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PLATO
WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

IV
LACHES PROTAGORAS MENO
EUTHYDEMUS

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The special introductions are intended merely to prepare the reader for the general character and purpose of each dialogue.

W. R. M. Lamb.
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Plato was born in 427 B.C. of Athenian parents who could provide him with the best education of the day, and ample means and leisure throughout his life. He came to manhood in the dismal close of the Peloponnesian War, when Aristophanes was at the height of his success, and Sophocles and Euripides had produced their last plays. As a boy he doubtless heard the lectures of Gorgias, Protagoras, and other sophists, and his early bent seems to have been towards poetry. But his intelligence was too progressive to rest in the agnostic position on which the sophistic culture was based. A century before, Heracleitus had declared knowledge to be impossible, because the objects of sense are continually changing; yet now a certain Cratylus was trying to build a theory of knowledge over the assertion of flux, by developing some hints let fall by its oracular author about the truth contained in names. From this influence Plato passed into contact with Socrates, whose character and gifts have left a singular impress on the thought of mankind. This effect is almost wholly due to Plato's applications and extensions of
his master's thought; since, fortunately for us, the pupil not only became a teacher in his turn, but brought his artistic genius into play, and composed the memorials of philosophic talk which we know as the Dialogues. Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Aeschines were other disciples of Socrates who drew similar sketches of his teaching: the suggestion came from the "mimes" of the Syracusan Sophron,—realistic studies of conversation between ordinary types of character. As Plato became more engrossed in the Socratic speculations, this artistic impulse was strengthened by the desire of recording each definite stage of thought as a basis for new discussion and advance.

When Plato was twenty years old, Socrates was over sixty, and had long been notorious in Athens for his peculiar kind of sophistry. In the Phaedo he tells how he tried, in his youth, the current scientific explanations of the universe, and found them full of puzzles. He then met with the theory of Anaxagoras,—that the cause of everything is "mind." This was more promising: but it led nowhere after all, since it failed to rise above the conception of physical energy; this "mind" showed no intelligent aim. Disappointed of an assurance that the universe works for the best, Socrates betook himself to the plan of making definitions of "beautiful," "good," "large," and so on, as qualities observed in the several classes of beautiful, good and large material things, and then employing these propositions, if they
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appeared to be sound, for the erection of higher hypotheses. The point is that he made a new science out of a recognized theory of "ideas" or "forms," which had come of reflecting on the quality predicated when we say "this man is good," and which postulates some sure reality behind the fleeting objects of sense. His "hypothetical" method, familiar to mathematicians, attains its full reach and significance in the Republic.

The Pythagoreans who appear in the intimate scene of the Phaedo were accustomed to the theory of ideas, and were a fit audience for the highest reasonings of Socrates on the true nature of life and the soul. For some years before the master's death (399 B.C.) Plato, if not a member of their circle, was often a spell-bound hearer of the "satyr." But ordinary Athenians had other views of Socrates, which varied according to their age and the extent of their acquaintance with him. Aristophanes' burlesque in the Clouds (423 B.C.) had left a common impression not unlike what we have of the King of Laputa. Yet the young men who had any frequent speech with him in his later years, while they felt there was something uncanny about him, found an irresistible attraction in his simple manner, his humorous insight into their ways and thoughts, and his fervent eloquence on the principles of their actions and careers. He kept no school, and took no fees; he distrusted the pretensions of the regular sophists, with whom he was carelessly confounded; moreover, he professed
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to have no knowledge himself, except so far as to know that he was ignorant. The earliest Dialogues, such as the Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Charmides, Laches and Lysis, show the manner in which he performed his ministry. In rousing men, especially those whose minds were fresh, to the need of knowing themselves, he promoted the authority of the intellect, the law of definite individual knowledge, above all reason of state or tie of party; and it is not surprising that his city, in the effort of recovering her political strength, decided to hush such an inconvenient voice. He must have foreseen his fate, but he continued his work undeterred.

Though he seems, in his usual talk, to have professed no positive doctrine, there were one or two beliefs which he frequently declared. Virtue, he said, is knowledge; for each man's good is his happiness, and once he knows it clearly, he needs must choose to ensue it. Further, this knowledge is innate in our minds, and we only need to have it awakened and exercised by "dialectic," or a systematic course of question and answer. He also believed his mission to be divinely ordained, and asserted that his own actions were guided at times by the prohibitions of a "spiritual sign." He was capable, as we find in the Symposium, of standing in rapt meditation at any moment for some time, and once for as long as twenty-four hours.

It is clear that, if he claimed no comprehensive theory of existence, and although his ethical reliance
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on knowledge, if he never analysed it, leaves him in a very crude stage of psychology, his logical and mystical suggestions must have led his favourite pupils a good way towards a new system of metaphysics. These intimates learnt, as they steeped their minds in his, and felt the growth of a unique affection amid the glow of enlightenment, that happiness may be elsewhere than in our dealings with the material world, and that the mind has prerogatives and duties far above the sphere of civic life.

After the death of Socrates in 399, Plato spent some twelve years in study and travel. For the first part of this time he was perhaps at Megara, where Eucleides, his fellow-student and friend, was forming a school of dialectic. Here he may have composed some of the six Dialogues already mentioned as recording Socrates’ activity in Athens. Towards and probably beyond the end of this period, in order to present the Socratic method in bolder conflict with sophistic education, he wrote the *Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus*, and *Gorgias*. These works show a much greater command of dramatic and literary art, and a deeper interest in logic. The last of them may well be later than 387, the year in which, after an all but disastrous attempt to better the mind of Dionysius of Syracuse, he returned to Athens, and, now forty years of age, founded the Academy; where the memory of his master was to be perpetuated by continuing and expanding the
Socratic discussions among the elect of the new generation. The rivalry of this private college with the professional school of Isocrates is discernible in the subject and tone of the *Gorgias*. Plato carried on the direction of the Academy till his death, at eighty-one, in 346; save that half-way through this period (367) he accepted the invitation of his friend Dion to undertake the instruction of the younger Dionysius at Syracuse. The elder tyrant had been annoyed by the Socratic freedom of Plato's talk: now it was a wayward youth who refused the yoke of a systematic training. What that training was like we see in the *Republic*, where true political wisdom is approached by an arduous ascent through mathematics, logic, and metaphysics. Plato returned, with less hopes of obtaining the ideal ruler, to make wonderful conquests in the realm of thought.

The *Meno* and *Gorgias* set forth the doctrine that knowledge of right is latent in our minds: dialectic, not the rhetoric of the schools, is the means of eliciting it. The method, as Plato soon perceived, must be long and difficult: but he felt a mystical rapture over its certainty, which led him to picture the immutable "forms" as existing in a world of their own. This feeling, and the conviction whence it springs—that knowledge is somehow possible, had come to the front of his mind when he began to know Socrates. Two brilliant compositions, the *Cratylus* and *Symposium*, display the strength of the conviction, and then, the noble fervour of the
feeling. In the latter of these works, the highest powers of imaginative sympathy and eloquence are summoned to unveil the sacred vision of absolute beauty. The *Phaedo* turns the logical theory upon the soul, which is seen to enjoy, when freed from the body, familiar cognition of the eternal types of being. Here Orphic dogma lends its aid to the Socratic search for knowledge, while we behold an inspiring picture of the philosopher in his hour of death.

With increasing confidence in himself as the successor of Socrates, Plato next undertook, in the *Republic*, to show the master meeting his own unsatisfied queries on education and politics. We read now of a "form" of good to which all thought and action aspire, and which, contemplated in itself, will explain not merely why justice is better than injustice, but the meaning and aim of everything. In order that man may be fully understood, we are to view him "writ large" in the organization of an ideal state. The scheme of description opens out into many subsidiary topics, including three great proposals already known to Greece,—the abolition of private property, the community of women and children, and the civic equality of the sexes. But the central subject is the preparation of the philosopher, through a series of ancillary sciences, for dialectic; so that, once possessed of the supreme truth, he may have light for directing his fellow-men. As in the *Phaedo*, the spell of mythical revelation is
brought to enhance the discourse of reason. The *Phaedrus* takes up the subject of rhetoric, to lead us allegorically into the realm of “ideas,” and thence to point out a new rhetoric, worthy of the well-trained dialectician. We get also a glimpse of the philosopher’s duty of investigating the mutual relations of the “forms” to which his study of particular things has led him.

A closer interest in logical method, appearing through his delight in imaginative construction, is one distinctive mark of this middle stage in Plato’s teaching. As he passes to the next two Dialogues, the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*, he puts off the aesthetic rapture, and considers the ideas as categories of thought which require co-ordination. The discussion of knowledge in the former makes it evident that the Academy was now the meeting-place of vigorous minds, some of which were eager to urge or hear refuted the doctrines they had learnt from other schools of thought; while the arguments are conducted with a critical caution very different from the brilliant and often hasty zeal of Socrates. The *Parmenides* corrects an actual or possible misconception of the theory of ideas in the domain of logic, showing perhaps how Aristotle, now a youthful disciple of Plato, found fault with the theory as he understood it. The forms are viewed in the light of the necessities of thought: knowledge is to be attained by a careful practice which will raise our minds to the vision of all parti-
culars in their rightly distinguished and connected classes.

Plato is here at work on his own great problem:—
If what we know is a single permanent law under which a multitude of things are ranged, what is the link between the one and the many? The *Sophist* contains some of his ripest thought on this increasingly urgent question: his confident advance beyond Socratic teaching is indicated by the literary form, which hardly disguises the continuous exposition of a lecture. We observe an attention to physical science, the association of soul, motion, and existence, and the comparative study of being and not-being. The *Politicus* returns to the topic of state-government, and carries on the process of acquiring perfect notions of reality by the classification of things. Perhaps we should see in the absolute "mean" which is posited as the standard of all arts, business, and conduct, a contribution from Aristotle. The *Philebus*, in dealing with pleasure and knowledge, dwells further on the correct division and classification required if our reason, as it surely must, is to apprehend truth. The method is becoming more thorough and more complex, and Plato's hope of bringing it to completion is more remote. But he is gaining a clearer insight into the problem of unity and plurality.

The magnificent myth of the *Timaeus*, related by a Pythagorean, describes the structure of the universe, so as to show how the One manifests
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itself as the Many. We have here the latest reflections of Plato on space, time, soul, and many physical matters. In the lengthy treatise of the *Laws*, he addresses himself to the final duty of the philosopher as announced in the *Republic*: a long habituation to abstract thought will qualify rather than disqualify him for the practical regulation of public and private affairs. Attention is fixed once more on soul, as the energy of the world and the vehicle of our sovereign reason.

Thus Plato maintains the fixity of the objects of knowledge in a great variety of studies, which enlarge the compass of Socrates' teaching till it embraces enough material for complete systems of logic and metaphysics. How far these systems were actually worked out in the discussions of the Academy we can only surmise from the Dialogues themselves and a careful comparison of Aristotle; whose writings, however, have come down to us in a much less perfect state. But it seems probable that, to the end, Plato was too fertile in thought to rest content with one authoritative body of doctrine. We may be able to detect in the *Timaeus* a tendency to view numbers as the real principles of things; and we may conjecture a late-found interest in the physical complexion of the world. As a true artist, with a keen sense of the beauty and stir of life, Plato had this interest, in a notable degree, throughout: but in speaking of his enthusiasm for science we must regard him rather as a great inventor of
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sciences than as what we should now call a scientist. This is giving him a splendid name, which few men have earned. Some of his inventions may be unrealizable, but it is hard to find one that is certainly futile. There are flaws in his arguments: to state them clearly and fairly is to win the privilege of taking part in a discussion at the Academy.

W. R. M. Lamb.

[Note.—Each of the Dialogues is a self-contained whole. The order in which they have been mentioned in this Introduction is that which agrees best in the main with modern views of Plato's mental progress, though the succession in some instances is uncertain.]
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LACHES
INTRODUCTION TO THE LACHES

This dialogue is so simple and clear that it requires but little preparatory comment, and indeed is in itself an excellent introduction to the Socratic method of probing the primary difficulties of any moral question. Two eminent generals, Nicias and Laches, are consulted by two old men, Lysimachus and Melesias, who, though their own fathers were Aristeides the Just and the elder Thucydides, are at a loss to know what is the best education for their sons. The four friends have just witnessed an exhibition of fighting in armour, and the immediate question is whether the boys ought to learn this new accomplishment. Socrates, now about fifty years old, is invited to join in the discussion; and after modestly disclaiming, in his usual manner, any knowledge of the subject, he turns the talk into an investigation of the nature of courage. Henceforward the argument is between Nicias, Laches, and Socrates: it soon passes from military to moral courage; and Nicias, working from a definition which he has previously heard from Socrates, suggests that courage is knowledge of what is to be dreaded. But this excludes animals and children, and Socrates points out that what is required

1 The aristocratic opponent of Pericles: see Meno 94c (note).
INTRODUCTION TO THE LACHES

is a knowledge of good and evil alike in the past, the present, and the future,—in fact, an equivalent of all the moral virtues together (199). Thus they find themselves as far as ever from knowing what courage may be, and there is nothing for it but to go to school themselves with the boys.

The supposed time of the conversation is about 420 B.C., and Plato's main purpose in composing the piece seems to have been to show Socrates' manner of dealing with distinguished men who are older than himself, and who soon recognize in him an intellectual acuteness at least equal to the steadfast courage that has already won the admiration of Laches. The characters of the two generals are lightly but firmly drawn: Nicias is interested in the military possibilities of the new mode of fighting, and wishes to have some reasoned discussion upon it; Laches is less intelligent, and bluntly dismisses it as a fashion evidently rejected by the Lacedaemonians. His gradual conversion from this state of impatient prejudice to a more philosophic attitude is admirably presented. On the artistic side we may also notice the charming dramatic touches by which Lysimachus's recognition of Socrates as a friend of his family is contrived (180-1); the humorous story told by Laches of the sad plight of Stesilaus in a naval engagement (183-4); and Nicias's friendly sketch of Socrates' artful way of conducting an argument (187-8). Philosophically, the result of the discussion appears to be nil; but the emphasis throughout is rather on the process of the Socratic "midwifery" or assistance in bringing correct notions to birth. In particular we should observe the care bestowed on evolving the general notion of a quality,
as distinct from its various concrete instances (191–2), and the insistence on the universality of knowledge, which must somehow embrace all the virtues, and can suffer no limitation in point of time. The way is thus prepared for the doctrine of the permanence and invariability of the true objects of knowledge.
ΔΑΧΗΣ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΑΝΔΡΕΙΑΣ· ΜΑΙΕΤΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΔΤΣΙΜΑΧΟΣ, ΜΕΛΗΣΙΑΣ, ΝΙΚΙΑΣ, ΛΑΧΗΣ, ΠΑΙΔΕΣ
ΔΤΣΙΜΑΧΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΛΗΣΙΟΥ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ

St. Η
p. 178

λγ. Τεθέασθε μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα μαχόμενον ἐν ὀπλοῖς, ὡς Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης· οὗ δ' ἕνεκα ὑμᾶς ἐκελεύσαμεν συνθεάσασθαι ἐγώ τε καὶ Μελησίας οδε, τότε μὲν οὐκ εἴπομεν, νῦν δ' ἐροῦμεν. Ἡγούμεθα γὰρ χρῆναι πρός γε ὑμᾶς παρρησιάζεσθαι. εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες οἱ τῶν τοιούτων καταγελῶσι, καὶ εἰάν τις αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύσῃται, οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν αὐ νοοῦσιν, Β ἀλλὰ στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ συμβουλευομένου ἄλλα λέγουσι παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν δόξαν· ὑμᾶς δὲ ἢμεῖς ἡγησάμενοι καὶ ἰκανοὺς γνῶναι καὶ γνώντας ἀπλῶς ἃν εἴπειν ἂ δοκεῖ ὑμῖν, οὔτω παρελάβομεν ἐπὶ τὴν συμβουλὴν περὶ ὧν μέλλομεν ἀνακοινωθῆναι. ἔστων οὖν τούτο, περὶ οὖ πάλαι τοσαῦτα προοι-

179 μιᾶςματι, τόδε. ἦμιν εἰσὶν νίεῖς οὕτω, ὁδε μὲν τοῦτο, πάππον ἔχων ὀνόμα Θουκυδίδης, ἐμὸς δὲ αὐτό ὁδὲ παππῶν δὲ καὶ οὕτος ὄνομ' ἔχει τούμοιν

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LACHES
[or ON COURAGE: "obstetric"]

CHARACTERS

Lysimachus, Melesias, Nicias, Laches, Sons of
Lysimachus and Melesias, Socrates

LYS. You have seen the performance of the man
fighting in armour, Nicias and Laches; but my friend
Melesias and I did not tell you at the time our reason
for requesting you to come and see it with us. How-
ever, we will tell you now; for we think we should
speak our minds freely to friends like you. Some
people, of course, pour ridicule on such appeals, and
when consulted for their advice will not say what
they think, but something different, making the
inquirer's wishes their aim, and speaking against
their own judgement. But you, we consider, not
merely have the necessary discernment but will give
us the benefit of it in telling us just what is in your
minds; and hence we have enlisted your counsel
on the question which we are about to lay before
you. Now the matter about which I have made all
this long preamble is this: we have two sons here,
my friend that one, called Thucydides after his
grandfather, and I this one; he also is named in
πατρὸς: Ἀριστείδην γὰρ αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν. ἦμιν οὖν τούτων δέδοκται ἐπιμεληθῆναι ὡς οἴον τε μάλιστα, καὶ μή ποιῆσαι ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ, ἐπειδὴ μειράκια γέγονεν, ἀνείναι αὐτοὺς ὃ τι βούλονται ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄρχεσθαι αὐτῶν ἐπιμελεῖ B λείσθαι καὶ θ᾽ ὅσον ὦτι τ᾽ ἐσμέν· εἰδότες οὖν καὶ ὦμιν νεῖσις ὄντας ἡγησάμεθα μεμεληκέναι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἴπερ τισιν ἄλλοις, πῶς ἂν θεραπευθέντες γένοιτο ἄριστοι· εἰ δὲ ἀρὰ πολλάκις μὴ προσεχήκατε τὸν νοῦν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, ὑπομνήσοντες ὅτι οὐ χρῆ αὐτοῦ ἀμελεῖν, καὶ παρακαλοῦντες ὦμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπιμελεῖαν τινα ποιῆσασθαι τῶν νείσων κοινὴ μεθ᾽ ἦμῶν.

"Οθεν δὲ ἦμιν ταῦτ᾽ ἐδοξεῖν, ὥς Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης, χρῆ ἀκοῦσαι, καὶ ἦ ὀλίγῳ μακρότερα. συστοίμειν γὰρ δὴ ἐγὼ τε καὶ Μελησίας οὖν, C καὶ ἦμιν τὰ μειράκια παρασιτεῖ. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἀρχόμενοι εἰπον τοῦ λόγου, παρρησιασώμεθα πρὸς ὦμᾶς. ἦμιν γὰρ ἐκάτεροι περὶ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ πατρὸς πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἐχει λέγειν πρὸς τοὺς νεανίσκους, καὶ ὥσα ἐν πολέμῳ εἰργάσαστο καὶ ὥσα ἐν εἰρήνῃ, διωικοῦντες τὰ τῶν συμμάχων καὶ τὰ τῆς τῆς πόλεως· ἦμετερα δὲ αὐτῶν ἔργα οὐδ-έτεροι ἐχει λέγειν. ταῦτα δὴ ὑποσχυμώμεθα τε τούσδε καὶ αἰτιώμεθα τοὺς πατέρας ἦμῶν, ὅτι D ἦμις μὲν εἰὼν τρυφῶν, ἐπειδῆ μειράκια ἐγενόμεθα, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων πράγματα ἐπραττοῦν· καὶ τοῦσδὲ τοῖς νεανίσκοις αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐνδεικνύμεθα, λέγοντες ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ἄμελήσουσιν ἑαυτῶν καὶ μὴ πείσονται ἦμῖν, ἀκλεεὶς γενήσονται, εἰ δὲ ἐπιμελήσονται,
the same way, after my father; we call him Aristeides. Well, we have resolved to give them our most constant care, and not—as most fathers do when their boys begin to be young men—let them run loose as their fancy leads them, but begin forthwith taking every possible care of them. Now, knowing that you too have sons, we thought that you above all men must have concerned yourselves with the question of the kind of upbringing that would make the best of them; and if by any chance you have not given your attention to the subject, we would remind you that it ought not to be neglected, and we invite you to join us in arranging some way of taking care of our sons.

How we formed this resolve, Nicias and Laches, is worth hearing, even though the story be somewhat long. My friend Melesias and I take our meals together, and our boys share our table. Now, as I said at the beginning of my remarks, we are going to speak quite freely to you. Each of us has many noble deeds of his own father to relate to these young fellows—their numerous achievements both in war and in peace, when they were managing the affairs either of the allies or of this city; but neither of us has any deeds of his own to tell. We cannot help feeling ashamed that our boys should observe this, and we blame our fathers for leaving us to indulge ourselves when we began to be young men, while they looked after other folks' affairs; and we point the moral of it all to these young people, telling them that if they are careless of themselves and will not take our advice they will win no reputation, but if they take due pains they may very likely

1 μειράκιον is applied to youths from 15 to 21.
τάχ’ ἂν τῶν ὅνομάτων ἄξιοι γένοιτο ἡ ἔχουσιν. οὕτωι μὲν οὐν φασὶ πείσεσθαι· ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ τούτο σκοποῦμεν, τί ἂν οὕτωι μαθόντες ἡ ἐπιτηδεύσαντες ὦτι ἂριστοι γένοιτο. εἰσηγήσατο οὖν τις ἡμῖν Ε καὶ τούτο τὸ μάθημα, ὥστε καλὸν εἰς τῷ νέῳ μαθεῖν ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι· καὶ ἐπίνει τούτον ὦν νῦν ἡμεῖς ὑθέασασθε ἐπιτεικνύμενον, κατ’ ἐκέλευε θεάσασθαι. ἐδοξε δὴ χρῆναι αὐτοῦς τε ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ θέαν τάνδρος καὶ ύμάς συμπαραλαβεῖν ἀμα μὲν συνθετάς, ἀμα δὲ συμβούλους τε καὶ κοινωνοὺς, ἔαν βούλησθε, περὶ τῆς τῶν νυὲων ἐπιμελείας.

180 ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐβουλόμεθα ὑμῖν ἀνακοινώσασθαι. ἦδη οὖν ὑμετέροι μέρος συμβουλεύειν καὶ περὶ τούτο τοῦ μαθήματος, εἴτε δοκεῖ χρῆναι μαθανά- νειν εἴτε μή, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ τι ἔχετε ἐπανέσαι μάθημα νέῳ ἄνδρι ἡ ἐπιτήδευμα, καὶ περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας λέγειν ὄποιον τι ποιήσετε.

Π. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὁ Λυσίμαχος καὶ Μελησία, ἐπαίνῳ τε ὑμῶν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ κοινωνεῖν ἐτοιμος, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Λάχητα τόνδε.

Β ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ γὰρ οἶει, ὡ Νικία. ὡς ὁ γε ἔλεγεν ὁ Λυσίμαχος ἀρτι περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ Μελησίου, πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ εὐ εἰρήσαθαι καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνος καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς καὶ εἰς ἄπαντας ὅσοι τὰ τῶν πόλεων πρᾶττουσιν, ὅτι αὐτοῖς σχεδὸν τι ταῦτα συμβαίνει, ὁ οὕτως λέγει, καὶ περὶ παιδάς καὶ περὶ τάλλα, τὰ ἵδια ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἁμελῶς δια- τίθεσθαι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καλῶς λέγεις, ὡ Λυσί-μαχε· ὅτι ο’ ἡμᾶς μὲν συμβούλους παρακαλεῖς.
LACHES

come to be worthy of the names they bear. Now they, for their part, say they will do as we bid; so we are now considering what lessons or pursuits will lead them to the highest attainable excellence. Someone directed us to this particular accomplishment of fighting in armour, as being an admirable one for a young man to learn; and he praised that man whose performance you were just watching, and then urged us to go and see him. So we decided that it would be well to go and see the man ourselves, and to take you along with us not merely as companions at the show, but also as counsellors and co-partners, if you will be so good, in the matter of looking after our sons. That is the question which we wanted to discuss with you. And we look to you now, on your part, to give us your advice, first as to whether you think this accomplishment should be learnt or not, and then as to any other such art or pursuit that you can recommend for a young man; and also, how you feel inclined as regards our partnership.

NIC. For myself, Lysimachus and Melesias, I highly approve of your purpose, and am ready to lend a hand; and I may say the same, I think, for Laches here.

LACH. Yes, you think truly, Nicias. For that remark which Lysimachus made just now about his father and the father of Melesias was very apposite, in my opinion, not only to them but to us and to all who deal with public affairs: it is practically the rule with them, as he says, to treat their private concerns, whether connected with children or anything else, in a slighting, careless spirit. You are quite right in saying that, Lysimachus; but to invite
ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν νεανίσκων παιδείαν, Σωκράτη δὲ τόνδε οὐ παρακαλεῖς, θαυμάζω, πρῶτον μὲν ὡντα δημότην, ἐπειτα ἐνταῦθα αἰεὶ τὰς διατριβὰς ποιοῦμεν, ὅτι τί ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων ἢν σὺ ζητεῖς περὶ τοὺς νέους ἢ μάθημα ἢ ἐπιτήδευμα καλὸν.

α. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Λάχης; Σωκράτης γὰρ ὁδε τῶν τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμέλειαν πεποίηται;

λα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Δυσίμαχε.

ν1. Τούτο μὲν σοι κἂν ἐγώ ἐχομι εἰπεῖν οὐ χείρον Λάχητος· καί γὰρ αὐτῷ μοι ἐναγχος

δ ἀνδρὰ προδότης τῷ οὐ εἰς διδάσκαλον μουσικῆς; Ἀγαθοκλέους μαθητήν Λάμωνα, ἀνδρῶν χαριστάτων οὐ μόνον τὴν μουσικῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τάλλα ὁπόσον βουλεί ἄξιον συνδιατρίβειν τηλικοῦτως νεανίσκους.

αχ. Οὕτω, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Νικία καὶ Λάχης, οἱ ἥλικοι ἐγὼ ἐτι γυγνώσκομεν τοὺς νεωτέρους, ἀτε κατ’ οἴκιαν τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβοντες ύπὸ τῆς ἥλικίας. ἀλλ' εἰ τι καὶ σὺ, ὦ παῖ Σωφρονίσκου, ἔχεις τῶς τῶν σαυτοῦ δημότης ἀγαθὸν

ε συμβουλεύσαι, χρῆ συμβουλεύεσαι. δίκαιος δ' εἰ: καὶ γὰρ πατρικὸς ἥμιν φίλος τυγχάνεις ὃν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ὦ σος πατὴρ ἐταίρῳ τε καὶ φίλῳ ἤμεν, καὶ πρότερον ἐκεῖνον ἐτελεύτησε, πρὶν τι ἐμοὶ διενέχθηναι. περιφέρει δ' τὸς με καὶ μνήμη ἄρτι τῶς θεάντων· τὰ γὰρ μειράκια τάδε πρὸς ἄλληλους οἶκοι διαλεγόμενοι θαμά ἐπιμελητηρία

Σωκράτους καὶ σφόδρα ἐπιστεύσιν οὐ μέντοι πώποτε αὐτοὺς ἀνηρώτητα, εἰ τὸν Σωφρονίσκου λέγονεν. ἀλλ', ὦ παῖδες, λέγετε μοι, ὦδ' ἐστι Σωκράτης, περὶ οὗ ἐκάστοτε μέμνησθε; παῖς. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ πάτερ, οὕτως.
us to be your advisers for the education of your boys, and not to invite Socrates here, is to me very strange, when, to begin with, he is of your district, and then he is always spending his time wherever there is any such excellent study or pursuit for young men as you are seeking.

LYS. How do you mean, Laches? Has Socrates here given his attention to anything of this sort?

LACH. To be sure he has, Lysimachus.

NIC. I too might perhaps be in as good a position as Laches to inform you about that; for quite recently he introduced to myself a music-teacher for my son—Damon, pupil of Agathocles, who is not only the most exquisitely skilled of musicians, but in every other way as profitable a companion as you could wish for young men of that age.

LYS. It is not possible, Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, for men of my years to continue to know our juniors, because old age makes us spend most of our time at home; but if you, son of Sophroniscus, have any good advice for our friend, who belongs to your own district, you ought to let him have it. And it is only right that you should: for you happen to be our friend through your father; he and I were constant companions and friends, and he died without ever having a single difference with me. And a certain recollection comes back to me on hearing what has just been said: for these boys, in talking with each other at home, frequently mention Socrates in terms of high praise; but I have never asked them whether they meant the son of Sophroniscus. Now tell me, my boys, is this the Socrates whose name you have mentioned so often?

SON. To be sure, father, it is he.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ΑΤ. Εὕ ς γε νὴ τὴν ὁμιλοῦσαν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ὁτι ὁ Ὀδυσσέας τὸν πατέρα, ἀριστον ἀνδρῶν ὄντα, καὶ ἄλλως καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁτι οἰκεῖα τὰ τε σὰ ἡμῖν ὑπάρξει καὶ σοι τὰ Ἡμέτερα.

ΑΑ. Καί μὴν, ὃς Λυσίμαχε, μὴ ἀφίεσθο γε τὸν ἀνδρός· ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλοθι γε αὐτὸν ἑθεασάμην οὐ μόνον τὸν πατέρα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πατρίδα ὀρθοῦντα· ἔν γὰρ τῇ ἀπὸ Δηλίου φυγῇ μετ' ἐμοὶ συνανεχώρει, καίγω σοι λέγω ὅτι εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι ἥθελον τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὀρθὴ ἄν ἡμῖν ἡ πόλις ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἄν ἐπεσε τότε τοιοῦτον πτώμα.

ΑΤ. Ὁ Σῶκρατες, οὐτος μέντοι ὁ ἐπαινῶς ἔστιν καλός, ὅν σὺ νῦν ἐπαινῇ ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν ἀξίων πιστευεθαί καὶ εἰς ταῦτα εἰς ἀ αὐτοῖ ἐπαινοῦσιν. εὖ ὅν ἱκθὶ ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἀκούων χαίρω ὅτι εὔδοκιμεῖς, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἧγοῦ με ἐν τοῖς γ' εὐνοοῦστατον

C σοι εἶναι. χρὴν μὲν ὅν καὶ πρότερον γε φοιτᾷν αὐτὸν παρ' ἡμᾶς καὶ οἰκείοις ἡγεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ δίκαιον· νῦν ὅ τ' ὅν ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας, ἐπειδὴ ἀνεγνωρίσαμεν ἀλλήλους, μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ σύνινθι τε καὶ γνώριζε καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ τούσδε τοὺς νεωτέρους, ὅπως ἂν διασώζῃ καὶ ἡμεῖς τὴν Ἡμετέραν φιλίαν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ ποιήσεις καὶ ἡμεῖς σε καὶ αὐθίς ὑπομνήσομεν· περὶ δὲ ὅν ἡμᾶς ἐστὶν φατε; τί δοκεῖ; τὸ μάθημα τοῖς μειράκιοις ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι ἡ οὖ, τὸ μαθεῖν ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι;

D ἔν. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων πέρι, ὃς Λυσίμαχε, ἔγγει πειράσομαι συμβουλεύειν ἂν τι δύνωμαι, καὶ αὐ

1 On the coast just north of Attica, where the Athenians were severely defeated by the Boeotians in 424 B.C.
LACHES

LYS. On my soul, Socrates, it is good to know that you keep up your father's name, which was a most honourable one, both on general grounds and particularly because of the intimate relation in which you and we shall equally feel ourselves to be.

LACH. Indeed, Lysimachus, he is a person you must not lose hold of; for I have observed him elsewhere too keeping up not merely his father's but his country's name. He accompanied me in the retreat from Delium,¹ and I assure you that if the rest had chosen to be like him, our city would be holding up her head and would not then have had such a terrible fall.

LYS. Socrates, this is indeed splendid praise which you are now receiving from men whose word is of great weight, and for such conduct as wins their praise. So let me tell you that I rejoice to hear this and to know you have such a good reputation; and you in return must count me as one of your warmest well-wishers. You ought indeed, on your own part, to have visited us before, and treated us on intimate terms, as you have a right to do: now, however, that we have discovered each other, from to-day onwards you must make a point of sharing our thoughts and getting to know us and our young people also, that you and they may in your turn preserve the friendship of our houses. That, however, you will do yourself, and we will remind you of it another time: but what do you say of the matter on which we began to speak? What is your view? Is the accomplishment of fighting in armour a suitable one for our boys to learn or not?

soc. On that matter, Lysimachus, I will do my best to advise you, so far as I can, and also to do all
δικαιότατον μέντοι μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἐμὲ νεότερον ὑπὸ τοῦ δε καὶ ἀπειροτέρον τούτων ἀκοῦειν πρότερον τί λέγουσι καὶ μανθάνειν παρ' αὐτῶν· εἶ ὅ' ἔχω τι ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτων λεγόμενα, τότ' ἦδη διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν καὶ σὰ καὶ τοῦτος. ἀλλ', ὁ Νικία, τί οὐ λέγει πότερος ὑμῶν;

182 Ε γὰρ καὶ ἐμοὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα τοῖς νέοις ὑφέλιμον εἶναι ἐπίστασθαι πολλαχῇ. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἄλλοθι διατρίβεται ὑπὸ τοῖς νέοις τὰς διατριβὰς ποιεῖσθαι, ὅταν σχολὴν ἀγωσίν, ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ, εὐ ἔχει, ὅθεν καὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον ἱσχεῖν ἀνάγκη

1 i.e. in regular warfare.
the rest that you so kindly ask. It seems to me, however, most proper that I, being so much younger and less experienced than you and your friends, should first hear what they have to say, and learn of them; and then, if I have anything else to suggest as against their remarks, I might try to explain it and persuade you and them to take my view. Come, Nicias, let one or other of you speak.

NIC. There is no difficulty about that, Socrates. For in my opinion this accomplishment is in many ways a useful thing for young men to possess. It is good for them, instead of spending their time on the ordinary things to which young men usually give their hours of leisure, to spend it on this, which not only has the necessary effect of improving their bodily health—since it is as good and strenuous as any physical exercise—but is also a form of exercise which, with riding, is particularly fitting for a free citizen; for only the men trained in the use of these warlike implements can claim to be trained in the contest whereof we are athletes and in the affairs wherein we are called upon to contend. Further, this accomplishment will be of some benefit also in actual battle, when it comes to fighting in line with a number of other men; but its greatest advantage will be felt when the ranks are broken, and you find you must fight man to man, either in pursuing someone who is trying to beat off your attack, or in retreating yourself and beating off the attack of another. Whoever possessed this accomplishment could come to no harm so long as he had but one to deal with, nor yet, perhaps, if he had several; it would give him an advantage in any situation. Moreover, it is a thing which impels one to desire
τοιούτων· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ μαθὴς ἐν ὅπλῳ μᾶχεσθαι ἐπιθυμήσει καὶ τοῦ ἔξής μαθήματος τοῦ περὶ τὰς τάξεις, καὶ ταῦτα λαβῶν καὶ φιλοτιμηθέντι ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ πᾶν ἄν τὸ περὶ τὰς στρατηγικὰς ὀρμήσεις· καὶ ἥδη δῆλον ὦτι τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα καὶ μαθήματα πάντα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ καλὰ καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξια ἀνδρὶ μαθεῖν τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσαι, ὃν καθηγήσαις ἄν τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα. προσθήσομεν δ' ἀυτῷ οὐ σμικρὰν προσθήκην, ὦτι πάντα ἄνδρα ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ θαρραλεώτερον καὶ ἀνδρεύτερον ἄν ποιήσεις αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ὄλγω αὐτή ἡ ἐπιστήμη. μὴ ἀτμιάσωμεν δὲ εἰπεῖν, εἰ καὶ τῷ σμικρότερον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὦτι καὶ εὐσχημονέστερον ἐνταῦθα οὐ χρῆ τὸν ἄνδρα εὐσχημονέστερον φαίνεσθαι, οὐ ἀμα καὶ δεινότερος τοῖς ἐχθροῖς φανεῖται διὰ τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Δυσίμαχε, ὥσπερ λέγω, δοκεῖ τε χρῆναι διδάσκειν τοὺς νεανίσκους ταῦτα καὶ δι' ἄ δοκεῖ εὐρῆκα. Λάχητος δ', εἰ τί παρὰ ταῦτα λέγει, καὶ αὐτὸς ἢδέως ἀκούσαιμι.

ΛΑ. Ἄλλ' ἔστι μὲν, ὦ Νικία, χαλεπὸν λέγειν περὶ ὄπλουν μαθήματος, ὅσον χρῆ μανθάνειν· πάντα γὰρ ἐπιστασθαι ἄγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι. καὶ

Ε δὴ καὶ τὸ ὀπλιτικὸν τοῦτο, εἰ μὲν ἔστι μάθημα, ὅπερ φασίν οἱ διδάσκοντες, καὶ οἶον Νικίας λέγει, χρῆ αὐτὸ μανθάνειν· εἰ δ' ἔστι μὲν μὴ μάθημα, ἄλλ' ἐξαπατῶσιν οἱ υπισχυόμενοι, μὴ μάθημα μὲν τυγχάνει ὃν, μὴ μὲντοι πάνυ σπουδαῖον, τί καὶ δέοι ἄν αὐτὸ μανθάνειν; λέγω δε ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τάδε ἀποβλέψας, ὦτι οἶμαι ἐγὼ τοῦτο, εἰ τί ἦν,
another noble accomplishment; for everyone who has learnt how to fight in armour will desire to learn the accomplishment which comes next, the management of troops; and when he has got that and once taken a pride in his work he will push on to attain the whole art of generalship. (It is evident already that all accomplishments and pursuits in the military sphere are both honourable and valuable to a man, either in acquisition or in practice; and this particular one may well be an introduction to them. And we can make this addition—no slight one—to its claims, that this science will make any man individually a great deal bolder and braver in war. Nor let us disdain to mention, even though some may think it a rather slight matter, that it will give him a smarter appearance in the place where a man should look smartest, and where at the same time he will appear more terrible to the enemy because of his smartness. So my opinion is, Lysimachus, as I say, that we ought to teach this skill to our young men, and I have told you my reasons for so thinking. But if Laches has a different view to state, I shall be as glad as anyone to hear it.

LACH. Well, Nicias, I am loth to say of any sort of accomplishment that it ought not to be learnt; for it seems good to know all things. And besides, if this skill in arms is an accomplishment, as they say who teach it, and as Nicias terms it, it ought to be learnt; while if it is not an accomplishment, and those who promise to give it are deceiving us, or if it is an accomplishment, but not a very important one, what can be the good of learning it? I speak of it in this way from the following point of view: I conceive that if there were anything in it, it would
οὐκ ἂν λεληθέναι Λακεδαίμονίος, οἷς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μέλει ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἡ τοῦτο ξητείν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν,

183 ὃ τι ἂν μαθόντες καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσαντες πλεονεκτοίεν τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τὸν πόλεμον. εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνοι ἔλελήθη, ἀλλ' οὗ τούτους γε τοὺς διδασκάλους αὐτοῦ λέληθεν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων σπουδάζουσι ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ ὅτι παρ' ἐκεῖνοι ἂν τις τιμηθείς εἰς ταῦτα καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων πλείστ' ἂν ἐργάζοιτο χρῆματα, ὥσπερ γε καὶ τραγῳδίας ποιητῆς παρ' ἡμῖν τιμηθείς. τουγάρτῳ δ' ὃς ἂν οὔτία τραγῳδίαν καλῶς

Β ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἔξωθεν κύκλω περὶ τὴν Ἄττικὴν κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιδεικνύμενος περίερχεται, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς δεύορ φέρεται καὶ τοῖσ' ἐπιδεικνύσει εἰκότως. τούς δὲ ἐν ὅπλοις μαχαμένους ἔγι τούτους ὅρῳ τὴν μὲν Λακεδαίμονα ἡγουμένους εἶναι ἅβατον ἱερὸν καὶ οὐδὲ ἀκρῷ ποδὶ ἐπιβαίνοντας, κύκλω δὲ περιόντας αὐτὴν καὶ πάσι μᾶλλον ἐπιδεικνυμένους, καὶ μάλιστα τούτως οἱ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογήσειν πολλοὺς σφῶν προτέρους εἶναι πρὸς τὰ τοῦ πολέμου. ἔπειτα, ὃ Λυσίμαχε, οὐ πάνιν ὀλίγοις ἐγώ τούτων παραγέγονα ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔργῳ, καὶ ὅρῳ οἰδί εἰσιν. ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν ἡμῖν σκέψασθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπίτηδες οὐδεὶς πῶς ποτ' εὐδόκιμος γέγονεν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀνήρ τῶν τὰ ὅπλιτα ἐπιτηδεύσαντων. καίτοι εἰς γε τάλλα πάντα ἐκ τούτων οἱ ὀνομαστοὶ γίγνονται, ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδεύσαντων ἑκαστ' οὕτω δ', ὡς ἐνική, παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους οὕτω σφόδρα εἰς τοῦτο δεδυστυχήκασιν. ἐπεῖ καὶ τούτον τὸν Ἐσθίλεων, ὃν ὑμεῖς μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐν τοσούτῳ ὄχλῳ ἔθεασασθε ἐπιδεικνύμενον καὶ τὰ
not have been overlooked by the Lacedaemonians, whose only concern in life is to seek out and practise whatever study or pursuit will give them an advantage over others in war. And if they have overlooked it, at any rate these teachers of it cannot have overlooked the obvious fact that the Lacedaemonians are more intent on such matters than any of the Greeks, and that anybody who won honour among them for this art would amass great riches elsewhere, just as a tragic poet does who has won honour among us. And for this reason he who thinks himself a good writer of tragedy does not tour round with his show in a circuit of the outlying Attic towns, but makes a straight line for this place and exhibits to our people, as one might expect. But I notice that these fighters in armour regard Lacedaemon as holy ground where none may tread, and do not step on it even with the tips of their toes, but circle round it and prefer to exhibit to any other people, especially to those who would themselves admit that they were inferior to many in the arts of war. Furthermore, Lysimachus, I have come across more than a few of these persons in actual operations, and I can see their quality. Indeed, we can estimate it offhand: for, as though it were of set purpose, not one of these experts in arms has ever yet distinguished himself in war. And yet in all the other arts, the men who have made a name are to be found among those who have specially pursued one or other of them; while these persons, apparently, stand out from the rest in this particularly hapless fate of their profession. Why, this man Stesilaus, whom you watched with me in that great crowd as he gave his performance and spoke in
D μεγάλα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγοντα ᾧ ἔλεγεν, ἑτέρωθι ἐγὼ κάλλιον ἐθεασάμην [ἐν τῇ ἁληθείᾳ] ὡς ἁληθῶς ἐπιδεικνύμενον οὐχ ἐκόντα. προσβαλούσης γὰρ τῆς νεὼς ἐφ᾿ ἥ ἐπεβάτευε πρὸς ὅλκάδα τινά, ἔμαχε τοῖς δορυδρέπανοι, διαφέρον δὴ ὣπλον ἄτε καὶ αὐτὸς τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρων. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν περὶ τάνδρος, τὸ δὲ σόφισμα τὸ τοῦ δρεπάνου τοῦ πρὸς τῇ λόγχῃ οἶον ἀπέβη.

Ε μαχομένου γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐνέσχετο ποὺ ἐν τοῖς τῆς νεὼς σκεύεσι καὶ ἀντελάβετο· εἶλκεν οὖν ὁ Στηνίλεως βουλόμενος ἀπολύσαι, καὶ οὐχ οἷος τ᾿ ἢν· ἢ δὲ ναῦς τῆν ναῦν παρῆκε. τέως μὲν οὖν παρέθει ἐν τῇ νῃ ἀντεχόμενος τοῦ δόρατος· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ παρημεῖβετο ἢ ναῦς τὴν ναύν καὶ ἐπέσπα αὐτὸν τοῦ δόρατος ἐχόμενου, ἐφίε τὸ δόρυ διὰ τῆς χειρός, ἐὼς ἄκρον τοῦ στύρακος ἀντελάβετο. ἢν δὲ γέλως καὶ κρότος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ὅλκαδος ἐπὶ τε τῷ σχῆματι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐπειδὴ βαλόντος τινὸς λίθῳ παρὰ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ κατάστρωμα ἀφίηται τοῦ δόρατος, τότε ἢδη καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς τριήρους οὐκέτι οἰοὶ τ᾿ ἢσαν τὸν γέλωτα κατέχειν, ὀρώντες αἰωρούμενος· ἐκ τῆς ὅλκαδος τὸ δορυδρέπανον ἐκεῖνο. ῥὼς μὲν οὖν εἰὴ ἀν τὶ ταῦτα, ὡσπερ Νυκίας λέγει· οἰς δ᾿ οὖν ἐγὼ ἐντεύχηκα, τοιαῦτ᾿ ἄττα ἐστίν. ὁ οὖν καὶ εἰ ἀρχής εἰπὼν, ὅτι

Β εἴτε οὖτω σιμκρᾶς ὁφελείας ἔχει μάθημα ὅν, εἴτε μὴ ὅν φασί καὶ προσποιοῦνται αὐτὸ εἶναι μάθημα, οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν· καὶ γὰρ οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, εἰ μὲν δειλὸς τις ὃν οὖν οὖσιν αὐτὸ εἰπότασθαί, θρασύτερος ἄν δι᾿ αὐτὸ γενόμενος ἐπιβανέστερος γένοιτο

1 ἐν τῇ ἁληθείᾳ secl. Schanz.
2 αὐτὸ Burnet: αὐτὸν, αὐτὸν δεῖν mss.
those high terms of himself before us, I have watched elsewhere giving a finer entertainment in the form of a very real display that he made against his will. The ship on which he was serving struck a transport vessel, and he was using in the fight a combination of a scythe and a spear—a remarkable weapon that suited so remarkable a man. Well, the story of this fellow’s doings is hardly of enough interest in the main, but you must hear the upshot of his device of a scythe fixed to a spear. As he was fighting, it stuck somehow in the other ship’s rigging, and held fast; so Stesilaus pulled at it in the hope of getting it free, but he could not, and the ships were passing by each other. For the first moments he ran along in his ship holding on to his spear; but as the other ship sheered off from his and drew him after, still holding the spear, he let it slip through his hand until he gripped the butt-end of the shaft. From the crew of the transport there came laughter and clapping at his posture, and when someone aimed a stone at him which hit the deck near his feet, and he let go the spear, the troops on the warship in their turn could no longer restrain their laughter, as they saw the notable scythe-spear dangling from the transport. Now, there may perhaps be something in this art of theirs, as Nicias argues, but at any rate that is my impression of it, in the cases I have met with. Hence, as I said at the beginning, whether it be an accomplishment, and one of but little use, or not an accomplishment, but only supposed and pretended to be such, it is not worth the trouble of learning it. For indeed I hold that if a man who was a coward believed that he possessed it, his only gain would be in rashness, which would make his
οῖος ἦν· εἰ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος, φυλαττόμενος ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ καὶ σιμκρόν ἐξαμάρτως, μεγάλας ἂν διαβολάς ἵσχεν· ἐπίφθονος γὰρ ἡ προσποίησις

τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιστήμης, ὥστε εἰ μὴ τι θαυμαστοῦν ὁσον διαφέρει τῇ ἀρετῇ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτις ἂν τις φύγων τὸ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι, φάσκων ἐχεῖν ταύτῃ τῆς ἐπιστήμην. τοιαύτη τις ἐμοιγε

dokei, ὡς Λυσίμαχε, ἥ περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα εἶναι σπουδὴ· χρῆ δ' ὅπερ σοι εἰς ἀρχῆς ἐλεγον, καὶ Σωκράτη τόνδε μὴ ἀφιέναι, ἀλλὰ δεῖσθαι συμβουλεύειν ὅτι δοκεῖ αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου.

лат. 'Αλλα δέομαι ἐγώγε, ὡς Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ ὅσπερ [ἐπὶ]¹ τοῦ διακρινοῦντος δοκεῖ μοι

D δεῖν ἡμῖν ἡ βουλή· εἰ μὲν γὰρ συνεφερόθην τώδε, ἦττον ἂν τοῦ τοιούτου ὅδε· νῦν δὲ· τῆς ἐναντίαν γὰρ, ὡς ὅρας, Λάχης Νικία ἔθετο—εὗ δὴ ἐχεῖ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ σοῦ, ποτέρῳ τοῖς ἄνδροιν σύμψηφος εἰ.

σπ. Τί δαί, ὡς Λυσίμαχε; ὅποτερ ἂν οἱ πλείους ἐπανώσων ἡμῶν τοῖς μέλεῖς χρῆσθαι;

лат. Τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες;

σπ. Ἡ καὶ σύ, ὡς Μελησία, οὕτως ᾧ ποιοῖς;

Ε κἂν εἰ τις περὶ ἀγωνίας τοῦ νείεος σοι βουλή εἴη τί χρῆ ἀσκεῖν, ἄρα τοῖς πλείοσιν ἂν ἡμῶν πείθοιο, ἢ ἐκείνω ὡστις τυγχάνοι ² ὑπὸ παιδοτρίβη ἄγαθῳ πεπαιδευμένοι καὶ ἡσκηκώς;

μελ. Ἐκείνῳ εἰκός γέν., ὡς Σώκρατες.

σπ. Αὐτῷ ἄρ' ἂν μᾶλλον πείθοιο ἡ τέτταροιν οὕσων ἡμῖν;

¹ επὶ secl. Ast: ἐπὶ Heindorf.
² τυγχάνοι Bekker: τυγχάνει mss.
true nature the more conspicuous; while if he were brave, people would be on the look-out for even the slightest mistake on his part, and he would incur much grievous slander; for the pretension to such skill arouses jealousy, so that unless a man be prodigiously superior to the rest in valour he cannot by any means escape being made a laughing-stock through professing to be so skilled. Such is my opinion, Lysimachus, of the interest taken in this accomplishment; but do as I told you at the beginning; you are not to let our friend Socrates go, but must request him to advise us according to his judgement on the matter in hand.

LYS. Well, I ask it of you, Socrates: for indeed our members of council, as it were, seem to me to need someone who will decide between them. Had these two agreed, we should not have required this help so much; but as it is—for Laches, you see, has voted on the opposite side to Nicias—it is as well that we should hear your view and see on which side you cast your vote.

SOC. What, Lysimachus? Are you going to join the side which gets the approval of the majority of us?

LYS. Why, what can one do, Socrates?

SOC. And you too, Melesias, would do the same? Suppose you had a consultation as to what your son's exercise should be for a coming contest, would you be guided by the majority of us, or by the one who happened to have trained and exercised under a good master?

MEL. By the latter, naturally, Socrates.

SOC. Would you be guided by him alone rather than the four of us?
MEΛ. "Ισως.
σπ. 'Επιστήμη γάρ, οίμαι, δεί κρίνεσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ πλήθει το ἡμέρας καὶ ἡ τοιοῦτος.

MEΛ. Πῶς γάρ οὐ;

ΣΠ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν χρῆ πρώτον αὐτὸ οὐκ ἄντον σκέ-185 ψασθαι, εἰ ἔστι τις ἡμῶν τεχνικὸς περὶ οὐ βουλευόμεθα, ἢ οὐκ οὐ καὶ εἰ μὲν ἔστων, ἐκεῖνοι πείδεσθαι εἰς ἀντί, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους εἶν. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἂλλον τινὰ 
ζητεῖν. ἢ περὶ σμικροῦ οἴσθε νυνί κινδυνεύειν καὶ οὐ καὶ Λυσίμαχος, οὐκ οὐ περὶ τοῦτον τοῦ κτήματος, ὁ τῶν οὐκέτων μέγιστον ὑπὸ τυχάνει; 

μελ. 'Αλθῆ λέγεις.

σπ. Πολλὴν ἄρα δεὶ προμηθίαν αὐτοῦ ἔχειν.

μελ. Πάνω γε.

β σπ. Πῶς οὖν, δ' ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἐλευν, ἐσκοποῦμεν ἄν, εἰ ἐβουλόμεθα σκέψασθαι τίς ἡμῶν περὶ ἀγωγίαν τεχνικῶτατος; ἂρ' οὐχ οἱ μαθῶν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσας, ὡ καὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγονότες ἦσαν αὐτοῦ 

τοῦτο.

μελ. "Εμοιγε δοκεῖ.

σπ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ πρῶτον, τίνος οὖν τοῦτον [οὗ] ζητοῦμεν τοὺς διδασκάλους;

μελ. Πῶς λέγεις;

σπ. Ὡδε ίσως μᾶλλον κατάδηλον ἔσται. οὐ μοι 

dokei εξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῶν ἠμολογήσατα, τί ποτ' ἔστι 

peri οὐ βουλευόμεθα [καὶ σκεπτόμεθα], ἢστις ἡμῶν

1 οὗ secl. Jacobs. 

2 καὶ σκεπτόμεθα secl. Ast.
LACHES

MEL. Very likely.

soc. Yes, for a question must be decided by knowledge, and not by numbers, if it is to have a right decision.

MEL. To be sure.

soc. Then in this case also we must first consider, in particular, whether anyone among us has expert skill in the subject of our consultation, or not; and if here is one who has, we must be guided by him, though he be but one, and pass over the rest; while if there is not, we must look for somebody else. Or do you think it a slight matter that you and Lysimachus have now at stake, and not that which is really your greatest possession? For I take it that according as the sons turn out well or the opposite will the whole life of their father's house be affected, depending for better or worse on their character.

MEL. Truly spoken.

soc. So it demands much forethought from us.

MEL. Certainly.

soc. How then—to take the case I suggested just now—should we set to work if we wanted to consider which of us was the most expert in regard to a contest? Should we not pick him who had learnt and practised, and had also had good teachers of this particular skill?

MEL. I think so.

soc. And even before that, we should ask what was this skill of which we are looking for the teachers?

MEL. How do you mean?

soc. Perhaps it will be more easily grasped in this form. I think we have not started with an agreement between us as to what the thing is about which we are consulting, in this question of who
PLATO

tεχνικός καὶ τούτου ἑνεκα διδασκάλους ἐκτήσατο, C καὶ ὅστις μή.

η. Οὐ γάρ, ὃ Σώκρατες, περὶ τοῦ ἐν ὀπλοῖς μά-
χεσθαι σκοποῦμεν, εἴτε χρή αὐτὸ τοὺς νεανίσκους
μανθάνειν εἴτε μή;

ζ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ὃ Νικία. ἀλλ' ὅταν περὶ 
φαρμάκου τῆς τοῦ πρὸς ὀφθαλμοὺς σκοπῆται, εἴτε 
χρή αὐτὸ ὑπαλείφεσθαι εἴτε μή, πότερον οἷοι τότε 
εἶναι τὴν βουλήν περὶ τοῦ φαρμάκου ἢ περὶ τῶν 
ὄφθαλμῶν;

η. Περὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν.

D ζ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅταν ἵππῳ χαλινῶν σκοπῆται τις 
eἰ προσουστέον ἡ μή, καὶ ὅποτε, τότε που περὶ τοῦ 
ἵππου βουλεύεται ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τοῦ χαλινοῦ;

η. Ἀληθῆ.

ζ. Οὐκοῦν ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ὅταν τῆς τῆς ἑνεκά του 
σκοπῆς, περὶ ἐκείνου ἢ βουλὴ τυγχάνει οὗτος οὗ 
ἑνεκα ἐσκόπει, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τοῦ ὃ ἑνεκά ἀλλοῦ 
ἐξῆτε.

η. Ἀνάγκη.

ζ. Δεὶ ἄρα καὶ τῶν σύμβουλον σκοπεῖν, ἄρα 
τεχνικὸς ἐστὶν εἰς ἐκείνου θεραπείαν, οὗ ἑνεκα 
σκοποῦμεν δ' σκοποῦμεν.

η. Πάνω γε.

ζ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν φαμὲν περὶ μαθήματος σκοπεῖν 
Ε τῆς ψυχῆς ἑνεκα τῆς τῶν νεανίσκων;

η. Ναί.

ζ. Εἰ τις ἄρα ἡμῶν τεχνικὸς περὶ ψυχῆς θερα-
πείαν καὶ οἷος τε καλῶς τοῦτο θεραπεύσαι, καὶ 
ὅτῳ διδάσκαλον ἄγαθον γεγόνασιν, τοῦτο σκεπτεῖν. 
ΛΑ. Τί δέ, ὃ Σώκρατες; οὕτω εἰώρακας ἀνευ

1 σκοποῦμεν δ Cron: σκοπούμενοι miss.
among us is an expert and to this end has resorted to teachers, and who not.

nic. Why, Socrates, is it not fighting in armour that we are considering, and whether it is a thing to be learnt by young men or not?
soc. Of course, Nicias; but when someone considers whether a medicine is to be used as an eye-salve or not, do you think that this consultation is about the medicine or about the eyes?

nic. About the eyes.
soc. And when one considers whether a horse is to be bridled or not, and at what time, I presume one takes counsel about the horse, and not about the bridle?

nic. True.
soc. And in a word, when one considers a thing for any purpose, the consulting is in fact about the end one had in view to start with, and not about the means to be used for such end.

nic. Necessarily.
soc. So we must consider our adviser too, and ask ourselves whether he is a skilled expert in the treatment required for the end which is the subject of our consideration.

nic. Certainly.
soc. And we say that our present subject is an accomplishment studied for the sake of young men's souls?

nic. Yes.
soc. So what we have to consider is whether one of us is skilled in treatment of the soul, and is able to treat it rightly, and which of us has had good teachers.

LACH. But I say, Socrates, have you never noticed


PLATO

didaskálwv tekhnikotérous gegevónatas eis énia ἡ metà didaskálwv;

σμ. "Ἐγώνε, ὦ Λάχης· οἶς γε σὺ οὐκ ἄν ἐθέλοις πιστεύσαι, εἰ φαίειν ἄγαθοι εἶναι δημιουργοὶ, εἰ μή τί σοι τῆς αὐτῶν τέχνης ἔργον ἔχουν ἐπιδείξαι εὑρεθήμενον, καὶ ἐν καὶ πλείω.

Αα. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὴ λέγεις.

σμ. Καὶ ἡμᾶς ἄρα δεῖ, ὦ Λάχης τε καὶ Νικία, ἐπειδὴ Λυσίμαχος καὶ Μελησίας εἰς συμβουλὴν παρεκαλεσάτην ἡμᾶς περὶ τῶν υἱῶν, προθυμοῦμενοι αὐτοῖν ὅτι ἁρίστας γενέσθαι τὰς γηνύχας, εἰ μὲν φαίειν ἔχειν, ἐπιδείξαι αὐτοῖς καὶ διδασκάλους οἰτινες ἡμῶν γεγόνασιν, <οἷον>¹ αὐτοὶ πρῶτον² ἄγαθοὶ ὄντες καὶ πολλῶν νέων τεθεραπευκότες γηνύχας

Β ἔπειτα καὶ ἡμᾶς διδάξαντες φαίνονται· ἦ ἐκ τις ἡμῶν αὐτῶν εαυτὸς διδάσκαλος μὲν σὺ φησὶ γεγονέναι, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔργα αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἔχει εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐπιδείξαι, τίνες Ἀθηναίων ἡ τῶν ἔχουν, ἡ δούλωι ἡ ἐλεύθεροι, δι' ἐκείνων ὅμολογουμένως ἄγαθοι γεγόνασιν· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἡμῶν τούτων υπάρχει, ἀλλοίς κελεύειν χρῆσθαι καὶ μή ἐν ἑταίρων ἄνδρῶν υἱέσι κινδυνεύειν διαφθείροντα τὴν μεγίστην αὐτίαν ἔχειν ὑπὸ τῶν ὀικειοπάτων. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε τε καὶ Μελησία, πρῶτος περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ

Ο λέγω ὅτι διδάσκαλος μοι οὐ γέγονε τούτων πέρι· καὶ τοιοῦτον ἐπιθυμῶ γε τοῦ πράγματος ἐκ νέου ἀρξάμενος. ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἔχω τελεῖν μισθοῦς, οὐπερ μόνοι ἐπηγγέλλοντο με οἱ ὁτ' εἶναι ποιήσαι καλὸν τε κἀγαθὸν· αὐτὸς δ' αὖ

¹ οἶ add. Bekker.
² πρῶτον Stephanus: πρῶτοι mss.
LACHES

how some people have become more skilled in certain things without teachers than others with them?

soc. Yes, I have, Laches; people, that is, whom you would not care to trust on their mere statement that they were good practitioners, unless they could put forward some example of their personal skill—some work well carried out—not in one only, but several cases.

LACH. That is truly spoken.

soc. We also, therefore, Laches and Nicias—since Lysimachus and Melesias have invited us to a consultation on their sons, whose souls they are anxious to have as good as possible—should bring to their notice what teachers we have had, if we say that we have any to mention, who being themselves good to begin with, and having treated the souls of many young people, taught us also in due course and are known to have done so. Or if any of ourselves says he has had no teacher, but has however some works of his own to speak of, and can point out to us what Athenians or strangers, either slaves or freemen, are acknowledged to owe their goodness to him, let him do so. But if there is nothing of the sort to be found amongst us, let us bid them look elsewhere; for we cannot run a risk with our good friends' children where we may ruin them, and so bring upon us the most grievous of accusations from our nearest and dearest. Now I, Lysimachus and Melesias, am the first to avow that I have had no teacher in this respect; and yet I have longed for such lessons from my youth up. But I have not the means to pay fees to the sophists, who were the only persons that professed to be able to make me a complete gentleman; and to this moment I remain powerless.
εὑρεῖν τὴν τέχνην ἀδυνατῶ ἐτὶ νυνί. εἰ δὲ Νικίας ἡ Λάχης εὑρηκεν ἡ μεμάθηκεν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαμι· καὶ γὰρ χρήμασιν ἐμοῦ δυνατώτεροι, ὡστε μαθεῖν παρ’ ἄλλων, καὶ ἁμα πρεσβύτεροι, ὡστε ἦδη εὑρηκέναι. δοκοῦσι δὴ μοι δυνατοὶ εἶναι παίδευσαι

Ὁ ἄνθρωπος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτὲ ἀδεῶς ἀπεφαίνοντο περὶ ἑπτηδευμάτων νέω χρηστῶν τε καὶ πονηρῶν, εἰ μὴ αὐτοῖς ἐπίστευον ἴκανῶς εἰδέναι. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ἔγγορε τοῦτοι πιστεύω· ὅτι δὲ δια-φέρεσθον ἄλληλοι, ἑθαύμασα. τούτο οὖν σου ἐγὼ ἀντιδέομαι, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, καθάπερ ἄρτι Λάχης μὴ ἀφίεσθαι σε ἐμοῦ διεκελεύετο ἄλλα ἐρωτῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν παρακελεύομαι σοι μὴ ἀφίεσθαι Λάχητος μηδὲ Νικίου, ἀλλ’ ἐρωτῶν λέγοντα, ὅτι δ’ μὲν Σω-

Ε κράτης οὐ φησιν ἐπαίειν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, οὐδ’ ἴκανὸς εἶναι διακρίναι ὅποτερος ὑμῶν ἀληθή λέγει· οὔτε γὰρ εὑρετής οὔτε μαθητής οὐδενὸς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων γεγονέναι· σοὶ δ’, ὦ Λάχης καὶ Νικία, εἰπετόν ἴμων ἐκάτερος, τίνι δὴ δεινοτάτῳ συγ-γεγοναν περὶ τῆς τῶν νέων τροφῆς, καὶ πότερα μαθόντε παρὰ τοῦ ἐπίστασθον ἤ αὐτῷ ἔξευρόντε, καὶ εἰ μὲν μαθόντε, τίς ὁ διδάσκαλος ἐκατέρω καὶ τίνες ἄλλοι ὁμότεχνοι αὐτοῖς, ἵν’ ἄν μὴ ὑμῶν σχολὴ ἢ υπὸ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων, ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνους ἱσμεν καὶ πείθωμεν ἡ δόροις ἡ χάρισιν ἡ ἀμφότερα ἐπιμεληθήσεσαι καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων παῖδων, ὅπως μὴ κατασχύνωσι τοὺς αὐτῶν προγόνους φαιλοι γενόμενοι· εἰ δ’ αὐτοὶ εὑρεταὶ γεγονότε τοῦ τοιούτου, ὅτε παράδειγμα, 32
to discover the art myself. But I should not be surprised if Nicias or Laches has discovered or learnt it: for they have more means at their command to enable them to learn from others, and they are also older, and have had time to discover it. Indeed, I regard them as able to educate a man; for they would never declare their minds so freely on pursuits that are beneficial or harmful to a youth unless they felt confident that they had the requisite knowledge. And I have entire confidence in them myself, except that I wondered at their differing from each other. I therefore make this counter-request of you, Lysimachus: just as Laches urged you a moment ago not to release me but to ask me questions, so I now call upon you not to release Laches or Nicias, but to question them in these terms: “Socrates says that he has no understanding of the matter, and that he is not competent to decide which of your statements is true; that he has never been either a discoverer or a learner of anything of the sort. But you, Laches and Nicias, are each to tell us who is the cleverest person you have heard on the upbringing of youth; whether you have knowledge of it by learning from someone or by discovering it yourselves; and if you learnt it, who were your teachers respectively, and what other colleagues they had: in order that, if you are not at leisure through the demands of public business, we may go to them and induce them either with gifts or good turns or with both to undertake the care of our and your children together, and so prevent them from turning out knaves and disgracing their ancestors. But if you have made the grand discovery yourselves, give us an instance to show what other persons you have
τίνων ἦδη ἄλλων ἐπιμεληθέντες ἐκ φαύλων καλούς τε κάγαθοσ ἐποιήσατε. εἰ γὰρ νῦν πρῶτον ἁρ-
B ξεσθε παιδεύειν, σκοπεῖν χρῆ μή οὐκ ἐν τῷ Καρὶ ὑμῖν ὁ κύνδυνος κωδυνεύτηται, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς υἱέσι τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν φίλων παισὶ, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγό-
meνον κατὰ τὴν παρομίαν ὑμῖν συμβαίνῃ ἐν πίθῳ ἢ κεραμεία γιγνομένη. λέγετε οὖν, τί τούτων ἦ
φατε ὑμῖν ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ προσήκειν, ἢ οὔ φατε. ταύτ’, ὁ Λυσίμαχε, παρ’ αὐτῶν πυνθάνου τε καὶ
μὴ μεθίσει τοὺς ἅδρας.
C λγ. Καλῶς μὲν ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὡ ανδρες, Σω-
krάτης λέγειν: εἰ δὲ βουλομένους ὑμῖν ἐστὶ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐρωτᾶσθαι τε καὶ διδόναι λόγον,
αὐτοὺς δὴ χρῆ γιγνώσκειν, ὃ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης. ἔμοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ Μελησία τόδε δῆλον ὅτι ἡδομένοις
ἀν εἴῃ, εἰ πάντα, ἢ Σωκράτης ἐρωτᾷ, ἑθέλοιτε
λόγῳ διεξεῖναι: καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἄρχης ἑντεῦθεν ἡρχόμην
λέγων, ὅτι εἰς συμβουλὴν διὰ ταύτα ὑμᾶς παρακαλέ-
σαιμεν, ὅτι μεμειληκέναι ὑμῖν ἡγούμεθα, ὡς εἰκός,
περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ἄλλως καὶ ἐπειδὴ οἱ παί-
D δες ὑμῖν ὀλίγον ὅσπερ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἥλικιαν ἔχουσι
παιδεύσθαι. εἰ ὁνὶν ὑμῖν μὴ τι διαφέρει, εἰπάτε
καὶ κοινῇ μετὰ Σωκράτους σκέψασθε, διδόντες τε καὶ
dехομένους λόγον παρ’ ἄλληλων. εὐ γὰρ καὶ
tοῦτο λέγει ὄνε, ὅτι περὶ τοῦ μεγίστον νῦν βου-
λευόμεθα τῶν ἡμετέρων. ἀλλ’ ὅτατε εἰ δοκεῖ
χρῆναι οὕτω ποιεῖν.
Ε πατρόθεν γιγνώσκειν μόνον, αὐτῷ δ’ οὐ συγγεγο-

1 Lit. “on the Carian slave.”
2 i.e. on a large instead of a small piece of work, in
succeeded in changing, by your care of them, from knaves to honest gentlemen. For if you are now going to make your first attempt at educating, you must beware lest you try your experiment, not on a *corpus vile*, but on your sons and the children of your friends, and you prove to be a mere case, as the proverbial saying has it, of starting pottery on a wine-jar. So tell us what you claim, or do not claim, as your resources and acquirements in this kind." There, Lysimachus, demand that from these good persons, and do not let them off.

Lys. To my mind, good sirs, these remarks of Socrates are excellent: but it is for you, Nicias and Laches, to decide for yourselves whether it suits you to be questioned and offer some explanation on such points. For I and Melesias here would certainly be delighted if you would consent to expound in detail all that Socrates puts to you in his questions: as I began by saying at the outset, we invited you to consult with us just because we thought, very naturally, that you had given serious consideration to this kind of thing, especially as your boys, like ours, are almost of an age to be educated. Accordingly, if it is all the same to you, discuss it now by joint inquiry with Socrates, exchanging views with him in turn: for it is a particularly good remark of his that we are consulting now about the greatest of all our concerns. Come, see if you consider that this is the proper course to take.

Nic. Lysimachus, it looks to me, in very truth, as though you only knew Socrates at second hand—through his father—and had not conversed with him which a beginner's mistake would be less costly. Cf. *Gorg.* 514 E.
νέαι ἀλλ' ἡ παιδὶ ὤντε, εἴ ποὺ ἐν τοῖς δημοταῖς μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἄκολουθῶν ἐπλησίασε σοι ἡ ἐν ἱερῷ ἡ ἐν ἄλλῳ τῷ συλλόγῳ τῶν δημοτῶν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ πρεσβύτερος γέγονεν, οὐκ ἐντευχηκὼς τῷ ἀνδρὶ δῆλος εἰ.

ιτ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Νικία;

ν. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖσ εἰδέναι ὅτι, δὴ ἂν ἐγχύτατα Ἀσκλήπειος ἢ [λόγῳ ὡσπερ γένει]¹ καὶ πλησιάζῃ διαλεγόμενος, ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ περὶ ἄλλου τοῦ πρότερον ἀρξηται διαλέγεσθαι, μὴ παύεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦτον περαγόμενον τῷ λόγῳ, πρὶν ἂν ἐμπέσῃ εἰς τὸ διδόναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγου, ὄντων τρόπων νῦν τε ἥη καὶ ὄντων τὸν παρεληλυθότα βίον βεβίωσκεν. ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐμπέση, ὅτι οὐ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀφῆσει Ἀσκλήπειος, πρὶν ἂν βασανίσῃ ταῦτα εὗ τε καὶ καλῶς ἀπαντά. ἔγω δὲ συνήθης τέ εἰμι τῶδε καὶ οἶδ' ὅτι ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ τοῦτον πάσχειν ταῦτα, καὶ ἔτι γε αὐτὸς ὅτι πείσομαι ταῦτα εὗ οἶδα· χαίρω γὰρ, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, τῷ ἀνδρὶ πλησιάζων, καὶ οὐδὲν οἴμαι κακῶν εἶναι τῷ ὑπομμηνήσκεσθαι

Β ὁ τι μὴ καλῶς ἡ πεποιήκαμεν ἡ ποιοῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα βίον προμηθέστερον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸν ταῦτα μὴ φεύγωντα, ἀλλ' ἐθέλοντα κατὰ τὸ τοῦ Σῶλωνος καὶ ἀξιοῦντα μανθάνειν ἔωσθεν ἄν ἥη, καὶ μὴ οἴμουν αὐτῷ τὸ γῆρας νοῦν ἔχον προσερέναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν άγχος οὐδ' αὐδ' άγχος ὑπὸ Ἀσκλήπειος βασανίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλαι σχέδον τι ἡπιστάμην, ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῶν μειρακίων ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἐσοιτο Σωκράτος παρόντος, ἀλλὰ

¹ λόγῳ ὡσπερ γένει secl. Cron.
personally except in his childhood, when you may have chanced to meet him among the people of his district, accompanying his father at the temple or at some local gathering. But you have evidently not yet had to do with him since he has reached maturer years.

Lys. How are you so sure of that, Nicias?

Nic. You strike me as not being aware that, whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and has any talk with him face to face, is bound to be drawn round and round by him in the course of the argument—though it may have started at first on a quite different theme—and cannot stop until he is led into giving an account of himself, of the manner in which he now spends his days, and of the kind of life he has lived hitherto; and when once he has been led into that, Socrates will never let him go until he has thoroughly and properly put all his ways to the test. Now I am accustomed to him, and so I know that one is bound to be thus treated by him, and further, that I myself shall certainly get the same treatment also. For I delight, Lysimachus, in conversing with the man, and see no harm in our being reminded of any past or present misdoing: nay, one must needs take more careful thought for the rest of one's life, if one does not fly from his words but is willing, as Solon said, and zealous to learn as long as one lives, and does not expect to get good sense by the mere arrival of old age. So to me there is nothing unusual, or unpleasant either, in being tried and tested by Socrates; in fact, I knew pretty well all the time that our argument would not be about the boys if

1 Fr. 10 ἔρασκε δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδάσκουμενος, "I grow old learning ever more and more"; see below, 189 a.
PLATO

C perì ἠμῶν αὐτῶν. ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν οὔδεν κωλύει Σωκράτει συνδιατρίβειν ὅπως οὖτος βουλεταί: Λάχητα δὲ τόνδε ὅρα ὅπως ἔχει περὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτον.

Δα. Ἀπλοῦν τὸ γ' ἐμὸν, ὡς Νικία, περὶ λόγων ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ βουλεῖ, οὐχ ἀπλοῦν, ἀλλὰ διπλοῦν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξαιμί τιν φιλόλογος εἶναι καὶ αὐθομόλογος. οταν μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῦω ἀνδρὸς περὶ ἀρτῆς διαλεγομένου ἢ περὶ τως σοφίας ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντος ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἀξίου τῶν λόγων ὅν λέγει, χαῖρω ὑπερφυὼς, θεώμενος ἀμα τὸν τε λέγοντα καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ὅτι πρέποντα ἄλληλοις καὶ ἀρμοττοῦμα ἐστι' καὶ κομιδὴ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἀρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμοσμένον οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παίδιας όργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὃντι [ἐγ'] ἡρμοσμένος οὖν] αὐτὸς αὐτὸς τὸν βίον σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἑργα, ἀτεχνῶς δωριστὶ ἄλλ' οὐκ ἱαστὶ, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ φρυγιστὶ οὗδε λυστὶ, ἄλλ' ἐπερ μόνη Ἑλληνικὴ ἐστιν ἀρμονία. ὁ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος

Ε ἔρειν με ποιεῖ φθεγγόμενος καὶ δοκεῖν ὄτως φιλόλογον εἶναι. οὔτω σφόδρα ἀποδέχομαι παρ' αὐτοῦ τὰ λεγόμενα. ὁ δὲ τάναντια τοῦτον πράττων λυπεῖ με, ὥσῳ ἂν δοκῇ ἄμενον λέγεων, τοσοῦτω μᾶλλον, καὶ ποιεῖ αὐτὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι μυσόλογον. Σωκράτους δ' ἐγώ τῶν μὲν λόγων οὐκ ἐμπειρός εἰμι, ἀλλὰ πρότερον, ὥς ἐσοκε, τῶν ἑργῶν ἐπειράθην, καὶ ἐκεῖ αὐτόν εὑρὼν ἂξιον ὄντα λόγων καλῶν καὶ

1 ἐγ' ἡρμοσμένος οὐ secl. Badham.

1 Laches plays with the two meanings of ἀπλοῦν—"I am single-minded (simple, straightforward) in such matters, that is, I should rather say, double-minded."

2 The different modes or scales in Greek music were
Socrates were present, but about ourselves. Let me therefore repeat that there is no objection on my part to holding a debate with Socrates after the fashion that he likes; but you must see how Laches here feels on the matter.

Lach. I have but a single mind, Nicias, in regard to discussions, or if you like, a double rather than a single one. For you might think me a lover, and yet also a hater, of discussions: for when I hear a man discussing virtue or any kind of wisdom, one who is truly a man and worthy of his argument, I am exceedingly delighted; I take the speaker and his speech together, and observe how they sort and harmonize with each other. Such a man is exactly what I understand by "musical,"—he has tuned himself with the fairest harmony, not that of a lyre or other entertaining instrument, but has made a true concord of his own life between his words and his deeds, not in the Ionian, no, nor in the Phrygian nor in the Lydian, but simply in the Dorian mode, which is the sole Hellenic harmony. Such a man makes me rejoice with his utterance, and anyone would judge me then a lover of discussion, so eagerly do I take in what he says: but a man who shows the opposite character gives me pain, and the better he seems to speak, the more I am pained, with the result, in this case, that I am judged a hater of discussion. Now of Socrates' words I have no experience, but formerly, I fancy, I have made trial of his deeds; and there I found him living up to any associated with different moral feelings. The Dorian was most favoured, as having a manly, stately character: the Ionian was more passionate and contentious. The Phrygian and Lydian were foreign modes, on the character of which there were various opinions. Cf. Rep. 398-99.
πάσης παρρησίας. εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐχει, συμβουλομαί τάνδρι, καὶ ἦδιστ' ἃν ἐξεταζομήν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιοῦτον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀχθοίμην μανθάνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ τῷ Σόλωνι, ἐν μονον προσλαβῶν, συγχωρῶ· γνησίσκων γάρ πολλὰ διδάσκεσθαι ἐθέλω ὑπὸ χρηστῶν μόνον. τοῦτο γάρ μοι συγχωρεῖτω, ἀγαθὸν καὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν διδάσκαλον, ὅσα μὴ δυσμαθῆσαν φαίνωμαι ἀηδῶς μανθάνων· εἰ δὲ νεώτερος ὁ διδάσκαλος έσται τὰ μήπω ἐν δόξη ὑν ἡ τι ἅλλο τῶν τοιούτων ἔχων, οὐδέν μοι μέλει. σοι οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατε, ἐγὼ ἐπαγγέλλομαι καὶ διδάσκεω καὶ ἑλέγχεω ἐμὲ ὁ τι ἅλλο γούλη, καὶ μανθάνως γε ὁ τι αὐτό ἐγὼ οἴδα: οὔτω σὺ παρ' ἐμοὶ διάκεισαι ἀπ' ἑκείνης τῆς ἡμέρας, ἢ μετ' ἐμιν συνδεκειδύνευσας καὶ ἑδώκας σαυτοῦ πείραν ἀρετῆς, ἥν χρῆ διδόναι τὸν μέλλοντα δικαίως δώσειν. λέγ οὗν ὁ τι σοί φίλον, μηδὲν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἥλικιαν ὑπόλογον ζω. Οὐ τὰ ὑμέτερα, ως έουκεν, αἵτιασόμεθα μή οὖν ἐτοιμα εἶναι καὶ συμβουλεύειν καὶ συσκοπεῖν.

40

This instance of Socrates’ intrepidity (at Delium, cf. above, 181 b) is more fully described by Alcibiades in the Symposium (221).
fine words however freely spoken. So if he has that gift as well, his wish is mine, and I should be very glad to be cross-examined by such a man, and should not chafe at learning; but I too agree with Solon, while adding just one word to his saying: I should like, as I grow old, to learn more and more, but only from honest folk. Let him concede to me that my teacher is himself good—else I shall dislike my lessons and be judged a dunce—but if you say that my teacher is to be a younger man, or one who so far has no reputation, or anything of that sort, I care not a jot. I therefore invite you, Socrates, both to teach and to refute me as much as you please, and to learn too what I on my part know; such is the position you hold in my eyes since that day on which you came through the same danger with me,¹ and gave a proof of your own valour which is to be expected of anyone who hopes to justify his good name. So say whatever you like, leaving out of account the difference of our ages.

soc. You two, it seems, will give us no ground for complaint on the score of your not being ready to join both in advising and in inquiring.

LYS. No, but the matter now rests with us, Socrates; for I venture to count you as one of us. So take my place in inquiring on behalf of the young men; make out what it is that we want our friends here to tell us, and be our adviser by discussing it with them. For I find that owing to my age I forget the questions I intend to put, and also the answers I receive; and if the discussion changes in the middle, my memory goes altogether. Do you therefore discuss and elucidate our problem among yourselves;
ἀκούσομαι καὶ ἀκούσας αὖ μετὰ Μελησίουν τοῦδε ποιήσω τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν καὶ ὑμῖν δοκῇ.

/language:el

ζη. Πειστέον, ὁ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης, Δυσμάχω καὶ Μελησία. ἃ μὲν οὖν νῦν δὴ ἐπεξερήσαμεν σκοπεῖν, τίνες οἱ διδάσκαλοι ἤμιν τῆς τοιαύτης παιδείας γεγόνασιν ἡ τίνας ἄλλους βελτίων πε-

πούκαμεν, ἵσως μὲν οὐ κακῶς ἔχει ἐξετάζειν καὶ

Ἐ τὰ τοιαύτα ἦμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀλλ' οἴμαι καὶ η τοιάδε σκέψις εἰς ταύτων φέρει, σχεδὸν δὲ τι καὶ μάλλον ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰν τίνι. εἰ γὰρ τυγχάνομεν ἐπιστάμενοι ὅτου ὁμοίων πέρι, ὅτι παραγενομένοι τοι βέλτιον ποιεῖν ἐκείνο ὡς παρεγένετο, καὶ προσέτι οἶοι τὲ ἐσμὲν αὐτὸ ποιεῖν παραγίγνεσθαι ἐκεῖνο, ἤδην ὅτι αὐτὸ γε ἐσμὲν τοῦτο, οὐ πέρι σύμβουλοι ἂν γενοῖμαι ὡς ἂν τις αὐτὸ ῥάστα καὶ ἀριστ', ἂν κτῆσαιτο. ἵσως οὖν οὐ μανθάνετέ μου ὅ τι λέγω, 

ἀλλ' ὡδε βάει μαθήσασθε. εἰ τυγχάνομεν ἐπι-

στάμενοι, ὅτι ὧμις παραγενομένη ὀφθαλμοῖς βελ-

τίους ποιεῖ ἐκεῖνος οἷς παρεγένετο, καὶ προσέτι 

οἶοι τὲ ἐσμῷ ποιεῖν αὐτὴν παραγίγνεσθαι ὁμισαι, 

ἡδην ὅτι ὧμις γε ἐσμὲν αὐτὴν ὅ τι ποτ' ἔστιν, ἥς 

πέρι σύμβουλοι ἁν γενοῖμαι ἡς ἂν τις αὐτήν 

ῥάστα καὶ ἀριστα κτῆσαιτο. εἰ γὰρ μηθ' αὐτὸ 

τοῦτο εἰδεῖμεν, ὅ τι ποτ' ἔστιν ὧμις ἡ ὅ τι ἐστὶν 

ἀκοή, σχολὴ ἁν σύμβουλοι γε ἄξιοι λόγου γενοῖμαι 

καὶ ἱστοι ἡ περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ἡ περὶ ἄτων, ὁμών 

Β τρόπον ἄκοην ἡ ὧμιν κάλλιστ' ἂν κτῆσαιτο 

τις.

ἐλ. Ἀληθὴς λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ζη. Οὐκοῦν, ὁ Λάχης, καὶ νῦν ἦμᾶς τώδε παρακα-

λεῖτον εἰς συμβουλὴν, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῖς νεόν 

αὐτῶν ἀρετὴ παραγενομένη ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἁμείνου 

ποιήσειν;
and I will listen, and then with my friend Melesias I will act at once upon whatever may be your decision.

soc. Let us do, Nicias and Laches, as Lysimachus and Melesias bid us. Now the questions that we attempted to consider a while ago—"Who have been our teachers in this sort of training? What other persons have we made better?"—are perhaps of a kind on which we might well examine ourselves: but I believe this other way of inquiring leads to the same thing, and will probably also start more from the beginning. For if we happen to know of such and such a thing that by being joined to another thing it makes this thing better, and further, if we are able to get the one joined to the other, we obviously know the thing itself on which we might be consulting as to how it might be best and most easily acquired. Now I daresay you do not grasp my meaning. Well, you will grasp it more easily in this way. If we happen to know that sight joined to eyes makes those eyes the better for it, and further if we are able to get it joined to eyes, we obviously know what this faculty of sight is, on which we might be consulting as to how it might be best and most easily acquired. For if we did not know first of all what sight or hearing is, we should hardly prove ourselves consultants or physicians of credit in the matter of eyes or ears, and the best way of acquiring sight or hearing.

LACH. Truly spoken, Socrates.

soc. And you know, Laches, at this moment our two friends are inviting us to a consultation as to the way in which virtue may be joined to their sons' souls, and so make them better?
Λ. Πάνω γε.

Σ. 'Αρ' οὖν τούτο γ' ύπάρχειν δεῖ, τὸ εἰδέναι ὁ τὶ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετή; εἰ γάρ ποιν μηδ' ἀρετήν εἰδεῖμεν τὸ παράπαν ὁ τὶ ποτε τυγχάνει οὖν, τίν' ἂν

Ϲ τρόπον τούτον σύμβουλοι γενοῦμεθα ὅτῳδον, ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸ κάλλιστα κτήσαιτο;

Λ. Οὐδένα, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὡ Σῶκρατες.

Σ. Φαμὲν ἀρα, ὡ Λάχης, εἰδέναι αὐτὸ ὁ τὶ ἕστιν.

Λ. Φαμὲν μέντοι.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ γε ἦμεν, κἂν εἴπομεν δήποτε τί ἕστιν.

Λ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Σ. Μὴ τοῖνυν, ὡ ἀριστε, περὶ ὅλης ἀρετῆς εὐθέως σκοπώμεθα: πλέον γὰρ ἰὸν ἔργον ἀλλὰ μέρους των πέρι πρῶτον ἑδομεν, εἰ ἰκανῶς ἑχομεν

(pros τὸ εἰδέναι· καὶ ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ῥάων ἡ σκέψις ἔσται.

Λ. 'Αλλ' οὖτω ποιῶμεν, ὡ Σῶκρατες, ὡς σὺ βουλεῖ.

Σ. Τί οὖν ἂν προελοίμεθα τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μερῶν; ἡ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τούτο εἰς ὁ τείνειν δοκεῖ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ὀπλοῖς μάθησις; δοκεῖ δὲ ποιν τοῖς πολλοῖς εἰς ἀνδρείαν. ἡ γάρ;

Λ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὖτω δοκεῖ.

Σ. Τοῦτο τοῖνυν πρῶτον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν, ὡ Λάχης, εἴπειν, ἀνδρεία τι ποτ' ἐστίν· ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο σκεφώμεθα καὶ ὅτω ἂν τρόπῳ τοῖς νεανίσκοις

Ε παραγένοιτο, καθ' ὅσον οἴον τε ἐξ ἐπιτηδευμάτων τε καὶ μαθημάτων παραγένοιτο. ἀλλὰ πειρῶ εἴπειν ὃ λέγω, τί ἕστιν ἀνδρεία.

Λ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὡ Σῶκρατες, οὐ χαλεπὸν εἴπειν· εἰ γάρ τις ἑθέλοι ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων ἀμύνε-
LACHES

LACH. Yes, indeed.

soc. Then our first requisite is to know what virtue is? For surely, if we had no idea at all what virtue actually is, we could not possibly consult with anyone as to how he might best acquire it?

LACH. I certainly think not, Socrates.

soc. Then we say, Laches, that we know what it is.

LACH. I suppose we must.

soc. And of that which we know, I presume, we can also say what it is.

LACH. To be sure.

soc. Let us not, therefore, my good friend, inquire forthwith about the whole of virtue, since that may well be too much for us; but let us first see if we are sufficiently provided with knowledge about some part of it. In all likelihood this will make our inquiry easier.

LACH. Yes, let us do as you propose, Socrates.

soc. Then which of the parts of virtue shall we choose? Clearly, I think, that which the art of fighting in armour is supposed to promote; and that, of course, is generally supposed to be courage, is it not?

LACH. Yes, it generally is, to be sure.

soc. Then let our first endeavour be, Laches, to say what courage is: after that we can proceed to inquire in what way our young men may obtain it, in so far as it is to be obtained by means of pursuits and studies. Come, try and tell me, as I suggest, what is courage.

LACH. On my word, Socrates, that is nothing difficult: anyone who is willing to stay at his post and

1 Here, and in what follows, "virtue" embraces the accomplishments and excellences of a good citizen.
PLATO

σθαί τούς πολεμίους καὶ μὴ φεύγοι, εὖ ἵσθι ὅτι ἀνδρεῖος ἐν εἴη.

σω. Ἐν μὲν λέγεις, ὦ Λάχης· ἄλλ' ἵσως ἐγὼ αὐτίος, οὐ σαφῶς εἰπών, τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ τούτῳ ὁ διανοούμενος ἣρομήν, ἄλλ' ἑτερον.

λα. Πῶς τούτῳ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

191 σω. Ἔγώ φράσω, έαν οἷός τε γένωμαι. ἀν- δρεῖος ποὺ οὔτος, ὃν καὶ οὖ λέγεις, ὃς ἂν ἐν ή τῇ τάξει μένων μάχεται τοῖς πολεμίοις.

λα. Ἔγὼ γοῦν φημί.

σω. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ. ἄλλα τί αὐ ὅδε, ὃς ἂν φεύγων μάχεται τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἄλλα μὴ μένων;

λα. Πῶς φεύγων;

σω. "Ωσπερ που καὶ Σκύθαι λέγονται οὐχ ἢττον φεύγοντες ἡ διώκοντες μάχεσθαι, καὶ Ἄομηρός ποὺ ἐπαυγὼν τοὺς τοῦ Αὐνείου ἅππους κραίπνα μάλ'

Β ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα ἔφη αὐτοῦς ἐπίστασθαι διώκειν ἥν ἃ 

φέβεσθαί· καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Αὐνεῖαν κατὰ τοῦτ' ἐν-

eκωμίσασε, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ φόβου ἐπιστήμην, καὶ εἶπεν 

αὐτὸν εἶναι μήστωρα φόβου.

λα. Καὶ καλῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· περὶ ἄρμάτων 

γὰρ ἔλεγε· καὶ σὺ τὸ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἅππους περὶ 

λέγεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἅππικον [τὸ ἐκείνων] οὔτω 

μάχεται, τὸ δὲ ὀπλιτικὸν [τὸ γε τῶν 'Ελλήνων], 1 

ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω.

σω. Πλήν γ' ἵσως, ὦ Λάχης, τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων.

C Λακεδαιμονίους γὰρ φασὶν ἐν Πλαταϊᾶς, ἐπειδὴ 

πρὸς τοῖς γερροφόροις ἐγένοντο, οὐκ ἐθέλειν μένον-

1 τὸ ἐκείνων, τὸ γε τῶν 'Ελλήνων om. papyr. Arsin.

1 II. viii. 107-108. Socrates pretends to take the hero's epithet "prompter of fright" (in the enemy) as meaning
face the enemy, and does not run away, you may be sure, is courageous.

soc. Rightly spoken, Laches; but I fear I am to blame, by not putting it clearly, for your having answered not the intention of my question, but something else.

lach. What do you mean by that, Socrates?

soc. I will explain, so far as I can: let us take that man to be courageous who, as you describe him yourself, stays at his post and fights the enemy.

lach. I, for one, agree to that.

soc. Yes, and I do too. But what of this other kind of man, who fights the enemy while fleeing, and not staying?

lach. How fleeing?

soc. Well, as the Scythians are said to fight, as much fleeing as pursuing; and as you know Homer says in praise of Aeneas' horses, that they knew "how to pursue and to flee in fright full swiftly this way and that way;" and he glorifies Aeneas himself for this very knowledge of fright, calling him "prompter of fright."¹

lach. And very properly too, Socrates; for he was speaking of chariots; and so are you speaking of the mode of the Scythian horsemen. That is the way of cavalry fighting; but with men-at-arms it is as I state it.²

soc. Except, perhaps, Laches, in the case of the Spartans. For they say that at Plataea, when the Spartans came up to the men with wicker shields, that he prompted fright in himself and his side, and so knew all about the feeling.

¹ i.e. they stand fast at their posts in the ranks (above, 191 a).

²
tas pròs autoús màchethai, allà feúgev, èpeidh' di' elúthiasan ai tásieis tônw Persónw, anástrefoménon àwster éppeas màchethai kai ou'tov nikhai tìn èkei màchn.

ΔΔ. 'Allhè hé légeis.

ΣΣ. Tò toûnto àrti éleugon, òti ègò autoís mú kalós se á pokrínasbas, òti ou kalós èrómhn.

D Boulóménon gár sou pithesbas mú mónon toûs èn tò óplitikó vàdréous, allà kai toûs èn tò íppikó kai èn súmpanti tò polémikó èidei, kai mú mónon toûs èn tò polémw, allà kai toûs èn toîs pròs tìn thalattan kiv dönous vàdréous òntas, kai èsoi ge pròs nósoús kai èsoi pròs pevias ò kai pròs tà politikà vàdréoi èisi, kai èti aú mú mónon èsoi pròs lútas vàdréoi èisw ò fóbous, allà kai pròs épithumias ò hòdwns dénóî màchethai, E kai mènontes ò anástrefontes—èisi gár pou tînes, ò Láchn, kai èn toîs toîoutois vàdréoi.

ΔΔ. Kai sfódra, ò Sókrates.

ΣΣ. Oukou vàdréoi mèn pántes ou'toi èisw, all' oí múèn èn hòdwnas, oí d' èn lúpasi, oí d' èn épithumias oí d' èn fóbous tìn vàdréan kékhtnai, oî dé g', ómias, deilías èn toîs autoís toûtois.

ΔΔ. Pánu ge.

ΣΣ. Ti pote òn èkateron touton, touto èpvnbadanómhn. Pálwn oûn peirw eîpeîn vàdréan pròton, tì òn èn pási toîou toûtois taûton èstiv. ò ou'w katanvàneas ò léghw;

ΔΔ. Oú pánu ti.

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1 In the final struggle at Plataea (479 B.C.) the Spartans at first hesitated before the barrier of wicker shields opposed
they were not willing to stand and fight against these, but fled; when, however, the Persian ranks were broken, the Spartans kept turning round and fighting like cavalry, and so won that great battle.¹

LACH. What you say is true.

soc. And so this is what I meant just now by saying that I was to blame for your wrong answer, by putting my question wrongly. For I wanted to have your view not only of brave men-at-arms, but also of courage in cavalry and in the entire warrior class; and of the courageous not only in war but in the perils of the sea, and all who in disease and poverty, or again in public affairs, are courageous; and further, all who are not merely courageous against pain or fear, but doughty fighters against desires and pleasures, whether standing their ground or turning back upon the foe—for I take it, Laches, there are courageous people in all these kinds.

LACH. Very much so, Socrates.

soc. Then all these are courageous, only some have acquired courage in pleasures, some in pains, some in desires and some in fears, while others, I conceive, have acquired cowardice in these same things.

LACH. To be sure.

soc. What either of them² is—that is what I wanted to know. So try again, and tell me first what is this thing, courage, which is the same in all of these cases; or do you still not comprehend my meaning?

LACH. Not very well.

to them by the Persians: but by a supreme effort they broke through and defeated the Persians by turning on them in man-to-man combat. Cf. Herod. ix. 61–2.

² i.e. courage and cowardice.
περὶ ἀνδρείας σεχ. Badham.
LACHES

soc. I mean in this way: suppose, for instance, I were asking you what is quickness, as we find it in running and harping, in speaking and learning, and in many other activities, and as possessed by us practically in any action worth mentioning, whether of arms or legs, or mouth or voice, or mind: or do you not use the word so?

LACH. Yes, to be sure.

soc. Well then, suppose someone asked me: Socrates, what do you mean by this thing which in all cases you term quickness? My reply would be: The faculty that gets a great deal done in a little time is what I call quickness, whether in a voice or in a race or in any of the other instances.

LACH. Your statement would be quite correct.

soc. So now try and tell me on your part, Laches, about courage in the same way: what faculty is it, the same whether in pleasure or in pain or in any of the things in which we said just now it was to be found, that has been singled out by the name of courage?

LACH. Well then, I take it to be a certain endurance of the soul, if I am to speak of the natural quality that appears in them all.

soc. Why, of course we must, if we are each to answer the other's actual question. Now it appears to me that by no means all endurance, as I conceive it, can appear to you to be courage. And my grounds for thinking so are these: I am almost certain, Laches, that you rank courage among the nobler qualities.
ΛΑ. Εὖ μὲν οὖν ἵσθι ὧτι τῶν καλλίστων.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν μετὰ φρονῆσεως καρτερία 
καλὴ κἀγαθή;
ΛΑ. Πάνω γε.

Δ ΣΩ. Τί δ’ ἢ μετ’ ἀφροσύνης; οὐ τούναντίον 
ταύτῃ βλαβερὰ καὶ κακοῦργος;
ΛΑ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καλὸν οὖν τι φήσεις οὐ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον,
ὅν κακοῦργον τε καὶ βλαβερὸν;
ΛΑ. Οὐκοῦν δίκαιον γε, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀρα τὴν γε τοιαύτην καρτερίαν ἀνδρείαν 
ὁμολογήσεις εἶναι, ἐπειδὴπερ οὐ καλὴ ἐστιν, ἢ 
δὲ ἀνδρεία καλὸν ἐστιν.
ΛΑ. 'Αληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. 'Ἡ φρόνιμος ἀρα καρτερία κατὰ τὸν σὸν 
λόγον ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη.
ΛΑ. 'Εοικέν.

Ε ΣΩ. 'Ἰδωμεν δὴ, ἢ εἰς τί φρόνιμος; ἢ ἢ εἰς 
ἀπαντα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ σμικρά; οἶον εἴ τις 
καρτερεῖ ἀναλίσκων ἀργύριον φρονίμως, εἰδὼς 
ὅτι ἀναλύσας πλέον ἑκτησεται, τούτον ἀνδρείον 
καλοῖς ἂν;
ΛΑ. Μᾶ Δι’ οὐκ ἔγνωγε.

ΣΩ. 'ΑΛŁ οἶον εἴ τις ἰατρὸς ὥν, περιπλευμονία τοῦ 
υἱός ἐχομένου ἢ ἄλλου τυφὸς καὶ δεομένου πιεῖν 
ἡ φαγεῖν δούναι, μὴ κάμπτοτο ἄλλα καρτεροί;
ΛΑ. Οὐδ’ ὀπωστιοῦν οὐδ’ αὕτη.

ΣΩ. 'ΑΛŁ ἐν πολέμῳ καρτεροῦντα ἀνδρα καὶ 
ἐθέλοντα μάχεσθαι, φρονίμως λογιζόμενον, εἰδότα 
μὲν ὦτι βοηθήσουσιν ἄλλοι αὐτῷ, πρὸς ἐλάττους δὲ
LACHES

LACH. Nay, among the noblest, you may be quite certain.

soc. And endurance joined with wisdom is noble and good?

LACH. Very much so.

soc. But what of it when joined with folly? Is it not, on the contrary, hurtful and mischievous?

LACH. Yes.

soc. And can you say that such a thing is noble, when it is both mischievous and hurtful?

LACH. Not with any justice, Socrates.

soc. Then you will not admit that such an endurance is courage, seeing that it is not noble, whereas courage is a noble quality.

LACH. That is true.

soc. So, by your account, wise endurance will be courage.

LACH. Apparently.

soc. Now let us see in what it is wise. In all things, whether great or small? For instance, if a man endures in spending money wisely, because he knows that by spending he will gain more, would you call him courageous?

LACH. On my word, not I.

soc. Or what do you call it in the case of a doctor who, when his son or anyone else is suffering from inflammation of the lungs and begs for something to drink or eat, inflexibly and enduringly refuses?

LACH. That is no case of it, in any sense, either.

soc. Well now, when a man endures in war, and is willing to fight, on a wise calculation whereby he knows that others will come to his aid, and that the forces
καὶ φαυλοτέρους μαχεῖται ἡ μεθ’ ὃν αὐτός ἐστιν, ἐτὶ δὲ χαρία ἔχει κρείττω, τούτον τὸν μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης φρονήσεως καὶ παρασκευῆς καρτεροῦντα ἀνδρείότερον ἂν φαίη ἡ τὸν ἐν τῷ ἑναντίῳ στρατοπέδῳ ἐθέλοντα ὑπομένειν τε καὶ καρτερεῖν;

B Ἅ. Τὸν ἐν τῷ ἑναντίῳ, ἔμουγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ἐπ. Ἅλλα μὴν ἀφρονεστέρα γε ἡ τούτου ἡ ἡ τοῦ ἐτέρου καρτερία.
ἄρ. Ἅληθῆ λέγεις.
ἐπ. Καὶ τὸν μετ’ ἐπιστήμης ἀρὰ ἐπικής καρτεροῦντα ἐν ἐπιμολῦνῃ ἤττον φήσεις ἀνδρείον εἶναι ἡ τὸν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης.
ἄρ. Ἔμουγε δοκεῖ.

C ἐπ. Καὶ τὸν μετὰ σφενδονητικῆς ἡ τοξικῆς ἡ ἀλλῆς τωὸς τέχνης καρτεροῦντα.
ἄρ. Πάνυ γε.
ἐπ. Καὶ οὗτοι ἂν ἐθέλωσιν εἰς φρέαρ καταβαίνοντες καὶ κολυμβῶντες καρτερεῖν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ, μὴ ἄντες δεινοί, ἡ ἐν τῳ ἀλλῳ τοιοῦτῳ, ἀνδρειοτέρους φήσεις τῶν ταῦτα δεινῶν.
ἄρ. Τῇ γὰρ ἂν τῆς ἀλλο φαίη, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ἐπ. Οὐδέν, εἴπερ οἰοντὸ γε οὔτως.
ἄρ. Ἅλλα μὴν οἴμαι γε.
ἐπ. Καὶ μὴν ποῦ ἀφρονεστέρως γε, ὦ Δάχης, οἱ τοιοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσι τε καὶ καρτεροῦσιν ἢ οἱ μετὰ τέχνης αὐτὸ πράττοντες.
ἄρ. Φαίνονται.

D ἐπ. Οὐκοῦν αἰσχρὰ ἡ ἀφρων τόλμῃ τε καὶ καρτέρησις ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐφάνῃ ἥμιν οὕσα καὶ βλαβερά;
ἄρ. Πάνυ γε.

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against him will be fewer and feeblener than those who are with him, and when he has besides the advantage of position,—would you say of this man, if he endures with such wisdom and preparation, that he, or a man in the opposing army who is willing to stand up against him and endure, is the more courageous?

LACH. The man opposed to him, I should say, Socrates.

SOC. But yet his endurance is more foolish than that of the first man.

LACH. That is true.

SOC. So you would say that he who in a cavalry fight endures with a knowledge of horsemanship is less courageous than he who endures without it.

LACH. Yes, I think so.

SOC. And he who endures with a skill in slinging or shooting or other such art.

LACH. To be sure.

SOC. And anyone who agrees to descend into a well, and to dive, and to endure in this or other such action, without being an adept in these things, you would say is more courageous than the adepts.

LACH. Yes, for what else can one say, Socrates?

SOC. Nothing, provided one thinks so.

LACH. But I do think it.

SOC. And you observe, I suppose, Laches, that persons of this sort are more foolish in their risks and endurances than those who do it with proper skill.

LACH. Evidently.

SOC. Now, we found before that foolish boldness and endurance are base and hurtful?

LACH. Quite so.

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PLATO

Σπ. Ἡ δὲ γε ἀνδρεία ὁμολογεῖτο καλὸν τι εἶναι.

Λα. Ὅμολογεῖτο γὰρ.

Σπ. Νῦν δ' αὖ πάλιν φαμὲν ἐκεῖνο τὸ αἰσχρὸν, τὴν ἄφρονα καρτέρησιν, ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

Λα. 'Εοίκαμεν.

Σπ. Καλῶς οὖν σοι δοκοῦμεν λέγεις;

Λα. Μὰ τὸν Δί', ὁ Ἐσκρατεῖς, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖ.

Σπ. Όὐκ ἀρα που κατὰ τὸν σον λόγον δωριστὶ Ἔ ἡμιόσμεθα ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ, ὁ Δάχης· τὰ γὰρ ἔργα οὐ συμφωνεῖ ἡμῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἔργω μὲν γὰρ, ὡς ἐοικε, φαίη ἂν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνδρείας μετέχειν, λόγῳ δ', ὡς ἐγώμαι, οὐκ ἂν, εἰ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀκούσεις διαλεγομένων.

Λα. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

Σπ. Τί οὖν; δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι οὕτως ἡμᾶς διακεῖσθαι;

Λα. Οὐδ' ὅπωστιον.

Σπ. Βούλει οὖν ὃ λέγομεν πειθὼμεθα τὸ γε τοσοῦτον;

Λα. Τὸ ποιον δὴ τούτο, καὶ τίνι τούτῳ;

Σπ. Τῷ λόγῳ δ'ς καρτερείν κελεύει. εἰ οὖν βούλει, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ζητήσει ἐπιμείνωμεν τε καὶ καρτερήσωμεν, ἵνα καὶ μὴ ἡμῶν αὐτή ἡ ἀνδρεία καταγελάσῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνδρείως αὐτῆς ζητοῦμεν, εἰ ἀρα πολλάκις αὐτή ἡ καρτέρησις ἐστιν ἀνδρεία.

Λα. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτομος, ὁ Ἐσκρατεῖς, μὴ προαδίστασθαι· καίτοι ἁθῆς γ' εἰμὶ τῶν τουοῦτων λόγων· ἀλλὰ τίς με καὶ φιλονικίᾳ ἐληφε πρὸς τὰ εἰρήμενα, Β καί ὃς ἀληθῶς ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ οὕτωσι ὅ νοσ ὡς
socr. But courage was admitted to be something noble.

LACH. Yes, it was.

socr. Whereas now, on the contrary, we say that this base thing—foolish endurance—is courage.

LACH. Apparently.

socr. Then do you think our statement is correct?

LACH. On my word, Socrates, not I.

socr. Hence I presume that, on your showing, you and I, Laches, are not tuned to the Dorian harmony: for our deeds do not accord with our words. By our deeds, most likely, the world might judge us to have our share of courage, but not by our words, I fancy, if they should hear the way we are talking now.

LACH. That is very true.

socr. Well now, does it seem right that we should be in such a condition?

LACH. Not by any means.

socr. Then do you mind if we accept our statement to a certain point?

LACH. To what point do you mean, and what statement?

socr. That which enjoins endurance. And, if you please, let us too be steadfast and enduring in our inquiry, so as not to be ridiculed by courage herself for failing to be courageous in our search for her, when we might perchance find after all that this very endurance is courage.

LACH. For my part I am ready, Socrates, to continue without faltering; and yet I am unaccustomed to discussions of this sort. But a certain ambitious ardour has got hold of me at hearing what has been said, and I am truly vexed at finding myself unable
οίός τ’ εἰμὶ εἶπεῖν. νοεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκῶ
περὶ ἀνδρείας ὃ τι ἐστιν, οὐκ οἶδα δ’ ὅπῃ με ἀρτι
dιέφυγεν, ὡστε μὴ συλλαβεῖν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτῆν καὶ
eἶπεῖν ὃ τι ἐστιν.

σπ. Οὐκοῦν, ὥ φίλε, τὸν ἄγαθὸν κυνηγήτην
μεταθεῖν χρῆ καὶ μὴ ἀνιέναι.

λα. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

σπ. Βοῦλει οὖν καὶ Νικίαν τόνδε παρακαλῶμεν
ἐπὶ τὸ κυνηγέσιον, εἰ τι ήμῶν εὔπορώτερὸς ἐστιν;

C

λα. Βούλομαι· πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

σπ. "Ἰθι δῆ, ὁ Νικία, ἀνδράσι φίλοις χειμαζομέ-
νοις ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσι βοήθησον, εἰ τινὰ ἔχεις
dύναμιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δῆ ἡμέτερα ὅρας ὡς ἀπορα·
σόν δ’ εἰπῶν ὃ τι ἡγῇ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, ἡμᾶς τε τῆς
ἀπορίας ἔκλυσαι καὶ αὐτὸς ἅ νοεῖς τῷ λόγῳ βε-
βαίωσαι.

νι. Δοκεῖτε τοῖνυν μοι πάλαι οὐ καλῶς, ὃ
Σώκρατες, ὀρίζεσθαι τὴν ἀνδρείαν· ὃ γὰρ ἐγὼ σοῦ
ἡδῆ καλῶς λέγοντος ἀκήκοα, τοῦτῳ οὐ χρῆσθε.

σπ. Ποίῳ δῆ, ὁ Νικία;

D

νι. Πολλάκις ἀκήκοα σου λέγοντος, ὅτι ταῦτα
ἀγαθὸς ἐκαστὸς ἡμῶν, ἀπερ σοφὸς, ἃ δὲ ἀμαθῆς,
tαῦτα δὲ κακῶς.

σπ. Ἀληθῆ μὲντοι νῆ Δία λέγεις, ὁ Νικία.

νι. Οὐκοῦν εἰπὲρ ὃ ἀνδρεῖος ἄγαθός, δῆλον ὅτι
σοφὸς ἐστιν.

σπ. "Ηκουσάς, ὁ Λάχης;

λα. "Εγώγη, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα γε μανθάνω ὃ λέγει.
to express offhand what I think. For I feel that I conceive in thought what courage is, but somehow or other she has given me the slip for the moment, so that I fail to lay hold of her in speech and state what she is.

soc. Well, my dear sir, the good huntsman must follow the hounds and not give up the chase.

LACH. Yes, indeed, by all means.

soc. Then do you agree to our inviting Nicias here to join in our hunt? He may be more resourceful than we are.

LACH. I agree, of course.

soc. Come now, Nicias, and use what powers you have to assist your friends, who are caught in a storm of argument and are quite perplexed. You see the perplexity of our case; you must now tell us what you think courage is, and so at once set us free from our perplexity and give your own thoughts the stability of speech.

NIC. Well, for some time I have been thinking, Socrates, that you two are not defining courage in the right way; for you are not acting upon an admirable remark which I have formerly heard you make.

soc. What is that, Nicias?

NIC. I have often heard you say that every man is good in that wherein he is wise, and bad in that wherein he is unlearned.

soc. Well, that is true, Nicias, I must say.

NIC. And hence, if the brave man is good, clearly he must be wise.

soc. Do you hear him, Laches?

LACH. I do, without understanding very well what he says.
"Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ δοκῶ μανθάνειν, καί μοι δοκεῖ ἁνήρ σοφίαν τινὰ τὴν ἄνδρείαν λέγειν.

Ἄληθεία, ὡς Σωκράτης, σοφίαν;

Ὀνκοῦν τόνδε τούτο ἐρωτᾶς;

"Ἐγώγει.

'Ἰδι δή, αὐτῷ εἰπέ, ὡς Νίκια, ποία σοφία ἄνδρεία ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. οὐ γὰρ που ἢ γε αὐλητική.

Ὀυδαμῶς.

Ὀυδὲ μὴν ἡ κυθαριστική.

Ὀυ δῆτα.

'Αλλὰ τίς δὴ αὕτη ἡ τίνος ἐπιστήμη;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὁρθῶς αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶς, ὡς Σωκράτης, καὶ εἰπέτω γε τίνα φησὶν αὐτὴν εἶναι.

Ταύτην ἔγωγε, ὡς Λάχης, τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασίων.

'Ὡς ἄτοπα λέγει, ὡς Σωκράτης.

Πρὸς τί τούτ' εἶπες βλέψας; ὡς Λάχης;

Πρὸς ὃ τι, χωρίς δῆται σοφία ἐστὶν ἄνδρείας.

Ὀνκοῦν φησὶ γε Νικίας.

Ὅμως μὲν Μιᾶ ταύτα τοι καὶ ληρεῖ.

Ὀνκοῦν διδάσκομεν αὐτόν, ἄλλα μὴ λοιδορέομεν.

Ὀὐκ, ἄλλα μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Σωκράτης, Λάχης ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ μὴν φανῆναι μηδὲν λέγοντα, ὅτι καὶ Ἀρτά τοιούτος ἐφάνη.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὡς Νικία, καὶ πειράσομαι γε ἀποφημί. οὔδὲν γὰρ λέγεις, ἐπεὶ αὐτικά ἐν ταῖς νόσοις οὐχ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ δεινὰ ἐπίστοται.
LACHES

soc. But I think I understand it: our friend appears to me to mean that courage is a kind of wisdom.

LACH. What kind of wisdom, Socrates?

soc. Well, will you put that question to your friend here?

LACH. I do.

soc. Come now, tell him, Nicias, what kind of wisdom courage may be, by your account. Not that, I presume, of flute-playing.

NIC. Not at all.

soc. Nor yet that of harping.

NIC. Oh, no.

soc. But what is this knowledge then, or of what?

LACH. I must say you question him quite correctly, Socrates, so let him just tell us what he thinks it is.

NIC. I say, Laches, that it is this—the knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared, either in war or in anything else.

LACH. How strangely he talks, Socrates!

soc. What is it that makes you say that, Laches?

LACH. What is it? Why, surely wisdom is distinct from courage.

soc. Well, Nicias denies that.

LACH. He does indeed, to be sure: that is where he just babbles.

soc. Then let us instruct and not abuse him.

NIC. No, it seems to me, Socrates, that Laches wants to have it proved that I am talking nonsense, because he was proved a moment ago to be in the same case himself.

LACH. Quite so, Nicias, and I will try to make it evident. You are talking nonsense: for instance, do not doctors know what is to be dreaded in dis-
ἡ οἱ ἄνδρεῖοι δοκοῦσι σοι ἐπίστασθαι; ἡ τοὺς ἰατροὺς σὺ ἄνδρεῖους καλεῖς;

νι. Οὔδ’ ὀπωστιοῦν.

λα. Οὐδὲ γε τοὺς γεωργοὺς οἶμαι. καίτοι τὰ γε ἐν τῇ γεωργίᾳ δεινὰ ὁὕτω δήπου ἐπίσταται, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ ἀπαντεῖ τὰ ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν τέχναις δεινὰ τε καὶ θαρραλέα ἵσασιν. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν C τὶ μᾶλλον ὁὕτω ἄνδρεῖοι εἰσιν.

σπ. Τῇ δοκεῖ Λάχης λέγειν, ὥ Νικία; ἔοικε μέντοι λέγειν τι.

νι. Καὶ γὰρ λέγει γέ τι, οὐ μέντοι ἄληθὲς γε.

σπ. Πῶς δὴ;

νι. Ὅσι οἶσται τοὺς ἰατροὺς πλέον τι εἰδέναι περὶ τοὺς κάμμοντας ἡ τό ὑγιεῖνον εἰπεῖν οἶν τε καὶ νοσώδεις. οἱ δὲ δήπου τοσοῦτον μόνον ἵσασιν· εἰ δὲ δεινὸν τῷ τοῦτῳ ἐστὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἡ τὸ κάμμεν, ἡγηθ ὑπ’ ὑπ’ τοῦτί, ὥ Λάχης, τοὺς ἰατροὺς ἐπίστασθαι; ἡ οὐ πολλοῖς οἰεὶ ἐκ τῆς νόσου άμεινον

D εἶναι μὴ ἀναστήναι ἡ ἀναστήναι; τοῦτο γὰρ εἰπέ· σοῦ πάσι φής άμεινον εἶναι ζῆν καὶ οὐ πολλοῖς κρείττον τεθνάναι;

λα. Οἶμαι ἐγωγε τοῦτο γε.

νι. Οίς οὖν τεθνάναι λυσιτελεῖ, ταυτὰ οἰεὶ δεινὰ εἶναι καὶ οῖς ζῆν;

λα. Οὐκ ἐγωγε.

νι. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ σὺ δίδως τοῖς ἰατροῖς γηγηνσκειν ἡ ἄλλω τωὶ δημιουργῷ πλήν τῷ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἐπιστήμων, ὅν ἐγὼ ἄνδρεῖον καλῶ; σπ. Κατανοεῖς, ὥ Λάχης, ὧ τι λέγει;

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ease? Or do you suppose that the courageous know this? Or do you call doctors courageous?

NIC. No, not at all.

LACH. Nor, I fancy, farmers either. And yet they, I presume, know what is to be dreaded in farming, and every other skilled worker knows what is to be dreaded and dared in his own craft; but they are none the more courageous for that.

SOC. What is Laches saying, in your opinion, Nicias? There does seem to be something in it.

NIC. Yes, there is something, only it is not true.

SOC. How so?

NIC. Because he thinks that doctors know something more, in treating sick persons, than how to tell what is healthy and what diseased. This, I imagine, is all that they know: but to tell whether health itself is to be dreaded by anyone rather than sickness,—do you suppose, Laches, that this is within a doctor's knowledge? Do you not think that for many it is better that they should never arise from their bed of sickness? Pray tell me, do you say that in every case it is better to live? Is it not often preferable to be dead?

LACH. I do think that is so.

NIC. And do you think that the same things are to be dreaded by those who were better dead, as by those who had better live?

LACH. No, I do not.

NIC. Well, do you attribute the judgement of this matter to doctors or to any other skilled worker except him who has knowledge of what is to be dreaded and what is not—the man whom I call courageous?

SOC. Do you comprehend his meaning, Laches?
Δ. "Εγώγε, διί γε τούς μάντεις καλεῖ τούς ἀνδρείους· τις γὰρ δὴ ἄλλος εἰσεται ὅτω ἀμενον ζῆν ἢ τεθνᾶναι; καὶ τοι οὐ, ὁ Νικία, πότερον ὁμολογεῖς μάντις εἶναι ἢ οὔτε μάντις οὔτε ἀνδρεῖος; 

καὶ τὰ δεινὰ γνωσκέναι καὶ τὰ θαρραλεά; 

Δ. "Εγώγε· τίνι γὰρ ἄλλῳ;

καὶ Ὡμί ἔγω λέγω πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὡ βέλτιστε· ἐπεὶ μάντιν γε τὰ σημεῖα μόνον δεῖ γνωσκέναι τῶν ἐσομένων, εἰτε τῷ θάνατος εἰτε νόσος εἰτε ἀποβολή

196 χρημάτων ἔσται, εἰτε νίκη εἰτε ἤττα ἢ πολέμου ἢ καὶ ἄλλης τινὸς ἀγωνίας· ὅ τι δὲ τῷ ἀμενον τούτων ἢ παθεῖν ἢ μὴ παθεῖν, τί μᾶλλον μάντει προσήκει κρίναι ἢ ἄλλω ὅτῳδ᾽;

Δ. 'Ἀλλ' ἔγω τούτου οὐ μανθάνω, ὡ Σώκρατες, ὅ τι βουλεῖται λέγειν· οὔτε γὰρ μάντιν οὔτε ἱατρὸν οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα δηλοὶ ὄντων λέγει τὸν ἀνδρείον, εἰ μὴ εἰ θεόν τινα λέγει αὐτὸν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν

β οὐ νοεῖται Νικίας οὐκ ἑδέλειν γενναίως ὁμολογεῖν ὃτι οὐδὲν λέγει, ἀλλὰ στρέφεται ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἐπικρυπτόμενος τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπορίαν. καὶ τοι οὖν ἡμεῖς οἴοι τε ἡμεῖν ἁρτὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ οὐ τοιαῦτα στρέφεσθαι, εἰ ἐβουλόμεθα μὴ δοκεῖν ἐναντία ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς λέγειν. εἰ μὲν oυν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἡμῶν οἱ λόγοι ἠσαν, εἰχὲν ἂν τινὰ λόγον ταῦτα ποιεῖν· νῦν δὲ τί ἂν τις ἐν συνουσίᾳ τοιάδε μάτην κενοῖς λόγοις αὐτός αὐτὸν κοσμοῖ;

εσ. Οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὁ Δάχης· ἀλλ᾽
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LACH. I do: it seems to be the seers whom he calls the courageous: for who else can know for which of us it is better to be alive than dead? And yet, Nicias, do you avow yourself to be a seer, or to be neither a seer nor courageous?

NIC. What! Is it now a seer, think you, who has the gift of judging what is to be dreaded and what to be dared?

LACH. That is my view: who else could it be?

NIC. Much rather the man of whom I speak, my dear sir: for the seer’s business is to judge only the signs of what is yet to come—whether a man is to meet with death or disease or loss of property, or victory or defeat in war or some other contest; but what is better among these things for a man to suffer or avoid suffering, can surely be no more for a seer to decide than for anyone else in the world.

LACH. Well, I fail to follow him, Socrates, or to see what he is driving at; for he points out that neither a seer nor a doctor nor anybody else is the man he refers to as the courageous, unless perchance he means it is some god. Now it appears to me that Nicias is unwilling to admit honestly that he has no meaning at all, but dodges this way and that in the hope of concealing his own perplexity. Why, you and I could have dodged in the same way just now, if we wished to avoid the appearance of contradicting ourselves. Of course, if we were arguing in a law-court, there would be some reason for so doing; but here, in a meeting like this of ours, why waste time in adorning oneself with empty words?

soc. I agree that it is out of place, Laches: but let
The fierce monster slain by Theseus in the region between Corinth and Megara before he became the hero of Attica.
LACHES

us see: perhaps Nicias thinks he does mean something, and is not talking just for the sake of talking. So let us ask him to explain more clearly what is in his mind; and if we find that he means something, we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him.

LACH. Then, Socrates, if you would like to ask him, please do so: I daresay I have done enough asking.

SOC. Well, I see no objection, since the question will be on behalf of us both.

LACH. Very well, then.

SOC. Now tell me, Nicias, or rather, tell us—for Laches and I are sharing the argument between us—do you say that courage is knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared?

NIC. I do.

SOC. And that it is not every man that knows it, since neither a doctor nor a seer can know it, and cannot be courageous unless he add this particular knowledge to his own? This was your statement, was it not?

NIC. Yes, it was.

SOC. And so in fact this is not a thing which, as the proverb says, "any pig would know"; and thus a pig cannot be courageous.

NIC. I think not.

SOC. Indeed it is obvious, Nicias, that you at least do not believe that even the Crommyonian sow\(^1\) could have been courageous. I say this not in jest, but because I conceive it is necessary for him who states this theory to refuse courage to any wild beast, or else to admit that a beast like a lion or a leopard or even a boar is so wise as to know what only a few men know because it is so hard to perceive. Why, he who subscribes to your account of
ναι: ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως λέοντα καὶ ἔλαφον καὶ ταῦρον καὶ πίθηκον πρὸς ἀνδρείαν φάναι πεφυκέναι τὸν τιθέμενον ἀνδρείαν τοῦθεν ὅπερ σὺ τίθεσαι.

197 ΔΔ. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, καὶ εὖ γε λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες. καὶ ἡμῖν ὡς ἄληθῶς τοῦτο ἀπόκριναι, ὁ Νικία, πότερον σοφώτερα φης ἡμῶν ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ θηρία, ἀ πάντες ὁμολογοῦμεν ἀνδρεία εἶναι, ἥ πᾶσιν ἐναντιούμενος τολμᾶς μηδε ἀνδρεία αὐτὰ καλεῖν;

νι. Οὐ γὰρ τι, ὁ Λάχης, ἔγωγε ἀνδρεία καλῶν ὀφείλει οὐτε θηρία ὀφείλει ἀλλο οὐδὲν τὸ τὰ δεινα ὑπὸ ἀναιας μη φοβοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἀφοβον καὶ μωρόν. ἥ καί τὰ

Β παίδια πάντα οἴει μὲ ἀνδρεία καλεῖν, ἀ δι' ἀνοιαν οὐδὲν δέδουκε; ἀλλ' οἴμαι τὸ ἀφοβον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον οὐ ταυτὸν ἐστίν. ἐγὼ δὲ ἀνδρείας μὲν καὶ προμηθίας πάνυ τισών ὁλίγων οἴμαι μετείναι, θραυστητος δὲ καὶ τόλμης καὶ τοῦ ἀφόβου μετὰ ἀπρομηθίας πάνυ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ θηρίων. ταῦτ' οὖν ἀ σὺ καλεῖς ἀνδρεία καὶ οἱ πολλοί, ἐγὼ θρασεά καλῶ, ἀνδρεία

C δὲ τὰ φρόνιμα περὶ ὧν λέγω.

ΔΔ. Θέασαι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὡς εὖ ὀδε ἐαυτὸν ἠθῇ, ὡς οἴεται, κοσμεῖ τῷ λόγῳ· ὡς δὲ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ἀνδρείους εἶναι, τούτους ἀποστερεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ ταυτῆς τῆς τιμῆς.

νι. Οὐκοῦν σὲ γε, ὁ Λάχης, ἀλλὰ θάρρει· φημὶ γάρ σὲ εἶναι σοφόν, καὶ Λάμαχον γε, εἰπὲρ ἐστὲ ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ ἄλλους γε συγχοῦς Ἀθηναίων.

ΔΔ. Οὐδὲν ἐρῶ πρὸς ταῦτα, ἔχων εἰπεῖν, ἢν μὴ μὲ φῆς ὡς ἄληθῶς Λεξωνέα εἶναι.

1 σὲ γε papyr. Oxyr.: ἐγώγε mss.

1 A deme or district of Attica, noted for the abusive wit of its people.
courage must needs agree that a lion, a stag, a bull, and a monkey have all an equal share of courage in their nature.

LACH. Heavens, Socrates, how admirably you argue! Now answer us sincerely, Nicias, and say whether those animals, which we all admit to be courageous, are wiser than we are; or whether you dare, in contradiction of everyone else, describe them as not even courageous.

NIC. No, Laches, I do not describe animals, or anything else that from thoughtlessness has no fear of the dreadful, as courageous, but rather as fearless and foolish. Or do you suppose I describe all children as courageous, that have no fear because they are thoughtless? I rather hold that the fearless and the courageous are not the same thing. In my opinion very few people are endowed with courage and forethought, while rashness, boldness, and fearlessness, with no forethought to guide it, are found in a great number of men, women, children, and animals. So you see, the acts that you and most people call courageous, I call rash, and it is the prudent acts which I speak of that are courageous.

LACH. Mark you, Socrates, how finely, as he fancies, my friend decks himself out with his words! And how he attempts to deprive of the distinction of courage those whom everyone admits to be courageous!

NIC. I am not referring to you, Laches, so do not be frightened: for I grant that you, and Lamachus also, are wise, since you are courageous, and I say the same of numerous other Athenians.

LACH. I will not say what I could say in answer to that, lest you call me a true son of Aexone.
PLATO

D ξν. Μηδε γε ειτης, ὁ Δάχης· καὶ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖσ οὐδὲ [μῆ] ἡθήσαται ὅτι ταῦτην τὴν σοφίαν παρὰ Δάμωνος τοῦ ἠμετέρου ἐταίρου παρείληφεν, ὃ δὲ Δάμων τῷ Προδίκῳ πολλὰ πλησιάζει, ὃς δὴ δοκεῖ τῶν σοφιστῶν κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅνοματα διαιρεῖν.

Λ. Καὶ γὰρ πρέπει, ὁ Σώκρατες, σοφιστῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον κομψεύεσθαι ἡ ἀνδρὶ δὲν ἡ πόλις ἄξιοί αὐτῆς προϊστάναι.

Ε ξν. Πρέπει μὲν ποι, ὁ μακάριε, τῶν μεγίστων προστατοῦντες μεγίστης φρονήσεως μετέχειν· δοκεῖ δὲ μοι Νικίας ἄξιος εἶναι ἐπισκέψεως, ὅποι ποτὲ βλέπων τούνομα τοῦτο τίθησι τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

Λ. Αὐτὸς τοῖς σκόπει, ὁ Σώκρατες.

Σ. Τοῦτο μέλλω ποιεῖν, ὁ ἀριστε· μὴ μέντοι οὖν με ἀφῆσεν σε τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν καὶ συσκόπει τὰ λεγόμενα.

Λ. Ταῦτα δὴ ἔστω, εἶ δοκεῖ χρήναι.

Σ. Ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ. σὺ δὲ, Νικία, λέγε ἡμῖν πάλιν 198 ἐξ ἀρχῆς· οἶσθι ὅτι τὴν ἀνδρείαν κατ’ ἀρχὰς τοῦ λόγου ἑκατοποῦμεν ὡς μέρος ἀρετῆς σκοποῦντες;

Ν. Πάνυ γε.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω ὡς μόριον, ὅτι τὸ καὶ ἄλλων μερῶν, ἡ σύμπαντα ἀρετὴ κέκληται;

Ν. Πώς γὰρ οὐ;

Σ. 'Αρ’ οὖν ἀπερ ἐγώ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἔγὼ δὲ καλῶ πρὸς ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἄλλ’ ἀττα τοιαῦτα. οὐ καὶ σὺ;

1 μὴ om. papyr. Oxyr.
2 του Stob.: τοι mss.

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soc. No, say nothing, Laches: for in fact you seem to me to have failed to perceive that he has acquired his wisdom from Damon, our good friend; and Damon constantly associates with Prodicus, who is supposed to be the cleverest of the sophists at distinguishing terms like these.

LACH. Yes, for it is more suitable, Socrates, for a sophist to make a show of such refinements than for a man whom the State thinks worthy to govern her.

soc. Indeed it is suitable, I presume, my amiable friend, for a man in the highest seat of government to be gifted with the highest degree of wisdom. But it seems to me that Nicias is worthy of further attention, so that we may learn in what connexion he uses this word "courage."

LACH. Then attend to him yourself, Socrates.

soc. That is what I propose to do, my good sir: still, you are not to think that I will release you from your due share of the argument. No, you must put your mind to it and join in weighing well what is said.

LACH. Well, so be it, if you think that I ought.

soc. Indeed I do. Now, Nicias, please go back to the beginning and answer us: you know we started our discussion by considering courage as a part of virtue?

NIC. Quite so.

soc. And you joined in this answer,—that it is a part, there being also other parts, which taken all together have received the name of virtue?

NIC. Why, of course.

soc. Now, do you mean the same as I do by these? Besides courage, I refer to temperance, justice, and other similar qualities. And you also, do you not?
B  νι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
   Σο. Ἐχε δὴ· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογοῦμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων σκεψώμεθα, ὡς μὴ σύ μὲν ἄλλον ἤγις, ἥμεις δὲ ἄλλα. ἀ μὲν οὖν ἥμεις ἥγιομεθα, φράσομεν σοι· σοὶ δὲ ἄν μὴ ὁμολογήσας, διδάξεις. ἥγιομεθα δ' ἥμεις δεῦμα μὲν εἶναι ἂ καὶ δέος παρέχει, θαρραλέα δὲ ἂ μὴ δέος παρέχει· δέος δὲ παρέχει οὐ τὰ γεγονότα οὖδὲ τὰ παρὸντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκώμενα· δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ· ἦ οὖχ οὖτω καὶ συνδοκεῖ; 1 Ὅ Λάχης;

C  λα. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, Ὡ Σώκρατε
   Σο. Τὰ μὲν ἡμετέρα τοινῦν, Ὡ Νικία, ἀκούεις, ὡς δεῦμα μὲν τὰ μέλλοντα κακὰ φαμεν εἶναι, θαρραλέα δὲ τὰ μὴ κακὰ ἡ ἀγαθὰ μέλλοντα· σοὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἡ ἄλλη περὶ τούτων λέγεις;
   Σον. Ταῦτη ἐγώγε
   Σο. Ἐτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον σκεψώμεθα εἰ συνδοκεῖ σοὶ τε καὶ ἦμιὼν.

D  νι. Τὸ ποιὸν δὴ τοῦτο;
   Σο. Ἐγὼ δὴ φράσω. δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ ἐμοὶ τε καὶ τῶδε, περὶ δόσων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν εἶναι περὶ γεγονότος εἰδέναι ὅτι γέγονεν, ἄλλη δὲ περὶ γεγομένων ὅτι γίγνεται, ἄλλη δὲ ὅτι ἀν κάλλιστα γένοιτο καὶ γενήσεται τὸ μῆτω γεγονός, ἄλλ' ἡ αὐτή. οἶον περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν εἰς ἀπαντας τοὺς θρόνους οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἡ ἱατρική, μία οὖσα, ἑφορὰ καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γεγονότα καὶ

1 συνδοκεὶ Burnet: σο δοκεῖ, δοκεῖ καὶ σο mss.

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Nic. Certainly I do.

soc. So much for that; thus far we agree: but let us pass on to what is to be dreaded and what to be dared, and make sure that you and we do not take two different views of these. Let me tell you our view of them, and if you do not agree with it, you shall instruct us. We hold that the dreadful are things that cause fear, and the safely ventured are those that do not; and fear is caused not by past or present, but by expected evils: for fear is expectation of coming evil. You are of the same mind with us in this, are you not, Laches?

Lach. Yes, entirely so, Socrates.

soc. So there you have our view, Nicias,—that coming evils are to be dreaded, and things not evil, or good things, that are to come are to be safely dared. Would you describe them in this way, or in some other?

Nic. I would describe them in this way.

soc. And the knowledge of these things is what you term courage?

Nic. Precisely.

soc. There is still a third point on which we must see if you are in agreement with us.

Nic. What point is that?

soc. I will tell you. It seems to your friend and me that, to take the various subjects of knowledge, there is not one knowledge of how a thing has happened in the past, another of how things are happening in the present, and another of how a thing that has not yet happened might or will happen most favourably in the future, but it is the same knowledge throughout. For example, in the case of health, it is medicine always and alone that
Ε γενησόμενα ὅτι γενησται· καὶ περὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς αὖ φυόμενα ἡ γεωργία ὡσαύτως ἔχει· καὶ δῆμον τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοῖ· ἀν μαρτυρήσατε ὅτι ἡ στρατηγία κάλλιστα προμηθεῖται τὰ τὲ ἄλλα καὶ περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἑσεθαί, οὐδὲ τῇ μαντικῇ οἴεται δεῖν ὑπηρετεῖν ἄλλα ἄρχειν, ὡς εἰδύνα κάλλιον τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα· καὶ ὁ νόμος οὕτως τάττει, μὴ τον μάντων τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἄρχειν, ἄλλα τὸν στρατηγὸν τοῦ μάντεως. φήσομεν ταῦτα, ὦ Λάχης; 

Ἀ. Φήσομεν.

Σ. Τί δέ; σὺ ἦμιν, ὦ Νικία, σύμφης περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐσομένων καὶ γιγνομένων καὶ γεγονότων ἐπαίεων;

Ν. Ἕγωγε· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες. 

Σ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ἄριστε, καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία τῶν δεινῶν 

Β ἐπιστήμην ἐστὶ καὶ θαρραλεών, ὡς φής· ἢ γάρ;

Ν. Ναί.

Σ. Τὰ δὲ δεινὰ ὅμοιονται καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα ἄγαθα, τὰ δὲ μέλλοντα κακὰ εἶναι.

Ν. Πάνυ γε.

Σ. 'Η δὲ γ' αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μελλόντων καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων εἶναι.

Ν. Ἡστὶ ταῦτα.

Σ. Οὐ μόνον ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐπιστήμη· ἐστὶ· οὐ γάρ μελλόντων μόνον πέρι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν ἐπαίει, ἄλλα 

C καὶ γιγνομένων καὶ γεγονότων καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων, ὡσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιστήμαι.

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surveys present, past, and future processes alike; and farming is in the same position as regards the productions of the earth. And in matters of war I am sure you yourselves will bear me out when I say that here generalship makes the best forecasts on the whole, and particularly of future results, and is the mistress rather than the servant of the seer’s art, because it knows better what is happening or about to happen in the operations of war; whence the law ordains that the general shall give orders to the seer, and not the seer to the general. May we say this, Laches?

LACH. We may.

soc. Well now, do you agree with us, Nicias, that the same knowledge has comprehension of the same things, whether future, present, or past?

NIC. I do, for that is my own opinion, Socrates.

soc. And courage, my good friend, is knowledge of what is to be dreaded and dared, as you say, do you not?

NIC. Yes.

soc. And things to be dreaded and things to be dared have been admitted to be either future goods or future evils?

NIC. Certainly.

soc. And the same knowledge is concerned with the same things, whether in the future or in any particular stage?

NIC. That is so.

soc. Then courage is knowledge not merely of what is to be dreaded and what dared, for it comprehends goods and evils not merely in the future, but also in the present and the past and in any stage, like the other kinds of knowledge.
PLATO

ν. ὤν Ὑοικέ γε.

ζη. Μέρος ἃρα ἀνδρείας ἦμιν, ὦ Νικία, ἀπεκρίνω σχεδὸν τι τρίτον· καίτοι ἢμεῖς ἢρωτῶμεν ὅλην ἀνδρείαν ὁ τι εἰη. καὶ νῦν δὴ, ὃς ἤοικε, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐ μόνον δεινῶν τε καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν τι ἢ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἔχοντων,

D ὡς νῦν αὖ ὁ σὸς λόγος, ἀνδρεία ἣν εἰη· οὔτως αὖ μετατίθεσθαι ἡ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Νικία;

ν. Ἐμονε ὅκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ζη. Ὅκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ δαμόνιε, ἀπολείπειν ἂν τι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄρετῆς, εἴπερ εἰδείη τά τε ἀγαθά πάντα καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς γίγνεται καὶ γεννηται καὶ γέγονε, καὶ τά κακά ὤσαύτως; καὶ τοῦτον οἰεὶ ἂν σὺ ἐνδεὰ εἶναι σωφροσύνης ἢ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὅσιότητος, ὑ γε μόνῳ προσῆκει καὶ περὶ θεοῦς

Ε καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους ἑξενθλαβεῖσθαι τε τά δεινά καὶ τά μῆ, καὶ τάγαθα πορίζεσθαι, ἐπισταμένῳ ὁρθῶς προσομλεῖν;

ν. Λέγειν τι ὦ Σώκρατες μοι ὅκεῖς.

ζη. Οὐκ ἃρα, ὦ Νικία, μόριον ἄρετῆς ἂν εἰη τὸ νῦν σοι λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ σύμπασα ἄρετῆ.

ν. Ἐοικεν.

ζη. Καὶ μὴν ἑφαμέν γε τὴν ἀνδρείαν μόριον εἶναι ἐν τῶν τῆς ἄρετῆς.

ν. Ἐφαμέν γάρ.

ζη. Τὸ δὲ γε νῦν λεγόμενον οὐ φαίνεται.

ν. Οὐκ ἐοικεν.

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LACHES

NIC. Apparently.
soc. So the answer that you gave us, Nicias, covers only about a third part of courage; whereas our question was of what courage is as a whole. And now it appears, on your own showing, that courage is knowledge not merely of what is to be dreaded and what dared, but practically a knowledge concerning all goods and evils at every stage; such is your present account of what courage must be. What do you say to this new version, Nicias?

NIC. I accept it, Socrates.
soc. Now do you think, my excellent friend, there could be anything wanting to the virtue of a man who knew all good things, and all about their production in the present, the future, and the past, and all about evil things likewise? Do you suppose that such a man could be lacking in temperance, or justice, and holiness, when he alone has the gift of taking due precaution, in his dealings with gods and men, as regards what is to be dreaded and what is not, and of procuring good things, owing to his knowledge of the right behaviour towards them?

NIC. I think, Socrates, there is something in what you say.
soc. Hence what you now describe, Nicias, will be not a part but the whole of virtue.

NIC. Apparently.
soc. But, you know, we said that courage is one of the parts of virtue.

NIC. Yes, we did.
soc. And what we now describe is seen to be different.

NIC. So it seems.
Σ. Ούκ ἄρα ήψηκαμεν, ὡ Νικία, ἀνδρεία ὃ τι ἐστιν.

Ν. Οὐ φανόμεθα.

Λ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε, ὥ φίλε Νικία, ὃμην σε 200 εὐρήσεων, ἐπειδὴ ἐμὸν κατεφρονησας Σωκράτει ἀποκρυμαμένου. πάνυ δὴ μεγάλην ἐλπίδα εἶχον, ὡς τῇ παρὰ τοῦ Δάμωνος σοφία αὐτῇ ἀνευρήσεις.

Ν. Εὖ γε, ὥ Δάχης, ὅτι οὐδὲν οἷει σὺ ἐτι πράγμα εἶναι, ὅτι αὐτῶς ἄρτι ἐφάνης ἀνδρείας πέρι οὐδὲν εἰδώς, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἐγὼ ἐτερος τοιοῦτος ἀναφανή- σομαι, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπεις, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐτι διοίσει, ὡς ἐοικε, σοι μετ' ἐμοῦ μηδὲν εἰδέναι ὃν προσήκει ἐπιστήμην ἔχεις ἀνδρὶ οἰομένῳ τί εἶναι. σὺ μὲν Β οὖν μοι δοκεῖς ὡς ἄληθῶς ἀνθρώπειον πράγμα ἐργάζεσθαι, οὐδὲν πρὸς αὐτῶν βλέπεις ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους· ἐγὼ δ' οἶμαι ἐμοὶ περὶ ὃν ελέγομεν νῦν τη ἐπιεικῶς εἰρήσαται, καὶ εἰ τι αὐτῶν μὴ ἰκανῶς εὐρηται, ὑστερον ἐπανορθώσεσθαι καὶ μετὰ Δά- μωνος, οὐ σὺ ποι οἷει καταγελάν, καὶ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἱδὼν πῶς τὸν Δάμωνα, καὶ μετ' ἄλλων· καὶ ἐπειδὰν βεβαιώσωμαι αὐτά, διδάξω καὶ σέ, Σ καὶ οὐ φθόνησω· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι καὶ μάλα σφόδρα δεῖσθαι μαθεῖν.

Λ. Σοφὸς γάρ τοι σὺ εἰ, ὥ Νικία. ἀλλ' ὃμως ἐγὼ Λυσιμάχῳ τῶδε καὶ Μελησία συμβου- λεύω, σὲ μὲν καὶ ἐμὲ περὶ τῆς παιδείας τῶν νεανι- σκών χαίρειν ἔαν, Σωκράτη δὲ τουτού, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, μὴ ἀφιέναι· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ᾧςαν οἱ παιδεῖς, ταῦτα ἄν ταῦτ' ἐποίουν.

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Thus we have failed to discover, Nicias, what courage really is.

Evidently.

And I, in fact, supposed, my dear Nicias, that you were going to discover it, when you showed such contempt for the answers I made to Socrates: indeed I had very great hopes that the wisdom you derived from Damon would avail you for the discovery.

That is all very fine, Laches; you think you can now make light of the fact that you were yourself shown just now to know nothing about courage; when my turn comes to be shown up in the same light, that is all you care, and now it will not matter to you at all, it seems, if I share your ignorance of things whereof any self-respecting man ought to have knowledge. You really strike me, indeed, as following the average man's practice of keeping an eye on others rather than on oneself: but I fancy that for the present I have said as much as could be expected on the subject of our discussion, and that later on I must make good any defects in my statement upon it with the help of Damon—whom I know you choose to ridicule, and that without ever having seen the actual Damon—and with others' help besides. And when I have settled the matter I will enlighten you, in no grudging spirit: for I think you are in very great need of instruction.

You are a man of wisdom, I know, Nicias. But still I advise Lysimachus here and Melesias to dismiss you and me, and to retain our friend Socrates as I said at first, for the education of your boys: were my own sons old enough, I should do the same thing too.
καὶ γὰρ ἄν δεινόν εἴη, ὁ Ἀνατίμαι, τούτο γε, μὴ ἔθελεν τὴν συμπροθυμεῖσθαι ὡς βελτίστως γενέσθαι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις τοῖς ἄρτι ἔγινυ μὲν ἐφανήν εἰδῶς, τῶδε δὲ μὴ εἰδότε, δίκαιον ἦν ἐμὲ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῦτὸ τὸ έργον παρακαλεῖν· νῦν δ', ὅμοιως γὰρ πάντες ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐγενόμεθα· τι οὖν ἄν τις ἡμῶν τινὰ προαιρεῖτο; ἐμοί μὲν οὖν δὴ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, σκέφσασθε ἃν τι δόξῳ συμβουλεύειν ὑμῖν. ἔγινυ γάρ φημὶ χρῆναι, ὁ ἄνδρες—οὔδεὶς γὰρ ἐκφορὸς λόγος—κοινῇ πάντας ἡμᾶς ζητεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς διδάσκαλον ὡς ἀριστον—δεόμεθα γὰρ—ἐπείτα καὶ τοῖς μειρακίοις, μὴτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μὴτε ἄλλου μηδενὸς· εὰν δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς ἔχειν, ὡς νῦν ἔχομεν, οὐ συμβουλεύων. εἰ δὲ τις ἡμῶν καταγελάσεται, ὅτι τηλικοὶδὲ οὖντες εἰς δίδα-
NIC. For my part I agree; if Socrates will consent to take charge of these young people, I will seek for no one else. I should be only too glad to entrust him with Niceratus, if he should consent: but when I begin to mention the matter to him, he always recommends other men to me and refuses himself. Just see, Lysimachus, if Socrates will give you a more favourable hearing.

LYS. It is only right that he should, Nicias, for indeed I would be willing to do many things for him which I would not do for a great many others. Well, what do you say, Socrates? Will you comply, and lend your endeavours for the highest improvement of these boys?

soc. Why, how strange it would be, Lysimachus, to refuse to lend one's endeavours for the highest improvement of anybody! Now if in the debates that we have just held I had been found to know what our two friends did not know, it would be right to make a point of inviting me to take up this work: but as it is, we have all got into the same difficulty, so why should one of us be preferred to another? In my own opinion, none of us should; and this being so, perhaps you will allow me to give you a piece of advice. I tell you, gentlemen—and this is confidential—that we ought all alike to seek out the best teacher we can find, first for ourselves—for we need one—and then for our boys, sparing neither expense nor anything else we can do: but to leave ourselves as we now are, this I do not advise. And if anyone makes fun of us for seeing fit to go to school at our time of life, I think we should appeal to Homer, who said that "shame is no good mate for a needy man." So let us not mind what any-
εάσαντες χαίρειν εἰ τίς τι ἐρεῖ, κοινῆ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν μειρακίων ἐπιμέλειαιν ποιησώμεθα.

Ἀτ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀρέσκει, ὡς Σωκράτης, ἀ λέγεις· καὶ ἔθελο, ὁσωπερ γεραϊτατός εἰμι, τοσοῦτῳ προθυμότατα μανθάνειν μετὰ τῶν νεανίσκων. ἀλλὰ C μοι οὕτως ποίησον· αὐριον ἔωθεν ἄφικον οἶκας, καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσῃς, ἵνα βουλευοῦμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων· τὸ δὲ νῦν εἶναι τὴν συνουσίαν διαλύσωμεν.

Ἐν. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, ὡς Λυσίμαχε, ταῦτα, καὶ ἥξω παρὰ σὲ αὐριον, ἐὰν θεὸς ἔθελῃ.
one may say, but join together in arranging for our own and the boys' tuition.

Lys. I gladly approve of your suggestion, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, so I am the most eager to have lessons with the young ones. Now this is what I ask you to do: come to my house to-morrow at daybreak; be sure not to fail, and then we shall consult on this very matter. For the present, let us break up our meeting.

Soc. I will not fail, Lysimachus, to come to you to-morrow, God willing.
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROTAGERAS

The masterly powers of description, characterization, rhetoric, and reasoning, which conspire in the Protageras to produce, with such apparent ease, one rapid and luminous effect, have earned it a very high— with some judges the highest—place among Plato's achievements in philosophic drama. After an introductory scene, in which the excitement of ardent young spirits over the arrival of a great intellectual personage leads quickly to the setting of the stage for the main business of the plot, we are shown Socrates in respectful but keenly critical contact with the first and most eminent of the itinerant professors of a new culture or enlightenment. On the other side we see the old and celebrated teacher displaying his various abilities with weight and credit, but with limitations which increasingly suggest that his light is waning before the fresh and more searching flame of Socratic inquiry. The drama is philosophic in the fullest sense, not merely owing to this animated controversy and its development of a great moral theme,—the acquisition of virtue, but because we are made to feel that behind or above the actual human disputants are certain principles and modes of thought, which hold a high and shadowy debate, as it were, of their own in the dimness of what is as yet unexamined and unexplained. Of this larger argument the human
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scene gives but fitful glimpses; but in the end it is suggested and impressed in sufficiently definite outline to become the further object of our roused and refined curiosity.

This dialogue is, indeed, a work of profoundly suggestive art, and our first duty is to observe and comprehend as clearly as may be the persons in the play and the interaction of their salient thoughts and feelings. Protagoras was the founder of a popular culture which aimed at presenting the highest lessons of the poets, thinkers, and artists of the preceding age in a convenient form for the needs of the rising generation of Greek statesmen,—a form also that should be marketable, for he invented the trade of the professional educator, and was the first to charge a regular fee for the wisdom or skill that he imparted. His own chief accomplishment was impressive declamation on moral and political themes: he was prone, as we find in this interview, to a somewhat lengthy style of exposition, and correspondingly loth to undergo the mental strain of being cross-examined by Socrates. No attempt is made here to tease or bait him. It is clear enough, without the express statement made in the Republic (x. 600), that he had attained a most honourable position in Greece through his earnest zeal for educational progress. But he did not stop to think out the bases of his teaching; and the immediate interest of the dialogue consists largely in watching the succession of strokes by which Socrates, a younger and subtler advocate of the same cause,

1 At the time of this meeting (just before the Peloponnesian War, in 432 B.C.) Socrates would be 36 years old, and Alcibiades 19.
exposes and undermines the fine but unsound fabric of his fame.

In the stately myth (320–328) by which Protagoras unfolds his theory of the origin of human society and morals, Plato gives us a carefully wrought imitation of the professor's favourite method and style. It is an eloquent substantiation of the common-sense view that virtue can be taught; and fidelity in characterization seems to have prompted Plato to attribute to the old sophist some principles which are more than ordinarily enlightened. In particular we may notice his account of the beginning of governments (322), and his appeal for the curative and preventive use of punishment (324). And later on, while he totters defenceless under the force and acuteness of Socrates' questions, we find him objecting—and it was soon to be Plato's own opinion—that it is rash to regard all pleasure as good (351). Plato, in fact, appears to be more intent on exhibiting the impetuous energy and superior skill with which Socrates could on occasion upset an experienced teacher and famous scholar, than on impressing us with the correctness of this or that theory which the younger man may snatch up and fling at the professor's head in the momentary sport or heat of the contest. The explanation which Socrates propounds of the poem of Simonides (343–347) is obviously a mocking satire on certain sophistic performances; but he is no less obviously serious, for the purpose in hand, when he makes his statement on the relation of virtue to pleasure. The unsatisfactory effect which this leaves upon our minds must be referred to the main object of the dialogue, which is to prove the power of the
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROTAGORAS

new science of dialectic in disturbing our settled habits of thought and in stimulating fresh inquiry into problems of the highest import to mankind.

Among the many minor interests attaching to this vivid picture of the intellectual life of Athens in the latter part of the fifth century, the appropriate style given in each case to the utterances of Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias deserves attention for the evidence thus afforded of a deliberate cultivation of prose-form at that time. Plato has left us a less sympathetic but similarly interesting study of Protagoras' manner of speech in his later work, the Theaetetus.

The following brief outline of the discussion may be useful:—

I. 309 a–316 a. Socrates tells his (unnamed) friend that he and Alcibiades have just been conversing with Protagoras, and describes how his young friend Hippocrates had announced to him the great sophist's arrival in Athens, and how, after questioning Hippocrates on his design of learning from the sophist, he proceeded with him to the house of Callias, with whom Protagoras was staying. They found there not only Protagoras but the learned Hippias and Prodicus also, and many followers and disciples who had assembled to hear their discourses.

II. 316 a–320 c. Protagoras explains the purpose of his teaching: he will educate Hippocrates in politics and citizenship. Socrates raises the question whether virtue can be taught.

III. 320 c–328 d. Protagoras delivers a characteristic speech, in which he relates a fable of the
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROTAGORAS

origin of man. It illustrates his doctrine that virtue can be taught, both by individuals and by the State.

IV. 328 d–334 c. Socrates cross-examines Protagoras: (1) Is each of the virtues a part of virtue, or only a different name for the same thing? (2) Protagoras replies that the several virtues differ like the parts of the face. (3) In answer to an objection from Socrates, Protagoras allows that justice and holiness must be like each other. (4) Socrates then urges that temperance and wisdom must be the same, and would argue likewise of temperance and justice; but (5) Protagoras, impatient of being questioned, reverts to his favourite method of declamation on the notions of "good" and "beneficial."

V. 334 c–338 e. Socrates makes as if to go: he will only stay if Protagoras will keep to the method of question and answer. At the request of Callias, Alcibiades, Critias, Prodicus and Hippias he agrees to stay and be questioned by Protagoras, after which Protagoras will be questioned by him.

VI. 338 e–347 a. Socrates is cross-examined by Protagoras on the meaning of a poem of Simonides, and tries to save the consistency of the poet, which Protagoras impugns, by distinguishing between "being good" and "becoming good"; he also suggests a peculiar significance of words in Ceos (the native place of the poet and of Prodicus, whose verbal learning he satirizes with some pedantic nonsense). He then gives his own explanation of the poem, which he holds to have been written to refute a saying of Pittacus (an Ionian sage of the latter part of the seventh century B.C.) that "it is
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hard to be good": to become good, said the poet, is hard; to be good is impossible; he looked for no perfect virtue on earth.

VII. 347 a-360 E. Alcibiades and Callias prevail on Protagoras, rather against his will, to be questioned by Socrates as to whether wisdom, temperance, courage, justice and holiness are all the same thing, or different parts of virtue. Protagoras singles out courage as distinct from the rest. When Socrates argues that it is the same as wisdom, Protagoras objects to his reasoning, and Socrates starts on a new line: Is not pleasure, viewed apart from its consequences, the same as the good? To be overcome by pleasure is merely to choose the less instead of the greater good, through ignorance; and pleasure being good, every action must be good that has pleasure as its object. The coward who will not fight when he ought is suffering from an ignorant misconception of what lies before him, so that courage must be knowledge.

VIII. 360 e-362 a. It is shown, in conclusion, that Socrates and Protagoras have each been led into a position opposite to that which they held at the beginning: Socrates' identification of virtue with knowledge brings him to the view that virtue must be teachable, which he at first denied; while Protagoras, who held that it is teachable, now declares that it is not knowledge, thus denying it the sole means of being taught.

A good modern edition of the Protagoras is that by J. Adam, Cambridge University Press, 1905.
ΠΡΩΤΑΓΩΡΑΣ
[Ἡ ΣΩΦΙΣΤΑΙ ΕΝΔΕΙΚΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΙΠΠΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΡΩΤΑΓΩΡΑΣ,
ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ, ΚΑΛΛΙΑΣ, ΚΡΙΤΙΑΣ, ΠΡΟΔΙΚΟΣ, ΙΠΠΙΑΣ

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eτ. Πόθεν, ὃ Σώκρατες, φαίνη; ἡ δὴ δὴ ὅτι ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὥραν; καὶ μὴν μοι καὶ πρῶτην ἰδόντι καλὸς μὲν ἑφαίνετο ἄνηρ ἔτι, ἄνηρ μέντοι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὡς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἦμων εἰρήσθαι, καὶ πώγωνος ἦδη ὑποπιμπλάμενος.

ἐπ. Εἶτα τί τοῦτο; οὐ ὡς μέντοι Ὁμήρου Β ἔπαινετος εἶ, ὃς ἐφή χαριστάτην ἦβην εἶναι τοῦ ὑπηνήτου, ἦν νῦν Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔχει;

eτ. Τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἡ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνη; καὶ πῶς πρὸς σὲ ὃ νεανίας διάκειται;

ἐπ. Ἕδη, ἐμοίγεν ἐδοξεῖν, οὐχ ἦκιστα δὲ καὶ τῇ νῦν ἡμέρᾳ· καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἴπε, βοηθῶν ἐμοί, καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι. ἄτοπον μέντοι τί σοι ἑθέλω εἴπειν· παρὸντος γὰρ 92
FR. Where have you been now, Socrates? Ah, but of course you have been in chase of Alcibiades and his youthful beauty! Well, only the other day, as I looked at him, I thought him still handsome as a man—for a man he is, Socrates, between you and me, and with quite a growth of beard.

soc. And what of that? Do you mean to say you do not approve of Homer,\(^1\) who said that youth has highest grace in him whose beard is appearing, as now in the case of Alcibiades?

FR. Then how is the affair at present? Have you been with him just now? And how is the young man treating you?

soc. Quite well, I considered, and especially so today: for he spoke a good deal on my side, supporting me in a discussion—in fact I have only just left him. However, there is a strange thing I have to tell you:

\(^1\) Iliad, xxiv. 348.
PLATO

ἐκεῖνου, οὐτὲ προσείχον τὸν νοῦν, ἐπελανθανόμην τε αὐτοῦ θαμά.

C  et. Καὶ τί ἄν γεγονὸς εἴη περὶ σὲ κάκεῖνον τοσοῦτον πράγμα; οὐ γὰρ δήποτε τινὶ καλλίων ἐνέτυχε ἄλλῳ ἐν γε τῇδε τῇ πόλει.

ση. Καὶ πολὺ γε.

et. Τί φῆς; ἀστῶ ἥ ἕνω;

ση. Ἐένω.

et. Ποδαπῶ;

ση. Ἀβδηρίτη.

et. Καὶ οὖτω καλὸς τις ὁ ἕνως ἔδοξε σοι εἶναι, ὡστε τοῦ Κλεινίου νιέος καλλίων σοι φανήναι;

ση. Πῶς δ᾿ οὐ μέλλει, ὃ μακάριε, το σοφώτατον κάλλιον φαίνεσθαι;

et. Ἀλλ᾿ ἥ σοφῶ τινὶ ἡμῖν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐντυχὼν πάρει;

D  ση. Σοφώτατῳ μὲν οὖν δήποτε τῶν γε νῦν, εἳ σοι δοκεῖ σοφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας.

et. Ὡ τί λέγεις; Πρωταγόρας ἐπιδεδήμηκεν;

ση. Τρίτην γε ᾧδὴ ἡμέραν.

et. Καὶ ἄρτι ἄρα ἐκεῖνῳ συγγεγονὸς ἦκεις;

ση. Πάνω γε πολλὰ καὶ εἰπὼν καὶ ἄκουσας.

310  et. Τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνοσίαν, εἰ μή σὲ τι κωλύει, καθιζόμενος ἐνταῦθι, ἐξαιστήσασα τὸν παιδὰ τουτοῦ;

ση. Πάνω μὲν οὖν καὶ χάριν γε εἰσομαι, ἔως ἀκούστε.

1 The Friend had an attendant who was sitting by him.

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PROTAGORAS

although he was present, I not merely paid him no attention, but at times forgot him altogether.

FR. Why, what can have happened between you and him? Something serious! For surely you did not find anyone else of greater beauty there,—no, not in our city.

soc. Yes, of far greater.

FR. What do you say? One of our people, or a foreigner?

soc. A foreigner.

FR. Of what city?

soc. Abdera.

FR. And you found this foreigner so beautiful that he appeared to you of greater beauty than the son of Cleinias?

soc. Why, my good sir, must not the wisest appear more beautiful?

FR. Do you mean it was some wise man that you met just now?

soc. Nay, rather the wisest of our generation, I may tell you, if "wisest" is what you agree to call Protagoras.

FR. Ah, what a piece of news! Protagoras come to town!

soc. Yes, two days ago.

FR. And it was his company that you left just now?

soc. Yes, and a great deal I said to him, and he to me.

FR. Then do let us hear your account of the conversation at once, if you are disengaged: take my boy's place, and sit here.

soc. Very good; indeed, I shall be obliged to you, if you will listen.
PLATO

et. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡμεῖς σοι, ἐὰν λέγης.

σπ. Διπλὴ ἂν εἶη ἡ χάρις. ἀλλ’ ὦν ἀκούετε.

Τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθέος ὅρθρου, Ἰπποκράτης ὁ Ἀπολλοδόρου νῦσ, Φά-σωνος δὲ ἄδελφος, τὴν θύραν τῇ βακτηρίᾳ πάνυ

B σφόδρα ἐκρουε, καὶ ἑπειδῆ αὐτῷ ἀνέφεξε τις, εὔθὺς εἶσω ἦς ἐπειγόμενος, καὶ τῇ φωνῇ μέγα λέγων, ὩΣ Σώκρατες, ἐφη, ἐγρήγορας ἡ καθεύδεις; καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν φωνὴν γνοὺς αὐτοῖ, Ἰπποκράτης, ἐφην, ὦτος· μὴ τι νεώτερον ἀγγέλλεις; Οὐδέν γ’, ἦ δ’ ὦς, εἰ μὴ ἀγαθά γε. Ἐande λέγοις, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· ἔστι δὲ τί, καὶ τοῦ ἑνεκα τηνικάδε ἀφίκοι;

Πρωταγόρας, ἐφη, ἦκει, στὰς παρ’ ἐμοί. Πρὸν, ἐφην ἐγὼ· σοὶ δὲ ἀρτὶ πέπτυσαι; Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς,

C ἐφη, ἑσπέρας γε. καὶ ἀμα ἐπιψηλαφήσας τοῦ σκίμποδος ἐκαθέξετο παρὰ τοὺς πόδας μου, καὶ εἴπεν· Ἑσπέρας δῆτα, μάλα γε ὀψὲ ἀφικόμενος ἐξ Οἰνόης. ὃ γὰρ τοι παῖς με ὁ Σάτυρος ἀπέδρα· καὶ δῆτα μέλλων σοι φράζειν, ὅτι διωξοίμην αὐτόν, ὑπὸ τινὸς ἄλλου ἐπελαθόμην· ἑπειδῆ δὲ Ἰλθον καὶ δεδειπτηκότες ἦμεν καὶ ἐμέλλομεν ἀναπαύεσθαι, τότε μοι ἄδελφος λέγει, ὅτι ἦκει Πρωταγόρας. καὶ ἔτι μὲν ἑνεχείρησα εὐθὺς παρὰ σὲ ἱέναι, ἑπειτά μοι λιὰν πόρρω ἐδοξε τῶν

D νυκτῶν εἶναι· ἑπειδῆ δὲ τάχιστα ἤ ἐκ τοῦ κόπου ὁ ὕπνος ἀνῆκεν, εὐθὺς ἀναστὰς οὕτω δεῦρο ἐπορεύμην. καὶ ἐγὼ γυγνώσκων αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν πτοίησιν, Τί οὖν σοι, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, τούτο; μῶν τί σε ἄδικει Πρωταγόρας; καὶ ὅς γελάσας, Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἐφη, ὩΣ Σώκρατες, ὅτι γε μόνος ἐστὶ σοφός, ἔμε δὲ ὦν ποιεῖ. Ἄλλα ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἐφην ἐγὼ, ἴν αὐτῷ διδῶς ἀργύριον καὶ πείθης 96
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fr. And we also to you, I assure you, if you will tell us.


During this night just past, in the small hours, Hippocrates, son of Apollodorus and brother of Phason, knocked violently at my door with his stick, and when they opened to him he came hurrying in at once and calling to me in a loud voice: Socrates, are you awake, or sleeping? Then I, recognizing his voice, said: Hippocrates, hallo! Some news to break to me? Only good news, he replied. Tell it, and welcome, I said: what is it, and what business brings you here at such an hour? Protagoras has come, he said, standing at my side. Yes, two days ago, I said: have you only just heard? Yes, by Heaven! he replied, last evening. With this he groped about for the bedstead, and sitting down by my feet he said: It was in the evening, after I had got in very late from Oenoë. My boy Satyrus, you see, had run away: I meant to let you know I was going in chase of him, but some other matter put it out of my head. On my return, when we had finished dinner and were about to retire, my brother told me, only then, that Protagoras had come. I made an effort, even at that hour, to get to you at once, but came to the conclusion that it was too late at night. But as soon as I had slept off my fatigue I got up at once and made my way straight here. Then I, noting the man's gallant spirit and the flutter he was in, remarked: Well, what is that to you? Has Protagoras wronged you? At this he laughed and, Yes, by the gods! he said, by being the only wise man, and not making me one. But, by Zeus! I said, if you give him a fee and win him over he will
ἐκεῖνον, ποιήσει καὶ σε σοφόν. Εἰ γὰρ, ἡ δ' ὦς, 
Ε ὁ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί, ἐν τούτῳ εἶδος ὡς οὔτ', ἂν τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιλίπομι οὐδὲν ὡς τῶν φίλων. ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἦκω παρὰ σέ, ἵνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοὶ διαλεχθῆς αὐτῷ. ἔγω γὰρ ἀμα μέν καὶ νεώτερος εἰμι, ἀμα δὲ οὐδὲ ἐώρακα Πρωταγόραν πώποτε οὐδ' ἀκήκοα οὐδὲν. ἐτι γὰρ παῖς ἦ, ὅτε το πρότερον ἐπεδήμησεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὁ Σώκρατες, πάντες τὸν ἀνδρά ἐπανοῦσι καὶ φασὶ σοφώτατον εἶναι λέγειν: ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ' αὐτὸν, 

311 ὑνα ἐνδον καταλάβωμεν; καταλύει δ', ὡς ἐγὼ ἦκουσα, παρὰ Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου. ἀλλ'' ἰωμεν. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐλπον. Μήπω, ὠγαθὲ, ἐκείσε ἰωμεν, προ' γάρ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δεῦρο ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν, καὶ περιώντες αὐτοῦ διατρίψωμεν, ἐως ἃν φῶς γένηται. εἰτα ἰωμεν. καὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Πρωταγόρας ἐνδον διατρίβει, ὡςτε, θάρρει, καταληψόμεθα αὐτόν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἐνδον. 

Μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλήν περιήμεν. 

Β καὶ ἐγὼ ἀποπειράμενοι τοῦ Ἰπποκράτους τῆς ῥώμης διεσκότου αὐτὸν καὶ ἡρῶτων, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁ Ἰππόκρατες, παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς ἱέναι, ἀργύριον τελῶν ἐκεῖνω μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τίνα ἀφιξόμενος καὶ τίς γενησόμενος; ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ ἐπενοεῖς παρὰ τὸν σαυτοῦ ὁμώνυμον ἐλθὼν Ἰπποκράτη τὸν Κών, τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν, ἀργύριον τελείω ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ μισθὸν ἐκεῖνω, εἰ τίς σε ἥρετο, Εἰπέ μοι, 

Σ μέλλεις τελείων, ὁ Ἰππόκρατες, Ἰπποκράτει μισθὸν ὡς τίνι ὀντι; τί ἄν ἀπεκρίνω; Εἰπον ἄν, ἔφη, ὅτι 98
make you wise too. Would to Zeus and all the
gods, he exclaimed, only that were needed! I
should not spare either my own pocket or those of
my friends. But it is on this very account I have
come to you now, to see if you will have a talk with
him on my behalf: for one thing, I am too young
to do it myself; and for another, I have never yet
seen Protagoras nor heard him speak a word—I was
but a child when he paid us his previous visit. You
know, Socrates, how everyone praises the man and
tells of his mastery of speech: let us step over to
him at once, to make sure of finding him in; he is
staying, so I was told, with Callias, son of Hipponicus.
Now, let us be going. To this I replied: We had
better not go there yet, my good friend, it is so
very early: let us rise and turn into the court here,
and spend the time strolling there till daylight
comes; after that we can go. Protagoras, you see,
sends most of his time indoors, so have no fear, we
shall find him in all right, most likely.

So then we got up and strolled in the court; and
I, to test Hippocrates' grit, began examining him
with a few questions. Tell me, Hippocrates, I said,
in your present design of going to Protagoras and
paying him money as a fee for his services to your-
self, to whom do you consider you are resorting, and
what is it that you are to become? Suppose, for
example, you had taken it into your head to call on
your namesake Hippocrates of Cos, the Asclepiad,
and pay him money as your personal fee, and suppose
someone asked you—Tell me, Hippocrates, in pur-
posing to pay a fee to Hippocrates, what do you
consider him to be? How would you answer that?

A doctor, I would say.
PLATO

ψς ιατρῷ. 'Ως τίς γενησόμενος; 'Ως ιατρός, ἐφη. Εἰ δὲ παρὰ Πολύκλειτον τὸν Ἄργειον ἦ Φείδιαν τὸν Ἀθηναίον ἐπενόεις ἀφικόμενος μισθὸν ύπὲρ σαυτοῦ τελείων ἑκείνους, εἰ τίς σε ἦρετο· τελείων τοῦτο τὸ ἀργύριον ὅς τίνι ὅντι ἐν νῷ ἔχεις Πολυκλείτῳ τε καὶ Φείδια; τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω; Εἶπον ἂν ὡς ἀγαλματοποιοῖς. 'Ως τίς δὲ γενησόμενος αὐτός; Δῆλον ὅτι ἀγαλματοποιοῖς. Εἰεν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ· παρὰ δὲ δὴ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἀφικόμενοι ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἀργύριον ἑκείνῳ μισθὸν ἔτοιμοι ἐσόμεθα τελείων ύπὲρ σοῦ, ἂν μὲν ἔξικνηται τὰ ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ τούτους πειθώμεν αὐτόν, εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων προσαναλίσκοντες. εἰ οὖν τίς ἡμᾶς περὶ ταῦτα οὕτω σφόδρα σπουδάζοντας ἔροιτο· εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σῶκρατέσ, τε καὶ Ἰππόκρατεσ, ὡς τίνι ὅντι τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ἐν νῷ ἔχετε χρήματα τελείων; τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμεθα;

Ε τί ὁνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν; ὡσπερ περὶ Φείδιον ἀγαλματοποιοῦν καὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου ποιητῆν, τί τοιοῦτον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν; Σοφιστήν δὴ τοῦ ὁνομαζουσί γε, ὦ Σῶκρατεσ, τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι, ἐφη. 'Ως σοφιστῇ ἃρα ἐρχόμεθα τελοῦντες τὰ χρήματα; Μάλιστα. Εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τίς σε προσέροιτο·

312 αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ ὡς τίς γενησόμενος ἔρχῃ παρὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν; καὶ ὃς εἰπεν ἐρυθριάσας— ἦδη γὰρ ύπέφαινε τι ἡμέρας, ὡστε καταφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι.
And what would you intend to become?
A doctor, he replied.

And suppose you had a mind to approach Polycleitus the Argive or Pheidias the Athenian and pay them a personal fee, and somebody asked you—What is it that you consider Polycleitus or Pheidias to be, that you are minded to pay them this money? What would your answer be to that?

Sculptors, I would reply.
And what would you intend to become?
Obviously, a sculptor.

Very well then, I said; you and I will go now to Protagoras, prepared to pay him money as your fee, from our own means if they are adequate for the purpose of prevailing on him, but if not, then drawing on our friends' resources to make up the sum. Now if anyone, observing our extreme earnestness in the matter, should ask us,—Pray, Socrates and Hippocrates, what is it that you take Protagoras to be, when you purpose to pay him money? What should we reply to him? What is the other name that we commonly hear attached to Protagoras? They call Pheidias a sculptor and Homer a poet: what title do they give Protagoras?

A sophist, to be sure, Socrates, is what they call him.

Then we go to him and pay him the money as a sophist?
Certainly.

Now suppose someone asked you this further question: And what is it that you yourself hope to become when you go to Protagoras?
To this he replied with a blush—for by then there was a glimmer of daylight by which I could see him
—Εἰ μὲν τι τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐσοκε, δὴλον ὅτι σοφιστής γενησόμενος. Σὺ δὲ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων; Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σωκράτες, εἰπέρ γε ἀ διανοοῦμαι χρῆ λέγεω. Ἄλλ’ ἄρα, ὦ Ἰππόκρατες, μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις σου τὴν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησιν ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλ’ οἴσιπερ Β ἡ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ κιθαριστῷ καὶ παιδοτρίβου; τούτων γὰρ σὺ ἐκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνη ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ παιδεία, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἔλευθερον πρέπει. Πάνω μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, τοιαύτῃ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἡ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις.

Οἶσθα οὖν ὃ μέλλεις νῦν πράττειν, ἢ σε λανθάνει; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. Τοῦ πέρι; Ὁτι μέλλεις τῇν C ψυχήν τῆν σαυτοῦ παρασχεῖν θεραπεύσαι ἀνδρί, ὡς φήσῃ, σοφιστή; ὃ τι δὲ ποτε ὁ σοφιστής ἔστι, θαυμάζομι ἂν εἰ οἶσθα. καίτοι εἰ τοῦτ’ ἄγνοεις, οὔδε ὅτω παραδίδως τὴν ψυχήν οἶσθα, οὔτ’ εἰ ἀγαθῷ οὔτ’ εἰ κακῷ πράγματι. Οἶμαι γ’, ἐφη, εἴδέναι. Λέγε δὴ, τὶ ἡγῇ εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν; Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἦ δ’ ὃς, ὡσπερ τοῦνομα λέγει, τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τοῦτο μὲν ἔξεστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ ζωγράφων.
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quite clearly—If it is like the previous cases, obviously, to become a sophist.

In Heaven's name, I said, would you not be ashamed to present yourself before the Greeks as a sophist?

Yes, on my soul I should, Socrates, if I am to speak my real thoughts.

Yet after all, Hippocrates, perhaps it is not this sort of learning that you expect to get from Protagoras, but rather the sort you had from your language-master, your harp-teacher, and your sports-instructor; for when you took your lessons from each of these it was not in the technical way, with a view to becoming a professional, but for education, as befits a private gentleman.

I quite agree, he said; it is rather this kind of learning that one gets from Protagoras.

Then are you aware what you are now about to do, or is it not clear to you? I asked.

To what do you refer?

I mean your intention of submitting your soul to the treatment of a man who, as you say, is a sophist; and as to what a sophist really is, I shall be surprised if you can tell me. And yet, if you are ignorant of this, you cannot know to whom you are entrusting your soul,—whether it is to something good or to something evil.

I really think, he said, that I know.

Then tell me, please, what you consider a sophist to be.

I should say, he replied, from what the name implies, that he is one who has knowledge of wise matters.

Well, I went on, we are able to say this of painters
καὶ περὶ τεκτῶνων, ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσίν οἱ τῶν σοφῶν

D ἐπιστήμονες: ἀλλ’ εἰ τις ἐρωτοῦ ἡμᾶς, τῶν τι σοφῶν εἰσίν οἱ ξωγράφοι ἐπιστήμονες, εἶπομεν ἂν ποιοι αὐτῶ, ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν την τῶν εἰκόνων, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως. εἰ δὲ τις ἐκεῖνο ἐρωτο, ὅ ἐν σοφιστῆς τῶν τι σοφῶν ἔστι; τί ἂν ἀποκρυνομέθα αὐτῷ; ποῖας ἔργασίας ἐπιστάτης;

Τί ἂν εἰπομεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἡ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν; Ἡ Ἡσίως ἂν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, οὐ μέντοι ἰκανῶς γε’ ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἔτη ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῶν δεῖται, περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν· ὥσπερ ὁ

Ε κιθαρίστης δεινὸν δὴποιεῖ λέγειν περὶ οὐπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, περὶ κιθαρίσεως· ἡ γάρ; Ναί. Εἰπὲν· ὃ δὲ δὴ σοφιστῆς περὶ τῶν δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν; Δὴλον ὅτι περὶ οὐπερ καὶ ἐπιστασθαι1; Εἰκός γε. τὶ δὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, περὶ οὗ αὐτὸς τε ἐπιστήμων ἔστιν ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ τῶν μαθητῶν ποιεῖ; Μᾶ Δί’, ἐφη, οὐκέτι ἐξῳ σοι λέγειν.

313 Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον μετὰ τοῦτο. Τι οὖν; οἰσθα εἰς ὅιον τῶν κώμδυνον ἔρχῃ ὑποθῆκων τὴν ψυχήν; ἢ εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν σε ἔδει τως, διακυκύναιντα ἡ χρηστὸν αὐτὸ γενέσθαι ἡ ποιηρόν, πολλά ἂν περιεσκέψω, εἰτ’ ἐπιτρέπτεον εἴτε οὖ, καὶ εἰς

1 ἐπιστασθαι Stahl: ἐπισταται mss.
also, and of carpenters,—that they are the persons who have knowledge of wise matters; and if someone asked us for what those matters are wise, of which painters have knowledge, I suppose we should tell him that they are wise for the production of likenesses, and similarly with the rest. But if he should ask for what the matters of the sophist are wise, how should we answer him? What sort of workmanship is he master of?

How should we describe him, Socrates,—as a master of making one a clever speaker?

Perhaps, I replied, we should be speaking the truth, but yet not all the truth; for our answer still calls for a question, as to the subject on which the sophist makes one a clever speaker: just as the harp-player makes one clever, I presume, at speaking on the matter of which he gives one knowledge, namely harp-playing,—you agree to that?

Yes.

Well, about what does the sophist make one a clever speaker?

Clearly it must be the same thing as that of which he gives one knowledge.

So it would seem: now what is this thing, of which the sophist himself has knowledge and gives knowledge to his pupil?

Ah, there, in good faith, he said, I fail to find you an answer.

I then went on to say: Now tell me, are you aware upon what sort of hazard you are going to stake your soul? If you had to entrust your body to someone, taking the risk of its being made better or worse, you would first consider most carefully whether you ought to entrust it or not, and would seek the
συμβουλήν τούς τε φίλους ἃν παρεκάλεις καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους, σκοπούμενος ἡμέρας συχνᾶς· ὃ δὲ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ σώματος ἤγει, τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐν ὧν πάντ’ ἐστὶ τὰ σὰ ἢ ἐν ἡ κακῶς πράττειν, χρηστοῦ ἡ πονηροῦ αὐτοῦ γενομένου, περὶ δὲ τούτου οὔτε B τῷ πατρὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀδελφῷ ἑπεκοινώσω ὦτε ἡμῶν τῶν ἑταίρων οὐδενί, εἰτ’ ἐπιτρεπτέον εἶτε καὶ οὐ τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ ξένῳ τὴν σήν ψυχήν, ἀλλ’ ἐσπέρας ἀκούσας, ὡς φής, ὅρθριος ἥκων περὶ μὲν τούτου οὐδένα λόγον οὐδὲ συμβουλήν ποιῆ, εἰτε χρή ἐπιτρέπειν σαυτὸν αὐτῷ εἶτε μή, ἔτοιμος δὲ εἰ ἀναλίσκειν τὰ τε σαυτόν καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων χρήματα, ὡς ἤδη διεγνωκός, ὅτι πάντως συνεστέον Πρωταγόρα, ὅν οὔτε γυμνώσκεις, ὡς φής, οὔτε C διείλεξαι οὐδεπώποτε, οοφιστὴν δ’ ὄνομάζεις, τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν, ὃ τί ποτε ἐστὶ, φαίνει ἀγνῶν, ὃ μέλλεις σαυτὸν ἐπιτρέπειν; καὶ ὅς ἀκούσας, Ἕοικεν, ἐφη, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔξ ὅν σὺ λέγεις. Ἔρ’ οὖν, ὃ Ἰππόκρατες, ὁ σοφιστὴς τυγχάνει ὃν ἐμπορός τις ἡ κάτηλος τῶν ἀγωγήμων, ἀφ’ ὅν ψυχὴ πρέφεται; φαίνεται γἀρ ἐμοιγε τοιοῦτος τις. Τρέφεται δὲ, ὡς Σώκρατες, ψυχή τίνι; Μαθήματι δήπο, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ. καὶ ὅπως γε μή, ὃ ἐταίρε, ὁ σοφιστὴς ἐπαινῶν ὁ πωλεῖ ἐξαπατήσει ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος τροφήν, ὃ ἐμποροὺς D τε καὶ κάτηλος. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ποὺ δὲν ἄγουσιν ἀγωγήμων οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἴσασιν ὃ τι χρηστὸν ἡ πονηρὸν περὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἐπαινοῦσι δὲ πάντα πωλοῦντες,
advice of your friends and relations and ponder it for a number of days: but in the case of your soul, which you value much more highly than your body, and on which depends the good or ill condition of all your affairs, according as it is made better or worse, would you omit to consult first with either your father or your brother or one of us your comrades,—as to whether or no you should entrust your very soul to this newly-arrived foreigner; but choose rather, having heard of him in the evening, as you say, and coming to me at dawn, to make no mention of this question, and take no counsel upon it—whether you ought to entrust yourself to him or not; and are ready to spend your own substance and that of your friends, in the settled conviction that at all costs you must converse with Protagoras, whom you neither know, as you tell me, nor have ever met in argument before, and whom you call "sophist," in patent ignorance of what this sophist may be to whom you are about to entrust yourself?

When he heard this he said: It seems so, Socrates, by what you say.

Then can it be, Hippocrates, that the sophist is really a sort of merchant or dealer in provisions on which a soul is nourished? For such is the view I take of him.

With what, Socrates, is a soul nourished?

With doctrines, presumably, I replied. And we must take care, my good friend, that the sophist, in commending his wares, does not deceive us, as both merchant and dealer do in the case of our bodily food. For among the provisions, you know, in which these men deal, not only are they themselves ignorant what is good or bad for the body, since in selling they
οὔτε οἱ ὁνομανεῖται παρ' αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μὴ τις τύχη γυμναστικὸς ἢ ἰατρὸς ὄν. οὔτω δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες καὶ κατηλεύοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἑπανοοῦσι μὲν πάντα ἡ πωλοῦσι, τάχα δ' ἂν τινες, ὃ ἀριστε, καὶ τούτων ἄγροιεν ὃν πωλοῦσιν ὃ τι

Ε χρηστόν ἡ πονηρὸν πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν· ὡς δ' αὐτῶς καὶ οἱ ὁνομανεῖται παρ' αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μὴ τις τύχη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν αὐτοῦ ἰατροκός ὄν. εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων τούτων τῷ χρηστῶν καὶ πονηρῶν, ἀσφαλές σοι ὄνειδιθαί μαθήματα καὶ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὄτονοις· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅρα, ὃ μακάριε, μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις

314 κυβεύης τε καὶ κινδυνεύης. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πολὺ μεῖξον κίνδυνος ἐν τῇ τῶν μαθημάτων ὄνη ἡ ἐν τῇ τῶν συτίων. σιτία μὲν γὰρ καὶ ποτὰ προκέμενον παρὰ τοῦ καπηλοῦ καὶ ἐμπόρου ἔξεστιν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀγγείοις ἄποφέρειν, καὶ πρὶν δὲξασθαι αὕτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα πλώτα ἡ φαγόντα, καταδέμενον οὐκαδὲ ἔξεστι συμβουλεύσασθαι, παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἑπαίοντα, ὅ τι τε ἐδέστεον ἡ ποτέον καὶ ὃ τι μή, καὶ ὅποσον καὶ ὅποτε· ὡστε ἐν τῇ ὄνῃ ὃ μέγας

Β ὃ κίνδυνος. μαθήματα δὲ οὐκ ἐστών ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀγγείῳ ἀπενεγκεἰν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη, καταθέντα τὴν τιμήν, τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα ἀπείναι ἡ βεβλαμμένον ἡ ὠφελημένον. ταῦτα οὖν σκοπόμεθα καὶ μετὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἦμῶν· ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἔτι νέοι ὡστε τοσοῦτον πράγμα διελέσθαι. νῦν μέντοι, ὡστε ὀρμήσαμεν, ὥσπερ

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commend them all, but the people who buy from them are so too, unless one happens to be a trainer or a doctor. And in the same way, those who take their doctrines the round of our cities, hawking them about to any odd purchaser who desires them, commend everything that they sell, and there may well be some of these too, my good sir, who are ignorant which of their wares is good or bad for the soul; and in just the same way are the people who buy from them, unless one happens to have a doctor's knowledge here also, but of the soul. So then, if you are well informed as to what is good or bad among these wares, it will be safe for you to buy doctrines from Protagoras or from anyone else you please: but if not, take care, my dear fellow, that you do not risk your greatest treasure on a toss of the dice. For I tell you there is far more serious risk in the purchase of doctrines than in that of eatables. When you buy victuals and liquors you can carry them off from the dealer or merchant in separate vessels, and before you take them into your body by drinking or eating you can lay them by in your house and take the advice of an expert whom you can call in, as to what is fit to eat or drink and what is not, and how much you should take and when; so that in this purchase the risk is not serious. But you cannot carry away doctrines in a separate vessel: you are compelled, when you have handed over the price, to take the doctrine in your very soul by learning it, and so to depart either an injured or a benefited man. These, then, are questions which we have to consider with the aid of our elders, since we ourselves are still rather young to unravel so great a matter. For the moment, how-
καὶ ἀκούσωμεν τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἐπειτα ἀκούσαντες καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνακοινωσόμεθα· καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνος Πρωταγόρας αὐτόθι ἔστιν, ἄλλα καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Κ. Ἡλεῖος· οἴμαι δὲ καὶ Πρόδικον τὸν Κεῖον ἐ· καὶ ἄλλου πολλοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ.

Δόξαν ἥμων ταύτα ἐπορεύόμεθα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγενόμεθα, ἐπιστάντες περὶ τινὸς λόγου διελεγόμεθα, ὅσ ἥμων κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐνέπεσεν· ἵνα οὖν μὴ ἀτελὴς γένοιτο, ἄλλα διαπερανάμενοι οὕτως ἐσόμενε, περὶ τῶν προθύρων διελεγόμεθα, ἐως συνωμολογήσαμεν ἄλληλοι. δοκεῖ οὖν οὕτως ὁ θυρωρός, εὐνοοῦχος τις, κατήκουν ἥμων, καὶ

D δυνεύει δὲ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σοφιστῶν ἀχθεσθαι τοῖς φοιτῶσιν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν· ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἐκρούσαμεν τὴν θύραν, ἀνοίξας καὶ ἴδων ἥμας, Ἐα, ἔφη, σοφιστὰ τινες· οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ· καὶ ἄμα ἀμφότερον τοῖν χερῶν τὴν θύραν πάνω προθύμως ὡς οἷός τ' ἤν ἐπήραξε. καὶ ἥμεις πάλιν ἐκρούσαν, καὶ δὴ ἐγκεκλημένης τῆς θύρας ἀποκρινόμενος εἶπεν, Ὡ άνθρωποι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκηκόατε, ὡς οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ; Ἀλλ' ὅ γαθέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν Ἐ ἤκομεν οὔτε σοφιστὰ ἐσμεν· ἄλλα θάρρει: Πρωταγόραν γὰρ τοι δεόμενοι ἰδεῖν ἡλθομεν· εἰσάγγελον οὖν. μόνις οὖν ποτὲ ἥμων ἄνθρωπος ἀνέψξε τὴν θύραν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰσήλθομεν, κατελάβομεν Πρωταγόραν ἐν τῷ προστάτῳ περιπατοῦντα, ἔξης δ' αὐτῶι συμπεριεπάτου ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐπι
ever, let us pursue our design and go and hear this person; and when we have heard him we shall proceed to consult others: for Protagoras is not the only one there; we shall find Hippias of Elis and, I believe, Prodicus of Ceos, and numerous other men of wisdom besides.

This we resolved on, and set forth; and when we arrived at the doorway, we stood discussing some question or other that had occurred to us by the way: so, not to leave it unfinished, but to get it settled before we went in, we stood there and discussed in front of the door, until we had come to an agreement with each other. Now, I fancy the door-keeper, who was a eunuch, overheard us; very likely the great number of sophists has made him annoyed with callers at the house: at any rate, when we had knocked on the door, he opened it and, on seeing us, —Hullo, he said, sophists there! Master is engaged. So saying, he seized the door with both hands and very smartly clapped it to with all his might. We tried knocking again, and then he spoke in answer through the closed door,—Sirs, have you not heard, he is engaged? But, my good fellow, I said, we have not come to see Callias, nor are we sophists. Have no fear: I tell you, we have come to ask if we may see Protagoras; so go and announce us. Then with much hesitation the fellow opened the door to us; and when we had entered, we came upon Protagoras as he was walking round in the cloister,\(^1\) and close behind him two companies were walking round also; on the one side Callias, son of

\(^1\) The passage from the front door led into a cloister which surrounded an open court and gave access to the various rooms of the house.
θάτερα Καλλίας ο Ιππονίκου καὶ ο ἀδελφός
315 αὐτοῦ ὁ ὀμομήτριος, Πάραλος ὁ Περικλέους, καὶ
Χαρμίδης ὁ Γλαύκωνος, ἕκ δὲ τοῦ ἑπὶ θάτερα ὁ
ἐτέρος τῶν Περικλέους Ξάνθιππος καὶ Φιλιππίδης
ὁ Φιλομήλος καὶ Ἀντίμοιρος ὁ Μενδαῖος, ὃσπερ
εὐδοκεῖ μάλιστα τῶν Πρωταγόρου μαθητῶν καὶ
ἐπὶ τέχνη μαθάνει, ὡς σοφιστής ἐσόμενος. τούτων
dὲ οἱ ὁπισθὲν ἡκολουθοῦν ἐπακούοντες τῶν
λεγομένων, τὸ μὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο, οὕς ἄγει
ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν πόλεων ὁ Πρωταγόρας, δι᾽ ὧν
dιεξέρχεται, κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ ὁσπερ Ὀρφέως, οἱ
B δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνήν ἐπονταὶ κεκηλημένοι· ἦσαν
dὲ τινες καὶ τῶν ἐπιχυρίων ἐν τῷ χορῷ. τοῦτον
τὸν χορὸν μάλιστα ἔγνως ἰδὼν ἡσθην, ὡς καλῶς
ἡλαβοῦντο μηδέποτε ἐμποδῶν ἐν τῷ προσθεν
ἐίναι Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπείδη αὐτὸς ἀναστρέφοι
καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου, εὖ πως καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ περι-
εσχίζοντο οὕτως οἱ ἐπήκοοι ἐνθεν καὶ ἐνθεν, καὶ ἐν
κύκλῳ περιοῦντες ἀεὶ εἰς τὸ ὁπισθὲν καβισταντὸ
cάλλιστα.

Τὸν δὲ μετ᾽ εἰσενόησα, ἐφη Ὅμηρος, Ἰππίαν
C τὸν Ἡλείον, καθήμενον ἐν τῷ κατ᾽ ἀντικρὺ προ-
στῶ χρόνῳ· περὶ αὐτοῦ δ᾽ ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ
βάθρων Ἐρυξίμαχος τὸ Ὄκομενον καὶ Φαῖδρος
ὁ Μυρρυνούσιος καὶ Ἀνδρων ὁ Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ
τῶν ξένων πολῖται τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς.
ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεως τε καὶ τῶν μετεώρων
ἀστρονομικὰ ἀττα διερωτᾶν τὸν Ἰππίαν, δ᾽ ἐν
θρόνῳ καθήμενος ἐκάστοις αὐτῶν διέκρινε καὶ
dιεξῆς τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλον

1 Od. xi. 601.
PROTAGORAS

Hipponicus and his brother on the mother's side, Paralus, son of Pericles, and Charmides, son of Glaucion, while the other troop consisted of Pericles' other son Xanthippus, Philippides, son of Philomelus, and Antimoerus of Mende, who is the most highly reputed of Protagoras' disciples and is taking the course professionally with a view to becoming a sophist. The persons who followed in their rear, listening to what they could of the talk, seemed to be mostly strangers, brought by the great Protagoras from the several cities which he traverses, enchanting them with his voice like Orpheus, while they follow where the voice sounds, enchanted; and some of our own inhabitants were also dancing attendance. As for me, when I saw their evolutions I was delighted with the admirable care they took not to hinder Protagoras at any moment by getting in front; but whenever the master turned about and those with him, it was fine to see the orderly manner in which his train of listeners split up into two parties on this side and on that, and wheeling round formed up again each time in his rear most admirably.

"And next did I mark," as Homer says, Hippias of Elis, seated high on a chair in the doorway opposite; and sitting around him on benches were Eryximachus, son of Acumenus, Phaedrus of Myrrhinous, Andron son of Androten and a number of strangers,—fellow-citizens of Hippias and some others. They seemed to be asking him a series of astronomical questions on nature and the heavenly bodies, while he, seated in his chair, was distinguishing and expounding to each in turn the subjects of their questions. "Nay more, Tantalus also did I there
A touch of epic dignity is humorously
PROTAGORAS

behold,"—for you know Prodicus of Ceos is in Athens too: he was in a certain apartment formerly used by Hipponicus as a strong-room, but now cleared out by Callias to make more space for his numerous visitors, and turned into a guest-chamber. Well, Prodicus was still abed, wrapped up in sundry fleeces and rugs, and plenty of them too, it seemed; and near him on the beds hard by lay Pausanias from Cerames, and with Pausanias a lad who was still quite young,—of good birth and breeding. I should say, and at all events a very good-looking person. I fancied I heard his name was Agathon, and I should not be surprised to find he is Pausanias’ favourite. Besides this youth there were the two Adeimantuses, sons of Cepis and Leucolophidas, and there seemed to be some others. The subjects of their conversation I was unable to gather from outside, despite my longing to hear Prodicus; for I regard the man as all-wise and divine: but owing to the depth of his voice the room was filled with a booming sound which made the talk indistinct.

We had only just come in, when close on our heels entered Alcibiades the good-looking, as you call him and I agree that he is, and Critias, son of Callaeschrus. So, when we had entered, after some more little delays over certain points we had to examine, we went up to Protagoras, and I said: Protagoras, you see we have come to you, Hippocrates and I.

Is it your wish, he asked, to converse with me alone, or in company with others?

It is all the same to us, I replied: let me first given to the mention of the two famous sophists, Hippias and Prodicus.
PLATO

έγώ, ουδέν διαφέρει: ἀκούσας δέ, οὗ ἐνεκα ἥλθομεν, αὐτὸς σκέψαι. Τί οὖν δή ἐστι, ἔφη, οὗ ἐνεκα ἤκετε; Ἡπποκράτης δὲ ἐστὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπιχωρίων, Ὀππολλοδόρου υἱὸς, οἰκίας μεγάλης τε καὶ εὐδαιμονος, αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν φύσιν δοκεῖ ἐναμίλλος εἶναι.

C τοὺς ἠλυκώτατις, ἐπιθυμεῖν δὲ μοι δοκεῖ ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, τοῦτο δὲ οἷστεί οἱ μάλιστ' ἂν γενέσθαι, εἰ οἱ συγγένεοι ταῦτ' οὗν ήδη συ σκόπει, πότερον περὶ αὐτῶν μόνος οἷεὶ δεῖν διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς μόνους, ἢ μετ' ἄλλων. Ὅρθως, ἔφη, προμηθή, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ. ξένον γὰρ ἄνδρα καὶ ἴοντα εἰς πόλεις μεγάλας, καὶ ἐν ταύταις πεθοντα τῶν νέων τοὺς βελτίστους ἀπολείποντας τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συνουσίας, καὶ οἰκείων καὶ θυνείων, καὶ πρεσβυτέρων καὶ νεωτέρων, ἑαυτῷ συνεῖναι ὡς βελτίους ἐσομένους διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ συνουσίαν, χρὴ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὸν ταῦτα πράττοντα. οὐ γὰρ σμικρόν περὶ αὐτὰ φθόνοι τε γίγνονται καὶ ἄλλαι δυσμένειαι τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί. έγώ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειριζομένους αὕτην τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν, φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθέα αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι, τοὺς μὲν ποίησιν, οἴον ὁμηρόν τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμώνιδην, τοὺς δὲ αὐτὴν τελεταίς τε καὶ χρησμοδίας, τοὺς ἀμφί τε ὁρφέα καὶ Μουσαίον, ἐνίους δὲ τινας ἤσθημαι καὶ γυμναστικῆς, οἴον Ἰκκος τε τὸ Ταραντίνος καὶ τὸν ἦττων σο-Ε φιστῆς Ὁρώδικος ὁ Σηλυμβριανὸς, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεύς μουσικῆν δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὑμετέρος
tell you our object in coming, and then you must decide.

Well, what is your object? he asked.

My friend Hippocrates is a native of the city, a son of Apollodorus and one of a great and prosperous family, while his own natural powers seem to make him a match for anyone of his age. I fancy he is anxious to gain consideration in our city, and he believes he can best gain it by consorting with you. So now it is for you to judge whether it will be fittest for you to converse on this matter privately with us alone, or in company with others.

You do right, Socrates, he said, to be so thoughtful on my behalf. For when one goes as a stranger into great cities, and there tries to persuade the best of the young men to drop their other connexions, either with their own folk or with foreigners, both old and young, and to join one's own circle, with the promise of improving them by this connexion with oneself, such a proceeding requires great caution; since very considerable jealousies are apt to ensue, and numerous enmities and intrigues. Now I tell you that sophistry is an ancient art, and those men of ancient times who practised it, fearing the odium it involved, disguised it in a decent dress, sometimes of poetry, as in the case of Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides; sometimes of mystic rites and soothsayings, as did Orpheus, Musaeus and their sects; and sometimes too, I have observed, of athletics, as with Icicus\(^1\) of Tarentum and another still living—as great a sophist as any—Herodicus\(^2\) of Selymbria, originally of Megara; and music was the disguise employed by your own

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1 A famous athlete and trainer.
2 A trainer who also practised medicine.
πρόσχημα ἐποιήσατο, μέγας ὁν σοφιστής, καὶ Πυθοκλείδης ὁ Κείσο καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί. οὗτοι πάντες, ὡσπερ λέγω, φοβηθέντες τὸν φθόνον ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσμασιν ἐχρήσαντο. ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις ἀπασὶ κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι οὗ εὐμφέρομαι: ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὗ τὶ διαπράξασθαι ο ἐβουλήθησαν: οὐ γὰρ λαθεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς δυναμένους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττειν, ὡσπερ ἐνεκα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ προσχήματα: ἐπεὶ οὗ γε πολλοὶ ὡς ἔτος εἴπειν οὔδεν αἰσθάνονται, ἀλλ' ἂττ' ἀν οὗτοι διαγγέλλωσι, ταύτα ὑμνοῦσι. τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρᾶναι, ἀλλὰ καταφανῇ 

Β εἶναι, πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος, καὶ πολὺ δυσμενεστέρους-παρέχεσθαι ἀνάγκη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἡγοῦνται γὰρ τὸν τούτον πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πανούργον εἶναι. ἐγὼ οὖν τούτων τὴν ἐναντίαν ἀπασαν ὅδον ἐλήλυθα, καὶ ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστῆς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ εὐλάβειαν ταύτην οἶμαι βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὁμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξαρνον εἶναι. καὶ ἄλλας πρὸς ταύτη ἐσκεμμαί, ὡστε, σὺν θεῷ εἴπειν, 

C μηδὲν δεινὸν πᾶσχεν διὰ τὸ ὁμολογεῖν σοφιστῆς εἶναι. καὶ τοῦ πολλά γε ἐτη ἦδη εἰμὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἐξύμπαντα πολλὰ μοι ἐστίν· οὔδενός ὅτου οὐ πάντων ἃν ὑμὸν καθ' ἡλικίαν πατὴρ εἶναι ὡστε πολὺ μοι ἡδιστόν ἐστίν, εἰ τι βουλέσθη, περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ἐναντίον τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων τῶν λόγων ποιεῖσθαι. καὶ ἐγὼ-ὑπώπτευσα γὰρ βουλέσθαι αὐτὸν τῷ τε Προδίκῳ καὶ τῷ Ἰππίῳ ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι, ὅτι ἑραστάτι αὐτοῦ 

D ἀφιγμένοι εἴημεν—Τι οὖν, ἐφειν ἐγώ, οὐ καὶ Πρό-
Agathocles, a great sophist, Pythocleides of Ceos, and many more. All these, as I say, from fear of ill-will made use of these arts as outer coverings. But I do not conform to the method of all these persons, since I believe they did not accomplish any of their designs: for the purpose of all this disguise could not escape the able men of affairs in each city; the multitude, of course, perceive practically nothing, but merely echo this or that pronouncement of their leaders. Now to try to run away, and to fail through being caught in the act, shows sad folly in the mere attempt, and must needs make people far more hostile; for they regard such an one, whatever else he may be, as a rogue. Hence the road I have taken is one entirely opposite to theirs: I admit that I am a sophist and that I educate men; and I consider this precaution, of admitting rather than denying, the better of the two. There are others besides that I have meditated, so as to avoid, under Heaven, any harm that may come of admitting that I am a sophist. And yet many long years have I now been in the profession, for many in total number are those that I have lived: not one of you all, but in age I might be his father. Hence it suits me by far the best, in meeting your wishes, to make my discourse on these matters in the presence of all who are in the house.

On this, as I suspected that he wished to make a display before Prodicus and Hippias, and give himself airs on the personal attachment shown by our coming to him, I remarked: Then surely we must call

1 A music-teacher.
2 In the Meno (91e) we are told that Protagoras lived nearly seventy years, forty of which he spent in teaching.
δικον καὶ Ἰππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν καὶ τοὺς μετ’ αὐτῶν, ἣν ἐπακούσωσιν ἡμῶν; Πάντως μὲν οὖν, ἐφεὶ οἱ Πρωταγόρας. Βούλεσθε οὖν, ὁ Καλλίας ἐφεὶ, συνεδριον κατασκευάζωμεν, ἵνα καθεξόμενοι διαλέγησθε; Ἐδοκεὶ χρήναι· ἀσμενοι δὲ πάντες ήμεῖς, ὡς ἀκουσόμενοι ἄνδρῶν σοφῶν, καὶ αὐτοῖ τε ἀντιλαβόμενοι τῶν βάθρων καὶ τῶν κλινῶν κατασκευάζομεν παρὰ τῷ Ἰππίᾳ· ἐκεῖ γὰρ προ- υπῆρχε τὰ βάθρα. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Καλλίας τε καὶ Ἐ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἠκέτην ἠγοντε τὸν Πρόδικον, ἀνα- στήσαντες ἐκ τῆς κλίνης, καὶ τους μετὰ τοῦ Προδίκου.

Ἔπει δὲ πάντες συνεκαθεξόμεθα, ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Νῦν δὴ ἂν, ἐφη, λέγοις, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἶδε πάρεισι, περὶ δὲ ὅλιγον πρότερον μνείαν ἐποιου πρὸς ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ νεανίσκου. καὶ ἐγὼ 318 εἶπον ότι Ἡ αὐτῇ μοι ἀρχή ἐστιν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, ἢπερ ἄρτι, περὶ δὲ ἄν ἀφικόμην. Ἰπποκράτης γὰρ ὄδε τυγχάνει ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὅν τῆς σῆς συνοισίας· ὁ τι οὖν αὐτῷ ἀποβήσεται, εάν σοι συνή, ἢδεως ἂν φησι πυθέσθαι. τοσοῦτος ὦ γε ἦμετερος λόγος. ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας εἶπεν· Ὡ νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοῖς σοι, ἐὰν ἐμοὶ συνῆς, ἢ ἂν ἠμέρα ἐμοὶ συγγένη, ἀπέναι οὐκαδε βελτίων γεγονότι, καὶ ἐν τῇ υπεραία ταύτα ταύτα· καὶ ἐκάστης ἠμέρας ὁ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν λέγεις, ἀλλὰ εἰκός, ἐπεὶ κἂν σὺ, καίπερ τηλικοῦτος
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Prodicus and Hippias and their followers to come and listen to us!

By all means, said Protagoras.

Then do you agree, said Callias, to our making a session of it, so that we may sit at ease for our conversation?

The proposal was accepted; and all of us, delighted at the prospect of listening to wise men, took hold of the benches and couches ourselves and arranged them where Hippias was, since the benches were there already. Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades came, bringing with them Prodicus, whom they had induced to rise from his couch, and Prodicus' circle also.

When we had all taken our seats,—So now, Socrates, said Protagoras, since these gentlemen are also present, be so good as to tell what you were mentioning to me a little while before on the young man's behalf.

To which I replied: The same point, Protagoras, will serve me for a beginning as a moment ago, in regard to the object of my visit. My friend Hippocrates finds himself desirous of joining your classes; and therefore he says he would be glad to know what result he will get from joining them. That is all the speech we have to make.

Then Protagoras answered at once, saying: Young man, you will gain this by coming to my classes, that on the day when you join them you will go home a better man, and on the day after it will be the same; every day you will constantly improve more and more.

When I heard this I said: Protagoras, what you say is not at all surprising, but quite likely, since even
καὶ οὕτω σοφός, εἴ τίς σε διδάσκειν ὁ μὴ τυχ-χάνοις ἐπιστάμενος, βελτίων ἄν γένοιο. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ αὐτίκα μάλα μεταβαλῶν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν Ἰπποκράτης οἴδε ἐπιθυμήσει τῆς συνουσίας τοῦτο τοῦ νεανίσκου τοῦ νῦν νεωστὶ ἐπιδημοῦντος, Ζεύξιπποι τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου, καὶ ἀφικόμενος παρ' αὐτόν, ὡσπερ παρὰ σὲ νῦν, ἀκούσειεν αὐτοῦ ταῦτα ταῦτα, ἀπερ σοῦ, ὅτι ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ξυνῶν αὐτῷ βελτίων ἔσται καὶ ἐπιδίωσεν εἰ αὐτὸν ἐπανέροτο τί δὴ φῆς βελτίων ἔσεσθαι καὶ εἰς τί ἐπιδίωσεν; εἴποι ἄν αὐτῶ ὁ Ζεύξιππος, ὅτι πρὸς γραφικήν· καὶ εἰ Ὁρθαγόρα τῷ Θηβαίῳ συγγενόμενος, ἀκούσας ἐκείνου ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, ἀπερ σοῦ, ἐπανέροτο αὐτόν εἰς τί βελτίων καθ' ἡμέραν ἔσται συγγενόμενος ἐκεῖνῳ, εἴποι ἄν, ὅτι εἰς αὐλησίν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ σὺ εἰπὲ τῷ νεανί-σκῳ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦτον ἐρωτώντι, Ἰπποκράτης οἴδε Πρωταγόρα οὐγγενόμενος, ἃν αὐτῷ ἡμέρα συγγένηται, βελτίων ἀπεσθ' γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμερῶν ἐκάστης οὕτως ἐπιδίωσει εἰς τί, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ περὶ τοῦ; καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ἀκούσας, Σύ τε καλῶς ἑρωτάς, ἐφθ., ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς καλῶς ἑρωτῶσι χαῖρω ἀποκρινόμενος. Ἰπποκράτης γὰρ παρ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος οὐ πέσεται, ἀπερ ἂν ἐπαθεν ἄλλω τῷ συγγενόμενῳ τῶν σοφιστῶν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λωβῶνται τοὺς νέους· τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς Ε ἐπεφυγότας ἀκοντας πάλιν αὐ ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμοῦ τε καὶ ἀστρονομιάς καὶ
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you, though so old and so wise, would be made better if someone taught you what you happen not to know. But let me put it another way: suppose Hippocrates here should change his desire all at once, and become desirous of this young fellow’s lessons who has just recently come to town, Zeuxippus of Heraclea, and should approach him, as he now does you, and should hear the very same thing from him as from you,—how on each day that he spent with him he would be better and make constant progress; and suppose he were to question him on this and ask: In what shall I become better as you say, and to what will my progress be? Zeuxippus’s reply would be, to painting. Then suppose he came to the lessons of Orthagoras the Theban, and heard the same thing from him as from you, and then inquired of him for what he would be better each day through attending his classes, the answer would be, for fluting. In the same way you also must satisfy this youth and me on this point, and tell us for what, Protagoras, and in what connexion my friend Hippocrates, on any day of attendance at the classes of Protagoras, will go away a better man, and on each of the succeeding days will make a like advance.

When Protagoras heard my words,—You do right, he said, to ask that, while I am only too glad to answer those who ask the right question. For Hippocrates, if he comes to me, will not be treated as he would have been if he had joined the classes of an ordinary sophist. The generality of them maltreat the young; for when they have escaped from the arts they bring them back against their will and force them into arts, teaching them
γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικῆν διδάσκοντες—καὶ ἀμα εἰς τὸν Ἰππίαν ἀπέβλεψε—παρὰ δ’ ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος μαθήσεται οὐ περὶ ἄλλου τούτου ἢ περὶ οὗ ἦκε. τὸ δὲ μάθημα ἐστὶν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὅπως ἃν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατῶτατος ἂν εἰη καὶ πράττει καὶ λέγειν.

Ἀρ’, ἐφην ἐγὼ, ἐπομαὶ σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγεις τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑποσχεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας.

Αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τούτὸ ἐστιν, ἐφη, ὁ Σῶκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα, ὁ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.

Ἡ καλὸν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, τέχνημα ἁρα κέκτησαι, εἰπερ κέκτησαι; οὐ γάρ τι ἄλλο πρὸς γε σὲ εἰρή- σεται ἢ ἄτερ νοώ. ἐγὼ γάρ τοῦτο, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, 

Β οὐκ ὠμὴν διδακτὸν εἶναι, σοι δὲ λέγοντι οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως [ἀν] ἀπιστῶ. οθεν δὲ αὐτὸ ἡγοῦμαι οἱ διδακτὸν εἶναι μηδ’ ὑπ’ ἄνθρωπων παρασκευαστόν ἄνθρωποι, δίκαιος εἰμι εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἀθη- ναίους, ὡσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἑλληνες, φημὶ σο- φοὺς εἶναι. ὅρῳ οὖν, ὅταν συλλεγὼμεν εἰς τὴν ἑκκλησίαν, ἑπειδὰν μὲν περὶ οἰκοδομίας τι δέη πράξαι τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους μεταπεμπο- μένους συμβούλους περὶ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων, ὅταν δὲ περὶ ναυπηγίας, τοὺς ναυπηγοὺς, καὶ τάλλα

C πάντα οὕτως, ὅσα ἡγοῦνται μαθητὰ τε καὶ διδακτὰ εἶναι· εὰν δὲ τὸς ἄλλος ἐπιχειρὴ αὐτοῖς συμ- βουλεύειν, ὃν ἐκείνοι μὴ οἴονται δημιουργὸν εἶναι, κἂν πᾶν καλὸς ἢ καὶ πλοῦσιος καὶ τῶν γενναίων, οὔτεν τι μάλλον ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλὰ καταγελώσι

1 ἀν secl. Heindorf.
arithmetic and astronomy and geometry and music (and here he glanced at Hippias); whereas, if he applies to me, he will learn precisely and solely that for which he has come. That learning consists of good judgement in his own affairs, showing how best to order his own home; and in the affairs of his city, showing how he may have most influence on public affairs both in speech and in action.

I wonder, I said, whether I follow what you are saying; for you appear to be speaking of the civic science, and undertaking to make men good citizens.

That, Socrates, he replied, is exactly the purport of what I profess.

Then it is a goodly accomplishment that you have acquired, to be sure, I remarked, if indeed you have acquired it—to such a man as you I may say sincerely what I think. For this is a thing, Protagoras, that I did not suppose to be teachable; but when you say it is, I do not see how I am to disbelieve it. How I came to think that it cannot be taught, or provided by men for men, I may be allowed to explain. I say, in common with the rest of the Greeks, that the Athenians are wise. Now I observe, when we are collected for the Assembly, and the city has to deal with an affair of building, we send for builders to advise us on what is proposed to be built; and when it is a case of laying down a ship, we send for shipwrights; and so in all other matters which are considered learnable and teachable: but if anyone else, whom the people do not regard as a craftsman, attempts to advise them, no matter how handsome and wealthy and well-born he may be, not one of these things induces them to accept him; they merely laugh him to scorn and shout him down,
καὶ θορυβοῦσιν, ἢ ὥσ τις ἄποστῇ ὁ ἐπιχείρων λέγειν καταθορυβηθεῖς, ἢ οἱ τοξόται αὐτὸν ἀφελκύσωσι ἢ ἐξάρωνται κελευόντων τῶν πρυτάνεων. περὶ μὲν οὖν δὲν οἴονται ἐν τέχνῃ εἶναι, οὔτω διαπράττονται· ἐπειδὰν δὲ τι περὶ τῆς πόλεως

D διουκήσως δὲν βουλεύσασθαι, συμβουλεύει αὐτοῖς ἀνυστάμενοι περὶ τούτων ὁμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ χαλκεῖς, σκυτοτόμος, ἕμπορος, ναύ-κληρος, πλούσιοι, πένης, γενναῖος, ἀγεννής, καὶ τούτοις οὐδεὶς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττει ὥσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν μαθῶν, οὐδὲ ὅντος διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῶ, ἐπειτὰ συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχείρει· δῆλον γὰρ, ὅτι οὐχ ἦγοῦντο διδακτὸν εἶναι. μὴ τοῦν ὃτι τοῦ κοῦν τῆς πόλεως

Ε οὔτως ἔχει, ἀλὰ ἵδια ἤμιν οἱ σοφῶτατοι καὶ ἀριστοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ταύτην τὴν ἁρετὴν ἢν ἔχουσιν οὐχ οἶοι τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι· ἐπεὶ Περικλῆς, ὁ τούτωι τῶν νεανίσκων πατήρ, τούτους ὃ μὲν διδασκάλων εἰχετο καλῶς καὶ εὑ ἐπαίδευσεν, ἀ δὲ

320 αὐτὸς σοφὸς ἕστιν, οὔτε αὐτὸς παίδευε ὁὔτε τῷ ἄλλῳ παραδίδοσιν, ἂλλ' αὐτῷ περιώντες νέμονται ὥσπερ ἄφετοι, ἐὰν ποι ἄντόματοι περιτύχωσι τῇ ἁρετῇ. εἰ δὲ βούλει, Κλεωνίαν, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου τούτου νεώτερον ἀδελφόν, ἐπιτροπεύων ὁ αὐτὸς ὦτος ἁνὴρ Περικλῆς, δεδιώς περὶ αὐτοῦ μὴ διαφθαρῇ δὴ ὑπὸ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τούτου, καταθέμενος ἐν Ἀρίφρονος ἑπαίδευε· καὶ πρὶν ἔξ μὴνας γεγονέναι, ἀπεδωκε τούτω οὐκ

Β ἔχων ὁ τι χρήσατο αὐτῷ. καὶ ἄλλους σοι παμ-
until either the speaker retires from his attempt, overborne by the clamour, or the tipstaves pull him from his place or turn him out altogether by order of the chair. Such is their procedure in matters which they consider professional. But when they have to deliberate on something connected with the administration of the State, the man who rises to advise them on this may equally well be a smith, a shoemaker, a merchant, a sea-captain, a rich man, a poor man, of good family or of none, and nobody thinks of casting in his teeth, as one would in the former case, that his attempt to give advice is justified by no instruction obtained in any quarter, no guidance of any master; and obviously it is because they hold that here the thing cannot be taught. Nay further, it is not only so with the service of the State, but in private life our best and wisest citizens are unable to transmit this excellence of theirs to others; for Pericles, the father of these young fellows here, gave them a first-rate training in the subjects for which he found teachers, but in those of which he is himself a master he neither trains them personally nor commits them to another's guidance, and so they go about grazing at will like sacred oxen, on the chance of their picking up excellence here or there for themselves. Or, if you like, there is Cleinias, the younger brother of Alcibiades here, whom this same Pericles, acting as his guardian, and fearing he might be corrupted, I suppose, by Alcibiades, carried off from his brother and placed in Ariphron's family to be educated: but before six months had passed he handed him back to Alcibiades, at a loss what to do with him. And there are a great many others whom I could mention to you as having
πόλλους ἔχω λέγειν, οἱ αὐτοὶ ἁγαθοὶ ὄντες οὐδένα πώποτε βελτίω ἐποίησαν ὦτε τῶν οἰκείων ὦτε τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. ἐγὼ οὖν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι διδακτὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν. ἐπειδή δέ σου ἀκούω ταῦτα λέγοντος, κάμπτομαι καὶ οἶμαι τί σε λέγειν διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι σε πολλῶν μὲν ἔμπειρον γεγονέναι, πολλὰ δὲ μεμαθηκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτῶν ἐξευρηκέναι. εἰ οὖν ἔχεις ἐναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξαι, ὡς διδακτὸν C ἔστω ἡ ἀρετή, μὴ φθονήσῃς, ἀλλ' ἐπιδείξῃς. 'Αλλ', ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐφη, οὐ φθονήσω. ἀλλὰ πότερον ἡμῖν, ὡς πρεσβύτερος νεωτέροις, μοῦδον λέγων ἐπιδείξω ἡ λόγως διεξελθῶν; πολλοὶ οὖν αὐτῷ ὑπέλαβον τῶν παρακαθημένων, ὀποτέρως βούλοιτο, οὕτω διεξέναι. Δοκεῖ τοῖνυν μοι, ἐφη, χαρίε·

στερον εἶναι μοῦδον ἡμῖν λέγειν.

Ἡν γάρ ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν, θυντὰ D δὲ γένη οὐκ ἦν. ἐπειδή δὲ καὶ τούτους χρόνους ἦλθεν εἰμαρμένοις γενέσεως, τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἐνδον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μίξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῆ κεράνυται. ἐπειδῆ· δ' ἄγεων αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἐμελλὼν, προσέταξαν Προμηθεῖ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεῖ κοσμῆσαι τε καὶ νεῖμαι δυνάμεις ἐκά·

στοις ὡς πρέπει. Προμηθεά δὲ παραίτεται Ἐπιμηθεὺς αὐτὸς νεῖμαι, νεῖμαντος δ' ἐμοῦ, ἐφη, E ἐπίσκεψαι· καὶ οὕτω πείσας νέμει. νέμων δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἱσχὺν ἄνευ τάχους προσήπτε, τοὺς δ' ἀσθενεστέρους τάχει ἐκόσμει· τοὺς δὲ ὑπλιξε.
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never succeeded, though virtuous themselves, in making anyone else better, either of their own or of other families. I therefore, Protagoras, in view of these facts, believe that virtue is not teachable: but when I hear you speak thus, I am swayed over, and suppose there is something in what you say, because I consider you to have gained experience in many things and to have learnt many, besides finding out some for yourself. So if you can demonstrate to us more explicitly that virtue is teachable, do not grudge us your demonstration.

No, Socrates, I will not grudge it you; but shall I, as an old man speaking to his juniors, put my demonstration in the form of a fable, or of a regular exposition?

Many of the company sitting by him instantly bade him treat his subject whichever way he pleased.

Well then, he said, I fancy the more agreeable way is for me to tell you a fable.

There was once a time when there were gods, but no mortal creatures. And when to these also came their destined time to be created, the gods moulded their forms within the earth, of a mixture made of earth and fire and all substances that are compounded with fire and earth. When they were about to bring these creatures to light, they charged Prometheus and Epimetheus to deal to each the equipment of his proper faculty. Epimetheus besought Prometheus that he might do the dealing himself; "And when I have dealt," he said, "you shall examine." Having thus persuaded him he dealt; and in dealing he attached strength without speed to some, while the weaker he equipped with speed; and some he armed, while devising for others, along
PLATO

tois δ' ἀπολον διδοὺς φύσιν ἄλλην τιν' αὐτοῖς ἑμηχανάτο δύναμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν. ἂ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σμικρότητι ἰδιπισχε, πτηνὸν φυγὴν ἢ κατάγειν οἰκεῖσθαι ἐνεμὲν. ἂ δὲ ηὐξὲ μεγέθει,

tῳδὲ αὐτῷ αὐτὰ ἔσωζε· καὶ τάλλα οὐτως ἐπανισῶν ἐνεμε. ταῦτα δὲ ἑμηχανάτο εὐλάβειαν ἔχων μὴ τι γένος ἰαστωθεὶς· ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀλληλοφθορίων διαφυγὰς ἕπρηκεσε, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ Διὸς ὠρας εὐμάρειαν ἑμηχανάτο ἀμφιεννὺς αὐτὰ πυκνὰς τε θριξί καὶ στερεοῖς δέρμασιν, ικανοῖς μὲν ἀμύναι χειμῶνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καύματα, καὶ εἰς εὐνάς ἱοῦσιν ὅπως ὑπάρχοι τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα στρωμνῇ οἰκείᾳ τε καὶ αὐτοφυὴς ἐκάστως· καὶ

B ύπὸ ποδῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπλαῖσ, τὰ δὲ οὐνξὶ καὶ δέρμασι στερεοῖς καὶ ἀναίμοις. τούντεθεν τροφὰς ἄλλοις ἄλλας ἔξεπεριζε, τοῖς μὲν ἐκ γῆς βοτάνην, ἄλλοις δὲ δένδρων καρποὺς, τοῖς δὲ βίζας· ἐστι δ' οἶς ἔδωκεν εἶναι τροφὴν ζῶνων ἄλλων βορᾶν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀλυγογονίαι προσῆμε, τοῖς δ' ἀναλυκομένοις ύπὸ τούτων πολυγονίαν, σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει πορίζων. ἄτε δὴ ὁν ὦν ὑπὸ πᾶν τι σοφὸς ὦν ὁ Ἐπιμή-

C θεὺς ἔλαβεν αὐτῶν καταναλώσας τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τὰ ἄλογα· λοιπὸν δὴ ἀκόσμητον ἔτι αὐτῷ ἢ τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἦπορει ὁ τι χρήσατο. ἀποροῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπισκεψάμενος τὴν νομὴν, καὶ ὃρα τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ζώα ἐμμελῶς πάντων ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπων γυμνὸν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ ἀστρωτὸν καὶ ἀπτλον· ἦδη δὲ καὶ ἦ ἐμμαρμενὴ ἠμέρα παρῆν, ἐν ἦ ἐδει καὶ ἀνθρωπὸν ἔξεναι ἐκ γῆς εἰς φῶς. ἀπορία ὦν

1 οὐνξι Baiter: θριξὶν mss.
with an unarmed condition, some different faculty for preservation. To those which he invested with smallness he dealt a winged escape or an underground habitation; those which he increased in largeness he preserved by this very means; and he dealt all the other properties on this plan of compensation. In contriving all this he was taking precaution that no kind should be extinguished; and when he had equipped them with avoidances of mutual destruction, he devised a provision against the seasons ordained by Heaven, in clothing them about with thick-set hair and solid hides, sufficient to ward off winter yet able to shield them also from the heats, and so that on going to their lairs they might find in these same things a bedding of their own that was native to each; and some he shod with hoofs, others with claws and solid, bloodless hides. Then he proceeded to furnish each of them with its proper food, some with pasture of the earth, others with fruits of trees, and others again with roots; and to a certain number for food he gave other creatures to devour: to some he attached a paucity in breeding, and to others, which were being consumed by these, a plenteous brood, and so procured survival of their kind. Now Epimetheus, being not so wise as he might be, heedlessly squandered his stock of properties on the brutes; he still had left unequipped the race of men, and was at a loss what to do with it. As he was casting about, Prometheus arrived to examine his distribution, and saw that whereas the other creatures were fully and suitably provided, man was naked, unshod, unbedded, unarmed; and already the destined day was come, whereon man like the rest should emerge from earth.
εὔκολον ὁ Προμηθέας, ἦτεν παράστασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐροῦ, κλέπτει Ἡφαίστου καὶ Ἄθηνᾶς

ΠΛΑΤΟ

τὴν ἐντεχνῶν σοφίαν σὺν πυρί—ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἦν ἄνευ πυρὸς αὐτῆς κτητῆς τῷ ἡ χρησιμήν γενεσθαί—καὶ οὕτω δὴ δωρεῖται ἀνθρώπων. τὴν μὲν ὀν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν ἀνθρώπων ταύτη ἐσχῆ, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ ἐίχεν. ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ Διί τῷ δὲ Προμηθείς εἰς μὲν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τὴν τοῦ Διὸς ὄικησιν οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν. πρὸς δὲ καὶ αἱ Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν. εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς Ἐ Ἁθηνᾶς καὶ Ἡφαίστου οὐκέμα τὸ κοινὸν, ἐν δὲ ἐφιλοτεχνεῖται, λαθῶν εἰσέρχεται, καὶ κλέψας τὴν τε ἐμπυρον τέχνην τὴν τοῦ Ἡφαίστου καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τῆς Ἁθηνᾶς δίδωσιν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἕκ τούτοις εὐπορίᾳ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ βίου γίγνεται, Προμηθέα δὲ δι' Ἐπιμηθέα ὑστερον, ἦπερ λέγεται, κλοπῆς δίκη μετήλθεν.

Ἐπειδή δὲ ὁ ἀνθρώπος θείας μετέσχη μοῖρας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν ζῆσεν μόνον θεους ἐνόμισε, καὶ ἐπεξείρει βωμοὺς τε ἴδρυσθαι καὶ ἄγαλματα θεῶν ἐπείτα φυσιν καὶ ὄνομα ταχύ διηθρώσατο τῇ τέχνῃ, καὶ οὐκήσεις καὶ ἐσθήτας καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ στρωμάτος καὶ τὰς ἕκ γῆς τροφὰς ἡμέτερο. οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι καὶ ἄρχας ἀνθρώποι ὄκουν σποράδην, πόλεις δὲ Β οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπώλειαν οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχὺ αὐτῶν ἀσθενεστέροι εἶναι, καὶ ἡ δημογραφικὴ τέχνη αὐτοῖς πρὸς μὲν τροφήν ἱκανή βοηθῶς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τῶν τῶν θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδείκνυσκε πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὕτω εἶχον, ἢς μέρος πολεμική. Ξένους δὴ ἄθροιζεσθαι καὶ σφίζεσθαι

1 i.e. of arts originally apportioned to gods alone.
to light. Then Prometheus, in his perplexity as to what preservation he could devise for man, stole from Hephaestus and Athena wisdom in the arts together with fire—since by no means without fire could it be acquired or helpfully used by any—and he handed it there and then as a gift to man. Now although man acquired in this way the wisdom of daily life, civic wisdom he had not, since this was in the possession of Zeus; Prometheus could not make so free as to enter the citadel which is the dwelling-place of Zeus, and moreover the guards of Zeus were terrible: but he entered unobserved the building shared by Athena and Hephaestus for the pursuit of their arts, and stealing Hephaestus’s fiery art and all Athena’s also he gave them to man, and hence it is that man gets facility for his livelihood, but Prometheus, through Epimetheus’ fault, later on (the story goes) stood his trial for theft.

And now that man was partaker of a divine portion,¹ he, in the first place, by his nearness of kin to deity, was the only creature that worshipped gods, and set himself to establish altars and holy images; and secondly, he soon was enabled by his skill to articulate speech and words, and to invent dwellings, clothes, sandals, beds, and the foods that are of the earth. Thus far provided, men dwelt separately in the beginning, and cities there were none; so that they were being destroyed by the wild beasts, since these were in all ways stronger than they; and although their skill in handiwork was a sufficient aid in respect of food, in their warfare with the beasts it was defective; for as yet they had no civic art, which includes the art of war. So they sought to band themselves together and secure

¹
κτίζοντες πόλεις· ὅτε οὖν ἀθροισθεῖν, ἡδίκουν ἀλλήλους ἀτε οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην,
C ὡστε πάλιν σκεδανύμενοι διεφθείροντο. Ζεῦς οὖν δεῖσας περὶ τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, μὴ ἀπόλοιτο πάν,
'Ερμῆν πέμπει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην, ὥστε εἰς πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας
συναγωγόι. ἔρωτα οὖν 'Ερμῆς Δία, τίνα οὖν τρόπον δοίη δίκην καὶ αἰδῶ ἀνθρώπων· πότερον
ὡς αἱ τέχναι νενέμηται, οὖν καὶ ταύτας νείμω; νενέμηται δὲ ὡδε· εἰς ἑχων ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς
ἰκανὸς ἰδιωτας, καὶ οἱ ἀλλοι δημιουργοί· καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰδῶ οὖν θῶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ
D ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω; ἐπὶ πάντας, ἐφη ὁ Ζεῦς, καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων· οὐ γὰρ ἄν γένουτο πόλεις, εἰ
ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχοιεν ὡσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν· καὶ νόμον γε θές παρ' ἐμοι, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς
καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν ός νόσον πόλεως.
οὕτω δὴ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ διὰ ταύτα οἱ τε ἄλλοι καὶ Ἀθηναίοι, ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἁρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ἢ
λόγος ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δημιουργικῆς, ὀλίγους οὖνται
Ε μετείναι συμβουλῆς, καὶ ἐάν τις ἐκτός ὅν τῶν
ολίγων συμβουλεύῃ, οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φῆς·
eikótως, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι· ὅταν δὲ εἰς συμβουλὴν
323 πολιτικῆς ἁρετῆς 'ώσων, ἦν δεὶ διὰ δικαιοσύνης
πᾶσαν ἦναι καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰκότως ἀπαντος ἀν-
δρός ἀνέχονται, ὡς παντὶ προσήκον ταύτης γε
μετέχειν τῆς ἁρετῆς, ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις· αὐτὴ, ὁ
Σωκράτης, τούτου αὐτίκα· ἢν δὲ μὴ οὗ ἀπατάσθαι,
ὡς τῷ ὀντὶ ἠγούνται πάντες ἀνθρωποὶ πάντα ἄνδρα
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their lives by founding cities. Now as often as they were banded together they did wrong to one another through the lack of civic art, and thus they began to be scattered again and to perish. So Zeus, fearing that our race was in danger of utter destruction, sent Hermes to bring respect and right among men, to the end that there should be regulation of cities and friendly ties to draw them together. Then Hermes asked Zeus in what manner then was he to give men right and respect: "Am I to deal them out as the arts have been dealt? That dealing was done in such wise that one man possessing medical art is able to treat many ordinary men, and so with the other craftsmen. Am I to place among men right and respect in this way also, or deal them out to all?" "To all," replied Zeus; "let all have their share; for cities cannot be formed if only a few have a share of these as of other arts. And make thereto a law of my ordaining, that he who cannot partake of respect and right shall die the death as a public pest." Hence it comes about, Socrates, that people in cities, and especially in Athens, consider it the concern of a few to advise on cases of artistic excellence or good craftsmanship, and if anyone outside the few gives advice they disallow it, as you say, and not without reason, as I think: but when they meet for a consultation on civic art, where they should be guided throughout by justice and good sense, they naturally allow advice from everybody, since it is held that everyone should partake of this excellence, or else that states cannot be. This, Socrates, is the explanation of it. And that you may not think you are mistaken, to show how all men verily believe that everyone
μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, τόδε αὖ λαβὲ τεκμήριον. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ὡσπερ ὑπὸ λέγεις, ἐάν τις φη ἄγαθὸς αὐλητῆς εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλην ἢντιῳν τέχνην, ἢν μὴ ἔστιν, ἢ καταγελῶσιν ἢ χαλεπαίνουσι, καὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι προσιόντες νουθετοῦσιν ὡς μανόμενον·

Β ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτικῇ ἀρετῇ, εάν τινα καὶ εἰδώσιν ὅτι ἀδικός ἐστιν, ἐάν οὗτος αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸν τάληθη λέγῃ ἑναντίον πολλῶν, ὁ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἤγοντο εἶναι, τάληθη λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μανίαν, καὶ φασὶν πάντας δεῖν φάναι εἶναι δικαίους, εάν τε ὁσιν εάν τε μὴ, ἢ μαίνεσθαι τὸν μὴ προσποιούμενον δικαιοσύνην· ὡς ἀναγκαῖον

C οὐδένα ὄντως οὐχὶ ἁμῶς γε πῶς μετέχειν αὐτῆς, ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν πάντ' ἄνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς σύμβουλον διὰ τὸ ἠγείσθαι παντὶ μετείναι αὐτῆς, ταύτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φύσει ἤγονται εἶναι οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοματοῦ, ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ ἔξ ἐπιμελείας παραγίγνεσθαι ὃ ἄν παραγίγνεται, τοῦτο σου μετὰ τοῦτο πει-

D ράσομαι ἀποδείξαι. ὅσα γὰρ ἤγονται ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἀνθρωποὶ φύσει ἡ τύχη, οὐδεὶς θυμοῦται οὐδὲ νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει τοὺς ταύτα ἔχοντας, ἢν μὴ τοιοῦτο ὅσιων, ἀλλ' ἔλεος-

σιν· οἶον τοὺς αἰσχροὺς ἢ σμικροὺς ἢ ἀσθενεῖς τὰς οὐτως ἄνουτος, ὥστε τι τούτων ἐπιχειρεῖν ποιεῖν; ταύτα μὲν γὰρ, οίμαι, ἴσασιν ὅτι φύσει τε καὶ τύχη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται, τὰ καλὰ καὶ τάναν-
partakes of justice and the rest of civic virtue, I can offer yet a further proof. In all other excellences, as you say, when a man professes to be good at flute-playing or any other art in which he has no such skill, they either laugh him to scorn or are annoyed with him, and his people come and reprove him for being so mad: but where justice or any other civic virtue is involved, and they happen to know that a certain person is unjust, if he confesses the truth about his conduct before the public, that truthfulness which in the former arts they would regard as good sense they here call madness. Everyone, they say, should profess to be just, whether he is so or not, and whoever does not make some pretension to justice is mad; since it is held that all without exception must needs partake of it in some way or other, or else not be of human kind.

Take my word for it, then, that they have good reason for admitting everybody as adviser on this virtue, owing to their belief that everyone has some of it; and next, that they do not regard it as natural or spontaneous, but as something taught and acquired after careful preparation by those who acquire it,—of this I will now endeavour to convince you. In all cases of evils which men deem to have befallen their neighbours by nature or fortune, nobody is wroth with them or reproves or lectures or punishes them, when so afflicted, with a view to their being other than they are; one merely pities them. Who, for instance, is such a fool as to try to do anything of the sort to the ugly, the puny, or the weak? Because, I presume, men know that it is by nature and fortune that people get these things, the graces of life and their opposites. But
τία τούτος· ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς οὖνται γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώποις,
Ε ἦν τις ταύτα μὴ ἔχῃ, ἀλλὰ τάναντια τούτων κακὰ, ἐπὶ τούτους ποι ὡς τε θυμοὶ γίγνονται καὶ αἱ κολάσεις καὶ αἱ νουθετήσεις. ὅν ἦστιν ἐν καὶ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἁσβεία καὶ συλλήβδην πάν τὸ
324 ἐναντίον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς. ἐνθα δὴ πᾶς παντὶ θυμοῦται καὶ νουθετεῖ, δῆλον ὡς ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ μαθήσεως κτητῆς οὐσίας. εἰ γὰρ έθελες ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζεων, ὦ Σώκρατε, τοὺς ἄδικον υπός τι ποτε δύναται, αὐτὸ σε δίδαξε, ὅτι ὦ γε ἂνθρωποι ἤγονται παρασκευαστον εἰναι ἀρετὴν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει τοὺς ἄδικοντας πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν
Β νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τούτου ἔνεκα, ὅτι ἠδικησεν, ὥστε μὴ ἄσπερ θηρίον ἄλογοστως τιμωρεῖται· ὧν δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζεων οὐ τοῦ παρεληθότος ἔνεκα ἄδικόματος τιμωρεῖται—οὐ γὰρ ἢν τὸ γε πραχθὲν ἁγένητον θεία—ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλουτος χάρων, ἵνα μὴ αὕθις ἄδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς οὔτος μήτε ἄλλος ᾧ τούτων ἱδῶν κολασθέντα· καὶ τοιαύτῃ διάνοιαν ἔχον διανοεῖται παιδεύτην εἰναι ἀρετῆν· ἀποτροπῆς γοῦν ἔνεκα κολάζει. ταύτῃν
C οὐν τῇν δόξαν πάντες ἔχουσιν, ὅσοιπερ τιμωροῦνται καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· τιμωροῦνται δὲ καὶ κολάζονται οἱ τε ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οὐ ἃν οἴσωνται ἄδικείν, καὶ όμη ἦκιστα Ἀθηναίοι, οἱ σοὶ πολῖται· ὥστε κατὰ τούτων τὸν λόγον καὶ Ἀθηναίοι εἰς τῶν ἡγουμένων παρασκευαστὸν εἰναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἀρετῆς. ὡς μὲν οὖν εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται οἱ σοὶ πολίται καὶ χαλκέως καὶ σκυτοτόμῳ συμβουλεύοντος τὰ πολιτικὰ, καὶ ὅτι διδακτὸν καὶ παρα-
as to all the good things that people are supposed to get by application and practice and teaching, where these are lacking in anyone and only their opposite evils are found, here surely are the occasions for wrath and punishment and reproof. One of them is injustice, and impiety, and in short all that is opposed to civic virtue; in such case anyone will be wroth with his neighbour and reprove him, clearly because the virtue is to be acquired by application and learning. For if you will consider punishment, Socrates, and what control it has over wrong-doers, the facts will inform you that men agree in regarding virtue as procured. No one punishes a wrong-doer from the mere contemplation or on account of his wrong-doing, unless one takes unreasoning vengeance like a wild beast. But he who undertakes to punish with reason does not avenge himself for the past offence, since he cannot make what was done as though it had not come to pass; he looks rather to the future, and aims at preventing that particular person and others who see him punished from doing wrong again. And being so minded he must have in mind that virtue comes by training: for you observe that he punishes to deter. This then is the accepted view of all who seek requital in either private or public life; and while men in general exact requital and punishment from those whom they suppose to have wronged them, this is especially the case with the Athenians, your fellow-citizens, so that by our argument the Athenians also share the view that virtue is procured and taught. Thus I have shown that your fellow-citizens have good reason for admitting a smith's or cobbler's counsel in public affairs, and that they hold virtue to be
D σκευαστὸν ἡγοῦνται ἀρετῆν, ἀποδεδεικταὶ σοι, ὦ Σωκράτες, ἰκανῶς, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ φαίνεται.

'Ετι δὴ λοιπῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἐστίν, ἦν ἀπορεῖς περὶ τῶν ἄνδρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τί δήποτε οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀγαθοί τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τους αὐτῶν υἱεῖς διδάσκοντον, ἢ διδασκάλων ἔχεται, καὶ σοφοὺς ποιοῦν, ἢ δὲ αὐτοῖ ἀρετῆν ἀγαθοὶ, οὐδενὸς βελτίως ποιοῦσι. τούτῳ δὴ πέρι, ὦ Σωκράτες, οὐκέτι μοθὸν σοι ἔρω, ἀλλὰ λόγον. ὧδε γὰρ ἐννόησον: πότερον

Ε ἔστι τι ἐν, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὗ ἀναγκαῖον πάντας τοὺς πολίτας μετέχειν, εἰπερ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι; ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ αὐτὴ λύεται ἡ ἀπορία, ἦν σὺ ἀπορεῖς, ἢ ἀλλοθι οὐδαμοῖο. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ τοῦτὸ ἔστι τὸ ἐν οὐ τεκτονικὴ οὐδὲ χαλκεία οὐδὲ κεραμεία, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ὁσιον

325 εἶναι, καὶ συλλήβδην ἐν αὐτῷ προσαγορεῖν εἶναι ἄνδρος ἀρετῆν; εἰ τούτ' ἔστιν, οὗ δεὶ πάντας μετέχειν καὶ μετὰ τούτου πάντ' ἄνδρα, εάν τι καὶ ἄλλο βούληται μανθάνειν ἡ πράττειν, οὔτω πράττειν, ἀνευ δὲ τούτου μή, ἡ τον μὴ μετέχοντα καὶ διδάσκειν καὶ κολάζειν, καὶ παίδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα, ἐωσπερ ἂν κολαζομένος βελτίως γένηται, ὡς ὃ ἂν μὴ ὑπακούῃ κολαζομένος καὶ διδασκόμενος,

Β ὡς ἀνίατον οὖντα τοῦτον ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἡ ἀποκτείνειν; εἰ οὔτω μὲν ἔχει, οὔτω δ' αὐτοῦ πεφυκότος οἱ ἄγαθοι ἄνδρες εἰ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα διδάσκονται τοὺς υἱεῖς, τοῦτο δὲ μή, σκέψασθαι ὡς θαυμάσιοι γίγνονται οἱ ἄγαθοι. ὡς δὲ καὶ γὰρ διδακτὸν αὐτὸ ἡγοῦνται καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία, ἀπεδείξαμεν; διδακτὸν δὲ ὄντος καὶ θεραπευτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα τοὺς υἱεῖς διδάσκονται, ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ

1 θαυμάσιοι Kroschel: θαυμασίως mss.

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taught and procured: of this I have given you satisfactory demonstration, Socrates, as it appears to me.

I have yet to deal with your remaining problem about good men, why it is that these good men have their sons taught the subjects in the regular teachers' courses, and so far make them wise, but do not make them excel in that virtue wherein consists their own goodness. On this point, Socrates, I shall give you argument instead of fable. Now consider: is there, or is there not, some one thing whereof all the citizens must needs partake, if there is to be a city? Here, and nowhere if not here, is the solution of this problem of yours. For if there is such a thing, and that one thing, instead of being the joiner's or smith's or potter's art, is rather justice and temperance and holiness—in short, what I may put together and call a man's virtue; and if it is this whereof all should partake and wherewith everyone should proceed to any further knowledge or action, but should not if he lacks it; if we should instruct and punish such as do not partake of it, whether child or husband or wife, until the punishment of such persons has made them better, and should cast forth from our cities or put to death as incurable whoever fails to respond to such punishment and instruction; —if it is like this, and yet, its nature being so, good men have their sons instructed in everything else but this, what very surprising folk the good are found to be! For we have proved that they regard this thing as teachable both in private and in public life, and then, though it may be taught and fostered, are we to say that they have their sons taught everything

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PLATO

ἐστι θάνατος ἡ ζημία, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπίστωται, ἐφ' ὦ δὲ ἡ τε ζημία θάνατος αὐτῶν τοῖς παισὶ καὶ
C φυγαὶ μὴ μαθοῦσι μηδὲ θεραπευθεῖσιν εἰς ἀρετήν, καὶ πρὸς τῷ θανάτῳ χρημάτων τε δημούσεις καὶ ὥς ἐποὺ εἰπεῖν συλλήξθην τῶν οίκων ἀνατροπαί, ταῦτα δ' ἀρα οὐ διδάσκονται οὐδ' ἐπιμελοῦνται πάσαν ἐπιμέλειαν; οἶεσθαι γε χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Ἐκ παίδων σμικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι, μέχρι οὖτερ ἄν ξώσι, καὶ διδάσκοντες καὶ νουθετοῦσι. ἐπειδὰν θάττον συνή τις τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ τροφὸς καὶ μήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ πατὴρ περὶ
D τούτον διαμάχονται, ὅπως ὦς βέλτιστος ἐσταὶ ὁ παῖς, παρ' ἐκαστὸν καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον διδά-

σκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι, ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ

δὲ ἄδικον, καὶ τὸδὲ μὲν καλὸν, τὸδὲ δὲ αἰσχρόν, καὶ τὸδὲ μὲν ὁσιον, τὸδὲ δὲ ἀνόσιον, καὶ τὰ μὲν

ποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἐκὼν πείθηται·

εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὦσπερ ἅγιον διαστρέφομεν καὶ καμ-

πτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς. μετὰ

δὲ ταῦτα εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες πολὺ μᾶλλον

ἐνέτελλονται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι εὐκοσμίας τῶν παίδων

Ε ἣ γραμμάτων τε καὶ κιθαρίσεως· οἱ δὲ διδά-

σκαλοὶ τούτων τε ἐπιμελοῦνται, καὶ ἐπειδὰν αὐτῷ

γράμματα μάθωσι καὶ μέλλωσι συνήσειν τὰ

γεγραμμένα, ὦσπερ τότε τὴν φωνήν, παρα-

τιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκει

326 καζόουσιν, ἐν οἷς πολλαὶ μὲν νουθετήσεις ἐνείοι,

πολλαὶ δὲ διεξοδοι καὶ ἐπαινοι καὶ ἑγκώμια

παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἢν ὁ παῖς ζηλῶν μι-

μήται καὶ ὀρέγνηται τουούτος γενέσθαι. οἶ τ' αὐ

κιθαρίσται, ἑτερα τοιαύτα, σωφροσύνης τε

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in which the penalty for ignorance is not death, but in a matter where the death-penalty or exile awaits their children if not instructed and cultivated in virtue—and not merely death, but confiscation of property and practically the entire subversion of their house—here they do not have them taught or take the utmost care of them? So at any rate we must conclude, Socrates.

They teach and admonish them from earliest childhood till the last day of their lives. As soon as one of them grasps what is said to him, the nurse, the mother, the tutor, and the father himself strive hard that the child may excel, and as each act and word occurs they teach and impress upon him that this is just, and that unjust, one thing noble, another base, one holy, another unholy, and that he is to do this, and not do that. If he readily obeys,—so; but if not, they treat him as a bent and twisted piece of wood and straighten him with threats and blows. After this they send them to school and charge the master to take far more pains over their children's good behaviour than over their letters and harp-playing. The masters take pains accordingly, and the children, when they have learnt their letters and are getting to understand the written word as before they did only the spoken, are furnished with works of good poets to read as they sit in class, and are made to learn them off by heart: here they meet with many admonitions, many descriptions and praises and eulogies of good men in times past, that the boy in envy may imitate them and yearn to become even as they. Then also the music-masters, in a similar
ἐπιμελεύονται καὶ ὅπως ἂν οἱ νέοι μηδὲν κακούρ-
γώσι: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἐπειδὰν κιθαρίζειν μά-
θωσιν, ἄλλων αὖ ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα
B διδάσκοντι μελοποιῶν, εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐν-
teίνοντες, καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς τε καὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας
ἀναγκάζουσιν οἰκειούσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παῖδων,
ινα ἡμερῶτεροι τε ὅσοι, καὶ εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ
eυαρμοστότεροι γυγνόμενοι χρήσιμοι ἄσω εἰς τὸ
λέγειν τε καὶ πράπτειν· πάς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀν-
θρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δέεται. ἔτι
τοῖς πρὸς τούτοις εἰς παιδοτρίβον πέμποντον,
ινα τὰ σώματα βελτίων ἔχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ
C διανοία χρηστῇ οὖσῃ, καὶ μὴ ἀναγκάζονται
ἀποδειλιάν διὰ τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ
ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πράξεις·
καὶ ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι· μάλιστα
δὲ δύνανται οἱ πλουσιώτατοι· καὶ οἱ τούτων υἱές,
πρωιαίτατα εἰς διδασκάλων τῆς ήλικίας ἀρξάμενοι
φοιτῶν, ὁμιλότατα ἀπαλλάττονται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐκ
διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγόσων, ἡ πόλις αὖ τοὺς τε
νόμους ἀναγκάζει μανθάνει καὶ κατὰ τούτους ζῆν
D καθάπερ 1 παράδειγμα, ἵνα μὴ αὐτοὶ ἐφ' αὐτῶν
εἰκῆ πρᾶττωσιν, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ γραμμα-
tισται τοῖς μῆπω δεινοῖς γράφειν τῶν παῖδων
ὑπογράφαντες γράμμας τῇ γραφίδι οὕτω τὸ
γραμματεῖον διδόσαι καὶ ἀναγκάζουσι γράφειν
κατὰ τὴν ύφήγησιν τῶν γραμμῶν, ὡς δὲ καὶ
ἡ πόλις νόμους ὑπογράφασα, ἀγαθῶν καὶ παλαιῶν
νομοθετῶν εὐρήματα, κατὰ τούτους ἀναγκάζει
καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι· ὅς δ' ἂν ἐκτὸς βαίνῃ
tούτων, κολάζει, καὶ ὄνομα τῇ κολάσει ταύτῃ

1 καθάπερ Heindorf: κατὰ mss.
sort, take pains for their self-restraint, and see that their young charges do not go wrong: moreover, when they learn to play the harp, they are taught the works of another set of good poets, the song-makers, while the master accompanies them on the harp; and they insist on familiarizing the boys' souls with the rhythms and scales, that they may gain in gentleness, and by advancing in rhythmic and harmonic grace may be efficient in speech and action; for the whole of man's life requires the graces of rhythm and harmony. Again, over and above all this, people send their sons to a trainer, that having improved their bodies they may perform the orders of their minds, which are now in fit condition, and that they may not be forced by bodily faults to play the coward in wars and other duties. This is what people do, who are most able; and the most able are the wealthiest. Their sons begin school at the earliest age, and are freed from it at the latest. And when they are released from their schooling the city next compels them to learn the laws and to live according to them as after a pattern, that their conduct may not be swayed by their own light fancies, but just as writing-masters first draw letters in faint outline with the pen for their less advanced pupils, and then give them the copy-book and make them write according to the guidance of their lines, so the city sketches out for them the laws devised by good lawgivers of yore, and constrains them to govern and be governed according to these. She punishes anyone who steps outside these borders, and this punishment among you and
PLATO

Ε καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλάχοι, ὡς εὐθυνούσης τῆς δίκης, εὐθύναι. τοσαύτης οὖν τῆς ἐπιμελείας οὖσης περὶ ἀρετῆς ἵδια καὶ δημοσία, θαυμάζεις, ὡς Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀπορεῖς, εἰ διδακτόν ἔστιν ἀρετή; ἀλλ' οὖ πρεπεῖ θαυμάζειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ διδακτόν.

Διὰ τί οὖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων πολλοί νεῖς φαύλοι γίγνονται; τούτῳ αὖ μάθε· οὐδὲν γὰρ θαυμαστόν, εἴπερ ἄληθῆ ἐγώ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ὁ λέγω οὐτως ἔχει—ἔχει δὲ μάλιστα πάντων οὕτως—ἐνθυμηθῇ ἄλλο τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποῖον καὶ μαθημάτων προελάμενος. εἰ μὴ οἰόν τ' ἢν πόλιν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πάντες αὐληταί ἦμεν, ὅποιός τις ἐδύνατο ἔκαστος, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἱδία καὶ δημοσίας πᾶς πάντα καὶ ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, καὶ μὴ ἐφθόνει τούτου, ὥσπερ νῦν τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων.

Β οὐδεὶς φθονεῖ οὖδ' ἀποκρύπτεται ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνημάτων· λυσιτελεῖ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἦμῶν ἡ ἄλληλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή· διὰ ταῦτα πᾶς παντὶ προθύμως λέγει καὶ διδάσκει καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ νόμιμα· εἰ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει πᾶσαν προθυμίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαν εἴχομεν ἄλληλους διδάσκειν, οὔει ἢν τι, ἐφη, μᾶλλον, ὡς Σώκρατες, τῶν ἄγαθῶν αὐλητῶν ἄγαθοὺς αὐλητὰς τοὺς νεῖς γίγνεσθαι ἢ τῶν φαύλων; ἢ οἶμαι μὲν οὖ, C ἀλλὰ ὅτου ἔτυχεν ὁ υἱὸς εὐφυέστατος γενόμενος εἰς αὐλησιν, οὗτος ἄν ἐλλόγιμος ηὔξηθη, ὅτου
PROTAGORAS

in many other cities, from the corrective purpose of the prosecution, is called a Correction.\(^1\) Seeing then that so much care is taken in the matter of both private and public virtue, do you wonder, Socrates, and make it a great difficulty, that virtue may be taught? Surely there is no reason to wonder at that: you would have far greater reason, if it were not so.

Then why is it that many sons of good fathers turn out so meanly? Let me explain this also: it is no wonder, granted that I was right in stating just now that no one, if we are to have a city, must be a mere layman in this affair of virtue. For if what I say is the case—and it is supremely true—reflect on the nature of any other pursuit or study that you choose to mention. Suppose that there could be no state unless we were all flute-players, in such sort as each was able, and suppose that everyone were giving his neighbour both private and public lessons in the art, and rebuked him too, if he failed to do it well, without grudging him the trouble—even as no one now thinks of grudging or reserving his skill in what is just and lawful as he does in other expert knowledge; for our neighbours' justice and virtue, I take it, is to our advantage, and consequently we all tell and teach one another what is just and lawful—well, if we made the same zealous and ungrudging efforts to instruct each other in flute-playing, do you think, Socrates, that the good flute-players would be more likely than the bad to have sons who were good flute-players? I do not think they would: no, wherever the son had happened to be born with a nature most apt for flute-playing, he would be found to have

\(^1\) The public inquiry to which a magistrate was liable after his term of office.
PLATO

dè ἀφύης, ἀκλεής· καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἀγαθοῦ ἀυλητοῦ φαῦλος ἡν ἀπέβη, πολλάκις δ' ἢν φαῦλον ἀγαθός· ἀλλ' οὖν ἀυληταὶ γ' ἢν1 πάντες ἤσαν ἵκανοι ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ μηδὲν αὐλήσεως ἐπαίνοντας. οὔτως οίον καὶ νῦν, ὅστις σοι ἀδικώτατος φαίνεται ἀνθρώπος τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώπωις ἑθραμμένων, δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ

D δημιουργὸν τούτοι τοῦ πράγματος, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώποις, οἷς μὴτε παιδεία ἐστὶ μὴτε δικαστήρια μὴτε νόμοι μηδὲ ἀνάγκη μηδεμία διὰ πάντος ἀναγκαζούσα ἁρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' εἰεν ἀγριοὶ τινες, οἰοισπερ οὐς πέρνου 

Φερεκράτης ὁ ποιητής ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Δηναιώ. // ἡ σφόδρα ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνθρώπωις γενόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χορῷ μισάνθρωποι, ἀγαπήσας ἃν, εἰ ἐντύχοις Εὐρυβάτῳ καὶ Φρυνώνδα,

Ε καὶ ἀνολοφύραι ἃν ποθῶν τὴν τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπων πονηρίαν· νῦν δὲ τρυφάς, ὡς Σώκρατες, διότι πάντες διδάσκαλοι εἰσὶν ἁρετῆς, καθ' ὁσον δύνανται ἐκαστος, καὶ οὐδείς σοι φαίνεται· εἰθ', ὥσπερ ἃν εἰ ζητοῖς τίς διδάσκαλος τοῦ ἐλληνίζειν,

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1 γ' ἂν Shilleto: γοῦν mss.

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advanced to distinction, and where unapt, to obscurity. Often the son of a good player would turn out a bad one, and often of a bad, a good. But, at any rate, all would be capable players as compared with ordinary persons who had no inkling of the art. Likewise in the present case you must regard any man who appears to you the most unjust person ever reared among human laws and society as a just man and a craftsman of justice, if he had to stand comparison with people who lacked education and law courts and laws and any constant compulsion to the pursuit of virtue, but were a kind of wild folk such as Pherecrates the poet brought on the scene at last year’s Lenaeum.\(^1\) Sure enough, if you found yourself among such people, as did the misanthropes among his chorus, you would be very glad to meet with Eurybatus and Phrynondas,\(^2\) and would bewail yourself with longing for the wickedness of the people here. Instead of that you give yourself dainty airs, Socrates, because everyone is a teacher of virtue to the extent of his powers, and you think there is no teacher. Why, you might as well ask who is a teacher of Greek; you would find none anywhere; and I suppose you might ask, who can teach the sons of our artisans the very crafts which of course they have learnt from their fathers, as far as the father was competent in each case, and his friends who followed the same trade,—I say if you asked who is to give these further instruction, I imagine it would be hard, Socrates, to find them a teacher, but easy enough in the case of those starting with no skill at all. And so it must be with virtue and everything else; if

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\(^1\) A dramatic festival, chiefly for comedies, held about the end of January.

\(^2\) Two notorious rogues.
πάντων· ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ ὁλίγον ἔστι τις ὅστις δια-
B φέρει ἡμῶν προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετὴν, ἀγαπητόν.
ὡς δὲ ἐγὼ οἴμαι εἰς εἶναι, καὶ διαφερόντως ἀν
τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ὡνήσαι· τών πρὸς τὸ καλὸν
καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἄξιως τοῦ μισθοῦ ὁν
πράττομαι, καὶ ἔτι πλείονός, ἄστε καὶ αὐτῷ
δοκεῖν τό· μαθόντι. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν τρόπων
tῆς πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ τοιοῦτον πεποίημαι·
ἐπειδὰν γάρ τις παρ’ ἐμοῦ μάθη, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται,
ἀποδέδωκεν ὁ ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον· ἐὰν δὲ
C μὴ, ἔλθων εἰς ἑρῶν, ὁμόσας, ὅσον ἂν φη ἄξια
εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν. τοιοῦ-
tόν σοι, ἐφι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐγώ καὶ μῦθον καὶ
λόγον εἰρήνη, ὡς διδακτόν ἀρετὴ καὶ Ἀθηναίοι
οὕτως ἡγοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν τῶν
ἀγαθῶν πατέρων φαύλους υἱῶν γίγνεσθαι καὶ
τῶν φαύλων ἀγαθοῖς, ἔπει καὶ οἱ Πολυκλεῖτον
ὑιῶς, Παράλοι καὶ Ξανθίππου τοῦτο ἡλικιῶται,
οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα εἰσί, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλων
dημιουργῶν. τῶν δὲ οὕτως ἄξιον τοῦτο κατη-
D γορεῖν· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰσίν ἐλπίδες· νέοι
γάρ.
Πρωταγόρας μὲν τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαύτα ἐπι-
deixάμενος ἀπεπαύσατο τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ἐγὼ
ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνον κεκηλημένος ἐτί πρὸς αὐτῶν
ἐβλεπον ὡς ἐροῦντα τι, ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκούειν· ἔπει
dε δὴ ἡ σοθόμην ὅτι τῷ ὄντι πεπαυμένοις εὑρ,
μόνης 
πως ἔμαυτον ὁσπερεί συναγείρας εἰπον, βλέψας
πρὸς τὸν Ἐπποκράτη· Ὀ μαῖ Ἀπολλοδώρου,
ὡς χάριν σοι ἔχω ὅτι προούρεθάς με ὅδε ἀφικέσθαι.
Ε πολλοῦ γάρ ποιοῦμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἃ ἀκήκοα. Πρωτ-
1 ὀνῆσασι Dobree: νοῆσασι mss.
there is somebody who excels us ever so little in showing the way to virtue, we must be thankful. Such an one I take myself to be, excelling all other men in the gift of assisting people to become good and true, and giving full value for the fee that I charge—nay, so much more than full, that the learner himself admits it. For this reason I have arranged my charges on a particular plan: when anyone has had lessons from me, if he likes he pays the sum that I ask; if not, he goes to a temple, states on oath the value he sets on what he has learnt, and disburses that amount. So now, Socrates, I have shown you by both fable and argument that virtue is teachable and is so deemed by the Athenians, and that it is no wonder that bad sons are born of good fathers and good of bad, since even the sons of Polycleitus, companions of Paralus and Xanthippus here, are not to be compared with their father, and the same is the case in other craftsmen’s families. As for these two, it is not fair to make this complaint of them yet; there is still hope in their case, for they are young.

After this great and fine performance Protagoras ceased from speaking. As for me, for a good while I was still under his spell and kept on looking at him as though he were going to say more, such was my eagerness to hear: but when I perceived that he had really come to a stop, I pulled myself together, as it were, with an effort, and looking at Hippocrates I said: Son of Apollodorus, I am very grateful to you for inducing me to come hither; for it is a great treat to have heard what I have heard from Prota-

1 Or in Milton’s version, Par. Lost, viii. 1–3:

in [my] eare
So charming left his voice, that [I] the while
Thought him still speaking, still stood fixt to hear.
PLATO

αγόρου. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἡγούμην οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν, ἡ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται. νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι. πλὴν σμικρὸν τί μοι ἐμποδῶν, δὴ λέγω ὅτι Πρωταγόρας ῥαδίως ἐπεκδιδάξει, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐξεδίδαξε. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων οὕτως ἐπηγένοιτο ὅτι οἱ τῶν δημηγόρων, τάχ' ἂν καὶ τοιούτους λόγους ἄκοψειεν ἡ Περικλέους ἡ ἄλλος τινὸς τῶν ἱκανῶν εἶπεῖν· εἰ δὲ ἐπανέριοτό τινά τι, ὥσπερ βιβλία οὕτως ἔχουσον οὔτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἐρέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐάν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπερωτήσῃ τι τῶν ῥήθεντων, ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγέντα μακρὸν ἤχει καὶ ἀποτείνει, ἔαν μὴ ἐπιλάβηται τις, καὶ οἱ δὲ τροπεῖς οὕτω σμικρὰ ἐρωτηθέντες δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. Πρωταγόρας δὲ δὲ ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἶπεῖν, ώς αὐτὰ δηλοί, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρινασθαι κατά βραχὺ καὶ ἐρώμενος περιμεῖναι τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἄ όλγοι έστι παρεσκευασμένα. νῦν οὖν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, σμικρὸ τινὸς ἐνδείης εἰμὶ πάντ' ἐχειν, εἰ μοι ἀποκρίναιο τόδε. τὴν ἄρετὴν φης διδακτόν εἶναι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπερ ἄλλω τω ἀνθρώπων πειθοῦν ἂν, καὶ σοι πείθομαι. ὁ

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Β ἐρωτηθέντες δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. Πρωταγόρας δὲ δὲ ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἶπεῖν, ώς αὐτὰ δηλοί, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρινασθαι κατά βραχὺ καὶ ἐρώμενος περιμεῖναι τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἄ όλγοι έστι παρεσκευασμένα. νῦν οὖν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, σμικρὸ τινὸς ἐνδείης εἰμὶ πάντ' ἐχειν, εἰ μοι ἀποκρίναιο τόδε. τὴν ἄρετὴν φης διδακτόν εἶναι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπερ ἄλλω τω ἀνθρώπων πειθοῦν ἂν, καὶ σοι πείθομαι. ὁ

C δ' ἐθαύμασά σοι λέγοντος, τούτοις μοι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀποπλήρωσον. ἔλεγες γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Ζεῦς τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν αἰδὼν πέμψει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ αὐτὸ πολλαχοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης καὶ

1 χαλκία Cobet: χαλκεῖα mss.
agoras. I used formerly to think that there was no human treatment by which the good were made good, but now I am convinced that there is. Only I find one slight difficulty, which Protagoras will of course easily explain away, since he has explained so many puzzles already. If one should be present when any of the public speakers were dealing with these same subjects, one could probably hear similar discourses from Pericles or some other able speaker: but suppose you put a question to one of them—they are just like books, incapable of either answering you or putting a question of their own; if you question even a small point in what has been said, just as brazen vessels ring a long time after they have been struck and prolong the note unless you put your hand on them, these orators too, on being asked a little question, extend their speech over a full-length course. But Protagoras here, while able to deliver, as events have shown, a long and excellent speech, is also able when questioned to reply briefly, and after asking a question to await and accept the answer—accomplishments that few can claim. And now, Protagoras, there is one little thing wanting to the completeness of what I have got, so please answer me this. You say that virtue may be taught, and if there is anybody in the world who could convince me, you are the man: but there was a point in your speech at which I wondered, and on which my spirit would fain be satisfied. You said that Zeus had sent justice and respect to mankind, and furthermore it was frequently stated in your discourse that justice, temperance, holiness and the

1 The metaphor is of a long-distance race of about $2\frac{3}{4}$ miles.
πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἐν τι εἰς συλλήβδην, ἀρετή· ταῦτ' οὖν αὐτὰ διελθὲ μοι ἀκριβῶς τῷ λόγῳ, πότερον ἐν μὲν τι ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, μόρια δὲ αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης,

ἡ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ νῦν ὑπὲ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πάντα ὀνόματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος· τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἐτι ἐπιποθῶ.

'Αλλὰ ῥάδιον τοὐτὸ γ', ἔφη, ὡ Σῶκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι ἐνὸς ὄντος τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια ἐστὶν ἡ ἐρωτᾶς. Πότερον, ἔφην, ὦσπερ προσώπου τὰ μόρια μόριά ἐστι, στόμα τε καὶ ρῆς καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὡτα, ἡ ὦσπερ τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὰ ἐτερα τῶν ἐτέρων, ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλ' ἡ μεγέθει καὶ σμίκρότητι; 'Εκείνως μοι φαίνεται, ὡ Σῶκρατες, ὦσπερ τὰ ἐ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πρόσωπον. Πότερον οὖν, ἂν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ μεταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι τούτων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο, ἡ ἀνάγκη, ἐάνπερ τις ἐν λάβῃ, ἀπαντ' ἔχειν; Οὐδ' αὐτοί, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ ἀνδρεῖοι εἶσιν, ἄδικοι δὲ, καὶ δίκαιοι αὐτοῖς, σοφοὶ δὲ οὖ. Ἡ ἐστι γάρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα μόρια τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔφην ἐγὼ, σοφία τε καὶ ἀνδρεία; Πάντων μάλιστα δήποτε, ἔφη· καὶ μέγιστον γε ἡ σοφία τῶν μορίων. Ἡ Εκαστὸν δὲ αὐτῶν ἐστὶν, ἂν δ' ἐγὼ, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο; Ναί. Ἡ καὶ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸν ἰδίαν ἔχει; ὦσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου, οὐκ ἐστὶν ὀφθαλμῶς οἶον τὰ ὡτα, οὐδ' ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἡ αὐτή· οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἐστὶν οἶον τὸ ἐτερον οὔτε κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα· ἃρ' οὖν οὔτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ

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rest were all but one single thing, virtue: pray, now proceed to deal with these in more precise exposition, stating whether virtue is a single thing, of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts, or whether the qualities I have just mentioned are all names of the same single thing. This is what I am still hankering after.

Why, the answer to that is easy, Socrates, he replied: it is that virtue is a single thing and the qualities in question are parts of it.

Do you mean parts, I asked, in the sense of the parts of a face, as mouth, nose, eyes, and ears; or, as in the parts of gold, is there no difference among the pieces, either between the parts or between a part and the whole, except in greatness and smallness?

In the former sense, I think, Socrates; as the parts of the face are to the whole face.

Well then, I continued, when men partake of these portions of virtue, do some have one, and some another, or if you get one, must you have them all?

By no means, he replied, since many are brave but unjust, and many again are just but not wise.

Then are these also parts of virtue, I asked—wisdom and courage?

Most certainly, I should say, he replied; and of the parts, wisdom is the greatest.

Each of them, I proceeded, is distinct from any other?

Yes.

Does each also have its particular function? Just as, in the parts of the face, the eye is not like the ears, nor is its function the same; nor is any of the other parts like another, in its function or in any other respect: in the same way, are the parts of
ΠΛΑΤΟ

Β ἐστι τὸ ἐτέρον οἷον τὸ ἐτέρον, οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτε ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ; ἡ δὴ δὴ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, εἰπέρ τῷ παραδείγματι γε ἔσκευν; Ἄλλῳ οὕτως, ἐφη, ἔχει, ὡΣωκρατές. // καὶ ἐγὼ εἰπὼν. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶ τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων άλλο οἷον ἐπιστήμη, οὐδ᾿ οἷον δικαιοσύνη, οὐδ᾿ οἷον ἀνδρεία, οὐδ᾿ οἷον σωφροσύνη, οὐδ᾿ οἷον ὀσιότης. Οὐκ ἔφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα ποιόν τι αὐτῶν ἐστίν ἐκαστὸν. πρῶτον μὲν

C τὸ τοιοῦτο: ἡ δικαιοσύνη πράγμα τί ἐστιν ἡ οὐδεν πράγμα; ἔμοι μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ· τί δὲ σοί; Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; εἰ τις ἔροιτο ἐμὲ τε καὶ σὲ; ὧς Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σωκράτης, εἴπετον δὴ μοι, τούτο τὸ πράγμα, ὁ ὄνομάσατε ἀρτι, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον ἔστιν ἡ ἀδικον; ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκρωναίμην ὅτι δίκαιον· σὺ δὲ τίν’ ἂν ψήφων θείο; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἡ ἀλλην; Τὴν αὐτὴν, ἔφη. "Εστιν ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἡ δικαιο-

D σύνη οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε ἀποκρονόμενοι τῷ ἐρωτῶντι οὐκοῦν καὶ σύ; Ναι, ἔφη. Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ἔρωτο· οὐκοῦν καὶ ὀσιότητα τινά φατε εἶναι; φαίμεν ἂν, ὡς ἐγώμαι. Ναι, ἡ δ’ ὦς. Οὐκοῦν φατε καὶ τοῦτο πράγμα τι εἶναι; φαίμεν ἂν· ἡ οὖ; Καὶ τοῦτο συνέφη. Πότερον δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πρά-

γμα φατε τοιοῦτον πεφυκέναι οἷον ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἡ οἷον ὀσιον; ἀγανακτήσαμι ἂν ἔγωγ’, ἔφην, τῷ ἐρωτήματι, καὶ εἶπομ’ ἂν· εὐφήμει, ὡς

Ε ἄνθρωπε· σχολῆ μέντ’ ἂν τι ἄλλο ὀσίον εἴη, εἰ

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virtue unlike each other, both in themselves and in their functions? Are they not evidently so, if the analogy holds?

Yes, they are so, Socrates, he said.

So then, I went on, among the parts of virtue, no other part is like knowledge, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness.

He agreed.

Come now, I said, let us consider together what sort of thing is each of these parts. First let us ask, is justice something, or not a thing at all? I think it is; what do you say?

So do I, he replied.

Well then, suppose someone should ask you and me: Protagoras and Socrates, pray tell me this—the thing you named just now, justice, is that itself just or unjust? I should reply, it is just: what would your verdict be? The same as mine or different?

The same, he said.

Then justice, I should say in reply to our questioner, is of a kind that is just: would you also?

Yes, he said.

Now suppose he proceeded to ask us: Do you also speak of a "holiness"? We should say we do, I fancy.

Yes, he said.

Then do you call this a thing also? We should say we do, should we not?

He assented again.

Do you say this thing itself is of such nature as to be unholy, or holy? For my part I should be annoyed at this question, I said, and should answer: Hush, my good sir! It is hard to see how anything
μὴ αὐτὴ γε ἡ ὀσίότης ὅσιον ἔσται. τί δὲ σὺ; οὐχ ὀυτῶς ἀν ἀποκρίναι; Πάνυ μὲν οὐν, ἐφη.

Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτ’ εἶποι ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς: πῶς οὖν ὅλγον πρότερον ἔλεγετε; ἢρ’ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμῶν κατήκουσα; ἐδοξάτε μοι φάναι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι ὀυτῶς ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὥς οὐκ ἐναὶ τὸ ἐτερον αὐτῶν οἰον τὸ ἐτερον εἴποιμ’ ἂν ἐγώγε ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὀρθῶς ἦκουσας, ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ οἷεi εἴπειν τοῦτο, παρῆκουσας.

331 Πρωταγόρας γὰρ ὁδε ταῦτα ἀπεκρίνατο, ἐγώ δὲ ἡρώτων. εἰ οὖν εἴποι· ἀληθῆ ὁδε λέγει, ὡς Πρωταγόρα; σὺ φῆς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἐτερον μόριον οἰον τὸ ἐτερον τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς; σὸς οὖτος ὁ λόγος ἐστί; τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκρίναιοι; Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὀμολογεῖν. Τί οὖν, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, ἀποκρινούμεθα αὐτῷ, ταῦτα ὀμολογήσαιες, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς ἐπανέρηται· οὐκ ἂρα ἐστὶν ὀσίότης οἰον δίκαιον εἶναι πράγμα, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη οἰον ὅσιον, ἀλλ’ οἰον μη ὅσιον· ἤ δ’ ὀσίότης οἰον μὴ δίκαιον, ἀλλ’ ἄδικον ἂρα, τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον; Β τί αὐτῷ ἀποκρινούμεθα; ἐγώ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ὑπέρ γε ἐμαυτοῦ φαίνη ἂν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην οἰον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὀσίότητα δίκαιον. καὶ ὑπέρ σοι δέ, εἰ με ἐψῆς, ταῦτα ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρινούμην, ὃτι ἦτοι ταῦτόν γ’ ἐστὶ δικαιότης ὁσίότητι ἢ ὅτι ὀμοιότατον, καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τε δικαιοσύνη οἰον ὀσίότης καὶ ἡ ὀσίότης οἰον δικαιοσύνη. ἀλλ’ ὡρα, εἰ διακωλύεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἢ καὶ σοι συνδοκεῖ οὐτως. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἀπλοῦν εἶναι, ὡστε συγχωρήσας τὴν τε δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν
PROTAGORAS

could be holy, if holiness itself is not to be holy! And you—would you not make the same reply?
Certainly I would, he said.
Now suppose he went on to ask us: Well, and what of your statement a little while since? Perhaps I did not hear you aright, but I understood you two to say that the parts of virtue are in such a relation to each other that one of them is not like another. Here my answer would be: As to the substance of it, you heard aright, but you made a mistake in thinking that I had any share in that statement. It was Protagoras here who made that answer; I was only the questioner. Then suppose he were to ask: Is our friend telling the truth, Protagoras? Is it you who say that one part of virtue is not like another? Is this statement yours? What answer would you give him?
I must needs admit it, Socrates, he said.
Well now, Protagoras, after that admission, what answer shall we give him, if he goes on to ask this question: Is not holiness something of such nature as to be just, and justice such as to be holy, or can it be unholy? Can holiness be not just, and therefore unjust, and justice unholy? What is to be our reply? I should say myself, on my own behalf, that both justice is holy and holiness just, and with your permission I would make this same reply for you also; since justness is either the same thing as holiness or extremely like it, and above all, justice is of the same kind as holiness, and holiness as justice. Are you minded to forbid this answer, or are you in agreement with it?
I do not take quite so simple a view of it, Socrates, as to grant that justice is holy and holiness just. I
δικαιον, ἀλλὰ τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι. ἄλλα τί τούτο διαφέρει; ἐφη·
εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἔστω ἤμιν καὶ δικαιοσύνη ὄσιον καὶ ὁσίότης δίκαιον. Μὴ μοι, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ· οὐδὲν
γὰρ δέομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἰ σοι δοκεῖ ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμὲ τε καὶ σέ· τὸ δ' ἐμὲ τε καὶ
σὲ τοῦτο λέγω, οὐδέμενος οὕτω τὸν λόγον βέλτιστον ἄν ἐλέγχεσθαι, εἰ τις τὸ εἰ ἀφέλοι αὐτοῦ. Ἐ' ἄλλα
μέντοι, ἢ δ' ὅς, προσέοικε τι δικαιοσύνη ὁσιότητι· καὶ γὰρ ὅτιον ὅτιον ἀμὴ γέ τι προσέοικε.
τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλαν ἐστὶν ὅπη προσέοικε, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ μαλακῷ, καὶ τάλλα ἡ δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτατα εἶναι ἄλληλοις· καὶ ἃ τότε ἔφαμεν ἄλλην δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἔτερον οἷον τὸ ἔτερον, τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια, ἀμὴ γέ τι πνεομένη καὶ ἐστὶ τὸ ἔτερον οἷον τὸ ἔτερον· ὡστε τούτῳ γε τῷ ἐλέγχου καὶ τούτῳ ἐλέγχου,
εἰ βούλου, ὡς ἀπαντᾷ ἐστὶν ὁμοίω ἄλληλοις. ἄλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ ὁμοίων τι ἔχοντα ὁμοία δικαιον
καλεῖν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμων τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμωνα καὶ πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχῃ τὸ ὁμοῖον. καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάζως εἴπον πρὸς αὐτὸν, Ἡ γὰρ οὕτω σοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ὀσίον πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔχει, οὕτω ὁμοίων τι
σμικρὸν ἔχειν ἄλληλοις; Οὐ πάνυ, ἐφη, οὕτως,
οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὐτὸς σὺ μοι δοκεῖς οἴεσθαι. Ἐ' ἄλλα μὴν, ἐφην ἐγὼ, ἐπειδὴ δύσχερῶς δοκεῖς
μοι ἔχειν πρὸς τοῦτο, τοῦτο μὲν ἐάσωμεν, τόδε
dὲ ἄλλο ἢν ἐλεγες ἐπισκεψόμεθα.
'Aφροσύνην τι καλεῖς; "Εφη. Τούτῳ τῷ
πράγματι οὐ πάν τοιναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία;
think we have to make a distinction here. Yet what difference does it make? he said: if you like, let us assume that justice is holy and holiness just.

No, no, I said; I do not want this "if you like" or "if you agree" sort of thing\(^1\) to be put to the proof, but you and me together; and when I say "you and me," I mean that our statement will be most properly tested if we take away the "if."

Well, at any rate, he said, justice has some resemblance to holiness; for anything in the world has some sort of resemblance to any other thing. Thus there is a point in which white resembles black, and hard soft, and so with all the other things which are regarded as most opposed to each other; and the things which we spoke of before as having different faculties and not being of the same kind as each other—the parts of the face—these in some sense resemble one another and are of like sort. In this way therefore you could prove, if you chose, that even these things are all like one another. But it is not fair to describe things as like which have some point alike, however small, or as unlike that have some point unlike.

This surprised me, and I said to him: What, do you regard just and holy as so related to each other that they have only some small point of likeness?

Not so, he replied, at all, nor yet, on the other hand, as I believe you regard them.

Well then, I said, since I find you chafe at this suggestion, we will let it pass, and consider another instance that you gave. Is there a thing you call folly?

Yes, he said.

Is not the direct opposite to that thing wisdom?

\(^1\) Cf. below, 333 c.
"Εμοιγε δοκεὶ, ἐφη. Πότερον δὲ ὅταν πράττωσιν ἀνθρωποὶ ὄρθως τε καὶ ὑφελίμως, τότε σωφρονεῖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες, ἢ [εἰ] τούναντίον [ἐπραττον]¹; Σωφρονεῖν, ἐφη.

Β Οὐκοῦν σωφροσύνη σωφρονοῦσιν; Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν οἱ μὴ ὄρθῶς πράττοντες ἀφρόνως πράττουσι καὶ οὐ σωφρονοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες; Συνδοκεὶ μοι, ἐφη. Τούναντίον ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἀφρόνως πράττειν τῷ σωφρόνως; Ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἀφρόνως πραττόμενα ἀφροσύνη πράττεται, τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως σωφροσύνη; Ὡμολόγει. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὶ ἰσχύει πράττεται, ἰσχυρῶς πράττεται, καὶ εἰ τὶ ἀσθενεία, ἀσθενῶς; Ἐδόκει. Καὶ εἰ τὶ μετὰ τάχους, ταχέως, καὶ εἰ τὶ μετὰ βραδυτῆτος,

C βραδέως; Ἐφη. Καὶ εἰ τὶ δὴ ὡσαύτως πράττεται, ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ εἰ τὶ ἐναντίως, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου; Συνέφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἢν δ' ἑγώ, ἐστὶ τι καλὸν; Συνεχώρει. Τούτῳ ἐστὶ τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ αἰσχρόν; Οὐκ ἐστὶν. Τί δὲ; ἐστὶ τι ἀγαθόν; Ἐστὶν. Τούτῳ ἐστι

¹ ei et ἐπραττον secl. Stallbaum.
I think so, he said.
And when men behave rightly and usefully, do you consider them temperate in so behaving, or the opposite?
Temperate, he said.
Then is it by temperance that they are temperate?
Necessarily.
Now those who do not behave rightly behave foolishly, and are not temperate in so behaving?
I agree, he said.
And behaving foolishly is the opposite to behaving temperately?
Yes, he said.
Now foolish behaviour is due to folly, and temperate behaviour to temperance?
He assented.
And whatever is done by strength is done strongly, and whatever by weakness, weakly?
He agreed.
And whatever with swiftness, swiftly, and whatever with slowness, slowly?
Yes, he said.
And so whatever is done in a certain way is done by that kind of faculty, and whatever in an opposite way, by the opposite kind?
He agreed.
Pray now, I proceeded, is there such a thing as the beautiful?
He granted it.
Has this any opposite except the ugly?
None.
Well, is there such a thing as the good?
There is.
Has it any opposite but the evil?
PLATO

τι ἑναντίον πλήν τὸ κακὸν; Ὅυκ ἔστιν. Τί δὲ; ἔστι τι δέξῃ ἐν φωνῇ; Ἐφη. Τοῦτῳ μὴ ἔστι τι ἑναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρύ; Ὅυκ ἔφη. Ὅυκοὖν, ἤν δ' ἐγώ, ἐνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἑναντίων ἐν Δ μόνον ἔστιν ἑναντίον καὶ οὐ πολλά; Συνωμολόγει. Ἰθα δή, ἤν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναλογισώμεθα τὰ ὁμολογημένα ἡμῖν. ὁμολογήκαμεν ἐν ἐνὶ μόνῳ ἑναντίον εἶναι, πλεῖω δὲ μή; Ὁμολογήκαμεν. Τὸ δὲ ἑναντίως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ ἑναντίων πράττεσθαι; Ἐφη. Ὁμολογήκαμεν δὲ ἑναντίως πράττεσθαι δ' ἂν ἀφρόνως πράττηται τῷ σωφρόνως πραττόμενῳ; Ἐφη. Τὸ δὲ σωφρόνως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀφρόνως Ε ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; Συνεχώρει. Οὐκοὖν εἶπερ ἑναντίως πράττεσθαι, ὑπὸ ἑναντίου πράττοιτ' ἂν; Ναι. Πράττεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; Ναι. Ἐναντίως; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοὖν ὑπὸ ἑναντίων ὄντων; Ναι. Ἐναντίον ἂρ' ἔστιν ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνης; Φαίνεται.

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None.

Tell me, is there such a thing as "shrill" in the voice?

Yes, he said.

Has it any other opposite than "deep."

No, he said.

Now, I went on, each single opposite has but one opposite, not many?

He admitted this.

Come now, I said, let us reckon up our points of agreement. We have agreed that one thing has but one opposite, and no more?

We have.

And that what is done in an opposite way is done by opposites?

Yes, he said.

And we have agreed that what is done foolishly is done in an opposite way to what is done temperately?

Yes, he said.

And that what is done temperately is done by temperance, and what foolishly by folly?

He assented.

Now if it is done in an opposite way, it must be done by an opposite?

Yes?

And one is done by temperance, and the other by folly?

Yes.

In an opposite way?

Certainly.

And by opposite faculties?

Yes.

Then folly is opposite to temperance?

Apparently.
Μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ὁμολόγηται ἡμῖν ἁφροσύνη σοφία ἐναντίον εἶναι; Συνωμολογεῖ. "Εν δὲ ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι; Φημὶ. 

333 Πότερον οὖν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, λύσωμεν τῶν λόγων; τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, ἢ ἐκείνον ἐν ὁ ἐλέγετο ἐτέρων εἶναι σωφροσύνησι σοφία, μόριον δὲ ἐκάτερον ἀρετής, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἐτέρων εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια; πότερον οὖν ὁ ἡ λύσωμεν; οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἀμφότεροι οὓς πάνυ μουσικῶς λέγονται; οὗ γὰρ συνάδουσιν οὐδὲ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλους. πῶς γὰρ ἂν Β συνάδοιεν, εἴπερ γε ἀνάγκη ἐνὶ μὲν ἐν μονὸν ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείσοις δὲ μῆ, τῇ δὲ ἁφροσύνη ἐνὶ δυτὶ σοφία ἐναντία καὶ σωφροσύνη ἀπὶ φαινεται· ἢ γάρ, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, ἐφην ἐγὼ, ἡ ἄλλως πως; Ὁμολόγησε καὶ μάλ' ἀκόντως. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἂν εἰ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ σοφία; τὸ δὲ πρότερον ἀπὸ ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὀσιότης σχεδὸν τι ταὐτῶν ὄν. οἴξε δὴ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ ἀποκάμωμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διασκεδασμέθα. ἃρα τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἄδικῶς ἄνθρωπος 

C σωφρονεῖν, ὅτι ἄδικε; Ἀἰσχυνοίμην ἂν ἐγω' ἐφη, ὁ Ὁμήρωσις, τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ γε φασί τῶν ἄνθρωπων. Πότερον οὖν πρὸς ἐκείνος τὸν λόγον ποιῆσομαι, ἐφην, ἡ πρὸς σέ; Εἰ βούλεις, ἐφη, πρὸς τούτον πρῶτον τὸν λόγον διαλέχθητι τὸν τῶν πολλῶν. 'Ἀλλ' οὔδεν μοι διαφέρει, ἐὰν μόνον σὺ γε ἀποκρίνῃ, εἴτ' οὖν

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Now do you recollect that in the previous stage we have agreed that folly is opposite to wisdom? He admitted this.

And that one thing has but one opposite? Yes.

Then which, Protagoras, of our propositions are we to reject—the statement that one thing has but one opposite; or the other, that wisdom is different from temperance, and each is a part of virtue, and moreover, a different part, and that the two are as unlike, both in themselves and in their faculties, as the parts of the face? Which are we to upset? The two of them together are not quite in tune; they do not chime in harmony. How could they, if one thing must needs have but one opposite and no more, while wisdom, and temperance likewise, appear both to be opposite to folly, which is a single thing? Such is the position, Protagoras, I said; or is it otherwise?

He admitted it was so, much against his will.

Then temperance and wisdom must be one thing? And indeed we found before that justice and holiness were almost the same thing. Come, Protagoras, I said, let us not falter, but carry out our inquiry to the end. Tell me, does a man who acts unjustly seem to you to be temperate in so acting?

I should be ashamed, Socrates, he replied, to admit that, in spite of what many people say.

Then shall I address my argument to them, I asked, or to you?

If you please, he answered, debate first against that popular theory.

It is all the same to me, I said, so long as you make answer, whether it be your own opinion or
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δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα, εἶτε μή. τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔγγυς μάλιστα ἑξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἵσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἑρωτώντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἑξετάζεσθαι.

D Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκαλλωπίζετο ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἦτιάτο δυσχερῆ εἶναι· ἔπειτα μέντοι συνεχώρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. 'Ἰθι δὴ, ἔφην ἕγω, ἔξ ἀρχῆς μοι ἀπόκριναι. δοκοῦσι τινὲς σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντες; 'Εστω, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν λέγεις εὖ φρονεῖν; 'Εφη. Τὸ δ' εὖ φρονεῖν εὖ βουλέυεσθαι, ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν; 'Εστω, ἔφη. Πότερον, ἢν δ' ἔγω, εἰ εὖ πράττον- σιν ἀδικοῦντες ἢ εἰ κακῶς; Εἰ εὖ. Λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθὰ ἅτα εἶναι; Λέγω. 'Αρ' οὖν, ἢν δ' ἔγω, ταῦτ' ἑστὶν ἀγαθὰ, ἢ ἑστὶν ὑφέλιμα τοῖς Ε ἄνθρωποις; Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δι', ἔφη, κἂν μὴ τοῖς ἄνθρωποις ὑφέλιμα ἢ, ἔγγυς καλῶ ἀγαθὰ. καὶ μοι ἐδόκει δ' Πρωταγόρας ἦδη τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ ἀγωνίαν καὶ παρατετάχθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀπο- κρίνεσθαι· ἐπείδη οὖν ἐώρων αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, εὐλαβούμενος ἦρεμα ἡρόμην. Πότερον, ἢν δ' 334 ἔγω, λέγεις, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, ἀ μηδενὶ ἄνθρωπων ὑφέλιμα ἑστὶν, ἢ ἡ μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ὑφέλιμα; καὶ τὰ τουαῦτα σὺ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖς; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἔγγυς πολλὰ οἶδ' ἃ ἄνθρωποι μὲν 168
not. For although my first object is to test the argument, the result perhaps will be that both I, the questioner, and my respondent are brought to the test.

At first Protagoras appeared to be coy, alleging that the argument was too disconcerting: however he consented at length to make answer. Well now, I said, begin at the beginning, and tell me, do you consider people to be temperate when they are unjust?

Let us suppose so, he said.
And by being temperate you mean being sensible?
Yes.
And being sensible is being well-advised in their injustice?
Let us grant it, he said.
Does this mean, I asked, if they fare well by their injustice, or if they fare ill?
If they fare well.
Now do you say there are things that are good?
I do.
Then, I asked, are those things good which are profitable to men?
Oh yes, to be sure, he replied, and also when they are not profitable to men I call them good.

Here Protagoras seemed to me to be in a thoroughly provoked and harassed state, and to have set his face against answering: so when I saw him in this mood I grew wary and went gently with my questions. Do you mean, Protagoras, I asked, things that are profitable to no human being, or things not profitable in any way at all? Can you call such things as these good?

By no means, he replied; but I know a number of
καὶ συτία καὶ ποτὰ καὶ φάρμακα καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τὰ δὲ γε ωφέλματα: τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώπους μὲν οὐδέτερα, ἵπποις δὲ· τὰ δὲ βουσὶ μόνον, τὰ δὲ κυσὶ· τὰ δὲ γε τούτων μὲν οὐδενὶ, δενδροις δὲ· τὰ δὲ τοῦ δένδρου ταῖς μὲν ῥίζαις ἀγαθα, ταῖς δὲ βλάσταις πονηρά, οἷον καὶ ἡ κόπρος.

Β) πάντων τῶν φυτῶν ταῖς μὲν ῥίζαις ἀγαθῶν παραβάλλομένη, εἰ δ’ ἑθέλοις ἐπὶ τοὺς πτόρθους καὶ τοὺς νέους κλάσας ἐπιβάλλειν, πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν· ἐπει καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς ἀπανίν ἐστὶ πάγκακον καὶ ταῖς θριξί πολεμιώτατον ταις τῶν ἄλλων ξώων πλῆν ταῖς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρώγουν καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι. οὕτω δὲ ποικίλον τί ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ παντοδαπόν, ὡστε καὶ ἑνταῦθα τοῖς μὲν ἐξωθεὶν τοῦ

C σώματος ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῖς δ’ ἐντὸς ταὐτὸ τοῦτο κάκιστον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ ἰατροὶ πάντες ἀπαγορεύουσι τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσι μὴ χρῆσθαι ἐλαίῳ ἀλλ’ ἢ ὅτι σμικροτάτῳ ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέλλει ἐδεσθαι, ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατασβέσαι τὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσει ταῖς διὰ τῶν ῥώνων γινομένην ἐν τοῖς σιτίοις τε καὶ ὤμοις.

Εἰπόντος οὖν ταῦτα αὐτοῖ i παρόντες ἀνεθορύβησαν ως εὗ λέγον· καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Ὡ Πρωταγόρα, ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσιμων τις ὁν D ἀνθρωπος, καὶ εἶν τὸς μοι μακρὰ λέγη, ἐπι-λανθάνομαι περὶ οὗ ἂν ἢ ὁ λόγος. ἃσπερ οὖν, εἰ ἐτύγχανον ὑπόκωφος ὁν, ἢν ἃν χρῆναι, εὕπερ ἐμελλεῖσ μοι διαλέξεσθαι, μεῖζον φθέγγεσθαι ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, οὕτω καὶ νῦν, ἐπειδή ἐπι-
things that are unprofitable to men, namely, foods, drinks, drugs, and countless others, and some that are profitable; some that are neither one nor the other to men, but are one or the other to horses; and some that are profitable only to cattle, or again to dogs; some also that are not profitable to any of those, but are to trees; and some that are good for the roots of a tree, but bad for its shoots—such as dung, which is a good thing when applied to the roots of all plants, whereas if you chose to cast it on the young twigs and branches, it will ruin all. And oil too is utterly bad for all plants, and most deadly for the hair of all animals save that of man, while to the hair of man it is helpful, as also to the rest of his body. The good is such an elusive and diverse thing that in this instance it is good for the outward parts of man's body, but at the same time as bad as can be for the inward; and for this reason all doctors forbid the sick to take oil, except the smallest possible quantity, in what one is going to eat—just enough to quench the loathing that arises in the sensations of one's nostrils from food and its dressings.¹

When he had thus spoken, the company acclaimed it as an excellent answer; and then I remarked: Protagoras, I find I am a forgetful sort of person, and if someone addresses me at any length I forget the subject on which he is talking. So, just as you, in entering on a discussion with me, would think fit to speak louder to me than to others if I happened to be hard of hearing, please bear in mind now that you have to deal with a forgetful person, and there-

¹ Probably such oil had a specially appetizing flavour or scent.
λήσμονι ἐνέτυχε, σύντεμνῇ μοί τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας ποίει, εἰ μέλλω σοι ἐπεσθαί. Πῶς οὖν κελεύεις με βραχέα ἀποκρίνεσθαι; ἦ βραχύτερά σου, ἐφη, ἀποκρίνωμαι ἦ δεῖ; Μη- δαμώς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. 'Αλλ' ὅσα δεί; ἐφη. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Πότερα οὖν ὅσα ἐμοί δοκεῖ δεῖν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τοσαύτα σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἦ σοι σοί; 'Ακήκοα γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι σὺ οἶδος τ' εἶ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλον διδάζαι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μακρὰ λέγειν, ἐὰν βούλη, οὕτως, ὡστε τὸν λόγον μηδέποτε ἐπιλιπεῖν, καὶ αὐ βραχέα οὕτως, ὡστε μηδένα σοῦ ἐν βραχυτέροις εἶπεῖν. εἰ οὖν μέλλεις ἐμοὶ διαλέξεσθαι, τῷ ἐτέρῳ χρῷ τρόπῳ πρὸς με, τῇ βραχυλογίᾳ. Θ Σώκρατες, ἐφη, ἐγὼ πολλοὶς ήδη εἰς ἀγώνα λόγων ἀφικόμεθα ἀνθρώ- ποις, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο ἔποιον ὁ σὺ κελεύεις, ὡς ὁ ἀντιλέγων ἐκέλευε με διαλέγεσθαι, οὕτω διελε- γόμεν, οὐδενὸς ἄν βελτίων ἐφαινόμην οὐδ' ἄν ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρου ὁνομα ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησ. καὶ ἐγὼ—ἐγνων γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἤρεσεν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεις ταῖς ἐμπρόσθεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔθελήσοι εἰκὼν εἰναι ἀποκρινόμενος διαλέγεσθαι— ἡγησάμενος οὐκέτι ἐμὸν ἔργων εἰναι παρεῖναι ἐν ταῖς συνονοσίαις, Ἀλλὰ τοι, ἐφη, ὃ Πρωταγόρα, οὐδ' ἐγὼ λιπαρῶς ἔχω παρὰ τά σοι δοκοῦντα τὴν συνονοσίαν ἦμῶν γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὰν σὺ βούλη διαλέγεσθαι ώς ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐπεσθαί, τότε σοι διαλέξομαι. οὐ μὲν γὰρ, ὡς λέγεται
fore cut up your answers into shorter pieces, that I may be able to follow you.

Well, what do you mean by short answers? he asked: do you want me to make them shorter than they should be?

Not at all, I said.

As long as they should be? he asked.

Yes, I said.

Then are my answers to be as long as I think they should be, or as you think they should be?

Well, for instance, I have heard, I said, that you yourself are able, in treating one and the same subject, not only to instruct another person in it but to speak on it at length, if you choose, without ever being at a loss for matter; or again briefly, so as to yield to no one in brevity of expression. So, if you are going to argue with me, employ with me the latter method, that of brevity.

Socrates, he said, I have undertaken in my time many contests of speech, and if I were to do what you demand, and argue just in the way that my opponent demanded, I should not be held superior to anyone nor would Protagoras have made a name among the Greeks.

Then, as I saw that he had not been quite satisfied with himself in making his former answers, and that he would not readily accept the part of answerer in debate, I considered it was not my business to attend his meetings further, and remarked: But you know, Protagoras, I too feel uncomfortable about our having this discussion against your inclination; but when you agree to argue in such a way that I can follow, then I will argue with you. For you—as people relate of you, and you yourself
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περὶ σοῦ, φῆς δὲ καὶ αὐτός, καὶ ἐν μακρολογίᾳ καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίᾳ οἷος τ' εἰ συνουσίας ποιεῖσθαι.

C σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ· ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἄδυνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἶος τ' εἶναι. ἀλλὰ σὲ ἔχρην ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν τὸν ἀμφότερα δυνάμενον, ἣν ἡ συνουσία ἐγίγνετο· νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐθέλεις καὶ ἐμοὶ τις ἀσχολία ἑστι καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἶος τ' εἰήν σοι παραμεῖναι ἀποτείνων μακροὺς λόγους— ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ποί με δεῖ—εἰμὶ· ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ' ἂν ἰσως οὐκ ἀγήδως σου ἥκονον. καὶ ἀμα ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἀνιστάμην ὡς ἀπιών· καὶ μοι ἀνιστα-

D μένου ἐπιλαμβάνεται ὁ Καλλίας τῆς χειρὸς τῇ δεξιᾷ, τῇ δ' ἀριστερᾷ ἀντελάβετο τοῦ τρίβωνος τούτου, καὶ εἰπεν· Οὐκ ἀφῆσομέν σε, ὦ Σώκρατες· εὰν γὰρ σὺ ἐξέλθῃς, οὐχ ὄμοιος ἡμῖν ἔσονται οἱ διάλογοι. δέομαι οὖν σου παραμεῖναι ἡμῖν· ὡς ἐγὼ οὕτ' ἂν ἐνὸς ἦδιον ἀκούσαμι ἥ σοῦ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρου διαλεγομένων· ἀλλὰ χάρισαι ἡμῖν πᾶσιν. καὶ ἐγὼ εἰπὼν—ἡδὴ δὲ ἀνειστήκη ὡς ἐξιῶν—Ὤ παῦ Ἰππονίκου, ἀεὶ μὲν ἐγωγέ σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἁγαμαί, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν ἑπανω

Ε καὶ φιλῷ, ὥστε βουλοίμην ἂν χαρίζεσθαι σοι, εἰ μοι δυνατὰ δέομεν· νῦν δ' ἐστὶν ὃσπερ ἂν εἰ δεόμοι μου Κρίσων τῷ Ἰμεραίῳ δρομεὶ ἀκμαίζοντι ἐπεσθαί, ἡ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῷ ἡ τῶν ἡμερο-

336 ὅτι πολὺ σοῦ μάλλον ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν δέομαι θέουσι τούτους ἀκολουθεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅστις γὰρ δύναμαι, ἀλλ' εἰ τι δέει θέασασθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐμὲ τε καὶ Κρίσωνα θέουσα, τούτου δέους συγκαθεῖναι· ἐγὼ

1 See 329 b, note.
2 Cf. Pheidippides in Herodotus, vi. 105.
assert—are able to hold a discussion in the form of either long or short speeches; you are a man of knowledge: but I have no ability for these long speeches, though I could wish that I had it. Surely you, who are proficient in both ways, ought to have made us this concession, that so we might have had our debate. But now that you refuse, and I am somewhat pressed for time and could not stay to hear you expatiate at any length—for I have an appointment—I will be off; though I daresay I should be happy enough to hear your views.

With these words I rose as if to go away; but, as I was getting up, Callias laid hold of my arm with his right hand, and grasped this cloak of mine with his left, and said: We will not let you go, Socrates; for if you leave us our discussions will not go so well. I beg you therefore to stay with us, for there is nothing I would rather hear than an argument between you and Protagoras. Come, you must oblige us all.

Then I said (I was now standing up as though to go out): Son of Hipponicus, I always admire your love of knowledge, but especially do I commend and love it now, so that I should be very glad to oblige you if you asked of me something that I could do: but I am afraid it is as though you asked me to keep pace with Criso the runner of Himera in his prime, or to keep up in a match with one of the long-distance or day-course racers, and I could only tell you that I wish that of myself, without your asking, I could keep pace with such runners, but of course I cannot. If you want to have the spectacle of Criso and me running together, you must ask him to adapt his pace; for whereas I
μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι ταχὺ θεών, οὗτος δὲ δύναται βραδέως. εἰ οὖν ἐπιθύμεις ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούεις, τούτου δέου, ὡσπερ τὸ πρῶτον μοι ἀπεκρίνατο διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, οὗτῳ καὶ νῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ

Β μή, τίς τρόπος ἔσται τῶν διαλόγων; χωρὶς γὰρ ἐγών ἐμήν εἶναι τὸ συνεῖναι τὲ ἄλληλοις διαλεγομένους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν. Ἄλλ᾽ ὀρᾶς, ἐφη, ὥς Σωκράτης· δίκαια δοκεῖ λέγειν Πρωταγόρας ἀξίων αὐτῶ τε ἐξεῖναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως βούλεται καὶ σὺ ὅπως ἂν αὕτη σὺ βούλῃ.

Τοπολαβῶν οὖν ὁ 'Ἀλκιβιάδης, Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ἐφη, ὥς Καλλία· Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ οὗτα ὁμολογεῖ μὴ μετεῖναι οἱ μακρολογίας καὶ παρα-

C χωρεῖ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι οἷός τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ ἐπίστασθαι λόγου τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι θαυμάζομι· ἂν εἰ τῶ ἀνθρώπων παραχωρεῖ. εἰ

μὲν οὖν καὶ Πρωταγόρας ὁμολογεῖ φαυλότερος εἶναι Σωκράτους διαλεখῆναι, ἐξαιρεῖ Σωκράτει· εἰ δὲ ἀντιποιεῖται, διαλέγεσθω ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐφ᾽ ἐκάστῃ ἐρωτῆσθαι μακρὸν λόγου ἀποτείνων, ἐκκρούων τοὺς λόγους καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπομηκύνων ἐως ἂν ἐπιλάθωνται περὶ ὅτου τὸ ἐρώτημα ἢν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀκούοντων· ἔπει Σωκράτη γε ἐγὼ ἐγγυώμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει καὶ φησὶν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι· ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ ἐπεικεστέρα Σωκράτης λέγει· χρὴ γὰρ ἐκαστὸν τὴν έαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι· μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ὥς ἐγώμαι, Κριτίας ἢν ὁ εἶπών· ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Ἰππία, Καλλίας μὲν δοκεῖ μοι μάλα πρὸς Πρωταγόρου εἶναι· Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ

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cannot run fast, he can run slowly. So if you desire to hear Protagoras and me, ask him to resume the method of answering which he used at first—in short sentences and keeping to the point raised. Otherwise what is to be our mode of discussion? For I thought that to hold a joint discussion and to make a harangue were two distinct things.

Ah, but you see, Socrates, he said, Protagoras thinks it only fair to claim that he be allowed to discuss in his chosen style, in return for your claim that it should be in yours.

At this Alcibiades intervened, saying: You do not state it quite philosophically, Callias,\(^1\) for Socrates here confesses he is no hand at long discourses, and yields therein to Protagoras; but I should be surprised if he yields to any man in ability to argue, or in understanding the interchange of reason. Now if Protagoras confesses himself inferior to Socrates in argumentation, Socrates has no more to ask: but if he challenges him, let him discuss by question and answer; not spinning out a lecture on each question—beating off the arguments, refusing to give a reason, and so dilating until most of his hearers have forgotten the point at issue. For Socrates, I warrant you, will not forget, despite his jesting way of calling himself forgetful. Now I think Socrates' proposal is the more equitable—for each of us should declare his personal opinion.

After Alcibiades, the next, I believe, to speak was Critias: Prodicus and Hippias, he said, it seems to me that Callias is all for supporting Protagoras, while Alcibiades is always for a contest in anything

\(^1\) The translation attempts to follow the jingle of kalá\(\theta\)s . . . kalía. 

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Ε ἀεὶ φιλόνικός ἦστι πρὸς ὃ ἀν ὀρμήσῃ· ἦμᾶς δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖ συμφιλονυκεῖν οὔτε Σωκράτει οὔτε Πρωταγόρα, ἀλλὰ κοινὴ ἀμφοτέρων δεῖσθαι μὴ μεταξὺ διαλύσαι τὴν ἔννοιαν· εἰπόντος δὲ αυτοῦ ταῦτα, ὁ Πρόδικος, Καλὸς μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὃ Κριτία· χρῆ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τοιοίσδε λόγοις παραγιγυμνόνοις κοινοὺς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφότεροὶ τοῖς διαλεγομένοις ἀκροατάς, ἵσους δὲ μή. ἦστι γὰρ οὐ ταῦταν· κοινὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀκούσαι δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων, μὴ ἵσον δὲ νεῖμαι ἐκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν σοφωτέρῳ πλέον, τῷ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρῳ ἔλαττον. ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὁ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σωκράτες, ἄξιον ἦμᾶς συγχωρεῖν καὶ ἄλληλοις περὶ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητεῖν μὲν, ἐρίζειν δὲ μή· ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ δι' εὐνοιαν οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσι δὲ οἱ διάφοροι τε καὶ ἔχοντες ἄλληλοις. καὶ οὔτως ἂν καλλίστη ἦμιν ἡ συννοσία γλυκύτοτε· ὡμεῖς τε γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὔτως ἐν ἠμῖν τοῖς ἀκούοντιν εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖς· εὐδοκιμεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔστι παρὰ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀκούοντων ἄνευ ἀπάτης, ἐπαινεῖσθαι δὲ ἐν λόγῳ πολλάκις παρα δόξαν.

C ψευδομένων· ὡμεῖς τ' αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀκούοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὔτως εὐφρανοίμεθα, οὐχ ήδοίμεθα· εὐφραίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι μανθανόντα τι καὶ φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ήδεσθαι δὲ ἐσθίωντ' τῇ ἄλλῳ ἱδίῳ πᾶσχοντα αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι. Ταῦτα οὖν εἰπόντος τοῦ Προδίκου πολλοῖ πάνυ τῶν παρόντων ἀπεδεξαντο· μετὰ δὲ τὸν Προδίκον Ἰππίας ὁ σοφὸς εἶπεν, Ὡ ἄνδρες, ἔφη,

1 Prodicus was specially expert in nice verbal distinctions.

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he takes up. It is not for us to contend on either side for Socrates or for Protagoras, but jointly to request them both not to break off our conference unconcluded.

When he had said this, Prodicus\(^1\) remarked: I think you are right, Critias: those who attend this sort of discussion ought to be joint, but not equal, hearers of both disputants. For there is a difference: we should listen jointly to them both, yet not give equal heed to each, but more to the wiser and less to the less intelligent. I on my part also, Protagoras and Socrates, call upon you to accede to our request, and to dispute, but not wrangle, with each other over your arguments: for friends dispute with friends, just from good feeling; whereas wrangling is between those who are at variance and enmity with one another. In this way our meeting will have highest success, since you the speakers will thus earn the greatest measure of good repute, not praise, from us who hear you. For good repute is present in the hearers' souls without deception, but praise is too often in the words of liars who hide what they really think. Again, we listeners would thus be most comforted, not pleased; for he is comforted who learns something and gets a share of good sense in his mind alone, whereas he is pleased who eats something or has some other pleasant sensation only in his body.

When Prodicus had thus spoken, quite a number of the company showed their approval: then after Prodicus the learned Hippias\(^2\) spoke: Gentlemen,

\(^2\) Hippias professed to teach a great variety of subjects. His frequent metaphors were evidently designed to display his wide range of knowledge.
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οὶ παρόντες, Ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ὡμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκεῖοις καὶ πολίταις ἀπαντᾷς εἶναι φύσει,

Ων νόμων τὸ γὰρ ὁμοιόν τῷ ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγ-

genés ἔστων, ὃ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος  ὡς τῶν ἀνθρώ-

πων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται. Ἡμᾶς

οὖν αἰσχρῶν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναι,

σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἐλλήνων, καὶ κατ'

αὐτὸ τοῦτο νῦν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἐλλάδος

eis αὐτὸ τὸ πρωτανείον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς

tῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὅλβιώτατον

οἰκὸν τόπῳ, μηδὲν τούτου τοῦ ἀξιωματος ἠξιόν

Ἀποφήγνασθαι, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους τῶν

ἀνθρώπων διαφέρεσθαι ἀλλήλους. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν

καὶ δέομαι καὶ συμβουλεύω, ἡ Πρωταγόρα τε

καὶ Σώκρατες, συμβῆναι ἡμᾶς ὡσπερ ὑπὸ διαι-

τητῶν ἡμῶν συμβαζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον, καὶ

μὴ τέ σε τὸ ἀκριβὲς τούτο εἴδος τῶν διαλόγων

ζητεῖν τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λιαν, εἰ μὴ ἧδυ Πρωταγόρα,

ἀλλ' ἐφείναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις,

ὡς μεγαλοπρεπεστεροι καὶ εὐσχημονέστεροι ἡμῖν

φαίνωνται, μὴ αὖ Πρωταγόραν πάντα κάλων

ἐκτείναντα, οὐρίᾳ ἐφέντα, φεύγειν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος

tῶν λόγων, ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, ἀλλὰ μέσων τι

ἀμφοτέρους τεμεῖν. ὅς οὖν ποιήσετε, καὶ πεί-

θεσθεὶς μοι ῥαβδοῦχον καὶ ἐπιστάτην καὶ πρύτανι

Β ἔλεσθαι, ὅς ὡμῖν φυλάξει τὸ μέτριον μῆκος τῶν

λόγων ἐκατέρου.

Ταῦτα ἦρεσε τοῖς παροῦσι, καὶ πάντες ἐπ-

ήνεσαν, καὶ ἐμὲ τε ὁ Καλλίας οὐκ ἔφη ἀφῆσεν

καὶ ἔλεσθαι ἔδειοντο ἐπιστάτην. εἰπον οὖν ἐγὼ

ὅτι αἰσχρῶν εἰδ βραβευτὴν ἔλεσθα τῶν λόγων.

εἰτε γὰρ χείρων ἔσται ἡμῶν ὃ αἰρεθείς, οὐκ ὅρθως

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he said, who are here present, I regard you all as kinsmen and intimates and fellow-citizens by nature, not by law: for like is akin to like by nature, whereas law, despot of mankind, often constrains us against nature. Hence it would be shameful if we, while knowing the nature of things, should yet—being the wisest of the Greeks, and having met together for the very purpose in the very sanctuary of the wisdom of Greece, and in this the greatest and most auspicious house of the city of cities—display no worthy sign of this dignity, but should quarrel with each other like low churls. Now let me beg and advise you, Protagoras and Socrates, to come to terms arranged, as it were, under our arbitration: you, Socrates, must not require that precise form of discussion with its extreme brevity, if it is disagreeable to Protagoras, but let the speeches have their head with a loose rein, that they may give us a more splendid and elegant impression; nor must you, Protagoras, let out full sail, as you run before the breeze, and so escape into the ocean of speech leaving the land nowhere in sight; rather, both of you must take a middle course. So you shall do as I say, and I strongly urge you to choose an umpire or supervisor or chairman who will keep watch for you over the due measure of either's speeches.

His proposal was approved by the company, and they all applauded it: Callias said he would not let me go, and they requested me to choose a supervisor. To this I replied that it would be a shame to choose an arbiter for our discussion; for if he who is chosen, said I, is to be our inferior, it would
διν ἔχοι τοῖς χείρω τῶν βελτίων ἐπιστατεῖν, εἰτε ὀμοιος, οὔδ' οὗτως ὅρθως· ο γὰρ ὁμοίος ἡμῖν ὁμοια καὶ ποιήσει, ὡστε ἐκ περιττοῦ ἁρή-
C σεται. ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίων ἡμῶν αἰρήσεσθε. τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ, ὡς ἐγώμαι, ἀδύνατον ἡμῖν ὡστε Πρωταγόρου τοῦδε σοφότερον τινα ἐλέοσαι· εἰ δὲ αἰρήσεσθε μὲν μηδὲν βελτίω, φύσετε δὲ, αἱ-
σχρόν καὶ τοῦτο τοῦτε γίγνεται, ὥσπερ φαίλω ἀνθρώπω ἐπιστάτην αἰρεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ τὸ γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν μοι διαφέρει. ἀλλ' οὗτωσί θέλειν ποιήσαι, ἣν' ὁ προδυμείσθη συνοουσία τε καὶ διάλογοι ἡμῖν γίγνωσται· εἰ μὴ βούλεται Πρωταγόρας ἀποκρί-
D νεσθαι, οὗτος μὲν ἔρωτάτω, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποκρινώμαι, καὶ ἀμα πειράσομαι αὐτῷ δεῖξαι, ὡς ἐγώ φημὶ χρήναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐγὼ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅπος' ἄν οὗτος βούληται ἐρωτάν, πάλιν οὗτος ἐμοὶ λόγον ὑποσχέτω ὁμώς.
Ε ἐὰν οὖν μὴ δοκῇ πρόθυμος εἶναι πρὸς αὐτό τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ὑμεῖς κοινῇ δεσομέθα αὐτοῦ ἀπερ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ, μὴ διαφθείρεστι τὴν συνοουσίαν καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τοῦτον ἐνεκα ἐνα ἐπιστάτην γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντες κοινῇ ἐπιστατήσετε. ἐδόκει πάσιν οὗτο ποιητέον εἶναι· καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας πάνι μὲν οὐκ ἦθελεν, ὁμώς δὲ ἡγαγάσθη ὁμολογήσαι ἐρωτηθεῖν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἰκανῶς ἐρωτήση, πάλιν δῶσει λόγον κατὰ σμι-
κρὸν ἀποκρινόμενον. ἦρξατο οὖν ἐρωτῶν οὕτωσί πως· Ἡγοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ Παιδείας μέγιστον 339 μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπών δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο
not be right to have the inferior overseeing the superior; while if he is our equal, that will be just as wrong, for our equal will only do very much as we do, and it will be superfluous to choose him. You may say you will choose one who is our superior. This, in very truth, I hold to be impossible—to choose someone who is wiser than our friend Protagoras; and if you choose one who is not his superior, though you may say he is, that again would cast a slur on him, as if he were some paltry fellow requiring a supervisor; for, as far as I am concerned, the matter is indifferent. But let me tell you how I would have the thing done, so that your eagerness for a conference and a discussion may be satisfied. If Protagoras does not wish to answer, let him ask questions, and I will answer: at the same time I will try to show him how the answerer, in my view, ought to answer; and when I have answered all the questions that he wishes to ask, in his turn he shall render account in like manner to me. So if he does not seem very ready to answer the particular question put to him, you and I will join in beseeching him, as you have besought me, not to upset our conference. And for this plan there is no need to have one man as supervisor; you will all supervise it together.

They all resolved that it should be done in this way: Protagoras, though very unwilling, was obliged after all to agree to ask questions and then, when he had asked a sufficient number, to take his turn at making due response in short answers.

And so he began to put questions in this sort of way: I consider, Socrates, that the greatest part of a man's education is to be skilled in the matter of
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τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἶνον τ' εἶναι συνιέναι ἃ τε ὀρθῶς πεποίηται καὶ ἃ μῆ, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον λόγον δοῦναι, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔσται τὸ ἐρώτημα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν, περὶ οὖπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ οὐ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, περὶ ἀρετῆς, μετεννεγμένον δὲ εἰς ποίησιν· τοσοῦτον μένον διοίσει. λέγει γάρ ποι Σιμωνίδης πρὸς Σκόπαν, τὸν Κρέοντος ύιὸν τοῦ Θετ-

ταλοῦ, ὦτι.

Β ἁνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἀνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.

τούτῳ ἐπίστασαί τὸ ἄσμα, ἣ πᾶν σοι διεξέλθω; καὶ ἓγω εἶπον ὅτι Οὐδὲν δεῖ· ἐπίσταμαι τε γάρ, καὶ πᾶν μου τυγχάνει μεμεληκός τοῦ ἄσματος. Εὖ, ἔφη, λέγεις. πότερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ πεποιήσθαι καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἣ οὔ; Πάνυ, ἔφην ἐγώ, <καλῶς> ¹ τε καὶ ὀρθῶς. Δοκεῖ δὲ σοι καλῶς πεποιήσθαι, εἰ ἐναντία λέγει αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁ ποιη-

τὴς; Οὔ καλῶς, ἣν δ' ἐγώ. "Ορα δή, ἔφη, Σ βέλτιον. 'Ἀλλ', ὦ γαθέ, ἐσκεμμαί ἰκανῶς. Οἴ-

οθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι προίόντος τοῦ ἄσματος λέγει πον·

οὔδε μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται, καίτοι σοφοὶ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναι.

ἐννοεῖς ὥτι ὁ αὐτὸς οὖτος καὶ τάδε λέγει κάκεινα

¹ καλῶς add. Bekker.

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VERS; that is, to be able to apprehend, in the utterances of the poets, what has been rightly and what wrongly composed, and to know how to distinguish them and account for them when questioned. Accordingly my question now will be on the same subject that you and I are now debating, namely virtue, but taken in connexion with poetry: that will be the only difference. Now, Simonides, I think, somewhere remarks to Scopas, the son of Creon of Thessaly—

For a man, indeed, to become good truly is hard,
In hands and feet and mind foursquare,
Fashioned without reproach.

Do you know the ode, or shall I recite the whole?
To this I replied: There is no need, for I know it;
it happens that I have especially studied that ode.
I am glad to hear it, he said. Now do you regard it as finely and correctly composed or not?
Very finely and correctly, I replied.
And do you regard it as finely composed, if the poet contradicts himself?
No, I replied.
Then observe it more closely, he said.
My good sir, I have given it ample attention.
Are you aware, then, he asked, that as the ode proceeds he says at one point—

Nor ringeth true to me
That word of Pittacus 1
And yet ’twas a sage who spake—
Hard, quoth he, to be good.

Do you note that this and the former are statements of the same person?

1 Pittacus, ruler of Mytilene, despaired of ruling well on the ground here stated.
τὰ ἐμπροσθεν; Οἶδα, ἢν ὦ ἐγώ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ἐφη, ταῦτα ἐκεῖνοι ὁμολογεῖσαι; Φαι-νεται ἐμιογε, (καὶ ἀμα μέντοι ἐφοβούμην μή τι λέγοι). ἀτάρ, ἐφην ἐγώ, σοι οὐ φαίνεται;

Πῶς γὰρ ἂν φαίνοιτο ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ ὁ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα λέγων, ὥσ γε τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτὸς ὑπέθετο χαλεπὸν εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέ-σθαι ἀληθεία, ὅλιγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθὼν ἐπελαθεῖτο, καὶ Πιττακὸν τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα ἐαυτῷ, ὧτι χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐμ-μεναι, τούτον μέμφεται τε καὶ οὐ φησὶν ἀπο-δέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτά ἐαυτῷ λέγοντος. καίτοι ὀπότε τὸν ταὐτὰ λέγοντα αὐτῷ μέμφεται, δῆλον ὧτι καὶ ἐαυτὸν μέμφεται, ὡστε ἦτοι τὸ πρότερον ἡ ὑστερον οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει.

Εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα πολλοῖς θόρυβον παρέσχε

καὶ ἔπαινον τῶν ἀκούοντων· καὶ ἐγὼ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὅσπερει ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγεῖς, ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ ἐγκυπεσα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυρβησάντων· ἐπεῖτα, ὥσ γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρήσθαι τάληθη, ὅν μοι χρόνος ἐγγένηται τῇ σκέψει τὶ λέγοι ὁ ποιητής, τρέ-πομαι πρὸς τὸν Πρόδικον, καὶ καλέσας αὐτὸν, Ὡ Πρόδικε, ἐφην ἐγὼ, ὦς μὲντοι Σμινώιδης πολίτης· δίκαιος εἰ βοθεῖν τῷ ἀνδρί. δοκῶ

340 οὖν μοι ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σέ, ὅσπερ ἐφη ὁ Ομήρος τὸν Σκάμανδρον πολιορκοῦμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλ-λέως τὸν Σμαύντα παρακαλεῖν, εἰπόντα·

φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροι περὶ σχῶμεν.

1 Iliad xxi. 308 foll.
I know that, I said.
Then do you think the second agrees with the first?
So far as I can see, it does, I replied (at the same time, though, I was afraid there was something in what he said). Why, I asked, does it not seem so to you?
How can anyone, he replied, be thought consistent, who says both of these things? First he laid it down himself that it is hard for a man to become good in truth, and then a little further on in his poem he forgot, and he proceeds to blame Pittacus for saying the same as he did—that it is hard to be good, and refuses to accept from him the same statement that he made himself. Yet, as often as he blames the man for saying the same as himself he obviously blames himself too, so that in either the former or the latter place his statement is wrong.

This speech of his won a clamorous approval from many of his hearers; and at first I felt as though I had been struck by a skilful boxer, and was quite blind and dizzy with the effect of his words and the noise of their applause. Then—to tell you the honest truth—in order to gain time for considering the poet's meaning, I turned to Prodicus and calling him—Prodicus, I said, surely Simonides was your townsman: it behoves you to come to the man's rescue. Accordingly I allow myself to call for your assistance—just as Scamander, in Homer, when besieged by Achilles, called Simois to his aid, saying—

Dear brother, let us both together stay this warrior's might.
άταρ καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ παρακαλῶ, μὴ ἥμιν ὁ Πρωταγόρας τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἐκπέρσῃ. καὶ γὰρ ὅν καὶ δεῖται τὸ ύπὲρ Σιμωνίδου ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς

β σῆς μονοκηφῆς, ἢ τὸ τε βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν διαίρεις ὡς οὐ ταύτῳ ὦν, καὶ δὲ νῦν δὴ ἐπὶ πολλά τε καὶ καλά. καὶ νῦν σκόπει, εἴ σοι συνδοκεῖ ὅπερ ἔμοι. οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ Σιμωνίδης. οὐ γὰρ, ὁ Πρόδικε, προαπόφημαι τὴν σήν γνώμην ταύτων σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο; "Αλλο νὴ Δί", ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγὼ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρῶτοις αὐτῶς ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν ἐαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφήνατο, ὅτι ἄνδρα ἄγαθὸν

С ἀληθεία γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν εἴη; Ἄληθή λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος. Τὸν δὲ γε Πιττακὸν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, μέμφεται, οὐχ ὅσσοι δέσται Πρωταγόρας, ταυτὸν ἐαυτῷ λέγοντα, ἀλλ' ἄλλο. οὐ γὰρ τούτῳ ὁ Πιττακὸς ἐλεγε τὸ χαλεπὸν, γενέσθαι ἔσθολον, ὡσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμμεναι· ἔστι δὲ οὐ ταυτὸν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, ὡς φησὶ Πρόδικος οὔ, τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή το αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι τῷ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντία λέγει ὁ Σιμωνίδης αὐτῶς αὐτῷ. καὶ ἕως ᾧν

D φαίη Πρόδικος οὔ δαι καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ, καθ' Ἡσίοδου, γενέσθαι μὲν ἄγαθὸν χαλεπὸν εἶναι· τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἐμπροσθεν τοὺς θεοὺς ἱδρῶτα θεῖαι· ὅταν δὲ τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἄκρον ἤκηται, ῥηθετὶν δὴ-πειτα πέλεων, χαλεπήν περ ἐσοῦσαν, ἐκτῆσθαι.

'Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἀκούσας ταῦτα ἐπήνεσε μὲ· ὁ δὲ Πρωταγόρας, Τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα σοι, ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, μείζον ἀμάρτημα ἔχει ἡ ὁ
In the same way I call upon you, lest Protagoras lay Simonides in ruins. For indeed to rehabilitate Simonides requires your artistry, by which you can discriminate between wishing and desiring as two distinct things in the fine and ample manner of your statement just now. So please consider if you agree with my view. For it is not clear that Simonides does contradict himself. Now you, Prodicus, shall declare your verdict first: do you consider becoming and being to be the same or different?

Different, to be sure, said Prodicus.

Now in the first passage, I said, Simonides gave it as his own opinion that it is hard for a man to become good in truth.

Quite true, said Prodicus.

And he blames Pittacus, I went on, for saying not, as Protagoras holds, the same as himself, but something different. For what Pittacus said was not, as Simonides said, that it is hard "to become" but "to be" good. Now being and becoming, Protagoras, as our friend Prodicus says, are not the same thing; and if being and becoming are not the same thing, Simonides does not contradict himself. Perhaps Prodicus and many others might say with Hesiod that to become good is hard, "for Heaven hath set hard travail on the way to virtue; and when one reacheth the summit thereof, 'tis an easy thing to possess, though hard before." ¹

When Prodicus heard this he gave me his approval: but Protagoras observed: Your correction, Socrates, contains an error greater than that which you are correcting.

¹ A not quite exact quotation of Hesiod, Works and Days, 289 foll.
ἐπανορθοῖς. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Κακὸν ἄρα μοι εἰργασταί, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ εἰμὶ Ἐ τις γελοῖος ἰατρός· ἵμμενος μεῖζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ. Ἄλλ' οὐτως ἔχει, ἐφη. Πῶς δή; ἣν δ' ἐγὼ. Πολλή ἄν, ἐφη, ἀμαθία εἰη τοῦ ποιητοῦ, εἰ οὕτω φαίδον τί φήσων εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐκτη- σθαι, ἔ ἐστι πάντων χαλεπώτερον, ὡς ἁπασι δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Νὴ τὸν Δία, εἰς καρὸν γε παρατετύχηκεν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις Πρόδικος ὃδε. κινδυνεύει γάρ τοι, ὦ Πρωτ- αγόρα, ἡ Προδίκου σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι, ἂτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου ἀρξαμένῃ, ἡ καὶ ἔτι παλαιο- τέρα. οὐ δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἐμπειρος ὡν ταύτης ἀπειρο ἐναι φαίνει, οὐχ ὃσπρ ἐγὼ ἐμπειρος διὰ τὸ μαθητής εἶναι Προδίκου τούτου· καὶ νῦν μοι δοκεῖς οὐ μανθάνειν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο ἰσως οὐχ οὕτω Σιμωνίδης ὑπελάμβανεν, ὃσπρ σὺ ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἀλλ' ὃσπρ περὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ Πρόδικος με οὕτοσι νουθετεῖ ἐκάστοτε, ὅταν ἐπαινῶν ἐγὼ ἣ σε ἦ ἂν ἄλλον τωλ' λέγω ὅτι Β Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἐστιν ἀνὴρ, ἐρωτά- ει οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τάγαθα δεινὰ καλῶν. τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν, φησί, κακὸν ἐστιν· οὔδεις γοῦν λέγει ἐκάστοτε δεινὸ πλοῦτον οὐδὲ δεινῆς εἰρήνης οὔδὲ δεινῆς ὑγιείας, ἀλλὰ δεινῆς νόσου καὶ δεινοῦ πολέμου καὶ δεινῆς πενίας, ὡς τοῦ δεινοῦ κακοῦ ὄντος. ισως οὖν καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν αὐ οἱ Κεῖοι καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης ἡ κακὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἡ ἄλλο τι δ' οὐ οὔ μανθάνεις· ἐρώμεθα οὖν Πρό- δικον. δίκαιον γὰρ τὴν Σιμωνίδου φωνὴν τούτον

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To which I answered: then it is a bad piece of work I have done, it would seem, Protagoras, and I am an absurd sort of physician; my treatment increases the malady.

Just so, he said.

How is that? I asked.

Great, he replied, would be the ignorance of the poet, if he calls it such a slight matter to possess virtue, which is the hardest thing in the world, as all men agree.

Then I remarked: Upon my word, how opportunely it has happened that Prodicus is here to join in our discussion! For it is very likely, Protagoras, that Prodicus' wisdom is a gift of long ago from heaven, beginning either in the time of Simonides or even earlier. But you, so skilled in many other things, appear to be unskilled in this, and lack the skill that I can boast because I am a disciple of the great Prodicus; and so now I find you do not understand that perhaps Simonides did not conceive "hard" in the way that you conceive it—just as, in the case of "awful," Prodicus here corrects me each time I use the word in praising you or someone else; when I say, for instance, that Protagoras is an awfully wise man, he asks if I am not ashamed to call good things awful. For awful, he says, is bad; thus no one on this or that occasion speaks of "awful wealth" or "awful peace" or "awful health," but we say "awful disease," "awful war" or "awful poverty," taking "awful" to be "bad." So perhaps "hard" also was intended by the Cans and Simonides as either "bad" or something else that you do not understand: let us therefore ask Prodicus, for it is fair to question him


Δ' έρωτάν· τί ἐλέγεν, ὃ Πρόδικε, τὸ χαλεπὸν Σιμωνίδης; Κακόν, ἔφη. Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ μέμφεται, ἢν δ' ἔγω, ὃ Πρόδικε, τὸν Πυττακὸν λέγοντα χαλεπὸν ἔσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ ἢκουν αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι ἐστὶ κακὸν ἔσθλὸν ἔμμεναι. 'Αλλὰ τί οἶει, ἔφη, λέγειν, ὃ Σῶ-κρατες, Σιμωνίδην ἄλλο ἦ τούτο, καὶ ὅνειδίζειν τῷ Πυττακῷ, ὅτι τὰ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἦπιστατο ὀρθῶς διαιρεῖν ἃτε Δέσβιος ὦν καὶ ἐν φωνῇ βαρβαρω τεθραμμένος; 'Ακοὐεις δή, ἔφην ἔγω, Ὡ Πρωταγόρα, Προδίκοι τοῦτε. ἔχεις τι πρός ταῦτα λέγειν; καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὃ Πρόδικε· ἀλλ' ἔγω εὐ οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ Σιμωνίδης τὸ χαλεπὸν ἔλεγεν ὅπερ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐ τὸ κακόν, ἀλλ' ὁ ἂν μὴ ράδιον ἦ, ἀλλὰ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων γίγνηται. 'Αλλὰ καὶ ἔγω οἶμαι, ἔφην, ὃ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο λέγειν Σιμωνίδην, καὶ Προδίκον γε τὸνδε εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ παίζειν καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειράσθαι, εἰ οἶδος τ' ἔσει τῷ σαντοῦ λόγῳ βοηθεῖν· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε Σι-Ε μωνίδης οὐ λέγει τὸ χαλεπὸν κακόν, μέγα τε-κμήριον ἔστιν εὐθὺς τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ρῆμα· λέγει γὰρ ὅτι

θέσι ἄν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας.

οὐ δὴποι τοῦτο γε λέγων, κακὸν ἔσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, εἰτὰ τὸν θεόν φησι μόνον τοῦτο ἄν ἔχειν καὶ τῷ θεῷ τοῦτο γέρας ἀπένειμε μόνως ἀκόλαστον γάρ ἄν των λέγων Σιμωνίδην ὁ Πρόδικος καὶ οὐδαμῶς Κεῖον. ἀλλ' ὁ μοι δοκεῖ διανοεῖσθαι Σιμωνίδης ἐν τοῦτο τῷ ἄσματι, ἑθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν, εἰ βούλει

342 λαβεῖν μοι πείραν ὅπως ἔχω, ὃ σού λέγεις τοῦτο, 192
on the dialect of Simonides. What did Simonides mean, Prodicus, by "hard"?

"Bad," he replied.

Then it is on this account, Prodicus, I said, that he blames Pittacus for saying it is hard to be good, just as though he heard him say it is bad to be good.

Well, Socrates, he said, what else do you think Simonides meant? Was he not reproaching Pittacus for not knowing how to distinguish words correctly, Lesbian as he was, and nurtured in a foreign tongue?

You hear, Protagoras, I said, what Prodicus here suggests: have you anything to say upon it?

The case, said Protagoras, is far otherwise, Prodicus: I am quite sure that Simonides meant by "hard" the same as we generally do—not "bad," but whatever is not easy and involves a great amount of trouble.

Ah, I agree with you, Protagoras, I said, that this is Simonides' meaning, and that our friend Prodicus knows it, but is joking and chooses to experiment on you to see if you will be able to support your own statement. For that Simonides does not mean that "hard" is "bad" we have clear proof forthwith in the next phrase, where he says—

God alone can have this privilege.

Surely he cannot mean that it is bad to be good, if he proceeds here to say that God alone can have this thing, and attributes this privilege to God only: otherwise Prodicus would call Simonides a rake, and no true Cean. But I should like to tell you what I take to be Simonides' intention in this ode, if you care to test my powers, as you put it,¹ in the matter

¹ Cf. 339 a above.
περὶ ἐπών· ἡν δὲ βούλῃ, σοῦ ἀκούσομαι. ὁ μὲν
σὸν Πρωταγόρας ἀκούσας μου ταῦτα λέγοντος,
Εἰ σὺ βούλει, ἔφη, ὦ Σῶκρατες· ὃ δὲ Πρόδικος
τε καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας ἐκελευνέτην πάντως· καὶ ὦ ἄλλῳ.
Ἐγὼ τοῖς ᾳ σεματοσ τοῦτο, πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διεξελθεῖν.
φιλοσοφία γὰρ ἐστὶ παλαιοστάτη τε καὶ πλείστῃ
tῶν Ἐλλήνων ἐν Κρήτῃ τε καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι,
Β καὶ σοφισταὶ πλεῖστοι γῆς ἐκεῖ εἰσίν· ἀλλ' ἐξ-
αρνοῦνται καὶ σχματιζοῦνται ἀμαθεῖς εἰναι, ἵνα
μὴ κατάδηλοι ὅσον ὁτι σοφία τῶν Ἐλλήνων
περίεισαν· ὥσπερ οὐς Πρωταγόρας ἐλεγε τοὺς
σοφιστάς· ἀλλὰ δοκῶσι τῷ μάχεσθαι καὶ ἀνδρεῖς
περιέναι· ἔχουμενοι· εἰ γνωσθεῖσιν ὃ περίεισι,
pάντας τοῦτο ἀσκήσειν· τὴν σοφίαν· νῦν δὲ
ἀποκρυφάμενοι ἐκεῖνο ἐξηπατήκασι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς
πόλεις λακωνίζοντας· καὶ οἱ μὲν ὃτα τε κατ-
ἀγνυται μεμούμενοι αὐτοῦς· καὶ ἰμάντας περι-
eιλέττονται καὶ φιλογυμναστοῦσα καὶ βραχέιας ἀνα-
βολὰς φοροῦν· ὡς δὴ τοῦτοι κρατοῦνται τῶν
Ἐλλήνων τοὺς Λακεδαίμονιούς· οἱ δὲ Λακε-
dαμόνιοι ἑπειδὰν βούλωνται ἀνέδην τοῖς παρ'
αὐτοῖς συγγενέσθαι σοφισταῖς· καὶ ἦδε ἀχθωνται
λάθρα ἐξγεγυμόμενοι· ἐξηλασίας ποιούμενοι τῶν
tε λακωνίζοντων τοῦτων καὶ ἐὰν τὰς ἄλλας ἔχεις
ὡς ἐπιδημῆση· συγγίγνοντα τοῖς σοφισταῖς λαν-
θάνοντες τοὺς ἔχειος· καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐδένα ἐώςι
D τῶν νέων εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐξεῖναι· ὥσπερ

1 Cf. 316 D. This whole passage is a mocking answer to
Protagoras's eulogy of sophistry.
2 Short cloaks or capes worn in a fashion imitated from
the Spartans.

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of verses; though if you would rather, I will hear your account.

When Protagoras heard me say this—As you please, Socrates, he said; then Prodicus and Hippias strongly urged me, and the rest of them also.

Well then, I said, I will try to explain to you my own feeling about this poem. Now philosophy is of more ancient and abundant growth in Crete and Lacedaemon than in any other part of Greece, and sophists are more numerous in those regions: but the people there deny it and make pretence of ignorance, in order to prevent the discovery that it is by wisdom that they have ascendancy over the rest of the Greeks, like those sophists of whom Protagoras was speaking; they prefer it to be thought that they owe their superiority to fighting and valour, conceiving that the revelation of its real cause would lead everyone to practise this wisdom. So well have they kept their secret that they have deceived the followers of the Spartan cult in our cities, with the result that some get broken ears by imitating them, bind their knuckles with thongs, go in for muscular exercises, and wear dashing little cloaks, as though it were by these means that the Spartans were the masters of Greece. And when the Spartans wish to converse unrestrainedly with their sophists, and begin to chafe at the secrecy of their meetings, they pass alien acts against the laconizing set and any other strangers within their gates, and have meetings with the sophists unknown to the foreigners; while on their part they do not permit any of their young men to travel abroad

\[3 \text{ i.e. people who have come to acquire the Spartan way of life, in order to spread it in other cities.}\]
οὐδὲ Κρῆτες, ἵνα μη ἀπομανθάνωσιν ἃ αὐτοὶ διδάσκουσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἐν ταῦταις ταῖς πόλεσιν ὦ μόνον ἄνδρες ἐπὶ παιδεύσει μέγα φρονοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναικεῖς. γνοίτε δ' ἄν, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ Λακεδαμόνιοι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ λόγους ἁρμάτα πεπαιδευται, ὧδε: εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλει τις Λακεδαμονίων τῷ φαυλοτάτῳ συγ-Ε γενέσθαι, τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εὐρήσει αὐτὸν φαύλον τινα φαινόμενον, ἡπειτα, ὅτου ἂν τῷξῃ τῶν λεγομένων, ἐνέβαλε ῥήμα αξίου λόγου βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένον ὕσσιν δεινὸς ἀκοντιστής, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον παι-δὸς μηδὲν βελτίω. τούτο οὖν αὐτὸ καὶ τῶν νῦν εἰσίν οἱ κατανεονήκασι καὶ τῶν πάλαι, ὅτι τὸ λακωνώςεων πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ φιλογυμναστεῖν, εἰδότες ὅτι τοιαῦτα οἶν τι 343 εἶναι ῥήματα φθέγγεσθαι τελεώς πεπαιδευμένου ἔστιν ἀνθρώπου. τούτων ἢν καὶ Θαλῆς ὁ Μι-λήσιος καὶ Πυττάκος ὁ Μυτιληναῖος καὶ Βίας ὁ Πρίηνεὺς καὶ Σόλων ὁ ἠμέτερος καὶ Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λινδιός καὶ Μύσων ὁ Χηνεὺς, καὶ ἐβδομος ἐν τούτοις ἐλέγετο Λακεδαμόνιος Χίλων. οὗτοι πάντες ζηλωταί καὶ ἐρασταὶ καὶ μαθηταὶ ἦσαν τῆς Λακεδαμονίων παιδείας· καὶ καταμάθοι ἂν τις αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν τοιαύτην οὕσαν, ῥήματα βραχέα ἀξιομηνόμενα ἐκάστω εἰρημένα, ἡ δ' 196
to the other cities—in this rule they resemble the Cretans—lest they unlearn what they are taught at home. In those two states there are not only men but women also who pride themselves on their education; and you can tell that what I say is true and that the Spartans have the best education in philosophy and argument by this: if you choose to consort with the meanest of Spartans, at first you will find him making a poor show in the conversation; but soon, at some point or other in the discussion, he gets home with a notable remark, short and compressed—a deadly shot that makes his interlocutor seem like a helpless child. Hence this very truth has been observed by certain persons both in our day and in former times—that the Spartan cult is much more the pursuit of wisdom than of athletics; for they know that a man's ability to utter such remarks is to be ascribed to his perfect education. Such men were Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, Bias of Priene, Solon of our city, Cleobulus of Lindus, Myson of Chen, and, last of the traditional seven, Chilon of Sparta. All these were enthusiasts, lovers and disciples of the Spartan culture; and you can recognize that character in their wisdom by the short, memorable sayings that fell from each of them: they assembled together and dedicated these as the first-fruits of their lore to Apollo in his Delphic temple, inscribing there those maxims which are on every tongue—"Know thyself" and "Nothing overmuch." To what intent do I say this? To show how the ancient philosophy had this style of laconic brevity; and

1 a add. Hermann.
καὶ τοῦ Πιππακοῦ ἰδία περιεφέρετο τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν, τὸ χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι. ὁ οὖν Συμωνίδης, ἀτε φιλότιμος ὡς ἐπὶ σοφία, ἐγνω ὅτι, εἰ καθέλοι τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ὡσπερ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἀθλητὴν καὶ περιγένοιτο αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς εὐδοκιμήσει ἐν τοῖς τότε ἀνθρώπως. εἰς τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ τοῦτον ἔνεκα τούτω ἐπιβουλεύων κολούσαν αὐτὸ ἀπαντὸ τὸ ἄσμα πεποίηκεν, ὡς μοι φαίνεται.

Ἐπισκεψόμεθα δὴ αὐτὸ κοινὴ ἄπαντες, εἰ ἀρα ἐγὼ ἀληθή λέγω. εὐθὺς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ ἁματας μανικὸν ἄν φανεῖη, εἰ βουλόμενος λέγειν, ὅτι ἄνδρα ἁγαθὸν γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, ἐπειτὰ ἐνέβαλε τὸ μέν, τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λόγον φαίνεται ἐμβεβληθαι, ἐὰν μή τις ὑπολάβῃ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιππακοῦ ῥῆμα ὡσπερ ἑρίζοντα λέγειν τὸν Συμωνίδην· λέγοντος τοῦ Πιππακοῦ ὅτι χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ἄμφισβητοῦντα εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ, ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν ἄνδρα ἁγαθὸν ἔστιν, ὡς Πιππακέ, ὡς ἀληθῶς, οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ ἁγαθὸν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτω λέγει τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς ἀρα ὄντων τινῶν τῶν μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἁγαθῶν, τῶν δὲ ἁγαθῶν μὲν, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθῶς· εὐθὺς γὰρ τοῦτο γε φανεῖ ἄν καὶ οὐ Συμωνίδου· ἀλλὰ ὑπερβατόν δεῖ θεῖαι ἐν τῷ ἁματα τὸ ἀλαθέως, οὕτωσι πὼς ὑπειπότα τὸ τοῦ Πιππακοῦ, ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ θείμεν αὐτὸν λέγουτα τὸν Πιππακὸ καὶ Συμωνίδην ἀποκρινόμενον, εἰπόντα ὡς ἀνθρώπολ, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, τὸν δὲ ἀποκρινόμενον ὅτι ὡ

1 In this view of the purpose of the poem (which is to show that there is no lasting perfection in human life), and 198
so it was that the saying of Pittacus was privately handed about with high approbation among the sages—that it is hard to be good. Then Simonides, ambitious to get a name for wisdom, perceived that if he could overthrow this saying, as one might some famous athlete, and become its conqueror, he would win fame himself amongst men of that day. Accordingly it was against this saying, and with this aim, that he composed the whole poem as a means of covertly assailing and abasing this maxim, as it seems to me.¹

Now let us all combine in considering whether my account is really true. The opening of the ode must at once appear crazy if, while intending to say that it is hard for a man to become good, he inserted "indeed." There is no sort of sense, I imagine, in this insertion, unless we suppose that Simonides is addressing himself to the saying of Pittacus as a disputant: Pittacus says—It is hard to be good; and the poet controverts this by observing—No, but to become good, indeed, is hard for a man, Pittacus, truly—not truly good; he does not mention truth in this connexion, or imply that some things are truly good, while others are good but not truly so: this would seem silly and unlike Simonides. We must rather take the "truly" as a poetical transposition, and first quote the saying of Pittacus in some such way as this: let us suppose Pittacus himself to be speaking and Simonides replying, as thus—Good people, he says, it is hard to be good; and the poet answers—Pittacus, what you

in the detailed commentary that follows, Socrates is aping the disquisitions of the more literary sophists (e.g. Hippias, who warmly approves, 347 a).
ΠΛΑΤΟ

344 Πιττακή, οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἄλλα
gενέσθαι μὲν ἕστιν ἄνδρα ἄγαθὸν χερσὶ τε καὶ
ποσὶ καὶ νῷ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον,
χαλέπων ἀλαθέως. οὕτω φαίνεται [τὸ]¹ πρὸς
λόγον τὸ μὲν ἐμβεβλημένον καὶ τὸ ἀλαθέως
ὀρθῶς ἐπ’ ἐσχάτῳ κείμενον. καὶ τὰ ἐπιώντα
πάντα τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ, ὡς οὕτως εὑρηται. πολ-
λὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ
Β ἁσματι εἰρημένων ἀποδείξει ὡς εὗ πεποίηται·
pάνω γὰρ χαριέντως καὶ μεμελημένως ἔχει· ἄλλα
μακρὸν ἂν εpolator οὕτως διελθείη. ἄλλα τὸν
τύπον αὐτοῦ τὸν ὅλον διεξῆθημεν καὶ τὴν βού-
λησιν, ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐλεγχὸς ἔστι τοῦ Πιτ-
τακείου ῥήματος διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ἁσματος.

Λέγει γὰρ μετὰ τούτῳ ὁλίγα διελθάνη, ὡς ἂν
εἰ λέγοι λόγον, ὅτι γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἄγαθὸν
χαλέπων ἀλαθέως, οἱ ὅν τε μέντοι ἐπὶ γε χρόνο
τυά· γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἔξει
C καὶ εἰναι ἄνδρα ἄγαθὸν, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ó Πιττακε, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρώπειον, ἄλλα θεὸς ἂν μόνος
tοῦτο ἔχοι τὸ γέρας,

ἄνδρα δ’ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
δν ἂν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.

τίνα οὖν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθαίρει ἐν πλοῖον
ἀρχῇ; δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸν ἰδιώτην· ὃ μὲν γὰρ
ἰδιώτης ἄει καθήρηται· ὡσπερ οὖν οὐ τὸν κεῖ-
μενόν τις ἂν καταβάλως, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἐστώτα
ποτὲ καταβάλως ἂν τις, ὡστε κείμενον ποιήσαι,
D τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὐ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν εὐμήχανον ὄντα
ποτὲ ἀμήχανος ἂν συμφορὰ καθέλοι, τὸν δὲ ἂει

¹ τὸ scel. Heindorf.

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PROTAGORAS

say is not true, for it is not being but becoming good, indeed—in hands and feet and mind foursquare, fashioned without reproach—that is truly hard. In this way we see a purpose in the insertion of "indeed," and that the "truly" is correctly placed at the end; and all that comes after corroborates this view of his meaning. There are many points in the various expressions of the poem which might be instanced to show its fine composition, for it is a work of very elegant and elaborate art; but it would take too long to detail all its beauties. However, let us go over its general outline and intention, which is assuredly to refute Pittacus' saying, throughout the ode.

Proceeding a little way on from our passage, just as though he were making a speech, he says to become, indeed, a good man is truly hard (not but what it is possible for a certain space of time); "but to continue in this state of what one has become, and to be a good man is, as you say, Pittacus, impossible, superhuman: God alone can have this privilege—

For that man cannot help but be bad
Whom irresistible mischance has overthrown.

Now who is it that an irresistible mischance overthrows in the command of a ship? Clearly not the ordinary man, for he may be overcome at any time; just as you cannot knock over one who is lying down, but one who is standing; you might knock over a standing man so as to make him lie down, not one who is lying down already. So it is a man apt to resist that an irresistible mischance would overthrow, and not one who could never resist
Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλὸς ἐγχωρεῖ κακῶς γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ παρ’ ἄλλου ποιητοῦ μαρτυρεῖται τοῦ εἰπόντος

αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἄγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακὸς, ἄλλοτε δ’ ἐσθλὸς.

tῷ δὲ κακῷ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ Ε ἐίναι ἀνάγκη. ὥστε τὸν μὲν εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ ἁγαθὸν ἐπειδὰν ἁμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη, οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἐμμεναι· σὺ δὲ φῆς, ὦ Πιττακέ, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναι· τὸ δ’ ἔστι γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν, δυνατὸν δὲ, ἐσθλὸν, ἐμμεναι δὲ ἀδύνατον.

πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἄγαθός, κακὸς δ’ εἰ κακῶς.

tίς οὖν εἰς γράμματα ἁγαθὴ πράξις ἐστι, καὶ tίς ἄνδρα ἁγαθὸν ποιεῖ εἰς γράμματα; δήλον ὅτι ἡ τούτων μάθησις. τίς δὲ εὐπραγία ἁγαθὸν ιατρὸν ποιεῖ; δήλον ὅτι ἡ τῶν καμινῶντων τῆς θεραπείας μάθησις. κακὸς δὲ κακῶς· τίς οὖν ἂν κακὸς ιατρός γένοιτο; δήλον ὅτι ὦ πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχῃ ιατρῷ εἶναι, ἕπειτα ἁγαθῷ ιατρῷ· οὕτως γὰρ ἄν κακὸς γένοιτο· ἠμεῖς δὲ οἱ ιατρικῆς ἰδίωται οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ γενοίμεθα κακῶς πράξαντες οὔτε ιατρῷ οὔτε τέκτονες οὔτε ἄλλο

Β οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅστις δὲ μὴ ιατρός ἂν γένοιτο κακῶς πράξας, δήλον ὅτι οὐδὲ κακὸς ιατρός. οὕτω καὶ ὃ μὲν ἁγαθὸς ἀνὴρ γένοιτ' ἂν ποτε καὶ 202
anything. A great storm breaking over a steersman will render him helpless, and a severe season will leave a farmer helpless, and a doctor will be in the same case. For the good has the capacity of becoming bad, as we have witness in another poet who said—

Nay more, the virtuous man is at one time bad, at another good.

whereas the bad man has no capacity for becoming, but must ever be, what he is; so that when an irresistible mischance overthrows him who is resourceful, wise, and good, he cannot but be bad; and you say, Pittacus, that it is hard to be good—that is, to become good, indeed, is hard, though possible, but to be good is impossible: for—

If he hath fared well, every man is good;
Bad, if ill.

Now what is good faring in letters—the thing that makes a man good at them? Clearly, the study of letters. What welfare makes a good doctor? Clearly, the study of the cure of the ailing. "Bad, if ill": who could become a bad doctor? Clearly, he who in the first place is a doctor, and in the second, a good doctor; for he could become a bad one also: whereas we, who are laymen in respect of medicine, could never by faring ill become either doctors or joiners or anything else of that sort; and if one cannot become a doctor by faring ill, clearly one cannot become a bad one either. In the same way the good man may one day become

1 Unknown.
2 The quotation of Simonides' poem is resumed (from 344 c).
κακὸς ἢ ὕπο χρόνου ἢ ὕπο πόνου ἢ ὕπο νόσου ἢ ὕπο ἄλλου τινὸς περιπτώματος· αὕτη γὰρ μόνη ἐστὶ κακῇ πρᾶξις, ἐπιστήμης στερηθήναι· ὅ δὲ κακὸς ἀνήρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο κακὸς· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἀεὶ· ἀλλ' εἰ μέλλει κακὸς γενέσθαι, δεῖ αὐτὸν πρὸτερον ἁγαθὸν γενέσθαι. ὧστε καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ἄσματος πρὸς τοῦτο τείνει, ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἄνδρα ἁγαθὸν οὖν οἶνον τε διατελοῦντα ἁγαθόν, γενέσθαι δὲ ἁγαθὸν οἶνον τε, καὶ κακὸν γε τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον· ἐπὶ πλείστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοί εἰσον οὐς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.

Ταῦτα τε οὖν πάντα πρὸς τὸν Πιττακὸν εἰρημεῖν, καὶ τὰ ἐπίοντα γε τοῦ ἄσματος ἑτὶ μᾶλλον δήλοι. φησὶ γὰρ·

tοῦνεκεν οὗ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατὸν διεξήμενος κενεῖν εἰς ἀπρακτὸν ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνοι βαλέων, πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὁσοὶ καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονὸς.

D ἐπὶ θ' ὑμῖν εὐρών ἀπαγγελέων,

φησίν· οὕτω σφόδρα καὶ δι' ὅλου τοῦ ἄσματος ἐπεξέρχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥήματι·

πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἐκὼν ὡστὶς ἔρδη μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται·

καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰρημένον. οὔ γὰρ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτος ἢν Σιμωνίδης, ὥστε τοῦτος φάναι ἐπανεῖν, ὅσ ἃν ἐκὼν μηδὲν καν' ὅτι, ὥσ ὄντων τινῶν οἶ έκόντες κακὰ ποιῶσιν. ἐγὼ γὰρ σχεδὸν τι οἴμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν 204
bad through the effect either of time or work or illness or some other accident; for there is only one sort of ill fare—the deprivation of knowledge. But the bad man can never become bad: he is that always. If he is to become bad, he must previously become good. Hence the upshot of this part of the poem is that it is impossible to be a good man, continuing to be good, but possible to become good, and bad also, in the case of the same person. And then—

Best also for the longest space are they whom the gods love.\(^1\)

All this has been said with reference to Pittacus, as is made still plainer by the ensuing verses, in which he says—

Therefore never shall I, in quest of what cannot come to pass, vainly cast my life’s lot upon a hope impracticable—of finding a man wholly blameless amongst us who partake of the fruit of the broad-based earth. If I light upon him, be sure I will report it—

says he; and in this vehement tone he pursues the saying of Pittacus all through the poem:

But I praise and love everyone willingly committing no baseness; for against necessity not even the gods make war.

This also is spoken—with the same intent. For Simonides was not so ill-educated as to say that he praised a person who willingly did no evil, as though there were some who did evil willingly. I am fairly sure of this—that none of the wise men con-

\(^1\) Probably a loose quotation of a line of the poem which was και τὸ πλείστον ἄριστοι, τοὺς κε θεοὶ φιλῶσιν (Aars).
ΠΛΑΤΟ

σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡγεῖται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἐκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνει οὐδὲ αἰσχρά τε καὶ κακά ἐκόντα ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλ' εὖ ἦσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντες ἀκούσει καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Συμωνίδης οὐχ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὰ ποιῆ ἐκών, τούτων φησὶν ἐπαινέτης εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λέγει τούτο τὸ ἑκὼν. ἡγεῖτο γὰρ ἀνδρὰ καλὸν κἀγαθὸν πολλάκις αὐτῶν ἐπαναγκάζειν φίλον τυί γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπαινέτην [φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπανεῖν], οἷον ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις συμβιβάζει μητέρα ἡ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον ἡ πατρίδα ἡ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ποιημαῖς, ὅταν τοιοῦτὸν τι αὐτῶς συμβιβάζει, ὡσπερ ἀσμένους ὅραν καὶ ψέ- γοντας ἐπιδεικνύει καὶ κατηγορεῖν τὴν ποιημάτιν τῶν γονέων ἡ πατρίδος, ὅπως τὰ δὲ ἅμα ἀκούσει καὶ τὰ ἅμα ἀκούσει τῷ γαμμή ὃς ἂν αὐτῶς ἅμα ἀκούσει

Β τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔχθρας ἐκοινοῦσι πρὸς ταῖς ἀναγκαῖαις προστίθεσθαι· τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς ἐπικρύπτεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἀναγκαζεῖσθαι, καὶ ἂν τὰ ὀργισθῶσι τοὺς γονεὺς ἡ πατρίδι ἀδικηθέντες, αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς παραμυθεῖσθαι καὶ διαλάττεσθαι προσαναγκάζοντας ἑαυτοὺς φιλεῖν τοὺς ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν. πολλάκις δὲ, οἷοι, καὶ ὁ Συμωνίδης ἡγήσατο καὶ αὐτὸς ἡ τύραννον ἡ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπαινέσαι καὶ ἐγκωμίασαι

C οὐχ ἐκών, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος. τάυτα δὴ καὶ τῷ Πιττακῷ λέγει ὅτι ἔγω, ὁ Πιττακός, οὐ διὰ τάυτά σε ψέγω, ὅτι εἴμι φιλόφογος, ἐπεὶ ἐμού' ἐξαρκεῖ δὲ ἂν μὴ κακὸς ἦ

1 φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπανεῖν secl. Grou.
PROTAGORAS

siders that anybody ever willingly errs or willingly does base and evil deeds; they are well aware that all who do base and evil things do them unwillingly; and so Simonides does not say he gives his praise to the person who willingly does no evil, but uses the word "willingly" of himself. For he considered that a man of sense and honour often constrains himself to become a friend and approver of some person, as when a man chances to have an un-congenial mother or father or country or other such connexion. Now when this sort of thing befalls the wicked, they seem glad to see their parents' or country's faults, and complainingly point them out and inveigh against them, in order that their own neglect of them may not be denounced by their neighbours, who might otherwise reproach them for being so neglectful; and hence they multiply their complaints and add voluntary to unavoidable feuds. But good men, he knew, conceal the trouble and constrain themselves to praise, and if they have any reason to be angered against their parents or country for some wrong done to them they pacify and conciliate their feelings, compelling themselves to love and praise their own people. And many a time, I think, Simonides was conscious that he had praised and eulogized some tyrant or other such person, not willingly, but under compulsion. So he proceeds to tell Pittacus—I, Pittacus, do not reproach you merely because I am apt to reproach, since—

For my part I am content with whosoever is not evil or

ἀναγκαίας Heusde: ἀναγκαίας mss.
μηδὲ ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰδώς τ' ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν
υγιῆς ἀνήρ.
oὐ μὲν ἐγὼ μωμήσομαι.
oὐ γὰρ ἐμὶ φιλόμωμος.
tῶν γὰρ ἥλιθινων ἀπείρων γενέθλα,
ὡςτ' εἴ τις χαίρει ψέγων, ἐμπληθείη ἂν ἐκείνους
μεμφόμενος.

πάντα τοι καλά, τοῦτο τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμικται.
oὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἶ ἐλεγεὶ πάντα τοι
D λευκά, οἷς μέλανα μὴ μέμικται. γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν
ἐγὼ πολλαχῇ. ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ μέσα ἀπο-
δέχεται ὡστε μὴ ψέγειν· καὶ οὐ ζητῶ, ἐφή,
πανάμμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυδοὺς ὅσοι καρπὸν
αὐτύμεθα χθονός, ἐπί θ' ὑμῖν εὐρὼν ἀπαγγελέως·
ὡστε τούτου γ' ἔνεκα οὐδένα ἐπανέσομαι, ἀλλὰ
μοι ἐξαρκεῖ, ἂν ἢ μέσος καὶ μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῇ,
ὡς ἐγὼ πάντας φιλέω καὶ ἐπαίνημι—καὶ τῇ φωνῇ
ἐνταῦθα κέχρηται τῇ τῶν Μυτιληναίων, ὡς πρὸς
E Πιτακὸν λέγων τὸ πάντας δὲ ἐπαίνημι καὶ
φιλέω ἐκών (ἐνταῦθα δεὶ ἐν τῷ ἐκών διαλαβεὶν
λέγοντα) ὅστις ἔρθη μηδὲν αἰσχρῶν, ἄκων δ' ἐστιν
οὐς ἐγὼ ἐπαίνῳ καὶ φιλῶ. σὲ οὖν, καὶ
eἰ μέσως ἐλεγεῖς ἐπιτεική καὶ ἀληθῆ, ὃ Πιτακέ,
347 οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐφεγεῖν. νῦν δὲ—σφόδρα γὰρ καὶ
περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψευδόμενοι δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ
λέγειν, διὰ ταῦτα σὲ ἐγὼ ψέγω.

Ταῦτα μοι δοκεῖ, ὃ Πρόδικε καὶ Πρωταγόρα,
ἡν δ' ἐγὼ. Σμιωνίδης διανοούμενος πεποιηκέναι
τούτο τὸ ἄσμα. καὶ ὁ Ἴππιας, Ἐν μὲν μοι δο-

1 τ' ὀνησίπολιν G. Hermann: γε ὄνησει πόλιν mss.
2 μὲν Schleiermacher: μὴν mss.
too intractable. He who knows Right, the support of a city, is a healthy man: him I shall never blame, for to blame I am not apt. Infinite is the race of fools.

So that whoever delights in reproaching would have his fill of blaming them:

Verily, all things are fair that have in them no admixture of base.

By this he does not mean to say, as it were, that all things are white that have no admixture of black; that would be ridiculous in many ways; but that he himself accepts the average sort without reproaching them. "I do not seek," said he, "a man wholly blameless amongst us who partake of the fruit of the broad-based earth: if I light upon him, be sure I will report it"—meaning, "If I wait for that, I shall never find anyone to praise. No, I am content if a man be average and do nothing evil, since I love and praise all"—and there he has used a Mytilenaean word,\(^1\) for his "I praise and love all willingly" is addressed to Pittacus (here at "willingly" one should make a pause);—"all who commit nothing base, but some there are whom I praise and love unwillingly. Hence I should never reproach you, Pittacus, if you would only speak what is moderately reasonable and true. But as it is, since you lie so grievously about the greatest matters with an air of speaking the truth, on this score I reproach you."

Such is my view, Prodicus and Protagoras, I said, of Simonides' intention in composing this ode.

Then Hippias remarked: It certainly seems to

\(^1\) The form of the word ἐπαινημί is pedantically adduced to emphasize the poet's censure of Pittacus.
PLATO

κεῖσ, ἐφη, ὥ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἀσματος διεληλυθέναι· ἔστι μέντοι, ἐφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ λόγος

Β περὶ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἔχων, ὃν ύμίν ἐπιδεῖξω, ἂν βούλησθε. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Ναί, ἐφη, ὥ Ἰππία, εἰσαῦθις ἄν χίν ἔδεικιν ἔστων, ἀ ὡμολογησάτην πρὸς ἄλληλον Πρωταγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης, Πρωταγόρας μὲν εἰ ἔτι βούλεται ἐρωτῶν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι Σωκράτης, εἰ δὲ ἐλθεῖν μὲν ἐπιτρέπει ἐγὼ εἰτε βούλεται ἐρωτῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ εἰτον 'Ἐπιτρέπω μὲν ἔγωγε Πρωταγόρα ὀπότερον αὐτῷ

C ἦδιον· εἰ δὲ βούλεται, περὶ μὲν ἀσμάτων τε καὶ ἐπῶν ἐάσωμεν, περὶ δὲ ὃν τὸ πρῶτον ἐγὼ σὲ ἡρώτησα, ὥ Πρωταγόρα, ἢδεσ ἀν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔλθομι μετὰ σοῦ σκοπούμενοι. καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι τὸ περὶ ποιήσεως διαλέγεσθαι ὁμοίοτατον εἶναι τοὺς συμποσίως τοῖς τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἄγοραῖων ἀνθρώπων. καὶ γὰρ οὕτω, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἄλληλοι δι' ἐαυτῶν συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ πότῳ μηδὲ διὰ τῆς ἐαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων

D τῶν ἐαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαιδεύσιας, τιμίας ποιοῦσι τὰς αὐλητρίδας, πολλοὶ μιαθοῦμενοι ἀλλοτρίαν φωνὴν τὴν τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἔκεισων φωνῆς ἄλληλοι σύνειν· ὅποιον δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοι συμπόται καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν, όν ὃν ᾧς οὕτως αὐλητρίδας οὕτε ὁρχηστρίδας οὕτε ψαλτρίας, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς ἱκανοὺς ὄντας συνεῖναι ἄνευ τῶν λῆρων τε καὶ παιδιῶν τούτων διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν φωνῆς, λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐν μέρει ἐαυτῶν κοσμίως, κἂν πάνω πολλοὶ οἶνον πίωσιν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε συνοισίαι, ἐὰν μὲν λάβωνται ἀνδρῶν, οἴοιπερ ἥμιν οἱ πολλοὶ φασὶν εἶναι, οὕδεν δέονται ἀλλοτρίας φωνῆς οὐδὲ ποιητῶν,
me, Socrates, that you have given a good exposition of the poem; but I also have an elegant discourse upon it, which I will perform for you if you wish.

Yes, Hippias, said Alcibiades, but some other time: for the moment the proper thing, according to the agreement which Protagoras and Socrates made between them, will be for Socrates to answer any questions that Protagoras may still wish to put to him, but if he prefers to answer Socrates, then it will be for Socrates to ask.

On this I remarked: For my part I place it in Protagoras's hands to do whichever he likes best. But if he does not mind, let us talk no more of poems and verses, but consider the points on which I questioned you at first, Protagoras, and on which I should be glad to reach, with your help, a conclusion. For it seems to me that arguing about poetry is comparable to the wine-parties of common market-folk. These people, owing to their inability to carry on a familiar conversation over their wine by means of their own voices and discussions—such is their lack of education—put a premium on flute-girls by hiring the extraneous voice of the flute at a high price, and carry on their intercourse by means of its utterance. But where the party consists of thorough gentlemen who have had a proper education, you will see neither flute-girls nor dancing-girls nor harp-girls, but only the company contenting themselves with their own conversation, and none of these fooleries and frolics—each speaking and listening decently in his turn, even though they may drink a great deal of wine. And so a gathering like this of ours, when it includes such men as most of us claim to be, requires no extraneous voices,
οὔς οὔτε ἄνερέσθαι οἶνον τ‟ ἐστι περὶ δ‟ ὑν λέγουσιν, ἐπαγόμενοι τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἳ μὲν ταῦτα φασι τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν, οἳ δ‟ ἔτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι δ‟ ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἐξελέγξαι· ἄλλα τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας συνουσίας ἔως χαίρειν, αὐτοὶ δ‟ ἐαυτοῖς σύνειοι δ‟ ἐαυτῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἐαυτῶν λόγοις πεῖραν ἄλληλων λαμβάνοντες καὶ διδόντες. τοὺς τουούτους μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι μᾶλλον μμείσθαι ἐμὲ τε καὶ σέ, καταθεμένους τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτοὺς δ‟ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς ἄλληλους τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πεῖραν λαμβάνοντας· καὶ μὲν βούλῃ ἐτὶ ἐρωτάν, ἐτομὸς εἰμὶ σοι παρέχων ἀποκρυνόμενος· εάν δ‟ ἐβούλη, σὺ εἰμὶ παράσχεσ, περὶ δ‟ ὑν μεταξὺ ἐπαυσάμεθα διεξίοντες, τούτους τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι. λέγοντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα οὐδ‟ ἄπεσάφει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ὀπότερα ποιήσοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ ᾿Αλκιβιάδης πρὸς τὸν Καλλίαν βλέψας, ᾿Ω Καλλία, δοκεῖ σοι, ἐφι, καὶ νῦν καλῶς Πρωταγόρας ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἔθελων εἴτε δώσει λόγον εἴτε μὴ διασαφεῖν; ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ· ἀλλ‟ ἦτοι διαλεγόμεν ἡ εἰπέτω ὦτι οὐκ ἔθελε διαλέγεσθαι, ἵνα τούτω μὲν ταῦτα συνειδώμεν. Σωκράτης δ‟ ἄλλω τῷ διαλέγεται ἡ ἄλλος ὁ στις ἀν βούληται ἄλλω. καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αἰσχυνθείς, ὃς γ„ μοι ἐδοξε, τοῦ τ‟ ᾿Αλκιβιάδου ταῦτα λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ Καλλίου δεομένου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδὸν τι τῶν παρόντων, μόνις προ-

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not even of the poets, whom one cannot question on the sense of what they say; when they are adduced in discussion we are generally told by some that the poet thought so and so, and by others, something different, and they go on arguing about a matter which they are powerless to determine. No, this sort of meeting is avoided by men of culture, who prefer to converse directly with each other, and to use their own way of speech in putting one another by turns to the test. It is this sort of person that I think you and I ought rather to imitate; putting the poets aside, let us hold our discussion together in our own persons, making trial of the truth and of ourselves. So if you wish to question me further, I am at your service as answerer; but if you like, put yourself at my service, so that we may clear up the several points of the inquiry in which we stopped half-way.

On my saying this and something more of the sort, Protagoras gave no indication as to which course he would take. So Alcibiades, looking at Callias, said: Do you consider, Callias, that Protagoras is behaving properly now in refusing to signify whether he will or will not answer? I do not think he is. Let him either debate or say that he does not want to debate, so that we may have this understanding with him; then Socrates can debate with someone else, or another of us with some other, as may be agreed.

Then Protagoras was ashamed, as it seemed to me, at these words of Alcibiades, and the more so when Callias requested him, together with almost the whole of the company; and so he reluctantly prevailed on himself to take up the debate, and
τράπετο εἰς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἔρωτὰς αὐτὸν ὡς ἀποκρυνούμενος.

Εἶπον δὴ ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ οἶον διαλέγεσθαι μέ σοι ἄλλο τι βουλόμενον ἢ ἄ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ ἐκάστοτε, ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἦγούμαι γὰρ πάνυ λέγειν τι τὸν "Ομηρὸν τὸ

D σὺν τε δὐ' ἐρχομένων, καὶ τε πρὸ δ τοῦ ἐνόησεν.

εὐπορώτεροι γὰρ πως ἀπαντέσ ἐσμὲν οἱ ἀνθρώποι πρὸς ἄπαν ἔργον καὶ λόγον καὶ διανόημα. μούνος δ' εἴπερ τε νόησῃ, αὐτίκα περιών ζητεῖ ὅτω ἐπιδείξῃ καὶ μεθ' ὅτον βεβαιώσῃται, ἔως ἂν ἐντύχῃ. ὥστε καὶ ἤγῳ ἦνεκα τούτοις σοι ἢδέως διαλέγομαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ τινί, ἥγού-

μενός σε βέλτιστ' ἂν ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ περὶ

Ε τῶν ἄλλων περὶ δ' δὲν εἰκός σκοπεῖσθαι τὸν ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς. τίνα γὰρ ἄλλον ἢ σέ; ὃς γε οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς οἶεί καλὸς κἀγαθὸς εἶναι, ὥστε τυφές ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσίν, ἄλλους δὲ οὐ δύνανται ποιεῖν· συ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς εἴ καὶ ἄλλους οἰός τ' εἴ ποιεῖν ἀγαθούς. καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῷ, ἦστε καὶ ἄλλων ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων σύ γ' ἀνα-

349 φανδόν σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυξάμενος εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἐλλήνας, σοφιστὴν ἐπονομάζας, σεαυτὸν ἀπέ-

φηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος τούτοις μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἄρνυθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐ

σε χρῆν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων σκέψιν καὶ ἐρωτάν καὶ ἀνακοινούσθαι; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐ.

καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνα, ἀπερ το πρῶτον ἠρώτων

1 Iliad, x. 224.
asked to have questions put to him, since he was ready to answer.

So I proceeded to say—Protagoras, do not suppose that I have any other desire in debating with you than to examine the difficulties which occur to myself at each point. For I hold that there is a good deal in what Homer says—

When two go together, one observes before the other;

for somehow it makes all of us human beings more resourceful in every deed or word or thought; but if one observes something alone, forthwith one has to go about searching until one discovers somebody to whom one can show it off and who can corroborate it. And I also have my reason for being glad to debate with you rather than with anyone else; it is that I regard you as the best person to investigate in general any matters that a sensible man may be expected to examine, and virtue in particular. Whom else should I choose but you? Not only do you consider yourself a worthy gentleman, like sundry other people, who are sensible enough themselves, but cannot make others so; but you are both good yourself and have the gift of making others good. And you are so confident of yourself that, while others make a secret of this art, you have had yourself publicly proclaimed to all the Greeks with the title of sophist, and have appointed yourself preceptor of culture and virtue, and are the first who has ever demanded a regular fee for such work. What then could I do but call upon you to deal with our problem both by question and communication? I had no other course. So now with regard to those points which I have raised.
περὶ τούτων, πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ εὖ ἄρχης τὰ μὲν
Β ἀναμισθῆναι παρὰ σοῦ, τὰ δὲ συνδιασκέψασθαι.
ἡ δὲ, ὡς ἐγώμαι, τὸ ἐρώτημα τὸδε· σοφία καὶ
σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὀσίότης
πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε ὅντα ὄνοματα, ἐπὶ ἐνὶ πράγ-
ματι ἐστιν, ἡ ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὄνομάτων τοῦτων
ὑπόκειται τις ἱδίος οὐσία καὶ πράγμα ἔχον ἐαυτοῦ
δύναμιν ἐκαστον, οὐκ ὃν οἶον τὸ ἐτερον αὐτῶν τὸ
ἐτερον; ἔφησα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὄνοματα ἐπὶ ἐνὶ εἶναι,
C ἄλλα ἐκαστον ἰδίω πράγματι τῶν ὄνομάτων τοῦτων
ἐπικείσομαι, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μόρια εἶναι ἀρετῆς,
οὐχ ὡς τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια ὀμοιὰ ἐστιν ἀλλήλοις
καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὐ μόρια ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ τοῦ προ-
σώπου μόρια καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὐ μόρια ἐστιν καὶ ἀλλή-
λοις ἀνόμοια, ἴδιαν ἐκαστα δύναμιν ἔχοντα. ταῦτα
εἰ μὲν σοι δοκεῖ ἐτὶ ὃσπερ τότε, φαθί· εἰ δὲ ἄλλως
πως, τοῦτο διόρισαι, ὡς ἔγωγε οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον
τίθεμαι, εάν πη ἀλλη νῦν φήσης· οὐ γὰρ ἄν θαυμά-
D ξομι, εἰ τότε ἀποπειρώμενον μοι ταῦτα ἐλεγες.
'Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, λέγω, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὅτι
tαῦτα πάντα μόρια μὲν ἐστιν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὰ μὲν
τέτταρα αὐτῶν ἑπικεκάωσα παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις
ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία πάνιν πολὺ διαφέρουν πάντων
tοῦτων. ἢδε δὲ γνώσει ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῇ λέγω·
eὐρήσεις γὰρ πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδικουτάτοις
μὲν ὅντας καὶ ἀνοσωτάτοις καὶ ἀκολαστάτοις
καὶ ἀμαθεστάτοις, ἀνδρειοτάτοις δὲ διαφερόντως.
Ε 'Εχε δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ· ἀξίων γὰρ τοι ἐπισκέψασθαι
ὁ λέγεις. πότερον τούς ἄνδρείους θαρραλέους
λέγεις ἡ ἀλλο τι; Καὶ ἤτας γε, ἔφη, ἔφ' α' οἱ πολλοὶ

1 Cf. 329 c foll.
PROTAGORAS

on the subject in my opening questions, I desire to be reminded of some by you and to have your help in investigating others. The question, I believe, was this: Are the five names of wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, and holiness attached to one thing, or underlying each of these names is there a distinct existence or thing that has its own particular function, each thing being different from the others? And your answer was that they are not names attached to one thing, but that each of these names applies to a distinct thing, and that all these are parts of virtue; not like the parts of gold, which are similar to each other and to the whole of which they are parts, but like the parts of the face, dissimilar to the whole of which they are parts and to each other, and each having a distinct function. If you still hold the same opinion of them, say so; if you have a new one, define what it is, for I make no objection to your replying now on other lines. Indeed I should not be surprised if you were merely experimenting upon me when you spoke before.

Well, Socrates, he replied, I say that all these are parts of virtue, and that while four of them are fairly on a par with each other, courage is something vastly different from all the rest. You may perceive the truth of what I say from this: you will find many people extremely unjust, unholy, dissolute, and ignorant, and yet pre-eminently courageous.

Stop now, I said: we must duly examine what you say. Do you call courageous men bold, or something else?

Yes, and impetuous also, he replied, where most men fear to tread.
PLATO

φοβοῦνται ἕναι. Φέρε δὴ, τὴν ἀρετὴν καλὸν τι φής εἶναι, καὶ ὡς καλὸν ὄντος αὐτοῦ σὺ διδάσκαλον σαυτὸν παρέχεις; Κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν, ἡφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι γε. Πότερον οὖν, ἤ δ' ἐγὼ, τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ αἰσχρόν, τὸ δὲ τι καλὸν, ἢ ὁλὸν καλὸν; "Ολον που καλὸν ως οἶον τε μάλιστα. Ὅσθα οὖν 350 τίνες εἰς τὰ φρέατα κολυμβῶσι θαρραλέως; "Ἐγγυς, ὅτι οἱ κολυμβηταί. Πότερον διότι ἐπίστανται ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι; "Ὅτι ἐπίστανται. Τίνες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱππῶν πολεμεῖν θαρραλέοι εἰσὶ; πότερον οἱ ἱππικοὶ ἢ οἱ ἄφιπποι; Οἱ ἱππικοὶ. Τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες; οἱ πελταστικοὶ ἢ οἱ μή; Οἱ πελταστικοί. καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γε πάντα, εἰ τοῦτο ζητεῖς, ἡφη, οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροὶ εἰσὶ, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐαυτῶν, ἐπειδὰν Β μάθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν. "Ηδη δέ τινας ἐώρακας, ἡφην, πάντων τούτων ἀνεπιστήμονας ὄντας, θαρροῦντας δὲ πρὸς ἐκαστὰ τούτων; "Ἐγγυς, ἢ δ' ὅσ, καὶ λίαν γε θαρροῦντας. Οὐκοῦν οἱ θαρραλεοὶ οὕτοι καὶ ἀνδρείοι εἴσιν; Αἰσχρὸν μὲντ' ἃν, ἡφη, εἴη ἢ ἀνδρεία· ἐπεὶ οὕτοι γε μανώμενοι εἴσιν. Πῶς οὖν, ἡφην ἐγὼ, λέγεις τοὺς ἀνδρείους; οὐχὶ τοὺς Σ θαρραλέους εἴναι; Καὶ νῦν γ', ἡφη. Οὐκοῦν 218
Well now, do you say that virtue is a good thing, and of this good thing offer yourself as teacher?

Nay, it is the best of things, he said, unless I am out of my senses.

Then is one part of it base and another good, or is the whole good?

Surely the whole is good in the highest possible degree.

Now do you know who dive boldly into wells?

I do; divers.

Is this because they have knowledge, or for some other reason?

Because they have knowledge.

And who are bold in going to war on horseback—those who are practised horsemen, or those who are not?

Practised horsemen.

And who with bucklers—buckler-men. or those who are not?

Buckler-men: and so with all other cases, he went on, if that is your point; those who have knowledge are bolder than those who lack it, and individually they are bolder when they have learnt than before learning.

But you must have seen at times, I said, persons who are without knowledge of any of these affairs, yet behaving boldly in each of them.

I have, he said, and very boldly too.

Then are these bold ones courageous also?

Nay, that would make courage a base thing, he replied; for those you speak of are out of their senses.

What then, I asked, do you mean by courageous men? Surely the same as bold men?

Yes, I do still, he said.
οὕτως, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, οἱ οὔτω θαρραλέοι οὔτες οὐκ ἀνδρείοι ἄλλα μανόμενοι φαίνονται; καὶ ἐκεῖ αὖ οἱ σοφώτατοι οὕτω καὶ θαρραλεώτατοι εἰσι, θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ οὔτες ἀνδρείοτατοι; καὶ κατὰ τούτον τὸν λόγον ἡ σοφία ἂν ἀνδρεία εἰη; Οὐ καλῶς, ἐφη, μνημονεύεις, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἄ ἐλεγόν τε καὶ ἀπεκρηνόμην σοι. ἔγρωγε ἐρωτηθεῖς ὑπὸ σοῦ, εἰ οἱ ἀνδρείοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ἡμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρείοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήθην· εἰ γὰρ με τότε ἦρουν, 

D εἶπον ἂν ὅτι οὐ πάντες· τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσί, τὸ ἐμὸν ὡμολόγημα οὐδαμοὶ ἐπεδείξας ὡς οὐκ ὑθῶς ὡμολόγησα. ἐπειτά τοὺς ἐπισταμένους αὐτοὺς ἑαυτῶν θαρραλεωτέρους οὕτας ἀποφαίνεις καὶ μη ἐπισταμένων ἄλλων, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ταύτων εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ μετιῶν καὶ τὴν ἱσχὺν οὐθείης ἂν εἶναι σοφίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἰ οὕτω μετιῶν ἐροιό μὲ εἰ οἱ ἱσχυροὶ δυνατοὶ εἰσι, φαίην ἂν.

Ε ἐπειτά, εἰ οἱ ἐπισταμένοι παλαίευν δυνατότεροι εἰσὶ τῶν μη ἐπισταμένων παλαίεω καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὰν μᾶλθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν, φαίην ἂν· ταῦτα δὲ ἐμὸν ὡμολογήσαντος ἐξεῖη ἂν σοι, χρωμένω τοῖς αὐτοῖς τεκμηρίοις τούτοις, λέγειν ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ὡμολογίαν ἡ σοφία ἤστιν ἱσχύς. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδ’ ἐνταῦθα ὡμολογῶ τοὺς δυνατοὺς ἱσχυροὺς εἶναι, τοὺς μὲντοι ἱσχυροὶ δυνατοὺς· οὐ γὰρ 351 ταύτων εἶναι δύναμιν τε καὶ ἱσχύν, ἄλλα τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης γίγνεσθαι, τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας γε καὶ θυμοῦ, ἱσχὺν δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν σωμάτων. οὕτω δὲ κάκει οὐ
Then these men, I went on, who are so brave, are found to be not courageous but mad? And in those former cases our wisest men are boldest too, and being boldest are most courageous? And on this reasoning, wisdom will be courage?

You do not rightly recall, Socrates, what I stated in replying to you. When you asked me whether courageous men are bold, I admitted it: I was not asked whether bold men are courageous. Had you asked me this before, I should have said—"Not all." And as to proving that courageous men are not bold, you have nowhere pointed out that I was wrong in my admission that they are. Next you show that such persons individually are bolder when they have knowledge, and bolder than others who lack it, and therewith you take courage and wisdom to be the same: proceeding in this manner you might even take strength to be wisdom. On this method you might begin by asking me whether the strong are powerful, and I should say "Yes"; and then, whether those who know how to wrestle are more powerful than those who do not know how to wrestle, and whether individually they are more powerful when they have learnt than before learning, and I should say "Yes." And on my admitting these points it would be open to you to say, by the same token, that according to my admission wisdom is strength. But neither there nor elsewhere do I admit that the powerful are strong, only that the strong are powerful; for I hold that power and strength are not the same, but that one of them, power, comes from knowledge, or from madness or rage, whereas strength comes from constitution and fit nurture of the body. So, in the other instance,
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taútôn eînai thársos te kai ándreián. óste súmbaínei toûs mév ándreiów tharraléous eînai, mú méntoi toûs ge tharraléous ándreiów pántas. thársos mév gàr kai ápò tékhηs gînetai ándhrwpois kai

B ápò thümou ge kai ápò manías, ὁσπερ ἢ δύναμις, ándreia dé ápò φύσεως καὶ εὔτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γînetai.

Légeis dé τīnas, ἔφη, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὖ ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ κακῶς; Ἔφη. Ἀρ όὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀνθρώπος ἃν εὖ ζῆν, εἰ ἀνιώμενός τε καὶ ὁδυνώμενος ζῶη; Οὐκ ἔφη. Τί δ’, εἰ ἰδέως βιοῦσ τὸν βίον τελευτήσειεν, οὐκ εὖ ἃν σοι δοκεῖ οὖτως βεβιωκέναι; Ἐμοιγ’, ἔφη. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ὁ ἰδέως ζῆν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ’ ἄρθδώς κακῶν; Ἐἰπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γ’, ἔφη, ζωή ἰδόμενος. Τί δή, ὡς Πρωταγόρα; μὴ καὶ σὺ, ὁσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ, ἰδέα ἄττα καλεῖς κακὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ ἀγαθὰ; ἐγώ γὰρ λέγω, καθ’ ὅ ἰδέα ἐστίν, ἀρα κατὰ τὸῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά, μὴ εἰ τι ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἀποβῆσεται ἄλλο; καὶ αὕθες αὐτὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὁσαίτως οὖτως οὐ καθ’ ὁσον ἀνιαρὰ, κακά; Οὐκ οἶδα, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἀπλῶς οὖτως,

D ὡς οὔ ἔρωτᾶς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκρίτεον ἐστίν, ὡς τὰ ἰδέα τε ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἀπαντα καὶ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κακὰ· ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμὸν, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ἃ τῶν ἰδέων οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀγαθά, ἐστι δ’ αὖ καὶ ἃ τῶν 222
boldness and courage are not the same, and therefore it results that the courageous are bold, but not that the bold are courageous; for boldness comes to a man from art, or from rage or madness, like power, whereas courage comes from constitution and fit nurture of the soul.

Do you speak of some men, Protagoras, I asked, as living well, and others ill?

Yes.

Then do you consider that a man would live well if he lived in distress and anguish?

No, he said.

Well now, if he lived pleasantly and so ended his life, would you not consider he had thus contrived to live well?

I would, he said.

And, I suppose, to live pleasantly is good, and unpleasantly, bad?

Yes, he said, if one lived in the enjoyment of honourable things.

But, Protagoras, will you tell me you agree with the majority in calling some pleasant things bad and some painful ones good? I mean to say—Are not things good in so far as they are pleasant, putting aside any other result they may have; and again, are not painful things in just the same sense bad—in so far as they are painful?

I cannot tell, Socrates, he replied, whether I am to answer, in such absolute fashion as that of your question, that all pleasant things are good and painful things bad: I rather think it safer for me to reply, with a view not merely to my present answer but to all the rest of my life, that some pleasant things are not good, and also that some
άνιαρών οὐκ ἦστι κακά, ἦστι δ' ἡ ἦστι, καὶ τρίτον ἡ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακά οὔτ' ἀγαθά. 'Ηδέα δὲ καλεῖς, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τὰ ἡδονής μετέχοντα ἢ Ε ποιοῦντα ἡδονήν; Πάντω γ', ἔφη. Τοῦτο τούνων λέγω, καθ' ὅσον ἦδεα ἦστίν, εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθά, τὴν ἡδονήν αὐτῆν ἐρωτῶν εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἦστιν. "Ωσπέρ οὐ λέγεις, ἔφη, ἐκάστοτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκοπώμεθα αὐτό, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς λόγον δοκῇ εἶναι τὸ σκέμμα καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνηται ἢδυ τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, συγχωρήσομεθα. εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἦδη ἀμφισβητήσομεν. Πότερον οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, σὺ βούλεις ἡγεμονεύειν τῆς σκέψεως, ἢ ἐγώ ἡγώμαι; Δίκαιος, ἔφη, σὺ ἡγεῖσθαι; σὺ γὰρ καὶ κατάρχεις τοῦ λόγου. Αρ' 352 οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τῇ δὲ πη καταφανές ἃν ἦμιν γένοιτο; ὦσπερ εἰ τις ἀνθρωπον σκοπῶν. ἐκ τοὔ εἰδοὺς ἢ πρὸς υγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐργών, ἰδὼν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χειρὰς ἀκρας εἶποι; ήθι δὴ μοι ἀποκαλύψας καὶ τὰ στήθη καὶ τὸ μετάφρενον ἐπίδειξον, ἵνα ἐπισκέψωμαι σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐγώ τοιοῦτον τι ποθῶ πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν. θειάσα- μενος ὅτι οὕτως ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἦδυ, ὦς φής, δέομαι τοιοῦτον τι εἴπειν· ήθι δὴ μοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ τόδε τῆς διανοίας ἀποκάλυψον· Β πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην; πότερον καὶ τοῦτο σοι δοκεῖ ὦσπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἄλλως; δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτον τι, οὔκ ἵσχυρον οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν εἶναι.
painful things are not bad, and some are, while a third class of them are indifferent—neither bad nor good.

You call pleasant, do you not, I asked, things that partake of pleasure or cause pleasure?

Certainly, he said.

So when I put it to you, whether things are not good in so far as they are pleasant, I am asking whether pleasure itself is not a good thing.

Let us examine the matter, Socrates, he said, in the form in which you put it at each point, and if the proposition seems to be reasonable, and pleasant and good are found to be the same, we shall agree upon it; if not, we shall dispute it there and then.

And would you like, I asked, to be leader in the inquiry, or am I to lead?

You ought to lead, he replied, since you are the inaugurator of this discussion.

Well then, I proceeded, will the following example give us the light we need? Just as, in estimating a man’s health or bodily efficiency by his appearance, one might look at his face and the lower part of his arms and say: Come now, uncover your chest too and your back and show them, that I may examine you thoroughly—so the same sort of desire comes over me in regard to our inquiry. Observing your condition to be as you describe in respect of the good and the pleasant, I am fain to say something like this: Come, my good Protagoras, uncover some more of your thoughts: how are you in regard to knowledge? Do you share the view that most people take of this, or have you some other? The opinion generally held of knowledge is something of this sort—that it is no strong or guiding or govern-
οὐδὲ ὢς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὅντος διανοοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἐνοῦσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμὸν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβου, ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς
C ἐπιστήμης, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ σοὶ τοιούτον τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἦ καλὸν τε εἶναι ἢ ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἶον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἐάνπερ γυγνώσκῃ τις τάγαθα καὶ τὰ κακά, μὴ ἀν κρατηθήναι ὑπὸ μηδενός, ὥστε ἀλλ' ἄττα πράττειν ἢ ἂν ἢ ἐπιστήμη κελεύῃ, ἀλλ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ; Καὶ δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ὃ
D Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀμα, ἐπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ, αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφιὰν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπεῖων πραγμάτων. Καλῶς γε, ἐφην ἐγὼ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἄληθη. οἴσθα οὖν ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοὶ τε καὶ σοὶ οὐ πείθονται, ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς φασὶ γυγνώσκοντας τὰ βέλτιστα οὐκ ἐθέλειν πράττειν, ἐξ' ἄυτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἄλλα πράττειν· καὶ ὅσουσ δὴ ἐγὼ ἡρόμην ὃ τί ποτε αὐτίον ἔστι τούτου, ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς φασὶν ἡττω-Ε μένοις ἡ λύπης ἢ ὃν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐλεγον ὑπὸ τῶν τούτων κρατουμένους ταῦτα ποιεῖν τοὺς ποιοῦντας. Πολλὰ γὰρ ὅμοι, ἐφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ὅρθως λέγουσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι. "Ἰθι δὴ μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐπιχείρησον πείθειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διδάσκειν ὃ ἔστω αὐτοῖς τότε τό πάθος, ὃ φασίν ὑπὸ τῶν 353 ἡδονῶν ἠττάσθαι καὶ οὐ πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα τὰ 226
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ing thing; it is not regarded as anything of that kind, but people think that, while a man often has knowledge in him, he is not governed by it, but by something else—now by passion, now by pleasure, now by pain, at times by love, and often by fear; their feeling about knowledge is just what they have about a slave, that it may be dragged about by any other force. Now do you agree with this view of it, or do you consider that knowledge is something noble and able to govern man, and that whoever learns what is good and what is bad will never be swayed by anything to act otherwise than as knowledge bids, and that intelligence is a sufficient succour for mankind?

My view, Socrates, he replied, is precisely that which you express, and what is more, it would be a disgrace for me above all men to assert that wisdom and knowledge were aught but the highest of all human things.

Well and truly spoken, I said. Now you know that most people will not listen to you and me, but say that many, while knowing what is best, refuse to perform it, though they have the power, and do other things instead. And whenever I have asked them to tell me what can be the reason of this, they say that those who act so are acting under the influence of pleasure or pain, or under the control of one of the things I have just mentioned.

Yes, Socrates, he replied, I regard this as but one of the many erroneous sayings of mankind.

Come then, and join me in the endeavour to persuade the world and explain what is this experience of theirs, which they call "being overcome by pleasure," and which they give as the
PLATO

βέλτιστα, ἐπεὶ γυνώσκειν γε αὐτά. ἦσως γὰρ ἂν λεγόντων ἡμῶν ὃτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγετε, ὡς ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ πεινόδεσθε, ἔρουν' ἂν ἡμᾶς. ὡς Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Σάκρατες, εἶ μὴ ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττάσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ, καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτὸ φατε εἰναι; εὐπτατον ἡμῖν. Τί δὲ, ὡς Σάκρατες, δεῖ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖνθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν

Β ἄνθρωπων, οἱ δ' ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν; Ὅμως, ὡς δ' ἐγώ, εἰναι τί ἡμῶν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν περὶ ἀνδρείας, πρὸς τὰλλα μόρια τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πῶς ποτ' ἔχει. εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐμμένων οἷς ἀρτι ἐδοξεῖν ἡμῖν, ἐμὲ ἡγῆσασθαι, ἡ οἴμαι ἂν ἐγώνε καλλιστα φανερὸν γενέσθαι, ἐποῦ' εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἰ σοι φίλον, εἰδ χαίρειν. Ἄλλ', ἐφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ πέρανε ὥσπερ ἡρξω.

C Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἐφην ἐγώ, εἰ ἔρουντο ἡμᾶς· τί οὖν φατε τοῦτο εἰναι, δι ὑμεῖς ἦττω εἰναι τῶν ἠδονῶν ἐλέγομεν; εἰποιμ' ἂν ἐγώγε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡδί· ἀκούετε δὴ· πειρασόμεθα γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας φράσαε. ἀλλο τι γὰρ, ὡς ἄνθρωποι, φατε ἡμῶν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι ἐν τοίῳδε, οἷον πολλάκις ὑπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ ἀφροδισίων κρατοῦμενοι ἠδέων ὄντων, γυνώσκουσώς ὅτι πονηρὰ ἔστων, ὅμως αὐτὰ πράττεων; Φαίειν ἂν. Οὐκοῦν ἐροῦμεθ' ἂν αὐτούς ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ πάλιν· πονηρὰ δὲ αὐτὰ πὴν φατε εἰναι; πότερον ὅτι τὴν ἡδονῆν ταύτην ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα παρέχει καὶ ἦδυ ἐστίν ἐκαστον αὐτῶν, ὥστι εἰς τῶν ὑστερον χρόνον νόσους τε ποιεῖ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἀλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ παρα-

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reason why they fail to do what is best though they have knowledge of it. For perhaps if we said to them: What you assert, good people, is not correct, but quite untrue—they might ask us: Protagoras and Socrates, if this experience is not “being overcome by pleasure” what on earth is it, and what do you call it? Tell us that.

Why, Socrates, must we consider the opinion of the mass of mankind, who say just what occurs to them?

I fancy, I replied, that this will be a step towards discovering how courage is related to the other parts of virtue. So if you think fit to abide by the arrangement we made a while ago—that I should lead in the direction which seems best for elucidating the matter—you must now follow; but if you would rather not, to suit your wishes I will let it pass.

No, he said, your plan is quite right: go on to the end as you began.

Once more then, I proceeded, suppose they should ask us: Then what do you call this thing which we described as “being overcome by pleasures”? The answer I should give them would be this: Please attend; Protagoras and I will try to explain it to you. Do you not say that this thing occurs, good people, in the common case of a man being overpowered by the pleasantness of food or drink or sexual acts, and doing what he does though he knows it to be wicked? They would admit it. Then you and I would ask them again: In what sense do you call such deeds wicked? Is it that they produce those pleasures and are themselves pleasant at the moment, or that later on they cause diseases and poverty, and have many more such ills
σκευάζει; ἢ κἂν εἰ τι τούτων εἰς τὸ ύστερον μηδὲν παρασκευάζει, χαίρειν δὲ μόνον ποιεῖ, ὁμωσὶ δὲ ἂν κακὰ ἦν, ὅτι μαθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὅπηρον; ἄρ’ οἶόμεθ’ ἂν αὐτοὺς, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, ἀλλ’ ἃ τι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἦ ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς τῆς ἡδονῆς Ε τῆς παραρχήμα εργασίαν κακὰ ἔστω, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ύστερον γυγνόμενα, νόσους τε καὶ τάλλα. 'Εγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας, τοὺς πολλοὺς ἂν ταύτα ἀποκρίνασθαι. Οὐκοῦν νόσους ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ, καὶ πενίας ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ; 354 ὀμολογοίειν ἂν, ὡς ἐγώμαι. Ἐναέφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Οὐκοῦν φαίνεται, ὡς ἄνθρωποι, ὦμιν, ὥς φαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας, δι’ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ταύτα κακὰ ὄντα, ἦ διότι εἰς ἀνίας τε ἀποτελευτᾶ καὶ ἄλλων ἡδονῶν ἀποστερεῖ; ὀμολογοίειν ἂν; Συνεδόκει ἦμιν ἄμφων. Οὐκοῦν πάλιν ἂν αὐτοὺς τὸ ἐναντίον εἰ ἐροίμεθα· ὡς ἄνθρωποι οἱ λέγοντες αὐτ ἄγαθὰ ἀνιαρὰ εἶναι, ἄρα οὐ τὰ τούδε λεγέτε, οἶον τὰ τε γυγνάσια καὶ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ιατρῶν θεραπείας τὰς διὰ καύσεων τε καὶ τομῶν καὶ φαρμακείων καὶ λιμοκτονιῶν γυγνομένας, ὅτι ταύτα ἄγαθὰ μὲν ἔστω, ἀνιαρὰ δὲ; B φαίειν ἂν; Συνεδόκει. Πότερον οὖν κατὰ τόδε ἄγαθὰ αὐτὰ καλεῖτε, ὅτι ἐν τῷ παραρχήμα ὕδυνας τὰς ἐσχάτας παρέχει καὶ ἀλγηδόνας, ἦ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ύστερον χρόνον ὑγίειαί τε ἀπ’ αὐτῶν γίγνονται καὶ εὐεξία τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν πόλεων σωτηρία καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχαί καὶ πλούτου; φαίειν ἂν, ὡς ἐγώμαι. 230
in store for us? Or, even though they have none of these things in store for a later day, and cause us only enjoyment, would they still be evil just because, forsooth, they cause enjoyment in some way or other? Can we suppose, Protagoras, that they will make any other answer than that these things are evil, not according to the operation of the actual pleasure of the moment, but owing to the later results in disease and those other ills?

I think, said Protagoras, that most people would answer thus.

Then in causing diseases they cause pains? And in causing poverty they cause pains? They would admit this, I imagine.

Protagoras agreed.

Then does it seem to you, my friends, as Protagoras and I assert, that the only reason why these things are evil is that they end at last in pains, and deprive us of other pleasures? Would they admit this?

We both agreed that they would.

Then again, suppose we should ask them the opposite: You, sirs, who tell us on the other hand that good things are painful—do you not give such instances as physical training, military service, and medical treatment conducted by cautery, incision, drugs, or starvation, and say that these are good, but painful? Would they not grant it?

He agreed that they would.

Then do you call them good because they produce extreme pangs and anguish for the moment, or because later on they result in health and good bodily condition, the deliverance of cities, dominion over others, and wealth? They would assent to this, I suppose.
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Συνεδόκει. Ταύτα δὲ ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ δι’ ἄλλο τι, ἦ ὅτι εἰς ἡδονὰς ἀποτελευτὰ καὶ λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγάς τε καὶ ἀποτροπᾶς; ἦ ἔχετε τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, C εἰς ὁ ἀποβλέψαντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖτε, ἄλλ’ ἡ ἡδονὰς τε καὶ λύπας; οὐκ ἂν φαίην, ὡς ἐγὼμαι. Οὐδ’ ἕμοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἡδονήν διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν, τὴν δὲ λύπην φεύγετε ὡς κακὸν; Συνεδόκει. Τούτ’ ἀρα ἤγεισθ’ εἶναι κακὸν, τὴν λύπην, καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἔπει καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν τότε λέγετε κακὸν εἶναι, ὅταν μείζονων ἡδονῶν ἀποστερῆ ἦ ὅσα αὐτὸ ἔχει, ἡ λύπας μείζους παρασκευάζῃ τῶν D ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδονῶν· ἔπει εἰ κατ’ ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν κακὸν καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες, ἔχοιτε ἄν καὶ ἡμῖν εἶπείν· ἄλλ’ οὐχ ἔξετε. Οὐδ’ ἕμοι δοκοῦσιν, ἐφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Ἀλλ’ τι οὐν πάλιν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; τότε καλεῖτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθὸν, ὅταν ἡ μείζους λύπας τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐσῶν ἀπαλλάττῃ ἡ μείζους ἡδονὰς τῶν λυπῶν παρασκευάζῃ; ἔπει εἰ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέπετε, E ὅταν καλήτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθὸν, ἦ πρὸς δ’ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἔχετε ἡμῖν εἶπείν· ἄλλ’ οὐχ ἔξετε. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Πάλιν τούτων, ἐφην ἐγὼ, εἰ μὲ ἀνέροισθε, ὃ ἀνθρωποι, τίνος οὖν δήποτε ἐνεκα πολλὰ περὶ τούτου λέγεις καὶ πολλαχῇ; συγγυγνώσκετε μοι, φαίην ἂν ἐγώγη. 1 ἦ add. Stephanus.
He agreed.
And are these things good for any other reason than that they end at last in pleasures and relief and riddance of pains? Or have you some other end to mention, with respect to which you call them good, apart from pleasures and pains? They could not find one, I fancy.

I too think they could not, said Protagoras.
Then do you pursue pleasure as being a good thing, and shun pain as being a bad one?
He agreed that we do.

So one thing you hold to be bad—pain; and pleasure you hold to be good, since the very act of enjoying you call bad as soon as it deprives us of greater pleasures than it has in itself, or leads to greater pains than the pleasures it contains. For if it is with reference to something else that you call the act of enjoyment bad, and with a view to some other end, you might be able to tell it us; but this you will be unable to do.

I too think that they cannot, said Protagoras.
Then is not the same thing repeated in regard to the state of being pained? You call being pained a good thing as soon as it either rids us of greater pains than those it comprises, or leads to greater pleasures than its pains. Now if you have in view some other end than those which I mention when you call being pained good, you can tell it us; but you never can.

Truly spoken, said Protagoras.

Once more then, I proceeded; if you were to ask me, my friends, Now why on earth do you speak at such length on this point, and in so many ways? I should reply, Forgive me: in the first
πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ βάδιον ἀποδείξει, τί ἐστὶ ποτὲ τούτο, ὃ ὑμεῖς καλεῖτε τῶν ἤδονῶν ἢ ττω εἶναι· ἐπειτὰ εὖ τούτῳ εἰσὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις. ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἔξεστι, εἴ τι πέρι ἔχετε ἄλλο τι 355 φάναι εἶναι τὸ ἁγάθον ἢ τὴν ἤδονήν, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν, ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἴδεως καταβιώναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ λυπῶν; εἴ δὲ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μὴ ἔχετε μηδὲν ἄλλο φάναι εἶναι ἁγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν, ὃ μὴ εἰς ταῦτα τελευτᾶ, τὸ μετὰ τούτο ἀκούετε. φημὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν τούτου οὕτως ἐχοντος γελοίον τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαί, ὅταν λέγητε, ὅτι πολλάκις γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ἀνθρωπὸς, ὅτι κακὰ ἐστὶν, ὦμος πράττει αὐτά, ἔξον μὴ πράττειν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἤδονῶν Β ἀγόμενος καὶ ἐκπληττόμενος. καὶ αὕθις αὐ τέλευτε, ὅτι γιγνώσκων ὁ ἀνθρωπὸς τἀγαθὰ πράττειν οὐκ ἔθελε διὰ τὰς παραχρήμα ἤδονάς, ὑπὸ τούτων ἤττώμενοι.

'Ως δὲ ταῦτα γελοῖα ἐστὶ, κατάδηλον ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ πολλοῖς ὠνόμαισι χρώμεθα ἁμα, ἴδει τε καὶ ἀνιαρῷ καὶ ἁγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἀλλ' ἐπειδῆ δύο ἐφάνη ταῦτα, δυοῦν καὶ ὠνόμαισι προσαγορεύωμεν αὐτά, πρῶτον μὲν ἁγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἐπειτὰ αὕθις ἴδει τε καὶ ἀνιαρῷ. θέμενοι δὴ οὕτω λέγωμεν,

C ὅτι γιγνώσκων ὁ ἀνθρωπὸς τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ ἐστὶν, ὦμος αὐτὰ ποιεῖ. ἐὰν οὖν τις ἠμᾶς ἔρηται, διὰ τί, ἤττώμενος, φήσομεν· ὑπὸ τοῦ; ἐκεῖνος ἐρήσεται ἠμᾶς· ἠμῖν δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν ἠδονής οὐκέτι ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλο γὰρ ὄνομα μετειλήφθην ἀντὶ τῆς ἠδονῆς τὸ ἁγάθον· ἐκεῖνος δὴ ἀποκρινώμεθα καὶ λέγωμεν, ὅτι ἤττώμενος. ὑπὸ τίνος; φήσει· τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ, φήσομεν νὴ Δία. ἀν οὖν τύχῃ ὁ ἐρόμενος ἠμᾶς ὑβριστής ὤν, γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ· ἡ γελοίον

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place, it is not easy to conclude what it is that you mean when you say "overcome by pleasures"; and secondly, on this point hang all our conclusions. But it is still quite possible to retract, if you can somehow contrive to say that the good is different from pleasure, or the bad from pain. Is it enough for you to live out your life pleasantly, without pain? If it is, and you are unable to tell us of any other good or evil that does not end in pleasure or pain, listen to what I have to say next. I tell you that if this is so, the argument becomes absurd, when you say that it is often the case that a man, knowing the evil to be evil, nevertheless commits it, when he might avoid it, because he is driven and dazed by his pleasures; while on the other hand you say that a man, knowing the good, refuses to do good because of the momentary pleasures by which he is overcome.

The absurdity of all this will be manifest if we refrain from using a number of terms at once, such as pleasant, painful, good, and bad; and as there appeared to be two things, let us call them by two names—first, good and evil, and then later on, pleasant and painful. Let us then lay it down as our statement, that a man does evil in spite of knowing the evil of it. Now if someone asks us: Why? we shall answer: Because he is overcome. By what? the questioner will ask us; and this time we shall be unable to reply: By pleasure—for this has exchanged its name for "the good." So we must answer only with the words: Because he is overcome. By what? says the questioner. The good—must surely be our reply. Now if our questioner chance to be an arrogant person he will laugh.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

Δ λέγετε πράγμα, εϊ πράττει τις κακά, γιγνώσκων ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, οὐ δέον αὐτὸν πράττειν, ἢττώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἁγαθῶν. ἄρα, φήσει, οὐκ ἄξιων οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν νικᾶν ἐν ὑμῖν τῶν ἁγαθῶν τὰ κακά, ἢ ἄξιων; φήσομεν δὴλον ὅτι ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄξιων οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν νικᾶν ἐστιν. κατὰ τί δὲ, φήσει ἵσως, ἀναξία ἐστὶν τάγαθα τῶν κακῶν ἢ τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἁγαθῶν; ἢ κατ᾽ ἄλλο τι ἡ ὅταν τὰ μὲν μείζων, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα ἢ; ἢ πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἑλάττω ἢ; οὐχ

Ε ἐξομεν εἴπειν ἄλλο ἡ τούτο. δὴλον ἄρα, φήσει, ὅτι τὸ ἡττάσθαι τούτο λέγετε, ἀντὶ ἑλάττων ἁγαθῶν μείζων κακὰ λαμβάνειν. ταῦτα μὲν οὐν οὖτων μεταλάβωμεν δὴ τὰ ὀνόματα πάλιν τὸ ἤδυ τε καὶ ἀνιαρὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις, καὶ λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνθρωπος πράττει, τότε μὲν ἑλέγομεν τὰ κακὰ, νῦν δὲ λέγουμεν τὰ ἀνιαρά, γιγνώσκον ὅτι ἀνιαρὰ ἐστιν, ἢττώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἱδεὼν, δήλον ὅτι 356 ἀναξίων οὖν νικᾶν. καὶ τὶς ἀλλή ἀναξία ἱδονῇ πρὸς λύπην ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ὑπερβολή ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐλλεψις; ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ μείζωυ τε καὶ σμικρότερα γιγνόμενα ἀλλήλων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἑλάττω καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἴττων. εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἀλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει, ὡς Σωκράτης, τὸ παραχρῆμα ἤδυ τοῦ εἰς τὸν ὑστερον χρόνον καὶ ἱδεος καὶ λυπηρο, μῶν ἀλλω τω, φαίνην ἂν ἔγνως, ἡ ἤδων καὶ λύπη. Β οὐ γὰρ ἔσθι ὅτι οὖν ἄλλω. ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ ἁγαθὸς ἰστάναι ἀνθρωπος, συνθεὶς τὰ ἱδεα καὶ συνθεὶς τὰ λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς καὶ τὸ πόρρω στήσας ἐν 236
and exclaim: What a ridiculous statement, that a man does evil, knowing it to be evil, and not having to do it, because he is overcome by the good! Is this, he will ask, because the good is not worthy of conquering the evil in you, or because it is worthy? Clearly we must reply: Because it is not worthy; otherwise he whom we speak of as overcome by pleasures would not have offended. But in what sense, he might ask us, is the good unworthy of the bad, or the bad of the good? This can only be when the one is greater and the other smaller, or when there are more on the one side and fewer on the other. We shall not find any other reason to give. So it is clear, he will say, that by "being overcome" you mean getting the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good. That must be agreed. Then let us apply the terms "pleasant" and "painful" to these things instead, and say that a man does what we previously called evil, but now call painful, knowing it to be painful, because he is overcome by the pleasant, which is obviously unworthy to conquer. What unworthiness can there be in pleasure as against pain, save an excess or defect of one compared with the other? That is, when one becomes greater and the other smaller, or when there are more on one side and fewer on the other, or here a greater degree and there a less. For if you should say: But, Socrates, the immediately pleasant differs widely from the subsequently pleasant or painful, I should reply: Do they differ in anything but pleasure and pain? That is the only distinction. Like a practised weigher, put pleasant things and painful in the scales, and with them the nearness and the remoteness, and tell me
τῶν ἔγγυτ, εἰπὲ πότερα πλείω ἐστίν. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἢδεα πρὸς ἢδεα ἱστῆς, τὰ μεῖζω ἂν καὶ πλείων ληπτεά. εὰν δὲ λυπηρά πρὸς λυπηρά, τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ σμικρότερα. εὰν δὲ ἢδεα πρὸς λυπηρά, εὰν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ υπερβάλληται υπὸ τῶν ἢδέων, εὰν τε τὰ ἐγγύτ ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω εάν τε τὰ πόρρω ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγύσ, ταύτην τὴν πράξεω πρακτέον ἐν ἦν ἂν C ταῦτ' ἐνη'. εὰν δὲ τὰ ἢδεα υπὸ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν, οὐ πρακτέα. μὴ πη ἀλλή ἔχει, φαῖνη ἂν, ταῦτα, ὥ ἄνθρωποι; οἴδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν ἄλλωσ λέγειν. Συνεδόκει καὶ ἐκείνω. ὁτε δὴ τούτο οὐτώς ἔχει, τόδε μοι ἀποκρίνασθε, φήσω. φαίνεται ἦμιν τῇ ὄψει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύθεν μὲν μεῖζω, πόρρωθεν δὲ ἐλάττω. ἦ οὖ; Φήσουσιν. Καὶ τὰ παχέα καὶ τὰ πολλά ὀσαύτως; καὶ αἱ φωναὶ <αι>1 ἦσαι ἐγγύθεν μὲν μεῖζοις, πόρρωθεν δὲ D σμικρότερας; Φαίειν ἂν. Εἰ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ἦμιν ἦν τὸ εὖ πράττειν, ἐν τῷ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μήκη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ καὶ фεύγει καὶ μὴ πράττειν, τίς ἂν ἦμιν σώτηρα ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἃρα ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη ἢ τῇ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις; ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἦμισ ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταῦτα καὶ μεταμέλειν καὶ ἐν ταῖσ πράξει καὶ ἐν ταῖσ αἰρέσει τῶν μεγάλων τε καὶ σμικρῶν; ἡ δὲ μετρητικὴ ἄκυρον μὲν ἂν ἐποίησε τοῦτο τὸ E φάντασμα, δηλώσασα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἰσουχίαν ἂν ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῶ ἀληθεῖ καὶ ἔσωσεν ἂν τὸν βίον; ἄρ' ἂν ὁμολογοῦεν οἱ

1 ai add. Heindorf.
which count for more. For if you weigh pleasant things against pleasant, the greater and the more are always to be preferred: if painful against painful, then always the fewer and smaller. If you weigh pleasant against painful, and find that the painful are outbalanced by the pleasant—whether the near by the remote or the remote by the near—you must take that course of action to which the pleasant are attached; but not that course if the pleasant are outweighed by the painful. Can the case be otherwise, I should ask, than thus, my friends? I am certain they could state no alternative.

To this he too assented.

Since that is the case, then, I shall say, please answer me this: Does not the same size appear larger to your sight when near, and smaller when distant? They will admit this. And it is the same with thickness and number? And sounds of equal strength are greater when near, and smaller when distant? They would agree to this. Now if our welfare consisted in doing and choosing things of large dimensions, and avoiding and not doing those of small, what would be our salvation in life? Would it be the art of measurement, or the power of appearance? Is it not the latter that leads us astray, as we saw, and many a time causes us to take things topsy-turvy and to have to change our minds both in our conduct and in our choice of great or small? Whereas the art of measurement would have made this appearance ineffective, and by showing us the truth would have brought our soul into the repose of abiding by the truth, and so would have saved our life. Would men acknowledge, in view of all this,
The intellectual control of our sense-perceptions, which differ as to the size or number of the same things when near and when distant, etc., has an important part in the educative process.
that the art which saves our life is measurement, or some other?

It is measurement, he agreed.

Well now, if the saving of our life depended on the choice of odd or even, and on knowing when to make a right choice of the greater and when of the less—taking each by itself or comparing it with the other, and whether near or distant—what would save our life? Would it not be knowledge; a knowledge of measurement, since the art here is concerned with excess and defect, and of numeration, as it has to do with odd and even? People would admit this, would they not?

Protagoras agreed that they would.

Well then, my friends, since we have found that the salvation of our life depends on making a right choice of pleasure and pain—of the more and the fewer, the greater and the smaller, and the nearer and the remoter—is it not evident, in the first place, that measurement is a study of their excess and defect and equality in relation to each other?

This must needs be so.

And being measurement, I presume it must be an art or science?

They will assent to this.

Well, the nature of this art or science we shall consider some other time; but the mere fact of its being a science will suffice for the proof which Protagoras and I are required to give in answer to the question you have put to us. You asked it, if you remember, when we were agreeing that there is nothing stronger than knowledge, and

tional scheme of the Republic. The measuring art is further considered in the Politicus (283 foll.).

Cf. 352 b foll.
εἶναι κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἄει κρατεῖν, ὅπου ἄν ἐνή, καὶ ἡδονής καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ ἔφατε τὴν ἡδονὴν πολλάκις κρατεῖν καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος ἀνθρώπου, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑμῖν οὐχ ὠμολογοῦμεν, μετὰ τοῦτο ἢρεσθε ἢμᾶς. Ὁ Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Σῶκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττάσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτὸ φατε εἶναι; εἴπατε ἢμῖν. εἰ μὲν οὖν τότε εὐθὺς ὑμῖν εἴπομεν ὅτι ἀμαθία, κατεγελάτε ἂν ἢμῶν· νῦν δὲ ἂν ἢμῶν καταγελάτε, καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καταγελάσεσθε. καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὠμολογήκατε ἐπιστήμης ἐνθεία ἐξαμαρτάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν αἴρεσιν καὶ λυπῶν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας· ταύτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ τε καὶ κακά· καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂς τὸ πρόσθεν ἐτὶ ὠμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικῆς· ἡ δὲ ἐξαμαρτ.

Ενομένη πράξεις ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἵστε ποὺ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμαθία πράττεται. ὡστε τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἡδονῆς ἕττω εἶναι, ἀμαθία ἡ μεγίστη. ἂς Πρωταγόρας δὲ φησὶν ἰατρὸς εἶναι καὶ Πρόδικος καὶ Ἰππίας. ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἄλλο τι ἡ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι οὐτε αὐτοὶ ἵστε 1 οὐτε τοὺς ὑμετέρους παῖδας παρὰ τοὺς τοῦτων διδασκάλους τούσδε τοὺς σοφιστᾶς πέμπτε, ὡς οὐ διδακτοὶ ὄντος, ἄλλα κηδόμενοι τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ οὐ διδόν-358 τε τοῦτος κακῶς πράττετε καὶ ὡδὶ καὶ δημοσίας.

Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοι ἂν ἢμεν· ὑμᾶς δὲ δὴ μετὰ Πρωταγόρου ἑρωτῶ, ὡς 2 Ἰππία τε καὶ Πρόδικε—κοινὸς γὰρ δὴ ἔστω ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος—πότερον δοκῶ ὑμῖν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἡ

1 ἵστε add. Madvig.
2 ὡ add. Rückert.
that knowledge, wherever it may be found, has always the upper hand of pleasure or anything else; and then you said that pleasure often masters even the man of knowledge, and on our refusing to agree with you, you went on to ask us: Protagoras and Socrates, if this experience is not "being overcome by pleasure," whatever can it be, and what do you call it? Tell us. If on the spur of the moment we had replied, "Ignorance," you would have laughed us to scorn: but now if you laugh at us you will be laughing at yourselves as well. For you have admitted that it is from defect of knowledge that men err, when they do err, in their choice of pleasures and pains—that is, in the choice of good and evil; and from defect not merely of knowledge but of the knowledge which you have now admitted also to be that of measurement. And surely you know well enough for yourselves that the erring act committed without knowledge is done through ignorance. Accordingly "to be overcome by pleasure" means just this—ignorance in the highest degree, which Protagoras here and Prodicus and Hippias profess to cure. But you, through supposing it to be something else than ignorance, will neither go yourselves nor send your children to these sophists, who are the teachers of those things—you say it cannot be taught; you are chary of your money and will give them none, and so you fare badly both in private and in public life.

Such would have been our answer to the world at large. And I ask you now, Hippias and Prodicus, as well as Protagoras—for I would have you make a joint reply—whether you think what I say is true or false.
ψευδεσθαι. Ἄπασιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ εἰρημένα. Ὄμολογείτε ἁρα, ἢν ὅ' ἐγὼ, τὸ μὲν ἤδυ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀναρον κακὸν. τὴν δὲ Προδίκου τοῦδε διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων παρ-

B αὐτοῦμαι· εἰτε γὰρ ἢδυ εἰτε τερπνὸν λέγεις εἰτε χαρτόν, εἰτε ὁπόθεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομάζων, ὃ βέλτιστε Πρόδικε, τοῦτο μοι πρὸς ὁ βούλομαι ἀπόκριναι. Γελάσας οὖν ὁ Προδίκος συνωμολόγησε, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. Τί δὲ δή; ὁ ἄνδρες, ἐφην ἐγώ, τὸ τοιόνδε; αἱ ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις ἀπασάι, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἠδεώς, ἅρ′ οὐ καλαί [καὶ ὁφέλιμοι1]; καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ ὁφέλιμον; Συνεδόκει. Εἰ ἁρα, ἐφην ἐγώ, τὸ ἢδυ ἀγαθὸν ἔστω, οὐδéις οὔτε εἴδως

C οὔτε ὁϊόμενος ἄλλα βελτίων εἶναι, ἥ ἂ ποιεὶ,2 καὶ δύνατά,3 ἐπειτα ποιεῖ τάῦτα, ἔξον τὰ βελτίων οὐδὲ τὸ ἢττῳ εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἄλλο τι τούτ' ἐστιν ἥ αμαθία, οὐδὲ κρείττων έαυτοῦ ἄλλο τι ἡ σοφία. Συν-

εδόκει πᾶσιν. Τί δὲ δή; ἀμαθίαν ἁρα τὸ τοιόνδε λέγετε, τὸ ψευδή ἔχειν δοξαν καὶ ἐψευδάθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν πολλοῦ ἄξιων; Καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσι συνεδόκει. "Αλλο τι οὖν, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἐπὶ γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδέις ἐκὼν ἔρχεται οὐδέ ἐπὶ ἄ οἰεται

D κακὰ εἶναι, οὔτ' ἐστι τούτο, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπὶ ἄ οἰεται κακὰ εἶναι ἐθέλειν ιέναι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὖν τε ἀναγκασθῇ δυοῖν κακοῖν τὸ

1 καὶ ὁφέλιμοι seel. Schleiermacher.
2 ποιεϊ Heindorf: ἐποιεί mss.
3 δύνατά Schleiermacher: δύναται mss.

1 "Yielding to oneself” and “mastery of oneself” are here put instead of “being overcome by pleasure” and 244
They all thought what I had said was absolutely true.

Then you agree, I continued, that the pleasant is good and the painful bad. And let me entreat my friend Prodicus to spare me his distinction of terms: for whether you say pleasant or delightful or enjoyable, my excellent Prodicus, or in whatever style or manner you may be pleased to name these things, pray reply to the sense of my question.

At this Prodicus laughed and consented, as did the rest.

Well now, my friends, I said, what of this? All actions aimed at living painlessly and pleasantly are honourable, are they not? And the honourable work is both good and useful?

They agreed.

Then if, I proceeded, the pleasant is good, no one who has knowledge or thought of other actions as better than those he is doing, and as possible, will do as he proposes if he is free to do the better ones; and this yielding to oneself is nothing but ignorance, and mastery of oneself is as certainly wisdom.

They all agreed.

Well then, by ignorance do you mean having a false opinion and being deceived about matters of importance?

They all agreed to this also.

Then surely, I went on, no one willingly goes after evil or what he thinks to be evil; it is not in human nature, apparently, to do so—to wish to go after what one thinks to be evil in preference to the good; and when compelled to choose one of the opposite state. The conflict between the better and worse self is discussed in Rep. iv. 430 e foll.
ετερον αίρείσθαι, ούδεις τὸ μεῖζον αἱρήσεται ἐξὸν τὸ ἐλαττον. "Ἀπαντά ταῦτα συνεδόκει ἅπασιν ἡμῖν. Τί οὖν; ἐφην ἔγω, καλείτε <τί>² δέος καὶ φόβον; καὶ ἀρα ὀπερ ἔγω; πρὸς σὲ λέγω, Πρόδικε. προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τούτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλείτε. 'Εδόκει Πρωτ-Ε αγόρα μὲν καὶ Ἱππία δέος τε καὶ φόβος εἶναι τοῦτο, Πρόδικῳ δὲ δέος, φόβος δ' οὔ. 'Αλλ' ουδέν, ἐφην ἔγω, Πρόδικε, διαφέρει· ἀλλὰ τὸδε. εἰ ἀληθὴ τὰ ἐμπροσθὲν ἔστων, ἃρα τις ἀνθρώπων ἑθελήσει ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἱέναι τα δεδοικέν, ἐξὸν ἐπὶ ἂ μή; ἦ ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν ὀμολογημένων; ἃ γὰρ δεδοικέν, ὀμολογήσῃ ἡγεῖσθαι κακὰ εἶναι· ἃ δὲ ἡγεῖται κακὰ, οὐδένα οὔτε ἱέναι ἐπὶ ταῦτα οὔτε λαμβάνειν ἐκόντα. 'Εδόκει καὶ ταῦτα πᾶσιν.

Οὔτω δὴ τούτων ὑποκειμένων, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, Πρόδικε τε καὶ Ἱππία, ἀπολογείσθω ἡμῖν Πρωτ- αγόρας οδε, ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπεκρίνατο, πῶς ὀρθῶς ἔχει, μή ἃ τὸ πρῶτον παντάπασι· τότε μεν γὰρ δὴ πέντε οὐντων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐδέν ἐφῇ εἶναι τὸ ἐτερον οἶον τὸ ἐτερον, ἴδιαν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐκαστὸν ἔχειν δύναμιν· ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλ' ἃ τὸ ύστερον ἐπε. τὸ γὰρ ύστερον ἐφῇ τὰ μὲν τέτταρα ἐπιεικῶς παραπλῆσια ἀλλῆλοις εἶναι, Β τὸ δὲ ἐν πάνι πολὺ διαφέρειν τῶν ἀλλων, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, γνώσεσθαι δὲ μ' ἐφῃ τεκμηρίων τὸδε· εὐρήσεις γάρ, ὥ Σῶκρατες, ἀνθρώπους ἀνοσιωτά-

² τι add. Heindorf.
two evils, nobody will choose the greater when he may the lesser.

All this met with the assent of everyone.

Well, I said, is there something you call dread, or fear? And is it—I address myself to you, Prodicus—the same as I have in mind—something I describe as an expectation of evil, whether you call it fear or dread?

Protagoras and Hippias agreed to this description of dread or fear; but Prodicus thought this was dread, not fear.

No matter, Prodicus, I said, but my point is this: if our former statements are true, will any man wish to go after what he dreads, when he may pursue what he does not? Surely this is impossible after what we have admitted—that he regards as evil that which he dreads? And what is regarded as evil is neither pursued nor accepted willingly, we saw, by anyone.

Here also they were all in agreement.

So much, then, being granted, Prodicus and Hippias, I said, let our friend Protagoras vindicate the correctness of the answer he made at first—not that which he made at the very beginning,\(^1\) when he said that, while there were five parts of virtue, none of them was like any other, but each had its particular function: I do not refer to that, but the statement he made afterwards,\(^2\) when he proceeded to say that four of them had a considerable resemblance to each other, but one was quite different from the rest—courage; and he told me I should perceive this by the following token: You will find, Socrates, said he, that men may be most

\(^1\) Cf. 330 A foll.; \(^2\) Cf. 349 B foll.
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tous μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀδικωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστο-
tάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ· ὃ
gνώσει ὅτι πολὺ διαφέρει ἡ ἀνδρεία τῶν ἄλλων μο-
ρίων τῆς ἀρετῆς. καὶ ἐγώ εὐθὺς τότε πάνυ
θαύμασα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, καὶ ἐτι μᾶλλον ἐπειδὴ
tαῦτα μεθ' ὑμῶν διεξῆλθον. ἡρόμην δ' οὖν
tοῦτον, εἴ τοὺς ἀνδρείους λέγοι θαρραλέους· ὃ δὲ,
C καὶ ἵτας γ', ἐφη. μέμνησαι, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, ὥς Πρωτ-
αγόρα, ταῦτα ἀποκρινόμενοι; Ὁμολόγει. Ἐθι δή,
ἐφην ἐγώ, εἰπὲ ἦμίν, ἐπὶ τί λέγεις ἵτασ εἶναι τοὺς
ἀνδρείους; ἥ ἐφ' ἀπερ οἱ δειλοὶ; Οὐκ ἐφη. Οὐκ-
οὖν ἐφ' ἑτερα. Ναὶ, ἥ δ' ὁς. Πότερον οἱ μὲν
δειλοὶ ἐπὶ τὰ θαρραλέα ἐρχονται, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐπὶ
tὰ δειλά; Λέγεται δή, ὥς Σώκρατες, οὕτως ὑπὸ
tῶν ἄνθρωπων. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφην ἐγώ, λέγεις· ἀλλ' οὐ

D τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ σὺ ἐπὶ τί φῆς ἵτασ εἶναι τοὺς
ἀνδρείους; ἀρ' ἐπὶ τὰ δειλά, ἡγομένους δειλά
εἶναι, ἥ ἐπὶ τὰ μή; Ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γ', ἐφη, ἐν οἷς σὺ
ἐλεγες τοὺς λόγους ἀπεδείχθη ἄρτι ὅτι ἄδικον.
Καὶ τοῦτο, ἐφην ἐγὼ, ἀληθὲς λέγεις. οὕτ' εἰ τοῦτο
ὁρθῶς ἀπεδείχθη, ἐπὶ μὲν ἡ δειλά ἠγεῖται εἶναι
οὓδεις ἐρχείται, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἦττω εἶναι ἐαυτοῦ ἡμέρθη
ἀμαθία οὖσα. Ὁμολόγει. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπὶ ἃ γε
θαρροῦσι πάντες αὖ ἐρχονται, καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ
ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ ταῦτη γε ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐρχονται οἱ
Ε δειλοὶ τε καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἐφη, ὥς
Σώκρατες, πάν γε τοῦναντίον ἐστίν ἐπὶ ἃ οἱ τε
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unholy, most unjust, most dissolute, and most ignorant, yet most courageous; whence you may judge that courage is very different from the other parts of virtue. His answer caused me great surprise at the moment, and still more when I went into the matter with your help. But anyhow, I asked him whether by the brave he meant "bold." Yes, he replied, and impetuous. Protagoras, I said, do you remember making this answer?

He admitted he did.

Well now, I said, tell us, towards what do you mean they are impetuous when they are courageous? Towards the same things as cowards?

No, he said.

Then towards other things?

Yes, he said.

Do cowards go after things that allow boldness, and the courageous after dreadful things?

So people say, Socrates.

Quite true, I said. But my point is rather, towards what, according to you, are the brave impetuous? Dreadful things, in the belief that they are dreadful, or towards what is not dreadful?

No, he said; the former has just been shown, by the arguments you put forward, to be impossible.

Quite true again, I said; so that if this proof was correct, no one goes to meet what he regards as dreadful, since to be overcome by oneself was found to be ignorance.

He admitted this.

And yet all men go also to meet what they can face boldly, whether cowardly or brave, and in this respect cowardly and brave go to meet the same things.

But still, Socrates, he said, what cowards go to
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dειλοὶ ἔρχονται καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι. αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν ἴναι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. Πότερον, ἐφην ἐγώ, καλὸν ὃν ἴναι ἢ αἰσχρὸν; Καλὸν, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν εἰπερ καλὸν, καὶ ἄγαθὸν ὁμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν. τὰς γὰρ καλὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας ἁγαθὰς ὁμολογήσαμεν. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, καὶ ἂει ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. Ὀρθῶς γε,

360 ἐφην ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ ποτέρους φης εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἐθέλειν ἴναι, καλὸν ὃν καὶ ἄγαθὸν; Τοὺς δειλοὺς, ἡ δ' ὦς. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, εἰπερ καλὸν καὶ ἄγαθὸν, καὶ ἦδυ; Ὁμολόγηται γοῦν, ἐφη. Ἄρ' οὖν γιγνώσκοντες οἱ δειλοὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἴναι ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιον¹ τε καὶ ἁμεινον καὶ ἦδιον; Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ὁμολογῶμεν, ἐφη, διαφεροῦμεν τὰς ἐμπροσθεν ὁμολογίας. Τί δ' ὁ ἀνδρείος; οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιον τε καὶ ἁμεινον καὶ

Β ἦδιον ἔρχεται; Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ὁμολογεῖν. Οὐκοῦν ὀλῶς οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι οὐκ αἰσχροὺς φόβους φοβοῦνται, ὅταν φοβῶνται, οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν; Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη. Εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρά, ἄρ' οὐ καλά; Ὁμολόγει. Εἰ δὲ καλά, καὶ ἁγαθά; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ μαίνομενοι τούναντίον αἰσχροὺς τε φόβους φοβοῦνται καὶ

¹ κάλλιον Stephanus: καλὸν mss.
meet is the very opposite of what the courageous go to meet. For instance, the latter are willing to go to war, but the former are not.

Is going to war an honourable thing, I asked, or a base thing?
Honourable, he replied. Then if it is honourable, we have admitted, by our former argument, that it is also good; for we agreed that all honourable actions were good.

True, and I abide by that decision. You are right to do so, I said. But which sort of men do you say are not willing to go to war, that being an honourable and good thing to do?

The cowardly, he replied. Then, I went on, if it is honourable and good, is it also pleasant?

That certainly has been admitted, he said. Now do the cowards wittingly refuse to go to what is more honourable, better, and pleasanter?

Well, if we admit that too, he replied, we shall undo our previous admissions. But what of the courageous man? Does he not go to the more honourable and better and pleasanter?

I am forced to admit that, he said. Now, in general, courageous men do not feel base fears, when they fear, nor is there anything base in their boldness?

True, he said. And if not base, then it must be honourable?

He admitted this. And if honourable, then good?

Yes.

And the cowardly and the bold and the mad, on the contrary, feel base fears and base boldness?
PLATO

αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν; Ὄμολογει. Θαρροῦσι
de τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ δι’ ἄλλο τι ἂν δι’ ἀγνοιαν
c καὶ ἀμαθίαν; Οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; τούτο δι’
ὁ δειλὸι εἰσών οἱ δειλοὶ, δειλῶν ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖσ;
Δειλῶν ἐγώγ’, ἔφη. Δειλῶ δὲ οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν
dεινῶν ἀμαθίαν ἐφάνησαν ὄντες; Πάνυ γ’, ἔφη.
Διὰ ταύτην ἀρα τὴν ἀμαθίαν δειλοὶ εἰσών; ‘Ὀμολόγει.
Δι’ ὁ δὲ δειλόι εἰσι, δειλία ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ σοῦ;
Συνέφη. Οὐκοῦν ἢ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μή δεινῶν
ἀμαθία δειλία ἂν εἴη; ‘Ἐπένευσεν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν,
δ ἂν δ’ ἐγώ, ἐναντίον ἀνδρεία δειλία. ’Εφη.
Οὐκοῦν ἢ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν σοφία ἐναντία
tῇ τούτων ἀμαθία ἐστίν; Καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔτι ἐπένευ-
σεν. Ἡ δὲ τούτων ἀμαθία δειλία; Πάνυ μόνος ἐν-
tαῦθα ἐπένευσεν. Ἡ σοφία ἁρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ
μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἐναντία οὕσα τῇ τούτων
ἀμαθία; Οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθα οὔτ’ ἐπινεῦσαι ἥθελησεν
ἐστίγα τε καὶ ἐγώ εἰπον. Τί δή, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, 252
He agreed. 
Do they feel base and evil boldness solely through 
stupidity and ignorance?
Just so, he said.
Well now, the cause of cowards being cowardly, 
do you call this cowardice or courage?
Cowardice, I call it, he replied.
And were they not found to be cowards through 
ignorance of what is dreadful?
Certainly, he said.
And so they are cowards because of that 
ignorance?
He agreed.
And the cause of their being cowards is admitted 
by you to be cowardice?
He assented.
Then ignorance of what is dreadful and not 
dreadful will be cowardice?
He nodded assent.
But surely courage, I went on, is the opposite of 
cowardice.
Yes.
Then the wisdom that knows what is and what is not 
dreadful is opposed to the ignorance of these things?
To this he could still nod assent.
And the ignorance of them is cowardice?
To this he nodded very reluctantly.
So the wisdom that knows what is and what is 
not dreadful is courage, being opposed to the 
ignorance of these things?
Here he could no longer bring himself to nod 
agreement, and remained silent. Then I proceeded:
Why is it, Protagoras, that you neither affirm nor 
deny what I ask you?
PLATO

οὔτε σὺ φὴς ἢ ἐρωτῶ οὔτε ἀπόφης; Αὐτὸς, ἕφη,
Ε πέρανον. "Ἐν γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, μόνον ἐρόμενος
έτι σέ, εἰ σοι ὄσπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι
tines ἀνθρωποὶ ἀμαθέστατοι μὲν, ἀνδρεώτατοι δὲ.
Φιλονικεῖν μοι, ἕφη, δοκεῖς, ὡς Ὡόκρατες, τὸ
ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον· χαριῶμαι οὖν σοι,
καὶ λέγω ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων ἀδύνατον μοι
δοκεῖ εἶναι.

Οὔτοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλοι ἑνεκα ἐρωτῶ πάντα
tαῦτα, ἢ σκέψασθαι βουλόμενος, πῶς ποτ' ἔχει τὰ
περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτό, ἡ ἀρετή;

361 οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι τούτον φανεροῦ γενομένου μάλιστ' 
ἀν κατάδηλον γένοιτο ἐκεῖνο, περὶ οὗ ἐγώ τε καὶ
σὺ μακρὸν λόγον ἐκάτερος ἀπετείναμεν, ἐγὼ μὲν
λέγων ὡς οὐ διδακτόν ἀρετή, σὺ δ' ὡς διδακτόν.
καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρτὶ ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων
ὦσπερ ἀνθρωπος κατηγορεῖν τε καὶ καταγελᾶν,
καὶ εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι, εἰπεῖν ἃν ὅτι ἄτοποί γ' ἐστέ,
ὁ Ὡόκρατες τε καὶ Πρωταγόρα: σὺ μὲν λέγων
ὅτι οὐ διδακτόν ἐστὶν ἀρετή ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν,

Β νῦν σεαυτῷ τάναντι οπεύδεις, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδεῖξαι
ὡς πάντα χρήματα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη
cαὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, ὁ τρόπῳ μάλιστ'
ἀν διδακτόν φανείη ἡ ἀρετή· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀλλο τι
ἡ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετή, ὅσπερ Πρωταγόρας
ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν, σαφῶς οὐκ ἂν ἢν διδακτόν· νῦν
δὲ εἰ φανήσεται ἐπιστήμη ὁλον, ὡς σὺ οπεύδεις, ὁ
StackNavigator ἐσται μὴ διδακτόν ὅν. Πρωτ-
αγόρας δ' αὖ διδακτόν τότε ὑποθέμενος νῦν

C τούναντιν έοικε οπεύδοντι, ὀλίγου πάντα μᾶλλον
φανήναι αὐτὸ ἡ ἐπιστήμην. καὶ οὔτως ἃν ἤκιστα

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PROTAGORAS

Finish it, he said, by yourself.
I must first ask you, I said, just one more question: Do you still think, as at the beginning, that there are any people who are most ignorant and yet most courageous?
I see, Socrates, you have set your heart on making me your answerer; so, to oblige you, I will say that by what we have admitted I consider it impossible.

My only motive, I then said, in asking all these questions has been a desire to examine the various relations of virtue and its own special nature. For I know that, were it once made plain, that other question on which you and I have argued at such length on either side—you maintaining and I denying that virtue can be taught—would be cleared up satisfactorily. Our discussion, in its present result, seems to me as though it accused and mocked us like some human person; if it were given a voice it would say: "What strange creatures you are, Socrates and Protagoras! You on the one hand, after having said at first that virtue cannot be taught, are now hot in opposition to yourself, endeavouring to prove that all things are knowledge—justice, temperance, and courage—which is the best way to make virtue appear teachable: for if virtue were anything else than knowledge, as Protagoras tried to make out, obviously it would not be teachable; but if as a matter of fact it turns out to be entirely knowledge, as you urge, Socrates, I shall be surprised if it is not teachable. Protagoras, on the other hand, though at first he claimed that it was teachable, now seems as eager for the opposite, declaring that it has been found to be almost anything but knowledge, which would make it quite unteachable!"
PLATO

εἰ η διδακτόν· ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πάντα ταῦτα καθορῶν ἂν ἔχω κάτω ταραττόμενα δεινῶς, πάσαν προθυμίαν ἐξω καταφανὴ αὐτὰ γενέσθαι, καὶ θυλοῦμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελθόντας ἦμας ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ἔπὶ τὴν ἁρετὴν ὧ τι ἐστὶ, καὶ πάλιν ἐπισκεψαθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἰτε διδακτόν εἰτε μὴ διδακτόν, μὴ πολλάκις ἦμας ὁ Ἕπιμηθεὺς ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐν τῇ

D σκέψει σφήλη ἐξαπατήσας, ὦσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ διανομῇ ἠμέλησεν ἦμών, ὡς φῆς σύ. ἦρεσεν οὖν μοι καὶ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ ὁ Προμήθεως μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἕπιμηθέως· ὦ χρώμενος ἐγὼ καὶ προμηθούμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ παντὸς πάντα ταῦτα πραγματεύομαι, καὶ εἰ σὺ ἑθέλοις, ὁπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχας ἔλεγον, μετὰ σοῦ ἂν ἢδιστα ταῦτα συνδιασκοπῆν. καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Ἔγώ μεν, ἤφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπαινῶ σου τὴν προθυμίαν καὶ τὴν διεξοδον τῶν

Ε λόγων. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τάλλα οἶμαι κακὸς εἶναι ἀνθρώπος, φθονερός τε ἡκιστ' ἄνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ σοῦ πρὸς πολλοὺς δὴ εἰρηκα, ὅτι δὲν ἐντυγχάνω πολὺ μάλιστα ἄγαμαι σὲ, τῶν μὲν τηλικούτων καὶ πάντω καὶ λέγω γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάξωμι, εἰ τῶν ἐλλογίμων γένοιο ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφία. καὶ περὶ τούτων δὲ εἰσαῦθις, ὅταν βούλῃ, διέξιμεν· νῦν δ' ὠρα ἡδη καὶ ἔπ' άλλο τι τρέπεσθαι. Ἀλλ', ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οὔτω χρῆ ποιεῖν, εἰ σοι δοκεί. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ οὔπερ ἑφην ἵναι πάλαι ὠρα, ἀλλὰ Καλλία τῷ καλῷ χαριζόμενοι παρέμενα. ταῦτ' εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀπῆμεν.
Now I, Protagoras, observing the extraordinary tangle into which we have managed to get the whole matter, am most anxious to have it thoroughly cleared up. And I should like to work our way through it until at last we reach what virtue is, and then go back and consider whether it is teachable or not, lest perchance your Epimetheus beguile and trip us up in our investigation as he overlooked us in your account of his distribution. I like the Prometheus of your fable better than the Epimetheus; for he is of use to me, and I take Promethean thought continually for my own life when I am occupied with all these questions; so, with your consent, as I said at the beginning, I should be delighted to have your aid in the inquiry.

I approve your zeal, Socrates, said Protagoras, and the way you develop your arguments; for I think I am not ill-natured, and I am the last person on earth to be envious. Indeed I have told many people how I regard you—as the man I admire far above any that I meet, and as quite an exception to men of your age; and I say I should not be surprised if you won high repute for wisdom. We shall pursue the subject on some other occasion, at your pleasure: for the present, it is time to turn to another affair.

I quite agree, said I, if you think so: for I was long ago due to be where I told you I was going; I stayed merely to oblige our excellent Callias.

Here our colloquy ended, and each went his way.

1 Cf. 321 c.
INTRODUCTION TO THE MENO

The Meno takes up the question which the Protagoras left waiting for an answer—Can virtue be taught? This dialogue proceeds in the direct dramatic form, without descriptive introduction or connecting narrative, and in a series of five scenes we are shown the various resources of Socratic method in a determined attempt to solve that important problem. Thus (1) (70 a–80 d) we find that the first requisite for progress in the search is a definition of virtue; (2) (80 d–86 c) the inquiry is shifted to the origin of knowledge, which is demonstrated, by an experiment on one of Meno's young attendants, to be latent in us, and recoverable by the proper stimulation of our memory; (3) (86 c–90 b) we return to the question of what virtue is, and while it appears to be teachable we are faced with the awkward fact that it has no real teachers—it is not taught; (4) (90 b–95 a) Anytus, the typical man of affairs, is convicted of error in his reliance on convention and common sense; and lastly (5) (95 a–100 b) Socrates discusses with Meno the relation of knowledge, in which virtue must somehow consist, to the true opinion which guides practical men along the right path in everyday life.

The first two of these scenes are preparatory: they point out that by some means or other we must
obtain a definition of the thing itself—virtue—on which our inquiry is bent, and then we are given a specimen of the method by which we are most likely to acquire such a piece of real knowledge. With these two lessons in mind, we return to the question as it stood at the end of the Protagoras, and come to grips once more with that great defaulter—the received system of education. The only hope of finding our way to the truth for which we are groping seems to lie in a study of the instinctive opinion which occasionally guides men of superior character to the right course of action, and in a comparison of this "inspired" thought—which has helped us already (81) towards the educational principle of "recollection"—with the reasoned knowledge which we may look to as an abiding and unfailing support to ourselves and as a power that we can transmit to others.

The sane and profound wisdom which moves beneath the whole discussion is as remarkable as the clearness and acuteness of its argumentation. The detection of insufficiency in existing modes of instruction, and the recognition of rightness in certain high examples of conduct, are marked by a gentle humour and a breadth of vision and sympathy which doubtless distinguished the actual Socrates: the purpose to which those points are applied—of turning our gaze to a higher level of education and a surer basis of all thought and action—is derived indeed from the Master, but brought into full flower, with promise of later fruit, by the personal ardour and art of Plato. We feel the splendid determination of a new master-mind; and although his attempt at a deeper probing of the question has
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to be given up for the present without an answer, we are subtly prepared for the ambitious elaboration and demonstration of the Republic and the Phaedo.

Besides this main impression, the Meno has many subsidiary interests. The sophists Protagoras and Gorgias are referred to with respect, though their teaching is proved to be seriously defective. We find here (81) perhaps the first, because so tentative and diffident, statement in Plato of the soul's experience of previous existence, and its present possession of a sort of latent or suppressed knowledge of general notions, which has to be elicited and revived by methodical inquiry. We have also (79) an account of the effect of Socrates' conversations upon his disciples, which is a useful counterpart and complement to the excited rhapsody of Alcibiades in the Symposium (215); while the humorous, mystifying modesty of Socrates in ascribing his highest beliefs to converse with poets, priests, and priestesses (81) is of a piece with his manner in the Symposium and elsewhere. Finally we should notice the suddenness of Anytus' appearance on the scene, and his abrupt exit: remembering that he was afterwards the accuser of Socrates, and observing the language and tone of his warning to that reckless critic of the democracy, we must conclude that Plato contrived the episode with the deliberate purpose of showing that he did not blame any single person for his beloved Master's death, but cherished a nobler grudge against a world that was politically and intellectually out of joint. He thus brings us almost unawares to the edge of the rift which was opening in his mind between philosophy and the ordinary life of affairs: we see it gaping

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INTRODUCTION TO THE MENO

wide and grim in the Gorgias; when we come to the Republic, it is a well-known gulf, to be carefully measured and mapped.

Meno was a young Thessalian of noble and wealthy family. He is supposed here to be on a visit to Athens about 402 B.C., three years before the death of Socrates. He has acquired some literary and scientific knowledge by association with Gorgias, who spent his last few years in Thessaly. He took part as a general in the great march of the Ten Thousand with Cyrus in 401 B.C. Xenophon depicts him in the Anabasis as greedy, self-seeking and treacherous. Plato shows us his pleasanter side, though we find here that he is rather conceited and lacking in self-control (76 a, 80 b, c, 86 d).

The Meno has been edited, with ample introduction and notes, by E S. Thompson (Macmillan, 1901).
ΜΕΝΩΝ

[Ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΕΤΗΣ ΠΕΙΡΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΜΕΝΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΑΙΣ ΜΕΝΩΝΟΣ, ΑΝΤΤΟΣ

St. II. p. 70

ΜΕΝ. Ἐχεις μοι εἴπειν, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἃρα διδακτὸν ἢ ἀρετή; ἢ οὐ διδακτόν ἀλλ' ἀσκητὸν; ἢ ὦτε ἀσκητὸν ὦτε μαθητόν, ἀλλὰ φύσει παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ;

ἐπ. Ὡ Μένων, πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Θετταλοὶ εὐδόκημοι ἦσαν ἐν τοῖς Ἐλλησι καὶ έθαυμάζοντο ἐφ' ἱππική

Β τε καὶ πλοῦτῳ, νῦν δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ σοφία, καὶ οὐχ ἤκιστα οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀριστίππου πολίται Λαρισαίοι. τούτου δὲ ὑμῖν αὐτὸς ἐστὶ Γοργίας· ἀφικόμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἑραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφία ἐξῆλθεν Ἀλευνάδῳ τε τοὺς πρῶτους, ὡν ὁ σὸς ἑραστὴς ἐστὶ Ἀρίστιππος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θετταλῶν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτο τὸ έθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν, ἀφάβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, εὰν τίς τι έρθηται, ὡσπερ Σ εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότας, ἀτε καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων αὐτὸν ἔρωταν τῶν Ἐλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὃ τι ἂν τις βούληται, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀποκρινόμενος. ἐν-
MENO

[OR ON VIRTUE: TESTING]

CHARACTERS

Meno, Socrates, Meno's Boy, Anytus

MEN. Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue can be taught, or is acquired by practice, not teaching? Or if neither by practice nor by learning, whether it comes to mankind by nature or in some other way?

soc. Meno, of old the Thessalians were famous and admired among the Greeks for their riding and their riches; but now they have a name, I believe, for wisdom also, especially your friend Aristippus's people, the Larisaeans. For this you have to thank Gorgias; for when he came to that city he made the leading men of the Aleuadae—among them your lover Aristippus—and the Thessalians generally enamoured of wisdom. Nay more, he has given you the regular habit of answering any chance question in a fearless, magnificent manner, as befits those who know: for he sets the example of offering himself to be questioned by any Greek who chooses, and on any point one likes, and he has an answer for everybody. Now in this place, my dear Meno,
θάδε δέ, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τὸ ἑκαντίον περιήγηκεν·
71 ὥσπερ αὐχμὸς τις τῆς σοφίας γέγονεν, καὶ κυν- συνεύει ἐκ τῶν τῶν τῶν παρ' ὑμάς οἶχεσθαι ἡ σοφία: εἰ γοῦν τινὰ ἐθέλεις οὕτως ἐρέσθαι τῶν εἰθάδε, οὐδέεις ὡς οὐ γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ: ὦ ξένε, κυνδυνεύω σοι δοκεῖν μακαρίος τις εἶναι, ἄρετὴν γοῦν εἰτε διδακτῶν εἰθ' ὅτω τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι· ἐγὼ δὲ τοσοῦτον δὲν εἰτε διδακτῶν εἰτε μὴ διδακτῶν εἰδέναι, ὡστ' οὐδὲ αὕτῳ, ὃ τι ποτ' ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἄρετή, τυγχάνω εἰδῶς.

B Ἑγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς, ὦ Μένων, οὕτως ἔχω· συμπένομαι τοῖς πολίταις τούτοις τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ἐστῶ τοῖς οἴκεσθαι ὡς οὐκ εἰδῶς περὶ ἄρετῆς τὸ παράπαν· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἔστι, πῶς ἄν ὑποποίον γέ τι εἰδείην; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οὐν τε εἶναι, ὡς Μένων μὴ γιγνώσκει τὸ παράπαν ὡς ἔστι; τοῦτον εἰδέναι εἰτε καλὸς εἰτε πλούσιος εἰτε καὶ γενναίος ἔστιν, εἰτε καὶ τάνατία τούτων; δοκεῖ σοι οὕν τ' εἶναι,

MEN. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ σὺ, ὦ Σώκρατες,

C ἀληθῶς οὖν ὃ τι ἄρετὴ ἔστιν οἴσθα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα περὶ σοῦ καὶ οἶκαδε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν;

Ἐπ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὥστε ἔσταρ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ ἄλλω πω ἐνέτυχον εἰδοτε, ὡς ἔμοι δοκῶ.

MEN. Τί δέ; Γοργία οὐκ ἐνέτυχες ὅτε ἐνθάδε ἦν;

Ἐπ. Ἔγωγε.

MEN. Εἶτα οὐκ ἔδοκει σοι εἰδέναι;

Ἑπ. Οὐ πάνυ εἰμὶ μνήμων, ὦ Μένων, ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πῶς μοι τότε ἔδοξει. ἀλλ' ἱσως ἐκεῖνος τε οἶδε, καὶ σὺ ᾧ ἐκεῖνος ἐλεγεν· ἀνάμμησον οὖν με, πῶς ἐλεγεν. 266
we have a contrary state of things: a drought of wisdom, as it were, has come on; and it seems as though wisdom had deserted our borders in favour of yours. You have only to ask one of our people a question such as that, and he will be sure to laugh and say: Stranger, you must think me a specially favoured mortal, to be able to tell whether virtue can be taught, or in what way it comes to one: so far am I from knowing whether it can be taught or not, that I actually do not even know what the thing itself, virtue, is at all.

And I myself, Meno, am in the same case; I share my townsmen's poverty in this matter: I have to reproach myself with an utter ignorance about virtue; and if I do not know what a thing is, how can I know what its nature may be? Or do you imagine it possible, if one has no cognisance at all of Meno, that one could know whether he is handsome or rich or noble, or the reverse of these? Do you suppose that one could?

MEN. Not I. But is it true, Socrates, that you do not even know what virtue is? Are we to return home with this report of you?

soc. Not only this, my friend, but also that I never yet came across anybody who did know, in my opinion.

MEN. What? You did not meet Gorgias when he was here?

soc. I did.

MEN. And you didn’t consider that he knew?

soc. I have not a very good memory, Meno, so I cannot tell at the moment how he struck me then. It may be that he did know, and that you know what he said: remind me therefore how he expressed
Ε Ἐμοιγε.

Σημ. Ἐκείνον μὲν τοίνυν ἐώμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀπεστώς· σὺ δὲ αὐτός, ὡς πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων, τι φήσ ἀρέτην εἶναι; εἶπον καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς, ὅνα εὐτυχέστατον ψεῦσμα ἐφευμένον ὑ, ἀν φανῆς σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς καὶ Γοργίας, ἔγω δὲ εἰρηκὼς μηδενὶ πώποτε εἰδότι ἐντευχηκέναι.

Ε Ἐμοιγε. Ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπῶν, ὡ Σώκρατες, εἶπεν. πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν, ράδιον, ὅτι αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἵκανον εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὑ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἔχθροις κακῶς, καὶ αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλει γνώμαις ἀρετήν, οὐ χαλεπῶν διελθεῖν, ὅτι ἰδια̣ αὐτήν τὴν οἰκίαν εὑ οἰκεῖν, σώζοντας τε τὰ ἔνδον καὶ κατήκοιον οὕσαν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς. καὶ ἄλλη ἐστὶ παιδὸς ἀρετή, καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρρενος, καὶ πρεσβύτερον ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἔλευθερον, εἰ δὲ βουλεῖ, δούλον. καὶ ἄλλας πάμπολλα ἀρεταὶ εἰσώ, ὡστε οὐκ ἁπορία εἶπεν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὁ τι ἐστι· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικίων πρὸς ἑκαστὸν ἐργὸν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστι· ὡσαύτως δέ, οἶμαι, ὡ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ κακία.

Σημ. Πολλῆ γε τινὶ εὐτυχία ἑοικα κεχρῆσθαι, ὡ Μένων, εἰ μίαν ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμῆνος τι ἀνηγυρικα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κεμένων. ἀτάρ, ὡ Μένων, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν περὶ τὰ Β σμήνη, εἰ μου ἑρωμένου μελήτης περὶ οὕσιασ

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it; or if you like, make your own statement, for I expect you share his views.

MEN. I do.

SOC. Then let us pass him over, since in fact he is not present, and do you tell me, in heaven's name, what is your own account of virtue. Speak out frankly, that I may find myself the victim of a most fortunate falsehood, if you and Gorgias prove to have knowledge of it, while I have said that I never yet came across anyone who had.

MEN. Why, there is no difficulty, Socrates, in telling. First of all, if you take the virtue of a man, it is easily stated that a man's virtue is this—that he be competent to manage the affairs of his city, and to manage them so as to benefit his friends and harm his enemies, and to take care to avoid suffering harm himself. Or take a woman's virtue: there is no difficulty in describing it as the duty of ordering the house well, looking after the property indoors, and obeying her husband. And the child has another virtue—one for the female, and one for the male; and there is another for elderly men—one, if you like, for freemen, and yet another for slaves. And there are very many other virtues besides, so that one cannot be at a loss to explain what virtue is; for it is according to each activity and age that every one of us, in whatever we do, has his virtue; and the same, I take it, Socrates, will hold also of vice.

SOC. I seem to be in a most lucky way, Meno; for in seeking one virtue I have discovered a whole swarm of virtues there in your keeping. Now, Meno, to follow this figure of a swarm, suppose I should ask you what is the real nature of the bee,
ο τί ποτ’ ἔστι, πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἔλεγες αὐτὰς εἶναι, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω μοι, εἴ σε ἡρώμην· ἄρα τούτῳ φής πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς εἶναι καὶ διαφεροῦσας ἄλληλων, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι; ἣ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἄλλῳ δὲ τῷ, οἱ οὐ κάλλει ἡ μεγέθει ἡ ἄλλα τῶν τῶν τοιοῦτων; εἰπέ, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω οὕτως ἐρωτηθεῖς;

men. Τούτ’ ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἢ μέλεται εἰσίν, ἢ ἐτέρα τῆς ἐτέρας.

C ση. Εἰ οὐν εἴπον μετὰ ταῦτα· τοῦτο τοῖνυν μοι αὐτὸ εἴπέ, ὡς Μένων· ὃ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ἄλλα ταῦτὼν εἰσιν ἀπασαι, τί τούτῳ φής εἶναι; εἴχες δήποτε ἂν τί μοι εἴπεῖν;

men. Ἐγώγε.

ση. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄρετῶν· κἂν εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαὶ εἰσιν, ἐν γέ τι εἰδὼς ταῦτον ἀπασαὶ ἔχοσιν, δι' ὃ εἰσιν ἄρεταί, εἰς ὁ καλῶς που ἔχει ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ ἐρωτήσαντι ἐκεῖνο δηλώσαι, ὃ τυγχάνει οὕσα

D ἄρετή· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὅ τι λέγω;

men. Δοκῶ γε μοι μανθάνειν· οὐ μέντοι ὃς βουλόμαι γε πω κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτώμενον.

ση. Πότερον δὲ περὶ ἄρετῆς μόνον σοι οὕτω δοκεῖ, ὡς Μένων, ἄλλη μὲν ἄνδρὸς εἶναι, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἥ καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ περὶ ἰσχύος ὡσαύτως; ἄλλη μὲν ἄνδρὸς δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ὑγίεια, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικὸς; ἡ ταυτὸν πανταχοῦ εἰδός ἔστιν, ἐάνπερ

Ε ὑγίεια ἡ, ἐάντε ἐν ἄνδρι ἐάντε ἐν ἄλλῳ ὀτιμοῦν ἡ; 270
and you replied that there are many different kinds of bees, and I rejoined: Do you say it is by being bees that they are of many and various kinds and differ from each other, or does their difference lie not in that, but in something else—for example, in their beauty or size or some other quality? Tell me, what would be your answer to this question?

MEN. Why, this—that they do not differ, as bees, the one from the other.

soc. And if I went on to say: Well now, there is this that I want you to tell me, Meno: what do you call the quality by which they do not differ, but are all alike? You could find me an answer, I presume?

MEN. I could.

soc. And likewise also with the virtues, however many and various they may be, they all have one common character whereby they are virtues, and on which one would of course be wise to keep an eye when one is giving a definitive answer to the question of what virtue really is. You take my meaning, do you not?

MEN. My impression is that I do; but still I do not yet grasp the meaning of the question as I could wish.

soc. Is it only in the case of virtue, do you think, Meno, that one can say there is one kind belonging to a man, another to a woman, and so on with the rest, or is it just the same, too, in the case of health and size and strength? Do you consider that there is one health for a man, and another for a woman? Or, wherever we find health, is it of the same character universally, in a man or in anyone else?
MEN. 'H αυτή μοι δοκεῖ ύπερία γε εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρός καὶ γυναικός.

ΣΠ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἴσχυς; ἕαντερ ἴσχυρὰ γυνῆ ἡ, τῷ αὐτῷ εἶδει καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἴσχυί ἴσχυρὰ ἐσται; τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω· οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἴσχυς εἶναι ἡ ἴσχυς, εάντε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ἡ εάντε ἐν γυναικὶ· ἡ δοκεῖ τί σοι διαφέρειν;

MEN. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε.

73 ΣΠ. 'H δὲ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἀρετὴ εἶναι διοίσει τι, εάντε ἐν παιδὶ ἡ εάντε ἐν πρεσβύτῃ, εάντε ἐν γυναικὶ εάντε ἐν ἀνδρί;

MEN. 'Εμοιγέ πως δοκεῖ, ὡ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὃμοιον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτοις.

ΣΠ. Τί δέ; οὐκ ἀνδρός μὲν ἀρετὴν ἔλεγε πόλιν εὐ διοικεῖν, γυναικὸς δὲ οἰκίαν;

MEN. 'Εγώγε.

ΣΠ. Ἀρ' οὖν οἷόν τε εὖ διοικεῖν ἡ πόλις ἡ οἰκίαν ἡ ἄλλο ὅτιον, μὴ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως διοικοῦντα;

B MEN. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΠ. Οὐκοῦν ἄντερ δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως διοικῶσι, δικαιοσύνη καί σωφροσύνη διοικήσουσιν;

MEN. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΠ. Τῶν αὐτῶν ἢρα ἁμφότεροι δέονται, εἶτερ μέλλουσιν ἁγαθοὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ὁ ἀνήρ, δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης.

MEN. Φαίνονται.

ΣΠ. Τί δὲ παῖς καὶ πρεσβύτης; μῶν ἀκόλαστον ὄντες καὶ ἁδικοὶ ἁγαθοὶ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο;

MEN. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΠ. Ἀλλὰ σωφρόνες καὶ δικαιοί;
MENO

MEN. I think that health is the same, both in man and in woman.

soc. Then is it not so with size and strength also? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and the same strength; by "the same" I mean that strength does not differ as strength, whether it be in a man or in a woman. Or do you think there is any difference?

MEN. I do not.

soc. And will virtue, as virtue, differ at all whether it be in a child or in an elderly person, in a woman or in a man?

MEN. I feel somehow, Socrates, that here we cease to be on the same ground as in those other cases.

soc. Why? Were you not saying that a man's virtue is to manage a state well, and a woman's a house?

MEN. I was.

soc. And is it possible to manage a state well, or a house, or anything at all, if you do not manage it temperately and justly?

MEN. Surely not.

soc. Then whoever manages temperately and justly will manage with temperance and justice?

MEN. That must be.

soc. Then both the woman and the man require the same qualities of justice and temperance, if they are to be good.

MEN. Evidently.

soc. And what of a child or an old man? Can they ever hope to be good if they are intemperate and unjust?

MEN. Surely not.

soc. Only if they are temperate and just?
PLATO

MEN. Ναί.

C ΣΠ. Πάντες ἄρ' ἀνθρωποι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἁγαθοὶ εἰσιν· τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τυχόντες ἁγαθοὶ γίγνονται.

MEN. ἩΕοικεν.

ΣΠ. Οὐκ ἂν δῆπον, εἰ γε μὴ ἡ αὐτῇ ἀρετῇ ἢν αὐτῶν, τῶν αὐτῶν ἂν τρόπῳ ἁγαθοὶ ἦσαν.

MEN. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΠ. ἩΕπειδὴ τοῖνυν ἡ αὐτῇ ἀρετῇ πάντων ἐστὶ, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμιμηθήναι, τῷ αὐτῷ φησι Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ σοὶ μετ' ἐκείνου.

MEN. Τί ἄλλο γ' ἡ ἀρχεῖν οἶδ' ὃ εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων; εἴπερ ἐν γέ τι ζητεῖς κατὰ πάντων.

ΣΠ. ἩΑλλὰ μὴν ζητῶ γε. ἄλλ' ἄρα καὶ παιδὸς ἡ αὐτῇ ἀρετῇ, ὦ Μένων, καὶ δούλου, ἀρχεῖν οἴων τε εἶναι τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ δοκεῖ σοι ἐτὶ ἂν δοῦλος εἶναι ὁ ἀρχὼν;

MEN. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΠ. Οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὃ ἀριστε. ἔτι γὰρ καὶ τόδε σκόπειν ἀρχεῖν φης οἴον τ' εἶναι· οὐ προσθήσομεν αὐτόσε τὸ δικαίως, ἀδίκως δὲ μή;

MEN. Οἶμαι ἡγώγη· ἡ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν.

Ε ΣΠ. Πότερον ἀρετή, ὃ Μένων, ἡ ἀρετή τίς;

MEN. Πῶς τούτο λέγεις;

ΣΠ. Ὡς περὶ ἀλλον ὄτουοιν. οἴον, εἰ βούλει, στρογγυλότητος πέρι εἶπομ' ἂν ἢγωγε, ὅτι σχῆμα τί ἐστιν, οὐχ οὕτως ἀπλῶς ὅτι σχῆμα. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως ἂν εἶπομι, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἐστὶ σχῆματα.

MEN. Ὅρθως γε λέγων σύ, ἐπεί καὶ ἑγὼ λέγω οὐ μόνον δικαιοσύνην ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλας εἶναι ἀρετὰς.

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MEN. Yes.
soc. So all mankind are good in the same way; for they become good when they acquire the same qualities.
MEN. So it seems.
soc. And I presume, if they had not the same virtue, they would not be good in the same way.
MEN. No, indeed.
soc. Seeing then that it is the same virtue in all cases, try and tell me, if you can recollect, what Gorgias—and you in agreement with him—say it is.
MEN. Simply that it is the power of governing mankind—if you want some single description to cover all cases.
soc. That is just what I am after. But is virtue the same in a child, Meno, and in a slave—an ability to govern each his master? And do you think he who governed would still be a slave?
MEN. I should say certainly not, Socrates.
soc. No, indeed, it would be unlikely, my excellent friend. And again, consider this further point: you say it is "to be able to govern"; shall we not add to that—"justly, not unjustly"?
MEN. Yes, I think so; for justice, Socrates, is virtue.
soc. Virtue, Meno, or a virtue?
MEN. What do you mean by that?
soc. What I would in any other case. To take roundness, for instance; I should call it a figure, and not figure pure and simple. And I should name it so because there are other figures as well.
MEN. You would be quite right—just as I say there are other virtues besides justice.
PLATO

74 ξ. Τίνας ταύτας; εἰπέ· οἶνον καὶ ἐγώ σοι εἴπομι ἂν καὶ ἄλλα σχήματα, εἰ μὲ κελεύοις· καὶ σὺ οὖν ἐμοὶ εἴπε ἄλλας ἀρετᾶς.

MEN. Ἡ ἀνδρεία τούτων ἔμοι γε δοκεῖ ἀρετὴ εἶναι καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ σοφία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλαι.

Ξ. Πάλιν, ὁ Μένων, ταῦταν πεπόνθαμεν· πολλὰς ἄθηρήκαμεν ἀρετᾶς μίαν ἐξητούντες, ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ νυνὶ· τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἢ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστὶν, οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀνευρεῖν.

B MEN. Οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι πω, ὡς Σωκρατεῖς, ὡς οὖ ἔκτεις, μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων, ὥσπερ εὶς τοῖς ἄλλοις.

Ξ. Εἰκότως γε· ἄλλ' ἐγὼ προθυμήσομαι, ἐὰν οἶος τ' ὁ, ἡμᾶς προβιβάσαι. μονοθάνεις γὰρ ποι, ὅτι ὅστως ἔχει περὶ παντὸς· εἰ τίς οὖ τήν ἀνέροιτο τοῦτο, ὁ νυνὶ ἐγώ ἔλεγον, τί ἐστι σχῆμα, ὃ Μένων; εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες ὅτι στρογγυλότης, εἰ σοι ἐπεν ἄπερ ἐγώ, πότερον σχῆμα ἡ στρογγυλότης ἐστὶν ἢ σχῆμα τι; εἶπες δὴπον ἂν ὅτι σχῆμα τι.

MEN. Πάνι γε.

C Ξ. Οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἐστὶ σχῆματα;

MEN. Ναι.

Ξ. Καὶ εἰ γε προσαναφρῶτα σε ὅποια, ἔλεγες ἂν;

MEN. Ἔγωγε.

Ξ. Καὶ αὕτε εἰ περὶ χρώματος ὁσαύτως ἀνήρετο ὁ τι ἐστι, καὶ εἰπόντος σου, ὅτι τὸ λευκόν, μετὰ ταῦτα ὑπέλαβεν ὁ ἔρωτων, πότερον τὸ λευκὸν χρώμα ἐστὶν ἡ χρώμα τι; εἶπες ἂν ὅτι χρώμα τι, διότι καὶ ἄλλα τυγχάνει ὄντα; 276
soc. What are they? Tell me. In the same way as I can tell you of other figures, if you request me, so do you tell me of other virtues.

MEN. Well then, courage, I consider, is a virtue, and temperance, and wisdom, and loftiness of mind; and there are a great many others.

soc. Once more, Meno, we are in the same plight: again we have found a number of virtues when we were looking for one, though not in the same way as we did just now; but the one that runs through them all, this we are not able to find.

MEN. No, for I am not yet able, Socrates, to follow your line of search, and find a single virtue common to all, as one can in other cases.

soc. And no wonder; but I will make an effort, so far as I can, to help us onward. You understand, of course, that this principle of mine applies to everything: if someone asked you the question I put to you just now: What is figure, Meno? and you replied: Roundness; and then he said, as I did: Is roundness figure or a figure? I suppose you would answer: A figure.

MEN. Certainly.

soc. And for this reason—that there are other figures as well?

MEN. Yes.

soc. And if he went on to ask you of what sort they were, you would tell him?

MEN. I would.

soc. And if he asked likewise what colour is, and on your answering "white" your questioner then rejoined: Is "white" colour or a colour? your reply would be: A colour; because there are other colours besides.
MEN. "Εγώγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ γε σε ἐκέλευε λέγειν ἄλλα χρώματα,

D ἐλέγες ἀν ἄλλα, ὃ οὐδὲν ἦττον τυχάνει οὐτα χρώ-

ματα τού λευκοῦ;

MEN. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν ὁσπερ ἐγὼ μετήμει τὸν λόγον,

καὶ ἐλέγεν ὅτι ἀεὶ εἰς πολλὰ ἀφικνούμεθα, ἄλλα

μὴ μοι οὔτως, ἀλλ' ἐπειδή τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐνι

των προσαγορεύεις όνόματι, καὶ φής οὐδὲν αὐτῶν

ὁ τι οὔ σχῆμα εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἑαυτία οὐντα

ἀλλήλοις, ὃ τι ἔστι τοῦτο, ὃ οὐδὲν ἦττον κατέχει

τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ τὸ εὐθὺ, ὃ δὴ όνομάζεις σχῆμα

Ε καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῆς τὸ στρογγύλον σχῆμα εἶναι

ἡ τὸ εὐθὺ; ἢ οὐχ οὔτω λέγεις;

MEN. "Εγὼγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν, ὅταν οὔτω λέγης, τότε οὐδὲν

μᾶλλον φῆς τὸ στρογγύλον εἶναι στρογγύλον ἢ

εὐθὺ, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐθὺ εὐθὺ ἢ στρογγύλον;

MEN. Οὐ δὴ ποιοῦ, ὁ Ἡσίκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν σχῆμα γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῆς

εἶναι τὸ στρογγύλον τοῦ εὐθεοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ έτερον

tοῦ έτέρου.

MEN. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε οὖν τοῦτο, οὐ τοῦτο ὄνομά ἐστι,

τὸ σχῆμα; πειρῶ λέγειν. εἰ οὖν τῷ ἐρωτῶντι

75 οὔτως ἢ περὶ σχῆματος ἢ χρώματος εἶπες ὅτι

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μανθάνω ἔγωγε ὃ τι βούλει, ὃ ἀνθρωπε,

οὐδὲ οἶδα ὃ τι λέγεις· ἵσως ἂν εἶθαίμασε καὶ

εἶπεν· οὐ μανθάνεις, ὅτι ξητῷ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῦτοις

ταὐτόν; ἢ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τοῦτοις, ὃ Μένων, ἔχοις ἂν

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MENO

MEN. It would.

soc. And if he bade you mention other colours, you would tell him of others that are colours just as much as white?

MEN. Yes.

soc. Now suppose that, like me, he pursued the argument and said: We are always arriving at a variety of things, but let me have no more of that: since you call these many things by one single name, and say they are figures, every one of them, even when they are opposed to one another, tell me what is that which comprises round and straight alike, and which you call figure—including straight equally with round under that term. For that is your statement, is it not?

MEN. It is.

soc. And in making it, do you mean to say that round is no more round than straight, or straight no more straight than round?

MEN. No, to be sure, Socrates.

soc. What you mean is that the round shape is no more a figure than the straight, or the straight than the round.

MEN. Quite right.

soc. Then what can this thing be, which bears the name of figure? Try and tell me. Suppose that, on being asked this question by someone, either about figure or about colour, you had replied: Why, I don’t so much as understand what you want, sir, or even know what you are saying: he might well have shown surprise, and said: Do you not understand that I am looking for that which is the same common element in all these things? Or would you still be unable to reply, Meno, if you were
eipteín, eí tís éρωτών· tí ēstw éπi tō όργυλω kai eúthei kai ēπi tōs āllous, ó δή σχήματα kaleís, ταύτων éπi pásai; peirop bíepeín, ūna kai ēνeñtá sōu meléti prós tīn perī tῆς āretpῆs ápókrwv.

B mēn. Mῆ, āllā su, ò Sōukrates, eíte.

σω. Bouleí suçi charísomai;

mēn. Pānu ge.

σω. 'Eθelēsēs onû kai su ēmoi eipteín perí tῆς āretpῆs;

mēn. 'Εγωγη.

σω. Prōduμiτētōn toūnuv· áξiouv γάρ.

mēn. Pānu mēn onû.

σω. Fēre ðῆ, peιrmwmedā suçi eipteín, tī ēstī σχήμα. sκópeī onû eĩ tōde ápodēχη autō eĩnai· ēstw γάρ ðῆ ūmīn tōtu σχήμα, ð μόνon tōn ōntωn tυγχάνει χρώμαtī aei ēpōmēnov. īkanwv sou, ÷ άllwv pws ζηteίz; ēγw γάρ kān ōntos ānaptwv ei mói āretpῆn eïpouw.

C mēn. 'Āllā toūtō ge eũthēs, ò Sōukrates.

σω. Pōs lēγeis;

mēn. "Oti σχῆμα pṑ ëstī kata tōn sōn lōgon, ð aei χρώa ēpetai. eiθèn. eĩ dē ðῆ tīn χróan tis mī fai̇h ēidēnai, āllā āwstwv āporoi ō史诗er peri tōu σχῆμatos, tī ān oīei suçi āpō- kekrīsthai;

σω. Tάlēthē ēγωγη. kai eĩ mēn ge tōn soφwv tis eî̇η kai ēριστικῶν te kai āγωνιστικῶν ð ērōmēnov, eîpōμi' ān autōr òti ēmoi mēn eĩrētai· eĩ dē mī̇ orθōs lēgō, sōn ēργον laμβάνειν lōgon kai ēλέγχειn. eĩ dē ō史诗er ēγw te kai su νπνī φiλοi ōntes bουλουντo āllhλoiz diαlēγεσθαι, dēi 280
approached on other terms, and were asked: What is it that is common to the round and the straight and everything else that you call figures—the same in all? Try and tell me; it will be good practice for your answer about virtue.

men. No, it is you who must answer, Socrates.
soc. You wish me to do you the favour?
men. By all means.
soc. And then you will agree to take your turn and answer me on virtue?
men. I will.
soc. Well then, I must make the effort, for it is worth our while.
men. Certainly.
soc. Come now, let me try and tell you what figure is. Just consider if you accept this description of it: figure, let us say, is the only existing thing that is found always following colour. Are you satisfied, or are you looking for something different? I am sure I should be content with a similar account of virtue from you.

men. But it is such a silly one, Socrates.
soc. How do you mean?
men. Well, figure, as I understand by your account, is what always follows colour. Very good; but if some one said he did not know colour, and was in the same difficulty about it as about figure, what answer do you suppose would have come from you?
soc. The truth, from me; and if my questioner were a professor of the eristic and contentious sort, I should say to him: I have made my statement; if it is wrong, your business is to examine and refute it. But if, like you and me on this occasion, we were friends and chose to have a discussion together, I
δὴ πραότερον πως καὶ διαλεκτικῶτερον ἀπο-
κρίνεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ἵσως τὸ διαλεκτικῶτερον μὴ
μόνον τάληθ᾽ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι᾽ ἑκείνων
ὡς ἂν προσομολογῇ εἰδέναι ὁ ἑρωτώμενος. πει-
ράσομαι δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ σοι οὕτως εἶπεῖν. λέγε
γὰρ μοι τελευτὴν καλεῖς τι; τοιὸνδε λέγω οἶον
Ε ἐπέρας καὶ ἐσχατον πάντα ταῦτα ταύτῳ τι λέγω.
ἵσως δὲ ἂν ἵμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροιτο ἀλλὰ σοῦ
γέ που καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι καὶ τετελευτηκέναι·
τὸ τοιοῦτον βούλομαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικίλον.
ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ καλῶ, καὶ οἶμαι μανθάνειν δὲ
λέγεις.

76 ξ. Τί δ᾽; ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι, καὶ ἔτερον
αὖ στερεόν, οἶον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν γεωμετρίαις;
ΜΕΝ. Ἐγώ γε καλῶ.

ξ. Ἡδὴ τοίνυν ἂν μάθουσ μοι ἐκ τούτων,
σχῆμα ὃ λέγω. κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς σχῆματος
τούτῳ λέγω, εἰς δὲ τὸ στερεόν περαινεῖ, τοῦτο
ἐίναι σχῆμα· ὁπερ ἂν συλλαβῶν εἶπομι στερεοῦ
πέρας σχῆμα εἶναι.

ΜΕΝ. Τὸ δὲ χρώμα τί λέγεις, ὡ Σῶκρατες;
ξ. Ὕβριστὴς γ᾽ εἰ, ὡ Μένων· ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτη
πράγματα προστάττεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ
Β ὁυκ ἔθελες ἀναμνησθεὶς εἴπεῖν, ὁ τί ποτε λέγει
Γοργίας ἀρετὴν εἶναι.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὰν μοι σὺ τοῦτ᾽ εἴπης, ὡ
Σῶκρατες, ἐρῶ σοι.

ξ. Κἂν κατακεκαλυμμένος τις γνῷν, ὡ
Μένων, διαλεγομένου σοι, ὅτι καλὸς εἰ καὶ ἑραςταὶ
σοι ἔτι εἴσιν.
MENO

should have to reply in some milder tone more suited to dialectic. The more dialectical way, I suppose, is not merely to answer what is true, but also to make use of those points which the questioned person acknowledges he knows. And this is the way in which I shall now try to argue with you. Tell me, is there something you call an end? Such a thing, I mean, as a limit, or extremity—I use all these terms in the same sense, though I daresay Prodicus\(^1\) might quarrel with us. But you, I am sure, refer to a thing as terminated or ended: something of that sort is what I mean—nothing complicated.

MEN. Yes, I do, and I think I grasp your meaning.

soc. Well then, you speak of a surface, and also of a solid—the terms employed in geometrical problems?

MEN. I do.

soc. So now you are able to comprehend from all this what I mean by figure. In every instance of figure I call that figure in which the solid ends; and I may put that more succinctly by saying that figure is "limit of solid."

MEN. And what do you say of colour, Socrates?

soc. How overbearing of you, Meno, to press an old man with demands for answers, when you will not trouble yourself to recollect and tell me what account Gorgias gives of virtue!

MEN. When you have answered my question, Socrates, I will answer yours.

soc. One might tell even blindfolded, Meno, by the way you discuss, that you are handsome and still have lovers.

\(^1\) Cf. Protag. 337 \(a\).
MEN. Τι δή;
ΧΩΝ. "Οτι οὐδέν ἄλλ' ἢ ἐπιτάττεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις: ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τρυφώντες, ἀτε τυραννεύοντες, ἐως ἂν ἐν ὕπα ὁμι. καὶ ἀμα ἐμὸν C ἀσως κατέγνωκας, ὅτι εἰμὶ ἦττων τῶν καλῶν. χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι καὶ ἀποκρινόμαι.
MEN. Πάντως οὖν, εᾶν σοι καὶ ἀπορροοῖ
ΚΑΙ πόρους, εἶς οὐς καὶ δι' ὃν αὐτ ἀπορροοί
πορεύονται;
MEN. Πάννε.
ΚΑΙ τῶν ἀπορροών τας μὲν ἀριστεῖν
C ἐνίοις τῶν πόροις, τας δὲ ἐλάττους η λείζους
eiνai;
MEN. Εστι ταῦτα.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗν καλεῖς τι;
MEN. Εγγυε.
Ἐκ τούτων δή ἐννε ὧ τοι λέγω, ἔφη
Παύδαρος. ἔστι γὰρ χρώα ἀπορροή σχημάτων ὁφει σύμμετροσ καὶ αἰσθητός.
ΜΕΝ. Ἀριστά μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σωκράτης, ταύτην
τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἰρηκέναι.
ΘΕ Ισως γὰρ σοι κατὰ συνήθειαν εἴρηται.

1 There is something of Gorgias's stately style in the definition that follows; but the implication seems mainly to be that the substance of it will be familiar to Meno because 284
MEN. Why so?

soc. Because you invariably speak in a peremptory tone, after the fashion of spoilt beauties, holding as they do a despotic power so long as their bloom is on them. You have also, I daresay, made a note of my weakness for handsome people. So I will indulge you, and answer.

MEN. You must certainly indulge me.

soc. Then would you like me to answer you in the manner of Gorgias,1 which you would find easiest to follow?

MEN. I should like that, of course.

soc. Do not both of you say there are certain effluences2 of existent things, as Empedocles held?

MEN. Certainly.

soc. And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?

MEN. To be sure.

soc. And some of the effluences fit into various passages, while some are too small or too large?

MEN. That is so.

soc. And further, there is what you call sight?

MEN. Yes.

soc. So now "conceive my meaning," as Pindar3 says: colour is an effluence of figures, commensurate with sight and sensible.

MEN. Your answer, Socrates, seems to me excellently put.

soc. Yes, for I expect you find its terms familiar; he was a pupil of Gorgias, who had learnt his science from Empedocles.

2 Empedocles taught that material objects are known to us by means of effluences or films given off by them and suited in various ways to our sense-organs.

3 Fr. 82 (Bergk); cf. Aristoph. Birds, 939.
καὶ ἀμα, οἷμαι, ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι ἔχοις ἂν ἔξ αὐτῆς εἴπειν καὶ φωνὴν, ὁ ἐστι, καὶ οἴσμη καὶ ἄλλα
Ε πολλὰ τῶν τοιοῦτων.

ΜΕΝ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΨ. Τραγικὴ γάρ ἔστιν, ὦ Μένων, ἡ ἀπόκρισις,
ὡς ἀρέσκει σοι μάλλον ἢ ἡ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΨ. Ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ παῖ Ἀλεξιδήμου, ὡς ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἄλλ' ἐκείνη βελτίων· οἶμαι
dὲ οὐδ' ἂν σοὶ δοξαί, εἰ μή, ἄσπερ χθές ἔλεγης, ἀναγκαῖον σοι ἀπιέναι πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων, ἄλλ'
eἰ περιμείναις τε καὶ μυθεῖσθα.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ περιμένοιμ' ἄν, ὦ Σωκράτες, εἰ
μοι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγουι.

ΣΨ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπολεῖσθω,
καὶ σοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, λέγων τοιαῦτα· ἄλλ' ὁπως μὴ οὐχ οἶος τ' ἔσομαι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν.
ἄλλ' ἂθι δὴ πειρῶ καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδοῦναι, κατὰ ὅλον εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς πέρι, ὃ τι ἐστι,
καὶ παῦσαι πολλὰ ποιῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός, ὅπερ φασὶ
tοὺς συντρίβοντάς τι ἐκάστοτε οἱ σκώπτοντες, ἄλλ'
Β ἔάσας ὅλην καὶ ὑγιῆ εἰπὲ τί ἔστιν ἀρετή. τὰ δὲ
γε παραδείγματα παρ' ἐμοὶ εἴληφας.

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Σωκράτες, ἀρετή
eἶναι, καθάπερ ὃ ποιητὴς λέγει, χαίρειν τε καλοῦσι
καὶ δύνασθαι· καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω ἀρετῆν, ἐπι-
θυμοῦντα ὑπὲρ γούν, καὶ δύνατον εἶναι πορίζεσθαι.

ΣΨ. Ἀρα λέγεις τὸν τῶν καλῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα
ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Μάλιστά γε.

ΣΨ. Ἀρα ὡς ὅντων τινῶν οἱ τῶν κακῶν ἐπι-

1 Perhaps from Simonides.
and at the same time I fancy you observe that it enables you to tell what sound and smell are, and numerous other things of the kind.

MEN. Certainly.

soc. It is an answer in the high poetic style, Meno, and so more agreeable to you than that about figure.

MEN. Yes, it is.

soc. But yet, son of Alexidemus, I am inclined to think the other was the better of the two; and I believe you also would prefer it, if you were not compelled, as you were saying yesterday, to go away before the mysteries, and could stay awhile and be initiated.

MEN. But I should stay, Socrates, if you would give me many such answers.

soc. Well then, I will spare no endeavour, both for your sake and for my own, to continue in that style; but I fear I may not succeed in keeping for long on that level. But come now, you in your turn must try and fulfil your promise by telling me what virtue is in a general way; and you must stop producing a plural from the singular, as the wags say whenever one breaks something, but leave virtue whole and sound, and tell me what it is. The pattern you have now got from me.

MEN. Well, in my view, Socrates, virtue is, in the poet’s words, “to rejoice in things honourable and be able for them”\(^1\); and that, I say, is virtue—to desire what is honourable and be able to procure it.

soc. Do you say that he who desires the honourable is desirous of the good?

MEN. Certainly.

soc. Implying that there are some who desire
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θυμοῦσιν, ἐτέρων δὲ οἱ τῶν ἁγαθῶν; οὐ πάντες,
C ὀριστε, δοκοῦσι σοι τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν;
MEN. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλὰ τινες τῶν κακῶν;
MEN. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Οἱ οὗμενοι τὰ κακὰ ἁγαθὰ εἶναι, λέγεις, ἵ
καὶ γιγνώσκοντες, ὅτι κακὰ ἔστων, ομως ἐπι-
θυμοῦσιν αὐτῶν;
MEN. 'Αμφότερα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. 'Ἡ γὰρ δοκεῖ τίς σοι, ὃ Μένων, γιγνώσκων
τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ ἔστων ομως ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν;
MEN. Μάλιστα.
ΣΩ. Τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις; ἢ γενέσθαι αὐτῶ;
D MEN. Γενέσθαι τί γὰρ ἄλλο;
ΣΩ. Πότερον ἡγούμενος τὰ κακὰ ωφελεῖν
ἐκεῖνον ὦ ἄν γένηται, ἢ γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι
βλάπτει ὦ ἄν παρῇ;
MEN. Εἰσὶ μὲν οἱ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ωφελεῖν,
εἰπὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι βλάπτει.
ΣΩ. 'Ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσι σοι γιγνώσκειν τὰ κακὰ,
ὅτι κακὰ ἔστων, οἱ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ωφελεῖν;
MEN. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δήλον ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν οὐ τῶν κακῶν
ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οἱ ἄγνοοντες αὐτά, ἀλλὰ εκεῖνον, ὃ
Ε ὕοντο ἁγαθὰ εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα γε κακά; ὥστε
οἱ ἄγνοοντες αὐτά καὶ οἰούμενοι ἁγαθὰ εἶναι δήλον
ὅτι τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν; ἢ οὐ;
MEN. Κινδυνεύονσιν οὗτοι γε.
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; οἱ τῶν κακῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντες,
ὡς φής σὺ, ἡγούμενοι δὲ τὰ κακὰ βλάπτειν ἐκεῖνον,
ὡ ἄν γένηται, γιγνώσκουσι δήλου ὅτι βλαβήσονται
ὑπ' αὐτῶν;
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the evil, and others the good? Do not all men, in your opinion, my dear sir, desire the good?

**MEN.** I think not.

**soc.** There are some who desire the evil?

**MEN.** Yes.

**soc.** Thinking the evil to be good, do you mean, or actually recognizing it to be evil, and desiring it nevertheless?

**MEN.** Both, I believe.

**soc.** Do you really believe, Meno, that a man knows the evil to be evil, and still desires it?

**MEN.** Certainly.

**soc.** What do you mean by "desires"? Desires the possession of it?

**MEN.** Yes; what else could it be?

**soc.** And does he think the evil benefits him who gets it, or does he know that it harms him who has it?

**MEN.** There are some who think the evil is a benefit, and others who know that it does harm.

**soc.** And, in your opinion, do those who think the evil a benefit know that it is evil?

**MEN.** I do not think that at all.

**soc.** Obviously those who are ignorant of the evil do not desire it, but only what they supposed to be good, though it is really evil; so that those who are ignorant of it and think it good are really desiring the good. Is not that so?

**MEN.** It would seem to be so in their case.

**soc.** Well now, I presume those who, as you say, desire the evil, and consider that the evil harms him who gets it, know that they will be harmed by it?
MEN. 'Ανάγκη.

78 Ἐν τοῖς βλαστομένοις οὐτοὶ οὐκ οὖνται ἀθλίους εἶναι καθ’ ὅσον βλάπτονται:

MEN. Καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη.

Ἐν. Τοὺς δὲ ἄθλιους οὐ κακοδαίμονας;

Ἐν. Ὁμιαί ἔγωγε.

Ἐν. 'Εστὶν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακο-

dαίμων εἶναι;

Ἐν. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Ὁσκρατεῖς.

Ἐν. Οὐκ ἁρα βούλεται, ὡς Μένων, τὰ κακὰ

ὅσεις, εἴπερ μη βούλεται τοιοῦτος εἶναι. τί γὰρ

ἀλλο ἔστιν ἄθλιον εἶναι, ἡ ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν

καὶ κτάσθαι;

B MEN. Κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὡς Ὁσκρατεῖς·

Ἐν. Οὐκοῦν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ ἄρετὴ

βούλεσθαι τε τάγαθα καὶ δύνασθαι;

Ἐν. Εἶπον γὰρ.

Ἐν. Οὐκοῦν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι

πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὗτεν ὁ ἐτέρος τοῦ

ἐτέρου βελτίων;

Ἐν. Φαίνεται.

Ἐν. 'Αλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι, εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων

ἀλλος ἄλλου, κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἂν εἴη ἀμείων.

Ἐν. Πάνυ γε.

Ἐν. Τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἁρα, ως ἑοικε, κατὰ τὸν σὸν

C λόγον ἄρετῆ, δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι τάγαθα.

Ἐν. Παντάπασι μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Ὁσκρατεῖς,

οὕτως ἔχεις, ὡς οὐ νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.

Ἐν. 'Ιδομεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἰ ἀληθῆς λέγεις·

Ἰσως γὰρ ἂν εὑ λέγοις. τάγαθα φῆς οἴνον τ’ εἶναι

πορίζεσθαι ἄρετήν εἶναι;

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MENO

MEN. They needs must.
soc. But do they not hold that those who are harmed are miserable in proportion to the harm they suffer?
MEN. That too must be.
soc. And are not the miserable ill-starred?
MEN. I think so.
soc. Then is there anyone who wishes to be miserable and ill-starred?
MEN. I do not suppose there is, Socrates.
soc. No one, then, Meno, desires evil, if no one desires to be such an one: for what is being miserable but desiring evil and obtaining it?
MEN. It seems that what you say is true, Socrates, and that nobody desires evil.
soc. Well now, you were saying a moment ago that virtue is the desire and ability for good?
MEN. Yes, I was.
soc. One part of the statement—the desire—belongs to our common nature, and in this respect one man is no better than another?
MEN. Apparently.
soc. But it is plain that if one man is not better than another in this, he must be superior in the ability.
MEN. Certainly.
soc. Then virtue, it seems by your account, is ability to procure goods.
MEN. I entirely agree, Socrates, with the view which you now take of the matter.
soc. Then let us see whether your statement is true in another respect; for very likely you may be right. You say virtue is the ability to procure goods?

1 ὁ τοῦ Ἀστ: τοῦτον μοι. 291
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MEN. Ὑγώγει.
ΣΝ. Ἄγαθά δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἴον ὕγιειν τε καὶ πλοῦτον;
ΜΕΝ. Καὶ χρυσίων λέγω καὶ ἀργύριοι κτάσθαι καὶ τιμᾶς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς.
ΣΝ. Μή ἀλλ᾽ ἄττα λέγεις τάγαθα ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα.

Ἐλευ. χρυσίων δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀργύριοι πορίζοισθαι ἄρετῆ ἔστω, ὡς φησί Μένων ὁ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως πατρικὸς ξένος. πότερον προστιθεῖς τούτω τῷ πόρῳ, ὡ Μένων, τὸ δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως, ἢ οὐδὲν σοι διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδίκως τις αὐτὰ πορίζηται, ὁμοίως σὺ αὐτὰ ἄρετῆν καλεῖς;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δῆπον, Ὡ Σώκρατες.
ΣΝ. Ἀλλὰ κακίαν.
ΜΕΝ. Πάντως δῆπον.
ΣΝ. Δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἐοικε, τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ δικαιοσύνην ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ ὁσιότητα προσεῖναι, ἢ ἄλλο Ἑτὶ μόριοι ἄρετῆς. εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἑσται ἄρετῆ, καί-περ ἐκπορίζουσα τάγαθα.
ΜΕΝ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἄρετὴ γένοιτ' ἂν;
ΣΝ. Τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐκπορίζειν χρυσίων καὶ ἀργύριοι, ὡταν μὴ δίκαιον ἢ, μήτε αὐτῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ, οὐκ ἄρετή καὶ αὐτὴ ἔστιν ἡ ἀπορία;
ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.
ΣΝ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα μᾶλλον ὁ πόρος τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἡ ἀπορία ἄρετὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀλλὰ, ὡς ἐοικεν, ὁ μὲν ἄν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης γίγνηται, ἄρετὴ ἑσται, 79 ὁ δὲ ἄν ἄνευ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, κακία.
MENO

MEN. I do.

soc. And do you not mean by goods such things as health and wealth?

MEN. Yes, and I include the acquisition of gold and silver, and of state honours and offices.

soc. Are there any things besides this sort, that you class as goods?

MEN. No, I refer only to everything of that sort.

soc. Very well: procuring gold and silver is virtue, according to Meno, the ancestral friend of the Great King. Tell me, do you add to such procuring, Meno, that it is to be done justly and piously, or is this indifferent to you, but even though a man procures these things unjustly, do you call them virtue all the same?

MEN. Surely not, Socrates.

soc. Rather, vice.

MEN. Yes, of course.

soc. Then it seems that justice or temperance or holiness or some other part of virtue must accompany the procuring of these things; otherwise it will not be virtue, though it provides one with goods.

MEN. Yes, for how, without these, could it be virtue?

soc. And not to procure gold and silver, when it would be unjust—what we call the want of such things—is virtue, is it not?

MEN. Apparently.

soc. So the procuring of this sort of goods will be no more virtue than the want of them; but it seems that whatever comes accompanied by justice will be virtue, and whatever comes without any such quality, vice.
PLATO

MEN. Δοκεί μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΝ. Οὐκοῦν τούτων ἐκαστον ὁλίγον πρότερον μόριον ἁρετῆς ἐφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;

MEN. Ναί.

ΣΝ. Εἶτα, ὁ Μένων, παῖζεις πρὸς με;

MEN. Τί δή, ὁ Σώκρατες;

ΣΝ. "Οτι ἄρτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος σου μὴ καταγνώσαι μηδὲ κερματίζειν τὴν ἁρετὴν, καὶ δῶντος παραδείγματα καθ’ ἀ δεόι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τούτων μὲν ἡμέλησας, λέγεις δὲ μοι, ὅτι ἁρετὴ ἐστίν οἶνον ἐστὶν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ ὑπομονής ἁρετὴς εἶναι;

MEN. "Εγώγε.

ΣΝ. Οὐκοῦν συμβαίνει εξ ὧν συ ὁμολογεῖς, τὸ μετὰ μορίου ἁρετῆς πράττει, ὅ τι ἂν πράττῃ, τούτο ἁρετὴν εἶναι τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόριον φης ἁρετῆς εἶναι, καὶ ἔκαστα τούτων. τί οὖν δή τούτο λέγω; ὅτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἁρετὴν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν ὅ τι ἐστι, πάσαν δὲ φης πράξεω ἁρετὴν εἶναι, ἐάνπερ μετὰ Μ μορίον ἁρετῆς πράττηται, ὡσπερ εἰρήκας ὅ τι ἁρετή ἐστι τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἣδη γνωσσιμένον ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐὰν συ κατακερματίζῃς αὐτὴν κατὰ μόρια. δεῖται οὖν σοι πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἐμοὶ θαὐκεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ὡς φίλε Μένων, τί ἔστιν ἁρετή, εἰ μετὰ μορίου ἁρετῆς πάσα πράξεις ἁρετῆ αὐτῇ ἢ εἰῇ; τούτο γὰρ ἐστὶ λέγειν, ὅταν λέγῃ τίς, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης πράξεως ἁρετή ἐστίν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν δεῖσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ἀλλ’ οἴει των εἰδέναι μόριον ἁρετῆς ὅ τι ἐστιν, αὐτὴν μὴ εἰδότα;
MENO

MEN. I agree that it must be as you say.
soc. And were we saying a little while ago that each of these things was a part of virtue—justice and temperance and the rest of them?
MEN. Yes.
soc. And here you are, Meno, making fun of me?
MEN. How so, Socrates?
soc. Because after my begging you not to break up virtue into small change, and giving you a pattern on which you should answer, you have ignored all this, and now tell me that virtue is the ability to procure good things with justice; and this, you tell me, is a part of virtue?
MEN. I do.
soc. Then it follows from your own admission that doing whatever one does with a part of virtue is itself virtue; for you say that justice is a part of virtue, and so is each of such qualities. You ask the meaning of my remark. It is that after my requesting you to speak of virtue as a whole, you say not a word as to what it is in itself, but tell me that every action is virtue provided that it is done with a part of virtue; as though you had told me what virtue is in the whole, and I must understand it forthwith—when you are really splitting it up into fragments! I think therefore that you must face the same question all over again, my dear Meno—What is virtue?—if we are to be told that every action accompanied by a part of virtue is virtue; for that is the meaning of the statement that every action accompanied by justice is virtue. Or do you not agree that you have to meet the same question afresh? Do you suppose that anyone can know a part of virtue when he does not know virtue itself?

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PLATO

MEN. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

D ΣΠ. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ μέμνησαι, ὅτε ἑγώ σοι ἀρτι ἀπεκρινάμην περὶ τοῦ σχῆματος, ἀπεβάλλομέν ποι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόκρισιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἐτὶ ζητομένων καὶ μήπω ὦμολογημένων ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

MEN. Καὶ ὅρθως γε ἀπεβάλλομεν, ὡ Σώκρατες.

ΣΠ. Μὴ τοινυν, ὥ ἀριστε, μηδὲ σὺ ἐτὶ ζητομένης ἀρετῆς ὀλης ὅ τι ἐντιν οἶου διὰ τῶν ταύτης μορίων ἀποκρινόμενος δηλώσεις αὐτὴν ὀτωοῦν, ἥ

Ε ἀλλὰ ὅτιοιν τούτῳ τῶν αὐτῶ τρόπων λέγων, ἀλλὰ πάλιν τῆς αὐτῆς δείησθων ἐρωτήσεως, τίνος ὄντος ἀρετῆς λέγεις ὁ λέγεις; ἥ οὐδέν σοι δοκῶ λέγειν;

MEN. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ὅρθως λέγειν.

ΣΠ. Ἀπόκριναι τοινυν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· τί φης ἀρετήν εἰναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἔταιρός σου;

MEN. Ὡ Σώκρατες, ἡκουον μὲν ἐγωγε πρὶν 80 καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὐδέν ἀλλο ἥ αὐτὸς τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν· καὶ νῦν, ὡς γε μοι δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπάδεις, ὡστε μεστὸν ἀπορίας γεγονέναι· καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὦμοιοτάτος εἰναι τὸ τε εἴδος καὶ τάλλα ταύτη τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκη τῇ θαλαττίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ τὸν ἀεὶ πλησιάζοντα καὶ ἀπτομενον ναρκάν ποιεῖ· καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιοῦτον τι πεποιηκέναι [ναρκάν].¹ ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἐγωγε καὶ

Β τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ στῶμα ναρκῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι ἀποκρίνωμαι σοι. καῦτοι μυριάκις γε περὶ ἀρετῆς

¹ ναρκάν secl. Dobree.

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MENO

MEN. No, I do not.

soc. And I daresay you remember, when I answered you a while ago about figure, how we rejected the sort of answer that attempts to proceed in terms which are still under inquiry and has not yet been admitted.

MEN. Yes, and we were right in rejecting it, Socrates.

soc. Well then, my good sir, you must not in your turn suppose that while the nature of virtue as a whole is still under inquiry you will explain it to anyone by replying in terms of its parts, or by any other statement on the same lines: you will only have to face the same question over again—What is this virtue, of which you are speaking all the time? Or do you see no force in what I say?

MEN. I think what you say is right.

soc. Then answer me again from the beginning: what do both you and your associate say that virtue is?

MEN. Socrates, I used to be told, before I began to meet you, that yours was just a case of being in doubt yourself and making others doubt also; and so now I find you are merely bewitching me with your spells and incantations, which have reduced me to utter perplexity. And if I am indeed to have my jest, I consider that both in your appearance and in other respects you are extremely like the flat torpedo sea-fish; for it benumbs anyone who approaches and touches it, and something of the sort is what I find you have done to me now. For in truth I feel my soul and my tongue quite benumbed, and I am at a loss what answer to give you. And yet on countless occasions I have made abundant
παμπόλλους λόγους εἰρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, καὶ πάνυ εὗ, ὡς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκουν· νῦν δὲ οὐδ’ ὦ τι ἐστι τὸ παράπαν ἔχω εἰπεῖν. καὶ μοι δοκεῖς εὔ

βουλεύσθαι οὐκ ἐκπλέων ἐνθένδε οὐδ’ ἀποδημῶν· εἰ γὰρ ξένοις ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει τοιαῦτα ποιοῖς, τάχ’ ἂν ὃς γόης ἀπαχθείης.

σν. Πανούργος εἰ, ὃ Μένων, καὶ ὅλγου ἐξ-

ηπάτησάς με.

ΜΕΝ. Τῇ μάλιστα, ὃ Σώκρατες;

C σν. Γιγνώσκω οὐ ἕνεκά με εἰκασάς.

ΜΕΝ. Τίνος δὴ οἶει;

σν. Ἡ ἵνα σε ἀντεικάσω. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο οἶδα

περὶ πάντων τῶν καλῶν, ὅτι χαῖρονες εἰκαζόμενοι.

λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς· καλαὶ γάρ, οἷμαι, ἃν

καλῶν καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀντεικάσομαι σε.

ἐγὼ δὲ, εἰ μὲν ἡ νάρκη αὐτῇ ναρκῶσα οὕτω καὶ

τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖ ναρκᾶν, ἐοικα αὐτῇ· εἰ δὲ μὴ,

οὐ. ὦ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπο-

ρεῖν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὕτως καὶ

D τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν. καὶ νῦν περὶ ἄρετῆς,

ὁ ἔστιν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μέντοι ἐσως πρότερον

μὲν ἡδονᾶ πρὶν ἐμοὶ ἄφασθαι, νῦν μέντοι ομοίος

εἰ οὐκ εἰδότι. ὦμος δὲ ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ σκέψασθαι

καὶ συζητῆσαι ὁ τί ποτέ ἔστιν.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητῆσεις, ὃ Σώκρατες,

τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ οἴσθα τὸ παράπαν ὃ τι ἔστι; ποῖον γὰρ

ἄν οὐκ οἴσθα προθέμενος ζητῆσεις; ἣ εἰ καὶ ὧτι

μάλιστα ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, πῶς εἰσῃ ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν,

ὁ σὺ οὐκ ἡδοσθα;
speeches on virtue to various people—and very good speeches they were, so I thought—but now I cannot say one word as to what it is. You are well advised, I consider, in not voyaging or taking a trip away from home; for if you went on like this as a stranger in any other city you would very likely be taken up for a wizard.

soc. You are a rogue, Meno, and had almost deceived me.

MEN. How is that, Socrates?

soc. I perceive your aim in thus comparing me.

MEN. What was it?

soc. That I might compare you in return. One thing I know about all handsome people is this—they delight in being compared to something. They do well over it, since fine features, I suppose, must have fine similes. But I am not for playing your game. As for me, if the torpedo is torpid itself while causing others to be torpid, I am like it, but not otherwise. For it is not from any sureness in myself that I cause others to doubt: it is from being in more doubt than anyone else that I cause doubt in others. So now, for my part, I have no idea what virtue is, whilst you, though perhaps you may have known before you came in touch with me, are now as good as ignorant of it also. But none the less I am willing to join you in examining it and inquiring into its nature.

MEN. Why, on what lines will you look, Socrates, for a thing of whose nature you know nothing at all? Pray, what sort of thing, amongst those that you know not, will you treat us to as the object of your search? Or even supposing, at the best, that you hit upon it, how will you know it is the thing you did not know?
PLATO

ση. Μανθάνω οίον βούλει λέγειν, ὡς Μένων.

Ε ὁρᾶς τοῦτον ὡς ἐρμοστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις, ὡς οὐκ ἀρα ἐστὶ ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὗτε ὃ οἶδεν οὕτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν; οὕτε γὰρ ἂν ὃ γε οἶδε ζητοῖ· οἰδε γὰρ, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως· οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ὃ τι ζητήσει.

81 MEN. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὃ λόγος οὕτως, ὡς Σώκρατες;

ση. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε.

MEN. Ἐχεις λέγειν ὅπη; 

ση. Ἐγωγε· ἀκήκοα γὰρ ἀνθρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα—

MEN. Τίνα λόγον λεγόντων; 

ση. Ἀληθῆ, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλῶν. 

MEN. Τίνα τοῦτον, καὶ τίνες οἱ λέγοντες; 

ση. Οἱ μὲν λέγοντές εἰσι τῶν ιερεῶν τε καὶ ιερεῖων ὁσοις μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν μεταχειρίζονται λόγον οἴους τ' εἶναι διδόναι· λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος 

Β καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν θεοῦτων, ὁσοὶ θεοὶ εἰσών. 

ὁ δὲ λέγουσι, ταυτί ἐστιν· ἄλλα σκόπει, εἰ σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. 

φασὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν, ὃ δὴ ἀποθνῄσκειν καλοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι δ' οὐδέποτε· δεῖν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὃς ὁσιώτατα διαβιώναι τὸν βίον· 

οἰσι γὰρ ἂν—

Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιὸν πένθεος 

δεξεται, εἰς τὸν ὑπερθεν ἀλιον κεῖνων ἐνάτῳ ἐτεὶ ἀνδιδοῖ ψυχῆς πάλιν, 

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soc. I understand the point you would make, Meno. Do you see what a captious argument you are introducing—that, forsooth, a man cannot inquire either about what he knows or about what he does not know? For he cannot inquire about what he knows, because he knows it, and in that case is in no need of inquiry; nor again can he inquire about what he does not know, since he does not know about what he is to inquire.

MEN. Now does it seem to you to be a good argument, Socrates?

soc. It does not.

MEN. Can you explain how not?

soc. I can; for I have heard from wise men and women who told of things divine that—

MEN. What was it they said?

soc. Something true, as I thought, and admirable.

MEN. What was it? And who were the speakers?

soc. They were certain priests and priestesses who have studied so as to be able to give a reasoned account of their ministry; and Pindar also and many another poet of heavenly gifts. As to their words, they are these: mark now, if you judge them to be true. They say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time comes to an end, which is called dying, and at another is born again, but never perishes. Consequently one ought to live all one's life in the utmost holiness.

For from whomsoever Persephone shall accept requital for ancient wrong,¹ the souls of these she restores in the ninth year to the upper sun again; from them arise glorious

¹ πένθος ("affliction") in mystic language means something like "fall" or "sin." These lines are probably from one of Pindar's Dirges (Bergk, fr. 133).
C ἐκ ταύν βασιλῆς ἄγανοι καὶ σθένει κραίνυν οσφία τε μέγιστοι ἀνδρεῖς αὐξόντες. 1 ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἡρωεῖ ἄγανον πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεῦνται.

"Ατε οὖν ἡ ψυχή ἀθάνατός τε οὐσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγονοῦν, καὶ ἑωφρακνία καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἂιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν δ ν τι οὐ μεμάθηκεν ὡστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἀλλῶν οἶνον τε δείχνει αὕτην ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἃ γε καὶ πρότερον ἡπιστάτω. Ἄτε γὰρ

D τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦς οὐσις, καὶ μεμάθηκιας τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα, δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἀνθρώπου, τάλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, εάν τις ἄνδρεις ἢ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμην ξητῶν τὸ γὰρ ξητεῖν ἀρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν. οὐκούν δέι πείθεσθαι τοῦτο τῷ ἐρωτικῷ λόγῳ οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἄργον ποιήσει καὶ ἔστι τοῖς μαλακοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡδούς ἀκούσαι, δὲ δὲ ἐργα-Ε στικοῦς τε καὶ ξητητικοῦς ποιεῖ: ὡς ἐγὼ πιστεύων ἀληθεῖ εἶναι θέλω μετὰ σοῦ ξητεῖν ἀρετῆς ὃ τι ἐστιν.

ΜΕΝ. Ναὶ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ μανθάνομεν, ἀλλὰ ἡν καλοῦμεν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησις ἐστίν; ἔχεις μὲ τοῦτο διδάσκαι ὡς οὕτως ἔχεις;

ΣΩ: Καὶ ἂρτι εἴπον, ὁ Μένων, ὅτι πανόργος εἰ, καὶ νῦν ἐρωτᾶς εἰ ἔχω σε διδάξαι, δὲ οὐ φημι 82 διδαχὴν εἶναι ἂλλ' ἀνάμνησιν, ἢν δὴ εὐθὺς φαίνω-μαι αὐτὸς ἐμαυτῷ τάναντα λέγων.

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐ δὲ τοῦτο βλέψας εἴπον, ἂλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους ἂλλ' εἰ 1 αὐξάντες ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῦ ἐμαυτῷ τάναντα λέγων.

1 αὐξάντες. Βοιχ.: αὐξάνται mss.
MENO

kings and men of splendid might and surpassing wisdom, and for all remaining time are they called holy heroes amongst mankind.

Seeing then that the soul is immortal and has been born many times, and has beheld all things both in this world and in the nether realms, she has acquired knowledge of all and everything; so that it is no wonder that she should be able to recollect all that she knew before about virtue and other things. For as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, there is no reason why we should not, by remembering but one single thing—an act which men call learning—discover everything else, if we have courage and faint not in the search; since, it would seem, research and learning are wholly recollection. So we must not hearken to that captious argument: it would make us idle, and is pleasing only to the indolent ear, whereas the other makes us energetic and inquiring. Putting my trust in its truth, I am ready to inquire with you into the nature of virtue.

MEN. Yes, Socrates, but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, and that what we call learning is recollection? Can you instruct me that this is so?

soc. I remarked just now, Meno, that you are a rogue; and so here you are asking if I can instruct you, when I say there is no teaching but only recollection: you hope that I may be caught contradicting myself forthwith.

MEN. I assure you, Socrates, that was not my intention; I only spoke from habit. But if you can
PLATO

πῶς μοι ἔχεις ἐνδείξασθαι, ὅτι ἔχει ὁσπερ λέγεις, ἐνδείξαι.

σν. Ἀλλ’ ἔστι μὲν οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω προθυμηθῆναι σοῦ ἔνεκα. ἀλλὰ μοι προσκάλεσον τῶν πολλῶν ἀκολούθων τοινων τῶν σαυτοῦ ἕνα, ἃ ὄντων βούλει, ἵνα ἐν τούτῳ σοι ἐπιδείξωμαί.

MEN. Πάνυ γε. δεύρο πρόσελθε.

σν. Ἐλλην μὲν ἐστι καὶ ἐλληνίζει; MEN. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, οἰκογενής γε.

σν. Πρόσεχε δὴ τὸν νοῦν, ὅποτερ' ἂν σοι φαίνῃ- ται, ἥ ἀναμμηνησκόμενος ἥ μανθάνων παρ' ἐμοῦ.

MEN. Ἀλλὰ προσέξω.

σν. Εἰπὲ δὴ μοι, ὡς παῖ, γιγνώσκεις τετρά-
γωνον χωρίον ὅτι τοιοῦτον ἔστιν;

PAIX. Ἐγώγε.

C σν. Ἐστὶν οὖν τετράγωνον χωρίον ἵσας ἐχον
tὰς γραμμὰς ταύτας πάσας, τέτταρας οὐσας;

PAIX. Πάνυ γε.

σν. Οὐ καὶ ταυταὶ τὰς διὰ μέσου ἐστὶν ἵσας
ἐχον;

PAIX. Ναί.

σν. Οὐκοῦν εἰή ἂν τοιοῦτον χωρίον καὶ μεῖζον
cαι ἔλαττον;

PAIX. Πάνυ γε.

σν. Εἰ οὖν εἰή αὐτή ἡ πλευρὰ δυοίν ποδοίν καὶ
αὐτὴ δυοίν, πόσων ἂν εἰή ποδῶν τὸ ὅλον; ὡδὲ
de σκόπει: εἰ ἢ ταύτῃ δυοίν ποδοῖν, ταύτῃ de ἐνὸς
ποδῶν μόνων, ἀλλὰ τὶ ἀπαξ ἂν ἢ δυοίν ποδοῖν τὸ
χωρίον;

PAIX. Ναί.

D σν. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ δυοίν ποδοίν καὶ ταύτῃ, ἀλλο
tὶ ἢ δις δυοίν γίγνεται;
MENO

somehow prove to me that it is as you say, pray do so.

soc. It is no easy matter, but still I am willing to try my best for your sake. Just call one of your own troop of attendants there, whichever one you please, that he may serve for my demonstration.


soc. He is a Greek, I suppose, and speaks Greek? men. Oh yes, to be sure—born in the house.

soc. Now observe closely whether he strikes you as recollecting or as learning from me.

men. I will.

soc. Tell me, boy, do you know that a square figure is like this?¹

boy. I do.

soc. Now, a square figure has these lines, four in number, all equal?

boy. Certainly.

soc. And these, drawn through the middle,² are equal too, are they not?

boy. Yes.

soc. And a figure of this sort may be larger or smaller?

boy. To be sure.

soc. Now if this side were two feet and that also two, how many feet would the whole be? Or let me put it thus: if one way it were two feet, and only one foot the other, of course the space would be two feet taken once?

boy. Yes.

soc. But as it is two feet also on that side, it must be twice two feet?

¹ Socrates draws in the sand.
² *i.e.* the middle of each side of the square.
PLATO

PAIS. Γίγνεται.

ΣΩ. Δυοῖν ἄρα δῖς γίγνεται ποδῶν;

PAIS. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Πόσοι οὖν εἰσίν οἱ δύο δῖς πόδες; λογισάμενος εἶπέ.

PAIS. Τέτταρες, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν γένοιτ' ἃν τοῦτον τοῦ χωρίου ἔτερον διπλάσιον, τοιοῦτον δέ, ἵσας ἔχον πάσας τὰς γραμμὰς ὥσπερ τοῦτο;

PAIS. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Πόσων οὖν ἔσται ποδῶν;

PAIS. 'Οκτώ.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πειρῶ μοι εἰπεῖν πηλίκη τις ἔσται Ἕ ἕκεινον ἡ γραμμὴ ἔκάστη. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦδε δυοῖν ποδῶν· τί δὲ ἡ ἕκεινον τοῦ διπλασίου;

PAIS. Δῆλον δή, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὅτι διπλασία.

ΣΩ. 'Ορᾶς, ὃ Μένων, ὃς ἐγὼ τοῦτον οὐδὲν διδάσκω, ἀλλ' ἔρωτὶ πάντα· καὶ νῦν οὗτος οἷς εἰδέναι, ὅποια ἔστων ἀφ' ἥς τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίου γενήσεται· ἡ οὖ δοκεῖ σοι;

MEN. 'Εμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οἶδεν οὖν;

MEN. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οἶτει δὲ γε ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας;

MEN. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Θεῶ δή αὐτῶν ἀναμμυνησκόμενος ἐφεξῆς, ὡς δὲῖ ἀναμμυνήσκεσθαι. σὺ δὲ μοι λέγε· ἀπὸ 83 τῆς διπλασίας γραμμῆς φῆς τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίου γίγνεσθαι; τοιοῦτοι λέγω, μὴ ταύτῃ μὲν μακρὸν, τῇ δὲ βραχύ, ἀλλὰ ἰσον πανταχῆ ἔστω ὥσπερ τοιτὶ, 306
MENO

BOY. It is.
SOC. Then the space is twice two feet?
BOY. Yes.
SOC. Well, how many are twice two feet? Count and tell me.
BOY. Four, Socrates.
SOC. And might there not be another figure twice the size of this, but of the same sort, with all its sides equal like this one?
BOY. Yes.
SOC. Then how many feet will it be?
BOY. Eight.
SOC. Come now, try and tell me how long will each side of that figure be. This one is two feet long: what will be the side of the other, which is double in size?
BOY. Clearly, Socrates, double.
SOC. Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but merely asking him each time? And now he supposes that he knows about the line required to make a figure of eight square feet; or do you not think he does?
MEN. I do.
SOC. Well, does he know?
MEN. Certainly not.
SOC. He just supposes it, from the double size required?
MEN. Yes.
SOC. Now watch his progress in recollecting, by the proper use of memory. Tell me, boy, do you say we get the double space from the double line? The space I speak of is not long one way and short the other, but must be equal each way like this one,
PLATO

dιπλάσιον δὲ τούτου, ὀκτώπουν· ἀλλ' ὃρα, εἰ ἔτι

σοι ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας δοκεῖ ἐσεῖσθαι.

παίε. "Εμοιγε.

σ. Ὁυκοῦν διπλασία αὐτῆς ταύτης γίγνεται,

ἀν ἔτεραν τοσαύτην προσθῶμεν ἐνθένδε;—

παίε. Πάνω γε.

σ. 'Απὸ ταύτης δή, φής, ἔσται τὸ ὀκτώπον

χωρίον, ἃν τέτταρες τοσαῦται γένωται;

παίε. Ναί.

Β σ. 'Ἀναγραφώμεθα δὴ ἅπ' αὐτῆς ἱσας τέτ-

ταρας. ἄλλο τι ἡ τοιτὶ ἂν εἴη ὁ φής τὸ ὀκτώπον

εἶναι;

παίε. Πάνω γε.

σ. Ὁυκοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἔστι ταυτὶ τέτταρα, ἂν

ἐκαστὸν ἵσον τούτῳ ἔστι τῷ τετράποδι;

παίε. Ναί.

σ. Πόσον οὖν γίγνεται; οὐ τετράκις τοσοῦ-

τον;

παίε. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

σ. Διπλάσιον οὖν ἔστι τὸ τετράκις τοσοῦτον;

παίε. Οὐ μᾶ Δία.

σ. 'Ἀλλὰ ποσαπλάσιον;

παίε. Τετραπλάσιον.

C σ. 'Απὸ τῆς διπλασίας ἀρὰ, ὧ παί, οὐ δι-

πλάσιον ἅλλα τετραπλάσιον γίγνεται χωρίον.

παίε. 'Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

σ. Τεττάρων γὰρ τετράκις ἐστὶν ἐκκαίδεκα.

οὐχὶ;

παίε. Ναί.

σ. 'Οκτώπουν δ' ἀπὸ ποιας γραμμῆς; οὐχὶ

ἀπὸ μὲν ταύτης τετραπλάσιον;

παίε. Φημί.

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while being double its size—eight square feet. Now see if you still think we get this from a double length of line.

boy. I do.
soc. Well, this line is doubled, if we add here another of the same length?
boy. Certainly.
soc. And you say we shall get our eight-foot space from four lines of this length?
boy. Yes.
soc. Then let us describe the square, drawing four equal lines of that length. This will be what you say is the eight-foot figure, will it not?
boy. Certainly.
soc. And here, contained in it, have we not four squares, each of which is equal to this space of four feet?
boy. Yes.
soc. Then how large is the whole? Four times that space, is it not?
boy. It must be.
soc. And is four times equal to double?
boy. No, to be sure.
soc. But how much is it?
boy. Fourfold.
soc. Thus, from the double-sized line, boy, we get a space, not of double, but of fourfold size.
boy. That is true.
soc. And if it is four times four it is sixteen, is it not?
boy. Yes.
soc. What line will give us a space of eight feet? This one gives us a fourfold space, does it not?
boy. It does.
PLATO

σ. Τετράπουν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμισέας ταυτησι
touτι;

παίς. Νάι.

σ. Εἶεν· τὸ δὲ ὀκτώπουν οὐ τοῦτο μὲν δι-
πλάσιον ἐστὶ, τούτου δὲ ἡμισι;

παίς. «Νάι»

σ. Οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν μείζονος ἔσται ἡ τοσαύτης
γραμμῆς, ἀπὸ ἐλάττονος δὲ ἡ τοσηδί; ἡ οὐ;

παίς. "Εμοίγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

σ. Καλῶς· τὸ γάρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνων;
καὶ μοι λέγε· οὐχ ἦδε μὲν δυοῦν ποδοῖν ἥν, ἡ δὲ
tεττάρων;

παίς. Νάι.

σ. Δεῖ ἀρα τὴν τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωρίου
γραμμήν μείζω μὲν εἰναὶ τῆς τῇς δίποδος,
ἐλάττω δὲ τῆς τετράποδος.

παίς. Δεῖ.

Ε σ. Πειρῶ δὴ λέγειν πηλίκην τινὰ φῆς αὐτῆς
εἶναι.

παίς. Τρίποδα.

σ. Οὔκοιν ἀντιπερ τρίπους ἢ, τὸ ἡμισιν ταυτής
προσληψόμεθα καὶ ἔσται τρίπους; δύο μὲν γὰρ
οἶδε, ὁ δὲ εἰς· καὶ ἐνθένδε ὑσαύτως δύο μὲν οἶδε,
ὁ δὲ εἰς· καὶ γίγνεται τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ὃ φῆς.

παίς. Νάι.

σ. Οὔκοιν ἂν ἡ τῆδε τριῶν καὶ τῆδε τριῶν, τὸ
ὁλον χωρίον τριῶν τρὶς ποδῶν γίγνεται;

παίς. Φαίνεται.

σ. Τρεῖς δὲ τρὶς πόσοι εἰσὶ πόδες;

παίς. 'Εννέα.

σ. "Εδει δὲ τὸ διπλάσιον πόσων εἶναι ποδῶν;

1 Νάι om. mss.
MENO

soc. And a space of four feet is made from this line of half the length?
boy. Yes.
soc. Very well; and is not a space of eight feet double the size of this one, and half the size of this other?
boy. Yes.
soc. Will it not be made from a line longer than the one of these, and shorter than the other?
boy. I think so.
soc. Excellent: always answer just what you think. Now tell me, did we not draw this line two feet, and that four?
boy. Yes.
soc. Then the line on the side of the eight-foot figure should be more than this of two feet, and less than the other of four?
boy. It should.
soc. Try and tell me how much you would say it is.
boy. Three feet.
soc. Then if it is to be three feet, we shall add on a half to this one, and so make it three feet? For here we have two, and here one more, and so again on that side there are two, and another one; and that makes the figure of which you speak.
boy. Yes.
soc. Now if it be three this way and three that way, the whole space will be thrice three feet, will it not?
boy. So it seems.
soc. And thrice three feet are how many?
boy. Nine.
soc. And how many feet was that double one to be?
παις. Ὁκτώ.

ζω. Οὔδε ἄρα ἀπὸ τῆς τρίποδος πω τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον γίγνεται.

παις. Οὐ δήτα.

ζω. Ἄλλ' ἀπὸ ποίας; πειρᾶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν ἀκρι-βῶς; καὶ εἰ μὴ βουλεῖ ἀριθμεῖν, ἄλλα δεῖξον ἀπὸ ποίας.

παις. Ἄλλα μᾶ τὸν Δία, Ὡ Σώκρατες, ἐγώγει οὐκ οἶδα.

ζω. Ἐννοεῖς αὐ, Ὡ Μένων, οὐ ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδη βαδίζων ὅσε τοῦ ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι; ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἦδει μὲν οὐ, ἡ τις ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωρίου γραμμὴ, ὠσπερ οὐδὲ νῦν πω οἶδεν, ἄλλ' οὖν ὡστὸ γ' αὐτὴν τότε εἰδέναι, καὶ θαρραλέως ἀπεκρίνετο ὡς εἰδώς, καὶ οὐχ ἦγεῖτο ἀπορεῖν. νῦν δὲ ἦγεῖται ἀπορεῖν ἡ ἡδη, καὶ ὠσπερ οὐκ οἶδεν, οὐδ' οἴεται

Β εἰδέναι.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀληθὴ λέγεις.

ζω. Οὐκοὖν νῦν βέλτιον ἔχει περὶ τὸ πράγμα οὐκ ἦδει;

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτο μοι δοκεῖ.

ζω. Ἀπορεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν ποιήσαντες καὶ ναρκᾶν ὠσπερ ἡ νάρκη, μῶν τι ἐβλάψαμεν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ζω. Προὐργοῦ γοῦν τι πεποιήκαμεν, ὡς ἔουκε, ἐν τὸ ἐξευρεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει· νῦν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ζητή-σειν ἂν ἡδέως οὐκ εἰδῶς, τότε δὲ ῥάδιως ἄν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις ὠτ' ἄν εὗ λέγειν περὶ

C τοῦ διπλασίου χωρίου, ὡς δὲι διπλασίαν τὴν γραμ-μὴν ἔχειν μῆκει.

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MENO

BOY. Eight.
soc. So we fail to get our eight-foot figure from this three-foot line.
BOY. Yes, indeed.
soc. But from what line shall we get it? Try and tell us exactly; and if you would rather not reckon it out, just show what line it is.
BOY. Well, on my word, Socrates, I for one do not know.
soc. There now, Meno, do you observe what progress he has already made in his recollection? At first he did not know what is the line that forms the figure of eight feet, and he does not know even now: but at any rate he thought he knew then, and confidently answered as though he knew, and was aware of no difficulty; whereas now he feels the difficulty he is in, and besides not knowing does not think he knows.
MEN. That is true.
soc. And is he not better off in respect of the matter which he did not know?
MEN. I think that too is so.
soc. Now, by causing him to doubt and giving him the torpedo's shock, have we done him any harm?
MEN. I think not.
soc. And we have certainly given him some assistance, it would seem, towards finding out the truth of the matter: for now he will push on in the search gladly, as lacking knowledge; whereas then he would have been only too ready to suppose he was right in saying, before any number of people any number of times, that the double space must have a line of double the length for its side.
PLATO

MEN. "Εοικεν.

ΣΠ. Οἵει σοιν ἂν αὐτὸν πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσαι ζητεῖν ἡ μανθάνειν τοῦτο, ὁ ἴθαντο εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδῶς, πρὶν εἰς ἀπορίαν κατέπεσεν ἡγησάμενος μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ ἐπόθησε τὸ εἰδέναι;

MEN. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὥ Σῶκρατες.

ΣΠ. "Ωνητὸ ἄρα ναρκήσας;

MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι.

ΣΠ. Σκέψαι δὴ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας ὁ τι καὶ ἀνευρήσει ζητῶν μετ’ ἐμοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἡ ἑρωτώντος D ἐμοῦ καὶ οὐ διδάσκοντος. φύλαττε δὲ ἂν που εὗρῃς μὲ διδάσκοντα καὶ διεξιόντα αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰς τούτον δόξας ἀνερωτώντα.

Δέγε γὰρ μοι σὺ· οὐ τὸ μὲν τετράπουν τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐστὶ χωρίον; μανθάνεις;

ΠΑΙΣ. "Εγώγε.

ΣΠ. "Ετερον δὲ αὐτῷ προσθείμεν ἂν τούτι ἴσον;

ΠΑΙΣ. Ναί.

ΣΠ. Καὶ τρίτον τόδε ἴσον ἐκατέρω τούτων;

ΠΑΙΣ. Ναί.

ΣΠ. Οὐκοῦν προσαναπληρωσάμεθ᾽ ἂν τὸ ἐν τῇ γνώσει τόδε;

ΠΑΙΣ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΠ. "Αλλο τι οὖν γένοιτ' ἂν τέτταρα ἵσα χωρία τάδε;

Ε παίς. Ναί.

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MEN. It seems so.
soc. Now do you imagine he would have attempted to inquire or learn what he thought he knew, when he did not know it, until he had been reduced to the perplexity of realizing that he did not know, and had felt a craving to know?
MEN. I think not, Socrates.
soc. Then the torpedo's shock was of advantage to him?
MEN. I think so.
soc. Now you should note how, as a result of this perplexity, he will go on and discover something by joint inquiry with me, while I merely ask questions and do not teach him; and be on the watch to see if at any point you find me teaching him or expounding to him, instead of questioning him on his opinions.
Tell me, boy: here we have a square of four feet,\(^1\) have we not? You understand?
BOY. Yes.
soc. And here we add another square\(^2\) equal to it?
BOY. Yes.
soc. And here a third,\(^3\) equal to either of them?
BOY. Yes.
soc. Now shall we fill up this vacant space\(^4\) in the corner?
BOY. By all means.
soc. So here we must have four equal spaces?
BOY. Yes.

\[\text{Diagram: ABCD. DCFE. CHGF. BIHC.}\]
Τί οὖν; τὸ ολον τόδε ποσαπλάσιον τούδε γίγνεται;

παίς. Τετραπλάσιον.

'Εδει δὲ διπλάσιον ἡμῖν γενέσθαι. ἢ οὖ μέμνησαι;

παίς. Πάνυ γε.

Ὅκουν ἐστιν αὕτη γραμμὴ ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τείνουσα, τέμνουσα δίχα ἐκαστὸν τοῦτων τῶν χωρίων;

παίς. Ναὶ.

Ὅκουν τέτταρας αὕτη γίγνονται γραμμαὶ ἵνα, περιέχουσαι τοὺτο τὸ χωρίον;

παίς. Γίγνονται γάρ.

Σκόπει δὴ τηλίκον τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον;

παίς. Οὐ μανθάνω.

Ὅχὶ τεττάρων ὄντων τοῦτων ἡμῖν ἐκάστου ἐκάστῃ ἡ γραμμὴ ἀποτείμηκεν ἐντὸς; ἢ οὖ;

παίς. Ναὶ.

Πῶσα οὖν τηλικαῦτα ἐν τούτω ἐνεστίν;

παίς. Τέτταρα.

Πῶσα δὲ ἐν τῶδε;

παίς. Δῦό.

Τὸ δὲ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν τὶ ἐστίν;

παίς. Διπλάσια.

'Οκτώποις.

'Απὸ ποίας γραμμῆς;

'Απὸ ταύτης.

'Απὸ τῆς ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τείνουσης τοῦ τετράποδος;

Ναὶ.
soc. Well now, how many times larger is this whole space than this other?

boy. Four times.

soc. But it was to have been only twice, you remember?

boy. To be sure.

soc. And does this line, drawn from corner to corner, cut in two each of these spaces?

boy. Yes.

soc. And have we here four equal lines containing this space?

boy. We have.

soc. Now consider how large this space is.

boy. I do not understand.

soc. Has not each of the inside lines cut off half of each of these four spaces?

boy. Yes.

soc. And how many spaces of that size are there in this part?

boy. Four.

soc. And how many in this?

boy. Two.

soc. And four is how many times two?

boy. Twice.

soc. And how many feet is this space?

boy. Eight feet.

soc. From what line do we get this figure?

boy. From this.

soc. From the line drawn corner-wise across the four-foot figure?

boy. Yes.

1 BD. 2 BD, DF, FH, HB. 3 BDFH. 4 ABCD. 5 BDFH.
ΣΝ. Καλούσι δέ γε ταύτην διάμετρον οἱ σοφισταί: ὥστ' εἰ ταύτην διάμετρος ὄνομα, ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἄν, ὡς σὺ φήσ, ὦ παῖ Μένωνος, γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον.

ΠΑΙΣ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΝ. Τί σοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων; ἐστιν ἡντια δόξαν οὐχ αὐτοῦ ὁδὸς ἀπεκρίνατο;

C ΜΕΝ. Οὔκ, ἄλλ' ἔαυτοῦ.

ΣΝ. Καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἤδει γε, ὥς ἐφάμεν ὁλίγον πρότερον.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΝ. Ἐνήσαν δε γε αὐτῷ αὐταί αἱ δόξαι· ἦ οὖ; ΜΕΝ. Ναι.

ΣΝ. Τῷ οὖκ εἰδότι ἀρα περὶ ἃν ἄν μὴ εἰδῆ ἐνεισω ἄληθεὶς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ἃν οὐκ οἴδεν;

ΜΕΝ. Φάινεται.

ΣΝ. Καὶ νῦν μὲν γε αὐτῷ ὅσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι ἀνακεκίνηται αἱ δόξαι αὐταί· εἰ δὲ αὐτὸν τῆς ἀνερήσεται πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλαχῇ, οἴσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶν οὐδενός ἦττον ἀκριβῶς ἐπι-

D στήσεται περὶ τούτων.

ΜΕΝ. Ἡσυχεῖν.

ΣΝ. Οὐκοῦν οὐδενός διδάξαντος ἀλλ' ἐρωτήσαντος ἐπιστήμηται, ἀναλάβων αὐτὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην;

ΜΕΝ. Ναι.

ΣΝ. Τὸ δὲ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐπιστήμην οὐκ ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι ἐστιν;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΝ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὖ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἦν νῦν οὕτως ἔχει, ἦτοι ἔλαβέ ποτε ἦ ἀεὶ ἐίχεν

ΜΕΝ. Ναι.

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soc. The professors call it the diagonal: so if the diagonal is its name, then according to you, Meno's boy, the double space is the square of the diagonal.

boy. Yes, certainly it is, Socrates.

soc. What do you think, Meno? Was there any opinion that he did not give as an answer of his own thought?

MEN. No, they were all his own.

soc. But you see, he did not know, as we were saying a while since.

MEN. That is true.

soc. Yet he had in him these opinions, had he not?

MEN. Yes.

soc. So that he who does not know about any matters, whatever they be, may have true opinions on such matters, about which he knows nothing?

MEN. Apparently.

soc. And at this moment those opinions have just been stirred up in him, like a dream; but if he were repeatedly asked these same questions in a variety of forms, you know he will have in the end as exact an understanding of them as anyone.

MEN. So it seems.

soc. Without anyone having taught him, and only through questions put to him, he will understand, recovering the knowledge out of himself?

MEN. Yes.

soc. And is not this recovery of knowledge, in himself and by himself, recollection?

MEN. Certainly.

soc. And must he not have either once acquired or always had the knowledge he now has?

MEN. Yes.
ἐν. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ἂεὶ εἶχεν, ἂεὶ καὶ ἂν ἐπιστή-μων· εἰ δὲ ἔλαβε ποτε, οὐκ ἂν ἔν γε τῷ νῦν βίω
Ε ἐληφθῶς εἰτ. ή δεδίδαξε τότε τούτον γεωμετρεῖν; οὔτος γὰρ ποιήσει περὶ πάσης γεωμετρίας ταύτα ταύτα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀπάντων. ἔστω οὖν ὡστις τούτον πάντα δεδίδαξε; δίκαιος γὰρ ποι εἰ εἰδέναι, ἂλλως τε ἐπειδή ἐν τῇ σῇ οἰκίᾳ γέγονε καὶ τέρπαται.

ΜΕΝ. 'Άλλ' οἶδα ἐγώγε ὅτι οὔδεὶς πώποτε ἐδίδαξεν.

ἐν. "Εχει δὲ ταύτας τὰς δόξας, η οὐχί; ΜΕΝ. 'Ανάγκη, ὧν Σώκρατες, φαίνεται.

ἐν. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίω λαβών, οὐκ ἦδη 86 τούτο δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ εἶχε καὶ ἐμεμαθήκει;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

ἐν. Οὐκοῦν οὔτος γε ἔστων ὁ χρόνος, ὅτ' οὐκ ἦν ἀνθρωπος;

ΜΕΝ. Ναι.

ἐν. Εἰ οὖν ὅν τ' ἂν ἡ χρόνον καὶ ὅν ἂν μὴ ἡ ἀνθρωπος, ἐνέσονται αὐτῷ ἄληθείς δόξαι, αἳ ἐρωτή-σει ἐπεγερθεῖσα ἐπιστήμηια γίγνονται, ἀρ' οὖν τὸν ἂεὶ χρόνον μεμαθηκὼν ἔσται ἡ ψυχή αὐτοῦ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἔστων ἡ οὐκ ἔστων ἀνθρωπος.

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

ἐν. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἂεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὅντων B ἔστων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχή, ἐἰτ. ὡστε θαρροῦντα χρῆ, ὁ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπισταμένοις νῦν, τοῦτο δ' ἔστων ὁ μὴ μεμνημένος, ἐπιχειρεῖν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι;

1 ὃν τ' ἂν Baiter: ὅταν, ἃτ' ἂν mss.
Now if he always had it, he was always in a state of knowing; and if he acquired it at some time, he could not have acquired it in this life. Or has someone taught him geometry? You see, he can do the same as this with all geometry and every branch of knowledge. Now, can anyone have taught him all this? You ought surely to know, especially as he was born and bred in your house.

Well, I know that no one has ever taught him.

And has he these opinions, or has he not?

He must have them, Socrates, evidently.

And if he did not acquire them in this present life, is it not obvious at once that he had them and learnt them during some other time?

Apparently.

And this must have been the time when he was not a human being?

Yes.

So if in both of these periods—when he was and was not a human being—he has had true opinions in him which have only to be awakened by questioning to become knowledge, his soul must have had this cognisance throughout all time? For clearly he has always either been or not been a human being.

Evidently.

And if the truth of all things that are is always in our soul, then the soul must be immortal; so that you should take heart and, whatever you do not happen to know at present—that is, what you do not remember—you must endeavour to search out and recollect?
ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΣ ΜΕΝ. Εὖ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὁ Μένων. καὶ τὰ μὲν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάντα ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διασχυρισάμην· ὅτι δ' οἴομενοι δεῖν ζητεῖν, ἃ μὴ τις οἴδε, βελτίως ἂν εἴμεν καὶ ἀνδρικώτεροι καὶ ήττον ἄργοι ἢ εἰ οἰῳμέθα, ἃ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα, μηδὲ δυνᾶτον εἶναι Κ τε οὐκ ἂν ζητεῖν, περὶ τοῦτο πάντα ἂν διαμαχοῦμην, εἰ οἶδός τε εὖν, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν γε δοκεῖς μοι εὖ λέγειν, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Βοῦλει οὖν, ἐπειδῆ ὁμονοοῦμεν, ὅτι ζητεῖν περὶ ὅτι μή τις οἴδεν, ἐπιχειρήσωμεν κοινῆ ζητεῖν τί ποτ' ἐστιν ἄρετή;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐ μέντοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἅλλ' ἐγώνε ἐκεῖνο ἂν ἡδιστα, ὅπερ ἡρόμην τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ σκέφασαι καὶ ἀκούσαμι, πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὑντι αὐτῷ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ὦς φύσει D ἢ ὥς τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ παραγιγνομένης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἄρετῆς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἡρχον, ὁ Μένων, μὴ μόνον ἐμαυτὸν ἄλλα καὶ σοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεφάλισθα πρότερον εἴτε διδακτόν εἴτε οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ ἄρετή, πρὶν οὐ τί ἐστι πρῶτον ἐξητήσαμεν αὐτῷ· ἐπειδῆ δὲ αὐ οὐκ ἂν μὲν οὖν' ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν, ἢν δὴ ἐλεύθερος ἢς, ἐμοῦ δὲ ἐπιχειρεῖς τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεις, συγχωρήσομαι σοι· τί γὰρ χρῆ ποιεῖν;

Ε ἔοικεν οὖν σκέπτεον εἶναι, ποιόν τι ἐστιν δ' μήπως

1 Socrates characteristically pretends to be at the mercy of the wayward young man.

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MENO

MEN. What you say commends itself to me, Socrates, I know not how.

soc. And so it does to me, Meno. Most of the points I have made in support of my argument are not such as I can confidently assert; but that the belief in the duty of inquiring after what we do not know will make us better and braver and less helpless than the notion that there is not even a possibility of discovering what we do not know, nor any duty of inquiring after it—this is a point for which I am determined to do battle, so far as I am able, both in word and deed.

MEN. There also I consider that you speak aright, Socrates.

soc. Then since we are of one mind as to the duty of inquiring into what one does not know, do you agree to our attempting a joint inquiry into the nature of virtue?

MEN. By all means. But still, Socrates, for my part I would like best of all to examine that question I asked at first, and hear your view as to whether in pursuing it we are to regard it as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature to mankind, or as arriving to them in some other way which I should be glad to know.

soc. Had I control over you, Meno, as over myself, we should not have begun considering whether virtue can or cannot be taught until we had first inquired into the main question of what it is. But as you do not so much as attempt to control yourself—you are so fond of your liberty—and both attempt and hold control over me,¹ I will yield to your request—what else am I to do? So it seems we are to consider what sort of thing it is of

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Ïsmev ó ti éstw. ei μή ti óuv ãllâ ñmikrôn gé moi tîs árkhîs xálasou, kai svngxwrrhson êx úpo-
thêsèwos auó skopoísthâi, eîte didakton estinv eîte õpwsou. Légw de tô êx úpôthêsèwos õûde, õôspcr oî gevwmètrai pollàkìs skopoùntai, ëpëidán tîs èrhtai auîouû, oîou perî xwrîou, ei oîou te ês 87 tôndê tôv kýkloû tôde tô xwrîon trîgwnon èn-
tâðînai, èîpôi àn tîs õtî ouîw õîða ei èstî toûto toioûtôv, ãllî õôspcr mèn tîa úpôthêsîn prôûrgou õîmâi êxein prôs tô pрагýma toîândê. ei mèn éstî toûto tô xwrîon toioûtôv, oîou parà tîn dothêísan auîou gramìîn paraðeînanta élleîpèçn
toioûtw xwrîw, oîou àn auî tô pârastaðamêvôn ãî, àllo ti svmbaînein môî dôkêî, kai àllo auî, ei âdûnâtôn êstî taûta pàðeîn: ùpôthêmènos ouîn èthèlw eîpëin sou tô svmbaînou perî tîs èntrásèwos B auîou eîs tôv kýkloû, eîte âdûnâtôn eîte μή.
oûtîw dê kai perî árêtîs ėmèîs, èpeidhî ouî õsmev ouîû' õ tî èstîn ouû' õpóîîn tî, ùpôthêmènou auîô skopoûmèn eîte didakton eîte ou didakton estîn, õûde légontes: eî poîîn tî èstî tôv perî tîn
ψuxhîs õntwn árêtî, didakton ân eîh ãî ou didakton; prîtôûîn mèn ei èstîn ãllôîîn ãî oîou èpísitîmêî, 324
which we do not yet know what it is! Well, the least you can do is to relax just a little of your authority, and allow the question—whether virtue comes by teaching or some other way—to be examined by means of hypothesis. I mean by hypothesis what the geometricians often do in dealing with a question put to them; for example, whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangular space in a given circle: they reply—"I cannot yet tell whether it has that capability; but I think, if I may put it so, that I have a certain helpful hypothesis for the problem, and it is as follows: If this area\(^1\) is such that when you apply it to the given line\(^2\) of the circle you find it falls short\(^3\) by a space similar to that which you have just applied, then I take it you have one consequence, and if it is impossible for it to fall so, then some other. Accordingly I wish to put a hypothesis, before I state our conclusion as regards inscribing this figure in the circle by saying whether it is impossible or not." In the same way with regard to our question about virtue, since we do not know either what it is or what kind of thing it may be, we had best make use of a hypothesis in considering whether it can be taught or not, as thus: what kind of thing must virtue be in the class of mental properties, so as to be teachable or not? In the first place, if it is something

\[\text{Diagram of a circle with a triangle inscribed.}\]

\(^{1}\) The problem seems to be that of inscribing in a circle a triangle (BDG) equal in area to a given rectangle (ABCD).

\(^{2}\) *i.e.* the diameter (BF).

\(^{3}\) *i.e.* falls short of the rectangle on the diameter (ABFE).
ορα διδακτόν ἂν οὐ, ἂν δὲν ἔλεγομεν, ἀναμνηστόν·
διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν ἵμιν ὁποτέρω ἂν τῷ ὀνόματι
C χρώμεθα· ἀλλ' ορα διδακτόν; ᾗ τοῦτο γε παντὶ
ῥηλον, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο διδάσκεται ἀνθρώπος ἂ
ἐπιστήμην;

men. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

σω. Εἰ δὲ γ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ ἁρετή, ῥηλον
ὅτι διδακτόν ἂν εἴη.

men. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

σω. Τούτου μὲν ἁρα ταχὺ ἀπηλλαγμεθα, ὅτι
τοιοῦδε μὲν ὄντος διδακτόν, τοιοῦδε δ' οὐ.

men. Πάνυ γε.

σω. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς έοικε, δεὶ σκέπασθαι,
πότερον ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἁρετή ἡ ἀλλοίον ἐπι-
στήμης.

D men. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον
ἐναι.

σω. Τί δὲ δὴ; ἄλλο τι ἡ ἁγαθὸν αὐτὸ φαμεν
ἐναι τὴν ἁρετῆν, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις μένει ἡμῖν,
ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι;

men. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

σω. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν τὶ ἐστὶν ἁγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο
χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης, τάχ' ἂν εἰη ἡ ἁρετὴ οὐκ
ἐπιστήμη τις· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἁγαθὸν, δ' οὐκ
ἐπιστήμη περιέχει, ἐπιστήμην ἂν τιν' αὐτὸ ὑπ-
οπτεύοντες εἰναι ὀρθῶς ὑποπτεύοιμεν.

men. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

σω. Καὶ μὴν ἁρετὴ γ' ἐσμὲν ἁγαθοί;

men. Ναι.

Ε σω. Εἰ δὲ ἁγαθοὶ, ὁφέλιμοι· πάντα γὰρ ἁγαθὰ
ὁφέλιμα. οὐχὶ;

men. Ναι.

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dissimilar or similar to knowledge, is it taught or not—or, as we were saying just now, remembered? Let us have no disputing about the choice of a name: is it taught? Or is not this fact plain to everyone—that the one and only thing taught to men is knowledge?

MEN. I agree to that.

soc. Then if virtue is a kind of knowledge, clearly it must be taught?

MEN. Certainly.

soc. So you see we have made short work of this question—if virtue belongs to one class of things it is teachable, and if to another, it is not.

MEN. To be sure.

soc. The next question, it would seem, that we have to consider is whether virtue is knowledge, or of another kind than knowledge.

MEN. I should say that is the next thing we have to consider.

soc. Well now, surely we call virtue a good thing, do we not, and our hypothesis stands, that it is good?

MEN. Certainly we do.

soc. Then if there is some good apart and separable from knowledge, it may be that virtue is not a kind of knowledge; but if there is nothing good that is not embraced by knowledge, our suspicion that virtue is a kind of knowledge would be well founded.

MEN. Quite so.

soc. Now it is by virtue that we are good?

MEN. Yes.

soc. And if good, profitable; for all good things are profitable, are they not?

MEN. Yes.
PLATO

καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δὴ ὦφελιμὸν ἐστίν;

Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ωμολογημένων.

Σκεψώμεθα δὴ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ποιά ἐστιν ὁ ἡμᾶς ὡφελεί. Ὑγίεια, φαμέν, καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δὴ ταύτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὦφελιμα. οὖχι;

Ναὶ.

Ταύτα δὲ ταύτα φαμεν ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν ἡ συ ἄλλως φης ἡ οὕτως;

Οὐκ, ἄλλ’ οὕτως.

Σκόπει δὴ, ὅταν τί ἐκάστον τούτων ἡγηται, ὡφελεὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ ὅταν τί, βλάπτει; ἄρ’ οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ὀρθὴ χρῆσις, ὡφελεὶ, ὅταν δὲ μὴ, βλάπτει;

Πάνυ γε.

ἴσα τοῖς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν σκεψώμεθα. σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ εὔμαθεν καὶ μνήμην καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;

Ἐγώγε.

Σκόπει δὴ, τούτων ἄττα σοι δοκεῖ μὴ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἄλλ’ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμης, εἰ οὐχὶ τοτε μὲν βλάπτει, τοτε δὲ ὡφελεί; οἶον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία ἄλλ’ οἶον βάρρος τι’ οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἀνευ νοῦ θαρρῆ ἄνθρωπος, βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῷ, ὑφελεῖται;

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνη ωσαύτως καὶ εὐμαθείᾳ μετὰ μὲν νοῦ καὶ μανθανόμενα καὶ καταρτόμενα ὦφελιμα, ἀνευ δὲ νοῦ βλαβερά;
soc. So virtue is profitable?
MEN. That must follow from what has been admitted.
soc. Then let us see, in particular instances, what sort of things they are that profit us. Health, let us say, and strength, and beauty, and wealth—these and their like we call profitable, do we not?
MEN. Yes.
soc. But these same things, we admit, actually harm us at times; or do you dispute that statement?
MEN. No, I agree.
soc. Consider now, what is the guiding condition in each case that makes them at one time profitable, and at another harmful. Are they not profitable when the use of them is right, and harmful when it is not?
MEN. To be sure.
soc. Then let us consider next the goods of the soul: by these you understand temperance, justice, courage, intelligence, memory, magnanimity, and so forth?
MEN. Yes.
soc. Now tell me; such of these as you think are not knowledge, but different from knowledge—do they not sometimes harm us, and sometimes profit us? For example, courage, if it is courage apart from prudence, and only a sort of boldness: when a man is bold without sense, he is harmed; but when he has sense at the same time, he is profited, is he not?
MEN. Yes.
soc. And the same holds of temperance and intelligence: things learnt and co-ordinated with the aid of sense are profitable, but without sense they are harmful?
C men. Πάνω σφόδρα.

σω. Οὐκοῦν συλλήβδην πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καρτερήματα ἥγουμένης μὲν φρόνησισι εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τελευτά, ἀφροσύνης δ’ εἰς τοῦνατίον;

men. "Εοικεν.

σω. Εἰ ἄρα ἀρετῆ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστι καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ωφέλιμῳ εἶναι, φρόνησιν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἰναι, ἐπειδήπερ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθ’ αὐτὰ οὔτε ωφέλιμα οὔτε βλαβερά ἐστι, προσγενομένης δὲ φρόνησισι ἡ ἀφροσύνης

D βλαβερά τε καὶ ωφέλιμα γίγνεται. κατὰ δὴ τούτων τὸν λόγον ωφέλιμόν γε οὕσαν τὴν ἀρετῆν φρόνησιν δεὶ τιν’ εἶναι.

men. "Εμοιγε δοκεῖ.

σω. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τάλλα, ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πλοῦτον τέ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοτὲ μὲν ἁγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι, ἃρ’ οὐχ ὦσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ ἡ φρόνησις ἥγουμενη ωφέλιμα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐποίει,

E ἡ δὲ ἀφροσύνη βλαβερά, οὔτως οὐ καὶ τούτως ἡ ψυχὴ ὀρθῶς μὲν χρωμενή καὶ ἥγουμενη ωφέλιμα αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ βλαβερά;

men. Πάνω γε.

σω. Ὅρθως δὲ γε ἡ ἔμφρων ἢγείται, ἡμαρτη-μένως δ’ ἡ ἀφρων;

men. "Εστι ταῦτα.

σω. Οὐκοῦν οὖτω δὴ κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν ἐστι, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα εἰς τὴν ψυχήν ἀνηρτήσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς 89 φρόνησιν, εἰ μέλλει ἁγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ τούτω τῷ λόγῳ φρόνησις ἂν εἴη τὸ ωφέλιμον· φαμεν δὲ τὴν ἀρετῆν ωφέλιμον εἶναι;

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MENO

MEN. Most certainly.

soc. And in brief, all the undertakings and endurances of the soul, when guided by wisdom, end in happiness, but when folly guides, in the opposite?

MEN. So it seems.

soc. Then if virtue is something that is in the soul, and must needs be profitable, it ought to be wisdom, seeing that all the properties of the soul are in themselves neither profitable nor harmful, but are made either one or the other by the addition of wisdom or folly; and hence, by this argument, virtue being profitable must be a sort of wisdom.

MEN. I agree.

soc. Then as to the other things, wealth and the like, that we mentioned just now as being sometimes good and sometimes harmful—are not these also made profitable or harmful by the soul according as she uses and guides them rightly or wrongly: just as, in the case of the soul generally, we found that the guidance of wisdom makes profitable the properties of the soul, while that of folly makes them harmful?

MEN. Certainly.

soc. And the wise soul guides rightly, and the foolish erroneously?

MEN. That is so.

soc. Then may we assert this as a universal rule, that in man all other things depend upon the soul, while the things of the soul herself depend upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and so by this account the profitable will be wisdom, and virtue, we say, is profitable?
PLATO

MEN. Πάνω γε.

ΣΠ. Φρόνησον ἄρα φαμέν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἢτοι σύμπασαν ἡ μέρος τι;

MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὡ Σώκρατες, τὰ λεγόμενα.

ΣΠ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν εἶνεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ.

MEN. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

B ΣΠ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν ποι καὶ τὸδ᾽ ἢν· εἰ φύσει οἱ ἁγαθοὶ ἠγίγνοντο, ἢσάν ποι ἂν ἢμῖν οἱ ἠγίγνωσκοι τῶν νεὼν τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις, οὔς ἡμεῖς ἂν παραλαβόντες ἐκεῖνων ἀποφημάντων ἐφυλάττομεν ἐν ἀκροπόλει, κατασκηνώμενοι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ χρυσὸν, ἵνα μηδεῖς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπείδη ἀφίκουστο εἰς τὴν ἥλικιαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοντο ταῖς πόλεσιν.

MEN. Εἰκὸς γε τοι, ὡ Σώκρατες.

ΣΠ. Ἀρ′ οὖν ἐπείδη οὐ φύσει οἱ ἁγαθοὶ ἁγαθοὶ

C γίγνονται, ἄρα μαθήσει:

MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι ἢδη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· καὶ δῆλον, ὡ Σώκρατες, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, εἰσπρο ἐπιστήμην ἐστὶν ἀρετή, ὅτι διδακτὸν ἐστιν.

ΣΠ. ἵσως νὴ Δία· ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὠμολογήσαμεν;

MEN. Καὶ μὴν ἔδοκει γε ἄρτι καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

ΣΠ. Ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δεὶ αὐτὸ

D δοκεῖν καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν καὶ

ἐν τῷ ἐπείτα, εἰ μέλλει τι αὐτοῦ ὑμεῖς εἶναι.

ΣΠ. ἤδη· πρὸς τί βλέπων δυσχεραίνεις

MEN. Τί οὖν δῆ; πρὸς τι βλέπων δυσχεραίνεις

Αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἢ ἡ ἀρετή; 332
MENO

MEN. Certainly.
soc. Hence we conclude that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom?
MEN. It seems to me that your statement, Socrates, is excellent.
soc. Then if this is so, good men cannot be good by nature.
MEN. I think not.
soc. No, for then, I presume, we should have had this result: if good men were so by nature, we surely should have had men able to discern who of the young were good by nature, and on their pointing them out we should have taken them over and kept them safe in the citadel, having set our mark on them far rather than on our gold treasure, in order that none might have tampered with them, and that when they came to be of age, they might be useful to their country.
MEN. Yes, most likely, Socrates.
soc. So since it is not by nature that the good become good, is it by education?
MEN. We must now conclude, I think, that it is; and plainly, Socrates, on our hypothesis that virtue is knowledge, it must be taught.
soc. Yes, I daresay; but what if we were not right in agreeing to that?
MEN. Well, it seemed to be a correct statement a moment ago.
soc. Yes, but not only a moment ago must it seem correct, but now also and hereafter, if it is to be at all sound.
MEN. Why, what reason have you to make a difficulty about it, and feel a doubt as to virtue being knowledge?
PLATO

σημ. Ἡγὼ σοι ἐρώ, ὁ Μένων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
dιδακτὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἶπέρ ἐπιστήμη έστιν, οὐκ
ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὔ καλῶς λέγεσθαι. ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ
ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, σκέψαι εὸν σοι δοκῶ εἰκότως ἀπιστεῖν. τόδε γὰρ μοι εἶπὲ: εἴ ἔστι διδακτὸν
ότι οὐν πράγμα, μὴ μόνον ἀρετῆ, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον
αὐτοῦ καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ μαθητᾶς εἶναι;

Ε ἡμεῖς δοκεῖ.

σημ. Ὀὐκοῦν τουναντίον αὕ, οὐ μὴ διδασκάλοι
μὴτε μαθηταί εἶεν, καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάζοντες
eἰκάζομεν μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι;

Ε ἡμεῖς. Ἡστι ταῦτα: ἄλλα ἀρετῆς διδασκάλοι οὐ
dοκοῦσι σοι εἶναι;

σημ. Πολλάκις γοῦν ξητῶν, εἰ τινὲς εἰεν αὐτῆς
dιδασκαλοί, πάντα ποιῶν οὐ δύναμαι εὑρεῖν.
καὶ τοι μετὰ πολλῶν γε ξητῶ, καὶ τούτων μᾶλιστα,
οὐς ἂν οἶωμαι ἐμπειροτάτους εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος.
καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὁ Μένων, εἰς καλὸν ἡμῖν "Ἀνυτὸς
90 ὅδε παρεκαθέζετο, ὃ μεταδόμεν τῆς ξητῆσεως.
eἰκότως δ᾽ αὖ μεταδόμεν. "Ἀνυτὸς γὰρ ὅδε πρῶτον
μὲν ἐστὶν πάτρος πλουσίου τε καὶ σοφοῦ Ἀνθεμίω-
νος, ὃς ἐγένετο πλούσιος οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου
οὐδὲ δόντος τινός, ὥσπερ ὁ νῦν νεωστὶ εἰληφὼς
τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα Ἰσμηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος,
ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας κτησάμενος καὶ ἐπιμελεία,
ἔπειτα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα οὕς ὑπερῆφανος δοκῶν εἶναι

Β πολίτης οὐδὲ ὑγιών τε καὶ ἑπαρχής, ἀλλὰ
κόσμιος καὶ εὐσταλής ἀνήρ. ἔπειτα τούτον εὗ
ἐθρεψε καὶ ἑπάιδευσεν, ὡς δοκεῖ Ἀθηναίων τῶ

1 A democratic leader at Thebes who assisted Anytus
and the other exiled Athenian democrats in 403 B.C., shortly
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soc. I will tell you, Meno. I do not withdraw as incorrect the statement that it is taught, if it is knowledge; but as to its being knowledge, consider if you think I have grounds for misgiving. For tell me now: if anything at all, not merely virtue, is teachable, must there not be teachers and learners of it?

MEN. I think so.

soc. Then also conversely, if a thing had neither teachers nor learners, we should be right in surmising that it could not be taught?

MEN. That is so: but do you think there are no teachers of virtue?

soc. I must say I have often inquired whether there were any, but for all my pains I cannot find one. And yet many have shared the search with me, and particularly those persons whom I regard as best qualified for the task. But look, Meno: here, at the very moment when he was wanted, we have Anytus sitting down beside us, to take his share in our quest. And we may well ask his assistance; for our friend Anytus, in the first place, is the son of a wise and wealthy father, Anthemion, who became rich not by a fluke or a gift—like that man the other day, Ismenias the Theban, who has come into the fortune of a Polycrates—but as the product of his own skill and industry; and secondly, he has the name of being in general a well-conducted, mannerly person, not insolent towards his fellow-citizens or arrogant and annoying; and further, he gave his son a good upbringing and education, as the Athenian people think, for they choose him before their return to Athens and the supposed time of this dialogue (about 402 B.C.). Cf. Rep. i. 336 A.

Tyrant of Samos about 530 B.C. Cf. Herodot. iii. 39 foll.

As a tanner.
πλήθει: αἱροῦνται γοῦν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τᾶς μεγίστας ἀρχῶς. δίκαιον δὴ μετὰ τουούτων ζητεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι διδασκάλους, εἰτ' εἰσών εἰτε μή, καὶ οἰτινες. οὐ οὖν ἠμῶν, ὡς ἀνυτε, συζήτησον, ἐμοὶ τε καὶ τῷ σαυτοῦ ξένων Μένωνι τῶδε, περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τῶν ἃν εἶνεν διδάσκαλοι. ὡδε δὲ σκέψαι εἰ βουλομένα Μένωνα τὸνδε ἄγαθον ἱατρὸν γενέσθαι, 

C παρὰ τίνας ἂν αὐτῶν πέμπομεν διδασκάλους; ἂρ' οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ἱατροῦς;

AN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΠ. Τί δὲ εἰ σκυτοτόμοι ἄγαθον βουλομένα γενέσθαι, ἂρ' οὐ παρὰ τοὺς σκυτοτόμους;

AN. Ναι.

ΣΠ. Καὶ τάλαλα οὔτως;

AN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΠ. Ὡδε δὴ μοι πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰπὲ. παρὰ τοὺς ἱατροῦς, φαμέν, πέμποντες τόνδε καλῶς ἃν ἐπέμπομεν, βουλόμενοι ἱατρὸν γενέσθαι:

D ἂρ' οταν τοῦτο λέγωμεν, τόδε λέγομεν, ὅτι παρὰ τούτους πέμποντες αὐτῶν σωφρονοῦμεν ἃν, τοὺς ἀντιποιομένους τε τῆς τέχνης μᾶλλον ἣ τοὺς μή, καὶ τοὺς μισθῷν πραπτομένους ἐπ' αὐτῶ τούτω, ἀποφήναντας αὐτοὺς διδασκάλους τοῦ βουλομένου ἱέναι τε καὶ μανθάνειν; ἂρ' οὐ πρὸς ταῦτα βλέψαντες καλῶς ἃν πέμπομεν;

AN. Ναι.

ΣΠ. Οὐκούν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα; πολλὴ ἄνοια ἐστὶ βουλομένους

Ε ἀυλητήν τινα ποιῆσαι παρὰ μὲν τοὺς ὑπισχυνομένους διδάξειν τὴν τέχνην καὶ μισθὸν πραπτομένους μὴ ἑθέλειν πέμπειν, ἄλλοις δὲ ταῖς πράγματα παρέχειν, ζητοῦντα μανθάνειν παρὰ τούτων, οἱ 336
for the highest offices. This is the sort of man to whom one may look for help in the inquiry as to whether there are teachers of virtue or not, and who they may be. So please, Anytus, join with me and your family-friend Meno in our inquiry about this matter—who can be the teachers. Consider it thus: if we wanted Meno here to be a good doctor, to whom should we send him for instruction? Would it not be to the doctors?

AN. Certainly.

soc. And if we wanted him to become a good cobbler, should we not send him to the cobblers?

AN. Yes.

soc. And in the same way with every other trade?

AN. Certainly.

soc. Now let me ask you something more about these same instances. We should be right, we say, in sending him to the doctors if we wanted him to be a doctor. When we say this, do we mean that we should be wise in sending him to those who profess the art rather than those who do not, and to those who charge a fee for the particular thing they do, as avowed teachers of anyone who wishes to come and learn of them? If these were our reasons, should we not be right in sending him?

AN. Yes.

soc. And the same would hold in the case of flute-playing, and so on with the rest? What folly, when we wanted to make someone a flute-player, to refuse to send him to the professed teachers of the art, who charge a regular fee, and to bother with requests for instruction other people who neither set up to
μήτε προσποιοῦνται διδάσκαλοι εἶναι μήτ' ἐστιν αὐτῶν μαθητῆς μηδεὶς τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος, οὐ ἢμεῖς ἀξιοῦμεν μανθάνειν παρ' αὐτῶν ὅν ἂν πέμπωμεν. οὐ πολλῇ σοι δοκεῖ ἀλογία εἶναι;

Ἀν. Ναὶ μὰ Δία ἐμοιγε, καὶ ἀμαθία γε πρόσ.

Σημ. Καλῶς λέγεις. νῦν τοίνυν ἔξεστί σε μετ' ἐμοὺ κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ἔξον τούτου Μένωνος. οὕτως γὰρ, ὡ "Ἀνυτε, πάλαι λέγει πρὸς με, ὅτι ἐπιθυμεῖς ταύτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς, ἣ οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ τᾶς τε οἰκίας καὶ τᾶς πόλεις καλῶς διουκοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς γονέας τοὺς αὐτῶν θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολῖτας καὶ ἔξον ὑποδέχασθαι τε καὶ ἀποπέμψαί ἐπίστανται ἄξιος ἢν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν "μαθησομενον" 1 σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἃν πέμποντες αὐτῶν ὀρθῶς πέμπομεν. ἢ δὴδον δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον, ὅτι παρὰ τούτους τοὺς ὑπισχυομένους ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι καὶ ἀποφήμαντας αὐτῶν κοινοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ μανθάνειν, μισθὸν τούτου ταξιμένους τε καὶ πραττομένους;

Ἀν. Καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους, ὡ "Σώκρατες;"

Σημ. Οἴσθα δήποτε καὶ σὺ, ὅτι οὕτως εἶναι οὐσὶ οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ καλοῦσι σοφιστάς.

Ὡς Ἡράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὡ "Σώκρατες. μηδένα τῶν γ' ἐμῶν 2 μήτε οἰκεῖων μήτε φίλων, μήτε ἀστόν μήτε ἔξον, τοιαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὅστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λαβηθήναι, ἐπεὶ οὕτως γε φανερά ἐστὶ λύβη τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τῶν συγγυνομένων.

Σημ. Πώς λέγεις, ὡ "Ἀνυτε; οὕτως ἀρα μόνοι

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1 μαθησομενον intercidisse coni. Cobet.
2 γ' ἐμῶν Burnet: γεμῶν, συγγενῶν mss.
MENO

be teachers nor have a single pupil in that sort of study which we expect him, when sent, to pursue! Do you not consider this would be grossly unreasonable?

AN. Yes, on my word, I do, and stupid to boot.

soc. Quite right. And now there is an opportunity of your joining me in a consultation on my friend Meno here. He has been declaring to me ever so long, Anytus, that he desires to have that wisdom and virtue whereby men keep their house or their city in good order, and honour their parents, and know when to welcome and when to speed citizens and strangers as befits a good man. Now tell me, to whom ought we properly to send him for lessons in this virtue? Or is it clear enough, from our argument just now, that he should go to these men who profess to be teachers of virtue and advertise themselves as the common teachers of the Greeks, and are ready to instruct anyone who chooses in return for fees charged on a fixed scale?

AN. To whom are you referring, Socrates?

soc. Surely you know as well as anyone; they are the men whom people call sophists.

AN. For heaven’s sake hold your tongue, Socrates! May no kinsman or friend of mine, whether of this city or another, be seized with such madness as to let himself be infected with the company of those men; for they are a manifest plague and corruption to those who frequent them.¹

soc. What is this, Anytus? Of all the people

¹ Anytus’ vehemence expresses the hostility of the ordinary practical democrat, after the restoration of 403 B.C., towards any novel movement in the state.
τῶν ἀντιποιομένων τι ἐπίστασθαι εὐεργετεῖν τοσοῦτον τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσιν, ὅσον οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἄφελοῦσιν, ὡσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὃ τι ἄν τις αὐτοῖς παραδῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸν διαφθείρουσι; καὶ τούτων φανερῶς χρῆματα ἄξιοσθ' πράττεσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως σοι πιστεύσω· οἶδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἑνα Πρωταγόραν πλείω χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν τε, ὃς οὐτω περιφανῶς καλὰ ἔργα εἰργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλοις δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν· καίτοι τέρας λέγεις, εἰ οἷς μὲν τὰ ὑποδήματα ἔργαζόμενοι τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια ἑξακούμενοι οὐκ ἂν δύναντο ἑλθεῖν τριάκονθ' ἰμέρας μοχθηρότερα ἀποδιδόντες ἢ παρέλαβον τὰ ἱμάτια τε καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἀλλ' εἰ τοιαύτα ποιοῖς, ταχὺ ἂν τῷ λημῷ ἀποθάνοις, Πρωταγόρας δὲ ἀρά ὅλην τὴν 'Ελλάδα ἐλάνθανε διαφθείρων τοὺς συγγενομένους καὶ μοχθηρότεροὺς ἀποτρέψ αὐτῷ τὰ παρελάμβανε πλέον ἢ τεταράκοντα ἔτη· οἴμαι γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγύς καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτη γεγονότα, τεταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα· καὶ ἐν ἀπαντὶ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἔτι εἰς τὴν ἰμέραν ταυτὴν εὐδοκιμών οὐδέν πέπαυται· καὶ οὐ μόνον Πρωταγόρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι, οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκεῖνοι, οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι οὖντες. πότερον δὴ οὖν φῶμεν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εἰδότας αὐτὸς ἑξαπατᾶν καὶ λυβάσθαι τοὺς νέους, ἡ λεηθέναι καὶ ἐαυτοὺς· καὶ οὕτω μαίνεσθαι ἄξιοσμοι τούτους, οὐς ἔνιοι φασὶ σοφωτάτους ἀνθρώπων εἶναι;

ἀν. Πολλοῦ γε δέουσι μαίνεσθαι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις διδόντες ἀργύριον
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who set up to understand how to do us good, do you mean to single out these as conveying not merely no benefit, such as the rest can give, but actually corruption to anyone placed in their hands? And is it for doing this that they openly claim the payment of fees? For my part I cannot bring myself to believe you; for I know of one man, Protagoras, who amassed more money by his craft than Pheidias —so famous for the noble works he produced—or any ten other sculptors. And yet how surprising that menders of old shoes and furbishers of clothes should not be able to go undetected thirty days if they should return the clothes or shoes in worse condition than they received them, and that such doings on their part would quickly starve them to death, while for more than forty years all Greece failed to notice that Protagoras was corrupting his classes and sending his pupils away in a worse state than when he took charge of them! For I believe he died about seventy years old, forty of which he spent in the practice of his art; and he retains undiminished to this day the high reputation he has enjoyed all that time—and not only Protagoras, but a multitude of others too: some who lived before him, and others still living. Now are we to take it, according to you, that they wittingly deceived and corrupted the youth, or that they were themselves unconscious of it? Are we to conclude those who are frequently termed the wisest of mankind to have been so demented as that?

An. Demented! Not they, Socrates: far rather the young men who pay them money, and still
τῶν νέων· τούτων δ' ἐτὶ μάλλον οἱ τούτοις ἐπι-
B τρέποντες, οἱ προσήκοντες· πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα πάντων
αἱ πόλεις, ἐώσαι αὐτοὺς εἰσαφικνείσθαι καὶ οὐκ
ἐξελαύνουσαι, εἴτε τις ξένος ἐπιχειρεῖ τοιοῦτον
τι ποιεῖν εἴτε ἀστός.

Σπ. Πότερον δὲ, ὡς Ἀνυτε, ἡδίκηκε τίς σε
tῶν σοφοτῶν, ἢ τί οὔτως αὐτοῖς χαλεπῶς εἰ;
ΑΝ. Οὔδε μά Δία ἐγώγε συγγέγονα πώποτε
αὐτῶν οὐδενί, οὔτ' ἀν ἄλλον ἐάσαιμι τῶν ἐμῶν
οὐδένα.

Σπ. Ἀπειρος ἂρ' εἰ παντάπασι τῶν ἀνδρῶν;
ΑΝ. Καὶ εἰήν γε.

Σπ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν, ὡς δαμιόνε, εἰδείης περὶ
tούτου τοῦ πράγματος, εἴτε τι ἁγαθὸν ἔχει ἐν
ἐαυτῷ εἴτε φλαῦρον, οὔ παντάπασιν ἀπειρος
εἴης;
ΑΝ. 'Ραδίως· τούτους γοῦν οἶδα οἱ εἰσιν,
eἴτ' οὖν ἀπειρος αὐτῶν εἰμι εἴτε μή;

Σπ. Μάντις εἰ ἱσως, ὡς Ἀνυτε· ἐπεί ὅπως γε
ἀλλως οἶσθα τούτων πέρι, ἔξ ὀν αὐτὸς λέγεις
θαυμάζομι ἂν. ἀλλὰ γάρ οὐ τούτους ἐπιζητοῦμεν
D τίνες εἰσί, παρ' οὖς ἄν Μένων ἀφικόμενος μοχθήρος
γένοιτο· οὕτωι μὲν γάρ, εἰ σὺ βούλει, ἑστώς οἱ
σοφισταί· ἀλλὰ δὴ ἐκεῖνος εἴπε ἥμιν, καὶ τῶν
πατρικῶν τόνδε ἑταίρων ἐνεργήσεσον, φράσας αὐτῶ,
pαρὰ τίνας ἀφικόμενος ἐν τοσαύτη πόλει τὴν
ἀρετὴν ὑπ' ψυχὴ ἐγὼ διῆλθον γένοιτ' ἂν ἄξιος
λόγον.

ΑΝ. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ σὺ ἐφφρασας;
Σπ. 'Αλλ' οὖς μὲν ἐγὼ ὁμών διδασκάλους
tούτων εἶναι, εἴποι, ἀλλὰ τυχαίῳ νοῦ ἐγὼ λέγων,
Ε ὡς σὺ φής· καὶ ἱσως τί λέγεις. ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ ἐν
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more the relations who let the young men have their way; and most of all the cities that allow them to enter, and do not expel them, whether such attempt be made by stranger or citizen.

soc. Tell me, Anytus, has any of the sophists wronged you? What makes you so hard on them?

AN. No, heaven knows I have never in my life had dealings with any of them, nor would I let any of my people have to do with them either.

soc. Then you have absolutely no experience of those persons?

AN. And trust I never may.

soc. How then, my good sir, can you tell whether a thing has any good or evil in it, if you are quite without experience of it?

AN. Easily: the fact is, I know what these people are, whether I have experience of them or not.

soc. You are a wizard, perhaps, Anytus; for I really cannot see, from what you say yourself, how else you can know anything about them. But we are not inquiring now who the teachers are whose lessons would make Meno wicked; let us grant, if you will, that they are the sophists: I only ask you to tell us, and do Meno a service as a friend of your family by letting him know, to whom in all this great city he should apply in order to become eminent in the virtue which I described just now.

AN. Why not tell him yourself?

soc. I did mention to him the men whom I supposed to be teachers of these things; but I find, from what you say, that I am quite off the track, and I daresay you are on it. Now you take


PLATO

tῳ μέρει αὐτῷ εἶπε παρὰ τίνας ἐλθῇ 'Αθηναίων, εἰπὲ ὅνομα ὅτου βούλει.

ἀν. Τί δὲ ἔνος ἀνθρώπον ὄνομα δεῖ ἀκοῦσαι; ὅτω γὰρ ἂν ἐντύχῃ 'Αθηναίων τῶν καλῶν κάγαθῶν, οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὅσοὶ βελτίων αὐτὸν ποιήσει ἦ ὁι σοφισταῖ, ἔαντερ θέλη πείθεσθαι.

σω. Πότερον δὲ οὗτοι οἱ καλοὶ κάγαθοι ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἐγένοντο τοιοῦτοι, παρ' οὔδενος μαθόντες ὅμως μέντοι ἄλλους διδάσκειν οἰοί τε 93 ὄντες ταῦτα, ὃ αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἔμαθον;

ἀν. Καὶ τούτους ἐγώγη ἄξιω παρὰ τῶν προτέρων μαθεῖν, ὄντων καλῶν κάγαθῶν; ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσι σοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ ἄγαθοὶ γεγονέναι ἐν τῇ δὲ τῇ πόλει ἄνδρες;

σω. Ἐμοιγε, ὁ Ἀνυτε, καὶ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν ἐνθάδε ἄγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ, καὶ γεγονέναι ἔτι οὐχ ἢττον ἢ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ διδάσκαλοι ἄγαθοὶ γεγόνασι τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς; τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστι περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἢμῖν τυγχάνει ὃν· οὐκ εἰ

Β εἰςών ἄγαθοι ἢ μὴ ἄνδρες ἐνθάδε, οὔδ' εἰ γεγόνασιν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ἀλλ' εἰ διδακτόν ἔστων ἀρετή πάλαι σκοποῦμεν. τοῦτο δὲ σκοποῦντες τόδε σκοποῦμεν, ἀρα οἱ ἄγαθοὶ ἄνδρες καὶ τῶν νῦν καὶ τῶν προτέρων ταύτην τήν ἀρετήν, ἡν αὐτοὶ ἄγαθοι ἡσαν, ἡπίσταντο καὶ ἄλλῳ παραδοῦναι, ἢ οὐ παραδοτόν τοῦτο ἁνθρώπῳ οὔδ' εἰς διαληπτόν ἄλλῳ παρ' ἄλλου. τοῦτ' ἔστων δ' πάλαι ζητοῦµεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Μένων. ὅδε οὖν σκόπει ἐκ τοῦ σαντού λόγου.

C Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἄγαθὸν ἢν φαίης ἄνδρα γεγονέναι;

ἀν. Ἐγώγη, πάντων γε μάλιστα.
your turn, and tell him to whom of the Athenians he is to go. Give us a name—anyone you please.

AN. Why mention a particular one? Any Athenian gentleman he comes across, without exception, will do him more good, if he will do as he is bid, than the sophists.

soc. And did those gentlemen grow spontaneously into what they are, and without learning from anybody are they able, nevertheless, to teach others what they did not learn themselves?

AN. I expect they must have learnt in their turn from the older generation, who were gentlemen: or does it not seem to you that we have had many good men in this city?

soc. Yes, I agree, Anytus; we have also many who are good at politics, and have had them in the past as well as now. But I want to know whether they have proved good teachers besides of their own virtue: that is the question with which our discussion is actually concerned; not whether there are, or formerly have been, good men here amongst us or not, but whether virtue is teachable; this has been our problem all the time. And our inquiry into this problem resolves itself into the question: Did the good men of our own and of former times know how to transmit to another man the virtue in respect of which they were good, or is it something not to be transmitted or taken over from one human being to another? That is the question I and Meno have been discussing all this time. Well, just consider it in your own way of speaking: would you not say that Themistocles was a good man?

AN. I would, particularly so.
σημ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διδάσκαλον ἀγαθόν, εἰπερ τις ἄλλος τής αὐτοῦ ἁρετής διδάσκαλος ἦν, κα-κεῖνον εἶναι;

Ἀν. Οἴμαι ἐγώγε, εἰπερ ἐβοῦλετό γε.

σημ. 'Αλλ', οἴει, οὐκ ἂν ἐβούληθη ἄλλους
tε τίνας καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ
ποὺ τὸν υἱὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ; ἦ οἴει αὐτοῦ φθονεῖν
αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες οὐ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἁρετήν,

ἢν αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς ἦν; ἦ οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὅτι Θεμι-
στοκλῆς Κλεόφαντον τὸν υἱὸν ἔπεε μὲν ἐδιδάξατο
ἀγαθόν; ἔπεμενε γοὺν ἐπὶ τῶν ἔππων ὀρθῶν
ἐστίκως, καὶ ἥκοντιζεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπτηπών ὀρθῶς,
καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ εἰργάζετο, ἀ ἐκεῖνος
αὐτὸν ἐπαιδεύσατο καὶ ἐποίησε σοφὸν, ὅσα διδα-
σκάλων ἀγαθῶν εἶχετο. ἦ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀκήκοας
τῶν πρεσβυτέρων;

Ἀν. Ἀκήκοα.

σημ. Οὐκ ἂν ἁρα τὴν γε φύσιν τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ
ητιάσαι ἂν τις εἶναι κακὴν.

Ε Ἀν. Ἰσως οὐκ ἂν.

σημ. Τι δὲ τόδε; ὡς Κλεόφαντος ὁ Θεμι-
στοκλέους ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς ἐγένετο ἀπερ
ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ, ἦδη τοῦ ἀκήκοας ἦ νεωτέρου ἦ
πρεσβυτέρου;

Ἀν. Οὐ δήτα.

σημ. Ἀρ' οὖν ταῦτα μὲν οἰλομεθα βούλεσθαι
αὐτὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ υἱὸν παιδεύσαι, ἦν δὲ αὐτὸς
σοφίαν ἦν σοφός, οὐδὲν τῶν γειτῶν βελτίω
ποιήσαι, εἰπερ ἦν γε διδακτὸν ἡ ἁρετή;

Ἀν. Ἰσως μὰ Δί' οὐ.

σημ. Οὗτος μὲν δὴ σοι τοιοῦτος διδάσκαλος

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MENO

soc. And if any man ever was a teacher of his own virtue, he especially was a good teacher of his?

AN. In my opinion, yes, assuming that he wished to be so.

soc. But can you suppose he would not have wished that other people should become good, honourable men—above all, I presume, his own son? Or do you think he was jealous of him, and deliberately refused to impart the virtue of his own goodness to him? Have you never heard how Themistocles had his son Cleophantus taught to be a good horseman? Why, he could keep his balance standing upright on horseback, and hurl the javelin while so standing, and perform many other wonderful feats in which his father had had him trained, so as to make him skilled in all that could be learnt from good masters. Surely you must have heard all this from your elders?

AN. I have.

soc. Then there could be no complaints of badness in his son’s nature?

AN. I daresay not.

soc. But I ask you—did you ever hear anybody, old or young, say that Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, had the same goodness and accomplishments as his father?

AN. Certainly not.

soc. And can we believe that his father chose to train his own son in those feats, and yet made him no better than his neighbours in his own particular accomplishments—if virtue, as alleged, was to be taught?

AN. On my word, I think not.

soc. Well, there you have a fine teacher of virtue
PLATO

ἀρετῆς, ὃν καὶ σὺ ὀμολογεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἀριστοῖς τῶν 94 προτέρων εἶναι. ἄλλον δὲ δὴ σκεφώμεθα, Ἀριστείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου. ἦ τούτου οὖς ὀμολογεῖς ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι;

Ἀν. Ἐγώγε, πάντως δήπον.

ση. Ὅντοι καὶ οὗτος τὸν νῦν τὸν αὐτοῦ Λυσιμάχου, ὥσ περ διδασκάλων εἰχετο, καλλίστα Ἀθηναίων ἐπαιδευσεν, ἄνδρα δὲ βελτίων δοκεῖ σοι ὄντον πεποιηκέναι; τούτῳ γάρ ποι καὶ συγγέγονας καὶ ὄρας οἷς ἐστιν. εἶ δὲ βούλει,

Β Περικλέα, οὗτο μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἄνδρα, οἷοθ' ὅτι δύο νιεῖς ἔθρεψε, Πάραλον καὶ Ξάνθιππον;

Ἀν. Ἐγώγε.

ση. Τούτους μέντοι, ὡς οἶδα καὶ σὺ, ἵππεας μὲν ἐδίδαξεν οὔδενὸς χείρος Ἀθηναίων, καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ ἀγωνίαν καὶ τάλλα ἐπαιδευσεν, ὥσ τέχνης ἔχεται, οὔδενὸς χείρος· ἀγαθοῦ δὲ ἄρα ἄνδρας οὐκ ἐβούλετο ποιήσαι; δοκῶ μὲν, ἐβούλετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὖν ἦ διδακτὸν. ἵνα δὲ μὴ ὀλίγους οὕς καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους Ἀθηναίων ἀδυνάτους

C γεγονέναι τούτο τὸ πράγμα, ἐνθυμήθητι ὅτι Θουκυδίδης αὐτὸ δύο νιεῖς ἔθρεψε, Μελησίαν καὶ Στέφανον, καὶ τούτους ἐπαιδευσε τὰ τῆς ἄλλας εῦ καὶ ἐπάλασαν κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων· τὸν μὲν γὰρ Ξανθία ἔδωκε, τὸν δὲ Ἐυδώρῳ· οὗτοι δὲ ποι ἐδόκουν τῶν τότε κάλλιστα παλαίειν· ἦν οὐ μέμνησαι;

Ἀν. Ἐγώγε, ἀκοῇ.

1 Thucydides (son of Melesias, and no relation of the historian) was an aristocrat of high principle and con-

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who, you admit, was one of the best men of past times. Let us take another, Aristeides, son of Lysimachus: do you not admit that he was a good man?

**AN.** I do, absolutely, of course.

**soc.** Well, did he not train his son Lysimachus better than any other Athenian in all that masters could teach him? And in the result, do you consider he has turned out better than anyone else? You have been in his company, I know, and you see what he is like. Or take another example—the splendidly accomplished Pericles: he, as you are aware, brought up two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus.

**AN.** Yes.

**soc.** And, you know as well as I, he taught them to be the foremost horsemen of Athens, and trained them to excel in music and gymnastics and all else that comes under the head of the arts; and with all that, had he no desire to make them good men? He wished to, I imagine, but presumably it is not a thing one can be taught. And that you may not suppose it was only a few of the meanest sort of Athenians who failed in this matter, let me remind you that Thucydides also brought up two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, and that besides giving them a good general education he made them the best wrestlers in Athens: one he placed with Xanthias, and the other with Eudorus—masters who, I should think, had the name of being the best exponents of the art. You remember them, do you not?

**AN.** Yes, by hearsay.

servative views who opposed the plans of Pericles for enriching and adorning Athens.
ΣΠ. Οὐκοῦν δήλον ὅτι οὗτος οὐκ ἂν ποτε, οὗ μὲν ἔδει δαπανῶμεν διδάσκειν, ταῦτα μὲν
D ἐδίδαξε τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς αὐτοῦ, οὗ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔδει ἀναλώσαντα ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρὰς ποιῆσαι, ταῦτα
dὲ οὐκ ἐδίδαξεν, εἴ διδακτὸν ἦν; ἄλλα γὰρ ἦσος ὁ Θουκυδίδης φαῦλος ἦν, καὶ οὖκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ
πλεῖστοι φίλοι Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων;
καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα ἐν τῇ
πόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις Ἔλλησι, ὥστε εἶπεν ἦν
tούτῳ διδακτόν, ἐξευρέθη ἄν οὕστις ἐμελλεν
αὐτοῦ τοὺς νεῖσι ἀγαθοὺς ποιῆσειν, ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων
Ε τις ἡ τῶν ἔξων, εἴ αὐτὸς μὴ ἐσχόλαζε διὰ τὴν
τῆς πόλεως ἐπιμέλειαν. ἄλλα γὰρ, ὥς ἐταίρε
Ἀνυτε, μὴ οὐκ ἦ διδακτόν ἄρετή.
ἈΝ. Ὁ Σώκρατες, ῥαδίως μοι δοκεῖσ κακῶς
λέγειν ἀνθρώπους. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἄν σοι συμ-
βουλεύσαμι, εἰ ἔθελες ἐμοὶ πείθεσθαι, εἰλα-
βείσθαι ὡς ἦσος μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ῥάδῳ
ἐστὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἡ εὐ, ἐν τῇδε δὲ
95 καὶ πάντως οἴμαι δὲ σὲ καὶ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι.
ΣΠ. Ὁ Μένων, Ἀνυτε μὲν μοι δοκεῖ χα-
λεπάινει καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμάζω σεῖται γὰρ μὲ
πρώτον μὲν κακηγορεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἀνδρὰς,
ἐπειτα ἦγεῖται καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι εἰς τούτων. ἄλλ'
οὕτως μὲν ἐάν ποτε γυνῇ, οἴον ἐστὶ τὸ κακῶς
λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπάινων, νῦν δὲ ἀγνοεῖ· σοῦ
dὲ μοι εἰπέ, οὐ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν εἰσὶ καλοὶ κάγαθοι
ἄνδρες;

1 ῥάδῳ Buttmann: ῥάδιων mss.

1 Anytus goes away. His parting words show that (in Plato’s view) he regarded Socrates as an enemy of the
restored democracy which, he hints, has popular juries only
too ready to condemn such an awkward critic.
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soc. Well, is it not obvious that this father would never have spent his money on having his children taught all those things, and then have omitted to teach them at no expense the others that would have made them good men, if virtue was to be taught? Will you say that perhaps Thucydides was one of the meaner sort, and had no great number of friends among the Athenians and allies? He, who was of a great house and had much influence in our city and all over Greece, so that if virtue were to be taught he would have found out the man who was likely to make his sons good, whether one of our own people or a foreigner, were he himself too busy owing to the cares of state! Ah no, my dear Anytus, it looks as though virtue were not a teachable thing.

AN. Socrates, I consider you are too apt to speak ill of people. I, for one, if you will take my advice, would warn you to be careful: in most cities it is probably easier to do people harm than good, and particularly in this one; I think you know that yourself.¹

soc. Meno, I think Anytus is angry, and I am not at all surprised: for he conceives, in the first place, that I am speaking ill of these gentlemen; and in the second place, he considers, he is one of them himself. Yet, should the day come when he knows what "speaking ill" means, his anger will cease; at present he does not know.² Now you must answer me: are there not good and honourable men among your people also?

² This is probably not a reference to a prosecution of Anytus himself, but a suggestion that what he needs is a Socratic discussion on "speaking ill," for "ill" may mean "maliciously," "untruthfully," "ignorantly," etc.
PLATO

MEN. Πάντα γε.

B ξω. Τί οὖν; ἑθέλουσιν ο瘕οι παρέχειν αὐτοὺς διδασκάλους τοῖς νέοις, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν διδάσκαλοι τε εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἀρετῆν;

MEN. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἂν αὐτῶν ἀκούσας ὡς διδακτὸν, τοτὲ δὲ ὡς οὐ.

ξω. Φῶμεν οὖν τούτους διδασκάλους εἶναι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, οἷς μηδὲ αὐτὸ τούτο ὁμολογεῖται;

MEN. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ξω. Τί δὲ δή; οἱ σοφίσται σοι οὕτω, οὗπερ Σ μόνοι ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ἀρετῆς;

MEN. Καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτα ἀγαμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἀκούσας ὑπισχυμένου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾶ, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ ὑπισχυμένων· ἀλλὰ λέγεις οἶτει δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινοῦς.

ξω. Οὐδ' ἀρα σοὶ δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφίσται δι-

δάσκαλοι εἰναι;

MEN. Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα· τοτὲ μὲν μοι δοκοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ οὐ.

ξω. Ὅσθα δὲ ὅτι οὐ μόνον σοὶ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τοῦτο δοκεῖ τοτὲ μὲν εἶναι διδακτόν, τοτὲ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θεόγνιν τὸν ποιητὴν οἰσθ' ὅτι ταύτα ταύτα λέγει;

MEN. Ἐν ποίοις ἔπεσιν;

ξω. Ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις, οὐ λέγει—

καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πίνε καὶ ἔσθιε, καὶ μετὰ τοῖς ἱεῖ, καὶ ἀνάδει τοῖς, ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις.
MENO

MEN. Certainly.

soc. Well then, are they willing to put themselves forward as teachers of the young, and avow that they are teachers and that virtue is to be taught?

MEN. No, no, Socrates, I assure you: sometimes you may hear them refer to it as teachable, but sometimes as not.

soc. Then are we to call those persons teachers of this thing, when they do not even agree on that great question?

MEN. I should say not, Socrates.

soc. Well, and what of the sophists? Do you consider these, its only professors, to be teachers of virtue?

MEN. That is a point, Socrates, for which I admire Gorgias: you will never hear him promising this, and he ridicules the others when he hears them promise it. Skill in speaking is what he takes it to be their business to produce.

soc. Then you do not think the sophists are teachers of virtue?

MEN. I cannot say, Socrates. I am in the same plight as the rest of the world: sometimes I think that they are, sometimes that they are not.

soc. And are you aware that not only you and other political folk are in two minds as to whether virtue is to be taught, but Theognis the poet also says, you remember, the very same thing?

MEN. In which part of his poems?

soc. In those elegiac lines where he says—

"Eat and drink with these men: sit with them, and be pleasing unto them, who wield great power: for from the
PLATO

ἔσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ’ ἐσθλὰ διδάξεαι· ἥν δὲ κακοῖσιν

οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ὡς διδακτοῦ οὐσίας τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει;

MEN. Φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐν ἀλλοις δὲ γε ὀλίγον μεταβάς,

εἰ δ’ ἦν ποιητὸν, φησί, καὶ ἐνθέτον ἀνδρὸν νόημα,

λέγει πως ὅτι

πολλοὺς ἄν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον

οἱ δυνάμενοι τούτῳ ποιεῖν, καὶ

οὗ ποτ’ ἄν ἔξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός,

96 πειθόμενοι μύθοις σαφόφροσιν. ἄλλα διδάσκοντο

οὗ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἀνδρὸν ἀγαθόν.

ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸς αὐτῷ πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν

tάναντία λέγει;

MEN. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὅτου οὐδ’ πράγματος,

οὗ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οὐχ ὡς ἄλλων

dιδάσκαλοι όμολογοῦνται, ἄλλ’ οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ

Β ἐπιστάσθαι, ἄλλα πονηροί εἶναι περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο

tὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ φασὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶναι, οἱ δὲ όμολογοῦντες

αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ τοτε μὲν φασὶν αὐτὸ διδακτὸν εἶναι,

τοτε δὲ οὐ; τοὺς οὖν οὕτω τεταραγμένους περὶ ὅτου οὐν

φαίης ἃν οὐ κυρίως διδασκάλους εἶναι;

MEN. Μὰ Δί’ οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφισταὶ μήτε οἱ αὐτοὶ

1 Bergk, 33-36. 2 Bergk, 434-438.
Do you observe how in these words he implies that virtue is to be taught?

MEN. He does, evidently.

SOC. But in some other lines he shifts his ground a little, saying—

"Could understanding be created and put into a man" (I think it runs thus) "many high rewards would they obtain" (that is, the men who were able to do such a thing): and again—

"Never would a bad son have sprung from a good father, for he would have followed the precepts of wisdom: but not by teaching wilt thou ever make the bad man good."²

You notice how in the second passage he contradicts himself on the same point?

MEN. Apparently.

SOC. Well, can you name any other subject in which the professing teachers are not only refused recognition as teachers of others, but regarded as not even understanding it themselves, and indeed as inferior in the very quality of which they claim to be teachers; while those who are themselves recognized as men of worth and honour say at one time that it is teachable, and at another that it is not? When people are so confused about this or that matter, can you say they are teachers in any proper sense of the word?

MEN. No, indeed, I cannot.

SOC. Well, if neither the sophists nor the men
καλοὶ κάγαθοι ὄντες διδάσκαλοὶ εἰσὶ τοῦ πράγματος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ἄλλοι γε;
MEN. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

C ἡ. Ἐι δὲ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί;
MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι ἐχειν ὡς λέγεις.

ἡ. Ομολογήκαμεν δὲ γε, πράγματος οὐ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταί εἰεν, τοῦτο μηδὲ δι-
dακτόν εἴναι;
MEN. Ομολογήκαμεν.

ἡ. Οὐκοὖν ἀρετῆς οὐδαμοῦ φαίνονται διδά-
σκαλοὶ;
MEN. "Εστι ταῦτα.

ἡ. Ἐι δὲ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί;
MEN. Φαίνεται οὕτως.

ἡ. Ἀρετή ἄρα οὐκ ἄν εἰή διδακτόν;

D MEN. Οὐκ ἔοικεν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκέι-
μεθα. ὥστε καὶ θαυμάζω δή, ὡς Σώκρατες,
pότερον ποτὲ οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἄγαθοι ἄνδρες, ἢ τίς ἂν
eἰη τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἄγαθῶν γιγνομένων.

ἡ. Κινδυνεύομεν, ὡς Μένων, ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ
φαύλοι τινες εἴναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σέ τε Γοργίας οὐχ
ἰκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι καὶ ἔμε Πρόδικος. παντὸς
μᾶλλον οὖν προσεκτέον τὸν νοῦν ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς, καὶ
ζητητέον ὅστις ἡμᾶς ἐνί γέ τω τρόπῳ βελτίως
Ε. ποιήσει, λέγω δὲ ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τὴν
ἀρτι ζήτησιν, ὡς ἡμᾶς ἔλαβε καταγελάστως,
ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης ἡγουμένης ὀρθῶς τε καὶ
ἐφι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράττεται τὰ πράγματα, ἢ'
ίσως καὶ διαφεύγει ἡμᾶς τὸ γνώναι, τίνα ποτὲ
τρόπον γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες.
MEN. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὡς Σώκρατες;

1 ἡ Madvig: ἡ mss.
who are themselves good and honourable are teachers of the subject, clearly no others can be?

MEN. I agree.
soc. And if there are no teachers, there can be no disciples either?

MEN. I think that statement is true.
soc. And we have admitted that a thing of which there are neither teachers nor disciples cannot be taught?

MEN. We have.
soc. So nowhere are any teachers of virtue to be found?

MEN. That is so.
soc. And if no teachers, then no disciples?

MEN. So it appears.
soc. Hence virtue cannot be taught?

MEN. It seems likely, if our investigation is correct. And that makes me wonder, I must say, Socrates, whether perhaps there are no good men at all, or by what possible sort of process good people can come to exist?

soc. I fear, Meno, you and I are but poor creatures, and Gorgias has been as faulty an educator of you as Prodicus of me. So our first duty is to look to ourselves, and try to find somebody who will have some means or other of making us better. I say this with special reference to our recent inquiry, in which I see that we absurdly failed to note that it is not only through the guidance of knowledge that human conduct is right and good; and it is probably owing to this that we fail to perceive by what means good men can be produced.

MEN. To what are you alluding, Socrates?
Σ. 'Ωδε· οτι μεν τους ἀγαθούς ἀνδρας δει ὡφελίμους εἰναι, ὅρθως ὑμολογήκαμεν τούτο 97 γε, οτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι· ἥ γάρ;  
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.  
Σ. Καὶ οτι γε ὡφελίμοι ἐσονται, ἂν ὅρθως ἡμῖν ἠγονται τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τούτῳ ποι  
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.  
Σ. "Οτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὅρθως ἠγείρθαι, ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ὁ, τούτῳ ὑμοιοὶ ἐσμεν οὐκ ὅρθως ὑμολογηκόσιν.  
ΜΕΝ. Πῶς δὴ [ὁρθῶς] λέγεις;  
Σ. Ἔγω ἔρω, εἴ τις εἰδὼς τὴν ὀδὸν τὴν εἰς Λάρισαν ἡ ὁποὶ βούλει ἄλλος οἰκιοτί, ἀλλο τι ὅρθως ἄν καὶ ἔθ ἠγοίτο;  
ΜΕΝ. Πάνω γε.  
Β Σ. Τι δ' εἴ τις ὅρθως μὲν δοξάζων, ἡτις ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, ἐληλυθὼς δὲ μὴ μηδ' ἐπιστάμενος,  
ΜΕΝ. Πάνω γε.  
Σ. Καὶ ἐως γ' ἂν ποι ὅρθην δόξαν ἔχη περὶ ἰν ὁ ἐτερος ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμῶν ἐσται, οἴομενος μὲν ἀληθῆ, φρονών δὲ μὴ, τοῦ  
ΜΕΝ. Οὐδέν γάρ.  
Σ. Δόξα ἄρα ἀληθῆς πρὸς ὅρθότητα πράξεως οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμῶν φρονήσεως· καὶ τούτῳ ἐστιν  
Ο σκέψει, ὁποῖον τι εἴη, λέγοντες ὅτι φρόνησιν  
ΜΟΝΟΝ ἠγείται τοῦ ὅρθως πράττειν· τὸ δὲ ἄρα  
ΚΑΙ ΔΟΞΑ ἦν ἀληθῆς.
MENO

soc. I mean that good men must be useful: we were right, were we not, in admitting that this must needs be so?

MEN. Yes.

soc. And in thinking that they will be useful if they give us right guidance in conduct: here also, I suppose, our admission was correct?

MEN. Yes.

soc. But our assertion that it is impossible to give right guidance unless one has knowledge looks very like a mistake.

MEN. What do you mean by that?

soc. I will tell you. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or any other place you please, and walked there and led others, would he not give right and good guidance?

MEN. Certainly.

soc. Well, and a person who had a right opinion as to which was the way, but had never been there and did not really know, might give right guidance, might he not?

MEN. Certainly.

soc. And so long, I presume, as he has right opinion about that which the other man really knows, he will be just as good a guide—if he thinks the truth instead of knowing it—as the man who has the knowledge.

MEN. Just as good.

soc. Hence true opinion is as good a guide to rightness of action as knowledge; and this is a point we omitted just now in our consideration of the nature of virtue, when we stated that knowledge is the only guide of right action; whereas we find there is also true opinion.
MEN. "Εοικε γε.

ΣΝ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἦττον ὑφέλιμον ἔστιν ὀρθὴ
doξα ἐπιστήμης.

MEN. Τοσοῦτω γε, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ὅτι ὁ μὲν
τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων ἀεὶ ἄν ἐπιτυγχάνοι, ὁ δὲ
τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν τοτὲ μὲν ἄν τυγχάνοι, τοτὲ δὲ
οὐ.

ΣΝ. Πῶς λέγεις; ὁ ἄεὶ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν
οὐκ ἀεὶ τυγχάνοι, ἐωσπερ ὀρθὰ δοξάζοι;

MEN. Ἀνάγκη μοι φαίνεται. ᾠστε θαυμάζω,

D ὦ Σῶκρατες, τούτου οὔτως ἔχοντο, ὅτι δὴ ποτὲ
πολὺ τιμωτέρα ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὀρθῆς δόξης, καὶ
dὲ ὁ τι τὸ μὲν ἐτερον, τὸ δὲ ἐτερὸν ἔστιν αὐτῶν.

ΣΝ. Οἴσθα οὖν δι' ὧ τι θαυμάζεις, ἢ ἐγώ σοι
εἴπω;

MEN. Πάνυ γ' εἶπέ.

ΣΝ. "Ὅτι τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν οὐ προσ-
ἑσχηκας τὸν νοῦν. 'Ισως δὲ οὐδ' ἔστι παρ' ύμιν. 

MEN. Προς τι δὲ δὴ τούτο λέγεις;

ΣΝ. "Ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ἢ,
ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει, ἐὰν δὲ δεδεμένα,
pαραμένει.

Ε ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν δή;

ΣΝ. Τῶν ἐκείνων ποιημάτων λελυμένων μὲν
ἐκτήσθαι οὐ πολλῆς τυνὸς ἄξιον ἔστι τιμῆς, ὡςπερ
dραπέτην ἀνθρωπον οὐ γὰρ παραμένει δεδεμέ-
νον δὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον. πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα
ἔστι. πρὸς τι οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς
dόξας τὰς ἀληθείς. καὶ γὰρ αι δόξαι αἱ ἀληθείς,

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1 Cf. Euthyphro 11. Socrates pretends to believe the old legend according to which Daedalus, the first sculptor, con-

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MENO

MEN. So it seems.

SOC. Then right opinion is just as useful as knowledge.

MEN. With this difference, Socrates, that he who has knowledge will always hit on the right way, whereas he who has right opinion will sometimes do so, but sometimes not.

SOC. How do you mean? Will not he who always has right opinion be always right, so long as he opines rightly?

MEN. It appears to me that he must; and therefore I wonder, Socrates, this being the case, that knowledge should ever be more prized than right opinion, and why they should be two distinct and separate things.

SOC. Well, do you know why it is that you wonder, or shall I tell you?

MEN. Please tell me.

SOC. It is because you have not observed with attention the images of Daedalus. But perhaps there are none in your country.

MEN. What is the point of your remark?

SOC. That if they are not fastened up they play truant and run away; but, if fastened, they stay where they are.

MEN. Well, what of that?

SOC. To possess one of his works which is let loose does not count for much in value; it will not stay with you any more than a runaway slave: but when fastened up it is worth a great deal, for his productions are very fine things. And to what am I referring in all this? To true opinions.

trived a wonderful mechanism in his statues by which they could move.
δόσων μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσι, καλῶν τὸ χρήμα καὶ πάντα τάγαθα ἐργάζονται. πολὺν δέ χρόνον οὐκ ἔθελον παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὡστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἐως ὅτι τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αὐτίας λογισμῷ. τούτο δ' ἔστιν, Μένων ἔταξε, ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρώθεν ἦμῖν ὁμολόγηται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθώσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστήμην γίγνονται, ἐπειτα μόνοι. καὶ διὰ ταύτα δὴ τιμωτέρου ἐπιστήμην ὁρθής δόξης ἐστὶ, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμην ὁρθῆς δόξης.

ΜΕΝ. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔσκευε τοιοῦτῳ τῶι.

Β ἘΝ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰκάζων ὡς τι δε ἐστὶ τί ἄλλοιον ὁρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμην, οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ τοῦτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι, ὅλγα δ' ἂν φαίην, ἐν δ' οὖν καὶ τούτῳ ἔκεινων θείῃν ἂν ὡς οἶδα.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ ὁρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις.

ἘΝ. Τί δὲ; τόδε οὐκ ὁρθῶς, ὡς ἀλήθης δόξα ἡγομένη τὸ ἔργον ἐκάστης τῆς πράξεως οὐδὲν χείρον ἀπεργάζεται ἡ ἐπιστήμη;

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τούτῳ δοκεῖς μοι ἀλήθη λέγειν.

C ἘΝ. Οὐδὲν ὡς ὡς ὁρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης χείρον οὐδὲ ἦττον ὑφελίμη ἐσται εἰς τὰς πράξεις, οὐδὲ ἀνήρ ο ἐχῶν ὁρθὴν δόξαι ἢ ἡ ἐπιστήμη.

ΜΕΝ. Ἐστι ταύτα.

ἘΝ. Καὶ μὴν ὦ γε ἄγαθός ἀνήρ ωφελίμος ἢμῖν ὁμολόγηται εἶναι.
For these, so long as they stay with us, are a
fine possession, and effect all that is good; but
they do not care to stay for long, and run away
out of the human soul, and thus are of no great value
until one makes them fast with causal reasoning.
And this process, friend Meno, is recollection, as
in our previous talk we have agreed. But when
once they are fastened, in the first place they turn
into knowledge, and in the second, are abiding.
And this is why knowledge is more prized than
right opinion: the one transcends the other by its
trammels.

MEN. Upon my word, Socrates, it seems to be
very much as you say.

SOC. And indeed I too speak as one who does not
know but only conjectures: yet that there is a differ-
ence between right opinion and knowledge is not at
all a conjecture with me but something I would
particularly assert that I knew: there are not
many things of which I would say that, but this one,
at any rate, I will include among those that I know.

MEN. Yes, and you are right, Socrates, in so saying.

SOC. Well, then, am I not right also in saying that
true opinion leading the way renders the effect of
each action as good as knowledge does?

MEN. There again, Socrates, I think you speak the
truth.

SOC. So that right opinion will be no whit inferior
to knowledge in worth or usefulness as regards our
actions, nor will the man who has right opinion be
inferior to him who has knowledge.

MEN. That is so.

SOC. And you know that the good man has been
admitted by us to be useful.
PLATO

MEN. Nai.

Σ. 'Επειδή τοίνυν οὐ μόνον δι' ἐπιστήμην ἁγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἄν εἶνεν καὶ ωφέλιμοι ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐπέρ εἶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ὀρθὴν δόξαν, τούτων δὲ οὐδετέρον φύσει ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὕτω ἐπὶ-

D στήμη οὕτε δόξα ἀληθῆς, ἐντ' ἐπίκτητα—ἡ δοκεῖ σοι φύσει ὁποτέρονοιν αὐτοῖν εἶναι;

MEN. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει, οὐδὲ οἱ ἁγαθοὶ φύσει εἶναι ἄν.

MEN. Οὐ δῆτα.

Σ. 'Επειδὴ δὲ γε οὐ φύσει, ἐσκόπουμεν τὸ μετὰ τούτο, εἰ διδακτὸν ἔστω.

MEN. Nai.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν διδακτὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι, εἰ φρόνησις ἡ ἀρετή;

MEN. Nai.

Σ. Καὶ εἰ γε διδακτὸν εἶη, φρόνησις ἄν εἶναι;

MEN. Πάνω γε.

Σ. Καὶ εἰ μέν γε διδάσκαλοι εἶεν, διδακτὸν Ε ἄν εἶναι, μὴ ὄντων δὲ οὐ διδακτόν;

MEN. Οὕτως.

Σ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁμολογήκαμεν μὴ εἶναι αὐτοὶ διδάσκαλοις;

MEN. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Σ. Ὁμολογήκαμεν ἀρα μήτε διδακτὸν αὐτὸ μήτε φρόνησιν εἶναι;

MEN. Πάνω γε.

Σ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἁγαθὸν γε αὐτὸ ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι;

MEN. Nai.

1 ὄντ' Apelt: οὖν' mss.
MEN. Yes.

soc. Since then it is not only because of knowledge that men will be good and useful to their country, where such men are to be found, but also on account of right opinion; and since neither of these two things—knowledge and true opinion—is a natural property of mankind, being acquired—or do you think that either of them is natural?

MEN. Not I.

soc. Then if they are not natural, good people cannot be good by nature either.

MEN. Of course not.

soc. And since they are not an effect of nature, we next considered whether virtue can be taught.

MEN. Yes.

soc. And we thought it teachable if virtue is wisdom?

MEN. Yes.

soc. And if teachable, it must be wisdom?

MEN. Certainly.

soc. And if there were teachers, it could be taught, but if there were none, it could not?

MEN. Quite so.

soc. But surely we acknowledged that it had no teachers?

MEN. That is true.

soc. Then we acknowledged it neither was taught nor was wisdom?

MEN. Certainly.

soc. But yet we admitted it was a good?

MEN. Yes.
PLATO

στ. Ὡφέλιμον δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγούμενον;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνω γε.

στ. Ὡρθῶς δὲ γε ἡγεῖσθαι δύο ὄντα ταῦτα 99 μόνα, δόξαν τε ἀληθῆ καὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἃ ἔχων ἄνθρωπος ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται. τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς γυνὸμενα οὐκ ἄνθρωπιν ἡγεμονία γίγνεται· ὃν δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἡγεμῶν ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν, δύο ταῦτα, δόξα ἀληθῆς καὶ ἐπιστήμην.

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι οὕτως.

στ. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδή οὐ διδακτὸν ἐστὶν, οὐδ’ ἐπιστήμην δὴ ἐτι γίγνεται ἡ ἀρετή;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

Β στ. Δυοῖν ἄρα ὄντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ ὦφελίμοι τοῦ μὲν ἔτερον ἀπολέλυται, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἶθ ἐν πολιτικῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμην ἡγεμῶν.

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

στ. οὐκ ἄρα σοφὶα τινὶ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες ἡγοῦντο ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἱ ἁμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα τε καὶ οὗς ἄρτι "Ανυτος ὀδε ἐλεγε· διὸ καὶ οὐχ ὦδὶ τε ἄλλους ποιεῖν τοιοῦτος οἶοι αὐτοὶ εἰσιν, ἀτε οὐ δι’ ἐπιστήμην ὄντες τοιοῦτοι.

ΜΕΝ. "Εοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡ Σῶκρατες, ὡς λέγεις.

στ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην, εὐδοξία δὴ τὸ C λοιπὸν γίγνεται· ἢ οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες χρώμενοι τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμοῦδοι τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντεις· καὶ γὰρ οὕτωι λέγουσι μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά, ἱσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν.

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sor. And that which guides rightly is useful and good?

men. Certainly.

sor. And that there are only two things—true opinion and knowledge—that guide rightly and a man guides rightly if he have these; for things that come about by chance do not occur through human guidance; but where a man is a guide to what is right we find these two things—true opinion and knowledge.

men. I agree.

sor. Well now, since virtue is not taught, we no longer take it to be knowledge?

men. Apparently not.

sor. So of two good and useful things one has been rejected: knowledge cannot be our guide in political conduct.

men. I think not.

sor. Therefore it was not by any wisdom, nor because they were wise, that the sort of men we spoke of controlled their states—Themistocles and the rest of them, to whom our friend Anytus was referring a moment ago. For this reason it was that they were unable to make others like unto themselves—because their qualities were not an effect of knowledge.

men. The case is probably as you say, Socrates.

sor. And if not by knowledge, as the only alternative it must have been by good opinion. This is the means which statesmen employ for their direction of states, and they have nothing more to do with wisdom than soothsayers and diviners; for these people utter many a true thing when inspired, but have no knowledge of anything they say.
PLATO

MEN. Κωνδυνεύει οὐτως ἔχειν.

ΣΝ. Οὐκοῦν, ὡς Μένων, ἄξιον τούτως θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἀνδρας, οὕτως νοῦν μή ἔχοντες πολλά καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσιν;

MEN. Πάνω γε.

ΣΝ. Ὁρθῶς ἄρ’ ἂν καλοίμεν θείους τε, οὐς

Δ νυνδὴ ἔλεγομεν χρησμωδούς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἀπαντας· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἤκιστα τούτων φαίμεν ἃν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους οὖντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθώσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὧν λέγουσιν.

MEN. Πάνω γε.

ΣΝ. Καὶ αἱ γε γυναίκες δήπον, ὡς Μένων, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρας θείους καλοῦσι· καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἑγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρα, θεῖος ἀνήρ, φασίν, οὖτος.

Ε ΜΕΝ. Καὶ φαίνονται γε, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὁρθῶς λέγειν. καίτοι ὦσας "Ἀνυτος ὦδε σοι ἄχθεται λέγοντι.

ΣΝ. Οὐδὲν μέλει ἔμοιγε. τούτω μὲν, ὡς Μένων, καὶ ἀὕθις διαλεξόμεθα· εἰ δὲ νῦν ήμεῖς ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καλῶς ἐξητῆσαμέντε καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὕτε φύσει οὕτε διδακτών, ἀλλὰ θεία μοῖρα παραγιγνομένη ἀνευ νοῦ, οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται, εἰ μὴ τις εἰς τοιοῦτος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἶος καὶ ἀλλὸν ποιῆσαι πολιτικοῦ· εἰ δὲ εἰη, σχεδὸν ἂν τι οὕτος λέγουτο τοιοῦτος ἐν τοῖς ζωῶν, οἶον ἐφη ὁμηρος ἐν τοῖς τεθνεώσι τῶν Τευρεσίαν εἶναι, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οἶος πέπινε τῶν ἐν ὁμοι, αἱ δὲ σκιαὶ ἄισσουσι. ταύτον ἂν καὶ ἐνθάδε ὦ τοιοῦτος
MENO

MEN. I daresay that is so.

soc. And may we, Meno, rightly call those men divine who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a great deed and word?

MEN. Certainly.

soc. Then we shall be right in calling those divine of whom we spoke just now as soothsayers and prophets and all of the poetic turn; and especially we can say of the statesmen that they are divine and enraptured, as being inspired and possessed of God when they succeed in speaking many great things, while knowing nought of what they say.

MEN. Certainly.

soc. And the women too, I presume, Meno, call good men divine; and the Spartans, when they eulogize a good man, say—"He is a divine person."

MEN. And to all appearance, Socrates, they are right; though perhaps our friend Anytus may be annoyed at your statement.

soc. For my part, I care not. As for him, Meno, we will converse with him some other time. At the moment, if through all this discussion our queries and statements have been correct, virtue is found to be neither natural nor taught, but is imparted to us by a divine dispensation without understanding in those who receive it, unless there should be somebody among the statesmen capable of making a statesman of another. And if there should be any such, he might fairly be said to be among the living what Homer says Teiresias was among the dead—"He alone has comprehension; the rest are flitting shades."\(^1\) In the same way he on earth, in

\(^1\) *Od.* x. 494.
PLATO

ωσπερ παρὰ σκιὰς ἀληθὲς αὐν πρᾶγμα εἶη πρὸς ἀρετὴν.

B 

ΜΕΝ. Κάλλιστα δοκεῖς μοι λέγεων, ὦ Σώκρατες. 

ἐπ. Ἔκ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦτον τοῦ λόγισμοῦ, ὦ 

Μένων, θεία μοῖρα ἡμῶν φαίνεται παραγιγνομένη ἡ ἀρετὴ, ὃις παραγίγνεται τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσόμεθα τότε, ὅταν πρὶν ἄτιν τρόπῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παραγίγνεται ἀρετή, πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ζητεῖν τί ποτ’ ἔστιν ἀρετή. νῦν δ’ ἐμοὶ μὲν ἄρα ποι ἴηναι, ὃν ἔν 

τὰ ταῦτα ἀπερ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι πεῖθε καὶ τὸν ξένον τόνδε Ἀνυτοῦν, ἰνα πραότερος ἦ. ὃς ἐὰν πείσης τοῦτον, ἐστιν ὦ τι καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ὀνήσεις.
MENO

respect of virtue, will be a real substance among shadows.

MEN. I think you put it excellently, Socrates.

soc. Then the result of our reasoning, Meno, is found to be that virtue comes to us by a divine dispensation, when it does come. But the certainty of this we shall only know when, before asking in what way virtue comes to mankind, we set about inquiring what virtue is, in and by itself. It is time now for me to go my way, but do you persuade our friend Anytus of that whereof you are now yourself persuaded, so as to put him in a gentler mood; for if you can persuade him, you will do a good turn to the people of Athens also.
EUTHYDEMUS
INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYDEMUS

This dialogue is remarkable amongst Plato's writings for the keenness and brilliance of its comic satire. In the main it is a relentless exposure of the "eristic" or disputatious side of the higher education which was fashionable at Athens towards the end of Socrates' life: the plot of the little drama is designed to ridicule the mischievous quibbles of two professors who are trying to captivate the mind of a handsome and promising youth. But at the same time it is plainly the work of an ardent teacher of philosophy, who is clearing the ground for the construction of what we now call a system of logic. The spurious argumentation of certain popular sophists had to be demolished before the Socratic method of "dialectic" could be exhibited in its full dignity and value.

There are good reasons for believing that the Euthydemus was written and published after the Protagoras and Meno, about 390 B.C.—some ten years after the death of Socrates, and not long before Plato founded the Academy in 387. Beneath all its mockery and laughter runs an eager tone of protest, which is only half muffled by the genial banter of Socrates. His manner towards the professors is throughout deferential and diffident, but the famous "irony" only serves to bring out
PLATO

in sharper relief the unscrupulous audacity of these sham philosophers. After allowing for some artistic selection and intensification, we may probably take it as a truthful picture of the actual Socrates in contrast with two attractive and successful educators of the day: but we cannot help perceiving also the zeal for true education which is steadily impelling Plato himself towards his high and responsible position in the intellectual world.

The form of the dialogue is notable in itself, for it is the only instance in Plato of a narrated conversation which is broken by remarks of the hearer (Crito) upon the story as told by Socrates, who discusses it with him. The account of the contest with the two sophists is moreover followed by some serious talk between Socrates and his friend about a person who stands half-way between philosophy and politics, and who has hastily spurned the former of these pursuits after listening to Euthydemos and Dionysodorus. Whether (as seems probable) the reference is to Isocrates, or to someone else, this epilogue serves to point the important moral that, despite the unworthiness of her ministers, Philosophy abides, ever undefiled, august and supreme. In relation to her, the half-way men are as worthless as her showy professors. It seems likely that Plato felt some apprehension lest the dramatic and literary skill with which he had represented, through the mouth of Socrates, the verbal antics of the two sophists had endangered the impression which he wished to leave of his master's and his own great interest in life—the right education of able and aspiring youth. Thus the whole piece is to be regarded as a comedy annotated, as it were,
INTRODUCTION TO THE *EUTHYDEMUS*

with a view to serious instruction, or an educational manifesto half concealed by lively scenes of satirical drama. Its art is entertaining in itself, and significant also for an understanding of the Aristophanic side of Plato's nature. Its real meaning, however, shows him treading in the steps of Socrates, and especially developing for his own ends his departed master's views on rhetoric and politics.

A useful modern edition of the *Euthydemus* by E. H. Gifford was published by the Clarendon Press, Oxford, in 1905.
ΕΤΟΥΔΗΜΟΣ

[Η ΕΡΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ ΑΝΑΤΡΕΠΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΕΤΟΥΔΗΜΟΣ, ΔΙΟΝΥΣΟΔΩΡΟΣ,
ΚΛΕΙΝΙΑΣ, ΚΤΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ

St. 1.
p. 271

κρι. Τίς ἂν, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὃς θέσε ἐν Λυκείῳ
dιελέγου; ἡ πολὺς ὑμᾶς ὁχλος περιευστήκει, ὡστ' ἔγνις βουλόμενος ἀκούειν προσελθὼν οὐδὲν οἷός τ' ἡ ἀκούσαι σαφές. ὑπερκύψας μέντοι κατείδουν, καὶ μοι ἐδοξεῖν εἶναι ξένοις τις, ὃ διελέγου. τίς ἂν;

ἐν. Πότερον καὶ ἐρωτᾶς, ὁ Κρίτων; οὐ γὰρ εἰς, ἀλλά δὺ ἦστην.

κρι. Ὁν μὲν ἔγω λέγω, ἐκ δεξιάς τρίτος ἀπὸ
Β σοῦ καθήστο. ἐν μέσῳ δ' ὑμῶν τὸ Ἀξιόχου μειρά-
κιον ἄν. καὶ μᾶλα πολὺ, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπιδεδωκέναι
μοι ἐδοξεῖν, καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου οὐ πολὺ τι τὴν ἡλικίαν
dιαφέρειν Κριτοβούλου. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος μὲν σκλη-
φρός, οὗτος δὲ προφερῆς καὶ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν
όψιν.

ἐν. Εὐθύδημος οὕτωσ ἔστιν, ὁ Κρίτων, ὅν ἐρωτᾶς· ὁ δὲ παρ' ἐμὲ καθήμενος ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς
ἀδελφὸς τούτου, Διονυσόδωρος· μετέχει δὲ καὶ
οὕτως τῶν λόγων.

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EUTHYDEMUS
[or ON DISPUTATION: refutative]

CHARACTERS

Crito, Socrates, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus,
Cleinias, Ctesippus

cri. Who was it, Socrates, that you were talking with yesterday at the Lyceum? Why, there was such a crowd standing about you that when I came up in the hope of listening I could hear nothing distinctly: still, by craning over I got a glimpse, and it appeared to me that it was a stranger with whom you were talking. Who was he?
soc. About which are you asking, Crito? There were two of them, not one.
cri. The man whom I mean was sitting next but one to you, on your right: between you was Axiochus’ boy; and he, Socrates, seemed to me to have grown a great deal, so as to look almost the same age as my Critobulus, who is rather puny; whereas this boy has come on finely, and has a noble air about him.
soc. Euthydemus is the person to whom you refer, Crito, and the one sitting on my left was his brother, Dionysodorus. He too takes part in our discussions.
κΡΙ. Οὐδέτερον γυνώσκω, ὥσ Ἔωκρατεσ. κανοὶ

κτις αὐν ὁντοι, ως ἐοικε, σοφισται ποδαποί; καὶ

τίς ἡ σοφία;

ςπ. Ὅντοι τὸ μὲν γένος, ὡς ἐγγυμαι, ἐντεῦθεν

ποθέν εἰσώ ἐκ Χίου, ἀπώκησαν δὲ ἐς Θούριοις,

φεύροντες δὲ ἐκείθεν πόλλ' ἦδη ἐτη περὶ τούς

τόπους διατρίβουσιν. ὁ δὲ σὺ ἐρωτᾶς τὴν σοφίαν

αὐτῶν, θαυμασία, ὡς Κρίτων. πασσοφοί ἀτεχνῶς τῶ

γε, οὐδ' ἦδη πρὸ τοῦ, ὃ τι εἰεν οἱ παγκρατισταί.

τούτω γὰρ ἐστον κομιδῇ παμμάχῳ ὦ κατὰ τῶ

Ἀκαρνάνε ἐγενέσθη τῷ παγκρατιστᾷ ἀδελφῷ.

D ἐκεῖνῳ μὲν γὰρ τῷ σώματι μόνον οἶοι τε μάχεσθαι

τούτῳ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ σώματι δευτεράτῳ

ἐστον καὶ μάχη, ἡ πάντων ἐστι κρατειν. ἐν

ὄπλοις γὰρ αυτῷ τὲ σοφῶ πάνυ μάχεσθαι καὶ

272 ἄλλον, ὃς ἄν διδῷ μισθόν, οἶος τε ποιῆσαι ἐπειτὰ

τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις μάχην κρατίστω καὶ

ἀγωνίσασθαι καὶ ἄλλον διδάξαι λέγειν τε καὶ

συγγράφεσθαι λόγους οἴους εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια.

πρὸ τοῦ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δεινω ἕστην μόνον, νῦν δὲ

tέλος ἐπιτεθήκατον παγκρατιστικὴ τέχνη. ἡ γὰρ

ἡν λοιπὴ αὐτῶν μάχη ἀργός, ταῦτην νῦν ἐξειργα-

σθον, ὥστε μηδ' ἂν ἐνα αὐτῶς οἶον τ' ἐναι μηδ'

ἀντάραι. οὕτω δεινῶ γεγόνατον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις

μάχεσθαι τε καὶ ἐξελέγχειν τὸ ἀεὶ λεγόμενον, ὅμοιος

B ἐάν τε ψεῦδος ἐάν τε ἀληθὲς ἧ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὡς

Κρίτων, ἐν νῷ ἔχω τοῖν ἀνδροῖν παραδοῦναι ἐμαυτὸν;

καὶ γὰρ φατον ἐν ὁλίγῳ χρόνῳ ποιῆσαι ἃν καὶ

ἄλλον ὄντων τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα δεινόν.

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1 The phrase refers especially to a very vigorous sport which combined wrestling and boxing.

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EUTHYDEMUS

cri. Neither of them is known to me, Socrates. A pair of fresh additions, I suppose, to our sophists. Where do they hail from, and what science do they profess?

soc. By birth I believe they belong to these parts, that is to say, Chios; they went out as colonists to Thurii, but have been exiled thence and have spent a good many years now in various parts of this country. As to what you ask of their profession, it is a wonderful one, Crito. These two men are absolutely omniscient: I never knew before what "all-round sportsmen"¹ were. They are a pair of regular all-round fighters—not in the style of the famous all-round athletes, the two brothers of Acarnania; they could fight with their bodies only. But these two, in the first place, are most formidable in body and in fight against all comers—for they are not only well skilled themselves in fighting under arms, but are able to impart that skill, for a fee, to another; and further, they are most competent also to fight the battle of the law-courts and teach others how to speak, or to have composed for them, such speeches as may win their suits. Formerly they had merely some ability for this; but now they have put the finishing touch to their skill as all-round sportsmen. The one feat of fighting yet unperformed by them they have now accomplished, so that nobody dares stand up to them for a moment; such a faculty they have acquired for wielding words as their weapons and confuting any argument as readily if it be true as if it be false. And so I, Crito, am minded to place myself in these two gentlemen's hands; for they say it would take them but a little while to make anyone else clever in just the same way.
κρι. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐ φοβή τὴν ἡλικίαν, μὴ ἣδη πρεσβύτερος ἦς;

ἐπὶ. "Ηκιστά γε, ὦ Κρίτων. ἵκανον τεκμήριον ἕχω καὶ παραμύθιον τοῦ μὴ φοβείσθαι. αὐτῶ γὰρ τούτω, ὡς ἐποὺς εἰπεῖν, γέροντε ὄντε ἡρξάσθην ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἰσ ἐγγυη ἐπιθυμῶ, τῆς C ἐριστικῆς· πέρυσιν ἦ προπέρυσιν οὐδέπω ἡστήν σοφώ. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐν μονὸν φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὖ ὅνειδος τοῖν ξένων περιάμαθω, ὥσπερ Κόννω τῷ Μητροβίον, τῷ κωδραστῇ, δἐ ἔμε διδάσκει ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν κιθαρίζεω· ὁρῶντες οὖν οἱ παῖδες οἱ συμφωνήται μου ἐμοῦ τε καταγελάσει καὶ τὸν Κόννων καλουσα γεροντοδιδάσκαλον. μὴ οὖν καὶ τοῖν ξένων τῖς ταῦτο τοῖτο ὅνειδίσῃ· οἱ δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἵσως φοβοῦμενοι τάχα με οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιν προσδέξασθαι. ἐγὼ δ', ὦ Κρίτων, ἐκείσε μὲν ἀλλὸς πέπεικα συμμαθητᾶς μοι φοιτῶν πρεσβύτας,

D ἐνταῦθα δὲ γε ἐτέρους πειράσομαι πείθεων. καὶ σὺ τί οὐ συμφωνᾶς; ὡς1 δὲ δέλεαρ αὐτοῖς ἀξομεν τοὺς σοὺς νειές· ἐφίεμενοι γὰρ ἐκεῖνων οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ ἤμας παιδεύσουσιν.

κρι. 'Αλλ' οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐὰν γε σοι δοκῇ. πρῶτον δὲ μοι διήγησαι τὴν σοφίαν τοῖν ἀνδρῶν τίς ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰδῶ ὅ τι καὶ μαθησόμεθα.

ἐπ. Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις ἀκούσων· ὡς οὖν ἂν ἔχομι γε εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὐ προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάνω καὶ προσεῖχον καὶ μέμνημαι, καὶ σοι πειρά-Ε σομαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀπαντα διηγήσασθαι. κατὰ θεοῦ

1 So Winckelmann: σὺ τί ποιν συμφωνῆτα ἵσωs mss.

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cri. What, Socrates! Are you not afraid, at your time of life, that you may be too old for that now?

soc. Not at all, Crito: I have enough proof and reassurance to the contrary. These same two persons were little less than old men at the time of their taking up this science, which I desire to have, of disputation. Last year, or the year before, they were as yet without their science. The only thing I am afraid of is that I may bring the same disgrace upon our two visitors as upon Connus, son of Metrobius, the harper, who is still trying to teach me the harp; so that the boys who go to his lessons with me make fun of me and call Connus "the gaffers' master." This makes me fear that someone may make the same reproach to the two strangers; and, for aught I know, their dread of this very thing may make them unwilling to accept me. So, Crito, just as in the other case I have persuaded some elderly men to come and have lessons with me, in this affair I am going to try and persuade another set. Now you, I am sure, will come with me to school; and we will take your sons as a bait to entice them, for I have no doubt that the attraction of these young fellows will make them include us also in the class.

cri. I have no objection, Socrates, if you think fit to do so. But first you must explain to me what is the science these men profess, that I may know what it is we are going to learn.

soc. You shall be told at once; for I cannot plead that I did not give them my attention, since I not only attended closely but remember and will try to expound the whole thing from the beginning.
This gymnasion (the Lyceum) was a public one, open to persons of all ages, and was a common resort of Socrates and the sophists.

Socrates believed that his conduct was occasionally
By some providence I chanced to be sitting in the place where you saw me, in the undressing-room,\(^1\) alone, and was just intending to get up and go; but the moment I did so, there came my wonted spiritual sign.\(^2\) So I sat down again, and after a little while these two persons entered—Euthydemus and Dionysodorus—and accompanying them, quite a number, as it seemed to me, of their pupils: the two men came in and began walking round inside the cloister.\(^3\) Hardly had they taken two or three turns, when in stepped Cleinias, who you say has come on so much, and you are right: behind him was a whole troop of lovers, and among them Ctesippus, a young fellow from Paeania, of gentle birth and breeding, except for a certain insolence of youth. So when Cleinias as he entered caught sight of me sitting there alone, he came straight across and sat beside me on my right, just as you say. Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, when they saw him, stood at first talking with each other, and casting an occasional glance at us—for my attention was fixed on them—but then one of them, Euthydemus, took a seat by the youth, and the other next to me on my left; the rest, where each happened to find one.

So I greeted the two brothers, as not having seen them for some time; after that I said to Cleinias: My dear Cleinias, these two men, you know, are skilled not in little things, but in great. For they guided by a spiritual voice or sign peculiar to himself. By Plato's account it was always negative, but the present instance shows how Xenophon might have some reason for saying that it was sometimes positive.

\(^3\) The cloister ran round the central open court, and was reached by passing through the undressing-room.

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γάρ περὶ τῶν πόλεμον πάντα ἐπιστασθον, ὡσα δεὶ
tῶν μέλλοντα στρατηγῶν ἔσεσθαι, τάς τε τάξεις
cαὶ τὰς ἡγεμονίας τῶν στρατοπεδῶν καὶ ὡσα ἐν
ὅπλωι μάχεσθαι διδακτέον: οἶω τε ἐδ καὶ πούσαι
dυνατῶν εἶναι αὐτῶν αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικα-
στηρίοις, ἀν τις αὐτῶν ἀδικῇ. εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα
κατεφρονήθην ὑπ’ αὐτῶν: ἐγελασάτην οὖν ἀμφω
βλέφαντε εἰς ἄλληλω, καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος εἶπεν:
Οὔτοι ἔτι ταῦτα, ὁ Σώκρατες, σπουδάζομεν, ἀλλὰ
παρέργους αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα. καγώ θαυμάσασ
εἶπον. Καλὸν ἂν τι τὸ ἔργον ὑμῶν εἶ, εἰ τηλι-
καῦτα πράγματα πάρεργα ὑμῖν τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ
πρὸς θεῶν εἴπετόν μοι, τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν.
'Αρετήν, ἕφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, οἴμεθα οἰω τ’ εἶναι
παραδοῦναι κάλλιστ’ ἄνθρωποι καὶ τάχιστα.

Ε Ὁ Ζεῦ, οἶον, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, λέγετον πράγμα: πόθεν
tοῦτο τὸ ἔρμαιον εὐρέτην; ἔγω δὲ περὶ ὑμῶν
dιενοούμην ἔτι, ὥσπερ νῦν ἄδη ἔλεγον, ὡς τὸ πολὺ
tοῦτο δευοῦν ὄντων, ἐν ὑπόλοις μάχεσθαί, καὶ ταῦτ’
ἔλεγον περὶ σφῶν· ὅτε γὰρ τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδή-
μησάτην, τοῦτο μέμνημαι σφῶ ἐπαγγελλομένων.
εἰ δὲ νῦν ἄληθῶς ταῦτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐχεῖν,
ἔλεω ἔητον· ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ἔγνω σφῶ ὅσπερ θεῶ
προσαγορεῦω, συγγνώμην δεόμενος ἔχειν μοι τῶν
ἐμπροσθεν εἰρήμενων. ἄλλ’ ὀράτου, ὁ Εὐθύδημε
τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε, εἰ ἄληθῇ ἐλέγετον· ὑπὸ γὰρ
τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐπαγγέλματος οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν
ἀπίστευν.

'Αλλ’ εὐ ὑσθι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐφατον, τοῦτο
οὕτως ἔχων.

Μακαρίζω ἃρ’ ὑμᾶς ἔγνω τοῦ κτήματος πολὺ

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understand all about war, that is, as much as is needful for him who is to be a good general; both the tactics and the strategy of armies, and all the teaching of troops under arms; and they can also enable one to get redress in the law courts for a wrong that one may have suffered.

When I had said this, I saw they despised me for it, and they both laughed, looking at each other; then Euthydemus said: No, no, Socrates, we do not make those matters our business now; we deal with them as diversions.

At this I wondered and said: Your business must be a fine one, if such great matters are indeed diversions to you; so I beseech you, tell me what this fine business is.

Virtue, Socrates, he replied, is what we deem ourselves able to purvey in a pre-eminently excellent and speedy manner.

Good heavens, I exclaimed, a mighty affair indeed! Where did you have the luck to pick it up? I was still considering you, as I remarked just now, to be chiefly skilled in fighting under arms, and so spoke of you in those terms: for when you visited our city before, this, I recollect, was the profession you made. But if you now in truth possess this other knowledge, have mercy—you see I address you just as though you were a couple of gods, beseeching you to forgive my former remarks. But make sure, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, that you spoke the truth: for the vastness of your promise gives me some excuse for disbelieving.

You may be sure, Socrates, they replied, it is as we say.

Then I congratulate you on your acquisition far
μᾶλλον ἡ μέγαν βασιλέα τῆς ἀρχῆς· τοσοῦν δὲ μοι εἴπετον, εἰ ἐν νῷ ἔχετον ἐπιδεικνύναι ταύτην τῆν σοφίαν, ἡ πῶς σφῶν βεβούλευται.

'Επ' αὐτὸ γε τοῦτο πάρεσμεν, ὃ Σῶκρατες, ὥς B ἐπιδείξοντε καὶ διδάξοντε, ἐάν τις ἐθέλῃ μανθάνειν. 'Αλλ' ὅτι μὲν ἐθελήσουσιν ἀπαντεῖν οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες, ἐγὼ ύμῖν ἐγγυώμαι, πρῶτος μὲν ἔγὼ, ἐπειτα δὲ Κλεινίας οὗτοι, πρὸς δ' ἢμῖν Κτήσιππός τε ὅδε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὕτως, ἤν δ' ἔγώ δεικνύς αὐτῷ τοὺς ἐραστὰς τοὺς Κλεινίου· οἰ δὲ ἐτύγχανον ἡμᾶς ήδη περιστάμενοι. ὃ γὰρ Κτήσιππος ἐτυχεί χόρρω καθεξόμενος τοῦ Κλεινίου, ἔμοι δοκεῖν· ὡς δ' ἐτύγχανεν ὁ Ἐυθύδημος ἐμοὶ διαλεγόμενος προ- nενεκὼς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν, ἐν μέσῳ οὗτος ύμῶν τοῦ Κλεινίου ἐπεσκότε τῷ Κτήσιππῷ τῆς θέας· βου- λόμενος τε οὖν θεασάσθαι ὁ Κτήσιππος τὰ παιδικά καὶ ἅμα φιλήκοος ἕν ἀναπηδήσας πρῶτος προσ- ἐστη ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ καταντικρύ· οὕτως οὖν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐκείνον ἱδόντες περιστρήσαν ἡμᾶς, οἱ τε τοῦ Κλεινίου ἐρασταὶ καὶ οἱ τοῦ Ἐυθύδημου τε καὶ Διονυσοδώρου ἑταῖροι. τούτους δὴ ἔγώ δεικνύς ἐλεγον τῷ Ἐυθύδημῳ, ὅτι πάντες ἔτοιμοι εἶν μανθάνειν· οὶ τε οὗν Κτήσιππος συνέφη μάλα D προβύμως καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ ἐκέλευον αὐτῷ κοινῇ πάντες ἐπιδείξοσθαι τὴν δύναμιν τῆς σοφίας.

Εἶπον οὖν ἔγω, Ὅ Ἐυθύδημε καὶ Διονυσοδώρω, πάντες μὲν οὖν παντὶ τρόπῳ καὶ τούτως χαρίσασθον καὶ ἐμοῦ ἑνεκα ἐπιδείξατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα δὴλον ὅτι οὐκ ὄλγον ἔργον ἐπιδείξαι· τὸδε δὲ μοι εἴπετον, πότερον πεπεισμένον ἦδη, ὡς χρῆ παρ' ύμῶν μανθάνειν, δύναιος' αὖ ἀγαθὸν ποιῆσαι ἄνδρα E μόνον, ἥ καὶ ἐκείνον τὸν μῆτω πεπεισμένον διὰ τὸ 388
more than I do the great king on his empire: only tell me whether you intend to exhibit this science of yours, or what you have determined to do.

We are here for the very purpose, Socrates, of exhibiting and expounding it to anyone who wishes to learn.

Well, I guarantee that all who do not possess it will wish to—myself to begin with, then Cleinias here and, besides us, Ctesippus and all these others, I said, showing him the lovers of Cleinias, who were by this time standing about us. For Ctesippus, as it happened, was sitting some way from Cleinias, I noticed; and by chance, as Euthydemus leant forward in talking to me he obscured Ctesippus’s view of Cleinias, who was between us. Then Ctesippus, desiring to gaze on his favourite and being also an eager listener, led the way by jumping up and placing himself opposite us; and this made the others, on seeing what he did, stand around us, both Cleinias’s lovers and the followers of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. Pointing to these, I told Euthydemus that they were all ready to learn; to which Ctesippus assented with great eagerness, and so did the rest; and they all joined in urging the two men to exhibit the power of their wisdom.

On this I remarked: My good Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, you must do your very best to gratify my friends and, for my sake also, to give us an exhibition. To do it in full, of course, would obviously be a lengthy performance: but tell me one thing—will you be able to make a good man of him only who is already convinced that he should learn of you, or of him also who is not yet so convinced, owing to
μὴ ὁμοσθαλί ὅλως τὸ πράγμα τὴν ἀρέτην μαθητῶν ἐκεῖνοι ἦς μὴ σφῶ ἐκεῖνοι αὐτῶν δίδασκαλῶν; φέρε, καὶ τὸν οὖν ἐξῆς ἔχοντα τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης ἔργον πείσαι, ὡς καὶ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρέτη καὶ οὗτοι ὑμεῖς ἔστε, παρ’ ὃν ἂν κάλλιστά τις αὐτὸ μάθου, ἡ ἄλλης;
Ταύτης μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, τῆς αὐτῆς, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ Διονυσίδωρος.
Τὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλων τὴν ἐπίδειξιν ἦμῖν, ἐφην, εἰσαὐθίς ἀπόθεσθον, τοῦτο δ’ αὐτὸ ἐπιδειξαθον’
tουτοί τὸν νεανίσκον πείσατον, ὡς χρῆ φιλοσο-

φεῖν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελείσθαι, καὶ χαριείσθον ἐμοὶ
tε καὶ τούτωσι πᾶσι. συμβέβηκε γάρ τι τοιοῦτον
tῷ μειράκιῳ τούτῳ ἐγὼ τε καὶ οἶδε πάντες
τυγχάνομεν ἐπιθυμοῦντες ὡς βέλτιστον αὐτὸν
gενέσθαι. ἔστι δὲ οὗτος Ἀξιόχου μὲν νῦς τοῦ
Β Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῦ παλαιοῦ, αὐτανεψιοὺς δὲ τοῦ
nῦν οὗτος Ἀλκιβιάδου ὄνομα δ’ αὐτῶ Κλεινίας.
ἔστι δὲ νέος: φοβούμεθα δὴ περὶ αὐτῶ, οἷον εἰκὸς
περὶ νέως, μή τις φθη ἡμᾶς ἐπ’ ἄλλο τι ἐπιτήδευμα
τρέψας τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ διαφθείρῃ. σφῶ οὖν ἴκε

τον εἰς κάλλιστον ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ τι διαφέρει ἡμῖν,
λάβετον πείραν τοῦ μειράκιον καὶ διαλέχθητον
ἐναντίον ἡμῶν.
Εἰπόντος οὖν ἐμοὶ σχεδόν τι αὕτα ταῦτα ὁ
Εὐθύδημος ἀμα ἄνδρεῖως τε καὶ θαρραλέως, Ἀλλ’
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an absolute disbelief that virtue is a thing that can be learnt or that you are teachers of it? Come now, is it the business of this same art to persuade such a man that virtue is teachable and that you are the men of whom one may best learn it, or does this need some other art?

No, this same one can do it, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.

Then you two, Dionysodorus, I said, would be the best persons now on earth to incite one to the pursuit of knowledge and the practice of virtue?

We think so, at least, Socrates.

Well then, please defer the display of all the rest to some other occasion, I said, and exhibit this one thing. You are to persuade this young fellow here that he ought to ensue wisdom and practise virtue, and so you will oblige both me and all these present. This youth happens to be in just the sort of condition I speak of; and I and all of us here are at this moment anxious for him to become as good as possible. He is the son of Axiochus, son of the former Alcibiades,¹ and is own cousin to the Alcibiades that now is: his name is Cleinias. He is young; and so we have fears for him, as well one may for a young man, lest someone forestall us and turn his inclination to some other course of life, and so corrupt him. Hence your arrival now is most happy. Come now, if it is all the same to you, make trial of the lad and talk with him in our presence.

When I had thus spoken, in almost these very words, Euthydemus answered in a tone both manly

¹ i.e. the famous Alcibiades, who died in 404 B.C. at the age of 44. The supposed time of this discussion must be a year or two before Socrates’ death (399 B.C.).
PLATO

κ οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ὥστε καὶ μόνον ἐθέλη ἄποκρίνεσθαι ὃ νεανίσκος.

'Αλλὰ μὲν δή, ἐφη ἐγὼ, τούτῳ γε καὶ εἴθισται: θαμὰ γὰρ αὐτῷ οἴδε προσώποι πολλὰ ἐρωτώσι τε καὶ διαλέγονται, ὡστε ἐπιεικῶς θαρρεῖ τὸ ἀποκρίνασθαι.

Τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα, ὧς Κρίτων, πῶς ἂν καλῶς σοι διηγησάμην; οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸν τὸ ἔργον, δύναιν ἀναλαβεῖν διεξὸντα σοφίαν ἁμήχανον ὅσην.

Ἔστ' ἔγωγε, καθάπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ, δέομαι ἀρχός-μενος τῆς διηγήσεως Μοῦσας τε καὶ Μνήμην ἐπικαλεῖσθαι. ἦρξατο δ' οὖν ἐνθέδε ποθὲν ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὡς ἔγωμαι. Ὡ Κλεινία, πότεροι εἰσὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μανθάνοντες, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἁμαθεῖς;

Καὶ τὸ μειράκιον, ἀτε μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐρωτήματος, ἤρυθρίασε τε καὶ ἀπορησάς ἐβλεπεν εἰς ἐμὲ· καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς αὐτὸν τεθορυβημένον, Θάρρει, ἂν δ' ἐγὼ, ὥς Κλεινία, καὶ ἀπόκριναι ἀνδρείως,

Ε ὁπότερά σοι φαίνεται ὅσως γὰρ τοι ὁφελεί τὴν μεγίστην ὁφέλειαν.

Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος προσκύψας μοι σμικρὸν πρὸς τὸ οὖς, πάνιν μειδίας τῷ προσώπῳ, Καὶ μὴν, ἐφη, σοι, ὥς Σώκρατες, προλέγω, ὅτι ὁπότερ' ἂν ἄποκρίνηται τὸ μειράκιον, ἐξελεγχθῆς τετα.

Καὶ αὐτοῦ μεταξὺ ταῦτα λέγοντος ὃ Κλεινίας ἔτυχεν ἄποκρινάμενος, ὡστε οὐδὲ παρακελεύσασθαι 276 μοι ἐξεγένετο εὐλαβηθῆναι τῷ μειρακίῳ, ἄλλῃ ἄπεκρίνατο, ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ εἶν οἱ μανθάνοντες.

Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, Καλεῖς δὲ τινας, ἐφη, διδασκάλους, ἢ οὐ; Ὡμολογεῖ. Οὐκοῦν τῶν μαν-

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and dashing: Oh, it is all the same to us, Socrates, provided the youth is willing to answer us.

Why, in fact, I said, that is just what he is used to: these people here are constantly coming to him and asking him a number of questions and debating with him, so he is a fairly fearless answerer.

What ensued, Crito, how am I to relate in proper style? For no slight matter it is to be able to recall in description such enormous knowledge as theirs. Consequently, like the poets, I must needs begin my narrative with an invocation of the Muses and Memory. Well, Euthydemus set to work, so far as I remember, in terms very much the same as these: Cleinias, which sort of men are the learners, the wise or the foolish?

At this the young man, feeling the embarrassment of the question, blushed and glanced at me in his helplessness. So I, perceiving his confusion, said: Have no fear, Cleinias; answer bravely, whichever you think it is: for perchance he is doing you the greatest service in the world.

Meanwhile Dionysodorus leant over a little to me, with a broad smile on his face, and whispered in my ear: Let me tell you, Socrates, beforehand that, whichever way the lad answers, he will be confuted.

While he was saying this, Cleinias made his reply, so that I was unable even to advise the boy to be wary: he replied that it was the wise who were the learners.

Then Euthydemus asked: And are there persons whom you call teachers, or not?

He agreed that there were.
θανόντων οἱ διδάσκαλοι διδάσκαλοι εἶσιν, ὦσπερ ὁ κιθαριστὴς καὶ ὁ γραμματιστὴς διδάσκαλοι δήποτε ἦσαν σοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παῖδων, ὡμεῖς δὲ μαθηταί; Συνέφη. Ἀλλο τι οὖν, ἡνίκα ἐμανθάνετε, οὕτω ἢπίστασθε ταῦτα, ἃ ἐμανθάνετε;

B Οὐκ ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν σοφοὶ ἦτε, ὅτε ταῦτα οὐκ ἢπίστασθε; Οὔ δήτα, ἃ δ' ὃς. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ σοφοὶ, ἀμαθεῖς; Πάνω γε. Ὡμεῖς ἄρα μανθάνοντες ἃ οὐκ ἢπίστασθε, ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες ἐμανθάνετε. ἔσπενευσε τὸ μειράκιον. Οἱ ἀμαθεῖς ἄρα μανθάνουσιν, ὡς Κλεινία, ἀλλ' οὖν οἱ σοφοὶ, ἃς σὺ οἶει.

Ταῦτ' οὖν εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ, ὦσπερ ὑπὸ διδασκάλου χορὸς ἀποσημήναντος, ἀμα ἀνεθορύβησάν τε καὶ ἐγέλασαν οἱ ἔπομενοι ἐκεῖνοι μετὰ τοῦ Διονυσο-

C δύρου τε καὶ Εὐθυδήμου· καὶ πρὶν ἀναπενύσαι καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ τὸ μειράκιον, ἐκδεξάμενος ὁ Διονυσόδωρος. Τί δὲ, ὡς Κλεινία, ἔφη, ὡς ὁπότε ἀποστοματίζοι οὕτω ὁ γραμματιστὴς, πότεροι ἐμάνθανον τῶν παῖδων τὰ ἀποστοματιζόμενα, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς; Οἱ σοφοὶ, ἔφη ὁ Κλεινίας. Οἱ σοφοὶ ἄρα μανθάνουσιν, ἀλλ' οὖν οἱ ἀμαθεῖς, καὶ οὐκ εὖ σὺ ἁρτὶ Εὐθυδήμῳ ἀπεκρίνω.

D Ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ πάνυ ἐγέλασαν τε καὶ ἑθορύβησαν οἱ ἑρασται τοῖν ἀνδροῖν, ἀγασθέντες τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῖν: οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ἡμεῖς ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσιωπώμεν. γνοὺς δὲ ἡμᾶς ὁ Εὐθυδήμος ἐκ- 1 εὖ σὺ Burnet: εὐθὺς mss.

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EUTHYDEMUS

And the teachers of the learners are teachers in the same way as your lute-master and your writing-master, I suppose, were teachers of you and the other boys, while you were pupils?

He assented.

Now, of course, when you were learning, you did not yet know the things you were learning?

No, he said.

So were you wise, when you did not know those things?

No, to be sure, he said.

Then if not wise, foolish?

Certainly.

So when you learnt what you did not know, you learnt while being foolish.

To this the lad nodded assent.

Hence it is the foolish who learn, Cleinias, and not the wise, as you suppose.

When he had thus spoken, all those followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus raised a cheer and a laugh, like a chorus at the signal of their director; and before the boy could fairly and fully recover his breath Dionysodorus took up the cudgels and said: Well now, Cleinias, whenever your writing-master dictated from memory, which of the boys learnt the piece recited, the wise or the foolish?

The wise, said Cleinias.

So it is the wise who learn, and not the foolish: hence the answer you gave just now to Euthydemus was a bad one.

Thereupon arose a great deal of laughter and loud applause from the pair's adorers, in admiration of their cleverness; while we on our side were dismayed and held our peace. Then Euthydemus, observing
πεπληγμένους, ὡς ἔτη μᾶλλον θαυμάζομεν αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἀνέι τὸ μειράκιον, ἄλλ᾽ ἦρωτα, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὀρχησταὶ, διπλὰ ἔστρεφε τὰ ἐρωτήματα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔφη. Πότερον γὰρ οἱ μανθάνοντες μανθάνουσιν ἢ ἐπίστανται ἢ ὁ μὴ ἐπίστανται;

Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος πάλιν μικρὸν πρὸς μὲ ψι-Ε θυρίσας, Καὶ τούτ᾽, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔτερον τουῦτον, οἶνον τὸ πρότερον.

"Ὤ Ζεῦ, ἔφην ἐγὼ, ἢ μὴ καὶ τὸ πρότερόν γε καλὸν ὑμῖν ἐφάνη τὸ ἐρώτημα.

Πάντ᾽, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα ἥμεις ἐρωτῶ-μεν ἄφυκτα.

Τοιγάρτου, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, δοκεῖτε μοι εὐδοκιμεῖν παρὰ τοῖς μαθηταῖς.

Έν δὲ τούτῳ ὁ μὲν Κλεινίας τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι μανθάνοιεν οἱ μανθάνοντες ἢ οὐκ ἐπίσταντο: ὁ δὲ ἦρετο αὐτῶν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν 277 ὄντερ τὸ πρότερον. Τί δὲ; ἢ δ᾽ ὃς, οὐκ ἐπίστασαι σὺ γράμματα; Ναὶ, ἔφη. Οὔκοιν ἄπαντα; Ὄμολογει. Ὄταν οὖν τις ἀποστοματιζῇ στιχοῖν, σὺ γράμματα ἀποστοματίζει; Ὄμολογει. Οὔκοιν ὅν τι σὺ ἐπίστασαι, ἔφη, ἀποστοματίζει, εἴτε πάντα ἐπίστασαι; Καὶ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖ. Τί οὖν; ἢ δ᾽ ὃς, ἄρα σὺ μανθάνεις ἀττ᾽ ἄν ἀπο-ποστοματιζῇ τις, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος γράμματα μανθάνει; Οὐκ, ἄλλ᾽, ἢ δ᾽ ὃς, μανθάνω. Οὔκοιν ἄ ἐπίστασαι, ἔφη, μανθάνεις, εἴ πέρ γε ἄπαντα 396
our dismay, and seeking to astonish us still further, would not let the boy go, but went on questioning him and, like a skilful dancer, gave a twofold twist to his questions on the same point: Now, do the learners learn what they know, he asked, or what they do not?

Then Dionysodorus whispered to me again softly: Here comes a second one, Socrates, just like the first.

Heavens! I replied: surely the first question served you well enough.

All our questions, Socrates, he said, are like that; they leave no escape.

And consequently, as it seems to me, I remarked, you have this high repute among your disciples.

Meanwhile Cleinias answered Euthydemus, that learners learnt what they did not know; so he had to meet the same course of questions as before: Well then, asked the other, do you not know your letters?

Yes, he said.

All of them?

He admitted it.

Now when anyone dictates some piece or other, does he not dictate letters?

He admitted it.

And he dictates things of which you know something, since you know all of them?

He admitted this too.

Well now, said the other, surely you do not learn whatever such a person dictates; it is rather he who does not know his letters that learns?

No, he replied; I learn.

Then you learn what you know, since you know all your letters.
PLATO

Β τὰ γράμματα ἐπίστασαι. Ὅμολογησεν. Οὔκ ἄρα ὅρθως ἀπεκρίνω, ἔφη.

Καὶ οὖπω σφόδρα τι ταῦτα εἴρητο τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ, καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ὁσπερ σφαίραν ἐκδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον πάλιν ἐστοχάζετο τοῦ μειράκιον, καὶ εἶπεν· Ἐξαπατᾷ σε Εὐθύδημος, ὁ Κλεινία. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τὸ μανθάνειν οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἐστὶ λαμβάνειν τούτων, οὐ ᾗν τις μανθάνῃ; Ὅμολογει ὁ Κλεινίας. Τὸ δ' ἐπίστασθαι, ἢ δ' ὡς, ἀλλο τι ἢ ἕχειν ἐπιστήμην ἥδη ἐστίν; Συνέφη. Τὸ ἄρα

C μὴ ἐπίστασθαι μήπω ἕχειν ἐπιστήμην ἐστίν; Ὅμολογει αὐτῷ. Πότερον οὖν εἰσὶν οἱ λαμβάνοντες ὅτιοιν οἱ ἔχοντες ἥδη ἢ οἰ ᾗν μή; Οἱ ἃν μὴ ἔχουσιν. Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογήκας εἶναι τούτων καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους, τῶν μή ἔχοντων; Κατένευσε. Τῶν λαμβανόντων ἃρ' εἰσίν οἱ μανθάνοντες, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν ἔχοντων; Συνέφη. Οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι ἄρα, ἔφη, μανθάνουσιν, ὁ Κλεινία, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι.

"Επὶ δὴ ἐπὶ τὸ τρίτον καταβαλῶν ὁσπερ πάλαισμα ὠρμα ὁ Εὐθύδημος τὸν νεανίσκον· καὶ

D ἐγὼ γνοὺς βαπτιζόμενον τὸ μειράκιον, βουλόμενος ἀναπαύσαι αὐτὸ, μὴ ἡμῖν ἀποδειλάσεις, παραμυθούμενος εἶπον. Ὅ Κλεινία, μὴ θαύμαζε, εἰ σοι φαίνονται ἄθετες οἱ λόγοι. ἵσως γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνει, οἶον ποιεῖτον τῷ ἔνως περὶ σὲ· ποιεῖτον

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He agreed.
So your answer was not correct, he said.
The last word was hardly out of Euthydemus' mouth when Dionysodorus caught, as it were, the ball of the argument and, aiming at the boy again, said: Euthydemus is deceiving you, Cleinias. Tell me, is not learning the reception of knowledge of that which one learns?
Cleinias agreed.
And is not knowing, he went on, just having knowledge at the time?
He assented.
So that not knowing is not yet having knowledge?
He agreed with him.
Then are those who receive anything those who have it already, or those who have it not?
Those who have it not.
And you have admitted that those who do not know belong also to this class of those who have it not?
He nodded assent.
And the learners belong to the class of the receiving and not to that of the having?
He agreed.
Hence it is those who do not know that learn, Cleinias, and not those who know.
Euthydemus was proceeding to press the youth for the third fall, when I, perceiving the lad was going under, and wishing to give him some breathing-space lest he should shame us by losing heart, encouraged him with these words: Cleinias, do not be surprised that these arguments seem strange to you; for perhaps you do not discern what our two visitors are doing to you. They are acting just like
δὲ ταύτων, ὅπερ οἱ ἐν τῇ τελετῇ τῶν Κορυβάντων, ὅταν τὴν θρόνωσιν ποιῶσιν περὶ τούτον, ὅν ἂν μέλλωσιν τελεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ χορεία τίς ἐστὶ καὶ παιδία, εἰ ἄρα καὶ τετέλεσαί καὶ νῦν τούτω

Ε  οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ χορεύετον περὶ σὲ καὶ οἶδον ὀρχεῖσθον παίζοντε, ὡς μετὰ τούτῳ τελοῦντε. νῦν οὖν νόμισον τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἱερῶν ἀκούειν τῶν σοφιστικῶν. πρῶτον γὰρ, ὡς φησὶ Πρόδικος, περὶ ὁνομάτων ὀρθότητος μαθεῖν δεῖ· ὅ δὲ καὶ ἐνδεικνυοθὸν σοι τῷ ἔξον, ὅτι οὐκ ἦδεισθα τὸ μανθάνειν ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ τοιῷδε, ὅταν τις ἔξ ἀρχῆς μηδεμίαν ἔχων ἐπιστήμην περὶ πράγματός τινος ἔπειτα ὑστερον αὐτοῦ λαμβάνῃ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, καλοῦσι δὲ ταῦτο τούτῳ καὶ ἑπειδὰν ἔχων ἡδὴ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ταύτη τῇ ἐπιστήμη ταὐτόν τοῦτο πράγμα ἐπισκόπη ἡ πραττόμενον ἡ λεγόμενον. μᾶλλον μὲν αὐτὸ ἔσχισθαι καλοῦσιν ἡ μανθάνειν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ μανθάνειν· σὲ δὲ τούτῳ, ὡς οὖν ἔπειτα ἐνδεικνυνταί, διαλέλθησε, ταὐτὸ ὁνομα ἐπ' ἄνθρωποι ἐναντίως ἔχουσι κείμενον, ἐπὶ τῷ τε εἰδότι καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μή· παραπλήσιον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ ἔρωτήματι, ἐν ζ

Β ἡρωτών σε, πότερα μανθάνονσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ ἐπίστανται, ἢ ἡ μή. ταῦτα δὴ τῶν μαθημάτων παιδία ἐστὶ· διὸ καὶ φημι ἐγὼ σοι τούτους προσπαίζειν· παιδίαν δὲ λέγω διὰ ταύτα, ὅτι, εἰ καὶ πολλά τις ἡ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα μάθοι, τὰ μὲν πράγματα οὐδὲν ἂν μᾶλλον εἰδείη τῇ ἔχει, προσ-
EUTHYDEMUS

the celebrants of the Corybantic rites, when they perform the enthronement of the person whom they are about to initiate. There, as you know, if you have been through it, they have dancing and merry-making; so here these two are merely dancing about you and performing their sportive gambols with a view to your subsequent initiation. You must now, accordingly, suppose you are listening to the first part of the professorial mysteries. First of all, as Prodicus says, you have to learn about the correct use of words—the very point that our two visitors are making plain to you, namely, that you were unaware that learning is the name which people apply on the one hand to the case of a man who, having originally no knowledge about some matter, in course of time receives such knowledge; and on the other hand the same word is applied when, having the knowledge already, he uses that knowledge for the investigation of the same matter whether occurring in action or in speech. It is true that they tend rather to call it understanding than learning, but occasionally they call it learning too; and this point, as our friends are demonstrating, has escaped your notice—how the same word is used for people who are in the opposite conditions of knowing and not knowing. A similar point underlay the second question, where they asked you whether people learn what they know, or what they do not. Such things are the sport of the sciences—and that is why I tell you these men are making game of you; I call it sport because, although one were to learn many or even all of such tricks, one would be not a whit the wiser as to the true state of the matters in hand, but only able to make game
παίξειν δὲ οἴος τ’ ἂν εἰς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων διαφορὰν ὑποσκελίζων καὶ ἀνατρέπων, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ σκολύθρια τῶν μελλόντων C καθιζήσομαι ὑποστῶντες χαίρουσι καὶ γελῶσιν, ἐπειδὰν ἰδίως ὑπτιον ἀνατετραμένον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν σοι παρὰ τούτων νόμιζε παιδιάν γεγονέναι. τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα δῆλον ὅτι τούτῳ γέ σοι αὐτῷ τὰ σπουδαία ἐνδείξεσθον, καὶ ἐγὼ υφηγήσομαι αὐτοῖν ἢ μου ὑπέσχοντο ἀποδώσειν. ἐφάτην γὰρ ἐπιδείξεσθαι1 τὴν προτρεπτικὴν σοφίαν. νῦν δὲ, μοι δοκεῖ, ψηθήτην πρότερον δεῖν παίσαι πρὸς σέ. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, ὥ Ἐὐθύδημε τε καὶ Διονυσίδωρε, D πεπαίσθω τε τὸ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἵσως ἰκανῶς ἔχειν τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπιδείξατον προτρέποντες τὸ μειράκιον, ὅπως χρῆ σοφίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμεληθῆναι. πρότερον δ’ ἐγὼ σφῶν ἐνδείξομαι, οἴον αὐτὸ ὑπολαμβάνω καὶ οἷον αὐτοῦ ἐπιθυμῶ ἀκούσαι. ἐὰν οὖν δόξῳ ὑμῖν ἰδιωτικῶς τε καὶ γελοίως αὐτὸ ποιεῖν, μὴ μοι καταγελάτε ὑπὸ προδημίας γὰρ E τοῦ ἀκούσαι τῆς υμετέρας σοφίας τολμήσω ἀποτελεσματικῶς ἐναντίον ὑμῶν. ἀνάγκασθον οὖν ἀγελαστὶ ἀκούσατε αὐτοὶ τε καὶ οἱ μαθηταὶ ὑμῶν· σὺ δὲ μοι, ὥ παι Ἀξίοχον, ἀπόκρυναι.

Ἀρὰ γε πάντες ἀνθρώποι βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν; ἦ τοῦτο μὲν ἐρώτημα ὅν νῦν δὴ ἐφοβοῦμην ἐν τῶν καταγελάστων; ἀνόητον γὰρ δῆλον καὶ τὸ ἐρωτᾶν τὰ τοιαῦτα· τίς γὰρ οὐ βουλέται ἐὖ πράττειν; Οὐδεὶς ὡστὶς οὐκ, ἐφη ὁ Κλεινίας. Εἰςεν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ· τὸ δὴ μετὰ τούτο, ἐπειδὴ βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν, πῶς ἂν εὖ πράττομεν; ἀρ ὅν εἰ

1 ἐπιδείξασθαι mss.: ἐπιδείξασθαι Stephanus.
of people, thanks to the difference in the sense of the words, by tripping them up and overturning them; just as those who slyly pull stools away from persons who are about to sit down make merry and laugh when they see one sprawling on one’s back. So far, then, you are to regard these gentlemen’s treatment of you as mere play: but after this they will doubtless display to you their own serious object, while I shall keep them on the track and see that they fulfil the promise they gave me. They said they would exhibit their skill in exhortation; but instead, I conceive, they thought fit to make sport with you first. So now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, let us have done with your sport: I daresay you have had as much as you want. What you have next to do is to give us a display of exhorting this youth as to how he should devote himself to wisdom and virtue. But first I shall explain to you how I regard this matter and how I desire to hear it dealt with. If I strike you as treating it in a crude and ridiculous manner, do not laugh me to scorn; for in my eagerness to listen to your wisdom I shall venture to improvise in your presence. So both you and your disciples must restrain yourselves and listen without laughing; and you, son of Axiochus, answer me this:

Do all we human beings wish to prosper? Or is this question one of the absurdities I was afraid of just now? For I suppose it is stupid merely to ask such things, since every man must wish to prosper.

Everyone in the world, said Cleinias.

Well then, I asked, as to the next step, since we wish to prosper, how can we prosper? Will it be if
PLATO

ήμιν πολλά κάγαθα εἴη; ἢ τοῦτο ἐκείνου ἐτι εὐθέστερον; δῆλον γὰρ ποὺ καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει. Συνέφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἀγαθὰ δὲ ποῖα ἄρα τῶν ὄντων τυχάνει Ἦμιν ὄντα; ἢ οὐ χαλεπῶν οὐδὲ σεμνοῦ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ τι οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐοικεν εἶναι εὐπορεῖν; πᾶς γὰρ ἂν Ἦμιν εἶποι, ὅτι τὸ πλοῦτεῖν ἀγαθὸν· ἢ γάρ; Πάνω γ’, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνει καὶ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ τάλλα κατὰ τὸ Β σῶμα ἰκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι; Συνεδόκει. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὐγένειαι τε καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τιμαὶ ἐν τῇ ἐαυτοῦ δῆλα ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα. Ὀμολόγει. Τί οὖν, ἔφην, ἔτι Ἦμιν λείπεται τῶν ἀγαθῶν; τί ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ σώφρονα τε εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀνδρείον; πότερον πρὸς Διός, ὡ Kleivía, ἤγεῖ σῦ, ἐὰν ταῦτα τιθῶμεν ὡς ἀγαθὰ, ὀρθῶς Ἦμᾶς θήσειν, ἢ ἐὰν μὴ; ἰδών γὰρ ἂν τις Ἦμιν ἀμφισβητήσεις· σοὶ δὲ πῶς δοκεῖ; Ἀγαθὰ, ἔφη ὡ Kleivía. Εἶεν, C ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ· τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ποὺ χοροῦ τάξιμεν; ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἢ πῶς λέγεις; Ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοίς. Ἐνθυμοῦ δῆ, μὴ τι παραλείπωμεν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὡ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἔφη, οὐδὲν, ὡ Kleivía. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀναμνησθεῖς εἴπον 404
we have many good things? Or is this an even sillier question than the other? For surely this too must obviously be so.

He agreed.

Come now, of things that are, what sort do we hold to be really good? Or does it appear to be no difficult matter, and no problem for an important person, to find here too a ready answer? Anyone will tell us that to be rich is good, surely?

Quite true, he said.

Then it is the same with being healthy and handsome, and having the other bodily endowments in plenty?

He agreed.

Again, it is surely clear that good birth and talents and distinctions in one's own country are good things.

He admitted it.

Then what have we still remaining, I asked, in the class of goods? What of being temperate, and just, and brave? I pray you tell me, Cleinias, do you think we shall be right in ranking these as goods, or in rejecting them? For it may be that someone will dispute it. How does it strike you?

They are goods, said Cleinias.

Very well, I went on, and where in the troupe shall we station wisdom? Among the goods, or how?

Among the goods.

Then take heed that we do not pass over any of the goods that may deserve mention.

I do not think we are leaving any out, said Cleinias.

Hereupon I recollected one and said: Yes, by
ὅτι Ναὶ μὰ Δία κυνδυνεύομεν γε τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν παραλιπεῖν. Τί τούτο; ἦ δ᾽ ὅσ. Τὴν εὐτυχίαν, ὁ Κλεινία· ὃ πάντες φασί, καὶ οἱ πάνω φαύλου, μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι. 'Αληθῆ λέγεις, ἐφη. καὶ ἐγώ αὖ πάλιν μετανοήσας εἶπον

D

ὅτι 'Ολύγου καταγέλαστοι ἐγενόμεθα ὑπὸ τῶν ξένων ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ, ὃ παὶ Ἀξιόχου. Τί δή, ἐφη, τούτο; Ὡτι εὐτυχίαν ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν θέμενοι νῦν δὴ αὕθις περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑλέγομεν. Τί οὖν δὴ τούτο; Καταγέλαστον δῆπου, ὃ πάλαι πρόκειται, τούτῳ πάλιν προτιθέναι καὶ δίς ταυτά λέγειν. Πῶς, ἐφη, τούτῳ λέγεις; Ἡ σοφία δῆπου, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εὐτυχία ἑστὶ· τούτῳ δὲ κἂν παῖς γνοη. καὶ δὲ ἑθαύμασεν· οὕτως ἔτι νέος τε καὶ εὐθῆς ἑστὶ· κἀγὼ γνοὺς αὐτὸν θυμάζοντα, Ἄρ᾽ οὖκ

Ε

οἴσθα, ἐφην, ὁ Κλεινία, ὅτι περὶ αὐλημάτων εὑραγίαν οἱ αὐληταὶ εὐτυχέστατοι εἰσὶν; Συν- ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ περὶ γραμμάτων γραφῆς τε καὶ ἀναγνώσεως οἱ γραμματισταί; Πάνυ γε. Τί δε; πρὸς τοὺς τῆς θαλάττης κυν- δύνους μῶν οἱ εὐτυχεστέρους τινὰς εἶναι τῶν σοφῶν κυβερνητῶν, ὡς ἐπὶ πᾶν εἶπεῖν; Οὐ δήτα. Τί δε; στρατευόμενος μετὰ ποτέρου ὃν ἤδιον τοῦ

1 γραμματισταί were the schoolmasters who taught reading and writing and explained the difficulties of Homer in primary education.

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Heaven, we are on the verge of omitting the greatest of the goods.

What is that? he asked.

Good fortune, Cleinias: a thing which all men, even the worst fools, refer to as the greatest of goods.

You are right, he said.

Once again I reconsidered and said: We have almost made ourselves laughing-stocks, you and I, son of Axiochus, for our visitors.

What is wrong now? he asked.

Why, after putting good fortune in our former list, we have just been discussing the same thing again.

What is the point?

Surely it is ridiculous, when a thing has been before us all the time, to set it forth again and go over the same ground twice.

To what are you referring? he asked.

Wisdom, I replied, is presumably good fortune: even a child could see that.

He wondered at this—he is still so young and simple-minded: then I, perceiving his surprise, went on: Can you be unaware, Cleinias, that for success in flute-music it is the flute-players that have the best fortune?

He agreed to this.

Then in writing and reading letters it will be the schoolmasters.¹

Certainly.

Well now, for the dangers of a sea-voyage, do you consider any pilots to be more fortunate, as a general rule, than the wise ones?

No, to be sure.

Well, then, suppose you were on a campaign, with which kind of general would you prefer to
PLATO

κωδύνου τε καὶ τῆς τύχης μετέχουσι, μετὰ σοφοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἡ μετ’ ἀμαθοῦς; Μετὰ σοφοῦ. Τί δὲ; ἀσθενῶν μετὰ ποτέρου ἄν ἢδεώς κωδυνεύοις, μετὰ σοφοῦ ἱατροῦ ἡ μετ’ ἀμαθοῦς; Μετὰ σοφοῦ.

280 'Αρ' οὖν, ἤν δ’ ἐγώ, οτι εὐτυχέστερον ἄν οἱ εἰ πράττεν μετὰ σοφοῦ πράττων ἡ μετ’ ἀμαθοῦς; Συνεχῶρει. 'Ἡ σοφία ἁρα πανταχοῦ εὐτυχεῖν ποιεὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. οὔ γαρ δῆπον ἀμαρτάνοι γ’ ἃν ποτέ τις σοφία ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη ὀρθῶς πράττεν καὶ τυγχάνειν: ἢ γαρ ἄν οὐκέτι σοφία εἰη.

Συνωμολογησάμεθα τελευτῶντες οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως

Β ἐν κεφαλαίῳ οὔτω τοῦτο ἔχειν, σοφίας παρούσης, ὃ ἂν παρῇ, μηδὲν προσδείσθαι εὐτυχίας· ἑπείδη δὲ τοῦτο συνωμολογησάμεθα, πάλιν ἐπυνθανόμεν αὐτοῦ τὰ πρότερον ὡμολογημένα πῶς ἄν ἦμῖν ἔχοι. Ὁμολογήσαμεν γάρ, ἐφη, εἰ ἦμῖν ἁγαθὰ πολλὰ παρεῖ, εὐθαμονεῖν ἄν καὶ εὕ πράττεν. Συνέφη. 'Αρ' οὖν εὐθαμονοίμεν ἄν διὰ τὰ παρόντα ἁγαθά, εἰ μηδὲν ἦμιᾶς ὦφελοὶ ἡ εἰ ὦφελοὶ; Εἰ ὦφελοὶ, ἐφη. 'Αρ' οὖν ἄν τι ὦφελοὶ, εἰ εἰη μόνον ἦμῖν, C χρώμεθα δ’ αὐτοῖς μή; οἴον συτία εἰ ἦμῖν εἰη πολλά, ἐσθίομεν δὲ μή, ἡ ποτόν, πίνομεν δὲ μή, ἔσθ’ ὁ τι ὦφελοίμεθ’ ἄν; Οὔ δῆτα, ἐφη. Τί δὲ; οἱ δημιουργοὶ πάντες, εἰ αὐτοῖς εἰη πάντα τὰ
share both the peril and the luck—a wise one, or an ignorant?

With a wise one.

Well then, supposing you were, sick, with which kind of doctor would you like to venture yourself—a wise one, or an ignorant?

With a wise one.

And your reason, I said, is this, that you would fare with better fortune in the hands of a wise one than of an ignorant one?

He assented.

So that wisdom everywhere causes men to be fortunate: since I presume she could never err, but must needs be right in act and result; otherwise she could be no longer wisdom.

We came to an agreement somehow or other in the end that the truth in general was this: when wisdom is present, he with whom it is present has no need of good fortune as well; and as we had agreed on this I began to inquire of him over again what we should think, in this case, of our previous agreements. For we agreed, said I, that if many goods were present to us we should be happy and prosper.

Yes, he said.

Then would we be happy because of our present goods, if they gave us no benefit, or if they gave us some?

If they gave us benefit, he said.

And would a thing benefit us if we merely had it and did not use it? For instance, if we had a lot of provisions, but did not eat them, or liquor, and did not drink it, could we be said to be benefited?

Of course not, he answered.

Well then, if every craftsman found the requisites
επιτήδεια παρεσκευασμένα ἐκάστῳ εἰς τὸ ἔαυτοῦ ἔργον, χρώματος δ' αὐτοῖς μή, ἄρ' ἂν οὕτω εἰ δια τὴν κτήσιν, ὅτι κεκτημένοι εἰς πάντα δ' ἰκανόν, τεκτάνοιο μή, ἔσθ' ὃ τι ωφελοῖτ' 3

D ἂν ἀπὸ τῆς κτήσεως; Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφη. Τί δέ, εἰ τὸς κεκτημένος εἰς πλούτον τε καὶ ἀ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα τὰ ἁγαθά, χρώματος δὲ αὐτοῖς μή, ἄρ' ἂν εὐθαμονοὶ διὰ τὴν τούτων κτήσιν τῶν ἁγαθῶν; Οὐ δήτα, ὦ Σῶκρατε. Δεῖν ἄρα, ἐφην, ὡς ἐοικε, μὴ μόνον κεκτήσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἁγαθὰ τὸν μέλλοντα εὐθαμονο ἐσεθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ χρήσθαι αὐτοῖς· ὡς οὐδὲν ωφελοῖ τῆς κτήσεως γίγνεται. 'Αληθῆ λέγεις. 'Αρ' οὖν, ὦ Κλεινία, Ε ἢδη τούτω ἰκανῶ 1 πρὸς τὸ εὐθαμονο ποιησαί τινα, τὸ τε κεκτήσθαι τά ἁγαθὰ καὶ τὸ χρήσθαι αὐτοῖς; 'Εμοιγε δοκεῖ. Πότερον, ἢν δ' ἑγώ, εἰν ὀρθῶς χρῆσθαι τις ἢ καὶ ἐὰν μή; Ἐὰν ὀρθῶς. Καλῶς δέ, ἢν δ' ἑγώ, λέγεις. πλεῖον γάρ ποι, οἴμαι, θάτερον ἐστιν, εἰν τὸς χρῆσθαι ὀτλοῦν μὴ ὀρθῶς πράγματι ἢ ἐὰν ἑά, τὸ μὲν γὰρ κακὸν, τὸ δὲ οὐτὲ 281 κακὸν οὐτε ἁγαθὸν· ἡ οὖχ οὕτω φαμέν; Ξυν- εχώρει. Τί οὖν; ἐν τῇ ἐργασίᾳ τε καὶ χρήσθῃ τῇ περὶ τὰ ἕύλα μῶν ἀλλο τί ἔστι τὸ ἀπεργαζόμενον ὀρθῶς χρῆσθαι ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ τεκτονική; Οὐ

1 τούτω ἰκανῶ R. G. Bury: τούτο ἰκανόν, τούτω καλλίω, τούτω καλλίω mss.
for his particular work all ready prepared for him, and then made no use of them, would he prosper because of these acquisitions, as having acquired all the things necessary for a craftsman to have at hand? For example, if a carpenter were furnished with all his tools and a good supply of wood, but did no carpentry, is it possible he could be benefited by what he had got?

By no means, he said.

Well now, suppose a man had got wealth and all the goods that we mentioned just now, but made no use of them; would he be happy because of his possessing these goods?

Surely not, Socrates.

So it seems one must not merely have acquired such goods if one is to be happy, but use them too; else there is no benefit gained from their possession.

True.

Then have we here enough means, Cleinias, for making a man happy—in the possession of these goods and using them?

I think so.

Shall we say, I asked, if he uses them rightly, or just as much if he does not?

If rightly.

Well answered, I said; for I suppose there is more mischief when a man uses anything wrongly than when he lets it alone. In the one case there is evil; in the other there is neither evil nor good. May we not state it so?

He agreed.

To proceed then: in the working and use connected with wood, is there anything else that effects the right use than the knowledge of carpentry?
δήτα, ἐφη. Ἠ ἄλλα μὴν ποι καὶ ἐν τῇ περὶ τὰ σκεύη ἐργασία τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπεργαζομένη. Συνέφη. ἦ Ἀρ' οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ περὶ τὴν χρείαν ὃν ἐλέγομεν τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ἁγαθῶν, πλούτου τε καὶ υγιείας καὶ κάλλους, τὸ ὀρθῶς πᾶσι τοῖς τουοῦτοις χρῆσαί ἐπιστήμη ἢν ἢ ἡγου-β μένη καὶ κατορθοῦσα τήν πρᾶξιν, ἢ ἄλλο τι; Ἔπιστήμη, ἢ δ' ὅσ. Οὐ μόνον ἀρα εὔτυχίαν, ἄλλα καὶ εὐπραγίαν, ὃς ἔσκει, ἢ ἐπιστήμη παρέχει ἐν πάσῃ κτήσει τε καὶ πράξει. Ὄμολόγει. ἦ Ἀρ' οὖν ὃ πρὸς Διός, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ὅφελός τι τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων ἄνευ φρονήσεως καὶ σοφίας; ἀρὰ γε ἄν ὁνειτο ἀνθρωπος πολλὰ κεκτημένος καὶ πολλὰ πράττων νοῦν μὴ ἔχων, μᾶλλον ἢ ὀλίγα; ὡδε δὲ σκόπει· οὐκ ἐλάττων πράττων ἐλάττω ἂν ἔξ-κ αμαρτάνοι, ἐλάττω δὲ ἀμαρτάνων ἦττον ἂν κακῶς πράττοι, ἦττον δὲ κακῶς πράττων ἁθλιος ἦττον ἂν εἰη; Πάνυ γ', ἐφη. Πότερον οὖν ἂν μᾶλλον ἐλάττω τις πράττοι πένης ὃν ἢ πλούσιος; Πένης, ἐφη. Πότερον δὲ ἀσθενής ἢ ἰσχυρός; Ἀσθενής. Πότερον δὲ ἐντυμος ἢ ἀτυμος; Ἀτυμος. Πότερον δὲ ἀνδρείος ὃν καὶ σώφρων ἐλάττω ἂν πράττοι ἢ

1 ἢ Badham.
2 μᾶλλον ἢ ὀλίγα Iambl.: ἢ μᾶλλον ὀλίγα νοῦν ἔχων mss.

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SURELY not, he said.
Further, I presume that in the working connected with furniture it is knowledge that effects the right work.
Yes, he said.
Then similarly, I went on, in the use of the goods we mentioned at first—wealth and health and beauty—was it knowledge that showed the way to the right use of all those advantages and rectified their conduct, or was it something else?
Knowledge, he replied.
So that knowledge, it would seem, supplies mankind not only with good luck, but with welfare, in all that he either possesses or conducts.
He agreed.
Then can we, in Heaven's name, get any benefit from all the other possessions without understanding and wisdom? Shall we say that a man will profit more by possessing much and doing much when he has no sense, than he will if he does and possesses little? Consider it this way: would he not err less if he did less; and so, erring less, do less ill; and hence, doing less ill, be less miserable?
Certainly, he said.
In which of the two cases, when one is poor or when one is rich, will one be more likely to do less?
When one is poor, he said.
And when one is weak, or when one is strong?
Weak.
And when one has high position, or has none?
None.
When one is brave and self-controlled, will one do less, or when one is a coward?
δειλός; Δειλός. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄργος μᾶλλον ἡ ἐργάτης; Συνεχώρει. Καὶ βραδὺς μᾶλλον ἡ
d' Ταχύς, καὶ ἀμβλύ ὄρων καὶ ἀκούων μᾶλλον ἡ ὄξυ; Πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ξυνεχωροῦμεν ἀλλήλοις.

Ἐν κεφαλαῖο δ', ἐφην, ὁ Κλεωπάτος, κυνικοῦς σύμπαντα, ὃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐφαμεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, οὐ̔
περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὡπως αὐτὰ γε καθ' αὐτὰ πέφυκεν ἀγαθᾶ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔοικεν ὡδ' ἔχειν· εὰν
μὲν αὐτῶν ἦγῇται ἀμαθία, μείζω κακὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥσος δυνατώτερα ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ ἠγοι-
μένῳ κακῷ ὦντι· εὰν δὲ φρόνησις τε καὶ σοφία,
Ε μείζω ἀγαθᾶ· αὐτὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ οὐδέτερα αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἄξια εἶναι. Φαίνεται, ἐφη, ὡς ἔοικεν,
οὕτως, ὡς σὺ λέγεις. Τι οὖν ἦμιν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων; ἀλλ' τι η τῶν μὲν ἄλλων οὐδὲν
ὁν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν, τούτου δὲ δύο ὄντων ἢ μὲν σοφία ἀγαθὸν, ἢ δὲ ἀμαθία κακὸν; Ὀμο-
282 λόγει.

"Ετι τοίνυν, ἐφην, τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπισκεψόμεθα. ἐπειδ' εὐδαίμονες μὲν εἶναι προθυμούμεθα πάντες,
ἐφανημεν δὲ τοιοῦτοι γιγνόμενοι ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι τε τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ ὅρθως χρῆσθαι, τὴν
dὲ ὁρθό-
tητα καὶ εὐτυχίαν ἑπιστήμη ἡ παρέξουσα, δεὶ δή,
ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου ἀπαντα ἂνδρα τοῦτο
παρασκευάζεσθαι, ὡπως ὡς σοφότατος ἔσται· ἡ
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A coward.
So too, when idle rather than busy?
He agreed.
And slow rather than quick, and dim of sight and hearing rather than sharp?
We agreed with each other as to these and all such cases.

To sum up then, Cleinias, I proceeded, it seems that, as regards the whole lot of things which at first we termed goods, the discussion they demand is not on the question of how they are in themselves and by nature goods, but rather, I conceive, as follows: if they are guided by ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, according as they are more capable of ministering to their evil guide; whereas if understanding and wisdom guide them, they are greater goods; but in themselves neither sort is of any worth.

I think the case appears, he replied, to be as you suggest.

Now what result do we get from our statements? Is it not precisely that, of all the other things, not one is either good or bad, but of these two, wisdom is good and ignorance bad?

He agreed.

Let us consider then, I said, the further conclusion that lies before us. Since we are all eager to be happy, and since we were found to become so by not only using things but using them aright, while knowledge, we saw, was that which provided the rightness and good fortune, it seems that every man must prepare himself by all available means so that he may be as wise as possible. Is it not so?
PLATO

οὐ; Ναὶ, ἕφη. Καὶ παρὰ πατρὸς γε δήπον τοῦτο
Β οἴομεν δεῖν παραλαμβάνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ χρή-
ματα, καὶ παρ’ ἐπιτρόπων καὶ φίλων τῶν τε ἄλλων
καὶ τῶν φασκόντων ἔραστῶν εἶναι, καὶ ξένων καὶ
πολιτῶν, δεόμενον καὶ ἱκετεύοντα σοφίας μετα-
διδόναι, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν, ὃ Κλεινία, οὐδὲ νεμεσθὸν
ἐνεκα τοῦτον ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ δουλεύειν καὶ ἔραστῇ
καὶ παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτιον ἐθέλοντα ὑπηρετεῖν τῶν
καλῶν ὑπηρετημάτων, προθυμούμενον σοφὸν γενέ-
σθαι. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, ἕφην ἐγώ, οὔτως; Πάνυ μὲν
C οὖν εὗ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ἢ δ’ ὅς. Εἰ ἔστι γε, ὃ
Κλεινία, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἡ σοφία διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ
ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.
tοῦτο γὰρ ἧμιν ἐτί ἄσκεπτον καὶ οὔπω διωμολο-
γημένον ἐμοί τε καὶ σοί. Ἀλλ’ ἐμοίγε, ἕφη, ὃ
Σώκρατεσ, διδακτόν εἶναι δοκεῖ. καὶ ἐγὼ ἧσθεὶς
εἰπὼν. Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις, ὃ ἄριστε ἀνθρῶν, καὶ εὗ
ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με σκέψεως πολλῆς περὶ
tοῦτον αὐτοῦ, πότερον διδακτόν ἢ οὐ διδακτόν
ἡ σοφία. νῦν οὖν ἐπειδὴ σοι καὶ διδακτόν δοκεῖ
D καὶ μόνον τῶν οὗτων εὐδαίμονα καὶ εὐτυχῆ ποιεῖν
tῶν ἀνθρωπον, ἀλλὸ τι ἡ φαίη ἂν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν νῷ ἐχεις αὐτὸ ποιεῖν;
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἕφη, ὃ Σώκρατεσ, ὃς οἶνον τε
μάλιστα.
Κἀγὼ ταῦτα ἄσμενος ἄκουσας, Τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν,
ἔφην, παράδειγμα, ὃ Διονυσόδωρε τε καὶ Εὐθύ-
δημε, οὗν ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων
εἶναι, τοιούτον, ἰδιωτικὸν ἑσώσ καὶ μόλις διὰ
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Yes, he said.

And if a man thinks, as well he may, that he ought to get this endowment from his father much more than money, and also from his guardians and his ordinary friends, and from those who profess to be his lovers, whether strangers or fellow-citizens—praying and beseeching them to give him his share of wisdom; there is no disgrace, Cleinias, or reprobation in making this a reason for serving and being a slave to either one's lover or any man, and being ready to perform any service that is honourable in one's eagerness to become wise. Is not this your view? I asked.

I think you are perfectly right, he replied.

Yes, Cleinias, I went on, if wisdom is teachable, and does not present itself to mankind of its own accord—for this is a question that we have still to consider as not yet agreed on by you and me.

For my part, Socrates, he said, I think it is teachable.

At this I was glad, and said: Well spoken indeed, my excellent friend! How good of you to relieve me of a long inquiry into this very point, whether wisdom is teachable or not teachable! So now, since you think it is both teachable and the only thing in the world that makes man happy and fortunate, can you help saying that it is necessary to pursue wisdom or intending to pursue it yourself?

Why, said he, I do say so, Socrates, with all my might.

So I, delighted to hear this, said: There, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, is my illustration of what I desire a hortatory argument to be—rough and ready, perhaps, and expressed at laborious length:

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μακρῶν λεγόμενον· σφῶν δὲ ὁπότεροι βούλεται, 

tαυτὸν τοῦτο τέχνη πράττων ἐπιδειξάτω ἡμῖν. εἰ 283

Ε δὲ μὴ τοῦτο βουλεσθοῦν, οὖν ἔγω ἀπέλιπον, τὸ 

ἐξῆς ἐπιδειξατον τῷ μειρακίῳ, πότερον πάσαν 

ἐπιστήμην δεὶ αὐτὸν κτάσθαι, ἢ ἐστὶ τις μία, ἢν 

dεὶ λαβόντα εὐδαιμονεῖ τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα 

eἶναι, καὶ τίς αὕτη. ὥς γὰρ ἔλεγον ἀρχόμενος, 

περὶ πολλοῦ ἡμῖν τυγχάνει ὅν τόνδε τὸν νεανίσκον 

σοφὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἶπον, ὁ Κρίτων: τῷ δὲ 

μετὰ τοῦτο ἔσομένῳ πάνυ σφόδρα προσεῖχον τὸν 

νοῦν, καὶ ἐπεσκόπουν, τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἄμοιντο 

τοῦ λόγου καὶ ὀπόθεν ἄρξοντο παρακελεύομενοι τῷ 

νεανίσκῳ σοφίναν τε καὶ ἄρετὴν ἀσκεῖν. ὁ οὖν 

πρεσβύτερος αὐτῶν, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, πρότερον 

ἡρχετο τοῦ λόγου, καὶ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἐβλέπομεν 

πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς αὐτικὰ μάλα ἀκουσόμενοι θαυ-

μασίους τινὰς λόγους· ὅπερ οὖν καὶ συνεβη ἡμῖν.

Β θαυμαστῶν γὰρ τινα, ὁ Κρίτων, ἀνὴρ καθήρχε 

λόγον, οὗ σοι ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι, ὡς παρακελεύστικος ὁ 

λόγος ἡν ἐπ᾽ ἄρετὴν.

Εἰπέ μοι, ἐφη, ὁ Ἔοκρατές τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ 

ἄλλοι, ὅσοι φατέ ἐπιθυμεῖν τόνδε τὸν νεανίσκον 

σοφὸν γενέσθαι, πότερον παίζετε ταῦτα λέγοντες 

ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιθυμεῖτε καὶ σπουδάζετε;

Κάγῳ διενοηθην, ὅτι ὑγιής ἀρα ἡμᾶς τὸ 

πρότερον παίζειν, ἦνικα ἐκελεύομεν διαλεχθῆναι 

τῷ νεανίσκῳ αὐτῷ, καὶ διὰ τάτα προσπεισάτην 

C τε καὶ οὐκ ἐσπουδάσατε· ταῦτα οὖν διανοηθείς ἐτὶ 

μᾶλλον εἶπον, ὅτι θαυμαστῶς σπουδάζομεν.

Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, Σκόπει μὴν, ἐφη, ὁ 

Σώκρατες, ὅπως μὴ ἐξαρνος ἐσεὶ ἄ νυν λέγεις.

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now let either of you who wishes to do so give us an example of an artist’s handling of this same matter. If you do not wish to do that, let your display begin where I left off, and show the lad whether he ought to acquire every kind of knowledge, or whether there is a single sort of it which one must obtain if one is to be both happy and a good man, and what it is. For as I was saying at the outset, it really is a matter of great moment to us that this youth should become wise and good.

These were my words, Crito; and I set about giving the closest attention to what should follow, and observing in what fashion they would deal with the question, and how they would start exhorting the youth to practise wisdom and virtue. So then the elder of them, Dionysodorus, entered first upon the discussion, and we all turned our eyes on him expecting to hear, there and then, some wonderful arguments. And this result we certainly got; for wondrous, in a way, Crito, was the argument that the man then ushered forth, which is worth your hearing as a notable incitement to virtue.

Tell me, Socrates, he said, and all you others who say you desire this youth to become wise, whether you say this in jest or truly and earnestly desire it.

At this I reflected that previously, as it seemed, they took us to be jesting, when we urged them to converse with the youth, and hence they made a jest of it and did not take it seriously. This reflection therefore made me insist all the more that we were in deadly earnest.

Then Dionysodorus said: Yet be careful, Socrates, that you do not have to deny what you say now.
'Εσκεμμαί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὦ γὰρ μὴ ποτ' ἐξαρνος γένομαι. Τί οὖν; ἐφη· φατὲ βουλέσθαι αὐτὸν σοφὸν γενέσθαι; Πάνιν μὲν οὖν. Νῦν δὲ, ἦ δ' ὦς, Κλεινίας πότερον σοφὸς ἦστιν ἢ οὖ; Οὐκοῦν φησί γε πω· ἐστὶ δὲ οὐκ ἀλαζών. 'Ὑμεῖς δὲ, ἐφη, 

D βουλέσθε γενέσθαι αὐτὸν σοφὸν, ἀμαθῇ δὲ μὴ εἶναι; 'Ὄμολογοῦμεν. Οὐκοῦν οὐς μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, βουλέσθε αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, οὐ δὲ ἐστιν νῦν, μηκέτι εἶναι. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐθορυβήθην· ὃ δὲ μου θορυβουμένου ὑπολαβὼν, Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἐφη, ἐπεὶ βουλέσθε αὐτόν, οὐ νῦν ἐστί, μηκέτι εἶναι, βουλέσθε αὐτόν, ὡς έοικεν, ἀπολωλέναι; καίτοι πολλοῦ ἄν άξιοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἶναι, ἐὰν φίλοι τε καὶ ἑρασταί, οὕτως τὰ παιδικὰ περὶ παντὸς ἀν ποιήσαντο ἐξολωλέναι.

E Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἀκούσας ἡγανάκτησε τε ὑπὲρ τῶν παιδικῶν καὶ εἶπεν. Ὡς έενε Θεões, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον, ἐφη, ἦν εἰπεῖν, εἶπον ἄν, σοὶ εἰς κεφαλήν, ὃ τι μαθῶν μου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταψευδεῖ τοιοῦτο πράγμα, ὃ ἐγὼ οἴμαι οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ τόνδε βουλοίμην ἀν ἐξολωλέναι.

Τί δὲ, ἐφη, ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἦ δοκεῖ σοι οἶνον τ' εἶναι ψευδεσθαί; Νὴ Δία, ἐφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι γε. Πότερον λέγοντα τὸ πράγμα, περὶ 284 ὦν ἄν ὁ λόγος ἦ, ἦ μὴ λέγοντα; Λέγοντα, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ λέγει αὐτό, οὐκ ἀλλο λέγει τῶν 420
I know what I am about, I said: I know I shall never deny it.
Well now, he proceeded; you tell me you wish him to become wise?
Certainly.
And at present, he asked, is Cleinias wise or not? He says he is not yet so—he is no vain pretender.
And you, he went on, wish him to become wise, and not to be ignorant?
We agreed.
So you wish him to become what he is not, and to be no longer what he now is.
When I heard this I was confused; and he, striking in on my confusion, said: Of course then, since you wish him to be no longer what he now is, you wish him, apparently, to be dead. And yet what valuable friends and lovers they must be, who would give anything to know their darling was dead and gone!
Ctesippus, on hearing this, was annoyed on his favourite's account, and said: Stranger of Thurii, were it not rather a rude thing to say, I should tell you, ill betide your design of speaking so falsely of me and my friends as to make out—what to me is almost too profane even to repeat—that I could wish this boy to be dead and gone!
Why, Ctesippus, said Euthydemus, do you think it possible to lie?
To be sure, I do, he replied: I should be mad otherwise.
Do you mean, when one tells the thing about which one is telling, or when one does not?
When one tells it, he said.
Then if you tell it, you tell just that thing
όντων ἣ ἐκείνο ὁπερ λέγει; Πῶς γὰρ ἂν; ἐφη ὁ Κτήσιππος. 'Εν μὴν κάκεινό γ' ἔστι τῶν ὀντων, ὃ λέγει, χωρίς τῶν ἄλλων. Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ὃ ἐκείνο λέγων τὸ ὄν, ἐφη, λέγει; Ναι. 'Αλλὰ μὴν ὃ γε τὸ ὄν λέγων καὶ τὰ ὀντα τάληθῃ λέγει· ὡστε ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, εἰπερ λέγει τὰ ὀντα, λέγει τάληθῃ καὶ οὐδὲν κατὰ σοῦ ψεύδεται. Ναι, ἐφη'.

Β ἀλλ' ὃ ταῦτα λέγων, ἐφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὁ Ἐυθύδημος, ὃ τὰ ὀντα λέγει. καὶ ὁ Ἐυθύδημος, Τὰ δὲ μὴ ὀντα, ἐφη, ἀλλ' τι ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν; Οὐκ ἔστιν. 'Αλλο τι οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τὰ γε μὴ ὀντα ὀντα ἔστιν; Οὐδαμοῦ. 'Εστιν οὖν ὅπως περὶ ταῦτα τὰ μὴ ὄντα πράξειεν ἄν τίς τι, ὡστε καὶ εἶναι1 ποιήσειεν ἄν καὶ ὀστισοῦν τὰ μηδαμοῦ ὄντα; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη ὁ Κτήσιππος. Τί οὖν; οἱ ρήτορες ὃταν λέγωσιν εὖ τῷ δήμῳ, οὐδέν πράττουσιν; Πράττουσι μὲν οὖν, ἢ δ' ὃς. Οὐκοῦν εἰπερ

C πράττουσι, καὶ ποιοῦσιν; Ναι. Τὸ λέγειν ἀρα πράττειν τε καὶ ποιεῖν ἔστιν; 'Ωμολόγησεν. Οὐκ ἀρα τά γε μὴ ὀντ', ἐφη, λέγει οὐδείς· ποιοὶ γὰρ ἂν ἦδη τί· σύ δὲ ἰμολόγηκας τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ οἷον τ'

1 ὡστε καὶ εἶναι Hermann: ὡστ' ἐκείνα, ὃς γε κλεινία κτλ. mss.

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which you tell, of all that are, and nothing else whatever?
   Of course, said Ctesippus.
   Now the thing that you tell is a single one, distinct from all the others there are.
   Certainly.
   Then the person who tells that thing tells that which is?
   Yes.
   But yet, surely he who tells what is, and things that are, tells the truth: so that Dionysodorus, if he tells things that are, tells the truth and speaks no lie about you.
   Yes, said Ctesippus; but he who speaks as he did, Euthydemus, does not say things that are.
   Then Euthydemus asked him: And the things which are not, surely are not?
   They are not.
   Then nowhere can the things that are not be?
   Nowhere.
   Then is it possible for anyone whatever so to deal with these things that are not as to make them be when they are nowhere?
   I think not, said Ctesippus.
   Well now, when orators speak before the people, do they do nothing?
   No, they do something, he replied.
   Then if they do, they also make?
   Yes.
   Now, is speaking doing and making?
   He agreed that it is.
   No one, I suppose, speaks what is not—for thereby he would be making something; and you have agreed that one cannot so much as make what is not—so
eînai μηδ' πουεῖν: ὡστε κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐδεὶς ψευδὴ λέγει, ἀλλ' εἴπερ λέγει Διονυσόδωρος, τάληθη τε καὶ τὰ οὖντα λέγει. Νη Δία, ἐφη ο Κτήσιππος, ὃ Εὐθύδημος. ἀλλά τὰ οὖντα μὲν τρόπον τινὰ λέγει, οὐ μέντοι ὡς γε ἔχει.

Πῶς λέγεις, ἐφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ὃ Κτήσιππε; D εἰσὶ γάρ τινες, οἱ λέγουσι τὰ πράγματα ὡς ἔχει; Εἰσὶ μέντοι, ἐφη, οἱ καλοὶ τε κἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ τα- ληθή λέγοντες. Τί οὖν; ἦ δ' ὃς τάγαθα οὐκ εὖ, ἐφη, ἔχει, τὰ δὲ κακὰ κακῶς; Συνεχώρει. Τοὺς δὲ καλοὺς τε κἀγαθοὺς ὁμολογεῖς λέγειν ὡς ἔχει τὰ πράγματα; ጸΟμολογώ. Κακῶς ἀρα, ἐφη, λέγουσιν, ὃ Κτήσιππε, οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ κακά, εἴπερ ὡς ἔχει λέγουσι. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὃς, σφόδρα γε, τοὺς γονὰς κακοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ὡν σὺ, εάν μοι

Ε πείθη, ευλαβήσεις εἶναι, Ῥνα μὴ σε οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακῶς λέγωσιν. ὡς εὖ ἵσθ' ὅτι κακῶς λέγουσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοὺς κακοὺς. Ἡ καὶ τοὺς μεγάλους, ἐφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, μεγάλως λέγουσι καὶ τοὺς θερμῶς θερμῶς; Μάλιστα δῆπο, ἐφη ο Κτήσιππος: τοὺς γονὺς ψυχροὺς ψυχρῶς λέγουσι τε καὶ φασὶ διαλέγεσθαι. Συ μὲν, ἐφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, λοιδορεῖ, ὃ Κτήσιππε, λοιδορεῖ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγγυγε, ἦ δ' ὃς, ὃ Διονυσόδωρε, ἐπεὶ φιλῶ σε, ἀλλὰ νοσθετῶ σ' ὡς ἐταίρον, καὶ πειρῶμαι πείθειν μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ οὔτως ἀγροίκως λέγειν,

1 The quibbling throughout this passage is a wilful confusion of the two very different uses of the verb “to be” (eînai), (a) in predication, where it has nothing to do with existence, and (b) by itself, as stating existence.

2 Euthydemus seizes on the ambiguous use of kacow, which may mean either “badly” or “injuriously.”
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that, by your account, no one speaks what is false, while if Dionysodorus speaks, he speaks what is true and is.

Yes, in faith, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but somehow or other he speaks what is, only not as it is.¹

How do you mean, Ctesippus? said Dionysodorus. Are there persons who tell things as they are?

Why surely, he replied, there are gentlemen—people who speak the truth?

Well, he went on, good things are in good case, bad in bad, are they not?

He assented.

And you admit that gentlemen tell things as they are.

I do.

Then, Ctesippus, good people speak evil of evil things, if they speak of them as they are.

Yes, I can tell you, very much so, when for instance they speak of evil men; among whom, if you take my advice, you will beware of being included, that the good may not speak ill of you. For, I assure you, the good speak ill² of the evil.

And they speak greatly of the great, asked Euthydemus, and hotly of the hot?

Certainly, I presume, said Ctesippus: I know they speak frigidly of the frigid, and call their way of arguing frigid.

You are turning abusive, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, quite abusive!

Not I, on my soul, Dionysodorus, for I like you: I am only giving you a friendly hint, and endeavouring to persuade you never to say anything so tactless.
285 οτι ἐγὼ τούτος βούλομαι ἐξολωλέναι, οὔς περὶ πλείοστον ποιοῦμαι.

Ἐγὼ οὖν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἐδόκουν ἄγριωτέρως πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔχειν, προσέπαιζον τε τὸν Κτήσιππον καὶ εἶπον ὅτι Ὁ Κτήσιππε, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἡμᾶς παρὰ τῶν ξένων δέχεσθαι ἢ λέγουσιν, εἰὼν ἐθέλωσι διδόναι, καὶ μὴ ὀνόματι διαφέρεσθαι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐπίστανται οὕτως ἐξολλύναι ἀνθρώπους, ὡστ' ἐκ πονηρῶν τε καὶ ἀφρόνων χρηστοὺς τε καὶ ἐμφρονας ποιεῖν, καὶ τούτο ἐάν αὐτῷ εὐφήκατον

Β εἶτε καὶ παρ' ἄλλου του ἐμαθέτην φθόρον τυᾷ καὶ ὀλεθρὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε ἀπολέσαντες πονηρὸν ὅντα χρηστὸν πάλιν ἀποφήναι· εἰ τούτῳ ἐπίστασθον— δήλου δὲ, ὅτι ἐπίστασθον· ἐφάτην γοῦν τὴν τέχνην σφῶν εἶναι τὴν νεωστὶ εὐρυμενὴν ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐκ πονηρῶν—συγχωρήσωμεν ὅνων αὐτῶν αὐτὸ· ἀπολεσάντων ἡμῖν τὸ μειράκιον καὶ φρόνιμον ποιησάντων, καὶ ἀπαντᾶς γε ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους. εἰ δὲ ύμεῖς οἱ νέοι φοβείσθε, ὡσπερ εἰ

C Καρὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐστώ ὁ κίνδυνος· ὡς ἐγὼ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρεσβύτης εἰμι, παρακυνδυνεύειν ἐτοιμὸς καὶ παραδίδωμι ἐμαυτὸν Διονυσιδῶρῳ τούτῳ ὡσπερ τῇ Μηδείᾳ τῇ Κόλχῳ: ἀπολλύτω με, καὶ εἰ μὲν βούλεται, ἐξετῶ, εἰ δ', ὅ τι βούλεται, τούτῳ ποιεῖτω· μόνον χρηστὸν ἀποφηγνάτω. καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἐφη, καὶ αὐτὸς, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐτοιμὸς εἰμὶ παρέχειν ἐμαυτὸν τοῖς ξένοις, καὶ εἰὼν βοῦλωνται δέρειν ἐτι μᾶλλον ἡ νῦν δέρουσιν, εἰ μοι ἡ

D δορὰ μὴ εἰς ἁσκοῦν τελευτήσει ὡσπερ ἡ τοῦ Μαρ-

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1 Lit. "a Carian slave."

2 This satyr was fabled to have challenged Apollo to a musical contest, and on his fluting being judged inferior to

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in my presence as that I wish these my most highly valued friends to be dead and gone.

So then I, observing that they were getting rather savage with each other, began to poke fun at Ctesippus, saying: Ctesippus, my feeling is that we ought to accept from our visitors what they tell us, if they are so good as to give it, and should not quarrel over a word. For if they understand how to do away with people in such sort as to change them from wicked and witless to honest and intelligent, and that too whether they have discovered for themselves or learnt from somebody else this peculiar kind of destruction or undoing, which enables them to destroy a man in his wickedness and set him up again in honesty; if they understand this—and obviously they do; you know they said that their newly discovered art was to turn wicked men into good—let us then accord them this power; let them destroy the lad for us, and make him sensible, and all the rest of us likewise. If you young fellows are afraid, let the experiment be made on me as a corpus vile; for I, being an elderly person, am ready to take the risk and put myself in the hands of Dionysodorus here, as if he were the famous Medea of Colchis. Let him destroy me, and if he likes let him boil me down, or do to me whatever he pleases: only he must make me good.

Then Ctesippus said: I too, Socrates, am ready to offer myself to be skinned by the strangers even more, if they choose, than they are doing now, if my hide is not to end by being made into a wine-skin, like that of Marsyas, but into the shape of virtue. Apollo's harping he was flayed alive by the god for his presumption, and his skin was hung up like a bag or bottle in a cave; cf. Herod. vii. 26.
σύνυ, ἄλλ' εἰς ἀρετήν. καίτοι με οἴεται Διονυσό-
δώρος οὔτοσι χαλεπαίνειν αὐτῷ· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ χαλε-
παίνω, ἄλλ' ἀντιλέγω πρὸς ταύτα, ἀ μοι δοκεῖ
πρὸς με μὴ καλῶς λέγειν· ἄλλα σὺ τὸ ἀντιλέγειν,
ἐφη, ὦ γενναῖε Διονυσόδωρε, μὴ κάλει λοιδορεῖ-
σθαι· ἐτερον γάρ τί ἐστι τὸ λοιδορεῖσθαι.

Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, 'Ως οὖντος, ἐφη, τοῦ ἀντι-
λέγειν, ὦ Κτήσιππε, ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους; Πάντως
δήπου, ἐφη, καὶ σφόδρα γε· ἢ σὺ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε,
Ε· οὐκ οἴει εἰναι ἀντιλέγειν; Οὔκονν σὺ τάν, ἐφη,
ἀποδείξαις πώποτε ἀκούσαι οὐδένος ἀντιλέγοντος
ἐτέρου ἐτέρω. Ἄληθῆ λέγεις; ἐφη· ἄλλα ἀκούω-
μεν νῦν, εἰ σοι ἀποδείκνυμι, ἀντιλέγοντος Κτήσ-
ϊππου Διονυσοδῶρῳ. Ἡ καὶ ύπόσχοις ἄν τούτου
λόγον; Πάνυ, ἐφη. Τί οὖν; ἢ δ' ὦς· εἰςων
ἐκάστῳ τῶν οὖντων λόγοι; Πάνυ γε. Οὔκοιν ὡς
ἐστιν ἐκαστον ἢ ως οὖκ ἐστιν; 'Ως ἐστιν. Εἰ
γὰρ μέμνησαι, ἐφη, ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ ἄρτι ἑπεδεί-
ξαμεν μηδένα λέγοντα ὡς οὐκ ἐστιν· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὃν
οὐδείς ἐφάνη λέγων. Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο; ἢ δ' ὦς ὦ
Κτήσιππος· ἤττον τι ἀντιλέγομεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ;
Πότερον οὖν, ἢ δ' ὦς, ἀντιλέγομεν ἄν τὸν τοῦ αὐτοῦ
πράγματος λόγον ἀμφότεροι λέγοντες, ἢ οὔτω μὲν
ἂν δήποι ταύτα λέγομεν; Συνεχώρει. Ἄλλ'
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And yet Dionysodorus here believes I am vexed with him. I am not vexed at all; I only contradict the remarks which I think he has improperly aimed at me. Come now, my generous Dionysodorus, do not call contradiction abuse: abuse is quite another thing.

On this Dionysodorus said: As though there were such a thing as contradiction! Is that the way you argue, Ctesippus?

Yes, to be sure, he replied, indeed I do; and do you, Dionysodorus, hold that there is not?

Well, you at any rate, he said, could not prove that you had ever heard a single person contradicting another.

Is that so? he replied: well, let us hear now whether I can prove a case of it—Ctesippus contradicting Dionysodorus.

Now, will you make that good?

Certainly, he said.

Well then, proceeded the other, each thing that is has its own description?

Certainly.

Then do you mean, as each is, or as it is not?

As it is.

Yes, he said, for if you recollect, Ctesippus, we showed just now that no one speaks of a thing as it is not; since we saw that no one speaks what is not.

Well, what of that? asked Ctesippus: are you and I contradicting any the less?

Now tell me, he said, could we contradict if we both spoke the description of the same thing? In this case should we not surely speak the same words?

He agreed.
The argument is that, if we cannot speak what is not, or falsely, of a thing (this assumption being based on the old confusion of being with existence), there can be only one description of a thing in any given relation, and so there is no room for contradiction. This argument is commonly ascribed to Antisthenes, the founder of the Cynic sect and opponent of Plato. It is not clear who exactly are meant by “the followers of Protagoras” or the “others before his time.”

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But when neither of us speaks the description of the thing, he asked, then we should contradict? Or in this case shall we say that neither of us touched on the matter at all?

This also he admitted.

Well now, when I for my part speak the description of the thing, while you give another of another thing, do we contradict then? Or do I describe the thing, while you do not describe it at all? How can he who does not describe contradict him who does?¹

At this Ctesippus was silent; but I, wondering at the argument, said: How do you mean, Dionysodorus? For, to be plain with you, this argument, though I have heard it from many people on various occasions, never fails to set me wondering—you know the followers of Protagoras made great use of it, as did others even before his time, but to me it always seems to have a wonderful way of upsetting not merely other views but itself also—and I believe I shall learn the truth of it from you far better than from anyone else. There is no such thing as speaking false—that is the substance of your statement, is it not? Either one must speak and speak the truth, or else not speak?

He agreed.

Then shall we say that speaking false “is not,” but thinking false “is”? No, it is the same with thinking, he said.

So neither is there any false opinion, I said, at all. No, he said.

Nor ignorance, nor ignorant men; or must not ignorance occur, if it ever can, when we put things falsely?

Certainly, he said.
τούτο οὐκ ἐστιν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκ ἔφη. Λόγου ἕνεκα, ὁ Διονυσόδωρε, λέγεις τὸν λόγον, ἵνα δὴ ἀτοπον λέγῃς, ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς δοκεῖ σοι οὐδεὶς εἶναι Ε ἀμαθῆς ἀνθρώπων; 'Ἀλλὰ σὺ, ἔφη, ἔλεγξον. Ἡ καὶ ἐστὶ τούτῳ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ἔξελεγξει, μηδενὸς ψευδομένου; Οὐκ ἐστιν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος. Ὡδ' ἀρα ἐκέλευεν, ἔφην ἐγώ, νῦν δὴ Διονυσόδωρος ἔξελεγξει; Τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὅν πῶς ἂν τις κελεύσαι; σὺ δὲ κελεύεις; Ὁτι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Εὐθύδημης, τὰ σοφὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ εὖ ἔχοντα οὐ πάνυ τι μανθάνω, ἀλλὰ παχέως πως ἐννοῶ. ἵσως μὲν οὖν φορτικώτερὸν τι ἐρήσομαι. ἀλλὰ συγγίγνωσκε, ὃρα 287 δὲ· εἰ γὰρ μὴτε ψευδεσθαι ἐστι μὴτε ψευδὴ δοξάζειν μὴτε ἀμαθὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὸ τι οὐδ' ἐξαμαρτάνειν ἐστιν, ὅταν τὶς τὶ πράττῃ; πράττοντα γὰρ οὐκ ἐστιν ἀμαρτάνειν τούτου δ' πράττει· οὐχ οὕτω λέγετε; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Τοῦτο ἐστιν ἦδη, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ φορτικὸν ἑρώτημα. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀμαρτάνομεν μὴτε πράττοντες μὴτε λέγοντες μὴτε διανοού-μενοι, ὡμεῖς, ὁ πρὸς Διὸς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, τίνος διδάσκαλοι ἤκετε; ἢ οὐκ ἄρτι ἐφατε ἀρετὴν Β κάλλιστ' ὁν παραδοῦναι ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἐθέλοντι μανθάνειν;

Εἰτ', ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ὑπο-432
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But there is no such thing as this, I said.
No, he said.
Is it merely to save your statement, Dionysodorus, that you state it so—just to say something startling—or is it really and truly your view that there is no such thing as an ignorant man?

But you, he replied, are to refute me.
Well, does your argument allow of such a thing as refutation, if there is nobody to speak false?

There is no such thing, said Euthydemus.

So neither did Dionysodorus just now bid me refute him? I asked.

No, for how can one bid something that is not? Do you bid such a thing?

Well, Euthydemus, I said, it is because I do not at all understand these clever devices and palpable hits: I am only a dull sort of thinker. And so I may perhaps be going to say something rather clownish; but you must forgive me. Here it is: if there is no such thing as speaking false or thinking false or being stupid, surely there can be no making a mistake either, when one does something. For in doing it there is no mistaking the thing that is done. You will state it so, will you not?

Certainly, he said.

My clownish question, I went on, is now already before you. If we make no mistake either in doing or saying or intending, I ask you what in Heaven's name, on that assumption, is the subject you two set up to teach. Or did you not say just now that your speciality was to put any man who wished in the way of learning virtue?

Now really, Socrates, interposed Dionysodorus,
λαβών, οὕτως εἶ Κρόνος, ὡστε ἄ το πρῶτον ἐπομεν νῦν ἀναμμηνήσκει, καὶ εἰ τι πέρυσιν εἶπον, νῦν ἀναμμηνήσκει, τοῖς δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι λεγομένοις οὐχ ἐξεις οἱ τι χρῆ; Καὶ γὰρ, ἐφην ἐγώ, χαλεποί εἰσι πάνυ, εἰκότως· παρὰ σοφῶν γὰρ λέγονταί ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτω τῷ τελευταῖο παγχάλεσκον χρήσασθαι ἐστιν, ὃ λέγεις. τὸ γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω ὦ τι χρῶμαι τί ποτε λέγεις, ὧ Διονυσόδωρε; ἡ δὴνον C ὃτι ὥς οὐκ ἔχω ἐξελέγξαι αὐτῶν; ἐπεὶ εἰπέ, τί σοι ἀλλο νοεῖ τοῦτο τὸ βῆμα, τὸ οὐκ ἔχω ὦ τι χρήσωμαι τοῖς λόγοις; 'Ἀλλ' ὦ σὺ λέγεις, ἐφη, τούτω γ' οὗ 1 πᾶν χαλεπὸν χρῆσθαι· ἐπεὶ ἀπόκριναι. Πρὶν σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὧ Διονυσόδωρε; οὐκ ἀποκρίνει; ἐφη. Ἡ καὶ δίκαιον; Δίκαιον μέντοι, ἐφη. Κατὰ τίνα λόγον; ἢν δ' ἐγώ'. ἡ δὴνον ὃτι κατὰ τόνδε, ὃτι σὺ νῦν πάνσοφός τις ἡμῖν ἀφίξαι περὶ λόγους, καὶ ὁδῷ ὃτε δεὶ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ὅτε μή; καὶ νῦν οὐδ' ἂν ὅτι οὖν D ἀποκρίνει, ἄτε γιγνώσκων ὃτι οὐ δεῖ; Δαλεῖς, ἐφη, ἀμελήσας ἀποκρίνασθαι· ἄλλ', ὧ 'γαθε, πείθου καὶ ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδῆ καὶ ὡμολογεῖς με σοφὸν εἶναι. Πειστέον τοῖνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνάγκη, ὡς ἐοικε· σὺ γὰρ ἄρχεις· ἄλλ' ἐρώτα. Πότερον οὖν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα νοεῖ τὰ νυκτῶντα, ἡ καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα; Τὰ ψυχὴν ἔχοντα. Οἶσθα οὖν

1 γ' οὐ Badham: τῷ mss.

1 i.e. νοεῖ, "intend."
are you such an old dotard as to recollect now what we
said at first, and will you now recollect what I may
have said last year, and yet be at a loss how to deal
with the arguments urged at the moment?

Well, you see, I replied, they are so very hard,
and naturally so; for they fall from the lips of wise
men; and this is further shown by the extreme
difficulty of dealing with this last one you put forward.
For what on earth do you mean, Dionysodorus, by
saying I am at a loss how to deal with it? Or is it
clear that you mean I am at a loss how to refute it?
You must tell me what else your phrase can intend,
"at a loss how to deal with the arguments."

But it is not so very hard to deal with that phrase
of yours, he said. Just answer me.

Before you answer me, Dionysodorus? I protested.
You refuse to answer? he said.

Is it fair?

Oh yes, it is fair enough, he replied.

On what principle? I asked: or is it plainly on
this one—that you present yourself to us at this
moment as universally skilled in discussion, and thus
can tell when an answer is to be given, and when
not? So now you will not answer a word, because
you discern that you ought not to

What nonsense you talk, he said, instead of
answering as you should. Come, good sir, do as I
bid you and answer, since you confess to my wisdom.

Well then, I must obey, I said, and of necessity,
it seems; for you are the master here. Now for
your question.

Then tell me, do things that "intend" have life
when they intend, or do lifeless things do it too?

Only those that have life.
τι, ἐφη, ρήμα ψυχήν ἔχον; Μά Δι' οὐκ ἔγωγε.
Ε Τί οὖν ἄρτι ἦροι, ὁ τί μοι νοοί τὸ ρήμα; Τί ἄλλο γε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ ἔξημαρτον διὰ τὴν βλακείαν; ἢ οὐκ ἔξημαρτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς εἶπον, εἰπὼν ὅτι νοεῖ τὰ ρήματα; πότερα φῆσ ἔξαμαρτάνευ με ἢ οὐ; εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔξημαρτον, οὔδὲ σὺ ἐξελέγξεις, καίπερ σοφὸς ὢν, οὔδε ἔχεις δ' τι χρῆ τῷ λόγῳ; εἰ δ' ἔξημαρτον, οὔδ' οὔτως ὀρθῶς λέγεις, φάσκων οὐκ εἶναι ἔξαμαρτάνευ καὶ ταῦτα οὐ πρὸς ἀ πέρυσιν ἔλεγες λέγω. ἀλλὰ ἐσύκεν, ἐφην ἐγώ, ὡς Διονυσόδωρω τε καὶ Εὐθύδημη, οὔτος μὲν ὁ λόγος εὖ ταύτῳ μένειν, καὶ ἔτι ὂσπερ τὸ παλαιὸν καταβαλὼν πίπτειν, καὶ ὥστε τοῦτο μὴ πάσχειν, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας πω τέχνης ἐξευρήσαται, καὶ ταῦτα οὔτωσι βαθμαστῆς ὑπῆς εἰς ἀκριβείαι λόγων.
Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, Θαυμάσια γε λέγετ', ἐφη, Β ὃ ἄνδρες Θοῦροι εἰτε Χίοι εἶθ' ὅποθεν καὶ ὅπη χαίρετον ὄνομαζόμενον· ὡς οὐδὲν ὑμῖν μέλει τοῦ παραληρεῖν.
Καὶ ἐγὼ φοβηθεὶς, μὴ λοιδορία γένηται, πάλιν κατεπράίνον τὸν Κτήσιππον καὶ εἶπον. Ὡς Κτήσιππος τε, καὶ νῦν δὴ ἄ πρὸς Κλευνίαν ἔλεγον, καὶ πρὸς σὲ ταῦτα ταῦτα λέγω, ὃτι οὐ γιγνώσκεις τῶν ἔσων τῆς σοφίας, ὃτι θαυμασιὰ ἐστίν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθέλετον ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξασθαι σπουδάζοντε, ἀλλ' τὸν Πρωτέα μιμεῖσθον τὸν Αἰγύπτιον σοφί-

1 Cf. above, 271 c.

2 Cf. Homer, Od. iv. 385 foll. Proteus was an ancient seer of the sea who, if one could catch him as he slept on the shore and hold him fast while he transformed himself into a variety of creatures, would tell one the intentions of the gods, the fate of absent friends, etc.

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Now do you know any phrase that has life?
Upon my soul, I do not.
Why then did you ask just now what my phrase intended?

Of course I made a great mistake, I said; I am such a dullard. Or perhaps it was not a mistake, and I was right in saying what I did, that phrases intend. Do you say I was mistaken or not? If I was not, then you will not refute me, with all your skill, and you are at a loss how to deal with the argument; while if I was mistaken, you are in the wrong there, too, for you assert that there is no such thing as making a mistake; and what I say is not aimed at what you said last year. But it seems, I went on, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that our argument remains just where it was, and still suffers from the old trouble of knocking others down and then falling itself, and even your art has not yet discovered a way of avoiding this failure—in spite, too, of the wonderful show it makes of accurate reasoning.

Here Ctesippus exclaimed: Yes, your way of discussion is marvellous, you men of Thurii or Chios or wherever or however it is you are pleased to get your names; for you have no scruple about babbling like fools.

At this I was afraid we might hear some abuse, so I soothed Ctesippus down once more, saying: Ctesippus, I repeat to you what I said to Cleinias just now, that you do not perceive the wonderful nature of our visitors' skill. Only they are unwilling to give us a display of it in real earnest, but treat us to jugglers' tricks in the style of Proteus the
PLATO

C στὴν γοητεύοντε ἡμᾶς. ἡμεῖς οὖν τὸν Μενέλαον μιμώμεθα, καὶ μὴ ἄφιώμεθα τοῖς ἀνδρῶι, ἐως ἃν ἡμῖν ἐκφανῇτον, ἐφ’ ὡς αὐτῷ σπουδάζετον· οἶμαι γάρ τι αὐτοῖς πάγκαλον φανεῖται, ἐπειδὰν ἀρξώνται σπουδάζειν· ἀλλὰ δεύμεθα καὶ παρα-μυθώμεθα καὶ προσευχώμεθα αὐτοῖς ἐκφανῆναι. ἐγὼ οὖν μοι δοκῶ καὶ αὐτὸς πάλιν ὑφηγήσασθαι, οὖν προσεύχομαι αὐτῷ φανῆναι μοι· οἴδεν γὰρ

1) τὸ πρότερον ἀπελιπτὼν, τὸ ἐξῆς τούτωι πειράσομαι, ὅπως ἂν δύνωμαι, διελθεῖν, εἶν πως ἐκκαλέ-σωμαι καὶ ἐλεήσαντε με καὶ οἰκτείραντε συν-τεταμένον καὶ σπουδᾶζουτα καὶ αὐτῷ σπουδάσητον. Σὺ δὲ, ὦ Κλεινία, ἐφην, ἀνάμνησον με, πόθεν τότ’ ἀπελίπτομεν. ὅς μὲν οὖν ἐγώμαι, ἐνθένδε ποθέν. φιλοσοφητέον ὡμολογήσαμεν τελευτῶντες· ἡ γάρ; Ναὶ, ἢ δ’ ὦσ. Ὁ δὲ γε φιλοσοφία κτῆσις ἐπιστήμης· οὐχ οὕτως; ἐφην. Ναὶ, ἐφη. Τίνα ποτ’ οὖν ἂν κτησάμενοι ἐπιστήμης ὁρθῶς κτή-σαίμεθα; ἄρ’ οὐ τοῦτο μὲν ἀπλοῦν, ἦτις ἡμᾶς ὅνησε; Πάνω γ’, ἐφη. Ἄρ’ οὖν ἂν τι ἡμᾶς ὅνησειν, εἰ ἐπισταίμεθα γιγνώσκειν περιμόντες, ὅπου τῆς γῆς χρυσίον πλείστον κατορώρυκται; Ἰσως, ἐφη. Ἄλλα το πρότερον, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, τούτῳ γε ἐξηλέγξαμεν, ὅτι οὐδὲν πλέον, οὐδ’ εἰ ἂνευ πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ ὀρὺττεν τῆν γῆν τὸ πάν ἡμῖν χρυσίον γένοιτο· ὡστε οὖδ’ εἰ τὰς 289 πέτρας χρυσάς ἐπισταίμεθα ποιεῖν, οὐδενὸς ἃν

1 Cf. Hom. Od. iv. 456. 2 Cf. 282 d.
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Egyptian adept. So let us take our cue from Menelaus,¹ and not leave hold of these gentlemen till they give us a sight of their own serious business. I believe something very fine will be found in them as soon as they begin to be serious. Come, let us beg and exhort and beseech them to let their light shine. For my part, then, I am minded to take the lead once more in showing what sort of persons I pray may be revealed in them: starting from where I left off before, I shall try, as best I can, to describe what follows on from that, to see if I can rouse them to action and make them, in merciful commiseration of my earnest endeavour, be earnest themselves.

Will you, Cleinias, I asked, please remind me of the point at which we left off? Now, as far as I can tell, it was something like this: we ended by agreeing that one ought to pursue wisdom, did we not?²

Yes, he said.

And this pursuit—called philosophy—is an acquiring of knowledge. Is it not so? I asked.

Yes, he said.

Then what knowledge should we acquire if we acquired it rightly? Is it not absolutely clear that it must be that knowledge which will profit us?

Certainly, he said.

Now will it profit us at all, if we know how to tell, as we go about, where the earth has most gold buried in it?

Perhaps, he said.

But yet, I went on, we refuted that former proposition, agreeing that even if without any trouble or digging the earth we got all the gold in the world, we should gain nothing, so that not if we knew how to turn the rocks into gold would our knowledge

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άξια ἡ ἐπιστήμη, εὖ· εἰ γὰρ μὴ καὶ χρησθαι ἐπιστησόμεθα τῷ χρυσῷ, οὐδὲν ὀφελος αὐτῷ ἐφάνη ὄν· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι; ἐφην ἐγὼ. Πάνυ γ', ἐφη, μέμνημαι. Οὐδέ γε, ὡς ἐοικε, τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιστήμης ὀφελος γίγνεται οὐδέν, οὔτε χρηματιστικής οὔτε ἰατρικής οὔτε ἄλλης οὐδεμιᾶς, ἢτις ποιεῖν τι ἐπίσταται, χρησθαι δὲ μὴ ὅ ἂν ποιήσῃ οὐχ οὕτως; Συνέφη. Οὐδέ γε εἰ τις B ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, ὡστε ἀθανάτους ποιεῖν, ἀνευ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τῇ ἄθανασίᾳ χρησθαι, οὐδὲ ταύτης ἐοικεν ὀφελος οὐδὲν εἶναι, εἰ τοῖς πρόσθεν ὠμολογημένους τεκμαίρεσθαι δεῖ. Συνεδόκει ἦμιν πάντα ταύτα. Τοιαύτης τινὸς ἄρα ἦμιν ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, ὃ καλὲ παῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐν ἦ συμπεπτωκεν ἀμα τὸ τε ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι χρησθαι τούτω, ὅ ἂν ποιή. Φαίνεται, ἐφη. Πολλοὶ ἄρα δεῖ, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἦμᾶς λυροποιοὺς ἐσχ οἶναι C καὶ τοιαύτης τινὸς ἐπιστήμης ἐπηβόλους. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ὅθε χωρὶς μὲν ἡ ποιοῦσα τέχνη, χωρὶς δὲ ἡ χρωμάνη, διήρηται δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι· ἡ γὰρ λυροποιικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ πολὺ διαφέρετον ἀλλήλων· οὐχ οὕτως; Συνέφη. Οὐδὲ μὴν αὐλοποιικῆς γε δήλον ὅτι δεόμεθα· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἑτέρα τοιαύτη. Συνεδόκει. 'Αλλὰ πρὸς θεών, ἐφην ἐγὼ, εἰ τήν λυροποιικὴν τέχνην μάθομεν, 440
be of any worth. For unless we know how to use the gold, we found no advantage in it. Do you not remember? I asked.

Certainly I do, he said.

Nor, it seems, do we get any advantage from all other knowledge, whether of money-making or medicine or any other that knows how to make things, without knowing how to use the thing made. Is it not so?

He agreed.

Nor again, if there is a knowledge enabling one to make men immortal, does this, if we lack the knowledge how to use immortality, seem to bring any advantage either, if we are to infer anything from our previous admissions.

On all these points we agreed.

Then the sort of knowledge we require, fair youth, I said, is that in which there happens to be a union of making and knowing how to use the thing made.

Apparently, he said.

So we ought, it seems, to aim at something far other than being lyre-makers or possessing that kind of knowledge. For in this case the art that makes and the art that uses are quite distinct, dealing in separation with the same thing; since there is a wide difference between the art of making lyres and that of harp-playing. Is it not so?

He agreed.

Nor again, obviously, do we require an art of flute-making; for this is another of the same kind.

He assented.

Now in good earnest, I asked, if we were to learn
δρά ἐστιν αὕτη, ἢν ἐδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι; Οὐκ οἴμαι, ἔφη, ἑγώ, ὁ Κλεινίας

Di ὑπολαβῶν. Τίνι τεκμηρίω, ἢν δ’ ἑγώ, χρή;

'Ορῶ, ἔφη, τινὰς λογοποιούς, οἱ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις, οἳ αὐτοὶ ποιοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ λυροποιοὶ ταῖς λύραις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑνταῦθα ἄλλοι δυνατοὶ χρῆσθαι οἳ ἐκεῖνοι εἰργάσαντο, οἱ λογοποιεῖν αὐτοὶ ἄδυνατοι. δήλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ περὶ λόγους χωρὶς ἡ τοῦ ποιεῖν τέχνη καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρῆσθαι.

Ἰκανὸν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφην ἑγώ, τεκμηρίων λέγειν, ὅτι οὐχ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν λογοποιῶν τέχνη, ἢν ἂν κτησάμενός τις εὐδαιμόνων εἶη. καίτοι ἑγὼ ὠμην ἑνταῦθα που φανήσεθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἢν δὴ

Ἐ πάλαι ξητοῦμεν. καὶ γὰρ μοι οἱ τε ἄνδρες αὐτοὶ οἱ λογοποιοῖ, ὅταν συγγένωμαι αὐτοῖς, ὑπέρσοφοι, ὁ Κλεινία, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῇ ἡ τέχνη αὐτῶν θεσπεσία τις καὶ υψηλή. καὶ μεντοὶ οὐδὲν θαυμαστῶν· ἔστι γὰρ τῆς τῶν ἐπωδῶν τέχνης

290 μόριον σμικρῶ τε ἐκείνης ὑποδεικτέρα. ἢ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπωδῶν ἐχεῶν τε καὶ φαλαγγίων καὶ σκορπίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων τε καὶ νόσων κήλησις ἐστιν, ἢ δὲ δικαστῶν τε καὶ ἐκκλησιαστῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ῥάλων κήλησις τε καὶ παραμυθία τυγχάνει οὕτα: ἡ σοι, ἔφην ἑγώ, ἄλλως πως δοκεῖ; Οὐκ, ἂλλ’ οὕτω μοι φαίνεται, ἔφη, ὡς σὺ λέγεις. Ποί οὖν, ἔφην ἑγώ, τραποίμεθ’ ἂν ἔτι; ἐπὶ ποιαν τέχνην; Ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ εὔπορω, ἔφη. Ἔκεῖ, ἢν δ’ ἑγώ, ἐμὲ οἴμαι εὐρηκέναι. Τίνα; ἔφη ὁ

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the art of speech-making, can that be the art we should acquire if we would be happy?

I for one think not, said Cleinias, interposing.

On what proof do you rely? I asked.

I see, he said, certain speech-writers who do not know how to use the special arguments composed by themselves, just as lyre-makers in regard to their lyres: in the former case also there are other persons able to use what the makers produced, while being themselves unable to make the written speech. Hence it is clear that in speech likewise there are two distinct arts, one of making and one of using.

I think you give sufficient proof, I said, that this art of the speech-writers cannot be that whose acquisition would make one happy. And yet I fancied that somewhere about this point would appear the knowledge which we have been seeking all this while. For not only do these speech-writers themselves, when I am in their company, impress me as prodigiously clever, Cleinias, but their art itself seems so exalted as to be almost inspired. However, this is not surprising; for it is a part of the sorcerer's art, and only slightly inferior to that. The sorcerer's art is the charming of snakes and tarantulas and scorpions and other beasts and diseases, while the other is just the charming and soothing of juries, assemblies, crowds, and so forth. Or does it strike you differently? I asked.

No, it appears to me, he replied, to be as you say.

Which way then, said I, shall we turn now?

What kind of art shall we try?

For my part, he said, I have no suggestion.

Why, I think I have found it myself, I said.

What is it? said Cleinias.
Β Κλεινίας. Ἡ στρατηγικὴ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφην ἐγὼ τέχνη παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι, ἂν ἂν τὶς κτησάμενος εὐδαίμονας εἰη. Οὗκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Πῶς; ἂδι εἰγώ. Θηρευτικὴ τις ἦδε γε ἐστὶ τέχνη ἀνθρώπων. Τί δή οὖν; ἐφην ἐγώ. Οὐδεμία, ἐφη, τῆς θηρευτικῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλέον ἐστὶν ἃ ὦσον θηρεύσας καὶ χειρώσασθαί. ἐπειδὰν δὲ χειρώ-ςωνται τοῦτο, ἂ ἂν θηρεύσαμαι, οὐ δύνανται τούτῳ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν κυνηγῶταί καὶ οἱ ἀλιεῖς τοῖς ὑμμοῦροις παραδιδόσαν, οἱ δ’ αὖ γεωμέτραι καὶ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι καὶ οἱ λογιστικοὶ—

γ) θηρευτικοὶ γάρ εἰσι καὶ οὐτοὶ οὗ γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὰ διαγράμματα ἕκαστοι τούτων, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ἀνεφριζοῦσι—ἀτε οὖν χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐπι-στάμενοι, ἀλλὰ θηρεύσας μόνον, παραδιδόσα δήπου τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς καταχρῆσθαι αὐτῶν τοῖς εὐρή-μασιν, ὅσοι γε αὐτῶν μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνόητοι εἰσιν.

Ἐξέν, ἂδι εἰγώ, ὡ κάλλιστε καὶ σοφώτατε Κλεινία· τοῦτο οὖτως ἔχει.

Πάνω μὲν οὖν· καὶ οἱ γε στρατηγοὶ, ἐφη, οὔτω τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἐπειδὰν ἢ πόλιν τινὰ θηρεύσων-

ται ἢ στρατόπεδον, παραδιδόσα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀνδράσιν· αὐτοὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι τούτοις, ἄ εθήρευσαν· ἄντερ, οἴμαι, οἱ ὀρτυγο-θήραι τοῖς ὀρτυγοτρόφοις παραδιδόσαν· εἰ οὖν, ἂδι ὅς, δεόμεθα ἀκείνης τῆς τέχνης, ἢτις ὃ ἂν κτήσηται ἢ ποιήσασα ἢ θηρευσαμένη αὐτῇ καὶ ἐπιστήσεται χρῆσθαι, καὶ ἢ τοιαύτη ποιῆσει ἡμᾶς μακαρίους, ἀλλὰν δὴ τινα, ἐφη, ξηπητεόν ἀντὶ τῆς στρατηγικῆς.

1 i.e. geometers etc. are not to be regarded as mere makers of diagrams, these being only the necessary and 444
Generalship, I replied, strikes me as the art whose acquisition above all others would make one happy.

I do not think so. Why not? I asked.

In a sense, this is an art of hunting men.

What then? I said.

No part of actual hunting, he replied, covers more than the province of chasing and overcoming; and when they have overcome the creature they are chasing, they are unable to use it: the huntsmen or the fishermen hand it over to the caterers, and so it is too with the geometers, astronomers, and calculators—for these also are hunters in their way, since they are not in each case diagram-makers, but discover the realities of things—and so, not knowing how to use their prey, but only how to hunt, I take it they hand over their discoveries to the dialecticians to use properly, those of them, at least, who are not utter blockheads.

Very good, I said, most handsome and ingenious Cleinias; and is this really so?

To be sure it is; and so, in the same way, with the generals. When they have hunted either a city or an army, they hand it over to the politicians—since they themselves do not know how to use what they have hunted—just as quail-hunters, I suppose, hand over their birds to the quail-keepers. If, therefore, he went on, we are looking for that art which itself shall know how to use what it has acquired either in making or chasing, and if this is the sort that will make us blest, we must reject generalship, he said, and seek out some other.

common machinery for their real business, the discovery of mathematical and other abstract truths.
Ε κρι. Τί λέγεις ού, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκείνο τὸ μειράκιον τοιαύτ᾽ ἐφθέγξατο;

σπ. Οὐκ οἶει, ὦ Κρῖτων;

κρι. Μὰ Δί, οὐ μέντοι. οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐγώ, εἰ ταὐτ᾽ εἴπεν, οὔτ᾽ Εὐθυδήμου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἐτ᾽ ἄνθρωπον δείσθαι εἰς παιδείαν.

σπ. Ἄλλα ἁρα, ὦ πρὸς Διός, μὴ ὡς Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ ταύτ᾽ εἴπων, ἔγω δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι;

291 κρι. Ποίος Κτήσιππος;

σπ. Ἄλλα μὴν τὸ γε εὖ οἶδα, ὅτι οὔτε Εὐθυδήμου οὔτε Διονυσόδωρος ἦν ὁ εἰπὼν ταῦτα. ἄλλα, ὡς δαμόνια Κρῖτων, μὴ τῶν κρειττόνων παρὰν αὐτὰ ἐφθέγξατο; ὅτι γὰρ ἤκουσά γε ταῦτα, εὖ οἶδα.

κρι. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες τῶν κρειττόνων μέντοι τις ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ πολὺ γε. ἄλλα μετὰ τοῦτο ἔτι τινὰ ἐξητήσατε τέχνην; καὶ ἥπετε ἐκείνην ἢ οὐχ ἥπετε, ἢς ἕνεκα ἐξητεῖτε;

Β σπ. Πόθεν, ὦ μακάρε, εὐρομεν; ἄλλῃ ἤμεν πάνυ γελοίοι, ὥσπερ τὰ παιδία τὰ τοὺς κορίδους διώκοντα· ἀεὶ ὧμεθα ἐκάστην τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὐτίκα λήψεθαι, αἰ δ᾽ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέφυγον. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ τί ἀν σοι λέγομι; ἐπὶ δὲ δὴ τὴν βασιλικήν ἐλθόντες τέχνην καὶ διασκοποούμενοι αὐτὴν, εἰ αὐτὴ εἰη ὡς τὴν εὐδαμονίαν παρέχουσα τε καὶ ἀπεργαζομενὴν, ἐνταῦθα ὅσπερ εἰς λαβύρινθον ἐμπεσόντες, οἴμοινον ἤδη ἐπὶ τέλει εἶναι, περὶ...

C κάμψατες πάλιν ὅσπερ ἐν ἄρχῃ τῆς ζητήσεως ἀνεφάνημεν ὄντες καὶ τοῦ ἱσον δεόμενοι, ὄσονπερ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐξητούμεν.

κρι. Πῶς δὴ τοῦτο ὑμῖν συνέβη, ὦ Σώκρατες;
EUTHYDEMUS

cri. What is this, Socrates? Such a pronouncement from that stripling!

soc. You do not believe it is his, Crito?

cri. I should rather think not. For I am sure, if he spoke thus, he has no need of education from Euthydemus or anyone else.

soc. But then, Heaven help me! I wonder if it was Ctesippus who said it, and my memory fails me.

cri. Very like Ctesippus!

soc. Well, of this at any rate I am certain, that it was neither Euthydemus nor Dionysodorus who said it. Tell me, mysterious Crito, was it some superior power that was there to speak it? For that speech I heard, I am sure.

cri. Yes, I promise you, Socrates: I fancy it was indeed some superior power—very much so. But after that, did you go on looking for a suitable art? Did you find the one which you had as the object of your search, or not?

soc. Find it, my good fellow! No, we were in a most ridiculous state; like children who run after crested larks, we kept on believing each moment we were just going to catch this or that one of the knowledges, while they as often slipped from our grasp. What need to tell you the story at length? When we reached the kingly art, and were examining it to see if we had here what provides and produces happiness, at this point we were involved in a labyrinth: when we supposed we had arrived at the end, we twisted about again and found ourselves practically at the beginning of our search, and just as sorely in want as when we first started on it.

cri. How did this happen to you, Socrates?
PLATO

ἐπ. Ἐγώ φράσω. ἐδοξε γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη ἡ αὐτή εἶναι.
κρι. Τί οὖν δή;
ἐπ. Ταύτη τῇ τέχνῃ ή τε στρατηγικῇ καὶ αἱ ἀλλαὶ παραδίδοναι ἄρχειν τῶν ἔργων, ὃν αὐταὶ δημιουργοὶ εἰσιν, ὡς μόνη ἐπισταμένη χρῆσθαι. σαφῶς οὖν ἔδοκει ἡμῖν αὐτῇ εἶναι, ἢν ἐξητοῦμεν,

καὶ ἡ αἰτία τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸ Αἰσχύλου ἱαμβεῖον μόνη ἐν τῇ πρύμνῃ καθῆσαι τῆς πόλεως, πάντα κυβερνώσα καὶ πάντων ἄρχουσα πάντα χρήσιμα ποιεῖν.
κρι. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς ἡμῖν ἔδοκεί, ὡς Σώκρατες;
ἐπ. Σὺ κρυνεῖς, ὃς Κρίτων, ἐὰν βούλῃ ἀκοῦειν καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα συμβάντα ἡμῖν. ἀδίκως γὰρ δὴ πάλιν ἐσκοπούμεν ὡδὲ πως. Φέρε, πάντων ἄρχουσα ἡ βασιλική τέχνη τι ἡμῖν ἀπεργάζεται

Ε ἔργον, ἡ οὐδὲν; Πάντως δήποτε, ἡμεῖς ἐφαμεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Οὐ καὶ σὺ ἂν ταῦτα φαίης, ὃς Κρίτων;
κρι. Ἐγώγε.
ἐπ. Τί οὖν ἂν φαίης αὐτῆς ἔργου εἶναι; ὡσπερ εἰ σὲ ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶμην, πάντων ἄρχουσα ἡ ἱατρική, ὃν ἄρχει, τί ἔργου παρέχεται; οὐ τὴν ὑγείαν φαίης;
κρι. Ἐγώγε.
ἐπ. Τί δε; ἡ ὑμετέρα τέχνῃ ἡ γεωργία, πάντων ἄρχουσα, ὃν ἄρχει, τί ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται; οὐ τὴν τροφὴν ἂν φαίης τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς παρέχειν ἡμῖν;
κρι. Ἐγώγε.

1 Cf. Aesch. Septem, 2 “Whoso at helm of the state keeps watch upon affairs, guiding the tiller without resting his eyelids in sleep.”

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socr. I will tell you. We took the view that the statesman's and the monarch's arts were one and the same.

cr. Well, what then?
socr. To this art, we thought, generalship and the other arts handed over the management of the productions of their own trades, as this one alone knew how to use them. So it seemed clear to us that this was the one we were seeking, and was the cause of right conduct in the state, and precisely as Aeschylus' line \(^1\) expresses it, is seated alone at the helm of the city, steering the whole, commanding the whole, and making the whole useful.

cr. And surely your notion was a good one, Socrates?
socr. You shall judge of that, Crito, if you care to hear what befell us thereafter. For later on we reconsidered it somewhat in this manner: Look now, does the monarch's art, that rules over all, produce any effect or not? Certainly it does, of course, we said to one another. Would you not say so too, Crito?

cr. I would.
socr. Then what would you say is its effect? For instance, if I were to ask you whether medicine, in ruling over all that comes under its rule, has any effect to show; would you not say: Yes, health?

cr. I would.
socr. And what about your art of agriculture? In ruling over all that comes under its rule, what effect does it produce? Would you not say that it supplies us with food from the earth?

cr. I would.
PLATO

υν. Τί δέ; ἡ βασιλική πάντων ἄρχουσα, ὅν ἄρχει, τί ἀπεργάζεται; ἦσος οὐ πάνυ γ' εὐπορεῖς.

κρι. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὥ Σώκρατες.

υν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἥμεις, ὥ Κρήτων. ἅλλα τοσόνδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι εἴπερ ἐστὶν αὐτῇ ἢν ἥμεις ξητοῦμεν, ὥφελιμον αὐτὴν δεὶ εἶναι.

κρι. Πάντα γε.

υν. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸν γέ τι δεὶ ἥμιν αὐτὴν παραδίδοναι;

κρι. Ἀνάγκη, ὥ Σώκρατες.

Β. υν. Ἀγαθὸν δέ γέ που ὠμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλους ἐγὼ τε καὶ Κλεινίας οὐδὲν εἶναι ἀλλο ἡ ἐπιστήμην τινά.

κρι. Ναί, οὕτως ἔλεγες.

υν. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἅλλα ἔργα, ἃ φαίνῃ ἂν τις πολιτικῆς εἶναι—πολλὰ δέ που ταῦτ' ἂν εἶν, οἶνον πλουσίους τοὺς πολίτας παρέχειν καὶ ἐλευθέρους καὶ ἀστασιαστός—πάντα ταῦτα οὔτε κακὰ οὔτε ἀγαθὰ ἐφάνη, ἐδει δὲ σοφοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ ἐπιστήμης μεταδίδοναι, εἴπερ ἐμελλεῖν αὐτῇ εἶναι ἡ ὥφελοῦσά C τε καὶ εὐδαίμονας ποιοῦσα.

κρι. Ἐστι ταῦτα: τότε γοῦν οὕτως ὑμῖν ὠμολογήθη, ὡς σὺ τοὺς λόγους ἀπῆγγελας.

υν. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡ βασιλικὴ σοφοὺς ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς;

κρι. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὥ Σώκρατες;

υν. Ἀλλ' ἀρα πάντας καὶ πάντα ἄγαθοὺς; καὶ πάσαν ἐπιστήμην, σκυτοτομικὴν τε καὶ τεκτονικήν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας, αὐτὴ ἡ παραδιδοῦσά ἐστίν;

κρι. Οὐκ οἴμαι ἐγώγη, ὥ Σώκρατες.

D. υν. Ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἐπιστήμην; ἥ τί χρησόμεθα,

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coc. And what of the monarch’s art? In ruling over all that comes under its rule, what does it produce? Perhaps you are not quite ready with the answer.

cr. I am not indeed, Socrates.

coc. Nor were we, Crito; yet so much you know, that if this is really the one we are seeking, it must be beneficial.

cr. Certainly.

coc. Then surely it must purvey something good?

cr. Necessarily, Socrates.

coc. And you know we agreed with each other, Cleinias and I, that nothing can be good but some sort of knowledge.

cr. Yes, so you told me.

coc. And it was found that all effects in general that you may ascribe to statesmanship—and a great many of them there must be, presumably, if the citizens are to be made wealthy and free and immune from faction—all these things were neither bad nor good, while this art must make us wise and impart knowledge, if it really was to be the one which benefited us and made us happy.

cr. True: so at all events you agreed then, by your account of the discussion.

coc. Then do you think that kingship makes men wise and good?

cr. Why not, Socrates?

coc. But does it make all men good, and in all things? And is this the art that confers every sort of knowledge—shoe-making and carpentry and so forth?

cr. No, I think not, Socrates.

coc. Well, what knowledge does it give? What
τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἔργων οὖν ὁδεγὸς δεὶ αὐτὴν δημιουργὸν εἶναι τῶν µῆτε κακῶν µῆτε ἀγαθῶν, ἐπιστήµην δὲ παραδιδόναι µηδεµίαν ἄλλην ἢ αὐτὴν ἕαυτὴν. λέγωµεν δὴ οὖν, τίς ποτε ἐστὶν αὐτή, ἢ τί χρησώ-µεθα; βούλει φῶµεν, ὃ κρῖτων, ἢ ἄλλους ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσοµεν;
κρι. Πάνω γε.

σφ. Οἶ τί ἐσονται ἡµῖν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ τί χρήσιµοι; ἢ ἐτὶ λέγωµεν, ὅτι ἄλλους ποιήσουσιν, οἴ δὲ ἄλλοι ἐκεῖνοι ἄλλους; ὃ τί δὲ ποτε ἀγαθοὶ εἶσιν, οὐδαµοὶ ἢµῖν φαῖνονται, ἐπειδήπερ τὰ ἔργα τὰ λεγόµενα εἶναι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡτµάσαµεν, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόµενον δ' Σὺς Κόρυθος γίγνεται, καὶ ὅπερ ἔλεγον, τοῦ ίσου ήµῖν ἐνδεί ἢ ἐτὶ πλέονος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι, τίς ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήµη ἐκεῖνη, ἢ ήµᾶς εὐδαίµονας ποιήσει;
κρι. Νη τὸν Δία, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰς πολλὴν γε ἀπορίαν, ὥς ἐοικέν, ἀφίκεσθε.

σφ. "Ἐγώγε οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὃ κρῖτων, ἐπειδὴ 293 ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἐνεπεπτώκη, πᾶσαν ἡδὴ φωνὴν ἡφίεν, δεόµενος τοῖν ξένον ὅσπερ Διοσ-κούρων ἐπικαλούµενος σώσαι ήµᾶς, ἐµὲ τε καὶ τὸ µειράκιον, ἐκ τῆς τρικυµίας τοῦ λόγου, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ σπουδάσαι, καὶ σπουδάσαντας ἐπι-δείξαι, τίς ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήµη, ἢς τυχόντες ἀν καλῶς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον διέλθωμεν.
κρι. Τί οὖν; ἡθέλησε τι ύµῖν ἐπιδείξαι ὁ Ἐυθύδηµος;

1 Cf. Pindar, Nem. vii. fin. Megara, a colony of Corinth, revolted, and when the Corinthians appealed to the sentiment attaching to Corinthus, the mythical founder of Megara, 452
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use can we make of it? It is not to be a producer of any of the effects which are neither bad nor good, while it is to confer no other knowledge but itself. Shall we try and say what it is, and what use we shall make of it? Do you mind if we describe it, Crito, as that whereby we shall make other men good?

cri. I quite agree.

soc. And in what respect are we going to have these men good, and in what useful? Or shall we venture to say they are to make others so, and these again others? In what respect they can possibly be good is nowhere evident to us, since we have discredited all the business commonly called politics, and it is merely a case of the proverbial "Corinthus Divine"; and, as I was saying, we are equally or even worse at fault as to what that knowledge can be which is to make us happy.

cri. Upon my word, Socrates, you got yourselves there, it seems, into a pretty fix.

soc. So then I myself, Crito, finding I had fallen into this perplexity, began to exclaim at the top of my voice, beseeching the two strangers as though I were calling upon the Heavenly Twins to save us, the lad and myself, from the mighty wave of the argument, and to give us the best of their efforts, and this done, to make plain to us what that knowledge can be of which we must get hold if we are to spend the remainder of our lives in a proper way.

cri. Well, did Euthydemus consent to propound anything for you?

the Megarians drove them off, taunting them with using a "vain repetition."

2 Lit. "the big wave that comes in every three."
Πλάτων. Πώς γάρ οὖ; καὶ ήρεματό γε, ὃ ἑταῖρε, πάνυ μεγαλοφρόνως τοῦ λόγου οὕδε·

Β Πότερον δὴ σε, ἐφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην, περὶ ἣν πάλαι ἀπορεῖτε, διδάξω, ἡ ἐπιδείξω ἔχοντα; Ὡ μακάριε, ἂν δ’ ἔγω, ἔστι δὲ ἐπὶ σοὶ τοῦτο; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Ἐπίδειξον τοῖνυν με νὴ Δί’, ἐφην ἔγω, ἔχοντα: πολὺ γὰρ ρᾶον ἡ μανθάνει τηλικόνδε ἄνδρα. Φέρε δὴ μοι ἀπόκριναι, ἐφη· ἐστιν δ’ τι ἐπίστασαι; Πάνυ γε, ἂν δ’ ἔγω, καὶ πολλά, σμικρά γε. Ἀρκεῖ, ἐφη. ἄρ’ οὖν δοκεῖς οἷὸν τέ τι τῶν ὄντων τοῦτο, ἰ τυγχάνει όν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι; Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί’ οὐκ ἔγωγε. Οὐκοῦν οὐ, ἐφης, ἐπίστασαι τι; Ἐγώγε. Οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμων εἶ, εἴπερ ἐπίστασαι; Πάνυ γε, τοῦτο γε αὐτοῦ. Οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἀλλ’ οἷκ ἀνάγκη σε ἔχει πάντα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμωνα γε ὄντα; Μὰ Δί’, ἐφην ἔγω· ἐπεὶ πολλὰ ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τι μὴ ἐπίστασαι, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἰ. Ἐκεῖνον γε, ὁ φίλε, ἂν δ’ ἔγω. Ἡττον οὖν τι, ἐφη, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἰ; ἀρτι δὲ ἐπιστήμων ἐφησθα εἶναι. θν καὶ οὖτω τυγχάνεις ὃν αὐτὸς οὕτος, ὅσ εἰ, καὶ

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sor. Why, certainly; and he began his discourse, 
my good friend, in this very lofty-minded fashion:
Would you rather, Socrates, that I instructed you 
as to this knowledge which has baffled you all this 
while, or propound that you have it?
O gifted sir, I exclaimed, and have you the power 
to do this?
Certainly I have, he replied.
Then for Heaven's sake, I cried, propound that I 
have it! This will be much easier than learning 
for a man of my age.
Come then, answer me this, he said: Do you 
know anything?
Yes, indeed, I replied. and many things, though 
trifles.
That is enough, he said; now do you think it 
possible that anything that is should not be just that 
which it actually is?
On my soul, not I.
Now you, he said, know something?
I do.
Then you are knowing, if you really know?
Certainly, in just that something.
That makes no difference; you are not under 
a necessity of knowing everything, if you are 
knowing?
No, to be sure, I replied; for there are many other 
things which I do not know.
Then if you do not know something, you are not 
knowing?
Not in that thing, my dear sir. I replied
Are you therefore any the less unknowing? Just 
now you said you were knowing; so here you are, 
actually the very man that you are, and again,
αὖ πάλιν οὐκ εἶ, κατὰ ταῦτα ἀμα. Ἐλευ, ἢν δ′ ἐγὼ, Εὐθύδημε· τὸ γὰρ λεγόμενον, καλὰ δὴ πάντα λέγεις· πῶς οὖν ἐπίσταμαι ἑκεῖνη τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἢν ἐξητούμεν; ὡς δὴ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ· εἶπερ ἐν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀπαντά ἐπίσταμαι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰθεν ἐπιστήμων τε καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων ἀμα· ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι, κάκεινην δὴ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχω· ἀρα οὕτως λέγεις, καὶ τοῦτο ἐστι τὸ σοφὸν;

Ε Αὐτὸς σαῦτον γε δὴ ἐξελέγχεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. 
Τί δὲ, ἢν δ′ ἐγὼ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, σὺ οὐ πέπονθας τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος; ἐγὼ γὰρ τοι μετὰ σοῦ ὅτι οὐν ἄν πάσχων καὶ μετὰ Διονυσιώδουρον τοῦδε, φίλης κεφαλῆς, οὐκ ἄν πάνυ ἀγανακτοῖν. εἰπὲ μοι, σφῶ οὐχί τὰ μὲν ἐπίστασθοι τῶν ὄντων, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐπίστασθοι; “Ἡκιστά γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσιώδωρος. Πῶς λέγετον; ἔφην ἐγὼ· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἀρα ἐπίστασθον; Καί μάλα, ἢ δ’ ὦς.

294 Πάντ’ ἀρα, ἔφην ἐγὼ, ἐπίστασθον, ἐπειδῆπερ καὶ ὅτιοι; Πάντ’, ἔφη· καὶ σὺ γε προς, εἶπερ καὶ ἐν ἐπίστασαι, πάντα ἐπίστασαι. Ὡ Ζεὺς, ἔφην ἐγὼ, ὅς θαυμαστὸν λέγεις καὶ ἀγαθὸν μέγα πεφάνθαι. μῶν καὶ οἱ ἀλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι πάντ’ ἐπίστανται, ἢ οὐδέν; Οὐ γὰρ δὴπου, ἔφη, τὰ μὲν ἐπίστανται, τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἐπίστανται, καὶ εἰσὶν ἀμα ἐπιστήμονες τε καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονες. 456
not that man, in regard to the same matter and at the same time!

Admitted, Euthydemus, I said: as the saying goes, "well said whate'er you say." How therefore do I know that knowledge which we were seeking? Since forsooth it is impossible for the same thing to be so and not be so; by knowing one thing I know all;—for I could not be at once both knowing and unknowing;—and as I know everything I have that knowledge to boot: is that your line of argument? Is this your wisdom?

Yes, you see, Socrates, he said, your own words refute you.

Well, but, Euthydemus, I continued, are you not in the same plight? I assure you, so long as I had you and this dear fellow Dionysodorus to share my lot, however hard, I should have nothing to complain of. Tell me, you both know some existent things, of course, and others you do not?

By no means, Socrates, said Dionysodorus. How do you mean? I asked: do you then not know anything?

Oh yes, we do, he said.

So you know everything, I asked, since you know anything?

Everything, he replied; yes, and you too, if you know one thing, know all.

Good Heavens, I cried, what a wonderful statement! What a great blessing to boast of! And the rest of mankind, do they know everything or nothing?

Surely, he said, they cannot know some things and not others, and so be at once knowing and unknowing.
'Αλλά τί; ἢν δ' ἔγω. Πάντες, ἢ δ' ὅσ, πάντα ἐπιστανται, εἴπερ καὶ ἔν. ἌΩ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, Β ἢν δ' ἔγω, ὡ Διονυσόδωρος· δήλοι γάρ μοι ἔστοι ἦδη ὅτι σπουδάζετον, καὶ μόλις ύμάς προοκαλεσάμην σπουδάζειν· αὐτῷ τῷ ὄντι πάντα ἐπιστασθον; οἶνον τεκτονικῆν καὶ σκυτικῆν; Πάνυ γ', ἐφη. Ἡ καὶ νευρορραφεῖν δυνατῶ ἔστον; Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία καττύειν, ἐφη. Ἡ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς ἀστέρας, ὑπὸ σοι εἰσί, καὶ τὴν ἁμμον; Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅσ· εἴτ' οὐκ ἄν οἱεὶ ὀμολογήσαι ύμᾶς;

Καὶ ὁ Κτησίππος ὑπολαβὼν· Πρὸς Διός, Κ ἐφη. Διονυσόδωρος, τεκμηρίων τί μοι τούτων ἐπιδείξατον τοιόνδε, ὃ εἰσομαι, ὅτι ἁληθῆ λέγετον. Τί ἐπιδείξω; ἐφη. Οἶσθα Εὐθύδημον, ὑπὸ σος ὁδόντας ἔχει, καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὑπὸ σος σὺ;

Οὐκ ἔξαρκεὶ σοι, ἐφη, ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι πάντα ἐπιστάμεθα;

Μηδαμῶς, ἢ δ' ὅσ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἐτὶ ἡμῖν μόνον εἰπατον καὶ ἐπιδείξατον, ὅτι ἁληθῆ λέγετον· καὶ ἐὰν εἰπητον, ὑπὸ σος ἐκάτερος ἔχει ύμῶν, καὶ φαίνησθε γνώντες ἡμῶν ἁριθμησάντων, ἦδη πεισομέθα ύμῶν καὶ τάλλα.

Δ 'Ἡγουμένω οὐν σκώπτεσθαι οὐκ ἴθελέτην, ἀλλ' ὀμολογησάτην πάντα χρήματα ἐπισταθαι, καθ' ἐν ἐκαστον ἐρωτῶμενοι ὑπὸ Κτησίππου. ὁ γὰρ 458
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But what then? I asked.
All men, he replied, know all things, if they know one.
In the name of goodness, Dionysodorus, I said—
for now I can see both of you are serious; before,
I could hardly prevail on you to be so—do you
yourselves really know everything? Carpentry, for
instance, and shoe-making?
Certainly, he said.
And you are good hands at leather-stitching?
Why yes, in faith, and cobbling, he said.
And are you good also at such things as counting
the stars, and the sand?
Certainly, he said: can you think we would not
admit that also?
Here Ctesippus broke in: Be so good, Diony-
sodorus, he said, as to place some such evidence
before me as will convince me that what you say
is true.
What shall I put forward? he asked.
Do you know how many teeth Euthydemus has,
and does Euthydemus know how many you have?
Are you not content, he rejoined, to be told that
we know everything?
No, do not say that, he replied: only tell us this
one thing more, and propound to us that you speak
the truth. Then, if you tell us how many teeth each
of you has, and you are found by our counting to
have known it, we shall believe you thenceforth in
everything else likewise.
Well, as they supposed we were making fun of
them, they would not do it: only they agreed that
they knew all subjects, when questioned on them,
one after the other, by Ctesippus; who, before he
Κτήσιππος πάνω ἀπαρακαλύπτως οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐκ ἠρώτα τελευτῶν, καὶ τὰ αἰσχυστα, εἰ ἐπισταῖ-σθην· τῷ δὲ ἀνδρειότατα ὀμόσε ἤτην τοῖς ἔρωτή-μασιν, ὀμολογοῦντες εἰδέναι, ὥσπερ οἱ κάπροι οἱ πρὸς τὴν πληγήν ὀμόσε αὐθούμενοι, ἄστ᾽ ἔγνως καὶ αὐτὸς, ὦ Κρίτων, ὅτι ἀπιστίας ἡγακάσθην τελευτῶν ἐρέσθαι [τὸν Εὐθύδημον], ἐι καὶ ὅρχει- 

Ε σθαὶ ἐπίστατο ὁ Διονυσόδωρος· ὁ δὲ, Πάνυ, ἔφη. Οὐ δήπου, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἐς μαχαίρας γε κυβιστὰν καὶ ἐπὶ τροχοῦ δινεῖσθαι τηλικοῦτος ὧν, οὔτω πόρρω σοφίας ἤκεις; Οὐδέν, ἔφη, ὅ τι οὐ. Πότερον δὲ, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πάντα νῦν μόνον ἐπιστάσθην ἢ καὶ ἀεί; Καὶ ἀεί, ἔφη. Καὶ ὅτε παιδία ἠστὴν καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι ἠπίστασθε; Πάντα, ἔφατην ἀμα ἀμφοτέρω.

295 Καὶ ἢμῖν μὲν ἀπιστὸν ἐδόκει τὸ πράγμα εἶναι· ὅ δὲ Εὐθύδημος, Ἀπιστεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σωκράτες; Πλὴν γ᾽ ὅτι, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς ἐστὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι. Ἀλλ᾽ ἢν, ἔφη, ἐθελήσῃς μοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω καὶ σὲ ταῦτα τὰ θαυμαστὰ ὀμολο- 

gοῦντα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, ἡδίστα ταῦτα ἐξελέγχομαι. εἰ γὰρ τοῦ λέληθα ἐμαυτὸν σοφὸς ὧν, σὺ δὲ τοῦτο ἐπιδείξεις ὡς πάντα ἐπισταμαι καὶ ἀεί, τί μείζων ἔρμαιον αὐτὸῦ ἄν εὐρομι ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ;

Ἀποκρίνου δή, ἔφη. Ὡς ἀποκρινουμένου

1 τὸν Εὐθύδημον secl. Hermann.
2 ἢν δ᾽ add. Cornarius.
EUTHYDEMUS

had done with them, asked them if they knew every kind of thing, even the most unseemly, without the least reserve; while they most valiantly encountered his questions, agreeing that they had the knowledge in each case, like boars when driven up to face the spears: so that I for my part, Crito, became quite incredulous, and had to ask in the end if Dionysodorus knew also how to dance. To which he replied: Certainly.

I do not suppose, I said, that you have attained such a degree of skill as to do sword-dancing, or be whirled about on a wheel, at your time of life?

There is nothing, he said, that I cannot do.

Then tell me, I went on, do you know everything at present only, or for ever?

For ever too, he said.

And when you were children, and were just born, you knew?

Everything, they both replied together.

Now, to us the thing seemed incredible: then Euthydemus said: You do not believe it, Socrates?

I will only say, I replied, that you must indeed be clever.

Why, he said, if you will consent to answer me, I will propound that you too admit these surprising facts.

Oh, I am only too glad, I replied, to be refuted in the matter. For if I am not aware of my own cleverness, and you are going to show me that I know everything always, what greater stroke of luck than this could befall me in all my living days?

Then answer me, he said.

Ask: I am ready to answer.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

Β ἔρωτα. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σῶκρατεσ, ἐπιστήμων του εἴ ἢ οὖ; Ἔγωγε. Πότερον οὖν ὦ ἐπιστήμων εἴ, τούτῳ καὶ ἐπιστάσαι, ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ; Ὡμι ἐπιστήμων. οἴμαι γάρ σε τὴν ψυχὴν λέγειν· ἢ οὐ τούτῳ λέγεις; Οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, ἔφη, ὦ Σῶκρατες; ἐρωτώμενος ἀντερωτᾶς; Εἶπεν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ· ἄλλα πῶς ποιῶ; οὕτω γάρ ποιήσω, ὡπως ἂν σὺ κελεύῃς. ὅταν μὴ εἰδῶ ὦ τι ἐρωτᾶς, κελεύεις με ὅμως ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἄλλα μὴ ἑπανερέσθαι; Ἑπολαμ.

C βάνεις γὰρ δήποτε τι, ἔφη, ὦ λέγω; Ἔγωγε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. Πρὸς τούτῳ τοίνυν ἀποκρίνου, ὦ ὑπολαμβάνεις. Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἂν σὺ μὲν ἄλλῃ ἐρωτᾷς διανοούμενος, ἐγώ δὲ ἄλλῃ ὑπολάβω, ἐπειτὰ πρὸς τούτῳ ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἐξαρκεῖ σοι, ἐὰν μηδὲν πρὸς ἐπος ἀποκρίνωμαι; Ἐμοιγε, ἢ δ' ὦς· οὐ μέντοι σοί γε, ὡς ἐγώμαι. Οὔ τοίνυν μὰ Δία ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, πρότερον, πρὶν ἂν πῦθωμαι. Οὐκ ἀποκρινῇ, ἔφη, πρὸς ὦ ἂν ἄει ὑπολαμβάνης,

D ὅτι ἔχων φλυαρεῖς καὶ ἀρχαιότερος εἰ τοῦ δέοντος.

Κάγω ἔγνων αὐτὸν ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνοι διαστέλλοντι τὰ λεγόμενα, βουλόμενος με θηρεύσαι τὰ ὄνομα περιστήσασ. ἀνεμνήσθην οὖν τοῦ Κόννου, ὅτι μοι κάκείνος χαλεπαίνει ἑκάστοτε, ὅταν αὐτῷ μὴ ὑπείκω, ἐπειτὰ μου ἦττον ἐπὶ- 462
EUTHYDEMUS

Well then, Socrates, he asked, have you knowledge of something, or not?
I have.
And tell me, do you know with that whereby you have knowledge, or with something else?
With that whereby I have knowledge: I think you mean the soul, or is not that your meaning?
Are you not ashamed, Socrates, he said, to ask a question on your side when you are being questioned?
Very well, I said: but how am I to proceed? I will do just as you bid me. When I cannot tell what you are asking, is it your order that I answer all the same, without asking a question upon it?
Why, he replied, you surely conceive some meaning in what I say?
I do, I replied.
Answer then to the meaning you conceive to be in my words.
Well, I said, if you ask a question with a different meaning in your mind from that which I conceive, and I answer to the latter, are you content I should answer nothing to the point?
For my part, he replied, I shall be content: you, however, will not, so far as I can see.
Then I declare I shall not answer, I said, before I get it right.
You refuse to answer, he said, to the meaning you conceive in each case, because you will go on drivel-ling, you hopeless old dotard!
Here I perceived he was annoyed with me for distinguishing between the phrases used, when he wanted to entrap me in his verbal snares. So I remembered Connus, how he too is annoyed with me whenever I do not give in to him, with the
μελείται ώς ἀμαθοὺς οὕτως· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐν διενενοῆμνη καὶ παρὰ τούτων φοιτᾶν, ὑήθην δὲιν ὑπείκειν, μὴ μὲ σκαίδων ἤγησάμενος φοιτήτην μὴ προσ-δέχοιτο. εἶπον οὖν. Ἄλλ’ εἰ δοκεῖ σοι, Ἐφιθύδημε, ἔ οὐτω ποιεῖν, ποιητέον· σὺ γὰρ πάντως που κάλ-λιν ἐπίστασαι διαλέγεσθαι ἦ ἐγὼ, τέχνην ἔχων ἰδιώτου ἀνθρώπου· ἔρωτα οὖν πάλιν εἶ ἄρχης.

'Αποκρίνου δὴ, ἐφη, πάλιν, πότερον ἐπίστασαι τῷ ἐπίστασαι, ἦ οὖ; "Ἐγώγε, ἐφην, τῇ γε ψυχῇ.

296 οὐτος αὐ, ἐφη, προσαποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτω-μένοις. οὐ γὰρ ἐγώγε ἐρωτῶν ὅτω, ἄλλ’ εἰ ἐπίστασαι τῷ. Πλέον αὐ, ἐφην ἐγώ, τοῦ δέοντος ἀπεκρινάμην ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας. ἄλλα συγ-γίγνωσκε μοι· ἀποκρινοῦμαι γὰρ ἥδη ἀπλῶς ὅτι ἐπίσταμαι τῷ ἐπίσταμαι. Πότερον, ἦ δ’ ὅς, τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ γ’ ἄει, ἦ ἐστι μὲν ὅτε τούτῳ, ἐστι δὲ ὅτε ἐτέρῳ; 'Αεί, ὅταν ἐπίστωμαι, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, τούτῳ. οὐκ αὖ, ἐφη, παύσει παραφθεγόμενος;

Β Ἀλλ’ ὅπως μὴ τι ἡμᾶς σφαλεῖ τὸ ἁεὶ τούτῳ. Ὁὐκοῦν ἡμᾶς γε, ἐφη, ἄλλ’ εἴπερ, σε. ἄλλ’ ἀποκρίνου· ἦ ἁεὶ τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι; 'Αεί, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἐπειδὴ δεὶ ἀφελεῖν τὸ ὅταν. Οὐκοῦν ἁεὶ μὲν τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι· ἁεὶ δ’ ἐπιστάμενος πότερον

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result that he now takes less trouble over me as being a stupid person. So being minded to take lessons from this new teacher, I decided that I had better give in, lest he should take me for a blockhead and not admit me to his classes. So I said: Well, if you think fit, Euthydemus, to proceed thus, we must do so; in any case I suppose you understand debating better than I do—you are versed in the method, and I am but a layman. Begin your questions, then, over again.

Now, answer me once more, he said: do you know what you know by means of something, or not?

I do, I replied; by means of my soul.

There he is again, he said, answering more than he is asked. For I am not asking what the means is, but only whether you know by some means.

Yes, I did again answer more than I ought, I said, through lack of education. But forgive me, and I will now simply reply that I know what I know by some means.

By one and the same means always, he asked, or sometimes by one and sometimes by another?

Always, whenever I know, I replied, it is by this means.

There again, he cried, you really must stop adding these qualifications.

But I am so afraid this word "always" may bring us to grief.

Not us, he rejoined, but, if anyone, you. Now answer: do you know by this means always?

Always, I replied, since I must withdraw the "whenever."

Then you always know by this means: that being
PLATO

tά μὲν τούτων ἐπίστασαι ὦ ἐπίστασαι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα, ἥ τούτῳ πάντα; Τούτῳ, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἀπαντα, ἡ γ' ἐπίστασαι. Τούτ' ἐκείνο, ἐφη ήκει τὸ αὐτὸ παράφθεγμα. ἊΛΛ' ἀφαιρῶ, ἐφην ἐγώ, τὸ ἡ γ' ἐπίστασαι. ἊΛΛά μηδὲ ἐν, ἐφη, ἀφέλησθ' οὐ-
C δὲν γάρ σου δέομαι. ἀλλά μοι ἀπόκριναι· δύναιο 
ἀν ἄπαντα ἐπίστασθαι, εἰ μὴ πάντα ἐπίστασαι; 
Τέρας γάρ ἂν εἴη, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ ὅς εἶπε· 
Προστίθει τοίνυν ἥδη ὁ τι βούλει· ἄπαντα 
γάρ ὁμολογεῖς ἐπίστασθαι. Ἕσοικα, ἐφην ἐγώ, 
ἐπειδήπερ γε οὐδεμίαν ἔχει δύναμιν τὸ ἡ 
ἐπίστασαι, πάντα δὲ ἐπίστασαι. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ 
ὡμολόγηκας ἐπίστασθαι τούτῳ, ὦ ἐπίστασαι, 
éíte ὅταν ἐπίστη ἐíte ὅπως βούλει· αἱ γὰρ 
ὡμολόγηκας ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀμα πάντα δήλον 
D οὖν, ὅτι καὶ παῖς ὅν ἠπίστω, καὶ δ' ἐγίγνου, 
kαὶ δ' ἐφύν' καὶ πρὶν αὐτός γενέσθαι, καὶ 
κτρὶν οὕρανὸν καὶ γῆν γενέσθαι, ἠπίστω ἄπαντα, 
eίπερ αἱ ἐπίστασαι. καὶ ναί μᾶ Δία, ἐφη, 
αὐτός αἱ ἐπιστήσει καὶ ἄπαντα, ἄν ἔγω βούλωμαι. 
ἈΛΛά βουληθεῖς, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ πολυτίμητε 
Εὐθύδημε, εἰ δὴ τῷ ὠντὶ ἄληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ' 
oὐ σοι πάνυ πιστεύω ἵκανῷ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ σοι συμ- 
βουληθείς ὁ ἀδελφός σου οὐτοσὶ Διονυσόδωρος. 
oὐτὼ τάχα ἀν. εἴπετον δὲ μοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ· 
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EUTHYDEMUS

the case, do you know some things by this means of knowing, and some things by another means, or everything by this?

Everything by this, I replied; everything, that is, that I know.

There it comes again, he cried; the same qualification!

Well, I withdraw my "that is, that I know."

No, do not withdraw a single word, he said: I ask you for no concession. Only answer me: could you know all things if you did not know everything?

It would be most surprising, I said.

Then he went on: You may therefore add on now whatever you please: for you admit that you know all things.

It seems I do, I replied, seeing that my "that I know" has no force, and I know everything.

Now you have also admitted that you know always by the means whereby you know, whenever you know—or however you like to put it. For you have admitted that you always know and, at the same time, everything. Hence it is clear that even as a child you knew, both when you were being born and when you were being conceived: and before you yourself came into being or heaven and earth existed, you knew all things, since you always know. Yes, and I declare, he said, you yourself will always know all things, if it be my pleasure.

Oh, pray let it be your pleasure, I replied, most worshipful Euthydemus, if what you say is really true. Only I do not quite trust in your efficacy, if your pleasure is not to be also that of your brother here, Dionysodorus: if it is, you will probably prevail. And tell me, I went on, since I cannot
Ε τά μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα ous ἔχω ὑμῖν πῶς ἀμφισβητοῖν, οὕτως εἰς σοφίαν τερατώδεσιν ἀνθρώπους, ὡς ὅπως οὐ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι, ἐπειδὴ ὑμεῖς φατέ: τὰ δὲ τούτα πῶς φῶ ἐπίστασθαι, Εὐθύδημε, ὡς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἄδικοὶ εἰσι; φέρε εἰπέ, τοῦτο ἐπίσταμαι ἢ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι; Ἐπίστασαι μέντοι, ἐφη. Τί; ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ. "Οτι οὐκ ἄδικοὶ εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ. Πάνω γε, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πάλαι. ἂλλ᾽ 297 οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ. ἂλλ᾽ ὡς ἄδικοὶ εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ, ποῦ ἔγω τοῦτο ἐμαθὼν; Οὐδαμοῦ, ἐφη ὁ Διονυσό- ὅωρος. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐπίσταμαι, ἐφη, τοῦτο ἔγω. Διαφθείρεις, ἐφη, τὸν λόγον, ὁ Εὐθύδημος πρὸς τὸν Διονυσόδωρον, καὶ φανήσεται οὕτως οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος, καὶ ἐπιστήμων ἁμα ὄν καὶ ἄν- ἐπιστήμων. καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ἠρυθρίασεν. 'Αλλὰ σύ, ἢν δ᾽ ἔγω, πῶς λέγεις, ὁ Εὐθύδημε; B οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ὁρθῶς ἀδελφὸς λέγειν ὁ πάντα εἰδός; Ἀδελφὸς γὰρ, ἐφη, ἔγω εἰμι Εὐθύδημου, ταχὺ ὑπολαβῶν ὁ Διονυσόδωρος; καγὼ εἶπον, Ἐασον, ὦ ἄγαθε, ἔως ὅτι Εὐθύδημός με διδάξῃ, ὡς ἐπι- σταμαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ὃτι ἄδικοι εἰσιν, καὶ μή μοι φθονήσῃς τοῦ μαθήματος. Φεύγεις, ἐφη, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Εἰκότως γ᾽, εἶπον ἔγω. ἢττων γάρ 468
EUTHYDEMUS

hope in a general way to dispute the statement that I know everything with persons so prodigiously clever—since it is your statement—how am I to say I know certain things, Euthydemus; for instance, that good men are unjust? Come, tell me, do I know this or not?

You know it certainly, he said.

What? I said.

That the good are not unjust.

Quite so, I said: I knew that all the time; but that is not what I ask: tell me, where did I learn that the good are unjust?

Nowhere, said Dionysodorus.

Then I do not know this, I said.

You are spoiling the argument, said Euthydemus to Dionysodorus, and we shall find that this fellow does not know, and is at once both knowing and unknowing.

At this Dionysodorus reddened. But you, I said, what do you mean, Euthydemus. Do you find that your brother, who knows everything, has not spoken aright?

I a brother of Euthydemus? quickly interposed Dionysodorus.

Whereupon I said: Let me alone, good sir, till Euthydemus has taught me that I know that good men are unjust, and do not grudge me this lesson.

You are running away, Socrates, said Dionysodorus; you refuse to answer.

Yes, and with good reason, I said: for I am weaker than either one of you, so I have no scruple about running away from the two together. You see, I am sadly inferior to Hercules, who was no match for the hydra—that she-professor who was
σοφίαν ἀνιείση, εἰ μίαν κεφαλὴν τοῦ λόγου τις ἀποτέμοι, πολλὰς ἀντί τῆς μιᾶς, καὶ καρκίνω των ἐτέρω σοφιστῇ, ἐκ θαλάττης ἀφιγμένω, νεωστί, μοι δοκεῖν, καταπεπλευκότως ὃς ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸν ἐλύπει οὔτως ἐκ τοῦ ἐπ᾿ ἀριστερὰ λέγων καὶ δάκνων, τὸν Ἰόλεων τὸν ἀδελφιδοῦν βοηθὸν ἐπεκαλέσατο, ὃ δὲ αὐτῷ ἰκανός ἐβοήθησεν. ὃ δ᾿ ἐμὸς Ἰόλεως [Πατροκλῆς]1 εἰ ἔλθοι, πλέον ἃν θάτερον ποιήσειν.

'Απόκριμαι δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ὅποτε σοι ταῦτα ὑμνηται: πότερον ὁ Ἰόλεως τοῦ Ἡρακλέους μᾶλλον ἂν ἀδελφιδοὺς ἢ σός; Κράτιστον τούν μοι, ὁ Διονυσόδωρε, ἂν δ᾿ ἐγώ, ἀποκρίνασθαι σοι. οὐ γὰρ μὴ ἀνής ἑρωτῶν, σχεδον τι ἐγὼ τοῦτ᾽ εὖ οἶδα, φθονῶν καὶ διακωλύων, ἵνα μὴ διδάξῃ με Ἐυθύδημος ἐκεῖνο τὸ σοφὸν. 'Αποκρίμου δὴ, ἔφη. 'Αποκρίνομαι δὴ, εἶπον, ὅτι τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἂν ὁ Ἰόλεως ἀδελφιδοῦς, ἐμὸς ἐδ᾽, ὃς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδ᾽ ὀπωσδήποτεν. οὐ γὰρ Πατροκλῆς ἂν αὐτῷ πατὴρ, ὁ ἐμὸς ἀδελφός, ἄλα παρατλήσων μὲν τούνομα Ἰφικλῆς, ὁ Ἡρακλέους ἀδελφός. Πατροκλῆς δὲ, ἧ δὲ ὦς, σός; Πάνυ γ’, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὀμομητρίως γε, οὐ μέντοι ὀμοπάτριοι. Ἀδελφός ἄρα ἔστι σοι καὶ οὐκ ἀδελφός. Οὐχ ὀμοπατρίως γε, ὃ βέλτιστε, ἔφην· ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ Χαιρέδημος ἂν πατήρ, ἐμὸς δὲ Σωφρονίσκος. Πατήρ δὲ ἦν, ἔφη, Σωφρονίσκος καὶ Χαιρέδημος; Πάνυ γ’, ἔφην· ὃ μὲν γε ἐμὸς, 298 ὃ δὲ ἐκεῖνον. Ὅντοις, ἧ δὲ ὦς, ἐτεροὶ ἡν Χαιρέ-

1 Πατροκλῆς secl. Heindorf.

1 i.e. any kinsman or helper I might summon would only add to the number of your victims.
so clever that she sent forth many heads of debate in place of each one that was cut off; nor for another sort of crab-professor from the sea—fresher, I fancy, arrived on shore; and, when the hero was so bothered with its leftward barks and bites, he summoned his nephew Iolaus to the rescue, and he brought him effective relief. But if my Iolaus were to come, he would do more harm than good.¹

Well, answer this, said Dionysodorus, now you have done your descanting: Was Iolaus more Hercules' nephew than yours?

I see I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, I said. For you will never cease putting questions—I think I may say I am sure of this—in a grudging, obstructing spirit, so that Euthydemus may not teach me that bit of cleverness.

Then answer, he said.

Well, I answer, I said, that Iolaus was Hercules' nephew, but not mine, so far as I can see, in any way whatever. For Patrocles, my brother, was not his father; only Hercules' brother Iphicles had a name somewhat similar to his.

And Patrocles, he said, is your brother?

Certainly, I said: that is, by the same mother, but not by the same father.

Then he is your brother and not your brother.

Not by the same father, worthy sir, I replied. His father was Chaeredemus, mine Sophroniscus.

So Sophroniscus and Chaeredemus, he said, were "father"?

Certainly, I said: the former mine, the latter his.

Then surely, he went on, Chaeredemus was other than "father"?

¹
δήμος τοῦ πατρὸς; Τούμου γ’, ἐφην ἐγώ. Ἄρ’
οὖν πατὴρ ἦν ἐτερος ὡν πατρός; ἦ σὺ εἰ ὁ αὐτὸς
tῶ λίθω; Δέδουικα μὲν ἐγω’, ἐφην, μὴ φανῶ
υπὸ σοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς· οὐ μέντοι μοι δοκῶ. Οὐκοῦν
ἐτερος εἰ, ἐφη, τοῦ λίθου; "Ἐτερος μέντοι. "Αλλο
tι οὖν ἐτερος, ἦ δ’ ὁς, ὡν λίθου οὐ λίθος εἰ; καὶ
ἐτερος ὡν χρυσοῦ οὐ χρυσὸς εἰ; "Ἐστι ταῦτα.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ Χαιρέδημος, ἐφη, ἐτερος ὡν πατρός
Β οὐκ ἄν πατήρ εἰη. "Εουκεν, ἦν δ’ ἐγω, οὐ πατήρ
eιναι. Εἰ γὰρ δῆπον, ἐφη, πατὴρ ἐστιν ὁ Χαι-
ρέδημος, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Εὐθύδημος, πάλιν αὖ ὁ
Σωφρονίσκος ἐτερος ὡν πατρός οὐ πατήρ ἐστιν,
ὡστε σὺ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀπάτωρ εἰ.

Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἑκδεξάμενος, "Ο δὲ ὑμέτεροσ,
ἐφη, αὖ πατὴρ οὐ ταῦτα ταῦτα πέποιθεν; ἐτερος
ἐστι τούμοι πατρός; Πολλοῦ γ’, ἐφη, δεί, ὁ
Εὐθύδημος. 'Αλλά, ἦ δ’ ὁς, ὁ αὐτός; 'Ο αὐτὸς
μέντοι. Οὐκ ἄν συμβουλοῖμην. ἀλλὰ πότερον,
C ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἐμὸς μόνος ἐστὶ πατήρ ἦ καὶ τῶν
ἀλλων ἄνθρώπων; Καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐφη. ἦ οἷς
tῶν αὐτῶν πατέρα οὖντα οὐ πατέρα εἶναι; "Ωμὴν
dὴτα, ἐφη ὁ Κτήσιππος. Τι δὲ; ἦ δ’ ὁς ἄνθρωπον
οὖντα μὴ χρυσὸν εἶναι; ἦ ἄνθρωπον οὖντα μὴ
ἀνθρώπον; Μὴ γὰρ, ἐφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὁ Ἐυθύ-

1 Cf. Gorgias, 494 a, where “the life of a stone” is given
as a proverbial example of a life without pleasure or pain.
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Than mine, at any rate, I said.
Why then, he was father while being other than father. Or are you the same as "the stone"? ¹
I fear you may prove that of me, I said, though I do not feel like it.
Then are you other than the stone?
Other, I must say.
Then of course, he went on, if you are other than stone, you are not stone? And if you are other than gold, you are not gold?
Quite so.
Hence Chaeredemus, he said, being other than father, cannot be "father."
It seems, I said, that he is not a father.
No, for I presume, interposed Euthydemus, that if Chaeredemus is a father Sophroniscus in his turn, being other than a father, is not a father; so that you, Socrates, are fatherless.
Here Ctesippus took it up, observing: And your father too, is he not in just the same plight? Is he other than my father?
Not in the slightest, said Euthydemus.
What, asked the other, is he the same?
The same, to be sure.
I should not like to think he was: but tell me, Euthydemus, is he my father only, or everybody else's too?
Everybody else's too, he replied; or do you suppose that the same man, being a father, can be no father?
I did suppose so, said Ctesippus.
Well, said the other, and that a thing being gold could be not gold? Or being a man, not man?
Perhaps, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, you are
δήμε, τό λεγόμενον, οὐ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτεις. 
δεινὸν γαρ λέγεις πράγμα, εἰ δ’ οὐκοῦν πάντων 
ἐστι πατήρ. 'Αλλ’ ἔστω, ἔφη. Πότερον ἄν-
θρωπων; ἢ δ’ ὃς ὁ Κτήσιππος, ἢ καὶ ἔπτων; 
ὅ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ζώων; Πάντων, ἔφη. 
'Η καὶ μήτηρ ἡ μήτηρ; Καὶ ἡ μήτηρ γε. 
Καὶ τῶν ἐχίνων ἄρα, ἔφη, ἡ σῇ μήτηρ μήτηρ ἐστὶ 
τῶν θαλαττῶν. Καὶ ἡ σῇ γ’, ἔφη. 
Καὶ σὺ ἄρα ἄδελφος εἰ τῶν κωβιῶν καὶ κυναρίων καὶ 
χοιρί-
δίων. Καὶ γὰρ σὺ, ἔφη. κάπρος1 ἄρα 
σοι πατήρ ἐστι καὶ κύων. 
Καὶ γὰρ σοί, ἔφη.

Αὐτίκα δεὶ γε, ἢ δ’ ὃς ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἃν 
μοι ἀποκρινθῇ, ὁ Κτήσιππε, ὀμολογήσεις ταῦτα. 
εἰπὲ γὰρ μοι, ἐστι σοι κύων; 
Καὶ μάλα πονηρός, ἔφη 
Ε ὁ Κτήσιππος. 'Εστω ὁδιν αὐτῷ κυνίδια; 
Καὶ 
μάλ’, ἔφη, ἔτερα τοιαῦτα. 
Οὐκοῦν πατήρ ἐστι 
αὐτῶν ὁ κύων; 
'Εγώγε τοι εἶδον, ἔφη, αὐτὸν 
ὀχεύοντα τῇν κύων. 
Τί οὖν; 
οὐ σὸς ἐστὶν ὁ 
κύων; 
Pάνυ γ’, ἔφη. 
Οὐκοῦν πατήρ ὁν 
σὸς ἐστιν, ὅπερ 
σος πατήρ γίγνεται ὁ κύων καὶ 
σὺ 
κυναρίων ἄδελφος;

Καὶ αὖθις ταχύ ὑπολαβῶν ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, 
 ilma μὴ πρότερον τι εἴποι ὁ Κτήσιππος, 
Καὶ ἐτι 
γε μοι μικρόν, ἔφη, ἀπόκριναι τύπτεις τὸν κύων

1 κάπρος Badham: καὶ πρὸς mss.

1 i.e. treating two different things as the same.

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knotting flax with cotton,¹ as they say: for it is a strange result that you state, if your father is father of all.

He is, though, was the reply.
Of all men, do you mean? asked Ctesippus, or of horses too, and all other animals?
Of all, he said.
And is your mother a mother in the same way?
My mother too.
And is your mother a mother of sea-urchins?
Yes, and yours is also, he replied.
So then you are a brother of the gudgeons and whelps and porkers.
Yes, and so are you, he said.
Then your father is a boar and a dog.
And so is yours, he said.
Yes, said Dionysodorus, and it will take you but a moment, if you will answer me, Ctesippus, to acknowledge all this. Just tell me, have you a dog?
Yes, a real rogue, said Ctesippus.
Has he got puppies?
Yes, a set of rogues like him.
Then is the dog their father?
Yes, indeed; I saw him with my own eyes covering the bitch.
Well now, is not the dog yours?
Certainly, he said.
Thus he is a father, and yours, and accordingly the dog turns out to be your father, and you a brother of whelps.

Hereupon Dionysodorus struck in again quickly. lest Ctesippus should get a word in before him: Answer me just one more little point: do you beat this dog?
τούτον; καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος γελάσας, Νὴ τοὺς
θεούς, ἐφη· οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι σέ. Οὐκοῦν τὸν
299 ταυτοῦ πατέρα, ἐφη, τύπτεις. Πολὺ μέντοι, ἐφη,
δικαίοτερον τὸν ύμέτερον πατέρα τύπτομε, ὦ τι
μαθῶν σοφός νῦεις οὕτως ἔφυσεν. ἀλλ' ἦ που,
ὁ Εὐθύδημε, ἐφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, πόλλ' ἄγαθα ἀπὸ
tῆς ύμετέρας σοφίας ταύτης ἀπολέλαυκεν ὁ πατήρ
ὁ ύμετέρος τε καὶ ὁ τῶν κυνιδίων. 'Αλλ' οὐδὲν
dεῖται πολλῶν ἄγαθῶν, ὃ Κτήσιππε, οὔτ' ἐκεῖνος
οὕτε σὺ. Οὐδὲ σὺ, ἦ δ' ὦς, ὃ Εὐθύδημε, αὐτός;
Οὐδὲ ἄλλος γε οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων. εἰπὲ γὰρ μοι,
Β ὃ Κτήσιππε, εἰ ἄγαθὸν νομίζεις εἶναι ἀσθενοῦντι
φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ οὐκ ἄγαθὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ σοι,
ὅταν δέηται· ἢ εἰς πόλεμον ὅταν ἦ, ὅπλα ἤχοντα
μᾶλλον ἴηναι ἢ ἄνοπλον. 'Εμοιγε, ἐφη. καίτοι
οἴμαι τί σε τῶν καλῶν ἐρεῖν. Σὺ ἀριστα εἰσεί,
ἐφη· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου. ἐπειδή γὰρ ὦμολογείς
ἄγαθὸν εἶναι φάρμακον, ὅταν δέη, πίνειν ἀνθρώπῳ,
ἄλλο τι τοῦτο τὸ ἄγαθὸν ὃς πλεῖστον ἐξέ τίνειν,
καὶ καλῶς ἐκεῖ ἔξει, ἐάν τις αὐτῷ τρύμας ἐγκεράσῃ
ἐλλεβόρου ἄμαξαν; καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος εἶπε, Πάνυ
C γε σφόδρα, ὃ Εὐθύδημε, εἶν ἦ γε ὁ πίνων ὦςος
ὁ ἀνδριάς ὃ ἐν Δελφοῖς. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφη, καὶ ἐν
τῷ πολέμῳ ἐπειδή ἄγαθὸν ἐστίν ὅπλα ἔχειν, ὃς
πλείστα δεῖ ἔχειν δόρατα τε καὶ ἀσπίδας, ἐπειδήπερ
ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν; Μάλα δὴ που, ἐφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.
EUTHYDEMUS

Ctesippus laughed and said: My word, yes; since I cannot beat you!
So you beat your own father? he said.
There would be much more justice, though, he replied, in my beating yours, for being so ill-advised as to beget clever sons like you. Yet I doubt, Ctesippus went on, if your father, Euthydemus—the puppies' father—has derived much good from this wisdom of yours.
Why, he has no need of much good, Ctesippus, neither he nor you.
And have you no need either, yourself, Euthydemus? he asked.
No, nor has any other man. Just tell me, Ctesippus, whether you think it good for a sick man to drink physic when he wants it, or whether you consider it not good; or for a man to go to the wars with arms rather than without them.
With them, I think, he replied: and yet I believe you are about to utter one of your pleantries.
You will gather that well enough, he said: only answer me. Since you admit that physic is good for a man to drink when necessary, surely one ought to drink this good thing as much as possible; and in such a case it will be well to pound and infuse in it a cart-load of hellebore?
To this Ctesippus replied: Quite so, to be sure, Euthydemus, at any rate if the drinker is as big as the Delphian statue.
Then, further, since in war, he proceeded, it is good to have arms, one ought to have as many spears and shields as possible, if we agree that it is a good thing?
Yes, I suppose, said Ctesippus; and you, Euthy-
Two fabulous giants (Geryon had three, Briareus fifty, pairs of arms).
demus, do you take the other view, that it should be one shield and one spear?

Yes, I do.

What, he said, and would you arm Geryon also and Briareus in this way? I thought you more of an expert than that, considering you are a man-at-arms, and your comrade here too!

At this Euthydemus was silent; then Dionysodorus asked some questions on Ctesippus' previous answers, saying: Well now, gold is in your opinion a good thing to have?

Certainly, and—here I agree—plenty of it too, said Ctesippus.

Well then, do you not think it right to have good things always and everywhere?

Assuredly, he said.

Then do you admit that gold is also a good?

Why, I have admitted it, he replied.

Then we ought always to have it, and everywhere, and above all, in oneself? And one will be happiest if one has three talents of gold in one's belly, a talent in one's skull, and a stater of gold in each eye?

Well, Euthydemus, replied Ctesippus, they say that among the Scythians those are the happiest and best men who have a lot of gold in their own skulls—somewhat as you were saying a moment ago that "dog" is "father"; and a still more marvellous thing is told, how they drink out of their skulls when gilded, and gaze inside them, holding their own headpiece in their hands.

Tell me, said Euthydemus, do the Scythians and men in general see things possible of sight, or things impossible?
PLATO

ἀδύνατα; Τὰ δυνατὰ δήπου. Οὐκούν καὶ σὺ, ἐφη; Καγώ. ὁ Ἰρᾶς οὖν τὰ ἡμέτερα ἰμάτια; Ναί. Δυνατὰ οὖν ὅραν ἐστὶ ταῦτα. Ὑπερφυσὶ, ἐφη ὁ Κτήσιππος. Τι δέ; ἢ δ' ὦς. Μηδὲν. σὺ δ' ἵσως οὐκ οἶει αὐτὰ ὅραν; οὕτως ἢδυς εἰ. ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς, Εὐθύδημε, οὐ καθεύδων ἐπικεκομισθαι, καὶ εἰ οίον τε λέγοντα μηδὲν λέγειν, Β καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

"Ἡ γὰρ οὐκ οἶον τε, ἐφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, σιγώντα λέγειν; Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἢ δ' ὦς ὁ Κτήσιππος. Ἀρ' οὐδὲ λέγοντα σιγᾶν; Ἐτι ἦττον, ἐφη. Ὑπαν οὖν λίθους λέγης καὶ ξύλα καὶ σιδήρια, οὐ σιγώντα λέγεις; Οὔκουν, εἰ γε ἔγω, ἐφη, παρέρχομαι ἐν τοῖς χαλκείοις, ἀλλὰ φθεγγόμενα καὶ βοῶντα μέγιστον τὰ σιδήρια λέγεται, ἐάν τις ἄφηται· ὦστε τοῦτο μὲν ἕπο σοφίας ἔλαβες οὔδ' εἰπὼν. ἀλλ' ἐτι μοι τὸ ἔτερον ἐπιδείξατον,

C ὡς αὖ ἐστι λέγοντα σιγᾶν. καὶ μοι ἐδόκει ὑπεραγωνίαν ὁ Κτήσιππος διὰ τὰ παιδικὰ. "Ὅταν σιγᾶς, ἐφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, οὐ πάντα σιγᾶς; Ἐγωγε, ἢ δ' ὦς. Οὔκουν καὶ τὰ λέγοντα σιγᾶν, εἰπέρ τῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τὰ λέγοντα.1 Τι δέ; ἐφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, οὐ σιγᾶ πάντα; Οὐ δήπου, ἐφη ὁ Εὐθύ-

1 τὰ λέγοντα Stephanus: τὰ λεγόμενα mss.

1 The quibble is on the double meaning of δυνατὰ ὅραν—(a) "possible," and (b) "able to see." So in what follows, σιγώντα λέγειν may mean both "the speaking of a silent person," or "speaking of silent things."
EUTHYDEMUS

Possible, I presume.
And you do so too?
I too.
Then you see our cloaks?
Yes.
And have they power of sight?¹
Quite extraordinarily, said Ctesippus.
What do they see? he asked.
Nothing. Perhaps you do not think they see
—you are such a sweet innocent. I should say, Euthydemus, that you have fallen asleep with your eyes open and, if it be possible to speak and at the same time say nothing, that this is what you are doing.

Why, asked Dionysodorus, may there not be a speaking of the silent?
By no means whatever, replied Ctesippus.
Nor a silence of speaking?
Still less, he said.

Now, when you speak of stones and timbers and irons, are you not speaking of the silent?
Not if I walk by a smithy, for there, as they say, the irons speak and cry aloud, when they are touched; so here your wisdom has seduced you into nonsense. But come, you have still to propound me your second point, how on the other hand there may be a silence of speaking. (It struck me that Ctesippus was specially excited on account of his young friend's presence.)

When you are silent, said Euthydemus, are you not making a silence of all things?
Yes, he replied.
Then it is a silence of speaking things also, if the speaking are among all things.
What, said Ctesippus, are not all things silent?
I presume not, said Euthydemus.

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δήμος. 'Αλλ' ἄρα, ὃ βέλτιστε, λέγει τὰ πάντα; Τά γε δὴπου λέγοντα. 'Αλλά, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ τοῦτο ἑρωτῶ, ἄλλα τὰ πάντα σιγᾷ ἦ λέγει; Οὐδέτερα

καὶ ἄμφοτερα, ἐφ' υφαρπάσας ὁ Διονυσόδωρος· ἐν γὰρ οίδα ὅτι τῇ ἀποκρίσει οὐχ ἔξεις ὁ τι χρὴ· καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὡσπερ εἰώθει, μέγα πάνυ ἀνακαγχάσας, Ἡ Εὐθύδημε, ἐφή, ὁ ἀδελφός σου ἐξημφοτέρικε τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἀπόλωλε τε καὶ ἤττηται. καὶ ὁ Κλεινίας πάνυ ἤθη καὶ ἐγέλασεν, ὡστε ὁ Κτήσιππος ἐγένετο πλεῖον ἡ δεκαπλάσιος· ὁ δ' οἶμαι,1 πανοῦργος ὃν, ὁ Κτήσιππος, παρ' αὐτῶν τούτων αὐτὰ ταῦτα παρηκηκόει· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλων τοιαύτη σοφία τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων.

Καγὼ εἶπον, Τί γελᾶς, ὃ Κλεινία, ἐπὶ σπουδαίοις οὖτω πράγμασι καὶ καλοῖς; Σὺ γὰρ ἤδη τι πάσποτε εἶδες, ὃ Σώκρατες, καλὸν πράγμα; ἐφή ὁ Διονυσόδωρος. Ἡ Ἐγωγε, ἐφήν, καὶ πολλὰ γε, ὃ Διονυσόδωρε. Ἡ Αρα ἐτερα δῶτα τοῦ καλοῦ, ἐφή,

301 ἣ ταύτα τῷ καλῷ; καγὼ ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ύπὸ ἀπορίας, καὶ ἡγούμην δίκαια πεποιθέναι, ὅτι ἐγχυξά, ομις δὲ ἐτερα ἐφήν αὐτοῦ γε τοῦ καλοῦ· πάρεστι μέντοι ἐκάστῳ αὐτῶν κάλλος τι. 'Εάν οὖν, ἐφή, παραγένηται σοὶ βοῦς, βοῦς εἶ, καὶ ὃτι νῦν ἐγὼ σοι πάρειμι, Διονυσόδωρος εἶ; Εὐφήμει

1 οὐ οἴματι Badham: ὃ οἴματι mss.
EUTHYDEMUS

But then, my good sir, do all things speak?
Yes, I suppose, at least those that speak.
But that is not what I ask, he said: are all things silent or do they speak?
Neither and both, said Dionysodorus, snatching the word from him: I am quite sure that is an answer that will baffle you!
At this Ctesippus, as his manner was, gave a mighty guffaw, and said: Ah, Euthydemus, your brother has made the argument ambiguous with his "both," and is worsted and done for.
Then Cleinias was greatly delighted and laughed, so that Ctesippus felt his strength was as the strength of ten: but I fancy Ctesippus—he is such a rogue—had picked up these very words by overhearing the men themselves, since in nobody else of the present age is such wisdom to be found.
So I remarked: Why are you laughing, Cleinias, at such serious and beautiful things?
What, have you, Socrates, ever yet seen a beautiful thing? asked Dionysodorus.
Yes, I have, I replied, and many of them, Dionysodorus.
Did you find them different from the beautiful, he said, or the same as the beautiful?
Here I was desperately perplexed, and felt that I had my deserts for the grunt I had made: however, I replied that they were different from the beautiful itself, though each of them had some beauty present with it.
So if an ox is present with you, he said, you are an ox, and since I am now present with you, you are Dionysodorus.
Heavens, do not say that! I cried.
PLATO

τούτο γε, ἥν δ᾽ ἐγώ. Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον, ἑφη, ἐτέρου ἐτέρῳ παραγενομένου τὸ ἐτερον ἐτερον ἂν B εἴη; Ἄρα τούτῳ, ἑφην ἐγώ, ἀπορεῖς; ηδη δὲ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν τὴν σοφίαν ἐπεχείρουν μμείσθαι, ἀτε ἐπιθυμῶν αὐτῆς. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀπορῶ, ἑφη, καὶ ἐγώ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀπαντες ἀνθρώποι, δ" μὴ ἔστω; Τι λέγεις, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε; οὐ τὸ καλὸν καλὸν ἔστι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν αἰσχρὸν; Ἐὰν ἐμοιγε, ἑφη, δοκῇ. Οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ; Πάνυ γε, ἑφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ταυτὸν ταυτὸν καὶ τὸ ἐτερον ἐτερον; οὐ γὰρ δῆπου τὸ γε ἐτερον ταυτὸν, ἄλλ' C ἐγωγε οὐδ' ἂν παίδα φίμην τούτο ἀπορήσαι, ὦς οὐ τὸ ἐτερον ἐτερον ἔστω. ἄλλ', ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, τούτῳ μὲν ἐκῶν παρῆκας, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἄλλα μοι δοκείτε ῥοσπερ οἱ δημιουργοί, οῖς ἐκαστα προσήκει ἀπεργάζεσθαι, καὶ ὑμεῖς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι παγκάλως ἀπεργάζεσθαι. Οἶσθαι οὖν, ἑφη, ὅ τι προσήκει ἐκάστοις τῶν δημιουργῶν; πρῶτον τίνα χαλκεύειν προσήκει, οἶσθα; Ἐγωγε· ὅτι χαλκέα. Τι δὲ κεραμεύειν; Κεραμέα. Τι δὲ σφάτειν τε καὶ D ἐκδέρειν καὶ τὰ σμικρὰ κρέα κατακόψαυτα ἐξειν καὶ ὀπτᾶν; Μάγειρον, ἥν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν εὰν τις, ἑφη, τὰ προσήκοντα πράττῃ, ὅρθως πράξει; 484
EUTHYDDEMUS

But in what way can one thing, by having a different thing present with it, be itself different?

Are you at a loss there? I asked: already I was attempting to imitate the cleverness of these men, I was so eager to get it.

Can I help being at a loss, he said, I and likewise everybody else in the world, in face of what cannot be?

What is that you say, Dionysodorus? I asked: is not the beautiful beautiful, and the ugly ugly?

Yes, if it seems so to me, he replied.

Then does it seem so?

Certainly, he said.

Then the same also is the same, and the different different? For I presume the different cannot be the same; nay, I thought not even a child would doubt that the different is different. But, Dionysodorus, you have deliberately passed over this one point; though, on the whole, I feel that, like craftsmen finishing off each his special piece of work, you two are carrying out your disputation in excellent style.

Well, he asked, do you know what is each craftsman's special piece of work? First of all, whose proper task is it to forge brass? Can you tell?

I can: a brazier's.

Well, again, whose to make pots?

A potter's.

Once more, whose to slaughter and skin, and after cutting up the joints to stew and roast?

A caterer's, I said.

Now, if one does one's proper work, he said, one will do rightly?
Μάλιστα. Προσήκει δε γε, ὡς φής, τὸν μάγειρον κατακόπτειν καὶ ἐκδέρεων; ὀμολογήσας ταύτα ἢ ὅ; Ὑμολογήσα, ἐφην, ἀλλὰ συγγνώμην μοι ἔχε. Δῆλον τοίνυν, ἢ δ' ὦς, ὅτι ἂν τις σφάξας τὸν μάγειρον καὶ κατακόψας ἐψήσῃ καὶ ὀπτήσῃ, τὰ προσήκοντα ποιήσει· καὶ ἐὰν τὸν χαλκέα τις αὐτὸν χαλκεῦῃ καὶ τὸν κεραμεά κεραμεύῃ, καὶ οὗτος τὰ προσήκοντα πράξει.

Ε Ὡ Πόσειδον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἣδη κολοφώνα ἐπιτίθης τῇ σοφίᾳ. ἀρά μοι ποτε αὐτὴ παραγενήσεται, ὅστε μοι οἰκεία γενέσθαι; Ἑπιγνοῖς ἂν αὐτῆν, ὦ Σώκρατε, ἐφη, οἰκεῖαν γενομένην; Ἐὰν σὺ γε βούλῃ, ἐφην ἐγώ, δῆλον ὦτι. Τι δέ, ἢ δ' ὦς, τὰ σαυτοῦ οἰεὶ γυγνώσκειν; Εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις· ἀπὸ σοῦ γὰρ δὲι ἄρχεσθαι, τελευτᾶν δ' εἰς Εὐθύ-δημον τόνδε. Ἄρ' ὦν, ἐφη, ταύτα ἴστε σὰ εἰναι, ὅπε ἂν ἄρξης καὶ ἐξῆ σοι αὐτὸις χρῆσθαι δ 302 τι ἂν βούλῃ; οἶον βούς καὶ πρόβατον, ἀρ' ἂν ἴγοοι ταύτα σὰ εἰναι, ἃ σοι ἐξείη καὶ ἀποδόσσαι καὶ δοῦναι καὶ θύσαι ὅσῳ βούλουσθεῖν; ἂ δ' ἂν μὴ οὔτως ἔχῃ, οὗ σά; κἀγὼ, ἦδη γὰρ ὅτι ἐξ αὐτῶν καλὸν τι ἀνακύψατο τῶν ἑρωτημάτων, καὶ ἄμα βουλόμενος ὅ τι τάχιστ' ἀκούσαι, Πάννυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφην, οὔτως ἔχει· τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐστὶ μόνα

1 The Greek words follow a usual form of prayer or hymn to the gods.

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EUTHYDEMUS

Yes, to be sure.
And is it, as you say, the caterer's proper work to cut up and skin? Did you admit this or not?
I did so, I replied, but pray forgive me.
It is clear then, he proceeded, that if someone slaughters the caterer and cuts him up, and then stews or roasts him, he will be doing his proper work; and if he hammers the brazier himself, and moulds the potter, he will be doing his business likewise.
Poseidon! I exclaimed, there you give the finishing-touch to your wisdom. I wonder if this skill could ever come to me in such manner as to be my very own.

Would you recognize it, Socrates, he asked, if it came to be your own?
Yes, if only you are agreeable, I replied, without a doubt.

Why, he went on, do you imagine you perceive what is yours?
Yes, if I take your meaning aright: for all my hopes arise from you, and end in Euthydemus here.1

Then tell me, he asked, do you count those things yours which you control and are free to use as you please? For instance, an ox or a sheep,—would you count these as yours, if you were free to sell or bestow them, or sacrifice them to any god you chose? And things which you could not treat thus are not yours?

Hereupon, since I knew that some brilliant result was sure to bob up from the mere turn of the questions, and as I also wanted to hear it as quickly as possible, I said: It is precisely as you say; only such things are mine.
ἐμά. Τί δὲ; ζῶα, ἐφη, οὐ ταῦτα καλεῖς, ἃ ἂν
Β ψυχὴν ἔχῃ; Ναὶ, ἐφην. Ὁμολογεῖς οὖν τῶν
ζώων ταῦτα μόνα εἶναι σά, περὶ ἃ ἂν σοι ἔκουσία
ἤ πάντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ἃ νῦν ὃθ' ἐγὼ ἔλεγον; Ὁμο-
λογῶ. καὶ ὃς, εἰρωνικῶς πάνυ ἔπισχὼν ὡς τι
μέγα σκοποῦμενος, Εἰπέ μοι, ἐφη, ὃ Σῶκρατες,
ἔστι σοι Ζεὺς πατρῶς; καὶ ἐγὼ ὑποπτεύομαι
ηὔσεων τὸν λόγον ἦπερ ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀπορών τινα
στροφὴν ἐφευγὼν τε καὶ ἐστρεφόμην ἢδη ὁσπέρ
ἐν δικτύω εἰλημμένος. Οὐκ ἔστων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ
Διονυσόδωρε. Ταλαιπωροῦσα τις τις γε ἄνθρω-

C εἰ καὶ οὐδὲ 'Αθηναῖος, ὃ μήτε θεοὶ πατρῶι
eἰσι μήτε ἵερα μήτε ἅλλο μηδὲν καλὸν καὶ ἁγαθὸν.
"Εα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ Διονυσόδωρε, εὐφήμεις τε καὶ μὴ
χαλεπῶς με προδίδασκε. ἔστι γὰρ ἐμοιμε καὶ
βωμοὶ καὶ ἵερα οἰκεῖα καὶ πατρῶι καὶ τὰ ἅλλα
ὅσπερ τοῖς ἅλλοις 'Αθηναίοις τῶν τοιοῦτων.
Εἰτα τοῖς ἅλλοις, ἐφη, 'Αθηναίοις οὐκ ἔστι Ζεὺς ὁ
πατρῶς; Οὐκ ἔστων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία
Ἰὼνων οὐδενὶ, οὐθ' ὃσοι ἐκ τῆς ῥήμας
ἀπωκυσμένοι εἰσίν τις οὐθ' ἤμων, ἀλλὰ Ἀπόλλων

D πατρῶι διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἰωνὸς γένεσιν. Ζεὺς δ' ἦμιν
πατρῶι μὲν ὃ καλεῖται, ἔρκευος δὲ καὶ
φράτριος, καὶ 'Αθηναίᾳ φρατρία. Ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ
γε, ἐφη ὃ Διονυσόδωρος. ἔστι γὰρ σοι, ὡς ἔστι
Ἀπόλλων τε καὶ Ζεὺς καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ. Πάνυ, ἦν δ'

1 'Αθηναία Cobet: 'Αθηνα mss.

1 Zeus was the ancestral or tutelary god of the Dorians.
2 Cf. Eurip. Ion, 64-75. Apollo begot Ion upon Creusa, daughter of Erechtheus.
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Well now, he went on; you call those things animals which have life?
Yes, I said.
And you admit that only those animals are yours which you are at liberty to deal with in those various ways that I mentioned just now?
I admit that.
Then—after a very ironical pause, as though he were pondering some great matter—he proceeded: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus?
Here I suspected the discussion was approaching the point at which it eventually ended, and so I tried what desperate wriggle I could to escape from the net in which I now felt myself entangled. My answer was: I have not, Dionysodorus.
What a miserable fellow you must be, he said, and no Athenian at all, if you have neither ancestral gods, nor shrines, nor anything else that denotes a gentleman!
Enough, Dionysodorus; speak fair words, and don't browbeat your pupil! For I have altars and shrines, domestic and ancestral, and everything else of the sort that other Athenians have.
Then have not other Athenians, he asked, their ancestral Zeus?
None of the Ionians, I replied, give him this title, neither we nor those who have left this city to settle abroad: they have an ancestral Apollo, because of Ion's parentage. Among us the name "ancestral" is not given to Zeus, but that of "houseward" and "tribal," and we have a tribal Athena.
That will do, said Dionysodorus; you have, it seems, Apollo and Zeus and Athena.
Certainly, I said.
ἐγώ. Ὅντοι καὶ οὗτοι σοὶ θεοὶ ἂν εἰεν; ἐφη. Πρόγονοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ δεσπόται. Ἄλλος οὖν σοὶ γε, ἐφη: ἢ οὐ σοὶ ύμωλόγηκας αὐτούς εἴναι; Ὡμωλόγηκα, ἐφην· τί γὰρ πάθω; Ὅντοι, ἐφη, καὶ ζώα εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ θεοὶ; ύμωλόγηκας γάρ.

Ε ὡσα ψυχὴν ἔχει, ζώα εἴναι. ἢ οὗτοι οἱ θεοὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ψυχήν; Ἐχουσιν, ἤν δ' ἐγώ. Ὅντοι καὶ ζώα εἰσιν; Ζώα, ἐφην. Τῶν δὲ γε ζώων, ἐφη, ύμωλόγηκας ταῦτ' εἶναι σά, ὡσα ἂν σοι ἔξη καὶ δοῦναι καὶ ἀποδόσθαι καὶ θύσαι ἂν θεῶ ὅτω ἂν βούλῃ. Ὡμωλόγηκα, ἐφην. οὐκ ἔστι γάρ μοι ἀνάδυσις, ὦ Εὐθύδημε. Ἰθι δὴ μοι εὐθύς, ἢ δ' ὅσ, εἰπέ ἐπειδή σὸν ύμωλογεῖς εἴναι τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοὺς θεοὺς, ἀρα ἔξεστί σοι αὐτοὺς ἀποδόσθαι.

303 ἢ δοῦναι ἢ ἄλλο τι ἂν βούλῃ χρησθαι οὐσπερ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς ζώοις; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Κρῖτων, οὕσπερ πληγεῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, ἐκείμην ἀφωνος· ὦ δὲ Κτήσιππός μοι Ἰὼν ὧς βοηθήσων, Πυππαξ ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἐφη, καλοῦ λόγου. καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, Πότερον οὖν, ἐφη, ὦ Ἡρακλῆς πυππάξ ἔστιν ἢ ὁ πυππάξ Ἡρακλῆς; καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, Ὡ Πόσειδον, ἐφη, δεινῶν λόγων· ἀφίσταμαι· ἀμάχῳ τῷ ἄνδρε.

Β Ἐνταῦθα μέντοι, ὦ φίλε Κρῖτων, οὔδεις ὅστις οὐ τῶν παρόντων ὑπερεπήνεσε τὸν λόγον καὶ τῷ ἄνδρε, καὶ γελώντες καὶ κροτοῦντες καὶ χαίροντες ὁλίγον παρετάθησαν. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἐμπρο-

1 γελώντες ... κροτοῦντες ... χαίροντες Badham: γελώντε ... κροτοῦντε ... χαίροντε MSS.

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Then these must be your gods? he said.
My ancestors, I said, and lords.
Well, at least, you have them, he said: or have you not admitted they are yours?
I have admitted it, I replied: what else could I do?
And are not these gods animals? he asked: you know you have admitted that whatever has life is an animal. Or have these gods no life?
They have, I replied.
Then are they not animals?
Yes, animals, I said.
And those animals, he went on, you have admitted to be yours, which you are free to bestow and sell and sacrifice to any god you please.
I have admitted it, I replied; there is no escape for me, Euthydemus.
Come then, tell me straight off, he said; since you admit that Zeus and the other gods are yours, are you free to sell or bestow them or treat them just as you please, like the other animals?
Well, Crito, here I must say I was knocked out, as it were, by the argument, and lay speechless; then Ctesippus rushed to the rescue and—Bravo, Hercules! he cried, a fine argument!
Whereat Dionysodorus asked: Now, do you mean that Hercules is a bravó, or that bravó is Hercules?
Ctesippus replied: Poseidon, what a frightful use of words! I give up the fight: these two are invincible.
Hereupon I confess, my dear Crito, that everyone present without exception wildly applauded the argument and the two men, till they all nearly died of laughing and clapping and rejoicing. For their
σθεν ἐφ’ ἐκάστους πᾶσι παγκάλως ἐθορύβουν μόνοι οἱ τοῦ Ἐυθυδήμου ἔρασται, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὀλίγου καὶ οἱ κόνες οἱ ἐν τῷ Δυκείῳ ἐθορύβησάν τ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἰδιότητι. ἔγω μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω διετέλην, ὡστε ὁμολογεῖν μηδένας πώποτε ἀνθρώπους ἰδεῖν οὕτω σοφοὺς, καὶ παντάπασι καταδουλωθεὶς ὑπὸ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦ ἔπι τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τε καὶ ἐγκωμιάζειν αὐτῷ ἐτραπόμην, καὶ εἶπον. Ὡ μακάριοι σφῶ τῆς θαυμαστῆς φύσεως, οἱ τοσοῦτον πράγμα οὕτω ταχὺ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἐξείργασθον. πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα οἱ λόγοι ύμῶν καλὰ ἔχουσιν, ὡς Ἐυθυδήμε τε καὶ Διονυσώ-δωρεῖ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τούτοι μεγαλοπρεπέστερον, ὦτι τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν σεμνῶν δὴ καὶ δοκοῦντων τί εἶναι οὐδὲν ὑμῖν μέλει, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὁμοίων ύμῖν μόνον. ἔγω γὰρ εὖ σοίδα, ὦτι τούτους τοὺς λόγους πάνυ μὲν ἀν ὀλίγου ἀγαπῶν ἀνθρώποι ομοιοὶ ύμῖν, οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι οὕτω νοοῦσιν αὐτούς, ὡστ’ εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἀν μᾶλλον ἐξελέγχοντες τοιοῦτοις λόγοις τοὺς ἄλλους ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐξελεγχόμενοι. καὶ τόδε αὐτό ἐτερον δημοτικόν τι καὶ πράον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ὅποτ’ ἐστίν ὑπὸ μῆτε καλὸν εἶναι μηδὲν μῆτε ἀγαθὸν πράγμα μῆτε λευκὸν μηδ’ ἄλλο τῶν τοιοῦτων μηδὲν, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἐτέρων ἐτερον, ἀτεχνῶς μὲν τῷ ὦτι ἔυρράπτετε τὰ στόματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὦσπερ καὶ φατε’ ὅτι δ’ οὐ μόνον τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ δοξαίτε ἂν καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα αὐτῶ, τοῦτο πάνυ χαρίεν τέ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἐπαχθές τῶν λό-γων ἀφαιρεῖται. τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον, ὦτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει ύμῖν καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐξεύρηται, ὡστε πάνυ ὀλίγω χρόνῳ ὄντων ἂν μαθεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἔγνων

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previous successes had been highly acclaimed one by one, but only by the devotees of Euthydemus; whereas now almost the very pillars of the Lyceum took part in the joyful acclamations in honour of the pair. For myself, I was quite disposed to admit that never had I set eyes on such clever people, and I was so utterly enthralled by their skill that I betook myself to praising and congratulating them, and said: Ah, happy pair! What amazing genius, to acquire such a great accomplishment so quickly and in so short a time! Among the many fine points in your arguments, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, there is one that stands out in particular magnificence—that you care not a jot for the multitude, or for any would-be important or famous people, but only for those of your own sort. And I am perfectly sure that there are but a few persons like yourselves who would be satisfied with these arguments: the rest of the world regard them only as arguments with which, I assure you, they would feel it a greater disgrace to refute others than to be refuted themselves. And further, there is at the same time a popular and kindly feature in your talk: when you say there is nothing either beautiful, or good, or white, and so on, and no difference of things at all, in truth you simply stitch up men's mouths, as you expressly say you do; while as to your apparent power of stitching up your own mouths as well, this is a piece of agreeable manners that takes off any offence from your talk. But the greatest thing of all is, that this faculty of yours is such, and is so skilfully contrived, that anyone in the world may learn it of you in a very short time; this fact I perceived myself by

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304 το ταχύ παραδιδόναι καλόν, ἐναντίον δ’ ἀνθρώπων διαλέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον, ἀλλ’ ἂν γ’ ἔμοι πειθησθησθε, εὐλαβήσεσθε μὴ πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν, ἵνα μὴ ταχὺ ἐκμαθώντες ὑμῖν μὴ εἰδῶσι χάριν: ἄλλα μάλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ μόνῳ διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μη, εἴπερ ἄλλου τοῦ ἐναντίον, ἐκείνου μόνου, ὥς ἂν ὑμῖν διδῶ ἀργύριον. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταύτα,

B ἔαν σωφρονῆτε, καὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς συμβουλεύσετε, μηδέποτε μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων διαλέγεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἦ ὑμῖν τε καὶ αὐτοῖς. τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, ὁ Εὐθυδήμη, τίμιον· τὸ δὲ ὑδωρ εὐνότατον, ἄριστον ὃν, ὡς ἔφη Πίνδαρος. ἀλλ’ ἂγετε, ἣν δ’ ἐγώ, ὅπως καμὲ καὶ Κλεινίαν τόνδε παραδέξεσθον.

Ταύτα, ὁ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα βραχέα διαλεχθέντες ἀπήμεν. σκόπει οὖν, ὅπως συμφωνήσεις

C παρὰ τῷ ἀνδρε, ὡς ἐκείνῳ φατὸν ὡς τ’ εἶναι διδάξαι τὸν ἐθέλοντ’ ἀργύριον διδόναι, καὶ οὔτε φύσιν οὔθ’ ἥλικιαν ἐξειργεῖν οὐδεμίαν—δ’ δὲ καὶ σοὶ μάλιστα προσήκει ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι οὔδε τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι φατὸν διακωλύειν οὐδέν—μὴ οὖ παραλαβεῖν ὄντων οὐπετῶς τὴν σφατέραν σοφίαν.

κρι. Καὶ μὴν, ὁ Σώκρατες, φιλήκοος μὲν ἔγωγε καὶ ἴδεως ἂν τι μανθάνομι, κινδυνεύω. μέντοι κἀγὼ εἰς εἰναι τῶν οὐχ ὄμοιών Εὐθυδήμῳ, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνων, ὅν δὴ καὶ σὺ ἔλεγες, τῶν ἢδον ἂν

D ἐξελεγχομένων ύπὸ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἢ ἐξ-ελεγχόντων. ἀτὰρ γελοἶον μὲν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι

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watching Ctesippus and observing how quickly he was able to imitate you on the spot. Now, in so far as your accomplishment can be quickly imparted, it is excellent; but for public discussions it is not suitable: if I may advise you, beware of talking before a number of people, lest they learn the whole thing in a trice and give you no credit for it. The best thing for you is to talk to each other by yourselves, in private; failing that, if a third person is present, it must be someone who will pay you a good fee. And if you are prudent you will give this same counsel to your pupils also—that they are never to converse with anybody except you and each other. For it is the rare, Euthydemus, that is precious, while water is cheapest, though best, as Pindar\(^1\) said. But come, I said, see if you can admit both me and Cleinias here to your class.

This, Crito, was our conversation, and after exchanging a few more words we went off. Now you must arrange to join us in taking lessons from the pair; for they say they are able to teach anyone who is willing to pay good money, and that no sort of character or age—and it is well that you especially should be told that they promise that their art is no hindrance to money-making—need deter anyone from an easy acquisition of their wisdom.

Crito. Indeed, Socrates, I love listening, and would be glad to learn from them; but I am afraid I am one of the sort who are not like Euthydemus, but who, as you described them just now, would prefer being refuted to refuting with such arguments. Now, although I feel it is absurd to admonish you,

\(^1\) Cf. Pindar, *Ol.* i., which begins—'Αριστον μὲν ἕδωρ.
PLATO

to voutheitein se, oµws de, a gy' ykouν, etheλw sou apaggeiλai. tων aφ' yµaν aπiontvν iot' oti proselthων tis moj peripatovnti, anhp oiömeνos πaνu eiηai soφo's, tou'tωn tis tων per'i tou's losjoνs tou's eis ta dikasthria deivwn, 'Ω Krίτων, efhi, ouδeν akroa tawn de tων soφων; Où ma touν Diα, ἡν δ' εγω' ou gαρ oìs t' ἥ prosoftas katakoüev upo tou oχλou. Kαι μην, efhi, aξiôν γ' ἕν akouσai.

Ε Τί δε; ἢν δ' εγώ. Ἕνa ykousas anδρων dia-
legeomyνov, oì νυν sofoytatoi eiηai tων per'i tou's
toioutous losjou'n. kagw eiηov, Τί οùn efai-
nontο sou; Τί δε αλλο, ἢ δ' ος, ἢ oιαπερ aεi aν

tis tων tοioutouν akoussai lηrhoυtvν kai per'i
ouδeνοs aξiow anαξiav spoudhν poioymενονv; ou-
twsi γαρ πωs kai eiπe tois oνoμασι. kai εγώ,
'Alλa μεντοι, efhi, χαριην γε τι prągmα ἐστων
η filosofhia. Poioν, efhi, χαριεν, δ' μακαριe;
ouδeνοs μεν ouν aξiow, αλla kai ei νυν parageνου,
paνu aν se oimai aiçhxnθνai uper tou seautoi'
etairoν. ou'tws ἢν a-topo's, efheλwν eautoν par-
εxein anhρwpois, ois ouδeν melεi o ti aν leγων,
pantοs δe ρήματον αντεχονται. kai ouτoi, ope
aρtι ελεγον, εν tois kratistois eiηai tων νυν.
aλla γαρ, Ω Krίτων, efhi, τo prągma atuo kai
oι anhρwpoi oι eπι τω prągmati diatρβουνε
faηloι eiηai kai katagελαστοι. efhi de, δ' Σω'

305 aκrates, το prągma edõkei ouκ oρθωs psεγεν
B oùθ' ouτos ouτ' ei tis αλλοs psεgei' τo μεντοι

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I wish nevertheless to report to you what was told me just now. Do you know, one of the people who had left your discussion came up to me as I was taking a stroll—a man who thinks himself very wise, one of those who are so clever at turning out speeches for the law-courts—and said: Crito, do you take no lessons from these wise men? No, in truth, I replied: there was such a crowd that, though I stood quite close, I was unable to catch what was said. Well, let me tell you, he said, it was something worth hearing. What was it? I asked. You would have heard the disputation of men who are the most accomplished of our day in that kind of speaking. To this I replied: Well, what did they show forth to you? Merely the sort of stuff, he said, that you may hear such people babbling about at any time—making an inconsequent ado about matters of no consequence (in some such parlance he expressed himself). Whereupon—Well, all the same, I said, philosophy is a charming thing. Charming is it, my dear innocent? he exclaimed: nay, a thing of no consequence. Why, had you been in that company just now, you would have been filled with shame, I fancy, for your particular friend: he was so strangely willing to lend himself to persons who care not a straw what they say, but merely fasten on any phrase that turns up. And these, as I said just now, are the heads of their profession to-day. But the fact is, Crito, he went on, the business itself and the people who follow it are worthless and ridiculous. Now, in my opinion, Socrates, he was not right in decrying the pursuit; he is wrong, and so is anyone else who decries it:

1 The allusion is probably to Isocrates.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ἐθέλειν διαλέγεσθαι τοιούτως ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ὥρθως μοι ἔδοκε μέμφεσθαι.

σπ. Ὡ Κρίτων, θαυμάσοι εἰσιν οἱ τοιούτω ἄνδρες. ἀτὰρ οὐπω οἶδα ὦ τι μέλλω ἔρειν. ποτέρων ἢν ὅ προσελθὼν σοι καὶ μεμφώμενος τὴν φιλοσοφίαν; πότερον τῶν ἀγωνίσασθαι δεινῶν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, ῥήτωρ τις, ἡ τῶν τούς τοιούτους εἰσπεμπόντων, ποιητής τῶν λόγων, οἷς οἱ ὁπτορες ἀγωνίζονται;

C κρι. "Ἡκιστα νὴ τὸν Δία ῥήτωρ, οὐδὲ οἶμαι πῶςτ' αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκέναι· ἀλλ' ἐπαίειν αὐτὸν φασὶ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος νὴ τὸν Δία καὶ δεινὸν εἰναι καὶ δεινοὺς λόγους συντιθέναι.

σπ. Ἡδὴ μανθάνω· περὶ τούτων καὶ αὐτὸς νῦν δὴ ἔμελλον λέγειν. οὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσὶ μέν, ὃ Κρίτων, οὐς ἔφη Πρόδικος μεθόρια φιλοσοφοῦ τε ἄνδρος καὶ πολιτικοῦ, οἴονται δ' εἰναι πάντων σοφῶτατοι ἀνθρώπων, πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἰναι καὶ δοκεῖν πάνυ παρὰ πολλοῖς, ὥστε παρὰ πᾶσιν

D ἐνδοκιμεῖν ἐμποδῶν σφίσιν εἰναι οὐδένας ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθρώπους. ἢγοίνει οὖν, ἐὰν τοῦτοι εἰς δόξαν καταστήσωσι μηδὲν ὁ δοκεῖν ἀξίους εἰναι, ἀναμφισβητήτως ἢδη παρὰ πᾶσι τὰ νυκτήρια εἰς δόξαν οἰσεσθαι σοφίας πέρι. εἰναι μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σφᾶς σοφωτάτους, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἴδιοις λόγοις ὅταν ἀπολειφθῶσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον κολούεσθαι. σοφοὶ δὲ ἢγοίνει εἰναι πάνυ εἰκότως· μετρίως μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἐχειν, μετρίως δὲ πολιτικῶν, πάνυ ἐξ εἰκότος 498
though I must say I felt he was right in blaming the readiness to engage in discussion with such people before a large company.

soc. Crito, these people are very odd. But I do not yet know what answer I shall give you. Of which party was he who came up to you and blamed philosophy? Was he one of those who excel in the contests of the courts, an orator; or of those who equip the orators for the fray, a composer of the speeches they deliver in their contests?

crict. Nothing of an orator, I dare swear, nor do I think he has ever appeared in court: only he is reputed to know about the business, so they declare, and to be a clever person, and compose clever speeches.

soc. Now I understand: it was of these people that I was just now going to speak myself. They are the persons, Crito, whom Prodicus described as the border-ground between philosopher and politician, yet they fancy that they are the wisest of all mankind, and that they not merely are but are thought so by a great many people; and accordingly they feel that none but the followers of philosophy stand in the way of their universal renown. Hence they believe that, if they can reduce the latter to a status of no esteem, the prize of victory will by common consent be awarded to them, without dispute or delay, and their claim to wisdom will be won. For they consider themselves to be in very truth the wisest, but find that, when caught in private conversation, they are cut off short by Euthydemus and his set. This conceit of their wisdom is very natural, since they regard themselves as moderately versed in philosophy, and moderately too in politics, on
Ε λόγου: μετέχειν γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ὦσον ἔδει, ἐκτὸς δὲ ὄντες κινδύνων καὶ ἀγώνων καρποῦσθαι τὴν σοφίαν.

ΚΡΙ. Τι οὖν; δοκοῦσί σοι τι, ὦ Σώκρατε, λέγειν; οὐ γὰρ τοι ἀλλ᾽ ὦ γε λόγος ἐχει τινὰ εὐπρέπειαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

ΣΝ. Καί γὰρ ἐχει οὕτως, ὦ Κρίτων, εὐπρέπειαν

506 μᾶλλον ἡ ἀλήθειαν. οὐ γὰρ ράδιον αὐτοὺς πείσαι, ὅτι καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ τὰλλα πάντα, ὡσα μεταξύ τινῶν δυνῶν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμφοτέρους τυγχάνει μετέχοντα, ὡσα μὲν ἐκ κακοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ μὲν βελτίω, τοῦ δὲ χείρῳ γίγνεται ὡσα δὲ ἐκ δυνῶν ἀγαθοῖν μή πρὸς ταύτων, ἀμφοῖν χείρῳ, πρὸς δ᾽ ἂν ἐκάτερον ἢ χρηστον ἐκείνων, ἐξ ὦν συνετέθη ὡσα δὲ ἐκ δυνῶν κακοῖν συντεθέντα μή πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ οὕτων ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἐστὶ, ταῦτα

Β μόνα βελτίω ἐκάτερον ἐκείνων ἐστίν, ὡν ἀμφοτέρων μέρος μετέχουσιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀγαθόν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ πράξις, πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ἐκάτερα, οὕτω δ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες τούτων ἐν μέσῳ εἰσίν, οὐδὲν λέγουσιν ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ εἰσὶν φαυλότεροι: εἰ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν, τῶν μὲν βελτίων, τῶν δὲ χείρων: εἰ δὲ κακὰ ἀμφότερα, οὕτως ἄν τι λέγοιην ἀλήθες, ἀλλως δ᾽ οὐδαμῶς. οὐκ ἂν οὖν οἶμαι αὐτοὺς ὁμολο-

C γῆσαι οὕτε κακῶν αὐτῶν ἀμφοτέρων εἰναι οὕτε τὸ μὲν κακὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν. ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι οὕτω ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες ἀμφοτέρων ἡττοὺς εἰσὶ
EUTHYDEMUS

quite reasonable grounds: for they have dipped into both as far as they needed, and, evading all risk and struggle, are content to gather the fruits of wisdom.

cri. Well, now, do you consider, Socrates, that there is anything in what they say? It is not to be denied that these men have some colour for their statements.

soc. Yes, that is so, Crito; colour rather than truth. It is no easy matter to persuade them that either people or things, which are between two other things and have a certain share of both, if compounded of bad and good are found to be better than the one and worse than the other; but if compounded of two good things which have not the same object, they are worse than either of their components in relation to the object to which each of them is adapted; while if they are compounded of two bad things which have not the same object, and stand between them, this is the only case where they are better than either of the two things of which they have a share. Now if philosophy and the statesman's business are both good things, and each of them has a different object, and if these persons, partaking of both, are between them, their claims are nought; for they are inferior to both: if one is good and the other bad, they are better than the one and worse than the other: while if both are bad, in this case there would be some truth in their statement, but in any other case there is none. Now I do not think they will admit either that both these things are bad, or that one is bad and the other good: the truth is that these people, partaking of both, are inferior to both in respect of

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πρὸς έκάτερον, πρὸς δ' ἡ τε πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φιλο-
σοφία ἀξίω λόγου ἔστων, καὶ τρίτοι ὄντες τῇ
ἀληθείᾳ ζητοῦσι πρῶτοι δοκεῖν εἶναι. συγγρι-
γνώσκειν μὲν οὖν αὐτοῖς χρῆ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ
μὴ χαλεπαίνειν, ἥγεισθαι μέντοι τοιοῦτοι εἶναι
οἱ ὡς πάντα γὰρ ἀνδρὰ χρῆ ἀγαπᾶν, ὡστε
καὶ ὅτι οὐ λέγει ἐχόμενον φρονήσεως πράγμα
D καὶ ἀνδρεῖως ἐπεξιῶν διαπονεῖται.
κρι. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτός περὶ
tῶν νύεων, ὥσπερ ἂεὶ πρὸς σε λέγω, ἐν ἀπορίᾳ
eἰμί, τί δει αὐτοῖς χρῆσασθαι. ὃ μὲν οὖν νεω-
tερος ἐτί καὶ σμικρός ἐστι, Κριτόβουλος δ' ἦδη
ἡλικίαν ἔχει καὶ δεῖται τινος, ὡστε αὐτὸν ὄνησει.
ἔγω μὲν οὖν ὅταν σοι ξυγγένωμαι, οὔτω δια-
tίθεμαι, ὡστε μοι δοκεῖν μιᾶν ἐιναι τὸ ἕνεκα
tῶν παίδων ἄλλων μὲν πολλῶν στοιχὴν τουαυτὴν
Ε ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ περὶ τοῦ γάμου, ὡπός ἐκ γεν-
ναιοτάτης ἐσονται μητρός, καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων,
ὡς ὥς πλουσιώτατοι, αὐτῶν δὲ περὶ παιδείας
ἀμελήσαι, ὅταν δὲ εἰς τινα ἀποβλέψω τῶν φα-
σκόντων ἂν παιδεύσαι ἀνθρώπους, ἐκπέπληγμαι,
καὶ μοι δοκεῖ εἰς ἐκαστος αὐτῶν σκοποῦντι πάνιν
307 ἀλλόκοτος εἶναι, ὡς γε πρὸς σε τάληθη εἰρήσθαι·
wοστε οὖκ ἔχω ὡπως προτρέψω τὸ μειράκιον
ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν.
ἐπ. Ὁ δὲ Κρίτων, οὐκ οἶδα, ὅτι ἐν παντὶ
ἐπιτηδεύματι οἱ μὲν φαύλοι πολλοὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς
ἀξιοι, οἱ δὲ σπουδαίοι ὄλγοι καὶ παντὸς ἀξιοι;
ἐπεί γυμναστικὴ οὐ καλὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ
χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ρητορικὴ καὶ στρατηγία;
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EUTHYDEMUS

the objects for which statesmanship and philosophy are important; and while they are really in the third place they seek to be accorded the first. However, we ought to be indulgent towards their ambition and not feel annoyed, while still judging them to be what they actually are. For we should be glad of anyone, whoever he may be, who says anything that verges on good sense, and labours steadily and manfully in its pursuit.

cri. Now I myself, Socrates, as I so often tell you, am in doubt about my sons, as to what I am to do with them. The younger is as yet quite small; but Critobulus is already grown up, and needs someone who will be of service to him. When I am in your company, the effect on me is such as to make me feel it is mere madness to have taken ever so much pains in various directions for the good of my children—first in so marrying that they should be of very good blood on their mother's side; then in making money so that they might be as well off as possible; while I have neglected the training of the boys themselves. But when I glance at one of the persons who profess to educate people, I am dismayed, and feel that each one of them, when I consider them, is wholly unsuitable—to tell you the truth between ourselves. So that I cannot see how I am to incline the lad towards philosophy.

soc. My dear Crito are you not aware that in every trade the duffers are many and worthless, whereas the good workers are few and worth any price? Why, do you not hold athletics, and money-making, and rhetoric, and generalship, to be fine things?
ΚΡΙ. "Έμοι γε πάντως δήπον.

ΣΝ. Τί οὖν ἐν ἑκαστῇ τούτῳ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς ἑκαστὸν τὸ ἔργον οὐ καταγελάστους ὄρας;
ΚΡΙ. Ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, καὶ μάλα ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΝ. Ἡ οὖν τούτου ἕνεκα αὐτὸς τε φεύξει πάντα τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τῶν οὐκ ἐπιτρέψεις;
ΚΡΙ. Οὐκοιν δίκαιῶν γε, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΝ. Μὴ τοίνυν ὁ γε οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖ, ὡς Κρίτων, ἀλλ' ἐάσας χαίρειν τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας φιλοσοφίαν,

C εἴτε χρηστοῦ εἰσιν εἴτε πονηροί, αὐτὸ τὸ πράγμα βασανίσας καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ, ἐὰν μὲν σοὶ φαίνηται

φαίλον ὡς, πάντ' ἄνδρα ἀπότρεπε, μὴ μόνον τοὺς

νείς· ἐὰν δὲ φαίνηται οἶνον όμαι αὐτὸ ἐγὼ εἶναι,

θαρρῶν δίωκε καὶ ἀσκεῖ, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο

αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὰ παιδία.
EUTHYDEMUS

cri. Certainly I do, of course.
soc. Well then, in each of these, do you not see most men making a ridiculous show at their respective tasks?
cri. Yes, I know: what you say is perfectly true.
soc. Then will you yourself on this account eschew all these pursuits, and not let your son have anything to do with them?
cri. No, there would be no good reason for that, Socrates.
soc. Then avoid at least what is wrong, Crito: let those who practise philosophy have their way, whether they are helpful or mischievous; and when you have tested the matter itself, well and truly, if you find it to be a poor affair, turn everyone you can away from it, not only your sons: but if you find it to be such as I think it is, pursue and ply it without fear, both you, as they say, and yours.
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