined, its place being subsequently taken by the rhetoric of the schools, characterized by a highly artificial and exaggerated style, the so-called Asianism. Mention may be made, however, of Demetrius of Phalcrum (c. 350–283 B.C.), appointed ruler of Athens by Cassander (317–307 B.C.). A versatile writer, he was the author of historical, political, and philosophical treatises, collections of the fables of Aesop and noteworthy moral maxims (χρηστά), and

a Demosthenes, 48; Quintilian, i. 4. 18.

b For the Theodectea (Rhetoric, iii. 9. 9) see later.
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of a lost treatise on Rhetoric in two books. The work On Interpretation, dealing with the different kinds of style, the period, hiatus, and rhetorical figures, which has come down to us under his name, is really of much later date. According to Cicero, he was the first who altered the character of oratory, rendering it weak and effeminate, and preferred to be thought agreeable rather than dignified. His flow of language is calm and placid, embellished by metaphor and metonymy. But his speeches seem to me to have a genuine Attic flavour.” Quintilian says: “although he was the first to alter the style of oratory for the worse, I must confess that he was an able and eloquent speaker, and deserves to be remembered as almost the last of the Attic orators worthy to be called by that name.”

The writers of the “Arts” which preceded the great work of Aristotle had almost entirely devoted their attention to forensic oratory, adapted to the requirements of the law courts, for which deliberative oratory, the language of the public assembly, although the nobler of the two, was neglected. Epideictic or display oratory may certainly be said to

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"A list of his works is given in the life of him by Diogenes Laërtius. "Brutus, ix. 38, lxxii. 285; Orator, xxvii. 92. Inst. Orat. x. i. 80.

The chief object of epideictic or show-speeches was to give pleasure to the hearers, whose function in regard to them is defined (Rhetoric, i. 3. 2) as that of “critics” of the intellectual performance and ability of the speaker, rather than that of “judges” of anything of serious importance, as in deliberative and forensic oratory. Funeral orations and speeches at the great public assemblies come under this head (see also iii. 12. 5). Quintilian (Inst. Orat. iii. 8. 7) says that the only result or gain in epideictic oratory is praise, not anything of practical value."
have existed since the time of Gorgias, but it is not spoken of as being on an equality with the two other branches. The creator of a systematic and scientific "Art" of Rhetoric is Aristotle. The unsatisfactory character of previous productions, whose compilers had neglected the all-important subject of "proofs" and confined themselves chiefly to appeals to the emotions and things irrelevant to the matter in hand, induced him to attack the subject from the point of view of a philosopher and psychologist, not from that of the mere rhetorician, which assuredly Aristotle was not.

Two of the Platonic dialogues, the _Gorgias_ and the _Phaedrus_, deal more or less with the subject of rhetoric, although they differ as to the manner in which it is discussed and in the attitude adopted towards it. In the _Gorgias_, the earlier dialogue, the discussion mainly turns upon the meaning of the term—the _nature_ of rhetoric not its _value_, and various definitions proposed are critically examined, amended, or narrowed down. Rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, and its function is to persuade the unintelligent multitude in the law courts and public assemblies in regard to justice and injustice. But the result of such persuasion is not the acquisition of knowledge; it merely produces belief, which is sometimes false, sometimes true, whereas knowledge is always true. The time at the speaker's disposal is not sufficient for the thorough discussion of such important subjects that leads to truth. Nevertheless, the practised rhetorician will be more successful than the expert in persuading his hearers on any subject whatever, even such matters as the building of walls
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and dockyards, although he knows nothing about them. It is sufficient for him to have acquired the power of persuasion, which will enable him to convince an ignorant audience that he knows more than those who possess real knowledge. This is sufficient to show the great power of the rhetorician, which must not, however, be abused; but if it is, the teacher cannot be blamed.

Socrates himself, being asked to give his definition of rhetoric, replies that it is not an art at all, but a mere knack of gratifying and pleasing the hearer. It is a species of the genus flattery, like cookery (the art of making dainties), cosmetic (of adorning the person), and sophistic. Mind and body have, each of them, a really healthy condition and a condition that is only apparently healthy. The art that is concerned with the mind is the political art, its branches are legislation and justice; that which is concerned with the body has no special name, its branches are gymnastic and medicine. Each of these true arts has a sham counterpart; sophistic corresponding to legislation, rhetoric to justice, cosmetic to gymnastic, cookery to medicine. The end of the true arts is what is good for mind or body; of the false, immediate gratification. Rhetoric is not a true art, and the power of the rhetorician is of the slightest, since he can only carry out what seems to him to be best, not what he really wishes to attain—happiness and well-being. The paradoxes, that it is worse to do wrong than to suffer wrong, and that it is better for the wrongdoer to be punished than to

—Aristotle (Rhetoric, i. 1. 13) points out that the objection that rhetoric may be abused is applicable to everything that is good and useful, except virtue.

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escape punishment, lead to the conclusion that the only use of rhetoric is, if we have done wrong, to enable us to accuse ourselves (and similarly our parents, children, friends, or country) and to bring our misdeeds to light, that we may be punished and healed; but, if an enemy is the offender, to prevent his being punished, so that he may spend the rest of his life in misery.

The difference between Plato’s treatment of rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* and in the *Gorgias* and his attitude towards it are obvious. The latter dealt chiefly with various definitions of rhetoric and its nature as expounded by its professors; the former is a philosophical theory of rhetoric as it ought to be, if it is to justify its claim to be considered a true art. It is not an out-and-out condemnation of sophistical rhetoric. Although the rules contained in the “Arts” of Thrasy machus, Theodorus, and others are rejected as absurd and useless, it is admitted that there is some practical benefit in its teaching. But it is unsystematic and, not being based upon truth, cannot be properly called an art, but is merely a preliminary training.

The basis of the discussion is an erotic speech by Lysias (read by Phaedrus), which is criticized by Socrates with the object of showing the superiority of his own speech and method. According to him, this is chiefly shown in the due observation of the two great principles of generalization and division, which are effected by Dialectic, “the coping-stone of all learning and the truest of all sciences,” to

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*a* Cope, however, does not admit this.

*b* On this ep. *Rhetorik*, i. 1. 12.

*c* *Republic*, 534 ε. On the relation of Rhetoric to Dialectic see Glossary.

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which rhetoric is indebted for nearly everything of value that it contains.

But the most important point is that the foundation of true rhetoric is psychology, the science of mind (soul), as already hinted in the definition here accepted by Plato (ψυχαγωγία διὰ λόγων, "winning men's minds by words," as contrasted with the vague πειθόν δημιουργός). The true rhetorician is assumed to have already settled the question whether all mind is one, or multiform. If it is multiform, he must know what are its different varieties; he must also be acquainted with all the different forms of argument, and know what particular forms of it are likely to be effective as instruments of persuasion in each particular case. But a merely theoretical knowledge of this is not sufficient; he must have practical experience to guide him, and must be able to decide without hesitation to which class of mind his hearers belong and to seize the opportune moment for the employment of each kind of discourse. A knowledge of the various rhetorical styles and figures of diction is also a useful accessory.

In view of these facts, the three (in particular the first two) books of Aristotle's Rhetoric have been described as "an expanded Phaedrus." Thus, the first book deals with the means of persuasion, the logical proofs based upon dialectic; the second with the psychological or ethical proofs, based upon a knowledge of the human emotions and their causes, and of the different types of character. The questions of style and arrangement (which are only cursorily alluded to in the Phaedrus) in reference to

\[a\] Thompson, Introduction, p. xx.
the superiority of oral to written instruction) are treated, but less fully, in the third book.

In addition to the Rhetoric, Aristotle was the author of several other rhetorical works, which have been lost. Six of these are mentioned in the Life of him by Diogenes Laërtius: (1) A collection of previous "Arts" of Rhetoric (Συνάγωγα δTELKHWN), a kind of literary history of the subject; (2) a dialogue called Gryllus, written in commemoration of his friend of that name, who was the son of Xenophon and fell in the battle of Mantinea (362 B.C.); (3), (4), (5) simply called "Arts" of Rhetoric in two, one, and two books respectively; (6) the Theodectea (Rhetoric, iii. 9. 9). There has been considerable discussion as to the authorship of the last, but it is now generally agreed that it is an earlier work of Aristotle, re-edited later, dealing mainly with style and composition, and that he named it after his friend and pupil. Its identification with the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum is rejected.

The date of the Rhetoric, which was written at Athens, is assigned to his second residence there (335–322), about 330 B.C. (at the earliest 335), although the exact year cannot be determined. The latest historical events which are referred to are: (ii. 23. 6) the embassy of Philip of Macedon to the Thebans, asking for a free passage for his army through their territory, so that he might attack Attica (Oct. Nov. 339); (ii. 23. 18) the peace concluded at Corinth soon after the accession of Alexander (autumn, 336); (ii. 24. 8) the attribution by

a Cicero, De Oratore, xxxviii. 160: librum, in quo exposuit dicendi artes omnium superiorum.
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Demades of the responsibility for the misfortunes of Greece to Demosthenes, but there is nothing to show whether the reference is to a time before or after Chaeronea. In this connexion it may be noted that the political opponents of Demosthenes declared that all that was best in his speeches was borrowed from Aristotle, whereas Dionysius of Halicarnassus \(^a\) endeavours to show that the *Rhetoric* was not written until after the delivery of the orator’s most important speeches.

It is remarkable that Aristotle, while freely drawing upon Isocrates, whose name is mentioned several times, to illustrate points of style, never once quotes from Demosthenes. The name of the latter occurs three times in the *Rhetoric*: in iii. 4. 3 it is suggested that the Athenian general, not the orator, is meant; in ii. 24. 8 it occurs in reference to the fallacy of treating as a cause what is not really so; in ii. 23. 3 it is also doubtful whether the orator is referred to. Nothing is known of Nicanor, and if necessary to connect Demosthenes with the affair, it has been suggested to read Nicodemus, in whose murder he was suspected of being concerned (Demosthenes, *Midias*, p. 549).

Isocrates is most highly spoken of in the *Phaedrus*, but his relations with Aristotle were, according to ancient authorities, the reverse of friendly. The chief reason for this seems to have been that Aristotle had started a school of Rhetoric, which threatened to endanger the popularity of that of his older rival. According to Cicero,\(^b\) "Aristotle, seeing that Isocrates was prospering and had a number of distinguished pupils (the result of having removed his

\(^a\) First Letter to Ammaeus (ed. W. R. Roberts), 1901.
\(^b\) *De Oratore*, iii. 35. 141.
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disputations from forensic and political causes and transferred them to an empty elegance of style), himself suddenly changed the form of his teaching almost entirely, slightly altering a verse in the *Philoctetes*.\(^a\) The original has, ‘It is disgraceful to remain silent and allow barbarians to speak,’ where Aristotle substituted *Isocrates* for *barbarians*. And so he ornamented and embellished the entire system of teaching rhetoric and united a knowledge of things with practice in speaking.” Further, Aristotle had attacked Isocrates, either in the *Gryllus* or the treatise on the different “Arts” of rhetoric, which called forth a lengthy reply from Cephisodorus, one of the pupils of Isocrates, in which various theories of Aristotle were criticized, and the philosopher himself stigmatized as a drunkard and a gourmandizer. Isocrates himself is said to have entered the lists; for the reference to “three or four sophists of the common herd who pretended to know everything,”\(^b\) is supposed to be meant for Aristotle, who is also attacked in the fifth *Letter* of Isocrates. The numerous citations from Isocrates in the *Rhetoric* have been explained by the assumption that, in a revised edition of his work, Aristotle retained the examples of an earlier ms., dating from a time (347) when Isocrates held the field and Demosthenes had not yet made his name. But the view is generally held that the *Rhetoric* was not published till at least ten years later, and in any case there seems no reason why a writer should not quote from the works of an unfriendly rival, if they seemed best suited for his purpose.

A brief notice must here be given of the *Rhetorica*

\(^a\) A lost play of Euripides. \(^b\) *Panathenaicus*, 20.
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ad Alexandrum, which gets its title from the admittedly spurious letter of dedication to the great Macedonian. More than half the length of our Rhetoric, it was formerly printed with Aristotle's works as his. Its genuineness was first doubted by Erasmus, followed by the well-known commentator Vittorio (Victorius), who did not hesitate to ascribe it to Anaximenes (c. 380–320), an historian and rhetorician of the time of Alexander the Great, whose tutor and friend he was and his companion in his Persian campaigns. Anaximenes is said to have been the first to practise extempore speaking, to have devoted his attention to all three branches of Rhetoric, and to have written an "Art." The question of authorship is generally regarded as settled in favour of Anaximenes by the arguments of Spengel (who certainly is obliged to take considerable liberties in some passages of the text without ms. authority) and Wendland. Cope, whose Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric contains a detailed analysis of the work and its language, and a full discussion of the question, supports Spengel's view, while admitting that "the evidence for the authorship of Anaximenes is not quite all that could be desired." His opinion of the work itself, which he says may be fairly called "An Art of Cheating," is in the highest degree unfavourable.

Other views are: (1) That it is a genuine work of Aristotle. This is supported by the former President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, in his article "Aristotle" in the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

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at the earliest from the first or second century A.D., and showing such numerous and striking resemblances to the Rhetoric of Aristotle that it must have been based upon it.\(^a\) (3) That it is a hodge-podge of very much later date. Other critics, however, maintain that the author (or authors) was unacquainted with Aristotle’s work, and that the resemblances between the two are not sufficiently strong to justify the theory of dependence. Further, the historical allusions in the Ad Alexandrum (regarded chronologically) are taken to show that it preceded the Rhetoric of Aristotle, and was written about 340 B.C. There is nothing about the relations of Athens with Philip and Alexander, but the Athenian naval league, Sparta, and Thebes are often mentioned. The latest event referred to is the defeat of the Carthaginians in Sicily by Timoleon (343). The beginning of the treatise is first definitely spoken of by Syrianus (In Hermogenem Commentaria, 133. 9) a Neo-Platonist of the fifth century A.D.\(^b\)

Full information concerning the mss. of our Rhetoric and other matters connected with the text and arrangement of the work is given by A. Roemer in his critical edition (Teubner Series, 1899). The oldest and by far the best of the first-class mss. is the Paris A\(^c\) of the eleventh century, which also contains the Poetics; those of the second class are all inferior. Midway between the two in point of

\(^a\) Barthélemy St. Hilaire, who includes it in his translation of the works of Aristotle, with a Preface in which he supports the above view.

\(^b\) For another account of the work consult Brzoska’s article Anaximenes in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyklopaedie. To the Bibliography P. Wendland, Anaximenes von Lampsakos, 1905, may be added.

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value is placed the old Latin translation by William of Moerbeke (thirteenth century), which, being extremely literal, is frequently of considerable service in determining the text of the original ms. from which the translation was made. It is not, however, to be taken for granted that this vetusta translatio (Vet. Tr.) reproduces the text of only one ms.; further, it may represent in places a marginal gloss or conjectural reading; also, Moerbeke's knowledge of Greek is said to have been very limited. The conclusion arrived at by Roemer (p. lxix) is that the present text represents the fusion of two copies of unequal length, the shorter of which contains a number of haphazard insertions by the copyist from the longer recension or alterations of his own. The original text has perished.

The genuineness of the whole of Book III., which originally may have been an independent supplement, has been disputed, but it is now generally recognized as Aristotle's. The numerous gaps, lack of connexion and arrangement a (a common feature, indeed, of all the Aristotelian writings), and textual errors have been attributed to the unsatisfactory manner in which the reports of three different lectures were made and put together by his pupils and to the lecturer's own faulty enunciation.

The present text (which makes no pretence of being a critical one) is based upon that of Bekker (Oxford, 1837), but numerous alterations, suggested by Roemer and others, have been incorporated. Several of these are also mentioned in the Notes to the Translation.

a Such as the position of ii. 18-26, which should properly come before 1-17.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


To most of the books here mentioned the translator, in one way or another, desires to acknowledge his obligations. He ought, perhaps, to mention that his translation was completed before he consulted those of Jebb and Welldon.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Editions.—Text only: I. Bekker, Oxford, 1837; A. Roemer, ed. 2, 1898, with long critical Introduction and Notes, references to the source of quotations, and full Apparatus Criticus (see also Zur Kritik der Rhetorik des A., an article by him in Rheinisches Museum, xxxix. 1884, pp. 491-510). With Notes: P. Victorius (Vittorio, Vettori), 1579; E. M. Cope, an exhaustive commentary in 3 vols., ed. J. E. Sandys, 1877. The last, together with Cope’s Introduction to the Rhetoric of Aristotle, 1867, stands first and foremost (in fact, almost alone) as a help to the English reader of the original. It must be admitted, however, that the diffuseness, lengthy parentheses, and wealth of detail sometimes make it difficult “to see the wood for the trees,” while many of the purely grammatical notes might have been shortened or omitted. a Spengel’s edition, 1867, with notes in Latin and containing William de Moerbeke’s old translation, is strongest on the critical side and in illustrations from the ancient orators, but less helpful exegetically; Variorum Edition, Oxford, 1820 (the name of Gaisford, the real editor, does not appear); F. J. Parsons, Oxford, 1836.

Translations.—Barthélemy St. Hilaire (including Rhetorica ad Alexandrum) in his translation of A.’s works;

a It may be noted that Prof. W. R. Roberts, of Leeds, well known for his work in kindred fields, in the Preface to his edition of the Literary Letters of Halicarnassus, promises a critical and annotated edition of the Rhetoric with notes.
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T. A. Buckley (including the *Poetics*), 1850 (Bohn’s Classical Library); N. Bonafous, Paris, 1856; J. E. C. Welldon, 1886, with notes and full analysis; R. C. Jebb (edited by J. E. Sandys with Introduction and additional notes), 1909.

The following abbreviations have been used in the Notes:


<sup>a</sup> Reference should also be made to *Lyra Graeca* (J. M. Edmonds, 1922, in the Loeb Classical Library).
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Book I

(i) Rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic, which it resembles in being concerned with matters of common knowledge, and not with any special science. Rhetoric is also an art; since it is possible to reduce to a system the means by which the rhetorician obtains success. Previous compilers of "Arts" of Rhetoric have neglected enthymemes, which are "the body" of proof, and have confined themselves to appeals to the passions, which are irrelevant and only have the effect of biasing the judge.

Although deliberative oratory is nobler than forensic, men prefer the latter, because it offers more opportunity for irrelevance and chicanery.

The rhetorical (as contrasted with the strictly scientific) method of demonstration is the enthymeme, which is a kind of syllogism. Therefore one who is thoroughly acquainted with the nature of the logical syllogism will be most likely to prove a master of enthymemes.

However, notwithstanding the unsatisfactory nature of previous "Arts," rhetoric is undoubtedly useful: (1) when truth and justice fail through inefficient advocates, the skilled rhetorician will set this right; (2) it enables a man to state his case in
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popular, not in scientific language, which would be unintelligible to some of his hearers; (3) it enables him to prove opposites, and to refute an opponent who makes an unfair use of arguments; (4) it provides an efficient defence. If it be objected that it does much harm when unfairly used, this applies to every good thing, except virtue.

(ii) Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of discerning the possible means of persuasion in each particular case. These consist of proofs, which are (1) inartificial (see xv.); (2) artificial. The latter are of three kinds: (1) ethical, derived from the moral character of the speaker; (2) emotional, the object of which is to put the hearer into a certain frame of mind; (3) logical, contained in the speech itself when a real or apparent truth is demonstrated. The orator must therefore be a competent judge of virtue and character; he must have a thorough knowledge of the emotions (or passions); and he must possess the power of reasoning. This being so, rhetoric must be considered as an offshoot of dialectic and of politics (including ethics).

There are two kinds of logical proof: (1) deductive—the enthymeme; (2) inductive—the example. Enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism, example a rhetorical induction.

Rhetoric does not consider what is probable for individuals, but for certain classes of individuals; and derives its material from the usual subjects of deliberation, which are necessarily contingent, for no one deliberates about what is certain. Hence enthymeme and example are concerned with things which, generally speaking, admit of being otherwise than they are.

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Enthymemes are formed from (1) probabilities; (2) signs. Signs are of two kinds: (1) necessary (tekmeria); (2) unnecessary, which have no distinctive name, and are related (a) as particular to universal, (b) as universal to particular. The example defined. Enthymemes are of two kinds: those which are deduced from (1) general truths, (2) special truths—from general or special "topics" or commonplaces.

(iii) There are three kinds of rhetoric, corresponding to the three kinds of hearers; for the hearer must be either (1) a judge of the future; or (2) a judge of the past; or (3) a mere "spectator" (critic) of the orator's skill. Hence the three kinds of rhetoric are: (1) deliberative; (2) forensic; (3) epideictic.

The business of the deliberative kind is to exhort or dissuade, its time the future, its end the expedient or the harmful: of the forensic to accuse or defend, its time the past, its end the just or the unjust; of the epideictic praise or blame, its time the present (sometimes the past or the future), its end the noble or the disgraceful.

All orators must, in addition, have ready for use a stock of propositions relating to the possible and the impossible; to the truth (or the contrary) of a past or a future fact; to the great and small, and the greater and less.

(iv) Deliberative oratory deals with contingent things, not with all, but only with such as are within our control; that which necessarily happens, or cannot possibly happen, is not a subject for consideration. Its most important topics are: (1) ways and means; (2) war and peace; (3) defence of the country; (4) imports and exports; (5) legislation.
The aim of all men is happiness, which is the subject of all exhortation and dissuasion. Definition of happiness. Its component parts are: noble birth; many and good friends; wealth; the blessing of many and good children; a good old age; health; beauty; strength; stature; athletic skill; a good reputation; good fortune; virtue.

The special end of the deliberative orator is that which is expedient; and since that which is expedient is a good, he must establish the general principles of the good and the expedient. Definition of the good. Indisputable and disputable goods.

The greater and less degree of the expedient and the good.

The deliberative orator must also be acquainted with the different forms of government; democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, the ends of which are freedom, wealth, education in accordance with the constitution. An unrestricted monarchy is called a tyranny, and its end is personal protection.

Epideictic oratory deals with praise or censure, the objects of which are the noble and the disgraceful, virtue and vice. (In discussing these, incidentally the orator will be able to produce a certain impression as to his own moral character, the ethical kind of proof mentioned in ii.)

The component parts of virtue are: justice, courage, self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, mildness, wisdom (both practical and speculative).

For purposes of praise or censure qualities which are closely akin may be regarded as identical. We
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should consider our audience, and praise that to which they attach special importance; and also endeavour to show that one whom we praise has acted with deliberate moral purpose, even in the case of mere coincidences and accidents.

Praise and encomium differ, in that the former commends the greatness of a virtue, while the latter is concerned with the things actually achieved.

Amplification also should be frequently made use of, and the person whom it is desired to praise should be compared with men of renown, or at any rate with other men generally. Amplification is most suitable to epideictic oratory; example to deliberative; enthymeme to forensic.

(x) Forensic oratory, which deals with accusation and defence, requires the consideration of (1) the motives of wrongdoing; (2) the frame of mind of the wrongdoer; (3) the kind of people to whom he does wrong. Wrongdoing is defined as voluntarily inflicting injury contrary to the law. A voluntary act is one committed with full knowledge and without compulsion, and as a rule with deliberate purpose. The causes of wrongdoing are depravity and lack of self-control. Its motives arise from human actions generally, which are voluntary or involuntary. There are four causes of voluntary action: habit, reason, anger, desire; of involuntary action, three: chance, nature, compulsion. The motives of the first are the good or the apparently good, and the pleasant or the apparently pleasant. The good has been already discussed (vi.), so that it only remains to speak of the pleasant.

(xi) Definition of the pleasant and a list of pleasant things.

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(xii) The frame of mind of the wrongdoer, and the classes of people liable to suffer wrong.
(xiii) Laws being special or general, so also are just and unjust acts, according as they affect the individual or the community. Hence it is necessary to have an exact definition of acts of injustice, because it often happens that a person, while admitting the commission of an act, will deny the description of it and its application.

There are two kinds of rules in regard to just and unjust acts, *written* (prescribed by the laws) and *unwritten*. The latter refer to the excess of virtue or vice, involving praise or disgrace, honour or dishonour; or they supply the omissions, voluntary or involuntary, in the written law. This supplementary justice is *equity*, defined as justice independent of the written law. “Equitable” acts are such as may be treated with leniency, and equity considers the intention or moral purpose of the agent rather than the act itself.

(xiv) The degrees of wrongdoing.
(xv) *Inartificial* proofs, which are specially adapted to forensic oratory, are five in number: laws, witnesses, contracts, torture, oaths.

**Book II**

(i) Since, in both deliberative and forensic oratory, it is a question of a decision being reached, the orator should consider, not only how to convince or persuade, but also how to create a certain impression of himself, and to put the judge into a certain frame of xxxvi
mind. The former is more important in the assembly, the latter in the law courts. The three qualities necessary to enable the speaker to convince the audience of his trustworthiness are: practical wisdom, virtue, and goodwill. How to obtain a reputation for wisdom and virtue will be clear from what has already been said concerning the virtues (i. 9); goodwill requires a knowledge of the emotions. Each of these falls under three heads: (1) the frame of mind which produces it; (2) those who are the objects of it; (3) the usual occasions of it.

(ii) Anger and Slight. There are three kinds of the latter: contempt, spite, and insolence. The frame of mind in which, and towards whom, men feel anger.

(iii) Mildness. The frame of mind and the situations in which, and the persons towards whom, men feel mildness.

(iv) Love or friendship. The persons for whom men feel friendship, and for what reason. Its opposite is hatred, the causes of which are anger, spite, and slander. Anger and hatred compared.

(v) Fear. Things which are objects of fear, and the feelings of those affected by it. Its opposite is boldness or confidence.

(vi) Shame and shamelessness. Persons in whose presence men feel shame, and the frame of mind in which they feel it.

(vii) Favour or benevolence. The means of disposing the hearer favourably or the reverse in regard to acts of benevolence.

(viii) Pity. Persons who are inclined to pity or the reverse. Things and persons that arouse pity. The difference between pity and horror.

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(ix) The particular opposite of pity is virtuous indignation. Envy also is an opposite of pity, but in a different way, being a pain at the good fortune of others (not because they are undeserving of it) who are our likes and equals. Those who arouse virtuous indignation, those who are likely to feel it, and on what occasions.

(x) Envy defined more at length. Persons who are liable to be the objects of envy, and the things which excite it.

(xi) Emulation. How it differs from envy. Persons likely to feel it, and the things which arouse it. Its opposite is contempt.

(xii) The characters of men must be considered with reference to their moral habits (i. 9) and their emotions (ii. 1), and their ages: youth, the prime of life, old age. Character of the young.

(xiii) Character of the old.

(xiv) Character of those in the prime of life.

(xv-xvii) Character as affected by the goods of fortune, such as noble birth, wealth, power, and good fortune.

(xvii, xix) The topics common to all three kinds of rhetoric are: (1) the possible and the impossible; (2) whether a thing has happened or not; (3) whether a thing will happen or not; (4) greatness or smallness, including amplification and depreciation.

(xx) The proofs common to all three kinds of rhetoric are: example and enthymeme (maxims being included under the latter). Examples are either (1) statements of things that have actually happened; or (2) invented by the speaker, consisting of (a) comparisons, (b) fables.

(xxii) Maxims are general statements relating to
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human actions, and teach what should be chosen or avoided. Maxims are the conclusions and premises of enthymemes, when the form of the syllogism is absent; when the why and the wherefore are added, the result is a true enthymeme. The four kinds of maxims. Directions for their use.

(xxii) Enthymemes must be neither too far-fetched nor too general; they must not be drawn from all opinions, but from such as are defined (e.g. by the judges): and conclusions must not be drawn only from necessary, but also from probable, premises. The speaker must also be acquainted with the special elements of the case. Enthymemes are:

(1) demonstrative, which draw a conclusion from acknowledged premises; (2) refutative, which draw a conclusion which is not admitted by the opponent.

(xxiii) Twenty-eight topics or elements (for the two are identical) of demonstrative and refutative enthymemes.

(xxiv) Ten topics of apparent enthymemes (fallacies).

(xxv) Solution (refutation) of arguments may be effected by (1) counter-conclusions, (2) objections. The latter are obtained: (1) from the thing itself (the opponent's enthymeme); (2) from an opposite; or (3) similar thing; (4) from previous decisions of well-known persons. There are four sources of enthymemes: the probable; the example; the necessary, and the fallible, sign. As the probable is that which happens generally, but not always, an enthymeme from probabilities and examples may always be refuted by an objection, not always real but sometimes fallacious; fallible signs also may be refuted, even if the facts are true (i. 2. 18). Infallible
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Signs cannot be refuted, unless the premises can be shown to be false.

(xxvi) Amplification and depreciation are not topics of enthymemes, but are themselves enthymemes, intended to show that a thing is great or small. Refutative and constructive enthymemes are of the same kind, for each infers the opposite of what has been demonstrated by another. An objection is not an enthymeme; it consists in stating a generally received opinion, from which it appears either that the argument is not strictly logical or that a false assumption has been made.

Examples, enthymemes, and, generally speaking, everything connected with "the intellect" (διάνοια), the inventive part of rhetoric (inventio), having been discussed, there only remain the questions of style and arrangement.

Book III

(i) Style. It is not sufficient to know what to say; we must also know how to say it. Delivery (declamation, oratorical action) is chiefly concerned with the management of the voice, and the employment of the tones and rhythms. It has hitherto been neglected, and has not yet been reduced to a system.

(ii) The two chief excellences of style are (1) clearness, (2) propriety. The first is attained by the use of terms in their proper sense; the other terms enumerated in the Poetics (xxii.) contribute to elevation and ornamentation.

The language should have a "foreign" air, some-
thing removed from the commonplace. In prose—and indeed, in poetry also—the appearance of artificiality must be concealed, and that of naturalness maintained. In prose the only terms suitable are those in general use and those used in their ordinary meaning; also metaphors, for all use metaphors in ordinary conversation. They produce clearness and a "foreign" air. They should be proportional, and, if the object be adornment, taken from the better things in the same class, if censure, from the worse; they should be euphonious; not too far-fetched; and taken from things beautiful to the ear or other senses. Epithets may be taken from the worse or from the better side.

(iii) Frigidity of style is due to the use of (1) compound words; (2) uncommon words; (3) long, misplaced, or heaped up epithets; (4) unsuitable metaphors—ridiculous, too pompous, or too tragic.

(iv) Simile is metaphor enlarged by a particle of comparison prefixed. Simile is useful in prose, but must not be used too frequently, for this gives an air of poetry.

(v) In regard to composition (as contrasted with the use of single words), the first consideration is purity; which is obtained by (1) the proper use of connecting particles or of clauses; (2) the use of special, not general terms; (3) of unambiguous terms; (4) correct use of genders; and (5) of numbers.

Written compositions should be easy to read and easy to utter; they should neither contain too many connecting particles, nor be badly punctuated; if there are two words referring to different senses, connecting them with a verb which denotes the operation of only one of these senses should be
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avoided; the meaning should be stated at the outset, if a number of parentheses are to be inserted, otherwise obscurity results.

(vi) To secure dignity of style, one should (1) use definitions instead of names, or vice versa for conciseness; (2) if there is anything indecent in the definition, use the name, and vice versa; (3) illustrate by metaphors and epithets (but avoiding the poetical); (4) use the plural for the singular; (5) avoid joining several terms with one article; (6) use connecting particles or omit them for conciseness, but without destroying the connexion of ideas; (7) amplify by using negative epithets to describe anything.

(vii) Propriety of style consists in its being emotional, ethical, and proportionate to the subject. The first creates a feeling of sympathy; the second expresses character, because every condition of life and moral habit has a language appropriate to it; the third is a caution against treating important subjects offhand or trivial matters in the grand style; nor should voice and gesture agree too exactly, for then the artifice is obvious. Compound words, a fair number of epithets, and "foreign" words should only be used by one who is under the influence of passionate emotion.

(viii) Prose should not be metrical, but must have rhythm. Metre distracts the hearer's attention, while the absence of rhythm creates unpleasantness and obscurity. The different kinds of rhythm are: the heroic, which is too dignified; the iambic, which is too ordinary; the trochaic, which is too like a comic dance; and the paean, which is of two kinds, —one (- - - -) suitable to the beginning, the other ( - - - - ) to the end of the sentence.

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(ix) Style must be (1) continuous or (2) periodic. The former is unpleasing, because it has no end in itself; whereas in the latter the period has a beginning and end in itself and its length can be taken in at a glance, so that it is pleasant and easily imparts information. The period must end with the sense, and must not be cut off abruptly. Periods contain either several members (clauses) or one only (simple periods). But neither members nor periods must be too short or too prolix. The period of several members is (1) divided by disjunctives, or (2) antithetical; in which there is a contrast of sense (there are also false antitheses). Parisosis is equality of members, Paromoiosis similarity of sound, either at the beginning, or end (Homoeoteleuton) of the sentence. All three (or four) may occur in the same sentence.

(x) Easy learning is naturally agreeable to all, and is the result of smartness of style and argument. Those arguments are most approved, which are neither superficial (obvious at once) nor difficult to understand, but are understood the moment they are uttered, or almost immediately afterwards. Smart sayings and arguments depend upon antithesis, metaphor, and actualization. Metaphors are of four kinds, the most approved being the proportional.

(xi) Actualization (putting things before the eyes) consists in representing things in a state of activity (e.g., representing inanimate things as animate). It is produced by metaphors and similes, which must be taken from things that are familiar, but not

*a The technical term is Homoeokatarkton, not mentioned by Aristotle.
obvious. Apophthegms, well-constructed riddles, paradoxes, jokes, play upon words, proverbs (which are metaphors from species to species) and hyperbole are also smart and pleasant.

(xii) Each kind of rhetoric has its own special style. The written style is most refined; the agonistic (that of debate) is best suited for declamation, and is ethical or emotional (pathetic). The deliberative style resembles a rough sketch; the forensic is more finished; the epideictic is best adapted for writing and, next to it, the forensic. Unnecessary classifications of style. This concludes the treatment of the subject of style.

(xiii) Arrangement. There are two necessary parts of a speech: (1) statement of the case; (2) proof. To these may be added exordium and epilogue. Further divisions are absurd; even the epilogue is not always necessary.

(xiv) Exordium is the beginning of a speech, resembling the prologue in poetry and the prelude in flute-playing. In an epideictic speech it resembles the musical prelude, and is connected with the body of the speech by the key-note; it is derived from topics of praise or blame. In a forensic speech, it resembles the prologue of a play or epic poem; hence it must declare the object of the speech. In a deliberative speech, the proems are derived from those of the forensic, but they are rarest in this kind of rhetoric (deliberative), being only needed (1) on account of the speaker himself, or (2) of his opponents; (3) to impress the hearer with the importance or otherwise of the case; (4) for ornament.

Other exordia are collective and general. They are derived (1) from the speaker, or (2) from the
opponent; (3) from the hearer, to make him well-disposed towards us or ill-disposed towards the opponent; (4) from the subject, making it out to be important or unimportant. Arousing the hearer's attention belongs to any part of a speech.

(xv) The topics that may be employed in dealing with slander or prejudice.

(xvi) *Narrative,* in epideictic speeches should not be continuous, but disjointed. In forensic, it must make the subject clear, and the speaker should narrate what tends to show his own good character or the opposite in the adversary, or is agreeable to the judges.

It is of less importance to the defendant, who should only give a summary of past events unless an account of them as actually taking place produces horror or pity. The narrative should also be ethical and show the moral purpose, and the various moral traits that accompany each particular character. The speaker should also use emotional features.

Narration finds least place in deliberative oratory.

(xvii) *Proof,* in deliberative oratory, has reference to (1) the fact, (2) the harm done, (3) the degree of harm, (4) the justification. In epideictic oratory, where there is little dispute as to the fact, *amplification* is the chief means of proof. In deliberative oratory, we must contend that what is predicted by the adversary will not take place; or, if it does, that it will be unjust or inexpedient, for which the responsibility will rest with him; or that it will be of less importance than he asserts. We must also look out for any false statement of his, for they are part of our proof.

Examples are best suited to deliberative, enthy-
memes to forensic oratory. Enthymemes should not be used in a series, nor on all subjects, nor to appeal to the emotions. Maxims may be used in both proof and narrative, for maxims are ethical.

Deliberative oratory is harder than forensic, for it deals with the unknown future, while forensic deals with the past, and has law for a foundation; nor does deliberative oratory offer so many opportunities for digression. If you have enthymemes, you should speak both ethically and demonstratively; if not, only ethically.

Refutative enthymemes are more highly thought of than demonstrative. In dealing with an adversary, the first speaker should give his proofs and anticipate the arguments of the other side; the second speaker should attack the arguments of the first and draw counter-syllogisms.

The character of the speaker, since statements may be made by him that are tactless, offensive, or too favourable to himself, is best conveyed by putting them into the mouth of some other person.

Enthymemes may sometimes be stated in the form of maxims.

(xviii) Interrogation and Ridicule. The first should be used when the adversary has already made an admission of such a kind that, when one more question is asked, the absurdity will be complete; when your conclusion will be established by it; when his arguments are shown to be self-contradictory or paradoxical; when he is reduced to giving sophistical answers. An ambiguous question should be answered by a regular definition, not too concise; by a direct answer before the adversary has finished; and by adding the reason for our action at the con-
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closure. Ridicule is of some use in debate, but the jokes must be such as befit a gentleman.

(xix) The peroration (epilogue) is composed of four elements: (1) making the hearer favourable to yourself and unfavourable to the adversary; (2) amplification or depreciation; (3) putting the hearer into an emotional frame of mind; (4) recapitulation. The speaker must begin by asserting that he has done what he promised; he must compare his arguments with those of the adversary, by irony or by interrogation. At the end of a speech connecting particles may be omitted, to show that it is not an oration, but a peroration.
ARISTOTLE'S
"ART" OF RHETORIC
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ
ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ
Α
1354α 1. Ἡ ρητορική ἔστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ. ἀμφότεραι γὰρ περὶ τοιούτων τινῶν εἰσὶν ἀκοινὰ τρόπον τινὰ ἀπάντων ἐστὶ γνωρίζειν καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφωρισμένης. διὸ καὶ πάντες τρόπον τινὰ μετέχουσιν ἀμφοῖν. πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς καὶ ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον καὶ ἀπο- 
2 λογεῖσθαι καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῆ ταύτα δρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνυθειαν ἀπὸ ἑξεως. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀμφότερως ἐνδέχεται, δήλων ὅτι εἰπ ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ ὅδοποιεῖν. δι' ὅ γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν οἱ τε διὰ συνυθειαν καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, τὴν αἰτίαν θεωρεῖν ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ τοιούτων ἦδη πάντες ἃν ὁμολογήσαιεν τέχνης ἐργον εἶναι.
3 Νῦν μὲν οὖν οἱ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες ὀλίγον πεπορίκασιν αὐτῆς μόριον. αἱ γὰρ πίστευς

1 These figures refer to the pages of Bekker’s Berlin edition (1831).

α Not an exact copy, but making a kind of pair with it, and corresponding to it as the antistrophe to the strophe in a choral ode.
1. Rhetoric is a counterpart \(^a\) of Dialectic; for both have to do with matters that are in a manner within the cognizance of all men and not confined \(^b\) to any special science. Hence all men in a manner have a share of both; for all, up to a certain point, endeavour to criticize or uphold an argument, to defend themselves or to accuse. Now, the majority of people do this either at random or with a familiarity arising from habit. But since both these ways are possible, it is clear that matters can be reduced to a system, for it is possible to examine the reason why some attain their end by familiarity and others by chance; and such an examination all would at once admit to be the function of an art.\(^c\)

Now, previous compilers of "Arts" \(^d\) of Rhetoric have provided us with only a small portion of this art, for proofs are the only things in it that come

\(^a\) Or "and they (Rhetoric and Dialectic) are not confined."

\(^b\) The special characteristic of an art is the discovery of a system or method, as distinguished from mere knack (ἐμπειρία).

\(^c\) Manuals or handbooks treating of the rules of any art or science.
His functions were a combination of those of the modern judge and juryman.

That is, forbid speaking of matters that have nothing to do with the case.

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within the province of art; everything else is merely an accessory. And yet they say nothing about enthymemes which are the body of proof, but chiefly devote their attention to matters outside the subject; for the arousing of prejudice, compassion, anger, and similar emotions has no connexion with the matter in hand, but is directed only to the dicast. The result would be that, if all trials were now carried on as they are in some States, especially those that are well administered, there would be nothing left for the rhetorician to say. For all men either think that all the laws ought so to prescribe, or in fact carry out the principle and forbid speaking outside the subject, as in the court of Areopagus, and in this they are right. For it is wrong to warp the dicast's feelings, to arouse him to anger, jealousy, or compassion, which would be like making the rule crooked which one intended to use. Further, it is evident that the only business of the litigant is to prove that the fact in question is or is not so, that it has happened or not; whether it is important or unimportant, just or unjust, in all cases in which the legislator has not laid down a ruling, is a matter for the dicast himself to decide; it is not the business of the litigants to instruct him.

First of all, therefore, it is proper that laws, properly enacted, should themselves define the issue of all cases as far as possible, and leave as little as possible to the discretion of the judges; in the first place, because it is easier to find one or a few men of good sense, capable of framing laws and pronouncing judgements, than a large number; secondly, legislation is the result of long consideration, whereas
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ψαμένων γίνονται, αἱ δὲ κρίσεις ἐξ ὑπογνίου, ὡστε χαλεπῶν ἀποδιδόναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καλῶς τοὺς κρίνοντας. τὸ δὲ πάντων μέγιστον, ὅτι ἢ μὲν τοῦ νομοθέτου κρίσις οὐ κατὰ μέρος, ἀλλὰ περὶ μελλόντων τε καὶ καθόλου ἐστὶν, ὁ δ’ ἐκκλησιαστὴς καὶ δικαστὴς ἦδη περὶ παρόντων καὶ ἀφωρισμένων κρίνουσιν. πρὸς οὖς καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν ἦδη καὶ τὸ μισεῖν καὶ τὸ ἰδιον συμφέρον συνήρτηται πολλάκις, ὡστε μηκέτι δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν ἰκανῶς τὸ ἀληθὲς, ἀλλ’ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἥ κρίσει τὸ ἰδιον ἤδυ ἢ λυπηρὸν.

8. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀλλων, ὡσπερ λέγομεν, δει ως ἐλαχίστων ποιεῖν κύριον τὸν κριτήν· περὶ δὲ τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι, ἢ ἐσεσθαι ἢ μὴ ἐσεσθαι, ἢ εἴναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη ἐπὶ τοῖς κριταῖς καταλείπειν· οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ταῦτα τὸν νομοθέτην πρὸ ἰδεῖν. εἰ δὴ ταὐθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦσιν ὅσοι τὰλλα διορίζουσιν, οἰον τί δει τὸ προοίμιον ἢ τὴν διήγησιν ἔχειν, καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ἐκαστὸν μορίων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀλλο πραγματεύονται πλὴν ὅπως τὸν κριτήν ποιὸν τνα ποιήσωσιν. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐντέχων πίστεων οὐδὲν δεικνύουσιν· τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶν, οθὲν ἀν τὸς γένους ἐνθυμηματικός.

9. Διὰ γὰρ τούτῳ τῆς αὐτῆς οὔσης μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικανικά, καὶ καλλίον καὶ πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας ούσης ἢ

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*a Systematic logical proofs (enthymeme, example), including testimony as to character and appeals to the emotions (2.3), which the rhetorician has to invent (ἐπείρων, inventio) for use in particular cases. They are contrasted with “in-artificial” proofs, which have nothing to do with the rules of the art, but are already in existence, and only need to be 6
judgements are delivered on the spur of the moment, so that it is difficult for the judges properly to decide questions of justice or expediency. But what is most important of all is that the judgement of the legislator does not apply to a particular case, but is universal and applies to the future, whereas the member of the public assembly and the dicast have to decide present and definite issues, and in their case love, hate, or personal interest is often involved, so that they are no longer capable of discerning the truth adequately, their judgement being obscured by their own pleasure or pain.

All other cases, as we have just said, should be left to the authority of the judge as seldom as possible, except where it is a question of a thing having happened or not, of its going to happen or not, of being or not being so; this must be left to the discretion of the judges, for it is impossible for the legislator to foresee such questions. If this is so, it is obvious that all those who definitely lay down, for instance, what should be the contents of the exordium or the narrative, or of the other parts of the discourse, are bringing under the rules of art what is outside the subject; for the only thing to which their attention is devoted is how to put the judge into a certain frame of mind. They give no account of the artificial proofs, which make a man a master of rhetorical argument.

Hence, although the method of deliberative and forensic Rhetoric is the same, and although the pursuit of the former is nobler and more worthy of a statesman than that of the latter, which is limited made use of. The former are dealt with in chs. iv.-xiv., the latter in ch. xv. of this book.
The case as a rule being a matter of personal indifference, the judges are likely to be led away by the arguments which seem most plausible.

Exact scientific proof (ἀπόδειξις), which probable proof (πίστις) only to a certain extent resembles.

Dialectic here apparently includes logic generally, the
RHETORIC, I. i. 10-11

to transactions between private citizens, they say nothing about the former, but without exception endeavour to bring forensic speaking under the rules of art. The reason of this is that in public speaking it is less worth while to talk of what is outside the subject, and that deliberative oratory lends itself to trickery less than forensic, because it is of more general interest. For in the assembly the judges decide upon their own affairs, so that the only thing necessary is to prove the truth of the statement of one who recommends a measure, but in the law courts this is not sufficient; there it is useful to win over the hearers, for the decision concerns other interests than those of the judges, who, having only themselves to consider and listening merely for their own pleasure, surrender to the pleaders but do not give a real decision. That is why, as I have said before, in many places the law prohibits speaking outside the subject in the law courts, whereas in the assembly the judges themselves take adequate precautions against this.

It is obvious, therefore, that a system arranged according to the rules of art is only concerned with proofs; that proof is a sort of demonstration, since we are most strongly convinced when we suppose anything to have been demonstrated; that rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme, which, generally speaking, is the strongest of rhetorical proofs; and lastly, that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism. Now, as it is the function of Dialectic as a whole, or of one of its parts, to consider every kind of syllogism in a similar manner, it is clear that he who is most "part" being either the Analytica Priora, which deals with the syllogism, or the Sophistici Elenchi, on Fallacies.
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Theophrastus, of whom we have the title of his works, The leads us to consider the following propositions: if the same person is known to all or to most of the wise, or is known to all men, or to most of them, or to all or most of the former, or to the most noted and esteemed.

"Or if, in any case, a similar thing is held by all or most of the wise, or by all or most of men, or by all, and by any of these, or by the most notable and esteemed."

Almost equivalent to demonstration or strictly logical proof.
capable of examining the matter and forms of a syllogism will be in the highest degree a master of rhetorical argument, if to this he adds a knowledge of the subjects with which enthymemes deal and the differences between them and logical syllogisms. For, in fact, the true and that which resembles it come under the purview of the same faculty, and at the same time men have a sufficient natural capacity for the truth and indeed in most cases attain to it; wherefore one who divines well in regard to the truth will also be able to divine well in regard to probabilities.\(^a\)

It is clear, then, that all other rhetoricians bring under the rules of art what is outside the subject, and \(^b\) have rather inclined to the forensic branch of oratory. Nevertheless, Rhetoric is useful, because the true and the just are naturally superior to their opposites, so that, if decisions are improperly made, they must owe their defeat to their own advocates; which is reprehensible. Further, in dealing with certain persons, even if we possessed the most accurate scientific knowledge, we should not find it easy to persuade them by the employment of such knowledge. For scientific discourse is concerned with instruction,\(^c\) but in the case of such persons instruction is impossible; our proofs and arguments must rest on generally accepted principles, as we said in the *Topics*,\(^d\) when speaking of converse with the multitude. Further, the orator should be able to prove opposites, as in logical arguments; not that we should do both (for one ought not to persuade people to do what is wrong), but that the real state

\(^a\) i. 2. The *Topics* is a treatise in eight books on Dialectic and drawing conclusions from probabilities.
The early sophistical definition was “the art of persuasion.”
of the case may not escape us, and that we ourselves may be able to counteract false arguments, if another makes an unfair use of them. Rhetoric and Dialectic alone of all the arts prove opposites; for both are equally concerned with them. However, it is not the same with the subject matter, but, generally speaking, that which is true and better is naturally always easier to prove and more likely to persuade. Besides, it would be absurd if it were considered disgraceful not to be able to defend oneself with the help of the body, but not disgraceful as far as speech is concerned, whose use is more characteristic of man than that of the body. If it is argued that one who makes an unfair use of such faculty of speech may do a great deal of harm, this objection applies equally to all good things except virtue, and above all to those things which are most useful, such as strength, health, wealth, generalship; for as these, rightly used, may be of the greatest benefit, so, wrongly used, they may do an equal amount of harm.

It is thus evident that Rhetoric does not deal with any one definite class of subjects, but, like Dialectic, [is of general application]; also, that it is useful; and further, that its function is not so much to persuade, as to find out in each case the existing means of persuasion. The same holds good in respect to all the other arts. For instance, it is not the function of medicine to restore a patient to health, but only to promote this end as far as possible; for even those whose recovery is impossible may be properly treated. It is further evident that it belongs to Rhetoric to discover the real and apparent means of persuasion, just as it belongs to Dialectic to discover the real and apparent syllogism. For what
The essence of sophistry consists in the moral purpose, the deliberate use of fallacious arguments. In Dialectic, the dialectician has the power or faculty of making use of them when he pleases; when he does so deliberately, he is called a sophist. In Rhetorico, this distinction does not exist; he who uses sound arguments as well as he who uses false ones, are both known as rhetoricians.

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makes the sophist is not the faculty but the moral purpose. But there is a difference: in Rhetoric, one who acts in accordance with sound argument, and one who acts in accordance with moral purpose, are both called rhetoricians; but in Dialectic it is the moral purpose that makes the sophist, the dialectician being one whose arguments rest, not on moral purpose but on the faculty.a

Let us now endeavour to treat of the method itself, to see how and by what means we shall be able to attain our objects. And so let us as it were start again, and having defined Rhetoric anew, pass on to the remainder of the subject.

2. Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever. This is the function of no other of the arts, each of which is able to instruct and persuade in its own special subject; thus, medicine deals with health and sickness, geometry with the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic with number, and similarly with all the other arts and sciences. But Rhetoric, so to say, appears to be able to discover the means of persuasion in reference to any given subject. That is why we say that as an art its rules are not applied to any particular definite class of things.

As for proofs, some are artificial, others inartificial. By the latter I understand all those which have not been furnished by ourselves but were already in existence, such as witnesses, tortures, contracts, and the like; by the former, all that can be constructed by system and by our own efforts. Thus we have only to make use of the latter, whereas we must invent the former.
3 Τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστευν τρία 
εἴδη ἔστιν· αἱ μέν γὰρ εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ ἡθεὶ τοῦ λέγοντος, 
αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀκροατῆν διαθέναι πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν 
αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ, διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἣ φαίνεσθαι 
δεικνύναι.

4 Διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἢθους, ὅταν οὔτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος 
ὡστε ἄξιόπιστον ποιήσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ 
ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θάττον, περὶ 
πάντων μὲν ἀπλῶς, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀκριβές μὴ ἔστω 
ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ 
τούτῳ συμβαίνειν διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τὸ 
προδεδοξάσθαι ποιῶν τυα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα· οὐ 
γὰρ ὡσπερ ἐνιοῦ τῶν τεχνολογούντων τιθέασιν ἐν 
τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὴν ἐπιεικείαν τοῦ λέγοντος ὡς οὐδὲν 
συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸ πιθανόν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ὡς
5 εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος. διὰ δὲ 
tῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προ-
αχθῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοῖως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυ-
πούμενοι καὶ χάροντες ἢ φιλούντες καὶ μισοῦντες· 
πρὸς δὲ καὶ μόνον πειράζοντας παραμετέχον 
τοὺς νῦν τεχνολογούντας. (περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων 
δηλωθήσεται καθ’ ἔκαστον, ὅταν περὶ τῶν παθῶν
6 λέγομεν;) διὰ δὲ τῶν λόγων πιστεύουσιν, ὅταν 
ἀληθὲς ἢ φανόμενον δεῖξουμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἔκαστα 
πιθανῶν.

7 Ἐπεί δ’ αἱ πίστεις διὰ τούτων εἰσί, φανερὸν ὅτι 
ταύτας ἐστὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένου 
καὶ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ ἡθη καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ
RHETORIC, I. II. 3-7

Now the proofs furnished by the speech are of three kinds. The first depends upon the moral character of the speaker, the second upon putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind, the third upon the speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove.

The orator persuades by moral character when his speech is delivered in such a manner as to render him worthy of confidence; for we feel confidence in a greater degree and more readily in persons of worth in regard to everything in general, but where there is no certainty and there is room for doubt, our confidence is absolute. But this confidence must be due to the speech itself, not to any preconceived idea of the speaker's character; for it is not the case, as some writers of rhetorical treatises lay down in their "Art," that the worth of the orator in no way contributes to his powers of persuasion; on the contrary, moral character, so to say, constitutes the most effective means of proof. The orator persuades by means of his hearers, when they are roused to emotion by his speech; for the judgements we deliver are not the same when we are influenced by joy or sorrow, love or hate; and it is to this alone that, as we have said, the present-day writers of treatises endeavour to devote their attention. (We will discuss these matters in detail when we come to speak of the emotions.) Lastly, persuasion is produced by the speech itself, when we establish the true or apparently true from the means of persuasion applicable to each individual subject.

Now, since proofs are effected by these means, it is evident that, to be able to grasp them, a man must be capable of logical reasoning, of studying characters and the virtues, and thirdly the emotions...
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τρίτον τοῦ περὶ τὰ πάθη, τί τε ἐκαστὸν ἦστι τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποίον τι, καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἐγγίνεται καὶ πώς. ὡστε συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφύει τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἴθι πραγ-ματείας, ἢν δίκαιον ἦστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν. διὸ καὶ ὑποδύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σχῆμα τὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡ ῥητορική καὶ οἱ ἀντιποιούμενοι ταῦτης τὰ μὲν δι᾽ ἀπαϊδευσίαν τὰ δὲ δι᾽ ἀλαζονεῖαν τὰ δὲ καὶ δι᾽ ἄλλας αἰτίας ἀνθρωπικάς: ἦστι γὰρ μορίον τι τῆς διαλεκ-τικῆς καὶ ὁμοίωμα, καθάπερ καὶ ἀρχόμενοι εἴπομεν· περὶ οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὑρισμένου ούδετέρα αὐτῶν ἦστιν ἐπιστήμη, πῶς ἔχει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινὲς τοῦ πορίσαε λόγους. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλας, εἴρηται σχεδὸν ἰκανῶς.

8 Τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἡ φαύνεσθαι δεικνύναι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς τὸ μὲν ἐπαγωγή ἦστι τὸ δὲ συλλογισμὸς τὸ δὲ φαύνομενος συλλογι-σμός, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁμοίως ἔχει· ἦστι γὰρ τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγή, τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός, [τὸ δὲ φαύνομενον ἐνθύμημα φαύνομενος συλλογι-σμός].¹ καλῶ δ’ ἐνθύμημα μὲν ῥητορικὸν συλ-λογισμὸν, παράδειγμα δὲ ἐπαγωγῆς ῥητορικῆς. πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστεις ποιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἡ παραδείγματα λέγοντες ἡ ἐνθυμήματα, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν πῶς· ὡστε εἴπερ καὶ ὅλως ἀνάγκη ἢ

¹ Inserted by Spengel from Dionysius of Halicarnassus (first letter to Ammaeus, vi.).

"Rhetorike, as dealing with human actions, characters, virtues, and emotions, is closely connected with Politics, which includes Ethics. The two latter treat of the same subject from a different point of view. Both deal with happiness and virtue, but the object of Politics is, by com-
—the nature and character of each, its origin, and the manner in which it is produced. Thus it appears that Rhetoric is as it were an offshoot of Dialectic and of the science of Ethics, which may be reasonably called Politics. That is why Rhetoric assumes the character of Politics, and those who claim to possess it, partly from ignorance, partly from boastfulness, and partly from other human weaknesses, do the same. For, as we said at the outset, Rhetoric is a sort of division or likeness of Dialectic, since neither of them is a science that deals with the nature of any definite subject, but they are merely faculties of furnishing arguments. We have now said nearly enough about the faculties of these arts and their mutual relations.

But for purposes of demonstration, real or apparent, just as Dialectic possesses two modes of argument, induction and the syllogism, real or apparent, the same is the case in Rhetoric; for the example is induction, and the enthyememe a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme an apparent syllogism. Accordingly I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical induction. Now all orators produce belief by employing as proofs either examples or enthymemes and nothing else; so that if, generally speaking, it is necessary to prove any parison of the different forms of States to find the one in which man will be most virtuous. Lastly, Rhetoric, as an important factor in the training and education of the individual citizen and of the members of the State as a whole, may be described as an offshoot of Politics, with which the sophistical rhetoricians identified it. For the relation of Rhetoric to Dialectic see Glossary.

b Or, "slips into the garb of" (Jebb). Probably a stage metaphor.
συλλογιζόμενου ἡ ἐπάγοντα δεικνύναι ὂτι οὖν (δήλον δ' ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν), ἀναγκαῖον ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐκατέρω τούτων τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι.

9 τίς δ' ἐστι διαφορὰ παραδείγματος καὶ ἐνθυμηματός, φανερῶν ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν. ἐκεῖ γὰρ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ἐπαγωγῆς εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τὸ ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὁμοίων δεικνύσαι ὁτι οὕτως ἔχει ἐκεῖ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ ἐστὶν ἐνταῦθα δὲ παράδειγμα, τὸ δὲ τινῶν ὄντων ἐτερὸν τι διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν παρὰ ταῦτα τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι, ἡ καθόλου ἡ ὃς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἐκεῖ μὲν συλλογισμὸς ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἐνθύμημα καλεῖται.

10 Φανερῶν δ' ὅτι καὶ ἐκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἴδος τῆς ῥήτορικῆς· καθάπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὁμοίως ἔχει· εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ μὲν παραδείγματώδεις ῥητορεῖα αἱ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικαί, καὶ ῥήτορες ὁμοίως οἱ μὲν παραδείγματώδες οἱ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικοί. πιθανοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἦττον οἱ λόγοι οἱ διὰ τῶν παραδειγμάτων, θορυβοῦνται δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοί. τὴν δ' αἰτίαν αὐτῶν, καὶ πῶς ἐκατέρω χρηστέον, ἐρούμεν ύστερον· νῦν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων μᾶλλον διορίσωμεν καθαρῶς.

'Επεὶ γὰρ τὸ πιθανὸν τινὶ πιθανὸν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ

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a Anal. Priora, ii. 23; Anal. Posteriors, i. 1.
b That is, enthymeme and example must be the same as syllogism and induction.
c From the definitions of syllogism (i. 1) and induction (i. 12). No particular passage, however, explains the difference here mentioned.
d The employment of syllogism and induction, τὸ εἴδος τῆς ῥήτορικῆς being taken as simply = ἡ ῥήτορική. Another rendering is: "that each kind of Rhetoric (that which de-
RHETORIC, I. ii. 8-11

fact whatever either by syllogism or by induction—and that this is so is clear from the Analytics—a—each of the two former must be identical with each of the two latter. The difference between example and enthymeme is evident from the Topics, where, in discussing syllogism and induction, it has previously been said that the proof from a number of particular cases that such is the rule, is called in Dialectic induction, in Rhetoric example; but when, certain things being posited, something different results by reason of them, alongside of them, from their being true, either universally or in most cases, such a conclusion in Dialectic is called a syllogism, in Rhetoric an enthymeme.

It is evident that Rhetoric enjoys both these advantages—for what has been said in the Methodica holds good also in this case—for rhetorical speeches are sometimes characterized by examples and sometimes by enthymemes, and orators themselves may be similarly distinguished by their fondness for one or the other. Now arguments that depend on examples are not less calculated to persuade, but those which depend upon enthymemes meet with greater approval. Their origin and the way in which each should be used will be discussed later; for the moment let us define more clearly these proofs themselves.

Now, that which is persuasive is persuasive in

ends upon example or upon enthymeme) enjoys some special advantage."

A lost treatise, mentioned by Diogenes Laërtius in his Life of Aristotle, xxiv., and by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the first letter to Ammaeus, vi. It is supposed to have dealt with some branch of Logic.

ii. 20-24.
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μὲν εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει δι’ αὐτὸ πιθανὸν καὶ πιστὸν τὸ δὲ τῷ δείκνυσθαι δοκεῖν διὰ τοιούτων, οὕτως δὲ τέχνῃ σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ’ ἐκαστον, οἶον ἡ ἰατρικὴ τι Σωκράτης τὸ υγιεινὸν ἐστιν ἡ Καλλία, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιῷδε ἡ τοῖς τοιοῦτοῖς (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐντεχνον, τὸ δὲ καθ’ ἐκαστον ἀπειρον καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητὸν), οὐδὲ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τὸ καθ’ ἐκαστον ἐνδοξὸν θεωρῆσι, οἶον Σωκράτης ἡ Ἰππία, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτο, καθ’ ἀπερ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνη συλλογί-ζεται οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἐτυχεν (φαίνεται γὰρ ἀττα καὶ τοῖς 1357 a παραληποῦσι), ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη μὲν ἐκ τῶν λόγων δεομένων, ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ ἐκ τῶν ἠδη βουλεύεσθαι εἰωθότων.

12 Ἡστὶ δὲ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς περὶ τε τοιούτων περὶ ὧν βουλευόμεθα καὶ τέχνας μὴ ἔχομεν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἀκροαταῖς οἱ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν συνορᾶν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν. βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέρως ἔχειν. περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἡ γενέσθαι ἡ ἐσεθεῖν ἡ ἔχειν οὐδὲς βουλεύεται οὕτως ὑπολαμ-βάνων. ὃ τούτω γὰρ πλέον. ἐνδέχεται δὲ συλλογί-ζεσθαι καὶ συνάγειν τὰ μὲν ἐκ συλλεογισμένων πρῶτον, τὰ δ’ ἐξ ἀσυλλογιστῶν μὲν δεομένων δὲ συλλογισμοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐνδοξα. ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν μὴ εἶναι εὐπακολούθητον διὰ τὸ

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a Or, “by persons who are so” (Jebb).

b Certain propositions, which seem paradoxical and improbable to a popular audience, must be proved before it is able to understand them.

22
RHETORIC, I. ii. 11–13

reference to some one, and is persuasive and convincing either at once and in and by itself, or because it appears to be proved by propositions that are convincing; further, no art has the particular in view, medicine for instance what is good for Socrates or Callias, but what is good for this or that class of persons (for this is a matter that comes within the province of an art, whereas the particular is infinite and cannot be the subject of a true science); similarly, therefore, Rhetoric will not consider what seems probable in each individual case, for instance to Socrates or Hippias, but that which seems probable to this or that class of persons. It is the same with Dialectic, which does not draw conclusions from any random premises—for even madmen have some fancies—but it takes its material from subjects which demand reasoned discussion, as Rhetoric does from those which are common subjects of deliberation.

The function of Rhetoric, then, is to deal with things about which we deliberate, but for which we have no systematic rules; and in the presence of such hearers as are unable to take a general view of many stages, or to follow a lengthy chain of argument. But we only deliberate about things which seem to admit of issuing in two ways; as for those things which cannot in the past, present, or future be otherwise, no one deliberates about them, if he supposes that they are such; for nothing would be gained by it. Now, it is possible to draw conclusions and inferences partly from what has been previously demonstrated syllogistically, partly from what has not, which however needs demonstration, because it is not probable. The first of these methods is necessarily difficult to follow owing to its length, for
μήκος (ὁ γὰρ κριτής ύπόκειται εἶναι ἀπλοῦς), τὰ δὲ μὴ πιθανὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ὀμολογουμένων εἶναι μηδὲ ἐνδόξων· ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τε ἐνθύμημα εἶναι καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἔχειν καὶ ἄλλως, τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγήν τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμόν, καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἑλαττών ὥς ἐξ ὧν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός· ἐὰν γὰρ ἢ τι τούτων γνώριμον, οὐδὲ δεῖ λέγειν· αὐτὸς γὰρ τούτο προστίθεσιν ὁ ἀκροατής. οἷον ὅτι Δωριέως στεφανίτην ἀγώνα νενίκηκεν, ἰκανὸν εἶπεῖν ὅτι Ὁλύμπια νενίκηκεν· τὸ δ’ ὅτι στεφανίτης τὰ Ὁλύμπια, οὐδὲ δεῖ προσθείναι· γυναῖκι τοῦ ἄρταντες.

"Επεὶ δ’ ἐστὶν ὀλίγα μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξ ὧν οἱ ρήτοροι συλλογισμοὶ εἰσί (τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ περὶ ὧν αἱ κρίσεις καὶ αἱ σκέψεις, ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν· περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ πράττοντοι, βουλεύονται καὶ σκοποῦσι, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα πάντα τοιούτων γένους ἑστι, καὶ οὐδὲν ὡς ἔπος εἴπειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τούτων), τὰ δ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἐκ τοιούτων ἀνάγκη ἐτέρων συλλογι-ζεσθαι, τὰ δ’ ἀναγκαία ἐξ ἀναγκαίων (ὅτι ημῖν καὶ τούτο ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν), φανερὸν ὅτι ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται, τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαία ἑσται, τὰ δὲ πλείοντα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. λέγεται γὰρ ἐνθυμήματα ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων, ὡστε

— πρῶτος: the primary, typical syllogism of the first figure.
— Son of Diagoras of Rhodes, and like his father celebrated for his victories in the Greek athletic contests. He played a considerable part in political and naval affairs in support of the Spartans (412-407 B.C.), whom he afterwards offended, and by whom he is said to have been put to death.
— Anal. Priora, i. 8, 13-14.
the judge is supposed to be a simple person; the second will obtain little credence, because it does not depend upon what is either admitted or probable. The necessary result then is that the enthymeme and the example are concerned with things which may, generally speaking, be other than they are, the example being a kind of induction and the enthymeme a kind of syllogism, and deduced from few premises, often from fewer than the regular $^a$ syllogism; for if any one of these is well known, there is no need to mention it, for the hearer can add it himself. For instance, to prove that Dorieus $^b$ was the victor in a contest at which the prize was a crown, it is enough to say that he won a victory at the Olympic games; there is no need to add that the prize at the Olympic games is a crown, for everybody knows it.

But since few of the propositions of the rhetorical syllogism are necessary, for most of the things which we judge and examine can be other than they are, human actions, which are the subject of our deliberation and examination, being all of such a character and, generally speaking, none of them necessary; since, further, facts which only generally happen or are merely possible can only be demonstrated by other facts of the same kind, and necessary facts by necessary propositions (and that this is so is clear from the Analytics $^c$), it is evident that the materials from which enthymemes are derived will be sometimes necessary, but for the most part only generally true; and these materials being probabilities and signs, it follows that these two elements must corre-
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ἀνάγκη τούτων ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρψι ταύτο εἶναι.

15 τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον,
οὕχ ἀπλῶς δὲ, καθάπερ ὁρίζονται τινες, ἀλλὰ τὸ
περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀλλὸς ἔχειν, οὕτως ἔχον πρὸς
ἐκείνο πρὸς δ' εἰκός, ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ

16 μέρος· τῶν δὲ σημείων τὸ μὲν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς τῶν
καθ' ἐκαστὸν τι πρὸς τὸ καθόλου, τὸ δὲ ὡς τῶν
καθόλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος. τούτων δὲ τὸ
μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τεκμήριον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον

17 ἀνώνυμον ἔστι κατὰ τὴν διαφοράν. ἀναγκαία μὲν
οὐν λέγω ἐξ ὧν γίνεται συλλογισμός, διὸ καὶ
tekmērion τὸ τοιοῦτον τῶν σημείων ἐστίν· ἤταν
gὰρ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι οἷονται λύσαι τὸ λεχθὲν, τότε

férkei οἷονται τεκμήριον ὡς δεδειγμένον καὶ πεπε-
ρασμένον· τὸ γὰρ τέκμαρ καὶ πέρας ταύτων ἐστὶ
catα τὴν ἀρχαίαν γλώτταν.

18 Ἡστὶ δὲ τῶν σημείων τὸ μὲν ὡς τὸ καθ’ ἐκα-
στον πρὸς τὸ καθόλου ὤδε, οἷον εἰ τις εἰπεῖν
σημείων εἶναι ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ δίκαιοι, Σωκράτης γὰρ
goφὸς ὑπ' ἢ καὶ δίκαιος. τούτο μὲν οὖν σημείων
ἔστι, λυτὸν δὲ, κἂν ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ εἰρημένον· ἄσυλ-
λόγιστον γὰρ. τὸ δὲ, οἷον εἰ τις εἰπεῖν σημείων
ὅτι νοσεῖ, πυρέττει γάρ, ἢ τέτοκεν ὅτι γάλα ἔχει,
ἀναγκαῖον. ὅπερ τῶν σημείων τεκμήριον μόνον
ἔστιν· μόνον γὰρ, ἄν ἀληθὲς ἢ, ἀλυτὸν ἐστὶν. τὸ
dὲ ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἔχον, οἷον
eἰ τις εἰπεῖν, ὅτι πυρέττει, σημείων εἶναι, πυκνὸν
γὰρ ἀναπνεῖ. λυτὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, κἂν ἀληθὲς ἢ.

That is, probabilities and signs correspond to general
and necessary propositions. This is not strictly correct;
only the τεκμήρια correspond to the necessary propositions,
the other signs and the probabilities to the general or con-
tingent propositions.

26
spond to these two kinds of propositions, each to each. For that which is probable is that which generally happens, not however unreservedly, as some define it, but that which is concerned with things that may be other than they are, being so related to that in regard to which it is probable as the universal to the particular. As to signs, some are related as the particular to the universal, others as the universal to the particular. Necessary signs are called tekmeria; those which are not necessary have no distinguishing name. I call those necessary signs from which a logical syllogism can be constructed, wherefore such a sign is called tekmerion; for when people think that their arguments are irrefutable, they think that they are bringing forward a tekmerion, something as it were proved and concluded; for in the old language tekmar and peras have the same meaning (limit, conclusion).

Among signs, some are related as the particular to the universal; for instance, if one were to say that all wise men are just, because Socrates was both wise and just. Now this is a sign, but even though the particular statement is true, it can be refuted, because it cannot be reduced to syllogistic form. But if one were to say that it is a sign that a man is ill, because he has a fever, or that a woman has had a child because she has milk, this is a necessary sign. This alone among signs is a tekmerion; for only in this case, if the fact is true, is the argument irrefutable. Other signs are related as the universal to the particular, for instance, if one were to say that it is a sign that this man has a fever, because he breathes hard; but even if the fact be true, this argument also can be refuted, for it is possible for
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19 Ἡ παράδειγμα δὲ ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἐπαγωγὴ καὶ περὶ ποῖα ἐπαγωγή, εἰρήται. ἔστι δὲ οὔτε ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον οὐθ' ὡς ὅλον πρὸς μέρος οὐθ' ὡς ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον, ἀλλ' ὡς μέρος πρὸς μέρος, ὁμοιον πρὸς ὁμοιον, ὅταν ἁμφω μὲν ἢ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος, γνωριμίωτερον δὲ θάτερον ἢ θατέρου, παράδειγμα ἐστιν. οὐδὲ ὅτι ἐπιβουλεύει τυραννίδι Διονύσιος αἰτῶν τὴν φυλακὴν καὶ γὰρ Πεισίστρατος πρότερον ἐπιβουλεύων ἤτει φυλακὴν καὶ λαβὼν ἐτυράννευσε, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις καὶ ἄλλοι οἴσου ἴσασι, παράδειγμα πάντες γίγνονται τοῦ Διονύσιον, ὃν οὐκ ἴσασί πω εἰ διὰ τοῦτο αἴτει. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου, ὅτι ὁ ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι φυλακὴν αἴτει.

1358 a Ἔξ ὃν μὲν οὖν λέγονται αἱ δοκοῦσαι εἶναι πίστεις ἀποδεικτικαί, εἰρήται. τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων μεγίστη διαφορὰ καὶ μάλιστα λεληθυῖα σχεδὸν πάντας ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἔστὶ κατὰ τὴν ρητορικὴν ὥσπερ καὶ κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἄλλας τέχνας καὶ δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν οὖσας τὰς δὲ οὕτως κατευθυμενὰς· διὸ καὶ λανθάνουσι τε, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπτόμενοι κατὰ τρόπον μεταβαίνουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν.
a man to breathe hard without having a fever. We have now explained the meaning of probable, sign, and necessary sign, and the difference between them; in the Analytics " we have defined them more clearly and stated why some of them can be converted into logical syllogisms, while others cannot.

We have said that example is a kind of induction and with what kind of material it deals by way of induction. It is neither the relation of part to whole, nor of whole to part, nor of one whole to another whole, but of part to part, of like to like, when both come under the same genus, but one of them is better known than the other. For example, to prove that Dionysius is aiming at a tyranny, because he asks for a bodyguard, one might say that Pisistratus before him and Theagenes of Megara did the same, and when they obtained what they asked for made themselves tyrants. All the other tyrants known may serve as an example of Dionysius, whose reason, however, for asking for a bodyguard we do not yet know. All these examples are contained under the same universal proposition, that one who is aiming at a tyranny asks for a bodyguard.

We have now stated the materials of proofs which are thought to be demonstrative. But a very great difference between enthymemes has escaped the notice of nearly every one, although it also exists in the dialectical method of syllogisms. For some of them belong to Rhetoric, some syllogisms only to Dialectic, and others to other arts and faculties, some already existing and others not yet established. Hence it is that this escapes the notice of the speakers, and the more they specialize in a subject, the more they transgress the limits of Rhetoric and
μάλλον δὲ σαφὲς ἦσται τὸ λεγόμενον διὰ πλειώνων ῥηθέν.

21 Λέγω γὰρ διαλεκτικοῦς τε καὶ ῥητορικοὺς συλλογισμοὺς εἶναι περὶ όν τοὺς τότους λέγομεν· οὔτοι δὲ εἰσὶν οἱ κοινῆ περὶ δικαίων καὶ φυσικῶν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν διαφέροντων εἰδει, οἴον ὁ τοῦ μάλλον καὶ ἦττον τότος: οὔδὲν γὰρ μάλλον ἦσται ἐκ τούτου συλλογίσασθαι ἢ ἐνθύμημα εἰσεῖν περὶ δικαίων ἢ φυσικῶν ἢ περὶ ἄτομων. καίτοι ταῦτα εἰδει διαφέρει. ἰδια δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἑκαστον εἴδους καὶ γένος προτάσεων ἔστιν, οἶον περὶ φυσικῶν εἰσὶ προτάσεις ἃ ὁ οὔτε ἐνθύμημα εὔτε συλλογισμός ἐστι περὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἄλλας ἕστιν ἔστι ὁ οὔτε ἐσται περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν· ὅμοιως δὲ τούτ' ἔχει ἐπὶ πάντων. κάκεινα μὲν οὐ ποιήσει περὶ οὔδεν γένος ἐμφρονα· περὶ οὔδέν γὰρ ὑποκείμενον ἔστιν· ταῦτα δὲ, ὅσω τις ἂν βέλτιον ἐκλέγηται τὰς προτάσεις, λήσει ποιήσας ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς· ἂν γὰρ ἐντύχη ἄρχαίς, οὐκέτι διαλεκτικῆ οὔδὲ ῥητορικὴ ἄλλ' ἐκείνῃ ἦσται ἵς ἔχει τὰς ἀρχάς. ἔστι δὲ τὰ πλείστα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἐκ τούτων τῶν εἴδων λεγόμενα τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἱδίων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν ἐλάττων. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς, καὶ ἐνταῦθα διαρρετέουν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ τε εἴδη καὶ τοὺς τότους ἕστι ὁν

\footnote{The common topics do not deal with particular subject matter, as the specific topics do. In making use of the latter, the "better" (that is, in regard to a special science) the propositions chosen by a man, the more he will without knowing it quit the domain of Rhetoric and Dialectic, and become a professor of that special science whose first principles he has hit upon.}
Rhetoric. But this will be clearer if stated at greater length.

I mean by dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms those which are concerned with what we call "topics," which may be applied alike to Law, Physics, Politics, and many other sciences that differ in kind, such as the topic of the more or less, which will furnish syllogisms and enthymemes equally well for Law, Physics, or any other science whatever, although these subjects differ in kind. Specific topics on the other hand are derived from propositions which are peculiar to each species or genus of things; there are, for example, propositions about Physics which can furnish neither enthymemes nor syllogisms about Ethics, and there are propositions concerned with Ethics which will be useless for furnishing conclusions about Physics; and the same holds good in all cases. The first kind of topics will not make a man practically wise about any particular class of things, because they do not deal with any particular subject matter; but as to the specific topics, the happier a man is in his choice of propositions, the more he will unconsciously produce a science quite different from Dialectic and Rhetoric. For if once he hits upon first principles, it will no longer be Dialectic or Rhetoric, but that science whose principles he has arrived at. Most enthymemes are constructed from these specific topics, which are called particular and special, fewer from those that are common or universal. As then we have done in the Topics, so here we must distinguish the specific and universal topics, from which enthymemes may be constructed.

 Sophisti Elenchi (Fallacies), 9. This treatise is really the ninth and concluding part of the Topics.
Propositions (or premises), the name given to the two first statements in a syllogism from which the conclusion is drawn: All men are mortal (major premise); Socrates is a man (minor premise); therefore Socrates is mortal.
By specific topics I mean the propositions peculiar to each class of things, by universal those common to all alike. Let us then first speak of the specific topics, but before doing so let us ascertain the different kinds of Rhetoric, so that, having determined their number, we may separately ascertain their elements and propositions.

3. The kinds of Rhetoric are three in number, corresponding to the three kinds of hearers. For every speech is composed of three parts: the speaker, the subject of which he treats, and the person to whom it is addressed, I mean the hearer, to whom the end or object of the speech refers. Now the hearer must necessarily be either a mere spectator or a judge, and a judge either of things past or of things to come. For instance, a member of the general assembly is a judge of things to come; the dicast, of things past; the mere spectator, of the ability of the speaker. Therefore there are necessarily three kinds of rhetorical speeches, deliberative, forensic, and epideictic.

The deliberative kind is either hortatory or dissuasive; for both those who give advice in private and those who speak in the assembly invariably either exhort or dissuade. The forensic kind is either accusatory or defensive; for litigants must necessarily either accuse or defend. The epideictic kind has for its subject praise or blame.

Further, to each of these a special time is appropriate: to the deliberative the future, for the mere spectator as a "critic"), although strictly κριτής should be limited to the law courts.

In i. 6, 1 and 8, 7 the present is also mentioned as a time appropriate to deliberative Rhetoric.
λεύει ἡ προτρέπων ἡ ἀποτρέπων), τῷ δὲ δικα-
ζομένῳ ὁ γενόμενος (περὶ γὰρ τῶν πεπραγμένων
ἄει ὁ μὲν κατηγορεῖ ὁ δὲ ἀπολογεῖται), τῷ δὲ
ἐπιδεικτικῷ κυριώτατος μὲν ὁ παρών· κατὰ γὰρ
τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπαίνοις ἢ ψέγουι πάντες, προσ-
χρῶνται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τὰ γενόμενα ἀναμμηνη-
κοντες καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα προεικάζοντες.
5 Τέλος δὲ ἐκάστοις τούτων ἐτερὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ
tρισὶν οὕτω τρία, τῷ μὲν συμβουλεύοντι τὸ συμ-
φέρον καὶ βλαβερὸν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ προτρέπων ὡς
βέλτιον συμβουλεύει, ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χεῖρον
ἀποτρέπει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πρὸς τούτο συμπαραλαμ-
βάνει, ἢ δύκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν· τοῖς
dὲ δικαζόμενοις τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, τὰ δὲ
ἄλλα καὶ οὕτωι συμπαραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς ταῦτα· τοῖς
dὲ ἐπαίνοις καὶ ψέγουι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἀἰσχρὸν,
tὰ δὲ ἄλλα καὶ οὕτωι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρουσι.
6 σημεῖον δὲ ὅτι τὸ εἰρημένον ἐκάστοις τέλος· περὶ
μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἅλλων ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἂν ἀμφισβητήσαιειν,
oiōν δὲ δικαζόμενοι ὡς οὐ γέγονεν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἐβλα-
ψειν· ὅτι δὲ ἄδικεί, οὐδὲ ποτ' ἂν ὀμολογήσειειν·
oiōν γὰρ ἂν ἔδει δίκης. ὅμως δὲ καὶ οἱ συμ-
βουλεύοντες τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πολλάκις προῖνεται, ὡς
dὲ ἀσύμφορα συμβουλεύοντι ἢ ὑπ' ὥφελίμων
ἀποτρέπουσιν οὐκ ἂν ὀμολογήσαιειν· ὡς δὲ οὐκ
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speaker, whether he exhorts or dissuades, always advises about things to come; to the forensic the past, for it is always in reference to things done that one party accuses and the other defends; to the epideictic most appropriately the present, for it is the existing condition of things that all those who praise or blame have in view. It is not uncommon, however, for epideictic speakers to avail themselves of other times, of the past by way of recalling it, or of the future by way of anticipating it.

Each of the three kinds has a different special end, and as there are three kinds of Rhetoric, so there are three special ends. The end of the deliberative speaker is the expedient or harmful; for he who exhorts recommends a course of action as better, and he who dissuades advises against it as worse; all other considerations, such as justice and injustice, honour and disgrace, are included as accessory in reference to this. The end of the forensic speaker is the just or the unjust; in this case also all other considerations are included as accessory. The end of those who praise or blame is the honourable and disgraceful; and they also refer all other considerations to these. A sign that what I have stated is the end which each has in view is the fact that sometimes the speakers will not dispute about the other points. For example, a man on trial does not always deny that an act has been committed or damage inflicted by him, but he will never admit that the act is unjust; for otherwise a trial would be unnecessary. Similarly, the deliberative orator, although he often sacrifices everything else, will never admit that he is recommending what is inexpedient or is dissuading from what is useful; but
The omission of όβκ before ἀδικοῦν has been suggested. The sense would then be: “As to the injustice of enslaving . . . he is quite indifferent.” There is no doubt a reference to the cruel treatment by Athens of the inhabitants of the island of Melos (416 B.C.) for its loyalty to the Spartans during the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. v. 84-116). The Athenian envoys declined to discuss the question of right or wrong, which they said was only possible between equal powers, and asserted that expediency was the only thing that had to be considered. The question of justice or injustice
often he is quite indifferent about showing that the enslavement of neighbouring peoples, even if they have done no harm, is not an act of injustice. Similarly, those who praise or blame do not consider whether a man has done what is expedient or harmful, but frequently make it a matter for praise that, disregarding his own interest, he performed some deed of honour. For example, they praise Achilles because he went to the aid of his comrade Patroclus, knowing that he was fated to die, although he might have lived. To him such a death was more honourable, although life was more expedient.

From what has been said it is evident that the orator must first have in readiness the propositions on these three subjects. Now, necessary signs, probabilities, and signs are the propositions of the rhetorician; for the syllogism universally consists of propositions, and the enthymeme is a syllogism composed of the propositions above mentioned. Again, since what is impossible can neither have been done nor will be done, but only what is possible, and since what has not taken place nor will take place can neither have been done nor will be done, it is necessary for each of the three kinds of orators to have in readiness propositions dealing with the possible and the impossible, and as to whether anything has taken place or will take place, or not. Further, since all, whether they praise or blame, (in the Melian case entirely disregarded), even when taken into account, was merely accessory and intended to serve as a specious justification for the policy of might.

To protect his body and avenge his death (Iliad, xviii.).

The expedient, the just, the honourable, and their contraries.

\(\delta\lambda\oslash\) : or, reading \(\delta\lambda\oslash\), "the syllogism as a whole."
ARISTOTLE

ἐπανοῦντες καὶ ψέγοντες καὶ προτρέποντες καὶ ἀποτρέποντες καὶ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ ἀπολογοῦμενοι οὐ μόνον τὰ εἰρημένα δεικνύναι πειρώνται ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι μέγα ἡ μικρόν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡ τὸ κακὸν ἡ τὸ καλὸν ἡ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἡ τὸ δίκαιον ἡ τὸ ἀδικον, ἡ καθ’ αὐτὰ λέγοντες ἢ πρὸς ἀλληλα ἀντιπαραβάλλοντες, δῆλον ὅτι δέοι ἂν καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος καὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ τοῦ ἐλάττονος προτάσεις ἤχειν, καὶ καθόλου καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου, οἶον τί μείζον ἄγαθον ἡ ἐλαττὸν ἡ ἀδίκημα ἡ δικαίωμα· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. περὶ δὲν μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖ λαβεῖν τὰς προτάσεις, εἰρήται· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαφορετῶν ἴδια περὶ ἐκάστου τούτων, οἶον περὶ ὅν συμβουλὴ καὶ περὶ ὅν οἱ ἐπι-δεικτικοὶ λόγοι, τρίτον δὲ περὶ δὲν αἱ δίκαι.

4. Πρώτον μὲν οὖν ληπτέον περὶ ποιὰ ἀγαθὰ ἡ κακὰ ὁ συμβουλεύων συμβουλεύει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ περὶ ἄπαντα ἄλλ’ ὡσα ἐνδέχεσται καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ μή.

2 ὡσα δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ ἐστὶν ἡ ἔσται ἡ ἀδύνατον ἐπάνω ἡ γενέσθαι, περὶ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστι συμβουλὴ.

3 οὔτε δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἀπάντων· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ φύσει ἐνια καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ μή, περὶ ὅν οὐδὲν πρὸ ἐργοῦ τὸ συμβουλεύειν· ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ὅσων ἔστι τὸ βουλεύεσθαι. τοιαῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ὡσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγεσθαι εἰς ἡμᾶς, καὶ οὖν ἡ ἄρχη τῆς γενέσεως ἕφ’ ἦμῖν ἐστὶν· μέχρι γὰρ τούτου σκόπου-μεν, ἐως ὅν εὐρωμεν εἰ ἦμῖν δυνατὰ ἡ ἀδύνατα πράξαι.

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exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, not only endeavour to prove what we have stated, but also that the same things, whether good or bad, honourable or disgraceful, just or unjust, are great or small, either in themselves or when compared with each other, it is clear that it will be necessary for the orator to be ready with propositions dealing with greatness and smallness and the greater and the less, both universally and in particular; for instance, which is the greater or less good, or act of injustice or justice; and similarly with regard to all other subjects. We have now stated the topics concerning which the orator must provide himself with propositions; after this, we must distinguish between each of them individually, that is, what the three kinds of Rhetoric, deliberative, epideictic, and forensic, are concerned with.

4. We must first ascertain about what kind of good or bad things the deliberative orator advises, since he cannot do so about everything, but only about things which may possibly happen or not. Everything which of necessity either is or will be, or which cannot possibly be or come to pass, is outside the scope of deliberation. Indeed, even in the case of things that are possible advice is not universally appropriate; for they include certain advantages, natural and accidental, about which it is not worth while to offer advice. But it is clear that advice is limited to those subjects about which we take counsel; and such are all those which can naturally be referred to ourselves and the first cause of whose origination is in our own power; for our examination is limited to finding out whether such things are possible or impossible for us to perform.
4 Kath' ekaston men oiv akrivws diaribhmiasathai kai diyalabhein eis eido peri ou eivathasi chrmatizein, eti o' osoun evndeketai peri auton dierisai kata ten altheian, ou dei kata ton paron kairon zhtew di to mhte tis rheorikh einai tchh as all' emfrovnesteras kai mallon altheini, pollw de pleiw dedosai kai nvn auti twn oikeiwn thevrmamton.

5 Sper gar kai proteron eirhkomenes tynhkanomen, althees estin, oti he rheorikh syngkeitai men ek te tis anavlitikis episthmi kai tis peris he politikh, omoia d' esti tis men tis dialektikh s.

6 De tois sophistikois logoi. Osow o' an tis he tis dialektikhn he tautein m' kathaper an dynameis all' episthmas peratai katakevazein, lhesetai tis fwn auton afaniasas to metaabanein episkevazein eis episthmas upokeimewn tisw pragmatwn, alla m' monon logwn. Omws o' sosa pro' ergon men esti dieleisin, eti o' upoleipeti skexis tis politikh episthmi, epowmen kai nv.

Sxedon gar, peri ou boulevontai pantes kai peri a' agorevounoi oi sumboulevontes, ta megistata tynhkanai penete ton arithmon ometa taute d' esti peri te poron, kai polemu kai eirhnh, esti de peri eulakeis tis chrmas, kai tisw eisagomewn kai exagomewn, kai peri nomothesias.

7 'Oste peri men poron ton melononta sumboulouvsew deoi an tas prosodos tis poleis eidein tines kai possai, opws eite tis paraleipetai pros tebhi kai e' tis elaptwv auxhthi, esti de tas da-

a The analytical science is Dialectic, incorrectly regarded as a branch of Analytics, which properly implies scientific demonstration.
However, there is no need at present to endeavour to enumerate with scrupulous exactness or to classify those subjects which men are wont to discuss, or to define them as far as possible with strict accuracy, since this is not the function of the rhetorical art but of one that is more intelligent and exact, and further, more than its legitimate subjects of inquiry have already been assigned to it. For what we have said before is true: that Rhetoric is composed of analytical science and of that branch of political science which is concerned with Ethics, and that it resembles partly Dialectic and partly sophistical arguments. But in proportion as anyone endeavours to make of Dialectic or Rhetoric, not what they are, faculties, but sciences, to that extent he will, without knowing it, destroy their real nature, in thus altering their character, by crossing over into the domain of sciences, whose subjects are certain definite things, not merely words. Nevertheless, even at present we may mention such matters as it is worth while to analyse, while still leaving much for political science to investigate.

Now, we may say that the most important subjects about which all men deliberate and deliberative orators harangue, are five in number, to wit: ways and means, war and peace, the defence of the country, imports and exports, legislation.

Accordingly, the orator who is going to give advice on ways and means should be acquainted with the nature and extent of the State resources, so that if any is omitted it may be added, and if any is in-

Taking εἰς ἐπιστήμας with μεταβαίνειν. If taken with ἐπισκευάζων, the sense will be: "by changing his ground (μεταβαίνειν being used absolutely) while altering their characters from faculties to sciences."
πάνας τῆς πόλεως ἀπάσας, ὅπως εἰ τις περίεργος ἀφαίρεθη καὶ εἰ τις μεῖζων ἐλάσττων γένηται· οὐ γὰρ μόνον πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα προστιθέντες πλούσιωτεροι γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀφαιροῦντες τῶν δαπανημάτων. ταῦτα δ’ οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἓδια ἐμπειρίας ἐνδέχεται συνορᾶ, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους εὐρήμενων ἱστορικὸν εἶναι πρὸς τὴν περὶ τούτων συμβουλὴν.

9 Περὶ δὲ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης τὴν δύναμιν εἰδέναι τῆς πόλεως, ὅπση τε ὑπάρχει ἵδη καὶ πόσην ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρξαι, καὶ ποιὰ τις ἢ τε ὑπάρχουσα ἐστὶ καὶ ἤτις ἐνδέχεται προσγενέσθαι, ἐτὶ δὲ πολέμους τίνας καὶ πῶς πεπολέμηκεν. οὐ μόνον δὲ τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὄμορφων ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι, καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἐπίδοξον πολεμεῖν, ὅπως πρὸς μὲν τοὺς κρείττους εἰρήνευται, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἣττους ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἢ τὸ πολέμειν. καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, πόστερον ὁμοιὰς ἢ ἀνόμοιας· ἐστὶ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἐλαττοῦσθαι. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα μὴ μόνον τοὺς οἰκείους πολέμους τεθεωρηκέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων, πῶς ἀποβαινοῦσιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ὀμοίων τὰ ὀμοία γίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν.

10 Ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας μὴ λανθάνειν πῶς φυλάττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰδέναι τῆς φυλακῆς καὶ τὸ εἴδος καὶ τοὺς τόπους τῶν φυλακ-
sufficient, it may be increased. Further, he should know all the expenses of the State, that if any is superfluous, it may be removed, or, if too great, may be curtailed. For men become wealthier, not only by adding to what they already possess, but also by cutting down expenses. Of these things it is not only possible to acquire a general view from individual experience, but in view of advising concerning them it is further necessary to be well informed about what has been discovered among others.

In regard to war and peace, the orator should be acquainted with the power of the State, how great it is already and how great it may possibly become; of what kind it is already and what additions may possibly be made to it; further, what wars it has waged and its conduct of them. These things he should be acquainted with, not only as far as his own State is concerned, but also in reference to neighbouring States, and particularly those with whom there is a likelihood of war, so that towards the stronger a pacific attitude may be maintained, and in regard to the weaker, the decision as to making war on them may be left to his own State. Again, he should know whether their forces are like or unlike his own, for herein also advantage or disadvantage may lie. With reference to these matters he must also have examined the results, not only of the wars carried on by his own State, but also of those carried on by others; for similar results naturally arise from similar causes.

Again, in regard to the defence of the country, he should not be ignorant how it is carried on; he should know both the strength of the guard, its character, and the positions of the guard-houses
τηρίων (τούτο δ' ἀδύνατον μὴ ἐμπειρὸν ὄντα τῆς χώρας), ἵν' εἰτ' ἐλάττων ἡ φυλακὴ προστεθῇ καὶ εἰ τις περίεργος ἀφαιρεθῇ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τόπους τηρῶσι μάλλον.

11 Ἔτι δὲ περὶ τροφῆς, πόση δαπάνη ἴκανή τῇ πόλει καὶ ποία ἡ αὐτοῦ τε γιγνομένη καὶ εἰσαγώγιμος, καὶ τίνων τ' ἐξαγωγῆς δέονται καὶ τίνων εἰσαγωγῆς, ἵνα πρὸς τούτους καὶ συνυὴκαὶ καὶ συμβολαὶ γίγνωσται. πρὸς δύο γὰρ διαφυλάττειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνεγκλήτους τοὺς πολίτας, πρὸς τε τοὺς κρείττους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς ταῦτα χρησίμουσ.

12 Εἰς δ' ἀσφάλειαν ἀπαντα μὲν ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαίδευν: εὖ γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως, ὡστ' ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι πόσα τ' ἐστὶ πολιτείων εἴδη, καὶ ποία συμφέρει ἐκάστη, καὶ ὑπὸ τίνων φθείρεσθαι πέφυκε καὶ οἰκείων τῆς πολιτείας καὶ ἐναντίων. λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι, ὅτι ἔξω τῆς βελτίωτης πολιτείας αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι καὶ ἀνιμέναι καὶ ἐπιτευνόμεναι φθείρονται, οἷον δημοκρατία οὐ μόνον ἀνιμένη ἀσθενεστέρα γίνεται ὡστε τέλος ἦξει εἰς ὁλιγαρχίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιτευνόμενη σφόδρα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ γρυπότης καὶ ἡ συμότης οὐ μόνον ἀνιμένα ἐρχεται εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλὰ καὶ σφόδρα γρυπᾶ γινόμενα ἡ σιμά οὕτω διατίθεται ὡστε

\[\text{a} \text{ toūtous}: \text{those who will receive exports and send imports.}\]
(which is impossible for one who is unacquainted with the country), so that if any guard is insufficient it may be increased, or if any is superfluous it may be disbanded, and greater attention devoted to suitable positions.

Again, in regard to food, he should know what amount of expenditure is sufficient to support the State; what kind of food is produced at home or can be imported; and what exports and imports are necessary, in order that contracts and agreements may be made with those who can furnish them; for it is necessary to keep the citizens free from reproach in their relations with two classes of people—those who are stronger and those who are useful for commercial purposes.

With a view to the safety of the State, it is necessary that the orator should be able to judge of all these questions, but an understanding of legislation is of special importance, for it is on the laws that the safety of the State is based. Wherefore he must know how many forms of government there are; what is expedient for each; and the natural causes of its downfall, whether they are peculiar to the particular form of government or opposed to it. By being ruined by causes peculiar to itself, I mean that, with the exception of the perfect form of government, all the rest are ruined by being relaxed or strained to excess. Thus democracy, not only when relaxed, but also when strained to excess, becomes weaker and will end in an oligarchy; similarly, not only does an aquiline or snub nose reach the mean, when one of these defects is relaxed, but when it becomes aquiline or snub to excess, it is altered to such an extent that even the likeness
13 μηδὲ μυκτήρα δοκεῖν εἶναι. χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τάς νομοθεσίας τὸ μὴ μόνον ἑπαίνει τίς πολιτεία συμ-
φέρει ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων θεωροῦντι, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
tὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰδέναι, αἱ ποίαι τοῖς ποῖοις ἀρμόττουσιν. ὥστε δὴλον ὅτι πρὸς μὲν τὴν νομο-
θεσίαν αἱ τῆς γῆς περίοδοι χρήσιμοι (ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ 
λαβεῖν ἐστὶ τοὺς τῶν ἐθνῶν νόμους), πρὸς δὲ τὰς 
pολιτικὰς συμβουλὰς αἱ τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις 
γραφόντων ἱστορίαι· ἀπαντᾷ δὲ ταύτα πολιτικῆς 
ἀλλ' οὐ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἔστιν.

Περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα συμβου-
λευεῖν, τὰ μέγιστα τοσοαῦτά ἐστιν· ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ καὶ 
περὶ τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων προτρέπειν ἢ 
ἀποτρέπειν, λέγωμεν πάλιν.

5. Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἰδία ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι 
υκοπόσ τις ἐστὶν, οὐ στοχαζόμενοι καὶ αἱροῦνται 
καὶ φεύγουσιν· καὶ τούτ' ἐστὶν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν 

2 ἢ τ' εὐδαμονία καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς. ὥστε παρα-
δείγματος χάριν λάβωμεν τί ἐστιν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν 
ἡ εὐδαμονία, καὶ ἐκ τῶν τὰ μόρια ταύτης· περὶ 
γὰρ ταύτης καὶ τῶν εἰς ταύτην συντεινόντων καὶ 
tῶν ἑναντίων ταύτην αἱ τε προτροπαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀπο-
τροπαὶ πᾶσαι εἰσιν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ παρασκευάζοντα 
tαύτην ἢ τῶν μορίων τι, ἡ μείζον ἀντ' ἐλάττωνος 
pοιοῦντα, δεῖ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ φθείροντα ἢ ἔμ-
pοδίζοντα ἢ τὰ ἑναντία ποιοῦντα μὴ πράττειν.

3 'Εστω δὴ εὐδαμονία εὔπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἡ 
αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς, ἡ ὁ βίος ὁ μετ' ἀσφαλείας ἰδιοτῶς;

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a This rendering, although convenient, hardly represents
of a nose is lost. Moreover, with reference to acts of legislation, it is useful not only to understand what form of government is expedient by judging in the light of the past, but also to become acquainted with those in existence in other nations, and to learn what kinds of government are suitable to what kinds of people. It is clear, therefore, that for legislation books of travel are useful, since they help us to understand the laws of other nations, and for political debates historical works. All these things, however, belong to Politics and not to Rhetoric.

Such, then, are the most important questions upon which the would-be deliberative orator must be well informed. Now let us again state the sources whence we must derive our arguments for exhortation or discussion on these and other questions.

5. Men, individually and in common, nearly all have some aim, in the attainment of which they choose or avoid certain things. This aim, briefly stated, is happiness and its component parts. Therefore, for the sake of illustration, let us ascertain what happiness, generally speaking, is, and what its parts consist in; for all who exhort or dissuade discuss happiness and the things which conduce or are detrimental to it. For one should do the things which procure happiness or one of its parts, or increase instead of diminishing it, and avoid doing those things which destroy or hinder it or bring about what is contrary to it.

Let us then define happiness as well-being combined with virtue, or independence of life, or the life that is most agreeable combined with security, or the Greek, which, literally translated, is “the investigations of those who write about human actions” (cf. ἱστορικός, § 8).
ARISTOTLE

ἡ εὐθηνία κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων· σχεδόν γὰρ τούτων ἐν ἡ πλείω τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὀμολογούσων 4 εἶναι ἄπαντες. εἰ δὴ ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγένειαν, πολυφιλίαν, χρηστοφιλίαν, πλοῦτον, εὐτεκνίαν, πολυτεκνίαν, εὐγηρίαν, ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετὰς, οἰον ὑγίειαν, κάλλος, ἵσχυς, μέγεθος, δύναμιν ἁγωνιστικὴν, δόξαν, τιμὴν, εὐτυχίαν, ἀρετήν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν αὐταρκεστατος εἴη, εἰ υπάρχοι αὐτῷ τὰ τ’ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα. ἐστὶ δ’ ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, ἕξω δὲ εὐγένεια καὶ φίλοι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμή. ἔτι δὲ προσήκειν οὐμεθα δυναμείς ὑπάρχειν καὶ τύχῃν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀσφαλεστατος ὁ βίος εἰη. λάβωμεν τοινυν ὁμοιώς καὶ τούτων ἑκαστον τί ἐστιν.

5 Εὐγένεια μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐθνεὶ μὲν καὶ πόλει τὸ αὐτόχθονας ἡ ἀρχαῖας εἶναι, καὶ ἡγεμόνας τοὺς πρώτους ἐπιφανεῖς, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς γεγονέαν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ζηλουμένοις· ίδία δὲ εὐγένεια ἡ ἀπ’ ἄνδρων ἡ ἀπὸ γυναικῶν, καὶ γνησίωτης ἀπ’ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ὃστερ ἐπὶ πόλεως τοὺς τὸ πρώτους γνωρίμους ἡ ἐπ’ ἀρετῆ ἡ πλούτω ἡ ἄλλω τῶν τῶν τιμωμένων, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς ἐκ τοῦ γένους καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναίκας καὶ νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους.

a This is the usual rendering, although it is hardly satisfactory. Jebb translates “a flourishing state . . . of body.”
b Or, “bring about,” “effect them.”
c i.e. of mind and body; or δυνάμεως may mean “positions of authority and influence.”
d This was a favourite boast of the Athenians.
abundance of possessions and slaves,\textsuperscript{a} combined with power to protect and make use of them \textsuperscript{b}; for nearly all men admit that one or more of these things constitutes happiness. If, then, such is the nature of happiness, its component parts must necessarily be: noble birth, numerous friends, good friends, wealth, good children, numerous children, a good old age; further, bodily excellences, such as health, beauty, strength, stature, fitness for athletic contests, a good reputation, honour, good luck, virtue. For a man would be entirely independent, provided he possessed all internal and external goods; for there are no others. Internal goods are those of mind and body; external goods are noble birth, friends, wealth, honour. To these we think should be added certain capacities \textsuperscript{c} and good luck; for on these conditions life will be perfectly secure. Let us now in the same way define each of these in detail.

Noble birth, in the case of a nation or State, means that its members or inhabitants are sprung from the soil,\textsuperscript{d} or of long standing; that its first members were famous as leaders, and that many of their descendants have been famous for qualities that are highly esteemed. In the case of private individuals, noble birth is derived from either the father’s or the mother’s side, and on both sides there must be legitimacy; and, as in the case of a State, it means that its founders were distinguished for virtue, or wealth, or any other of the things that men honour, and that a number of famous persons, both men and women, young and old, belong to the family.
Aristotle

6 Εὐτεκνία δὲ καὶ πολυτεκνία οὐκ ἀδηλαί. ἔστι δὲ τῷ κοινῷ μέν, νεότης ἀν ἢ πολλῆ καὶ ἀγαθῆ, ἀγαθῆ δὲ κατ’ ἀρετὴν σῶματος, οἷον μέγεθος κάλλος ἵσχυν δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικῆν. ψυχής δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία νέου ἀρεταί. ἰδία δὲ εὐτεκνία καὶ πολυτεκνία τὸ τὰ ἱδία τέκνα πολλὰ καὶ τοιαῦτα εἶναι, καὶ θύλεα καὶ ἀρρενα. θηλείων δὲ ἀρετὴ σῶματος μὲν κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος, ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ φιλεργία ἀνευ ἀνελευθερίας. ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἤδια καὶ κοινῆ καὶ κατ’ ἀνδρασ καὶ κατὰ γυναίκας δει ζητεῖν ἐκαστὸν ὑπάρχειν τῶν τοιούτων ὅσοι γὰρ τὰ κατὰ γυναίκας φαύλα ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμονίως, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὸ ἢμισυ οὐκ εὐδαιμονοῦσιν.

7 Πλοῦτον δὲ μέρη νομίσματος πλήθος, γῆς, χωρίων κτήσεις, ἐτὶ δὲ ἐπίπλων κτήσεις καὶ βοσκημάτων καὶ ἀνδραπόδων πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ κάλλει διαφερόντων, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καὶ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐλευθερία καὶ χρήσιμαι. ἔστι δὲ χρήσιμαι μὲν μᾶλλον τὰ κάρπημα, ἐλευθερία δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν κάρπημα δὲ λέγω ἀφ’ ὧν αἱ πρόσῳδοι, ἀπολαυστικὰ δὲ ἀφ’ ὧν μηδὲν παρὰ τὴν χρήσιν γίγνεται, ὃ τι καὶ ἄξιον. ὡς ὁ ἄρσαλείας μὲν τὸ ἐνταῦθα καὶ οὔτω κεκτηθαί  ὁστ’ ἐφ’ αὐτῷ εἶναι τὴν χρήσιν αὐτῶν· τὸ δὲ οἰκεία εἶναι ὅταν ἐφ’ αὐτῷ ἃ ἀπαλλοτριῶσαι ἡ μῆ, λέγω δὲ ἀπαλλοτριῶσων δόσιν καὶ

α ἀνελευθερία: literally, qualities unbecoming to a free man or woman, ungentlemanly, unladylike; hence, mean, servile, sordid.

b A similar charge against the Spartan women is made in the Politics (ii. 9. 5): “Further, the looseness (ἀνεσίς) of the Spartan women is injurious both to the purpose of the constitution and the well-being of the State . . . their life is one of absolute luxury and intemperance” (compare Euripides, Andromache, 595-6 “even if she wished it, a Spartan girl
The blessing of good children and numerous children needs little explanation. For the commonwealth it consists in a large number of good young men, good in bodily excellences, such as stature, beauty, strength, fitness for athletic contests; the moral excellences of a young man are self-control and courage. For the individual it consists in a number of good children of his own, both male and female, and such as we have described. Female bodily excellences are beauty and stature, their moral excellences self-control and industrious habits, free from servility.* The object of both the individual and of the community should be to secure the existence of each of these qualities in both men and women; for all those States in which the character of women is unsatisfactory, as in Lacedaemon,\(^b\) may be considered only half-happy.

Wealth consists in abundance of money, ownership of land and properties, and further of movables, cattle, and slaves, remarkable for number, size, and beauty, if they are all secure, liberal, and useful. Property that is productive is more useful, but that which has enjoyment for its object is more liberal. By productive I mean that which is a source of income, by enjoyable that which offers no advantage beyond the use of it—at least, none worth mentioning. Security may be defined as possession of property in such places and on such conditions that the use of it is in our own hands; and ownership as the right of alienation or not,\(^c\) by which I mean giving could not be chaste”). The opinion of Xenophon and Plutarch is much more favourable.

\(^a\) The alteration is Spengel’s.

\(^b\) \(\eta \ μη\): in the ms. readings these words follow \(τού\) \(οικεία \ είναι\): “ownership or non-ownership.” The alteration is Spengel’s.
8  Εὐδοξία δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ πάντων σπουδαῖον ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι, ἣ τοιούτων τι ἔχειν οὐ πάντες ἐφίένται ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἢ οἱ φρόνιμοι.

9  Τιμή δ' ἐστὶ μὲν σημεῖον ἐνεργετικῆς δόξης, τιμῶνται δὲ δικαίως μὲν καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἐνεργητικῶτες, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τιμᾶται καὶ ὁ δυνάμενος ἐνεργετεῖν· ἐνεργεσία δὲ ἢ εἰς σωτηρίαν καὶ ὅσα αὐτίκα τοῦ εἶναι, ἢ εἰς πλοῦτον, ἢ εἰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, ὅν μὴ βαδία ἢ κτήσις ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἢ ποτέ· πολλοὶ γὰρ διὰ μικρὰ δοκοῦντα τιμῆς πυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ τόσοι καὶ οἱ καρποὶ αὐτοί. μέρη δὲ τιμῆς θυσίαι, μνήμαι ἐν μέτροις καὶ ἀνευ μέτρων, γέρα, τεμένη, προεδρία, τάφοι, εἰκόνες, τροφὰ δημόσια, τὰ βαρβαρικὰ, ὅδιον προσκυνήσεις καὶ ἐκστάσεις, δώρα τὰ παρ᾽ ἑκάστοις τίμια. καὶ γὰρ τὸ δώρον ἐστὶ κτήματος δόσις καὶ τιμῆς σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ οἱ φιλοχρήματί καὶ οἱ φιλότιμοι ἐφίένται αὐτῶν· ἀμφοτέρους γὰρ ἔχει οὐ δένται· καὶ γὰρ κτήμα ἐστὶν, οὐ ἐφίένται οἱ φιλοχρήματοι, καὶ τιμὴν ἔχει, οὐ οἱ φιλότιμοι.

10  Σώματος δὲ ἀρετὴ ύγίεια, αὐτὴ δὲ οὕτως ὡστε ἀνόσους εἰναι χρωμένους τοῖς σώμασιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ύγιαίνουσιν ὡσπερ Ἡρόδικος λέγεται, οὐς οὐδεὶς

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α ἐνέργεια: realization in action or fact.

b Of Selymbria, physician and teacher of hygienic gymnastics (c. 420 B.C.). He is said to have made his patients walk from Athens to Megara and back, about 70 miles. He was satirized by Plato and by his old pupil Hippo-
the property away or selling it. In a word, being wealthy consists rather in use than in possession; for the actualization\(^a\) and use of such things is wealth.

A good reputation consists in being considered a man of worth by all, or in possessing something of such a nature that all or most men, or the good, or the men of practical wisdom desire it.

Honour is a token of a reputation for doing good; and those who have already done good are justly and above all honoured, not but that he who is capable of doing good is also honoured. Doing good relates either to personal security and all the causes of existence; or to wealth; or to any other good things which are not easy to acquire, either in any conditions, or at such a place, or at such a time; for many obtain honour for things that appear trifling, but this depends upon place and time. The components of honour are sacrifices, memorials in verse and prose, privileges, grants of land, front seats, public burial, State maintenance, and among the barbarians, prostration and giving place, and all gifts which are highly prized in each country. For a gift is at once a giving of a possession and a token of honour; wherefore gifts are desired by the ambitious and by those who are fond of money, since they are an acquisition for the latter and an honour for the former; so that they furnish both with what they want.

Bodily excellence is health, and of such a kind that when exercising the body we are free from sickness; for many are healthy in the way Herodicus\(^b\) is said to have been, 'whom no one would consider crates as one who killed those for whom he prescribed (cf. ii. 23. 29).
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αὐν εὐδαιμονίσειε τῆς υγιείας διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἢ τῶν πλείστων.

11 Κάλλος δὲ ἑτερον καθ’ ἐκάστην ἡλικίαν ἐστίν. νέου μὲν οὖν κάλλος τὸ πρὸς τοὺς πόνους χρήσιμον ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα τοὺς τε πρὸς δρόμον καὶ πρὸς βίαν, ἢδυν οὔτα ἰδεῖν πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν, διὸ οἱ πέντεθλοι κάλλιστοι, ὅτι πρὸς βίαν καὶ πρὸς τάχος ἀμα πεφύκασιν· ἀκμάζοντος δὲ πρὸς μὲν πόνους τοὺς πολεμικοὺς, ἢδυν δὲ εἶναι δοκεῖν μετὰ φοβερότητος· γέροντος δὲ πρὸς μὲν πόνους τοὺς ἀναγκαίους ἰκανόν, ἀλυπον δὲ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὁν τὸ γήρας λυβάται.

12 Ἰσχὺς δ’ ἐστὶ μὲν δύναμις τοῦ κυνείν ἑτερον ὡς βουλεταὶ, ἀνάγκη δὲ κυνείν ἑτερον ἢ ἐλκοντα ἢ ὤθοντα ἢ αἴροντα ἢ πιέζοντα ἢ συνθλίβοντα, ὥστε ὁ ἰσχυρὸς ἢ πάσων ἢ τούτων τισὶν ἐστὶν ἰσχυρός.

13 Μεγέθους δὲ ἄρετῇ τὸ ύπερέχειν κατὰ μήκος καὶ βάθος καὶ πλάτος τῶν πολλῶν τοσοῦτω μείζον ὥστε μὴ βραδυτέρας ποιεῖν τὰς κινήσεις διὰ τὴν ύπερβολὴν.

14 Ἀγωνιστική δὲ σώματος ἄρετῇ σύγκειται ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ ἱσχύος καὶ τάχους· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ταχύς ἰσχυρὸς ἐστὶν· ὁ γὰρ δυνάμενος τὰ σκέλη βιπτεῖν πως καὶ κυνείν ταχύ καὶ πόρρω δρομικός, ὁ δὲ θλίβειν καὶ κατέχειν παλαιστικός, ὁ δὲ ὀδηγεῖ τῇ

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a Five contests: jumping, running, discus-throwing, javelin-throwing, wrestling.

b Or simply, “freedom from pain” (§ 15).
happy in the matter of health, because they are obliged to abstain from all or nearly all human enjoyments.

Beauty varies with each age. In a young man, it consists in possessing a body capable of enduring all efforts, either of the racecourse or of bodily strength, while he himself is pleasant to look upon and a sheer delight. This is why the athletes in the pentathlum are most beautiful, because they are naturally adapted for bodily exertion and for swiftness of foot. In a man who has reached his prime, beauty consists in being naturally adapted for the toils of war, in being pleasant to look upon and at the same time awe-inspiring. In an old man, beauty consists in being naturally adapted to contend with unavoidable labours and in not causing annoyance to others, thanks to the absence of the disagreeable accompaniments of old age.

Strength consists in the power of moving another as one wills, for which purpose it is necessary to pull or push, to lift, to squeeze or crush, so that the strong man is strong by virtue of being able to do all or some of these things.

Excellence of stature consists in being superior to most men in height, depth, and breadth, but in such proportion as not to render the movements of the body slower as the result of excess.

Bodily excellence in athletics consists in size, strength, and swiftness of foot; for to be swift is to be strong. For one who is able to throw his legs about in a certain way, to move them rapidly and with long strides, makes a good runner; one who can hug and grapple, a good wrestler; one who can thrust away by a blow of the fist, a good boxer;
A combination of wrestling and boxing.

The results of art and the results due to nature are often assisted (or hindered) by the interference of the irregular operations of fortune or chance. Health may be the result of fortune, as well as of art (a sick man may be cured by a drug taken by chance, one not prescribed by the physician); beauty and strength, of fortune as well as nature. It is parenthetically remarked that fortune may also produce unnatural monstrosities. The removal of the brackets and the substitution of a comma for the colon after φύσις have
one who excels in boxing and wrestling is fit for the pancratium, he who excels in all for the pentathlum.

A happy old age is one that comes slowly with freedom from pain; for neither one who rapidly grows old nor one who grows old insensibly but with pain enjoys a happy old age. This also depends upon bodily excellences and good fortune; for unless a man is free from illness and is strong, he will never be free from suffering, nor will he live long and painlessly without good fortune. Apart from health and strength, however, there is a power of vitality in certain cases; for many live long who are not endowed with bodily excellences. But a minute examination of such questions is needless for the present purpose.

The meaning of numerous and worthy friends is easy to understand from the definition of a friend. A friend is one who exerts himself to do for the sake of another what he thinks is advantageous to him. A man to whom many persons are so disposed, has many friends; if they are virtuous, he has worthy friends.

Good fortune consists in the acquisition or possession of either all, or the most, or the most important of those goods of which fortune is the cause. Now fortune is the cause of some things with which the arts also are concerned, and also of many which have nothing to do with art, for instance, such as are due to nature (though it is possible that the results of fortune may be contrary to nature); for art is a cause of health, but nature of beauty and stature. The meaning would then be: “for instance, such as are due to nature, but possibly may be also contrary to nature.”

57
φύσις. ὄλως δὲ τὰ τοιαύτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἦστιν ἀπὸ τύχης, ἐφ’ οἷς ἦστιν ὁ φθόνος. ἦστι δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγον ἀγαθῶν αὐτία τύχη, οἴον εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι αἰσχροὶ ἀδελφοί, ὁ δὲ καλός, ἡ οἱ ἄλλοι μὴ εἶδον τὸν θησαυρόν, ὁ δ’ εὐρέν, ἡ εἰ τοῦ πλησίον ἔτυχε τὸ βέλος, τούτοι δὲ μή, ἡ εἰ μή ἦλθε μόνος ἀεὶ φοιτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἅπαξ ἐλθόντες διεφθάρησαν πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαύτα εὑρυχῆματα δοκεῖ εἶναι.

18 Περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς, ἐπείπερ οἰκείωτατος ὁ περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους τόπος, ὅταν περὶ ἐπαίνου ποιώμεθα τὸν λόγον, τότε διοριστέον.

6. Ὡν μὲν οὖν δεὶ στοιχάζεσθαι προτρέποντα ὡς ἐσομένων ἡ ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ ὅν ἀποτρέποντα, φανερῶν τὰ γὰρ ἕναντία τούτων ἦστιν. ἤπει δὲ πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλεύοντι σκοποῦ τὸ συμφέρον, βουλεύονται δὲ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἄλλα περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δ’ ἦστι τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν, ληπτέον ἄν εἰ ἡ στοιχεῖα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἀπλῶς.

2 Ἐστώ δὴ ἄγαθὸν ὁ ἂν αὐτὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἐνεκό ἢ αἱρετόν, καὶ οὗ ἐνεκα ἄλλο αἱρούμεθα, καὶ οὗ ἐφίεσαι πάντα ἡ πάντα τὰ αἰσθησιν ἔχοντα ἡ νοῦν, ἡ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν. καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἐκάστω ἀποδοθη, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἐκαστον νοὺς ἀποδιδῶσιν ἐκάστω, τοῦτο ἦστιν ἐκάστῳ ἄγαθόν, καὶ οὗ παρόντος εὑ ἀδιάκειται καὶ αὐτάρκως ἔχει, καὶ τὸ αὐτάρκες, καὶ
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Speaking generally, the goods which come from fortune are such as excite envy. Fortune is also a cause of those goods which are beyond calculation; for instance, a man's brothers are all ugly, while he is handsome; they did not see the treasure, while he found it; the arrow hit one who stood by and not the man aimed at; or, one who frequented a certain place was the only one who did not go there on a certain occasion, while those who went there then for the first time met their death. All such instances appear to be examples of good fortune.

The definition of virtue, with which the topic of praise is most closely connected, must be left until we come to treat of the latter.

6. It is evident, then, what things, likely to happen or already existing, the orator should aim at, when exhorting, and what when dissuading; for they are opposites. But since the aim before the deliberative orator is that which is expedient, and men deliberate, not about the end, but about the means to the end, which are the things which are expedient in regard to our actions; and since, further, the expedient is good, we must first grasp the elementary notions of good and expedient in general.

Let us assume good to be whatever is desirable for its own sake, or for the sake of which we choose something else; that which is the aim of all things, or of all things that possess sensation or reason; or would be, if they could acquire the latter. Whatever reason might assign to each and whatever reason does assign to each in individual cases, that is good for each; and that whose presence makes a man fit and also independent; and independence in
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tò poietikòn ἡ φυλακτικὸν τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ὁ ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ τοιαύτα, καὶ τὰ κωλυτικὰ τῶν ἑναντίων καὶ τὰ φθαρτικά.

3 Ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ διχῶς: ἢ γὰρ ἀμα ἢ ὑστερον, οἷον τῷ μὲν μανθάνειν τὸ ἐπιστασθαι ὑστερον, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ζήν ἀμα. καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ τριχῶς, τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ὑγιείας, τὰ δὲ ὡς σιτία ὑγιείας, τὰ δὲ ὡς τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι, ὧτι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ

4 πολὺ ποιεῖ ὑγιείαν. τοῦτων δὲ κειμένων ἀνάγκη τάς τε λήψεις τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθὰς εἶναι καὶ τᾶς τῶν κακῶν ἀποβολὰς: ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ μὲν τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὸ κακὸν ἀμα, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν

5 ὑστερον. καὶ ἡ ἀντ’ ἐλάττωνος ἀγαθοῦ μεῖζονος λήψεις καὶ ἀντὶ μεῖζονος κακοῦ ἐλάττωνος: ὃ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τὸ μεῖζον τοῦ ἐλάττωνος, τοῦτω γίνεται

6 τοῦ μὲν λήψεις τοῦ δ’ ἀποβολῆ. καὶ τᾶς ἀρετὰς δὲ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὸν εἶναι: κατὰ γὰρ ταῦτας εὖ τε διάκειναι οἱ ἔχοντες, καὶ ποιητικά τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ πρακτικαί. περὶ ἐκάστης δὲ, καὶ τίς καὶ ποία,

7 χωρὶς ῥητέον. καὶ τὴν ἥδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι: πάντα γὰρ ἐφιέσται τὰ ζῶα αὐτῆς τῇ φύσει. ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἥδονῆς ποιητικά, τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καθ’ ἐαυτὰ αἱρετὰ ἐστίν.

8 Ὡς δὲ καθ’ ἐν εἰπεῖν, ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τάδε. εὐδαίμονια: καὶ γὰρ καθ’ αὐτὸ αἱρετῶν καὶ αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἕνεκα αὐτῶν πολλὰ αἱρούμεθα. δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρια, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοψυχία, μεγαλο-

prέπει καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ τοιαύται ἐξεῖς: ἀρετὰς γὰρ
general; and that which produces or preserves such things, or on which such things follow, or all that is likely to prevent or destroy their opposites.

Now things follow in two ways—simultaneously or subsequently; for instance, knowledge is subsequent to learning, but life is simultaneous with health. Things which produce act in three ways; thus, healthiness produces health; and so does food; and exercise as a rule. This being laid down, it necessarily follows that the acquisition of good things and the loss of evil things are both good; for it follows simultaneously on the latter that we are rid of that which is bad, and subsequently on the former that we obtain possession of that which is good. The same applies to the acquisition of a greater in place of a less good, and a less in place of a greater evil; for in proportion as the greater exceeds the less, there is an acquisition of the one and a loss of the other. The virtues also must be a good thing; for those who possess them are in a sound condition, and they are also productive of good things and practical. However, we must speak separately concerning each—what it is, and of what kind. Pleasure also must be a good; for all living creatures naturally desire it. Hence it follows that both agreeable and beautiful things must be good; for the former produce pleasure, while among beautiful things some are pleasant and others are desirable in themselves.

To enumerate them one by one, the following things must necessarily be good. Happiness, since it is desirable in itself and self-sufficient, and to obtain it we choose a number of things. Justice, courage, self-control, magnanimity, magnificence, and all other similar states of mind, for they are virtues
The excellence of anything is proportionate to its success in the performance of its proper function. The function of acquisition is to get something valuable, such as money, and its "excellence" may be judged by the amount of wealth obtained.
of the soul. Health, beauty, and the like, for they are virtues of the body and produce many advantages; for instance, health is productive of pleasure and of life, wherefore it is thought to be best of all, because it is the cause of two things which the majority of men prize most highly. Wealth, since it is the excellence of acquisition and productive of many things. A friend and friendship, since a friend is desirable in himself and produces many advantages. Honour and good repute, since they are agreeable and produce many advantages, and are generally accompanied by the possession of those things for which men are honoured. Eloquence and capacity for action; for all such faculties are productive of many advantages. Further, natural cleverness, good memory, readiness to learn, quick-wittedness, and all similar qualities; for these faculties are productive of advantages. The same applies to all the sciences, arts, and even life, for even though no other good should result from it, it is desirable in itself. Lastly, justice, since it is expedient in general for the common weal.

These are nearly all the things generally recognized as good; in the case of doubtful goods, the arguments in their favour are drawn from the following. That is good the opposite of which is evil, or the opposite of which is advantageous to our enemies; for instance, if it is specially advantageous to our enemies that we should be cowards, it is clear that courage is specially advantageous to the citizens. And, speaking generally, the opposite of what our enemies desire or of that in which they rejoice, appears to be advantageous; wherefore it was well said:
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ἡ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος.

ἔστι δ' οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ἐνίοτε ταῦτα συμφέρειν τοῖς ἑναντίοις. ὅθεν λέγει τὸς τὰ κακὰ συνάγει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν ἦ ταῦτα βλαβερὸν ἄμφοι孳.

1363 a 21 Καὶ ὁ μὴ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή, τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν, ὅ δ' ἂν ἦ μεῖζον ἡ δεῖ, κακόν. καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα πολλὰ πεπόνηται ἡ δεδαπάνηται. φαινόμενον γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἡδη, καὶ ὡς τέλος τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπολαμβάνεται, καὶ τέλος πολλῶν τὸ δὲ τέλος ἀγαθὸν. ὅθεν ταῦτ' εἴρηται,

καὶ δὲ κεν εὐχωλήν Πριάμῳ καὶ Τρωσὶ λήποιεν Ἀργείην Ἐλενὴν]

καὶ αἰσχρόν τοι δηρόν τε μένειν κενεόν τε νέεσθαι,

καὶ ἡ παροιμία δέ, τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν υδριαν.

23 Καὶ οὗ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται, καὶ τὸ περιμάχητον φαινόμενον οὗ γὰρ πάντες ἐφίενται, τοῦτ' ἀγαθὸν ἦν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὡσπερ πάντες φαινονται. καὶ τὸ ἐπαυνετὸν οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἐπαυνεί. καὶ οἱ οἳ ἐχθροὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἡδη

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\[a\] Iliad, i. 255. The words are those of Nestor to Achilles and Agamemnon, in which he points out how their enemies would rejoice if they heard all the story of their quarrel.

\[b\] Reading ὅ. The ordinary reading ὦ is taken to mean "that which does not permit of excess," that which is midway between two extremes, the mean. Another suggested rendering is, "that of which one cannot have too much."

\[c\] Iliad, ii. 160. Addressed by Hera to Athene, begging her to prevent the Greeks departing from Troy and leaving Helen behind.

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RHETORIC, I. vi. 20–24

Of a truth Priam would exult.¹

This is not always the case, but only as a general rule, for there is nothing to prevent one and the same thing being sometimes advantageous to two opposite parties; hence it is said that misfortune brings men together, when a common danger threatens them.

That which is not in excess ² is good, whereas that which is greater than it should be, is bad. And that which has cost much labour and expense, for it at once is seen to be an apparent good, and such a thing is regarded as an end, and an end of many efforts; now, an end is a good. Wherefore it was said:

And they would [leave Argive Helen for Priam and the Trojans] to boast of,³

and,

It is disgraceful to tarry long,⁴

and the proverb, "[to break] the pitcher at the door."⁵

And that which many aim at and which is seen to be competed for by many; for that which all aim at was recognized as a good, and the majority may almost stand for "all." And that which is the object of praise, for no one praises that which is not good. And that which is praised by enemies; for if even

¹ Iliad, ii. 298. Spoken by Odysseus. While sympathizing with the desire of the army to leave, he points out that it would be "disgraceful after waiting so long" to return unsuccessful, and exhorts them to hold out.

² Proverbial for "lost labour." Cf. French "faire naufrage au port," and the English "there's many a slip 'twixt cup and lip."
ομολογούσων, εἰ καὶ οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες. διὰ γὰρ τὸ φανερὸν ομολογοῖεν ἂν, ἡσπερ καὶ φαύλοι οὐς οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἐπανοῦσιν. διὸ λεολοδηρῆσθαι ὑπέλαβον ὂρομίθιοι ὑπὸ Συμωνίδου ποιήσαντος

Κορινθίοις δ' οὕ μέμφεται τὸ "Ιλιον.

25 καὶ δ' τῶν φρονίμων τις ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄνδρῶν ἡ γυναικῶν προέκρινεν, οἶον Ὄδυσσεα Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ Ἐλένην Θησεύς καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον αἱ θεαὶ καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ὄμηρος.

26 Καὶ ὅλως τὰ προαιρετά: προαιροῦνται δὲ πράττειν τὰ τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς κακὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατά. ταῦτα δὲ διεἰσὶ· τὰ τε γενόμενα ἃν καὶ τὰ ῥαδίως γεγομέναν. ῥάδια δὲ ὅσα ἡ ἀνευ λύπης ἢ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ· τὸ γὰρ χαλέπον ὀρίζεται ἡ λύπη ἡ πλήθει χρόνου, καὶ ἕαν ὡς βούλονται· βούλονται δὲ ἡ μηδὲν κακὸν ἢ ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· τούτο δ' ἔσται, ἐὰν ἡ λαν-

27 θάνῃ ἡ τιμωρία ἡ μικρὰ ἡ. καὶ τὰ ὅδια, καὶ ἡ μηδεῖς, καὶ τὰ περιττά· τιμῆ γὰρ οὕτω μᾶλλον. καὶ τὰ ἁμοπόττοντα αὐτοῖς· τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ τε προσήκοντα κατὰ γένος καὶ δύναμιν, καὶ ὃν ἐλλείπειν

\(^{a}\) Meaning that they cannot have done their duty against their enemies, who would then have blamed them. Another suggested reading is οὐς οἱ φίλοι ψέγουσι καὶ οὐς οἱ ἐχθροὶ μὴ ψέγουσι ("those whom their friends blame and whom their enemies do not blame").

\(^{b}\) In the Iliad Glaucus, a Corinthian, is described as an ally of the Trojans. Simonides meant to praise, but the Corinthians were suspicious and thought his words were meant satirically, in accordance with the view just expressed by Aristotle. The Simonides referred to is Simonides of Ceos (Frag. 50, P.L.G. iii., where the line is differently given). Aristotle is evidently quoting from memory, as he often does, although not always accurately.
those who are injured by it acknowledge its goodness, this amounts to a universal recognition of it; for it is because of its goodness being evident that they acknowledge it, just as those whom their enemies praise are worthless.\(^a\) Wherefore the Corinthians imagined themselves insulted by Simonides, when he wrote,

Ilium does not blame the Corinthians.\(^b\)

And that which one of the practically wise or good, man or woman, has chosen before others, as Athene chose Odysseus, Theseus Helen, the goddesses Alexander (Paris), and Homer Achilles.

And, generally speaking, all that is deliberately chosen is good. Now, men deliberately choose to do the things just mentioned, and those which are harmful to their enemies, and advantageous to their friends, and things which are possible. The last are of two kinds: things which might happen,\(^c\) and things which easily happen; by the latter are meant things that happen without labour or in a short time, for difficulty is defined by labour or length of time. And anything that happens as men wish is good; and what they wish is either what is not evil at all or is less an evil than a good, which will be the case for instance, whenever the penalty attached to it is unnoticed or light. And things that are peculiar to them, or which no one else possesses,\(^d\) or which are out of the common; for thus the honour is greater. And things which are appropriate to them; such are all things befitting them in respect of birth and power. And things which they think they lack,

\(^a\) ev\(\varepsilon\)v\(\varepsilon\)va \(\hat{\alpha}\nu\): Spengel omits \(\hat{\alpha}\nu\): i.e. “things which have happened.”

\(^b\) “Or which no one else has done” (Jebb).
οὐνται, καὶ μικρὰ ἢ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦττον προαιροῦνται
29 ταῦτα πράττει. καὶ τὰ εὐκατέργαστα· δυνατὰ
γὰρ ὡς ράδια· εὐκατέργαστα δὲ, ἀ πάντες ἢ ὁι
πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ ὁμοιοὶ ἢ οἱ ἦττος κατώρθωσαν. καὶ
ἀ χαριστοῦν τοῖς φίλοις, ἢ ἀ ἀπεχθήσονται τοῖς
ἐχθροῖς. καὶ ὃσα οὔς θαυμάζουν προαιροῦνται
πράττειν. καὶ πρὸς ἀ εὐφνεῖσ εἰσὶ καὶ ἐμπειροὶ,
ῥᾶν γὰρ κατορθώσειν οὐνται. καὶ ὃ μηδεῖς
φαύλος· ἐπανετὰ γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὃν ἑπιθυμοῦντες
tυγχάνουσιν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἦδυ ἄλλα καὶ
30 βέλτιον φαίνεται. καὶ μάλιστα ἐκαστοῦ πρὸς ἀ
τοιοῦτοι, οἶον οἱ φιλόνικοι εἰ νίκη ἐσται, οἱ φιλό-
tιμοὶ εἰ τιμή, οἱ φιλοχρήματοι εἰ χρήματα, καὶ οἱ
ἄλλοι ὑστάτως. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἁγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ
συμφέροντος ἐκ τοῦτων ληπτέον τὰς πίστεις.
7. Ἑπεὶ δὲ πολλάκις ὀμολογοῦντες ἀμφω συμ-
φέρειν περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ἐφεξῆς ἂν
εἰη λεκτέον περὶ τοῦ μεицыνος ἁγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ
2 μᾶλλον συμφέροντος. ἐστὼ δὴ ὑπερέχων μὲν το-
σοῦτον καὶ ἐτι, ὑπερεχομενον δὲ τὸ ἐνυπάρχον.
καὶ μεицыν μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ πλεῖον πρὸς ἐλαττον, μέγα
dὲ καὶ μικρὸν καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὁλίγον πρὸς τὸ τῶν
πολλῶν μέγεθος, καὶ ὑπερέχων μὲν τὸ μέγα, τὸ δὲ
ἐλλεῖπον μικρὸν, καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὁλίγον ὑστάτωσ.
3 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἁγαθὸν λέγομεν τὸ τε αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα
however unimportant; for none the less they deliberately choose to acquire them. And things which are easy of accomplishment, for being easy they are possible; such things are those in which all, or most men, or those who are equals or inferiors have been successful. And things whereby they will gratify friends or incur the hatred of enemies. And all things that those whom they admire deliberately choose to do. And those things in regard to which they are clever naturally or by experience; for they hope to be more easily successful in them. And things which no worthless man would approve, for that makes them the more commendable. And things which they happen to desire, for such things seem not only agreeable, but also better. Lastly, and above all, each man thinks those things good which are the object of his special desire, as victory of the man who desires victory, honour of the ambitious man, money of the avaricious, and so in other instances. These then are the materials from which we must draw our arguments in reference to good and the expedient.

7. But since men often agree that both of two things are useful, but dispute which is the more so, we must next speak of the greater good and the more expedient. Let one thing, then, be said to exceed another, when it is as great and something more—and to be exceeded when it is contained in the other. "Greater" and "more" always imply a relation with less; "great" and "small," "much" and "little" with the general size of things; the "great" is that which exceeds, and that which falls short of it is "small"; and similarly "much" and "little." Since, besides, we call good that which is
καὶ μὴ ἄλλου αἱρετῶν, καὶ οὗ πάντ’ ἐφίεται, καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἂν καὶ φρόνησιν λαβόντα ἔλοιπό, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ φυλακτικὸν, ἢ ὃ ἐπεταί τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ δ’ οὐ ἔνεκα τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ, τέλος δ’ ἐστὶν οὐ ἔνεκα τὰ ἄλλα, αὐτῷ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν ταῦτα πεπονθός, ἀνάγκη τὰ τε πλείω τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τῶν ἐλαττώνων, συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τῶν ἐλαττώνων, μειζὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ὑπερέχει γὰρ, τὸ δὲ ἐνυπάρχον ὑπερέχεται.

4 Καὶ ἐὰν τὸ μεγίστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπερέχῃ, καὶ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν· καὶ ὡς αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ μεγίστον τοῦ μεγίστου· οἶνον εἰ ὁ μεγίστος ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς τῆς μεγίστης μείζων· καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἄνδρες τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους· καὶ εἰ οἱ ἄνδρες ὅλως τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους, καὶ ἀνὴρ ὁ μεγίστος τῆς μεγίστης γυναικὸς μείζων· ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἔχουσιν αἱ ὑπεροχὰ τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτοῖς. καὶ

5 ὅταν τὸδε μὲν τῶδε ἔπηται, ἐκείνο δὲ τοῦτῳ μή· ἐπεται δὲ ἡ τῷ ἀμα ἢ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἢ τῇ δυνάμει· ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἡ χρήσις ἢ τοῦ ἐπομένου ἐν τῇ θατέρου. ἐπεται δὲ ἀμα μὲν τῷ ὑγιαίῳ τὸ ᾗν, τοῦτῳ δὲ ἐκείνῳ οὐ, ὑπερεν δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι, δυνάμει δὲ τῷ ἱεροσυλεῖν τὸ ἀποστερεῖν· δ’ ἡ γὰρ ἱεροσυλήσας καὶ ἀποστερήσεις. καὶ

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*a* The one, the smaller number, and the greater number must be of the same species. Thus, 5 pounds is a greater good than 2 pounds; but 5 farthings is not a greater good than 2 pounds, since the smaller number is not reckoned in with the greater (Buckley).

*b* If B (life) follows on, is the consequent of A (health), but A is not the consequent of B, then A is a greater good than B.
desirable for its own sake and not for anything else, and that which all things aim at and which they would choose if they possessed reason and practical wisdom; and that which is productive or protective of good, or on which such things follow; and since that for the sake of which anything is done is the end, and the end is that for the sake of which everything else is done, and that is good for each man which relatively to him presents all these conditions, it necessarily follows that a larger number of good things is a greater good than one or a smaller number, if the one or the smaller number is reckoned as one of them;\(^a\) for it exceeds them and that which is contained is exceeded.

And if that which is greatest in one class surpass that which is greatest in another class, the first class will surpass the second; and whenever one class surpasses another, the greatest of that class will surpass the greatest of the other. For instance, if the biggest man is greater than the biggest woman, men in general will be bigger than women; and if men in general are bigger than women, the biggest man will be bigger than the biggest woman; for the superiority of classes and of the greatest things contained in them are proportionate. And when this follows on that, but not that on this [then “that” is the greater good];\(^b\) for the enjoyment of that which follows is contained in that of the other. Now, things follow simultaneously, or successively, or potentially; thus, life follows simultaneously on health, but not health on life; knowledge follows subsequently on learning [but not learning on knowledge]; and simple theft potentially on sacrilege, for one who commits sacrilege will also steal.

71
6 τὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ μεῖζον μεῖζω· ἀνάγκη
7 γὰρ ὑπερέχειν καὶ τοῦ μεῖζονος. καὶ τὰ μεῖζονος ἀγαθοῦ ποιητικὰ μεῖζω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἤν τὸ μεῖζονος ποιητικῷ εἶναι. καὶ οὐ τὸ ποιητικὸν μεῖζον, ὡσ- αὐτῶς· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ύγιεῖνον αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ἦδεος καὶ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡ ύγίεια τῆς ἦδονῆς μεῖζων.
8 καὶ τὸ αἱρετώτερον καθ’ αὐτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθ’ αὐτό,

1364α οἶον ἰσχὺς ύγιεινοῦ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὖχ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, 9 τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ, ὁπερ ἤν τὸ ἀγαθόν. κἂν ἦ τὸ μὲν τέλος, τὸ δὲ μὴ τέλος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλον ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ, οἶον τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι τοῦ εὐ ἔχειν τὸ
10 σῶμα. καὶ τὸ ἦττον προσδεόμενον θατέρου ἢ ἐτέρων· αὐταρκέστερον γὰρ ἦττον δὲ προσδεῖται
11 τὸ ἐλαττόνων ἢ βρόνων προσδεόμενον. καὶ ὅταν τόδε μὲν ἄνευ τοῦδε μὴ ἦ ἦ μὴ δυνατὸν ἢ γενόεσθαι, θάτερον δὲ ἄνευ τοῦτου· αὐταρκέστερον δὲ τὸ μὴ δεόμενον, ὥστε φαίνεται μεῖζον ἀγαθόν.
12 Κἂν ἦ ἀρχή· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή. κἂν ἦ αἰτίον, τὸ δ’ οὐκ αἰτίον, διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ· ἄνευ γὰρ αἰτίου καὶ ἀρχῆς ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ γενόεσθαι. καὶ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς μεῖζονος μεῖζον, καὶ δυοῖν αἰτίοιν τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ μεῖζονος αἰτίου μεῖζον. καὶ ἀνάπαλιν δὴ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν ἢ τοῦ μεῖζονος ἀρχή μεῖζων καὶ δυοῖν αἰτίοιν

*a* Eight is greater than 2 by 6, which itself is greater than 2.

72
And things which exceed the same thing by a greater amount [than something else] are greater, for they must also exceed the greater. And things which produce a greater good are greater; for this we agreed was the meaning of productive of greater. And similarly, that which is produced by a greater cause; for if that which produces health is more desirable than that which produces pleasure and a greater good, then health is a greater good than pleasure. And that which is more desirable in itself is superior to that which is not; for example, strength is a greater good than the wholesome, which is not desirable for its own sake, while strength is; and this we agreed was the meaning of a good. And the end is a greater good than the means; for the latter is desirable for the sake of something else, the former for its own sake; for instance, exercise is only a means for the acquirement of a good constitution. And that which has less need of one or several other things in addition is a greater good, for it is more independent (and “having less need” means needing fewer or easier additions). And when one thing does not exist or cannot be brought into existence without the aid of another, but that other can, then that which needs no aid is more independent, and accordingly is seen to be a greater good.

And if one thing is a first principle, and another not; if one thing is a cause and another not, for the same reason; for without cause or first principle nothing can exist or come into existence. And if there are two first principles or two causes, that which results from the greater is greater; and conversely, when there are two first principles or two causes, that which is the first cause or principle
ARISTOTLE

13 τὸ τοῦ μεῖζονος αὕτων μεῖζον. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀμφοτέρως μεῖζον ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἄρχη, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἄρχη, δόξει μεῖζον εἶναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἄρχη, τὸ δὲ ἄρχη, τὸ γὰρ τέλος μεῖζον καὶ οὐκ ἄρχη, ὥσπερ ὁ Λεωδάμας κατηγορῶν ἐφ' Καλλιστράτου τὸν Βουλεύσαντα τοῦ πράξαντος μᾶλλον ἄδικεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν πραχθῆναι μὴ Βουλευσαμένου· πάλιν δὲ καὶ Χαβρίου, τὸν πράξαντα τοῦ Βουλευσαντος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἢν ὁ πράξων· τούτου γὰρ ἐνεκα ἐπιβουλεύειν, ὅπως πράξωσιν.

14 Καὶ τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου, οἷον χρυσὸς αἰθήρον ἄχρηστότερον ὥν· μεῖζον γὰρ ἡ κτῆσις διὰ τὸ χαλεπώτεραν εἶναι. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τοῖς ἀφθόνοις τοῦ σπανίου, ὅτι ἡ χρῆσις ὑπερέχει· τὸ γὰρ πολλάκις τοῦ ὅλιγάκις ὑπερέχει· οἶδεν ἴσοντα ἀριστον μὲν ὤδωρ.

15 καὶ ἔλος τοῦ χαλεπώτερον τοῦ βάρονος· σπανιώτερον γὰρ. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ βάρον τοῦ χαλεπω-

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13 A thing may be of greater importance in two ways: (a) that which is a first principle is superior to that which is not; (b) that which is not a first principle, but an end, is superior to that which is a first principle; for the end is superior to the means. In the illustration that follows: (a) the first principle (suggesting the plot) is said to be of more importance (worse) than the end or result (carrying out the plot); (b) on the other hand, this end is said to be worse than the first principle, since the end is superior to the means. Thus the question of the amount of guilt can be argued both ways.

14 Oropus, a frontier-town of Boeotia and Attica, had been occupied by the Thebans (366 B.C.). Callistratus suggested an arrangement which was agreed to and carried out by Chabrias—the town should remain in Theban possession for the time being. Negotiations proved unsuccessful and
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of the greater is greater. It is clear then, from what has been said, that a thing may be greater in two ways; for if it is a first principle but another is not, it will appear to be greater, and if it is not a first principle [but an end], while another is; for the end is greater and not a first principle. Thus, Leodamas, when accusing Callistratus, declared that the man who had given the advice was more guilty than the one who carried it out; for if he had not suggested it, it could not have been carried out. And conversely, when accusing Chabrias, he declared that the man who had carried out the advice was more guilty than the one who had given it; for it could not have been carried out, had there not been some one to do so, and the reason why people devised plots was that others might carry them out.

And that which is scarcer is a greater good than that which is abundant, as gold than iron, although it is less useful, but the possession of it is more valuable, since it is more difficult of acquisition. From another point of view, that which is abundant is to be preferred to that which is scarce, because the use of it is greater, for "often" exceeds "seldom"; whence the saying:

Water is best.

And, speaking generally, that which is more difficult is preferable to that which is easier of attainment, for it is scarcer; but from another point of view that which is easier is preferable to that which is more

the Thebans refused to leave, whereupon Chabrias and Callistratus were brought to trial. Leodamas was an Athenian orator, pupil of Isocrates, and pro-Theban in his political views.

e Pindar, Olympia, i. 1.
16 τέρον: ἔχει γὰρ ὡς βουλόμεθα. καὶ ὃ τὸ ἐναντίον μεῖζον, καὶ οὐ ἡ στέρησις μεῖζων. καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακία μὴ κακίας μεῖζων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ
17 τέλη, τὰ δ' οὐ τέλη. καὶ ὃν τὰ ἔργα καλλώ ἢ αἰσχῶ, μεῖζω αὐτά. καὶ ὃν αἱ κακίαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ μεῖζους, καὶ τὰ ἔργα μεῖζω, ἐπείπερ ὡς τὰ αἰτία καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί, καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, καὶ ὃς τὰ
18 ἀποβαίνοντα, καὶ τὰ αἰτία καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί. καὶ ὃν ἡ ὑπεροχὴ αἱρετωτέρα ἡ καλλίων, οἰον τὸ ἀκριβῶς ὅραν αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ὑφισ
1364 ὀσφρήσεως· καὶ τὸ φιλεταίρον εἶναι τοῦ φιλοχρηματον μᾶλλον κάλλιον, ὡστε καὶ φιλεταιρία φιλοχρηματίας. καὶ ἀντικειμένως δὲ τῶν βελτίων αἱ ὑπερβολαι βελτίους καὶ καλλιόνων καλλίους.
19 καὶ ὃν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι καλλίους ἡ βελτίους· αἱ γὰρ μεῖζους ὀρέξεις μειζόνων εἰσίν. καὶ τῶν καλλιόνων δὲ ἡ καὶ βελτίων αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι βελτίους καὶ καλλίους διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ.
20 Καὶ ὃν αἱ ἐπιστήμαι καλλίους ἡ σπουδαϊότεραι, καὶ τὰ πράγματα καλλίω καὶ σπουδαϊότερα· ὡς γὰρ ἔχει ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἄληθες· κελεύει δὲ τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη. καὶ τῶν σπουδαιότερων δὲ καὶ
21 καλλιόνων αἱ ἐπιστήμαι ἀνάλογον διὰ ταῦτα. καὶ ὁ κρίνειαν ἃν ἡ κεκρίκασιν οἱ φρόνιμοι ἡ πάντες ἡ οἱ πολλοὶ ἡ οἱ πλείους ἡ οἱ κράτιστοι ἀγαθῶν ἡ

a e.g. it is worse to be blind than deaf; therefore sight is better than hearing (Schrader).
difficult; for its nature is as we wish. And that, the contrary or the deprivation of which is greater, is the greater good. And virtue is greater than non-virtue, and vice than non-vice; for virtues and vices are ends, the others not. And those things whose works are nobler or more disgraceful are themselves greater; and the works of those things, the vices and virtues of which are greater, will also be greater, since between causes and first principles compared with results there is the same relation as between results compared with causes and first principles. Things, superiority in which is more desirable or nobler, are to be preferred; for instance, sharpness of sight is preferable to keenness of smell; for sight is better than smell. And loving one's friends more than money is nobler, whence it follows that love of friends is nobler than love of money. And, on the other hand, the better and nobler things are, the better and nobler will be their superiority; and similarly, those things, the desire for which is nobler and better, are themselves nobler and better, for greater longings are directed towards greater objects. For the same reason, the better and nobler the object, the better and nobler are the desires.

And when the sciences are nobler and more dignified, the nobler and more dignified are their subjects; for as is the science, so is the truth which is its object, and each science prescribes that which properly belongs to it; and, by analogy, the nobler and more dignified the objects of a science, the nobler and more dignified is the science itself, for the same reasons. And that which men of practical wisdom, either all, or more, or the best of them, would judge, or have judged, to be a greater good, must necessarily
μεῖζον, ἀνάγκη οὗτως ἔχειν, ἡ ἀπλῶς ἡ ἢ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν ἐκριναν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κοινὸν καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀλλων· καὶ γὰρ τι καὶ ποσὸν καὶ ποιόν οὗτως ἔχει ὡς ἢν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ φρόνησις εἶποι. ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀγαθῶν εἰρήκαμεν· ὥρισται γὰρ ἀγαθόν εἶναι, ὁ λαβόντα τὰ πράγματα φρόνησιν ἠλοιτ' ἢν ἐκαστον· δήλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ μεῖζον, ὁ μᾶλλον ἡ φρόνησις
22 λέγει. καὶ τὸ τοῖς βελτίωσιν ὑπάρχον, ἡ ἀπλῶς ἡ ἢ βελτίους, οἷον ἀνδρία ἱσχύος. καὶ ὁ ἠλοιτ' ἢν ὁ βελτίων, ἡ ἀπλῶς ἡ ἢ βελτίων, οἷον τὸ ἀδικείσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ἀδικείω· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ δικαιότερος ἢν
23 ἠλοιτο. καὶ τὸ ἢδιον του ἤττουν ἢδέος· τὴν γὰρ ἢδονὴν πάντα διώκει, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἑνεκα του ἢδεσθαι ὀρέγονται, ὥρισται δὲ τούτοις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ τέλος. ἢδιον δὲ τὸ τε ἀλυπότερον καὶ τὸ πολυ-
24 χρονιώτερον ἢδυ. καὶ τὸ κάλλιον τοῦ ἤττουν καλοῦ· τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἔστιν ἢτοι τὸ ἢδυ ἢ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ
25 αἰρετόν. καὶ ὅσων αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἡ φίλοις βούλονται αὖτιοι εἶναι μᾶλλον, ταῦτα μεῖζον ἀγαθά,
26 ὅσων δὲ ἢκιστα, μεῖζον κακά. καὶ τὰ πολυχρονιώτερα τῶν ὀλιγοχρονιωτέρων καὶ τὰ βεβαιότερα τῶν μὴ βεβαιοτέρων· ὑπερέχει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις τῶν μὲν τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν δὲ τῇ βουλήσει· ὅταν γὰρ βούλωνται, ὑπάρχει μᾶλλον ἡ τοῦ βεβαιοῦ.
27 Καὶ ὡς ἢν ἐκ τῶν συστοίχων καὶ τῶν ὅμοιων

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be such, either absolutely or in so far as they have judged as men of practical wisdom. The same may be said in regard to everything else; for the nature, quantity, and quality of things are such as would be defined by science and practical wisdom. But our statement only applies to goods; for we defined that as good which everything, if possessed of practical wisdom, would choose; hence it is evident that that is a greater good to which practical wisdom assigns the superiority. So also are those things which better men possess, either absolutely, or in so far as they are better; for instance courage is better than strength. And what the better man would choose, either absolutely or in so far as he is better; thus, it is better to suffer wrong than to commit it, for that is what the juster man would choose. And that which is more agreeable rather than that which is less so; for all things pursue pleasure and desire it for its own sake; and it is by these conditions that the good and the end have been defined. And that is more agreeable which is less subject to pain and is agreeable for a longer time. And that which is nobler than that which is less noble; for the noble is that which is either agreeable or desirable in itself. And all things which we have a greater desire to be instrumental in procuring for ourselves or for our friends are greater goods, and those as to which our desire is least are greater evils. And things that last longer are preferable to those that are of shorter duration, and those that are safer to those that are less so; for time increases the use of the first and the wish that of the second; for whenever we wish, we can make greater use of things that are safe.

And things in all cases follow the relations between
πτώσεων, καὶ τάλλ’ ἀκολουθεῖ· οἶον εἰ τὸ ἀνδρείως κάλλιον καὶ αἰρετώτερον τοῦ σωφρόνως, καὶ ἀνδρία σωφροσύνης αἰρετωτέρα καὶ τὸ ἀνδρείον εἶναι τοῦ 28 σωφρονεῖν. καὶ ὅ πάντες αἱροῦνται τοῦ μὴ ὅ πάντες. καὶ ὅ οἱ πλείους ἢ [ὁ] ὀἱ ἐλάττους· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἢν οὐ πάντες ἐφίεναι, ὥστε καὶ μεῖζον οὐ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὅ οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἢ οἱ κρίνοντες ἢ οὺς οὕτωι κρίνοντων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὃς ἂν εἰ πάντες φαίνει ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ οἱ κύριοι καὶ οἱ εἴδότες. 29 καὶ ὅτε μὲν οὐ πάντες μετέχουσι μεῖζον· ἀτιμία γὰρ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν· ὅτε δὲ οὐ μηδεῖς ἢ οὐ οἴλιγοι· 30 σπανιώτερον γάρ. καὶ τὰ ἐπανειτωτέρα· καλλίω γάρ. καὶ ὅν αἱ τιμαὶ μεῖζον· ἀσαντῶς· ἢ γὰρ τιμῇ ὀσπερ ἄξια τις ἐστὶν. καὶ ὅν αἱ ξημιά·

καὶ τὰ τῶν ὀμολογουμένων ἢ φανομένων μεγάλων μεῖζον. καὶ διαφορόμενα δὲ εἰς τὰ μέρη τὰ αὐτὰ μεῖζον φαίνεται· πλεῖον γὰρ ὑπερεχεῖν φαίνεται. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς φησὶ πείσαι τὸν Ἐμέλεαγρον ἀναστήναι ὁσσα κἂν ἀνθρώπους πέλει τῶν ἀστυ ἀλώπῃ· λαοὶ μὲν φθινόθουσιν, πόλιν δὲ τῷ πυρ ἀμαθύνει, τέκνα δὲ τῇ ἄλλοι ἁγούσιν.

Καὶ τὸ συντιθέναι καὶ ἐποικοδομεῖν, ὀσπερ

1 Inserted by Spengel.

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a "Things of which the prices are greater, price being a sort of worth" (Jebb).

b Or, "superiority over a greater number of things."

c After πείσαι all the ms. except Α (Paris) have λέγουσαν. If this is retained, it must refer to Meleager's wife Cleopatra, who "persuaded him . . . by quoting." As the text stands, the literal rendering is: "the poet says that (the recital of the three verses) persuaded." The passage is from Iliad, ix. 592-594 (slightly different). 

d See Glossary.

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co-ordinates and similar inflexions; for instance, if "courageously" is nobler than and preferable to "temperately," then "courage" is preferable to "temperance," and it is better to be "courageous" than "temperate." And that which is chosen by all is better than that which is not; and that which the majority choose than that which the minority choose; for, as we have said, the good is that which all desire, and consequently a good is greater, the more it is desired. The same applies to goods which are recognized as greater by opponents or enemies, by judges, or by those whom they select; for in the one case it would be, so to say, the verdict of all mankind, in the other that of those who are acknowledged authorities and experts. And sometimes a good is greater in which all participate, for it is a disgrace not to participate in it; sometimes when none or only a few participate in it, for it is scarcer. And things which are more praiseworthy, since they are nobler. And in the same way things which are more highly honoured, for honour is a sort of measure of worth; and conversely those things are greater evils, the punishment for which is greater. And those things which are greater than what is acknowledged, or appears, to be great, are greater. And the same whole when divided into parts appears greater, for there appears to be superiority in a greater number of things. When the poet says that Meleager was persuaded to rise up and fight by the recital of

All the ills that befall those whose city is taken; the people perish, and fire utterly destroys the city, and strangers carry off the children.

Combination and building up, as employed by
'Επίχαρμος, διά τε τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ διαφέρει (ἢ γὰρ σύνθεσις ὑπεροχὴν δείκνυσι πολλὴν) καὶ ὁτι ἀρχῇ
32 φαίνεται μεγάλων καὶ αὐτίων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ σπανιώτερον μείζον, καὶ οἱ καιροὶ καὶ οἱ ἥλικιαι καὶ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ χρόνοι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ποιοῦσι μεγάλα; εἰ γὰρ παρὰ δύναμιν καὶ παρ’ ἥλικιαι καὶ παρὰ τοὺς ὦμοιους, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἡ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τόθ’, ἔξει μέγεθος καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τῷ ὀλυμπιονίκῃ.

προσθή μὲν ἀμφ’ ὦμοιοις ἐξὼν τραχεῖαν ἀσιλλαν ἢθὸς ἐξ’ Ἀργοὺς εἰς Τέγεαν ἐφερον.

καὶ ὁ Ἰφικράτης αὐτὸν ἐνεκκυμίαζε λέγων ἐξ ὄν
33 ὑπηρέξε ταῦτα. καὶ τὸ αὐτοφυῆς τοῦ ἐπικτήτου χαλεπώτερον γάρ. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητής φησιν αὐτοδίδακτος δ’ εἰμι.

34 καὶ τὸ μεγάλου μέγιστον μέρος· οἶον Περικλῆς τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λέγων, τὴν νεότητα ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀνηρῆσθαι ὡσπερ τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναυτοῦ εἰ ἔξαιρεθεὶ τ. 35 καὶ τὰ ἐν χρεία μείζον κρήσιμα, οἶον τὰ ἐν γῆρα καὶ νόσοις. καὶ δυοῖν τὸ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ τέλους. καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ τοῦ ἄπλως. καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν τοῦ

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*Epicharmus (c. 550-460 B.C.), writer of comedies and Pythagorean philosopher, was born at Megara in Sicily (according to others, in the island of Cos). His comedies, written in the Doric dialect, and without a chorus, were either mythological or comedies of manners, as extant titles show. Plato speaks of him as "the prince of comedy" and Horace states definitely that he was imitated by Plautus.

* Simonides, Frag. 163 (P.L.G. iii.).

* Or, the yoke to which the basket, like our milk-pails long ago, was attached.
Epicharmus, produce the same effect as division, and for the same reason; for combination is an exhibition of great superiority and appears to be the origin and cause of great things. And since that which is harder to obtain and scarcer is greater, it follows that special occasions, ages, places, times, and powers, produce great effects; for if a man does things beyond his powers, beyond his age, and beyond what his equals could do, if they are done in such a manner, in such a place, and at such a time, they will possess importance in actions that are noble, good, or just, or the opposite. Hence the epigram on the Olympian victor:

Formerly, with a rough basket on my shoulders, I used to carry fish from Argos to Tegea.

And Iphicrates lauded himself, saying, "Look what I started from!" And that which is natural is a greater good than that which is acquired, because it is harder. Whence the poet says:

Self-taught am I.

And that which is the greatest part of that which is great is more to be desired; as Pericles said in his Funeral Oration, that the removal of the youth from the city was like the year being robbed of its spring. And those things which are available in greater need, as in old age and illness, are greater goods. And of two things that which is nearer the end proposed is preferable. And that which is useful for the individual is preferable to that which is useful ab-

\[d\] Odyssey, xxii. 347. The words are those of the minstrel Phemius, who was forced to sing to the suitors of Penelope.
\[e\] Not in the oration in Thucydides (ii. 35).
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άδυνάτου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ, τὸ δ’ οὐ. καὶ τὰ ἐν τελεὶ τοῦ βίου· τέλη γὰρ μᾶλλον τὰ πρὸς τῷ τελεὶ.

36 Καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἀληθείαν τῶν πρὸς δόξαν. ὄρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν, ὁ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἔλοιπο. διὸ καὶ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν τοῦ εὖ ποιεῖν δόξειν ἂν αἱρετώτερον εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κἂν λανθάνῃ αἰρή- σεται, ποιεῖν δ’ εὖ λανθάνων οὐ δοκεῖ ἂν ἐλέσθαι. διὸ καὶ ὁ σα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἡ δοκεῖν βούλονται· πρὸς ἀληθείαν γὰρ μᾶλλον. διὸ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην φασὶ μικρὸν εἶναι, ὅτι δοκεῖν ἡ εἶναι αἱρετώτερον.

37 τὸ δὲ οὐ γιναινειν οὐ. καὶ τὸ πρὸς πολλὰ χρησιμώ- τερον, οἰον τὸ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν καὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ καλά. διὸ καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ υγεία μέγιστα δοκεῖ εἶναι· ἀπαντᾷ γὰρ ἔχει 38 ταῦτα. καὶ τὸ ἀλυπότερον καὶ τὸ μεθ’ ἡδονῆς· πλείω γὰρ ἐνός, ὥστε υπάρχει καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄγαθον καὶ ἡ ἀλυπία. καὶ δυσὶν ὁ τῷ αὐτῷ προστιθέ- 40 μενον μεῖζον τὸ ὁλον ποιεῖ. καὶ ἢ μὴ λανθάνει παρόντα ἡ [ἄ] λανθάνει· πρὸς ἀληθείαν γὰρ τείνει ταῦτα. διὸ τὸ πλούτειν φανείη ἂν μεῖζον ἄγαθον

a Or, reading καὶ ἀπλᾶσ: “that which is useful both to the individual and absolutely is a greater good” (than that which is only useful in one way), but this necessitates a considerable ellipse.

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solutely; that which is possible to that which is
impossible; for it is the possible that is useful to us,
not the impossible. And those things which are at
the end of life; for things near the end are more
like ends.
And real things are preferable to those that have
reference to public opinion, the latter being defined
as those which a man would not choose if they were
likely to remain unnoticed by others. It would seem
then that it is better to receive than to confer a
benefit; for one would choose the former even if it
should pass unnoticed, whereas one would not choose
to confer a benefit, if it were likely to remain un-
known. Those things also are to be preferred, which
men would rather possess in reality than in appear-
ance, because they are nearer the truth; wherefore
it is commonly said that justice is a thing of little
importance, because people prefer to appear just
than to be just; and this is not the case, for instance,
in regard to health. The same may be said of things
that serve several ends; for instance, those that
assist us to live, to live well, to enjoy life, and to do
noble actions; wherefore health and wealth seem to
be the greatest goods, for they include all these
advantages. And that which is more free from pain
and accompanied by pleasure is a greater good; for
there is more than one good, since pleasure and free-
dom from pain combined are both goods. And of
two goods the greater is that which, added to one
and the same, makes the whole greater. And those
things, the presence of which does not escape notice,
are preferable to those which pass unnoticed, because
they appear more real; whence being wealthy would
appear to be a greater good than the appearance of
41 τοῦ δοκεῖν. καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητὸν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μόνον τοῖς δὲ μετ’ ἀλλων. διό καὶ οὐκ ἦση ξημία, ἂν τις τὸν ἐτερόθθαλμον τυφλώσῃ καὶ τὸν δὴ ἔχοντα· ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἀφήρηται.

8. Ἕκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰς πίστεις φέρειν ἐν τῷ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν, σχέδον εἰρήται. μέγιστον δὲ καὶ κυριώτατον ἀπάντων πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι πείθειν καὶ καλῶς συμβουλεύειν, τὰς πολιτείας ἀπάσας λαβεῖν καὶ τὰ ἐκάστης ἔθη καὶ 2 νόμιμα καὶ συμβέροντα διελεῖν. πείθονται γὰρ ἀπαντεῖ τῷ συμβέροντι, συμβέρει δὲ τὸ σῶζον τὴν πολιτείαν. ἐτι δὲ κυρία μὲν ἔστιν ἡ τοῦ κυρίου ἀπόφασις, τα δὲ κύρια διήρηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας. οὐσι γὰρ αἱ πολιτείαι, τοσαύτα καὶ τὰ κύρια ἔστιν.

3 Εἰςὶ δὲ πολιτείας τέτταρες, δημοκρατία ὄλγαρχία ἀριστοκρατία μοναρχία. ὡστε τὸ μὲν κύριον καὶ τὸ κρῖτον τοῦτων τι ἄστιν ἀεὶ μόριον, η ὀλον 4 τοῦτων. ἔστι δὲ δημοκρατία μὲν πολιτεία ἐν ἡ κλήρῳ διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς, ὄλγαρχία δὲ ἐν ἡ οί ἀπὸ τμημάτων, ἀριστοκρατία δὲ ἐν ἡ οί κατὰ παιδείαν. παιδείαν δὲ λέγω τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου κειμένην, οἱ γὰρ ἐμμεμενηκότες ἐν τοῖς νομίμως ἐν τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ἀρχουσιν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους

1 The ordinary ms. reading is ἀπόφασις, but this word appears most commonly to mean “negation” (from ἀπόφημι) in Aristotle, as opposed to “affirmation” (from κατάφημι). ἀπόφασις is from ἀπόφαινον.

It is difficult to see the connexion here. Munro’s suggestion, τῷ δοκεῖν for τοῦ δοκεῖν, adopted by Roemer, would mean “by the show of it,” that is, by its attracting notice.

Or, “is not punished equally.”

The pronouncements of the supreme authority are them-
it. And that which is held most dear, sometimes alone, sometimes accompanied by other things, is a greater good. Wherefore he who puts out the eye of a one-eyed man and he who puts out one eye of another who has two, does not do equal injury; for in the former case, a man has been deprived of that which he held most dear.

8. These are nearly all the topics from which arguments may be drawn in persuading and dissuading; but the most important and effective of all the means of persuasion and good counsel is to know all the forms of government and to distinguish the manners and customs, institutions, and interests of each; for all men are guided by considerations of expediency, and that which preserves the State is expedient. Further, the declaration of the authority is authoritative, and the different kinds of authority are distinguished according to forms of government; in fact, there are as many authorities as there are forms of government.

Now, there are four kinds of government, democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, so that the supreme and deciding authority is always a part or the whole of these. Democracy is a form of government in which the offices are distributed by the people among themselves by lot; in an oligarchy, by those who possess a certain property-qualification; in an aristocracy, by those who possess an educational qualification, meaning an education that is laid down by the law. In fact, in an aristocracy, power and office are in the hands of those who have remained faithful to what the law prescribes, and selves authoritative as laying down laws and regulations for the citizens.
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φαίνεσθαι ἀρίστους· οθὲν καὶ τούνομα εἶληφε τοῦτο.  

1366 a μοναρχία ὁ ἐστὶ κατὰ τούνομα ἐν ἢ εἰς ἀπάντως  

κυρίος ἐστιν· τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν κατὰ τάξιν τινὰ  

βασιλεία, ἢ δ' ἀόριστος τυραννὶς.

5 Τὸ δὴ τέλος ἐκάστης πολιτείας οὐ δεὶ λανθάνειν·  

αἱροῦνται γὰρ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ἐστὶ δὲ δημο-  

κρατίας μὲν τέλος ἐλευθερία, ὀλυγαρχίας δὲ πλούτος,  

ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ τὰ πρὸς παιδείαν καὶ τὰ νόμιμα,  

tυραννίδος δὲ φυλακὴ.  δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὰ πρὸς τὸ  

tέλος ἐκάστης ἑθη καὶ νόμιμα καὶ συμφέροντα  

dιαιρετέον, εἴπερ αἱροῦνται πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπανα-  

6 φέροντες. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον αἱ πίστεις γίνονται δι'  

ἀποδεικτικοῦ λόγου ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἡθικοῦ (τῷ γὰρ  

ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα πιστεύομεν, τοῦτο  

δ' ἐστὶν ἂν ἀγαθὸς φαίνηται ἡ εὐνοὺς ἡ ἀμφω),  

δεόι ἂν τὰ ἡθη τῶν πολιτείων ἐκάστης ἑχειν ἡμᾶς·  

tὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκάστης ἡθος πιθανότατον ἀνάγκη  

πρὸς ἐκάστην εἶναι. ταῦτα δὲ ληφθησται διὰ  

tῶν αὐτῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡθη φανερὰ κατὰ τὴν  

προσαίρεσιν, ἢ δὲ προσαίρεσις ἀναφέρεται πρὸς τὸ  

tέλος.

7 Οὐν μὲν οὖν δεὶ ὀρέγεσθαι προτρέποντας ὡς ἐσο-  

μένων ἡ ὀντών, καὶ ἐκ τίνων δεὶ τὰς περὶ τοῦ  

συμφέροντος πίστεις λαμβάνειν, ἐτι δὲ περὶ τῶν  

περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἡθῶν καὶ νομίμων διὰ τίνων τε  

καὶ πῶς εὐπορῆσομεν, ἐφ' ὃςον ἢν τῷ παρόντε  

καιρῷ σύμμετρον, εὑρηται· διηκρίβωται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς  

πολιτικοῖς περὶ τούτων.

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a The "end" of monarchy is wanting here.

b iii. 7-18, iv.
RHETORIC, I. viii. 4-7

who must of necessity appear best, whence this form of government has taken its name. In a monarchy, as its name indicates, one man alone is supreme over all; if it is subject to certain regulations, it is called a kingdom; if it is unlimited, a tyranny.

Nor should the end of each form of government be neglected, for men choose the things which have reference to the end. Now, the end of democracy is liberty, of oligarchy wealth, of aristocracy things relating to education and what the law prescribes, . . ., of tyranny self-protection. It is clear then that we must distinguish the manners and customs, institutions, and interests of each form of government, since it is in reference to this that men make their choice. But as proofs are established not only by demonstrative, but also by ethical argument—since we have confidence in an orator who exhibits certain qualities, such as goodness, goodwill, or both—it follows that we ought to be acquainted with the characters of each form of government; for, in reference to each, the character most likely to persuade must be that which is characteristic of it. These characters will be understood by the same means; for characters reveal themselves in accordance with moral purpose, and moral purpose has reference to the end.

We have now stated what things, whether future or present, should be the aim of those who recommend a certain course; from what topics they should derive their proofs of expediency; further, the ways and means of being well equipped for dealing with the characters and institutions of each form of government, so far as was within the scope of the present occasion; for the subject has been discussed in detail in the Politics.
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9. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λέγωμεν περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ· οὗτοι γὰρ σκοτοῦ τῷ ἐπαινοῦντι καὶ ψέγοντι· συμβηκεται γὰρ ἀμα περὶ τούτων λέγοντας κάκεινα δηλοῦν ἢ τὸ ποιοὶ τινες ὑποληφθήσομεθα κατὰ τὸ ἴθος, ἦπερ ἢν δευτέρα πίστις· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἦμας τε καὶ ἀλλον ἀξιόπιστον δυνησόμεθα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀρετῆν. 2 ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβαίνει καὶ χωρίς σπουδῆς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐπαινεῖν πολλάκις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον ἢ θεῶν ἄλλα καὶ ἄμυχα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τὸ τυχόν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ περὶ τούτων ἤπτεόν τὰς προτάσεις, ὡστε ὁσον παραδείγματος χάριν εἴπομεν καὶ περὶ τούτων.

3. Καλὸν μὲν όν ἐστὶν, ὥς ἀν δι’ αὐτὸ αἵρετον ὑπὸ ἐπαινετὸν ἢ, ἢ ὁ ἄν ἀγαθὸν ὑπὸ ἤδυ ἢ, ὡς ἀγαθὸν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἔστι τὸ καλὸν, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀρετῆν 4 καλὸν εἶναι· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ὑπὸ ἐπαινετὸν ἐστὶν. ἀρετὴ δ’ ἔστι μὲν δύναμις, ὡς δοκεῖ, ποριστική ἀγαθῶν καὶ φυλακτική, καὶ δύναμις ἐυρεγετική πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, καὶ πάντων περὶ πάντα. μέρη δὲ ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, ἔλευθεριότης, πραότης, φρό- 6 νησίς, σοφία. ἀνάγκη δὲ μεγίστας εἶναι ἀρετὰς τὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις χρησιμωτάτας, ἐπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις ἐυρεγετική. διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δικαίους καὶ ἀνδρείους μάλιστα τιμῶσιν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πολέμῳ ἢ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ χρῆσιμοι ἄλλοι. εἶτα ἡ ἔλευθεριότης· προένται γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἀνταγωνίζονται περὶ τῶν χρημάτων, ὡς μάλιστα ἐφέσται ἄλλοι. 7 ἐστὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ δι’ ἦν τὰ αὐτῶν

" Or, “a faculty of doing many and great benefits to all men in all cases” (Jebb).
RHETORIC, I. ix. 1-7

9. We will next speak of virtue and vice, of the noble and the disgraceful, since they constitute the aim of one who praises and of one who blames; for, when speaking of these, we shall incidentally bring to light the means of making us appear of such and such a character, which, as we have said, is a second method of proof; for it is by the same means that we shall be able to inspire confidence in ourselves or others in regard to virtue. But since it happens that men, seriously or not, often praise not only a man or a god but even inanimate things or any ordinary animal, we ought in the same way to make ourselves familiar with the propositions relating to these subjects. Let us, then, discuss these matters also, so far as may serve for illustration.

The noble, then, is that which, being desirable in itself, is at the same time worthy of praise, or which, being good, is pleasant because it is good. If this is the noble, then virtue must of necessity be noble, for, being good, it is worthy of praise. Virtue, it would seem, is a faculty of providing and preserving good things, a faculty productive of many and great benefits, in fact, of all things in all cases. The components of virtue are justice, courage, self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, practical and speculative wisdom. The greatest virtues are necessarily those which are most useful to others, if virtue is the faculty of conferring benefits. For this reason justice and courage are the most esteemed, the latter being useful to others in war, the former in peace as well. Next is liberality, for the liberal spend freely and do not dispute the possession of wealth, which is the chief object of other men's desire. Justice is a virtue which assigns
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ἐκαστοι ἔχουσι, καὶ ως ὁ νόμος, ἀδικία δὲ δι᾽ ἡν 8 τὰ ἄλλοτρα, οὐχ ὃς ὁ νόμος. ἀνδρία δὲ δι᾽ ἡν πρακτικοί εἰσι τῶν καλῶν ἑργῶν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, καὶ ὃς ὁ νόμος κελεύει, καὶ ὑπηρετικοί τῶν νόμων. 9 δειλία δὲ τουλαντίων. σωφροσύνη δὲ ἀρετὴ δι᾽ ἡν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς τοῦ σώματος οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὃς ὁ νόμος κελεύει: ἀκολογία δὲ τουλαντίων.
10 ἐλευθεριότης δὲ περὶ χρήματα εὖ ποιητικὴ, ἀν-
11 ελευθερία δὲ τουλαντίων. μεγαλοψυχία δὲ ἀρετὴ 
12 τουλαντίων. μεγαλοπρέπεια δὲ ἀρετὴ ἐν δαπανή-
13 μασι μεγέθους ποιητική, μικροψυχία δὲ καὶ μικρο-
14 πρέπεια τάναντια. φρόνησις δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοιας, 
καθ᾽ ἂν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἁγαθῶν καὶ 
κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονιαν.
15 Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἁρετῆς καὶ κακίας καθόλου καὶ 
περὶ τῶν μορίων εἰρηται κατὰ τῶν ἐνεστῶτα καὶ-
ρόν ἰκανῶς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ χαλεπῶν ἵδειν-
φανερὸν γὰρ ὃτι ἀνάγκη τὰ τε ποιητικὰ τῆς ἁρετῆς 
eἶναι καλὰ (πρὸς ἁρετὴν γάρ) καὶ τὰ ἀπ᾽ ἁρετῆς 
γνώμενα, τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ τε σημεῖα τῆς ἁρετῆς καὶ 
τὰ ἔργα. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὰ 
ἔστιν ἁγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ πάθη καλὰ, ἀνάγκη ὅσα τε 
ἀνδρίας ἔργα ἢ σημεῖα ἁνδρίας ἢ ἀνδρείως πέπρα-
κται καλὰ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ δικαίως ἔργα 
(πάθη δὲ οὐ ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ταύτῃ τῶν ἁρετῶν οὐκ ἂν 
ἀεὶ τὸ δικαίως καλόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔμμονόθεν 
αισχρὸν τὸ δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἁδίκως), καὶ κατὰ

a Or, taking eis eudaimonian with boulousethai, “come to a wise decision conducive to their happiness.”
to each man his due in conformity with the law; injustice claims what belongs to others, in opposition to the law. Courage makes men perform noble acts in the midst of dangers according to the dictates of the law and in submission to it; the contrary is cowardice. Self-control is a virtue which disposes men in regard to the pleasures of the body as the law prescribes; the contrary is licentiousness. Liberality does good in many matters; the contrary is avarice. Magnanimity is a virtue productive of great benefits; the contrary is little-mindedness. Magnificence is a virtue which produces greatness in matters of expenditure; the contraries are little-mindedness and meanness. Practical wisdom is a virtue of reason, which enables men to come to a wise decision in regard to good and evil things, which have been mentioned as connected with happiness.

Concerning virtue and vice in general and their separate parts, enough has been said for the moment. To discern the rest presents no difficulty; for it is evident that whatever produces virtue, as it tends to it, must be noble, and so also must be what comes from virtue; for such are its signs and works. But since the signs of virtue and such things as are the works and sufferings of a good man are noble, it necessarily follows that all the works and signs of courage and all courageous acts are also noble. The same may be said of just things and of just actions; (but not of what one suffers justly; for in this alone amongst the virtues that which is justly done is not always noble, and a just punishment is more disgraceful than an unjust punishment). The same applies

\[b\ i.e.\ the\ causes\ and\ results\ of\ virtue\ (Cope);\ or,\ the\ noble\ and\ the\ disgraceful\ (Jebb).\]
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

16 τὰς ἄλλας δὲ ἀρετὰς ὁσαύτως. καὶ ἐφ’ ὅσοις τὰ ἄθλα τιμῇ, καλά. καὶ ἐφ’ ὅσοις τιμῇ μᾶλλον ἡ χρήματα. καὶ ὅσα μὴ αὐτῶν ἐνεκά πράττει τις
tων αἱρετῶν. καὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά, ὅσα ὑπὲρ
tῆς πατρίδος τις ἐποίησε, παριδῶν τὸ αὐτοῦ. καὶ
tὰ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθά: καὶ ἃ μὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθά: αὐτοῦ
1367α γὰρ ἐνεκα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

18 Καὶ ὅσα τεθνεῶτι ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἡ
ζωτι. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐνεκά μᾶλλον ἔχει τὰ ζωτι.
19 καὶ ὅσα ἔργα τῶν ἄλλων ἐνεκα· ἦττον γὰρ αὐτῶν.
καὶ ὅσαι εὑπραγίαι περὶ ἄλλους, ἄλλα μὴ περὶ
αὐτόν. καὶ περὶ τοὺς εὐ ποιήσαντας. δικαίουν γάρ.
20 καὶ τὰ ἐνεργετήματα· οὐ γὰρ εἰς αὐτόν. καὶ τὰ
ἐναντία η ἐφ’ οἷς αἰσχύνονται· τὰ γὰρ αἰσχρὰ αἰ-
σχύνονται καὶ λέγοντες καὶ ποιοῦντες καὶ μέλλοντες
ὡσπερ καὶ Σαπφὼ πεποίηκεν, εἰπόντος τοῦ
Ἀλκαῖου

θέλω τι θείπην, ἄλλα με κωλυει
αἰδός,
αἱ δ’ εἴχες ἐσθλῶν ἡμερον ἡ καλῶν
καὶ μὴ τι θείπην γλῶσσο’ ἐκύκα κακὸν,
αἰδός κεν οὐκί σ’ εἴχεν ὁμματ’,
ἄλλ’ ἔλεγες περὶ τῶν δικαίων.

21 Καὶ περὶ δὲν ἀγωνιῶσι μὴ φοβοῦμενοι· περὶ γὰρ
tῶν πρὸς δόξαιν φερόντων ἀγαθῶν τούτο πάσχου-
22 σων. καὶ αἱ τῶν φύσει σπουδαιοτέρων ἀρεταὶ καλ-
23 λίους καὶ τὰ ἔργα, οἶδον ἀνδρὸς ἢ γυναικὸς. καὶ
αἱ ἀπολαυστικαὶ ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ἡ αὐτοῖς: διὸ τὸ

a Frag. 55 (P.L.G. iii.).  
b Frag. 28 (P.L.G. iii.).

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equally to the other virtues. Those things of which the reward is honour are noble; also those which are done for honour rather than money. Also, those desirable things which a man does not do for his own sake; things which are absolutely good, which a man has done for the sake of his country, while neglecting his own interests; things which are naturally good; and not such as are good for the individual, since such things are inspired by selfish motives.

And those things are noble which it is possible for a man to possess after death rather than during his lifetime, for the latter involve more selfishness; all acts done for the sake of others, for they are more disinterested; the successes gained, not for oneself, but for others; and for one's benefactors, for that is justice; in a word, all acts of kindness, for they are disinterested. And the contrary of those things of which we are ashamed; for we are ashamed of what is disgraceful, in words, acts, or intention; as, for instance, when Alcaeus said:

I would fain say something, but shame holds me back,\(^a\)  
Sappho rejoined:

Hadst thou desired what was good or noble, and had not thy tongue stirred up some evil to utter it, shame would not have filled thine eyes, but thou would'st have spoken of what is right.\(^b\)

Those things also are noble for which men anxiously strive, but without fear; for men are thus affected about goods which lead to good repute. Virtues and actions are nobler, when they proceed from those who are naturally worthier, for instance, from a man rather than from a woman. It is the same with those which are the cause of enjoyment to others
24 δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καλόν. καὶ τὸ τούς ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ καταλλάσσεσθαι. τὸ τε γὰρ ἀνταποδιδόναι δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον
25 καλόν, καὶ ἀνδρείου τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι. καὶ νίκη καὶ τυμὴ τῶν καλῶν· αἱρετὰ τε γὰρ ἀκαρπά ὄντα, καὶ ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετὴς δηλοῖ. καὶ τὰ μνημονευτά, καὶ
tὰ μᾶλλον μᾶλλον. καὶ ἀ μὴ ξύωντι ἔπεται. καὶ οἰς τυμῇ ἄκολουθεῖ. καὶ τὰ περιττά. καὶ τὰ μόνω
26 ὑπάρχοντα καλλίω· εὐμνημονευτότερα γὰρ. καὶ κτήματα ἀκαρπὰ· ἑλευθερώτερα γάρ. καὶ τὰ παρ᾽ ἐκάστοις δὲ ἰδιὰ καλά. καὶ ὅσα σημεῖα ἐστὶ τῶν
παρ᾽ ἐκάστοις ἐπανωμένων, οἶνον ἐν Λακεδαιμονί
cομᾶν καλόν· ἑλευθέρου γὰρ σημείων· οὐ γάρ ἔστι
27 κομὼντα φάντων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν ἔργον θητικόν. καὶ
tὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην· ἑλευθέ-
ρου γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν.
28 Ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ σύνεγγυς τοῖς ὑπάρχονσιν ὡς
tαυτὰ ὄντα καὶ πρὸς ἐπανων καὶ πρὸς ψόγον, οἶνον
tὸν εὐλαβὴ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον καὶ τὸν ἡλίθιον
29 χρηστὸν καὶ τὸν ἀνάλγητον πράον. καὶ ἐκαστὸν δὲ
ἐκ τῶν παρακολουθοῦντων ἄει κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον,
oiν τὸν ὑργίλων καὶ τὸν μανικὸν ἀπλοῦν καὶ τὸν
1367 β αὐθαίδη μεγαλοπρεπῆ καὶ σεμνόν. καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς
ὑπερβολαῖς ὡς ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὄντας, οἶνον τὸν
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RHETORIC, I. ix. 24–29

rather than to ourselves; this is why justice and that which is just are noble. To take vengeance on one's enemies is nobler than to come to terms with them; for to retaliate is just, and that which is just is noble; and further, a courageous man ought not to allow himself to be beaten. Victory and honour also are noble; for both are desirable even when they are fruitless, and are manifestations of superior virtue. And things worthy of remembrance, which are the more honourable the longer their memory lasts; those which follow us after death; those which are accompanied by honour; and those which are out of the common. Those which are only possessed by a single individual, because they are more worthy of remembrance. And possessions which bring no profit; for they are more gentlemanly. Customs that are peculiar to individual peoples and all the tokens of what is esteemed among them are noble; for instance, in Lacedaemon it is noble to wear one's hair long, for it is the mark of a gentleman, the performance of any servile task being difficult for one whose hair is long. And not carrying on any vulgar profession is noble, for a gentleman does not live in dependence on others.

We must also assume, for the purpose of praise or blame, that qualities which closely resemble the real qualities are identical with them; for instance, that the cautious man is cold and designing, the simpleton good-natured, and the emotionless gentle. And in each case we must adopt a term from qualities closely connected, always in the more favourable sense; for instance, the choleric and passionate man may be spoken of as frank and open, the arrogant as magnificent and dignified; those in excess as
Those whose qualities are extreme may be described as possessing the virtues of which these are the excess.

Thus, the Seythians may be assumed to be brave and great hunters; the Spartans hardy, courageous, and brief in speech; the Athenians fond of literature—and they should be praised accordingly.

That is, τὸ τίμιον looks as if it were really καλὸν, and should be spoken of as if it were so.
possessing the corresponding virtue, the fool-hardy as courageous, the recklessly extravagant as liberal. For most people will think so, and at the same time a fallacious argument may be drawn from the motive; for if a man risks his life when there is no necessity, much more will he be thought likely to do so when it is honourable; and if he is lavish to all comers, the more so will he be to his friends; for the height of virtue is to do good to all. We ought also to consider in whose presence we praise, for, as Socrates said, it is not difficult to praise Athenians among Athenians. We ought also to speak of what is esteemed among the particular audience, Scythians, Lacedaemonians, or philosophers, as actually existing there. And, generally speaking, that which is esteemed should be classed as noble, since there seems to be a close resemblance between the two. Again, all such actions as are in accord with what is fitting are noble; if, for instance, they are worthy of a man’s ancestors or of his own previous achievements; for to obtain additional honour is noble and conduces to happiness. Also, if the tendency of what is done is better and nobler, and goes beyond what is to be expected; for instance, if a man is moderate in good fortune and stout-hearted in adversity, or if, when he becomes greater, he is better and more forgiving. Such was the phrase of Iphicrates, “Look what I started from!” and of the Olympian victor:

Formerly, with a rough basket on my shoulders, I used to carry fish from Argos to Tegea.

and of Simonides:
32 Ἡ πατρὸς τε καὶ ἄνδρος ἀδελφῶν τ' οὕσα τυράννων.

33 Ἡ Ἔστι δ' ἐπαινώς λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς. 

34 μακαρισμὸς δὲ καὶ εὐδαιμονισμὸς αὐτοῖς μὲν ταύτα, 

35 Ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἰδός ὃ ἐπαινώς καὶ αἱ συμβουλαὶ.

1368 α οὖν ἔχομεν ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ποιῶν τινα εἶναι, 

a Archedice, daughter of Hippias, tyrant of Athens, and 

wife of Aeantides, son of Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus.
Since praise is founded on actions, and acting according to moral purpose is characteristic of the worthy man, we must endeavour to show that a man is acting in that manner, and it is useful that it should appear that he has done so on several occasions. For this reason also one must assume that accidents and strokes of good fortune are due to moral purpose; for if a number of similar examples can be adduced, they will be thought to be signs of virtue and moral purpose.

Now praise is language that sets forth greatness of virtue; hence it is necessary to show that a man's actions are virtuous. But encomium deals with achievements—all attendant circumstances, such as noble birth and education, merely conduce to persuasion; for it is probable that virtuous parents will have virtuous offspring and that a man will turn out as he has been brought up. Hence we pronounce an encomium upon those who have achieved something. Achievements, in fact, are signs of moral habit; for we should praise even a man who had not achieved anything, if we felt confident that he was likely to do so. Blessing and felicitation are identical with each other, but are not the same as praise and encomium, which, as virtue is contained in happiness, are contained in felicitation.

Praise and counsels have a common aspect; for what you might suggest in counselling becomes encomium by a change in the phrase. Accordingly, when we know what we ought to do and the qualities we ought to possess, we ought to make a change in the phrase and turn it, employing this knowledge as a suggestion. For instance, the statement that "one ought not to pride oneself on goods which are
οὖν λεχθέν ὑποθήκην δύναται, ὥδε δ’ ἐπαίνον "μέγα φρονῶν οὔ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρχουσιν ἄλλα τοῖς δι’ αὐτόν." ὥστε ὅταν ἐπανεῖν βούλη, ὥρα τί ἂν ὑπόθοιο, καὶ ὅταν ὑποθέσθαι, ὥρα τί ἂν ἐπαι-
37 νέσειας. ἡ δὲ λέξις ἔσται ἀντικειμένη ἔξ ἂνἀγκης, ὅταν τὸ μὲν κωλὺν τὸ δὲ μῆ κωλὺν μετατεθῇ.
38 Χριστέων δὲ καὶ τῶν αὐξητικῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον εἰ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μετ’ ὀλίγων ἢ καὶ [δ] μάλιστα πεποίηκεν. ἀπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα καλά. καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν· ταῦτα δὲ παρὰ τὸ προσήκον. καὶ εἰ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ κατώρθωκεν· ἡμέρα γὰρ, καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἄλλα δι’ αὐτὸν ἄν δόξειν. καὶ εἰ τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ τιμῶντα διὰ τοῦτον εὐρηται καὶ κατεσκευάσθη. καὶ εἰς ὅν πρῶτον ἐγκώμιον ἐποιήθη, οἷον εἰς Ἰππόλοχον, καὶ Ἀρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριστογέιτονα τὸ ἐν ἀγορᾷ σταθήναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἑναντίων. καὶ μὴ καθ’ αὐτὸν εὐπορήσας, πρὸς ἄλλους ἀντιπαραβάλλειν· ὀπερ Ἰσοκράτης ἐποίει διὰ τὴν ἀσυνήθειαν τοῦ δικολογεῖν. δεὶ δὲ πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν. αὐξη-
39 τικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλόν, εἰ σπουδαίων βελτίων. πίπτει δ’ εὐλόγως ἡ αὐξήσις εἰς τοὺς ἐπαίνους. ἐν ὑπερ-

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a In the first sentence, the statement is imperative; in the second, it is a simple affirmative, implying praise. In the one case there is forbidding, in the other not-forbidding, which are opposites.
b Nothing more is known of him.
c Who slew Hipparchus, tyrant of Athens.
d Reading ἀσυνήθειαν. He had no legal practice, which would have shown the irrelevancy of comparisons in a law court, whereas in epideictic speeches they are useful. ἀσυνήθειαν gives exactly the opposite sense, and must refer to his having written speeches for others to deliver in the courts.
due to fortune, but on those which are due to oneself alone," when expressed in this way, has the force of a suggestion; but expressed thus, "he was proud, not of goods which were due to fortune, but of those which were due to himself alone," it becomes praise. Accordingly, if you desire to praise, look what you would suggest; if you desire to suggest, look what you would praise. The form of the expression will necessarily be opposite, when the prohibitive has been changed into the non-prohibitive.\(^a\)

We must also employ many of the means of amplification; for instance, if a man has done anything alone, or first, or with a few, or has been chiefly responsible for it; all these circumstances render an action noble. Similarly, topics derived from times and seasons, that is to say, if our expectation is surpassed. Also, if a man has often been successful in the same thing; for this is of importance and would appear to be due to the man himself, and not to be the result of chance. And if it is for his sake that distinctions which are an encouragement or honour have been invented and established; and if he was the first on whom an encomium was pronounced, as Hippolochus,\(^b\) or to whom a statue was set up in the market-place, as to Harmodius and Aristogiton.\(^c\) And similarly in opposite cases. If he does not furnish you with enough material in himself, you must compare him with others, as Isocrates used to do, because of his inexperience\(^d\) of forensic speaking. And you must compare him with illustrious personages, for it affords ground for amplification and is noble, if he can be proved better than men of worth. Amplification is with good reason ranked as one of the forms of praise, since it
οχή γάρ ἐστιν, ἢ δ' ὑπεροχὴ τῶν καλῶν. διὸ κἂν μὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐνδόξους, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους δεὶ παραβάλλειν, ἐπείπερ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ δοκεῖ μηνύειν 40 ἀρετήν. ὅλως δὲ τῶν κοινῶν εἰδῶν ἀπασὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἡ μὲν αὐξήσις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς. τὰς γὰρ πράξεις ὁμολογουμένας λαμβάνουσιν, ὥστε λοιπὸν μέγεθος περιθέναι καὶ κάλλος· τὰ δὲ παραδείγματα τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα καταμαντεύομενοι κρίνομεν· τὰ δὲ ἐνθυμήματα τοῖς δικαιοκοῦσι· αἰτίᾶν γὰρ καὶ ἀπόδειξιν μάλιστα δέχεται τὸ γεγονὸς διὰ τὸ 41 ἀσαφές. ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν οἱ ἔπαινοι καὶ οἱ ψόγοι λέγονται σχέδον πάντες, καὶ πρὸς ποία δεὶ βλέπον- τας ἐπαίνειν καὶ ἑγείρειν, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ ἐγκώμια γίγνεται καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη, ταῦτ' ἐστίν· ἔχομένων γὰρ τούτων τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις φανερά· ὁ γὰρ ψόγος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν.

1368 b 10. Περὶ δὲ κατηγορίας καὶ ἀπολογίας, ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποῖων ποιεῖσθαι δεὶ τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς, 2 ἐχόμενον ἂν εὖ λέγειν. δεὶ δὴ λαβεῖν τρία, ἐν μὲν τίνων καὶ πόσων ἔνεκα ἀδικοῦσι, δεύτερον δὲ πῶς αὐτοὶ διακείμενοι, τρίτον δὲ τοὺς ποίους καὶ 3 πῶς ἔχοντας. διορισάμενοι οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖν λέγομεν ἐξῆς.

"Εστώ δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα παρὰ τὸν νόμον. νόμος δ' ἐστίν ὁ μὲν ἰδιος ὁ δὲ κοινός. λέγω δὲ ἰδιον μὲν καθ' ὅν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται,
consists in superiority, and superiority is one of the things that are noble. That is why, if you cannot compare him with illustrious personages, you must compare him with ordinary persons, since superiority is thought to indicate virtue. Speaking generally, of the topics common to all rhetorical arguments, amplification is most suitable for epideictic speakers, whose subject is actions which are not disputed, so that all that remains to be done is to attribute beauty and importance to them. Examples are most suitable for deliberative speakers, for it is by examination of the past that we divine and judge the future. Enthymemes are most suitable for forensic speakers, because the past, by reason of its obscurity, above all lends itself to the investigation of causes and to demonstrative proof. Such are nearly all the materials of praise or blame, the things which those who praise or blame should keep in view, and the sources of encomia and invective; for when these are known their contraries are obvious, since blame is derived from the contrary things.

10. We have next to speak of the number and quality of the propositions of which those syllogisms are constructed which have for their object accusation and defence. Three things have to be considered; first, the nature and the number of the motives which lead men to act unjustly; secondly, what is the state of mind of those who so act; thirdly, the character and dispositions of those who are exposed to injustice. We will discuss these questions in order, after we have first defined acting unjustly.

Let injustice, then, be defined as voluntarily causing injury contrary to the law. Now, the law is particular or general. By particular, I mean the
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κοινὸν δὲ ὅσα ἄγραφα παρὰ πᾶσιν ὀμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ. ἐκόντες δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅσα εἴδότες καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι. ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐκόντες, οὐ πάντα προαιρούμενοι, ὅσα δὲ προαιρούμενοι, εἴδότες 4 ἀπαντᾷ οὖν γὰρ ὁ προαιρεῖται ἄγνοει. δι' ὃ δὲ προαιροῦνται βλάπτειν καὶ φαῦλα ποιεῖν παρὰ τῶν νόμων, κακία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκρασία· ἐὰν γάρ τινες ἐχωσὶν μοχθηρίαν ἢ μίαν ἢ πλείους, περὶ δὲ τούτο ὁ μοχθηρὸς τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, καὶ ἀδικοὶ εἰσών, οίον ὁ μὲν ἀνελεύθερος περὶ χρήματα, ὁ δ' ἀκόλουθος περὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἱδωνάς, ὁ δὲ μαλακὸς περὶ τὰ ῥάθυμα, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς περὶ τοὺς κυνύνους (τοὺς γὰρ συγκινδυνεύοντας ἐγκαταλμπάνουσι διὰ τὸν φόβον), ὁ δὲ φιλότιμος διὰ τιμήν, ὁ δ' ἄξιοθυμος δι' ὀργήν, ὁ δὲ φιλόνικος διὰ νίκην, ὁ δὲ πικρός διὰ τιμωρίαν, ὁ δ' ἀφρῶν διὰ τὸ ἀπατάσθαι περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἀδικοῦν, ὁ δ' ἀναισχύνοτος δι' ὀλιγωρίαν δόξης. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκαστος περὶ ἔκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων.

5 Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων δήλον, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰρημένων, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη ῥηθησομένων· λοιπὸν δ' εἰπεῖν τίνος ἐνεκα 6 καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι, καὶ τίνας. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν διελώμεθα τῶν ὁρεγόμενοι καὶ ποῖα φεύγοντες ἐγχειροῦσιν ἀδικεῖν· δήλον γὰρ ὡς τῶ μὲν

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"προαιρέσεις (premeditation, deliberate or moral choice) is always voluntary, but all voluntary action is not premeditated; we sometimes act on the spur of the moment. Choice is a voluntary act, the result of deliberate counsel, including the use of reason and knowledge. In the Ethics (iii. 3. 19) Aristotle defines προαιρέσεις as "a deliberate appeti-
written law in accordance with which a state is administered; by general, the unwritten regulations which appear to be universally recognized. Men act voluntarily when they know what they do, and do not act under compulsion. What is done voluntarily is not always done with premeditation; but what is done with premeditation is always known to the agent, for no one is ignorant of what he does with a purpose. The motives which lead men to do injury and commit wrong actions are depravity and incontinence. For if men have one or more vices, it is in that which makes him vicious that he shows himself unjust; for example, the illiberal in regard to money, the licentious in regard to bodily pleasures, the effeminate in regard to what makes for ease, the coward in regard to dangers, for fright makes him desert his comrades in peril; the ambitious in his desire for honour, the irascible owing to anger, one who is eager to conquer in his desire for victory, the rancorous in his desire for vengeance; the foolish man from having mistaken ideas of right and wrong, the shameless from his contempt for the opinion of others. Similarly, each of the rest of mankind is unjust in regard to his special weakness.

This will be perfectly clear, partly from what has already been said about the virtues, and partly from what will be said about the emotions. It remains to state the motives and character of those who do wrong and of those who suffer from it. First, then, let us decide what those who set about doing wrong long for or avoid; for it is evident that the accusation of (longing for, ὤπεξίς) things in our power," as to which we should necessarily be well-informed.

Or, "in the matter of ease," taking τὰ ὀνάθυμα as = ὀπάθυμα.
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κατηγοροῦντι πόσα καὶ ποία τούτων ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ σκεπτέον, τῷ δ’ ἀπολογουμένῳ ποίᾳ καὶ ἑπταντεῖ τὰ μὲν οὐ δ’ αὐτοὺς τὰ δὲ δι’ αὐτοὺς. τῶν μὲν οὖν μὴ δι’ αὐτοὺς τὰ μὲν διὰ τύχην πράττουσι τὰ δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τῶν δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μὲν βίᾳ τὰ δὲ φύσει. ὡστε πάντα ὁσα μὴ δι’ αὐτοὺς πράττουσι, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης τὰ δὲ φύσει τὰ δὲ βία. ὁσα δὲ δι’ αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἰν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ μὲν δι’ ἔθος τὰ δὲ δι’ ὀρέξιν, καὶ τὰ μὲν διὰ λογι-
8 στικὴν ὀρέξιν τὰ δὲ δι’ ἀλόγιστον. ἐστὶ δ’ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέξιν (οὔτεις γὰρ βούλεται ἄλλ’ ἡ ὦταν οὐθῇ εἰναι ἁγαθὸν), ἀλογοὶ δ’ ὀρέξεις ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ὡστε πάντα ὁσα πράττουσιν ἀνάγκη πράττεω δι’ αἰτίας ἐπτά, διὰ τύχην, διὰ φύσιν, διὰ βίαν, δι’ ἔθος, διὰ λογισμὸν, διὰ θυμὸν, δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν.

9 Τὸ δὲ προσδιορίσθαι καθ’ ἥλυκιας ἥ ἐξεις ἡ ἄλλ’ ἀττα τὰ πράττομενα περίεργον. εἰ γὰρ συμ-
βέβηκε τοῖς νέοις ὀργίλοις εἰναὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμητικοῖς, οὐ διὰ τὴν νεότητα πράττουσι τὰ τοιάδα ἄλλα δι’ ὀργὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. οὔτε διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν, ἄλλα συμβέβηκε τοῖς μὲν πένησι διὰ τὴν ἑνδειαν ἐπιθυμεῖν χρημάτων, τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν. ἄλλα πράξουσι καὶ οὕτω οὐ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν ἄλλα διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ ἅδικοι, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ λεγό-

a In the cases of the young, the poor, and the rich, their youth etc. are only "accidents," accidental not real causes. Aristotle defines ὁ συμβεβηκός (Metaphysics, iv. 30) as "that which is inherent in something, and may be predicated of it as true, but neither necessarily, nor in most cases; for instance, if a man, when digging a hole for a plant, finds a
must examine the number and nature of the motives which are to be found in his opponent; the defendant, which of them are not to be found in him. Now, all human actions are either the result of man’s efforts or not. Of the latter some are due to chance, others to necessity. Of those due to necessity, some are to be attributed to compulsion, others to nature, so that the things which men do not do of themselves are all the result of chance, nature, or compulsion. As for those which they do of themselves and of which they are the cause, some are the result of habit, others of longing, and of the latter some are due to rational, others to irrational longing. Now wish is a [rational] longing for good, for no one wishes for anything unless he thinks it is good; irrational longings are anger and desire. Thus all the actions of men must necessarily be referred to seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reason, anger, and desire.

But it is superfluous to establish further distinctions of men’s acts based upon age, moral habits, or anything else. For if the young happen to be irascible, or passionately desire anything, it is not because of their youth that they act accordingly, but because of anger and desire. Nor is it because of wealth or poverty; but the poor happen to desire wealth because of their lack of it, and the rich desire unnecessary pleasures because they are able to procure them. Yet in their case too it will not be wealth or poverty, but desire, that will be the mainspring of their action. Similarly, the just and the unjust, and all the others who are said to act in accordance with
treasure.” The colour of a man’s eyes is an “inseparable” accident, the fact that a man is a lawyer is a “separable” accident.
μενοι κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις πράττειν, διὰ ταύτα πράξουσιν.

10 ἡ γὰρ διὰ λογισμὸν ἡ διὰ πάθος· ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν δι’

ηθή καὶ πάθη χρηστά, οἱ δὲ διὰ τάναντια. συμβαίνει μέντοι ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἔξεσι τὰ τοιαύτα ἀκολουθεῖν, ταῖς δὲ τοιαύτῃ δὲ τοιάδε· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἵνα ποῦτον διὰ τὸ σῶφρον εἶναι δόξαι τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι χρησταὶ ἐπακολουθοῦσι περὶ τῶν ἠδέων, τῷ δ’ ἀκολάστῳ αἱ ἐναντίαι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων. διὸ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας διαιρέσεις ἐστεόν, σκεπτέον δὲ ποιὰ ποίοις εἰσόθεν ἐπεσθαί· εἰ μὲν γὰρ λευκὸς ἡ μέλας ἡ μέγας ἡ μικρός, οὐδὲν τέτακται τῶν τοιούτων ἀκολουθεῖν, εἰ δὲ νέος ἡ πρεσβύτης ἡ δίκαιος ἡ ἄδικος, ἡ δὴ διαφέρει. καὶ ὅλως ὅσα τῶν συμβαίνοντων ποιεῖ διαφέρειν τὰ ἡθη τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἶκον πλοῦτειν δοκῶν ἑαυτῷ ἡ πένεσθαι διοίσει τι, καὶ εὐσπευχὴν ἡ ἀτυχεῖν. ταύτα μὲν οὖν ὑστερον ἐρούμεν, νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιτωμεν πρῶτον.

12 Ὁ ἐστι γ’ ἀπὸ τῦχης μὲν τὰ τοιαύτα γυνώμενα, ὡσον ἢ τε αἰτία ἀόριστος καὶ μὴ ἔνεκά του γίγνεται καὶ μὴτε ἀεὶ μὴτε ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μὴτε τεταγμένως· δὴλον δ’ ἐκ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ τῆς τύχης περὶ τούτων. φύσει δὲ, ὡσων ἢ τ’ αἰτία ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ 13 τούτων. φύσει δὲ, ὡσων ἢ τ’ αἰτία ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ 1369 b τεταγμένη· ἡ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὕστατος ἀποβαίνει. τὰ γὰρ παρὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, πότερα κατὰ φύσιν τινὰ ἡ ἀλλην αἰτίαν γίγνεται· δόξει δ’ ἀν καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων. βία δέ, ὡσα παρ’ ἐπιθυμίαιν ἡ τοὺς λογι-
their moral habits, will act from the same causes, either from reason or emotion, but some from good characters and emotions, and others from the opposite. Not but that it does happen that such and such moral habits are followed by such and such consequences; for it may be that from the outset the fact of being temperate produces in the temperate man good opinions and desires in the matter of pleasant things, in the intemperate man the contrary. Therefore we must leave these distinctions on one side, but we must examine what are the usual consequences of certain conditions. For, if a man is fair or dark, tall or short, there is no rule that any such consequences should follow, but if he is young or old, just or unjust, it does make a difference. In a word, it will be necessary to take account of all the circumstances that make men’s characters different; for instance, if a man fancies himself rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate, it will make a difference. We will, however, discuss this later a; let us now speak of what remains to be said here.

Things which are the result of chance are all those of which the cause is indefinite, those which happen without any end in view, and that neither always, nor generally, nor regularly. The definition of chance will make this clear. Things which are the result of nature are all those of which the cause is in themselves and regular; for they turn out always, or generally, in the same way. As for those which happen contrary to nature there is no need to investigate minutely whether their occurrence is due to a certain force of nature or some other cause (it would seem, however, that such cases also are due to chance). Those things are the result of com-
σμοῦς γίγνεται δι' αὐτῶν τῶν πραττόντων. ἔθει
15 δὲ, ὦσα διὰ τὸ πολλάκις πεποιηκέναι ποιοῦσιν.
16 διὰ λογισμὸν δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα συμφέρειν ἐκ τῶν ἐιρημένων ἁγαθῶν ἢ ὡσ τέλος ἢ ὡσ πρὸς τὸ
tέλος, ὅταν διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν πράττηται ἕνα γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκόλαστοι συμφέροντα πράττουσιν, ἀλλ' ὅ
οὐ διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν ἀλλὰ δι’ ἡδονὴν. διὰ θυμὸν
17 δὲ καὶ ὄργῃ τὰ τιμωρητικά. διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία
καὶ κόλασις· ἢ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἢ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἵνα
18 ἀποπληρωθῇ. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἢ ὄργη, δῆλον ἐσται ἐν τοῖς περὶ παθῶν, δὴ ἐπιθυμίαι δὲ πράτ-
tεται ὦσα φαίνεται ἡδέα. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνηθες
καὶ τὸ ἔθιστον ἐν τοῖς ἡδέσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν
φύσει μὴ ἡδέων, ὅταν ἐθισθῶσιν, ἡδέως ποιοῦσιν.
"Ὡστε συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν, ὦσα δι’ αὐτοὺς πράτ-
tουσιν, ἀπαντ’ ἐστὶν ἢ ἁγαθὰ ἢ φαινόμενα ἁγαθὰ
ἡ ἡδέα ἢ φαινόμενα ἡδέα. ἐπεὶ δ’ ὦσα δι’ αὐτοὺς,
ἐκόντες πράττουσιν, οὐχ ἐκόντες δὲ ὦσα μὴ δι’
αὐτοὺς, πάντ’ ἂν εἴη, ὦσα ἐκόντες πράττουσιν, ἢ
ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινόμενα ἁγαθὰ ἢ ἡδέα ἢ φαινόμενα
ἡδέα· τίθημι γὰρ καὶ τὴν τῶν κακῶν ἢ φαινομένων
κακῶν ἢ ἀπαλλαγὴν ἢ ἀντὶ μείζωνος ἐλάττουνος μετά-
ληψιν ἐν τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς (αἱρέται γὰρ πωσ), καὶ τὴν
tῶν λυπηρῶν ἢ φαινομένων ἢ ἀπαλλαγὴν ἢ μετάληψιν
ἀντὶ μείζωνον ἐλαττῶν ἐν τοῖς ἡδέσιν ὦσαύτως.

a ii. 2.
pulsion which are done by the agents themselves in opposition to their desire or calculation. Things are the result of habit, when they are done because they have often been done. Things are the result of calculation which are done because, of the goods already mentioned, they appear to be expedient either as an end or means to an end, provided they are done by reason of their being expedient; for even the intemperate do certain things that are expedient, for the sake, not of expediency, but of pleasure. Passion and anger are the causes of acts of revenge. But there is a difference between revenge and punishment; the latter is inflicted in the interest of the sufferer, the former in the interest of him who inflicts it, that he may obtain satisfaction. We will define anger when we come to speak of the emotions. Desire is the cause of things being done that are apparently pleasant. The things which are familiar and to which we have become accustomed are among pleasant things; for men do with pleasure many things which are not naturally pleasant, when they have become accustomed to them.

In short, all things that men do of themselves either are, or seem, good or pleasant; and since men do voluntarily what they do of themselves, and involuntarily what they do not, it follows that all that men do voluntarily will be either that which is or seems good, or that which is or seems pleasant. For I reckon among good things the removal of that which is evil or seems evil, or the exchange of a greater evil for a less, because these two things are in a way desirable; in like manner, I reckon among pleasant things the removal of that which is or appears painful, and the exchange of a greater pain
ληπτέον ἀρα τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ ἴδεα, πόσα
19 καὶ ποια. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐν τοῖς
συμβουλευτικοῖς εἰρηται πρῶτον, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἴδεος
eἰπωμεν νῦν. δεὶ δὲ νομίζειν ἵκανούς εἰναίτους ὀροῦς,
ἐάν ὦσι περὶ ἐκάστου μήτε ἀσαφεῖς μήτε ἀκριβεῖς.

11. Ὑποκείσθω δ' ἦμιν εἰναι τὴν ἱδονὴν κίνησιν
τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν
εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τούμαντιών.
2 εἰ δ' ἔστιν ἱδονὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον, δήλον ὦτι καὶ ὢδύ
ἐστι τὸ ποιητικὸν τῆς εἰρημένης διαθέσεως, τὸ δὲ
φθαρτικὸν ἢ τῆς ἐναντίας καταστάσεως ποιητικὸν
3 λυπηρόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν ἢδυ εἰναι τὸ τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ
φύσιν ἦναι ως ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν
ἀπειληφώτα ἢ τὴν ἐαυτῶν φύσιν τὰ κατ' αὐτὴν
γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὰ ἐθη' καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰδομένου
ωσπερ πεθυμός ἦδη γίγνεται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τὸ
ἔθος τῇ φύσει· ἐγγὺς γὰρ καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τῶν ἀει,
ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ ἀει, τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολλά-
4 κις. καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαυν· παρὰ φύσιν γὰρ ἡ βία.
διὸ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον λυπηρόν, καὶ ὀρθῶς εἰρηται
πάν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πράγμα ἀνιαρὸν ἐφι.

τὰς δ' ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς στοινῶς καὶ τὰς συν-
τονίας λυπηρὰς· ἀναγκάτα γὰρ καὶ βίαια παθώτα,
ἐὰν μὴ ἐθισθώσων· οὕτω δὲ τὸ ἔθος ποιεῖ ἤδυ. τὰ
δ' ἐναντία ἴδεα· διὸ αἱ ῥαθυμαίαι καὶ αἱ ἀπονίαι
καὶ αἱ ἀμέλειαι καὶ αἱ παιδίαι καὶ αἱ ἀναπαύσεις
καὶ ὁ ὑπνος τῶν ἴδεων· οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην

a Cf. i. 6 above.
b The true nature of the "normal state" was lost during the period of disturbance and unsettlement.
c From Evenus of Paros (Frag. 8, P.L.G. ii.): see Introd.
d Or, "rest" (bodily).
for a less. We must therefore make ourselves acquainted with the number and quality of expedient and pleasant things. We have already spoken of the expedient when discussing deliberative rhetoric; let us now speak of the pleasant. And we must regard our definitions as sufficient in each case, provided they are neither obscure nor too precise.

11. Let it be assumed by us that pleasure is a certain movement of the soul, a sudden and perceptible settling down into its natural state, and pain the opposite. If such is the nature of pleasure, it is evident that that which produces the disposition we have just mentioned is pleasant, and that that which destroys it or produces the contrary settling down is painful. Necessarily, therefore, it must be generally pleasant to enter into a normal state (especially when what is done in accordance with that state has come into its own again); and the same with habits. For that which has become habitual becomes as it were natural; in fact, habit is something like nature, for the distance between "often" and "always" is not great, and nature belongs to the idea of "always," habit to that of "often." That which is not compulsory is also pleasant, for compulsion is contrary to nature. That is why what is necessary is painful, and it was rightly said,

For every act of necessity is disagreeable.

Application, study, and intense effort are also painful, for these involve necessity and compulsion, if they have not become habitual; for then habit makes them pleasant. Things contrary to these are pleasant; wherefore states of ease, idleness, carelessness, amusement, recreation, and sleep are among pleasant things, because none of these is in any way compulsory.
5 τούτων. καὶ οὔ ἂν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνή, ἀπαν ἡδὺ· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέως ἐστὶν ὑρεξῖς. Τῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν ἄλογοί εἰσιν αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου. λέγω δὲ ἄλογους μὲν, ὅσας μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν τι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ ποιοῦνται ὅσα εἶναι λέγονται φῦσει, ὦσπερ αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ὑπάρχουσαι, οἶον ἡ τροφής, δύση καὶ πείνα, καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον τροφῆς εἶδος ἐπιθυμία, καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ γενοτὰ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ὅλως τὰ ἀπτά, καὶ περὶ ὁμὴν καὶ ἀκοὴν καὶ ὑψίν. μετὰ λόγου δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ πεισθέντες.

6 Ἡπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἡδέσθαι ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι τινος πάθους, ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησις τις ἀσθενῆς, κἂν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ ἂν φαντασία τις οὔ μέμνηται ἡ ἐλπίζει. εἰ δὲ

1 Keeping Bekker’ s καῦ = καὶ év. Roemer reads κὰεὶ = καὶ ἀεὶ, Spengel ἀεὶ év.

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*a There is no consideration or “definite theory” (Jebb, Welldon) of the results that may follow. The desires arise without anything of the kind; they simply come.

*b The passage Ἡπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ . . . αἴσθησις has been punctuated in two ways. (1) With a full stop at ἐλπίζει (Roemer, Jebb). The conclusion then drawn is that memory and hope are accompanied by imagination of what is remembered or hoped. To this it is objected that what Aristotle really wants to prove is that memory and hope are a cause of pleasure. (2) With a comma at ἐλπίζει (Cope, Victorius). The steps in the argument will then be: if pleasure is the sensation of a certain emotion; if imagination is a weakened (faded) sensation; if one who remembers or hopes is attended by an imagination of what he remembers or hopes; then, this being so, pleasure will attend one who remembers or
Everything of which we have in us the desire is pleasant, for desire is a longing for the pleasant.

Now, of desires some are irrational, others rational. I call irrational all those that are not the result of any assumption. Such are all those which are called natural; for instance, those which come into existence through the body—such as the desire of food, thirst, hunger, the desire of such and such food in particular; the desires connected with taste, sexual pleasures, in a word, with touch, smell, hearing, and sight. I call those desires rational which are due to our being convinced; for there are many things which we desire to see or acquire when we have heard them spoken of and are convinced that they are pleasant.

And if pleasure consists in the sensation of a certain emotion, and imagination is a weakened sensation, then both the man who remembers and the man who hopes will be attended by an imagination of what he remembers or hopes. This being so, it is evident hopes, since there is sensation, and pleasure is sensation and a kind of movement (§ 1).

*φαντασία*, the faculty of forming mental images (variously translated “imagination,” “mental impression,” “fantasy”) is defined by Aristotle (*De Anima*, iii. 3. 11) as a kind of movement, which cannot arise apart from sensation, and the movement produced must resemble the sensation which produced it. But *φαντασία* is more than this; it is not merely a faculty of sense, but occupies a place midway between sense and intellect; while imagination has need of the senses, the intellect has need of imagination.

If *φαντασία* is referred to an earlier perception of which the sense image is a copy, this is memory. Imagination carries the sense images (*φαντάσματα*) to the seat of memory. They are then transformed into memory (of something past) or hope (of something future) and are handed on to the intellect. (See Cope here, and R. D. Hicks in his edition of the *De Anima*.)
ARISTOTLE

tóúto, δήλον ὁτι καὶ ἡδοναί ἀμα μεμνημένοι καὶ
7 ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐπεῖπερ καὶ αἰσθησις. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη
πάντα τὰ ἡδέα ἡ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι παρόντα
ἡ ἐν τῷ μεμνημοί γεγενημένα ἡ ἐν τῷ ἐλπίζειν
μέλλοντα: αἰσθάνονται μὲν γὰρ τὰ παρόντα, μὲ-
1370 bν μνημείων τὰ γεγενημένα, ἐλπίζουσι δὲ τὰ μέλ-
λοντα. τὰ μὲν οὖν μνημονεύοντα ἡδέα ἐστὶν, οὐ
μόνον ὅσα ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ὅτε παρῆν, ἡδέα ἢν,
ἀλλ' ἐνα καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ἀν ἡ ὑπερον καλὸν καὶ
ἀγαθὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτοι. οθέν καὶ τοῦτ' εἰρηται,
ἀλλ' ἡδύ τοι σωθέντα μεμνημόθαι πόνων,
καὶ
μετὰ γάρ τε καὶ ἀλγείς τερπέται ἀνήρ
μνήμενοι, ὃς τις πολλὰ πάθη καὶ πολλὰ ἔοργη.
9 τοῦτον δ' αὖτιον ὅτι ἡδύ καὶ τὸ μή ἔχειν κακῶν.
τὰ δ' ἐν ἐλπίδι, ὅσα παρόντα ἡ εὐφραίνειν ἡ ὑφελεῖν
φαίνεται μεγάλα, καὶ ἀνευ λύπης ὑφελεῖν. ὅλως
δ' ὅσα παρόντα εὐφραίνει, καὶ ἐλπίζοντας καὶ
μεμνημένοις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. διὸ καὶ τὸ ὀργί-
ζεσθαι ἡδύ, ὡσπερ καὶ Ὁμηρος ἐποίησε περὶ τοῦ
θυμοῦ
ὡς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοι:
οὐθέν γάρ ὀργίζεται τῷ ἄδυνάτῳ φαινομένῳ
τμωρίας τυχεῖν, οὐδὲ τοῖς πολὺ ὑπὲρ αὐτούς τῇ
dυνάμει: ἡ οὐκ ὀργίζονται ἡ ὀττον.
10 Καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις ἐπιθυμίαις ἀκολουθεῖ τις
ἡδονή: ἡ γάρ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἑτυχὸν ἡ ἐλπίζουσε

a Euripides, Andromeda (Frag. 133, T.G.F.).
b Odyssey, xv. 400, 401, but misquoted in the second line,
which runs: ὃς τε δὴ μάλα πολλὰ πάθη καὶ πόλλ' ἐπαληθῆ.

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that there is pleasure both for those who remember and for those who hope, since there is sensation. Therefore all pleasant things must either be present in sensation, or past in recollection, or future in hope; for one senses the present, recollects the past, and hopes for the future. Therefore our recollections are pleasant, not only when they recall things which when present were agreeable, but also some things which were not, if their consequence subsequently proves honourable or good; whence the saying:

Truly it is pleasant to remember toil after one has escaped it,

and,

When a man has suffered much and accomplished much, he afterwards takes pleasure even in his sorrows when he recalls them.

The reason of this is that even to be free from evil is pleasant. Things which we hope for are pleasant, when their presence seems likely to afford us great pleasure or advantage, without the accompaniment of pain. In a word, all things that afford pleasure by their presence as a rule also afford pleasure when we hope for or remember them. Wherefore even resentment is pleasant, as Homer said of anger that it is

Far sweeter than dripping honey;

for no one feels resentment against those whom vengeance clearly cannot overtake, or those who are far more powerful than he is; against such, men feel either no resentment or at any rate less.

Most of our desires are accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, for the recollection of a past or the hope

\[c \text{ Iliad, xviii. 108.}\]
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

ως τεύξονται χαίρουσι τυνὰ ἥδονήν, οἴον οἳ τ’ ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς ἐχόμενοι ταῖς δύσας καὶ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἐπιν καὶ ἐλπὶζόντες πιέσθαι χαίρουσιν, καὶ

11 οἱ ἔρωτες καὶ διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες, καὶ ποιοῦντες τι ἀεὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου χαίρουσιν· ἐν ἀπασι γὰρ τοῖς τοιοῦτοι μεμνημένοι οἴον αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐνται τοῦ ἐρωμένου. καὶ ἄρχῃ δὲ τοῦ ἐρωτος αὕτη γίγνεται πᾶσιν, ὅταν μὴ μόνον παρόντος χαίρωσιν ἄλλα καὶ ἀπόντος μεμνημένοι

12 ἐρώσιν. διὸ καὶ ὅταν λυπηρὸς γένηται τῷ μὴ παρεῖναι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ἐγγίνεται τις ἥδονή· ἡ μὲν γὰρ λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἥδονή δὲ ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ ὄραν πως ἐκεῖνον, καὶ ἀ ἔπραττε, καὶ οἶος ἦν. διὸ καὶ τοῦτ’ εἰκότως εἰρηται,

ὡς φάτο, τοῦσι δὲ πᾶσιν υφ’ ἵμερον ὀρσε γόοιο.

13 Καὶ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι ἢδυ· οὐ γὰρ τὸ μὴ τυγχάνειν λυπηρόν, τὸ τυγχάνειν ἢδυ· οἱ δ’ ὀργιζόμενοι λυποῦνται ἀνυπερβλήτως μὴ τιμωροῦμενοι, ἐλπὶς

14 ζοντες δὲ χαίρουσιν. καὶ τὸ νικᾶν ἢδυ, οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλονίκοις ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν· φαντασία γὰρ ὑπεροχῆς γίγνεται, οὗ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἐπιθυμίαν ἡ ἡρέμα ἡ

15 μᾶλλον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ νικᾶν ἢδυ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς ἡδείας εἶναι τὰς μαχητικὰς καὶ τὰς ἐριστικὰς (πολλάκις γὰρ ἐν ταύταις γίγνεται τὸ νικᾶν)

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a Or “doing something that has to do with the beloved.”
b *Iliad*, xxiii. 108, on the occasion of the mourning for
of a future pleasure creates a certain pleasurable enjoyment; thus, those suffering from fever and tormented by thirst enjoy the remembrance of having drunk and the hope that they will drink again. The lovesick always take pleasure in talking, writing, or composing verses about the beloved; for it seems to them that in all this recollection makes the object of their affection perceptible. Love always begins in this manner, when men are happy not only in the presence of the beloved, but also in his absence when they recall him to mind. This is why, even when his absence is painful, there is a certain amount of pleasure even in mourning and lamentation; for the pain is due to his absence, but there is pleasure in remembering and, as it were, seeing him and recalling his actions and personality. Wherefore it was rightly said by the poet:

Thus he spake, and excited in all a desire of weeping.

And revenge is pleasant; for if it is painful to be unsuccessful, it is pleasant to succeed. Now, those who are resentful are pained beyond measure when they fail to secure revenge, while the hope of it delights them. Victory is pleasant, not only to those who love to conquer, but to all; for there is produced an idea of superiority, which all with more or less eagerness desire. And since victory is pleasant, competitive and disputatious amusements must be so too, for victories are often gained in them; among Patroclus; Odyssey, iv. 183, referring to the mourning for the absence of Odysseus.

Controversiae or school rhetorical exercises, as well as arguing in the law courts; unless ἐρησικάς means simply "in which there is rivalry."
καὶ ἀστραγαλίσεις καὶ σφαίρισεις καὶ κυβείας καὶ
πετείας. καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐσπουδασμένας δὲ παιδίας
όμοιως: αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἤδειαν γίγνονται, ἀν τις ἦ
συνήθης, αἱ δὲ εὐθὺς ἤδειαν, οἰον κυνηγία καὶ
πᾶσα θηρευτικὴ ὅπου γὰρ ἀμιλλα, ἐνταῦθα καὶ
νίκη ἔστιν. διό καὶ ἡ δικανικὴ καὶ ἡ ἐριστικὴ

16 ἤδεια τοῖς εἰθισμένοις καὶ δυναμένοις. καὶ τιμὴ
καὶ εὐδοξία τῶν ἡδίστων διὰ τὸ γίγνεσθαι φαν-
tασίαν ἐκάστω ὅτι τοιοῦτος οἶος ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ
μάλλον ὅταν φῶσιν οὐς οἴεται ἄληθεύειν. τοιοῦτοι
d' οἱ ἐγγὺς μᾶλλον τῶν πόρρω, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις καὶ
οἱ πολίται τῶν ἄπωθεν, καὶ οἱ ὀντες τῶν μελλόντων,
καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι ἁφρόνων, καὶ πολλοὶ ὀλέγων·
mάλλον γὰρ εἰκός ἄληθευεν τοὺς εἰρήμενος τῶν
ἐναντίων· ἐπεὶ ὅτι τοῖς πολὺ καταφρονεῖ, ὡσπερ
παιδίων ἡ θηρίων, οὔδὲν μέλει τῆς τούτων τιμῆς
ἡ τῆς δόξης αὐτῆς γε τῆς δόξης χάρων, ἄλλ' εἴπερ,
di' ἄλλο τι.

17 Καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν ἡδέων· τὸ τε γὰρ φιλεῖν ἦδύ
(οὔδείς γὰρ φίλουνος μὴ χαίρων οὖν), καὶ τὸ
φιλεώσθαι ἦδύ· φαντασία γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ
ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, οὗ πάντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν
οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι· τὸ δὲ φιλεώσθαι ἀγαπάσθαι

18 ἐστιν αὐτῶν δι' αὐτῶν. καὶ τὸ θαυμάζεσθαι ἦδύ
di' αὐτὸ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι. καὶ τὸ κολακεύεσθαι καὶ
ὁ κόλαξ ἦδύ· φανόμενος γὰρ θαυμαστῇ καὶ
φανόμενος φίλος ὁ κόλαξ ἑστίν. καὶ τὸ ταῦτά

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a For the meaning of φιλία, φιλεῖν cf. ii. 4.

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these we may include games with knuckle-bones, ball-games, dicing, and draughts. It is the same with serious sports; for some become pleasant when one is familiar with them, while others are so from the outset, such as the chase and every description of outdoor sport; for rivalry implies victory. It follows from this that practice in the law courts and disputation are pleasant to those who are familiar with them and well qualified. Honour and good repute are among the most pleasant things, because every one imagines that he possesses the qualities of a worthy man, and still more when those whom he believes to be trustworthy say that he does. Such are neighbours rather than those who live at a distance; intimate friends and fellow-citizens rather than those who are unknown; contemporaries rather than those who come later; the sensible rather than the senseless; the many rather than the few; for such persons are more likely to be trustworthy than their opposites. As for those for whom men feel great contempt, such as children and animals, they pay no heed to their respect or esteem, or, if they do, it is not for the sake of their esteem, but for some other reason.

A friend also is among pleasant things, for it is pleasant to love—a—for no one loves wine unless he finds pleasure in it—just as it is pleasant to be loved; for in this case also a man has an impression that he is really endowed with good qualities, a thing desired by all who perceive it; and to be loved is to be cherished for one's own sake. And it is pleasant to be admired, because of the mere honour. Flattery and the flatterer are pleasant, the latter being a sham admirer and friend. It is pleasant to do the...
prάττειν πολλάκις ἧδυ· τὸ γὰρ σύνθεσε ἧδυ ἤν. 20 καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν ἧδυ· εἰς φύσιν γὰρ γίγνεται μεταβάλλειν· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὑπερβολὴν ποιεῖ τῆς καθεστώσης ἔξεως· ὅθεν εἰρήται μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκῆ.

diὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ διὰ χρόνου ἓδεα ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀνθρώποι καὶ πράγματα· μεταβολή γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος ἐστὶν, ἀμα δὲ καὶ σπάνιον τὸ διὰ χρόνου. καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἧδυ ώς ἐπὶ τὸ πολυ· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μαθεῖν ἐστὶν, ὡστε τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητὸν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι. καὶ τὸ εὐ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ εὐ πάσχειν τῶν ἓδεων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐ πάσχειν τυγχάνειν ἐστὶν ὃν ἐπιθυμοῦν, τὸ δὲ εὐ ποιεῖν ἔχειν καὶ ὑπερέχειν, ὃν ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίενται. διὰ δὲ τὸ ἓδυ εἶναι τὸ εὐποιητικόν, καὶ τὸ ἑπανορθοῦν ἓδυ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστὶ τοὺς πλησίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐλληπὴ ἐπιτελεῖν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τῇ ἓδῳ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιῶδε ἀνάγκῃ ἓδεα εἶναι οἰον τῷ τῷ μυμοῦμεν, ὃς περ γραφικῇ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιαὶ καὶ ποιητικῇ, καὶ πᾶν ὁ ἄν εὖ μεμιμημένου, κἂν ἢ μὴ ἓδυ αὐτῷ τὸ μεμιμημένου· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συνλογισμός ἐστὶν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὡστε μαν-

23 πλησίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐλληπὴ ἐπιτελεῖν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τῇ ἓδῳ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιῶδε ἀνάγκῃ ἓδεα εἶναι οἰον τῷ τῷ μυμοῦμεν, ὃς περ γραφικῇ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιαὶ καὶ ποιητικῇ, καὶ πᾶν ὁ ἄν εὖ μεμιμημένου, κἂν ἢ μὴ ἓδυ αὐτῷ τὸ μεμιμημένου· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συνλογισμός ἐστὶν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὡστε μαν-

24 θάνειν τι συμβαίνει. καὶ αἱ περιπέτειαι καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρόν σώζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κινόμων· πάντα γὰρ θαυμαστὰ ταῦτα. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν 1 Roemer reads τὸ τὸ μυμητικόν. The meaning is much the same, only μυμοῦμεν is passive.

1 Euripides, Orestes, 234.
2 True knowledge or philosophy, which is the result of learning, is the highest condition of the intellect, its normal...
same things often; for that which is familiar is, as we said, pleasant. Change also is pleasant, since change is in the order of nature; for perpetual sameness creates an excess of the normal condition; whence it was said:

Change in all things is sweet.\(^a\)

This is why what we only see at intervals, whether men or things, is pleasant; for there is a change from the present, and at the same time it is rare. And learning and admiring are as a rule pleasant; for admiring implies the desire to learn, so that what causes admiration is to be desired, and learning implies a return to the normal.\(^b\) It is pleasant to bestow and to receive benefits; the latter is the attainment of what we desire, the former the possession of more than sufficient means,\(^c\) both of them things that men desire. Since it is pleasant to do good, it must also be pleasant for men to set their neighbours on their feet, and to supply their deficiencies. And since learning and admiring are pleasant, all things connected with them must also be pleasant; for instance, a work of imitation, such as painting, sculpture, poetry, and all that is well imitated, even if the object of imitation is not pleasant; for it is not this that causes pleasure or the reverse, but the inference that the imitation and the object imitated are identical, so that the result is that we learn something. The same may be said of sudden changes and narrow escapes from danger; for all these things excite wonder. And since that or settled state. Consequently, a return to this is pleasure, which is defined (§ 1) as a settling down of the soul into its natural state after a period of disturbance.

\(^a\) Or, "larger means than the person benefited."
Aristotle

ηδύ, τὰ συγγενῆ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἄλληλοις ἐστίν, πάντα τὰ συγγενῆ καὶ ομοία ἤδεα ώς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, οίον ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρώπῳ καὶ ἰππὸς ἰππῷ καὶ νέος νέω. ὅτεν καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι εἰρηνταί, ὃς ἥλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει,

καὶ

ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοίον,

καὶ

ἐγνω δὲ θήρ θήρα,

καὶ

αἱ κολοίδες παρὰ κολοίδον,

καὶ ὁσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.

26 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὁμοίον καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ἦδύ ἐαυτῷ ἀπαν, μάλιστα δ᾽ αὐτὸς πρὸς ἐαυτὸν ἐκαστὸς τοῦτο πέπουθεν, ἀνάγκη πάντας φιλαύτους εἶναι ἡ μάλλον ἡ ἤτοι· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὐτὸν μάλιστα. ἔπει δὲ φιλαύτοι πάντες, καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη ἤδεα εἶναι πάσων, οἶον ἔργα καὶ λόγους. διὸ καὶ φιλοκόλακες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ φιλεράσται καὶ φιλότμοι καὶ φιλότεκνοι· αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔργα τὰ τέκνα. καὶ τὰ ἐλλιπῆ ἐπὶ-

27 τελεῖν ἦδύ: αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔργου ἤδη γίγνεται. καὶ ἔπει τὸ ἄρχειν ἤδιστον, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν δοκεῖν εἶναι ἦδύ. ἄρχυκον γὰρ τὸ φρονεῖν, ἐστι δ᾽ ἡ σοφία πολλῶν καὶ θαυμαστῶν ἐπιστήμης. ἐτι ἔπει φιλό-

τμοι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἐπιτμαῖν τοὺς πέλας ἦδυ εἶναι. καὶ τὸ ἐν ὦ βέλτιστος δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸς αὐτοῖ, ἐνταῦθα διατρίβειν, ὄσπερ καὶ Ἐὔριπίδης φησὶ

a Odyssey, xvii. 218 ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοίον ἀγεῖ θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοίον.

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which is in accordance with nature is pleasant, and things which are akin are akin in accordance with nature, all things akin and like are for the most part pleasant to each other, as man to man, horse to horse, youth to youth. This is the origin of the proverbs:

The old have charms for the old, the young for the young,
Like to like,\(^a\)
Beast knows beast,
Birds of a feather flock together,\(^b\)
and all similar sayings.

And since things which are akin and like are always pleasant to one another, and every man in the highest degree feels this in regard to himself, it must needs be that all men are more or less selfish; for it is in himself above all that such conditions\(^c\) are to be found. Since, then, all men are selfish, it follows that all find pleasure in what is their own, such as their works and words. That is why men as a rule are fond of those who flatter and love them, of honour, and of children; for the last are their own work. It is also pleasant to supply what is wanting,\(^d\) for then it becomes our work. And since it is most pleasant to command, it is also pleasant to be regarded as wise;\(^e\) for practical wisdom is commanding, and philosophy consists in the knowledge of many things that excite wonder. Further, since men are generally ambitious, it follows that it is also agreeable to find fault with our neighbours. And if a man thinks he excels in anything, he likes to devote his time to it; as Euripides says:

\(^b\) Literally, "ever jackdaw to jackdaw."
\(^c\) Of likeness and kinship.
\(^d\) § 22.
\(^e\) Both practically and speculatively or philosophically.
29 όμοιως δε καὶ ἐπεὶ η ἐκάστη τῶν ἡδέων καὶ πάσα ἀνεσις, καὶ ο γέλως τῶν ἡδέων, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γελοῖα ἡδέα εἰναι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα: διώρισται δὲ περὶ γελοίων χωρίς εν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἡδέων εἰρήσθω ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτων φανεῖ.  

12. "Ὡν μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα ἀδικούσι, ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν. πῶς δ’ ἐχοντες καὶ τίνας, λέγομεν νῦν. αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν ὅταν οἴκον ταῦτα δυνατὸν εἰναι τὸ πράγμα πραξάντες, ἡ μὴ λαθόντες μὴ δοῦναι δίκην, ἡ δοῦναι μὲν ἀλλ’ ἐλάττω τὴν ζημίαν εἰναι τοῦ  

2 κέρδους ἐαυτοῖς ἡ ὡν κήδονται. ποῦα μὲν οὖν δυνατὰ φαίνεται καὶ ποῦα ἀδύνατα εν τοῖς ὑστερον ῥήθησεται (κοινὰ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντων τῶν λόγων), αὐτοὶ δ’ οἴονται δυνατοὶ εἰναι μάλιστα ἀζήμιοι ἀδικεῖν οἱ εἰπεῖν δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ πρακτικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἐμπειροὶ πολλῶν ἀγώνων, καὶ πολύφιλοι ὠσιν,  

3 καὶ πλοῦσιοι. καὶ μάλιστα μὲν, ἂν αὐτοὶ δῶν ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις, οἴονται δύνασθαι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ ὑπάρχωσιν αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτοι φίλοι ἦ υπηρέται ἡ κοινωνία διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα δύνανται καὶ πράττειν  

4 καὶ λαπθάνειν καὶ μὴ δοῦναι δίκην. καὶ ἐὰν φίλοι ὄσι τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις ἡ τοῖς κρυταῖς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ φίλοι ἀφύλακτοι τε πρὸς τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ προσ-

a Antiope (Frag. 183, T.G.F.).  
b Only the definition appears in the existing text: "The ridiculous is an error, painless and non-destructive ugliness (5)."
And allotting the best part of each day to that in which he happens to surpass himself, he presses eagerly towards it.\

Similarly, since amusement, every kind of relaxation, and laughter are pleasant, ridiculous things—men, words, or deeds—must also be pleasant. The ridiculous has been discussed separately in the *Poetics*. Let this suffice for things that are pleasant; those that are painful will be obvious from the contraries of these.

12. Such are the motives of injustice; let us now state the frame of mind of those who commit it, and who are the sufferers from it. Men do wrong when they think that it can be done and that it can be done by them; when they think that their action will either be undiscovered, or if discovered will remain unpunished; or if it is punished, that the punishment will be less than the profit to themselves or to those for whom they care. As for the kind of things which seem possible or impossible, we will discuss them later, for these topics are common to all kinds of rhetoric. Now men who commit wrong think they are most likely to be able to do so with impunity, if they are eloquent, business-like, experienced in judicial trials, if they have many friends, and if they are wealthy. They think there is the greatest chance of their being able to do so, if they themselves belong to the above classes; if not, if they have friends, servants, or accomplices who do; for thanks to these qualities they are able to commit wrong and to escape discovery and punishment. Similarly, if they are friends of those who are being wronged, or of the judges; for friends are not on their guard against being wronged and, besides, they

\[^{c}\text{ ii. 19.}\]

\[^{k}\text{129}\]
καταλλάττονται πρὶν ἐπεξελθεῖν, οἱ δὲ κριταὶ χαρίζονται οἷς ἄν φίλοι ὤσι, καὶ ἥ ὀλως ἀφιάσιν ἡ μικροῖς ζημιοῦσιν.

5 Λαθητικοί δ’ εἰσίν οἱ τ’ ἐναντίοι τοῖς ἐγκλήμασιν, οἱ δὲ ἀσθενής περὶ αἰκίας καὶ ὁ πένης καὶ ὁ αἰσχρὸς περὶ μοιχείας. καὶ τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμῶι ἀφύλακτα γὰρ διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἄν οἴεσθαι. καὶ τὰ τηλικάτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οἱ μὴ ἄν εἰς ἀφύλακτα γὰρ καὶ ταὐτα. πάντες γὰρ τὰ εἰσθότα ὡσπερ ἀρρωστήματα φυλάττονται καὶ τάδικήματα, ὃ δὲ μηδεῖς πω ἡρρώστηκεν, οὐδεὶς εὐλαβεῖται. καὶ οἷς μηδεῖς ἔχθρος ἡ πολλοὶ οἱ μὲν γὰρ οἶονται λήσειν διὰ τὸ μὴ φυλάττεσθαι, οἱ δὲ λανθάνουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ἃν ἐπιχειρῆσαι φυλαττομένους, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀπολογίαν ἔχειν ὁτι 8 οὐκ ἄν ἐνεχείρησαν. καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει κρύψις ἡ τρόπος ἡ τόπος ἡ διάθεσις εὐπορος. καὶ ὁσοὶ μὴ λαθοῦσιν ἐστὶ δίωσι δίκης ἡ ἀναβολὴ χρόνου ἡ διαφθοραὶ κριτῶν. καὶ οἷς, ἐὰν γένηται ζημία, ἐστὶ δίωσι τῆς ἐκτίσεως ἡ ἀναβολὴ χρόνοις, ἡ 9 δι’ ἄπορίαν μηδὲν ἔξει ὁ τι ἀπολέσῃ. καὶ οἷς τὰ μὲν κέρδη φανερὰ ἡ μεγάλα ἡ ἐγγύς, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι μικραὶ ἡ ἀφανείς ἡ πόρρω. καὶ ὁ μὴ ἔστι τιμωρία 10 ἵση τῇ ὁφελείᾳ, οἱ δὲ δοκεῖ ἡ τυραννίς. καὶ ὁσοὶ

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a Two different persons. If the second ὁ be omitted, the reference is to one.

b Or, a “resourceful mind.”
prefer reconciliation to taking proceedings; and judges favour those whom they are fond of, and either let them off altogether or inflict a small penalty.

Those are likely to remain undetected whose qualities are out of keeping with the charges, for instance, if a man wanting in physical strength were accused of assault and battery, or a poor and an ugly man of adultery. Also, if the acts are done quite openly and in sight of all; for they are not guarded against, because no one would think them possible. Also, if they are so great and of such a nature that no one would even be likely to attempt them, for these also are not guarded against; for all guard against ordinary ailments and wrongs, but no one takes precautions against those ailments from which no one has ever yet suffered. And those who have either no enemy at all or many; the former hope to escape notice because they are not watched, the latter do escape because they would not be thought likely to attack those who are on their guard and because they can defend themselves by the plea that they would never have attempted it. And those who have ways or places of concealment for stolen property, or abundant opportunities of disposing of it. And those who, even if they do not remain undetected, can get the trial set aside or put off, or corrupt the judges. And those who, if a fine be imposed, can get payment in full set aside or put off for a long time, or those who, owing to poverty, have nothing to lose. And in cases where the profit is certain, large, or immediate, while the punishment is small, uncertain, or remote. And where there can be no punishment equal to the advantages, as seems to be the case in a tyranny. And when the unjust
tâ μὲν ἀδικήματα λήμματα, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι ονείδη μόνον. καὶ οἱς τοῦναντίον τὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα εἰς ἐπαινὸν των, οίον εἰ συνεβή ἀμα τιμωρήσασθαι ὑπὲρ πατρός ἡ μητρός, ὥσπερ Ζήνωνι, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι εἰς χρήματα ἡ φυγὴ ἡ τοιοῦτον τν· δι’ ἀμφότερα γὰρ ἀδικοῦσι καὶ ἀμφοτέρως ἔχοντες, πλὴν οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀλλ’ οἱ ἑναντίοι τοῖς ἥθεσιν.

11 καὶ οἱ πολλάκις ἡ λεληθότες ἡ μὴ ἔξημωμένοι.
καὶ οἱ πολλάκις ἀποτετυχηκότες. εἰσὶ γὰρ τινὲς καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς,
12 οἶοι ἀναμάχεσθαι. καὶ οἳς ἂν παραχρῆμα ἡ τὸ ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ύστερον, ἡ τὸ κέρδος, ἡ δὲ ζημία ύστερον· οἱ γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς τοιοῦτοι, ἐστὶ δ’
13 ἀκρασία περὶ πάντα ὅσων ὑρέγονται. καὶ οἳς ἂν τοῦναντίον τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν ἡδή ἡ ἡ ἡ ζημία, τὸ δὲ ἡδύ καὶ ὁφέλιμον ύστερα καὶ χρονιώτερα· οἱ γὰρ ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ φρονιμότεροι τὰ τοιαῦτα διώκουσιν.
14 καὶ οἳς ἂν ἐνδέχηται διὰ τύχην δόξαι πράξαι ἡ δ’ ἀνάγκην ἡ διὰ φύσιν ἡ δ’ ἐθος, καὶ ὅλως ἀμαρ-
15 τεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄδικεῖν. καὶ οἳς ἂν ἡ τοῦ ἑπτεικοῦς τυχεῖν. καὶ οἳς ἂν ἐνδεεῖς ὅσων. διχως δ’ εἰόν ἐνδεεῖς. ἡ γὰρ ὡς ἀναγκαίον, ὥσπερ οἱ πένητες, ἡ
16 ὡς ὑπερβολής, ὥσπερ οἱ πλούσιοι. καὶ οἱ σφόδρα εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ οἱ σφόδρα ἀδοξοῦντες, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐ δόξοντες, οἱ δ’ ὡς οὐδὲν μᾶλλον δόξοντες.
17 Αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐν οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπιχειροῦσιν, ἀδικοῦσι δὲ τοὺς τοιοῦτους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς

\[\text{a} \text{ Who Zeno was, and what the story, is unknown}.\]

\[\text{b} \text{ Some do wrong for the sake of gain, others for the sake of praise; but the former sacrifice honour for self-interest, the latter self-interest for honour}.\]

\[\text{c} \text{ “More distant” (Jebb).}\]

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acts are real gains and the only punishment is disgrace; and when, on the contrary, the unjust acts tend to our credit, for instance, if one avenges father or mother, as was the case with Zeno, while the punishment only involves loss of money, exile, or something of the kind. For men do wrong from both these motives and in both these conditions of mind; but the persons are not the same, and their characters are exactly opposite. And those who have often been undetected or have escaped punishment; and those who have often been unsuccessful; for in such cases, as in actual warfare, there are always men ready to return to the fight. And all who hope for pleasure and profit at once, while the pain and the loss come later; such are the intemperate, intemperance being concerned with all things that men long for. And when, on the contrary, the pain or the loss is immediate, while the pleasure and the profit are later and more lasting; for temperate and wiser men pursue such aims. And those who may possibly be thought to have acted by chance or from necessity, from some natural impulse or from habit, in a word, to have committed an error rather than a crime. And those who hope to obtain indulgence; and all those who are in need, which is of two kinds; for men either need what is necessary, as the poor, or what is superfluous, as the wealthy. And those who are highly esteemed or held in great contempt; the former will not be suspected, the latter no more than they are already.

In such a frame of mind men attempt to do wrong, and the objects of their wrongdoing are men and circumstances of the following kind. Those who

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ἔχοντας ὃν αὐτὸλ ἐνδεεῖς ἦ εἰσ τάναγκαὶ ἦ ἐἰς 18 ὑπεροχὴν ἦ εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν, καὶ τοὺς πόρρω καὶ τοὺς ἐγγύς: τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἦ λῆμψις ταχεία, τῶν δ’ ἦ τιμωρία βραδεία, οἴον οἱ συλώντες τοὺς Καρχη- 19 δονίους. καὶ τοὺς μὴ εὐλαβεῖς μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς ἀλλὰ πιστευτικοὺς· ῥάδιον γὰρ πάντας λαθεῖν. καὶ τοὺς ῥαθύμους· ἐπιμελοῦς γὰρ τὸ ἐπεξελθεῖν. καὶ τοὺς αἰσχυντηλοὺς· οὐ γὰρ μαχητικοὶ περὶ 20 κέρδους. καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀδικηθέντας καὶ μὴ ἐπεξελθόντας ὡς ὄντας κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν 21 τούτους Μυσῶν λείαν. καὶ οὐς μηδεπώποτε καὶ οὕς πολλάκις· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἀφύλακτοι, οἱ μὲν 22 ὡς οὐδέποτε, οἱ δ’ ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι. καὶ τοὺς δια- βεβλημένους ἢ εὐδιαβόλους· οἱ τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οὔτε προαιροῦνται, φοβούμενοι τοὺς κριτάς, οὔτε δύ- ναντα πείθεν. ὡν οἱ μισοῦμενοι καὶ φθονοῦμενοι 23 εἰσιν. καὶ πρὸς οὕς ἔχουσι πρόφασιν ἢ προγόνων 1373 a ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ φίλων ἢ ποιησάντων κακῶς ἢ μελ- λησάντων ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ προγόνους ἢ ἄν κηδονται· ῥόσπερ γὰρ ἡ παροιμία, προφάσεως δεῖται μό- 24 νον ἡ πονηρία. καὶ τοὺς ἑξθρούς καὶ τοὺς φίλους· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ῥάδιον, τοὺς δ’ ἤδυ. καὶ τοὺς ἀφίλους. καὶ τοὺς μὴ δεινοὺς εἰπεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι· ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἐγχειροῦσιν ἐπεξεῖναι, ἢ καταλλάττονται, 25 ἢ οὐδὲν περαίνουσιν. καὶ οἷς μὴ λυσιτελεῖ δια-

a Who were too far off to retaliate.

b A proverb meaning “an easy prey.” The Mysians were regarded as cowardly and unwarlike.

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possess what they themselves lack, things either necessary, or superfluous, or enjoyable; both those who are far off and those who are near, for in the one case the gain is speedy, in the other reprisals are slow, as if, for instance, Greeks were to plunder Carthaginians. And those who never take precautions and are never on their guard, but are confiding; for all these are easily taken unawares. And those who are indolent; for it requires a man who takes pains to prosecute. And those who are bashful; for they are not likely to fight about money. And those who have often been wronged but have not prosecuted, being, as the proverb says, "Mysian booty." And those who have never, or those who have often, suffered wrong; for both are off their guard, the one because they have never yet been attacked, the others because they do not expect to be attacked again. And those who have been slandered, or are easy to slander; for such men neither care to go to law, for fear of the judges, nor, if they do, can they convince them; to this class belong those who are exposed to hatred or envy. And those against whom the wrongdoer can pretend that either their ancestors, or themselves, or their friends, have either committed, or intended to commit, wrong either against himself, or his ancestors, or those for whom he has great regard; for, as the proverb says, "evil-doing only needs an excuse." And both enemies and friends; for it is easy to injure the latter, and pleasant to injure the former. And those who are friendless. And those who are unskilled in speech or action; for either they make no attempt to prosecute, or come to terms, or accomplish nothing. And those to whom it is no
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τρίβεν ἑπτηροζοῦσιν ἡ δίκην ἡ ἐκτισιν, οἴον οἱ ξένοι καὶ αὐτοῦργοί· ἔπι μικρῶ τε γὰρ διαλύονται καὶ 26 ῥαδίως καταπαύονται, καὶ τοὺς πολλὰ ἡδικηκό- τας, ἡ τοιαῦτα οίκα ἀδικοῦντα· ἐγγὺς γὰρ τι δοκεῖ 27 τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἶναι, ὅταν τι τοιοῦτον ἡδικηθῇ 28 τις οἴνοι εἰώθει καὶ αὐτὸς ἀδικεῖν· λέγω δ’ οἴον 29 εἰ τις τὸν εἰώθοτα ὑβρίζειν αἰκίσατο. καὶ τοὺς 30 ἡ πεποικότας κακῶς ἡ βουληθέντας ἡ βουλο- μένους ἡ ποιήσοντας· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἑδύ καὶ τὸ 31 καλόν, καὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν φαίνεται. καὶ 32 οίς χαριοῦνται ἡ φίλοις ἡ θαυμαξόμενος ἡ ἐρω- μένος ἡ κυρίοις ἡ ὀλος πρὸς οὐς ἥσων αὐτοῖ· 33 καὶ πρὸς οὐς ἐστιν ἐπιεικείας τυχεῖν. καὶ οίς ἂν 34 ἐγκεκληκότες ὤσι καὶ προδιακεχωρηκότες, οἴον 35 Κάλλιππος ἐποίει τὰ περὶ Δίωνα· καὶ γὰρ τὰ 36 τοιαῦτα ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν φαίνεται. καὶ τοὺς 37 υπ’ ἄλλων μέλλοντας, ἂν μὴ αὐτοῖ, ὡς οὐκετί 38 ἐνδεχόμενον βουλεύσασθαι, ὡσπερ λέγεται Αἰνεσί- δημος Πέλωνι πέμψα οἰκτάβια ἀνδραποδισμένων, 39 ὅτι ἐφθασεν, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς μέλλων. καὶ οὐς ἀδι- κήσαντες δυνήσονται πολλὰ δίκαια πράττειν, ὡς

a aikia (assault) was a less serious offence than ὑβρις (wanton outrage).
b ois, i.e. supplying ἀδικομένοις, “by whose being wronged.” ois has been suggested, i.e. supplying ἀδικοῦντες, “wronging whom.”
c In our relations with whom, almost = from whom. Another interpretation is: “In reference to whom there is a chance . . . consideration from others, meaning the judges” (Welldon).
d Callippus was a friend of Dion, who freed Syracuse from Dionysius the Younger. He afterwards accused Dion and contrived his murder. His excuse was that Dion knew what he intended to do, and would be likely to strike first, if he did not anticipate him.
advantage to waste time waiting for the verdict or damages, such as strangers or husbandmen; for they are ready to compromise on easy terms and to drop proceedings. And those who have committed numerous wrongs, or such as those from which they themselves are suffering; for it seems almost an act of justice that a man should suffer a wrong such as he had been accustomed to make others suffer; if, for instance, one were to assault a man who was in the habit of outraging others. And those who have already injured us, or intended, or intend, or are about to do so; for in such a case vengeance is both pleasant and honourable, and seems to be almost an act of justice. And those whom we wrong in order to ingratiate ourselves with our friends, or persons whom we admire or love, or our masters, in a word, those by whom our life is ruled. And those in reference to whom there is a chance of obtaining merciful consideration. And those against whom we have a complaint, or with whom we have had a previous difference, as Callippus acted in the matter of Dion; for in such cases it seems almost an act of justice. And those who are going to be attacked by others, if we do not attack first, since it is no longer possible to deliberate; thus, Aenesidemus is said to have sent the prize in the game of cottabus to Gelon, who, having reduced a town to slavery, had anticipated him by doing what he had intended to do himself. And those to whom, after having injured them, we shall be enabled to do many acts of justice, in the

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* Aenesidemus, tyrant of Leontini, being anticipated by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, in the enslavement of a neighbouring state, sent him the cottabus prize, as a compliment for having "played the game" so skilfully. The cottabus was originally a Sicilian game.
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"διίως ιασόμενοι, ὡσπερ ἐφη Ἰάσων ὁ Θετταλὸς
deīn ἄδικεῖν ἕνα, ὡπως δύνηται καὶ δίκαια πολλὰ
ποιεῖν.

32 Καὶ ὁ πάντες ἂ πολλοί ἄδικεῖν εἰώθασιν· συν-
33 γνώμης γὰρ οἴονται τεῦξεθαί. καὶ τὰ ράδια
κρύψαι τοιαῦτα δ’ ὅσα ταχὺ ἀναλίσκεται, οἷον
tὰ ἐδώδιμα, ἡ τὰ εὐμετάβλητα σχήμασιν ἡ χρώ-
34 μασιν ἡ κράσεσιν. ἡ ἂ πολλαχοῦ ἀφανίσαι εὑπορον·
tοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ εὐβάστακτα καὶ ἐν μικροῖς τόποις
35 ἀφανιζόμενα. καὶ οἷς ἄδιάφορα καὶ ὅμοια πολλὰ
προὐπήρχε τῷ ἄδικοῦντι. καὶ ὅσα αἰσχύνονται ο掞
ἀδικηθέντες λέγειν, οἷον γυναικῶν οἰκείων ὑβρεῖς
ἡ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἡ εἰς νίεῖς. καὶ ὅσα φιλοδικεῖнолог
δοξειν ἂν ὁ ἐπεξιῶν· τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ τε μικρὰ καὶ
ἐφ’ οἷς συγγνώμη. ὅσ μὲν οὐν ἔχοντες ἄδικοῦν,
καὶ ποία καὶ ποίους καὶ διὰ τί, σχεδὸν ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν.

1373 b 13. Τὰ δ’ ἄδικήματα πάντα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα
dιέλωμεν, ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἐντεῦθεν. ὥρισται
δὴ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πρὸς τε νόμους [δῦο].
καὶ πρὸς οὕς ἐστὶ, διχῶς. λέγω δὲ νόμον τὸν μὲν
Ἰδίον τὸν δὲ κοινόν, Ἰδίον μὲν τὸν ἐκάστοις ὥρι-
σμένον πρὸς αὐτοὺς, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν μὲν ἀγραφὸν
τὸν δὲ γεγραμμένον, κοινὸν δὲ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν.
ἐστὶ γὰρ, ὅ μαντεύονται τι πάντες, φύσει κοινὸν
dίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, κἂν μηδεμία κοινωνία πρὸς

1 Bracketed by Spengel, but retained by Roemer.

188 a Tyrant of Pherae.
idea that it will be easy to repair the wrong; as Jason the Thessalian \(^1\) said one should sometimes commit injustice, in order to be able also to do justice often.

Men are ready to commit wrongs which all or many are in the habit of committing, for they hope to be pardoned for their offences. They steal objects that are easy to conceal; such are things that are quickly consumed, as eatables; things which can easily be changed in form or colour or composition; things for which there are many convenient hiding-places, such as those that are easy to carry or stow away in a corner; those of which a thief already possesses a considerable number exactly similar or hard to distinguish. Or they commit wrongs which the victims are ashamed to disclose, such as outrages upon the women of their family, upon themselves, or upon their children. And all those wrongs in regard to which appeal to the law would create the appearance of litigiousness; such are wrongs which are unimportant or venial. These are nearly all the dispositions which induce men to commit wrong, the nature and motive of the wrongs, and the kind of persons who are the victims of wrong.

13. Let us now classify just and unjust actions generally, starting from what follows. Justice and injustice have been defined in reference to laws and persons in two ways. Now there are two kinds of laws, particular and general. By particular laws I mean those established by each people in reference to themselves, which again are divided into written and unwritten; by general laws I mean those based upon nature. In fact, there is a general idea of just and unjust in accordance with nature, as all men in a manner divine, even if there is neither communic-
Ἀριστοτέλης ὁ μηδὲ συνθήκη, οἶνον καὶ ὁ Σωφοκλέος Ἀντιγόνη φαίνεται λέγουσα, ὅτι δίκαιον ἀπειρημένον θάψαι τὸν Πολυνείκη, ὡς φύει ὁν τούτο δίκαιον.

οὺ γάρ τι νῦν γε κάχθες, ἄλλ' ἀεὶ ποτε ζῇ τούτο, κοῦδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὦτον φάνη.

καὶ ὡς Ἔμπεδοκλῆς λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἐμψυχον· τούτο γὰρ ὦ τισὶ μὲν δίκαιον τισὶ δ' οὐ δίκαιον,

ἄλλα τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμμουν διὰ τ' εὑρυμέδοντος αἰθέρος ἤνεκέως τέταται διὰ τ' ἀπλέτον αὐ γῆς.

καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ λέγει Ἀλκιδάμας. 3 πρὸς οὐς δὲ διώρισται, διχῶς διώρισται· ἣ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς ἕνα τῶν κοινωνοῦντων, δ' ἄλλα τοῦ μὲν πάντων νόμμουν διὰ τ' εὑρυμέδοντος αἰθέρος ἤνεκέως τέταται διά τ' ἀπλέτον αὐ γῆς.

Διὸ καὶ τάδικῆματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διχῶς ἔστιν ἄδικεὶν καὶ δικαιοπραγείν· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ ἀρσιμένον ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν· ὅ γὰρ μοιχεύων καὶ τύπτων ἄδικεῖ τινὰ τῶν ἁρισμένων, ὅ δὲ μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινὸν. ἀπάντων δὴ τῶν ἄδικημάτων διηρημένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους, ἀναλαβόντες τί ἔστι τὸ ἄδικεῖσθαι, λέγωμεν τὰ λοιπά. 5 ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἄδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἐκόντος τὰ ἄδικα πάσχειν· τὸ γὰρ ἄδικεῖν ἁριστάτι πρότερον ἐκούσιον

\[a\] Antigone, 456.

\[b\] Of Elis, pupil of Gorgias. The oration is not extant, but
tion nor agreement between them. This is what Antigone in Sophocles a evidently means, when she declares that it is just, though forbidden, to bury Polynices, as being naturally just:

For neither to-day nor yesterday, but from all eternity, these statutes live and no man knoweth whence they came.

And as Empedocles says in regard to not killing that which has life, for this is not right for some and wrong for others,

But a universal precept, which extends without a break throughout the wide-ruling sky and the boundless earth.

Alcidamas b also speaks of this precept in his Messe-

niacus. . . . And in relation to persons, there is a twofold division of law; for what one ought to do or ought not to do is concerned with the community generally, or one of its members.

Therefore there are two kinds of just and unjust acts, since they can be committed against a definite individual or against the community; he who com-
mits adultery or an assault is guilty of wrong against a definite individual, he who refuses to serve in the army of wrong against the State. All kinds of wrong acts having been thus distinguished, some of which affect the State, others one or several indi-
viduals, let us repeat the definition of being wronged, and then go on to the rest. Being wronged is to suffer injustice at the hands of one who voluntarily inflicts it, for it has been established

the scholiast supplies his words: ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας
θεός· οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν (“God has left all men free; Nature has made none a slave”). The Messen-
i ans had revolted from Sparta.

c i. 10. 3.
6 εἶναι. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκη τὸν ἄδικούμενον βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἀκουσίως βλάπτεσθαι, αἱ μὲν βλάβαι ἐκ τῶν πρότερον φανεραὶ εἰσὶν: τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ διήρηται καθ' αὐτὰ πρότερον, καὶ τὰ ἐκούσια, 7 ὅτι ἐστὶν ὅσα εἰδότες. ὡστ' ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἡ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἰδιὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ ἀγνοοῦντος ἡ ἀκοντος, ἡ ἐκοντος καὶ εἰδότος, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν προελομένου τὰ δὲ διὰ πάθος. 8 περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ῥήθησεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποία δὲ προαιροῦνται καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εὑρηται πρότερον.

9 Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁμολογοῦντες πολλάκις πεπραχέναι ἡ ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἡ περὶ δ' τὸ ἐπίγραμμα, οἶνον λαβεῖν μὲν ἄλλ' οὐ κλέψαι, καὶ πατάξαι πρότερον ἄλλ' οὐχ ύβρίσαι, καὶ συγγενέσθαι ἄλλ' οὐ μοιχεῦσαι, ἡ κλέψαι ἄλλ' οὐχ ἔροσυλήσαι (οὐ γὰρ θεοὶ τι), ἡ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἄλλ' οὐ δημόσιαν, ἡ διειλέχθαι μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἄλλ' οὐ προδοῦναι, διὰ ταῦτα δέοι ἃν καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρίσθαι, τὰ κλοπῆ, τὶ υβρίς, τὶ μοιχεία, ὅπως εάν τε ὑπάρχειν εάν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλώμεθα 10 δεικνύναι, ἐχωμεν ἐμφανίζειν τὸ δίκαιον. ἐστὶ δὲ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τοῦ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ φαύλον ἡ μὴ ἄδικον ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις· ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει

a i. 6.  b i. 10. 3.  c ii. 2.  d i. 11, 12.

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that injustice is a voluntary act. And since the man who suffers injustice necessarily sustains injury and that against his will, it is evident from what has been said in what the injuries consist; for things good and bad have already been distinguished in themselves,\(^a\) and it has been said that voluntary acts are all such as are committed with knowledge of the case.\(^b\) Hence it necessarily follows that all accusations concern the State or the individual, the accused having acted either ignorantly and against his will, or voluntarily and with knowledge, and in the latter case with malice aforethought or from passion. We will speak of anger when we come to treat of the passions,\(^c\) and we have already stated \(^d\) in what circumstances and with what dispositions men act with deliberate purpose.

But since a man, while admitting the fact, often denies the description of the charge or the point on which it turns—for instance, admits that he took something, but did not steal it; that he was the first to strike, but committed no outrage; that he had relations, but did not commit adultery, with a woman; or that he stole something but was not guilty of sacrilege, since the object in question was not consecrated; or that he trespassed, but not on public land; or that he held converse with the enemy, but was not guilty of treason—for this reason it will be necessary that a definition should be given of theft, outrage, or adultery, in order that, if we desire to prove that an offence has or has not been committed, we may be able to put the case in a true light. In all such instances the question at issue is to know whether the supposed offender is a wrong-doer and a worthless person, or not; for vice and
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η μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄνομάτων προσσημαίνει τὴν προαιρέσιν, οἶνον ὑβρις καὶ κλοπή: οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξε, πάντως ὑβρισεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἔνεκα του, οἶνον τοῦ ἀτύμασαι ἐκεῖνον ἡ αὐτὸς ἁσθήναι. οὐδὲ πάντως, εἰ λάθρα ἔλαβεν, ἐκλεψεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβη καὶ σφετερισμῷ ἐαυτοῦ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει, ὡσπερ καὶ περὶ τούτων.

11 'Επεὶ δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἢν δύο εἴδη (τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγραμμένα τὰ δ' ἀγραφά), περὶ δὲν μὲν οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν εὑρήται, τῶν δ' ἀγράφων δύο ἐστὶν εἴδη: ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, ἐφ' οἷς ὀνείδη καὶ ἐπαινοῦ καὶ ἀτυμία καὶ τιμαί καὶ δωρεαί, οἷον τὸ χάριν ἔχειν τῷ ποιήσαντι εὖ καὶ ἀντευποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιήσαντα καὶ βοηθητικὸν εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἱδίου νόμου καὶ

12 γεγραμμένου ἔλλειμμα. τὸ γὰρ ἑπιεικὲς δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἐστὶ δὲ ἑπιεικὲς τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δίκαιον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἀκόντων τὰ δὲ ἐκόντων τῶν νομοθετῶν, ἀκόντων μὲν ὅταν λάθη, ἐκόντων δ' ὅταν μὴ δύνανται διορίσαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ἢ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, μὴ ἢ δὲ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. καὶ ὅσα

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a Roemer reads, after Dittmeyer, εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ [τούτου ἀφ' οὗ ἔλαβε] καὶ . . . from the old Latin translation.

b Laws are special and general, the former being written or unwritten. The unwritten law, again, is of two kinds: (1) general; (2) supplementary to the special written law. This general law (not the same as the general law “based upon nature”) § 2) refers to acts which go beyond the legal standard of virtuous or vicious acts and are characterized by
wrongdoing consist in the moral purpose, and such terms as outrage and theft further indicate purpose; for if a man has struck, it does not in all cases follow that he has committed an outrage, but only if he has struck with a certain object, for instance, to bring disrepute upon the other or to please himself. Again, if a man has taken something by stealth, it is by no means certain that he has committed theft, but only if he has taken it to injure another or to get something for himself. It is the same in all other cases as in these.

We have said that there are two kinds of just and unjust actions (for some are written, but others are unwritten), and have spoken of those concerning which the laws are explicit; of those that are unwritten there are two kinds. One kind arises from an excess of virtue or vice, which is followed by praise or blame, honour or dishonour, and rewards; for instance, to be grateful to a benefactor, to render good for good, to help one's friends, and the like; the other kind contains what is omitted in the special written law. For that which is equitable seems to be just, and equity is justice that goes beyond the written law. These omissions are sometimes involuntary, sometimes voluntary, on the part of the legislators; involuntary when it may have escaped their notice, voluntary when, being unable to define for all cases, they are obliged to make a universal statement, which is not applicable to all, but only to most, cases; and whenever it is difficult to give a remarkable degree (καθε' υπερβολήν) of virtue or the opposite. For these laws do not prescribe any special reward or punishment, but acts are praised or blamed, honoured or dishonoured, rewarded or punished, in accordance with the general feeling of mankind.
μὴ πέδιον διορίσαι δι’ ἀπειρίαν, οἷον τὸ τρῶσαι σιδήρῳ τηλίκῳ καὶ ποίῳ τυι’ ὑπολείποι γὰρ ἂν

14 ὁ αἰών διαρθμοῦντα. ἂν οὖν ἤ ἀδιόριστον, δὲν ἐνομοθετῆσαι, ἀνάγκη ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ὥστε καὶν ἀνατύλιον ἔχων ἐπάρηται τὴν χείρα ἡ πατάξῃ, κατὰ μὲν τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον ἐνοχός ἐστι καὶ ἄδικεί, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἄδικεί, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς τούτῳ ἐστὶν.

15 Εἰ δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, φανερὸν ποιά ἐστι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ ποιοὶ

16 οὐκ ἐπιεικεῖς ἀνθρωποί· ἐφ’ ὦς τε γὰρ δεὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἐπιεικὴς ταύτα, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἀμαρτή-

ματα καὶ τὰ ἁδικήματα μὴ τοῦ ἰσον ἄξιον, μηδὲ τὰ ἀτυχήματα· ἐστι δ’ ἀτυχήματα μὲν ὁσα παρά-

λογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἀμαρτήματα δὲ ὁσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἁδικήματα
dὲ ὁσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τ’ ἐστίν·

17 τὰ γὰρ δι’ ἐπιθυμιάν ἀπὸ πονηρίας. καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγνώμοσκεῖν ἐπιεικές. καὶ τὸ μὴ

πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἄλλα πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην σκοπεῖν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἄλλα πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν

tοῦ νομοθέτου, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὴν πράξειν ἄλλα πρὸς

18 τὴν προαίρεσιν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸ μέρος ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ ὄλον, μηδὲ ποιός τις νῦν, ἄλλα ποιός τις ἦν

ἀεὶ ἢ ὥσ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. καὶ τὸ μημομενεύειν μᾶλλον ὃν ἐπαθεὶν ἄγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, καὶ ἁγαθῶν ὃν

ἐπαθεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐποίησεν. καὶ τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἁδικούμενον. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον λόγῳ ἑθέλειν κρί-

19 νεοθαὶ ἡ ἐργῳ. καὶ τὸ εἰς δίαιταν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς
dίκην βουλεύσθαι ἱέναι· ὁ γὰρ διαίτητης τὸ ἐπιεικὲς

a “Inexperience” (Jebb).
a definition owing to the infinite number of cases, as, for instance, the size and kind of an iron instrument used in wounding; for life would not be long enough to reckon all the possibilities. If then no exact definition is possible, but legislation is necessary, one must have recourse to general terms; so that, if a man wearing a ring lifts up his hand to strike or actually strikes, according to the written law he is guilty of wrongdoing, but in reality he is not; and this is a case for equity.

If then our definition of equity is correct, it is easy to see what things and persons are equitable or not. Actions which should be leniently treated are cases for equity; errors, wrong acts, and misfortunes, must not be thought deserving of the same penalty. Misfortunes are all such things as are unexpected and not vicious; errors are not unexpected, but are not vicious; wrong acts are such as might be expected and vicious, for acts committed through desire arise from vice. And it is equitable to pardon human weaknesses, and to look, not to the law but to the legislator; not to the letter of the law but to the intention of the legislator; not to the action itself, but to the moral purpose; not to the part, but to the whole; not to what a man is now, but to what he has been, always or generally; to remember good rather than ill treatment, and benefits received rather than those conferred; to bear injury with patience; to be willing to appeal to the judgement of reason rather than to violence; to prefer arbitration to the law court, for the arbitrator keeps equity in view, whereas the dicast looks

"To be willing that a judicial sentence should be nominal rather than real" (Jebb).
14. Ἀδίκημα δὲ μεῖζον, ὅσω ἂν ἀπὸ μεῖζονος ἢ ἀδικίας· διὸ καὶ τὰ ἐλάχιστα μέγιστα, ὅπως τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἱσχύῃ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον.

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a i. 7. 13. Callistratus and Melanopus were rival orators. Nothing is known of this particular charge.
b The magistrates who superintended the building and repairing operations.
c Understanding ἵσσθαι. Or "to punish adequately," supplying οὐ μὴ ἢσθι τιμωρία.
d An orator, not the tragic poet.
e "Or has been seldom paralleled" (Cope, but cp. i. 9. 38).
only to the law, and the reason why arbitrators were appointed was that equity might prevail. Let this manner of defining equity suffice.

14. Wrong acts are greater in proportion to the injustice from which they spring. For this reason the most trifling are sometimes the greatest, as in the charge brought by Callistratus a against Melanopus that he had fraudulently kept back three consecrated half-obols from the temple-builders b; whereas, in the case of just actions, it is quite the contrary. The reason is that the greater potentially inheres in the less; for he who has stolen three consecrated half-obols will commit any wrong whatever. Wrong acts are judged greater sometimes in this way, sometimes by the extent of the injury done. A wrong act is greater when there is no adequate punishment for it, but all are insufficient; when there is no remedy, because it is difficult if not impossible to repair it; c and when the person injured cannot obtain legal satisfaction, since it is irremediable; for justice and punishment are kinds of remedies. And if the sufferer, having been wronged, has inflicted some terrible injury upon himself, the guilty person deserves greater punishment; wherefore Sophocles, d when pleading on behalf of Euctemon, who had committed suicide after the outrage he had suffered, declared that he would not assess the punishment at less than the victim had assessed it for himself. A wrong act is also greater when it is unprecedented, or the first of its kind, or when committed with the aid of few accomplices e; and when it has been frequently committed; or when because of it new prohibitions and penalties have been sought and found: thus, at Argos the citizen owing to whom a new
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νόμος τεθή καὶ δι’ οὐς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ὕκοδο-5 μήθη. καὶ τὸ θηριωδέστερον ἄδικημα μεῖζον. καὶ ὁ ἐκ προνοίας μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ οἱ ἀκούντες φοβοῦνται μᾶλλον ἡ ἔλεοσιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ῥητορικά ἐστι τουαῦτα, ὅτι πολλὰ ἀνήρηκε δίκαια ἡ ὑπερ-βέβηκεν, οἴον ὀρκοὺς δεξιὰς πίστεως ἐπιγαμίας. 6 πολλῶν γὰρ ἄδικημάτων ὑπεροχῆ. καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα ὡθ. κολάζονται οἱ ἄδικοντες, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ ψευδομαρτυροῦντες. ποὺ γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄδικήσειν, εἰ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ; καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς αἰσχύνη μάλιστα. καὶ εἰ τοῦτον ὑφ’ οὗ εὗ πέπονθεν. πλείω γὰρ ἄδικεῖ, ὅτι τε κακῶς ποιεῖ καὶ ὦτι οὐκ 7 εὖ. καὶ ὁ παρὰ τὰ ἄγραφα δίκαια. ἀμείνονος γὰρ μὴ δι᾽ ἀνάγκην δίκαιον εἶναι. τὰ μὲν οὖν γεγραμ-μένα εξ ἀνάγκης, τὰ δ’ ἄγραφα οὐ. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον, εἰ παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα. δ’ γὰρ τὰ φοβερὰ ἄδικῶν καὶ τὰ ἐπιζήμια καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐπιζήμια ἄδικήσειν ἂν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἄδικήματος μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττουνος εἰρηται.

15. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων ἔχόμενον ἐστὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπιδραμεῖν. ἦδαί γὰρ 2 αὕται τῶν δικανικῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν,

a And therefore the violation of them is more discreditable.
b When he thinks of the punishment they may entail.
law has been passed, is punished, as well as those on whose account a new prison had to be built. The crime is greater, the more brutal it is; or when it has been for a long time premeditated; when the recital of it inspires terror rather than pity. Rhetorical tricks of the following kind may be used:—the statement that the accused person has swept away or violated several principles of justice, for example, oaths, pledges of friendship, plighted word, the sanctity of marriage; for this amounts to heaping crime upon crime. Wrong acts are greater when committed in the very place where wrongdoers themselves are sentenced, as is done by false witnesses; for where would a man not commit wrong, if he does so in a court of justice? They are also greater when accompanied by the greatest disgrace; when committed against one who has been the guilty person's benefactor, for in that case, the wrongdoer is guilty of wrong twice over, in that he not only does wrong, but does not return good for good. So too, again, when a man offends against the unwritten laws of right, for there is greater merit in doing right without being compelled; now the written laws involve compulsion, the unwritten do not. Looked at in another way, wrongdoing is greater, if it violates the written laws; for a man who commits wrongs that alarm him and involve punishment, will be ready to commit wrong for which he will not be punished. Let this suffice for the treatment of the greater or less degree of wrongdoing.

15. Following on what we have just spoken of, we have now briefly to run over what are called the inartificial proofs, for these properly belong to forensic oratory. These proofs are five in number: laws,
Although the use of inartificial proofs is almost entirely confined to forensic oratory, they may be used in deliberative oratory.

b The first line is quoted i. 13. 2. The second differs somewhat from Sophocles (Antigone, 458), where the passage runs, τούτων ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔμελλον, ἄνδρος οὐδενός | φρόνημα δείσας', ἐν θεοὶ τὴν δίκην | δάσειν ("I was not likely, through fear of the
witnesses, contracts, torture, oaths. Let us first then speak of the laws, and state what use should be made of them when exhorting or dissuading, accuse or defending. For it is evident that, if the written law is contrary to our case, we must have recourse to the general law and equity, as more in accordance with justice; and we must argue that, when the dicast takes an oath to decide to the best of his judgement, he means that he will not abide rigorously by the written laws; that equity is ever constant and never changes, even as the general law, which is based on nature, whereas the written laws often vary (this is why Antigone in Sophocles justifies herself for having buried Polynices contrary to the law of Creon, but not contrary to the unwritten law):

For this law is not of now or yesterday, but is eternal . . . this I was not likely [to infringe through fear of the pride] of any man); and further, that justice is real and expedient, but not that which only appears just; nor the written law either, because it does not do the work of the law; that the judge is like an assayer of silver, whose duty is to distinguish spurious from genuine justice; that it is the part of a better man to make use of and abide by the unwritten rather than the written law. Again, it is necessary to see whether the law is contradictory to another approved law or to itself; for instance, one law enacts that all con-
συνθώνται, δ' ἀπαγορεύει μὴ συντίθεσθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος, ὡστε στρέφειν καὶ ὅραν ἐφ' ὁποτέραν τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἐφ' ἀρμόσει ἡ τὸ συμφέρον, εἶτα τούτω χρῆσθαι. καὶ εἰ τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἐφ' οἷς ἔτέθη ὁ νόμος μηκέτι μένει, ὁ δὲ νόμος, πειρατέον τοῦτο δηλοῦν καὶ μάχεσθαι ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν νόμον. ἐὰν δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος ἢ πρὸς τὸ πράγμα, τὸ τε γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστῃ λεκτέον ὅτι οὐ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἐνεκα δικάζειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἵνα, ἐὰν ἀγνοήητι τι λέγει ὁ νόμος, μὴ ἐπιορκῇ. καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν αἱρεῖται οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτῷ. καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἡ μὴ κείσθαι ἡ μὴ χρῆσθαι. καὶ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐ λυσιτελεῖ παρασοφίζεσθαι τὸν ἰατρόν· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἡ ἀμαρτία τοῦ ἰατροῦ ὅσον τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἀρχοντὶ. καὶ ὅτι τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφώτερον ξητεῖν εἶναι, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὅ ἐν τοῖς ἑπανουμένοις νόμοις ἀπαγορεύεται. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων οὕτω διωρίσθων.

13 Περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, μάρτυρες εἰςι διττοὶ, οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ οἱ δὲ πρόσφατοι, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν μετέχοντες τοῦ κεδυόν οἱ δ' ἐκτός. λέγω δὲ παλαιοὺς μὲν τοὺς τε ποιητὰς καὶ ὅσων ἄλλων γνωρίμων εἰςι κρίσεις φανερά, οἶδον Ἀθηναίοι Ὀμήρῳ μάρτυρι ἐχρῆσαντο περὶ Σαλαμίνως καὶ Τενεδίων ἔναγχος Περιάνδρω τῷ Κορινθίῳ πρὸς

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a Αἰας δ' ἐκ Σαλαμίνως ἔγεν δυναίδεκα νῆας, | στήσε δ' ἄγων ἐν Ἀθηναίων ἱσταντὸ φαλαγγεῖς, Iliad, ii. 557-8. The Lacedaemonians, acting as arbitrators between Athens and Megara, who were fighting for the possession of Salamis, decided in favour of Athens on the strength of the two lines in the Iliad, which were taken to show that Salamis belonged to Athens.
tracts should be binding, while another forbids making contracts contrary to the law. If the meaning of the law is equivocal, we must turn it about, and see in which way it is to be interpreted so as to suit the application of justice or expediency, and have recourse to that. If the conditions which led to the enactment of the law are now obsolete, while the law itself remains, one must endeavour to make this clear and to combat the law by this argument. But if the written law favours our case, we must say that the oath of the dicast "to decide to the best of his judgement" does not justify him in deciding contrary to the law, but is only intended to relieve him from the charge of perjury, if he is ignorant of the meaning of the law; that no one chooses that which is good absolutely, but that which is good for himself; that there is no difference between not using the laws and their not being enacted; that in the other arts there is no advantage in trying to be wiser than the physician, for an error on his part does not do so much harm as the habit of disobeying the authority; that to seek to be wiser than the laws is just what is forbidden in the most approved laws. Thus much for the laws.

Witnesses are of two kinds, ancient and recent; of the latter some share the risk of the trial, others are outside it. By ancient I mean the poets and men of repute whose judgements are known to all; for instance, the Athenians, in the matter of Salamis, appealed to Homer as a witness, and recently the inhabitants of Tenedos to Periander of Corinth. It was reported that the second line was the invention of Solon. 

b It is not known to what this refers.
Σιγειέης. καὶ Κλεοφῶν κατὰ Κριτίου τοὺς Σόλωνος ἐλεγείους ἔχρησατο, λέγων ὅτι πάλαι ἀσελγῆς ἡ οἰκία· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτὲ ἐποίησε Σόλων

εἶπεν μοι Κριτία πυρρότριχο πατρὸς ἀκούειν.

14 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν γενομένων οἱ τοιοῦτοι μάρτυρες, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ οἱ χρησμολόγωι, οἳν Θεμιστοκλῆς, ὅτι ναυμαχτέον, τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος λέγων. ἔτι καὶ αἱ παρομίαι, ὡσπερ εἰρηταί, μαρτύρων ἐστὶν· οἳοι εἰ τὶς συμβουλεύει μὴ ποιεῖσθαι φίλον γέροντα, τούτω μαρτυρεῖ ἡ παρομία, μὴποτ' εὖ ἐρδεῖν γέροντα.

καὶ τὸ τοὺς υἱοὺς ἀναρεῖν ὃν καὶ τοὺς πατέρας,

νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει.

15 Πρόσφατοι δ’ ὅσοι γνώριμοι τι κεκρίκασοι· χρῆσιμοι γὰρ αἱ τοῦτων κρίσεις τοῖς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν· οἵον Εὐβουλος ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἔχρησατο κατὰ Χάρητος ὁ Πλάτων εἴπε πρὸς Ἀρχίβιον, ὅτι ἐπιδείδωκεν ἐν τῇ πόλει

16 τὸ ὁμολογεῖν ποιηροῦσι εἶναι· καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου, ἀν δόξωσι ψεύδεσθαι. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτοι τῶν τοιοῦτων μόνον μάρτυρες εἶσων, εἰ

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a (Frag. 22, P.L.G. ii., where the line runs, εἰπέμεναι Κριτία ἐναθότριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν). The Critias attacked by Cleophon is the well-known oligarch and grandson of the first. Cleophon argued from the phrase “bid him listen to his father” that his ancestor was a disobedient son and a degenerate. In reality, Solon had a high opinion of the family, and probably meant to praise the father.

b Herodotus, vii. 141.

c They have not been mentioned before. Spengel would therefore omit εἰρηταί, and remove the commas: “proverbs are, as it were, evidence.”

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against the Sigeans. Cleophon also made use of the elegiacs of Solon against Critias, to prove that his family had long been notorious for licentiousness, otherwise Solon would never have written:

Bid me the fair-haired Critias listen to his father.\(^a\)

One should appeal to such witnesses for the past, but also to interpreters of oracles for the future; thus, for instance, Themistocles interpreted the wooden wall to mean that they must fight at sea.\(^b\) Further, proverbs, as stated,\(^c\) are evidence; for instance, if one man advises another not to make a friend of an old man, he can appeal to the proverb,

Never do good to an old man.

And if he advises another to kill the children, after having killed the fathers, he can say,

Foolish is he who, having killed the father, suffers the children to live.\(^d\)

By recent witnesses I mean all well-known persons who have given a decision on any point, for their decisions are useful to those who are arguing about similar cases. Thus, for instance, Eubulus,\(^e\) when attacking Chares in the law courts, made use of what Plato said against Archibius, namely, "that the open confession of wickedness had increased in the city." And those who share the risk of the trial, if they are thought to be perjurers. Such witnesses only serve to establish whether an act has taken place or

\(^a\) From the \textit{Cypria} of Stasinus, of the "epic cycle."
\(^b\) Opponent of Demosthenes. Chares was an Athenian commander, both naval and military. Nothing is known of Archibius. Plato is probably the comic poet.
 Aristotle

gέγονεν ἣ μή, εἰ ἔστιν ἣ μή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιῶν οὐ μάρτυρες, οἷον εἰ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, εἰ συμφέρον
17 ἢ ἀσύμφορον· οἱ δ’ ἰπωθεὶ καὶ περὶ τούτων πιστότατοι. πιστότατοι δ’ οἱ παλαιοί· ἀδιάφθοροι γάρ. πιστώματα δὲ περὶ μάρτυριῶν μάρτυρας μὲν μὴ ἔχοντι, ὧτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων δεὶ κρίνειν καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστῃ, καὶ ὧτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατήσαι τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίῳ, καὶ ὧτι οὐχ ἀλλικεται τὰ εἰκότα ψευδομάρτυρῶν. ἔχοντι δὲ πρὸς μὴ ἔχοντα, ὧτι οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα, καὶ ὧτι οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει μάρτυριῶν, εἰ ἐκ τῶν λόγων
18 ἐκανὼν ἢν θεωρήσαι. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μάρτυρίαι αἱ μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἁμώμοβητοῦντος, καὶ αἱ μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἥθους, ὡστε φανερὸν ὧτι οὐδέποτ’ ἔστιν ἀπορήσαι μάρτυρια χρησίμης· εἰ μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν πράγματος ἢ αὐτῶ ὀμολογομενῆς ἢ τῷ ἁμώμοβητοῦντι ἐναντίας, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἥθους ἢ αὐτοῦ εἰς ἐπιείκειαν ἢ τοῦ ἁμώμοβητοῦντος εἰς φαυλότητα.
19 τὰ δ’ ἀλλὰ περὶ μάρτυρος ἢ φίλου ἢ ἐχθροῦ ἢ μεταξῦ, ἢ εὐδικόμεντος ἢ ἄδοξόντος ἢ μεταξὺ, καὶ ὡσεὶ ἀλλαὶ τοιαῦται διαφοραί, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων λεκτέων ἐξ οὕωντερ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγομεν.
20 Περὶ δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν τοσαῦτη τοῦ λόγου χρη-
1376 b σίς ἐστιν ὅσον αὐξεῖν ἢ καθαίρειν ἢ πιστᾶσ ποιεῖν

a Or, “witnesses wholly unconnected with the case.”

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not, whether it is or is not the case; but if it is a question of the quality of the act, for instance, whether it is just or unjust, expedient or inexpedient, they are not competent witnesses; but witnesses from a distance are very trustworthy even in regard to this. But ancient witnesses are the most trustworthy of all, for they cannot be corrupted. In regard to the confirmation of evidence, when a man has no witnesses, he can say that the decision should be given in accordance with probabilities, and that this is the meaning of the oath "according to the best of one's judgement"; that probabilities cannot be bribed to deceive, and that they cannot be convicted of bearing false witness. But if a man has witnesses and his adversary has none, he can say that probabilities incur no responsibility, and that there would have been no need of evidence, if an investigation according to the arguments were sufficient. Evidence partly concerns ourselves, partly our adversary, as to the fact itself or moral character; so that it is evident that one never need lack useful evidence. For, if we have no evidence as to the fact itself, neither in confirmation of our own case nor against our opponent, it will always be possible to obtain some evidence as to character that will establish either our own respectability or the worthlessness of our opponent. As for all the other questions relative to a witness, whether he is a friend, an enemy, or neutral, of good or bad or middling reputation, and for all other differences of this kind, we must have recourse to the same topics as those from which we derive our enthymemes.

As for contracts, argument may be used to the extent of magnifying or minimizing their importance,
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΕ

η ἀπίστους, ἕαν μὲν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχωσι, πιστὰς καὶ
cυρίας, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος τούναντίον.
21 πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πιστὰς η ἀπίστους κατασκευάζειν
οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῆς περὶ τοὺς μάρτυρας πραγ-
ματείας· ὁποίοι γὰρ ἂν τινες ὄσοι οἱ ἐπιγεγραμ-
μένοι ἡ φυλάττοντες, τούτοις αἱ συνθήκαι πισταὶ
eἰσιν. ὁμολογουμένης δὲ εἶναι τῆς συνθήκης,
oικείας μὲν οὕσης αὐξητέου· η γὰρ συνθήκη νόμος
ἐστὶν ἤδιος καὶ κατὰ μέρος, καὶ αἱ μὲν συνθήκαι
οὐ ποιοῦσι τὸν νόμον κύριον, οἱ δὲ νόμοι τὰς κατὰ
tὸν νόμον συνθήκας. καὶ ὅλως αὐτὸς ὁ νόμος
συνθήκη τις ἐστὶν, ὡστε ὅστις ἀπιστεῖ ἣ ἀναιρεῖ
22 συνθήκην, τοὺς νόμους ἀναιρεῖ. ἔτι δὲ πράττε-
tαι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἐκοῦσα
κατὰ συνθήκας, ὡστε ἀκύρων γιγαντιῶν ἀναι-
ρεῖται ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρεία τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
καὶ τὰλα δὲ ὅσα ἁρμόττει, ἐπιπολῆς ἱδεῖν ἐστὶν.
23 ἂν δ' ἐναντία ἢ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντων,
πρῶτον μὲν, ἀπερ ἂν τις πρὸς νόμον ἐναντίον μα-
χέσαιτο, ταῦθ' ἁρμόττει· ἀτοποπὸν γὰρ εἰ τοῖς μὲν
νόμοις, ὧν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ὅσον ἄλλ' ἔξαμάρ-
tωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, οὐκ οἴμεθα δεῖν πείθεσθαι,
24 ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ἀναγκαῖον. εἴθ' ὅτι τοῦ δικαίου
ἐστὶ βραβευτὴς ὁ δικαστὴς· οὐκουν τούτο σκεπτέον,
25 ἄλλως δικαιότερον. καὶ τοῦ μὲν δικαίου οὐκ ἐστι
μεταστρέψαι οὔτ' ἀπάτη οὔτ' ἀνάγκη (πεφυκὸς
γὰρ ἐστιν), συνθήκαι δὲ γίγνονται καὶ ἔξαπατη-
θέντων καὶ ἀναγκασθέντων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
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of proving that they do or do not deserve credit. If we have them on our side, we must try to prove them worthy of credit and authoritative; but if they are on the side of our opponent, we must do the opposite. In view of rendering them worthy or unworthy of credit, the method of procedure is exactly the same as in the case of witnesses; for contracts are trustworthy according to the character of their signatories or depositaries. When the existence of the contract is admitted, if it is in our favour, we must strengthen it by asserting that the contract is a law, special and partial; and it is not the contracts that make the law authoritative, but it is the laws that give force to legal contracts. And in a general sense the law itself is a kind of contract, so that whoever disobeys or subverts a contract, subverts the laws. Further, most ordinary and all voluntary transactions are carried out according to contract; so that if you destroy the authority of contracts, the mutual intercourse of men is destroyed. All other arguments suitable to the occasion are easy to see. But if the contract is against us and in favour of our opponents, in the first place those arguments are suitable which we should oppose to the law if it were against us; that it would be strange if, while we consider ourselves entitled to refuse to obey ill-made laws, whose authors have erred, we should be obliged to consider ourselves always bound by contracts. Or, that the judge is the dispenser of justice; so that it is not the contents of the contract that he has to consider, but what is juster. Further, that one cannot alter justice either by fraud or compulsion, for it is based upon nature, whereas contracts may be entered into under both conditions.
σκοπεῖν εἰ ἐναντία ἔστι τιν ἡ τῶν γεγραμμένων νόμων ἡ τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἡ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἡ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, ἔπειτα εἰ ἄλλαις συνθήκαις ὑστέραις ἡ προτέραις· ἡ γὰρ αἱ ὑστέραι κύριαι, ἀκυροὶ δ’ αἱ προτέραι, ἡ αἱ προτέραι ὀρθαί, αἱ δ’ ὑστέραι ἡπατήκασιν, ὁποτέρως ἡν ἡ χρήσιμον. ἦτι δὲ τὸ συμφέρον ὅταν, εἰ τῇ ἐναντιοῦται τοῖς κριταῖς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα εὐθείωρητα ὁμοίως.

26 Αἱ δὲ βάσανοι μαρτυρίᾳ τινές εἰσιν, ἔχειν δὲ δοκοῦσι τὸ πιστὸν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τις πρόσεστιν. οὐκουν χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν τὰ εὐδεχόμενα, ἐξ ὧν ἐὰν τε υπάρξωσιν οἰκεῖαι αὐξεῖν ἑστιν, ὅτι ἀληθεῖς μόναι τῶν μαρτυριῶν εἰσὶν αὐταί· ἐὰν τε ὑπεναντίαν ὠσι καὶ μετα τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, διαλύοι ἂν τις τάληθη λέγων καθ’ ὅλου τοῦ γένους τῶν βασάνων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἤττον ἀναγκαζόμενοι τὰ ψευδὴ λέγων ἡ τάληθη, καὶ διακαρτηροῦντες μὴ λέγειν τάληθη, καὶ ῥαδίως καταψευδόμενοι ως παυσόμενοι βάπτων. δεὶ δ’ ἔχειν ἐπαναφέρειν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα γεγενημένα παραδείγματα ἢ ἱσασιν οἱ κρίνοντες. δεὶ δὲ λέγειν ὃς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς αἱ βάσανοι· πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ παχύφρονες, καὶ λιθόδερμοι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὀντες δυνατοὶ γενναίως ἐγκαρτηροῦσι ταῖς ἀνάγκαις, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ εὐλαβεῖς πρὸ τοῦ τὰς ἀνάγκας ἱδεῖν αὐτῶν καταθαρρόουσιν, ὥστε οὐδέν ἐστι πιστῶν ἐν βασάνοις.

1 This passage [δεὶ δ’ ἔχειν . . . βασάνοις], which is found in the best (Paris. Λε) ms., is now generally rejected, mainly as being linguistically un-Aristotelian.
In addition to this, we must examine whether the contract is contrary to any written law of our own or foreign countries, or to any general law, or to other previous or subsequent contracts. For either the latter are valid and the former not, or the former are right and the latter fraudulent; we may put it in whichever way it seems fit. We must also consider the question of expediency—whether the contract is in any way opposed to the interest of the judges. There are a number of other arguments of the same kind, which are equally easy to discern.

Torture is a kind of evidence, which appears trustworthy, because a sort of compulsion is attached to it. Nor is it difficult to see what may be said concerning it, and by what arguments, if it is in our favour, we can exaggerate its importance by asserting that it is the only true kind of evidence; but if it is against us and in favour of our opponent, we can destroy its value by telling the truth about all kinds of torture generally; for those under compulsion are as likely to give false evidence as true, some being ready to endure everything rather than tell the truth, while others are equally ready to make false charges against others, in the hope of being sooner released from torture. It is also necessary to be able to quote actual examples of the kind with which the judges are acquainted. It may also be said that evidence given under torture is not true; for many thick-witted and thick-skinned persons, and those who are stout-hearted heroically hold out under sufferings, while the cowardly and cautious, before they see the sufferings before them, are bold enough; wherefore evidence from torture may be considered utterly untrustworthy.
ARISTOTLE

27 Περὶ δ' ὀρκων τετραχῶς ἔστι διελείν· ἦ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ λαμβάνει, ἦ οὐδέτερον, ἦ τὸ μὲν τὸ δ' οὐ, καὶ τούτων ἦ δίδωσι μὲν οὐ λαμβάνει δὲ, ἦ λαμβάνει μὲν δίδωσι δ' οὐ, ἐτι ἄλλως παρὰ ταῦτα, εἰ ὀμῶμοσται οὔτος ἦ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἦ ὑπ'.

28 ἐκείνου. οὐ δίδωσι μὲν οὖν, οτι ραδίως ἐπιορκοῦσιν, καὶ διότι ὁ μὲν ὁμόσας οὐκ ἀποδίδωσι, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὁμόσαντος οἴεται καταδικάσεως. καὶ ὁς οὔτος ὁ κίνδυνος κρείττων ὢ ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς·

29 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πιστεύει τῷ δ' οὐ. οὐ λαμβάνει δ', ὃτι ἄντι χρημάτων ὀρκο **) καὶ ὃτι ἐν ἣν φαύλος, κατωμόσατο ἀν' κρείττων γὰρ ἐνεκά του φαύλου εἶναι ἡ μηδενός: ὁμός μὲν οὖν ἔξει, μὴ ὁμός μὲν οὔ. οὔτω δὲ δὶ' ἀρετήν ἃν εἶη, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' ἐπιορκίαν τὸ μὴ. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους ἁρμόττει, ὃτι οὐκ ὑπ' ἀρκλησις αὕτη ἀσεβεῖ πρὸς εὐσεβή, ἀλλ' ὁμοία καὶ εἰ ὑσχυρὸς ἀσθενή πατάξαι ἐν πληγήματι προκαλέσατο. εἰ δὲ λαμβάνει, ὃτι πιστεύει αὐτῷ, ἐκείνῳ δ' οὐ. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους μεταστρέψαντα φατέον οὔτως ὑπὸ εἶναι ἃν ὁ μὲν ἀσεβῆς διδῶ, ὁ δ' εὐσεβῆς ὁμοῦ. δεινὸν

a In Attic legal procedure, the challenge (προκλησις) to take an oath on the question at issue was one method of deciding it. One party offered the other something to swear by (δίδωσι ὁρκον), this being the real meaning of ὁρκος, and the other party either accepted (λαμβάνει, δέχεται) it or refused it. Both parties, of their own accord, might propose to take the oath.

b There are three reasons for not tendering the oath: (1) men are always ready to perjure themselves, if they are likely to benefit by doing so; (2) if your adversary takes the oath, he will decline to pay, trusting that he will be acquitted, whereas, if he is not on his oath, he will probably be condemned; (3) there is less risk in leaving the decision to the dicasts, who can be trusted.

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RHETORIC, I. xv. 27–30

As to oaths four divisions may be made; for either we tender an oath and accept it, or we do neither, or one without the other, and in the last case we either tender but do not accept, or accept but do not tender. Besides this, one may consider whether the oath has already been taken by us or by the other party. If you do not tender the oath to the adversary, it is because men readily perjure themselves, and because, after he has taken the oath, he will refuse to repay the money, while, if he does not take the oath, you think that the dicasts will condemn him; and also because the risk incurred in leaving the decision to the dicasts is preferable, for you have confidence in them, but not in your adversary. If you refuse to take the oath yourself, you may argue that the oath is only taken with a view to money; that, if you had been a scoundrel, you would have taken it at once, for it is better to be a scoundrel for something than for nothing; that, if you take it, you will win your case, if not, you will probably lose it; consequently, your refusal to take it is due to moral excellence, not to fear of committing perjury. And the apophthegm of Xenophanes is apposite—that "it is unfair for an impious man to challenge a pious one," for it is the same as a strong man challenging a weak one to hit or be hit. If you accept the oath, you may say that you have confidence in yourself, but not in your opponent, and, reversing the apophthegm of Xenophanes, that the only fair way is that the impious man should tender the oath and the pious man take it; and that it

Born at Colophon in Asia Minor, he migrated to Elea in Italy, where he founded the Eleatic school of philosophy.
The defence in such cases is: (1) that the previous oath was taken as the result of fraud or compulsion; (2) that you did not mean what you said.
would be monstrous to refuse to take the oath yourself, while demanding that the judges should take it before giving their verdict. But if you tender the oath, you may say that it is an act of piety to be willing to leave the matter to the gods; that your opponent has no need to look for other judges, for you allow him to make the decision himself; and that it would be ridiculous that he should be unwilling to take an oath in cases where he demands that the dicasts should take one.

Now, since we have shown how we must deal with each case individually, it is clear how we must deal with them when taken two and two; for instance, if we wish to take the oath but not to tender it, to tender it but not to take it, to accept and tender it, or to do neither the one nor the other. For such cases, and similarly the arguments, must be a combination of those already mentioned. And if we have already taken an oath which contradicts the present one, we may argue that it is not perjury; for whereas wrongdoing is voluntary, and perjury is wrongdoing, what is done in error or under compulsion is involuntary. Here we must draw the conclusion that perjury consists in the intention, not in what is said. But if the opponent has taken such an oath, we may say that one who does not abide by what he has sworn subverts everything, for this is the reason why the dicasts take an oath before applying the laws; and [we may make this appeal]: "They demand that you abide by your oath as judges, while they themselves do not abide by theirs." Further, we should employ all means of amplification. Let this suffice for the inartificial proofs.
1. 'Ek tīnov mēn oṅv deī kai protrepein kai ἀποτρέπειν kai ἐπανεῖν kai ψέγειν kai κατηγορεῖν kai ἀπολογεῖσθαι, kai poīai dōzai kai protáseis χρῆσιμοι πρὸς τὰς τούτων πίστεις, ταῦτ’ ἔστιν· περὶ γὰρ τούτων kai ἐκ τούτων τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ὡς περὶ ἑκαστον εἰπεῖν ἴδια τὸ γένος τῶν λόγων.

2 ἔπει δ’ ἐνεκα κρίσεως ἔστιν ἡ ῥήτορική (καὶ γὰρ τὰς συμβουλὰς κρίνουσι καὶ ἡ δίκη κρίσις ἔστιν), ἀνάγκη μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὅρᾶν, ὡς ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται καὶ πιστός, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ποιόν τινα καὶ τὸν κριτήν κατασκευάζειν, πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει πρὸς πίστιν, μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς, ἐντα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δίκαις, τὸ ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ τὸ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἔχειν πως αὐτὸν, πρὸς δὲ τούτως ἐὰν καὶ αὐτοὶ διακείμενοι πως τυγχάνωσιν. τὸ μὲν ὀὖν ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα χρησμώτερον

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*a* This is Cope’s interpretation. Jebb renders: “If we take each branch of Rhetoric by itself.” The classes are of course the deliberative, forensic, and epideictic.

*b* The instructions given for enthymematic or logical proof should suffice; but since the function of Rhetoric is to find the available means of persuasion and its end is a judgement; and since an appeal to the speaker’s own character and to the passions of those who are to give the judgement is bound to carry great weight, the speaker must be provided with rules for ethical and “pathetic” (emotional) proofs. In i. 5
BOOK II

1. Such then are the materials which we must employ in exhorting and dissuading, praising and blaming, accusing and defending, and such are the opinions and propositions that are useful to produce conviction in these circumstances; for they are the subject and source of enthymemes, which are specially suitable to each class (so to say) of speeches.

But since the object of Rhetoric is judgement—for judgements are pronounced in deliberative rhetoric and judicial proceedings are a judgement—it is not only necessary to consider how to make the speech itself demonstrative and convincing, but also that the speaker should show himself to be of a certain character and should know how to put the judge into a certain frame of mind. For it makes a great difference with regard to producing conviction—especially in demonstrative, and, next to this, in forensic oratory—that the speaker should show himself to be possessed of certain qualities and that his hearers should think that he is disposed in a certain way towards them; and further, that they themselves should be disposed in a certain way towards him. In deliberative oratory, it is more useful that the orator Aristotle mentions appeals to the emotions with disapproval, but this does not apply to all such appeals, but only to those which are likely to bias the judges unfairly (e.g. stirring up envy, hatred, a desire for revenge).
eis tαs συμβουλάς ἐστιν, το δὲ διακείσθαι πως τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς δίκας· οὐ γὰρ ταύτα φαίνεται φιλούσι καὶ μισοῦσιν, οὔτ' ὄργιζομένους καὶ πράως ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ τὸ παράπαν ἔτερα ἡ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος ἔτερα· τῷ μὲν γὰρ φιλούντι, περὶ οὗ ποιεῖται τὴν κρίσιν, ἡ οὐκ ἄδικειν ἡ μικρὰ δοκεῖ ἄδικειν, τῷ δὲ μισοῦντι τοῦναντίον καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντι καὶ εὐέλπιδι ὑντί, ἕαν ἡ τὸ ἐσόμενον ἡδὺ, καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι φαίνεται, τῷ δ' ἀπαθεῖ καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι τοῦναντίον.

5 Τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ εἶναι πιστοὺς τοὺς λέγοντας τρία ἐστὶ τὰ αὕτα· τοσαῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ δ' ἄ πιστεύομεν ἐξώ τῶν ἀποδείξεων. ἔστι δὲ ταύτα φρόνησι καὶ ἀρετή καὶ εὐνοια· διαφεύγονται γὰρ περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν ἡ συμβουλεύουσιν ἡ διὰ πάντα τὰ ταύτα ἡ διὰ τούτων τι· ἡ γὰρ δ' ἀφροσύνην οὐκ ὀρθῶς δοξάζουσιν, ἡ δοξάζουσιν ὀρθῶς διὰ μοχ-θηρίαν οὐ τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγουσιν, ἡ φρόνιμοι μὲν καὶ ἐπιευκεῖς εἰσιν ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐνοι· διότερ ἐνδε-χεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν γιγνώσκοντας καὶ παρὰ ταύτα οὐδέν· ἀνάγκη ἃ ἂν τὸν ἄπαντα δοκοῦντα ταύτ' ἐχειν εἶναι τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις

7 πιστῶν. ὅθεν μὲν τοῖνυν φρόνιμοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι φανεῖν ἂν, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διηρημένων ληπτέον· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ καὶ ἔτερον τις καὶ ἐαυτὸν κατασκευάσει τοιοῦτον· περὶ δ' εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθῃ λεκτέον.

a Opposed to εὐλπίδι. Others render "in a bad humour."

b ἐπιευκής and σπουδαῖος both = ἀγαθός. In a restricted sense ἐπιευκής is "respectable," σπουδαῖος "serious."

c i. 9.

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should appear to be of a certain character, in forensic, that the hearer should be disposed in a certain way; for opinions vary, according as men love or hate, are wrathful or mild, and things appear either altogether different, or different in degree; for when a man is favourably disposed towards one on whom he is passing judgement, he either thinks that the accused has committed no wrong at all or that his offence is trifling; but if he hates him, the reverse is the case. And if a man desires anything and has good hopes of getting it, if what is to come is pleasant, he thinks that it is sure to come to pass and will be good; but if a man is unemotional or not hopeful \(^a\) it is quite the reverse.

For the orator to produce conviction three qualities are necessary; for, independently of demonstrations, the things which induce belief are three in number. These qualities are good sense, virtue, and goodwill; for speakers are wrong both in what they say and in the advice they give, because they lack either all three or one of them. For either through want of sense they form incorrect opinions, or, if their opinions are correct, through viciousness they do not say what they think, or, if they are sensible and good, \(^b\) they lack goodwill; wherefore it may happen that they do not give the best advice, although they know what it is. These qualities are all that are necessary, so that the speaker who appears to possess all three will necessarily convince his hearers. The means whereby he may appear sensible and good \(^b\) must be inferred from the classification of the virtues; \(^c\) for to make himself appear such he would employ the same means as he would in the case of others. We must now speak of goodwill and friendship in our discussion of the emotions.
8 ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη, δι' ὃσα μεταβάλλοντες δια-
férouντι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις, οἷς ἔπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἰον ὄργη ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὃσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.
9 καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐναντία. δεὶ δὲ διαφεῖν τὰ περὶ ἑκαστὸν εἰς τρία· λέγω δ' οἶον περὶ ὄργης, πῶς ἔπεις ἀριθμοὶ ὄργεῖον, καὶ τίς εἰσδόθη ὄργεῖον, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἐν ἓ τὰ δύο ἑχομεν τούτων, ἀπαντᾶ δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον ἢν εἰπὴ τὴν ὄργην ἐμποίειν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων διεγράφαμεν τὰς προτάσεις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ποιήσωμεν καὶ διέλωμεν τὸν ἐιρήμενον τρόπον.

2. ἔστω δὴ ὄργη ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλυγωρίαν τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ὀλυγωρεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος. 2 εἰ δ' τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ ὄργη, ἀνάγκη τῶν ὄργιζομένων ὄργεῖον ὀδερθαὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκαστόν των, οἷον Κλέωνι 
1378 b ἀλλ' οὖν ἄνθρωπως, καὶ ὅτι αὐτόν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τι πεποίηκεν ἢ ἑκέλλευ, καὶ πάσῃ ὄργῇ ἐπεσθαί τυνα ἡδονήν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι· ἣδυ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἷεσθαι τεῦξεσθαι ἢν ἔφεσται, οὐδεὸς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων ἔφεσεν αὐτῷ, ὃ δ' ὄργιζομένος ἔφεσεν δυνατῶν αὐτῷ. διὸ καλῶς εἰρήται περὶ θυμοῦ ὃς τε πολὺ γλυκῶν μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσιν ἄξεσται·

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a In i. generally (cp. i. 2. 22).

b Gomperz translates φαινομένης “real or apparent”; Jebb omits φαινομένης and translates φαινομένην “apparent”; Cope confines both to the meaning “manifest.”

c Iliad, xviii. 109 (cp. i. 11. 9).
The emotions are all those affections which cause men to change their opinion in regard to their judgements, and are accompanied by pleasure and pain; such are anger, pity, fear, and all similar emotions and their contraries. And each of them must be divided under three heads; for instance, in regard to anger, the disposition of mind which makes men angry, the persons with whom they are usually angry, and the occasions which give rise to anger. For if we knew one or even two of these heads, but not all three, it would be impossible to arouse that emotion. The same applies to the rest. Just as, then, we have given a list of propositions in what we have previously said, we will do the same here and divide the emotions in the same manner.

2. Let us then define anger as a longing, accompanied by pain, for a real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent slight, affecting a man himself or one of his friends, when such a slight is undeserved. If this definition is correct, the angry man must always be angry with a particular individual (for instance, with Cleon, but not with men generally), and because this individual has done, or was on the point of doing, something against him or one of his friends; and lastly, anger is always accompanied by a certain pleasure, due to the hope of revenge to come. For it is pleasant to think that one will obtain what one aims at; now, no one aims at what is obviously impossible of attainment by him, and the angry man aims at what is possible for himself. Wherefore it has been well said of anger, that

Far sweeter than dripping honey down the throat it spreads in men's hearts.
Ακολούθει γὰρ καὶ ἡδονή τις διά τε τοῦτο καὶ
dιότι διατρίβουσιν ἐν τῷ τιμωρεῖσθαι τῇ διανοίᾳ·
ἡ οὖν τότε γνωμένη φαντασία ἡδονήν ἐμποιεῖ,
όσπερ ἡ τῶν ἐνυπνίων.

3 'Επεὶ δ' ἡ ὀλιγωρία ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια δόξης περὶ
tὸ μηδενὸς ἀξίων φαινόμενον· καὶ γὰρ τὰ κακὰ
cαὶ τάγαθα ἀξία οἴομεθα σπουδῆς εἶναι, καὶ τὰ
sυντείνοντα πρὸς αὐτὰ· ὡσα δὲ μηδὲν τι ἡ μικρόν,
οὐδενὸς ἀξία ὑπολαμβάνομεν. τρία δ' ἐστὶν εἴδη
ὀλιγωρίας, καταφρόνησις τε καὶ ἐπηρεασμὸς καὶ

4 ὑβρίς· ὁ τε γὰρ καταφρονῶν ὀλιγωρεῖ· ὡσα γὰρ
οἶονται μηδενὸς ἀξία, τούτων καταφρονοῦσιν, τῶν
dὲ μηδενὸς ἀξίων ὀλιγωροῦσιν· καὶ ὁ ἐπηρεάζων
φαίνεται καταφρονεῖν. ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐπηρεασμὸς
ἐμποδισμὸς ταῖς βουλήσεσιν οὐχ ἴνα τι αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ἴνα μὴ ἐκεῖνῳ.
ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐχ ἴνα αὐτῷ τι, ὀλι-

gωρεῖ· δήλον γὰρ ὅτι οὔτε βλάψειν ὑπολαμβάνει·
ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ ἀν καὶ οὐκ ὀλιγωρεῖ· οὔτε ὦφελήσαι
ἀν οὐδὲν ἀξίων λόγου· ἐφρόντιζε γὰρ ἂν ὡστε

5 ὁ ὑβρίζων δ' ὀλιγωρεῖ· ἐστὶ γὰρ ὑβρις τὸ
βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν1 ἐφ' οίς αἰσχύνῃ ἐστὶ τῷ

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1 Λε reads πράπτειν καὶ λέγειν, adopted by Roemer.

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a The thought of revenge in the future, as distinguished
from dwelling upon it in the present.

b Or, "those in which this tendency does not exist, or is
trifling."

c Or, "how to make him his friend," φίλος being for


φίλον

by attraction.

d In Attic law ὑβρις (insulting, degrading treatment) was

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for it is accompanied by a certain pleasure, for this reason first,\(^a\) and also because men dwell upon the thought of revenge, and the vision that rises before us produces the same pleasure as one seen in dreams.

Slighting is an actualization of opinion in regard to something which appears valueless; for things which are really bad or good, or tend to become so, we consider worthy of attention, but those which are of no importance or trifling\(^b\) we ignore. Now there are three kinds of slight: disdain, spitefulness, and insult. For he who disdains, slight\(s\), since men disdain those things which they consider valueless and slight what is of no account. And the spiteful man appears to show disdain; for spitefulness consists in placing obstacles in the way of another's wishes, not in order that any advantage may accrue to him who spites, but to prevent any accruing to the other. Since then he does not act in this manner from self-interest, it is a slight; for it is evident that he has no idea that the other is likely to hurt him, for in that case he would be afraid of him instead of slighting him; nor that he will be of any use to him worth speaking of, for in that case his thought would be how to become his friend.\(^c\)

Similarly, he who insults another also slight\(s\) him; for insult\(^d\) consists in causing injury or annoyance a more serious offence than \(aikia\) (bodily ill-treatment). It was the subject of a State criminal prosecution (\(γραφή\)), \(aikia\) of a private action (\(δίκη\)) for damages. The penalty was assessed in court, and might even be death. It had to be proved that the defendant struck the first blow (ii. 24. 9). One of the best known instances is the action brought by Demosthenes against Midias for a personal outrage on himself, when \(choregus\) of his tribe and responsible for the equipment of a chorus for musical competitions at public festivals.

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\(^a\)\(^b\)\(^c\)\(^d\)
πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γένηται αὐτῷ ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι ἐγένετο, ἄλλ᾽ ὅπως ἥσθη· οἱ γὰρ ἀντιποιοῦντες ὅ συχ ὑβρίζουσιν ἄλλα τιμωροῦνται. αὐτίον δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς τοῖς ὑβρίζουσιν, ὅτι οἶονται κακῶς δράντες αὐτῶς ὑπερέχειν μᾶλλον. διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ πλοῦσιοι ὑβρισταῖ· ὑπερέχειν γὰρ οἶονται ὑβρίζοντες. ὑβρεως δὲ ἀτμία, ὅ ὅ ἀτμιάζων ὀλίγωρεῖ· τὸ γὰρ μηθὲν ἄξιον οὐδεμίαν ἔχει τιμὴν, οὔτ' ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ. διὸ λέγει ὑργιζόμενος ὁ 'Αχιλλεὺς

ἡτίμησεν· ἐλών γὰρ ἔχει γέρας αὐτὸς καὶ

ὡςεὶ τω' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην,

7 ὡς διὰ ταύτα ὑργιζόμενος. προσήκειν δ' οἴονται πολυωρείσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡττόνων κατὰ γένος, κατὰ 1379α δύναμιν, κατ' ἁρετήν, καὶ ὅλως εὖ ὃ ἀν ταύτῳ ὑπερέχῃ πολύ, οἶον εὖ χρήμασιν ὁ πλοῦσιος πένητος καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν ῥητορικός ἀδυνάτου εἶπεὶ καὶ ἀρχὸν ἀρχομένου καὶ ἀρχεῖν ἄξιον οἰόμενος τοῦ ἀρχεσθαι ἄξιον. διὸ εὑρήται

θυμὸς δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφέων βασιλῆων καὶ

ἀλλὰ τε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον·

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a  Νιᾶδ, i. 356.
b  Νιᾶδ, ix. 648. μετανάστης, lit. "one who changes his home," used as a term of reproach (see also Glossary).
c  ταὐτῷ. Other readings are ταῦτα, or τις.
d  Νιᾶδ, ii. 196.
e  Νιᾶδ, i. 82. The words are those of the soothsayer Calchas to Achilles, and the reference is to Agamemnon.

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Rhetoric, II. 11. 5–7

whereby the sufferer is disgraced, not to obtain any other advantage for oneself besides the performance of the act, but for one’s own pleasure; for retaliation is not insult, but punishment. The cause of the pleasure felt by those who insult is the idea that, in ill-treating others, they are more fully showing superiority. That is why the young and the wealthy are given to insults; for they think that, in committing them, they are showing their superiority. Dishonour is characteristic of insult; and one who dishonours another slights him; for that which is worthless has no value, either as good or evil. Hence Achilles in his wrath exclaims:

He has dishonoured me, since he keeps the prize he has taken for himself, and

[has treated me] like a dishonoured vagrant,
as if being wrath for these reasons. Now men think that they have a right to be highly esteemed by those who are inferior to them in birth, power, and virtue, and generally, in whatever similar respect a man is far superior to another; for example, the rich man to the poor man in the matter of money, the eloquent to the incompetent speaker in the matter of oratory, the governor to the governed, and the man who thinks himself worthy to rule to one who is only fit to be ruled. Wherefore it has been said:

Great is the wrath of kings cherished by Zeus, and

Yet it may be that even afterwards he cherishes his resentment,
8 ἀγανακτοῦσι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ύπεροχὴν. ἔτι ὡς ἐὰν τις οἴεται εὐ πάσχειν δεῖν· οὕτω δέ εἰσὶν οὓς εὖ πεποίηκεν ἡ ποιεῖ, ἡ αὐτὸς ἡ δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν αὐτὸν τις, ἡ βούλεται ἡ ἐβουλήθη.

9 Φανερῶν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ἡδὴ πῶς τ᾽ ἔχοντες ὀργίζονται αὐτοὶ καὶ τίς καὶ διὰ ποία. αὐτοῖς μὲν γὰρ, ὅταν λυπῶνται· ἐφίεται γὰρ τινος δὲ λυπούμενος· εάν τε οὖν κατ᾽ εὐθυωρίαν ὀτιοῦν ἀντικρούσῃ τις, οἶον τῷ διψῶντι πρὸς τὸ πιεῖν, εάν τε μή, ὁμοίως ταύτῳ φαίνεται ποιεῖν· καὶ ἐάν τε ἀντιπράττῃ τις εάν τε μὴ συμπράττῃ εάν τε ἀλλο τῷ ἐνοχλή ὦτως ἔχοντα, τοῖς πάσιν ὀργίζονται. διὸ κάμνοντες, πενόμενοι, [πολεμοῦντες], ἐρῶντες, διψῶντες, ὅλως ἐπιθυμοῦντες καὶ μὴ κατορθοῦντες ὀργίλου εἰσὶ καὶ εὐπαρόμητοι, μάλιστα μὲν πρὸς τοὺς τοῦ παρόντος ὀλιγωροῦντας, οἶον κάμνων μὲν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν νόσον, πενόμενος δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πενίαν, πολεμοῦν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, ἔρων δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν ἔρωτα· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις· προσδοκοῦνται γὰρ ἐκαστὸς πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστου ὀργὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος πάθους. ἔτι δ᾽ ἐὰν τάναντια τύχῃ προσδεχόμενος· λυπεῖ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν, ὦσπερ καὶ τέρπει τὸ πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν, ἐὰν γένηται δ᾽ ἐβουλήθη.

9 a tois prois tis vospou : lit. "the sick man [is angry with those who slight him] in regard to his illness," that is, by making light of it.

b Or, "his suffering at the moment."
for kings are resentful in consideration of their superior rank. Further, men are angry at slights from those by whom they think they have a right to expect to be well treated; such are those on whom they have conferred or are conferring benefits, either themselves, or some one else for them, or one of their friends; and all those whom they desire, or did desire, to benefit.

It is now evident from these considerations what is the disposition of those who are angry, with whom they are angry, and for what reasons. Men are angry when they are pained, because one who is pained aims at something; if then anyone directly opposes him in anything, as, for instance, prevents him from drinking when thirsty, or not directly, but seems to be doing just the same; and if anyone goes against him or refuses to assist him, or troubles him in any other way when he is in this frame of mind, he is angry with all such persons. Wherefore the sick, the necessitous, [those at war], the love-sick, the thirsty, in a word, all who desire something and cannot obtain it, are prone to anger and easily excited, especially against those who make light of their present condition; for instance, the sick man is easily provoked in regard to his illness, the necessitous in regard to his poverty, the warrior in regard to warlike affairs, the lover in regard to love-affairs, and so with all the rest; for the passion present in his mind in each case paves the way for his anger. Again, men are angry when the event is contrary to their expectation, for the more unexpected a thing is, the more it pains; just as they are overjoyed if, contrary to expectation, what they desire comes to pass. From this it is obvious what
12 Αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχοντες εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὅργην, ὅργίζονται δὲ τοῖς τε καταγελῶσι καὶ χλευάζουσι καὶ σκώπτουσιν· ὑβρίζουσι γάρ. καὶ τοῖς τὰ τοιαύτα βλάπτουσιν ὡσα ὑβρεως σημεῖα. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοιαύτα εἶναι ἀ μῆτε ἀντὶ τινος μῆτ' ὀφέλιμα τοῖς ποιοῦσιν· ἦδη γὰρ δοκεῖ δι' ὑβριν.
13 καὶ τοῖς κακῶς λέγουσι καὶ καταφρονοῦσι περὶ ἀ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα σπουδάζουσιν, οίνοι οἱ ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίας φιλοτιμούμενοι ἐὰν τις εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τῇ ἴδεᾳ ἐὰν τις εἰς τὴν ἴδεαν, ὀμοίως δὲ 14 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ταῦτα δὲ πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν ὑποπτεύσωσι μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς, ἡ δὲ ἡ μὴ ἴσχυρώς, ἡ μὴ δοκεῖν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ σφόδρα οἱνταί ὑπάρχειν ἐν τούτοις ἐν οἷς σκώπτονται, οὐ φροντίζουσιν. καὶ τοῖς φιλοσ μᾶλλον ἡ τοῖς μὴ φιλοις· οἴονται γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον πάσχειν εὖ ὑπ’ 15 αὐτῶν ἡ μη. καὶ τοῖς εἰδίσμενοις τιμᾶν ἡ φροντίζειν, ἐὰν πάλιν μὴ οὕτως ὀμιλῶσιν καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ τούτων οἴονται καταφρονεῖσθαι· ταῦτα γὰρ ἂν

1 ἐν τοῦτοι is bracketed by Spengel: Cope explains it as “in those particular things” (philosophy, personal beauty, and the like).

a εὐκίνητοι refers grammatically to διαθέσεις and ἡλικίαι.
are the seasons, times, states of mind, and conditions of age in which we are easily moved to anger; and what are the various times, places, and reasons, which make us more prone to anger in proportion as we are subject to their influence.

Such then are the dispositions of those who are easily roused to anger. As to the objects of their anger, men are angry with those who ridicule, mock, and scoff at them, for this is an insult. And with those who injure them in ways that are indications of insult. But these acts must be of such a kind that they are neither retaliatory nor advantageous to those who commit them; for if they are, they then appear due to gratuitous insult. And men are angry with those who speak ill of or despise things which they themselves consider of the greatest importance; for instance, if a man speaks contemptuously of philosophy or of personal beauty in the presence of those who pride themselves upon them; and so in all other cases. But they are far more angry if they suspect that they do not possess these qualities, either not at all, or not to any great extent, or when others do not think they possess them. For when they feel strongly that they do possess those qualities which are the subject of mockery, they pay no heed to it. And they are more angry with those who are their friends than with those who are not, for they think that they have a right to be treated well by them rather than ill. And they are angry with those who have been in the habit of honouring and treating them with respect, if they no longer behave so towards them; for they think that they are being treated with contempt by them, otherwise they would treat them as
17 ποιεῖν. καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἀντιποιοῦσιν εἰ, μηδὲ τὴν ἵσην ἀνταποδιδοῦσιν. καὶ τοῖς τάναντια ποιοῦσιν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν ἔττους ὅσιν καταφρονεῖν γὰρ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι φαίνονται, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς ἔττόνων οἱ δ' ὡς παρ' ἔττόνων.

18 Καὶ τοῖς ἐν μηδενὶ λόγῳ ὅσιν, ἀν τι ὀλυγωρῶσι, μᾶλλον· ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡ ὅργη τῆς ὀλυγωρίας πρὸς τοὺς μὴ προσήκοντας, προσήκει δὲ τοῖς ἔττοσιν τοῖς ὀλυγωρεῖν. τοῖς δὲ φίλοις, ἐὰν τε μὴ ἐξ ἀλήωσιν ἦ τοιοῦτον, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐὰν τάναντα, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αἰσθάνονται δεομένων, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἀντιφώντος Πλέξιππος τῷ Μελεάγρῳ· ὀλυγωρίας γὰρ τὸ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι σημεῖον· ὅν γὰρ φροντίζομεν, οὐ λανθάνει. καὶ τοῖς ἐπιχαίρουσι ταῖς ἀτυχίαις καὶ ὅλως εὐθυμομένοις ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀτυχίαις· ἡ γὰρ ἐχθροῦ ἡ ὀλυγωροῦντος σημεῖον· καὶ τοῖς μὴ φροντίζουσιν, ἐὰν λυπήσωσιν· διὸ καὶ τοῖς κακὰ ἀγγέλλουσιν ὀργίζονται. καὶ τοῖς ἢ ἀκούοντι περὶ αὐτῶν ἢ θεωμένοις τὰ αὐτῶν φαῖλα· ὃμοιοι γὰρ εἰσὶν ἡ ὀλυγωροῦσιν ἡ ἐχθροῖς· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι συναλγοῦσιν, θεώμενοι δὲ τὰ οἰκεῖα φαῖλα πάντες ἁλγοῦσιν. ἔτι τοῖς ὀλυγωροῦσι πρὸς πέντε, πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, πρὸς οὓς θαυμάζουσιν, ὅφεὶ ὑπολόγουν θαυμάζεσθαι, ἡ οὖσι αἰσχύνονται, ἠ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθημομένοις αὐτοῖς· ἐν τούτοις οὖν τις

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a Plexippus was the uncle of Meleager. The allusion is obscure. It may refer to Meleager giving the skin of the Calydonian boar to Atalanta, which his uncle wanted. One of Antiphanes's tragedies was named Meleager (T.G.F. p. 792).

b Literally, "for the things which (= the persons whom) one respects, do not escape notice."
before. And with those who do not return their kindnesses nor requite them in full; and with those who oppose them, if they are inferiors; for all such appear to treat them with contempt, the latter as if they regarded them as inferiors, the former as if they had received kindnesses from inferiors.

And they are more angry with those who are of no account, if they slight them; for anger at a slight was assumed to be felt at those who ought not to behave in such a manner; for inferiors ought not to slight their superiors. And they are angry with friends, if they neither speak well of nor treat them well, and in an even greater degree, if they do the opposite. And if they fail to perceive that they want something from them, as Plexippus \(^a\) in Antipho's tragedy reproached Meleager; for failure to perceive this is a sign of slight; since, when we care for people, these things are noticed.\(^b\) And they are angry with those who rejoice, or in a general way are cheerful when they are unfortunate; for this is an indication of enmity or slight. And with those who do not care if they pain them; whence they are angry with those who bring bad news. And with those who listen to the tale of their faults, or look on them with indifference, for they resemble slighters or enemies; for friends sympathize and all men are pained to see their own faults exposed.\(^c\) And further, with those who slight them before five classes of persons: namely, their rivals, those whom they admire, those by whom they would like to be admired, those whom they respect, or those who respect them; when anyone slight them before these, their anger is

\(^a\) The real friend, therefore, would feel as much pain as the other whose faults are exposed.
23 ὀλιγωρή, ὀργίζονται μᾶλλον. καὶ τοῖς εἰς τὰ τοιαύτα ὀλιγωροῦσιν ὑπὲρ δὲν αὐτοῖς αὐσχρόν μὴ βοηθεῖν, οἰον γονεῖς, τέκνα, γυναῖκας, ἁρχομένους, καὶ τοῖς χάριν μὴ ἀποδιδοῦσιν. παρὰ τὸ προσήκον
24 γὰρ ἡ ὀλιγωρία. καὶ τοῖς εἰρωνευομένοις πρὸς
25 σπουδάζοντας· καταφρονητικὸν γὰρ ἡ εἰρωνεία. καὶ τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων εὐποιητικοῖς, ἦν μὴ καὶ αὐτῶν. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο καταφρονητικὸν, τὸ μὴ
26 ἄξιον ὑπὸ πάντας καὶ αὐτῶν. ποιητικὸν δ᾽ ὀργής καὶ ἡ λήθη, οἴον καὶ ἡ τῶν ονομάτων οὕτως οὕσαν περὶ μικρὸν ὀλιγωρίας γὰρ δοκεῖ καὶ ἡ λήθη σημεῖον εἶναι. δι᾽ ἀμέλειαν μὲν γὰρ ἡ λήθη γὰρ
27 νεται, ἡ δ᾽ ἀμέλεια ὀλιγωρία ἑστίν. οἶς μὲν οὖν ὀργίζονται καὶ ὃς ἔχοντες καὶ διὰ ποία, ἀμα
1380 α εἴρηται· δῆλον δ᾽ ὅτι δεόει ἂν αὐτὸν κατασκευάζειν τῷ λόγῳ τοιούτους οἴοι ὄντες ὀργίλως ἔχουσιν, καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους τοῦτοις ἐνόχους ὄντας ἐφ᾽ οἷς ὀργίζονται, καὶ τοιούτους ὑπὸς ὀργίζονται.
3. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐναντίον τῷ πραγμάτευσθαι καὶ ὀργῇ πραγματεύστη, ληπτέον πῶς ἔχοντες πρᾶοι εἰσὶ καὶ πρὸς τίνας πρᾶως ἔχουσι καὶ διὰ τίνων πράγματα. ἐστώ δὴ πράψις κατάστασις
3 καὶ ἡ ἑρμηνεία ὀργῆς. εἰ οὖν ὀργίζονται τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσιν, ὀλιγωρία δ᾽ ἑστὶν ἐκούσιον, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν τούτων ποιοῦσιν ἡ ἀκούσιος
4 ποιοῦσιν ἡ φαινομένοις τοιοῦτοι πρᾶοι εἰσιν. καὶ τοὺς τάναντια δὲν ἐποίησαν βουλομένοις. καὶ οὖσι

a Cope translates “rulers and governors”; but can ἀρχεσθαι be used in a middle sense?

b To avoid the apparent tautology (§ 17), Roemer (Rhein. Mus. xxxix. p. 503) boldly conjectures χαίρειν: “not to return another’s greeting.”

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greater. They are also angry with those who slight such persons as it would be disgraceful for them not to defend, for instance, parents, children, wives, and dependents. And with those who are ungrateful, for the slight is contrary to all sense of obligation. And with those who employ irony, when they themselves are in earnest; for irony shows contempt. And with those who do good to others, but not to them; for not to think them worthy of what they bestow upon all others also shows contempt. Forgetfulness also is a cause of anger, such as forgetting names, although it is a mere trifle, since even forgetfulness seems a sign of slight; for it is caused by indifference, and indifference is a slight. We have thus stated at one and the same time the frame of mind and the reasons which make men angry, and the objects of their anger. It is evident then that it will be necessary for the speaker, by his eloquence, to put the hearers into the frame of mind of those who are inclined to anger, and to show that his opponents are responsible for things which rouse men to anger and are people of the kind with whom men are angry.

3. And since becoming angry is the opposite of becoming mild, and anger of mildness, we must determine the state of mind which makes men mild, towards whom they become mild, and the reasons which make them so. Let us then define making mild as the quieting and appeasing of anger. If then men are angry with those who slight them, and slight is voluntary, it is evident that they are mild towards those who do none of these things, or do them involuntarily, or at least appear to be such; and towards those who intended the opposite of what
καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰς αὐτοὺς τοιούτως. οὔδεις γὰρ αὐτὸς
5 αὐτοῦ δοκεῖ ὀλυγωρεῖν. καὶ τοῖς ὀμολογοῦσι καὶ
μεταμελομένοις· ὡς γὰρ ἔχοντες δίκην τὸ λυπεῖ-
θαι ἐπὶ τοῖς πεποιημένοις παύονται τῆς ὄργῆς.
σημείον δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν οἰκετῶν κολάσεως· τοὺς
μὲν γὰρ ἀντιλέγοντας καὶ ἄρνουμένους μᾶλλον
κολάζομεν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὀμολογοῦντας δικαίως
κολάζεσθαι πανόμεθα θυμοῦμεν. αὐτῖον δ’ ὅτι
ἀναισχυντία τὸ τὰ φανερὰ ἀρνεῖσθαι, ἢ δ’ ἀν-
αισχυντία ὀλιγωρία καὶ καταφρόνησις· ὃν γοῦν
6 πολὺ καταφρονοῦμεν, οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα. καὶ τοῖς
tapeinoumenois prois autois kai mē antilegoumim.
faínontai gar omologéin ήττous eínavi, oi δ’ ήττous
fboúntai, fboúmenos de oúdeis olugwreí. ōti
dἐ πρὸς τοὺς tapeinoumenous pāúetai ἡ ὄργη, kai
oĩ kūnēs deholous ou δákwnotes touς kathizontas.
7 kai tois spoudázousi prois touς spoudázontas:
dokei gar spoudázōssthai áll’ ou kataphroneissthai.
8 kai tois meiéw kecharismenous. kai tois deoménois
9 kai paraitoumenois· tapeinótteroi gar. kai tois
mē ὑβρισταῖς μηδὲ χλευασταῖς μηδ’ ὀλιγώροις, ἢ
eis μηδένα ἢ μη’ eis χριστούς μηδ’ eis touiónous
10 oioi per autoi. olwos δ’ εἰ τῶν ἐναντίων δεὶ
skopein tā prαuwntiká. καὶ οὐς fboúntai ἢ aĩ-
schýnontai· ews gar ἄν οὖτωs ἑχωσι, oûk ὅρ-
γίζονται· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμα fboeissthai kai ὅρ-

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a ἔξαπινθης δ’ Ὄδυσση ἰδον κῦνες υλακόμωροι· οἱ μὲν κεκλη-
γοῦτες ἐπεδραμοῦν· αὐτὰρ Ὅδυσσεὺς | ἔζατο κερδοσύνη (Odyssey,
xiv. 29-31).
b That is, greater than their present disservices.

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they have done, and all who behave in the same way to themselves, for no one is likely to slight himself. And towards those who admit and are sorry for a slight; for finding as it were satisfaction in the pain the offenders feel at what they have done, men cease to be angry. Evidence of this may be seen in the punishment of slaves; for we punish more severely those who contradict us and deny their offence, but cease to be angry with those who admit that they are justly punished. The reason is that to deny what is evident is disrespect, and disrespect is slight and contempt; anyhow, we show no respect for those for whom we entertain a profound contempt. Men also are mild towards those who humble themselves before them and do not contradict them, for they seem to recognize that they are inferior; now, those who are inferior are afraid, and no one who is afraid slights another. Even the behaviour of dogs proves that anger ceases towards those who humble themselves, for they do not bite those who sit down. And men are mild towards those who are serious with them when they are serious, for they think they are being treated seriously, not with contempt. And towards those who have rendered them greater services. And towards those who want something and deprecate their anger, for they are humbler. And towards those who refrain from insulting, mocking, or slighting anyone, or any virtuous man, or those who resemble themselves. And generally speaking, one can determine the reasons that make for mildness by their opposites. Thus, men are mild towards those whom they fear or respect, as long as they feel so towards them, for it is impossible to be afraid and
ARISTOTLE

11 γιζεσθαι. καὶ τοὺς δὲ ὀργῆν ποιήσασιν ἡ οὐκ ὀργιζονται ἡ ἦτον ὀργιζονται· οὐ γὰρ δὲ ὀλυγωρίαν φαινονται πράξαι· οὐδὲς γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος ὀλυγωρεῖ. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀλυγωρία ἄλυτον, ἡ δὲ ὀργὴ μετὰ λύτης.

12 καὶ τοὺς αἰσχυνόμενοις αὐτοῖς.

Καὶ ἔχοντες δὲ ἐναντίως τῶ ὀργιζεσθαι δήλον ὁτι πράοι εἰσίν, οἰον ἐν παιδίᾳ, ἐν γέλωτι, ἐν ἑορτῇ, ἐν εὐημερίᾳ, ἐν κατορθώσει, ἐν πληρώσει, ὀλως ἐν ἄλυτια καὶ ἣδονη μὴ ὑβριστικῇ καὶ ἐν ἐλπίδι ἐπιεικῇ. ἔτι κεχρονικότες καὶ μὴ ὑπόγυοι.

13 τῇ ὀργῇ ὄντες· παύει γὰρ ὀργήν ὁ χρόνος. παύει δὲ καὶ ἑτέρου ὀργὴν μείζω ἡ παρ' ἄλλου ληφθείσα τιμωρία πρότερον· διὸ εὖ Φιλοκράτης, εἰπόντος τινὸς ὀργιζομένου τοῦ δήμου "τι οὐκ ἄπολογεί," "οὔπω γε" ἔφη. "ἄλλα πότε;" "οτιν ἄλλον ᾿δω διαβεβλημένον." πράοι γὰρ γίγνονται, ὁταν εἰς ἄλλον τὴν ὀργὴν ἀναλώσωσι, οἰον συνεβη ἐπὶ Ἑργοφίλου· μᾶλλον γὰρ χαλεπαίνοντες ἡ Ἐταλλισθένει ἀφεῖσαν διὰ τὸ Ἐταλλισθένους τῇ 13 str. 47 b

14 προτεραία καταγινώναι θάνατον. καὶ ἑαν ἔλεωσιν καὶ ἑαν μείζον κακὸν πεπονθότες ὅσιν ἡ οἱ ὀργι

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\textsuperscript{a} They regard the disrespectful treatment as merely a temporary lapse.

\textsuperscript{b} πλήρωσις: lit. “filling up.” The reference may be to the “fulfilment” of one’s desires, or to “repletion” in the matter of food (L. and S.), which seems less likely; “in fullness of content” (Jebb).

\textsuperscript{c} Opponent of Demosthenes, and one of the pro-Macedonian party. Impeached for his share in the disastrous “Peace of Philocrates,” he went into exile and was condemned to death during his absence.

\textsuperscript{d} Ergophilus failed in an attack on Cotys, king of Thrace, while Callisthenes concluded a premature peace with Perdiccas, king of Macedonia.

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angry at the same time. And against those who have acted in anger they either feel no anger or in a less degree, for they do not seem to have acted from a desire to slight. For no one slights another when angry, since slight is free from pain, but anger is accompanied by it. And men are not angry with those who usually show respect for them.a

It is also evident that those are mild whose condition is contrary to that which excites anger, as when laughing, in sport, at a feast, in prosperity, in success, in abundance, b and, in general, in freedom from pain, in pleasure which does not imply insult, or in virtuous hope. Further, those whose anger is of long standing and not in its full flush, for time appeases anger. Again, vengeance previously taken upon one person appeases anger against another, even though it be greater. Wherefore Philocrates,c when someone asked him why he did not justify himself when the people were angry with him, made the judicious reply, “Not yet.” “When then?” “When I see someone accused of the same offence”; for men grow mild when they have exhausted their anger upon another, as happened in the case of Ergophilus.d For although the Athenians were more indignant with him than with Callisthenes, they acquitted him, because they had condemned Calliocrates to death on the previous day. Men also grow mild towards those whom they pity e; and if an offender has suffered greater evil than those

a Another reading is ἐὰν ἐλεσί, “if they have convicted him.” This is adopted by Roemer, who refers to Plato, Republic, 558 a, where, in speaking of the freedom allowed to all who live under a democracy, it is remarked that, even if a man is convicted by a court of justice, he takes no heed of the sentence, which is very often not enforced.
Therefore, if you think that a man will never learn who took vengeance on him, you will be less cruel; for anger is personal, and so Odysseus, because he was angry, inflicted a savage punishment, and wished Polyphemus to know it.

^Odyssey, ix. 504.

"Or, "as if Odysseus would not have considered himself avenged, had P. remained ignorant ..."

"Or, "with any who can no longer feel their anger." Cope translates: "with all the rest (besides those actually within reach) who are out of sight."

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who are angry would have inflicted, for they have an idea that they have as it were obtained reparation. And if they think that they themselves are wrong and deserve what they suffer, for anger is not aroused against what is just; they no longer think that they are being treated otherwise than they should be, which, as we have said, is the essence of anger. Wherefore we should inflict a preliminary verbal chastisement, for even slaves are less indignant at punishment of this kind. And men are milder if they think that those punished will never know that the punishment comes from them in requital for their own wrongs; for anger has to do with the individual, as is clear from our definition. Wherefore it is justly said by the poet:

Tell him that it is Odysseus, sacker of cities, as if Polyphemus would not have been punished, had he remained ignorant who had blinded him and for what. So that men are not angry either with any others who cannot know who punishes them, or with the dead, since they have paid the last penalty and can feel neither pain nor anything else, which is the aim of those who are angry. So then, in regard to Hector, Homer, when desirous of restraining the anger of Achilles against a dead man, well says:

For it is senseless clay that he outrages in his wrath.

It is evident, then, that men must have recourse to these topics when they desire to appease their audience, putting them into the frame of mind.

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*c To make the offender feel pain as part of the punishment.

† Iliad, xxiv. 54.
Aristotle

σκευάζουσι τοιούτους, οἷς δ' ὄργιζονται, ἡ φο-βεροῦσ ἡ αἰσχύνης ἡξίουσ ἡ κεχαρισμένους ἡ ἀκοντας ἡ ὑπεραλγοῦντας τοῖς πεποιημένοις.

4. Τίνας δὲ φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τι, τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν ὄρισάμενοι λέγωμεν.

2 ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλεσθαί τινι ᾗ οἴεται ἀγαθά, ἐκείνου ἔνεκα ἄλλα μὴ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι τούτων. φίλος δ' ἔστιν ὁ φιλῶν καὶ ἀντιφιλούμενος. οὖν ταῦτα δὲ φιλοῦ εἶναι οἱ οὐτως ἔχειν οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἄλλους.

3 τούτων δὲ ὑποκειμένων ἀνάγκη φιλοῦ εἶναι τὸν συνηδόμενον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ συναλγοῦντα τοῖς λυπηροῖς μὴ διὰ τι ἔτερον ἄλλα δι' ἐκείνου. γιγνο-μένων γὰρ ὃν βούλονται χαίροντι πάντες, τῶν ἐναντίων δὲ λυποῦνται, ὥστε τῆς βουλήσεως σημεῖον αἱ λύπαι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. καὶ οἷς δὴ ταῦτὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά, καὶ οἱ τοῖς αὐτοῖς φίλοι, καὶ οἱ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐχθροὶ ταῦτα γὰρ τούτοις βούλεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ὥστε α' περ αὐτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βουλόμενος, τούτῳ φαίνεται φίλος εἶναι.

5 Καὶ τοὺς πεποιηκότας εὔ φιλοῦσιν, ἡ αὐτοῦς ἡ ὃν κηδονται· ἡ εἰ μεγάλα, ἡ εἰ προθύμως, ἡ εἰ ἐν τοιούτοις καιροῖς, καὶ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα· ἡ οἷς ἂν οἴωνται βούλεσθαι ποιεῖν εὐ. καὶ τοὺς τῶν φιλῶν φίλους καὶ φιλοῦντας οὗς αὐτοὶ φιλοῦσι. καὶ τοὺς φιλουμένους ὕπο τῶν φιλουμένων αὐτοῖς. καὶ τοὺς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐχθροὺς καὶ μισοῦντας οὗς αὐτοὶ

a φιλεῖν may be translated "to love" or "to like"; φιλία by "love," "liking," or "friendship"; for φίλος "friend" alone is suitable. For the two meanings cp. the use of aimer in French, and lieben in German.
required and representing those with whom they are angry as either formidable or deserving of respect, or as having rendered them great services, or acted involuntarily, or as exceedingly grieved at what they have done.

4. Let us now state who are the persons that men love or hate, and why, after we have defined love and loving. Let loving, then, be defined as wishing for anyone the things which we believe to be good, for his sake but not for our own, and procuring them for him as far as lies in our power. A friend is one who loves and is loved in return, and those who think their relationship is of this character consider themselves friends. This being granted, it necessarily follows that he is a friend who shares our joy in good fortune and our sorrow in affliction, for our own sake and not for any other reason. For all men rejoice when what they desire comes to pass and are pained when the contrary happens, so that pain and pleasure are indications of their wish. And those are friends who have the same ideas of good and bad, and love and hate the same persons, since they necessarily wish the same things; wherefore one who wishes for another what he wishes for himself seems to be the other's friend.

We also like those who have done good either to us or to those whom we hold dear, if the services are important, or are cordially rendered, or under certain circumstances, and for our sake only; and all those whom we think desirous of doing us good. And those who are friends of our friends and who like those whom we like, and those who are liked by those who are liked by us; and those whose enemies are ours, those who hate those whom we ourselves
Aristotle's opinion of husbandry, in which tillage and planting, keeping of bees, fish, and fowl were included, was not nearly so favourable as that of Xenophon in his *Oeconomicus*. In two lists of the elements of a State given in the *Politics*, it comes first at the head of the lower occupations. In its favour it is said that it forms the best material of a rural democracy, furnishes good sailors, a healthy body of men, not money-grabbers like merchants and tradesmen, and does not make men unfit to bear arms. On the other hand, it claims so much of a man's time that
hate, and those who are hated by those who are hated by us; for all such persons have the same idea as ourselves of what is good, so that they wish what is good for us, which, as we said, is the characteristic of a friend. Further, we like those who are ready to help others in the matter of money or personal safety; wherefore men honour those who are liberal and courageous and just. And such we consider those who do not live upon others; the sort of men who live by their exertions, and among them agriculturists, and, beyond all others, those who work with their own hands. And the self-controlled, because they are not likely to commit injustice; and those who are not busybodies, for the same reason. And those with whom we wish to be friends, if they also seem to wish it; such are those who excel in virtue and enjoy a good reputation, either generally, or amongst the best, or amongst those who are admired by us or by whom we are admired. Further, those who are agreeable to live or spend the time with; such are those who are good-tempered and not given to earing at our errors, neither quarrelsome nor contentious, for all such persons are pugnacious, and the wishes of the pugnacious appear to be opposed to ours.

he is unable to devote proper attention to political duties, and should be excluded from holding office. He further says that husbandmen, if possible, should be slaves (neither of the same race nor hot-tempered, for they will work better and are less likely to revolt); or, as the next best alternative, barbarians or serfs. The favourable view taken by Aristotle here and in the *Politics* (probably not his) does not agree with that put forward in the *Politics*.

b Spengel reads ἕ ἐν οἷς θαυμαζούσιν αὐτοὶ and brackets [ἕ ἐν τοῖς θαυμαζομένοις ύπ' αὐτῶν]. ἀπασικ, ἑλτίστοις, and οἷς will then all be neuter.
ARISTOTLE

13 Καὶ οἱ ἐπιδεξίοι καὶ τωθάσαι¹ καὶ ὑπομείναι· ἐπὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφότεροι σπεύδουσι τῷ πλησίον, δυνάμενοι τε σκώπτεσθαι καὶ ἐμμελῶς σκώπτοντες. καὶ τοὺς ἐπανοῦντας τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἁγαθά, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀ φοβοῦνται μή ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς. καὶ τοὺς καθαρίους περὶ ὅψιν, περὶ ἀμπ- εχόνην, περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον. καὶ τοὺς μή ὀνειδι-

1381 ος μήτε τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων μήτε τῶν ἐνεργε-17 τημάτων· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐλεγκτικοί. καὶ τοὺς μή μνησικάκους, μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς τῶν ἐγκλημάτων, ἀλλ' εὐκαταλλάκτους· οίος γὰρ ἄν ὑπολαμβάνωσιν εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς οἴονται.

18 καὶ τοὺς μή κακολόγους μηδὲ εἰδότας μήτε τὰ τῶν πλησίον κακὰ μήτε τὰ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τάγαθα.

19 ὁ γὰρ ἁγαθὸς ταῦτα δρά. καὶ τοὺς μή ἀντιτείνουντας τοὺς ὀργιζομένους ἢ σπουδάζουσιν· μαχητικοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. καὶ τοὺς πρὸς αὐτοὺς σπουδαίως πως ἔχοντας, οἶον θαυμάζοντας αὐτούς καὶ σπου-

20 δαίουσι ὑπολαμβάνοντας καὶ χαίροντας αὐτοῖς, καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα πεπονθότας περὶ ἀ μάλιστα βούλονται αὐτοὶ ἡ θαυμάζεσθαι ἡ σπουδαίοι δοκεῖν εἰναι ὡς ή δεῖς· καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ ταὐτὰ ἐπι-

21 τηδεύοντας, εὰν μή παρενοχλῶσι μηδ' ἀπὸ ταὐτὸν ἡ ὁ βίος· γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτω τὸ

κεραμεῖς κεραμεῖ.

22 καὶ τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντας, ὥν ἐνδεχεται ἀμα μετέχειν αὐτοὺς· εἰ δὲ μή, ταῦτο καὶ οὕτω

1 Spengel reads τῷ παῖσαν καὶ τῷ ὑπομείναι (from Λε). Roemer (Rhein. Mus. xxxix. p. 504) supports this, on the ground that τωθάσεν implies gross abuse, and would hardly be spoken of as ἐμμελῶς σκώπτειν.
And those are liked who are clever at making or taking a joke, for each has the same end in view as his neighbour, being able to take a joke and return it in good taste. And those who praise our good qualities, especially those which we ourselves are afraid we do not possess; those who are neat in their personal appearance and dress, and clean-living; those who do not make our errors or the benefits they have conferred a matter of reproach, for both these are inclined to be censorious; those who bear no malice and do not cherish the memory of their wrongs, but are easily appeased; for we think that they will be to ourselves such as we suppose them to be to others; and those who are neither given to slander, or eager to know the faults of their neighbours nor our own, but only the good qualities; for this is the way in which the good man acts. And those who do not oppose us when we are angry or occupied, for such persons are pugnacious; and those who show any good feeling towards us; for instance, if they admire us, think us good men, and take pleasure in our company, especially those who are so disposed towards us in regard to things for which we particularly desire to be either admired or to be thought worthy or agreeable. And we like those who resemble us and have the same tastes, provided their interests do not clash with ours and that they do not gain their living in the same way; for then it becomes a case of Potter [being jealous] of potter.\(^a\)

And those who desire the same things, provided it is possible for us to share them; otherwise the same

\(^a\) Two of a trade never agree (Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 25).
23 συμβάινει. καὶ πρὸς οὓς οὔτως ἔχουσιν ὡστε μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι τὰ πρὸς δόξαν, μὴ καταφρονοῦντες.
24 καὶ πρὸς οὓς αἰσχύνονται τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν. καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἢ ὅπ' ἄν ξηλοῦσθαι βούλονται καὶ μὴ φθονεῖσθαι, τούτοις. ἢ φιλοῦσιν ἢ βούλονται φίλοι εἶναι. καὶ οἷς ἀν τάγαθα συμπράττωσιν, ἐὰν μὴ μέλλη αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι μείζω
26 κακά. καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς ἀπόντας καὶ τοὺς παρόντας φιλοῦσιν· διὸ καὶ τοὺς περὶ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας τοιούτους πάντες φιλοῦσιν.

Καὶ ὅλως τοὺς σφόδρα φιλοφίλους καὶ μὴ ἐγκαταλείποντας· μάλιστα γὰρ φιλοῦσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τοὺς φιλείν ἀγαθοὺς. καὶ τοὺς μὴ πλαστομένους πρὸς αὐτοὺς· τοιούτου δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ φαιλὰ τὰ ἑαυτῶν λέγοντες. εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι πρὸς τοὺς φίλους τὰ πρὸς δόξαν οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα· εἰ οὖν ὁ αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φιλεῖ, ὁ μὴ αἰσχυνόμενος φιλοῦντι έοικεν. καὶ τοὺς μὴ φοβεροὺς, καὶ οὓς θαρροῦμεν·
28 οὖδεὶς γὰρ ὅν φοβεῖται φιλεῖ. εἴδη δὲ φιλίως ἐταιρεία οἰκείωτης συγγένεια καὶ έστα τοιαῦτα.
29 ποιητικὰ δὲ φιλίας χάρις, καὶ τὸ μὴ δεθέντος ποιήσαι, καὶ τὸ ποιήσαντα μὴ δηλώσαι· αὐτοὺς γὰρ οὕτως ένεκα φαίνεται καὶ οὐ διὰ τί ἔτερον.
30 Περὶ δ' ἑχθρὰς καὶ τοῦ μισεῖν φανερὸν ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων δεῖ θεωρεῖν. ποιητικὰ δ' ἑχθρας ὁργή, ἐπηρεασμός, διαβολή. ὁργή μὲν οὖν έστιν

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*a Those with whom we are ambitious of entering into competition “in the race for distinction” (Cope). There is no unfriendliness, whereas envy produces it.

*b A parenthetical remark. Aristotle explains that he is not thinking of merely conventional faults; if, then, one who is ashamed of these is no friend, then one who is not...*
thing would happen again. And those with whom we are on such terms that we do not blush before them for faults merely condemned by public opinion, provided that this is not due to contempt; and those before whom we do blush for faults that are really bad. And those whose rivals we are, or by whom we wish to be emulated, but not envied,—these we either like or wish to be friends with them. And those whom we are ready to assist in obtaining what is good, provided greater evil does not result for ourselves. And those who show equal fondness for friends, whether absent or present; wherefore all men like those who show such feeling for the dead.

In a word, men like those who are strongly attached to their friends and do not leave them in the lurch; for among good men they chiefly like those who are good friends. And those who do not dissemble with them; such are those who do not fear to mention even their faults. (For, as we have said, before friends we do not blush for faults merely condemned by public opinion; if then he who blushes for such faults is not a friend, he who does not is likely to be one). And men like those who are not formidable, and in whom they have confidence; for no one likes one whom he fears. Companionship, intimacy, kinship, and similar relations are species of friendship. Things that create friendship are doing a favour, and doing it unasked, and not making it public after doing it; for then it seems to have been rendered for the sake of the friend, and not for any other reason.

As for enmity and hatred, it is evident that they must be examined in the light of their contraries. The causes which produce enmity are anger, spitefulness, slander. Anger arises from acts committed
He wishes to see and know the result of the measures taken against those with whom he is angry. Or, it may mean that he wishes the object of his anger to feel his wrath, and to know by whom, and for what, he is punished.
against us, enmity even from those that are not; for if we imagine a man to be of such and such a character, we hate him. Anger has always an individual as its object, for instance Callias or Socrates, whereas hatred applies to classes; for instance, every one hates a thief or informer. Anger is curable by time, hatred not; the aim of anger is pain, of hatred evil; for the angry man wishes to see what happens; to one who hates it does not matter. Now, the things which cause pain are all perceptible, while things which are especially bad, such as injustice or folly, are least perceptible; for the presence of vice causes no pain. Anger is accompanied by pain, but hatred not; for he who is angry suffers pain, but he who hates does not. One who is angry might feel compassion in many cases, but one who hates, never; for the former wishes that the object of his anger should suffer in his turn, the latter, that he should perish. It is evident, then, from what we have just said, that it is possible to prove that men are enemies or friends, or to make them such if they are not; to refute those who pretend that they are, and when they oppose us through anger or enmity, to bring them over to whichever side may be preferred. The things and persons that men fear and in what frame of mind, will be evident from the following considerations.

5. Let fear be defined as a painful or troubled feeling caused by the impression of an imminent evil that causes destruction or pain; for men do not fear all evils, for instance, becoming unjust or slow-witted, but only such as involve great pain or destruction, and only if they appear to be not far off but near at hand and threatening, for men do not fear things that are very remote; all know that they
by the definitions of anger and hatred.

And therefore, having the inclination to be unjust, if he has the power, he will be so.
have to die, but as death is not near at hand, they are indifferent. If then this is fear, all things must be fearful that appear to have great power of destroying or inflicting injuries that tend to produce great pain. That is why even the signs of such misfortunes are fearful, for the fearful thing itself appears to be near at hand, and danger is the approach of anything fearful. Such signs are the enmity and anger of those able to injure us in any way; for it is evident that they have the wish, so that they are not far from doing so. And injustice possessed of power is fearful, for the unjust man is unjust through deliberate inclination. And outraged virtue when it has power, for it is evident that it always desires satisfaction, whenever it is outraged, and now it has the power. And fear felt by those able to injure us in any way, for such as these also must be ready to act. And since most men are rather bad than good and the slaves of gain and cowardly in time of danger, being at the mercy of another is generally fearful, so that one who has committed a crime has reason to fear his accomplices as likely to denounce or leave him in the lurch. And those who are able to ill-treat others are to be feared by those who can be so treated; for as a rule men do wrong whenever they can. Those who have been, or think they are being, wronged, are also to be feared, for they are ever on the look out for an opportunity. And those who have committed some wrong, when they have the power, since they are afraid of retaliation, which was assumed to be something to be feared. And those who are our rivals for the same things, whenever it is impossible to share them, for men are always contending with
10 τοιούτων. καὶ οἱ τοῖς κρείττοσιν αὐτῶν φοβεροί· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν δύναντο βλάπτειν αὐτούς, εἰ καὶ
toús κρείττοσι. καὶ οὐς φοβοῦνται οἱ κρείττοσι
11 αὐτῶν, διὰ ταύτο. καὶ οἱ τοὺς κρείττοσιν αὐτῶν ἀνηρηκότες. καὶ οἱ τοὺς ἤττοσιν αὐτῶν ἐπι-
tιθέμενοι. ἡ γὰρ ἦδη φοβεροὶ ἡ αὐξηθέντες.
Καὶ τῶν ἰδικημένων καὶ ἐχθρῶν ἡ ἀντιπάλων
οὐ̣χ οἱ ἰδιώμου καὶ παρρησιαστικοί, ἀλλ’ οἱ πράοι
καὶ εἰρωνεῖ καὶ πανούργοι· ἀδηλοί γὰρ εἰ ἐγγύς,
12 ὡστ’ οὐδέποτε φανεροὶ ὅτι πόρρω. πάντα δὲ τὰ
φοβερὰ φοβερῶτερα, οὐσα, ἂν ἀμάρτωσιν, ἐπανορ-
θώσασθαι μὴ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἐκεῖ ἄδινατα, ἡ
μὴ ἐφ’ ἐαυτοῖς ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑαυτίοισι. καὶ ὃν
βοηθεῖαι μὴ εἰσιν ἡ μὴ βάδιαι. ὡς δ’ ἀπλῶς
eἰπεῖν, φοβερὰ ἐστὶν οὐσα ἐφ’ ἐτέρων γιγνόμενα ἡ
μέλλοντα ἐλεεινά ἐστιν. τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ, καὶ
ἀ φοβοῦνται, σχεδόν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰ μέγιστα ταῦτ’
ἐστίν· ὡς δὲ διακείμενοι αὐτοὶ φοβοῦνται, νῦν
λέγωμεν.
13 Εἴ δὴ ἐστιν ὁ φόβος μετὰ προσοδοκίας τοῦ
πείσεσθαι τι φθαρτικῶν πάθος, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδεὶς
φοβεῖται τῶν οἰωμένων μηδὲν ἂν παθεῖν, οὐδὲ
ταῦτα ἃ μὴ οἴονται παθεῖν, οὐδὲ τούτους ὕφ’ ὅν
μὴ οἴονται, οὐδὲ τότε ὅτε μὴ οἴονται. ἀνάγκη
such persons. And those who are feared by those who are stronger than we are, for they would be better able to injure us, if they could injure those stronger than ourselves; and those whom those who are stronger than ourselves are afraid of, for the same reason. And those who have overthrown those who are stronger than us and those who attack those who are weaker, for they are either already to be feared, or will be, when they have grown stronger.

And among those whom we have wronged, or are our enemies or rivals, we should fear not the hot-tempered or outspoken, but those who are mild, dissemblers, and thorough rascals; for it is uncertain whether they are on the point of acting, so that one never knows whether they are far from it. All things that are to be feared are more so when, after an error has once been committed, it is impossible to repair it, either because it is absolutely impossible, or no longer in our power, but in that of our opponents; also when there is no possibility of help or it is not easy to obtain. In a word, all things are to be feared which, when they happen, or are on the point of happening, to others, excite compassion. These are, so to say, nearly all the most important things which are to be feared and which men fear. Let us now state the frame of mind which leads men to fear.

If then fear is accompanied by the expectation that we are going to suffer some fatal misfortune, it is evident that none of those who think that they will suffer nothing at all is afraid either of those things which he does not think will happen to him, or of those from whom he does not expect them, or at a time when he does not think them likely to happen. It therefore needs be that those who think
τούνν φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς οἰομένους τι παθεῖν ἂν, καὶ
tοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τότε. οὐκ οἴονται
dὲ παθεῖν ἂν οὔτε οἱ ἐν εὐτυχίας μεγάλαις οἴντες
καὶ δοκοῦντες, διὸ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ολίγωροι καὶ
θρασίες (ποιεῖ δὲ τοιούτους πλοῦτος ἴσχὺς πολυ-
φιλία δύναμις), οὔτε οἱ ήδη πεποιθέναι πάντα
νομίζοντες τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἀπεξηγήμενοι πρὸς τὸ
μέλλον, ὡσπερ οἱ ἀποτυπανιζόμενοι ήδη· ἄλλα
dὲ τινὰ ἐλπίδα ὑπείναι σωτηρίας, περὶ οὐ ἀγω-
νώσων. σημεῖον δὲ· ὁ γὰρ φόβοι βουλευτικοὺς
ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιούτους βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν ἄν-
elπίστων. ὡστε δὲ τοιούτους παρασκευάζειν, ὅταν
ἡ βέλτιον τὸ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς, ὅτι τοιοῦτοι οἰσων
οἴοι παθεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοι μείζονς ἔπαθον· καὶ
tοὺς ὁμοίους δεικνύναι πάσχοντας ἡ πεποιθότας,
καὶ ὑπὸ τοιούτων ὑφ' ὅν οὐκ φῶντο, καὶ ταῦτα
καὶ τότε ὅτε οὐκ φῶντο.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φόβου φανερὸν τί ἐστι, καὶ τῶν
φοβερῶν, καὶ ὡς ἐκαστοὶ ἔχοντες δεδίασι, φανερὸν
ἐκ τούτων καὶ τὸ θαρρεῖν τί ἐστι, καὶ περὶ ποιὰ
θαραλέοι καὶ πῶς διακείμενοι θαραλέοι εἰσίν·
tὸ τέ γὰρ θάρσος ἐναντίον τῶν φόβων καὶ τὸ θαρ-
ραλέον τῶν φοβερῶν· ὡστε μετὰ φαντασίας ἡ ἐλπίς
tῶν σωτηρίων ἐν ἐγγὺς ὄντων, τῶν δὲ φοβερῶν

ἡ μὴ ὄντων ἡ πόρρω ὄντων. ἐστὶ δὲ θαραλεῖα

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they are likely to suffer anything should be afraid, either of the persons at whose hands they expect it, or of certain things, and at certain times. Those who either are, or seem to be, highly prosperous do not think they are likely to suffer anything; wherefore they are insolent, contemptuous, and rash, and what makes them such is wealth, strength, a number of friends, power. It is the same with those who think that they have already suffered all possible ills and are coldly indifferent to the future, like those who are being beaten to death; for it is a necessary incentive to fear that there should remain some hope of being saved from the cause of their distress. A sign of this is that fear makes men deliberate, whereas no one deliberates about things that are hopeless. So that whenever it is preferable that the audience should feel afraid, it is necessary to make them think they are likely to suffer, by reminding them that others greater than they have suffered, and showing that their equals are suffering or have suffered, and that at the hands of those from whom they did not expect it, in such a manner and at times when they did not think it likely.

Now, since we have made clear what fear and fearful things are, and the frame of mind in each case which makes men fear, one can see from this what confidence is, what are the things that give it, and the frame of mind of those who possess it; for confidence is the contrary of fear and that which gives confidence of that which causes fear, so that the hope of what is salutary is accompanied by an impression that it is quite near at hand, while the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off. Confidence is inspired by the remoteness of fearful
ἀπομαχῶν; ἐὰν ὁσίος καὶ ὁπόθεται, ἡ πολλαὶ ἐνθαλα τῇ ἄμφω, καὶ μήτε ἑδίκημον μήτε ἑδίκηκότες ὅσισ, ἄνταγωνιστάη τε ἡ μὴ ὅσιν ὅλως, ἡ μὴ ἔχωσι δύναιμ, ἡ δύναιμ ἔχοντες ὅσι σφύλη ἡ ἐποιηκότες εὐ ἡ ἐποιηθότες. ἡ ἐὰν πλεῖον ὅσιν οἰς ταῦτα συμφέρει, ἡ κρείττους, ἡ ἄμφω. αὐτοὶ δὴ οὕτως ἔχοντες ἄμφαλεοι εἰσίν, ἐὰν πολλὰ κατωρθωκέναι οὕστη καὶ μὴ ἐποιηθέναι, ἡ ἐὰν πολλάκις ἐληλυθότες εἰς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ διαπεφευγότες ὅσιν διχῶς γὰρ ἀπαθεῖσ γίγνονται οἱ ἀνθρωποι, ἡ τῷ μὴ πεπεἰράθαι ἡ τῷ βοηθείας ἔχειν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ θάλατταν κυνδύνοις οἱ τέ ἀπειροὶ χειμώνοις θαρροῦσι τὰ μέλλοντα καὶ οἱ βοηθείας ἔχοντες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. 

καὶ ὅταν τοῖς ὦμον ἡ μὴ φοβερών, μηδὲ τοῖς ὦττοι καὶ ὄν κρείττους οὕστη εἶναι οὕστη δὲ, ὅν κεκρατήκασιν ἡ αὐτῶν ἡ τῶν κρείττων ἡ ἡ τῶν ὦμοιν. καὶ ἐὰν ὑπάρχειν αὐτοίς οὕστη πλείον καὶ μεῖζον, οἷς ὑπερέχοντες φοβεροὶ εἰσιν· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστί πλῆθος χρημάτων καὶ ἱσχύς σωμάτων καὶ φίλων καὶ χῶρας καὶ τῶν πρὸς πόλεμον παρασκευῶν, ἡ πασών ἡ τῶν μεγίστων. καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἑδίκηκότες ὅσιν ἡ μηδέναι ἡ μὴ πολλοὺς ἡ μὴ τοιούτων περὶ ὦν φοβοῦνται. καὶ ὅλως ἂν τὰ πρὸς θεοὺς αὐτοῖς καλῶς ἔχη, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ σημείων καὶ λογίων ταρραλέουν γὰρ ἡ ὀργή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖν ἀλλ’ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὀργῆς ποιητικὸν,
things, or by the nearness of things that justify it.\(^a\)

If remedies are possible, if there are means of help, either great or numerous, or both; if we have neither committed nor suffered wrong; if we have no rivals at all, or only such as are powerless, or, if they have power, are our friends, or have either done us good or have received it from us; if those whose interests are the same as ours are more numerous, or stronger, or both. We feel confidence in the following states of mind: if we believe that we have often succeeded and have not suffered, or if we have often been in danger and escaped it; for men are unaffected by fear in two ways, either because they have never been tested or have means of help; thus, in dangers at sea, those who have never experienced a storm and those who have means of help as the result of experience have confidence as to the future. We are also reassured, when a thing does not inspire fear in our equals, our inferiors, or those to whom we think ourselves superior; and we think ourselves superior to those whom we have conquered, either themselves or their superiors or equals. And if we think we possess more or more considerable advantages, such as make their possessors formidable; such are abundance of money, strength of body, friends, territory, military equipments, either all or the most important. And if we have never done wrong to anyone, or only to a few, or not to such as are to be feared; and, generally, if it is well with us in regard to the gods, especially as to intimations from signs and oracles, and everything else of the kind; for anger inspires confidence, and it is the wrong that we suffer and not that which we inflict upon others that
It is assumed that the gods will be on our side if we have suffered wrong; suffering wrong rouses anger and at the same time inspires confidence, if our relations with the gods are such that we feel we can rely upon them for assistance.

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causes anger, and the gods are supposed to assist those who are wronged. Lastly, we feel confidence when, at the beginning of any undertaking, we do not expect disaster either in the present or future, or hope for success. Such are the things that inspire fear or confidence.

6. What are the things of which men are ashamed or the contrary, and before whom, and in what frame of mind, will be clear from the following considerations. Let shame then be defined as a kind of pain or uneasiness in respect of misdeeds, past, present, or future, which seem to tend to bring dishonour; and shamelessness as contempt and indifference in regard to these same things. If this definition of shame is correct, it follows that we are ashamed of all such misdeeds as seem to be disgraceful, either for ourselves or for those whom we care for. Such are all those that are due to vice, such as throwing away one's shield or taking to flight, for this is due to cowardice; or withholding a deposit, for this is due to injustice. And illicit relations with any persons, at forbidden places or times, for this is due to licentiousness. And making profit out of what is petty or disgraceful, or out of the weak, such as the indigent or dead; whence the proverb, "to rob even a corpse," for this is due to base love of gain and stinginess. And to refuse assistance in money matters when we are able to render it, or to give less than we can; to accept assistance from those less able to afford it than ourselves; to borrow when anyone seems likely to ask for a loan, to ask for a loan from one who wants his money back, and asking for repayment from one who wants to borrow; to praise in order to seem to be asking for a loan, and
Ἀριστοτέλης

ἀποτετυχηκότα μηδὲν ἦττον· πάντα γὰρ ἀνελευθερίας ταῦτα σημεία. τὸ δ’ ἐπαινεῖν παρόντας, καὶ τὸ τἀγαθὰ μὲν ὑπερεπαινεῖν τὰ δὲ φαῦλα συναλείψειν, καὶ τὸ ὑπεραλγεῖν ἀλγοῦντι παρόντα, καὶ τάλλα πάντα ὅσα τοιαῦτα· κολακείας γὰρ σημεία.

9 Καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπομένειν πόνους οὐς οἱ πρεσβύτεροι ὣς οἱ τρυφῶντες ἢ οἱ ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ μᾶλλον ὄντες ἢ ὀλως οἱ ἀδυνατώτεροι· πάντα γὰρ μαλακίας σημεία.

10 καὶ τὸ υφ’ ἐτέρου εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὸ πολλάκις, καὶ ἀ εὖ ἐποίησεν ὄνειδιζειν· μικροψυχίας γὰρ πάντα

11 καὶ ταπεινότητος σημεία. καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα λέγειν καὶ ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ταλλότρια αὐτοῦ φάσκειν· ἄλαζονεας γὰρ. ὄμοιας δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστης τῶν τοῦ ἥθους κακίων τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ σημεία καὶ τὰ ὄμοια· αἰσχρα γὰρ

12 καὶ αἰσχυντικά. καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸ τῶν καλῶν ὧν πάντες μετέχουσιν ἢ οἱ ὀμοίοι πάντες ἢ οἱ πλείστοι, μὴ μετέχειν. ὄμοιος δὲ λέγω ὀμοεθεῖς, πολύτας, ἥλικας, συγγενεῖς, ὀλως τοὺς ἐξ ἰσον· αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἢδη τὸ μὴ μετέχειν, οἰον παιδεύσεως ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀμοίως. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μᾶλλον, ἃν δὲ ἐαυτὸν φαίνηται· οὕτω γὰρ ἢδη ἀπὸ κακίας μᾶλλον, ἃν αὐτὸς ἢ αὕτιος τῶν

13 ὑπαρξάντων ἢ ὑπαρχόντων ἢ μελλόντων. πάσχοντες δὲ ἢ πεπονθότες ἢ πεισόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα

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when you have failed to obtain it to keep on asking; for all these are signs of stinginess. And to praise people when they are present, to overpraise their good qualities and to palliate the bad, to show excessive grief at another's grief when present, and all similar actions; for they are signs of flattery.

And not to submit to toils, which those put up with who are older or live luxuriously or hold higher positions, or, generally speaking, are less fitted to do so; for all these are signs of effeminacy. To accept favours from another and often, and then to throw them in his teeth; for all these things are signs of littleness and abasement of soul. And to speak at great length about oneself and to make all kinds of professions, and to take the credit for what another has done; for this is a sign of boastfulness. Similarly, in regard to each of all the other vices of character, the acts resulting from them, their signs, and the things which resemble them, all these are disgraceful, and should make us ashamed. It is also shameful not to have a share in the honourable things which all men, or all who resemble us, or the majority of them, have a share in. By those who resemble us I mean those of the same race, of the same city, of the same age, of the same family, and, generally speaking, those who are on an equality; for then it is disgraceful not to have a share, for instance, in education and other things, to the same extent. All these things are the more disgraceful, if the fault appears to be our own; for they are at once seen to be due rather to natural depravity if we ourselves are the cause of past, present, or future defects. And we are ashamed when we suffer or have suffered or are likely to suffer things which tend
αἰσχύνονται ὅσα εἰς ἀτιμίαν φέρει καὶ ὀνείδη·
ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ εἰς ὑπηρετῆσεις ἡ σώματος ἡ
ἐργών αἰσχρῶν, ὥν ἐστὶ τὸ ύπρίζεσθαι. καὶ τὰ
μὲν εἰς ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἕκοντα καὶ ἄκοντα (τὰ δ' ἐις
βιάν ἄκοντα): ἀπὸ ἀνανδρίας γὰρ ἡ δειλίας ἡ
ὑπομονῆ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀμύνεσθαι.

"Α μὲν οὖν αἰσχύνονται, ταῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ
14 τοιαῦτα: ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία ἐστὶν ἡ
αισχύνη, καὶ ταύτης αὐτῆς χάριν ἄλλα μὴ τῶν
ἀποβαίνοντων, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης φροντίζει ἄλλ' ἡ
dιὰ τοὺς δοξάζοντας, ἀνάγκη τούτους αἰσχύ-
15 νεσθαι ὅτι λόγον ἔχει. λόγον δ' ἔχει τῶν θαυμα-
ζόντων, καὶ οὐς θαυμάζει, καὶ ὅ' ὅν βούλεται
θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ πρὸς οὐς φιλοτιμεῖται, καὶ ὅν
16 μὴ καταφρονεῖ τῆς δόξης. θαυμάζεσθαι μὲν οὖν
βούλονται ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ θαυμάζουσι τούτους
ὅσοι τι ἔχουσι ἁγαθὸν τῶν τιμών, ἡ παρ' ὃν
τυχανοῦσι δεόμενοι σφόδρα τινὸς ὃν ἐκείνοι κύριοι,
17 οἷον οἱ ἐρώντες· φιλοτιμοῦνται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους,
φροντίζουσι δ' ὅς ἀληθευόντων τῶν φρονίμων
τοιοῦτοι δ' οἱ τε προεβύπτοντει καὶ οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι.
18 καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐν φανερῷ μᾶλλον
ὁθὲν καὶ ἡ παρομία, τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδώ.
διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς ἄεὶ παρεσομένους μᾶλλον αἰσχύ-
νονται καὶ τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ ἐν
1384 b ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμφότερα.
19 Καὶ τοὺς μὴ περὶ ταύτα ἐνόχους· δῆλον γὰρ ὦτι

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a Euripides, Cretan: αἰδὼς ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς γίγνεται, τέκνον (T.G.F. frag. 457).
to ignominy and reproach; such are prostituting one's person or performing disgraceful actions, including unnatural lust. And of these actions those that promote licentiousness are disgraceful, whether voluntary or involuntary (the latter being those that are done under compulsion), since meek endurance and the absence of resistance are the result of unmanliness or cowardice.

These and similar things are those of which men are ashamed. And since shame is an impression about dishonour, and that for its own sake and not for its results; and since no one heeds the opinion of others except on account of those who hold it, it follows that men feel shame before those whom they esteem. Now men esteem those who admire them and those whom they admire, those by whom they wish to be admired, those whose rivals they are, and whose opinion they do not despise. They desire to be admired by those, and admire those who possess anything good that is greatly esteemed, or from whom they urgently require something which it is in their power to give, as is the case with lovers. And they are rivals of those who are like them; and they give heed to the men of practical wisdom as likely to be truthful; such are the older and well educated. They are also more ashamed of things that are done before their eyes and in broad daylight; whence the proverb, The eyes are the abode of shame. That is why they feel more ashamed before those who are likely to be always with them or who keep watch upon them, because in both cases they are under the eyes of others.

Men are also ashamed before those who are not open to the same accusations, for it is evident that
τάναντια δοκεῖ τούτοις. καὶ τοὺς μὴ συγγεν- 
μονικοὺς τοὺς φανομένους ἀμαρτάνειν· ἀ γάρ τις 
αὐτὸς ποιεῖ, ταῦτα λέγεται τοὺς πέλας οὐ νεμεσάν, 
20 ὡστε ἡ μὴ ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι νεμεσά. καὶ τοὺς 
ἐξαγγελτικοὺς πολλοῖς· οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει μὴ 
δοκεῖν ἡ μὴ ἐξαγγέλλειν. ἐξαγγελτικοὶ δὲ οἳ τε 
ηδικημένοι διὰ τὸ παρατηρεῖν καὶ οἳ κακολόγοι· 
εἴπερ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀμαρτάνοντας, ἔτι μᾶλλον 
tους ἀμαρτάνοντας. καὶ οἷς ἡ διατριβὴ ἐπὶ ταῖς 
tῶν πέλας ἀμαρτίαις, οἷον χλευασταῖς καὶ κωμῳδο- 
pοιοῖς· κακολόγοι γὰρ πως οὐτοί καὶ ἐξαγγελτι- 
κοί. καὶ ἐν οἷς μηδὲν ἀποτευχήκασιν· ὡστε 
γὰρ θαυμαζόμενοι διάκενται· διὸ καὶ τοὺς πρῶτον 
δεηθέντας τί αἰσχύνονται ὡς οὐδὲν πω ἡδοξήκοτες 
ἐν αὐτοῖς. τοιούτῳ δ’ οἳ τε ἁρτι βουλόμενοι φίλοι 
eἶναι (τὰ γὰρ βέλτιστα τεθέανται, διὸ εὖ ἔχει ἡ 
tοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἀπόκρισις πρὸς τοὺς Συρακοσίους) 
kαὶ τῶν πάλαι γνωρίμων οἱ μηδὲν συνειδότες. 
21 αἰσχύνονται δ’ οὐ μόνον αὐτὰ τὰ ῥηθέντα αἰσχυ- 
tηλὰ ἄλλα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα, οἷον οὐ μόνον ἀφροδι- 
σιάξουτες ἄλλα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα αὐτοῦ. καὶ οὐ 
22 μόνον ποιοῦντες τὰ αἰσχρὰ, ἄλλα καὶ λέγοντες. 
ὄμοιως δὲ οὐ τοὺς εἰρημένους μόνον αἰσχύνονται, 
ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς δηλώσοντας αὐτοῖς, οἷον θεράποντας 
23 καὶ φίλους τοῦτων. ὅλως δ’ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται οὐθ’

\[a\] Jebb translates, “who have never seen us break down.”

b The Greek scholiast says: “Euripides, having been sent as ambassador to the Syracusans, to ask for peace and friendship, when they refused said: O Syracusans, if for no other reason than that we are just feeling the need of your friendship, you ought to respect our admiration.” Nothing is known of this embassy. Hyperides has been suggested instead of Euripides.
their feelings are contrary. And before those who are not indulgent towards those who appear to err; for a man is supposed not to reproach others with what he does himself, so it is clear that what he reproaches them with is what he does not do himself. And before those who are fond of gossiping generally; for not to gossip about the fault of another amounts to not regarding it as a fault at all. Now those who are inclined to gossip are those who have suffered wrong, because they always have their eyes upon us; and slanderers, because, if they traduce the innocent, still more will they traduce the guilty. And before those who spend their time in looking for their neighbours' faults, for instance, mockers and comic poets; for they are also in a manner slanderers and gossips. And before those from whom they have never asked anything in vain, for they feel as if they were greatly esteemed. For this reason they feel ashamed before those who ask them for something for the first time, as never yet having lost their good opinion. Such are those who have recently sought their friendship (for they have only seen what is best in them, which is the point of the answer of Euripides to the Syracusans), or old acquaintances who know nothing against us. And men are ashamed not only of the disgraceful things we have spoken of, but also of indications of them, for instance, not only of sensual pleasures, but also of the indications of them; and not only of doing, but also of saying disgraceful things. Similarly, men are ashamed not only before those who have been mentioned, but also before those who will reveal their faults to them, such as their servants or friends. In a word, they are not ashamed either before those


ARISTOTLE

δὲν πολὺ καταφρονοῦσι τῆς δόξης τοῦ ἂληθεύειν (οὔδεισ γὰρ παιδία καὶ θηρία αἰσχύνεται) ὦτε
tαυτὰ τοὺς γνωρίμους καὶ τοὺς ἁγνῶτας, ἄλla
tοὺς μὲν γνωρίμους τὰ πρὸς ἂληθειαν δοκοῦντα
tοὺς δὲ ἀπωθεῖν τὰ πρὸς τὸν νόμον.

24 Αὐτοὶ δὲ ὤδε διακείμενοι αἰσχυνθεῖν ἃν, πρῶτον
μὲν εἰ ὑπάρχοιεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχοντες οὕτω τινὲς
οίους ἐφαμεν εἶναι οὗς αἰσχύνονται. ἤσαν δὲ οὗτοι
ἡ θαυμαζόμενοι ἡ θαυμάζοντες ἡ ύφι ὁν βούλονται
θαυμάζεσθαι, ἡ ἢ δέονται τινα χρείαν ὃν μὴ
tεύξονται ἄδοξοι οὕτε, καὶ οὗτοι ἡ ὀρῶντες
(ὡσπερ Κυδίας περὶ τῆς Σάμου κληρουχίας ἐδη-
μηγόρησεν. ἡξίου γὰρ ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους
περιεστάναι κύκλῳ τοὺς Ἐλλήνας, ὃς ὀρῶντας
cαι μὴ μόνον ἄκουσομένους ἃ ἢν ψηφίσονται), ἡ
ἂν πλησίον ὃςν οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἡ μέλλωσιν αἰσθή-
σεσθαι. διὸ καὶ ὀρᾶσθαι ἀτυχόντες ὑπὸ τῶν

1885 a ζηλοῦντων ποτὲ οὐ βούλονται. θαυμασταῖ γὰρ οἱ
25 ζηλωταί. καὶ ὅταν ἔχωσιν ἀ κατασχύνουσιν ἔργα
καὶ πράγματα ἡ αὐτῶν ἡ προγόνων ἡ ἄλλων τινῶν
πρὸς οὕς ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς ἄγχιστεία τις. καὶ ὅλως
ὑπὲρ ὃν αἰσχύνονται αὐτοῖ. εἷσι δὲ οὗτοι οἱ εἰρη-
μένοι καὶ οἱ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἄναφερόμενοι, ὃν διδά-
σκαλοὶ ἡ σύμβουλοι γεγόνασι, ἡ ἐὰν ὃςν ἔτεροι

"This rendering involves a plural neuter with a plural
verb. Others take the actions or things in a good sense,
"deeds and fortunes, their own or their ancestors, which
they are likely to disgrace."

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RHETORIC, II. vi. 23–25

whose opinion in regard to the truth they greatly despise—for instance, no one feels shame before children or animals—or of the same things before those who are known to them and those who are not; before the former, they are ashamed of things that appear really disgraceful, before strangers, of those which are only condemned by convention.

Men are likely to feel shame in the following situations; first, if there are any who are so related to them as those before whom we said that they feel shame. These, as we pointed out, are those who are admired by them or who admire them, or by whom they wish to be admired, or from whom they need some service, which they will not obtain if they lose their reputation. These, again, are either persons who directly see what is going on (just as Cydias, when haranguing the people about the allotment of the territory of Samos, begged the Athenians to picture to themselves that the Greeks were standing round them and would not only hear, but also see what they were going to decree); or neighbours; or those likely to be aware of what they say or do. That is why men do not like, when unfortunate, to be seen by those who were once their rivals, for rivalry presumes admiration. Men also feel shame when they are connected with actions or things which entail disgrace, for which either they themselves, or their ancestors, or any others with whom they are closely connected are responsible. In a word, men feel shame for those whom they themselves respect; such are those mentioned and those who have any relation to them, for instance, whose teachers or advisers they have been; similarly, when they are

\[i.e.\] when they have done anything disgraceful.
26 ὃμοιοι, πρὸς οὖς φιλοτιμοῦνται· πολλὰ γὰρ αἱ-
σχυνόμενοι διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ οὐ
27 ποιοῦσιν. καὶ μέλλοντες ὀράσθαι καὶ ἐν φανερῷ
ἀναστρέφεσθαι τοῖς συνεδόσιν αἰσχυντηλοὶ μᾶλ-
λον εἰσίν. ὅθεν καὶ Ἀντιφῶν ὁ ποιητὴς μέλλων
ἀποτυμπανίζεσθαι ὑπὸ Διονυσίου εἶπεν, ἵδιν τοὺς
συναποθνήσκειν μέλλοντας ἐγκαλυπτομένους ὡς
アクセプトゥ ἐξατῆνι τῶν πυλῶν, "τί ἐγκαλύπτεσθε" ἔφη:
"ἲ μὴ αὐρίον τις ὑμᾶς ἵδι τούτων;" περὶ μὲν
οὖν αἰσχύνης ταῦτα· περὶ δὲ ἀναισχυντίας δῆλον
ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐννατίων εὐπορήσομεν.

7. Τίσι δὲ χάριν ἐχονσι καὶ ἔπι τίσιν ἢ πῶς
αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες, ὄρισμένους τὴν χάριν δῆλον ἔσται.
2 ἐστώ δὴ χάρις. καθ' ἢν ὁ ἔχων λέγεται χάριν
ὑπουργείν¹ δεομένῳ μὴ ἀντὶ τινος, μηδὲ ἵνα τι
αὐτῶ τῷ ὑπουργοῦντι, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἐκείνῳ τῷ μεγάλῃ
δ' ἅν ἢ σφόδρα δεομένῳ, ἢ μεγάλων καὶ χαλεπῶν,
ἡ ἐν καιροῖς τοιούτοις, ἢ μόνος, ἢ πρῶτος, ἢ
3 μάλιστα. δεήσεις δ' εἰσίν αἱ ὄρεξεις, καὶ τούτων
μάλιστα αἱ μετὰ λύπης τοῦ μὴ γιγνομένου· τοιαῦται
dε αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, οἶδον ὁ ἔρως. καὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς τού

¹ Spengel reads καθ' ἢν ὁ ἔχων λέγεται χάριν ἔχειν, ὑπουργεία
"favour, in accordance with which he who has it is said to
feel benevolence, is rendering a service to one who needs
it."

—a When on an embassy to Syracuse, he was asked by
Dionysius which was the best kind of brass. On his replying,
in rivalry with others who are like them; for there are many things which they either do or do not do owing to the feeling of shame which these men inspire. And they are more likely to be ashamed when they have to be seen and to associate openly with those who are aware of their disgrace. Wherefore the tragic poet Antiphon, when he was about to be flogged to death by order of Dionysius, seeing that those who were to die with him covered their faces as they passed through the gates, said, "Why cover your faces? Is it because you are afraid that one of the crowd should see you to-morrow?" Let this account of shame suffice; as for shamelessness, it is evident that we shall be able to obtain ample knowledge of it from the contrary arguments.

7. The persons towards whom men feel benevolent, and for what reasons, and in what frame of mind, will be clear when we have defined what favour is. Let it then be taken to be the feeling in accordance with which one who has it is said to render a service to one who needs it, not in return for something nor in the interest of him who renders it, but in that of the recipient. And the favour will be great if the recipient is in pressing need, or if the service or the times and circumstances are important or difficult, or if the benefactor is the only one, or the first who has rendered it, or has done so in the highest degree. By needs I mean longings, especially for things the failure to obtain which is accompanied by pain; such are the desires, for instance, love; also those "that from which the Athenians made their statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton," Dionysius ordered him to be put to death.

\[ \chi\acute{a}r\acute{a}s \text{ may mean (1) benevolence, the feeling which prompts a favour; (2) an actual favour conferred; (3) gratitude.} \]
Probably given to a beggar or vagrant who had nothing to sleep on.

That is, should have in view the satisfaction of urgent wants and desires (Cope).

Reading ὅτε; others read οἶς, “by whom.”

'ἄχαριστος: the word generally means “ungrateful,” and so Jebb takes it here: “and to make men ungrateful.”

The other five categories in Aristotle’s list are: relation, position, possession, activity, passivity.

Because in that ease their motives in rendering the greater service cannot be disinterested.
RHETORIC, II. vii. 3–6

which arise in bodily sufferings and dangers, for when a man is in pain or danger he desires something. That is why those who help a man who is poor or an exile, even if the service be ever so small, are regarded with favour owing to the urgency and occasion of the need; for instance, the man who gave the mat \(^{a}\) to another in the Lyceum. It is necessary then, if possible, that the service should be in the same direction \(^{b}\); if not, that it should apply to cases of similar or greater need.

Since then it is evident on what occasions,\(^{c}\) for what reasons, and in what frame of mind a feeling of benevolence arises, it is clear that we must derive our arguments from this—to show that the one side either has been, or still is, in such pain or need, and that the other has rendered, or is rendering, such a service in such a time of need. It is evident also by what means it is possible to make out that there is no favour at all, or that those who render it are not actuated by benevolence \(^{d}\); for it can either be said that they do, or have done so, for their own sake, in which case there is no favour; or that it was mere chance; or that they acted under compulsion; or that they were making a return, not a gift, whether they knew it or not; for in both cases it is an equivalent return, so that in this case also there is no favour. And the action must be considered in reference to all the categories; for if there is a favour it is so because of substance, quantity, quality, time, or place.\(^{e}\) And it denotes lack of goodwill, if persons have not rendered a smaller service,\(^{f}\) or if they have rendered similar, equal, or greater services to our enemies; for it is evident that they do not act for

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\(^{a}\) mat

\(^{b}\) same direction

\(^{c}\) on what occasions

\(^{d}\) actuated by benevolence

\(^{e}\) substance, quantity, quality, time, or place

\(^{f}\) smaller service
γὰρ ὅτι οὔδε ταῦτα ἡμῶν ἔνεκα. ἦ εἰ φαύλα εἰδώς· οὔδεις γὰρ ὁμολογεῖ δεῖσθαι φαύλων.

8. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ ἀχαριστεῖν εἰρήται· ποία δὲ ἐλεεινὰ καὶ τίνας ἐλεοῦσι, καὶ 2 πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες, λέγωμεν. ἔστω δὴ ἐλεος ὑπὲρ τις ἐπὶ φανομένως κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, δὲ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειν ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοῦτο, ὅταν πλησίον φαύνηται· δὴλον γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸν μέλλοντα ἑλεύθερον ὑπάρχειν τοιοῦτον ὅσον οἶσθαι παθεῖν ἂν τι κακὸν ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοιοῦτο κακὸν ὅσον εἰρήται ἐν τῷ ὁρῷ ἢ ὁμοίον ἢ 3 παραπλήσιον. διὸ οὔτε οἱ παντελῶς ἀπολωλότες ἐλεοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐτί παθεῖν ὅσονται· πεπόνθαι γὰρ) οὔτε οἱ ὑπερευθαμιονεῖν οἴσοντες, ἀλλὰ ὑβρίζουσιν· εἰ γὰρ ἀπαντά ὅσονται ὑπάρχειν τάγαθά, δὴλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μῆ ἐνδέχεσθαι παθεῖν 4 μηδὲν κακὸν· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἱ νομίζειν παθεῖν ἂν οἳ τε πεπονθότες ἰδικοὶ καὶ διαπεφυγότες, καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ διὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ δὴ ἐμπερίαν, καὶ οἱ ἀσθενείς, καὶ οἱ δειλότεροι μᾶλλον, καὶ οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι· 5 εὐλόγιστοι γὰρ. καὶ οἱς ὑπάρχονσι γονεῖς ἢ τέκνα ἢ γυναῖκες· αὐτοῦ τε γὰρ ταῦτα, καὶ οἷα παθεῖν 8 τὰ εἰρημένα. καὶ οἱ μήτε ἐν ἀνδρίας πάθει οἴντες, οἰον ἐν ὄργῃ ἢ θάρρει (ἀλόγιστα γὰρ τοῦ ἐσομένου ταῦτα) μήτ' ἐν ὑβριστικῇ διαθέσει (καὶ γὰρ οὕτωι 224.
our sake in this case either. Or if the service was insignificant, and rendered by one who knew it; for no one admits that he has need of what is insignificant.

8. Let this suffice for benevolence and the opposite. We will now state what things and persons excite pity, and the state of mind of those who feel it. Let pity then be a kind of pain excited by the sight of evil, deadly or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it; an evil which one might expect to come upon himself or one of his friends, and when it seems near. For it is evident that one who is likely to feel pity must be such as to think that he, or one of his friends, is liable to suffer some evil, and such an evil as has been stated in the definition, or one similar, or nearly similar. Wherefore neither those who are utterly ruined, are capable of pity, for they think they have nothing more to suffer, since they have exhausted suffering; nor those who think themselves supremely fortunate, who rather are insolent. For if they think that all good things are theirs, it is clear that they think that they cannot possibly suffer evil, and this is one of the good things. Now those persons who think they are likely to suffer are those who have already suffered and escaped; the advanced in age, by reason of their wisdom and experience; and the weak, and those who are rather more timid; and the educated, for they reckon rightly; and those who have parents, children, or wives, for these are part of them and likely to suffer the evils of which we have spoken; and those who are not influenced by any courageous emotion, such as anger or confidence, for these emotions do not take thought of the future; and those who are not in a wantonly insolent frame of
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΣ

άλογιστοι τού πείσεσθαι τι, ἀλλ' οἱ μεταξὺ τοῦτων. μήτ' αὖ φοβούμενοι σφόδρα: οὐ γὰρ ἐλεύθων οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ 7 οἰκείῳ πάθει. κἂν οὖνται τινὰς εἶναι ἐπιεικείς: οὐ γὰρ μηδένα οἰόμενος πάντας οὐσίστει αἷσίους 1386 α εἶναι κακοῦ. καὶ ὅλως δὴ ὅταν ἔχη οὕτως ἀστ' ἀναμυνθῆναι τοιαῦτα συμβεβηκότα ἡ αὐτῷ ἡ τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἡ ἐλπίσαι γενέσθαι ἡ αὐτῷ ἡ τῶν αὐτοῦ. 8 Ὡς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἐλεύθων, εὑρηταί, ἀ δ' ἐλεύθων, ἐκ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ δήλον: ὡσα τε γὰρ τῶν λυπηρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν φθαρτικά, πάντα ἐλευθά, καὶ ὡσα ἀναιρετικά, καὶ ὡσων ἡ τύχῃ αἰτία κακῶν 9 μέγεθος ἔχοντων. ἔστι δ' ὄδυνηρά μὲν καὶ φθαρτικά θάνατοι καὶ αἰκίαι σωμάτων καὶ κακώσεις 10 καὶ γῆρας καὶ νόσου καὶ τροφῆς ἔνδεια, ὡν δ' ἡ τύχῃ αἰτία κακῶν, ἀφιλία, ἀλιγοφιλία (διὸ καὶ τὸ διεσπάζει απὸ τῶν φίλων καὶ συνήθων ἐλευθῶν), αἰσχος, ἀσθένεια, ἀναπηρία. καὶ τὸ θεῖον προσήκειν 11 ἀγαθόν τι πράξαι, κακόν τι συμβήναι. καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τοιοῦτον. καὶ τὸ πεπονθότος γενέσθαι τι ἀγαθόν, οἶον Διοπείθει τὰ παρὰ βασιλέως τεθυεῖτο κατεπέμφθη. καὶ τὸ ἡ μηδὲν γεγενή- σθαι ἄγαθόν, ἡ γενομένων μὴ εἶναι ἀπόλαυσιν. 'Εφ' οἷς μὲν οὖν ἐλεύθωσιν, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα 12 ἔστω: ἐλεύθωσι δὲ τοὺς τε γνωρίμους, ἐὰν μὴ σφό-
RHETORIC, II. viii. 6–12

mind, for they also take no thought of future suffering; but it is those who are between the two extremes that feel pity. Those who are not in great fear; for those who are panic-stricken are incapable of pity, because they are preoccupied with their own emotion. And men feel pity if they think that some persons are virtuous; for he who thinks that no one is will think that all deserve misfortune. And, generally speaking, a man is moved to pity when he is so affected that he remembers that such evils have happened, or expects that they may happen, either to himself or to one of his friends.

We have stated the frame of mind which leads men to pity; and the things which arouse this feeling are clearly shown by the definition. They are all painful and distressing things that are also destructive, and all that are ruinous; and all evils of which fortune is the cause, if they are great. Things distressing and destructive are various kinds of death, personal ill-treatment and injuries, old age, disease, and lack of food. The evils for which fortune is responsible are lack of friends, or few friends (wherefore it is pitiable to be torn away from friends and intimates), ugliness, weakness, mutilation; if some misfortune comes to pass from a quarter whence one might have reasonably expected something good; and if this happens often; and if good fortune does not come until a man has already suffered, as when the presents from the Great King were not dispatched to Diopithes until he was dead. Those also are to be pitied to whom no good has ever accrued, or who are unable to enjoy it when it has.

These and the like things, then, excite pity. The persons men pity are those whom they know, pro-
δρα ἐγγὺς ὅσιν οἰκεῖότητι περὶ δὲ τούτους ὀσπερ περὶ αὐτούς μέλλοντας ἔχουσιν. διό καὶ Ἀμασίς ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ υἱὲ ἀγομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν οὐκ ἔδακρυσεν, ὡς φασίν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ φίλῳ προσαντούντι· τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ ἐλεεινόν, ἔκεινο δὲ δεινόν· το γὰρ δεινὸν ἔτερον τοῦ ἐλεεινοῦ καὶ ἐκκρουστικὸν τοῦ

13 ἐλέου καὶ πολλάκις τῷ ἑναντίῳ χρήσιμον. ἔτι ἐλεοῦσιν ἐγγὺς αὐτοῖς τοῦ δεινοῦ ὄντος. καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσι κατὰ ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἡθή, κατὰ ἐξεις, κατὰ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένη· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις μᾶλλον φαίνεται καὶ αὐτῷ ἄν ὑπάρξαι· ὅλως γὰρ καὶ ἑνταῦθα δεῖ λαβεῖν οὕτι, ὡσ ἐφ' αὐτῶν φοβοῦνται, ταῦτα ἔπ' ἄλλως γιγνόμενα

14 ἐλεοῦσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐγγὺς φανόμενα τὰ πάθη ἐλεεινά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ μυριστὸν ἐτος γενόμενα ἥ ἐσόμενα οὔτ' ἐλπίζοντες οὔτε μεμνημένου ἥ ὅλως οὐκ ἐλεοῦσιν ἥ ὅχ ὁμοίως, ἀνάγκη τοὺς συν-

15 ποιοῦντες, ἥ ὡς μέλλουν ἥ ὡς γεγονός. καὶ τὰ

1386 b γεγονότα ἀρτί ἡ μέλλοντα διὰ ταχέων ἐλεεινότερα

16 διὰ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἶνον ἐσθήτας τε τῶν πεπονθῶν καὶ ὡσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ λόγους καὶ ὡσα ἄλλα τῶν ἐν τῷ πάθει ὄντων, οἶνον ἡδη τελευτῶντων. καὶ μάλιστα τὸ σπου-

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a Herodotus, iii. 14, where the story is told, not of Amasis, but of his son Psammenitus.

b Jebb renders: "Again men pity when the danger is near themselves," which may mean when they see something terrible happening to others and likely soon to befall them.

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vided they are not too closely connected with them; for if they are, they feel the same as if they themselves were likely to suffer. This is why Amasis a is said not to have wept when his son was led to execution, but did weep at the sight of a friend reduced to beggary, for the latter excited pity, the former terror. The terrible is different from the pitiable, for it drives out pity, and often serves to produce the opposite feeling. Further, the nearness of the terrible makes men pity. b Men also pity those who resemble them in age, character, habits, position, or family; for all such relations make a man more likely to think that their misfortune may befall him as well. For, in general, here also we may conclude that all that men fear in regard to themselves excites their pity when others are the victims. And since sufferings are pitiable when they appear close at hand, while those that are past or future, ten thousand years backwards or forwards, either do not excite pity at all or only in a less degree, because men neither expect the one nor remember the other, it follows that those who contribute to the effect by gestures, voice, dress, and dramatic action generally, are more pitiable; for they make the evil appear close at hand, setting it before our eyes as either future or past. And disasters that have just happened or are soon about to happen excite more pity for the same reason. Pity is also aroused by signs and actions, such as the dress of those who have suffered, and all such objects, and the words and everything else that concerns those who are actually suffering, for instance, at the point of death. And

selves. Vahlen inserts ὁ δὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ πρὶν ἐκ τι: "For men cease to pity when the terrible comes close to themselves."

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ARISTOTLE

daious eina en tois toutouis kairois ontas eleiev-
non. apanta gar tauta dia to egyns faivnetai
mallois potei ton elenon, kai ois anaxipou onton, kai
en ophthalmois faivomeno tois pathous.

9. 'Antikeintai de tv elleiw malistia men o
kaloudi nevesan. tv gar luteisbhai epi taix an-
axias kakovragias antikeimenoi esti trpopon twa
kai ap tov authou etsous to luteisbhai epi taix
anaxias eutoagias. kai amfow to pathi etsous
chrestov. dei gar epi men tois anaxios prattouni
kakox svanaqhesa kai elleiw, tois de eis nevesan.
adikon gar to para thn axiav ginomenon, did
kai tois theois apodidomev to nevesan. doxei de o
an kai o phosos tv elleiw ton authon antikeisbhai
trpopon wos svnegyw ovn kai tauton tv nevesan,
esti de etsou laiphe men gar taaraqothis kai o
phosos esti kai eis eutragian, ala ou tov anaxiou
all tov ison kai dimoiou. to de mu oti authis ti
symbeirstei etsou, alla di authon ton plhison,
apasit dimoiw deis uparxein. ou gar esti estai to
men nevesis to de phosos, alla phosos, ean dia
touto etsi laiphe uparxh kai etsi taaraqh, oti authis ti
4 estai faulon apo ths ekteinou eutragias. fane-
ron de oti akolouthesei kai ta evantia pathi tov-
tous. o men gar lupoymevois epi tois anaxios kakov-
tragouin hsthssetai etsi allupos estai epi tois

a "When the men, who are in such crises, are good men" (Jebb). If they were not, their misfortune would appear
deserved.
b The signs and actions, and the demeanour of the
sufferer.
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when men show themselves undaunted at such critical times it is specially pitiable; for all these things, because they come immediately under our observation, increase the feeling of pity, both because the sufferer does not seem to deserve his fate, and because the suffering is before our eyes.

9. Now what is called indignation is the antithesis to pity; for the being pained at undeserved good fortune is in a manner contrary to being pained at undeserved bad fortune and arises from the same character. And both emotions show good character, for if we sympathize with and pity those who suffer undeservedly, we ought to be indignant with those who prosper undeservedly; for that which happens beyond a man's deserts is unjust, wherefore we attribute this feeling even to gods. It would seem that envy also is similarly opposed to pity, as being akin to or identical with indignation, although it is really different; envy also is indeed a disturbing pain and directed against good fortune, but not that of one who does not deserve it, but of one who is our equal and like. Now, all who feel envy and indignation must have this in common, that they are disturbed, not because they think that any harm will happen to themselves, but on account of their neighbour; for it will cease to be indignation and envy, but will be fear, if the pain and disturbance arise from the idea that harm may come to themselves from another's good fortune. And it is evident that these feelings will be accompanied by opposite feelings; for he who is pained at the sight of those who are undeservedly unfortunate will rejoice or will at least not be pained at the sight of those who are

\[\omicron\ \nu\epsilon\mu\epsilon\sigma\acute{\alpha}ν:\ \text{"the nobler brother of envy" (Nietzsche).}\]

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There is justice both in the punishment of the parricide and in the deserved good fortune of others. The conclusion 232
deservedly so; for instance, no good man would be pained at seeing parricides or assassins punished; we should rather rejoice at their lot, and at that of men who are deservedly fortunate; for both these are just and cause the worthy man to rejoice, because he cannot help hoping that what has happened to his like may also happen to himself. And all these feelings arise from the same character and their contraries from the contrary; for he who is malicious is also envious, since, if the envious man is pained at another's possession or acquisition of good fortune, he is bound to rejoice at the destruction or non-acquisition of the same. Wherefore all these emotions are a hindrance to pity, although they differ for the reasons stated; so that they are all equally useful for preventing any feeling of pity.

Let us then first speak of indignation, the persons with whom men feel indignant, for what reasons, and in what frame of mind; and then proceed to the rest of the emotions. What we have just said will make matters clear. For if indignation is being pained at the sight of good fortune that is apparently undeserved, in the first place it is clear that it is not possible to feel indignation at all good things; for no one will be indignant with a man who is just or courageous, or may acquire any virtue (for one does not feel pity in the case of opposites of those qualities), but men are indignant at wealth, power, in a word, at all the advantages of which good men are worthy. [And those who possess natural advantages, such as noble birth, beauty, and all such must refer to the latter; if his like is fortunate, he hopes he may be.

Because it is a man's own fault, and pity is only felt for what is undeserved.
The first part of the sentence is clear: men are indignant when what good men deserve is possessed by those who are not good. The literal translation of the text as it stands is: “Men are indignant ... at all the advantages of which good men and those who possess natural advantages are worthy”; but this cannot be right, since there is nothing in natural advantages to arouse moral indignation, there is no question of their being deserved or undeserved. Something may have fallen out like “but they will not be indignant with those who possess natural advantages.” Roemer (Rhein. Mus. xxxix. p. 504) suggests: οὐδ’ εἰ τὰ φύσει ἔχουσιν ἄγαθα (understanding νεμεσήσει τούτοις).
things.] And since that which is old seems closely to resemble that which is natural, it follows that, if two parties have the same good, men are more indignant with the one who has recently acquired it and owes his prosperity to it; for the newly rich cause more annoyance than those who have long possessed or inherited wealth. The same applies to offices of state, power, numerous friends, virtuous children, and any other advantages of the kind. And if these advantages bring them some other advantage, men are equally indignant; for in this case also the newly rich who attain to office owing to their wealth cause more annoyance than those who have long been wealthy; and similarly in all other cases of the same kind. The reason is that the latter seem to possess what belongs to them, the former not; for that which all along shows itself in the same light suggests a reality, so that the former seem to possess what is not theirs. And since every kind of good is not suitable to the first comer, but a certain proportion and suitability are necessary (as for instance beautiful weapons are not suitable to the just but to the courageous man, and distinguished marriages not to the newly rich but to the nobly born), if a virtuous man does not obtain what is suitable to him, we feel indignant. Similarly, if the inferior contends with the superior, especially among those engaged in the same pursuit,—whence the saying of the poet,

\[b \text{δοκεῖν is a stronger word than } \text{φαίνεσθαι}, \text{ indicating an intellectual operation as opposed to an impression received through the senses. The idea is that where anything has been so long in a person's possession, it has come to be regarded as his by right.}\]
Aristotle

L. 1387b ei de μή, καὶ ὄπωσον ὁ ἦττων τῷ κρείττονι, οὖν ei o μονοκός τῷ δικαίῳ βέλτιον γὰρ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς μονοκής.

Ois mēn oūn νεμεσώσι καὶ δι’ α’, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον·

12 ταύτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἐστιν. αὐτοὶ δὲ νε-

μεσητικοὶ εἰσιν, ἐὰν ἄξιοι τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες τῶν

μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν καὶ ταύτα κεκτημένοι: τὸ γὰρ

tῶν ὀμοίων ἦξιῶθαι τοὺς μη ὀμοίους οὐ δίκαιον.

13 δεύτερον δ’, ἂν ὄντες ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σπουδαῖοι τυγ-

χάνωσιν· κρίνοντι τε γὰρ εὖ, καὶ τὰ ἄδικα μισοῦσιν.

14 καὶ ἐὰν φιλότιμοι καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τινῶν πράξεων,

καὶ μάλιστα περὶ ταύτα φιλότιμοι ὅσιν ἂν ἔτεροι

15 ἀνάξιοι ὄντες τυγχάνωσιν. καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἄξιοῦντες

αὐτοὶ αὐτοῦς, ὃν ἔτερους μὴ ἄξιοῦσί, νεμεσητικοὶ
tοῦτοι καὶ τούτων. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἀνδραποδώδεις

καὶ φαύλοι καὶ ἀφιλότιμοι οὐ νεμεσητικοὶ οὐδὲν

16 γὰρ ἔστων οὐ ἐαυτοῦς οἴονται ἄξιους εἶναι. φανερὸν

d’, ἐκ τούτων ἐπὶ ποιίς ἀτυχοῦσι καὶ κακο-

πραγοῦσιν ἡ μὴ τυγχάνουσι χαίρειν ἡ ἀλύπως

ἐχειν δεῖ· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ ἀντικείμενά

ἔστι δῆλα, ὥστε ἐὰν τοὺς τε κριτὰς τοιούτους

παρασκευάσῃ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὺς ἄξιούντας ἐλεεῖ-

σθαι, καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς ἔλεειςθαι, δεῖξῃ ἀνάξιους μὲν

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a Iliad, xi. 542. Only the first verse is given in the received text of Homer; the second is not found in any of the mss. The reference is to Cebriones, a son of Priam slain by Patroclus.

b It has been suggested to insert μῆ before τυγχάνωσι: "if, although virtuous and worthy, they do not happen to possess such advantages."
He avoided battle with Ajax, son of Telamon, for Zeus was indignant with him, when he would fight with a better man; or, if the pursuit is not the same, wherever the inferior contends with the superior in anything whatever, as for instance, the musician with the just man; for justice is better than music.

From this it is clear, then, with whom men are indignant and for what reasons; they are these or of such a kind. Men are prone to indignation, first, if they happen to deserve or possess the greatest advantages, for it is not just that those who do not resemble them should be deemed worthy of the same advantages; secondly, if they happen to be virtuous and worthy, for they both judge correctly and hate what is unjust. And those who are ambitious and long for certain positions, especially if they are those which others, although unworthy, have obtained. And, in general, those who think themselves worthy of advantages of which they consider others unworthy, are inclined to be indignant with the latter and because of these advantages. This is why the servile and worthless and unambitious are not inclined to indignation; for there is nothing of which they think themselves worthy. It is evident from this what kind of men they are whose ill fortunes, calamities, and lack of success must make us rejoice or at least feel no pain; for the opposites are clear from what has been said. If then the speaker puts the judges into such a frame of mind and proves that those who claim our pity (and the reasons why they do so) are unworthy to obtain it and deserve

Or, "of which others happen to be unworthy."
denas tughanein ajious de mu tughanein, adunaton elleiv.

10. Ailelou de kai· eipi tisi phanoi u kai tisi kai pous ekontes, eiiper estin o phqos lupta tis eipi eupragia fainomene toy eurhmevnw agathow peri toue omious, mu` ina ti autw, alla di` ekheinou· phoynhsoi mou ven gar oin tounou ois eis
tines omoi o phainontai. omious de legw kata genos, kata synageniean, kata` hlikian, kata` eixi, kata` doxan, kata` ta uparxonta. kai ois mikroiv ellpeite to mu` panta uparxew. dio oin megalha prattontes kai oin euptuxontes phoyneroi eisw.
pantas gar oinontai ta autowv ferew. kai oin tiswmenoi eipi tini diaferontwos, kai malistata eipi sofia' h eu'daimonia. kai ois filotitmoi phoynerox-
teroi tov aphi loptimow. kai ois doxosofoi· filo-
timoi gar eipi sofia. kai olws ois filodoxicoi per`
ti phoyneroi peri` touto. kai ois mikropjxhoxi-
panta gar megalha dokei autous eina.

4 'Ef` ois de` phoynous, ta` men` agath`a e`rhtai· ef'

a oisous gar filododojousi kai filotimouontai ergous h
cتوقف که y w` doxh, kai dasa euptuxhmatat
este, scheidon peri pant` phqos este, kai malistata
oun autoi h` oreugontai h` oinontai dein autous echew,
` inin` kti`se`i mikro` uperheousin h` mikro` e`
leipousin.

5 `Fanevou de kai ois phoynousi` ama gar` e`rhtai·

a If some one else possesses the one thing which they think
necessary to complete their happiness, they are envious of
him, because they consider it ought to be theirs.

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that it should be refused them, then pity will be impossible.

10. It is equally clear for what reason, and of whom, and in what frame of mind, men are envious, if envy is a kind of pain at the sight of good fortune in regard to the goods mentioned; in the case of those like themselves; and not for the sake of a man getting anything, but because of others possessing it. For those men will be envious who have, or seem to have, others "like" them. I mean like in birth, relationship, age, moral habit, reputation, and possessions. And those will be envious who possess all but one of these advantages; that is why those who attempt great things and succeed are envious, because they think that every one is trying to deprive them of their own. And those who are honoured for some special reason, especially for wisdom or happiness. And the ambitious are more envious than the unambitious. And those who are wise in their own conceit, for they are ambitious of a reputation for wisdom; and, in general, those who wish to be distinguished in anything are envious in regard to it. And the little-minded, because everything appears to them to be great.

The advantages which excite envy have already been stated. Nearly all the actions or possessions which make men desire glory or honour and long for fame, and the favours of fortune, create envy, especially when men long for them themselves, or think that they have a right to them, or the possession of which makes them slightly superior or slightly inferior.

And it is evident whom men envy, for it has just been stated by implication. They envy those who
τοῖς γὰρ ἔγγυς καὶ χρόνω καὶ τόπῳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ δόξῃ φθονοῦσιν. οὗτοι εἰρηταί
tὸ συγγενὲς γὰρ καὶ φθονεῖν ἐπίσταται.
καὶ πρὸς οὗς φιλοτιμοῦνται. φιλοτιμοῦνται μὲν γὰρ
πρὸς τοὺς εἰρημένους, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μυριστῶν ἔτος
ὄντας ἥ πρὸς τοὺς ἐσομένους ἥ τεθνεῶτας οὐδὲις,
οὐδὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἔφ’ Ἡρακλείαις στῆλαις. οὐδ’ ἀν
πολὺ οἴονται παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἢ πάρα τοῖς ἄλλοις λεί-
πεσθαί, οὐδ’ ἀν πολὺ ὑπερέχειν, ὦσαυτῶς καὶ πρὸς
6 τούτους καὶ περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα. ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς
ἀνταγωνιστὰς καὶ ἀντεραστὰς καὶ ὅλως τοὺς τῶν
αὐτῶν ἐφεμένους φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἀνάγκη μάλιστα
tούτους φθονεῖν. οὗτοι εἰρηταί
cαὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ.
7 καὶ τοῖς ταχὺ οἱ ἡ μόλις τυχόντες ἡ μὴ τυχόντες
8 φθονοῦσιν. καὶ ἀν ἡ κεκτημένων ἡ κατορθοῦντων
όνειδος αὐτῶς· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οὔτοι ἐγγὺς καὶ ὄμοιοι.
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι παρ’ αὐτοῖς οὐ τυχάνουσι τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ, ὥστε τούτο λυποῦν ποιεῖ τῶν φθόνον.
9 καὶ τοῖς ἐξοισι ταύτα ἡ κεκτημένως ἢσα αὐτοῖς
προσήκεν ἡ κέκτηντο ποτὲ· διὸ πρεσβύτεροι νεω-
10 τέροις. καὶ οἱ πολλὰ δαπανήσαντες εἰς ταῦτο τοῖς
11 ὀλίγα φθονοῦσιν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς χαίροντον
οἶ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἐπὶ τίς καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες· ὣς γὰρ

a According to the scholiast, from Aeschylus.
b Two rocks at the east end of the Straits of Gibraltar, supposed to be the limit westwards of the ancient world.
c That is, no one will attempt to compete with them in their special branch of study. Roemer reads καὶ πρὸς τοὺς
περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα, translated by Jebb as if there were a full
are near them in time, place, age, and reputation, whence it was said,

Kinship knows how to envy also; and those with whom they are in rivalry, who are those just spoken of; for no man tries to rival those who lived ten thousand years ago, or are about to be born, or are already dead; nor those who live near the Pillars of Hercules; nor those who, in his own opinion or in that of others, are either far inferior or superior to him; and the people and things which one envies are on the same footing. And since men strive for honour with those who are competitors, or rivals in love, in short, with those who aim at the same things, they are bound to feel most envious of these; whence the saying,

Potter [being jealous] of potter.

And those who have succeeded with difficulty or have failed envy those whose success has been rapid. And those whose possessions or successes are a reproach to themselves, and these, too, are those near or like them; for it is clear that it is their own fault that they do not obtain the same advantage, so that this pains and causes envy. And those who either have or have acquired what was naturally theirs or what they had once acquired; this is why an older man is envious of a younger one. Those who have spent much envy those who have only spent little to obtain the same thing. And it is clear at what things and persons the envious rejoice, and in what frame of mind; for, as when they do stop at ἀπερέχεσθαι. "In like manner we vie with those engaged in such or such pursuits."

\[ \text{ii. 4. 21.} \]
έχοντες λυποῦνται, οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν-αντίοις ἕσθησονται. ὥστε ἂν αὐτοὶ μὲν παρασκευα-σθῶσιν οὕτως ἔχειν, οἱ δ' ἐλεείσθαι ἡ τυγχάνειν τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἄξιομενοι ὅσιν οἰοὶ οἱ εἰρημένοι, δήλου ὡς οὐ τεύξονται ἔλεον παρὰ τῶν κυρίων.

11. Πῶς δ' ἔχοντες ἔσθησοι καὶ τὰ ποιά καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν, ἐνθένδ' ἐστὶ δήλον. εἰ γὰρ ἐστι ζήλος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένη παρουσία ἀγαθῶν ἐντίμων καὶ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ λαβεῖν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους τῇ φύσει, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλω ἄλλ' ὅτι οὕχι καὶ αὐτῷ ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικές ἐστιν ο ζήλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶς, τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν φαύλον καὶ φαύλων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν παρασκευάζει διὰ τὸν ζήλον τυγχάνειν τὼν ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίον μὴ ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον· ἀνάγκη δὴ ζηλωτικὸς μὲν εἶναι τοὺς ἄξιοντας αὐτοὺς ἀγαθῶν ὅν μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἄξιοί τὰ φαινό-2 μενα ἀδύνατα. διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ μεγαλόπυθαι στοιχεῖ. καὶ οἰς ὑπάρχει τοιαῦτα ἁγαθᾶ τα τῶν ἐντίμων ἄξιά ἐστιν ἀνδρῶν· ἐστὶ γὰρ ταῦτα πλοῦτος καὶ πολυφυλία καὶ ἀρχαι καὶ ὁσα τοιαῦτα· ὅσ γὰρ προσήκουν αὐτοῖς ἁγαθοῖς εἶναι, ὁτι προοικε τοῖς ἁγαθῶς ἔχουσι ζήλουσι τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἁγαθῶν.

καὶ οὖς οἱ ἄλλοι ἄξιοῦσιν. καὶ ὅν πρόγονοι ἡ συγγενεῖς ἡ οἰκεῖοι ἡ τὸ ἔθνος ἡ τὸ πόλις ἐντιμοὶ,

\[\text{a}^{1388 b}\] “The same state of mind which is absent in the painful feeling will be present in the joy excited by the opposite occasions,” meaning that, if one set of circumstances produces pain, the opposite will produce pleasure (Cope). Or, omitting οὐκ before ἔχοντες, “For in the same frame of mind as they are pained (at another’s good fortune) they will rejoice in the contrary state of things” (at another’s bad fortune).

\[\text{b}\] Something like “although they are within their grasp” is needed to complete the sense.

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not possess certain things, they are pained, so when they do possess them, they will rejoice in the opposite circumstances. So that if the judges are brought into that frame of mind, and those who claim their pity or any other boon are such as we have stated, it is plain that they will not obtain pity from those with whom the decision rests.

11. The frame of mind in which men feel emulation, what things and persons give rise to it, will be clear from the following considerations. Let us assume that emulation is a feeling of pain at the evident presence of highly valued goods, which are possible for us to obtain, in the possession of those who naturally resemble us—pain not due to the fact that another possesses them, but to the fact that we ourselves do not. Emulation therefore is virtuous and characteristic of virtuous men, whereas envy is base and characteristic of base men; for the one, owing to emulation, fits himself to obtain such goods, while the object of the other, owing to envy, is to prevent his neighbour possessing them. Necessarily, then, those are emulous who hold that they have a claim to goods that they do not possess; for no one claims what seems impossible. Hence the young and high-minded are emulous. And so are those who possess such advantages as are worthy of honourable men, which include wealth, a number of friends, positions of office, and all similar things. For, believing it their duty to be good, because such goods naturally belong to those who are good, they strive to preserve them. And those are emulous, whom others think worthy of them. Honours obtained by ancestors, kinsfolk, intimates, nation, or
4 εἶναι, καὶ ἄξιοι τούτων. εἰ δ’ ἐστὶ ζηλωτά τὰ ἐντιμα ἄγαθα, ἀνάγκη τὰς τε ἄρετὰς εἶναι τοιαύτας, καὶ ὅσα τοῖς ἄλλοις ωφέλιμα καὶ ἐυρεγετικὰ τιμῶσι γὰρ τοὺς ἐυρεγετοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἄγαθοὺς. καὶ ὅσων ἄγαθῶν ἀπόλαυσις τοῖς πλησίον ἔστιν, οἶνον πλούτος καὶ κάλλος μᾶλλον ύγιείας.

5 Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ ζηλωτοὶ τίνες: οἱ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κεκτημένου ζηλωτοί. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα τὰ εἰρημένα, οἶνον ἀνδρία σοφία ἀρχὴ οἱ γὰρ ἄρχοντες πολλούς δύνανται εὐ ποιεῖν, στρατηγοῖ,

6 βῆτορες, πάντες οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα δυνάμενοι. καὶ οἷς πολλοὶ ὁμοίῳ βούλονται εἶναι, ἡ πολλοὶ γνώριμαι, ἡ φίλοι πολλοί. ἡ οὐς πολλοὶ θαυμάζουσιν, ἡ οὖς αὐτοὶ θαυμάζουσιν. καὶ ὃν ἔπαινοι καὶ ἑγκώμια λέγονται ἡ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν ἡ λογογράφων καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἐναντίον γὰρ ζῆλω καταφρόνησις ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ζῆλον τῶν καταφρονεῖν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας ὦστε ζηλωσά τινας ἡ ζηλοῦσθαι, καταφρονητικοῖς εἶναι τούτων τε καὶ ἐπὶ τούτως ὅσοι τὰ ἐναντία κακὰ ἔχουσι τῶν ἄγαθῶν τῶν ζηλωτῶν. διὸ πολλάκις καταφρονοῦσι τῶν εὐτυχοῦντων, ὅταν ἀνευ τῶν ἐντιμῶν ἄγαθῶν υπάρχῃ αὐτοῖς ἡ τύχη. δι’ ὃν μὲν

a Spending one’s money benefits one’s neighbour to a certain extent, and beauty is always pleasant to look upon. One does not admire anyone because he is in good health, so much as because he is handsome.

b “Who have many acquaintances or friends” (Jebb).

c λογογράφοι means either the oldest Greek historians (or rather “chroniclers”), or the writers of speeches for use in the law courts, or of panegyrics.

d καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις. According to Cope, an unnecessary
city make men emulous in regard to such honours; for they think that these honours really belong to them and that they are worthy of them. And if highly valued goods are the object of emulation, it necessarily follows that the virtues must be such and all things that are useful and beneficial to the rest of mankind, for benefactors and virtuous men are honoured; to these we may add all the goods which our neighbours can enjoy with us, such as wealth and beauty, rather than health.\(^a\)

It is also evident who are the objects of emulation; for they are those who possess these or similar goods, such as have already been spoken of, for instance, courage, wisdom, authority; for those in authority, such as generals, orators, and all who have similar powers, can do good to many. And those whom many desire to be like, or to be their acquaintances or friends;\(^b\) those whom many or ourselves admire; those who are praised or eulogized either by poets or by prose writers.\(^c\) The opposite characters we despise; for contempt is the opposite of emulation, and the idea of emulation of the idea of contempt. And those who are in a condition which makes them emulate, or be emulated by, others, must be inclined to despise those persons\(^d\) (and for that reason) who suffer from defects contrary to the good things which excite emulation. That is why we often despise those who are fortunate, whenever their good fortune is not accompanied by highly valued goods. The means of producing and destroy-
οὖν τὰ πάθη ἐγγίγνεται καὶ διαλύεται, ἐξ ὧν αἱ πίστεις γίγνονται περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰρήται.

12. Τὰ δὲ ἡθη ποιοὶ τινες κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἤξεις καὶ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τὰς τύχας, διέλθωμεν 2 μετὰ ταύτα. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ὀργὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὰ τουαῦτα, περὶ δὲ ἔιρήκαμεν πρότερον, ἤξεις δὲ ἁρετᾶς καὶ κακίας· εἰρήται δὲ περὶ τοῦτων πρότερον, καὶ ποία προαιροῦνται ἑκαστοι, καὶ ποιῶν πρακτικοί. ἡλικίαι δ’ εἰσὶ νεότης καὶ ἀκμή καὶ γήρας. τύχην δὲ λέγω εὐγένειαι καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τάναντία τοῦτοι καὶ ὅλως εὐτυχίαι καὶ δυστυχίαι.

3 Οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἡθη εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικοί, καὶ οἱς ποιεῖν ὃν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν. καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμῶν μάλιστα ἄκολουθητικοί εἰσὶ ταῖς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια, καὶ ἀκρατεῖς ταύτης.

4 εὐμετάβολοι δὲ καὶ ἄφικοροι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, ταχέως δὲ παύονται· ὀξεῖαι γὰρ αἱ βουλήσεις καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι, ὡσπέρ 5 αἱ τῶν καμνόντων δύσαι καὶ πεναί. καὶ θυμικοὶ καὶ ὀξύθυμοι καὶ οἱ ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ ὀρμῇ, καὶ ἤττους εἰσὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ· διὰ γὰρ φιλοτιμίαν οὐκ ἄνεχονται ὀλγωρούμενοι, ἀλλ’ ἀγανακτοῦσι, ἀν 6 οἴωνται ἀδικεῖσθαι. καὶ φιλότιμοι μὲν εἰσὶ, μᾶλ- λον δὲ φιλόνικοι· ὑπεροχῆς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡ νεότης, ἡ δὲ νίκη ὑπεροχή τις. καὶ ἄμφω ταύτα μᾶλλον ἡ φιλοχρήματοι· φιλοχρήματοι δὲ ἥκιστα διὰ τὸ μὴ ποιεῖ εὐδείας πεπειράσθαι, ὡσπέρ τὸ Πιττακοῦ 7 ἔχει ἀπόφθεγμα εἰς Ἀμφιάραον. καὶ οὐ κακοήθεις

a The πίστεις ἡθη has been resumed from ii. 1. 8. As the πάθη and ἤξεις have been discussed already, only the ages and their character remain.
ing the various emotions in men, from which the methods of persuasion that concern them are derived, have now been stated.

12. Let us now describe the nature of the characters of men according to their emotions, habits, ages, and fortunes. By the emotions I mean anger, desire, and the like, of which we have already spoken; by habits virtues and vices, of which also we have previously spoken, as well as the kind of things men individually and deliberately choose and practise. The ages are youth, the prime of life, and old age. By fortune I mean noble birth, wealth, power, and their contraries, and, in general, good or bad fortune.¹

The young, as to character, are ready to desire and to carry out what they desire. Of the bodily desires they chiefly obey those of sensual pleasure and these they are unable to control. Changeable in their desires and soon tiring of them, they desire with extreme ardour, but soon cool; for their will, like the hunger and thirst of the sick, is keen rather than strong. They are passionate, hot-tempered, and carried away by impulse, and unable to control their passion; for owing to their ambition they cannot endure to be slighted, and become indignant when they think they are being wronged. They are ambitious of honour, but more so of victory; for youth desires superiority, and victory is a kind of superiority. And their desire for both these is greater than their desire for money, to which they attach only the slightest value, because they have never yet experienced want, as Pittacus ² said in his pithy remark on Amphiaras. They are not ill-

¹ One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece.

² One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece.
ALL' EU'THEIS DIÀ TÒ M'HÒW TETHEWRIKÉNAI POLLÀS PONHRIAS. KAI EU'PISTOI DIÀ TÒ M'HÒW POLLÀ

8 E'XHATHEIΣHAI. KAI EU'ELPIDES: ὩΣΠΕΡ ΓΑΡ ΟΙ ΟΪΝΩ-

MÉNOI, ΟΤΩΤ ΔΙΑΘΕΡΜΟΙ ΕΙΣΩΝ ΟΙ ΝΕΟΙ ΥΠΌ ΤΗΣ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ. ΑΜΑ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ DIÀ TÒ M'HÒW POLLÀ ĀPOTEUTUKHÈKÉNAI.

ΚΑΙ ΖΩΣΙ ΤΑ ΠΛΕΙΣΤΑ ΕΛΠΙΔΙ. Η ΜΕΝ ΓΑΡ ἘΛΠΙΣ ΤΟΥ

MÉLLONTÓS ΕΣΤΙΝ Η ΔΕ ΜΝΗΜΗ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΡΟΙΧΟΜΕΝΟΥ,

ΤΟΙΣ ΔΕ ΝΕΟΙ ΤΟ ΜΕΝ ΜΕΛΛΩΝ ΠΟΛΗ ΤΟ ΔΕ ΠΑΡ-

ΕΛΗΛΥΘΟΣ ΒΡΑΧΥ. ΤΗ ΓΑΡ ΠΡΩΤΗ ἩΜΕΡΑ ΜΕΜΗΣΘΑΙ

ΜΕΝ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΟΙΩΝ ΤΕ, ΕΛΠΙΖΕΙΝ ΔΕ ΠΑΝΤΑ. KAI EU-

ΕΞΑΓΑΝΤΗΤΟΙ ΕΙΣΙ DIÀ TÒ EIPHMÉNÒ. ἘΛΠΙΖΟΥΝ ΓΑΡ

9 ΡΑΔΙΩΣ. KAI AN' DREIOΣÒRON. ΘΥΜΩΔΕΙΣ ΓΑΡ KAI EU'EL-

PIDES, ΟΝ ΤΟ ΜΕΝ ΜΗ ΦΟΒΕΙΣΘΑΙ ΤΟ ΔΕ ΘΑΡΡΕΙΝ ΠΟΙΕΙ

ΟΥΤΕ ΓΑΡ ΟΡΓΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΟΥΔΕΙΣ ΦΟΒΕΙΤΑΙ, ΤΟ ΤΕ

10 ΕΛΠΙΖΕΙΝ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΤΙ ΘΑΡΡΑΛΕΩΝ ΕΣΤΙΝ. KAI ΑΙΣΧΥΝ-

ΤΗΛΟΙ. ΟΥ ΓΑΡ ΠΟ ΚΑΛΑ ΕΤΕΡΑ ὝΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΥΣΙΝ, ΑΛΛΑ

11 ΠΕΠΑΙΔΕΥΤΑΙ ΥΠΌ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΜΟΥ ΜΟΝΟΝ. KAI MEGALO-

ΨΥΧΟΙ. ΟΥΤΕ ΓΑΡ ΥΠΌ ΤΟΥ ΒΙΟΥ ΠΟ ΤΕΤΑΠΕΙΝΑΙΝΤΑΙ,

ΑΛΛΑ ΤΩΝ ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΩΝ ἈΠΕΙΡΟΙ ΕΙΣΩΝ, KAI ΤΟ ΆΞΙΟΥΝ

ΑΥΤΩΝ ΜΕΓΆΛΩΝ ΜΕΓΑΛΟΨΥΧΙΑ. ΤΟΥΤΟ Δ' ΕΥ'ELPIDOS.

12 ΚΑΙ ΜΑΛΛΩΝ ΑΙΡΟΥΝΤΑΙ ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ ΤΑ ΚΑΛΑ ΤΩΝ

ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝΤΩΝ. ΤΩ ΓΑΡ Ζ'ΘΕΙ ΖΩΣΙ ΜΑΛΛΩΝ Η ΤΩ

LOGISMOΣ, ΕΣΤΙ Δ' Ο ΜΕΝ LOGISMOΣ ΤΟΥ ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝΤΟΣ

13 Η ΔΕ ἈΡΕΤΗ ΤΟΥ ΚΑΛΟΥ. ΚΑΙ ΦΙΛΟΦΙΛΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΦΙΛ-

1389 b ΕΤΑΙΡΟΙ ΜΑΛΛΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΆΛΛΩΝ ἩΛΙΚΙΩΝ ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΧΑΙΡΕΩ

ΤΩ ΣΥΖΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΜΗΠΩ ΠΡΩΣ ΤΟ ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ ΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ

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a Or., “they do not look at things in a bad light, but in a
good,” i.e. they are not always ready to suspect.
b Social convention is the only law that they know, and
they are ashamed if they violate it, because as yet they have
no idea of higher laws which may command them to do so.
c Ἑθος “in the widest sense, includes all that is habitual
natured but simple-natured, because they have never yet witnessed much depravity; confiding, because they have as yet not been often deceived; full of hope, for they are naturally as hot-blooded as those who are drunken with wine, and besides they have not yet experienced many failures. For the most part they live in hope, for hope is concerned with the future as memory is with the past. For the young the future is long, the past short; for in the morning of life it is not possible for them to remember anything, but they have everything to hope; which makes them easy to deceive, for they readily hope. And they are more courageous, for they are full of passion and hope, and the former of these prevents them fearing, while the latter inspires them with confidence, for no one fears when angry, and hope of some advantage inspires confidence. And they are bashful, for as yet they fail to conceive of other things that are noble, but have been educated solely by convention. They are high-minded, for they have not yet been humbled by life nor have they experienced the force of necessity; further, there is high-mindedness in thinking oneself worthy of great things, a feeling which belongs to one who is full of hope.

In their actions, they prefer the noble to the useful; their life is guided by their character rather than by calculation, for the latter aims at the useful, virtue at the noble. At this age more than any other they are fond of their friends and companions, because they take pleasure in living in company and as yet judge nothing by expediency, not even their and characteristic; in a limited sense, it expresses the habitual temper or disposition" (Twining).
14 μηδέν, ὅστε μηδὲ τοὺς φίλους. καὶ ἂπαντα ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ σφοδρότερον ἀμαρτάνουσι παρὰ τὸ Χιλώνειον: πάντα γὰρ ἀγαν πράττουσιν· φιλοῦσι τε γὰρ ἀγαν καὶ μισοῦσιν ἀγαν καὶ τάλλα πάντα ὁμοίως. καὶ εἰδέναι πάντα οἴονται καὶ δισχυρίζονται· τούτο γὰρ αὐτῶν ἔστι καὶ τοῦ πάντα ἄγαν.
15 καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἄδικοισιν εἰς ὑβρίς καὶ οὐ κακουργίαιν. καὶ ἐλεητικὸ διὰ τὸ πάντας χρηστοὺς καὶ βελτίους ὑπολαμβάνειν· τῇ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀκακία τοὺς πέλας μετροῦσιν, ᾠστ' ἀνάξια πάσχειν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν αὐτοὺς. καὶ φιλογέλωτες, διὸ καὶ εὐτράπελον· ἡ γὰρ εὐτραπελλα πεπαιδευμένη ὑβρίς ἐστὶν. τὸ μὲν οὐν τῶν νεῶν τοιοῦτον ἔστιν ἱθὸς.
16 Οἳ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηκμακότες σχέδον ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτως τὰ πλείστα ἔχουσιν ἡθη· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλὰ ἐτή βεβιωκέναι καὶ πλεῖως ἐξηπατήσωσιν καὶ ἡμαρτήκεναι, καὶ τὰ πλεῖον βαῖλα εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὔτε διαβεβαιώνται οὐδέν, τὸ ἱστόν τε ἄγαν ἂπαντ' ἡ δελ. καὶ οἴονται, ἱσασι δ' οὐδέν. καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες προστιθέασιν ἂν τὸ ἴσως καὶ τάχα, καὶ πάντα λέγουσιν οὕτω, 2 παγίως δ' οὐδέν. καὶ κακοῆθεις εἰσὶν. ἐστὶ γὰρ κακοῆθεια τὸ ἄπαντα ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον ὑπολαμβάνειν πάντα. ἐτι δὲ κακοίπτοτοι εἰσὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν, ἀπιστοὶ 3 παγίως δ' οὐδέν. καὶ κακοῆθεις εἰσίν. ἐστὶ γὰρ κακοῆθεια τὸ ἄπαντα ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον ὑπολαμβάνειν πάντα. ἐτι δὲ κακοίπτοτοι εἰσὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν, ἀπιστοὶ 4 δὲ δὲ ἐμπειρίαν. καὶ οὔτε φιλοῦσι σφόδρα οὔτε μισοῦσι διὰ ταύτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν Βίαντος ὑποθήκην καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς μισῆσοντες καὶ μισοῦσιν ὡς 5 φιλῆσοντες. καὶ μικρόψυχοι διὰ τὸ τεταπεινώσθαι

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a One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece. The maxim was 
Μηδεν αγαν, Ne quid nimis, Never go to extremes.

b Or, “better than they really are.”

c One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece.
friends. All their errors are due to excess and vehemence and their neglect of the maxim of Chilon, for they do everything to excess, love, hate, and everything else. And they think they know everything, and confidently affirm it, and this is the cause of their excess in everything. If they do wrong, it is due to insolence, not to wickedness. And they are inclined to pity, because they think all men are virtuous and better than themselves; for they measure their neighbours by their own inoffensiveness, so that they think that they suffer undeservedly. And they are fond of laughter, and therefore witty; for wit is cultured insolence. Such then is the character of the young.

13. Older men and those who have passed their prime have in most cases characters opposite to those of the young. For, owing to their having lived many years and having been more often deceived by others or made more mistakes themselves, and since most human things turn out badly, they are positive about nothing, and in everything they show an excessive lack of energy. They always "think," but "know" nothing; and in their hesitation they always add "perhaps," or "maybe"; all their statements are of this kind, never unqualified. They are malicious; for malice consists in looking upon the worse side of everything. Further, they are always suspicious owing to mistrust, and mistrustful owing to experience. And neither their love nor their hatred is strong for the same reasons; but, according to the precept of Bias, they love as if they would one day hate, and hate as if they would one day love. And they are little-minded, because they
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΗ

υπὸ τοῦ βίου· οὐδενὸς γὰρ μεγάλου οὐδὲ περιπτοῦ, 6 ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. καὶ ἀνελεύθεροι· ἐν γὰρ τι τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ἡ οὐσία, ὡμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἰσασσιν ὡς χαλέπιν τὸ 7 κτήσασθαι καὶ τῶν πάντων προφοβητικοί· ἐναντίως γὰρ διάκεινται τοῖς νέοις· κατεψυχημένοι γὰρ εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ θερμοί. ὥστε προωδοποιήσε τὸ γῆρας τῇ δειλίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ
8 ὁ φόβος κατὰψυχῆς τις ἐστίν. καὶ φιλοξωί, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπί τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀπόντος εἶναι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὐ δὲ ἐνδειγ., τούτων
9 μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμεῖν. καὶ φίλαιντοι μᾶλλον ἡ δείκνυσιν γὰρ τις καὶ αὐτῇ. καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν, μᾶλλον ἡ δεῖ, διὰ τὸ φίλαιντοι εἶναι τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον
10 Καὶ ἀναίσχυντοι μᾶλλον ἡ αἰσχροτάλοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ φορτίζειν ὀμοίως τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφερόντος ὀλυγισμοῦ τοῦ δοκεῖν. καὶ δυσέλπιδες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· τὰ γὰρ πλείω τῶν γιγνομένων φαίλα ἐστίν· ἀποβαίνει γοῦν τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὸ 11 χείρον· καὶ ἐπὶ διὰ τὴν δειλίαν. καὶ ζῶσι τῇ μνήμῃ μᾶλλον ἡ τῇ ἐλπίδι· τοῦ γὰρ βίου τὸ μὲν λοιπὸν ὀλίγον τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς πολύ, ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐλπίς τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡ δὲ μνήμη τῶν παροιχομένων. ὁπερ αὐτικοί καὶ τῆς ἀδολεσχίας αὐτοῖς· διατελοῦσι γὰρ τὰ γενόμενα λέγοντες· ἀναμμηνησκόμενοι γὰρ
12 ἡδοναί. καὶ οἱ θυμοὶ ὀξεῖς μὲν ἀσθενεῖς δὲ εἰσιν, καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ μὲν ἐκκελοῦσαν αἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς εἰσιν, ὥστε οὕτ' ἐπιθυμητικοὶ οὐτε πρακτικοὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ

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have been humbled by life; for they desire nothing great or uncommon, but only the necessaries of life. They are not generous, for property is one of these necessaries, and at the same time, they know from experience how hard it is to get and how easy to lose. And they are cowardly and inclined to anticipate evil, for their state of mind is the opposite of that of the young; they are chilled, whereas the young are hot, so that old age paves the way for cowardice, for fear is a kind of chill. And they are fond of life, especially in their last days, because desire is directed towards that which is absent and men especially desire what they lack. And they are unduly selfish, for this also is littleness of mind. And they live not for the noble, but for the useful, more than they ought, because they are selfish; for the useful is a good for the individual, whereas the noble is good absolutely.

And they are rather shameless than modest; for since they do not care for the noble so much as for the useful, they pay little attention to what people think. And they are little given to hope owing to their experience, for things that happen are mostly bad and at all events generally turn out for the worse, and also owing to their cowardice. They live in memory rather than in hope; for the life that remains to them is short, but that which is past is long, and hope belongs to the future, memory to the past. This is the reason of their loquacity; for they are incessantly talking of the past, because they take pleasure in recollection. Their outbursts of anger are violent, but feeble; of their desires some have ceased, while others are weak, so that they neither feel them nor act in accordance with them, but only
κέρδος. διό καὶ σωφρονικοὶ φαίνονται οἱ τηλικοῦτοι·
αὖ τε γάρ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀνείκασι, καὶ δουλεύουσι τῷ
14 κέρδει. καὶ μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ κατὰ
τὸ ἰθὸς· ὃ μὲν γὰρ λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος τὸ
δ' ἰθὸς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστιν. καὶ τάδικήματα άδι-
15 κοῦσιν εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ύβριν. ἐλεητικοὶ δὲ
καὶ οἱ γέροντες εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ ταῦτο τοῖς νέοις·
οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ διὰ ἀσθένειαν·
pάντα γὰρ οἴονται ἐγγὺς εἰναι αὐτοῖς παθεῖν,
tούτο δ' ἦν ἐλεητικόν. θεοὶ οὐδυρτικοί εἰσι, καὶ
οὐκ εὐτράπελοι οὐδὲ φιλογέλουι· ἐναντίον γὰρ τὸ
16 οὐδυρτικὸν τῷ φιλογέλωτι. τῶν μὲν οὖν νέων καὶ
tῶν πρεσβυτέρων τὰ ἰθῆ τοιαύτα· ὥστε ἐπεὶ
ἀποδέχονται πάντες τοὺς τῷ σφετέρῳ ἰθεὶ λεγο-
μένους λόγους καὶ τοὺς ὅμοιους, οὐκ ἄδηλον πῶς
χρώμενοι τοῖς λόγοις τοιοῦτοι φανοῦνται καὶ αὐτοὶ
καὶ οἱ λόγοι.

14. Οἱ δὲ ἀκμᾶζοντες φανερὸν ὅτι μεταξὺ
tουτῶν τὸ ἰθὸς ἐσονται, ἐκατέρων ἀφαιροῦντες
τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, καὶ οὔτε σφόδρα θαρροῦντες
(θρασύτης γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον) οὔτε λίαν φοβοῦμενοι,
2 καλῶς δὲ πρὸς ἀμφώ ἑχοντες, οὔτε πᾶσι πιστεύοντες
οὔτε πᾶσιν ἀπιστοῦντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς
1390 b κρίνοντες μᾶλλον. καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες
μόνον οὔτε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀμφώ.
καὶ οὔτε πρὸς φειδὼ οὔτε πρὸς ἀσωτίαν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς
3 τὸ ἀρμόττον. ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ πρὸς θυμὸν καὶ
πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν. καὶ σώφρονες μετ' ἄνδρίας καὶ

a Or, “speeches which resemble (or reflect) it” (their character).
RHETORIC, II. xiii. 13—xiv. 3

from motives of gain. Hence men of this age are regarded as self-controlled, for their desires have slackened, and they are slaves to gain. In their manner of life there is more calculation than moral character, for calculation is concerned with that which is useful, moral character with virtue. If they commit acts of injustice it is due to vice rather than to insolence. The old, like the young, are inclined to pity, but not for the same reason; the latter show pity from humanity, the former from weakness, because they think that they are on the point of suffering all kinds of misfortunes, and this is one of the reasons that incline men to pity. That is why the old are querulous, and neither witty nor fond of laughter; for a querulous disposition is the opposite of a love of laughter. Such are the characters of the young and older men. Wherefore, since all men are willing to listen to speeches which harmonize with their own character and to speakers who resemble them, it is easy to see what language we must employ so that both ourselves and our speeches may appear to be of such and such a character.

14. It is evident that the character of those in the prime of life will be the mean between that of the other two, if the excess in each case be removed. At this age, men are neither over-confident, which would show rashness, nor too fearful, but preserving a right attitude in regard to both, neither trusting nor distrusting all, but judging rather in accordance with actual facts. Their rule of conduct is neither the noble nor the useful alone, but both at once. They are neither parsimonious nor prodigal, but preserve the due mean. It is the same in regard to passion and desire. Their self-control is combined
ανδρείοι μετὰ σωφροσύνης. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νέοις καὶ
tοῖς γέρουσι διήρηται ταῦτα: εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν νέοι
ανδρείοι καὶ ἀκόλαστοι, οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι σώφρονες
καὶ δειλοί. ὡς δὲ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, οὐσα μὲν διήρηται
ἡ νεότης καὶ τὸ γήρας τῶν ὑφελίμων, ταῦτα ἄμφω
ἐξουσι, ὥσα δ’ ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἡ ἐλλείπουσιν,

4 τούτων τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ ἀρμόττον. ἀκμάζει δὲ
tὸ μὲν σῶμα ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἑτῶν μέχρι τῶν
πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα, ἢ δὲ ψυχὴ περὶ τὰ ἑνὸς δεῖν
πεντήκοντα. περὶ μὲν οὖν νεότητος καὶ γήρως
καὶ ἀκμῆς, ποίων ἥθων ἑκαστὸν ἑστιν, εἰρήσθω
τοσαῦτα.

15. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνομένων ἁγαθῶν,
δι’ ὅσα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἡθη ποιὰ ἄττα συμβαίνει
2 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, λέγωμεν ἐφεξῆς. εὐγενείας μὲν
οὖν ἡθὸς ἐστὶ τὸ φιλοτιμότερον εἰναι τὸν κεκτη-
μένον αὐτήν. ἀπαντεῖς γὰρ, ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ τι, πρὸς
tούτῳ σωφρεῦει εἰσώθωσιν, ἢ δ’ εὐγένεια ἐντιμότης
tῆς προγόνων ἑστίν. καὶ καταφρονητικὸς καὶ
tῶν ὁμοίων ἐστὶ τοῖς προγόνοις τοῖς αὐτῶν, διότι
πόρρω ταύτα μᾶλλον ἡ ἐγγύς γιγνόμενα ἐντιμότερα
3 καὶ εὐαλαξόνευτα. ἐστὶ δὲ εὐγενεῖς μὲν κατὰ τὴν
τοῦ γένους ἀρετὴν, γενναίον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μή εξ-
ἰστασθαι τῆς φύσεως· ὅπερ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐ
συμβαίνει τοῖς εὐγενεῖσιν, ἀλλ’ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ
eὐτελείς· φορὰ γάρ τὸς ἑστὶν ἐν τοῖς γένεσιν ἄνδρῶν
ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς χώρας γιγνομένοις, καὶ
ἐνίοτε ἃν ἡ ἁγαθὸν τὸ γένος, ἐγχύνονται διὰ τῶν
χρόνων ἄνδρες περιττοί, καπέτα πάλιν ἀναδίδωσιν.
εξίσταται δὲ τὰ μὲν εὐφύᾳ γένη εἰς μανικώτερα

a i.e. the advantages and distinctions the family possessed

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with courage and their courage with self-control, whereas in the young and old these qualities are found separately; for the young are courageous but without self-control, the old are self-controlled but cowardly. Speaking generally, all the advantages that youth and old age possess separately, those in the prime of life possess combined; and all cases of excess or defect in the other two are replaced by due moderation and fitness. The body is most fully developed from thirty to thirty-five years of age, the mind at about forty-nine. Let this suffice for youth, old age, and the prime of life, and the characters which belong to each.

15. Let us next speak of the goods that are due to fortune, all those, at least, which produce certain characters in men. A characteristic of noble birth is that he who possesses it is more ambitious; for all men, when they start with any good, are accustomed to heap it up, and noble birth is a heritage of honour from one’s ancestors. Such men are prone to look down even upon those who are as important as their ancestors, because the same things are more honourable and inspire greater vanity when remote than when they are recent. The idea of noble birth refers to excellence of race, that of noble character to not degenerating from the family type, a quality not as a rule found in those of noble birth, most of whom are good for nothing. For in the generations of men there is a kind of crop as in the fruits of the field; sometimes, if the race is good, for a certain period men out of the common are born in it, and then it deteriorates. Highly gifted families often of old; such distinctions, when possessed by those of later date, are less thought of.
Ηθή, οίνον οἱ ἀπ᾽ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Διονυσίου τοῦ προτέρου, τὰ δὲ στάσιμα εἰς ἄβελτεριάν καὶ νωθρότητα, οἴνον οἱ ἀπὸ Κύμωνος καὶ Περικλέους καὶ Σωκράτους. 

16. Τῷ δὲ πλούτῳ ὁ ἕπεται Ἡθή, ἐπιτολής ἑστὶν ἰδεῖν ἀπασιν· ὑβρισταὶ γὰρ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι, πᾶσχοντες τι ὑπὸ τῆς κτήσεως τοῦ πλούτου· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔχοντες ἀπαντᾷ τάγαθὰ οὕτω διάκειναι· ὁ γὰρ πλοῦτος οἶνον τιμῇ τις τῆς ἀξίας τῶν ἄλλων, 

2 διὸ φαίνεται ὃνια ἀπαντὰ εἶναι αὐτοῦ. καὶ τρυφεροὶ καὶ σαλάκωνες, τρυφεροὶ μὲν διὰ τὴν τρυφὴν καὶ τὴν ἐνδείξιν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, σαλάκωνες δὲ καὶ σολοκοί διὰ τὸ πάντας εἰσθέναι διατρίβειν περὶ τὸ ἐρώμενον καὶ θαυμαζόμενον ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, καὶ τῷ οἴεσθαι ζηλοῦν τοὺς ἄλλους ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ. ἀμα δὲ καὶ εἰκότως τούτῳ πάσχουσιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ εἰσιν οἱ δεόμενοι τῶν ἔχοντων. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Σιμωνίδου εἴρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν Ἰέρωνος ἐρομένην πότερον γενέσθαι κρείττον πλούσιον ἥ σοφόν· πλουσίων εἰπεῖν· τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἐφη ὅραν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν 3 πλουσίων θύραις διατρίβονται. καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἀξίους εἶναι ἀρχεῖν· ἔχειν γὰρ οἴονται ὃν ἐνεκεν ἀρχεῖν ἀξιόν. καὶ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ, ἀνοίχτου εὐ- 

4 δαίμονος Ἡθὸς πλούτου ἑστὶν. διαφέρει δὲ τοῖς νεωστὶ κεκτημένοις καὶ τοῖς πάλαι τὰ Ἡθή τῷ ἀπαντᾷ μᾶλλον καὶ φαυλότερα τὰ κακὰ ἔχειν τοὺς νεοπλούτους· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀπαδευσία πλούτου ἑστὶ τὸ νεόπλοτον εἶναι. καὶ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν

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degenerate into maniacs, as, for example, the descendants of Alcibiades and the elder Dionysius; those that are stable into fools and dullards, like the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates.

16. The characters which accompany wealth are plain for all to see. The wealthy are insolent and arrogant, being mentally affected by the acquisition of wealth, for they seem to think that they possess all good things; for wealth is a kind of standard of value of everything else, so that everything seems purchasable by it. They are luxurious and swaggerers, luxurious because of their luxury and the display of their prosperity, swaggerers and ill-mannered because all men are accustomed to devote their attention to what they like and admire, and the rich suppose that what they themselves are emulous of is the object of all other men's emulation. At the same time this feeling is not unreasonable; for those who have need of the wealthy are many in number. Hence the answer of Simonides to the wife of Hiero concerning the wise and the rich, when she asked which was preferable, to be wise or to be rich. "Rich," he answered, "for we see the wise spending their time at the doors of the rich." And the rich think they are worthy to rule, because they believe they possess that which makes them so. In a word, the character of the rich man is that of a fool favoured by fortune. At the same time there is a difference between the character of the newly rich and of those whose wealth is of long standing, because the former have the vices of wealth in a greater degree and more; for, so to say, they have not been educated to the use of wealth. Their unjust acts are not due to malice,

"What makes power worth having" (Cope).

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17. Ὑμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως σχεδὸν τὰ πλείστα φανερὰ ἐστὶν ἡθήν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχει ἡ δύναμις τῷ πλούτῳ τὰ δὲ βελτίων· φιλοτιμότεροι γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρῳδέστεροί εἰσι τὰ ἡθήν οἱ δυνάμενοι τῶν πλούσιων διὰ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι ἔργων ὅσα ἐξουσία 3 αὐτοῖς πράττειν διὰ τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ σπουδα-στικῶτερον διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ εἰναι, ἀναγκαζό-

μενοι σκοπεῖν τὰ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ σεμνότεροι ἡ βαρύτεροι· ποιεῖ γὰρ ἐμφανεστέρους τὸ ἄξιόμα, διὸ μετριάζουσιν· ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ σεμνότης μαλακῆ καὶ εὐσχῆμων βαρύτης. καὶ ἄδικῶς, οὐ μικραδικηταί εἰσιν ἀλλὰ μεγαλάδικοι.

5 Ἡ δ' εὐνυχία κατὰ τὰ μόρια τῶν εἰρημένων ἔχει τὰ ἡθήν· εἰς γὰρ ταῦτα συντείνουσιν αἱ μέγισται δοκοῦσαι εἰναι εὐνυχίαι, καὶ ἐτὶ εἰς εὐτεκνίαν καὶ 1391β τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἁγαθὰ παρασκευάζει ἡ εὐνυχία 6 πλεονεκτείν. ὑπερηφανώτεροι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀ-

λογιστότεροι διὰ τὴν εὐνυχίαν εἰσὶν, ἐν δὲ ἀκολού-

θεί βέλτιστον ἥθος τῇ εὐνυχίᾳ, ὅτι φιλόθεοι εἰσὶ καὶ ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ θεῖόν πῶς, πιστεύοντες διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἁγαθά ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης· περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν καὶ τύχην ἡθῶν ἐίρηται· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία τῶν εἰρημένων ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων

a ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ: “because they are administrators” (Jebb).

b The three divisions are noble birth, wealth, and power.

The meaning is that the highest kinds of good fortune tend or converge to these (i.e. to noble birth, wealth, and power).

κατὰ τὰ μόρια might also mean “in part.” Hobbes, in his Brief of the Art of Rhetorick, paraphrases: “the manners

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but partly to insolence, partly to incontinence, which tends to make them commit assault and battery and adultery.

17. In regard to power, nearly all the characters to which it gives rise are equally clear; for power, compared with wealth, exhibits partly identical, and partly superior characteristics. Thus, the powerful are more ambitious and more manly in character than the rich, since they aim at the performance of deeds which their power gives them the opportunity of carrying out. And they are more energetic; for being obliged to look after their power, they are always on the watch. And they are dignified rather than heavily pompous; for their rank renders them more conspicuous, so that they avoid excess; and this dignity is a mild and decent pomposity. And their wrongdoings are never petty, but great.

Good fortune in its divisions exhibits characters corresponding to those which have just been mentioned; for those which appear to be the most important kinds of good fortune tend in their direction; further, good fortune furnishes advantages over others in the blessing of children and bodily goods. Now, although men are more arrogant and thoughtless owing to good fortune, it is accompanied by a most precious quality. Fortunate men stand in a certain relation to the divinity and love the gods, having confidence in them owing to the benefits they have received from fortune. We have spoken of the characters associated with different ages and fortunes; the opposite characters to those described, of men that prosper, are compounded of the manners of the nobility, the rich, and those that are in power, for to some of these all prosperity appertains.”

\[ c \text{ ii. 12-14; ii. 15-17.}\]
Having dealt with ethical and pathetic proofs, Aristotle proceeds to the discussion of topics of enthymemes common to all three kinds of Rhetoric. The difficulty in the Greek lies in the absence of a suitable apodosis to the long sentence beginning ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν πυθανῶν λόγων χρήσις πρὸς κρῖσιν ἐστὶ (περὶ δὲν γὰρ ἢσμεν καὶ κεκρίκαμεν, οὐδὲν ἐτὶ δεῖ λόγοι), ἐστι δὲ, ἂν τε πρὸς ἐνα τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος προστρέπῃ ἡ ἀποστρέφῃ, οἶνοι νουθετοῦντες ποιοῦσιν ἡ πείθοντες (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢττον κριτῆς ὁ εἰς· ὅ γὰρ δεῖ πείσαι, οὕτως ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἴπειν κριτῆς), ἐὰν τε πρὸς ἀμφισβητοῦντα ἐὰν τε πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν λέγῃ τις, ὁμοίως· τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀναφεῖν τὰν αντία, πρὸς ἡ ὁσπερ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται. ὅσαυτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς· ὠσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν τὸν θεωρὸν ὁ λόγος συνεστηκεν. ὅλως δὲ μόνος ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς κριτῆς ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀγώσιν ὁ τὰ ζητοῦμενα κρῖνων· τά τε γὰρ ἀμφισβητούμενα ζητεῖται πῶς ἔχει, καὶ περὶ δὲν βουλεύονται. περὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας ἢθῶν ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς εὑρηται πρῶτον. ὠστε διωρισμένον ἂν εἴη πῶς τε καὶ διὰ τῶν τοὺς λόγους ἢθικοὺς ποιητέον.
for instance, of the poor, of the unfortunate, and of the weak, are obvious from their opposites.

18. Now the employment of persuasive speeches is directed towards a judgement; for when a thing is known and judged, there is no longer any need of argument. And there is judgement, whether a speaker addresses himself to a single individual and makes use of his speech to exhort or dissuade, as those do who give advice or try to persuade, for this single individual is equally a judge, since, speaking generally, he who has to be persuaded is a judge; if the speaker is arguing against an opponent or against some theory, it is just the same, for it is necessary to make use of speech to destroy the opposing arguments, against which he speaks as if they were the actual opponent; and similarly in epideictic speeches, for the speech is put together with reference to the spectator as if he were a judge. Generally speaking, however, only he who decides questions at issue in civil controversies is a judge in the proper sense of the word, for in judicial cases the point at issue is the state of the case, in deliberative the subjects of deliberation. We have already spoken of the characters of forms of government in treating of deliberative rhetoric, so that it has been determined how and by what means we must make our speeches conform to those characters, discussion of the characters and emotions. I have also spoken of the characters of the forms of government; so that this part of the subject need no longer detain us.” It is generally agreed that we have not the chapter as originally arranged, although it is not supposed that any part of it is non-Aristotelian (see Cope and note in Jebb’s translation).

b Both forensic and deliberative.

c Or, “for in both forensic and deliberative arguments the issue is the state of the case.”

d i. 8.
2 'Επεὶ δὲ περὶ ἐκαστον μὲν γένος τῶν λόγων ἔτερον ἢν τὸ τέλος, περὶ ἀπάντων δ' αὐτῶν εἰλημμέναι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις εἰσίν, ἦς δὲν τὰς πίστεις φέρουσι καὶ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ ἐπιδεικνύομενοι καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, ἔτι δ' ἦς ἡθικοὺς τοὺς λόγους ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν, καὶ περὶ τούτων διώρισται, 3 λοιπὸν ἦμῖν διελθεῖν περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πᾶσι γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τὰ περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου προσχρῆσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὡς ἐσταὶ τοὺς δὲ ὡς γέγονε πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι.

4 ἔτι δὲ περὶ μεγέθους κοινῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν λόγων: χρώνται γὰρ πάντες τῷ μειον καὶ αὐξεῖν καὶ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ ἑπανοῦντες ἡ ψέγοντες 5 καὶ κατηγοροῦντες ἡ ἀπολογούμενοι. τούτων δὲ διορισθέντων περὶ τε ἐνθυμημάτων κοινῆ πειραθώμεν εἰπεῖν, εἰ τι ἔχομεν, καὶ περὶ παραδειγμάτων, ὡς πάντα προσθέντες ἀποδώμεν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν κοινῶν τὸ μὲν αὐξεῖν οἰκειοτάτου τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, ἀναπερ ἐρηταί, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς τοῖς δικανικοῖς (περὶ τούτων γὰρ ἡ κρίσις), τὸ δὲ δυνατόν καὶ ἐσόμενον τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς.

19. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου λέγομεν. ἂν δὴ τοιοῦτον ἢ δυνατὸν ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον δόξειν ἂν εἶναι δυνατόν· οἷον εἰ δυνατὸν ἀνθρωπὸν ψυχηθῆναι, καὶ νοσήσαι· ἡ γὰρ αὐτῇ δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων, ἢ ἐναντία. καὶ

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*a* i. 3.  
*b* i. 4-8.  
*c* i. 9; 10-15.  
*d* i. 9. 40.  

Amplication is to be understood of the exaggeration of both great and small things. It is most
Now, since each kind of Rhetoric, as was said, has its own special end, and in regard to all of them we have gathered popular opinions and premises whence men derive their proofs in deliberative, epideictic, and judicial speeches, and, further, we have determined the special rules according to which it is possible to make our speeches ethical, it only remains to discuss the topics common to the three kinds of rhetoric. For all orators are obliged, in their speeches, also to make use of the topic of the possible and impossible, and to endeavour to show, some of them that a thing will happen, others that it has happened. Further, the topic of magnitude is common to all kinds of Rhetoric, for all men employ extenuation or amplification whether deliberating, praising or blaming, accusing or defending. When these topics have been determined, we will endeavour to say what we can in general about enthymemes and examples, in order that, when we have added what remains, we may carry out what we proposed at the outset. Now, of the commonplaces amplification is most appropriate to epideictic rhetoric, as has been stated; the past to forensic, since things past are the subject of judgement; and the possible and future to deliberative.

19. Let us first speak of the possible and the impossible. If of two contrary things it is possible that one should exist or come into existence, then it would seem that the other is equally possible; for instance, if a man can be cured, he can also be ill; for the potentiality of contraries, qua contraries, is suited to epideictic oratory, in which there is no doubt as to the facts; so that it is only necessary to accentuate their importance or non-importance.
2 ei to ómioi duname, kai to ómioi. kai ei to 3 xalépopóteron duname, kai to róoun. kai ei to 4 spoudaiou kai kalon genvisthai dunate, kai olws 
dunaton genvisthai. xalépopóteron gar kalhn oikian 
5 hi oikian einai. kai ou hi arxh dúvatai genvisthai, 
kai to télos. oudein gar gignetai oud' arxetai 
gignesthai twn ádunatwn, ouon to symmetroi thn 
diámetroi einai ou't an arxaitó gignetai ou'te 
gignetai. kai ou to télos, kai hi arxh dunate. 
6 apanta gar ex arxhís gignetai. kai ei to ústeron 
ti ouxia ti tig genvéseai dunate dunate, kai to 
próteron, ouon ei ándra genvisthai dunate, kai paiáda-
próteron gar ékeino gignetai. kai ei paiáda, kai 
7 ándra. arxh gar ékeini. kai oun érws hi épithumía 
phi sei estin. oudeis gar twn ádunatwn épai ou'd 
8 épithumei ws epi to polý. kai oun épisthmai ei so 
kai teknai, dynata tauta kai einai kai genvisthai. 
9 kai osow hi arxh tis genvésews en toutous estin a 
htimai anagkásonme an ti peísonme: tauta d' 
10 estin oiv krestous hi kúroi hi filoi. kai oun ta 
mere dunate, kai to olon. kai oun to olon dunate, 
kai ta mere ws epi to polý: ei gar prósxiema 
kai kefalís kai xitwn dunate genvisthai, kai 
upodiama dunate genvisthai, kai ei upodiama, 
11 kai prósxiema kai kefalís kai xitwn. kai ei to

a As a general rule, from their nature as contraries, although it may not be true in particular cases. If a man is ill, he may also be well, although in particular cases certain qualities may make him more liable to one or the other, e.g. he may suffer from an incurable disease (Schrader).

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the same. Similarly, if of two like things the one is possible, so also is the other. And if the harder of two things is possible, so also is the easier. And if it is possible for a thing to be made excellent or beautiful, it is possible for it to be made in general; for it is harder for a beautiful house to be made than a mere house. Again, if the beginning is possible, so also is the end; for no impossible thing comes, or begins to come, into existence; for instance, that the diameter of a square should be commensurable with the side of a square is neither possible nor could be possible. And when the end is possible, so also is the beginning; for all things arise from a beginning. And if that which is subsequent in being or generation can come into being, so then can that which is antecedent; for instance, if a man can come into being, so can a child, for the child is antecedent; and similarly, if a child can come into being, so can a man, for the child is a beginning. And things which we love or desire naturally are possible; for as a rule no one loves the impossible or desires it. And those things which form the subject of sciences or arts can also exist and come into existence. And so with all those things, the productive principles of which reside in those things which we can control by force or persuasion, when they depend upon those whose superiors, masters, or friends we are. And if the parts are possible, so also is the whole; and if the whole is possible, so also are the parts, speaking generally; for instance, if the front, toe-cap, and upper leather, can be made, then shoes can be made, and if shoes, then the above parts. And if

*b An argument *a fortiori*. If a beautiful house can be built, so can a house of any kind; for this is easier.

The meaning of the Greek words is quite uncertain.
1392 b γένος ὅλων τῶν δυνατῶν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ εἰ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ γένος, οἶον εἰ πλοῖον γενέσθαι δυνατόν, καὶ τριήρη, καὶ εἰ τριήρη, καὶ πλοῖον. 
12 καὶ εἰ θάτερον τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλα περικότων, καὶ θάτερον, οἶον εἰ διπλάσιον, καὶ ήμισὺ, καὶ εἰ ήμισὺ, 
13 καὶ διπλάσιον. καὶ εἰ ἄνευ τέχνης καὶ παρασκευῆς δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, μᾶλλον διὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιμελείας δυνατὸν· οὗτοι καὶ Ἀγάθων εἰρήται 
καὶ μὴν τὰ μέν γε χρὴ τέχνη πράσσειν, τὰ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη προσγίγνεται. 
14 καὶ εἰ τοῖς χείροσι καὶ ἡττοσι καὶ ἀφρονεστέροις δυνατόν, καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ἐφή δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ ὁ μὲν Ἐὔθυνος 
15 ἐμαθεν, αὐτὸς δὲ μὴ δυνήσεται εὑρεῖν. περὶ δὲ ἀδυνάτου δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὑπάρχει. 
16 Εἰ δὲ γέγονεν ἡ μὴ γέγονεν, ἐκ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, εἰ τὸ ἡττον γίγνεσθαι πεφυκός 
17 γέγονεν, γεγονὸς ἂν εἰ ἦν καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον. καὶ εἰ τὸ ύστερον εἰωθὸς γίγνεσθαι γέγονεν, καὶ τὸ πρότερον γέγονεν, οἶον εἰ ἐπιλέξησται, καὶ ἐμαθέ ποτε 
18 τούτω. καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐβούλετο, πέπραξεν· πάντες γάρ, ὅταν δυνάμενοι βουλήθωσι, πρᾶτ- 
19 τουσιν ἐμποδοῦν γὰρ οὐδέν. ἐτὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο καὶ

a T.G.F. p. 765.
the whole genus is among things possible to be made, so is the species, and if the species, so the genus; for example, if a vessel can be built, so can a trireme, if a trireme can, so can a vessel. If of two naturally corresponding things one is possible, so also is the other; for instance, if the double is possible, so is the half, if the half, so the double. If a thing can be made without art or preparation, much the more can it be made with the help of art and carefulness. Whence it was said by Agathon:

And moreover we have to do some things by art, while others fall to our lot by compulsion or chance.

And if a thing is possible for those who are inferior, or weaker, or less intelligent, it will be still more so for those whose qualities are the opposite; as Isocrates said, it would be very strange if he were unable by himself to find out what Euthynus had learnt [with the help of others]. As for the impossible, it is clear that there is a supply of arguments to be derived from the opposite of what has been said about the possible.

The question whether a thing has or has not happened must be considered from the following points of view. In the first place, if that which is naturally less likely has happened, then that which is more likely will most probably have happened. If that which usually happens afterwards has happened, then that which precedes must also have happened; for instance, if a man has forgotten a thing, he must once have learnt it. If a man was able and wished to do a thing, he has done it; for all men do a thing, when they are able and resolve to do it, for nothing hinders them. Further, if a man wished to do it
μηδὲν τῶν ἐξω ἐκώλυνεν, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ὁργίζετο, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐπεθύμει· ώς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ὡν ὀρέγονται, ἂν δύνωνται, καὶ ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φαύλοι δὲ ἀκρασίαν, οἱ δὲ ἑπιεικεῖς ὡτι τῶν ἑπιεικῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. καὶ εἰ ἐμελλε γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ποιεῖν· εἰκὸς γὰρ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ ποιῆσαι.

21 καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ὡςα πεφύκει πρὸ ἐκείνου ἢ ἑνεκα ἐκείνου, οἰον εἰ ἠστραψε, καὶ ἐβρόντησεν, καὶ εἰ ἐπείρασε, καὶ ἐπράξεν. καὶ εἰ ὡςα ύστερον πεφύκει γίγνεσθαι ἢ οὐ ἑνεκα γίγνεται γέγονεν, καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ τοῦτο ἑνεκα γέγονεν, οἰον εἰ ἐβρόντησε, καὶ ἠστραψεν, καὶ εἰ ἐπράξε, καὶ ἐπείρασεν. ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἀπάντων τὰ μὲν εἰς ἀνάγκης τὰ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὕτως ἔχοντα. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ γεγονέναι φανερὸν ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

1303 a Καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν δῆλον· τὸ τε γὰρ ἐν δυνάμει καὶ βουλήσει ὃν ἔσται, καὶ τὰ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ ὀργῇ καὶ λογισμῷ μετὰ δυνάμεως ὄντα. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ εἰ ἐν ὀρμῇ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἢ μελλῆσει, ἔσται· ώς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνεται μᾶλλον τὰ μέλλοντα ἢ τὰ μὴ μέλλοντα. καὶ εἰ προγέγονεν ὡςα πρότερον πεφύκει γίγνεσθαι, οἰον 25 εἰ συννεφεὶ, εἰκὸς ὑσαι. καὶ εἰ τὸ ἑνεκα τούτου 270
and there was no external obstacle; if he was able to do it and was in a state of anger; if he was able and desired to do it; for men as a rule, whenever they can, do those things which they long for, the vicious owing to want of self-control, the virtuous because they desire what is good. And if anything was on the point of being done, it most probably was done; for it is likely that one who was on the point of doing something has carried it out. And if all the natural antecedents or causes of a thing have happened; for instance, if it has lightened, it has also thundered; and if a man has already attempted a crime, he has also committed it. And if all the natural consequences or motives of actions have happened, then the antecedent or the cause has happened; for instance, if it has thundered, it has also lightened, and if a man has committed a crime, he has also attempted it. Of all these things some are so related necessarily, others only as a general rule. To establish that a thing has not happened, it is evident that our argument must be derived from the opposite of what has been said.

In regard to the future, it is clear that one can argue in the same way; for if we are able and wish to do a thing, it will be done; and so too will those things which desire, anger, and reasoning urge us to do, if we have the power. For this reason also, if a man has an eager desire, or intention, of doing a thing, it will probably be done; since, as a rule, things that are about to happen are more likely to happen than those which are not. And if all the natural antecedents have happened; for instance, if the sky is cloudy, it will probably rain. And if one thing has been done with a view to another, it is probable that the latter
γέγονεν, καὶ τοῦτο εἰκὸς γενέσθαι, οἵον εἰ θεμέλιος, καὶ οὐκια.

26 Περὶ δὲ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ μειζόνος τε καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ ὀλος μεγάλων καὶ μικρῶν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἦμων ἐστὶ φανερὸν· εὑρηται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς περὶ τε με-

27 εγέθους ἁγαθῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μειζόνος ἀπλῶς καὶ ἐλάττονος. ὥστε ἔπει καθ’ ἐκαστὸν τῶν λόγων τὸ προκείμενον τέλος ἁγαθόν ἐστὶν, οἷον τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, φανερὸν ὅτι δι’
will also be done; for instance, if a foundation has been laid, a house will probably be built.

What we have previously said clearly shows the nature of the greatness and smallness of things, of the greater and less, and of things great and small generally. For, when treating of deliberative rhetoric, we spoke of greatness of goods, and of the greater and less generally. Therefore, since in each branch of Rhetoric the end set before it is a good, such as the expedient, the noble, or the just, it is evident that all must take the materials of amplification from these. To make any further inquiry as to magnitude and superiority absolutely would be waste of words; for the particular has more authority than the general for practical purposes. Let this suffice for the possible and impossible; for the question whether a thing has happened, or will happen, or not; and for the greatness or smallness of things.

20. It remains to speak of the proofs common to all branches of Rhetoric, since the particular proofs have been discussed. These common proofs are of two kinds, example and enthymeme (for the maxim is part of an enthymeme). Let us then first speak of the example; for the example resembles induction, and induction is a beginning. There are two kinds of examples; namely, one which consists in relating things that have happened before, and another in inventing them oneself. The latter are subdivided into comparisons or fables, such as those of Aesop and the Libyan. It would be an

\[ a \text{ i. 7.} \]
\[ b \text{ As a starting-point and first principle of knowledge.} \]
\[ c \text{ The Libyan fables were of African origin. They are mentioned by Quintilian (Inst. Orat. v. 11. 20) and belonged to the class of animal fables.} \]
The παραβολή as understood by Aristotle is a comparison and application of cases easily supposable and such as occur in real life, for the purpose of illustrating the point in question; the fable, on the other hand, is pure fiction.

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instance of the historical kind of example, if one were to say that it is necessary to make preparations against the Great King and not to allow him to subdue Egypt; for Darius did not cross over to Greece until he had obtained possession of Egypt; but as soon as he had done so, he did. Again, Xerxes did not attack us until he had obtained possession of that country, but when he had, he crossed over; consequently, if the present Great King shall do the same, he will cross over, wherefore it must not be allowed. Comparison is illustrated by the sayings of Socrates; for instance, if one were to say that magistrates should not be chosen by lot, for this would be the same as choosing as representative athletes not those competent to contend, but those on whom the lot falls; or as choosing any of the sailors as the man who should take the helm, as if it were right that the choice should be decided by lot, not by a man’s knowledge.a

A fable, to give an example, is that of Stesichorus concerning Phalaris, or that of Aesop on behalf of the demagogue. For Stesichorus, when the people of Himera had chosen Phalaris dictator and were on the point of giving him a body-guard, after many arguments related a fable to them: “A horse was in sole occupation of a meadow. A stag having come and done much damage to the pasture, the horse, wishing to avenge himself on the stag, asked a man whether he could help him to punish the stag. The man consented, on condition that the horse submitted to the bit and allowed him to mount him javelins in hand. The horse agreed to the terms and the man mounted him, but instead of obtaining vengeance on the stag, the horse from that time
λευσεν ἡδη τω ἀνθρώπῳ. “οὔτω δὲ καὶ ὤμεις,” ἔφη, “ὁρᾶτε μὴ βουλόμενοι τοὺς πολεμίων τιμωρήσασθαι ταυτὸ πάθητε τῷ ἵππῳ τὸν μὲν γὰρ χαλινὸν ἔχετε ἡδη, ἐλόμενοι στρατηγὸν αὐτο-κράτορα· ἐὰν δὲ φυλακὴν δῶτε καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἔάσητε, δουλεύσετε ἡδη Φαλάριδι.” Λίσσωπος δὲ ἐν Σάμῳ συνηγοροῦν δημαγωγῷ κρινομένῳ περὶ τανάτου ἔφη ἀλώπεκα διαβαίνουσαν ποταμὸν ἀπωθῆναι εἰς φάραγγα, οὐ δυναμένην δὲ ἐκβήναι πολύν χρόνον κακοπαθεῖν, καὶ κυνοραϊστὰς πολλοὺς ἔχεσθαι αὐτῆς· ἐχίνων δὲ πλανώμενον, ὡς εἰδὲν αὐτήν, κατοικτείρατα ἔρωταν εἰ ἀφέλοι αὐτῆς τοὺς κυνοραϊστὰς· τὴν δὲ οὐκ ἐὰν· ἐρομένου δὲ διὰ τί, ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν φάναι ἡδη μου πλήρεις εἰσὶ καὶ ὅλων ἔλκουσιν αἷμα· ἐὰν δὲ τούτους ἀφέλῃ, ἔτεροι ἐλθόντες πενώντες ἐκπιουνταί μου τὸ λοιπὸν αἷμα. “ἀτὰρ καὶ ὤμας,” ἔφη, “ὁ ἄνδρες Σάμωι, οὗτοι μὲν οὐδὲν ἔτι βλάψει (πλού-σιος γὰρ ἐστιν). ἐὰν δὲ τούτων ἀποκτείνῃ, ἔτεροι ἦξουσι πένητες, οἱ ὦμῖν ἀναλώσουσι τὰ κοινὰ 7 κλέπτοντες.” εἰσὶ δ’ οἱ λόγοι δημιουργικοί, καὶ ἔχουσιν ἁγαθὸν τοῦτο, ὅτι πράγματα μὲν εὑρεῖν ὁμοία γεγενημένα χαλεπόν, λόγους δὲ βραβον· ποῦσαι γὰρ δεὶ ὃσπερ καὶ παραβολάς, ἀν τις δύνηται τὸ ὁμοίων ὅραν, ὅπερ βραβὸν ἐστιν ἐκ φιλο-8 σοφίας. βάμω μὲν οὖν πορίσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν λόγων, χρησιμοτερα δὲ πρὸς τὸ βουλεύσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων· ὁμοία γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς γεγονόσιν.

a “Literary knowledge” (Jebb); “literature” (Cope, 276)
became the man’s slave. So then,” said he, “do you take care lest, in your desire to avenge yourselves on the enemy, you be treated like the horse. You already have the bit, since you have chosen a dictator; if you give him a body-guard and allow him to mount you, you will at once be the slaves of Phalaris.” Aesop, when defending at Samos a demagogue who was being tried for his life, related the following anecdote. “A fox, while crossing a river, was driven into a ravine. Being unable to get out, she was for a long time in sore distress, and a number of dog-fleas elung to her skin. A hedgehog, wandering about, saw her and, moved with compassion, asked her if he should remove the fleas. The fox refused and when the hedgehog asked the reason, she answered: ‘They are already full of me and draw little blood; but if you take them away, others will come that are hungry and will drain what remains to me.’ You in like manner, O Samians, will suffer no more harm from this man, for he is wealthy; but if you put him to death, others will come who are poor, who will steal and squander your public funds.” Fables are suitable for public speaking, and they have this advantage that, while it is difficult to find similar things that have really happened in the past, it is easier to invent fables; for they must be invented, like comparisons, if a man is capable of seizing the analogy; and this is easy if one studies philosophy. Thus, while the lessons conveyed by fables are easier to provide, those derived from facts are more useful for deliberative oratory, because as a rule the future resembles the past.

Introd. p. 256, who, however, in his annotated ed. explains: “intellectual study and mental exercises in general”).
9  Δεὶ δὲ χρήσθαι τοὺς παραδείγματι μὴ ἔχοντα μὲν ἐνθυμήματα ὡς ἀποδείξεων (ἣ γὰρ πίστις διὰ τούτων), ἔχοντα δὲ ὡς μαρτυρίους, ἐπιλόγω χρώμενον τοὺς ἐνθυμήμασιν. προτιθέμενα μὲν γὰρ ἐσικεν ἐπαγωγή, τοὺς δὲ ῥητορικοῖς οὐκ οὐκεῖον ἐπαγωγή πλὴν ἐν ὀλίγοις, ἐπιλεγόμενα δὲ μαρτυρίοις, ὁ δὲ μάρτυς πανταχοῦ πιθανός. διὸ καὶ προτιθέντι μὲν ἀνάγκη πολλὰ λέγειν, ἐπιλέγοντι δὲ καὶ ἐν ἰκανῶν μάρτυς γὰρ πιστός καὶ εἰς χρήσιμος. πόσα μὲν οὖν εἰδὴ παραδειγμάτων, καὶ πῶς αὐτοῖς καὶ πότε χρηστέον, εἰρήται.

21. Περὶ δὲ γνωμολογίας, ῥηθέντος τί ἐστι γνώμη, μάλιστ' ἂν γένοιτο φανερὸν περὶ ποιῶν τε καὶ πότε καὶ τίσιν ἀρμόττει χρήσθαι τῷ γνωμο-λογεῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. ἐστι δὲ γνώμη ἀπόφασις, οὐ μέντοι περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστὸν, οἶνον ποιῶς τις Ἰφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου· καὶ οὐ περὶ πάντων καθόλου, οἶνον ὅτι τὸ εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἴσι, καὶ αἱ ἱστα μὲν ἡ φευκτὰ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ πράττειν. ὡστε ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα ο περὶ τούτων συλλογισμός ἐστι σχεδὸν, τά τε συμπεράσματα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ γνώμαι εἴσι, οἶνον χρή δ’ οὐ ποθ’, ὅς τις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ’ ἀνήρ, παίδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφοὺς.

tούτῳ μὲν οὖν γνώμη προστεθείσης δὲ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ τί, ἐνθυμημά ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπαν, οἴον

a If we have no enthymemes, we must use examples instead of them; for they are useful for persuasion, although they do not really demonstrate anything. If we have enthymemes, we must use examples in corroboration of them (see 21. 3 note).

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If we have no enthymemes, we must employ examples as demonstrative proofs, for conviction is produced by these; but if we have them, examples must be used as evidence and as a kind of epilogue to the enthymemes. For if they stand first, they resemble induction, and induction is not suitable to rhetorical speeches except in very few cases; if they stand last they resemble evidence, and a witness is in every case likely to induce belief. Wherefore also it is necessary to quote a number of examples if they are put first, but one alone is sufficient if they are put last; for even a single trustworthy witness is of use. We have thus stated how many kinds of examples there are, and how and when they should be made use of.

21. In regard to the use of maxims, it will most readily be evident on what subjects, and on what occasions, and by whom it is appropriate that maxims should be employed in speeches, after a maxim has been defined. Now, a maxim is a statement, not however concerning particulars, as, for instance, what sort of a man Iphicrates was, but general; it does not even deal with all general things, as for instance that the straight is the opposite of the crooked, but with the objects of human actions, and with what should be chosen or avoided with reference to them. And as the enthymeme is, we may say, the syllogism dealing with such things, maxims are the premises or conclusions of enthymemes without the syllogism. For example:

No man who is sensible ought to have his children taught to be excessively clever,
is a maxim; but when the why and the wherefore are added, the whole makes an enthymeme; for instance,

\[ \text{Putting the comma after } \sigma\chi\epsilon\delta\omicron\nu. \]

\[ \text{Eur. Medea, 296.} \]
οὐκ ἦστιν ὅσ τις πάντ᾽ ἄνηρ εὐδαιμονεῖ.
καὶ τὸ
οὐκ ἦστιν ἀνδρῶν ὁσ τις ἐστ᾽ ἐλεύθερος
γνώμη, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἐχομένῳ ἐνθύμημα.
ἡ χρημάτων γὰρ δοῦλος ἦστιν ἡ τύχης.
3 εἰ δὴ ἦστιν γνώμη τὸ εἰρημένον, ἀνάγκη τέτταρα
εἶδη εἶναι γνώμης. ἡ γὰρ μετ᾽ ἐπιλόγου ἦσται ἡ
4 ἀνευ ἐπιλόγου. ἀποδείξεως μὲν οὖν δεόμεναι
εἰσὶν ὅσα παράδοξαν τι λέγουσιν ἡ ἀμφισβητοῦμενον. ὅσα
dὲ μηδὲν παράδοξον, ἀνευ ἐπιλόγου.
5 ποιήτων δ’ ἀνάγκη τὰς μὲν διὰ τὸ προεγνώσθαι
μηδὲν δεῖσθαι ἐπιλόγου, οἴον
ἀνδρὶ δ’ ύμιανεν ἀριστὸν ἦστιν, ὅσ γ’ ἑμῖν δοκεῖν
φαίνεται γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς οὖτω. τὰς δ’ ἀμα λεγο-
μένας δήλας εἶναι ἐπιβλέψασιν, οἴον
οὔδεις ἔραστὴς ὅσ τις οὐκ ἂει φιλεῖ.
6 τῶν δὲ μετ᾽ ἐπιλόγου αἱ μὲν ἐνθυμηματος μέρος
ἐσίν, ὅπερ

a "The idle habits which they contract" (Cope).
b Euripides, Theneboea (frag. 661, T.G.F.).
c Euripides, Hecuba, 858.
d Maxims with an epilogue are (1) imperfect enthymemes, or (2) enthymematic in character, but not in form; those without an epilogue are (1) such as are well known, or (2) such as are clear as soon as they are uttered.
for, not to speak of the charge of idleness brought against them, they earn jealous hostility from the citizens.

Another example:

There is no man who is happy in everything; or, There is no man who is really free.
The latter is a maxim, but taken with the next verse it is an enthymeme:

for he is the slave of either wealth or fortune.

Now, if a maxim is what we have stated, it follows that maxims are of four kinds; for they are either accompanied by an epilogue or not. Now all those that state anything that is contrary to the general opinion or is a matter of dispute, need demonstrative proof; but those that do not, need no epilogue, either because they are already known, as, for instance,

Health is a most excellent thing for a man, at least in our opinion,

for this is generally agreed; or because, no sooner are they uttered than they are clear to those who consider them, for instance,

He is no lover who does not love always.

As for the maxims that are accompanied by an epilogue, some form part of an enthymeme, as

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"Something added as a supplementary proof, the why and the wherefore; in iii. 19 it is used for the peroration of a speech.

From Simonides or Epicharmus.

Euripides, Troades, 1051."
χρη δ' οὖ ποθ' ὡστις ἀρτίφρων,
αἱ δ' ἐνθυμηματικαὶ μὲν, οὐκ ἐνθυμήματος δὲ μέρος· αὖπερ καὶ μάλιστ' εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. εἰσὶ δ' αὖτι εὐ ὁσιὰς ἐμφαίνεται τοῦ λεγομένου τὸ αἰτιον, οἰον ἐν τῷ

ἀθάνατον ὄργην μὴ φύλασσε θνητὸς ὡν·
tὸ μὲν γὰρ φάναι μὴ δεῖν ἄεὶ φυλάττειν τὴν ὄργην γνώμη, τὸ δὲ προσκείμενον "θνητόν ὄντα" τὸ διὰ τί λέγει. ὁμοιον δὲ καὶ τὸ

θνατὰ χρη τὸν θνατόν, οὐκ ἀθάνατα τὸν θνατὸν

φρονεῖν.

7 Φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πόσα τε εἴδη
gνώμης, καὶ περὶ ποῦν ἐκαστὸν ἀρμόττει· περὶ
mὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἡ παραδόξων μὴ
ἀνεὶ ἐπιλόγου, ἀλλ' ἡ προθέντα τὸν ἐπίλογον
gνώμη χρῆσθαι τῷ συμπεράσματι, οἰον εἰ τις
eἰποι "ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ἐπειδή οὔτε φθονεῖσθαι δει
οὔτ' ἄργον εἶναι, οὐ φημι χρῆναι παραδεύσῃσθαι," ἡ
tοῦτο προεύποντα ἐπειπεῖν τὰ ἐμπροσθεν. περὶ
δὲ τῶν μὴ παραδόξων ἀδήλων δὲ, προστίθεντα τὸ
8 διότι στρογγυλώτατα. ἀρμόττει δ' ἐν τοῖς τοιού-
τοις καὶ τὰ Λακωνικὰ ἀποφθέγματα καὶ τὰ
αἰνιγματώδη, οἰον εἰ τις λέγει ὅπερ Στησίχορος

1395 a ἐν Λοκροῖς εἴπεν, ὅτι οὐ δεὶ ὑβριστὰς εἶναι, ὅπως
9 μὴ οἱ τέττιγες χαμόθεν ἀδώσων. ἀρμόττει δὲ
gνωριμολογεῖν ἥλικια μὲν πρεσβυτέροις, περὶ δὲ

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*a* See § 2.

*b* They partake of the nature of, but not of the form of, enthymemes.

*c* Author unknown (T.G.F. p. 854).
RHETORIC, II. xxi. 6–9

No one who is sensible, etc.,

while others are enthymematic, but are not part of an enthymeme; and these are most highly esteemed. Such are those maxims in which the reason of what is said is apparent: for instance,

Being a mortal, do not nourish immortal wrath; to say that one should not always nourish immortal wrath is a maxim, but the addition “being a mortal” states the reason. It is the same with

A mortal should have mortal, not immortal thoughts.

It is evident, therefore, from what has been said, how many kinds of maxims there are, and to what it is appropriate to apply them in each case. For in the case of matters of dispute or what is contrary to the general opinion, the epilogue is necessary; but either the epilogue may be put first and the conclusion used as a maxim, as, for example, if one were to say, “As for me, since one ought neither to be the object of jealousy nor to be idle, I say that children ought not to be educated”; or put the maxim first and append the epilogue. In all cases where the statements made, although not paradoxical, are obscure, the reason should be added as concisely as possible. In such cases Laconic apophthegms and riddling sayings are suitable; as, for instance, to say what Stesichorus said to the Locrians, that they ought not to be insolent, lest their cicadas should be forced to chirp from the ground. The use of maxims is suitable for one who is advanced

\[d\] According to Bentley, from Epicharmus.

\[e\] Meaning that the land would be devastated and the trees cut down.
τούτων ὃν ἐμπειρὸς τις ἔστιν, ὡς τὸ μὲν μὴ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα γνωμολογεῖν ἀπρεπὲς ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ μυθολογεῖν, περὶ δ’ ὃν ἀπειροῦσ, ἥλιθιον καὶ ἀπαίδευτον. σημεῖον δ’ ἰκανόν· οἱ γὰρ ἀγροῖκοι μάλιστα γνωμοτύποι εἰς καὶ ῥαδίως ἄποφαίνονται.

10 Καθόλου δὲ μὴ ὄντος καθόλου εἰσὶν μάλιστα ἀρμόττει ἐν σχετλιασμῷ καὶ δεινώσει, καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἀρχόμενον ἡ ἀποδείξαντα. χρήσθαι δὲ δεὶ καὶ ταῖς τεθρυλημέναις καὶ κοιναῖς γνώμαις, ἐὰν ὡς χρήσιμοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι κοιναῖ, ὡς ὀμολογούντων ἀπάντων, ὀρθῶς ἐξειν δοκοῦσιν, οἴον παρακαλοῦντι ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν μὴ θυσαμένους εἰς οἴωνὸς ἀριστος ἀμώνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἡπτοὺς ὄντας

ἔξυνὸς Ἄνυάλιος,
καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναίρειν τῶν ἕχθρων τὰ τέκνα καὶ μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα

νῆπιοσ ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει.

12 Ἐστι ἐνὶ τῶν παρομιῶν καὶ γνώμων εἰςιν, ὃ ὑπὸ παρομία "Ἀττικὸς πάροικος." δεὶ δὲ τὰς γνώμας λέγειν καὶ παρὰ τὰ δεδημοσιεύμενα (λέγω δὲ δεδημοσιεύμενα οἴον τὸ Γνώθι σαυτόν καὶ τὸ Μηδὲν ἁγαν), ὅταν ἡ τὸ ἔθος φαίνεσθαι μέλλῃ βέλτιον, ἡ παθητικῶς εἰρημένη ἤ. ἐστὶ δὲ παθήτικὴ μὲν, οἴον εἰ τις ὀργιζόμενος φαίη ψεύδος

"Iliad, xii. 243. "Iliad, xviii. 309. " i. 15. 14. " Cf. Thucydides, i. 70, where the Corinthians complain of the lack of energy shown by the Spartans, as compared with their own restless and troublesome neighbours, the Athenians.

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in years, and in regard to things in which one has experience; since the use of maxims before such an age is unseemly, as also is story-telling; and to speak about things of which one has no experience shows foolishness and lack of education. A sufficient proof of this is that rustics especially are fond of coining maxims and ready to make display of them.

To express in general terms what is not general is especially suitable in complaint or exaggeration, and then either at the beginning or after the demonstration. One should even make use of common and frequently quoted maxims, if they are useful; for because they are common, they seem to be true, since all as it were acknowledge them as such; for instance, one who is exhorting his soldiers to brave danger before having sacrificed may say,

The best of omens is to defend one's country, and if they are inferior in numbers,

The chances of war are the same for both, and if advising them to destroy the children of the enemy even though they are innocent of wrong,

Foolish is he who, having slain the father, suffers the children to live.

Further, some proverbs are also maxims; for example, "An Attic neighbour." Maxims should also be used even when contrary to the most popular sayings, such as "Know thyself" and "Nothing in excess," either when one's character is thereby likely to appear better, or if they are expressed in the language of passion. It would be an instance of the latter if a man in a rage were to say, "It is not

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εἶναι ὃς δὲ γυγνώσκειν αὐτὸν· οὗτος γοῦν εἰ ἐγίγνωσκεν ἐαυτὸν, ὦκ ἂν ποτε στρατηγεῖν ἥξιωσεν. τὸ δὲ ἦθος βέλτιον, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ὡσπέρ φασὶν, φιλεῖν ὃς μισήσωτας ἄλλα μᾶλλον μισεῖν

14 ὃς φιλήσωτας. δεὶ δὲ τῇ λέξει τὴν προαιρέσεις συνήθησον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὴν αὐτίαν ἐπιλέγειν, οἷον ἥ οὔτως εἰπόντα, ὅτι "δεὶ φιλεῖν οὔχ ὡσπέρ φασίν, ἄλλ᾽ ὃς ἂεί φιλήσωτα· ἐπιβουλὸν γὰρ θάτερον,' ἢ ὦδε "οὔκ ἀρέσκει δὲ μοι τὸ λεγόμενον· δεὶ γὰρ τὸν γ᾽ ἀληθινὸν φίλον ὃς φιλήσωτα ἂεί φιλεῖν." καὶ "οὔδε τὸ μηδὲν ἀγαν· δεὶ γὰρ τοὺς γε κακοὺς ἀγαν μισεῖν."

15 "Εξουσί δ᾽ εἶς τοὺς λόγους βοήθειαν μεγάλην μίαν μὲν δὴ διὰ τὴν φορτικότητα τῶν ἄκροατῶν· χαίρουσι γὰρ, εἰάν τις καθόλου λέγων ἐπιτυχῇ τῶν δοξῶν ἃς ἔκεινοι κατὰ μέρος ἔχουσιν. δὲ δὲ λέγω, δηλον ἐσται ὤδε, ἀμα δὲ καὶ πῶς δεὶ αὐτὰς θηρεῦειν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ γνώμη, ὡσπέρ εἰρηται, ἀπόφανσις καθόλου ἐστὶν, χαίρουσι δὲ καθόλου λεγομένου δ κατὰ μέρος προϋπολαμβάνοντες τυγχάνουσιν· οἶον εἰ τὶς γειτονίς τύχοι κεχρημένος ἡ τέκνων φαύλοις, ἀποδέξατ᾽ ἂν τοῦ εἰπόντος ὅτι

οὗδεν γειτονίας χαλεπώτερον,

ἡ ὃτι οὗδεν ἡλιθιώτερον τεκνοποιίας. ὡστε δεὶ στοχάζεσθαι πῶς τυγχάνουσι ποῖα προϋπολαμβάνοντες, εἴθο οὔτω περὶ τούτων καθόλου λέγειν.

16 ταύτην τε δὴ ἔχει μίαν χρήσιν τὸ γνωμολογεῖν,

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"Want of cultivation and intelligence" (Cope). "Amour-propre" (St. Hilaire).

b In reference to their own particular case.

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true that a man should know himself; at any rate, such a man as this, if he had known himself, would never have claimed the chief command.” And one’s character would appear better, if one were to say that it is not right, as men say, to love as if one were bound to hate, but rather to hate as if one were bound to love. The moral purpose also should be made clear by the language, or else one should add the reason; for example, either by saying “that it is right to love, not as men say, but as if one were going to love for ever, for the other kind of love would imply treachery”; or thus, “The maxim does not please me, for the true friend should love as if he were going to love for ever. Nor do I approve the maxim ‘Nothing in excess,’ for one cannot hate the wicked too much.”

Further, maxims are of great assistance to speakers, first, because of the vulgarity\(^a\) of the hearers, who are pleased if an orator, speaking generally, hits upon the opinions which they specially hold.\(^b\) What I mean will be clear from the following, and also how one should hunt for maxims. The maxim, as we have said, is a statement of the general; accordingly, the hearers are pleased to hear stated in general terms the opinion which they have already specially formed. For instance, a man who happened to have bad neighbours or children would welcome any one’s statement that nothing is more troublesome than neighbours or more stupid than to beget children. Wherefore the speaker should endeavour to guess how his hearers formed their preconceived opinions and what they are, and then express himself in general terms in regard to them. This is one of the advantages of the use of maxims, but another
The conclusion must not be reached by means of a long series of arguments, as it were strung together in a chain: cp. i. 2. 12, where the hearers are spoken of as unable to take in at a glance a long series of arguments or “to follow a long chain of reasoning” (οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν).
is greater; for it makes speeches ethical. Speeches have this character, in which the moral purpose is clear. And this is the effect of all maxims, because he who employs them in a general manner declares his moral preferences; if then the maxims are good, they show the speaker also to be a man of good character. Let this suffice for what we had to say concerning maxims, their nature, how many kinds of them there are, the way they should be used, and what their advantages are.

22. Let us now speak of enthymemes in general and the manner of looking for them, and next of their topics; for each of these things is different in kind. We have already said that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism, what makes it so, and in what it differs from the dialectic syllogisms; for the conclusion must neither be drawn from too far back nor should it include all the steps of the argument. In the first case its length causes obscurity, in the second, it is simply a waste of words, because it states much that is obvious. It is this that makes the ignorant more persuasive than the educated in the presence of crowds; as the poets say, “the ignorant are more skilled at speaking before a mob.” For the educated use commonplaces and generalities, whereas the ignorant speak of what they know and of what more nearly concerns the audience. Wherefore one must not argue from all possible opinions, but only from such as are definite and admitted, for instance, either by the judges themselves or by those of whose judgement they approve. Further, it should be clear that this is the opinion

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*b* Euripides, *Hippolytus*, 989.
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

η τοῖς πλείστοις. καὶ μὴ μόνον συνάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὃς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.

4 Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δεὶ λαβεῖν ὅτι περὶ οὗ δεὶ λέγειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι εἶτε πολιτικῶ συλλογισμῷ εἰθ’ ὅποιωσον, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ τούτω ἔχειν ὑπάρχοντα, ἢ πάντα ἢ ἐνία: μὴδὲν γὰρ ἔχουν εἰς οὐδενὸς ἃν ἔχοις συνάγειν. λέγω δὲ οἰον πῶς ἀν δυναίμεθα συμβουλεύειν Ἀθηναίοις εἰ πολεμητέον ἢ μὴ πολεμητέοιν, μὴ ἔχοντες τίς ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν, πότερον ναυτική ἢ πεζική ἢ ἁμφω, καὶ αὐτὴ πόση, καὶ πρόσοδοι τίνες ἢ φίλοι καὶ ἔχθροι, ἔτι δὲ τίνας πολέμους πεπολεμήκασι καὶ πῶς, καὶ τὰλλα τὰ 6 τοιαῦτα; ἢ ἐπανεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἔχοιμεν τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖν ναυμαχίαν ἢ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶν μάχην ἢ τὰ ὑπὲρ Ἡρακλειδῶν πραξθέντα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιοῦτων; ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἢ δοκοῦντων ὑπάρχειν 7 καλῶν ἐπανοθοῦσα πάντες. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ψέγουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, σκοποῦντες τί ὑπάρχει τοιοῦτον αὐτοῖς ἢ δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν, οἶνον ὅτι τοὺς Ἑλλήνας κατεδουλώσαντο, καὶ τοὺς πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον συμμαχεσαμένους καὶ ἀριστευότας ἕνδραπο- δίσαντο Ἀιγινήτας καὶ Ποτιδαιότας, καὶ ὃσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ἀμάρτημα ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. ως δ’ αὐτῶς καὶ οἱ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ οἱ ἀπολογούμενοι ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σκοποῦν- 8 μενοι κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται. οὐδὲν δὲ 290
of all or most of the hearers; and again, conclusions should not be drawn from necessary premises alone, but also from those which are only true as a rule.

First of all, then, it must be understood that, in regard to the subject of our speech or reasoning, whether it be political or of any other kind, it is necessary to be also acquainted with the elements of the question, either entirely or in part; for if you know none of these things, you will have nothing from which to draw a conclusion. I should like to know, for instance, how we are to give advice to the Athenians as to making war or not, if we do not know in what their strength consists, whether it is naval, military, or both, how great it is, their sources of revenue, their friends and enemies, and further, what wars they have already waged, with what success, and all similar things? Again, how could we praise them, if we did not know of the naval engagement at Salamis or the battle of Marathon, or what they did for the Heraclidae, and other similar things? for men always base their praise upon what really are, or are thought to be, glorious deeds. Similarly, they base their censure upon actions that are contrary to these, examining whether those censured have really, or seem to have, committed them; for example, that the Athenians subjugated the Greeks, and reduced to slavery the Aeginetans and Potidaeans who had fought with distinction on their side against the barbarians, and all such acts, and whatever other similar offences may have been committed by them. Similarly, in accusation and defence, speakers argue from an examination of the circumstances of the case. It makes no difference in doing this, whether it is a
diapherei peri 'Athnaioiws & Lakedamouinivn & anbropou & theou tauto touto drain kai gar symboulevonta tw 'Akhilei kai empainouta kai pségonta kai katetgorouonta kai apologoumevon uper autou ta uparchonta & dokouonta uparchein lhpenteon, in ev touton lêgmven empainoutes & pségontes e'i ti kalon & aistros uparchei, katetgorouentes de & apologoumeven ei ti dikaiov & dikov, symboulevontes de & e'i ti sympheron & blaberov.

9 ómiois de toutois kai peri pragmautos stoouvi, oion peri dikaiosunhs, ei agathon & mh agathon, ek twv uparchontw t' dikaiosunh kai tw agathw.

10 "Ost' epidei kai pantes oytou faivoutai apodeikynutes, e'an te akribësteron e'an te malakwteron

1396 b sullagizontai (ou gar ex apantwn lumbanounw all' ek twv peri ekastov uparchontw, kai dia tou logosu deilon oti adunaton allws deikunai), fanerov oti anagkaion, wisper ev tois totpikois, prwtov peri ekastov echn exeiilegymena peri twv

11 evdechomewn kai twv epikairostatwn, peri de twv ex upougion gignomewn zhtein twv auton trpon, apobleptona mh eis oristota all' eis ta uparchonta, peri auv o logos, kai periurgafontas oti pleistata kai engyntata tou pragmautos, osu men gar an pleiws exhetai twv uparchontw, tosooutw baron deikynai, osu de' engyterov, tosooutw oikieoterapera

12 kai e'tton koua. lêgno de koua men to empainein ton 'Akhilea oti anbropos kai oti twv himivewn

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a Or, "by means of the speech it is impossible to prove anything otherwise" (Cope).

b i. 14. prwtov: i.e. "the speaker's chief care should be..."
question of Athenians or Lacedaemonians, of a man or a god. For, when advising Achilles, praising or censuring, accusing or defending him, we must grasp all that really belongs, or appears to belong to him, in order that we may praise or censure in accordance with this, if there is anything noble or disgraceful; defend or accuse, if there is anything just or unjust; advise, if there is anything expedient or harmful. And similarly in regard to any subject whatever. For instance, in regard to justice, whether it is good or not, we must consider the question in the light of what is inherent in justice or the good.

Therefore, since it is evident that all men follow this procedure in demonstration, whether they reason strictly or loosely—since they do not derive their arguments from all things indiscriminately, but from what is inherent in each particular subject, and reason makes it clear that it is impossible to prove anything in any other way—a—it is evidently necessary, as has been stated in the Topics, to have first on each subject a selection of premises about probabilities and what is most suitable. As for those to be used in sudden emergencies, the same method of inquiry must be adopted; we must look, not at what is indefinite but at what is inherent in the subject treated of in the speech, marking off as many facts as possible, particularly those intimately connected with the subject; for the more facts one has, the easier it is to demonstrate, and the more closely connected they are with the subject, the more suitable are they and less common. By common I mean, for instance, praising Achilles because he is a man,

The more suitable they will be, and the less they will resemble ordinary, trivial generalities.
καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ Ἰλιον ἐστρατεύσατο· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ άλλοις ὑπάρχει πολλοῖς, ὡςτ' οὖνδε μᾶλλον ὁ τοιοῦτος Ἀχιλλεά ἐπανεῖ ἡ Διομήδην. ἦδια δὲ ἀ μηδεὶν ἀλλω συμβέβηκεν ἄ τῷ Ἀχιλλεΐ, οὗν τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν Ἑκτόρα τὸν ἄριστον τῶν Τρῶων καὶ τὸν Κύκνον, δι' ἐκώλυσεν ἀπαντας ἀποβαίνειν ἀτρωτος ὡς, καὶ ὅτι νεώτατος καὶ οὐκ ἐνορκος ὡς ἐστράτευσεν, καὶ ὡςα ἀλλα τοιαῦτα.

13 Εἰς μὲν οὖν τρόπον τῆς ἐκλογῆς καὶ πρῶτος οὖτος ὁ τοπικός, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων λέγομεν (στοιχεῖων δὲ λέγω καὶ τόπων ἐνθυμήματος τὸ αὐτό). πρῶτον δ' εἰπώμεν περὶ ὧν ἀναγκαίον εἰπεῖν πρῶτον. ἑστι γὰρ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εἶδη δύο· τὰ μὲν γὰρ δεικτικά ἑστιν ὅτι ἑστιν ἡ οὐκ ἑστι, τὰ δ' ἐλεγκτικά· καὶ διαφέρει ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ἐλεγχοῖς καὶ συλλογισμός. ἑστι δὲ τὸ μὲν δεικτικὸν ἐνθύμημα τὸ εἶ ὀμολογομένων συνάγειν, τὸ δὲ ἐλεγκτικὸν τὸ τὰ ἀνομο-

16 λογούμενα συνάγειν. σχεδον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν περὶ ἐκάστων τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν χρησίμων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἔχονται οἱ τόποι· ἐξελεγμέναι γὰρ αἱ προτάσεις περὶ ἐκαστόν εἰσιν, ὡςτ' ἐξ ὧν δὲι φέρειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα τῶν περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ κακοῦ ἡ καλοῦ ἡ αἰσχροῦ ἡ δικαίου ἡ ἄδικου, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ παθημάτων καὶ ἐξεων ὁσαύτως εἶλημένοι

17 ἡμῖν ὑπάρχουσι πρότερον οἱ τόποι. ἑτὶ δ' ἄλλον τρόπον καθόλου περὶ ἀπάντων λάβωμεν, καὶ

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a The demonstrative enthymeme draws its conclusion 294
or one of the demigods, or because he went on the expedition against Troy; for this is applicable to many others as well, so that such praise is no more suited to Achilles than to Diomedes. By particular I mean what belongs to Achilles, but to no one else; for instance, to have slain Hector, the bravest of the Trojans, and Cycnus, who prevented all the Greeks from disembarking, being invulnerable; to have gone to the war when very young, and without having taken the oath; and all such things.

One method of selection then, and this the first, is the topical. Let us now speak of the elements of enthymemes (by element and topic of enthymeme I mean the same thing). But let us first make some necessary remarks. There are two kinds of enthymemes, the one demonstrative, which proves that a thing is or is not, and the other refutative, the two differing like refutation and syllogism in Dialectic. The demonstrative enthymeme draws conclusions from admitted premises, the refutative draws conclusions disputed by the adversary.\(^a\) We know nearly all the general heads of each of the special topics that are useful or necessary; for the propositions relating to each have been selected, so that we have in like manner already established all the topics from which enthymemes may be derived on the subject of good or bad, fair or foul, just or unjust, characters, emotions, and habits. Let us now endeavour to find topics about enthymemes in general in another way, noting in passing\(^b\) those from facts admitted by the opponent; the refutative draws its conclusion from the same, but the conclusion is one which is disputed by the opponent.

\(^a\) Or, "noting in addition" (Victorius); or, "pointing out, side by side" (Jebb).
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λέγωμεν παρασημανομένοι τοὺς ἐλεγκτικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀποδεικτικοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων, οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων, ἐπείπερ οὐδὲ συλλογισμῶν. δηλωθέντων δὲ τούτων, περὶ τῶν λύσεων καὶ ἐνστάσεων διορίσωμεν, πόθεν δεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἐνθυμήματα φέρειν.

23. "Εστι δ' εἰς μὲν τόπος τῶν δεικτικῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων· δεῖ γὰρ σκοπεῖν εἰ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπάρχει, ἀναιροῦντα μὲν εἴ μὴ ὑπάρχει, κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ ὑπάρχει, οἴον ὅτι τὸ συν-φρονεῖν ἁγαθὸν· τὸ γὰρ ἀκολασταίνειν βλαβερὸν. ἢ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνικῷ· εἰ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος αἰτίως τῶν παρόντων κακῶν, μετὰ τῆς εἰρήνης δεῖ ἐπαν-ορθώσασθαι.

εἴπερ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῖς κακῶς δεδρακόσιν ἀκουσίως δίκαιον εἰς ὀργὴν πεσεῖν, οὐδ' ἂν ἀναγκασθεὶς τις εὗ ὁράσῃ τινά, προσήκον ἔστι τῷ δ' οφείλεσθαι χάριν.

ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἔστων ἐν βροτοῖς ψευδηγορεῖν πιθανά, νομιζεῖν χρή σε καὶ τοιναντίον, ἀπιστ' ἀληθή πολλὰ συμβάινειν βροτοῖς.

2 "Αλλὸς ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων· ὁμοίως γὰρ δεῖ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον οὐ πάν ἁγαθὸν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ δικαίως· νῦν δ' οὐχ αἱρετὸν τὸ δικαίως ἀποθανεῖν.

3 "Αλλὸς ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα· εἰ γὰρ θατέρῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ καλὸς ἢ δικαίως ποιήσαι, θατέρῳ τὸ

a Assuming that self-control is good, then if the opposite of good (that is, bad) can be predicated of lack of self-control, this proves the truth of the first proposition; otherwise, it may be refuted.
which are refutative and those which are demonstrative, and those of apparent enthymemes, which are not really enthymemes, since they are not syllogisms. After this has been made clear, we will settle the question of solutions and objections, and whence they must be derived to refute enthymemes.

23. One topic of demonstrative enthymemes is derived from opposites; for it is necessary to consider whether one opposite is prediciable of the other, as a means of destroying an argument, if it is not, as a means of constructing one, if it is; for instance, self-control is good, for lack of self-control is harmful; or as in the *Messeniacus*,

If the war is responsible for the present evils, one must repair them with the aid of peace.

And,

For if it is unfair to be angry with those who have done wrong unintentionally, it is not fitting to feel beholden to one who is forced to do us good.

Or,

If men are in the habit of gaining credit for false statements, you must also admit the contrary, that men often disbelieve what is true.

Another topic is derived from similar inflexions, for in like manner the derivatives must either be prediciable of the subject or not; for instance, that the just is not entirely good, for in that case good would be prediciable of anything that happens justly; but to be justly put to death is not desirable.

Another topic is derived from relative terms. For if to have done rightly or justly may be predicated of one, then to have suffered similarly may be

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*b* Cf. i. 13. 2 note.  
*c* Authorship unknown.  
*d* Euripides, *Thyestes* (Frag. 396, *T.G.F.*).
The argument is that if there was no disgrace in selling the right of farming the taxes, there could be none in purchasing this right.

Pupil of Plato and Isocrates, great friend of Aristotle, the author of fifty tragedies and also of an "Art" of Rhetoric. Alcmaeon murdered his mother Eriphyle. Alphesiboea, his wife, says to him, Was not your mother hated? To this he replied, Yes, but there is a distinction; they said she deserved to die, but not at my hands.
predicated of the other; there is the same relation between having ordered and having carried out, as Diomedon the tax-gatherer said about the taxes, “If selling is not disgraceful for you, neither is buying disgraceful for us.” And if rightly or justly can be predicated of the sufferer, it can equally be predicated of the one who inflicts suffering; if of the latter, then also of the former. However, in this there is room for a fallacy. For if a man has suffered justly, he has suffered justly, but perhaps not at your hands. Wherefore one must consider separately whether the sufferer deserves to suffer, and whether he who inflicts suffering is the right person to do so, and then make use of the argument either way; for sometimes there is a difference in such a case, and nothing prevents [its being argued], as in the Alcmaeon of Theodectes:

And did no one of mortals loathe thy mother?  
Alcmaeon replied: “We must make a division before we examine the matter.” And when Alphesiboea asked “How?”, he rejoined,

Their decision was that she should die, but that it was not for me to kill her.

Another example may be found in the trial of Demosthenes and those who slew Nicanor. For since it was decided that they had justly slain him, it was thought that he had been justly put to death. Again, in the case of the man who was murdered at Thebes, when the defendants demanded that the judges should decide whether the murdered man deserved to die, since a man who deserved it could be put to death without injustice.

Nothing is known of this trial.
"Allos ek tou moullon kai hetton, oion "ei mηd' o'i theoi pantα isasai, scholη o'i ge anvtherpou." touto gar estin, ei o moullon an uparxoi huparxhei, dηlon oti ou'd' w hetton. to δ' oti touz plhion tuptei os ge kai touz patera, ek tou, ei to hetton uparxhei, kai to moullon uparxhei, kata opoterov an deig deiasai, ei' th' oti uparxhei ei' th' oti 5 ou. eti ei mhte moullon mhte hetton. othen eirnetai

kai so's mou oiktros paidas apoleosas patir'. Oineus δ' ar' ou'xi kleioν apoleosas gōnon;

kai oti, ei μηδη Θησευς ηδικησεν, ou'd' 'Aléξandros, kai ei μηδ' o'i Thudaridai, ou'd' 'Aléξandros, kai ei Patroklov "Ektωr, kai 'Aχιλλεα 'Aléξandros. kai ei μηδ' o' alloi teχnita fauhlou, ou'd' o'i philosofoi. kai ei μηδ' o' strathgou fauhlou, oti htpwntai pollakis, ou'd' o' sofistai. kai oti "ei dei ton idiwtin tηs υmesteras do' hς επιμελεισθαι, kai umas tηs touv 'Ellhnoun."

"Allos ek tou tou chronon skopoiv, oion w's 'Iphikrathts en tη pro's 'Armodiou, oti "ei proν poisai hξiouν tηs eikonos tvxein ean poisai,

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The argument is that since men beat their fathers less commonly than they do their neighbours, if they beat their fathers they will also beat their neighbours, and the Paris ms. in a longer form of the argument has an explanatory addition to this effect, inserting after uparxhei the words touz gar pateras hetton tuptousv ἕ τοις πλησιον.

In a similar passage in the Topics (ii. 10) eikos (or dokouv) is inserted after moullon and hetton. Welldon suggests that here also the reading should be to hetton eikos and to moullon eikos (Grote, Aristotle, p. 294).

b From the Meleager of Antiphon (T.G.F. p. 885).

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Another topic is derived from the more and less. For instance, if not even the gods know everything, hardly can men; for this amounts to saying that if a predicate, which is more probably affirmable of one thing, does not belong to it, it is clear that it does not belong to another of which it is less probably affirmable. And to say that a man who beats his father also beats his neighbours, is an instance of the rule that, if the less exists, the more also exists. Either of these arguments may be used, according as it is necessary to prove either that a predicate is affirmable or that it is not. Further, if there is no question of greater or less; whence it was said,

Thy father deserves to be pitied for having lost his children; is not Oeneus then equally to be pitied for having lost an illustrious offspring?

Other instances are: if Theseus did no wrong, neither did Alexander (Paris); if the sons of Tyndareus did no wrong, neither did Alexander; and if Hector did no wrong in slaying Patroclus, neither did Alexander in slaying Achilles; if no other professional men are contemptible, then neither are philosophers; if generals are not despised because they are frequently defeated, neither are the sophists; or, if it behoves a private citizen to take care of your reputation, it is your duty to take care of that of Greece.

Another topic is derived from the consideration of time. Thus Iphicrates, in his speech against Harmodius, says: “If, before accomplishing anything, I had demanded the statue from you in the

c In carrying off Helen.
d The Paris ms. has θανατούνταυ, “are put to death.”
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7 "Αλλος ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καθ' αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα: διαφέρει δὲ ὁ τρόπος, οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεῦκρῳ ὡς ἔχρήσατο Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ἀριστοφῶντα, ἐπερόμενος εἴ προδοή ἂν τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν: οὐ φάσκοντος δὲ "εἰτα" εἴπεν "οὐ μὲν ὁν Ἰφικράτης;" δεῖ δ' ὑπάρχειν μάλλον ἂν δοκοῦντα ἄδικησαι ἐκεῖνον· εἰ δὲ μῇ, γελοίον ἂν φανεῖ, εἰ πρὸς Ἀριστείδην κατηγοροῦντα τούτο τις εἴπειεν, ἄλλα πρὸς ἀπιστίαν τοῦ κατηγόρου· οἷος γὰρ βούλεται ὁ κατηγορῶν βελτίων εἰναι τοῦ φεύγοντος· τούτ' ὦν ἐξελέγχειν ἄει. καθόλου δ' ἄτοπός ἔστιν, ὅταν τις ἐπιτιμᾷ ἄλλους ὁ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ ἥ ποιήσειεν ἂν, ἥ προτρέπη ποιεῖν ὁ αὐτὸς μῇ ποιεῖ μηδὲ ποιήσειεν ἂν.

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a Fragment of a speech of Lysias. It was proposed to put up a statue to the famous Athenian general Iphicrates in honour of his defeat of the Spartans (392 B.C.). This was later opposed by Harmodius, probably a descendant of the tyrannicide. The speech, which is considered spurious, was called ἥ περι τῆς εἰκόνος.

b Or, "the ways of doing this are various" (Jebb).

c The illustration is lost or perhaps purposely omitted as well known. The Teucer was a tragedy of Sophocles.

d It would be absurd to use such an argument against the accusation of a "just man" like Aristides, and to pretend that he is more likely to have committed the crime. It
event of my success, you would have granted it; will you then refuse it, now that I have succeeded? Do not therefore make a promise when you expect something, and break it when you have received it.”

Again, to persuade the Thebans to allow Philip to pass through their territory into Attica, they were told that “if he had made this request before helping them against the Phocians, they would have promised; it would be absurd, therefore, if they refused to let him through now, because he had thrown away his opportunity and had trusted them.”

Another topic consists in turning upon the opponent what has been said against ourselves; and this is an excellent method. For instance, in the Teucer and Iphicrates employed it against Aristophon, when he asked him whether he would have betrayed the fleet for a bribe; when Aristophon said no, “Then,” retorted Iphicrates, “if you, Aristophon, would not have betrayed it, would I, Iphicrates, have done so?” But the opponent must be a man who seems the more likely to have committed a crime; otherwise, it would appear ridiculous, if anyone were to make use of such an argument in reference to such an opponent, for instance, as Aristides; it should only be used to discredit the accuser. For in general the accuser aspires to be better than the defendant; accordingly, it must always be shown that this is not the case. And generally, it is ridiculous for a man to reproach others for what he does or would do himself, or to encourage others to do what he does not or would not do himself.

must only be used when the opponent’s character is suspect, and lends itself to such a retort.
"Allos εξ ὁρισμοῦ, οἷον ὃτι τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἄλλῳ ἡ θεὸς ἡ θεοῦ ἔργον· καίτοι ὡστὶς οἴσται θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι, τούτον ἀνάγκη οἴσται καὶ θεοῦ εἶναι· καὶ ὡς Ἰφικράτης, ὦτι γενναιότατος ὁ βέλτιστος· καὶ γὰρ Ἀρμοδίως καὶ Ἀριστογειτονίῳ οὐδὲν πρότερον ὑπῆρχε γενναῖον πρὶν γενναῖον τί πράξαι. καὶ ὦτι συγγενέστερος αὐτὸς: "τὰ γοῦν ἔργα συγγενέστερά ἐστι τὰ ἐμὰ τοῖς Ἀρμοδίῳ καὶ Ἀριστογειτόνῳ ἡ τὰ σὰ." καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ Ἀλέξανδρῳ, ὦτι πάντες ἂν ὀμολογήσειαν τοὺς μὴ κοσμίους οὐχ ἔνος σώματος ἀγαπῶν ἀπόλαυσιν. καὶ δὴ ὁ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔφη βαδίζειν ὡς Ἀρχέλαον· ὥστε γὰρ ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι ὄργανον ἐν παθόντα, ὡσπερ καὶ κακῶς. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὄρισίμενοι καὶ λαβόντες τὸ τί ἐστιν, συνελογίζονται περὶ ὅν λέγουσιν.
9 "Allos ἐκ τοῦ ποσαχῶς, οἷον ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς.
10 "Allos ἐκ διαφ Throne, οἷον εἰ πάντες τριῶν ἑνεκεν ἄδικον· ἡ τοῦτο γὰρ ἑνεκα ἡ τοῦτε ἡ τοῦτε· καὶ διὰ μὲν τα δύο ἄδινατον, διὰ δὲ τὸ τρίτον οὐδ' αὐτοὶ φασιν.

a The reference is obviously to Socrates, who claimed that a daimonion (a certain divine principle that acted as his internal monitor) checked his actions in many cases. When accused of not believing in the gods, he was able to prove, by his definition of the daimonion, that he was no atheist. Similarly, Iphicrates, by his definition of γενναῖος and συγγενής could refute the allegation that he was ignoble and show that his deeds were more akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogiton than to those of his opponents. Paris could say that he was not intemperate, because he was satisfied with Helen alone. Lastly, Socrates refused an invitation.
Another topic is derived from definition. For instance, that the *daimonion* \(^a\) is nothing else than a god or the work of a god; but he who thinks it to be the work of a god necessarily thinks that gods exist. When Iphicrates desired to prove that the best man is the noblest, he declared that there was nothing noble attaching to Harmodius and Aristogiton, before they did something noble; and, “I myself am more akin to them than you; at any rate, my deeds are more akin to theirs than yours.” And as it is said in the *Alexander* \(^b\) that it would be generally admitted that men of disorderly passions are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one woman’s person alone. Also, the reason why Socrates refused to visit Archelaus, declaring that it was disgraceful not to be in a position to return a favour as well as an injury.\(^c\) In all these cases, it is by definition and the knowledge of what the thing is in itself that conclusions are drawn upon the subject in question.

Another topic is derived from the different significations of a word, as explained in the *Topics*, where the correct use of these terms has been discussed.\(^d\)

Another, from division. For example, “There are always three motives for wrongdoing; two are excluded from consideration as impossible; as for the third, not even the accusers assert it.”

to visit Archelaus, king of Macedonia, because he would be unable to return the benefits received, which would imply his being put to shame, and make the invitation a kind of insult.

\(^a\) Of Polycrates.

\(^b\) “Just as it is to requite them with evil” (Jebb).

\(^c\) Supplying \([λεξέκται]\) περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς \([χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς]\). Others render: “in reference to the use of the word ὀρθῶς” (but ὀρθῶς does not occur in the passage in the *Topics*, i. 15). A suggested reading is περὶ τοῦτον ὀρθῶς εἰρηται.
"Аллос еξ ἐπαγωγῆς, οἰον ἐκ τῆς Πεπαρηθίας, δι-ορίζοντα τάληθες· τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ Ἁθήνησι Μαντία
τῷ ῥήτορι ἀμφισβητοῦντι πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἦ μήτηρ
ἀπέφηνεν, τούτῳ δὲ Θήβην αὐτὸν ὡς Ἀρχίλοχον καὶ Στίλ-
βωνος ἀμφισβητοῦντων ἡ Δωδωνίς ἀπέδειξεν Ἀριστοτέλειον
τὸν υἱὸν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Θεσπεσίας Ἐρασίππου ἑόρμηζον. καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ
Θεοδέκτου, εἰ τοῖς κακῶς ἐπιμεληθείσι τῶν
ἀλλοτρίων ἵππων οὐ παραδιδόσας τοὺς οἰκείους,
οὔδὲ τοῖς ἀνατρέψας τὰς ἀλλοτριώς ναός· οὐκοῦν
εἰ ὦμοιός ἐφ’ ἀπάντων, καὶ τοῖς κακῶς φυλάξασι
τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν οὐ χρηστόν ἔστιν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν
σωτηρίαν. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκεδάμας, ὅτι πάντες τοὺς
σοφοὺς τιμῶσιν. Πάριοι γοῦν Ἀρχίλοχον καὶ περ
βλάσφημοι ὄντα τετειμήκασιν, καὶ Χίοι ὤμηρον
οὐκ ὄντα πολιτικόν, καὶ Ἡμιληναῖοι Σασπὰρ καὶ περ
γυναίκα ὄσαν, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Χῖλων τῶν
γερόντων ἐποίησαν ἥκιστα δοξολογοῦσιν, καὶ
Ἰταλιώται Πυθαγόραν, καὶ Λαμπακηνοὶ Ἀναξ-
αγόραν ἔγνων ὄντα ἑπαύσαν καὶ τιμῶσι χτι καὶ
νῦν . . ὅτι Ἀθηναίων τόσον Σόλωνος νόμους χρησά-
μενοι εὐδαιμόνησαν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς Λυ-
κούργοις, καὶ Θήβησιν ἀμα ὁ προστάτας τόποις
εὖγένοτο καὶ εὐδαιμόνησεν ἡ πόλις.

a Mantias had one legitimate son Mantitheus and two
illegitimate by a certain Plagon. Mantias at first refused
to acknowledge the latter as his sons, until the mother
declared they were.

b The name of the mother; or simply, "the woman of
Dodona," like "the woman of Peparethus."

c Others read πολίτην, "although he was not their fellow-
citizen" (but Chios was one of the claimants to his birthplace).

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Another, from induction. For instance, from the case of the woman of Peparethus, it is argued that in matters of parentage women always discern the truth; similarly, at Athens, when Mantias the orator was litigating with his son, the mother declared the truth; and again, at Thebes, when Ismenias and Stilbon were disputing about a child, Dodonis declared that Ismenias was its father, Thetataliscus being accordingly recognized as the son of Ismenias. There is another instance in the "law" of Theodectes: "If we do not entrust our own horses to those who have neglected the horses of others, or our ships to those who have upset the ships of others; then, if this is so in all cases, we must not entrust our own safety to those who have failed to preserve the safety of others." Similarly, in order to prove that men of talent are everywhere honoured, Alcidamas said: "The Parians honoured Archilochus, in spite of his evil-speaking; the Chians Homer, although he had rendered no public services; the Mytileneans Sappho, although she was a woman; the Lacedaemonians, by no means a people fond of learning, elected Chilon one of their senators; the Italiotes honoured Pythagoras, and the Lampscenes buried Anaxagoras, although he was a foreigner, and still hold him in honour... The Athenians were happy as long as they lived under the laws of Solon, and the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus; and at Thebes, as soon as those who had the conduct of affairs became philosophers, the city flourished."

"Something has fallen out, what follows being intended to prove that the best rulers for a state are the philosophers. Epaminondas and Pelopidas. One would rather expect, "as soon as philosophers had the conduct of affairs."
ARISTOTLE

12 "Αλλος ἐκ κρίσεως περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ὀμολογία ἡ ἐναντίων, μάλιστα μὲν εἰ πάντες καὶ ἀεί, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀλλ' οὐ γε πλείστου, ἡ σοφία, ἡ πάντες ἡ οἱ πλείστοι, ἡ ἀγάθοι. ἡ εἰ αὐτοὶ οἱ κρίνοντες, ἡ οὐς ἀποδέχονται οἱ κρίνοντες, ἡ οἷς μὴ οἶν τε ἐναντίων κρίνειν, οἷον τοῖς κυρίοις, ἡ οἷς μὴ καλὸν τὰ ἐναντία κρίνειν, οἷον θεοῖς ἡ πατρὶ ἡ διδασκάλοις, ῥόσπερ τὸ εἰς Μιξιδημίδην εἴπεν Ἀὐτοκλῆς, εἰ τάς μὲν σεμναῖς θεαὶ ἵκανος εἰχεν ἐν 'Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ δοῦναι δίκην, Μιξιδημίδη δ' οὐ. ἡ ῥόσπερ Σαπφώ, ὅτι τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν κακόν· οἱ θεοὶ γὰρ οὐτω κεκρικασεν· ἀπέθνησκον γὰρ ἄν. ἡ ὡς Ἀρίστιππος πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐπαγγελτικώτερόν τι εἰπόντα, ὡς φησιν "ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ γ' ἐταῖρος ἡμῶν, ἐφ᾽, "οὐθὲν τοιοῦτον," λέγων τὸν Σωκράτην. καὶ 'Ἡγήσιππος ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱρώτα τὸν θεόν, πρότερον κεχρημένος ὅλυμπιασιν, εἰ αὐτῷ ταυτα δοκεῖ ἀπερ τῷ πατρί, ὡς αὐχρόν ὃν τὰναντία εἰπεῖν. καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἐλένης ὡς Ἰσοκράτης ἐγραψεν ὅτι σπουδαία, εἴπερ Θησεῦς ἐκρίνεν· καὶ περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ὃν αἱ θεαι πρεσκεψεν, καὶ περὶ Εὐαγόρου, ὃτι σπουδαίος, ῥόσπερ Ἰσοκράτης φησίν.

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a Athenian ambassador to Sparta (371 B.C.), whose aggressive policy he attacked. His argument is that, if the Eumenides could agree without any loss of dignity to stand their trial before the Areopagus, as described in Aeschylus, surely Mixidemides could do the same. Nothing is known of Mixidemides, but it is clear that he refused to submit his case to it, when charged with some offence.

b The story is told of Agesipolis (which others read here) in Xenophon, Hellenica, iv. 7. 2. The Argives, when a Lacedaemonian army threatened to invade their territory, were in the habit of alleging that it was festival time, when there should be a holy truce. This obviously left the door open.
Another topic is that from a previous judgement in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter, if possible when the judgement was unanimous or the same at all times; if not, when it was at least that of the majority, or of the wise, either all or most, or of the good; or of the judges themselves or of those whose judgement they accept, or of those whose judgement it is not possible to contradict, for instance, those in authority, or of those whose judgement it is unseemly to contradict, for instance, the gods, a father, or instructors; as Autocles a said in his attack on Mixidemides, "If the awful goddesses were content to stand their trial before the Areopagus, should not Mixidemides?" Or Sappho, "Death is an evil; the gods have so decided, for otherwise they would die." Or as Aristippus, when in his opinion Plato had expressed himself too presumptuously, said, "Our friend at any rate never spoke like that," referring to Socrates. Hegesippus, b after having first consulted the oracle at Olympia, asked the god at Delphi whether his opinion was the same as his father's, meaning that it would be disgraceful to contradict him. Helen was a virtuous woman, wrote Isocrates, because Theseus so judged; the same applies to Alexander (Paris), whom the goddesses chose before others. Evagoras was virtuous, as Isocrates open to fraud, so Agesipolis (one of the Spartan kings) consulted the oracle of Zeus at Olympia to ask whether he was to respect such a truce. The reply of the oracle was that he might decline a truce fraudulently demanded. To confirm this, Agesipolis put the same question to Apollo: "Is your opinion as to the truce the same as that of your father (Zeus)?" "Certainly," answered Apollo. Agesipolis thereupon invaded Argos. The point is that really Apollo had little choice, since it would have been disgraceful for the son to contradict the father.

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After his defeat at Aegospotami (405 B.C.) the Athenian general Conon, fearing for his life, took refuge with Evagoras, king of Cyprus—a proof, according to Aristotle, of the goodness of the latter.

If the genus can be affirmed of any subject, then one or other of the species, which make up the genus, must also be predicable of it. If the proposition to be maintained is,
says, for at any rate Conon⁴ in his misfortune, passing over everyone else, sought his assistance.

Another topic is that from enumerating the parts, as in the Topics: What kind of movement is the soul? for it must be this or that.⁵ There is an instance of this in the Socrates of Theodectes: "What holy place has he profaned? Which of the gods recognized by the city has he neglected to honour?"

Again, since in most human affairs the same thing is accompanied by some bad or good result, another topic consists in employing the consequence to exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or blame. For instance, education is attended by the evil of being envied, and by the good of being wise; therefore we should not be educated, for we should avoid being envied; nay rather, we should be educated, for we should be wise. This topic is identical with the "Art" of Callippus, when you have also included the topic of the possible and the others which have been mentioned.

Another topic may be employed when it is necessary to exhort or dissuade in regard to two opposites, and one has to employ the method previously stated in the case of both. But there is this difference, that in the former case things of any kind whatever are opposed, in the latter opposites. For instance, a priestess refused to allow her son to speak in public; "For if," said she, "you say what is just, men will hate you; if you say what is unjust, the gods will." On the other hand, "you should the soul is moved, it is necessary to examine whether any of the different kinds of motion (increase, decrease, decay, change of place, generation, alteration) can be predicated of the soul. If not, the generic predicate is not applicable, and the proposition is refuted.

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λέγησιν, οἱ θεοὶ σε φιλήσουσιν, εἰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, 
οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ. τούτι δ' ἐστὶν ταύτῳ τῷ λεγομένῳ
τὸ ἔλος πρίσοσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἁλᾶς· καὶ ἡ βλαίσωσις
τούτῳ ἐστὶν, ὅταν δυοῖν ἐναντίων ἐκατέρω ἄγαθὸν
καὶ κακὸν ἔπηται, ἐναντία ἐκατέρω ἐκατέρως.

16 Ἀλλος, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ταύτα φανερῶς ἐπανομοῦσιν
καὶ ἀφανῶς, ἀλλὰ φανερῶς μὲν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ
κακὰ ἐπανομοῦσι μᾶλλον, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα
μᾶλλον βούλονται, εκ τούτων πειράζονται συνάγειν
θάτερον· τῶν γὰρ παραδόξων οὖντος ὁ τόπος κυρίω-
τατός ἐστιν.

17 Ἀλλος ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ταύτα συμβαίνουσιν· οἴον
ὁ Ἰφικράτης τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ νεώτερον ὄντα τῆς
ἡλικίας, ὅτι μέγας ἦν, λειτουργεῖν ἀναγκαζόντων,
eἶπεν ὅτι εἰ τοὺς μεγάλους τῶν παίδων ἄνδρας
νομίζουσι, τοὺς μικροὺς τῶν ἄνδρῶν παίδας εἶναι
ψηφιοῦνται. καὶ Θεοδεκτής ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, ὅτι
πολίτας μὲν ποιεῖσθε τοὺς μισθοφόρους, οἴον
Στράβον καὶ Χαρίδημον διὰ τήν ἐπιείκειαν
φυγάδας δ' οὐ ποιήσετε τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μισθοφόροις
ἀνήκεστα διαπεπραγμένους;

18 Ἀλλος ἐκ τοῦ τὸ συμβαίνον ἐὰν ἦ ταύτων, ὡς
καὶ ἐξ ἐν συμβαίνει ταύτα· οἴον Ξενοφόνης ἔλεγεν
ὅτι ὅμοιως ἄσβεστον οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς

a The bad with the good. The exact meaning of
βλαίσωσις (see Glossary) has not been satisfactorily explained.
In the definition given of the retortion of a dilemma, the two
opposite things would be speaking truth or untruth; the two
opposite consequences, pleasing men and pleasing God.

b e.g. a man may say that an honourable death should be
preferred to a pleasant life, and honest poverty to ill-acquired
wealth, whereas really he wishes the opposite. “If then his
words are in accordance with his real wishes, he must be
confronted with his public statements; if they are in accord-

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speak in public; for if you say what is just, the gods will love you, if you say what is unjust, men will." This is the same as the proverb, "To buy the swamp with the salt"; and retorting a dilemma on its proposer takes place when, two things being opposite, good and evil follow on each, the good and evil being opposite like the things themselves.

Again, since men do not praise the same things in public and in secret, but in public chiefly praise what is just and beautiful, and in secret rather wish for what is expedient, another topic consists in endeavouring to infer its opposite from one or other of these statements. This topic is the most weighty of those that deal with paradox.

Another topic is derived from analogy in things. For instance, Iphicrates, when they tried to force his son to perform public services because he was tall, although under the legal age, said: "If you consider tall boys men, you must vote that short men are boys." Similarly, Theodectes in his "law," says: "Since you bestow the rights of citizenship upon mercenaries such as Strabax and Charidemus on account of their merits, will you not banish those of them who have wrought such irreparable misfortunes?"

Another topic consists in concluding the identity of antecedents from the identity of results. Thus Xenophanes said: "There is as much impiety in

ance with the latter, he must be confronted with his secret wishes. In either case he must fall into paradox, and contradict either his publicly expressed or secret opinions" (Sophistici Elenchi, ii. 12, Poste's translation).}

\* This "law" (already mentioned in 11) is said to have been an oration on the legal position of mercenaries.

\* Cause and effect.

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19 "'Allos ektou mol'ta utou autous aeic aipeiswai usteroyn hei prosterone, all' anakaliv, oion tode to enthymema, "ei feugontes mev emachomeba opow katelelwmen, katelelwntes de feugomema opow muh

maxomeba." oste mene gar to muev anji tou

ma克斯ba icrovno, oste de to mol' machesba antii
tou mol' muev.

20 "'Allos to ou evnek' av eihei he gevnoito, tou tou

eveka fabai einai he gevenisba, oion ei doji av

tis tui iv afelomenos luptisi. othn kai tou'te

eirndai,

pollois o da'vwv ou kat' eunovn ferun

megala didswin euntichimai', all' ivn

tas sumforas labwum epiphaneisteras.

kai to ek tou Melaeagrou tou 'Antiphonos,

Isocrates, Antidosis, 173.

b The peace concluded between the Greeks (although the

Lacedaemonians held aloof) and Alexander the Great after

the death of Philip of Macedon (336 B.C.).

c Lysias, xxxiv. 11.

d i.e. after their return, they preferred to leave the city

rather than fight. This is Cope's explanation, but the

meaning of the clause oste muev . . . icrovno is then some-

what obscure. A more suitable interpretation would be:

"At one time they preferred to return from exile at the

price of fighting: at another, not to fight, at the price of

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asserting that the gods are born as in saying that they die; for either way the result is that at some time or other they did not exist.” And, generally speaking, one may always regard as identical the results produced by one or other of any two things: “You are about to decide, not about Isocrates alone, but about education generally, whether it is right to study philosophy.” And, “to give earth and water is slavery,” and “to be included in the common peace implies obeying orders.” Of two alternatives, you should take that which is useful.

Another topic is derived from the fact that the same men do not always choose the same thing before and after, but the contrary. The following enthymeme is an example: “If, when in exile, we fought to return to our country [it would be monstrous] if, now that we have returned, we were to return to exile to avoid fighting”! This amounts to saying that at one time they preferred to hold their ground at the price of fighting; at another, not to fight at the price of not remaining.

Another topic consists in maintaining that the cause of something which is or has been is something which would generally, or possibly might, be the cause of it; for example, if one were to make a present of something to another, in order to cause him pain by depriving him of it. Whence it has been said:

It is not from benevolence that the deity bestows great blessings upon many, but in order that they may suffer more striking calamities.

And these verses from the Meleager of Antiphon:

being exiled a second time (St. Hilaire),” but one does not see how this can be got out of the Greek.

* The author is unknown.
οὐχ ἦν κτάνωσι βῆρ’, ὅπως δὲ μάρτυρες ἄρετῆς γένωνται Μελεάγρῳ πρὸς 'Ελλάδα. 
καὶ τό ἐκ τοῦ Αἴαντος τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης προείλετο Ὄδυσσα ὑπ τιμῶν, ἀλλ’ ἦν ἦττων ᾧ ὁ ἀκολουθῶν ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τούτῳ ἐνεκα πούσαι.

21 Ἀλλος κοινὸς καὶ τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ τοῖς συμβουλεύοντες, σκοπεῖν τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα, καὶ δὲν ἐνεκα καὶ πράττοντα καὶ φεύγουσιν: ταῦτα γὰρ ἔστων ἢ ἐὰν μὲν ὑπάρχῃ δεῖ πράττειν [ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, μὴ πράττειν], ὥστε ἐς δυσατὸν καὶ ράδιον καὶ ὕφελμον ἢ ἀυτῶ ἢ φίλους, ἢ βλαβερῶν ἐχθροῖς καὶ ἐπιζήμιον, ἢ ἔλάττων ἢ ζημία τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ προτρέπονται δ’ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἀποτρέπονται ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἐκ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται: ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀποτρεπόντων ἀπολογοῦνται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν προτρεπóντων κατηγοροῦσιν. ἔστι δ’ ὁ τόπος οὕτως ὅλη τέχνη ἢ τε Παμφιλόου καὶ ἦ Καλλίππου.

22 Ἀλλος ἐκ τῶν δοκούντων μὲν γίγνεσθαι ἀπίστων δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔδοξεν, εἰ μὴ ἦν ἢ ἐγνύῃ ἦν. καὶ ὅτι μᾶλλον ἢ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἢ τὰ εἰκότα ὑπολαμβάνονουσι; εἰ οὖν ἀπιστὸν καὶ μὴ εἰκός, ἀληθές ἂν εἴη· οὖ γὰρ διά γε τὸ εἰκός καὶ πιθανὸν δοκεῖ οὕτως. οἷον Ἀνδροκλῆς ἔλεγεν ὁ Πιτθεὺς κατ-

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a Frag. 2 (T.G.F. p. 792).
b Iliad, x. 218; cp. T.G.F. p. 801.
c By pointing out what is likely to deter a man from committing a crime, and vice versa.
d The argument is: we accept either that which really is, or that which is probable; if then a statement is made which
Not in order to slay the monster, but that they may be witnesses to Greece of the valour of Meleager.

And the following remark from the Ajax of Theodorctes, that Diomedes chose Odysseus before all others, not to do him honour, but that his companion might be his inferior; for this may have been the reason.

Another topic common to forensic and deliberative rhetoric consists in examining what is hortatory and dissuasive, and the reasons which make men act or not. Now, these are the reasons which, if they exist, determine us to act, if not, not; for instance, if a thing is possible, easy, or useful to ourselves or our friends, or injurious and prejudicial to our enemies, or if the penalty is less than the profit. From these grounds we exhort, and dissuade from their contraries. It is on the same grounds that we accuse and defend; for what dissuades serves for defence, what persuades, for accusation. This topic comprises the whole "Art" of Pamphilus and Callippus.

Another topic is derived from things which are thought to happen but are incredible, because it would never have been thought so, if they had not happened or almost happened. And further, these things are even more likely to be true; for we only believe in that which is, or that which is probable: if then a thing is incredible and not probable, it will be true; for it is not because it is probable and credible that we think it true. Thus, Androcles of

\[ e \] Athenian demagogue and opponent of Alcibiades, for whose banishment he was chiefly responsible. When the Four Hundred were set up, he was put to death. Pitthus was an Athenian deme or parish.
ηγορῶν τοῦ νόμου, ἐπεὶ ἐθορύβησαν αὐτῷ εἰπόντι "δεόνται οἱ νόμοι νόμου τοῦ διορθώσοντος· καὶ
gάρ οἱ ἰχθύες ἀλός, καίτοι οὐκ εἰκός οὐδὲ πιθανὸν ἐν ἀληθεία τρεφομένους ἐδείσθαι ἀλός, καὶ τὰ στέφυλα ἐλαίου· καί τοι ἀπιστον, ἐξ ὧν ἐλαίου γίγνεται, ταύτα
deίσθαι ἑλαίου."

23 "Ἀλλος ἐλεγκτικός, τὸ τὰ ἀνομολογοῦμενα σκοπεῖν, εἰ τι ἀνομολογοῦμενον ἐκ πάντων καὶ χρόνων καὶ πράξεων καὶ λόγων, χωρὶς μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀμφι-
σβητούντος, οἶνον "καὶ φησὶ μὲν φιλεῖν ὑμᾶς, συνώμοσε δὲ τοὺς τριάκοντα," χωρὶς δ' ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ, "καὶ φησὶ μὲν εἶναι με φιλόδικον, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ ἀποδειξεῖ δεδικασμένον οὐδεμίαν δίκην," χωρὶς δ' ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, "καὶ οὕτωs μὲν οὐ δεδάμεικε πώποτ' οὐδέν, ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ πολλοὺς λέλυμαι ὑμῶν."

24 "Ἀλλος τοῖς προδιαβεβλημένοις καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ πράγμασιν, ἦ δοκοῦσι, τὸ λέγει· τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ παράδοξου· ἐστι γάρ τι δι' ὤς φαίνεται. οἶνον ὑποβεβλημένης τινὸς τῶν αἰτίων τίναι διὰ τὸ ἀσπά-
ζεσθαι ἐδοκεῖ συνεῖναι τῷ μειρακίῳ, λεγόντων δὲ τοῦ αἰτίου ἐλύθη ὡς διαβόλη· καὶ οἶνον ἐν τῷ Ἄιαντι τῷ Θεοδέκτου Ὀδυσσείδει πρὸς τὸν Ἄιαντα, διότι ἀνδρειότερος ὃν τοῦ Ἄιαντος οὐ δοκεῖ.

25 "Ἀλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου, ἄν τι ὑπάρχῃ, ὃτι ἐστι, κἂν μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, ὃτι οὐκ ἐστιν· ἀμα γάρ το αἰτίων καὶ οὐ αἰτίων, καὶ ἂνει αἰτίῳ οὐθέν ἐστιν. οἶνον Λεωδάμας ἀπολογοῦμενος ἔλεγε, κατηγορήσαντος Ὑρασυβουλοῦ ὅτι ἦν στηλίτης γεγονὼς ἐν τῇ

*a Understanding διαβεβλήθαι. Others read μὴ (for ἦ) δοκοῦσι, "when there seems no reason to suspect them."*
Pitthus, speaking against the law, being shouted at when he said "the laws need a law to correct them," went on, "and fishes need salt, although it is neither probable nor credible that they should, being brought up in brine; similarly, pressed olives need oil, although it is incredible that what produces oil should itself need oil."

Another topic, appropriate to refutation, consists in examining contradictories, whether in dates, actions, or words, first, separately in the case of the adversary, for instance, "he says that he loves you, and yet he conspired with the Thirty;" next, separately in your own case, "he says that I am litigious, but he cannot prove that I have ever brought an action against anyone"; lastly, separately in the case of your adversary and yourself together: "he has never yet lent anything, but I have ransomed many of you."

Another topic, when men or things have been attacked by slander, in reality or in appearance, consists in stating the reason for the false opinion; for there must be a reason for the supposition of guilt. For example, a woman embraced her son in a manner that suggested she had illicit relations with him, but when the reason was explained, the slander was quashed. Again, in the Ajax of Theodectes, Odysseus explains to Ajax why, although really more courageous than Ajax, he is not considered to be so.

Another topic is derived from the cause. If the cause exists, the effect exists; if the cause does not exist, the effect does not exist; for the effect exists with the cause, and without cause there is nothing. For example, Leodamas, when defending himself against the accusation of Thrasybulus that his name


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ακροπόλει, ἀλλ’ ἐκκόψαι ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα, οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐφ’ μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν πιστεύειν αὐτῷ τοὺς τριάκοντα ἐγγεγραμμένης τῆς ἔχθρας πρὸς τὸν δήμον.

26 ’Ἀλλος, εἰ ἐνεδέχετο βέλτιον ἄλλως ἢ ἐνδέχεται ὅν ἡ συμβουλεύει ἡ πράττει ἡ πέπραξε σκοπεῖν· φανερὸν γὰρ οτι εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐ πέπραξεν· οὔδεις γὰρ ἐκὼν τὰ φαύλα καὶ γυνώσκων προαιρεῖται. ἐστι δὲ τούτῳ ψεύδος· πολλάκις γὰρ ύστερον γίγνεται δῆλον πῶς ἦν πρᾶξαι βέλτιον, πρότερον δὲ ἄδηλον.

27 ’Ἀλλος, ὅταν τι ἐναντίον μέλλῃ πράττεσθαι τοῖς πεπραγμένοις, ἁμα σκοπεῖν· οὐν Εὐνοφάνης Ἐλεάτας ἔρωτῶσον εἰ θύωσι τῇ Δευκοθέα καὶ θρηνῶσιν, ἡ μή, συνεβούλευν, εἰ μὲν θεόν υπολαμβάνουσι, μή θρηνεῖν, εἰ δ’ ἄνθρωπον, μή θύειν.

28 ’Ἀλλος τόπος τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἀμαρτηθέντων κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπολογείσθαι, οἶον ἐν τῇ Καρκίνῳ Μηδείᾳ οἱ μὲν κατηγοροῦσιν ὅτι τοὺς παῖδας ἀπεκτενεῖν, οὐ φαίνεσθαι γοῦν αὐτοῦ· ἡμαρτε γὰρ ἡ Μηδεία περὶ τὴν ἀποστολὴν τῶν παίδων· ἡ δ’

α The names of traitors were inscribed on a brazen pillar in the Acropolis. Leodamas supported the oligarchical, Thrasylbulus the democratical party. In answer to the charge that he had had his name removed from the pillar when his party came into power, Leodamas replied that, if he had been originally posted as an enemy of the people and a hater of democracy, he would have preferred to keep the record, as likely to increase the confidence of the Thirty in him, than to have it erased, even though it branded him as a traitor.

b If a person has not taken the better course, when he had the chance of doing so, he cannot be guilty.

c Leucothea was the name of the deified Ino. She was the daughter of Cadmus and the wife of Athamas king of 320
had been posted in the Acropolis\textsuperscript{a} but that he had erased it in the time of the Thirty, declared that it was impossible, for the Thirty would have had more confidence in him if his hatred against the people had been graven on the stone.

Another topic consists in examining whether there was or is another better course than that which is advised, or is being, or has been, carried out. For it is evident that, if this has not been done,\textsuperscript{b} a person has not committed a certain action; because no one, purposely or knowingly, chooses what is bad. However, this argument may be false; for often it is not until later that it becomes clear what was the better course, which previously was uncertain.

Another topic, when something contrary to what has already been done is on the point of being done, consists in examining them together. For instance, when the people of Elea asked Xenophanes if they ought to sacrifice and sing dirges to Leucothea,\textsuperscript{c} or not, he advised them that, if they believed her to be a goddess they ought not to sing dirges, but if they believed her to be a mortal, they ought not to sacrifice to her.

Another topic consists in making use of errors committed, for purposes of accusation or defence. For instance, in the Medea of Carcinus,\textsuperscript{d} some accuse Medea of having killed her children,—at any rate, they had disappeared; for she had made the mistake of sending them out of the way. Medea herself

Thebes. The latter went mad and, in order to escape from him, Ino threw herself into the sea with her infant son Melicertes. Both became marine deities.

\textsuperscript{a} Tragic poet, contemporary of Aristophanes (T.G.F. p. 798).
Ἀπολογεῖται ὅτι οὐκ ἂν τοὺς παῖδας ἄλλα τὸν Ἰάσονα ἂν ἀπέκτεινεν· τούτῳ γὰρ ἦμαρτεν ἂν μὴ ποιήσασα, εἴπερ καὶ θάτερον ἔποιήσεν. ἐστὶ δ’ ὁ τόπος οὗτος τοῦ ἐνθυμημάτως καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὅλη ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη.

29 Ἄλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅνοματος, οἶδον ὡς ὁ Σοφοκλῆς σαφῶς Σιδηρῶ καὶ φοροῦσα τούνομα,

καὶ ὡς ἐν τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ἑπαύνοις εἰώθασι λέγειν,
καὶ ὡς Κόνων Ὁρασύβουλον ὅρασύβουλον ἐκάλει,
καὶ Ἡρόδικος Ὁρασύμαχον “ἀεὶ ὁρασύμαχος εἶ,” καὶ Πώλου “ἀεὶ σὺ πώλος εἰ,” καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην, ὅτι οὐκ ἄνθρωπον οἱ νόμοι ἄλλα δράκοντος· χαλεποὶ γὰρ. καὶ ὡς ἡ Εὐριπίδου Ἐκάβη εἰς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην

καὶ τούνομ’ ὁρθῶς ἀφροσύνης ἀρχεῖ θεᾶς.
καὶ ὡς Χαϊρήμων

Πενθεύς ἐσομένης συμφορᾶς ἐπώνυμος.

30 Εὐδοκιμεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἑλεγκτικὰ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν διὰ τὸ συναγωγὴν μὲν ἐναντίων εἰναι ἐν μικρῷ τὸ ἑλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα, παρ’ ἄλληλα δὲ φανερὰ εἰναι τῷ ἀκροατῇ

\[a\] An early edition, afterwards enlarged. It must have contained something more than the topic of “errors” to be of any use.
\[b\] Sophocles, Tyro, Frag. 597 (T.G.F.). The reference is to Sidero (σίδηρος, iron), the cruel stepmother of Tyro.
\[c\] Thompson’s rendering (Introd. to his ed. of Plato’s Gorgias, p. 5). “Colt” refers to Polus’s skittishness and frisking from one subject to another.
\[d\] Troades, 990.
pleads that she would have slain, not her children, but her husband Jason; for it would have been a mistake on her part not to have done this, if she had done the other. This topic and kind of enthymeme is the subject of the whole of the first "Art" of Theodorus.\footnote{a}

Another topic is derived from the meaning of a name. For instance, Sophocles says,

Certainly thou art iron, like thy name.\footnote{b}

This topic is also commonly employed in praising the gods. Conon used to call Thrasybulus "the man bold in counsel," and Herodicus said of Thrasymachus, "Thou art ever bold in fight," and of Polus, "Thou art ever Polus (colt) by name and colt by nature,"\footnote{c} and of Draco the legislator that his laws were not those of a man, but of a dragon, so severe were they. Hecuba in Euripides\footnote{d} speaks thus of Aphro-dite:

And rightly does the name of the goddess begin like the word aphro-syne (folly);

and Chaeremon\footnote{e} of Pentheus,

Pentheus named after his unhappy future.

Enthymemes that serve to refute are more popular than those that serve to demonstrate, because the former is a conclusion of opposites\footnote{f} in a small compass, and things in juxtaposition are always clearer to the

\footnote{e} Frag. 4 (T.G.F.). The name Pentheus is from πένθος (sorrow).

\footnote{f} "Admitting the apparent correctness of the opposing argument, we may prove the contradictory of its conclusion by an unassailable argument of our own, which is then called an elenchus" (Thomson, \textit{Laws of Thought}, §127).
μᾶλλον. πάντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἑλεγκτικῶν καὶ τῶν δεικτικῶν συλλογισμῶν θορυβεῖται μάλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσα ἄρχόμενα προορώσι μὴ τῷ ἐπιτολῆς εἶναι (ἲμα γὰρ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφ᾿ αὐτοῖς χαίροντι προαιρεσθανόμενοι), καὶ ὅσοι τοσοῦτον ὑστερίζουσιν ἠσθ᾽ ἀμα εἰρημένων γνωρίζειν.

24. Ἐπει δ᾿ εὐδέχεται τὸν μὲν εἶναι συλλογισμὸν, τὸν δὲ μὴ εἶναι μὲν φαίνεσθαι δὲ, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐνθύμημα τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἐνθύμημα, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι φαίνεσθαι δὲ, ἐπείπερ τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμὸς τις.

2 Τότοι δ᾿ εἰσὶ τῶν φανομένων ἐνθυμημάτων εἰς μὲν ὁ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, καὶ τούτον ἐν μὲν μέρος, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, τὸ μὴ συλλογισμένου συμπερασματικῶς τὸ τελευταῖον εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἀρα τὸ καὶ τὸ, ἀνάγκη ἅρα τὸ καὶ τὸ. καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι τὸ συνεστραμμένως καὶ ἀντικειμένως εἰπεῖν φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα: ἢ γὰρ τοιαύτη λέξις χώρα ἑστὶν ἐνθυμημάτος. καὶ έουκε τὸ τοσοῦτον εἶναι παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως. ἐστὶ δὲ εἰς τὸ τῇ λέξει συλλογιστικῶς λέγειν χρήσιμον τὸ συλλογισμῶν πολλῶν κεφάλαια λέγειν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἔσωσε, τοῖς δ᾿ ἐτέρους ἔτιμωρησε, τοὺς δ᾿ Ἐλληνας ἥλενθέρωσεν· ἐκαστὸν μὲν γὰρ τοὺτον ἔξι ἄλλων ἀπεδείχθη, συντεθέντων δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων τι γίγνεσθαι.

Ἐν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, ὡς τὸ φάναι σπουδαίον εἶναι μὲν, ἀφ᾿ οὗ γ᾿ ἐστὶν ἡ τιμωτάτη πασῶν τελετή· τὰ γὰρ μυστήρια πασῶν τιμωτάτη

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a Isocrates, Evagoras, 65-69.
b Or equivocation, in which a single term has a double meaning.

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audience. But of all syllogisms, whether refutative or demonstrative, those are specially applauded, the result of which the hearers foresee as soon as they are begun, and not because they are superficial (for as they listen they congratulate themselves on anticipating the conclusion); and also those which the hearers are only so little behind that they understand what they mean as soon as they are delivered.

24. But as it is possible that some syllogisms may be real, and others not real but only apparent, there must also be real and apparent enthymemes, since the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism.

Now, of the topics of apparent enthymemes one is that of diction, which is of two kinds. The first, as in Dialectic, consists in ending with a conclusion syllogistically expressed, although there has been no syllogistic process, "therefore it is neither this nor that," "so it must be this or that"; and similarly in rhetorical arguments a concise and antithetical statement is supposed to be an enthymeme; for such a style appears to contain a real enthymeme. This fallacy appears to be the result of the form of expression. For the purpose of using the diction to create an impression of syllogistic reasoning it is useful to state the heads of several syllogisms: "He saved some, avenged others, and freed the Greeks"; for each of these propositions has been proved by others, but their union appears to furnish a fresh conclusion.

The second kind of fallacy of diction is homonymy. For instance, if one were to say that the mouse is an important animal, since from it is derived the most honoured of all religious festivals, namely, the
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teleií. ἢ εἶ τις κύια ἐγκωμιᾶξων τὸν ἐν τῷ
οὐρανῷ συμπαραλαμβάνει ἢ τὸν Πάνα, ὅτι Πίνδαρος
ἐφησεν

ὁ μάκαρ, ὅν τε μεγάλας θεοῦ κύια παντοδαπὸν
καλέουσιν 'Ολυμπιοί.

ἡ ὅτι τὸ μηδένα εἰναι κύια ἀτυμότατον ἐστιν,
ὡστε τὸ κύια δῆλον ὅτι τίμιον. καὶ τὸ κοινωνικὸν
φάναι τὸν Ἑρμῆς εἰναι μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν· μόνος
γὰρ καλεῖται κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς. καὶ τὸ τὸν λόγον
eιναι σπουδαιότατον, ὅτι οἱ ἁγαθοὶ ἄνδρες οὐ χρη-
μάτων ἀλλὰ λόγου εἰσίν αξίοι· τὸ γὰρ λόγου ἀξίων
οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται.

3 Ἀλλος τὸ διηγημένον συντιθέντα λέγειν ἢ τὸ
συγκείμενον διαιροῦντα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ταύτον δοκεῖ
εἰναι οὐκ ὅν ταύτον πολλάκις, ὀπότερον χρησιμώ-
teron, τούτο δὲ ποιεῖν. ἐστὶ δὲ τούτο Εὐθυδήμου
λόγος, οἷον τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι τρήρης ἐν Πειραιεῖ
ἐστίν· ἐκαστὸν γὰρ οἶδεν. καὶ τὸν τὰ οπίσιεια

a Deriving μυστήρια (μύειν, to close the lips) from μῦς
(mouse).

b A fragment from the Parthenia (songs sung by maidens
to the accompaniment of the flute). Pan is called “the dog
of Cybele,” the great nature-goddess of the Greeks, as being
always in attendance on her, being himself a nature-god.
The fact that Pindar calls Pan “dog” is taken as a
glorification of that animal.

c κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς is a proverbial expression meaning
“halves!” When anyone had a stroke of luck, such as
finding a purse full of money in the street, anyone with
him expected to go halves. Hermes was the god of luck,
and such a find was called ἔρμαίον. κοινωνικὸς is taken to
mean (1) liberal to others, or (2) sociable.

d λόγος: (1) speech; (2) account, esteem.

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mysteries; or if, in praising the dog, one were to include the dog in heaven (Sirius), or Pan, because Pindar said,

O blessed one, whom the Olympians call dog of the Great Mother, taking every form,
or were to say that the dog is an honourable animal, since to be without a dog is most dishonourable. And to say that Hermes is the most sociable of the gods, because he alone is called common; and that words are most excellent, since good men are considered worthy, not of riches but of consideration; for λόγου ἀξιός has a double meaning.

Another fallacy consists in combining what is divided or dividing what is combined. For since a thing which is not the same as another often appears to be the same, one may adopt the more convenient alternative. Such was the argument of Euthydemus, to prove, for example, that a man knows that there is a trireme in the Piraeus, because he knows the existence of two things, the Piraeus and the trireme; or that, when one knows the letters, one also knows

Very obscure and no explanation is satisfactory. The parallel passage in Sophistici elenchi (20. 6) is: "Do you being in Sicily now know that there are triremes in the Piraeus?" The ambiguity lies in the position of "now," whether it is to be taken with "in Sicily" or with "in the Piraeus." At the moment when a man is in Sicily he cannot know that there are at this time triremes in the Piraeus; but being in Sicily he can certainly know of the ships in the Piraeus, which should be there, but are now in Sicily (Kirchmann). St. Hilaire suggests that the two clauses are: Do you now, being in Sicily, see the triremes which are in the Piraeus? and, Did you when in Sicily, see the triremes which are now in the Piraeus? The fallacy consists in the two facts (being in the Piraeus and the existence of triremes in Sicily), true separately, being untrue combined.
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ἐπιστόμενον ὅτι τὸ ἐπος οἴδει· τὸ γὰρ ἐπος τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστιν. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ δὴς τοσοῦτον νοσῶδες, μηδὲ τὸ ἐν φάναι ύγιεινὸν εἶναι· ἀτοπον γὰρ εἰ τὰ δύο ἁγαθὰ ἐν κακὸν ἔστιν. οὐτω μὲν οὐν ἠλεγκτικῶν, ὡδὲ δὲ δεικτικῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν ἁγαθὸν δύο κακά. ὄλος δὲ ὁ τόπος παραλογιστικός. πάλιν τὸ Πολυκράτους εἰς Θρασύβουλον, ἀτι τριάκοντα τυράννους κατέλυσεν· συντίθησι γὰρ. ἦ τὸ ἐν τῷ Ὡρέστῃ τῷ Θεοδέκτου· ἐκ διαίρεσεως γὰρ ἔστιν.

stileis ἔστιν, ἦ τις ἄν κτείνη πόσιν,

ἀποθνήσκειν ταύτην, καὶ τῶν πατρί γε τιμωρεῖν τὸν υἱόν· οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα πέπρακται· συντεθέντα γὰρ ἵνας οὐκέτι δίκαιον. εἰὼ δ' ἄν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἐλλευφίν· ἀφαιρεῖται γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ τίνος.

4 Ἀλλος δὲ τόπος τὸ δεινῶσει κατασκευάζειν ἢ ἀνασκευάζειν. τούτῳ δ' ἔστιν οταν, μὴ δείξας ὅτι ἐποίησεν, αὐξήσῃ τὸ πράγμα· ποιεὶ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ὡς οὔτε πεποίηκεν, οταν ὁ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχων αὐξή, ἢ ὡς πεποίηκεν, οταν ὁ κατηγορὼν ῥωγίζεται. οὐκοῦν ἔστιν ἐνθύμησα· παραλογίζεται γὰρ ὁ ἀκροατὴς ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἢ οὐκ ἐποίησεν, οὐ δεδείγμενον.

5 Ἀλλος τὸ ἐκ σημείου· ἀσυλλογιστὸν γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. οἰον εἰ τις λέγωι "ταῖς πόλεσι συμφέρουσιν οί ἔρωντες· ὁ γὰρ Ἀρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος

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a Thrasylbulus deposed the thirty individuals and put down the single tyranny which they composed; he then claimed a thirtyfold reward, as having put down thirty tyrannies.

b Frag. 5 (T.G.F.).

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the word made of them, for word and letters are the same thing. Further, since twice so much is unwholesome, one may argue that neither is the original amount wholesome; for it would be absurd that two halves separately should be good, but bad combined. In this way the argument may be used for refutation, in another way for demonstration, if one were to say, one good thing cannot make two bad things. But the whole topic is fallacious. Again, one may quote what Polycrates said of Thrasybulus, that he deposed thirty tyrants, for here he combines them; or the example of the fallacy of division in the Orestes of Theodectes: "It is just that a woman who has killed her husband" should be put to death, and that the son should avenge the father; and this in fact is what has been done. But if they are combined, perhaps the act ceases to be just. The same might also be classed as an example of the fallacy of omission; for the name of the one who should put the woman to death is not mentioned.

Another topic is that of constructing or destroying by exaggeration, which takes place when the speaker, without having proved that any crime has actually been committed, exaggerates the supposed fact; for it makes it appear either that the accused is not guilty, when he himself exaggerates it, or that he is guilty, when it is the accuser who is in a rage. Therefore there is no enthymeme; for the hearer falsely concludes that the accused is guilty or not, although neither has been proved.

Another fallacy is that of the sign, for this argument also is illogical. For instance, if one were to say that those who love one another are useful to States, since the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton
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"έρως κατέλυσε τὸν τύραννον Ἰππαρχον." ἦ εἰ
tis légoi óti kléptēs Διονύσιος· poιηρος γάρ·
ἀσυλλόγιστον γαρ καὶ τοῦτο· οὐ γαρ πᾶς poιηρος
kléptēs, ἀλλ' ó kléptēs pᾶς poιηρος.

6 "Ἀλλος διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἶον ὁ λέγει Πολυ-
κράτης εἰς τοὺς μοῦ, ὅτι ἐβοήθησαν διατραγώντες
tὰς νευρὰς. ἦ εἰ τις φαίη τὸ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον κληθῆναι
tμιουτατον. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς
ἐμήνισε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐν Τενέδῳ· ὁ δ' ᾨς ἀτμια-
ζόμενος ἐμήνισεν, συνέβη δὲ τούτῳ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ
κληθῆναι.

7 "Ἀλλος τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐπώμενον, οἶον ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξ-
άνδρῳ, ὅτι μεγαλόψυχος· ύπεριδῶν γὰρ τὴν πολλὰ
ὁμιλίαν ἐν τῇ "Ιδὴ διέτριβε καθ' αὐτὸν· ὅτι γὰρ
ὁι μεγαλόψυχοι τουούτοι, καὶ οὕτως μεγαλόψυχος
δόξειεν ἄν. καὶ ἐπεὶ καλλωπιστής καὶ νῦκτωρ πλα-
νάται, μοιχὸς· τουούτοι γάρ. ὁμοίων δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐν
toῖς ἱεροῖς οἱ πτωχοὶ καὶ ἄδουσι καὶ ὄρχονται, καὶ
ὅτι τοῖς φυγάσιν ἐξεστίν οἰκεῖν ὅπου ἂν ἥλωσιν·
ὅτι γὰρ τοῖς δοκοῦσιν εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχει ταῦτα,
καὶ οἱς ταῦτα ὑπάρχει, δόξαειν ἂν εὐδαιμονεῖν.

a Herodotus, ii. 141. The story was that, when
Sennacherib invaded Egypt, a host of field-mice devoured
all the quivers, bowstrings and leather shield-holders of the
Assyrians. Apollo was called Sminthens (σμῖνθος, mouse)
and was represented on coins with a mouse in his hand,
either as the mouse-slayer and protector of crops, or because
the animal was sacred to him. The story, alluded to else-
where, was of Greek, not of Egyptian origin. Similar
overthrew the tyrant Hipparchus; or that Dionysius is a thief, because he is a rascal; for here again the argument is inconclusive; not every rascal is a thief although every thief is a rascal.

Another fallacy is derived from accident; for instance, when Polycrates says of the mice, that they rendered great service by gnawing the bowstrings. Or if one were to say that nothing is more honourable than to be invited to a dinner, for because he was not invited Achilles was wroth with the Achaeans at Tenedos; whereas he was really wroth because he had been treated with disrespect, but this was an accident due to his not having been invited.

Another fallacy is that of the Consequence. For instance, in the Alexander (Paris) it is said that Paris was high-minded, because he despised the companionship of the common herd and dwelt on Ida by himself; for because the high-minded are of this character. Paris also might be thought high-minded. Or, since a man pays attention to dress and roams about at night, he is a libertine, because libertines are of this character. Similarly, the poor sing and dance in the temples, exiles can live where they please; and since these things belong to those who are apparently happy, those to whom they belong may also be thought happy. But there is a difference in panegyrics on ridiculous things or animals included pots, counters, salt, flies, bees, and such subjects as death, sleep, and food.

Sophocles, The Gathering of the Greeks (T.G.F. p. 161), a satyric drama. His not being invited was a mere accident of the disrespect.

Assuming a proposition to be convertible, when it is not; it does not follow, assuming that all the high-minded dwell by themselves, that all who dwell by themselves are high-minded.
The poor want to get money; the rich dance and sing to amuse themselves, or to show that they can do as they like. Exiles can certainly live where they like in a foreign land, but would prefer to live in their own country; the rich, who are not exiles, travel to amuse themselves.

\( a \) The first “is” means “has a real, absolute existence”; the second “is” merely expresses the identity of the terms of the proposition, and is particular; but the sophistical reasoner takes it in the same sense as the first. The same applies to the argument about the unknown.

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tions; wherefore this topic also falls under the head of omission.

Another fallacy consists of taking what is not the cause for the cause, as when a thing has happened at the same time as, or after, another; for it is believed that what happens after is produced by the other, especially by politicians. Thus, Demades declared that the policy of Demosthenes was the cause of all the evils that happened, since it was followed by the war.

Another fallacy is the omission of when and how. For instance, Alexander (Paris) had a right to carry off Helen, for the choice of a husband had been given her by her father. But (this was a fallacy), for it was not, as might be thought, for all time, but only for the first time; for the father’s authority only lasts till then. Or, if one should say that it is wanton outrage to beat a free man; for this is not always the case, but only when the assailant gives the first blow.

Further, as in sophistical disputations, an apparent syllogism arises as the result of considering a thing first absolutely, and then not absolutely, but only in a particular case. For instance, in Dialectic, it is argued that that which is not is, for that which is not is that which is not; also, that the unknown can be known, for it can be known of the unknown that it is unknown. Similarly, in Rhetoric, an apparent enthymeme may arise from that which is not absolutely probable but only in particular cases. But this is not to be understood absolutely, as Agathon says:
This utterance of Protagoras gave particular offence as apparently implying that the weaker cause was really identical with the worse, so that to support it was to support injustice. But, considering the high moral character ascribed to Protagoras, it seems more probable to take the formula as a statement of the aim of all ancient orators—how to overcome stronger arguments by arguments weaker in themselves.
One might perhaps say that this very thing is probable, that many things happen to men that are not probable; for that which is contrary to probability nevertheless does happen, so that that which is contrary to probability is probable. If this is so, that which is improbable will be probable. But not absolutely; but as, in the case of sophistical disputations, the argument becomes fallacious when the circumstances, reference, and manner are not added, so here it will become so owing to the probability being not probable absolutely but only in particular cases. The "Art" of Corax is composed of this topic. For if a man is not likely to be guilty of what he is accused of, for instance if, being weak, he is accused of assault and battery, his defence will be that the crime is not probable; but if he is likely to be guilty, for instance, if he is strong, it may be argued again that the crime is not probable, for the very reason that it was bound to appear so. It is the same in all other cases; for a man must either be likely to have committed a crime or not. Here, both the alternatives appear equally probable, but the one is really so, the other not probable absolutely, but only in the conditions mentioned. And this is what "making the worse appear the better argument" means. Wherefore men were justly disgusted with the promise of Protagoras; for it is a lie, not a real but an apparent probability, not found in any art except Rhetoric and Sophistic. So much for real or apparent enthymemes.

25. Next to what has been said we must speak of refutation. An argument may be refuted either by a counter-syllogism or by bringing an objection.

In which the contrary of an opponent's conclusion is proved.
ARISTOTLE

ζεσθαί δὴλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων,
3 δοκοῦντα δὲ πολλὰ ἐναντία ἅλληλοις ἐστίν. αἱ δ' ἐνστάσεις φέρονται καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς,
tετραχῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἡ ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἡ ἐκ
4 τοῦ ἐναντίου ἡ ἐκ τῶν κεκριμένων. λέγω δὲ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ μὲν, οἶνον εἰ περὶ ἔρωτος εἰῇ τὸ ἐνθύμημα
ὡς σπουδαιός, ἡ ἐνστασις διχῶς· ἡ γὰρ καθόλου εἰπόντα ὅτι πᾶσα ἐνδεία πονηρόν, ἡ κατὰ μέρος
ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ἐλέγετο Καύνιος ἔρως, εἰ μὴ ἦσαν καὶ
5 πονηροὺς ἔρωτες. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐνστάσεις
φέρεται, οἷον εἰ τὸ ἐνθύμημα ἢν ὅτι ὁ ἁγαθὸς ἄνδρὴν
πάντας τοὺς φίλους εὑ ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' οὖν 'ὁ μοχθηρός
κακῶς. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοίου, εἰ ἢν τὸ ἐνθύμημα
ὅτι οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες αἰεὶ μυσόσων, ὅτι ἀλλ' οὖν εὑ
πεπονθότες αἰεὶ φιλοῦσων. αἱ δὲ κρίσεις
ἀπὸ τῶν γυνώρίμων ἄνδρῶν, οἶνον εἰ τις ἐνθύμημα
ἐπεν ὅτι τοὺς μεθύουσι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν,
ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἀμαρτάνουσι, ἐνστασις ὅτι οὐκουν
ὁ Πιστακός ἀνετός· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μείζους ζημίας
ἐνομοθέτησαν ἐάν τις μεθύων ἀμαρτάνη.
8 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται ἐκ τεττάρων,
τὰ δὲ τέτταρα ταῦτ' ἐστίν εἰκὸς παράδειγμα
τεκμήριον σημείον, ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ
τὸ πολὺ ἢ ὄντων ἢ δοκοῦντων συνηγμένα ἐνθυμή-

a i.e. the opponent's enthymeme.
b Love is regarded as a desire, and therefore as bad as any other desire. It is here included under the general head of want.
c Incest: Ovid, Metamorphoses, ix. 454.
d The contrary of “good men do good to all their friends” is “bad men do harm to all their friends,” but this is not 336
It is clear that the same topics may furnish countersyllogisms; for syllogisms are derived from probable materials and many probabilities are contrary to one another. An objection is brought, as shown in the *Topics*, in four ways: it may be derived either from itself, or from what is similar, or from what is contrary, or from what has been decided. In the first case, if for instance the enthymeme was intended to prove that love is good, two objections might be made; either the general statement that all want is bad, or in particular, that Caunian love would not have become proverbial, unless some forms of love had been bad. An objection from what is contrary is brought if, for instance, the enthymeme is that the good man does good to all his friends; it may be objected: But the bad man does not do harm [to all his friends]. An objection from what is similar is brought, if the enthymeme is that those who have been injured always hate, by arguing that those who have been benefited do not always love. The fourth kind of objection is derived from the former decisions of well-known men. For instance, if the enthymeme is that one should make allowance for those who are drunk, for their offence is the result of ignorance, it may be objected that Pittacus then is unworthy of commendation, otherwise he would not have laid down severer punishment for a man who commits an offence when drunk.

Now the material of enthymemes is derived from four sources—probabilities, examples, necessary signs, and signs. Conclusions are drawn from probabilities, when based upon things which most commonly occur always true. Jebb gives the objection as: “No, the bad man does not do evil to all his enemies.”
ματα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων, τὰ δὲ δι᾿ ἐπαγωγῆς διὰ τοῦ ὁμοίου, ἦ ἐνὸς ἦ πλειόνων, ὅταν λαβών τὸ καθόλου εἶτα συλλογίσῃ τὰ κατὰ μέρος διὰ παραδείγματος, τὰ δὲ δι᾿ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ὄντος διὰ τεκμηρίου, τὰ δὲ διὰ τοῦ καθόλου ἦ τοῦ ἐν μέρει ὄντος, ἐάν τε ὅν ἐάν τε μή, διὰ σημείων, τὸ δὲ εἰκός οὐ τὸ ἀεὶ ἀλλὰ τὸ ὃς ἐτί τὸ πολὺ, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα μὲν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἀεὶ ἐστὶ λύειν φέροντα ἐν- 9 στασιν, ἦ δὲ λύσις φαινομένη ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀληθῆς ἀεὶ’ οὐ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός, λύει ὅ ἐνιστάμενος, ἀλλ’ ὅτι 10 οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. διὸ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐστὶ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπολογούμενον μᾶλλον ἢ κατηγοροῦντα διὰ τούτον τὸν παραλογισμὸν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὃ μὲν κατηγορῶν δι᾿ εἰκότων ἀποδείκνυσιν, ἐστὶ δὲ οὐ ταύτῳ λύσαι ἦ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός ἦ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαίον, ἀεὶ δὲ ἑχει ἐνστασιν τὸ ὃς ἐτί τὸ πολὺ. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν εἰκός ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον. ὅ δὲ κριτῆς οἶται, ἂν οὕτω λυθῇ, ἢ οὐκ εἰκός εἶναι ἢ οὐχ ἄντω κριτέον, παραλογιζόμενον, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων δεῖ τούτων μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ γνώμη τῆς ἀρίστης κρίνειν. οὐκοιν ἰκανῶν ἂν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός. τοῦτο δὲ συμβηκεῖται, ἐὰν ἦ ἦ ἐνστασις μᾶλλον ὃς ἐτί 11 τὸ πολὺ. ἐνδέχεται δὲ εἶναι τοιαύτην διχῶς, ἦ

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a Translating ἀεὶ inserted by Vahlen before ὄντος.

b That is, if the argument is shown to be not “necessary.”

c The important point in the conclusion drawn is that the judge thinks it is not his business to decide, because the argument is not necessary, whereas his duty is to decide, not about things that are necessary but about things that are probable.

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or seem to occur; from examples, when they are the result of induction from one or more similar cases, and when one assumes the general and then concludes the particular by an example; from necessary signs, when based upon that which is necessary and ever a exists; from signs, when their material is the general or the particular, whether true or not. Now, the probable being not what occurs invariably but only for the most part, it is evident that enthymemes of this character can always be refuted by bringing an objection. But the objection is often only apparent, not real; for he who brings the objection endeavours to show, not that the argument is not probable, but that it is not necessary. Wherefore, by the employment of this fallacy, the defendant always has an advantage over the accuser. For since the latter always bases his proof upon probabilities, and it is not the same thing to show that an argument is not probable as to show that it is not necessary, and that which is only true for the most part is always liable to objection (otherwise it would not be probable, but constant and necessary),—then the judge thinks, if the refutation is made in this manner, either that the argument is not probable, or that it is not for him to decide, being deceived by the fallacy, as we have just indicated. For his judgement must not rest upon necessary arguments alone, but also upon probabilities; for this is what is meant by deciding according to the best of one's judgement. It is therefore not enough to refute an argument by showing that it is not necessary; it must also be shown that it is not probable. This will be attained if the objection itself is specially based upon what happens generally. This may take
τῷ χρόνῳ ἡ τοῖς πράγμασιν, κυριώτατα δέ, εἰ

1403 a ἀμφότεροι ἐὰν γὰρ τὰ πλεονάκις οὕτω, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν εἰκὸς μάλλον.

12 Αὕτη δὲ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ διὰ σημείου ἐνθυμήματα εἰρημένα, κἂν ἢ ὑπάρχοντα, ὥστε ἐλέχθη ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις. ὧτι γὰρ ἀσυλλογιστὸν ἐστὶ πάν σημείου, δῆλον ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.

13 πρὸς δὲ τὰ παραδειγματίζοντες ἡ αυτὴ λύσις καὶ τὰ εἰκότα: εὰν τε γὰρ ἐχωμεν τι οὐχ οὕτω, λέγεται, ὧτι οὐκ ἀναγκαίον, εἰ καὶ τὰ πλεῖω ἡ πλεονάκις ἄλλοι: εὰν τε καὶ τὰ πλεῖο καὶ τὰ πλεονάκις οὕτω, μαχεῖται, ἡ ὧτι τὸ παρὼν οὐχ ὁμοιον ἡ οὐχ ὧμοιος ἡ διαφορά γέ τινα ἔχει. τὰ δὲ τεκμηρία καὶ τεκμηριώδη ἐνθυμήματα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἀσυλλογιστὸν οὐκ ἐσται λύσι (δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν), λέγεται δ’ ὃς οὐχ ὑπάρχει τὸ λεγόμενον δεικνύει. εἰ δὲ φανερὸν καὶ ὧτι ὑπάρχει καὶ ὧτι τεκμηρίον, ἀλλοι ἡδίς γίγνεται τοῦτο: πάντα γὰρ γίγνεται ἀποδείξει ἡδίς φανερά.

26. Τὸ δ’ αὐξών καὶ μειοῦν οὐκ ἐστιν ἐνθυμήματος στοιχείων: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχείον καὶ τόπον: ἐστι γὰρ στοιχείον καὶ τόπος, εἰς δ’

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a χρόνῳ ... πράγμασιν. If χρόνῳ be taken to mean the date, there are the following alternatives. The date may be questioned, the facts admitted; both date and facts may be questioned; both date and facts may be admitted, but circumstances may have altered (a pound was worth twenty shillings in 1914, not in 1924). Others take χρόνῳ to mean the greater number of times the same fact has occurred, πράγμασι the more numerous facts that increase probability. But χρόνῳ can hardly bear this meaning (see Jebb’s note).
b i. 2. 18; or, “at the beginning,” i.e. of this book.
c Anal. priora, ii. 27.
d On the other side, in the opponent’s favour.

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place in two ways, from consideration either of the time or of the facts. The strongest objections are those in which both are combined; for a thing is more probable, the greater the number of similar cases.

Signs and enthymemes based upon signs, even if true, may be refuted in the manner previously stated; for it is clear from the *Analytics* that no sign can furnish a logical conclusion. As for enthymemes derived from examples, they may be refuted in the same manner as probabilities. For if we have a single fact that contradicts the opponent’s example, the argument is refuted as not being necessary, even though examples, more in number and of more common occurrence, are otherwise; but if the majority and greater frequency of examples is on the side of the opponent, we must contend either that the present example is not similar to those cited by him, or that the thing did not take place in the same way, or that there is some difference. But necessary signs and the enthymemes derived from them cannot be refuted on the ground of not furnishing a logical conclusion, as is clear from the *Analytics*; the only thing that remains is to prove that the thing alleged is non-existent. But if it is evident that it is true and that it is a necessary sign, the argument at once becomes irrefutable; for, by means of demonstration, everything at once becomes clear.

26. Amplification and depreciation are not elements of enthymeme (for I regard element and topic as identical), since element (or topic) is a head under

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*That is, “when the tekmerion is converted into a syllogism.” For tekmerion see i. 2. 16.*
ARISTOTLE

πολλα ἐνθυμήματα ἐμπίπτει. τὸ δ’ αὐξειν καὶ
μειοῦν ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματα πρὸς τὸ δείξαι ὅτι μέγα
ἡ μικρόν, ὦσπερ καὶ ὅτι ἄγαθον ἢ κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον
2 ἡ ἅδικον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτι οὐ.
τὰῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν πάντα περὶ ἅν οἱ συλλογισμοὶ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα·
ὡς εἰ μηδεὶς τούτον ἐκατοστὸν ἐνθυμήματος τόπος,
3 οὔδε τὸ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν. οὔδε τὰ λυτικὰ ἐνθυμή-
ματα εἶδος τι ἐστίν ἄλλο τῶν κατασκευαστικῶν·
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι λύει μὲν ἡ δείξας ἡ ἐνστασιν ἐνεγκών,
ἀνταποδεικνύοις δὲ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, οἷον εἰ
ἐδείξειν ὅτι γέγονεν, ὦτος ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν, εἰ δ’
ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν, ὦτος ὅτι γέγονεν. ὥστε αὐτὴ
μὲν οὐκ ἢν εἴη ἡ διαφορά· τοῖς αὐτοῖς γὰρ χρώνται
ἀμφότεροι· ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἐστιν ἡ ἐστιν, ἐνθυμήματα
4 φέρουσιν· ἡ δ’ ἐνστασις οὐκ ἐστιν ἐνθύμημα, ἀλλὰ
cαθάπερ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς τὸ ἐκπεῖν δόξαν τινὰ ἔξ
حساس ἐσται δῆλον ὅτι οὐ συλλεγόμεναι ἢ ὅτι ἰδεῖτο
5 τι εἰληφεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ τρία ἐστιν ἃ δεῖ πραγ-
ματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον, ὑπὲρ μὲν παραδειγ-
μάτων καὶ γνωμῶν καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ ὅλως τῶν
περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, θεῖν τε εὐπορήσομεν καὶ ὡς
αὐτὰ λύσομεν, εἰρήθων ἡμῖν τοσαῦτα. λοιπὸν δὲ
διελθεῖν περὶ λέξεως καὶ τάξεως.

4103 b “Intellectual capacity, as evinced in language (or
actions), and seen when the actors argue or make an appeal
to the feelings of others, in other words, when they reason or
plead with one of the other dramatis personae in the same
sort of way as a rhetor might do” (Bywater on the Poetics,
2, 1450 a 6, where the text is speaking of the διάνοια of the
actors in a play).
RHETORIC, II. xxvi. 1–5

which several enthymemes are included, but they are enthymemes which serve to show that a thing is great or small, just as others serve to show that it is good or bad, just or unjust, or anything else. All these are the materials of syllogisms and enthymemes; so that if none of these is a topic of enthymeme, neither is amplification or depreciation. Nor are enthymemes by which arguments are refuted of a different kind from those by which they are established; for it is clear that demonstration or bringing an objection is the means of refutation. By the first the contrary of the adversary's conclusion is demonstrated; for instance, if he has shown that a thing has happened, his opponent shows that it has not; if he has shown that a thing has not happened, he shows that it has. This, therefore, will not be the difference between them; for both employ the same arguments; they bring forward enthymemes to show that the thing is or that it is not. And the objection is not an enthymeme, but, as I said in the Topics, it is stating an opinion which is intended to make it clear that the adversary's syllogism is not logical, or that he has assumed some false premise. Now, since there are three things in regard to speech, to which special attention should be devoted, let what has been said suffice for examples, maxims, enthymemes, and what concerns the intelligence generally; for the sources of a supply of arguments and the means of refuting them. It only remains to speak of style and arrangement.

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Γ

1. Ἔπειδή τρία ἔστιν ἢ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἐν μὲν ἑκ τίνων ἢ πίστεις ἔσονται, δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν, τρίτον δὲ πῶς χρῆ τάξαι τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, περὶ μὲν τῶν πίστεων εἰρηται, καὶ ἓκ πόσων, ὥστε ἕκ τριῶν εἰσὶ, καὶ ταῦτα ποία, καὶ διὰ τὶ τοσαῦτα μόνα· ἢ γὰρ τῷ αυτοῖ τι πεπονθέναι οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ τῷ ποιοῦς τινας ὑπολαμβάνειν τοὺς λέγοντας, ἢ τῷ ἀποδεδείχθαι πειθοῦται πάντες. εἰρηται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, πόθεν δεῖ πορίζεσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἴδη τῶν ἐνθυμήματων, τὰ δὲ τόποι.

2. Περὶ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἐχόμενον ἔστιν εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη τὸ ἐχεῖν ἢ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν, καὶ συμβάλλειν τολλά. πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι ποιῶν τινα τὸν λόγον. τὸ μὲν ὅτι πρῶτον ἐξητήθη κατὰ φύσιν, ὅπερ πέφυκε πρῶτον, αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ἐκ τίνων ἔχει τὸ πιθανόν· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ταῦτα τῇ λέξει διαθέσθαι· τρίτον δὲ τούτων, ὅ δύναιν μὲν ἔχει μεγίστην. οὐπω δ’ ἐπικεχείρηται, τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν, καὶ γὰρ εἰς τὴν τραγικὴν καὶ ραψῳδίαν ὑπὲρ ἰηθείν. ὑπεκρίνοντο γὰρ αυτοὶ τὰς τραγῳδίας.
BOOK III

1. There are three things which require special attention in regard to speech: first, the sources of proofs; secondly, style; and thirdly, the arrangement of the parts of the speech. We have already spoken of proofs and stated that they are three in number, what is their nature, and why there are only three; for in all cases persuasion is the result either of the judges themselves being affected in a certain manner, or because they consider the speakers to be of a certain character, or because something has been demonstrated. We have also stated the sources from which enthymemes should be derived—some of them being special, the others general commonplaces.

We have therefore next to speak of style; for it is not sufficient to know what one ought to say, but one must also know how to say it, and this largely contributes to making the speech appear of a certain character. In the first place, following the natural order, we investigated that which first presented itself—what gives things themselves their persuasiveness; in the second place, their arrangement by style; and in the third place, delivery, which is of the greatest importance, but has not yet been treated of by any one. In fact, it only made its appearance late in tragedy and rhapsody, for at first the poets
Since the authors of tragedies acted their own plays, there was no need for professional actors, nor for instruction in the art of delivery or acting. This explains why no attempt had been made to deal with the question. Similarly, the rhapsodists (reciters of epic poems) were at first as a rule the composers of the poems themselves.
themselves acted their tragedies. It is clear, therefore, that there is something of the sort in rhetoric as well as in poetry, and it has been dealt with by Glaucon of Teos among others. Now delivery is a matter of voice, as to the mode in which it should be used for each particular emotion; when it should be loud, when low, when intermediate; and how the tones, that is, shrill, deep, and intermediate, should be used; and what rhythms are adapted to each subject. For there are three qualities that are considered,—volume, harmony, rhythm. Those who use these properly nearly always carry off the prizes in dramatic contests, and as at the present day actors have greater influence on the stage than the poets, it is the same in political contests, owing to the corruptness of our forms of government. But no treatise has yet been composed on delivery, since the matter of style itself only lately came into notice; and rightly considered it is thought vulgar. But since the whole business of Rhetoric is to influence opinion, we must pay attention to it, not as being right, but necessary; for, as a matter of right, one should aim at nothing more in a speech than how to avoid exciting pain or pleasure. For justice should consist in fighting the case with the facts alone, so that everything else that is beside demonstration is superfluous; nevertheless, as we have just said, it is of great importance owing to the corruption of the hearer. However, in every system of instruction there is some slight necessity to pay attention to style; for it does make a difference, for

\[\text{\textsuperscript{a}}\] In the law courts and public assembly.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{b}}\] Cope prefers: "is thought vulgar, and rightly so considered."

\[\text{\textsuperscript{c}}\] Or, "is concerned with appearance."

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οὐδὲ ἢ οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν· οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον, ἀλλ’ ἀπαντά
φαντασία ταύτ’ ἔστι καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν· διὸ
οὐδεὶς οὐτω γεωμετρεῖν διδάσκει.

7 Ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν ὅταν ἔλθη ταύτο ποιήσει τῇ
ὑποκριτικῇ, ἐγκεχειρήκασι δὲ ἐπ’ ὅλιγον περὶ
αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν τινές, οἶνον Ὀρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις·
καὶ ἐστὶ φύσεως τὸ ὑποκριτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνό-
τερον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἐντεχνὸν. διὸ καὶ τοῖς
τούτῳ δυναμένοις γίνεται πάλιν ἄθλα, καθάπερ
καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ἰητόρων· οἱ γὰρ
γραφόμενοι λόγου μεῖζον ἵσχύουσι διὰ τὴν λέξιν
ἡ διὰ τὴν διάνοιαν.

8 Ἡράκλετο μὲν οὖν κινήσαι τὸ πρῶτον, ὅσπερ
πέφυκεν, οἱ ποιηταὶ· τὰ γὰρ ὁνόματα μιμήματα
ἐστίν, ὑπήρξε δὲ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μιμητικῶ-
tatou τῶν μορίων ἡμῖν· διὸ καὶ αἱ τέχναι συν-
έστησαν, ἡ τε ραβῳδία καὶ ἡ ὑποκριτικὴ καὶ ἄλλαι

9 γε. ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐθῆ διὰ τὴν
λέξιν ἐδόκουν πορίσασθαι τὴν δόξαν, διὰ τοῦτο
ποιητικὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο λέξις, οἶνον ἡ Γοργίου.
καὶ νῦν ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀπαιδευτῶν τοὺς τουρμ-
tous οἴονται διαλέγεσθαι κάλλιστα. τοῦτο δ’ οὖν
ἐστὶν, ἀλλ’ ἐτέρα λόγου καὶ ποιήσεως λέξις ἑστὶν.
δηλοὶ δὲ τὸ συμβαίνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ τὰς τραγῳδίας
ποιοῦντες ἔτι χρῶνται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ’
ὡσπερ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἱαμβεῖον
μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ τῶν μέτρων

a i.e. style, delivery, and acting, which are of no use to serious students.
b A treatise on Pathos.

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the purpose of making a thing clear, to speak in this or that manner; still, the difference is not so very great, but all these things⁴ are mere outward show for pleasing the hearer; wherefore no one teaches geometry in this way.

Now, when delivery comes into fashion, it will have the same effect as acting. Some writers have attempted to say a few words about it, as Thrasy-machus, in his Eleoi⁵; and in fact, a gift for acting is a natural talent and depends less upon art, but in regard to style it is artificial. Wherefore people who excel in this in their turn obtain prizes, just as orators who excel in delivery; for written speeches owe their effect not so much to the sense as to the style.

The poets, as was natural, were the first to give an impulse to style; for words are imitations, and the voice also, which of all our parts is best adapted for imitation, was ready to hand; thus the arts of the rhapsodists, actors, and others, were fashioned. And as the poets, although their utterances were devoid of sense, appeared to have gained their reputation through their style, it was a poetical style that first came into being, as that of Gorgias.⁶ Even now the majority of the uneducated think that such persons express themselves most beautifully, whereas this is not the case, for the style of prose is not the same as that of poetry. And the result proves it; for even the writers of tragedies do not employ it in the same manner, but as they have changed from the tetrametric to the iambic metre, because the latter, of all other metres, most nearly resembles

⁴ Of Leontini in Sicily, Greek sophist and rhetorician (see Introduction).
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όμοιότατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, οὕτω καὶ τῶν όνομάτων ἀφείκασιν ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτον ἑστιν, οἷς οἱ πρώτοι ἐκόσμουν, καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἱ τὰ ἕξαμετρα ποιοῦντες· διὸ γελοῖον μιμεῖσθαι τούτοις οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐκέτι χρώνται ἐκεῖνω τῷ τρόπῳ. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπαντᾷ ὅσα περὶ λέξεως ἑστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀκριβολογητέον ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ὅσα περὶ τοιαύτης οἶνας λέγομεν. περὶ δ' ἐκείνης εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

2. Ἐστώ οὖν ἐκείνα τεθεωρημένα, καὶ ὅρισθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι· σημεῖον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος, εὰν μὴ δηλοί, οὐ ποιῆσει τὸ ἔαυτον ἔργον· καὶ μήτε ταπεινήν μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἄξιωμα, ἀλλ' πρέπουσαι· ἡ γὰρ ποιητικὴ ὅσως οὐ ταπεινή, ἀλλ' ὅπου πρέπουσα λόγω. τῶν δ' όνομάτων καὶ ρῆμάτων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινήν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τάλλα ὀνόματα ὧνα εἰρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς· τὸ γὰρ ἐξαλλάξαι ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι σεμνοτέραν· ὡσπέρ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους οἱ ἀνθρώποι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, τὸ αὐτὸ πά-3 σχοῦσι καὶ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν. διὸ δὲὶ ποιεῖν ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον· θαυμάσται γὰρ τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσιν, ἥδι δὲ τὸ θαυμαστόν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μέτρων πολλά τε ποιεῖ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀρμόττει ἐκεῖ· πλέον γὰρ ἐξέστηκε περὶ ἀ καὶ περὶ οὕς ὁ λόγος· ἐν δὲ

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a i.e. the poetic style. See Poetics, 22, where the choice of words and the extent to which out-of-the-way words and phrases may be used in poetry is discussed.

b "Nouns and verbs" is a conventional expression for all the parts of speech. Cp. Horace, Ars Poetica, 240, "non ego inornata et dominantia nomina solum | verbaque," where dominantia is a literal adaptation of κύρια (see Glossary), the usual Latin equivalent for which is propria.

c Ch. 21.

d It is impossible to find a satisfactory English equivalent
prose, they have in like manner discarded all such words as differ from those of ordinary conversation, with which the early poets used to adorn their writings, and which even now are employed by the writers of hexameters. It is therefore ridiculous to imitate those who no longer employ that manner of writing. Consequently, it is evident that we need not enter too precisely into all questions of style, but only those which concern such a style as we are discussing. As for the other kind of style, it has already been treated in the Poetics.

2. Let this suffice for the consideration of these points. In regard to style, one of its chief merits may be defined as perspicuity. This is shown by the fact that the speech, if it does not make the meaning clear, will not perform its proper function; neither must it be mean, nor above the dignity of the subject, but appropriate to it; for the poetic style may be is not mean, but it is not appropriate to prose. Of nouns and verbs it is the proper ones that make style perspicuous; all the others which have been spoken of in the Poetics elevate and make it ornate; for departure from the ordinary makes it appear more dignified. In this respect men feel the same in regard to style as in regard to foreigners and fellow-citizens. Wherefore we should give our language a "foreign air"; for men admire what is remote, and that which excites admiration is pleasant. In poetry many things conduce to this and there it is appropriate; for the subjects and persons spoken of are more out of the common. But for the terms εἴνος, εἴνικός, τὸ εἴνιζον, as applied to style. "Foreign" does not really convey the idea, which is rather that of something opposed to "home-like,"—out-of-the way, as if from "abroad." Jebb suggests "distinctive."


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toîs ψιλοῖς λόγοις πολλῶν ἐλάττωσιν· ἣ γὰρ ὑπόθεσις ἐλάττων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἑνταῦθα, εἰ δοῦλος καλλιεπότο ἢ λίαν νέος, ἀπρεπεστερον, ἢ περὶ λίαν μικρῶν· ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐπισυντελλόμενον καὶ 4 αὐξανόμενον τό πρέπον. διὸ δὲι λανθάνειν ποιοῦντας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν πεπλασμένως ἀλλὰ πεϕυκότως· τοῦτο γὰρ πιθανόν, ἐκείνο δὲ τοῦνατίον· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντα διαβάλλονται, καθάπερ πρὸς τοὺς οὗν τοὺς μεμυγμένους, καὶ οἶνον ἡ Θεοδώρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λέγοντος έοικεν 5 εἶναι, αἰ δ' ἀλλότρια. κλέπτεται δ' εὖ, εάν τις ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυνίας διαλέκτου ἐκλέγων συντιθῆ· ὅπερ Ἐὐριπίδης ποιεὶ καὶ ὑπέδειξε πρῶτος.

"Οντων δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων εξ ὧν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν, τῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων τοσαῦτ' ἐχόντων εἴδη ὅσα τεθεώρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιήσεως, τούτων γλώττας μὲν καὶ διπλοΐς ὁνόμαι καὶ πεποιημένους ὀλγάκις καὶ ὀλγαχοῦ χρηστεόν (ὅπως δέ, ὕστερον ἔρομεν, τό τε διὰ τί εὑρήται. 6 ἐπὶ τό μείζον γὰρ ἐξαλλάττει τοῦ πρέποντος.) τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οὐκείον καὶ μεταφορά μόναι χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων λέξιν. σημειῶν δὲ, ἢτι τούτως μόνοις πάντες χρῶνται· πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραίς διαλέγονται καὶ τοῖς οὐκείοις καὶ τοῖς κύριοις· ὥστε δὴ λόγον ὡς ἂν εὖ ποιῇ τις, ἔσται τε κενίκον καὶ λανθάνειν ἐνδέχεται καὶ σαφήνει.

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a Cp. Horace, Ars Poetica, 46, where it is said that the choice and use of words requires subtlety and care, skill in making an old word new by clever combination (callida iunctura) being especially praised. b Chs. 3 and 7.

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in prose such methods are appropriate in much fewer instances, for the subject is less elevated; and even in poetry, if fine language were used by a slave or a very young man, or about quite unimportant matters, it would be hardly becoming; for even here due proportion consists in contraction and amplification as the subject requires. Wherefore those who practise this artifice must conceal it and avoid the appearance of speaking artificially instead of naturally; for that which is natural persuades, but the artificial does not. For men become suspicious of one whom they think to be laying a trap for them, as they are of mixed wines. Such was the case with the voice of Theodorus as contrasted with that of the rest of the actors; for his seemed to be the voice of the speaker, that of the others the voice of some one else. Art is cleverly concealed when the speaker chooses his words from ordinary language and puts them together like Euripides, who was the first to show the way.

Nouns and verbs being the components of speech, and nouns being of the different kinds which have been considered in the Poetics, of these we should use strange, compound, or coined words only rarely and in few places. We will state later in what places they should be used; the reason for this has already been mentioned, namely, that it involves too great a departure from suitable language. Proper and appropriate words and metaphors are alone to be employed in the style of prose; this is shown by the fact that no one employs anything but these. For all use metaphors in conversation, as well as proper and appropriate words; wherefore it is clear that, if a speaker manages well, there will be some-
7 αὕτη δὲ ἢ τοῦ ρήτορικοῦ λόγου ἀρετή. τῶν δ᾽ ὀνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῇ ὁμωνυμίαι χρήσιμοι (παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακοῦργει), τῷ ποιητῇ δὲ 1405 συνωνυμίαι. λέγω δὲ κύριά τε καὶ συνώνυμα, οἰον τὸ πορεύεσθαι καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφότερα καὶ κύρια καὶ συνώνυμα ἄλληλοις.

Τί μὲν οὖν τούτων ἔκαστόν ἐστι, καὶ πόσα εἰδὴ μεταφοράς, καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο πλείστον δύναται καὶ ἐν ποιήσει καὶ ἐν λόγοις, εὑρηταί, καθάπερ ἐλέ- 8 γομεν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς· τοσοῦτω δ᾽ ἐν λόγω δεῖ μᾶλλον φιλοποιεῖσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐξ ἔλαττῶν δομημάτων ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ τῶν μέτρων. καὶ τὸ σαφές καὶ τὸ ἡδυ καὶ τὸ ξενικὸν ἐχει μάλιστα ἡ μεταφορά. καὶ λαβεῖν οὐκ ἔστων 9 αὐτήν παρ᾽ ἄλλον. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα καὶ τὰς μεταφορὰς ἀρμοττούσας λέγειν. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐσται ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπρεπές φανεῖται διὰ τὸ παράλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὡς νέω φοινικίς, αὕτω γέροντι 10 τί· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὕτη πρέπει ἐσθησ. καὶ εάν τε κοσμεῖν βούλῃ, ἀπὸ τῶν βελτιώνων τῶν ἐν ταύτῳ γένει φέρειν τὴν μεταφοράν, εάν τε φέγειν, ἀπὸ τῶν χειρόνων. λέγω δ᾽ οἴον, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, τὸ φάναι τὸν μὲν πτωχεύοντα εὐχεσθαι, τὸν δὲ εὐχόμενον πτωχεύειν, ὦτι ἀμφω αἰτήσεις, τὸ εἰρημένον ἐστὶ ποιεῖν· ὡς καὶ Ἰφικράτης

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7 This is a parenthetical note. \[\text{b Chs. 21, 22.}\]

\[\text{c The different kinds of words.}\]

\[\text{d Poetics, 22. 9: "for this alone cannot be borrowed from another."}\]

\[\text{e Begging (as a beggar does) and praying (as a priest might) are both forms of asking, and by substituting one for the other, you can amplify or depreciate.}\]

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thing "foreign" about his speech, while possibly the art may not be detected, and his meaning will be clear. And this, as we have said, is the chief merit of rhetorical language. (In regard to nouns, homonyms are most useful to the sophist, for it is by their aid that he employs captious arguments, and synonyms to the poet. Instances of words that are both proper and synonymous are "going" and "walking": for these two words are proper and have the same meaning.)

It has already been stated, as we have said, in the Poetics, what each of these things is, how many kinds of metaphor there are, and that it is most important both in poetry and in prose. But the orator must devote the greater attention to them in prose, since the latter has fewer resources than verse. It is metaphor above all that gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air, and it cannot be learnt from anyone else; but we must make use of metaphors and epithets that are appropriate. This will be secured by observing due proportion; otherwise there will be a lack of propriety, because it is when placed in juxtaposition that contraries are most evident. We must consider, as a red cloak suits a young man, what suits an old one; for the same garment is not suitable for both. And if we wish to ornament our subject, we must derive our metaphor from the better species under the same genus; if to depreciate it, from the worse. Thus, to say (for you have two opposites belonging to the same genus) that the man who begs prays, or that the man who prays begs (for both are forms of asking) is an instance of doing this; as, when

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Kallían μητραγύρτην ἀλλ' οū δαδοῦχον. ὁ δ' ἔφη ἀμύητον αὐτὸν εἶναι· οū γὰρ ἂν μητραγύρτην αὐτὸν καλεῖν, ἀλλὰ δαδοῦχον· ἀμφω γὰρ περὶ θεόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τίμιον τὸ δὲ ἄτιμον. καὶ ὁ μὲν διωνυσοκόλακας, αὐτοὶ δ' αὐτοὺς τεχνίτας καλοῦσιν· ταῦτα δ' ἀμφω μεταφορά, ἡ μὲν ρυπανόντων ἢ δὲ τοὐναντίον. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἁγιαί αὐτοὺς πορίστας καλοῦσι νῦν· διὸ ἔξεστι λέγειν τὸν ἄδικήσαντα μὲν ἄμαρτάνειν, τὸν δ' ἄμαρτάνοντα ἄδικησαι, καὶ τὸν κλέψαντα καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ πορθῆσαι. τὸ δὲ ὡς ὁ Τῆλεφος Εὐριπίδου φησίν,

κώπης ἀνάσσειν, κάποβᾶς εἰς Μυσίαν ἀπρεπές, ὅτι μεῖζον τὸ ἀνάσσειν ἢ κατ' ἄξιαν· οւ 11 κέκλεπται οὖν. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς συλλαβαῖς ἄμαρτία, ἐὰν μὴ ἠδείας ἢ σημεία φωνῆς, οἴον Διονύσιος προσαγορεύει ὁ χαλκοῦς ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις κραυγῇν Καλλιόπης τὴν ποίησιν, ὅτι ἀμφω φωναῖ· φαύλη δὲ ἢ μετα- φορά ταῖς ἀσύμμοις φωναῖς.

a See i. 7. 32.

b Head of a distinguished Athenian family which held the office of torch-bearer at the Eleusinian mysteries. A man of notoriously dissipated character, he took some part in politics.

c The δαδοῦχος or hereditary torch-bearer ranked next to the hierophant or chief priest. In addition to holding the torch during the sacrifices, he took part in the recitation of the ritual and certain purificatory ceremonies. The μητραγύρται or mendicant priests collected alms on behalf of various deities, especially the great Mother Cybele (whence their name). They included both men and women of profligate character, addicted to every kind of lewdness.

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Iphicrates, a called Callias b a mendicant priest instead of a torch-bearer, Callias replied that Iphicrates himself could not be initiated, otherwise he would not have called him mendicant priest but torch-bearer c; both titles indeed have to do with a divinity, but the one is honourable, the other dishonourable. And some call actors flatterers of Dionysus, whereas they call themselves “artists.” Both these names are metaphors, but the one is a term of abuse, the other the contrary. Similarly, pirates now call themselves purveyors d; and so it is allowable to say that the man who has committed a crime has “made a mistake,” that the man who has “made a mistake” is “guilty of crime,” and that one who has committed a theft has either “taken” or “ravaged.”

The saying in the Telephus of Euripides,

Ruling over the oar and having landed in Mysia,
is inappropriate, because the word “ruling” exceeds the dignity of the subject, and so the artifice can be seen. Forms of words also are faulty, if they do not express an agreeable sound; for instance, Dionysius the Brazen e in his elegiaca speaks of poetry as the scream of Calliope;

both are sounds, but the metaphor is bad, because the sounds have no meaning.f

d Cf. “‘convey’ the wise it call” (Merry Wives, I. iii.). Either the euphemistic or unfavourable application of the term may be adopted.

e According to Athenaeus, xv. p. 669, he was a poet and rhetorician who recommended the Athenians to use bronze money.

f A scream is neither articulate nor agreeable, like the sound of poetry, although both are voices or sound, and to that extent the metaphor is correct.
'Ετι δὲ οὐ πόρρωθεν δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν μεταφέρειν τὰ ἀνώνυμα ὑνο-μασμένως, ὃ λεχθὲν δῆλον ἐστὶν ὃτι συγγενές, οἷον ἐν τῷ αἰνίγματι τῷ εὔδοκιμοντι

άνδρ' εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπὶ ἄνερι κολλησαντα· ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ πάθος, ἐστὶ δ' ἀμφω πρόσθεσις τις· κόλλησιν τοίνυν εἰπὲ τὴν τῆς σικύας προσβολήν. καὶ ὅλως ἐκ τῶν εὐ ἄνυμεν ἐστὶ μεταφορὰς λαβεῖν ἐπιεικεῖς· μεταφοραὶ γὰρ αἰνίττονται, ὡσεὶ

δήλον ὅτι εὖ μετενήμενται. καὶ ἀπὸ καλῶν· κάλλος δὲ ὄνοματος τὸ μέν, ὃσπερ Λικύμνιος λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἡ τῷ σημαινομένῳ, καὶ αἰσχος δὲ ὁμαντῶς. ἐτὶ δὲ τρίτον, ὃ λυεῖ τὸν σοφιστικὸν λόγον· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔφη Βρύσων οὐθένα αἰσχρολογεῖν, εἰτέρ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει τὸδε ἀντὶ τοῦ τόδε εἴπειν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ ψεύδος· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἄλλο ἄλλου κυρίωτερον καὶ ὁμοιωμένον μᾶλλον καὶ οἰκείοτερον τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ πράγμα πρὸ ὀμμάτων. ἐτὶ οὐχ ὁμοιώς ἔχον σημαίνει τὸδε καὶ τόδε, ὡστε καὶ οὔτως ἄλλο ἄλλου κάλλιον καὶ αἰσχονθετέον· ἀμφω μὲν γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν σημαί-

νουσιν, ἄλλ' οὐχ ἢ καλὸν ἢ οὐχ ἢ αἰσχρὸν· ἢ ταῦτα μὲν, ἄλλα μᾶλλον καὶ ἓττον. τὰς δὲ μετα- 

φορὰς ἐντεύθεν οἰστέον, ἀπὸ καλὸν ἢ τῇ φωνῇ ἢ τῇ δυνάμει ἢ τῇ δύναμιν ἢ ἂλλῃ τωὶ αἰσθήσει. διαφέρει δ' εἴπειν, οἷον ῥοδοδάκτυλος ἢς μᾶλλον ἢ φωικοδάκτυλος, ἢ ἐτὶ φαυλότερον ἐρυθρο-

δάκτυλος.

a Athenaeus, p. 452.
b Rhetorician and sophist of Heraclea in Pontus.

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RHETORIC, III. II. 12-13

Further, metaphors must not be far-fetched, but we must give names to things that have none by deriving the metaphor from what is akin and of the same kind, so that, as soon as it is uttered, it is clearly seen to be akin, as in the famous enigma,

I saw a man who glued bronze with fire upon another.

There was no name for what took place, but as in both cases there is a kind of application, he called the application of the cupping-glass “gluing.” And, generally speaking, clever enigmas furnish good metaphors; for metaphor is a kind of enigma, so that it is clear that the transference is clever. Metaphors should also be derived from things that are beautiful, the beauty of a word consisting, as Licymnius says, in its sound or sense, and its ugliness in the same. There is a third condition, which refutes the sophistical argument; for it is not the case, as Bryson said, that no one ever uses foul language, if the meaning is the same whether this or that word is used; this is false; for one word is more proper than another, more of a likeness, and better suited to putting the matter before the eyes. Further, this word or that does not signify a thing under the same conditions; thus for this reason also it must be admitted that one word is fairer or fouler than the other. Both, indeed, signify what is fair or foul, but not qua fair or foul; or if they do, it is in a greater or less degree. Metaphors therefore should be derived from what is beautiful either in sound, or in signification, or to sight, or to some other sense. For it does make a difference, for instance, whether one says “rosy-fingered morn,” rather than “purple-fingered,” or, what is still worse, “red-fingered.”
14 Καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις ἔστι μὲν τὰς ἐπιθέσεις ποιεῖσθαι ἀπὸ φαύλου ἢ αἰσχροῦ, οἶνον ὁ μητρο-φόντης, ἔστι δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίωνος, οἶνον ὁ πατρὸς ἀμύντωρ· καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ὅτε μὲν ἔδιδον μισθὸν ὀλίγον αὐτῷ ὁ νικήσας τοῖς ὀρείσιν, οὐκ ἦθελε ποιεῖν ὡς δυσχεραίνων εἰς ἠμόνοις ποιεῖν, ἐπεὶ δ’ ἰκανὸν ἐδώκεν, ἐποίησε ἀφαντείας θύγατρες ἵππων· καίτοι καὶ τῶν ὄνων θυγατέρες ἰσαν. ἔτι τὸ

15 αὐτὸ ὑποκορίζεσθαι. ἔστι δ’ ὁ ὑποκορισμός, ὅς ἔλαττον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἄγαθὸν, ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοφάνης σκόππει ἐν τοῖς Βαβυλωνίοις, ἀντί μὲν χρυσοῦ χρυσιδάρων, ἀντὶ δ’ ἱματίου ἵματιδάρων, ἀντὶ δὲ λοιδορίας λοιδορημάτιον καὶ νοσημάτιον. εὐλαβεῖσθαι δὲ δεὶ καὶ παρατηρεῖν ἐν ἀμφότερον τὸ μέτριον.

3. Τὰ δὲ ψυχρὰ ἐν τέταρτοι γίγνεται κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, ἐν τε τοῖς διπλοῖς ὄνομασιν, οἶνον Λυκόφρων τὸν πολυπρόσωπον οὐρανὸν τῆς μεγαλοκορύφου γῆς καὶ ἀκτῆν δὲ στενοπόρον, καὶ ὡς Γοργίας ὄνόμαζεν, πτωχόμουσος κόλαξ, ἐπιρρήσαντας καὶ κατευροκήσαντας. καὶ ὡς Ἁλκιδάμας “μένουσ μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν πλημμύρησεν, πυρίχρων δὲ τὴν ὄμοιν γιγανμένην,” καὶ “τελεσφόρον ὁθοθή τὴν προθυμίαν αὐτῶν γενήσεσθαι,” καὶ “τελεσφόρον τὴν πειθῶ τῶν λόγων κατέστησεν,” καὶ “κυανό-

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a Euripides, Orestes, 1588. In the preceding line Mene-laus accuses Orestes as a matricide and ready to heap murder on murder, to which Orestes replies, you should rather call me the avenger of my father Agamemnon, who had been murdered by his wife Clytaemnestra, the mother 360
As for epithets, they may be applied from what is vile or disgraceful, for instance, "the matricide," or from what is more honourable, for instance, "the avenger of his father." When the winner in a mule-race offered Simonides a small sum, he refused to write an ode, as if he thought it beneath him to write on half-asses; but when he gave him a sufficient amount, he wrote,

Hail, daughters of storm-footed steeds! and yet they were also the daughters of asses. Further, the use of diminutives amounts to the same. It is the diminutive which makes the good and the bad appear less, as Aristophanes in the Babylonians jestingly uses "goldlet, cloaklet, affrontlet, diseaselet" instead of "gold, cloak, affront, disease." But one must be careful to observe the due mean in their use as well as in that of epithets.

3. Frigidity of style arises from four causes: first, the use of compound words, as when Lycophron speaks of "the many-faced sky of the mighty-topped earth," "narrow-passaged shore"; and Gorgias of "a begging-poet flatterer," "those who commit perjury and those who swear right solemnly." And as Alcidamas says, "the soul full of anger and the face fire-coloured," "he thought that their zeal would be end-accomplishing," "he made persuasive words end-accomplishing," and "the azure-coloured of Orestes. "Matricide" and "avenger of his father" show the good and bad sides of the deed of Orestes.

b Frag. 7 (P.L.G. iii. p. 390). The winner of the mule-race was Anaxilaus of Rhegium.

c A sophist, not the poet (author of the obscure Alexander or Cassandra), who was later than Aristotle.

d Lobeck conjectured κατεπιορκήσαντας, "who commit out-and-out perjury."
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χρών τὸ τῆς θαλάττης ἐδαφὸς:” πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ποιητικὰ διὰ τὴν δύπλωσιν φαίνεται.

2 Μία μὲν οὖν αὐτῇ αὐτία, μία δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι γλώτταις, οἶνον Λυκόφρων Σέρεξιν πέλωρον ἄνδρα, καὶ Σκίρων σίννης ἄνήρ, καὶ Ἀλκιδάμας ἀθυρμα τῇ ποιήσει, καὶ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀτασθαλίαν, καὶ ἀκράτω τῆς διανοίας ὀργῆς τεθηγμένων.

3 Τρίτου δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις τὸ ἡ μακροίς ἡ ἀκαίροις ἡ πυκνοῖς χρῆσθαι: ἐν μὲν γὰρ ποιήσει πρέπει γάλα λευκὸν εἰπεῖν, ἐν δὲ λόγῳ τὰ μὲν ἀπρεπέστερα, τὰ δὲ, ἃν ἡ κατακορῆ, ἐξελέγχει καὶ ποιεῖ φανερὸν ὅτι ποίησις ἔστιν· ἐπεὶ δὲι γε χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς· ἐξαλλάττει γὰρ τὸ εἰσθός, καὶ ἕνεκήν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν. ἀλλὰ δεὶ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ μετρίου, ἐπεὶ μείζον ποιεῖ κακὸν τοῦ εἰκῆ λέγειν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ εὖ, ἢ δὲ τὸ κακῶς. διὸ τὰ Ἀλκιδάμαντος ψυχρά φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἤδυσματι χρήται ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, οὔτω πυκνοῖς καὶ μείζοσι καὶ ἐπιδήλοις, οἶνον οὐχ ἱδρώτα ἀλλὰ τὸν υγρὸν ἱδρῶτα, καὶ οὐκ εἰς Ἰσθμία ἀλλ’ εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἰσθμίων πανήγυριν, καὶ οὖχι νόμους ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῶν πόλεων βασιλείσ νόμους, καὶ οὐ δρόμω ἀλλὰ δρομαία τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄρμη, καὶ οὖχι μουσείον ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβῶν μουσείον, καὶ σκυθρωπῶν τὴν φροντίδα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐ χάριτος ἀλλὰ πανδήμου χάριτος δημιουργός.

a Sciron and Sinnis were both robbers slain by Theseus, but Lycophron turns Sinnis into a γλώττα, using it adjectivally = “destructive”; cf. σῖνος, “harm”; σίνης = σῖνος.

b The meaning of παραλαβῶν is quite obscure; various renderings are “having taken to himself,” “received,” “grasped,” “inherited.” The word μουσείον, originally a haunt of the Muses, came to mean a school of art or literature.

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floor of the sea,” for all these appear poetical because they are compound.

This is one cause of frigidity; another is the use of strange words; as Lycophron calls Xerxes “a monster of a man,” Sciron “a human scourge”; and Alcidamas says “plaything in poetry,” “the audaciousness of nature,” “whetted with unmitigated wrath of thought.”

A third cause is the use of epithets that are either long or unseasonable or too crowded; thus, in poetry it is appropriate to speak of white milk, but in prose it is less so; and if epithets are employed to excess, they reveal the art and make it evident that it is poetry. And yet such may be used to a certain extent, since it removes the style from the ordinary and gives a “foreign” air. But one must aim at the mean, for neglect to do so does more harm than speaking at random; for a random style lacks merit, but excess is vicious. That is why the style of Alcidamas appears frigid; for he uses epithets not as a seasoning but as a regular dish, so crowded, so long, and so glaring are they. For instance, he does not say “sweat” but “damp sweat”; not “to the Isthmian games” but “to the solemn assembly of the Isthmian games”; not “laws,” but “the laws, the rulers of states”; not “running,” but “with a race-like impulse of the soul”; not “museum,” but “having taken up the museum of nature”; and “the scowling anxiety of the soul”; “creator,” not “of favour,” but “all-popular favour”; and “dis-

The fault appears to consist in the addition of τῆς φύσεως, but it is difficult to see why. Cope confesses his inability to understand the passage. Jebb translates: “he does not say, ‘having taken to himself a school of the Muses,’ but ‘to Nature’s school of the Muses.’”
On this passage Thompson (Gorgias, p. 179) says: "The metaphor of reaping and sowing is a mere commonplace ... but 'pallid and bloodless affairs' is a phrase which would need apology even from a modern." On the other hand, it is difficult to see what objection there is to calling the Odyssey "a beautiful mirror of human life." Another reading is έναμα, which Cope translates "events.
penser of the pleasure of the hearers"; "he hid," not "with branches," but "with the branches of the forest"; "he covered," not "his body," but "the nakedness of his body." He also calls desire "counter-initiative" of the soul—an expression which is at once compound and an epithet, so that it becomes poetry—and "the excess of his depravity so beyond all bounds." Hence those who employ poetic language by their lack of taste make the style ridiculous and frigid, and such idle chatter produces obscurity; for when words are piled upon one who already knows, it destroys perspicuity by a cloud of verbiage. People use compound words, when a thing has no name and the word is easy to combine, as χρονοτριβεὶν, to pass time; but if the practice is abused, the style becomes entirely poetical. This is why compound words are especially employed by dithyrambic poets, who are full of noise; strange words by epic poets, for they imply dignity and self-assertion; metaphor to writers of iambics, who now employ them, as we have stated.

The fourth cause of frigidity of style is to be found in metaphors; for metaphors also are inappropriate, some because they are ridiculous—for the comic poets also employ them—others because they are too dignified and somewhat tragic; and if they are far-fetched, they are obscure, as when Gorgias says: "Affairs pale and bloodless"; "you have sown shame and reaped misfortune"; for this is too much like poetry. And as Alcidamas calls philosophy "a fresh with the blood in them." If the two extracts are taken together, it is suggested (apparently by the editor of Cope's notes) that the sense may be: "things green and unripe (flushed with sap), and this was the crop which you . . . " the adjectives referring to green and unripe stalks of corn.
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έπιτείχισμα τῶν νόμων, καὶ τὴν Ἄθισσειαν καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον, καὶ “οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἄθυρμα τῇ ποιήσει προσφέρων” ἀπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπίθανα διὰ τὰ εἰρημένα. τὸ δὲ Γοργίου εἰς τὴν χελιδόνα, ἐπεὶ κατ’ αὐτόν πετομένη ἀφήκε τὸ περίπτωμα, ἄριστα τῶν τραγικῶν· εἰπε γὰρ ὁ Ἀισχρόν γε ὃ Φιλομήλα.” ὤριθι μὲν γὰρ, εἰ ἐποίησεν, οὐκ ἀισχρόν, παρθένῳ δὲ αἰσχρόν. εὖ οὖν ἐλοιδόρησεν εἰπὼν δ ὁ ἦν, ἀλλ’ οὖχ δ ἑστών.

4. Ἐστι δὲ καὶ ἥ εἰκὼν μεταφορά· διαφέρει γὰρ μικρόν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἶπῃ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ὡς δὲ λέων ἐπόρουσεν,

εἰκὼν ἔστιν, ὅταν δὲ “λέων ἐπόρουσε,” μεταφορά· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄμφω ἀνδρείους εἶναι, προσηγόρευσε 2 μετενέγκας λέοντα τὸν Ἀχιλλέα. χρήσιμον δὲ ἡ εἰκὼν καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, ὀλυγάκις δὲ· ποιητικὸν γὰρ. οἰστέα δὲ ὡσπερ αἱ μεταφοραί· μεταφορά· γὰρ 3 εἰσὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἰρημένῳ. εἰσὶ δ’ εἰκόνες οἴον ἢν Ἀνδροτίων εἰς Ἰδρίεα, ὅτι ὁμοίως τοῖς ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν κυνιδίως· ἐκείνα τε γὰρ προσπέπτοτα δάκνει, καὶ Ἰδρίεα λυθέντα ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν εἶναι χαλέπτων. καὶ ὡς Θεοδάμας εἰκάζειν Ἀρχίδαμον Εὐξένω γεωμετρεῖν οὐκ ἐπισταμένω ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογῳ· ἔσται γὰρ καὶ ὁ Εὐξένων Ἀρχίδαμος γεωμετρικός· καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι οἱ τοὺς

a Or, “a barrier against the laws.” This is the general meaning of ἐπιτείχισμα, a border fortress commanding an enemy’s country.

b Compare Ἰλιαδ, xxii. 164 ἐνάντιον ὡρτο λέων ὃς.

c Pupil of Isocrates and historical writer. Idrieus was a prince of Caria, who had been imprisoned.

d Meaning that there was no difference between Euxenus
bulwark of the laws," a and the Odyssey "a beautiful mirror of human life," and "introducing no such plaything in poetry." All these expressions fail to produce persuasion, for the reasons stated. As for what Gorgias said to the swallow which, flying over his head, let fall her droppings upon him, it was in the best tragic style. He exclaimed, "Fie, for shame, Philomela!"; for there would have been nothing in this act disgraceful for a bird, whereas it would have been for a young lady. The reproach therefore was appropriate, addressing her as she was, not as she is.

4. The simile also is a metaphor; for there is very little difference. When the poet says of Achilles, he rushed on like a lion,

it is a simile; if he says, "a lion, he rushed on," it is a metaphor; for because both are courageous, he transfers the sense and calls Achilles a lion. The simile is also useful in prose, but should be less frequently used, for there is something poetical about it. Similes must be used like metaphors, which only differ in the manner stated. The following are examples of similes. Androtonio said of Idrieus that he was like curs just unchained; for as they attack and bite, so he when loosed from his bonds was dangerous. Again, Theodamas likened Archidamus to a Euxenus ignorant of geometry, by proportion; for Euxenus "will be Archidamus acquainted with geometry." Again, Plato in the Republic compares without a knowledge of geometry and Archidamus with a knowledge of geometry. The proportion of geometrical knowledge will remain the same, so that Archidamus can be called an ungeometrical Euxenus, and Euxenus a geometrical Archidamus (see note a on p. 370 for "by proportion").
τεθνεώτας σκυλεύοντες ἐοίκασι τοῖς κυνιδίοις, ἀ
toὺς λίθους δάκνει τοῦ βάλλοντος οὐχ ἀπτόμενα.
καὶ ἡ ἐἰς τὸν δήμον, ὅτι ὁμοίους ναυκλήρω ἱσχυρῷ
μὲν ὑποκώφῳ δέ. καὶ ἡ ἐἰς τὰ μέτρα τῶν ποιητῶν,
ὅτι ἐοίκε τοῖς ἄνευ κάλλους όραιοῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ
1407 α ἀπανθήσαντες, τὰ δὲ διαλυθέντα οὐχ ὁμοία φαίνεται.
καὶ ἡ Περικλέους εἰς Σαμίους, ἐοικέναι αὐτοὺς
τοῖς παιδίοις ὁ τὸν ψωμὸν δέχεται μὲν, κλαίοντα
dὲ. καὶ εἰς Βοιωτοὺς, ὅτι ὁμοίου τοῖς πρῖνοις-
tοὺς τε γὰρ πρίνους ὑφ’ αὐτῶν κατακόπτεσθαι,
cαὶ τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς πρὸς ἄλληλους μαχομένους.
cαὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης τὸν δήμον, ὅτι ὁμοίος ἐστὶ τοῖς
ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις ναυτίων. καὶ ὡς ὁ Δημοκράτης
ἐικασε τοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς τίτθαις αἰ τὸ ψώμισμα
καταπίνουσαι τῷ σιάλῳ τὰ παιδία παραλείψουσιν.
cαὶ ὡς Ἀντιοθένης Κηφισώδοτον τὸν λεπτὸν
λιβανωτῷ εἰκασεν, ὅτι ἀπολλύμενος εὐφραίνει.
pάσας γὰρ ταύτας καὶ ὡς εἰκόνας καὶ ὡς μεταφορὰς
ἐξεστὶ λέγειν· ὡστε ὅσι ἄν εὐδοκιμῶσιν ὡς
μεταφορὰ λεχθείσαι, δήλον ὅτι αὕται καὶ εἰκόνες
ἐσονται, καὶ αἰ εἰκόνες μεταφορὰ λόγον δεόμεναι.
ἀἐι δὲ δεὶ τὴν μεταφορὰν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἁνάλογον
ἄνταποδιδόναι καὶ ἐπὶ θάτερα τῶν ὁμογενῶν· οἶδον

a 488 a.  
b 601 b.
c If metrical restrictions have been removed and they are read as prose.

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those who strip the dead to curs, which bite stones, but do not touch those who throw them; he also says that the people is like a ship’s captain who is vigorous, but rather deaf;\(^a\) that poets’ verses resemble those who are in the bloom of youth but lack beauty;\(^b\) for neither the one after they have lost their bloom, nor the others after they have been broken up,\(^c\) appear the same as before. Pericles said that the Samians were like children who cry while they accept the scraps.\(^d\) He also compared the Boeotians to holm-oaks; for just as these are beaten down by knocking against each other,\(^e\) so are the Boeotians by their civil strife. Demosthenes compared the people to passengers who are seasick.\(^f\) Democrats said that orators resembled nurses who gulp down the morsel and rub the babies’ lips with the spittle.\(^g\) Antisthenes likened the skinny Cephisodotus to incense, for he also gives pleasure by wasting away. All such expressions may be used as similes or metaphors, so that all that are approved as metaphors will obviously also serve as similes which are metaphors without the details. But in all cases the metaphor from proportion should be reciprocal and applicable to either of the two things of the same genus; for instance, if the goblet is the

\(^a\) Meaning that they did not appreciate the benefits received from the Athenians, who conquered the islands (440 B.C.).

\(^b\) Or, “are cut down by axes, the handles of which are made of their own wood.”

\(^c\) It is disputed whether Demosthenes is the orator or the Athenian general in the Peloponnesian War. The point of the comparison is that in a democracy the general instability of political conditions makes the people sick of the existing state of things and eager for a change.

\(^d\) Aristophanes, *Knights*, 715-718.
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εἰ ἡ φιάλη ἀσπίς Διονύσου, καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀρμόττει λέγεσθαι φιάλην "Αρεος.

5. ὃ μὲν οὖν λόγος συντιθέται ἐκ τούτων. ἐστὶ δ’ ἀρχὴ τῆς λέξεως τὸ ἐλληνίζειν. τοῦτο δ’ 2 ἐστὶν ἐν πέντε, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις, ἂν ἀποδιδῶ τις ὡς πεφύκασι πρότεροι καὶ ὑστεροὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀλλήλων, οἶον ἐνοῦ ἀπαιτοῦν, ὥσπερ ὑμὲν καὶ ὑμῖν ἐγώ μὲν ἀπαιτεῖ τὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν ὑμᾶς. ἐν δὲ ἐως μέμνηται ἀνταποδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις, καὶ μήτε μακρὰν ἀπαρτάν μήτε συνδέσμον πρὸ συν- δέσμου ἀποδιδόναι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου· ὅλιγαχοῦ γὰρ ἀρμόττει. “ἐγὼ δ’, ἐπεὶ μοι εἶπεν ( ἠλθε γὰρ Κλέων δεόμενός τε καὶ ἄξιών) ἐπορεύόμην παρα- λαβὼν αὐτούς.” ἐν τούτοις γὰρ πολλοὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἀποδοθησομένου συνδέσμου προεμβέβληται σύν- δεσμοι. ἐὰν δὲ πολὺ τὸ μεταξὺ γένηται τοῦ 3 ἐπορευόμην, ἄσαφές. ἐν μὲν δὴ τὸ εὖ ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τοῖς ἰδίοις ὑόμασι 4 λέγειν καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχονσιν. τρίτον, μὴ ἀμφιβόλοις· ταῦτα δὲ, ἃν μὴ τάναντία προαιρήται. ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, ὅταν μηθὲν μὲν ἔχωσι λέγειν, προσποιῶνται δὲ τι λέγειν· οἱ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἐν

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As the shield is to Ares, so is the goblet to Dionysus. Proportion is defined (Ethics, v. 3. 8) as “an equality of ratios, implying four terms at the least,” and the proportional metaphor is one in which the second term is to the first as the fourth is to the third; for then one can by metaphor substitute the fourth for the second, or the second for the fourth. Let A be Dionysus, B a goblet, C Ares, D a shield. Then by the definition, the goblet is to Dionysus as the shield

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shield of Dionysus, then the shield may properly be called the goblet of Ares.\(^a\)

5. Such then are the elements of speech. But purity, which is the foundation of style, depends upon five rules. First, connecting particles should be introduced in their natural order, before or after, as they require; thus, \(\mu\varepsilon\nu\) and \(\varepsilon\gamma\omega\ \mu\varepsilon\nu\) require to be followed by \(\delta\varepsilon\) and \(\delta\ \delta\varepsilon\). Further, they should be made to correspond whilst the hearer still recollects; they should not be put too far apart, nor should a clause be introduced before the necessary connexion\(^b\); for this is rarely appropriate. For instance, "As for me, I, after he had told me—for Cleon came begging and praying—set out, taking them with me." For in this phrase several connecting words have been foisted in before the one which is to furnish the apodosis; and if the interval between "I" and "set out" is too great, the result is obscurity. The first rule therefore is to make a proper use of connecting particles; the second, to employ special, not generic terms. The third consists in avoiding ambiguous terms, unless you deliberately intend the opposite, like those who, having nothing to say, yet pretend to say something; such people accomplish this by the use of verse, after the

\(\delta\text{ποδόσωσις}\) is used in the sense of introducing a clause answering to the \(\pi\rho\tau\alpha\iota\varsigma\), and \(\delta\text{ποδόσωσις}\) for this answering clause.
ποιήσει λέγονσι ταύτα, οίον 'Εμπεδοκλῆς· φενακίζει γάρ τὸ κύκλω πολὺ ὄν, καὶ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκροαται ὁπερ οἱ πολλοὶ παρὰ τοῖς μάντεσιν· δότων γὰρ λέγουσιν ἀμφίβολα, συμπαρανεύουσιν.

Κροϊσος Ὁλιν διαβὰς μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καταλύσει.

καὶ διὰ τὸ ὅλως ἐλαττὸν εἶναι ἀμάρτημα, διὰ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ πράγματος λέγονσιν οἱ μάντες· τύχοι γὰρ ἂν τις μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἀρτιασμοῖς ἀρτια ἡ περισσά εἰτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσα ἐχει, καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἐσται ἡ τὸ πότε, διὸ οἱ χρησιμολόγου οὐ προσ- ορίζονται τὸ πότε. ἀπαντᾷ δὴ ταύτα ὀμοια· ὥστ' 5 ἂν μὴ τοιούτῳ τινὸς ἑνεκα, φευκτέον· τέταρτον, ὥσ Πρωταγόρας τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων διήρει, ἄρρενα καὶ θήλεα καὶ σκεῦς· δὲ γὰρ ἀποδιδόναι 6 καὶ ταύτα ὀρθῶς· "ἡ δ' ἐλθοῦσα καὶ διαλεχθεῖσα ὕχετο." πέμπτον, ἐν τῷ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὅλιγα καὶ ἐν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάξειν· "οἱ δ' ἐλθόντες ἑτυπτόν με." Ὅλως δὲ δὲι εὐναγνωστόν εἶναι τὸ γεγραμ- μένον καὶ εὐφραστόν· ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτό. ὁπερ οἱ πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὐδ' ἂ μὴ ράδιον

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a Of Agrigentum (c. 490-430), poet, philosopher, and physician. Among other legends connected with him, he is said to have thrown himself into the crater of Etna, so that by suddenly disappearing he might be thought to be a god. His chief work was a poem called Nature, praised by Lucretius. The principles of things are the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth, which are unalterable and indestructible. Love and hate, alternately prevailing, regulate the periods of the formation of the world. The existing fragments corroborate Aristotle’s statement.

b Herodotus, i. 53, 91. Croesus consulted the Delphian oracle whether he should attack Cyrus the Persian or not.
manner of Empedocles. For the long circumlocution takes in the hearers, who find themselves affected like the majority of those who listen to the soothsayers. For when the latter utter their ambiguities, they also assent; for example,

Croesus, by crossing the Halys, shall ruin a mighty dominion.

And as there is less chance of making a mistake when speaking generally, diviners express themselves in general terms on the question of fact; for, in playing odd or even, one is more likely to be right if he says "even" or "odd" than if he gives a definite number, and similarly one who says "it will be" than if he states "when." This is why soothsayers do not further define the exact time. All such ambiguities are alike, wherefore they should be avoided, except for some such reason. The fourth rule consists in keeping the genders distinct—masculine, feminine, and neuter, as laid down by Protagoras; these also must be properly introduced: "She, having come (fem.) and having conversed (fem.) with me, went away." The fifth rule consists in observing number, according as many, few, or one are referred to: "They, having come (pl.), began to beat (pl.) me."

Generally speaking, that which is written should be easy to read or easy to utter, which is the same thing. Now, this is not the case when there is a number of connecting particles, or when the punctua-

Encouraged by the ambiguous oracle, he did so, but was utterly defeated.

* The deliberate intention to mislead.

<sup>a</sup> σκεινη, "inanimate things," the classification probably being male, female, and inanimate, not the grammatical one of masculine, feminine, and neuter.
ARISTOTLE

Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535-475). His chief work was on Nature. From the harshness of his language and the carelessness of his style he was called ὁ σκοτεινός (the obscure). According to him, fire was the origin of all things; all things become fire, and then fire becomes all other things. All things are in a constant state of flux; all is the same and yet not the same. Knowledge is founded upon sensual perception, but only the gods possess knowledge in perfection.
tion is hard, as in the writings of Heracleitus. For it is hard, since it is uncertain to which word another belongs, whether to that which follows or that which precedes; for instance, at the beginning of his composition he says: “Of this reason which exists always men are ignorant,” where it is uncertain whether “always” should go with “which exists” or with “are ignorant.” Further, a solecism results from not appropriately connecting or joining two words with a word which is equally suitable to both. For instance, in speaking of “sound” and “colour,” the word “seeing” should not be used, for it is not suitable to both, whereas “perceiving” is. It also causes obscurity, if you do not say at the outset what you mean, when you intend to insert a number of details in the middle; for instance, if you say: “I intended after having spoken to him thus and thus and in this way to set out” instead of “I intended to set out after having spoken to him,” and then this or that happened, in this or that manner.

6. The following rules contribute to loftiness of style. Use of the description instead of the name of a thing; for instance, do not say “circle,” but “a plane figure, all the points of which are equidistant from the centre.” But for the purpose of conciseness the reverse—use the name instead of the description. You should do the same to express anything foul or indecent; if the foulness is in the description, use the name; if in the name, the description. Use metaphors and epithets by way of illustration, taking care, however, to avoid what is too poetical. Use

b Or, “although this reason exists for ever men are born ... without understanding” (Welldon).
πολλα ποιεῖν, ὑπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ ποιοῦσιν· ἕν ὅντος λιμένος ὅμως λέγουσιν

λιμένας εἰς Ἀχαϊκοῦς

καὶ
dέλτου μὲν αἴδε πολύθυροι διαπτυχαί.

5 καὶ μὴ ἔπιξενυνύναι, ἀλλ' ἐκατέρῳ ἐκάτερον, "τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας." ἐὰν δὲ συντόμως, 6 τοῦναντίον "τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός." καὶ μετὰ συνδέσμου λέγειν· ἐὰν δὲ συντόμως, ἀνεφ μὲν

1403 α συνδέσμου, μὴ ἀσύνετα δὲ, οἶνον "πορευθέοις καὶ 7 διαλεξθεῖς," "πορευθέοις διελέχθην." καὶ τὸ Ἀντιμάχου χρήσιμον, ἐξ ὃν μὴ ἑχει λέγειν, ὁ ἐκεῖνος ποιεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ Τευμήσσου,

ἐστὶ τις ἴσκεμόεις ὅλιγοις λόφοις.

αὐξηται γὰρ οὕτως εἰς ἀπερον. ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ ἄγαθων καὶ κακῶν, ὅπως οὐκ ἔχει, ὅποτέρως ἄν ἡ χρήσιμον. ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ὁνόματα οἱ ποιηταὶ φέρουσιν, τὸ ἀχορδὸν καὶ τὸ ἀλυρον μέλος· ἐκ τῶν στερῆσεων γὰρ ἐπιφέρουσιν· εὐδοκιμεῖ γὰρ τὸ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς μεταφοράις λεγόμενον ταῖς ἀνάλογον, οἶνον τὸ φάναι τὴν σάλπιγγα εἶναι μέλος ἀλυρον.

7. Τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἐξεῖ ἡ λέξες, ἐὰν ἡ παθητικὴ τε καὶ ἡθικὴ καὶ τοὺς ὑποκειμένους πράγμασιν 2 ἀνάλογον. τὸ δ' ἀνάλογον ἐστὶν, ἐὰν μὴτε περὶ εὐόγκων αὐτοκαβδάλως λέγηται μὴτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μηδ' ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὅνοματι ἐπὶ κόσμοις.

a Euripides, Iphig. Taur. 727.
b In Boeotia. The quotation is from the Thebaid of Antimachus of Claros (c. 450 n.c.). The Alexandrians placed him next to Homer among the epic poets. In his eulogy of the little hill, he went on to attribute to it all the 376
RHETORIC, III. VI. 4—VII. 2

the plural for the singular, after the manner of the poets, who, although there is only one harbour, say

to Achaean harbours,

and,

Here are the many-leaved folds of the tablet.

You should avoid linking up, but each word should have its own article: τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας. But for conciseness, the reverse: τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικὸς. Employ a connecting particle or for conciseness omit it, but avoid destroying the connexion; for instance “having gone and having conversed with him,” or, “having gone, I conversed with him.” Also the practice of Antimachus is useful, that of describing a thing by the qualities it does not possess; thus, in speaking of the hill Teumessus, he says,

There is a little wind-swept hill;

for in this way amplification may be carried on ad infinitum. This method may be applied to things good and bad, in whichever way it may be useful. Poets also make use of this in inventing words, as a melody “without strings” or “without the lyre”; for they employ epithets from negations, a course which is approved in proportional metaphors, as for instance, to say that the sound of the trumpet is a melody without the lyre.

7. Propriety of style will be obtained by the expression of emotion and character, and by proportion to the subject matter. Style is proportionate to the subject matter when neither weighty matters are treated offhand, nor trifling matters with dignity, and no embellishment is attached to an ordinary good qualities it did not possess, a process which could obviously be carried on ad infinitum.
By some identified with the tragic poet spoken of in the Poetics, 2. His manner of expression, due to the wish to use fine language, was ridiculous owing to its being out of harmony with the subject. Others consider that he was not a poet at all but an orator. πότνια was a title of respect, applied to females, whether they were goddesses or ordinary women.
word; otherwise there is an appearance of comedy, as in the poetry of Cleophon, who used certain expressions that reminded one of saying "madam fig." Style expresses emotion, when a man speaks with anger of wanton outrage; with indignation and reserve, even in mentioning them, of things foul or impious; with admiration of things praiseworthy; with lowliness of things pitiable; and so in all other cases. Appropriate style also makes the fact appear credible; for the mind of the hearer is imposed upon under the impression that the speaker is speaking the truth, because, in such circumstances, his feelings are the same, so that he thinks (even if it is not the case as the speaker puts it) that things are as he represents them; and the hearer always sympathizes with one who speaks emotionally, even though he really says nothing. This is why speakers often confound their hearers by mere noise.

Character also may be expressed by the proof from signs, because to each class and habit there is an appropriate style. I mean class in reference to age—child, man, or old man; to sex—man or woman; to country—Lacedaemonian or Thessalian. I call habits those moral states which form a man's character in life; for not all habits do this. If then anyone uses the language appropriate to each habit, he will represent the character; for the uneducated man will not say the same things in the same way as the educated. But the hearers also are impressed in a certain way by a device employed ad nauseam by writers of speeches: "Who does not know?" "Everybody knows"; for the hearer agrees, because

\[b\] Or, "draws a wrong conclusion."

\[c\] Alluding to Isocrates.
λογεὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀκούων αἰσχυνόμενος, ὡς μετέχῃ οὕτε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

8 Τὸ δὲ εὐκαίρως ἢ μὴ εὐκαίρως χρήσθαι κοινὸν ἀπάντων τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστὶν. ἀκος δὲ ἐπὶ πάση ὑπερβολῇ τὸ θρυλοῦμενον. δει γὰρ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ προετπλήττειν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἄληθές εἶναι, ἐπεὶ οὐ λανθάνει γε ὁ ποιεῖ τὸν λέγοντα. ἐτὶ τοῖς ἀνάλογοις μὴ πᾶσιν ἀμα χρήσασθαι. οὔτω γὰρ κλέπττεται ὁ ἀκροατὴς. λέγω δὲ οἴνον ἐὰν τὰ ὑόματα σκληρὰ ἢ, μὴ καὶ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀρμόττουσιν. εἰ δὲ μὴ, φανερὸν γίνεται ἐκαστὸν ὁ ἔστιν. ἐὰν δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή, λανθάνει ποιῶν τὸ αὐτό. ἐὰν οὖν τὰ μαλακὰ σκληρῶς καὶ τὰ σκληρὰ μαλακῶς λέγηται, ἀπίθανον γίγνεται.

10 Τὰ δὲ ὑόματα τὰ διπλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα πλείω καὶ τὰ ξένα μάλιστα ἀρμόττει λέγοντι παθητικῶς· συγγυμνῇ γὰρ ὀργιζομένῳ κακὸν φάναι υἱρανομηκὲς ἢ πελώριον εἰπέων. καὶ ὅταν ἔχῃ ἥδη τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καὶ ποιήσῃ ἐνθουσίασαι ἡ ἐπαίνος ἡ ψόγος ἡ ὀργὴ ἡ φιλία, οἶνον καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ ἐπὶ τέλει, “φήμη δὲ καὶ γνώμη” καὶ “οὐ τινὲς ἐτλησαν” φθέγγονται τε γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὡστε καὶ ἀποδέχονται ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχοντες. διὸ καὶ τῇ ποιήσῃ ἡμοσεν ἐνθεν γὰρ ἡ ποιήσης. ἡ δὴ οὕτω δεῖ.

a Or, “to all the special rules given above.”

b The exaggeration should be brought forward first, by way of forestalling the objection, and accompanied by some limiting phrase. Quintilian (Inst. Orat. viii. 3. 37) gives as examples: “so to say,” “if I may be allowed to say so.”

c Adaptation of voice, features, etc., to the subject.

d § 186, where μνήμη is the reading, translated “name” above (lit. memory) for the sake of the jingle, which also
he is ashamed to appear not to share what is a matter of common knowledge.

The opportune or inopportune use of these devices applies to all kinds of Rhetoric.\textsuperscript{a} But whenever one has gone too far, the remedy may be found in the common piece of advice—that he should rebuke himself in advance; \textsuperscript{b} then the excess seems true, since the orator is obviously aware of what he is doing. Further, one ought not to make use of all kinds of correspondence \textsuperscript{c} together; for in this manner the hearer is deceived. I mean, for instance, if the language is harsh, the voice, features, and all things connected should not be equally harsh; otherwise what each really is becomes evident. But if you do this in one instance and not in another, the art escapes notice, although the result is the same. If mild sentiments are harshly expressed or harsh sentiments mildly, the speech lacks persuasiveness.

Compound words, a number of epithets, and "foreign" words especially, are appropriate to an emotional speaker; for when a man is enraged it is excusable for him to call an evil "high-as-heaven" or "stupendous." He may do the same when he has gripped his audience and filled it with enthusiasm, either by praise, blame, anger, or friendliness, as Isocrates does at the end of his \textit{Panegyricus} \textsuperscript{d}: "Oh, the fame and the name!" and "In that they endured." For such is the language of enthusiastic orators, and it is clear that the hearers accept what they say in a sympathetic spirit. Wherefore this style is appropriate to poetry; for there is something inspired in poetry. It should therefore be used either in this appears in the Greek of Isocrates. All the mss. of Aristotle give γυώμη here, which shows that it is a misquotation.
ARISTOTLE

8. Το δὲ σχήμα τῆς λέξεως δεῖ μήτε ἐμμετρὸν εἶναι μήτε ἀρρυθμὸν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπίθανον (πε- πλάσθαι γὰρ δοκεῖ) καὶ ἀμα καὶ ἐξιστημένω· προσ- έχειν γὰρ ποιεῖ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, πότε πάλιν ἤσει. ὥσπερ οὖν τῶν κηρύκων προλαμβάνουσι τὰ παιδία τὸ "τίνα αἰρεῖται ἐπίτροπον ο ἀπελευθερούμενος;"

2 Κλέωνα." τὸ δὲ ἀρρυθμὸν ἀπεραντον, δεὶ δὲ πεπεράνθαι μὲν, μὴ μέτρω δὲ· ἀγδὲς γὰρ καὶ ἀγνωστον τὸ ἀπειρον. περαίνεται δὲ ἀριθμῷ πάντα· ὅ δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τῆς λέξεως ἀριθμὸς ὑψιθμός ἢ ὑψιθμὸς ἢ ἔστων, οὐ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τμῆματα. διὸ ὕψιθμὸν δεὶ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον, μέτρων δὲ μὴ· ποίημα γὰρ ἔσται. ὑψιθμὸν δὲ μὴ ἀκριβῶς· τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται, ἐὰν μέχρι του ἦ.

4 Τῶν δὲ ὕψιθμῶν δὲ μὲν ἡρῴος σεμνὸς ἀλλὰ λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας δεόμενος, δ’ ἵαμβος αυτῆ

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"238 d, 241 e. In the first of these passages Socrates attributes his unusual flow of words to the inspiration of the nymphs, and tells Phaedrus not to wonder if he seems to be in a divine fury, for he is not far from breaking out into dithyrambs. An example of the irony (a term implying a certain amount of contempt (ii. 2. 25)) of Gorgias is given in the Politics (iii. 2). When asked how a person comes to be a citizen, he answers: "as those are mortars which have been made by mortar-makers, so those are Larissaeans who have been made by artisans (δημιουργοὺς); for some of these were Larissa-makers (δημιουργοὺς). There is a play on the double meaning of δημιουργοῖς, (1) artisan, (2) magistrate, lit. people-maker. Larissa-makers means makers of Larissaeans in such numbers that they might be regarded as makers of Larissa itself. It has also been suggested that λαρισοτοιοῦς may mean "kettle-makers," from λάρισα "a kettle," so 382"
way or when speaking ironically, after the manner of Gorgias, or of Plato in the *Phaedrus*.a

8. The form of diction should be neither metrical nor without rhythm. If it is metrical, it lacks persuasiveness, for it appears artificial, and at the same time it distracts the hearer’s attention, since it sets him on the watch for the recurrence of such and such a cadence; just as, when the public criers ask, “Whom does the emancipated b choose for his patron?” the children shout “Cleon.” If it is without rhythm, it is unlimited, whereas it ought to be limited (but not by metre); for that which is unlimited is unpleasant and unknowable. Now all things are limited by number, and the number belonging to the form of diction is rhythm, of which the metres are divisions. c Wherefore prose must be rhythmical, but not metrical, otherwise it will be a poem. Nor must this rhythm be rigorously carried out, but only up to a certain point.

Of the different rhythms the heroic is dignified, but lacking the harmony of ordinary conversation; the iambic is the language of the many, wherefore called from having been first made at Larissa, but this seems unnecessary. The point is that Gorgias maintained that all were citizens who were made so by the magistrates, that citizenship was a manufactured article (see W. L. Newman’s note on the passage, and W. H. Thompson’s Appendix to his edition of Plato’s *Gorgias*).

b He did not generally possess full rights of citizenship. The point of the illustration is that the hearer looks for the cadence just as confidently as, when a freedman is asked what patron he selects, every one expects him to say “Cleon.”

c Bywater’s emendation for τιμητά of the mss. Aristotle seems to be referring to the Pythagorean theory that “number” is the regulating force in all things, and in giving shape to language “number” is rhythm, which reduces a formless mass of words to order.

383
Δ' ἔστι νή λέξεις ἢ τῶν πολλῶν· διὸ μᾶλλον πάντων
tῶν μέτρων ἰαμβεία φθέγγονται λέγοντες. δεῖ δὲ
σεμνότητα γενέσθαι καὶ ἐκστίναι. ὄ δὲ τροχαῖος
κορδακκυκώτερος· δηλοὶ δὲ τὰ τετράμετρα· ἐστὶ γὰρ
tροχερὸς ρυθμός τὰ τετράμετρα. λειτοπεῖ δὲ
παίαν, ὃ ἐχρῶντο μὲν ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξάμενοι,
οὐκ εἶχον δὲ λέγειν τὸς θην.

"Εστι δὲ τρίτος ὁ παίαν, καὶ ἐχόμενος τῶν εἰ-
ρημένων· τρία γὰρ πρὸς δυ" ἐστιν, ἐκείνων δὲ ὁ
μὲν ἐν πρὸς ἐν, ὁ δὲ δύο πρὸς ἐν. ἔχεται δὲ τῶν
λόγων τούτων ὁ ἡμιόλιος· οὕτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ παίαν.
5 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι διὰ τε τὰ εἰρημένα ἀφετέοι, καὶ
διότι μετρικοί· ὃ δὲ παίαν ληπτέος· ἀπὸ μόνου
γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶ μέτρον τῶν ῥηθέντων ρυθμῶν, ὡστε
μᾶλλον λανθάνειν. νῦν μὲν οὖν χρονται τῷ ἐν
παίαν καὶ ἀρχόμενοι, δεὶ δὲ διαφέρειν τὴν τελευτὴν
6 τῆς ἀρχῆς. ἐστι δὲ παίανος δύο εἶδο ἀντικείμενα
ἀλλήλοις, ὃν τὸ μὲν ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀρμόττει, ὡσπερ
καὶ χρῶνται· οὕτος δ' ἐστὶν οὗ ἀρχεῖ μὲν ἡ μακρὰ,
tελευτώσι δὲ τρεῖς βραχεῖαν,

Δαλογενὲς εἶτε Λυκίαν
καὶ

χρυσοκόκκα "Εκατε παῖ Διόσ.

έτερος δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας, οὐ βραχεῖαν ἀρχονσι τρεῖς,
ἡ δὲ μακρὰ τελευταία:"
of all metres it is most used in common speech; but speech should be dignified and calculated to rouse the hearer. The trochaic is too much like the cordax; this is clear from the tetrameters, which form a tripping rhythm. There remains the paean, used by rhetoricians from the time of Thrasy-machus, although they could not define it.

The paean is a third kind of rhythm closely related to those already mentioned; for its proportion is 3 to 2, that of the others 1 to 1 and 2 to 1, with both of which the paean, whose proportion is 1½ to 1, is connected. All the other metres then are to be disregarded for the reasons stated, and also because they are metrical; but the paean should be retained, because it is the only one of the rhythms mentioned which is not adapted to a metrical system, so that it is most likely to be undetected. At the present day one kind of paean alone is employed, at the beginning as well as at the end; the end, however, ought to differ from the beginning. Now there are two kinds of paeans, opposed to each other. The one is appropriate at the beginning, where in fact it is used. It begins with a long syllable and ends with three short:

Δαλόγενές | εἰτε Λυκῆν ("O Delos-born, or it may be Lycia"),

and

Χρυσόκομω | Ἐκατέ | παῖ Δήσ ("Golden-haired far-darter, son of Zeus").

The other on the contrary begins with three short syllables and ends with one long one:

μετὰ δὲ γὰν | ὑδατὰ τ’ ὦ καὶ ἄνυν ἤφανίσετε νυὲ ("after earth and waters, night obscured ocean").
οὔτος δὲ τελευτήν ποιεῖ· ἦ γὰρ βραχεία διὰ τὸ ἀτελῆς εἶναι ποιεῖ κολοβὸν. ἄλλα δὲ τῇ μακρᾷ ἀποκόπτεσθαι καὶ δήλην εἶναι τὴν τελευτήν, μὴ διὰ τὸν γραφέα, μηδὲ διὰ τὴν παραγραφήν, ἄλλα διὰ τῶν ρυθμῶν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εὑρύθμον δεῖ εἶναι τὴν λέξιν καὶ μὴ ἄρρυθμον, καὶ τίνες εὐρύθμον ποιούσι ρυθμοὶ καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εὑρηται.

9. Τὴν δὲ λέξιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἡ εἰρομένη καὶ τῷ συνδέσμῳ μίαν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς διθυράμβοις ἀναβολέα, ἡ κατεστραμμένη καὶ ὁμοιάν ταῖς τῶν ἁρχαίων ποιητῶν ἀντιστρόφοις. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρο-

2 μένῃ λέξις ἢ ἁρχαία ἐστίν. "Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἢδ' ἱστορίης ἀπόδειξις." ταύτη γὰρ πρότερον μὲν ἀπαντείς, νῦν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ ἥρωνται. λέγω. δὲ εἰρομένην, ἡ οὖν ἐχει τέλος καθ' αὐτὴν, ἢν μὴ τὸ πράγμα λεγόμενον τελειωθῇ. ἐστὶ δὲ ἀρθὲς διὰ τὸ ἄπειρον· τὸ γὰρ τέλος πάντες βουλοῦνται καθορᾶν. διόπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς καμπτήρους ἐκπνεοῦσι καὶ ἐκλύονται· προορώντες γὰρ τὸ πέρας οὐ καμ—

3 νοσι πρότερον. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη τῆς λέξεως ἐστὶν ὡς, κατεστραμμένη δὲ ἡ ἐν περίοδοι. λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσιν ἁρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν· αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον. ἡ δεῖα δ' ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ εὐμαθῆς, ἡ δεῖα μὲν διὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν τῷ ἀπεράντῳ, καὶ ὅτι ἀεὶ τι οἶτει ἔχειν ὁ ἀκροατής [καὶ] πεπεράνθαι τι αὐτῷ. τὸ δὲ μηδὲν προοείσιν εἶναι μηδὲ ἄνυεν ἀρθών. εὐμαθῆς δὲ, ὧν εὐμνημόνευτος. τοῦτο δὲ, ὧν ἀρθμόν ἔχει ἡ

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[a] A dash below the first word of a line, indicating the end of a sentence.

[b] καμπτήρες, properly the turning-point of the διανόσ or double course, is here used for the goal itself.

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This is a suitable ending, for the short syllable, being incomplete, mutilates the cadence. But the period should be broken off by a long syllable and the end should be clearly marked, not by the scribe nor by a punctuation mark, but by the rhythm itself. That the style should be rhythmical and not un-rhythmical, and what rhythms and what arrangement of them make it of this character, has now been sufficiently shown.

9. The style must be either continuous and united by connecting particles, like the dithyrambic preludes, or periodic, like the antistrophes of the ancient poets. The continuous style is the ancient one; for example, "This is the exposition of the investigation of Herodotus of Thurii." It was formerly used by all, but now is used only by a few. By a continuous style I mean that which has no end in itself and only stops when the sense is complete. It is unpleasant, because it is endless, for all wish to have the end in sight. That explains why runners, just when they have reached the goal, lose their breath and strength, whereas before, when the end is in sight, they show no signs of fatigue. Such is the continuous style. The other style consists of periods, and by period I mean a sentence that has a beginning and end in itself and a magnitude that can be easily grasped. What is written in this style is pleasant and easy to learn, pleasant because it is the opposite of that which is unlimited, because the hearer at every moment thinks he is securing something for himself and that some conclusion has been reached; whereas it is unpleasant neither to foresee nor to get to the end of anything. It is easy to learn, because it can be easily retained in the memory. The reason is that
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ἐν περιόδοις λέξις, δ’ πάντων εὐμημονευτότατον. διὸ καὶ τὰ μέτρα πάντες μημονεύουσι μᾶλλον τῶν χύδην. ἄριθμον γὰρ ἔχει οὗ μετρεῖται. δεὶ δὲ τὴν περιόδον καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τετελειώσθαι, καὶ μὴ διακόπτεσθαι ὥσπερ τὰ Σοφοκλέους ἰαμβεῖα,

Καλυδῶν μὲν ἦδε γαῖα Πελοπίας χθονὸς·

τούναντίον γὰρ ἑστὼν ὑπολαβεῖν τῷ διαερέσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰρήμενον τῇν Καλυδῶνα εἶναι τῆς Πελοποννήσου.

5 Περίοδος δὲ ἦ μὲν ἐν κὼλοις, ἢ δ’ ἀφελῆς. ἑστὶ δ’ ἐν κὼλοις μὲν λέξις ἡ τετελειωμένη τε καὶ διηρημένη καὶ εὐανάπνευστος, ἡ ἐν τῇ διαερέσθαι ὥσπερ ἡ εἰρήμενη περίοδος, ἀλλ’ ὄλη. κὼλον δ’ ἑστὶ τὸ ἐστερον μόριον ταύτης. ἀφελῆ δὲ λέγω τὴν 6 μονόκωλον. δεὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ κώλα καὶ τὰς περιόδους μὴτε μυούροις εἶναι μὴτε μακρᾶς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν προσπταῖειν πολλάκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἄκροατὴν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ, ὅταν ἑτὶ ὀρμῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πόρρω καὶ τὸ μέτρον, οὔ ἔχει ἐν ἐαυτῷ ὄρον, ἀντισπασθῇ παύσαμένου, οἶνον προσπταῖει γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀντικρουσιν. τὰ δὲ μακρὰ ἀπολείπεσθαι ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐξωτέρῳ ἀποκάμπτοντες τοῦ τέρματος· ἀπολείπουσι γὰρ καὶ ὥστοι τοὺς συμπεριπατοῦντας. ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ περιόδοι αἱ μακραὶ οὗται λόγοι.

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a τῶν χύδην: lit. what is poured forth promiscuously:
in flowing, unfettered language (Liddell and Scott).

b Really from the Meleager of Euripides, Frag. 515 (T.G.F.). The break in the sense comes after γαῖα, Πελοπίας χθονὸς really belonging to the next line: ἐν ἀντιπόθυμοι πέδι' ἔχουσε εὐδαίμονα. As it stands in the text, the line implies that Calydon was in Peloponnesus, which of course it was not. The meaning then is: “This is the land of Calydon.
the periodic style has number, which of all things is the easiest to remember; that explains why all learn verse with greater facility than prose, for it has number by which it can be measured. But the period must be completed with the sense and not stop short, as in the iambics of Sophocles.

This is Calydon, territory of the land of Pelops;

for by a division of this kind it is possible to suppose the contrary of the fact, as in the example, that Calydon is in Peloponnesus.

A period may be composed of clauses, or simple. The former is a complete sentence, distinct in its parts and easy to repeat in a breath, not divided like the period in the line of Sophocles above, but when it is taken as a whole. By clause I mean one of the two parts of this period, and by a simple period one that consists of only one clause. But neither clauses nor periods should be curtailed or too long. If too short, they often make the hearer stumble; for when he is hurrying on towards the measure of which he already has a definite idea, if he is checked by the speaker stopping, a sort of stumble is bound to occur in consequence of the sudden stop. If too long, they leave the hearer behind, as those who do not turn till past the ordinary limit leave behind those who are walking with them. Similarly long periods assume the proportions of a speech and with its fertile plains in the country over against Peloponnesus (on the opposite side of the strait, near the mouth of the Corinthian gulf).

It does not consist in simply dividing off any words from the context as the speaker pleases, but the parts of the sentence as a whole are properly constructed and distinguished and the sense also is complete.
γίνεται καὶ ἀναβολὴ ὀμοιον. ὡστε γίνεται ὁ ἐσκωπεῖ Δημόκριτος ὁ Χῖος εἰς Μελανιππίδην ποιήσαντα ἀντὶ τῶν ἀντιστρόφων ἀναβολάς,

οἱ τ' ἀυτῶ κακὰ τεῦχει ἀνήρ ἄλλῳ κακὰ τεῦχων, ἢ δὲ μακρὰ ἀναβολὴ τῷ ποιήσαντι κακιστῇ.

ἀρμόττει γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ εἰς τοὺς μακροκώλους λέγειν. οἳ τε λιαν βραχύκωλου ὡς περίοδος γίγνεται: προτετή ὡν ἁγει τὸν ἀκροατήν.

7 Τῆς δὲ ἐν κώλους λέξεως ἢ μὲν διηρήμενή ἡ στίν ἢ δὲ ἀντικειμένη, διηρήμενὴ μὲν οἶνον "πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τῶν τὰς πανηγύρεις συναγωγῶν καὶ τοὺς γυμνικοὺς ἁγῶνας καταστησάντων," ἀντικειμένῃ δὲ, ἐν ἢ ἐκατέρω τῷ κώλῳ ἢ πρὸς ἐναντίων ἐναντίον σύγκειται ἢ ταυτὸ ἐπέζευκται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, οἶον "ἀμφοτέρους δὲ ὁνησαν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπομείναντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολουθήσαντας· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πλείω τῆς σώκοι προσεκτήσαντο, τοῖς δὲ ἱκανῇ τῇ σώκοι κατέλιπον." ἐναντία ὑπομονή ἀκολουθήσεις, ἱκανόν πλείον. "ὡστε καὶ τοῖς χρημάτων δεομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαύσαι βουλομένοις." ἀπόλαυσις κτίσει ἀντίκειται. καὶ ἔτι "συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐν ταύταις καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἀφρονας κατορθοῦν." "εὐθὺς μὲν τῶν ἀριστεῖν ἡξιώθησαν, οὐ πολὺ δὲ ύστερον τῆν ἄρχην τῆς θαλάττης ἐλαβον." "πλέυσαι μὲν διὰ τῆς ἦπείρου, πεζεῦσαι δὲ διὰ

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a A well-known musician.
b Of Melos. He wrote rambling dithyrambic preludes without strophic correspondence. Others take ἀναβολὴ to mean an entire ode.
RHETORIC, III. ix. 6-7

resemble dithyrambic preludes. This gives rise to what Democritus of Chios a jokingly rebuked in Melanippides, b who instead of antistrophes composed dithyrambic preludes:

A man does harm to himself in doing harm to another, and a long prelude is most deadly to one who composes it; c for these verses may be applied to those who employ long clauses. Again, if the clauses are too short, they do not make a period, so that the hearer himself is carried away headlong.

The clauses of the periodic style are divided or opposed; divided, as in the following sentence: "I have often wondered at those who gathered together the general assemblies and instituted the gymnastic contests"; a opposed, in which, in each of the two clauses, one contrary is brought close to another, or the same word is coupled with both contraries; for instance, "They were useful to both, both those who stayed and those who followed; for the latter they gained in addition greater possessions than they had at home, for the former they left what was sufficient in their own country. Here "staying behind," "following," "sufficient," "more" are contraries. Again: "to those who need money and those who wish to enjoy it"; where "enjoying" is contrary to "acquiring." Again: "It often happens in these vicissitudes that the wise are unsuccessful, while fools succeed": "At once they were deemed worthy of the prize of valour and not long after won the command of the sea": "To sail over the mainland, to go by land over the

a Hesiod, Works and Days, 265. The second line is a parody of 266, ἡ δὲ κακὴ βουλὴ τῷ βουλεύσαντι κακίατη.

b The beginning of Isocrates' Panegyricus.
CHAPTER 9

Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1423a

"To dwell with us" (Jebb). The point seems to be that the barbarian domestics were in a comfortable position as compared with those of the allies who were reduced to slavery; and there is a contrast between the desire of getting servants for private convenience, while in a matter affecting public life indifference was shown.

All the above quotations are from the Panegyricus: 1, 35, 41, 48, 72, 89, 105, 149, 181, 186, with slight variations. The last quotation is part of the sentence of which the beginning appears in 7. 11 above. The whole runs: "And how great must we consider the fame and the name and the
sea, bridging over the Hellespont and digging through Athos": "And that, though citizens by nature, they were deprived of the rights of citizenship by law": "For some of them perished miserably, others saved themselves disgracefully": "Privately to employ barbarians as servants, but publicly to view with indifference many of the allies reduced to slavery": "Either to possess it while living or to leave it behind when dead." And what some one said against Pitholaus and Lycophron in the law-court: "These men, who used to sell you when they were at home, having come to you have bought you." All these passages are examples of antithesis. This kind of style is pleasing, because contraries are easily understood and even more so when placed side by side, and also because antithesis resembles a syllogism; for refutation is a bringing together of contraries.

Such then is the nature of antithesis; equality of clauses is parisosis; the similarity of the final syllables of each clause paromoiosis. This must take place at the beginning or end of the clauses. At the beginning the similarity is always shown in entire words; at the end, in the last syllables, or the inflexions of one and the same word, or the repetition of the same word. For instance, at the glory which those who have highly distinguished themselves in such deeds of valour will either have when living or will leave behind after their death."

"They murdered Alexander, tyrant of Pherae, being instigated by their sister, his wife. Nothing is known of the case referred to. According to Cope, the meaning is: "When they were at Pherae, they used to sell you as slaves, but now they have come to buy you" (referring to bribery in court). Others take ὠνεισθαῖ in a passive sense: "they have been bought," i.e. have had to sell themselves to you.
ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα "ἀγρὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν παρ' αὐτοῖν,"

διωρητοὶ τ’ ἐπέλουτο παράρρητοι τ’ ἐπέεσσων.

ἐπὶ τελευτής δὲ "ἀψήθησαν αὐτὸν παιδίων τετοκέναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ αὐτικόν γεγονέναι," "ἐν πλεῖσταις δὲ φροντίσας καὶ ἐν έλαχίσταις ἐλπίσων." πτώσις δὲ ταύτο "ἄξιος δὲ σταθήναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὅν χαλκοῦ." ταῦτα δ’ ὄνομα "σὺ δ’ αὐτὸν καὶ ζώντα ἔλεγες κακῶς καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς.

απὸ συναβής δὲ "τί ἂν ἔπαθες δεινόν, εἰ ἀνδρ’ είδες ἄργον;" ἐστι δὲ ἀμα πάντα ἔχειν ταύτω, καὶ ἀντιθέσει εἶναι ταύτο καὶ πάρουν καὶ ὁμοοτέλευτον. αἱ δ’ ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιόδων σχεδὸν ἐν

τόκα μὲν ἐν τῆς ἡμῶν ἐγών ἢ, τόκα δὲ παρὰ τῆς ἡμῶν ἐγών.

10. Ἐπεὶ δὲ διώρισται περὶ τούτων, πόθεν λέγεται τά ἀστεία καὶ τά εὐδοκιμοῦντα λεκτέον. ποιεῖν μὲν ὄν ἐστι τοῦ εὐφυοῦς ή τοῦ γεγυμνα-2 σμένου, δείξαι δὲ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης. εἴπωμεν οὖν καὶ διαρθημησόμεθα: ἀρχῇ δ’ ἐστω ἡμῶν αὐτή. τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ῥαδίως ἢδ’ φύσει πᾶσιν ἐστὶ,

\[\text{ARISTOTLE}\]

a Aristophanes, Frag. 649 (Kock, Com. Att. Frag. i. 1880).

b Iliad, ix. 526.

c The text is obviously corrupt.

d See Introduction.

e Roemer’s text has ἄρεται (excellences).

f There is no real antithesis, the sense of both clauses being the same.

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beginning: "Αγρὸν γὰρ ἐλαβεν ἀργὸν παρ’ αὐτοῦ, "for he received from him land un till ed”; 

dωρητοί τ’ ἐπέλοντο παράρρητοι τ’ ἐπέσσων, "they were ready to accept gifts and to be persuaded by words;” 

at the end: ὁθῆθασαν αὐτὸν παιδίον τετοκέναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν αἳτων γεγονέναι, “they thought that he was the father of a child, but that he was the cause of it”; ἐν πλείσταισ δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἑλαχίσταισ ἐλπίσιν, “in the greatest anxiety and the smallest hopes.” Inflexions of the same word: ἄξιος δὲ σταθήναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὅν χαλκοῦ, “worthy of a bronze statue, not being worth a brass farthing.” 

Repetition of a word: σὺ δ’ αὐτὸν καὶ ἧοντα ἐλεγες κακῶς καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς, “while he lived you spoke ill of him, now he is dead you write ill of him.” 

Resemblance of one syllable: τί ἂν ἐπαθεὶς δεινόν, εἰ ἄνδρ’ εἰδες ἀργόν, “what ill would you have suffered, if you had seen an idle man?” All these figures may be found in the same sentence at once—antithesis, equality of clauses, and similarity of endings. In the Theodectea nearly all the beginnings of periods have been enumerated. There are also false antitheses, as in the verse of Epicharmus: 

τόκα μὲν ἐν τὴν ἔγγον, τόκα δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐγάν, “at one time I was in their house, at another I was with them.” 

10. Having settled these questions, we must next state the sources of smart and popular sayings. They are produced either by natural genius or by practice; to show what they are is the function of this inquiry. Let us therefore begin by giving a full list of them, and let our starting-point be the following. Easy learning is naturally pleasant to all, and words mean
tā δὲ ὑνόματα σημαίνει τι, ὡστε ὅσα τῶν όνο-
μάτων ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν, ἡδιστα. αἱ μὲν οὖν
γλώτται ἄγνωτες, τὰ δὲ κύρια ἵσμεν. ἢ δὲ μετα-
φορά ποιεῖ τοῦτο μάλιστα. ὅταν γὰρ εἴπῃ τὸ γῆρας
καλάμην, ἔποιησε μάθησιν καὶ γνῶσιν διὰ τοῦ
3 γένους: ἀμφοῦ γὰρ ἀπηνηθηκότα. ποιοῦσι μὲν οὖν
καὶ αἱ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰκόνες τὸ αὐτὸ: διόπερ ἄν εἰ,
ἀστείον φαίνεται. ἦστι γὰρ ἡ εἰκών, καθάπερ
εὑρητι πρότερον, μεταφορὰ διαφέρουσα προβέβησε:
dio ἦττον ἡδύ, ὅτι μακροτέρως· καὶ οὐ λέγει ὡς
τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο· οὐκ οὖν οὐδὲ ζητεῖ τοῦτο ἡ ψυχή.
4 ἄναγκη δὴ καὶ λέξιν καὶ ἐνθυμήματα ταύτ' εἶναι
ἀστεία, ὅσα ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν ταχείαν. διὸ
οὔτε τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εὐδοκιμεῖ
(ἐπιπόλαια γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα, καὶ ἀ
μηδὲν δεὶ ζητῆσαι), οὔτε ὅσα εἰρημένα ἀγνοοῦμενα
ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἡ ἄμα λεγομένων ἡ γνώσις
γίνεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν, ἡ μικρὸν
ὑστερίζει ἡ διάνοια· γίγνεται γὰρ οἶον μαθησις,
ἐκεῖνος δὲ οὐδέτερον.
5 Κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ λεγομένου τὰ
τοιαῦτα εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν
λέξιν τῶν μὲν σχήματι, ἐὰν ἀντικειμένως λέγηται,

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*a Odyssey, xiv. 213 ἀλλ' ἐμπις καλάμην γέ σ' ὀνομαι
eisaporwonta | γινωσκεν. The words are those of Odysseus,
whom Athene had changed into an old beggar, to Eumaeus,
his faithful swineherd, in whose house he was staying un-
recognized.

*b προσθέτει: the addition of the particle of comparison
ὡς. προσθέτει (the reading of the Paris ms.) would mean,
(1) "manner of setting forth" (Cope), or (2) "a metaphor,
with a preface" (Jebb) (but the meaning of this is not clear).
The simile only says that one thing resembles another, not,
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something, so that all words which make us learn something are most pleasant. Now we do not know the meaning of strange words, and proper terms we know already. It is metaphor, therefore, that above all produces this effect; for when Homer calls old age stubble, he teaches and informs us through the genus; for both have lost their bloom. The similes of the poets also have the same effect; wherefore, if they are well constructed, an impression of smartness is produced. For the simile, as we have said, is a metaphor differing only by the addition of a word, wherefore it is less pleasant because it is longer; it does not say that this is that, so that the mind does not even examine this. Of necessity, therefore, all style and enthymemes that give us rapid information are smart. This is the reason why superficial enthymemes, meaning those that are obvious to all and need no mental effort, and those which, when stated, are not understood, are not popular, but only those which are understood the moment they are stated, or those of which the meaning, although not clear at first, comes a little later; for from the latter a kind of knowledge results, from the former neither the one nor the other.

In regard to the meaning of what is said, then, such enthymemes are popular. As to style, popularity of form is due to antithetical statement; for like the metaphor, that it is another; since the speaker does not say this, the result is that the mind of the hearer does not go into the matter, and so the chance of instruction, of acquiring some information, is lost.

The meaning is: the two kinds of enthymemes mentioned last do convey some information, whereas the superficial enthymemes teach nothing, either at once, or a little later, when reflection has made the meaning clear.
In the Poetics (21) metaphor and its four classes are defined: "Metaphor consists in assigning to a thing the name of something else; and this may take place either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or proportionally. An instance of a metaphor from genus to species is 'here stands my ship,' for 'standing' is a genus, 'being moored' a species; from species to genus: 'Odysseus truly has wrought a myriad good deeds,' for 'myriad' is a specific large number, used for the generic 'multitude'; from species to species: 'having drawn off the life with the bronze' and 'having cut it with the unyielding bronze,' where 'drawn off' is used in the sense of 'cut,' and 'cut' in the sense of 'drawn off,' both being species of 'taking away.'" For the proportional metaphor see note on 4. 4 above.
instance, "accounting the peace that all shared to be a war against their private interests," where "war" is opposed to "peace"; as to words, they are popular if they contain metaphor, provided it be neither strange, for then it is difficult to take in at a glance, nor superficial, for then it does not impress the hearer; further, if they set things "before the eyes"; for we ought to see what is being done rather than what is going to be done. We ought therefore to aim at three things—metaphor, antithesis, actuality.

Of the four kinds of metaphor the most popular are those based on proportion. Thus, Pericles said that the youth that had perished during the war had disappeared from the State as if the year had lost its springtime. Leptines, speaking of the Lacedaemonians, said that he would not let the Athenians stand by and see Greece deprived of one of her eyes. When Chares was eager to have his accounts for the Olynthian war examined, Cephisodotus indignantly exclaimed that, now he had the people by the throat, he was trying to get his accounts examined; on another occasion also he exhorted the Athenians to

\[ \text{i. 7. 34.} \]

\[ \text{e} \theta v\nu \nu \text{ was the technical term for the examination of accounts to which all public officers had to submit when their term of office expired. Cephisodotus and Chares were both Athenian generals. "Having the people by the throat" may refer to the condition of Athens financially and his unsatisfactory conduct of the war. But the phrase eis πνιγμα του δημου ἔχοντα is objected to by Cope, who reads ἀγαγόντα and translates: "that he drove the people into a fit of choking by his attempts to offer his accounts for scrutiny in this way," i.e. he tried to force his accounts down their throats, and nearly choked them. Another reading suggested is ἀγχοντα (throttling so as to choke).} \]
This may refer to a decree of Miltiades which was so speedily carried out that it became proverbial. The expedition was undertaken to assist Euboea against Thebes.

By making peace, Iphicrates said that the Athenians had deprived themselves of the opportunity of attacking and plundering a weak maritime city, and so securing provisions for the war. The word ἑφόδια properly means provisions for a journey and travelling expenses.

The Paralus and Salaminia were the two sacred galleys which conveyed state prisoners.

It commanded the trade of the Euxine.

Moerocles was a contemporary of Demosthenes, and an anti-Macedonian in politics. He seems to have been a money-grubber and was once prosecuted for extortion. The
set out for Euboea without delay "and provision themselves there, like the decree of Miltiades."

After the Athenians had made peace with Epidaurus and the maritime cities, Iphicrates indignantly declared "that they had deprived themselves of provisions for the war." Pitholaus called the Paralus "the bludgeon of the people," and Sestos "the corn-chest of the Piraeus." Pericles recommended that Aegina, "the eyesore of the Piraeus," should be removed. Moerocles, mentioning a very "respectable" person by name, declared that he was as much a scoundrel as himself; for whereas that honest man played the scoundrel at 33 per cent, he himself was satisfied with 10 per cent. And the iambic of Anaxandrides, on girls who were slow to marry,

My daughters are "past the time" of marriage.

And the saying of Polyeuctus upon a certain paralytic named Speusippus, "that he could not keep quiet, although Fortune had bound him in a five-holed pillory of disease." Cephisodotus called the triremes "parti-coloured mills," and [Diogenes] the Cynic used to say that the taverns were "the degree of the respectability (or rather, the swindling practices) of each is calculated by their respective profits.

Poet of the Middle Comedy: Frag. 68 (Kock, Com. Att. Frag. ii.). The metaphor in ἰπερήμερος is from those who failed to keep the term of payment of a fine or debt. Cope translates: "I find (μω) the young ladies are ... ."

Athenian orator, contemporary of Demosthenes.

As grinding down the tributary states. They differed from ordinary mills in being gaily painted.

Contrasted with the Spartan "messes," which were of a plain and simple character, at which all the citizens dined together. The tavern orgies, according to Diogenes, represented these at Athens.
Aρίστολος δε, ὅτι εἰς Σικελίαν τὴν πόλιν ἐξέχεαν·
τούτο γάρ μεταφορά καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων. καὶ
"ὡστε βοήσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα"· καὶ τούτῳ τρόπον
τυπὼν μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων. καὶ ὡστερ
Κηφισοδότος εὐλαβεῖσθαι ἐκέλευε μὴ πολλὰς ποιή-
σωσί τὰς συνδρομὰς. καὶ Ἰσοκράτης πρὸς τοὺς
συντρέχοντας ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν. καὶ οἶνον ἐν
tῶν ἐπιταφίων, διότι ἄξιον ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ τάφῳ τῷ τῶν
ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τελευτησάντων κείμασθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα
ὡς συγκαταθαπτομένης τῇ ἀρετῇ αὐτῶν τῆς
ἐλευθερίας· εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἶπεν ὅτι ἄξιον δακρύσαι
συγκαταθαπτομένης τῆς ἀρετῆς, μεταφορὰ καὶ
πρὸ ὀμμάτων, τὸ δὲ "τῇ ἀρετῇ τῆς ἐλευθερίας"
ἀντίθεσιν τινα ἔχει. καὶ ὡς Ἰφικράτης εἶπεν
"η γὰρ ὁδὸς μοι τῶν λόγων διὰ μέσων τῶν
Χάρητι πεπραγμένων ἐστίν"· μεταφορὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν,
καὶ τὸ διὰ μέσου πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖ. καὶ
tὸ φάναι παρακαλεῖν τοὺς κινδύνους τοῖς
κινδύνοις βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὀμμάτων μεταφορά.
καὶ Δυναλέων υπὲρ Χαβρίου "οὐδὲ τὴν ἱκετηρίαν
ἀισχυνθέντες αὐτοῦ, τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν χαλκῆν"
· μεταφορὰ γάρ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἂλλ' οὐκ ἄει, ἄλλα
πρὸ ὀμμάτων· κινδυνεύοντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἱκετεύει
ἡ εἰκὼν, τὸ ἄψυχον δὴ ἐμψυχον, τὸ ὑπόμνημα
tῶν τῆς πόλεως ἔργων. καὶ "πάντα τρόπον
μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες"· τὸ γὰρ μελετῶν

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a Athenian orator, opponent of Demosthenes.
b Referring to the disastrous Sicilian expedition.
c Philippus, 12. Both συνδρομὰς and συντρέχοντας refer to
the collecting of a mob in a state of excitement.
d The statue of Chabrias, erected after one of his victories,
represented him as kneeling on the ground, the position
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messes” of Attica. Aesion used to say that they had “drained” the State into Sicily, which is a metaphor and sets the thing before the eyes. His words “so that Greece uttered a cry” are also in a manner a metaphor and a vivid one. And again, as Cephasodotus bade the Athenians take care not to hold their “concourses” too often; and in the same way Isocrates, who spoke of those “who rush together” in the assemblies. And as Lysias says in his Funeral Oration, that it was right that Greece should cut her hair at the tomb of those who fell at Salamis, since her freedom was buried along with their valour. If the speaker had said that it was fitting that Greece should weep, her valour being buried with them, it would have been a metaphor and a vivid one, whereas “freedom” by the side of “valour” produces a kind of antithesis. And as Iphicrates said, “The path of my words leads through the centre of the deeds of Chares”; here the metaphor is proportional and the words “through the centre” create vividness. Also, to say that one “calls upon dangers to help against dangers” is a vivid metaphor. And Lycoleon on behalf of Chabrias said, “not even reverencing the suppliant attitude of his statue of bronze,” a metaphor for the moment, not for all time, but still vivid; for when Chabrias is in danger, the statue intercedes for him, the inanimate becomes animate, the memorial of what he has done for the State. And “in every way studying poverty of spirit,” for “studying” a thing implies to which he had ordered his soldiers to take up when awaiting the enemy. The statue was in the agora and could be seen from the court. Lycoleon points to it, and bases his appeal on its suppliant attitude.

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αύξειν τι ἔστιν. καὶ ὅτι τὸν νοῦν ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἀνήψεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. ἀμφω γὰρ δηλοὶ τι. "οὐ γὰρ διαλυόμεθα τοὺς πολέμους, ἀλλ' ἀναβαλλόμεθα." ἀμφω γὰρ ἐστὶ μέλλοντα, καὶ ἡ ἀναβολὴ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη εἰρήνη. καὶ τὸ τὰς συνθηκὰς φάναι "πρότασιον εἶναι πολὺ κάλλιον τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις γινομένων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ μικρῶν καὶ μᾶς τύχης, αὐταὶ δ' ὑπὲρ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου". ἀμφω γὰρ νίκης σημεῖα. ὅτι καὶ αἱ πόλεις τῷ ψόγῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγάλας εὐθύνας διδόσαν· ἡ γὰρ εὐθύνα βλάβη τις δικαία ἔστιν.

11. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεία ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τε τῆς ἀνάλογον λέγεται καὶ τῷ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν, εἰρήται. λεκτέον δὲ τί λέγομεν πρὸ ὀμμάτων, καὶ τί ποιοῦσι γίγνεται τοῦτο. λέγω δὴ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὡσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει. οἶον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον μεταφορά: ἀμφω γὰρ τέλεια, ἀλλ' οὐ σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν. ἀλλὰ τὸ "ἀνθοῦσαν ἐχοντος τὴν ἄκμην" ἐνέργεια, καὶ τὸ "σὲ δ' ὦσπερ ἀφετον" ἐνέργεια, καὶ τοῦτευθεν οὖν "Ελληνες ἄξαντες ποσὶν τὸ ἄξαντες ἐνέργεια καὶ μεταφορά. καὶ ὃς

a Metaphor from species to genus (p. 398, n.), "studying" being a species of "increasing." As a rule one studies to increase some good quality, not a bad one.
b Ibid. 172.
c Ibid. 180 (apparently from memory).
d εὐθύνα (see note on p. 399) further implies the punishment for an unsatisfactory statement of accounts.
e Simonides, Frag. 5 (P.I.G. ii.). Both a good man and a square are complete as far as they go, but they do not express actuality.
f Isocrates, Philippus, 10.
g Ibid. 127. This speech is an appeal to Philip to lead the Greeks against Persia. As a sacred animal could roam
increase it. And that "reason is a light that God has kindled in the soul," for both the words reason and light make something clear. "For we do not put an end to wars, but put them off," for both ideas refer to the future—putting off and a peace of such a kind. And again, it is a metaphor to say that such a treaty is "a trophy far more splendid than those gained in war; for the latter are raised in memory of trifling advantages and a single favour of fortune, but the former commemorates the end of the whole war"; for both treaty and trophy are signs of victory. Again, that cities also render a heavy account to the censure of men; for rendering an account is a sort of just punishment.

11. We have said that smart sayings are derived from proportional metaphor and expressions which set things before the eyes. We must now explain the meaning of "before the eyes," and what must be done to produce this. I mean that things are set before the eyes by words that signify actuality. For instance, to say that a good man is "four-square" is a metaphor, for both these are complete, but the phrase does not express actuality, whereas "of one having the prime of his life in full bloom" does; similarly, "thee, like a sacred animal ranging at will" expresses actuality, and in

Thereupon the Greeks shooting forward with their feet the word "shooting" contains both actuality and

where it pleased within the precincts of its temple, so Philip could claim the whole of Greece as his fatherland, while other descendants of Heracles (whom Isocrates calls the author of Philip's line) were tied down and their outlook narrowed by the laws and constitution of the city in which they dwelt.

\(^{h}\) Euripides, *Iphig. Aul.* 80, with ὅρι for ποσίν.
κέχρηται ὁμήρος πολλαχοῦ τῷ τὰ ἁψυχα ἐμψυχα
3 λέγειν διὰ τῆς μεταφορᾶς. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέρ-
γειαν ποιεῖν εὐδοκιμεῖ, οἷον ἐν τοίοδε,
αὕτη ἐπὶ δάπεδόνδε κυλίνδετο λᾶς ἀναιδῆς,
καὶ
ἐπτατ’ ὀίστος,
καὶ
ἐπιπτέσθαι μενεαινων,
καὶ
ἐν γαῖῃ ἱσταντο λιλαιόμενα χροὸς ἄσαι,
καὶ
ἀἴχμη δὲ στέρνου διεσοντο μαμώωσα.
ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτους διὰ τὸ ἐμψυχα εἶναι ἐνερ-
γοῦντα φαίνεται: τὸ ἀναισχυντείν γὰρ καὶ μαμά
καὶ τάλλα ἐνεργεια. ταῦτα δὲ προσήψε διὰ τῆς
καὶ ἀναλογίαν μεταφορᾶς: ὅσ γὰρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς
τὸν Σίσυφον, ὁ ἀναισχυντῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀναισχύν-
τούμενον. ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐδοκιμούσασ
εἰκόσι ἐπὶ τῶν ἁψυχῶν ταῦτα:
κυρτά, φαληριώωντα: πρὸ μὲν τ’ ἄλλ’, αὐτάρ ἐπ’
ἄλλα:
κινούμενα γὰρ καὶ ζώντα ποιεῖ πάντα, ἢ δ’ ἐνεργεια
κίνησις.
5 Δεῖ δὲ μεταφέρειν, καθάπερ εἰρηται πρότερον,
ἀπὸ οἰκείων καὶ μὴ φανερῶν, οἶον καὶ ἐν φιλο-
σοφία τὸ ὁμοιον καὶ ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι θεωρεῖν
εὐστόχου, ᾠσπερ Ἀρχύτας ἐφή ταύτων εἶναι
διαίστητην καὶ βωμῶν· ἐπ’ ἀμφω γὰρ τὸ ἀδικοῦ-

a Odyssey, xi. 598, with ἐπειτα πέδονδε for ἐπὶ δάπεδόνδε.
RHETORIC, III. xi. 2–5

metaphor. And as Homer often, by making use of metaphor, speaks of inanimate things as if they were animate; and it is to creating actuality in all such cases that his popularity is due, as in the following examples:

Again the ruthless stone rolled down to the plain.\(^a\)
The arrow flew.\(^b\)
[The arrow] eager to fly [towards the crowd].\(^c\)
[The spears] were buried in the ground, longing to take their fill of flesh.\(^d\)
The spear-point sped eagerly through his breast.\(^e\)

For in all these examples there is appearance of actuality, since the objects are represented as animate: "the shameless stone," "the eager spear-point," and the rest express actuality. Homer has attached these attributes by the employment of the proportional metaphor; for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless one to the one who is shamelessly treated. In his popular similes also he proceeds in the same manner with inanimate things:

Arched, foam-crested, some in front, others behind; \(^f\)

for he gives movement and life to all, and actuality is movement.

As we have said before, metaphors should be drawn from objects which are proper to the object, but not too obvious; just as, for instance, in philosophy it needs sagacity to grasp the similarity in things that are apart. Thus Archytas said that there was no difference between an arbitrator and an altar, for the wronged betakes itself to one or the other.

\(^a\) Iliad, xiii. 587. \(^b\) Ibid. iv. 126. \(^c\) Ibid. xi. 574.
\(^d\) Ibid. xv. 541.
\(^e\) Ibid. xiii. 799. \(^f\) Ibid. xiii. 587. The reference is to the "boiling waves of the loud-roaring sea."
μενον καταφεύγει. ἓ εἰ τις φαίη ἄγκυραν καὶ κρεμάθραν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἁμφω γὰρ ταυτό τι, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῷ ἀνωθεν καὶ κάτωθεν. καὶ τὸ "ὤμαλίσθαι τὰς πόλεις" εἰν πολὺ διέχουσι ταυτό, εὖ ἐπιφανεία καὶ δυνάμεις τὸ ἱσον.

6 "Εστὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεία τὰ πλείστα διὰ μεταφορᾶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ προεξαπατῶν μᾶλλον γὰρ γίγνεται δῆλον ὅτι ἔμαθε παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν, καὶ έουκε λέγειν ἣ ψυχὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ ἡμαρτον." καὶ τῶν ἀποφθευγμάτων δὲ τὰ ἀστεία ἔστω ἐκ τοῦ μη ὁ φησι λέγειν, οἶον τὸ τοῦ Στησι-χόρου, ὅτι οἱ τέττιγες έαυτοῖς χαμόθεν ἄσονται. καὶ τὰ εὗ ἴνιγμένα διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἴδεα· μάθησις γάρ, καὶ λέγεται μεταφορά. καὶ θ λέγει Θεόδωρος, τὸ καὶ νὰ λέγειν. γίγνεται δὲ, ὅταν παράδοξον ἢ, καὶ μή, ὡς ἐκεῖνος λέγει, πρὸς τὴν ἐμπροσθεν δόξαν, ἀλλ' ὦσπερ οἱ εὖ τοῖς γελοίοις τὰ παρά-πεποιημένα. ὅπερ δύναται καὶ τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώμματα· ἐξαπατᾶ γὰρ, καὶ εὖ τοῖς μέτροις οὐ γὰρ ὦσπερ ὁ ἀκοῦων ὑπέλαβεν.

\[a\] The anchor keeps a ship steady below, the pot-hook is above, and the pot hangs down from it.

\[b\] Cope, retaining ἀνωμαλίσθαι (as if from ἀνωμαλίζειν, aequalitatem restituere Bonitz, cf. ἀνωμάλωσις) says: "the widely dissimilar things here compared are the areas of properties and the state offices and privileges, which are to be alike equalized," translating: "And the re-equalization of cities, when the same principle is applied to things standing wide apart, viz. to surface (area) and powers (functions, offices)." (av- is not negative, but = re.) But the passage quoted by Victorius from Isocrates, Philippus, § 40: "for I know that all the cities of Greece have been placed on the same level (ὤμαλισθαι) by misfortunes" suggests this as a
Similarly, if one were to say that an anchor and a pot-hook hung up were identical; for both are the same sort of thing, but they differ in this—that one is hung up above and the other below. And if one were to say "the cities have been reduced to the same level," this amounts to the same in the case of things far apart—the equality of "levelling" in regard to superficies and resources.

Most smart sayings are derived from metaphor, and also from misleading the hearer beforehand. For it becomes more evident to him that he has learnt something, when the conclusion turns out contrary to his expectation, and the mind seems to say, "How true it is! but I missed it." And smart apophthegms arise from not meaning what one says, as in the apophthegm of Stesichorus, that "the grasshoppers will sing to themselves from the ground." And clever riddles are agreeable for the same reason; for something is learnt, and the expression is also metaphorical. And what Theodorus calls "novel expressions" arise when what follows is paradoxical, and, as he puts it, not in accordance with our previous expectation; just as humorists make use of slight changes in words. The same effect is produced by jokes that turn on a change of letter; for they are deceptive. These novelties occur in poetry as well as in prose; for instance, the following verse does not finish as the hearer expected:

preferable reading here, ὄμαλοςθαί meaning (1) have been levelled to the ground (although the Lexica give no instance of this use), (2) reduced to the same level of weakness.

ε προεξαπατάν. Or, reading προσεξαπατάν, "by adding deception."

See ii. 21. 8.
According to Cope, Θράττεί εἶ, "you are no better than a Thracian slave-girl."

There is obviously a play on πέρσαι (aor. 1 infin. of πέρθω) and Πέρσαι (Persians), but no satisfactory interpretation of the joke has been suggested.

The paradoxical and verbal. "Suitably" may refer to the manner of delivery; to being used at the proper time; or to taking care that the word is one that may be used in the two senses.

Philippus, 61; De Pace, 101. The point in the illustrations lies in the use of ἄρχην, first in the sense of "empire," then in that of "beginning." It could be said that the
And he strode on, under his feet—chilblains, whereas the hearer thought he was going to say "sandals." This kind of joke must be clear from the moment of utterance. Jokes that turn on the word are produced, not by giving it the proper meaning, but by perverting it; for instance, when Theodorus said to Nicon, the player on the cithara, "you are troubled" ($\theta\rho\alpha\tau\tau\epsilon\iota$); for while pretending to say "something troubles you," he deceives us; for he means something else. Therefore the joke is only agreeable to one who understands the point; for if one does not know that Nicon is a Thracian, he will not see any joke in it. Similarly, "you wish to destroy him ($\pi\epsilon\rho\sigma\alpha\iota$)." Jokes of both these kinds must be suitably expressed. Similar instances are such witticisms as saying that "the empire of the sea" was not "the beginning of misfortunes" for the Athenians, for they benefited by it; or, with Isocrates, that "empire" was "the beginning of misfortunes for the city"; in both cases that which one would not have expected to be said is said, and recognized as true. For, in the second example, to say that "empire is empire" shows no cleverness, but this is not what he means, but something else; in the first, the $\alpha\rho\chi\gamma\iota$ which is negatived is used in a different sense. In all these cases, success is attained when a word is appropriately applied, either by homonym or by metaphor. For example, in the phrase Anaschetos (Bearable) is Unbearable, there "empire" of the sea was or was not "the beginning of misfortunes" for Athens; for at first it was highly beneficial to them, but in the end brought disaster, and thus was the "beginning" of evil.

* Usually translated, "There is no bearing Baring."
σχετός ούκ ἀνασχετός· ὁμονυμίαν ἀπέφησεν, ἀλλὰ προσηκόντως, εἰ ἀγηθή. καὶ

οὐκ ἂν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἢ ξένος ξένος· ἢ οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ σὲ δεῖ, τὸ αὐτό. καὶ "οὐ δεὶ τὸν ξένον ξένον ἂεὶ εἰναι." ἀλλότριον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ Ἀναξανδρίδου τὸ ἑπανωμένον, καλὸν γ´ ἀποθανεῖν πρὶν θανάτου δρᾶν ἄξιον·

ταῦτόν γάρ ἐστι τῷ εἰπεῖν ἄξιον γὰρ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ ὄντα ἄξιον ἀποθανεῖν, ἡ ἄξιόν γ´ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ θανάτου ἄξιον ὄντα, ἡ μὴ ποιοῦντα θανάτου ἄξια. τὸ μὲν οὖν εἴδος τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς λέξεως τούτων· ἀλλ´ ὅσω ἂν ἐλάττων καὶ ἀντικειμένως λεχθῇ, τοσοῦτο εὐδοκιμεῖ μᾶλλον. τὸ δ´ αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ μάθησις διὰ μὲν τὸ ἀντικείσθαι μᾶλλον, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ θάττον γίνεται. δεὶ δ´ αἰεὶ προσεῖναι ἢ τὸ πρὸς ὅν λέγεται ἢ τὸ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι, εἰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἄληθές καὶ μὴ ἐπιπόλαιον· ἐστὶ γὰρ ταῦτα χωρίς ἔχειν, οἷον "ἀποθνήσκειν δεῖ μηθὲν ἀμαρτάνοντα"· ἀλλ´ οὐκ ἀστεῖον. "τὴν ἄξιον δεἰ γαμεῖν τὸν ἄξιον" ἀλλ´ οὐκ ἀστεῖον. ἀλλ´ εὰν ἁμα ἄμφω ἔχη. "ἀξίον γ´ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ ἄξιον ὄντα τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν." ὅσω δ´ ἂν πλεῖω ἔχη, τοσοῦτῳ ἀστείοτερον φαίνεται, οἷον εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα

a Kock, C.A.F. iii. 209, p. 448. In the two first examples "stranger" refers to a distant and reserved manner, as we say "don't make yourself a stranger"; in the third ξένος is apparently to be taken in the sense of "alien." Cope translates: "for that too is of a different kind" (foreign, alien to the two others; ἀλλότριον, belonging to something or somebody else, opposed to οἶκεῖον). But the whole passage is obscure.
is a contradiction of the homonym, which is only appropriate, if Anaschetus is an unbearable person. And, "Thou shalt not be more of a stranger than a stranger," or "not more than you should be," which is the same thing. And again,

The stranger must not always be a stranger, for here too the word repeated is taken in a different sense. A It is the same with the celebrated verse of Anaxandrides,

It is noble to die before doing anything that deserves death; b

for this is the same as saying that "it is worthy to die when one does not deserve to die," or, that "it is worthy to die when one is not worthy of death," or, "when one does nothing that is worthy of death." Now the form of expression of these sayings is the same; but the more concisely and antithetically they are expressed, the greater is their popularity. The reason is that antithesis is more instructive and conciseness gives knowledge more rapidly. Further, in order that what is said may be true and not superficial, it must always either apply to a particular person or be suitably expressed; for it is possible for it to have one quality and not the other. For instance, "One ought to die guiltless of any offence," "The worthy man should take a worthy woman to wife." There is no smartness in either of these expressions, but there will be if both conditions are fulfilled: "It is worthy for a man to die, when he is not worthy of death." The more special qualities the expression possesses, the smarter it appears; for instance, if the words contain a metaphor, and a

b Kock, C.A.F. ii. Frag. 64, p. 163.
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μεταφορά εὖ καὶ μεταφορὰ τοιαδή καὶ ἀντίθεσις καὶ παρίσωσις, καὶ ἔχοι ἐνέργειαν.

11 Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες, ὡσπερ εὑρηταί καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄνω, ἀεὶ εὐδοκιμοῦσαι τρόπον τινὰ μεταφοράι. ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ δυοῖν λέγονται, ὡσπερ ἡ ἀνάλογον μεταφορά· οἷον ἡ ἀστίς φαμέν ἐστι φιάλη "Ἀρεος, καὶ τὸξον φόρμιγξ ἁχόρδος. οὔτω μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν οἷς ἀπλοῦν, τὸ δ’ εἰπεῖν τὸ τόξον φόρμιγγα ἡ τῆν ἀσπίδα φιάλην ἀπλοῦν. καὶ εἰκάζουσι δὲ οὖτως, οἷον πυθήκῳ αὐλητήν, λύχνῳ ψακαζομένῳ μύωπα.

13 ἀμφοὶ γὰρ συνάγεται. τὸ δὲ εὐ̣ ἐστὶν ὅταν μεταφορὰ ἡ ἐστὶ γὰρ εἰκάζαι τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλην "Ἀρεος καὶ τὸ ἔρειπιον ράκειι οἰκίας, καὶ τὸν Νικήρατον φάναι Φιλοκτήτην εἶναι δεδημένον ὑπὸ Πράτνους, ὡσπερ εἰκάσε Θρασύμαχος ἵδων τὸν Νικήρατον ἦττημένου ὑπὸ Πράτνους βασιλεύτα, κομῶτα δὲ καὶ αὐχμηρὸν ἔτι. εν οἷς μάλιστα ἐκπέπτουσιν οἱ ποιηταί, ἐὰν μὴ εὐ, καὶ ἐὰν εὐ, εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. λέγω δ’ ὅταν ἀποδιδῶσιν,

ὡσπερ σέλινον οὐλα τὰ σκέλη φορεῖ,
ὡσπερ Φιλάμμων ξυγομαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ.

καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντ’ εἰκόνες εἰσίν. αἱ δ’ εἰκόνες ὅτι μεταφοράι, εὑρηταί πολλάκις.

a Or, reading ἀι for αἰ, “approved similes are. . . .”

b In the simple metaphor “goblet” is substituted for “shield,” but sometimes additions are made to the word as differently applied, such as “of Ares” and “without strings.” These additions, besides involving greater detail (a characteristic of the simile), distinctly bring out the contrast of the two terms and make a simile, whereas the metaphor simply transfers the meaning.

c In posture.
metaphor of a special kind, antithesis, and equality of clauses, and actuality.

Similes also, as said above, are always in a manner approved metaphors; since they always consist of two terms, like the proportional metaphor, as when we say, for instance, that the shield is the goblet of Ares, and the bow a lyre without strings. But such an expression is not simple, but when we call the bow a lyre, or the shield a goblet, it is. And similes may be formed as follows: a flute-player resembles an ape, a short-sighted man a spluttering lamp; for in both cases there is contraction. But they are excellent when there is a proportional metaphor; for it is possible to liken a shield to the goblet of Ares and a ruin to the rag of a house; to say that Niceratus is a Philoctetes bitten by Pratys, to use the simile of Thrasy Machus, when he saw Niceratus, defeated by Pratys in a rhapsodic competition, still dirty with his hair uncut. It is herein that poets are especially condemned if they fail, but applauded if they succeed.

I mean, for instance, when they introduce an answering clause:

He carries his legs twisted like parsley,

or again,

Like Philammon punching the leather sack.

All such expressions are similes, and similes, as has been often said, are metaphors of a kind.

* Contraction of eyelids and flame.

* Like Philoctetes on Lemnos after he had been bitten by the snake.

When the concluding corresponds with the introductory expression. This "answering clause" is called apodosis (p. 371), not restricted, as in modern usage, to the conclusion of a conditional sentence.
14. Kai ai paroimiae metatoprai apo eidous eti eidósi eisw, oion an tis ws agathon peisomenos auton epaganyntai, eti Blabhi, ws o Karpathios phis taxon laqow 'amfow gar to eirhmenon peponbasin. Othen men ouv ta asteiia legetai kai dioti, schedon eirhntai to auton.

15. Eisi de kai evdokimoussai uperbolai metatoprai, oion eis upotipioseis "wphthei d' an auton einai suxamimwn kalathov". eruhrwn gar ti to upotygon, allla to polu sfodra. to de wspfer to kai to, uperbolh ti lexei diapherousa.

wspfer Philammiwn zygozakwv tw kvarukw.

wspfer selwv ovla ta skelh forow.

wphtheis d' an ou skelh allla selina exew owtws ovla.

16. Eisi de uperbolai meirakwdeis sfodrotita gar dholousin. did orhigomevnoi leghousi malista:

ou' ei mou tosa doia oesa yamathos te konis te. kouryn d' ou gamaew 'Agamemnonos 'Athetaidao, ou' ei khrusei 'Aphrodite kallos eriioi, erga d' 'Athenai.

1413. 3 xroonetai de malista tovto ou 'Avtikoi rtopores. didi presbyterew legein aprpepes.

a Or, "he says it is a case of the Carpathian and the hare." An inhabitant of the island of Carpathus introduced a brace of hares, which so multiplied that they devoured all the crops and ruined the farmers (like the rabbits in Australia).

b Iliad, ix. 385.

c This must be taken as a parenthetical remark, if it is Aristotle's at all.
Proverbs also are metaphors from species to species. If a man, for instance, introduces into his house something from which he expects to benefit, but afterwards finds himself injured instead, it is as the Carpathian \( ^{a} \) says of the hare; for both have experienced the same misfortunes. This is nearly all that can be said of the sources of smart sayings and the reasons which make them so.

Approved hyperboles are also metaphors. For instance, one may say of a man whose eye is all black and blue, "you would have thought he was a basket of mulberries," because the black eye is something purple, but the great quantity constitutes the hyperbole. Again, when one says "like this or that" there is a hyperbole differing only in the wording:

Like Philammon punching the leather sack, or, "you would have thought that he was Philammon fighting the sack";

Carrying his legs twisted like parsley, or, "you would have thought that he had no legs, but parsley, they being so twisted." There is something youthful about hyperboles; for they show vehemence. Wherefore those who are in a passion most frequently make use of them:

Not even were he to offer me gifts as many in number as the sand and dust . . . but a daughter of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, I will not wed, not even if she rivalled golden Aphrodite in beauty, or Athene in accomplishments.\(^{b}\)

(Attic orators are especially fond of hyperbole.\(^{c}\) Wherefore \( ^{d} \) it is unbecoming for elderly people to make use of them.

\(^{a}\) Because they are boyish.

\(^{b}\) \(^{c}\) \(^{d}\)
12. Dei de μὴ λειπθέναι ὅτι ἄλλη ἐκάστω γένει ἀρμόττει λέξις. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀγωνιστικὴ, οὐδὲ δημηγορικὴ καὶ δικανικὴ. ἀμφοὶ δὲ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἑστὶν ἐλληνιζέων ἐπίστασθαι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι κατασκευάζων, ἄν τι βούληται μεταδοῦναι τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅπερ 2 πάσχουσιν οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι γράφειν. ἔστι δὲ λέξις γραφικὴ μὲν ἢ ἀκριβεστάτη, ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἢ ὑποκριτικωστάτη. ταύτης δὲ δύο εἶδόμενα· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἡθικὴ ἢ δὲ παθητική, διὸ καὶ οἱ ὑποκριται τὰ τουαῦτα τῶν δραμάτων διώκοντες, καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς τοιούτους. βαστάζονται δὲ οἱ ἀγωνιστικοὶ, οἰον Χαιρήμων (ἀκριβῆς γὰρ ὅσπερ λογογράφος) καὶ Λυκόμνιος τῶν διθυραμβοποιῶν. καὶ παραβαλλόμενοι οἱ μὲν τῶν γραφικῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγώσι στενοί φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων εὐθεῖας ἰδιωτικῶς ἐν ταῖς χερών. αὐτίον δέ ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγώνι ἀρμόττει· διὸ καὶ τὰ ὑποκριτικὰ ἀφηρημένης τῆς ὑποκρίσεως οὐ ποιοῦντα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον φαίνεται εὐήθει, οἰον τὰ τε ἀσύνετα καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἐν τῇ γραφικῇ ὀρθῶς ἀποδοκειμένη, ἐν δὲ ἀγωνιστικῇ καὶ οἱ ρήτορες χρώνται· ἐστι 3 γὰρ ὑποκριτικά. ἀνάγκη δὲ μεταβάλλει τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντας· ὅπερ ὡς προοδοποιεῖ τῷ ὑποκρίνεσθαι: "οὗτος ἐστιν ὁ κλέψας ὑμῶν, οὗτος ἐστιν ὁ ἐξ- απατήσας, οὗτος ὁ τὸ ἐσχατὸν προδοῦναι ἐπιχειρή- σας." οἰον καὶ Φιλήμων ὁ ὑποκριτὴς ἐποίει ἐν

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* See 2. 13 of this book.
* What follows, to the end of § 3, is of the nature of a parenthesis, not immediately connected with the subject of the chapter.
* The variation in the form of the expression suggests a similar variation in the form of the delivery or declamation.
12. But we must not lose sight of the fact that a different style is suitable to each kind of Rhetoric. That of written compositions is not the same as that of debate; nor, in the latter, is that of public speaking the same as that of the law courts. But it is necessary to be acquainted with both; for the one requires a knowledge of good Greek, while the other prevents the necessity of keeping silent when we wish to communicate something to others, which happens to those who do not know how to write. The style of written compositions is most precise, that of debate is most suitable for delivery. Of the latter there are two kinds, ethical and emotional; this is why actors are always running after plays of this character, and poets after suitable actors. However, poets whose works are only meant for reading are also popular, as Chaeremon, who is as precise as a writer of speeches, and Licymnius among dithyrambic poets. When compared, the speeches of writers appear meagre in public debates, while those of the rhetoricians, however well delivered, are amateurish when read. The reason is that they are only suitable to public debates; hence speeches suited for delivery, when delivery is absent, do not fulfil their proper function and appear silly. For instance, asyndeta and frequent repetition of the same word are rightly disapproved in written speech, but in public debate even rhetoricians make use of them, for they lend themselves to acting. (But one must vary the expression when one repeats the same thing, for this as it were paves the way for declamation: as, "This is he who robbed you, this is he who deceived you, this is he who at last attempted to betray you." This is what Philemon the actor
Aristotle

τε τῇ Ἀνάξανδρίδου γεροντομανίᾳ, ὅτε λέγει "Ῥαδάμανθι καὶ Παλαμήδης," καὶ ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ τῶν Εὔσεβῶν τῷ "ἐγὼ," ἐὰν γάρ τις τὰ τοιαύτα μὴ ὑποκρίνηται, γίνεται "ὁ τὴν δοκοῦν φέρων."

4 Καὶ τὰ ἀσύνδητα ωσαύτως. "ἡλθον, ἀπήνυσα, ἐδεόμην" ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑποκρίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐν λέγοντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἤθει καὶ τόνω εἴπειν. ἔτι ἔχει ίδιον τι τὰ ἀσύνδητα. ἐν ᾧσο γὰρ χρόνῳ πολλὰ δοκεῖ εἰρήσθαι. ὁ γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἐν ποιεῖ τὰ πολλά, ὡστε ἐὰν ξαιρεθῇ, δὴλον ὅτι τούναντιον ἔσται τὸ ἐν πολλά. ἔχει οὖν αὐξήσων. "ἡλθον, διελέχθην, ἰκέτευσα." πολλὰ δοκεῖ ὑπερείδειν ὅσα εἶπεν. τούτῳ δὲ βούλεται ποιεῖν καὶ "Ομηρος ἐν τῷ

Νηρέας αὖ Σύμηθεν,
Νηρέας Ἀγαλῆς,
Νηρέας ὃς κάλλιστος.

περὶ οὖ γὰρ πολλὰ εἰρήται, ἀνάγκη καὶ πολλάκις εἰρήσθαι. εἰ οὖν καὶ πολλάκις, καὶ πολλὰ δοκεῖ, ὡστε ηὔξησεν ἀπάξ μνησθεὶς διὰ τὸν παραλογισμὸν,

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"The meaning of this has not been satisfactorily explained. On the face of it, it seems to mean that the excellence of Philemon’s delivery consisted in his way of declaiming passages in which the same words were repeated. Philemon is not to be confused with the writer of the New Comedy, the rival and contemporary of Menander.

Used of a stiff, ungraceful speaker.

Spengel’s reading here is: πολλὰ δοκεῖ "ὑπερείδειν ὅσα εἶπον," πολλὰ δοκεῖ being parenthetical, and ὑπερείδειν ὅσα 420"
did in *The Old Man's Folly* of Anaxandrides, when he says "Rhadamanthus and Palamedes," and when he repeats the word "I" in the prologue to *The Pious.* For unless such expressions are varied by action, it is a case of "the man who carries the beam" in the proverb.)

It is the same with asyndeta: "I came, I met, I entreated." For here delivery is needed, and the words should not be pronounced with the same tone and character, as if there was only one clause. Further, asyndeta have a special characteristic; for in an equal space of time many things appear to be said, because the connecting particle makes many things one, so that, if it be removed, it is clear that the contrary will be the case, and that the one will become many. Therefore an asyndeton produces amplification: thus, in "I came, I conversed, I besought," the hearer seems to be surveying many things, all that the speaker said. This also is Homer's intention in the passage

Nireus, again, from Syme ... ,
Nireus son of Aglaia ... ,
Nireus, the most beautiful ... ;

for it is necessary that one of whom much has been said should be often mentioned; if then the name is often mentioned, it seems as if much has been said; so that, by means of this fallacy, Homer has increased

εἰπὼν part of the quotation. Jebb translates: "I came, I spoke to him, I besought" (these seem many things); "he disregarded all I said" (which certainly gives a more natural sense to ἑπερείδεν).

*d* Iliad, ii. 671 ff.

*e* Cope translates: "they think that, if the name is often repeated, there must be a great deal to say about its owner"; but can this be got out of the Greek (εἰρησθαί)?
καὶ μνήμην πεποίηκεν, οὐδαμοὶ ὠστερὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον ποιησάμενος.

5 Ἡ μὲν οὖν δημηγορικὴ λέξις καὶ παντελῶς ἔοικε τῇ σκιαγραφίᾳ: ὥσπερ γὰρ ἂν πλεῖων ἢ ὁ ὄχλος, πορρωτέρω ἢ θέα, διὸ τὰ ἀκριβὴ περίεργα καὶ χείρω φαίνεται ἐν ἀμφοτέροις: ἢ δὲ δικανικὴ ἀκριβεστέρα. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐνι κριτῆ ἐλάχιστον γὰρ ἐστὶν ῥητορικῆς: εὐσύνοπτον γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ οἰκεῖον τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον, καὶ ὁ ἄγων ἀπεστίν, ὠστε καθαρὰ ἡ κρίσις. διὸ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐν πάσι τούτοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν ῥήτορες: ἀλλ' ὅπου μάλιστα ὑποκρίσεως, ἐνταῦθα ἡκιστα ἀκριβεία ἐνι. τούτῳ δὲ, ὅπου φωνῆς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅπου μεγάλης.

ἲ ἡ μὲν ἐπιδιευκτικὴ λέξις γραφικωτάτης: τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις δευτέρα δὲ ἡ δικανικὴ. τὸ δὲ προσδιαίρεσθαι τῆς λέξιν, ὅτι ἤδειαν δεὶ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ, περίεργον τὸ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ σώφρονα καὶ ἔλευθερον καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλη ἡθοὺς ἀρέτη; τὸ γὰρ ἤδειαν εἶναι ποιήσει δῆλον ὅτι τὰ εἰρημένα, εἴπερ ὄρθως ὦρισται ἡ ἄρετή τῆς λέξεως: τίνος γὰρ ἐνεκα δεὶ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινών εἶναι ἀλλὰ πρέποισαν; ἄν τε γὰρ ἀδολεσχῆ, οὐ

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a Intended to produce the effect of finished work at a distance before a large number of spectators.

b The meaning apparently is that there is no discussion, as might be the case when there were several judges, so that the decision is clear and unbiased. ἀγών and ἀγωνιστική λέξις are terms used for debate (e.g. in the law courts) and the style suited to it (cf. § 1). Cope's editor refers to Cicero, Ad Atticum, i. 16. 8 "remoto illo studio contentionis, quem vos [you Athenians] ἀγῶνα appellatis." Jebb translates: "the
the reputation of Nireus, though he only mentions him in one passage; he has perpetuated his memory, although he never speaks of him again.

The deliberative style is exactly like a rough sketch, for the greater the crowd, the further off is the point of view; wherefore in both too much refinement is a superfluity and even a disadvantage. But the forensic style is more finished, and more so before a single judge, because there is least opportunity of employing rhetorical devices, since the mind more readily takes in at a glance what belongs to the subject and what is foreign to it; there is no discussion, so the judgement is clear. This is why the same orators do not excel in all these styles; where action is most effective, there the style is least finished, and this is a case in which voice, especially a loud one, is needed.

The epideictic style is especially suited to written compositions, for its function is reading; and next to it comes the forensic style. It is superfluous to make the further distinction that style should be pleasant or magnificent. Why so, any more than temperate, liberal, or anything else that indicates moral virtue? For it is evident that, if virtue of style has been correctly defined, what we have said will suffice to make it pleasant. For why, if not to please, need it be clear, not mean, but appropriate? If it be too diffuse, or too concise, it will not be turmoil is absent, so that the judgement is serene” (in a note, “unclouded”).

This does not seem to agree with the general view. Funeral orations of the nature of panegyrics, for instance, were certainly meant to be spoken; but the ἐργον or proper function of an epideictic may be said to consist in reading, in its being agreeable to read. Its τέλος or end is to be read.
ARISTOTLE

σαφῆς, ουδέ ἂν σύντομος. ἀλλὰ δήλον ὅτι τὸ μέσον ἀρμόττει. καὶ τὸ ἴδειν τὰ εἰρημένα ποιήσει, ἄν εὖ μιχθῇ, τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ ἕνικόν, καὶ ὁ ῥυθμός, καὶ τὸ πιθανὸν ἐκ τοῦ πρέποντος. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως εἰρηται, καὶ κοινῇ περὶ ἀπάντων καὶ ἱδίᾳ περὶ ἑκαστον γένος· λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τἀξεως εἰπτεῖν.

13. "Εστι δὲ τοῦ λόγου δύο μέρη· ἀναγκαῖον γάρ τὸ τε πράγμα εἰπτεῖν περὶ οὗ, καὶ τότε ἀποδείξαι. 

διὸ εἰπόντα μὴ ἀποδείξαι ἢ ἀποδείξαι μὴ προ- 

ειπόντα ἀδύνατον· οὐ τε γὰρ ἀποδεικνύων τι ἀπο- 

δεῖκνυσι, καὶ ὁ προλέγων ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι 

2 προλέγει. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πρόθεσις ἐστι τὸ δὲ 

πίστις, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ τοις διέλοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρόβλημα 

3 τὸ δὲ ἀποδείξει. νῦν δὲ διαιροῦσι γελοίως· διήγησις 

γάρ που τοῦ δικανικοῦ μόνον λόγου ἐστίν, ἔπι- 

δεικτικοῦ δὲ καὶ δημιουργικοῦ πῶς ἐνδέχεται 

εἰναι διήγησιν οἷς λέγουσιν, ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀντί- 

dikou, ἢ ἐπιλογον τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν; προοίμιον 

dὲ καὶ ἀντιπαραβολὴ καὶ ἐπάνοδος ἐν ταῖς δημη- 

γορίαις τότε γίνεται, ὅταν ἀντιλογία ἢ. καὶ γάρ 

ἡ κατηγορία καὶ ἡ ἀπολογία πολλάκις, ἀλλὰ οὐχ 

ἡ συμβολῆ· ἀλλ' ὁ ἐπιλογος ἐτι οὐδὲ δικανικοῦ 

παντός, οἷον ἐὰν μικρὸς ὁ λόγος, ἢ τὸ πράγμα

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*a The generally accepted divisions are: προοίμιον (exordium), διήγησις (narrative), πλάτος (proof), ἐπιλογος (peroration). (διήγησις is a species of πρόθεσις, which is used instead of it just before.) Aristotle objects that it is (as a rule) only the forensic speech which requires a regular διήγησις, a full and detailed statement of what has happened before. In epideictic and demonstrative (deliberative) speeches, the
clear; but it is plain that the mean is most suitable. What we have said will make the style pleasant, if it contains a happy mixture of proper and "foreign" words, of rhythm, and of persuasiveness resulting from propriety. This finishes what we had to say about style; of all the three kinds of Rhetoric in general, and of each of them in particular. It only remains to speak of arrangement.

13. A speech has two parts. It is necessary to state the subject, and then to prove it. Wherefore it is impossible to make a statement without proving it, or to prove it without first putting it forward; for both he who proves proves something, and he who puts something forward does so in order to prove it. The first of these parts is the statement of the case, the second the proof, a similar division to that of problem and demonstration. But the division now generally made is absurd; for narrative only belongs in a manner to forensic speech, but in epideictic or deliberative speech how is it possible that there should be narrative as it is defined, or a refutation; or an epilogue in demonstrative speeches? In deliberative speeches, again, exordium, comparison, and recapitulation are only admissible when there is a conflict of opinion. For both accusation and defence are often found in deliberative, but not qua deliberative speech. And further, the epilogue does not even belong to every forensic speech, for instance, when it is short, or the matter is easy to object of which is to prove something, there is no need of another existing division called the refutation of the adversary, and in the demonstrative there can be no room for an epilogue, which is not a summary of proofs and arguments. Thus the necessary divisions of a speech are really only two: πρόθεσις and πίστις, or at most four. 425
4 Ἀναγκαῖα ἀρα μόρια πρόθεσις καὶ πίστις. Ἡδια μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ πλεῖότα προοίμιον πρόθεσις πίστις ἐπίλογος· τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἀντιδικὸν τῶν πίστεων ἔστι, καὶ ἡ ἀντιπαραβολὴ αὐξήσις τῶν αὐτῶν, ὥστε μέρος τι τῶν πίστεων· ἀποδείκνυσι γὰρ τι ὁ ποιῶν τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ προοίμιον, οὐδὲ ἐπίλογος, ἀλλ’ ἀναμμηνήσκει. ἔσται οὖν, ἂν τις τὰ τοιαῦτα διαιρῆ, ὅπερ ἐποίουν οἱ περὶ Θεό-δωρον, διήγησις ἔτερον καὶ ἐπιδιήγησις καὶ προ-διήγησις καὶ ἔλεγχος καὶ ἐπεξελεγχος. δεὶ δὲ εἰδῶς τι λέγοντα καὶ διαφορὰν ὄνομα τίθεσθαι. εἰ δὲ μή, γίνεται κενὸν καὶ ληρῶδες, οἶον Λυκύμνος ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἐπούρωσιν ὄνομάζων καὶ ἀπο-πλάνησι καὶ ὁξίους.

14. Τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιον ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ λόγου, ὅπερ ἐν ποιήσει πρόλογος καὶ ἐν αὐλῆσι προαύλιον· πάντα γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ταῦτ’ εἰσί, καὶ οὐν ὀδοποίησις τῷ ἐπιόντι. τὸ μὲν οὖν προαύλιον ὁμοιον τῷ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοιμίων· καὶ γὰρ οἱ αὐληταῖ, ὃ τι ἂν εὗ ἔχωσιν αὐλῆσαι, τοῦτο προαύλισαντες συνήματι τῷ ἐνδοσίμῳ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις δεὶ οὕτω γράφειν· ὃ τι γὰρ ἂν βιοῦται εὗτοι ἐπώντα ἐνδοσίματι καὶ συνάρμα. ὅπερ πάντες ποιοῦσιν. παράδειγμα τῷ τῆς Ἰσοκράτους Ἑλένης

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a i.e. its use is to recall the main facts briefly (§ 4 end), which in a short speech is needless.

b Plato, Phaedrus, 266 d, where the additional kinds of narrative are omitted, and their place taken by πίστισι καὶ ἐπιπλάσιοι (confirmation of the proof).

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recollect; for in the epilogue what happens is that there is a reduction of length.\textsuperscript{a}

So then the necessary parts of a speech are the statement of the case and proof. These divisions are appropriate to every speech, and at the most the parts are four in number—exordium, statement, proof, epilogue; for refutation of an opponent is part of the proofs, and comparison is an amplification of one’s own case, and therefore also part of the proofs; for he who does this proves something, whereas the exordium and the epilogue are merely aids to memory. Therefore, if we adopt all such divisions we shall be following Theodorus\textsuperscript{b} and his school, who distinguished narrative, additional narrative, and preliminary narrative, refutation and additional refutation. But one must only adopt a name to express a distinct species or a real difference; otherwise, it becomes empty and silly, like the terms introduced by Licymniius in his “Art,” where he speaks of “being wafted along,” “wandering from the subject,”\textsuperscript{c} and “ramifications.”\textsuperscript{d}

14. The exordium is the beginning of a speech, as the prologue in poetry and the prelude in flute-playing; for all these are beginnings, and as it were a paving the way for what follows. The prelude resembles the exordium of epideictic speeches; for as flute-players begin by playing whatever they can execute skilfully and attach it to the key-note, so also in epideictic speeches should be the composition of the exordium; the speaker should say at once whatever he likes, give the key-note and then attach the main subject. And all do this, an example being the exordium of the Helen of Isocrates; for

\textsuperscript{a} Or, “diverting the judge’s attention.”
The subject of the oration was the praise of Helen, but Isocrates took the opportunity of attacking the sophists. This exemplifies his skill in the introduction of matter not strictly proper to, or in common with, the subject. The key-note is Helen; but the exordium is an attack on the Eristics, with special allusion to the Cynics and Megarians.

Of Samos, epic poet, author of a poem on the Persian
the eristics and Helen have nothing in common. At the same time, even if the speaker wanders from the point, this is more appropriate than that the speech should be monotonous.

In epideictic speeches, the sources of the exordia are praise and blame, as Gorgias, in the Olympiacus, says, "Men of Greece, you are worthy to be admired by many," where he is praising those who instituted the solemn assemblies. Isocrates on the other hand blames them because they rewarded bodily excellences, but instituted no prize for men of wisdom. Exordia may also be derived from advice, for instance, "one should honour the good," wherefore the speaker praises Aristides, or such as are neither famous nor worthless, but who, although they are good, remain obscure, as Alexander, son of Priam; for this is a piece of advice. Again, they may be derived from forensic exordia, that is to say, from appeals to the hearer, if the subject treated is paradoxical, difficult, or commonly known, in order to obtain indulgence, like Choerilus:

But now when all has been allotted.

These then are the sources of epideictic exordia—praise, blame, exhortation, dissuasion, appeals to the hearer. And these exordia may be either foreign or intimately connected with the speech.

As for the exordia of the forensic speech, it must

war, from which this half-line and the context preserved in the Scholiast are taken. He complains that whereas the poets of olden times had plenty to write about, the field of poetry being as yet untilled, it was now all apportioned, and he, the last of the poets, was left behind, unable to find "a new chariot for the race-course of his song."

"ἐνδόσιμα here = προϊμία."
tautò dúvatai óper tōn dramátωn oi prólogoi kai tōn épōw tā prooimia: tā μὲν γὰρ tōn di-
thuράμβωn ómoua tois epideiiktikoiś.

dia se kai teā dōra eîte skūla.

6 ēn de tois lógois kai ἐπεσε δείγμα ἐστὶ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα προειδώσι περὶ οὗ ἢν ὁ λόγος καὶ μὴ κρέμηται ἡ διάνοια· τὸ γὰρ ἀόριστον πλανά· ὁ δοὺς οὖν ὦσπερ εἰς τὴν χείρα τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιεῖ ἐχόμενον ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. dia toûto

μὴν αἰεὶδε θεά,

ἀνδρα μοι ἐννεπε μοῦσα,

ἥγεο μοι λόγον ἄλλον, ὡπως Ἀσίας ἀπὸ γαίης ἧλθεν ἐς Εὐρώπην πόλεμος μέγας.

kai oi ῥαγικοὶ δηλοῦσι περὶ τὸ δρᾶμα, καὶ μὴ εὐθὺς ὦσπερ Εὐριπίδης, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ πρὸλογῷ γέ που, ὦσπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς

ἐμοὶ πατὴρ ἦν Πόλυβος.

kai ἡ κωμῳδία ὦσαύτως. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαιο-
tatov ἔργον τοῦ προοµίου καὶ ἄδιον τοῦτο, δηλῶσαι τί ἐστι τὸ τέλος οὗ ἐνεκα ὁ λόγος. διὸσπερ ἃν δῆλον ἢ καὶ μικρὸν τὸ πράγμα, οὐ χρηστέουν τι προομίων. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα εἰδὴ οἷς χρώνται, ἰατρεύ-

a A parenthetical remark to the effect that epideictic exordia are different. Those of a forensic speech are like prologues and epic exordia, but it is different with epideictic, which may be wild, high-flown, as in the example given from an unknown author.

b That is, forensic speeches. δράμασι has been suggested for λόγους.

c Iliad, i. 1.

d Odyssey, i. 1.

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be noted that they produce the same effect as dramatic prologues and epic exordia (for those of dithyrambs resemble epideictic exordia:

For thee and thy presents or spoils). *

But in speeches and epic poems the exordia provide a sample of the subject, in order that the hearers may know beforehand what it is about, and that the mind may not be kept in suspense, for that which is undefined leads astray; so then he who puts the beginning, so to say, into the hearer's hand enables him, if he holds fast to it, to follow the story. Hence the following exordia:

Sing the wrath, O Muse.
Tell me of the man, O Muse.
Inspire me with another theme, how from the land of Asia a great war crossed into Europe.

Similarly, tragic poets make clear the subject of their drama, if not at the outset, like Euripides, at least somewhere in the prologue, like Sophocles,

My father was Polybus.

It is the same in comedy. So then the most essential and special function of the exordium is to make clear what is the end or purpose of the speech; wherefore it should not be employed, if the subject is quite clear or unimportant. All the other forms of exordia in use are only remedies, and are common to all three

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* From Choerilus (§ 4).
† Sophocles, Oed. Tyr. 774. But this can hardly be called the prologue.
‡ That is, special remedies in the case of the hearers suffering from "inattention, unfavourable disposition, and the like" (Cope).
ματα καὶ κοινά. λέγεται δὲ ταῦτα ἐκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίον. περὶ αὐτοῦ μὲν καὶ τοῦ ἀντιδίκου, ὡσα περὶ διαβολῆν λύσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι, ἔστι δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως· ἀπολογουμένως μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τὰ πρὸς διαβολὴν, κατηγοροῦντι δ’ ἐν τῷ ἐπιλόγῳ. δι’ ο’ δὲ, οὐκ ἄδηλον· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀπολογούμενον, ὅταν μέλλῃ εἰσάξειν αὐτόν, ἀναγκαῖον ἀναλείπῃ τὰ κωλύοντα, ὡστε λυτέον πρῶτον τὴν διαβολὴν· τῷ δὲ διαβάλλοντι ἐν τῷ ἐπιλόγῳ διαβλητεύον, ἵνα μνημονεύσωσι μᾶλλον.

Τὰ δ’ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἐκ τε τοῦ εὖνον ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὄργισαι, καὶ ἐνίοτε δὲ ἐκ τοῦ προσεκτικοῦ ἡ τούναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ συμφέρει ποιεῖν προσεκτικόν, διὸ πολλοὶ εἰς γέλωτα πειρῶνται προάγειν. εἰς δὲ εὐμάθειαν ἀπαντα ἀνάξει, εάν τις βούληται, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικῆ φαίνεσθαι· προσέχουσι γὰρ μᾶλλον τούτοις. προσεκτικοὶ δὲ τοῖς μεγάλοις, τοῖς ἴδιοις, τοῖς θαυμαστοῖς, τοῖς ἡδέσιν· διὸ δεῖ ἐμποιεῖν ὡς περὶ τοιούτων ὁ λόγος. εὰν δὲ μὴ προσεκτικοὺς, ὅτι μικρόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐκείνους, ὅτι λυπηρόν.

8 Δεὶ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι πάντα ἔξω τοῦ λόγου τὰ τοιαῦτα· πρὸς φαύλον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ἀκοῦοντα, ἐπεὶ ἃν μὴ τοιοῦτος 432
branches of Rhetoric. These are derived from the speaker, the hearer, the subject, and the opponent. From the speaker and the opponent, all that helps to destroy or create prejudice. But this must not be done in the same way; for the defendant must deal with this at the beginning, the accuser in the epilogue. The reason is obvious. The defendant, when about to introduce himself, must remove all obstacles, so that he must first clear away all prejudice; the accuser must create prejudice in the epilogue, that his hearers may have a livelier recollection of it.

The object of an appeal to the hearer is to make him well disposed or to arouse his indignation, and sometimes to engage his attention or the opposite; for it is not always expedient to engage his attention, which is the reason why many speakers try to make their hearers laugh. As for rendering the hearers tractable, everything will lead up to it if a person wishes, including the appearance of respectability, because respectable persons command more attention. Hearers pay most attention to things that are important, that concern their own interests, that are astonishing, that are agreeable; wherefore one should put the idea into their heads that the speech deals with such subjects. To make his hearers inattentive, the speaker must persuade them that the matter is unimportant, that it does not concern them, that it is painful.

But we must not lose sight of the fact that all such things are outside the question, for they are only addressed to a hearer whose judgement is poor and who is ready to listen to what is beside the case; for if he is not a man of this kind, there is no need
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ἡ, οὕθεν δεῖ προοιμίου, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὁσον τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν κεφαλαιωδῶς, ἵνα ἔχῃ ὄσπερ σῶμα κεφαλῆν.

9 ἔτι τὸ προσεκτικοῦς ποιεῖν πάντων τῶν μερῶν κοινῶν, ἦν δεῖ· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἀνιᾶσι μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρχόμενοι. διὸ γελοῖον ἐν ἄρχῃ τάττειν, οτε μάλιστα πάντες προσέχοντες ἀκροώνται. ὥστε ὅπου ἄν ἡ καιρός, λεκτέον “καὶ μοι προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν· οὕθεν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐμὸν ἡ υμέτερον” καὶ “ἐρῶ γὰρ ὑμῖν οἶνον οὐδεπώποτε” ἀκηκόατε δεινὸν ἡ οὕτω θαυμαστόν. τοῦτο δ’ ἔστιν, ἦσπερ ἐφη Πρόδικος, οτε νυστάζοιεν οἱ ἀκροταῖ, παρ-

10 εμβάλλειν τῆς πεντηκονταδράχμου αὐτοίς. ὥτι δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροτὴν οὐχ ἣπερ ἀκροτής, δῆλον· πάντες γὰρ ἡ διαβάλλουσιν ἡ φόβοις ἀπολύονται ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις.

ἀναξ, ἔρω μὲν οὐχ ὅπως σπουδής ὑπὸ.

τί φρομμάζῃ;

καὶ οἱ πονηρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔχοντες ἡ δοκοῦντες· πανταχοῦ γὰρ βέλτιον διατρίβειν ἢ ἐν τῷ πράγματι. διὸ οἱ δούλοι οὐ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα λέγουσιν ἄλλα τὰ κύκλῳ, καὶ προοιμιάζονται. πόθεν δ’ εὖνος δεῖ ποιεῖν, εἰρήται, καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐκαστὸν τῶν τοιούτων. ἐπεὶ δ’ εὖ λέγεται

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a i.e. to claim the hearer’s attention at the beginning, for every one is keen to listen then, but later on attention slackens.

b The hearer qua hearer should be unbiased, but in fact
of an exordium, except just to make a summary statement of the subject, so that, like a body, it may have a head. Further, engaging the hearers' attention is common to all parts of the speech, if necessary; for attention slackens everywhere else rather than at the beginning. Accordingly, it is ridiculous to put this at the beginning, at a time when all listen with the greatest attention. Wherefore, when the right moment comes, one must say, "And give me your attention, for it concerns you as much as myself"; and, "I will tell you such a thing as you have never yet heard of, so strange and wonderful. This is what Prodicus used to do; whenever his hearers began to nod, he would throw in a dash of his fifty-drachma lecture. But it is clear that one does not speak thus to the hearer qua hearer; for all in their exordia endeavour either to arouse prejudice or to remove their own apprehensions:

O prince, I will not say that with haste [I have come breathless].

Why this preamble? This is what those also do who have, or seem to have, a bad case; for it is better to lay stress upon anything rather than the case itself. That is why slaves never answer questions directly but go all round them, and indulge in preambles. We have stated how the hearer's goodwill is to be secured and all other similar states of mind. And since it is rightly said,

hearers often suffer from the defects referred to in § 7, for which certain forms of exordia are remedies.

Sophocles, Antigone, 223.  
Euripides, Iphig. Taur. 1162.  
ii. 1. 7, 8.
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dὸς μ’ ἐς Φαίηκας φίλον ἐλθεῖν ἥδ’ ἐλεεών, 
tούτων δὲ δύο στοχάζεσθαι.

Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς οἶςθαι δὲι ποιεῖν 
συνεπαινεῖσθαι τὸν ἀκροατήν, ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ γένος 
ἢ ἔπτηθεύματα αὐτοῦ ἢ ἄμως γε πως: δὲ γὰρ λέγει 
Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, ἀληθεῖς, ὅτι οὐ χαλεπὸν 
Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν ἅλλ’ ἐν Λακεδαι-
μονίοις.

12 Τὰ δὲ τοῦ δημηγορικοῦ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ δικανικοῦ 
λόγου ἐστίν, φύσει δ’ ἥκιστα ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ 
οὗ ἵσασι, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖται τὸ πράγμα προοιμίου, 
ἀλλ’ ἢ δ’ αὐτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας, ἢ ἐὰν μὴ 
ἡλίκοιν βούλει ὑπολαμβάνωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἢ μείζον ἢ 
ἐλαττον. διὸ ἢ διαβάλλει ἢ ἀπολύεσθαι ἀνάγκη, 
καὶ ἢ αὑξήσαι ἢ μειώσαι. τούτων δὲ ἑνεκά προ-
οιμίου δεῖται, ἢ κόσμου χάριν, ὡς αὐτοκάβδαλα 
φαίνεται, ἢ ἀναλλο προοιμίου καὶ τοῦ Γοργίου 
ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἡλείους· οὐδὲν γὰρ προεξαγκωνίσας 
οὐδὲ προανακινήσας εὐθὺς ἀρχεῖται "Ἡλις πόλις 
eὐδαίμων."

15. Περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς ἐν μὲν τὸ ἔξ ὧν ἄν τις 
ὑπόληψιν δυσχερὴ ἀπολύεσαι: οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει 
eῖτε εἰπόντος τινὸς εἶτε μὴ, ὡστε τοῦτο καθόλου.

2 ἄλλος τρόπος ὑστε πρὸς τὰ ἀμφισβητοῦμενα 
ἀπαντῶν, ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ ὡς οὐ βλαβερὸν, ἢ οὐ 
tούτω, ἢ ὡς οὐ τηλικοῦτον ἢ οὐκ ἄδικον ἢ οὐ μέγα

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\(^{a}\) Odyssey, vii. 327. 
\(^{b}\) See i. 9. 30. 
\(^{c}\) Another reading is τόπος (topic) and so throughout.

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Grant that on reaching the Phaeacians I may find friendship or compassion,\(^a\)

the orator should aim at exciting these two feelings.

In epideictic exordia, one must make the hearer believe that he shares the praise, either himself, or his family, or his pursuits, or at any rate in some way or other. For Socrates says truly in his Funeral Oration that “it is easy to praise Athenians in the presence of Athenians, but not in the presence of Lacedaemonians.”\(^b\)

Deliberative oratory borrows its exordia from forensic, but naturally they are very uncommon in it. For in fact the hearers are acquainted with the subject, so that the case needs no exordium, except for the orator’s own sake, or on account of his adversaries, or if the hearers attach too much or too little importance to the question according to his idea. Wherefore he must either excite or remove prejudice, and magnify or minimize the importance of the subject. Such are the reasons for exordia; or else they merely serve the purpose of ornament, since their absence makes the speech appear offhand. For such is the encomium on the Eleans, in which Gorgias, without any preliminary sparring or movements, starts off at once, “Elis, happy city.”

15. One way of removing prejudice is to make use of the arguments by which one may clear oneself from disagreeable suspicion; for it makes no difference whether this suspicion has been openly expressed or not; and so this may be taken as a general rule. Another way\(^c\) consists in contesting the disputed points, either by denying the fact or its harmfulness, at least to the plaintiff; or by asserting that its importance is exaggerated; or that it is not unjust

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Sophocles had two sons, Iophon and Ariston, by different wives; the latter had a son named Sophocles. Iophon, jealous of the affection shown by Sophocles to this grandson, summoned him before the *phratores* (a body which had some jurisdiction in family affairs) on the ground that his age rendered him incapable of managing his affairs. In reply to the charge, Sophocles read the famous choric ode on Attica from the *Oedipus Coloneus*, beginning Υπηνεν ἦλθε, τάσις | χώρας (668 ff.), and was acquitted. The story in this form is probably derived from some comedy, which introduced the case on the stage (see Jebb's Introd. to the tragedy).

In the reading in the text, *αὐτός* must apparently refer
at all, or only slightly so; or neither disgraceful nor important. These are the possible points of dispute: as Iphicrates, in answer to Nausicrates, admitted that he had done what the prosecutor alleged and inflicted damage, but denied that he had been guilty of wrongdoing. Again, one may strike the balance, when guilty of wrongdoing, by maintaining that although the action was injurious it was honourable, painful but useful, or anything else of the kind.

Another method consists in saying that it was a case of error, misfortune, or necessity; as, for example, Sophocles said that he trembled, not, as the accuser said, in order to appear old, but from necessity, for it was against his wish that he was eighty years of age. One may also substitute one motive for another, and say that one did not mean to injure but to do something else, not that of which one was accused, and that the wrongdoing was accidental: “I should deserve your hatred, had I acted so as to bring this about.”

Another method may be employed if the accuser, either himself or one closely related to him has been involved in a similar charge, either now or formerly; or, if others are involved who are admittedly not exposed to the charge; for instance, if it is argued that so-and-so is an adulterer, because he is a dandy, then so-and-so must be.

Again, if the accuser has already similarly accused others, or himself been accused by others; or if others, without being formally accused, have been suspected as you are now, and their innocence has been proved.

to the defendant, and one would rather expect αὐτῶν. Spengel’s suggested ἦ δὲλλος ἦ αὐτός for ἦ δὲλλος αὐτοῦς: “if he (i.e. the adversary) or another has similarly accused others.”
7 "Ἀλλος ἐκ τοῦ ἀντιδιαβάλλειν τὸν διαβάλλοντα· ἀτοποὺ γὰρ εἰ ὁς αὐτὸς ἄπιστος, οἱ τούτων λόγοι ἔσονται πιστοὶ.

8 "Ἀλλος, εἰ γέγονε φρίσσω, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης πρὸς Ὀμιλοῦσα ἐν τῇ ἀντιδοσεὶ κατηγοροῦντα ὡς ἀσεβῆς, ὁς γ᾽ ἐποίησε κελεύων ἐπιορκεῖν ἥ γλῶσσα ὁμώμοχ', ἥ δὲ φήμη ἀνώμοτος.

"Εφῇ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀδικεῖν τὰς ἑκ τοῦ Διονυσιακοῦ ἀγώνου φρίσεις ἐις τὰ δικαστήρια ἀγονα· ἐκεῖ γὰρ αὐτῶν δεδωκέναι λόγον ἡ δύσειν, εἰ βούλεται κατηγορεῖν.

9 "Ἀλλος ἐκ τοῦ διαβολῆς κατηγορεῖν, ἡλίκον, καὶ τούτῳ ὅτι ἄλλας φρίσεις ποιεῖ, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πιστεύει τῷ πράγματι.

"Κοινὸς δ᾽ ἀμφότερος τὸ σύμβολον λέγειν, οἰον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ ὦ Ὑδυσσείς ὅτι οἰκείος τῷ Πριάμῳ· ἥ γὰρ Ἡσιόνη ἀδελφή· ὦ δὲ ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ ἐχθρός τῷ Πριάμῳ, ὦ Τελαμών, καὶ ὅτι οὐ κατείπε τῶν κατασκόπων.

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*a* When a citizen was called upon to perform a "liturgy" or public service (e.g. the equipment of a chorus), if he thought that one richer than himself had been passed over he could summon him and compel him to exchange properties.

*b* *Hippolytus*, 612. This well-known verse is three times parodied in Aristophanes (*Thesmophoriazusae*, 275; *Frogs*, 101, 1471). In the first passage, the sense is reversed: Euripides has dressed up a certain Mnesilochus as a woman in order that he may attend the Thesmophorian assembly. Mnesilochus first requires Euripides to take an oath that he will help him out of any trouble that may arise. Euripides takes an oath by all the gods, whereupon Mnesilochus says to Euripides: "Remember that it was your mind that swore, but not your tongue."

When Euripides was engaged in a lawsuit, his adversary quoted the line, implying that even on oath Euripides could
Another method consists in counter-attacking the accuser; for it would be absurd to believe the words of one who is himself unworthy of belief.

Another method is to appeal to a verdict already given, as Euripides did in the case about the exchange of property; when Hygiaenon accused him of impiety as having advised perjury in the verse,

My tongue hath sworn, but my mind is unsworn,

Euripides replied that his accuser did wrong in transferring the decisions of the court of Dionysus to the law courts; for he had already rendered an account of what he had said there, or was still ready to do so, if his adversary desired to accuse him.

Another method consists in attacking slander, showing how great an evil it is, and this because it alters the nature of judgements, and that it does not rely on the real facts of the case.

Common to both parties is the topic of tokens, as, in the Teucer, Odysseus reproaches Teucer with being a relative of Priam, whose sister his mother Hesione was; to which Teucer replied that his father Telamon was the enemy of Priam, and that he himself did not denounce the spies.

not be believed; Euripides replied that his adversary had no right to bring before the law courts a matter which had already been settled by the theatrical judges.

e In the great Dionysiac theatre.

Or, "makes extraneous points the subject of decision" (Cope), "raises false issues" (Jebb).

c Of Sophocles.

f Who had been sent to Troy by the Greeks to spy upon the Trojans. It seems that he was afterwards accused of treachery, the token being the fact that Teucer was a near connexion of Priam; to which he replied with another token that his father was an enemy of Priam, and further, when the Greek spies were in Troy, he never betrayed them.
10 Ἄλλος τῷ διαβάλλοντι, τὸ ἑπανοῦντι μικρὸν μακρῷς ψέξαι μέγα συντόμως, ἢ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ προθέντα, ο εἰς τὸ πράγμα προφέρει ἐν ψέξαι. τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ τεχνικῶτατοι καὶ ἀδικώτατοι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ βλάπτειν πειρῶνται, μυγνύτες αὐτὰ τῷ κακῷ.

Κοινὸν δὲ τῷ διαβάλλοντι καὶ τῷ ἀπολυμένῳ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται πλειόνων ἕνεκα πραχθῆναι, τῷ μὲν διαβάλλοντι κακοηθιστεόν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐκλαμβάνοντι, τῷ δὲ ἀπολυμένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον· οἶον ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης τὸν Ὅδυσσέα προείλετο, τῷ μὲν ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἀριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν Ὅδυσσέα, τῷ δ' ὅτι οὐ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μόνον μὴ ἀνταγωνιστεῖν ὡς φαῖλον. καὶ περὶ μὲν διαβολῆς εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.

16. Διήγησις δ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς ἔστιν οὐκ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλὰ κατὰ μέρος· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ταῖς πράξεις διελθεῖν ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος· σύγκειται γὰρ ἔχων ὁ λόγος τὸ μὲν ἀτεχνὸν (οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ λέγων τῶν πράξεων) τὸ δ' ἐκ τῆς τέχνης· τούτῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι ἔστι δεῖξαι, ἢν ἢ ἀπιστον, ἢ ὅτι 2 ποιόν, ἢ ὅτι ποσόν, ἢ καὶ ἄπαντα. διὰ δὲ τούτῳ ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἐφεξῆς δεὶ διηγεῖσθαι πάντα, ὅτι δυσμηνόμενον τὸ δεικνύναι οὖτως. ἐκ μὲν οὖν

\[a\] Jebb refers τοιοῦτοι to the accusers, translating τεχνικὸν "artistic," certainly the commoner meaning.

\[b\] Involving a continuous succession of proofs.
Another method, suitable for the accuser, is to praise something unimportant at great length, and to condemn something important concisely; or, putting forward several things that are praiseworthy in the opponent, to condemn the one thing that has an important bearing upon the case. Such methods are most artful and unfair; for by their use men endeavour to make what is good in a man injurious to him, by mixing it up with what is bad.

Another method is common to both accuser and defender. Since the same thing may have been done from several motives, the accuser must disparage it by taking it in the worse sense, while the defender must take it in the better sense. For instance, when Diomedes chose Odysseus for his companion, it may be said on the one hand that he did so because he considered him to be the bravest of men, on the other, that it was because Odysseus was the only man who was no possible rival for him, since he was a poltroon. Let this suffice for the question of prejudice.

16. In the epideictic style the narrative should not be consecutive, but disjointed; for it is necessary to go through the actions which form the subject of the speech. For a speech is made up of one part that is inartificial (the speaker being in no way the author of the actions which he relates), and of another that does depend upon art. The latter consists in showing that the action did take place, if it be incredible, or that it is of a certain kind, or of a certain importance, or all three together. This is why it is sometimes right not to narrate all the facts consecutively, because a demonstration of this kind is difficult to remember. From some facts a man
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tou̱t̯w̱n áṉḏṟe̱i̱o̱s, ék dé ṯw̱ṉḏe̱ so̱f̱ós ḥ̱ ḏíḵa̱i̱o̱s. ḵa̱i̱ á̱p̱ḻo̱ú̱s̱ṯe̱ṟo̱s̱ o̱ ḻó̱g̱o̱s o̱ú̱ṯo̱s, é̱ḵe̱i̱ṉo̱s̱ ḏe̱ p̱o̱u̱ḵí̱ḻo̱s
3 ḵa̱i̱ o̱ú̱ ḻi̱ṯó̱s. ḏe̱i̱ dé ṯás̱ mè̱n γ̱ṉw̱ṟí̱m̱o̱u̱s̱ á̱ṉa̱-̱m̱μ̱μ̱ṉή̱σ̱ḵe̱w̱s̱. ḏi̱o̱ i̱i̱ o̱i̱ p̱o̱ḻḻo̱i̱ o̱ú̱ḏe̱ṉ ḏe̱o̱ṉṯa̱i̱ ḏi̱γ̱γ̱ή̱σ̱e̱w̱s̱, ó̱ḏṉ e̱i̱ ṯẖe̱ḻe̱i̱s̱ '̱A̱x̱i̱ḻḻḻé̱a̱ è̱p̱a̱i̱ṉe̱i̱s̱. i̱s̱a̱s̱i̱ g̱a̱ṟ p̱á̱ṉṯe̱s̱ ṯás̱ p̱ṟá̱x̱e̱i̱s̱, á̱ḻḻa̱ x̱ṟή̱s̱ẖa̱i̱ a̱u̱ṯá̱i̱s̱ ḏe̱i̱. é̱a̱ṉ ḏe̱ 4 Ḵṟi̱ṯi̱a̱ṉ, ḏe̱i̱ o̱ú̱ g̱a̱ṟ p̱o̱ḻḻo̱i̱ i̱s̱a̱s̱i̱ṉ. . . . v̱ṉ ḏe̱ g̱e̱ḻo̱í̱w̱s̱ ṯẖṉ ḏi̱γ̱γ̱ή̱s̱i̱ṉ f̱a̱s̱i̱ ḏe̱i̱ṉ e̱i̱ṉ ṯa̱x̱é̱i̱a̱n. ḵa̱í̱ṯo̱i̱ ó̱s̱p̱e̱ṟ o̱ ṯw̱ má̱ṯṯo̱ṉṯi̱ é̱ρ̱o̱m̱é̱ṉw̱ p̱ó̱ṯe̱ṟo̱ṉ s̱ḵḻη̱ṟáṉ η̱ μ̱a̱ḻa̱ḵi̱ṉ μ̱á̱ξ̱η̱, “ṯí̱ d’;” έ̱φ̱η̱, “e̱v̱ ā̱ḏúṉa̱ṯo̱n;” ḵa̱i̱ é̱ṉṯa̱u̱ð̱a̱ ó̱μ̱o̱i̱w̱s̱. ḏe̱i̱ g̱a̱ṟ μ̱η̱ m̱a̱ḵṟós̱ ḏi̱γ̱γ̱ε̱ί̱s̱ẖa̱ ó̱s̱p̱e̱ṟ o̱ú̱ḏe̱ π̱ṟo̱ο̱μ̱i̱α̱ξ̱e̱σ̱ẖa̱i̱ μ̱a̱ḵṟós̱, o̱ú̱ḏe̱ ṯás̱ p̱í̱s̱ṯe̱i̱s̱ ḻé̱γ̱e̱i̱ṉ. o̱ú̱ḏe̱ g̱a̱ṟ é̱ṉṯa̱u̱ð̱a̱ é̱s̱ṯi̱ ṯo̱ e̱ ë̱ η̱ ṯó̱ ṯα̱χ̱ ò̱ ṯó̱ s̱υ̱ν̱τ̱ό̱m̱o̱w̱s̱, á̱ḻḻa̱ ṯó̱ m̱e̱ṯṟí̱w̱s̱. ṯo̱υ̱ṯo̱ d’ é̱s̱ṯi̱ ṯó̱ ḻé̱γ̱e̱i̱ṉ ó̱s̱a̱ δ̱e̱ḻλ̱ώ̱s̱e̱ i̱ ṉ 1417a τ̱ó̱ p̱ṟά̱γ̱m̱a, η̱ ó̱s̱a̱ p̱o̱û̱s̱e̱i̱ υ̱p̱oλ̱a̱β̱e̱i̱ṉ γ̱e̱γ̱oν̱e̱ṉ η̱ β̱e̱ḇḻα̱f̱έ̱ṉαι̱ η̱ ἡ̱δ̱ι̱κ̱ẖκ̱έ̱ṉαι̱, η̱ τ̱η̱λ̱ι̱κ̱α̱υ̱τ̱α̱ η̱λ̱ί̱κ̱α̱ 5 ḇo̱û̱λ̱e̱i̱. τ̱w̱ ḏe̱ é̱ν̱α̱ν̱τ̱i̱w̱ ṯά̱ é̱ν̱α̱ν̱τ̱i̱a. p̱αράδι̱γ̱γ̱ε̱ι̱s̱ẖa̱i̱ ḏe̱ ó̱s̱a̱ e̱i̱s̱ ṯẖṉ s̱ẖṉ ἄ̱ρ̱ε̱τ̱ẖṉ φ̱έ̱ṟε̱i̱, ó̱i̱ṉ “e̱γ̱ώ̱ d’ ἐ̱ν̱ο̱u̱θ̱έ̱ṯo̱ṉ a̱ε̱ ṯ ṯά̱ ḏί̱κ̱a̱i̱a̱ ḻέ̱γ̱ω̱ν̱, μ̱η̱ ṯά̱ ṯέ̱κ̱ṉa̱ ἐ̱γ̱καταλεί̱p̱e̱i̱ν̱.” η̱ θ̱α̱τ̱έ̱ṟo̱w̱ ḵa̱ḵi̱áṉ. “ὁ̱ ὁ̱ ἀ̱π̱ε̱κρ̱ι̱-̱ν̱α̱τ̱o̱ μ̱ο̱ι̱ o̱ṯi̱ o̱ŭ̱ ἀ̱ν̱ ἄ̱υ̱τ̱ό̱ς̱, ἐ̱σ̱ται̱ ἀλ̱λ̱α̱ π̱α̱ι̱δ̱ί̱α.” ὁ̱ ṯο̱υ̱s̱ ἀ̱φ̱ι̱σ̱ταμ̱ε̱ν̱ω̱ς̱ Α̱ι̱γ̱υ̱π̱τ̱ί̱ο̱ω̱ν̱ ἀ̱π̱ο̱κρ̱ί̱να̱σ̱θ̱α̱ι̱ φ̱η̱σ̱ω̱ν̱ ὁ̱ Ἡ̱ρ̱ό̱δ̱ο̱τ̱ο̱ς̱. η̱ ὁ̱s̱a̱ ἡ̱δ̱έ̱a̱ ṯο̱ι̱s̱ δ̱ι̱κασ̱τ̱α̱i̱s̱. 
6 Ἀ̱π̱o̱λ̱o̱γ̱o̱μ̱ου̱μ̱έ̱ν̱ω̱ ḏe̱ ἐ̱λ̱ά̱τ̱τ̱ω̱ν̱ ἡ̱ ḏi̱γ̱γ̱ή̱σ̱i̱ς̱, αὶ̱ ὁ̱

a Something has been lost here, as is shown by the transition from epideictic to forensic Rhetoric. All the mss. have a gap, which in several of them is filled by introducing the passage ἐστὶ δ’ ἔπαυνος . . . μετατεθῇ (i. 9. 33-37).
b ii. 30. The story was that a number of Egyptian soldiers had revolted and left in a body for Ethiopia. Their king Psammetichus begged them not to desert their wives.
may be shown to be courageous, from others wise or just. Besides, a speech of this kind is simpler, whereas the other is intricate and not plain. It is only necessary to recall famous actions; wherefore most people have no need of narrative—for instance, if you wish to praise Achilles; for everybody knows what he did, and it is only necessary to make use of it. But if you wish to praise Critias, narrative is necessary, for not many people know what he did.

But at the present day it is absurdly laid down that the narrative should be rapid. And yet, as the man said to the baker when he asked whether he was to knead bread hard or soft, "What! is it impossible to knead it well?" so it is in this case; for the narrative must not be long, nor the exordium, nor the proofs either. For in this case also propriety does not consist either in rapidity or conciseness, but in a due mean; that is, one must say all that will make the facts clear, or create the belief that they have happened or have done injury or wrong, or that they are as important as you wish to make them. The opposite party must do the opposite. And you should incidentally narrate anything that tends to show your own virtue, for instance, "I always recommended him to act rightly, not to forsake his children"; or the wickedness of your opponent, for instance, "but he answered that, wherever he might be, he would always find other children," an answer attributed by Herodotus to the Egyptian rebels; or anything which is likely to please the dicasts.

In defence, the narrative need not be so long; for and children, to which one of them made answer (των δὲ τινα λέγεται δέξαντα τὸ αἰσθὸν εἰπεῖν, ἐνθα ἂν τούτῳ ἦ, ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖς ἐνθαύτα καὶ τέκνα καὶ γυναῖκας).
Ἀριστοτέλης ὁ μὴ γεγονότας ὁ μὴ βλαβερὸν εἶναι ὁ μὴ ἄδικον ὁ μὴ τηλικὸν, ὥστε περὶ τὸ ὀμολογοῦμενον οὐ διατριπτέον, ἐὰν μὴ τὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο συντείνῃ, οἰον εἰ πέτρακται, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄδικον. ἔτι πεπραγμένα δεῖ λέγειν, ὅσα μὴ πραττόμενα ἢ οἴκτον ἢ δείνωσιν φέρειν. παράδειγμα ὁ Ἀλκίνοος ἀπόλογος, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν Πηνελόπην ἐν ἔξηκοντα ἔτεσι πεποίηται. καὶ ὡς Φάυλλος τὸν κύκλον, καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ Οἰνεὶ πρόλογος. 8 Ἡθικὴ δὲ χρὴ τὴν διήγησιν εἶναι. ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο, ἂν εἰδῶμεν τὶ ἡθος ποιεῖν ἐν μὲν δὴ τὸ προαιρέσιν δηλοῦν, ποιοὶ δὲ τὸ ἡθος τῷ ποιῶν ταύτην ἢ δὲ προαιρέσις ποιὰ τῷ τέλει. διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἡθῆ, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαιρέσιν τὸ γὰρ οὐ ἕνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ’ οἰ Σωκρατικοὶ περὶ τοιούτων γὰρ λέγουσιν. 9 ἄλλα ἡθικὰ τὰ ἐπόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἡθεῖν, οἰον ὅτι ἄμα λέγων ἐβάδίζειν δηλοὶ γὰρ θρασύτητα καὶ ἀγροικίαν ἡθοὺς. καὶ μὴ ὡς ἀπὸ διανοίας λέγειν, ὡσπερ οἱ νῦν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως. “ἐγὼ δ’ ἐβουλόμην καὶ προειλόμην γὰρ τοῦτο. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ ὑπήμην, βέλτιον.” τὸ μὲν γὰρ φρονίμου τὸ δὲ ἀγαθοῦ φρονίμου μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ τῷ ὢφέλιμον διώκειν, ἀγαθοῦ δ’ ἐν τῷ τῷ καλόν. ἃν δ’ ἀπιστοῦν ἦ, τότε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιλέγειν, ὡσπερ Σωφοκλῆς ποιεῖ παράδειγμα τὸ ἐκ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης, ὅτι μᾶλλον

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a Odyssey, xxiii. 264-284, 310-343. The title referred to the narrative in Books ix.-xii. It became proverbial for a long-winded story.
b He apparently summarized it.
c Of Euripides. It was apparently very compact.
the points at issue are either that the fact has not happened or that it was neither injurious nor wrong nor so important as asserted, so that one should not waste time over what all are agreed upon, unless anything tends to prove that, admitting the act, it is not wrong. Again, one should only mention such past things as are likely to excite pity or indignation if described as actually happening; for instance, the story of Alcinous, because in the presence of Penelope it is reduced to sixty lines, and the way in which Phaëllus dealt with the epic cycle, and the prologue to the Oeneus.

And the narrative should be of a moral character, and in fact it will be so, if we know what effects this. One thing is to make clear our moral purpose; for as is the moral purpose, so is the character, and as is the end, so is the moral purpose. For this reason mathematical treatises have no moral character, because neither have they moral purpose; for they have no moral end. But the Socratic dialogues have; for they discuss such questions. Other ethical indications are the accompanying peculiarities of each individual character; for instance, "He was talking and walking on at the same time," which indicates effrontery and boorishness. Nor should we speak as if from the intellect, after the manner of present-day orators, but from moral purpose: "But I wished it, and I preferred it; and even if I profited nothing, it is better." The first statement indicates prudence, the second virtue; for prudence consists in the pursuit of what is useful, virtue in that of what is honourable. If anything of the kind seems incredible, then the reason must be added; of this Sophocles gives an example, where his Antigone says
Aristotle

tov ἀδελφοῦ ἐκήδετο Ἔ ἀνδρὸς ἔ τέκνων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι ἀπολόμενα,

μητρὸς δ' ἐν ἄδου καὶ πατρός βεβηκότων οὐκ ἔστι ἀδελφὸς ὁς τις ἂν βλάστοι ποτέ.

εὰν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς αὐτίαν, ἀλλ' ότι οὐκ ἄγνοεις ἀπιστοῦ λέγων, ἀλλὰ φύσει τοιοῦτος εἰ· ἀπιστοῦσι γὰρ ἀλλο τι πράττειν ἐκόντα πλὴν το συμφέρον.

10 "Ετι ἐκ τῶν παθητικῶν λέγειν, διηγοῦμενοι καὶ τὰ ἐπόμενα καὶ ἂ ἱσασι, καὶ τὰ ἱδία ἂ αὐτὰς ἂ ἐκεῖνως προσόντα· "ὁ δ' ὕχετο με ὑποβλέψας.'

καὶ ὦς περὶ Κρατίλου Αἰσχίνης, ὅτι διασίζων καὶ τοῖν χερῶν διασείων· πιθανὰ γὰρ, διὸτι οὕμνος βολα γίνεται ταῦτα ἂ ἱσασιν ἐκεῖνων ὃν οὐκ ἱσασιν πλείοτα δὲ τοιαῦτα λαβεῖν ἐξ 'Ομῆρου ἔστιν.

ὢς ἀρ' ἐφη, γρηγορεῖ δὲ κατέσχετο χερός πρόσωπα·

οἱ γὰρ δακρύειν ἀρχὸμενοι ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. καὶ εὐθὺς εἰσάγαγε σεαυτοῦ ποιῶν τινα, ἵνα ὦς τοιοῦτον θεωρῶσι καὶ τῶν ἀντίδικων λαμβάνων δὲ ποίει. ότι δὲ ράδιον, ὅραν δεὶ ἔπει τῶν ἀπαγγελλόντων· περὶ ὃν γὰρ μηθὲν ῥομνίος λαμβάνομεν ὑπόληψιν τινα.

11 Πολλαχοῦ δὲ δεὶ διηγεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἔ

a Antigone, 911-912, where the mss. have kekeudhote instead of Aristotle's bebekotow.

b Whereas this man makes his temperament responsible for the strange things he does; he is built that way and cannot help it.

c Supposed to be Aeschines called Socrates from his intimate friendship with Socrates. A philosopher and writer of speeches for the law courts, he had a great reputation as an orator.
that she cared more for her brother than for her husband or children; for the latter can be replaced after they are gone,
but when father and mother are in the grave, no brother can ever be born.\(^a\)

If you have no reason, you should at least say that you are aware that what you assert is incredible, but that it is your nature; for no one believes that a man ever does anything of his own free will except from motives of self-interest.\(^b\)

Further, the narrative should draw upon what is emotional by the introduction of such of its accompaniments as are well known, and of what is specially characteristic of either yourself or of the adversary: "And he went off looking grimly at me"; and as Aeschines \(^c\) says of Cratylus, that he hissed violently and violently shook his fists. Such details produce persuasion because, being known to the hearer, they become tokens of what he does not know. Numerous examples of this may be found in Homer:

Thus she spoke, and the aged nurse covered her face with her hands; \(^d\)

for those who are beginning to weep lay hold on their eyes. And you should at once introduce yourself and your adversary as being of a certain character, that the hearers may regard you or him as such; but do not let it be seen. That this is easy is perfectly clear \(^e\) from the example of messengers; we do not yet know what they are going to say, but nevertheless we have an inkling of it.

Again, the narrative should be introduced in several

\(^a\) Odyssey, xix. 361.
\(^b\) \(\delta\epsilon\iota\) (omitted by others) = "one cannot help seeing."

\(2\) \(g\)

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ἀρχῇ. ἐν δὲ δημηγορίᾳ ἤκιστα διήγησις ἔστιν, ὅτι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων οὐθέσι διηγεῖται. ἄλλῳ εὖν περὶ διήγησις ἢ, τῶν γενομένων ἔσται, ὡς ἀναμνησθέντες ἐκεῖνων βέλτιων βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν ύστερον. ἡ διαβάλλοντες, ἢ ἔπαινούντες. ἄλλα τότε οὐ τὸ τοῦ συμβούλου ποιεῖ ἔργον. ἂν δ᾿ ἡ ἄπιστον, ὑποσχεῖσθαι [τε] καὶ αἰτίαν λέγειν εὐθὺς, καὶ διατάττειν οἷς βούλονται, οἶον ἡ Ἰοκάστῃ ἡ Ἐκήθαμα ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι αἰεί ὑποσχεῖσθαι πυνθανομένου τοῦ ζητοῦντος τὸν νῦν. καὶ ὁ Αἴμων ὁ Σωφοκλέους.

17. Τὰς δὲ πίστεις δεῖ ἀποδεικτικὰς εἶναι ἀποδεικνύαι δὲ χρῆ, ἐπεὶ περὶ τεττάρων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβήτουμενοῦ φέροντα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. οἶον εἰ ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν ἀμφισβητεῖ, ἢν τῇ κρίσει δεὶ τούτῳ μάλιστα τὴν ἀπὸδειξιν φέρειν, εἰ δ᾿ ὅτι οὐκ ἐβλαψε, τούτου, καὶ ὅτι οὐκοῦνδε ἢ ὅτι δικαίως, ὁσαύτως καὶ εἰ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι τοῦτο ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις. μὴ λανθανέτω δ᾿ ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβητήσει μόνῃ τὸν

a Omitting τε. The difficulty is διατάκτων, which can apparently only mean “arrange.” Jebb retains τε, and reads ὡς for ὡς: “the speaker must make himself responsible for the fact... and marshal his reasons in a way acceptable to the hearers.” The old Latin translation vadiare quibus volunt suggested to Roemer διατητάς, “to the arbitrators they approve.”

b According to Jebb, Jocasta tells the inquirer incredible things about her son, and pledges her word for the facts. Cope says: “promises (to do something or other to satisfy him).”

c Antigone, 683-723. On this Cope remarks: “This last example must be given up as hopeless; there is nothing in the extant play which could be interpreted as required here.”
places, sometimes not at all at the beginning. In deliberative oratory narrative is very rare, because no one can narrate things to come; but if there is narrative, it will be of things past, in order that, being reminded of them, the hearers may take better counsel about the future. This may be done in a spirit either of blame or of praise; but in that case the speaker does not perform the function of the deliberative orator. If there is anything incredible, you should immediately promise both to give a reason for it at once and to submit it to the judgement of any whom the hearers approve; as, for instance, Jocasta in the Oedipus of Carcinus is always promising, when the man who is looking for her son makes inquiries of her; and similarly Haemon in Sophocles.

17. Proofs should be demonstrative, and as the disputed points are four, the demonstration should bear upon the particular point disputed; for instance, if the fact is disputed, proof of this must be brought at the trial before anything else; or if it is maintained that no injury has been done; or that the act was not so important as asserted; or was just, then this must be proved, the three last questions being matters of dispute just as the question of fact. But do not forget that it is only in the case of a dispute as to this question of fact that one of

According to Jebb, the "incredibility" consists in the fact that Haemon, although in love with Antigone, and strongly opposed to the sentence pronounced upon her by his father Creon, still remains loyal to the latter. Haemon explains the reason in lines 701-3, where he says that he prizes his father's welfare more than anything else, for a father's good name and prosperity is the greatest ornament for children, as is the son's for the father.
Aristotle’s argument is as follows. But it must not be forgotten that it is only in a dispute as to this question of fact that one of the two parties must necessarily be a rogue. For ignorance is not the cause (of there being a dispute about the fact, e.g. “you hit me,” “no, I didn’t,” where both know the truth), as it might be in a dispute on what was right or wrong, so that this is the topic on which you should spend some time (i.e. because here you can prove or disprove that A is πονηρός).

The passage is generally taken to mean that when it is a question of fact it is universally true that one of the disputants must be a rogue. Cope alone among editors makes any comment. In his note he says: “all that is meant is that there is a certain class of cases which fall under this
the two parties must necessarily be a rogue; for ignorance is not the cause, as it might be if a question of right or wrong were the issue; so that in this case one should spend time on this topic, but not in the others.

In epideictic speeches, amplification is employed, as a rule, to prove that things are honourable or useful; for the facts must be taken on trust, since proofs of these are rarely given, and only if they are incredible or the responsibility is attributed to another.

In deliberative oratory, it may be maintained either that certain consequences will not happen, or that what the adversary recommends will happen, but that it will be unjust, inexpedient, or not so important as supposed. But one must also look to see whether he makes any false statements as to things outside the issue; for these look like evidence that he makes misstatements about the issue itself as well.

Examples are best suited to deliberative oratory and enthymemes to forensic. The first is concerned with the future, so that its examples must be derived from the past; the second with the question of the existence or non-existence of facts, in which demonstrative and necessary proofs are more in place; for the past involves a kind of necessity. One should not introduce a series of enthymemes continuously issue, in which this topic may be safely used."

For instance, A may on justifiable grounds charge B with theft; B denies it, and he may be innocent, although the evidence is strongly against him. In such a case, neither of the parties is necessarily πονηρός.

Or, reading ἄλλως, "if there is some other reason."

It is irrevocable, and it is possible to discuss it with some degree of certainty, whereas the future is quite uncertain, and all that can be done is to draw inferences from the past.
ARISTOTLE

ἐνθυμήματα, ἀλλ' ἀναμιγνύναι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, κατα-
βλάπτει ἄλληλα. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ ὅρος·

ὡς φίλ', ἐπεὶ τόσα εἶπες ὅσ' ἂν πεπνυμένος ἀνήρ,

7 ἀλλ' οὐ τοιαύτα. καὶ μὴ περὶ πάντων ἐνθυμήματα
ζητεῖν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ποιήσεις ὅπερ ἐνοι ποιοῦσι τῶν
φιλοσοφοῦντων, οὐ συλλογίζονται τὰ γνωριμώτερα
8 καὶ πιστότερα ἡ ἔξ ὅν λέγουσιν. καὶ όταν πάθος
ποιῆσι, μὴ λέγε ἐνθύμημα· ἡ γὰρ ἐκκρούσει τὸ
πάθος ἡ μάτην εἰρημένον ἐσται τὸ ἐνθύμημα·
ἐκκρούσωσι γὰρ αἱ κινήσεις ἄλληλας αἱ ἁμα, καὶ
ἡ ἀφανίζονσιν ἡ ἀσθενεῖς ποιοῦσιν. οὐδ' ὅταν
ἡθικὸν τὸν λόγον, οὐ δεὶ ἐνθύμημά τι ζητεῖν ἁμα·
οὐ γὰρ ἔχει οὔτε ἱθὸς οὔτε προαιρέσιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις.

9 Γνώμαις δὲ χρηστέοι καὶ ἐν διηγήσει καὶ ἐν
πίστει· ἡθικὸν γὰρ. "καὶ ἐγὼ δέδωκα, καὶ ταῦτ'
eἰδὼς ὡς οὐ δεὶ πιστεύειν." ἔιν δὲ παθητικῶς,
"καὶ οὐ μεταμέλει μοι καίπερ ἡδικημένως· τούτω
μὲν γὰρ περίεστι τὸ κέρδος, ἐμοὶ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον."

10 Τὸ δὲ δημιουρεῖν χαλεπώτερον τοῦ δικάζεσθαι,
eἰκότως, διότι περὶ τὸ μέλλον· ἐκεῖ δὲ περὶ τὸ
γεγονός, ὃ ἐπιστητὸν ἥδη καὶ τοὺς μάντεσιν, ὡς
ἐφὶ Ἐπιμενίδης ὁ Κρῆς· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ περὶ τῶν
ἐσομένων οὐκ ἔμαντευσε, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονό-
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but mix them up; otherwise they destroy one another. For there is a limit of quantity; thus,

Friend, since thou hast said as much as a wise man would say,\(^a\)

where Homer does not say τοιαύτα (such things as), but τόσα (as many things as). Nor should you try to find enthymemes about everything; otherwise you will be imitating certain philosophers, who draw conclusions that are better known and more plausible than the premises from which they are drawn.\(^b\) And whenever you wish to arouse emotion, do not use an enthymeme, for it will either drive out the emotion or it will be useless; for simultaneous movements drive each other out, the result being their mutual destruction or weakening. Nor should you look for an enthymeme at the time when you wish to give the speech an ethical character; for demonstration involves neither moral character nor moral purpose.

Moral maxims, on the other hand, should be used in both narrative and proof; for they express moral character; for instance, "I gave him the money and that although I knew that one ought not to trust." Or, to arouse emotion: "I do not regret it, although I have been wronged; his is the profit, mine the right."

Deliberative speaking is more difficult than forensic, and naturally so, because it has to do with the future; whereas forensic speaking has to do with the past, which is already known, even by diviners, as Epimenides the Cretan said; for he used to divine, not the future, but only things that were past

\(^a\) Odyssey, iv. 204.

\(^b\) For this passage see i. 2. 12-13. The meaning is that it is absurd to prove what every one knows already.
The remark of Epimenides is by many editors interpreted as a sarcasm upon the fraternity of soothsayers, who pretended to be able to *foretell the future*. But how is this to be got out of the Greek? The point is perhaps something like: "it is easy enough to talk about the past, for even soothsayers know it." What Aristotle says here is that Epimenides practised a different kind of divination, relating to the obscure phenomena of the past. The following is an instance. After the followers of Cylon, who tried to make himself tyrant of Athens (c. 632) had been put to death by the Alemaeonid archon Megacles, in violation of the terms of surrender, a curse rested upon the city and it was devastated by a pestilence. On the advice of the oracle,
but obscure.\textsuperscript{a} Further, the law is the subject in forensic speaking; and when one has a starting-point, it is easier to find a demonstrative proof. Deliberative speaking does not allow many opportunities for lingering—for instance, attacks on the adversary, remarks about oneself, or attempts to arouse emotion. In this branch of Rhetoric there is less room for these than in any other, unless the speaker wanders from the subject. Therefore, when at a loss for topics, one must do as the orators at Athens, amongst them Isocrates, for even when deliberating, he brings accusations against the Lace-daemonians, for instance, in the \textit{Panegyricus},\textsuperscript{b} and against Chares in the \textit{Symmachikos} (On the Peace).\textsuperscript{c}

Epideictic speeches should be varied with laudatory episodes, after the manner of Isocrates, who is always bringing somebody in. This is what Gorgias meant when he said that he was never at a loss for something to say; for, if he is speaking of Peleus, he praises Achilles, then Aeacus, then the god; similarly courage, which does this and that,\textsuperscript{d} or is of such a kind. If you have proofs, then, your language must be both ethical and demonstrative; if you have no enthymemes, ethical only. In fact, it is more fitting that a virtuous man should show himself good than that his speech should be painfully exact.

Refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative, because, in all cases of refutation, it

\textsuperscript{a} Epimenides was summoned from Crete, and by certain rites and sacrifices purified the city and put a stop to the pestilence.\textsuperscript{b} 110-114.\textsuperscript{c} 27.
\textsuperscript{d} He enumerates all the deeds that proceed from courage. Another reading is ἡ τὰ καὶ τὰ, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἑνδὲ ἐστιν, \textit{i.e.}, when praising courage, and this or that, he is employing a method of the kind mentioned.
There is no difference in form between the demonstrative and refutative enthymeme, but the latter draws opposite conclusions; and opposites are always more striking when they are brought together, and a parallel drawn between them. It is then easy to see where the fallacy lies. Cf. ii. 23. 30: "Refutative enthymemes are more effective (popular) than demonstrative, because they bring opposites together in a small compass, which are more striking (clearer) to the hearer from being put side by side."

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is clearer that a logical conclusion has been reached; for opposites are more noticeable when placed in juxtaposition.\textsuperscript{a} The refutation of the opponent is not a particular kind of proof; his arguments should be refuted partly by objection, partly by countersyllogism.\textsuperscript{b} In both deliberative and forensic rhetoric he who speaks first should state his own proofs and afterwards meet the arguments of the opponent, refuting or pulling them to pieces beforehand. But if the opposition is varied,\textsuperscript{c} these arguments should be dealt with first, as Callistratus did in the Messenian assembly; in fact, it was only after he had first refuted what his opponents were likely to say that he put forward his own proofs. He who replies should first state the arguments against the opponent’s speech, refuting and answering it by syllogisms, especially if his arguments have met with approval. For as the mind is ill-disposed towards one against whom prejudices have been raised beforehand, it is equally so towards a speech, if the adversary is thought to have spoken well. One must therefore make room in the hearer’s mind for the speech one intends to make; and for this purpose you must destroy the impression made by the adversary. Wherefore it is only after having combated all the arguments, or the most important, or those which are plausible, or most easy to refute, that you should substantiate your own case:

\textsuperscript{b} In the translation τἀν πιστευω is taken with ἔστι: it is the business of, the proper function of, proofs. Others take it with τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δὲ: some . . . other (of the opponent’s arguments).

\textsuperscript{c} If the opponent’s arguments are numerous and strong, by reason of the varied nature of the points dealt with.
ταῖς θεαίσι πρώτα σύμμαχος γενήσομαι.
ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἅραν...

ἐν τούτοις ἦματο πρῶτον τοῦ εὐηθεστάτου.

16 Περὶ μὲν οὖν πίστεων ταῦτα. εἰς δὲ τὸ ἤθος,
ἐπειδὴ ἑνα περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν ἦ ἐπίφθονον ἦ
μακρολογίαις ἦ ἀντιλογίαι ἐχει, καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ἦ
λοιποῖν ἦ ἀγροικίαι, ἐτερον χρή λέγοντα ποιεῖν,
ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ
ἀντιδώσει, καὶ ὦς Ἀρχίλοχος ψέγει· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸν
πατέρα λέγοντα περὶ τῆς θυγατρὸς ἐν τῷ ιάμβῳ
χρημάτων δ' ἀελπτον οὐθέν ἐστιν οὐδ' ἀπώμοτον,
καὶ τὸν Ἰάμβων τὸν τέκτονα ἐν τῷ ιάμβῳ οὐ ἦ
ἀρχῇ
οὐ μοι τὰ Γύγεω.

καὶ ὦς Σοφοκλῆς τὸν Ἀμονα ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης
17 πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὦς λεγόντων έτέρων. δεὶ δὲ

a Euripides, Troades, 969-971. Hecuba had advised
Menelaus to put Helen to death; she defends herself at
length, and is answered by Hecuba in a reply of which these
words form part. Her argument is that none of the three
goddesses who contended for the prize of beauty on Mt. Ida
would have been such fools as to allow Argos and Athens to
become subject to Troy as the result of the contest, which
was merely a prank.

b 4-7. Isocrates says that his friends thought very highly
of one of his addresses, as likely to bring peace.

c 132-139, 141-149. Here again Isocrates puts compli-
ments on his composition into the mouth of an imaginary
friend.

d Archilochus (c. 650) of Paros was engaged to Neobule,
the daughter of Lycambes. Her father broke off the en-
gagement, whereupon Archilochus pursued father and
daughter with furious and scurrilous abuse. It is here said
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I will first defend the goddesses, for I [do not think] that Hera ... in this passage the poet has first seized upon the weakest argument.

So much concerning proofs. In regard to moral character, since sometimes, in speaking of ourselves, we render ourselves liable to envy, to the charge of prolixity, or contradiction, or, when speaking of another, we may be accused of abuse or boorishness, we must make another speak in our place, as Isocrates does in the *Philippus* b and in the *Antidosis*. c Archilochus uses the same device in censure; for in his iambics he introduces the father speaking as follows of his daughter:

There is nothing beyond expectation, nothing that can be sworn impossible, d and the carpenter Charon in the iambic verse beginning

I [care not for the wealth] of Gyges; e

Sophocles, also, f introduces Haemon, when defending Antigone against his father, as if quoting the opinion that, instead of attacking the daughter directly, he represented her as being attacked by her father. The meaning of ἄδελπτον is not clear. It may be a general statement: the unexpected often happens; or, there is nothing so bad that you may not expect it. B. St. Hilaire translates: “There is nothing that money cannot procure,” meaning that the father was prepared to sell his daughter (Frag. 74).

g The line ends: τοῦ πολυχρῶσου μέλει. Archilochus represents Charon the carpenter as expressing his own disapproval of the desire for wealth and of the envy caused by others possessing it.

h Here again, Haemon similarly puts his own feelings as to Creon’s cruel treatment of Antigone into the mouth of the people of the city, and refers to popular rumour.
καί μεταβάλλειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ γνώμας ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε, οἷον "χρῆ δὲ τὰς διαλλαγὰς ποιεῖν τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας εὑτυχοῦντας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μέγιστα πλεονεκτοίεν." ἐνθυμηματικῶς δὲ "εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, ὅταν ὀφελιμώταται ὅσι καὶ πλεονεκτικῶταται αἱ καταλλαγαί, τότε καταλλάττεσθαι, εὐτυχοῦντας δεῖ καταλλάττεσθαι."

18. Περὶ δὲ ἐρωτῆσεως, εὐκαίρον ἐστὶ ποιεῖσθαι μάλιστα μὲν ὅταν τὸ ἔτερον εἰρηκὼς ᾗ, ὡστε ἕνος προσερωτηθέντος συμβαίνει τὸ ἀτοπον· οἷον Περικλῆς Λάμπωνα ἐπήρετο περὶ τῆς τελετῆς τῶν τῆς σωτείρας ἵερῶν, εἰπόντος δὲ ὅτι οὖχ οἷον τε ἀτέλεστον ἀκούειν, ἤρετο εἰ οἶδεν αὐτὸς, φάσκον-2 τος δὲ "καὶ πῶς ἀτέλεστος ὦν;" δεύτερον δὲ ὅταν τὸ μὲν φανερὸν ᾗ, τὸ δὲ ἐρωτήσαντι δήλον ᾗ ὅτι δώσας· πυθόμενον γὰρ δεῖ τὴν μίαν πρότασιν μὴ προσερωτᾶν τὸ φανερὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰπεῖν, οἷον Σωκράτης Μελήτου οὐ φάσκοντος αὐτὸν θεοῦς νομίζειν [ἡρετο] εἰ δαμόνιων τι λέγοι, ὀμολογήσαντος δὲ ἤρετο εἰ οὖχ οἱ δαίμονες ἢτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἰεν ἡ θείων τι, φήσαντος δὲ "ἐστιν οὖν," 3 ἔφη, "ὅστις θεῶν μὲν παίδας οἶεται εἰσιν, θεοὺς

a The words ὅταν . . . ᾗ have been variously translated: (1) when one of the two alternatives has already been stated; (2) when the opponent has stated what is different from the fact; (3) when the opponent has already conceded so much, “made one admission” (Jebb).
b Reading ἤρετο.
of others. One should also sometimes change enthymemes into moral maxims; for instance, "Sensible men should become reconciled when they are prosperous; for in this manner they will obtain the greatest advantages," which is equivalent to the enthymeme: "If men should become reconciled whenever it is most useful and advantageous, they should be reconciled in a time of prosperity."

18. In regard to interrogation, its employment is especially opportune, when the opponent has already stated the opposite, so that the addition of a question makes the result an absurdity; as, for instance, when Pericles interrogated Lampon about initiation into the sacred rites of the saviour goddess. On Lampon replying that it was not possible for one who was not initiated to be told about them, Pericles asked him if he himself was acquainted with the rites, and when he said yes, Pericles further asked, "How can that be, seeing that you are uninitiated?" Again, interrogation should be employed when one of the two propositions is evident, and it is obvious that the opponent will admit the other if you ask him. But the interrogator, having obtained the second premise by putting a question, should not make an additional question of what is evident, but should state the conclusion. For instance, Socrates, when accused by Meletus of not believing in the gods, asked whether he did not say that there was a divine something; and when Meletus said yes, Socrates went on to ask if divine beings were not either children of the gods or something godlike. When Meletus again said yes, Socrates rejoined, "Is there a man, then, who can admit that the children of the gods exist without at the same time admitting
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δὲ οὐ;’’ ἐτὶ ὅταν μέλλῃ ἡ ἐναντία λέγοντα δείξειν
4 ἡ παράδοξον. τέταρτον δὲ, ὅταν μὴ ἐνὶ ἀλλ’ ἡ
σοφιστικῶς ἀποκρινόμενον λύσαι· ἐὰν γὰρ οὕτως
ἀποκρίνηται, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ἐστὶ δ’ οὐ, ἡ τὰ μὲν τὰ
δ’ οὐ, ἡ π’ ἡ μὲν π’ δ’ οὐ, θορυβοῦσιν ὡς ἀποροῦντος.
ἀλλ’ δὲ μὴ ἐγχειρεῖν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἐνστῇ, κεκρατήσθαι
dοκεῖ· οὐ γὰρ οἶνον τε πολλὰ ἐρωτᾶν διὰ τὴν ἀ-
σθένειαν τοῦ ἀκρωτοῦ. διὸ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα
ὅτι μάλιστα συμπρέφειν δεῖ.
5 Ἀποκρίνασθαι δὲ δεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀμφίβολα
dιαφοροῦντα λόγω καὶ μὴ συντόμως, πρὸς δὲ τὰ
dοκοῦντα ἐναντία τὴν λύσιν φέροντα εὐθὺς τῇ
ἀποκρίσει, πρὶν ἐπερωτήσαι τὸ ἐπὶ δ’ ἡ συλλογίσα-
σθαι· οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν προορᾶν ἐν τινὶ ὁ λόγος.
φανερὸν δ’ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν καὶ τούτῳ
6 καὶ αἱ λύσεις. καὶ συμπεραινόμενον, ἐὰν ἐρώτημα
ποὺ τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὴν αἰτίαν εἰπεῖν· οἷον
Σοφοκλῆς ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ Πεισάνδρου εἰ ἔδοξεν
αὐτῷ ὕσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προβοῦλοις, κατα-
stήσαι τοὺς τετρακοσίους, ἐφη. “τ’ δὲ; οὐ
πονηρά σοι ταῦτα ἐδόκει εἶναι;” ἐφη. “οὔκοιν

a For the first of the quibbles Sandys refers to Aristophanes, Acharnians, 396, where Cephalophon, being asked
if Euripides was indoors, replies, “Yes and no, if you under-
stand me”; and he gives the explanation, his mind is outside,
collecting scraps of poetry, while he himself is upstairs
(ἀναβάδην, unless it means “with his legs up”) composing
a tragedy. The reference in the second instance is to the
adversary being reduced to such a position that he cannot
answer without having recourse to sophistical divisions and
distinctions, which seem to imply uncertainty. Aristotle
himself is fond of such “cautiously limited judgements”
(Gomperz).

The translation is that of the reading ἀποροῦντος, a con-
jecture of Spengel’s. The audience will be ready to express
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that the gods exist?" Thirdly, when it is intended to show that the opponent either contradicts himself or puts forward a paradox. Further, when the opponent can do nothing else but answer the question by a sophistical solution; for if he answers, "Partly yes, and partly no," "Some are, but some are not," "In one sense it is so, in another not," the hearers cry out against him as being in a difficulty. In other cases interrogation should not be attempted; for if the adversary raises an objection, the interrogator seems to be defeated; for it is impossible to ask a number of questions, owing to the hearer's weakness. Wherefore also we should compress our enthymemes as much as possible.

Ambiguous questions should be answered by defining them by a regular explanation, and not too concisely; those that appear likely to make us contradict ourselves should be solved at once in the answer, before the adversary has time to ask the next question or to draw a conclusion; for it is not difficult to see the drift of his argument. Both this, however, and the means of answering will be sufficiently clear from the Topics. If a conclusion is put in the form of a question, we should state the reason for our answer. For instance, Sophocles being asked by Pisander whether he, like the rest of the Committee of Ten, had approved the setting up of the Four Hundred, he admitted it. "What then?" asked Pisander, "did not this appear to you to be a wicked thing?" Sophocles admitted it. Its disapproval of his shuffling answers, which are evidence of his perplexity. The ordinary reading ἀποφοίντες attributes the "perplexity" to the hearers. Or, "the hearers, thinking he is puzzled, applaud us [the interrogator]" (Jebb).
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су та́ута ἐπραξας τὰ πονηρά;” “ναι,” ἔφη. “οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄλλα βελτίω.” καὶ ὡς ο λάκων εὐθυνό-
μενος τῆς ἐφορίας, ἐρωτώμενος εἰ δοκοῦσιν αὐτῷ 
δικαίως ἀπολωλέναι ἄτεροι, ἔφη. ὦ δὲ „οὐκοῦν 
σὺ τοῦτοι ταύτα ἔθου;” καὶ δέ ἔφη. „οὐκοῦν 
δικαίως ἂν,” ἔφη, „καὶ σὺ ἀπόλοιο;” „οὐ 
δήτα,” ἔφη. „οἱ μὲν γὰρ χρήματα λαβόντες ταύτα 
ἐπραξαν, ἐγὼ δ' οὐ, ἄλλα γνώμη.” διὸ οὔτ’ 
ἐπερωτάν δεῖ μετὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα, οὐτὲ τὸ συμ-
πέρασμα ἐπερωτάν, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ πολύ περὶ τοῦ 
ἀληθοῦς.

7 Περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοίων, ἐπειδὴ τινα δοκεῖ χρήσων 
ἐχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγώνι, καὶ δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν 
mὲν σπουδὴν διαφθείρει μὲ τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι 
tὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδῆ, ὀρθώς λέγων, εἴρηται 
pόσα εἶδο γελοίων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, 
ὅν τὸ μὲν ἀρμόττει ἔλευθέρῳ τὸ δ' οὔ. ὅπως οὖν 
tὸ ἀρμόττον αὐτῷ λήμεται. ἐστὶ δ' ἡ εἰρωνεῖα 
tῆς βιωμολογίας ἐλευθεριώτερον. ὦ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ 
ἔνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ γελοῖον, ὦ δὲ βιωμολόχος ἐτέρου.

19. Ο δ' ἐπίλογος σύγκειται ἐκ τεττάρων, ἐκ 
tοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσας εὖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν 
kαὶ τὸν ἐναντίον φαύλως, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐξησαι καὶ 
tαπεινώσαι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ εἰς τὰ πάθη τὸν ἀκροατὴν 
kαταστήσαι, καὶ εξ ἀναμνήσεως. πέφυκε γὰρ 
μετὰ τὸ ἀποδείξαι αὐτὸν μὲν ἁληθῆ τὸν δὲ ἐναντίον 
ψευδή, οὕτω τὸ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν καὶ ἐπιχαλ-
κεύειν. δυοῖν δὲ θατέρου δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, ἡ ὅτι 
tούτως ἀγαθὸς ἡ ὅτι ἀπλῶς, ὦ δ' ὅτι κακὸς τούτως

a The chapters are lost (cp. i. 11. 29).
b Or, “mould the hearers to one's will” (L. and S.).

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“So then you did what was wicked?” “Yes, for there was nothing better to be done.” The Lacedaemonian, who was called to account for his ephorality, being asked if he did not think that the rest of his colleagues had been justly put to death, answered yes. “But did not you pass the same measures as they did?” “Yes.” “Would not you, then, also be justly put to death?” “No; for my colleagues did this for money; I did not, but acted according to my conscience.” For this reason we should not ask any further questions after drawing the conclusion, nor put the conclusion itself as a question, unless the balance of truth is unmistakably in our favour.

As for jests, since they may sometimes be useful in debates, the advice of Gorgias was good—to confound the opponents’ earnest with jest and their jest with earnest. We have stated in the Poetics how many kinds of jests there are, some of them becoming a gentleman, others not. You should therefore choose the kind that suits you. Irony is more gentlemanly than buffoonery; for the first is employed on one’s own account, the second on that of another.

19. The epilogue is composed of four parts: to dispose the hearer favourably towards oneself and unfavourably towards the adversary; to amplify and depreciate; to excite the emotions of the hearer; to recapitulate. For after you have proved that you are truthful and that the adversary is false, the natural order of things is to praise ourselves, blame him, and put the finishing touches. One of two things should be aimed at, to show that you are either relatively or absolutely good and the adversary

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ἡ ὡς ἀπλῶς. εἴς ὅν δὲ δὴ τοιούτους κατασκευάζειν δεῖ, εἰρηνεύει οἱ τόποι πόθεν σπουδαίους δεῖ κατα-
2 σκευάζειν καὶ φαύλους. τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο δεδειγ-
μένων ἡδὴ αὐξεῖν ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ταπεινοῦν.
δεῖ γὰρ τὰ πεπραγμένα ὀμολογεῖσθαι, εἰ μέλλει
τὸ ποσὸν ἐρεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων αὐξήσις
ἐκ προϋπαρχόντων ἐστὶ. οὕτως δὲ δεῖ αὐξεῖν καὶ
3 ταπεινοῦν, ἐκκεντεῖ οἱ τόποι πρότερον. μετὰ
dὲ ταῦτα, δήλων ὄντων καὶ οῖα καὶ ἥλικα, εἷς τὰ
πάθη ἀγείν τὸν ἀκροατῆν· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἔλεος
καὶ δείνωσι καὶ ὄργη καὶ μῦσι καὶ φθόνος καὶ
ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις. εἰρηνεύει δὲ καὶ τούτων οἱ τόποι
4 πρότερον. ὥστε λοιπὸν ἀναμνήσαι τὰ προειρη-
μένα. τοῦτο δὲ ἁρμόττει ποιεῖν οὕτως ὥσπερ
φασίν ἐν τοῖς προομίσσους, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντες:
ινα γὰρ εὐμαθὴ ἡ, κελεύουσι πολλάκις εἰπεῖν.
ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν δεὶ τὸ πράγμα εἰπεῖν, ἢν μὴ λανθάνῃ
περὶ οὗ ἡ κρίσις, ἐνταῦθα δὲ δι' ὧν δέδεικται
κεφαλαίωδῶς.

5 Ἀρχὴ δὲ, διότι ἡ ὑπέσχετο ἀποδέδωκεν· ὥστε
α τε καὶ δι' ὁ λεκτέον. λέγεται δὲ εἴς ἀντιπαρα-
βολῆς τοῦ ἑναντίου. παραβάλλειν δὲ ἡ ὅσα περὶ
tὸ αὐτὸ ἁμφῶς εἶπον, ἡ μὴ καταντικρύ. "ἀλλ' ὁ
οὕτως μὲν τάδε περὶ τούτου, ἐγὼ δὲ ταῦτί, καὶ διὰ
tαῦτα." ἡ εἴρωνείας, οἷον "οὕτως γὰρ τάδ'
eἰπεν, ἐγὼ δὲ τάδε. καὶ τί ἄν ἐποίει, εἰ τάδε
ἐδείξειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ταῦτὶ;" ἡ εἴς ἐρωτηθεσώς. "τί
either relatively or absolutely bad. The topics which serve to represent men as good or bad have already been stated. After this, when the proof has once been established, the natural thing is to amplify or depreciate; for it is necessary that the facts should be admitted, if it is intended to deal with the question of degree; just as the growth of the body is due to things previously existing. The topics of amplification and depreciation have been previously set forth. Next, when the nature and importance of the facts are clear, one should rouse the hearer to certain emotions—pity, indignation, anger, hate, jealousy, emulation, and quarrelsomeness. The topics of these also have been previously stated, so that all that remains is to recapitulate what has been said. This may appropriately be done at this stage in the way certain rhetoricians wrongly recommend for the exordium, when they advise frequent repetition of the points, so that they may be easily learnt. In the exordium we should state the subject, in order that the question to be decided may not escape notice, but in the epilogue we should give a summary statement of the proofs.

We should begin by saying that we have kept our promise, and then state what we have said and why. Our case may also be closely compared with our opponent's; and we may either compare what both of us have said on the same point, or without direct comparison: "My opponent said so-and-so, and I said so-and-so on this point and for these reasons." Or ironically, as for instance, "He said this and I answered that; what would he have done, if he had proved this, and not simply that?" Or by interrogation: "What is there that has not been proved?"
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οὐ δεδεικται;” ἥ “οὗτος τί ἐδειξεν;” ἥ δὴ οὗτως ἐκ παραβολῆς, ἥ κατὰ φύσιν, ως ἐλέχθῃ, οὗτω τὰ αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάλιν, ἕαν βούλῃ, χωρὶς τὰ 6 τοῦ ἐναντίου λόγου. τελευτὴ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἀρμόττει ἢ ἀσύνθετος, ὡς ἑπιλογὸς ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος ἢ. “εἰρήκα, ἀκηκόατε, ἔχετε, κρίνατε.”

a Reading τελευτῆ, a conjecture of Victorius. With τελευτη, the sense will be: “as a conclusion, the asyndetic style is appropriate.”

b It is generally supposed that this example of a suitable
or, "What has my opponent proved?" We may, therefore, either sum up by comparison, or in the natural order of the statements, just as they were made, our own first, and then again, separately, if we so desire, what has been said by our opponent. To the conclusion of the speech the most appropriate style is that which has no connecting particles, in order that it may be a peroration, but not an oration: "I have spoken; you have heard; you know the facts; now give your decision." peroration is an echo of the conclusion of the speech of Lysias Against Eratosthenes.
SELECT GLOSSARY
OF TECHNICAL AND OTHER TERMS

[As a rule, only the meanings of words in Aristotle's "Rhetoric" are noticed, without reference to later rhetoricians.]

ἄγωνιστικός (i. 5. 14): "fit for athletic contests"; (iii. 12. 1) of style: "suited to debate" (ἄγων), including both deliberative and forensic speeches. It is opposed to γραφική, the style of compositions meant to be read.

άκριβεια (iii. 12. 5), άκριβολογία (i. 5. 15), άκριβής (iii. 17. 12): of style, "precise," "nicely finished," "highly correct"; of statements, "exact," "closely reasoned."

ἀποπλάνησις (iii. 13. 5): throwing dust in the eyes of the judge and diverting his attention from what is unfavourable; unless it is taken in a neuter sense, wandering from the subject, "digression."

ἀρμονία (iii. 1. 4): lit. joining; here, pitch or tone, accent, modulation of the voice.

ἀρχή . . . αἰτίων (i. 7. 12): the latter (cause) precedes the former (first principle or beginning). "In a plant, the seed is the ἀρχή, the power of vegetation the αἰτίων."

ἀτεχνοί (i. 2. 2; 15. 1); of proofs, those which are independent of art, being already in existence and ready for use; ἐντεχνοί are those which have to be invented by the orator: alias esse probationes quas extra dicendi rationem acciperet orator, alias quas ex causa traheret ipse et quodammodo gigneret; ideoque illas ἀτεχνοί, inartificiales, has ἐντεχνοί, artificiales, vocaret (Quint. Inst. Orat. v. 1. 8).

ἀδέξησις (i. 9. 39), αὐδητικά (i. 9. 38), αὐδέων (ii. 18. 4): "amplification." Its object is to increase the rhetorical effect and importance of a statement by intensifying the circumstances of an object or action.

αὐτοκαβδάλως (iii. 7. 2): "off-hand, lightly, at random;"
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αὐτοκάβδαλος (iii. 14. 11) is used of a hastily built ship by the poet Lycophron (see note on iii. 3. 1). It is said to be properly applied to badly kneaded meal.

ἀφελῆς (iii. 9. 5): “simple,” the equivalent of ἀπλοῦς or μονόκολος as applied to the period; that is, consisting of only one κόλον (member, clause) as opposed to the complex, which allowed more than one, but was not supposed to exceed four κόλα.

βλαίσωσις (ii. 23. 15): retortion of a dilemma upon the proposer of it: a form of enthymeme in which, from each of two contraries, some good or evil follows, each contrary to the other. The adj. βλαϊσωσ is translated (1) bow-legged, or (2) bandy-legged; but the connexion of this with the examples given is obscure. Cope suggests that the word properly means “straddling of the legs”; “legs irregularly diverging” (Welldon).

γλωττα (iii. 3. 2): an obsolete, foreign, or dialectal word, in any way out of the common, which needs to be explained.

γνώμη (ii. 21. 2): a moral maxim or sentiment; a general (not particular) statement relating to the conduct of life. Maxims are to enthymemes as premises are to syllogisms, not in the case of every enthymeme, but only those that deal with the actions and passions of ordinary life.

γραφική λέξις (iii. 12. 1): “suited for writing,” “literary,” opposed to ἀγωνιστική λ.

δείγμα (iii. 14. 6): “sample, pattern”; the prologue or proem in an epic poem or drama, so called from its giving a sample of what is to follow, thus making the hearer acquainted with the nature of the subject to be treated of.

δεικτικὰ ἐνθυμήματα (ii. 22. 14): direct arguments (as opposed e.g. to the reductio ad absurdum), the object of which is to demonstrate or explain: they are opposed to ἔλεγχικτικὰ ε., the object of which is refutation; δείξις (iii. 7. 6): “method of proof.”

δεινωσίς (ii. 21. 10): “exaggeration,” “intensification,” defined by Longinus as a form of αὔξησις; also “indignation,” or the arousing of this feeling. Cicero (De inventione, i. 53. 100) describes it as a form of speech whereby intense hatred of a person or disgust at anything is aroused.

διαλείψις (ii. 23. 10): distribution or division into parts or
heads, dealing with the different bearings of the case; in *Poetics* (1461 a 23) it is more or less equivalent to punctuation, although it includes every kind of break. \(\delta i\alpha ρέιν τῷ λόγῳ\) (iii. 18. 5) is used of giving a detailed explanation, as opposed to συντόμως, one that is concise.

\(\delta i\alpha \lambda eκτικῇ\) (i. 1. 1): logical discussion, properly by way of question and answer; here and elsewhere in Aristotle, the logic of probabilities, as opposed to strict demonstration or scientific proof (\(\alpha \pi όδειξις\)). The premises of the latter being incontrovertibly true, the conclusions drawn from them must be equally true. The premises of the dialectic syllogism and the rhetorical enthymeme on the other hand are only probable, such as appear to be true to certain persons, and therefore the conclusions drawn from them can only be probable.

Rhetoric is here stated to be a counterpart of, not absolutely identical with, Dialectic (Cicero, *Orator*, 114, quasi ex altera parte respondere *dialecticae*), since there are points of difference as well as resemblance between them. Elsewhere it is called an offshoot, or likeness, of Dialectic. Both are, theoretically, of universal application (although practically Rhetoric is limited to Politics in the widest sense, including the ethical sciences) and deal with material which to a certain extent is within the knowledge of all and belongs to no separate science. Neither has any special first principles, like those of a particular science, which cannot be transferred to another.

Dialectic proceeds by question and answer, whereas Rhetoric sets forth its ideas in a continuous speech, addressed, not to a select audience, but to a miscellaneous crowd with the object of persuading them to embrace a certain opinion. While the dialectical syllogism leads to general conclusions, the rhetorical, dealing rather with individual questions, leads to particular conclusions; for instance, whether punishment is to be inflicted in a particular case.

Both take either side of a question and are ready to prove either a negative or affirmative, whereas the conclusions of demonstrative proof are universal and necessary, and cannot be used to support one view or its opposite indifferently.

\(\delta i\α\nuοτα\) (i. 13. 17; iii. 10. 4, 5): “meaning,” “intention”;
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(ii. 26. 5; iii. 1. 7): “thought,” the logical or inventive part of Rhetoric; (iii. 16. 9): “intellectual capacity,” contrasted with the moral purpose.

διαστημή (iii. 5. 6): “to punctuate” (see διάλειπεσις).

διαπροσβή (iii. 17. 10): opportunity for dwelling on a subject (commoratio); occasion for digression.

διαγραφή (iii. 9. 7): disjointed (of style), in which the members or clauses of a period are marked off by a connecting particle.

δύναμις: (1) power, strength, of body or authority: (2) faculty, natural capacity, cleverness: (3) potentiality, virtual existence or action, as opposed to ἐνέργεια, actuality, actual existence or action.

ἐγκώμιον (i. 9. 33): eulogy of achievements, bodily or mental, distinguished from ἐπαινος, praise of virtuous qualities.

εἶδος: (1) form, appearance: (2) particular kind, sort: (3) species, as contrasted with genus: (4) “special topics.”

eἰκός (i. 2. 15): probability, a proposition in contingent matter, which is true in the greater number of cases (Envious men hate those whom they envy), but not in all. Its relation to the conclusion to be drawn is that of the universal to the particular.

εἰκών (iii. 4. 3): a metaphor with the addition of the particle of comparison “as,” “like.” Quintilian, Inst. Orat. viii. 6. 8, 9 metaphorae est brevior similitudo, eoque distat, quod illa comparatur rei, quam volumus exprimere, haec pro ipsa re dici tur.

εἰρομένη λέξις (iii. 9. 1): continuous, running style (lit. strung together), such as that of Herodotus, in which the only connexion is that of the συνδεσμοί; the sentences resemble straight lines which may be produced indefinitely, keeping an uninterrupted course.

ἐνδόσιμον (iii. 14. 1): the key-note in music; (iii. 14. 4) the key-note in a speech, almost the same as προφυμον.

ἐνέργεια (iii. 11. 2): actualization, vividness, representing things inanimate as animate (see δύναμις).

ἐνθύμησις (i. 2. 8): an enthymeme (lit. thought, argument) in the Rhetoric is a rhetorical syllogism, that is, it is drawn from probable premises and is therefore not a strictly demonstrative proof. The use of the term for a syllogism in which one of the premises is suppressed is due to a misunderstanding of the word ἀτελής [unless
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this is an interpolation], "incomplete," in Anal. Priora, ii. 29 [27]. 2, which refers to its logical value, not to its form. In the same treatise Aristotle defines an enthymeme as a syllogism from probabilities or signs (see R. C. Seaton in Classical Review, June, 1914).

ενστασις (ii. 25. 1): in logic, an objection directed not against an opponent's conclusion, but to the proposition advanced by him. This being universal if his conclusion is to be universal, the objection may be universal or particular. The establishment of the denial of one particular is sufficient to destroy the universal.

ἐντεχνοτιπάτεις (i. 2. 2): see ἄτεχνοι πίστεις.

ἐξ (ii. 12. 2): a formed and permanent habit of mind, the result of πράξεις; it tends to the production of certain actions and is bound to produce them, unless external circumstances prevent it.

ἐπαίνοις (i. 9. 33): see ἐγκώμιον.

ἐπεισόδιοιν (iii. 17. 11): to introduce an ἐπεισόδιον or accessory incident.

ἐπιεικής, ἐπιείκεια (i. 2. 4): goodness; (i. 13. 13): reasonable treatment, equity.

ἐπίθετον (iii. 2. 14; iii. 3. 3): not limited to adjectives, but used for any strengthening, descriptive, or ornamental addition (e.g. Tydides).

ἐπίλογος (iii. 13. 3): peroration, winding-up of a speech, in which the chief points are recapitulated.

ἐπιστήμη (i. 1. 1), ἐπιστήτους (ii. 24. 10): science, that which can be scientifically known, opposed to τέχνη, a system or set of rules, and to ἐμπειρία, experience, knack, without knowledge of principles.

ἐπικοδομεῖν (i. 7. 31): "building up of one phrase upon another, one rising above another step by step like the rounds of a ladder, κλίμαξ" (Cope). They are so arranged that the last important word of one is repeated as the first of the next, as in Romans, v. 3-4 Tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope. "Climax" is hardly a suitable rendering, which in modern popular language generally implies the highest point, culmination.

ἐρώτησις (iii. 18. 1): a question put to the adversary, which only requires a simple affirmative or negative answer, opposed to πέδια or πύσμα, which needs an explanation.
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εὐθήνης (ii. 12. 7): good-natured, simple, opposed to κακοθήνης;
(iii. 1. 9; 12. 2): of speeches and style, foolish, lacking force, empty.


εὐφής (i. 6. 29): possessed of good natural gifts, as distinct from powers that are the result of practice and study.

ἥδος: originally, a man’s natural bent, his habitual temper or disposition, moral character; it furnishes an indirect proof (1) from the character of the speaker, who wants to convince his hearers of his own virtue (i. 2. 3); (2) from the characters of the different forms of government (i. 8. 6) and the various conditions of men (ii. 12-17), to which different language and methods of conciliation are suitable; in style (iii. 7. 6; 16. 8, 9), from exhibiting a knowledge of and due regard for the characteristics of individuals.

ἰατρεύματα (iii. 14. 7): “correctives,” “antidotes” to the listlessness and indifference of the hearer, of general application, capable of being used in any part of a speech.

ἰδια ὄνοματα (iii. 5. 3): “specific,” opposed to περιέχομα, “general” terms.

κατασκευάζειν (ii. 24. 4): “to construct” an argument, opposed to ἀνασκευάζειν, ἀναιρεῖν, “to demolish”; (ii. 2. 27; iii. 19. 1) “to put into a certain frame of mind”; κατασκευαστικός (ii. 26. 3): “constructive.”

καταστραμμένη λέξις (iii. 9. 3): “close” or periodic style, in which the period, as distinguished from sentences in the εἰρόμενη λ., resembles a circular line, which returns and ends at a certain point.

κύριος (i. 1. 11; i. 8. 1, 2; 15. 9, 21): “authoritative,” “effective”; (i. 3. 4) “opportune,” “appropriate”; (iii. 2. 2) of words, “established,” “vernacular,” used in their natural sense, opposed to “foreign,” figurative, or archaic words, in fact, to any that are unusual or out of the common.

κώλον (iii. 9. 5): “member,” “clause,” a subdivision of the period.

λεκτικός (iii. 8. 4): belonging to the language of ordinary life and conversation.

λατός (iii. 16. 2): lit. smooth: of style, “plain,” “unadorned.”

λόγος: “speech,” “oration”; (iii. 6. 1) “description,” “de-
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finiton," opposed to ὁνομα, the noun or term; (iii. 2. 7) prose; (ii. 20. 2) "story," "fable"; (ii. 2. 18) "consideration," "prose; (ii. 20. 2) "story," "fable"; (ii. 1. 8. 7) "account," "account," 

(άγγελις εν μηδέν εύναι).

μαλακόν (i. 10. 4): "effeminate"; (ii. 17. 4) "mild," "unim-

μέγεθος (i. 5. 13) "stature," (iii. 1. 4) of style, "grandeur.

μειών (i. 18. 4): "to extenuate," "deprecate," opposed to
amείων, μύοινος (iii. 9. 6): "docked," "curtailed," of a

clause or period which seems to end too soon.

μειρακιώδης (iii. 11. 16): of style, characterized by youthful

force and vehemence and therefore not becoming to the

old. In other rhetorical writers, "puerile.

μείωσις (μειών, ii. 18. 4; 26. 1): "depreciation," "extenua-
tion," opposed to αὔξησις, αὔξειν.

μετανάστης (ii. 2. 6): "immigrant," "vagrant," opposed to a

native. It appears to be the same as the later μέτοικος
(resident alien): cp. Politics. iii. 5. 9, where ἀτύμητος is

explained as "having no share of office." It might also

mean "of no value," one whom anybody could kill with

impunity (see Leaf on Iliad, ix. 648).

μεταφορά (iii. 10. 7): "transference," "metaphor." "Meta-

phor is the application to a thing of a name that belongs
to something else, the transference taking place from

genus to species, from species to genus, from species to

species, or proportionally " (Poetics, 21).

μέτρον: "metre," "measure": see ρυθμός.

μυόκουλος (iii. 9. 5): of a period, consisting of only one

clause or member.

νόμος: sometimes used in the sense of "convention," as

opposed to φύσις.

ὁγκός (iii. 6. 1): "weight," "importance," "dignity." It

also has the sense of "bombast" (Longinus, iii. 4).

οἶκειός (i. 5. 7): "one's own," that which one can dispose of

as one wishes; (i. 4. 12), that which is peculiar to some-
things, as to a form of government; (iii. 2. 6; 7. 4): of

style and the use of words, "appropriate," much the same

as κόρος.

ὁμονομία (ii. 24. 2; iii. 2. 7): the use of words in an equivocal

sense and such words themselves, i.e. those that have the

same sound but a different sense.

ὁνομα: as a general term, includes nouns, adjectives, articles,
and pronouns; as a special term, “noun” opposed to “verb.”

πάθος, πάσχειν (ii. 16, 1, 2): mental condition or affection generally; (ii. 1, 8; iii. 17, 8), “passion,” “emotion”; (i. 2, 1) “quality,” “property” of things; (i. 9, 15) “suffering”; (iii. 7, 3) a pathetic style; so παθητική λέξις and παθητικά λέγειν.

παραβολή (iii. 19, 5): “placing side by side,” “comparison”; (ii. 20, 4) “illustration.”

παράδειγμα (ii. 20, 1, 2): “example,” “instance,” including both the historical (παραβολή) and the fictitious (λόγος); (i. 2, 8) proof from example, “rhetorical induction,” contrasted with ἐνθύμημα.

παράλογος (i. 13, 16): “beyond calculation,” “unexpected;” παραλογίζεσθαι (i. 14, 1), “to cheat,” “defraud”; (ii. 24, 4) “to reason falsely, or be led astray by false reasoning” (also in an active sense); παραλογιστικός (i. 9, 29), “fallacious,” παραλογισμός (iii. 12, 4), “fallacy.”

παρίσωσις (iii. 9, 9): “balancing of clauses;” πάρισος, of a clause, “exactly balanced.”

παρομοίωσις (iii. 9, 9): “making like,” “assimilation” of sounds at the beginning or end of clauses.

πεποιημένον δύναμ (iii. 2, 5): a word coined or invented for the occasion.

περίοδος (iii. 9, 3): a complete sentence, composed of several clauses, from one full stop to another; π. τῆς γῆς (i. 4, 13): a traveller’s description of the countries visited by him.

περιπέτεια (i. 11, 24): sudden change or reverse of fortune

In tragedy, the word implies “a complete change or reversal of situation within the limits of a single scene or act” (Bywater on Poetics, 10).

πίστις (i. 14, 5): pledge of good faith, distinguished from ὅρκος and δέξια; (i. 1, 11, and elsewhere): means of persuasion, “probable” opposed to “demonstrative” proof.

πράκτικός (i. 6, 11): “able to do,” followed by the genitive, unless here it be translated “efficient,” “practical,” not connected grammatically with τῶν ἄγαθῶν.


προοίμιον (i. 1, 9; iii. 14, 1): “preamble,” “exordium,” compared to the πρόλογος in tragedy and comedy, “all that
GLOSSARY

part of the play which comes before the first song of the chorus” (Poetics, 12. 4).

πρότασις (i. 3. 7): “proposition,” “premise” of a syllogism; combined with δόξα, “notion,” “popular opinion” as useful for producing persuasion (ii. 1. 1).

πτώσις (i. 7. 27): used by Aristotle as a general term for the inflexions, not only of a noun, but also of a verb, generally marked by a difference of form; thus, the adjective χαλκώς from χαλκός (iii. 9. 9) and the adverb ἄνδρεως from ἄνδρια (i. 7. 27) are instances of “inflexions” (Bywater on Poetics, 20. 10).

ῥήμα: (1) generally, that which is spoken; (2) grammatically, a verb as opposed to a noun (ὅρμα). The term also appears to be applied to an adjective when used as a predicate.

ῥητορική: see διαλεκτική.

ῥυθμός (iii. 1. 4, 8. 2): “time”; in general, any regular, harmonious movement, in sound or motion, which can be measured by number; thus, it may be applied to the tramp of a body of soldiers, the flapping of birds’ wings, the dance, music, and writing, in the last expressed in long and short syllables. “Rhythm consists of certain lengths of time, while metre is determined by the order in which these lengths are placed. Consequently, the one seems to be concerned with quantity, the other with quality [the syllables must be in a certain order] . . . rhythm has unlimited space over which it may range, whereas the spaces of metre are confined; . . . further, metre is concerned with words alone, while rhythm extends also to the motion of the body” (Quintilian, Inst. Orat. ix. 4. 45, Loeb Series translation).

σαφής λέξις (iii. 2. 1): “clear,” “perspicuous,” defined (iii. 12. 6) as the mean between ἀδολεσχία (garrulity, prolixity) and σωτομῆλα (excessive conciseness).

σεμνή λέξις (iii. 2. 2): “noble,” “majestic,” “dignified.”

σημείον (i. 2. 16): “sign,” a probable argument as proof of a conclusion. Signs are of two kinds, one having the relation of particular to universal, the other that of universal to particular. τεκμήριον, on the other hand, is a necessary sign, and such signs can be made into a demonstrative syllogism, which cannot be refuted. Thus, “sign” is both a general and special term. As a general
term, it embraces the τεκμήρια; as a special term, the two kinds of signs, which are capable of refutation.

σολοίκος (ii. 16. 2): “one who offends against good taste or manners”; also one who speaks incorrectly (σολοικίζειν, iii. 5. 7).


στοιχεῖον (ii. 22. 13; 26. 1): “element” of an enthymeme, identified by Aristotle with τόπος.

στρογγύλος (ii. 21. 7): “rounded”; of style, “terse,” “compact.”

συκοφαντία (ii. 24. 10): “false accusation,” here used for “sophism,” a specious but fallacious argument.

σύμβολον (iii. 15. 9, 16. 10): “sign,” “token”; not to be confused with σύμβολη (i. 4. 11), “contract.” σύμβολον itself elsewhere = mutual covenant.

συνάγειν (i. 2. 13; ii. 22. 3, 15): “to conclude,” “draw an inference”: (iii. 11. 12) “draw together,” “contract.”

σύνδεσμος (iii. 5. 2): “connecting particle”: it includes the preposition, the copulative conjunctions, and certain particles.

συνετραμμένως (ii. 24. 2): “twisted up,” “compactly” (cp. συντρέφειν, iii. 18. 4).

σύστοιχα (i. 7. 27): “conjugates,” “co-ordinates”: λέγεται δὲ σύστοιχα μὲν τὰ τοιάδε ὅλον τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὁ δίκαιος τῇ δίκαιον-σύνῃ καὶ τὰ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τῷ ἀνδρίᾳ (Topics, ii. 9. 1).

σχέτλαισμός (ii. 21. 10): “passionate complaint” of injustice or ill-fortune: one of the parts of the peroration, in which we endeavour to secure the commiseration of the hearer, the first thing necessary being to put him into a sympathetic and pitying frame of mind (Forcellini, s.v. con-questio).

σχῆμα (ii. 24. 2; iii. 8. 1): “form,” “figure” of a speech. It does not correspond to the modern expression “figure of speech,” but is an “attitude” or “turn of meaning given to the language when it comes to be actually spoken” . . . “a difference of sense resulting from a difference of some kind in the mode of enunciation” (Bywater, Poetics, 19. 7).

τάξις (iii. 13-19): the arrangement or distribution of the parts of a speech.

ταπεινή λέξις (iii. 2. 1): “low,” “poor,” “mean”; in a moral sense, “base,” “vile” (ταπεινότης, ii. 6. 10).
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τεκμήριον (i. 2. 16, 17): see σημεῖον.

tέχνη (i. 1. 3): set of rules, "handbook" of Rhetoric; elsewhere of the "tricks" of rhetoricians; τεχνολογεῖν (i. 1. 9): to bring under the rules of art, reduce to a system.

τόπος (ii. 26. 1): lit., a place to look for a store of something, and the store itself; a heading or department, containing a number of rhetorical arguments of the same kind (τόπος έις δ' πολλὰ ἐνθυμῆματα ἐμπληκτεί). These are all classified and placed where they can be easily found ready for use. τόποι are of two kinds: (1) κοινοὶ τόποι ("commonplaces") or simply τόποι, the topics common to the three kinds of Rhetoric (i. 2. 21; ii. 18. 3-5); (2) εἴδη or ίδια (i. 2. 21), specific topics, propositions of limited applicability, chiefly derived from Ethics and Politics.

υπάρκσις (iii. 1. 3): "delivery" of a speech, under which declamation, gesticulation, expression, and everything connected with acting are included; υποκρήτικη λέξις (iii. 12. 2), "style suited for delivery," "lending itself to acting"; [τέχνη] (iii. 1. 7): "the art of acting."

χώρα (iii. 17. 15): "room" for our own arguments as well as those of the adversary in the hearer's mind, "to get a footing" for what we are going to say; (ii. 24. 2): the proper place, province.

ψιλός (iii. 2. 3): "bare," "bald," of prose as opposed to poetry.

ψυχρός (iii. 3. 1): "cold," "frigid," "insipid." As a noun, τὸ ψυχρόν means generally any defect of style as opposed to ἄρετή λέξεως.
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