The histories

Polybius
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

EDITED BY

E. CAPPS, PH.D., LL.D.  T. E. PAGE, LITT.D.  W. H. D. ROUSE, LITT.D.

POLYBIUS

II
## CONTENTS OF VOLUME II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOOK</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOOK III</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOOK IV</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE HISTORIES OF
POLYBIUS
ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ
ΙΣΤΟΡΙΩΝ ΤΡΙΤΗ

1 Ὄσι μὲν ἀρχὰς ὑποτιθέμεθα τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας τὸν τε συμμαχικὸν καὶ τὸν Ἀννιβακόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸν περὶ Κούλης Συρίας πόλεμον, ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μὲν τῆς ὕλης συντάξεως, τρίτῃ δὲ ταύτῃ ἄνωτερον βύβλω δεδηλώκαμεν· ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ τὰς αἰτίας, δι’ ἀσ ἀναδραμόντες τοῖς χρόνοις πρὸ τοῦτων τῶν καρδῶν συνεταξάμεθα τάς πρὸ ταύτῃ βύβλους, ἐν αὐτῇ ’κείνῃ διεσαφήσαμεν. νῦν δὲ πειρασόμεθα τοὺς προειρημένους πολέμους, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξ ὧν ἐγένοντο καὶ δι’ ἂς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ηὐξῆθησαν, μετ’ ἀποδείξεως ἐξαγγέλλειν, βραχέα προειπόντες ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας.

4 Ὅντος γὰρ ἐνὸς ἔργου καὶ θεάματος ἐνὸς τοῦ σύμπαντος, ὑπὲρ οὗ γράφεων ἐπικεχειρήκαμεν, τοῦ πῶς καὶ πότε καὶ διὰ τί πάντα τὰ γνωριζόμενα μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης ὑπὸ τὴν Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν ἐγένετο, τούτου δ’ ἔχοντος καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν γνωριζομένη καὶ τὸν χρόνον ὑρισμένον καὶ τὴν συντέλειαν ὁμολογουμένην, χρήσιμον ἡγούμεθ’ εἶναι καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτῶ μερῶν, ὥσα μεταξὺ κεῖται τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ τέλους, κεφαλαίως ἐπιμνησθῆναι καὶ προεκθέσθαι. μάλιστα γὰρ ὅτι τῶς 2
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

BOOK III

1. In my first Book, the third, that is, from this counting backwards, I explained that I fixed as the starting-points of my work, the Social war, the Hannibalic war, and the war for Coele-Syria. I likewise set forth in the same place the reasons why I wrote the two preceding Books dealing with events of an earlier date. I will now attempt to give a well attested account of the above wars, their first causes and the reasons why they attained such magnitude; but in the first place I have a few words to say regarding my work as a whole.

The subject I have undertaken to treat, the how, when, and wherefore of the subjection of the known parts of the world to the dominion of Rome, should be viewed as a single whole, with a recognized beginning, a fixed duration, and an end which is not a matter of dispute; and I think it will be advantageous to give a brief prefatory survey of the chief parts of this whole from the beginning to the end.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

υπολαμβάνομεν τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσι παρασκευάσεων
7 ἵκανην ἐννοιαν τῆς ὄλης ἐπιβολῆς. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ
προλαμβανοῦσης τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ τῶν ὅλων πρὸς τὴν
κατὰ μέρος τῶν πραγμάτων γνώσιν, πολλὰ δὲ ἐκ τῶν
κατὰ μέρος πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐπιστήμην, ἀρίστην
ηγούμενοι τὴν ἕξ ἀμφοῖν ἐπίστασιν καὶ θέαν, ἀκό-
λουθον τοῖς εἰρήμενοι ποιησόμεθα τὴν προέκθεσιν
8 τῆς αὐτών πραγματείας. τὴν μὲν οὖν καθόλου τῆς
ὑποθέσεως ἐμφασιν καὶ τὴν περιγραφῆν ἣδη δεδηλώ-
9 καμεν. τῶν δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἐν αὐτῇ γεγονότων
ἀρχὰς μὲν εἶναι συμβαίνει τοὺς προερημένους
πολέμους, καταστροφῆν δὲ καὶ συντέλειαν τὴν
καταλυσιν τῆς ἐν Μακεδονία βασιλείας, χρόνον δὲ
τὸν μεταξὺ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ τέλους ἐτη πεντήκοντα
10 τρία, περιέχεσθαι δὲ ἐν τούτῳ τηλικαύτας καὶ
toιαύτας πράξεις, ὅσας οὔδεις τῶν προγεγονότων
11 καιρῶν ἐν ἰσω περιέλαβε διαστήματι. περὶ δὲ ἀντὶ
τῆς ἔκατοστῆς καὶ τετταρακοστῆς ὀλυμπιάδος
ἀρξάμενοι τοιάνδε τινὰ ποιησόμεθα τὴν ἐφόδου τῆς
ἐξηγήσεως.
2 Ἡποδείξαντες γὰρ τὰς αἰτίας, διὰ ὧν δὲ προδεδηλώ-
μένος συνέστη Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ Ῥωμαίοι πόλεμος,
ὁ προσαγορευθεὶς Ἁνπιωκόσ, ἔρωθεν ως εἰς
2 Ἰταλίαν ἐμβαλόντες Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ καταλύσαντες
τὴν Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν εἰς μέγαν μὲν φόβον
ἐκεῖνον ἡγαγον περὶ σφῶν καὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος
ἐδάφους, μεγάλας δὲ ἔσχον αὐτοῖ καὶ παραδόξους
ἐλπίδας, ὡς καὶ τῆς Ῥώμης αὐτῆς ἕξ ἐφόδου
3 κρατήσαντες. ἐξῆς δὲ τούτωσ περισσόμεθα διασα-
φεῖν ώς κατὰ τοὺς αὐτούς καιροὺς Φίλιππος μὲν ὃ
Μακεδῶν διαπολεμήσας Αἰτωλοῖς καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα
συντησάμενος τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ἐλλήνας, ἐπεβάλετο
4
BOOK III. 1.6–2.3

For I believe this will be the best means of giving students an adequate idea of my whole plan. Since a previous general view is of great assistance to the mind in acquiring a knowledge of details, and at the same time a previous notion of the details helps us to knowledge of the whole, I regard a preliminary survey based on both as best and will draw up these prefatory remarks to my history on this principle. I have already indicated the general scope and limits of this history. The particular events comprised in it begin with the above-mentioned wars and culminate and end in the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy. Between the beginning and end lies a space of fifty-three years, comprising a greater number of grave and momentous events than any period of equal length in the past. Starting from the 140th Olympiad I shall adopt the following order in my exposition of them.

2. First I shall indicate the causes of the above war between Rome and Carthage, known as the Hannibal war, and tell how the Carthaginians invaded Italy, broke up the dominion of Rome, and cast the Romans into great fear for their safety and even for their native soil, while great was their own hope, such as they had never dared to entertain, of capturing Rome itself. Next I will attempt to describe how at the same period Philip of Macedon, after finishing his war with the Aetolians and settling the affairs of Greece, conceived the project of an
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

4 κοινωνεῖν Καρχηδονίους τῶν αὐτῶν ἑλπίδων, Ἀντίοχος δὲ καὶ Πτολεμαῖος οἱ Φιλοπάτωρ ἡμιφιλεῖ- 
tουν, τέλος δὲ ἐπολέμησαν ὑπὲρ Κοίλης Συρίας πρὸς
5 ἀλλήλους, Ὁδοὺ δὲ καὶ Προυσίας ἀναλαβόντες 

πρὸς Βυζαντίους πόλεμον ἡνάγκασαν αὐτοὺς ἀπο-

στήναι τοῦ παραγωγάζειν τοὺς πλέοντας εἰς τὸν
6 Ποντόν. στῆσαντες δὲ ἐπὶ τοὺτοι τὴν διήγησιν τὸν

ὑπὲρ τῆς Ρωμαίων πολιτείας συντησοῦμεθα λόγον, 

ὅτα τὸ συνεχὲς ὑποδείξουμεν ὅτι μέγιστα 

συνεβάλετ' αὐτοῖς ἢ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἰδιότης πρὸς 

tὸ μὴ μόνον ἀνακτήσασθαι τὴν Ἰταλιωτῶν καὶ 

Σικελιωτῶν δυναστείαν, ἔτι δὲ τῆν Ἰβηρῶν προσλα-

βεῖν καὶ Κελτῶν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τελευταῖον καὶ πρὸς 

tὸ κρατήσαντας τῷ πολέμῳ Καρχηδονίων ἔννοιαν
7 σχεῖν τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβολῆς. ἀμα δὲ τούτοις κατὰ 

παρέκβασιν δηλώσομεν τὴν κατάλυσιν τῆς Ἰέρωνος 

8 τοῦ Συρακουσίων δυναστείας. οἷς ἐπισυνάψομεν τὰς 

περὶ τὴν Ἀἰγυπτον ταραχὰς καὶ τίνα τρόπον Πτο-

λεμαίον τοῦ βασιλέως μεταλλάξαντος τὸν βίον συμ-

φρονήσαντες Ἀντίοχος καὶ Φίλιππος ἔτι διαμένει 

tῆς τοῦ καταλελειμμένου παιδὸς ἀρχῆς ἦρξαντο κα-

κοπραγμονεῖν καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιβάλλειν Φίλιππος 

μὲν τοῖς κατ’ Αἰγαῖον καὶ Καρίαν καὶ Σάμον, Ἀν-

τίοχος δὲ τοῖς κατὰ Κοίλην Συρίαν καὶ Φωνίκην.

3 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συγκεφαλαισμένοι τὰς ἐν Ἰβηρία 

καὶ Λιβύη καὶ Σικελία πράξεις Ρωμαίων καὶ Καρ-

χηδονίων μεταβιβάσομεν τὴν διήγησιν ὁλοσχερῶς 

eis toûs kata tìn 'Elláda toûs amà taïs tûn

2 πραγμάτων μεταβολαῖς. ἐξηγησάμενοι δὲ τὰς Ἀτ-

τάλου καὶ Ὁρδίων ναυμαχίας πρὸς Φίλιππον, ἔτι δὲ 

tón 'Ρωμαίων kai Φίλιππου πόλεμον, ós ἐπράχθη 

3 kai dià tîn toû kai tî toû telos ēsche, touûs sun-
BOOK III. 2.4–3.3

alliance with Carthage; how Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator first quarrelled and at length went to war with each other for the possession of Coele-Syria, and how the Rhodians and Prusias, declaring war on the Byzantines, compelled them to stop levying toll on ships bound for the Euxine. Interrupting my narrative at this point, I shall draw up my account of the Roman Constitution, as a sequel to which I shall point out how the peculiar qualities of the Constitution conduced very largely not only to their subjection of the Italians and Sicilians, and subsequently of the Spaniards and Celts, but finally to their victory over Carthage and their conceiving the project of universal empire. Simultaneously in a digression I shall narrate how the dominion of Hiero of Syracuse fell and after this I shall deal with the troubles in Egypt, and tell how, on the death of Ptolemy, Antiochus and Philip, conspiring to partition the dominions of his son, a helpless infant, began to be guilty of acts of unjust aggression, Philip laying hands on the islands of the Aegean, and on Caria and Samos, while Antiochus seized on Coele-Syria and Phoenicia.

3. Next, after summing up the doings of the Roman and Carthaginians in Spain, Africa, and Sicily I shall shift the scene of my story definitely, as the scene of action shifted, to Greece and its neighbourhood. I shall describe the sea-battles in which Attalus and the Rhodians met Philip, and after this deal with the war between the Romans and Philip, its course, its reason, and its result. Following on this I shall
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

άπτοντες τὸ συνεχὲς μνημοσύνημα τῆς Αἰτωλῶν ὀργῆς, καθ’ ἣν Ἀντίοχον ἐπισπασάμενοι τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀσίας Ἀχαιόις καὶ Ῥωμαῖοις ἐξέκασαν πόλεμον.  
4 οὖ δηλώσαντες τὸς αἰτίας καὶ τὴν Ἀντίοχον διάβασιν εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην, διασαφήσουμεν πρῶτον μὲν τὴν τρόπουν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐφυγε, δεύτερον δὲ πῶς ἦττηθεὶς τῆς ἔπι τάδε τοῦ Ταῦρου πάσης ἐξεχώρησε,  
5 τὸ δὲ τρίτον τίνα τρόπον Ῥωμαίου καταλύσαντες τὴν Γαλατῶν ὑβρίν ἀδήριτον μὲν σφίκα παρεσκέυασαν τὴν τῆς Ἀσίας ἀρχήν, ἀπέλυσαν δὲ τοὺς ἔπι τάδε τοῦ Ταῦρου κατοικοῦντας βαρβαρικῶν φόβων καὶ τῆς Γαλατῶν παρανομίας. μετὰ δὲ ταύτα θέντες ὑπὸ τὴν ὅμων τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ Κεφαλήνων ἀτυχίας ἐπισαλοῦμεν τοὺς Εὐμένει συστάντας πρὸς τε Προσιάν καὶ Γαλάτας πολέμους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν 7 μετ’ Ἀριαράθου πρὸς Φαρνάκαν. οἷς ἐξῆς ἐπιμνησθέντες τῆς παρὰ Πελοποννησίων ὁμονοιας καὶ καταστάσεως, ἔτι δὲ τῆς αὐξήσεως τοῦ Ῥωμαίων πολιτεύματος, συγκεφαλαιωσόμεθα τὴν ὅλην διήγησιν ἀμα καὶ τᾶς πράξεις, ἐπὶ πάσων ἐξηγήσαμενοι τὴν Ἀντιόχου στρατείαν εἰς Ἀίγυπτον τοῦ κληθέντος Ἑσπανούς καὶ τὸν Περσικὸν πόλεμον καὶ τὴν κατάλυσιν τῆς ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλείας.  
8 γησὶν ἀμα καὶ τῆς πράξεις, ἐπὶ πάσων ἐξηγήσαμενοι τὴν Ἀντιόχου στρατείαν εἰς Ἀίγυπτον τοῦ κληθέντος Ἑσπανούς καὶ τὸν Περσικὸν πόλεμον καὶ τὴν κατάλυσιν τῆς ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλείας.  
9 δι’ όν ἀμα θεωρηθήσεται πῶς ἐκαστα χειρίσαντες Ῥωμαίοι πάσαν ἐποίησαν τὴν οἰκουμένην ὑπῆκοοι αὐτοῖς.  
4 Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν κατορθωμάτων ἦ καὶ τῶν ἐλπισμάτων ἰκανῆν ἐνεδέχετο πουήσοισαι τὴν διάλεξην ὑπὲρ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἢ τοῦντον ἐπανετών ἀνδρῶν καὶ πολιτευμάτων, ἐνθάδε που λήγειν ἄν ἡμᾶς ἔδει καὶ καταστρέφειν ἀμα τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ἐπὶ τὰς τελευταίας ῥηθείσας 8
make mention of the angry spirit of the Aetolians yielding to which they invited Antiochus over, and thus set ablaze the war from Asia against the Achaeans and Romans. After narrating the causes of this war, and how Antiochus crossed to Europe, I shall describe in the first place how he fled from Greece; secondly how on his defeat after this he abandoned all Asia up to the Taurus; and thirdly, how the Romans, suppressing the insolence of the Galatian Gauls, established their undisputed supremacy in Asia and freed its inhabitants on this side of the Taurus from the fear of barbarians and the lawless violence of these Gauls. Next I shall bring before the reader’s eyes the misfortune that befell the Aetolians and Cephallenians, and then make mention of the war of Eumenes with Prusias and the Gauls and of that between Ariarathes and Pharnaces. Subsequently, after some notice of the unification and pacification of the Peloponnese and of the growth of the Rhodian State, I shall bring the whole narrative of events to a conclusion, narrating finally the expedition of Antiochus Epiphanes against Egypt, the war with Perseus, and the abolition of the Macedonian monarchy. All the above events will enable us to perceive how the Romans dealt with each contingency and thus subjected the whole world to their rule.

4. Now if from their success or failure alone we could form an adequate judgement of how far states and individuals are worthy of praise or blame, I could here lay down my pen, bringing my narrative and this whole work to a close with the last-mentioned
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

2 πράξεις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν. ὃ τε γὰρ χρόνος ὁ πεντηκοντακατετής εἰσ ταῦτ᾽ ἐληγεν ἡ τ᾽ αὐξήσις καὶ προκοπῆ τῆς Ῥωμαίων δυναστείας
3 ἐτετελείωτο. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁμολογούμενοι ἐδόκει τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι καὶ κατηγογακασμένον ἀπάσων ὦτι λοιπὸν ἔστι Ῥωμαίων ἀκούει καὶ τούτως πειθαρχεῖν ὑπὲρ
4 τῶν παραγγελλομένων. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐκ αὐτοτελεῖς εἰσὶν οὔτε περὶ τῶν κρατησάντων οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἐλαττωθέντων αἵ ὕμιλῶς ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀγωνισμάτων διὰ-
5 λήψεις, διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς μὲν τὰ μέγιστα δοκοῦντʼ εἶναι τῶν κατορθωμάτων, ὅταν μὴ δεόντως αὐτοῖς χρήσωται, τὰς μεγίστας ἐπενηροχέσαι συμφοράς,
6 οὐκ οἷγοι δὲ τὰς ἐκπληκτικώτατας περιπετείας, ὅταν εὐγενῶς αὐτὰς ἀναδέξωνται, πολλάκις εἰς τὴν οὐ περιπετευομένους περιπετευκέναι μερίδα, προσβε-
7 τέον ἃν εἰη ταῖς προειρημέναις πράξει τὴν τε τῶν κρατοῦντων αἵρεσιν, ποία τις ἤν μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ πῶς προεστάτει τῶν ὅλων, τὰς τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀποδοχάς,
8 καὶ διαλήψεις, πόσαι καὶ τίνες ὑπηρχον περὶ τῶν ἠγουμένων, πρὸς δὲ τούτως τὰς ὀρμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ζῆλους ἐξηγητέον, τίνες παρ᾽ ἐκάστους ἐπεκράτουν
9 καὶ κατίσχυν περὶ τε τοὺς κατ᾽ ἱδίαν βίους καὶ
tὰς κοινὰς πολιτείας. δὴ ἦλθον γὰρ ὃς ἐκ τούτων
φανερὸν ἔσται τοῖς μὲν νῦν οὗτοι πότερα φευκτὴν ἢ τοῦναυτὸν αἵρετην εἶναι συμβαίνει τὴν Ῥωμαίων
dυναστείαν, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐπιγυμνόμενοι πότερον ἐπαινετήν καὶ ζηλωτὴν ἢ ψεκτὴν γεγονέναι νομιστεόν τὴν
9 ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν. τὸ γὰρ ωφέλιμον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἱστο-
8 ρίας πρὸς τε τὸ παρόν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἐν τούτῳ
9 πλεῖστον κείσεται τῷ μέρει. οὔ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι
tέλος ὑπολήπτεον ἐν πράγμασιν οὔτε τοῖς ἡγουμέ-
νοις οὔτε τοῖς ἀποφαινομένοις ὑπὲρ τούτων, τὸ νι-
events, as was my original intention. For the period of fifty-three years finished here, and the growth and advance of Roman power was now complete. Besides which it was now universally accepted as a necessary fact that henceforth all must submit to the Romans and obey their orders. But since judgements regarding either the conquerors or the conquered based purely on performance are by no means final—what is thought to be the greatest success having brought the greatest calamities on many, if they do not make proper use of it, and the most dreadful catastrophes often turning out to the advantage of those who support them bravely—I must append to the history of the above period an account of the subsequent policy of the conquerors and their method of universal rule, as well as of the various opinions and appreciations of their rulers entertained by the subjects, and finally I must describe what were the prevailing and dominant tendencies and ambitions of the various peoples in their private and public life. For it is evident that contemporaries will thus be able to see clearly whether the Roman rule is acceptable or the reverse, and future generations whether their government should be considered to have been worthy of praise and admiration or rather of blame. And indeed it is just in this that the chief usefulness of this work for the present and the future will lie. For neither rulers themselves nor their critics should regard the end of action as being merely conquest.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

10 κήσαι καὶ ποιήσασθαι πάντας ὑφ’ έαυτούς. οὕτε γὰρ πολεμεῖ τοῖς πέλας οὐδεὶς νοῦν ἔχων ἔνεκεν αὐτοῦ τοῦ καταγωνίσασθαι τοὺς ἀντιταττομένους, οὕτε πλεῖ τὰ πελάγη χάριν τοῦ περαιώθηναι μόνον, καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰς ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας αὐτῆς ἔνεκα τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀναλαμβάνει. πάντες δὲ πράττουσι πάντα χάριν τῶν ἐπιγνωμένων τοῖς ἔργοις ἡδέων ἡ καλῶν ἡ συμφερόντων. διὸ καὶ τῆς πραγματείας ταύτης τοῦτ’ ἔσται τελεσιούργημα, τὸ γνώναι τὴν κατάστασιν παρ’ ἐκάστοις, ποία τις ἢ μετὰ τὸ καταγωνίσθηναι τὰ ὀλὰ καὶ πεσεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐξουσίαν, ἐως τῆς μετά ταύτα πάλιν ἐπι-

13 γενομένης θαραχῆς καὶ κινήσεως. ὑπὲρ ἂς διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πράξεων καὶ τὸ παράδοξον τῶν συμβαίνοντων, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον διὰ τὸ τῶν πλείστων μὴ μόνον αὐτόπτης, ἀλλ’ ὅν μὲν συνεργός, ὅν δὲ καὶ χειριστὴς γεγονέναι, προήκηθην οἶον ἄρχην

5 ποιησάμενος ἄλλην γράφειν. ἦν δ’ ἡ προερημένη κίνησις, ἐν ἡ Ῥωμαίοι μὲν πρὸς Κελτίβηρας καὶ Οὐακκαίους ἐξήγεικαν πόλεμον, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τὸν πρὸς Μασσανάσσαν βασιλέα τῶν Λιβύων.

2 περὶ δὲ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἀττάλος μὲν καὶ Προυσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπολέμησαν, ὁ δὲ τῶν Καππαδοκῶν βασιλεὺς Ἀριαράθης, ἐκπεσὼν ἐκ τῆς ἄρχης ὑπ’ Ὀροφέρνου δ.δ. Δημητρίου τοῦ βασιλέως, αὐθεὶς ἀνεκτήσατο δι’ Ἀττάλου τὴν πατρίως ἄρχην.

3 ό δὲ Σελεύκου Δημήτριος κύριος γενομένος ἔτη δώδεκα τῆς ἐν Συρία βασίλειας ἡμα τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς ἄρχης ἐστερήθη, συνηγέμοντων ἐπὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἄλλων βασιλεῶν, ἀποκατέστησαν δὲ καὶ Ῥωμαίοι τοὺς Ἐλλήνας εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ Περσικοῦ πολέμου κατατιθέντας, ἀπολύσαντες τῆς ἐπενεχ-

12
BOOK III. 4.10 – 5.4

and the subjection of all to their rule; since no man of sound sense goes to war with his neighbours simply for the sake of crushing an adversary, just as no one sails on the open sea just for the sake of crossing it. Indeed no one even takes up the study of arts and crafts merely for the sake of knowledge, but all men do all they do for the resulting pleasure, good, or utility. So the final end achieved by this work will be, to gain knowledge of what was the condition of each people after all had been crushed and had come under the dominion of Rome, until the disturbed and troubled time that afterwards ensued. About this latter, owing to the importance of the actions and the unexpected character of the events, and chiefly because I not only witnessed most but took part and even directed some, I was induced to write as if starting on a fresh work. 5. This period of disturbance comprises, firstly the war waged by Rome against the Celtiberians and Vaccaei, that between Carthage and Massinissa the King of the Libyans and that between Attalus and Prusias in Asia. Next, Ariarathes, King of Cappadocia was expelled from his kingdom by Orophernes through the agency of King Demetrius and recovered his ancestral throne by the help of Attalus. Then Demetrius, son of Seleucus, after reigning in Syria for twelve years lost both his kingdom and his life, the other kings combining against him. Next the Romans restored to their homes the Greeks who had been accused in consequence of the war with Perseus, acquitting them of the charges brought against them.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

5 θείσης αὐτοῖς διαβολῆς. οἱ δ’ αὐτοὶ μετ’ οὐ πολὺ 
Καρχηδόνιος ἐπέβαλον τὰς χεῖρας, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον 
μεταναστήσας, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἄρδην αὐτοὺς 
ἐξαναστήσαι προθέμενοι διὰ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ῥήθη-
6 σομένας αἰτίας. οἵς κατάληλη Μακεδόνων μὲν 
ἀπὸ τῆς Ἡρωμαίων φιλίας, Λακεδαίμονιῶν δὲ τῆς 
tῶν Ἀχαιῶν συμπολιτείας ἀποστάτων, ἃμα τὴν 
ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος ἐσχε τὸ κοινὸν ἀτύχημα πάσης 
tῆς Ἑλλάδος.

7 Ὁ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἡμῶν τοιαῦτα. προσδεί 
δ’ ἔτι τῆς τύχης, ἱνα συνδράμη τὰ τοῦ βίου πρὸς 
8 τὸ τὴν πρόθεσιν ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν. πέπεισμαι μὲν 
γάρ, κἂν τι συμβῇ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπων, οὐκ 
ἀργήσων τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οὐδὲ ἀπορήσων ἀνδρῶν 
ἀξίωσεως, διὰ τὸ κάλλους πολλοὺς κατεγγυθήσε-
θαι καὶ σπουδάσειν ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν αὐτῶν.

9 Ἡσπεῖ δὲ τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας τῶν πράξεων ἐπὶ κεφα-
λαίου διεληλυθαμεν, βουλόμενοι καὶ καθόλου καὶ 
κατὰ μέρος εἰς ἐννοιαν ἀγαγεῖν τῆς ὁλῆς ἱστορίας 
tους ἐντυγχάνοντας, ὅρα μνημονεύσοντας τῆς προ-
θέσεως ἐπαναγαγεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αὐτῶν ὑπο-
θέσεως.

6 Ἔνιοι δὲ τῶν συγγεγραφῶν τὰς κατ’ Ἀννίβαν 
πράξεις, βουλόμενοι τὰς αἰτίας ἡμῶν ὑποδεικνύναι, 
di’ ἅς Ἡρωμαίως καὶ Καρχηδόνιους ὁ προειρημένος 
ἐνέστη πόλεμος, πρῶτην μὲν ἀποφαίνουσι τὴν Ζα-
2 κάνθης πολιορκίαν ὑπὸ Καρχηδόνιων, δευτέραν δὲ 
tὴν διάβασιν αὐτῶν παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας τοῦ προσ-
αγορευμένου παρὰ τοῖς ἐγχώριοι Ἱβηροὶ ποταμοῖ.
3 ἔγω δὲ ταῦτα ἄρχας μὲν εἶναι τοῦ πολέμου φή-
σαιμ’ ἃν, αἰτίας γε μὴν οὐδαμῶς ἄν συγχωρήσαμε. 
4 πολλοῦ γε δεῖν, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου διά-
BOOK III. 5.5–6.4

A little later the Romans attacked Carthage, having resolved in the first place on changing its site and subsequently on its utter destruction for the reasons that I shall state in due course. Close upon this followed the withdrawal of the Macedonians from their alliance with Rome and that of the Lacedaemonians from the Achaean League, and hereupon the beginning and the end of the general calamity that overtook Greece.

Such is the plan I propose, but all depends on Fortune's granting me a life long enough to execute it. However I am convinced that in the event of my death, the project will not fall to the ground for want of men competent to carry it on, since there are many others who will set their hands to the task and labour to complete it.

Now having given a summary of the most important events, with the object of conveying to my readers a notion of this work as a whole and its contents in detail, it is time for me to call to mind my original plan and return to the starting-point of my history.

6. Some of those authors who have dealt with Hannibal and his times, wishing to indicate the causes that led to the above war between Rome and Carthage, allege as its first cause the siege of Saguntum by the Carthaginians and as its second their crossing, contrary to treaty, the river whose native name is the Iber. I should agree in stating that these were the beginnings of the war, but I can by no means allow that they were its causes, unless we call Alexander's crossing to Asia the cause
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

βασιν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν αἰτίαν εἶναι τις φήσει τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας πολέμου καὶ τὸν Ἀντιόχου κατάπλουν εἰς Δημητρίαδα τοῦ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους· ὥν 5 οὖτ᾿ εἰκὸς οὖτ᾿ ἀληθὲς ἐστίν οὐδὲτερον. τὸς γὰρ ἂν νομίσει ταύτας αἰτίας ὑπάρχειν, ὥν πολλὰ μὲν Ἀλέξανδρος πρότερον, οὐκ ὄλγα δὲ Φίλιππος ἔτι ξῶν ἐνήργησε καὶ παρεσκευάσατο πρὸς τὸν κατὰ τῶν Περσῶν πόλεμον, ὡμοίως δὲ πάλιν Ἀιτωλοὶ πρὸ τῆς Ἀντιόχου παρουσίας πρὸς τὸν κατὰ Ῥω- 6 μαίων; ἀλλ᾿ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ διευθύνων ἄρχή τί διαφέρει καὶ πόσον διεστήκειν αἰτίας καὶ προφάσεως, καὶ διότι τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ πρῶτα τῶν ἀπάντων, ἡ δ᾿ ἄρχη τελευταῖον τῶν εἰρημένων. 7 ἐγὼ δὲ παντὸς ἄρχας μὲν εἰναι φημὶ τὰς πρῶτας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πράξεις τῶν ἡδη κεκριμένων, αἰτίας δὲ τὰς προκαθηγημένας τῶν κρίσεως καὶ διαλή- ψεως· λέγω δ᾿ ἐπινοίας καὶ διάθεσις καὶ τοὺς περὶ ταύτα συλλογισμοὺς καὶ δι᾿ ὧν ἐπὶ τὸ κρίναι τι 8 καὶ προβιβαίοι παραγινόμεθα. δὴνοῦ δ᾿ οἶνον τὸ 9 προερημένον ἐκ τῶν ἐπιφερομένων. τίνες γὰρ ἀλη- θῶς ἦσαν αἰτίας καὶ πόθεν φύναι συνέβη τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας πόλεμον, εὐμαρὲς καὶ τῷ τυχόντι συν- 10 ιδεῖν. ἢν δὲ πρώτη μὲν ἡ τῶν μετὰ Ξενοφῶντος Ἐλλήνων ἐκ τῶν ἄνω σατραπεῖων ἑπάνοδος, ἢ ἐν 11 πᾶσιν τὴν Ἀσίαν διαπορευομένων αὐτῶν πολεμίαν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐδεὶς ἐτόλμα μένειν κατὰ πρόσωπον 12 τῶν Βαβυλῶν· δευτέρα δ᾿ ἡ τοῦ Δακεδαμονίων βασιλέως Ἀγησίλαος διάβασις εἰς τῇ Ἀσίαν, ἐν ἡ ἱκνὸς οὐδὲν ἄξιοχρεών οὐδ᾿ ἀντίπαλον εὐρὼν ταῖς σφετέραις ἐπιβολαῖς ἀπρακτός ἦγαγκάσθη μεταξὺ διὰ τὰς περί τὴν Ἐλλάδα ταραχὰς ἐπανελθεῖν. ἐξ 16
BOOK III. 6. 4 – 12

of his war against Persia and Antiochus' landing at Demetrias the cause of his war against Rome, neither of which assertions is either reasonable or true. For who could consider these to be causes of wars, plans and preparations for which, in the case of the Persian war, had been made earlier, many by Alexander and even some by Philip during his life, and in the case of the war against Rome by the Aetolians long before Antiochus arrived? These are pronouncements of men who are unable to see the great and essential distinction between a beginning and a cause or purpose, these being the first origin of all, and the beginning coming last. By the beginning of anything I mean the first attempt to execute and put in action plans on which we have decided, by its causes what is most initiatory in our judgements and opinions, that is to say our notions of things, our state of mind, our reasoning about these, and everything through which we reach decisions and projects. The nature of these is evident from the instances adduced above; it is easy for anyone to see the real causes and origin of the war against Persia. The first was the retreat of the Greeks under Xenophon from the upper Satrapies, in which, though they traversed the whole of Asia, a hostile country, none of the barbarians ventured to face them. The second was the crossing of Agesilaus, King of Sparta, to Asia, where he found no opposition of any moment to his projects, and was only compelled to return without effecting anything owing to the disturbances in Greece. From both of these facts Philip perceived and reckoned on the
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

Περσῶν ἀναδρίαν καὶ ῥαθυμίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ Μακεδόνων εὐεξίαν ἐν τοῖς πολέμικοῖς, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος τῶν ἐσομένων ἄθλων 13 ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν θέμενος, ἀμα τῷ περιποίησασθαι τὴν ἐκ τῶν Ἐλλήνων εὐνοιαν ὁμολογομένην, εὐθέως προφάσει χρόμενος ὅτι σπεύδει μετελθεῖν τὴν Περσῶν παρανομίαν εἰς τοὺς Ἐλλήνας, ὅμων ἔσχε καὶ προεθέτο πολεμεῖν, καὶ πάντα 14 πρὸς τούτο τὸ μέρος ἑτοίμαζε. διόπερ αἰτίας μὲν τὰς πρῶτας ἡθείσαις ἠγγητέον τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας πολέμου, προφασὶν δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, ἀρχὴν δὲ τὴν 7 ᾽Αλεξάνδρου διάβασιν εἰς τὴν Ὀσίαν. καὶ μὴν τοῦ κατ᾽ Ὅρμισθον καὶ Ὅρμαίόν ὁδηγῶν ὡς αἰτίας μὲν 2 τὴν ᾿Αἰτωλῶν ὅργην θετέον. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ δοξατεὶς ὑπὸ Ὅρμαίων ἀληθεύσασθαι κατὰ πολλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐκβασιν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Φιλίππου πολέμου, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προείπον, οὐ μόνον Ὅρμισθον ἐπεστάσαντο, πάν δὲ καὶ πρᾶξαν καὶ παθεῖν ὑπέστησαν διὰ τὴν ἐπιγενομένην ὅργην ἐκ τῶν προερημένων καρυῶν. 3 προφασὶν δὲ ἠγγητέον τὴν τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἑλευθερωσιν, ἂν ἐκεῖνοι περίπερενόμενοι μετ᾽ Ὅρμισθον τὰς πόλεις ἀλὸγως καὶ ψευδῶς κατήγγελλον, ἀρχὴν δὲ τοῦ πολέμου τὸν Ὅρμισθον κατάπλουν εἰς Δημητρίαδα. 4 Ὁ γὰρ δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαστολὴν πεποίημαι περὶ τούτων οὐχ ἔνεκα τῆς τῶν συγγραφέων ἐπιτιμήσεως, χάριν δὲ τῆς τῶν φιλομαθῶν ἔπανορθώσεως, τι γὰρ ὁφελοῦσα ἱστορία κάμνουσιν ἀγνοοῦντο τὰς αἰτίας τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα διαθέσεων; τι δὲ ἄνδρος πράγματικοῦ μὴ δυναμένου συλλογίζεσθαι πώς καὶ διὰ τί καὶ πόθεν ἔκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων 5 τὰς ἀφορμὰς εἶληφεν; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνον εἰκὸς οὐδὲ-
cowardice and indolence of the Persians as compared with the military efficiency of himself and his Macedonians, and further fixing his eyes on the splendour of the great prize which the war promised, he lost no time, once he had secured the avowed good-will of the Greeks, but seizing on the pretext that it was his urgent duty to take vengeance on the Persians for their injurious treatment of the Greeks, he bestirred himself and decided to go to war, beginning to make every preparation for this purpose. We must therefore look on the first considerations I have mentioned as the causes of the war against Persia, the second as its pretext, and Alexander’s crossing to Asia as its beginning. 7. Similarly it is evident that the cause of the war between Antiochus and the Romans was the anger of the Aetolians, who (as I above stated) looking upon themselves as having been slighted in many ways by the Romans as regards their share in bringing the war with Philip to an end, not only invited Antiochus over, but were ready to do and suffer anything owing to the anger they conceived under the above circumstances. But the liberation of Greece, which they announced in defiance of reason and truth going round with Antiochus from city to city, we must consider to be a pretext of this war, and its beginning the landing of Antiochus at Demetrias.

In speaking at such length on this matter, my object has not been to censure previous writers, but to rectify the ideas of students. For of what use to the sick is a physician who is ignorant of the causes of certain conditions of the body? And of what use is a statesman who cannot reckon how, why, and whence each event has originated? The
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ποτε δεόντως συντήσασθαι τὰς τῶν σωμάτων θεραπείας οὐτὲ τῶν πραγματικῶν οὐδὲν οἶον τε κατὰ τρόπον χειρίσαι τῶν προσπιτότων ἀνευ τῆς τῶν 7 προειρημένων ἑπιγνώσεως. διόπερ οὐδὲν οὕτω φυλακτέον καὶ ξητητέον ὡς τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου τῶν συμβαινόντων, ἐπειδὴ φύεται μέν ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων πολλάκις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων, ἰᾶσθαι δὲ βραστὸν ἐστὶ παντὸς τὰς πρώτας ἑπιβολὰς καὶ διαλήψεις.

8 Φάβιος δὲ φησιν ὁ 'Ρωμαῖος συγγραφεὺς ἀμα τῷ κατὰ Ζακανθαίους ἀδικήματι καὶ τὴν 'Ασδρούβου πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλαρχίαν αἰτίαν γενόθαι τοῦ 2 κατ' Ἀννίβαν πολέμου. ἐκεῖνον γὰρ μεγάλην ἀνειληφότα τὴν δυναστείαν ἐν τοῖσι κατ' Ἰβηρίαν τόποις, μετὰ ταῦτα παραγενόμενον ἐπὶ Διβύῃ ἐπιβαλέσθαι καταλύσαντα τοὺς νόμους εἰς μοναρχίαν 3 περιστῆσαι τὸ πολίτευμα τῶν Καρχηδονίων· τοὺς δὲ πρώτους ἁνδρὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πολιτεύματος προϊδομένους αὐτοῦ τὴν ἑπιβολὴν συμφρονήσαι καὶ διαστῆναι πρὸς αὐτούς. τὸν δ' Ἀσδρούβαν ὑπιδόμενον, ἀναχωρήσαντ' ἐκ τῆς Διβύης, τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὴ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν χειρὶξειν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προάρσεων, 4 οὖ προσέχοντα τῷ συνεδρίῳ τῶν Καρχηδονίων. Ἀννίβαν δὲ κοινωνὸν καὶ ζηλωθῆν ἐκ μειρακίου γεγονότα τῆς ἐκεῖνον προαιρέσεως, καὶ τὸτε διαδεξάμενον τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, τὴν αὐτὴν ἀγωγὴν 'Ασ- 6 δρούβα ποιεῖσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων. διὸ καὶ νῦν τὸν πόλεμον τούτον ἑξευθυνοῖν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προ- αίρεσιν 'Ρωμαίοις παρὰ τὴν Καρχηδονίων γνώμην. 7 οὐδένα γὰρ εὐδοκεῖν τῶν ἀξιολόγων ἀνδρῶν ἐν Καρχηδόνι τοῖς ὑπ' Ἀννίβου περὶ τὴν Ζακανθαίων πό- 8 λίν πραχθεῖσι. ταῦτα δ' εἰπών φησι μετὰ τὴν τῆς 20
former will scarcely be likely to recommend proper treatment for the body and it will be impossible for the latter without such knowledge to deal properly with circumstances. Nothing, therefore, should be more carefully guarded against and more diligently sought out than the first causes of each event, since matters of the greatest moment often originate from trifles, and it is the initial impulses and conceptions in every matter which are most easily remedied.

8. Fabius, the Roman annalist, says that besides the outrage on the Saguntines, a cause of the war was Hasdrubal's ambition and love of power. He tells us how, having acquired a great dominion in Spain, he arrived in Africa and attempted to abolish the constitution of Carthage and change the form of government to a monarchy. The leading statesmen, however, got wind of his project and united to oppose him, upon which Hasdrubal, suspicious of their intentions, left Africa and in future governed Iberia as he chose, without paying any attention to the Carthaginian Senate. Hannibal from boyhood had shared and admired his father's principles; and on succeeding to the governor-generalship of Iberia, he had employed the same method as Hasdrubal. Consequently, he now began this war against Rome on his own initiative and in defiance of Carthaginian opinion, not a single one of the notables in Carthage approving his conduct towards Saguntum. After telling us this, Fabius says that on the capture of
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

προειρημένης πόλεως ἀλων παραγενόθθαι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, οἰομένους δείν ἢ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἐκδιδόναι σφίσι τοὺς Καρχηδόνιος ἢ τὸν πόλεμον ἀναλαμβάνειν. ἐν δὲ τὸν οὐρανόν συγγραφέα ποῖος ἢ καὶ ρόις οἰκείοτερος τοῖς Καρχηδόνιοις ποίον πράγμα τούτου δικαιότερον ἢ συμφρονότερον, ἐπείπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δυσπροστοιεύοντο, καθάπερ οὗτος φησι, τοῖς ὕπ’ Ἀννίβου πραττομένους, τοῦ πεισθέντας τότε τοῖς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων παρακαλουμένους ἐκδοσθάν μὲν τὸν αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀδικημάτων, ἐπανελέθη δὲ εὐλόγως δι’ ἐτέρων τὸν κοινὸν ἔχθρων τῆς πόλεως, περιποίησαθαι δὲ τῇ χώρᾳ τῆς ἀσφάλειαν, ἀποτρυφαμένους τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον πόλεμον, δόγματι μοῦν τῆν ἐκδίκησιν ποιησαμένους, τιν’ ἂν εἰπέτω ἐχοί πρὸς αὐτὰ; δῆλον γὰρ ὡς οὐδέν. οὐ γε τοσούτων ἀπέσχον τοῦ πράξαι τι τῶν προειρημένων, ὡς ἐπτακαίδεκ’ ἐνῇ συνεχώς πολεμήσαντες κατὰ τὴν Ἀννίβου προαίροντον οὐ πρότερον καταλῦσαν τὸν πόλεμον ἀς οὐ πάσας ἐξελέγχαντες τὰς ἐλπίδας τελευταῖον εἰς τὸν περὶ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ σωμάτων παρεγένοντο κίνδυνον.

9 Τίνος δὴ χάριν ἐμνήσθην Φαβίου καὶ τῶν ὑπ’ ἐκείνου γεγραμμένων; οὖχ ἐνεκα τῆς πιθανότητος τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀγωνιῶν μη πιστευθῇ παρὰ τοιών ἢ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ τούτων ἀλογία καὶ χωρίς τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξηγήσεως αὐτῇ δι’ αὐτής δύναται θεωρεῖσθαι παρὰ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν. ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀναλαμβανόντων τᾶς ἐκείνου βύβλων ὑπομνήσεως, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιγραφήν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰ πράγματα βλέπωσιν. ἐννοεῖ γὰρ οὖχ ἐπὶ τὰ λεγόμενα συνεπιστήσαντες, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λέγοντα, καὶ λαβόντες ἐν νῷ διότι κατὰ τοὺς καιροὺς ὁ γράφων γέγονε καὶ τοῦ συνεδρίου 22
BOOK III. 8. 8 – 9. 4

this city the Romans came forward demanding that the Carthaginians should either deliver Hannibal into their hands or accept war. Now if anyone were to pose the following question to this writer—how opportunity could have better favoured the Carthaginians' wishes or what could have been a juster act and more in their interest (since, as he says, they had disapproved Hannibal’s action from the outset) than to yield to the Roman demand, and by giving up the man who had caused the offence, with some show of reason to destroy by the hands of others the common enemy of their state and secure the safety of their territory, ridding themselves of the war that menaced them and accomplishing their vengeance by a simple resolution—if anyone, I say, were to ask him this, what would he have to say? Evidently nothing; for so far were they from doing any of the above things that after carrying on the war, in obedience to Hannibal's decision, for seventeen years, they did not abandon the struggle, until finally, every resource on which they relied being now exhausted, their native city and her inhabitants stood in deadly peril.

9. One may ask why I make any mention of Fabius and his statement. It is not from apprehension lest it may find acceptance from some owing to its plausibility; for its inherent unreasonableness, even without my comment, is self-evident to anyone who reads it. But what I wish is to warn those who consult his book not to pay attention to the title, but to facts. For there are some people who pay regard not to what he writes but to the writer himself and, taking into consideration that he was a contemporary and a Roman senator, at once accept
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

μετείχε τών ἮΡωμαιῶν, πάντων εὐθέως ἡγοῦνται τὸ λέ-
5 γόμενον ὑπὸ τούτου πιστόν. ἔγω δὲ φημὶ μὲν δὲν
οὖκ ἐν μικρῷ προσλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν τοῦ συγγρα-
φέως πίστιν, οὐκ αὐτοτελῆ δὲ κρίνειν, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον
ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀναγι-
νώσκοντας τὰς δοκιμασίας.

6 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ γε ἮΡωμαιῶν καὶ Καρχηδο-
νίων πολέμου, τὴν γὰρ παρεκβασθεὶν ἐντεύθεν ἐποιη-
σάμεθα, νομίστεον πρῶτον μὲν αἰτίον γεγονέναι τὸν
Ἄμιλκον θυμὸν τοῦ Βάρκα μὲν ἐπικαλουμένου, πα-
7 τὸς δὲ κατὰ φύσιν Ἀννίβου γεγονότος. ἐκείνος γὰρ
οὐχ ἠττηθεὶς τῷ περὶ Σικελίας πολέμῳ τῇ ψυχῇ, τῷ
δοκεῖν αὐτὸς μὲν ἀκέραια διατηρηθήκειν τὰ περὶ
τὸν Ἐρυκα στρατόπεδα ταῖς ὀρμαῖς ἐφ’ ὅν αὐτὸς
ήν, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τῶν Καρχηδονίων
ήτταν τοῖς καιροῖς εἰκὼν πεποίησθαι τὰς συνθήκας,
ἐμενεν ἐπὶ τῇς ὀρμής, τηρῶν ἄει πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν.

8 εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ τὸ περὶ τούς ἑξένους ἐγένετο κίνημα
τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, εὐθέως ἂν ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἐποιεῖτο
9 καὶ παρασκευή πραγμάτων, ὡς οὖν ἐπὶ ἐκείνῳ. προ-
καταληφθεῖς δὲ ταῖς ἐμφυλίοις ταραχαίς ἐν τούτωι
10 καὶ περὶ ταῦτας διέτριβε τὰς πράξεις. ἮΡωμαιῶν δὲ
μετὰ τὸ καταλύσασθαι Καρχηδονίους τὴν προειρη-
μένην ταραχήν ἀπαγγειλάντων αὐτοῖς πόλεμον, τὸ
μὲν πρῶτον εἰς πᾶν συγκατέβαινον, ὑπολαμβάνοντες
αὐτοῖς νικήσεων τοῖς δικαίοις, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸ
2 ταύτης βύβλοις περὶ τούτων δεδηλώκαμεν, ὡν χωρίς
οὐχ οἰόν ἃν ἂν συμπεριενεχθήναι δεόντως οὕτε τοῖς
νῦν λεγομένοις οὕτε τοῖς μετὰ ταύτα ρήθησομένοις
3 ὑπ’ ἤμων. πλὴν οὖκ ἐντρεπομένων τῶν ἮΡωμαιῶν,
εἰξαντες τῇ περιστάσει, καὶ βαρυνόμενοι μὲν, οὔκ
ἐχοντες δὲ ποιεῖν οὐδέν, ἐξεχώρησαν Σαρδόνος, συν-
24
all he says as worthy of credit. But my own opinion is that while not treating his authority as negligible we should not regard it as final, but that readers should in most cases test his statements by reference to the actual facts.

To return to the war between Rome and Carthage, from which this digression has carried us away, we must regard its first cause as being the indignation of Hamilcar surnamed Barcas, the actual father of Hannibal. Unvanquished in spirit by the war for Sicily, since he felt that he had kept the army at Eryx under his command combative and resolute until the end, and had only agreed to peace yielding to circumstances after the defeat of the Carthaginians in the naval battle, he maintained his resolve and waited for an opportunity to strike. Had not the mutinous outbreak among the mercenaries occurred, he would very soon, as far as it lay in his power, have created some other means and other resources for resuming the contest, but he was hampered by these civil disturbances which occupied all his time and attention. 10. When, on the suppression of this disturbance by the Carthaginians, the Romans announced their intention of making war on Carthage, the latter at first was ready to negotiate on all points, thinking that, justice being on her side, she would prevail (about this I have spoken in the preceding Books, without a perusal of which it is impossible to follow properly what I am now saying and what I am about to say); but as the Romans refused to negotiate, the Carthaginians had to yield to circumstances, and though deeply aggrieved they were powerless, and evacuated
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

eχώρησαν δὲ εἰσοδευτὶν ἄλλα χίλια καὶ διακόσια τὰ
λαντα πρὸς τὸ τούς πρῶτον, ἐφ' ὧ μὴ τὸν πόλεμον
4 ἐκείνοις ἀναδέξασθαι τοῖς καιροῖς. διὸ καὶ δευτέραν, μεγίστην δὲ, ταύτην θετέον αἰτίαν τοῦ μετὰ
5 ταύτα συστάντος πολέμου. Ἀμίλκας γὰρ προσ-
λαβὼν τοὺς ἱδίους θυμοῖς τὴν ἐπὶ τούτους ὀργὴν τῶν
πολιτῶν, ὡς θάττων τοὺς ἀποστάντας τῶν μισθο-
φόρων καταπολεμήσας ἐβεβαιώσε τῇ πατρίδι τὴν
ἀσφάλειαν, εὐθέως ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ὀρμήν ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ
tὴν Ἰβηρίαν πράγματα, σπουδάζων ταύτη χρήσα-
σθαι παρασκευῆ πρὸς τὸν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πόλεμον.
6 ἦν δὲ καὶ τρίτην αἰτίαν νομιστέον, λέγω δὲ τὴν
εὑρον τῶν κατὰ Ἰβηρίαν πραγμάτων Καρχηδο-
νίους. ταύτας γὰρ ταῖς χερσὶ πιστεύοντες εὐ-
θαρσῶς ἔνεβησαν εἰς τὸν προερημένον πόλεμον.
7 "Ὅτι δ' Ἀμίλκας πλεῖστα μὲν συνεβάλετο πρὸς
τὴν σύστασιν τοῦ δευτέρου πολέμου, καὶ περὶ τετε-
λυτηκῶς ἔτεσι δέκα πρῶτον τῆς καταρχῆς αὐτοῦ,
πολλὰ μὲν ἂν εὑροῖ τις εἰς τούτο. σχεδὸν δὲ πρὸς
11 πίστων ἀρκοῦν ἔσται τὸ λέγεσθαι μέλλον. καθ' ὀὖς
γὰρ καιροὺς καταπολεμηθείσης Ἀννίβας ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων
tέλος ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος ἐξεχώρησε καὶ παρ' Ἀντίοχω
διέτριβε, τότε Ῥωμαιοὶ συνθεωροῦντες ὑδὴ τῆν
Αἰτωλῶν ἐπιβολὴν ἐξαπέστειλαν πρεσβευτὰς πρὸς
Ἀντίοχον, βουλόμενοι μὴ λανθάνειν σφαῖρα τῆς τοῦ
2 βασιλέως προάρσεων. οἱ δὲ πρεσβεῖς, ὁρῶντες τὸν
Ἀντίοχον προσέχοντα τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς καὶ πρόθυμον
οὖν πολεμεῖν Ῥωμαίοις, ἐθεράπευον τὸν Ἀννίβαν,
σπουδάζοντες εἰς ὑποψίαν ἐμβαλεῖν πρὸς τὸν Ἀν-
3 τίοχον. ὁ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. προβαίνοντος γὰρ
τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως ὑπόπτως ἔχοντος αἰεί
καὶ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸν Ἀννίβαν, ἐγένετο τὸς καιρὸς
26
Sardinia, agreeing also to pay twelve hundred talents in addition to the sum previously exacted, in order not to be forced to accept war at that time. This, then, we must take to be the second and principal cause of the subsequent war; for Hamilcar, with the anger felt by all his compatriots at this last outrage added to his old indignation, as soon as he had finally crushed the mutiny of the mercenaries and secured the safety of his country, at once threw all his efforts into the conquest of Spain, with the object of using the resources thus obtained for the war against Rome. This success of the Carthaginian project in Spain must be held to be the third cause of the war, for relying on this increase of strength, they entered upon it with confidence.

Of the fact that Hamilcar, although he died ten years before the beginning of the Second Punic War, contributed much to its origin many evidences can be found; but the anecdote I am about to relate suffices, I think, to confirm this. 11. At the time when Hannibal on his final defeat by the Romans had left his native land and was staying at the court of Antiochus, the Romans, who saw through the project of the Aetolians, sent an embassy to Antiochus, wishing to be fully aware what the king’s purpose was. The legates, as they saw that Antiochus was lending an ear to the Aetolians and was disposed to go to war with Rome, paid many attentions to Hannibal, wishing to make Antiochus suspicious of him, as in fact they succeeded in doing. For as time went on, the king’s mistrust of Hannibal grew ever more strong; and it fell out on one occasion that
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ὡς ἐπὶ λόγον ἀχθῆναι τὴν ὑποκουρουμένην ἀτο-
πίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς. ἐν ὧ καὶ πλείον ἀπολογισμοῦς
ποιησάμενος Ἀννίβας τέλος ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτο κατή-
νησι, δυσχρηστούμενος τοῖς λόγοις. ἔφη γάρ, καθ'
ὅν καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν αὐτῶν τῆν ἐις Ἰβηρίαν ἔξοδον
μέλλουσιν στρατεύεσθαι μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, ἔτη ἐν
έχειν ἔννεα, ὥστε δ' αὐτῷ τῷ Διὶ παρεστάναι
6 παρὰ τὸν βωμὸν. ἔπει δὲ καλλιερήσας κατασπείσαι
tois theoῖς καὶ ποιῆσαι τὰ νομίζομενα, τοὺς μὲν
ἐκλογὰς τοὺς περὶ τὴν θυσίαν ἀποστῆναι κελεύσαι
μικρῶν, αὐτὸν δὲ προσκαλεσάμενον ἐρέσθαι φιλο-
φρόνως ἐπὶ βουλεῖται συνεξορμᾶν ἐπὶ τὴν στρατεύαν.
7 ἀσμένως δὲ κατανεύσαντος αὐτοῦ, καὶ τι καὶ προσ-
αξίωσαντος παιδικῶς, λαβόμενον τῆς δεξιᾶς προσ-
αγαγεῖν αὐτὸν πρὸς τὸν βωμὸν καὶ κελεύειν ἀμά-
μενον τῶν ἱερῶν ὁμοῦν μηδέποτε Ῥωμαίοις εὐ-
νοήσειν. ταῦτ' ὁδὸν εἰσότα σαφῶς ἥξιον τὸν Ἀν-
tίόχου, ἐγὼς μὲν ἀν τι δυσχερῆς βουλεύσας κατὰ
Ῥωμαίων, θαρρεῖν καὶ πιστεύειν, αὐτὸν συνεργὸν
9 ἔξειν νομίζοντ' ἀληθινώτατον. ἐπὰν δὲ διαλύσεις
ἡ φιλίαν συντίθηται πρὸς αὐτοῦ, τότε μὴ προσ-
δείκνυσιν διαβολῆς, ἀλλ' ἀπιστεῖν καὶ φυλάττεσθαι.
12 τὰν γάρ τι πράξαι κατ' αὐτῶν ὁ δυνατὸς εἶη. ὁ
μὲν οὖν Ἀντίόχος ἀκούσας, καὶ δόξας αὐτοπαθῶς,
ἀμα δ' ἀληθῶς εἰρήσθαι, πάσης τῆς προϋπαρχοῦ-
2 σης ὑποψίας ἀπέστη. τῆς μέντοι γε δυσμενείας τῆς
Ἀμίλκου καὶ τῆς ὄλης προθέσεως ὁμολογούμενον
θετέον εἶναι τοῦτο μαρτύριον, ὡς καὶ δι' αὐτῶν
3 φανερῶν ἐγένετο τῶν πραγμάτων. τοιοῦτος γὰρ
ἐχθροὺς παρεσκεύασε Ῥωμαίοις Ἀσθρούβαν τε τὸν
28
they came to have a talk about the alienation which had been secretly growing up between them. In the course of the conversation Hannibal defended himself on various grounds, and at length, being at a loss for further arguments, resorted to the following. He said that at the time when his father was about to start with his army on his expedition to Spain, he himself, then nine years of age, was standing by the altar, while Hamilcar was sacrificing to Zeus. When, on the omens being favourable, Hamilcar had poured a libation to the gods and performed all the customary rites, he ordered the others who were attending the sacrifice to withdraw to a slight distance and calling Hannibal to him asked him kindly if he wished to accompany him on the expedition. On his accepting with delight, and, like a boy, even begging to do it besides, his father took him by the hand, led him up to the altar, and bade him lay his hand on the victim and swear never to be the friend of the Romans. He begged Antiochus, then, now he knew this for a fact, as long as his intentions were hostile to Rome, to rely on him confidently and believe that he would have in him his sincerest supporter, but from the moment he made peace and alliance with her he had no need to wait for accusations but should mistrust and beware of him; for there was nothing he would not do against the Romans. 12. Antiochus, listening to this, thought he spoke genuinely and sincerely and in consequence abandoned all his former mistrust. However, we should consider this as an unquestionable proof of Hamilcar's hostility and general purpose, and it is confirmed by the facts. For he made of his daughter's husband Hasdrubal and his own
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

τῆς θυγατρὸς ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ὕδων Ἦν ποιησε τὴν αὐτοῦ πρὸθεσιν, Ἄννιβα δὲ παρεδωκαν οἱ καιροὶ καὶ λίαν ἐναποδείγασθαι τὴν πα-5 τρώαν ἔχθραν εἰς Ῥωμαίους. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ πραγμάτων ταττωμένους χρῆ τῶν τοιούτων οὔδενός μᾶλλον φροντίζειν ὡς τοῦ μὴ λανθάνειν τὰς προ-αίρεσις τῶν διαλυομένων τὰς ἔχθρας ἢ συντιθε-μένων τὰς φιλίας, πότε τοῖς καιροῖς εἰκονεῖς καὶ πότε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἴττωμενοι ποιοῦνται τὰς συνθή-6 κας, ἵνα τοὺς μὲν ἐφεδροὺς νομίζοντες εἰναι τῶν καιρῶν ἀεὶ φυλάττωνται, τοῖς δὲ πιστεύοντες, ὡς υπηκόου ἡ φίλοι ἀληθινοὶ, πάν τὸ παραπίπτον ἔξ ἐτοίμου παραγγέλλωσιν.

7 Αὐτίας μὲν οὖν τοῦ κατ᾽ Ἐννιβαν πολέμου τὰς προειρημένας ἡγητέου, ἀρχάς δὲ τὰς μελλούσας λέ-13 γεσθαί. Καρχηδόνιοι γὰρ βαρέως μὲν ἔφερον καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ Σικελίας ἤτταν, συνετέτευκα δ᾽ αὐτῶν τὴν ὀργήν, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προείπον, τὰ κατὰ Σαρ-δόνα καὶ τὸ τῶν τελευταίων συντεθέντων χρημάτων 2 πλῆθος. διόπερ ἄμα τὰ τὰ πλείστα κατ᾽ Ἰβηρίαν ὑφ᾽ αὐτοὺς πούσασθαι πρὸς πάν ἐτοίμως διέκειτο 3 τὸ κατα Ῥωμαίων ὑποδεικνύμενον. προσπεσοῦσης οὖν τῆς Ἀσδρούβου τελευτῆς, ὧ μετὰ τὸν Ἀμίλκου 4 πάνατον ἐνεχείρισαν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκαραδόκων τὰς τῶν δυνάμεως ὁρμάς. ἀφ-ικομένης δὲ τῆς ἀγγελίας ἐκ τῶν στρατοπέδων ὅτι συμβαίνει τὰς δυνάμεις ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἦρθον στρα-τηγῶν Ἐννιβαν, παραυτικά συναθροίσαντες τὸν ὅη-

30
son Hannibal such enemies of Rome that none could be more bitter. As Hasdrubal died before putting his purpose into execution, it was not in his case fully evident, but circumstances put it in the power of Hannibal to give only too manifest proof of his inherited hatred of Rome. Therefore, statesmen should above all take care that the true motives of the reconciliation of enmities and the formation of friendships do not escape them. They should observe when it is that men come to terms under pressure of circumstances and when owing to their spirit being broken, so that in the former case they may regard them as reserving themselves for a favourable opportunity and be constantly on their guard, and in the latter they may trust them as true friends and subjects and not hesitate to command their services when required.

We must consider, then, the causes of the Hannibalic War to have been those I have stated, while its beginnings were as follows. 13. The Carthaginians could ill bear their defeat in the war for Sicily, and, as I said above, they were additionally exasperated by the matter of Sardinia and the exorbitancy of the sum they had been last obliged to agree to pay. Therefore, when they had subjugated the greater part of Iberia, they were quite ready to adopt any measures against Rome which suggested themselves. On the death of Hasdrubal, to whom after that of Hamilcar they had entrusted the government of Iberia, they at first waited for a pronouncement on the part of the troops, and when news reached them from their armies that the soldiers had unanimously chosen Hannibal as their commander, they hastened to summon a general assembly
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

μου μιὰ γνώμη κυρίαν ἐποίησαν τὴν τῶν στρατο-5 πέδων αἵρεσιν. Ἄννιβας δὲ παραλαβὼν τὴν ἄρχην εὐθέως ὄρμησεν ὡς καταστρεφόμενος τὸ τῶν Ὑλκά-6 δών ἔθνος. αἱφικόμενος δὲ πρὸς Ἀλθαίαν τὴν βα-8 ρυτάτην αὐτῶν πόλιν κατεστρατοπέδευσε. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα χρησάμενος ἑνεργοὺς ἀμα καὶ καταπληκτικαῖς προσβολαῖς ταχέως ἐκράτησε τῆς πόλεως. οὐ συμ-βάντος οἱ λοιποὶ γενόμενοι καταπλαγεῖς ἐνέδωκαν
7 αὐτοὺς τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ἀργυρολογήσας δὲ τὰς πόλεις, καὶ κυριεύσας πολλῶν χρημάτων, ἥκε παρα-
8 χεμάσων εἰς Καυνὴν πόλιν. μεγαλοπρόγευσας δὲ χρη-σάμενος τοῖς ὑποταττομένοις, καὶ τὰ μὲν δοὺς τῶν ὦφων τοῖς συστρατευομένοις, τὰ δ᾽ ὑπηχυρο-μένοις, πολλῆς εὐνοίαν καὶ μεγάλης ἐλπίδας ἐνειρ-
14 γάσατο ταῖς δυνάμεσι. τῷ δ᾽ ἐπιγνωμένῳ θέρει πάλιν ὀρμήσας ἐπὶ τοὺς Ὄλυκκαιοὺς Ἐλµαντικὴν μὲν εἰς ἐφόδου ποιησάμενος προσβολάς κατέσχεν, Ἀρβουκάλην δὲ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὸ πλῆθος, ἔτι δὲ τὴν γενναιότητα τῶν οἰκητῶν, μετὰ πολλῆς ταλαιπωρίας πολυρκήσας κατὰ κράτος
2 εἶλε. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παραδόξως εἰς τοὺς μεγίστους ἰδθὲ κυνήγους ἐπανάγων, συνδραμῶντων ἐπὶ αὐτῶν τῶν Καρπησίων, δὲ σχεδὸν ἵσχυρονταν ἐστὶν ἔθνος
3 τῶν κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀστυνεῖτῶν ἀθροισθέντων ἀμα τούτοις, οὕς ἤρε-θισαν μάλιστα μὲν οἱ τῶν Ὑλκάδων φυγάδες, συν-εξέκαυσαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἐλµαντικῆς οἱ διασω-
4 θέντες. πρὸς οὖς εἰ μὲν ἐκ παρατάξεως ἡναγκά-
5 θησαν οἱ Καρχηδονίοι διακινδυνεύεις, ὁμολογού-

52
of the commons, which unanimously ratified the choice of the soldiers. Hannibal on assuming the command, at once set forth with the view of subduing a tribe called the Olcades, and arriving before their most powerful city Althaea,\(^a\) encamped there and soon made himself master of it by a series of vigorous and formidable assaults, upon which the rest of the tribe were overawed and submitted to the Carthaginians. After exacting tribute from the towns and possessing himself of a considerable sum, he retired to winter quarters at New Carthage. By the generosity he now displayed to the troops under his command, paying them in part and promising further payment, he inspired in them great good-will to himself and high hopes of the future. 14. Next summer he made a fresh attack on the Vaccaei, assaulted and took Hermandica at the first onset, but Arbacala being a very large city with a numerous and brave population, he had to lay siege to it and only took it by assault after much pains. Subsequently on his return he unexpectedly found himself in great peril, the Carpetani, the strongest tribe in the district gathering to attack him and being joined by the neighbouring tribes, all incited to this by the fugitive Olcades, and also by those who had escaped from Hermandica. Had the Carthaginians been obliged to meet all this host in a pitched battle, they would assuredly have suffered defeat; but, as it was, Hannibal very wisely and skilfully faced about and retreated so as to place the river Tagus in his front,

\(^a\) Livy calls it Castala.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ποταμὸν, καὶ περὶ τὴν τοῦ ποταμοῦ διάβασιν συ-
στησαμένου τὸν κίνδυνον, ἀμα δὲ συγχρησάμενον
συγαγωνιστῇ τῷ ποταμῷ καὶ τοῖς θερίσις οἷς εἰς
περὶ τετταράκοντα τὸν ἀριθμὸν, συνέβη τὰ ὅλα
6 παραδόξως καὶ κατὰ λόγον αυτῷ χωρήσαι. τῶν γὰρ
βαρβάρων ἐπιβαλομένων κατὰ πλείους τόπους βιά-
ζοντι καὶ περιαύλουσί τοῦ ποταμοῦ, τὸ μὲν πλεῖ-
στον αὐτῶν μέρος διεσθάρη περὶ τὰς ἐκβάσεις,
παραπορευμένων τῶν θηρίων παρὰ τὸ χείλος καὶ
7 τοὺς ἐκβαίνοντας ἀεὶ προκαταλαμβανόντων. πολλοὶ
dὲ κατ᾽ αὐτὸν τὸν ποταμὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπείων ἀπ-
ώλοντο, διὰ τὸ κρατεῖν μὲν μάλλον τοῦ ῥεύματος
tους ἦποις, ἢ ὑπερδεξίου δὲ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν 
8 τοὺς ἐπέας πρὸς τοὺς πεζοὺς. τέλος δὲ τοῦτοπλὰν
ἐπιθυμοῦσαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρ-
βάρους ἐτρέψαντο πλείους ἢ δέκα μυριάδας ἀνθρώ-
9 πων. ὃν ἠπτθηθέντων οὐδεὶς ἔτι τῶν ἐντὸς Ἰβηρὸς
ποταμοῦ ραδίως πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀντοφθαλμεῖν ἐτόλμα
10 πλὴν Ζακανθαίων. ταῦτας δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐπειράτο
κατὰ δύναμιν ἀπέχεσθαι, βουλόμενος μηδεμίαν
ἀφορμὴν ὁμολογουμένην δοῦναι τοῦ πολέμου Ῥω-
μαίους, ἔως τάλα πάντα βεβαίως ὑφ’ αὐτὸν ποιή-
σαιτο κατὰ τὰς Ἀμίλκου τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποθήκας καὶ
παρανέσεις.

15 Οἱ δὲ Ζακανθαίοι συνεχῶς ἔπεμπον εἰς τὴν
Ῥώμην, ἀμα μὲν ἄγωνωντες περὶ σφῶν καὶ προ-
ορῶντες τὸ μέλλον, ἀμα δὲ βουλόμενοι μὴ λαυ-
thάνειν Ῥωμαίους τὴν γνωμένην εὐροίαν Καρχηδο-
νίος τῶν κατ’ Ἰβηρίαν παραγμάτων. Ῥωμαίου δὲ,
πλεονάκις αὐτῶν παρακηκοῦσε, τότε πρεσβευτὸς
ἐξαπέστειλαν τοὺς ἐπισκεψομένους ὑπὲρ τῶν προσ-
τιπτόντων. Ἀννίβας δὲ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ-
34
BOOK III. 14. 5 – 15. 3

and remained there to dispute the crossing, availing himself of the aid both of the river and of his elephants, of which he had about forty, so that everything went as he had calculated and as no one else would have dared to expect. For when the barbarians tried to force a crossing at various points, the greater mass of them perished in coming out of the river, the elephants following its bank and being upon them as soon as they landed. Many also were cut down in the stream itself by the cavalry, as the horses could bear up better against the current, and the mounted men in fighting had the advantage of being higher than the unmounted enemy. Finally, Hannibal in his turn crossed the river and attacked the barbarians, putting to flight a force of more than one hundred thousand. After their defeat none of the peoples on that side of the Ebro ventured lightly to face the Carthaginians, with the exception of the Saguntines. Hannibal tried as far as he could to keep his hands off this city, wishing to give the Romans no avowed pretext for war, until he had secured his possession of all the rest of the country, following in this his father Hamilcar’s suggestions and advice.

15. But the Saguntines sent repeated messages to Rome, as on the one hand they were alarmed for their own safety and foresaw what was coming, and at the same time they wished to keep the Romans informed how well things went with the Carthaginians in Spain. The Romans, who had more than once paid little attention to them, sent on this occasion legates to report on the situation. Hannibal at the same time, having reduced the tribes he
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ροὺς πεποιημένος υφ’ αὐτὸν οὐς προέθετο, παρὴν αὖθις μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων παραχειμάσων εἰς Καὶ-
νὴν πόλιν, ἦτις ὡς ἂν εἰ προσχῆμα καὶ βασίλειον ἤν Καρχηδονίων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν τόποις. 4
καταλαβὼν δὲ τὴν παρὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρεσβείαν,
καὶ δοὺς αὐτὸν εἰς ἐντευξίν, διήκουν περὶ τῶν ἐν-
5 εστώτων. Ῥωμαίοι μὲν οὖν διεμαρτύροντο Ζακαι-
θαίων ἀπέχεσθαι, κείσθαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ σφε-
τέρᾳ πίστει, καὶ τὸν Ἰβηρα ποταμὸν μὴ διαβαίνειν
6 κατὰ τὰς ἔπ’ Ἀσδρούβου γενομένας ὁμολογίας. ὅ
δ’ Ὕνιβας, ἀπε νέος μὲν ὄψιν, πλήρης δὲ πολεμικῆς
ὅρμης, ἐπιτυχής δ’ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, πάλαι δὲ παρ-
7 ὁμομένους πρὸς τὴν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων ἕχθραν, πρὸς
μὲν ἕκείνους, ὡς κηδόμενος Ζακανθᾶνων, ἐνεκάλει
῾Ῥωμαῖοι διότι μικροῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις, στασι-
8 ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, λαβόντες τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν [εἰς τὸ δια-
λυσα] ἀδίκως ἐπανέλουτο τινος τῶν προεστῶν.
οὐ δὲ περιοψεῖς παρεπιστηριευόμενοι· πάτριον γὰρ
eῖναι Καρχηδονίοις τὸ μηδένα τῶν ἄδικουμένων
9 περίοραν· πρὸς δὲ Καρχηδονίων διεπέμπετο, πυν-
θανόμενος τί δεὶ ποιεῖν, ὅτι Ζακανθαιοὶ πιστεύον-
tes τῇ Ῥωμαίων συμμαχίᾳ τινὰ τῶν υφ’ αὐτοὺς
ταττομένων ἀδικοῦσι. καθὸλου δ’ ἦν πλήρης ἀλο-
γίας καὶ θυμοῦ βιαίου. διὸ καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἀληθιναῖς
8 ἀίδιας οὐκ ἔχρητο, κατέφυγε δ’ εἰς προφάσεις ἀλό-
γους· ἀπερ εἰώθασι ποιεῖν οἱ διὰ τὰς προεγκαθη-
μένας αὐτοῖς ὀρμάς ὀλυγρωύντες τοῦ καθήκοντος.
10 πόσῳ γὰρ ἦν ἀμενον οἰεσθαι δεῖν Ῥωμαίοις ἀπο-
δοῦναι σφίσι Σαρδόνα καὶ τοὺς ἐπιταχθέντας ἅμα
tαύτῃ φόρους, οὐς τοῖς καροῖς συνεπιθέμενοι πρὸ-
tερον ἀδίκως παρ’ αὐτῶν ἐλαβον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, φάναι
BOOK III, 15. 3 – 10

intended, arrived with his forces to winter at New Carthage, which was in a way the chief ornament and capital of the Carthaginian empire in Spain. Here he found the Roman legates, to whom he gave audience and listened to their present communication. The Romans protested against his attacking Saguntum, which they said was under their protection, or crossing the Ebro, contrary to the treaty engagements entered into in Hasdrubal’s time. Hannibal, being young, full of martial ardour, encouraged by the success of his enterprises, and spurred on by his long-standing enmity to Rome, in his answer to the legates affected to be guarding the interests of the Saguntines and accused the Romans of having a short time previously, when there was a party quarrel at Saguntum and they were called in to arbitrate, unjustly put to death some of the leading men. The Carthaginians, he said, would not overlook this violation of good faith for it was from of old the principle of Carthage never to neglect the cause of the victims of injustice. To Carthage, however, he sent, asking for instructions, since the Saguntines, relying on their alliance with Rome, were wronging some of the peoples subject to Carthage. Being wholly under the influence of unreasoning and violent anger, he did not allege the true reasons, but took refuge in groundless pretexts, as men are wont to do who disregard duty because they are prepossessed by passion. How much better would it have been for him to demand from the Romans the restitution of Sardinia, and at the same time of the tribute which they had so unjustly exacted, availing themselves of the misfortunes of Carthage, and to threaten war in
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

11 πολεμήσεων; νῦν δὲ τὴν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν ἀληθινὴν παρασιωπῶν, τὴν δὴ οὐχ ὑπάρχουσαν περὶ Ζακάνθαιων πλάττων, οὐ μόνον ἀλόγως, ἐτί δὲ μᾶλλον
12 ἀδίκως κατάρχει εἴδοκει τοῦ πολέμου. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρέσβεις, ὅτι μὲν εἰς πολεμητέων σαφῶς εἰ δότες, ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς Καρχηδόνα, τὰ παραπλήσα
13 θέλοντες ἐπιμαρτύρασθαι κάκεινος· οὗ μὴν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ γε πολεμήσεων ἠλπίσαν, ἀλλὰ ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ, χρήςεσθαι δὲ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὀρμητηρίῳ τῇ Ζακάνθαιον πόλει.

16 Διὸ καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ἀρμοζόμενοι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἢ σύγκλητος ἔκρινεν ἀσφαλίσασθαι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰλυρίδα πράγματα, προοριζόμενη διὸτι μέγας ἡ ἐστι καὶ πολυχρόνιος καὶ μακρὰν ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας ὁ πόλεμος. συνέβαινε γὰρ κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς καυροὺς Δημήτριον τὸν Φάριον, ἐπιλελημμένου μὲν τῶν προγεγονότων εἰς αὐτὸν εὐρεγετημάτων ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων, καταπεφρονηκότα δὲ πρότερον μὲν διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ Γαλατῶν, τότε δὲ διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ Καρχηδονίων
2 φόβον περιεστώτα Ῥωμαίους, πᾶσας δὲ ἔχοντα τὰς ἐλπίδας ἐν τῇ Μακεδόνων οἶκια διὰ τὸ συμπεπολεμηκέναι καὶ μετεσχηκέναι τῶν πρὸς Κλεομένην κυνόνων Ἀντιγόνων, πορθεῖν μὲν καὶ καταστρέφεσθαι τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἰλυρίδα πόλεις τὰς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ταττομένας, πεπλευκέναι δὲ ἔξω τοῦ Λίσσου παρὰ τὰς συνθήκες πεντήκοντα λέμβοις καὶ πεπόθηκαν κέναι πολλὰς τῶν Κυκλάδων νῆσων. εἰς δὲ βλέποντες Ῥωμαίους, καὶ θεωροῦντες ἀνθώπων τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν, ἔσπευδον ἀσφαλίσασθαι τὰ πρὸς ἐξ ὑπὸ Ἱταλίας, πεπεισμένοι κατατάξεσθαι διορθωσάμενοι μὲν τὴν Ἰλυρίων ἁγιοῖς, ἐπιτυχμήσαντες δὲ καὶ κολάσαντες τὴν ἀχαριστίαν καὶ
the event of refusal! But as it was, by keeping silent as to the real cause and by inventing a non-existing one about Saguntum, he gave the idea that he was entering on the war not only unsupported by reason but without justice on his side. The Roman legates, seeing clearly that war was inevitable, took ship for Carthage to convey the same protest to the Government there. They never thought, however, that the war would be in Italy, but supposed they would fight in Spain with Saguntum for a base.

16. Consequently, the Senate, adapting their measures to this supposition, decided to secure their position in Illyria, as they foresaw that the war would be serious and long and the scene of it far away from home. It so happened that at that time in Illyria Demetrius of Pharos, oblivious of the benefits that the Romans had conferred on him, contemptuous of Rome because of the peril to which she was exposed first from the Gauls and now from Carthage, and placing all his hopes in the Royal House of Macedon owing to his having fought by the side of Antigonus in the battles against Cleomenes, was sacking and destroying the Illyrian cities subject to Rome, and, sailing beyond Lissus, contrary to the terms of the treaty, with fifty boats, had pillaged many of the Cyclades. The Romans, in view of those proceedings and of the flourishing fortunes of the Macedonian kingdom, were anxious to secure their position in the lands lying east of Italy, feeling confident that they would have time to correct the errors of the Illyrians and rebuke and
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

5 ἐπρέπετειν τὴν Δημητρίου. διεψεύδησαν δὲ τοῖς λογισμοῖς· κατετάχθησε γὰρ αὐτῶς Ἀνιβάς,
6 ἐξελὼν τὴν Ζακανθαίαν πόλιν. καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ συνέβη τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ, πρὸς αὐτὴν δὲ
7 τῇ Ῥώμῃ καὶ κατὰ πᾶσαν γενέσθαι τὴν Ἰταλίαν. οὔ μὴν ἀλλὰ τούτως χρησάμενοι τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς Ῥωμαίοι μὲν ὑπὸ τὴν ὁραίαν Δεύκιον τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἐξαπέστειλαν μετὰ δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τὰ σατὰ
8 τὴν Ἰλυρίδα πράξεις κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἔτος τῆς ἐκατοστήσας καὶ τετταρακοστῆς ὀλυμπιάδος.

9 Ἀνιβάς δὲ μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἀναζεύξας ἐκ τῆς Καινῆς πόλεως προῆγε, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ
10 τὴν Ζάκανθαν. ἢ δὲ πόλις αὐτῇ κεῖται μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ πρὸς θάλατταν καθήκοντι πρόποδι τῆς ὀρεινῆς τῆς
11 συναπτούσης τὰ πέρατα τῆς Ἰβηρίας καὶ Κελτιβηρίας, ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς θαλάττης ὡς ἑπτά στάδια.
12 νέμονται δὲ χώραν οἱ κατοικοῦντες αὐτὴν πάμφορον
13 καὶ διαφέρουσαν ἁρετῇ πάσης τῆς Ἰβηρίας. ἢ τότε παραστρατοπεδεύσας Ἀνιβάς ἐνεργῶς ἐγίνετο περὶ
14 τὴν πολιορκίαν, πολλὰ προορίζομενοι εὐχρηστὰ πρὸς
15 τὸ μέλλον ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ κράτος ἔλειν αὐτὴν. πρῶτον
16 μὲν γὰρ ὑπέλαβε παρελέσθαι Ῥωμαίων τὴν ἐλπίδα
toι συντήρησαν τὸν πόλεμον ἐν Ἰβηρία. δεύτερον
dὲ καταπληξάμενος ἄπαντας εὐτακτοτέρους μὲν
epέπειστο παρακεκάσεσθαι τοὺς ὑπὸ αὐτὸν ἰδῆς ἡτ
tομένους, εὐλαβεῖτεροι δὲ τοὺς ἀκμῆν ἀυτοκρά-
18 τορας ὄντος τῶν Ἰβηρῶν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, οὐδὲν
ἄπολιτῶν ὅπισθεν πολέμιον ἀσφαλῶς ποιήσεθαι
19 τὴν εἰς τοῦ μπροσθεν πορείαν. χωρὶς τε τούτων εὐ-
πορήσειν μὲν χορηγιῶν αὐτὸς ὑπελάμβανε πρὸς τὰς
ἐπιβολὰς, προθυμίων δὲ ἐνεργάσεσθαι ταῖς δυνάμεις
ὄκ τῆς ἐσομενῆς ἐκάστους ὑφελείας, προκαλέσε- 40
chastise Demetrius for his ingratitude and temerity. But in this calculation they were deceived; for Hannibal forestalled them by taking Saguntum, and, as a consequence, the war was not waged in Spain but at the very gates of Rome and through the whole of Italy. However, the Romans now moved by these considerations dispatched a force under Lucius Aemilius just before summer in the first year of the 140th Olympiad to operate in Illyria.

17. Hannibal at the same time quitted New Carthage with his army and advanced towards Saguntum. This city lies on the seaward foot of the range of hills connecting Iberia and Celtiberia, at a distance of about seven stades from the sea. The territory of the Saguntines yields every kind of crop and is the most fertile in the whole of Iberia. Hannibal, now encamping before the town, set himself to besiege it vigorously, foreseeing that many advantages would result from its capture. First of all he thought that he would thus deprive the Romans of any prospect of a campaign in Iberia, and secondly he was convinced that by this blow he would inspire universal terror, and render the Iberian tribes who had already submitted more orderly and those who were still independent more cautious, while above all he would be enabled to advance safely with no enemy left in his rear. Besides, he would then have abundant funds and supplies for his projected expedition, he would raise the spirit of his troops by the booty distributed
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

σθαι δὲ τὴν εὔνοιαν τῶν ἐν οἴκῳ Καρχηδονίων διὰ τῶν ἀποσταλησμένων αὐτοῖς λαφύρων. τοιοῦτοι δὲ χρώμενοι διαλογισμοῖς, ἐνεργῶς προσέκειτο τῇ πολιορκίᾳ, τοτὲ μὲν ὑπόδειγμα τῷ πλῆθει ποιῶν αὐτὸν καὶ γνώμενοι αὐτοῦργος τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐργοῖς ταλαιπωρίας, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε παρακαλῶν τὰ πλήθη καὶ παραβόλως διδοῦσ αὐτὸν εἰς τοὺς κυνόνους. πᾶσαν δὲ κακοπάθειαν καὶ μέριμναν ὑπομείνας τέλος ἐν ὁκτὼ μησὶ κατὰ κράτος εἴλε τὴν πόλιν. κύριος δὲ γενόμενος χρημάτων πολλῶν καὶ σωμάτων καὶ κατασκευῆς, τὰ μὲν χρήματ' εἰς τὰς ἑδίας ἐπιβολὰς παρέθετο κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἄρχης πρόθεσιν, τὰ δὲ σώματα διένειμε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκάστοις τῶν συν-στρατευόμενων, τῆς δὲ κατασκευῆς παραχρήμα πᾶσαν ἐξέπεμψε τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ταῦτα δὲ πράξας οὐ διεξεύσθη τοῖς λογισμοῖς οὐδ᾽ ἀπέτυχε τῆς ἐξ ἄρχης προθεσμίας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τε στρατιῶτας προθυμιοτέρους ἐποίησε πρὸς τὸ κυνόνους, τοὺς τε Καρχηδονίους ἑτοίμους παρεσκευάσει πρὸς τὸ παραγγελλόμενον, αὐτὸς τε πολλὰ τῶν χρησίμων μετὰ ταῦτα κατειργάσατο διὰ τῆς τῶν χορηγῶν παραθέσεως.

18 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καυροὺς Δημήτριος ἄμα τῷ συνείναι τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῶν ἠρωμαίων παρατίθεν, μὲν εἰς τὴν Διμάλην ἀξίοχρεων φρουράν εἰσέπεμψε καὶ τὰς ἁρμοζούσας ταύτης χορηγίας, ἐκ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν πόλεων τοὺς μὲν ἀντιπολιτευόμενους ἐποιησε πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιούς φίλους ἐνεχείρισε τὰς δυνα-2 στείας, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὑποτεγχεῖσών ἐπιλέξας τοὺς ἀνδρωδεστάτους ἐξακυσχιλίους συνέστησε τοὺς-3 τοὺς εἰς τὴν Φάρον. ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ρωμαίων, ᾠκίκεμοις εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, καὶ θεωρῶν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους θαρροῦντας ἐπὶ τῇ 42
among them and would conciliate the Carthaginians at home by the spoils he would send them. From all these considerations he actively pursued the siege, now setting an example to the soldiers by sharing personally the fatigue of the battering operations, now cheering on the troops and exposing himself recklessly to danger. At length after ten months of hardship and anxiety he took the city by storm. A great booty of money, slaves, and property fell into his hands. The money, as he had determined, he set aside for his own purposes, the slaves he distributed among his men according to rank, and the miscellaneous property he sent off at once to Carthage. The result did not deceive his expectations, nor did he fail to accomplish his original purpose; but he both made his troops more eager to face danger and the Carthaginians more ready to accede to his demands on them, while he himself, by setting aside these funds, was able to accomplish many things of much service to him.

18. While this was taking place Demetrius, getting wind of the Romans' purpose, at once sent a considerable garrison to Dimale with the supplies requisite for such a force. In the other cities he made away with those who opposed his policy and placed the government in the hands of his friends while he himself, selecting six thousand of his bravest troops, quartered them at Pharos. The Roman Consul, on reaching Illyria with his army and observing that the enemy were very confident in
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

τῆς Δυμάλης ὧχυρότητι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς, ἐτὶ δὲ τῷ δοκεῖν αὐτὴν ἀνάλωτον ὑπάρχειν, ταύτῃ πρῶτον ἐγχειρεῖν ἐκρινε, βουλόμενος καταπλήξασθαι 4 τοὺς πολέμους. παρακαλέσας δὲ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἡγεμόνας, καὶ προσαγαγὼν ἔργα κατὰ πλείους τό- 5 πους, ἦρξατο πολιορκεῖν. λαβὼν δὲ κατὰ κράτος ἐν ἡμέραις ἐπτα παραχρῆμα πάντας ἦττησε ταῖς 6 ψυχαῖς τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. διόπερ εὐθέως παρῆσαν ἐκ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων ἐπιτρέποντες καὶ διδόντες 7 αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν. δὲ δὲ προσδεξάμενος ἐκάστους ἐπὶ ταῖς ἁμοιούσαις ὁμολο- 8 γίαις ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν εἰς τὴν Φάρον ἐπ’ αὐτὸν τὸν Δημήτριον. πυθανόμενος δὲ τὴν τε πόλιν ὁχυράν εἶναι καὶ πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων διαφέροντων εἰς αὐτὴν ἠθοροῦσαι, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ταῖς χορηγίαις ἐξηρτύσαται καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις παρασκευαῖς, ὑθεωράτο μὴ δυσχερῆ καὶ πολυχρόνιον συμβῆ γενέσθαι τὴν 9 πολιορκίαν. διὸ προορώμενος ἐκαστα τούτων ἔχρη- 10 σατο παρ’ αὐτὸν τὸν καίρον τοῦτος τοῖς γένει στρα- 11 τηγήματος. πουσάμενος γὰρ τὸν ἐπίπλουν νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν νῆσον παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι, τὸ μὲν πλείον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως ἀπεβίβασεν εἰς τινας ὑλώδεις 12 λιμένα. συνορῶντες δὲ τὰς ναῦς οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημή- 13 τριον, καὶ καταφρονοῦντες τοῦ πλῆθους, ἀφημας 14 ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τὸν λιμένα, κωλύοντες τὴν ἀπό- 15 βασιν τῶν ὑπεναντίων. ἀμα δὲ τῷ συμμίξαι γνω- 16 μένῃς ἠχυρᾶς τῆς συμπλοκῆς προσεβοῦσθην αἰαὶ πλείους τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως· τέλος δὲ πάντες ἐξ- 19 εὐθύθησαν εἰς τὸν κύδυνον. τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων οἱ 44
the natural strength of Dimale and the measures they had taken for its defence, there being also a general belief that it was impregnable, decided to attack it first, wishing to strike terror into them. Having given instructions to his officers and erected batteries in several places he began to besiege it. By capturing it in seven days, he at one blow broke the spirit of all the enemy, so that from every city they at once flocked to surrender themselves unconditionally to Rome. Having accepted their submission and imposed suitable conditions on each he sailed to Pharos to attack Demetrius himself. Learning that the city was very strong, that a large force of exceptionally fine troops was assembled within it and that it was excellently furnished with supplies and munitions of war, he was apprehensive that the siege might prove difficult and long. In view of this, therefore, he employed the following impromptu stratagem. Sailing up to the island at night with his whole force he disembarked the greater part of it in certain well-wooded dells, and at daybreak with twenty ships sailed openly against the harbour which lies nearest to the town. Demetrius, seeing the ships and contemptuous of their small number, sallied from the city down to the harbour to prevent the enemy from landing. On his encountering them (19) the struggle was very violent, and more and more troops kept coming out of the town to help, until at length the whole garrison had poured out to take part in the battle. The Roman force which had landed in the night now
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἡμα, διὰ τῶν ἄδηλων ποιούμενοι τὴν πορείαν. 3 καὶ καταλαβόμενοι μεταξὺ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοῦ λιμένος λόφον ἔρυμνον διέκλεισαν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως τοῦ 4 ἐκβεβοηθηκότας. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δημήτριον, συννοήσαντες τὸ γεγονός, τοῦ μὲν διακωλύσαν τοὺς ἀποβαίνοντας ἀπέστησαν, συναδροίσαντες δὲ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ παρακαλέσαντες ἔριμησαν, κρίναντες ἐκ παρατάξεως διακωδυνεύεις πρὸς τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ λόφου. 5 οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι, θεωροῦντες τὴν ἐφοδία τῶν Ἰλλυρίων ἐνεργὸν καὶ συντεταγμένην, ἀντέπεσον ταῖς 6 σπείραις καταπληκτικῶις. ἀμα δὲ τοῖς προερημέ- νοι οἱ πεποιημένοι τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἀπὸ τῶν πλοίων, συνορῶντες τὸ γινόμενον, προσέκειντο κατόπιν· καὶ πανταχόθεν προσπίπτοντες θόρυβον καὶ ταραχὴν οὐ 7 μικράν ἐν τοῖς Ἰλλυρίοις κατεσκεύαζον. ἐξ οὗ τῶν μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον, τῶν δὲ κατὰ νότιον πονοῦν- των, τέλος οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημήτριον ἔτραφαν· καὶ τινὲς μὲν αὐτῶν ἔφυγαν ως πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, οἱ δὲ 8 πλείους ἀνοδία κατὰ τῆς νῆσου διεσπάρθησαν. ὃ δὲ Δημήτριος, ἔχων ἐτοίμους λέμβους πρὸς τὸ συμ- βάινον ἐν τοις τόποις ἔρημοις ὑφορμούτας, ἐπὶ τούτους ἐπονήσατο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν. εἰς οὐς ἐμβὰς ἐπιγενομένης τῆς νυκτός ἀπέπλευσε, καὶ διεκομίσθη παράδοξως πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα Φίλιππον, παρ’ ὃ τὸ 9 λοιπὸν διέτριβε τοῦ βίου μέρος, ἀνήρ θράσος μὲν καὶ τόλμαν κεκτημένος, ἀλόγιστον δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ 10 τελέως ἀκριτον. διὸ καὶ τὴν καταστροφήν παρα- πλησίαν αὐτῷ συνέβη γενέσθαι τῇ κατὰ τὸν ὄλον 11 βίον προαιρέσθε. καταλαβέσθαι γὰρ ἐγχειρήσας μετὰ τῆς Φίλιππου γνώμης τῆς τῶν Μεσσηνίων 46
BOOK III. 19. 2–11

opportune arrived, having marched by a concealed route, and occupying a steep hill between the city and the harbour, shut off from the town the troops who had sallied out. Demetrius, perceiving what had happened, desisted from opposing the landing and collecting his forces and cheering them on started with the intention of fighting a pitched battle with those on the hill. The Romans, seeing the Illyrians advancing resolutely and in good order, formed their ranks and delivered a terrible charge, while at the same time those who had landed from the ships, seeing what was going on, took the enemy in the rear, so that being attacked on all sides the Illyrians were thrown into much tumult and confusion. At the end, being hard pressed both in front and in the rear, Demetrius’ troops turned and fled, some escaping to the city, but the greater number dispersing themselves over the island across country. Demetrius had some boats lying ready for such a contingency at a lonely spot, and retreating there and embarking sailed away at nightfall and managed to cross and reach King Philip, at whose court he spent the rest of his life. He was a man of a bold and venturesome spirit, but with an entire lack of reasoning power and judgement, defects which brought him to an end of a piece with the rest of his life. For having, with the approval of Philip, made a foolhardy and ill-managed attempt to seize Messene, he perished in the action, as I shall narrate
12 ὅταν ἐπὶ τοὺς καρποὺς ἔλθωμεν, διασαφήσομεν. ὅ 
δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἱρωμαίων Αἰμίλιος τὴν μὲν Φά-
ρον εὐθέως ἐξ ἐφόδου παραλαβῶν κατέσκαψε, τῆς 
δὲ λοιπῆς Ἰλλυρίδος ἔγκρατης γενόμενος, καὶ πάντα 
διατάξεις κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαιρέσειν, μετὰ ταῦτα 
ληγοῦσις ἦδη τῆς θερείας εἰς τὴν ἹΡώμην ἐπανήλθε, 
καὶ τὴν εἰσοδον ἐπούσατο μετὰ θρίαμβου καὶ τῆς 
13 ἀπάσης εὐδοξίας. ἔδοκει γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἐπιδεξίως, 
ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀνδρωδῶς κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν. 
20 Οἱ δὲ Ἱρωμαῖοι, προσπεπτωκύιας αὐτοῖς ἦδη τῆς 
τῶν Ζακανθαίων ἀλώσεως, οὐ μᾶ Δία περὶ τοῦ πο-
λέμου τότε διαβουλίου ἔγγον, καθάπερ ἐνιοῦ τῶν 
συγγραφέων φασὶ, προσκατατάπτοντες ἐτι καὶ τοὺς 
eἰς ἐκάτερα ρηθέντας λόγους, πάντως ἀτοπώτατον 
2 πράγμα ποιοῦντες. πῶς γὰρ οἶον τῷ ἴν ἹΡωμαίου 
τοὺς ἐναυτῷ πρότερον ἐπηγγελκότας πόλεμον Καρ-
χιδονίοις, ἐὰν ἐπιβαίνωσι τῆς Ζακανθαίων χώρας, 
tούτους κατὰ κράτος ἐλακτυκίας αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως 
tότε βουλεύσατο συνελθόντας πότερα πολεμητέον 
3 ἡ τούναντιον; πῶς δὲ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀμα μὲ τὴν 
στυγνότητα τοῦ συνεδρίου παρεισάγουσι θαυμάσιον, 
ἀμα δὲ τοῖς νίουσι ἀπὸ δῶδεκ’ ἐτῶν ἄγεν φασὶ 
tοὺς πατέρας εἰς τὸ συνεδρίον, οὐς μετέχοντας τῶν 
dιαβουλίων οὔδὲ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδενὶ προέσθαι 
4 τῶν ἁπορρήτων οὐδέν; ἄν οὐτ’ εἰκὸς οὐτ’ ἀληθές 
ἐστι τὸ παράπαν οὐδέν, εἰ μὴ νὴ Δία πρὸς τοῖς 
ἄλλοις ἡ τύχῃ καὶ τούτο προσένεμε τῷ ἹΡωμαίοις, τὸ 
5 φρονεῖν αὐτοὺς εὐθέως ἐκ γενετῆς. πρὸς μὲν οὖν 
tὰ τοιάτα τῶν συγγραμμάτων οἷα γράφει Χαιρέας 
καὶ Σωσίλος οὐδέν ἓν δέοι πλέον λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ 
ἰστορίας, ἀλλὰ κουρεακῆς καὶ παιδῆμον λαλάς 
ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι τάξις ἔχειν καὶ δύναμιν.
in detail when we reach that date. Aemilius, the Roman Consul, took Pharos at once by assault and razed it to the ground, and after subduing the rest of Illyria and organizing it as he thought best, returned to Rome late in summer and entered the city in triumph, acclaimed by all, for he seemed to have managed matters not only with ability, but with very high courage.

20. The Romans, when the news of the fall of Saguntum reached them, did not assuredly hold a debate on the question of the war, as some authors allege, even setting down the speeches made on both sides—a most absurd proceeding. For how could the Romans, who a year ago had announced to the Carthaginians that their entering the territory of Saguntum would be regarded as a casus belli, now when the city itself had been taken by assault, assemble to debate whether they should go to war or not? How is it that on the one hand these authors draw a wonderful picture of the gloomy aspect of the Senate and on the other tell us that fathers brought their sons from the age of twelve upwards to the Senate House, and that these boys attended the debate but divulged not a syllable even to any of their near relatives? Nothing in this is the least true or even probable, unless, indeed, Fortune has bestowed on the Romans among other gifts that of being wise from their cradles. No further criticism, indeed, of such works as those of Chaereas and Sosylus is necessary; they rank in authority, it seems to me, not with history, but with the common gossip of a barber's shop.

* Of Chaereas nothing is known. Sosylus was Hannibal's Greek teacher and accompanied him on his campaign.
6 Ἡ Ῥωμαίοι δὲ, προσπεσόντος οὕτως δὲ, παραχρῆμα προσβεντᾶς ἐλομένω κατὰ σπούδην ἐξαπεστειλαν 7 εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα, δύο προτείνοντες αὐτοῖς, ὅτι τὸ μὲν αἰσχύνην ἁμα καὶ βλάβην ἔδοκεν φέρειν δεξαμένους τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, τὸ δὲ ἔτερον πραγμάτων καὶ 8 κυνδύων ἀρχὴν μεγάλων. Ἡ γὰρ τῶν στρατηγῶν Ἀντίβαν καὶ τοὺς μετ’ αὐτοῦ συνέδρους [ἐκδότους διδόναι] Ῥωμαίοις ἐκδότεον ἡ προήγγελλον τὸν 9 πόλεμον. παραγενομένων δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων, καὶ παρελθόντων εἰς τὸ συνέδριον καὶ διασαφούστων ταῦτα, δυσχερῶς ἤκουσαν οἱ Καρχηδόνοι τὴν αὕρη- 10 σιν τῶν προτεινομένων. ὁμος δὲ προστησάμενοι τὸν ἐπιτηδειότατον εξ αὐτῶν ἠρέσατο περὶ σφῶν 21 δικαιολογεῖσθαι. τὰς μὲν οὖν πρὸς Ἀσδρούβαν ὀμολογίας παρεσιώπων, ὡς οὕτε γεγενημένας, εἰ τε γεγόνας, οὐδὲν οὔσας πρὸς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὸ χωρίς 2 τῆς σφετερᾶς πεπράχθαι γνώμης. ἔχρωντο δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν Ῥωμαίων εἰς τοῦτο παραδείγματι. τὰς γὰρ ἐπὶ Λυκαιοῦ γενομένας συνθήκας ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ περὶ Σικελίας, ταῦτα ἔφασαν ἦδη συνεμιλογη- 3 μένας ὑπὸ Λυκαιῶν μετὰ ταῦτα τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀκόροντι ποιῆσαι διὰ τὸ χωρίς τῆς αὐτοῦ 4 γενέσθαι γνώμης. ἐπιέζον δὲ καὶ προσαπηρεῖδοντο παρ’ ὅλην τὴν δικαιολογίαν ἐπὶ τάς τελευταίας συν- θήκας τὰς γεγομένας ἐν τῷ περὶ Σικελίας πολέμῳ. 4 ἐν αἷς περὶ μὲν Ἡβρίας οὐκ ἔφασαν ὑπάρχειν ἔγγραφον οὐδὲν, περὶ δὲ τοῦ τοῖς ἐκατέρω συμμάχους τῆς παρ’ ἀμφότερον ἄσφαλειαν εἶναι ῥήτως κατατέ- 5 τετάχθαι. Ζακανθαίους δὲ παρεδείκνυν οὐκ ὄντας τότε Ῥωμαίων συμμάχους, καὶ παραγενεύσκον τὸ 6 πρὸς τοῦτο πλεονάκις τὰς συνθήκας. Ῥωμαίοι δὲ 50
BOOK III. 20. 6 – 21. 6

The Romans, on hearing of the calamity that had befallen Saguntum, at once appointed ambassadors and sent them post-haste to Carthage, giving the Carthaginians the option of two alternatives, the one of which, if they accepted it, entailed disgrace and damage, while the other would give rise to extreme trouble and peril. Either they must give up Hannibal and the members of his Council or war would be declared. On the Roman envoys arriving and appearing before the Senate and delivering their message the Carthaginians listened with indignation to this choice of alternatives, but putting up their most able member to speak, they entered upon their justification. 21. They said not a word of the treaty with Hasdrubal, considering it as not existent, or if existent, as not concerning them, since it was made without their approval. Here they quoted the precedent of the Romans themselves, alleging that the treaty made in the war for Sicily under Lutatius, though agreed to by Lutatius, had been repudiated by the Romans as having been made without their approval. In all their plea of justification they founded and insisted on the treaty at the end of the war for Sicily, in which they said there was no mention of Iberia, but it was expressly set down that the allies of each power should be secure from attack by the other. They pointed out that at that time the Saguntines were not the allies of Rome, and to prove their point they read aloud several extracts from the treaty. The Romans
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tou men dikaiologeitai kathapathe apegynwskou, faskontes akeraion men eti diamevounthi ths ton Zakynthaiwn poleis epidexusai t' na pragmatea dikaiologian kai dunaton einai logon peri ton
7 amfisbhtoumenewn diezageiv: taunti dè parapou-
demenv th tois aitious ekdoteon einai sfisi, di' oí
fanerou estai pásin ós ou meteochkaai tis adikias,
all' anev tis autwn gnwismis peprakh ai touto
8 tourgon, òi mh bvoumewnou touto pouvei, omoioyn-
tas dè koumomev 'th ths adikias kai surnanadexusai
ton polemon.

Oi men oin kathlikwteron pws exhrhanto tois
9 logois. 'hmv' d' anagkaion einai dokei to mh para-
leipsen asekpeton touto to meros, òna mh' ois
kathkei kai diaphrigei to saphos evdenvi th en tou-
tois akribheias, parapaiwai this alltheias en tois
10 anagkaistaitois diabhoulous, mh' ois filomethodotes
perï touton astochwsi, sumplanoymenoi taís angoulais
kai filotimiais twon syngraphewn, all' ò ths omolo-
gyounmenvi theoria twon apo ths arxhs uparzantwn
dikaiwn 'Rhmaiow kai Karhchdhiois prosw allh-
lous eis tois tovs kath' hmyas kairophs.
22 Gínontai tougrapon syntheika 'Rhmaiow kai Kar-
chdhioi proswata kata Leukion 'Iovnion Broudton
kai Markon 'Oration, tous prwtous katastathntas
uitous meta th twn basilewn katallous, up' ón
synephe kaiherwthnai kai to tout Dios ierwn
2 touto Kapetwlon. Taouta d' esti protera ths Xer-
exou diabhasewos eis thn 'Ellada trakovn estei leir-
3 poui duewin. òs kath' ousoi hyn dunaton akribestata
diermeneusantes hmeis upoyegrafamen. tereukath
gar h diafora géyone ths dialéktou kai parà 'Rhw-
52
BOOK III. 21. 6 – 22. 3

refused definitely to discuss the matter of justification, saying that while Saguntum still stood unharmed matters admitted of a plea of justification and it was possible to reach a decision on the disputed points by argument, but now that the treaty had been broken by the seizure of the city either they must give up the culprits, which would make it clear to all that they had no share in the wrong, but that it had been done without their approval, or if they refused to do so and thus confessed that they were participators in the misdeed they must accept war.

On this occasion the question was dealt with in more or less general terms, but I think it necessary for myself not to neglect it, so that neither those whose duty and interest it is to be accurately informed about this may deviate from the truth in critical debates, nor students, led astray by the ignorance or partisanship of historians, acquire mistaken notions on the subject, but that there may be some survey generally recognized as accurate of the treaties between Rome and Carthage up to our own time.

22. The first treaty between Rome and Carthage dates from the consulship of Lucius Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, the first Consuls after the expulsion of the kings, and the founders of the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. This is twenty-eight years before the crossing of Xerxes to Greece. I give below as accurate a rendering as I can of this treaty, but the ancient Roman language differs so

53
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

μαίους τής νῦν πρὸς τήν ἀρχαίαν ὀστε τούς συνετώ-
4 τάτους ἔνα μόλις ἔξ ἐπιστάσεως διευκρινεῖν. εἰσὶ
δ’ αἱ συνθήκαι τουαίδε τυνές: "ἐπὶ τοῖς ἕλιαν
εἶναι Ἦρωμαίοις καὶ τοῖς Ἦρωμαίοις συμμάχοις καὶ
Καρχηδονίοις καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδονίων συμμάχοις:
5 μὴ πλεῦν <μακραῖς ναυοίχ> Ἦρωμαίοις μηδὲ τούς
Ἦρωμαίων συμμάχους ἑπέκειον τοῦ Κάλου ἀκρωτη-
6 ρίον, ἦν μὴ ὕπο χειμώνος ἡ πολέμων ἀναγκασθώ-
σιν. ἦν δὲ τις βία κατενεχθή, μὴ ἐξέστω αὐτῷ
μηδὲν ἀγοράζειν μηδὲ λαμβάνειν πλῆν ὡσα πρὸς
7 πλοίου ἐπισκευὴν ἡ πρὸς ἱερά, ἐν πέντε δ’ ἡμέρας
ἀποτρεχέων. τοῖς δὲ κατ’ ἐμπορίαν παραγωμέ-
νοις μηδὲν ἑστω τέλος πλῆν ἐπὶ κήρυκι ἦ γραμματεῖ.
9 ὡσα δ’ ἂν τούτων περάντων πραθῆ, δημοσία πιστεύει
ὁφειλέσθω τῷ ἀποδομένῳ, ὡσα ἂν ἦ ἐν διβυή ἦ
10 ἐν Σαρδώνι πραθῆ. ἦν Ἦρωμαίων τις εἰς Σικελίαν
παραγινῆται, ἦς Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπάρχουσιν, ὡσα ἑστω
11 τὰ Ἦρωμαίων πάντα. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ μὴ ἄδικεῖ-
τωσαν δήμον Ἅρδεατῶν, Ἀντιατῶν, Λαρέντιων, Κυρκαμιτῶν,
Ταρρακιντῶν, μηδ’ ἄλλον μηδένα
12 Λατίνων, ὡσαν ἄν ὑπήκουσι. ἦν δὲ τίνες μὴ ἄσων
ὑπήκουσι, τῶν πόλεων ἀπεχέσθωσαν ἂν δὲ λάβωσι,
13 Ἦρωμαιοι ἀποδιδότωσαν ἀκέραιον. φρούριον μὴ
ἐνοικοδομεῖτωσαν ἐν τῇ Λατίνῃ. ἦν ὡς πολέμιοι
ἐς τὴν χώραν εἰσέλθωσαν, ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ μὴ ἐννυκτε-
ρεύετωσαν."

23 Τὸ μὲν οὖν Κάλου ἀκρωτηρίων ἐστι τὸ προκεί-
μένον αὐτῆς τῆς Καρχηδόνος ὡς πρὸς τὰς ἀρκτους:
2 οὐ καθάπαξ ἐπέκειον πλεῦν ὡς πρὸς μεσημβρίας
οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι τοὺς Ἦρωμαίους
μακραῖς ναυοῖς διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύειν γνώσκειν αὐ-
τούς, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μήτε τούς κατὰ τὴν Βυζσάτων
54
much from the modern that it can only be partially made out, and that after much application, by the most intelligent men. The treaty is more or less as follows: "There is to be friendship between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians and their allies on these terms: The Romans and their allies not to sail with long ships beyond the Fair Promontory unless forced by storm or by enemies; it is forbidden to anyone carried beyond it by force to buy or carry away anything beyond what is required for the repair of his ship or for sacrifice, and he must depart within five days. Men coming to trade may conclude no business except in the presence of a herald or town-clerk, and the price of whatever is sold in the presence of such shall be secured to the vendor by the state, if the sale take place in Libya or Sardinia. If any Roman come to the Carthaginian province in Sicily, he shall enjoy equal rights with others. The Carthaginians shall do no wrong to the peoples of Ardea, Antium, Laurentium, Circeii, Terracina, or any other city of the Latins who are subject to Rome. Touching those Latins who are not subjects, they shall keep their hands off their cities, and if they take any city shall deliver it up to the Romans undamaged. They shall build no fort in the Latin territory. If they enter the land in arms, they shall not pass a night therein."

23. The "Fair Promontory" is that lying in front of Carthage to the North. The Carthaginians forbid the Romans absolutely to sail south of this on its western side in long ships, the reason being, I think, that they did not wish them to become acquainted either with the district round Byssatis or
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

μήτε τοὺς κατά τὴν μικρὰν Σύρτιν τόπους, δὲ δὴ
καλοῦσιν Ἐμπόρια, διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς χώρας. ἐὰν
dὲ τις ύπὸ χειμῶνος ἢ πολεμίων βίας κατενεχθεῖς
dήται τοῦ τῶν ἀναγκαίων πρὸς ἑρὰ καὶ πρὸς
ἐπισκευὴν πλοίου, ταῦτα, πάρεξ δὲ μηδὲν οἴονται
δεῖν λαμβάνειν, καὶ κατ’ ἀνάγκην ἐν πένθῃ ἡμέραις
ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοὺς καθορισμοθέντας. εἰς δὲ Καρ-
χηδόνα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Καλοῦ ἀκρω-
tηρίου τῆς Διβύς καὶ Σαρδόνα καὶ Σικελίαν, ἢς
ἐπάρχουσι Καρχηδόνοι, κατ’ ἐμπορίαν πλεῖν Ὀω-
μαῖοις ἔμεινει, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ύποχωνυμίαν βεβαι-
ωσεῖ τινὶ Καρχηδόνοις, ὡς ὅμοιος πίστευε. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
τῶν τῶν συνθηκῶν περὶ μὲν Σαρδόνας καὶ Διβύς
ἐμφαίνουσιν ὡς περὶ ἱδίας ποιούμενοι τὸν λόγον.
ὑπὲρ δὲ Σικελίας τάναντια διαστέλλονται ῥητῶς,
ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τούτων ποιούμενοι τὰς συνθήκας, ὅσα
τῆς Σικελίας ὑπὸ τὴν Καρχηδονίων πίπτει δύνα-
στείαν. ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ Ὀωμαῖοι περὶ τῆς Δατίνης
αὐτῆς χώρας ποιούνται τὰς συνθήκας, τῆς δὲ λοιπῆς
Ἰταλίας οὐ μνημονεύουσι, διὰ τὸ μὴ πίπτειν ὑπὸ
tῆς αὐτῶν ἐξουσίαν.

24. Μετὰ δὲ ταύτας ἐτέρας ποιοῦνται συνθήκας, ἐν
ἀλλ' προσπερικῆς Καρχηδόνοι Τυρίους καὶ τῶν
2 Ἰτυκαίων δήμου. πρόσκειται δὲ καὶ τῷ Καλῷ
ἄκρωτηριῳ Μαστία, Ταρσίου, ἄν ἐκτὸς ἀνταποδεῖ
δεῖν Ὀωμαῖοι μήτε λήξεσθαι μήτε πόλιν κτίζειν.
3 εἰς δὲ τοιαίδε τινές· "ἐπὶ τοῖς φιλίαν εἶναι
Ὀωμαῖοι καὶ τοῖς Ὀωμαίων συμμάχοις καὶ
Καρχηδονίων καὶ Τυρίων καὶ Ἰτυκαίων δήμῳ καὶ
4 τοῖς τούτων συμμάχοις. τοῦ Καλοῦ ἄκρωτηριον,
Μαστία, Ταρσίου, μὴ λήξεσθαι ἐπέκεινα Ὀω-
μαῖοι μὴ ἐμπορεύεσθαι μὴ δὲ πόλιν κτίζειν. ἔαν
56
that near the greater Syrtis, which they call Emporia, owing to their great fertility. If anyone, carried there by a storm or driven by his enemies, requires anything for the purpose of sacrificing to the gods or of repairing his ships, he may have this, but nothing beyond it, and those who touch there must leave within five days. To Carthage itself and all parts of Libya on this side of the Fair Promontory, to Sardinia and the Carthaginian province of Sicily the Romans may come for trading purposes, and the Carthaginian state engages to secure payment of their just debts. The phrasing of this treaty shows that they consider Sardinia and Libya as their own, whereas they distinctly express themselves otherwise about Sicily, mentioning only in the treaty those parts of it which are under Carthaginian rule. Similarly, the Romans include in the treaty Latium alone, making no mention of the rest of Italy as it was not then subject to their authority.

24. At a later date they made another treaty, in 306 B.C., which the Carthaginians include Tyre and Utica, and mention, in addition to the Fair Promontory, Mastia and Tarseum as points beyond which the Romans may not either make marauding expeditions, or trade, or found cities. This treaty is more or less as follows: "There is to be friendship on the following conditions between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians, Tyrians, and the people of Utica and their respective allies. The Romans shall not maraud or trade or found a city on the farther side of Fair Promontory, Mastia, and
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

dé Καρχηδόνιοι λάβωσιν ἐν τῇ Λατινῇ πόλιν τινὰ μὴ οὔσαν ὑπῆκοον ἮΡωμαίοις, τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρας ἐχέτωσαν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἀποδιδότωσαν. ἦν δὲ τινὲς Καρχηδονίων λάβωσι τινας, πρὸς οὓς εἰρήνη μὲν ἐστιν ἐγγραπτὸς ἮΡωμαίοις, μὴ ὑποτάττονται δὲ τι αὐτοῖς, μὴ καταγέτωσαν εἰς τοὺς ἮΡωμαιῶν λιμένας· ἦν δὲ καταχθέντος ἐπιλάβηται ὁ ἮΡω-
7 μαῖος, ἀφιέσθω. ὡσαύτως δὲ μὴ γαίρειν οἱ ἮΡωμαιοι
8 ποιεῖτωσαν. ᾗν ἐκ τινος χώρας, ὡς Ἀρχηγὸς ἔπαρχουσιν, ὡς ἐφόδια λάβη ὁ ἮΡωμαῖος, μετὰ τοῦτων τῶν ἐφοδίων μὴ ἀδικεῖτω μηδένα πρὸς
9 οὓς εἰρήνη καὶ φιλία ἐστι <Καρχηδόνιοι>. ὡσαύ-
10 τως δὲ μὴ γαίρειν ὁ Ἀρχηγός ἔνθετον ποιεῖτω. εἰ δὲ, μὴ ἴδια μεταπορεύεσθω, ἦν δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους ἵνα
11 δημόσιον γινέσθω τὸ ἀδίκημα. ἐν Σαρδόνι καὶ
12 Λιβύη μὴδείς ἮΡωμαιῶν μὴ ἐμπορευέσθω μὴτε πόλιν κτιζέτω, . . . . εἰ μὴ ἕως τοῦ ἐφόδια λαβεῖν ἡ πλοῖον ἐπισκευάσει. ἦν δὲ χειμῶν κατενέγκῃ,
13 ἐν πενθῇ ἡμέρας ἀποτρεχέτω. ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ἦς
14 Ἀρχηγός ἔπαρχουσι, καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι πάντα καὶ ποιεῖτω καὶ πωλεῖτω δῶς καὶ τῷ πολίτῃ ἐξ-
15 εστίν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἀρχηγὸς ποιεῖτω ἐν ἮΡωμη.”
16 Πάλιν ἐν ταῦταις ταῖς συνθήκαις τὰ μὲν κατὰ
17 Λιβύην καὶ Σαρδόνα προσεπιτείνουσιν ἐξεδιαζόμενοι καὶ πάσας ἀφαιρούμενοι τὰς ἐπιβάθρας ἮΡω-
18 μαῖον, περὶ δὲ Σικελίας τἀναντία προοδιασάφους;
19 περὶ τῆς ὑπ’ αὐτούς ταττομένης. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
20 ἮΡωμαῖοι περὶ τῆς Λατινῆς· οὐκ οἶονται δὲν τοὺς
21 Καρχηδονίους ἀδικεῖν Ἀρδεάτας, Ἀντιάτας, Κίρ-
22 καίτας, Ταρρακινίτας. αὐται δ’ εἰσὶν αἱ πόλεις

58
BOOK III. 24. 5 – 16

Tarseum. If the Carthaginians capture any city in Latium not subject to Rome, they shall keep the valuables and the men, but give up the city. If any Carthaginians take captive any of a people with whom the Romans have a treaty of peace, but who are not subject to Rome, they shall not bring them into Roman harbours, but if one be brought in and a Roman lay hold of him, he shall be set free. The Romans shall not do likewise. If a Roman gets water or provisions from any place over which the Carthaginians rule, he shall not use these provisions to wrong any member of a people with whom the Carthaginians have peace and friendship. The Carthaginians shall not do likewise. If either do so, the aggrieved person shall not take private vengeance, and if he do, his wrongdoing shall be public. No Roman shall trade or found a city in Sardinia and Libya nor remain in a Sardinian or Libyan post longer than is required for taking in provisions or repairing his ship. If he be driven there by stress of weather, he shall depart within five days. In the Carthaginian province of Sicily and at Carthage he may do and sell anything that is permitted to a citizen. A Carthaginian in Rome may do likewise."

Again in this treaty they lay particular stress on Libya and Sardinia, asserting them to be their own private property and closing all landing-places to the Romans, but of Sicily they distinctly speak contrariwise, mentioning the part of it subject to them. Similarly, the Romans in referring to Latium forbid the Carthaginians to wrong the people of Ardea, Antium, Circeii, and Terracina, the cities that stand

* i.e. claims him as his slave.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

αἱ περιέχουσαι παρὰ θαλατταὶ τὴν Λατινὴν χώραν, ὕπερ ἢς πουοῦνται τὰς συνθήκας.

25 Ἔτει τουγαροῦν τελευταῖας συνθήκας πουοῦνται Ἡρωμαῖοι κατὰ τὴν Πύρρου διάβασιν πρὸς τοὺς συστήσασθαι τοὺς Καρχηδόνιοι τὸν περὶ Σικελίας πόλεος ἐν αἴσ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τηροῦσι πάντα κατὰ τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ὁμολογίας, πρὸσκειται δὲ τοῦτος τὰ ὑπογεγραμμένα. "ἐὰν συμμαχίαν πουοῦνται πρὸς Πύρρουν, ἐγγραπτον ποιεῖσθωσαν ἀμφότεροι, ὅπως ἐξή βοηθεῖν ἄλληλοις ἐν τῇ τῶν πολεμουμένων χώρᾳ. ὅποτε δὲ ἂν χρείαν ἔχωσιν τῆς βοηθείας, τὰ πλοῖα παρεχέτωσαν Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ εἰς τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἑφοδον, τὰ δὲ ὁμόνωμα τοῖς αὐτῶν ἐκάτεροι. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ καὶ κατὰ θαλάτταν Ἡρωμαῖος βοηθεῖτος, ἄν χρεία ἢ. τὰ δὲ πληρώματα μηδεις ἀναγκαζότω ἐκβαίνειν ἀκούσωσιν.

6 Τὸν δὲ ὅρκον ὁμνύει ἐδει τοιοῦτον, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πρῶτων συνθηκῶν Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς πατρίως, Ἡρωμαῖοι δὲ Δία λίθον κατὰ τι παλαιὸν ἔθος, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων τὸν Ἀρην 7 καὶ τὸν Ἐμνάλιον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ Δία λίθον τοιοῦτον λαβὼν εἰς τὴν χειρὰ λίθον ὁ ποιούμενος τὰ ὅρκια περὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν, ἐπειδὰν ὁμόθυμος δημοσία πίστευε, 8 λέγει τάδε: εὐορκοῦντι μὲν μοι εἰτή τάγαθα: εἰ δὲ ἄλλως διανοθείην τι ἡ πράξειμι, πάντων τῶν ἄλλων σωζομένων ἐν ταῖς ἴδιαις πατρίσιν, ἐν τοῖς ἴδιοις νόμοις, εἰπὶ τῶν ἴδιων βίων, ἱερῶν, τάφων, 9 ἐγὼ μόνος ἐκπέσοιμι οὖτως ὅσο δὲ λίθος νῦν. καὶ ταῦτα εἰπὼν ῥίππει τῶν λίθων ἐκ τῆς χειρὸς.

26 Τοῦτων δὲ τοιούτων ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ τηρομένων τῶν συνθηκῶν ἐτὶ νῦν ἐν χαλκῷμαισι παρὰ τὸν Δία τὸν Καπετάλλιον ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀγορανόμων
on the coast of that Latin territory with which the treaty is concerned.

25. A further and final treaty with Carthage was made by the Romans at the time of Pyrrhus' invasion before the Carthaginians had begun the war for Sicily. In this they maintain all the previous agreements and add the following: "If they make an alliance with Pyrrhus, both shall make it an express condition that they may go to the help of each other in whichever country is attacked. No matter which require help, the Carthaginians are to provide the ships for transport and hostilities, but each country shall provide the pay for its own men. The Carthaginians, if necessary, shall come to the help of the Romans by sea too, but no one shall compel the crews to land against their will."

The oaths they had to swear were as follows. In the case of the first treaty the Carthaginians swore by their ancestral gods and the Romans, following an old custom, by Jupiter Lapis, and in the case of this latter treaty by Mars and Quirinus. The oath by Jupiter Lapis is as follows. The man who is swearing to the treaty takes in his hand a stone, and when he has sworn in the name of the state, he says, "If I abide by this my oath may all good be mine, but if I do otherwise in thought or act, let all other men dwell safe in their own countries under their own laws and in possession of their own substance, temples, and tombs, and may I alone be cast forth, even as this stone," and so saying he throws the stone from his hand.

26. The treaties being such, and preserved as they are on bronze tablets beside the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus in the treasury of the Quaestors, who
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

2 ταμείων, τίς ούκ ἂν εἰκότως θαυμάσεις Φιλίνου τοῦ συγγραφέως, οὔ διότι ταῦτ’ ἡγνόει τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὔ θαυμαστόν, ἐπεὶ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἔτι καὶ Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδόνιων οἱ προσβύτατοι καὶ μάλιστα δο-3·κόντες περὶ τὰ κοινὰ σπουδάζειν ἡγνώσασθαι. ἀλλὰ πόθεν ή ἡ πώς ἐθάρρησε γράψαι τάναντία τούτοις, διότι Ῥωμαίοι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι ὑπάρχοιες συν-θήκας, καθ’ ὰς ἔδει Ῥωμαίους μὲν ἀπέχεσθαι Σι-4·κελίας ἀπάσης, Καρχηδόνιους δ’ Ἰταλίας, καὶ διότι ὑπέρβανον Ῥωμαίοι τὰς συνθήκας καὶ τοὺς ὄρκους, ἐπεὶ ἐποιήσαντο τὴν πρώτην εἰς Σικελίαν διάβασιν, μήτε γεγονότος μὴ τ’ ὑπάρχοντος παράπαν ἐγγράφοι 5·τοιοῦτον μηδενός. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ λέγει θβήλω διαρρήκθην. περὶ ἂν ἡμείς ἐν τῇ παρακεφή 7·τῆς ἰδίας πραγματείας μνησθέντες, εἰς τούτον ὑπερ- ἐθέμεθα τὸν καίρον κατὰ μέρος περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξερ- γάσασθαι διὰ τὸ καὶ πλείους διεφεύρθαι τῆς ἀλη- θείας ἐν τούτοις, πιστεύσαντας τῇ Φιλίνου γραφῇ.

6 οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ εἰ κατὰ τοῦτο τις ἐπιλαμβάνεται Ῥω- μαίων περὶ τῆς εἰς Σικελίαν διαβάσεως, ὡς καθό- λου Μαμερτίνους προσέλαβοι εἰς τὴν φιλίαν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα δεομένοις ἐβοήθησαν, οὗτως οὐ μόνον τὴν Μεσσηνίων πόλιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν Ῥηγίνων παρεπόνθησαν, εἰκότως ἂν δόξηε δυσαρεστεῖν.

7 εἰ δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ὄρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας ὑπολαμ- βάνει τις αὐτοὺς πεποιήσασθαι τὴν διάβασιν, ἀγνοεῖ προφανῶς.

27 Συντελεσθέντος τοῖνυν τοῦ περὶ Σικελίας πολέ- μου ποιοῦνται συνθήκας ἀλλας, ἐν αἰς τὰ συνέχοντα 2·τῶν ἐγγράπτων ἢν ταῦτα. ‘‘ἐκχωρεῖν Καρχηδόνιους < καὶ Σικελίας ἀπάσης καὶ > τῶν νῆσων ἀπασών τῶν 3·κειμένων ἤταλίας μεταξὴ καὶ Σικελίας. τὴν ἀσφά-
can fail to be surprised at Philinus the historian, not indeed for his ignorance of them, for that is by no means surprising, since still in my time, the most aged among the Romans and Carthaginians and those best versed in public affairs were ignorant of them; but how did he venture and on what authority to state just the opposite, to wit that there was a treaty between Rome and Carthage by which the Romans were obliged to keep away from the whole of Sicily and the Carthaginians from the whole of Italy, and that the Romans broke the treaty and their oath by their first crossing to Sicily? There is, as a fact, no such document at all, nor ever was there; yet in his Second Book he states this in so many words. I mentioned the subject in the introductory part of this work, but deferred until the present occasion the detailed treatment it deserves, in view of the fact that many people, relying on Philinus’ work, have false notions on the subject. True, if as regards the crossing of the Romans to Sicily anyone chooses to blame them for having ever consented to receive into their friendship and afterwards to help those Mamertines who seized treacherously not only Messene but Rhegium, he would have good reason for his disapproval, but if he supposes that they crossed contrary to treaty and to their oath he is obviously ignorant of the true facts.

27. At the close of the war for Sicily, then, they made another treaty, the clauses of which run as follows: “The Carthaginians are to evacuate the whole of Sicily and all the islands between Italy and Sicily. The allies of both parties are to be

241 B.C.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

λειαν ὑπάρχειν παρ’ ἐκατέρων τοῖς ἐκατέρων συμμάχωσις. μηδετέρως ἐν ταῖς ἀλλήλων ἐπαρχίας μηδὲν ἐπιτάττειν μηδ᾽ οἰκοδομεῖν δημοσία μηδὲν ἐξενολογεῖν μηδὲ προσλαμβάνειν εἰς φιλίαν τοὺς ἀλλήλων συμμάχους. ἐξενεγκεῖν Καρχηδονίους ἐν ἐτεσί δέκα δισχίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντα, παραντικα δὲ δοῦναι χίλια. τοὺς αἱχμαλώτους χωρίς λύτρων ἀποδοῦναι πάντας Καρχηδονίους τοῖς Ἐρωμαίοις.”


28 Ἡσσέρ αὖν τὴν εἰς Ἀκελιᾶν διάβασιν Ἐρωμαίων οὐ παρὰ τοὺς δόκους εὐρίσκομεν γεγενημένην, οὕτως ὑπὲρ τοῦ δευτέρου πολέμου, καθ᾽ ὑπὸ ἐποίησαν τὸς Σαρδώνως συνθήκησα, οὕτε πρόφασιν 2 οὕτε αὐτῶς εὐρί τις ἂν εὐλογοῦν, ἀλλ᾽ ὀμολογούμενως τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἡγαγκασμένους παρὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια διὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐκχωρήσας μὲν Σαρδώνως, ἐξενεγκεῖν δὲ τὸ προειρημένον πλῆθος τῶν 3 χρημάτων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ Ἐρωμαίων περὶ τοὺτων λεγόμενον ἔγκλημα, διὸτι τοὺς παρὰ σφῶν πλοιοκτημένους ἡδίκουν κατὰ τὸν Διβυκόν πόλεμον, ἐλυθῆ καθ᾽ οὐς καίρους κομμασάμενοι παρὰ Καρχηδονίων ἀπαντᾷ τοὺς κατηγομένους ἀντιδιώρησαντο χωρίς 64
secure from attack by the other. Neither party is entitled to impose any contribution to construct public buildings, or to enrol soldiers, in the dominions of the other, nor to form alliances with the allies of the other. The Carthaginians are to pay twelve hundred talents within ten years, and a sum of a thousand talents at once. The Carthaginians are to give up to the Romans all prisoners free of ransom.” Later, at the end of the Libyan War, after the Romans had actually passed a decree declaring war on Carthage, they added the following clause, as I stated above: “The Carthaginians are to evacuate Sardinia and pay a further sum of twelve hundred talents.” The very last of this series of agreements is that made with Hasdrubal in Spain, that “The Carthaginians are not to cross the Ebro in arms.” Such is the diplomatic history of the relations between Rome and Carthage up to the time of Hannibal.

28. While therefore we find that the crossing of the Romans to Sicily was not contrary to treaty, for the second war, that in which they made the treaty about Sardinia, it is impossible to discover any reasonable pretext or cause. In this case everyone would agree that the Carthaginians, contrary to all justice, and merely because the occasion permitted it, were forced to evacuate Sardinia and pay the additional sum I mentioned. For from the charge brought by the Romans against them in justification of this, that in the Libyan war they inflicted wrongs on the crews of ships sailing from Rome, they had freed them on the occasion when they had received back from them all their sailors who had been brought into Carthage and in return gave back
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

λύτρων ἐν χάρι τοὺς παρὰ σφίσιν ὑπάρχοντας 4 αἰχμαλώτους. ὑπέρ ὧν ἦμεις τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἐν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης βύβλω δεδηλώκαμεν.

5 Τούτων δὴ τοιούτων ὑπαρχόντων, λοιπὸν διευκρι- νήσαι καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ τοῦ κατ’ Ἀννίβαν πολέμου ποτέ όροις αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναθετέον.

29 Τὰ μὲν οὖν ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων τὸτε ῥηθέντα δεδηλώκαμεν, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων λεγόμενα νῦν ἔροιμε· οἷς τότε μὲν οὐκ ἔχρησαντο διὰ τὸν ἑπὶ τῇ Ζακανθαίων ἀπωλεία θυμόν· λέγεται δὲ πολ- 2 λάκις καὶ ὑπὸ πολλῶν παρ’ αὐτῶς· πρῶτον μὲν ὁτι τὸς πρὸς Ἀσδρούβαν γενομένας ὁμολογίας οὐκ ἀθετητέον, καθάπερ οἱ Καρχηδόνοι λέγεω ἐθάρρου- οὐ γὰρ προσέκειτο, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ Λυτατίου, 3 "κυρίας εἶναι ταύτας, ἐὰν καὶ τῷ δῆμῳ δόξῃ τῶν Ῥωμαίων." ἀλλ’ αὐτοτελῶς ἐποιήσατο τὰς ὁμο- λογίας Ἀσδρούβας, ἐν αἷς ἦν, "τὸν Ἰβηρα ποταμὸν 4 μὴ διαβαίνεων ἐπὶ πολέμῳ Καρχηδόνοις." καὶ μὴν ἐν ταῖς περὶ Σικελίας συνθήκαις ἦν ἔγγραπτόν, καθα- περ κακεῖνοι φασών, "ὑπάρχειν τοὺς ἀμφοτέρων συμ- μάχως τὴν παρ’ ἐκατέρων ἀσφάλειαν," οὐκ αὐτοὶς 5 μόνον τὸς τότε συμμαχοῦσι, καθάπερ ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἐκδοχὴν ὁι Καρχηδόνοι· προσέκειτο γὰρ ἀν ἦτοι τὸ μὴ προσλαμβάνειν ἐτέρων συμμάχως παρὰ τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας ἢ τὸ μὴ παραλαμβάνεσθαι τοὺς ὑστε- 6 ρον προσληφθέντας τούτων τῶν συνθηκῶν. οτὲ δὲ τούτων οὐδέτερον ἔγραφη, προφανὲς ἦν ὅτι πάσι 66
all their own prisoners as an act of grace and without ransom. Of this I have spoken at length in my previous Book.

Having established these facts it remains for us to consider, after thorough investigation, to which of the two states we should attribute the cause of the Hannibalic war.

29. I have already stated what the Carthaginians alleged, and will now give the reply of the Romans—a reply indeed which they did not make at the time owing to their indignation at the loss of Saguntum, but it has been given on many occasions and by many different people at Rome. In the first place they contend that the treaty with Hasdrubal should not be ignored, as the Carthaginians had the audacity to say; for there was no conditioning clause at the end as in the treaty made by Lutatius: “This treaty shall be valid if the Roman people also agree to it,” but Hasdrubal finally and unconditionally made the agreement in which was the clause, “The Carthaginians shall not cross the Ebro in arms.” Again, in the treaty about Sicily there was, as the Carthaginians admit, the clause: “The allies of either party are to be secure from attack by the other,” and this does not mean “those who were allies at that time,” as the Carthaginians interpret it; for in that case there would have been a further clause to the effect either that neither party should enter into other alliances than their existing ones or that those subsequently received into alliance should not be admitted to the benefits of the treaty. But since neither of these clauses was appended, it is evident that each party undertook that all allies of the other, both those then existing and those sub-
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

μετὰ ταύτα προσληψησομένους, τὴν παρ’ ἀμφοῖν
7 ἀσφάλειαν ἀεὶ δέον ἦν ὑπάρχειν. δ’ δὴ καὶ πάντως
ἂν εἰκὸς εἶναι δόξειν. οὐ γὰρ δὴπον τοιαύτας ἐξελ-
λον ποιησθεῖαι συνθήκας δι’ ἂν ἀφελοῦνται τὴν
ἐξουσίαν σφῶν αὐτῶν τοῦ προσλαμβάνειν κατὰ και-
ροῖς, ἂν τινες ἐπιτήδειοι φανώσῳ αὐτοῖς φίλοι καὶ
8 σύμμαχοι, οὐδὲ μὴν προσλαβόντες εἰς τὴν σφετέραν
πίστιν περιώσθεσθαι τούτους ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀδικουμε-
νους· ἀλλ’ ἣν ἀμφοτέρων τὸ συνέχον τῆς ἐννοίας
τῆς ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις τῶν μὲν ὑπαρχόντων ἀμφο-
τέρως τότε συμμάχων ἀφέξεσθαι καὶ κατὰ μηδένα
τρόπον τοὺς ἐτέρους παρὰ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐπιδεξεσθαί
10 τινας τούτων εἰς συμμαχίαν, περὶ δὲ τῶν μετὰ ταύτα
προσληψησομένων αὐτὸ τοῦτο μήτε ἐξενολογεῖν
μήτ’ ἐπιτάττειν μηδετέρους, μηδὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀλλήλων
ἐπαρχίαις καὶ συμμαχίαις· ὑπάρχει τε τὴν ἀσφά-
λειαν πάσι τὴν παρ’ ἀμφοῖν.

30 Τούτων δὴ τοιούτων ὑπαρχόντων, ὀμολογούμε-
νον ἦν κάκεινο διότι Ἰακάνθαιοι πλεῖσσιν ἔτεσσιν
7 ἦδη πρότερον τῶν κατ’ Ἀννίβαν καριῶν ἐθεδώκει-
2 σαν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν. σημεῖον
δὲ τοῦτο μέγιστον καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς Καρχηδο-
νίοις ὀμολογούμενον ὅτι στασιάζοντες Ἰακάνθαιοι
πρὸς σφᾶς οὐ Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπέτρεψαν, καίπερ ἐγγὺς
ὀντων αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἠβρείαν ἦδη πράττον-
των, ἀλλ’ Ῥωμαίοι, καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐποίησαντο
3 τὴν κατόρθωσιν τῆς πολιτείας. διὸτερ εἰ μὲν τις
τὴν Ἰακάνθης ἀπώλειαν αἰτίαν τίθησι τοῦ πολέμου,
συγχωρητέον ἀδίκως ἐξενησχέον τὸν πόλεμον Καρ-
χηδόνιοι κατὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ Ῥωμαίων συνθήκας,
καθ’ ἃς ἔδει τοῖς ἐκατέρων συμμάχων τὴν ὕφ’ ἐκα-
sequently admitted to alliance, should be secure from attack. This indeed seems a quite reasonable view; for surely they would never have made a treaty by which they deprived themselves of the freedom to admit into alliance from time to time any peoples whose friendship seemed to be of advantage to them, nor, having taken such under their protection, was it to be supposed that they would ignore injuries done to them by certain people. But the chief meaning of the treaty to both parties when they made it was, that they would each leave unmolested the existing allies of the other and in no way admit any of those into their own alliance, whereas, regarding subsequent alliances, to which this clause particularly applies, they undertook not to enlist soldiers or levy contributions in the provinces of each or in countries allied to each, and that all allies of each in general should be secure from attack by the other.

30. This being so, it is an acknowledged fact that the Saguntines, a good many years before the time of Hannibal, placed themselves under the protection of Rome. The surest proof of this, and one accepted by the Carthaginians themselves, is that when a civil disturbance broke out at Saguntum they did not call in the mediation of the Carthaginians, although they were close at hand and already concerning themselves with Spanish matters, but that of the Romans, and with their help set right the affairs of the state. Therefore, if we take the destruction of Saguntum to be the cause of the war we must allow that the Carthaginians were in the wrong in beginning the war, both in view of the treaty of Lutatius, in which it was stipulated that the allies
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

térwv ὑπάρχειν ἀσφάλειαν, κατά τε τὰς ἔπει' Ἀσ-
дрουβοῦ, καθ' ἃς οὖκ ἔδει διαβαίνειν τὸν Ἰβηρα-
4 ποταμὸν ἐπὶ πολέμῳ Καρχηδονίους· εἰ δὲ τὴν Σαρ-
δόνος ἀφαίρεσιν καὶ τὰ σὺν ταύτῃ χρήματα, πάν-
tως διμολογητέον εὐλόγως πεπολεμηκέναι τὸν κατ'
Ἀννίβαν πόλεμον τοὺς Καρχηδονίους· καιρῷ γὰρ
πεισθέντες ἦμυνοντο σὺν καιρῷ τοὺς βλάψαντας.
31 Ἔνοι δὲ τῶν ἀκρίτως τὰ τοιαύτα θεωμένων τάχ'
ἀν φήσαιεν ἡμᾶς οὖκ ἀναγκαῖος ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐξακρί-
2 βοῦν τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων λόγους. ἐγὼ δ', εἰ
μὲν τις ὑπείληφε πρὸς πάσαν περίστασιν αὐτάρκης
ὑπάρχειν, καλὴν μὲν, οὖκ ἀναγκαίαν δ' ἵσως φή-
σαιμ' ἄν εἶναι τὴν τῶν προγεγονότων ἐπιστήμην·
3 εἰ δὲ μηδείς ἂν μήτε περὶ τῶν κατ' ἱδίαν μήτε περὶ
τῶν κοινῶν τολμήσαι τοῦτ' εἰπεῖν ἄνθρωπος ὦν, διὰ
tό, κἂν κατὰ τὸ παρόν εὐτυχῆ, τὴν γε περὶ τοῦ
μέλλοντος ἐλπίδα μηδὲν ἂν ἐκ τῶν νῦν παρόντων
εὐλόγως βεβαιώσονθαι μηδένα τῶν νοῦν ἔχοντων,
4 οὐ μόνον καλὴν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι
φημὶ διά ταῦτα τὴν τῶν παρεληλυθότων ἐπίγνωσιν.
5 πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἰτ' αὐτὸς ἀδικούμενος τις ἢ τῆς πατρί-
dos ἀδικουμένης βοηθοῦσ εὑροὶ καὶ συμμάχους, εἴτε
κτήσασθαι τι καὶ προκατάρξασθαι σπουδάζων τοὺς
συνεργήσοντας αὐτῷ παρορμήσαι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιβολὰς;
6 πῶς δ' ἂν εὐδοκούμενος τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις τοὺς
βεβαιώσοντας τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν καὶ διαφυλά-
ξοντας τὴν κατάστασιν παροξύναι δικαίως, εἰ μηδὲν
εἰδείη τῆς τῶν προγεγονότων περὶ ἐκάστους ὑπομνή-
70
BOOK III. 30. 3 – 31. 6

of each should be secure from attack by the other, and in view of the convention made with Hasdrubal, by which the Carthaginians undertook not to cross the Ebro in arms. If, however, we take the cause of the war to have been the robbery of Sardinia and the tribute then exacted, we must certainly confess that they had good reason for entering on the Hannibalie war, since having yielded only to circumstances, they now availed themselves of circumstances to be avenged on those who had injured them.

31. It might be said by some of these who look on such things without discernment, that these are matters which it was not necessary for me to treat in such detail. My answer is, that if there were any man who considered that he had sufficient force in himself to face any circumstances, I should say perhaps that knowledge of the past was good for him, but not necessary; but if there is no one in this world at least who would venture to speak so of himself either as regards his private fortunes or those of his country—since, even if all is well with him now no man of sense could from his present circumstances have any reasonable confidence that he will be prosperous in the future—I affirm for this reason that such knowledge is not only good but in the highest degree necessary. For how can anyone when wronged himself or when his country is wronged find helpmates and allies; how can he, when desirous of acquiring some possession or initiating some project, stir to action those whose co-operation he wishes; how, finally, if he is content with present conditions, can he rightly stimulate others to establish his own convictions and maintain things as they are, if he knows nothing at all of the
ΤΑ ΗΣΤΟΡΙΑΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

7 σεως; πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ παρὸν ἀεὶ τῶς ἀρμοζόμενοι καὶ συνυποκρινόμενοι τοιαῦτα καὶ λέγοντες καὶ πράττοντες πάντες ὡστε δυσθεώρητον εἶναι τὴν ἐκάστου προαιρέσει καὶ λῖαν ἐν πολλοῖς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι τὴν
8 ἀλήθειαν. τὰ δὲ παρελθόντα τῶν ἔργων, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων λαμβάνοντα τὴν δοκιμασίαν, ἀληθινῶς ἐμφαίνει τὰς ἐκάστων αἴρεσις καὶ διάληψεις, καὶ δηλοὶ παρ’ οἷς μὲν χάριν, εὐεργεσίαν, βοήθειαν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, παρ’ οἷς δὲ τάναντια
tούτων. ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθοντα καὶ τὸν συνοργοῦμεν, ἔτι δὲ τὸν δικαιώσοντα, πολλάκις κατὶ
10 πολλῶν εὑρεῖν ἑστιν. ἀπερ ἔχει μεγίστας ἐπικουρίας καὶ κοινῆ καὶ κατ’ ιδίαν πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βιόν.
11 διότερο όν πριν ὑπὸς ἑστὶν φροντιστέον τῆς αὐτῶν τῶν πράξεων ἡγηγήσεως, ὡστε τοῖς γράφουσιν ὡστε τοῖς ἀναγνώσκοις τὰς ἱστορίας, ὡς τῶν πρῶτον καὶ
12 τῶν ἁμα καὶ τῶν ἐπιγινωμένων τοῖς ἔργοις. ἱστορίας γὰρ ἓναν ἀφέλη τις τὸ διὰ τί καὶ πῶς καὶ τίνος χάριν ἐπράξη τὸ πραχθὲν καὶ πότερον εὐ-
λογον ἑσχὲ τὸ τέλος, τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀγώ-
13 νισμα μὲν, μάθημα δ’ οὗ γίνεται, καὶ παρατίκα
μὲν τέρτη, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὥφελεῖ τὸ
παράπαν.

32 Ἡ καὶ τοὺς ὑπολαμβάνοντας δύσκτητον εἶναι καὶ δυσανάγνωστον τὴν ἠμετέραν πραγματείαν διὰ τὸ πλήθος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν βύβλων ἀγνοεῖν νο-
2 μιστέον. πῶς γὰρ βαὸν ἐστι καὶ κτήσασθαι καὶ διαναγνώσαι βύβλους τετταράκοντα καθάπερ ἰν ἐν κατὰ μίτον ἐξουσιωδένας, καὶ παρακολουθήσαι σαφῶς ταῖς μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν καὶ Λιβύην
πράξεων ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ Πύρρον [καὶ Τίμαιοι συγ-
γραφέων καὶ καιρῶν ἡγηγήσεως] ἐις τὴν Καρχη-
past history of those he would influence? For all men are given to adapt themselves to the present and assume a character suited to the times, so that from their words and actions it is difficult to judge of the principles of each, and in many cases the truth is quite overcast. But men’s past actions, bringing to bear the test of actual fact, indicate truly the principles and opinions of each, and show us where we may look for gratitude, kindness, and help, and where for the reverse. It is by this means that we shall often and in many circumstances find those who will compassionately our distresses, who will share our anger or join us in being avenged on our enemies, all which is most helpful to life both in public and in private. Therefore both writers and readers of history should not pay so much attention to the actual narrative of events, as to what precedes, what accompanies, and what follows each. For if we take from history the discussion of why, how, and wherefore each thing was done, and whether the result was what we should have reasonably expected, what is left is a clever essay but not a lesson, and while pleasing for the moment of no possible benefit for the future.

32. For this reason I must pronounce those to be much mistaken who think that this my work is difficult to acquire and difficult to read owing to the number and length of the Books it contains. How much easier it is to acquire and peruse forty Books, all as it were connected by one thread, and thus to follow clearly events in Italy, Sicily, and Libya from the time of Pyrrhus to the capture of Carthage, and
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

3 δόνος ἀλωσιν, ταῖς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην οἰκουμένην ἀπὸ τῆς Κλεομένους τοῦ Σπαρτιάτου φυγῆς κατὰ τὸ συνεχεῖς μέχρι τῆς Ἀχαιῶν καὶ Ῥωμαίων περὶ τὸν Ἰσθμοῦ παρατάξεως, ἡ τὰς τῶν κατὰ μέρος γραφόντων συντάξεις ἀναγνώσκειν ἡ κτάσθαι;

4 χωρίς γὰρ τοῦ πολλαπλασίου αὐτὰς ὑπάρχειν τῶν ἠμετέρων ὑπομνημάτων οὐδὲ καταλαβεῖν ἐξ αὐτῶν βεβαιῶς οὐδὲν οἶνον τε τοὺς ἀναγνώσκοντας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὸ τοὺς πλείστους μὴ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν γράφειν, εἶτα διὰ τὸ τὰς καταλήλους τῶν πράξεων παραλεῖπεν, ὅν ἐκ παραθέσεως συνθεωρούμενων καὶ συγκρινομένων ἀλλοιωτέρας ἐκαστα τυχχάινει δοκιμασίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος διαλήψεως, τῶν δὲ κυριωτάτων μηδὲ ἤσαείν αὐτοὺς δύνασθαι τὸ παράπαν.

5 ἀκμὴν γὰρ φαμεν ἀναγκαιότατα μέρη τῆς ἱστορίας εἶναι τὰ τ’ ἐπιγνώμενα τοὺς ἔργους καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα καὶ μάλιστα τὰ περὶ τὰς αἰτίας. θεωροῦμεν δὲ τὸν μὲν Ὀντωχικὸν πόλεμον ἐκ τοῦ Φιλιππικοῦ τὰς ἀφομᾶς εἰληφότα, τὸν δὲ Φιλιππικὸν ἐκ τοῦ κατ’ Ἀννίβαν, τὸν δὲ Ἀννίβιακὸν ἐκ τοῦ περὶ Σικέλιαν, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας ἐσχηκότα διαθέσεις, πάσας δὲ συνε

6 νευσόμες πρὸς τὴν ἀυτὴν ὑπόθεσιν. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ μὲν τῶν γραφόντων καθὸλου δυνατὸν ἐπιγνώναι καὶ μαθεῖν, διὰ δὲ τῶν τοὺς πολέμους αὐτούς, οἶνον τὸν Περσικὸν ἢ τὸν Φιλιππικόν, ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰς παρατάξεις τις ἀναγνώσκων αὐτὰς ἐξ ὧν ἐκεῖνοι γράφουσιν ὑπολαμβάνει σαφῶς ἐπεγνώκειν καὶ τὴν τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ σύμπαντος οἰκονομίαν καὶ διάθεσιν. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι τούτων οὐδὲν, ἀλλ’ ὅσω διαφέρει τὸ μαθεῖν τοῦ μόνον
those in the rest of the world from the flight of Cleomenes of Sparta on till the battle of the Romans and Achaeans at the Isthmus, than to read or procure the works of those who treat of particular transactions. Apart from their being many times as long as my history, readers cannot gather anything with certainty from them, firstly because most of them give different accounts of the same matter, and next because they omit those contemporary events by a comparative review and estimation of which we can assign its true value to everything much more surely than by judging from particulars; and, finally, because it is out of their power even to touch on what is most essential. For I maintain that far the most essential part of history is the consideration of the remote or immediate consequences of events and especially that of causes. Thus I regard the war with Antiochus as deriving its origin from that with Philip, the latter as resulting from that with Hannibal, and the Hannibalic war as a consequence of that about Sicily, the intermediate events, however many and various their character, all tending to the same purpose. All this can be recognized and understood from a general history, but not at all from the historians of the wars themselves, such as the war with Perseus or that with Philip, unless indeed anyone reading their descriptions of the battles alone conceives that he has acquired an adequate knowledge of the management and nature of the whole war. This, however, is not at all so, and I consider that my history differs to its ad-
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἀκούσαι, τοσούτω καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἱστορίαν ὑπο-
λαμβάνω διαφέρειν τῶν ἔπι μέρους συντάξεων.

33 Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρέσβεις, τὴν γὰρ
παρέκβασιν ἀντεθεῖσαν ἐποιησάμεθα, διακούσασαν τὰ
2 παρὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ἐλπίζαν, δὲ
πρεσβύτατος αὐτῶν δείξασα τοὺς ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ
τὸν κόλπον, ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοῖς ἔφη
καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην φέρειν· ἐκβαλὼν οὖν, ὁπότερον ἂν
3 κελεύσωσον ἀπολείψεως. δὲ ἐβασιλεύσας τῶν Καρ-
χηδονίων, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖς φαινεῖται, τούτοις ἐκβα-
4 λεῖν ἐκέλευσε. τοῦ δὲ Ῥωμαίου φύσαντος τὸν πό-
λεμον ἐκβαλεῖν, ἀνεφώνησαν ἁμα καὶ πλείους τῶν
ἐκ τοῦ συνεδρίου, δέχεσθαι φάσκοντες. οἱ μὲν οὖν
πρέσβεις καὶ τὸ συνέδριον ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐχωρίσθησαν.

5 Ἀννίβας δὲ, παραχειμάζων ἐν Καυκῆ πόλει, προ-
τῶν μὲν διαφῆκε τοὺς Ἰβηραὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ἐαυτῶν πόλεις,
βουλόμενος ἐτούμοις καὶ προθύμους παρασκευάζειν
6 πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, δεύτερον δὲ Ἀσδρουῆς τάδειλῳ
diēτάξει πῶς δεῖσθη τῇ τῶν Ἰβηρῶν ἄρχῃ καὶ δυ-
ναστείᾳ χρησάμενα ταῖς τε πρὸς Ῥωμαίοις παρα-
7 σκεύαις, εἰς αὐτὸς χωρίζῃται ποιοῦ, τρίτον ὑπὲρ τῆς
ἀσφαλείας τῶν ἐν Διβύη προνοεῖστο προγμάτων.
8 πάντων δ᾽ ἐμπείρων καὶ φρονίμως ἐκλογιζόμενος, ἔκ
μὲν Διβύης εἰς Ἰβηρίαν, ἕκ δὲ Ἰβηρίας εἰς Διβύην
dieβιβάζει στρατιώτας, ἐκδοκούμων τὴν ἐκατέρων πτι-
9 σιν εἰς ἄλληλους διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης οἰκονομίας. ἦσαν
δὲ οἱ διαβάντες εἰς τὴν Διβύην Θερσίται, Μαστι-
10 νοῦς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ὀρῆτας Ἰβηρεῖς, Ὀλκάδες, οἱ
dὲ συμπάντες ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν ἐθνῶν ἱππεῖς μὲν
χίλιοι διακόσιοι, πεζοὶ δὲ μύριοι τρισχίλιοι ὀκτα-
11 κόσιοι πεντήκοντα, πρὸς δὲ τούτους Βαλαιρεῖς ὀκτα-
κόσιοι ἐβδομήκοντα. οὐς κυρίως μὲν καλοῦσι σφεν-
vantage as much from the works on particular episodes as learning does from listening.

33. I interrupted my narrative to enter on this digression at the point where the Roman ambassadors were at Carthage. After listening to the Carthaginians’ statement of their case, they made no other reply but the following. The oldest member of the embassy, pointing to the bosom of his toga, told the Senate that it held both war and peace for them: therefore he would let fall from it and leave with them whichever of the two they bade him. The Carthaginian Suffete bade him let fall whichever the Romans chose, and when the envoy said he would let fall war, many of the senators cried out at once, “We accept it.” The ambassadors and the Senate parted on these terms.

Hannibal, who was wintering in New Carthage, in the first place dismissed the Iberians to their own cities hoping thus to make them readily disposed to help in the future; next he instructed his brother Hasdrubal how to manage the government of Spain and prepare to resist the Romans if he himself happened to be absent; in the third place he took precautions for the security of Africa, adopting the very sensible and wise policy of sending soldiers from Africa to Spain, and vice versa. Binding by this measure the two provinces to reciprocal loyalty. The troops who crossed to Africa were supplied by the Thersitae, Mastiani, Iberian Oretes and Olcades, and numbered twelve hundred horse and thirteen thousand eight hundred and fifty foot, besides which there were eight hundred and seventy Balearians, a popular appellation, derived from ballein, “to throw,” and
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

donëtas, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς χρείας ταύτης συνωνύμως καὶ τὸ ἔθνος αὐτῶν προσαγορεύουσι καὶ τὴν νῆσον.
12 τῶν δὲ προσεχμένων τοὺς μὲν πλείους εἰς τὰ Ἑπτάγωνα τῆς Λιβνίας, τινὰς δ' εἰς αὐτὴν Καρχηδόνα
13 κατέταξεν. ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πόλεων τῶν Ἑπτάγων τῶν καλομένων ἀπέστειλεν ἄλλους εἰς Καρχηδόνα περι-
ζοὺς τετρακισχίλιους, ὁμηρείας ἔχοντας καὶ βοηθείας ἄμα ταξίν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Ἰβηρίας ἀπέλυσεν
Ἀσδροῦβα τάδελφῷ πεντήρεις μὲν πεντήκοντα, τε-
τρήρεις δὲ δύο καὶ τριήρεις πέντε. τούτων ἔχουσας
πληρώματα πεντήρεις μὲν τριάκοντα δύο, τριήρεις
15 δὲ πέντε. καὶ μήν ἰππεῖς Λιβυφούκτων μὲν καὶ
Λιβύων τετρακόσιοι πεντήκοντα, Λεγέρτων δὲ
τριακόσιοι, Νομάδων δὲ Μασυλίων καὶ Ἡσαυρί-
λίων καὶ Μακκοίων καὶ Μαυρουσίων τῶν παρὰ τὸν
16 ὠκεανὸν χιλίου ὀκτακόσιοι, πεζοὺς δὲ Λιβύων
μυρίους χιλίου ὀκτακόσιοι πεντήκοντα, Δυναστι-
νοὺς τριακόσιοι, Βαλιαρέως πεντακόσιοι, ἐλέφαν-
τας εἰκόσι καὶ ἕνα.

17 Οὐ χρὴ δὲ θαυμάζειν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τῆς ἀνα-
γραφῆς, εἰ τοιαύτῃ κεχρήμεθα περὶ τῶν ὑπ’ Ἀννί-
βου κατ’ Ἰβηρίαν πεπραγμένων οὐ μόλις ἂν
χρησιμοὶ τις αὐτῶς κεχειρικῶς τὰς κατὰ μέρος πρά-
ζεις, οὐδὲ προκαταγωγῶςκειν, εἰ πεποιήκαμεν παρα-
πλήσιον τοῖς ἀξιόπιστοις ψευδομένοις τῶν συγ-
γραφέων. ἢμεῖς γὰρ εὑρόντες ἐπὶ Λακινίῳ τὴν
γραφὴν ταύτην ἐν χαλκῷ ματι κατατεγραμμένην ὑπ’
Ἀννίβου, καθ’ οὐς καίρους ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰτα-
λίαν τόποις ἀνεστρέφοτο, πάντως ἐνομίσαμεν αὐτὴν
περὶ γε τῶν τοιούτων ἀξιόπιστον εἶναι· διὸ καὶ κατ-
ακόλουθεῖν εἰλήμεθα τῇ γραφῇ ταύτῃ.

34 Ἀννίβας δὲ πάντα προνοθεῖς περὶ τῆς ἁσφα-
meaning slingers, given to them owing to their skill with this weapon and extended to their nation and islands. He stationed most of these troops at Metagonia in Libya and some in Carthage itself. From the so-called Metagonian towns he sent four thousand foot to Carthage to serve both as a reinforcement and as hostages. In Spain he left with his brother Hasdrubal fifty quinqueremes, two tetraremes, and five triremes, thirty-two of the quinqueremes and all the triremes being fully manned. He also gave him as cavalry Libyo-Phoenicians and Libyans to the number of four hundred and fifty, three hundred Ilergetes and eighteen hundred Numidians drawn from the Masylia, Masaesylia, Maccæi and Maurusi, who dwell by the ocean, and as infantry eleven thousand eight hundred and fifty Libyans, three hundred Ligurians, and five hundred Balearians, as well as twenty-one elephants.

No one need be surprised at the accuracy of the information I give here about Hannibal’s arrangements in Spain, an accuracy which even the actual organizer of the details would have some difficulty in attaining, and I need not be condemned off-hand under the idea that I am acting like those authors who try to make their misstatements plausible. The fact is that I found on the Lacinian promontory a bronze tablet on which Hannibal himself had made out these lists during the time he was in Italy, and thinking this an absolutely first-rate authority, decided to follow the document.

34. Hannibal, after taking all precautions for the
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

λείαις τῶν τε κατὰ Διβύην πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἡβήρᾳ λουθὸν ἐκαραδόκει καὶ προσεδόχετο τοὺς παρὰ τῶν Κελτῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποστελλομένους. 2 σαφῶς γὰρ ἔξητάκει καὶ τὴν ἁρετὴν τῆς ὑπὸ τὰς Ἀλπεῖς καὶ περὶ τὸν Πάδον ποταμὸν χώρας καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν κατοικοῦντων αὐτήν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους τῶν ἀνδρῶν τόλμαν, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον τῆν ὑπάρχουσαν δυσμένειαν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ προγεγονότος πολέμου πρὸς Ρωμαίους, ὑπὲρ οὗ δυῆθομεν ἡμεῖς ἐν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης βύβλῳ χάριν τοῦ συμπεριφέρεσθαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τοὺς νῦν μέλλοντι 4 λέγεσθαι. διότι εἰχετο ταύτης τῆς ἐλπίδος, καὶ πάν ὑπισχνεύτο, διαπεμπόμενος ἐπιμελῶς πρὸς τοὺς δυνάστας τῶν Κελτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τάδε καὶ τοὺς ἐν 5 αὐταῖς ταῖς Ἀλπεῖς ἐνοικοῦντας, μόνως ἄν ὑπολαμβάνων ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ συντησασθαί τὸν πρὸς Ρωμαίους πολέμουν, εἰ δυνθηθεί διαπεράσασ τὰς πρὸ τοῦ δυσχωρίας εἰς τοὺς προερημένους ἀφικέσθαι τόπους καὶ συνεργοῖς καὶ συμμάχους χρησασθαί Κελ- 6 τοῖς εἰς τὴν προκεμένην ἐπιβολὴν. ἀφοκομένων δὲ τῶν ἄγγέλων, καὶ τὴν τε τῶν Κελτῶν βούλησι καὶ προσδοκιάν ἀπαγγελλόντων, τὴν τε τῶν Ἀλπεων ὀρῶν ὑπερβολὴν ἐπίτονον μὲν καὶ δυσχερή λίαν, οὐ μὴν ἀδύνατον εἰναὶ φασκόντων, συνήγε τὰς δυ- νάμεις ἐκ τῆς παραχεμασίας υπὸ τὴν ἐαρινὴν ὃραν. 7 προσπεπτωκότων δὲ προσφάτως αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Καρχηδόνος, ἐπαρθεὶς τῷ θυμῷ καὶ πιστεύων τῇ τῶν πολιτῶν εὐνοία, παρεκάλει τὰς δυνάμεις φανερῶς ἡδι πρὸς τὸν κατὰ Ρωμαίων πόλεμον, 8 ἐμφανίζων μὲν ὡν τρόπον έκδοτον αὐτὸν ἐγχειρή- σανεν αἰτεῖσθαι Ἐρμαίοι καὶ πάντας τοὺς τοῦ στρατοπέδου προεστώτας, ὑποδεικνύων δὲ τὴν τῆς χώ-
safety of Africa and Spain, was anxiously awaiting the arrival of the messengers he expected from the Celts. He had informed himself accurately about the fertility of the land at the foot of the Alps and near the river Po, the denseness of its population, the bravery of the men in war, and above all their hatred of Rome ever since that former war with the Romans which I described in the preceding Book to enable my readers to follow all I am about to narrate. He therefore cherished high hopes of them, and was careful to send messengers with unlimited promises to the Celtic chiefs both on this side of the Alps and in the mountains themselves, thinking that the only means of carrying the war against the Romans into Italy was, after surmounting, if possible, the difficulties of the route, to reach the above country and employ the Celts as co-operators and confederates in his enterprise. When the messengers arrived and reported that the Celts consented and awaited him, at the same time saying that the crossing of the Alps was very toilsome and difficult, but by no means impossible, he drew out his troops from their winter quarters in the early spring. As the news of what had happened in Carthage had just reached him, his spirits were now high, and trusting in the favourable disposition of the citizens, he now called openly on his men to join him in the war against Rome, impressing upon them the demand of the Romans that he and all his principal officers should be given up to them, and pointing out at the same time the wealth of the country they were
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ρας ἀρετήν, εἰς ἣν ἀφίξονται, καὶ τὴν τῶν Κελτῶν
ἐνων καὶ συμμαχίαν. εὐθύμως δὲ τῶν ὄχλων
ἀυτῶν συνεξισταμένων, ἐπαινέσας καὶ παραγγείλας
τακτὴν ἡμέραν, ἐν ᾧ ποιήσεται τὴν ἔξοδον, τότε μὲν
dιέλυσε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν.

35 Ἐπιτελέσας δὲ τὰ προειρήμενα κατὰ τὴν παρα-
χεμασίαν, καὶ παρασκευάσας ἰκανὴν ἀσφάλειαν τοῖς
tε κατὰ τὴν Αιθύην καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πράγμασι,
παραγενομένης τῆς ταχείας ἡμέρας, προῆγε, πε-
ζῶν μὲν ἔχων εἰς ἐννέα μυρίας, ἵππεῖς δὲ περὶ
2 μυρίους καὶ δισεκατομμύριοι. καὶ διαβάζει τὸν Ἰβηρα πο-
tαμόν κατεστρέφετο τὸ τε τῶν Ἰουργητῶν ἔθνος
καὶ Βαργουσίων, ἐτὶ δὲ τοὺς Αἰρηνοσίους καὶ τοὺς
Ἀνδοσίους, μέχρι τῆς προσαγορευμένης Πυρήνης.

3 ποιησάμενος δὲ πάντας ύψι ἐαυτὸν καὶ τινὰς πό-
λεις κατὰ κράτος ἐλών, ταχέως μὲν καὶ παρ’ ἐλ-
pίδα, μετὰ πολλῶν δὲ καὶ μεγάλων ἀγώνων ἐτὶ δὲ
4 πολλῆς καταφθορᾶς ἀνδρῶν, ἡγεμόνα μὲν ἐπὶ πά-
sης κατέλιπε τῆς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ ποταμοῦ χώρας Ἀν-
νωνα, τῶν δὲ Βαργουσίων καὶ δεσπότην μάλιστα
γὰρ τοῦτος ἦπιστει διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ρωμαίοις εὐ-
5 νοιαν. ἀπεμέρισε δὲ καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ἂς εἰχε τῷ
μὲν Ἀμνών πεζοὺς μυρίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ χιλίους, καὶ
τὰς ἀποσκευὰς ἀπέλυε τοῦτω τῶν αὐτῶς συνεξορ-
6 μῶντων. εἰς δὲ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀπέλυσε τοὺς ἱπποὺς
τοῖς προειρημένοις, βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς τε τούτους
εὐνοὺς ἀπολυτεῖν, τοῖς τε λυποῖς ὑποδεικνύων ἐλ-
pίδα τῆς εἰς οἰκον ἐπανόδου, καὶ τοῖς μεθ’ ἐαυτοῦ
μὲν στρατευμένοις, οὐκ ἔτον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν ὦκῳ
μένους τῶν Ἰβηρῶν, ἵνα προθύμως ἐξορμῶσαι πάν-
tες, ἄν ποτὲ τις ἐπικουρίας χρεία γένηται παρ’ αὐ-
7 τῶν. τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν στρατιὰν ἀναλαβὼν εὐζωνον,
BOOK III. 34. 8 – 35. 7

bound for and the friendly feelings of the Gauls who would be their allies. When he saw that the soldiers listened gladly and were as eager as himself to be off, he commended their alacrity and after ordering them to be ready on the day fixed for his departure, dismissed the meeting.

35. Having completed the arrangements I mentioned above during the winter and thus assured the security of Africa and Spain, he advanced on the day he had fixed with an army of about ninety thousand foot and twelve thousand horse. Crossing the Ebro, he set about subduing the tribes of the Ilurgetes, Bargusii, Aerenosii, and Andosini as far as the Pyrenees, and having reduced them all and taken some cities by assault, with unexpected rapidity indeed, but after many severe engagements and with great loss, he left Hanno in command of all the country on this side of the river, placing the Bargusii under his absolute rule, as he mistrusted them most, owing to their friendly sentiments toward Rome. He assigned to Hanno out of his own army ten thousand foot and one thousand horse, and he left with him all the heavy baggage of the expeditionary force. He dismissed at the same time an equal number of troops to their homes, with the view of leaving them well disposed to himself and encouraging the hope of a safe return in the rest of the Spaniards, not only those who were serving with him, but those who remained at home, so that if he ever had to call on them for reinforcements, they might all readily respond. With the rest of his force, thus lightened of its impedimenta and
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

πεζοὺς μὲν πεντακισμυρίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ πρὸς ἐννακισχιλίους ἤγε διὰ τῶν Πυρηναίων λεγομένων ὄρων ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Ἡρακλείου καλουμένου ποταμοῦ διάβα-
σιν, ἐχὼν οὖχ οὕτως πολλὴν δύναμιν ὡς χρησίμην καὶ γεγυμνασμένην διαφερόντως ἐκ τῆς συνεχείας τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἀγώνων.

36 Ἰνα δὲ μὴ τῶν τόπων ἀγνοουμένων παντάπασιν ἀσαφῆ γίνεσθαι συμβαίνῃ τὴν διήγησιν, ῥητέον ἃν εἰ ἐπὶ πόθεν ὀρμήσας Ἀννίβας καὶ τίνας καὶ πόσους
dιελθὼν τόπους εἰς ποιὰ μέρη κατῆρε τῆς Ἰταλίας. 2 ῥητέον δ’ οὐκ αὐτάς τὰς ὀνομασίας τῶν τόπων καὶ
pοταμῶν καὶ πόλεων, ὅπερ ἔνοικοι τῶν συγ

gραφέων, ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἑν παντὶ πρὸς γνώσιν
c καὶ σαφήνειαν αὐτοτελές εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ μέρος. οὐ

μαί δ’, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν γνωριζομένων τῶν οὐ μικρά,
megálα δὲ συμβάλλεσθαι πεποίηκε πρὸς ἀνάμνησιν
ή τῶν ὀνομάτων παράθεσις. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγνοομέ

νων εἰς τέλος ὁμοίων ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν ἡ τῶν ὁν

ομάτων ἐξήγησις ταῖς ἀδιανοητοῖς καὶ κρουσματικαῖς

4 λέξεων. τῆς γὰρ διανοίας ἐπ’ οὐδὲν ἀπερειδομένης

οὐδὲ δυναμένης ἑφαρμότετον τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπ’ οὐ

δὲν γνώριμον, ἀνυπότακτος καὶ κωφὴ γίνεθ’ ἢ δι-

5 ήγησις. διόπερ ὑποδεικτέος ἂν εἰ ἐκ τόπος, δι’ οὗ

dynatōn ἔσται περὶ τῶν ἀγνοομένων λέγοντας κατὰ

ποσὸν εἰς ἀληθινὰς καὶ γνωρίμους ἐννοίας ἀγεν

τοὺς ἀκούοντας.

6 Πρώτη μὲν οὖν καὶ μεγίστη γνώσις, ἐτι δὲ κοινὴ

πάσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἡμᾶς
diαρέσει καὶ τάξις, καθ’ ἦν πάντες, ὃν καὶ μικρὸν

ὀφέλος, ἀνατολάς, δύσεις, μεσημβρίαν, ἀρκτον,

7 γνωρίζομεν δευτέρα δὲ, καθ’ ἦν ἐκάστη διαφορά

tῶν προερημένων τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς τόπους ὑποτάτ-
consisting now of fifty thousand foot and about nine thousand horse, he advanced through the Pyrenees towards the crossing of the Rhone, having now an army not so strong in number as serviceable and highly trained owing to the unbroken series of wars in Spain.

36. That my narrative may not be altogether obscure to readers owing to their ignorance of the topography I must explain whence Hannibal started, what countries he traversed, and into what part of Italy he descended. Nor must I simply give the names of countries, rivers, and cities, as some authors do under the idea that this is amply sufficient for a clear knowledge. I am of opinion that as regards known countries the mention of names is of no small assistance in recalling them to our memory, but in the case of unknown lands such citation of names is just of as much value as if they were unintelligible and inarticulate sounds. For the mind here has nothing to lean upon for support and cannot connect the words with anything known to it, so that the narrative is associated with nothing in the readers’ mind, and therefore meaningless to him. We must therefore light upon and indicate a method which will make it possible when speaking of unknown places to convey to the reader a more or less real and familiar notion of them.

Now the primary and most general conception and one common to all mankind is the division and ordering of the heavens by which all of us, even those of the meanest capacity, distinguish East, West, South, and North. The next step in knowledge is to classify the parts of the earth under each of these divisions,

\(^a\) Cf. Bk. v. 21. 4.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tontes kai fèrontes òeì tì diavolía tò leugómènon èpì tì tòv πroeiρmhènōv eis gynwrimous kai syn-
ήtheis épynoiáas émpípttomev úpèr tòv ágnwstwv káv-
37 rátwv tòpòwv. toútwv dé peri tìs òlhes γῆs úpo-
keiménon, àkóλoutron àn eìg tò kai peri tìs kath' 
ήìas oíkoumènìs ìnà tòv autòv lògôn dieloménaus
2 eìs épístasan áganein tous àkouontas. taùthès di-
γrhìmenès eìs tríia mérho kai treís oñomasías, tò mèn
èn méros autòs Ἀσίαν, tò δ' èteron Διβύνην, tò dé
3 trítòn Eúwṓpíh prossagoreúousi. tás dé diaphorás
taùtás àrìzoun ò de Tánavís potamós kai Neíllos
4 kai tò kath' Ἡρακλέous stílias stóma. Neílou mèn
òvn kai Tavanódos metaxú tòv Ἀσίαν keìsathai súμ-
bébhke, píptve ò de tòu peirièxontos ùpò tò metaxú
5 diástìma therwov anatolóvn kai mesàmbria. ò eìg
Διβύνη keìtai mèn metaxú Neílou kai stílów Ἡρα-
kleíwn, tòû ò de peirièxontos pèptukèn ùpò te tòn
mesàmbriai kai kata tò suńexèst ùpò tás cheimé-
nòv dúsèis èwos tòs ísòmeronìs katafòrás, ò píptèi
6 kath' Ἡρακλέous stílias. autìs mèn òvn ai xórai
katholikúteron òwpróimenvai tòn pròs tòn mesà-
briaian tòpòv èpèchnoui tìs kath' òmàs báláttheis àpò
7 tòv anatolóvn òs pròs tàs dúsèis. ò δ' Eúwṓpíh
taútain àmfoóereis òs pròs tòs árktovs àntipará-
keíta, kata tò suńexèst àpò tòv anatolóvn para-
8 ìkousa mèn áxhr pròs tās dúsèis, keìtai δ' autìs
ò mev olóchreòsterev kai baðúteron méros ýnp'
aútás tòs árktovs metaxú tòv te Tavanódos pota-
moù kai tòv Nárbovovs, òs ou polýn ápèche tòpò
òs pròs dúsèis àpò Miasalía kai tòv te Ἄρ-
danovv stòomàtvov, di' ón èis tò Sarðóvovv pélaçov
9 ejììsou ó πroeiρhímenos potamós. àpò dé tòv Nár-
86
ever mentally referring each statement to one of them until we arrive at a familiar conception of unknown and unseen regions. This once established as regards the whole earth, it remains for me to lay before my readers the division on the same principle of that portion of the world known to us. This is divided into three parts, each with its name, the one part being called Asia, the second Africa, and the third Europe. Their respective boundaries are the river Don, the Nile, and the straits at the Pillars of Hercules. Asia lies between the Nile and Don and falls under that portion of the heaven lying between the north-east and the south. Africa lies between the Nile and the Pillars of Hercules, and it falls under the portion of the heaven which extends from the south to the south-west and west, as far as the point of the equinoctial sunset, in which latter quarter are the Pillars of Hercules. These two divisions of the earth, then, regarded from a general point of view, occupy the part of it which lies to the south of the Mediterranean, reaching from east to west. Europe lies opposite to them on the north shore of this sea, extending continuously from east to west, its most compact and deepest portion lying due north between the Don and the Narbo, the latter river being not far to the west of Marseilles and of the mouths by which the Rhone discharges itself into the Sardinian Sea. The Celts inhabit the
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

βωνος καὶ τὰ περὶ τούτων Κελτῶν νέμονται μέχρι τῶν προσαγορευμένων Πυρηναίων ὅρων, ὁ δια-
τείνει κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἀπὸ τῆς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς θαλάτ-
της ἐως εἰς τὴν ἐκτός. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν μέρος τῆς
Εὐρώπης ἀπὸ τῶν προσειρημένων ὅρων τὸ συνάπτον
πρὸς τε τὰς δύσεις καὶ πρὸς Ἡρακλείους στήλας
περιέχεται μὲν ὑπὸ τε τῆς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς καὶ τῆς ἐξω
θαλάττης, καλεῖται δὲ τοῦ μὲν παρὰ τὴν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς
παρῆκον ἐως Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν Ἰβηρία, τὸ δὲ
παρὰ τὴν ἐξω καὶ μεγάλης προσαγορευμένης κοινῆς
μὲν ὄνομασίαν οὐκ ἔχει διὰ τὸ προσφάτως κατωπτεύ-
σθαι, κατοικεῖται δὲ πάν ὑπὸ βαρβάρων ἐθνῶν καὶ
πολυανθρώπων, ὑπὲρ ὃν ἡμεῖς μετὰ ταῦτα τόν
κατὰ μέρος λόγων ἀποδώσομεν. καθάπερ δὲ καὶ τῆς
Ἀσίας καὶ τῆς Αἰβύης, καθὸ συνάπτοσιν ἀλλήλαις
περὶ τὴν Αἰθιοίαν, οὐδεὶς ἔχει λέγειν ἀτρεκῶς ἐώς
tῶν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς καιρῶν πότερον ἡπειρός ἐστὶ κατὰ
tὸ συνεχές τὰ πρὸς τὴν μεσημβρίαν ἡ θαλάττη περι-
2 ἐχεται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τὸ μεταξὺ Τανάῖδος καὶ
Νάρβωνος εἰς τὰς ἁρκτοὺς ἄνηκον ἄγνωστον ἡμῖν
ἐως τοῦ νῦν ἐστιν, ἐὰν μὴ τι μετὰ ταῦτα πολυ-
3 πραγμανοῦντες ἰστορήσωμεν. τοὺς δὲ λέγοντάς τι
περὶ τούτων ἄλλως ἡ γράφοντας ἄγνοεῖν καὶ μύ-
θους διατίθεσθαι νομιστέον.

4 Ταῦτα μὲν οὐν εἰρήσθω μοι χάρω τοῦ μὴ τε-
λεώς ἀνυπότακτον εἶναι τοῖς ἀπείροις τῶν τόπων
τὴν διήγησιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ γε τὰς ὀλοκολοφοιαῖς δια-
φορὰς συνεπιβάλλειν καὶ φέρειν ἐπὶ τῆς 
τὸ λεγόμενον, τεκμαιρόμενος ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος.
5 καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς ὃρᾶσεως εἰθίσμεθα συνεπι-
country near the Narbo and beyond it as far as the chain of the Pyrenees which stretches in an unbroken line from the Mediterranean to the Outer Sea. The remaining part of Europe beyond the Pyrenees reaching to its western end and to the Pillars of Hercules is bounded on the one side by the Mediterranean and on the other by the Outer Sea, that portion which is washed by the Mediterranean as far as the Pillars of Hercules being called Iberia, while that part which lies along the Outer or Great Sea has no general name, as it has only recently come under notice, but is all densely inhabited by barbarous tribes of whom I shall speak more particularly on a subsequent occasion. 38. Just as with regard to Asia and Africa where they meet in Aethiopia no one up to the present has been able to say with certainty whether the southern extension of them is continuous land or is bounded by a sea, so that part of Europe which extends to the north between the Don and Narbo is up to now unknown to us, and will remain so unless the curiosity of explorers lead to some discoveries in the future. We must pronounce that those who either by word of mouth or in writing make rash statements about these regions have no knowledge of them, and invent mere fables.

I have said so much in order that my narrative should not be without something to range itself under in the minds of those who are ignorant of the localities, but that they should have some notion at least of the main geographical distinctions, with which they can connect in thought and to which they can refer my statements, calculating the position of places from the quarter of the heaven under which they lie. For as in the case of physical sight we
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

στρέφειν ἀεὶ τὰ πρόσωπα πρὸς τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνδει-ξιν ὑποδεικνύμενον, οὕτως καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρή συν-διανεύειν καὶ συρρέειν ἐπὶ τοὺς τόπους ἀεὶ τοὺς διὰ τοῦ λόγου συνεπιδεικνύμένους. ἀφέμενοι δὲ τούτων τρεξόμεθα πρὸς τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς προκειμέ-νης ἦμας διηγήσεως.

2 Ἡρακλέους στήλας. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μήκός ἐστι τῆς παραλίας ύπερ τοὺς ἕξακουσίλους καὶ μυρίους στα-

3 Ἡρακλέους στήλας. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μήκός ἐστι τῆς παραλίας ύπερ τοὺς ἕξακουσίλους καὶ μυρίους στα-

4 δίους. διαβάντες δὲ τὸν καθ’ Ἡρακλέους στήλας πόρων ὁμοίως ἑκακριτήκεισαν καὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας ἀπά-

5 σης ἔως τῆς βαχίας, ὃ πέρας ἐστὶ πρὸς τῇ καθ’ ἰμαῖς θαλάττῃ τῶν Πυρηναίων ὄρων, ἀ διορίζει τοὺς Ἰβηρα καὶ Κελτοὺς. ἀπέχει δὲ τοῦ καθ’ Ἡρακλέους στήλας στόματος οὗτος ὁ τόπος περὶ ὁ ὁδικοισχιλίους στάδιος. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ Καυνῆν πό-

6 λιν ἀπὸ στηλῶν εἶναι συμβαίνει τρισχιλίους, οὐθὲν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ὄρμην Ἀννίβας τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν. [τὴν δὲ Καυνῆν πόλιν ἔνοι Νέαν Καρχεδώνα καλοῦσιν.] ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης εἰς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν Ἰβηρα ποταμῶν ἐξακοσίους στάδιοι πρὸς δισχιλίους, ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου πάλιν εἰς Ἐμπόριον χίλιοι σὺν ἕξακοσίοις, <ἀπὸ δ’ Ἐμπορίου πόλεως εἰς Νάρβωνα περὶ ἕξακοσίους,> καὶ μὴν ἐνευθεὶς ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ διάβασον περὶ χιλίους ἕξακοσίους. ταύτα γὰρ ὧν βεβημά-

7 τοῦτο καὶ συνθημεῖται κατὰ στάδιος ὁκτώ διὰ Ῥωμαίων ἑπταμέλῶς. ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς διαβάσεως τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ πορευομένους παρ’ αὐτὸν τὸν ποταμὸν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς πηγὰς ἔως πρὸς τὴν ἀναβολήν τῶν Ἀλπεων.
are in the habit of turning our faces in the direction of any object pointed out to us, so should we mentally ever turn and shift our glance to each place to which the story calls our attention.

39. Dismissing this matter I will now continue my narrative. At the time of which we are speaking the Carthaginians were masters of all that part of Africa which looks towards the Mediterranean from the Altars of Philaenus on the Greater Syrtis as far as the Pillars of Hercules. The length of this coast-line is more than sixteen thousand stades. Crossing the straits at the Pillars of Hercules they had similarly subdued all Iberia as far as the point on the coast of the Mediterranean where the Pyrenees, which separate the Celts from the Iberians, end. This spot is about eight thousand stades distant from the mouth of this sea at the Pillars of Hercules, the distance being three thousand stades from the Pillars to New Carthage, from which place Hannibal started for Italy, two thousand six hundred stades from hence to the Ebro, and from the Ebro to Emporium one thousand six hundred stades. From Emporium to Narbo it is about six hundred stades, and from Narbo to the passage of the Rhone about sixteen hundred, this part of the road having now been carefully measured by the Romans and marked with milestones at every eighth stade. From the passage of the Rhone, following the bank of the river in the direction of its source as far as the foot of the pass across the Alps to Italy, the distance is

\* Originally the boundary between Egypt and Cyrene.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

10 τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν χίλιοι τετρακόσιοι. λοιπαὶ δ’ αἱ
tῶν Ἀλπεων ὑπερβολαί, περὶ χίλιοι διακοσίους·
ἀς ὑπερβαλὼν ἔμελλεν ἤξεν εἰς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδουν
11 πεδία τῆς Ἰταλίας. ὃστε ἐναὶ τοὺς πάντας ἐκ Καὶ-
νῆς πόλεως σταδίους περὶ ἐνακισχύλους, οὕς ἐδει
12 διελθεῖν αὐτὸν. τούτων δὴ τῶν τόπων κατὰ μέν
τὸ μῆκος ἤδη σχεδὸν τοὺς ἡμίσεις διελθήθει, κατὰ
dὲ τὴν δυσχέρειαν τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ μέρος ἀπελεύησεν
tῆς πορείας.

40 'Ανώβας μὲν οὖν ἐνεχείρει ταῖς διεξολοῖς τῶν
Πυρηναίων ὀρῶν, κατάφοβος ἢν τοὺς Κέλτους διὰ
2 τὰς χυρότητας τῶν τόπων. 'Ρωμαῖοι δὲ κατὰ τοὺς
αὐτοὺς καίρους διακούσαντες μὲν τῶν ἐξαποσταλέν-
tων εἰς Καρχηδόνα προσβεβότων τὰ δεδομένα καὶ
τοὺς δῆθεν τάσις λόγους, προσπεσόντος δὲ θάττων ἢ
προσεδόκων 'Ανώβαν διαβεβηκέναι τὸν Ἰβηρὰ πο-
tαμὸν μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως, προερήματο πέμπεο
μετὰ στρατοπέδων Πόλιον μὲν Κορυήλιον εἰς Ἰβη-
ρίαν, Τεθέριον δὲ Σεμπρώνιον εἰς Λιβύην.

3 'Εν δὲ οὕτως ὡς ὀστοὶ περὶ τὰς καταγραφὰς ἐγίνοντο
τῶν στρατοπέδων καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν,
ἐσπευσαν ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀποκίας,
oὶ δὴ πρότερον ἦσαν εἰς Γαλατίαν ἀποστάλλει προ-
4 κεχειρισμένοι. τὰς μὲν οὖν πόλεις ἐνεργῶς ἐτείχιζον,
tοὺς δ’ οὐκότερας ἐν ἠμέραις τρίακοντα παρῆγγειλαν
ἐπιτόπους γίνεσθαι, τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντας εἰς ἑκατέραν
5 τὴν πόλιν εἰς ἐξακισχύλους. δὲ τὴν μὲν μίαν ἐκτύ-
ζον ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Πάδου ποταμοῦ, προσαγορεῦσαν-
tες Πλακεντίαν, τὴν δ’ ἄλλην ἐπὶ βάτερα, κατονο-
6 μάσαντες Κρεμώνην. ἦδη δὲ τούτων συνοικισμένων,
oὶ Βοῦοι καλούμενοι Γαλάται, πάλαι μὲν οὖν λο-
χῶντες τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίοις φιλίαν, οὐκ ἔχοντες δὲ
92
BOOK III. 39. 10 – 40. 6

fourteen hundred stades, and the length of the actual pass which would bring Hannibal down into the plain of the Po, about twelve hundred. So that to arrive there he had, starting from New Carthage, to march about nine thousand stades. Of this, as far as distance goes, he had nearly traversed the half, but if we look to difficulty far the largest part lay before him.

40. While Hannibal was thus attempting to cross the Pyrenees, in great fear of the Celts owing to the natural strength of the passes, the Romans, having received from the envoys they had sent to Carthage an account of the decision arrived at, and the speeches made there, and on news reaching them sooner than they had expected that Hannibal had crossed the Ebro with his army, determined to send, with their legions, the Consuls Publius Cornelius Scipio to Spain and Tiberius Sempronius Longus to Africa.

While occupied in enrolling the legions and making other preparations they were pushing on the project of establishing in Cisalpine Gaul the colonies on which they had decided. They took active steps to fortify the towns, and ordered the colonists, who were about six thousand in number for either city, to be on the spot within thirty days. The one city they founded on this side of the Po, calling it Placentia, the other, which they named Cremona, on the far side. Scarce had both these colonies been established when the Boii Gauls, who had been for long as it were lying in wait to throw off their allegiance to Rome, but had hitherto found no
7 toté kairón, metewriázomevnoi kai pisteúontes ék tōn diapempoménōn tē parousía tōn Karχhiδονíōn, ápēsthsan apó Ρωμαίων, ēγκαταλιπόντes toutōs ómērōu, oús ēdousan ēkbaīnontes ék toutō polēmou toutō progegonótos, ūpēr oū tēn ēxeγγhsan hēmēs ēn tē 8 protēra būblw tautēs ēpoιhómētha. parakalēsan dē toutōs ᾼnsoμbrās, kai suμfroνhςantes kata tēn progeγeνmēnēn òrhγh, kateusuran tēn katakeκληρουχήmēnēn χώρan υπὸ Ρωμαίων, kai toutōs feugontas suνδwξantas eis Motínhes, āpoukian 9 υπάρχονταν Ρωμαίων, ἐπολιόρκουν. ἐν ois kai treis anárras toutōn éptipanwv suνkłówiasan toutō ēpí tēn daíreσan tēs χώρas ēpασεμένουs. oin ēis mēn hēn Γάιοs Λυτάτios kai tēn υπατον ἁρχhν εἰλhφw, 10 ois dē dúo tēn exapélekov. oisyménōn dē deív toutōw eis lōγουs σφίαi suνελθēi, υπήκουsan oi Boiοi. toutō d' anórraw exelθōνtoν, paraσπονδηςantas suνελαβον autouς, ēpíσasantes diá toutōw 11 koμeištai toutōs autōn ómērōs. ἐλκvios dē Mάl- λiós exapélekov υπάρχον, kai prokathmēnos ēpí toutō topow metà duνάmeos, ακούςα τό γεγονός, 12 ēβοηθει kata σπουδh. ois dē Boiοi suνéntes autōu tēn parousian, ēn tis drumoiš eτοιμάσαντes énē- dras, αμα τά parθleiv eis toutōs úlōdeis topous pantaχόθεn amá prospesóntes pollous ἀπέκτηναν 13 toutō Ρωμαίων. ois dē loipoi tás mēn ἄρχas ύμη- σαν πρὸς φυγῆν. ēpei dē tōn ὑψηλων ἱταντο χω- ρίων, ēpí poson suνέστησαν ousan ēsste mōlis eνοχήmōa συνήθαι tēn ἀρχwρησ. ois dē Boiοi kataκολουθῆςantas suνέκλεισαν kai toutous 14 eis tēn Tάννηtoς kaloumēnēn kûmhn. toutō d' ēn tē 94 'Ρώμη prospesóntos oun tī tētartōn stratōpēdov
opportunity, elated now by the messages they received assuring them of the near arrival of the Carthaginians, revolted from Rome, abandoning the hostages they gave at the end of the former war which I described in my last Book. Calling on the Insubres to join them, whose support they easily gained owing to their long-standing rancour against Rome, they overran the lands which the Romans had allotted to their colonies and on the settlers taking to flight, pursued them to Mutina, a Roman colony, and there besieged them. Among those shut up there were three men of high rank who had been sent to carry out the partitionment of the country, Gaius Lutatius, a former Consul, and two former Praetors. On these three requesting a parley with the Boii, the latter consented, but when they came out for the purpose they treacherously made them prisoners, hoping by means of them to get back their own hostages. When the Praetor Lucius Manlius, who with his troops was occupying an advanced position in the neighbourhood, heard of this, he hastened up to give help. The Boii had heard of his approach, and posting ambuscades in a certain forest attacked him from all sides at once as soon as he reached the wooded country, and killed many of the Romans. The remainder at first took to flight, but on getting to higher ground rallied just enough to give their retreat an appearance of order. The Boii following at their heels shut this force too up in the place called Vicus Tannetis." When the news reached Rome that the

"Near Parma.

95
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

περειλημμένον ὑπὸ τῶν Βοίων πολιορκεῖται κατὰ κράτος, τὰ μὲν τῷ Ποπλίῳ προκεχειρισμένα στρατόπεδα κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐξαπέστελλον ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων βοήθειαν, ἡγεμόνα συστήσαντες ἐξοπέλεκυν, ἀλλὰ δὲ συνάγει καὶ καταγράφειν ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων αὐτῶν παρήγγειλαν.

41 Τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ Κελτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἦσαν εἰς τὴν 'Αννίβου παρουσίαν ἐν τούτωι ἦν καὶ τοιαύτη εἰλήφει διέξοδον, οἶναν ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τοῦ 2 καὶ νῦν διεληλύθαμεν. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ τῶν 'Ρωμαίων ἐτοιμασάμενοι τὰ πρὸς τὰς ἱδίας ἐπιβολάς, ἐξέπλεον ὑπὸ τὴν ὑφαίνει ἐπὶ τὰς προκεμένας πράξεις, Πόπλιος μὲν οὖν εἰς Ἱβηρίαν ἐξῆκοντα ναυσί, Τεβέριος δὲ Σεμπρώνιος εἰς Λιβύην ἐκατόν ἐξήκον-3 τα σκάφη εὐτυχικώς. οἷς οὕτως καταπληκτικώς ἐπεβάλετο πολεμεῖν καὶ τουιάτας ἐποιεῖτο παρα-4 σκεύας ἐν τῷ Λιλυβαίῳ, πάντας καὶ πανταχόθεν ἅθροίζων, ὡς εὐθέως ἐκ κατάπλου πολιορκήσων 5 αὐτὴν τὴν Καρχηδόνα. Πόπλιος δὲ κομισθεὶς παρὰ τὴν Δυναστίνην ἦκε πεμπταῖος ἀπὸ Πισιῦν εἰς τοὺς 6 κατὰ Μασσαλίαν τόπους, καὶ καθορμισθεὶς πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον στόμα τοῦ 'Ροδανοῦ, τὸ Μασσαλιστικόν 7 προσαγορεύμενον, ἀπεβίβαζε τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀκούοιν μὲν ὑπερβάλλειν ὡθή τὰ Πυρηναῖα τὸν 'Αννίβαν ὅρη, πεπεισμένος δ' ἐπὶ μακρὰν ἀπέχειν αὐτὸν διὰ τὰς δυσχωρίας τῶν τόπων καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος 8 τῶν μεταξύ κειμένων Κελτῶν. 'Αννίβας δὲ παρα- 4 δόξας, τοὺς μὲν χρήματι πείσας τῶν Κελτῶν, τοὺς δὲ βιασάμενος, ἥκε μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, δεξιόν ἔχων τὸ Σαρδόνιον πέλαγος, ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ 'Ροδανοῦ διάβασιν. ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος, διασαφηθέντος αὐτῷ παρ- 9 ἐναὐς τοὺς υπεναντίους, τὰ μὲν ἀπιστῶν διὰ τὸ
fourth legion was surrounded by the Boii and besieged, they instantly sent off the legions destined for Publius under the command of a Praetor to its assistance, ordering Publius to enrol other legions from the allies.

41. The condition and course of Celtic affairs from the outset up to the arrival of Hannibal were such as I have narrated here and in the previous Book. The two Roman Consuls, having made all preparations for their respective enterprises, set sail early in summer to take in hand the operations determined on, Publius bound for Iberia with sixty ships and Tiberius Sempronius for Africa with a hundred and sixty quinqueremes. With these he threatened such a redoubtable expedition and made such vast preparations at Lilybaeum, collecting all kinds of forces from everywhere, that it seemed as if he expected to sail up to Carthage and at once lay siege to it. Publius, coasting along Liguria, reached the neighbourhood of Marseilles from Pisa in five days, and coming to anchor off the first mouth of the Rhone, known as the Massaliotic mouth, disembarked his forces there, having heard that Hannibal was already crossing the Pyrenees, but convinced that he was still at a distance of many days' march owing to the difficulty of the country and the numbers of Celtic tribes between them. Hannibal, however, who had bribed some of the Celts and forced others to give him passage, unexpectedly appeared with his army at the crossing of the Rhone, having marched with the Sardinian Sea on his right. Publius, when the arrival of the enemy was reported to him, being partly incredulous owing to the
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tάχος τῆς παρουσίας, τὰ δὲ βουλόμενος εἰδέναι τὴν ἀκρίβειαν, αὐτὸς μὲν ἀνελάμβανε τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκ τοῦ πλοῦ, καὶ διενοεῖτο μετὰ τῶν χιλιάρχων ποιοῖς χρηστέον τῶν τόπων καὶ συμμικτέον τοῖς ὑπεννα-τίοις· τριακοσίους δὲ τῶν ὕππεων ἐξαπέστειλε τοὺς ἀνδρωδεστάτους, συντήσας μετ’ αὐτῶν καθηγεμόνας ἁμα καὶ συναγωνιστὰς Κελτοὺς, οἱ παρὰ τοῖς Μασ-σαλώταις ἐτύγχανον μισθοφοροῦντες.

42 Ἀννίβας δὲ προσμίζας τοῖς περὶ τῶν ποταμῶν τόποις, εὐθέως ἐνεχείρει ποιεῖσθαι τὴν διάβασιν κατὰ τὴν ἀπλῆν ρύου, σχεδὸν ἡμερῶν τεττάρων
3 ὁδὸν ἀπέχων στρατοπέδῳ τῆς θαλάττης. καὶ φιλο-ποιησάμενος παντὶ τρόπῳ τοὺς παροικοῦντας τὸν ποταμὸν ἐξηγοράσας παρ’ αὐτῶν τα τε μονόξυλα πλοία πάντα καὶ τοὺς λέμβους, ὅντας ἰκανοὺς τῷ πλῆθει διὰ τὸ ταῖς ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἐμπορίας πολ-3 λοὺς χρῆσθαι τῶν παροικοῦντων τῶν 'Ροδανῶν. ἔτι δὲ τὴν ἀρμόζουσαν ξυλεῖαν ἐξέλαβε πρὸς τὴν κατα-σκευὴν τῶν μονοξύλων· ἐξ ὧν ἐν δυσίν ἡμέραις πλῆθος ἀναρίθμητον ἐγένετο πορθμεῖων, ἐκάστου σπεύδοντος μὴ προσδεῖσθαι τοῦ πέλας, ἐν αὐτῷ δ’
4 ἔχειν τὰς τῆς διαβάσεως ἐλπίδας. κατὰ δὲ τὸν κα-ρυν τοῦτον ἐν τῷ πέραν πλῆθος ἡρῴοισθη βαρβά-ρων χάριν τοῦ κωλύειν τὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων διά-κατα-ρισθήν. εἰς οὐς ἀποβλέπων Ἰννίβας καὶ συλλογιζό-μενος ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ὡς οὐτε διαβαίνειν μετὰ βίας δυνατὸν εἰς τοσοῦτον πολεμίων ἐφεστῶτων, οὐτ’ ἐπιμένειν, μὴ πανταχόθεν προσδέξηται τοὺς ὑπεννατίους, ἐπιγενομένης τῆς τρίτης νικτῶς ἐξ-αποστέλλει μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως, συντήσας καθ-ηγεμόνας ἐγχωρίους, ἐπὶ δὲ πάντων Ἀννίβα τὸν 7 Βοιαμίλκου τοῦ βασιλέως. οἱ ποιησάμενοι τὴν πο-
rapidity of their advance and partly desirous of ascertaining the exact truth—while he himself was refreshing his troops after their voyage and consulting with his Tribunes in what place it would be wisest to offer battle to the enemy—sent out three hundred of his bravest cavalry, giving them as guides and supports certain Celts who were in the service of the Massaliots as mercenaries.

42. Hannibal, on reaching the neighbourhood of the river, at once set about attempting to cross it where the stream is single at a distance of about four days' march from the sea. Doing his best to make friends with the inhabitants of the bank, he bought up all their canoes and boats, amounting to a considerable number, since many of the people on the banks of the Rhone engage in maritime traffic. He also got from them the logs suitable for making the canoes, so that in two days he had an innumerable quantity of ferry-boats, every one doing his best to dispense with any assistance and relying on himself for his chance of getting across. In the meantime a large force of barbarians had gathered on the opposite bank to prevent the Carthaginians from crossing. Hannibal observing this and concluding that as things stood it was neither possible to force a crossing in face of such a strong hostile force nor to put it off, lest he should find himself attacked on all sides, sent off on the third night after his arrival a portion of his army, giving them native guides and placing them under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar the Suffete.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ρείαν ἄντιοι τῷ ἰτίπαιτι παρὰ τῶν ποταμῶν ἐπὶ διακόσια στάδια, παραγενόμενοι πρὸς των τόπων, ἐν ὧν συνέβαινε περὶ τὶ χωρίῳ νησίζου περιοχίζε-8 σθαι τῶν ποταμῶν, ἐνταῦθα κατέμεναν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς παρακειμένης ὑλής τὰ μὲν συμπηγγυόντες τῶν ξύλων, τὰ δὲ συνδεσμεύόντες, ἐν ὑλίγω χρόνῳ πολλὰς ἦρ-μοσαν σχέδιας, ἀρκούσας τῇ χρείᾳ πρὸς τὸ παρόν· ἐφ’ αἰς διεκομίσθησαν ἀσφαλῶς οὐδενὸς κωλύοντος.

καταλαβόμενοι δὲ τόπον ἔχουσιν ἐκείνην μὲν τὴν ἡμέραν ἐμεναν ἀναπαύοντες σφαῖς ἐκ τῆς προγε-γενημένης κακοπαθείας, ἀμα δὲ παρασκευαζόμενοι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθύμου τρεῖαν κατὰ τὸ συντεταγμένον.

καὶ μὴν Ἐνιβάς τὸ παραπλήσιον ἐποίει περὶ τὰς 10 μεθ’ ἐαυτοῦ καταλευθέρωσας δυνάμεις. μάλιστα δ’ αὐτῷ παρεῖχε δυναχρηστίαν ἢ τῶν ἐλεφάντων διαβασίας· οὕτω δ’ ἦσαν ἐπτά καὶ τριάκοντα τὸν ἀριθμόν.

43 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐπιγεγομένης τῆς πέμπτης υπεκτὸς οἱ μὲν προδιαβάντες ἐκ τοῦ πέραν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐωθινήν προῆγον παρ’ αὐτὸν τῶν ποταμῶν ἐπὶ τοὺς 2 ἀντίποιρα βαρβάρους, ὁ δ’ Ἐνιβάς ἐτοίμως ἔχουν τοὺς στρατιώτας ἔπειξε τῇ διαβάσει, τοὺς μὲν λέμ-βους πεπληρωκώς τῶν πελτοφόρων ἰππέων, τὰ δὲ 3 μονόξυλα τῶν εὐκινητότατων πεζῶν. εἶχον δὲ τὴν μὲν εἰς ὑπέρδεξίον καὶ παρὰ τὸ πεῦμα τάξιν οἱ λέμ-βοι, τὴν δ’ ὑπὸ τούτους τὰ λεπτὰ τῶν πορθεμῶν, ὥσ τὸ πολύ τῆς τοῦ βίας ἀποδεχομένων τῶν λέμβων ἀσφαλεστέρα γίνοιτο τοῖς μονοξύλοις 4 ἡ παρακομίδη διὰ τοῦ πόρου. κατὰ δὲ τὰς πρύμνας τῶν λέμβων ἐφέλκειν διευνοῦντο τοὺς ἰπποὺς νέον-τας, τρεῖς ἀμα καὶ τέταρας τοὺς ἀγωγεύον ἐνὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐξ ἐκατέρου τοῦ μέρους τῆς πρύμνης οἰακι-100
Advancing up the bank of the river for two hundred stades they reached a place at which the stream divides, forming an island, and here they stopped. Using the timber they found ready to hand and either nailing or lashing logs together they soon constructed a number of rafts sufficient for their present need, and on these they crossed in safety, meeting with no opposition. Occupying a post of some natural strength they remained there for that day to rest after their exertions and at the same time to prepare for the movement which they had been ordered to execute. Hannibal, moreover, with the part of the army that remained behind with him, was similarly occupied. The question that caused him the greatest embarrassment was how to get the elephants, thirty-seven in number, across.

43. On the fifth night, however, the force which had already crossed began a little before dawn to advance along the opposite bank against the barbarians there, while Hannibal had got his soldiers ready and was waiting till the time for crossing came. He had filled the boats with his light horse and the canoes with his lightest infantry. The large boats were placed highest up stream and the lighter ferry-boats farther down, so that the heavier vessels receiving the chief force of the current the canoes should be less exposed to risk in crossing. They hit on the plan of towing the horses astern of the boats swimming, one man at each side of the stern guiding three or four horses by their leading reins, so that
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ζοντος, ὥστε πλῆθος ἰκανὸν ὕππων συνδιακομίζε-5 σθαι κατὰ τὴν πρῶτην εὐθέως διάβασιν. οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι, θεωροῦντες τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἀτάκτως ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος ἐξεχέοντο καὶ σποράδην, πεπεσμένοι κωλύειν εὐχερῶς τὴν ἀπόβασιν
6 τῶν Καρχηδονίων. Ἀνιβάσας δὲ ἄμα τῷ συνιδεῖν ἐν τῷ πέραν ἐγγίζοντας ἦδη τοὺς παρ’ αὐτοῦ στρα-7 τιώτας, σημηναίων ἐκεῖνων τὴν παρουσίαν τῷ καπνῷ κατὰ τὸ συντεταγμένον, ἐμβαινειν ἀπασοὶ ἄμα παρήγγελλε καὶ βιάζονται πρὸς τὸ βέβια τοῦ 8 ἐπὶ τῶν πορθμείων τεταγμένων. ταχὺ δὲ τούτου γενομένου, καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις ἀμυλλωμένων μὲν πρὸς ἀλλήλους μετὰ κραυγῆς, διαγωνίζομένων
9 δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ποταμοῦ βίαν, τῶν δὲ στρατοπέ-δων ἀμφοτέρων εξ ἐκατέρου τοῦ μέρους παρὰ τὰ χείλη τοῦ ποταμοῦ παρεστῶτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἰδίων 10 συναγωνώντων καὶ παρακολουθοῦντων μετὰ κραυγῆς, τῶν δὲ κατὰ πρόσωπον βαρβάρων παιανιζον- 11 τών καὶ προκαλομένων τῶν κίνδυνον, ἢ τὸ γενό- 12 μενον ἐκπληκτικὸν καὶ παραστατικὸν ἀγωνίας. ἐν 13 δὲ καὶ ὧν βαρβάρων ἀπολειπότων τὰς σκηνὰς ἐπιτεθοῦς ἄφων καὶ παραδόξως οἱ πέραν Καρχη- 14 δόνιοι, τυνὲς μὲν αὐτῶν ἐνεπίμπτασαν τὴν στρατο- 15 πεδείαν, οἱ δὲ πλείους ὠρμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς τὴν διά- 16 βασιν τηροῦντας. οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι, παράλογον τοῦ 17 πράγματος φανέντος αὐτοῖς, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνὰς ἐφέροντο βοηθῆσοντες, οἱ δ’ ἦμινόντο καὶ διεμά- 18 χοντο πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτυθεμένους. Ἀνιβάσας δὲ, κατὰ 19 τὴν πρόθεσιν αὐτῶν συντρεχόντων τῶν πραγμάτων, 20 εὐθέως τοὺς πρῶτους ἀποβαίνοντας συνίστατα καὶ 21 παρεκάλει, καὶ συνέπλεκετο τοῖς βαρβάροις. οἱ δὲ 22 Κελτοὶ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀταξίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ παράδοξον 23
BOOK III. 43. 4 – 12

a considerable number were got across at once in the first batch. The barbarians seeing the enemy’s project poured out of their camp, scattered and in no order, feeling sure that they would easily prevent the Carthaginians from landing. Hannibal, as soon as he saw that the force he had previously sent across was near at hand on the opposite bank, they having announced their approach by a smoke-signal as arranged, ordered all in charge of the ferry-boats to embark and push up against the current. He was at once obeyed, and now with the men in the boats shouting as they vied with one another in their efforts and struggled to stem the current, with the two armies standing on either bank at the very brink of the river, the Carthaginians following the progress of the boats with loud cheers and sharing in the fearful suspense, and the barbarians yelling their war-cry and challenging to combat, the scene was in the highest degree striking and thrilling. At this moment, the barbarians having deserted their tents, the Carthaginians on the far bank attacked suddenly and unexpectedly, and while some of them set fire to the enemy’s encampment, the larger portion fell upon the defenders of the passage. The barbarians, taken quite by surprise, rushed some of them to save their tents, while others defended themselves against their assailants. Hannibal, all falling out favourably as he had purposed, at once marshalled those of his men who were the first to land, and after addressing some words of exhortation to them, led them to meet the barbarians, upon which the Celts, owing to their disordered
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tου συμβαίνοντος ταχέως τραπέντες ὠρμησαν πρὸς φυγήν.

44 Ο δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀμα τῆς τε διαβάσεως καὶ τῶν ὑπεναντίων κεκρατηκῶς παραυτῖκα μὲν ἐγίνετο πρὸς τῇ παρακομίδῇ τῶν πέραν ἀπολειπόμενων ἀνδρῶν, πάσας δὲ ἐν βραχεῖ χρόνω διαπεραίωσας τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκείνην μὲν τὴν νύκτα

3 παρ’ αὐτὸν τὸν ποταμὸν κατεστρατοπέδευσε, τῇ δὲ ἐπαύριον ἀκούσεν τῶν τῶν Ῥωμαίων στόλων περὶ τὰ στόματα τοῦ ποταμοῦ καθωρμίσας, προφερισάμενος πεντακοσίους τῶν Νομαδικῶν ἐπίπεδων ἐξαπέστειλε κατασκευομένους ποῦ καὶ πόσοι τυγχάνομεν

4 σιν ὄντες καὶ τί πράπτουσαν οἱ πολέμοι. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐλεφάντων διά

5 βασιν προφερίσατο τοὺς ἐπιτηδεούς. αὐτὸς δὲ συναγαγὼς τὰς δυνάμεις εἰσῆγαγε τοὺς βασιλισκοὺς τοὺς περὶ Μάγιλον· οὕτω γὰρ ἦκον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδίων· καὶ δὴ ἐρμηνέως τὰ

6 δεδομένα παρ’ αὐτῶν διεσάφει τοῖς ὀχλοῖς. ἦν δὲ τῶν λεγομένων ἱσχυρότατα πρὸς θάρσος τῶν πολλῶν πρῶτον μὲν ἡ τῆς παρουσίας ἐνάργεια τῶν ἐπιστρωµένων καὶ κοινωνήσεως ἐπαγγελλουµένων τοῦ

7 πρὸς Ῥωµαίους πολέµου, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τῆς ἐπι-

αγγελίας αὐτῶν ἀξιόπιστον, ὅτι καθηγησόνται διὰ τόπων τοιούτων δι’ ὧν οὐδενὸς ἐπιδεόμενοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων συντόµως ἀμα καὶ μετ’ ἀσφαλείας ποι-

8 ἔστεντα τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν πορείαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτος ἡ τῆς χώρας γενναίωτης, εἰς ἄνθιζεν, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, ἐτὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡ προθυμία, μεθ’ ὧν μελλοντι ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀγώνας πρὸς τὰς τῶν Ῥω-

9 μαίων δυνάμεις. οἱ μὲν οὖν Κέλτωι τοιαύτα δια-

10 λεχθέντες ἄνεχωρήσαν. μετὰ δὲ τούτους εἰσελθὼν

104
condition and to their being taken by surprise, soon turned and turned to flight.

44. The Carthaginian general, having thus made himself master of the passage and defeated the enemy, at once occupied himself in fetching over the men who had been left on the other bank, and having in a very short time brought his whole army across encamped for that night beside the river. Next morning, hearing that the Roman fleet was anchored off the mouths of the Rhone, he selected five hundred of his Numidian horse and sent them off to observe the whereabouts and number of the enemy and what they were about. At the same time he set the proper men to the task of bringing the elephants across and then called a meeting of his soldiers and, introducing Magilus and the other chieftains who had come to him from the plain of the Po, made the troops acquainted through a dragoman with what they reported to be the decision of their tribes. What encouraged the soldiers most in their address was firstly the actual and visible presence of those Gauls who were inviting them to Italy and promising to join them in the war against Rome, and secondly the reliance they placed on their promise to guide them by a route which would take them without their being exposed to any privations, rapidly and safely to Italy. In addition to this the Gauls dwelt on the richness and extent of the country they were going to, and the eager spirit of the men by whose side they were about to face the armies of Rome. The Celts, after speaking in this sense, withdrew, and Hannibal
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

...
himself now came forward and began by reminding them of their achievements in the past: though, he said, they had undertaken many hazardous enterprises and fought many a battle they had never met with ill success when they followed his plans and counsels. Next he bade them be of good heart considering that the hardest part of their task was now accomplished, since they had forced the passage of the river and had the testimony of their own eyes and ears to the friendly sentiments and readiness to help of their allies. He begged them therefore to be at their ease about details which were his own business, but to obey orders and behave like brave men and in a manner worthy of their own record in the past. When the men applauded him, exhibiting great enthusiasm and ardour, he commended them and, after offering a prayer to the gods on behalf of all, dismissed them, bidding them get everything ready expeditiously as they would start on their march next day.

45. After the assembly had broken up the Numidian scouts who had been sent out to reconnoitre returned, the greater part of the force lost and the remainder in headlong flight. Not far from their own camp they had fallen in with the Roman cavalry sent out by Publius on the same errand, and both forces had shown such heroism in the engagement that the Romans and Celts lost about a hundred and forty horsemen and the Numidians more than two hundred. Afterwards the Romans carried their pursuit close up to the Carthaginian camp, and having surveyed it, turned and hastily rode off to report to the Consul the arrival of the
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

πολεμίων· ἀφικόμενοι δ' εἰς τὴν παρεμβολὴν ἀνήγ- 4 γελαν. Πόλλιος δὲ παραυτίκα τὴν ἀποσκευὴν ἀνα- θέμενος ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, ἀνέζευξε παντὶ τῷ στρατεύ- ματι, καὶ προήγη παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν, σπεύδων συμ- μίξας τοὺς ὑπεναντίους.

5 Ἀννίβας δὲ τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρα τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἀμα τῷ φωτὶ τοὺς μὲν ἑπτεῖς προεῖθε πάντας ὡς πρὸς θάλατταν, ἐφεδρείας ἔχοντας τάξιν, τὴν δὲ τῶν πεζῶν ἐκίνησε δύναμιν ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος εἰς πο- 6 ρείαν. αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς ἑλέφαντας ἐξεδέχετο καὶ τοὺς ἄμα τούτοις ἀπολελειμμένους ἄνδρας. ἐγένετο δ' 46 ἡ διακομιδὴ τῶν θηρίων τοιαύτη τις. πήξαντες σχέδιας καὶ πλείους ἄραρότως, τούτων δύο πρὸς ἀλλήλας ζεύξαντες βιαῖς ἱρείως ἀμφοτέροις εἰς τὴν γην κατὰ τὴν ἐμβασιν τοῦ ποταμοῦ, πλάτων ἔχουσας τὸ συναμφότερον ὡς πεντήκοντα πόδας. 2 ταῦτας δὲ συζευγνύντες ἄλλας ἐκ τῶν ἑκτὸς προσ- ἴμοιζον, προτείνοντες τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ ζεύγ- 3 ματος εἰς τὸν πόρον. τὴν δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ῥεύματος πλευρᾶν ἠσφαλίζοντο τοῖς ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐπιγώνος, εἰς τὰ περὶ τὸ χείλος πεφυκότα τῶν δένδρων ἐνάπτων- τες, πρὸς τὸ συμμένειν καὶ μὴ παρωθεῖσθαι τὸ 4 ὅλον ἔργον κατὰ τοῦ ποταμοῦ. ποιῆσαντες δὲ πρὸς δύο πλῆθα τῷ μήκει τὸ πάν ζευγμα τῆς προβολῆς, μετὰ ταύτα δύο πεπηγνίας σχέδιας διαφέροντως [τὰς μεγίστας] προσέβαλλον ταῖς ἐσχάταις, πρὸς αὐτὰς μὲν βιαῖως δεδεμένοις, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας οὕτως ὡστ' εὐδιακόπους αὐτῶν εἶναι τοὺς δεσμοὺς. 5 ρύματα δὲ καὶ πλείω ταῦτας ἐνῆφαν, οἷς ἐμελλόν ὦτο λέμβοι ρυμουλκοῦντες οὐκ ἐάσεις φέρεσθαι κατὰ ποταμὸν, βία δὲ πρὸς τὸν ῥόδην κατέχοντες παρα- 6 κομεῖν καὶ περαιώσειν ἐπὶ τούτων τὰ θηρία. μετὰ

108
enemy, and on reaching their camp did so. Publius at once put his baggage on board the ships and started with his whole army marching up the river bank with the view of encountering the Carthaginians.

Hannibal, on the day after the assembly, advanced his cavalry in the direction of the sea to act as a covering force and then moved his infantry out of the camp and sent them off on their march, while he himself waited for the elephants and the men who had been left with them. The way they got the elephants across was as follows. 46. They built a number of very solid rafts and lashing two of these together fixed them very firmly into the bank of the river, their united width being about fifty feet. To these they attached others on the farther side, prolonging the bridge out into the stream. They secured the side of it which faced the current by cables attached to the trees that grew on the bank, so that the whole structure might remain in place and not be shifted by the current. When they had made the whole bridge or pier of rafts about two hundred feet long they attached to the end of it two particularly compact ones, very firmly fastened to each other, but so connected with the rest that the lashings could easily be cut. They attached to these several towing-lines by which boats were to tow them, not allowing them to be carried down stream, but holding them up against the current, and thus were to convey the elephants which would be in
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

dē tauta xohν efereν eti pāsas polūν, ēws ōpī-
ballontes ēxωmōiωsan, ōmalēν kai svγχrouν poi-
oúntes tī diā tīs kherōu pherōu phrōs tīn diā-
diebas ǒddē. tōn dē thēriōn eidosmēnōn tois 'Indōis
mēkri mēn prōs tō υγρόν aei peitharχeίn, eiś dē tō
oudo ρεμαίνειν oūdamōs eti tolmōntωn, ēgon diā
του χωματος δύo prōthēmenvo thēleias, peitharχoùn-
tωn autaῖs των thērīwn. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπί τας tεlē-
taías épésthrasan scheidias, diakófantes tois desmois,
ois prōsērhtnto prōs tαs állas, kai tois lēmbοus
ēpιsppasάmenvo τα rūmata, tαχέωs ēpēspasan apό
tου χωματος tα te thēria kai tαs ὑπ' autois sche-
dias. oδ genvomēnou diataraχhēnta tα kōi kαtά
mēn tαs ērχhēs ēstrefetο kai kαtα pānta tόpou
ωrma: periekhōme na dē pantaχhēn ὑπ' του rēmα-
tos apedelhia kai mēnei nηagkάζετo kαtα χωραν.
kai tōioutōs dη tρópo phrōsarmuzomēnōn aei scheid-
diōn dvēin, tα plēiosta tωn thērīwν eti tōutωn

diekomhēti, tiva dē kαtα mēsoν των pōrōn ēπερ-
rhisen eis tōn pōtamōn auta diā tōn phōboun ὑν
tous mēn 'Indōus apoleśthai suneyb phántas, tουs

d' ēlefantaς diasewthēni. diā γar tēn dūnōm
kai tō meγēthos tωn prōbasakiswv ëxaironwtes tautaς
úper tō υγρόν kai diapnēontes, αμα d' ekphrōnwn
tan tō pαrēmphπtov, āntēnchon, tō polh kαb' ῥδα-
tos ὑρθοί pοiουμενοι tēn pοrēian.

47 Pēraioθhenton dē tōn thērīwn, ἀναλαβών Ἄν-
vības touς ēlefantaς kai touς ἵππεις prōhγe tou-
tous āpouroγhν para tōn pōtamōn ãpō thalāttηs
ws ēpi tēn ēw, poioumēνoς tēn pοrēian ὡς eis tēn
2 μεσόγαιον tēs Eōrōtηs. ὁ dē ὶRɔdanos ēχει tας
mēn phgás úper tōn Ἀδριατικού μυχόν prōs tēn

110
them across. After this they piled up a quantity of earth on all the line of rafts, until the whole was on the same level and of the same appearance as the path on shore leading to the crossing. The animals were always accustomed to obey their mahouts up to the water, but would never enter it on any account, and they now drove them along over the earth with two females in front, whom they obediently followed. As soon as they set foot on the last rafts the ropes which held these fast to the others were cut, and the boats pulling taut, the towing-lines rapidly tugged away from the pile of earth the elephants and the rafts on which they stood. Hereupon the animals becoming very alarmed at first turned round and ran about in all directions, but as they were shut in on all sides by the stream they finally grew afraid and were compelled to keep quiet. In this manner, by continuing to attach two rafts to the end of the structure, they managed to get most of them over on these, but some were so frightened that they threw themselves into the river when half-way across. The mahouts of these were all drowned, but the elephants were saved, for owing to the power and length of their trunks they kept them above the water and breathed through them, at the same time spouting out any water that got into their mouths and so held out, most of them passing through the water on their feet.

47. After the elephants had been put across, Hannibal, taking them and his cavalry and forming these into a rear-guard, advanced up the river bank away from the sea in an easterly direction as though making for the centre of Europe. The Rhone rises north-west of the head of the Adriatic on the northern
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἐσπέραν νεούσας, ἐν τοῖς ἀποκλίνουσι μέρεσι τῶν Ἀλπεων ὡς πρὸς τὰς ἀρκτους, ρεῖ δὲ πρὸς [τὰς] δύσεις χειμερινάς, ἐκβάλλει δὲ εἰς τὸ Σαρδῶν πέ-3 λαγός. φέρεται δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ δι’ αὐλώνος, οὗ πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἀρκτους Ἀρδυνες Κελτοὶ κατοικοῦσι, τὴν δ’ ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας αὐτοῦ πλευρὰν ὀρίζουσι πᾶσαν αἱ πρὸς ἄρκτον κεκλιμέναι τῶν Ἀλπεων παρώρειαν. 4 τὰ δὲ πεδία τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον, ὅπερ ἄν ἦμῖν εἰρήται διὰ πλεύνων, ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Ῥόδανον αὐλῶνος διαζευγνύουσιν αἱ τῶν προειρημένων ὄρων ἀκρώρεια, λαμβάνουσι τὴν ἄρχην ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας 5 ἦς ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ παντὸς Ἀδρίου μνημόνιος δὲ τὸν ὑπεράρας Ἀννίβας ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ῥόδανον τόπων ἐνέβαλεν ἐς Ἰταλίαν. 6 Ὕνιοι δὲ τῶν γεγραφότων περὶ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ταύτης, θεωροῦμεν τούς ἀναγνωσκόντας ἐκπλήττ-τεως τῇ περὶ τῶν προειρημένων τόπων παραδοξο-λογίᾳ, λανθάνουσιν ἐμπίπτοντες εἰς δύο τὰ πάσης ἱστορίας ἀλλοτριωτάτα· καὶ γὰρ ἰσασειρωγοῦν καὶ 7 μαχόμενα γράφειν αὐτοὶς ἀναγκάζονται. ἀμα μέν γὰρ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἀμίμητον των παρευσάγοντας στρατηγὸν καὶ τόλμη καὶ προνοία τοῦτων ὀμολο-8 γομένως ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἢμῖν ἀλογιστότατον, ἀμα δὲ καταστροφὴν οὐ δυνάμενοι λαμβάνειν οὐδ’ ἔξ-οδον τῷ προθυγόνος θεοῦ καὶ θεόν παιδᾶς εἰς πραγ-9 ματικὴν ἱστορίαν παρευσάγοντων. ὑποθέμενοι γὰρ τὰς ἐρμονότητας καὶ τραχύτητας τῶν Ἀλπεων ὄρων τουαύτας ὡστε μὴ οἶνον ἵππους καὶ στρατό-πεδα, σὺν δὲ τούτωι ἑλέφαντας, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ πεζοὺς εὐξέων εὐχερῶς ὁμ οἰκεῖαν, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἔρημον τουαύτην τινὰ περὶ τοὺς τόπους ὑπογρά-ψαντες ἢμῖν ὡστ’ εἰ μὴ θεός ἦ τις ἢρως ἀπαν-112
slope of the Alps, and running in a south-westerly direction, falls into the Sardinian Sea. A great part of its course is through a deep valley, to the north of which lives the Celtic tribe of the Ardyes, while on the south it is bounded for its whole extent by the northern spurs of the Alps. The plain of the Po which I described above at length is separated from the Rhone valley by the lofty main chain of these mountains, which starting from Marseilles extends to the head of the Adriatic. It is this chain which Hannibal now crossed to enter Italy from the Rhone valley.

Some of the writers who have described this passage of the Alps, from the wish to impress their readers by the marvels they recount of these mountains, are betrayed into two vices ever most alien to true history; for they are compelled to make both false statements and statements which contradict each other. While on the one hand introducing Hannibal as a commander of unequalled courage and foresight, they incontestably represent him to us as entirely wanting in prudence, and again, being unable to bring their series of falsehoods to any close or issue they introduce gods and the sons of gods into the sober history of facts. By representing the Alps as being so steep and rugged that not only horses and troops accompanied by elephants, but even active men on foot would have difficulty in passing, and at the same time picturing to us the desolation of the country as being such, that unless
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tίς περὶ τὴν Ἀννίβαν ὑπεδείξε τὰς οδοὺς, ἐξαπορήσαντι αὐν καταφθαρῆναι πάντας, ὄμολογο-
μένως ἐκ τοῦτων εἰς ἐκάτερον τῶν προερημένων

₄₈ ἀμαρτημάτων ἐμπίπτουσι. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸς
φανεῖς στρατηγὸς ἀλουστότερος Ἀννίβου τῖς καὶ

² σκιάτοτερος ἵγεμών, ὅσ τοσοῦτον ἵγοβμένος δυνὰ-
mew ν καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἔλπιδας ἔχων ἐν τούτοις

tοῦ κατορθώσεν τοῖς ὀλοῖς, οὔτε τὰς ὀδοὺς οὔτε
τόπους, ὃς οὗτος φασιν, οὔτε ποῦ πορεύεται τὸ

³ παράπαν οὔτε πρὸς τίνας ἔγινοικε, τὸ δὲ πέρας
οὐδέ εἰ καθόλου [τοίνυν] δυνατοὶ ἐπιβάλλεται

⁴ πράγμασιν; ἀλλὰ ὅπερ οἱ τοῖς ὀλοῖς ἐπταμκότες καὶ

κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἔξαποροῦντες οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν,

ὡστ' εἰς ἀπρονοήτους καθιέναι τόπους μετὰ δυνά-
mew χοτο, τοῦτο περιτεθείον οἱ συγγραφεῖς Ἀννίβα τῶν

τὰς μεγίστας ἔλπιδας ἀκεραίους ἔχοντες περὶ τῶν

⁵ καθ' αὐτῶν πραγμάτων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ
tῆς ἔρημίας, ἔτι ὃ ἐρυμιόττητος καὶ δυσχωρίας τῶν

⁶ τόπων ἐκδηλοῦν ποιεῖ τὸ ψεύδος αὐτῶν. οὐχ ἱστο-
rήσαντες γὰρ ὅτι συμβαίνει τοὺς Κέλτους τοὺς παρὰ

τὸν Ῥόδανον ποταμὸν οἰκοῦτας οὐχ ἄπαξ οὔτε δίσ

πρὸ τῆς Ἀννίβου παρουσίας, οὔτε μὴν πάλαι, προσ-
φάτως δὲ, μεγάλους στρατοπέδους ὑπερβάντας τὰς

Ἀλπεῖς παρατετάχθαι μὲν Ῥωμαίοις, συγκυνώσθαι
dὲ Κέλτως τοῖς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδία κατοι-
κοῦσι, καθὰπερ ἡμεῖς ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τοῦτων ἑδηλὼ-

⁷ σαμεν, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοι οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι πλείστων
ἀνθρώπων φύλον κατ' αὐτὰς οἰκεῖν συμβαίνει τὰς

Ἀλπεῖς, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες ἐκατα τῶν εἰρημένων

ἡμών τινα φασιν ἐπιφανέντα συνυποδείξας τὰς ὀδοὺς

⁸ αὐτοῖς. εὖ δὲν εἰκότως ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς τὸ παρα-

tηλίσιον τοῖς τραγωδιογράφοις. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι

¹¹⁴
BOOK III. 47. 9 - 48. 8

some god or hero had met Hannibal and showed him the way, his whole army would have gone astray and perished utterly, they unquestionably fall into both the above vices. 48. For in the first place can we imagine a more imprudent general or a more incompetent leader than Hannibal would have been, if with so large an army under his command and all his hopes of ultimate success resting on it, he did not know the roads and the country, as these writers say, and had absolutely no idea where he was marching or against whom, or in fact if his enterprise were feasible or not? What they would have us believe is that Hannibal, who had met with no check to diminish his high hopes of success, ventured on a course that no general, even after a crushing defeat and utterly at his wits' end, would take, to march, that is, into a country as to which he had no information. Similarly, in what they say about the loneliness, and the extreme steepness and difficulty of the road, the falsehood is manifest. For they never took the trouble to learn that the Celts who live near the Rhone not on one or on two occasions only before Hannibal's arrival but often, and not at any remote date but quite recently, had crossed the Alps with large armies and met the Romans in the field side by side with the Celts who inhabit the plain of the Po (as I narrated in an earlier Book) nor are they aware that there is a considerable population in the Alps themselves; but in entire ignorance of all this they tell us that some hero appeared and showed the road. The natural consequence is that they get into the same difficulties as tragic dramatists, all of whom, to bring

115
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

πάσων αἱ καταστροφαὶ τῶν δραμάτων προσδέονται θεοῦ καὶ μηχανῆς διὰ τὸ τὰς πρῶτας ὑποθέσεις
9 ψευδεῖς καὶ παραλόγους λαμβάνειν, τοὺς τε συγγρα-
φέας ἀνάγκη τὸ παραπλήσιον πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν
ήρως τε καὶ θεοὺς ἐπιφαινομένους, ἐπειδὰν τὰς
ἀρχὰς ἀπιθάνους καὶ ψευδεῖς ὑποστήσεως. πῶς
γὰρ οἰόν τε παραλόγους ἀρχαῖς εὐλογον ἐπιθεῖναι
10 τέλος; Ἀννίβας γε μὴν, οὐχ ὃς οὔτοι γράφον τοὺς,
λιὰν δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πραγματικῶς ἔχρητο ταῖς ἐπι-
11 βολαῖς. καὶ γὰρ τὴν τῆς χώρας ἀρετὴν, εἰς ἣν
ἔπεβάλετο καθιέναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν όχλων ἀλλοτριο-
τὴτα πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἐξητάκει σαφῶς, εἰς τὸ τὰς
μεταξὺ δυσχωρίας ὀδηγοῖς καὶ καθηγεμόνοις ἐγχω-
ρίοις ἔχρητο τοῖς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίδων μελλοντι
12 κοινωνεῖν. ἡμεῖς δὲ περὶ τούτων εὐθαρσῶς ἀπο-
φαινόμεθα διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν πράξεων παρʼ αὐτῶν
ἰστορικέναι τῶν παρατευκόντων τοῖς καιροῖς, τοὺς
δὲ τόπους κατοπτευκέναι καὶ τῆ διὰ τῶν Ἀλπεων
αὐτοὶ κεχρήσθαι πορεία γνώσεως ἐνεκα καὶ θέας.

49 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ Πόπλιος μὲν ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων
στρατηγός ἡμέρας ύστερον τρισὶ τῆς ἀναξιγῆς τῆς
τῶν Καρχηδονῶν παραγενόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ πο-
ταμοῦ διάβασιν, καὶ καταλαβὼν ὀρμηκότας τοὺς
ὑπεναντίοις, ἔξενισθη μὲν ὡς ἐνδέχεται μάλιστα,
2 πεπεισμένος οὐδέποτ' ἂν αὐτοῖς τολμήσαι τῇ δὲ
ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν πορείαν, διὰ τὸ πλῆ-
θος καὶ τὴν ἀθεσίαν τῶν κατοικοῦντων τοὺς τό-
3 ποὺς βαρβάρων. θεωρῶν δὲ τετολμηκότας, αὖθις
eπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἤπειγετο, καὶ παραγενόμενος ἐνεβίβαζε
4 τὰς δυνάμεις. καὶ τὸν μὲν ἀδελφὸν ἐξεπεμπεν ἐπὶ
tὰς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πράξεις, αὐτὸς δὲ πάλιν ὑποστρέφας
116
their dramas to a close, require a *deus ex machina*, as the data they choose on which to found their plots are false and contrary to reasonable probability. These writers are necessarily in the same strait and invent apparitions of heroes and gods, since the beginnings on which they build are false and improbable; for how is it possible to finish conformably to reason what has been begun in defiance of it? Of course Hannibal did not act as these writers describe, but conducted his plans with sound practical sense. He had ascertained by careful inquiry the richness of the country into which he proposed to descend and the aversion of the people to the Romans, and for the difficulties of the route he employed as guides and pioneers natives of the country, who were about to take part in his adventure. On these points I can speak with some confidence as I have inquired about the circumstances from men present on the occasion and have personally inspected the country and made the passage of the Alps to learn for myself and see.

49. Now the Roman Consul Publius arrived at the crossing of the river three days after the departure of the Carthaginians, and finding the enemy gone was in the highest degree astonished, as he had been convinced that they would never venture to march on Italy by this route owing to the number and unruly character of the native inhabitants. On seeing that they had done so he returned with all speed to his ships and began to embark his forces. Sending his brother to conduct the campaign in Spain, he himself turned back and made sail for
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

eis Ἰταλίαν ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν, σπεύδων κατα-
tacchēsai toûs ùpeanatîous diâ Turrhniás prós tûn
tûn Ἀλπεων ύπερβολὴν.

5 Ἄννιβας δὲ ποησάμενος ἐξῆς ἐπὶ τέτταρας
ημέρας τὴν πορείαν ἀπὸ τῆς διαβάσεως ἤκε πρὸς
tὴν καλουμένη Ὡήσων, χώραν πολύχολον καὶ
συντόφορον, ἔχουσαν δὲ τὴν προσηγορίαν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν
6 τοῦ συμπτώματος. ἦ μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ῥοδανός, ἦ δ’ Ἰσάρας
προσαγορευόμενος, βέοντες παρ’ ἐκάτεραν
tὴν πλευράν, ἀποκοροφοῦσιν αὐτῆς τὸ σχήμα κατὰ
7 τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλους σύμπτωσιν. ἔστι δὲ παραπλησία
τῶν μεγέθει καὶ τῶν σχήματι τῶν κατ’ Ἀγνυπτὸν
καλουμένων Δέλτα, πλὴν ἐκεῖνον μὲν θάλαττα τὴν
μίαν πλευρὰν καὶ τὰς τῶν ποταμῶν ρύσεις ἐπιζεύγ-
νυσί, ταύτης δ’ ὅρη δυσπρόσοδα καὶ δυσέμβολα καὶ
8 σχέδων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπρόσιτα. πρὸς ἧν ἀφικόμενος,
καὶ καταλαβὼν ἐν αὐτῆ δὶ’ ἀδελφὸς ὑπὲρ τῆς
βασιλείας στασιάζοντας καὶ μετὰ στρατοπέδων
9 ἀντικαθημένους ἄλληλοι, ἐπιστωμένου τοῦ πρεσ-
βυτέρου καὶ παρακαλοῦντος εἰς τὸ συμπράξαι καὶ
συμπεριποιῆσαι τὴν ἄρχῃν, [αὐτῶ] ὑπῆκουσε,
προδῆλου σχέδων ὑπαρχόντας τῆς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν
10 ἐσομένης αὐτῶ χρείας. διὸ καὶ συνεπιθέμενος καὶ
συνεκβαλὼν τὸν ἔτερον πολλῆς ἐπικουρίας ἔτυχε
11 παρὰ τοῦ κρατήσαντος· οὔ γὰρ μόνον σῖτῳ καὶ
tοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτηδείοις ἀφθόνως ἔχορῆγος τὸ
στρατόπεδον, ἄλλα καὶ τῶν ὀπλῶν τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ
tὰ πεπονηκότα πάντα διαλλάξας ἐκανοποίησε
12 πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν εὐκαίρως, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς πλείστους
ἐσθήτη καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ὑποδέσει κοσμήσας μεγάλην
εὐχρηστίαν παρέσχετο πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὀρῶν ύπερ-
13 βολάς. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, εὐλαβῶς διακειμένουs
118
BOOK III. 49. 4 – 13

Italy with the design of marching rapidly through Etruria and reaching the foot of the pass over the Alps before the enemy.

Hannibal, marching steadily from the crossing-place for four days, reached a place called the "Island," a populous district producing abundance of corn and deriving its name from its situation; for the Rhone and Isère running along each side of it meet at its point. It is similar in size and shape to the Egyptian Delta; only in that case the sea forms the base line uniting the two branches of the Nile, while here the base line is formed by a range of mountains difficult to climb or penetrate, and, one may say, almost inaccessible. On arriving there he found two brothers disputing the crown and posted over against each other with their armies, and on the elder one making overtures to him and begging him to assist in establishing him on the throne, he consented, it being almost a matter of certainty that under present circumstances this would be of great service to him. Having united with him therefore to attack and expel the other, he derived great assistance from the victor; for not only did he furnish the army with plenty of corn and other provisions but he replaced all their old and worn weapons by new ones, thus freshening up the whole force very opportunely. He also supplied most of them with warm clothing and foot-wear, things of the greatest possible service to them in crossing the mountains. But the most important of all was, that the Carthaginians being not at all easy on the
ΤΗΣ ΗISTORYΣ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

πρὸς τὴν διὰ τῶν Ἀλλοβρίγων καλουμένων Γαλατῶν πορείαν ἀποφαγήσας μετὰ τῆς σφετέρας δυνάμεως ἀσφαλῆ παρεσκεύασε τὴν δίοδον αὐτῶς, ἐως ἦγγοισαν τῇ τῶν Ἀλπεών ὑπερβολῆ.

50 Ἄννίβας δ’ ἐν ἡμέραις δέκα πορευθεὶς παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν εἰς οἰκτακούονς σταδίους ἤρξατο τῆς πρὸς τὰς Ἀλπεῖς ἀναβολῆς, καὶ συνέβη μεγίστους αὐτὸν 2 περιπετείων κυνύνοις. ἐως μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτέ-
δοις ἦσαν, ἀπείχωντο πάντες αὐτῶν οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἡγεμόνες τῶν Ἀλλοβρίγων, τὰ μὲν τοὺς ἱππεῖς δεδιότες, τὰ δὲ τοὺς παραπέμποντας βαρβάρους.

3 ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἔκεινοι μὲν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἀπηλλάγησαν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἄννίβαν ἤρξαντο προάγει εἰς τὰς δυσχωρίας, τότε συναθροίσαντες οἱ τῶν Ἀλλοβρί-
γων ἡγεμόνες ἱκανον τὶ πλῆθος, προκατελάβοντο τοὺς εὐκαίροις τόπους, δι’ ὅν ἔδει τοὺς περὶ τὸν

4 Ἄννίβαν κατ’ ἀνάγκην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀναβολήν. εἰ μὲν σὺν ἐκρυψά τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, ὀλοσχερῶς ἄν δι-

5 ἐφθιέραν τὸ στρατεύμα τῶν Καρχηδόνων. νῦν δὲ καταφανεῖς γενόμενοι μεγάλα μὲν καὶ τοὺς περὶ

6 Ἄννίβαν ἔβλαψαν, οὐκ ἐλάττω δ’ ἐστοῦσ. γνώσ

7 προέπεμψε δὲ τινὰς τῶν καθηγουμένων αὐτοῖς Γα-

8 λατῶν χάριν τοῦ κατασκέψασθαι τὴν τῶν ὑπενα-

9 τῶν ἐπίνοιαν καὶ τὴν ὁλῆν ὑπόθεσιν. ὃν πραξά-
subject of their passage through the territory of the Allobroges, he protected them in the rear with his own forces and enabled them to reach the foot of the pass in safety.

50. After a ten days' march of eight hundred stades along the bank of the Isère a Hannibal began the ascent of the Alps and now found himself involved in very great difficulties. For as long as they had been in flat country, the various chiefs of the Allobroges had left them alone, being afraid both of the cavalry and of the barbarians who were escorting them. But when the latter had set off on their return home, and Hannibal's troops began to advance into the difficult region, the Allobrogian chieftains got together a considerable force and occupied advantageous positions on the road by which the Carthaginians would be obliged to ascend. Had they only kept their project secret, they would have utterly annihilated the Carthaginian army, but, as it was, it was discovered, and though they inflicted a good deal of damage on Hannibal, they did more injury to themselves; for the Carthaginian general having learnt that the barbarians had seized on these critical positions, encamped himself at the foot of the pass, and remaining there sent on in advance some of his Gaulish guides, to reconnoitre and report on the enemy's plan and the whole situation. His orders were executed, and on learning that the enemy remained most strictly at their post during the day-time but retired at night to a neighbouring township, he adapted his measures to this intelligence

a Polybius says simply "the river."
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

8 τοιαύτην. ἀναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν προῆγεν ἐμφανῶς, καὶ συνεγιόσας ταῖς δυσχωρίαις οὐ μακρὰν τῶν πολεμίων κατεστρατοπέδευσε. τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς ἐπιγενομένης, συντάξας τὰ πυρὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ μὲν πλείον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ κατέλυε, τοὺς δὲ ἐπιτηδειοτάτους εὐξώνους ποιήσας διήλθε τὰ στενὰ τὴν νύκτα καὶ κατέσχε τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων προκαταληφθέντας τόπους, ἀποκεχωρηκότων τῶν βαρβάρων κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

51 οὐ συμβάντος καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπιγενομένης, οἱ βάρβαροι συνθεασάμενοι τὸ γεγονός τοῖς μὲν ἄρχας άπέστησαν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα θεωροῦντες τὸ τῶν ὑποζυγίων πλῆθος καὶ τοὺς ἰππεῖς δυσχερῶς ἐκμηνυομένους καὶ μακρῶς τὰς δυσχωρίας, ἔκληθησαν ὑπὸ τού συμβαίνοντος ἐξάπτεσθαι τῆς πορείας. τούτου δὲ γενομένου, καὶ κατὰ πλείω μέρη προσπεσοῦντων τῶν βαρβάρων, οὐχ οὔτως ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὡς ὑπὸ τῶν τόπων πολὺς ἐγίνετο φθόροι τῶν Καρχηδονίων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἰππών καὶ τῶν ὑποζυγίων. οὔσης γὰρ οὐ μόνον στενῆς καὶ τραχείας τῆς προσβολῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κρήμνώδους, ἀπὸ παντὸς κνήματος καὶ πάσης ταραχῆς ἐφέρετο κατὰ τῶν κρημνῶν ὁμός τοῖς φορτίοις πολλὰ τῶν ὑπό-ζυγίων. καὶ μάλιστα τὴν τοιαύτην ταραχῆν ἐποίουν οἱ τραυματιζόμενοι τῶν ἰππῶν· τοὺτων γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἄντιοι συμπάπποντες τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις, ὅποτε διαπτοθεῖεν ἐκ τῆς πληγῆς, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς τούμπον συνθεὶς ὡρμηθοῦντες πᾶν τὸ παραπτώτον ἐν τοῖς δυσχωρίαις, μεγάλην ἀπειργάζοντο ταραχὴν. εἰς δὲ βλέπων Ἀννίβας, καὶ συλλογιζόμενος ὡς οὔδὲ τοῖς διαφυγοῦσι τῶν κίνδυνον ἔστη σωτηρία τοῦ σκευοφόρου διαφθαρέντος, ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς προκατασχόν-
and arranged the following plan. He advanced openly with his whole army, and on approaching the difficult points he encamped not far from the enemy. As soon as it was night, he ordered the fires to be lit, and leaving the greater part of his forces there, took the men most fitted for the enterprise, whom he had lightened of their accoutrements, and passing through the narrow part of the road occupied the posts abandoned by the enemy, who had retired as usual to the town. At daylight the enemy observed what had happened and at first desisted from their project, but afterwards on seeing the long string of sumpter-animals and horsemen slowly and with difficulty winding up the narrow path, they were tempted by this to molest their march. On their doing so and attacking at several different points, the Carthaginians suffered great loss chiefly in horses and sumpter-mules, not so much at the hands of the barbarians as owing to the ground. For the road up the pass being not only narrow and uneven but precipitous, the least movement or disturbance caused many of the animals to be pushed over the precipice with their packs. It was chiefly the horses on being wounded which caused the disturbance, some of them, terrified by the pain, turning and meeting the pack-animals and others rushing on ahead and pushing aside in the narrow path everything that came in their way, thus creating a general confusion. Hannibal, on seeing this and reflecting that there would be no chance of safety even for those who escaped from the battle if the pack-train were destroyed, took with him the men
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tas tēn nūkta tās ὑπερβολὰς άρμησε παραβοηθή-
7 σων τοὺς τῇ πορείᾳ προλαβοῦσιν. οὗ γενομένου
pollοί μὲν τῶν πολεμίων ἀπώλυντο διὰ τὸ ποιεί-
σθαι τὴν ἔφοδον εἶ ὑπερδεξίων τῶν 'Αννίβαν, οὐκ
8 ἑλάττους δὲ καὶ τῶν ἱδίων. οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν πορείαν
θόρυβος εἶ ἀμφότερον ὑπέτει διὰ τὴν τῶν προερη-
9 μένων κραυγὴν καὶ συμπλοκὴν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοὺς μὲν
πλείστους τῶν 'Αλλοβρίγων ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ λοι-
ποὺς τρεψάμενος ἁνάγκασε φυγεῖν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν,
tότε δὴ τὸ μὲν ἐτὶ περιλειπόμενον πλῆθος τῶν ὑπο-
ζυγίων καὶ τῶν ἵππων μόλις καὶ ταλαιπώρως διήνυε
10 τὰς δυσχωρίας, αὐτὸς δὲ συναθροίσας ὅσους ἥδυ-
νυστα πλείστους ἐκ τοῦ κυνδύου, προσέβαλε πρὸς
tὴν πόλιν, εἷς ὃς ἐπονήσαντο τὴν ὀρμήν οἱ πολέμιοι.
11 καταλαβὼν δὲ σχεδὸν ἔρημον διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐκκλη-
θήναι πρὸς τὰς ὕφαλειάς, ἐγκρατῆς ἐγένετο τῆς πό-
λεως. ἐκ δὲ τούτου πολλὰ συνέβη τῶν χρησίμων
12 αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον. παρ-
αυτικὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκομίσατο πλῆθος ἵππων καὶ ὑπο-
ζυγίων καὶ τῶν ἁμα τούτοις ἑαλωκότων ἀνδρῶν,
eἰς δὲ τὸ μέλλον ἐσχε μὲν καὶ σίτοι καὶ θρεμμά-
13 των ἐπὶ δεινών καὶ τρισίν ἠμέραις εὐπορίαν, τὸ δὲ
συνέχον, φόβον ἐνεγράσατο τοῖς ἔξης, πρὸς τὸ μὴ
tολμᾶν αὐτῷ ῥαδίως ἐγχειρεῖν μηδένα τῶν παρα-
κειμένων ταῖς ἀναβολαῖς.

52 Τότε μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ ποιησάμενος τὴν παρεμβο-
2 λὴν, καὶ μίαν ἐπιμείνας ἠμέραν, αὖθις ὥρμα. ταῖς
δ’ ἔξης μεχρὶ μὲν τινος ἀσφαλῶς διήγε τὴν στρα-
τιάν’ ἦδη δὲ τεταρταιός ὡν αὖθις εἰς κυνδύων
3 παρεγένετο μεγάλους. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τὴν δίοδον οἰ-
κούντες συμφρονήσαντο ἐπὶ δόλῳ συνήμτων αὐτῷ,
who had occupied the heights at night and hastened to render assistance to the head of the marching column. He inflicted great loss on the Allobroges, as he was charging from higher ground, but the loss was equally heavy among his own troops, since the column on the march was thrown into further confusion in both directions at once owing to the shouting and struggling of those taking part in this combat. It was only when he had put the greater part of the Allobroges to the sword and compelled the rest to take to flight and run for their own land, that the remainder of the pack-train and the horses got slowly and with great difficulty over the dangerous part, and he himself rallying as many troops as he could after the fight, attacked the town from which the enemy had issued to make their onslaught. He found it nearly deserted, as all the inhabitants had been tempted out by hope of pillage, and seized on it. This proved of great service to him for the future as well as the present; for not only did he recover a number of pack-animals and horses and the men who had been captured together with them, but he got a supply of corn and cattle amply sufficient for two or three days, and in addition to this he struck such terror into the next tribes that none of those in the neighbourhood of the ascent were likely to venture to molest him.

52. For the present, he encamped here, and after a stay of one day resumed his march. For the following days he conducted the army in safety up to a certain point, but on the fourth day he was again placed in great danger. The natives near the pass conspired together and came out to meet him with treacherous intentions, holding olive-branches
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

θάλλον ἔχοντες καὶ στεφάνους· τοῦτο γὰρ σχεδὸν πάσι τοῖς βαρβάροις ἦστι σύνθημα φιλίας, καθάπερ 
4 τὸ κηρύκειον τοῖς Ἕλλησι. εὐλαβῶς δὲ διακεί-
μενος πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην πίστιν Ἄννιβας ἐξῆτας 
φιλοτίμως τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ὅλην ἐπιβο-
λήν. τῶν ὑπὸ φασκόντων καλῶς εἰδέναι καὶ τὴν τῆς 
pόλεως ἀλώσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐγχειρησάντων αὐτῶν 
ἀδικείν ἀπώλειαν, καὶ διασαφούστων ὅτι πάρεισι 
dιὰ ταύτα, βουλόμενοι μήτε ποιήσαι μήτε παθεῖν 
μηδὲν δυσχερές, ὑπαχνομένων δὲ καὶ δώσεων ἐξ 
6 αὐτῶν ὀμηρᾶ, πολὺν μὲν χρόνον εὐλαβεῖτο καὶ 
διηπότεο τοῖς λεγομένοις, συλλογιζόμενος «δ’ ὠς 
δεξάμενος» μὲν τὰ προτεινόμενα, τάχ’ ἄν ἵσως 
eὐλαβεστέρους καὶ πραστέρους ποιήσαι τοὺς παρα-
γεγονότας, μὴ προσδέξαμεν δὲ προδῆλους ἔξει πο-
λέμιοι αὐτοῖς, συγκατένευσε τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ 
7 συνυπεκρίθη τίθεσθαι φιλίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς. τῶν ὑπὸ 
βαρβάρων τὰ ὄμηρα παραδόντων καὶ θρέμμασι χα-
ρηγούντων ἀφθόνοις, καὶ καθὸλου διδόντων σφᾶς 
αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἀπαρατηρήτως, ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἐπὶ-
στεναὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἄννιβαν, ὡςτε καὶ καθηγε-
μόσιν αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἐξῆς δυσχωρίας.
8 προπορευομένων δ’ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ δῦ ἠμέραις, συναθροι-
σθέντες οἱ προειρημένοι καὶ συνακολουθήσαντες 
ἐπιτίθενται, φάραγγα τινὰ δύσβατον καὶ κρημώδη 
53 περαιομένων αὐτῶν. ἐν θαυματά πάντας ἄν ἄρ-
δην ἀπολέσθαι συνεβή τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἄννιβαν, εἰ 
μὴ δεδιότες ἀκμὴν ἐπὶ ποσὸν καὶ προορώμενοι τὸ 
μέλλον τὰ μὲν σκευοφόρα καὶ τοὺς ἵππεις ἔχον ἐν 
τῇ πρωτοπορείᾳ, τοὺς δ’ ὁπλίταις ἐπὶ τῆς ουραγίας.
2 τοῦτω δ’ ἐφεδρεύοντων ἔλαττον συνεβή γενέσθαι 
tὸ πάθος· οὕτωι γὰρ ἔστεξαν τὴν ἐπιφορὰν τῶν βαρ-
and wreaths, which nearly all the barbarians use as tokens of friendship, just as we Greeks use the herald's staff. Hannibal, who was a little suspicious of such proffers of alliance, took great pains to ascertain what their project and general motives were. When they told him that they knew all about the capture of the city and the destruction of those who had attempted to do him wrong, and assured him that for this reason they were come to him, as they neither wished to inflict nor to suffer any injury, and on their promising to give him hostages from among themselves, he for long hesitated, distrusting their word. But, reflecting that if he accepted their offers, he might perhaps make them more chary of attacking him and more pacific, but that if he refused, they would certainly be his declared enemies, he finally agreed to their proposals, and feigned to accept their friendship. Upon the barbarians now delivering the hostages and providing him with cattle in abundance, and altogether putting themselves unreservedly into his hands, he trusted in them so far as to employ them as guides for the next difficult part of the road. But after two days' march these same barbarians collecting and following on the heels of the Carthaginians, attacked them as they were traversing a certain difficult and precipitous gorge. 53. On this occasion Hannibal's whole army would have been utterly destroyed, had he not still been a little apprehensive and foreseeing such a contingency placed the pack-train and cavalry at the head of the column and the heavy infantry in the rear. As the latter now acted as a covering force, the disaster was less serious, the infantry
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

3 βάρων. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ τούτου συγκυρήσαντος πολὺ τι πλῆθος καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῶν ὑποζυγίων
4 καὶ τῶν ἵππων διεφθάρη. τῶν γὰρ τόπων ὑπερ-
δεξίων ὄντων τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀντιπαράγοντες οἱ
βάρβαροι ταῖς παρωρείαις, καὶ τοῖς μὲν τὰς πέτρας
ἐπικυλιόντες, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ χειρὸς τοῖς λίθοις τύπτοντες,
5 εἰς ὀλοσχερὴ διατροπὴν καὶ κίνδυνον ἦγον, οὕτως
ὡστε ἀναγκασθῆναι τὸν Ἀννίβαν μετὰ τῆς ἰμβείας
dυνάμεως νυκτερεύσαι περὶ τι λευκὸπετρον ὁχυρὸν
χωρίς τῶν ἱππῶν καὶ τῶν ὑποζυγίων, ἐφεδρένουτα
tοῦτοι, ἐως ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ νυκτὶ ταῦτα μόλις ἔξεμηρυ-
6 σατο τῆς χαράδρας. τῇ δ' ἐπαύριον τῶν πολεμίων
χωρισθέντων, συνάψας τοῖς ἑπευξεί καὶ τοῖς ὑποζυ-
γίοις προῆγε πρὸς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τὰς ἀνωτάτως τῶν
"Αλπεων, ὀλοσχερεῖ μὲν οὐδενὶ περιπιπτῶν ἐτι συ-
στήματι τῶν βαρβάρων, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸ-
7 πους παρενοχλοῦμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν· ὅν οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ
tῆς οὐραγίας, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς πρωτοπορείας ἀπέσπων
tῶν σκευοφόρων ἔνια, προσπέπτοντες ἐυκαίρως.
8 μεγίστην δ' αὐτῷ παρείχετο χρείαν τὰ θηρία: καθ' ὅν
γὰρ ἄν τόπον ὑπάρχου τῆς πορείας ταῦτα, πρὸς
tοῦτο τὸ μέρος οὐκ ἐτόλμων οἱ πολέμιοι προσέναι,
tὸ παράδοξον ἐκπληρῶμενοι τῆς τῶν ζώων φαντα-
9 σίας. ἐναταῖς δὲ διανύσας εἰς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς αὐτοῦ
κατεστρατοπέδευσε, καὶ δυ' ἡμέρας προσέμενε, βου-
λόμενος ἀμα μὲν ἀναπαύσαι τοὺς διασφοζόμενος,
10 ἀμα δὲ προσδέξασθαι τοὺς ἀπολειπομένους. ἐν ὦ
καιρῷ συνέβη πολλοὺς μὲν ἑπευξεί τῶν ἀπεπτημέ-

νων, πολλά δ' ὑποζύγια τῶν ἀπερριφότων τὰ φορ-
tία παραδόξως ἀναδραμεῖν τοὺς στίβους ἐπόμενα
54 καὶ συνάψαι πρὸς τὴν παρεμβολὴν. τῆς δὲ χιόνος
meeting the brunt of the attack. But in spite of all this a great many men, pack-animals, and horses were lost. For the enemy being on higher ground skirted along the slopes and either by rolling rocks down or by hurling stones from the hand threw the Carthaginians into such extreme peril and confusion that Hannibal was compelled to pass the night with half of his force at a certain place defended by bare rocks and separated from his horses and pack-train, whose advance he waited to cover, until after a whole night’s labour they managed to extricate themselves from the defile. Next day, the enemy having taken their departure, he joined the cavalry and pack-animals and advanced to the summit of the pass, encountering no longer any massed force of barbarians, but molested from time to time and in certain places by some of them who took advantage of the ground to attack him either from the rear or from the front and carry off some of the pack-animals. In these circumstances the elephants were of the greatest service to him; for the enemy never dared to approach that part of the column in which these animals were, being terrified by the strangeness of their appearance. After an ascent of nine days Hannibal reached the summit, and encamping there remained for two days to rest the survivors of his army and wait for stragglers. During this interval a good many of the horses which had broken away in terror and a number of those sumpter-animals which had thrown off their packs returned strangely enough, having followed the track of the march, and came into the camp. 54. As it was now close
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ηδη περι τους άκρους άθροιζομενης δια το συνάπτειν
tην τής Πλειάδος δύσων, θεωρῶν τα πλήθη δυσθύ-
μως διακείμενα καὶ διὰ τὴν προγεγενημένην τα-
λατπωρίαν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἑτί προσδοκωμένην, ἑπει-
ράτῳ συναθροίσας παρακαλεῖν, μίαν ἑχουν ἀφορμὴν
εἰς τοῦτο τὴν τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐνάργειαν. οὔτως γὰρ
ὑποπεπτώκει τοῖς προειρημένοις ὅρεσιν ὡστε συν-
θεωρουμένων ἀμφοτὲρ ἀκροτόλεως φαίνεσθαι διὰ-
3 θεον ἑχουν τὰς Ἀλπεῖς τῆς δῆλης Ἰταλίας. διότερ
ἐνδεικνύμενοι αὐτοὶς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδία,
καὶ καθόλου τῆς εὐνοίας ὑπομονήσκων τῆς τῶν
κατοικοῦντων αὐτάς Γαλατῶν, ἀμα δὲ καὶ τὸν τῆς
Ῥώμης αὐτῆς τόπον ὑποδεικνύων, ἐπὶ ποσὸν εὐθαρ-
4 σεῖς ἐποίησε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. τῇ δ’ ἐπαύριοι ἀνα-
ζεύγας ἐνήχετο τῆς καταβάσεως. ἐν ἂν πολεμίως
μὲν οὐκέτι περιέτυχε πλὴν τῶν λάθρως κακοποιοῦν-
των, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τόπων καὶ τῆς χιόνος οὐ πολλῶ
λείποντας ἀπέβαλε τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀνάβασιν φθαρέν-
5 τῶν. οὕτως γὰρ στενῆς καὶ κατωφεροῦσ τῆς κατα-
βάσεως, τῆς δε χιόνος ἀδήλου ποιοῦσιν ἐκάστως
tὴν ἐπίβασιν, πάν τὸ παραπέσον τῆς ὀδοῦ καὶ
6 σφαλὲν ἐφέρετο κατὰ τῶν κρημνῶν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα
ταῦτην μὲν ὑπέφερον τὴν τάλαπωρίαν, ἀτε συν-
7 ήθεις οὔτε ἢδη τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς. ἀμα δὲ τῷ
παραγενέσθαι πρὸς τοιοῦτον τόπον, ὅν οὔτε τοῖς
θηρίοις οὔτε τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις δυνατὸν ἦν παρελθεῖν
dιὰ τὴν στενότητα, σχεδὸν ἐπὶ τρὶς ἠμιστάδια τῆς
ἀπορρώγος καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν οὕτως, τότε δὲ καὶ μάλ-
λον ἐτι προσφάτως ἀπερρώγιας, ἐνταῦθα πάλιν ἄθυ-
8 μᾶςι καὶ διατραπῆναι συνέβη τὸ πλῆθος. τὸ μὲν
οὖν πρῶτον ἐπεβάλετο περιελθέων τὰς δυσχωρίας
τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγός. ἐπιγενομένης δὲ
on the setting of the Pleiads snow had already gathered on the summit, and noticing that the men were in bad spirits owing to all they had suffered up to now and expected to suffer he summoned them to a meeting and attempted to cheer them up, relying chiefly for this purpose on the actual view of Italy, which lies so close under these mountains, that when both are viewed together the Alps stand to the whole of Italy in the relation of a citadel to a city. Showing them, therefore, the plain of the Po, and reminding them of the friendly feelings of the Gauls inhabiting it, while at the same time pointing out the situation of Rome itself, he to some extent restored their spirits. Next day he broke up his camp and began the descent. During this he encountered no enemy, except a few skulking marauders, but owing to the difficulties of the ground and the snow his losses were nearly as heavy as on the ascent. The descending path was very narrow and steep, and as both men and beasts could not tell on what they were treading owing to the snow, all that stepped wide of the path or stumbled were dashed down the precipice. This trial, however, they put up with, being by this time familiar with such sufferings, but they at length reached a place where it was impossible for either the elephants or the pack-animals to pass owing to the extreme narrowness of the path, a previous landslip having carried away about one and a half stades of the face of the mountain and a further landslip having recently occurred, and here the soldiers once more became disheartened and discouraged. The Carthaginian general at first thought of avoiding the difficult part by a detour, but as a fresh fall of snow made progress
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS.

χιόνος καὶ ταύτην ἀδύνατον πουόησις τὴν πορείαν, 55 ἀπέστη τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. τὸ γὰρ συμβαίνον ίδιον ἢν καὶ παρηγλαμένον. ἐπὶ γὰρ τὴν προϋπάρχουσαν χίόνα καὶ διαμεμενηκύιαν ἐκ τοῦ πρῶτον χειμώνος ἄρτι τῆς ἐπ’ ἑτοὺς πεπτωκυίας, ταύτην μὲν εὐδιάκοπτον εἶναι συνέβαινε καὶ διὰ τὸ πρόσφατον οὖσαι ἄπαρχεσκαὶ καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδέπω βάθος 2 ἔχειν. ὅποτε δὲ ταύτην διαπατήσαντες ἐπὶ τὴν ὑποκάτω καὶ συνεστηκυιαν ἐπιβαίνει, οὐκέτι διέκοπτον, ἀλλ’ ἐπέπλεον ὁλισθάνοντες ἀμφοτέρους ἀμα τοῖς ποσί, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῇ γῆ συμβαίνει τοῖς διὰ τῶν 3 ἀκροτήλων πορευμένους. τὸ δὲ συνεξακολουθοῦν 4 τοῦτοι ἐτί δυσχερέστερον ὑπήρχειν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄνδρες οὐ δύναντον τὴν κάτω χίόνα διακόπτειν, ὅποτε πεσόντες βουληθεῖ ἢ τοῖς γόνασιν ἢ τοῖς χερσὶ προσεξερείσασθαι πρὸς τὴν ἤξιανάστασιν, τότε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπέπλεον ἀμα πάσι τοῖς ἐρείσμοσιν, ἕπι 5 πολὺ καταφερῶν ὅντων τῶν χωρίων. τὰ δὲ ὑποζύγια διέκοπτεν, ὅτε πέσοι, τὴν κάτω χίόνα κατὰ τὴν διανάστασιν, διακόψαντα δὲ ἔμενε μετὰ τῶν φορτίων ὀλοκαταπτηγότα διὰ τὸ βάρος καὶ διὰ 6 τὸ πῆγμα τῆς προὐπάρχουσας χιόνος. οὸν ἀποστάς τῆς τοιαύτης ἐλπίδος ἐστρατοπέδευσε περὶ τὴν ράχιν, διαμεμενενος τὴν ἐπ’ αὐτὴς χίόνα, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα παραστῆσα τὰ πλῆθη τὸν κρημνὸν ἔξωκο- 7 δόμει μετὰ πολλῆς ταλασπυρίας. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ὑποζύγιοι καὶ τοῖς ἑπίσω ἵκανη ἐποίησε πάροδον ἐν ἡμέρα μιᾷ. διὸ καὶ ταῦτα μὲν εὐθέως διαγαγών καὶ καταστρατοπεδεύσας περὶ τοὺς ἐκφεύγοντας ἕδη 8 τὴν χίόνα τόπους διαφῆκε πρὸς τὰς νομιὰς, τοὺς δὲ Νομᾶδας ἀνὰ μέρος προῆγε πρὸς τὴν οἰκοδομίαν, καὶ μόλις ἐν ἡμέραις τρισὶ κακοπαθήσας διήγαγε τὰ 182
impossible he had to abandon this project. 55. The state of matters was altogether peculiar and unusual. The new snow which had fallen on the top of the old snow remaining since the previous winter, was itself yielding, both owing to its softness, being a fresh fall, and because it was not yet very deep, but when they had trodden through it and set foot on the congealed snow beneath it, they no longer sunk in it, but slid along it with both feet, as happens to those who walk on ground with a coat of mud on it. But what followed on this was even more trying. As for the men, when, unable to pierce the lower layer of snow, they fell and then tried to help themselves to rise by the support of their knees and hands, they slid along still more rapidly on these, the slope being exceedingly steep. But the animals, when they fell, broke through the lower layer of snow in their efforts to rise, and remained there with their packs as if frozen into it, owing to their weight and the congealed condition of this old snow. Giving up this project, then, Hannibal encamped on the ridge, sweeping it clear of snow, and next set the soldiers to work to build up the path along the cliff, a most toilsome task. In one day he had made a passage sufficiently wide for the pack-train and horses; so he at once took these across and encamping on ground free of snow, sent them out to pasture, and then took the Numidians in relays to work at building up the path, so that with great difficulty in three days he managed to
θηρία. καὶ τάδε συνεβαίνει κακῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λιμοῦ δια-
9 τεθείσθαι· τῶν γὰρ Ἀλπεων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα καὶ τὰ
πρὸς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἀνήκοντα τελέως ἀδενάρα καὶ
ψιλὰ πάντ’ ἔστι διὰ τὸ συνεχῶς ἐπιμένειν τὴν χιώνα
καὶ θέρους καὶ χειμῶνος, τὰ δ’ ὑπὸ μέσην τὴν παρ-
ώρειαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τῶν μερόν ὑλοφόρα καὶ δεν-
δροφόρα καὶ τὸ ὄλον ὀίκησιμ’ ἔστων.

56 Ἀνίβας δὲ συναθροίσας ὧμοι πᾶσαν τὴν δύνα-
mιν κατέβαινε, καὶ τριταιός ἀπὸ τῶν προειρημένων
2 κρημνῶν διανύσας ἦπατο τῶν ἐπιτέδων, πολλοὺς
μὲν ἀπολωλεκὼς τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὑπὸ τε τῶν πολε-
mίων καὶ τῶν ποταμών ἐν τῇ καθόλου πορείᾳ, πολ-
lούς δ’ ὑπὸ τῶν κρημνῶν καὶ τῶν δυσχωρίων κατὰ
tὰς Ἀλπεῖς οὐ μόνον ἀνδρᾶς, ἕτε τὰ πλεῖον ἵππους
3 καὶ ὑποζύγια. τέλος δὲ τὴν μὲν πᾶσαν πορείαν ἐκ
Καινῆς πόλεως ἐν πέντε μηνί ποιησάμενος, τὴν δὲ
tῶν Ἀλπεων ὑπερβολὴν ἡμέραις δεκαπέντε, κατῆρε
τολμηρός εἰς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδία καὶ τὸ τῶν
4 Ἰνομβρῶν ἐθνος, ἐξων τὸ διασωζόμενον μέρος τῆς
μὲν τῶν Λιβύων δυνάμεως πεζοῦς μυρίους καὶ δισ-
χιλίους, τῆς δὲ τῶν Ἰβηρῶν εἰς ὀκτακισχιλίους, ἵπ-
Pεῖς δὲ τοὺς πάντας οὐ πλείον ἐξακισχίλιων, ὡς
ἀυτὸς ἐν τῇ στήλῃ τῇ περὶ τοῦ πλῆθους ἑχοῦσῃ
tὴν ἐπιγραφήν ἐπὶ Δακινῶ διασαφεί.

5 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς, ὡς ἑπάνω προείπα,
Pόπλιος ἀπολελουίσας τὰς δυνάμεις Γναῖτω τάξει,
καὶ παρακεκληκὼς αὐτὸν ἔχεοι τῶν ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ
πραγμάτων καὶ πολεμεῖν ἐρρωμένως Ἀσδρούβα,
6 κατέπλευσε μετ’ ὀλίγων αὐτῶς εἰς Πίσας. ποιησά-
μενος δὲ τὴν πορείαν διὰ Τυρρηνίας, καὶ παραλαβὼν
τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἐξαπελέκεων στρατόπεδα τὰ προκαθή-
μενα καὶ προσπολεμοῦντα τοῖς Βοίοις, ἤκε πρὸς τὰ
get the elephants across, but in a wretched condition from hunger; for the summits of the Alps and the parts near the top of the passes are all quite treeless and bare owing to the snow lying there continuously both winter and summer, but the slopes half-way up on both sides are grassy and wooded and on the whole inhabitable.

56. Hannibal having now got all his forces together continued the descent, and in three days' march from the precipice just described reached flat country. He had lost many of his men by the hands of the enemy in the crossing of rivers and on the march in general, and the precipices and difficulties of the Alps had cost him not only many men, but a far greater number of horses and sumpter-animals. The whole march from New Carthage had taken him five months, and he had spent fifteen days in crossing the Alps, and now, when he thus boldly descended into the plain of the Po and the territory of the Insubres, his surviving forces numbered twelve thousand African and eight thousand Iberian foot, and not more than six thousand horse in all, as he himself states in the inscription on the column at Lacinium relating to the number of his forces.

About the same time, as I stated above, Publius Scipio, leaving his forces with his brother Gnaeus with orders to conduct operations in Spain and vigorously combat Hasdrubal, arrived by sea at Pisa with a small following. Marching through Etruria and taking over from the Praetors the frontier legions which were engaged with the Boii, he reached
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

peri tôn Pádon pedía kai katastratopedeúsas ἐπείχε τοῖς πολεμίοις, σπεύδων συμβαλεῖν εἰς μάχην.

57 Ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἀμφοτέρων καὶ τὸν πόλεμον εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἠγάγομεν, πρὸ τοῦ τῶν ἀγώνων ἀρξασθαι βραχέα βουλόμεθα περὶ τῶν ἀρμοζόντων τῇ πραγματείᾳ διελθεῖν. ἦσσως γὰρ δὴ τινες ἐπιζητήσουσι πῶς πεποιμένοι τὸν πλείστον λόγον ὑπὲρ τῶν κατὰ Διβύνην καὶ κατ' Ἰβηρίαν τῶν οὔτε περὶ τοῦ καθ' Ἡρακλέους στήλαις στόματος οὕδεν ἐπὶ πλείον εἰρήκαμεν οὔτε περὶ τῆς ἐξωθεὶσεως καὶ τῶν ἐν ταύτῃ συμβαίνοντων ἱδιωμάτων, οὐδὲ μὴν περὶ τῶν Βρεττανίκων νῆσων καὶ τῆς τοῦ καττηρέου κατασκευῆς, ἐτί δὲ τῶν ἀργυρείων καὶ χρυσείων τῶν κατ' αὐτὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ὑπὲρ ὡν οἱ συγγραφεῖς ἀμφιγητοῦσας πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸν πλείστον διατίθενται λόγον.

4 Ἡμεῖς δ' οὐχὶ νομίζοντες ἀλλότριον εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς ἰστορίας διὰ τοῦτο παρελείπομεν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν οὐ βουλόμεθα παρ' ἕκαστα διαστάνῃ τὴν διήγησιν οὐδ' ἀποπλανῶν ἀπὸ τῆς πραγματικῆς ὑπο-

5 θέσεως τοὺς φιληκουούτας, δεύτερον δὲ κρίνοντες οὐ διερρυμμένην οὐδ' ἐν παρέργῳ ποιήσασθαι τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν μνήμην, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἱδίαν καὶ τότον καὶ καιρὸν ἀπονείματε τῷ μέρει τούτῳ καθ' ὅσον οἶοι τ' ἔσμεν τῇ ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν εἴησα- σθαι. διὸπερ οὐ χρὴ θαυμάζειν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς, ἐὰν ἐπὶ τινας τόπους ἐρχόμενοι τοιοῦτος παρελεί-

6 παμεν τοῦτο τὸ μέρος διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας. εἰ δὲ τινας πάντως ἐπιζητοῦσι κατὰ τότον καὶ κατὰ μέρος τῶν τοιούτων ἀκούσει, ίσως ἀγνοοῦσι παρα-

7 πλήσιὸν τι πάσχοντες τοῖς λίχνοις τῶν δειπνητῶν.

136
the plain of the Po, and encamping there, waited for the enemy, being anxious to give him battle.

57. Now that I have brought my narrative and the war and the two generals into Italy, I desire, before entering upon the struggle, to say a few words on what I think proper to my method in this work. Some readers will perhaps ask themselves why, since most of what I have said relates to Africa and Spain, I have not said a word more about the mouth of the Mediterranean at the Pillars of Hercules, or about the Outer Sea and its peculiarities, or about the British Isles and the method of obtaining tin, and the gold and silver mines in Spain itself, all matters concerning which authors dispute with each other at great length. I have omitted these subjects not because I think they are foreign to my history, but in the first place because I did not wish to be constantly interrupting the narrative and distracting readers from the actual subject, and next because I decided not to make scattered and casual allusions to such matters, but assigning the proper place and time to their special treatment to give as true an account of all as is in my power. No one then need be surprised when in the course of my history I reach such localities, if I avoid for the reason here stated any description of them. But if there be any who insist on such descriptions of each place that may be mentioned, they are perhaps unaware that they are much in the case of gourmands at a supper party
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

8 καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι πάντων ἀπογενόμενοι τῶν παρακειμένων οὐτὲ κατὰ τὸ παρόν οὐδὲνος ἀληθῶς ἀπολαύοντι τῶν βραμάτων οὔτε εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὤφελίμον ἐξ αὐτῶν τὴν ἀνάδοσιν καὶ τροφὴν κομίζονται, πάντες τῇς παραπλήσιος ποιοῦντες οὔτε τῇς παραπτικὰς διαγωγῆς ἀληθῶς οὔτε τῆς εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὦφελείας στοχάζονται δεόντως.

58 Διότι μὲν οὖν εἰ καὶ τὶ τῶν τῆς ιστορίας μερῶν ἄλλο, καὶ τοῦτο προσδεῖ λόγου καὶ διορθώσεως ἀληθινωτέρας, προφανὲς ἐκ πολλῶν, μάλιστα δὲ ἐκ τούτων. σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων, εἰ δὲ μὴ γε, τῶν πλείστων συγγραφέων πεπειραμένων μὲν ἐξηγεῖσθαι τὰς ἰδιότητας καὶ θέσεις τῶν περὶ τὰς ἑσχατίας τόπων τῆς καθ’ ἦμᾶς οἰκουμένης, ἐν πολλοῖς δὲ τῶν πλείστων διημαρτηκότων, παραλείπεις μὲν οὐδαμῶς καθήκει, ρητέον δὲ τὶ πρὸς αὐτούς οὐκ ἐκ παρέγγυω καὶ διερμημένους, ἀλλὰ ἐξ ἐπιστάσεως,

4 καὶ ρητέον οὐκ ἐπιτιμώντας οὐδὲ ἐπιπλήττοντας, ἐπαινοῦντας δὲ μάλλον καὶ διορθομένους τὴν ἀγνοίαν αὐτῶν, γινώσκοντας ὅτι κακεῖνοι τῶν νῦν καὶ ρωτῶν ἐπιλαβόμενοι πολλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰρημένων εἰς διόρθωσιν ἄν καὶ μετάθεσιν ἡγαγον. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ προγεγονότι χρόνῳ σπανίος ἀν εὑροί τις τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς ἐπιβεβλημένους πολυπραγμονείν τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἑσχατίας διὰ τὸ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἀδύνατον. πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ κατὰ ἐπταλάτταν τὸτε κίνδυνοι καὶ δυσεξαρίθμητοι, πολλαπλάσιοι δὲ τούτων οἱ κατὰ γῆν. ἀλλὰ εἰ καὶ τὶς ἤ κατα ἀνάγκην ἡ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἐξίκοιτο πρὸς τὰ πέρατα τῆς οἰκουμένης, οὐδὲ οὕτως ἦν ὑπὸ τὸ προκείμενον. δυσχερὲς μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ πλέον τινῶν αὐτόπτην γενέσθαι

138
who taste everything on the table and neither truly enjoy any dish at the moment nor digest any enough to derive beneficial nourishment from it in the future. So those who act in the same way about reading do not properly attain either present entertainment or future benefit.

58. That no part of history requires more circumspection and more correction by the light of truth than this is evident from many considerations and chiefly from the following. While nearly all authors or at least the greater number have attempted to describe the peculiarities and the situation of the countries at the extremities of the known world, most of them are mistaken on many points. We must therefore by no means pass over the subject, but we must say a word to them, and that not casually and by scattered allusions, but giving due attention to it, and in what we say we must not find fault with or rebuke them, but rather be grateful to them and correct them when wrong, knowing as we do that they too, had they the privilege of living at the present day, would correct and modify many of their own statements. In old times, indeed, we find very few Greeks who attempted to inquire into the outlying parts of the world, owing to the practical impossibility of doing so; for the sea had so many perils that it is difficult to enumerate them, and the land ever so many more. Again, even if anyone by his own choice or by the force of circumstances reached the extremity of the world, that did not mean that he was able to accomplish his purpose. For it was a difficult matter to see many things at all closely with one's own eyes, owing to
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

dià τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἐκβεβαρβαρώσθαι, τοὺς δ’ ἐρήμους εἶναι τόπους, ἂτι δὲ χαλεπῶτερον τὸ περὶ τῶν ὀραθέντων διὰ λόγου τι γνώναι καὶ μαθεῖν διὰ τὸ τῆς φωνῆς ἐξηλαγμένον. ἕαν δὲ καὶ γνῶ τις, ἔτι τῶν πρὸ τοῦ δυσχερέστερον τὸ τῶν ἐωφρακότων τινὰ μετρίω χρήσθαι τρόπῳ καὶ καταφρονήσαντα τῆς παραδοξολογίας καὶ τερατείας ἐαυτοῦ χάριν προτιμήσαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ μηδὲν τῶν πάρεξ ὄντων ἡμῖν ἀναγγέλαι. διόπερ οὐ δυσχεροῦσ, ἀλλ’ ἀδυνάτου σχεδὸν ὑπαρχοῦσης κατὰ γε τοὺς προγεγονότας καιροὺς τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἱστορίας ὑπὲρ τῶν προειρημένων, οὐκ εἰ τι παρέλιπον οἱ συγγραφεῖς ἢ διήμαρτον, ἐπιτιμῶν αὐτοῖς ἀξίουν, ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐγνωσάν τι καὶ προεβίβασαν τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τὴν περὶ τούτων ἐν τοιούτωι καιροῖς, ἐπαινεῖν καὶ θαυμάζειν αὐτούς.

3 δίκαιον. ἐν δὲ τοῖς καθ’ ἡμᾶς τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν διὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου δυναστείαν, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τῶν τοπῶν διὰ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ὑπεροχῆς σχεδὸν

4 ἀπάντων πλωτῶν καὶ πορευτῶν γεγονότων, ἀπολευμένων δὲ καὶ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἀνδρῶν τῆς περὶ τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς πράξεις φιλοτιμίας, ἐκ δὲ τούτων πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀφορμὰς εἰληφότων εἰς τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν καὶ φιλομαθεῖν περὶ τῶν προειρημένων, δέον ἂν εἰ καὶ βέλτιον γνώσκειν καληθυνότερον ὑπὲρ τῶν πρότερον ἀγνοομένων.

6 ὅπερ ἤμεῖς αὐτοὶ τε πειρασόμεθα ποιεῖν, λαβόντες ἀρμόζοντα τόπον ἐν τῇ πραγματείᾳ τῷ μέρει τούτῳ, τούς τε φιλοπευτοῦντας ὀλοσχερώστερον βουλησό-7 μεθα συνεπιστήσαι περὶ τῶν προειρημένων, ἐπειδή καὶ τὸ πλεῖον τούτου χάριν ὑπεδεξάμεθα τοὺς κωνδύνους [καὶ τὰς κακοπαθείας] τοὺς συμβάντας ἡμῖν ἐν πλάνῃ τῇ κατὰ Διβύθην καὶ κατ’ Ἰβηρίαν, ἐτι δὲ
some of the countries being utterly barbarous and others quite desolate, and it was still more difficult to get information about the things one did see, owing to the difference of the language. Then, even if anyone did see for himself and observe the facts, it was even still more difficult for him to be moderate in his statements, to scorn all talk of marvels and monsters and, preferring truth for its own sake, to tell us nothing beyond it. 59. As, therefore, it was almost impossible in old times to give a true account of the regions I speak of, we should not find fault with the writers for their omissions or mistakes, but should praise and admire them, considering the times they lived in, for having ascertained something on the subject and advanced our knowledge. But in our own times since, owing to Alexander's empire in Asia and that of the Romans in other parts of the world, nearly all regions have become approachable by sea or land, since our men of action in Greece are relieved from the ambitions of a military or political career and have therefore ample means for inquiry and study, we ought to be able to arrive at a better knowledge and something more like the truth about lands which were formerly little known. This is what I myself will attempt to do when I find a suitable place in this work for introducing the subject, and I shall then ask those who are curious about such things to give their undivided attention to me, in view of the fact that I underwent the perils of journeys through Africa, Spain, and Gaul, and of voyages on
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

Γαλατίαν καὶ τὴν ἐξώθεν ταῦταί ταῖς χώραις συν- 8 κυρώσαν ἑλλατταν, ἵνα διορθωσάμενοι τὴν τῶν προγεγονότων ἀγνοιαν ἐν τούτοις γνώριμα ποιή- σωμεν τοῖς Ἑλλησ καὶ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη τῆς οἰκου- μένης.

9 Νῦν δ’ ἀναδραμόντες ἐπὶ τὴν παρέκβασιν τῆς διηγήσεως πειρασόμεθα δηλοῦν τοὺς γενομένους ἐκ παρατάξεως ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Ἑρακλη- δονίοις ἀγώνας.

60 Τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῆς δυνάμεως, ὡς ἔχων Ἀννίβας ἐνεβαλεν εἰς Ἰταλίαν, ἦδη δεδηλώκαμεν. 2 μετὰ δὲ τὴν εἰσβολὴν καταστρατοπεδεύσας ὑπ’ αὐ- τὴν τὴν παρώρειαν τῶν Ἀλπέων τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς 3 ἀνελάβαμεν τὰς δυνάμεις. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναβάσεως καὶ καταβάσεως, ἔτι δὲ τραχυτήτων τῶν κατὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς, δειγμῶς ἐτελείωσατο τὸ σύμ- πασιν αὐτῷ στρατόπεδον, ἄλλα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἐπιτηδείων σπάνει καὶ ταῖς τῶν σωμάτων ἀθεραπεσόις κα- 4 κὼς ἀπῆλλαττε. πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ καθυφεῖνθ’ ἐαυτοὺς ὀλοσχερῷ διὰ τὴν ἐνδεικνυμίαν καὶ συνέχειαν τῶν πό- νων. οὔτε γὰρ διακομίζειν εἰς τοσαῦτα μυριάδας διὰ τοιούτων τόπων δαμάσκετο πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν ὦλοι τ’ ἦσαν, ἃ τε καὶ παρεκομίζον ἄμα τῇ τῶν ὑποζυγίων καταφθορᾷ, καὶ τούτων τὰ πλεῖστα συν- 5 ἀπώλυτο. διόπερ ὄρμησας ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Ῥωδανοῦ διαβάσεως, πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς ὀκτακυκλίους καὶ τρισ- μυρίους ἔχων, ἱππεῖς δὲ πλείον ὀκτακυκλίων, σχεδόν που τὴν ἡμίζειαν τῆς δυνάμεως, καθάπερ 6 ἐπάνω προείπον, ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς διέφθειρεν. οἷ ἔς μὴν σωθέντες καὶ ταῖς ἐπιφανείαις καὶ τῇ λοιπῇ διαθέσει διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν προειρημένων πό- 7 νων οἶον ἀποτεθηριωμένοι πάντες ἦσαν. πολλὴν

142
the seas that lie on the farther side of these countries, mostly for this very purpose of correcting the errors of former writers and making those parts of the world also known to the Greeks.

But now returning to the point at which I digressed from my narrative I shall attempt to describe the battles between the Romans and Carthaginians in Italy.

60. I have already stated the strength of Hannibal's army when he entered Italy. Once arrived there he at first encamped at the very foot of the Alps to refresh his forces. For his men had not only suffered terribly from the toil of ascent and descent of the passes and the roughness of the road but they were also in wretched condition owing to the scarcity of provisions and neglect of their persons, many having fallen into a state of utter despondency from prolonged toil and want of food. For it had been impossible to transport over such ground a plentiful supply of provisions for so many thousand men, and with the loss of the pack-animals the greater part of what they were carrying perished. So that while Hannibal started from the passage of the Rhone with thirty-eight thousand foot and more than eight thousand horse he lost in crossing the passes, as I said above, about half his whole force, while the survivors, owing to the continued hardships they had suffered, had become in their external appearance and general condition more like beasts than men. Hannibal, therefore, made every provision
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

οὖν ποιοῦμενος πρόνοιαν Ἀννίβας τῆς ἐπιμελείας αὐτῶν ἀνεκτάτο καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἄμα καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ὅμως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἵππων. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, προσανεληφθῆ ἦδη τῆς δυνάμεως, τῶν Ταυρίνων, οἱ τυγχάνουσι πρὸς τὴν παρωρεία κατοικοῦντες, στασιαζόντων μὲν πρὸς τοὺς Ἴνσομβρας, ἀπιστούντων δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτοῖς εἰς φιλαν προουκαλεῖτο καὶ συμμαχίαν ὑπακοούντων δὲ, περιστρατοπεδεύσας τὴν βαρύτατην πόλιν ἐν τρισιν ἡμέρας ἔξεποληρίσθησε. κατασφάξας δὲ τοὺς ἐναντιωθέντας αὐτῷ τοιούτων ἐνεργάσατο φόβον τοὺς σύνεγγυς κατοικοῦσι τῶν βαρβάρων οὕτοις πάντας ἐκ χειρὸς παραγίνεσθαι, διδόντας αὐτοῖς εἰς τὴν πίστιν. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν τὰ πεδία κατοικοῦντων Κελτῶν ἐσπουδαζέ µὲν κοινωνεῖ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τῶν πραγμάτων κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιβολήν· παρηλλαχότων δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίκῶν στρατοπέδων ἦδη τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν καὶ διακεκλικότων, ἡσυχίαν ἤγον· των δὲ καὶ συστρατεύειν ἡγαγκάζοντο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. εἰς δὲ βλέψων Ἀννίβας ἔκρυνε µὴ μέλλειν, ἀλλὰ προάγειν εἰς τούμπροσθεν καὶ πράττειν τι πρὸς τὸ βαρηθεῖν τοὺς βουλομένους μετέχειν σφίσι τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίδων.

Προθέμενος δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν Πόπλιον ἀκοῦν ἦδη διαβεβήκεναι τὸν Πάδον μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ σύνεγγυς εἶναι, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἤπιστει τοῖς προσαγγελλόμενοις, ἐνθυμοῦμενος μὲν δὴ τοὺς πρῶτον ἡμέρας ὁλίγας αὐτὸν ἀπέλυσε περὶ τὴν τοῦ Ῥωδανοῦ διάβασιν, καὶ συλλογιζόμενος τὸν τε πλοῖον τὸν ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας εἰς Τυρρηνίαν ὡς μακρὸς καὶ δυσ- παρακόμιστος εἴη, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὴν πορείαν.
BOOK III. 60. 7 – 61. 3

for carefully attending to the men and the horses likewise until they were restored in body and spirit. After this, his forces having now picked up their strength, when the Taurini who live at the foot of the mountains quarrelled with the Insubres and showed no confidence in the Carthaginians, he at first made overtures for their friendship and alliance, but on their rejecting these he encamped round their chief city and reduced it in three days. By massacring those who had been opposed to him he struck such terror into the neighbouring tribes of barbarians that they all came in at once and submitted to him. The remaining Celtic inhabitants of the plain were impatient to join the Carthaginians, as had been their original design, but as the Roman legions had advanced beyond most of them and cut them off, they kept quiet, some even being compelled to serve with the Romans. Hannibal, in view of this, decided not to delay, but to advance and try by some action to encourage those who wished to take part in his enterprise.

61. Such was the purpose he had in view when the news reached him that Publius had already crossed the Po and was quite near at hand. At first he refused to believe it, reflecting that he had left him only a few days previously near the crossing of the Rhone and that the coasting voyage from Marseilles to Etruria was long and difficult, and learning further by inquiry that the road through
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ιστορῶν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ Τυρρηνικοῦ πελάγους διὰ τῆς Ἰταλίας μέχρι πρὸς τὰς Ἀλπεῖς ὡς πολλῇ καὶ δυσ-
4 δίοδος ὑπάρχει στρατοπέδους. πλεύων δὲ καὶ σαφεστέρως ἀεὶ προσαγγελλότων, έθαύμαζε καὶ
κατεπέληκτο τὴν ὅλην ἐπιβολὴν καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν
5 τοῦ στρατηγοῦ. τὸ δὲ παραπλησίου συνεβαίνει πά-
σχευ καὶ τὸν Πόσπλιον. τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὰς οὐδ’
ἐπιβαλέσθαι τῇ διὰ τῶν Ἀλπεῶν ἡπίσει πορείας τὸν Ἀννίβαν δυνάμεις ἀλλοφύλους. εἰ δὲ καὶ τοιμή-
σαι, καταφθαρήσεθαι προδήλωσ αὐτὸν ὑπελάμβανε.
6 διόπερ ἐν τοιούτως ὡς διαλογισμοῖς, ὡς ἔπιστα-
νετο καὶ σεσώχαν καὶ πολιορκεί καὶ τοιχὸν ἡ τινὰς
πόλεις ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ, κατεπέληκτο τὴν τόλμαν καὶ τὸ
7 παράβολον τάνδρος. τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ συνεβαίνει καὶ τοῖς
ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ πεποιθέναι περὶ τῶν προσπιτῶντων.
8 ἅρτι γὰρ τῆς τελευταίας φήμης καταληγοῦσας ὑπὲρ
τῶν Καρχηδονίων ὑπὸ Ζάκανθεον εἰλήφασι, καὶ πρὸς
ταύτῃν βεβουλευμένων τὴν ἔννοιαν, καὶ τὸν μὲν
ἐνα τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐξαπεσταλκότων εἰς τὴν Λι-
βύην, ὡς αὐτὴν τὴν Καρχηδόνα πολιορκήσοντα,
tὸν ἔτερον δ’ εἰς Ἰβηρίαν, ὡς πρὸς Ἀννίβαν ἔκει
διαπολεμήσοντα, παρῆν ἀγγελία διότι πάρεστιν Ἀν-
νίβας μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ πολιορκεῖ τινὰς ἥδη πό-
9 λεις ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ. διότι καὶ παραδόξου φανέντος αὐ-
τοῖς τοῦ γνωμένου, διαταραχθέντες παραχρῆμα πρὸς
tὸν Τεβέριον εἰς τὸ Λιλύβαν ἐξαπέστελλον, δη-
λοῦντες μὲν τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν πολεμίων, οἶμομενοὶ δὲ
dein ἀφέμενοι τῶν προκειμένων κατὰ σπουδὴν βοη-
10 θεὶν τοῖς ἱδίοις πράγμασιν. ὥ δ’ Τεβέριος τοὺς μὲν
ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου παραυτικὰ συναθροίσας ἐξέπεμψε,
παραγγεῖλας ποιεῖσθαι τὸν πλοῦν ὡς ἐπ’ οἴκου:
tὰς δὲ πεζικὰς δυνάμεις ἐξώρκισε διὰ τῶν χιλιάρ-
146
BOOK III. 61. 3 - 10

Italy from the Tyrrenian Sea to the Alps was likewise very long and not suited for the march of troops. But when more messengers continued to arrive bringing the same news in a more definite form, he was struck with amazement at the whole project of the Consul and the way he had carried it out. Publius had very much the same feeling; for at first he had never expected that Hannibal would even attempt to cross the Alps with foreign forces, and if he ventured on it he thought that certain destruction awaited him. So that, his anticipations being such, when he heard that Hannibal was safe and was already besieging towns in Italy he was amazed too at his daring and venturesomeness. In Rome itself the intelligence had much the same effect. The stir created by the last news of the Carthaginians—that they had captured Saguntum—had only just subsided, measures had been taken to meet this situation by sending one Consul to Libya who was to besiege Carthage itself, and the other to Spain to fight, as they thought, with Hannibal there; and now news came that Hannibal was in Italy with his army and already laying siege to some cities. The thing therefore seemed altogether astounding to them, and in great alarm they sent urgent orders to Tiberius at Lilybaeum, informing him of the arrival of the enemy and bidding him abandon his present project and hasten to the help of his own country. Tiberius at once collected the crews of his fleet and dispatched it with orders to make for home. From his soldiers he exacted through the Tribunes an oath that they would all be
καὶ τὰ ἡμέραν ἐν ἤ δέχεσθε πάντας ἐν Ἄρμινῳ
11 γενέσθαι κουταίοις. αὕτη δ’ ἔστι πόλις παρὰ τῶν
Ἀδριαν ἐπὶ τῷ πέρατι κειμένη τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον
12 πεδίων ὡς ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας. πανταχόθεν δὲ τοῦ
κινήματος ἀμα γινομένου, καὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων
πᾶσι παρὰ δόξαν προσπεπτόντων, ἦν παρ’ ἐκάστους
ἐπίστασις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητος.

62 Κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τούτον ἦδη συνεγγίζοντες
ἀλλήλοις Ἀννίβας καὶ Πόλιος ἐπεβάλοντο παρα-
καλεῖν τὰς ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεις, ἐκάτερος προθέμενος
2 τὰ πρέποντα τοῖς παροῦν ἱκαρίσ. Ἀννίβας μὲν
οὖν διὰ τοιούτῳ τινος ἐνεχείρη τρόπου ποιεῖσθαι
3 τὴν παραίσειν. συναγαγὼν γὰρ τὰ πλῆθα παρ-
ήγαγε νεανίσκους τῶν αἵμαλωτῶν, οὐς εἰλήφει
κακοποιοῦντας τὴν πορείαν ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὰς Ἀλπεῖς
4 δυσχωρίας. τούτους δὲ κακῶς διετίθετο, παρα-
σκευαζόμενος πρὸς τὸ μέλλον. καὶ γὰρ δεσμοὺς εἴ-
χον βαρεῖς καὶ τῷ λιμῷ συνέσχητο καὶ ταῖς πλη-
5 γαῖς αὐτῶν τὰ σώματα διέφθαρτο. καθίσας οὖν
τούτους εἰς τὸ μέσον προείθηκε πανοπλίας Γαλατι-
κάς, οἷς εἰσώθαιν οἱ βασιλεῖς αὐτῶν, ὅταν μονο-
μαχεῖν μέλλοσι, κατακοσμεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτους
ἱπποὺς παρέστησε καὶ σάγους εἰσήγαγε πολυτελεῖς.

6 κάπειτα τῶν νεανίσκων ἦρετο τῖνες αὐτῶν βοῦ-
λοντας διαγωνίσασθαι πρὸς ἄλληλους, ἐφ’ ὅ τὸν
μὲν νικήσαντα τὰ προκειμένα λαμβάνειν ἀθλα, τὸν
δ’ ἡττηθέντα τῶν παροῦν ἀπηλλάχθαι κακών,
7 τελευτήσαντα τὸν βίον. πάντων δ’ ἀναβοσάντων
ἀμα καὶ δηλοῦντων ὧτι βαύλονται μονομαχεῖν, κλη-
ρώσασθαι προσέπταξε, καὶ δύο τοὺς λαχῶνας καθ-
οπλισμένους ἐκέλευσε μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλους.
8 παραυτίκα μὲν οὖν ἄκουσαντες οἱ νεανίσκοι ταῦτα,
at Ariminum on a certain day before bed-time. This is a city on the Adriatic at the southern edge of the plains of the Po. So that as there was great stir and activity all round, and as the news that arrived was what nobody expected, there was on both sides that intense concern for the future which an enemy cannot afford to neglect.

62. Hannibal and Publius were now near each other, and they both thought it proper to address their troops in a manner suitable to the occasion. The device by which Hannibal tried to encourage his men was as follows. Mustering the troops, he brought forward certain young men from among the prisoners he had taken molesting his march in the difficult part of the Alpine pass. He had purposely, with a view to the use he was going to make of them, ill-used them: they wore heavy fetters, they had suffered much from hunger, and their bodies were disfigured by the marks of blows. Placing them in the middle of the meeting he exhibited some Gaulish suits of armour, such as their kings are wont to deck themselves with when about to engage in single combat. In addition to these he placed there some horses and had some rich military cloaks brought in. He then asked the young men which of them were willing to do combat with each other, the prizes exhibited being destined for the victor, while the vanquished would be delivered by death from his present misery. When all shouted out with one voice that they were willing to fight, he ordered them to draw lots, and the two on whom the lot fell to arm themselves and do combat. The young men, the moment they heard this, lifted up their hands
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἔξαίροντες, εὐχοντο τοῖς θεοῖς, σπεύ-9 δὼν ἐκαστὸς αὐτὸς γενέσθαι τῶν λαχώντων. ἔπει-
δὲ ἐδηλώθη τὰ κατὰ τὸν κλήρον, ἦσαν οἱ μὲν εἰ-
ληχότες περιχαρεῖς, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι τοῦνατινών. γενο-
μένης δὲ τῆς μάχης οὐχ ἦττον ἐμακάριζον οἱ περι-
λειπόμενοι τῶν αἶχμαλώτων τὸν τεθνεώτα του νε-
νικηκότος, ὡς πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων κακῶν ἐκείνου
μὲν ἀπολελυμένου, σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀκμὴν ὑπο-
11 μένοντας. ἦν δὲ παραπλησία καὶ περὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς
τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἡ διάληψις· ἐκ παραθέσεως γάρ
θεωρουμένης τῆς τῶν ἀγομένων καὶ ζώντων ταλαι-
pωρίας, τούτους μὲν ἦλέουν, τὸν δὲ τεθνεώτα πάν-
63 τες ἐμακάριζον. Ἀννίβας δὲ διὰ τῶν προειρήμενων
τῆς προκειμένης διάδεσθαι ἐνεργάσάμενος ταῖς τῶν
2 δυνάμεως ψυχαῖς, μετὰ ταῦτα προελθὼς αὐτὸς τοῦ-
του χάρων ἔφη παρεισάγει τοὺς αἴχμαλωτοὺς, ἵν’
ἐπὶ τῶν ἅλλορών συμπτωμάτων ἐναργῶς θεασά-
μενοι τὸ συμβαίνον βελτιῶν ὑπὲρ τῶν σφίσι παρ-
3 όντων βουλεύωνται πραγμάτων. εἰς παραπλήσιον
γάρ αὐτοὺς ἀγώνα καὶ καρπὸν τήν τύχην συγ-
κεκλεικέναι καὶ παραπλήσια τοῖς νῦν ἄθλα προ-
4 τεθεικέναι. δεῖν γάρ ἡ νικῶν ἡ θνήσκειν ἡ τοῖς
ἐξήρωτ’ ὑποχειρίους γενέσθαι ζωντας. εἰναι δ’ ἐκ
μὲν τοῦ νικῶν ἄθλον οὐχ ἦππους καὶ σάγους, ἀλλὰ
tὸ πάντων ἄθρωπων γενέσθαι μακαριστάτους,
5 κρατήσαντας τῆς Ἦρωμαίων εὐδαιμονίας, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
μαχομένους τι παθεῖν διαγωνιζομένους ἔως τῆς
ἐσχάτης ἀναπνοῆς ὑπὲρ τῆς καλλίστης ἐλπίδος μετ-
αλλάξαι τὸν βίον ἐν χειρῶν νόμω, μηδενὸς κακοῦ
6 λαβόντας πείραν, τοῖς δ’ ἠττωμένοι καὶ διὰ τὴν
πρὸς τὸ ζήν ἐπιθυμίαιν υπομένουσι φεύγειν ἢ κατ’
ἀλλον τινὰ τρόπον ἔλομένοι τὸ ζήν παντὸς κακοῦ
150
and prayed to the gods, each eager to be himself one of the chosen. When the result was announced, those on whom the lot had fallen were overjoyed and the rest mournful and dejected, and after the combat was over the remaining prisoners congratulated the fallen champion no less than the victor, as having been set free from many and grievous evils which they themselves were left alive to suffer. The sentiment of most of the Carthaginians was identical; for looking on the misery of the other prisoners as they were led away alive, they pitied them on comparing their fate with that of the dead whom they all pronounced to be fortunate. 63. When Hannibal had by this means produced the disposition he desired in the minds of his troops, he rose and told them that he had brought the prisoners before them designedly in order that clearly seeing in the person of others what they might themselves have to suffer, they should thence take better counsel at the present crisis. "Fortune," he said, "has brought you to a like pass, she has shut you in on a like listed field of combat, and the prizes and prospects she offers you are the same. For either you must conquer, or die, or fall alive into the hands of your foes. For you the prize of victory is not to possess horses and cloaks, but to be the most envied of mankind, masters of all the wealth of Rome. The prize of death on the battle-field is to depart from life in the heat of the fight, struggling till your last breath for the noblest of objects and without having learnt to know suffering. But what awaits those of you who are vanquished and for the love of life consent to fly, or who preserve their lives by any other means, is to have every evil and every mis-
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

7 καὶ πάσης ἀτυχίας μετασχέειν. οὕδένα γὰρ οὕτως ἀλόγιστον οὐδὲ νωθρὸν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, δὲ μνημο-
νεύων μὲν τοῦ μὴκος τῆς ὅδου τῆς διηνομένης ἐκ τῶν πατρίδων, μνημονεύων δὲ τοῦ πλῆθους τῶν μεταξὺ πολεμίων, εἰδὼς δὲ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ποταμῶν ἢν διεπέρασεν, ἐλπίζαι ποτὲ ἄν ὦ ντι φευ-
γων εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἀφίξεται. διόπερ ἔστω δὲιν αὐτοὺς, ἀποκεκομμένης καθόλου τῆς τοιαύτης ἐλπί-
δος, τὴν αὐτὴν διάληψιν ποιεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν καθ’ αὐτοὺς πραγμάτων ἦπερ ἄρτιος ἔποιοντο περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων συμπτωμάτων. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐκείνων τὸν μὲν νυκήσαντα καὶ τεθνεῶτα πάντες ἔμακάρισσον, τοὺς δὲ ξάνθας ἥλεον, οὕτως ἔστω δὲιν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς καθ’ αὐτοὺς διαλαμβάνειν, καὶ πάντας ἴηνα πρὸς τοὺς ἄγωνας, μάλιστα μὲν νική-
σοντας, ἄν δὲ μὴ τούτ’ ἢ ὑμνατόν, ἀποθανομεῖ-

10 νοὺς. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ξῆν ἡττημένους ἐλπίδα κατὰ μυθένα τρόπον ἦξιον λαμβάνειν ἐν νῷ. τούτω γὰρ χρησιμεύουσαν αὐτῶν τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ τῇ προθέσει ταύτην καὶ τὸ νικάν ἀμα καὶ τὸ σφίζεσθαι προδήλως σφίσθην εὐπερακολουθήσεσιν. πάντας γὰρ τοὺς ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἢ κατ’ ἄναγκην τοιαύτη προθέσει κεχρη-

12 μένους οὐδέποτε διεμείθησαν τοῦ κρατεῖν τῶν ἀντι-

13 ταξιμένων. ὅταν δὲ δὴ καὶ τοῖς πολεμίως συμ-

βαίνῃ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐλπίδα ταύτης ὑπάρχειν, ὁ νῦν ἔστη περὶ Ῥωμαίους, ὥστε φεύγουσιν πρόδηλον εἶναι τοῖς πλείστοις τὴν σωτηρίαν, παρακεκόμενῆς αὐτοῖς τῆς οἰκείας, δῆλον ὡς ἀνυπόστατος γίνοιτ’ ἄν ἢ τῶν ἀπηλπικότων τόλμα. τῶν δὲ πολλῶν ἀπο-

14 δεχομένων τὸ τε παράδειγμα καὶ τοὺς λόγους, καὶ λαμβανόντων ὅρμην καὶ παράστασιν οίαν ὁ παρακαλῶν ἐσπούδασε, τότε μὲν ἐπανέσας αὐτοὺς.
fortune for their lot. There is not one of you so dull and unreflecting as to hope to reach his home by flight, when he remembers the length of the road he traversed from his native land, the numbers of the enemies that lie between, and the size of the rivers he crossed. I beg you, therefore, cut off as you are entirely from any such hope, to take the same view of your own situation that you have just expressed regarding that of others. For as you all accounted both the victor and the fallen fortunate and pitied the survivors, so now should you think about yourselves and go all of you to battle resolved to conquer if you can, and if this be impossible, to die. And I implore you not to let the hope of living after defeat enter your minds at all. If you reason and purpose as I urge upon you, it is clear that victory and safety will follow; for none ever who either by necessity or choice formed such a resolve have been deceived in their hope of putting their enemies to flight. And when the enemy have the opposite hope, as is now the case with the Romans, most of them being sure of finding safety in flight as their homes are near at hand, it is evident that the courage of those who despair of safety will carry all before it." The object-lesson and the speech were well received by the troops, in whom they produced the enthusiasm and self-confidence that the speaker desired, and after commending
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

diaφήκε, τῇ δ' ἐπαύριον ἀναζυγὴν ἡμα τῷ φωτὶ
παρῆγγειλε.

64 Πόπλιος δὲ περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμέρας τὸν Πάδον
ποταμὸν ἦδη πεπερασμένον, τὸν δὲ Τίκυνον κρί-
νων εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν διαβαίνειν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ-
τηδείοις γεφυροποιεῖν παρῆγγειλε, τὰς δὲ λουτάς
2 δυνάμεις συναγαγὼν παρεκάλει. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ
τῶν λεγομένων ἦν περὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἁξιώ-
ματος καὶ τῶν προγονικῶν πράξεων, τὰ δὲ τοὺς
3 παρεστώτος καίρου τοιάδε. ἐφη γὰρ δεῖν καὶ μη-
δείμαι μὲν εἰληφότας πείραν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος
τῶν ὑπεναντίων, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο γινώσκοντας ὀτι
μέλλουσι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους κυνύνειν, ἀναμφί-

ουσιν ἐκεῖν τὴν τοῦ νικᾶν ἐλπίδα, καὶ καθόλου
δεῖν ἥγεισθαι καὶ παράλογον, εἰ τολμῶσι Καρχι-
δόνοις Ῥωμαίοις ἀντοφθαλμεῖν, πολλάκις μὲν ὑπ'
αὐτῶν ἠττημένου, πολλοὺς δ' ἐξενθηρωτεῖς φόρους,
μόνον δ' οὐχὶ δουλεύοντες αὐτοῖς ἦδη τοσοῦτος
5 χρόνους. ὅταν δὲ, χωρὶς τῶν προερημένων, καὶ τῶν
νῦν παρόντων ἄνδρῶν ἐχωμεν ἐπὶ ποσῶν πείραν
ὅτι [μόνον] οὐ τολμῶσι κατὰ πρόσωπον ἴδειν ἡμᾶς
τῶν χρή διάληψιν ποιεῖσθαι περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος
6 τοῦ ὁρᾶσι λογιζομένους; καὶ μὴν οὕτε τοὺς ἐπιπεῖς
συμπεσόντας τὸς παρ' αὐτῶν ἐπίτις περὶ τῶν
Ῥοδανὸν ποταμὸν ἀπαλλάξαι καλῶς, ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς
ἀποβαλόντας αὐτῶν φυγεῖν αἰσχρῶς μέχρι τῆς ἰδίας
παρεμβολῆς, τὸν τε στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σύμ-

πασαν δύναμιν, ἐπιγνώστας τὴν παρούσιαν τῶν
haustern στρατιωτῶν, φυγῇ παραπλησίαν ποιῆ-
σασθαι τὴν ἀποχώρησιν, καὶ παρά τὴν αὐτῶν προ-
αίρεσιν διὰ τὸν φόβον κεχρησθαι τῇ διὰ τῶν Ἀλπεων
8 πορεία. παρεῖναι δὲ καὶ νῦν ἐφη τὸν Ἱλισίβαν,
154
them he dismissed them, ordering them to be ready to start at daybreak.

64. At about the same date Publius Scipio, who had already crossed the Po and had decided to advance across the Ticinus, ordered those qualified for that task to build a bridge and, summoning a meeting of the rest of his forces, addressed them. Most of what he said related to the exalted position of their country and the achievements of their ancestors; what concerned the present situation was as follows. He said that even if they had had no recent experience of the enemy, the knowledge alone that they were going to fight against Carthaginians should give them unshaken hope of victory. They should regard it as altogether an outrageous and surprising thing that Carthaginians should dare to face Romans, by whom they had been so often beaten, to whom they had paid so much tribute, and whose slaves almost they had been for so many years. "But now," he went on to say, "when apart from this we can judge more or less by our own experience that these actual men here on the spot do not venture to look us in the face, what should our opinion be as to the future, if we estimate chances correctly? Why! not even their cavalry when they met ours near the Rhone came off well, but after losing many of their number fled disgracefully to their own camp, upon which their general and all his forces, as soon as they knew our soldiers were coming, made a retreat more resembling a flight, and contrary to their original intention chose the route through the Alps from pure fear of us. Hannibal has now arrived,"
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

catephtharkóta mèn tò plēíston mérōs tῆς dynámēs, tò dè perileipómenon άdúnavτov kai dúskhroσtov ἔχοντα δiá tήn kakoukẖiάν: ὧμoίως dè kai tòvν ἵππων τòvν mèn plēístoν tòvν ἀπολωλέκoτα, τòvν dè loipóν ἤκρεισκότa δiá tò mήkοs kai tήν δυσχέρειαν tῆς ὀδού. δ' dìn ἐπιδεικνύειν ἐπειράτο διότι μόνον ἐπιφανῆναι δεί τοῖς πολεμίοις. μάλιστα δ' ἥξιον ἐπηρείν αὐτοὺς βλέποντας εἰς τήν αὐτοῦ παρουσίαν: οὐδέποτε γάρ ἂν ἀπολυτων τῶν στόλων kai tάς ἐν Ἰβηρία πράξεις, ἐφ' ὧς ἀπεστάλη, δεύρω μετά τοιαύτης ἐλθεῖν σπουδής, εἰ μή καὶ λίαν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἑώρᾳ τήν πράξειν ταύτην ἀναγκαίαν μὲν οὐδαν τῇ πατρίδι, πρόδηλον δ' ἐν αὐτῇ τήν νίκην ὑπάρχουσαν. πάντων δὲ καὶ διὰ τήν τού λέγοντος πίστιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν λεγομένων ἄλληθειαν ἐκθύμωσ ἔχοντων πρός τὸ κινδυνεύειν, ἀποδεξάμενος αὐτῶν τήν ὀρμήν διαφῆκε, προσπαρακάλεσας ἐτοίμους εἶναι πρὸς τὸ παραγγελλόμενον.

65 Τῇ δὲ κατὰ πόδας ἦμερα προήγου ἄμφοτεροι παρὰ τῶν ποταμῶν ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς τὰς Ἀλπεῖς μέρους, ἔχοντες εὐώνυμον μὲν οἱ Ῥωμαίοι, δεξιῶν δὲ τὸν 2 ροῦν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι. γνώντες δὲ τῇ δεύτερᾳ διὰ τῶν προνομενοντων ὅτι σῦνεγχά εἰςων ἄλληλων, 3 τότε μὲν αὐτοῦ καταστρατοπεδεύσαντες ἐμείναν. τῇ δ' ἐπαύριον πάσαν τήν ἱππον ἀναλαβόντες ἄμφοτεροι. Πόπλιος δὲ καὶ τῶν πεζῶν τούς ἀκουστάς, προήγου διὰ τοῦ πεδίου, σπεύδωντες κατοπτεύσαι 4 τάς ἄλληλων δυνάμεις. ἀμά τῷ πλησιάζειν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνιδεῖν τὸν κοινοτὸν ἐξαιρόμενον, εἰ- 5 θέως συνετάττων πρὸς μάχην. ὅ μὲν οὖν Πό- πλιος, προθέμενος τούς ἀκουστάς καὶ τοὺς ἀμα τούτοις Γαλατικοὺς ἰππεῖς, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐν μετ-
he said, "but he has lost most of his army and the rest are weak and useless owing to hardship; he has lost most of his horses too, and those he has left he has rendered fit for nothing by the length and difficulty of his march." From all this he tried to convince them that they had only to show themselves to the enemy. He bade them above all be encouraged by his own presence, for never would he have abandoned his fleet and the Spanish expedition on which he was dispatched, and made such haste to reach Italy, had it not been evident to him that he was doing a necessary service to his country and that victory was a matter of certainty. When all the troops, owing to the authority of the speaker, and the truth of what he said, showed themselves most ardent for a battle, he commended their alacrity and dismissed them, bidding them hold themselves in readiness to execute his orders.

65. Next day they both advanced along the Po on the bank nearest the Alps, the Romans having the stream on their left and the Carthaginians on their right. Learning on the following day from their scouts that they were near each other, they both encamped where they were and remained there for the present. But next morning both generals took the whole of their cavalry, and Publius his javelineers also, and advanced through the plain with the object of reconnoitring each other's forces. Upon their approaching each other and seeing the clouds of dust they at once got into order for action. Publius, placing his javelineers and the Gaulish cavalry which was with them in front and the rest
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

6 ὥσπερ καταστήσας, προῆι βάδην. ὦ δ᾽ Ἀννίβας
tὴν μὲν κεχαλισμένην ἵππον καὶ πάν τὸ στάσιμον
ἀυτῆς κατὰ πρόσωπον τάξας ἀπῆντα τοῖς πολέμοις,
tοὺς δὲ Νομαδικοὺς ἵππεῖς ἀφ᾽ ἐκατέρω τοῦ κέρα-
7 τος ἡτοιμάκει πρὸς κύκλωσιν. ἀμφοτέρων δὲ καὶ
tῶν ἥγημον καὶ τῶν ἵππεων φιλοτίμως διακει-
μένων πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, τοιαύτην συνέβη γενέ-
σθαι τὴν πρώτην σύμπτωσιν ἀπό τούς ἀκοντιστάς
μηθὰσαι τὸ πρῶτον ἐκβαλόντας βέλος, φέυγειν
δ᾽ ἐγκλίναντας εὐθέως διὰ τῶν διαστημάτων ὕπο
τὰς παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ἔλας, καταπλαγέντας τὴν ἐπιφορὰν
καὶ περιδεινείς γενομένους μὴ συμπαθῆσον ὕπο
8 τῶν ἐπιφορομένων ἵππων. οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ πρόσ-
ωπον ἀλλήλους συμπεσόντες ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐποὶ-
9 οὖν ἰσόρροπον τὸν κίνδυνον. ὅμω γὰρ ἢν ἐπι-
μαχία καὶ πεζομαχία διὰ τὸ πλήθος τῶν πολι-
10 καταβαίνοντων ἀνδρῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ μάχῃ. τῶν δὲ
Νομάδων κυκλωσάντων καὶ κατόπιν ἐπιπεσόντων,
oἱ μὲν πεζακοντισταὶ τὸ πρῶτον διαφυγόντες τὴν
σύμπτωσιν τῶν ἵππων τότε συνεπαθῆσαν ὕπο
11 τοῦ πλήθους καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς τῶν Νομάδων· οἱ
dὲ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἐξ ἀρχῆς διαμαχόμενοι πρὸς
tοὺς Καρχηδονίους, πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπολωλε-
kότες, ἐτὶ δὲ πλείους τῶν Καρχηδονίων διεφθαρ-
kότες, συνεπιθεμένων ἀπ᾽ οὐρᾶς τῶν Νομάδων,
ἐτράπησαν, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ σποράδες, τινὲς δὲ περὶ
τὸν ἴχμενον συστραφέντες.

66 Πόπλως μὲν οὖν ἀναζεύξας προσῆγε διὰ τῶν πε-
δίων ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Πάδου γέφυραν, σπείδων φθὰ-
2 σαι διαβιβάσας τὰ στρατόπεδα. θεωρῶν γὰρ τοὺς
μὲν τόπους ἐπιπεδεῖς ὄντας, τοὺς δ᾽ ὑπεναντίους
ἐπικρατοῦντας, αὐτὸν δὲ βαρυνόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ
158
behind, advanced slowly. Hannibal, putting his bridled cavalry and all the heavier part of it in front, led them to meet the enemy, having his Numidian horse ready on each wing to execute an outflanking movement. Both of the leaders and their cavalry were so anxious to join battle that at the opening of the action the javelineers had no time to discharge their first volley, but gave way at once and retired through the gaps between the troops of their own cavalry, in terror of the impending charge and fearful of being trodden under foot by the horsemen who were bearing down on them. The cavalry met front to front and for some time maintained an evenly balanced contest, the engagement being both a cavalry and infantry one, owing to the number of men who dismounted during its progress. When, however, the Numidians outflanked the Romans and took them in the rear, the javelineers on foot who had at first escaped from the charge of the cavalry were now ridden down by the numbers and force of the Numidians, while the cavalry, who from the outset had been facing the Carthaginians, after suffering heavy loss and inflicting still greater on the enemy, being now attacked by the Numidians also in the rear, broke into flight, most of them scattering in every direction but a few gathering closely round the Consul.

66. Publius now broke up his camp and advanced through the plain to the bridge of the Po, hastening to get his legions across before it was too late. For since the country was all flat, since the enemy was superior in cavalry, and since he himself was
ΤΡΑΪΜΑΤΟΣ, ΕΙΣ ἈΣΦΑΛΕΣ ἘΚΡΙΝΕ ΔΕΙΝ ἈΠΟΚΑΤΑΣΤΗΣΑΙ
3 ΤΑΣ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙΣ. ἈΝΝΙΒΑΣ ΔΕ ΜΕΧΡΙ ΜΕΝ ΤΙΝΟΣ ὩΠΕΛΑΒΕ
ΤΟΙΣ ΠΕΖΙΚΟΙΣ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΠΕΔΟΙΣ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΔΙΑΚΙΝΔΥΝΕΙΕΙΝ·
ΣΥΝΙΔΟΝ ΔΕ ΚΕΚΙΝΗΚΟΤΑΣ ΕΚ ΤΗΣ ΠΑΡΕΜΒΟΛΗΣ, ἘΩΣ
ΜΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΩΤΟΥ ΠΟΤΑΜΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΠΙ ΤΟΥΤΟΥ ΓΕΦΥΡΑΣ ἩΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙ, ΚΑΤΑΛΑΒΩΝ ΔΕ ΤΑΣ ΜΕΝ ΠΛΕΙΣΤΑΣ
ΤΩΝ ΣΑΝΙΔΩΝ ἈΝΕΣΠΑΣΜΕΝΑΣ, ΤΟΥΣ ΔΕ ΦΥΛΑΤΤΟΝΤΑΣ
ΤΗΝ ΓΕΦΥΡΑΝ ἘΤΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΝ ΠΟΤΑΜΟΥ ὩΠΟΙΕΙΠΟΜΕΝΟΥΣ,
ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΜΕΝ ἘΓΚΡΑΤΗΣ ἘΓΕΝΕΤΟ, ΣΧΕΔΟΝ ἘΞΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ
5 ΟΝΤΩΝ ΤΟΝ ἈΡΙΘΜΟΝ· ΤΟΥΣ ΔΕ ΛΟΙΠΟΥΣ ΑΚΟΥΩΝ ΗΔΗ
ΠΟΛΥ ΠΡΟΕΙΛΗΧΕΙΝ, ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΑΘΘΙΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΑΝΑΝ-
ΤΙΑ ΠΑΡΑ ΤΟΝ ΠΟΤΑΜΟΝ ἘΠΟΙΕΙΤΟ ΤΗΝ ΠΟΡΕΙΑΝ, ΣΠΕΥ-
ΔΩΝ ἘΠΙ ΤΟΠΟΝ ΕΥΓΕΦΥΡΩΤΩΝ ἈΦΙΚΕΣΘΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΘΟΥ.
6 ΚΑΤΑΛΥΣΑΣ ΔΕ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΑΙΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΓΕΦΥΡΩΣΑΣ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟ-
ΤΑΜΟΙΟΙ ΠΛΟΙΟΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΔΙΑΒΑΣΩΝ ἈΣΘΡΟΥΒΑΜΕΝ ἘΠΕ-
ΕΤΑΞΕ ΔΙΑΚΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ ΤΟ ΠΛΗΘΟΣ, ΑΥΤΟΣ ΔΕ ΔΙΑΒΑΣ ΕΥ-
ΘΕΪΟΝ ἘΧΡΗΜΑΤΙΖΕΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΑΡΑΓΕΓΟΝΟΙΣ ΠΡΟΣΒΕΝΤΑΙΣ
7 ΑΠΟ ΤΩΝ ΣΥΝΕΓΥΝ ΤΟΙΣ. ἌΜΑ ΓΑΡ ΤΩΝ ΓΕΝΕΣΙΑΙ ΤΟ
ΠΡΟΤΕΡΗΜΑ ΠΑΝΤΕΣ ΕΣΠΕΥΔΟΝ ΟΙ ΠΑΡΑΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΙ ΚΕΛΤΟΙ
ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΞ ΑΡΧΗΣ ΠΡΟΘΕΣΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΦΙΛΟΙ ΓΙΝΕΣΙΑΙ
ΚΑΙ ΧΟΡΗΓΕΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΣΥΣΤΡΑΤΕΥΕΙΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΚΑΡΧΙΘΝΟΙΙΟΙ.
8 ΑΠΟΔΕΞΑΜΕΝΟΣ ΔΕ ΤΟΥΣ ΠΑΡΟΝΤΑΣ ΦΙΛΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΣ ΚΑΙ
ΚΟΜΙΣΑΜΕΝΟΣ ΤΑΣ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙΣ ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΠΕΡΑΝ, ΠΡΟΣΗΓΕ
ΠΑΡΑ ΤΟΝ ΠΟΤΑΜΟΝ, ΤΗΝ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΑΝ ΠΟΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΤ ΤΗ
ΠΡΟΣΘΕΝ ΠΑΡΟΔΩΝ· ΚΑΤΑ ΡΟΥΝ ΓΑΡ ΕΠΟΙΕΙΤΟ ΤΗΝ ΠΟ-
9 ΡΕΙΑΝ, ΣΠΕΥΔΩΝ ΣΥΝΑΙΣΤΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ὩΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΙΣ. Ὅ ΔΕ
ΠΟΠΛΙΟΣ, ΠΕΡΑΙΩΘΕΙΝ ΤΟΝ ΠΑΘΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΠΕΔΕΥ-
ΣΑΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΛΥΝ ΠΛΑΚΕΝΤΙΑΝ, ΗΤΙΣ ἩΝ ἈΠΟΙΚΙΑ ῬΩ-
ΜΑΙΩΝ, ἌΜΑ ΜΕΝ ΑΥΤΟΝ ἘΘΕΡΑΠΕΥΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ἈΛΛΟΥS
160
severely wounded, he decided to place his forces in safety. Hannibal had at first supposed that the Romans would risk an infantry engagement, but on seeing that they had moved out of their camp, followed them as far as the bridge over the first river, but finding most of the planking of it torn up, but the force set to guard it still remaining at their post by the river side, he took them prisoners to the number of about six hundred, and on hearing that the rest of the Romans were far in advance of him he now wheeled round and marched in the opposite direction up the Po with the object of reaching a place where it was easy to bridge it. After two days' march he halted and, constructing a bridge of boats, ordered Hasdrubal to see to the passage of the army and he himself crossing at once gave a hearing to the envoys who had arrived from the districts round. For immediately upon his success, all the neighbouring Celts hastened, as had been their wish from the outset, to make alliance with the Carthaginians, to provide them with supplies and to send them contingents. He received them all courteously, and being now joined by his troops from the opposite bank, he advanced along the Po in the opposite direction to his previous march; for now he marched down stream with the object of encountering the enemy. Meanwhile Publius, having crossed the Po and encamped at Placentia, a Roman colony, where he occupied himself with the cure of himself and the other wounded, and

\[ a \text{ i.e. the Ticino. Livy wrongly makes it to be the bridge of boats over the Po. The engagement took place near Victumulae, the modern Vigerano, on the right bank of the Ticino.} \]
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

τραυματισάς, ἀμα δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς ἀσφαλὲς ἀπ-10 ηρεῖσθαι νομίζων, ἤγε τὴν ἤσσυχιαν. Ἄννιβας δὲ11 παραγενόμενος δευτεραῖος ἀπὸ τῆς διαβάσεως ἐγγὺς τῶν πολεμίων, τῇ τρίτῃ παρέταξε τὴν δύναμιν ἐν12 συνόψει τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις. οὐδενός δὲ σφίσων ἀντ-13 εξάγοντος, κατεστρατοπέδευσε λαβών περὶ πεν-14 τήκοντα στάδια τὸ μεταξὺ διάστημα τῶν στρατο-15 πέδων.

67 Οἱ δὲ συστρατευόμενοι Κελτοὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις,16 διαγραύσας ἕπικυδεστέρας τὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐλπίδας, συνταξάμενοι πρὸς ἅλλους, καρφών ἐπ-17 ἐπήρουν πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν, μένοντες εἰς ταῖς ἐαυτῶν18 ἐκαστοὺς σκηναῖς. διεισνοηησαμένων δὲ καὶ κατα-19 κομισθέντων τῶν ἐν τῷ χάρακι, παρελθεῖν ἑάσαν-20 τε τὸ πλεῖον μέρος τῆς νυκτὸς καθώπλισμένοι21 περὶ τὴν ἐωθινὴν φυλακὴν ἐπιτύθενται τοῖς σύν-22 εὐγες τῶν Ῥωμαίων παραστρατοπεδεύουσι. καὶ23 πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν, οὐκ ὄλγον δὲ κατ-24 ετραμάτισαν· τέλος δὲ τὰς κεφαλὰς ἀποτεμόντες25 τῶν τεθνεότων ἀπεκάθισαν πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδο-26 νίους, ὅντες πεζοὶ μὲν εἰς δυσχιλίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ27 μικρῶς λείποντες διακοσίως. Ἄννιβας δὲ φιλο-28 φρόνως ἀποδεξάμενος αὐτῶν τὴν παρουσίαν, τοῦτοις29 μὲν εὐθέως παρακαλότας καὶ δωρεὰς ἐκάστοις τὰς30 ἀρµοζόντας ἐπαγγελλόμενος ἐξέπεμψαν εἰς τὰς αὐ-31 τῶν πόλεις, δηλώσαντες μὲν τὰ πεπραγμένα τοῖς32 πολίταις, παρακαλέσαντες δὲ πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ συμ-33 μαχίαν. ᾨδει γὰρ ὅτι πάντες κατ’ ἀνάγκην αὐτῶ34 κοινωνήσουσι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπιγνώντες τὸ γεγο-35 νός ἐκ τῶν σφετέρων πολιτῶν παραπόνδημα κατὰ36 τῶν Ῥωμαίων. ἀμα δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν Βοιῶν παρα-37 γεγονότων, καὶ τοὺς τρεῖς ἄνδρας ἐγχειριζόντων
BOOK III. 66. 9 – 67. 6

thinking that his forces were now firmly established in a safe position, made no move. But two days after his crossing Hannibal appeared close at hand and next day drew up his army in full view of the enemy. Upon their refusing his challenge, he encamped at a distance of about fifty stades from the Roman position.

67. The Celtic contingents in the Roman army, seeing that the prospects of the Carthaginians were now brighter, had come to an understanding with each other, and while all remaining quiet in their tents were waiting for an opportunity to attack the Romans. All in the entrenched camp had had their supper and retired to rest, and the Celts, letting the greater part of the night go by, armed themselves about the morning watch and fell upon the Romans who were encamped nearest to them. They killed or wounded many, and finally, cutting off the heads of the slain, went over to the Carthaginians, being in number about two thousand foot and rather less than two hundred horse. They were gladly welcomed on their arrival by Hannibal, who at once, after addressing some words of encouragement to them and promising suitable gifts to all, sent them off to their own cities to announce to their countrymen what they had done and urge them to join him. For he was now quite sure that all would take his part on learning of this act of treachery to the Romans on the part of their own countrymen. When at the same time the Boii came to him and delivered up

163
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

αὐτῶς τοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν διάδοσιν τῆς χώρας ὑπὸ Ἀρχάχας ἐκυρίευσαν τοῦ πολέμου, παρασπονδήσαντες, καθάπερ ἐπάνω 7 προείπον, ἀποδεξάμενος Ἀννίβας τὴν εὐνοιαν αὐτῶν, ὑπὲρ μὲν τῆς φιλίας καὶ συμμαχίας ἔθετο πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας πίστεις· τοὺς γε μὴν ἄνδρας αὐτοῖς ἀπέδωκε, παραγγέλας τηρεῖν, ἵνα παρὰ τούτων κομίσουντα τοὺς αὐτῶν ὁμήρους κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν.

8 Πόπλιος δὲ σχετιλάζων ἐπὶ τῷ γεγονότι παρασπονδήματι, καὶ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι πάλαι τῶν Κελτῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἄλλοτρίως διακειμένων, τούτων ἐπιγεγονότων πάντας τοὺς πέριξ Γαλάτας συμβήσεται πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀπονεύειν, ἐγὼ δειν 9 εὐλαβηθήναι τὸ μέλλον. διόπερ ἐπιγεγομένης τῆς νυκτὸς ὑπὸ τὴν ἐωθινὴν ἀνάξειξα, ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Τρεβίαν ποταμὸν καὶ τοὺς τούτων συνάπτοντας γεωλόφους, πιστεύουσιν τῇ τε τῶν τόπων ὀχυρότητι καὶ τοῖς παροικοῦσιν τῶν συμμάχων. Ἀννίβας δὲ τὴν ἀναξιγήν αὐτῶν ἐπιγνοὺς, παρατικὰ μὲν τοὺς Νομαδικοὺς ἱππεῖς ἔξαπεστελλὲ, μετ’ οὗ πολὺ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους, τοῦτοι δὲ ἐκ ποδὸς τὴν δύνα-

2 μὲν ἔχων αὐτὸς ἐξετασκότιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν Νομάδες εἰς ἔρημον τὴν στρατοπεδεῖαν ἐμπεσόντες ταῦτα τὴν ἐνεπίμπρασαν. δὴ δὴ καὶ σφόδρα συνήγευκε τοῖς Ἀρχαῖοι, ὡς εἴπερ ὁδῷ κατὰ πόδας ἀκολουθῆσαντες συνήψαν ταῖς ἀποσκευαῖς, πολλοὺς ἄν αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἐν τοῖς ἐσπεύδοις συνέβη διαφθαρῆναι. νῦν δ’ οἱ πλείονες ἐφθασαν διαβάντες τὸν Τρεβίαν ποταμὸν· τῶν δὲ καταλείβοντων ἐπὶ τῆς ὀυραγίας οἱ μὲν διεφθάρησαν, οἱ δὲ ἔλησαν ὑπὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων.

164
to him the three Roman officials charged with the partition of their lands, whom, as I mentioned above, they had originally captured by treachery, Hannibal welcomed their friendly advances and made a formal alliance with them through the envoys. He gave the three Romans, however, back to them, advising them to keep them in order through them to get their own hostages back, as had been their original design.

Publius was much concerned at this act of treachery, and taking into consideration that as the Celts had been disaffected for some time, now with this additional incentive all the Gauls round about would go over to the Carthaginians, decided to take precautions for the future. In consequence he broke up his camp that same night a little before daybreak and marched towards the river Trebia and the hills in its neighbourhood, relying on the natural strength of the country and the loyalty of the neighbouring allies. 68. Hannibal, on being apprised of their departure, at once sent off his Numidian horse, and shortly afterwards the rest of his cavalry, and himself with his army followed close behind. The Numidians, finding the camp deserted, stopped to set fire to it, which proved of great advantage to the Romans, for had the cavalry at once followed them up and overtaken the baggage-train they would have suffered great loss in the flat country. As it was, most of them succeeded in crossing the Trebia, but those who were left behind in the extreme rear were either cut to pieces or captured by the Carthaginians.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

5 Πόπλιος μὲν οὖν διαβὰς τὸν προειρήμενον πο-
ταμὸν ἐστρατοπέδευσε περὶ τοὺς πρῶτους λόφους,
καὶ περιλαβὼν τάφρω καὶ χάρακι τὴν παρεμβολὴν ἀνεδέχετο μὲν τὸν Τεβέριον καὶ τὰς μετ’ ἑκείνου
dυνάμεις· ἐθεράπευε δ’ αὐτὸν ἐπιμελῶς, σπουδάζων,
eἰ δύνατο κοινωνήσαι τοῦ μέλλοντος κινδύνου.
7 Ἀννίβας δὲ περὶ τετταράκοντα σταδίους ἀποσχὼν
τῶν πολεμίων, αὐτοῦ κατεστρατοπέδευσε. τὸ δὲ
τῶν Κελτῶν πλῆθος τὸ τὰ πεδία κατοικοῦν, συν-
εξεστηκός ταῖς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐλπίσι, δαμιλῶς
μὲν ἔχορήγη τὸ στρατόπεδον τοῖς ἑπταδεῖοι, ἐτοι-
μον δ’ ἢ παντὸς κοινωνεῖν ἔργου καὶ κινδύνου
τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν.

9 Οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ, προσπεπτωκότων τῶν κατὰ
τὴν ἰππομαχίαν, ἐξενίζοντο μὲν τῷ τὸ συμβεβηκός
eῖναι παρά τὴν προσδοκίαν, οὐ μὴν ἡπόρουν γε
σκηνῇσθαι πρὸς τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν αὐτοῖς ἦτταν εἴναι τὸ
10 γεγονός, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἡττῶντο τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ
προπέτειαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν τῶν Κελτῶν ἐθελοκάκησιν,
στοχαζόμενοι διὰ τῆς τελευταίας ἀποστάσεως.
11 καθόλου δὲ τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπεδῶν ἄκεραίων
ὁντων ἄκεραίους εἶναι διελάμβανον τὰς ύπερ τῶν
12 ὅλων ἐλπίδας. οθὲν καὶ συνάσφαστος τοῦ Τεβερίου
καὶ τῶν μετ’ ἑκείνου στρατοπεδῶν, καὶ διαπορευ-
μένων διὰ τῆς Ῥώμης, ἐξ ἐπιφανείας ἐδόξαζον
κριθῆσθαι τὴν μάχην. ἀθροισθέντων δὲ τῶν
στρατιωτῶν κατὰ τὸν ὀρκον εἰς Ἀρίμινον, ἀναλαβῶν
αὐτοὶς ὁ στρατηγὸς προῆκε, σπεῦδων συνάσαι τοῖς
14 περὶ τὸν Πόπλιον. συμμίσθαι δὲ καὶ καταστρατοπε-
δεύσας παρ’ αὐτοῖς ταῖς οἰκείαις δυνάμεις, τὸ μὲν
πλῆθος ἀνελάμβανε τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ὡς ἂν ἐκ Λιλυ-
βαίου τετταράκοντα συνεχῶς ἡμέρας πεπεζοπορηκό-
Publius, crossing the Trebia, encamped on the first hills he reached and fortifying his camp with a trench and palisade awaited the arrival of Tiberius and his forces. In the meantime he attended carefully to the treatment of his wound, as he was anxious to be able to take part in the coming battle. Hannibal encamped at a distance of about forty stades from the enemy. The numerous Celtic population of the plain, enthusiastically taking up the cause of the Carthaginians, kept the camp furnished with abundance of provisions and were ready to take their part in any of Hannibal’s operations or battles.

When the news of the cavalry engagement reached Rome they were surprised that it had not resulted as they would have expected, but were in no want of pretexts to convince themselves that it was not a defeat, some of them putting it down to the Consul’s rashness and some to wilful poltroonery on the part of the Celts, assuming this from their subsequent desertion. But on the whole, as their infantry forces were still unimpaired, their trust in final success was likewise undiminished. So that when Tiberius and his legions arrived and marched through the city, the general opinion was that they had only to show themselves to decide the battle. On the soldiers, as they had pledged themselves by oath, assembling at Ariminum, the Consul put himself at their head and advanced with all speed to join Publius. When he had done so he encamped with his own forces near Scipio’s, to refresh his men after their forty days’ continuous march from Lilybaeum to Ariminum.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

των εἰς Ἀρίμινον· τὰς δὲ παρασκευὰς ἐποιεῖτο πά- 
15 σας ὡς πρὸς μάχην, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπιμελῶς συνήδρευε 
tῷ Πολιώ, τὰ μὲν ἦδη γεγονότα συνθανόμενος, 
περὶ δὲ τῶν παρόντων συνδιανοοῦμενος.

69 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτούς καιροὺς Ἄννιβας πραξι-
κοπήσας πόλιν Κλαστίδιον, ἐνδόντος αὐτῶ τοῦ πε-
pιστευμένου παρὰ Ἦρωμαιν, ἄνδρος Βρεντεσίου, 
2 κατέσχε. γενόμενος δὲ κύριος τῆς φρουρᾶς καὶ τῆς 
tοῦ σιτοῦ παραθέσεως, τούτω μὲν πρὸς τὸ παρόν 
ἐχρήσατο, τοὺς δὲ παραληφθέντας ἄνδρας ἀβλαβεῖς 
3 μεθ’ ἑαυτοῦ προῆκε, δείγμα βουλόμενος ἐκφέρειν 
tῆς σφετέρας προϊσέως πρὸς τὸ μὴ δεδοτα 
ἀπελπίζειν τὴν παρ’ αὐτοῦ σωτηρίαν τῶν ὑπὸ 
4 τῶν καιρῶν καταλαμβανομένων. τὸν δὲ προδότην 
ἐτίμησε μεγαλείως, ἐκκαλέσασθαι σπουδάζων τοὺς 
ἐπὶ πραγμάτων ταττομένους πρὸς τὰς Καρχηδονίων 
ἐλπίδας.

5 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνθεωρήσας τινὰς τῶν Κελ-
tῶν, οἵ κατὰκοι μεταξ’ τοῦ Πάδου καὶ τοῦ Τρεβία 
ποταμοῦ, πεποιημένους μὲν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίαν, 
dιασεμπομένους δὲ καὶ πρὸς Ἦρωμαιν, καὶ πεπει-
σμένους τῷ τουιτῷ τρόπῳ τὴν παρ’ ἀμφοῖν ἀσφά-
6 λειαν αὐτὸς ὑπάρξειν, ἔξαποστέλλει πεζοὺς μὲν δισ-
χιλίους, ἐπιπεῖς δὲ Κελτοὺς καὶ Νομάδας εἰς χιλίους,
7 προστάξας ἐπιδραμεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν. τῶν δὲ 
πραξάντων τὸ προσταθὲν καὶ πολλὴν περιβαλομέ-
νων λειαν, εὐθέως οἱ Κελτοὶ παρῆσαν ἐπὶ τὸν χά-
8 ρακα τῶν Ἦρωμαιν, δεόμενοι σφίξι βοθεῖν. Τε-
βέριος δὲ καὶ πάλαι ξητών ἀφορμήν τοῦ πράττειν 
ti, τότε λαβὼν πρόφασιν ἐξαπέστειλε τῶν μὲν ὑπ-
πέων τὸ πλείστων μέρος, πεζοὺς δὲ σὺν τούτωι 
9 ἀκοντιστὰς εἰς χιλίους. σπουδὴ δὲ τοιῶν προσ-
168
BOOK III. 68. 14 – 69. 9

Meanwhile he made all preparations for a battle and had many close conferences with Scipio, ascertaining the truth about what had occurred, and discussing the present situation with him.

69. At about the same time the town of Clastidium was betrayed to Hannibal by a native of Brundisium, to whom the Romans had entrusted it, the garrison and all the stores of grain falling into his hands. The latter he used for his present needs, but he took the men he had captured with him without doing them any hurt, wishing to make a display of leniency, so that those who were overtaken by adversity should not be terrified and give up hope of their lives being spared by him. He conferred high honours on the traitor, as he was anxious to win over those in positions of authority to the Carthaginian cause.

After this, on observing that some of the Celts who lived between the Trebia and the Po had made alliance with himself, but were negotiating with the Romans also, under the idea that thus they would be safe from both, he dispatched two thousand foot and about a thousand Celtic and Numidian horse with orders to raid their country. On his orders being executed and a large amount of booty secured, the Celts at once came into the Roman camp asking for help. Tiberius had long been on the look-out for some ground justifying an active step and now that he had this pretext sent out the greater part of his cavalry and about a thousand javelineers on foot. Making all dispatch they met the enemy
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

μιξάντων πέραν τοῦ Τρεβία καὶ διαμαχομένων τοῖς πολεμίοις ὑπὲρ τῆς λείας, ἔτράπησαν οἱ Κέλται σὺν τοῖς Νομάσι καὶ τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ἔπε τὸν ἑαυτῶν ἐπὶ τὸν ἑαυτὸν χάρακα. ταχὺ δὲ συννόησαντες τὸ γινόμενον οἱ προκαθήμενοι τῆς τῶν Καρχηδονίων παρεμβολῆς ἐνετέθεν ταῖς ἐφεδρείαις ἐβοήθουν τοῖς πιεζομένοις. οὐ γενομένου τραπέντες οἱ Ῥωμαίοι πάλιν ἐποιούντο τὴν ἀπόλυσιν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν παρ

11 εμβολήν. Τεβέριος δὲ συνορῶν τὸ γινόμενον, πάντας ἐπαφῆκε τοὺς ἱπποὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστάς. τούτου δὲ συμπεσόντος, αὖθις ἐγκλίναντες οἱ Κέλται πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀσφάλειαν ἀπεχώρουν. ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Καρχηδονίων, ἀπαράσκευος ὡν πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν τὰ ὅλα, καὶ νομίζων δεῖν μηδέποτε χωρίς προθέσεως μηδὲ ἐκ πάσης ἀφορμῆς ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ὀλοχερεῖς

12 κινδύνους, ὅπερ εἶναι φατέον ἡγεμόνος ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ, τότε μὲν ἐπέσχε τοὺς παρ’ αὐτοῦ συνεγίναστας τῷ χάρακι, καὶ στῆναι μὲν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἡγάγασε, διόκειν δὲ καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐκώλυσε, διὰ τῶν ὑπηρετῶν καὶ σαλπιγκτῶν ἀνακαλοῦμεν

13 νοσ. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαίοι βραχὺν ἐπισχόντες χρόνον ἀνέλυσαν, ὠλίγους μὲν αὐτῶν ἀποβαλόντες, πλείους δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων διεφθαρκότες.

70 Ὁ δὲ Τεβέριος μετεωρισθείς καὶ περιχαρῆς γενόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ προτερήματι, φιλοτιμῶς εἰχὲ πρὸς τὸ 2 τὴν ταχίστην κρίνα τὰ ὅλα. προέκειτο μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν γνώμην χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι, διὰ τὸ τὸν Πόπλιον ἀρρωστεῖν ὃμως δὲ βουλόμενος προσλαβέσθαι καὶ τὴν τοῦ συνάρχου τοὺς γνώμην,

3 ἐποιεῖτο λόγους περὶ τοῦτον πρὸς αὐτὸν. ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος τὴν ἑναντίαν εἰχὲ διάληψιν περὶ τῶν ἐν

4 εστῶτων· τὰ γὰρ στρατόπεδα χειμασκήνατα βελ-

170
BOOK III. 69. 9 – 70. 4

beyond the Trebia and on their disputing possession of the booty with them the Celts and Numidians gave way and began to retire on their own camp. Those in command of the advanced posts outside the Carthaginian camp soon understood what had happened and sent out a covering force to support the fugitives, upon which the Romans in their turn were put to flight and fell back on their camp. Tiberius on seeing this ordered out all his remaining cavalry and javeliniers, and when these had joined the rest, the Celts again gave way and retreated to a position of safety. The Carthaginian general, as he was not at this time prepared for a general battle, and took the view that a decisive engagement should never be undertaken on any chance pretext and without a definite purpose—as we must pronounce to be the part of a good general—made the men in retreat halt and face about when they approached the camp, but he would not allow them to advance and engage the enemy, calling them back by his officers and buglers. The Romans after waiting for a short time retired after losing a few of their own number, but inflicting a larger loss on the Carthaginians.

70. Tiberius, elated and overjoyed by his success, was all eagerness to bring on a decisive battle as soon as possible. He was, it is true, at liberty to act as he thought best owing to the illness of Scipio, but wishing to have his colleague’s opinion he spoke to him on the subject. Scipio’s view of the situation was just the opposite. He considered
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tίω τὰ παρ’ αὐτῶν ὑπελάμβανε γενήσεσθαι, τὴν τε τῶν Κελτῶν ἄθεσίαν οὐκ ἐμμενεῖν ἐν τῇ πίστει, τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπραγούντων καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἀναγκαζομένων ἄγειν, ἀλλὰ καινοτομήσειν τι πάλιν κατ’ ἐκείνων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις αὐτὸς ὑγιασθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος ἀληθινῆν παρέξεσθαι χρείαν ἡλπίζε τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγμασι. διὸ καὶ τοιούτους χρώμενος λογισμοῖς μένειν ἡξίου τὸν Τεβέριον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπο-7 κεμένων. ὁ δὲ προειρημένος ἦδει μὲν ἐκαστα τού-8 τῶν ἀληθινῶς λεγόμενα καὶ δεόντως, ὡπο δὲ τῆς φιλοδοξίας ἐλαυνόμενος καὶ καταπιστεύων τοῖς πράγμασι παραλόγως ἐσπευδε κρίναι δι’ αὐτοῦ τὰ ὅλα καὶ μῆτε τὸν Πόπλιον δύνασθαι παρατυχεῖν τῇ μάχῃ μῆτε τοὺς ἐπικαθεσταμένους στρατηγοὺς φθάσαι παραλαβόντας τὴν ἀρχήν. οὕτως γὰρ ἦν ὁ χρόνος. διόπερ οὐ τῶν τῶν πραγμάτων καὶρὸν ἐκλεγόμενος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἱδιον, ἐμέλλε τοῦ δέοντος σφαλήσεσθαι προφανῶς.

9 Ὅ δ’ Ἀννίβας, παραπλησίους ἔχων ἐπινοίας Πόπλιών περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων, κατὰ τοῦναντίον ἐσπευδε συμβαλείν τοῖς πολεμίοις, θέλων μὲν πρῶτον ἀκεραίοις ἀποχρήσοσθαι ταῖς τῶν Κελτῶν ὀρμαίς, δεύτερον ἀνασκήτοις καὶ νεοσυλλόγους συμβαλείν τοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατοπέδους, τρίτον ἀδενατοῦντος ἐτι τοῦ Πόπλιον ποιήσοσθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον πράττειν τι καὶ μὴ προτεν-σθαι διὰ κενῆς τὸν χρόνον. τῷ γὰρ εἰς ἄλλοτριάν καθέντι χώραν στρατόπεδα καὶ παραδόξους ἐγχευ-ροῦντι πράγμασιν εἰς τρόπον ἐστίν οὕτως σωτηρίας, τὸ συνεχώς καινοποιεῖν ἀεὶ τὰς τῶν συμμάχων ἐλπίδας.

10 Ἀννίβας μὲν οὖν, εἰδὼς τὴν ἐσομένην ὀρμὴν

172
that their legions would be all the better for a winter’s drilling, and that the notoriously fickle Celts would not remain loyal to the Carthaginians if the latter were kept in forced inaction, but would throw them over in their turn. Besides he hoped himself when his wound was healed to be of some real service in their joint action. On all these grounds therefore he advised Tiberius to let matters remain as they were. Tiberius was quite conscious of the truth and cogency of all these reasons, but, urged on by his ambition and with an unreasonable confidence in his fortune, he was eager to deliver the decisive blow himself and did not wish Publius to be able to be present at the battle, or that the Consuls designate should enter upon office before all was over—it being now nearly the time for this. Since, then, he did not choose the time indicated by circumstances, but his own time, his action was bound to be mistaken.

Hannibal’s view of the situation was very much the same as Scipio’s; so that he on the other hand was anxious to force a battle on the enemy, wishing in the first place to avail himself of the enthusiasm of the Celts while still fresh, secondly to encounter the Roman legions while still newly-levied and undrilled, thirdly to fight the battle before Scipio had recovered, but most of all to be up and doing and not let the time slip away resultlessly. For when a general has brought his army into a foreign country and is engaged in such a risky enterprise, his only hope of safety lies in constantly keeping alive the hopes of his allies.

Such, then, was the purpose of Hannibal, who
ΤΗΣ ΗΙΣΤΟΡΙΕΣ ΟΥ ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

71 τοῦ Τεβερίου, πρὸς τούτοις ἦν. πάλαὶ δὲ συνειρρακῶς μεταξὺ τῶν στρατοπεδῶν τόπων, ἐπίπεδον μὲν καὶ ψυλὸν, εὐφυῆ δὲ πρὸς ἐνέδραν διὰ τι βέβαιως ἔχον ὄφριν, ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτης ἀκάνθας καὶ βάτους συνεχεῖς ἐπιπεφυκότας, ἐγίνετο πρὸς τῷ στρατηγεῖν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. ἐμέλλε οὖ τεύχεσθαι λήσεως· οἱ γὰρ Ῥωμαίοι πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὑλῶδες τόπους ὑπόττως εἶχον διὰ τὸ τοὺς Κελτοὺς ἀεὶ τιθέναι τὰς ἐνέδρας ἐν τοῖς τουτούς χωρίοις, τοῖς δὲ ἐπὶ πέδοις καὶ ψυλοῖς ἀπεπίστευσαν, οὐκ εἰδότες ὦτι καὶ πρὸς τὸ λαθείν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν παθεῖν τοὺς ἐνεδρεύσαντας εὐφυέστεροι τυγχάνουσιν ὃντες τῶν ὑλῶδων, διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι μὲν ἐκ πολλοῦ προφαράν πάντα τοὺς ἐνεδρεύσαντας, εἶναι δὲ ἐπιπροσθέσεις ἑκατέρας ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις τόποις. τὸ γὰρ τυχόν ἐνέδρον μετὰ βραχείας ὀφρῶς, ποτὲ δὲ κάλαμοι καὶ πτέρεις καὶ τὰ γένος ἀκανθῶν, οὐ μόνον πεζοὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἰππεῖς ἐνίοτε δύναται κρύπτειν, εὖν βραχέα τις προνοθῆκη τοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐπίσημα τῶν ὄπλων ὑπτείν τιθέναι πρὸς τὴν γῆν, τὰς δὲ περιπολολαίας ὑποτιθέναι τοῖς ὀπλοῖς. πλῆν δὲ γε τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς κοινολογηθεῖς Μάγωνι τάδελφόν καὶ τοῖς συνέδροις περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀγώνος, συγκατατιθεμένων αὐτῶ πάντων ταῖς ἐπιθεσιολαίσ, ἀμα τὰ δεινοποιήσασθαι τὸ στρατόπεδον ἀνακαλεσάμενος Μάγωνα τὸν ἀδελφόν, διὸν νέον μὲν, ὀρμῆσθαι δὲ πλήρης καὶ παιδομαθής περὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ, συνέστησε τῶν ἰππέων ἀνδράς ἑκατὸν καὶ πεζοὺς τοὺς ἰσούς. ἔτι δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας οὔτης ἐξ ὀλοῦ τοῦ στρατόπεδου σημειῶμεν τοὺς εὐρωστοτάτους παρηγγέλκει δεινοποιησάμενος ἦκεν ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ σκηνὴν. παρακαλέσας δὲ καὶ παραστήσας 174
BOOK III. 71. 1-8

knew that Tiberius was sure to be aggressively inclined. 71. He had long ago noticed a place between the two camps, flat indeed and treeless, but well adapted for an ambuscade, as it was traversed by a water-course with steep banks densely overgrown with brambles and other thorny plants, and here he proposed to lay a stratagem to surprise the enemy. It was probable that he would easily elude their vigilance; for the Romans, while very suspicious of thickly-wooded ground, which the Celts usually chose for their ambuscades, were not at all afraid of flat and treeless places, not being aware that they are better adapted than woods for the concealment and security of an ambush, because the men can see all round them for a long distance and have at the same time sufficient cover in most cases. Any water-course with a slight bank and reeds or bracken or some kind of thorny plants can be made use of to conceal not only infantry, but even the dismounted horsemen at times, if a little care be taken to lay shields with conspicuous devices inside uppermost on the ground and hide the helmets under them. The Carthaginian general now consulted with his brother Mago and the rest of the staff about the coming battle, and on their all approving of his plan, after the troops had had their supper, he summoned Mago, who was still quite young, but full of martial enthusiasm and trained from boyhood in the art of war, and put under his command a hundred men from the cavalry and the same number of infantry. During the day he had ordered these men, whom he had marked as the most stout-hearted in his army, to come to his tent after supper. After addressing
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tούτοις τὴν πρέπουσαν ὀρμὴν τῷ καυρῷ, παρῆγγελε δέκα τοὺς ἀνδρωδεστάτους ἐκαστὸν ἐπιλεξάμενον ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων τάξεων ἦκειν εἰς τῶν τόπον ἔνεδραν, δυνάμεις ὑμνῆς καὶ τάξεως πεζοῦς ἀλλος τοσοῦτος ἐξαπέστειλε γυναῖκας εἰς τὴν ἔνεδραν, συντήρησες ὑμνῆς καὶ τάξεως.

διαταξάμενος περὶ τοῦ καυροῦ τῆς ἐπιθέσεως ὁ αὐτὸς δ' ἀμα τῷ φωτὶ τοὺς Νομαδικοὺς ἔπεις συναγαγόν, ὡς ὁρεφέκακος διαφερόντως, παρεκάλεσε καὶ τινὰς δωρεάς ἐπαγγελμένας τοῖς ἀνδραγαθήσας προσέπας πελάσαντας τῷ τῶν ἐναντίων χάρακι κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐπιδιαβάνειν τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ προσακροβολιζομένους καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, βουλόμενος ἀναρίστως καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀπαρασκεύων λαβέως τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἡγεμόνας ἅθροίζεσας ὡμοίως παρεκάλεσε πρὸς τὸν κύνδυνον, καὶ πάσαν ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι παρήγγειλε καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὁπλῶν καὶ τῶν ἱππῶν γίνεσθαι θεραπείαν.

72 Ο δὲ Τεθέριος ἀμα τῷ συνιδεῖν ἐγγίζοντας τοὺς Νομαδικοὺς ἔπεις παραντίκα μὲν αὐτὴν τὴν ἐπιτελεῖτο που ἐξαπέστειλε, προστάξας ἔχεσθαι καὶ συμπλέκει τοὺς πολεμίους. ἐξῆς δὲ τούτους ἐξέπεμπε τοὺς πέξακοντιστὰς εἰς ἐξακισθυλίους. ἐκείναι δὲ καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος, ὡς ἐξ ἐπιφανείας κριθησομένων τῶν ὀλιγῶν, ἐπαιρόμενος τῷ τε πληθεὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῷ γεγονότι τῇ προτεραιᾷ περὶ τοῦς ἔπεις εὑμερήματι. οὔσας δὲ τῆς ὠρᾶς περὶ χειμερινᾶς τροπᾶς καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας νυφετῶν καὶ ψυχῆς διαφερόντως, τῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῶν ἱππῶν σχεδὸν ὡς εὐπεῖν ἀπάντων ἀναρίστων ἐκ-176
BOOK III. 71. 8 – 72. 3

them and working up their zeal to the required pitch, he ordered each of them to pick out ten of the bravest men from his own company and to come to a certain place in the camp known to them. They did as they were bidden and in the night he sent out the whole force, which now amounted to a thousand horse and as many foot, to the ambuscade, furnishing them with guides and giving his brother orders about the time to attack. At daybreak he mustered his Numidian horsemen, all men capable of great endurance, whom he ordered, after having addressed them and promised certain gifts to those who distinguished themselves, to ride up to the enemy's camp, and crossing the river with all speed to draw out the Romans by shooting at them, his wish being to get the enemy to fight him before they had breakfasted or made any preparations. He then collected the other officers and exhorted them likewise to battle, and he ordered the whole army to get their breakfasts and to see to their arms and horses.

72. Tiberius, when he saw the Numidian horse approaching, sent out at first only his cavalry with orders to close with the enemy. He next dispatched about six thousand javeliners on foot and then began to move his whole army out of the camp, thinking that the mere sight of them would decide the issue, so much confidence did his superiority in numbers and the success of his cavalry on the previous day give him. The time of year was about the winter solstice, and the day exceedingly cold and snowy, while the men and horses nearly all left the camp without having had their morning meal.
πεπορευμένων, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὀρμῇ καὶ προθυμία
4 τὸ πλῆθος περιήν· ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς τοῦ Τρεβία
ποταμοῦ διαβάσεως, καὶ προσαναβεβήκτος τῷ ἰεύ-
ματι διὰ τὸν ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ γενόμενον ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ
τὰ στρατόπεδα τόποις ὁμβρῶν, μόλις ἔως τῶν μα-
5 σθῶν οἱ πεζοὶ βαπτιζόμενοι διεβαίνον· εἶ ὃς ἐκακο-
pάθει τὸ στρατόπεδον ὑπὸ τέ τοῦ ψύχους καὶ τῆς
ἐνδείας, ὡς ἂν ἦδη καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας προβαίνουσα.
6 οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνοι, κατὰ σκηνὰς βεβρωκότες καὶ
πεπωκότες, καὶ τοὺς ἱπποὺς ἱτομακότες, ἰλείφοντο
7 καὶ καθωπλίζοντο περὶ τὰ πυρὰ πάντες. Ἀννίβας
δὲ τὸν καιρὸν ἐπιτηρῶν, ἀμα τῷ συνιδεῖν διαβεβη-
κότας τοὺς Ῥωμαίους τὸν ποταμὸν προβαλόμενος
ἐφεδρεῖαν τοὺς λογχοφόρους καὶ Βαλιαρεῖς, ὄντας
8 εἰς ὀκτακυκλίους, ἔξηγε τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ προ-
ἀγαγών ὡς ὀκτὼ στάδια πρὸ τῆς στρατόπεδείας τοὺς
μὲν πεζοὺς ἐπὶ μίαν εὐθείαν παρενέβαλε, περὶ δισ-
μυρίους ὄντας τὸν ἄριθμόν, Ἰθήρας καὶ Κελτούς
9 καὶ Δίβωας, τοὺς δέ ἱππεῖς διελὼν ἑφ’ ἐκάτερον
παρέστησε τὸ κέρας, πλείους ὄντας μυρίων σὺν τοῖς
παρὰ τῶν Κελτῶν συμμάχους, τὰ δὲ θηρία μερίσας
10 πρὸ τῶν κεράτων, δι’ ἀμφοτέρων προεβάλετο. Τε-
βέριος δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς
ἀνεκάλείτο, θεωρῶν όUK ἔχοντας δ’ ἐρήμησαν τοῖς
ὑπεναντίοις διὰ τὸ τοὺς Νομάδας ἀποχωρεῖν μὲν
ἐὑχερῶς καὶ σποράδην, ἐπικείονται δὲ πάλιν ἐκ μετα-
βολῆς τολμηρῶς καὶ θρασεός· τὸ γὰρ τῆς Νομαδι-
11 κῆς μάχης ἦδον ἐστὶ τοῦτο· τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς παρεν-
έβαλε κατὰ τὰς εἰδισκέψεις παρ’ αὐτοῖς τάξεις, ὄντας
τοὺς μὲν Ῥωμαίους εἰς μυρίους ἔξακισχύλιους, τοὺς
12 δὲ συμμάχους εἰς δισμυρίους. τὸ γὰρ τέλειον στρα-
τόπεδον παρ’ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰς ὀλοσχερεῖς ἐπιβολὰς
178
At first their enthusiasm and eagerness sustained them, but when they had to cross the Trebia, swollen as it was owing to the rain that had fallen during the night higher up the valley than where the armies were, the infantry had great difficulty in crossing, as the water was breast-high. The consequence was that the whole force suffered much from cold and also from hunger, as the day was now advancing. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, who had eaten and drunk in their tents and looked after their horses, were all anointing and arming themselves round their fires. Hannibal, who was waiting for his opportunity, when he saw that the Romans had crossed the river, threw forward as a covering force his pikemen and slingers about eight thousand in number and led out his army. After advancing for about eight stades he drew up his infantry, about twenty thousand in number, and consisting of Spaniards, Celts, and Africans, in a single line, while he divided his cavalry, numbering, together with the Celtic allies, more than ten thousand, and stationed them on each wing, dividing also his elephants and placing them in front of the wings so that his flanks were doubly protected. Tiberius now recalled his cavalry, perceiving that they could not cope with the enemy, as the Numidians easily scattered and retreated, but afterwards wheeled round and attacked with great daring—these being their peculiar tactics. He drew up his infantry in the usual Roman order. They numbered about sixteen thousand Romans and twenty thousand allies, this being the strength of their complete army for decisive operations, when
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἐκ τοσούτων ἀνδρῶν ἔστων, ὅταν ὁμοί τοὺς ὑπάτους
13 ἐκατέρως οἱ καρυοὶ συνάγωσι. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς
ἐπρεπες ἐφ’ ἐκάτερον θεία τὸ κέρας, ὡστα εἰς τετρα-
κυσχιόνοις, ἐπήει τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις σοβαρῶς, ἐν τάξει
73 καὶ βάδην ποιούμενος τὴν ἔφοδον. ἦδη δὲ σύν-
εγγυς ὠντων ἀλλήλοις, συνεπέλεκτησαν οἱ προκείμενοι
2 τῶν δυνάμεων εὐξώνοι. τούτου δὲ συμβάντος, οἱ
μὲν Ἄρμαίοι κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ἠπατούντο,
τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδόνιοις ὑπερδέξεις γίνεσθαι συνέβαινε
3 τὴν χρείαν, ἂτε δὴ τῶν μὲν Ἄρμαίων πεζακοντι-
στῶν κακοταθοῦντων ἐξ ὀρθοῦ καὶ προεμένων τὰ
πλείστα βέλη κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Νομάδας συμπλο-
κῆν, τῶν δὲ καταλειπομένων βελῶν ἡχοειμένων
4 αὐτοῖς διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς νοτίδος. παραπλήσα
δὲ τούτως συνέβαινε καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἐπιπεδὸς γίνεσθαι
5 καὶ περὶ τὸ σύμπαν αὐτοῖς στρατόπεδον. περὶ γε
μὴν τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους ὑπῆρχε τάναντα τούτων
ἀκμαῖοι γὰρ παρατεταγμένοι καὶ νεαλεῖς ἂεὶ πρὸς τὸ
6 δέον εὐχρήστως καὶ προθύμως εἶχον. διότερ ἃμα
τῷ δέξασθαι διὰ τῶν διαστημάτων τοὺς προκυνδυ-
νεύοντας καὶ συμπεσεῖν τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὄπλων ἀλλή-
λοις, οἱ μὲν ἐπειδὴ οἱ τῶν Καρχηδόνιων εὐθεῖος ἀπ’
ἀμφοῖν τῶν κεράτων ἐπέεξον τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ὡς
ἀν τῷ πλήθει πολὺ διαφέροντες καὶ ταῖς ἀκμαῖς
αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἐπών διὰ τὴν προειρημένην ἀκε-
7 ραίτητα περὶ τὴν ἔξοδον τοῖς δὲ Ἄρμαίωις τῶν
ἐπέων ὑποχωρησάντων καὶ ψυλλητῶν τῶν τῆς
φάλαγγος κεράτων, οἱ τε λογχοφόροι τῶν Καρχηδο-
νίων καὶ τὸ τῶν Νομάδων πλῆθος, ὑπεραιροῦντες
τοὺς προτεταγμένους τῶν ἱδίων καὶ πρὸς τὰ κέρατα
προσπίπτοντες τοῖς Ἅρμαίοις, πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ
dιειργάζοντο καὶ μάχεσθαι τοῖς κατὰ πρόσωπον ὅπως
180
BOOK III. 72. 12 – 73. 7

the Consuls chance to be united. Afterwards placing his cavalry, numbering about four thousand, on each wing he advanced on the enemy in imposing style marching in order at a slow step. 73. When they were nearly at close quarters, the light-armed troops in the van of each army began the combat, and here the Romans laboured under many disadvantages, the efficiency of the Carthaginians being much superior, since the Roman javelinoers had had a hard time since daybreak, and had spent most of their missiles in the skirmish with the Numidians, while those they had left had been rendered useless by the continued wet weather. The cavalry and the whole army were in much the same state, whereas just the opposite was the case with the Carthaginians, who, standing in their ranks fresh and in first-rate condition, were ready to give efficient support wherever it was required. So when the skirmishers had retired through the gaps in their line and the heavy-armed infantry met, the Carthaginian cavalry at once pressed on both flanks of the enemy, being greatly superior in numbers and in the condition of themselves and their horses, having, as I explained above, started quite fresh. When the Roman cavalry fell back and left the flanks of the infantry exposed, the Carthaginian pike-men and the Numidians in a body, dashing past their own troops that were in front of them, fell on the Romans from both flanks, damaging them severely and preventing them
8 εἰών. οἱ δ’ ἐν τοῖς βαρέσιν ὅπλοις, παρ’ ἀμφοῖν τὰς πρῶτας ἥχοντες καὶ μέσας τής ὄλης παρεμβολῆς τάξεις, ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐμάχοντο συστάδην, ἐφά-74 μιλλὸν ποιοῦμενοι τὸν κίνδυνον. ἐν ζ’ καιρῷ διανα-στάτων τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας Νομάδων, καὶ προσ-πεσόντων ἄφων κατὰ νύντον τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις περὶ τὰ μέσα, μεγάλην ταραχὴν καὶ δυσχηρείαν συνέβαλε γίνεσθαι περὶ τάς τῶν Ῥωμαίων δυνά-2 μεις. τέλος δ’ ἀμφότερα τὰ κέρατα τῶν περὶ τὸν Τεβέριον πιεζοῦμενα κατὰ πρόσωπον μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων, πέριξ δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων ἐπιφανείας ὑπὸ τῶν εὐζώνων, ἐτράπησαν καὶ συνεωθοῦντο κατὰ τὸν διωγμόν πρὸς τὸν 3 ὑποκείμενον ποταμόν. τούτου δὲ συμβάντος, οἱ κατὰ μέσον τὸν κίνδυνον ταχθέντες τῶν Ῥωμαίων, οἱ μὲν κατόπιν ἐφεστῶτες ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐνέ-δρας προσπεσόντων ἀπώλυντο καὶ κακῶς ἔπαθον, 4 οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς πρῶτας χώρας ἐπαναγκασθέντες ἐκράτησαν τῶν Κελτῶν καὶ μέρους τινὸς τῶν Διβύων, καὶ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἀποκτείναντες διέκοψαν 5 τὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων τάξιν. θεωροῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἱδίων κεράτων ἐκπεπιεισμένους, τὸ μὲν ἐπιβοθεῖν τούτους ἂ πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀπίπαντα παρεμβολην ἀπέγνωσαν, ὑφορόμενοι μὲν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἵππων, κυλυόμενοι δὲ διὰ τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφόραν καὶ συστροφὴν τοῦ κατὰ κεφαλὴν 6 ὀμβρου. τηροῦντες δὲ τὰς τάξεις ἄθροί μετ’ ἀσφαλείας ἀπεχώρησαν εἰς Πλακεντίαν, οὔτε οὐκ 7 ἐλάττουσιν μυρίων. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν οἱ μὲν πλείστοι περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐφθάρησαν ὑπὸ τε τῶν θηρίων καὶ 8 τῶν ἵππων, οἱ δὲ διαμαγόντες τῶν πεζῶν καὶ τὸ πλείστον μέρος τῶν ἵππων, πρὸς τὸ προειρημένον 182
from dealing with the enemy in their front. The heavy-armed troops on both sides, who occupied the advanced centre of the whole formation, maintained for long a hand-to-hand combat with no advantage on either side. 74. But now the Numidians issued from their ambuscade and suddenly attacked the enemy's centre from the rear, upon which the whole Roman army was thrown into the utmost confusion and distress. At length both of Tiberius' wings, hard pressed in front by the elephants and all round their flanks by the light-armed troops, turned and were driven by their pursuers back on the river behind them. After this, while the rear of the Roman centre was suffering heavy loss from the attack of the ambuscade, those in the van, thus forced to advance, defeated the Celts and part of the Africans, and after killing many of them broke through the Carthaginian line. But seeing that both their flanks had been forced off the field, they despaired of giving help there and of returning to their camp, afraid as they were of the very numerous cavalry and hindered by the river and the force and heaviness of the rain which was pouring down on their heads. They kept, however, in close order and retired on Placentia, being not less than ten thousand in number. Of the remainder the greater part were killed near the river by the elephants and cavalry, but the few infantry who escaped and most of the
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

σύστημα ποιούμενοι τὴν ἀποχώρησιν, ἀνεκομικὸς σθῆσαν ἀμα τοῦτος εἰς Πλακεντίαν. τὸ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατόπεδον, ἐστὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ καταδώξαν τοὺς πολεμίους, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ χειμῶνος οὐκέτι δυνάμενον πορρωτέρῳ προβαίνειν, ἐπανήλθε πάλιν 10 εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν. καὶ πάντες ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ μάχῃ περιχαρεῖς ἦσαν, ὡς κατωρθωκότες· συνέβαινε γὰρ ὅλίγοις μὲν τῶν Ἰβήρων καὶ Διβύων, τοὺς δὲ πλείους ἀπολωλέναι τῶν Κελτῶν. ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ὄμβρων καὶ τῆς ἐπιγνωμονῆς χιόνος οὕτως διετέθηντο δεινός ὡστε τὰ μὲν θηρία διαφθάρναι πλὴν ἐνός, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀπόλλυσαί καὶ τῶν ἵππων διὰ τὸ ψύχος.

75 ὁ δὲ Τεθέριος, εἰδὼς μὲν τὰ συμβεβηκότα, βουλόμενος δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπικρύπτεσθαι τοὺς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ τὸ γεγονός, ἔστημε τοὺς ἀπαγγελούντας ὅτι μάχης γενομένης τὴν νύκτην αὐτῶν ὁ χειμῶν ἀφείλει 2 λετο. ὁ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι παραντίκα μὲν ἐπίστευον τοῖς προσπίπτοντοι· μετ’ οὗ πολὺ δὲ πυνθανόμενοι τοὺς μὲν Καρχηδονίους καὶ τὴν παρεμβολὴν τὴν αὐτῶν τὴρεῖν καὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς πάντας ἀπονευκέναι πρὸς 3 τὴν ἐκείνων φιλίαν, τοὺς δὲ παρ’ αὐτῶν ἀπολειπόντας τὴν παρεμβολήν ἐκ τῆς μάχης ἀνακεχωρηκέναι καὶ συνήθροισθαι πάντας εἰς τὰς πόλεις, καὶ χορηγεύθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοι ἐκ ταλάττης ἀνὰ τὸν Πάδον ποταμόν, καὶ λίαν σαφῶς ἐγνοσαν τὰ γεγο- 4 νότα περὶ τῶν κίνδυνον. διὸ καὶ παραδόξου φανέντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ πράγματος περὶ τὰς λυπᾶς παρασκευὰς διαφερόντως ἐγένοντο καὶ περὶ φυλακήν τῶν προκειμένων τόπων, πέμποντες εἰς Σαρδώνα καὶ Συκελίαν στρατόπεδα, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς εἰς Τάραντα προφυλακᾶς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τόπων εἰς τοὺς εὐκαί- 184
BOOK III. 74. 8—75. 4

cavalry retreated to join the body I just mentioned and with them got safely into Placentia. The Carthagenian army, after pursuing the enemy as far as the river, being unable to advance further owing to the storm, returned to their camp. They were all highly elated at the result of the battle, regarding it as a signal success; for very few Africans and Spaniards had been killed, the chief loss having fallen on the Celts. They suffered so severely, however, from the rain and the snow that followed that all the elephants perished except one, and many men and horses also died of the cold.

75. Tiberius, though well knowing the facts, wished as far as possible to conceal them from those in Rome, and therefore sent messengers to announce that a battle had taken place and that the storm had deprived him of the victory. The Romans at first gave credence to this news, but when shortly afterwards they learnt that the Carthaginians still kept their camp and that all the Celts had gone over to them, but that their own forces had abandoned their camp and retreated from the field and were now all collected in cities, and getting their supplies up from the sea by the river Po, they quite realized what had been the result of the battle. Therefore, although they were much taken by surprise, they adopted all manner of steps to prepare for the war and especially to protect exposed points, dispatching legions to Sardinia and Sicily and sending garrisons to Tarentum and other suitable
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

rous: παρεσκεύασαν δὲ καὶ ναὸς ἕξηκοντα πεντήρεις.
5 Γνάιος δὲ Σερούλλος καὶ Γάιος Φλαμίνιος, οἴπερ ἔτυχον ὑπατοι τὸτε καθεσταμένοι, συνήχων τοὺς συμμάχους καὶ κατέγραφον τὰ παρ᾿ αὐτοῖς στρατό-
6 πεδα. παρῆγον δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς τὰς μὲν εἰς Ἀρίμυνον, τὰς δ᾿ εἰς Τυρρηνίαν, ὡς ἐπὶ τούτοις
7 ποησόμενοι τοὺς τόπους τὴν ἔξοδον. ἔπεμψαν
dὲ καὶ πρὸς Ἰέρωνα περὶ βοηθείας, δὲ καὶ πεν-
tακοσίους αὐτοῖς ἐξαπέστειλε Κρήτας καὶ χιλίους πελτοφόρους. πάντα δὲ καὶ πανταχόθεν ἑνεργῶς
8 ἠτοίμαζον. τὸτε γὰρ εἰσὶ φοβεράτατοι Ἡρωμαῖοι καὶ κοινὴ καὶ κατ᾿ ἱδίαν, ὅταν αὐτοὺς περιστῇ
φόβος ἀλγηθῶς.

76 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καίρους Γνάιος Κορνήλιος
ὁ καταλειφθεὶς ὑπὸ τάδελφοῦ Ποπλίου στρατηγὸς
ἐπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προ-
eἰπον, ἀναχθεὶς ἀπὸ τῶν τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ στομάτων
παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ, προσέσεξε τῆς Ἰβηρίας πρὸς τοὺς
2 κατὰ τὸ καλούμενον Ἐμπόριον τόπους. ἀρξάμενος
δ᾿ ἐντεῦθεν ἀποβάσεις ἐποιεῖτο, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπει-
θοῦντος ἐπολιόρκει τῶν τὴν παραλίαν κατοικοῦν-
tων ἔως Ἰβηρίος ποταμοῦ, τοὺς δὲ προσδεχομένους
ἐφιλανθρώπει, τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ποιούμενος περὶ
3 αὐτῶν προμήθειαν. ἀσφαλισάμενος δὲ τοὺς προσ-
κεχωρηκότας τῶν παραθαλασσῶν προῆγε παντὶ τῷ
στρατεύματι, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν εἰς τὴν μεσό-
4 γαίαν· πολὺ γὰρ ἤδη καὶ τὸ συμμαχικὸν ἱθροίκει
τῶν Ἰβηρῶν. ἀμα δὲ προϊόν ὡς μὲν προσήκετο,
5 τὰς δὲ κατεστρέφετο τῶν πόλεων. τῶν δὲ Καρχη-
δονίων, οὐχ ἔχουν ἐπὶ τούτων ἀπελείφθη τῶν τόπων
"Αννων, ἀντιστρατοπεδευσάντων αὐτοῖς περὶ πόλιν
προσαγορευομένην Κίσσαν, συμβαλὼν ὁ Γνάιος ἐκ
186
places, and getting ready also a fleet of sixty quinqueremes. Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius, the Consuls designate, were busy mustering the allies and enrolling their own legions, sending depots of supplies at the same time to Ariminum and Etruria which they meant to be their bases in the campaign. They also applied for help to Hiero, who sent them five hundred Cretans and a thousand light infantry, and on all sides they made active preparations. For the Romans both in public and in private are most to be feared when they stand in real danger.

76. During this time Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, who, as I said, had been left by his brother Publius in command of the naval forces, sailing from the mouths of the Rhone with his whole fleet to the place in Spain called Emporium, and starting from there made a series of landings, reducing by siege the towns on the coast as far as the Ebro, which refused his advances, but bestowing favours on those which accepted them and taking all possible precautions for their safety. After securing all the sea-board places which had submitted to him he advanced with his whole army into the interior, having now got together also a considerable force of Iberian allies. He won over some of the towns on the line of his march and subdued others, and when the Carthaginians who had been left to guard this district under the command of Hanno encamped opposite to him near a city called Cissa, Gnaeus
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

παρατάξεως καὶ νικήσας τῇ μάχῃ πολλῶν μὲν χρημάτων ἐγένετ’ ἐγκρατής, ὡς ἂν ἀπάσης τῆς ἀποσκευῆς τῶν εἰς Ἰταλίαν ὀρμησάντων παρὰ τούτοις ἀπολελειμμένης, πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἐντὸς Ἰβηρίας ποταμοῦ συμμάχους ἐποιήσατο καὶ φίλους, ζωγρία δὲ τὸν τε τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸν Ἀννωνα καὶ τὸν τῶν Ἰβηρίων Ἀνδροβάλην ἔλαβε. τούτοις δὲ συνέβαλε τύραννον μὲν ἐκεῖ τῶν κατὰ τὴν μεσόγαιον τόπων, εὐνοῦν δὲ διαφερόντως αἰεὶ ποτὲ Καρχηδονίων. ταχὺ δὲ συνείς τὸ γεγονός Ἀσδρούβας, ἦκε παραβοηθῶν διαβὰς τὸν Ἰβηρία ποταμὸν. καὶ καταμάθων ἀπολελειμμένους τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ῥαθύμωσι καὶ κατατεθαρρηκῶς ἀναστρεφομένους διὰ τὸ προτέρημα τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων, παραλαβὼν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπαυτῶν δυνάμεως πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς ὀκτακισχίλιους (ἵππεῖς δὲ περὶ χιλίους), καὶ καταλαβὼν ἐσκεδασμένους κατὰ τῆς χώρας τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν πλοίων, πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἡγάκασε φυγεῖν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. οὕτος μὲν οὖν ἀναχωρήσας, καὶ διαβὰς αὐθις τὸν Ἰβηρία ποταμὸν, ἐγίνετο περὶ παρασκεύην καὶ φυλακὴ τῶν ἐντὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ τόπων, ποιούμενος τὴν παραχειμασίαν ἐν Καυτῇ πόλει. ὁ δὲ Γναῖος συνάψει τῷ στόλῳ, καὶ τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν συμβεβηκότων κατὰ τοὺς παρ’ αὐτοῖς θίων ολοκλάσας, τὸ λοιπὸν ἢδη συναγαγὼν ἐπὶ ταύτῳ τὴν τε πεζῆν καὶ τὴν ναυτικὴν στρατιάν ἐν Ταρράκωνῃ τὴν παραχειμάσιαν ἐποιεῖτο. διαδός δὲ τὴν λείαν ἵσως τοῖς στρατιώταις μεγάλην εὐνοίαν καὶ προθυμίαν ἑνεργάσατο πρὸς τὸ μέλλον.

77 Καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἐν τούτως ἦν ἐνισταμένης δὲ τῆς ἐαρινῆς ώρας, Γάιος μὲν Φλα-
BOOK III. 76. 5 – 77. 1

defeated them in a pitched battle, possessing himself of a large amount of valuable booty—all the heavy baggage of the army that had set out for Italy having been left under their charge—securing the alliance of all the tribes north of the Ebro and taking prisoners the Carthaginian general Hanno and the Iberian general Andobales. The latter was despot of all central Iberia and a strenuous supporter of the Carthaginians. Hasdrubal soon got news of the disaster and crossing the Ebro came to the rescue. Learning that the crews of the Roman ships had been left behind and were off their guard and unduly confident owing to the success of the land forces, he took with him about eight thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry from his own force, and finding the men from the ships scattered over the country, killed a large number of them and compelled the remainder to take refuge on board their vessels. He then retreated, and recrossing the Ebro busied himself with fortifying and garrisoning the places south of the Ebro, passing the winter in New Carthage. Gnaeus, on rejoining the fleet, inflicted the customary penalty on those responsible for what had happened, and now uniting his land and sea forces went into winter quarters at Tarraco. By dividing the booty in equal shares among his soldiers he made them very well disposed to him and ready to do their best in the future.

77. Such was the state of matters in Spain. In 217 B.C. the early spring Gaius Flaminius with his army
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

μύνιος ἀναλαβὼν τὰς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεις προῆγε διὰ Τυρρηνίας, καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσε πρὸ τῆς τῶν
2 Ἀρρητίνων πόλεως, Γνάιος δὲ Σερενύλιος τοῦμπαλιν
ώς ἐπ’ Ἀριμίνου, ταυτή παρατηρήσων τὴν εἰσβολὴν
3 τῶν ὑπεναντίων. Ἀννίβας δὲ παραχεμάζων ἐν τῇ
Κελτίκῇ τοὺς μὲν Ῥωμαίους τῶν ἐκ τῆς μάχης αἱ-
4 καλώτων ἐν φυλακῇ συνεῖχε, τὰ μέτρα τῶν ἐπι-
τηδείων διδοὺς, τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν
πρῶτον ἐν τῇ πάσῃ φιλανθρωπίᾳ διεξήγη, μετὰ δὲ
tαῦτα συναγαγὼν παρεκάλει, φάσκων οὐκ ἐκεῖνος
ἡκεν πολεμήσων, ἀλλὰ Ῥωμαίοις ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων.
5 διόπερ ἐφή δεῖν αὐτούς, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς φρονῶσιν,
6 ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίας. παρεῖναι γὰρ
πρῶτον μὲν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀνακτησόμενος Ἰταλιώ-
7 ταῖς. οἷοι δὲ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἡν ὑπὸ
Ῥωμαίων ἀπολωλεκτές ἐκαστοι τυγχάνουσι, συν-
8 ανασώσων. ταῦτα δ’ εἰτῶν ἄφηκε πάντας χωρὶς
λύτρων εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, βουλόμενος ἅμα μὲν προ-
καλεῖσθαι διὰ τοιούτου τρόπου πρὸς αὐτὸν τοὺς
κατοικοῦντας τὴν Ἰταλίαν. ἁμα δ’ ἀπαλλοτριῶν
tῆς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους εὐνοίας, ἐρεθίζων δὲ τοὺς
dοκοῦντας πόλειν ἡ λυμέσιν ἡλαττῶσαι τι διὰ τῆς
Ῥωμαίων ἀρχῆς.

78 Ἐχρήσατο δὲ τινὶ καὶ Φοινικικῷ στρατηγήματι
2 τοιοῦτω κατὰ τὴν παραχεμασίαν. ἀγωνίνων γὰρ
tῆν ἀθεσίαν τῶν Κελτῶν καὶ τὰς ἐπιβουλὰς τὰς
περὶ τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὸ πρόσφατον τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς
συντάσεως, κατασκευάσατο περιθέτας τρίχας, ἀρμο-
ζούσας ταῖς κατὰ τὰς ὅλος χέρεις διαφορὰς τῶν ἠλ-
3 κιῶν ἐπιπρεπείας, καὶ ταύταις ἔχρητο συνεχῶς
μετατιθέμενος. οἷοι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἔσθήτας μετ-
4 ελάμβανε τὰς καθηκούσας ἀεὶ ταῖς περιθεταῖς. δι’

190
advanced through Etruria and encamped before Arretium, while Gnaeus Servilius advanced as far as Ariminum to watch for the invasion of the enemy from that side. Hannibal, who was wintering in Cisalpine Gaul, kept the Roman prisoners he had taken in the battle in custody, giving them just sufficient to eat, but to the prisoners from the allies he continued to show the greatest kindness, and afterwards called a meeting of them and addressed them, saying that he had not come to make war on them, but on the Romans for their sakes and therefore if they were wise they should embrace his friendship, for he had come first of all to re-establish the liberty of the peoples of Italy and also to help them to recover the cities and territories of which the Romans had deprived them. Having spoken so, he dismissed them all to their homes without ransom, his aim in doing so being both to gain over the inhabitants of Italy to his own cause and to alienate their affections from Rome, provoking at the same time to revolt those who thought their cities or harbours had suffered damage by Roman rule.

78. During this winter he also adopted a truly Punic artifice. Fearing the fickleness of the Celts and possible attempts on his life, owing to his establishment of the friendly relations with them being so very recent, he had a number of wigs made, dyed to suit the appearance of persons differing widely in age, and kept constantly changing them, at the same time also dressing in a style that suited the wig, so that not only those who had seen him
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

διν οὐ μόνον τοῖς αἰφνιδίως ἱδούσι δύσηνωστος ἦν ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ἐν συνήθεια γεγονόσι.

5 Ἐσερών δὲ τοὺς Κελτοὺς δυσχεραίνοντας ἐπὶ τῷ τὸν πόλεμον ἐν τῇ παρ’ αὐτῶν χώρᾳ λαμβάνειν τὴν τριβήν, σπεύδοντας δὲ καὶ μετέχοντες οὕτως εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν, προφάσει μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ἐρωμαίους ὀργὴν, τὸ δὲ πλείον διὰ τὰς ὠφελείας, ἐκρίνε τὴν ταχύτητα ἀναζευγνύων καὶ συνεκπληροῦν τὰς τῶν δυνάμεων ὀρμᾶς. διότερ ἄμα τῷ τῇ ὃραν μεταβαλλεῖν, πυθανόμενοι τῶν μάλιστα τῆς χώρας δοκοῦντων ἐμπερέιν, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἐμβολάς τὰς εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν μακρὰς εὗρισκε καὶ προδήλους τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἐλῶν εἰς Τύρρηνιαν φέρουσαν, δυσχερῆ μὲν, σύντομον δὲ καὶ παράδοξον 7 φανησομένην τοῖς περὶ τῶν Φλαμίνιον. ἑαὶ δὲ πως οἰκεῖος ὃν τῇ φύσει τοῦτο τοῦ μέρους, ταύτῃ 8 προέθετο ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πορείαν. διαδοθείσας δὲ τῆς φήμης ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ διότι μέλλει διὰ τῶν ἐλῶν ἄγεων αὐτοῦ ὁ στρατηγός, πᾶς τὰς εὐλαβῶς εἶχε πρὸς τὴν πορείαν, υφορώμενος βάραθρα καὶ 79 τοὺς λιμνώδεις τῶν τόπων. Ἀννίβας δ’ ἐπιμελῶς ἐξητάκως τεναγώδεις καὶ στερεοὺς ὑπάρχοντας τοὺς κατὰ τὴν διόδον τόπους, ἀναζεύγοντο εἰς μὲν τὴν πρωτοπορείαν ἐθηκε τοὺς Δίνιαν καὶ τοὺς Ἰβηρας καὶ πάν τὸ χρησιμότερον μέρος τῆς σφετέρας δυνάμεως, συγκαταμίξας αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀποσκευὴν, ἱνα πρὸς 2 τὸ παρὸν εὐπρόσοιτων ἐπιτηδείων. πρὸς γὰρ τὸ μέλλον εἰς τέλος ἀφροντίστως εἶχε περὶ παντὸς τοῦ σκευοφόρου, λογιζόμενος ὡς ἐὰν ἄψηται τῆς πολεμίας, ἡττηθεὶς μὲν οὐ προσδέσθησε τῶν ἀναγκαίων, κρατῶν δὲ τῶν ὑπαίθρων οὐκ ἀπορήσει τῶν ἔπι-
but for a moment, but even his familiars found difficulty in recognizing him.

Observing that the Celts were dissatisfied at the prosecution of the war in their own territory, but were eagerly looking forward to an invasion of that of the enemy, professedly owing to their hatred of the Romans, but as a fact chiefly in hope of booty, he decided to be on the move as soon as possible and satisfy the desire of his troops. As soon, then, as the weather began to change he ascertained by inquiring from those who knew the country best that the other routes for invading the Roman territory were both long and obvious to the enemy, but that the road through the marshes to Etruria was difficult indeed but expeditious and calculated to take Flaminius by surprise. As he was by nature always inclined to such expedients, he decided to march by this road. When the news spread in the camp that the general was going to lead them through marshes, everyone was very reluctant to start, imagining that there would be deep bogs and quagmires. 79. But Hannibal had made careful inquiries, and having ascertained that the water on the ground they would have to pass over was shallow and the bottom solid, broke up his quarters and started, placing in the van the Africans and Spaniards and all the most serviceable portion of his army, intermingling the baggage train with them, so that for the present they might be kept supplied with food. For as regards the future he did not trouble himself about the pack-animals at all, as he calculated that on reaching the enemy's country he would, if defeated, have no need of provisions, and if he gained command of the open country
ΤΗΣ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΕΣ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

3 τηδείων. ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς προειρημένους ἐπέβαλε τοὺς
4 Κελτοὺς, ἐπὶ δὲ πάσι τοὺς ἱππεῖς. ἐπιμελητὴν δὲ
τῆς οὐραγίας τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀπέλυε Μάγωνα τῶν τε
λουκῶν χάριν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς τῶν Κελτῶν μαλα-
κίας καὶ φυγοποιίας, ἵνα εὰν κακοπαθοῦντες τρέ-
πωνται πάλιν εἰς τοῦτο, κωλύει διὰ τῶν ἱππέων
5 καὶ προσφέρῃ τὰς χειρὰς αὐτοῖς. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἰθη-
ρεσ καὶ Δίπνες δὲ ἀκεραίων τῶν ἑλῶν ποιοῦμενοι
τὴν πορείαν μετρίως κακοπαθοῦντες ἦννυν, ἀτε καὶ
φερέκακοι πάντες ὄντες καὶ συνήθεις ταῖς τοιαύταις
6 ταλαιπωρίαις. οἱ δὲ Κελτοὶ δυσχερῶς μὲν εἰς τοὺμ-
προσθεν προύβαλον, τεταραγμένων καὶ διαπετατη-
μένων εἰς βάθος τῶν ἑλῶν, ἐπιτόνως δὲ καὶ ταλαι-
πώρως υπέμενον τὴν κακοπάθειαν, ἀπεριοὶ πάσης
7 τῆς τοιαύτης ὄντες κακούχια. ἐκωλυόντο δὲ πάλιν
ἀπονεύειν εἰς τοῦτο ὅπως διὰ τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας αὐτοῖς
8 ἱππεῖς. πάντες μὲν οὖν ἐκακοπάθουν, καὶ μάλιστα
διὰ τὴν ἀγρυπνίαν, ὡς ἄν ἐξῆς ἡμέρας τέτταρας
καὶ τρεῖς νύχτας συνεχῶς δι᾽ ὑδατὸς ποιοῦμενοι
τὴν πορείαν διαφερόντως γε μὴν ἔπονον καὶ
9 κατεθείρων ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἄλλους οἱ Κελτοὶ. τῶν
δὲ υποζυγίων αὐτοῦ τὰ πλεῖστα πίπτοντα διὰ τοὺς
πηλοὺς ἀπώλυντο, μίαν παρεχόμενα χρείαν ἐν τῷ
10 πεσεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. καθεξόμενοι γὰρ ἐπὶ αὐτῶν
καὶ τῶν σκευῶν σωφρόνων ὑπὲρ τὸ ὕγρον ὑπερείχον,
καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ βραχὺ μέρος τῆς νυκτὸς
11 ἀπεκοιμώμενο. οὐκ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἱππῶν τὰς
ὄπλας ἀπέβαλον διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς διὰ τῶν
12 πηλῶν πορεῖας. Ἀνωθέν δὲ μόλις ἐπὶ τοῦ περι-
λειφθέντος θηρίου διεσώθη μετὰ πολλῆς ταλαιπω-
ρίας, ὑπεραληθῆ γὰρ διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς ἐπενεχθει-
σθαι ὀφθαλμίας αὐτῷ, δι’ ἡν καὶ τέλος ἐστερῆθη τῆς

194
would be in no want of supplies. Behind the troops I mentioned he placed the Celts and in the extreme rear his cavalry, leaving his brother Mago in charge of the rear-guard. This course he took for various reasons, but chiefly owing to the softness and aversion to labour of the Celts, so that if, owing to the hardships they suffered, they tried to turn back Mago could prevent them by falling on them with his cavalry. The Spaniards and Africans for their part, as the marshes were still firm when they marched over them, got across without suffering seriously, being all inured to fatigue and accustomed to such hardships, but the Celts not only progressed with difficulty, the marshes being now cut up and trodden down to some depth, but were much fatigued and distressed by the severity of the task, being quite unused to suffering of the kind. They were prevented, however, from turning back by the cavalry in their rear. All the army, indeed, suffered much, and chiefly from want of sleep, as they had to march through water for three continuous days and nights, but the Celts were much more worn out and lost more men than the rest. Most of the pack-animals fell and perished in the mud, the only service they rendered being that when they fell the men piled the packs on their bodies and lay upon them, being thus out of the water and enabled to snatch a little sleep during the night. Many of the horses also lost their hooves by the continuous march through the mud. Hannibal himself on the sole remaining elephant got across with much difficulty and suffering, being in great pain from a severe attack of ophthalmia, which finally led to the
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

μᾶς ὤψεως, οὐκ ἔπιδεχομένου τοῦ καιροῦ καταμονὴν οὐδὲ θεραπείαν διὰ τὸ τῆς περιστάσεως ἁδύνατον.

80 Διαπεράσας δὲ παραδόξως τοὺς ἐλώδεις τόπους, καὶ καταλαβὼν ἐν Τυρρηνίᾳ τῶν Φλαμίνιον στρατοπεδεύοντα πρὸ τῆς τῶν Ἀρρητίων πόλεως, τότε 2 μὲν αὐτοῦ πρὸς τοὺς ἔλεοι κατεστρατοπέδευσε, βουλόμενος τὴν τε δύναμιν ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ πολυπραγμονήσαι τὰ περὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους καὶ τοὺς πρὸ-3 κειμένους τῶν τόπων. πυθανόμενος δὲ τῇ μὲν χώρᾳ τὴν πρόσθεν πολλῆς γέμεως ὠφελείας, τὸν δὲ Φλαμίνιον ὁχλοκόπον μὲν καὶ δημαγωγὸν εἶναι τέλειον, πρὸς ἀληθῶν δὲ καὶ πολεμικῶν πραγμάτων χειρισμὸν οὐκ εὐφυὴν, πρὸς δὲ τούτους κατα-4 πεπιστευκέναι τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι, συνελογίζετο διότι παραλλάξαντος αὐτοῦ τὴν ἑκείνων στρατοπεδείαν καὶ καθέντος εἰς τοὺς ἐμπροσθεν τόπους, τὰ μὲν ἄγωνων τὸν ἐπιτωβασμὸν τῶν ὁχλῶν οὐ δυνήσεται περισσῶς δημομενήν τὴν χώραν, τὰ δὲ κατηγορίως παρέσται προχείρως εἰς πάντα τόπον ἐπόμενος, σπουδάζων δὲ αὐτοῦ ποιήσασθαι τὸ προτέρημα καὶ μὴ προσδέξασθαι τὴν παρουσίαν 5 τοῦ τῆς ἐρχῆν ἔχοντος. εἰ δὲ πολλοὺς αὐτὸν ὑπελάμβανε παραδώσειν καιροῦς πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν.

81 πάντα δ᾽ ἐμφρόνως ἐλογίζετο ταῦτα καὶ πραγματικῶς οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἄλλως εἰπεῖν, ὡς εἰ τις οἰεῖται κυριώτερον τι μέρος εἶναι στρατηγίας τοῦ γνῶναι τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ φύσιν τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡγεμό-2 νος, ἄγνοιει καὶ τετύφωται. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν κατ᾽ ἄνδρα καὶ ζυγὸν ἄγωνισμάτων δοῖ τὸν μέλλοντα νικᾶν συνθεωρεῖν πῶς δυνατὸν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ τί γυμνὸν ἢ ποιον ἐξοπλοῦν μέρος φαίνεται τῶν 3 ἀνταγωνιστῶν, οὕτως χρῆ καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων 196
loss of one eye as he had no time to stop and apply any treatment to it, the circumstances rendering that impossible.

80. Having thus almost beyond expectation crossed the marshes, and, finding that Flaminius was encamped in Etruria before the city of Arretium, he pitched his camp for the present at the edge of the marshes, with the view of refreshing his forces and getting information about the enemy and about the country in front of him. On learning that this country promised a rich booty, and that Flaminius was a thorough mob-courtier and demagogue, with no talent for the practical conduct of war and exceedingly self-confident withal, he calculated that if he passed by the Roman army and advanced into the country in his front, the Consul would on the one hand never look on while he laid it waste for fear of being jeered at by his soldiery; and on the other hand he would be so grieved that he would be ready to follow anywhere, in his anxiety to gain the coming victory himself without waiting for the arrival of his colleague. From all this he concluded that Flaminius would give him plenty of opportunities of attacking him. 81. And all this reasoning on his part was very wise and sound. For there is no denying that he who thinks that there is anything more essential to a general than the knowledge of his opponent's principles and character, is both ignorant and foolish. For as in combats between man and man and rank and rank, he who means to conquer must observe how best to attain his aim, and what naked or unprotected part of the enemy is visible, so he who is in command must try to
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

προεστῶτας σκοπεῖν οὖχ ὅπου τι τοῦ σώματος γυμνόν, ἀλλὰ ποῦ τῆς ψυχῆς εὐχείρωτον τι παραβαίνεται τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡγεμόνος. ἔπευξη πολλοὶ μὲν διὰ βραθμίαν καὶ τὴν σύμπασαν ἀργίαν οὐ μόνον τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἰδίους κατα-προτενταὶ βίους ἄρθην. πολλοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν οἰνοῦν ἐπιθυμίαν οὐδ' ὑπνῶσαι δύναται χωρίς ἀλλοιώσεως καὶ μέθης, ἐνοι δὲ διὰ τὰς τῶν ἀφρο-διυίων ὀρμᾶς καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτοις ἐκπλήξεων οὐ μόνον πόλεις καὶ βίους ἀναστάτους πεποιήκασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ᾿ζην αὐτῶν ἀφήρηται μετ' αἰσχύνης. καὶ μήν δειλία καὶ βλακεία κατ' ῾ιδιὰν μὲν αὐτοῖς ὄνειδος ἐπιφέρει τοῖς ἔχουσι, περὶ δὲ τὸν τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμόνα γενομένη κοινῶν ἔστι καὶ μέγιστον συμπτω-μάτων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀπράκτους ποιεῖ τοὺς ὑποταττομένους, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ κινδύνους ἐπιφέρει τοὺς μεγίστους τοῖς πεπιστευκόσι. προπέτεια γε μὴν καὶ θρασύτης καὶ θυμὸς ἄλογος, ἔτι δὲ κενοδοξία καὶ τύφος, εὐχείρωτα μὲν τοῖς ἔχθροις, ἐπισφαλειστατα δὲ τοῖς φίλοις. πρὸς γὰρ πάσαν ἐπιβουλήν, ἐνέδραν, ἀπάτην ἐτοιμὸς ὅ γε τοιοῦτος. διότερ εἰ τις δύνατο συννοεῖν τὰ περὶ τοὺς πέλας ἀμαρτηματα καὶ την τὸν προσέναι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, ή μάλιστα καὶ δὴ ὧν εὐχείρωτος ἐσθ' ὁ προεστῶς τῶν πολεμίων, τάχιστ' ἀν τῶν ὅλων κατακρατοῦσι. καθάπερ γὰρ νεῶς ἔξω ἂν ἑρεία τῆς τὸν κυβερνήτην, τὸ ὅλον αὐτανδρί σκάφος ὑποχείρων γίνεται τοῖς ἔχθροις, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐὰν τὸν προεστῶτα σπόλομον δυνάμεως χειρότητας τις κατὰ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ συλλογισμούς, αὐτανδρί γίνεται πολλάκις κρατεῖν τῶν ἀντιταττομένων.

"Α δὴ καὶ τότε προϊόδιμον καὶ συλλογισμόν 198
see in the enemy's general not what part of his body is exposed, but what are the weak spots that can be discovered in his mind. For there are many men who, owing to indolence and general inactivity, bring to utter ruin not only the welfare of the state but their private fortunes as well; while there are many others so fond of wine that they cannot even go to sleep without fuddling themselves with drink; and some, owing to their abandonment to venery and the consequent derangement of their minds, have not only ruined their countries and their fortunes but brought their lives to a shameful end. But cowardice and stupidity are vices which, disgraceful as they are in private to those who have them, are when found in a general the greatest of public calamities. For not only do they render his army inefficient but often expose those who confide in him to the greatest perils. Rashness on the other hand on his part and undue boldness and blind anger, as well as vaingloriousness and conceit, are easy to be taken advantage of by his enemy and are most dangerous to his friends; for such a general is the easy victim of all manner of plots, ambushes, and cheatery. Therefore the leader who will soonest gain a decisive victory, is he who is able to perceive the faults of others, and to choose that manner and means of attacking the enemy which will take full advantage of the weaknesses of their commander. For just as a ship if deprived of its pilot will fall with its whole crew into the hands of the enemy, so the general who is his opponent's master in strategy and reasoning may often capture his whole army.

And in this case too, as Hannibal had correctly
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

'Αννίβας περὶ τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡγεμόνος οὐ διεσφάλη τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. ὡς γὰρ θάττον ποιησάμενος ἀναζηγήν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Φαίσολαν τόπων καὶ μικρὸν ὑπεράρας τὴν τῶν Ἡρώμαιων στρατοπεδείαν ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν προκεμένην χώραν, 2 εὐθέως μετέωρος ἦν ὁ Φλαμίνιος καὶ θυμοῦ πλήρης, δοξάζων ἐαυτόν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων καταφρονεῖθαι. 3 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πορθομένης τῆς χώρας, καὶ πανταχόθεν τοῦ καπνοῦ σμαίνοντος τὴν καταφθορὰν αὐτῆς, ἐσχετλίαζε, δεινὸν ἡγούμενος τὸ γνώμενον. 4 διὸ καὶ τινῶν οἰομένων δεῖν μὴ προχείρως ἐπακολουθεῖν μηδὲ συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις, φυλάττεσθαι δὲ καὶ προσέχειν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἔπειρων, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐτερόν ὑπατον προσλαβεῖν καὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ ταῦτα τοῖς στρατοπέδοις ὅμοιοι ποιήσασθαι τὸν 5 κίνδυνον, οὐχ οἷον προσεῖχε τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἀλλ' 6 οὖν ἀνείχετο τῶν ἀποφαινομένων ταῦτα, παρεκάλει δ' αὐτοῦς ἐν νῷ λαμβάνειν τὸ λέγειν εἰκός τοὺς ἐν τῇ πατρίδι τῆς μὲν χώρας καταφθειρομένης σχεδὸν ἐκὼς πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν Ἡρώμην, αὐτῶν δὲ κατόπιν τῶν 7 πολεμίων ἐν Τυρηνίᾳ στρατοπεδεύοντων. τέλος δὲ ταῦτ' εἰπὼν, ἀναζεύξας προῆγε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως, οὗ καὶ ὅτον προορώμενος, μόνον δὲ σπεύδων συμπεσεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, ὦς προδήλου 8 τῆς νίκης αὐτοῖς ὑπαρχούσης· τηλικοῦτον γὰρ προενεβεβλῆκε κατελπισμὸν τοῖς ὡς ὀψαλμέτοις εἰναι τῶν τὰ ὀπλὰ φερόντων τοὺς ἑκτὸς παραπομένους τῆς ἀφελείας χάριν, κομιζοντας ἀλύσεις καὶ πέδας καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν τουαύτην παρασκευήν. 9 "Ὁ γε μήν Ἄννίβας ἢμα μὲν εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν ὡς πρὸς τὴν Ἡρώμην προήγε διὰ τῆς Τυρηνίας, εὐθύμουσαν.
foreseen and reckoned on the conduct of Flaminius, his plan had the success he expected. 82. For as soon as he left the neighbourhood of Faesulae and advancing a short way beyond the Roman camp invaded the country in front of him, Flaminius swelled with fury and resentment, thinking that the enemy were treating him with contempt. And when very soon they began to lay waste the country, and the smoke rising from all quarters told its tale of destruction, he was still more indignant, regarding this as insufferable. So that when some of his officers gave it as their opinion that he should not instantly pursue and engage the enemy, but remain on his guard and beware of their numerous cavalry, and when they especially urged him to wait until his colleague joined him and to give battle with all their united legions, he not only paid no attention to the advice, but could not listen with patience to those who offered it, begging them to consider what would be said in Rome if, while the country was laid waste almost up to the walls, the army remained encamped in Etruria in the rear of the enemy. Finally, with these words, he broke up his camp, and advanced with his army, utterly regardless of time or place, but bent only on falling in with the enemy, as if victory were a dead certainty. He had even inspired the people with such confident hopes that the soldiery were outnumbered by the rabble that followed him for the sake of the booty, bringing chains, fetters, and other such implements.

Hannibal in the meantime while advancing on Rome through Etruria, with the city of Cortona and
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

όνυμον μὲν πόλιν ἔχων τὴν προσαγορευμένην
Κυρτώνιον καὶ τὰ ταύτης ὅρη, δεξιὰν δὲ τὴν Ταρ-
10 σμένην καλουμένην λίμνην· ἀμα δὲ προάγων
ἐπιτρέπει καὶ κατέφθειρε τὴν χώραν, βουλόμενος
11 ἐκκαλέσασθαι τὸν θυμὸν τῶν ὑπεναντίων. ἐπεὶ
dὲ τὸν Φλαμύνιον ἦδη συνάπτοντα καθεώρα, τόπους
83 δ᾽ εὐφυεῖς συνεθεώρησε πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, ἐγίνετο
πρὸς τὸ διακινδυνεῦεν. ὅτι δὲ κατὰ τὴν δίοδον
αὐλῶνος ἐπιπέδου, τούτου δὲ παρὰ μὲν τὰς εἰς
μήκος πλευρὰς ἐκατέρας βουνοῦς ἔχοντο ύψηλους
καὶ συνεχεῖς, παρὰ δὲ τὰς εἰς πλάτος κατὰ μὲν τὴν
ἀντικρῆ λόφου ἐπικείμενον ἐρυμοῦν καὶ δύσβατον,
cατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπ᾽ οὐράς λίμνην τελείως στενὴν ἀπο-
λείπουσαν πάροδον ὡς εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα παρὰ τὴν
2 παρώρειαν, διελθὼν τὸν αὐλῶνα παρὰ τὴν λίμνην,
tὸν μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον τῆς πορείας λόφον αὐτὸς
κατελάβετο, καὶ τοὺς Ἰβηράς καὶ τοὺς Λίβυας
3 ἔχων ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ κατεστρατοπέδευσε, τοὺς δὲ Βαλια-
ρείς καὶ λογχοφόρους κατὰ τὴν πρωτοπορείαν
ἐκπεριάγων ὑπὸ τοὺς ἐν δεξιᾷ βουνοὺς τῶν παρὰ
τὸν αὐλῶνα κειμένων, ἐπὶ πολὺ παρατείνας ὑπ-
4 ἐστείλε, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐπιπέδες καὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς ὁμοίως
τῶν εὐνύμιῳ βουνῶν κύκλῳ περιαγάγῳ παρεξ-
έτεινε συνεχεῖς, ὥστε τοὺς ἐσχάτους εἶναι κατ'
αὐτὴν τὴν εἴσοδον τὴν παρὰ τε τὴν λίμνην καὶ τὰς
παρωρείας φέρουσαν εἰς τὸν προειρημένον τόπον.
5 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀννίβας, ταῦτα προκατασχευασάμενος
τῆς νυκτὸς καὶ περιελήφος τὸν αὐλῶνα ταῖς ἐν-
6 ἑδραῖς, τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἔλεγε. ὅ δὲ Φλαμύνιος εἴπετο
7 κατόπιν, σπεύδων συνάβαι [τῶν πολεμίων]. κατ-
εστρατοπεδευκὼς δὲ τῇ προτεραιᾷ πρὸς αὐτὴ τῇ
λίμνῃ τελείως ὑψὲ τῆς ὑγρᾶς, μετὰ ταῦτα τῆς ἦμερᾶς
202
its hills on his left and the Thrasymene lake on his right, continued to burn and devastate the country on his way, with the view of provoking the enemy. When he saw Flaminius already approaching him and had also observed a position favourable for his purpose, he made his plans for battle. 83. The road led through a narrow strip of level ground with a range of high hills on each side of it lengthwise. This defile was overlooked in front crosswise by a steep hill difficult to climb, and behind it lay the lake, between which and the hill side the passage giving access to the defile was quite narrow. Hannibal coasting the lake and passing through the defile occupied himself the hill in front, encamping on it with his Spaniards and Africans; his slingers and pikemen he brought round to the front by a detour and stationed them in an extended line under the hills to the right of the defile, and similarly taking his cavalry and the Celts round the hills on the left he placed them in a continuous line under these hills, so that the last of them were just at the entrance to the defile, lying between the hillside and the lake.

Having made all these preparations during the night and thus encompassed the defile with troops waiting in ambush, Hannibal remained quiet. Flaminius was following close on his steps impatient to overtake him. He had encamped the night before at a very late hour close to the lake itself; and next
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἐπιγενομένης, ευθέως ὑπὸ τὴν ἐωθινὴν ἤγε τὴν πρωτοπορείαν παρὰ τὴν λίμνην εἰς τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐλῶνα, βουλόμενος ἡξάπτεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων. 84 οὖσα δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ὁμιχλώδους διαφερόντως, Ἀν-νίβας ἁμα τῷ τὸ πλείστον μέρος τῆς πορείας εἶς τὸν αὐλῶνα προσδέξασθαι καὶ συνάπτειν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἦδη τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων πρωτοπορείαν, ἀποδοῦσ τὰ συνθήματα καὶ διαπεμψάμενος πρὸς τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἐνέδραις, συνεπεχείρει πανταχοῦν ἁμα τοῖς πολε-2 μίοις. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον παραδόξου γενο-μένης αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐπιφανείας, ἔτι δὲ δυσσωπότου τῆς κατὰ τὰν ἀέρα περιστάσεως ὑπαρχοῦσης, καὶ τῶν πολεμίων κατὰ πολλοὺς τόπους ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου καταφερομένων καὶ προσπιπτόντων, οὐχ οἰον παρα-βοθεῖν ἐδύναντο πρὸς τι τῶν δεομένων οἱ ταξιαρ-χοὶ καὶ χιλιάρχοι τῶν Ἀρμαῖων, ἀλλ' οὐδε συννη-3 σα το γινόμενον. ἀμα γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον, οἱ δ' ἀπ' οὔρας, οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων αὐτοῖς προσ-
4 ἐπιπτόν, διὸ καὶ συνέβη τοὺς πλείστους ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς πορείας σχήματι κατακοπήναι, μὴ δυναμένους αὐτοῖς βοηθεῖν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν εἰ προδεδομένους ὑπὸ 5 τῆς τοῦ προεστῶτος ἀκρισίας. ἔτι γὰρ διαβουλεύο-
6 μενοι τί δει πράττειν ἀπώλυντο παραδόξως. ἐν ὕ καιρῷ καὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον αὐτὸν δυσχρηστούμενον καὶ περικακοῦντα τοὺς ὅλους προσπεσόντες τινές τῶν 7 Κελτῶν ἀπέκτειναν. ἔπεσον οὖν τῶν Ἀρμαίων κατὰ τὸν αὐλῶνα σχεδὸν εἰς μυρίους καὶ πεντακισχι-λίους, οὕτ' εἰκεν τοῖς παροῦσιν οὔτε πράττειν οὔδὲν δυνάμενοι, τούτῳ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐθισμῶν αὐτὸ περὶ πλεί-
8 στοῦ ποιούμενο, τὸ μὴ φεύγειν μηδὲ λείπειν τὸς τάξεις. οἱ δ' κατὰ πορείαν μεταξὺ τῆς λίμνης καὶ τῆς παρωρείας ἐν τοῖς στενοῖς συγκλεισθέντες αἰ- 204
day as soon as it was dawn he led his vanguard along the lake to the above-mentioned defile, with the view of coming in touch with the enemy. 84. It was an unusually misty morning, and Hannibal, as soon as the greater part of the enemy's column had entered the defile and when the head was already in contact with him, giving the signal for battle and sending notice to those in the ambuscades, attacked the Romans from all sides at the same time. The sudden appearance of the enemy took Flaminius completely by surprise, and as the condition of the atmosphere rendered it very difficult to see, and their foes were charging down on them in so many places from higher ground, the Roman Centurions and Tribunes were not only unable to take any effectual measures to set things right, but could not even understand what was happening. They were charged at one and the same instant from the front, from the rear, and from the flanks, so that most of them were cut to pieces in marching order as they were quite unable to protect themselves, and, as it were, betrayed by their commander's lack of judgement. For while they were still occupied in considering what was best to do, they were being slaughtered without realizing how. Flaminius himself, who was in the utmost dismay and dejection, was here attacked and slain by certain Celts. So there fell in the valley about fifteen thousand of the Romans, unable either to yield to circumstances, or to achieve anything, but deeming it, as they had been brought up to do, their supreme duty not to fly or quit their ranks. Those again who had been shut in between the hillside and the lake perished
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

σχῆμας, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ταλαιπώρως διεφθείροντο. 9 συνωθούμενοι [μὲν] γὰρ εἰς τὴν λίμνην οἱ μὲν διὰ τὴν παράστασιν τῆς διανοίας ὁρμῶντες ἐπὶ τὸ νήχεσθαι σὺν τοῖς ὁπλοῖς ἀπεπνίγοντο, τὸ δὲ πολὺ πλήθος μέχρι μὲν τοῦ δυνατοῦ προβαίνον εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἔμενε τὰς κεφαλὰς αὐτῶς ὑπὲρ τὸ ὤγρον ὑπερίσχον. 10 ἐπιγενομένων δὲ τῶν ἱππέων, καὶ προδήλου γενομένης ἀπωλείας, ἐξαίροντες τὰς χεῖρας καὶ δεόμενοι ζωγρεῖν καὶ πᾶσαν προϊέμενοι φωνὴν τὸ τελευταῖον οἱ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, τινὲς δὲ παρακαλέσαντες 11 αὐτοὺς διεφθάρησαν. ἐξακοιχίλιοι δ’ ἵσως τῶν κατὰ τὸν αὐλώνα τοὺς κατὰ πρόσωπον νικήσαντες παραβοήθειν μὲν τοὺς ἱδίους καὶ περιστάσαι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἦδυνάτουν, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν συνορᾶν τῶν γινομένων, καίπερ μεγάλην δυνάμειν πρὸς τὰ ὀλα 12 παρέχεσθαι χρείαν· ἀεὶ δὲ τοῦ πρόσθεν ὅρεγόμενου, προήγουν πεπεισμένοι συμπεσείσθαι τισιν, ἐως ἐλαθον ἐκπεσόντες πρὸς τοὺς υπερδεξίους τόπους. 13 γενόμενοι δ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων, καὶ τῆς ὁμίχλης ἢδη πεπτωκυίας, συνέπτες τὸ γεγονὸς ἀτύχημα, καὶ ποιεῖν οὐδὲν οὔτε ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁλοίς ἐπικρατεῖ καὶ πάντα προκατέχειν ἢδη τοὺς πολεμίους, συναγάφεται ἀπεκώρυσαν ἔς τινα κόμην Τυρρη- 14 νίδα. μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην ἀποσταλέντος ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ μετὰ τῶν Ἰβηρῶν καὶ λογχοφόρων Μαάρβα καὶ περιστρατοπεδεύσαντος τὴν κόμην, ποικίλης αὐτοῦς ἀπορίας περιεστώσης, ἀποθέμενοι τὰ ὅπλα παρέδοσαν αὐτοὺς ὑποσπόνδους, ὡς τευξό- μενοι τῆς σωτηρίας.

15 Ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ὅλων κίνδυνον τῶν γενό- μενον ἐν Τυρρηνίᾳ Ἄρμαιοι καὶ Καρχηδονίας τοῦτον ἐπετελέσθη τὸν τρόπον. "Αννίβας δέ, πρὸς 206
in a shameful and still more pitiable manner. For when they were forced into the lake in a mass, some of them quite lost their wits and trying to swim in their armour were drowned, but the greater number, wading into the lake as far as they could, stood there with only their heads out of the water, and when the cavalry approached them, and death stared them in the face, though lifting up their hands and entreating to be spared in the most piteous terms, they were finally dispatched either by the horsemen or in some cases by begging their comrades to do them this service. About six thousand of those in the defile, who had defeated the enemy in their front, were unable to render any assistance to their own army or to get to the rear of their adversaries, as they could see nothing of what was happening, although they might have been of very material service. They simply continued to press forward in the belief that they were sure to meet with someone until they found themselves isolated on the high ground and on reaching the crest of the hill, the mist having now broken, they perceived the extent of the disaster, but were no longer able to help, as the enemy were now completely victorious and in occupation of all the ground. They therefore retired in a body to a certain Etruscan village. After the battle, on Maharbal being sent by the general with the Spaniards and pikemen to surround the village, finding themselves beset by a complication of dangers they laid down their arms and surrendered on condition of their lives being spared.

Such was the result of the battle in Etruria between the Romans and Carthaginians. 85. Hannibal, when the prisoners who had surrendered
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

αὐτὸν ἐπαναχθέντων τῶν ὑποστόνδων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰχμαλῶτων, συναγαγὼν πάντας,
2 ὄντας πλείους τῶν μυρίων καὶ πεντακισχιλίων, πρῶτον μὲν διεσάφησεν ὅτι Μαάρβας οὖκ εἶ ἐφύσεις
ἀνευ τῆς αὐτοῦ γνώμης διδοὺς τὴν ἁσφάλειαν τοῖς ὑποστόνδωι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα κατηγορίαν ἐποιήσατο
3 Ὄρμαίων. λήξας δὲ τούτων, οὐσοὶ μὲν ἦσαν Ὅρω-
μαίοι τῶν ἑανωκότων, διέδωκεν εἰς φυλακὰς ἔπι τὰ
tάγματα, τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους ἀπέλυσε χωρίς λύτρων
4 ἀπαντας εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, ἐπιφθεξάμενος τὸν αὐτὸν
ὅν καὶ πρόσθεν λόγον ὧτι πάρεστι πολεμήσων οὐκ Ἰταλιώταις, ἀλλὰ Ὄρμαίοις ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἰταλιωτῶν
5 ἔλευθερίας. τὴν δὲ ἐαυτῷ δύναμιν ἀνελάμβανε,
καὶ τῶν νεκρῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς σφετέρας δυνάμεως
toûs ἐπιφανεστάτους ἔθαμβεν, ὄντας εἰς τριάκοντα
τὸν ἁριθμὸν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πάντες εἰς χιλίους καὶ
πεντακισίους ἔπεσον, ὧν ἦσαν οἱ πλείους Kελτῶν.
6 ταῦτα δὲ πράξας διενοεῖτο μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν
φίλων ποῦ καὶ πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ὁρμήν, εὐθαρ-
σθῇ ὑπὲρ ἴδῃ περὶ τῶν ἠλων.
7 Εἰς δὲ τὴν Ὅρμην προσπεσόντος ἦδη τοῦ γεγο-
νότος ἀτυχήματος, στέλλεσθαι μὲν ἡ ταπεινοῦν τὸ
συμβεβηκόν τοῖς προεστῶτες τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἡθο-
νάτων διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς συμφορᾶς, λέγει δὲ
toῖς πολλοῖς ἡναγκάζοντο τὰ γεγονότα, συναθροῦ-
8 σαντας τὸν δήμου εἰς ἐκκλησίαν. διόπερ ἄμα τῷ
τοῦ στρατηγῶν εἰπεῖν τοῖς ὁχλοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμβάλων
ὅτι Λειτούμεθα μάχη μεγάλη, τηλικοῦτην συνεβή γε-
νέσθαι διατροφῆς ὡστε τοῖς παραγενομένους ἐφ’ ἐκα-
tέρων τῶν καυρῶν πολλῶν μείζον τότε φανήσαι τὸ
γεγονός ἢ παρ’ αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς μάχης καυρόν. καὶ
9 τούτ’ εἰκότως συνεβή. πολλῶν γὰρ χρόνων ἀπειροι
208
on terms as well as the others were brought to him, assembled the whole body, more than fifteen thousand in number, and after informing them in the first place that Maharbal had no authority without consulting him to promise the former their safety, launched out into an invective against the Romans, and at the end of it distributed such of the prisoners as were Romans among his troops to keep guard over, and setting all the allies free, sent them to their homes, adding, as on a previous occasion, that he was not come to fight with the Italians, but with the Romans for the freedom of Italy. He now allowed his own troops to rest and paid the last honours to those of the highest rank among the fallen, about thirty in number, his whole loss having been about fifteen hundred, most of them Celts. After this he consulted with his brother and friends as to where and how it was best to deliver his attack, being now quite confident of final success.

On the news of the defeat reaching Rome the chiefs of the state were unable to conceal or soften down the facts, owing to the magnitude of the calamity, and were obliged to summon a meeting of the commons and announce it. When the Praetor therefore from the Rostra said, "We have been defeated in a great battle," it produced such consternation that to those who were present on both occasions the disaster seemed much greater now than during the actual battle. And this was quite natural; for since for many years they had had no
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

καὶ τοῦ βήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος ὑπάρχοντες τῆς ὁμολογουμένης ἦττης οὐ μετρίως οὐδὲ κατὰ σχῆμα
10 τὴν περιπέτειαν ἐφερον. οὐ μὴν ἢ γε σύγκλητος,
ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος ἐμενε λογισμοῦ, καὶ δι-
ενοεῖτο περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος πῶς καὶ τί πρακτέον
ἐκάστοις εἰη.

86 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς τῆς μάχης καιροὺς Γνάιος Σερού-
λιος ὁ προκαθήμενος ὑπατος ἐπὶ τῶν κατ᾽ Ἄριμνον
2 τόπων, οὗτοι δ’ εἰσίν ἐπὶ τῆς παρὰ τὸν Ἄδριαν
πλευράς, οὐ συνάπτει τὰ Γαλατικὰ πεδία πρὸς τὴν
ἀλλήν Ἰταλίαν, οὐ μακρὰν τῆς εἰς θάλατταν ἐκβο-
3 λῆς τῶν τοῦ Πάδου στομάτων, ἀκούσας εἰσβεβλη-
κότα τὸν Ἀννίβαν εἰς Τυρρηνίαν ἀντιστρατοπεδεύειν
τῷ Φλαμίνῳ, πάσι μὲν ἔπεβαλετο τοῖς στρατοπέδοις
αὐτὸς συνάπτειν· ἀδυνατῶν δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς
βάρος, Γάιον Κεντήκων κατὰ σπουδὴν δους τετρα-
κυσχιλίων ὑπεῖς προεξεπέστειλε, βουλόμενος, εἰ
dεόιη’ οἱ καιροί, πρὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ παρουσίας τούτους
4 καταταχεῖν. Ἀννίβας δὲ, μετὰ τὴν μάχην προσ-
αγγελθείσης αὐτῷ τῆς τῶν ὑπεναντίων βοηθείας, ἔξ-
apostellēs Μαάρβαν, ἔχοντα τοὺς λογχοφόρους καὶ
5 τι μέρος τῶν ὑπέων. οἱ καὶ συμπεσόντες τοῖς περὶ
tὸν Γάιον ἐν αὐτῇ μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ συμπλοκῇ σχέδου
τοὺς ἡμίσεις αὐτῶν διέφθειραν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς
ἐἰς τινα λόφου συνδιώκαντες ἡ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρα
6 πάντας ἔλαβον ὑποχειρίους. ἐν δὲ τῇ Ῥώμῃ, τρι-
taías οὖσι τῆς κατὰ τὴν μάχην προσαγγελίας,
καὶ μάλιστα τοτε τοῦ πάθους κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὡς
ἀν εἰ φλεγμαίνοντος, ἐπιγενομένης καὶ ταύτης τῆς
περιπετείας, οὐ μόνον τὸ πληθος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν σύγ-
7 κήπον αὐτὴν συνεβή διατραπήναι. διὸ καὶ παρέντες
τὴν κατ’ ἐναντίον ἀγωγὴν τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τὴν
210
experience of the word or fact of avowed defeat, they could not bear the reverse with moderation and dignity. This was not, however, the case with the Senate, which remained self-possessed, taking thought for the future as to what should be done by everyone, and how best to do it.

86. At the time of the battle Gnaeus Servilius, the Consul in command in the district of Ariminum (the district that is on the coast of the Adriatic where the plain of Cisalpine Gaul joins the rest of Italy not far from the mouth of the river Po), hearing that Hannibal had invaded Etruria and was encamped opposite Flaminius, formed the project of joining the latter with his whole army, but as this was impossible owing to the weight of his forces he dispatched Gaius Centenius at once in advance, giving him four thousand horse, intending them, if the situation were critical, to press on and arrive before himself. When, after the battle, news reached Hannibal of the approach of these reinforcements, he sent off Maharbal with the pikemen and part of the cavalry. Encountering Gaius, they killed about half of his force in their first attack, and pursuing the others to a hill, made them all prisoners on the following day. Three days after the news of the great battle had reached Rome, and just when throughout the city the sore, so to speak, was most violently inflamed, came the tidings of this fresh disaster, and now not only the populace but the Senate too were thrown into consternation. Abandoning therefore the system of government by
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

αἱρεσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων, μειζόνως ἐπεβάλοντο βουλεύοντας περί τῶν ἑνεστῶτων, νομίζοντες αὐτοκράτορος δεῖσθαι στρατηγοῦ τά πράγματα καὶ τοὺς περιεστῶτας καυροῦς.

8 Ἀννίβας δὲ, κατατεθαρρηκός τοῖς ὄλοις ἦδη, τὸ μὲν συνεγγίζειν τῇ Ἡρώμη κατὰ τὸ παρόν ἀπεδοκίμασε· τὴν δὲ χώραν ἐπιπορευόμενος ἀδεῶς ἐπόρθει, 9 ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀδριαν. διανύσας τε τὴν τε τῶν Ὀμβρων καλομένην χώραν καὶ τὴν τῶν Πικέντων ἥκε δεκαταιός πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὸν Ἀδριαν τόπους, πολλῆς μὲν λείας γεγονός ἐγκρατησίας, ὡστε μήτ' ἀγενή μήτε φέρειν δύνασθαι τὸ στρατόπεδον τὰς ὕφελειάς, πολύ δὲ πλῆθος ἀν-

11 θρώπων ἀπεκταγκὼς κατὰ τὴν δίδον· καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τῶν πόλεως καταλήψει, καὶ τότε παράγγελμά τι δεδομένον ἢν φονεύειν τοὺς ὑποπίπτοντας τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις. ταῦτα δ΄ ἐποίει διὰ τὸ προ-

87 ὕπαρχον αὐτῶ μίσος ἔμφυτον πρὸς Ἡρωμαῖος. ἐν όι καὶ καταστρατοπεδεύσας παρά τὸν Ἀδριαν ἐν χώρᾳ πρὸς πάντα τὰ γεγονότα διαφερούση μεγάλην ἐποιεῖτο σπουδὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀναλήψεως καὶ θεραπείας τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐχ ἦττον δὲ καὶ τῶν ἱσ-

2 πων. ὅσα ἂν γὰρ ὑπάρχον τῆς παραχειμασίας γεγενημένης ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Γαλατίαν τόπους ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχοὺς καὶ τῆς ἀνθροπίας, ἔτι δὲ τῆς μετὰ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν ἐλῶν πορείας καὶ ταλαιπωρίας, ἐπεγεγονεῖ σχεδὸν ἀπασί τοῖς ἱσποις, ὅμως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τὸ λεγόμενον λιμῷωσας καὶ τοιαύτη καχεξία.

3 διὸ γεγονέτος ἐγκρατησις χώρας εὐδαιμονὸς ἐσωματοποίησε μὲν τοὺς ἱσποις, ἀνεκτήσατο δὲ τὰ τῶν σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν στρατιωτῶν· μετακαθώπλησε δὲ τοὺς Λίβνας εἰς τὸν Ἡρωμαίκον τρόπον 212
BOOK III. 86. 7 – 87. 3

magistrates elected annually they decided to deal with the present situation more radically, thinking that the state of affairs and the impending peril demanded the appointment of a single general with full powers.

Hannibal, now fully assured of success, dismissed the idea of approaching Rome for the present, but began to ravage the country unmolested, advancing towards the Adriatic. Passing through Umbria and Picenum he reached the coast on the tenth day, having possessed himself of so large an amount of booty that his army could not drive or carry it all off and having killed a number of people on his road. For, as at the capture of cities by assault, the order had been given to put to the sword all adults who fell into their hands, Hannibal acting thus owing to his inveterate hatred of the Romans. 87. He now encamped near the Adriatic in a country abounding in all kinds of produce, and paid great attention to recruiting the health of his men as well as of his horses by proper treatment. In consequence of the cold from which they had suffered while wintering in the open in Gaul, combined with their being unable to get the friction with oil to which they were accustomed, and owing also to the hardships of the subsequent march through the marshes, nearly all the horses as well as the men had been attacked by so-called "hunger-mange" and its evil results. So that, now he was in occupation of such a rich country, he built up his horses and restored the physical and mental condition of his men. He also re-armed the Africans in the Roman fashion with select weapons,
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἔκλεκτοὺς ὁπλοὺς, ὡς ὁν γεγονός κύριος τοιούτων
σκύλων. ἐξαπέστειλε δὲ κατὰ θάλατταν ἐν τῷ και-
ρῷ τούτῳ καὶ τοὺς διασαφήσοντας εἰς τὴν Καρχη-
δόνα περὶ τῶν γεγονότων· τότε γὰρ πρῶτον ἦψατο
θαλάττης, ἀφ’ οὗ τὴν εἰσβολήν ἐποιήσατο τὴν εἰς
Ἰταλίαν. ἐφ’ οἷς ἀκούσαντες μεγαλείως ἔχαρησαν
οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ πολλὴν ἐποιοῦντο σπουδὴν καὶ
πρόνοιαν ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐπικουρεῖν
καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πράγμασι.

Ῥωμαίοι δὲ δικτάτορα μὲν κατέστησαν Κόλυτον
Φάβιον, ἄνδρα καὶ φρονήσει διαφέροντα καὶ πεφυ-
kότα καλῶς. ἔτι γοῦν ἐπεκαλοῦντο καὶ καθ’ ἡμᾶς
οἱ ταύτης τῆς οἰκίας Μάξιμοι, τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶ μέγι-
στοι, διὰ τὰς ἐκείνους τάνδρος ἐπιτυχίας καὶ πράξεις.

ὁ δὲ δικτάτωρ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὑπά-
tων· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπάτων ἐκατέρω δύσδεκα πελέκεις
ἀκολούθουσι, τούτῳ δ’ εἴκοσι καὶ τέταρτεσ, κάκει-
νοι μὲν ἐν πολλοῖς προσδέονται τῆς συγκλήτου πρὸς
τὸ συντελεῖν τὰς ἐπιβολὰς, οὕτως δ’ ἐστὶν αὐτο-
kράτωρ στρατηγός, οὗ κατασταθέντος παραχρῆμα
dιαλύεσθαι συμβαίνει πάσας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ
πλὴν τῶν δημάρχων. οὗ μὴν ἄλλα περὶ μὲν τοὺ-
tων ἐν ἄλλοις ἀκριβεστέραν ποιησόμεθα τὴν δια-
στολήν. ἄμα δὲ τῷ δικτάτορι κατέστησαν ἑπάρ-
χην Μάρκον Μινύκιον. οὕτως δὲ τέτακται μὲν ὑπὸ
tὸν αὐτοκράτορα, γίνεται δ’ οἷον εἰ διάδοχος τῆς
ἀρχῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνους περιπασμοῖς.

Ἀννίβας δὲ κατὰ βραχὺ μεταθεὶς τὴν παρεμβο-
lῆν ἐνδιέτριβε τῇ παρὰ τῶν Ἀδριαν χώρα, καὶ τοὺς
μὲν ἐπειπον ἐκλούνων τοῖς παλαιοῖς οἶνοις διὰ τὸ
πλῆθος ἐξειδεράπευε τὴν καχεξίαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν
ψώραν, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς μὲν
214
being, as he now was, in possession of a very large quantity of captured arms. He also sent at this time messengers to Carthage by sea with the news of what had happened, this being the first time he had come in touch with the sea since he invaded Italy. The news was received with great rejoicing by the Carthaginians, who hastened to take steps to support in every possible manner the two campaigns in Italy and in Spain.

The Romans had appointed as Dictator Quintus Fabius, a man of admirable judgement and great natural gifts, so much so that still in my own day the members of this family bear the name of Maximus, "Greatest," owing to the achievements and success of this man. A dictator differs from the Consuls in these respects, that while each of the Consuls is attended by twelve lictors, the Dictator has twenty-four, and that while the Consuls require in many matters the co-operation of the Senate, the Dictator is a general with absolute powers, all the magistrates in Rome, except the Tribunes, ceasing to hold office on his appointment. However, I will deal with this subject in greater detail later. At the same time they appointed Marcus Minucius Master of the Horse. The Master of the Horse is subordinate to the Dictator but becomes as it were his successor when the Dictator is otherwise occupied.

88. Hannibal now shifting his camp from time to time continued to remain in the country near the Adriatic, and by bathing his horses with old wine, of which there was abundance, he thoroughly set right their mangy condition. In like manner he
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

τραυματίας ἐξυγίασε, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς εὐκτας παρ-
εσκεύασε καὶ προθύμους εἰς τὰς ἐπιφερομένας χρείας.
3 διελθῶν δὲ καὶ καταφθείρας τήν τε Πραιτεττιανήν
καὶ τήν Ἀδριανήν ἔτι δὲ τήν Μαρρουκίνην καὶ
Φρεντανήν χώραν, ὃρμησε ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν
4 εἰς τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν. ἦς διηρημένης εἰς τρεῖς ὁμο-
σίας, καὶ τῶν μὲν προσαγορευομένων Δαυνίων <τῶν
de Ἔνυκετίων>, τῶν δὲ Μεσσαπίων, εἰς πρῶτην
5 ἐνέβαλε τὴν Δαυνίαν. ἀρξάμενος δὲ ταύτης ἀπὸ
Δονκαρίας, οὐφες ἀποκίας Ἰρωμαίων, ἐπόρθει τὴν
6 χώραν. μετὰ δὲ ταύτα καταστρατοπεδεύσας περὶ τὸ
καλούμενον Οἰβώνιον ἐπέτρεψε τὴν Ἀργυριππάνην
καὶ πᾶσαν ἀδεῶς ἑληλιάτει τὴν Δαυνίαν.

7 ᾽Εν δὲ καιρῷ καὶ Φάβιος μετὰ τὴν κατάστασιν θύσας
toῖς θεοῖς εξωρυμησε μετὰ τοῦ συνάρχοντος καὶ τῶν
ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ καταγραφέντων τεττάρων στρατόπε-
8 δων. συμμίξας δὲ ταῖς ἀπὸ Ἀρμίνου βοηθούσαις
dυνάμει περὶ τὴν Ναρνίαν, Γνάιον μὲν τὸν ὑπάρ-
χοντα στρατηγὸν ἀπολύσας τῆς κατὰ γῆν στρατείας
ἐξαπέστειλε μετὰ παραπομπῆς εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, ἐν-
tειλάμενος, εὰν τι κατὰ βαλλαταν κινώνταi Καρχη-
9 δόνιοι, βοηθεῖν αἰεί τοῖς ὑποπτίπτουσι καιροῖς, αὐτός
dὲ μετὰ τοῦ συνάρχοντος παραλαβῶν τὰς δυνάμεις
ἀντεστρατοπέδευσε τοῖς Καρχηδόνιοις περὶ τὰς
Αἴκας καλούμενας, ἀπέχων τῶν πολεμίων περὶ
πεντήκοντα σταδίους.

89 ᾽Αννίβας δὲ συνεις τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ Φαβίου,
καὶ βουλόμενος ἐξ ἐφόδου καταπλήξασθαι τοὺς
ὑπεναντίους, ἐξαγαγὼν τὴν δύναμιν καὶ συνεγχίσας
τῶν Ῥωμαίων χάρακι παρετάξατο. χρόνον
dὲ των μείνας, οὐδενὸς ἐπεξιόντος αὖθις ἄνεγκρησεν
2 εἰς τὴν ἕαυτοῦ παρεμβολήν. ὁ γὰρ Φάβιος δι-
216
completely cured his wounded, and made the rest of his men sound in body and ready to perform cheerfully the services that would be required of them. After passing through and devastating the territories of Praetutia, Hadriana, Marrucina, and Frentana he marched on towards Lapygia. This province is divided among three peoples, the Daunii, Peucetii and Messapii, and it was the territory of the Daunii that Hannibal first invaded. Starting from Luceria, a Roman colony in this district, he laid waste the surrounding country. He next encamped near Vibo and overran the territory of Argyripa and plundered all Daunia unopposed.

At the same time Fabius on his appointment, after sacrificing to the gods, also took the field with his colleague and the four legions which had been raised for the emergency. Joining near Narnia the army from Ariminum, he relieved Gnaeus the Consul of his command on land and sent him with an escort to Rome with orders to take the steps that circumstances called for should the Carthaginians make any naval movements. Himself with his Master of the Horse taking the whole army under his command, he encamped opposite the Carthaginians near Aecae about six miles from the enemy.

89. When he learnt that Fabius had arrived, Hannibal, wishing to strike such a blow as would effectually cow the enemy, led his forces out and drew them up in order of battle at a short distance from the Roman camp, but after waiting some time, as nobody came out to meet him, he retired again to his own camp. For Fabius, having determined not

* Otherwise Arpi.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

eγνωκὼς μήτε παραβάλλεσθαι μήτε διακινδυνεύειν, στοχάζεσθαι δὲ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῶν ὑποταττομένων, ἔμενε βεβαίως ἐπὶ τῆς διαλή-3ψεως ταύτης. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς κατεφρονεῖτο καὶ παρείχε λόγων ὡς ἀποδεδεικνύωσι καὶ καταπεπληγμένως τὸν κίνδυνον, τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πάντας ἡνάγκασε παρομοιογήσαι καὶ συγχωρεῖν ὡς οὔτε νουνεχέστερον οὔτε φρονιμώτερον οὐδένα δυνατόν ἢν χρήσθαι 4τοῖς τότε περιεστώσι καιροῖς. ταχὺ δὲ καὶ τὰ πράγματα προσεμφυρήσε τοῖς λογισμοῖς αὐτοῖ. καὶ 5τοῦτ’ εἰκότως ἐγένετο. τὰς μὲν γὰρ τῶν ὑπεναντίων δυνάμεις συνεβαίνε γεγυμνάσθαι μὲν ἐκ τῆς πρώτης ἡλικίας συνεχῶς ἐν τοῖς πολέμικοις, ἤγεμόνι δὲ χρήσθαι συνεθραμμένω σφίσι καὶ παιδομαθεὶ περί τὰς 6ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις χρείαις, νενικηκέναι δὲ πολλὰς μὲν ἐν Ἰβηρία μάχας, δίς δὲ Ῥωμαῖους ἑξῆς καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἀπεγνωκότας πάντα μίαν ἔχειν ἔλπιδα τῆς σωτηρίας τὴν ἐν τῷ νικῶν· 7περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατιῶν τάναττα τοῦ· 8τοὺς ὑπήρχε. διόπερ εἰς μὲν τὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων κίνδυνον οὐχ οἶδος τ’ ἢν συγκαταβαίνειν, προδήλου τῆς ἐλαττώσεως ὑπαρχοῦσης· εἰς δὲ τὰ σφέτερα προτερήματα τοῖς λογισμοῖς ἀναχωρήσας ἐν τοῦτος 9διέτριβε καὶ διὰ τούτων ἔχειρὶ τὸν πόλεμον. ἢν δὲ τὰ προτερήματα Ῥωμαίων ἀκατάρπητα χορήγα 90καὶ χειρῶν πλῆθος. διόπερ κατὰ τοὺς ἑξῆς χρόνους ἀντιπαρῆγγε τοῖς πολέμιοις αἱ καὶ τοὺς εὐκαίρους προκατελάμβανε τόπους κατὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. 2ἔχον δὲ κατὰ νότου τὰς χορηγίας αἴθουν, οὐδέ-
to expose himself to any risk or to venture on a battle, but to make the safety of the army under his command his first and chief aim, adhered steadfastly to this purpose. At first, it is true, he was despised for this, and gave people occasion to say that he was playing the coward and was in deadly fear of an engagement, but as time went on, he forced everyone to confess and acknowledge that it was impossible for anyone to deal with the present situation in a more sensible and prudent manner. Very soon indeed facts testified to the wisdom of his conduct, and this was no wonder. For the enemy's forces had been trained in actual warfare constantly from their earliest youth, they had a general who had been brought up together with them and was accustomed from childhood to operations in the field, they had won many battles in Spain and had twice in succession beaten the Romans and their allies, and what was most important, they had cast to the winds everything else, and their only hope of safety lay in victory. The circumstances of the Roman army were the exact opposite, and therefore Fabius was not able to meet the enemy in a general battle, as it would evidently result in a reverse, but on due consideration he fell back on those means in which the Romans had the advantage, confined himself to these, and regulated his conduct of the war thereby. These advantages of the Romans lay in inexhaustible supplies of provisions and men. 90. He, therefore, during the period which followed continued to move parallel to the enemy, always occupying in advance the positions which his knowledge of the country told him were the most advantageous. Having always a plentiful store of pro-
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ποτε τοὺς στρατιωτὰς ἦφει προνομεύειν οὔδὲ χωρίζεσθαι καθάπαξ ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος, ἄθροις δ’ ἀεὶ καὶ συνεστραμμένους τηρῶν ἐφήδρευε τοῖς τόποις καὶ

3 καρφοῖς. καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν πολεμίων ἀποσπασμένους ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς ἐπὶ τὰς προνομὰς διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν ὑποερίους ἐλάμβανε καὶ κατέφθειρε

4 τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ. ταύτα δ’ ἐποίει, βουλόμενος ἀμα μὲν ἀφ’ ἀρισμένου πλήθους ἐλαττοῦν ἀεὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἀμα δὲ τὰς τῶν ἰδίων δυνάμεων ψυχὰς προηττημένας τοῖς ὀλοις διὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος προ-

τερημάτων κατὰ βραχὺ σωματοποιεῖν καὶ προσανα-

5 λαμβάνειν. εἰς ὁλοχερή δὲ κρίσιν εξ όμολογου

6 συγκαταβαίνειν οὐδαμῶς οἶός τ’ ἂν. οὐ μὴν Μάρκω

γε τῷ συνάρχοντι τούτων οὐδὲν ἤρεσκε. σύμψηθον
dὲ τοῖς ὄχλοις ποιῶν αὐτὸν τὸν μὲν Φάβιον κατελά-

λει πρὸς πάντας, ὡς ἀγεννῶς χρώμενον τοῖς πράγ-

μασι καὶ νωθρῶς, αὐτὸς δὲ πρόθυμος ἢν παραβάλ-

λεσθαι καὶ διακυδυνεῦεν.

7 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι καταφθείραντες τοὺς προε-

ρημένους τόπους ὑπερέβαλον τὸν Ἀπεννίνου, καὶ

κατάραντες εἰς τὴν Σαυνίτην χώραν, οὐδαν εὐδαί-

μονα καὶ πολλῶν χρώνων ἀπολέμητον, ἐν τοιαύτῃ

περιουσίᾳ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἦσαν ὡστε μὴτε χρωμε-

νους μὴτε καταφθείραντας ἀνύειν δύνασθαι τὰς

8 λείας. κατέδραμον δὲ καὶ τὴν Οὐθινεντανήν,

Ῥωμαίων ἀποικίαν ὑπάρχουσαν. εἶλον δὲ καὶ πόλιν

Τελεσίαν, ἀτείχουσαν οὐδαν καὶ πολλῆς καὶ παντοδα-

9 τῆς ἀποσκευῆς γέμουσαν. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαίοι κατόπιν

μὲν εἰποντο συνεχῶς, μιᾶς καὶ δυνεών ἠμεᾶν ἀπέχοντες, ἐγγίζειν γε μὴν καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς

10 πολεμίοις οὖχ οἶοι τ’ ἦσαν. διόπερ Ἀνδριπασ, δρῶν

τὸν Φάβιον φυγομαχοῦντα μὲν προδήλως, τοῖς δ’

220
visions in his rear he never allowed his soldiers to forage or to straggle from the camp on any pretext, but keeping them continually massed together watched for such opportunities as time and place afforded. In this manner he continued to take or kill numbers of the enemy, who despising him had strayed far from their own camp in foraging. He acted so in order, on the one hand, to keep on reducing the strictly limited numbers of the enemy, and, on the other, with the view of gradually strengthening and restoring by partial successes the spirits of his own troops, broken as they were by the general reverses. He was, however, not at all disposed to respond to the enemy's challenge and meet him in a set battle. But all this much displeased his colleague Marcus, who, echoing the popular verdict, ran down Fabius to all for his craven and slow conduct of the campaign, while he himself was most eager to risk a battle.

The Carthaginians, after ravaging the country I mentioned, crossed the Apennines and descended into the territory of the Samnites, which was very fertile and had not for long been visited by war, so that they had such abundance of provisions that they could not succeed either in using or in destroying all their booty. They also overran the territory of Beneventum, a Roman colony, and took the city of Telesia, which was unwalled and full of all manner of property. The Romans continued to hang on their rear at a distance of one or two days' march, refusing to approach nearer and engage the enemy. Hannibal, consequently, seeing that Fabius, while obviously wishing to avoid a battle, had no inten-
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

όλοις οὐκ ἐκχωροῦντα τῶν ὑπαίθρων, ὀρμησε τολμώρως εἰς τὰ περὶ Καπτῆς πεδία, καὶ τούτων εἰς τὸν προσαγορεύμενον Φάλερνον τόπον, πεπεισμένος δυνεὶς θάτερον, ἡ μάχεσθαι τοὺς πολέμιους ἀναγκάσειν ἡ πάσι δήλον ποιήσειν ὑπὲρ κρατεῖ τῶν οἰκον καὶ παραχωροῦσι Ρωμαίῳ τῶν ὑπαίθρων αὐτῶν.  

οὐ γενομένου καταπλαγείσας ἦλπιζε τὰς πόλεις ὀρμήσει πρὸς τὴν ἁπέρ Ῥωμαίων ἀπόστασιν.  

ἐώς γὰρ τότε δυσὶ μάχαις ἴδῃ λελειμμένων αὐτῶν οὐδεμία πόλις ἀπέστη τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πρὸς Καρχηδόνιον, ἀλλὰ διετήρουν τὴν πίστιν, καί τὸ πρός ἐναὶ πάσχουσι κακῶς. ἔξω καὶ παρασημηναίαν τὸν τὴν κατάπληξιν καὶ καταξίωσιν παρὰ τοῖς συμμάχοις τοῦ Ῥωμαίων πολιτεύματος.  

91 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ὁ γὰρ Ἀννίβας εἰκότως ἐπὶ τούτους κατήντα τοὺς λογισμούς. τὰ γάρ πεδία τὰ κατὰ Καπτῆς ἐπιφανέστατα μὲν ἐστὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ διά τὸ κάλλος καὶ διὰ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὴν κείσθαι τῇ θαλάττῃ καὶ τούτους χρήσθαι τοῖς ἐμπορίοις, εἰς ὁ σχεδὸν ἐκ πάσης τῆς οἰκουμένης κατατρέχουσι οἱ πλέοντες εἰς Ἰταλίαν.  

3 περιέχουσι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας καὶ καλλίστας πόλεις τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐν αὐτοῖς. τὴν μὲν γὰρ παραλίαν αὐτῶν Σενουεσανοί καὶ Κυμαίοι καὶ Δικαίορχιτα νεύμοναί πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Νεαπόλιτα, τε-5 λευταῖον δὲ τὸ τῶν Νουκερίων ἔθνως. τῆς δὲ μεσογάιου τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἀρκτοὺς Καληνοὶ καὶ Τιανίται κατοικοῦσι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἑω καὶ μεσημβριάν 6 Δαύνοι καὶ Νωλανοί. κατὰ μέσα δὲ τὰ πεδία κείσθαι συμβαίνει τὴν πασῶν ποτὲ μακρασκεύτην γε-7 γονιάν πόλιν Καπτῆν. ἐπιεικέστατος δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μυθογράφοις ὁ περὶ τούτων τῶν πεδίων λέγε-
tion of withdrawing altogether from the open country, made a bold dash at Falernum in the plain of Capua, counting with certainty on one of two alternatives: either he would compel the enemy to fight or make it plain to everybody that he was winning and that the Romans were abandoning the country to him. Upon this happening he hoped that the towns would be much impressed and hasten to throw off their allegiance to Rome. For up to now, although the Romans had been beaten in two battles, not a single Italian city had revolted to the Carthaginians, but all remained loyal, although some suffered much. From which one may estimate the awe and respect that the allies felt for the Roman state.

91. Hannibal, however, had sufficient reason for reckoning as he did. The plain round Capua is the most celebrated in all Italy, both for its fertility and beauty, and because it is served by those seaports at which voyagers to Italy from nearly all parts of the world land. It also contains the most celebrated and finest cities in Italy. On the coast lie Sinuessa, Cyme, and Dicaearchea, and following on these Naples and finally Nuceria. In the interior we find on the north Cales and Teanum and east and south Caudium and Nola, while in the very middle of the plain lies Capua, once the wealthiest of cities. The mythical tale concerning this plain,

* The text has Daunii.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tai logos prosgorevei de kai tauta Phlegraia, kathaper kai etera tvon epifanon pediwn theous ge mhn malosta peri toutwn eikos hrikenai dia to
8 kallos kai tyn arretyn auton. ama de tois proe
rmenois xurpa dokei kai dusembola telews einai
ta pedia. tae mhn gar thalatt, to de pleion orsei
megalois panti kai synexeo periexetai, di av ei-
bolai treis uparchousi monon ek tis mesogaion,
9 stevai kai dysbatou, mia mev apod tis Sannitidos,
<deuter a> apo tis Latynis, h de katolouros
10 apod tvon katatous 'Irpinous topon. dioter emel-
lon eis tauta katasstratopedvesantes wssper eis
theatron oii Karxhidonoi katasplxeiouv men tv
paralogi pantas, ekxevmenei de toous polemious
phugomachonta, autoi de ex omologou fanheisathai
ton upaitroun krateontes.

92 'Anvias mhn ouv toinotous xehsamenos logi-
smois, kai dielefnon ek tis Sannitidos ta stevad
katat ton 'Eribianon kaloumenon lophon, katestrato-
pedeusae parad ton 'Athiron potamou, dos sxe-
2 don diai diarpe tis proeriemena pedia. kai tyn
men parembolhn ek tou pros 'Rwmhn merous eixe,
tais de pronoiai pan epitrexein epondhe tis pe-
3 deon adeos. Phbias de katepelihto mhn tyn
epi-
bolhn kai tolma tvon upaniw, tosoufws de
4 mallon ep twn kekmewn emene. o de synar-
chwn autou Markos kai pantes oi kata tis strat-
pedon xilirchoi kai taixarchoi nomizontes en kalw
tois polemious apeulhfenai, steudein zonito dein
kai synaptein eis ta pedia kai mhe perioran tyn
224
BOOK III. 91. 7–92. 4

and other celebrated plains which like it are called Phlegraean, has indeed much semblance of probability; for it was quite natural that they should have been a special cause of strife among the gods owing to their beauty and fertility. Besides the above advantages the whole plain of Capua is strongly protected by nature and difficult of approach, being completely surrounded on one side by the sea and for the greater part by lofty mountain-ranges, through which there are only three passes from the interior, all of them narrow and difficult, one from Samnium, the second from Latium, and the third from the country of the Hirpini. The Carthaginians, then, by quartering themselves in this plain made of it a kind of theatre, in which they were sure to create a deep impression on all by their unexpected appearance, giving a spectacular exhibition of the timidity of their enemy and themselves demonstrating indisputably that they were in command of the country.

92. Such being Hannibal’s anticipations, he left Samnium and traversing the pass near the hill called Eribianus encamped beside the river Athyrnus, which approximately cuts this plain in half. Establishing his camp on the side of the river towards Rome he overran and plundered the whole plain unmolested. Fabius, though taken aback by the audacity of this stroke on the part of the enemy, continued all the more to adhere to his deliberate plan. But his colleague Marcus and all the tribunes and centurions in his army, thinking they had caught Hannibal famously, urged him to make all haste to reach the plain and not allow the finest part of

* Otherwise Volturnus.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

5 ἐπιφανεστάτην χώραν δηρουμένην. Φάβιος δὲ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ συνάψαι τοῖς τόποις ἐσπευδὴ καὶ συνυπεκρίνετο τοῖς προθύμωσι καὶ φιλοκινδύνως διακειμένος, ἔγγισας δὲ τῷ Φαλέρνῳ ταῖς μὲν παρωρείαις ἐπιφανώμενος ἀντιπαρῆγγε τοῖς πολεμίοις, ὡστε μὴ δοκεῖν τοῖς αὐτῶν συμμάχοις ἐκχωρεῖν τῶν ὑπάρχων, εἰς δὲ τὸ πεδίον οὐ καθεῖ τὴν δύναμιν, εὐλαβούμενος τοὺς ὀλοσχερεῖς κινδύνους διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας καὶ διὰ τὸ προφανῶς ἱπποκράτειν παρὰ πολὺ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους.

8 Ἄννιβας δὲ ἐπειδὴ καταπείρασας τῶν πολεμίων καὶ καταφθείρας πάν τὸ πεδίον ἠθροίσε λείας ἀπλετον πλῆθος, ἐγίνετο πρὸς ἀναξιογην, βουλόμενος μὴ καταφθείρα τὴν λείαν, ἀλλ' εἰς τοιοῦτον ἀπερείσθη τόπον, ἐν ὑπόθεσι συνήθα τοῖς παραχεμασίαν, οὐ μὴ μόνον κατὰ τὸ παρὸν εὐωχίαν, ἀλλὰ συνεχῶς δαψίλειαν ἔχῃ τῶν ἐπιτη-

10 δείων τὸ στρατόπεδον. Φάβιος δὲ καὶ κατανοῶν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν, ὅτι προκειρίζεται ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἑπάνοδον ἦπερ ἐποίησατο καὶ τὴν εἰσοδόν, καὶ θεωρῶν τοὺς τόπους στενοὺς ὄντος καὶ καθ' ὑπερβο-

11 λὴν εὐφυεῖς πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν, ἐν αὐτῆς μὲν τῆς διεκ-

βολῆς περὶ τετρακυκλίους ἐπέστησε, παρακαλέσας χρήσασθαι τῇ προθυμίᾳ σὺν καιρῷ μετὰ τῆς τῶν τόπων εὐφυίας, αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ πολὺ μέρος ἔχων τῆς δυνάμεως, ἐπὶ τινα λόφον ὑπερδέξατο πρὸ τῶν στε-

93 νῶν κατεστρατοπέδευσε. παραγενομένων δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων, καὶ ποιησαμένων τὴν παρεμβολήν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις ὑπ' αὐτὴν τὴν παρώρειαν, τὴν μὲν λείαν αὐτῶν ἤλπισεν ἀδηρίτως περισύρειν, ὡς δὲ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τοῖς ὀλοίς πέρας ἐπιθήσειν διὰ τὴν τῶν τῶν τόπων εὐκαιρίαν. καὶ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς τού-

226
the country to be devastated. Fabius did bestir himself to reach the district, sharing in so far the view of the more eager and venturesome spirits, but when he came in view of the enemy on approaching Falernum, while moving along the hills parallel to them so as not to appear to the allies to be abandoning the open country, he did not bring his army down into the plain, avoiding a general action both for the above-mentioned reasons and because the Carthaginians were obviously much his superiors in cavalry.

Hannibal, having thus done his best to provoke the Romans by laying the whole plain waste, found himself in possession of a huge amount of booty and decided to withdraw, as he wished not to waste the booty, but to secure it in a place suitable for his winter quarters, so that his army should not only fare sumptuously for the present, but continue to have abundance of provisions. Fabius, divining that his plan was to retire by the same pass by which he had entered, and seeing that owing to its narrowness the place was exceedingly favourable for delivering an attack, stationed about four thousand men at the actual pass, bidding them act at the proper time with all spirit, while availing themselves fully of the advantage of the ground. He himself with the greater part of his army encamped on a hill in front of the pass and overlooking it. 98. When the Carthaginians arrived and made their camp on the level ground just under the hill, Fabius thought that at least he would be able to carry away their booty without their disputing it and possibly even to put an end to the whole campaign owing to the great advantage his position gave him. He was in fact
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tοὺς ἐγίνετο τοὺς διαβουλίους, διανοούμενος πη καὶ
πῶς χρήσεται τοὺς τόπους καὶ τίνες καὶ πόθεν πρῶ-
3 τον ἐγχειρήσουσι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. Ἀννίβας δὲ,
tαύτα πρὸς τὴν ἐπιούσαν ἦμέραν παρασκευαζόμε-
ναι τῶν πολεμίων, συλλογίζομενος ἐκ τῶν εἰκό-
tων, οὐκ ἔδωκε χρόνον οὐδ' ἀναστροφὴν ταῖς ἐπι-
4 βολαῖς αὐτῶν, ἀνακαλέσαμενος δὲ τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν λει-
tουργῶν τεταγμένον Ἀσδρούβαν παρήγγειλε λαμ-
πάδας δεσμεύειν ἐκ τῆς ἔτρασι καὶ παντοδαπῆς ὕλης
catâ tâchos wós pleîstas, kai tâs èrgatâw boîw
ēklêxant' êk pâsas tês leias tòus éuropostatous
5 eîs dîisxîlious âthrôsai prô tês parêmboles. gênô-
ménoû de toutou, sunagagôw uîpédîexe toîs leitour-
gôîs uîpêbolôn tina metaû kaimênh tês aŭtou
stratopîdeias kai tòôn stevôn, ìì' ìwv émelle poi-
eîsai tìn pôrêian, prôs ìhn èkêleuê pîoselaînê
 tôn boîs ènerghs kai metà bîas, òtan dothi tô
6 parâgnelma, mékri sunáîsw toîs âkrois. metà dè
touto déiunopoihsaménous ânapaîseisai kath' ìwra
7 parîgygeîle pásow. àma dè òw kîlnai tô trîton mé-
ròs tês ìwktòs euðîwos èxîhe toûs leitourgoûs, kai
prôsdeîn èkêleuse prôs tà kêrapa toîs boûi tàs
8 lamîpâdas. tâkì dè toutou gênômènou dià tô plê-
thos, ìânâì parîgygeîle pásas, kai tòûs mév boûs
èlaînê kai prôsbaítê prôs tâs âkrwreias èp-
9 ètàxe, toûs dè loqkhôfrôûs katîpòn èpîstíssas tout-
tòûs èwes mèn tìwos suînregiîn parêkaleûtô toîs
èlaînousoûs, òtan dè tôn prôtîn àpâx òrmîn lâbî
tà xôa, paratîxontas pàra tô plâgîa kai suîn-
krouôntas àma tôw ùpereîswn ântêkseî tòpow
kai prôkatalamîbânein tâs âkrwreias, ìnà parà-
boûthoi kai suîmplèkîntai toîs pòlemîois, èan pò
228
entirely occupied in considering at what point and how he should avail himself of local conditions, and with what troops he should attack, and from which direction. But while the enemy were making these preparations for next day, Hannibal, conjecturing that they would act so, gave them no time or leisure to develop their plan, but summoning Hasdrubal, who was in command of the Army Service, ordered him to get as many faggots as possible of any kind of dry wood made promptly and to collect in the front of the camp about two thousand of the strongest plough oxen among all the captured stock. When this had been done, he collected the army servants and pointed out to them a rise in the ground between his own camp and the pass through which he was about to march. For this eminence he ordered them to drive the oxen whenever they received the word as furiously as they could till they reached the top. He next ordered all his men to get their supper and retire to rest early. When the third watch of the night was nearly over he led out the army servants and ordered them to bind the fagots to the horns of the oxen. This was soon done as there were plenty of hands, and he now bade them light all the fagots and drive the oxen up to the ridge. Placing his pikemen behind these men, he ordered them to help the drivers up to a certain point, but as soon as the animals were well started on their career, to run along on each side of them and keep them together, making for the higher ground. They were then to occupy the ridge, so that if the enemy advanced to any part of it, they
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

10 συναντώσι πρόσ τάς ύπερβολάς. κατὰ δὲ τῶν κατ-
ρόν τοῦτον αὐτὸς ἀναλαβὼν πρῶτα μὲν τὰ βαρέα
tῶν ὁπλῶν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺτοις τοὺς ἵππεῖς, ἔξης δὲ
tὴν λείαν, ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούς Ἰβηρας καὶ Κελτοῦς,

94 ἢκε πρὸς τὰ στενά καὶ τὰς διεκβολάς. τῶν δὲ Ὀρ-
μαίων οἱ μὲν ἔπὶ τοῖς στενοῖς φυλάττοντες, ἀμα
tῷ συνιδεῖν τὰ φῶτα προσβάλλοντα πρὸς τὰς ύπε-
ρβολὰς, νομίζοντες ταύτη ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ὀρμήν τὸ
Ἀννίβας, ἀπολιπόντες τὰς δυσχωρίας παρεβο-
θοῦν τοῖς ἀκροῖς. ἐγγίζοντες δὲ τοῖς βοῶν ἥπο-
ροῦντα διὰ τὰ φῶτα, μείζόν τι τοῦ συμβάινοντος
cαὶ δεινότερον ἀναπλάττοντες καὶ προσδοκώντες.

3 ἐπηγεινόμενοι δὲ τῶν λογχοφόρων, οὗτοι μὲν βρα-
χέα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀκροβολίσάμενοι, τῶν βοῶν
αὐτοῖς ἐμπίπτοντων, ἐμεναν διαστάντες ἐπὶ τῶν
ἀκρῶν ἀμφότεροι, καὶ προσανεῖχον καρδακοῦντες
tὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς ἡμέρας, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι

4 γνώναι τὸ γινόμενον. Φάβιος δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀπο-
ρούμενος ἐπὶ τῷ συμβαίνοντι καὶ κατὰ τὸν ποιη-
tὴν οἰκοσάμενος δόλον εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ
ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν οὐδαμῶς κρίνων ἐκκυβεύειν οὐδὲ
παραβάλλεσθαι τοῖς δόλοις, ἤγε τὴν ἰσοχίαν ἐπὶ τῷ

5 χάρακι καὶ προσεδέχετο τὴν ἡμέραν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν
καίρον τοῦτον Ἀννίβας, προχωροῦντων αὐτῷ τῶν
πραγμάτων κατὰ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν, τὴν τε δύναμιν
dιεκόμισε διὰ τῶν στενῶν μετ’ ἀσφαλείας καὶ τὴν
λείαν, λεοντοῦτοι τοὺς τόπους τῶν παραφιλαττῶν-

6 τῶν τὰς δυσχωρίας. ἀμα δὲ τῷ φωτί συνιδαν τοὺς
ἐν τοῖς ἀκροῖς ἀντικαθημένους τοῖς λογχοφοροῖς,
ἐπαπέστειλε τινὰς τῶν Ἰβηρῶν· οἱ καὶ συμμίστοντες
κατέβαλον μὲν τῶν Ὀρμαίων εἰς χιλίους, ῥαδίως δὲ
tοὺς παρὰ σφῶν εὐζώνους ἐκδεξάμενοι κατεβιβάσαν.

280
might meet and attack him. At the same time he himself with his heavy-armed troops in front, next them his cavalry, next the captured cattle, and finally the Spaniards and Celts, made for the narrow gorge of the pass. 94. The Romans who were guarding the gorge, as soon as they saw the lights advancing up the slope, thinking that Hannibal was pressing on rapidly in that direction, left the narrow part of the pass and advanced to the hill to meet the enemy. But when they got near the oxen they were entirely puzzled by the lights, fancying that they were about to encounter something much more formidable than the reality. When the pike-men came up, both forces skirmished with each other for a short time, and then when the oxen rushed in among them they drew apart and remained on the heights waiting until day should break, not being able to understand what was the matter. Fabius, partly because he was at a loss to know what was occurring, and as Homer says, deeming it to be a trick, and partly because he adhered to his former resolve not to risk or hazard a general engagement, remained quiet in his camp waiting for daylight. Meanwhile Hannibal, whose plan had been entirely successful, brought his army and all his booty safely through the gorge, those who had been guarding the difficult passage having quitted their post. When at daybreak he saw the Romans on the hill drawn up opposite his pikemen, he sent there some Spaniards as a reinforcement. Attacking the Romans they killed about a thousand and easily relieved and brought down their own light infantry.

* * Odyssey, x. 232.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

7 Ἀννίβας μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐκ τοῦ Φαλέρου ποησάμενος τὴν ἔξοδον, λοιπὸν ἦδη στρατοπεδεύων ἄσφαλῶς κατεσκέπτετο καὶ προνοεῖτο περὶ τῆς χειμασίας πού καὶ πῶς ποιήσεται, μέγαν φόβον καὶ πολλήν ἀπορίαν παρεστακὼς ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἀνθρώποις. Φάβιος δὲ κακῶς μὲν ἦκουε παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ὡς ἀνάδρως ἐκ τοιούτων τόπων προέμενος τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, οὐ μὴν ἀφίστατο γε τῆς προθέσεως. καταναγκασθεὶς δὲ μετ’ οἵλας ἡμέρας ἐπὶ τινας ἀπελθεῖν θυσίας εἰς τὴν Ρώμην, παρέδωκε τῷ συνάρχοντι τὰ στρατόπεδα, καὶ πολλὰ χωριζόμενος ἐνετείλα τῷ τοσαύτῃ τὴν ποιεῖσθαι σπουδὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ βλάψαν τοὺς πολεμίους ἡλίκην ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδὲν αὐτοῦ παθεῖν δει
don. ὦν οὐδὲ μικρῶν ἔν νῦι τιθέμενος Μάρκος ἔτι λέγωντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα πρὸς τῷ παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ τῷ διακυνδυνεύειν ὅλος καὶ πᾶς ἦν.

95 Ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τοιαύτην εἶχε τὴν διάθεσιν. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καυροῦς ταῖς προειρημέναις πράξεσιν Ἀσδρούβας δὲ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας στρατηγὸς, κατηρτικῶς ἐν τῇ παραχειμασίᾳ τὰς ὑπὸ τάδελφοι καταλειψθέισα τρίακοντα ναῦς, καὶ δέκα προσπεπληρωκὼς ἄλλος, ἀρχομένης τῆς θερείας ἀνέχθη τετταράκοντα ναυοὶ καταφράκτων εἰς Κανής πόλεως, προχειρισάμενος Ἀμίλκαν τοῦ στόλου ναύαρχου. ἄμα δὲ καὶ τὴν πεζὴν ἐκ τῆς παραχειμασίας ήθορικὸς δύναμιν ἀνέζευξε· καὶ ταῖς μὲν ναυοὶ παρὰ τὴν χέρσου ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν, τοῖς δὲ πεζοῖς τὴν πορείαν παρὰ τὸν αἰγιαλόν, ὁπευδον ἀμφοτέραις ἀμα ταῖς δυνάμεις καταζεεύσει πρὸς τὸν Ἰβηρα ποταμῶν. Γναῖος δὲ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς συλλογιζόμενος τῶν Καρχηδονίων, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον 232
Hannibal, having thus effected his retirement from Falernum, remained now safely in camp and began to take thought where and how he should establish his winter quarters. He had spread great terror and perplexity through all the cities and peoples of Italy. Fabius, though generally reproached for his craven conduct in letting the enemy escape from such a situation, still did not abandon his policy. But a few days afterwards he was compelled to leave for Rome to perform certain sacrifices and handed over his legions to his Master of the Horse, enjoining on him strictly, in taking leave, not to attach so much importance to damaging the enemy as to avoiding disaster for himself. Marcus, instead of paying any attention to this advice, was, even while Fabius was tendering it, entirely wrapped up in the project of risking a great battle.

95. Such was the position of affairs in Italy. Contemporaneously with these events Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian commander in Spain, after fitting out during the winter the thirty ships his brother had left him, and manning ten others, put out at the beginning of summer from New Carthage with his fleet of forty decked ships, appointing Hamilcar his admiral. At the same time he collected his troops from their winter quarters and took the field. His fleet sailed close to the shore and his army marched along the beach, his object being to halt with both forces near the Ebro. Gnaeus, conjecturing that this was the plan of the Carthaginians, first of all
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἐπεβάλετο κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλαταν ἐκ τῆς παραχεμασίας ποιείσθαι τὴν ἀπάντησιν. ἄκούων δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς παρασκευῆς, τὸ μὲν κατὰ γῆν ἀπαντῶν ἀπεδοκίμασε, συμπληρώσας δὲ πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα ναῦς, καὶ λαβὼν ἐκ τοῦ πεζικοῦ στρατεύματος τοὺς ἔπιτη- δεοτάτους ἄνδρας πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβατικὴν χρείαν ἀνήχθη, καὶ κατήρε δευτεραῖος ἐκ Ταρράκωνος εἰς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἰβηρά ποταμὸν τόπους. καθορμισθεὶς δὲ τῶν πολεμίων ἐν ἀποστήματι περὶ τοὺς ὁγδοκοντα- στάδίους, προσπέστειλε κατασκευασμένος δύο ναῦς ταχυπλούσας Μασσαλιτικάς. καὶ γὰρ προκαθ- θηγοῦτο καὶ προεκδύνευον οὗτος καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπο- τομως σφίσει παρείχοντο τῇ χρειαί. εὐγενῶς γάρ, εἰ καὶ τινὲς ἔτεροι, κεκοινωνήκας Ρωμαίους πραγμάτων καὶ Μασσαλιῶται, πολλάκις μὲν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ τὸν Ἀνυβιακὸν πόλεμον.

διασαφούντων δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν κατασκοπὴν ἐκπεμ- φέντων ὅτι περὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ ποταμοῦ συμβαί- νει τῶν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ὀρμεῖν στόλων, ἀνήγετο κατὰ σπουδὴν, βουλόμενος ἄφωνο προσπέσειν τοῖς πολεμίωσι. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀσδροῦβαν, σημηνάν- των αὐτοῖς τῶν σκοπῶν ἐκ πολλοῦ τῶν ἐπίπλουν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἁμα τὰς πεζικὰς ἐξετάσατο δυνά- μεις παρὰ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν, καὶ τοῖς πληρώμασι παρ- ἡγελλω ἐμβαίνει εἰς τὰς ναύς. ἤδη δὲ καὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων σύνεγγυς ἄντων, σημήναντες πολεμικὸν ἀνήγοντο, κρίνοντες ναυμαχεῖν. συμβαλόντες δὲ τοῖς πολεμίωσι βραχὺν μὲν τινα χρόνον ἀντεπούχ- σαντο τῆς νίκης, μετ’ οὐ πολὺ δὲ πρὸς τὸ κλίνειν ἡμῖνες. ἡ γὰρ ἐφεδρεία τῶν πεζῶν ἡ περὶ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν ὁχὸς ὀυτῶς αὐτοὺς ὄνησε θάρσος παριστά-
BOOK III. 95. 4 – 96. 3

designed to quit his winter quarters and meet them both by land and sea, but on learning the strength of their forces and the extensive scale of their preparations he renounced the project of meeting them by land, and manning thirty-five ships and embarking on them as marines the men from his army most suited for this service, appeared off the Ebro two days after sailing from Tarraco. Anchoring at a distance of about eighty stades from the enemy he sent on two swift Massaliot ships to reconnoitre, for these used to head the line both in sailing and in battle, and there was absolutely no service they were not ready to render. Indeed if any people have given generous support to the Romans it is the people of Marseilles both on many subsequent occasions and especially in the Hanniballic War. When the scouts reported that the enemy’s fleet was anchored off the mouth of the river, he weighed anchor and advanced rapidly, wishing to fall upon them suddenly. 96. Hasdrubal, to whom his look-out men had given early notice of the approach of the enemy, drew up his land forces on the beach and ordered his crews to embark. The Romans being now close at hand, he gave the signal for battle, having decided on a naval action. The Carthaginians on meeting the enemy contested the victory only for a short time and then began to give way. For the covering military force on the beach did not benefit them so much by the confidence it inspired as it
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

νουσα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὡς ἔβλαψε τὴν ἐλπίδα
4 τῆς σωτηρίας ἐτοίμην παρασκεύαζουσα. πλὴν δύο
μὲν αὐτάνδρους νήσας ἀποβαλόντες, ἑττόρων δὲ
tοὺς ταρσοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἑπτάτας, ἐθευγὸν ἐκκλή-
νατες εἰς γῆν. ἐπικεμένων δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων αὐ-
tοῖς ἐκθύμως, τὰς μὲν ναὸς ἐξέβαλον εἰς τὸν αἰ-
gιαλόν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀποπηδήσαντες ἐκ τῶν πλοίων
6 ἐσάξοντο πρὸς τοὺς παρατεταγμένους. οἱ δὲ Ῥω-
μαίοι τολμηρῶς συνεγχύσαντες τῇ γῇ, καὶ τὰ δυνά-
μενα κινεῶσα τῶν πλοίων ἀναδησάμενοι, μετὰ χα-
rὰς ὑπερβαλλούσης ἀπέπλεον, νευκηκότες μὲν εἰς
ἐφόδου τοὺς ὑπενάντιους, κρατοῦντες δὲ τῆς θα-
lάττης, εἰκοσὶ δὲ καὶ πέντε ναὸς ἐχοντες τῶν
πολεμίων.

7 Τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἀπὸ τοὺς ἐπικυκδέτερας εἰλήφει τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τὰς ἐλπίδας
8 διὰ τὸ προειρημένον κατόρθωμα. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδό-
nοι, προσπεσόντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ γεγονότος ἐλαττώμα-
τος, παραχρήμα πληρώσαντες ἐβδομήκοντα νῆσας
ἐξαπέστειλαν, κρίναντες ἄναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς πάσας
9 τὰς ἐπιβολὰς ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς θαλάττης. αἱ τὸ μὲν
πρῶτον εἰς Σαρδόν, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς περὶ
Πίσας τόπους τῆς Ἰταλίας προσέβαλον, πεπεισμέ-
nων τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων συμμίζουν ἐνῆδε τοῖς περὶ
10 τὸν Ἀνίβαν. ταχὺ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀναχθέντων
ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς Ῥώμης ἐκατόν εἰκοσὶ σκά-
φεως πεντηρικῶς, πυθόμενοι τὸν ἀνάπλουν, οὗτοι
μὲν αὐθίς ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Σαρδόνα, μετὰ δὲ
11 ταύτα πάλιν εἰς Καρχηδόνα. Γνῶσις δὲ Σερούλιος,
ἐχὼν τὸν προειρημένον στόλον, ἔως μὲν τῶν ἐπ-
ηκολούθει τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, συνάψεως πεπεισμένος,
12 πολὺ δὲ καθυστερῶν ἀπέγνω. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον
236
damaged them by ensuring an easy and safe retreat. After losing two ships with all their crews and the oars and marines of four others, they fell back on the shore. On the Romans pursuing them vigorously they ran their ships aground and leaping out of them took refuge with the troops. The Romans very boldly approached the shore, and taking in tow such ships as were in a condition to float, sailed off in high spirits, having beaten the enemy at the first onslaught, established their supremacy at sea and possessed themselves of five and twenty of the enemy's ships.

Owing to this success the prospects of the Romans in Spain began thenceforth to look brighter. But the Carthaginians, on the news of their defeat, at once manned and dispatched seventy ships, regarding the command of the sea as necessary for all their projects. These ships touched first at Sardinia and then at Pisa in Italy, the commander believing they would meet Hannibal there, but on learning that the Romans had at once put to sea from Rome itself with a hundred and twenty quinqueremes to attack them, they sailed back again to Sardinia and thence to Carthage. Gnaeus Servilius, the commander of this Roman fleet, followed up the Carthaginians for a certain distance, believing he would overtake them, but on being left a long way behind, he gave up the chase. He first of all put in at
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

τῆς Σικελίας Λιλβαίων προσέχει, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καταπλεύσας τῆς Λιβύης ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν Κερκυνητῶν νῆσον, καὶ λαβὼν παρὰ αὐτῶν χρήματα τοῦ μὴ πορθῆσαι τὴν χώραν, ἀπηλλάγην. κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἀνάπλουν γενόμενον κύριον νῆσου Κοσσύρου, καὶ φρούραν εἰς τὸ πολισμάτων εἰσαγαγόν, αὕτης εἰς τὸ Λιλβαίων κατῆρε. καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὗτος μὲν αὐτῶι συνορμίσας τὸν στόλον μετ’ οὐ πολὺν χρόνον αὐτός ἀνεκομίσθη πρὸς τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις.

97 Οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου, πυθόμενοι τὸ γεγονός προτέρημα διὰ τοῦ Γναίου περὶ τὴν ναυμαχίαν, καὶ νομίσαντες χρήσιμον εἶναι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ μὴ προέσωδα τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ἀλλ’ ἐνίστασθαι τοῖς Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὔξειν, προχειρισάμενοι ναῦς εἰκοσι καὶ στρατηγόν ἐπιστήσαντες Πόπλιον Σκιπίσσα κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἀρχής πρόδεσιν, ἐξαπέστειλον μετὰ σπουδὴς πρὸς τὸν ἄδελφὸν Γναίων, κοινὴν πράξοντα μετ’ ἑκείνου τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν. πάνω γὰρ ἡγωνίων μὴ κρατήσαντες Καρχηδόνιοι τῶν τόπων εἰκεῖνω, καὶ περιποιησάμενοι χορηγίας ἄφθονους καὶ χεῖρας, ἀντιποίησονται μὲν τῆς θαλάττης ὀλοσχερότερον, συνεπώνται δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, στρατόπεδα πέμποντες καὶ χρήσιμα τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀννιβάν. διότερ ἐν μεγάλῳ τιθέμενοι καὶ τοῦτον τὸν πόλεμον, ἐξαπέστειλαν τὰς τε ναυᾶς καὶ τὸν Πόπλιον. δὲ καὶ παραγενόμενος εἰς Ἰβηρίαν καὶ συμμίσχιος τῶν δελφῶν μεγάλην παρεῖχε χρεῖαν τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγματος. οὐδέποτε γὰρ πρότερον θαρρήσαντες διαβῆναι τὸν Ἰβηριανότατον, ἀλλ’ ἁμαρτίζοντες τῇ τῶν ἐπὶ τάδε φιλία καὶ συμμαχία, τότε διέβησαν καὶ τότε πρῶτον ἐδάρρησαν ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τῶν πέρα...
Lilybaeum in Sicily and afterwards sailed to the African island of Cercina, which he quitted after receiving from the inhabitants a sum of money on condition of his not laying the country waste. On his return voyage he possessed himself of the island of Cossyrus, and leaving a garrison in the small town returned to Lilybaeum. After laying up his fleet in harbour there, he very shortly went off to join the land forces.

97. The Senate on hearing of Gnaeus Scipio's success in the naval battle, thinking it advantageous or rather imperative not to neglect the affairs of Spain but to keep up the pressure on the Carthaginians and increase their forces, got ready twenty ships, and placing them, as they had originally decided, under the command of Publius Scipio, dispatched him at once to join his brother Gnaeus and operate in Spain together with him. For they were very apprehensive lest the Carthaginians should master that country, and, collecting abundance of supplies and soldiers, make a more serious effort to regain the command of the sea and thus support the invasion of Italy by sending troops and money to Hannibal. Treating this war, then, also as of great moment they dispatched Publius with his fleet, and on reaching Iberia and joining his brother he rendered great service in their joint operations. For the Romans, who had never before dared to cross the Ebro, but had been content with the friendship and alliance of the peoples on its north bank, now crossed it, and for the first time ventured to aim at acquiring dominion on the other side,
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ραν πραγμάτων, μεγάλα καὶ ταὐτομάτον συνεργή-
σαντος σφίσι πρὸς τοὺς περιστάτας καιροὺς.
6 Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ καταπληξάμενοι τοὺς περὶ τὴν διά-
βασιν οἰκούντας τῶν Ἰβηρῶν ἤκον πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ζα-
κανθαίων πόλιν, ἀποσχόντες σταδίους ὡς τετταρά-
κοντα περὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἱερὸν κατεστρατοπέ-
7 δευσαν, λαβόντες τόπων εὐφυῶς κείμενον πρὸς τε
τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἑκ
8 θαλάττης χορηγίαν· ὁμοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνέβαινε καὶ
τὸν στόλον ποιεῖσθαι τὸν παράπλουν. ἦνθα δη'
98 γίνεται τις πραγμάτων περιπέτειας τοιάδε. καθ' 
οὖς καιροὺς Ἀνώβας ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν εἰς Ἰτα-
λίαν, ἦσας πόλεσιν ἡπὶστησε τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβη-
ρίαν, ἔλαβε παρὰ τούτων ὀμήρα τοὺς νείς τῶν ἔπιφανεστάτων ἀνδρῶν· οὖς πάντας εἰς τὴν Ζακα-
κανθαίων ἀπέθετο πόλιν διά τῇ τὴν ὄχυρωτητα καὶ διὰ 
τὴν τῶν ἀπολειψομένων ἐπ' αὐτῆς ἄνδρων πίστιν.
2 ἦν δὲ τις ἀνήρ Ἰβηρ, Ἀβίλυς ὄνομα, κατὰ μὲν τὴν 
δόξαν καὶ τὴν τοῦ βίου περὶςτασιν οὐδενὸς δεύτε-
ρος Ἰβηρῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς Καρχηδονίους εὐ-
νοιαν καὶ πίστιν πολὺ τι διαφέρειν δοκῶν τῶν ἄλ-
3 λων. οὔτος θεωρῶν τὰ πράγματα, καὶ νομίσας 
ἐπικυδεστέρας εἶναι τὸς τῶν Ρωμαίων ἐλπίδας, συν-
elογίσατο παρ' ἑαυτῷ περὶ τῆς τῶν ὄμηρων προ-
4 δοσίας συλλογισμὸν Ἰβηρικὸν καὶ βαρβαρικόν. πει-
ςθεὶς γὰρ διότι δύναται μέγας γενέσθαι παρὰ Ῥω-
μαίοις προσενεγκάμενος ἐν καιρῷ πίστιν ἁμα καὶ 
χρείαν, ἐγίνετο πρὸς τῷ παρασποιδῆσας τοὺς Καρ-
χηδονίους ἐγχειρίσαι τοὺς ὄμηρους τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις.
5 θεωρῶν δὲ τὸν Βώστορα τοῖς τῶν Καρχηδονίων 
στρατηγὸν, ὃς ἀπεστάλη μὲν ὑπ' Ἀσδροῦβοι κω-
λύσων τοὺς Ῥωμαίους διαβαίνειν τὸν ποταμὸν, οὐ
240
chance also greatly contributing to advance their prospects in the following manner.

When after overawing the Iberian tribes dwelling near the crossing of the Ebro they reached Saguntum, they encamped at a distance of about five miles from the town near the temple of Venus, choosing a place well situated both as regards security from the enemy and facility for obtaining supplies from the sea, since their fleet was coasting down together with them. 98. Here a remarkable development of events occurred. When Hannibal was starting on his march for Italy, he took as hostages from those cities in Iberia on which he did not rely the sons of their principal men, and all these he placed in Saguntum owing to the strength of the place and the loyalty of the officers he left in charge of it. Now there was a certain Iberian named Abilyx, second to none in Iberia in rank and wealth and with the reputation of being more devoted and loyal to the Carthaginians than anyone else. Reviewing the situation and thinking that the prospects of the Romans were now the brightest, he reasoned with himself in a manner thoroughly Spanish and barbarian on the question of betraying the hostages. For, being convinced that if he both rendered the Romans a timely service and gave them proof of his good faith, he would become very influential with them, he formed the scheme of playing the traitor to the Carthaginians and handing over the hostages to the Romans. The Carthaginian general, Bostar, whom Hasdrubal had sent to oppose the Romans if they tried to cross the Ebro, but who
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

θαρρήσας δὲ τούτο ποιεῖν, ἀνακεχωρηκὼς ἐστρατο-
πέδευε τῆς Ζακάνθης ἐν τοῖς πρὸς θάλατταν μέρειςν,
τοῦτον μὲν ἄκακον ὅντα τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ πρᾷον τῇ
8 φύσει, πιστῶς δὲ τὰ πρὸς αὐτόν διακείμενον, ποι-
εῖται λόγους ὑπὲρ τῶν ὁμήρων πρὸς τὸν Βώστορα,
φάσκων, ἐπειδὴ διαβεβήκασι Ῥωμαίοι τὸν ποταμόν,
οὐκέτα δύνασθαι Καρχηδονίους φόβῳ συνέχεια τὰ
κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, προσδείεται δὲ τοὺς καρποὺς τῆς
7 τῶν ὑποταττομένων εὐνοίας· νῦν οὖν ἡγικότων
Ῥωμαίων, καὶ προσκαθεξομένων τῇ Ζακάνθη, καὶ
κυνδυνοῦσας τῆς πόλεως, ἐὰν ἐξαγαγόν τῷ ὁμή-
ρους ἀποκαταστήσῃ τὸν γονέως καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν,
ἐκλύσεις μὲν αὐτὸν τῶν Ῥωμαίων τὴν φιλοτιμίαν·
tοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ μάλιστα σπουδάζειν ἔκεινος
8 πράξαι, κυριεύοντας τῶν ὁμήρων· ἐκκαλέσεσθαι
dὲ τὴν τῶν Ἰβηρῶν πάντων πρὸς Καρχηδονίους εὐ-
νοιαν, προιδόμενον τὸ μέλλον καὶ προνοηθέντα τῆς
τῶν ὁμήρων ἀσφαλείας. τὴν δὲ χάριν αὐξήσεων ἐφή
πολλαπλασίαν, αὐτὸς γενόμενος χειριστής τοῦ πράγ-
9 ματος. ἀποκαθιστάνων γὰρ εἰς τὰς πόλεις τοὺς
παῖδας οὐ μόνον τὴν παρ’ αὐτῶν εὐνοιαν ἔπιστα-
σεσθαι τῶν γεννησάντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τῶν πολ-
lών, ὧν τὴν ὄψιν τιθεῖς διὰ τὸ συμβαίνοντος τὴν
Καρχηδονίους πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους αἴρεσιν καὶ με-
10 γαλοψυχίαν. προσδοκάν δ’ αὐτὸν ἐκέλευσε καὶ δῶ-
ρων πλῆθος ἰδίᾳ παρὰ τῶν τὰ τέκνα κομιζομένων·
παραδόξως γὰρ ἐκάστους ἄγκρατης γυνομένους τῶν
ἀναγκαιοτάτων ἄμυλλαν ποιήσεται τῆς εἰς τὸν κύ-
11 μον τῶν πραγμάτων εὐεργεσίας. παραπλήσια δὲ
τούτου ἔτερα καὶ πλείω πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
242
had not ventured to do so, had now retreated and
encamped between Saguntum and the sea. Abilyx,
perceiving that he was of a guileless and mild dis-
position and placed full confidence in himself,
approached him on the subject of the hostages,
saying that now the Romans had once crossed the
river it was no longer possible for the Carthaginians
to control the Iberians by fear, but that present
circumstances required the goodwill of all the
subject peoples. So now, when the Romans had
approached and were encamped close to Saguntum
and the city was in danger, if he brought the
hostages out and restored them to their parents
and cities, he would in the first place frustrate
the ambitious project of the Romans, who were
bent on taking just the same step if they got the
hostages into their hands, and further he would
elicit the gratitude of all the Iberians to the
Carthaginians by thus foreseeing the future and
taking thought for the safety of the hostages. This
act of grace, he said, would be very much enhanced,
if Bostar would let him take the matter in hand
personally. For in restoring the children to the
cities not only would he gain him the goodwill of
their parents but that of the mass of the people, by
thus bringing actually before their eyes this evidence
of the magnanimous conduct of Carthage toward
her allies. He told Bostar also that he could count
on numerous presents to himself from those to
whom their children were returned; for each and
all, on thus unexpectedly receiving back their
dearest, would vie with each other in heaping
benefits on the author of the measure. By these
and more words to the like effect he persuaded
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

διαλεξθεὶς ἐπεισε τῶν Βώστωρα συγκαταθέσθαι τοῖς
99 λεγομένοις. καὶ τότε μὲν ἔπανηλθε, ταξάμενος ἦμε-
ραν, ἢ παρέστατα μετὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων πρὸς τὴν ἀνα-
2 κοιμιὰν τῶν παιδῶν. παραγενθεὶς δὲ νυκτὸς ἐπὶ
τὸ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατόπεδον, καὶ συμμίμησα τις
τῶν συστρατευμένων ἐκείνως Ἰβήρων, διὰ τούτων
3 εἰσῆλθε πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς. εὐκλωϊζόμενος δὲ
diὰ πλειόνων τὴν ἐσομένην ὅρμην καὶ μετάπτωσιν
πρὸς αὐτοὺς τῶν Ἰβήρων, ἐὰν ἐγκρατεῖσι γένωνται
τῶν ὁμήρων, ἐπηγγείλατο παραδώσειν αὐτοῖς τοὺς
4 παιδᾶς. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν Πόπλιον ὑπερβολὴ προ-
θύμως δεξαμένων τὴν ἐλπίδα καὶ μεγάλας ὑπ-
ισχυσμένων δωρεάς, τότε μὲν εἰς τὴν ἱδίαν ἀπ-
ηλάγη, συνθήμενος ἦμεραν καὶ καιρὸν καὶ τόπον, ἐν
5 ὧ δείησε τοὺς ἐκδεξομένους αὐτῶν ὑπομένειν. μετὰ
dὲ ταῦτα παραλαβὼν τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τῶν φίλων
ήκε πρὸς τὸν Βώστωρα, καὶ παραδοθέντων αὐτῷ
τῶν παιδῶν ἐκ τῆς Ζακάνθης, νυκτὸς ποιησάμενος
τὴν ἔξοδον, ὡς θέλων λαθεῖν, παραπορευθεὶς τῶν
χάρακα τῶν πολεμίων ἦκε πρὸς τὸν τεταγμένων
καιρὸν καὶ τόπον καὶ πάντας χειρίσει τοὺς ὁμὴ-
8 ρους τοῖς ἠγεμόσι τῶν Ῥωμαίων. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν
Πόπλιον ἐτύμησαν τε διαφερόντως τὸν Ἄβιλυγα καὶ
πρὸς τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν τῶν ὁμήρων εἰς τὰς πα-
τρίδας ἐχρήσαντο τούτως, συμπέμψαντες τοὺς ἐπτυ-
7 δείους. ὃς ἐπιστρεφόμενος τὰς πόλεις καὶ διὰ τῆς
τῶν παιδῶν ἀποκαταστάσεως τυθεῖς ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν
tὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πραότητα καὶ μεγαλοφυκὴν παρὰ
tὴν Καρχηδονίων ἀπιστίαν καὶ βαρύτητα, καὶ προσ-
παρατιθεῖς τὴν αὐτοῦ μετάθεσιν, πολλοὺς Ἰβήρων
8 παρώρμησε πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων φιλίαν. Βώ-
στωρ δὲ παιδικῶτερον ἦ κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν δόξας
244
BOOK III. 98. 11 – 99. 8

Bostar to assent to his proposal. 99. For the present he left to return home, fixing the day on which he would come with his followers to escort the children. At night he went to the Roman camp, and having found some of the Iberians who were serving in the army, gained access through them to the generals. Pointing out at some length how the Iberians if they recovered their hostages would with one impulse go over to the Romans, he undertook to give up the children to them. Publius, to whom the prospect was exceedingly welcome, having promised him a great reward, he now left for his own country, having fixed a day and agreed on the hour and place at which those who were to take over the hostages should await him. After this, taking his most intimate friends with him, he came to Bostar; and on the children being handed over to him from Saguntum, he sallied out from the town by night as if to keep the matter secret, and marching along the enemies' entrenched camp reached the appointed place at the appointed hour and delivered all the hostages to the Roman generals. Publius conferred great honours on Abilyx, and employed him in the restoration of the hostages to their respective countries, sending certain of his friends with him. Going from city to city, and bringing, by the repatriation of the children, the gentleness and magnanimity of the Romans into manifest contrast with the suspiciousness and harshness of the Carthaginians, at the same time exhibiting the example of his own change of sides, he induced many of the Iberians to become allies of Rome. Bostar was judged in thus handing over the hostages
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

9 

100

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

56

58

60

62

64

66

68

70

72

74

76

78

80

82

84

86

88

90

92

94

96

98

100

102

104

106

108

110

112

114

116

118

120

122

124

126

128

130

132

134

136

138

140

142

144

146

148

150

152

154

156

158

160

162

164

166

168

170

172

174

176

178

180

182

184

186

188

190

192

194

196

198

200

202

204

206

208

210

212

214

216

218

220

222

224

226

228

230

232

234

236

238

240

242

244

246

248

250

252

254

256
to the enemy to have acted more like a child than became his years, and was in serious danger of his life. For the present both sides, as the season was now advanced, broke up their forces for the winter; chance in this matter of the children having materially contributed to assist the projects the Romans had in view.

100. Such was the position of affairs in Spain. Hannibal, whom we left in Italy looking out for winter quarters, learning from his scouts that there was plenty of corn in the country round Luceria and Geronium, and that the best place for collecting supplies was Geronium, decided to winter there and advanced to this district, marching past Mount Libyrnus. On reaching Geronium, which is two hundred stades from Luceria, he at first sent messages to the inhabitants asking for their alliance and offering pledges of the advantages he promised them, but as they paid no attention to them he began the siege. He soon took the city, upon which he put the inhabitants to the sword, but kept the walls and most of the houses uninjured, intending to use them as corn magazines for the winter. He encamped his army before the town, fortifying his camp with a trench and palisade. When he had completed this he sent two divisions of his army out to gather corn, ordering each to bring in each day for its own use the quantity imposed by those in charge of the commissariat. With the remaining third he guarded the camp and covered the foraging parties here and there. As most of the country was flat and easy to overrun, and the foragers were one
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

συναγόντων ὃς ἔποιοι ἑπεῖν ἀναριθμήτων, ἦτι δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἀκμαζούσης πρὸς τὴν συγκομιδήν, ἀπλετον συνέβαλε καθ' ἐκάστην ἦμέραν ἀθροίζοντας τοῦ σίτου τὸ πλῆθος.

101 Μάρκος δὲ παρειληφὼς τὰς δυνάμεις παρὰ Φαβίου, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀντιπαρῆγε ταῖς ἀκρωτείαις, πεπεισμένος ἄει περὶ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς συμπεσεῖσθαί 2 ποτὲ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ἀκούσας δὲ τὸ μὲν Γερούνιον τοὺς περὶ τὸν ᾿Αννίβαν ἦδη κατέχειν, τὴν δὲ χώραν σιτολογεῖν, πρὸ δὲ τῆς πόλεως χάρακα βεβλημένους στρατοπεδεύειν, ἐπιστρέψας ἐκ τῶν ἀκρωτείων κατέβας κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ πεδία κατα- 3 τείνουσαν ράχιν. ἀφικόμενος δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν, ἦ 4 κείται μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς Λαρινάτιδος χώρας, προσαγόρευ- ται δὲ Καλήνη, κατεστρατοπέδευε σείρᾳ ταύτην, πρόχειρος ὃν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις. ᾿Αννίβας δὲ θεωρῶν ἐγγίζοντας τοὺς πολεμίους, τὸ μὲν τρίτον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως εἶσαι σιτολογεῖν, τὰ δὲ δύο μέρη λαβὼν καὶ προελθὼν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐκκαίδεκα σταδίους πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐπὶ τῶν βουνοῦ κατεστρατοπέδευσε, βουλόμενος ἀμα μὲν καταπλήξασθαι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἄμα δὲ τοῖς σιτολογοῦσι τὴν ἀσφάλειαν παρασκεύαζεν.

5 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα γεωλόφοι τινὸς ὑπάρχοντος μεταξὺ τῶν στρατοπέδων, δὲ εὐκαίρως καὶ σύνεγγυς ἐπέ- κειτο τῇ τῶν πολεμίων παρεμβολή, τοῦτον ἐτὶ νυκτὸς ἐξαποστείλας περὶ δισχιλίως τῶν λογχοφόρων κατε- 6 λάβετο. ὦς ἐπιγενομένης τῆς ἦμέρας συνιδών Μάρκος ἐξῆγε τοὺς εὐζώνους καὶ προσέβαλε τῷ 7 λόφῳ. γενομένου δὲ ἀκροβολισμοῦ νεανικοῦ, τελος ἐπεκράτησαν οἱ Ῥωμαίοι, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν οἷην στρατοπεδεύειν μετεβίβασαν εἰς τοῦτον τὸν τόπον.

248
might say infinite in number, and the weather was very favourable for fetching in the grain, an enormous quantity was collected every day.

101. Minucius on taking over the command from Fabius at first followed the Carthaginians along the hills, always expecting to encounter them when attempting to cross. But on hearing that Hannibal had already occupied Geronium, and was foraging in the district, and had established himself in a fortified camp before the city, he turned and descended from the hills by a ridge that slopes down to the town. Arriving at the height in the territory of Larinum called Calena he encamped there, being eager at all hazards to engage the enemy. Hannibal, seeing the approach of the Romans, left the third part of his army to forage, and taking the other two-thirds advanced sixteen stades from the town and encamped on a hill with the view of overawing the enemy and affording protection to the foragers. There was a certain hillock between the two armies, and observing that it lay close to the enemy's camp and commanded it, he sent two thousand of his pikemen in the night to occupy it. Marcus, catching sight of them at daybreak, led out his light-armed troops and attacked the hill. A brisk skirmish took place in which the Romans were victorious, and afterwards they transferred their whole army to this hill.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

8 δὲ Ἄννίβας ἔως μὲν τινὸς διὰ τὴν ἀντιστρατοπε- 
δείαν συνείχε τὸ πλείστον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως ἐφ’ 
9 αὐτόν. πλειόνων δὲ γενομένων ἥμερῶν, ἦναγκάζετο 
τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν νομὴν τῶν θρημάτων ἀπομειρίζειν, 
10 τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν συντολὴν, σπουδάζων κατὰ τὴν ἐν 
ἀρχῇ πρόθεσιν μῆτε τὴν λείαν καταφθεῖραι τὸν τε 
σίτον ὡς πλείστον συναγαγεῖν, ἵνα πάντων ἡ κατὰ 
τὴν παραξεμασίαν δαφύλευα τοὺς ἀνδράσι, μὴ χεῖρον 
11 δὲ τοὺς ὑποζυγίους καὶ τοὺς ἵππους· εἰχε γὰρ τὰς 
πλείστας ἑλπίδας τῆς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως ἐν τῷ τῶν 
ἵππεων τάγματι.

102 Ἐν δὲ καὶ Μάρκος, συνθεωρήσας τὸ 
πολὺ μέρος τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἐπὶ τὰς προερημένας 
χρείας κατὰ τῆς χώρας σκεδασμόνευν, λαβὼν τὸν 
ἀκμαίοτατον καὶ ἡμέρας ἐξῆγε τὴν δύναμιν, 
2 καὶ συνεγνύσας τῇ παρεμβολῇ τῶν Καρχηδονίων τὰ 
μὲν βαρέα τῶν ὑπλων ἐξέταζε, τοὺς δὲ ἵππεῖς καὶ 
τοὺς ἐνώπιον κατὰ μέρη διελών ἐπαφῆκε τοῖς προ- 
3 νουμεύοντι, παραγγείλας μηδένα ξωγρεῖν. Ἄννίβας 
δὲ τούτου συμβάντος εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐνεπεπτύκει με- 
γάλην· οὔτε γὰρ ἀντεξάγει τοῖς παρατεταγμένοις 
ἀξιόχρεως ἦν οὔτε παραβοηθεῖν τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας 
4 διεσπαρμένοις. τῶν δὲ Ὀρμαίων οἱ μὲν εἶπ τοὺς 
προνομεύοντας ἐξαποσταλέντες πολλοὺς τῶν ἐσκε- 
δασμένων ἀπέκτειναν· οἱ δὲ παρατεταγμένοι τέλος 
eἰς τούτῳ ἦλθον καταφρονήσεως ὡστε καὶ διασπάν 
τὸν χάρακα καὶ μένον ὑπὸ πολιορκεῖν τοὺς Καρχη- 
δονίους. ὃ δὲ Ἄννίβας ἦν μὲν ἐν κακοῖς, ὅμως δὲ 
χειμαζόμενος ἔμενε, τοὺς πελάζοντας ἀποτριβόμενος 
6 καὶ μόλις διαφυλάττων τὴν παρεμβολήν, ἔως Ἀσ- 
δρουβᾶς ἀναλαβών τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας συμπεφευ- 
gότας εἰς τὸν χάρακα τὸν περὶ τὸ Γερούνιον, ὅτας 
250
Hannibal for a certain time kept the whole of his forces within the camp owing to the propinquity of the enemy; but after some days he was compelled to tell off a portion to pasture the animals, and send others to forage for corn, as he was anxious, according to his original plan, to avoid loss in the live stock he had captured and to collect as much corn as possible, so that for the whole winter there should be plenty of everything both for his men and also for the horses and pack-animals; for it was on his cavalry above all that he placed reliance.

102. Minucius, remarking that the greater number of the enemy were dispersed over the country on these services, chose the time when the day was at its height to lead out his forces, and on approaching the enemy's camp, drew up his legionaries, and dividing his cavalry and light-armed infantry into several troops sent them out to attack the foragers, with orders to take no prisoners. Hannibal hereupon found himself in a very difficult position, being neither strong enough to march out and meet the enemy nor able to go to the assistance of those of his men who were scattered over the country. The Romans who had been dispatched to attack the foraging parties, killed numbers of them, and finally the troops drawn up in line reached such a pitch of contempt for the enemy that they began to pull down the palisade and very nearly stormed the Carthaginian camp. Hannibal was in sore straits, but notwithstanding the tempest that had thus overtaken him he continued to drive off all assailants and with difficulty to hold his camp, until Hasdrubal, with those who had fled from the country for refuge to the camp before Geronium, about four thousand
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

7 eis tetraakwchilous, hèke parabophthèn. tote de mi-
kron ánatharrhènas èpekhilhe, kai braxu pro tis
stratopediain pærembalain molis àpoeitèphato ton
8 ènestòta k³ndunon. Màrkuos de pollous mèn èn tì
peri ton chàraka sýmplokê ton polemíwn àpoktei-
navas, èti de pleíous èpì tis chwras diebharikos, ton
mèn èpanhêthe megálas èlpidas èkhon ùper toú méli-
9 lontos. tì de èpauýmiv èkliptonwv ton chàraka
ton Karçchodounw, èpébh kai katelàbeta tòn èkei-
10 nòv n pàrembolòn. ò gar' Aivnibas diagwnavasas toûs
'Pwmaiów, mi kataphymenoi vuktos èrhmwv ònta
ton èpi tò Gerouniw chàraka kûriou gëwun tìs
áposkeuìs kai tòn parâdêswn, èkriwv autòs àna-
chwrein kai pálav èkei pòwesth tìn stratopediain.
11 apò de toútwv tòn kàròn oî mèn Karçchodounoi
tais pronoimais euðèstéteron èxrwnto kai phylakti-
kóteron, oî de 'Pwmaiòi tänánta tharralewteron
kai pròpèstèteron.

103 Oî de èn tì 'Rwmì, pròspesòntos sfízì tòj ge-
ynótos meiòwèn ò kath tìn álhtèin, perikharèn
ìsan dià to pròtwv mèn ek tìs pròuparchoûsias
ùper tòn dlwv dúselpwstias ôlon ei metabòlhn wna
2 pròs tò bèltiwn autòi pròfaìnesthai, deûteron de
kai dià to dòkeín ton pro toútwv chrónou tìn àpra-
gìan kai katáplhèin tòn stratopedon mh para tìn
tòn dunamewv àpodeiliwv, ìlla para tòn tòj
3 pròestwthos euðèseian gëgònêvai. dìo kai tòn mèn
Fábôn ètwnto kai kataemèfwnvo pàntes ós àtol-
ìwv chròwmenon toûs kàrwoûs, ton de Màrkou èpì to-
soûton ëdizv dià tò sýmbebhkòs ùste tòte gëneúthai
4 tò mhðeþote gëgônòs: autokrátora gar kàkeînov
catésthasn, pepeiwmènov tachèws autòn tèlòs èpi-
252
in number, came to succour him. He now regained a little confidence, and sallying from the camp drew up his troops a short distance in front of it and with difficulty averted the impending peril. Minucius, after killing many of the enemy in the engagement at the camp and still more throughout the country, now retired, but with great hopes for the future, and next day, on the Carthaginians evacuating their camp, occupied it himself. For Hannibal, fearful lest the Romans, finding the camp at Geronium deserted at night, should capture his baggage and stores, decided to return and encamp there again. Henceforth the Carthaginians were much more cautious and guarded in foraging, while the Romans on the contrary, foraged with greater confidence and temerity.

103. People in Rome, when an exaggerated account of this success reached the city, were overjoyed, partly because this change for the better relieved their general despondency, and in the next place because they inferred that the former inaction and disheartenment of their army was not the result of any want of courage in the soldiers, but of the excessive caution of the general. All therefore found fault with Fabius, accusing him of not making a bold use of his opportunities, while Marcus's reputation rose so much owing to this event that they took an entirely unprecedented step, investing him like the Dictator with absolute power, in the belief that he would very soon put an end to the
θήσει τοῖς πράγμασι: καὶ δὴ δύο δικτάτορες ἐγενότειν ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτὰς πράξεις: ὁ πρῶτον οὐδὲν ἕπη συνεβεβήκει παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις. τῷ δὲ Μάρκῳ διασαφθείσῃ τῆς τε τοῦ πλῆθους εὐνοίας καὶ τῆς παρὰ τοῦ δῆμου δεδομένης ἀρχῆς αὐτῷ, δυσπλαίσις παρωρμῆθη πρὸς τὸ παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ κατατολμᾶν 6 τῶν πολεμίων. ἦκε δὲ καὶ Φάβιος ἐπὶ τὰς δυνάμεις οὐδὲν ἠλλοιωμένον ὑπὸ τῶν συμβεβηκότων, ἔτι δὲ βεβαιότερον μένων ἔπι τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλήψεως. 7 θεωρῶν δὲ τὸν Μάρκον ἐκπεφυσημένον καὶ πρὸς πάντ' ἀντιφιλονικοῦντα καὶ καθόλου πολὺν ὄντα πρὸς τῷ διακινδυνεύσει, αἰρεσὶν αὐτῷ προύτευε οἰκιαῦτην, ἡ κατὰ μέρος ἀρχειν ἡ διελόμενον τὰς δυνάμεις χρῆσθαι τοῖς σφετέρους στρατοπέδους κατὰ 8 τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν. τοῦ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἀσμένως δεξαμένου τὸν μερισμὸν, διελόμενον τὸ πλῆθος χωρίς ἐστρατοπέδευσαν ἄλληλων, ἀπέχοντες ὡς δώδεκα σταδίων. Ἀνίβασα δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀκούων τῶν ἀλισκομένων αἰχμαλώτων, τὰ δὲ θεωρῶν ἐκ τῶν πραττομένων ἤδει τῇ τε τῶν ἡγεμόνων πρὸς ἄλληλους φιλοτιμίαν καὶ τὴν ὀρμὴν καὶ τὴν φιλοδοξίαν τοῦ 2 Μάρκου. διόπερ οὐ καθ' αὐτοῦ: πρὸς αὐτοῦ δὲ νομίζως εἶναι τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους, ἐγινετο περὶ τὸν Μάρκον, σπουδάζων τὴν τόλμαν ἀφελέσθαι καὶ προκαταλαβεῖν αὐτοῦ τὴν ὀρμὴν. 3 οὔσης δὲ τῶν ὑπεροχῆς μεταξύ τῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ Μάρκου στρατοπεδείας δυναμένης ἐκατέρους βλάπτειν ἐπεβάλετο καταλαβεῖν ταύτην. σαφῶς δὲ γινώσκων ἐκ τοῦ προγεγονότος κατορθώματος ὅτι παρέσται βοηθῶν ἐκ χειρὸς πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἔπι- 4 βολήν, ἐπινοεῖ τι τοιοῦτον. τῶν γὰρ τόπων τῶν περὶ τὸν λόφον ὑπαρχόντων ψιλῶν μὲν, πολλὰς δὲ 254
war. So two Dictators were actually appointed for the same field of action, a thing which had never before happened at Rome. When Minucius was informed of his popularity at home and the office given him by the people's decree, he grew twice as eager to run risks and take some bold action against the enemy. Fabius now returned to the army wholly unchanged by recent circumstances, and adhering even more firmly than before to his original determination. Observing that Minucius was unduly elated and was jealously opposing him in every way and altogether strongly disposed to risk a battle, he offered for his choice, either that he should be in full command on alternate days, or that he should take half the army and use his own legions in any way he thought fit. Minucius having readily agreed to the division of the army, they divided it and encamped apart at a distance of about twelve stades from each other. 104. Hannibal, partly from what he heard from prisoners and partly from what he saw was going on, was aware of the rivalry of the two generals and of Marcus' impulsiveness and ambition. Considering, then, that the present circumstances of the enemy were not against him but in his favour, he turned his attention to Minucius, being anxious to put a stop to his venturesomeness and anticipate his offensive. There was a small eminence between his own camp and that of Minucius capable of being used against either of them, and this he decided to occupy. Well knowing that owing to his previous achievement Minucius would instantly advance to frustrate this project, he devised the following stratagem. The ground round the hill was treeless
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

παντοδαπᾶς ἐχόντων περικλάσεις καὶ κοιλότητας,
εξέπεμψε τῆς νυκτὸς εἰς τὰς ἐπιτηδειοτάτας ὑποβολὰς ἀνὰ διακοσίους καὶ τριακοσίους, πεντακοσίους
μὲν ἵππεῖς, ψιλοὺς δὲ καὶ πεζοὺς τοὺς πάντας εἰς
5 πεντακισχιλίους. ἦνα δὲ μὴ πρὶν κατοπτευθῶσιν
ὑπὸ τῶν εἰς τὰς πρωνομὰς ἐκπορευομένων, ἀμα τῷ
dιαυγάζειν κατελάμβανε τοῖς εὐζώνιοι τὸν λόφον.
6 ὁ δὲ Μάρκος θεωρῶν τὸ γνώμενον, καὶ νομίσας
ἔρμαιὸν εἶναι, παραυτίκα μὲν ἐξαπέστειλε τοὺς ψιλοὺς,
κελεύσας ἀγωνίζεσθαι καὶ διαμάχεσθαι περὶ
7 τοῦ τόπου, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ἱππεῖς. εξῆς δὲ
tοῦτοι κατόπιν αὐτὸς ἦγε συνεχὴ τὰ βαρέα τῶν
ἀπλων, καθὰπερ καὶ πρὸτερον, ἐκάστων ποιούμενος
105 παραπλήσου τὸν χειρισμὸν. ἀρτὶ δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας δια-
φαινοῦσας καὶ πάντων ταῖς τε διανοίασι καὶ τοῖς
ὁμοιοὶ περιεσποσμένῳ περὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ γεωλφῷ
κινδυνεύοντας, ἀνύποπτος ἢν ἢ τῶν ἐνεδρεύοντων
2 ὑποβολῆ. τοὺ δ ’Αννίβου συνεχῶς μὲν ἐπαποστέλ-
λοντος τοῖς ἐν τῷ λόφῳ τοὺς βοηθήσοντας, ἐπομένῳ
dὲ κατὰ πόδας αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῶν ἱππεῶν καὶ τῆς
dυνάμεως, ταχέως συνέβη καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς συμπεσεῖν
3 ἀλλήλους. οὐ γενομένου, καὶ πιεζομένων τῶν Ῥω-
μαίων εὐζώνων ὑπὸ τοῦ πλῆθους τῶν ἱππεῶν, ἀμα
μὲν οὐκοῦ καταφεύγοντες εἰς τὰ βαρέα τῶν ἀπλων
4 θὸρυβὸν ἐποίον, ἀμα δὲ τοῦ συνήματος ἀπο-
dοθέντος τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἐνέδραις, πανταχόθεν ἐπιφαι-
νομένων καὶ προσπιπτόντων τούτων, οὐκέτι περὶ
tοὺς εὐζώνως μόνον, ἀλλὰ περὶ παῖν τὸ στράτευμα
5 μέγας κινδύνος συνειστήκει τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. κατὰ
dὲ τὸν καιρὸν τούτον Φάβιος, θεωρῶν τὸ γνώμενον
καὶ διαγωνιᾶσας μὴ σφαλῶσι τοῖς ὀλοι, ἐξῆγι τῶς
dυνάμεις καὶ κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐβοήθει τοῖς κινδυ-
but had many irregularities and hollows of every description in it, and he sent out at night to the most suitable positions for ambuscade, in bodies of two or three hundred, five hundred horse and about five thousand light-armed and other infantry. In order that they should not be observed in the early morning by the Romans who were going out to forage, he occupied the hill with his light-armed troops as soon as it was daybreak. Minucius, seeing this and thinking it a favourable chance, sent out at once his light infantry with orders to engage the enemy and dispute the position. Afterwards he sent his cavalry too and next followed in person leading his legions in close order, as on the former occasion, operating exactly in the same manner as then. 105. The day was just dawning, and the minds and eyes of all were engrossed in the battle on the hill, so that no one suspected that the ambuscade had been posted. Hannibal kept constantly sending reinforcements to his men on the hill, and when he very shortly followed himself with his cavalry and the rest of his force, the cavalry on both sides soon came into action. Upon this, the Roman light infantry were forced off the field by the numbers of the Carthaginian horse, and, falling back on the legions, threw them into confusion, while at the same time, on the signal being given to those lying in ambush, they appeared from all directions and attacked, upon which not only the Roman light infantry but their whole army found itself in a most perilous position. It was now that Fabius, seeing the state of matters and seriously fearing a total disaster, came up in haste with his own army to
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

6 νεύουσι. ταχὺ δὲ συνεγγίσαντος αὐτοῦ, πάλιν ἀνα-
θαρρήσαντες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι, καίπερ λελυκότες ἦδη τὴν
ὅλην τάξιν, αὖθις ἀθροιζόμενοι περὶ τὸς σημαίας
ἀνεχόρουν καὶ κατέφευγον ὑπὸ τὴν τούτων ἁσφα-
λειαν, πολλοὺς μὲν ἀπολελυκότες τῶν εὑξώνων, ἔτι
δὲ πλείους ἐκ τῶν ταγμάτων καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους
7 ἀνδρὰς. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν καταπλαγέντες
tὴν ἀκεραιότητα καὶ σύνταξιν τῶν παραβεβοθηκό-
tων στρατοπέδων, ἀπέστησαν τοῦ διωγμοῦ καὶ τῆς
8 μάχης. τοῖς μὲν οὖν παρ’ αὐτῶν γενομένοις τὸν
κίνδυνον ἢν ἑναργῆς ὅτι διὰ μὲν τὴν Μάρκου τόλ-
μαν ἀπόλυοτα τὰ ὅλα, διὰ δὲ τὴν εὑλάβειαν τοῦ
9 Φαβίου σέσωσται καὶ πρὸ τοῦ καὶ νῦν· τοῖς δὲ ἐν
τῇ Ῥώμῃ τότ’ ἐγένετο φανερὸν ὡμολογουμένως τι
διαφερεῖ στρατιωτικῆς προπετείας καὶ κενοδοξίας
στρατηγικῆ πρόνοια καὶ λογισμὸς ἐστῶς καὶ νοον-
10 εχῆς. οὐ μὴν ἂλλ’ οἱ μὲν Ῥωμαῖοι, διδαχθέντες ὑπὸ
tῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ βαλόμενοι χάρακα πάλιν ἔνα
πάντες, ἐστρατοπέδευσαν ὡμόσε, καὶ λοιπὸν ἢδη
Φαβίῳ προσέχον τὸν νοῦν καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ τούτου
11 παραγγελλομένοις. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὸν μὲν με-
ταξὺ τόπον τοῦ βουνοῦ καὶ τῆς σφετέρας παρεμβο-
λῆς διετάφρευσαν, περὶ δὲ τῆς κορυφῆς τοῦ κατα-
ληφθέντος λόφου χάρακα περιβαλόντες καὶ φυλακὴν
ἐπιστήμαντες λοιπὸν ἢδη πρὸς τὴν χειμασίαν ἁσφα-
λῶς ἠτομαζόμενο.

106 Τῆς δὲ τῶν ἀρχαιεσίων ὃρας συνεγγυζούσης,
eἰλοντο στρατηγοῦσι οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι Λεύκων Αἰμίλιον
καὶ Γάιον Τερέντιον. ὃν κατασταθέντων οἱ μὲν
2 δικτάτορες ἀπέθεντο τὴν ἄρχην, οἱ δὲ προύπαρχον-
tες ὑπατοῖ, Γνάιος Σερούλιος καὶ Μάρκος Ῥηγοῦ-
λος ο μετὰ τὴν Φλαμνίου τελευτὴν ἐπικατασταθεῖς,
assist. On his approach the Romans again plucked up courage, although they had now entirely broken their ranks, and collecting round the standards retreated and took refuge under cover of Fabius' force after losing many of their light-armed troops, but still more of the legionaries and the very best men among them. Hannibal, being afraid of the legions, which, quite fresh and in admirable order, had come to the help of their comrades, abandoned the pursuit and brought the battle to a close. To those who were actually present at the action it was evident that all was lost by the rashness of Minucius, and that now, as on previous occasions, all had been saved by the caution of Fabius. And to those in Rome it became indisputably clear how widely the foresight, good sense, and calm calculation of a general differ from the recklessness and bravado of a mere soldier. The Romans, however, had received a practical lesson, and again fortifying a single camp, joined their forces in it, and in future paid due attention to Fabius and his orders. The Carthaginians dug a trench between the hill and their own camp, and erecting a stockade round the hill, which was now in their hands, and placing a garrison on it, made their preparations henceforth for the winter undisturbed.

106. The time for the consular elections was now 216 B.C. approaching, and the Romans elected Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varro. On their appointment, the Dictators laid down their office, and the Consuls of the previous year, Gnaeus Servilius and Marcus Regulus—who had been appointed after the death of Flaminius—were

259
tòte προχειρισθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἀντιστράτηγοι, καὶ παραλαβόντες τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἑπαύθροις ἕξουσίαν, ἑχείριζον κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γνώμην 3 τὰ κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον, βουλευσάμενοι μετὰ τῆς συγκλήτου, τὸ μὲν ἐλλείπον πλῆθος ἐτὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν πρὸς τὴν ὅλην ἐπιβο- 4 λὴν παραχρήμα καταγράψαντες ἔξαπεστελαν, τοῖς 5 δὲ περὶ τὸν Γνάιον διεσάφησαν ὁλοσχερή μὲν κῶν- δυνον κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον συνίστασθαι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκροβολίσμοις ὡς ἐνεργοτάτους ποιεῖ- σθαι καὶ συνεχεστάτους χάριν τοῖς γυμνάζεσιν καὶ παρασκευάζεσιν εὐθαρσεῖς τοὺς νέους πρὸς τοὺς ὅλο- 5 σχερεῖς ἀγώνας, τῷ καὶ τὰ πρότερον αὐτοῖς συμ- πτώματα δοκεῖν οὐχ ἥκιστα γεγονέναι διὰ τὸ νεο- συλλόγους καὶ τελέως ἀνασκήτους κεχρήσθαι τοῖς 6 στρατοπέδοις. αὐτοὶ δὲ Λεύκιοι μὲν Ποστούμιον, ἐξαπέλεκν ὡντα στρατηγῶν, στρατόπεδον δόντες εἰς Γαλατίαν ἐξαπέστελαν, βουλήμενοι ποιεῖν ἀντι- περίστασμα τοῖς Κελτοῖς τοῖς μετ’ Ἀννίβου στρα- 7 τευμένοις. πρόνοιας δ’ ἐποίησαντο καὶ τῆς ἀνα- κομιδῆς τοῦ παραχειμάζοντος ἐν τῷ Διλυβαῖῳ στό- λου, διεπέμβαντο δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ στρατηγοῖς 8 πάντα τὰ κατεπείγοντα πρὸς τὴν χρείαν. οὕτοι μὲν ὀυν περὶ ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἐγίνοντο παρα- 9 σκευᾶς ἐπιμελῆς. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Γνάιον, κομι- σάμενοι τὰς παρὰ τῶν ὑπάτων ἐντολᾶς, πάντα τὰ 10 κατὰ μέρος ἑχείριζον κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνων γνώμην. διὸ καὶ τὸ πλεῖον γράφειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν παρήσομεν. ὁλο- σχερῆς μὲν γὰρ ἡ μνήμης ἄξιον ἀπλῶς οὐδὲν ἐπρά- χθη διὰ τὴν ἐντολὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν τούτῳ καιρῷ περί- 11 στασιν, ἀκροβολίσμοι δὲ μόνον καὶ συμπλοκαὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐγίνοντο πλείους, ἐν αἷς εὐδοκίμουν οἱ προ- 260
BOOK III. 106. 2–11

invested with proconsular authority by Aemilius, and taking command in the field directed the operations of their forces as they thought fit. Aemilius after consulting with the Senate at once enrolled the soldiers still wanting to make up the total levy and dispatched them to the front, expressly ordering Servilius on no account to risk a general engagement, but to skirmish vigorously and intermittently so as to train the lads and give them confidence for a general battle; for they thought the chief cause of their late reverses lay in their having employed newly raised and quite untrained levies. The Consuls also gave a legion to the Praetor Lucius Postumius, and sent him to Cisalpine Gaul to create a diversion among those Celts who were serving with Hannibal, they took measures for the return of the fleet that was wintering at Lilybaeum and sent the generals in Spain all the supplies of which they had need. The Consuls and Senate were thus occupied with these and other preparations, and Servilius, on receiving orders from the Consuls, conducted all petty operations as they directed. I shall therefore not make further mention of these, for nothing decisive or noteworthy was done owing to these orders and owing to circumstances, but only numerous skirmishes and minor engagements took place in which the Roman commanders had the
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

εστώτες τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ γὰρ ἀνδρωδῶς καὶ νοον-εχώς ἔδοκον ἔκαστα χειρίζεων.

107 Τὸν μὲν οὖν χειμῶνα καὶ τὴν ἐκρυθὴν ὄραν δι-έμειναν ἀντιστρατοπεδεύοντες ἀλλήλοις. ἦδη δὲ πα-ραδιὸντος τοῦ καρποῦ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐπετείων καρ-πῶν χορηγῶν, ἕκινε τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τούτῳ περὶ τὸ 2 Γερούνιον χάρακος Ἀννίβας. κρίνων δὲ συμφέρειν τὸ κατὰ πάντα προῆδον ἀναγκάσαι μάχεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους, καταλαμβάνει τὴν τῆς Κάννης προσαγο-3 ρευμήν τὸν πόλεως ἀκραν. εἰς γὰρ ταῦτα συν-έβαψε τὸν τε σίτον καὶ τὸς λοίπος χορηγίας ἄθροι-ζεσθαι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐκ τῶν περὶ Καννίων τόπων ἐκ δὲ ταῦτης ἀεὶ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἐπὶ τὸ στρατό-4 πεδον παρακομίζεσθαι. τὴν μὲν οὖν πόλιν ἐτὶ πρό-τερον συνέβανε κατεσκάβθαι τῆς παρασκευῆς δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀκρας τὸτε καταληψίης, οὐ μικρὰν συν-έπεσε ταραχὴν γενέσθαι περὶ τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων δυ-5 νάμεις. οὐ γὰρ μόνον διὰ τὰς χορηγίας ἐσώτερον-στοῦν ἐπὶ τῶ κατελήφθαι τὸν προερμένου τό-που, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὴν πέριξ εὐφυῶς κεὶ-6 σθαι χώραν. πέμπτης οὖν εἰς τὴν Ἀρμηνίαν συν-εχώς ἐπυνθάνοντο τί δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἐὰν ἐγγύσωσι τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐ δυνητόμενοι φυγομαχεῖν, τῆς μὲν χώρας καταφθειρομένης, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων 7 πάντων μετεώρων ὅντων ταῖς διανοίασι. οἱ δὲ ἐβου-λεύσαντο μάχεσθαι καὶ συμβάλλειν τοῖς πολεμίοις. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πρὸς τὸν Γνάων ἐπισχεῖν ἐτί διεσά-8 φησαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ τοὺς ὑπάτους ἐξαπέστελλον. συν-έβανε δὲ πάντας εἰς τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς τούτον ἀπερείδεσθαι τὰς πλείστας ἐπίδας διὰ τε τὴν ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ βίου καλοκαγαθίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ μικρὸς πρότερον χρόνος ἀνδρωδῶς ἀμα καὶ 262
advantage, their conduct of the campaign being generally thought to have been both courageous and skilful.

107. All through the winter and spring the two armies remained encamped opposite each other, and it was not until the season was advanced enough for them to get supplies from the years' crops that Hannibal moved his forces out of the camp near Geronium. Judging that it was in his interest to compel the enemy to fight by every means in his power, he seized on the citadel of a town called Cannae, in which the Romans had collected the corn and other supplies from the country round Canusium, conveying hence to their camp from time to time enough to supply their wants. The city itself had previously been razed, but the capture now of the citadel and stores caused no little commotion in the Roman army; for they were distressed at the fall of the place not only owing to the loss of their supplies, but because it commanded the surrounding district. They continued, therefore, to send constant messages to Rome asking how they should act, stating that if they approached the enemy they would not be able to escape a battle, as the country was being pillaged and the temper of all the allies was uncertain. The Senate decided to give the enemy battle, but they ordered Servilius to wait, and dispatched the Consuls to the front. It was to Aemilius that the eyes of all were directed; and they placed their chiefest hope in him, owing to his general high character, and because a few years
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

συμφερόντως δοκεῖν κεχειρικέναι τὸν πρὸς Ἡλληνικὸς πόλεμον. προέθεντο δὲ στρατόπεδοι ὅκτω διακωδυνεύειν, δό τρότερον οὐδέποτ’ ἐγεγόνει παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις, ἐκάστου τῶν στρατόπεδῶν ἐχοντος ἀνθρώπως εἰς πεντακοσίων χωρίς τῶν συμμάχων. Ῥωμαίοι γὰρ, καθά που καὶ πρότερον εἰρήκαμεν, ἢ οἱ ποτε τέταρα στρατόπεδα προχωρήσαντι τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον> πεζοὺς μὲν λαμβάνει περὶ τετρακισιλίως, ἐπὶ δὲ τὶς ὀλοσχε- ρεστέρα προβαίνεται χρεία, τοὺς μὲν πεζοὺς ἐν ἐκάστω στρατόπεδῳ ποιοῦσι περὶ πεντακοσίων, τοὺς δὲ ἵππεις τριακισίως. τῶν δὲ συμμάχων τὸ μὲν τῶν πεζῶν πλῆθος πάρισσον ποιοῦσι τοῖς Ῥωμαϊκοῖς στρατόπεδοις, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἵππων ὡς ἔπιπαν τριπλα- σιον. τούτων δὲ τοὺς ἡμίσεις τῶν συμμάχων καὶ τὰ δύο στρατόπεδα δόντες ἐκατέρως τῶν ύπάτων ἐξαποστέλλουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις. καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀγώνας δι’ ἐνὸς ύπάτου καὶ δύο στρατόπεδων καὶ τοῦ προειρήμενον πλῆθους τῶν συμ- μάχων κρίνουσι, σπανίως δὲ πᾶσι πρὸς ἐνα καρδόν καὶ πρὸς ἐνα χρῶνται κίνδυνον. τότε γε μὴν οὕτως ἐκπλαγεῖσθαι ἦσαν καὶ κατάφοροι τὸ μέλλον ὡς οὐ μόνον τέταρσιν, ἀλλ’ ὅκτω στρατόπεδοις Ῥωμαϊκοῖς ὅμως προήρητο διακωδυνεύειν.

108 Διὸ καὶ παρακαλέσαντες τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀιμίλιον, καὶ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν θέντες τὸ μέγεθος τῶν εἰς ἐκάστου τὸ μέρος ἀποβησμένων ἐκ τῆς μάχης, ἐξαπέστειλαν, ἐνειλαμένου σὺν καρφὶ κρίνειν τὰ ἰδα γενναίως καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἀξίως. οἱ καὶ παρα- γεγονόμενοι πρὸς τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ συναθροίσαντες τὰ πλήθη τῆς τε τῆς συγκλήτου γνώμην διεσά- φησαν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ παρεκάλουν τὰ πρέποντα
previously he was thought to have conducted the Illyrian war with courage and advantage to the state. They decided to bring eight legions into the field, a thing which had never been done before by the Romans, each legion consisting of about five thousand men apart from the allies. For, as I previously explained, they invariably employ four legions, each numbering about four thousand foot and two hundred horse, but on occasions of exceptional gravity they raise the number of foot in each legion to five thousand and that of the cavalry to three hundred. They make the number of the allied infantry equal to that of the Roman legions, but, as a rule, the allied cavalry are three times as numerous as the Roman. They give each of the Consuls half of the allies and two legions when they dispatch them to the field, and most of their wars are decided by one Consul with two legions and the above number of allies, it being only on rare occasions that they employ all their forces at one time and in one battle. But now they were so alarmed and anxious as to the future that they decided to bring into action not four legions but eight.

108. Therefore after exhorting Aemilius and putting before his eyes the magnitude of the results which in either event the battle would bring about, they dispatched him with orders to decide the issue, when the time came, bravely and worthily of his country. On reaching the army he assembled the soldiers and conveyed to them the decision of the Senate, addressing them in a manner befitting the
τοὺς παρεστώσι καιροῖς, ἐξ αὐτοπαθείας τοῦ Δευ-
3 κίου διατιθεμένου τοὺς λόγους. ἦν δὲ τὰ πλείστα
τῶν λεγομένων πρὸς τούτον τείνοντα τὸν νοῦν, τὸν
ὑπὲρ τῶν νεωτί γεγονότων συμπτωμάτων· ὥδε
γὰρ καὶ τὴδε που συνέβανε διατετράφθαι καὶ
4 προσδείσθαι παραινέσεως τοὺς πολλοὺς. διόπερ
ἐπειράτο συνιστάνειν ὦτι τῶν μὲν ἐν ταῖς προγεγε-
νημέναις μάχαις ἐλαττωμάτων οὐχ ἐν οὐδὲ δεύτε-
ρον, καὶ πλεῖώ δὲ ἂν εὐρόι τις αὕτη, δι’ ἂν τοιοῦ-
5 των αὐτῶν ἐξέβη τὸ τέλος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν νῦν καιρῶν
οὐδεμία λειπέται πρόφασις, ἔαν ἀνδρεὺς ὤσι, τοῦ
6 μὴ νικῶν τοὺς ἔχθρους. τότε μὲν γὰρ οὔτε τοὺς
ἲγεμόνας ἀμφοτέρους οὐδέποτε συνηγνώσθαι τοῖς
στρατοπέδους, οὔτε ταῖς δυνάμεσι κεχρῆσθαι γεγυ-
μνασμέναις, ἀλλὰ νεοσυλλόγοις καθότως παντὸς
7 δεινοῦ· τὸ τε μέγιστον, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀγνοεῖσθαι
παρ’ αὐτοῖς πρότερον τὰ κατὰ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους
ὡστε σχεδὸν μηδ’ ἐγερκότας τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς
παρατάττεσθαι καὶ συγκαταβαίνειν εἰς τοὺς ὀλο-
8 σχερεῖς κυνόνους. οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν Τρεβίαν
ποταμὸν σφαλέντες, ἐκ Σικελίας τῇ προτεραίᾳ
παραγεγενηθέντες, ἀμα τῷ φωτὶ τῇ κατὰ πόδας
9 ἡμέρα παρατάξαντο. τοῖς δὲ κατὰ Τυρρηνίαν
ἀγωνισμένοις οὐχ οἶνον πρότερον, ἀλλ’ ὦνδ’ ἐν
αὐτῇ τῇ μάχῃ συνιδεῖν ἐξεγένετο τοὺς πολεμίους
10 διὰ τὸ περὶ τὸν άέρα γενόμενον σύμπτωμα. νῦν γε
μὴν πάντα τάναντα τοῖς προερημένοις ὑπάρχει.
109 πρῶτον γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἀμφότεροι πάρεσμεν οὐ μόνον
αὐτοὶ κοινωνῆσοντες ὑμῖν τῶν κυνόνων, ἀλλὰ
καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ πρότερον ἐτοὺς ἀρχοντὰς ἐτοί-
μους παρασκευάκαμεν πρὸς τὸ μένειν καὶ μετέχειν
2 τῶν αὐτῶν ἀγώνων. ἡμεῖς γε μὴν οὐ μόνον ἐω-
266
occasion and in words that evidently sprang from his heart. The greater part of his speech was devoted to accounting for the former reverses, for it was particularly the impression created by these that made the men disheartened and in need of encouragement. He attempted therefore to impress upon them, that while not one or two but many causes could be found owing to which the previous battles resulted in defeat, there was at present, if they behaved like men, no reason at all left why they should not be victorious. "For then," he said, "the two Consuls never gave battle with their united armies, nor were the forces they disposed of well trained, but raw levies who had never looked danger in the face. But the most important consideration of all is that our troops were then so ignorant of the enemy that one might almost say they ventured on decisive battles with them without ever having set eyes on them. Those who were worsted at the Trebia had only arrived from Sicily the day before," and at daybreak on the following morning went into action, while those who fought in Etruria not only had not seen their enemies before, but could not even see them in the battle itself owing to the condition of the atmosphere. But now all the circumstances are precisely the opposite of what they were then. 109. For in the first place we, the Consuls, are both present, and are not only about to share your perils ourselves but have given you also the Consuls of last year to stand by you and participate in the struggle. And you your-

\* This is not consistent with the statement in Chapter 69.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ράκατε τούς καθοπλισμούς, τὰς τάξεις, τὰ πλήθη τῶν πολεμίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαμαχόμενοι μόνον οὐ καθ’ ἐκάστην ἦμέραν δεύτερον ἕνιατον ἦδη διατε-3 λείτε. πάντων οὖν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐναντίως ἔχον- των ταῖς προγεγενημέναις μάχαις εἰκός καὶ τὸ τέλος 4 ἐναντίον ἐκβήσεσθαι τοῦ νῦν ἁγώνος. καὶ γὰρ ἄτο-πον, μᾶλλον δ’ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀδύνατον, ἐν μὲν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀκροβολισμοῖς ἰσούς πρὸς ἰσούς συμ- πίπτοντας τὸ πλείον ἐπικρατεῖν, ὡμοῦ δὲ πάντας παραταξάμενοι, πλείους ὄντας ἡ διπλασίας τῶν 5 ύπεναντίων, ἐλαττωθῆναι. διόπερ, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάν- των ὑμῶν παρεσκευασμένων πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν, ἐνός προσδεῖται τὰ πράγματα, τῆς ύμετέρας βουλῆσεως καὶ προθυμίας, ύπερ ἦς οὐδὲ παρακαλεῖσθαι πλείω 6 πρέπειν ὑμῖν ὑπολαμβάνως. τοῖς μὲν γε μισθοῦ παρὰ τοις στρατευμένοις ἡ τοῖς κατὰ συμμαχίαν ύπερ τῶν πέλας μέλλουσι κινδυνεύειν, οἷς κατ’ αὐ- τὸν τὸν ἁγώνα καιρός ἐστι δεινότατος, τὰ δ’ ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαίνων βραχεῖαν ἔχει διαφοράν, ἀναγκαῖος 7 ὁ τῆς παρακλήσεως γίνεται τρόπος. οἷς δέ, καθά- περ ὑμῖν νῦν, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἐτέρων, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ πατρίδος καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ τέκνων ὁ κίν- δυνος συνέστηκε, καὶ πολλαπλασιάζει τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνοντα τὴν διαφοράν ἔχει τῶν ἑνεστῶτων ἀεὶ κινδύνων, ὑπομνήσεως μόνον, παρακλήσεως δ’ οὐ 8 προσδεῖ. τὶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄν βουλοιτο μάλιστα μὲν νικῶν ἁγωνιζόμενος, εἰ δὲ μὴ τοὐτ’ εἴῃ δυνατόν, τεθνάναι πρὸςθεν μαχόμενος ἡ ἀνίκητος ἐπιδείξει τὴν τῶν 9 προειρημένων ὑβριν καὶ καταθοράν; διόπερ, ὦ ἄνδρες, χωρὶς τῶν ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ λεγομένων, αὐτῷ λαμ-268
BOOK III. 109. 2–9

selves have not only seen how the enemy are armed, how they dispose their forces, and what is their strength, but for two years now you have been fighting with them nearly every day. As, therefore, all the conditions are now the reverse of those in the battles I spoke of, we may anticipate that the result of the present battle will likewise be the opposite. For it would be a strange or rather indeed impossible thing, that after meeting your enemies on equal terms in so many separate skirmishes and in most cases being victorious, now when you confront them with your united forces and outnumber them by more than two to one you should be beaten. Therefore, my men, every measure having been taken to secure victory for you, one thing alone is wanting, your own zeal and resolution, and as to this it is not, I think, fitting that I should exhort you further. For those who in some countries serve for hire or for those who are about to fight for their neighbours by the terms of an alliance, the moment of greatest peril is during the battle itself, but the result makes little difference to them, and in such a case exhortation is necessary. But those who like you are about to fight not for others, but for yourselves, your country, and your wives and children, and for whom the results that will ensue are of vastly more importance than the present peril, require not to be exhorted to do their duty but only to be reminded of it. For what man is there who would not wish before all things to conquer in the struggle, or if this be not possible, to die fighting rather than witness the outrage and destruction of all that is dearest to him? Therefore, my men, even without these words of mine, fix your
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

βάνοντες πρὸ ὧν ὕθημα τὴν εἶκ τοῦ λείπεσθαι καὶ τοῦ νικᾶν διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ συνεξακολουθοῦντα τούτοις, οὕτως ἠμαζόμην εἰρατήσεσθαι πρὸς τὴν μάχην ὡς τῆς πατρίδος οὐ κινδυνεύοντος νῦν αὐτοῖς τοῖς 10 στρατοπέδοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὅλοις. τῇ γὰρ ἔτει προσθείσαι τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, εἰναὶ ἀλλοι πως τὰ παρόντα κριθῇ, 11 περιγενήσεται τῶν ἐχθρῶν, οὐκ ἔχει. πᾶσαν γὰρ τὴν αὐτῆς προθυμίαν καὶ δύναμιν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀπῆρεσται, καὶ πᾶσας τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχει τῆς σωτηρίας ἐν ὑμῖν. 12 ὅπερ ὑμεῖς αὐτὴν μὴ διαψεύσθητε νῦν, ἀλλ' ἀπόδοτε μὲν τῇ πατρίδι τὰς ἀρμοζοῦσας χάριτας, φανερών δὲ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ποιήσατε διότι καὶ τὰ πρότερον ἐλαττώματα γέγονεν οὐ διὰ τὸ 'Ῥωμαῖοι χεῖρος ἀνδρας εἶναι Καρχηδονίων, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀπειρίαν τῶν τότε μαχομένων καὶ διὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν καρφῶν περιστά- 13 σεις. τότε μὲν οὖν ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα παρακαλέσας ὁ Λεύκιος διαφήκε τοὺς πολλοὺς.

110 Τῇ δ' ἐπαύριον ἀναζεύζαντες ἦγον τὴν δύναμιν οὕτως πολεμίων ἢκον στρατοπέδευεν. δευτε- ραίοι δ' ἐπιβάλοντες παρενέβαλον, περὶ πεντήκοντα 2 σταδίους ἀποχώντες τῶν πολεμίων. οἷς οὖν Λεύκ- κιος, συνθεσάμενος ἐπιπέδους καὶ χιλιῶν ὅντας τοὺς περίξ τόπους, οὐκ ἔφη δεῖν συμβάλλειν ἱππο- κρατοῦντων τῶν πολεμίων, ἀλλ' ἐπιπάσχαν καὶ προάγει μᾶλλον εἰς τόπους τοιούτους ἐν οἷς τὸ πλέον ἔσται διὰ τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων ὡς μάχη. 3 τοῖς δὲ Γαίων διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐναντίας ὑπάρχοντος γνώμης, ἢν ἀμφισβήτησις καὶ δυσχρη- στία περὶ τούς ἡγεμόνας, δὲ πάντων ἔστι σφαλερῶ 4 τατον. τῆς δ' ἡγεμονίας τῷ Γαίῳ καθηκούσης εἰς τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἡμέραν διὰ τὸ παρὰ μίαν ἐκ τῶν θει- σμῶν μεταλαμβάνειν τὴν ἀρχήν τοὺς ὑπάτους, ἀνα- 270
eyes on the difference between defeat and victory and on all that must follow upon either, and enter on this battle as if not your country's legions but her existence were at stake. For if the issue of the day be adverse, she has no further resources to overcome her foes; but she has centred all her power and spirit in you, and in you lies her sole hope of safety. Do not cheat her, then, of this hope, but now pay the debt of gratitude you owe to her, and make it clear to all men that our former defeats were not due to the Romans being less brave than the Carthaginians, but to the inexperience of those who fought for us then and to the force of circumstances." Having addressed the troops in these words Aemilius dismissed them.

110. Next day the Consuls broke up their camp and advanced towards the place where they heard that of the enemy was. Coming in view of them on the second day, they encamped at a distance of about five miles from them. Aemilius, seeing that the district round was flat and treeless, was opposed to attacking the enemy there as they were superior in cavalry, his advice being to lure them on by advancing into a country where the battle would be decided rather by the infantry. As Terentius, owing to his inexperience, was of the contrary opinion, difficulties and disputes arose between the generals, one of the most pernicious things possible. Terentius was in command next day—the two Consuls according to the usual practice commanding on alternate days—and he broke up his camp and
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

στρατοπεδεύσας προήγε, βουλόμενος ἐγγίσαι τοῖς πολεμίοις, πολλὰ διαμαρτυρομένου καὶ κωλύοντος ὁ τοῦ Λευκίου. ὁ δὲ ᾿Αντίβας ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς εὐ-ζώνους καὶ τοὺς ἵππεις ἀπήντα, καὶ προσπεσῶν ἔτι κατὰ πορείαν οὖσι παραδόξως συνεπλέκετο, καὶ πο-6 λὺν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐποιεῖτο θόρυβον. οἱ δὲ ῾Ρωμαῖοι ἐν τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ ἐπιφορὰν ἐδέξαντο, προθέμενοι τινὰς τῶν ἐν τοῖς βαρέσι καθοπλισμοῖς· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ἀκούτιστας καὶ τοὺς ἵππεις ἐπαφέντες ἐπροτέ-ρουν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην συμπλοκὴν διὰ τὸ τοῖς μὲν Καρ-χθενίοις μὴν ἐφεδρεύειν ἀξιόλογον, τοῖς δὲ ῾Ρωμαίοις ἀναμεμγμένοις τοὺς εὐζώνους ὁμόσε καὶ-7 δυνεύειν τινὰς σπείρας. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐπιγενομένης νυκτὸς ἐξωρίζθησαν ἀπ᾿ ἀλλήλων, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῖς Καρχθενίοις ἐκβάσης τῆς ἐπιθέσεως. 8 εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαύριον ὁ Λευκίος, οὔτε μάχεσθαι κρίνων οὔτε μὴν ἀπάγειν ἀσφαλῶς τὴν στρατιὰν ἐτὶ δυνάμενος, τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ μέρεσι κατεστρατοπέδευσε 9 παρὰ τὸν Ἀὖφιδον καλούμενον ποταμὸν, δς μόνος διαρρεῖ τὸν ῾Απεννίνον· τοῦτο δ’ ἔστων ὅρος συνεχεῖς, δ’ ἔφερεν πάσας τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ῥύσεις, τὰς μὲν εἰς τὸ Τυρρηνικὸν πέλαγος, τὰς δ’ εἰς τὸν ῾Α-δρίαν· δι’ οὗ ῥέοντα συμβαίνει τὸν Ἀὖφιδον τὰς μὲν πηγὰς ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὸ Τυρρηνικὸν κλίμασι τῆς ῾Ιταλίας, ποιεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν ἐκβολὴν εἰς τὸν ῾Αδρίαν. 10 τῷ δὲ τρίτῳ πέραν, ἀπὸ διαβάσεως πρὸς τὰς ἀνα-τολάς, ἐβάλετο χάρακα, τῆς μὲν ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς περὶ δέκα σταδίους ἀποσχών, τῆς δὲ τῶν ὑπενα-11 τῶν μικρῶν πλεῖων, βουλόμενος διὰ τούτων προ-καθήσασθαι μὲν τῶν ἐκ τῆς πέραν παρεμβολῆς προ-νομεύοντων, ἐπικείσθαι δὲ τοῖς παρὰ τῶν Καρχθε-δονίων.

272
advanced with the object of approaching the enemy in spite of Aemilius's strong protests and efforts to prevent him. Hannibal met him with his light-armed troops and cavalry and surprising him while still on the march disordered the Romans much. They met, however, the first charge by advancing some of their heavy infantry, and afterwards sending forwards also their javelineers and cavalry got the better in the whole engagement, as the Carthaginians had no considerable covering force, while they themselves had some companies of their legions fighting mixed with the light-armed troops. The fall of night now made them draw off from each other, the attack of the Carthaginians not having had the success they hoped. Next day Aemilius, who neither judged it advisable to fight nor could now withdraw the army in safety, encamped with two-thirds of it on the bank of the river Aufidus. This is the only river which traverses the Apennines, the long chain of mountains separating all the Italian streams, those on one side descending to the Tyrrhenian sea and those on the other to the Adriatic. The Aufidus, however, runs right through these mountains, having its source on the side of Italy turned to the Tyrrhenian Sea and falling into the Adriatic. For the remaining portion of his army he fortified a position on the farther side of the river, to the east of the ford, at a distance of about two miles from his own camp and rather more from that of the enemy, intending thus to cover the foraging parties from his main camp across the river and harass those of the Carthaginians.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

111 Ἀννίβας δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν θεωρῶν ὅτι καλεῖ τὰ πράγματα μάχεσθαι καὶ συμβάλλειν τοῖς πολεμίοις, εὐλαβοῦμενὸς δὲ μὴ διατέραται τὸ πλήθος ἓκ τοῦ προγεγονότος ἐλαττώματος, κρίνας προσδείσθησθαι παρακλήσεως τὸν καιρὸν συνήγε τοὺς 2 πολλοὺς. ἀθροισθέντων δὲ, περιβλέψας κελεύσας πάντας εἰς τοὺς πέριξ τόπους, ἔρετο τί μεῖξον εὐ-ξασθαι τοῖς θείοις κατὰ τοὺς παρόντας ἐδύνατο καιρόν, δοθείσης αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίας, τοῦ παρὰ πολὺ τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιποκρατοῦντας εἰς τοιούτοις τόποις 3 διακριθήναι περὶ τῶν ὄλων. πάντων δὲ τὸ ῥήθεν ἐπισημηναμένων διὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν, Τούτου τοι-γαροῦν, ἐφι, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς θείοις ἔχετε χάριν· ἐκείνου γὰρ ἦμιν συγκατασκευάζοντες τὴν νίκην εἰς 4 τοιούτους τόπους ἠχαία τοὺς ἔχθρους· δεύτερον δὲ ἦμιν, ὅτι καὶ μάχεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους συνηγαγκά-σαμεν, οὐ γὰρ ἑτὶ δύνανται τοῦτο διαφυγεῖν, καὶ μάχεσθαι προφανῶς εἰς τοῖς ἡμετέροις προτερήμασι. 5 τὸ δὲ παρακαλεῖν ὦμᾶς νῦν διὰ πλειόνων ἑυθαρ-σείς καὶ προθύμους εἶναι πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον οὐδα- 6 μῶς μοι δοκεῖ καθήκειν. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἀπείρως διέκεισθε τῆς πρὸς Ἐρωμαίους μάχης, ἐδει τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ μεθ᾽ ὑποδειγμάτων ἐγώ πρὸς ὦμᾶς πολ- 7 λοὺς διεχέτων λόγοις. ἵπτε δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνεχέστα τρισὶ μάχαις τιληκυκτεῖν ἐξ ὦμολογεμένου νενικήκατε Ἐρωμαίους, ποιός ἄν ἔτι λόγος ὦμῖν ἵσχυρότερον 8 παραστῇσαι θάρασισ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων; διὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρὸ τοῦ κινδύνων κεκρατήκατε τῆς χώρας καὶ τῶν ἑκ ταύτης ἀγαθῶν κατὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας ἐπαγγε- λίας, ἀφεντούντων ἦμιν ἐν πάσι τοῖς πρὸς ὦμᾶς εἰρημένους· ὅ δὲ νῦν ἄγων ἐνέστηκε περὶ τῶν ἰθ- 9 λεων καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς ἀγαθῶν. οὐ κρατήσαντες 274
BOOK III. 111. 1 - 9

111. Hannibal now seeing that it was imperative for him to give battle and attack the enemy, and careful lest his soldiers might be disheartened by this recent reverse, thought that the occasion demanded some words of exhortation and called a meeting of the men. When they were assembled he bade them all look at the country round, and asked them what greater boon they could in their present circumstances crave from the gods, if they had their choice, than to fight the decisive battle on such ground, greatly superior as they were to the enemy in cavalry. As they could see this for themselves they all applauded and, he continued: "In the first place then thank the gods for this; for it is they who working to aid you to victory have led the enemy on to such ground, and next thank myself for compelling them to fight, a thing they can no longer avoid, and to fight here where the advantages are manifestly ours. I do not think it at all my duty to exhort you at further length to be of good heart and eager for the battle, and this is why. Then, when you had no experience of what a battle with the Romans was, this was necessary, and I often addressed you, giving examples, but now that you have beyond dispute beaten the Romans consecutively in three great battles, what words of mine could confirm your courage more than your own deeds? For by these former battles you have gained possession of the country and all its wealth, even as I promised you, and not a word I spoke but has proved true; and the coming battle will be for the cities and their wealth. Your victory will make
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

κύριοι μὲν ἔσεσθε παραχρῆμα πᾶσης Ἰταλίας, ἀπαλαγέντες δὲ τῶν νῦν πόλων, γενόμενοι συμπάσχος ἐγκρατεῖσι τῆς Ρωμαιῶν εὐδαιμονίας, ἥγεμονες ἁμα καὶ ἰσπόταυ πάντων γενήσεθε διὰ ταύτης τῆς 10 μάχης. διόπερ οὐκέτι λόγων, ἀλλὰ ἔργων ἐστὶν ἡ χρεία. θεῶν γὰρ βουλομένων ὡσον οὔτω βεβαιώσιν 11 σειῶ ὡμὶν πέπεισμαι τὰς ἐπαγγελίας. ταύτα δὲ καὶ τούτους παραπλῆσια διαλεχθεῖσι, προθύμους αὐτῶν ἐπισημαινομένου τοῦ πλῆθους, ἐπαινεσάς καὶ δεξαμενος αὐτῶν τὴν ὀρμὴν ἀφήκε, καὶ παραχρῆμα κατεστρατοπέδευσε, ποιούμενος τὸν χάρακα παρὰ τὴν αὐτὴν πλευρὰν τοῦ ποταμοῦ τῇ μείζων στρατοπεδείᾳ τῶν ὑπεναντίων.

112 Τῇ δὲ ἐχομένη περὶ παρασκευῆν καὶ θεραπείαν παρῆγγειλε γίνεσθαι πᾶσι. τῇ δὲ ἐξῆς παρὰ τῶν ποταμῶν ἐξέτατε τὰ στρατόπεδα, καὶ ἥδης ἤν μᾶ- 2 χεσθαι σπεῦδων τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις. ὁ δὲ Λεύκιος, δυσαρεστούμενος μὲν τοῖς τόποις, ὄρων δὲ ὅτι τα- χέως ἀναγκασθήσονται μεταστρατοπέδευσεν οἱ Καρ- χεόνοι διὰ τὸν πορισμὸν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων, εἶχε τὴν ἡσυχίαν, ἀναλυεῖσθαι ταῖς ἐφεδρείαις τὰς 3 παρεμβολὰς. Ἀνυῖβας δὲ χρόνων ἴκανὸν μείνας, οὐδενός ἀντεξόντος, τὴν μὲν λοιπὴν δύναμιν αἶδος εἰς χάρακα κατέστησε, τοὺς δὲ Νομάδας ἐπαφῆκε τοῖς ὑδρευμένοις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλάττων 4 παρεμβολῆς. τῶν δὲ Νομάδων ἔως πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν χάρακα προσπιττόντων καὶ διακωλύσων τὴν ὑδρείαν, ὁ τε Γάιος ἐτι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τούτως παρωξύνετο, τὰ τε πλήθη πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὀρμὴν εἶχε καὶ δυσχερῶς ἐφερε τὸς ὑπερθέσεις. 5 βαρύτατος γὰρ δὴ πάσην ἀνθρώπων ὁ τοῦ μέλ- λων γίνεται χρόνος: ὅταν δὲ ἀπαξ κριθῇ, ὁ τε ἦν 276
you at once masters of all Italy, and through this one battle you will be freed from your present toil, you will possess yourselves of all the vast wealth of Rome, and will be lords and masters of all men and all things. Therefore no more words are wanted, but deeds; for if it be the will of the gods I am confident that I shall fulfil my promises forthwith.” After he had spoken further to this effect, the army applauded him heartily, whereupon he thanked them and acknowledging their spirit dismissed them, and immediately pitched his camp, placing his entrenchments by the same bank of the river with the larger camp of the enemy.

112. Next day he ordered all his troops to look to their persons and their accoutrements, and on the day following he drew up his army along the river with the evident intention of giving battle as soon as possible. Aemilius was not pleased with the ground, and seeing that the Carthaginians would soon have to shift their camp in order to obtain supplies, kept quiet, after securing his two camps by covering forces. Hannibal, after waiting for some time without anyone coming out to meet him, withdrew again the rest of his army into their intrenchments, but sent out the Numidians to intercept the water-bearers from the lesser Roman camp. When the Numidians came up to the actual palisade of the camp and prevented the men from watering, not only was this a further stimulus to Terentius, but the soldiers displayed great eagerness for battle and ill brooked further delay. For nothing is more trying to men in general than prolonged suspense, but when the issue has once been decided we make
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἐπὶ πάσχειν πάντων τῶν δοκούντων εἰσὶν δεινῶν ὑπομενετέον.

6 Ἐις δὲ τὴν Ῥώμην προσπεπτωκότος ὅτι παραστρατευόντωσιν ἅλληλοι καὶ συμπλοκαὶ γίνονται τῶν προκινδυνεύοντων ἀν ἕκαστην ἡμέραν, ὡρθῇ καὶ

7 περίφοβος ἦν ἡ πόλις, δεδιότων μὲν τῶν πολλῶν τὸ μέλλον διὰ τὸ πολλάκις ἡδη προηττήθηκαί, προορωμένων δὲ καὶ προλαμβανόντων τὰ συμβησόμενα ταῖς

8 ἑννοίαις, ἐὰν σφάλλωνται τοῖς ὀλοις. πάντα δὴ ἦν τὰ παρ᾿ αὐτοῖς λόγῳ πᾶσι τότε διὰ στόματος, στημείων δὲ καὶ τεράτων πᾶν μὲν ἱερόν, πάσα δὴ ἦν ὁικία πλήρης, ἐξ ὧν εὐχαί καὶ θυναί καὶ θεών

9 ἱκετηρίαι καὶ δεήσεις ἐπείχουν τὴν πόλιν. δενο γὰρ ἐν ταῖς περιστάσεσι Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ θεοὺς ἐξηλάσασθαι κάνθρωπος καὶ μηδὲν ἀπρεπῆ μηδ᾿ ἀγεννηνὲς ἐν τοῖς τουούτοις καιροῖς ἰγείσθαι τῶν περὶ ταῦτα συντελομένων.

113 Ὅ δὲ Γάιος ἁμα τῶν παραλαβεῖν τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρα τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἀρτί τῆς κατὰ τόν ἡλιον ἀνατολῆς ἐπιφανομένης, ἐκίνει τὴν δύναμιν ἐς ἐκατέρα ἁμα

2 τῆς παρεμβολῆς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τοῦ μεῖζονος χάρακος διαμεμβάζον τὸν ποταμὸν εὐθέως παρενεβάλε, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ θατέρου συνάπτων τούτως ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθείαν ἐξεταττε, λαμβάνων πᾶσι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν

3 τὴν πρὸς μεσημβρίαν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἱππείς παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος κατέστησε, τοὺς δὲ πεζους συνεχείς τούτως ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς εὐθείας ἐξέτευε, πυκνοτέρας ἡ πρόσθεν τὰς σημαίας καθιστάνων, καὶ ποιῶν πολλαπλάσιον

4 τὸ βάθος ἐν ταῖς σπείραις τοῦ μετώπου. τοὺς δὲ τῶν συμμάχων ἱππείς εἰς τὸ λαιὸν κέρας παρενέβαλε· πάσης δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως προεστησε τοὺς εὐ-
BOOK III. 112. 5 – 113. 4

a shift to endure patiently all that men regard as the depth of misery.

When the news reached Rome that the armies were encamped opposite each other and that engagements between the outposts occurred every day, there was the utmost excitement and fear in the city, as most people dreaded the result owing to their frequent previous reverses, and foresaw and anticipated in imagination the consequences of total defeat. All the oracles that had ever been delivered to them were in men’s mouths, every temple and every house was full of signs and prodigies, so that vows, sacrifices, supplicatory processions and litanies pervaded the town. For in seasons of danger the Romans are much given to propitiating both gods and men, and there is nothing at such times in rites of the kind that they regard as unbecoming or beneath their dignity.

113. Next day it was Terentius’ turn to take the command, and just after sunrise he began to move his forces out of both camps. Crossing the river with those from the larger camp he at once put them in order of battle, drawing up those from the other camp next to them in the same line, the whole army facing south. He stationed the Roman cavalry close to the river on the right wing and the foot next to them in the same line, placing the maniples closer together than was formerly the usage and making the depth of each many times exceed its front. The allied horse he drew up on his left wing, and in front of the whole force at some
ΤΟΙΑΔΙΑΣΚΟΩΝ. ἢσαν δὲ σὺν τοῖς συμμάχοις πεζῶν μὲν εἰς ὁκτώ μυριάδας, ἵππεῖς δὲ μικρῶ
6 πλεούσας τῶν ἔξικοςχιλίων. Ἀνιβάσας δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καρὺν τοὺς μὲν Βαλιαρεῖς καὶ λογχοφόρους
dιαβιβάσας τὸν ποταμὸν προεβάλετο τῆς δυνάμεως, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἔξαγαγὼν ἐκ τοῦ ἱππακοῦς καὶ περ
ραώσας κατὰ διάτοις τῶνυ τὸ βέβηρον ἀντετάτε
7 τετο τοῖς πολεμίοις. ἐπίθει δ᾽ ἐπὶ αὐτὸν μὲν τὸν
ποταμὸν, ἐπὶ τῶν εὐωνύμων, τοὺς Ἰβηρᾶς καὶ Κελτοὺς ἵππεῖς ἀντίοις τοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἵππεῖσι,
συνέχεις δὲ τούτους πεζῶς τοὺς ἡμίσεις τῶν ἐν
toῖς βαρέσι καθοπλισμοῖς Λιβύων, ἐξῆς δὲ τοῖς
eἰρημένοις Ἰβηρᾶς καὶ Κελτούς. παρὰ δὲ τούτους
tὸ λοιπὸν μέρος ἔθηκε τῶν Λιβύων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ
8 δεξιοῦ κέρως ἐπέταξε τοὺς Νομαδικοὺς ἵππεῖς. ἐπει
dὲ πάντ᾽ ἐπὶ μίαν εὐθείαν ἐξέτευσε, μετὰ ταύτα
λαβὼν τὰ μέσα τῶν Ἰβηρῶν καὶ Κελτῶν τάγματα
προῆκε, καὶ τάλλα τούτων ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ λόγον παρ
ίστανε θυγατρία, μηνοείπες ποιῶν τὸ κύρτωμα καὶ
9 λεπτών τὸ τούτων αὐτῶν σχῆμα, βουλόμενος ἐφ
εδρείας μὲν τάξιν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τοὺς Λιβύως αὐτῶν
ἐχειν, προκυδινυέσσαι δὲ τοῖς Ἰβηροῖ καὶ Κελτοῖς.

114 "Ἡν δ᾽ ὁ καθοπλισμὸς τῶν μὲν Λιβύων Ῥωμαῖ-
kός, οὕς πάντας Ἀνιβάσας τοῖς ἐκ τῆς προγεγεν
2 μένης μάχης σκύλοις ἐκλέξας κατακεκοσμήκει· τῶν
d᾽ Ἰβηρῶν καὶ Κελτῶν ὁ μὲν θυρεὸς ἦν παραπλή
3 σιως, τὰ δὲ ἕξις τὴν ἐναντίον ἐχει διάθεσιν· τῆς
μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔλαυν τὸ κέντρον τῆς κταφορᾶς
ἐσχε πρὸς τὸ βλάπτειν, ἡ δὲ Γαλατικὴ μάχαιρα
μὲν ἐχει χρείαν τὴν ἐκ κταφορᾶς, καὶ ταύτην ἔχ
4 ἀποστάσεως. ἐναλλάξ δὲ ταῖς στείραις αὐτῶν
παρατεταγμένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν Κελτῶν γυμνῶν, τῶν
280
distance he placed his light-armed troops. The whole army, including the allies, numbered about eighty thousand foot and rather more than six thousand horse. Hannibal at the same time sent his slingers and pikemen over the river and stationed them in front, and leading the rest of his forces out of camp he crossed the stream in two places and drew them up opposite the enemy. On his left close to the river he placed his Spanish and Celtic horse facing the Roman cavalry, next these half his heavy-armed Africans, then the Spanish and Celtic infantry, and after them the other half of the Africans, and finally, on his right wing, his Numidian horse. After thus drawing up his whole army in a straight line, he took the central companies of the Spaniards and Celts and advanced with them, keeping the rest of them in contact with these companies, but gradually falling off, so as to produce a crescent-shaped formation, the line of the flanking companies growing thinner as it was prolonged, his object being to employ the Africans as a reserve force and to begin the action with the Spaniards and Celts.

114. The Africans were armed in the Roman fashion, Hannibal having equipped them with the choicest of the arms captured in the previous battles. The shields of the Spaniards and Celts were very similar, but their swords were entirely different, those of the Spaniards thrusting with as deadly effect as they cut, but the Gaulish sword being only able to slash and requiring a long sweep to do so. As they were drawn up in alternate companies, the Gauls naked and the Spaniards in short tunics bordered with purple, their national dress, they
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

δ' Ἰβήρων λυνώς περιπορφύροις χιτωνισκοῖς κεκοσμημένοι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, ξενίζουσαν ἁμα καὶ καταπληκτικὴν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὴν πρόσοψιν. 5 ἦν δὲ τὸ μὲν τῶν ἐπικών πλῆθος τὸ σύμπαν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις εἰς μυρίους, τὸ δὲ τῶν πεζῶν οὐ πολὺ πλείους τετρακισμυρίων σὺν τοῖς Κελτοῖς. 6 εἴχε δὲ τὸ μὲν δεξίον τῶν Ῥωμαίων Λιμίλος, τὸ δ' εὐώνυμον Γάιος, τὰ δὲ μέσα Μάρκος καὶ Γνάους 7 οἱ τῶν πρῶτον ἔτει στρατηγοῦντες. τῶν δὲ Καρ-χηδονίων τὸ μὲν εὐώνυμον Ἀσδρούβας εἴχε, τὸ δὲ δεξίον ὁ Ἀννωμ. ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς μέσους αὐτὸς ἦν ἀννίβας, ἔχων μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ Μάγωνα τὸν ἄδελφον. βλε-πούσης δὲ τῆς μὲν τῶν Ῥωμαίων τάξεως πρὸς με-σημβριάν, ὡς ἐπάνω προεῖπτα, τῆς δὲ τῶν Καρχη-δονίων πρὸς τὰς ἄρκτους, ἑκατέρους ἀβλαβῆ συν-έβαινε γίνεσθαι τὴν κατὰ τὸν ἠμὸν ἀνατολήν. 8

115 Γενομένης δὲ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῆς πρώτης ἐκ τῶν προτεταγμένων, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν τῶν εὐξώνων 2 ἐπ' ἴσον ἦν ὁ κίνδυνος, ἁμα δὲ τῶν Ιβηρας καὶ Κελτοὺς ἐπιεῖς ἀπὸ τῶν εὐωνυμῶν πελάσαι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἐποίουν ὦτοι μάχην ἀληθῶν καὶ 3 βαρβαρῆν. οὐ γὰρ ἦν κατὰ νόμους ἐξ ἀναστροφῆς καὶ μεταβολῆς ὁ κίνδυνος, ἀλλ' εἰσαπαξ συμπεσόν- τες ἐμάχοντο συμπλεκόμενοι κατ' ἄνδρα, παρακατα- 4 βαίνοντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιπών. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐκράτησαν οἱ παρὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀπέκτειναν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ, πάντων ἐκθύμως καὶ γενναίως διαγωνιζομένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἠλαύνων παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν φονεύοντες καὶ προσφέροντες τὰς χείρας ἀπαραιτήτως, τότε δὴ τὰ πεζικὰ στρατόπεδα διαδεξάμενα τοὺς εὐξώνουσι συν- 5 ἐπεσεν ἀλλήλοις. ἐπὶ βραχὺ μὲν οὖν τῶν Ἰβήρων 282
BOOK III. 114. 4 – 115. 5

presented a strange and impressive appearance. The Carthaginian cavalry numbered about ten thousand, and their infantry, including the Celts, did not much exceed forty thousand. The Roman right wing was under the command of Aemilius, the left under that of Terentius, and the centre under the Consuls of the previous year, Marcus Atilius and Gnaeus Servilius. Hasdrubal commanded the Carthaginian left, Hanno the right, and Hannibal himself with his brother Mago the centre. Since the Roman army, as I said, faced south and the Carthaginians north, they were neither of them inconvenienced by the rising sun.

115. The advanced guards were the first to come into action, and at first when only the light infantry were engaged neither side had the advantage; but when the Spanish and Celtic horse on the left wing came into collision with the Roman cavalry, the struggle that ensued was truly barbaric; for there were none of the normal wheeling evolutions, but having once met they dismounted and fought man to man. The Carthaginians finally got the upper hand, killed most of the enemy in the mélée, all the Romans fighting with desperate bravery, and began to drive the rest along the river, cutting them down mercilessly, and it was now that the heavy infantry on each side took the place of the light-armed troops and met. For a time the Spaniards
ΤΑΣ ἩΣΤΙΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΡΩΜΑΙΟΥ

καὶ τῶν Κελτῶν ἔμενον αἱ τάξεις καὶ διεμάχοντο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις γενναίως. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα θηρεῖ τὸ βάρει θλιβόμενοι κλίνοντες ὑπεχώρουν εἰς τοῦπόσιον, λύ-6 σαντες τὸν μηνίσκον. αἱ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στείραι κατὰ τὴν ἐκθεμίαν ἐπόμεναι τούσιν διέκοψαν θα- δίως τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων τάξιν, ἀτε δὴ τῶν μὲν Κελτῶν ἐπὶ λεπτὸν ἐκτεταγμένων, αὐτοὶ δὲ πεπυ-κνωκότες ἀπὸ τῶν κεράτων ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα καὶ τὸν 7 κινδυνεύοντα τόπον· οὐ γὰρ ἄμα συνέβαινε τὰ κέ- ρατα καὶ τὰ μέσα συμπίπτεν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτα τὰ μέσα, διὰ τὸ τοὺς Κελτοὺς ἐν μνημονείᾳ συχματὶ τεταγ- μένους πολὺ προπεπτωκέναι τῶν κεράτων, ἀτε τοῦ 8 μηνίσκου τὸ κύρωμα πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἔχοντος. πλὴν ἐπόμενοι γε τοῦτος οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ συντρέ- χοντες ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα καὶ τὸν εἰκοντα τόπον τῶν πο- λεμίων οὔτως ἐπὶ πολὺ προέπεσον ὡστ’ ἔξ ἐκατέρου τοῦ μέρους κατὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων ἔπισφαιρες τοὺς Λίβυνας αὐτῶν γενέσθαι τοὺς ἐν τοῖς βαρέσι 9 καθόπλασμοι· ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος κλίναντες ἐπὶ ἀσπίδα καὶ τὴν ἐμβολὴν ἐκ δόρατος ποιούμενοι παράταντο παρὰ πλευράν τοῖς πολε- 10 μίοις, οἱ δ’ ἀπὸ τῶν εὐωνύμων ἐπὶ δόρυ ποιοῦ- μενοι τὴν κλίσιν ἐξ ἀσπίδος ἐσπαρενεβαλλον, αὐ- τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος ὦ δέσον ἃ ποιεῖν ὑποδεικνύτο. 11 ἔξ ὀς συνέβη κατὰ τὴν Ἀνιβῆν πρόνοιαν μέσους ἀποληφθήναι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ὑπὸ τῶν Λιβύων κατὰ 12 τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς παράπτωσιν. οὕτως μὲν οὐν ὠκεῖτι φαλαγγηδὸν, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ σπεί- ρας στρεφόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων προσ- πεπτωκότας ἐποιοῦντο τὴν μάχην.

116 Δεύκιος δὲ, καίπερ ὥν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος καὶ μετασχῶν ἐπὶ τι τοῦ τῶν ἔπεσων
and Celts kept their ranks and struggled bravely with the Romans, but soon, borne down by the weight of the legions, they gave way and fell back, breaking up the crescent. The Roman maniples, pursuing them furiously, easily penetrated the enemy’s front, since the Celts were deployed in a thin line while they themselves had crowded up from the wings to the centre where the fighting was going on. For the centres and wings did not come into action simultaneously, but the centres first, as the Celts were drawn up in a crescent and a long way in advance of their wings, the convex face of the crescent being turned towards the enemy. The Romans, however, following up the Celts and pressing on to the centre and that part of the enemy’s line which was giving way, progressed so far that they now had the heavy-armed Africans on both of their flanks. Hereupon the Africans on the right wing facing to the left and then beginning from the right charged upon the enemy’s flank, while those on the left faced to the right and dressing by the left, did the same, the situation itself indicating to them how to act. The consequence was that, as Hannibal had designed, the Romans, straying too far in pursuit of the Celts, were caught between the two divisions of the enemy, and they now no longer kept their compact formation but turned singly or in companies to deal with the enemy who was falling on their flanks.

116. Aemilius, though he had been on the right wing from the outset and had taken part in the
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

2 ἀγώνος, ὅμως ἔτι τὸτε διεσώζετο. βουλόμενος δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν παράκλησιν λόγους ἀκολούθως ἔπι αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι τῶν ἔργων, καὶ θεωρῶν τὸ συνέχον τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἁγώνα κρίσεως ἐν τοῖς πεζικοῖς
3 στρατοπέδων κείμενον, παρισπεύον ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα τῆς ὅλης παρατάξεως ἀμα μὲν αὐτὸς συνεπλέκετο καὶ προσέφερε τὰς χεῖρας τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, ἀμα δὲ παρεκάλει καὶ παρώξυνε τοὺς παρ’ αὐτοῦ στρατιώ-
4 τας. τὸ δὲ παραπλήσιον Ἀννίβας ἐπολείπει καὶ γὰρ ὁὔτος εἶ ἀρχής ἐπὶ τούτους τοῖς μέρεσι ἐπέστη τῆς δυνάμεως.
5 Οἱ δὲ Νομάδες ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος προσπίπτον-
6 τε τοίς ὑπεναντίοις ἐπεύθυνο τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν εὐωνύμων
tεταγμένοις μέγα μὲν οὔτ’ ἐποίουν οὐδὲν οὔτ’
ἐπασχον διὰ τὴν ἰδιότητα τῆς μάχης, ἀπράκτους
gε μὴν τοὺς πολεμίους παρεσκεύαζον, περισσῶντε
καὶ πανταχόθεν προσπίπτοντες. ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ περὶ τὸν
Ἀσδρούβαν, ἀποκτείναντες τοὺς περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν
ἐπεῖς πλην παντελῶς ὁλίγων, παρεβοήθησαν ἀπὸ
tῶν εὐωνύμων τοῖς Νομάσι, τότε προϊδόμενοι τὴν
ἐφοδον αὐτῶν οἱ σύμμαχοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπείς,
7 ἔκκλιναντες ἀπεχώρουν. ἐν δὲ καυρῷ πραγματικῶ
δοκεῖ ποιῆσαι καὶ φρόνιμον ἔργον Ἀσδρούβας. θεω-
ρῶν γὰρ τοὺς Νομάδας τῷ τε πλήθει πολλοῖς ὄντας
καὶ πρακτικωτάτους καὶ φοβερώτατος τοῖς ἀπαξ
ἔγκλιναν, τοὺς μὲν φεύγοντας παρέδωκε τοῖς Νο-
μάσι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν πεζῶν μάχην ἤγειτο, σπεύ-
8 δὼν παραβοήθησαι τοῖς Λίβυσι. προσπεσὼν δὲ τοῖς
Ῥωμαϊκοῖς στρατοπέδωις κατὰ νώτον, καὶ ποιούμε-
νος ἐκ διαδοχῆς ταῖς ἱλαι ἐμβολᾶς ἀμα κατὰ πολ-
λοῦς τόπους, ἐπέρρωσε μὲν τοὺς Λίβυας, ἐταπεί-
νωσε δὲ καὶ κατέπληξε ταῖς ψυχαῖς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους.
cavalry action, was still safe and sound; but wishing
to act up to what he had said in his address to the
troops, and to be present himself at the fighting,
and seeing that the decision of the battle lay mainly
with the legions, he rode along to the centre of the
whole line, where he not only threw himself per-
sonally into the combat and exchanged blows with
the enemy but kept cheering on and exhorting his
men. Hannibal, who had been in this part of the
field since the commencement of the battle, did
likewise.

The Numidians meanwhile on the right wing,
attacking the cavalry opposite them on the Roman
left, neither gained any great advantage nor suffered
any serious loss owing to their peculiar mode of
fighting, but they kept the enemy’s cavalry out of
action by drawing them off and attacking them
from all sides at once. Hasdrubal, having by this
time cut up very nearly all the enemy’s cavalry by
the river, came up from the left to help the Numi-
dians, and now the Roman allied horse, seeing that
they were going to be charged by him, broke and
fled. Hasdrubal at this juncture appears to have
acted with great skill and prudence; for in view of
the fact that the Numidians were very numerous and
most efficient and formidable when in pursuit of a
flying foe he left them to deal with the Roman cavalry
and led his squadrons on to where the infantry
were engaged with the object of supporting the
Africans. Attacking the Roman legions in the rear
and delivering repeated charges at various points
all at once, he raised the spirits of the Africans and
cowed and dismayed the Romans. It was here that
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

9 ἐν δ' καίρῳ καὶ Δεύκιος Αἰμίλιος περιπεσὼν βιαιῶς πληγαῖς ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ μετήλλαξε τὸν βίον, ἀνὴρ πάντα τὰ δίκαια τῇ πατρίδι κατὰ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἔσχατον καίρον, εἰ καὶ τις ἑτέρος, 10 ποιήσας. οἴ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι, μέχρι μὲν ἐμάχοντο κατὰ τὰς ἐπιφανείας στρεφόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς κεκυκλωκώτας, ἀντείχον· ἀεὶ δὲ τῶν πέριξ ἀπολλυμένων, καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ συγκλείστε, τέλος αὐτοῦ πάντες, ἐν οἷς καὶ Μάρκος καὶ Γάιος, ἔπεσον, οἷ τὸ πρότερον ἔτος ἔπαιτοι γεγονότες, ἀνδρὲς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ τῆς Ῥώμης ἄξιοι γενόμενοι κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον. κατὰ δὲ τὸν τούτων φόνον καὶ τὴν συμπλοκὴν οἱ Νομάδες ἐπόμενοι τοὺς φεύγουσι τῶν ἰππέων τοὺς μὲν πλεῖστος ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ κατεκρήμνισαν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰππών. οἳ γοῦν ἔτει Ὀλενοῦσιν διέφυγον, ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ Γάιος Τερέντιος ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγός, ἀνὴρ αἰσχρὰν μὲν τὴν φυγήν, ἀλυστελὴ δὲ τὴν ἁρχὴν τὴν αὐτοῦ τῇ πατρίδι πεποιημένοι.

117 'Ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ Κάνναν γενομένη μάχη Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων ἐπετελέσθη τὸν τρόπον τούτον, μάχη γεναιοτάτους ἄνδρας ἔχουσα καὶ τοὺς 2 νικήσαντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκτηθέντας. δῆλον δὲ τοὺτ' ἐγένετ' ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐξαισχυνόμενων ἰππέων ἐβδομήκοντα μὲν εἰς Ὀλενουσίαν μετὰ Γαίου διέφυγον, περὶ τριακοσίων δὲ τῶν 3 συμμάχων σποράδες εἰς τὰς πόλεις ἐσώθησαν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν πεζῶν μαχόμενοι μὲν ἐάλωσαν εἰς μυρίους, οὐ δ' ἐντὸς ὑπὲς τῆς μάχης, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ κυνήγου τρισχίλιοι μόνον ἱκώς εἰς τὰς παρακελμένας 4 πόλεις διέφυγον. οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ πάντες, ὑντες εἰς ἐπτὰ μυριάδας, ἀπέθανον εὐγενῶς, τὴν μεγαλίθην χρείαν παρεσχημένου τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις εἰς τὸ νικάν

288
Lucius Aemilius fell in the thick of the fight after receiving several dreadful wounds, and of him we may say that if there ever was a man who did his duty by his country both all through his life and in these last times, it was he. The Romans as long as they could turn and present a front on every side to the enemy, held out, but as the outer ranks continued to fall, and the rest were gradually huddled in and surrounded, they finally all were killed where they stood, among them Marcus and Gnaeus, the Consuls of the preceding year, who had borne themselves in the battle like brave men worthy of Rome. While this murderous combat was going on, the Numidians following up the flying cavalry killed most of them and unseated others. A few escaped to Venusia, among them being the Consul Gaius Terentius, who disgraced himself by his flight and in his tenure of office had been most unprofitable to his country.

117. Such was the outcome of the battle at Cannae between the Romans and Carthaginians, a battle in which both the victors and the vanquished displayed conspicuous bravery, as was evinced by the facts. For of the six thousand cavalry, seventy escaped to Venusia with Terentius, and about three hundred of the allied horse reached different cities in scattered groups. Of the infantry about ten thousand were captured fighting but not in the actual battle, while only perhaps three thousand escaped from the field to neighbouring towns. All the rest, numbering about seventy thousand, died bravely. Both on this occasion and on former ones their numerous cavalry had contributed most to the victory of the Cartha-
ΤΗΣ ΗΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΣ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

5 καὶ τότε καὶ πρὸ τοῦ τοῦ τῶν ἰππέων ὄχλου. καὶ δῆλον ἐγένετο τοῖς ἐπιγνωμένοις ὅτι κρείττον ἐστὶ πρὸς τοὺς τῶν πολέμων καυροὺς ἢμέσως ἔχειν πε-ζούς, ἰπποκρατεῖν δὲ τοῖς ὀλοί, μᾶλλον ἡ πάντα
6 πάρσα τοῖς πολέμοις ἐχοντα διακινδυνεύειν. τῶν δὲ μετ’ Ἀννίβοι Κελτοῖ, μὲν ἔπεσον εἰς τετρακικυ-

λίους, Ἰβηρεῖς δὲ καὶ Διβνεῖς εἰς χιλίους καὶ πεντα-

κοσίους, ἰππεῖς δὲ περὶ διακόσιοι.
7 Οἱ δὲ ἱωγρηθέντες τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐκτὸς ἐγένοντο
8 τοῦ κινδύνος, καὶ διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτιάν. Λεύκιος

ἀπέλυε μυρίους πεζοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ παρεμβολῆς, ὡς ἐὰν μὲν Ἀννίβας ὁ λυγωρήσας τοῦ χάρακως ἐκτάξῃ

πάσι, παραπεσόντες οὐκ οὐκ κατὰ τὸν τὴς μάχης καιρὸν

ἐγκρατεῖς γέννωται τῆς τῶν πολέμων ἀποσκευής,
9 ἐὰν δὲ προϊόνον τὸ μέλλον ἀπολίπῃ φυλακῆς ἀξίω-

χρεών, πρὸς ἐλάττους αὐτοῖς ὃ περὶ τῶν ὀλυμ γένηται
10 κίνδυνος. ἐάλωσαν δὲ τοιοῦτῳ τῳ ὄρωπῳ. κατα-

λιπόντος Ἀννίβου φυλακήν ἀρκοῦσαν ἐπὶ τοῦ χάρα-

κος, ἀμα τῷ κατάρξασθαι τὴν μάχην κατὰ τὸ συν-

tαχθὲν ἐπολυάρκον οἱ Ῥωμαίοι προσβάλλοντος τοὺς

ἀπολελειμμένους ἐν τῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων χάρακι.
11 τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἀντείχον. ὅτι δ’ αὐτῶν πεζο-

μένων, ἔπειδὴ κατὰ πάντα τὰ μέρη τὴν μάχην Ἀν-

νίβας ἔκρυψε, καὶ τότε παραβοηθήσας καὶ τρεφόμε-

νως συνέκλεισε τοὺς Ῥωμαίους εἰς τὴν ἒδον παρεμ-

βολὴν, καὶ δισχύλους μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινε, τῶν δὲ
12 λοιπῶν ἐγκρατῆς ἐγένετο ζωγρίᾳ πάντων. ὡμιῶς
dὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἐρύματα συμ-

πεφυγότας ἐκπολιορκήσαντες οἱ Νομάδες ἔπαν-

ῆγον, ὅταν εἰς δισχύλους τῶν εἰς φυγὴν τραπέν-

tων ἰππέων.

118 Βραβευθείσης δὲ τῆς μάχης τὸν προειρημένον

290
ginians, and it demonstrated to posterity that in times of war it is better to give battle with half as many infantry as the enemy and an overwhelming force of cavalry than to be in all respects his equal. Of Hannibal's army there fell about four thousand Celts, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans and two hundred cavalry.

The Romans who were made prisoners were not in the battle for the following reason. Lucius had left a force of ten thousand foot in his own camp, in order that, if Hannibal, neglecting his camp, employed his whole army in the field, they might during the battle gain entrance there and capture all the enemy's baggage: if, on the other hand, Hannibal, guessing this danger, left a strong garrison in the camp, the force opposed to the Romans would be reduced in numbers. The circumstances of their capture were more or less as follows. Hannibal had left an adequate force to guard his camp, and when the battle opened, the Romans, as they had been ordered, delivered an assault on this force. At first they held out, but as they were beginning to be hard pressed, Hannibal, who was now victorious in every part of the field, came to their assistance, and routing the Romans shut them up in their own camp. He killed two thousand of them and afterwards made all the rest prisoners. The Numidians also reduced the various strongholds throughout the country which had given shelter to the flying enemy and brought in the fugitives, consisting of about two thousand horse.

118. The result of the battle being as I have de-
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

τρόπον, ἀκόλουθον εἰλήφει τὰ ὁλα κρίσιν τοὺς ὑπ’ 2 ἀμφοτέρων προσδοκωμένους. Καρχηδόνιον μὲν γὰρ
dιὰ τῆς πράξεως ταύτης παραχρῆμα τῆς μὲν λοιπῆς
3 παραλίας σχεδὸν πάσης ἦσαν ἐγκρατεῖς. Ταραντῖνοι
τε γὰρ εὐθέως ἐνεχείριζον αὐτούς, Ἀργυριππανοὶ
dὲ καὶ Καπανῶν τινες ἐκάλουν τὸν Ἀννίβαν, οἷς
dὲ λοιποὶ πάντες ἀπέβλεπον ἦδη τότε πρὸς Καρχηδό-
nίους. μεγάλας δ’ εἶχον ἐπίδιας ἐξ ἐφόδου καὶ τῆς
5 Ῥώμης αὐτῆς ἔσεσθαι κύριοι. Ῥωμαῖοι γε μὴν τὴν
Ἰταλικῶν δυναστείαν παραχρῆμα διὰ τὴν ἤτην
ἀπεγνώκεσαν, ἐν μεγάλοις δὲ φόβοις καὶ κυνύνοις
ἡσαν περὶ τοῦ σφὼν αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρί-
δος ἔδαφους, ὅσον οὖπι προσδοκώντες ἤξειν αὐτὸν
6 τὸν Ἀννίβαν. καὶ γὰρ ὀστερὴ ἐπιμετροῦσαν καὶ
συνεπαγωγομένης τοῖς γεγονόσι τῆς τύχης συνέβη
μετ’ ὅλης ἡμέρας, τοῦ φόβου κατέχοντος τὴν
πόλιν, καὶ τὸν εἰς τὴν Γαλατίαν στρατηγὸν ἀπο-
σταλέντ’ εἰς ἐνέδραν ἐμπεσόντα παράδοξος ἁρδην
ὑπὸ τῶν Κελτῶν διαφθαρῆσαι μετά τῆς δυνάμεως.
7 οὐ μὴν ἢ γε σύγκλητος. οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπτο τῶν ἐνδε-
χωμένων, ἀλλὰ παρεκάλει μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἡσφα-
λίζετο δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, ἐβουλεύετο δὲ περὶ
tῶν ἐνεστώτων ἀνδρῶν. τοῦτο δ’ ἐγένετο φανε-
8 ρόν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ ταύτα συμβάντων’ ὁμολογουμένως
gὰρ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἡττηθέντων τότε καὶ παραχωρή-
9 σάντων τῇ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἁρετής, τῇ τοῦ πολευ-
ματος ἱδρυτῆ καὶ τῷ βουλεύεσθαι καλῶς οὗ μόνῳ
ἀνεκτήσαντο τὴν τῆς Ἰταλίας δυναστείαν, νικήσαν-
tες μετὰ ταύτα Καρχηδόνιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς οἰκου-
μένης ἀπάσης ἐγκρατεῖς ἐγένοντο μετ’ ὅλης χρό-
nοις.
10 Διόπερ ἦμεῖς ταύτην μὲν τὴν βύβλον ἐπὶ τοῦτών
292
scribed, the general consequences that had been anticipated on both sides followed. The Carthaginians by this action became at once masters of almost all the rest of the coast, Tarentum immediately surrendering, while Argyrippa and some Campanian towns invited Hannibal to come to them, and the eyes of all were now turned to the Carthaginians, who had great hopes of even taking Rome itself at the first assault. The Romans on their part owing to this defeat at once abandoned all hope of retaining their supremacy in Italy, and were in the greatest fear about their own safety and that of Rome, expecting Hannibal every moment to appear. It seemed indeed as if Fortune were taking part against them in their struggle with adversity and meant to fill the cup to overflowing; for but a few days afterwards, while the city was yet panic-stricken, the commander they had sent to Cisalpine Gaul was surprised by the Celts in an ambush and he and his force utterly destroyed. Yet the Senate neglected no means in its power, but exhorted and encouraged the populace, strengthened the defences of the city, and deliberated on the situation with manly coolness. And subsequent events made this manifest. For though the Romans were now incontestably beaten and their military reputation shattered, yet by the peculiar virtues of their constitution and by wise counsel they not only recovered their supremacy in Italy and afterwards defeated the Carthaginians, but in a few years made themselves masters of the whole world.

I therefore end this Book at this point, having
τῶν ἔργων καταστρέψομεν, ἀ περελάβειν Ἰβηρικῶν καὶ τῶν Ἰταλικῶν ἡ τετταρακοστὴ πρὸς ταῖς ἐκατὸν 11 ὀλυμπιάσι δηλώσαντες. ὅταν δὲ τὰς Ἐλληνικὰς πράξεις τὰς κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὀλυμπιάδα γενομένας διεξέγοντες ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς καιροῖς τούτοις, τὸν ἤδη προθέμενοι ψυλῶς τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς Ῥωμαίων 12 πολιτείας ποιησόμεθα λόγον, νομίζοντες οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἱστορίας σύνταξιν οἰκείαν εἶναι τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς ἐξήγησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολιτευμάτων διορθώσεις καὶ κατασκευὰς μεγάλα συμβάλλοντες τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσι καὶ πραγματικοῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν.
now described the events in Spain and Italy that occurred in the 140th Olympiad. When I have brought down the history of Greece in the same Olympiad to the same date, I shall pause to premise to the rest of the history a separate account of the Roman constitution; for I think that a description of it is not only germane to the whole scheme of my work, but will be of great service to students and practical statesmen for forming or reforming other constitutions.
ΙΣΤΟΡΙΩΝ ΤΕΤΑΡΤΗ

1 Ἐν μὲν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης βύβλῳ τὰς αἰτίας ἐδηλώσαμεν τοῦ δευτέρου συστάντος Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων πολέμου, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς εἰσβολῆς

2 τῆς εἰς Ἰταλίαν Ἀννίβου διήλθομεν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐξηγησάμεθα τοὺς γενομένους αὐτοῖς ἀγώνας πρὸς ἀλλήλους μέχρι τῆς μάχης τῆς περὶ τὸν Ἀὐφιδού ποταμὸν καὶ πόλιν Κάνναν γενομένης.

3 νῦν δὲ τὰς Ἐλληνικὰς διέξαμεν πράξεις τὰς κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς ἐπιτελεσθείσας τοῖς προειρημένοις καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκατοστηθῆς καὶ τεταρακοστῆς

4 ὀλυμπιάδος, πρότερον ἀναμνήσαντες διὰ βραχέων τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τῇ πραγματείᾳ τῆς κατασκευῆς ἢν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ βύβλῳ περὶ τῶν Ἐλληνικῶν ἐπιστήματα, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαϊῶν ἔθνων, διὰ τὸ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πολιτεύμα παράδοξον ἐπίδοσιν λαβεῖν εἰς τε τοὺς πρὸ ἡμῶν

5 καὶ καθ’ ἡμᾶς καιροὺς. ἀρξάμενοι γὰρ ἀπὸ Τίσσαμον τῶν Ὀρέστου παιδῶν ἐνὸς, καὶ φήσαντες αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ μὲν τούτου βασιλεύσῃ κατὰ γένος ἐως εἰς Ὁμήρου, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καλλιστὴ προαιρέσει χρησιμένους δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ Μακεδονίας βασιλέων

6 διασπασθῆναι κατὰ πόλεις καὶ κώμας, ἐξῆς δὲ 296
BOOK IV

1. In the preceding Book after pointing out the causes of the second war between Rome and Carthage, I described the invasion of Italy by Hannibal, and the engagements which took place between the belligerents up to the battle on the river Ausidus at the town of Cannae. I shall now give an account of the contemporary events in Greece from the 140th Olympiad onwards, after \(220-216\) B.C. briefly recalling to the minds of my readers the sketch I gave in my second Book\(^a\) of Greek affairs and especially of the growth of the Achaean League, the progress of that state having been surprisingly rapid in my own time and earlier. Beginning their history with Tisamenus, one of Orestes' sons, I stated that they were ruled by kings of his house down to the reign of Ogygus, after which they adopted a most admirable democratic constitution, until for a time their League was dissolved into cities and villages by the kings of Macedon. Next I went on to tell how they subse-

---

\(^a\) Chapters 41-71.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tou'tois èpebalómeva légēn πῶς αὖθις ἦρξαντο
symφρονεῖν καὶ τότε, καὶ τίνες αὐτοῖς πρῶτοι
7 συνέστησαν. τούτοις δ' ἐπομένως ἐδηλώσαμεν
τίνι τρόπῳ καὶ ποίᾳ προαιρέσει προσαγόμενοι τὰς
πόλεις ἐπεβάλοντο Πελοποννησίους πάντας ὑπὸ
8 τὴν αὐτὴν ἄγεων ὀνομασίαν καὶ πολιτείαν. καθο-
λικῶς δὲ περὶ τῆς προειρημένης ἐπιβολῆς ἀποφη-
νάμενοι, μετὰ ταύτα τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἔργων κατὰ
τὸ συνεχῆ ἐπιψαύοντες εἰς τὴν Κλεομένου τοῦ
Δακεδαιμωνίων βασιλέως ἐκπτωσιν κατηντήσαμεν.
9 συγκεφαλαιωσάμενοι δὲ τὰς ἐκ τῆς προκατασκευῆς
πράξεις ἔως τῆς Ἀρτιγόνου καὶ Σελεύκου καὶ Πτο-
λεμαίου τελευτῆς, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καυροὺς
πάντες οὗτοι μετῆλαξαν, λοιπὸν ἐπηγειλάμεθα
τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας ἀρχὴν πουήσασθαι τὰς
2 ἐξής τοῖς προειρημένοις πράξεις, καλλιστὴν ὑπό-
στασιν ὑπολαμβάνοντες εἶναι ταύτην διὰ τὸ πρῶ-
τον μὲν τὴν Ἀράτου σύνταξιν ἐπὶ τούτων κατα-
στρέφειν τοὺς καυροὺς, ὦς συναπτούντες τὴν διή-
γησιν τῶν ἄκολουθον ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἀποδι-
2 δόναι προηρήμεθα λόγον, δεύτερον δὲ διὰ τὸ καὶ
toûs χρόνους οὕτως συντρέχειν τοὺς ἔξης καὶ τοὺς
πίπτοντας ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἱστορίαν ὡστε τοὺς
μὲν καθ ἡμᾶς εἶναι τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τοὺς πατέρας
ἡμῶν, ἐξ οὗ συμβαίνει τοῖς μὲν αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς παρα-
γεγονέναι τὰ δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἑωρακότων ἀκηκοέναι.
3 τοῦ γὰρ ἀνωτέρω προσλαμβάνειν τοῖς χρόνοις, ὡς
ἀκοὴν ἐξ ἀκοῆς γράφειν, οὐκ ἐφαίνεθ' ἡμῖν ἀσφα-
λεῖς ἔχειν οὐτὲ τὰς διαλήψεις οὐτὲ τὰς ἀποφάσεις.
4 μάλιστα δ' ἀπὸ τοῦτων ἡρξάμεθα τῶν καυρῶν διὰ
to kai tēn tūchēn ὡσανεί kεκαυσαποιηκέναι pάnta
tā kαtā tēn oīkoumēnēn en toīs προειρημένοις
298
BOOK IV. 1. 6 – 2. 4

quently began to reunite, and which were the first cities to league themselves, and following on this I pointed out in what manner and on what principle they tried to attract other cities and formed the design of uniting all the Peloponnesians in one polity and under one name. After a general survey of this design, I gave a brief but continuous sketch of events in detail up to the dethronement of Cleomenes, king of Sparta. Summarizing, next, the occurrences dealt with in my introductory sketch up to the deaths of Antigonus Doson, Seleucus Ceraunus, and Ptolemy Euergetes, which all took place about the same time, I announced that I would enter on my main history with the events immediately following the above period. 2. This I considered to be the best starting-point, because in the first place, Aratus's book terminates just at this period and I had decided on taking up and carrying on the narrative of Greek affairs from the date at which he leaves off, and secondly because the period following on this date and included in my history coincides with my own and the preceding generation, so that I have been present at some of the events and have the testimony of eyewitnesses for others. It seemed to me indeed that if I comprised events of an earlier date, repeating mere hearsay evidence, I should be safe neither in my estimates nor in my assertions. But my chief reason for beginning at this date, was that Fortune had then so to speak rebuilt the world.

299
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

8 καίροις. Φίλιππος μὲν γὰρ ὁ Δημητρίου κατὰ
φύσιν νῦς, ἐτὶ παῖς ὃν, ἀρτι παρελάβανε τὴν
6 Μακεδόνων ἅρχην. Ἀχαίος δὲ τῆς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ
Ταύρου δυναστεύων οὐ μόνον προστασίαν εἶχε
7 βασιλικὴν ἄλλα καὶ δύναμιν. ὁ δὲ Μέγας ἐπικλη-
θεὶς Ἀντίοχος μικροὶς ἀνώτεροι χρόνοις, τοῦ ἀδελ-
φοῦ Σελεύκου μετηλαχότος, ἐτὶ κομιδῆ νέου ὃν
8 τὴν ἐν Συρία διεδέδεκτο βασιλεύαν. ἀμα δὲ τοῦ-
τοις Ἀριαράθης παρέλαβε τὴν Καππαδοκῶν ἅρχην:
ὁ δὲ Φιλοπάτωρ Πτολεμαῖος ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καίροις
9 τῶν κατ᾽ Αἰγυπτὸν ἐγεγόνει κύριος. Δυκοῦργος
δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων μετ᾽ οὐ πολὺ κατεστάθη βασι-
λεύσ. ἤρθη δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι προσφάτως ἐπὶ τὰς
προειρημένας πράξεις στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν Ἀνιβαν.
10 οὕτως δὲ τοιαύτης περὶ πάσας τὰς δυναστείας
κανονικὰς οὐσίας ἔμελλε πραγμάτων ἔσεσθαι
καὶ ἀρχὴ· τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ πέφυκε καὶ φίλεὶ
συμβαίνειν κατὰ φύσιν. οὶ καὶ τότε συνέβη γενέ-
11 θαι. Ὁρμαίοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι τὸν
προειρημένον ἐνεστήσαντο πόλεμον, Ἀντίοχος δὲ
καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ἀμα τούτοις τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς Κόιλης
Συρίας, Ἀχαιοὶ δὲ καὶ Φίλιππος τὸν πρὸς Αἰτω-
λοὺς καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, οὗ τὰς αἰτίας συνέβη
gενέσθαι τοιαύτας.

3 Ἀιτωλοὶ πάλαι μὲν δυσχερῶς ἔφερον τὴν εἰρήνην
καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἴδιων ὑπαρχόντων δαπάνας ὥς ἂν
εἰθερμὸνοι μὲν ζήν ἀπὸ τῶν πέλας, δεόμενοι δὲ
πολλῆς χορηγίας διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀλαζονεῖαν, ἢ
δουλεύοντες ἀεὶ πλεονεκτικὸν καὶ θηριώδη ζῶσι
βίον, οὐδὲν οἰκείον, πάντα δὲ ἤγουμενοι πολέμων.
BOOK IV. 2. 5 – 3. 1

For Philip, son of Demetrius, being still quite a boy, had inherited the throne of Macedonia, Achaeus, the ruler of all Asia on this side of the Taurus, had now not only the state, but the power of a king, Antiochus surnamed “The Great” who was still very young had but a short time previously, on the death of his brother Seleucus, succeeded him in Syria, Ariarathes at the same time had become king of Cappadocia, and Ptolemy Philopator king of Egypt, while not long afterwards began the reign of Lycurgus, king of Sparta. The Carthaginians also had but recently appointed Hannibal to be their general in the campaign I mentioned. Since therefore the personalities of the rulers were everywhere new, it was evident that a new series of events would begin, this being the natural and usual consequence. And such indeed was the case; for the Romans and Carthaginians now entered on the war I mentioned; Antiochus and Ptolemy on that for Coele-Syria, and the Achaeans and Philip on that against the Aetolians and Spartans.

3. The causes of the latter were as follows. The Aetolians had for long been dissatisfied with peace and with an outlay limited to their own resources, as they had been accustomed to live on their neighbours, and required abundance of funds, owing to that natural covetousness, enslaved by which they always lead a life of greed and aggression, like beasts of prey, with no ties of friendship but regarding everyone as an enemy. Nevertheless up to now,
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

2 οὖ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον, ἐως Ἀντίγονος
3 ἔζη, δεδιότες Μακεδόνας ἤγον ἦσουσιν. ἔπειδὴ
4 δὲ ἐκεῖνος μετῆλλαξε τὸν βίον παῖδα καταλιπὼν
5 Φίλιππον, καταφρονήσαντες ἐξήτουν ἀφορμὰς καὶ
6 προφάσεως τῆς εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἐπιπλοκῆς, ἄγο-
7 μενοι κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν ἔθος ἐπὶ τὰς ἑκ ταύτῃς
8 ἀρπαγάς, ἀμα δὲ καὶ νομίζοντες ἄξιοχρεὺς εἶναι
9 σφᾶς πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν αὐτοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς. ὄντες δὲ
10 ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς προβάσεως, βραχέα ταυτομάτου
11 σφίζοντας συνεργῆσαντος ἐλαβον ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὴν
12 ἐπιβολὴν τουίτας.
13 
14 Δωρίμαχος δὲ Τριχώνευς ἦν μὲν υἱὸς Νικο-
15 στράτου τοῦ παραπονδήσαντος τὴν τῶν Παμ-
16 βοστίων πανήγυρις, νέος δὲ ὃν καὶ πλήρης
17 Αἰτωλικῆς ὀρμῆς καὶ πλεονέξιος ἐξαπεστάλη
18 κατὰ κοινόν εἰς τὴν τῶν Φιγαλέων πόλιν, ήτις
19 ἔστι μὲν ἐν Πελοπόννησῳ, κεῖται δὲ πρὸς τοῖς
20 τῶν Μεσσηνίων ὅροις, ἔτυγχανε δὲ τότε συμπολι-
21 τευνομένη τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς, λόγω μὲν παραφυλάξων
22 τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὴν πόλιν τῶν Φιγαλέων, ἔργῳ
23 δὲ κατασκόπου τάξεων ἔχων τῶν ἐν Πελοπόννησῳ
24 πραγμάτων. συνδραμόντιν δὲ πειρατών καὶ παρα-
25 γενομένων πρὸς αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν Φιγαλείαν, οὐκ
26 ἔχων τούτοις ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαίου συμπαρασκευάζων
27 ὥφελείας διὰ τὸ μένειν ἄτι τότε τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης
tοῖς Ἐλληνσι τὴν ὑπ᾽ Ἀντίγονον συντελεσθέναι,
28 τέλος ἀπορούμενος ἐπέτρεπε τοῖς πειραταῖς ληθε-
29 έσθαι τὰ τῶν Μεσσηνίων θρέμματα, φίλων ὅντων
30 καὶ συμμάχων. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἦδικον τὰ
31 περὶ τὰς ἐσχατικὰς ποιμνια, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα προ-
32 βανούσης τῆς ἀπονοιας ἐνεχείρησαν καὶ τὰς ἑπὶ
tῶν ἀγρῶν οἰκίας ἐκκόπτειν, ἀνυπονοήτως τὰς
33 302
as long as Antigonus was alive, they kept quiet owing to their fear of Macedonia, but when that king died leaving Philip still a child to succeed him, they thought they could ignore this king and began to look out for pretexes and grounds for interfering in the affairs of the Peloponnese, giving way to their old habit of looking for pillage from that country and thinking they were a match for the Achaeans now the latter were isolated. Such being their bent and purpose, and chance favouring them in a certain measure, they found the following pretext for putting their design in execution.

Dorimachus of Trichonium was the son of that Nicostratus who broke the solemn truce at the Pamboeotian congress. He was a young man full of the violent and aggressive spirit of the Aetolians and was sent on a public mission to Phigalea, a city in the Peloponnese near the Messenian border and at that time in alliance with the Aetolian League; professedly to guard the city and its territory, but really to act as a spy on Peloponnesian affairs. When a recently formed band of brigands came to join him there, and he could not provide them with any legitimate pretext for plundering, as the general peace in Greece established by Antigonus still continued, he finally, finding himself at a loss, gave them leave to make forays on the cattle of the Messenians who were friends and allies of the Aetolians. At first, then, they only raided the flocks on the border, but later, growing ever more insolent, they took to breaking into the country houses, surprising the unsuspecting inmates by
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

11 νῦκτας ἐπιφανώμενοι. τῶν δὲ Μεσσηνίων ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀγανακτούντων καὶ διαπροβεβουμένων πρὸς τὸν Δωρίμαχον τὰς μὲν ἄρχος παρῆκουν, βουλῶμενος τὰ μὲν ὡφελεῖν τοὺς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦν ταττομένους, τὰ δ’ αὐτῶς ὡφελεῖσθαι μερίτης γυνόμενος τῶν λαμβανομένων. πλεοναζούσης δὲ τῆς παρουσίας τῶν προσβειῶν διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν ἄδικημάτων, αὐτὸς ἤζειν ἐπὶ τὴν Μεσσήνην ἐφη δικαιολογησόμενος πρὸς τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας τοὺς Αἰτωλοῖς.

12 ἐπειδὴ δὲ παρεγένετο, προσπορευομένων αὐτῶν τῶν ἡδυκημένων τοὺς μὲν διέσυρε χλευάζων, τῶν δὲ κατανόησα, τοὺς δὲ ἐξέπληττε λοιποῖν.

4 "Ετι δ’ αὐτοῦ παρεπιδημοῦντος ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ, συνεγγύσαντες τῇ πόλει νυκτὸς οἱ περισταὶ καὶ προσβαλόντες κλίμακας ἐξέκοψαν τὸ Χυρώνος καλούμενον ἐπαύλιον, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀμυνομένους ἀπέσφαξαν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς τῶν οἰκετῶν δῆσαντες καὶ τὰ κτήνη μετ’ αὐτῶν ἀπήγαγον. οἱ δὲ τῶν Μεσσηνίων ἐφοροὶ πάλαι μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς γυνομένοις καὶ τῇ παρεπιδημίᾳ τοῦ Δωρίμαχου διαλγοῦντες, τότε δὲ καὶ προσενυφρίζεσθαι δόξαντες, ἀνεκαλοῦντ’ αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰς συναρχίας. ἐν θείᾳ Σκύρων, ὃς ἦν μὲν ἐφορός τότε τῶν Μεσσηνίων εὐδοκίμης δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον παρὰ τοῖς πολίταις, συνεβούλευε μὴ προσεθεῖν τὸν Δωρίμαχον ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐὰν μὴ τὰ μὲν ἀπολωλότα πάντα τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις ἀποκαταστῆσῃ, περὶ δὲ τῶν τεθνεώτων δωσιδίκους παράσχει τοὺς ἡδυκηκότας.

3 πάντων δ’ ἐπισημηναμένων ὡς δίκαια λέγοντος τοῦ Σκύρωνος, διοργίουσθει τὸ Δωρίμαχος εὐθείᾳ αὐτοῦς ἐφῇ τελέως ύπάρχειν, εἰ Δωρίμαχον οἴονται νῦν προπηλακίζειν, ἀλλ’ οὔ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν.
night. When the Messenians grew indignant at this and sent envoys to Dorimachus to complain, he at first paid no attention, as he wished not only to benefit the men under him but himself also by taking his share of their captures. But when such embassies began to arrive more frequently, owing to the continuance of the outrages, he announced that he would come himself to Messene to plead his cause against those who accused the Aetolians, and on appearing there when the victims approached him, he ridiculed and jeered at some of them, attacked some by recrimination and intimidated others by abusive language.

4. While he was still staying in Messene the banditti approached the city by night, and with the aid of scaling-ladders broke into the farm called Chyron's, where after killing those who offered resistance they bound the rest of the slaves and carried them off together with the cattle. The Messenian Ephors, who had long been annoyed by all that took place and by Dorimachus' stay in the town, thought this was adding insult to injury and summoned him before their college. On this occasion Scyron, then one of the ephors, and otherwise highly esteemed by the citizens, advised them not to let Dorimachus escape from the city, unless he made good all the losses of the Messenians and delivered up to justice those guilty of murder. When all signified their approval of what Scyron said, Dorimachus flew into a passion, and said they were utter simpletons if they thought it was Dorimachus they were now affronting and not the Aetolian
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

λῶν καὶ καθόλου δεινὸν ἦγείτο τὸ γινόμενον, καὶ κοινῆς αὐτοῦς ἐπιστροφῆς ἐφ' θεύεσθαι, καὶ ὃ τοῦτο πείσεσθαι δικαίως. ἢν δὲ τις κατ' ἐκεῖνους τοὺς καρποὺς ἀνθρωπος ἀσυρής ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ, τῶν ἐξηρμένων τὸν ἄνδρα κατὰ πάντα τρόπον, ὄνομα Βαβύρτας, ὃς τις εἰ περιέθηκε τὴν καυσίαν καὶ χλαμύδα τοῦ Δωρίμαχου, μὴ οἶδ' τ' εἶναι διαγινώσκειν: ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔξωμοίωτο κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τάλλα μέρη τοῦ σώματος τῷ προειρημένῳ. καὶ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἐλάνθανε τὸν Δωρίμαχον. ὃς δὲ καὶ ἀνατικικῶς τότε καὶ μάλα ὑπερηφάνως τοὺς Μεσσηνίους, περιοργισθεῖς ὁ Σκύρων " νομίζεις γὰρ ἢμιν " ἐφ' " σοι μέλεως τῇ πλῆθος σῆς ἀνατάσεως, Βαβύρτα; οὐδὲν τούτου παρατίκη μὲν εἰς δὲ τὸ Δωρίμαχος τῇ περιστάσει συνεχώρησε πάντων ἐπιστροφὴν πονήσεθαι τῶν γεγονότων ἄδικημάτων τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις, ἐπανελθὼν δ' εἰς τὴν Αἰτωλίαν οὕτω πικρῶς ἦν γεικε καὶ βαρέως τὸ ῥηθὲν ως οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην ἔχων εὐλογον πρὸφασιν δ' αὐτὸ τούτο τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις ἐξέκασθε τὸν πόλεμον.

5 Στρατηγὸς μὲν οὖν ὑπήρχε τῶν Αἰτωλῶν 'Αρίστων. οὕτως δὲ διὰ τινας σωματικὰς ἀσθενείας ἀδύνατος ὁ πρὸς πολεμικὴν χρείαν, ἀμα δὲ καὶ συγγενῆς ὑπάρχων Δωρίμαχον καὶ Σκόπα, τρόπον τὸν κατὰ παρακεχωρήσει τούτῳ τῆς ὅλης ἀρχῆς. ὃ δὲ Δωρίμαχος κατὰ κοινὸν μὲν οὐκ ἐτόλμη παρακαλεῖν τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς εἰς τὸν κατὰ τῶν Μεσσηνίων πόλεμον διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἔχειν ἀξίαν λόγου πρόφασιν, ἀλλ' ὄμολογομένως ἐκ παρανομίας καὶ σκάμματος γεγονέναι τὴν ὀρμήν. ἀφέμενος δὲ τῆς ἐπινοίας ταύτης ἱδίᾳ προετρέπετο τὸν Σκόπαν κοινωνήσαι.
BOOK IV. 4. 4 – 5. 3

League. He thought the whole affair altogether outrageous, and they would receive such public chastisement for it as would serve them right. There was at this time a certain lewd fellow at Messene, one of those who had in every way renounced his claim to be a man, called Babyrtas. If anyone had dressed this man up in Dorimachus’ sun-hat and chlamys it would have been impossible to distinguish the two, so exact was the resemblance both in voice and in person, and of this Dorimachus was perfectly aware. Upon his speaking now in this threatening and overbearing manner, Scyron grew very angry and said, “Do you think we care a fig for you or your threats, Babyrtas?” Upon his saying this Dorimachus, yielding for the moment to circumstances, consented to give satisfaction for all damage inflicted on the Messenians, but on his return to Aetolia he continued to resent this taunt so bitterly, that without having any other plausible pretext he stirred up a war against Messene on account of this alone.

5. The Strategus of the Aetolians at this time was Ariston. Being himself incapacitated for service in the field by certain bodily infirmities and being related to Dorimachus and Scopas, he had more or less ceded his whole office to the latter. Dorimachus did not venture to exhort the Aetolians by public speeches to make war on Messene, since he really had no valid pretext, but, as every body knew, his animus was due to his own lawless violence and his resentment of a jibe. So he desisted from any such plan, and took to urging on Scopas in private to join
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

τῆς ἐπιβολῆς αὐτῶ τῆς κατὰ τῶν Μεσσηνίων, ὑποδεικνύων μὲν τὴν ἀπὸ Μακεδόνων ἀσφάλειαν διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν τοῦ προστάτου (οὐ γάρ εἶχε 4 πλεῖον ἔτων τότε Φίλιππος ἐπτακαίδεκα), παρατείθει δὲ τὴν Δακεδαιμονίων ἀλλοτριότητα πρὸς τοὺς Μεσσηνίους, ἀναμμήνησκων δὲ τῆς Ἡλείων πρὸς σφᾶς εὐνοίας καὶ συμμαχίας, εξ ὧν ἀσφαλὴ τὴν εἰσβολὴν τὴν εἰς τὴν Μεσσηνίαν ἐσομένην 5 αὐτοῖς ἀπέφαυνεν. τὸ δὲ συνέχον τῆς Αἰτωλικῆς προτροπῆς, ὑπὸ τὴν ὅψιν ἐτίθει τὰς ἐσομένας ωφελείας ἐκ τῆς τῶν Μεσσηνίων χώρας, οὕτως ἀπρονοήτου καὶ διαμεμενηκιας ἀκεραίου μόνης τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ κατὰ τῶν Κλεομενικόν πόλε- 6 μον. ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις συνίστανε τὴν ἐξακο- λουθήσουσαν εὐνοιαν σφίσι παρὰ τοῦ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν 7 πλήθους. Ἀχαιοὶ δ', ἄν μὲν κωλύσωσι τὴν 8 δίοδον, οὐκ ἐρεῖν ἐγκλήματα τοῖς ἁμυνομένοις, ἐὰν δ' ἀγάγωσι τὴν ἡσυχίαν, οὐκ ἐμποδίειν αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολήν. πρὸς δὲ Μεσσηνίους προ- φάσεως οὐκ ἀπορήθειν ἐφ' ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀδικεῖν, Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ Μακεδόνες ἐπηγγελμένους 9 κοινωνήσει τῆς συμμαχίας. ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν καὶ παραπλήσα τούτοις ἔτερα πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθε- σιν, τουαύτην ὅρμην παρέστησε τῷ Σκόπτῃ καὶ τοῖς τούτου φίλοις ὡστε οὕτε κοινὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν προσδεξάμενοι σύνοδον οὕτε τοῖς ἀποκλήτοις συμ- μεταδόντες, οὐδὲ μὴν ἄλλο τῶν καθηκόντων οὐδὲν 10 πράξαντες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁρμὰς καὶ κρίσεις διαλαβόντες ἄμα Μεσσηνίους Ἡπειρώτας Ἀχαιοὶ Ἀκαρνανσί Μακεδόνες πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν.

6 Καὶ κατὰ μὲν βάλατον παραχρῆμα πειρατὰς ἐξέπεμψαν, οἱ παρατυχόντες πλοῖω βασιλικῷ τῶν 308
BOOK IV. 5. 3–6. 1

him in his project against the Messenians, pointing out to him that they were safe as regards Macedonia owing to the youth of its ruler—Philip being now not more than seventeen—calling his attention to the hostility of the Lacedaemonians to the Messenians, and reminding him that Elis was the friend and ally of the Aetolians; from all which facts he deduced that they would be quite safe in invading Messenia. But next—this being the most convincing argument to an Aetolian—he pictured to him the great booty that they would get from Messenia, the country being without warning of invasion and being the only one in Greece that the Cleomenic war had spared. Finally he dwelt on the popularity they themselves would gain in Aetolia. The Achaeans, he said, if they opposed their passage, could not complain if the Aetolians met force by force, but if they kept quiet they would not stand in the way of the project. Against the Messenians they would have no difficulty in finding a grievance, for they had long been inflicting wrong on the Aetolians by promising to ally themselves with the Achaeans and Macedonians. By these arguments and others in the same sense, he made Scopas and his friends so eager for the enterprise that without waiting for the General Assembly of the Aetolians, without taking the Special Council into their confidence, without in fact taking any proper steps, but acting solely as their own passion and their private judgement dictated, they made war all at once on the Messenians, Epirots, Achaeans, Acarnanians, and Macedonians.

6. By sea they immediately sent out privateers, who falling in with a ship of the royal Macedonian
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἐκ Μακεδονίας περὶ Κόθηρα τούτο τε εἰς Αἰτωλίαν καταγαγόντες αὐτανδρον, τούς τε ναυκλήρους καὶ τοὺς ἑπιβάτας, σὺν δὲ τούτοις τὴν ναῦν ἀπέδοντο.

2 τῆς δ’ Ἡπείρου τὴν παραλίαν ἐπόρθουν, συγχρώμενοι πρὸς τὴν ἀδικίαν ταῖς τῶν Κεφαλλήνων ναυσί. ἐπεβάλοντο δὲ καὶ τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας Θύ-ριον καταλαβέσθαι. ἀμα δὲ τούτοις λάθρα διὰ Πελοπόννησον τινὰς πέμψαντες εἰς μέση τῆς τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν χώρα κατέσχον τὸ καλούμενον ὀχύρωμα Κλάριον, δ' ἐλαφροπωλείως χρησάμενοι 4 διήγησαν εἰς τούτῳ πρὸς τὰς ἀρπαγάς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τούτῳ μὲν Τιμόξενος ὁ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγός, παραλαβὼν Ταυρίναν τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοπόννησῳ βασιλικῶν πραγμάτων ὑπ’ Ἀντιγόνου καταλειμ-μένον, ἐξεπολύρκησε τελέως εἰς ὀλίγας ἥμερας.

5 ὁ γὰρ βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος Κόρινθον μὲν εἶχε κατὰ τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν συνχώρημα διὰ τοὺς Κλεομενι-κοὺς καιροὺς, Ὦρχομενοῦ δὲ κατὰ κράτος ἔλλον οὐκ ἀποκατέστησε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀλλὰ σφετερίσα-

6 μενος κατείχε, βουλομένους, ὡς γ’ ἔμοι δοκεῖ, μὴ μόνον τῆς εἰσόδου κυριεύειν τῆς εἰς Πελοπόννησον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μεσόγαιαν αὐτῆς παραφύλλοτεν διὰ 7 τῆς ἐν Ὀρχομενῷ φρουρᾶς καὶ παρασκευῆς. οί δὲ περὶ τὸν Δωρίμαχον καὶ Σκόπαν παρατηρή-σαντες τὸν καιρόν, ἐν δὲ λοιπὸς ἄρτι Τιμοξένῳ μὲν ὀλίγος ἐτὶ χρόνος τῆς ἄρχης, Ὦρατος δὲ καθίστατο μὲν εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν ἐπὶ οὕτω στρατηγός ὑπὸ 8 τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, οὕτω δὲ ἔμελλε τὴν ἄρχην ἔξειν, συναθροίσαντες πανδημεῖ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ἐπὶ τὸ Ῥίον, καὶ παρασκευασάμενοι πορθμεία καὶ τὰς Κεφαλλήνων ἐτοιμάσαντες ναῦς, διεβιβασαν τοὺς ἄνδρας εἰς Πελοπόννησον καὶ προῆγον ἐπὶ τὴν 310
navy near Cythera brought her to Aetolia with all her crew, and there sold the officers, the troops, and the ship herself. Afterwards they pillaged the coast of Epirus, being aided in these outrages by the Cephallenian fleet. They also made an attempt to seize Thyrium in Acarnania. At the same time, sending a small force secretly through the Peloponnese, they occupied the fort called Clarium in the middle of the territory of Megalopolis, and continued to use it as a base for forays and a market for the sale of booty. This place, however, was shortly afterwards besieged and captured in a few days by Timoxenus, the Achaean Strategus, with the aid of Taurion, the officer left by Antigonus in charge of Peloponnesian affairs. I should explain that Antigonus continued to hold Corinth, which the Achaeans had given up to him, to further his purposes in the Cleomenic war, but that after storming Orchomenus he did not restore it to the Achaeans, but annexed and occupied it, wishing, as I think, not only to be master of the entrance into the Peloponnese, but to safeguard his interests in the interior by means of his garrison and arsenal at Orchomenus. Dorimachus and Scopas waited for the time when Timoxenus’ year of office had nearly expired, and Aratus, who had been appointed Strategus for the ensuing year by the Achaeans, would not yet be in office, and then, collecting the whole of the Aetolian forces at Rhium and preparing ferry-boats as well as the Cephallenian ships, they conveyed their men over to the Peloponnese and
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

9 Μεσσηνίαν. ποιούμενοι δὲ τὴν πορείαν διὰ τῆς Πατρέων καὶ Φαραιέων καὶ Τριταίεων χώρας ύπεκρίνοντο μὲν βούλεσθαι μηδὲν ἀδίκημα ποιεῖν 
10 εἰς τοὺς Ἀχαιούς, οὐ δυναμένου δὲ τοῦ πλήθους ἀπέχεσθαι τῆς χώρας διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὰς ὠφελείας ἀκρασίαν κακοποιοῦντες αὐτὴν καὶ λυμαινόμενοι 
δυσεῖν, μέχρι παρεγενήθησαν εἰς τὴν Φιγάλειαν. 
11 ποιησάμενοι δὲ τὴν ὀρμὴν ἐντεῦθεν αἰφνιδίως καὶ 
θρασείας ἐνέβαλον εἰς τὴν τῶν Μεσσηνίων χώραν, οὔτε 
τῆς ὑπαρχοῦσης αὐτοῖς ἐκ παλαιῶν χρόνων πρὸς 
τοὺς Μεσσηνίους φίλιας καὶ συμμαχίας οὐδὲ 
ἡμεῖς ποιησάμενοι πρὸνοιαν οὔτε τῶν κατὰ 
12 κοινῶν ὄρισμένων δικαίων παρ’ ἀνθρώπως, ἀπαντᾷ 
δ’ ἐν ἐλάττων θέμενοι τῆς σφετέρας πλεονεξίας 
ἀδεώς ἐπόρθουν, ὥστε τοιμάζων ἐπεξείνας καθολοῦ 
τῶν Μεσσηνίων.

7 Οἶ δ’ Ἀχαιοὶ, καθηκούσης αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν νόμων 
συνόδου κατὰ τὸν καρδὸν τοῦτον, ἦκον εἰς Αἴγινον. 
2 συνελθόντες δ’ εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησιὰν, καὶ τῶν τε 
Πατρέων καὶ Φαραιέων ἀπολογιζομένων τὰ γεγο-

νότα περὶ τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν ἀδικήματα κατὰ τὴν 
τῶν Αἰτωλῶν δίοδον, τῶν τε Μεσσηνίων παρόντων 
κατὰ πρεσβείαν καὶ δεσμέων σφίσι βοηθεῖν 
3 ἀδικομένως καὶ παραπονοῦμενοις, διακούσαν-

tες τῶν λεγομένων, καὶ συναγαγοῦντες μὲν 
tοίς Πατρέων καὶ Φαραιέων συμπάσχοντες δὲ 
4 ταῖς τῶν Μεσσηνίων ἀτυχίας, μάλιστα δὲ νομι-
ζοῦντες εἶναι δεινὸν εἰ μήτε συγχωρήσαντος τοῖς 
Αἰτωλοῖς μηδὲν τὴν δίοδον, μήτε καθάπαξ 
ἐπιβαλόμενοι παρατείσθαι, κατετόλμησαν ἐπιβιβάζε
tαι στρατοπέδῳ τῆς Ἀχαιας παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας, 
5 ἐπὶ πάσι τούτοις παροξυσάντες ἐνθησάμενοι βοηθεῖν
began to advance towards Messenia. On their march through the territory of Patrae, Pharae, and Tritaea, they pretended indeed not to wish to inflict any hurt on the Achaians, but as the men could not keep their hands off the country, owing to their passion for pillaging, they went through it, spoiling and damaging, until they reached Phigalea. Thence by a bold and sudden rush they invaded Messenia, utterly regardless both of their long-existing alliance and friendship with the Messenians and of the established law of nations. Subordinating everything to their own selfish greed, they pillaged the country unmolested, the Messenians not daring to come out at all to attack them.

7. This being the time fixed by law for the meeting of their Federal Assembly, the Achaians gathered at Aegium; and when the assembly met, the members from Patrae and Pharae gave an account of the injuries done to their country during the passage of the Aetolians, while an embassy from Messene arrived begging for help, as they had been treacherously and unjustly attacked. The Achaians listened to these statements, and as they shared the indignation of the people of Patrae and Pharae, and sympathized with the Messenians in their misfortune, but chiefly since they thought it outrageous that the Aetolians without getting leave of passage from anyone and without making the least attempt to justify the action, had ventured to enter Achaea in arms contrary to treaty, they were so exasperated by all these considerations that they voted that help should be given to the Messenians,
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tοῖς Μεσσηνίοις καὶ συνάγεις τῶν στρατηγῶν τοὺς Ἀχαίους ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις, ὡς δὲ ἂν τοῖς συνελθοῦσιν ὑπελομένοις δόξης, τοῦτ' εἶναι κύριον. ὁ μὲν οὖν Τιμόξενος ὁ τότε ἦτο ὑπάρχων στρατηγός, ὡσον οὕτω ληγούσης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀμα δὲ τοῖς Ἀχαίοις ἀπιστῶν διὰ τὸ ῥαθύμως αὐτοὺς ἑσχηκέναι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν περὶ τήν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις γυμνασίαις, ἀνεδύετο τὴν ἔξοδον καὶ καθόλου τὴν συν-
7 αγωγὴν τῶν ὀχλῶν μετὰ γὰρ τὴν Κλεομένους τοῦ Σπαρτιατῶν βασιλέως ἔκπτωσον κάμνοντες μὲν τοῖς προγεγονόσι πολέμοις, πιστεύοντες δὲ τῇ παρούσῃ καταστάσει πάντες ὁλιγώρησαν Πε-
λοπονήσουι τῆς περὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ παρασκευῆς.
8 ὁ δὲ Ἀρατὸς σχετλιάζων καὶ παροξυνόμενος ἔπι τῇ τόλμῃ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν θυμικότερον ἔχρητο τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἀτε καὶ προὕπαρχουσας αὐτοῖς ἀλ-
9 λοτριότητος ἐκ τῶν ἐπάνω χρόνων. διὸ καὶ συνάγειν ἐσπευδὴ τοὺς Ἀχαίους ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ συμβαλεῖν πρόθυμος ἢν τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς. τέλος δὲ πένθι ἡμέραις πρότερον τοῦ καθήκοντος αὐτῶν χρόνου παραλαβῶν παρὰ τοῦ Τιμόξενου τῆν δήμοσιαν σφραγίδα πρὸς ταῖς πόλεις ἔγραφε καὶ συννήγε τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων
11 εἰς τὴν Μεγάλην πόλιν. ὑπὲρ οὖν δοκεῖ μοι πρέ-
πον εἶναι βραχέα προεπεῖν διὰ τὴν ἰδιότητα τῆς φύσεως.
8 Ἀρατὸς γὰρ ἢν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τέλειος ἄνηρ εἰς 2 τὸν πραγματικὸν τρόπον· καὶ γὰρ εἰπεῖν καὶ διανοηθῆναι καὶ στέξαι τὸ κρίθεν δυνατός, καὶ μὴν ἐνεγκεῖ τὰς πολιτικὰς διαφορὰς πρᾶσιν καὶ φίλους ἐνδήσασθαι καὶ συμμάχους προσλαβεῖν
3 ὁμοδενὸς δεύτερος, ἔτι δὲ πράξεις ἀπάτας ἐπί-
314
that the Strategus should call a general levy of the Achaeans, and that this levy when it met should have full power to decide on what was to be done. Now Timoxenus, who was still Strategus, both because his term of office had very nearly expired, and because he had little confidence in the Achaean forces which had latterly much neglected their drilling, shrank from taking the field and even from levying the troops. For the fact is that ever since the fall of King Cleomenes of Sparta all the Peloponnesians, worn out as they were by the previous wars and trusting to the permanency of the present state of tranquillity, had paid no attention at all to preparations for war. But Aratus, incensed and exasperated by the audacity of the Aetolians, entered upon the business with much greater warmth, especially as he had a difference of long standing with that people. He therefore was in a hurry to call the levy of the Achaeans and to take the field against the Aetolians, and at length receiving the public seal from Timoxenus five days before the proper date of his entering office, wrote to the different cities with orders that all citizens of military age should present themselves in arms at Megalopolis.

Before proceeding I think I should say a few words about Aratus owing to the singularity of his character. He had in general all the qualities that go to make a perfect man of affairs. He was a powerful speaker and a clear thinker and had the faculty of keeping his own counsel. In his power of dealing suavely with political opponents, of attaching friends to himself and forming fresh alliances he was second to none. He also had a
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

βουλάς συντήρασθαι κατά τῶν πολεμίων καὶ
tαύτας ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ κακο-
4 παθείας καὶ τόλμης δεινότατος. ἔναργῃ δὲ τῶν
tοιούτων μαρτύρια καὶ πλείω μὲν ἐκφανῇ ὁ στι
tοῖς ἱστορικοῖς κατὰ μέρος περὶ τῆς Σικυώνος
cαὶ Μαντινείας καταλήψεως καὶ περὶ τῆς Λιτω-
λῶν ἐκ τῆς Πελοπεινοῦ πόλεως ἐκβολῆς, τὸ δὲ
μέγιστον, περὶ τῆς ἑπ' Ἀκροκόρινθον πράξεως.
5 ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς οὕτως ὤτε τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἀντιποι-
σαθαι βουληθεὶς, νυνρός μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἐπινοιαῖς,
ἀτολμός δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, ἐν ὀφεῖ δ' οὐ μένων
6 τοῦ δεινόν. διὸ καὶ τροπαίων ἐπ' αὐτὸν βλεπόντων
ἐπληρώσε τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ, καὶ τήδει τῇ τοῖς
7 πολεμίως ἀεὶ ποτ' ἦν εὐχείρωτος. οὕτως οἱ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων φύσει οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασι ἔχονοι
tι πολεμεῖς, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ὡστε
tὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς διαφέρουσι τῶν
ἐνεργημάτων πρὸς ἁ μὲν εὐφυῖος ἔχειν πρὸς ἃ
dὲ ἐναντίως, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τινά τῶν ὁμοειδῶν
πολλάκις τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ συνετῶτατον ἐναὶ καὶ
βραδύτατον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τολμηρότατον καὶ
8 δειλότατον. οὐ παράδοξα ταῦτα γε, συνήθη δὲ
9 καὶ γνώριμα τοῖς βουλομένοις συνεφιστάνειν. τως
μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς κυνηγίαις εἰσὶ τολμηροί πρὸς
tὰς τῶν θηρίων συγκαταστάσεις, οἱ δ' αὐτοὶ
πρὸς ὁπλα καὶ πολεμίους ἀγεννεῖς, καὶ τῆς γε
πολεμικῆς χρείας τῆς καὶ ἄνδρα μὲν καὶ κατ'
ἵλιαν εὐχερεῖς καὶ πράκτωρ, κοινῇ δὲ καὶ μετὰ
10 πολεμικῆς [ἐνίων] συντάξεως ἀπράκτων. Θεττα-
λῶν γοῦν ἂπεις κατ' ὅλην μὲν καὶ φαλαγγήδουν
ἀνυπόστατοι, χωρὶς δὲ παρατάξεως πρὸς καρδὸν

316
marvellous gift for devising *coup de main*, stratagems, and ruses against the enemy, and for executing such with the utmost personal courage and endurance. Of this we have many clear proofs, but the most conspicuous instances are the detailed accounts we possess of his seizure of Sicyon and Mantinea, his expulsion of the Aetolians from Pellene, and first and foremost his surprise of the Acrocorinthus. But this very same man, when he undertook field operations, was slow in conception, timid in performance, and devoid of personal courage. The consequence was that he filled the Peloponnese with trophies commemorating his defeats, and in this respect the enemy could always get the better of him. So true is it that there is something multiform in the nature not only of men’s bodies, but of their minds, so that not merely in pursuits of a different class the same man has a talent for some and none for others, but often in the case of such pursuits as are similar the same man may be most intelligent and most dull, or most audacious and most cowardly. Nor is this a paradox, but a fact familiar to careful observers. For instance some men are most bold in facing the charge of savage beasts in the chase but are poltroons when they meet an armed enemy, and again in war itself some are expert and efficient in a single combat, but inefficient when in a body and when standing in the ranks and sharing the risk with their comrades. For example the Thessalian cavalry are irresistible when in squadrons and brigades, but slow and awkward when dispersed and
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

καὶ τόπον κατ' ἄνδρα κυνδυνεύσαι δύσχρηστοι καὶ βραδείσ. Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ τούτων τάναντία.
11 Κρήτες δὲ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν πρὸς μὲν ἐνέδρας καὶ ληστείας καὶ κλοπὰς πολεμίων καὶ νυκτερινὰς ἐπιθέσεις καὶ πάσας τὰς μετὰ δόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος χρείας ἀνυπόστατοι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐξ ὀμολογοῦ καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον φαλαγ-γραδὸν ἔφοδον ἄγεννεῖς καὶ πλάγιοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς.
'Αχαιοὶ δὲ καὶ Μακεδόνες τάναντία τούτων.
12 ταῦτα μὲν εἰρήσθω μοι χάριν τοῦ μὴ διαπιστείν τοὺς ἀναγνώσκοντας τοὺς λεγομένους, ἐὰν που περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐναντίας ἀποφάσεις ποιώμεθα περὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τῶν ἐπιτηδειμάτων.
9 Ἀθροισθέντων δὲ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις μετὰ τῶν ὀπλών εἰς τὴν Μεγάλην πόλιν κατὰ δόγμα τῶν Ἀχαίων (ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτων παρεξέβημεν),
2 καὶ τῶν Μεσσηνίων αὐθεὶς ἐπιπορευθέντων ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ δεσμέων μὴ περιύδειν σφάσις οὕτω προφανῶς παρασπονδουμένους, βουλομένων δὲ καὶ τῆς κοινῆς συμμαχίας μετασχεῖν καὶ σπευδὸν-
3 τῶν ὁμοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιγραφῆναι, περὶ μὲν τῆς συμμαχίας οἱ προεστῶτες τῶν Ἀχαίων ἀπέλεγον,
4 οὐ φάσκοντες δυνατὸν εἶναι χωρίς Φιλίππου καὶ τῶν συμμαχῶν οὐδένα προσλαβεῖν (ἔτι γὰρ ἐν-ορκος ἐμενε πάσιν ἡ γεγενημένη συμμαχία δι᾽ Ἀντιγόνου κατὰ τοὺς Κλεομενικοὺς καίρους Ἀ-χαίοις Ἡπειρώταις Φωκεύσι Μακεδόσι Βουστοῖς
5 Ἀκαρνανίᾳ Θεσσαλοῖς), ἐξελεύσθησε δὲ καὶ βοήθησεν αὐτοῖς ἐφασαν, ἐὰν όμηρα δῶσων οἱ παρα-γεγονότες τοὺς ἑαυτῶν υἱεῖς εἰς τὴν τῶν Δακεδαι-μονίων πόλιν χάριν τοῦ μὴ διαλυθῆσθαι πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς χωρίς τῆς τῶν Ἀχαίων βουλήσεως.
318
engaging the enemy single-handed as they chance to encounter them. The Aetolian horse are just the reverse. The Cretans both by land and sea are irresistible in ambushes, forays, tricks played on the enemy, night attacks, and all petty operations which require fraud, but they are cowardly and down-hearted in the massed face-to-face charge of an open battle. It is just the reverse with the Achaeans and Macedonians. I say this in order that my readers may not refuse to trust my judgement, because in some cases I make contrary pronouncements regarding the conduct of the same men even when engaged in pursuits of a like nature.

9. When the men of military age had assembled in arms at Megalopolis in accordance with the decree of the Achaeans—it was at this point that I digressed from my narrative—and when the Messenians again presented themselves before the people, entreating them not to disregard the flagrant breach of treaty committed against them, and at the same time offering to join the general alliance and begging that they should at once be enrolled among the members, the Achaean magistrates refused the latter request on the ground that they were not empowered to receive additional members without consulting Philip and the rest of the allies. For the alliance was still in force which Antigonus had concluded during the Cleomenic war between the Achaeans, Epirots, Phocians, Macedonians, Boeotians, Acarnaneans, and Thessalians. They, however, agreed to march out to their assistance on condition that the envoys deposited in Sparta their own sons as hostages, to ensure that the Messenians should not come to terms with the Aetolians without the consent of the Achaeans. I
6 ἐστατόπεδευν δὲ καὶ Δακεδαμόνιοι, κατὰ τὴν 
συμμαχίαν ἐξεληλυθότες, ἔπι τοῖς τῶν Μεγαλο-
πολιτῶν ὄροις, ἐφέδρων καὶ θεωρῶν μᾶλλον ἦ
7 συμμάχων ἔχοντες τάξιν. ὁ Ἀρατός δὲ τὸν τρόπον 
τούτον τὰ πρὸς Μεσσηνίους διαπράξας ἐπεμπε 
πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλούς, διασαφῶν τὰ δεδογμένα 
καὶ παρακελεύομενος ἐπανάγειν ἐκ τῆς τῶν Μεσ-
σηνίων χώρας καὶ τῆς Ἀχαΐας μῆ αὐενί 
8 Σκόπας δὲ καὶ Δωρίμαχος ἀκούσαντες τὰ λεγό-
μενα καὶ γνώντες ἠθροισμένους τοὺς Ἀχαίους, 
ἁγοῦντο συμφέρεις φόβοι τότε θεόθατα τοῖς 
9 παραγγελομένους. παραντικὰ μὲν οὖν ἐξαπέστει-
λον γραμματοφόρους εἰς ταῖς Κυλλήνης καὶ πρὸς 
Ἀρίστωνα τῶν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν στρατηγών, ἄξιοντες 
κατὰ σπουδὴν αὐτοῖς ἀποστέλλει τὰ πορθμεῖα 
τῆς Ἡλείας εἰς τὴν Φειάδα καλομένην νῆσον. 
10 αὐτοὶ δὲ μετὰ δύο ἡμέρας ἀνέξευσαν γέμοντε 
τῆς λείας, καὶ προῆγον ὃς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡλείαν. ἀεὶ 
γὰρ ποτὲ τῆς τῶν Ἡλείων ἀντείχοντο φιλίας 
Αἰτωλοῖς χάριν τοῦ διὰ τούτων ἐπιπλοκάς λαμβά-
νειν πρὸς τὰς ἀρμαγῶς τὰς ἐκ Πελοποννήσου καὶ 
ληστείας.

10 ὁ δὲ Ἀρατός ἐπιμείνας δύο ἡμέρας, καὶ πιστεύ-
σας εὐθύς ὅτι ποιήσονται τὴν ἐπάνων καθάπερ 
ὑπεδείκνυσαν, τοὺς μὲν λοιποὺς Ἀχαίους καὶ 
τοὺς Δακεδαμονίους διαφήμηκε πάντας εἰς τὴν 
2 οἰκείαν, τρισχιλίους δὲ ἔχουν πεζοὺς καὶ τριακοσίους 
ἐπτεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀμα τῷ Ταυρίωνι στρατιωτάς 
προῆγε τὴν ἐπὶ Πάτρας, ἀντιπαράγειν τοῖς Αἰτω-
3 λοῖς προαιρούμενος. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δωρίμαχον 
πυθανόμενοι τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀρατὸν ἀντιπαράγειν
should mention that the Spartans, too, had marched out according to the terms of the alliance, and were encamped on the borders of the territory of Megalopolis, in the position rather of reserves and spectators than of allies. Aratus having thus carried out his intentions regarding the Messenians, sent a message to the Aetolians informing them of the resolutions, and demanding that they should evacuate Messenia and not set foot in Achaea, or he would treat trespassers as enemies. Scopas and Dorimachus, having listened to this message and knowing that the Achaean forces were assembled, thought it best for the time to cede to this demand. They therefore at once sent dispatches to Ariston, the Aetolian Strategus at Cyllene, begging him to send them the transports as soon as possible to the island called Pheias off the coast of Elis. After two days they themselves took their departure loaded with booty and advanced towards Elis; for the Aetolians have always courted the friendship of the Eleans, as through them they could get in touch with the rest of the Peloponnese for purposes of foraying and raiding.

10. Aratus waited two days: and thinking foolishly that the Aetolians would return by the way they had indicated, dismissed to their homes all the rest of the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians, and taking with him three thousand foot, three hundred horse, and Taurion's troops, advanced in the direction of Patrae with the intention of keeping on the flank of the Aetolians. Dorimachus, on learning that Aratus was hanging on his flank and had not broken
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

αὐτοῖς καὶ συμμένεις, τὰ μὲν διαγωνισάντες μὴ κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὰς ναῦς ἔμβασιν ἐπιθώνται σφίσι περισσωμένους, τὰ δὲ σπουδάζοντες συγχέοι τὸν 4 πόλεμον, τὴν μὲν λείαν ἀπέστειλαν ἐπὶ τὰ πλοῖα, συστήσαντες τοὺς ἰκανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς τὴν διακομήδην, προσενετελάμενοι τοῖς ἐκ- πεμπομένοις ταῦτα πρὸς τὸ Ῥών ἀπαντάν ὡς 5 ἐντεύθεν ποιησόμενοι τὴν ἔμβασιν, αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐφθάσεον τῇ τῆς λείας ἐξαποστολή 6 περιέποντες, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα προῆγον ἐκ μεταβολῆς ὡς ἐπὶ Ὀλυμπίας. ἀκούοντες δὲ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ταυρίωνα μετὰ τοῦ προειρημένου πλήθους περὶ τὴν Κλειτορίαν εἶναι, καὶ νομίζοντες οὖν ὡς δυνήσονται τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ῥών διάβασιν ἀνευ κιν- 7 δύνου ποιήσασθαι καὶ συμπλοκῆς, ἐκρίναν συμ- φέρειν τοῖς σφητέροις πράγμασιν ὡς τάχιστα συμμίζαι τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον ἀκμὴν ὀλίγους οὐδι 8 καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀνυπονοήτοις, ὑπολαβόντες, ἂν μὲν τρέφονται τούτοις, προκατασύραντες τὴν χώραν ἀσφαλῆ ποιήσονται τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ῥών διάβασιν, ἐν ὃ μέλλει καὶ βουλεύεται συναθροί- 9 ζεσθαι πάλιν τὸ τῶν Ἀχαϊῶν πλῆθος, ἂν δὲ καταπλαγέντες φυγομαχώσι καὶ μὴ βούλωνται συμβάλλειν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἅρατον, ἀνευ κινδύνου ποιήσονται τῇ ἀπόλυσιν, ὅποταν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ 10 συμφέρειν. οὕτως μὲν οὖν τοιούτως χρησάμενοι λογισμοῖς προῆγον, καὶ κατεστράτοπεδευσαν περὶ Μεθύδρων τῆς Μεγαλοπολίτιδος.

11 Οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀχαϊῶν ἥγεμόνες, συνέντες τὴν παρ- ουσίαν τῶν Ἀἰτωλῶν, οὕτως κακῶς ἐχρήσαντο τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς ὑπερβολὴν ἀνοίας μὴ καταλιπεῖν. 2 ἀναστρέψαντες γὰρ ἐκ τῆς Κλειτορίας κατεστρατο-

322
up all his force, fearful on the one hand lest he should attack them while occupied in embarking and eager also to stir up war, sent his booty off to the ships, under charge of a sufficient force of competent men to superintend the passage, ordering those in charge of the ships to meet him at Rhium where it was his intention to embark, while he himself at first accompanied the booty to protect it during its shipment and afterwards reversed the direction of his march and advanced towards Olympia. There he heard that Taurion with the forces I mentioned above was in the neighbourhood of Cleitor, and judging that, this being so, he would not be able to embark at Rhium in security and without an engagement, he thought it most in his interest to make all haste to encounter Aratus, whose army was still weak and who had no suspicion of his intention. He thought that if he defeated him, he could first ravage the country and then embark safely at Rhium, while Aratus was occupied in taking measures for again mustering the Achaeans, whereas, if Aratus were intimidated and refused a battle, he could safely withdraw whenever he thought fit. Acting therefore on these considerations he advanced and encamped near Methydrium in the territory of Megalopolis.

11. The Achaean commanders, when they became aware of the approach of the Aetolians, mismanaged matters to such an extent that it was impossible for anyone to have acted more stupidly. For, returning from the territory of Cleitor, they encamped near
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

3 πέδευσαν περὶ Καφύας, τῶν δὲ Αἰτωλῶν ποιουμένων τὴν πορείαν ἀπὸ Μεθυδρίου παρὰ τὴν τῶν Ὄρχο-
μενίων πόλιν ἐξάγοντες τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐν τῷ τῶν
Καφυών πεδίῳ παρενέβαλον, πρόβλημα ποιούμε-

4 νοι τὸν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἴσοντα ποταμόν. οἱ δὲ Αἰτωλοὶ
καὶ διὰ τὰς μεταξὺ δυσχωρίας (ὁσαν γὰρ ἔτι
πρὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τάφροι καὶ πλείους δύσβατοι)
καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐπίφασιν τῆς ἐτομότητος τῶν Ἀχαιῶν
πρὸς τὸν κύδωνιν τοὺς μὲν ἐγχειρεῖν τοὺς ὑπεναν-
τίως κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν ἀπεδείκθαν,

5 μετὰ δὲ πολλῆς εὐταξίας ἐποιοῦντο τὴν πορείαν
ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἄλιγμαντον, ἀσμε-
νίζοντες εἰ μὴ τοὺς αὐτοῖς ἐγχειρεῖ καὶ βιάζοντο

6 κινδυνεύειν. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν "Αρατον, τῆς μὲν
πρωτοπορείας τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ήδη προσβαίνουσας
πρὸς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς, τῶν δὲ ἱππέων οὐραγοῦντον
dia τοῦ πεδίου καὶ συνεγγιζόντων τῷ προσαγο-

7 ρεμομένῳ Πρόποδι τῆς παρωρείας, ἐξαποστέλλουσι
touς ἱππεῖς καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους, 'Επίστρατον
ἐπιστήσαντες τὸν Ἀκαρνάνα, καὶ συντάξαντες
ἐξάπτεσαν τῆς οὐραγίας καὶ καταπεράζεις τῶν

8 πολεμίων. καίτοι γε εἰ μὲν τὴν κινδυνεύτου, οὐ
πρὸς τὴν οὐραγίαν ἔχριν συμπλέκεσθαι δυνητικῶν
ηδῆ τῶν πολεμίων τοὺς ὁμαλοὺς τόπους, πρὸς
δὲ τὴν πρωτοπορείαν εὐθέως ἐμβαλόντων εἰς τὸ

9 πεδίον. οὕτως γὰρ ἄν τῶν ἀγῶνα συνέβη γενέσθαι
tον ὁλον ἐν τοῖς ἔπιπεδοις καὶ πεδινοῖς τόποις,
οὐ τοὺς μὲν Αἰτωλοὺς δυσχρηστοτάτους εἶναι

324
Caphyae, and when the Aetolians began to march from Methydrion past Orchomenus, they led out the Achaean forces and drew them up in the plain of Caphyae, with the river which traverses it in their front. The Aetolians, both owing to the difficulties of the ground between the two armies—for besides the river there were several awkward ditches—and owing to the display of readiness for battle on the part of the Achaeans, were afraid of attacking the enemy as they had intended, but marched in admirable order towards the heights by Olygyrtus, thinking themselves lucky if no one attacked them and forced them to fight. But Aratus, when the van of the Aetolians was already beginning to mount the heights, and while their cavalry were protecting their rear and approaching the spot at the foot of the hill called Propous, or Foothill, sent out his cavalry and light-armed infantry under the command of the Acarnanian Epistratus, ordering him to get into touch with the enemy's rear and harass them. Now if he had decided to engage the enemy, he should not have attacked their rear after they had already got over the level ground, but their van the moment they entered the plain; for thus the whole battle would have been on flat ground, where the Aetolians are very inefficient, owing to their accoutrement and general tactics, while the Achaeans, owing to their total difference in both these respects, are very capable and strong. But now neglecting to avail themselves of the time and place that suited
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

eis ta twn polemiwn proterhmatata sygkaté-

12 bysas. tougarouin akolouthon to telos exébhi tou

ciwdhnon taís epibolais. eixaptoménwv gár twn
euvówn tetroúntes oi twn Aitwllwn Íppheis tén
táxewn anechoýroun eis tén paróreian, espéoutetes
2 svnápsi tois par' autów pégois. oi Í de peri ton

"Ara ton ou te katioudites kalwos to ginómevno
ou't eklogisaménei deiówns to meta taíta sy姆bhe-
sómevno, amia t' Íppheis idein upoxwroúntas
3 elpísantes autous feýgein, toun méns apó twn
kerástwn thwrikítas exapéstelain, paraqgeílan-
tes botheín kai svnáptein tois par' autów eu-

4 xwónou, autoi Í' épi kérais klimántes tén dúnamen
4 Ígon meta' drómov kai spoudhís. oí Í de twn Aitw-

5 lantess exemvno, tous de peziou Íthroiou prós t' 
plágia kai parékallon, étoimous prós tén kranhýn
ánatrochoúntow kai paraqesóúntow åei t'n ék
6 tís poréias. Ípeí Í' axiomachous úpélabov einai
sphás autous kata to plhðos, swstraféntes
enébalon tois proamachomévous tón 'Axaímwn Íp-
péwn kai xiláwn. otites de pleíous kai poiounvnoi
tén éphdo w eí upérdeziw polúv mév chrónon ékiv-
dúnevavn, telos Í' étrépsanto tous svkakásthwta.
7 en de t' Ítous exklínantaí feýgein oí paraqeh-
thoúntes thwrikítai kata poréias átaktws eis-
paraqenómenvoi kai sporádhn, oí méns apoórnutes
epi tois ginomévnoi, oí Í de svmpipántontes án'toi

tois feýghouj kata tén apoxwríxen, ánastérfew
8 Ínagnkáxovto kai to parapltísion pouiein. éx oú

326

Digitized by Google
them they yielded up every advantage to the enemy. In consequence the result of the battle was what naturally follows on such an opening. 12. For when the light-armed troops got in touch with them, the Aetolian cavalry retired to the foot of the hill in good order with the object of joining their infantry. But Aratus, who had neither observed well what was happening nor calculated properly what would follow, thinking, the moment he saw the cavalry retreating, that they were in flight, sent the cuirassed troops from his wings with orders to join and support his light-armed force, while he himself, forming his men in column, led them on at the double. The Aetolian horse, having traversed the plain, joined their infantry, and while halting there, themselves under the shelter of the hill, began to collect the infantry on their flanks by calling on them, the men on the march giving a ready ear to their shouts and running back and falling in to help. When they thought they were sufficiently strong, they formed up close and fell upon the leading lines of the Achaean horse and light infantry. As they were superior in number, and as they were charging from higher ground, after a somewhat lengthy struggle they at length put their adversaries to flight. When these gave way and ran, the cuirassed men who were hurrying up to help them, and kept arriving in no order and in batches, some of them being at a loss to know what was the matter and others coming into collision with the fugitives, were compelled to turn round and take to flight also. The consequence was that
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

9 δὲ φεύγοντας πλείους διαχιλίων. τοὺς δὲ πράγματος αὐτοῦ διδάσκοντος τοὺς Αἰτωλούς ὁ δὲ οὖν ποιεῖν, εἴποντο κατόπιν ἐπιπολαστικῶς καὶ κατα-

10 κόρως χρωμένοι τῇ κραυγῇ. ποιομένων δὲ τῶν Ἀχαϊκῶν τὴν ἀποχώρησιν πρὸς τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὄπλων ὡς μενόντων ὑπὸ ταῖς ἀσφαλείαις ἐπὶ τῆς ἕξ ἀρχῆς τάξεως, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εὐσχήμων ἐγένεθ’

11 ἡ φυγὴ καὶ σωτηρίως· συνθεσάμενοι δὲ καὶ τοῦτος λελοιπότας τὰς τῶν τόπων ἀσφαλείας καὶ μακροῦς ὄντας ἐν πορείᾳ καὶ διαλευκύνουσιν, οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν εὐθέως διαρρέοντες ἀτάκτως ἑπούσια τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ἐπὶ τὰς παρακείμενας

12 πόλεις, οἱ δὲ συμπίπτοντες ἀντίοις τοῖς ἐπιφερο-

13 μένοις φαλαγγίταις οὐ προσεδέοντο τῶν πολεμῶν, αὐτοὶ δὲ σφαῖς αὐτοὺς ἐκπλήττοντες ἤναγκαζον

13 φεύγειν προτροπάδην. ἔχρωντο δὲ τῇ φυγῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀποχώρησιν, ὡς προείπομεν, ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις· ὁ τε γὰρ Ὁρχομενὸς αἰ te Καφύα σύνεγγυς οὖσαν πολλοὺς ὄνησαν. μὴ γὰρ τούτου συμβάστος ἀπαν-

14 τε ἐκυκνύρευσαν διαφαρμῆναι παραλόγως.

13 τούτον ἀπέβη τὸν τρόπον· οἱ δὲ Μεγαλοπολῖται συνέντευσε τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς περὶ τὸ Μεθύδρων ἐστρα-

12 τοπεδευκότας, ἦκον ἀπὸ σάλπυγγος πανδημεῖλ βοη-

3 τῶν ἐχθρῶν τετελευτηκότας. ὀρύζαντες δὲ τάφρων ἐν τῷ τῶν Καφύων πεδίῳ, καὶ συναθροίσαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς, ἐκθέσαν μετὰ πάσης φιλοτιμίας τοὺς ἡτυχηκότας.

328
while those routed on the field were not above five hundred, the number of those in flight exceeded two thousand. The circumstances of the moment making it clear to the Aetolians what was to be done, they followed on the heel of the enemy with insolent and continued shouts. The retreat of the Achaean was at first an honourable retirement, as it seemed, to a position of safety, since they imagined they were falling back on their heavy-armed troops whom they supposed to be still strong in their original position. But upon seeing that the latter also had quitted their strong position and were already far off and marching in a straggling line, some of them at once dispersed and fled in disorder to the neighbouring towns, while those who encountered the men of their own phalanx marching in the opposite direction, had no need of the enemy, but threw their comrades as well as themselves into a panic and forced them to headlong flight. They fled, as I said, to the towns, Orchomenus and Caphyae being quite near and affording refuge to many: for if this had not been the case the whole force would have run the risk of a destruction as complete as unexpected.

Such was the issue of the battle at Caphyae. 13. The Megalopolitans, on hearing that the Aetolians were encamped at Methydrum, summoned their whole levy by trumpet and arrived to help the day after the battle, so that they were compelled to bury, slain by the foe, the very men side by side with whom they had expected to stand and meet that foe in battle. Digging a trench in the plain of Caphyae, they collected the bodies and interred the unfortunates with all due honours.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

4 Ὅδε Ἀῖτωλοὶ παραδόξως δὲ αὐτῶν τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν ποιήσαντες τὸ προτέρημα, λοιπὸν ἢδη μετὰ ἀσφαλείας διὰ μέσης Πελοποννήσου διήσαν. ἔνων καὶ καταπειράσαντες μὲν τῆς Πελληνῶν πόλεως, κατασύραντες δὲ τῆς Σικυωνίαν χώραν, τέλος κατὰ τὸν ἴσθμον ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἀπόλυσιν.

6 Τὴν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀφορμὴν ὁ συμμαχικὸς πόλεμος ἔσχεν ἐκ τούτων, τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν ἐκ τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα γενομένου δόγματος ἀπάντων τῶν συμμάχων, ὁ συνελθόντες εἰς τὴν τῶν Κορινθίων πόλιν ἐπεκύρωσαν, διαπρατενεύσαντο τὸ διαβοῦ-λιον Φιλίππου τοῦ βασιλέως. τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πλήθος μετὰ τινας ἡμέρας ἁθροισθὲν εἰς τὴν καθήκουσαν σύνοδον, πικρῶς διέκειτο καὶ κοινῆ καὶ κατ’ ἰδίαν πρὸς τὸν Ἄρατον ὡς τούτων ὀμολογομένως αἴτιον γεγονότα τοῦ προειρημένου συμ-πτώματος. διὸ καὶ τῶν ἀντιπολιτευμένων κατηγοροῦντων αὐτοῦ καὶ φερόντων ἀπολογισμοὺς ἐναργεῖς, ἦτο μᾶλλον ἡγανάκτει καὶ παρωξύνετο τὸ πλῆθος. ἔδοκεν γὰρ πρῶτον ἀμάρτημα προ-βανὲς εἶναι τὸ μιθέω τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶ καθηκούσης προλαβόντα τὸν ἄλλοτριον καιρὸν ἀναδέχεσθαι τοιαῦτα πράξεις ἐν αἷς συνήδει πολλάκις αὐτῷ διεσφαλμένῳ. δεύτερον δὲ καὶ μείζω ντούτου τὸ διαφέρειν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἀκμῆν ἐν μέσω Πελοποννή-σου τῶν Ἀῖτωλῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ προδιελληφότα διότι σπεύδοντο οἱ περὶ τὸν Σκόπαν καὶ Δωρίμαχον κινεῖν τὰ καθεστώτα καὶ συντα-5 ράζαι τὸν πόλεμον· τρίτον δὲ τὸ συμβαλεῖν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις οὕτω μετ’ ὀλίγων μηδεμίας κατ- επειγούσης ἀνάγκης, δυνάμενον ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὰς 380
The Aetolians, having in this remarkable manner won a battle with their cavalry and light infantry alone, continued to advance henceforth in safety through the middle of the Peloponnese. After making an attempt on Pellene during their march and pillaging the territory of Sicyon, they finally withdrew by way of the Isthmus.

Such was the cause and origin of the Social War, its beginning being the resolution passed by all the allies, who assembling at Corinth under the presidency of King Philip, confirmed this measure. A few days afterwards the Achaean Federal Assembly held its regular general meeting, at which both the whole body and the individual numbers showed themselves very bitterly disposed towards Aratus as having indisputably caused the late disaster, and so when his political opponents accused him, producing clear proofs of his culpability, the Assembly became still more exasperated and embittered against him. For the general opinion was that he had manifestly erred in the first place in usurping his predecessor’s office before the time in order to undertake the sort of enterprise in which to his own knowledge he had often failed. His second and graver error lay in his having disbanded the Achaean while the Aetolians were still in the very heart of the Peloponnese, especially as he had been previously aware that Scopas and Dorimachus were doing their best to disturb the existing settlement and stir up war. Thirdly, he had engaged the enemy with such a small force, when there was no urgent necessity to do so, as he might

* See Chapter 25.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

παρακειμένας πόλεις ἀποχωρήσαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν 
τοὺς Ἁχαιοὺς καὶ τότε συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις,
6 εἰ τοῦτο πάντως ἤγειτο συμφέρειν· τελευταίον 
καὶ μέγιστον τὸ προθέμενον καὶ συμβαλεῖν οὕτως 
eἰκῇ καὶ ἀσκότως χρήσασθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡστε 
παρέντα τὰ πεδία καὶ τὴν τῶν ὀπλιτῶν χρείαν δι’ 
αὐτῶν τῶν εὐξώνων ταῖς παρωρείαις πρὸς Αἰτω-
λοῦς ποιῆσασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, οἷς οὐδὲν ἦν τοῦτον 
7 προσγραίτερον οὐδὲ οἰκείότερον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ 
ἀμα τῷ προελθόντα τὸν Ἀρατον ἀναμνῆσαι μὲν 
tῶν προτεπολιτευμένων καὶ πεπραγμένων πρότε-
ρον αὐτῷ, φέρειν δ’ ἀπολογισμοῦς περὶ τῶν ἐγκα-
lουμένων ως οὐ γέγονεν αἰτίος τῶν συμβεβηκότων,
αἰτεῖσθαι δὲ συγγνώμην εἰ καὶ τι παρεώρακε κατὰ 
tὸν γενόμενον κίνδυνον, οἷς θεοῦ δὲ δεῖ καὶ καθόλου 
σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ πράγματα μὴ πικρῶς ἀλλ’ ἄνθρωπο-
8 νως, οὕτως ταχέως καὶ μεγαλοπύκτως μετεμελήθη 
tὸ πλήθος ὡστε καὶ τοῖς συνεπιτιθεμένοις αὐτῷ 
tῶν ἀντιπολιτευμένων ἐπὶ πολὺ δυσαρεστήσας καὶ 
περὶ τῶν ἂξίω μὴ βουλεύσεθαι κατὰ τὴν Ἀράτου 
γνώμην.
9 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν προτέραν ἔπεσεν ὀλυμπιάδα,
tὰ δὲ ἂξίως εἰς τὴν τετταρακοστὴν ἔπι ταῖς ἑκατον.
15 ᾧ ἦν δὲ τὰ δόξαντα τοὺς Ἁχαιοὺς ταῦτα· προσβεβείν 
πρὸς Ἡπείροτας Βοιωτοὺς Φυκέας Ἀκαρνάνας.
2 Φιλιπποῦ, καὶ διασαφεῖν τίνα τρόπον Αἰτωλοῦ 
παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας μεθ’ ὁπλῶν τηδὲ διὸς εἰσοβε-
βληκότες εἰῆσαν εἰς τὴν Ἁχαιαν, καὶ παρακαλεῖν 
αὐτοὺς βοηθεῖν κατὰ τὰς ὀμολογίας, προσδέξασθαι
3 δὲ καὶ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους εἰς τὴν συμμαχίαν· τῶν 
δὲ στρατηγῶν ἐπιλέξατο τῶν Ἁχαιῶν πεζοὺς μὲν

382
have retired safely to the towns close at hand and reassembled the Achaean forces before giving battle. But his fourth and greatest error was, that when he had decided to fight he managed matters so casually and inconsiderately, that neglecting to avail himself of the plain and make a proper use of his hoplites, he elected to fight on the hill, with only his light-armed troops, against Aetolians to whom nothing is more advantageous and familiar than such conditions. Nevertheless, when Aratus rose, and after reminding them of his conduct of affairs and achievements in the past, defended himself against the accusations, maintaining that he was not responsible for what occurred; and when he asked their pardon if he had possibly been guilty of any oversight in the battle, and said he thought that in general it was better to view facts in no spirit of bitterness, but with human charity: he produced such a rapid and generous revulsion of feeling in the Assembly, that they remained for long displeased with those of his political opponents who had joined in the attack on him, and as to the immediate future adopted Aratus' opinion in every matter. This took place in the previous Olympiad; what follows falls in the 140th.

15. The resolution passed by the Achaegans was as follows: To send embassies to the Epirotes, Boeotians, Phocians, Acarnanians, and to Philip, pointing out how the Aetolians had twice, in direct breach of the treaty, entered Achaea in arms, and begging for assistance according to the terms of their alliance and also for the admission of the Messenians into the confederacy. The Strategus of the Achaeans
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

πεντακισχιλίους ἱππεῖς δὲ πεντακοσίους, καὶ βοηθεῖν τοὺς Μεσσηνίους, ἐὰν ἐπιβαίνωσιν Αἰτωλοὶ
4 τῆς χώρας αὐτῶν. συντάξασθαι δὲ καὶ πρὸς Λακεδαμινίους καὶ πρὸς Μεσσηνίους δοῦσιν δεήσοι
παρ' ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἱππεῖς καὶ πεζοὺς πρὸς τὰς
5 κοινὰς χρείας. δοξάντων δὲ τούτων οἱ μὲν Ἁχαιοὶ
φέρουσε γενναίως τὸ γεγονὸς οὐτε τοὺς Μεσσηνίους ἐγκατέληπτον οὔτε τὴν αὐτῶν πρόθεσιν, οἱ
δὲ πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους καθεσταμένους τὰς προ-
6 σβείας ἐπετέλουν, ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς
Ἀχαϊάς ἄνδρας ἐπέλεγε κατὰ τὸ δόγμα, πρὸς δὲ
τοὺς Λακεδαμινίους καὶ Μεσσηνίους συνετάττετο
πεζοὺς μὲν παρ' ἐκατέρων ὑπάρχειν διαχιλίους καὶ
πεντακοσίους ἱππείς δὲ πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίους,
7 ὑστ' εἶναι τὸ πᾶν σύστημα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιγενομένας
χρείας πεζοὺς μὲν μυρίους ἱππεῖς δὲ χιλίους.

8 Οἱ δ' Ἁιτωλοὶ, παραγενομένης αὐτοῖς τῆς καθ-
ηκουσης ἐκκλησίας, συνελθόντες ἐβουλεύσαντο
πρὸς τε Λακεδαμινίους καὶ Μεσσηνίους καὶ τοὺς
ἀλλούς πάντας εἰρήνην ἄγειν, κακοπραγμονοῦντες
καὶ βουλόμενοι φθείρειν καὶ λυμαίνεσθαι τοὺς τῶν
9 Ἁχαιῶν συμμάχους. πρὸς αὐτοὺς δὲ τοὺς Ἁ-
χαιοὺς, ἐὰν μὲν ἀφιστῶνται τῆς τῶν Μεσσηνίων
συμμαχίας, ἄγειν ἕσησαντο τὴν εἰρήνην, εἰ δὲ
10 μὴ, πολέμειν, πράγμα πάντων ἀλογώτατον. ὅντες
γὰρ αὐτοὶ σύμμαχοι καὶ τῶν Ἁχαιῶν καὶ τῶν
Μεσσηνίων, εἰ μὲν οὕτω πρὸς ἄλληλους φιλίαι
ἄγουε καὶ συμμαχίαι, τὸν πόλεμον τοῖς Ἁχαιοῖς
ἐπήγειλον, εἰ δὲ ἔχθραν ἐλουτοὶ πρὸς τοὺς Με-
σσηνίους, τὴν εἰρήνην αὐτοῖς ἐποίουν κατὰ μόνας,
11 ὡστε μὴν ὑπὸ λόγου πίπτειν τὴν ἄδικιαν αὐτῶν
diὰ τὸ παρηλλαγμένον αὐτῶν τῶν ἐγχειρημάτων.
334
was to levy a force of five thousand foot and five hundred horse, and to go to the assistance of the Messenians, should the Aetolians invade their country. He was further to arrange with Sparta and Messene how many cavalry and infantry each state should contribute for the needs of the League. Having passed this resolution the Achaeans continued to bear their late reverse bravely, and neither abandoned the Messenians nor their own purpose. The ambassadors sent to the allies executed their instructions, and the Strategus enrolled in Achaia the number of men decided on, and arranged with the Lacedaemonians and Messenians that they should each send two thousand five hundred foot and two hundred and fifty horse, so that the whole force available for the coming campaign amounted to ten thousand foot and a thousand horse.

The Aetolians, when the time came for their regular annual Assembly to meet, voted to maintain peace with the Lacedaemonians, Messenians, and all the other states, with the mischievous design of corrupting and spoiling the allies of the Achaeans. As regards the Achaeans themselves they voted to be at peace with them if they abandoned the Messenian alliance, but if this alliance were maintained to go to war with them. Nothing could have been more unreasonable. For they were themselves allies of both the Achaeans and Messenians, and now if these two states remained in alliance with each other they threatened to declare war on the Achaeans, but they offered a separate peace to the Achaeans if they chose to be at enmity with the Messenians. So that no reasonable explanation can be given of their iniquity, so utterly wrong-headed were their designs.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

16  Οἵ δὲ Ἡπειρώται καὶ Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀκούσαντες τῶν πρέσβεων τοὺς μὲν Μεσσηνίονς
2 εἰς τὴν συμμαχίαν προσέλαβον, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν πεπραγμένους παρατικά μὲν ἡγανάκτησαν, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἔθαμμασαν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν παράδοξον τῶν εἰθισμένων δὲ τι πεποιηκέναι τοὺς
3 Αἰτωλοὺς. διόπερ οὖθ’ ὤργίσθησαν ἐπὶ πλεῖον, ἀλλ’ ἐφηφίσαντο τὴν εἰρήνην ἀγεννὸς πρὸς αὐτούς·
οὕτως ἡ συνεχὴς ἀδικία συγγενώμης τυγχάνει μᾶλλον τῆς σπανίου καὶ παραδόξου πονηρίας.
4 Αἰτωλοὶ γοὺς τούτων τῷ τρόπῳ χρώμενοι καὶ ληστεύοντες συνεχῶς τὴν Ἐλλάδα, καὶ πολέμους
ἀνεπαγγέλτους φέροντες πολλοῖς, οὖθ’ ἀπολογίας ἔτι κατηχίζουν τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσε-
χεύοντες εἰ τις αὐτοὺς εἰς δικαιοδοσίαν προκολούθων περὶ τῶν γεγονότων ἡ καὶ νῆ Δίᾳ τῶν μελλόντων.
5 οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προσφάτως μὲν ἠλευθερωμένοι
dι’ Ἀντιγόνου καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν Ἀχαϊῶν φιλοτι-
μίας, ὀφείλοντες δὲ Μακεδόνιοι καὶ Φίλιππῳ μηδὲν
ὑπεναντίον πράττενεν, διαπεμψάμενοι λάθρα πρὸς
τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς φιλίαν δι’ ἀπορρήτων ἔθεντο καὶ
συμμαχίαν.
6 Ἡδὴ δὲ ἐπιλεγμένων τῶν Ἀχαϊῶν νεανίσκων
cαὶ συντεταγμένων ὑπὲρ τῆς βοηθείας τῶν Λακε-
dαιμονίων καὶ Μεσσηνίων, Σικερδιλαίδας ὡς καὶ
Δημήτριος ὁ Φάριος ἐπλευσαν ἐκ τῆς ‘Ιλλυ-
ρίδος ἐνενήκοντα λέμβοις ἔξω τοῦ Λίσσου παρὰ
7 τὰς πρὸς ’Ρωμαίους συνθήκας. οἱ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον
τῇ Πύλῳ προσμίζοντες καὶ ποιησάμενοι προσ-
8 βολὰς ἀπέπεσον· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Δημήτριος μὲν
ἐχῶν τοὺς πεντήκοντα τῶν λέμβων ὃρμησεν ἐπὶ
νήσων, καὶ περιπλέων τυνὰς μὲν ἦγευρολόγει.
BOOK IV. 16. 1–8

16. The Epirots and Philip, after listening to the envoys, agreed to receive the Messenians into the alliance. They felt a momentary indignation at the proceedings of the Aetolians, but were not deeply shocked at them, as the Aetolians had not acted in a manner to surprise anyone, but simply as is their habit. Consequently their resentment was of brief duration, and they voted to remain at peace with the Aetolians. So true is it that persistent wrongdoing is more readily pardoned than occasional and startling acts of iniquity. The Aetolians at least, continuing to behave in this manner, constantly pillaging Greece and committing frequent acts of war without declaration, not only never thought it worth the trouble to defend themselves against complaints, but ridiculed anyone who called them to account for their past offences or even for their future designs. As for the Lacedaemonians, though they had been so recently set free through Antigonus, and through the spirited action of the Achaeans, and should not have in any way acted against the Macedonians and Philip, they sent privately to the Aetolians and made a secret alliance with them.

The Achaean levy had been enrolled, and the Lacedaemonians and Messenians had contracted to send their contingents, when Scerdilaïdas, together with Demetrius of Pharos, sailed from Illyria with a fleet of ninety boats and passed Lissus, thus breaking the treaty with Rome. They touched first at Pylos and made some attacks on it which failed. Demetrius now with fifty of the boats started for the islands, and sailing through the Cyclades pillaged or levied
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

9 τινὰς δ’ ἐπόρθει τῶν Κυκλάδων, Σκερδιλαΐδας δὲ ποιοῦμενος τὸν πλοῦν ὡς ἐπ’ οἴκου προσείχε πρὸς Ναύπακτον μετὰ τετταράκοντα λέμβων, πεισθεὶς Ἀμυνᾶ τῷ βασιλεῖ τῶν Ἀθαμάνων, ὡς ἐτύγχανε
10 κηδεστής ὑπάρχων αὐτοῦ, ποιησάμενος δὲ συνθήκας πρὸς Ἀιτωλοὺς δι’ Ἀγελάου περὶ τοῦ μερισμοῦ τῶν λαφύρων ὑπέσχετο συνεμβαλεῖν ὁμόσε τοῖς Ἀιτωλοῖς εἰς τὴν Ἀχαΐαν.

11 Συνθέμενοι δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Σκερδιλαΐδαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀγέλαον καὶ Δωρίμαχον καὶ Σκόπαν, πραττομένης αὐτοῖς τῆς τῶν Κυναϊθέων πόλεως, συναδροίσαντες πανδημεῖ τοὺς Ἀιτωλοὺς ἐνέβαλον εἰς τὴν Ἀχαίαν μετα τῶν Ἰλλυρίων. Ἀριστων δ’ ὅ τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν στρατηγός, οὐ προσστούμενος οὐδὲν τῶν γνωμομένων, ἤγε τὴν ἤσυχιάν ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκείας, φάσκων οὐ πολεμεῖν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀλλὰ διατηρεῖ τὴν εἰρήνην, εὐθέσει καὶ παιδικὸν πράγμα ποιῶν ἰδίων γὰρ ὡς εὐθῆ καὶ μάταιον εἰκὸς φαίνεσθαι τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅταν ὑπολαμβάνῃ τοῖς λόγοις ἐπικρύψασθαι τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων ἔναργειας. οἱ δὲ περὶ τῶν Δωρίμαχον διὰ τῆς Ἀχαϊάτιδος ποιησάμενοι τὴν πορείαν

2 ἦκον ἄφνω πρὸς τὴν Κύναιθαν. συνέβαινε δὲ τοὺς Κυναϊθέως δοντας Ἀρκάδας ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων [ἐν] ἀκαταπαύστως καὶ μεγάλαις συνεχήσεις στάσεις, καὶ πολλὰς μὲν κατ’ ἀλλήλων πεποίησθαι σφαγά καὶ φυγάς, πρὸς δὲ τούτων ἄρπαγας
3 ὑπαρχόντων, ἔτι δὲ γῆς ἀναδασμοῦς, τέλος δ’ ἐπικρατήσας τοὺς τὰ τῶν Ἀχαϊών αἰρομένους καὶ κατασχεῖν τῷ τοῦ ἐχοντας τῶν τειχῶν καὶ στρατηγὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐξ Ἀχαιας.

4 τούτων δ’ οὕτως ἐχόντων, ὀλίγοις ἐμπροσθὲν χρόνοις τῆς τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν παρουσίας διασπερμομὲνοι 338.
blackmail on some of them. Scerdilaïdas on his voyage home touched at Naupactus with his forty boats at the request of Amynas, the king of Aetamania, who was his connexion by marriage. Here, having come to terms with the Aetolians through Agelaus about the division of the spoil, he promised to join them in invading Achaea.

Agelaus, Dorimachus, and Scopas were negotiating for the betrayal to them of the city of Cynaetha, and having made this arrangement with Scredilaïdas, they collected the Aetolian forces *en masse* and invaded Achaea with the Illyrians. 17. Meanwhile Ariston, the Aetolian Strategus, in pretended ignorance of what was going on, kept quiet in Aetolia, asserting that he was not making war on the Achaeans but keeping the peace; which was most foolish and childish on his part. For it is obvious that a man who thinks he can cloak by words the clear evidence of facts must be regarded as a foolish and futile person. Dorimachus, marching through Achaea, appeared suddenly before Cynaetha. The people of Cynaetha, who are Arcadians, had been for many years vexed by the never-ending and embittered strife of factions; there had been constant massacres, expulsions, robbery of goods, and confiscation of lands by the one party or the other, and now at length the Achaean party had the upper hand and were in possession of the city, the Achaeans furnishing them with a garrison to hold the walls and a military governor of the city. Such was the state of affairs, when a short time before the arrival of the Aetolians, upon the exiles sending frequent
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

νων τῶν φυγάδων πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ δεσμέων διαλυθῆναι πρὸς αὐτούς καὶ κατάγειν σφάς
7 εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, πεισθέντες οἱ κατέχοντες τὴν πόλιν ἐπρέσβευον πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀχαίων ἔθνους,
βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῆς ἐκείνων γνώμης ποιεῖσθαι
8 τὰς διαλύσεις. ἐπιχωρησάντων δὲ ἐτοίμως διὰ
τὸ πεπεῖσθαι σφίσι ἀμφοτέρους εὐνοῆσεν, ἀτε
τῶν μὲν κατεχόντων τὴν πόλιν ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαίοις
ἐχόντων πάσας τὰς ἐλπίδας, τῶν δὲ καταπορευο-
μένων μελλόντων τυχάνειν τῆς σωτηρίας διὰ τὴν
9 τῶν Ἀχαίων συγκατάθεσιν, οὕτως ἀποστείλαντες
τὴν παραφυλακὴν καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως
οἱ Κυναιθῆς διελύσαντο καὶ κατήγαγον τοὺς
φυγάδας, ὡς σχεδὸν εἰς τριακοσίους, λαβόντες
πίστεις τῶν παρ’ ἀνθρώποις νομίζομένων τὰς
10 ἵσχυροτάτας. οἱ δὲ κατανοοῦσαντες οὐχ ὡς
ἀιτίας ἤ προφάσεως ἐπιγενομένης τοῦ δοκεῖν
ἀλλὰς διαφορὰς ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς τινα γεγενῆσθαι,
τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον παραχρήμα κατελθόντες εὐθέως
11 ἐπεθυμεῖν τῇ πατρίδι καὶ τοῖς σώσασι. καὶ μοι
δοκοῦσιν, καθ’ ὄν καὶρὸν ἐπὶ τῶν σφαγίων τοὺς
ὄρκους καὶ τὰς πίστεις ἐδίδοσαν ἀλλήλοις, τότε
μάλιστα διανοεῖσθαι περὶ τε τῆς εἰς τὸ θεῖον καὶ
12 τοὺς πιστεύσαντας ἀσέβειας. ἄμα γαρ τῷ μετα-
σχεῖν τῆς πολιτείας εὐθέως ἐπεσπώντο τοὺς Αἰ-
τωλοὺς καὶ τοῦτοι ἐπράττον τὴν πόλιν, σπεύδοντες
τοὺς σώσαντας ἄμα καὶ τὴν θρέψασαν ἄρδην ἀπο-
λέσαι.

18 Τῇ δὲ πρᾶξιν τοιαδέ των τόλμη καὶ τοιούτω
2 τρόπῳ συνεστήσαντο. πολέμαρχοι τῶν κατελη-
340
messages to those in the city entreating them to be reconciled and permit them to return home, the party in possession sent envoys to the Achaean League, wishing the reconciliation to be with their consent. The Achaeans readily agreed, as they felt sure that they would thus gain the goodwill of both factions, since those who were masters of the city were entirely devoted to them and the home-coming exiles would owe their safe return to the consent of the League. Accordingly, the Cynaetheans dismissed the garrison and commandant from the city and recalled the exiles, who numbered about three hundred, exacting from them such pledges as are generally regarded among mankind as most binding. But these repatriated citizens, not because they had any cause or pretext subsequent to their readmission for suspecting that other contentions were imminent, but on the contrary from the very moment of their return, set about conspiring against their city and their preservers. I am even inclined to think that at the very instant when they were mutually pledging their faith by solemn oaths over the sacrifice, their minds were full of the impious project of breaking their faith to heaven and to those who trusted in them. For no sooner were they again associated in the government than they began to solicit the Aetolians and offer to betray the city to them, taking the safest and swiftest means of bringing to utter destruction those to whom they owed their safety and the city in whose lap they had been nourished.

18. The coup de main by which they executed their project was as follows. Some among the returned
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

λυθότων τινές ἐγεγόνεισαν· ταύτην δὲ συμβαίνει τὴν ἀρχήν κλείειν τὰς πύλας καὶ τὸν μεταξὺ χρόνον κυριεύειν τῶν κλειδῶν, ποιεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸ καθ’ ἢμέραν τὴν δίαιταν ἐπὶ τῶν πυλώνων. οἱ μὲν οὖν Αἴτωλοι διεσκευασμένοι καὶ τὰς κλίμακας έτοίμας ἔχοντες ἐπετήρουν τὸν καιρὸν. οἱ δὲ πολεμαρχοῦντες τῶν φυγάδων, κατασφάζοντας τοὺς συνάρχοντας ταῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ πυλώνος, ἀνέωξαν τὴν πύλην. οὐ δὲ συμβάντος τινές μὲν τῶν Αἴτωλῶν διὰ ταύτης εἰσέπιπτον, τινὲς δὲ τὰς κλίμακας προσερείσαντες ἐβιάσαντο διὰ τούτων καὶ κατελάμβανον τὸ τείχος. 6 οἱ δ’ ἐν τῇ πόλει πάντες ἐκπλαγεῖσι οὕτως ἐπὶ τοῖς συντελουμένοις, ἀπόρως καὶ δυσχρήστως εἶχον πρὸς τὸ συμβαίνον· οὕτε γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς διὰ τῆς πύλης εἰσπίπτοντας οἱ τῇ ἱσαν βοθεῖν ἀπεριστάστως διὰ τοὺς πρὸς τὰ τείχη προσβάλλοντας, οὐδὲ μὴν τοῖς τείχεσιν ἐπαμύνειν διὰ τοὺς τῇ πύλῃ βιασύνενους. οἱ δ’ Αἴτωλοι διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ταχέως ἐγκρατεῖσι γενόμενοι τῆς πόλεως τῶν ἀδίκων ἔργων ἐν τούτῳ ἐπραξαν δικαιοτατόν· πρῶτος γὰρ τοὺς εἰσαγαγόντας καὶ προδότας αὐτοῖς τὴν πόλιν κατασφάξαντες διήρπασαν τοὺς τούτων βίους. ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐχρήσατο πάσιν. τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον ἐπισκηνώσαντες ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκίας ἐξετοξωρύχθησαν μὲν τοὺς βίους, ἐστρέβλωσαν δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν Κυναίθεων, οἷς ἠπίστησαν ἐχεῖν κεκρυμμένον διάφορον ἡ κατασκεύασμα ἡ ἀλλο τῶν πλείονος ἄξιων. 9 Τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον λυβησάμενοι τοὺς Κυναίθεις ἀνεστρατοπέδευσαν, ἀπολιπόντες φυλακῆν τῶν τείχων, καὶ προῆ γον ὅς ἐπὶ Δούσων· καὶ παραγενόμενοι πρὸς τὸ τῆς ’Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερὸν, δ’ κεῖται 342
exiles held the office of Polemarch. It is the duty of these magistrates to shut the gates: they keep the keys in their custody until the gates are reopened and by day reside in the gate-houses. The Aetolians then lay in readiness with their scaling-ladders awaiting the moment for attack. The Polemarchs of the party which had been in exile, after murdering their colleagues at one of the gate-houses, opened the gate, upon which some of the Aetolians rushed in through it, while others, planting their ladders against the wall, took forcible possession of the fortifications by this means. All the inhabitants were seized with consternation at this and knew not what course to take in these difficult circumstances. For neither were their hands free to oppose those who were streaming in through the gate, owing to the attack on the walls, nor could they defend the walls properly owing to the forcing of the gate. For these reasons the Aetolians soon made themselves masters of the town, and thereupon, amid all their iniquities, performed one act of exemplary justice. For in the first place they killed and plundered the property of the traitors who had introduced them into the city. All the rest of the citizens were treated in the same way. Finally, they quartered themselves in the houses and thoroughly pillaged all the property, putting to the torture many of the Cynaetheans whom they suspected of having concealed money, plate, or other valuables.

After this cruel treatment of the Cynaetheans, they took their departure, leaving a garrison to guard the walls and advanced towards Lusi. On arriving at the temple of Artemis which lies between Cleitor
ΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΕΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

μὲν μεταξὺ Κλείτορος καὶ Κυναίθης, ἀσυλον δὲ νενόμισται παρὰ τοῖς Ἐλλησιν, ἀνετείνυτο διαρ-πάσεω τὰ θρέμματα τῆς θεοῦ καὶ τάλλα τὰ περὶ τὸν ναόν. οἱ δὲ Λουσιάται νουνεχῶς δόντες τῶν τῶν κατασκευασμάτων τῆς θεοῦ, παρητήσαντο τὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἁσέβειαν [καὶ] τοῦ μηδὲν παθεῖν ἀνήκεστον. οἱ δὲ δεξάμενοι, παραχρήμα 

αναζεύχαντες, προσεπρατοπέδευσαν τῇ τῶν Κλειτορίων πόλει.

19 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καροὺς τούτους ὁ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγός Ἀρατὸς ἔξαπέστειλε μὲν πρὸς Φίλιππον παρακαλῶν βοηθεῖν, συνήγε δὲ τούς ἐπιλέκτους, μετεπέμπετο δὲ παρὰ Δακε- 

dαμονίων καὶ Μεσσηνίων τοὺς διατηταιμένους κατὰ τὰς ὀμολογίας. οἱ δ’ Αἰτωλοὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον παρεκάλουν τοὺς Κλειτορίους ἀποστάντας τῶν Ἀχαιῶν αἴρεισθαι τῆν πρὸς αὐτοὺς συμμαχίαν, 

3 τῶν δὲ Κλειτορίων ἀπλάσ ὡς προσεμένων τοὺς λόγους προσβολᾶς ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ προσερείδοντες τὰς κλίμακας τοῖς τείχεσι κατεπείραζον τῆς πόλεως. ἀμυνομένων δὲ γενναίως καὶ τολμηρῶς τῶν ἐνδον εἴριας τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀνεστατο- 

πέδευσαν, καὶ προσαγαγόντες ἁθίς ὡς ἐπί τῇ Κυναίθαι, ὃμως τὰ θρέμματα τῆς θεοῦ περι- 

5 σύραντες ἀπήγαγον. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον παρε- 

dίδοσαν τοῖς Ἡλείοις τῆς Κυναίθαις, οὐ βουλο- 

μένων δὲ προσδέχασθαι τῶν Ἡλείων ἐπεβάλλοντο μὲν δὲ αὐτῶν κατέχει τὴν πόλιν, στρατηγόν 

6 ἐπιστήσαντες Εὐριπίδαν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἐδείξαντες ἐκ τῶν προσαγγελλομένων τῆν ἐκ Μακεδονίας βοήθειαν, ἐμπρήσαντες τὴν πόλιν ἀπηλλάγησαν, καὶ προῆγον αὐτὸς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ Ῥίον, 344.
and Cynætha, and is regarded as inviolable by the Greeks, they threatened to lift the cattle of the goddess and plunder the other property about the temple. But the people of Lusi very wisely induced them to refrain from their impious purpose and commit no serious outrage by giving them some of the sacred furniture. On receiving this they at once left the place and encamped before Cleitor.

19. Meanwhile Aratus, the Achaean Strategus, had sent to Philip begging for help, was collecting the Achaean levy, and had sent for the contingent which the Messenians and Lacedaemonians had agreed to furnish.

The Aetolians in the first place invited the Cleitorians to abandon their alliance with the Achaeans and form one with themselves. When the Cleitorians absolutely refused to listen to them, they began an assault, and attempted to take the town by escalading. But on meeting with a gallant and determined resistance from the inhabitants they yielded to the force of circumstances, and breaking up their camp advanced again towards Cynætha, raiding and driving off the sacred cattle in spite of having undertaken not to do so. At first they wished to hand over Cynætha to the Eleans; but on the latter declining they decided to hold the town themselves, appointing Eurypides commandant. But afterwards, as they were afraid from the intelligence they received of a relief force coming from Macedonia, they burnt the city and withdrew, marching again
7 ταύτη κρίνοντες ποιείσθαι τήν διάβασιν. ὁ δὲ Ταυρίων πυθανόμενος τήν τῶν Ἀἰτωλῶν εἰσβολήν καὶ τὰ περὶ τήν Κύναγαν πεπραγμένα, θεωρῶν δὲ τὸν Δημήτριον τὸν Φάριον ἀπὸ τῶν νήσων εἰς τὰς Κεγχρεάς καταπεπλευκότα, παρεκάλει τούτον βοηθῆσαι τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ διωθμίσαντα τοὺς λέμβους ἐπιτίθεσθαι τῇ τῶν Ἀἰτωλῶν διαβάσει.  
8 ὁ δὲ Δημήτριος λυσιτελὴ μὲν οὐκ εὐσχήμονα δὲ πεποιημένος τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν νήσων ἐπάνοδον διὰ τῶν τῶν Ἐρῶν ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ἀνάπλουν, ἀσμενὸς ὑπῆκουσε τῷ Ταυρίῳν, προσδεξαμένου ἐκείνου τὴν  
9 εἰς τὴν ὑπέρβασιν τῶν λέμβων δαπάνην. οὕτως μὲν οὖν ὑπερισθαίσας, καὶ δυνὴ καθυστερήσας ἡμέραις τῆς τῶν Ἀἰτωλῶν διαβάσεως, προκατασύρας τινὰς τόπους τῆς παραλίας τῆς τῶν Ἀιτω-
10 λῶν κατήχθη πάλιν εἰς τὴν Κόρινθον. Δακταδαμοῦν οἱ δὲ τὸ μὲν πέμπετεν τὰς βοθειὰς κατὰ τὴν διάταξιν ἐνεκάκησαν, βραχεῖς δὲ τινὰς παντελῶς ἐπεῖσι καὶ πεζοὺς, στοχαζόμενου τοῦ δοκεῖν  
11 μόνον, ἐξέσεμψαν. Ἅρατος δὲ τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἔχειν πολιτικώτερον ἢ στρατηγικώτερον ὑπὲρ  
12 τῶν παρόντων ἐβουλεύσατο· μέχρι γὰρ τοῦτο τὴν ἱστολίαν ἤγε, προσανέχων καὶ μεμημένον τῆς προγεγενημένης συμφορᾶς, ἐώς οὗ πάντα διαπραξάμενοι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν προαιρεσίας οἱ περὶ τὸν Σκόπαν καὶ Δωρίμαχον ἐπανήλθον εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, καὶ περὶ διὰ τῶν ποιούμενοι τὰς πορείας εὐποιήτων καὶ στενῶν καὶ μόνου σαλ-
13 πυγκτοῦ δεομένων.  
13 Κυναθείς δὲ μεγάλοις ἄτυχήμασιν ὑπ’ Ἀἰτωλῶν καὶ μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπεσόντες ὃμως πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐδοξαν ἡτυχηκέναι δικαιότατα. 346
to Rhium, whence they had decided to make the crossing. Taurion had learnt of the Aetolian invasion and the fate of Cynaetha; and seeing that Demetrius of Pharos had sailed back from the islands to Cenchreae, begged him to assist the Achaeans, and after conveying his boats across the Isthmus, to fall upon the Aetolians during their crossing. Demetrius, whose return from his expedition to the islands had been much to his advantage indeed, but somewhat ignominious, as the Rhodians were sailing to attack him, lent a ready ear to Taurion, who had engaged to meet the expense of transporting the boats. But having traversed the Isthmus and missed the crossing of the Aetolians by two days, he returned again to Corinth, after raiding some places on the Aetolian coast. The Lacedaemonians had culpably omitted to send the stipulated contingent of men, but dispatched quite an insignificant number of horse and foot to save appearances. But Aratus who had his Achaeans, displayed rather on this occasion the caution of a politician than the courage of a general; for he made no move, fearful of committing himself and mindful of his recent reverse, until Scopas and Dorimachus, having accomplished all they had purposed, returned home, and this although their march had taken them through narrow defiles, most advantageous for an attacking force and where a call of the bugle would have been sufficient.

20. The Cynaetheans, on whom the Aetolians had brought this terrible disaster, were, however, generally esteemed to have deserved their fate more
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

20 ἐπειδὴ δὲ κοινῆ τὸ τῶν Ἀρκάδων ἔθνος ἔχει τινὰ παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς Ἑλλησον ἔπ᾽ ἀρετῇ φήμῃ, οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἦθεσι καί βίοις φιλοξενίαι καὶ φιλανθρωπίαι; μάλιστα δὲ διὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ θεῖον εὐσέβειαν, ἢξιον βραχὺ διαπορήσαι περὶ τῆς Κυναι-θέων ἀγριότητος, πῶς ὄντες ὁμολογομένως Ἀρ-κάδες τοσοῦτο κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς καίρους διήγεγκαν τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ὑμότητι καὶ παρανομία.

3 δοκοῦσι δὲ μοι, διότι τὰ καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἁρχαίων ἐπινενοημένα καὶ φυσικῶς συνθεωρημένα περὶ πάντας τοὺς κατοικοῦντας τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν, ταῦτα δὴ πρῶτοι καὶ μόνοι τῶν Ἀρκάδων ἐγκατέλιπον.

4 μουσικὴν γάρ, τὴν γε ἀληθῶς μουσικὴν, πάσι μὲν ἀνθρώποις ὄφελος ἀσκήσεως Ἀρκάσι δὲ καὶ 5 ἀναγκαῖον. οὐ γάρ ἤγιον γε μουσικὴν, ὡς Ἐφορὸς φησιν ἐν τῷ προοίμῳ τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας, ὁδαμῶς ἀρμόζοντα λόγον αὐτῷ ῥίψας, ἔπ᾽ ἀπάτη.

6 καὶ γοητεία παρείσχθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: οὐδὲ τοὺς παλαιοὺς Κρήτας καὶ Δακεδαμονίων αὐτὸν καὶ ῥυθμὸν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἄντι σάλπιγγος εἰκῆ.

7 νομιστέων εἰσαγαγεῖν, οὐδὲ τοὺς πρῶτοι Ἀρκά-δων εἰς τὴν ὅλην πολιτείαν τὴν μουσικὴν παρα-λαβεῖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο ὥστε μὴ μόνον παισίν οὖσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ νεανίσκοις γενομένους ἐως τριάκοντα, ἐτῶν κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην σύντροφον ποιεῖν αὐτῆς.

8 τάλλα τοῖς βίοις ὄντας αὐτηροτάτους. ταῦτα γὰρ πᾶσιν ἐστὶ γνώριμα καὶ συνήθη, διότι σχεδόν παρὰ μόνοις Ἀρκάσι πρῶτον μὲν οἱ παιδεῖς ἐκ νηπίων ἔδειξον πατρίν καὶ παίανας, οἷς ἔκαστοι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τούς ἔπιχωρίους ἦρως καὶ θεοὺς ὑμνοῦσι: μετὰ δὲ

348
BOOK IV. 20. 1 - 9

than any men ever did. Since the Arcadian nation on the whole has a very high reputation for virtue among the Greeks, due not only to their humane and hospitable character and usages, but especially to their piety to the gods, it is worth while to give a moment’s consideration to the question of the savagery of the Cynaetheans, and ask ourselves why, though unquestionably of Arcadian stock, they so far surpassed all other Greeks at this period in cruelty and wickedness. I think the reason was that they were the first and indeed only people in Arcadia to abandon an admirable institution, introduced by their forefathers with a nice regard for the natural conditions under which all the inhabitants of that country live. For the practice of music, I mean real music, is beneficial to all men, but to Arcadians it is a necessity. For we must not suppose, as Ephorus, in the Preface to his History, making a hasty assertion quite unworthy of him, says, that music was introduced by men for the purpose of deception and delusion; we should not think that the ancient Cretans and Lacedaemonians acted at haphazard in substituting the flute and rhythmic movement for the bugle in war, or that the early Arcadians had no good reason for incorporating music in their whole public life to such an extent that not only boys, but young men up to the age of thirty were compelled to study it constantly, although in other matters their lives were most austere. For it is a well-known fact, familiar to all, that it is hardly known except in Arcadia, that in the first place the boys from their earliest childhood are trained to sing in measure the hymns and paans in which by traditional usage they celebrate the heroes and gods of each particular
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

taũta toús Filožéñou kai Tιmοθέου νόμους μαν-
thánontes pollhì filotimià xoreúounoi kat' ēnainont
tois Διωνυσιακοῖς αὐληταῖς ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, οἱ
mēn paidēs toûs paidikous àγώνας oí dē neanískoī
10 toûs tòw ãndrhōn λεγομένουs. ὀμοίως γε μὴn
cai par' ὅλον τὸν βίον τὰς ἀγωγὰς τὰs ἐν τοῖς
synousiaῖς οὔχ οὔτως ποιοῦνται διὰ τῶν ἐπεσ-
άκτων ἀκροαμάτων ὡς δὶ' αὐτῶν, ἀνὰ μέρος
11 ξέδειν ἀλλήλους προστάττοντες. καὶ τῶν μὲn
ἀλλων μαθημάτων ἀρνηθήναι τι μὴν γνώσκειν
οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν ἠγοῦνται, τῆν γε μὴν ὡδῆν οὔτ' ἀρ-
νηθήναι δύνανται διὰ τὸ κατ' ἀνάγκην πάντας
μανθάνειν, οὔθ' ὀμολογοῦντες ἀποτρίβεσθαι διὰ
τὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς νομίζεσθαι τοῦτo.
12 καὶ μὴν ἐμβατήρια μετ' αὐλοῦ καὶ τάξεως ἀσκοῦν-
tes, ἐτι δ' ὀρχήσεις ἐκπονοῦντες μετὰ κοινῆς
ἐπιστροφῆς καὶ δαπάνης κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἐν τοῖς
θεάτροις ἐπιδείκνυνται τοῖς αὐτῶν πολίταις oí
21 νέοι. ταῦτα τέ μοι δοκοῦσιν oί πάλαι παρεισ-
αγαγεῖν οὐ τρυφής καὶ περιουσίας χάρων, ἀλλὰ
θεωροῦντες μὲν τὴν ἐκάστων αὐτουργίαν καὶ
συλλήβδην τὸ τῶν βίων ἐπίτονον καὶ σκληρόν,
θεωροῦντες δὲ τὴν τῶν ἡδῶν αὐστηρίαν, ἦτις
αὐτοῖς παρέπεται διὰ τὴν τοῦ περιέχοντος ψυχρό-
τητα καὶ στυγνότητα τὴν κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ἐν
τοῖς τόποις ὑπάρχουσαν, ὃ συνεξομοιοῦσθαι πε-
2 φύκαμεν πάντες ἀνθρωποι κατ' ἀνάγκην. οὐ γὰρ
di' ἄλλην, διὰ δὲ ταῦτη τὴν αἰτίαν κατὰ τὰs
ἐθνικὰs καὶ τὰs ὀλοσχερεῖς διαστάσεις πλεῖστον
ἀλλήλων διαφέρομεν ἥθει τε καὶ μορφαῖς καὶ
χρώμασιν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἐπιτηθευμάτων τοῖς πλεί-
place: later they learn the measures of Philoxenus and Timotheus, and every year in the theatre they compete keenly in choral singing to the accompaniment of professional flute-players, the boys in the contest proper to them and the young men in what is called the men’s contest. And not only this, but through their whole life they entertain themselves at banquets not by listening to hired musicians but by their own efforts, calling for a song from each in turn. Whereas they are not ashamed of denying acquaintance with other studies, in the case of singing it is neither possible for them to deny a knowledge of it because they all are compelled to learn it, nor, if they confess to such knowledge can they excuse themselves, so great a disgrace is this considered in that country. Besides this the young men practise military parades to the music of the flute and perfect themselves in dances and give annual performances in the theatres, all under state supervision and at the public expense. 21. Now all these practices I believe to have been introduced by the men of old time, not as luxuries and superfluities but because they had before their eyes the universal practice of personal manual labour in Arcadia, and in general the toilsomeness and hardship of the men’s lives, as well as the harshness of character resulting from the cold and gloomy atmospheric conditions usually prevailing in these parts—conditions to which all men by their very nature must perforce assimilate themselves; there being no other cause than this why separate nations and peoples dwelling widely apart differ so much from each other in character, feature, and colour as well as in the most of their pursuits. The primitive
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

3 στοις. βουλόμενοι δὲ μαλάττειν καὶ κυρνὰν τὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐθάδες καὶ σκληρὸν, τὰ τε προερημένα πάντα παρεισήγαγον, καὶ πρὸς τούτους συνόδους κοινὰς καὶ θυσίας πλείστας ὁμοίως ἀνδράς καὶ γυναῖξι κατείθισαν, ἐτὶ δὲ χοροὺς
4 παρθένων ὁμοὶ καὶ παῖδων, καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶν ἐμπυκάνησαντο, σπεύδοντες τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπεραιμόν διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐθισμῶν κατασκευῆς ἐξήμερον καὶ πραῖνεν. ὃν Κυμαιθείς ὀλυγωρήσαντες εἰς τέλος, καὶ ταῦτα πλείστης δεόμενοι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπικουρίας διὰ τὸ σκληρότατον παρὰ πόλιν τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἐξενά ἁρέα καὶ τόπον, πρὸς αὐτὰς δὲ τὰς ἐν ἅλλησος παρατρήσας καὶ φιλοτιμίας ὀρμήσαντες, τέλος ἀπεθανὼν εἰς τὸν ἔστειλεν ὄστε μηδὲν ὁ πότε ὅποια γεγονέναι τῶν Ἐλληνίδων πόλεων ἀσεβῆς,
5 ματα μείζονα καὶ συνεχέστερα. σημείων δὲ τῆς Κυμαιθείων ἀτυχίας περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος καὶ τῆς τῶν ἅλλων Ἀρκαδίων τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν ἐπιτη-
6 δεματῶν δυσαρεστήσεως· καθ’ οὓς γὰρ καίρους τὴν μεγάλην σφαγήν ποιήσαντες Κυμαιθείς ἐπρέσβευσαν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, εἰς ὃς πόλεις ποτὲ Ἀρκαδικὰς εἰσῆλθεν κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν, οἱ μὲν ἅλλοι
7 παραχρῆμα πάντες αὐτοὺς ἐξεκήρυξαν, Μαντινείας δὲ μετὰ τὴν μεταλλαγὴν αὐτῶν καὶ καθαρμὸν ἐποίησαντο καὶ σφάγια περιήγηκαν τῆς τε πό-
8 λεως κύκλω καὶ τῆς χώρας πάσης.  
9 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήθω χάριν τοῦ μῆ διὰ μίαν πόλιν τὸ κοινὸν ἤθος διαβάλλεσθαι τῶν Ἀρκαδίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῦ μῆ νομίζαντο ἐνίους τῶν κατοικοῦντων τῆς Ἀρκαδίαν περιουσίας χάριν τὰ κατὰ μουσικὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἀσκεῖσθαι παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὀλυγωρεῖν ἐγχειρήσαι τούτον τοῦ
10 352
Arcadians, therefore, with the view of softening and tempering the stubbornness and harshness of nature, introduced all the practices I mentioned, and in addition accustomed the people, both men and women, to frequent festivals and general sacrifices, and dances of young men and maidens, and in fact resorted to every contrivance to render more gentle and mild, by the influence of the customs they instituted, the extreme hardness of the national character. The Cynaetheans, by entirely neglecting these institutions, though in special need of such influences, as their country is the most rugged and their climate the most inclement in Arcadia, and by devoting themselves exclusively to their local affairs and political rivalries, finally became so savage that in no city of Greece were greater and more constant crimes committed. As an indication of the deplorable condition of the Cynaetheans in this respect and the detestation of the other Arcadians for such practices I may mention the following: at the time when, after the great massacre, the Cynaetheans sent an embassy to Sparta, the other Arcadian cities which they entered on their journey gave them instant notice to depart by cry of herald, but the Mantineans after their departure even made a solemn purification by offering piacular sacrifices and carrying them round their city and all their territory.

I have said so much on this subject firstly in order that the character of the Arcadian nation should not suffer for the crimes of one city, and secondly to deter any other Arcadians from beginning to neglect music under the impression that its extensive practice in Arcadia serves no necessary purpose. I
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

11 μέρους, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ Κυναϊθέων ἐνεκα, ἵν' ἂν ποτ' αὐτοῖς ὁ θεὸς εὑ δῷ, τραπέντες πρὸς παιδείαν ἠμερῶσαν αὐτούς, καὶ μάλιστα ταύτης πρὸς μουσικήν· οὕτως γὰρ μόνως ἂν λήξαεν τῆς τότε
12 περὶ αὐτοὺς γενομένης ἀγριότητος. ἤμεις δ' ἐπειδή τὰ περὶ Κυναϊθέων ὑποπίπτοντα δεδηλώκαμεν, αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκτροπὴν ἑπάνωμεν.
22 Αἰτωλοί μὲν οὖν τοιαύτα διεργασάμενοι κατὰ τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἦκον εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἁσφάλισιν δὲ μετὰ δυνάμεως βοηθῶν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς παρῆν εἰς Κόρινθον, ὑστερήσας δὲ τοῦ καιροῦ ἀπέστειλε βιβλιαφόρους πρὸς πάντας τοὺς συμμάχους, παρακαλῶν πέμπειν ἐκάστους παρ' αὐτῶν κατὰ σπουδὴν εἰς Κόρινθον τοὺς βουλευσιμένους
3 ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῆς συμφερόντων. αὐτοὺς δ' ἀναζεύξας ὡς ἐπὶ Τεγέας προῆγε, πυθανόμενος τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους εἰς σφαγάς καὶ ταραχὰς
4 ἐμπεπτωκέναι πρὸς ἄλληνος. οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι συνήθεις ὄντες βασιλεύεσθαι καὶ πάντως τοῖς προετοίμασι πεθαρχεῖν, τότε προσφάτως μὲν ἠλευθερωμένοι δι' Ἀντιγόνου, βασιλέως δ' ὦν ὑποάρχοντος παρ' αὐτοῖς, ἐστασίαζον πρὸς σφάσας, πάντες ὑπολαμβάνοντες ὅσον αὐτοῖς μετείναι τῆς
5 πολιτείας. τάς μὲν οὖν ἄρχας οἱ μὲν δύο τῶν ἐφόρων ἀδηλῶν ἔχον τὴν γνώμην, οἱ δὲ τρεῖς ἐκοινώνουν τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων, πεπεισμένοι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν τῶν Φίλιππον οὐδέπω δυνήσεσθαι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Πελοπόννησον πράγμασιν
6 ἐπαρκεῖν. ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ μὲν Αἰτωλοὶ παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν αὐτῶν εἴ Πελοποννήσου ταχεῖαν ἐποίησαντο τὴν ἐπάνοδον, δ' ὑπὸ Φίλιππος ἐκ Μακεδονίας
7 ἔτι θάττω τὴν παρουσίαν, ἀπιστοῦντες οἱ τρεῖς

354
also spoke for the sake of the Cynætheans themselves, in order that, if Heaven ever grant them better fortune, they may humanize themselves by turning their attention to education and especially to music; for by no other means can they hope to free themselves from that savagery which overtook them at this time. Having now said all that occurred to me on the subject of this people I return to the point whence I digressed.

22. The Aetolians, after these exploits in the Peloponnese, had returned home in safety, when Philip appeared at Corinth with an army to help the Achaean. As he arrived too late for this, he sent couriers to all the allies, begging them to send as soon as possible to Corinth representatives to discuss the measures necessary for the common service. He himself quitting Corinth advanced towards Tegea, as he had heard that intestine disturbances accompanied by massacres had broken out at Sparta. For the Lacedaemonians, who had been accustomed to be ruled by kings and to unconditional obedience to their rulers, now having recently gained their liberty though Antigonus and finding themselves without a king, began to fall into factions, as they all thought they should have an equal share of political power. At first two of the ephors did not pronounce for either side, but the other three threw in their lot with the Aetolians, as they were convinced that owing to his tender age Philip would not yet be able to control Peloponnesian affairs. But when, contrary to their expectation, the Aetolians made a hasty retreat from the Peloponnese, and Philip was even quicker in arriving from Macedonia, the three ephors in question, very suspicious
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἐνὶ τῶν δυνῆν Ἀδειμάντω διὰ τὸ συνειδέναι μὲν σφίσι πάσας τὰς ἐπιβολὰς, μὴ λίαν δὲ τοῖς γνωμένοις εὐθυκεῖν, ἡγωνίων μὴ συνεγγίσαντος τοῦ βασιλεῶς πάντα τὰ πραττόμενα πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον ἔξηγήσηται. δι’ ἀ δὴ συλλαλήσαντες τοῖς τῶν νέων ἐκήρυττον εἰς τὸ τῆς Χαλκιοίκου τέμενος μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων ἴέναι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις ὡς τῶν

9 Μακεδόνων ἔπο τῆν πόλιν παραγωγομένων. ταχὺ δὲ διὰ τὸ παράδοξον ἄθροισθέντων, δυσαρεστῶν Ἀδειμάντος τοῖς γνωμένοις ἐπειράτο προπερευθεῖς παρακαλεῖν καὶ διδάσκειν διότι πρῶην ἐδεί τὰ κηρύγματα ταύτα καὶ τοὺς ἄθροισμοὺς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις παραγγέλλειν, καθ’ ἐν καὶρόν τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς πολεμίους ὄντας ἥκούμεν τοὺς ὅρους τῆς χώρας ἠμῶν συνεγγύζειν, οὗ νῦν, ὥστε Μακεδόνας τοὺς εὐρεγέτας καὶ σωτήρας πυνθα-

10 νόμεθα πλησιάζειν μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως. ἔτι δ’ αὐτοῦ ταῦτ’ ἀνακρουμένου, προσπεσόντες οἱ παρακεκλημένοι τῶν νέων τούτων τε συνεκέντησαν καὶ μετὰ τούτου Σθενέλαον Ἀλκαμένῃ Θυέ-

11 στὴν Βιωνίδαν, ἑτέρους τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ πλείους.

12 οἳ δὲ περὶ Πολυφόνταν καὶ τινες ἁμα τούτοις, ἐμφρόνως προϊσόμενοι τὸ μέλλων, ἀπεχώρησαν

23 πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον. ταύτα δὲ πράξαντες εὐθέως ἐπεμπον οἱ προεστῶτες ἐφοροὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τοὺς κατηγορήσαντος πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον τῶν ἀγηρμένων καὶ παρακέλεσαν αὐτόν ἐπισειχὼν τὴν παρουσίαν, ἔως ἃν ἐκ τοῦ γεγονότος κινήματος εἰς τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν ἔλθῃ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, γινώσκειν δὲ διότι πρόκειται διατηρεῖν αὐτοῖς πάντα τὰ δίκαια καὶ φιλάνθρωπα πρὸς Μακεδόνας—

2 oἳ καὶ συμμίσχαντες ἤδη περὶ τὸ Παρθένων ὄρος

356
of one of the other two, Adeimantus, as he was privy to all their projects and did not highly approve their attitude, were in much fear of his revealing all their designs to the king on his approach. Therefore, after a private conference with some of the younger men, they ordered by proclamation all those of military age to assemble in arms at the temple of Artemis of the Brazen House as the Macedonians were advancing on the city. At an order so strange and unexpected all rapidly assembled, upon which Adeimantus, who disapproved of this proceeding, came forward and tried to address the people, pointing out that “These proclamations and orders to assemble in arms should have been made of late when we heard that our enemies the Aetolians were near our frontier, and not now when we learn that the Macedonians, our benefactors and preservers, are approaching with their king.” While he was still haranguing in this fashion, those young men who had been appointed to the task by the ephors fell upon him and ran him through as well as Sthenelaus, Alcamenes, Thyestes, Bionidas, and a good many other citizens. Polyphontas, however, and a few with him, foreseeing what was likely to occur, had wisely withdrawn and joined Philip. 23. After these proceedings the ephors now in power at once sent messengers to Philip bringing accusations against their victims, begging him to delay his arrival until the present disturbance had subsided and the town had resumed its normal condition, and informing him that it was their intention to maintain all their obligations to Macedonia and remain friendly. These messengers met the king near Mt. Parthenium and spoke
τῶν βασιλεῖς διελέχθησαν ἀκολούθως ταῖς ἐντολαῖς. ὁ δὲ διακούσας παρεκάλεσε τοὺς ἦκοντας κατὰ σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰς οἶκον ἔπανοδον, καὶ δηλοῦν τὸς ἐφόροις ὅτι κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς πορευθὲς αὐτὸς μὲν ἐν Τεγέα ποιῆσεται τὴν στρατοπεδείαν, ἐκείνους δὲ οἴεται δεῖν τὴν ταχύτηται ἐκπέμπειν ἄνδρας ἀξιοχρέους τοὺς κοινολογησομένους πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐνεστώτων. ποιησάντων δὲ τὸ προσταχθὲν τῶν ἀπαντησάντων, διακούσατε τὰ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως οἱ προεστῶτες τῶν Λακεδαίμων ἐξέπεμψαν ἄνδρας δέκα πρὸς ὅ τον Φίλιππον· οἱ καὶ πορευθέντες εἰς τὴν Τέγεαν καὶ παρελθόντες εἰς τὸ τοῦ βασιλέως συνέδριον, ὦμων προεστῶτος αὐτῶν, κατηγόρησαν μὲν τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀδείμαντον ὡς αἵτινος ἕγερνοτός τής κινήσεως, πάντα δὲ ὑποσχόνται ποιήσειν αὐτῷ τῷ Φίλιππῳ τὰ κατὰ τὴν συμμαχίαν, καὶ μηδὲν ἑν πνευματικῷ φανήσεσθαι δεύτεροι κατὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοίαν τῶν δοκούντων ἀληθινῶν αὐτῷ φίλων ὑπάρχειν. οἱ μὲν οὖν Λακεδαίμωνοι ταῦτα καὶ τούτῳ παραπλήσια διαλεχθέντες μετέστησαν, οἱ δὲ μετέχοντες τοῦ συνεδρίου διεφέροντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους ταῖς γνώμαις. καὶ τοῖς μὲν εἰδότες τὴν κακοπραγμοσύνην τῶν ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ, καὶ πεπεισμένους τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀδείμαντον ἀπολωλέναι διὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὐνοίαν τοὺς τε Λακεδαίμωνοι ἐπιβεβλήσατο κοινοπραγεῖν τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς, συνεβούλευσιν τῷ Φίλιππῳ παράδειγμα ποιῆσαι τοὺς Λακεδαίμωνοι, χρησάμενοι αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτόν τρόπον ὀντερ με Ἀλέξανδρος ἐξήρησατο Θηβαίοις εὐθέως παραλαβῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐτεροὶ δὲ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τὴν μὲν τοιαύτην ὀργὴν βαρυτέραν.
according to their instructions. After listening to them, he bade them return home at once, and inform the ephors that for his own part he would continue his march and take up his quarters in Tegea, where he demanded that they should send him as soon as possible some persons of sufficient weight to discuss the present situation with him. The messengers obeyed, and the Lacedaemonian magistrates, on receiving the king's communication, dispatched ten envoys to Philip, the chief of the mission being Omias, who on reaching Tegea and presenting themselves before the king's council, laid the responsibility of the late disturbance on Adeimantus, and engaged themselves to observe faithfully the terms of the alliance with Philip, and be second to none of those who were regarded as his true friends in their devotion to him. So the Lacedaemonians after these and other similar assurances withdrew, upon which there was a difference of opinion among the members of the council. Some knowing the evil disposition of the Spartan government, and convinced that Adeimantus and the others had met their fate owing to their favouring Macedonia, and that the project of the Lacedaemonians was to join the Aetolians, advised Philip to make an example of Sparta, treating it in the same way as Alexander had treated Thebes at the outset of his reign. But some of the older councillors declared that such
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἀπέφαυνον εἶναι τῶν γεγονότων, ἐπιτυµῆσαι δὲ
δεῖν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, καὶ μεταστησάµενον τούτους
ἐγχειρίσαι τὸ πολίτευµα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῖς
24 αὐτοῦ φίλοις. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, εἰ χρὴ
tοῦ βασιλέως λέγειν τὰς τότε γνώµας· οὐ γὰρ
εἰκὸς ἐπτακαιδεκαέτη παιδὰ περὶ τηλικοῦτων
2 δύνασθαι πραγµάτων διευκρινεῖν. ἀλλ’ ἦµῖν µὲν
καθήκει τοῖς γράφουσι τὰς κυρούσας τὰ διαβουλία
γνώµας ἀνατίθεναι τοῖς προεστῶι τῶν ὀλίν·
tοὺς µέντοι γε ἀκούοντας αὐτοὺς χρὴ συνυπονοεῖν
διότι τῶν συνόντων, καὶ µάλιστα τῶν παρακει-
µένων, εἰκὸς ἔστων εἶναι τὰς τοιαύτας ὑποθέσεις
3 καὶ διαλήψεις, ὅν Ἀράτω τὶς ἐπιεικέστατ’ ἄν
προσάπτω τὴν τότε ῥηθεῖσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως
4 γνώµην. ὁ γὰρ Φίλιππος τὰ µὲν κατ’ ἱδίαν τῶν
συµµάχων εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀδικήµατα καθήκειν ἐφησεν
αὐτῷ µέχρι λόγου καὶ γραµµάτων διορθῶν καὶ
5 συνεπισηµαίνεσθαι· τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν ἀν-
ήκοντα συµµαχίαιν, ταύτ’ ἐφῇ µόνα δεῖν κοινῆς
ἐπιστροφῆς καὶ διορθώσεως τυχανῶν ὑπὸ πάντων.
6 Λακεδαιµονίων δὲ µὴν εἰς τὴν κοινὴν συµµαχίαν
ἐκθανὼν ἡµαρτηκότων, ἐπαγγελλοµένων δὲ πάντα
καὶ ποιεῖν τὰ δίκαια πρὸς ἡµᾶς, οὐ καλῶς ἔχον
εἶναι τὸ βουλεύεσθαι τι περὶ αὐτῶν ἀπαράιτητον.
7 καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸν µὲν πατέρα πολεµίων ὄντων
κρατήσασα µηδὲν ποιῆσαι δεινὸν, αὐτὸν δ’ ἐφ’
οὗτῳ µικρὰς αἰτίας ἀνήκεστον τι βουλευεσθαι
8 περὶ αὐτῶν. ἐπικυρωθείσῃ δὲ ταύτῃ τῆς γνώµης,
ὅτι δὲ παριδεῖν τὸ γεγονός, εὐθέως ὁ βασιλεὺς
Πέτραυν τῶν αὐτοῦ φίλων ἀµα τοῖς περὶ τὸν
Ὀµίαν ἔξαπέστελλε παρακαλέσοντα τοὺς πολλοὺς
ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ Μακεδόνας εὐνοίας,
vengeance was heavier than the offence deserved. Philip, they said, should punish the guilty parties and, removing them from office, place the government in the hands of his own friends. 24. Finally the king spoke, if indeed we are to suppose that the opinion he delivered was his own; for it is scarcely probable that a boy of seventeen should be able to decide about such grave matters. It is, however, the duty of us writers to attribute to the supreme ruler the expression of opinion which prevailed at his council, while it is open for the reader to suspect that such decisions and the arguments on which they rest are due to his associates and especially to those closest to his person. Among these in the present case Aratus is the one to whom we may most plausibly attribute the opinion delivered by the king. Philip said that, as far as regarded injuries inflicted by the allies on themselves, it was not incumbent on him to go beyond correcting and censuring such either by word of mouth or by letter; but that only injuries inflicted on the whole alliance called for punishment and redress by the joint action of all. As the Lacedaemonians had not committed any manifest offence against the alliance as a whole, and had engaged to meet faithfully all their obligations to himself, it would not be right to treat them with excessive harshness. Considering indeed that his father after conquering them as enemies, had done them no hurt, it would ill become himself to take extreme vengeance on them for such a trifling fault. When the council had voted to act thus and overlook the incident, the king sent Petraeus, one of his friends, together with Omias, to exhort the people in Sparta to remain faithful to their friend.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

άμα δὲ δώσοντα καὶ ληψόμενον τοὺς ὀρκοὺς περὶ
συμμαχίας. αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἀνα-
ζεύξας προῆγε πάλιν ὡς ἐπὶ Κορίνθων, καλὸν
δεῖγμα τῆς ἕαυτος προαιρέσεως τοῖς συμμάχοις
ἐκτεθειμένος ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαίμονιοὺς
ἀποφάσει.

25 Καταλαβὼν δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν συμμαχίδων
παραγεγονότας εἰς τὴν Κόρινθον συνήδρευε καὶ
διελάμβανε μετὰ τούτων τί δὲ ποιεῖν καὶ πῶς
2 χρήσασθαι τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς. ἐγκαλοῦντων δὲ Βουω-
τῶν μὲν ὅτι συλήσαιεν τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τῆς Ἰτωνίας
ἰερὸν εἰρήνης ἄπαρχουσης, Φωκέως δὲ διὸτι
στρατευόμενος ἐν Ἀμβρωσοὶ καὶ Δαύλιον ἐπι-
3 βάλοντο καταλαβέομαι τὰς πόλεις, Ἡπειρωτῶν
δὲ καθότι πορθήσαιεν αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν, Ἀκαρ-
νᾶνων δὲ παραδεικνύοντων τινὰ τρόπον συστη-
μενοι πρᾶξιν ἐπὶ Θύριον νυκτὸς ἐτὶ καὶ προσβαλεῖν
4 τολμήσαιν τῇ πόλει, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ἀχαιῶν
ἀπολογιζομένων ὡς καταλάβοντο μὲν τῆς Με-
γαλοπολίτιδος Κλάριον, πορθήσαιεν δὲ διεξόντες
τὴν Πατρέων καὶ Φαραέων χώραν, διαρράσαμεν
δὲ Κύναιαν, συλήσαιεν δὲ τὸ τῆς ἔν Λούσοις
Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερὸν, πολιορκήσαιεν δὲ Κλειτορίουσ,
ἐπιβουλεύσαιεν δὲ κατὰ μὲν θάλατταν Πήλιῳ,
κατὰ δὲ γῆν ἄρτι συνοικιζομένη τῇ Μεγάλῃ πόλει
σπεύδοντες μετὰ τῶν Ἰλυριῶν ἀνάστατον αὐτὴν
5 ποιήσαι, διακούσαντες τούτων οἱ τῶν συμμάχων
σύνεδροι πάντες ὁμοθυμαδόν ἐκφέρειν ἐβουλεύ-
6 σαντο τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς τῶν πόλεμον. προθεμενοὶ δὲ
τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας ἐν τῷ δόγματι παρα-
κατεβάλλοντο ψήφισμα, προσδιασαφοῦντες ὅτι συν-
ἀνασώσουσι τοῖς συμμάχοις εἰ τινα κατέχουσι
362
ship with himself and the Macedonians and to exchange oaths confirming the alliance. He himself broke up his camp and began to march back to Corinth, having in his decision about the Spartans given the allies an excellent specimen of the policy he meant to pursue.

25. As he found the deputies from the allied cities assembled at Corinth, he held a Council to deliberate on the measures to be taken with regard to the Aetolians. The Boeotians accused the Aetolians of having plundered the temple of Athene Itonia in time of peace, the Phocians of having marched upon Ambrysus and Daulium and attempted to seize both cities, and the Epirots of having pillaged their territory. The Arcadians pointed out how they had organized a coup de main against Thyrium and had gone so far as to attack the city under cover of night. The Achaeans related how they had occupied Clarium in the territory of Megalopolis, and during their passage through Achaea ravaged the country of Patrae and Pharae, how they had sacked Cynaetha and despoiled the temple of Artemis at Lusi, laid siege to Cleitor, and made attempts by sea on Pylos and by land on Megalopolis, which was only just in process of being repopulated, intending to reduce it again to desolation with the help of the Illyrians. The deputies of the allies, after hearing all these complaints, decided unanimously to make war on Aetolia. After reciting the above reasons in the preamble of their decree, they subjoined a declaration that they would recover for the allies any city
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

αὐτῶν Αἰτωλοῖ χώραν ἦ πόλιν, ἀφ’ οὗ Δημήτριος
7 ὁ Φιλίππου κατὰ φύσιν πατήρ μετήλλαξε. παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν καιρῶν ἡγαγκασμένους ἀκουσίως μετέχειν τῆς Αἰτωλῶν συμπολιτείας, ὅτι πάντας τούτους ἀποκαταστήσουσιν εἰς τὰ πάτρια πολιτεύματα, χώραν ἔχοντας καὶ πόλεις τὰς αὐτῶν, ἀφρουρήτους ἀφορολογήτους ἐλευθέρους ὄντας, πολιτείας καὶ νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις. συνανακομείσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀμφικτύσσων ἔγραψαν τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ἐξουσίαν, ἣν Αἰτωλοὶ παρῆρηται νῦν, βουλόμενοι τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἱερὸν ἐπικρατεῖν αὐτοῖς.

26 Τούτου δὲ τοῦ δόγματος κυρωθέντος κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἦτος τῆς ἐκατοστήσεως καὶ τετταρακοστῆς ὀλυμπιάδος ὁ μὲν συμμαχικὸς προσαγορευόμενος πόλεμος ἄρχην εἰλήφει δικαιῶν καὶ πρέπουσαν
2 τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἀδικήμασιν, οἱ δὲ σύνδεροι παραχρήμα πρεσβεύσας ἔξαπενεστέλλον πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους, ἵνα παρ’ ἐκάστους διὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπικυρωθέντος τοῦ δόγματος ἐκφέρωσι πάντες τοῖς Αἰτω-
3 λοῖς τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας πόλεμον. ἔπεμψε δὲ καὶ τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς ἐπιστολὴν ὁ Φιλίππος διασαφῶν, ὅτι οἱ τὰς ἐξουσίας δίκαιων ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐγκαλουμένων, ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν συνελθόντες διὰ λόγου ποιῶνται
4 τὴν διεξαγωγὴν ἐι δ’ ὑπελήφθαις, διότι χωρίς κοινοῦ δόγματος λεγεῖτος καὶ πορθοῦσι πάντας, οὐκ ἀμυνότας τοὺς ἀδικομένους, ἐὰν δ’ ἀμύ-
5 νώτας, νομισθήσεσθαι τούτους κατάρχειν τοῦ πολέμου, πάντων αὐτοὺς εὐθεστάτους εἶναι. κοιμασμενοί δ’ οἱ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἄρχοντες τὴν ἐπιστολὴν
BOOK IV. 25. 6 – 26. 5

or land occupied by the Aetolians since the death of Demetrius, father of Philip; and likewise concerning those who had been compelled by circumstances to join the Aetolian League against their will, they pledged themselves that they should be reinstated in their ancient form of government, and should remain in possession of their cities and lands, without garrisons, exempt from tribute, and completely independent, in the enjoyment of their traditional constitution and laws. They also added a clause engaging to recover for the Amphictyonic Council its ancient laws, and its authority over the Delphic temple, of which it had been deprived by the Aetolians, who wished to control the affairs of the temple themselves.

26. This decree was passed in the first year of the 140th Olympiad and the war known as the Social War thus began, a just war and a fitting sequel to the crimes that had been committed. The Congress at once sent envoys to the allies, so that on the confirmation of the decree by the popular Assembly in each state they might all join in the war against the Aetolians. Philip also sent a letter to the Aetolians, informing them that, if they had any just defence against the accusations with which they had been charged, they still had time to meet and arrive at a settlement by conference. If, however, they imagined that because they pillaged and despoiled every part of Greece without any previous declaration of war by their League, the injured parties were not to retaliate, or if they retaliated should be considered to have broken the peace, they were the most simple-minded people in the world. The Aetolian magistrates on the receipt of this letter

365
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

taútēn, to mēn prōtou elptísantes oux ἦξειν tôn Filippou, suneiethento ῥητῆν ἦμεραν ἐν ἦ πρὸς τὸ
6 Ῥίον ἀπαντῆσουσι γνώντες δὲ παραγινόμενον,
ἀπέστειλαν γραμματοφόρον διασαφοῦτες ὡς οὗ
dúνανται πρὸ τῆς τῶν Αἰτωλῶν συνόδου δι’ αὐτῶν
7 οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομεῖν. οἱ δ’ Ἀχαιοὶ
συνελθόντες εἰς τὴν καθήκουσαν σύνοδον τὸ te
dōyma πάντες ἐπεκύρωσαν καὶ τὸ λάφυρον ἐπεκύρ-
8 ρυζαν κατὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν. προσελθόντος δὲ καὶ
tου βασιλέως πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν ἐν Ἀιγίῳ καὶ
dialexchέντος διὰ πλειόνων, τὰ ρηθέντα μετ’ εὐνοιας
ἀπεδέξαντο καὶ τὰ προούπάρχοντα φιλάνθρωπα
tois progoñois anevēsantο prōs autōn tôn
Filippou.
27 Katá δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Αἰτωλοῖς, συνάψαντος
tou tōn arχairesiωn xronon, stratēghon autōn
eilontο Skópan, δὲ ἐγεγόνει πάντων tōn proei-
2 rhmewn adikhmátωn aítios. ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐκ οἶδα
pōs chrē légein. tó gár koinô mēn dōgmati μή
polemein, pandhmei δὲ stratéuontas ágein kai
φέρειn tā tōn pēlas, kai kolázein mēn mēdēna
tōn aítion, stratēghous δ’ aíreištai kai tīmān
tous proestótas tōn toioútōn érgωn, émōi mēn
3 dōkei tēs pásēs gémein kakopragmósynēs. tī
gár dān ēlllo tis tās toiaútas kakías dhomáseien;
4 dēlōn δ’ ēstai tò leγómenon ēk toútωn. Lako-
daimónion tēn Kadmeían Phoibidou parapouvē-
santos tōn mēn aítion ežiμiωsan tēn δὲ φρουράν
ouk ežíγαγον, ὡσπερ λυμένης tēs adikías diā
tēs tōu prázantos bláβhēs, paròn tānántia poiēn·
at first, in the hope that Philip would not come, named a day on which they would meet him at Rhium, but on hearing that he was come there sent a courier to inform him that before the General Assembly of the Aetolians met they could take no steps on their own responsibility concerning any matters of state. The Achaeans, meeting in their regular annual Assembly, unanimously confirmed the decree and made a proclamation authorizing reprisals on the Aetolians. Upon the king’s attending the Council at Aegium and addressing them at length, they received his speech favourably and renewed with Philip in person their friendly relations with the kings, his ancestors.

27. Meanwhile, it being the date of their annual election, the Aetolians elected as Strategus that very Scopas who had been the chief cause of all the outrages I have narrated above. I really scarcely find words in which to express myself about this matter. After declaring by a public decree that they were not going to war, to make an expedition in full force and pillage the countries of their neighbours and then, instead of punishing any of the guilty persons, to honour by electing to their chief offices the directors of these proceedings seems to me the very height of villainy; for how can we characterize otherwise such base conduct?—conduct the nature of which the following examples will serve to illustrate. When the Lacedaemonians gained possession of the Cadmea by the treachery of Phoebidas, they punished the guilty general but did not withdraw the garrison, as if the injustice of the act were atoned for by the perpetrator being made to suffer for it, while if they had chosen, they might have done just the reverse, for the Thebans
ΤΟΥΤΟ ΓΑΡ ΔΙΕΦΕΡΕ ΤΟΙΣ ΘΕΒΑΙΟΙΣ. ΠΑΛΙΝ ΕΚΗΡΥΤ- 
ΤΟΝ ἈΦΙΕΝΤΕΣ ΤΑΣ ΠΟΛΕΙΣ ἘΛΕΥΘΕΡΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΝΟΜΟUS 
ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ἘΠ᾿ ΑΝΤΑΛΚΙΔΟΥ ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΗΝ ΕΙΡΗΝΗΝ, 
ΤΟΥΣ Θ ἈΡΜΟΣΤΑΣ ΟΥΚ ἜΞΗΓΟΝ ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΕΩΝ. 
ΜΑΝΤΙΝΕΩΙΣ ΦΙΛΟΥΣ ὈΝΤΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΣΥΜΜΑΧΟΥΣ ἈΝΑΣΤΑ- 
ΤΟΥΣ ΠΟΥΖΑΝΤΕΣ ΟΥΚ ΕΦΑΣΑΝ ΑΔΙΚΕΙΝ, ΕΚ ΜΙΑΣ 
ΠΟΛΕΩΣ ΕΙΣ ΠΛΕΙΟΥΣ ΑΥΤΟΥΣ ΔΙΟΥΚΙΣΑΝΤΕΣ, ἈΝΟΙΓ 
ΜΕΤᾴ ΚΑΚΙΑΣ . . . ΤΟ ΔΟΚΕΙΝ, ΕἍΝ ΤΙΣ ΑΥΤΟΣ ἘΠΙΜΗΤΗ, 
ΜΗΔΕ ΤΟΥΣ ΠΕΛΑΣ ὈΡΑΝ. ἈΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙΣ ΤΟΙΝΝ Ὁ ΖΗΛΟΣ 
ΟΥΣ ὋΣ ΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ ΑΙΤΙΟΣ ΚΑΤΕΣΤΗ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΓΙΣΤΩΝ 
ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΩΝ. ΔΝ ΟΥΔΑΜΑΣ ΟΥΔΑΜΗ ΖΗΛΩΤΕΟΝ, 
ΟΥΤΕ ΚΑΤ᾿ ΊΔΙΑΝ ΟΥΤΕ ΚΟΥΝΗ, ΤΟΥΣ ΘΡΘΩΣ ΒΟΥΛΕΥΟ-
ΜΕΝΟΥΣ.

Ο ΔΕ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΣ ΧΡΗΜΑΤΙΣΑΣ ΤΟΙΣ ἈΧΑΙΟΙΣ 
ΑΝΕΞΕΥΞΕ ΜΕΤᾴ ΤΗΣ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΩΣ ἙΠΙ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΙΑΣ, ΣΠΕΥ-
ΔΩΝ ἘΠΙ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΗΝ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΠΟΛΕΟΥΝ, ΟΥ 
ΜΟΝΟΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΣΥΜΜΑΧΟΥΣ ΆΛΛΑ ΠΑΣΙ ΤΟΙΣ ἘΛΛΗΝΙ 
ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΟΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΥ ΨΗΦΙΣΜΑΤΟΣ ΚΑΛΑΣ ἙΛΠΙΔΑΣ ὩΠΟ-
ΔΕΙΚΝΥΩΝ ΠΡΑΘΤΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΓΑΛΟΦΥΧΙΑΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΗΣ.

ΤΑῦΤΑ ΔΕ ἘΠΡΑΤΤΕΤΟ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΥΤΟΥΣ ΚΑΙΡΟΥΣ 
ΚΑΘ᾿ ΟΥΣ ἈΝΝΙΒΑΣ, ΓΕΓΟΝΩΣ ἩΔΗ ΚΥΡΙΟΣ ΤΩΝ ἘΝΤΟΣ 
ἸΒΗΡΟΣ ΠΟΤΑΜΟΥ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ, ἘΠΟΥΕΙΤΟ ΤΗΝ ὈΡΜΗΝ ἙΠΙ 
ΤΗΝ ΖΑΚΑΝΘΑΙΩΝ ΠΟΛΙΝ. ΕΙ ΜΕΝ ΟΥΝ ΤΑΣ ΠΡΩΤΑΣ 
ἘΠΙΒΟΛΑΣ ΤΑΣ ἈΝΝΙΒΟΥ ΤΑΥΣ ἘΛΛΗΝΙΚΑΙΣ ΠΡΑΞΕΙΝ 
ἈΠ˚ ἈΡΧΗΣ ΕΥΘΕΩΣ ἘΠΙΠΕΔΛΘΑΙ ΣΥΝΕΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ, ΔΗΛΟΥ 
ὩΣ ἙΝ ΤΗ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΑ ΒΥΒΛΩ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΑΝ ᾿ΗΜΑΣ 
ΕΝΑΛΛΑΞ ἘΔΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΤΑ ΠΑΡΑΘΕΣΙΝ ΤΟΙΣ ἙΒΗΡΙΚΟΙΣ 
ΠΕΠΟΙΗΘΑΙΝ ΤΗΝ ΕΞΗΓΗΣΙΝ, ἈΚΟΛΟΥΘΟΙΝΤΑΣ ΤΟΙΣ 
ΚΑΙΡΟΙΣ. ἘΠΕΙ ΔΕ ΤΑ ΤΕ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ἸΤΑΛΙΑΝ ΚΑΙ 
ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ἘΛΛΆΔΑ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ἈΣΙΑΝ ΤΑΣ ΜΕΝ 
368
BOOK IV. 27. 5 – 28. 3

were concerned about the garrison, not about the man. Again by the terms of the peace of Antalcidas the same people proclaimed all Greek cities free and autonomous, but did not withdraw their harmosts from them, and again in expelling from their homes the Mantineans, who were their friends and allies, they maintained that they inflicted no wrong on them by transferring them from one city to several. In all this they exhibited their folly as well as their knavery, for they evidently thought that if a man shuts his own eyes his neighbours too are blind. Now to both states, the Aetolians and the Spartans, this unscrupulous policy resulted in the greatest calamities, and it should never be an object of imitation in the public or private life of men who are well advised.

King Philip now having finished his business with the Achaeans left with his army for Macedonia to hasten on the preparations for the war, having given by the above decree not only to the allies, but to all the Greeks a happy prospect of mildness in his rule and of that magnanimity which befits a king.

28. This took place at the same time that Hannibal, after subduing all Iberia south of the Ebro, began his attack on Saguntum. Now had there been any connexion at the outset between Hannibal's enterprise and the affairs of Greece it is evident that I should have included the latter in the previous Book, and, following the chronology, placed my narrative of them side by side in alternate sections with that of the affairs of Spain. But the fact being that the circumstances of Italy, Greece, and Asia
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἀρχὰς τῶν πολέμων τούτων ἴδιας εἰλήφει τὰς δὲ συντελείας κοινὰς, καὶ τὴν ἐξήγησιν περὶ αὐτῶν ἐκρίναμεν ποιῆσασθαι κατ’ ἴδιαν, ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ τῶν καιρῶν ἔλθωμεν τούτων ἐν ὧδε συνεπλάκησαν αἱ προερημέναι πράξεις ἀλλήλαις καὶ πρὸς ἐν τέλος ἡ ἤρξαντο τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχειν (οὕτως γὰρ ἦ τε περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐκάστων ἔσται διήγησις σαφῆς ἦ τε συμπλοκὴ καταφανῆς, περὶ ἢς ἐν ἀρχαῖς ἐνεδει-ξάμεθα, παραδείγματε πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ δι’ ἃς αὐτίας γέγονεν), λοιπὸν ἦδη κοινὴν ποιῆσασθαι περὶ πάντων τὴν ἱστορίαν. Ἐγένετο δὲ ἡ συμπλοκὴ τῶν πράξεων περὶ τὴν τοῦ πολέμου συντελείαν κατὰ τὸ τρίτον ἔτος τῆς ἑκατοστῆς καὶ τετταρακοστῆς ὀλυμπιάδος. διὸ καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταύτα κοινὴ τοῖς καιροῖς ἀκολουθοῦντες ἐξηγησόμεθα, τὰ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ κατ’ ἴδιαν, ὡς εἴπα, προσαναμμενήσκοντες μόνον τῶν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ βύβλῳ δεδηλωμένων, ἵνα μὴ μόνον εὑπαρακολουθητὸς ἄλλα καὶ καταπληκτικὴ γίνηται τοῖς προσ-έχουσιν ἡ διήγησις.

29  Φίλιππος δὲ παραχειμάζων ἐν Μακεδονία κατ-έγραφε τὰς δυνάμεις πρὸς τὴν μέλλουσιν χρείαν ἐπιμελῶς, ἀμα δὲ τούτοις ἡσφαλίζετο τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ὑπερκειμένους τῆς Μακεδονίας βαρβάρους. μετὰ δὲ ταύτα συνελθοῦσα πρὸς Σκερδιλαίδαν καὶ τομη-ρῶς δοὺς αὐτὸν εἰς τὰς χειρὰς διελέγετο περὶ φιλίας καὶ συμμαχίας, καὶ τὰ μὲν υπισχυομένοις αὐτῷ συνκατασκευάσει τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ κατηγορῶν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ὄντων εὐκατηγορήτων, ῥαδίως ἔπεισε συγχωρεῖν τοῖς παρακαλομένοις. μὴποτε γὰρ οὔδὲν διαφέρει τὰ κατ’ ἴδιαν ἀδικήματα τῶν κοινῶν, ἄλλα πλῆθει 370
were such that the beginnings of these wars were particular to each country, while their ends were common to all, I thought it proper to give a separate account of them, until reaching the date when these conflicts came into connexion with each other and began to tend towards one end—both the narratives of the beginnings of each war being thus made more lucid, and a conspicuous place being given to that subsequent interconnexion of all three, which I mentioned at the outset, indicating when, how, and for what reason it came about—and, then upon reaching this point to comprise all three wars in a single narrative. The interconnexion I speak of took place towards the end of the Social War in the third year of the 140th Olympiad. After this date therefore I shall give a general history of events in chronological order; but up to it, as I said, a separate account of each war, merely recapitulating the contemporary occurrences set forth in the previous Book, so that the whole narrative may not only be easy to follow but may make a due impression on my readers.

29. While wintering in Macedonia Philip spent his time in diligently levying troops for the coming campaign, and in securing his frontiers from attack by the barbarians of the interior. In the next place he met Scerdilaïdas, fearlessly putting himself in his power, and made him offers of friendship and alliance. By promising on the one hand to aid him in subduing Illyria and on the other hand by bringing accusations against the Aetolians, which was no difficult matter, he easily persuaded him to agree to his proposals. Public crimes, as a fact, differ from private ones only in the extent and quantity of their
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

μόνον καὶ μεγέθει τῶν συμβαινόντων. καὶ γὰρ κατ’ ἓδιαν τὸ τῶν ραδιουργῶν καὶ κλεπτῶν φίλον τούτω μάλιστα τῷ τρόπῳ σφάλλεται, τῶ μή ποιεῖν ἄλλης τὰς δίκαιας, καὶ συλλήβδην διὰ τὰς εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀθεσίας. ὃ καὶ τότε συνέβη γενέσθαι περὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς. συνθέμενοι γὰρ τῷ Σκερδυ- λαίδα δώσειν μέρος τι τῆς λείας, ἐὰν συνεισβάλῃ μετ’ αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν Ἀχαίαν, πεισθέντος καὶ ποιή- σαντος τοῦτο διαρτάσαντες τὴν τῶν Κυναθέων πόλην καὶ πολλὰ περιελασάμενοι σώματος καὶ θρέμματα τῶν Σκερδυλαίδων οὐδενὸς μερίτην ἐποίη- 7 σαν τῶν ἀλόντων. διὸπερ ὑποκαθημένης ἐκ τούτων αὐτῷ τῆς ὄργης, βραχέα προσαναμήσαντος τοῦ Φίλιππου ταχέως ὑπήκουσε καὶ συνεδείπνησε μεθέξου τῆς κοινῆς συμμαχίας, ἐφ’ ὃ λαμβάνει μὲν εἰκοσὶ τάλαντα κατ’ ἑναντίον, πλεῖν δὲ λέμβοις τριάκοντα καὶ πολλοῖς τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς κατὰ βαλλαττάν.

30 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Φίλιππος περὶ ταύτα διέτριβεν, οἱ δ’ ἐξαποσταλέντες πρέσβεις πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους ἀφικόμενοι πρῶτον εἰς Ἀκαρνανίαν ἐνετύγχανον 2 τούτους. οἱ δ’ Ἀκαρνάνες τὸ τε δόγμα γνησίως συνεπεκύρωσαν καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ χώρας πόλεμον ἔξ- ἴηνεκαν τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς· καίπερ τούτοις, εἰ καὶ των έτέρων, δίκαιον ἦν συγγνώμην ἔχειν ὑπερ- τυβερέον καὶ καταμέλλουσι καὶ καθόλου δεδώσι 3 τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀστυνειτόνων πόλεμον καὶ διὰ τὸ παρακείσθαι μὲν συντερμονοῦντας τῇ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν χώρᾳ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ κατ’ ἓδιαν εὐχειρώ- τους ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, διὰ τὸ μικρὸς ἐμπροσθεὶς χρόνοις πείραν εἰληφέναι τῶν δεινοτάτων 4 διὰ τὴν πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς ἀπέχθειαν. ἀλλὰ μα δοκοῦσιν οἱ γνησίοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ κοινὴ καὶ κατ’ 372
results. In private life also the whole tribe of thieves and swindlers come to grief most frequently by not treating their confederates justly and generally speaking by perfidy towards each other, and this was what happened now to the Aetolians. They had agreed with Scerdilaïdas to give him a part of the spoil if he joined them in their invasion of Achaea, and when he consented and did so and they had sacked Cynaetha, carrying off a large booty of slaves and cattle, they gave him no share at all of their captures. As he had been nursing anger against them for this ever since, it only required a brief mention by Philip of this grievance to make him at once consent and agree to adhere to the general alliance on condition of receiving an annual sum of twenty talents, in consideration of which he was to attack the Aetolians by sea with thirty boats.

30. Philip, then, was thus occupied. Meanwhile the envoys sent to the allies proceeded first to Acarnania and communicated with the people. The Acarnanians acted with perfect straightforwardness, confirming the decree and agreeing to make war on the Aetolians from Acarnania, although they, if any people, might have been excused for deferring and hesitating and generally for dreading a war with a neighbouring state, and this for three reasons: the first being the immediate neighbourhood of Aetolia, the next and more important, their military weakness when isolated, but the gravest of all, the terrible suffering they had recently undergone owing to their hostility to the Aetolians. But really straight and honourable men, both in public and private, value, I think, no
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ιδίαν ουδέποτε περι πλείονος οὐδὲν ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ καθήκοντος· ὅτερ Ἀκαρνανεῖς ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις καιροῖς οὐδὲν τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἦττον εὐρίσκονται διατετηρήκότες, καίπερ ἀπὸ μικρᾶς ὄρμῳμενοι δυνάμεως. οἷς οὐκ ὁκηθεῖν κατὰ τὰς περιστάσεις κοινωνεῖν πραγμάτων, σπευστέον δὲ μᾶλλον, εἰ καὶ τισιν ἐτέροις τῶν Ἐλλήνων· καὶ γάρ ἰδια καὶ 6 κοινὴ στάσιμον ἔχουσι τι καὶ φιλελεύθερον. Ἡπειρώται δὲ ἐκ παραθέσεως διακούσαντες τῶν πρέσβεων τὸ μὲν δόγμα παραπλησίως ἐπέκυρωσαν, τὸν δὲ πόλεμον ἐκφέρειν ἐμφήσαντο τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς, 7 ἐπειδὰν καὶ Φιλίππος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔξενεγκη, τοῖς δὲ παρὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν πρεσβευταῖς ἀπεκρίθησαν ὅτι δέδοκται τοῖς Ἡπειρώταις διατηρεῖν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τὴν εἰρήνην, ἀγεννώς καὶ ποικίλως χρώμενοι 8 τοῖς πράγμασιν. ἀπεστάλησαν δὲ καὶ πρὸς βασιλέα Πτολεμαίον πρέσβεις οἱ παρακαλέσοντες αὐτὸν μήτε χρήματα πέμπειν τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς μήτ' ἄλλο μηδὲν χορηγεῖν κατὰ Φιλίππου καὶ τῶν συμμάχων.

31 Μεσσηνιοὶ δὲ, δι' οὓς ὁ πόλεμος τὴν ἀρχήν ἔλαβε, τοῖς παραγενομένοις πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀπεκρίθησαν ὅτι τῆς Φιγαλείας κειμένης ἐπὶ τοῖς θροῖς αὐτῶν καὶ ταττομένης ὑπ' Αἰτωλοῦς, οὐκ ἂν ἐπιδεξιαντὶ τὸν πόλεμον πρὶν ἢ ταύτην ἀπ' Αἰτωλῶν ἀποστασθηκήθηναι 2 τὴν πόλιν. περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ταύτης κατ' ἑσχύναν, οὐδαμῶς εὐδοκούντων τῶν πολλῶν, [Αἰ-τωλῶν οἱ] ἑφορεύοντες Οίνις καὶ Νίκιππος καὶ τινὲς ἑτεροι τῶν ὀλυγαρχῶν, ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ πολὺ παραπαίνοντες τοῦ δέουντος κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν 3 γνώμην. ἐγὼ γὰρ φοβερὸν μὲν εἶναι φήμι τὸν πόλεμον, οὐ μὴν οὕτω γε φοβερὸν ὡστε πᾶν ὑπο- 4 μένειν χάριν τοῦ μή προσδέξασθαι πόλεμον, ἐπεὶ
considerations above their duty, and this principle the Acarnanians are found to have maintained on most occasions more firmly than any other people in Greece, although their resources were but slender. No one, then, should hesitate to seek the alliance of this people in a crisis; rather it should be embraced with more eagerness than that of any other Greek people; for both in public and in private they are characterized by steadfastness and love of liberty. The Epirots, on the contrary, after receiving the envoys, while they also confirmed the decree and voted to make war on the Aetolians as soon as King Philip himself took the field, in their reply to the Aetolian embassy stated that they had passed a resolution to maintain peace with them, thus playing a part as ignoble as it was double-faced. Envoys were also sent to King Ptolemy requesting him neither to send funds to the Aetolians, nor to furnish them with any other supplies for use against Philip and the allies.

31. The Messenians, on whose account the war began, replied to the envoys sent to them, that seeing that Phigalea lay on their borders and was subject to the Aetolians, they would not undertake the war until this city had been detached from the Aetolians. This resolution was by no means generally approved, but was forced through by the ephors Oenis and Nicippus and certain other members of the oligarchical party, who in my opinion were much mistaken and took a course which was far from being correct. That war is a terrible thing I agree, but it is not so terrible that we should submit to anything in order to avoid it. For why do we
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tί καὶ θρασύνομεν τὴν ἰσηγορίαν καὶ παρρησίαν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἑλευθερίας οἴνομα πάντες, εἰ μηδὲν
6 ἔσται προφυγιάτερον τῆς εἰρήνης; οὐδὲ γὰρ
Θηβαίοις ἐπαινοῦμεν κατὰ τὰ Μηδικά, διότι τῶν
ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀποστάντων κινδύνων τὰ Περσῶν
εἰλοντο διὰ τὸν φόβον, οὐδὲ Πίνδαρον τὸν συναπο-
φηνάμενον αὐτοῖς ἀγείν τὴν ἡσυχίαν διὰ τῶν
ποιημάτων,

6 τὸ κοινὸν τις ἀστῶν ἐν εὐθίᾳ τιθεῖς
ἐρευνασάτω μεγαλάνορος ἡσυχία τὸ φαιδρὸν φάος.

7 δόξας γὰρ παραντικὰ πιθανῶς εἰρηκέναι, μετ' οὖ
πολὺ πάντων αἰσχίστην εὐρέθη καὶ βλαβερωτάτην
8 πεποιημένος ἀπόφασιν· εἰρήνη γὰρ μετὰ μὲν τοῦ
dικαῖου καὶ πρέποντος κάλλιστον ἐστὶ κτήμα καὶ
λυσιτελέστατον, μετὰ δὲ κακίας ἡ δελίας ἐπονει-
δίστον πάντων αἰσχυστὸν καὶ βλαβερώτατον.

32 Οἱ δὲ τῶν Μεσοπόταμων προεστῶτες, ὄντες ὀλγ-
αρχικοὶ καὶ στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ παρατά κατ' ἱδίαν
λυσιτελοὺς, φιλοτιμότερον τοῦ δέοντος αἰεὶ δι-
2 ἐκείνῳ πρὸς τὴν εἰρήνην. διὸ πολλὰς μὲν περι-
στάσεις καὶ καιροὺς ἔχοντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ φόβους
καὶ κινδύνους διωλίσθανον· ἡθροίζετο δὲ κατὰ
tὴν πρόθεσιν ταύτην αἰεὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτοῖς, καὶ
μεγίσταις ἐποίουν παλαίεν τὴν πατρίδα συμφοραῖς.
3 δοκῶ δ' ἐγγυεῖ τὴν αἰτίαν εἰναι ταύτην, ὅτι δυσὶ
γειτνιώντες ἔθνεσι τοῖς μεγίστοις τῶν κατὰ Πελο-
πόνησον, μᾶλλον δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ τῶν  Ὑπαρκάδων, λέγω
de τῷ τε τῶν Ἀρκάδων καὶ τῷ τῶν Λακώνων,
376
all vaunt our civic equality and liberty of speech and all that we mean by the word freedom, if nothing is more advantageous than peace? We do not indeed praise the Thebans because at the time of the Persian invasion they deserted Greece in the hour of peril and took the side of the Persians from fear, nor do we praise Pindar for confirming them in their resolution to remain inactive by the verses

Stablish in calm the common weal,
Ye burghers all, and seek the light of lordly Peace that ever beameth bright.*

For though at the time this advice seemed plausible it was not long before the decision he recommended proved to be the source of the deepest disaster and disgrace. Peace indeed, with justice and honour is the fairest and most profitable of possessions, but when joined with baseness and disgraceful cowardice, nothing is more infamous and hurtful.

32. The oligarchs who were then in power in Messenia, aiming at their own immediate advantage, were always too warm advocates of peace. Consequently though they often found themselves in critical situations and were sometimes exposed to grave peril, they always managed to slip through without friction. But the sum of the evils caused by this policy of theirs continued to accumulate, and at last their country was forced to struggle with the worst calamities. The cause of this I believe to be, that living as they did on the borders of two of the greatest nations in the Peloponnese or even in Greece, the Arcadians and Laconians, of whom

* Pindar probably meant civic peace and Polybius accuses him unjustly.

377
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

4 καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἔχθρῶς καὶ ἀκαταλλάκτως ἀεὶ ποτὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχοντος ἐξ οὗ καὶ κατέσχον τὴν χώραν, τοῦ δὲ φιλικῶς καὶ κηδεμονικῶς, οὕτε τὴν πρὸς Λακεδαίμονιον ἔχθραν εὐγενῶς ἀνελάμβανον 5 οὕτε τὴν πρὸς Ἀρκάδας φίλαν. λοιπὸν ὅταν μὲν οὕτω πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἦ πρὸς ἑτέρους πολεμοῦντες ἐν περισσαμοῖς ἦσαν, ἐγίνετο τὸ δὲν αὐτοῖς· ἦγον γὰρ τὴν εἰρήνην ἀεὶ παρευδιαζόμενοι διὰ τὴν 6 τοῦ τόπου παράπτωσιν· ὅταν δὲ ἐνσχολι θραπερο- σπαστοι Λακεδαίμονιοι γενηθέντες ἠτράπησαν πρὸς 7 τὸ βλάπτειν αὐτοὺς, οὕτ' αὐτοὶ δ' αὐτῶν ἀντ- οφθαλμεὶν ἔδυναντο πρὸς τὸ βάρος τὸ Λακε- δαίμονιν, οὕτε προκατεσκευασμένοι φίλους τοὺς ἀληθινῶς αὐτοῖς πάντα συνυποστησομένους ἢ δουλεύειν ἡγακάζοντο τούτοις ἀχθοφοροῦντες, ἢ φεύγοντες τὴν δουλείαν ἀνάστατοι γίνεσθαι, λεί- πουντες τὴν χώραν μετὰ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν, 8 ὅπερ ἢδη πλεονάκις αὐτοῖς συνέβη παθεῖν οὐ πάνυ 9 πολλοῖς χρόνοις. εἰ δὲ μὲν οὖν οἰονεὶ συμφύναι τὴν νῦν ὑπάρχονσαν κατάστασιν Πελοποννησίους, ήνα 10 μήδενὸς δέη τῶν λέγεσθαι μελλόντων· ἐὰν δὲ ποτὲ κίνησιν καὶ μετάστασιν σχῆ ταῦτα, μίαν ὅρῳ Μεσσήνιος καὶ Μεγαλοπολίταις ἔλπίδα τοῦ δύνα- σθαι νέμεσθαι τὴν αὐτῶν χώραν τὸν πλεῖον χρόνον, ἔαν συμφρονήσαντες κατὰ τὴν Ἐπαμμινώδου γνώ- μην παντὸς καίρου καὶ πράγματος ἑλωνται κοινω- νεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἀληθινῶς.

33 Ὅ δὲ λόγος οὗτος ἔχει μὲν ἰσως καὶ διὰ τῶν 2 πάλαι γεγονότων πιστών. οἱ γὰρ Μεσσήνιοι πρὸς 378
the latter had been their implacable enemies ever since their first occupation of the country, while the former were their friends and protectors, they were never thoroughly frank and whole-hearted either in their enmity to the Lacedaemonians or in their friendship to the Arcadians. Consequently when the attention of these two peoples was distracted by wars between themselves or against other states, the Messenians were not ill treated, for they enjoyed tranquillity and peace owing to their country lying outside the theatre of war. But whenever the Lacedaemonians, finding themselves again at leisure and undistracted, took to maltreating them, they could neither face the might of Sparta alone, nor had they secured for themselves friends who would be ready to stand by them in all circumstances, and consequently they were compelled either to be the slaves and carriers of the Lacedaemonians, or if they wished to avoid slavery, to break up their homes and abandon their country with their wives and children, a fate which has overtaken them more than once in a comparatively short period of time. Heaven grant that the present tranquillity of the Peloponnese may be firmly established, so that the advice I am about to give may not be required; but should there be a change and a recurrence of disturbances the only hope I see for the Messenians and Megalopolitans of being able to continue in possession of their countries, is for them, as Epaminondas advised, to be of one mind and resolve on whole-hearted co-operation in all circumstances and in all action.

33. This counsel may perhaps find some support from circumstances that took place many years previously. For besides many other things I might
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἄλλοις πολλοῖς καὶ παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Λυκαιῶν
βωμὸν ἀνέθεσαν στήλην ἐν τοῖς κατ᾽ Ἀριστομένην
καιροῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Καλλισθένης φησίν, γράφαν-
tες τὸ γράμμα τοῦτο.

3 πάντως ὁ χρόνος εὑρείς δίκην ἀδίκω βασιλῆι,
eὑρεὶ δὲ Μεσσήνη σὺν Διῷ τὸν προδότην
ῥηδίως. χαλεπὸν δὲ λαθείν θεόν ἀνδρὲ ἐπιορκον.
χαῖρε, Ζεύ βασιλεῦ, καὶ σάῳ Ἀρκάδιαν.

4 Ἔσεὶ γὰρ τῆς αὐτῶν ἐστερήθησαν, οίονεὶ περὶ
dευτέρας πατρίδος, ὡς γ’ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τοῖς θεοῖς
eὐχόμενοι σώζειν τὴν Ἀρκάδίαν, τοῦτ’ ἀνέθεσαν
5 τὸ γράμμα. καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως ἐποίουν· οὐ γὰρ
μόνον αὐτοῖς Ἀρκάδες υποδεξάμενοι κατὰ τὴν
ἐκπτώσιν τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἱδίας ὑπὸ τὸν Ἀριστομένειν
πόλεμον ὁμεστίους ἐποίησαντο καὶ πολίτας, ἄλλα
καὶ τὰς θυγατέρας ἐγκήσαντο τοῖς ἐν ἡλκία διδό-
6 ναι τῶν Μεσσήνων, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀναζητήσαντες
τὴν Ἀριστοκράτους τοῦ βασιλέως προδοσίαν ἐν
tῇ μάχῃ τῇ καλομεμένῃ περὶ Τάφρου αὐτὸν τ’ ἀνεὶ-
7 λον καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ πᾶν ἤφανσαν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα
καὶ χωρίς τῶν πάλαι τὰ τελευταία γεγονότα μετὰ
tὸν Μεγάλης πόλεως καὶ Μεσσήνης συνοικισμὸν
ἐκανὴν ἀν παράσχοι πίστιν τοῖς υἱῶν ἡμῶν εἰρημέ-
8 νος. καθ’ οὕς γὰρ καιροὺς, τῆς περὶ Μαντίνειαν
μάχης τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἀμφιδήμητον ἔχοντος τὴν
νίκην διὰ τὸν Ἐπαμνώνδου θάνατον, ἐκώλυν
Λακεδαιμόνιοι μετέχειν τῶν σπουδῶν Μεσσήνων,
ἀκμὴν σφετερίζομενοι ταῖς ἐλπίς τὴν Μεσσήνιαν,
9 ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο διέσπευσαν Μεγαλοπόλιται καὶ πάντες
οἱ κοινωνοῦντες Ἀρκάδων τῆς αὐτῶν συμμαχίας.
BOOK IV. 33. 2–9

mention, the Messenians set up in the time of Aristomenes, as Callisthenes tells us, a pillar beside the altar of Zeus Lycaeus bearing the inscription:

Time faileth ne'er to find the unjust and bring
A righteous doom on an unrighteous king.
Messene now, with ease, for Zeus did speed,
Found out the traitor. Yea, 'tis hard indeed
For the forsworn to hide him from God's eye.
All hail, O Zeus, the king; save Arcady.

It was, as a fact, after they had lost their own country that they dedicated this inscription praying the gods to save Arcadia as if it were a second fatherland to them. And in this they were quite justified; for the Arcadians not only received them on their expulsion from Messenia in the Aristomenean War, taking them to their homes and making them citizens, but passed a resolution to give their daughters in marriage to those Messenians who were of proper age. In addition to this, after holding an inquiry into the treachery of the king Aristocrates in the battle of the Trench, they put him and his whole family to death. But, apart from these remote events, my assertion derives sufficient support from the circumstances that followed the recent foundation of the cities of Megalopolis and Messene. For at the time when, after the battle of Mantinea, the result of which was doubtful owing to the death of Epaminondas, the Spartans refused to allow the Messenians to participate in the truce, as they still hoped to re-annex Messenia, the Megalopolitans and all the Arcadians in alliance with them were so active in

* For details see the account of the second Messenian war in Pausanias iv. 14–24.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

οὔπερ Μεσσηνίους μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων προσ−
dεχθήναι καὶ μετασχεῖν τῶν ὄρκων καὶ διαλύσεων,
Λακεδαίμονίους δὲ μόνους ἐκσπόνδους γενέσθαι
10 τῶν Ἐλλήνων. ᾗ τίς οὖν ἄν τῶν ἐπιγνωμένων ἐν
νῷ τιθέμενος νομίσειε καλῶς εἰρήσθαι τὰ μικρὰ
πρότερον ὑφ’ ἡμῶν διελθώμενα;
11 Ταῦτα μὲι οὖν εἰρήσθω μοι χάριν Ἄρκάδων καὶ
Μεσσηνίων, ἵνα μνημονεύοντες τῶν συμβεβηκότων
αὐτοῖς περὶ τὰς πατρίδας ἀτυχημάτων ὑπὸ Λακε−
dαίμονίων ἀληθύνωσ᾽ ἀντέχωντι τῆς πρὸς αὐτῶν
12 εὐνοίας καὶ πίστεως, καὶ μήτε φόβον ὑφορώμενοι
μήτ’ εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐγκαταλείπωσιν ἄλλη−
lους ἐν ταῖς ὀλοσχεροῖ περιστάσεως.
34 Λακεδαίμονιοι δὲ τῶν εἰθισμένων ἐποίησάν τι
(τοῦτο γὰρ συνεχέσ ἢ τοῖς προειρημένοις). τέλος
γὰρ τοὺς παρὰ τῶν συμμάχων πρέσβεις ἀναποκρίτους
ἀπέστειλαν. οὕτως ἐξηπόρησαν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀλογίας
2 καὶ κακίας τῆς αὐτῶν. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτ᾽ ἄληθὲς
εἶναι, διότι πολλάκις τολμᾶν περιττὸν εἰς ἄνοιαν
3 καὶ τὸ μηδὲν κατατάνα ἐἰσθεν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μετὰ
tαῦτα, κατασταθέντων ἐφόρων ἄλλων, οἱ κυνήσαν−
tες ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα καὶ γενόμενοι τῆς
προειρημένης σφαγῆς αὕτοι διεπέμποντο πρὸς
4 τοὺς Αἰτωλούς, ἐπιστώμενοι προσβευτήν. τῶν
dὲ καὶ μᾶλ’ ἀσμένως ὑπακουούσαντων ἦκε μετ’
ὅλων προσβευτῶν εἰς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα Μαχατᾶς.
5 καὶ παρατικά προσῆει τοῖς ἐφόροις . . . οἱ ὄμεν−
νοι δεῖν τῷ τε Μαχατᾶ δίδοσθαι τὴν ἔφοδον ἐπὶ
tοὺς πολλούς, καὶ βασιλέας καθιστάναι κατὰ τὰ
382
their efforts, that the Messenians were received by
the allies and included in the general treaty of peace,
while the Lacedaemonians alone among the Greeks
were excluded from it. Anyone in the future who
takes this into consideration will agree that the
opinion I advanced a little above is correct. I
have spoken at such length on the subject for the
sake of the Arcadians and Messenians, in order
that, bearing in mind the misfortunes that have
befallen their countries at the hands of the Lacedae-
monians, they may adhere in the spirit as well as
in the letter to their alliance and neither from fear
of consequences or from a desire for peace desert
each other in critical times.

34. To continue my account of the reception of
the envoys, the Lacedaemonians acted in the
manner usual with them, dismissing the envoys
without making any reply at all; so utterly in-
capable were they of arriving at a decision owing
to the absurdity and viciousness of their late policy.
Indeed it seems to me very true the saying that
excessive daring ends in mere senselessness and
nothingness. Subsequently, however, on the appoint-
ment of new ephors, the original movers of the
sedition and authors of the massacre I described
above sent messengers to the Aetolians inviting
them to negotiate. The Aetolians were quite
happy to agree to this, and shortly afterwards
Machatas arrived in Sparta as their envoy and at
once presented himself before the ephors [accom-
panied by members of the party which had invited
him who] demanded that they should grant Machatas
access to the general assembly and appoint kings
in accordance with the ancient constitution, for
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

πάτρια, καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν τὸν πλεῖω χρόνον παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καταλελυμένην τὴν τῶν Ἡρακλείδῶν ἀρχὴν. οἱ δ’ ἔφοροι δυσαρεστούμενοι μὲν τοῖς ὅλοις πράγμασιν, οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὁρμὴν ἀντοφθαλμεῖν ἀλλὰ δεδιότες τὴν τῶν νέων συστρο-φήν, περὶ μὲν τῶν βασιλέων ἐφασαν μετὰ ταῦτα βουλεύσεθαι, τῷ δὲ Μαχατὰ συνεχώρησαν δῶσειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. συναχθέντος δὲ τοῦ πλῆθους παρελθὼν ὁ Μαχατᾶς παρεκάλει διὰ πλειόνων αὐτοῦς αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν πρὸς Αἰτωλοῦς συμμαχίαν, εἰκῇ μὲν καὶ θρασέως κατηγορῶν Μακεδόνων, ἀλὰγως δὲ καὶ ψευδῶς ἐγκωμιάζων τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς. μεταστάντος δὲ τοῦτον πολλῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως ἐτύγχανε τὸ πράγμα: τινὲς μὲν γὰρ συνηγόρουν τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς καὶ συντίθεσαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς παρῆναι τὴν συμμαχίαν, ἐνοι δὲ τούτους ἀντέλεγον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τινὲς ἐπιστήσαντες τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀντιγόνου καὶ Μακεδόνων εὐεργεσίας ἐπὶ τὰς διὰ Χαρίζου καὶ Τιμαίου βλάβας, ὅτε στρατεύσαντες Αἰτωλοὶ πανδημεῖ κατέφθειραν μὲν αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν, ἔξηγαραποδισάντο δὲ τὰς περιοίκους, ἐπεβουλεύσαν δὲ τῇ Σπάρτῃ μετὰ δόλου καὶ βίας τοὺς φυγάδας ἐπιστήσαντες, ἐπὶ ἀλλὰς ἐγένοντο γνώμης, καὶ τέλος ἐπεισόδησαν τηρεῖν τὴν πρὸς Φιλίππου καὶ Μακε-δόνας συμμαχίαν. γεγομένων δὲ τούτων ὁ μὲν Μαχατᾶς ἀπρακτὸς ἐπανῆλθεν πάλιν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, οἱ δὲ ἄρχης αὐτῶν γεγονότες τῆς κωῆσεως, οὐδαμῶς εἶχαν δυνάμενοι τοῖς παρόνιοις, ἀντὶς ἐπεβάλοντο πράγμα ποιεῖν πάντων ἀσεβέστατον, 2 φθείραντες τινὰς τῶν νέων. κατὰ γὰρ τινὰ ἤθην

384
they must no longer permit the royal house of the Heraclidae to be dethroned in defiance of law. The ephors, who were displeased by the whole proceeding, but were incapable of boldly confronting the party of violence as they were intimidated by the mob of young men, said that they would take time to decide about re-establishing the kings, but agreed to allow Machatas to address a meeting of the commons. On the people assembling, Machatas came forward and in a speech of some length exhorted them to declare for alliance with the Aetolians, bringing random and audacious accusations against the Macedonians and praising the Aetolians in terms as absurd as they were false. On his withdrawal an animated discussion took place, some speaking on behalf of the Aetolians and advising the conclusion of an alliance with them, while other speakers took the opposite view. However when some of the elder citizens reminded the people of the benefits conferred on them by Antigonus and the Macedonians and of the injuries they had received at the hands of Charixenus and Timaeus—when the Aetolians invading Laconia in full force devastated the country, enslaved the villages of the Perioeci and formed a plot to capture Sparta, combining fraud and force to reinstate the exiles—the people were brought round to another opinion, and finally persuaded to maintain their alliance with Philip and the Macedonians. Hereupon Machatas returned home without effecting his purpose; (35) but the original authors of the sedition had no mind to give way and again resolved to commit a most impious crime, having debauched for this purposesome of the younger men. At a certain sacrifice of ancient
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

πάτριον ἔδει τοὺς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις μετὰ τῶν ὀπλών πομπεύειν ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τῆς Χαλκοϊκοῦ νεών, τοὺς δὲ ἐφόροις συντελεῖν τὰ περὶ τὴν θυσίαν, αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸ τέμενος διατρίβοντας. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ τῶν πομπευόντων ἐν τοῖς ὀπλίσιν τινές τῶν νεανίσκων ἀφινο προσπεσόντες θύουσι τοῖς ἐφόροις ἀπέσφαξαν αὐτούς. καίτοι πάσιν τοῖς καταφυγούσι τὴν ἀσφάλειαν παρεσκεύαζε τὸ 4 ἱερόν, καὶ θανάτου τις ἡ κατακεκριμένος· τότε δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡμότητα τῶν τολμώντων εἰς τούτῳ ἠλθει καταφρονήσασι ὠστε περὶ τὸν βωμὸν καὶ τὴν τράπεζα τῆς θεοῦ κατασφαγήν τοὺς ἐφόρους 5 ἀπαντας. ἔξις δὲ τούτου τάκολουθον τῇ προθέσει ποιοῦντες ἀνέίλων μὲν τοὺς περὶ Γυρίδαν τῶν γερόντων, ἐφυγόντως δὲ τοὺς ἀντεπόντας τοῖς Αἰτωλῶις, εἶλοντο δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐφόρους, συνέθευσ

6 δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς τὴν συμμαχίαν. ἐποίουν δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ τὴν τε πρὸς Ἀχαιοὺς ἀπέκθειαν καὶ τὴν πρὸς Μακεδόνας ἄχαρισταν καὶ καθόλου τὴν πρὸς πάντας ἀλογίαν ὑπέμενον, οὐχ ἤκιστα διὰ Κλεομένη καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνον εὐνοιαν, ἐπελπίζωντες ἀπέ καὶ προσδοκίαν ἔχοντες τῆς ἐκείνου

7 παρουσίας ἀμα καὶ σωτηρίας. οὔτως οἱ δυνάμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιδειξὶς ὁμολέιν τοῖς συμπεριφερομένοισι οὐ μόνον παρόντες ἀλλὰ καὶ μακρὰν ἀφεστώτες ἐγκαταλείπονσι τινὰ καὶ λίαν ἰσχυρὰ

8 τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὐνοίας αἰθύγματα. οἱ γε, χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τὸτε, πολιτεύωμεν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια σχεδὸν ἤδη τρεῖς ἐναυτοὺς μετὰ τὴν Κλεομένος ἐκπτωσαν, οὕτοι ἐπενόησαν οὐδὲποτε

9 βασιλεῖς καταστήσατι τῆς Σπάρτης· ἀμα δὲ τῷ τὴν φήμην ἀφικέσθαι περὶ τῆς Κλεομένους τελευτῆσ

386
BOOK IV. 35. 2–9

institution the citizens of military age had to form a procession in arms and march to the temple of Athene of the Brazen House, while the ephors remained in the sanctuary to perform the sacrificial rites. Certain of the young men who took part in the procession chose the moment when the ephors were sacrificing for suddenly attacking and slaying them. It must be remembered that the holy place secured the safety of anyone who took sanctuary in it, even if he were condemned to death; and yet its sanctity was held in such slight esteem by those who had the heart to do this savage deed, that all the ephors were butchered at the very altar and table of the goddess. Continuing to pursue their purpose, they next killed Gyridas, one of the elders, expelled those who had spoken against the Aetolians, chose new ephors from their own faction and concluded the alliance with the Aetolians. Their chief motive for all these proceedings and for exhibiting enmity to the Achaeans, ingratitude to Macedonia, and a general lack of consideration in their conduct to all mankind, was their attachment to Cleomenes, to whose safe return they were always looking forward with confidence. So true is it that men who have the faculty of tactfully treating those about them do not only arouse devotion to their persons when present, but even when far away keep the spark of loyalty bright and alive in the hearts of their adherents. These men, apart from other considerations, had now during the three years they had passed under their old constitution since the dethronement of Cleomenes never thought of appointing new kings of Sparta; but the moment the report of his death reached them they at once
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

eὐθέως ὡρμησαν ἔπι τὸ βασιλεῖς καθιστάναι τὰ τε
10 πλῆθη καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἄρχειον. καὶ κατέ-
στησαν οἱ κοινωνοῦντες ἐφοροὶ τῆς αἱρέσεως τοῖς
στασιώταίς, οἱ καὶ τὴν πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς συνθέμενοι
συμμαχίαν, ὑπὲρ ὧν τὸν ἄρτι λόγον ἐποιησάμην,
τὸν μὲν ἔνα νομίμως καὶ καθηκόντως, Ἀγησίπολον,
ὅντα μὲν παίδα τὴν ἥλικιαν, νῦν δὲ Ἀγησιπόλιδος
11 τοῦ Κλεομβρότου· τὸν δὲ συνέβαινε βεβαιλευ-
κέναι, καθ’ οὗς καρδοὺς ἐξῆπες Λεωνίδης ἐκ τῆς
ἀρχῆς, διὰ τὸ κατὰ γένος ὑπάρχειν ἐγνώστα τῆς
12 οἰκίας ταύτης. ἐπίτροπον δὲ τοῦ παιδὸς εἴλοντο
Κλεομένη, Κλεομβρότου μὲν νῦν Ἄγησιπόλιδος
13 δὲ ἄδελφον. ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐτέρας οἰκίας ὄντων ἐκ
τῆς Ἰππομέδοντος θυγατρὸς Ἀρχιδάμῳ δυνεῖν
παιδῶν, ὃς ἦν νῦν Εὐδαμίδου, ζῶντος δὲ καὶ
Ἰππομέδοντος ἀκμῆν, ὃς ἦν νῦν Ἀγησιλάου τοῦ
Εὐδαμίδου, καὶ ἐτέρων δὲ πλείονων ἀπὸ τῆς
οἰκίας ὑπαρχόντων, ἀπωτέρω μὲν τῶν προειρημένων
προσηκόντων δὲ κατὰ γένος, τούτους μὲν ἀπαντᾶς
14 υπερεῖδον, Δικούργον δὲ βασιλέα κατέστησαν,
οὐ τῶν προγόνων οὐδεὶς ἑτερεῖχε τῆς προση-
γορίας· ὃς δὲν ἔκαστω τῶν ἐφόρων τάλαντον
'Ἡρακλέους ἀπόγονος καὶ βασιλεὺς ἐγενόμενος τῆς
15 Ἐπάρτης. οὕτως εὖωνα πανταχῇ τὰ καλὰ γέγονεν.
τοιγαροῦν οὐ παῖδες παιδῶν, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι τῆς
ἀνοίας ἀπέτυσαν τοὺς μισθοὺς οἱ καταστήσαντες.
36 'Ο δὲ Μαχατᾶς πυθόμενος τὰ γεγονότα περὶ τοὺς
Λακεδαιμονίους ἦκε πάλιν ὑποστρέψας εἰς τὴν
Σπάρτην, καὶ παρεκάλει τοὺς ἐφόρους καὶ τοὺς
βασιλέας ἐξενεγκεῖν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τὸν πόλεμον.
2 μόνως γὰρ ἄν οὕτως ἔφη λήξαι τὴν τῶν Λακεδαι-
μονίων φιλονεικίαν τῶν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπον δια-

388
urged the people and the ephors to create kings. The ephors belonging to the faction of disorder whom I mentioned above, the same who had concluded the alliance with the Aetolians, hereupon made a choice which was legal and proper in the case of the one king, Agesipolis, still a minor, but the son of Agesipolis son of Cleombrotus who had succeeded to the throne on the deposition of Leonidas as being the next in blood of that house. They appointed to be the boy's guardian Cleomenes, the son of Cleombrotus and brother of Agesipolis. But as for the other house, notwithstanding that Archidamus, the son of Eudamidas, had left two sons born to him by the daughter of Hippomedon and that Hippomedon, who was the son of Agesilaus and grandson of Eudamidas, was still alive, there being also other members of the house more distant than these, but of the blood royal, they passed over all these and nominated as king Lycurgus, none of whose ancestors had borne this title, but he by giving each of the ephors a talent became a descendant of Heracles and king of Sparta, so cheap everywhere had distinctions become. But it happened in consequence that not their children's children, but the very men who made the appointment were the first to suffer for their folly.

36. When Machatas heard what had happened in Sparta, he returned there and urged the ephors and kings to make war on the Achaeans, for that he said was the only means of putting a stop to the factious policy of those Lacedaemonians who wished by any and every means to break the alliance with
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

κοπτόντων τήν πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς συμμαχίαν, τήν τε τῶν ἐν Αἰτωλίᾳ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις πραττόντων.
3 πεισθέντων δὲ τῶν ἐφόρων καὶ τῶν βασιλέων ὁ μὲν Μαχατᾶς ἐπανήλθε συντετελεσμένοι τήν πρόθεσιν
4 διὰ τήν ἄγνοιαν τῶν συμπραττόντων, δὲ Δυκευρ-
γος ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς στρατιώτας καὶ τινὰς τῶν πολιτικῶν ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν 'Αργείαν, ἀφυλάκτως
διακειμένων εἰς τέλος τῶν 'Αργείων διὰ τήν
5 προϋπάρχουσαν κατάστασιν. καὶ Πολίχναν μὲν
καὶ Πρασίας καὶ Λεύκας καὶ Κύφαντα προσπεσόν
άφω κατέσχεν, Γλυμπέσι δὲ καὶ Ζάρακι προσ-
6 πεσὼν ἀπέπεσε. τούτου δὲ ταῦτα πράξαντος
ἐπεκήρυξαν τὸ λάφυρον οἱ Λακεδαμόνιοι κατὰ
tῶν Ἀχαιῶν. ἔπεισαν δὲ καὶ τοὺς 'Ηλείους οἱ
περὶ τῶν Μαχατῶν, παραπλήσια λέγοντες ἀπερ
καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαμόνιους, ἐξενεγκείω τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς
τὸν πόλεμον.
7 Παραδόξως δὲ καὶ κατὰ νοῦν τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς
tῶν πραγμάτων προκεχωρηκότων οὕτωι μὲν εὐ-
θαρσῶς ἐνέβαινον εἰς τὸν πόλεμον, οἱ δ' Ἀχαιοὶ
tάναντία. Φίλιππος μὲν γάρ, ἐφ' ὦ τὰς ἐλπίδας
ἐξον, ἀκμὴν ἐγίνετο περὶ παρασκευήν, 'Ηπειρῶται
δ' ἐμελλὼν πολεμεῖν, Μεσσήνιοι δ' ἦσυχαιν εἴχον,
8 Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ, προσευληφότες τὴν 'Ηλείων καὶ
Λακεδαμόνιων ἄγνοιαν, πανταχὸς ἐπερείχον αὐ-
37 τοὺς τῷ πολέμῳ. Ἀράτω μὲν οὖν συνέβαινε κατὰ
tὸν καίρον τούτον ἦδη λήγειν τὴν ἀρχήν, Ἀρατοῦ
dὲ τὸν νῦν αὐτοῦ καθεσταμένον ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν
2 παραλαμβάνετε τὴν στρατηγίαν. Αἰτωλῶν δ' ἐ-
στρατήγηκε Σκόπας, δ' ἐχρόνος αὐτῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς
μᾶλστα τότε πως δήρητο τὰς γράφ' ἀρχαίρεσιάς
Αἰτωλοὶ μὲν ἔποιουν μετὰ τὴν φθινοπωρήν
390
the Aetolians and of those in Aetolia who were working for the same end. Upon the ephors and kings consenting, Machatas returned, having accomplished his purpose owing to the blindness of those who supported him. Lycurgus now, taking the regular army and some others of the citizens, invaded Argolis, the Argives being quite off their guard owing to the prevailing tranquillity. By a sudden assault he seized Polichna, Prasiae, Leucae, and Cyphanta, but was repulsed in his attack on Glympe and Zarax. After these achievements of the king the Lacedaemonians proclaimed the right of reprisal against the Achaeans. Machatas also persuaded the Eleans by the same arguments that he had used at Sparta to make war on the Achaeans.

Owing to their cause having thus prospered beyond their expectations the Aetolians entered on the war with confidence. But it was quite the opposite with the Achaeans; for Philip, in whom they chiefly trusted, had not completed his preparations, the Epirots were putting off the commencement of hostilities, the Messenians were entirely inactive, and the Aetolians, supported by the mistaken policy of Elis and Sparta, had enclosed them in a circle of war. 37. Aratus’ term of office was now expiring, and his son Aratus who had been elected in his place was on the point of succeeding him as strategus. Scopas was still the Aetolian strategus, his term of office being now about half through; for the Aetolians hold their elections after the autumn equinox, but the Achaeans in
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ισθμερίαιν εὐθέως, Ἀχαιοὶ δὲ τὸτε περὶ τὴν τῆς
3 Πλειάδος ἐπιτολὴν. ἦδη δὲ τῆς θερείας ἐνιστα-
μένης, καὶ μετειληφότοις Ἀράτου τοῦ νεωτέρου
τῆν στρατηγίαν, ἀμα πάντα τὰ πράγματα τὰς
4 ἐπιβολὰς ἐλάμβανε καὶ τὰς ἄρχας. Ἀννίβας μὲν
γὰρ ἐνεχείρει κατὰ τοὺς καίρους τούτους Ζά-
κανθαν πολιορκεῖν, Ὀμμαίοι δὲ Ἀτεύκιοι Αἰμίλιον
εἰς τὴν Ἰλυρίδα μετὰ δυνάμεως ἔξαπέστελλον ἐπὶ
Δημήτριον τὸν Φάριν. ὑπὲρ ὃν ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ
5 βύβλω δεδηλώκαμεν. Ἀντίοχος δὲ, Πτολεμαῖδα
καὶ Τύρων παραδόντος αὐτῷ Θεόδωτον, τοῖς κατὰ
Κοίλην Συρίαν ἐγχειρεῖν ἐπεβάλλετο. Πτολεμαῖος
dὲ περὶ παρασκευὴν ἐγίνετο τοῦ πρὸς Ἀντίοχον
6 πόλεμον. Λυκοῦργος δ’ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων βουλό-
μενος ἄρχεσθαι Κλεομένει, τὸ τῶν Μεγαλοπολετῶν
Ἀθήναν ἐπολιορκεῖ προσεπτοπεδευκώς. Ἀ-
χαῖοι δὲ μισθοφόρους ἦπεις καὶ ἐξούς ἡθοῖζον
7 εἰς τὸν περιεστώτα πόλεμον. Φίλιππος δ’ ἐκ Μακε-
δονίας ἐκέινε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως, ἔχων Μακεδόνων
φαλαγγίτις μὲν μυρίων πελταστὰς δὲ πεντακισχι-
λίους, ἀμα δὲ τοῦτος ἦπεις ὀκτακοσίους.
8 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀπαντῆ ἣν ἐν τοιούτως ἐπιβολαῖς
καὶ παρασκευάσεις κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς ἔξ-
7ενηγκαν Ὀρδοῦ Βυζαντίοις πόλεμον διὰ τισα τοιαύ-
38 τας αἰτίας. Βυζαντίοι κατὰ μὲν θάλασσαν εὐκα-
rότατον οἰκοῦσι τόπον καὶ πρὸς ἁρφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς
εὔδαιμονιαν πάντη τῶν ἐν τῇ καθ’ ἡμῶν οἰκουμένη,
κατὰ δὲ γῆν πρὸς ἀμφότερα πάντων ἀφέστατον.
2 κατὰ μὲν γὰρ θάλασσαν οὐτως ἔπικειντα τῷ στόματι
τοῦ Πόντου κυρίως ὡστε μῆτ’ εἰσπλεύσαε μῆτ’
ἐκπλεύσαι δυσατὸν εἶναι . . τῶν ἐμπόρων χωρὶς
3 τῆς ἐκείνων βουλήσεως. ἔχουτος δὲ τοῦ Πόντου
392
early summer at about the time of the rising of the Pleiads. The date at which the younger Aratus assumed office, summer being then well advanced, marked the commencement of activity in all quarters. As I narrated in the previous Book, Hannibal at this date was opening the siege of Saguntum and the Romans were dispatching Lucius Aemilius to Illyria. Simultaneously Antiochus, Ptolemais and Tyre having been surrendered to him by Theodotus, was about to invade Coele-Syria, Ptolemy was preparing for the war against Antiochus, Lycurgus, wishing to rival Cleomenes at the outset of his campaign, had encamped before the Athenaeum in the territory of Megalopolis and was investing it, the Achaeans were collecting mercenaries both horse and foot for the war which threatened them, and finally Philip was moving out of Macedonia with his forces consisting of ten thousand heavy-armed infantry, five thousand peltasts, and eight hundred horse, all the above being Macedonians.

Such were the projects and preparations on all sides, and at the same time the Rhodians went to war with the Byzantines for the following reasons. 38. The site of Byzantium is as regards the sea more favourable to security and prosperity than that of any other city in the world known to us, but as regards the land it is most disadvantageous in both respects. For, as concerning the sea, it completely blocks the mouth of the Pontus in such a manner that no one can sail in or out without the consent of the Byzantines. So that they have complete
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

πολλὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον εὐχρήστων τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις πάντως εἰσὶ τούτων κύριοι Βυζάντιοι.

4 πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀναγκαίας τοῦ βίου χρείας τὰ τὰς δουλείας ἀγομένων σωμάτων πλήθος οἱ κατὰ τὸν Πόντον ἡμῖν τόποι παρασκευάζουσι δαμάλεσταν καὶ χρησιμοτάτον ὅμολογομένως, πρὸς δὲ περιουσίαν μὲν κηρὸν τάριχος ἀφθόνως ἡμῖν χορηγοῦσιν. δέχονται γε μὴν τῶν ἐν τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν τόποις περιτευόντων ἔλαιον καὶ πᾶν οἶνον γένος. σίτῳ δὲ ἀμείβονται, ποτὲ μὲν εὐκαίρως διδόντες ποτὲ δὲ λαμβάνοντες.

5 πάντων δὲ τούτων ἢ κωλύσεθαι δέον ἢν ὀλοσχερῶς τοῖς Ἑλληνισὶ τελέως ἀλυσιτελή γίνεσθαι σφίσι τὴν ἀλλαγὴν αὐτῶν, Βυζαντίων ὡτοι βουλομένων ἐθελοκακεῖν καὶ συνυδαξεῖν ποτὲ μὲν Γαλαταῖς τοτὲ δὲ πλείονα Θρακίων, ἢ τὸ παράπαν μὴ κατοι-κοῦν τοὺς τόπους. διὰ τε γὰρ τὴν στενότητα τοῦ πόρου καὶ τὸ παρακείμενον πλῆθος τῶν βαρ-βάρων ἀπλους ἢν ἡμῖν ἢν ὅμολογομένως ὁ Πόντος.

6 μέγιστα μὲν οὖν ἵσως αὐτοῖς ἐκεῖνοι περιγίνεται λυσιτελή πρὸς τοὺς βίους διὰ τὰς τῶν τόπων ἱδιότητας. ἀπαν γὰρ τὸ μὲν περιτεύον παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἐξαγωγῆς, τὸ δὲ λεῖτον εἰσαγωγῆς ἐτοίμου τυγχάνει καὶ λυσιτελοῦσαν πάσης κακοπαθείας καὶ κινδύνου πολλὰ γε μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐ-χρηστά δι’ ἑκείνους, ὃς εἰρήκαμεν, ἀπαντᾷ. διὸ καὶ κοινὸ τινὲς ὡς εὐεργετά τοῦτων ὑπάρχοντες εἰκότως ἃν οὐ μόνον χάριτος ἄλλα καὶ ἑπικουρίας κοινῆς τυγχάνωσιν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων κατὰ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων περιστάσεις.

7 Ἐπειδὲ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις ἀγνοεῖσθαι συνεβαφε 394
control over the supply of all those many products furnished by the Pontus which men in general require in their daily life. For as regards necessities it is an undisputed fact that the most plentiful supplies and best qualities of cattle and slaves reach us from the countries lying round the Pontus, while among luxuries the same countries furnish us with abundance of honey, wax, and preserved fish, while of the superfluous produce of our countries they take olive-oil and every kind of wine. As for corn there is a give-and-take, they sometimes supplying us when we require it and sometimes importing it from us. The Greeks, then, would entirely lose all this commerce or it would be quite unprofitable to them, if the Byzantines were disposed to be deliberately unfriendly to them, and had made common cause formerly with the Gauls and more especially at present with the Thracians, or if they had abandoned the place altogether. For, owing to the narrowness of the strait and the numbers of the barbarians on its banks, it would evidently be impossible for our ships to sail into the Pontus. Though perhaps the Byzantines themselves are the people who derive most financial benefit from the situation of their town, since they can readily export all their superfluous produce and import whatever they require on advantageous terms and without any danger or hardship, yet, as I said, they are of great service to other peoples. Therefore, as being the common benefactors of all, they naturally not only should meet with gratitude from the Greeks, but with general support when they are exposed to peril from the barbarians.

Now since the majority of people are unacquainted
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν εὐφυὴν τοῦ τόπου διὰ τὸ μικρὸν ἔξω κείσαθι τῶν ἐπισκοπούμενῶν μερῶν τῆς οἰκουμένης, βουλόμεθα δὲ πάντες εἰδέναι τὰ τοιούτα, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτόπται γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐχόντων παρηλπαγμένων τι καὶ διαφέρον τόπων, εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτῳ δυνατόν, ἐννοίας γε καὶ τούποις ἔχειν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐγγυτὰ τῆς ἀληθείας, ῥήτεον ἄν εἴη τί τὸ συμβαίνον ἔστι καὶ τί τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν τηλικαύτην καὶ τοιαύτην εὐπορίαν τῆς προειρημένης πόλεως.

39 Ὅ δὴ καλούμενος Πόντος ἔχει τὴν μὲν περίμετρον ἐγγυτά τῶν δισμυρίων καὶ δισυχλίων σταδίων, στόματα δὲ διττὰ κατὰ διαμέτρον ἀλλήλων κείμενα, τὸ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Προποντίδος τὸ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Μαιώτιδος λίμνης, ἤτοι αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ὀκτακυκλιών ἔχει σταδίων τὴν περιγραφὴν. εἰς δὲ τὰ προειρημένα κοιλώματα πολλῶν μὲν καὶ μεγάλων ποταμῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας ἐκβαλλόντων, ἐτί δὲ μειούμενοι καὶ πλειόνων ἐκ τῆς Ἐυρώπης, συμβαίνει τὴν μὲν Μαιώτιν ἀναπληρομένην ὑπὸ τούτων βείν εἰς τὸν Πόντον διὰ τοῦ στόματος, τὸν δὲ Πόντον εἰς τὴν 3 Προποντίδα. καλεῖται δὲ τὸ μὲν τῆς Μαιώτιδος στόμα Ὀμηρεῖκος Βόσπορος, δὲ τὸ μὲν πλάτος ἔχει περὶ τριάκοντα στάδια τὸ δὲ μήκος ἑξήκοντα, 4 πάν δ’ ἐστὶν ἀλητεῖν. τὸ δὲ τοῦ Πόντου παραπλησίως ὀνομάζεται μὲν Βόσπορος Θράκιος, ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν μήκος ἐφ’ ἑκάτων καὶ εἶκοσι στάδια, τὸ 5 δὲ πλάτος οὐ πάντη ταύτῳ. ἄρξει δὲ τοῦ στόματος ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς Προποντίδος τὸ κατὰ Καλχηδόνα διάστημα καὶ Βυζάντιον, δὲ δεκατετάρων 6 ἐστὶ σταδίων, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Πόντου τὸ καλούμενον Ἰερόν, ἐφ’ οὖν τόπου φασὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκ Κόλχων ἀνακομιδὴν Ἰάσονα βὸσι πρῶτον τοῖς δώδεκα 396
with the peculiar advantages of this site, as it lies somewhat outside those parts of the world which are generally visited, and as we all wish to have information about such matters, if possible visiting personally places so peculiar and interesting, but if this be out of our power, acquiring impressions and ideas of them as near the truth as possible, I had better state the facts of the case and explain what is the cause of the singular prosperity of this city.

39. The sea known as the Pontus is very nearly twenty-two thousand stades in circumference and has two mouths exactly opposite each other, one communicating with the Propontis and the other with the Palus Maeotis, which itself has a circumference of eight thousand stades. As many large rivers from Asia and still more numerous and larger ones from Europe fall into these two basins, the Maeotis being thus replenished flows into the Pontus and the Pontus into the Propontis. The mouth of the Palus Maeotis is called the Cimmerian Bosporus; it is thirty stades in width and sixty in length and is all of no great depth. The mouth of the Pontus is similarly called the Thracian Bosporus and is a hundred and twenty stades long and not of the same width throughout. From the side of the Propontis its beginning is the passage between Calchedon and Byzantium which is fourteen stades in width. On the side of the Pontus it begins at the so-called Holy Place, where they say that Jason on his voyage back from Colchis first sacrificed to the twelve gods.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

θεοὶς· ὃ κεῖται μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσίας, ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς Ἐὐρώπης ἐπὶ δώδεκα στάδια πρὸς τὸ καταντικρῦ
7 κείμενον Σαραπιεῖον τῆς Θράκης. τοῦ δὲ ρέιν ἔξω κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς τῆν τε Μαιῶτιν καὶ τὸν
Πόντον εἰσίν αἰτίαι διήται, μία μὲν αὐτὸθεν καὶ
πάσι προφανῆς, καθ’ ἦν, πολλῶν εἰσπαπτότων
ῥεμάτων εἰς περιγραφὴν ἀγγείων ἀρισμένων,
8 πλεῖον ἀεὶ καὶ πλεῖον γίνεται τὸ ύγρὸν, ὁ μηδεμίας
μὲν υπαρχοῦσης ἐκρύσεως δέον ἂν ἦν προσανα-
βαίνων ἀεὶ μείζω καὶ πλείω τοῦ κολώματος περι-
λαμβάνειν τόπον, υπαρχοῦσῶν δ’ ἐκρύσεων ἀνάγκη
tὸ προσγυμένον καὶ πλεονάζουν ὑπερπιπττον ἀπο-
ρεῖν καὶ φέρεται συνεχῶς διὰ τῶν υπαρχόντων
9 στομάτων· δευτέρα δὲ, καθ’ ἦν, πολὺν καὶ παντο-
δαπὸν χόον εἰσφερόντων εἰς τὰ προειρήμενα κοι-
λώματα τῶν ποταμῶν κατὰ τὰς τῶν ὅμβρων
ἐπιτάσεις, ἐκπεζόμενον τὸ ύγρὸν ὑπὸ τῶν συν-
ισταμένων ἐγχωμάτων ἀεὶ προσαναβαίνει καὶ φέ-
ρεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον διὰ τῶν υπαρχοῦσων
10 ἐκρύσεων. τῆς δ’ ἐγχώσεως καὶ τῆς ἐπιρρύσεως
ἀδιαπαῦστον καὶ συνεχῶς γυμνομένης ἐκ τῶν
ποταμῶν, καὶ τὴν ἀπόρρυσιν ἀδιάπαυστον καὶ
συνεχὴ γίνεσθαι διὰ τῶν στομάτων ἀναγκαῖον.
11 Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλθείς αἰτίαι τοῦ ρεῖν ἔξω τὸν
Πόντον αἰδ’ εἰσίν, οὐκ ἐξ ἐμπορικῶν ἐξουσί
διηγημάτων τὴν πίστιν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν
θεωρίας, ὃς ἀκριβεστέραν εὑρεῖν οὐ βάδιον· ἐπεὶ
40 δ’ ἐπὶ τῶν τόπων ἐπεστῆμεν, οὐδὲν ἀφετέον ἄργον
οὐδ’ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ φάσει κείμενον, ὅπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι
ποιεῖν εἰώθαι τῶν συγγραφέων, ἀποδεικτικῇ
dὲ μάλλον τῇ διηγήσει χρηστέον, ἣν μηδὲν ἀπορον
ἀπολείπωμεν τῶν ζητομένων τοῖς φιληκόσοις.
398
This lies in Asia and is about twelve stades distant from the opposite point in Thrace the temple of Sarapis. There are two causes of the constant flow from the Palus Maeotis and the Pontus, one, at once evident to all, being that where many streams fall into basins of limited circumference the water constantly increases and, if there were no outlets, would continue to mount higher and occupy a larger area of the basin. In the case, however, of there being outlets the surplus water runs off by these channels. The second cause is that as the rivers carry down into these basins after heavy rains quantities of all kinds of alluvial matter, the water in the seas is forcibly displaced by the banks thus formed and continues to mount and flow out in like manner through the existing outlets. As the influx and deposit of alluvium by the rivers is constant, the outflow through the mouths must likewise be constant.

The true reasons then of the current flowing from the Pontus are these, depending as they do not on the reports of traders but on reasoning from the facts of nature, a more accurate method than which it is not easy to find. 40. But since our attention is now fixed on this subject, I must leave no point unelaborated and barely stated, as is the habit of most writers, but must rather give a description of the facts supported by proofs, so that no doubts may be left in the reader's mind. For this is the
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

2 τούτο γὰρ ἰδιόν ἦστι τῶν νῦν καυρῶν, ἐν οἷς πάντων πλωτῶν καὶ πορευτῶν γεγονότων ὤν ἂν ἔτι πρέπειν εἴη ποιήσαι καὶ μυθογράφοις χρῆσθαι

3 μάρτυς περὶ τῶν ἀγνοουμένων, ὅπερ οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν πεποιήκασι περὶ τῶν πλείστων, ἀπίστους ἀμφισβητούμενων παρεχόμενοι βεβαιωτάς κατὰ τὸν Ἅρακλειον, πειρατέον δὲ δ’ αὐτὴς τῆς ἱστορίας ἱκανὴν παροστάνατι πίστιν τοῖς ἀκούονσιν.

4 Φαμεν δὴ χώννυσθαι μὲν καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν τὸν Πόντον, χρόνῳ γε μὴν ὅλοσχερῶς ἐγχωσθήσθησθαι τὴν τε Μαιώτιν καὶ τούτων, μενούσης γε δὴ τῆς αὐτῆς τάξεως περὶ τοὺς τόπους, καὶ τῶν αἰτίων τῆς ἐγχώσεως ἐνεργοῦτων κατὰ τὸ συνεχές.

5 ὅταν γὰρ ὁ μὲν χρόνος ἄπειρος ἦ, τὰ δὲ κοιλώματα πάντη πάντως ὄρισμένα, δῆλον ὡς, κἂν τὸ τυχόν

6 εἰσφέρεται, πληρωθῆσονται τῷ χρόνῳ. κατὰ φύ- σιν γὰρ τὸ πεπερασμένον ἐν ἄπειρῳ χρόνῳ συνεχῶς γνώμενον ἢ φθειρόμενον, κἂν κατ’ ἐλάχιστον γίνη- ται (τοῦτο γὰρ νοεῖσθω νῦν), ἀνάγκη τελειωθῆναι

7 κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν. ὅταν δὲ μὴ τὸ τυχόν ἄλλα καὶ λίαν πολὺς τις εἰσφέρεται χοῦς, φανερὸν ὡς ὦ ποτὲ ταχέως δὲ συμβῆσεται γενέσθαι τὸ νῦν δὴ

8 λεγόμενον ὧδ’ ἡμῶν. δὴ δὴ καὶ φαίνεται γνώμενον, τὴν μὲν οὖν Μαιῶτιν ἢδ’ κεχώσθαι συμβαίνει: τὸ γὰρ τοῦ πλείστον αὐτῆς μέρος ἐν ἑπτὰ καὶ πέντε ὀργων ἐστὶν, διὸ καὶ πλεῖων αὐτῆς οὐκέτι δύνανται ναυσὶ μεγάλαις χωρίς καθηγεμόνοις.

9 οὔσα τ’ ἐξ ἀρχῆς θάλαττα σύρρους τῷ Πόντῳ, καθάπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ συμφωνοῦσι, νῦν ἐστὶ λίμνῃ γλυκείᾳ, τῆς μὲν θαλάττης ἐκπεπεσμένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγχωμάτων, τῆς δὲ τῶν ποταμῶν εἰσβολῆς

400
characteristic of the present age, in which, all parts of the world being accessible by land or sea, it is no longer proper to cite the testimony of poets and mythographers regarding matters of which we are ignorant, "offering," as Heraclitus says, "untrustworthy sureties for disputed facts," but we should aim at laying before our readers a narrative resting on its own credit.

I say then that the silting up of the Pontus has gone on from time immemorial and still continues, and that in course of time both this sea and the Palus Maeotis will be entirely filled, if the existing local conditions remain the same and the causes of the alluvial deposit continue to act. For time being infinite, and the area of these basins being certainly limited, it is evident that even if the accretions were quite insignificant, the seas will be filled up in time; for by the law of nature if a finite quantity continually grows or decreases in infinite time, even if the increase or decrease be infinitesimal—for this is what I now assume—it stands to reason that the process must finally be completed. But when, as in this case, the increase is no small one, but a very large quantity of soil is being deposited, it is evident that what I state will not happen at some remote date, but very shortly. And it is indeed visibly happening. As for the Palus Maeotis it is already silted up, the greater part of it varying in depth between five and seven fathoms, so that large ships can no longer navigate it without a pilot. And while it was once, as all ancient authorities agree, a sea continuous with the Pontus, it is now a fresh-water lake, the salt water having being forced out by the deposits and the inflow from the rivers prevailing.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

10 ἑπικρατοῦσης. ἦσται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν Πόντων παραπλῆσιον, καὶ γίνεται νῦν ἀλλ' οὕτως λίαν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐστὶ καταφανὲς διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ κοιλώματος. τοῖς μὲντοι γε βραχέα συνεπιστή- 
σασι καὶ νῦν ἔστι δῆλον τὸ γινόμενον. τοῦ γὰρ Ἰστροῦ πλείοσι στόμασιν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐυρώπης εἰς 
tὸν Πόντον εἰσβάλλοντος, συμβαίνει πρὸς τοῦτον σχεδὸν ἐπὶ χίλια στάδια συνεστάναι ταῦταν ἡμέρας 
δρόμοιν ἀπέχουσαν τῆς γῆς [ητίς νῦν συνέστηκεν].

41 ἐκ τῆς τοῦτος στόμασιν εἰσφερομένης ἤλυος. ἐφ' 
ἡν ἐτι πελάγιοι τρέχοντες οἱ πλέοντες τὸν Πόντον 
λαυθάνουσιν ἐποκέλλουσιν νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τούς τόπους.

3 καλοῦσι δ' αὐτούς οἱ ναυτικοὶ Στήθη. τοῦ δὲ 
μὴ παρ' αὐτὴν συνίστασθαι τὴν γῆν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ 
pολὺ προωθεῖσθαι τῶν χοῦν ταύτην νομιστεύν

4 εἶναι τῆν αἰτίαν. ἐφ' ὅσον μὲν γὰρ αἱ ρύσεις τῶν 
ποταμῶν διὰ τὴν βλάν τῆς φορᾶς ἑπικρατοῦσι καὶ 
διωθοῦνται τὴν θάλασσαν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο καὶ τὴν 
γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ ρεύματα τοῖς ρεύμασιν ἀνάγκη 
προωθεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν μονῆν μὴ δὲ στάσιν

5 ἀπλῶς· ὅταν δὲ διὰ τὸ βάθος ἢ ἡ ἤ καὶ πλῆθος τῆς 
θαλάσσης ἐκλύεται τὰ ρεύματα, τὸ τ' εἰκὸς ἢ ἡ ἄτα 
φύσις ρεύμαν κατω μονὴν καὶ στάσιν λαμ-

6 βάνειν τῶν χοῦν. ὅτι δ' ἤ τὰ τῶν μὲν λάβρων καὶ 
μεγάλων ποταμῶν τὰ μὲν χώματα μακρὰν συνίστα-
tαι τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὴν χέρσον ἐστὶν ἀγχιβαθή, τῶν 
δὲ ἐλαττώνων καὶ πρῶς ἰερῶν παρ' αὐτὰς τὰς

7 εἰσβολᾶς οἱ θῖνες συνίστανται. μάλιστα δ' ἐκδηλῶν 
γίνεται τοῦτο κατὰ τὰς τῶν ὀμβρῶν ἐπιφοράς· 
καὶ γὰρ τὰ τυχόντα τότε τῶν ἰερῶν, ἐπειδὰν 
ἐπικρατήσωσι τῷ κύματος κατὰ τὴν εἰσβολήν, 
προωθοῦσι τῶν χοῦν εἰς θάλασσαν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον

402
BOOK IV. 40. 10 – 41. 7

Some day it will be the same with the Pontus; in fact the thing is actually taking place, and although not very generally noticed owing to the large size of the basin, it is apparent to anyone who gives some slight attention to the matter. 41. For the Danube flowing from Europe and falling into the Pontus by several mouths, a bank formed of the matter discharged from these mouths and reaching out to sea for a day's journey, stretches for about a hundred miles opposite them, and ships navigating the Pontus, while still far out at sea, often at night when sailing unwarily run aground on certain parts of this belt, which are known to sailors as "The Paps." The reason why the deposit is not formed close to the land but is projected so far we must consider to be as follows. As far as the currents of the rivers prevail owing to their strength and force a way through the sea, the earth and all other matter carried down by the stream must continue to be pushed forward and not suffered to rest or subside at all; but when owing to the increasing depth and volume of the sea the rivers lose their force, then of course the earth sinks by its natural weight and settles. This is why in the case of large and swift rivers the deposits are formed at a distance, the sea near the coast being deep, but in that of small and sluggish streams the sand-banks are close to their mouths. This becomes especially evident during heavy rains; for then insignificant streams when they have overpowered the surge at their mouths push forward their mud out to sea for a
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἐστε πρὸς λόγον ἐκάστου γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀπόστασιν
8 τῇ βίᾳ τῶν ἐμπιπτόντων ρευμάτων. τῷ δὲ μεγέθει
τῆς προειρημένης ταινίας καὶ καθόλου τῷ πλήθει
τῶν εἰσφερομένων λίθων καὶ ξύλων καὶ γῆς ύπὸ
tῶν ποταμῶν οὐδαμῶς ἀπιστητέον, εὑρέθεις γάρ,
9 θεωροῦντας ύπὸ τὴν ὀψιν τὸν τυχόντα χειμάρρους
ἐν βραχεῖ χρόνω πολλάκις ἐκχαράδρουντα μὲν καὶ
dιακόπτοντα τόπους ἠλιβάτους, φέροντα δὲ πάν
γένος ὑλῆς καὶ γῆς καὶ λίθων, ἑπιχώσεις δὲ ποιοῦ-
μενον τηλικαύτας ὡστ' ἀλλοιούν ἐνίοτε καὶ μηδὲ
gινώσκειν ἐν βραχεῖ χρόνῳ τούτος αὐτοῦ τόπους.

42 ἐξ ὧν οὖν εἰκός θανμάζειν πῶς οἱ τηλικοῦτοι καὶ
τουτοῖς ποταμοὶ συνεχῶς ήρεντες ἀπεργάζονται
τι τῶν προειρημένων καὶ τέλος ἐκπληροῦσι τὸν
2 Πόντον. οὐ γάρ εἰκός ἄλλη ἀναγκαίον γενέσθαι
τούτῳ γε προφαίνεται κατὰ τὸν ὅρθον λόγον.
3 σημείων δὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος· δοσὶ γάρ ἐστὶ νῦν ἡ
Μαιώτις γλυκυτέρα τῆς Ποντικῆς θαλάττης, οὕτως
θεωρεῖται διαφέρουσα προφανῶς ἡ Ποντικῆ τῆς
4 καθ' ἡμᾶς. ἐξ ὧν δὴ λόγῳ ὦ, ὅταν ὁ χρόνος εἰν ὧν
πεπληρώσθαι συμβαίνει τὴν Μαιώτιν, τοῦτον λάβῃ
τὸν λόγον πρὸς τὸν χρόνον ὃν ἔχει τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ
κοιλώματος πρὸς τὸ κοίλωμα, τότε συμβῆσεται
καὶ τὸν Πόντον τεναγώδη καὶ γλυκὸν καὶ λιμνώδη
5 γενέσθαι παραπλησίως τῇ Μαιώτιδι λίμνη. καὶ
θάττον δὲ τοῦτον ὑποληπτέον, ὅσῳ μείζονος καὶ
πλείους εἰσὶν αἱ ρύσεις τῶν εἰς τούτον ἐκπιπτόν-
tων ποταμῶν.

6 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήθω τὸς πρὸς τοὺς ἀπίστως
diakēmyéunous, eἰ δὴ χώνυνθαι νῦν καὶ χωσθήσεσθαι
ποτε συμβῆσεται τὸν Πόντον, καὶ λίμνη καὶ τέναγος
7 ἔσται τὸ τηλικοῦτον πέλαγος. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον
404
distance exactly proportionate to the force of their currents. We must not at all refuse to believe in the extent of the bank at the mouth of the Danube and in the quantity of stones, timber, and earth carried down by the rivers in general. It would be folly to do so when we often see with our own eyes an insignificant torrent scooping out a bed and forcing its way through high ground, carrying down every kind of wood, stones, and earth and forming such vast deposits that the spot may in a short space of time be so changed in aspect as to be unrecognizable. 42. We should not therefore be surprised if such great rivers flowing continuously produce some such effect as I have stated, and finally fill up the Pontus; we must indeed anticipate this not as a probability but as a certainty if we reason rightly. The following is an indication of what may be expected. The Palus Maeotis is at present less salt than the Pontus, and we find that the Pontus correspondingly is decidedly less salt than the Mediterranean. From which it is evident that when a period has elapsed which stands to the time it takes to fill up the Palus Maeotis in the same proportion as the cubic capacity of the larger basin to that of the smaller, the Pontus will become, like the Palus Maeotis, a shallow fresh-water lake. We must indeed anticipate this result still earlier, since the rivers that fall into the Pontus are larger and more numerous.

What I have said may suffice to satisfy the doubts of those who are unwilling to believe that the Pontus is filling up and will be filled up, and that so large a sea will be converted into a shallow lake. But I speak especially in view
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

eἰρήσθω καὶ τῆς τῶν πλοῖσομένων ψευδολογίας καὶ τερατείας χάριν, ἵνα μὴ παντὶ τῶν λεγομένων προσκεκχεισθηκαί παδικῶς ἀναγκαζόμεθα διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἔχοντες δὲ ἵνη τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπὶ ποσὸν εἴς αὐτῶν ἐπικρίνειν δυνάμεθα τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ 8 τινων ἀληθῶς ἢ τούναντιον. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς εὐκαιρίας τῶν Βυζαντίων ἐπάνιμεν.

43 Τοῦ δὲ στόματος τοῦ τοῦ Πόντου καὶ τῆς Προ-
pontīδα συνάπτοντος άντος ἐκατον εἶκοσι σταδίων τὸ μῆκος, καθάπερ ἅρτιωσ εἶπον, καὶ τοῦ μὲν Ἰεροῦ τὸ πρὸς τὸν Πόντον πέρας ὀρίζοντος, τοῦ δὲ κατὰ Βυζάντιον διαστήματος τὸ πρὸς τὴν Προ-
pontīδα, μεταξὺ τούτων ἑστὶν Ἑρμιαν τῆς Εὐ-
ρώπης ἐπὶ προοχῆς τινος ἀκρωτηριαζόσυς ἐν τῷ στόματι κείμενον, δὲ τῆς μὲν Ἀσίας ἀπέχει περὶ πέντε στάδια, κατὰ τὸν στενώτατον δὲ τόπον ὑπάρχει τοῦ παντὸς στόματος: ἢ καὶ Δαρείον Ἴπεδαν διὰ τοῦ πόρου, καθ’ ὅν χρόνον ἐποιεῖτο 3 τὴν ἐπὶ Σκύθας διάβασον. κατὰ μὲν δὲ τὸν ἅλλον τόπον ἀπὸ τοῦ Πόντου παραπλήσιος ἐστὶν ἢ φορὰ τοῦ βείματος διὰ τὴν ὀμοιότητα τῶν παρ’ ἐκάτερον 4 τὸ μέρος τῶ στόματι παρηκόντων τῶν. ἐπάν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῆς Εὐρώπης Ἑρμιαν, ἢ στενώτατον ἐφαμεν εἰναι, φερόμενος ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου καὶ συγκλείόμενον ἡ ῥόδα βία προσπέσῃ, τότε δὴ τραπεῖς ὄσπερ ἀπὸ πληγῆς ἐμπίπτει τοῖς ἀντί-
5 περας τῆς Ἀσίας τόποις. ἐκφύτευε δὲ πάλιν, ὅποιν ἤς ὑποστροφῆς, τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν ποιεῖται πρὸς τὰ περὶ τὰς Ἑστίας ἀκρα καλούμενα τῆς Εὐρώπης. 6 οὗτος αὐθίς ὀρμήσας προσπίπτει πρὸς τὴν βοῶι καλοῦμένην, ὅς ἐστὶ τῆς Ἀσίας τόπος, ἐφ’ ὅν ἐπιστήναι φασι πρῶτον οἱ μόθοι τῆν Ἰω περαῖο-
406
of the falsehoods and sensational tales of seafarers, so that we may not be obliged owing to ignorance to listen greedily like children to anything that is told us, but having now some traces of the truth in our minds may be more or less able to form an independent judgement as to the truth or falsehood of the reports made by this or that person.

43. I must now resume my account of the specially favourable situation of Byzantium. The channel connecting the Pontus and the Propontis being a hundred and twenty stades in length, as I just said, the Holy Place marking its termination towards the Pontus and the strait of Byzantium that towards the Propontis, half way between these on the European side stands the Hermaeum on a promontory running out into the channel at a distance of about five stades from Asia and situated at the narrowest part of the whole. It is here, they say, that Darius bridged the straits when he crossed to attack the Scythians. Now the force of the current from the Pontus has been so far uniform owing to the similarity of the country on each bank of the channel, but when it reaches the Hermaeum on the European side, which is, as I said, the narrowest point, this current from the Pontus being confined and sweeping strongly against the headland, rebounds as if from a blow, and dashes against the opposite coast of Asia. It now again recoils from this coast and is carried against the promontory on the European bank known as the Hearths, from which its force is once more deflected to the place on the Asiatic bank called the Cow, where legend says that Io first
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

7 θείσαιν. πλήν ὁ γε ροῦς· τὸ τελευταῖον δρμῆσας ἀπὸ τῆς Βοῦς ἐπ’ αὐτὸ φέρεται τὸ Βυζάντιον, περισχισθεὶς δὲ περὶ τὴν πόλιν βραχὺ μὲν εἰς τὸν κόλπον αὐτοῦ διορίζει τὸν καλομένου Κέρας, 8 τὸ δὲ πλείον πόλιν ἀπονεῦει. διευκρονεῖ μὲν οὖν οὐκέτι δύναται πρὸς τὴν ἀντίπερα χώραν, ἐφ’ ἦς ἐστὶ Καλχηδῶν· πλεονάκις γὰρ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν πεποιημένοι καὶ τοῦ πόρου πλάτος ἔχοντος ἢ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τόπον ἐκλυόμενος ὁ ῥόες οὐκέτι βραχείας πρὸς ὅσεῖδε γωνίαν ποιεῖται τὰς ἀνακλάσεις ἐπὶ τὴν περαίαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀμβλείαιν, διόπερ ἀπολυτῶν τὴν τῶν Καλχηδονίων πόλιν φέρεται διὰ πόρου. καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν μὲν τῶν Βυζάντιων πόλιν εὐκαιροτάτην τὴν δὲ τῶν Καλχηδονίων τάναντία, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ νῦν ὡς ἡμῶν εἰρημένον, καίπερ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅψεως ὅμοιας ἀμφοτέραις δοκοῦσης εἰναι τῆς θέσεως πρὸς τὴν 2 εὐκαιρίαν. ἀλλ’ ὡς εἰς τὴν μὲν βουληθήνετα καταπλέω’ οὐ ράβδουν, πρὸς ἂν δὲ, κἂν μὴ βούλῃ, φέρει κατ’ ἀνάγκην ὁ ῥόες, καθάπερ ἀρτίως εἴπο- 3 μεν. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου· ἐκ Καλχηδόνος γὰρ οἱ βουλόμενοι διαίρεων εἰς Βυζάντιον οὐ δύνανται πλεῖν κατ’ εὐθείαν διὰ τὸν μεταξὺ ῥοῦν, ἀλλὰ παράγοντες ἐπὶ τε τὴν Βοῦν καὶ τὴν καλομένην 4 Χρυσόπολιν, ἢν Ἀρηναῖοι τότε κατασχόντες Ἀλκι— βιάδου γυνήμην, παραγωγησάξειν ἐπεβάλοντο πρῶτον τοὺς εἰς Πόντον πλέοντας, τὸ δ’ ἐμπροσθεν ἀφιάσει κατὰ ῥοῦν, ὦ φέροντα κατ’ ἀνάγκην πρὸς τὸ 5 Βυζάντιον. ὅμως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν ἐπὶ θάτερα πλοῦν ἐστὶ τῆς Βυζάντιων πόλεως. 6 ἀν τε γὰρ ἂφ’ Ἔλλησπόντου τρέχῃ τις τοῖς νότοις ἂν τ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἐλλήσποντον ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου τοῖς 408
found a footing after crossing. Finally the current runs rapidly from the Cow to Byzantium itself, and dividing into two near the city, sends off its smaller branch into the gulf known as the Horn, while the larger branch is again deflected. It has however, no longer sufficient force to reach the coast opposite, on which stands Calchedon; for as it has now several times crossed and recrossed the channel, which here is already of considerable width, the current has now become feeblter, and ceases to make short rebounds to the opposite coast at an acute angle, but is rather deflected at an obtuse angle. It therefore fails to reach Calchedon and flows out through the strait. 44. What therefore makes the situation of Byzantium so favourable and that of Calchedon the reverse is the fact here stated. To look at them indeed you would say they were equally well placed, but nevertheless it is not easy to reach Calchedon by sea, if one wishes, while to Byzantium the current carries one whether one wishes or not, as I just said. Evidence of this is that those who wish to cross from Calchedon to Byzantium cannot sail in a straight course owing to the current between, but steer obliquely for the Cow and the place called Chrysopolis—which the Athenians once occupied by the advice of Alcibiades and used it when they first attempted to levy toll on vessels bound for the Pontus—and from hence commit themselves to the current which perforce carries them to Byzantium. The approaches by sea to Byzantium from the other side are equally favourable. For those sailing with a south wind from the Hellespont, or from the Pontus to the
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἐτησίως, παρὰ μὲν τὴν Εὐρώπην ἐκ τῆς Βυζαντίων πόλεως ὅρθος ἁμα δ’ εὐπαρακόμωτος ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦς ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς Προποντίδος στενὰ κατ’ Ἀβυδον καὶ Σηστόν, κάκειθεν ὁματίως πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ Βυ-
Ζάντιον, ἀπὸ δὲ Καλχηδόνος παρὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν τάνατια τούτους διὰ τὸ κολπώδε τὸν παράπλουν ὑπάρχει καὶ προτεινεν πολὺ τὴν τῶν Κυζικηνῶν
χώραν. ἀν’ Ἐλλησπόντου γὰρ φερόμενον εἰς Καλχηδόνα χρῆσασθαι τῷ παρὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην πλώ, κατειτα συνεγγίζοντα τοῖς κατὰ Βυζάντιων τόποις κάμπτειν καὶ προστρέχει πρὸς τὴν Καλχη-
δόνα διὰ τὸν ῥόου καὶ τὰ προειρημένα δυσχέρες.

9 ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν ἐκπλέοντα προστρέχειν εὐθέως τῇ Θράκη τελέως ἂδύνατον διὰ τὸν μεταξὺ ῥοῦ καὶ διὰ τὸ τούς ἀνέμους έκατέρους ἀνταπέπτειν.

10 πρὸς ἀμφότερα τὰς ἑπιβολὰς, ἑπειδὴ περευμεν ἐπισάγει μὲν εἰς τὸν Πόντον νότος ἐξάγει δὲ βορέας, καὶ τούτους ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἐκάτερον τὸν δρόμον τοὺς ἀνέμους.

11 Τὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν εὐκαίριαν πιοιοῦντα Βυζαντίους ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ τὴν κατὰ γῆν ἀκαίριαν χάλαττες εἰς χάλατταν καθῆκεν αἰών ἔχουσιν πόλεμον καὶ δυσχέρες πρὸς τούτους. οὖτε γὰρ παρασκευασάμενοι καὶ κρατήσαντες αὐτῶν εἰσάγοντες ἀποτρίψασθαι τὸν πόλεμον οἴοι τ’ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τῶν ὁχλῶν καὶ τῶν δυναστῶν· ἔαν [τε] γὰρ ἐνὸς περιγένεσθαι, τρεῖς ἐπιβάινουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων χώραν ἄλλοι βαρύτεροι δυνᾶσται. καὶ

410
BOOK IV. 44. 6 – 45. 4

Hellespont with the Etesian winds, find the course from Byzantium along the European coast to the commencement of the narrows at Sestus and Abydus a straight and easy one, and so is the return voyage to Byzantium. But the voyage from Calchedon along the Asiatic coast is the reverse of this, because one must follow the shores of a deep gulf, and the headland formed by the territory of Cyzicus runs out to a great distance. Nor can ships sailing from the Hellespont to Calchedon easily coast along Europe and then on approaching Byzantium turn and make for Calchedon, as the current and the circumstances mentioned above make it difficult. And similarly it is quite impossible for a ship leaving Calchedon to make the coast of Thrace at once owing to the current between, and owing to the wind. Both the south and north winds are adverse to both the attempts, since the south wind will carry one towards the Pontus and the north wind away from it, and these are the winds one must avail oneself of for the voyage from Calchedon to Hellespont or for the voyage back.

Such are the causes of the favourable position of Byzantium as regards the sea; its disadvantages on the land side being as follows. 45. As Thrace encompasses their territory so effectually as to extend from one sea to the other, they are engaged in perpetual and most difficult warfare with its inhabitants. They cannot on the one hand rid themselves of the war once for all by a carefully prepared attack resulting in victory, owing to the great number of the chieftains and their followers. For if they get the better of one, three other more powerful chieftains are sure to invade their territory.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

μὴν οὖν ἐξαντες καὶ συγκαταβάντες εἰς φόρους καὶ συνθήκας οὐδὲν ποιοῦσι πλέον· ἂν γὰρ ἐν πρώτω ὑμῖν πεπαλαιῶσας ἔστω τοῦτο πολέμους εὐρίσκοις. διότερ οὖν ἐστὶ συνεχομένα καὶ ἄναψες σεισμών· τί γὰρ ἐπισφαλέστερον ἀστυνεῖ-βρότον καὶ βαρβάρου πολέμου; τί δεινότερον; οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τούτως τὸ παράπαν κακοὶς παλαίοντες κατὰ γῆν, χωρὶς τῶν άλλων τῶν παρεπομένων τῷ πολέμῳ κακών, ὑπομένουσι τινα καὶ τιμωρίαν

7 Ταντάλευον κατὰ τόν ποιητήν. ἔσχοντες γὰρ χώ-ραν γεννητάτην, ὥστε διαπονήσωσι ταύτην καὶ γένηται τό τῶν καρπῶν πλήθος τοῖς κάλλει διαφέρον, κάπετα παραγενηθέντες οἱ βάρβαροι τοὺς μὲν καταφθείρωσι τοὺς δὲ συναθροίσαντες ἀποφέρωσι.

8 τότε δὴ, χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῆς δαπάνης, καὶ τῆς καταφθοράς θεώμενοι διὰ τὸ κάλλος τῶν καρπῶν σχετιάζουσι καὶ βαρέως φέρουσι τὸ συμ- βαῖνον.

9 Ἄλλῳ δ' ὁμοιώ τὸν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν Ὁρακῶν πόλεμον κατὰ τήν συνθήκην ἀναφέροντες ἐμενον ἐπὶ τῶν

10 ἐξ ἀρχῆς δικαίων πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας, προσεπυγε- νομένων δὲ Γαλατῶν αὐτοῖς τῶν περὶ Κομοντόριουν εἰς πᾶν ἥλθον περιστάσεως. οὕτω δ' ἐκίνησαν μὲν αμα τοῖς περὶ Βρέννον ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας, δια- φυγόντες δὲ τῶν περὶ Δελφών κίνδυνον καὶ παρα- γενόμενοι πρὸς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον εἰς μὲν τὴν Ἀσίαν οὐκ ἐπεραιώθησαν, αὐτοῖς δὲ κατέμεναι διὰ τὸ φιλοχωρήσαι τοῖς περὶ τὸ Βυζάντιον τόποις.

2 οحياء καὶ κρατήσαντες τῶν Ὁρακῶν, καὶ κατασκευα-
BOOK IV. 45. 4 – 46. 2

Nor are they at all better off if they give way and agree to terms and the payment of tribute; for the very fact of their making concessions to one chief raises against them enemies many times more numerous. So that they are, as I said, involved in a warfare both perpetual and most difficult; for what can be more full of peril, what more terrible than a war with near neighbours who are at the same time barbarians? Nay, such being in general the adverse circumstances against which they have to struggle on land, they have in addition to the other evils attendant on war to suffer too something like the torments of Tantalus that Homer describes; for, owners as they are of a most fertile country, when they have carefully cultivated it and a superb harvest is the result, and when the barbarians now appear and destroy part of the crops, collecting and carrying off the rest, then indeed, apart from their lost toil and expense, the very beauty of the harvest when they witness its destruction adds to their indignation and distress.

In spite of all, however, they continued to bear the burden to which they had grown accustomed of the war with the Thracians, without departing from their ancient engagements to the Greek states. But when they were attacked also by the Gauls under Comontorius, they found themselves in very grave danger. 46. These Gauls had quitted their homes together with Brennus and his Gauls, and after escaping from the disaster at Delphi reached the Hellespont, where instead of crossing to Asia, they remained on the spot, as they took a fancy to the country near Byzantium. Here when they had conquered the Thracians and had established
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

3 ἡγον τοὺς Βυζαντίους. κατὰ μὲν ὅπιν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν ταῖς ἑφόδοις αὐτῶν, ταῖς κατὰ Κομοντόριον τὸν πρῶτον βασιλεύσαντα, δώρα διέτελον οἱ Βυζάντιοι διδόντες ἀνὰ τρισχιλίους καὶ πεντακισχιλίους, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ μυρίους χρυσοῦς, ἐφ᾽ ὃ μὴ καταφθείρειν

4 τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν. τέλος δ᾽ ἡγαγκάσθησαν ὁγδοή-

κοντα τάλαντα συγχωρῆσαι φόρον τελεῖν κατ᾽ ἐν-

αυτῶν ἔως εἰς Καύαρον, ἐφ᾽ οὐ κατελύθη μὲν ἡ

βασιλεία, τὸ δὲ γένος αὐτῶν ἐξεφθάρη πάν ὑπὸ

5 Ὠρακῶν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἐπικρατήθησεν. ἐν οἷς καιροῖς

ὑπὸ τῶν φόρων πιεζόμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπρέ-

σβενον πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλληνας, δεόμενοι σφίσι βοηθεῖν

καὶ συγχωρηγεῖν εἰς τοὺς περιστώτας καιροὺς;

6 τῶν δὲ πλείστων παρολιγυροῦντων ἐνεχείρησαν

ἀπαναγκαζόμενες παραγωγιᾷ τοὺς εἰς τὸν

47 Πόντον πλέοντας. μεγάλης δὲ γενομένης τῆς

ἀλωνεῖσθείας καὶ δυσχρηστίας πάσιν ἐκ τοῦ τέλος

πράττειν τοὺς Βυζαντίους τῶν ἐξαγωγών ἐκ τοῦ

Πόντου, δεινὸν ἡγοῦντο, καὶ πάντες ἐνεκάλουν οἱ

πλοῖζόμενοι τοῖς Ῥόδιοι διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν τοῦτος

2 προεστάναι τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν. ἔξ ὅσ συνεβη

φύνα τὸν πόλεμον ὑπὲρ οὗ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἱστορεῖν

μέλλομεν.

3 Οἱ γὰρ Ῥόδιοι συνεξεγερθέντες ἀμα μὲν διὰ τὴν

σφετέραν βλάβην ἀμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν πέλας

ἀλάττωσιν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον παραλαβόντες τοὺς

συμμάχους ἐπρέσβευν πρὸς τοὺς Βυζαντίους,

ἀξιοῦντες καταλύσειν αὐτοὺς τὸ παραγώγων.

4 οὐκ ἐντρεπομένων δὲ τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλὰ πεπεισμένων

dίκαια λέγειν ἐκ τῆς ἀντικαταστάσεως τῆς γενο-

μένης παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἐκατόδωρον καὶ
their capital at Tylis, they placed the Byzantines in extreme danger. At first, during the inroads made under Comontorius the first king, the Byzantines continued to pay on each occasion three thousand, five thousand, and sometimes even ten thousand gold pieces to save their territory from being laid waste, and finally they were compelled to consent to pay an annual tribute of eighty talents down to the reign of Cavarus, during which the kingdom came to an end and the whole tribe were in their turn conquered by the Thracians and annihilated. It was in these times that, being hard pressed by the tribute, they at first sent embassies to the Greeks imploring them to help them and contribute to relieve them in their distress and danger. But when most states paid no attention to their solicitations they were driven by sheer necessity to begin exacting duties from vessels trading with the Pontus. 47. When general inconvenience and loss of profit was caused by the Byzantines levying duties on exports from the Pontus, all the traders were aggrieved and brought their complaint before the Rhodians who were considered the supreme authority in maritime matters. This was the origin of the war the history of which I am about to tell.

For the Rhodians, roused to action by the loss they suffered themselves and the detriment to neighbouring states, at first together with their allies sent an embassy to Byzantium demanding the abolition of the duty. The Byzantines were not disposed to make any concession, being convinced of the justice of their cause by the terms in which Hecatodorus and Olympiodorus, their chief magis-
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

Ολυμπιόδωρον πρῶς τοὺς τῶν Ῥωμῶν πρεσβευτὰς
(οὗτοι γὰρ τὸτε προεσπασαν τοῦ τῶν Βυζαντίων
πολεμῶντας), τότε μὲν ἀπηλλάγησαν οἱ Ῥώμεοι
περάναντες οὐδὲν, ἐπανελθόντες δὲ τὸν πόλεμον
ἐξηγήσαντο τοῖς Βυζαντίοις διὰ τὰς προειρήμενας
αἰτίας. καὶ παρανικά πρεσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστελλον
πρὸς Προσιαίαν παρακαλοῦντες καὶ τοῦτον εἰς
τὸν πόλεμον ἤδεσαν γὰρ τὸν Προσιάιαν παρα-
τριβόμενον ἐκ τινῶν πρὸς τοὺς Βυζαντίους. τὸ
dὲ παραπλήσιον ἔποιον καὶ Βυζάντιοι πρὸς τε
γὰρ Ἀτταλοὺς καὶ πρὸς Ἀχαιόν ἔπεμπον πρέσβεις,
δὲ οὐδὲν σφίξας βοηθεῖν. ο μὲν οὖν Ἀτταλος ἦν
πρόθυμος, εἰχὲ δὲ βραχείαν τὸτε ῥοπὴν ὡς ἀν ὑπ'
Ἀχαιοῦ συνεκλημένον εἰς τὴν πατρίαν ἀρχὴν.
ὁ δὲ Ἀχαῖος κρατῶν μὲν τῆς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου,
βασιλεὰ δὲ προσφάτως αὐτὸν ἄναδειχθαὶς ἔπηγ-
γέλλετο βοηθήσειν, ὑπάρχων δὲ ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς
προαίρεσιν ποῖς μὲν Βυζαντίοις μεγάλην ἐλπίδα
παρεσκεύαζε, τοῖς δὲ Ῥώμεοι καὶ Προσιάια τὰ-
ναντία κατάπληξεν. Ἀχαιός γὰρ ἦν μὲν Ἀντιό-
χου συγγενῆς τοῦ παρεληφότος τὴν ἐν Συρίᾳ
βασιλείαν, ἐγκρατὴς δὲ ἐγένετο τῆς προειρήμενης
δύναστεις διὰ τινὰς τοιαύτας αἰτίας. Σελεύκου
μεταλλάξατον τοῦ βίων, ὃς ἦν Ἀντιόχου τοῦ
προειρημένου πατήρ, διαδεχαμένον δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν
Σελεύκου πρεσβύτατον τῶν νῦν, ἀμα τούτῳ διὰ
tὴν οἰκείοτητα συνυπερέβαλε τὸν Ταύρον δυσὶ
μάλιστα πως ἔτει πρῶτον τῶν νῦν λεγομένων
καιρῶν. Σελευκος γὰρ ὁ νέος ως θάττων παρέλαβε
τὴν βασιλείαν, πυνθανόμενος Ἀτταλον πᾶσαν
ῃδὴ τὴν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου δυναστείαν ύφ' αὐτῶν πεποιήσατο, παρωρμήθη βοηθεῖν τοῖς σφητέ-
trates at the time, replied to the Rhodian envoys. The Rhodians therefore took their departure without having accomplished anything, and on their return war was declared by Rhodes on Byzantium for the reasons above stated. They at once sent envoys to Prusias pressing him to take part in the war, for they knew that for various reasons he was offended with the Byzantines. 48. The Byzantines took similar measures, sending envoys asking for help to Attalus and Achaeus. Attalus was heartily disposed to help, but his support at this time was of very little weight, as he had been confined within the limits of his ancestral dominions by Achaeus. But Achaeus, who was now master of all the country on this side of the Taurus and had recently assumed the royal title, promised his aid, and his decision to do so greatly raised the hopes of the Byzantines, while on the contrary, it alarmed Prusias and the Rhodians. Achaeus was a relative of that Antiochus who had just succeeded to the throne of Syria and had acquired the dominion I stated by the following means. When on the death of Seleucus, father of this Antiochus, his eldest son Seleucus succeeded him, Achaeus in his quality of a kinsman accompanied the king on his expedition across the Taurus about two years before the time I am speaking of. For the young Seleucus, immediately on ascending the throne, having learnt that Attalus had appropriated all his dominions on this side Taurus hastened there to defend his interests. He crossed
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

8 ροις πράγμασιν, ὑπερβαλὼν δὲ μεγάλη δυνάμει τὸν Ταύρον, καὶ δολοφονηθεὶς ὑπὸ τὸ Ἀπατουρίου τοῦ Γαλάτου καὶ Νικάνορος, μετήλλαξε τὸν βίον.
9 Ἀχαῖος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίοτητα τὸν φόνον αὐτοῦ μετήλθε παραχρήμα, τοὺς περὶ τὸν Νικάνορα καὶ τὸν Ἀπατουρίου ἀποκτείνας, τῶν τε δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων φρονίμως καὶ μεγαλο-
10 ψύχως προέστη. τῶν γὰρ καιρῶν παρόντων αὐτῶ καὶ τῆς τῶν ὁχλῶν ὀρμής συνεργοῦσα εἰς τὸ διάδημα περιβέθαι, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ προεῖλετο πονῆσαι, τηρῶν δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν Ἀντιόχῳ τῷ νεωτέρῳ τῶν υἱῶν, ἐνεργῶς ἐπιτορπεύομενος ἀνεκτάτῳ
11 τὴν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου πᾶσαν. τῶν δὲ πραγμά-
12 των αὐτῶν παραδόξως εὐροούντων, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν Ἀτταλον εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ Πέργαμον συνέκλεισε τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πάντων ἢν ἐγκρατής, ἐπαρθεὶς τοῖς εὐτυχήσασι παρὰ πόδας ἑξώκειλε, καὶ διάδημα περιδέμενος καὶ βασιλέα προσαγορεύοντας αὐτὸν βαρύτατος ἢν τότε καὶ φοβερῶτατος τῶν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν. ὡς καὶ μάλιστα τότε Βυζάντιοι πιστεύσαντες ἀνεδέξαντο τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Ρωμαίους καὶ Προσποίαν πόλεμον.
13 Ὁ δὲ Προσπόλος ἐνεκάλει μὲν πρότερον τοῖς Βυζάντιοις ὅτι ἡ σφησαμένων τινὰς εἰκόνας αὐτοῦ ταύτας οὐχ ἀνετίθεσαν ἀλλ’ εἰς ἐπισυμφονίαν καὶ λήθην ἄγοιν, δυσηρέστει δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ πάσαν προσενέγκασθαι φιλονεικίαν εἰς τὸ διαλύσαι τὴν Ἀχαίον πρὸς Ἀτταλον ἔχθραν καὶ τὸν πόλεμον, νομίζων κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ἀλυσιτελῆ τοῖς αὐτοῦ πράγμασιν ὑπάρχειν τὴν ἐκείνων φιλίαν.
14 ἠμέθυσε δ’ αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν Βυζάντιοι πρὸς μὲν Ἀτταλον εἰς τοὺς τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἄγονας τοὺς

418
the Taurus at the head of a great army, but perished assassinated by the Gaul Apaturius and Nicanor. Achaeus, as his kinsman, at once avenged his murder by putting Nicanor and Apaturius to death, and taking the command of the army and the direction of affairs in his hands, conducted both with prudence and magnanimity. For though the opportunity was favourable and he was eagerly urged by the troops to assume the diadem, he decided not to do so, and holding the throne for the younger brother Antiochus, advanced energetically and recovered the whole of the country on this side of Taurus. But when he met with a success that surpassed his expectations, having shut up Attalus in Pergamus itself and made himself master of all the rest of the country he was so elated by his good fortune that in a very short space of time he swerved clean away from rectitude, and having assumed the diadem and styled himself king he was at this moment the most imposing and formidable of all the kings and potentates on this side Taurus. This was the man on whom the Byzantines most relied when they undertook the war against Rhodes and Prusias.

49. One of Prusias's grievances against the Byzantines was that after having voted certain statues of him they had never erected them, but had neglected and finally forgotten the matter. He was likewise displeased with them for having employed every effort to reconcile Achaeus with Attalus and put an end to the war between them, thinking that a friendship between these two princes was in many ways prejudicial to his own interests. He was also irritated because it was said that the Byzantines had sent to Attalus representatives to take part in the
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

συνθύσοντας ἐξαπεσταλκέναι, πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ εἰς τὰ Σωτῆρια μιθένα πεπομφέναι. διόπερ ἐκ πάντων τούτων ὑποκούουμενης παρ' αὐτῷ τῆς ὀργῆς ἀσμενος ἐπελάβετο τῆς τῶν Ῥοδίων προφάσεως, καὶ συγκαταθέμενος τοῖς πρεσβευταῖς ἐκείνους μὲν ὥστε δεῖν κατὰ θάλατταν πολεμεῖν, αὐτὸς δὲ κατὰ γῆν οὐκ ἐλάττων βλάψειν ἐδοξεῖ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους.

5 Ὅ μὲν οὖν Ῥοδίων πρὸς Βυζαντίων πόλεμος διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαύτην ἔλαβε τῆν ἀρχήν· οἱ δὲ Βυζάντιοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐρρωμένως ἐπολέμουν, πεπεισμένοι τὸν μὲν Ἀχαιοὺς σφίσας βοηθεῖν, αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸν Τιβοῖτην ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας ἐπαγαγόντες ἀντιπεριστήσεως τῷ Προσεῖα φόβους καὶ κινδύνους, ὅς κατὰ τὴν προερημένην ὀρμήν πολεμῶν παρεῖλητο μὲν αὐτῶν τὸ καλούμενον ἐπὶ τοῦ στόματος Ἴερόν, οὗ Βυζαντίων μικροὶς ἀνότερον χρόνος μεγάλων ὑψηλόμενοι χρημάτων ἐσφετερίσαντο διὰ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τοῦ ὁποῦ, βουλόμενοι μηθείσοις ἀφορμῇ μηθεὶς καταλύειν μήτε κατὰ τῶν εἰς τὸν Πόντον πλεόντων ἐμπόρων μήτε περὶ τοὺς δούλους καὶ τὰς εξ αὐτῆς τῆς θαλάττης ἐργασίας, 3 παρεῖλητο δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπί τῆς Ἀσίας χώραν, ἢν κατείχον Βυζάντιοι τῆς Μυκηναίων πολλοὺς ἤδη χρόνους. οἱ δὲ Ῥόδιοι πληρώσαντες ναῦς ἐξ, ἀμα δὲ ταῦτας παρὰ τῶν συμμάχων προσαλβόντες τέτταρας, καὶ ναύαρχοι προχειρίσαμεν Ξενόφαντον, 6 ἐπλεον ἐφ' Ἐλλησιωῦντο δέκα ναυσίν. καὶ ταῖς μὲν λοιπαῖς ὑμιχθοῦσεν περὶ Σητῶν ἐκώλυον τὸν πλεοντας εἰς τὸν Πόντον, μὴ δ' ἐκπλεύσας ὁ ναύαρχος κατεπείραζε τῶν Βυζαντίων, εἰ πως ἦδη 7 μετομέλοιτο καταπιπληγμένοι τὸν πόλεμον. τῶν 420
sacrifice held at the festival of Áthene, whereas they had sent none to himself when he celebrated the Soteria. Therefore as he continued to nurse resentment for all these offences, he gladly availed himself of the pretext offered by the Rhodians and came to an agreement with their envoys demanding that they should undertake to carry on the war by sea, while he himself hoped to be able to damage the enemy no less severely on land.

Such were the causes and such was the beginning of the war between Rhodes and Byzantium. 50. The Byzantines at first fought with great vigour, being confident that Achaeus would come to help them and trusting by bringing Tiboetes from Macedonia to throw Prusias in his turn into alarm and peril. For Prusias having begun the war with the feelings I have indicated had taken the place called "The Holy Place" on the Bosporus, which a few years previously they had acquired by purchase for a large sum, owing to its favourable situation, as they did not wish to leave anyone any base from which to attack traders with the Pontus or interfere with the slave-trade or the fishing. He had also seized their Asiatic territory, a part of Mysia which had long been in their possession. The Rhodians, manning six ships and getting four others from the allies, appointed Xenophonius admiral and sailed for the Hellespont with the ten ships. Anchoring the rest off Sestos to prevent the passage of vessels bound for the Pontus, the admiral left in one to find out if the Byzantines were already sufficiently alarmed at the war to have changed their minds.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

δ' οὖ προσεχῶντ' ἀπέπλευσε καὶ παραλαβὼν τὰς
λουτᾶς ναῦς ἀπῆρε πάσας εἰς τὴν Ῥόδον. οἱ δὲ
Βυζάντιοι πρὸς τε τὸν Ἀχαιόν ἐπεμπον ἄξιοντες
βοηθεῖν, ἔπὶ τε τὸν Τιβοίτην ἐξαπέστελλον τοὺς
ἁζοντας αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας. ἔδοκει γὰρ οὐχ
ἵττον ἡ Βιθυνῶν ἀρχὴ Τιβοίτη καθήκειν ἡ Προυσία
diὰ τὸ πατρὸς ἀδελφὸν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν τῷ Προυσίᾳ.
οἱ δὲ Ῥόδιοι θεωροῦντες τὴν τῶν Βυζαντίων
ὑπόστασιν, πραγματικῶς διενοήθησαν πρὸς τὸ
καθιστθῆναι τῆς προθέσεως. ὁρῶντες γὰρ τὸ συν-
ῄον τοὺς Βυζαντίους τῆς ὑπομονῆς τοῦ πολέμου
κείμενον ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν Ἀχαιόν ἐλπίσοιν, θεωροῦν-
tes δὲ τὸν πατέρα τὸν Ἀχαιοῦ κατεχόμενον ἐν
Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ, τὸν δ' Ἀχαιόν περὶ πλείστου ποιοῦ-
μενον τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς σωτηρίαν, ἐπεβάλοντο
πρεσβεύειν πρὸς τὸν Πτολεμαίον καὶ παρατείσθαι
τὸν Ἀνδρόμαχον, καὶ πρότερον μὲν ἐκ παρέργου
τοῦτο πεποιηκότες, τότε δ' ἀληθῶς σπεύδοντες
ὑπὲρ τοῦ πράγματος, ἵνα προσενεγκάμενοι πρὸς
τὸν Ἀχαιόν τὴν χάριν ταύτην ὑπόχρεως αὐτοῦ
ποιῆσονται πρὸς πάν τὸ παρακαλοῦμενον. οἱ δὲ
Πτολεμαῖοι παραγενομένων τῶν πρεσβεων ἐβου-
λεύεις μὲν παρακατέχειν τὸν Ἀνδρόμαχον, ἐλπίζον
αὐτῷ χρῆσαθαι πρὸς καιρὸν διὰ τὸ τὰ τε πρὸς τὸν
Ἀντίοχον ἄκριτα μὲνεν αὐτῶ, καὶ τὸ τὸν Ἀχαιόν
ἀναδειχότα προσφάτως αὐτὸν βασιλεὰ πραγμάτων
ἐλαὶ κύριον ἰκανῶν των· ἣν γὰρ Ἀνδρόμαχος
Ἀχαιοῦ μὲν πατήρ, ἀδελφὸς δὲ Λαοδίκης τῆς
Σελεύκου γυναικός. οὐ μὴν ἅλλα προσκλίνων τοῖς
Ῥοδίοις ὁ Πτολεμαῖος κατὰ τὴν ὀλὴν αἱρεσιν, καὶ
πάντα σπεύδων χαρίζεσθαι, συνεχώρησε καὶ παρ-
ἐδωκε τὸν Ἀνδρόμαχον αὐτοῖς ἀποκομίζειν ὡς τὸν
422
BOOK IV. 50. 7 – 51. 5

But as they paid no attention to his overtures, he sailed away and picking up the rest of his ships, left for Rhodes with the whole squadron. The Byzantines kept on sending to Achaesus, demanding succour, and sent a mission to bring Tiboetes from Macedonia; for Tiboetes was considered to have just as good a claim to the throne of Bithynia as Prusias, as he was his uncle on the father’s side. The Rhodians seeing that the Byzantines stood firm, thought of a plan for attaining their purpose likely to prove very efficient. 51. For observing that the chief cause of the Byzantines’ resolute endurance of the war lay in their hopes of support from Achaesus, and knowing that Achaesus’ father was a prisoner at Alexandria and that Achaesus above all things desired his deliverance, they decided to send an embassy to Ptolemy begging him to give up Andromachus. They had indeed previously made this request without insisting much on it, but now they pressed it most seriously, in order that by doing this favour to Achaesus they might put him under such an obligation that he would do all they demanded. Ptolemy, on the arrival of the embassy, deliberated as to retaining Andromachus, whom he hoped to make use of at the proper time, considering that his differences with Antiochus had not yet been decided, and that Achaesus, who had just proclaimed himself king, could exercise a decisive influence in certain important matters; for Andromachus was Achaesus’ father and brother of Laodice the wife of Seleucus. But nevertheless, as his sympathies in general were with the Rhodians and he was anxious to do them any favour, he yielded and gave up Andromachus
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

6 6 νύκτα. οἱ δὲ ἐπιτελεσάμενοι τούτο, καὶ προσεπι-
μετρήσαντες τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀχαῖον τιμᾶς τινας,
παρείλαντο τὴν ὀλοσχεροτάτην ἐλπίδα τῶν Βυζαν-
tῶν. συνεκύρισε δὲ τι καὶ ἔτερον τοῖς Βυζαντίοις
ἀτόπον· ὁ γὰρ Τιβοῦτης καταγόμενος ἐκ τῆς
Μακεδονίας ἐσφηλε τὰς ἐπιβολὰς αὐτῶν, μετ-
ο ἀλλάξας τὸν βίον. οὐκ ἱμβάντως οἱ μὲν Βυζάντιοι
ταῖς ὀρμαις ἀνέπεσον, ὁ δὲ Προυσίας ἐπιρρωθεῖ·
ταῖς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐλπίσαν ἀμα μὲν αὐτὸς ἀπὸ
τῶν κατ᾽ Ἀσίαν μερῶν ἐπολέμης καὶ προσέκειτο
τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐνεργώς, ἀμα δὲ τοὺς Ὀρᾶκας
μισθοσάμενος οὐκ εἰς τὰς πῦλας ἔξειν τοὺς
Βυζαντίους ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην μερῶν.
9 οἱ δὲ Βυζάντιοι τῶν σφετέρων ἐλπίδων ἐφευσμένοι,
τῷ πολέμῳ πουοῦντες πανταχόθεν, ἐξαγωγὴν
52 περιέβλεπον εὐσχήμονα τῶν πραγμάτων. Κανάρου
δὲ τοῦ τῶν Γαλατῶν βασιλέως παραγενομένου
πρὸς τὸ Βυζάντιον καὶ σπουδάζοντος διαλύσαι τὸν
πόλεμον καὶ διέχοντος τὰς χειρὰς φιλοτίμως,
συνεχώρησαν τοῖς παρακαλομένοις ὁ τε Προυσίας
2 οἱ τε Βυζάντιοι. πυθόμενοι δὲ οἱ Ῥώδιοι τὴν τὴν
τοῦ Κανάρου σπουδὴν καὶ τὴν ἐντροπὴν τοῦ
Προυσίαν, σπουδάζοντες δὲ καὶ τὴν αὐτῶν πρόθεσιν
ἐπὶ τελὸς ἀγανεῖ, προσβεβέντην μὲν Ἄριδίκην
προσεχρίσαντο πρὸς τοὺς Βυζαντίους. Πολεμοκλῆ
δὲ τρεῖς ἐχοντα τριήρεις ὅμοι συναπέστειλαν,
3 βουλόμενοι, τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον, καὶ τὸ δόρυ καὶ τὸ
κηρύκειον ἀμα πέμπεσιν πρὸς τοὺς Βυζαντίους.
4 ἐπιφανέντων δὲ τοῦτω ἐγένοντο διαλύσεις ἐπὶ
Κάθωνος τοῦ Καλλιγείτου ἐρομμηνούντος ἐν
5 τῷ Βυζαντίῳ, πρὸς μὲν Ῥώδιος ἀπλαί, Βυζαντίους
μὲν μηδένα πράττειν τὸ διαγώγιον τῶν εἰς τῶν
424
to them to conduct back to his son. Having accomplished this and in addition conferred certain honours on Achaeus they deprived the Byzantines of their most important source of hope. At the same time the Byzantines met with another mischance; for Tiboetes on his way from Macedonia foiled their hopes by his death, upon which the Byzantines relaxed their efforts, while Prusias, fortified in his expectations of success in the war, at one and the same time was himself attacking the enemy from Asia with his whole energy, and on the European side, by hiring the services of the Thracians, prevented the Byzantines from venturing out of their gates. The Byzantines, all their hopes being now defeated, were suffering on all sides from the war and began to look about for an honourable solution of the questions at issue. 52. Accordingly when Cavarus, the Gallic king, came to Byzantium and did his best to put an end to the war, intervening heartily to part the combatants, both Prusias and the Byzantines yielded to his exhortations. The Rhodians, on hearing of Cavarus's efforts and Prusias's compliance and being anxious to effect their purpose at once, appointed Aridices as envoy to Byzantium and at the same time dispatched Polemocles with three triremes, wishing, as we say, to send the Byzantines the spear and the herald's staff at once.\(^a\) Upon their appearance treaties were made in the year of Cothon, son of Calligeiton, hieromnemon\(^b\) in Byzantium, that with the Rhodians being simple and as follows: "The Byzantines engage not to levy toll on ships bound

\(^a\) That is, war and peace; the iron hand in the velvet glove.
\(^b\) The eponymous annual magistrate.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

Πόντον πλεόντων, Ἡρόδιος δὲ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τούτου γενομένου τὴν εἰρήνην ἀγειν πρὸς Βυζαντίους, πρὸς δὲ Προυσίαν τουαλίτες, εἶναι Προυσία καὶ Βυζαντίως εἰρήνην καὶ φιλίαν εἰς τὸν ἄπαντα χρόνο, μὴ στρατεύειν δὲ μὴτε Βυζαντίως ἐπὶ Προυσίαν τρόπω μηδενὶ μὴτε Προυσίαν ἐπὶ Βυζαντίους, ἀποδοῦναι δὲ Προυσίαν Βυζαντίους τὰς τε χώρας καὶ τὰ φρούρια καὶ τοὺς λαοὺς καὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ σώματα χωρίς λύτρων, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὰ πλοία τὰ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ληφθέντα τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τὰ βέλη τὰ καταληφθέντ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐρύμαισι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὴν λείψιαν καὶ τὸν κέραμον τὸν ἐκ τοῦ Ἱεροῦ χωρίου (ὁ γὰρ Προυσίας, ἀγωνιών τὴν τοῦ Τιβείτου κάθοδον, πάντα καθεῖλε τὰ δοκοῦντα τῶν φρουρίων εὐ- καίρως πρὸς τι κείσοθαι). Ἐπαναγκάσαι δὲ Προυσίαν καὶ ὅσα τυχὲ τῶν Βυζαντίων εἶχον ἐκ τῆς Μυσίας χώρας τῆς ὑπὸ Βυζαντίους ταττομένης ἀποδούναι τοῖς γεωργοῖς.

Ὀ μὲν όν Ἡρόδιος καὶ Προυσία πρὸς Βυζαντίους συστάς πόλεμος τουαλίτας ἐλάβε τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὸ τέλος· κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Κνώσσιου προσβήσαντες πρὸς Ἡρόδιους ἐπείσαν τὰς τε μετὰ Πολεμωκλέως ναῦς καὶ τρία τὰν ἀφράκτων προσ- κατασφάσαντας αὐτοῖς ἀποστείλα. γενομένου δὲ τούτου καὶ τῶν πλοίων ἀφικομένων εἰς τὴν Κρήτην, καὶ ἔχοντων ὑποίπαν τῶν Ἐλευθεραίων ὅτι τὸν πολέμην αὐτῶν Τίμαρχον οἱ περὶ τὸν Πολεμοκλῆς χαριζόμενοι τοῖς Κνωσσίους ἀνήρξασι, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ῥύσια κατήγειλαν τοῖς Ἡρόδιους, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πόλεμον ἐξήγεικαν.

3 Περιέπεσον δὲ καὶ Λύττιοι βραχὺ πρὸ τοῦτων τῶν
for the Pontus, and on this condition the Rhodians and their allies shall be at peace with the Byzantines."

The terms they made with Prusias were these: "There is to be peace and friendship for all time between Prusias and the Byzantines and in no manner are the Byzantines to make war on Prusias or Prusias on the Byzantines. Prusias is to give up to the Byzantines the lands, the fortresses, the people, and the slaves taken from the enemy free from ransom, and in addition the ships taken at the outset of the war, the missiles captured in the forts; likewise the timbers, building stones, and tiles taken from the Holy Place"—for Prusias, dreading the return of Tiboetes, had destroyed all strong places that seemed favourably situated for any hostile design—"Prusias is to compel any Bithynians occupying lands in that part of Mysia subject to Byzantium to give these up to the farmers."

53. Such was the beginning and such the end of the war of Prusias and the Rhodians with Byzantium. At about the same time the Cnossians sent an embassy to the Rhodians and persuaded them to send the squadron under Polemocles to them with three undocked vessels in addition. Upon this, when the fleet arrived in Crete, the people of Eleuthernae, conceiving a suspicion that Polemocles to please the Cnossians had killed Timarchus one of their citizens, first of all proclaimed reprisals against the Rhodians and next made open war on them.

A little before this the people of Lyttus had met
κατά τὴν σύμπασαν Κρήτην ὑπῆρξεν ἐν τοιαύτῃ τινὶ τότε
4 καταστάσει. Κνώσσιοι συμφρονησαντες Γορτυνίως
πάσαν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν Κρήτην ὑφ’ αὐτοὺς πλὴν τῆς
Λυττίων πόλεως, μόνης δὲ ταύτης ἀπειθοῦσις
ἐπεβάλοντο πολεμεῖν, σπεύδοντες αὐτὴν εἰς τέλος
ἀνάστατον ποιῆσαι καὶ παραδείγματος καὶ φόβον
5 χάριν τῶν ἄλλων Κρηταιέων. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον
ἐπολέμουν πάντες οἱ Κρηταιεῖς τοῖς Λυττίοις·
ἐγγενομένης δὲ φιλοτιμίας ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων,
ὅπερ ἔθος ἔστι Κρητῶν, ἐστασίασαν πρὸς τοὺς
6 ἄλλους, καὶ Πολυρρήνιοι μὲν καὶ Κερέται καὶ
Δαμπαίοι πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Ὄρμοι μετ’ Ἀρκάδων
ὅμοθυμαδὸν ἀποστάντες τῆς τῶν Κνωσσίων φιλίας
7 ἐγνωσαν τοῖς Λυττίοις συμμαχεῖν, τῶν δὲ Γορτυνίων
οἱ μὲν πρεσβύτατοι τὰ τῶν Κνωσσίων οἱ δὲ
νεώτεροι τὰ τῶν Λυττίων αἱροῦμεν διεστασίασαν
8 πρὸς ἄλλους. οἱ δὲ Κνώσσιοι, παραδόξου γεγο-
νότος αὐτοῖς τοῦ περὶ τοὺς συμμάχους κυνήματος,
ἐπιστάνται χυλῶς ἐξ Αἰτωλίας ἄνδρας κατὰ
9 συμμαχίαν. οἱ γενομένου παρατίκα τῶν Γορτυ-
νίων οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καταλαμβάνομεν τὴν ἀκραν
eἰσάγονται τοὺς τα Κνωσσίους καὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλούς,
καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐξέβαλον τοὺς δ’ ἀπέκτειναν τῶν νέων,
54 τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐνεχείρισαν τοῖς Κνωσσίοις. κατὰ
dὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶροὺς Λυττίων ἐξωδευκότων εἰς
tὴν πολεμίαν πανδημεῖ, συννοήσαντες οἱ Κνώσσιοι
τὸ γεγονός καταλαμβάνονται τὴν Λύττουν ἔρημον
2 οὕς τῶν βοηθησόντων· καὶ τὰ μὲν τέκνα καὶ
tὰς γυναῖκας εἰς Κνωσσὸν ἀπέπεμψαν, τὴν δὲ
πόλιν ἐμπρήσαντες καὶ κατασκάμαντες καὶ λωβη-
3 σάμενοι κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐπανήλθον. οἱ δὲ
428
with an irreparable disaster. The general condition of affairs in Crete had been as follows. The Cnossians in alliance with the Gortynians had subjected the whole of Crete with the exception of Lyttus. This being the only city that refused obedience, they undertook a war against it with the object of its final extermination as an example and terror to the rest of Crete. At first all the Cretans took part in the war against Lyttus, but jealousy having sprung up from some trifling cause, as is common with the Cretans, some separated from the rest, the people of Polyrhenia, Ceraeae, Lappa, Horium, and Arcadia a unanimously abandoning the alliance with Cnossus and deciding to take the part of Lyttus, while Gortyna was in a state of civil war, the elder citizens taking the part of Cnossus and the younger that of Lyttus. The Cnossians, whom these disturbances among their allies took by surprise, obtained the assistance of a thousand Aetolians in virtue of their alliance, and once these had arrived the elder Gortynians, seizing the citadel and introducing the Cnossians and Aetolians, exiled or put to death the younger men and delivered the city to the Cnossians. 54. At about the same time the Lyttians having left with their whole force for an expedition into the enemy’s country, the Cnossians getting word of it seized on Lyttus which was left without defenders, and having sent off the women and children to Cnossus, and burnt, demolished, and in every way they could wrecked the town, returned

a The town in Crete of that name.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

Δύττοι παραγενόμενοι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξοδείας, καὶ συνθεασάμενοι τὸ συμβεβηκός, οὕτως περιπάθεις ἐγένοντο ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὅστε μὴ εἰσελθέων μηδένα τολμήσαι τῶν παρόντων εἰς τὴν πατρίδα. πάντες δὲ περιπορευθέντες αὐτὴν κύκλω, καὶ πολλάκις ἀνοιμώξαντες καὶ κατολοφυράμενοι τὴν τε τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τήν αὐτῶν τύχην, αὕτως έξ άναστροφῆς ἐπανήλθον εἰς τὴν τῶν Λατπαίων πόλιν. φιλανθρώπως δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ μετὰ πάσης προθυμίας τῶν Λατπαίων ὑποδεξαμένων, οὕτως μὲν ἀντὶ πολιτῶν ἀπόλιθες ἐν ἰμέρᾳ μιᾷ καὶ ξενοὶ γεγονότες ἐπολέμουν πρὸς τοὺς Κυνοσίους ἀμα 6 τοῖς συμμάχοις, Δύττος δ’ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἀποικός οὕτα καὶ συγγενής, ἀρχαιότατη δὲ τῶν κατὰ Κρήτην πόλεων, άνδρας δ’ ὀμολογομένως ἀρίστους αἰεὶ τρέφουσα Κρηταιέων, οὕτως ἀρδὴν καὶ παραλόγως ἀνηπάσθη.

55 Πολυρρήνιοι δὲ καὶ Λατπαίοι καὶ πάντες οἱ τούτων σύμμαχοι, θεωρούντες τοὺς Κυνοσίους ἀντεχομένους τῆς τῶν Αἰτωλῶν συμμαχίας, τοὺς δ’ Αἰτωλοὺς ὀρώντες πολέμιους ὄντας τῷ τε βασιλεῖ Φιλίππῳ καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, πέμπουσι πρόσβεσι πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα καὶ τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς περὶ βοήθειας καὶ συμμαχίας. οἱ δ’ Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ Φίλιππος εἰς τῇ κοινῇ συμμαχίᾳ αὐτοὺς προσεδέχατο καὶ βοήθειαν ἔξαπεσεσθαν, Ἰλλυρίους μὲν τετρακοσίους, ὃν ἠγεῖτο Πλάτωρ, Ἀχαιοὺς δὲ 3 διακοσίους, Φωκέας ἐκατόν, οἱ καὶ παραγενόμενοι μεγάλην ἐπούραν ἐπίδοσον τοῖς Πολυρρηνίοις καὶ τοῖς τούτων συμμάχοις πάντων γὰρ ἐν βραχεί χρόνω τείχερεις καταστήσαντες τοὺς τ’ Ἐλευθερναίους καὶ Κυδωνιάτας ἔτη δὲ τοὺς Ἀπετεραίους 430
home. When the Lyttians came back to their city from the expedition and saw what had happened, they were so much affected that none of them had the heart even to enter his native town, but one and all after marching round it and many times bewailing and lamenting the fate of their country and themselves, turned their backs on it and retired to Lappa. The Lappaeans received them with the utmost kindness and cordiality; and thus having become in one day cityless aliens instead of citizens they went on fighting against Cnossus with the other allies. Thus was Lyttus, a colony of the Spartans and allied to them by blood, the most ancient city in Crete, and ever, as all acknowledged, the breeding-place of her bravest men, utterly and unexpectedly made away with.

55. The Polyrhenians, Lappaeans, and all their allies seeing that the Cnossians clung to the alliance of the Aetolians who were the enemies of King Philip and the Achaeans, sent envoys to the king and to the League requesting their assistance and alliance. The Achaeans and Philip hereupon received them into the general confederacy and sent them as support four hundred Illyrians under the command of Plator, two hundred Achaeans and one hundred Phocians. The arrival of this force was of the greatest advantage to the Polyrhenians and their allies; for in a very short space of time they shut the Eleuthernians, Cydoniats, and Apteraeans
ΤΑ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν Κρήτην ἐν τούτοις ἦν περὶ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους καὶ Μιθριδάτης ἐξήγησε μὲν Σινωπεύοις πόλεμον, καὶ τις οἱ οὖν ἄρχι τότε καὶ πρόφασις ἐγένετο τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος ἀρχής
2 ἀτυχίας Σινωπεύσων. εἰς δὲ τὸν πόλεμον τούτων προσβενεσάντων αὐτῶν πρὸς Ῥόδιους καὶ παρακαλοῦντων βοηθεῖν, ἔδοξε τοῖς Ῥόδιοις προχειρίσασθαι τρεῖς ἄνδρας, καὶ διὸ ἔοικε τούτως δραχμῶν δεκατέτταρας μυρίδας, τοὺς δὲ λαβόντας παρασκευάσαι τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἐπιτήδεια τοῖς Σινωπεύσων.
3 οἳ δὲ καταστάθησαν ἦτοίμασαν οὖν κεράμια μύρια, τριχῶς εἰργασμένης τάλαντα τριακόσια, νεώρων εἰργασμένων ἐκατὸν τάλαντα, πανοπλίας χιλίας, χρυσοῦς ἑπισήμους τρισχιλίους, ἐτὶ δὲ
4 λιθοφόρους τέτταρας καὶ τοὺς ἄφετας τούτοις. ἄ καὶ λαβόντες οἳ τῶν Σινωπέων πρέσβεις ἐπανήλθον. ἦσαν γὰρ οἳ Σινωπεύοι ἐν ἀγωνίᾳ μὴ πολιορκεῖν οφάς ὁ Μιθριδάτης ἐγχειρήσῃ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλαταν· διὸ καὶ τὰς παρασκευὰς πρὸς
5 τούτο τὸ μέρος ἐποιοῦντο πάσας. ὡ δὲ Σινώπη
432
inside their walls and compelled them to desert the alliance of Cnossus and share their fortunes. After this success the Polyrhenians and their allies sent to Philip and the Achaeans five hundred Cretans, while the Cnossians had a little earlier sent a thousand to the Aetolians and both these Cretan forces continued to take part in the present war. The Gortynian exiles seized on the harbour of Phaestus and even audaciously continued to hold that of Gortyna itself, and from both these positions made war on those in the city.

56. Such was the state of affairs in Crete. At the same period Mithridates too went to war with Sinope, and this proved as it were the beginning and first occasion of the misfortunes which finally befall this city. The Sinopeans sent an embassy to Rhodes begging for assistance towards this war and the Rhodians passed a decree to appoint three commissioners and to place in their hands a sum of 140,000 drachmae on receiving which they were to supply the requirements of the Sinopeans. The commissioners got ready ten thousand jars of wine, three hundred talents of prepared hair, a hundred talents of prepared bow-string, a thousand complete suits of armour, three thousand gold pieces, and four catapults with their artillerymen, on receiving which the Sinopean envoys returned home. These things were sent because the Sinopeans were in great dread of Mithridates undertaking the siege of the city by land and sea, and they therefore were making all their preparations with this view. Sinope lies
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

κεῖται μὲν ἐν τοῖς δεξιοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ Πόντου παρὰ τὸν Ἐσσñe πλοῦν, οὐκεῖται δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν χειρονόμου· ἐν τὸ πέλαγος, ἢ τὸν μὲν αὐχένα τὸν συνάπτοντα πρὸς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ὅς ἔστων οὖ πλεῖον δυνεῖν σταθῆναι, ἢ πόλις ἐπικεκυμένη

6 διακλείει κυρίως. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τῆς χειρονόμου πρόκειται μὲν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος, ἔστω δὲ ἐπὶ πέπεδου καὶ πανευφόδου ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν, κύκλῳ δὲ ἐκ θαλάττης ἀπότομον καὶ δυσπροσόμιστον καὶ παντελῶς

7 ὀλίγας ἔχουν προσβάσεις. διόπερ ἀγωνιῶντες οἱ Συνωπεῖς μὴ ποτὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀσίας πλευρᾶς ὁ Μιθριδάτης συντησάμενος ἔργα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀπεναντία ταύτης ὁμοίως ποιησάμενος ἀπόβασιν κατὰ θαλατταν εἰς τοὺς ὁμαλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὑπερκεμένους τῆς πόλεως τόπους, ἐγχειρήσει πολυρκείν

8 αὐτοῦς, ἐπεβάλοντο τῆς χειρονόμου κύκλῳ τὸ νησίζων ὀχυρωῦν, ἀποσταυροῦντες καὶ περιγερακοῦντες τὰς ἐκ θαλαττής προσβάσεις, ἀμα δὲ καὶ βέλη καὶ στρατιώτας τιθέντες ἐπὶ τοὺς εὐκαίρους

9 τῶν τόπων· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ παῖν μέγεθος αὐτῆς οὐ πολύ, τελέως δὲ εὐκατακράτητον καὶ μέτριον.

57 Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Συνωπῆς ἐν τούτοις ἦν, ὅ δὲ βασιλεὺς Φίλιππος ἁναζεύξας ἐκ Μακεδονίας μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως (ἐν γὰρ ταύταις ταῖς ἑπιβολαῖς ἀπελίπαμεν ἀρτὶ τῶν συμμαχικῶν πόλεμοι) ὀρμήσεν ἐπὶ Θεσσαλίας καὶ τῆς Ἡπείρου, σπεύδων ταύτη 2 ποιῆσασθαι τὴν εἰσβολήν τὴν εἰς Αἰτωλίαν. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ καὶ Δωρίμαχος κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἔχοντες πράξει κατὰ τῆς τῶν Ἀιγείρατῶν πόλεως, ἀθροίζαντες τῶν Αἰτωλῶν περὶ χιλίων καὶ διακοσίων εἰς Οἰάνθειαν τῆς Αἰτωλίας, ἡ κεῖται καταντικρύ τῆς προειρήμενης πόλεως, καὶ πορθμεῖα 434.
on the southern shore of the Pontus on the route to the Phasis and is situated on a peninsula running out to the open sea. The neck of this peninsula connecting it with Asia is not more than two stades in width and is absolutely closed by the city which is situated upon it; the rest of the peninsula runs out to the open sea and is flat and affords an easy approach to the town, but on its sea face it is very steep, difficult to anchor off, and with very few approaches from the sea. The Sinopeans were fearful lest Mithridates should lay siege to them by throwing up works on the side of the city next Asia, while at the same time effecting a disembarkation on the opposite side and occupying the flat ground overlooking the city; and consequently they busied themselves with strengthening all round that part of the peninsula which was washed by the sea, blocking up the approaches from the sea by means of stakes and stockades and placing soldiers and stores of missiles at suitable spots, the whole peninsula being of no great size but quite easily defensible by a moderate force.

57. Such was the situation at Sinope. But King Philip starting from Macedonia with his army—for it was here that I interrupted my account of operations in the Social War—marched on Thessaly and Epirus with the view of invading Aetolia from thence.

Alexander and Dorimachus at this time having formed a project for surprising Aegeira, had collected about twelve hundred Aetolians at Oeantheia in Aetolia, which is situated just opposite Aegeira, and

219 B.C.

435
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

toútois étoumásvntes, plóon ét右手ν πρὸς τὴν
3 ἐπιβολήν. τῶν γὰρ ἴτουμοληκῶτων τις ἐξ Αἰτω-
λίας, καὶ πλεῖον χρόνον διατετριφότας παρὰ τοῖς
Αἰγειράταις καὶ συντεθεωρηκὼς τοὺς φυλάττοντας
τὸν ἀπ’ Αἰγίου πυλῶνα μεθυσκομένους καὶ ῥαβύμας
4 διεξάγοντας τὰ κατὰ τὴν φυλακήν, πλεονάκις
παραβαλλόμενοι καὶ διαβαίνον πρὸς τοὺς περὶ
Δωρίμαχον ἐξεκέκλητο πρὸς τὴν πράξιν αὐτοῦς ἀπε
λίαν οἰκείους ὅντας τῶν τοιούτων ἐγχειρημάτων.
5 ἦ δὲ τῶν Αἰγειρατῶν πόλεως ἐκτισταὶ μὲν τῇ
Πελοποννήσου κατὰ τὸν Κορινθιακὸν κόλπον μεταξὺ
τῆς Αἰγινέων καὶ Σικυωνίων πόλεως, κεῖται δ’ ἐπὶ
λόφων ἐρυμνῶν καὶ δυσβάτων, νεεῖ δὲ τῇ θέσει
πρὸς τὸν Παρνασσὸν καὶ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη τῆς
ἀντίπερα χώρας, ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης ὡς ἔππα
6 στάδια. παραπεσόντος δὲ πλοῦ τοῖς περὶ τὸν
Δωρίμαχον ἀνήχθησαν, καὶ καθημείζονται νυκτὸς
ἐτὶ πρὸς τὸν παρά τὴν πόλιν καταρρέοντα ποταμῶν.
7 οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ Δωρίμαχον,
ἀμα δὲ τούτως Ἀρχίδαμον τὸν Παντάλεων ὕδων,
ἔχοντε σερί αὐτοὺς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Αἰγινεῶν
προσεβαίνον πρὸς τὴν πόλιν κατὰ τὴν ἀπ’ Αἰγίνον
8 φέρουσαν ὅδον. ὃ δ’ αὐτόμολος ἔχων εἰκοσ
τοὺς ἐπιτηδειοτάτους, διανύσας ταῖς ἀνοδίαις τοῖς
κρημνοῖς θάττον τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν,
καὶ διαδότι διὰ τῶν υδρορροίας, ἔτι κομμωμένους
9 κατέλαβε τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ πυλῶνος. κατασφάξας δ’
αὐτοὺς ἄκμην ἐν ταῖς κοίταις ὃντας, καὶ διακόψας
τοῖς πελέκεσι τοὺς μοχλοὺς, ἀνέψε τοῖς Αἰγινεῶν
10 τὰς πύλας. οἱ δὲ παρευπεσόντες λαμπρῶς ἀπερ
νοῦτος ἔρχεσαντο τοῖς πράγμασιν. δ’ καὶ παραί
τοιν ἐγένετο τοῖς μὲν Αἰγειράταις τῆς σωτηρίας.
having provided transports for this force were waiting for favourable weather to cross and make the attack. For a certain Aetolian deserter, who had spent some time at Aegeira and had noticed that the guards of the Aegium gate were constantly drunk and neglectful of their watch, had several times at some risk crossed over to Dorimachus and urged him to make the attempt, well knowing that such an enterprise was quite in his line. Aegeira is situated in the Peloponnese on the gulf of Corinth between Aegium and Sicyon and is built on steep hills difficult of access, looking towards Parnassus and that part of the opposite coast, its distance from the sea being about seven stades. The weather being now favourable, Dorimachus and with them Archidamus the son of Pantaleon, now took the main body of the Aetolians and approached the city by the road leading from Aegium. The deserter with twenty picked men, leaving the path and mounting the precipice quicker than the others as he knew the ground; got in through an aqueduct and found the guard of the gate still asleep. Having killed them before they could rise from their beds and cut through the bolts with axes, he opened the gates to the Aetolians. They dashed brilliantly into the city, but afterwards conducted matters with such an entire lack of caution that finally the Aegeiratans were saved and they themselves destroyed.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

11 τοὺς δ’ Αιτωλοὺς τῆς ἀπωλείας. ὑπολαμβάνοντες γὰρ τοῦτο τέλος εἶναι τοῦ κατασχεῖν ἀλλοτρίαν πόλιν, τὸ γενέσθαι τῶν πυλώνων ἐντὸς, τοῦτον τὸν 58 τρόπον ἔχρωντο τοῖς πράγμασι. διὸ καὶ βραχχον παντελῶς χρόνον ἀθρόοι συμμείναντες περὶ τὴν ἄγοράν, λοιπὸν ἐκπαθεῖς οὗτος πρὸς τᾶς ὀφελείας διέφευ, καὶ παρευπέπτοντες εἰς τὰς οἰκίας

2 διήρταζον τοὺς βίους ἤδη φωτὸς ὄντος. οἱ δ’ Αἰγειράται, τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῖς ἀνελπίστοι καὶ παραδόξου τελέως συμβεβηκότος, οἱ μὲν ἐπέστησαν οἱ πολέμιοι κατὰ τὰς οἰκίας, ἐκπλαγεῖς καὶ περί- φοβοι γενόμενοι πάντες ἐτρέποντο πρὸς φυγὴν ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἡδ’ βεβαιῶς αὐτῆς κεκρατημένης

3 ύπὸ τῶν πολέμων, δόσοι δὲ τῆς κραυγῆς ἀκούοντες ἐξ ἀκεραίων τῶν οἰκίων ἐξεβόθουσαν, πάντες εἰς

4 τὴν ἄκραν συνέτρεχον. οὕτωι μὲν οὖν ἄεὶ πλείους ἐγίνοντο καὶ θαρσαλεώτεροι, τὸ δὲ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν σύστρεμμα τοῦντιν ἔλαττον καὶ ταραχωδέστερον

5 διὰ τὰς προειρήμενας αἰτίας. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα συν- ορῶντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Δωρίμαχον ἢδ’ τὸν περιεστῶτα κύνδυνον αὐτοὺς, συστραφέντες ἠμηκαν ἐπὶ τοὺς κατέχοντας τὴν ἄκραν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τῇ θραυ- τητῇ καὶ τόλμῃ καταπληξάμενοι τρέψασθαι τοὺς

6 ἠθροισμένους ἐπὶ τὴν βοήθειαν. οἱ δ’ Αἰγειράται παρακαλέσαντες σφάς αὐτοὺς ἠμύνοντο καὶ συν-

7 επιλέκοντο τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς γενναίως. οὐσὶς δὲ τῆς ἄκρας ἀτειχίστου καὶ τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἐκ χειρὸς καὶ κατ’ ἄνδρα γινομένης, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἧν ἄγων ὁποῖον εἰκός, ἄτε τῶν μὲν ὑπὲρ πατρίδος καὶ τέκνων τῶν δ’ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας ἄγωνζομένων, τέλος γε μὴν ἐτράπησαν οἱ παρευσπεπτοκότες τῶν Αἰτωλῶν.

8 οἱ δ’ Αἰγειράται λαβόντες ἀφορμὴν ἐγκλίματος 438
For considering that the occupation of a foreign city is finished when one is once within the gates, they acted on this principle, (58) so that, after keeping together for only quite a short time in the neighbourhood of the market-place, their passion for plunder caused them to disperse, and, breaking into the houses, they began to plunder the property, it being now daylight. The people of Aegeira had been entirely taken by surprise, and now those whose houses had been attacked by the enemy were all in the utmost state of terror and consternation, and fled out of the town in which they supposed the enemy to be already securely established. Those, however, who came to assist on hearing the shouting and whose houses were still intact, all ran to the citadel. Here they gradually increased in numbers and gained courage, while the collected force of the Aetolians on the contrary became ever smaller and more disordered for the reasons above-mentioned. But Dorimachus, seeing now the danger that menaced them, got his men together and attacked the occupants of the citadel, thinking that by this bold and vigorous effort he would intimidate and put to flight those who had gathered to defend the city. But the Aegiratans, cheering each other on, resisted and met the Aetolian attack most gallantly. The citadel was unwalled, and the combat was a hand-to-hand one between man and man, so that at first there was a struggle as desperate as one would expect when the one side is fighting for their country and children and the other for their lives, but at the end the Aetolian invaders were put to flight. The pursuit of the enemy by the Aegiratans, who took advantage of their higher
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἐνεργῶς ἐπέκειντο καὶ καταπληκτικῶς τοῖς πολεμίοις, εξ ὧν συνεβή τοὺς πλείστους τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν διὰ τὴν πτοιαν αὐτούς ὑπάρχουσαν φεύγοντας ἐν ταῖς 9 πύλαις συμπατηθήναι. ο μὲν οὖν Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ κατ’ αὐτὸν ἔπεσε τὸν κίνδυνον, ὁ δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ἐν τῷ περὶ τὰς πύλας ὅθισε καὶ 10 πυγμαῖς διεθάρη. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλήθος τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν τὸ μὲν συνεπατήθη, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τῶν 11 κρημνῶν φεύγουν ταῖς ἀνοδίαις ἐξετραχήλισθη. τὸ δὲ καὶ διασωθὲν αὐτῶν μέρος πρὸς τὰς ναῦς, ἐρριφός τὰ ὅπλα παναιχρῆς ἀμα δ’ ἀνελπίσως ἐποίησατο τὸν ἀπόλογον.

12 Αἰγείραται μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν ὀλυγωρίαν ἀποβαλὸντες τὴν παρρίδα, διὰ τὴν εὐψυχίαν καὶ γεναιώτητα πάλιν ἔσωσαν παραδόξως: κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Εὐριπίδας, ὃς ἦν ἀπεσταλμένος ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν στρατηγὸς τοῖς Ἡλείοις, καταδραμὼν τὴν Δυμαίων καὶ Φαραιέων ἔτι δὲ τὴν τῶν Τριταίων χώραν, καὶ περιελασάμενος λείας πλῆθος ἰκανόν, ἔποιεῖτο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ὧς 2 ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡλείαν. ὁ δὲ Μίκκος ὁ Δυμαιός, ὅσπερ ἐτύγχανε κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς ὑποστράτηγος ὄν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ἐκβοθῆσας πανδημεί τοὺς τε Δυμαίους καὶ Φαραιέως ἀμα δὲ καὶ Τριταίεως ἐχων, 3 προσέκειτο τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀπαλλαττομένοις. ἐνεργότερον δ’ . . . ἐμπεσούσαν εἰς ἐνέδραν ἐσφάλη καὶ πολλοὺς ἀπέβαλε τῶν ἀνδρῶν· τεταράκοντα μὲν γὰρ ἐπεσον, ἐάλωσαν δὲ περὶ διακοσίους τῶν πεζῶν. 4 ὁ μὲν οὖν Εὐριπίδας ποιήσας τούτῳ τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ μετεωρισθεὶς ἔπει τῷ γεγονότι, μετ’ ὀλίγας ἤμερας αὐτὸς ἐξελθὼν κατέλαβε παρὰ τῶν Ἀραξοὺ φρούριον τῶν Δυμαίων εὐκαίρον τὸ καλούμενον 440
position, was so vigorous and formidable, that most of the Aetolians owing to the state of panic they were in trampled each other to death in the gate. Alexander fell fighting in the actual engagement and Archidamus perished in the suffocating crush at the gate. The rest of the Aetolians were either trampled to death there or were dashed to pieces in their attempt to escape down the cliffs where there was no path. The survivors who reached the ships after throwing away their shields managed, beyond hope and with the stigma of this disgrace, to sail away. Thus did the Aegiratans lose their city by their negligence, and recover it again beyond hope by their courage and valour.

59. About the same time Euripidas, whom the Aetolians had sent to the Eleans to command their forces, after an inroad on the territory of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaeae, in which he had collected a considerable amount of booty, was on his way back to Elis. But Miccus of Dyme, who was at this time the sub-strategus of the Achaeans, taking with him the complete levies of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaeae, marched out and attacked the enemy as they were retiring. Pressing on too vigorously he fell into an ambush and was defeated with considerable loss, forty of his infantry being killed and about two hundred taken prisoners. Euripidas, elated by this success, made another expedition a few days afterwards and took a fort of the Dymaeans called "The Wall," favourably situated near the Araxus and
Τείχος, ὁ φασὶν οἱ μῦθοι τὸ παλαιὸν Ἡρακλέα πολεμοῦντα τοῖς Ἡλείοις ἐποικοδομήσαι, βουλόμενον ὑμητηρίῳ χρῆσθαι τούτῳ κατ’ αὐτῶν. οἱ δὲ Δυμαῖοι καὶ Φαραίεις καὶ Τριταιεῖς ἡλαττωμένοι μὲν περὶ τὴν βοήθειαν, δεδούτε δὲ τὸ μέλλον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ φρουρίου καταλήψεως, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεμπὸν ἀγγέλους πρὸς τὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, δηλούντες τὰ γεγονότα καὶ δεόμενοι σφίξει βοηθεῖν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρεσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστελλον τοὺς 2 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιώσοντας. ὁ δ’ Ἀρατος οὔτε τὸ ἔξωκαν ἐδύνατο συστήσασθαι διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὸν Κλεομενικὸν πόλεμον ἐλλειποῦσιν τίνα τῶν ὁφωνίων τοὺς Ἀχαιός τοῖς μισθοφόροις, καθόλου τε ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς καὶ συλλήβδην πάνι τοῖς τοῦ πολέμου πράγμασιν ἀτόλμως ἐχρῆτο καὶ νωθρῶς. 3 διόπερ δὲ τὰ Δυκοῦργος εἰλε τὸ τῶν Μεγαλοπολίτῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὁ τ’ Εὐριπίδας ἔζηρ τοῖς εἰρημένοις 4 Γόρτυναν τῆς Τελφούσιας. οἱ τὲ Δυμαῖοι καὶ Φαραίεις καὶ Τριταιεῖς, δυσελπιστήσαντες ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ στρατηγοῦ βοήθειας, συνεφόρησαν ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ τὰς μὲν κοινὰς εἰσορᾶς τοῖς Ἀχαίοῖς μὴ 5 τελεῖν, ἵδια δὲ συστήσασθαι μισθοφόρους, πεζοὺς μὲν τρικασίους ἰππεῖς δὲ πεντήκοντα, καὶ διὰ 6 τοῦτων ἀφαλλίζεσθαι τὴν χώραν. τοῦτο δὲ πράξαντες ὑπὲρ μὲν τῶν καθ’ αὐτοὺς πραγμάτων ἐνδεχομένως ἐδοξαν βεβουλεύσαντες, περὶ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν τάναττα: λογοφαῖς γὰρ ἐφόδου καὶ προφάσεως τοῖς βουλομένοις διαλύειν τὸ ἐθνὸς ἐδόκουν 7 ἀρχηγοὶ καὶ καθηγεμόνες γεγονέναι. ταύτης δὲ τῆς πράξεως τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον τῆς αἰτίας ἐπὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀν τις ἀναφέροι δικαίως τὸν ὀλγυροῦντα καὶ καταμέλλοντα καὶ προϊόμενον ἀεὶ τοὺς δεομένους. 442
fabled to have been built long ago by Heracles when he was making war on the Eleans to use as a place of arms against them. 60. The Dyvaeans, Pharaeans, and Tritaeans, thus worsted in their attack on the invaders and afraid of what might happen owing to the occupation of the fort, at first dispatched messengers to the strategus of the Achaeans informing him of what had occurred and begging for help, and subsequently sent a formal embassy with the same request. Aratus could not get a foreign force together, as after the Cleomenic War the Achaeans had not paid their mercenaries in full, and in general he exhibited a great lack of daring and energy in his plans and his whole conduct of the war. So that Lycurgus took the Athenaeum in the territory of Megalopolis, and Euripidas, in addition to his previous successes, captured Gortyna in the territory of Telphusa. Hereupon the peoples of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritae, despairing of help from the strategus, came to an agreement with each other to refuse to pay their contributions to the Achaean League and to collect a private mercenary force of three hundred foot and fifty horse with which to secure the safety of their lands. In acting thus they were thought to have taken a proper course as regards their own affairs, but the reverse of this as regards the League; for they thus became the initiators and establishers of an evil precedent and pretext of which anyone who wished to dissolve the League could avail himself. It is true that the greater part of the blame for this action of theirs rested on the Strategus, guilty as he was of habitual negligence, delay, and inattention to
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

8 πᾶς γὰρ ὁ κινδυνεύων, ἐως μὲν ἂν τινος ἐλπίδος ἀντέχῃ ταῖς τῶν οἰκείων καὶ συμμάχων, προσανέχει τιμαῖς, ὅταν δὲ δυσχρηστῶν ἀπογνωστεῖ τὸν ἢδη βοηθεῖν ἀναγκάζεται αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν. διὸ καὶ Τριταιεύθι καὶ Φαραιεῦθι καὶ Δυμαῖοι, ὅτι μὲν ἴδια συνεστήσαντο μισοθοφόρους καταμέλλοντο τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαίων ἔγειρόν, οὐκ ἐγκλητέον, ὅτι δὲ τὰς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν εἰσφόρας ἀπὲιπαν, μεμψυμορητέον. ἔχρηγι γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἴδιαν χρείαν μὴ παραλιπεῖν, εὐκαιροῦντάς γε δὴ καὶ δυναμένος, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν πολιτείαν δίκαια συντηρεῖν, ἀλλὰς τε δὴ καὶ κομιδὴς ὑπαρχοῦσης ἄδιαπτῶτων κατὰ τοὺς κοινοὺς νόμους, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, γεγονότας ἀρχηγοῦ τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαίων συστήματος.

61 Τα μὲν οὖν κατὰ Πελοπόννησον ἐν τούτοις ἦν, δὲ βασιλεὺς Φίλιππος διελθὼν τὴν Ἡθετάλιαν 2 παρῆν εἰς Ἡπειρον. ἀναλαβὼν δὲ τοὺς Ἡπειρώτας ἀμα τοῖς Μακεδόνισι πανδημεῖ καὶ τοὺς εἰς Ἀχαίας αὐτῷ συνηγιγμένος σφενδονήτας τρικοσίων, ἐτὶ δὲ τοὺς παρὰ Πολυρρηνίων ἀπεσταλμένοις Κρήτας πεντακόσιοι, προῆγε, καὶ διελθὼν τὴν Ἡπειρον 3 παρῆν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἀμβρακιωτῶν χώραν. εἴ μὲν οὖν εἰς ἐφόδου κατὰ τὸ συνεχές ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν μεσόγαιαν τὴν Ἁττιλίαν, ἀφίσις καὶ παραδόξως ἐπιπεσὼν δυνάμει βαρείᾳ τοῖς ὀλίσθροι πράγμασιν 4 ἐπιτεθείκει τέλος· νῦν δὲ πεισθεὶς τοῖς Ἡπειρώταις πρῶτον ἐκπολυρκησία τῶν Ἀμβρακών, ἔδωκε τοῖς Ἁττιλοῖς ἀναστροφήν εἰς τὸ καὶ στῆναι καὶ προνοηθήναι τί καὶ παρασκευάζονται πρὸς τὸ μέλλον. 5 οἷς γὰρ Ἡπειρώτα τὸ σφέτερον ἀναγκαίοτερον τὴν θέμενοι τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν συμμάχων, καὶ μεγάλως 444.
requests. For everyone in the hour of danger, as long as he keeps up any hope of assistance from his allies and friends, reposes his confidence on this; but when he abandons it in his distress he is forced to do all in his power to help himself. We should therefore not find fault with the Tritaeans, Pharaeans, and Dymaeans for hiring a private force when the Head of their confederacy delayed to take action, but they must be blamed for refusing to pay their contribution to the League. While duly considering their own interests, especially as they could well afford to do so, they should have observed their engagements to the League; especially as according to the common laws they were perfectly assured of recovery; and above all considering they were the actual founders of the Confederacy.

61. Such was the state of affairs in the Peloponnese. Meanwhile King Philip, after passing through Thessaly, had arrived in Epirus. Uniting with his Macedonians the complete levy of the Epirots, three hundred slingers who had joined him from Achaea and five hundred Cretans sent by the Polyrhrenians, he advanced and passing through Epirus reached Ambracia. Had he only not turned aside but advanced rapidly into the interior of Aetolia, he would by thus suddenly and unexpectedly invading with so formidable a force have put an end to the whole war. But as it was, letting himself be persuaded by the Epirots to take Ambracius in the first place, he gave the Aetolians leisure to collect themselves, to take precautionary measures and to make preparations for the future. For the Epirots, setting their own particular advantage above that of the
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

σπουδάζοντες ύφ’ αὐτὸν διαπερισσαθαί τὸν Ἀμβρακοῦν, ἐδέοντο τοῦ Φίλιππου διαπερισσαθαι πολιορκίαν
6 περὶ τὸ χωρίον καὶ τοῦτο πρότερον ἠξελεῖ, περὶ πλείστοτε διαπερισσαθαι τὴν Ἀμβρακίαν παρὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν, τοῦτο δὲ γενέσθαι μόνως ἀν ἐλπίζοντε, εἰ τοῦ προειρημένου τόπου κυριεύσαντες
7 ἐπικαθίσασεν τῇ πόλει. ὃ γὰρ Ἀμβρακὸς ἐστὶ μὲν χωρίον εὑ κατεσκευασμένον καὶ προτειχίσμασιν καὶ τείχει, κεῖται δὲ ἐν λίμναις, μίαν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας στενῆς καὶ χωστῆ ἐχῶν πρόσοδον, ἐπίκειται δὲ εὐκαίρως τῇ τε χώρᾳ τῶν Ἀμβρακιωτῶν καὶ τῇ πόλει.

8 Φίλιππος μὲν οὖν πεισθεὶς Ἡπειρώτας, καὶ καταστρατευόμενος περὶ τοῦ Ἀμβρακοῦν, ἐγίνετο περὶ τὴν παρασκευήν τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν.

62 Σκόπας δὲ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τούτον ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς πανδημέει, καὶ ποιησάμενος τὴν πορείαν διὰ Θεσσαλίας, ἐνέβαλεν εἰς Μακεδονίαν, καὶ τὸν τε σῖτον ἐπιπορευόμενον τοῦ κατὰ τὴν Πιερίαν ἑφθείρε, καὶ λείας περιβαλόμενος πλῆθος ἐπανῆγε,

2 ποιησάμενος τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ Δῖον. ἐκλιπόντων δὲ τῶν κατοικοῦντων τὸν τόπον, εἰσελθὼν τὰ τείχη κατέσκαψε καὶ τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὸ γυμνάσιον, πρὸς δὲ τούτων ἐνέτραχε τὸς στόχος τὰς περὶ τὸ τέμενος, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διέθρει τῶν ἀναθημάτων, ὥσπερ πρὸς κόσμον ἡ χρείαν ὑπήρχε τοῖς εἰς τὰς πανηγύρεις συμπορευομένους· ἀνέτρεψε δὲ καὶ τὰς εἰκόνας

3 τῶν βασιλέων ἀπάσας. οὖτος μὲν οὖν εὐθέως κατὰ τὴν ἐνστασιν τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τὴν πρώτην πράξιν οὐ μόνον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς

4 θεοῖς πολέμων ἐξενθημϊκῶς ἑπαινείε, καὶ παραγενόμενος εἰς Αἰτωλίαν οὖχ ὡς ἡσεβηκὼς ἄλλῳ ως 446
allies and exceedingly eager to get Ambracus into their possession, implored Philip to besiege and capture this place in the first instance. They regarded it as of the highest importance to recover Ambracia from the Aetolians, and the only way they hoped to do so was by making themselves masters of this place and laying siege to the city of Ambracia from it. For Ambracus is a place strongly fortified by outworks and a wall and lies in a lake with only one narrow approach from the town, and it is so situated as to command effectually both the country and the town.

62. Philip, then, acting as the Epirots wished and encamping before Ambracus, began to make preparations for its siege. But while he was thus employed, Scopas raised a general levy of the Aetolians and marching through Thessaly invaded Macedonia, where he destroyed the crops in Pieria and after collecting a quantity of booty, turned back and marched towards Dium. On its inhabitants deserting this place he entered it and demolished the walls, houses, and gymnasion, burning also the colonnade round the sanctuary and destroying all the other monuments of piety which served for adornment or for the convenience of those who frequented the festival. He also threw down all the royal statues. Having thus at the very outset of the war and by his first action made war not only on men but on the gods, he now returned, and on reaching Aetolia, just as if he had not been guilty
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἀγαθὸς ἄνηρ εἷς τὰ κοινὰ πράγματα γεγονὼς ἐτυμάτω καὶ περιεβλέπετο, πλήρεις ἐλπίδων κενῶν καὶ φρονήματος ἀλόγου πεποιηκὼς τοὺς Αἰτωλίας· 5 ἔσχον γὰρ ἐκ τούτων διάληψιν ὡς τῆς μὲν Αἰτωλίας ουδὲ ἐγκέκειν τολμήσοντος οὐδένος, αὐτοὶ δὲ πορθήσοντες ἀδεῶς οὐ μόνον τὴν Πελοπόννησον, καθάπερ ἔθος ἦν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν Θεσσαλίαν καὶ τὴν Ἕπειρον. Φίλιππος δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν Μακεδονίαν ἀκούσας, καὶ παραχρῆμα τῆς Ἡπειρωτῶν ἁγνοίας καὶ φιλονεικίας τάπιχειρα κεκοιμημένος, ἐπολυρκεῖ 2 τὸν Ἀμβρακον. χρησάμενος δὲ τοῖς τε χώμασιν ἐνεργῶς καὶ τῇ λοιπῇ παρασκευῇ ταχέως κατεπλήξατο τοὺς ἐνοτάς, καὶ παρέλαβε τὸ χωρίον 3 ἐν ἡμέραις τετταράκοντα ταῖς πάσαις. ἀφεὶς δὲ τούς φυλάττοντας υποστόνδους, ὄντας εἰς πεντακοσίους Αἰτωλῶν, τὴν μὲν τῶν Ἡπειρωτῶν ἐπιθυμιάν ἐπλήρωσε παραδοὺς τὸν Ἀμβρακον, 4 αὐτὸς δὲ ἀναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν προῆγε παρὰ Χαράδραν, σπεύδων διαβῆναι τὸν Ἀμβρακικὸν καλοῦμενον κόλπον, οὐ στενοτάτον ἑστι, κατὰ τὸ 5 τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων ἱερὸν καλοῦμενον Ἀκτίων. ὁ γὰρ προειρημένος κόλπος ἐκπίπτει μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Σικελικοῦ πελάγους μεταξὺ τῆς Ἡπείρου καὶ 6 τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας στενῶς παντελῶς στόματι (λείπει γὰρ τῶν πέντε σταδίων), προβαίνων δὲ εἰς τὴν μεσόγαιαν κατὰ μὲν τὸ πλάτος ἐφ’ ἐκατὸν στάδια κεῖται, κατὰ δὲ τὸ μῆκος ἀπὸ τοῦ πελάγους προ- πίπτει περὶ τριακόσια στάδια· διορίζει δὲ τὴν Ἡπείρον καὶ τὴν Ἀκαρνανίαν, ἔχων τὴν μὲν τὴν Ἡπείρον ἀπὸ τῶν ἄρκτων ἔως Ἀκαρνανίαν 7 ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας. περαιῶσας δὲ κατὰ τὸ προ- ειρημένον στῶμα τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ διελθῶν τὴν 448
of an impious outrage, but had done a great public service, he was universally honoured and admired, having succeeded in filling the Aetolians with empty hopes and foolish arrogance. For henceforth they had the notion that no one would ever dare even to approach Aetolia, but that they themselves might pillage unhindered not only the Peloponnese, as had been their constant practice, but Thessaly and Macedonia also. 63. Philip received the news from Macedonia, and having thus at once reaped the fruits of the folly and selfishness of the Epirots, began to besiege Ambracus. Pushing on his earthworks and other operations energetically he soon intimidated the defenders and in forty days captured the place. Letting the garrison, consisting of five hundred Aetolians, depart on terms, he satisfied the desire of the Epirots by handing over Ambracus to them, and himself advanced with his army by way of Charadra, with the object of crossing the gulf of Ambracia at its narrowest point by the Acarnanian temple called Actium. For this gulf is an inlet of the Sicilian sea between Epirus and Acarnania, entered by a quite narrow mouth, less than five stades across, but as it advances into the interior it expands to a width of a hundred stades and it reaches inland to a distance of three hundred stades from the sea. It divides Epirus from Acarnania, Epirus lying north of it and Acarnania south. After taking his army across at its mouth and passing through
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

'Ακαρνανίας, ἦκε τῆς Αἰτωλίας πρὸς τὴν καλομε-νὴν πόλιν Φοιτίας, συμπαρειληφὼς 'Ακαρνάνων
8 πεζῶς δισχιλίων ἐπείδη δὲ διακοίνουσα. περι-
στρατοπεδεύσας δὲ τὴν προειρημένην πόλιν, καὶ
προσβολᾶς ἐνεργοὺς καὶ καταπληκτικὰς ἐπὶ δύο
ἡμέρας ποιησάμενος, παρέλαβε καθ' ὁμολογίαν,
ἀφεὶς ύποστόνδους τοὺς ἑνώτας τῶν Αἰτωλῶν.
9 τῆς δ' ἐπιούσης νυκτός, ὡς ἐτί μενούσης ἀναλότου
τῆς πόλεως, ἢκον βοηθοῦντες πεντακόσιοι τῶν
Αἰτωλῶν. ἵππον τὴν παρουσίαν προαισθανόμενος ὁ
βασιλεὺς, καθ' ἐπὶ τῶς τύπους εὐκαίρους
ἐνέδρας, τοῖς μὲν πλείους αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινε τοὺς δὲ
λοιποὺς ὑποχειρίους ἔλαβε πλῆθος τελέως ὀλίγων.
10 μετά δὲ ταῦτα συμπετρήσας εἰς τριάκονθ' ἡμέρας
tῆν δύναμιν ἐκ τοῦ περικαταληφθέντος σῖτου (πολὺ
gὰρ πλῆθος ἐν ταῖς Φοιτίας εὑρέθη συνήθοιμενόν)
προῆγε ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν εἰς τὴν Στρατικήν.
11 ἀποσχῶν δὲ τῆς πόλεως περὶ δέκα στάδια κατε-
στρατοπέδευε περὶ τῶν Ἀχελώων ποταμῶν, ὁμοι-
μενος δ' ἐνετέθην ἀδεῶς ἐπορθεὶ τὴν χώραν, οὔτε δὲ
ἐπεξέβαινεν τολμῶντος τῶν ὑπεναντίων.

64. Οἵ δὲ Ἀχαῖοι κατὰ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους πιε-
ζόμενοι τῷ πολέμῳ, τὸν δὲ βασιλέα πυθανόμενοι
σύνεχος ἔλαβαν, πέμπουσι πρέσβεις ἀξιοῦντες βοή-
2 θεῖν. οἱ καὶ συμμίζοντες ἑπὶ περὶ Στράτων ὄντι
τῷ Φιλίππῳ τὰ τε λοιπὰ διελέγοντο κατὰ τὰς
ἐντολὰς, καὶ τὰς ὦφελείς ὑποδεικνύτες τῷ στρα-
τοπέδῳ τὰς ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας ἑπεθοῦν αὐτὸν διαβάντα
3 τῷ Ἡρῴῳ ἐμβιαλεῖν εἰς τὴν Ἡλείαν. ὅμως δὲ
βασιλεὺς διακούοντας τοὺς μὲν προσβεντάς παρακατέσχε,
φήσας βουλέσθησαι περὶ τῶν παρακαλουμένων,
αὐτὸς δ' ἀναζεύξας προῆγε, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν
450
Acarnania Philip reached the Aetolian city called Phoetiae, having been reinforced by two thousand Acarnanian foot and two hundred horse. He encamped before this city and delivered for two days a series of assaults so vigorous and formidable that the Aetolian garrison surrendered upon conditions and were dismissed unhurt. During the following night a force of five hundred Aetolians arrived to help under the impression that the city still held out. The king got word of their approach and, placing an ambuscade in a favourable spot, killed the greater number of them and took all the rest prisoners, except a very few. After this, having distributed enough of the captured corn to his troops to last thirty days—a large quantity having been found stored at Phoetiae—he advanced, marching on the territory of Stratus. Stopping at a distance of ten stades from the town he encamped by the river Achelous, and making forays from there, laid waste the country unopposed, none of the enemy venturing to come out to attack him.

64. The Achaean, at this time, finding themselves hard pressed by the war and learning that the king was close at hand, sent envoys asking for help. Encountering the king while still before Stratus they delivered the message with which they had been charged, and pointing out to him the large booty that his army would take in the enemy's country, tried to persuade him to cross at Rhium and invade Elis. The king after listening to them kept the envoys with him, saying he would give their request consideration, and breaking up his camp advanced in the direction of Metropolis and
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

4 ὃς ἐπὶ Μητροπόλεως καὶ Κωνώπης. οἱ δὲ Αἰτωλοὶ τὴν μὲν ἄκραν τῆς Μητροπόλεως κατεῖχον, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐξέλιπον. ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἐμπρήσας τὴν Μητρόπολιν προῆκε κατὰ τὸ συνεχές ἐπὶ τὴν
5 Κωνώπην. τῶν δὲ Αἰτωλῶν ἰππέων ἀθροισθέντων καὶ τολμησάντων ἀπαντάντων πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ποταμοῦ διάβασιν, ἡ κεῖται πρὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐκείνης στάδια διέχοισα, καὶ πεπεισμένων ἡ κωλύσειν τελείως ἡ κακοποιήσει πολλὰ τοὺς Μακεδόνας περὶ τὴν
6 ἐκβασιν, συννοῆσας αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ὁ βασι-
λεὺς παρῆγγειλε τοῖς πελτασταῖς πρῶτοι ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ ποιεῖται τὴν ἐκβασιν ἀδρόους
7 κατὰ τάγμα συνηποικότας. τῶν δὲ πειθαρχοῦ-
των, ἀμα τῷ τὴν πρώτην διαβήναι σημαίναι βραχέα
ταύτης καταπειράσαντες οἱ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἰππεῖς,
ἐν τῷ ταύτην τε μεῖναι συνασπίσασαι καὶ τὴν
dευτέραν καὶ τρίτην διαβασινάς συμφράττειν
tοῖς ὀπλοῖς πρὸς τὴν ὕφεστώσαν, ἀπραγοῦντες καὶ
dυσχρήστως ἀπαλλάττοντες ἀπεχώρουν πρὸς τὴν
8 πόλιν. καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἦδη τὸ μὲν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν
φρόνημα συμπεθενεις εἰς τὰς πόλεις ήγε τὴν ἡσυ-
9 χίαν, ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἐπιδιαβάς τῷ στρατεύματι, καὶ
πορθήσας ἀδεώς καὶ ταύτην τὴν χώραν ἤκεν εἰς
tὴν Ἰθωριάν. τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶ χωρίον ὁ κεῖται μὲν ἐπὶ
tῆς παρόδου κυρίως, ὁχυρότητι δὲ φυσικῇ καὶ
10 χειροποιήτῳ διαφέρει. συνεγγίζοντος δ’ αὐτῶν
καταπλαγέντες οἱ φιλάττοντες ἐξέλιπον τὸν τόπον· ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς κυριεύσας τοῦ τόπου εἰς ἔδαφος
11 καθελε. παραπληγοῦσς δὲ καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πύρ-
γους τοὺς κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἐπέταξε τοῖς πρω-
μεύουσι καταφέρειν. διελθὼν δὲ τὰ στενὰ τὸ λοιπὸν
ηδη βάθην καὶ πραείσαν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν,
65 452
Conope. The Aetolians held to the citadel of Metropolis, abandoning the town, which the king burnt and then continued his advance on Conope. When a body of Aetolian cavalry ventured to meet him, at the ford of the river which runs in front of the town at a distance of about twenty stades from it, trusting either to prevent his passage entirely or to inflict considerable damage on the Macedonians as they were crossing, the king, perceiving their design, ordered his peltasts to enter the river first and land on the other bank in close order shield to shield and company by company. His orders were obeyed, and as soon as the first company had passed, the Aetolian cavalry, after a feeble attack on it, finding that it stood firm with shields interlocked and that the second and third companies as they landed closed up with it, were unable to effect anything, and seeing that they were getting into difficulties made off for the town; and henceforth the Aetolians, with all their haughty spirit, kept quiet within the shelter of their walls. Philip crossed with his army, and having pillaged this country too unopposed, advanced on Ithoria. This is a place absolutely commanding the road through the pass and of singular natural and artificial strength; but on his approach the garrison were terror-stricken and abandoned it. The king on obtaining possession of it razed it to the ground, and ordered his advanced guards to demolish likewise the other small forts in the country. 65. Having passed through the defile he continued to advance slowly and quietly, giving his troops leisure.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἀναστροφὴν διδοὺς τῇ δυνάμει πρὸς τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς
2 χώρας ὠφελεῖας. γέμοντος δὲ τοῦ στρατοπέδου
πάντων τῶν ἐπιτηδείων, ἤκε πρὸς τοὺς Οἰνιάδας.
3 καταστρατοπεδεύσας δὲ πρὸς τὸ Παιάνων τούτῳ
πρῶτον ἔχελεῖν ἐκρινε· ποιησάμενος δὲ προσβολὰς
συνεχείς ἔλεγεν αὐτῷ κατὰ κράτος, πόλιν κατὰ μὲν
τὸν περίβολον οὔ μεγάλην (ἐλάττων γὰρ ἢν ἐπτὰ
περιδίων), κατὰ δὲ τὴν σύμπασαν κατασκευὴν
οἰκίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ πύργων οὐδ’ ὄποιας ἦττω.
4 ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν τείχος κατέσκαψε πάν εἰς ἔδαφος,
τὰς δ’ οἰκήσεις διαλύων τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὸν κέραμον
εἰς σχέδια καθήμορες τῷ ποταμῷ μετὰ πολλῆς
5 φιλοτιμίας εἰς τοὺς Οἰνιάδας. οἱ δ’ Αἰτωλοὶ τὸ
μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεβάλοντο διατηρεῖν τὴν ἀκραν τὴν
ἐν τοῖς Οἰνιάδας, ἀσφαλισάμενοι τείχεοι καὶ τῇ
λοιπῇ κατασκευῇ· συνεγήζοντος δὲ τοῦ Φιλίππου
6 καταπλαγέντες ἔξεχωρήσαν. ο ὁ βασιλεὺς παρα-
λαβὼν καὶ ταύτην τὴν πόλιν, ἐξ αὐτῆς προεθέων
καταστρατοπέδευσε τῆς Καλυδωνίας πρὸς τι χωρίον
ὤχυρον, ὁ καλεῖται μὲν Ἠλαος ἀσφαλισταὶ δὲ
teixései kai tais loipais paraskevai diapherontos,
7 τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς. γενόμενοι δὲ καὶ τούτου κύριοι
κατὰ κράτος οἱ Μακεδόνες, καὶ πάσαν κατασώραντες
8 τὴν Καλυδωνίαν, ἦκουν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς Οἰνιάδας. ο
δὲ Φιλίππος συνθεσάμενος τὴν εὐκαίριαν τοῦ
τόπου πρὸς τε τάλλα καὶ μάλιστα πρὸς τὰς εἰς
9 πόλιν. τοὺς γὰρ Οἰνιάδας κείσθαι συμβαίνει παρὰ
θάλατταν, ἐπὶ τῷ πέρατι τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας τῷ
πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς συνάπτοντι, περί τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ
10 Κορινθιακοῦ κόλπου. τῆς δὲ Πελοπόννησου τέτα-

454
to pillage the country, and when he reached Oeniadae his army was abundantly furnished with provisions of every kind. Encamping before Paeonium he determined to capture this city in the first place and after several assaults took it by storm. It is a town of no great size, being less than seven stades in circumference, but inferior to none in the fine construction of its houses, walls, and towers. Philip razed the wall to the ground, and taking down the houses made the timbers and tiles into rafts and sent down the stones on them with the greatest care to Oeniadae. The Aetolians at first determined to hold the citadel of Oeniadae, feeling themselves safe behind walls furnished with all other defences, but on Philip's approach took fright and retired. The king, taking possession of this town too, advanced from it and encamped before a strong place in the territory of Calydon called Elaus admirably fortified by walls and other defences, Attalus having undertaken for the Aetolians the expense of construction. The Macedonians assaulted and took this place also and after laying waste the whole territory of Calydon returned to Oeniadae. But Philip, observing the natural advantages of the spot both in other respects and as a point from which to cross to the Peloponnese, conceived the plan of fortifying the town. Oeniadae lies at the extreme border of Acarnania on the coast of Aetolia, just at the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf. The part of the Peloponnese facing it is the coast
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

κταὶ μὲν ἡ πόλις καταντικροῦτης ἀπαλλαῖσ τῆς τῶν Δυμαίων, ἔγγυτα δ' αὐτῆς ὑπάρχει τοῖς κατὰ τὸν "Αραξον τόποις· ἀπέχει γὰρ οὐ πλεῖον ἐκατὸν
11 σταδίων. εἰς δὲ βλέπας τὴν τε ἀκραν καθ' αὐτὴν Ἰσραίλισατο, καὶ τῷ λιμένι καὶ τοῖς νεωρίωσιν ὅμοιοι τεῖχοις περιβάλλον ἔνεχειρὶ συνάψαι πρὸς τὴν ἀκραν, χρώμενος πρὸς τὴν οἰκονομίαν ταῖς ἑκ τοῦ Πανανίου παρασκευαῖς.

66 Εἰτὶ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα γινομένου τοῦ βασιλέως παρὴν ἐκ Μακεδονίας ἅγγελος διασαφῶν ὅτι συμβαίνει τοὺς Δαρδάνεις, ὑπονοηκότας τὴν εἰς Πελοπόννησον αὐτοῦ στρατείαν, ἀθροίζειν δυνάμεις καὶ παρασκευὴν ποιεῖσθαι μεγάλην, κεκρι-2 κόταις ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν Μακεδονίαν. ἀκούσας δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ νομίζας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι βοηθεῖν κατὰ τάχος τῇ Μακεδονίᾳ, τοὺς μὲν παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν προσβείς ἀπέστειλε, δοὺς ἀπόκρισιν ὅτι τοῖς προσ-ηγελμένοις ἐπαρκέσασι οὐδὲν προοριζαίτερον ποιή-σαται μετὰ ταῦτα τοῦ βοηθεῖν σφίσι κατὰ δύναμιν,
3 αὐτὸς δὲ ἀναζεύχας μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐποιεῖτο τῇ τὴν ἐπάνων ήπερ καὶ τὴν παρουσίαν ἐπεποίητο. 4 μέλλοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ διαβαίνειν τὸν Ἀμβρακικὸν κόλπον ἐξ Ἀκαρνανίας εἰς Ἡπειρον παρὴν ἐφ' ἐνὸς λέμβου Δημήτριος ὁ Φάριος, ἔκπεπτυκὼς ὑπὸ Ρωμαίων ἐκ τῆς Ἰλιυρίδος. ὑπὲρ δὴν ἐν τοῖς 5 πρὸ τούτων ἡμῶν δεδήλωται. τούτων μὲν οὖν Φιλίππος ἀποδεξάμενος φιλανθρώπως ἐκέλευε πλεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ Κόρωνον κακεῖθεν ήκειν διὰ Θετταλίας εἰς Μακεδονίαν, αὐτὸς δὲ διαβὰς εἰς τὴν Ἡπειρον 6 προῆγε κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. παραγενο-μένου δ' αὐτοῦ τῆς Μακεδονίας εἰς Πέλλαν, ἀκού-σαντες οἱ Δαρδάνοι παρὰ Θρακῶν τινῶν αὐτομόλων
456
BOOK IV. 65. 10 – 66. 6

territory of Dyme, the nearest point being the pro-
montory of Araxus which is not more than a hundred
stades distant. Looking to these facts Philip forti-
fied the citadel separately and surrounding the
harbour and dockyards with a wall he intended to
connect them with the citadel, using the building
material he had brought down from Paeonium for
the work.

66. But while the king was still thus engaged, a
post arrived from Macedonia informing him that
the Dardani, understanding that he contemplated
a campaign in the Peloponnese, were collecting forces
and making great preparations with the intention of
invading Macedonia. On hearing this, he thought it
necessary to hasten back to the help of Macedonia,
and now dismissing the Achaean envoys with the
reply that when he had done what was called for
by the intelligence he had received he would make
it his first object to assist them as far as was within
his power, he broke up his camp and returned home
with all speed by the same route as that by which
he had come. As he was about to cross the Gulf
of Ambracia from Acarnania to Epirus, Demetrius
of Pharus appeared in a single frigate, having been
driven by the Romans from Illyria, as I narrated in
a previous Book. Philip received him kindly and
bade him sail for Corinth and from thence make his
way to Macedonia through Thessaly, while he him-
self crossed to Epirus and continued his advance.
When he reached Pella in Macedonia, the Dardani,
hearing of his arrival from some Thracian desperats,
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tήν παρουσίαν τοῦ Φιλίππου, καταπλαγέντες παρα-
χρήμα διέλυσαν τήν στρατείαν, καὶ πέρ ἓν ὁ νεγγυς
7 ὄντες τῆς Μακεδονίας. Φιλίππος δὲ πυθόμενος
τήν τῶν Δαρδανέων μετάνοιαν τοὺς μὲν Μακεδόνας
dιαφήκη πάντας ἐπὶ τῆν τῆς ὁπώρας συγκωμιδήν,
aὐτὸς δὲ πορευθεὶς εἰς Θεταλίαν τὸ λοιπὸν μέρος
tου θέρους ἐν Λαρίς διήγεν.
8 Κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Αἰμίλιος ἐκ τῆς
Ἱλυρίδος εἰσήγηε λαμπρῶς εἰς τήν Ἠρών κατά
θρίαμβον, Ἀννίβας δὲ Ζάκανθαν ἡρηκὼς κατὰ
kράτος διέλυσε τᾶς δυνάμεις εἰς παραχεμασίαν,
9 Ῥωμαιοὶ δὲ, προσπεσοῦσας αὐτοῖς τῆς Ζακανθαίων
ἀλώσεως, πρεσβευταὶ ἔπεμψαν ἐξαιτήσοντας Ἀν-
nίβαν παρὰ Καρχηδόνιων, ἀμα δὲ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον
παρεσκεύαζοντο, καταστήσαντες ὑπάτους Πόλιον
10 Κορνήλιον καὶ Τιβέριον Σεμπρόνιον. ὑπὲρ ὧν
ἡμεῖς τὰ μὲν κατὰ μέρος ἐν τῇ προτέρα βύβλω
δεδηλώκαμεν· νῦν δὲ ἀναμνήσεως χάριν αὐτὰ προ-
ηγεγκάμεθα κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἀρχῆς ἐπαγγελίαν, ἵνα
gινώσκηται τὰ κατάλληλα τῶν πραγμάτων.
11 Καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔτος ἔληγε τῆς ὑποκειμένης
67 ὀλυμπιάδος, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς ἦδη τῶν
ἀρχαιότων καθηκόντων στρατηγοῦς ἡρήθη Δωρί-
μαχος, ὁς παρακάτω τὴν ἀρχήν παραλαβὼν καὶ
toús Aἰτωλóis ἄθροίσας μετά τῶν ὄπλων ἐνέβαλεν
eis toús āνω τόπους tῆs Ἡπείρου καὶ tὴn χώραν
2 ἐδήν, θυμικώτερον χρώμενος tῆs καταφθορᾶ· τὸ
γὰρ πλεῖον οὗ τῆς σφετέρας ὅψεις ἀλλὰ tῆs
tῶν Ἡπειρωτῶν βλάβης χάριν ἐκαστο συνετελεῖ.
3 παραγενόμενος δὲ πρὸς τὸ περὶ Δωδώνην ἱερὸν
tάς τε στοὰς ἐνέπρησε καὶ πολλά τῶν ἀναθημάτων
dιέφθειρε, κατέσκαψε δὲ καὶ tῆs ἱερὰν οἰκίαν,
458
took fright and at once dismissed their army, although they were now close to Macedonia. Philip, on learning that the Dardani had abandoned their project, sent home all his Macedonians to gather in the harvest and returning to Thessaly spent the rest of the summer at Larisa.

It was at this same time that Aemilius, on his return from Illyria, celebrated a splendid triumph in Rome, that Hannibal after taking Saguntum by assault dismissed his army to winter quarters, that the Romans on hearing of the fall of Saguntum sent ambassadors to Carthage demanding that Hannibal should be given up to them, and at the same time began to prepare for war after electing as Consuls Publius Cornelius Scipio and Tiberius Sempronius Longus. All these matters I have dealt with in detail in my previous Book, and now merely recall them to my readers in pursuance of my original plan that they may know what events were contemporaneous.

67. And so the first year of this Olympiad was drawing to its close. It was now the date for the elections in Aetolia, and Dorimachus was chosen strategus. As soon as he entered on office he summoned the Aetolians to arms and invading upper Epirus laid the country waste, carrying out the work of destruction in a thoroughly vindictive spirit: for the measures he took were all not so much meant to secure booty for himself as to inflict damage on the Epirots. On reaching the temple of Dodona he burnt the porticoes, destroyed many of the votive offerings and demolished the sacred building, so that
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

4 ὥστε μὴ τ' εἰρήνης ὅρον μὴ τε πολέμου πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς περιστάσεσι παρὰ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐθη καὶ νόμιμα χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς.

5 Ὁδός μὲν οὖν ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα διαπραξάμενος ἔπανηγέν αὕτης εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν· τοῦ δὲ χειμῶνος ἐτί προβαίνοντος, καὶ πάντων ἀπηλπικότων τὴν παροικίαν τοῦ Φιλίππου διὰ τὸν καιρὸν, ἀναλαβὼν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀλκάσπιδας μὲν τρισχιλίους πελταστάς δὲ δισχιλίους καὶ Κρήτας τριακοσίους, πρὸς δὲ τούτους ἵππεῖς τοὺς περὶ τὴν αὐλὴν εἰς τετρακοσίους, πρὸς ἄτοντας τὸ δ' Ἀραπίας καὶ διαβιβάσας τούτους ἐκ Θεσσαλίας εἰς Εὔβοιαν κακείθεν εἰς Κῦκνον ἦκε διὰ τὴς Βοιωτίας καὶ Μεγαρίδος εἰς Κόρινθον περὶ τροπᾶς χειμερινάς, ἐνεργοῦν καὶ λαθραίαν πεποιημένοι τὴν παροικίαν οὕτως ὅστε μηδένα Πελο-

8 πονησιῶν ὑπονόησαι τὸ γεγονός. κλείσας δὲ τὰς πύλας τοῦ Κόρινθου καὶ διαλαβὼν τὰς ὅδους φυλακαίς, τῇ κατὰ πόδας Ἁρατον μὲν τὸν προσβήτερον ως αὐτὸν ἐκ τοῦ Σικυῶνος μετεπέμπετο, γράμματά τε πρὸς τὸν στρατηγόν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ πρὸς τὰς πόλεις ἐξαπέστελλεν, ἐν οἷς διεσάφει πότε καὶ ποῦ δεῖσει συναντάν πάντας ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις.

9 ταῦτα δ' οἰκονομήσας ἀνέξενε, καὶ προσελθὼν κατεστρατοπέδευσε τὴς Φλωιαίας περὶ τὸ Διοσκού-

68 ρίον. κατὰ δὲ τούς αὐτούς καρπὸς Εὐρυπίδας, ἔχων ὁ Ἡλείων δύο λόχους μετὰ τῶν πειρατῶν καὶ μισθοφόρων, ὥστ' εἶναι τοὺς πάντας εἰς δισχιλίους καὶ διακοσίους, ἀμα δὲ τούτους ἱππεῖς ἐκατόν, ὀρμήσας ἐκ Ψωφίδος ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν διὰ τῆς Φενυκῆς καὶ Στυμφαλίας, οὐδὲν μὲν εἴδως τῶν κατὰ τὸν Φιλίππου, βουλόμενος δὲ κατασθαίραι τὴν

460
we may say that for the Aetolians no restrictions exist either in peace or war, but that in both circumstances they pursue their designs in defiance of the common usages and principles of mankind.

Dorimachus after this and similar exploits returned home. As the winter was now advanced, everyone had given up any hope of Philip’s reappearance owing to the season, but suddenly the king taking with him three thousand of his brazen-shielded hoplites, two thousand peltasts, three hundred Cretans, and about four hundred of his horse guards, started from Larisa. Transporting this force from Thessaly to Euboea and thence to Cynus, he passed through Boeotia and Megaris and reached Corinth about the winter solstice, having marched with such expedition and secrecy that no one in the Peloponnese was aware of what had happened. Shutting the gates of Corinth and posting patrols in the streets, he sent next day to Sicyon for the elder Aratus, at the same time dispatching letters to the strategus of the Achaeans and to the different cities informing them at what date and place he required them all to meet him in arms. After making these arrangements he left Corinth, and advancing encamped near the temple of the Dioscuri in the territory of Phlius. 68. Just at this time Euripidas with two companies of Eleans together with his freebooters and mercenaries, so that his whole force of infantry numbered about two thousand two hundred, and with a hundred horsemen, had left Psophis and was marching through the territories of Pheneus and Stymphalus, knowing nothing of Philip’s arrival, but bent on laying waste

461
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

2 τῶν Σικυωνίων χώραν. τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς τῆς αυτῆς ἐν ἧς συνέβαινες στρατοπεδέυειν τὸν Φιλίππον περὶ τὸ Διοσκούριον, παρηλλαχὼς τὴν στρατοπεδείαν τοῦ βασιλέως περὶ τὴν ἐσθωνήν ἐμβάλλεις οὗτος τ' ἡμίπρος τὴν Σικυωνίαν. τῶν δὲ παρὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου Κρητῶν των ἀπολεούσων τὰς τάξεις καὶ διαχνεύοντες περὶ τὰς προνομεῖας ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδαν. οὐς άνακρίνας καὶ συνείς τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν Μακεδόνων οἱ προειρήμενοι, οὐδεὶς ποιήσας φανερὸν οὖν ἡμῖν τῶν προσπεπτώκτων, ἀναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς αὕτης ἀνέλυε τὴν αὐτὴν ὀδὸν ἐν ἦστιν ήδειν βουλὸν, μενός, ἀμα δὲ καὶ καταλπίζων καταταχήσεις τοὺς Μακεδόνας διεκβαλῶν τὴν Στυμφαλίαν καὶ συνάψας ταῖς ὑπερκείμεναις δυσχώριαις. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς οὐδὲν εἰδὼς τῶν περὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, κατὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ πρόθεσιν ἀναζεύξας τὴν ἐσθωνήν προήγε, κρίνων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πορείαν παρ’ αὐτὸν τὸν Στυμφαλὸν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς Καφύας ἐνθάδε γὰρ ἐγεγράφη τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς συναθροίζεσθαι μετὰ τῶν ὀπλών. τῆς δὲ πρωτοπορείας τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐπιβαλούσης ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τὴν περὶ τὸ καλοῦμενον 'Απέλαυρον, ἦ δρόμηται τῆς τῶν Στυμφαλίων πόλεως περὶ δέκα στάδια, ἀμα συνεκύρησε καὶ τὴν τῶν Ἡλείων πρωτοπορείαν συμπεσεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Εὐριπίδας συννόησα τὸ γεγονός ἐκ τῶν προσηγγελμένων, παραλαβὼν μεθ' ἐαυτοῦ τινας τῶν ἱππεῶν καὶ διαδρας τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καίρον ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν εἰς τὴν Ψωφίδα 3 ταῖς ἀνοδίαις. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν Ἡλείων ἐγκαταλείμμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ προεστῶτος καὶ γεγονός ἐκπλαγεῖς ἐπὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότι κατὰ πορείαν ἔμενε, 462
the district round Sicyon. On the very night on which Philip was encamped near the temple of the Dioscuri, he passed close by the king's camp in the early morning and was just about to invade the territory of Sicyon. But some of Philip's Cretans, who had left their ranks and were prowling about in search of plunder, fell in with Euripidas' force. He questioned them, and on learning of the arrival of the Macedonians, without revealing the news to a soul, he led his force back by the road along which he had come, with the wish and hope of getting a start of the Macedonians and thus passing through the territory of Stymphalus and gaining the difficult highland country above it. The king, quite ignorant also of the enemy's vicinity and simply in pursuance of his plan, broke up his camp early in the morning and advanced, intending to march past Stymphalus itself in the direction of Caphyae; for it was there that he had written to the Achaeans to assemble in arms. 69. As the advanced guard of the Macedonians was coming over the hill near the place called Apelaurus, about ten stades before you come to Stymphalus, it so happened that the advanced guard of the Eleans converged on the pass also. Euripidas, who understood what had happened from the intelligence he had previously received, took a few horsemen with him and escaping from the danger retreated across country to Psophis. The rest of the Eleans, thus deserted by their commander and thoroughly alarmed by what had occurred, remained in marching order at a loss what to do or
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

diaporoúmenon tί δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ πῇ τρέπεσθαι.
4 tό μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον αὐτῶν οἱ προεστῶτες ὑπελαμβανόν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν αὐτῶν τινάς συνεπιβεβοθηκέναι. καὶ μάλιστ' ἦπάτων αὐτοὺς οἱ χαλκάσπιδες.
5 Μεγαλοπολίτας γὰρ εἶναι τούτους ἐδόξαζον διὰ τό τοιούτου ὁπλοὶ κεχρῆσθαι τοὺς προειρημένους ἐν τῷ περὶ Σελλασίαν πρὸς Κλεομένη κωδύνω, καθοπλίσαντος Ἀντιγόνου τοῦ βασιλέως πρὸς τήν
6 παρούσαν χρείαν. διόπερ ἀπεχώρουν τηροῦντες τάς τάξεις πρὸς τινὰς ὑπερδεξίους τόπους, οὐκ ἀπελπίζοντες τήν σωτηρίαν. ἀμα δὲ τῷ προσάγοντας αὐτοὶ τοὺς Μακεδόνας σύνεγγυς γενέσθαι λαβόντες ἐνοικὸν τοῦ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὄντος, πάντες
7 ὤρμησαν πρὸς φυγήν ρύπαντες τὰ ὅπλα. ζωγρία μὲν οὖν ἐάλωσαν αὐτῶν περὶ χιλίων καὶ διακοσίων, τό δὲ λουτόν διεφθάρη πλῆθος, τό μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν κρημνῶν, διέφυγον δ' 
8 οὐ πλείους τῶν ἐκατόν. ὁ δὲ Φιλίππος τά τε σκύλα καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους εἰς Κόρινθον ἀποτέμησα 
9 εἰχέτο τῶν προκειμένων. τοῖς δὲ Πελοποννησίων πάσι παράδοξον ἐφάνη τὸ γεγονός. ἀμα γὰρ ἦκουν τήν παρούσιαν καὶ τὴν νίκην τοῦ βασιλέως.

70 Ποιησάμενος δὲ τὴν πορείαν διὰ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας, καὶ πολλάς ἀναδεξάμενος χιώνας καὶ ταλαιπωρίας ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸν Ὀλύμπυντον ὑπερβολαίς, τῇ τρίτῃ 
2 τῶν ἡμερῶν κατήρε νῦκτωρ εἰς Καφύας. θεραπεύσας δὲ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπὶ δύ' ἡμέρας ἐνταῦθα, καὶ προσαναλαβὼν Ἀρατόν τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τοὺς ἁμα τοῦτο συνηθομενοὺς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ὥστ' εἶναι τὴν ὀλην δύναμιν εἰς τοὺς μυρίους, προῆγε διὰ τῆς Κλειτορίας ὡς ἐπὶ Ψωφίδους, συναθροίζων ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὄν τεσπορεύσετο βέλη καὶ κλίμακας. 
464
what direction to take. At first, I must explain, their officers thought it was an Achaean force which had come to oppose them, taken in chiefly by the brazen-shielded hoplites whom they supposed to be Megalopolitans, as the contingent from there had carried such shields in the battle at Sellasia against Cleomenes, King Antigonus having thus armed them for the occasion. They therefore kept their ranks and began to retire to some higher ground, not despairing of safety. But as soon as the Macedonians advancing on them drew close, they realized the truth and all took to flight throwing away their shields. About twelve hundred of them were made prisoners and the remainder perished, either at the hands of the Macedonians or by falling down the precipices, only about a hundred escaping. Philip, sending the prisoners and captured arms back to Corinth, continued his march. This event exceedingly astonished all the Peloponnesians, who heard at one and the same time of the king's arrival and of his victory.

70. Marching through Arcadia and encountering heavy snowstorms and many hardships in crossing the pass of Mount Olygyrtus, he reached Caphyae in the night of the third day. Having rested his troops here for two days and being joined by the younger Aratus and the Achaeans he had collected, so that his whole force was now about ten thousand strong, he advanced on Psophis through the territory of Cleitor, collecting missiles and ladders from the towns he passed through. Psophis is an undisputably
3 ἡ δὲ Ψωφίς ἔστι μὲν ὀμολογούμενον καὶ παλαιὸν Ἀρκάδων κτίσμα τῆς Ἀξανίδος, κεῖται δὲ τῆς μὲν συμπάσης Πελοποννήσου κατὰ τὴν μεσόγαιον, αυτῆς δὲ τῆς Ἀρκάδιας ἐπὶ τοῖς πρὸς δυσμὰς πέρασιν, συνάπτουσα τοῖς περὶ τὰς ἔσχατιὰς κατοικοῦσι τῶν προσεπείρων Ἀχαιῶν· ἐπίκειται δὲ εὐφυῶς τῇ τῶν Ἡλείων χώρῃ, μεθ’ ὧν συνέβαινεν τότε πολιτεύεσθαι αὐτὴν. πρὸς ἦν Φιλιππὸς τριτάιος ἐκ τῶν Καρφών διανύσας κατεστρατοπέδευεν περὶ τοὺς ἀπέναντι τῆς πόλεως ὑπερκειμένους βουνοὺς, ἀφ’ ὧν ἦν κατοπτεύεσθαι τῇ τε πόλιν ὅλην ἀσφαλώς καὶ τοὺς πέριξ αὐτῆς τόπους. 
6 συνθεωρών δὲ τὴν ἀχυρότητα τῆς Ψωφίδος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἤτορεῖτο τῇ χρή ποιεῖν. τῇ γὰρ ἄφ’ ἐσπέρας πλευρὰν αὐτῆς καταφέρεται λάβρος χειμάρρους ποταμός, ὅσα κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἀβατός ἐστιν, ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἔχουν καὶ διατρόφοδοι τῇ τοῦ πολὺν διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ κοιλώματος, ὁ κατὰ βραχὺ τῷ χρόνῳ κατεύρ- 
8 γασταὶ φερόμενος εξ ὑπερδεξίων τόπων. παρὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπ’ ὧν πλευρὰν ἔχει τὸν Ἐρύμανθον, μέγαν καὶ λάβρον ποταμόν, ὑπὲρ οὗ πολὺς καὶ ὑπὸ πολλῶν τεθρύληται λόγος. τοῦ δὲ χειμάρρους προσπέπτοντος πρὸς τὸν Ἐρύμανθον ὑπὸ τὸ πρὸς μεσημβρίαν μέρος τῆς πόλεως, συμβαίνει τὰς μὲν τρεῖς ἐπι- 
φανείς αὐτῆς ὑπὸ τῶν ποταμῶν περιλαμβανο- 
μένας ἀσφαλίζεσθαι τὸν προειρημένον τρόπον. 
9 τῇ δὲ λοιπῇ, τῇ πρὸς ἄρκτον, βουνὸς ἔρυμνος ἐπίκειται τετειχυμένοις, ἀκρας εὐφυῶς καὶ πραγ- 
ματικῆς λαμβάνων τάξιν. ἔχει δὲ καὶ τείχη 
10 διαφέροντα τῷ μεγέθει καὶ ταῖς κατασκευαῖς. 
11 πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοι βοήθειαν συνέβαινε παρὰ τῶν 466
Arcadian foundation of great antiquity in the district of Azanis lying in the interior of the Peloponnese taken as a whole, but on the western borders of Arcadia itself and coterminous with the up-country of western Achaea. It commands with great advantage the territory of the Eleans, with whom it was then politically united. Philip, reaching it in three days from Caphyae, encamped on the hills opposite, from which one can securely view the whole town and its environs. When he observed the great strength of Psophis, the king was at a loss what to do; for on its western side there descends a violent torrent, impassable for the greater part of the winter, and rendering the city very strongly protected and difficult of approach on this side, owing to the depth of the bed it has gradually formed for itself, descending as it does from a height. On the eastern side of the town flows the Erymanthus, a large and rapid stream of which many fables are told by various authors. The torrent falls into the Erymanthus to the south of the city, so that three faces of the city are surrounded and protected by the rivers in the manner I have described. On the fourth or northern side rises a steep hill protected by walls, serving very efficiently as a natural citadel. The town has also walls of unusual size and admirable construction, and besides all these advantages it had just received a reinforce-
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

'Ἡλείων εἰςπεπτωκέναι, καὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδαν ἐκ τῆς φυγῆς διασεωσμένον ὑπάρχειν ἐν αὐτῇ.

71. Ταῦτ᾽ οὖν πάντα σωρῶν καὶ συλλογιζόμενος ὁ Φίλιππος τὰ μὲν ἀφίστατο τοῖς λογισμοῖς τοῦ βιάζονται καὶ πολυρκεῖν τὴν πόλιν, τὰ δὲ προ-
2 θύμως εἶχε, τὴν εὐκαιρίαν ὁρῶν τοῦ τόπου, καθ᾽ ὁδόν γὰρ ἐπέκειτο τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τότε καὶ τοῖς Ἀρκάσι καὶ πολεμητηρίου ὑπήρχε τοῖς Ἡλείοις ἀσφαλές, κατὰ τοσοῦτον πάλιν κρατηθέν ἐμελεῖ
3 τῶν μὲν Ἀρκάδων προκεῖσθαι κατὰ δὲ τῶν Ἡλείων ὀρμητήριου ὑπάρξειν τοῖς συμμάχοις εὔκαιρον. 

3 διόπερ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸ μέρος ὁμήρας τῇ γνώμῃ παρήγγελλε τοῖς Μακεδόνοις ἀμα τῷ φωτὶ πᾶσιν ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι καὶ διεσκευασμένους ἐτοίμους ὑπ-
4 ἄρχειν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαβὰς τὴν κατὰ τὸν Ἐρυ-
5 μανθὸν γέφυραν, οὐδενὸς ἐμποδῶν στάντως διὰ τὸ παράδοξον τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, ήκε πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν 

6 πόλιν ἐνεργώς καὶ καταπληκτικῶς. οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὸν Εὐριπίδαν καὶ πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν διηπό-
7 ροῦν ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνοντι τῷ πεπείσθαι μήτ᾽ ἂν ἐξ ἐφόδου τολμῆσαι τοὺς πολεμίους προσβαλεῖν
καὶ βιάζοντας πρὸς οὕτως χυρὰν πόλιν μῆτε
χρόνον ἄν συντῆγοινον πολυρκίαν διὰ τὴν τοῦ
8 καιροῦ περίστασιν. ἀμα δὲ ταῦτα λογιζόμενοι

dιηπόστολοι ἀλλήλοις, δεδιότες μὴ πράξειν ὁ Φίλιππος 
eἰ ὀ ἄντων συνεσταμένοι κατὰ τῆς πόλεως.
7 ἐτεὶ δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἐώρων τοοῦτον ἐξ αὐτῶν γινόμενον,

ωρμησαν οἱ μὲν πλείους ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη βοηθῆσοντες,
oi δὲ μισθοφόροι τῶν Ἡλείων κατὰ ταύ πόλιν

υπερδέξετον ἐξήλθον ὡς ἐπιθησόμενοι τοῖς πο-
8 λεμίοις. ὦ δὲ βασιλεὺς διατάξας κατὰ τρεῖς
tόπους τοὺς προσοίσοντας τῷ τείχει τὰς κλίμακας,
ment of Eleans, and Euripidas was present having taken refuge there after his flight.

71. Philip observing and reflecting on all this, was on the one hand deterred by his judgement from any attempt to carry the town by force or besiege it, but was again strongly disposed thereto when he considered the advantages of its situation. For just as it was now a menace to Achaea and Arcadia and a secure place of arms for the Eleans, so, if it were taken, it would be a bulwark defending Arcadia and an excellent base of operations for the allies against Elis. These considerations finally prevailed, and he gave orders to the Macedonians to get all of them their breakfasts at daybreak and then prepare for action and hold themselves in readiness. This having been done, he crossed the bridge over the Erymanthus, no one opposing him owing to the unexpectedness of the movement, and unhesitatingly marched on the town in formidable array. Euripidas and all in the town were wholly taken aback by this, as they had been convinced that the enemy would neither venture to attempt to assault by storm such a strong city, nor would open a lengthy siege at this disadvantageous season of the year. In this very conviction they now began to entertain suspicions of each other, fearing lest Philip had arranged with some of those inside the city for its betrayal. But when they saw no signs of any such project among themselves, the greater number of them ran to the walls to help, while the mercenaries of the Eleans issued from one of the gates higher up the hill to attack the enemy. The king ordered the bearers of the scaling-ladders to set them up at three separate
καὶ τούτους ὀμοίως μερίσασ τοὺς ἄλλους Μακεδόνας, μετὰ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν σαλπυγκτῶν ἀποδοὺς ἐκάστους τὸ σύνθημα πανταχόθεν ἀμα τὴν προσβολὴν ἐποιεῖτο τὸι τείχεσι. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἡμύνοντο γενναίως οἱ κατέχοντος τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πολλοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν κλημάκων ἀπερίττον· ἐπεὶ δ’ ἦ τε χορηγία τῶν βελῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἐπιτη- δείων ἐνέλειπεν ὡς ἃν ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ τῆς παρασκευῆς γεγενημένην, οἱ τε Μακεδόνες οὐ κατεπλήττοντο τὸ γνώμενον, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ῥυφέντος ἀπὸ τῶν κλημάκων χώραν ὃ κατόπτων ἀμελλήτως ἐπέβαινεν.

10 τέλος οἱ μὲν ἔκ τῆς πόλεως τραπέντες ἐφευγον πάντες πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, τῶν δὲ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες ἐπέβησαν τοῦ τείχους, οἱ δὲ Κρῆτες πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν ὑπερδέξιον πύλην ἐπεξελθόντας τῶν μισθοφόρων συμμίξαντες ἥναγκα- σαν αὐτοὺς οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ῥίψαντας τὰ ὀπλα φεύγειν.

11 οἷς ἐπικείμενοι καὶ προσφέροντες τὰς χείρας συνεισέπεσον διὰ τῆς πύλης· ἔξ οὐ συνέβη παντα- χόθεν ἀμα καταληφθῆναι τὴν πόλιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ψωφίδιοι μετὰ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν ἀπεχώρησαν εἰς τὴν ἄκραν, ἀμα δὲ τούτους οἱ περὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδαν, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν διασωζόμενων.

12 οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες εἰσπέσοντες τὴν μὲν ἐνδομενίαν ἀπαςαν ἐκ τῶν οἰκίων παραχήμα διήρπασαν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ταῖς οἰκεῖαις ἐπισκηνώσαντες κατείχουν 2 τὴν πόλιν. οἱ δὲ συμπεφευγότες εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, οὔδεμισα σφώς παρασκευῆς ὑπαρχοῦσης, προορώ- μενοι τὸ μέλλον ἐγνώσαν ἐγχειρίζειν σφᾶς αὐτούς 3 τῶ Ἐρύτπων. πέμψαντες οὖν κήρυκα πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα, καὶ λαβόντες συγχώρημα περὶ προσβείας, ἐξαπέστειλαν τοὺς ἀρχοντας καὶ μετὰ τούτων 470
spots, and similarly dividing the rest of his Macedonians into three bodies, gave the signal by the sound of trumpet and attacked the wall simultaneously from every side. At first the holders of the city offered a stout resistance and threw down many of the assailants from the ladders, but when their supply of missiles and other requisites began to fall short—their preparations having been made on the spur of the moment—and the Macedonians were showing no signs of fear, the place of each man thrown off the ladder being instantly taken by the man next behind him, the defenders at length turned their backs and all fled to the citadel, while of the king's forces the Macedonians mounted the walls, and the Cretans, attacking the mercenaries who had sallied from the upper gate, forced them to fly in disorder, throwing away their shields. Pressing close on their heels and cutting them down, they entered the gate together with them, and thus the city was taken from every side at once. The Psophidians with their wives and children retreated to the citadel together with Euripidas' force and the rest of the fugitives, (72) and the Macedonians, breaking into the houses, pillaged them at once of all their contents and afterwards lodged in them and took regular possession of the town. The fugitives in the citadel, as they were not prepared for a siege, decided to anticipate matters by surrendering to Philip. They therefore sent a herald to the king; and on obtaining a safe-conduct for an embassy dispatched the magistrates accompanied by Euripidas on this
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

Εὐριπίδαν· οἱ καὶ ποιησάμενοι σπουδᾶς ἔλαβον τὴν ἀσφάλειαν τοῖς συμπεφευγόσιν ὁμοῦ ξένοις 4 καὶ πολίταις. οὕτωι μὲν οὖν αὕτης ἐπανήλθον δὲν ὡμηροσάν, ἔχοντες παράγγελμα μένειν κατὰ χώραν ἐνδὲ ἡ δύναμις ἀναζεύξῃ, μὴ τὼς ἀπειθή-
5 σαντες τῶν στρατιωτῶν διαρπάσωσιν αὐτούς· ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἐπιγενομένης χώνος ἡναγκάσθη μένειν ἐπὶ τόπον των ἡμέρας, ἐν αἷς συναγογῶν τοὺς παρόντας τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πρῶτον μὲν τὴν ὀχυρότητα καὶ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν ἐπεδείκνυε τῆς πόλεως πρὸς τὸν 6 ἐνεστὼτα πόλεμον, ἀπελογίσατο δὲ καὶ τὴν αἱρέσιν καὶ τὴν εὐνοιαν ἣν ἔχοι πρὸς τὸ ἔθνος, ἐπὶ δὲ πάσην ἔφη καὶ νῦν παραχωρεῖν καὶ διδόναι τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τὴν πόλιν προκειόταξι γὰρ αὐτῷ τὰ δυνατὰ χαρί-
7 ζεσθαί καὶ μηθὲν ἔλλειπεν προθυμίας. ἐφ’ οἷς εὐχαριστοῦντων αὐτῶ τῶν τε περὶ τὸν Ἀρατὸν καὶ τῶν πολλῶν, διαλύσας τὴν ἐκκλησίαν δὲν Φίλιππος μετὰ τῆς δύναμεως ἀναζεύξας ἐπὶ Λασιῶνος 8 ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν, οἱ δὲ Ψωφίδιοι καταβάντες ἐκ τῆς ἀκρας ἐκομίσαντο τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις ἐκαστοῖς τὰς αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδαν ἀπῆλθον 9 εἰς τὸν Κόρινθου κἀκεῖθεν εἰς Αἰτωλίαν. τῶν δ’ Ἀχαϊκῶν ἄρχοντων οἱ παρόντες ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν ἀκραν ἐπέστηγαν μετὰ φυλακῆς ἰκανῆς Πρόλαου Σικυώνιον, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν πόλιν Πυθίων Πελληνέα.

10 Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Ψωφίδα τοῦτον ἐπετελέσθη 73 τῶν τρόπων· οἱ δὲ παραφυλάττοντες τὸν Λασιῶνο 

τῶν Ἡλεῖων συνεντὶ τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν Μακεδό-
νων, πεπυμένοι δὲ καὶ τὰ γεγονότα περὶ τὴν 2 Ψωφίδα, παραχρῆμα τὴν πόλιν ἐξέλιπον. δ’ δὲ βασιλεὺς ὃς ἄρατον ἦκε, τούτῃ μὲν εἶ ἐφόδου παρέλαβεν, συναύξων δὲ τὴν πρόθεσιν ἢν εἶχε

472
BOOK IV. 72. 3 – 73. 2

mission, who made terms with the king, securing the lives and liberties of all the fugitives both natives and foreigners. They then returned whence they came with orders for all to remain where they were until the departure of the army, lest any of the soldiery might disobey orders and plunder them. The king, owing to a snow-fall, was obliged to remain here for several days, in the course of which he called a meeting of the Achaean present, and first of all pointing out to them the strength of the town and its excellent situation for the purposes of the present war, and next protesting his affection and esteem for their state, finally told them that he now handed over the city to the Achaean as a free gift, it being his purpose to favour them by all means in his power and never fail to consult their interests. Aratus and the Achaean troops having expressed their thanks to him for this, Philip dismissed the meeting and departed with his army, marching towards Lasion. Hereupon, the Psophidians coming down from the citadel, their city and houses were restored to them, and Euripidas went away to Corinth and thence back to Aetolia. The Achaean magistrates present put Prolaus of Sicyon in command of the citadel with an adequate garrison and Pythias of Pellene in command of the town.

73. So ended the incident of Psophis. The Elean garrison of Lasion, hearing of the approach of the Macedonians and learning what had befallen Psophis, at once abandoned the town. The king took the city immediately on his arrival and, as a further testimony of his generous intentions towards the
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

πρὸς τὸ ἔθνος, παρέδωκε καὶ τὸν Δασιῶνα τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς. ὅμως δὲ καὶ τὴν Στράτον ἐκλιπόντων τῶν Ἡλείων ἀποκατέστησε τοῖς Τελφούσιοισι. 3 ταῦτα δὲ διαπραξάμενος ἦκε πεμπτάος εἰς Ὀλυμ-

πίαν. θύσας δὲ τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἐστίασα, ἀμα δὲ καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν προσαναπαύσας δύναμιν ἐπὶ τρεῖς ἡμέρας, μετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν ἀν-

4 ἔξευξεν· καὶ προελθὼν εἰς τὴν Ἡλείαν τὰς μὲν προ-

νομᾶς ἐπαφῆκε κατὰ τῆς χώρας, αὐτὸς δὲ κατ-

εστρατοπέδευσε περὶ τὸ καλούμενον Ἀρτεμίσιον. 5 προοδεύσαμεν δὲ ἐνταῦθα τὴν λείαν μετέβη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ Διοσκούριον.

Δηκομένης δὲ τῆς χώρας πολὺ μὲν ἢ τὸ τῶν ἀλισκομένων πλῆθος, ἔτι δὲ πλέον τὸ συμφεύγων εἰς τὰς παρακειμένας κώμας καὶ τοὺς ἐρυμούσις τῶν 6 τόπων. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὴν τῶν Ἡλείων χώραν δια-

φερόντως οἰκείον καὶ γέμεις σωμάτων καὶ κατα-

7 σκευής παρὰ τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον. ἔνοι, γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐτῶς στέργουσι τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν βίον ὥστε τῶν ἐπὶ δύο καὶ τρεῖς γενεάς, ἔχοντας ἱκανὰς οὐσίας, μὴ παραβεβληκέναι τὸ παράπαν εἰς 8 ἄλλαν. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται διὰ τὸ μεγάλην ποιείσθαι σπουδὴ καὶ πρόνοιαν τοὺς πολιτευμένους τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας κατοικοῦντων, ἵνα τὸ τέκνοις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τόπου διεξάγηται καὶ τῶν πρὸς βιωτικὰς χρείας 9 μηθὲν ἐλλείπῃ. δοκοῦσι δὲ μοι πάντα ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος μὲν τῆς χώρας τὸ παλαιὸν ἐπινοῆσαι καὶ νομοθετῆσαι, τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον διὰ τὸν ὑπάρχοντά 10 ποτὲ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἱερὸν βίον, ὅτε λαβὸντες παρὰ τῶν Ἐλλήνων συνχώρημα διὰ τῶν ἀγανα τῶν Ὀλυμπίων ἱερῶν καὶ ἀπόρθητον ὄκουν τὴν Ἡλείαν, ἀπειροὶ παντὸς ὄντες δεινοῦ καὶ πάσης πολεμικῆς 474
BOOK IV. 73. 2–10

League, gave up Lasion also to the Achaeans. He likewise restored to the Telphusians the town of Stratus, which had been evacuated by the Eleans, and after completing these arrangements reached Olympia five days later, where he sacrificed to the god and entertained his captains, and, having given all his army a three days' rest, again moved on. Advancing into Elis he sent out foraging parties to scour the country, and himself encamped at the place called the Artemisium, where he waited for the booty and then went on to the Dioscurium.

When the country was plundered, the number of captives was great, and still more numerous were those who escaped to the neighbouring villages and strong places. For Elis is much more thickly inhabited and more full of slaves and farm stock than any other part of the Peloponnese. Some of the Eleans in fact are so fond of country life, that though men of substance, they have not for two or three generations shown their faces in the law-courts, and this because those who occupy themselves with politics show the greatest concern for their fellow-citizens in the country and see that justice is done to them on the spot, and that they are plentifully furnished with all the necessaries of life. As it seems to me, they have adopted such a system from old time and legislated accordingly in a measure because of the large extent of their territory, but chiefly owing to the sacrosanct life they formerly led, having, ever since the Greeks conferred immunity on them owing to the Olympian games, dwelt in a country which was holy and safe from pillage, with no experience of danger and entirely unmenaced.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

74. περιστάσεως. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τὴν Ἀρκάδων ἀμφισβήτησιν περὶ Δασιώνος καὶ τῆς Πισάτιδος πάσης ἀναγκασθεῖτε ἐπαμύνει τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ 2 μεταλαβεῖν τὰς ἀγωγὰς τῶν βίων, οὐκέτι περὶ τοῦ πάλιν ἀνακτήσασθαι παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὴν παλαιὰν καὶ πάτριων ἀσυλίαν οὐδὲ τὴν τυχόσαν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔσχον, ἀλλ' ἔμεναν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ποιοῦ- 3 μενοι πρόνοιαι· εἰ γάρ, ἢς πάντες εὐχόμεθα τοῖς θεοῖς τυχεῖν, καὶ πάν ὑπομένωμεν ἴμείροντες αὐτῆς μετασχεῖν, καὶ μόνον τούτῳ τῶν νομιζομένων ἀγαθῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον ἐστὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις, λέγω δὴ τὴν εἰρήνην, ταύτην δυνάμενοι τινες μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ καθήκοντος παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἁδήριτον κτάσοντες παρολιγω- ροῦσιν ἢ προοριναίτερον τι ποιοῦνται τούτοι, πώς 4 οὐκ ἄν ὁμολογούμενως ἄγνοιαι δόξαν; νὴ Δι', ἀλλ' ἵσως εὐδεῖθετοι τοῖς πολεμεῖν καὶ παρα- σπονδεῖν προθεμένοις ἐκ τῆς τουαύτης ἄγωγῆς 5 γίνονται τῶν βίων. ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ μὲν σπάνιοι, κἀν 215 ποτε γένηται, δυνάμενον κοινῆς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων 6 τυγχάνειν ἔπικουρίας· πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἀδικίας ὑπογενομένης τοῖς βίοις χορηγίας, ὅπερ εἰκὸς ὑπάρξει πάντα χρόνον ἐν εἰρήνη διάγουσιν, δὴλον ωσ οὐκ ἄν ἡπόρησαν ξένων καὶ μισθοφόρων 7 τῶν κατὰ τόπους ἢ καιροὺς παρεφεδρεύωτων. νῦν 216 δὲ τὸ σπάνιον καὶ παράδοξον δεδιότες, ἐν συνεχείᾳ πολέμοις καὶ καταφθοράς τὴν τε χώραν ἔχουσι καὶ τοὺς βίους.

8. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἢμιν τῆς Ἡλείων ὑπομνήσεως εἰρήσθω χάρω, ἐπειδὴ τὰ τῶν καιρῶν οὐδὲποτε πρότερον εὐφυεστέραν διάθεσιν ἔσχηκε τῆς νῦν 476
BOOK IV. 74. 1–8

by war. 74. But later, when, owing to the Arcadians disputing their possession of Lasion and all the territory of Pisa, they were compelled to defend their country and change their mode of life, they never afterwards showed the least concern to recover from the Greeks their ancient heritage of inviolability, but remained as they now were, acting wrongly in my judgement in thus neglecting their future interests. Peace is a blessing for which we all pray to the gods; we submit to every suffering from the desire to attain it, and it is the only one of the so-called good things in life to which no man refuses this title. If then there be any people which, while able by right and with all honour to obtain from the Greeks perpetual and undisputed peace, neglect this object or esteem any other of greater importance, everyone would surely agree that they are much in the wrong. Perhaps indeed they might plead that such a manner of life exposes them to the attack of neighbours bent on war and regardless of treaties. But this is a thing not likely to happen often and claiming if it does occur the aid of all the Greeks; while to secure themselves against any local and temporary damage, amidst a plentiful supply of wealth, such as will probably be theirs if they enjoy constant peace, they will be in no want of foreign mercenary soldiers to protect them at the place and time required. But now simply from fear of rare and improbable perils they expose their country and their properties to constant war and devastation. Let this be taken as said to remind the Eleans of the duty they owe themselves; since a more favourable opportunity never offered itself than the present for
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

πρὸς τὸ παρὰ πάντων ὀμολογουμένην κτήσασθαι τὴν ἀσυλίαν· τὴν δὲ χώραν, καθάπερ ἔπανω προ-
εύπον, ἐτι τῆς παλαιάς συνηθείας οἰνον αἰθυγμάτων
ἐμμενόντων οἰκούσι διαφερόντως Ἡλεῖοι. Διό καὶ
κατὰ τὴν Φιλίππου παρουσίαν ἀπλετον μὲν ἦν τὸ
tῶν ἀλισκομένων πλῆθος, ἐτι δὲ πλεῖον τὸ τῶν
2 συμπεφευγότων. πλείστη δ’ ἀποσκευή καὶ πλείστος
ὀχλος ἠθροίσθη σωμάτων καὶ θρεμμάτων εἰς τὸ
χωρίον δ’ καλοῦσθι Θαλάμας, διὰ τὸ τὴν τε χώραν
tὴν πέριξ αὐτοῦ στενὴν εἶναι καὶ δυσέμβολον τὸ
3 τε χωρίον ἀπραγμάτευτον καὶ δυσπρόσδοκον. ἀκούσων
δ’ ὁ βασιλεὺς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν συμπεφευγότων εἰς
tὸν προειρημένον τόπον, καὶ κρίνας μηδὲν ἀβασά-
νιστον μηδ’ ἀπέραντον ἀπολιπεῖν, τοῖς μὲν μισθο-
φόροις παρακτελάβετο τούς ἐπὶ τῆς εἰσβολῆς εὐ-
4 φυώς κειμένους τότεσ, αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν ἀποσκευήν
καταλιπὼν ἐν τῷ χάρακι καὶ τὸ πλεῖον μέρος τῆς
dυνάμεως, ἄναλαβὼν τοὺς πελταστάς καὶ τοὺς εὐξώ-
νους προῆγε διὰ τῶν στενῶν, οὕδενος δὲ κωλύοντος
5 ἦκε πρὸς τὸ χωρίον. καταπλαγέντων δὲ τῶν
συμπεφευγότων τὴν ἔφοδον ἀτε δὴ πρὸς πάσαν
πολεμικὴν χρείαν ἀπείρως καὶ ἀπαρασκευάσα
κειμένων, ἀμα δὲ καὶ συνδεδραμήκτος ὀχλοῦ
6 συνετέωδους, ταχέως παρέδοσαν αὐτοὺς· ἐν οἷς
ήσαν καὶ μισθοφόροι διακόσιοι μιγάδες, οἷς ἦκεν
7 ἔχων Ἀμφίδαμος ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἡλείων. ὁ
δὲ Φιλίππος κυριεύσας ἀποσκευής τε πολλῆς καὶ
σωμάτων πλειών ἦ πεντακισχιλίων, πρὸς δὲ
tούτως τῆς τετράποδος λείας ἀναρίθμητον ἐξελασά-
μενοι πλῆθος, τότε μὲν ἐπανήλθε πρὸς χάρακα,
8 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς δυνάμεως ὑπεργεμονής αὐτῷ
παντοδαπῆς ὑφελείας βαρύς ὁν καὶ δύσχρηστος
478
BOOK IV. 74. 8—75. 8

recovering by universal consent their immunity from pillage.

But, as I said above, since some sparks of their old habits are still alive, Elis is an exceedingly populous country; (75) and therefore, upon Philip’s entering it, the number of captives was enormous, and the fugitives were still more numerous. A quantity of property and a vast crowd of slaves and cattle were collected at a place they call Thalamae or The Recess, because the approaches to it are narrow and difficult and the place itself secluded and not easily entered. The king, hearing of the numbers of fugitives who had taken refuge in this place and deciding to leave nothing unattempted or half-accomplished, occupied with his mercenaries such spots as commanded the approach, and himself, leaving his baggage and the greater part of his forces in the camp, advanced through the defile with his peltasts and light-armed infantry. He reached the place without encountering any opposition, and the fugitives, thrown into great dismay by the attack, as they had no knowledge of military matters and had made no preparations, and as it was a mixed rabble which had collected in the place, soon surrendered, among them being two hundred mercenaries of various nationalities brought there by Amphidamus the Elean Strategus. Philip, having captured a large amount of movable property, and more than five thousand persons, and having also driven off vast numbers of cattle, now returned to his camp, and shortly, as his army was loaded with booty of every variety and had become unwieldy
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἀνεχώρει διὰ ταύτα, καὶ κατέζευξε πάλιν εἰς τὴν Ὀλυμπίαν.

76 Ἀπελλῆς δὲ, ὅσ ἦν μὲν εἰς τῶν ὑπ᾽ Ἀντιγόνου καταλειφθέντων ἐπιτρόπων τοῦ παιδός, πλείστον δ᾽ ἐτύχαν τότε δυνάμενος παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ, βουλθεῖς τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνος ἄγαγεῖν εἰς παραπληροῖαν διάθεσιν τῇ Θεσσαλῶν ἐπεβάλετο πράγμα 2 ποιεῖν μοχθηρόν. Θεσσαλοὶ γὰρ ἔδοκον μὲν κατὰ νόμους πολιτείαν καὶ πολὺ διαφέρειν Μακεδόνων, διέφερον δ᾽ οὐδὲν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ὁμοίως ἔπασχον Μακεδόσι καὶ πᾶν ἔποιον τὸ προστατόμενον τοῖς 3 βασιλικοῖς. διὸ καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ἀρμοζόμενος τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὁ προειρημένος ἐπεβάλετο κατα- 4 πειράζεν τῶν συστρατευμένων. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶ- τον ἐπέτρεψε τοῖς Μακεδόσι ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῶν σταθμῶν ἀεὶ τοὺς προκατέχοντας τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καταλύσεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν λείαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.

5 μετὰ δὲ ταύτα τὰς χείρας προσέφερε διὰ τῶν ὑπηρετῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τυχούσαις αἰτίαις, τοὺς δὲ συναγαγακτοῦντας ἡ προσβοηθοῦντας τοῖς μαστι- γούμενοι παρὼν αὐτός εἰς τὴν ἄλυσιν ἀπῆγε,

6 πεπεισμένοι διὰ τοῦ τοιούτου τρόπου τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λήσειν εἰς συνήθειαν ἄγαγών τοῦ μηδένα μηδὲν ἤγεισθαι δεμόν, ὁ ποτ' ἀν πάσχῃ τις ὑπὸ 7 τοῦ βασιλέως, καὶ ταύτα μικροῖς χρόνοις πρότερον μετ᾽ Ἀντιγόνου συνεστρατευμένος, καὶ τεθεαμένος τοὺς Ἀχαιῶς ὅτι παντὸς δεινοῦ λαβεῖν πείραν ὑπέμειναι ἐφ᾽ ὧν μὴ ποιεῖν Κλεομένει τὸ προστατ- 8 τόμενον. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα συστραφέντων τινῶν Ἀχαϊ- κῶν νεανίσκων καὶ προσελθόντων τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀρατον καὶ διασφούντων τὴν Ἀπελλοῦ βουλήσιν, ἦκον ἐπὶ τὸν Φιλιππον οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀρατον, 480
and useless in the field, he for this reason retired and again encamped at Olympia.

76. One of the guardians of the young Philip left by Antigonus was Apelles, who had at this time very great influence with the king. He now entered on the base project of reducing the Achaeans to a position similar to that of the Thessalians. For the Thessalians, though supposed to be governed constitutionally and much more liberally than the Macedonians, were as a fact treated in just the same way and obeyed all the orders of the king's ministers. Apelles, therefore, in furtherance of this design began to test the temper of the Achaean contingent. He began by allowing the Macedonians to eject from their quarters such Achaeans as had secured billets, and also to appropriate their share of the booty. He next began to inflict personal chastisement on Achaeans by the hands of his subordinates for quite trivial reasons, and himself carried off to bondage anyone who protested against the floggings or attempted to help the victims, being persuaded that by these means he would gradually and imperceptibly accustom them to submit without remonstrance to any treatment the king chose to inflict on them—and this in spite of the fact that he had shortly before made the campaign with Antigonus, and seen how the Achaeans were ready to face any danger rather than obey the behests of Cleomenes. Some of the young Achaeans, however, met together, and coming before Aratus, pointed out the design that Apelles was pursuing, whereupon Aratus approached
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

κρίναντες ἐν ἀρχαις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διίστασθαι 9 καὶ μὴ καταμέλλειν. ἐνυκχύτων δὲ αὐτῶν τῷ βασιλεῖ περὶ τούτων, διακούσας ὁ Φίλιππος τὰ γεγονότα τοὺς μὲν νεανίσκους παρεκάλει ταρρεῖν ὡς οὐδενὸς αὐτοῖς ἐτί συμβησομένου τοιούτου, τῷ δὲ Ἄπελλῆν παρήγγειλε μηδὲν ἐπιτάττειν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς χωρίς τῆς τοῦ στρατηγοῦ γνώμης.

77 Φίλιππος μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὀμιλίαν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἐν ύπαιθροῖς συνδιατρίβοντας καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς πράξιν καὶ τόλμαν οὐ μόνον παρὰ τοῖς στρατευόμενοις ἄλλα καὶ παρὰ τοῖς 2 λοιποῖς πάσιν Πελοποννησίοις εὐδοκίμει. βασιλέα γὰρ πλείοσιν ἀφορμαῖς ἐκ φύσεως κεχορηγημένον πρὸς πραγμάτων κατάκτησιν οὐκ εὐμαρές εὑρεῖν· 3 καὶ γὰρ ἀγχίνοια καὶ μνήμη καὶ χάρις ἔπην αὐτῷ διαφέρουσα, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐπίφασις βασιλικὴ καὶ δύναμις, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πράξιν καὶ τόλμα 4 πολεμικῆ. καὶ τί δὴ ποτ᾽ ἢν τὸ ταῦτα πάντα καταγωνισάμενον καὶ ποιήσαν ἐκ βασιλέως εὐφυῶς τύραννον ἄγριον, οὐκ εὐχερές διὰ βραχέων δηλώσαι. διὸ καὶ περὶ μὲν τοὺς σκέπτεσθαι καὶ διαπορεῖν ἄλλοις ἀρμόσει καιρὸς μᾶλλον τοῦ νῦν ἀνεστώτος· 5 ο ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἐκ τῆς Ὀλυμπίας ἀναξεύξας τὴν ἐπὶ Φαραίαν παρῆν εἰς Τέλφουσαν κάκειθεν εἰς Ἡραίαν. καὶ τὴν μὲν λείαν ἑλαφροπούλει, τὴν δὲ γέφυραν ἐπεσκεύαζε τὴν κατὰ τὸν Ἀλφειόν, βουλόμενος ταῦτα ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰς τὴν Τριφυλίαν 6 εἰσβολήν. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Δωρίμαχος ὁ τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν στρατηγὸς, δεσμέων τῶν Ἡλείων σφίζοι βοηθεῖν πορθομένους, ἔξακοσίους Αἰτωλοὺς 7 καὶ στρατηγὸν Φιλιδαν αὐτοῖς ἐξεπεμψεν· ὡς παραγενόμενος εἰς τὴν Ἡλείαν, καὶ παραλαβῶν 482
Philip, judging it better in such a matter to express his disapproval at the outset and without delay. He laid the matter before the king, who, when made aware of the circumstances, bade the young men lay aside all fear, since nothing of the kind would occur again, and ordered Apelles to issue no orders to the Achaeans without consulting their stratagus.

77. Philip, then, both by his behaviour to those with whom he was associated in the camp and by his ability and daring in the field, was winning a high reputation not only among those serving with him but among all the rest of the Peloponnesians. For it would be difficult to find a prince more richly endowed by nature with the qualities requisite for the attainment of power. He possessed a quick intelligence, a retentive memory, and great personal charm, as well as the presence and authority that becomes a king, and above all ability and courage as a general. What indeed it was that defeated all these advantages, and turned a king of such good natural parts into a savage tyrant, is not easy to explain in a few words, and therefore the examination and discussion of the matter must be left for a more suitable occasion than the present.

Setting out from Olympia by the road leading to Pharaea, Philip reached first Telphusa and thence Heraea. Here he held a sale of the booty and repaired the bridge over the Alpheus, intending to invade Triphylia by this road. At about the same time Dorimachus, the Aetolian stratagus, on the Eleans requesting him to come to the aid of their country which was being ravaged, dispatched six hundred Aetolians under the command of Phillidas. On reaching Elis, he took over the Elean mercen-
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tous misothoforous twon 'Hleiwon ointas eis pentakosious kai politikous xilious, ama de toutous tous
8 Tarantinos, ke bothw eis thn Trufylian, ths mev prosphoriais teineche taithis apo Trufylou
twn 'Arkados paiidow enos, keitai de tis Pelopon
vhsou parathalattan metazu ths 'Hleiwon kai
Mesoetnwn khwras, teptrapai de eis to Lebukon
pelagon, eschatenousa tis 'Arkadias ws pros
9 chemereinais duoies, echei 8 en auth polies
taithas, Samikon Leipreon 'Tapanan Tspaneas
10 Pironon Aithnon Boulaka Stilagnion Phizan. wv
oligos crwonios proteon epikrathtantas 'Hleioi
proselaibonto kai twn twn 'Alifeirewn polin,
ousan eis arxhis up 'Arkadian kai Megalyn polin,
Ludiado tov Megalopoliton kata twn tparanida
pros twas idiias praxeis allaqyn dountos tois
78 'Hleioi. plhn o ge Filidias tous mev 'Hleious
eis Leipreon tous de misothoforou eis 'Alifeiran
aposteilas, autous de tous Aitwlon echei ev
2 Tspaneias ekadadei to sumbhsomion. de bai
basileus apodevenos twn apokesven kai diaba kai
gefura tov 'Alifeidon potamou, de mei par authn
twn 'Hrhaiwn polin, ke pro twn 'Alifeiran,
3 kei tais mev epil lopho khrmnwdo pantaqthev,
exontos pleioi kai deka stadiwn prosbasen, echei 8
akran en auth tis korphi tov sumpantos lophou
kai xalkon 'Athenas anbrianta kallei kai megexhei
4 diafereonta, od twn mev aitiain, apo poias prothesew
th xorghias elabe twn arxh ths katakesvenhs,
ambostrateis symbainhe kai parastois egkholios
(oute gar podhen oute tis anekhen eurisketai
5 trawos), to mevtoi ge tis techhs apostelosma
484
aries, about five hundred in number, and one thousand citizen soldiers, as well as the Tarentines, and came to help Triphylia. This district derives its name from Triphylus, one of the sons of Arcas, and lies on the coast of the Peloponnese between Elis and Messenia, facing the Libyan Sea and forming the extreme south-west portion of Arcadia. It contains the following towns: Samicum, Lepreum, Hypana, Typaneae, Pyrgus, Aepium, Bolax, Stylangium, and Phrixia, all of which the Eleans had annexed, adding to them Alipheira which had originally belonged to Arcadia proper, but had been given to the Eleans during his tyranny by Lydiades of Megalopolis in return for certain private services they rendered him.

78. Phillidas now sent the Eleans to Lepreum and the mercenaries to Alipheira, and remained himself with his Aetolians in Typaneae to see what would happen. The king, after ridding himself of his heavy baggage, crossed by the bridge the Alpheus which runs past Heraea and arrived at Alipheira. This city lies on a hill defended on all sides by precipices, the ascent of which is more than ten stades. It has a citadel on the summit of the whole hill and a bronze statue of Athena, remarkable for its size and beauty. The origin of this statue—from what motive and at whose expense it was made—is a subject of dispute among the natives themselves, as there is nothing to show definitely who dedicated it and why; but all agree as to the

—a particular kind of light mercenary cavalry were so called, whether they came from Tarentum or not.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

συμφωνεῖται παρὰ πᾶσι διότι τῶν μεγαλομερεστάτων καὶ τεχνικωτάτων ἔργων ἐστίν, Ἐκατοδώρου καὶ Σωστράτου κατεσχευακότων.

6 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ‘ ἐπιγενομένης ἡμέρας αἰθρίου καὶ λαμπρᾶς διατάξας ὑπὸ τὴν ἐωθικὴν ὁ βασιλεὺς κατὰ πλείους τόπους τοὺς τε τὰς κλίμακας φέροντας καὶ 7 τὰς τῶν μισθοφόρων ἐφεδρείας πρὸ τούτων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς προερημένους τοὺς Μακεδόνας διηρημένους κατόπιν ἐκάστους ἐπιστήσας, ἀμα τῷ τὸν ἦλιον ἐπιβάλλειν πάσι προσέταξε προσβαίνειν πρὸς τὸν 8 λόφον. ποιοῦντων δὲ τὸ παραγγελθὲν ἐκθύμως καὶ καταπληκτικῶς τῶν Μακεδόνων, συνέβαινε τοὺς Ἀλιφειρεῖς πρὸς τούτους ὅρμαν ἀεὶ καὶ συντρέχειν τοὺς τόπους ὅσοι μάλιστα τοὺς Μακεδόνας 9 ἑώρων προσπελάζοντας. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τούτον αὐτὸς ὁ βασιλεὺς ἤχων τοὺς ἐπιπτηθειστάτους διὰ τῶν γρηγορῶν ἔλαθε πρὸς τὸ τῆς ἄκρας 10 προαστειον ἀναβάς. ἀποδοθέντος δὲ τοῦ συνθήματος, πάντες ἀμα προσερέσαντες τὰς κλίμακας 11 κατεπείραζον τῆς πόλεως. πρῶτος μὲν οὖν ὁ βασιλεὺς κατέσχε τὸ προάστειον τῆς ἄκρας, ἐρήμων καταλαβῶν· τούτου δὲ ἐμπιπτομένου προϊόμενοι τὸ μέλλον οἱ τοῖς τείχεσιν ἐπαμύνοντες, καὶ περιδεεῖς γενόμενοι μὴ τῆς ἄκρας προκαταλήφθείσης στερηθῶσι καὶ τῆς τελευταίας ἐλπίδος, ὄρμησαν ἀπολυπόντες τὰ τείχη φεύγειν πρὸς τὴν 12 ἄκραπολιν. οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες γενομένου τούτου παραχρῆμα καὶ τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐκυρεύσαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαπρεπεσυμπένων τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἄκρας πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον, δοὺς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν παρέλαβε καὶ ταύτην καθ‘ ὁμολογίαν.

79 Συντελεσθέντων δὲ τούτων καταπλαγεῖσι γε- 486
excellence of the workmanship, it being one of the most magnificent and artistic statues in existence, the work of Hecatodorus and Sostratus.

The next day broke bright and cloudless, and at early dawn the king distributed at various points the ladder-bearers supported by the mercenaries in front, and dividing his Macedonians placed a body of them in the rear of each party. As soon as the sun was visible, he ordered them all to advance on the hill, and the Macedonians, executing his orders with great alacrity and in formidable style, the Alipheirians kept always running to whatever spots they saw the Macedonians approaching. But the king meanwhile with a picked force managed by climbing some precipitous rocks to reach unperceived the suburb of the citadel. The signal was now given and all at one and the same time planted the ladders against the walls and began the assault of the town. The king was the first to enter, taking the suburb of the citadel, which he found unoccupied, and when this suburb was in flames, the defenders of the walls, seeing what was likely to happen and in dread lest with the fall of the citadel they should find their last hope gone, left the walls and rushed to take refuge within it. Upon this the Macedonians at once captured the walls and the town; and afterwards the garrison of the citadel sent commissioners to Philip and, on his promising to spare their lives, they surrendered it to him by treaty.

79. All the people of Triphylia were much alarmed
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

gonótès pántes ói kata tìn Trufilíán éboulevonton
2 peri sfón autów kai tov ñiíon patríðon. ó de
Filídías ekliptov tás Túpanéas, prosoiartásas
TVÁS TÔN OIKIÓN, ápéxwrhson eis tò Léptron.
3 taúta García epíkeira tôte tôis Aítvulów égíneto
suumáchois, tò µή mónon èn tôis anagkaiotátois
kairoís égkatelleúpeboi profanós, allá kai
diaprágnavas ñ prodóthentas tótois peripíttewives
úpò tôs sumúáchew d tôis krateíceis úpto tôs
4 polemíwv ófeiletei páschein. ói de Túpanéaítai
paréðóson tì Filítpov tìn póleiv. tótois de
 tô parapléwv ëpoíshen ói tìn Ýpanan katoi-
5 kountes. áma de tótois Fialeís, akônontes tà
peri tìn Trufilíán kai duxarostóumevoi tì tòv
Aítvulów sumumachía, kátelabon metá tôs óplów
6 tôs peri tô polemárchion tôtvon. ói de tôs Aítvulów
peiratáis, diatrébonves èn taútv tì póleiv diá tās
ék tìs Mēsouvnías ófeleías, tì mév prwton oíoi
Tì ëgnaì enychreiv kai kapatolmán tôs Fialeów,
7 drównes de tôs polítas ómousmadóv átroios-
mévous proç tìs bohtieian àpeósthsen tìs épibolhèis,
speioámevoi de kai laðontes tôs autòv atopoeusas
8 apèlthon ëk tìs póleivs. ói de Fialeís diapre-
sbeúmevoi proç tôv Filiptov ènexheírisan sfás
autòvs kai tìn pólewv.

80 "Etì de tòtvov prattoménov ói Lepreítai
katalambómevoi tòtvon tìvà tìs póleiv ëgí
ékëwrivein tìs àkra kai tìs póleiv tòvov 'Hléíoun
cai tòvov Aítvulów, ñmòis de kai tòvov parà
Lakédaimonión. ëike gár kai par' èkeínov autòv
2 bohtieia. tô mév ouí prwton ói peri tòv Filídian
òu próseíkon, ìlì ëmenv ós katalplëzòmevoi
488
by this achievement of Philip and began to consider how best to save themselves and their own cities. Phillidas now returned to Lepreum, evacuating Typaneae after plundering some of the houses. For this was the reward that the allies of the Aetolians used then to receive; not only to be barefacedly deserted in the hour of need, but to be plundered or betrayed and suffer at the hands of their allies the treatment that the vanquished may expect from their enemies. The people of Typaneae now gave up their city to Philip and those of Hypana followed their example. At the same time the Phigalians, hearing the news from Triphylia and ill-pleased with the Aetolian alliance, rose in arms and seized on the ground round the Polemarch's office. The Aetolian freebooters, who had quartered themselves in the city for the purpose of plundering Messenia, were at first disposed to put a bold face on it and attack the Phigalians, but when the citizens came flocking with one accord to the rescue, they desisted from their project, and came to terms, leaving the city with their possessions, upon which the Phigalians sent deputies to Philip and delivered themselves and the town into his hands.

80. While these transactions were in progress, the people of Lepreum, seizing on a certain position in the city, demanded the evacuation of the citadel and city by the Eleans, Aetolians, and Lacedaemonians (for a reinforcement had come from Sparta also). Phillidas at first paid no heed to the request but remained where he was, thinking to overawe
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

3 τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει· τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως εἰς μὲν τὴν Φιάλειαν Ταυρίωνα μετὰ στρατιωτῶν ἐξαποστείλατος, αὐτοῦ δὲ προάγοντος εἰς τὸ Λέσπενον καὶ συνεγγίζοντος ἦδη τῇ πόλει, συνέντεσε δὲ περὶ τὸν Φιλίδαν ἐταπεινώθησαν, οἱ δὲ Λεπρεάται

4 προσεπερρώθησαν ταῖς ὅρμαις. καλὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο Λεπρέαται ἔργον πέπρακται, τὸ χιλῶν μὲν ἔνδον ὄντων Ἡλείων, χιλίων δὲ σὺν τοῖς πειραταῖς Αἰτωλῶν, πεντακοσίων δὲ μυσθοφόρων, διακοσίων δὲ Λακεδαίμονιν, πρὸς δὲ τούτους τῆς ἁκρας κατεχομένης, ὀμοὶ ἀντιποιήσασθαι τῆς ἕαυτῶν πατρίδος καὶ μὴ προεσθαι τὰς σφετέρας

5 ἐπίδας. οὐ δὲ Φιλίδας ὅρων τοὺς Λεπρέατας ἀνδρωδῶς υφισταμένως καὶ τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐγγίζοντας, ἐξεχώρησε τῆς πόλεως ἀμα τοῖς

6 Ἡλείως καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τῶν Λακεδαίμονίων. οἳ μὲν οὐν παρὰ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν Κρήτες διὰ τῆς Μεσσηνίας εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἑπανηλθον, οἵ δὲ περὶ τὸν Φιλίδαν ἐποιηύντο τὴν ἀπόλυσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ

7 Σαμικόν. τὸ δὲ τῶν Λεπρεάτων πλῆθος ἐγκρατεῖς γεγονός τῆς πατρίδος ἐξαπέστειλε προεβευτάς,

8 ἐγκειρίζου τῷ Φιλίππῳ τῆς πόλιν. οὐ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἀκούσας τὰ γεγονότα τὴν μὲν λοιπὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ Λέσπενον ἀπέστειλε, τοὺς δὲ πελαταστὰς καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους ἀναλαβὼν ἤγειτο, συνάψας σπεύδων

9 τοῖς περὶ τὸν Φιλίδαν. καταλαβὼν δὲ τῆς μὲν ἀποσκευῆς ἐγκρατῆς ἐγένετο πάσης, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Φιλίδαν κατετάχθησαν εἰς τὸ Σαμικόν παρα-

10 πεσόντες. προσστρατοπεδεύσας δὲ τῷ χωρίῳ, καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν ἐπισπασάμενος ἐκ τοῦ Λεπρέουν δύναμιν, ἐμφάσων ἐποίηε τοῖς ἔνδον ὡς πολυρκή-

11 σων τὸ χωρίον. οὐ δὲ Αἰτωλοὶ μετὰ τῶν Ἡλείων

490
the citizens. But when the king, having sent Taurion with some troops to Phigalia, advanced in person to Lepreum and was approaching the town, Phillidas on hearing of it lost his assurance, while the people of the town were strengthened in their resolution. It was indeed a fine action on the part of the Lepreates, with no less than a thousand Eleans, a thousand Aetolians counting the free-booters, five hundred mercenaries and two hundred Lacedaemonians within the walls and with the citadel occupied, yet to strive to vindicate their country’s freedom and not abandon hope. Phillidas, when he saw that the Lepreatans were gallantly holding out and that the Macedonians were approaching, quitted the city accompanied by the Eleans and the Lacedaemonian contingent. Those Cretans whom the Spartans had sent returned home by way of Messenia, while Phillidas retired in the direction of Samicum. The people of Lepreum being now masters of their city, sent envoys to Philip placing it in his hands. The king, on hearing of what had taken place, sent the rest of his forces to Lepreum, but placing himself at the head of his peltasts and light infantry, started in the hope of encountering Phillidas. He came up with him and captured all his baggage-train, but Phillidas and his men succeeded in throwing themselves into Samicum in time. Encamping before this place and fetching up the rest of his forces from Lepreum, Philip gave those within the impression of being about to besiege them. The Aetolians and Eleans had nothing
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

οὐδὲν ἔχοντες ἐτοιμὸν πρὸς πολιορκίαν πλὴν χερῶν, καταπλαγέντες τὴν περίστασιν ἐλάλου
d 12 περὶ ἀσφαλείας πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον. λαβόντες δὲ συγχώρημα μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων πουήσασθαι τὴν ἀπόλυσιν, οὕτω μὲν ὤρμησαν εἰς τὴν 'Ηλείαν· ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τοῦ μὲν Σαμικοῦ παραντίκα κύριος 13 ἐγένετο, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, παραγενομένων πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεθ’ ἱκετηρίας, παρέλαβε Φρίξαν Στυλάγγιον Αἰπύρων Βώλακα Πύργον Ἐπι-
tάλιον. ταῦτα δὲ διαπραξάμενος ἐπανήλθε πάλιν εἰς τὸ Λέπρεον, πᾶσαν ψῆ ἐαυτὸν πεποιημένος 15 τὴν Τριφυλίαν ἐν ἡμέραις ἡξ. παρακαλέσας δὲ τοὺς Λεπέρατας τὰ πρέποντα τῷ καρῷ, καὶ φυλακῆς εἰςαγαγῶν εἰς τὴν ἄκραν, ἀνέζευξε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐφ’ Ἡραίας, ἀπολύτων ἐπιμελητὴν 16 τῆς Τριφυλίας Λάδικον τὸν Ἀκαρνᾶν. παρα-
gενομένος δ’ εἰς τὴν προειρημένην πόλιν τὴν μὲν 18 λείαν διένειμε πᾶσαν, τὴν δ’ ἀποσκευὴν ἀνα-
λαβὼν ἐκ τῆς Ἡραίας ἤλθε μέσου χειμῶνος εἰς Μεγάλην πόλιν.

81 Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοὺς αὐτούς καὶ τοὺς Φίλιππος ἐπράττε τὰ κατὰ τὴν Τριφυλίαν, καὶ Χελώνων ο Λακεδα-
μόνων ὑπολαμβάνων αὐτῷ καθήκεν κατὰ γένος τὴν βασιλείαν, καὶ βαρέως φέρων τὴν γεγονημένην ὑπεροπθέα περὶ αὐτῶν ἐκ τῶν ἑφόρων ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸν Λυκοῦργον κρίσει περὶ τῆς βασιλείας, καὶ 2 ἐπεβάλετο τὰ καθεστώτα. νομίσασθα δὲ, εἰ τὴν ὅδον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔλθοι. Κλεομένει καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑποδέιξαι τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς κληρονομίας καὶ τῶν ἀναδασμῶν, ταχέως ἐπακολούθησεν αὐτῷ τὸ 3 πλῆθος, ὤρμησε πρὸς τὴν πράξειν. συμφρονήσας δὲ περὶ τούτων πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ λαβῶν 492
wherewith to meet a siege but their numbers only, and alarmed by the prospect began to treat with Philip for their lives and liberties. On receiving permission to withdraw with their arms they marched off for Elis; and the king thus at once became master of Samicum, and afterwards, when representatives of the other towns came begging for grace, he took possession of Phrixia, Stylangium, Aepium, Bolax, Pyrgus, and Epitalium, and after these achievements returned again to Lepreum, having in the space of six days subdued the whole of Triphylia. After addressing the Lepreates in a manner suitable to the occasion, and placing a garrison in the citadel, he left with his army for Heraea, leaving Ladicus the Acarnanian in charge of Triphylia. On his arrival at Heraea he divided all the booty, and picking up here his heavy baggage reached Megalopolis in mid-winter.

81. At the same time that Philip was operating in Triphylia, Cheilon, the Lacedaemonian, considering that he was the lawful heir to the throne and deeply resenting having been passed over by the ephors when they selected Lycurgus as king, resolved to bring about a revolution. Thinking that if he followed in Cleomenes' footsteps and held out to the multitude the hope of allotments and redivision of the land, he would soon have the masses behind him, he set to work on his design. Having come to an understanding with his friends on this subject
κοινωνούς τῆς τόλμης εἰς διακοσίους τὸ πλήθος,
4 ἐγίνετο πρὸς τῷ συντελείν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν. Θεωρῶν
δὲ μέγιστον ἐμπόδιον ὑπάρχων αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν
ἐπιβολὴν τὸν Λυκοῦργον καὶ τοὺς ἑφόρους τοὺς
περιθέντας ἐκεῖνου τὴν βασιλείαν, ὄρμησε πρῶτον
5 ἐπὶ τούτους. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἑφόρους δεινοῦντας
καταλαβὼν πάντας αὐτοῦ κατέσφαξε, τῆς τύχης
τὴν ἀρμόζουσαν αὐτοῖς ἐπιθείσης δίκην· καὶ γὰρ
ὑφ’ οὗ καὶ ὑπὲρ οὗ ταῦτ’ ἐπαθον, δικαίως αὐτούς
6 ἢν τις φήσειε πεποινθέναι. ὦ δὲ Χείλων τὰ κατὰ
τούτους συντελεσάμενος παρῆν ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ
Λυκοῦργον, καὶ κατέλαβε μὲν ἐνδον, οὐ μὴν
7 ἐδυνάμηθη γ’ ἐγκρατῆς αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι· διὰ γὰρ
τῶν οἰκετῶν καὶ γειτῶν ἐκκλατεῖς καὶ διαδρᾶς
ἐλαθεν αὐτόν. οὕτος μὲν οὖν ἀνεχώρησε ταῖς
ἀνοδίαις εἰς τὴν ἐν τῇ Τριπόλει προσαγορευμένην
8 Πελλήνην· ὦ δὲ Χείλων ἀπεσφαλμένος τοῦ κυ-
ρωτάτου πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἀθύμως διέκειτο,
9 πράττειν δ’ ὅμως ἡμαγκάζετο τὸ συνεχές. διόπερ
εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν εἰσβαλὼν τοῖς μὲν ἐχθροῖς προσ-
ἐφερε τὰς χεῖρας, τοὺς δ’ οἰκείους καὶ φίλους
παρεκάλει, τοῖς δὲ λουποῖς ὑπεδείκνυε τὰς ἄρτι
10 ῥήθεισας ἐλπίδας. οὐδενὸς δὲ προσέχοντος αὐτῶ,
τάναντια δὲ συστρεφομένων ἐπ’ αὐτὸν τῶν ἀνθρώ-
πων, συννόησας τὸ γινόμενον ἀπεχώρει λαθραίως,
καὶ διελθὼν τὴν χώραν ἦκε μόνος εἰς τὴν Ἀχαίαν
11 ἐκπεπτωκός. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, δείσαντες τὴν
τοῦ Φιλίτπου παρουσίαν, τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας
ἀπεσκευάζοντο καὶ τὸ τῶν Μεγαλοπολίτῶν Ἀθή-
ναίων κατασκάψαντες ἐξείλησαν.
12 Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς Δυσκύρου
νομοθεσίας καλλίστη χρησάμενοι πολιτεία καὶ
494
and secured the co-operation of about two hundred in the venture, he entered on the execution of the project. Perceiving that the greatest hindrance to the success of his plot lay in Lycurgus and the ephors who had set him on the throne, he directed his attack first on them. Falling on the ephors while they were at supper he slew them all on the spot, chance thus visiting them with the fitting penalty for their crime. For when we consider the person at whose hands and the person for whose sake they suffered death we must confess that they met with their deserts. Cheilon, after thus disposing of the ephors, hastened to the house of Lycurgus, where he found the king, but failed to get possession of his person; for he was smuggled out by some servants and neighbours, and got away unperceived, escaping afterwards across country to Pellene in the Tripolis. Cheilon, thus baulked of his most important object, had now little heart for his enterprise, but still was forced to continue its pursuit. He therefore advanced into the agora, cutting down his enemies, calling upon his relatives and friends to join him, and tempting the rest of the people by those hopes and promises I just spoke of. But as no one listened to him, but on the contrary a hostile crowd collected, as soon as he perceived how matters stood, he left Sparta secretly, and passing through Laconia arrived in Achaea, alone and an exile. The Lacedaemonians, now dreading the arrival of Philip, brought in all property from the country and evacuated the Athenaeum in the territory of Megalopolis after razing it to the ground.

Thus the Lacedaemonians who ever since the legislation of Lycurgus had enjoyed the best form
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

megiosthēn exontes dynamen evos tēs en Deukterous máchēs, autēs eπi tānangia trapeiōs autōs tēs tūchēs, kai toūmpalw eπi tō xheiron āei kai māllon tēs politeias autōn proboanouŋhēs, tēlos pleistōn mēn pōnōn kai stásēswn emphulīwn peirōn eixo, pleistōs dē épalaian anadaios kai phugois, πυκροτήsh dē douleias peirōn elabov éwos tēs Nábidos tūranvīdos, oī tō prōn oūde toūvoma
dunvēnteis anaşxēshai radīwsw autēs. tā mēn oūn pālai kai tā pleiō perī Lakedamouńwvn eis ēkāteron mēros ὑπὸ pollwv εἰρήτai tādē, ēnara-
gēstata dē ēstivn af' ou Klesomēnhs oloscherwōs
catēlusia tō patrōn politeia. vōn dē ὕφο
ēmōn rēthēsetai kata tous ārmōζontas āei kairopws.

82 'O de Filippos anazēxas ek tēs Megálēs pōlews kai porēvthēs dia Tegeas parēn eis
"Argyos, kākei tō loupōn mēros toux chēmwnos
diētrībe, kāta tē tēn loupēn ānastrophēn kai kata
tas prāxeis tebəmamēnōs ὑπὲρ tēn ἕλκιαν ēν
2 taís proerēmēnous strateiai. ē dē 'Apelλēhs
ouδ' ὡς ēllynē tēs ēpibolēs, āl' ouīs t' ōn āγēn
ὔπο tōn ζυγων tū kata braph tōu xhanoiou.
3 ōrōn de tē touiētē prothēsei toûs perī tōn "Aratou
ēmopōwv istamēnous kai tōn Filippou autōs
prosēkonta, kai māllon tō prepoutrēw diā tē
tēn proś 'Antīgonon sūstassai kai diā tē plēiōnov
ev tois 'Alexiōs iskhēn, kai mālouta diā tēn
epideixōtēta kai vouνēchein tāndrōs, perī touτou
epēbaleto gíneitha kai kakhpragmonēn tōiōde
4 tui̇ troplōw. exetazōn toûs antipolitēneumēn
ou toûs perī tōn "Aratōn, tīves eisīn, ēkāstous eik
tōn pōlewv ēpeπαςato, kai lamvānwv eis tās
496
of government and had the greatest power until the battle of Leuctra, when chance henceforth turned against them, and their system of government instead of improving began to go rapidly from bad to worse, finally had more experience than any other people of civic trouble and discord. No other nation was so harassed by banishment of citizens and confiscations of property, none had to submit to more cruel servitude culminating in the tyranny of Nabis, although formerly they could not even bear to hear the word "tyrant" mentioned. However, the ancient history of Sparta and the subsequent history of her elevation and decline has been narrated by many. The progress of the latter is most conspicuous since the entire subversion of the ancient constitution by Cleomenes; and I shall continue to speak of it whenever the occasion offers.

82. Leaving Megalopolis and passing through Tegea, Philip arrived at Argos, where he spent the rest of the winter, having won in this campaign universal admiration for a correctness of conduct and a brilliancy of achievement beyond his years. Apelles, however, had by no means given up his project, but was bent on gradually bringing the Achaeans under the yoke. Seeing that the elder and younger Aratus stood in the way of this design and that Philip paid great regard to them, especially to the elder owing to his former friendship with Antigonus and his great influence with the Achaeans, but still more owing to his talent and discernment, he formed a plan of damaging their credit in the following manner. Inquiring first of all the names of Aratus' political opponents in each city, he sent for them, and when he made their acquaintance
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

χειρας ἐψυχαγωγεῖ καὶ παρεκάλει πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμειν, συνιστανε δὲ καὶ τῷ Φιλίππῳ, προσπεπελευκοūν αὐτῷ παρ’ ἐκαστὸν ὡς ἐὰν μὲν Ἀράτῳ προσέχῃ, χρήσεται τοῖς Ἀχαιῶι κατὰ τὴν ἐγκατάστασιν συμμαχίαν, ἐὰν δ’ αὐτῷ πείθηται καὶ τοιούτως προσλαμβάνῃ φίλους, χρήσεται πάσιν.

6 Πελοπονησίωι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν. περὶ τε τῶν ἀρχαιοτῶν εὐθὺς ἐσπούδαζε, βουλόμενος τούτων τυχ ἐπιστήθησαι τὴν στρατηγίαν, τοὺς δὲ 7 περὶ τὸν Ἀρατον ἐκβάλειν ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως. δὴ δὴ καὶ πείθει Φιλίππον παραγένηθαι πρὸς τὰς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἀρχαιοτίας εἰς Ἀἰγινῶν ὡς εἰς τὴν Ἡλείαν ἃ μονοῦμενον τὴν πορείαν. πεισθέντος δ’ αὐτῷ τοῦ βασιλέως, παρών αὐτός ἐπὶ τοῦ καιροῦ, καὶ τοὺς μὲν παρακαλῶν οῖς δ’ ἀνατευνόμενος, μόλις μὲν ἧμυσε, κατεκράτησε δ’ οὖν ὁμως τοῦ γενέσθαι στρατηγὸν Ἐπίρατον Φαραεά, τὸν δὲ Τιμόξενον ἐκπεσεύν τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀρατον ἐγκαλομενον.

83 Μετὰ δὲ ταύτα ἀναζεύξας δ’ βασιλεὺς, καὶ ποιησάμενος τὴν πορείαν διὰ Πατρών καὶ Δύμης, ἦκε πρὸς τὸ φρούριον δ’ καλεῖται μὲν Τείχος, πρόκειται δὲ τῆς Δυμαίων χώρας: κατέσχον δ’ αὐτῷ μικροὶς ἐμπροσθεν χρόνοις, καθάπερ ἀνώτερον εἰπον, οἱ 2 περὶ τῶν Εὐρυπίδαν. σπεύδων δὴ τούτο κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀνακοίμησασθαι τοῖς Δυμαίοις προσ- 3 εστρατοπέδευσε μετὰ πάσης δυνάμεως. κατα- πλαγέντες δ’ οἱ φυλάττοντες τῶν Ἡλείων παρ- ἐδοσαν τὸ φρούριον τῷ Φιλίππῳ, χωρίον οὐ 4 μέγα μὲν ἰσφαλισμένον δὲ διαφερόντως: τὴν μὲν γὰρ περίμετρον ἐξεν οὐ πλείω τριῶν ἡμισταδίον, τὸ δ’ ύψος τοῦ τείχους οὔδαμη τριάκοντα πῆχεων 498
began to cajole them and solicit their friendship. He also presented them to Philip pointing out to him in the case of each that if he gave ear to Aratus he must deal with the Achaeans according to the letter of the treaty of alliance; "but" he would say, "if you listen to me and secure the friendship of such men as this, you will be able to treat all the Peloponnesians exactly as you wish." He at once began to occupy himself with the approaching election, wishing to procure the office of strategus for one of these men and oust Aratus and his son from affairs. With this object he persuaded Philip to be present at Aegium for the Achaean elections, under the pretence that it was a station on his march to Elis. The king having consented to this, Apelles himself came for the occasion, and partly by solicitations partly by threats contrived, with difficulty it is true, to bring in as strategus Eperatus of Pharae. Timoxenus, the candidate nominated by Aratus, being defeated.

83. After this the king left Aegium and marching through Patrae and Dyme came to a fort called "The Wall," which defends the territory of Dyme, but which, as I said above, had been a short time before seized by Euripidas. Being anxious at all hazards to recover this place for Dyme, he encamped before it with his whole army. The Elean garrison in dismay surrendered the fort, which, though not a large place, was admirably fortified. Its circumference did not exceed one and a half stades, but the wall was nowhere less than thirty cubits in height.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

5 ἔλαττον. παραδοῦς δὲ τούτῳ τοῖς Δυμαίοις ἐπήει πορθῶν τήν τῶν Ἡλείων χώραν· φθείρας δὲ ταύτην, καὶ πολλὴν περιβαλόμενος λειαν, ἐπανῆλθε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς τὴν Δύμην.

84 Ὁ δὲ Ἀπελλῆς δοκῶν ἡνυκέναι τι τῆς προθέσεως τῷ δὲ αὐτοῦ καθεστάσαι τὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγόν, αὐθες ἐνεχείρει τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἅρατον, βουλόμενος εἰς τέλος ἀποστάσαι τὸν Φιλίππον ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς φιλίας. ἐπεβάλετο δὲ τῇ διαβολῇ πλάττεω διὰ τοιαύτης τινὸς ἐπινοίας.

2 Ἀμφίδαμος δὲ τῶν Ἡλείων στρατηγός, ἐν ταῖς Θαλάμαις ἀλοὺς ἀμα τοῖς συμπεφευγόσων, καθάπερ ἀνώτερον ἡμῖν ἔρρηθι περὶ τούτων, ὡς ἤκε μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰχμαλώτων ἀγόμενος εἰς Ὁλυμπίαν, ἐσπευσα διὰ τινων εἰς λόγους ἐλθείν τῷ βασιλεί,

3 τυχῶν δὲ τούτου διελεχτο, φάσκων εἶναι δυσατος ἐπαγαγέονται τοὺς Ἡλείους εἰς τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίαν καὶ συμμαχίαν. δὲ δὲ Φιλίππος πεισθείς

4 ἐξαπέστειλε τὸν Ἀμφίδαμον χώρις λύτρων, κελεύσας ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι τοῖς Ἡλείοις, ἐὰν ἐλωντα τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίαν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν αἰχμαλωτὰ πάντα χώρις λύτρων ἀποδώσει, τῇ δὲ χώρᾳ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς παρα-

5 σκευάσει, πρὸς τούτως αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἀφροφήτους ἀφορολογῆτος, χρωμένους τοῖς ἴδιοις

6 πολιτεύμαισι, διαιτησία. οἵ μὲν οὖν Ἡλείοι διακούσαντες τούτων οὐδὲν προσέχον, καὶ περὶ ἐπιστασικῶν καὶ μεγάλων εἶναι δοκοῦσιν τῶν

7 προτεινομένων. ὁ δὲ Ἀπελλῆς ἐκ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος πλάσας τὴν διαβολὴν προσήνεγκε τῷ Φιλίππῳ, φάσκων τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἅρατον οὐκ εἴλικρνη τὴν φιλίαν ἄγειν πρὸς Μακεδόνας οὐδ' 500
Handing it over to the Dymeans he advanced, laying waste the territory of Elis. After pillaging it and collecting a quantity of booty he returned with his army to Dyme.

84. Apelles, thinking that he had succeeded so far in his plan, by the election of the Achaean strategus through his influence, renewed his attack on Aratus with the view of entirely alienating Philip from him. He devised the following plan for trumping up a false accusation against him. Amphidamus, the Elean strategus, had been captured at Thalamae together with the other fugitives, as I above narrated, and when he was brought to Olympia with the rest of the prisoners begged urgently through certain persons for an interview with Philip, and on this being granted, he discoursed at some length stating that it was in his power to gain over the Eleans to the king's side and persuade them to enter into alliance with him. Philip, believing this, sent back Amphidamus without ransom, bidding him promise the Eleans that if they joined him he would return all captured men and animals without ransom, would assure the future safety of the country from any outside attack, and would maintain the Eleans in freedom without garrison or tribute and in the enjoyment of their own form of government. Attractive and generous as these offers seemed, the Eleans refused to listen to them, and Apelles, founding his false accusation on this circumstance, brought it before Philip, telling him that Aratus was not sincere in his friendship for the
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ἀληθινῶς εὐνοεῖν αὐτῷ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν τῆς Ἡλείων
8 ἀλλοτριώτητος τούτους αἰτίους γεγονέναι· καθ’
ὅν γὰρ καίρων Ἀμφιδαμον ἢ Ὀλυμπίας εἰς Ἡλῖν
ἀπέστειλεν, τούτους ἔφη κατ’ ἰδίαν λαβόντας
ἐπιτρῆσαι τὸν ἀνθρωπον, καὶ λέγει ὅτι κατ’
οὐδένα τρόπον συμφέρει τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις τὸ
9 γενέσθαι Φίλιππον Ἡλείων κύριον· καὶ διὰ ταύτην
τὴν αἰτίαν πάνθ’ ὑπεριδόντας τὰ προτεινόμενα
τοὺς Ἡλείους διατηρεῖν μὲν τὴν πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς
φιλίαν, ὑπομένειν δὲ τὸν πρὸς Μακεδόνας πόλεμον.
85 τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον Φίλιππος δεξάμενος τοὺς
λόγους καλεῖν ἐκέλευε τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀρατόν καὶ
2 λέγειν ἐναντίον ἐκεῖνων ταύτα τὸν Ἀπελλῆν καὶ
τῶν δὲ παραγενομένων ἔλεγε τὰ προειρημένα τολ-
μηρῶς καὶ κατακληκτικῶς ὁ Ἀπελλῆς καὶ τί
προσεπείπε τοιοῦτον ἐτὶ σωπῶντος τοῦ βασιλέως.
3 ἐπιτείπερ ὅτως ἅχαριστος ὑμᾶς ὁ βασιλεύς,
"Ἀρατε, καὶ λίαν ἀγνώμονας εὑρίσκει, κρίνει
συναγαγών τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ περὶ τούτων ἀπο-
λογισμοὺς ποιησάμενος ἀπαλλάττεσθαι πάλιν εἰς
4 Μακεδονίαν." ὁ δὲ προεβύτερος Ἀρατος ὑπολαβὼν
καθόλου μὲν ἥξιον τὸν Φίλιππον μηδενὶ τῶν
λεγομένων ὁξέως μηδ᾽ ἁκρίτως μηδέποτε πι-
5 στείειν, ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τυχὸς τῶν φίλων καὶ συμμάχων
προσπέσα τις αὐτῷ λόγος, τὸν ἁκριβέστερον
ἐλέγχον ποιεῖσθαι πρὶν ἡ δέξασθαι τὴν διαβολήν·
καὶ γὰρ βασιλικὸν εἶναι τὸ τουτοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὰν
6 συμφέρον. διὸ καὶ νῦν ἥξιον περὶ τῶν ὑπ’ Ἀπελλοῦ
λεγομένων καλεῖν τοὺς ἁκηκοῦτας, ἀγείν ἐἰς τὸ
μέσον τὸν εἰρηκότα πρὸς αὐτὸν, μηδὲν παραλπεῖν
τῶν δυνατῶν εἰς τὸ γνώναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, πρὶν ἡ
πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἀνακαλύπτειν τι τούτων.
502
BOOK IV. 84. 7–85. 6

Macedonians or really attached to the king; for it was to him on the present occasion that the coldness of the Eleans was due: for he had when Amphidamalus was sent from Olympia to Elis taken him apart and set him against the project, saying that it was by no means in the interest of the Peloponnesians that Philip should become master of Elis; this was why the Eleans had ignored all the king’s offers and remaining faithful to their alliance with the Aetolians, chosen to persist in the war against the Macedonians. 85. On receiving this report, Philip first ordered Apelles to summon Aratus and say the same thing in his presence, and when Aratus arrived, Apelles repeated his accusation in a confident and threatening manner, adding, before the king had spoken, some such words as these: “Since, Aratus, the king finds you to be so ungrateful and to have shown so little consideration for him he has decided to call a meeting of the Achaeans and after laying this matter before them to return to Macedonia.” Hereupon the elder Aratus, interrupting him, exhorted Philip to make it a general principle never to give credence to reports rashly or without duly weighing the evidence; and especially when it was a friend or ally against whom he heard anything said, to examine most closely into the accusation, before accepting it. This he said was conduct becoming a king and in every way to his interest. Therefore he begged him now as regarded Apelles’ allegation to summon those who had heard the words attributed to him spoken, to demand the attendance of Apelles’ informant, and to take every possible means of getting at the truth before making any public statement to the Achaeans. 86. Upon the

503
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

86 τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως ευαρεστήσαντος τοὺς λεγομένους, καὶ φήσαντος οὐκ ὁλυγωρήσειν ἀλλ' ἔξετάσειν, 2 τότε μὲν διελύθησαν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἔξης ἡμέραις ὁ μὲν Ἀπελλῆς οὐδεμίαν ἀπόδειξιν προσήγη τοῖς εἰρημένοις, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὸν "Ἄρατον ἑγένετο τι 3 συγκύρημα τοιοῦτον. οἱ γὰρ Ἡλείοι, καθ' δὲν καὶρὸν ὁ Φίλιππος αὐτῶν ἔπορθε τὴν χώραν, ὑποπτεύοντες τὸν Ἀμφίδαμον ἐπεβάλοντο συλλα- 4 βεῖν καὶ δήσαντες εἰς τὴν Ἀιτωλίαν ἐκπέμπειν. ὁ δὲ προαυθόμενος αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν ἀπεχώρησε τὰς μὲν ἄρχας εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πυθανόμενον τὸν Φίλιππον ἐν τῇ Δύμῃ περὶ τὴν τῶν λαφύρων οἰκονομίαν διατρίβειν, ἐσπευσα πρὸς 5 τοῦτον διαπεσεῖν. ὃθέν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον, ἀκούσαντες τὸν Ἀμφίδαμον ἐκ τῆς Ἡλείας ἐκπεπτωκότα παρεῖναι, γενόμενοι περιχαρεῖς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν αὐτῶς συνειδέναι, προσελθόντες ζώοντο 6 δεῖν τὸν βασιλέα καλεῖν τὸν Ἀμφίδαμον· καὶ γὰρ εἰδέναι περὶ τῶν κατηγορουμένων ἐκείνων βέλτιστα πρὸς ὅν ἐρρήθη, καὶ δηλώσειν τὴν ἁλθείαν, πεφευγότα μὲν εἰς οἰκον διὰ τὸν Φίλιππον, τὰς δ' ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα τῆς σωτηρίας κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἐν 7 ἐκείνῳ. πεισθεὶς δὲ τοὺς λεγομένους ὁ βασιλεὺς, καὶ μεταπεμψάμενος τὸν Ἀμφίδαμον, εὑρεῖ τὴν 8 διαβολὴν οὕσαν ψευδῆ. διὸ καὶ τὸν μὲν Ἄρατον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρας αἰεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπεδέχετο καὶ κατηξίου, πρὸς δὲ τὸν Ἀπελλήνῃ λοξότερον εἶχε; τῇ γε μὴν ὄλοσχερεὶ προκατεχόμενος ἀπο- δοχῇ πολλὰ παρορᾶν ἤγαγκάζετο τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γνωμένων.

87 'Ὁ δ' Ἀπελλήλῃς οὐδαμῶς ἀφίστατο τῆς προθέσεως, ἀλλ' ἀμα μὲν τὸν Ταυρίωνα τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν Πελο-
king's consenting to this and engaging not to neglect the matter, but to make inquiries, they separated. During the days that followed Apelles produced no proof of his assertions, and now a happy accident, most helpful to Aratus, occurred. The Eleans, at the time when Philip was ravaging their country, conceived suspicions of Amphidamus and formed the design of arresting him and sending him in chains to Aetolia. But, getting intelligence of their project, he first fled to Olympia and then, when he heard that Philip was in Dyme engaged in dealing with the booty, he hastened to escape to him there. Aratus, in consequence, when he heard that Amphidamus had fled from Elis and arrived, was exceedingly joyful, as he had nothing on his conscience, and coming to the king, demanded that Amphidamus should be summoned: "For the man," he said, "who knew best about the accusation was he to whom he was said to have spoken the words, and Amphidamus would be sure to tell the truth, as he had been exiled from his home for Philip's sake and depended on him now for his safety." On the king's consenting and sending for Amphidamus, he found the charge to be false, and henceforward he continued to like and esteem Aratus more and more, while becoming a little suspicious of Apelles. Prepossessed, however, as he was by his long prejudice in favour of this minister, he could not but overlook many of his errors.

87. Apelles, however, by no means desisted from his design, but in the first place began to traduce Taurion, who had been entrusted with the super-
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

2 ποινήσω τεταιμένου διέβαλλεν, οὐ ψέγων ἄλλῳ ἕπαινών καὶ φάσκων ἐπιτήδειον αὐτὸν εἶναι μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐν τοῖς υπαίθροις συνδιατρίβειν, βουλόμενος ἔτερον ἐπισταθήναι δι’ αὐτοῦ τοὺς ἐν 3 Πελοποννήσῳ πράγμασιν. κανός γὰρ δὴ τις οὖς εὐρήται τρόπος διαβολής, τὸ μὴ ψέγωνας 4 ἄλλῳ ἐπαινοῦντας λυμαίνεσθαι τοὺς πέλας· εὐρήται δὲ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον τουαύτῃ κακεντρέχεια καὶ βασκανία καὶ δόλος ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς αὐλὰς διατριβόντων καὶ τῆς τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ζηλοτυπίας καὶ πλεονεξίας. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς θεραπείας τεταιμένου Ἀλέξανδρον, ὅτε λάβοι καιρόν, διέδακνεν, βουλόμενος καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸ σώμα φυλακὴν τοῦ βασιλέως δι’ αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ καθόλου κινήσαι τὴν ὑπ’ Ἀντιγόνου καταλείπειν διάταξιν. Ἀντίγονος γὰρ καλῶς μὲν τίς προέστη τῆς τε βασιλείας καὶ τοῦ παιδὸς αὐτοῦ, καλῶς δὲ τὸν βίον μεταλλάττων προεννοήθη πρὸς 7 τὸ μέλλον περὶ πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀπολιπὼν γὰρ διαθήκην ἔγραψε Μακεδόσιν ὑπὲρ τῶν δυσκημένων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος διέταξε, τῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔκαστα δεήσει χειρίζεσθαι, βουλόμενος μηδεμίαν ἀφορμὴν καταλεπεῖν τοῖς περὶ τὴν αὐλὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλοτυμίας καὶ 8 στάσεις. ἐν οἷς τῶν τότε συστρατευομένων αὐτὸς μὲν Ἀπελλῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτρόποις ἀπελέειπτο, Λεόντιος δ’ ἐπὶ τῶν πελταστῶν, Μεγαλέας δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ γραμματείου, Ταυρίων δ’ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ Πελοπόννησον, Ἀλέξανδρος δ’ ἐπὶ τῆς θεραπείας. 9 τὸν μὲν οὖν Λεόντιον καὶ Μεγαλέαν ύπ’ αὐτῶν εἶχεν ὀλοσχερῶς, τὸν δ’ Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ Ταυρίωνα μεταστησάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς χρείας ἔσπευδε καὶ 506
vision of Peloponnesian affairs, not indeed by finding fault with him, but by praising him and saying that he was a most proper person to be attached to the king's person in the camp, his object being to get some one else appointed by his influence to this post. This is indeed a new kind of calumny, to damage the fortunes of one's neighbours not by blame but by praise, and this variety of malice, envy, and trickery is especially and primarily the invention of courtiers to serve their mutual jealousies and ambitions. He also, whenever he had an opportunity, used to traduce Alexander, the Captain of the Body-guard, wishing to be himself charged with the protection of the king's person, and generally to subvert all the arrangements established by the testament of Antigonus. For not only was Antigonus during his lifetime a good ruler and an excellent guardian of his son, but on his death, he made admirable dispositions for the future regarding everything. In his will he gave to his people an account of his administration, and left orders how and by whom each matter was to be managed with the view of leaving no pretext for rivalries and quarrels among the courtiers. Of those officers who were on Antigonus' staff at the time Apelles was left one of the king's guardians, Leontius was made Captain of the Peltasts, Megaleas Secretary in Chief, Taurion High Commissioner for the Peloponnese, and Alexander Captain of the Body-guard. Apelles had Leontius and Megaleas entirely at his disposal, and his purpose was to remove Alexander and Taurion
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

taúta kai tάllα pάntα δι' αυτών kai διά tών
10 iδίων fίλων χειρίζεται. δ' δή kai ραδίως ἃν ἐπετέλεσε
μὴ παρασκευάσας ἀνταγωνιστήν Ἀρατόν αὐτῷ.
νῦν δὲ ταχέως πεῖραν ἔλαβε τῆς σφετέρας ἀφρό-
11 σύνης kai πλεονέξιας. δ' γὰρ αὐτός ἐπέβαλετο
πράξαι κατὰ τῶν πέλας, τούτ' ἔπαθε kai λίαν ἐν
12 πάνω βραχεῖ χρόνω. πῶς δὲ καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ τούτῳ
συνέβη γενέσθαι, κατὰ μὲν τὸ παρόν ὑπερθησόμεθα,
kai καταστρέψομεν τὴν βύβλον ταύτην, ἐν δὲ τοῖς
13 ἐξής πειρασόμεθα σαφῶς ὑπὲρ ἑκάστων ἐξαγ-
gέλλεων. Φιλίππος δὲ τὰ προειρημένα διαταξά-
μένος ἐπανήλθεν εἰς Ἀργος κάνταυθα τὴν παραχει-
ymasían ἐποίει μετὰ τῶν φίλων, τάς δὲ δυνάμεις
ἀπέλυσεν εἰς Μακεδονίαν.
from their posts and direct these and all other matters through himself and his friends. And he would easily have accomplished this, had he not invited the opposition of Aratus; but as it was he was soon to experience the consequence of his folly and greed of power; for what he had plotted to bring upon his colleagues, he had to suffer himself within a very short space of time. As to how and by what means this happened, I shall defer speaking for the present and bring this Book to a close; but in subsequent ones I shall try to give a clear account of the whole matter, Philip, after making the arrangements I mentioned, returned to Argos and there spent the remainder of the winter with his friends, dismissing his troops to Macedonia.

END OF BOOK IV
INDEX

Abilyx, iii. 98. 2; 99. 6
Abydos, iv. 44. 6
Acarnanes, iv. 5. 10; 9. 4;
15. 1; 25. 3; 30. 2; 63. 4
Acarnania, iv. 6. 2; 30. 1;
63. 6; 65. 9; 66. 4
Achaea, iv. 7. 4; 9. 7; 15.
2; 15. 6; 16. 10; 17. 3;
29. 6; 61. 2; 81. 10
Achaei, iii. 3. 3; 5. 6; 32.
3; iv. 1. 4; 5. 7; 6. 10;
7; 8. 12; 9. 1; 10; 11;
14; 15. 3; 17; 35; 36. 2;
37. 6; 59; 60; 64. 1; 66.
2; 67. 8; 69; 71; 72; 76.
1; 82. 2; 84. 1; 85. 3
Achaicus, Andromachi filius,
iv. 2. 5; 48; 49. 2; 50;
51
Achelous, iv. 63. 11
Acrocorinthus, iv. 8. 4
Actium, iv. 63. 5
Adimantus, iv. 22. 7; 23. 5
Adriaticum mare, iii. 47. 2;
61. 11; 86; 88. 1; 110. 9
Aecae, iii. 88. 9
Aegaeum mare, iii. 2. 8
Aegira, iv. 57. 2; 59
Aegium, iv. 7. 1; 26. 8; 57.
3; 82. 7
Aegyptus iii. 2. 8; 3. 8; iv.
2. 8
L. Aemilius Paulus, iii. 16.
7; 19. 12; 106. 1; 107. 8;
108. 1; 109. 13; 110. 8;
112. 2; 114. 6; 116. 1;
117. 8; iv. 37. 4; 66. 8
Aepium, iv. 77. 9; 80. 13
Aerenosii, iii. 35. 2
Aethiopia, iii. 38. 1
Aetoli, iii. 2. 3; 3. 3; 6. 5;
7. 1; 11. 1; iv. 2. 11; 3;
5. 6; 6. 8; 7; 8. 4; 9. 5;
11; 12; 13; 14; 15; 16;
17. 12; 18; 19; 25; 26;
29; 30; 34. 3; 34. 7; 35;
36; 53. 9; 55. 1; 58; 62.
4; 63. 3; 67. 1; 77. 6;
78. 1; 79; 80; 84. 9
Aetolia, iv. 4. 9; 36. 2; 53.
8; 57. 2; 61. 3; 62. 4;
64; 72. 9; 86. 3
Afri, iii. 33. 15; 56. 4; 72.
9; 74. 4; 79. 1; 83. 2;
87. 3; 113. 7; 115. 8;
116. 7
Africa, iii. 3. 1; 8. 2; 22;
10; 23. 4; 24. 11; 32. 2;
33. 7; 35. 1; 37. 2; 38. 1;
39. 2; 41. 2; 57. 2; 59. 7;
61. 8; 96. 12
Agelaus Naupactus, iv. 16.
10
Agesilaus, rex Lacedaemo-
INDEX

niorum, iii. 6. 11; iv. 35. 13
Agesipolis, iv. 35. 10
Agesipolis, superioris pater, iv. 35. 10
Alcamenes, iv. 22. 11
Alcibiades, iv. 44. 4
Alexander Aetolus, iv. 57. 2; 58. 9
Alexander Magnus, iii. 6. 4; 6. 14; 59. 3; iv. 23. 9
Alexander alius, iv. 87. 5; 87. 8
Alexandria Aegypti, iv. 51. 1
Alphera, iv. 77. 10; 78. 1
Allobroges, iii. 49. 13; 50. 2; 51. 9
Alpes, iii. 34. 2; 39. 9; 47. 2; 48. 6; 49; 53. 6; 54. 2; 55. 9; 56; 60. 2; 61. 3; 62. 3; 64. 7
Alpheus, iv. 77. 5; 78. 2
Althaea, iii. 13. 5
Ambracus, iv. 61. 3; 63. 1
Ambrysus, iv. 25. 2
Amilcar Barcas, iii. 9. 6; 10; 13. 3; 14. 10
Amilcar alius, iii. 95. 2
Amphidamus, iv. 75. 6; 84. 86. 3
Amyynes, iv. 16. 9
Andosini, iii. 35. 2
Andromachus, iv. 51. 1
Antalcidas, iv. 27. 5
Autias populus, iii. 22. 11; 24. 16
Antigonus Doson, iv. 1. 9; 6. 4; 9. 4; 16. 5; 22. 4; 34. 9; 69. 6; 76. 1; 82. 3; 87. 6
Antigonus Gonatas, iv. 3. 3
Antiochus Magnus, iii. 2. 4; 3. 3; 3. 8; 6. 4; 7. 1; 11. 1; 12. 1; 32. 7; iv. 2. 7; 37. 5; 48. 5; 51. 3
Apaturius, iv. 48. 8
Apelaurus, iv. 69. 1
Apelles, iv. 76. 1; 82. 2; 84. 1; 85; 86; 87
Apenninus mons, iii. 90. 7; 110. 9
Apteraei, iv. 55. 4
Aratus Sicyonius senior, iv. 2. 1; 6. 7; 7. 8; 8. 1; 9. 7; 10; 12. 2; 14. 1; 19. 1; 19. 12; 24. 3; 67. 8; 76. 8; 82. 3; 84. 1; 85. 86; 87. 10
Aratus iunior, iv. 37. 1; 60. 2; 70. 2; 72. 7
Araxus, iv. 59. 4; 65. 10
Arbucala, iii. 14. 1
Arcades, iv. 17. 4; 20. 1; 21. 7; 32. 3; 33. 5; 33. 11; 53. 6; 70. 3; 71. 74. 1
Arcadia, iv. 20. 3; 21. 5; 33. 3; 70. 1; 77. 8; 77. 10
Arcas, iv. 77. 8
Archidamus, Eumenidae filius, iv. 35. 13
Archidamus, Pantaleontis filius, iv. 57. 7; 58. 9
Ardiae, iii. 22. 11; 24. 16
Ardyes, iii. 47. 3
Argivi, iv. 36. 4
Argos, iv. 82. 1; 87. 13
Aridices, iv. 52. 2
Ariminum, iii. 61. 10; 68. 13; 75. 6; 77. 2; 86. 1; 88. 7
Arirathes, iii. 3. 6; 5. 2; iv. 2. 8

512
INDEX

Aristocrates, iv. 33. 6
Aristomenes, iv. 33. 2
Ariston, iv. 5. 1; 9. 9; 17. 1
Arpi, iii. 88. 6
Arretini, iii. 77. 1; 80. 1
Artemision, iv. 73. 4
Asdrubal, gener Hamilcaris
Barcae, iii. 8. 1; 12. 3.
13. 3; 15. 5; 21. 1; 27. 9; 29. 2; 30. 3
Asdrubal, Hannibalis frater,
iii. 33. 6; 33. 14; 56. 6;
76. 8; 95. 2; 96. 1; 98. 5
Asdrubal, iii. 66. 6; 93. 4
Asdrubal, iii. 102. 6; 114. 7;
116. 6
Asia, iii. 3. 3; 6; 37. 2; 38.
1; 59. 3; iv. 28. 3; 39. 2;
43. 2; 44. 7; 46. 1; 50. 4;
51. 8; 56. 5
Athenienses, iv. 44. 4
Athyrnus, iii. 92. 1
M. Atius Regulus, cos., iii.
106. 2; 114. 6
Attalus, Eumenis pater, iii.
3. 2; 5. 2; 48. 1; 48. 11;
49. 2; 65. 6
Ausidus, iii. 110. 8; iv. 1. 2
Azanis, iv. 70. 3

BABYRTAS, iv. 4. 5
Baleares, iii. 33. 11; 33. 16;
72. 7; 83. 2; 113. 6
Bargysii, iii. 35. 2
Beneventum, iii. 90. 8
Bionidas, iv. 22. 11
Bithynia, iv. 50. 9; 52. 9
Boeoti, iv. 9. 4; 15. 1; 25. 2;
67. 7
Boii, iii. 40. 6; 40. 10; 56. 6;
67. 6
Bolax, iv. 77. 9; 80. 13

Bosphorus Cimmerius, iv.
39. 3
Bosphorus Thracius, iv. 39. 4
Bostar, iii. 98. 5; 98. 12;
99. 5
Brennus, iv. 46. 1
Britannia, iii. 57. 3
Brundisini, iii. 69. 1
Byssatis, iii. 23. 2
Byzantini, iii. 2. 5; iv. 37. 8;
42. 8; 44. 1; 46. 2; 47;
48. 13; 50; 51
Byzantium, iv. 39. 5; 43. 1;
43. 7; 46. 1; 52. 1

CALCEDON, iv. 39. 5; 43. 8;
44. 3; 44. 7
Calene, iii. 101. 3
Calligiton, iv. 52. 4
Callisthenes, iv. 33. 2
Calydonia, iv. 65. 6
Campani, iii. 118. 3
Canna, iii. 107. 2; 117. 1;
iv. 1. 2
Canusium, iii. 107. 3
Caphyae, iv. 11. 3; 12. 13;
68. 6; 70. 1
Capitolium, iii. 22. 1; 26. 1
Cappadoci, iii. 5. 2; iv. 2. 8
Capua, iii. 90. 10; 91. 6
Caria, iii. 2. 8
Carpetani, iii. 14. 2
Carthaginienses, iii. 2. 1; 3.
1; 5. 1; 5. 5; 6; 8. 3; 9.
6; 13. 1; 14; 15; 17. 7;
20; 21; 22; 23; 29; 39;
42. 4; 49; 54. 8; 59. 9;
60. 8; 61. 8; 62. 11; 64;
65; 67; 68; 69; 71; 73;
74; 75; 84; 88; 89. 7;
91. 10; 97; 98; 110; 115;
117; iv. 1. 2. 9; 66. 9

VOL. II 2 L 513
## INDEX

| Carthago, iii. 15. 12; 20. 6; 23. 1; 32. 2; 33. 12; 34. 7; 40. 2; 41. 3; 61. 8; 87. 4; 96. 10 |
| Carthago nova, iii. 13. 7; 15. 3; 17. 1; 33. 5; 39. 6; 56. 3; 76. 11; 95. 2 |
| Cavarus, iv. 46. 4; 52. 1 |
| Celti, iii. 2. 6; 34. 1; 37. 9; 39. 4; 40. 1; 41. 1; 41. 9; 43. 12; 44. 9; 45. 2; 48. 6; 60. 11; 66. 7; 67. 1; 68. 8; 69; 70. 4; 71. 2; 72. 8; 74. 4; 75. 2; 78. 2; 83. 4; 84. 6; 85. 5; 93. 10; 106. 6; 113. 7; 115. 2; 118. 6 |
| Celtiberia, iii. 5. 1; 17. 2 |
| Cenchreae, iv. 19. 7 |
| C. Centeniius, iii. 86. 3 |
| Cephaleni, iii. 3. 6; iv. 6. 2; 6. 8 |
| Ceraitae, iv. 53. 6 |
| Ceras (Kēpas), iv. 43. 7 |
| Cercina, iii. 96. 12 |
| Chaereas, iii. 20. 5 |
| Charadra, iv. 63. 4 |
| Charixenus, iv. 34. 9 |
| Chilon, iv. 81 |
| Chrysopolis, iv. 44. 3 |
| Cissa, iii. 76. 5 |
| Clarium, iv. 6. 4; 25. 4 |
| Clastidium, iii. 69. 1 |
| Cleombratus, Agesipolidis pater, iv. 35. 10 |
| Cleomenes, iii. 16. 3; 32. 3; iv. 1. 8; 7. 7; 35. 6; 37. 6; 69. 5; 76. 7; 81. 2; 81. 14 |
| Clitor, iv. 10. 6; 11. 2; 18. 10; 25. 4; 70. 2 |
| Cnosus, iv. 53. 1; 55. 4 |
| Coes SYRIA, iii. 1. 1; 2. 4; 2. 8; iv. 2. 11; 37. 5 |

| Comontorius, iv. 45. 10; 46. 3 |
| Conope, iv. 64. 3 |
| Corinthiaci, iv. 13. 7 |
| Corinthlacus sinus, iv. 57. 5; 65. 9 |
| Corinthus, iv. 6. 5; 19. 9; 22. 2; 24. 9; 66. 5; 67. 7; 69. 8; 72. 9 |
| Cn. Cornelius Scipio, iii. 56. 5; 76. 1; 76. 5; 95. 4; 97. 2 |
| P. Cornelius Scipio, cos., iii. 40. 2; 41. 45. 2; 49. 1; 56. 5; 61. 1; 62. 1; 64. 1; 65. 3; 66. 1; 66. 9; 67. 8; 68. 5; 68. 13; 70. 76. 1; 88. 8; 97. 2; 99. 4; iv. 66. 9 |
| Cortona, iii. 82. 9 |
| Cossyris, iii. 96. 13 |
| Cothon, iv. 52. 4 |
| Cremona, iii. 40. 5 |
| Creta, iv. 53. 1; 54. 6; 56. 1; 80. 6 |
| Cretenses, iii. 75. 7; iv. 8. 11; 20. 6; 55. 5; 61. 3; 67. 6; 68. 3; 71. 11 |
| Cuma, Cyme, iii. 91. 4 |
| Cyclades insulae, iii. 16. 3; iv. 16. 9 |
| Cylleus, iv. 9. 9 |
| Cynaetha, iv. 16. 11; 17. 3; 18. 10; 19. 4; 25. 4 |
| Cynaethenses, iv. 17. 9; 18. 8; 19. 13; 20. 2; 21. 5; 21. 11; 29. 6 |
| Cyphanta, iv. 36. 5 |
| Cythera, iv. 6. 1 |
| Cyzicus, iv. 44. 7 |

| DARDANIS, iv. 66. 1 |
| Darius Hystaspis, iv. 43. 2 |
INDEX

Daulium, iv. 25. 2
Daunia, iii. 88. 4; 91. 5
Delphi, iv. 46. 1
Delta Aegyptiorum, iii. 49. 6
Demetrias, iii. 6. 4; 7. 3
Demetrius, Antigonionatae filius, iv. 25. 6
Demetrius Pharius, iii. 16. 2; 16. 5; 18. 1; 19; iv. 16. 6; 19. 7; 37. 4; 66. 4
Demetrius Soter, iii. 5. 3
Dicaearchus, iii. 91. 4
Dimalus, sive Dimale, iii. 18. 1
Dioscurium, iv. 67. 9; 68. 2; 73. 5
Dium, iv. 62. 2
Dodonae, iv. 67. 3
Dorimachus, iv. 3. 5; 4; 6. 5; 9. 8; 10. 3; 14. 4; 16. 11; 19. 12; 57. 2; 67. 1; 77. 6
Dyma, Dyme, iv. 59. 1; 65. 10; 83. 1; 86. 4
ELAUS, iv. 65. 6
Elea ( primaryStage Λεία), iv. 9. 9; 73. 4; 77. 7; 80; 82. 7
Elei, iv. 5. 4; 19. 5; 36. 6; 59. 1; 68. 1; 69. 1; 70. 4; 71; 73. 1; 74. 8; 77. 6; 80; 83. 3; 84; 86. 3
Eleuthernaei, iv. 53. 2; 55. 4
Elis urbs, iv. 59. 1; 64. 2
Emperatus, iv. 82. 8
Emporia ( primaries Εμπορία), iii. 23. 2
Emporium, iii. 39. 7; 76. 1
Ἐμπάνδρος, iii. 25. 6
Epaminondas, iv. 32. 10; 33. 8
Ephorus, iv. 20. 5
Epiorota, iv. 5. 10; 9. 4; 15.

1; 16. 1; 25. 3; 30. 6; 36. 7; 61. 2; 63. 1; 67. 2
Epirus, iv. 6. 1; 57. 1; 61. 1; 63. 5; 66. 4; 67. 1
Epistratus, iv. 11. 6
Eptalium, iv. 80. 13
Eribanous mons, iii. 92. 2
Erymanthus, iv. 70. 8; 71. 4
Eryx oppidum, iii. 9. 7
Etruria, iii. 49. 4; 56. 6; 61. 2; 75. 6; 77. 1; 78. 6; 80. 1; 82. 6; 84. 15; 86. 3; 108. 9
Etruscum, sive Tyrrhenum, sive Tuscanum mare, iii. 61. 3; 110. 9
Euboea, iv. 67. 7
Eudamidas, iv. 35. 13
Eumenes, iii. 3. 6
Euripidas, iv. 19. 6; 59. 1; 60. 3; 68. 1; 69. 2; 70. 11; 71. 5; 72; 83. 1
Europa, iii. 3. 4; 37. 2; 47. 1; iv. 39. 2; 41. 1; 43. 2; 44. 6; 51. 8
Q. Fabius Maximus, iii. 87. 6; 88. 7; 89; 90; 92. 3; 94. 4; 101. 1; 103. 3; 105. 5
Q. Fabius Pictor, iii. 8. 1; 9. 1
Faesula, Faesulae, iii. 82. 1
Falernus mons et ager, iii. 90. 11; 92. 6; 94. 7
C. Flaminius, plebistraibunus, iii. 75. 5; 77. 1; 78. 6; 80. 1; 82. 2; 83. 6; 84. 2; 86. 3; 106. 2
Fossa, iv. 33. 6
Frentanus ager, iii. 88. 3
Γαλατία (Gallia Cisalpina), iii. 106. 6

VOL. II 2 L 2 515
INDEX

Galli (Γαλάται), iii. 3. 5; 16.
2; 50. 6; 54. 3; 67. 8; iv.
38. 6; 45. 10; 52. 1
Gallia, iii. 40. 3; 59. 7; 87.
2; 118. 6
Geranium, iii. 100. 1; 102.
6; 107, 1
Glycos, iv. 36. 5
Gortyn Arcadiae, iv. 60. 3
Gortyn Crete, iv. 53. 4;
55. 6
Græci, iii. 2. 3; 5. 4; 6. 9;
52. 3; 58. 5; 59. 8; iv. 2;
1; 3. 8; 18. 10; 20. 1; 27.
10; 30. 4; 31. 5; 33. 8;
38. 6; 45. 10; 46. 5; 73.
10; 74
Graecia, iii. 3. 1; 3. 4; 5. 6;
6. 11; 22. 3; 16. 4; iv.
28. 3
Gyridas, iv. 35. 5

HADRIANUS AGER, iii. 88. 3
Hannibal, Amilcaris Barcae
filius, iii. 6. 1; 8. 5; 9. 6;
11. 1; 12. 3; 13. 4; 14. 5;
15; 16; 17; 20. 8; 30. 4;
33. 5; 34; 35; 36; 39. 6;
40. 1; 41. 1; 42. 43. 45.
5; 47; 48; 50; 51; 52;
53; 56. 1; 60. 1; 61. 5;
61. 8; 62. 1; 63; 64. 8;
65. 6; 66. 3; 67; 68; 70.
9; 72; 77. 3; 79. 1; 79.
12; 81; 12; 82. 9; 83. 5;
84; 85. 1; 86. 3; 88. 1;
90. 10; 92; 93; 94; 96;
97; 98; 100. 1; 101; 102;
111; 113; 117; iv. 2. 9;
28. 1; 37. 4; 66. 8
Hanno, Bomilcaris filius, iii.
42. 6; 114. 7

Hanno, Hispaniae praefec-
tus, iii. 35. 4; 76. 5
Hectodorus, iv. 47. 4; 75. 5
Hellespontus, iv. 44. 6; 46.
1; 50. 5
Heracleidae, iv. 34. 5
Heracleitius, iv. 40. 3
Heraclea, iv. 77. 5; 78. 2; 80.
15
Herculis Columnae, iii. 37.
3; 39. 2; 57. 2
Hermaeum, iv. 43. 2
Hestiae, iv. 43. 5
Hieron, iii. 2. 6; 75. 7
Hieron (rô), iv. 50. 2
Hippomeron, iv. 35. 13
Hirpinii, iii. 91. 9
Hispani, iii. 2. 6; 17. 6; 33.
5; 35. 6; 39. 4; 56. 4;
72. 8; 74. 9; 76. 4; 79. 1;
83. 2; 84. 14; 93. 10; 94.
6; 98. 3; 113. 7; 115. 2
Hispania, iii. 3. 1; 8. 2; 10.
5; 11. 5; 13. 2; 15. 16;
6; 17. 2; 20. 4; 26. 9; 30.
2; 35. 1; 37. 11; 41. 2;
49. 4; 57. 2; 59. 7; 61. 8;
64. 10; 87. 5; 89. 6; 95.
2; 97. 1; 99. 9; 106. 7
M. Horatius, cos., iii. 22. 1
Hypana, iv. 77. 9; 79. 4

IAPYGIA, iii. 88. 3
Iason, iv. 39. 6
Iberus, iii. 6. 2; 14. 9; 15.
5; 26. 9; 29. 3; 30. 2;
33. 2; 39. 6; 40. 2; 76. 2;
76. 6; 95. 3; 97. 5
Ilgeretes, iii. 35. 2
Illyria, iii. 16. 1; 16. 3; 18.
3; 19. 12; iv. 16. 6; 29.
3; 55. 2; 66. 8
INDEX

Illyrii, iii. 16. 4; 19. 5; iv. 16. 11; 25. 4; 37. 4; 66. 4
Indibilis (Ἀνδοβάλης), iii. 76. 6
Insabres, iii. 40. 8; 56. 4; 60. 8
Insula (Νῆσος), iii. 49. 5
Io, iv. 43. 6
Isaros, iii. 49. 6
Ister, iv. 40. 1
Isthmus Corinthiacus, iii. 32. 3
Itali, iii. 2. 6; 77. 6; 85. 4; 118. 5
Italia, iii. 2. 2; 15. 13; 16. 4; 27. 1; 32. 2; 34. 5; 35; 39. 6; 44. 8; 47. 5; 49. 2; 54. 2; 57. 1; 59. 9; 61. 3; 76. 5; 77. 7; 87. 4; 90. 13; 91. 7; 96. 9; 97. 2; 110. 9; 111. 9; iv. 28. 3
Ithoria, iv. 64. 9
L. Iunius Brutus, cos., iii. 22. 1

LACEDAEMON, iv. 34. 4
Lacedaemonii, iii. 5. 6; 6. 11; iv. 2. 9; 5. 4; 9. 5; 10; 15. 4; 19. 1; 19. 9; 20. 6; 21. 8; 22. 3; 23. 4; 24. 6; 27. 4; 32. 4; 33. 8; 34. 1; 36. 1; 54. 6; 80. 1; 81. 11
Lacinium, iii. 33. 18; 56. 4
Lacones, iv. 32. 3
Ladicus, iv. 80. 15
Laodice, uxor Seleuci Callinici, iv. 51. 4
Lappaei, iv. 53. 6; 54. 4; 55. 1
Larinas ager, iii. 101. 3
Larisa, iv. 66. 7; 67. 6
Lasion, iv. 72. 7; 74. 1
Latini, iii. 22. 11
Latium, iii. 23. 6; 24. 16; 91. 9
Laurentini, iii. 22. 11
Leonidas, iv. 35. 11
Leontius, iv. 87. 8
Lepreum, iv. 77. 9; 78. 1; 79. 2; 80. 1
Lergetes, iii. 33. 15
Leucae, Peloponnesi, iv. 36. 5
Leuctra (τὰ), iv. 81. 13
Liburnus mons, iii. 100. 2
Libyphoenices, iii. 33. 15
Ligures, iii. 33. 16
Lilibaeum, urb., iii. 41. 2; 61. 9; 68. 14; 96. 12; 106. 7
Lissus, iii. 16. 3; iv. 16. 6
Lucaria, iii. 88. 5; 100. 1
Lusi vel Lusa (τὰ), iv. 18. 9; 25. 4
C. Lutatius Catulus, cos., iii. 20. 2; 29. 2; 30. 3; 40. 8
Lycurgus, iv. 2. 9; 35. 14; 36. 4; 37. 5; 60. 3; 81
Lydiadas, iv. 77. 10
Lyticus, iv. 53. 3; 54
MACCOEI, iii. 33. 15
Macedones, iii. 1. 9; 5. 6; 6. 12; 16. 3; iv. 2. 5; 3; 8. 12; 9. 4; 16. 5; 19. 1; 22. 8; 24. 8; 34; 35. 6; 61. 1; 63. 1; 64. 5; 65. 7; 68. 4; 69. 6; 71; 73. 1; 76; 78. 7; 80. 5; 84. 7; 87. 7
Macedonia, iii. 3. 8; iv. 1. 5; 19. 6; 22. 6; 27. 9; 29. 1; 37. 8; 50. 1; 51. 7; 517
INDEX

57. 1 ; 62. 1 ; 66. 1 ; 85. 3 ; 87. 13
Machatas, iv. 34. 4 ; 36. 1 ; 36. 6
Maeoticus lacus, iv. 39 ; 40 ; 42. 3
Magilus, iii. 44. 5
Mago, Hannibalis frater, iii. 71. 5 ; 79. 4 ; 114. 7
Maharbal, iii. 84. 14 ; 85. 2 ; 86. 4
Mamertini, iii. 26. 6
L. Manlius, iii. 40. 11
Mantinea, iv. 8. 4 ; 38. 8
Mantinenses, iv. 21. 9 ; 27. 6
Marrucinus ager, iii. 88. 3
Mars, iii. 26. 5
Masaesyli, iii. 33. 15
Massilia, iii. 37. 8 ; 47. 4 ; 61. 2
Massilienses, iii. 41. 9 ; 95. 7
Massinissa, iii. 5. 1
Mastia, iii. 24. 2
Mastianae, iii. 33. 9
Masyilii, iii. 33. 15
Megaleas, iv. 87. 8
Megalopolis, iv. 7. 11 ; 9. 1 ; 10. 10 ; 13. 1 ; 25. 4 ; 33. 7 ; 69. 4 ; 77. 10 ; 80. 16 ; 82. 1
Megalopolitani, iv. 6. 3 ; 9. 6 ; 32. 10 ; 33. 9 ; 37. 6 ; 60. 3 ; 81. 11
Megaris, iv. 67. 7
Messapii, iii. 88. 4
Messene, iii. 19. 11 ; 26. 6 ; iv. 3. 12 ; 4 ; 33. 3 ; 33. 7 ; 79. 6 ; 80. 6
Messenii, iv. 3. 6 ; 6 ; 7 . 9 . 2 ; 9. 7 ; 15. 2 ; 31. 1 ; 32. 1 ; 32. 10 ; 33. 1 ; 33. 8 ; 36. 8 ; 77. 8
Metagonia (râ), iii. 33. 12
Methydrium, iv. 10. 10 ; 13. 1
Metropolis, iv. 64. 3
Miccus, iv. 59. 2
M. Minucius, iii. 87. 9 ; 89. 6 ; 92. 4 ; 94. 10 ; 101. 1 ; 102 ; 103. 3 ; 104. 105
Mithradates, iv. 56. 1
Mutina, iii. 40. 8
Mysia, iv. 50. 4 ; 52. 9
Narbo, iii. 37. 8 ; 38. 2 ; 39. 8
Narnia, iii. 88. 8
Naupactus, iv. 16. 9
Neapolis, iii. 91. 4
Nicanor, iv. 48. 8
Nicippus, iv. 31. 2
Nicostratus, iv. 3. 5
Nilus, iii. 37. 3
Nola, iii. 91. 5
Nucerini, iii. 91. 5
Numidae, iii. 33. 15 ; 44. 3 ; 45. 1 ; 55. 8 ; 65. 10 ; 68. 2 ; 69. 6 ; 69. 9 ; 72. 10 ; 73. 3 ; 74. 112. 3 ; 116 ; 117. 12
Oeanthia, iv. 57. 2
Oeniadaceae, iv. 65. 2
Oenis, iv. 31. 2
Ogygus, iv. 1. 5
Olcades, iii. 13. 5 ; 14. 3 ; 33. 9
Olygyrtus, iv. 11. 5 ; 70. 1
Olympia, iv. 10. 5 ; 73. 3 ; 75. 8 ; 77. 5 ; 84. 2 ; 86. 4
Olympiodorus, iv. 47. 4
Omasias, iv. 23. 5 ; 24. 8
Orchomenus, iv. 6. 5 ; 11. 3 ; 12. 13
Oretes, iii. 33. 10
Orophernes, iii. 5. 2

518
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PADUS, iii. 34. 2; 39. 10; 40. 5; 44. 5; 47. 4; 48. 6; 54. 3; 56. 3;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56. 6; 61. 1; 61. 11; 64. 1; 66. 1; 66. 5; 69. 5; 75. 3; 86. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paeanum, iv. 65. 2; 65. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pantaleo, iv. 57. 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parnassus mons, iv. 57. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parthenius mons, iv. 23. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrae, iv. 6. 9; 10. 2; 25. 4; 83. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pella, Macedonieae, iv. 66. 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pellene, Achaeae, iv. 8. 4; 13. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pellene (vel Πελλάνα), Lac-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coniae, iv. 81. 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peloponnesiaci, iii. 3. 7; iv. 1. 7; 7. 7; 32. 9; 67. 7; 69. 9;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77. 1; 82. 6; 84. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peloponnesus, iv. 3. 3; 5. 5; 6. 3; 6. 8; 8. 6; 9. 10; 13. 4; 14. 4;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. 1; 32. 3; 57. 5; 61. 1; 64. 5; 65. 8; 66. 1; 70. 3; 73. 6; 77. 9;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pergamum, iv. 48. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persae, iii. 6; iv. 31. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petraeus, iv. 24. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peucetii, iii. 88. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phaestus, iv. 55. 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharae, urbs Achaeorum, iv. 6. 9; 25. 4; 59. 1; 77. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmaces, iii. 3. 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharus urbs, iii. 18. 2; 18. 7; 19. 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phasis, iv. 56. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phelias, iv. 9. 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pheneus, iv. 68. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phialia, Phigalia, iv. 3. 5; 6. 10; 31. 1; 79. 5; 80. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philaeni arca, iii. 39. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philinus, iii. 26. 2; 26. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippus, Amyntae filius, iii. 2. 3; 2. 8; 3. 2; 6. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippus, Demetrii filius, pater Persei, iv. 2. 5; 5. 4; 9. 3;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. 7; 15. 1; 16. 1; 19. 1; 22. 1; 23; 24. 4; 26. 3; 27. 9; 29. 1;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. 1; 34. 10; 36. 7; 37. 7; 55. 1; 57. 1; 61. 1; 63. 1; 64. 2;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65. 5; 66. 5; 67. 6; 68. 1; 69. 8; 70. 5; 71; 72. 2; 75. 1; 76; 77;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78. 13; 80. 81. 1; 81. 11; 82. 1; 83. 3; 84. 1; 85; 86. 3; 87. 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phyllidas, iv. 77. 7; 78. 1; 79. 2; 80. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philoxenus, iv. 20. 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phlegarei campi, iii. 91. 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phlius, iv. 67. 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoci, iv. 9. 4; 15. 1; 25. 2; 55. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoebidas, iv. 27. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix, iii. 2. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoetiae, iv. 63. 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phrixus, iv. 77. 9; 80. 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picensus ager, iii. 86. 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pieria, iv. 62. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pindar, iv. 31. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisa, iii. 56. 6; 96. 9; iv. 74. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placentia, iii. 40. 5; 66. 9; 74. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plator, iv. 55. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polemocles, iv. 52. 2; 53. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polichna, iv. 36. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyphonatas, iv. 22. 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyrrhenii, iv. 53. 6; 55. 1; 61. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontus Euxinus, ii. 2. 6; iv. 38. 2; 39; 40; 41; 42; 43. 1; 44. 4;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. 6; 50. 3; 52. 5; 56. 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

519
INDEX

L. Postumius Albinus, praetor, iii. 106. 6
Praetutianus, iii. 88. 3
Prasiae, iv. 36. 5
Prolaus, iv. 72. 9
Propontis, iv. 39. 1; 43. 1; 44. 6
Propus, iv. 11. 6
Prusias, iii. 2. 4; 3. 6; 5. 2;
iv. 47. 7; 48. 4; 48. 13;
50; 51; 52
Psophis, iv. 68. 1; 69. 2;
70. 2; 70. 7; 71. 13; 72. 8;
73. 1
Ptolemaeus Euergetes, iv. 1. 9
Ptolemaeus Philopater, iii.
2. 4; 2. 5; iv. 2. 8; 30. 8;
37. 5; 51. 1
Ptolemais, iv. 37. 5
Pulchrum promontorium, iii.
22. 5; 23. 1; 23. 4; 24. 2
Pyreneus monts, ἡ Πυρήνη,
iii. 35. 2; 35. 7; 37. 9; 39. 4;
40. 1; 41. 6
Pyrgus, iv. 77. 9; 80. 13
Pyrrhus, iii. 25. 1; 32. 2
Pythias, iv. 72. 9
Rhium, promontorium, iv.
10. 4; 19. 6; 64. 2
Rhodanus, iii. 35. 7; 37. 8;
39. 8; 41. 5; 42. 2; 47. 2;
48. 6; 49. 5; 60. 5; 61. 2;
64. 6; 76. 1
Rhodii, iii. 2. 5; 3. 2; 3. 7;
iv. 19. 8; 37. 8; 47; 48;
50; 52. 2; 53; 56
Rhodus, iv. 50. 8
Romae, iii. 2. 2; 15. 1; 16. 6; 19. 12; 24. 13; 40. 13;
54. 3; 61. 6; 68. 9; 68. 12; 75. 1; 82. 6; 85. 7;
86. 6; 87. 8; 88. 8; 92. 2;
94. 9; 96. 10; 103. 1; 105. 9; 107. 6; 112. 6; 118. 4
Romani, iii. 2. 1; 3. 1; 4. 2;
4. 12; 5. 1; 6. 1; 8. 6;
9. 6; 10; 11; 15; 16; 17;
18; 20; 21; 23; 24; 25;
29; 34; 40; 44; 45; 48;
59. 3; 59. 9; 60. 12; 63. 5;
63. 13; 65. 1; 66. 9;
67; 69; 71; 72; 73; 74;
76; 77; 84; 85; 89; 90;
94; 95. 7; 96–98; 99;
107; 110; 115; 116; 117;
iv. 1; 16. 6; 37. 4; 66. 4
Saguntini, iii. 8. 1; 8. 7;
14. 9; 15. 1; 16. 5; 21. 5;
29. 1; 30. 1; 37. 4; iv.
66. 9
Saguntum, ἡ Ζάκαρθα, iii. 6.
1; 17. 1; 20. 1; 30. 3;
61. 8; 97. 6; 98; 99. 5;
iv. 28. 1
Salmantica, ἡ Ελμαντική, iii.
14. 1
Samicum, iv. 77. 9; 80. 6
Samnites, iii. 90. 7
Samnium, iii. 91. 9
Samus, iii. 2. 8
Sarapis, iv. 39. 6
Sardinia, iii. 10. 3; 13. 1; 15.
10; 22. 10; 23. 4; 24. 11;
27. 8; 30. 4; 75. 4; 96. 9
Sardoumar, iii. 37. 8;
41. 7; 47. 2
Serdilaiadas, iv. 16. 6; 16.
9; 16. 11; 29
Sciron, iv. 4. 3
Scopas, iv. 5. 1; 5. 9; 6. 5;
9. 8; 14. 4; 16. 11; 19.
12; 27. 1; 37. 1; 62. 1
INDEX

Scythea, iv. 43. 2
Selcucus Callinicus, iv. 51. 5
Selcucus Ceraunus, iv. 1. 9; 2. 7; 48. 6
Selasia, iv. 69. 5
T. Sempronius Longus, cos., iii. 40. 2; 41. 2; 61. 9; 68. 6; 68. 12; 69. 8; 70. 72. 1; 72. 10; 74. 2; 75. 1; iv. 66. 9
Cn. Servilius Geminus, cos., iii. 75. 5; 77. 2; 86. 1; 96. 11; 97. 1; 106. 2; 107. 7; 114. 6
Sestus, iv. 44. 6; 50. 5
Sicilia, iii. 3. 1; 9. 7; 13. 1; 20. 2; 22. 10; 23. 4; 24. 12; 25. 1; 26. 4; 29. 4; 32. 2; 75. 4; 96. 12; 108. 7
Sicilienses, iii. 2. 6
Siculm mare, iv. 63. 5
Sicyon, iv. 8. 4; 57. 5; 67. 8; 68
Sinoke, iv. 56. 1; 57. 1
Sinuessa, iii. 91. 4
Sostratus, artex statuaris, iv. 78. 5
Sosyllus, iii. 20. 5
Sparta, iv. 22. 8; 34. 9; 35. 8; 36. 1
Sthenelaus, iv. 22. 11
Stratus, iv. 63. 10; 64. 2; 73. 3
Styllum, iv. 77. 9; 80. 13
Stympalus, iv. 68. 1; 68. 5
Syrtis maior, iii. 23. 2; 39. 2
Tagus, iii. 14. 5
Tanaist, iii. 37. 3; 38. 2
Tannetis, iii. 40. 13
Tarentini, iii. 118. 3; iv. 77. 7
Tarentum, iii. 75. 4
Tarracinenses, iii. 22. 11; 24. 16
Tarraco, iii. 76. 12; 95. 5
Tarseium, iii. 24. 2
Taurini, iii. 60. 8
Taurion, iv. 6. 4; 10. 2; 10. 6; 19. 7; 80. 3; 87. 1; 87. 8
Taurus mons, iii. 3. 4; iv. 2. 7; 48. 3
Teanitae, iii. 91. 5
Tegea, iv. 22. 3; 23. 3; 82. 1
Telphusa, iv. 73. 3; 77. 5
C. Terentius Varro, cos., iii. 106. 1; 110; 112. 4; 114. 6; 116. 13
Thalamae, iv. 75. 2; 84. 2
Thebaci, iv. 23. 9; 27. 5; 31. 5
Theodotus Aetolus, iv. 37. 5
Thersitae, iii. 33. 9
Thessali, iv. 9. 4; 76. 1
Thessalia, iv. 57. 1; 61. 1; 62. 1; 66. 5; 67. 7
Thraces, iv. 38. 6; 45. 9; 46. 2; 46. 4; 51. 8; 66. 6
Thracia, iv. 39. 6; 44. 9; 45. 1
Thyestes, iv. 22. 11
Thyreum, Thuriurn, iv. 6. 3; 25. 3
Tiboces, iv. 50. 1; 51; 52. 8
Tichos, iv. 59. 5; 83. 1
Ticinus, iii. 64. 1
Timaeus, Aetolorum dux, iv. 34. 9
Timaeus historicus, iii. 32. 2
Timarchus, iv. 53. 2
Timotheus, iv. 20. 9

521
## INDEX

| Timoxenus, iv. 6. 4; 7. 6; 82. 8 | Tyrus, iii. 24. 1; iv. 37. 5 |
| Tisamenus, iv. 1. 5 | Vaccaei, iii. 5. 1; 14. 1 |
| Trasumenum lacus, iii. 82. 9 | Venusia, iii. 116. 13 |
| Trebia, iii. 67. 9; 68. 4; 69. 5; 72. 4; 108. 7 | Vibonium, iii. 88. 6 |
| Triphylia, iv. 77. 5; 79. 1; 80. 15; 81. 1 | Umbri, iii. 86. 9 |
| Triphyllos, iv. 77. 8 | Utica, iii. 24. 2 |
| Tripolis, iv. 81. 7 | Xenophantes, iv. 50, 5 |
| Tritaea, Tritaea, iv. 6. 9; 59. 1 | Xenophon, iii. 6. 9 |
| Tula, Tulis, iv. 46. 2 | Zarax, iv. 36. 5 |
| Tympaneae, iv. 77. 9; 78. 1; 79. 2 | |

*Printed in Great Britain by R. & R. Clark, Limited, Edinburgh.*
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

VOLUMES ALREADY PUBLISHED.

Latin Authors.


AUSONIUS. H. G. Evelyn White. 2 Vols.

BOETHIUS. TRACTS AND DE CONSOLATIONE PHILOSOPHIÆ.


CAESAR: CIVIL WARS. A. G. Peskett. (2nd Imp.)

CAESAR: GALLIC WAR. H. J. Edwards. (2nd Imp.)

CATULLUS. F. W. Cornish; TIBULlus. J. P. Postgate; and PER-VIGILIUM VENERIS. J. W. Mackail. (5th Imp.)

CICERO: DE FINIBUS. H. Rackham. (2nd Imp.)

CICERO: DE OFFICIIS. Walter Miller. (2nd Imp.)

CICERO: LETTERS TO ATTICUS. E. O. Winstedt. 3 vols. (2nd Imp.)

CLAUDIAN. M. Platnauer. 2 Vols.

CONFessions OF ST. AUGUSTINE. W. Watts (1631). 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)

FRONTO: CORRESPONDENCE. C. R. Haines. 2 Vols.

HORACE: ODES AND EPODES. C. E. Bennett. (4th Imp.)

JUVENAL AND PERSIUS. G. G. Ramsay. (2nd Imp.)


MARTIAL. W. C. Ker. 2 Vols.

OVID: HEROIDES AND AMORES. Grant Showerman. (2nd Imp.)

OVID: METAMORPHOSES. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Ed.)

PETRONIUS. M. Heseltine; SENECA: APOCOLOCYNTOSIS. W. H. D.

Rousse. (3rd Imp.)

PLAUTUS. Paul Nixon. 5 Vols. Vols. I. and II.

PLINY: LETTERS. Melmoth's translation revised by W. M. L. Hutchinson. 2 Vols.

PROPERTIUS. H. E. Butler. (2nd Imp.)

QUINTILIAN. H. E. Butler. 4 Vols.

SALLUST. J. C. Rolfe.

SCRIPTORES HISTORIAE AUGUSTAE. D. Magie. 4 Vols. Vol. I.


I. and II.

SENeca: TRAGEDIES. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols.

SUETONIUS. J. C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)

TACITUS: DIALOGUS. Sir Wm. Peterson; and AGRICOLA AND GERMANIA. Maurice Hutton. (2nd Imp.)

TERENCE. John Sargeaunt. 2 Vols. (3rd Imp.)

VIRGIL. H. R. Fairclough. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.)
Greek Authors.

ACHILLES TATIUS. S. Gaselee.
AESCHINES. C. D. Adams.
APOLLODORUS. Sir J. G. Frazer. 2 Vols.
APOLLONIUS RHODIUS. R. C. Seaton. (2nd Imp.)
THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS. Kirsopp Lake. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)
APPIAN'S ROMAN HISTORY. Horace White. 4 Vols.
CALLIMACHUS AND LYCOPHRON. A. W. Mair; ARATUS. G. R. Mair.
CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Rev. G. W. Butterworth.
DAPHNIS AND CLIO. Thornley's translation revised by J. M.
Edmonds; and PARTHENIUS. S. Gaselee.
DIO CASSIUS: ROMAN HISTORY. E. Cary. 9 Vols. Vols. I. to VI.
EURIPIDES. A. S. Way. 4 Vols. (3rd Imp.)
GALEN: ON THE NATURAL FACULTIES. A. J. Brock.
THE GREEK ANTHOLOGY. W. R. Paton. 8 Vols. (2nd Imp.)
THE GREEK BUCOLIC POETS (THEOCRITUS, BION, MOSCHUS).
J. M. Edmonds. (3rd Imp.)
HERODOTUS. A. D. Godley. 4 Vols. Vols. I. and II.
HESIOD AND THE HOMERIC HYMNS. H. G. Evelyn White. (2nd Imp.)
HOMER: ODYSSEY. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols.
JULIAN. Wilmer Cave Wright. 3 Vols. Vols. I. and II.
LUCIAN. A. M. Harmon. 8 Vols. Vols. I. to III. (2nd Imp.)
LYRA GRAECA. J. M. Edmonds. 3 Vols. Vol. I.
MARCUS AURELIUS. C. R. Haines.
MENANDER. F. G. Allinson.
PAUSANIAS: DESCRIPTION OF GREECE. W. H. S. Jones. 5 Vols.
PHILOSTRATUS: THE LIFE OF APOLLONIUS OF TYANA. F. C.
Conybeare. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)
PHILOSTRATUS AND EUNAPIUS: LIVES OF THE SOPHISTS.
Wilmer Cave Wright.
PINDAR. Sir J. E. Sandys. (2nd Ed.)
PLATO: EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, PHAEDO, PHAEDRUS.
H. N. Fowler. (3rd Imp.)
PLATO: THEAETETUS, SOPHIST. H. N. Fowler.
PLUTARCH: THE PARALLEL LIVES. B. Perrin. 11 Vols.
Vols. I. to X.
POLYBIUS. W. R. Paton. 6 Vols. Vols. I. and II.
Vols. I to III.
QUINTUS SMYRNAEUS. A. S. Way.
SOPHOCLES. F. Storr. 2 Vols. (3rd Imp.)
ST. JOHN DAMASCENE: BARLAAM AND IOASAPH. Rev. G. R.
Woodward and Harold Mattingly.
THEOPHRASTUS: ENQUIRY INTO PLANTS. Sir Arthur Hort, Bart.
2 Vols.
THUCYDIDES. C. F. Smith. 4 Vols. Vols. I. to III.
XENOPHON: CYROPAEDIA. Walter Miller. 2 Vols.
XENOPHON: HELLENICA, ANABASIS, APOLOGY, AND SYM-
POSIMUM. C. L. Brownson and O. J. Tod. 3 Vols.