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Polybius

Polybius,
Immanuel Bekker
POLYBIUS

THE HISTORIES

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

W. R. PATON

IN SIX VOLUMES

I

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Quare historiae huius non postrema haec laus est, quod in parte versetur rerum Romanarum longe nobilissima, sive virorum virtutem spectes, sive publica instituta aut mores, sive gestorum magnitudinem. Cum autem inter excellentis historiae condiciones doctissimi veterum hanc cum primis ponant, ut certi intervallo temporis circumscribatur, et a notabili principio ad notabilem finem perducatur, hanc historiae legem, ut quidem illis placet, a Polybio mirifice esse observatam invenimus.

Casaubon.
INTRODUCTION

Polybius was born about 208 B.C. at Megalopolis in Arcadia. His father, Lycortas, who spent the greater part of his life—more especially the years 181–168 B.C.—in the service of the Achaean League, was a friend and supporter of Philopoemen; he went as ambassador to Rome in 189, to Ptolemy Epiphanes, king of Egypt, in 186 and again in 181; and he was Strategus of the League in 184. In his youth Polybius began to take part in public affairs. He seems to have served with the Romans in the campaign of 189 against the Gauls in Asia Minor; he carried the urn of Philopoemen to burial in 183; he was associated with his father Lycortas in the embassy to Egypt in 181; and he was Hipparchus of the Achaean League for the year 169–8.

Throughout the period (181–168) of political association with his father Polybius consistently maintained the view that the supremacy of Rome in Greece must be accepted, and that the Greek states must conduct their affairs, whether singly or collectively, and preserve their freedom, without giving any offence, or cause of complaint, to the Roman republic. But there was much intriguing, in Greece and at Rome, against this policy of legal independence; and the suspicions of the Romans were so far aroused
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that they came to regard the independents with no less displeasure than the avowed enemies of the republic. Thus, though the Achaean League maintained correctly enough this policy of a strict legality during the third war between Rome and Macedon (172–168), its leaders were quickly brought to account after the defeat of King Perseus at Pydna (168 B.C.), and no less than a thousand Achaeans were transported to Italy to be tried for their alleged opposition to the sovereignty of Rome. Of this company was Polybius—we hear nothing more of his father Lycortas: he may have died about this time. Quartered in Italian cities, these Greeks waited for the trial which never came; and at last in 151 B.C., when after sixteen years liberty was given to them to return home, there were less than three hundred of the thousand left to go back.

Polybius was more fortunate than the rest. He had become acquainted with Aemilius Paulus and his two sons during the campaign against Perseus and afterwards in Macedonia, and now in 167 he was allowed to remain in Rome in the house of Aemilius, to act as tutor to the two boys. This was the beginning of that famous friendship between Polybius and the younger son, who became by adoption Publius Scipio Aemilianus. Panaetius, the Stoic philosopher, was also an inmate of Aemilius Paulus' house about this time, exercising—perhaps in rivalry with Polybius—a tutorial influence upon the sons. Polybius had access through Aemilius Paulus to the best of Roman society during those sixteen years of expatriation in Italy, and he made good use of his opportunities. He studied the history and institutions of Rome, doubtless with a view to viii
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the history that he meant to write himself; he observed Roman life and character, in the individual and in the state; he hunted the boar with the younger sportsmen.

The Romans appreciated the ability and the versatility of Polybius, and in 149 B.C.—less than two years after his return to Arcadia—invited his assistance in the diplomatic discussions that preceded the last Punic War. And when Publius Scipio rejoined the army before Carthage in 147 as commander-in-chief, Polybius was in close attendance, to advise on questions of siege operations, or to conduct explorations on the coast of Africa in ships officially supplied. He stood by Scipio’s side while Carthage was burning (146 B.C.); and when that destruction was finished he returned to Greece, in time, if not to witness the sack of Corinth by Mummius, at any rate to modify the executions of the Romans and to rescue some of the treasures of art from destruction or deportation. And when the Roman commissioners withdrew from Greece, they left Polybius with authority to settle the details for the administration of each surviving city. Thus he came to be regarded as a public benefactor, for he had done his work well; and statues were raised to him in Megalopolis, Mantinea, Tegea, Olympia, and elsewhere.

Polybius lived for some twenty years after this work was done, but we know little or nothing about his employments. He may have joined Scipio during the siege of Numantia in Spain (134–132): he visited Egypt again: his travels in Europe, Asia, and perhaps in Africa, may have been continued and

1 Cf. vi. 56, on the moral tone of the Romans.
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extended in this period; and his literary work—there were, in addition to the History, a Life of Philopoemen in three books, a Treatise on Tactics, and a History of the Numantine War—must have occupied much of his time. A sportsman to the last, he met his death at eighty-two by an accidental fall from his horse as he was returning from the country.

The project of writing a history of the age probably suggested itself to Polybius, and was certainly developed, during the years of his detention in Italy. Expatriation loosened the links with Greece, and tightened the connexion with Rome. His original scheme was to record the rise of Rome to supremacy over the Mediterranean states in the years 220–168 B.C., i.e. from the beginning of the Second Punic War to the end of the Third Macedonian War. He subsequently extended this scheme in order to include an account of events from the first expedition of the Romans outside Italy (i.e. from the beginning of the First Punic War, in 264 B.C., the point where the history of Timaeus had ended) and to continue the record to the year (146 B.C.) which witnessed the destruction of Carthage and of Corinth. In the end the History consisted of forty books, of which the first two were introductory (πρωκατασκευή), the next thirty dealt with the main subject, and the last eight with the corollary. Of the forty books the first five only are preserved complete: of the rest there are only sections and fragments—numerous, it is true, but of varying length and importance—gathered from epitomes and excerpts.

Polybius was keenly alive to the greatness of his subject: he never forgot it himself, and he did
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not allow his readers to forget it. "Fruitful as Fortune is in change, and constantly as she is producing dramas in the life of men, yet assuredly never before this did she work such a marvel, or act such a drama, as that which we have witnessed."1 "What man is so indifferent or so idle that he would not wish to know how and under what form of government almost all the inhabited world came under the single rule of the Romans in less than fifty-three years (220–168 B.C.)?" 2 Thus at the outset he stated the scheme of his work; several times in the earlier books 3 he repeated the formula, for such it was, explaining in due course the extension of the scheme 4 in order to provide a proper introduction and conclusion; and in the last surviving chapter of the last book 5 he acknowledged the completion of his purpose. Careful to observe throughout the proportion and the continuity of things, he composed his treatise (πραγματεία) to be at once "catholic" (καθ’ ἔλοι) in its relation to the general history of the world, and "pragmatic" or "apodeictic" in its conscious demonstration of the principle of cause and effect.6 And so he made his work "perhaps the greatest universal history, or history of the civilized world, attempted in old times." 7 Was there ever a book, indeed, written so strictly according to plan, by a person so well qualified?

For indeed it seemed that destiny itself had called and trained Polybius to this task. The son of a statesman, he spent the first forty years of his life in actual connexion with politics, diplomacy, and war;

1 i. 4. 2 i. 1. 3 e.g. iii. 1–3, 31, 32. 4 iii. 4. 5 xlv. 14. 6 iii. 6–8. 7 Mahaffy, Greek Life and Thought, p. 556.
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and he naturally came to regard it as an indispensable qualification of a historian that he should be able to record his own experiences of peace and war, describing from his own knowledge men and circumstances, events and localities. As a man of action himself, he felt the necessity of first-hand evidence wherever it was obtainable, and spared no pains to obtain it; and he had no opinion of stay-at-home historians (like Timaeus) who lived in libraries and wrote as bookmen. Nevertheless, in the technical preparation of his work Polybius was cautious and painstaking beyond all others: he was a practical man, but he did not despise theory. So far and with his travels, extensive and systematic as they were, he made a special study of geography—embodying many of his observations in Book xxxiv., which is almost entirely geographical; and with his visits, official or unofficial, to various countries, he combined an examination of documents and records—and all, no doubt, to make his work correct, continuous, and complete. He may not have been a great general, or diplomat, or even topographer; but he was always careful, and generally right in his conclusions. He was impelled and guided by a natural instinct for truth: "For as a living creature is rendered wholly useless if deprived of its eyes, so if you take truth from history, what is left is but an idle unprofitable tale?" Truth, he says elsewhere, is shown by nature to mankind as supreme in divinity and power: sooner or later, truth must prevail over all opposition.  

It is worth while to consider a little further what

1 e.g. he crossed the Alps by the pass which Hannibal was believed to have used.  
2 i. 14.  
3 xiii. 5.
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was the position of Polybius in Greece—for in a sense it was typical of his age—and what his point of view. He was a native of Megalopolis, a city whose very foundation in the fourth century had been an experiment in federal unity. By birth and instinct an aristocrat, he had no sympathy with democratic survivals or demagogic outbreaks. As a statesman he realized that the old Greek ideas of freedom and independence, centred in the city-state, were gone, nor ever likely to return, except so far as was possible under the suzerainty of Rome—or rather, in the reconciliation of Roman rule and Greek intellect. Early in his career he saw that the Roman power was inevitable and irresistible; and therefore he strove by skilful diplomacy to guide and keep the Achaean League, and the Greeks in general, in ways that were correct and unexceptionable. He was a Stoic, and he believed that the Roman order of things was part of a divine Providence that ruled the world. This belief, confirmed by his closer acquaintance with the Romans, and by their progress in conquest, he expounded in his History, with such detail of causes, circumstances, and consequences as to show that he understood the position and the prospects of the Romans in the Mediterranean world far more clearly than at that time they themselves were able to do.

Polybius lived in a self-conscious age, when criticism was mostly captious and destructive, and standards of right and wrong, of truth and falsehood, were unsteady and uncertain. In the History he himself criticizes other writers freely enough, often at great length\(^1\), and with a severity that became \(^1\) e.g. Timaeus in Book xii.

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proverbial. Was he not nicknamed ἐπιτίμαως for his treatment of Timaeus in particular? He divides historians into three classes: those who write for pay—to suit the pleasure or the plans of kings and states; those who write for rhetorical display; those who write for truth, and for the good of mankind.\(^1\) He appreciates the power of rhetoric in history for good and ill; but he avoids such assistance in his own work, for fear that he may fail to tell “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” He employs the vocabulary of ordinary usage; and though his statements are always clear, and generally adequate, the style is seldom remarkable or attractive. Yet in the opinion of a great historian “the narrative is a model of completeness, simplicity, and clearness”\(^2\): it is the concentration of intellect upon a task—a vital century in the history of Rome—for which something besides intellect was needed, something of moral judgement, of spiritual understanding. In this respect—the larger humanity, where a sense of imagination joins with a sense of humour to modify the mechanism of intellect—Polybius is certainly lacking; and his narrative, for all its simplicity and clearness, fails often to interest just because it is so uniformly correct, so invariably instructive.

The work of Polybius was valued in ancient times, and not least by the Romans. Was his History intended primarily for Roman readers? Possibly: but at first it would scarcely be comprehended by more than a few of them, such as the Scipionic circle.

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\(^1\) xvi. 14.

\(^2\) Mommsen, History of Rome (English Translation), vol. iii. p. 467.
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And to many, if not most, of the Greeks of his own day he must have seemed something of a suspect, and no proper patriot, who could devote forty books to an outspoken appreciation of all things Roman. Yet, save for his lack of rhetoric, he was thought to have exemplified every virtue of history: his opinions were frequently quoted, his works were compressed into epitomes and reproduced in excerpts. The pity is that by such abridged editions we have been deprived of the means of forming a just estimate of his work as a whole. For what was chosen for survival in epitome or excerpt, because it appeared most interesting or important in the generations that followed his own, cannot give us the whole story as Polybius told it—the σχῆμα καθ' ἀλον καὶ μέρος, we might almost say—nor reveal the whole mind of Polybius. Yet enough remains to establish his worth, as a historian who was generally right in point of fact and reasonable in point of view, who “accomplished what he had intended, a history to guide life, to proclaim truth, and in all sagacity to forecast the future from the past.”

For the books (i.-v.) which are still extant in complete form the best Manuscript is A, Codex Vaticanus 124, of the eleventh century. Fragments of the lost books are to be seen in F, Codex Urbinas 102, of the eleventh century, in the Constantine Excerpts, and in M, Codex Vaticanus 73, of the tenth century, a palimpsest containing excerpts. The Constantine Excerpts, so called because they

1 Wyttenbach, Praefatio ad selecta principum histori- corum.

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were made by direction of the Byzantine Emperor Constantine (A.D. 912–959) as part of an Encyclopaedia of History and Political Science, give passages of Polybius arranged under various headings according to the subject matter.

H. J. EDWARDS.

The Translator died suddenly in 1921, and the Editors have seen the work through the press. The Introduction has been supplied by Colonel Edwards, C.B.
THE HISTORIES OF
POLYBIUS
ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

ΙΣΤΟΡΙΩΝ ΠΡΩΤΗ

1 Εἰ μὲν τοῖς πρὸ ἦμῶν ἀναγράφουσι τὰς πράξεις παραλειφθαί συνεβαίνε τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς ἱστορίας ἔπαινον, ὡσθε ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τὸ προτρέπεσθαι πάντα πρὸς τὴν αἱρέσιν καὶ παραδοχὴν τῶν τωιοτῶν ὑπομνημάτων, διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐτοιμεραν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διόρθωσι τῆς τῶν

2 προγεγενημένων πράξεων ἐπιστήμης. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ τινὲς οὐδ' ἐπὶ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ὡς ἐποίεν ἀρχῇ καὶ τέλει κέχρηται τούτῳ, φάσκοντες ἀληθωστάτην μὲν εἶναι παραίτως καὶ γνωμασίαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας μάθησιν, ἐναργεστάτην δὲ καὶ μόνην διδάσκαλον τοῦ δύνασθαι τὰς τῆς τύχης μεταβολὰς γενναῖως ὑποθέσει τὴν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων περιπετειών ὑπομνήσειν, δῆλον

3 ὃς ουδενὶ μὲν ἂν δόξαι καθήκεν περὶ τῶν καλῶς καὶ πολλοῖς εἰρημένων ταυτολογεῖν, ἦκιστα δ' ἦμῖν. 4 αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξον τῶν πράξεων, ὑπὲρ ὧν προηρήμεθα γράφειν, ἴκανον ἐστὶ προκαλέσασθαι καὶ παρορμῆσαι πάντα καὶ νέον καὶ πρεσβύτερον 5 πρὸς τὴν ἐνεπεξεργαζόμενη ἡγεμονίας. τὸς γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει φαύλος ἢ ράθυμος ἀνθρώπων ὡς ὁμίκρον ἂν βούλοιτο γνώναι πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπι-
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BOOK I

1. Had previous chroniclers neglected to speak in praise of History in general, it might perhaps have been necessary for me to recommend everyone to choose for study and welcome such treatises as the present, since there is no more ready corrective of conduct than knowledge of the past. But all historians, one may say without exception, and in no half-hearted manner, but making this the beginning and end of their labour, have impressed on us that the soundest education and training for a life of active politics is the study of History, and that the surest and indeed the only method of learning how to bear bravely the vicissitudes of fortune, is to recall the calamities of others. Evidently therefore no one, and least of all myself, would think it his duty at this day to repeat what has been so well and so often said. For the very element of unexpectedness in the events I have chosen as my theme will be sufficient to challenge and incite young and old alike to peruse these pages. For who is so worthless or indolent as not to wish to know by what means and under what system of polity the Romans in
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κρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἀπαντὰ τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν οἷς ὅλοις πεντῆκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωμαίων, δὴ πρότερον οὐχ ἐυρίσκεται γεγονός, τὸς δὲ πάλιν οὕτως ἐκπαθής πρὸς τὶ τῶν ἄλλων θεαμάτων ἢ μαθημάτων ὁς προφυγαίτερον οὐ τι ποιῆσαι τῇ ἀρχῇ ἐμπεφράσα.

2 'Ὡς δ' ἔστι παράδοξον καὶ μέγα τὸ περὶ τῆς ἴμμετέραν ὑπόθεσιν θεώρημα γένοιτ' οὐτος μᾶλιστ' ἐμφανὲς, εἰ τὰς ἐλλογμυστάτας τῶν προγεγενημένων δυναστείων, περὶ ὅσοι συγγραφεῖς τοὺς πλεῖστους διατέθειται λόγους, παραβάλομεν καὶ συγκρίνοιμεν πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαίων ὑπεροχήν. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ τῆς παραβολῆς ἡξιά καὶ συγκρίσεως αὕτη. Πέρσαι κατὰ τινας καυροὺς μεγάλην ἀρχὴν κατεκτήσαντο καὶ δυναστείαν ἀλλ' ὅσα καὶ ἔτολμησαν ὑπερβῆναι τοὺς τῆς Ἀσίας ὄρους, οὐ μόνον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἂλλα καὶ περὶ σφῶν ἐκινδύνευσαν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι πολλοὶ ἀμφισβητήσαντες χρόνους ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας, ἐπειδὴ ποτ' ἐκράτησαν, μόλις ἐτή διώδεκα κατείχον αὐτὴν ἀδήμων. Μακεδόνες τῆς μὲν Εὐρώπης ἠρξαν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἀδριαν τῶν ὕπων ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰστρόν ποταμὸν, δ' ἐμπρὸς παντελώς ἄν καθορίζως μὲν ἡ προερχόμενης χώρας. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα προσέλαβόν τιν ἡ Ἀσίας ἀρχὴν, καταλύοντες τὴν τῶν Περσῶν δυναστείαν. ἂλλ' ὅμως οὕτως πλείστων δόξαντες καὶ τόπων καὶ πραγμάτων γενέσθαι κύριοι, τὸ πολὺ μέρος ἄκμην ἀπέλιπον τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀλλότριον. Σωκλάς μὲν γὰρ καὶ Σαρδοὺς καὶ Λαβύθως οὐδ' ἐπεβάλοντο καθάπαξ ἀμφισβητεῖν, τῆς δ' Εὐρώπης τὰ μαχαίρια γενναὶ τῶν προσεπορίων ἐθνῶν ἵσχυσι εἰπεῖν οὖν ἐγί-
BOOK I

less than fifty-three years have succeeded in subjecting nearly the whole inhabited world to their sole government—a thing unique in history? Or who again is there so passionately devoted to other spectacles or studies as to regard anything as of greater moment than the acquisition of this knowledge?

2. How striking and grand is the spectacle presented by the period with which I purpose to deal, will be most clearly apparent if we set beside and compare with the Roman dominion the most famous empires of the past, those which have formed the chief theme of historians. Those worthy of being thus set beside it and compared are these. The Persians for a certain period possessed a great rule and dominion, but so often as they ventured to overstep the boundaries of Asia they imperilled not only the security of this empire, but their own existence. The Lacedaemonians, after having for many years disputed the hegemony of Greece, at length attained it but to hold it uncontested for scarce twelve years. The Macedonian rule in Europe extended but from the Adriatic to the Danube, which would appear a quite insignificant portion of the continent. Subsequently, by overthrowing the Persian empire they became supreme in Asia also. But though their empire was now regarded as the greatest in extent and power that had ever existed, they left the larger part of the inhabited world as yet outside it. For they never even made a single attempt on Sicily, Sardinia, or Africa, and the most warlike nations of Western Europe were, to speak the simple truth, unknown
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7 νωσκον. Ἡ Ῥωμαίοι γε μὴν οὐ τινὰ μέρη, σχεδὸν δὲ πᾶσαν πεποιημένου τὴν οἰκουμένην ὑπήκοον αὐτοῖς, .. . σιω, ἀνυπέρβλητον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιγνομένοις ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τέχνου τῆς αὐτῶν. 8 δυναστείας .. . ἐκ τῆς γραφῆς. 1 έξεσται σαφέστερον κατανοεῖν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ πόσα καὶ πηλίκα συμβάλλεσθαι πέφυκε τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσιν ὁ τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας τρόπος.

3 Αρξεῖ δὲ τῆς πραγματείας ἡμῖν τῶν μὲν χρόνων ὀλυμπιάς ἐκάτοστη καὶ τετταρακοστή, τῶν δὲ πράξεων παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ἐλλησιον ὁ προσαγορευθεὶς συμμαχικός πόλεμος, ὁν πρῶτον ἔξηγεν, τῷ Ἀχαϊῶν πρὸς Αἰτωλῶν Φίλιππος, Δημητρίου μὲν νίός, πατὴρ δὲ Περσέως, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς τῆς Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦσιν ὁ περὶ Κοίλης Συρίας, ὃν Ἀντίοχος καὶ

2 Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Φιλοπάτωρ ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἄλλην. ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Λιβυκήν τόποις ὁ συστὰς Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδόνιοις, ὃν οἱ πλείστοι προσαγορεύουσιν Ἀννιβιάκον, ταῦτα ὅ ἐστι συνεχῆ τοῖς τελευταίοις τῆς παρ᾽ Ἀράτου

3 Σικυωνίου συντάξεως. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρὸ τοῦ τῶν χρόνων ὡς ἐν τῇ παράδεισεν συνεβαίνει τὰς τῆς οἰκουμενής πράξεις, διὰ τὸ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιβολάς, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς συντελεῖς αὐτῶν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς τόπους ἐκάστα τῶν πεπραγμένων.

4 ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων τῶν καρκῶν οἶνον εἰ σωματειδὴ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὴν ἱστορίαν, συμπλέκεσθαι τε τὰς Ἰταλικὰς καὶ Λιβυκὰς πράξεις ταῖς τε κατὰ τὴν

1 In this passage the ms. A is partly illegible. The English is only meant to show the probable sense of what is missing.

6
BOOK I

to them. But the Romans have subjected to their rule not portions, but nearly the whole of the world, and possess an empire which is not only immeasurably greater than any which preceded it, but need not fear rivalry in the future. In the course of this work it will become more clearly intelligible by what steps this power was acquired, and it will also be seen how many and how great advantages accrue to the student from the systematic treatment of history.

3. The date from which I propose to begin is the 140th Olympiad [220–216 B.C.], and the events are the following: (1) in Greece the so-called Social War, the first waged against the Aetolians by the Achaeans in league with and under the leadership of Philip of Macedon, the son of Demetrius and father of Perseus, (2) in Asia the war for Coele-Syria between Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator, (3) in Italy, Africa, and the adjacent regions, the war between Rome and Carthage, usually known as the Hannibalic War. These events immediately succeed those related at the end of the work of Aratus of Sicyon. Previously the doings of the world had been, so to say, dispersed, as they were held together by no unity of initiative, results, or locality; but ever since this date history has been an organic whole, and the affairs of Italy and Africa have been inter-
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'Ασίαν καὶ ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς καὶ πρὸς ἐν γίνεσθαι τέλος τὴν ἀναφοράν ἀπαύγασθαι διὸ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας ἀπὸ τοὺς πεποιήμεθα τῶν καιρῶν. τῷ γὰρ προειρημένῳ πολέμῳ κρατησάντες Ῥωμαίοι Καρχηδονίων, καὶ νομίζοντες τὸ κυριότατον καὶ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτοῖς ἤνυσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβολὴν, οὕτως καὶ τότε πρῶτον ἐθάρησαν ἐπὶ τὰ λυπᾶ τὰς χεῖρας ἐκτείνειν καὶ περαιοῦσθαι μετὰ δυνάμεως εἰς τῇ Ἑλλάδα καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν τόπους.

7 Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦμων ἢν συνήθη καὶ γνώριμα τὰ πολιτεύματα τὰ περὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητήσαντα, ἵσως οὐδὲν ἂν ἦμας ἐδει περὶ τῶν πρὸ τοῦ γράφειν, ἀπὸ ποίας προθέσεως ἡ δυνάμεως ὄρμηθεν ἐνεχείρισαν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τηλικούτοις ἔργοις. ἐπεὶ δ’ οὕτε τοῦ Ῥωμαίων οὕτε τοῦ Καρχηδονίων πολιτεύματος πρόχειρος ἐστὶ τοῖς πόλεις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡ προγεγενημένη δύναμις οὐδ’ αἱ πράξεις αὐτῶν, ἀναγκαίον ὑπελάβομεν εἶναι συντάξασθαι ταύτην καὶ τὴν ἐξῆς βύβλον πρὸ τῆς ἱστορίας, ἵνα μηδεὶς ἐπιστᾶ ἐπ’ αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξήγησιν τότε διαπορή καὶ ἤτητι ποίοις διαβουλίοις ἡ ποίας δυνάμεως καὶ χορηγίαις χρησάμενοι Ῥωμαίοι πρὸς ταύτας ὠρμήσαν τὰς ἐπιβολὰς, δι’ ὅν καὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῆς θαλάττης τῆς καθ’ ἠμᾶς ἐγένοντο πάσης ἐγκρατεῖσιν.

9 ἂλλ’ ἐκ τούτων τῶν βυβλίων καὶ τῆς ἐν ταύταις προκατασκευῆς δῆλον ἢ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν ὦτι καὶ λίαν εὐλόγους ἀφορμαίς χρησάμενοι πρὸς τῇ ἐπίνυον ὄρμησαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν συντέλειαν ἔξ-ικοντο τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς καὶ δυναστείας. τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἠμετέρας πραγματείας ἰδιον καὶ τὸ θαυ-
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linked with those of Greece and Asia, all leading up to one end. And this is my reason for beginning where I do. For it was owing to their defeat of the Carthaginians in the Hannibalic War that the Romans, feeling that the chief and most essential step in their scheme of universal aggression had now been taken, were first emboldened to reach out their hands to grasp the rest and to cross with an army to Greece and Asia.

Now were we Greeks well acquainted with the two states which disputed the empire of the world, it would not perhaps have been necessary for me to deal at all with their previous history, or to narrate what purpose guided them, and on what sources of strength they relied, in entering upon such a vast undertaking. But as neither the former power nor the earlier history of Rome and Carthage is familiar to most of us, I thought it necessary to prefix this Book and the next to the actual history, in order that no one after becoming engrossed in the narrative may find himself at a loss, and ask by what counsel and trusting to what power and resources the Romans embarked on that enterprise which has made them lords over our land and our seas, but that from these Books and the preliminary sketch in them it may be clear to readers that they had quite adequate grounds for conceiving the ambition of a world-empire and adequate means for achieving their purpose.

4. For what gives my work its peculiar quality, and what is most remarkable in the present
μάςιον τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς καυρῶν τοὺτ’ ἐστιν, ὅτι καθ’ ἀπερ ἡ τύχη σχεδὸν ἀπαντά τὰ τῆς οἰκουμένης πράγματα πρὸς ἐν ἐκλινε μέρος καὶ πάντα νεύειν ἡμάκασα πρὸς ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν σκοπὸν, οὕτως 2 καὶ δεὶ διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑπὸ μίαν σύνοψιν ἀγαγεῖν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνοντι τὸν χειρισμὸν τῆς τύχης, ὧ κεχρηται πρὸς τῶν τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων συντέλειαν. καὶ γάρ τὸ προκαλεσάμενον ἡμᾶς καὶ παρομηθαν πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς ἱστορίας μάλιστα τούτῳ γέγονε· σὺν δὲ τοῖτω καὶ τὸ μηδένα τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἐπιβεβληθαί τῇ τῶν καθολοῦ πραγμάτων συντάξει· πολὺ γάρ ἄν ἤττον ἐγνυσε πρὸς τούτο τὸ μέρος 3 ἐφιλοτιμήθην, νῦν δ’ ὀρῶν τοὺς μὲν κατὰ μέρος πολέμους καὶ τινῶς τῶν ἁμα τούτοις πράξεων καὶ πλείους πραγματευομένους, τὴν δὲ καθολοῦ καὶ συλλήβδην οἰκονομίαν τῶν γεγονότων, πότε καὶ πόθεν ὑρμήθη καὶ πῶς ἔσχε τὴν συντέλειαν, ταῦτα τὴν οὕτ’ ἐπιβαλόμενον οὐδένα βασανίζειν, ὅσον γε 4 καὶ ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι, παντελῶς ὑπέλαβον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ μὴ παραλιπεῖν μηδ’ ἐὰςαι παρελθεῖν ἀνεπιστάτως τὸ κάλλιστον ἁμα κωφελμότατον ἐπίτηδε 5 δεῦμα τῆς τύχης. πολλὰ γάρ αὕτη καυνοποιοῦσα καὶ συνεχῶς ἐναγωνιζομένη τοῖς τῶν ἄνθρωπων βίοις οὐδέπω τοιόνδ’ ἀπλῶς οὔτ’ εἰργάσατ’ ἔργον οὔτ’ ἥγωνίσατ’ ἀγώνισμα, οἶον τὸ καθ’ ἡμᾶς. 6 ὅπερ ἐκ μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος γραφόντων τὰς ἱστορίας οὐχ οἶον τε συνιδεῖν, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας πόλεις τις κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην ἐπελθὼν ἡ καὶ νὴ Δία γεγραμμένας χωρίς ἀλλήλων θεασάμενος εὐθέως ὑπολαμβάνει κατανεοκεῖαι καὶ τὸ τῆς ὅλης οἰκουμένης σχῆμα καὶ τὴν σύμπασαν αὕτης 7 θέσιν καὶ τάξιν· ὅπερ ἐστὶν οὐδαμῶς εἰκός. καθο-
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age, is this. Fortune having guided almost all the
affairs of the world in one direction and having
forced them to incline towards one and the same end,
a historian should bring before his readers under one
synoptical view the operations by which she has
accomplished her general purpose. Indeed it was
this chiefly that invited and encouraged me to under-
take my task; and secondarily the fact that none of
my contemporaries have undertaken to write a general
history, in which case I should have been much less
eager to take this in hand. As it is, I observe that
while several modern writers deal with particular
wars and certain matters connected with them, no
one, as far as I am aware, has even attempted to
inquire critically when and whence the general and
comprehensive scheme of events originated and how
it led up to the end. I therefore thought it quite
necessary not to leave unnoticed or allow to pass into
oblivion this the finest and most beneficent of the
performances of Fortune. For though she is ever
producing something new and ever playing a part in
the lives of men, she has not in a single instance
ever accomplished such a work, ever achieved such
a triumph, as in our own times. We can no more
hope to perceive this from histories dealing with
particular events than to get at once a notion of
the form of the whole world, its disposition and
order, by visiting, each in turn, the most famous
cities, or indeed by looking at separate plans of each:
a result by no means likely. He indeed who believes
λου μὲν γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οἱ πεπεισμένοι διὰ τῆς κατὰ μέρος ἱστορίας μετρίως συνόψεσθαι τὰ ὅλα παραπλήσιον τι πάσχειν, ὡς ἂν εἰ τινες ἐμψύχου καὶ καλοῦ σώματος γεγονότος διερρημμένα τὰ μέρη θεώμενοι νομίζοιειν ἵκανως αὐτόπται γίνεσθαι τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ζῶου καὶ καλλονῆς. εἰ γὰρ τις αὐτίκα μᾶλα συνθεὶς καὶ τέλειον αὖθις ἀπεργασάμενος τὸ ζῶον τῷ τ’ εἶδει καὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς εὔπρεπείᾳ, κάπετα πάλιν ἐπιδεικνύοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐκεῖνοις, ταχέως ἂν οἰμαὶ πάντας αὐτοὺς ὄμολογήσειν διότι καὶ λίαν πολὺ τι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπελεύσετο πρὸςθεν καὶ παραπλήσιον τοῖς ὅνειροι πρὸτεσθεν ἢν. ἔννοιαν μὲν γὰρ λαβεῖν ἀπὸ μέρους τῶν ὅλων ὅπως ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ γνώμην ἀτρεκὴ σχεῖν ἀδύνατον. διὸ παντελῶς βραχὺ τι νομοστέον συμβάλλεσθαι τὴν κατὰ μέρος ἱστορίαν πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐμπερίαν καὶ πίστιν. ἐκ μέντοι γε τῆς ἀπάντων πρὸς ἀλληλα συμπλοκῆς καὶ παραθέσεως, ἐτι δ’ ὀμοιότητος καὶ διαφορᾶς, μόνως ἂν τις ἐφίκοιτο καὶ διυθείη κατοπτεύσας ἀμα καὶ τὸ χρῆσιμον καὶ τὸ τερπνὸν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας ἀναλαβεῖν.

5 Ὑποθεσόμεθα δὲ ταύτης ἀρχὴν τῆς βύβλον τὴν πρώτην διάβασον ἐξ Ἰταλίας Ῥωμαίων. αὕτη δ’ ἐστι συνεχὴς μὲν τοῖς ἀφ’ ὧν Τίμαιος ἀπέλυσε, πίπτει δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐνατὴν καὶ εἰκοστὴν πρὸς ταῖς ἔκατον ὀλυμπιάδα. διὸ καὶ βητέων ἂν εἰ ἐν ὅς καὶ πότε συστήσαμενο τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καὶ τίσιν ἀφορμαῖς μετὰ ταύτα χρησάμενοι, διαβαίνειν ὁρ- μήσαν εἰς Σικελίαν. ταύτῃ γὰρ τῇ γῇ πρώτων ἐπέ- 3 βησον τῶν ἐκτὸς τόπων τῆς Ἰταλίας. καὶ βητέον αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς διαβάσεως αἰτίαν ψιλῶς, ἢν μὴ τῆς 12
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that by studying isolated histories he can acquire a fairly just view of history as a whole, is, as it seems to me, much in the case of one, who, after having looked at the dismembered limbs of an animal once alive and beautiful, fancies he has been as good as an eyewitness of the creature itself in all its action and grace. For could anyone put the creature together on the spot, restoring its form and the comeliness of life, and then show it to the same man, I think he would quickly avow that he was formerly very far away from the truth and more like one in a dream. For we can get some idea of a whole from a part, but never knowledge or exact opinion. Special histories therefore contribute very little to the knowledge of the whole and conviction of its truth. It is only indeed by study of the interconnexion of all the particulars, their resemblances and differences, that we are enabled at least to make a general survey, and thus derive both benefit and pleasure from history.

5. I shall adopt as the starting-point of this book the first occasion on which the Romans crossed the sea from Italy. This follows immediately on the close of Timaeus’ History and took place in the 129th Olympiad [264–261 B.C.]. Thus we must first state how and when the Romans established their position in Italy, and what prompted them afterwards to cross to Sicily, the first country outside Italy where they set foot. The actual cause of their crossing must be stated without comment; for if I were to seek the
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4 ὑποθέσεως ἀρχὴ γένηται καὶ θεωρία. ληπτεόν δὲ καὶ τοῖς καυροῖς ὀμολογουμένην καὶ γνωριζομένην ἀρχὴν παρ' ἀπασί, καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι δυναμένην αὐτὴν ἔξ αὐτῆς θεωρεῖσθαι, κἂν δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις βραχὺ προσαναδραμόντας κεφαλαίωδη τῶν μεταξὺ
5 πράξεων ποιήσονται τὴν ἀνάμνησιν. τῆς γὰρ ἀρχῆς ἀγνοουμένης ἢ καὶ νὴ Δὲ ἀμφισβητούμενης οὐδὲ τῶν ἔξης οὐδὲν ὁ παρὰ τὰ παραδοχῆς ἀξιωθῆναι καὶ πίστεως· ὅταν δ' ἡ περὶ ταύτης ὀμολογουμένη παρασκευασθῆ ἐξαιτία, τότε ἡδη καὶ τὰς ὀ συνεχῆς λόγους ἀποδοχῆς τυγχάνει παρά τοῖς ἀκούοντοιν.

6 Ἡτος μὲν οὖν ἐνειστῆτει μετὰ μὲν τὴν ἐν Αἰγώνοις ποταμοῖς ναυμαχίαν ἐνεακαδέκατον, πρὸ δὲ τῆς ἐν Λευκτροὶς μάχης ἐκκαδέκατον, ἐν δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν τὴν ἐπ᾽ Ἀνταλκιδοῦ λεγομένην εἰρήνην πρὸς βασιλέα τῶν Περσῶν ἐκύρωσαν καὶ πρεσβύτερος Διονύσιος τῇ περὶ τὸν Ἑλλήνων ποταμόν μάχη νεικηκώς τούς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν Ἑλλήνας ἐπολύρκει Ῥήγων, Γαλάται δὲ κατὰ κράτος ἐλέντες αὐτὴν τὴν Ῥώμην κατείχον πλὴν τούτων.

3 Καπετωλίου. πρὸς οὖς ποιησάμενοι Ῥωμαίοι οπον- δάς καὶ διαλύσεις εὐδοκουμένας Γαλάταις, καὶ γενόμενοι πάλιν ἀνευπίστως τῆς πατρίδος ἐγκρατεῖς, καὶ λαβόντες ὁ πάν ἀρχὴν τῆς συναυξάσεως, ἐπολέ- μουν ἐν τοῖς ἔξης χρόνοις πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυνεῖτονοι.

4 γενόμενοι δ' ἐγκρατεῖς ἀπάντων τῶν Λατίνων διὰ τε τήν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις ἐπιτυχίαν, μετὰ ταῦτ' ἐπολέμουν Τυρρηνοῖς, ἐπειτὰ Κελτοῖς, ἔξης δὲ Σαυνίταις, τοὺς πρὸς τὸς ἀνατολὰς καὶ τὰς ἀρκτοὺς συντερμονοῦσι τῇ τῶν Λατίνων χώρᾳ.
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cause of the cause and so on, my whole work would have no clear starting-point and principle. The starting-point must be an era generally agreed upon and recognized, and one self-apparent from the events, even if this involves my going back a little in point of date and giving a summary of intervening occurrences. For if readers are ignorant or indeed in any doubt as to what are the facts from which the work opens, it is impossible that what follows should meet with acceptance or credence; but once we produce in them a general agreement on this point they will give ear to all the subsequent narrative.

6. It was then the nineteenth year after the battle of Aegospotami and the sixteenth before that of Leuctra, the year in which the Spartans made the peace known as that of Antalcidas with the King of Persia, that in which also Dionysius the Elder, after defeating the Italiot Greeks in the battle at the river Elleporos, was besieging Rhegium, and that in which the Gauls, after taking Rome itself by assault, occupied the whole of that city except the Capitol. The Romans, after making a truce on conditions satisfactory to the Gauls and being thus contrary to their expectation reinstated in their home and as it were now started on the road of aggrandizement, continued in the following years to wage war on their neighbours. After subduing all the Latins by their valour and the fortune of war they fought first against the Etruscans, then against the Celts, and next against the Samnites, whose territory was conterminous with that of the Latins on the East
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6 μετά δὲ τινά χρόνον Ταραντίνων διὰ τὴν εἰς τοὺς προσβεντᾶς Ῥωμαίοις ἀσέλγειαν καὶ τὸν διὰ ταῦτα φόβον ἐπιπασαμένων Πύρρον τῷ πρώτευον ἔτει τῆς τῶν Γαλατῶν ἐφόδου τῶν τε περὶ Δελφοὺς φθαρένθη τῶν καὶ περαιώθησαν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, Ῥωμαίοι Τυρρήνοις μὲν καὶ Σαμνίταις υφ’ αὐτοὺς πεποιημένοι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν Κέλτως πολλαῖς μάχαις ἡδή νεινηκότες, τότε πρῶτον ἔπι τὰ λοιπὰ μέρη τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀφῆσαν, οὐχ ἤσσον ὑπὲρ ὀθνείων, ἔπι δὲ τὸ πλεῖον ὡς ὑπὲρ ἰδίων ἡδη καὶ καθηκόντων σφίοι πολεμήσατε, ἀθληταὶ γεγονότες ἀληθῶν τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἔργον ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς 7 Σαμνίτας καὶ Κέλτως ἀγώνων. ὑποστάντες δὲ γενναίως τὸν πόλεμον τῶν, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον τάς τε δυνάμεις καὶ Πύρρον ἐκβάλοντες ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας, αὖθις ἐπολέμουν καὶ κατεστρέφοντο τοὺς 8 κοινωνήσαντας Πύρρῳ τῶν πραγμάτων. γενόμενοι δὲ παραδόξως ἄπαντων ἐγκρατεῖς, καὶ ποιησάμενοι τοὺς τὴν Ἰταλίαν οἰκοῦντας υφ’ αὐτούς πλὴν Κέλτων, μετὰ ταῦτα πολυρκεῖν ἐνεχείρησαν τοὺς τότε κατέχοντας τὸ Ῥήγιον Ῥωμαίους.

7 "Ἰδιον γὰρ τις συνέβη καὶ παραπλήσιον ἐκατέρας ταῖς περὶ τὸν πορθμὸν ἐκτισμέναις πόλεσιν· εἰς δ’ αὐτὰ τὴν ταχέαν καὶ τὴν Ρήγιον· Μεσσήνη καὶ τὴν Ρήγιον· Μεσσήνην μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἀνώτερος χρόνος τῶν νῦν λεγομένων καὶ πᾶς Ἀχαιότεροι παρὰ Ἀγαθοκλῆ αὐτὸς μεταξῆς καὶ πάλαι περὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν λουτήτιν εὐδαιμονίαν τῆς πόλεως ὁθολομωντες, ἀμα τῶν λαβεῖν 3 καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐπεχείρησαν παραπονεῖσθαι παρεισελθοῦντες δ’ ὡς φίλοι, καὶ κατασχόντες τὴν πόλιν, οὕς μὲν ἐξέβαλον τῶν πολιτῶν, οὕς δ’ ἀπ’ 4 ἐσφαξαν. πράξαντες δὲ ταῦτα, τὰς μὲν γυναίκας
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and North. After some time the Tarentines, fearing the consequences of their insolence to the Roman envoys, begged for the intervention of Pyrrhus. (This was in the year preceding the expedition of those Gauls who met with the reverse at Delphi and then crossed to Asia.) The Romans thereupon reduced the Etruscans and Samnites and had vanquished the Italian Celts in many battles, and they now for the first time attacked the rest of Italy not as if it were a foreign country, but as if it rightfully belonged to them. Their struggle with the Samnites and Celts had made them veritable masters in the art of war, and after bravely supporting this war with Pyrrhus and finally expelling himself and his army from Italy, they continued to fight with and subdue those who had sided with him. When, with extraordinary good fortune, they had reduced all these peoples and had made all the inhabitants of Italy their subjects excepting the Celts, they undertook the siege of Rhegium now held by certain of their compatriots.

7. For very much the same fortune had befallen the two cities on the Straits, Messene and Rhegium. Certain Campanians serving under Agathocles had long cast covetous eyes on the beauty and prosperity of Messene; and not long before the events I am speaking of they availed themselves of the first opportunity to capture it by treachery. After being admitted as friends and occupying the city, they first expelled or massacred the citizens and took
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καὶ τὰ τέκνα τῶν ἡκληρηκότων, ὡς ποθ' ἢ τύχη
diēneime par' autôn tòn tûs paranomías kai'ren
ékástois, outrws ésochon. tûs dè loipous bîous kai
5 tûn khôran metà taûta dieîlomevô kateîchôn. tachû
dè kai rádîos kalès khôras kai pálewes éngkrateîês
gevîmenoi, parâ pôdas eurôn mûmntas tûs práxeis.
6 'Rhynîon gár, kath' òn kairôn Pûrros èis 'Italián
éperaiou'to, kataplageîs gevîmenoi tûn éphodun au-
tûu, dediótes dè kai Karxhdonîous thalattokra-
tûntas, épesspásanto fylakîn áma kai boîtheían
7 parâ 'Rhmainon. oî d' éiselthôntes xronon mé twn
diêtîrhou tûn pôlîn kai tûn éautûn pîston, óntes
tetraiskîlioi tôn árithmnôn, òn ëgeîto Dêkios Kamy-
8 pânos: télos dè xelôsanâtes tûs Mâmertínous, áma
dè kai sunergous labônûtes autûs, parespôndhsan
tûs 'Rhynînous, êkpatheîs óntes épî te tê tûs pôlews
eukairia kai tê tûn 'Rhynîn peri' tûs idîous
bîous evdaimonía. kai tûs mév ëkbalîntes, tûs
d' ápsofbântes tûs politûn, tûn autûn trôpon
tûs Kâmpânous katêschn tûn pôlîn. oî dè
9 'Rhmainoi barèwos mév ëfepron tû gegovos. oû mév
eîchon xe pousin oude'n dia' to sunechsthai tûs pro-
10 eúrômênoi polêmous. étei d' ápô toûtûn égêvnto,
syngkleisântes autûs èpolidrûkous tû 'Rhynîn,
kath'peter ëpân w proeîpov. krateîsanâtes dê tûs
11 mév plêstous ev autû tê katallîphei dièftheiran,
èkhûmous ànumnomènoi diá to prorâsthâi to méllon,
âwgrîa d' èkuriévous plêionov òn trakosîwn. òn
12 ánapemphèntwn èis tûn 'Rhómhn, oî stratetgoi
proagagôntes èis tûn ágorân kai màstigwûntes
âpantas katal' to par' autôs èthos èpelékiasan,
boulîmenoi dia' têis èis èkeînous tîmôrias, kath' èson
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possession of the wives and families of their unhappy victims, just as chance assigned them at the time of the outrage. They next divided among themselves the land and all other property. Having thus possessed themselves so quickly and easily of a fine city and territory, they were not long in finding imitators of their exploit. For the people of Rhegium, when Pyrrhus crossed to Italy, dreading an attack by him and fearing also the Carthaginians who commanded the sea, begged from the Romans a garrison and support. The force which was sent, four thousand in number and under the command of Decius, a Campanian, kept the city and their faith for some time, but at length, anxious to rival the Mamertines and with their co-operation, played the people of Rhegium false, and eagerly coveting a city so favourably situated and containing so much private wealth, expelled or massacred the citizens and possessed themselves of the city in the same manner as the Campanians had done. The Romans were highly displeased, yet could do nothing at the time, as they were occupied with the wars I have already mentioned. But when they had a free hand they shut up the culprits in the city and proceeded to lay siege to it as I have stated above. When Rhegium fell, most of the besieged were slain in the actual assault, having defended themselves desperately, as they knew what awaited them, but more than three hundred were captured. When they were sent to 271 B.C. Rome the Consuls had them all conducted to the forum and there, according to the Roman custom, scourged and beheaded; their object being to recover as far as possible by this punishment their reputation

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οἶοι τ’ ἦσαν, διορθοῦσθαι παρὰ τοῖς συμμάχοις τὴν
13 αὐτῶν πίστιν. τὴν δὲ χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν παρα-
χήμα τοῖς Ῥηγίνοις ἀπέδοσαν.
8 Οἱ δὲ Μαμερτῖνοι, τοῦτο γὰρ τοῦνομα κυριεύ-
σαντες οἱ Καμπανοὶ τῆς Μεσσήνης προσγόρευσαν
φασά αὐτούς, ἐως μὲν συνεχῶντο τῇ τῶν Ῥω-
μαίων συμμαχίᾳ τῶν τὸ Ῥήγιον κατασχόντων, οὐ
μόνον τῆς ἑαυτῶν πόλεως καὶ χώρας ἁρφαλῶς κατ-
εκράτουν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς συνορούσῃς σοῦ ὡς
ἐτυχε παρηγώχλου τοῖς τε Καρχηδονίους καὶ τοῖς
Σιρακοσίους, καὶ πολλὰ μέρη τῆς Σικελίας ἐφο-
2 λόγουν. ἔπει δ’ ἐστερήθησαν τῆς προερημένης
ἐπικουρίας, συγκλεισθέντων τῶν τὸ Ῥήγιον κατ-
εχόντων εἰς τὴν πολιορκίαν, παρὰ πόδας ὑπὸ τῶν
Σιρακοσίων αὐτοὶ πάλιν συνειδώχθησαν εἰς τὴν
3 πόλιν διὰ τινας τοιαύτας αἰτίας. χρόνοις οὐ πολλοῖς
πρότερον αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν Σιρακοσίων διενεχθέναι
πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ διατρίβονσι περὶ τὴν
Μεργάνην, κατέστησαν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄρχοντας, Ἀρτεμί-
δωρόν τε καὶ τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα βασιλεύσαντα τῶν
Σιρακοσίων Ἰέρωνα, νέον μὲν ὄντα κομιδὴν, πρὸς
δὲ τι γένους εὐφυῆ βασιλικῆς καὶ πραγματικῆς οἰκο-
4 νομίας. ὁ δὲ παραλαβὼν τὴν ἁρχὴν καὶ παρεισέλθων
eἰς τὴν πόλιν διὰ τινῶν οἰκεῖων καὶ κύριος γενό-
μενος τῶν ἀντιπολίτευμον, οὕτως ἔχρησατο
πρᾶσι καὶ μεγαλοψύχοις τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὡστε τοὺς
Σιρακοσίους, καίπερ οὐδαμῶς εὐδοκομενοὺς ἐπὶ
taῖς τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀρχαισεις, τότε πάντας
ὁμοθυμαδὸν εὐδοκήσαι στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν
5 Ἰέρωνα. δς ὥς τῶν πρώτων ἐπινοημάτων εὐθέως
δῆλος ἦν τοῖς ὀρθῶς σκοπομένοις μειζόνων ὅργο-
μενος ἐλπίδων ἦ κατὰ τὴν στρατηγίαν. θεωρῶν
BOOK I

for good faith with the allies. The city and territory of Rhegium they at once restored to the citizens.

8. The Mamertines (for this was the name adopted by the Campanians after their seizure of Messene), as long as they enjoyed the alliance of the Romans who had occupied Rhegium, not only remained in secure possession of their own city and territory but caused no little trouble to the Carthaginians and Syracusans about the adjacent territories, levying tribute from many parts of Sicily. When, however, they were deprived of this support, the captors of Rhegium being now closely invested, they were at once in their turn driven to take refuge in their city by the Syracusans owing to the following causes. Not many years before the Syracusan army had quarrelled with those in the city. They were then posted near Mergane and appointed two magistrates chosen from their own body, Artemidorus and Hiero, who was subsequently king of Syracuse. He was still quite young 275 B.C. but naturally qualified to be a ruler and statesman of a kind. Having accepted the command, he gained admittance to the city through certain relatives, and after overpowering the opposite party, administered affairs with such mildness and magnanimity that the Syracusans, though by no means inclined to approve camp elections, on this occasion unanimously accepted him as their general. From his first measures it was evident at once to all capable of judging that his ambition was not limited to a mere command.
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9 γάρ τοὺς Συρακοσίους, ἐπειδὰν ἐκπέμψωσι τὰς δυνά-
μεις καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, αὐτοὺς
ἐν αὐτοῖς στασιάζοντας καὶ καινοτομοῦντας αἰεὶ τι.
2 τὸν δὲ Λεπτίνην εἰδῶς καὶ τῇ προστασίᾳ καὶ τῇ
πίστει πολὺ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν, εὐθο-
κιμοῦντα δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῷ πλῆθει διαφέροντως, συν-
άπτεται κηδεῖαν πρὸς αὐτόν, βουλόμενον οἶνον ἐφε-
δρείαν ἀπολυπεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει τούτων, ὅτ’ αὐτὸν
3 ἐξιέναι δὲοι μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις.
γῆμας δὲ τὴν θυγατέρα τοῦ προερημένου, καὶ
συνθεωρῶν τοὺς ἀρχαίους μισθοφόρους καχέκτας
ὄντας καὶ κυνηκοὺς, ἐξάγει στρατεῖαν ὡς ἐπὶ τοὺς
4 βαρβάρους τοὺς τὴν Μεσσήνην κατασχόντας. ἀντι-
στρατοπεδεύσας δὲ περὶ Κεντόριτα, καὶ παρα-
ταξάμενος περὶ τὸν Κυαμόσωρον ποταμὸν, τοὺς μὲν
πολιτικοὺς ἐπιεῖς καὶ πεζοὺς αὐτὸς ἐν ἀποστήματι
συνείχεν, ὡς κατ’ ἄλλον τόπον τοῖς πολεμίοις
συμμίξων, τοὺς δὲ ἐξένους προβαλόμενος εἰσίσε
5 πάντας ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων διαφθαρῆναι. κατὰ δὲ
τὸν τῆς ἐκείνων τροπῆς καιρὸν ἀσφαλῶς αὐτὸς
6 ἀπεχώρησε μετὰ τῶν πολιτῶν εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας.
συντελεσάμενος δὲ τὸ προκείμενον πραγματικῶς,
καὶ παρηηκόω πᾶν τὸ κυνηκὸν καὶ στασιώδες
τῆς δυνάμεως, ξενολογήσας δι’ αὐτοῦ πλῆθος
ἰκανῶν μισθοφόρων, ἀσφαλῶς ἡδη τὰ κατὰ τὴν
7 ἀρχὴν διεξῆγε. θεωρῶν δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐκ τοῦ
προτερήματος θρασείως καὶ προπετῶ ἀναστρεφο-
μένους, καθοπλίσας καὶ γυμνάσας ἑνεργῶς τὰς
πολιτικὰς δυνάμεις ἐξῆγε, καὶ συμβάλλει τοῖς
πολεμίοις ἐν τῷ Μυλαίῳ πεδίῳ περὶ τὸν Λογγανὸν
8 καλούμενον ποταμὸν. τροπὴν δὲ ποιήσας αὐτῶν
ἰσχυρὰν, καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ἐγκρατῆς γενόμενος
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BOOK 1

9. For observing that the Syracusans, every time they dispatch their forces on an expedition accompanied by their supreme magistrates, begin quarrelling among themselves and introducing continual changes, and knowing that Leptines had a wider circle of dependents and enjoyed more credit than any other burgher and had an especially high name among the common people, he allied himself with him by marriage, so that whenever he had to take the field himself he might leave him behind as a sort of reserve force. He married, then, the daughter of this Leptines, and finding that the veteran mercenaries were disaffected and turbulent, he marched out in force professedly against the foreigners who had occupied Messene. He met the enemy near Centuripa and offered battle near the river Cyamoeorus. He held back the citizen cavalry and infantry at a distance under his personal command as if he meant to attack on another side, but advancing the mercenaries he allowed them all to be cut up by the Campanians. During their rout he himself retired safely to Syracuse with the citizens. Having thus efficiently accomplished his purpose and purged the army of its turbulent and seditious element, he himself enlisted a considerable number of mercenaries and henceforth continued to rule in safety. Observing that the Mamertines, owing to their success, were behaving in a bold and reckless manner, he efficiently armed and trained the urban levies and leading them out engaged the enemy in the Mylaean plain near the river Longanus, and inflicted a severe defeat on 268 B.C.
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ζωγρία, τήν μὲν τῶν βαρβάρων κατέπαυσε τόλμαν, αὐτὸς δὲ παραγενόμενος εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ πάντων προσηγορεύθη τῶν συμμάχων.

10 Οἱ δὲ Μαμερτίνοι, πρότερον μὲν ἐστερημένοι τῆς ἐπικουρίας τῆς ἐκ τοῦ Ῥηγίων, καθάπερ ἀνώτερον εἶπον, τότε δὲ τοῖς ἱδίοις πράγμασι ἐπταικότες ὀλοσχερῶς διὰ τὰς νῦν ῥήθεισας αἰτίας, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ Καρχηδονίους κατέφευγον, καὶ τούτοις ἐν-2 εχείριζον σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν ἄκραν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἔπρεβενον, παραδιδόντες τὴν πόλιν καὶ δεόμενοι βοηθήσεων σφᾶς αὐτοῖς ὀμοφύλους ὑπάρ-3 χουσί. Ῥωμαίοι δὲ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἡπόρησαν διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν ἔξοφθαλμον εἶναι τὴν ἀλογίαν τῆς 4 βοηθείας. τὸ γὰρ μικρῷ πρότερον τοὺς ἱδίους πολίτας μετὰ τῆς μεγίστης ἀνηρικότας τιμωρίας, οἱ Ῥηγίνους παρεσπόνδησαν, παραχρήμα Μαμερτίνους 5 βοηθείν ζητεῖν τοῖς τὰ παραπλήσια πεποιηκόσιν οὐ μόνον εἰς τὴν Μεσσηνίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν Ῥηγίνων πόλιν, δυσαπολόγητον εἰχε τὴν ἀμαρτίαν. οὐ μὴν ἀγνοοῦντες γε τούτων οὐδέν, θεωροῦντες δὲ τοὺς 6 Καρχηδονίους οὐ μόνον τὰ κατὰ τὴν Δεβύνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας ὑπῆκοα πολλὰ μέρη πεποιηκόσιν, ἐτι δὲ τῶν νῆσων ἀτασῶν ἐγκρατεῖς ὑπάρχοντας τῶν κατὰ τὸ Σαρδώνιον καὶ Τυρρηνικὸν πέλαγος, 7 ἡγωνιώ, εἰ Σικελίας ἐτι κυριεύσαειν, μὴ λίαν βα- 8 ρεῖσ καὶ φοβεροὶ γείτονες αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχοιεν, κύκλῳ σφᾶς περιέχοντες καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς Ἰταλίας μέρεσιν ἐπικείμενοι. διότι δὲ ταχέως ὑφ’ αὐτοῖς ποιή- 9 σονται τὴν Σικελίαν, μὴ τυχόντων ἐπικουρίας τῶν 8 Μαμερτίνων, προφανῆ ἦν. κρατήσαντες γὰρ ἐγχειρι- 10 ριζομένης αὐτοῖς τῆς Μεσσήνης ἐμέλλουν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ τὰς Συρακούσας ἐπανελέσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσης
them, capturing their leaders. This put an end to the audacity of the Mamertines, and on his return to Syracuse he was with one voice proclaimed king by all the allies.

10. The Mamertines had previously, as I above narrated, lost their support from Rhegium and had now suffered complete disaster at home for the reasons I have just stated. Some of them appealed to the Carthaginians, proposing to put themselves and the citadel into their hands, while others sent an embassy to Rome, offering to surrender the city and begging for assistance as a kindred people. The Romans were long at a loss, the succour demanded being so obviously unjustifiable. For they had just inflicted on their own fellow-citizens the highest penalty for their treachery to the people of Rhegium, and now to try to help the Mamertines, who had been guilty of like offence not only at Messene but at Rhegium also, was a piece of injustice very difficult to excuse. But fully aware as they were of this, they yet saw that the Carthaginians had not only reduced Libya to subjection, but a great part of Spain besides, and that they were also in possession of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrenian Seas. They were therefore in great apprehension lest, if they also became masters of Sicily, they would be most troublesome and dangerous neighbours, hemming them in on all sides and threatening every part of Italy. That they would soon be supreme in Sicily, if the Mamertines were not helped, was evident; for once Messene had fallen into their hands, they would shortly subdue Syracuse also, as they were
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9 ἡ σχεδὸν δεσπόζειν τῆς ἄλλης Σικελίας. ὁ προορώμενοι Ἡραμαῖοι, καὶ νομίζοντες ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σφίζει τὸ μῆ προέσθαι τὴν Μεσσήνην, μηδὲ ἔσαισι Καρχηδονίους οἴον εἰ γεφυρῶσαί τιν εἰς Ἰταλίαν αὐτοῖς
diáβασιν, πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἐβουλεύσαντο, καὶ τὸ μὲν συνέδριον οὐδὲ ἐπέλευσε τὴν γνώμην
diὰ τὰς ἀρτὶ ῥηθείσας αὕτις. ἔδοκες γὰρ τὰ περὶ
tὴν ἀλογίαν τῆς τοὺς Μαμερτίνους ἐπικουρίας
2 ἱσορροπεῖν τοῖς ἐκ τῆς βοηθείας συμφέρουσιν. οἱ
dὲ πολλοὶ, τετρυμένοι μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν προγεγονότων
πολέμων καὶ προορώμενοι παντοδαπῆς ἐπανορ-
thώσεως, ἀμα δὲ τοὺς ἀρτὶ ῥηθείσα περὶ τοῦ κοινῆ
συμφέρειν τῶν πόλεμον καὶ κατ᾽ ἱδιὰν ἐκάστοις
ὡφελείας προθῆκος καὶ μεγάλας ὑποδεικνύοντων
3 τῶν στρατηγῶν, ἔκριναν βοηθεῖν. κυρωθέντος δὲ
tοῦ δόγματος ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, προχειρισάμενοι τὸν
ἐτερον τῶν ὑπάτων στρατηγὸν Ἀππίουν Κλαύδιον
ἐξαπέστειλαν, κελεύσαντες βοηθεῖν καὶ διαβαίνειν
4 εἰς Μεσσήνην. οἱ δὲ Μαμερτίνου τὸν μὲν τῶν
Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸν, ἥδη κατέχοντα τὴν ἄκραν,
ἐξῆπαλον, τὰ μὲν καταπληξάμενοι, τὰ δὲ παρα-
λογισάμενοι τὸν δ᾽ Ἀππίουν ἐπεπόωντο, καὶ τοῦτω
5 τὴν πόλιν ἐνεχείριζον. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τὸν μὲν
στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν ἀνεσταύρωσαν, νομίσαντες αὐτὸν
ἀβούλως, ἀμα δ᾽ ἀνάνδρως, προέσθαι τὴν ἀκρότολιν.
6 αὐτοὶ δὲ τῇ μὲν ναυτικῇ δυνάμει περὶ Πελώριά
οτροπεδεύσαντες, τῷ δὲ πεζῷ στρατεύματι περὶ
tὰς Σύνεν καλουμένας, ἐνεργῶς προσέκειντο τῇ
7 Μεσσήνη. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Ίέρων,
νομίζασα εὐφυῶς ἔχειν τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὸ τοὺς
βαρβάρους τοὺς τὴν Μεσσήνην κατέχοντας ὀλο-
σχερῶς ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας, τίθεται πρὸς τοὺς
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BOOK I

absolute lords of almost all the rest of Sicily. The Romans, foreseeing this and viewing it as a necessity for themselves not to abandon Messene and thus allow the Carthaginians as it were to build a bridge over to Italy, debated the matter for long, (11) and, even at the end, the Senate did not sanction the proposal for the reason given above, considering that the objection on the score of inconsistency was equal in weight to the advantage to be derived from intervention. The commons however, worn out as they were by the recent wars and in need of any and every kind of restorative, listened readily to the military commanders, who, besides giving the reasons above stated for the general advantageousness of the war, pointed out the great benefit in the way of plunder which each and every one would evidently derive from it. They were therefore in favour of consenting; and when the measure had been passed by the people they appointed to the command one of the Consuls, Appius Claudius, who was ordered to cross to Messene. The Mamertines, partly by menace and partly by stratagem, dislodged the Carthaginian commander, who was already established in the citadel, and then invited Appius to enter, placing the city in his hands. The Carthaginians crucified their general, thinking him guilty of a lack both of judgement and of courage in abandoning the citadel. Acting for themselves they stationed their fleet in the neighbourhood of Cape Pelorias, and with their land forces pressed Messene close in the direction of Sunes. Hiero now, thinking that present circumstances were favourable for expelling from Sicily entirely the foreigners who occupied Messene, made
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Καρχηδονίους συνθήκας. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ’ ἀναζεύξας
8 ἐκ τῶν Συρακουσῶν ἔποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ τὴν
προειρημένην πόλιν. καταστρατοπεδεύσας δὲ ἐκ
θατέρου μέρους περὶ τὸ Χαλκιδικὸν ὄρος καλούμενον
ἀπέκλεισε καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἐξόδου τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει.
9 ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων Ἀππιὸς νυκτὸς καὶ
παραβόλως περιωθεῖς τὸν πορθμὸν ἦκεν εἰς τὴν
10 Μεσσήνην. ὅρων δὲ πανταχόθεν ἐνεργῶς προση-
ρεικότας τοὺς πολέμιους, καὶ συλλογισμένος ἀμα
μὲν αἰσχράν, ἀμα δ’ ἐπισφαλῆ γίνεσθαι τὴν πολιο-
11 κίαν αὐτῷ, τῆς τε γῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπικρατοῦν-
των καὶ τῆς θαλάττης, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διεπρε-
σβεύτως πρὸς ἄμφοτέρους, βουλόμενος ἐξελέθηκα
12 τοῦ πολέμου τοὺς Μαμερτίνους. οὖν ἔνας δὲ
προσέχοντο αὐτῷ, τέλος ἐπαναγκαζόμενος ἔκρινε
13 διακωδυνεύειν καὶ πρῶτον ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς Συρακο-
σίοις. ἔγαγαγὼν δὲ τὴν δύναμιν παρέταξε πρὸς
μάχην, ἑτοίμως εἰς τὸν ἀγώνα συγκαταβάντος
14 αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς Συρακοσίων βασιλέως: ἐπὶ
πολὺς δὲ χρόνον διαγωνισάμενος ἐπεκρατήσε τῶν
πολεμίων, καὶ κατεδίωξε τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἐως εἰς
15 τὸν χάρακα πάντας. ὁ δ’ Ἀππιὸς μὲν οὖν ἐκδικεύσας
τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐπανῆλθε πάλιν εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην.
12 ὁ δ’ Ἰέρων, ὅτεν τοὺς προῆχον τι περὶ τῶν ὅλων πραγμά-
των, ἐπιγενομένης τῆς νυκτὸς ἀνεχώρησε κατὰ
12 σπουδὴν εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας. τῇ δὲ κατὰ πόδας
ημέρα γνώσα τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τῶν προειρη-
μένων, καὶ γενόμενος εὐθαρσῆς, ἔκρινε μὴ μέλλειν,
12 ἀλλ’ ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. παραγγείλας
οὖν τοῖς στρατιώταις ἔν ὀρᾷ γίνεσθαι τὴν θεραπείαν,
12 ἄμα τῷ φωτὶ τὴν ἐξόδου ἐποιεῖτο. συμβαλὼν δὲ
τοῖς ὑπεναντίους πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτευνε,
an alliance with the Carthaginians, and quitting Syracuse with his army marched towards that city. Pitching his camp near the Chalcidian mountain on the side opposite to the Carthaginians he cut off this means of exit from the city as well. Appius, the Roman consul, at the same time succeeded at great risk in crossing the Straits by night and entering the city. Finding that the enemy had strictly invested Messene on all sides and regarding it as both inglorious and perilous for himself to be besieged, as they commanded both land and sea, he at first tried to negotiate with both, desiring to deliver the Mamertines from the war. But when neither paid any attention to him, he decided perforce to risk an engagement and in the first place to attack the Syracusans. Leading out his forces he drew them up in order of battle, the king of Syracuse readily accepting the challenge. After a prolonged struggle Appius was victorious and drove the whole hostile force back to their camp. After despoiling the dead he returned to Messene. Hiero, divining the final issue of the whole conflict, retreated in haste after nightfall to Syracuse. 12. On the following day Appius, learning of his retirement and encouraged thereby, decided not to delay but to attack the Carthaginians. He ordered his troops to be in readiness early and sallied forth at break of day. Engaging the enemy he slew many of them and compelled the rest to
ΤΟΥΣ ΔΕ ΛΟΙΠΟΥΣ ᴮ/lgplέφη ρυγείν προτροπάθην εἰς τάς παρακείμενας πόλεις. χρημάμενος δὲ τοῖς εὐτυχήμασι τούτους καὶ λύσας τήν πολιορκίαν, λοιπὸν ἐπιπορεύομενος ἀδεώς ἐπορθεῖ τήν τε τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ τήν τῶν συμμαχουτών αὐτοῖς χώραν, οὐδὲν ἄντιποομένου τῶν υπαίθρων· τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον προσκαθίσας αὐτός ἐπεβάλετο πολιορκεῖν τὰς Συρακούσας.

5 Ὅ μὲν οὖν πρώτῃ 'Ρωμαίων ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας διάβασις μετὰ δυνάμεως ἦδε καὶ διὰ ταύτα καὶ κατὰ τούτους ἐγένετο τοὺς καιροὺς, ἥν οἰκειοτάτην κρίναντες ἄρχην εἶναι τῆς ὅλης προθέσεως, ἀπὸ ταύτης ἐποιησάμεθα τὴν ἐπιστασίαν, ἀναδραμόντες ἐτι τοῖς χρόνοις, τοῦ μηδὲν ἀπόρρημα καταλυεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰτίας ἀποδείξεων. τῷ γὰρ πῶς καὶ πότε πταίσαντες αὐτῇ τῇ πατρίδι 'Ρωμαίοι τῆς ἑπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἦρξαντο προκοπῆς, καὶ πότε πάλιν καὶ πῶς κρατήσαντες τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐπεβάλοντο πράγμασιν ἀναγκαίον ὑπελάβομεν εἴπαι παρακολουθῆσαι τοῖς μέλλοντι καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν τῆς νῦν ὑπεροχῆς δεόντως συν- ὀψεσθαι. διόσπερ οὐ χρή θαυμάζειν οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς ἕξης, ἐν χωρὶς πού προσανατρέχωμεν τοῖς χρόνοις περὶ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων πολιτευμάτων. τοῦτο γὰρ ποιήσαμεν χάριν τού λαμβάνειν ἀρχᾶς τοιαύτας, ἢ ἐν ἑτοὶ σαφῶς κατανοεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἔκαστοι καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς ὀρμηθέντες εἰς ταύτας παρεγένοντο τὰς διαθέσεις, ἐν αἷς ὑπάρχοντι νῦν. ὃ ἔδει καὶ περὶ 'Ῥωμαῖων ἄρτι πεποιήκαμεν.

13 Ἀφεμένους δὲ τούτων λέγειν ὃρα περὶ τῶν προκειμένων, ἐπὶ βραχυ καὶ κεφαλαιοδῶς προεκ-θεμένους τὰς εἰς τῇ προκατασκευῇ πράξεις. ὃν εἰσι.
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retreat in disorder to the neighbouring cities. Having raised the siege by these successes, he advanced fearlessly, devastating the territory of the Syracusans and of their allies, no one disputing the open country with him. Finally he sat down before Syracuse and commenced to besiege it.

Such then was the occasion and motive of this the first crossing of the Romans from Italy with an armed force, an event which I take to be the most natural starting-point of this whole work. I have therefore made it my serious base, but went also somewhat further back in order to leave no possible obscurity in my statements of general causes. To follow out this previous history—how and when the Romans after the disaster to Rome itself began their progress to better fortunes, and again how and when after conquering Italy they entered on the path of foreign enterprise—seems to me necessary for anyone who hopes to gain a proper general survey of their present supremacy. My readers need not therefore be surprised if, in the further course of this work, I occasionally give them in addition some of the earlier history of the most famous states; for I shall do so in order to establish such a fundamental view as will make it clear in the sequel starting from what origins and how and when they severally reached their present position. This is exactly what I have just done about the Romans.

13. Enough of such explanations. It is now time to come to my subject after a brief summary of the events included in these introductory Books. To
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πρώται κατὰ τὴν τάξιν αἱ γενόμεναι Ἡρωμαίοις καὶ Ἡρωμαίους ἐν τῷ περὶ Σικελίας πολέμῳ. ταύταις συνεχῆς ὁ Λιβυκὸς πόλεμος· ὁ Συρίαν Ἀμίλκα, μετὰ δὲ τούτον Ἀσδροῦβα πραξάντας καὶ Καρχηδόνιοις. οἷς ἐγένετο κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ἡ πρῶτη Ἡρωμαίων διάβασις εἰς τὴν Ἡλληνιδᾶ καὶ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη τῆς Ἐυρώπης, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις οἱ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ Κελτοῖς ἀγώνες. τούτοις δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν παρὰ τοῖς Ἔλλησιν ὁ Κλεομενικὸς καλούμενος ἐνηργεῖτο πόλεμος, εἰς ὁν καὶ τὴν καταστροφὴν ἐποιησάμεθα τῆς ὅλης κατασκευῆς καὶ τῆς δευτέρας βόσβου.

6 Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐξαριθμεῖται τὰ κατὰ μέρος ὑπὲρ τῶν προειρημένων πράξεων οὐδὲν οὐθ' ἢμῶν ἀναγ-7 φαίνεται τοῖς ἀκούσοις χρήσιμον. οὐ γὰρ ἑστι-8 ρεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν προτεθέμεθα, μνησθῆναι δὲ κε-9 φαλαινῶν λαοὺ προαρθομέθα χάριν τῆς προκατασκευῆς τῶν μελλοντῶν ὡς ἢμῶν ἱστορεῖτο πράξεων.

8 διότε εἶπεν κεφαλαίων ψαύνοντες κατὰ τὸ συνεχὸς τῶν προειρημένων πειρασόμεθα συναίσθαι τὴν τε-9 λευτὶ τῆς προκατασκευῆς τῇ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἱστορίᾳ ἐρ-10 χή καὶ προθέσει. τούτον γὰρ τὸν τρόπον συν-11 εχοῖς γνωμονησμὸς τῆς διηγήσεως, ἥμεις τε ἀνακ-12 ρώσων οὐκ ἐπάντεσθαι τῶν ἦδη προϊστοριμένων ἐτέ-13 ροις, τοῖς τε φιλομαθοῦσι ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης οἰκο-14 νομίας εὐμαθῇ καὶ ῥαδίαιν ἐπὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ρηθή-15 ησαν παρασκευάσομεν τὴν ἔφοδον. βραχύ τε ἐπι-16 μελεστέρον πειρασόμεθα διελθεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πρώτου συστάντος πολέμου Ἡρωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδόνιοις 11 περὶ Σικελίας. οὔτε γὰρ πολυχρονιστέρον τούτο πόλεμον εὑρεῖν ῥάδιον οὔτε παρασκευᾶς ὀλοσχερ-
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take them in order we have first the incidents of the war between Rome and Carthage for Sicily. Next follows the war in Libya and next the achievements of the Carthaginians in Spain under Hamilcar and afterwards under Hasdrubal. At the same time occurred the first crossing of the Romans to Illyria and these parts of Europe, and subsequently to the preceding events their struggle with the Italian Celts. Contemporary with this the so-called Cleomeric war was proceeding in Greece, and with this war I wind up my Introduction as a whole and my second Book.

Now to recount all these events in detail is neither incumbent on me nor would it be useful to my readers; for it is not my purpose to write their history but to mention them summarily as introductory to the events which are my real theme. I shall therefore attempt by such summary treatment of them in their proper order to fit in the end of the Introduction to the beginning of the actual History. Thus there will be no break in the narrative and it will be seen that I have been justified in touching on events which have been previously narrated by others, while this arrangement will render the approach to what follows intelligible and easy for students. I shall, however, attempt to narrate somewhat more carefully the first war between Rome and Carthage for the possession of Sicily; since it is not easy to name any war which lasted longer, nor one which exhibited on both sides more extensive preparations,
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στέρασ οὔτε συνεχεστέρας πράξεις οὔτε πλείως ἀγώνας οὔτε περιπετείας μείζους τῶν ἐν τῷ προερήμων μένῳ πολέμῳ συμβάντων ἐκατέρως. αὐτὰ τὰ πολιτεύματα καὶ ἐκεῖνος τοὺς καυροὺς ἀκμῆν ἀκέραια κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἡμῖν ἡ τοῖς ἔδισμοις, μέτρια δὲ ταῖς τύχαις, πάρωσα δὲ ταῖς δυνάμεσι. διὸ καὶ τοῖς βουλομένοις καλῶς συνθεάσασθαι τὴν ἐκατέρω τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἰδιότητα καὶ διάναμιν οἷς οὕτως ἐκ τῶν ἐπιγενομένων πολέμων ἡς ἐκ τούτου ποιητέων τὴν σύγκρισιν.  

14 Οὐχ ἦττον δὲ τῶν προερημένων παρωφόρηθην ἐπιστήσοι τοῦτῷ τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐμπειροστότατα δοκοῦντας γράφειν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, Φιλίνω καὶ Φάβιον, μὴ δεόντως ἢμῖν ἀπηγγελθέναι τῇ ἀλήθεια. ἐκκόψας μὲν οὖν ἐφευρέσας τοὺς ἄνδρας οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνων, στοχαζόμενος ἐκ τῶν βιῶν καὶ τῆς αἰρέσεως αὐτῶν· δοκοῦσι δὲ μοι πεποιθέναι τι παρακείμενον τοῖς μελέτοις, ἐπί γὰρ τὴν αἴρεσιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην εὐνοιαν Φιλίνω μὲν πάντα δοκοῦσιν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι πεπράχθαι φρονίμως, καλῶς, ἀνδρωδῶς, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαίοι, τάναντια, Φαβίω δὲ τούτως παρακαλοῦν τοὺς τοὺς ισότητα André 12: 819

3 πλέσσων τοῖς ἐρώσι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν αἴρεσιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην εὐνοιαν Φιλίνω μὲν πάντα δοκοῦσιν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι πεπράχθαι φρονίμως, καλῶς, ἀνδρωδῶς, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαίοι, τάναντια, Φαβίω δὲ τούτως παρακαλοῦν τοὺς τοὺς ισότητα André 12: 819

4 τοὺς πλέσσων τοῖς ἐρώσι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν αἴρεσιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην εὐνοιαν Φιλίνω μὲν πάντα δοκοῦσιν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι πεπράχθαι φρονίμως, καλῶς, ἀνδρωδῶς, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαίοι, τάναντια, Φαβίω δὲ τούτως παρακαλοῦν τοὺς τοὺς ισότητα André 12: 819

5 τοὺς πλέσσων τοῖς ἐρώσι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν αἴρεσιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην εὐνοιαν Φιλίνω μὲν πάντα δοκοῦσιν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι πεπράχθαι φρονίμως, καλῶς, ἀνδρωδῶς, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαίοι, τάναντια, Φαβίω δὲ τούτως παρακαλοῦν τοὺς τοὺς ισότητα André 12: 819

6 δευμάτων ἀμαρτίας τοῦθ᾽ ὑποδεικνύσων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ζώου τῶν ὦν ὤνει ἀφαιρεθεῖσῶν ἀνρείοται τὸ
more intermittent activity, more battles, and greater changes of fortune. The two states were also at this period still uncorrupted in principle, moderate in fortune, and equal in strength, so that a better estimate of the peculiar qualities and gifts of each can be formed by comparing their conduct in this war than in any subsequent one.

14. An equally powerful motive with me for paying particular attention to this war is that the truth has not been adequately stated by those historians who are reputed to be the best authorities on it, Philinus and Fabius. I do not indeed accuse them of intentional falsehood, in view of their character and principles, but they seem to me to have been much in the case of lovers; for owing to his convictions and constant partiality Philinus will have it that the Carthaginians in every case acted wisely, well, and bravely, and the Romans otherwise, whilst Fabius takes the precisely opposite view. In other relations of life we should not perhaps exclude all such favouritism; for a good man should love his friends and his country, he should share the hatreds and attachments of his friends; but he who assumes the character of a historian must ignore everything of the sort, and often, if their actions demand this, speak good of his enemies and honour them with the highest praises while criticizing and even reproaching roundly his closest friends, should the errors of their conduct impose this duty on him.

For just as a living creature which has lost its
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δόλων, οὕτως εἰς ἱστορίας ἀναρκθείσης τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ καταλείπομενον αὐτῆς ἀνωφελὲς γίνεται δι-7 ἡγήμα. διόπερ οὐτε τῶν φίλων κατηγορεῖν οὐτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐπαυεῖν ὁκνητέον, οὐτε δε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ψέγειν, ποτὲ δ’ ἐγκωμίμαζεν εὐλαβήτεον, ἔπειδῃ τοὺς ἐν πράγμασιν ἀναστρεφομένους οὔτ’ εὐστοχεῖν αἰτεῖ 8 δυνατὸν οὐθ’ ἀμαρτάνειν συνεχῶς εἰκόν. ἀποστάντας οὖν τῶν πραττόντων αὐτοῖς τοῖς πραττομένοις ἐφαρ- 9 μοστέον τὰς προπούσας ἀποφάσεις καὶ διαλήψεις ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν.

15 Ὡς δ’ ἔστιν ἀληθὴ τὰ νῦν ύψι ήμων· εἰρήμενα σκοπεῖν ἐκ τούτων πάρεστιν. ὁ γὰρ Φιλίνος ἀρχόμενος ἄμα τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῆς δευτέρας βύβλου φησί προσκαθήσθαι τῇ Μεσσήνῃ πολεομον- 2 τας τοὺς τε Καρχηδονίους καὶ τοὺς Συρακοσίους, παραγενομένοις δὲ τούς Ὁρωμαίους κατά θάλατταν εἰς τὴν πόλιν εὐθὺς ἐξελθεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς Συρακοσίους· λαβόντας δὲ πολλὰς πληγὰς ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην· αὕτης δ’ ἐπὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐκπορευθέντας οὐ μόνον πληγὰς λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξυγρία τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἰκανοὺς ἀποβαλεῖν. ταύτα 3 δ’ εἰτῶν τὸν μὲν Ἰέρωνα φησὶ μετὰ τὴν γενομένην συμπλοκὴν οὕτως ἔξω γενέσθαι τοῦ φρονεῖν ὅστε μὴ μόνον παραχρῆμα τὸν χάρακα καὶ τὰς σκηνὰς ἐμπρήσαντα φυγεῖν νυκτὸς εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας, ἀλλὰ τὰ φρουρία πάντα καταλιπεῖν τὰ κείμενα κατὰ τῆς τῶν Μεσσηνίων χώρας· ὅμως δὲ καὶ 4 τοὺς Καρχηδονίους μετὰ τὴν μάχην εὐθέως ἐκλείπον- τας τὸν χάρακα διελεῖν σφάς εἰς τὰς πόλεις, τῶν δ’ ὑπαίθρων οὐδ’ ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τολμᾶν ἐτι. διὸ καὶ συνθεωρήσαντας τοὺς ἠγουμένους αὐτῶν ἀπο- δεδεικτας τοὺς ὁχλοὺς βουλεύσασθαι μὴ κρίνειν
eyesight is wholly incapacitated, so if History is stripped of her truth all that is left is but an idle tale. We should therefore not shrink from accusing our friends or praising our enemies; nor need we be shy of sometimes praising and sometimes blaming the same people, since it is neither possible that men in the actual business of life should always be in the right, nor is it probable that they should be always mistaken. We must therefore disregard the actors in our narrative and apply to the actions such terms and such criticism as they deserve.

15. The truth of what I have just said is evident from what follows. Philinus, in commencing his narrative at the outset of his second Book, tells us that the Carthaginians and Syracusans were besieging Messene, that the Romans reaching the city by sea, at once marched out against the Syracusans, but after being severely handled returned to Messene. They next sallied out against the Carthaginians and were not only worsted but lost a considerable number of prisoners. After making these statements he says that Hiero after the engagement so far lost his wits as not only to burn his camp and tents and take flight to Syracuse the same night, but to withdraw all his garrisons from the forts which menaced the territory of Messene. The Carthaginians, likewise, he tells us, after the battle at once quitted their camp and distributed themselves among the towns, not even daring to dispute the open country further: their leaders, he says, seeing how dispirited the ranks were, resolved not to risk a
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5 διὰ μάχης τὰ πράγματα· τοὺς δὲ Ἡρωμαίους ἐπομένους αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τὴν χώραν πορθεῖν τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ Συρακοσίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς Συρακούσας αὐτὰς προσκαθίσαντας ἐπιβαλέσθαι
6 πολιορκεῖν. ταύτα δ’, ώς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς πάσης ἐστὶν ἀλογίας πλήρη, καὶ διαστολῆς οὐ προσδεῖται
7 τὸ παράπαν· οὕς μὲν γὰρ πολιορκοῦντας τὴν Μεσσήνην καὶ νικώντας ἐν ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς ὑπέθετο, τούτους φεύγοντας καὶ τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἐκχωροῦντας καὶ τέλος πολιορκομένους καὶ ταῖς ὕψαίς ἀποδε-
8 δειλικότας ἀπέφηνε· οὕς δ’ ἡττωμένους καὶ πο-
λιορκομένους ὑπεστήσατο, τούτους διώκοντας καὶ παραχρῆμα κρατοῦντας τῶν ὑπαίθρων καὶ τέλος
9 πολιορκοῦντας τὰς Συρακούσας ἀπέδειξε. ταύτα δὲ
συνάδειν ἄλληλοις οὐδαμῶς δύναται· πῶς γὰρ;
αλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὰς ὑποθέσεις εἶναι τὰς πρώτας
ψευδεῖς ἢ τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν συμβανόντων ἀποφάσεις.
10 εἰσὶ δ’ αὐταὶ μὲν ἄλληθεις· καὶ γὰρ ἔξεχόρησαν οἱ
Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ Συρακόσιοι τῶν ὑπαίθρων, καὶ
tὰς Συρακούσας ἐπολιορκοῦν οἱ Ἡρωμαῖοι κατὰ
πόδας, ώς δ’ οὕτως φησί, καὶ τὴν Ἐχέταν, ἐν μέσῃ
κειμένη τῇ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων
11 ἐπαρχία. λοιπὸν ἀνάγκη συγχωρεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ
tὰς ὑποθέσεις εἶναι ψευδεῖς, καὶ νικώντων εὐθέως
tῶν Ἡρωμάιων ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὴν Μεσσήνην συμπλο-
καῖς ἡττημένους αὐτοὺς ἠμῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ συγγραφέως
ἀπηγγέλθαι.
12 Φιλίνων μὲν οὖν παρ’ ὅλην ἀν τις τὴν πραγ-
ματείαν εὑροὶ τοιοῦτον ὄντα, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ
Φάβιον, ὡς ἐπ’ αὐτῶν δειχθῆσηται τῶν καρών.
13 ἡμεῖς δ’ ἔπειδη τοὺς ἀρμόζοντας πεποιήμεθα λόγους
ὑπὲρ τῆς παρεκβάσεως, ἐπανελθόντες ἐπὶ τὰς πρά-
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decisive engagement, and the Romans following up the enemy not only laid waste the territory of the Carthaginians and Syracusans, but sat down before Syracuse and undertook its siege. This account is, it seems to me, full of inconsistencies and does not require a lengthy discussion. For those whom he introduced as besieging Messene and victorious in the engagements, he now represents as in flight and abandoning the open country and finally besieged and dispirited, while whose who were defeated and besieged are now stated to be in pursuit of their foes, and at once commanding the open country and finally besieging Syracuse. It is absolutely impossible to reconcile the two assertions, and either his initial statements or his account of what followed must be false. But the latter is true; for as a fact the Carthaginians and Syracusans abandoned the open country, and the Romans at once began to lay siege to Syracuse and, as he says, even to Echetla too, which lies between the Syracusan and Carthaginian provinces. We must therefore concede that Philinus's initial statements are false, and that, while the Romans were victorious in the engagements before Messene, this author announces that they were worsted.

We can trace indeed the same fault throughout the whole work of Philinus and alike through that of Fabius, as I shall show when occasion arises. Now that I have said what is fitting on the subject of this digression, I will return to facts and attempt in a
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ξεις πευρασόμεθα προστιθέντες άει τον έξης λόγον εἰς ἀληθινὰς ἐννοιας ἀγεὼν διὰ βραχέων τοὺς ἐννυχάνοντες ὑπὲρ τοῦ προειρημένου πολέμου.

16 Προσπεσόντων γὰρ εἰς τὴν Ὄρμην ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀππιον καὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα προτερημάτων, καταστήσαντες ὑπάτους Μάνιον Ὑστακίλου καὶ Μάνιον Ὑδαλέριον τάς τε δυνάμεις ἀπάσας ἐξαπέστελλον καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς ἀμφότερος εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν. ἔστι δὲ παρὰ Ρωμαίοις τὰ πάντα τέταρτα στρατόπεδα Ἱρωμαῖκα χωρίς τῶν συμμάχων, ἀ κατ’ ἐναυτὸν προχειρίζονται· τούτων ἔκαστον ἀνὰ τετρακυκλίους πεζοῦς, ἐπειδὲ δὲ τριακοσίους. δὲν παραγενομένων ἀπὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων αἱ πλείους αὐτόμονοι πόλεις προσετίθεντο τοῖς Ρωμαίοις ἀπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων.

δ' Ἰέρων θεωρῶν τὴν διατροπὴν καὶ κατάπληξιν τῶν Σικελιωτῶν, ἀμα δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ βάρος τῶν Ἱρωμαϊκῶν στρατοπέδων, ἐκ πάντων συνελογίζετο τοῦτων ἐπικυδεστέρας εἶναι τὰς τῶν Ἱρωμαίων ἦ τὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐλπίδας. διότι ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸ μέρος ὀρμήσας τοῖς λογισμοῖς διεσέμπετο πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς, ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης καὶ φιλίας ποιοῦν μενος τοὺς λόγους. οἱ δ' Ἱρωμαῖοι προσεδέξαντο, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὰς χορηγίας· ἥθαλλοκρατοῦντων γὰρ τῶν Καρχηδονίων εὐλαβοῦντο μὴ πανταχόθεν ἀποκλειθῶσοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τοῦ καὶ περὶ τὰ πρὸ τοῦ διαβάντα στρατόπεδα πολλὴν ἐνδείαν γεγονέα τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. διότι ὑπολαβόντες τὸν Ἰέρωνα μεγάλην εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος αὐτοῖς παρεξελθεῖν χρείαν ἀσμένως προσεδέξαντο τὴν φιλίαν. ποιησάμενοι δὲ συνθήκας ἐφ' ὃ τα μὲν αἰχμάλωτα χωρίς λύτρων ἀποδοθοῦντο τῶν βασιλέα Ἱρωμαίοις.
BOOK I

narrative that strictly follows the order of events to guide my readers by a short road to a true notion of this war.

16. When news of the successes of Appius and his legions reached Rome, they elected Manius Otacilius and Manius Valerius Consuls, and dispatched their whole armed force and both commanders to Sicily. The Romans have four legions of Roman citizens in all apart from the allies. These they enrol annually, each legion comprising four thousand foot and three hundred horse. On their arrival in Sicily most of the cities revolted from the Carthaginians and Syracusans and joined the Romans. Hiero, observing both the confusion and consternation of the Sicilians, and at the same time the numbers and powerful nature of the Roman forces, reached from all this the conclusion that the prospects of the Romans were more brilliant than those of the Carthaginians. His conviction therefore impelling him to side with the Romans, he sent several messages to the Consuls with proposals for peace and alliance. The Romans accepted his overtures, especially for the sake of their supplies; for since the Carthaginians commanded the sea they were apprehensive lest they should be cut off on all sides from the necessities of life, in view of the fact that the armies which had previously crossed to Sicily had run very short of provisions. Therefore, supposing that Hiero would be of great service to them in this respect, they readily accepted his friendly advances. Having made a treaty by which the king bound himself to give up his prisoners to the Romans without ransom, and in addition to this
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ἀργυρίον δὲ προσθείναι τάλαντα τούτοις ἐκατόν, λοιπὸν ἦδη Ῥωμαίοι μὲν ὡς φίλοις καὶ συμμάχοις 10 ἔχρωντο τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Ἰέρων ὑποστείλας ἑαυτὸν ὑπὸ τὴν Ῥωμαίων σκέπην, καὶ χορηγῶν ἀεὶ τούτοις εἰς τὰ κατεπείγοντα τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀδεῶς ἐβασιλεύε τῶν Συρακοσίων τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνον, φιλοστεφανῶν καὶ φιλοδοξῶν 11 εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. ἐπιφανέστατος γὰρ ὅτι πάντων οὕτως δοκεῖ καὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον ἀπολελαυκέναι τῆς ἱδίας εὐβουλίας ἐν τε τοῖς κατὰ μέρος καὶ τοῖς καθόλου πράγμασιν.

17 Ἐπανενεχθεισών δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, καὶ προσδεξαμένον τοῦ δήμου καὶ κυρώσαντος τὰς πρὸς Ἰέρωνα διαλύσεις, λοιπὸν οὐκέτι πάσας ἔκρινον ἐξαποστέλλειν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὰς δύναμις, ἀλλὰ δύο μόνον στρατόπεδα, νομίζοντες ἂμα μὲν κεκουφισθαί τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοῖς προσκεχωρηκότος τοῦ βασιλέως, ἀμα δὲ μᾶλλον ὑπολαμβάνοντες 8 οὕτως εὐπορήσειν τὰς δύναμεις τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοι. οἳ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, θεωροῦντες τὸν μὲν Ἰέρωνα πολέμου αὐτοῖς γεγονότα, τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους ὀλοσχερέστερον ἐμπλεκομένους εἰς τὰ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν, ὑπελαβον βαρυτέρας προσδείσθαι παρασκευῆς, δι' ἢς ἀντοφθαλμεῖν δυνήσονται τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ 4 συνέχεια τὰ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν. διὸ καὶ ἐκενολογήσαντες ἐκ τῆς ἀντιπέρας χώρας πολλοὺς μὲν Λιγυστίνους καὶ Κελτοὺς, ἐτί δὲ πλείους τούτων 5 Ἰβηρας, ἀπαντάς εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν ἀπέστειλαν. ὀρῶντες δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἀκραγαντίων πόλιν ἐυφυεστάτην οὕσαν πρὸς τὰς παρασκευὰς καὶ βαρυτάτην ἀμα τῆς αὐτῶν ἐπαρχίας, εἰς ταύτην συνήθροισαν τὰ τε χορήγια καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, ὀρμητηρίω
to pay them a hundred talents, the Romans henceforth treated the Syracusans as allies and friends. King Hiero having placed himself under the protection of the Romans, continued to furnish them with the resources of which they stood in urgent need, and ruled over Syracuse henceforth in security, treating the Greeks in such a way as to win from them crowns and other honours. We may, indeed, regard him as the most illustrious of princes and the one who reaped longest the fruits of his own wisdom in particular cases and in general policy.

17. When the terms of the treaty were referred to Rome, and when the people had accepted and ratified this agreement with Hiero, the Romans decided not to continue to employ all their forces in the expedition, but only two legions, thinking on the one hand that, now the king had joined them, the war had become a lighter task and calculating that their forces would thus be better off for supplies. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, when they saw that Hiero had become their enemy, and that the Romans were becoming more deeply involved in the enterprise in Sicily, considered that they themselves required stronger forces in order to be able to confront their enemies and control Sicilian affairs. They therefore enlisted foreign mercenaries from the opposite coasts, many of them Ligurians, Celts, and still more Iberians, and dispatched them all to Sicily. Perceiving that the city of Agrigentum had the greatest natural advantages for making their preparations, it being also the most important city in their province, they collected their troops and
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6 κρίνοντες χρῆσθαι ταύτη τῇ πόλει πρὸς τὸν πολέμον.

Τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων οἳ μὲν πρὸς τὸν Ἱέρωνα πουησάμενοι στρατηγοὶ τὰς συνθήκας ἀνακεχωρήκεισαν, οἳ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτους κατασταθέντες Λεύκιος Ποστούμιος καὶ Κόντως Μαμίλιος ἦκον εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν μετὰ 7 τῶν στρατοπεδῶν. θεωροῦντες δὲ τὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐπιβολήν καὶ τὰς περὶ τὸν Ἀκράγαντα παρακενάς ἔγνωσαν τολμηρότερον ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς πρᾶγμασι διὸ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μέρη τοῦ πολέμου παρῆκαν, φέροντες δὲ παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι πρὸς αὐτὸν Ἀκράγαντα προσήρευσαν καὶ στρατοπεδεύσαντες ἐν ὀκτὼ σταδίοις ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως συνέκλεισαν ἐντὸς τειχῶν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. ἀκμαζόντης δὲ τῆς τοῦ σιτου συναγωγῆς, καὶ προφανομένης χρονίου πολιορκίας, ὁμολογοῦσιν ἐκθυμότερον τοῖς 10 δέοντος οἱ στρατιῶται πρὸς τὸ σιτολογεῖν. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδονίοι κατιδόντες τοὺς πολέμους ἐσκεδασμένους κατὰ τῆς χώρας, εξελθόντες ἐπέθεντο τοῖς σιτολογοῦσι. τρεισάμενοι δὲ τούτους βαδίσας οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ χάρακος ἄρπαξαν ὤρμησαν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς 11 ἐφεδρείας. ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν ἑθισμῶν διαφορᾶς καὶ τότε καὶ πολλάκις ἥδη σέσωκε τὰ Ῥωμαίων πράγματα. τὸ γὰρ πρόστιμον παρ’ αὐτοῖς θάνατός ἐστι τῷ προεμένῳ τὸν τόπον καὶ φυγόντι τὸ παράπαν ἐξ ἐφεδρείας. διὸ καὶ τότε πολλαπλασίως ὄντας τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ὑποστάντας γενναίως πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν ἱδίων ἀπέβαλον, ἐτὶ δὲ πλείους τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀπ- 12 ἐκτείναν. τέλος δὲ κυκλώσαντες τοὺς πολεμίους ὅσον οὕτω διασπώντας τὸν χάρακα, τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν διέφθειραν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐπικείμενοι καὶ φονεύοντες συνεδίωξαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

44
supplies there and decided to use it as a base in the war.

Meanwhile the Roman Consuls who had made 262 B.C. the treaty with Hiero had left, and their successors, Lucius Postumius and Quintus Mamilius, had arrived in Sicily with their legions. On taking note of the plan of the Carthaginians, and their activity at Agrigentum, they decided on a bolder initiative. Abandoning therefore other operations they brought all their forces to bear on Agrigentum itself, and encamping at a distance of eight stades from the city, shut the Carthaginians up within the walls. It was the height of the harvest, and as a long siege was anticipated, the soldiers began gathering corn with more venturesomeness than was advisable. The Carthaginians, observing that the enemy were dispersed about the country, made a sortie and attacked the foragers. Having easily put these to flight, some of them pressed on to plunder the fortified camp while others advanced on the covering force. But on this occasion and often on previous ones it is the excellence of their institutions which has saved the situation for the Romans; for with them death is the penalty incurred by a man who deserts the post or takes flight in any way from such a supporting force. Therefore on this occasion as on others they gallantly faced opponents who largely outnumbered them, and, though they suffered heavy loss, killed still more of the enemy. Finally surrounding them as they were on the point of tearing up the palisade, they dispatched some on the spot and pressing hard on the rest pursued them with slaughter to the city.
18 Μετά δὲ ταύτα συνέβη τοὺς μὲν Καρχηδονίους εὐλαβέστερον διακείσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθέσεις, τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίοις φυλακτικῶτερον χρήσθαι ταῖς προ-2 νομαῖς. ἔπει δ’ οὐκ ἀντεξῆσαι οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι πλὴν ἔως ἀκροβολισμοῦ, διελόντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ῥω-3 μαίων εἰς δύο μέρη τὴν δύναμιν τῷ μὲν ἔνι περὶ τὸ πρὸ τῆς πόλεως Ἀσκληπιείων ἔμενον, θατέρω δὲ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς Ἰράκλειαν κεκλι-4 μένοις μέρεσι τῆς πόλεως. τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν στρα-5 τοπέδων ἐξ ἐκατέρω τοῦ μέρους τῆς πόλεως ὑχυ-6 ρώσαντο, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐντὸς αὐτῶν τάφρων προν-7 βάλοντο χάριν τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἐξίωντας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀσφαλείας, τὴν δ’ ἐκτὸς αὐτῶν περιβά-8 λοντο, φυλακὴν ποιούμενοι τῶν ἐξωθεὶν ἐπιθέσεων καὶ τῶν παρευσάγεσθαι καὶ παρεσπόπτειν εἰωθῶν 9 εἰς τὰς πολυρκουμένας πόλεις. τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν στρατοπέδων διαστήματα φυλακαῖς 10 διέλαβον, ὑχυροποιησάμενοι τοὺς εὐκαίρους τῶν 11 τόπων ἐν διαστάσει. τὰ δὲ χορήγια καὶ τὴν ἄλλην 12 παρασκευὴν οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι πάντες ἔθροιζον αὐτοῖς καὶ παρῆγον εἰς Ἐρβηθὸν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐὰν ταύ-13 της τῆς πόλεως οὐ μακρὰν ὑπαρχοῦσας ἀγοντες καὶ 14 φέροντες συνεχῶς τὰς ἄγορὰς δαμαλῆ δαναγκαίᾳ 15 σφίσι παρεσκευάζον. πέντε μὲν οὖν οἰων μήνας ἐπὶ 16 τῶν αὐτῶν διέμενοι, οὐδὲν ὀλοσχερὸς προτέρημα 17 δυνάμενοι λάβειν κατ’ ἀλλήλων πλὴν τῶν ἐν αὐ-18 τοῖς τοῖς ἀκροβολισμοῖς συμβαινόντων. συναγομέ-19 νων δὲ τῷ λιμῷ τῶν Καρχηδόνιων διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει συγκεκλεισμένων ἀνδρῶν, οὐ γὰρ 20 ἐλάττωσιν πέντε μυριάδων ὑπῆρχον, δυσχρηστούμε-21 νος Ἀννιβας ἦδη τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ 22 τῶν πολυρκουμένων δυνάμεων, διεπέμπετο συν-23 46
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18. After this the Carthaginians were more inclined to be cautious in taking the offensive, while the Romans were more on their guard in foraging. As the Carthaginians did not advance beyond skirmishing range, the Roman generals divided their force into two bodies, remaining with one near the temple of Asclepius outside the walls and encamping with the other on that side of the city that is turned towards Heraclea. They fortified the ground between their camps on each side of the city, protecting themselves by the inner trench from sallies from within and encircling themselves with an outer one to guard against attacks from outside, and to prevent that secret introduction of supplies and men which is usual in the case of beleaguered cities. On the spaces between the trenches and their camps they placed pickets, fortifying suitable places at some distance from each other. Their supplies and other material were collected for them by all the other members of the alliance, and brought to Herbesus, and they themselves constantly fetching in live stock and provisions from this city which was at no great distance, kept themselves abundantly supplied with what they required. So for five months or so matters were at a standstill, neither side being able to score any decisive advantage, nothing in fact beyond incidental success in their exchange of shots; but when the Carthaginians began to be pressed by famine owing to the number of people cooped up in the city—fifty thousand at least in number—Hannibal, the commander of the besieged forces, found himself in a difficult situation and sent
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εἴως εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα τὴν τε περίστασιν δια-
σαφῶν καὶ βοηθείων παρακαλῶν. οὐ δὲ ἐν τῇ Κα-
ρχηδόνῃ τῶν ἐπισυνηγμένων στρατιωτῶν καὶ θηρίων
γεμίσαντες τὰς ναῦς ἐξεπεμψαν εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν
πρὸς Ἀννωνα τὸν ἕτερον στρατηγὸν. ὡς συναγα-
γῶν τὰς παρασκευὰς καὶ δυνάμεις εἰς Ἡράκλειαν,
πρῶτον μὲν πραξικοπήσας κατέσχε τὴν τῶν Ἐργη-
σέων πόλιν, καὶ παρεῖλετο τὰς ἄγορας καὶ τὴν τῶν
ἀναγκαίων χορηγίαν τοῖς τῶν ὑπεναντῶν στρατο-
πέδοις. εἴς οὖ συνέβη τοὺς 'Ῥωμαίους ἐπ᾽ ἵσσον πο-
λιορκεῖν καὶ πολιορκεῖσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν. εἰς γὰρ
τούτῳ συνήγοντο τῇ συνοδείᾳ καὶ σπάνει τῶν ἀναγ-
καίων ὅστε πολλάκις βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ λύσιν
11 τῆς πολιορκίας. ὃ δὴ καὶ τέλος ἂν ἐποίησαν, εἰ
μὴ πάσαν σπουδὴν καὶ μικρὴν προσφερόμενος Ἰέ-
ρων τὰ μέτρια καὶ τάναγκαίᾳ σφίσι παρεσκεύαξε
19 τῶν χορηγῶν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα θεωρῶν ὁ προειρη-
μένος ἂνὴρ τούς μὲν 'Ῥωμαίους ὑπὸ τε τῆς νόσου
καὶ τῆς ἐνδείας ἀσθενῶς διακείμενος διὰ τὸ λοι-
μικὴν εἶναι παρ᾽ αὐτῶν κατάστασιν, τά δὲ σφέτερα
στρατόπεδα νομίζων ἀξιόρχεια πρὸς μάχην ὑπάρχειν,
2 ἀναλαμβῶν τά τε θηρία περὶ πεντήκοντα τὸν ἀριθ-
μὸν ὅντα καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἄπασαν προῆγε
κατὰ σπουδὴν ἕκ τῆς Ἡρακλείας, παραγγείλας τοῖς
Νομαδικοῖς ἢπεῖσι προπορεύεσθαι, καὶ συνεγγί-
σαι τῷ χάρακι τῶν ἐναντίων ἑρεθίζων καὶ πειρά-
σθαι τοὺς ἢπεῖς αὐτῶν ἐκκαλεσθαι, κάπετε πά-
λιν ἐκκλίνασιν ἀποχωρεῖν, ἐξὸς ἂν αὐτῷ συμμίξωσι.
3 πραξάντων δὲ τὸ συνταχθὲν τῶν Νομαδῶν καὶ
προσμικάντων θατέρω τῶν στρατοπέδων, εὐθὺς οἱ
tῶν 'Ῥωμαίων ἢπεῖσ ἐξεχέοντο καὶ θρασέως ἐπ-
4 ἐκείνο τοῖς Νομάσιοι. οὐ δὲ Δίβνες ὑπεχώρουν
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constant messages to Carthage explaining his position and begging for reinforcements. The Carthaginian
government shipped the troops they had collected and their elephants and sent them to Sicily to
Hanno their other general. Hanno concentrated his troops and material of war at Heraclea and in
the first place surprised and occupied Herbesus, cutting off the enemy’s camps from their provisions
and necessary supplies. The result of this was that the Romans were as a fact both besieged and be-
siegers at the same time; for they were so hard pressed by want of food and scarcity of the neces-
sities of life, that they often contemplated raising the siege, and would in the end have done so, had
not Hiero, by using every effort and every device, provided them with a moderate amount of strictly
necessary supplies. 19. In the next place Hanno, perceiving that the Romans were weakened by
disease and privation, owing to an epidemic having broken out among them, and thinking that his own
troops were in fit fighting condition, took with him all his elephants, about fifty in number, and all the
rest of his force, and advanced rapidly from Heraclea. He had ordered the Numidian horse to precede him,
and approaching the enemy’s fortified camp to pro-
voke him and attempt to draw his cavalry out, after
which they were to give way and retire until they re-
joined himself. The Numidians acting on these orders advanced up to one of the camps, and the Roman
cavalry at once issued forth and boldly attacked
them. The Africans retreated as they had been
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catà τὸ παράγγελμα, μέχρι συνέμειξαν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἄσσωνα: λοιπὸν τ’ ἐκ μεταβολῆς περιχυθέντες ἐπέ-έκειντο τοῖς πολεμίοις, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπε-έκτεων, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἦσσε εἰς τὸν χάρακα ἰσνυνίζαν. γενομένων δὲ τούτων ἐπεστρατοπέδευσαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἄσσωνα τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, καταλαβό-μενοι τὸν λόφον τὸν καλούμενον Τόρον, ὡς δέκα στάδιον ἄπέκοψαν τῶν ὑπεναντίων. καὶ δύο μὲν μήνας ἤμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκεμένων, οὐδὲν ὀλο-σχερές πράττοντες πλὴν ἀκροβολίζομενοι καθ’ ἐκά-στην ἡμέραν. τοῦ δ’ Ἀννίβου διαπυρσευμένου καὶ διαπεμπομένου συνεχῶς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πρὸς τὸν Ἄσσωνα, καὶ δηλούντος ὅτι τὰ πλήθη τὸν λιμὸν οὑχ ὑπομενεί, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους αὐτομολοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἐνδειαν, ἐγὼν διακυνδυνεύειν ὁ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγός, οὐχ ἂντον ἐπὶ τούτῳ φερομένων καὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων διὰ τὰς προερημένας αἰτίας. διόπερ ἐξαγαγόντες ἄμφοτεροι τὰς δυνά-μεις εἰς τὸν μεταξὶ τόπον τῶν στρατοπέδων συν-

ἐβαλλον ἀλλήλους. ἐπὶ πολὺν δὲ χρόνον γενομένης τῆς máχης τέλος ἐτρέψαντο τοὺς προκυνδυνεύσαντας μισθοφόρους τῶν Καρχηδονίων οἱ Ῥωμαιοὶ. τού-
tῶν δὲ πεσόντων εἰς τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς τάξεις τὰς ἐφεστηκυίας συνέβη πάνω συνταραχθῆναι τὸ

10 τῶν Φωνίκων στρατόπεδον. γενομένου δ’ ἐγκλί-
matos ὀλοσχερῶς οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι διεφθάρησαν αὐ-
tῶν, τινὲς δ’ εἰς Ἡράκλειαν ἀπεχώρησαν: οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαιοὶ τῶν τε πλείστων ἐκφεύγεσαν θηρίων καὶ

11 τῆς ἐπισκευῆς ἀπάσης. ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς νυκτός, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῶν κατορθωμάτων χαράν καὶ διὰ τῶν κόπων Ῥαθυμότερον ταῖς φυλακαῖς αὐτῶν χρη-σαμένων, ἀπελπίσας Ἀννίβασ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ νο-
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ordered until they joined Hanno's army and then, wheeling round and encircling the enemy, they attacked them, killing many and pursuing the rest as far as the camp. After this Hanno encamped opposite the Romans, occupying the hill called Torus, at a distance of about ten stades from the enemy. For two months they remained stationary, without any action more decisive than shooting at each other every day; but as Hannibal kept on announcing to Hanno by fire-signals and messengers that the population could not support the famine, and that deserters to the enemy were numerous owing to privation, the Carthaginian general decided to risk battle, the Romans being no less eager for this owing to the reasons I stated above. Both therefore led out their forces to the space between the camps and engaged. The battle lasted for long, but at the end the Romans put to flight the advanced line of Carthaginian mercenaries, and as the latter fell back on the elephants and the other divisions in their rear, the whole Phoenician army was thrown into disorder. A complete rout ensued, and most of them were put to the sword, some escaping to Heraclea. The Romans captured most of the elephants and all the baggage. But after nightfall, while the Romans, partly from joy at their success and partly from fatigue, had relaxed the vigilance of their watch, Hannibal, regarding his situation as desperate, and thinking for the above reasons that
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μίσας ἔχειν εὐφυή καὶ ρο ᾰ καταρρίαν διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας, ἠρμησε περὶ μέσας νύκτας έκ τῆς πόλεως, ἔχων τὰς ἔξω ἑδυνάμεις. χώσας δὲ φορμοίς ἀχύρων σεσαγμένοις τᾶς τάφρους ἔλαθε τοὺς πολεμίους ἀπαγαγών ἁσφαλῶς τῆς δύναμιν.

14 οἱ δὲ Ἡρωάιοι τῆς ἥμερας ἐπελθούσης συνέντες τὸ γεγονός, καὶ τῆς οὐραγίας τῆς τῶν περὶ τῶν Ἀκράγαντα ἐπὶ βραχύ καθαυτάμενοι, μετὰ ταῦτα πάντες ἠρμησαν πρὸς τὰς πόλεις. οὐδενὸς δὲ ἐμποδῶν αὐτοῖς ἱσταμένου παρεισπεσόντες διήρπασαν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πολλῶν μὲν σωμάτων, πολλῆς δὲ καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἐγένοντο κατασκευὴς ἐγκρατείας.

20 Τῆς δὲ ἀγγελίας ἁφικομένης εἰς τὴν σύγκλητον τῶν Ἡρωάιων ὑπὲρ τῶν κατὰ τῶν Ἀκράγαντα, περιχαρείς γενόμενοι καὶ ταῖς διανοίασι ἐπαρθέντες οὐκ ἔμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξ αρχής λογισμῶν, οὐδὲ ἡρ- κόντο σεσωκέναι τοὺς Μαμερτίους οὐδὲ ταῖς ἔξω αὐτοῦ τοῦ πολέμου γενομέναις ὑφελείαις, ἐλπίσαντες δὲ καθόλου δυνατὸν εἶναι τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς νήσου, τούτου δὲ γενομένου μεγάλην ἐπίδοσιν αὐτῶν λήψεσθαι τὰ πράγματα, πρὸς τοῦτο ἦσαν τοῖς λογισμοῖς καὶ ταῖς περὶ τούτο τὸ 3 μέρος ἐπινοίας. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πεζικὰς δυ- 4 νάμεις ἐώρων κατὰ λόγον σφίσον προχωροῦντα· μετὰ γάρ τοὺς τῶν Ἀκράγαντα πολιορκήσαντας οἱ κατα- σταθέντες στρατηγοὶ Δεύκιος Οὐαλέριος καὶ Τίτος Ὀτακίλιος ἐδόκουν ἐνδεχομένως χειρίζεσθαι τὰ κατὰ 5 τὴν Σικελίαν. τῆς δὲ θαλάττης ἀκονίτη τῶν Καρ- χηδονίων ἐπικρατοῦντων ἐξυγοσταεῖτ' αὐτοῖς ὁ πό- 8 λεμος· ἐν γάρ τοῖς ἑξῆς χρόνοις, κατεχόντων αὐ- τῶν ήδη τῶν Ἀκράγαντα, πολλαὶ μὲν πόλεις προσ- ετίθεντο τῶν μεσογαίων τοῖς Ἡρωάιοις, ἀγωνιώσαο 52
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this was a fine opportunity for saving himself, broke out of the city about midnight with his mercenaries. By filling up the trenches with baskets packed tightly with straw he managed to withdraw his force in safety unperceived by the enemy. When day broke the Romans became aware of what had happened, and, after slightly molesting Hannibal's rear-guard, advanced with their whole force to the gates. Finding nobody to oppose them they entered the city and plundered it, possessing themselves of many slaves and a quantity of booty of every description.

20. When the news of what had occurred at Agrigentum reached the Roman Senate, in their joy and elation they no longer confined themselves to their original designs and were no longer satisfied with having saved the Mamertines and with what they had gained in the war itself, but, hoping that it would be possible to drive the Carthaginians entirely out of the island and that if this were done their own power would be much augmented, they directed their attention to this project and to plans that would serve their purpose. As regards their military force at least they noted that all progressed satisfactorily; for the Consuls appointed after those who had reduced Agrigentum, Lucius Valerius Flaccus and Titus Otacilius Crassus, seemed to be managing Sicilian affairs as well as possible; but as the Carthaginians maintained without any trouble the command of the sea the fortunes of the war continued to hang in the balance. For in the 261 B.C. period that followed, now that Agrigentum was in their hands, while many inland cities joined the
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tὰς πεξικὰς δυνάμεις, ἔτι δὲ πλείους ἀφίσταντο τῶν
παραθαλαττῶν, καταπεπληγμέναι τὸν τῶν Καρχη-
δονίων στόλον. ὃθεν ὅρωντες αἰεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον εἰς
ἐκάτερα τὰ μέρη ῥοπᾶς λαμβάνοντα τὸν πόλεμον
diὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας, ἔτι δὲ τὴν μὲν Ἰτα-
λίαν πορθομένην πολλάκις ὑπὸ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυ-
νάμεως, τὴν δὲ Διβύην ἐς τέλος ἀβλαβὴ διαμένου-
σαν, ὑρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ συνεμβαίνειν τὸς Καρχη-
δο-
νίοις εἰς τὴν θάλατταν. διὸ καὶ τούτῳ τὸ μέρος
οὐχ ἦκιστα μὲ παρώρμηση ποιήσασθαι μνήμην ἐπὶ
πλεῖον τοῦ προειρημένου πόλεμον, χάριν τοῦ μηδὲ
tαύτην ἄγνοεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρχήν, πῶς καὶ πότε καὶ δι’
ἀς αἰτίας πρῶτον ἔνθησαν εἰς ἥλατταν Ὁρμαιο.
9 Ἐσωροῦσε δὲ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοῖς τριβὴν λαμβά-
νοντα, τότε πρῶτον ἐπεβάλοντο ναυπηγεῖσθαι σκά-
10 φη, πεντηρικὰ μὲν ἐκατόν, εἶκοσι δὲ τριήρεις. τῶν
δὲ ναυπηγῶν εἰς τέλος ἄπειρων ὄντων τῆς περὶ τὰς
πεντήρεις ναυπηγίας διὰ τὸ μηδένα τότε τῶν κατὰ
tὴν Ἰταλίαν κεχρῆσθαι τοιούτοις σκάφεσι, πολλὴν
11 αὐτοῖς παρεῖχε τούτῳ τὸ μέρος δυσχέρειαν. εὖ δὲ
καὶ μάλιστα συνίδοι τὸς ἀν τὸ μεγαλόψιχον καὶ
12 παράβολον τῆς Ὁρμαιῶν αἱρέσεως. οὐ γὰρ οἶνον
εὐλόγους ἀφορμὰς ἔχοντες, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἀφορμὰς
καθάπαξ, οὐδ’ ἐπίνοιαν οὐδὲποτε ποιησάμενοι τῆς
θαλάττης, τότε δὴ πρῶτον ἐν νῷ λαμβάνοντες
οὕτως τολμηρῶς ἐνεχείρησαν ὥστε πρὶν ἡ πειραθή-
ναι τοῦ πράγματος, εὐθὺς ἐπιβαλέσθαι Καρχηδονίοις
ναυμαχεῖν τοὺς ἐκ προγόνων ἔχοντι τὴν κατὰ θάλατ-
13 ταν ἡγεμονίαν ἀδήμωτον. μαρτυρίω δ’ ἂν τις χρή-
σαιτο πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν νῦν ὑπ’ ἐμοὶ λεγο-
μένων καὶ πρὸς τὸ παράδοξον αὐτῶν τῆς τόλμης.
ὅτε γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησαν διαβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν
54
BOOK I

Romans from dread of their military forces, still more seaboard cities deserted their cause in terror of the Carthaginian fleet. Hence when they saw that the balance of the war tended more and more to shift to this side or that for the above reason, and that while Italy was frequently ravaged by the fleet, Libya remained entirely free from damage, they took urgent steps to get on the sea like the Carthaginians. And one of the reasons which induced me to narrate the history of this war at some length is just this, that my readers should, in this case too, not be kept in ignorance of the beginning of how, when, and for what reasons the Romans first took to the sea.

When they saw that the war was dragging on, they undertook for the first time to build ships, a hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes. As their shipwrights were absolutely inexperienced in building quinqueremes, such ships never having been in use in Italy, the matter caused them much difficulty, and this fact shows us better than anything else how spirited and daring the Romans are when they are determined to do a thing. It was not that they had fairly good resources for it, but they had none whatever, nor had they ever given a thought to the sea; yet when they once had conceived the project, they took it in hand so boldly, that before gaining any experience in the matter they at once engaged the Carthaginians who had held for generations undisputed command of the sea. Evidence of the truth of what I am saying and of their incredible pluck is this. When they first undertook to send their
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Μεσοθνήν τὰς δυνάμεις, οὐχ οἶμοι κατάφρακτος αὐτοῖς ὑπήρχε ναὸς, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ καθόλου μακρὸν πλοῖον
οὐδὲ λέμβος οὐδ' εἷς, ἀλλὰ παρὰ Ταραντίνων καὶ
Δοκρῶν ἐτί δ' Ἐλεατῶν καὶ Νεαπολίτων συγχρη-
σάμενοι πεντηκοντάρους καὶ τριήμεροι ἐπὶ τούτων
παραβόλως διεκόμησαν τοὺς ἄνδρας. ἐν δὲ ἡ καιρῷ
τῶν Καρχηδόνων κατὰ τὸν πορθμὸν ἐπαναχθέντων
αὐτοῖς, καὶ μᾶς νεώς καταφράκτου διὰ τὴν προ-
θυμίαν προπεσοῦσης, ὥστ' ἐποκείλασαν γενέσθαι
τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ὑποχείριον, ταύτη παραδείγματι
χρώμενοι τότε πρὸς ταύτην ἐποιοῦντο τὴν τοῦ
παντὸς στόλου ναυπηγίαν, ὡς εἰ μὴ τούτῳ συνέβη
gενέσθαι, δήλον ὡς διὰ τήν ἀπειρίαν εἰς τέλος ἂν
ἐκωλύθησαν τῇς ἐπιβολῆς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οἷς μὲν
ἐπιμελές ἢ τῆς ναυπηγίας, ἐγίνοντο περὶ τῆς τῶν
πλοίων κατασκευήν, οἱ δὲ τὰ πληρώματα συναθροί-
santes ἐδίδασκον ἐν τῇ γῇ κωπηλατεῖν τὸν τρόπον
τοῦ τοῦτον. καθίσαντες ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρεσίων ἐν τῇ χέρσῳ
tοὺς ἄνδρας τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντας τάξιν ταῖς ἐπὶ αὐτῶν
tῶν πλοίων καθέδραις, μέσον δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς στήσαντες
tὸν κελευστὴν, ἀμα πάντας ἀναπίπτεων ἐφ' αὐτοὺς
ἀγονας τὰς χεῖρας, καὶ πάλιν προνεῦσαν ἐξωθοῦν-
tas ταύτας συνείδησιν ἀρχεσθαί τε καὶ λήγειν τῶν
κινήσεων πρὸς τὰ τοῦ κελευστοῦ παραγγέλματα.

3 προκατασκευασθέντων δὲ τούτων ἀμα τῷ συντελε-
σθῆναι τὰς ναῦς καθελκύσαντες, καὶ βραχὺν χρό-
νον ἐπ' αὐτὴς τῆς ἄλλης ἐν θαλάτῃ πειραθέν-
tes, ἐπελεον παρὰ τῇ ʹΙταλίαν κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα
τοῦ στρατηγοῦ. ὁ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως

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forces across to Messene not only had they not any decked ships, but no long ships at all, not even a single boat, and borrowing fifty-oared boats and triremes from the Tarentines and Locrians, and also from the people of Elea and Naples they took their troops across in these at great hazard. On this occasion the Carthaginians put to sea to attack them as they were crossing, and one of their decked ships advanced too far in its eagerness to overtake them and running aground fell into the hands of the Romans. This ship they now used as a model, and built their whole fleet on its pattern; so that it is evident that if this had not occurred they would have been entirely prevented from carrying out their design by lack of practical knowledge. 21. Now, however, those to whom the construction of the ships was committed were busy in getting them ready, and those who had collected the crews were teaching them to row on shore in the following fashion. Making the men sit on rowers' benches on dry land, in the same order as on the benches of the ships themselves, and stationing the fugle-man in the middle, they accustomed them to fall back all at once bringing their hands up to them, and again to come forward stretching out their hands, and to begin and finish these movements at the word of command of the fugle-man. When the crews had been trained, they launched the ships as soon as they were completed, and having practised for a brief time actual rowing at sea, they sailed along the coast of Italy as their commander had ordered. For the Consul appointed by the Romans to the command 260 B.C.

* It is often necessary to use the word "sail," but it should be borne in mind that the ships were propelled chiefly by oars.
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tetagmenos tois Ἦρωμαιοις Γνάιος Κορνήλιος, ὡλίγας ἡμέρας πρότερον, συντάξας τοῖς ναυάρχοις, ἐπειδὰν καταρτίσωσι τὸν στόλον, πλεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν πορθμόν, αὐτὸς ἀναχθεῖς μετὰ νεών ἐπτακαϊδεκα προκατέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὴν Μεσσηνίην, σπουδάζων τὰ κατεπείγοντα πρὸς τὴν χρείαν παρασκευάσαι τῷ 5 στόλῳ. προσπεσοῦσης δ' αὐτῷ πράξεως ἐκεῖ περὶ τῆς τῶν Λιπαραίων πόλεως, δεξάμενος τὴν ἐλπίδα προχειρότερον τοῦ δεόντος ἐπλεῖ ταῖς προερημέναις 6 ναυσὶ καὶ καθωρμίσθη πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. ὁ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς Ἀννίβας, ἀκούσας ἐν τῷ Πανόρμῳ τὸ γεγονός, ἐξαποστέλλει Βοώδῃ τῆς γε- 7 ρουσίας ὑπάρχοντα, ναῦς εἰκοσι δοὺς. ὁς ἐπιπλεύσας νυκτὸς ἐν τῷ λυμένι συνέκλεισε τοὺς περὶ τὸν Γνάιον. ἡμέρας δ' ἐπιγενομένης τὰ μὲν πληρώματα πρὸς φυγὴν ὁρμησέν εἰς τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ Γνάιος ἐκπλα- γής γενόμενος καὶ ποιεῖν ἔχων οὐδὲν τέλος παρέδω- 8 κεν αὐτῶν τοῖς πολέμοις. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὰς τε ναῦς καὶ τὸν στρατηγόν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ὑποχεῖ- 9 ροιν ἔχοντες παραχρῆμα πρὸς τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἀπήραν. μετ' οὗ πολλὰς δ' ἡμέρας, ὠτοὺς ἐναργοὺς ὄντος καὶ προσφάτου τοῦ περὶ τὸν Γνάιον ἀτυχήματος, παρ' ὁλίγον αὐτὸς Ἀννίβας εἰς τὸ παραπλῆσθαι ἀμάρ- τημα προφανῶς ἐνέπεσεν. ἀκούσας γὰρ τῶν τῶν Ἦρωμαιῶν στόλου κομιζόμενον παρὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν σύνεγγυς εἶναι, κατιδεῖν βουλόμενος τὸ τε πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ὅλην συντάξαν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, λαβὼν πεν- τήκοντα ναῦς ἐπιπλεῖ. κάμπτων δὲ περὶ τὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀκρωτήριον ἐμπίπτει τοῖς πολέμοις ἐν κόσμῳ καὶ τάξει ποιομένοις τὸν πλοῦν, καὶ τὰς μὲν πλείους ἀπέβαλε τῶν νεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ τῶν ὑπολειφθείσων ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως διέφυγεν. 58
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of their naval force, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, had a few days previously given orders to the captains to sail in the direction of the Straits whenever the fleet was ready, while he himself, putting to sea with seventeen ships, preceded them to Messene, being anxious to provide for all the urgent needs of the fleet. While there a proposal happened to be made to him with regard to the city of Lipara, and embracing the prospect with undue eagerness he sailed with the above-mentioned ships and anchored off the town. The Carthaginian general Hannibal, hearing at Panormus what had happened, sent off Boödes, a member of the Senate, giving him twenty ships. Boödes sailed up to Lipara at night and shut up Gnaeus in the harbour. When day dawned the Roman crews hastily took refuge on land, and Gnaeus, falling into a state of terror and being unable to do anything, finally surrendered to the enemy. The Carthaginians now set off at once to rejoin Hannibal with the captured ships and commander. But a few days later, though Gnaeus’ disaster was so signal and recent, Hannibal himself came very near falling into the same error with his eyes open. For hearing that the Roman fleet which was sailing along the coast of Italy was near at hand, and wishing to get a glimpse of the numbers and general disposition of the enemy, he sailed towards them with fifty ships. As he was rounding the Cape of Italy he came upon the enemy sailing in good order and trim. He lost most of his ships and escaped himself with the remainder, which was more than he expected or hoped.
22 Ὅ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι μετὰ ταῦτα συνεγγίσαντες τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν τόποις, καὶ συνέντευς τὸ γεγο-νός σύμπτωμα περὶ τὸν Γνάου, παραυτικά μὲν διεπέμποντο πρὸς Γάιον Βίλιον τὸν ἰγνούμενον τῆς πεζῆς δυνάμεως, καὶ τούτον ἀνέμενον, ἀμα δ’ ἄκοφορτα οὐ μακρὰν εἶναι τὸν τῶν πολεμίων στό-λον, ἐγίνοντο πρὸς παρασκευὴν τοῦ ναυμαχεῖν. ὃντων δὲ τῶν πλοίων φαύλων ταῖς κατασκευαῖς καὶ δυσκινήσεις, ὑποτίθενται τις αὐτοῖς βοήθημα πρὸς τὴν μάχην τοὺς ἐπικληθέντας μετὰ ταῦτα κόρακας δὲ συνέβαινε τὴν κατασκευὴν εἶναι τοιαύτην. στό-λος ἐν πρώρρα στρογγύλος εἰστήκει, μῆκος μὲν ὀρ-γυνῶν τεττάρων, κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλάτος τριῶν παλαι-5 στῶν ἔχων τὴν διαμέτρου. οὕτος αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς κορυφῆς τροχιλᾶν εἰχε, περιετίθετο δ’ αὐτῷ κλήμαξ ἐπικαρπίας σαλίσι καθηλωμένη, πλάτος μὲν 6 ποδῶν τεττάρων, τὸ δὲ μῆκος ἐξ ὀργυνῶν. τὸ δὲ τρήμα τοῦ σανιδώματος ἔναν παράμηκας καὶ περι-έβαινε περὶ τὸν στόλον μετὰ τὰς πρώτας εὐθέως τῆς κλίμακος δυ’ ὀργυνάς. εἰχε δὲ καὶ δρύφακτον αὐτὴ παρ’ ἐκατέρα τὴν ἐπιμηκή πλευρᾶν εἰς γόνι τὸ 7 βάθος. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πέρατος αὐτοῦ προσήμοσο σύνηρον ὁδὸν ύπερον ἀπωξυμένον, ἔχον δακτύλιον ἐπὶ τῆς κορυφῆς, ὡς τὸ ὅλον φαίνεσθαι παραπλή-8 σιον ταῖς σιτοποικαίς μηχανήσεσι. εἰς δὲ τούτον τὸν δακτύλιον ἐνεδέδετο κάλως, ὥς κατὰ τὰς ἐμβο-λὰς τῶν πλοίων ἔξαρπνε τοὺς κόρακας δια τῆς τῶν στόλων τροχιλίας ἀφίεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ κατάστρωμα τῆς ἄλλοτρίας νεῶς ποτὲ μὲν κατὰ πρῶρραν, ποτὲ δ’ ἀντιπεριάγοντες <εἰς> 1 τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων

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1 I insert elis.
BOOK I

22. After this the Romans approached the coast of Sicily and learning of the disaster that had befallen Gnaeus, at once communicated with Gaius Duilius, the commander of the land forces, and awaited his arrival. At the same time, hearing that the enemy’s fleet was not far distant, they began to get ready for battle. As their ships were ill-built and slow in their movements, someone suggested to them as a help in fighting the engines which afterwards came to be called “ravens.” They were constructed as follows: On the prow stood a round pole four fathoms in height and three palms in diameter. This pole had a pulley at the summit and round it was put a gangway made of cross planks attached by nails, four feet in width and six fathoms in length. In this gangway was an oblong hole, and it went round the pole at a distance of two fathoms from its near end. The gangway also had a railing on each of its long sides as high as a man’s knee. At its extremity was fastened an iron object like a pestle pointed at one end and with a ring at the other end, so that the whole looked like the machine for pounding corn. To this ring was attached a rope with which, when the ship charged an enemy, they raised the ravens by means of the pulley on the pole and let them down on the enemy’s deck, sometimes from the prow and sometimes bringing them round when the ships collided.

\[ a \] The gangway (36 feet long) was composed of two parts united by a joint, the near part (12 feet long), which always remained horizontal, and the far part (24 feet long) which could be drawn up at right angles to the near part, thus reaching the top of the pole (also 24 feet long) and remaining vertical until lowered. The whole could be moved round the pole which pierced it at the junction of the two parts.

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9 προσπιπτούσας ἐμβολάς. ο̣τε δὲ ταῖς σανίσι τῶν καταστρωμάτων ἐμπαγέντες οἱ κόρακες ὁμοί συνδήσαιεν τὰς ναῦς, εἰ μὲν πλάγιαν παραβάλοιεν ἀλλήλαις, πανταχόθεν ἐπεπῆδων, εἰ δὲ κατὰ πρώραι, διʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κόρακος ἐπὶ δύο συνεχείς ἐποιοῦν-
10 τὸ τὴν ἔφοδον. ὥν οἱ μὲν ἤγομενοι τὴν κατὰ πρόσωπον ἐπιφάνειαι ἐσκέπασαν ταῖς τῶν θυρεῶν προβολαῖς, οἱ δὲ ἐπόμενοι τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων ἦσοφλιζον πλευρᾶς ὑπὲρ τὸν δρυφακτὸν ὑπερτιθέν-
11 μενοι τὰς ὃτις τῶν ὅπλων. οὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη κεχρημένοι παρασκευή καιρὸν ἐπετήρουν πρὸς ναυμαχίαν.

23 Ὅ δὲ Γαῖος Βίλιος ὠς θάττων ἔγνω τὴν περι-
πέτειαν τοῦ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἤγομενον,
παραδοὺς τὰ πεζικὰ στρατόπεδα τοῖς χιλιάρχοις
2 αὐτὸς διεκομίσθη πρὸς τὸν στόλον. πυθόμενος δὲ
toῖς πολεμίοις πορθεὶν τὴν Μυλαῖτιν χώραν, ἐπιπλεῖ
3 στόλῳ παντὶ. συνιδόντες δ’ οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ
χαρᾶς καὶ σπουδῆς ἀνήγοντο ναυσὶν ἐκατόν καὶ
τριάκοντα, καταφρονοῦντες τῆς ἀπειρίας τῶν 'Ρω-
μαίων, καὶ πάντες ἐπλεῶν ἀντίπρωρροι τοῖς πολεµί-
οις, οὐδὲ τάξεως καταξιώσαντες τὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλ’
4 ὡς ἐπὶ λεῖαν τῶν πρόδηλον. ἤγειτο δ’ Ἀννίβας
αὐτῶν—οὗτος δ’ ἦν ὁ τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκκλέψας νυκτὸς
ἐκ τῆς τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων πόλεως—ἐχων ἐπτήρη
5 τὴν γενομένην Πύρρου τοῦ βασιλέως. ἀμα δὲ τῷ
πλησιάζειν συνθετεῦσαν ἀνανευκότας τοὺς κό-
ρακας ἐν ταῖς ἐκάστοις πρώραισι, ἐπὶ ποσὸν μὲν
ηπόρουν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, ἔνιοι ὁμοίοι ταῖς τῶν
ὀργάνων κατασκευαῖς: οὐ μὴν ἄλλα τελέως
κατεγνωκότες τῶν ἐναντίων ἐνέβαλον οἱ πρῶτοι
6 πλεοῦντες τετολμηκότως. τῶν δὲ συμπλεκομένων
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BOOK 1

broadsides. Once the ravens were fixed in the planks of the enemy’s deck and grappled the ships together, if they were broadside on, they boarded from all sides, but if they had charged with the prow, they attacked by passing over the gangway of the raven itself two abreast. The leading pair protected the front by holding up their shields, and those who followed secured the two flanks by resting the rims of their shields on the top of the railing. Having, then, adopted this device, they awaited an opportunity for going into action.

23. As for Gaius Duilius, no sooner had he learnt of the disaster which had befallen the commander of the naval forces than handing over his legions to the military tribunes he proceeded to the fleet. Learning that the enemy were ravaging the territory of Mylae, he sailed against them with his whole force. The Carthaginians on sighting him put to sea with a hundred and thirty sail, quite overjoyed and eager, as they despised the inexperience of the Romans. They all sailed straight on the enemy, not even thinking it worth while to maintain order in the attack, but just as if they were falling on a prey that was obviously theirs. They were commanded by Hannibal—the same who stole out of Agrigentum by night with his army—in the seven-banked galley that was formerly King Pyrrhus’. On approaching and seeing the ravens hauled up on the prow of each ship, the Carthaginians were at first nonplussed, being surprised at the construction of the engines. However, as they entirely gave the enemy up for lost, the front ships attacked daringly. But when the ships that came into collision were in
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σκαφῶν ἀεὶ δεδεμένων τοῖς ὀργάνοις, καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν εὐθὺς ἐπιπορευομένων δι’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κόρακος καὶ συμπλεκομένων ἐπὶ τοῖς καταστρώμασιν, οἱ μὲν ἐφονεύοντο τῶν Καρχηδόνων, οἱ δὲ παρεδίδοσαν ἑαυτοὺς ἐκπληττόμενοι τὸ γινόμενον· παραπλήσιον 7 γὰρ πεζομαχίας συνέβαινε τὸν κίνδυνον ἀποτελεῖσθαι. διὸ καὶ τρικοντα μὲν τὰς πρώτας συμβαλούσας ναῦς αὐτάνδρους ἀπέβαλον, σὺν αἷς ἔγενετ’ αἰχμάλωτον καὶ τὸ του στρατηγοῦ πλοῖον· ᾿Αννίβας δ’ ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραβόλως αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ σκάφῃ 8 διέφυγε. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν Καρχηδόνων ἐποιεῖτο μὲν τὸν ἐπίπλουν ὡς εἰς ἐμβολὴν, ἐν δὲ τῷ συνεγκύασις θεωροῦντο τὸ συμβεβηκὸς περὶ τὰς προπλεύσας ναῦς, ἐξέκλινον καὶ διένεισαν τὰς τῶν 9 ὀργάνων ἐπιβολὰς. πιστεύοντες δὲ τῷ ταχυναύτῃ, οἱ μὲν ἐκ πλαγίων, οἱ δὲ κατὰ πρόμινων ἐκτείνοντες ἀσφαλῶς ἦλπιζον ποιήσασθαι τὰς ἐμβολὰς. 10 πάντη δὲ καὶ πάντως ἀντιπεριοσταμένων καὶ συνδιαιευνότων τῶν ὀργάνων οὕτως ὡστε κατ’ ἀνάγκην τοὺς ἐγγίζοντας συνδεσθαι, τέλος ἐγκλίναντες ἔφυγον οἱ Καρχηδονοί, καταπλαγέντες τὴν καινοτομίαν τοῦ συμβαίνοντος, πεντήκοντα ναῦς ἀποβαλόντες.

24 Οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαιοὶ παραδόξως ἀντιπεποιημένοι τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν ἐλπίδος, διπλασίως ἐπερρῶσθησαν 2 ταῖς ὀρμαίς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον. τότε μὲν οὖν προσχόντες τῇ Σικελίᾳ τὴν τ’ Αἰγεσταίων ἐλυσαν πολιορκίαν, ἐσχάτως αὐτῶν ἑδὲ διακειμένους, κατά τε τὴν ἐκ τῆς Αἰγέστης ἀναχώρησιν Μάκελλαν πόλιν κατὰ κράτος ἐλλον.

3 Μετά δὲ τὴν ναυμαχίαν ᾿Αμίλκας ὁ τῶν Καρχηδόνων στρατηγὸς ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῶν πεζικῶν

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every case held fast by the machines, and the Roman crews boarded by means of the ravens and attacked them hand to hand on deck, some of the Carthaginians were cut down and others surrendered from dismay at what was happening, the battle having become just like a fight on land. So the first thirty ships that engaged were taken with all their crews, including the commander’s galley, Hannibal himself managing to escape beyond his hopes by a miracle in the jolly-boat. The rest of the Carthaginian force was bearing up as if to charge the enemy, but seeing, as they approached, the fate of the advanced ships they turned aside and avoided the blows of the engines. Trusting in their swiftness, they veered round the enemy in the hope of being able to strike him in safety either on the broadside or on the stern, but when the ravens swung round and shifted in all directions and in all manner of ways so that those who approached them were of necessity grappled, they finally gave way and took to flight, terror-stricken by this novel experience and with the loss of fifty ships.

24. When the Romans had thus, contrary to all expectation, gained the prospect of success at sea their determination to prosecute the war became twice as strong. On this occasion they put in on the coast of Sicily, raised the siege of Segesta which was in the last stage of distress, and in leaving Segesta took the city of Macella by assault.

After the battle at sea Hamilcar, the Carthaginian commander of their land forces, who was quartered
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dunámew, diatréibw peri Pánormon, gnwós en tois Ἦρωμαικοις στρατοπέδοις στασάζοντας τους συμμάχους πρὸς τοὺς Ἦρωμαίους peri τῶν ἐν ταῖς máchais
4 πρωτεῖων, kai πυνθανόμενοι στρατοπεδεύειν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔαυτοὺς τοὺς συμμάχους μεταξὺ τοῦ Παρώπου καὶ τῶν Θερμῶν τῶν Ἰμεραιῶν, ἐπιτεσσέων αὐτοῖς αἰφνιδίως ἀναστρατοπεδεύουσι μετὰ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως σχεδὸν eis τετρακισχίλιους ἀπέκτεινε.
5 μετὰ δε ταύτην τὴν πράξειν ὁ μὲν Ἀννίβας ἔχων τὰς διασωθείσας ναῦς ἀπέπλευσεν eis τὴν Καρχηδόνα, μετ’ οὐ πολὺ δ’ ἐκείθεν εἰς Σαρδόνα διήρε, προσλαβὼν ναῦς καὶ τινας τῶν ἐνδοξῶν τριπόρτων.
6 χρόνους δ’ οὐ πολλοῖς κατόπιν ἐν τῇ Σαρδόνῃ συγκλεισθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἦρωμαίων ἐν τῖνι λιμένι καὶ πολλὰς ἀποβαλῶν τῶν νεῶν, παρακάτω συλλήφθεις ὑπὸ τῶν διασωθέντων Καρχηδονῶν ἀνεσταυρώθη.
7 Ἦρωμαίοι γὰρ ἅμα τῆς θαλάττης θησαυρὸ καὶ τῶν κατὰ Σαρδόνα πραγμάτων εὐθέως ἀντείχοντο.
8 Τὰ δ’ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ στρατόπεδα τῶν Ἦρωμαίων
259 b.c. κατὰ μὲν τὸν ἔξης ἐνιαυτὸν οὐδὲν ἀξίων ἔπραξαν
9 λόγου, τότε δὲ προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς ἐπικαθεσταμένους ἄρχοντας Αἴθων Ἀτίλων καὶ Γάιων Σουλπίκιων ἀρμήσαν ἐπὶ τὸν Πάνορμον διὰ τὸ τὰς τῶν
258 b.c. Καρχηδονίων δυνάμεις ἔκει παραχεμάζειν. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ συνεγίγονται τῇ πόλει μετὰ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως παρετάξαντο. τῶν δὲ πολεμίων οὐκ ἀντεξόντων, πάλιν ἐνετέθεν ἐποιήσαν τὴν ὀρμὴν ἐπὶ
11 πόλιν Ἰππάναν, καὶ ταύτην μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου κατὰ κράτος ἔλαβον, ἐκδικά δὲ καὶ τὸ Μυττίστρατον, πολλοὺς χρόνους ὑπομεμενηκός τὴν πολιορκίαν διὰ τὴν
12 ὀχυρότητα τοῦ τόπου. τὴν δὲ Καμαρναίων πόλιν, μικρῷ πρότερον ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἀποστάσαν, τότε προσ-
in the neighbourhood of Panormus, heard that in the Roman camp the allies and the Romans were at variance as to which had most distinguished themselves in the battles, and that the allies were encamped by themselves between the Paropus and the Hot Springs of Himera. Suddenly falling on them with his whole force as they were breaking up their camp he killed about four thousand. After this action Hannibal with the ships that escaped sailed away to Carthage and shortly after crossed from there to Sardinia, taking with him additional ships and some of the most celebrated naval officers. Not long afterwards he was blockaded in one of the harbours of Sardinia by the Romans and after losing many of his ships was summarily arrested by the surviving Carthaginians and crucified. The Romans, I should explain, from the moment they concerned themselves with the sea, began to entertain designs on Sardinia.

The Roman troops in Sicily did nothing worthy of note during the following year; but at its close when they had received their new commanders the Consuls of that year, Aulus Atilius and Gaius Sulpicius, they started to attack Panormus, because the Carthaginian forces were wintering there. The Consuls, when they got close up to the city, offered battle with their whole forces, but as the enemy did not come out to meet them they left Panormus and went off to attack Hippana. This city they took by assault and they also took Myttistratum which withstood the siege for long owing to its strong situation. They then occupied Camarina which had lately deserted their cause, bringing up a siege battery and
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evégkançtes εργα και καταβάλοντες τά τείχη κατ-
έσχων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τήν Ἐνναν καὶ ἔτερα πλείω
13 πολισμάτω πάνω Καρχηδόνιν. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων γε-
νόμενοι Λιπαραῖοι ἐπεχείρησαν πολιορκεῖν.

25 Τῷ δὲ εἴης ἐναυτῷ Γάιος Ἀτίλιος ὁ στρατηγὸς
257 Β. Σ. τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρὸς Τυνδαρίδα καθορμισθείς, καὶ
συνθεσάμενος ἀτάκτως παραπλέοντα τῶν τῶν
Καρχηδόνιν οὖγον, παραγγείλας τοῖς ἰδίοις
πληρώμασιν ἐπεσθαι τοῖς ἰγγουμένοις, αὐτὸς ὁρμῆσε
2 πρὸ τῶν ἀλλων, ἔχων δέκα ναῦς ὀμπλούσας. οἱ
δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, συνιδόντες τῶν ὑπεναντίων τοὺς
μὲν ἀκμὴν ἐμβαίνοντας, τοὺς δὲ ἀναγομένους, τοὺς
dὲ πρώτους πολὺ προεληφότας τῶν ἀλλων, ἐπὶ-
3 στρέφαντες αὐτοῖς ἀπήντων. καὶ κυκλώσαντες τάς
μὲν ἄλλας διέφθειραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ταῖς
παρ’ ὀλγον αὐτανδρὸν ἔλαβον. οὐ μὴν ἄλλ’ αὐτὴ
μὲν ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις ἐξηρτυμένη καὶ ταχυναυτούσα
4 διέφυγε παράδοξως τῶν κίνδυνον, αἱ δὲ λυσία
τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπιπλέουσαι κατὰ βραχὺ συνηθροί-
ζοντο. γενόμεναι δ’ ἐν μετώπῳ συνέβαλλον τοῖς
πολεμίως, καὶ δέκα μὲν αὐτανδρόν ναῦς ἔλαβον,
ὅκτω δὲ κατέδυσαν. αἱ δὲ λυσία τῶν Καρχηδόνιων
ἀπεχώρησαν εἰς τᾶς Λιπαραίας καλουμένας νῆσους.
5 Ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τῆς ναυμαχίας ἀμφότεροι νομίζον-
tes ἐφάμιλλον πεποιήθαι τῶν κίνδυνον, ὠρμησαν
ὀλοσχερόστερον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιστασθαι ναυτικὰς δυνά-
6 μεις καὶ τῶν κατὰ τάλαταν ἀντέχεσθαι πραγμάτων.
αἱ δὲ πεζικαὶ δυνάμεις ἐν τοῖς κατὰ ταῦτα καιροῖς
οὐδὲν ἔπραξαν ἄξιον μνήμης, ἀλλὰ περὶ μικρᾶς καὶ
7 τὰς τυχούσας πράξεις κατέτριψαν τοὺς χρόνους.

256 Β. Σ. διὸ παρασκευασάμενοι, καθάπερ εἰπὼν, εἰς τὴν
ἐπιφερομένην θερείαν ἀνήχησαν Ῥωμαιοὶ μὲν
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BOOK I

making a breach in the wall. They similarly took Enna and several other small places belonging to the Carthaginians, and when they had finished with these operations they undertook the siege of Lipara.

25. Next year Gaius Atilius Regulus the Roman Consul, while anchored off Tyndaris, caught sight of the Carthaginian fleet sailing past in disorder. Ordering his crews to follow the leaders, he dashed out before the rest with ten ships sailing together. The Carthaginians, observing that some of the enemy were still embarking, and some just getting under weigh, while those in the van had much outstripped the others, turned and met them. Surrounding them they sunk the rest of the ten, and came very near to taking the admiral's ship with its crew. However, as it was well manned and swift, it foiled their expectation and got out of danger. The rest of the Roman fleet sailed up and gradually got into close order. As soon as they faced the enemy, they bore down on them and took ten ships with their crews, sinking eight. The rest of the Carthaginian fleet withdrew to the islands known as Liparaean.

The result of this battle was that both sides thought that they had fought now on equal terms, and both threw themselves more thoroughly into the task of organizing a navy and disputing the command of the sea, while in the mean time the land forces accomplished nothing worthy of mention, but spent their time in minor operations of no significance. The Romans, therefore, after making preparations for the coming summer, set to sea with

257 B.C.

256 B.C.
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triákonta kai triakosíais makraís nauôi katafhrá-
8 kou, kai katéschon eis Mesôthn̄. óthn̄ anaxhêntes
élpleoun deziàn èxontes tìn Sikeliān, kâµfantes de
tón Páchnon úperíran eis "Eknomôn dià to kai to
9 pezôn strátêuma peri touów autouês einai touús
tópoues. Karĥhdonîn de pentîkoua kai triako-
síais nauôi katafrâktoûs anaplêusântes Lînvaiô
prosèchon, èntêbêven de prôs 'Hrákleían tìn
26 Mînîan katharomîôthsan. õn de tîn mên 'Rhômaiô
prôthesi eis tìn Lebûn plêiv kai tôn pôleuën ékei
perostân, éna toûs Karĥhdonîous mû peri Sikeliâs,
álâ peri sfôn auvtôn kai tîs idias khûras ó
2 kîndunos gîntai. toûs de Karĥhdonîous tânantia
touûn èdókei: svnidóntes gár ùs eînêfodôs èstîn
h Lebû kai pâs o kàta tìn khûran laûs eîxeîrîvos
toûs aptâ eis auvtôn èmûaloudán, ouî ouî tî hsaî
3 èpitrépein, álâ diakîndunueîn kai naumaxeîn
èspetoud. õntôn de tîn mên prôs tô kowûiv, tôv
de prôs tô biâzeîthai, prôfanîs õn o mèllon àgôn
4 èk tîs èkatéra swstásthai filotîmias. oî mên
ouden 'Rhômaiô prôs àmôftera tîn parasskeû
àrmôzounan èpouînîto, prôs te tîn katà thalattan
5 xreîan kai prôs tîn apôbason tîn eis tîn pôleumîn.
dîsper èpulézântes èk tîn pezikôn stratópèdôn
tàs àristas xêiras dîeûlon tîn pásan dûnavmîn, õn
6 hmelôn ànalambânein, eis têttara môrê. tô de
mèros èkastôn dîtâs eîche prôsphorîas: prôton
mên gar èkalêîto stratópèdon kai prwtoû sólòs,
kai tô loupâ kàta lôgon. tô de tètârtôn kai trîthn
èpwnumînan èti prosseilîfheî: trîarîoi gar ónowmâ-
7 zôunto kàta tîn en toûs pezikôis stratópèdous
sunnêtheian. kai tô mên sùmpan õn strátêuma
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BOOK I

a fleet of three hundred and thirty decked ships of
war and put in to Messene. Starting again from
there they sailed with Sicily on their right hand,
and doubling Cape Pachynus they came round to
Ecnomus, because their land forces too happened to
be just in that neighbourhood. The Carthaginians,
setting sail with three hundred and fifty decked
vessels, touched at Lilybaeum, and proceeding thence
came to anchor off Heraclea Minoa. 26. The plan
of the Romans was to sail to Africa and deflect the
war to that country, so that the Carthaginians might
find no longer Sicily but themselves and their own
territory in danger. The Carthaginians were re-
solved on just the opposite course, for, aware as they
were that Africa is easily accessible, and that all the
people in the country would be easily subdued by
anyone who had once invaded it, they were unable
to allow this, and were anxious to run the risk
of a sea-battle. The object of the one side being to
prevent and that of the other to force a crossing, it
was clear that their rival aims would result in the
struggle which followed. The Romans had made
suitable preparations for both contingencies—for an
action at sea and for a landing in the enemy's country.
For the latter purpose, selecting the best men from
their land forces, they divided into four corps the
total force they were about to embark. Each corps
had two names; it was called either the First Legion
or the First Squadron, and the others accordingly.
The fourth had a third name in addition; they were
called triarii after the usage in the land forces. The
whole body embarked on the ships numbered about a
toútwv t'hν ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως περὶ τέτταρας καὶ
déka μυριάδας, ὡς ἂν ἐκάστης νεως λαμβανούσης
8 ἐρέτας μὲν τριακοσίους, ἐπιβάτας δ’ ἐκατὸν εἶκοσιν.
oi δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὸ μὲν πλεῖον καὶ τὸ πάν ἡμιόζων-
to πρὸς τὸν κατὰ βάλατταν κίνδυνον· τὸ γε μὴν
πλῆθος αὐτῶν ἦν ὑπὲρ πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας κατὰ
9 τὸν τῶν νεῶν λόγον. ἡψ’ οἷς οὐχ οἶδαν ἂν τις παρῶν
καὶ θεώμενος ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ κἀν ἄκουσαν
καταπλαγεῖ ὑπὸ τοῦ κινδύνου μέγεθος καὶ τὴν τῶν
πολιτευμάτων ἀμφοτέρων μεγαλομεριαν καὶ δύνα-
μιν, στοχαζόμενος ἔκ τε τοῦ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τοῦ
tῶν νεῶν πλῆθος.
10 Οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαίοι συλλογιζόμενοι διότι τῶν μὲν πλούν
ἐναι συμβαινὲι πελάγιον, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους τα-
χυναυτεῖν, πανταχόθεν ἐπειρώντα ποιεῖσθαι τὴν
11 τάξιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ δυσπρόσωδον. τὰς μὲν οὖν
ἐξήρεις δ’ οὔσας, ἐφ’ ὅν ἐπλεον οἱ στρατηγοὶ
Μάρκος Ἀτύλιος καὶ Δεύκιος Μάλιος, πρώτας ἐν
μετώπῳ παραλλήλους ἔταξαν. τούτων δ’ ἐκατέρα
12 συνεχεῖς κατὰ μίαν ναῦν ἐπιτάττοντες τῇ μὲν τῶν
πρῶτον, τῇ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον στόλον ἐπέστησαν, ἂεὶ
καθ’ ἐκάστην ναῦν ἐκατέρου τοῦ στόλου μείζον τὸ
μεταξὺ πουόντες διάστημα. ταῖς δὲ πρώρραις
13 ἔξω νεύοντα τὰ σκάφη τὴν ἐπίστασιν ἐπ’ ἄλλ’ ἡλιοὺς
ἐξέχειν. ἐπείδὴ δὲ τὸν πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον στόλον
ἀπλῶς εἰς ἐμβολῶν ἔταξαν, ἐπέβαλον τούτοις ἐπὶ
μίαν ναῦν ἐν μετώπῳ τὸ τρίτον στρατόπεδον· ὀν
ἐπιστάντων ἀπετελέσθη τρίγωνον τὸ πάν εἶδος τῆς
τάξεως. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἐπέστησαν τὰς ἰππηγούς,
ῥύματα δόντες ἐξ αὐτῶν ταῖς τοῦ τρίτου στόλου

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a This can only mean that the prow of each ship was
hundred and forty thousand, each ship holding three hundred rowers and a hundred and twenty soldiers. The Carthaginians were chiefly or solely adapting their preparations to a maritime war, their numbers being, to reckon by the number of ships, actually above one hundred and fifty thousand. These are figures calculated to strike not only one present and with the forces under his eyes but even a hearer with amazement at the magnitude of the struggle and at that lavish outlay and vast power of the two states, which may be estimated from the number of men and ships.

The Romans taking into consideration that the voyage was across the open sea and that the enemy were their superiors in speed, tried by every means to range their fleet in an order which would render it secure and difficult to attack. Accordingly, they stationed their two six-banked galleys, on which the commanders, Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius, were sailing, in front and in line with each other. Behind each of these they placed ships in single file, the first squadron behind the one and the second behind the other, so arranging them that the distance between each pair of ships in the two squadrons grew ever greater. The ships were stationed in column with their prows directed outwards. Having thus arranged the first and second squadrons in the form of a simple wedge, they stationed the third in a single line at the base, so that when these ships had taken their places the resulting form of the whole was a triangle. Behind these ships at the base they stationed the horse-transport, attaching them by towing-lines to the directed to the open sea and not to the ship in front of it; i.e. they were in echelon.
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15 ναυοί. ταύτας δὲ κατόπιν ἐπέβαλον τὸν τέταρτον
στόλον, τοὺς τριαρίους κληθέντας, ἐπὶ μίαν παρεκτεί-
νατες ναῦν, ὡς ὑπερτείνειν ἐξ ἐκατέρον τοῦ μέρους
16 τοὺς πρὸ ἕαυτῶν. καὶ συναρμοσθέντων πάντων
κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον, τὸ μὲν ὄλον ἀπετελέσθη
σχῆμα τῆς τάξεως ἕμβολον, οὐ τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν
κορυφὴν μέρος ἤν κοίλον, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τῇ βάσει
στερεόν, τὸ δὲ σύμπαν ἐνεργὸν καὶ πρακτικὸν, ἀμα
δὲ καὶ δυσδιάλυτον.

27 Οἱ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγοὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
καίρον παρακαλέσαντες τὰ πλῆθη διὰ βραχέων, καὶ
συνυποδείξαντες αὐτοῖς ὅτι νικήσαντες μὲν τῇ ναυ-
μαχίᾳ περὶ Σικελίας ποησοῦνταί τὸν πόλεμον, ἥττη-
θέντες δὲ περὶ τῆς σφετέρας πατρίδος κανδυνέσουσι
2 καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, οὕτως αὐτοῖς παρῆγγειλαν
ἐμβαίνειν εἰς τὰς ναύς. προθύμως δὲ πάντων ποιοῦν-
των τὸ παραγγελλόμενον διὰ τὸ προορᾶθαι τὸ
μέλλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, εὐθαρσῶς ἀνήγγειλος καὶ
3 καταπληκτικός. θεωροῦντες δὲ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων
τάξιν οἱ στρατηγοὶ, καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ἀρμοζόμενον, τὰ
μὲν τρία μέρη τῆς αὐτῶν δυνάμεως ἐπὶ μίαν ἔταττον
ναῦν, πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος ἀνατείναντες τὸ δεξίον
κέρας, ὡς κυκλώσαντες τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, πάσας
ἰστάντες ἀντιπρόωρος τὰς ναῦς τοῖς πολεμίοις.
4 τὸ δὲ τέταρτον εὐώνυμον τῆς ὀλῆς τάξεως ἐποίουν,
5 ἐν ἑπικαμπίῳ νεῦον πρὸς τὴν γῆν. ἤγοντο δὲ τῶν
Καρχηδονίων, τού μὲν δεξιοῦ κέρως, ἔχουν ἐπίπλους
καὶ πεντήρεις τὰς μάλιστα ταχυναυτοῦσας πρὸς τὴν
ὑπερκέρασιν, Ἄνων ὁ περὶ τὸν Ἀκράγαντα
6 λειφθεῖς τῇ παρατάξῃ. τῶν δὲ εὐωνύμων εἰχε τὴν
ἐπιμέλειαν Ἀμίλκας ὁ περὶ τὴν Τυνδαρίδα ναυμα-
χήσας. οὐ τότε κατὰ μέσην τὴν τάξιν ποιοῦμενος
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vessels of the third squadron. Finally, behind these they stationed the fourth squadron, known as *triairi*, placing each ship at a greater distance from the next so that the line overlapped that in front of it at each extremity. When all had been put together in the manner I have described, the whole arrangement had the form of a wedge, the apex of which was open, the base compact, and the whole effective and practical, while also difficult to break up.

27. About the same time the Carthaginian commanders briefly addressed their forces. They pointed out to them that in the event of victory in the battle they would be fighting afterwards for Sicily, but that if defeated they would have to fight for their own country and their homes, and bade them take this to heart and embark. When all readily did as they were ordered, as their general’s words had made clear to them the issues at stake, they set to sea in a confident and menacing spirit. The commanders when they saw the enemy’s order adapted their own to it. Three-quarters of their force they drew up in a single line, extending their right wing to the open sea for the purpose of encircling the enemy and with all their ships facing the Romans. The remaining quarter of their force formed the left wing of their whole line, and reached shoreward at an angle with the rest. Their right wing was under the command of the same Hanno who had been worsted in the engagement near Agrigentum. He had vessels for charging and also the swiftest quinqueremes for the outflanking movement. The left wing was in charge of Hamilcar, the one who commanded in the sea-battle at Tyndaris, and he, fighting as he was in the centre of the whole line,
ΤΗΣ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΣ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

7 τῶν κίνδυνον ἔχρησάτο τοις στρατηγήματι κατὰ τὸν ἄγωνα τοιώδε. τῶν γὰρ Ῥωμαίων συνθεσαμενῶν ἐπὶ λεπτὸν ἐκτεταμένους τοὺς Καρχερδόνιους, καὶ ποιησαμένων τὴν ὁμήρη ἐπὶ μέσους, τὴν μὲν ἄρχῃν
8 ὁ κίνδυνος ἔλαβε τουαύτην. ταχὺ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰ μέσα Καρχερδόνιοι ἐκ παραγγέλματος κλινάντων πρὸς φυγήν χάριν τοῦ διασπάσαι τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων τάξιν, οὔτοι μὲν ὑπεχύρων μετὰ σπουδῆς, οἱ δὲ
9 Ῥωμαίοι κατόπιν ἰκολούθουν ἐκθύμως. ο μὲν οὖν πρῶτος καὶ δεύτερος στόλος ἔπεκειτο τοῖς φεύγουσι, τὸ δὲ τρίτου καὶ τὸ τέταρτον στρατόπεδον ἀπεστάτο, τῶν μὲν ῥυμουλκοῦντων τὰς ἐπιθηγοὺς
10 ναῦς, τῶν δὲ τριαρίων συμμενόντων καὶ συνεφθερεύοντων τούτων. ἔπει δὲ τὸν πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον στόλον ἱκανοῦ τῶν ἄλλων ἔδοξον ἀπεστακέναι τότον οἱ Καρχερδόνιοι, συνθήματος ἀρθέντος ἐκ τῆς Ἀμίλκου νεὼς μετεβάλλοντο πάντες ἄμα καὶ συνεβα-
11 λον τοῖς ἐπικειμένοις. ἄγωνος δὲ συστάντος καρτε-
12 ροῦ, τῷ μὲν ταχυναυτεῖν ἐκπεριπλέοντες καὶ ἐξίδως μὲν προσιόντες, ὃζεως δ᾽ ἀποχωροῦντες, πολὺ περι-
13 ησαν οἱ Καρχερδόνιοι, τῷ δὲ βιασμαχεῖν κατὰ τᾶς συμπλοκᾶς καὶ συνδείν τοῖς κόραξι τοὺς ἀπαξ ἑγγίσαντας, ἄμα δὲ καὶ τῷ συναγωνιζομένων ἄμφωτερων τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐν ὀψεὶ τῶν ἱγουμένων ποιεῖν τῶν κίνδυνον, οὐχ ἢττον ἐπικυδεστέρας εἶχον οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τῶν Καρχερδόνων τὰς ἐλπίδας.
14 ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τούτους μάχη τουαύτην εἶχε διάθεσιν.
15 κατὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν καιρὸν τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν κέρας ἔχων Ἀννῶν, τὸ μεῖναν ἐν ἀποστάσει κατὰ τὴν πρώτην συμβολήν, τὸ τε πέλαγος ὑπεράρας ἐνέβαλε ταῖς τῶν τριαρίων ναυσὶ καὶ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρεῖχε
16 καὶ δυσχρηστίαν αὐτοῖς. οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὴν γῆν

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made use of the following stratagem. The battle was begun by the Romans who, noticing that the Carthaginian line was thin owing to its great extent, delivered an attack on the centre. The Carthaginian centre had received Hamilcar's orders to fall back at once with the view of breaking the order of the Romans, and, as they hastily retreated, the Romans pursued them vigorously. While the first and second squadrons thus pressed on the flying enemy, the third and fourth were separated from them, the third squadron towing the horse-transports, and the *triarii* remaining with them as a supporting force. When the Carthaginians thought they had drawn off the first and second squadrons far enough from the others, they all, on receiving a signal from Hamilcar's ship, turned simultaneously and attacked their pursuers. The engagement that followed was a very hot one, the superior speed of the Carthaginians enabling them to move round the enemy's flank as well as to approach easily and retire rapidly, while the Romans, relying on their sheer strength when they closed with the enemy, grappling with the ravens every ship as soon as it approached, fighting also, as they were, under the very eyes of both the Consuls, who were personally taking part in the combat, had no less high hopes of success. Such then was the state of the battle in this quarter. 28. At one and the same time Hanno with the right wing, which had held its distance in the first attack, sailed across the open sea and fell upon the ships of the *triarii*, causing them great embarrassment and distress. Meanwhile that part of the Carthaginian
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tetagmēnoi tōn Karχẖdovnīwv, paragegenontes eis
mētwpon ēk tīs proûparchoúth θάxeus, kai
ποιήσαντες ἀντιπρώρρους tās ναῦς, ἐνέβαλον tōis
bhmoulkoûsi tās ἵππηγούς. οἱ δ’ ἀφέμενοι tā
rūmata synesplekonto kai diγγωνύζοντο tōis pole-
mious. ἢ d’ τρία μέρη tīs ὅλης συμπλοκῆς kai
treis ναυμαχίας συνέστησαν πολὺ κεχωρισμέναι
4 tōis tōpoi allhipwv. τῷ δ’ ἐκατέρω πάρσα tā
μέρη γενέσθαι κατὰ tōn ēx ἀρχῆς χειρισμὸν
ἐφάμιλλον εἶναι συνεβαίνει kai tōn kîndvov. οὐ
5 μὴν ἀλλὰ tō katal λόγον εν ἐκάστους ἐπετελείτο
péri tīn máxhν, ὅπερ εἰκός ὅταν ἡ παραπλήσια
6 πάντα tā tōn ἀγωνιζόμενων. οἱ γὰρ πρώτοι <κυ-
δυνεύοντες εἰς τῶν ἱππηγοῦν ἰκβανεῖ
tēlos γὰρ ἐκβιασθέντες οἱ peri tōn Ἀμῖλκαν εἰς φυγὴν ὧρη-
7 σαν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Λεύκιος ἀνεδείτο tās αἰχμαλώτων
ναῦς. ὁ δὲ Μάρκος, συνωρῶν tōn peri tois tirmv-
ous kai tōs ἵππηγοў ἀγώνα, κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐβοηθεῖ
τούτους, ἔχων τῶν δευτέρω στόλου tās ἀκεράιους
8 ναῦς. συνάψαντος dē kai προσομεκανοῦν τόυτων tōs
peri tōn Ἀννωνα, ταχέως ἀναθαρρήσαντες οἱ tirmv-
rous, καίπερ ἦδη κακῶς ἀπαλλάττοντες, πάλιν ἐπερ-
9 ρώσθησαν πρὸς tōν kîndvov. οἱ δὲ Karχẖdovnīwv,
tōn mēn katal πρόσωπον αὐτῶν προσμαχομένων,
tōn dē katal νώτου προσπιπτόντων, δυσχρηστού-
menov, kai paraδοξω ὑπὸ tōn bθηθησάντων kυ-
κλούμενον, κλίναντες πελαγίαν ἐπουδυντό tīn ὑπο-
10 χώρησιν. κατὰ dē tōn avtōn kaimnov d’ tē Leύkios,
eπαναπλέων ἦδη kai thewroun synkekleisμένωn πρὸς
tῆ γῆ tōn trītovn stόλων ὑπὸ tōv tōv Karχẖdovnīwv
euvnýmou kératos, d’ tē Mάρκov, en ἁσφαλεί katal-
līptovn tās ἵππηγούς kai tōv tirmvrous, ὧρμη-
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force which was posted near the shore, changing their former formation and deploying into line with their prows facing the enemy, attacked the vessels which were towing the horse-transports. Letting go their tow-lines this squadron met and engaged the enemy. Thus the whole conflict consisted of three parts, and three battles were going on at a wide distance from each other. As the respective forces were in each case of equal strength owing to their disposition at the outset, the battle also was fought on equal terms. However, in each case things fell out as one would expect, when the forces engaged are so equally matched. Those who had commenced the battle were the first to be separated, for Hamilcar's division was finally forced back and took to flight. Lucius was now occupied in taking the prizes in tow, and Marcus, observing the struggle in which the triarii and horse-transports were involved, hastened to their assistance with such of the ships of the second squadron as were undamaged. When he reached Hanno's division and came into conflict with it, the triarii at once took heart, though they had had much the worst of it, and recovered their fighting spirit. The Carthaginians, attacked both in front and in the rear, were in difficulties, finding themselves surrounded, to their surprise, by the relieving force, and giving way, they began to retreat out to sea. Meanwhile both Lucius, who was by this time sailing up and observed that the third squadron was shut in close to the shore by the Carthaginian left wing, and Marcus, who had now left the horse-transports and triarii in
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11 σαν ἀμφότεροι βοηθεῖν τοὺς κινδυνεύοντος. παραπλήσιον γὰρ ἦν ήδη τὸ γινόμενον πολιορκίας καὶ πάντες ἂν ἀπολύσασιν οὕτω γε προφανῶς, εἰ μὴ δεδιότες τοὺς κόρακας οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι περιφράξαντες μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τῇ γῇ συνεῖχον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐμβολὰς διὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν εὑλαβῶς ἔχοντες οὐ προσήνεαν. ταχέως δὲ ἐπιγενόμενοι καὶ κυκλώσαντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους αὐτάνδρους μὲν ἔλαβον πεντήκοντα ναῦς τῶν πολεμίων, ὀλίγαν δὲ τις νεσ παρὰ τὴν γῇν ἐξελίξασι διέφυγον. οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ μέρος κίνδυνος τοιαύτην ἔσχε τὴν διάθεσιν, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς συμπάθης ναυμαχίας ἐγένετο κατὰ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους. διεθάρη δὲ τούτων μὲν εἰκοσικαὶ τέταρτα σκάφη, τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα. ναῦς δὲ τῶν μὲν Ῥωμαίων αὐτάνδρος ὁδεμία τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐγένεθ' ὑποχείριος, τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ἐξήκοντα καὶ τέταρτες.

29 Ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν οἱ Ῥωμαιοὶ προσπεπιστάμενοι καὶ τὰς αἰχμαλώτους ναῦς καταρτίσαντες, ἑτεροτρόπως τὸν ἀρμόζουσαν τοῖς προτερήμασιν ἐπιμέλειαι ποιησάμενοι τῶν πληρωμῶν, ἀνήγοντο. 2 πουούμενοι τῶν πλοίων ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Λιβύην. προσσχόντες δὲ ταῖς πρώταις πλεούσαις ναυσὶν ὑπὸ τὴν ἀκραῖ τὴν Ῥήμαλον ἐπονομαζομένην, ἡ ἀπὸ παντὸς τοῦ περὶ τὴν Καρχηδόνα κόλπον κειμένη προτείνει πελάγιος ὡς πρὸς τὴν Σικελίαν, καὶ προσδεξάμενοι τὰς ἐπιπλεούσας ἐνταῦθα ναῦς, καὶ πάντα συναθροίσαντες τὸν στόλον, ἐπλεον παρὰ τὴν χώραν, ἔσω ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀσπίδα καλομένην πόλιν ἀφίκοντο. 3 ποιησάμενοι δὲ τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἐνταῦθα καὶ νεολικήσαντες, ἑτεροτρόπως καὶ χάρακι περιλαβόντες τὰς ναῦς, ἐγύνοντο πρὸς τὸ πολιορκεῖν αὐτὴν, οὐ βού—
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safety, hastened together to the relief of this force which was in grave peril; for the state of matters now was just like a siege, and they all would evidently have been lost if the Carthaginians had not been afraid of the ravens and simply hedged them in and held them close to the land instead of charging, apprehensive as they were of coming to close quarters. The Consuls, coming up rapidly and surrounding the Carthaginians, captured fifty ships with their crews, a few managing to slip out along shore and escape. The separate encounters fell out as I have described, and the final result of the whole battle was in favour of the Romans. The latter lost twenty-four sail sunk and the Carthaginians more than thirty. Not a single Roman ship with its crew fell into the enemy’s hands, but sixty-four Carthaginian ships were so captured.

29. After this the Romans, laying in a further supply of provisions, repairing the captured ships, and bestowing on their men the attention which their success deserved, put to sea and sailed towards Africa, reaching the shore with their advanced ships under the promontory known as the Hermaeum which lies in front of the whole Gulf of Carthage and stretches out to sea in the direction of Sicily. Having waited there until their other ships came up, and having united their whole fleet, they sailed along the coast till they reached the city of Aspis. Landing there and beaching their ships, which they surrounded with a trench and palisade, they set themselves to lay siege to the town, the garrison of

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λομένων ἐκουσίως σφίσει προσχωρήσαι τῶν κατ-4 εχόντων τὴν πόλιν. οί δὲ διαφυγόντες ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν κινδύνου τῶν Καρχηδονίων κατα-πλεύσαντες, καὶ πεπεσμένοι τοὺς ὑπεναντίοις ἐκ τοῦ γεγονότος προτερήματος ἐπαρθένας εὐθέως ποιήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπίπλουν ἐπ’ αὐτὴν τὴν Καρχη-δόνα, παρετήρουν ταῖς πεζικαῖς καὶ ναυτικαῖς δυνά-5 μει τοὺς προκειμένους τῆς πόλεως τόπους. ἐπιγνόντες δὲ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἀσφαλῶς ἀποβεβηκότας καὶ πολιορκοῦντας τὴν Ἀσπίδα, τοὺς μὲν παρα-φυλάττειν τὸν ἐπίπλουν ἀπέγνωσαν, συνήθροιζον δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ περὶ φυλακὴν ἐγίνοντο τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τῆς χώρας. οί δὲ Ῥωμαιοὶ κυριεύ-σαντες τῆς Ἀσπίδος καὶ φυλακῆν ἀπολυπόντες τῆς 6 πόλεως καὶ χώρας, ἔτι δὲ πρεσβευτάς εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην πέμψαντες τοὺς ἀπαγγέλοντας μὲν περὶ τῶν γεγονότων, ἐρημομένους δὲ περὶ τῶν μελλόντων, τί δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ πῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασι, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα πάση τῇ δυνάμει κατὰ σπουδὴν ἀναζέυ-7 ἔστε καὶ ἠρμῆσαν ἐπὶ τὸ πορθεῖν τὴν χώραν. οὐδὲνος δ’ ἐμποδῶν ἱσταμένους, πολλὰς μὲν οἰκήσεις περιττῶς κατεσκευασμένα διέφθειραν, πολὺ δὲ πλῆθος τῆς τετραπόδου λείας περιβάλλοντος. σώματα δὲ πλεῖστον 8 τῶν δισμυρίων ἐπὶ τὰς ναύς ἀνήγαγον. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ παρῆσαν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης οἱ διασα-φοῦντες ὅτι δεῖ τὸν μὲν ἕνα τῶν στρατηγῶν μέν τινα ἐχοντα δυνάμεις τὰς ἄρκουσας, τὸν δ’ ἐτερον ἀπο-9 κομίζειν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην τὸν στόλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν Μάρκος ἔμενεν, ὑπολειπόμενος ναῦς τετταράκοντα καὶ πεζοὺς μυρίους καὶ πεντακισχιλίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ 10 πεντακοσίους· οὶ δὲ Δεύκιος ἄναλαβὼν τὰ πληρώ-ματα καὶ τὸ τῶν αἱμαλῶτων πλῆθος, καὶ κομι-82
which refused to surrender voluntarily. Those Carthaginians who made good their escape from the naval battle sailed home, and being convinced that the enemy, elated by their recent success, would at once attack Carthage itself from the sea, kept watch at different points over the approaches to the city with their land and sea forces. But when they learnt that the Romans had safely landed and were laying siege to Aspis, they abandoned the measures taken to guard against an attack from the sea, and uniting their forces devoted themselves to the protection of the capital and its environs. The Romans, after making themselves masters of Aspis, where they left a garrison to hold the town and district, sent a mission to Rome to report on recent events, and to inquire what they should do in future and how they were to deal with the whole situation. They then hastily advanced with their whole force and set about plundering the country. As nobody tried to prevent them, they destroyed a number of handsome and luxuriously furnished dwelling-houses, possessed themselves of a quantity of cattle, and captured more than twenty thousand slaves, taking them back to their ships. Messengers from Rome now arrived with instructions for one of the Consuls to remain on the spot with an adequate force and for the other to bring the fleet back to Rome. Marcus Regulus, therefore, remained, retaining forty ships and a force of fifteen thousand infantry and five hundred horse, while Lucius, taking with him the ship’s crews and all
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30 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι θεωροῦντες τὴν τῶν πολεμῶν παρασκευὴν χρονιωτέραν οὖσαν, πρῶτον μὲν στρατηγοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἐλπιστο δύο, τὸν τ’ Ἀννωνὸς Ἀσδοῦβαν καὶ Βώσταρον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Ἀμίλκαν ἐπεμπότο εἰς τὴν Ἡράκλεαν, καλοῦντες 2 κατὰ τάχος αὐτῶν. ὃ δὲ ἀναλαβὼν ἔππεισε πεντακοσίους καὶ πεζοὺς πεντακισχιλίους παρῆν εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα. καὶ καταστάθηκε στρατηγὸς τρίτος, ἐβουλεύετο μετὰ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀσδοῦβαν πῶς δεῖ 3 χρησθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν. ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς βοηθεῖν τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ μὴ περιορᾷν αὐτὴν ἄδεως πορθομένην. ὃ δὲ Μάρκος μετὰ τινας ἡμέρας ἐπεπορεύετο, τά μὲν ἀτείχοστα τῶν ἐρυμάτων ἐξ ἐφόδου διαρ- 4 πάξων, τὰ δὲ τετείχισεμένα πολιορκῶν. ἀφικόμενος δὲ πρὸς πόλιν Ἀδυν ἄξιοχρεω, περιστρατοπεδεύσας ταύτην συνιστάτο μετὰ σπουδῆς ἔργα καὶ πολιορκ- 5 κίαν. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τῇ τε πόλει σπουδάζον- 6 τε βοηθῆσαι καὶ τῶν ὑπάθρων ἀντιποιεῖσθαι κρίνοντες ἐξῆγον τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ καταλαβόμενοι λόφον ὑπερδέξιον μὲν τῶν πολεμίων, ἀφυή δὲ ταῖς ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεσιν, ἐν τούτῳ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν. 7 λοιπὸν ἔχοντες μὲν τὰς πλείστας ἐλπίδας ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπεύσι καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις, ἀφέμενοι δὲ τῶν ἐπιπέ- 8 δῶν χωρίων καὶ συγκλείσαντες σφᾶς αὑτοὺς εἰς τόπους ἐρυμνοὺς καὶ δυσβάτους, ἐμελλόν διδάξειν τοῖς πολεμίους δὲ δέον ἦν πρᾶττει κατ’ αὐτῶν. ὃ 9 δὴ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. συννόησαν γὰρ οἱ τῶν Ἡρωμάιῶν ἠγεμόνες ἐμπείρωσιν ὅτι τὸ πρακτικῶτατον καὶ φοβερῶτατον τῆς τῶν ὑπεναντίων δυνάμεως

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the prisoners, passed safely along the coast of Sicily and reached Rome.

30. The Carthaginians, observing that the Romans were preparing for a long occupation, in the first place elected two generals from among themselves, Hasdrubal, the son of Hanno, and Bostarus, and next sent to Heraclea to Hamilcar, ordering him to return instantly. Taking with him five hundred horse and five thousand foot, he came to Carthage where, being appointed third general, he held a consultation with Hasdrubal and his staff as to what steps should be taken. They decided on marching to the assistance of the country and no longer looking on while it was plundered with immunity. A few days later Regulus began to advance, taking by assault and pillaging the un-walled places and laying siege to those which had walls. On reaching Adys, a town of some importance, he encamped about it and busied himself with raising works to besiege it. The Carthaginians, being anxious to relieve the town, and having decided to attempt to regain the command of the open country, led out their forces. They took possession of a hill which, while overlooking the enemy, was not a favourable position for their own army and there they encamped. In this manner, though their best hope lay in their cavalry and elephants, yet by quitting the level country and shutting themselves up in a precipitous place, difficult of access, they were sure to make it plain to their adversaries how best to attack them, and this is exactly what did happen. For the Roman commanders, perceiving from their experience of war that the most efficient and formidable part of the
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10 ήχρείωται διὰ τοὺς τόπους, οὐκ ἀνέμεμναν ἑως ἐκεῖνοι καταβάντες εἰς τὰ πεδία παρετάξαντο, χρώμενοι δὲ τοὺς ἰδίους καιροὺς ἀμα τῷ φωτὶ προσέβαλον ἐξ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὸν λόφον. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἔπεισαν καὶ τὰ θηρία τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἦν ἄχρηστα τελέως· οἱ δὲ μισθοφόροι πάνυ γενναῖοι καὶ προθύμως ἀκμαθήσαντες τὸ μὲν πρῶτον στρατόπεδον ἠνάγκασαν ἐκκλίναι καὶ φυγεῖν· ἐπεὶ δὲ προπεσόντες καὶ κυκλωθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ βαθέρον μέρους προσβαίνοντων ἐτράπησαν, μετὰ ταῦτα πάντες εὑρίσκοντο τὴν ἁρπαγματείαν· θὰ ἦσσον ἐκ τῆς στρατοπεδείας ἐξέπεσον. τὰ μὲν οὖν θηρία μετὰ τῶν ἔπεών, ἐπεὶ τάχιστα τῶν ὕμαλλων ἤψατο, μετ’ ἀσφαλείας ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν· οἱ δὲ Ἡρμαῖοι τοὺς πεζοὺς βραχὺν ἐπιδιώκαντες τόπον καὶ τὸν χάρακα διαρπάσαντες, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάσαν ἐπιπορεύομενοι τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἀδεῶς ἐπόρθουν. γενόμενοι δὲ τῆς προσαγορευμένης πόλεως Τύνητος ἐγκρατεῖς, εὐφυοῖς ὑποχούσας πρὸς τὰς προκειμένες ἐπιβολὰς, ἐπὶ δὲ κειμένης εὐκαίρως κατὰ τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς σύνεγγυς ταύτης χώρας, κατεστρατοπέδευσαν εἰς αὐτήν.

31. Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι μικρῷ μὲν πρότερον κατὰ θάλατταν, τότε δὲ κατὰ γῆν ἐπτακότες, οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνανδρίαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἱγουμένων ἀβουλίαν, κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐνεπεπτύκεισαν εἰς δυσχερῆ διάθεσιν. άμα γὰρ τοῖς προειρημένοις καὶ τοῖς Νομάδων ἔθνοις συνεπιτίθεμενοι αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐλάττω, πλείω δὲ τῶν Ἡρμαίων εἰργάζετο κακὰ τὴν χώραν. ἐξ ὧν διὰ τὸν φόβον συμφεύγοντων εἰς τὴν πέλαν τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας δυσθυμία καὶ λιμὸς ἢν ὀλοσχερῆς, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος, τὰ δὲ
enemy's force was rendered unserviceable by their position, did not wait for the Carthaginians to come down and offer battle on the plain, but, seizing on their own opportunity, advanced at daybreak on the hill from both sides. And so their elephants and cavalry were absolutely useless to the Carthaginians, but their mercenaries sallying out with great gallantry and dash compelled the first legion to give way and take to flight; but on their advancing too far and being surrounded and driven back by the force that was attacking on the other side, the whole Carthaginian army abandoned their camp. The elephants and cavalry, as soon as they reached level ground, effected their retreat in safety, and the Romans, after pursuing the infantry for a short distance and destroying the camp, henceforth overran and plundered the country and its towns unmolested. Having made themselves masters of the town named Tunis, which was a suitable base for these raids, and also well situated for operations against the capital and its immediate environs, they established themselves there.

31. The Carthaginians, having thus been twice defeated, shortly before at sea and now on land, in both cases owing to no lack of bravery in their troops, but owing to the incompetence of their commanders, were now in a thoroughly difficult position. For, in addition to the misfortunes I have mentioned, the Numidians, attacking them at the same time as the Romans, inflicted not less but even more damage on the country than the latter. The terror-stricken inhabitants took refuge in the city of Carthage where utter despondency and extreme famine prevailed, the latter owing to overcrowding and the former
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4 διὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν τῆς πολιορκίας. ὁ δὲ Μάρκος ὅραν τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ἐσφαλμένους, καὶ νομίζων ὅσον οὕτως κρατήσειν τῆς πόλεως, ἀγωνιῶν δὲ μὴ συμβῇ τὸν ἐπιπαραγωγὸν στρατηγὸν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης φθάσαντα τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τῶν πραγμάτων λαβεῖν, προε-καλεῖτο τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους εἰς διαλύσεις. οἱ δ’ ἀσμένως ἀκούσαντες ἐξέπεμψαν αὐτῶν τοὺς πρώτους ἄνδρας. οἱ καὶ συμμίσσαντες αὐτῷ τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχουν τοῦ ἰέσεων ταῖς γνώμαις ἐπὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τι τῶν λεγομένων ὅστ’ οὐδ’ ἀκούσαντες ὑπομένειν ἐδύ-πναυτὸ τὸ βάρος τῶν ἐπισταγμάτων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Μάρ-κος, ὡς ἂδη κεκρατηκὼς τῶν ὅλων, ὃ τι ποτὲ συν-εχώρει, πᾶν ὡς τοῖς δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐν χάριτι καὶ δωρεά发动. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι θεωροῦντες ὅτι καὶ γενομένους αὐτοῖς ὑποχειρίως οὐδὲν ἂν συνεξακο-λουθήσαι βαρύτερον τῶν τότε προσταγμάτων, οὐ μόνον δυσαρεστήσαντες τοὺς προτεινομένους ἐπανηλ-θοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσκόψαντες τῇ βαρύτετη τοῦ Μάρ-κου. τὸ δὲ συνέδριον τῶν Καρχηδονίων διακούσαν τὰ προτεινόμενα παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τῶν Ῥωμαίων, καίπερ σχέδον ἀπεγνωσκός τὰς τῆς σωτηρίας ἐπί-δας, ὅμως οὐτως ἄνδρωδος ἐστὶ καὶ γενναῖως ὡσπερ πᾶν ὑπομένειν εἴλετο καὶ παντὸς ἔργου καὶ καιροῦ πείραν λαμβάνειν, ἐφ’ ὃ μηδὲν ἀγενέστερ’ ἀν-άξιον τῶν πρὸ τοῦ πράξεων ὑπομείναι.

32 Περὶ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους καταπλεῖ τις εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα ἐξελόγοις τῶν ἀπεσταλμένων εἰς τὴν Ἕλλαδα πρότερον [εἰς τὴν Καρχηδονίαν], ἀγωνίστησαν πλείστος, ἐν οἷς καὶ Ξάνθιττον τῶν Λακεδαιμόνιον, ἄνδρα τῆς Λακωνικῆς ἀγωγῆς μετ-
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owing to the expectation of a siege. Regulus, perceiving that the Carthaginians were utterly worsted both by land and sea and expecting to capture the city in a very short time, was yet apprehensive lest his successor in the Consulate should arrive from Rome before Carthage fell and receive the credit of the success, and he therefore invited the enemy to enter into negotiations. The Carthaginians gave a ready ear to these advances, and sent out an embassy of their leading citizens. On meeting Regulus, however, the envoys were so far from being inclined to yield to the conditions he proposed that they could not even bear listening to the severity of his demands. For, imagining himself to be complete master of the situation, he considered they ought to regard any concessions on his part as gifts and acts of grace. As it was evident to the Carthaginians that even if they became subject to the Romans, they could be in no worse case than if they yielded to the present demands, they returned not only dissatisfied with the conditions proposed but offended by Regulus’s harshness. The attitude of the Carthaginian Senate on hearing the Roman general’s proposals was, although they had almost abandoned all hope of safety, yet one of such manly dignity that rather than submit to anything ignoble or unworthy of their past they were willing to suffer anything and to face every exertion and every extremity.

32. Just about this time there arrived at Carthage one of the recruiting-officers they had formerly dispatched to Greece, bringing a considerable number of soldiers and among them a certain Xanthippus of Lacedaemon, a man who had been

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εσχηκότα καὶ τριβὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἐχοντα 2 σύμμετρον. ὃς διακούσας τὸ γεγονὸς ἐλάττωμα καὶ πῶς καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ γέγονε, καὶ συνθεωρήσας τὰς τε λοιπὰς παρασκευὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἐλεφάντων, παρατικὰ συνελογίσατο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἐνεφάνισε διότι συμβαίνει τοὺς Καρχηδονίους οὐχ ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων, αὐτοὺς δὲ ὅφε αὐτῶν ἦττάσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν 3 τῶν ἱγουμένων. ταχὺ δὲ διὰ τὴν περίστασιν τῶν τοῦ Ξανθίππου λόγων διαδοθέντων εἰς τὰ πλῆθη καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς, ἐγνώσαν οἱ προεστῶτες ἀνά- 4 καλείσθαι καὶ πείραν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνειν. ὁ δὲ παρα- γενόμενος εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἐφερε τοῖς ἄρχοντι τοὺς ἀπολογοσμοὺς καὶ παρὰ τί νῦν σφαλεῖσαν, καὶ διότι πεισθέντες αὐτῶ καὶ χρησάμενοι τοῖς ἐπιπέ- δοις τῶν τόπων ἐν τε ταῖς πορείαις καὶ στρατο- πεδεῖαις καὶ παρατάξεσιν εὐχερῶς ἐαυτοῖς τῇ ἀσφάλειαν δυνήσονται παρασκευάζειν καὶ τοὺς ὑπ- 5 εναντίους νικᾶν. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ δεξάμενοι τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ πεισθέντες αὐτῷ παραχρήμα τὰς δυ- 6 νάμεις ἐνεχείρισαν. ἵνα μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν παρὰ τοῦ Ξανθίππου διαδιδομένην φωνὴν ὁ θρόος καὶ λαλία τις εὔελπίς παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς· 7 ὡς δὲ ἔξαγαγὼν πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τῆς δύναμιν ἐν κόσμῳ παρενέβαλε καὶ τι καὶ κνεῦν τῶν μερῶν ἐν τάξιν καὶ παραγγέλλειν κατὰ νόμους ἡρξατο, τηλι- καύτην ἐποίει διαφορὰν παρὰ τὴν τῶν πρότερον στρατηγῶν ἀπειρίαν ὡστε μετὰ κρανηγῆς ἐπιση- μαίνεσθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ πεπίδευν ὡς τάξιμα συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, πεπισήμενος μηδὲν ἄν 8 παθεῖν δεινῶν ἡγουμένου Ξανθίππου. τούτων δὲ
brought up in the Spartan discipline, and had had a fair amount of military experience. On hearing of the recent reverse and how and in what way it occurred, and on taking a comprehensive view of the remaining resources of the Carthaginians and their strength in cavalry and elephants, he at once reached the conclusion and communicated it to friends that the Carthaginians owed their defeat not to the Romans but to themselves, through the inexperience of their generals. Owing to the critical situation Xanthippus's remarks soon got abroad and reached the ears of the generals, whereupon the government decided to summon him before them and examine him. He presented himself before them and communicated to them his estimate of the situation, pointing out why they were now being worsted, and urging that if they would take his advice and avail themselves of the level country for marching, encamping and offering battle they could easily not only secure their own safety, but defeat the enemy. The generals, accepting what he said and resolving to follow his advice, at once entrusted their forces to him. Now even when the original utterance of Xanthippus got abroad, it had caused considerable rumour and more or less sanguine talk among the populace, but on his leading the army out and drawing it up in good order before the city and even beginning to manoeuvre some portions of it correctly and give the word of command in the orthodox military terms, the contrast to the incompetency of the former generals was so striking that the soldiery expressed their approval by cheers and were eager to engage the enemy, feeling sure that if Xanthippus was in command no disaster could
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γνωμένων οἱ στρατηγοὶ συνιδόντες τοὺς ὀχλοὺς ἀνατεθαρρηκότας παραδόξως ταῖς ψυχαῖς, παρακάλεσαν αὐτοὺς τὰ πρέποντα τῷ καιρῷ, μετ' ὀλίγας ἡμέρας ἀρμήσαν ἀναλαβόντες τὴν δύναμιν. αὕτη δὲ ἤν πεζοὶ μὲν εἰς μυρίους καὶ δυσχιλίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ τετρακισχίλιοι, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἔλεφάντων πλήθος ἔγγυστα ποι τῶν ἑκατόν.

33 Οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαίοι θεωροῦντες τοὺς Καρχηδονίους τὰς τε πορείας ποιομένους διὰ τῶν ὤμαλῶν τόπων καὶ τὰς στρατοπεδεύσεις τιθέντας ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις τῶν χωρίων, κατ' αὐτὸ μὲν τοῦτο ἔξοικόμενον διετέρων, τοῖς γε μὴν ὅλος ἐπευδεὶν ἐγγύσαι τοῖς πολεμίοις. συναφάντες δὲ τὴν μὲν πρώτην ἡμέραν κατεστρατοπέδευσαν ὡς δέκα στάδιως ἀποσχόντες τῶν ὑπεναντίων. τῇ δὲ κατὰ πόδας οἱ μὲν προεστῶτες τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐβουλεύοντο πῶς καὶ τί πρακτέον εἰς κατὰ τὸ παρόν. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ προθύμως ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, συστρεφόμενοι κατὰ μέρη καὶ κατ' ὄνομα τὸν Ἐανθίττου ἀναβοῦντες ἑξάγειν σφᾶς ὄντος δεῖν τὴν ταχίστην. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ τὴν τε τῶν ὀχλῶν ὄρμην καὶ προθυμίαν θεωροῦντες, ἄμα δὲ καὶ τοῦ Ἐανθίττου διαμαρτυρομένου μὴ παριέναι τὸν καιρόν, παρήγγειλαν τῷ μὲν πλήθει διασκευάζεσθαι, τῷ δὲ Ἐανθίττου χρησθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπέτρεψαι ὡς ποτ' αὐτῷ δοκεῖ 6 συμφέρειν. δὲ λαβὼν τὴν ἔξονιαν, τοὺς μὲν ἕλεφαντας ἐξαγαγὼν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸ πρὸ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως ἐν μετώπως κατέστησε, τὴν δὲ φάλαγγα τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐν ἀποστήματι συμμέτρω τούτους κατ᾽ ὅπιν ἐπέστησε. τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας παρενέβαλε, τοὺς δὲ εὐκινητοτάτους ὁμοί τοῖς ἱππεῖσιν ἐκατέρου τοῦ κέρατος προεστη-
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befall them. Upon this the generals, seeing the extraordinary recovery of courage among the troops, addressed them in words suitable to the occasion and after a few days took the field with their forces. These consisted of twelve thousand foot, four thousand horse and very nearly a hundred elephants.

33. When the Romans saw that the Carthaginians were marching through the flat country and pitching their camps on level ground, they were surprised indeed and somewhat disturbed by this in particular, but yet were anxious on the whole to get into contact with the enemy. On coming into touch they encamped on the first day at a distance of about ten stades from him. On the following day the Carthaginian government held a council to discuss what should be done for the present and the means thereto. But the troops, eager as they were for a battle, collecting in groups and calling on Xanthippus by name, clearly indicated their opinion that he should lead them forward at once. The generals when they saw the enthusiasm and keenness of the soldiers, Xanthippus at the same time imploring them not to let the opportunity slip, ordered the troops to get ready and gave Xanthippus authority to conduct operations as he himself thought most advantageous. Acting on this authority he sent the elephants forward and drew them up in a single line in front of the whole force, placing the Carthaginian phalanx at a suitable distance behind them. Some of the mercenaries he stationed on the right wing, while the most active he placed together with the cavalry in front of both wings. The Romans, seeing

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8 σεν. οἱ δὲ Ἡρωμαῖοι συνιδόντες παραταττομένους
tous ὑπεναντίους ἀντεξῆσαν ἐτοίμως. καταπλητ-
tόμενοι δὲ καὶ προορώμενοι τὴν τῶν ἐλεφάντων ἐφ-
odou, προθέμενοι τοὺς γροσφομάχους πολλὰς ἐπ'
ἀλλήλαις κατόπιν ἱστασαν σημείας, τοὺς δὲ ἱππεῖς
10 ἐμέρυσαν ἐφ’ ἐκάτερον τὸ κέρας. τὴν δὲ σύμπασαν
tάξιν βραχυτέραν μὲν ἢ πρόσθεν, βαθυτέραν δὲ
πονήσαντες, τῆς μὲν πρὸς τὰ θηρία μάχης δεόντως
ἳσαν ἑστοιχισμένοι, τῆς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἱππεῖς, πολι-
lλαπλασίους ὑπέρα τῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς, ὀλοσχερῶς ἠστό-
11 ψαν. ἔπει δ’ ἀμφότεροι κατὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν προ-
aιρέσεις καὶ καθόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐκάστους ἔθη-
cαν εἰς τὰς ἀρμοζούσας τάξεις, ἐμενον ἐν κόσμῳ,
καραδοκοῦντες τὸν καιρὸν τῆς ἀλλήλων ἐπιθέσεως.
34 ἀμα δὲ τῶν Εάνθιππων τοῖς μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν θη-
ρίων παραγγείλαν προάγειν καὶ διασπᾶν τὰς τῶν
ὑπεναντίων τάξεις, τοῖς δὲ ἱππεῖσιν ἐφ’ ἐκατέρου
τοῦ κέρατος κυκλοῦ καὶ προσβάλλειν τοῖς πολεμί-
2 ψαν, τότε δὴ καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἡρωμάιων στρατόπεδον κατὰ
tὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἔθη συνεφόβησαν τοῖς ὀπλοῖς καὶ
3 συναλαλάξαντες ὑρμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους. οἱ
μὲν οὖν ἱππεῖς τῶν Ἡρωμάιων ταχέως ἀφ’ ἐκατέρω
τῶν κεράτων ἔφυγον, διὰ τὸ πολλαπλασίους εἶναι
4 τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. τῶν δὲ πεζῶν οἱ ταχθέντες ἐπὶ
tοῦ λαιοῦ κέρως, ἀμα μὲν ἐκκλίνοντες τὴν τῶν θηρί-
ων ἐφοδον, ἀμα δὲ καταφρονοῦντες τῶν μισοθοφόρων,
ὑρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ δεξίον κέρας τῶν Καρχηδονίων
τρεφάμενοι δὲ τούτους ἐπέκειντο καὶ κατεδίκων
5 αὐτοὺς ἔως εἰς τὸν χάρακα. τῶν δὲ κατὰ τοὺς
ἐλέφαντας ταχθέντων οἱ μὲν πρῶτοι συμπεσόντες
υπὸ τῆς βιας τῶν ζώων ἐξωθοῦμεν καὶ καταπα-
tοῦμενοι σωρηδὸν ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ διεφθείροντο,
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the enemy drawn up to offer battle, issued forth to meet them with alacrity. Alarmed at the prospect of the elephants' charge, they stationed the velites in the van and behind them the legions many maniples deep, dividing the cavalry between the two wings. In thus making their whole line shorter and deeper than before they had been correct enough in so far as concerned the coming encounter with the elephants, but as to that with the cavalry, which largely outnumbered theirs, they were very wide of the mark. When both sides had made that general and detailed disposition of their forces that best suited their plan, they remained drawn up in order, each awaiting a favourable opportunity to attack. 34. No sooner had Xanthippus ordered the elephant-drivers to advance and break the enemy's line and the cavalry on each wing to execute a turning movement and charge, than the Roman army, clashing their shields and spears together, as is their custom, and uttering their battle-cry, advanced to the attack. As for the Roman cavalry on both wings it was speedily put to flight owing to the superior numbers of the Carthaginians; while of the infantry, the left wing, partly to avoid the onset of the elephants, and partly owing to the contempt they felt for the mercenary force, fell upon the Carthaginian right wing, and having broken it, pressed on and pursued it as far as the camp. But the first ranks of those who were stationed opposite the elephants, pushed back when they encountered them and trodden under foot by the strength of the animals, fell in heaps in the mêlée, while the formation of the
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τῆς γε μὴν δόλης τάξεως τὸ σύστημα διὰ τὸ βάθος τῶν ἐφεστῶτων ἐως τινὸς ἀδιάσπαστον ἐμενεν. 6 ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ μὲν τὰς ἔσχατας ἔχοντες τάξεις κυκλο-
μενοι πανταχόθεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἰππέων ἦναγκάζοντο πρὸς τοὺς ουστράμους στρεφόμενοι κινοῦντες, οἱ δὲ διὰ μέσων τῶν ἐλεφάντων ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν ἐκβιαζόμενοι καὶ κατὰ νότου παριστάμενοι τῶν θηρίων ἔς ἀκέ-
ραιν καὶ συντεταγμένην ἐμπιπτοντες τὴν τῶν Καρ-
7 χιδονίων φάλαγγα διεφθείροντο, τότε δὴ πανταχό-
θεν πονοῦνtes, οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων συν-
ipατήθησαν ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερφυοῦς βίας τῶν ζῴων, οἱ δὲ λειτοὶ συνεκτίσθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ πλῆθους τῶν ἰππέων ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς παρατάξεως τόπῳ, τελέως
8 δὲ τῖνες ὁρᾶν πρὸς φυγὴν ὠρμησαν. οὐσῶν δὲ πεδινῶν τῶν ὑποχωρήσεως, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων καὶ τῶν ἰππέων ἀπώλυντο, πεντα-
κόσιοι δὲ ἵσως οἱ μετὰ Μάρκου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ φυ-
γόντες μετ’ ὁλίγον ὑποχείριον γενόμενοι σὺν αὐτῶ
9 κεῖνω πάντως ἐξωγρηθήσαν. τῶν μὲν οὖν παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις μισθοφόρων ἔπεσον εἰς ὀκτα-
kόσιοι οἱ κατὰ τὸ λιαῦν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ταχθέντες, τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων ἐσώθησαν μὲν εἰς δισχύλους οἱ κατὰ τὸ δίωγμα τῶν προειρημένων ἐκτὸς γενόμενοι
10 τοῦ κινδύνου, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος διεφθάρη πλὴ
Μάρκου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τῶν ἁμα τοῦτῳ φυγὸν-
11 τῶν. οἱ μὲν οὖν σημαινὲν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀι σωθει-
12 σαι διέπεσον εἰς τὴν Ὅσπίδα παραδόξως. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδονίοι τοὺς νεκροὺς συκευάζουντες καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἁμα μετὰ τὸν ἀιχμαλώτων ἄγοντες ἐπαν-
ήλθον περιχαρεῖσ τοῖς παροῦσι εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

35 Ὑν δὲ καρφὶ πολλὰ τις ὁ τρόσως ἐπισημαίνω-
μενος εὑροὶ πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσον τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
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main body, owing to the depths of the ranks behind, remained for a time unbroken. At length, however, those in the rear were surrounded on all sides by the cavalry and obliged to face round and fight them, while those who had managed to force a passage through the elephants and collect in the rear of those beasts, encountered the Carthaginian phalanx quite fresh and in good order and were cut to pieces. Henceforth the Romans were in sore straits on all sides, the greater number were trampled to death by the vast weight of the elephants, while the remainder were shot down by the numerous cavalry in their ranks as they stood. Only quite a small body tried to effect their escape, and of these, as their line of retreat was over level ground, some were dispatched by the elephants and cavalry, and about five hundred who got away with their general Regulus shortly afterwards fell into the enemy’s hands and were made prisoners, himself included. It resulted that in this battle the Carthaginians lost about eight hundred of the mercenaries, who had faced the Roman left wing, while of the Romans there were saved but about two thousand, whom the pursuit of the mercenaries I mentioned above carried out of the main battle. All the rest perished with the exception of the general Regulus and those who took to flight together with him. The maniples which escaped got through by extraordinary luck to Aspis. The Carthaginians stripped the dead, and taking with them the Consul and the other captives, returned to the city in high glee at the turn of affairs.

35. In these events there will be found by one who notes them aright much to contribute to
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2 βίου συντελεσθέντα. καὶ γὰρ τὸ διαπιστεῖν τῇ τύχῃ, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὰς εὐπραγίας, ἐναργέστατον ἐφάνη πάσι τότε διὰ τῶν Μάρκου συμπτωμάτων.

3 ὁ γὰρ μικρῷ πρότερον οὐ διδοὺς ἔλεον οὐδὲ συγγνώμην τοῖς πταίονσι παρὰ πόδας αὐτὸς ἦγετο δεή.

4 σόμενος τούτων περὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σωτηρίας. καὶ μὴν τὸ παρ᾽ Εὐρυπίδη πάλαι καλῶς εἰρήσθαι δοκοῦν ὡς "ἐν σοφὸν βούλευμα τὰς πολλὰς χέρας νυκ.” τότε δι᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἔλαβε τὴν πίστιν.

5 εἰς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ μία γνώμη τὰ μὲν ἄκτητα πλήθη καὶ πραγματικὰ δοκοῦντ᾽ εἶναι καθεῖλε, τὸ δὲ προφανῶς πεπτυκός ἀρδην πολέτεμα καὶ τὰς ἀπηληκυνίας ψυχὰς τῶν δυνάμεων ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον ἥγαγεν. ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ἐπεμνήσθην χάριν τῆς τῶν ἐνυγχανόντων τοίς ὑπομνήμασι διορθώσεως. δυνὰ

6 γὰρ ὅτων τρόπων πᾶσιν ἀνθρώπων τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον μεταθέσεως, τοῦ τε διὰ τῶν ἑδών συμπτωμάτων καὶ τοῦ διὰ τῶν ἀλλωτρίων, ἐναργεστέρον μὲν εἶναι συμβαίνει τὸν διὰ τῶν οἰκείων περιπετειών, ἀβλαβέστερον δὲ τὸν διὰ τῶν ἀλλωτρίων.

7 διὸ τὸν μὲν οὐδέποθ᾽ ἐκουσίως αἱρετέον, ἔπει μετὰ μεγάλων πόνων καὶ κινδύνων ποιεῖ τὴν διόρθωσιν, τὸν δ᾽ αἰεὶ θηρευτέον, ἔπει χωρίς βλάβης ἐστὶ συν- μείη ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιον. ἐξ ὧν συνιδόντι καλλι-

8 στὴν παιδείαν ἡγητέον πρὸς ἀληθινὸν βίον τὴν ἐκ τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας περιγυμνομένην ἐμπειρίαν. μόνη γὰρ αὕτη χωρίς βλάβης ἐπὶ παντὸς καυροῦ καὶ περιστάσεως κρυτὰς ἀληθινοὺς ἀποτελεῖ τοῦ βελτίωνος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἦμιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθωσ.

36 Καρχηδόνοι δὲ, κατὰ νοῦν ἀπάντων σφίσι κε-

χωρηκότων, ὑπερβολὴν χαρᾶς οὐκ ἀπέλιπον διὰ τε
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the better conduct of life. For the precept to distrust Fortune, and especially when we are enjoying success, was most clearly enforced on all by Regulus's misfortunes. He who so short a time previously had refused to pity or take mercy on those in distress was now, almost immediately afterwards, being led captive to implore pity and mercy in order to save his own life. And again Euripides' words, so long recognized as just, that "one wise counsel conquers many hands" were then confirmed by the actual facts. For one man and one brain laid low that host which seemed so invincible and efficient, and restored the fortunes of a state which in the eyes of all was utterly fallen and the deadened spirit of its soldiers. This I mention for the sake of the improvement of the readers of this history. For there are two ways by which all men can reform themselves, the one through their own mischances, the other through those of others, and of these the former is the more impressive, but the latter the less hurtful. Therefore we should never choose the first method if we can help it, as it corrects by means of great pain and peril, but ever pursue the other, since by it we can discern what is best without suffering hurt. Reflecting on this we should regard as the best discipline for actual life the experience that accrues from serious history; for this alone makes us, without inflicting any harm on us, the most competent judges of what is best at every time and in every circumstance. Well, on this subject I have said enough.

36. All having now fallen out with the Carthaginians as they could best desire, there was no extravagance of rejoicing in which they did not
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tῆς πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὐχαριστίας καὶ διὰ τῆς μετ’ 2 ἄλληλων φιλοφροσύνης. Ἐάνθιππος δὲ τηλικαύτην ἐπίδοσαν καὶ ὑπῆρχαν ποιήσας τοῖς Καρχηδόνιων πράγμασι μετ’ οὐ πολὺν χρόνον ἀπέπλευσε πάλιν, φρο- 3 νίμως καὶ συνετῶς βουλευσάμενος. αἰ γὰρ ἐπιφανεῖς καὶ παράδοξοι πράξεις βαρεῖς μὲν τοὺς φθό- νους, ὄξειας δὲ τὰς διαβολὰς γεννῶσιν ὄσ’ οἱ μὲν ἐγκυρίως διὰ τὰς διαδικεῖαις καὶ τῶν φίλων πλῆθος οὐκ ἂν <ἐγὼ ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον> ἀνα- φέρειν, οἱ δὲ ἔξοι ταχεῖς υἱ’ ἐκατέρων τούτων 4 ἤττονται καὶ κινδυνεύουσιν. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἔτερος ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀπαλλαγῆς τῆς Ἐανθίππου λόγος, ὅτι πε- 5 ρασόμεθα διασαφεῖ ὀικείοτερον λαβόντες τοῦ παρ- ὁντός καιρόν.

5 Ὁ Ρωμαίοι δὲ, προσπεσόντων σφίσι παρ’ ἐπίδα τῶν ἐν Λιβύῃ συμβεβηκότων, εὐθέως ἐγύνοντο πρὸς τὸ καταρτίζειν τὸν στόλον καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρας ἔξαι- 6 ὁμάθαι τοὺς ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ διασεσωμένους. οἱ δὲ 7 Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ ταῦτα στρατοπεδεύσαντες ἐπο- λιόρκουν τὴν Ἀσπίδα, σπουδάζοντες ἐγκρατεῖσι γε- νθαὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς μάχης διαφυγόντων. διὰ δὲ 8 τὴν γενναιότητα καὶ τόλμαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐδαμῶς ἔλειν δυνάμενοι τέλος ἀπέστησαν τῆς πολυρκίας.

9 προσπεσόντος δ’ αὐτοῖς ἐξαρτύειν τῶν στόλον τοὺς Ἡρωμίας, καὶ μέλλειν αἴθως ἐπὶ τὴν Λιβύην ποι- εῖσθαι τῶν πλοῦν, τὰ μὲν ἐπεσκευάζον σκάφη, τὰ 10 δ’ ἐκ καταβολῆς ἐναυπηγοῦντο. ταχὺ δὲ συμπλη- ρώσαντες νάδι διακοσίας ἀνήχθησαν καὶ παρεφύ- λαττον τὸν ἐπίπλου τῶν ὑπεναντίων.

10 Οἱ δὲ Ἡρωμάιοι τῆς θερείας ἀρχομένης καθελκύ- σαντες τριακόσια καὶ πεντήκοντα σκάφη, καὶ στρατηγοὺς ἐπιστήσαντες Μάρκον Αἰμίλιον καὶ
indulge, paying thank-offerings to the gods and giving congratulatory entertainments. But Xanthippus, to whom this revolution and notable advance in the fortunes of Carthage was due, after a little time left again for home, and this was a very prudent and sensible decision on his part; for brilliant and exceptional achievements are wont to breed the deepest jealousy and most bitter slander. Natives of a place, supported as they are by their kinsmen and having many friends, may possibly be able to hold their own against those for some time, but foreigners when exposed to either speedily succumb and find themselves in peril. There is another account given of Xanthippus's departure which I will endeavour to set forth on an occasion more suitable than the present.

The Romans, who had never expected to receive such bad news from Africa, at once directed their efforts to fitting out their fleet and rescuing their surviving troops there. The Carthaginians after the battle encamped before Aspis and laid siege to it with the object of capturing these survivors, but as they had no success owing to the gallantry and daring of the defenders they at length abandoned the siege. When news reached them that the Romans were preparing their fleet and were about to sail again for Africa, they set to repairing the ships they had and building other entirely new ones, and having soon manned a fleet of two hundred sail, they put to sea and remained on the watch for the enemy.

In the early summer the Romans, having launched 265 B.C. three hundred and fifty ships, sent them off under the command of Marcus Aemilius and Servius

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Σερούμων Φόλουνον ἐξαπέστελλον. οί δ' ἀναχθέντες
11 ἔπλεον παρὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς Λιβύης.
συμμίζαντες δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἑρμαιάν τῷ τῶν Καρχη- 
δωνίων στόλῳ, τούτους μὲν ἔξ ἐφόδου καὶ ῥαδίως
12 τρεφάμενοι ναῦς ἔλαβον αὐτάντρους ἐκατὸν δεκα-
τέτταρας. τοὺς δ' ἐν Λιβύη διαμείναντας νεανίσκους
ἀναλαβόντες ἐκ τῆς Ἀσπίδος ἔπλεον αἰθίου ἐπὶ τῆς
37 Σικελίας. διάραντες δὲ τὸν πόρον ἀσφαλῶς καὶ
προσμίζαντες τῇ τῶν Καμαρναίων χώρᾳ, τηλικοῦτῳ
περιέπεσον χειμώνη καὶ τηλικαύτας συμφοραῖς
ὡσεὶ μηδὲ ἂν ἐπείν ἄξιως δύνασθαι διὰ τὴν ὑπερ-
2 βολὴν τοῦ συμβάντος. τῶν γὰρ ἐξήκοντα καὶ
τεττάρων πρὸς ταῖς τριακοσίας ναυῶν ὅγδοκοντα
μόνον συνεβη σηρειφθῆναι σκάφη, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν
τὰ μὲν ύποβρύχια γενέσθαι, τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ῥαχίας
πρὸς ταῖς σπιλάσι καὶ τοῖς ἀκρωτηρίοις καταγώ-
3 μενα πλῆρη ποιήσαι σωμάτων τὴν παραλίαν καὶ
ναυαγίων. ταύτης δὲ μείζω περιπέτειαν ἐν ἔνι
καιρῷ κατὰ θάλατταν οὐδὲ ἰστορήθαι συμβέβηκεν.
4 ἦς τῆς αἰτίας οὐχ οὐτώς εἰς τὴν τύχην ως εἰς τοὺς
ἡγεμόνας ἐπανωστέον. πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν κυβερνητῶν
διαμαρτυραμένων μὴ πλεῖν παρὰ τὴν ἔξω πλευράν
τῆς Σικελίας τὴν πρὸς τὸ Λιβυκὸν πέλαγος ἐστραμ-
μένην, διὰ τὸ τραχεῖαν εἶναι καὶ δυσπροσόμιστον,
ἀμα δὲ καὶ τὴν μὲν οὐδέπω καταλῆγειν ἐπισημαίναν,
τὴν δ' ἐπιφέρονται. μεταξὺ γὰρ ἐποιοῦντο τὸν πλοῦν
5 τῆς Ὀρίωνος καὶ κυνὸς ἐπιτολῆς. οὕθεν προσχόν-
τες τῶν λεγομένων ἔπλεον ἔξω πελάγιοι, σπουδάζο-
τες τινας τῶν ἐν τῷ παράπλω πόλεις τῇ τοῦ γε-
6 γονότος εὐτυχήματος φαντασίᾳ καταπληξίμηνοι
προσλαβόνται. πλὴν οὗτοι μὲν μικρῶν ἐλπίδων
ἐνεκα μεγάλοις περιτυχόντες ἀτυχήσαν τότε τὴν
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Fulvius, who proceeded along the coast of Sicily making for Africa. Encountering the Carthaginian fleet near the Hermaeum they fell on them and easily routed them, capturing one hundred and fourteen ships with their crews. Then having taken on board at Aspis the lads who remained in Africa they set sail again for Sicily. 37. They had crossed the strait in safety and were off the territory of Camarina when they were overtaken by so fierce a storm and so terrible a disaster that it is difficult adequately to describe it owing to its surpassing magnitude. For of their three hundred and sixty-four ships only eighty were saved; the rest either foundered or were dashed by the waves against the rocks and headlands and broken to pieces, covering the shore with corpses and wreckage. History tells of no greater catastrophe at sea taking place at one time. The blame must be laid not so much on ill-fortune as on the commanders; for the captains had repeatedly urged them not to sail along the outer coast of Sicily, that turned towards the Libyan sea, as it was very rugged and had few safe anchorages: they also warned them that one of the dangerous astral periods was not over and another just approaching (for it was between the rising of Orion and that of Sirius\textsuperscript{a} that they undertook the voyage). The commanders, however, paid no attention to a single word they said, and there they were in the open sea thinking to strike terror into some of the cities they passed by the brilliancy of their recent success and thus win them over. But now, all for the sake of such meagre expectations, they exposed themselves to this great disaster, and were obliged

\textsuperscript{a} Sirius rises in July, Orion early in December.

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7 αὐτῶν ἀβουλίαν ἔγνωσαν. καθόλου δὲ Ἡρωμαίων πρὸς πάντα χρώμενοι τῇ βίᾳ, καὶ τὸ προτεθὲν οἴμενοι δεῖν καὶ ἀνάγκην ἐπιτελεῖν καὶ μηδὲν ἀδύνατον εἶναι σφίσι τῶν ἀπαξ δοξάντων, ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν κατορθοῦσι διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ὀρμήν, ἐν τοῖς δὲ προφανῶς σφάλλονται, καὶ μάλιστ’ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ 8 θάλατται. ἔπε μὲν γὰρ τῆς γῆς πρὸς ἄνθρωποις καὶ τὰ τούτων ἔργα ποιοῦμενοι τὰς ἐπιβολὰς τά μὲν πολλὰ κατορθοῦσι διὰ τὸ πρὸς παραπλησίους δυνάμεις χρῆσθαι τῇ βίᾳ, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ σπανίως ἀπο- 9 τυγχάνουσιν πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν καὶ πρὸς τὸ περιέχον ὅταν παραβάλλωνται καὶ βιομαχῶσι. 10 μεγάλους ἐλαττώματι περιπίπτουσιν. δὲ καὶ τότε καὶ πλεονάκες αὐτοῖς ἦδη συνέβη καὶ συμβήκεσαι πάσχειν, ἐως ἂν ποτὲ διορθώσωνται τῇ τοιαύτῃ τόλμαι καὶ βιάν, καθ’ ἂν οἴονται δεῖν αὐτοῖς πάντα καυρὸν εἶναι πλωτὸν καὶ πορευτόν.

38 Ὅτε δὲ Καρχηδόνωι, συνείτες τὸν γεγονότα φθό- ρον τοῦ τῶν Ἡρωμαίων στόλου, καὶ νομίζαντες κατὰ μὲν γῆν ἀξιόχρεως σφάς εἶναι διὰ τὸ προγεγονὸς εὐτύχημα, κατὰ δὲ θάλατταν διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην τῶν Ἡρωμαίων περιπέτειαν, ὠρμησαν προθυμότερον ἐπί 2 τὸ τὰς ναυτικὰς καὶ πεζικὰς παρασκευάσ. καὶ τὸν μὲν Ἀσδρούβαν εὐθὺς ἐξαπέστειλον εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν, δόντες αὐτῷ τοὺς τε προὐπάρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἑκ τῆς Ἡρακλείας παραγεγονότας στρατιῶτας, ἀμα δὲ 3 τούτως ἐλέφαντας ἑκατόν καὶ τετταράκοντα. τούτων δὲ ἐκπέμψαντες διακοσίας κατεσκεύαζοντο ναῦς καὶ 4 τάλλα τὰ πρὸς τὸν πλοῦν ἡτοίμαζον. ὁ δ’ Ἀσδρού- βας διακομισθεῖς εἰς τὸ Διλύθαιον ἀσφαλῶς τά
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to acknowledge their lack of judgement. The Romans, to speak generally, rely on force in all their enterprises, and think it is incumbent on them to carry out their projects in spite of all, and that nothing is impossible when they have once decided on it. They owe their success in many cases to this spirit, but sometimes they conspicuously fail by reason of it and especially at sea. For on land they are attacking men and the works of man and are usually successful, as there they are employing force against forces of the same nature, although even here they have in some rare instances failed. But when they come to encounter the sea and the atmosphere and choose to fight them by force they meet with signal defeats. It was so on this occasion and on many others, and it will always continue to be so, until they correct this fault of daring and violence which makes them think they can sail and travel where they will at no matter what season.

38. The Carthaginians, on hearing of the destruction of the Roman fleet, conceiving themselves to be now a match for the Romans both on land owing to their recent success and at sea owing to this disaster, were encouraged to make more extensive military and naval preparations. They at once dispatched Hasdrubal to Sicily, giving him the troops they previously had and a force which had joined them from Heraclea, together with a hundred and forty elephants. After dispatching him they began to get ready for sea two hundred ships and to make all other preparations for a naval expedition. Hasdrubal having crossed in safety to Lilybaeum occupied himself in drilling unopposed
ΤΕ ΘΗΡΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΑΣ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙΣ ἙΓΥΜΝΑΞΕ, ΚΑΙ ΔΗΛΟΣ ᾿ΗΝ 5 ἈΝΤΙΠΟΙΟΗΣΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΤΩΝ ὙΠΑΙΘΡΩΝ.

Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ναυαγίας ἀνακομμοθέντων διακοῦσαντες τὸ κατὰ μέρος, βαρέως μὲν ἦνεγκαὶ τὸ γεγονός· οὐ βουλόμενοι δὲ καθάπαξ εἰκεῖν, αὖθις ἔγνωσαν ἐκ δρυόχως εἰκοσι καὶ διακόσια ναυτηγεῖ- 6 σθαι σκάφη. τούτων δὲ τὴν συντέλειαν ἐν τριήμην λαβόντων, ὅπερ οὐδὲ πιστεύσαι βάδιον, εὐθέως οἱ κατασταθέντες ἁρχοντες Αὔλος Ἀτίλιος καὶ Γνάιος 7 Κορνήλιος καταρτίσαντες τὸν στόλον ἀνήχθησαν, καὶ πλεύσαντες διὰ πορθμοῦ προσέλαβον ἐκ τῆς Μεσσήνης τὰ διασωθέντα τῶν πλοίων ἐκ τῆς ναυα- γίας, καὶ κατάραντες εἰς Πάνορμον τῆς Σικελίας τριακοσίας ναυσίν, ἦπερ ἦν βαρυτάτη πόλις τῆς 8 Καρχηδόνιων ἐπαρχίας, ἐνεχείρησαν αὐτὴν πολιορ- κεῖν. συντησάμενοι δὲ κατὰ διττοὺς τόπους ἔργα 9 καὶ ταλλὰ παρασκευασάμενοι, προσήγαγον τὰς μηχανάς. βαδίος δὲ τοῦ παρὰ θάλατταν πύργου πεσόντος, καὶ βιασμένων ταυτή τῶν στρατιωτῶν, ἡ μὲν καλουμένη Νέα πόλις ἐστάλκει κατὰ κράτος· ἡ δὲ Παλαιὰ προσαγορευμένη τούτου συμβάντος 10 ἐκκινδύνευσε. διὸ καὶ ταχέως ἐνέδωκαν αὐτὴν οἱ κατοικοῦντες, γενόμενοι δὲ ἐγκρατεῖσι οὕτως μὲν ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Ὁρμήν, ἀπολιπόντες φυλακὴν τῆς πόλεως.

39 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς θερείας ἐπιγενομένης οἱ κατασταθέντες ἁρχοντες Γναῖος Σεροῦλιος καὶ Γάιος Σεμπρώνιος ἀνέπλευσαν παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ, καὶ 2 διάραντες εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν ἀφώρμησαν ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὴν Λιβύην. κομιζόμενοι δὲ παρὰ τὴν χώραν ἐποιοῦντο καὶ πλείστας ἀποβάσεις. ἐν αἷς οὖν ἄξιολογον πράττοντες παρεγίνοντο πρὸς τὴν τῶν 106
his elephants and the rest of his force, and plainly intended to dispute the possession of the open country.

The Romans, on receiving full information about the disaster from the survivors of the shipwreck, were deeply grieved, but being resolved on no account to give in, they decided to put on the stocks a fresh fleet of two hundred and twenty ships. In three months they were completed—a thing difficult to believe—and the new Consuls, Aulus \text{254 B.C.} Atilius and Gnaeus Cornelius, having fitted out the fleet, put to sea, and passing the straits picked up at Messene the ships that had escaped shipwreck. Descending with their total fleet of three hundred sail on Panormus, the most important city in the Carthaginian province, they undertook its siege. They threw up works in two places and after making the other necessary preparations brought up their battering-rams. The tower on the sea shore was easily knocked down, and, the soldiers pressing in through this breach, the so-called New Town was stormed, and the part known as the Old Town being now in imminent danger, its inhabitants surrendered it. Having taken possession of it the Consuls sailed back to Rome leaving a garrison in the town.

39. Their successors, Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius \text{253 B.C.} Sempronius, put to sea with their whole fleet as soon as it was summer and after crossing to Sicily proceeded thence to Africa, and sailing along the coast, made a number of descents in which they accomplished nothing of importance, and finally
Δωτοφάγων νήσου, ἥ καλείται μὲν Μῆνυγξ, οὐ
3 μακρὰν δὲ ἀπέχει τῆς μικρᾶς Ἀὔρτεως. ἐν ἡ προσπε-
σόντες εἰς τινα βραχέα διὰ τὴν ἀπερίαν, γενομένης
4 ἀμυτάτως καὶ καθισάντων τῶν πλοίων εἰς πᾶσαν
γῆθον ἀπορίαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἀνελπίστως
μετὰ τινα χρόνον ἐπενεχθείς τῆς θαλάττης,
ἐκρίβωστε ἐκ τῶν πλοίων πάντα τὰ βάρη μόλις
5 ἐκουφίσαν τὰς ναῦς. οὐ γενομένου φυγῆ παρα-
πλήσον ἐποίησαν τὸν ἀπόπλουν. ἠφάμενοι δὲ
6 τῆς Σικελίας καὶ κάμψαντες τὸ Διολύβαυον καθωρ-
μίσθησαν εἰς Πάνορμον. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ποιούμενοι
παραβόλως καὶ διὰ πόρον τὸν πλοῦν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην
πάλιν περίπεσον χειμών τηλικούτω τὸ μέγεθος
ὡστε πλείω τῶν ἑκατόν καὶ πεντήκοντα πλοίων
ἀποβαλέιν.
7 Ὁδέ εἶν τῇ Ῥώμη τοῦτων συμβάντων, καίπερ ὄν-
τες ἐν παντὶ φιλότιμοι διαφερόντως, ὅμως τότε διὰ
τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν συμπτωμάτων τοῦ
μὲν ἐτὶ στόλον ἄθροίζειν ἀναγκασθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν
8 πραγμάτων ἀπέστησαν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πεζικάις δυνάμεις
τὰς ὑπολοίπους ἔχοντες ἐλπίδας, τοὺς μὲν στρατη-
γοὺς ἀπέστελλον Δεύκιον Κακέλιον καὶ Γάιον Φου-
ριον καὶ στρατόπεδα μετὰ τούτων εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν,
ἐξήκοντα δὲ μόνον ἐπιλήσασαν ναῦς χάριν τοῦ τᾶς
9 ἀγορᾶς κομίζειν τοῖς στρατόπεδοις. ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρή-
μένων περιπτευόταν συνέβη πάλιν ἐπικυδέστερα γενέ-
10 οθαι τὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων πράγματα. τῆς μὲν γὰρ
θαλάττης ἀδεῶς ἐπεκράτουν ἐκκεχωρηκότων τῶν
Ῥωμαίων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πεζικάις δυνάμεις μεγάλας
11 εἰχον ἔλπίδας. καὶ τούτ’ ἔπασχον οὐκ ἄλογως: οἱ
gὰρ Ῥωμαίοι, διαδοθείς φήμης περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ
Λεβύη μάχης ότι τὰ θηρία τὰς τέ τάξεις αὐτῶν
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reached the isle of the lotos-eaters, which is called Menix and is not far distant from the lesser Syrtis. Here, owing to their ignorance of these seas, they ran on to some shoals, and, on the tide retreating and the ships grounding fast, they were in a most difficult position. However, as the tide unexpectedly rose again after some time, they managed with difficulty to lighten their ships by throwing overboard all heavy objects. Their departure now was so hasty as to resemble a flight, and having made Sicily and rounded Cape Lilybaeum they anchored at Panormus. As they were rashly crossing the open sea on the way hence to Rome they again encountered such a terrific storm that they lost more than a hundred and fifty ships.

The Roman Government upon this, although in all matters they are exceedingly ambitious of success, still on the present occasion, owing to the magnitude and frequency of the disasters they met with, were obliged by the force of circumstances to renounce the project of getting another fleet together. Relying now solely on their military forces, they dispatched to Sicily with some legions the Consuls Lucius Caecilius and Gaius Furius and only manned sixty ships to revictual the legions. The above disasters resulted in the prospects of the Carthaginians becoming once more brighter; for they had now undisturbed command of the sea, the Romans having retired from it, and they had great hopes of their army. These hopes were not unjustified, for the Romans, when the report circulated regarding the battle in Africa that their ranks were broken and
διασπάσαι καὶ τοὺς πλείστους διαφθείραι τῶν ἀν-
12 δρῶν, οὕτως ἔσαν κατάφοβοι τοὺς ἑλέφαντας ὡς ἐπὶ δυ' ἐναυτοὺς τοὺς ἔξης τῶν προειρημένων και-
ρῶν πολλάκις μὲν ἐν τῇ Λυλβαίτιδι χώρα, πολλάκις δ' ἐν τῇ Σελινουντίᾳ παραταττόμενοι τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐν ἔξι καὶ πέντε σταδίοις οὐκ ἑδάρρησαν οὐδέποτε κατάρξαί τῆς μάχης οὐδ' εἰς τοὺς ὀμαλοὺς καθόλου συγκαταβάναι τόπους, δεδιότες τῶν ἑλέφαντων
13 ἔφοδον. Θέρμαν δὲ μόνον καὶ Διπάραν ἐξεπολιόρ-
κησαν ἐν τούτοις τοῖς καιροῖς, ἀντεχόμενοι τῶν
14 ὀρεινῶν καὶ δυσδιαβάτων τόπων. διὸ καὶ θεωρούν-
tες οἱ Ρωμαῖοι τὴν ἐν τοῖς πεζικοῖς στρατοπέδους πτοίαν καὶ δυσελπιστικάν, αὖθις ἐγνωσαν ἐκ μετα-
15 μελείας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς θαλάττης. καὶ κατα-
στήσαντες στρατηγοὺς Γάιον ´Ατιλίον καὶ Λέκικων
Μάλιον ναυπηγοῦνται πεντήκοντα σκάφη, καὶ κατ-
έγραφον καὶ συνήθροιζον στόλον ἐνεργώς.
40 Ὄ δὲ προεστῶς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ´Ασδρούβας,
όρων ἀποδειλιώντας τοὺς ´Ρωμαίους ἐν ταῖς προγε-
γενημέναις παρατάξεις, πυθόμενος τὸν μὲν ἐνα τῶν
στρατηγῶν μετὰ τῆς ἑμισειας δυνάμεως εἰς τὴν Ἰτα-
λιαν ἀπηλάχθαι, τὸν δὲ Κακέλιον ἐν τῷ Πανόρμῳ
διατρίβετο τὸ λοιπὸν μέρος ἔχοντα τῆς στρατιᾶς,
βουλόμενον ἐφεδρέῳσαν τοῖς τῶν συμμάχων καρ-
2 ποῖς, ἀκμαζόντας τῆς συγκομιδῆς, ἀναλαβών ἐκ τοῦ
Λυλβαίου τὴν δύναμιν ὄρμησε καὶ κατεστρατοπέ-
δευσε πρὸς τοῖς ὀροῖς τῆς χώρας τῆς Πανορμίτιδος.
3 Ὅ δὲ Κακέλιος, θεωρῶν αὐτὸν κατατεθάρηκότα,
καὶ σπουδάζων ἐκκαλείσθαι τὴν ὀρμὴν αὐτοῦ, συν-
4 ἔχει τοὺς στρατιώτας ἑντὸς τῶν πυλῶν. οἷς ἑπα-
ρόμενος ´Ασδρούβας, ὡς οὗ τολμῶντος ἀντεξίεναι
τοῦ Κακελίου, θρασεῖς ὀρμήσας παντὶ τῷ στρα-
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the most of those who fell killed by the elephants, grew so afraid of these that for the two following years, though often both in the district of Lilybaeum and in that of Selinus they were drawn up at a distance of five or six stades from the enemy, they never began to attack, and in fact never would come down at all to meet the enemy on flat ground, so much did they dread a charge of the elephants. During this period all they accomplished was the reduction by siege of Therma and Lipara, keeping as they did to mountainous and difficult country. Consequently the Government, observing the timidity and despondency that prevailed in their land forces, changed their minds and decided to try their fortunes at sea again. In the consulship of Gaius Atilius and Lucius Manlius we find them building fifty ships and actively enrolling sailors and getting a fleet together.

250 B.C.

40. The Carthaginian commander-in-chief, Hasdrubal, had noted the lack of courage which the Romans exhibited, on the occasions when they were in presence of the enemy, and when he learnt that while one of the Consuls with half the whole force had left for Italy, Caecilius and the rest of the army remained at Panormus with the object of protecting the corn of the allies—it now being the height of the harvest—removed his forces from Lilybaeum and encamped on the frontier of the territory of Panormus. Caecilius, observing Hasdrubal’s aggressive spirit and wishing to provoke him to attack, kept his own soldiers within the gates. Hasdrubal gained fresh confidence from this, thinking that Caecilius did not venture to come out, and boldly advancing with his...
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teúmati katήre diá tów stevón eis tých Πανορ-
5 μίτων. φθείροντος δὲ τών καρπών αὐτοῦ μέχρι
tῆς πόλεως, ἐμενεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὑποκειμένης γνώμης ὁ
Καυκέλιος, ἐως αὐτὸν ἐξεκαλέσατο διαβήνα τὸν πρὸ
8 τῆς πόλεως ποταμόν. ἔπει δὲ τὰ θηρία διεβίβασαν
οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, τὸ τηνικάτα δὲ
τῶν εὐγάνων ἐξαποστέλλων ἥρεθίζε, μέχρι πάν
7 αὐτούς ἐκτάξα τὸ στρατόπεδον ἡμιάκασε. συνθεα-
σάμενος δὲ γινόμενον δ' προὔθετο, τινὰς μὲν τῶν
eὐκωντῶν πρὸ τοῦ τείχους καὶ τάφρου παρεν-
έβαλε, προστάξας, ἃν ἐγγίζῃ τὰ θηρία πρὸς αὐτούς,
8 χρῄζαμε τοῖς βέλεσιν ἀφθόνως, ὅταν δ' ἐκπιεζό-
ται, καταφεύγεω εἰς τὴν τάφρον, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ ταύ-
της ὁρμομένους εἰσακοντίζειν εἰς τὰ προσπίπτοντα
9 τῶν θόων. τοῖς δ' ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς βανάσσους φέ-
ρεν προσέταξε τὰ βέλη, καὶ παραβάλλειν ἔξω παρὰ
10 τὸν θεμέλιον τοῦ τείχους. αὐτὸς δὲ τὰς σημαίας
ἐχὼν ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ λαιὸν κέρας τῶν ὑπεναντίων
κειμένης πύλης ἐφευστήκει, πλείους αἰτεὶ καὶ πλείους
11 ἐπαποστέλλω τοῖς ἀκροβολιζομένοις. ἀμα δὲ τῶ
τούτων ὀλοσχεροτέραν γενέσθαι τὴν συμπλοκὴν
ἀντιφιλοδοξοῦντες οἱ τῶν ἐλεφάντων ἐπιστάται πρὸς
τὸν Ἀσδρούβαλ, καὶ βουλόμενοι δὴ αὐτῶν ποιήσαι
τὸ προτέρημα, πάντες ὁμοίαν ἐπὶ τοὺς προκυνδυ-
νεύοντας. τρεψάμενοι δὲ τούτους ῥαδίως συνεδίω-
12 δ' ἐν τῇ τάφρον. προσπεσόντων δὲ τῶν θη-
ρίων, καὶ τρυποσκομένων μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν έκ τοῦ τεί-
χους τοξεύοντων, συνακοντιζομένων δ' ἐνεργοῖς καὶ
πυκνοῖς τοῖς ύσσοῖς καὶ τοῖς γρόσοις ὑπ' ἀκεραίων
13 τῶν πρὸ τῆς τάφρου διατεταγμένων, συμβελή γινό-
μενα καὶ κατατραυματιζομένα ταχέως διεταράχθη,
καὶ στραφέντα κατὰ τῶν ἱδίων ἐφέρετο, τοὺς μὲν
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whole force, descended through the pass on the territory of Panormus. Caecilius, adhering to his original plan, let him ravage the crops up to the walls, until he had led him on to cross the river that runs in front of the town. Once the Carthaginians had got their elephants and other forces across, he kept sending out light-armed troops to molest them, until he had compelled them to deploy their whole force. When he saw that what he had designed was taking place he stationed some of his light troops before the wall and the trench, ordering them, if the elephants approached, not to spare their missiles, and when driven from their position, they were to take refuge in the trench and sallying from it again shoot at those elephants they met. Ordering the lower classes of the civil population to bring the missiles and arrange them outside at the foot of the wall, he himself with his maniples took up his position at the gate which faced the enemy’s left wing and kept sending constant reinforcements to those engaged in shooting. When this latter force more generally engaged with the enemy, the drivers of the elephants, anxious to exhibit their prowess to Hasdrubal and wishing the victory to be due to themselves, all charged those of the enemy who were in advance and putting them easily to flight pursued them to the trench. When the elephants reached the trench and began to be wounded by those who were shooting from the wall, while at the same time a rapid shower of javelins and darts fell on them from the fresh troops drawn up before the trench, they very soon, finding themselves hit and hurt in many places, were thrown into confusion and turned on their own troops,
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ἀνδρας καταπατοῦντα καὶ διαφθείροντα, τὰς δὲ τὰς
14 ξεις συγχέοντα καὶ καταστῶντα τὰς αὐτῶν. ὁ καὶ
κατιδών ὁ Κακέλιος ἐξῆλῃ τὴν δύναμιν ἐνεργώς·
καὶ συμπεσὼν ἐκ πλαγίου κατὰ κέρας τεταραγμένος
τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἀκεραίους ἔχων καὶ συντεταγμένος,
τροπὴν ἐποίει τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἱσχυρῶν,
καὶ πολλοὺς μεν αὐτῶν ἄπεκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς
15 ἴμαγκασε φεύγειν προτροπάδην. θηρία δὲ σὺν αὐτοῖς
μὲν Ἰνδοῖς ἔλαβε δέκα, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τοὺς
Ἰνδοὺς ἀπερριφότων, μετὰ τὴν μάχην περιέλασάμενος
16 νος ἐκυρίευσε πάντων. ταύτα δὲ ἐπιτελεσάμενος
ὁμολογούμενος αὐτοὺς ἔδοκε γεγονέναι τοῖς Ῥω-
μαίοις πράγμασι τοὺς πάλιν ἀναθαρρῆσαι τὰς πεζικὰς
dυνάμεις καὶ κρατῆσαι τῶν ὑπαίθρων.

41 Τοῦ δὲ προτερήματος τούτου προσπεσόντος εἰς
tὴν Ῥώμην, περιχαρεῖς ἦσαν οὐχ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῷ τοῖς
πολεμίοις ἤλαττόσθαι τῶν θηρίων ἐστερημένοις,
ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ τοὺς ἰδίους τεθαρρηκέναι τῶν ἑλεφάν-
των κεκρατηκότας. διὸ καὶ πάλιν ἐπερρώσθησαν
dia ταύτα κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν εἰς τὸ μετὰ
στόλου καὶ ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐπὶ
tὰς πράξεις ἐκπέμπειν, σπουδάζοντες εἰς δύναμιν
3 πέρας ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ πολέμῳ. παρασκευασθέντων δὲ
τῶν ἐπιτηδείων πρὸς τὴν ἐξαποστολὴν ἔπλεον οἱ
στρατηγοὶ διακοσίως ναυῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς Σικελίας.

4 ἦτος δὲ ἤν τῷ πολέμῳ τεταραπανδέκατον. καθορ
μισθέντες δὲ πρὸς τὸ Λιλύβαιον, ἀμα καὶ τῶν πε
ζικῶν ἐκεῖ στρατοπέδων αὐτοῖς ἀπηνηκότων, ἐνεχειρ
ροῦν πολιορκεῖν, ὅτε κρατήσαντες ταύτης βάδισα
5 μεταβιβάζουσι τὸν πολέμον εἰς τὴν Λιβύην. σχε
dόν δὲ πέρι γε τούτου τοῦ μέρους καὶ τῶν Καρ
χηδονίων οἱ προεστῶτες ὡμοδόξουν καὶ τοὺς αὐ

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trampling down and killing the men and disturbing and breaking the ranks. Caecilius, on seeing this, made a vigorous sally and falling on the flank of the enemy, who were now in disorder, with his own fresh and well-ordered troops inflicted a severe defeat on them, killing many and compelling the rest to quit the field in headlong flight. He took ten elephants with their mahouts, and after the battle, having penned up the others who had thrown their mahouts, he captured them all. By this exploit he was universally acknowledged to have caused the Roman land forces to pluck up courage again and gain the command of the open country.

41. When news of this success reached Rome it caused great rejoicing, not so much because of the enemy being weakened by the loss of their elephants as because of the confidence which the capture of these gave to their own troops. They were consequently encouraged to revert to their original plan of sending out the Consuls to the campaign with a fleet and naval force; for they were eager by all means in their power to put an end to the war. When all that was required for the expedition was ready, the Consuls set sail for Sicily with two hundred ships. This was in the fourteenth year of the war. Anchor- 250 B.C. ing off Lilybaeum, where they were joined by their land forces, they undertook its siege, thinking that if it fell into their possession it would be easy for them to transfer the war to Africa. On this matter at least the Carthaginian Government agreed more

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6 toûs eîchôn logosmous toîs 'Rwmaîous. diô kai tâlla párenga poieômenoi peri tî bosthên égînontos kai parabâllôsebas kai pâs ûpômênes ûper tîs pro-eirhêmêns pôleous diâ tî mûdêmian aîfomih kata-leîpsebas sfîsi, pásis dê tîs ìllhîs Sikeîias épî-krateîn 'Rwmaîous plîn Drepânnos.

"Yna dê mi' toîs ângnoûsi toûs tôpous âsastî tâ leugômena gînêtai, peirassômeba dià brakhèwv ágâ-geîn eîs ënnoiàv tîs eûkairiâs kai ðhêsèwv aûtwv tòûs èntuhkánontas. tîn mèn oûn sümposan Sikeî- liân tî ðhései tetákhai sümîbaînei prôs tîn 'Italiân kai tâkéînhs pêrata paraplhêsîwv tîs Pêlopôn-
vôsow ðhései prôs tîn lôiîn 'Elláda kai tâ taûtîs ákra, toûtw d' aûtw diarfêren allîlwv,
ù 'keînîs mèn xerôndhêsos <'estw, aûtî dê ðhîsos >
ìs mèn gar d' metâzû tôpous ëstî porèutôs, ùs dê
plwtoû. tô dê sçîma tîs Sikeîlias ëstî mèn
trîgwnòn, aî dê kðrmfai tôwv gwniwv ëkâsths
akkôrrhriwv laîmbânonu tâxeis, òn tô mèn prôs
mêsîmbriân neûon, eîs dê tî Sikeîkôn pêlagoû
ânateînon, Pâxûnos kalêîta, tô d' eîs tâs árktoûs
kekllûnon orîzei mèn tôu porbhmou tô prôs dûseis
mêros, âpêchei dê tîs 'Italiâs ùs dekadûo stàdia,
prosaçoropêtai dê Pêlôpô. tô dê trîtôn têtra-
pou têntai mèn eîs aûtw tîn Líbûn, épîkeîta dê tòûs
prokômînovous tîs Karkhôdônous akkôrrhriwv eûkai-
rîs, diêxon ùs xîlîous stàdios, neûei d' eîs xei-
merwvûs dûseis, diarîei dê tô Lîbûkôn kai tô Sar-
drôwv pêlagoû, prosaçoropêtai dê Lîlûbâion. èpî
dê toûtw pòlis ðûnwnûmûs keîta tîw tôpouv, peri tîn
tôte sunêbâwine tòûs 'Rwmaîous súnistatwsi tîn po-
lîorhîan, teîkhesi te diarfêrontwsw ësphalîmênhn kai
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or less with the Romans, sharing their estimate of the place’s value; so that, shelving all other projects, they devoted their whole attention to the relief of this city and were ready to undertake every risk and burden for this purpose; for if it fell, no base was left for them, as the Romans were masters of all the rest of Sicily except Drepana.

To prevent my narrative from being obscure to readers owing to their ignorance of the geography, I will try to convey briefly to them an idea of the natural advantages and exact position of the places referred to. 42. Sicily, then, as a whole occupies the same position with regard to Italy and its extremity that the Peloponnese occupies with regard to the rest of Greece and its extremity, the difference lying in this, that the Peloponnese is a peninsula whereas Sicily is an island, the communication being in the one case by land and in the other by sea. Sicily is triangular in shape, the apices of all three angles being formed by capes. The cape that looks to the south and stretches out into the Sicilian Sea is called Pachynus, that on the north forms the extremity of the western coast of the Strait; it is about twelve stades distant from Italy and is called Pelorias. The third looks towards Africa itself, and is favourably situated as a base for attacking the promontories in front of Carthage, from which it is distant about one thousand stades. It is turned to the south-west, separating the Libyan from the Sardinian Sea, and its name is Lilybaeum. On the cape stands the city of the same name, of which the Romans were now opening the siege. It is excellently defended both by walls and by a deep moat all round, and on the
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πέριξ τάφρω βαθεία καὶ τενάγεσιν ἐκ θαλάττης, δι’ ὅν ἔστιν εἰς τοὺς λυμένας εἰςπλους πολλῆς δεόμενος ἐμπείριας καὶ συνηθείας.

8 Ταῦτη δὲ προσστρατοπεδεύσαντες εξ ἔκατέρου μέρους οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι, καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν στρατοπέδων τάφρῳ καὶ χάρακι καὶ τείχει διαλαβόντες, ἤρξαντο προσάγειν ἔργα κατὰ τὸν ἐγγιστὰ κείμενον τῆς θαλάττης πύργον ὦς πρὸς τὸ Διβυκὸν πέλαγος, προσκατασκευάζοντες δὲ ἀεὶ τοὺς ὑποκειμένους καὶ παρεκτείνοντες τῶν ἔργων τὰς κατασκευὰς, τέλος ἐξ πύργους τοὺς συνεχείς τῷ προειρημένῳ κατέβαλον, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς πάντας ἀμα κριοκοπεῖν ἐν- 

10 εχείρησαν. γινομένης δὲ ἐνεργοῦ καὶ καταπληκτικῆς τῆς πολιορκίας, καὶ τῶν πύργων τῶν μὲν πονοῦντων ἀν’ ἐκάστην ἤμεραν, τῶν δ’ ἐρευμένων, ἀμα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἔργων ἐπιβαίνοντων ἀεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐντὸς τῆς πόλεως, ἦν ἴσχυρὰ διατροπὴ καὶ κατάπληξις παρὰ τοῖς πολιορκομένοις, καίσιρον ὄντων ἐν τῇ πόλει χωρὶς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλῆθους αὐτῶν τῶν μισθοφόρων εἰς μυρίους. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ὅ γε στρατηγὸς αὐτῶν Ἰμιλκών οὐδὲν παρέλευσε τῶν δυνάτων, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἀντοικοδομῶν, τὰ δ’ ἀντιμεταλλεύον ὑπ’ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἀπορίαν παρείχε τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις.

12 ἔτι δὲ καθ’ ἐκάστην ἤμεραν ἐπιπορευόμενος καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐγχειρῶν, εἰ πῶς δύναιτο πῦρ ἐμβαλεῖν, πολλοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦτο τοῦ μέρους καὶ παραβόλους ἄγωνας δὴ συνιστάτο καὶ μεθ’ ἤμεραν καὶ νύκτωρ, ὥστε πλεῖους ἐνίοτε γίνεσθαι νεκροὺς ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συμπλοκαῖς τῶν εἰωθῶν πίπτειν ἐν ταῖς παρατάξεις.

43 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καμώσκοι τοῦτοι τῶν ἡγεμόνων τινές τῶν τὰς μεγίστας χώρας ἐχόντων ἐν τοῖς μυ-
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side facing the sea by shoaly water, the passage through which into the harbour requires great skill and practice.

The Romans encamped on either side of the city, fortifying the space between their camps with a trench, a stockade, and a wall. They then began to throw up works against the tower that lay nearest the sea on the Libyan side, and, gradually advancing from the base thus acquired and extending their works, they succeeded at last in knocking down the six adjacent towers, and attacked all the others at once with battering rams. The siege was now so vigorously pursued and so terrifying, each day seeing some of the towers shaken or demolished and the enemy's works advancing further and further into the city, that the besieged were thrown into a state of utter confusion and panic, although, besides the civil population, there were nearly ten thousand mercenaries in the town. Their general, Himilco, however, omitted no means of resistance in his power, and by counter-building and counter-mining caused the enemy no little difficulty. Every day he would advance and make attempts on the siege works, trying to succeed in setting them on fire, and with this object was indeed engaged by night and day in combats of so desperate a character, that at times more men fell in these encounters than usually fall in a pitched battle.

43. About this time some of the superior officers in the mercenary force, after talking the
σοθοφόρους, συλλαλήσαντες ἑαυτοῖς ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὴν πόλιν ἐνδούνα τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις καὶ πεπεισμένοι πειθαρχήσεωι σφία τοὺς ὑποτεταγμένους, ἐξεπήρησαν νυκτὸς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ διελέγοντο τῷ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγῷ περὶ τοῦ 2 τῶν. ὁ δ' Ἀχαῖος Ἀλέξων, ὁ καὶ τοῖς Ἀκραγαντινοῖς κατὰ τοὺς ἐπάνω χρόνους αὐτῶν γενόμενοι τῆς σωτηρίας, καθ' ὅν καιρὸν ἔπεβαλοντο παρασπονδείν αὐτοὺς οἱ τῶν Σιρακοσίων μισθοφόροι, καὶ τότε πρῶτος συνεις τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀνίηγειλε τῷ στρα-3 τηγῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων. ὁ δὲ διακόοσας παρα-χρῆμα συνήγε τοὺς καταλειπομένους τῶν ἡγεμόνων, καὶ παρεκάλει μετὰ δεήσεως, μεγάλας ὁδεγὰς καὶ χάριτας ὑποσχομένους, ἐὰν ἐμμείνασι τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν πίστει καὶ μὴ κοινωνήσωμεν τοῖς ἔξεληλυθόσι 4 τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. δεχομένων δὲ προθύμως τοὺς λόγους, εὐθέως μετ' αὐτῶν ἀπέστειλε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς Κελτοὺς Ἀννίβαν τὸν ὑιόν τοῦ Ἀννίβου τοῦ μεταλλάξαντος ἐν Σαρδόνι διὰ τὴν προγεγενημένην ἐν τῇ στρατείᾳ πρὸς αὐτοὺς συνηθεῖαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους μισθοφόρους Ἀλέξωνα διὰ τὴν παρ' ἐκεί-5 νοις ἀποδοχὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ πίστιν· οἱ καὶ συναγαγόντες τὰ πλήθη καὶ παρακαλέσαντες, ἔτι δὲ πιστωσάμενοι τὸς προτεινομένους ἐκάστοις ὁρειαὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ῥαδίως ἐπείσαν αὐτοὺς μένειν ἐπὶ 6 τῶν ὑποκειμένων. διὸ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, τῶν ἐκπην-δησάντων ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς ἐρχομένων πρὸς τὰ τείχη, καὶ βουλομένων παρακαλεῖν καὶ λέγειν τῷ περὶ τῆς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπαγγελίας, οὔχ οἷον προσείχον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς οὖδ' ἀκούειν ἡξίουν, βάλλοντες δὲ τοῖς λίθοις καὶ συνακοντίζοντες ἀπεδώξαν ἀπὸ 7 τοῦ τείχους. Καρχηδόνωνι μὲν οὖν διὰ τὰς προειρή-120
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matter over among themselves and in the full conviction that their subordinates would obey them, escaped from the town by night to the Roman camp and made proposals to the Consul for the surrender of the city. But the Achaean Alexon, who had on a former occasion saved the Agrigentines, when the Syracusan mercenaries had formed a project of breaking faith with them, was now too the first to get wind of what was going on and informed the Carthaginian general. Himilco on hearing of it at once summoned the remaining officers and urgently implored their aid, promising them lavish gifts and favours if they remained loyal to him and refused to participate in the plot of those who had left the city. On their readily consenting, he bade them return at once to their troops, sending with them to the Celts Hannibal, the son of that Hannibal who died in Sardinia, as they had served under him and were well acquainted with him, while to the other mercenaries he sent Alexon, owing to his popularity and credit with them. They called a meeting of the soldiery and partly by entreating them, partly moreover by assuring them that each man would receive the bounty the general had offered, easily persuaded them to bide by their engagements. So, afterwards, when the officers who had quitted the city advanced openly to the walls and attempted to entreat them and tell them of the promises made by the Romans, not only did they pay no attention but would not lend ear to them at all, and chased them away from the wall with stones and other missiles. The Carthaginians, then, for the above reasons very
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ménas aitías para mikróv ἥλθον ἀπολέσαι tā prág-
8 ματα, paraqounōthéntes ὑπὸ tōn miasthóforon. 'Aléξων dē próteron 'Akragantiónois ēsowse dia tīn
pístin oú mónon tīn pōli kai tīn χώρan, allā
kai tōn nómuon kai tīn éluevtheríon, tōte dē
Karkhídovioi aitios ēgéneto tōu μή σφαλήναι toίς
ōlois.

44. Oi δ' ēn tē Karkhídov toútw mēn oudeiv eî-
dótes, sułlogiζómenoi dē tás ēn taís poliorkēías
χρείας, plērōsantēs stratiwotán penthkounta nais,
kai paraqaleabantes tois ārmózousi lógois tīs prá-
xeωs, tôn ēpi toútw tētαgmenōn 'Anwbain, ós ēn
'Amílkon mēn vīs, triērarchos dē kai filos 'Atár-
bou prōtōs, ēkastateilai kata spoudēn, ēntelá-
menoi μή kataμelēhsai, xhēsāmenon dē suvn kaiρw
2 tē tōlmē bōsthēsai toîs poliorkouménois. O δ' ān-
axtheis metā muřīw stratiwotwv, kai kathorimathēis
ēn taís kaloumēnais Aignousais, metaz η dē keimē-
nais Δulvbaiou kai Karkhídovos, ēpetērēi tōn plōwv.
3 labwv δ' oúron kai lamprōn āνemou, ēkpetásas
pās τoîs ārmēnois kai kataurwósas ēp' āvto τō
stōma toû lūmēnōs ēpoueitō tōn plōwv, ēxwv kath-
wplamēnous kai prōs máxhēn ētoîmous toîs āndras
4 ēpī tōn katastrwmatōn. Oi dē 'Rwmaioi, tā mēn
aînvidiōn xenomēνh tīs ēpифaneiαs, tā dē fō-
boûmenoi μή sūn toîs polelmwv ὑπὸ tīs bías tōv
pnevumatōs sughkatexchwswv eis tōn lūmēn wv
upenaptwv, tō mēn diakolwswv tōn ēpîplouv tīs
boutheiαs ēpēγγwswv, ēpī dē tīs thalâttsws ēsthtwv
5 katalêpplhmēnou tīn tōn polelmwv tōlmwv. Tō δ'
ēk tīs pōlewsw plēðos ἡθροιζομένou ēpī tā teίχh
pān āma mēn ἡγωνία tō sumpbēsōmenov, āma d' ēpī
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narrowly escaped a complete disaster due to the treachery of their mercenaries, and Alexon, who had previously saved by his loyalty not only the city and district but the laws and liberties of Agrigentum, now was the cause of the Carthaginians being saved from total ruin.

44. The Carthaginian government knew nothing of all this, but calculating the requirements of a besieged town, they filled fifty ships with troops. After addressing the soldiers in terms befitting the enterprise, they sent them off at once under the command of Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, trierarch and most intimate friend of Adherbal, with orders not to delay, but at the first opportunity to make a bold attempt to relieve the besieged. Setting sail with ten thousand troops on board, he came to anchor off the islands called Aegusae, which lie between Lilybaeum and Carthage, and there awaited favourable weather. As soon as he had a fine stern breeze he hoisted all sail and running before the wind sailed straight for the mouth of the harbour, his men drawn up on deck armed ready for action. The Romans, partly owing to the suddenness of the fleet's appearance and partly because they feared being carried into the hostile harbour by the force of the wind together with their enemies, made no effort to prevent the entrance of the relieving force, but stood out at sea amazed at the audacity of the Carthaginians. The whole population had assembled on the walls in an agony of suspense on the one hand as to what would happen, and at the same time so overjoyed at the unexpected prospect of
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tώ παραδόξω τῆς ἐλπίδος ὑπερχαρές ὑπάρχειν μετὰ κρότου καὶ κραυγῆς παρεκάλει τοὺς εἰσπλέοντας.

6 Ἀννίβας δὲ παραβόλως καὶ τεθαρρηκότως εἰσδραμὼν καὶ καθορμισθεὶς εἰς τὸν λιμένα μετ᾽ ἀσφαλείας ἀπεβίβασε τοὺς οὐρανούς ὑποτάξας ἐπὶ τῆς τῆς βοήθειας παρουσία περιχαρεῖς, καὶ περὶ μεγάλην ἐλπίδα καὶ χείρα προσειληφότες, ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ τετολμηκέναι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους κωλύσαι τὸν ἐπιτίθεν τῶν Ἐπικεφαλέων.

45 Ἰμίλκων δ᾽ ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως οὐρανοῦ, θεωρῶν τὴν ὁμίλην καὶ προθυμίαν τῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ πόλει διὰ τὴν παρουσίαν τῆς βοήθειας, τῶν δὲ παραγεγονότων διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν περιστών τῶν κακῶν, βουλόμενος άκεραιος ἀποχήσασθαι ταῖς ἐκατέρων ὁμοίας πρὸς τὴν διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐπίθεσιν τοῖς ἔργοις, συνῆγε πάντας εἰς ἐκκλησίαν.

2 τῶν κακῶν, βουλόμενος ἀκεραιος ἀποχήσασθαι ταῖς ἐκατέρων ὁμοίας πρὸς τὴν διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐπίθεσιν τοῖς ἔργοις, συνῆγε πάντας εἰς ἐκκλησίαν.

3 παρακαλέσας δὲ τῷ καίρῳ τὰ πρόεστα διὰ πλείονων καὶ παραστῆσας ὁμίλην ὑπερβάλλουσα διὰ τὸ ἐμέγεθος τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων τοῖς κατ᾽ ἱδίαι ανδραγαθήσας καὶ τὰς κατὰ κοινὸν ἐσομένας χάριτας.

4 αὐτοῖς καὶ δωρεᾶς παρὰ Ἐπικεφαλέων, ὀμοθυμαδόν ἐπισημανομένων καὶ βοώντων μὴ μέλλειν, ἀλλ’ ἄγεν αὐτοῖς, τότε μὲν ἐπαυγάσας καὶ δεξάμενος τὴν προθυμίαν ἀφῆκε, παραγγείλας ἀναπαύεσθαι.

5 καθ’ ὄραν καὶ πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ἕγουμένους μετ’ οὐ πολὺ δὲ συγκαλέσας τοὺς προσεπτόμενας αὐτῶν διένεμε τοὺς ἀρμόζοντας πρὸς τὴν ἐπίθεσιν ἐκάστοις τόποις, καὶ τὸ σύνθημα καὶ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς ἐπιθέσεως ἐδήλωσε, καὶ παρῆγγελε τοῖς ἕγεμοις μετὰ πάντων τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων ἐπὶ τοῖς τόποις.
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succour that they kept on encouraging the fleet as it sailed in by cheers and clapping of hands. Hannibal, having entered the harbour in this hazardous and daring manner, anchored and disembarked his troops in security. All those in the city were delighted not so much at the arrival of the relief, although their prospects were much improved and their force increased thereby, as at the fact that the Romans had not ventured to try to prevent the Carthaginians from sailing in.

45. Himilco, the commander of the garrison, seeing that all were full of spirit and confidence, the original garrison owing to the arrival of relief, and the newcomers owing to their ignorance as yet of the perilous situation, desired to avail himself of this fresh spirit in the ranks and make another attempt to fire the enemy’s works. He therefore summoned the soldiers to a general assembly, and addressing them at some length in words suitable to the occasion, roused them to great enthusiasm by his lavish promises of reward to those who distinguished themselves personally, and his assurance that the force as a whole would be duly recompensed by the Government. On their all applauding him and shouting to him not to delay but to lead them on at once, he dismissed them for the present after praising them and expressing his pleasure at their eagerness, ordering them to retire to rest early and obey their officers. Soon afterwards he summoned the commanding officers and assigned to each his proper place in the assault, giving them the watchword and informing them of the hour. He ordered all the commanders with the whole of their forces to be on the spot at the morning

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8 ἐσθενῆς εἶναι φυλάκης. τῶν δὲ πειθαρχησάντων, ἔξισαγγόν τὴν δύναμιν ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ κατὰ πλείους 7 τόπους ἐνεχείρει τοῖς ἔργοις. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι διὰ τὸ προορᾶσαί τὸ μέλλον οὐκ ἄργως οὐδ’ ἀπαρα- σκεύως εἰξον, ἀλλ’ ἐτοίμως ἐβοήθουν πρὸς τὸ δεό- μενον καὶ διεμάχοντο τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐρρωμένως.
8 πάντων δ’ ἐν βραχεῖ χρόνῳ συμπεσόντων ἀλλήλως ἦν ἀγών παράβολος πέριξ τοῦ τείχους. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἦσαν οὐκ ἐλάττουσι διαμυρίων, οἱ 9 δ’ ἐξωθεὶν ἔτι πλείους τούτων. ὅσω δὲ συνεβαίνει 10 τοὺς ἀνδρας ἐκτὸς τάξεως ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μάχην ἀνα- μιξεῖ κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν προαιρέσεις, τοσούτως λαμπρό- τερος ἦν ὁ κύνδυνος, ὡς ἂν ἐκ τοσοῦτον πλήθους κατ’ ἀνδρα καὶ κατὰ ξυγὸν οὐν εἰ μονομαχικῆς συν- εστώσης περὶ τοὺς ἄγωνιζομένους τῆς φιλοτιμίας.
10 οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἦ τε κραυγῇ καὶ τὸ σύστρεμμα δια- 11 φέρον ἦν πρὸς αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἔργοις. οἱ γὰρ ἀρχηθέν- ἐπ’ αὐτῷ τούτῳ παρ’ ἀμφοῖν ταχθέντες, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ τρέψασθαι τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων, οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τῷ μη- προέσθαι ταῦτα, τηλικαύτην ἐποιεύντω φιλοτιμίαν καὶ σπουδήν, οἱ μὲν ἐξόωσι σπεύδουντες, οἱ δ’ οὐ- δαμῶς εἰξει τούτοις τολμῶντες, ἄωστε διὰ τὴν 12 προθυμίαν τέλος ἐν αὐταῖς μένοντες ταῖς ἐξ ἀρχής χώραις ἀπέθνησκον. οἱ γε μὴν ἃμα τούτοις ἀναμεμιγμένου, δάδα καὶ στυππίν καὶ πῦρ ἔχοντες, οὐτω τολμηρῶς καὶ πανταχόθεν ἅμα προσπίπτοντες ἐνέβαλλον ταῖς μηχαναῖς ὡστε τοὺς Ρωμαίους εἰς τὸν ἐσχατὸν παραγενέσθαι κύνδυνον, μὴ δύναμε- 13 νοσ κατακρατήσαι τῆς τῶν ἑναντίων ἐπιβολῆς. ὁ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς, θεωρῶν ἐν μὲν τῷ κύνδυνῳ πόλλους ἀποθνήσκοντας, οὖ δ’ ἐνεκα ταύτ’

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watch, and his orders having been executed, he led the whole force out as it was getting light and attacked the works in several places. The Romans, who had foreseen what was coming, were not idle or unprepared, but promptly ran to defend the threatened points and opposed a vigorous resistance to the enemy. Soon the whole of both forces were engaged, and a desperate fight was going on all round the walls, the salliers numbering not less than twenty thousand and the force outside being rather more numerous. Inasmuch as they were fighting confusedly and in no order, each man as he thought best, the battle was all the more fierce, such a large force being engaged man to man and company to company, so that there was something of the keenness of single combat in the whole contest. It was, however, particularly at the siege-works themselves that there was most shouting and pressure. For those on both sides whose task from the outset was on the one hand to drive the defenders from the works, and on the other not to abandon them, exhibited such emulation and resolution, the assailants doing their very best to turn the Romans out, and the latter refusing to give way, that at last owing to this resolute spirit the men remained and fell on the spot where they had first stood. Yet, in spite of all, the bearers of pine-branches, tow, and fire intermingled with the combatants, attacked the engines from every side, hurling the burning matter at them with such pluck that the Romans were in the utmost peril, being unable to master the onset of the enemy. But the Carthaginian general, observing that many were falling in the battle, and that his object of
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έπραττεν, οὐ δυναμένους κρατήσαι τῶν ἔργων,
14 ἀνακαλείσθαι τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παρῆγγειλε τοῖς σαλπι-
σταῖς. οἱ δὲ Ἡρωμαίων παρ’ οὐδὲν ἐλθόντες τοῦ
πάσας ἀποβαλεῖν τὰς παρασκευάσ, τέλος ἐκράτησαν
τῶν ἔργων καὶ πάντα διετήρησαν ἀσφαλῶς. ὅ
46 μὲν οὖν Ἀννίβασ μετὰ τὴν χρεῖαν ταύτην ἐξ-
ἐπλευσε νῦκτωρ ἐπὶ μετὰ τῶν νεῶν λαθῶν τοὺς
πολεμίους εἷς τὰ Δρέπανα πρὸς Ἀτάρβαν τὸν τῶν
2 Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸν. διὰ γὰρ τὴν εὐκαρίαν
τοῦ τόπου καὶ τὸ κάλλος τοῦ περὶ τὰ Δρέπανα λι-
μένοις ἀεὶ μεγάλην ἐποιοῦντο σπουδὴν οἱ Καρχηδό-
νοι περὶ τὴν φυλακὴν αὐτοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦ
Λιλοβαίου τούτου ἀπεχεῖ τὸν τόπον ὡς ἂν ἐκατὸν
καὶ εἶκοσι στάδια.

4 Τοῖς δ’ ἐν τῇ Καρχηδόνι βουλομένοις μὲν εἰδέναι
τὰ περὶ τὸ Λιλοβαίον, οὐ δυναμένοις δὲ διὰ τὸ
τοὺς μὲν συγκεκλείσθαι, τοὺς δὲ παραφυλάττεσθαι
φιλοτίμως, ἐπηγγείλατο τις ἀνὴρ τῶν ἐνδόξων,
Ἀννίβας ἐπικαλούμενος Ῥόδιος, εἰσπλέυσας εἰς
τὸ Λιλοβαίον καὶ γενόμενος αὐτόπτης ἀπαντά
5 διασαφήσειν. οἱ δὲ τῆς ἐπαγγέλας μὲν ἂσμε-
νως ἤκουσαν, οὐ μὴν ἐπιστευόν γε διὰ τὸ τῶν ὀστῶ
τοὺς Ἡρωμαίων ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν εἰσπλουν στόμα-
6 τοῖς ἐφορμεῖν. ὃ δὲ καταρτίσας τὴν ἑδίαν ναῦν ἄν-
ήχθη καὶ διάρας εἰς τινὰ τῶν πρὸ τοῦ Λιλοβαίου
κειμένων νήσων, τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρας λαβὼν εὐ-
κάριως ἀνεμον οὐριον περὶ τετάρτην ὥραν ἀπάν-
των τῶν πολεμίων ὀρῶντος καὶ καταπετήμενων
7 τὴν τόλμαν εἰσέπλευσε. καὶ τὴν κατόπιν εὐθέως
8 ἐγινετε περὶ ἀναγωγῆν. ὃ δὲ τῶν Ἡρωμαίων στρα-
τηγὸς βουλόμενος ἐπιμελεότερον τὸν κατὰ τὸν εἰσ-
πλουν τόπον τηρεῖν, ἐξηρτυκὼς ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ δέκα

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taking the works was not being attained, ordered his trumpeters to sound the retreat. Thus the Romans who had come very near losing all their siege-material, at length were masters of their works, and remained in secure possession of them.

46. As for Hannibal he sailed out after the action while it was still night, unobserved by the enemy, and proceeded to Drepana to meet the Carthaginian commander there, Adherbal. Owing to the convenient situation of Drepana and the excellency of its harbour, the Carthaginians had always given great attention to its protection. The place lies at a distance of about a hundred and twenty stades from Lilybaeum.

The Carthaginians at home wishing to know what was happening at Lilybaeum, but being unable to do so as their own forces were shut up in the town and the Romans were active in their vigilance, one of their leading citizens, Hannibal, surnamed the Rhodian, offered to sail into Lilybaeum and make a full report from personal observation. They listened to his offer eagerly, but did not believe he could do this, as the Romans were anchored outside the mouth of the port. But after fitting out his own ship, he set sail, and crossed to one of the islands that lie before Lilybaeum, and next day finding the wind happily favourable, sailed in at about ten o'clock in the morning in full sight of the enemy who were thunderstruck by his audacity. Next day he at once made preparations for departure, but the Roman general, with the view of guarding the entrance more carefully, had fitted out in the night
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ναῦς τὰς ἄριστα πλεοῦσας, αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ λι-
μένου ἑστὼς ἐθεώρει τὸ συμβαίνον, ὦμοιως δὲ καὶ
9 πᾶν τὸ στρατόπεδον. οἱ δὲ νῆσε τοῦ στόματος ἑξ
ἀμφοῦ τοῖν μερῶν, ἐφ’ ὄσον ἦν δυνατὸν ἐγγιστα
tοῖς τενάγεσι προσάγειν, ἑπείχον, ἐπτερωκυίαί πρὸς
tὴν ἐμβολὴν καὶ σύλληψιν τῆς ἐκπλεῖν μελλούσης
10 νεώς. ὁ δὲ Ῥόδιος ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς τὴν ἀναγω-
γὴν ποιησάμενος ὦτως κατανέστη τῶν πολέμιων
τῇ τε τόλμῃ καὶ τῷ ταχυναυτείν ὦστ’ οὐ μόνον
ἀτρωτὸν ἐξέπλευσε τὴν ναῦν ἐχὼν καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας,
οἶν οὐτώτα παραδραμὼν τὰ σκάφη τῶν ὑπ-
11 εναντίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ βραχὺ προπλεύσας ἐπέστη πτε-
ρῶσας τὴν ναῦν, ὡς ἂν εἰ προκαλοῦμενος τοὺς
12 πολέμιους. οὔδενος δὲ τολμῶντος ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ἀντα-
ἀγεσθαι διὰ τὸ τάχος τῆς ἐιρεσίας, ἀπέπλευσε κατ-
αναστάς μιᾷ νηὶ παντὸς τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων στόλου.
13 καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἥδη πλεονάκις ποιῶν ταῦτό τοῦτο
μεγάλην χρείαν παρείχετο, τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίους
ἀεὶ τὰ κατεπείγοντα διασαφῶν, τοὺς δὲ πολυορκο-
μένους εὐθαρσεῖς παρασκευάζων, τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους
47 καταπληττόμενος τῷ παραβόλῳ. μέγιστα δὲ συν-
εβάλλετο πρὸς τὴν τόλμαν αὐτοῦ τὸ διὰ τῶν προβρα-
χέων ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἀκριβῶς σεσημειώθαι τὸν
2 εἴσπλουν. ὑπεράρας γὰρ καὶ φαινόμενος ἐπειτ’, ἄν
ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν μερῶν ἐλάμβανε τὸν ἐπὶ
tῆς θαλάττης πύργῳ κατὰ πρώραν οὕτως ὡστε
tοῖς πρὸς τὴν Λιβύην τετραμμένοις πύργους τῆς πό-
λεως ἐπιπροσθεῖν ἀπασί. δὲ οὗ τρόπου μόνως ἑστὶ
δυνατὸν ἐξ οὐρίας τοῦ κατὰ τὸν εἴσπλουν στόματος
3 εὐστοιχεῖν. τῇ δὲ τοῦ Ῥόδιον τόλμῃ πιστεύοντες
καὶ πλείους ἀπεθάρρησαν τῶν εἰδότων τοὺς τόπους
tὸ παραπλήσιον ποιεῖν. ἐξ ὑν οἱ Ῥωμαιοὶ δυσχρη-
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ten of his fastest ships, and now he himself and his whole army stood by the harbour waiting to see what would happen. The ships were waiting on either side of the entrance as near as the shoals would allow them to approach, their oars out and ready to charge and capture the ship that was about to sail out. But the "Rhodian," getting under weigh in the sight of all, so far outbraved the Romans by his audacity and speed that not only did he bring his ship and her whole crew out unhurt, passing the enemy's ships just as if they were motionless, but after sailing on a short way, he pulled up without shipping his oars as if to challenge the enemy, and no one venturing to come out against him owing to the speed of his rowing, he sailed off, after thus having with one ship successfully defied the whole Roman fleet. After this he several times performed the same feat and was of great service by continuing to report at Carthage the news of most urgent importance, while at the same time he kept up the spirits of the besieged and struck terror into the Romans by his venturesomeness. 47. What tended most to give him confidence was that from experience he had accurately noted the course to be followed through the shoals in entering. For as soon as he had crossed and come into view, he would get the sea-tower on the Italian side on his bows so that it covered the whole line of towers turned towards Africa; and this is the only way that a vessel running before the wind can hit the mouth of the harbour in entering. Several others who had local knowledge, gaining confidence from the "Rhodian's" audacity, undertook to do the same, and in consequence the Romans, to whom this was a
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στούμενοι τῷ συμβαίνοντι χωννύειν τὸ στόμα τοῦ
4 λυμένος ἐπεχείρησαν. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ πλεῖστον
μέρος τῆς ἐπιβολῆς οὐδὲν ἦνον διὰ τὸ βάθος τῆς
θαλάττης καὶ διὰ τὸ μηθὲν δύνασθαι τῶν ἐμβαλλο-
μένων στήναι μηδὲ συμμείναι τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ’
ὑπὸ τε τοῦ κλύδωνος καὶ τῆς τοῦ ῥοῦ βίας τὸ
ῥυτούμενον εὐθέως ἐν τῇ καταφορᾷ παρωθεῖσθαι
5 καὶ διασκορπίζεσθαι, κατὰ δὲ τῶν τόπων ἔχοντα
βραχεὰ συνέστη χώμα μετὰ πολλῆς ταλαιπωρίας,
ἐφ’ ὦ τετρήρης ἐκτρέχουσα νυκτὸς ἐκάθισε καὶ τοῖς
πολεμίοις ὑποχείριος ἐγένετο, διαφέρουσα τῇ κατα-
6 σκευῇ τῆς ναυτηγίας. ής οἱ Ἡρωμαῖοι κρατήσαντες
καὶ πληρώματι καταρτίσαντες ἐπιλέκτῳ, πάντας
7 τοὺς ἐισπλέοντας, μάλιστα δὲ τὸν Ἡρώδων, ἔπετή-
ρον. ο̣ δὲ κατὰ τύχην ἐισπλέυσας νυκτὸς μετὰ
taύτα πάλιν ἀνήγετο φανερῶς. τεθωράω δὲ ἐκ
καταβολῆς αὐτῷ τὴν τετρήρη συνεξομήσασαν,
8 γινοὺς τὴν ναῦν διεπράτη. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον
ώρμησαν ὡς καταταχήσων· τῇ δὲ τοῦ πληρώματος
παρασκευῇ καταλαμβανόμενος, τέλος ἐπιστρέφας
9 ἡναγκάσθη συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις. καταπροτε-
ροῦμενος δὲ τοῖς ἐπιβατικοῖς διὰ τε τὸ πλῆθος καὶ
diὰ τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐγένετο τοῖς ἐχθροῖς
10 ὑποχείριος. οἱ δὲ Ἡρωμαῖοι, κυριεύσαντες καὶ
taύτης τῆς νεώς εὖ κατεσκευασμένης, καὶ καταρτί-
sαντες αὐτὴν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, οὕτως ἐκώλυσαν
τοὺς καταλαμώντας καὶ πλέοντας εἰς τὸ Λιλύ-
βαιον.

48 Τῶν δὲ πολυρκουμένων ταῖς μὲν ἀντοικοδομίαις
ἐνεργῶς χρωμένων, τοῦ δὲ λυμαίνοσθαι καὶ δια-
φθείρειν τὰς τῶν ὑπενταυτῶν παρασκευὰς ἀπεγνω-
2 κότων, γίνεται τις ἀνέμου στάσις ἑχούσα τηλικαύτην
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great annoyance, tried to fill up the mouth of the harbour. For the most part indeed their attempt was resultless, both owing to the depth of the sea, and because none of the stuff that they threw in would remain in its place or hold together in the least, but all they shot in used to be at once shifted and scattered as it was sinking to the bottom, by the surge and the force of the current. However, in one place where there were shoals a solid bank was formed at the cost of infinite pains, and on this a four-banked ship which was coming out at night grounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. This ship was of remarkably fine build, and the Romans, after capturing it and manning it with a select crew, kept watch for all the blockade-runners and especially for the "Rhodian." It so happened that he had sailed in that very night, and was afterwards sailing out quite openly, but, on seeing the four-banked vessel putting out to sea again together with himself and recognizing it, he was alarmed. At first he made a spurt to get away from it, but finding himself overhauled owing to the good oarsmanship of its crew he had at length to turn and engage the enemy. Being no match for the boarders, who were numerous and all picked men, he fell into the enemy's hands. His ship was, like the other, very well built, and the Romans when they were in possession of her fitted her out too for this special service and so put a stop to all this venturesome blockade-running at Lilybaeum.

48. The besieged were still counterbuilding energetically though they had renounced their effort to spoil or destroy the enemy's works, when there arose a turbulent storm of wind, blowing with
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βίαν καὶ φορὰν εἰς αὐτὰς τὰς τῶν μηχανημάτων προσαγωγὰς ὡστε καὶ τὰς στοὰς διασαλεύειν καὶ τοὺς προκειμένους τοῦτων πύργους τῇ βίᾳ βαστά-
3 ζεω. ἐν δὲ καιρῷ συννοησάντες τινες τῶν Ἑλλη-

νικῶν μισθοφόρων τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα τῆς περιστά-
σεως πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἔργων διαφθορὰν προσφέρουσι
4 τῷ στρατηγῷ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν. τοῦ δὲ δεξαμενοῦ καὶ
tαχέως ἐτομάσαντος πάν τὸ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἀρμό-
ζου, συστραφέντες οἱ νεανίσκοι κατὰ τριττοὺς τὸ-
5 ποὺς ἐνέβαλον πῦρ τοῖς ἔργοις. ὡς δὴ ἄν τῶν μὲν
catatkevusamátov dia tōn chrónov en parákeuau-

σμένov prós to βαθίουs ἐμπρησθῆναι, tῆs dē tou
 consisted of a single page from a book. The text is in Greek and discusses military strategies and actions taken by the Athenians, particularly focusing on the construction and use of fortifications. The passage mentions the use of laborers under the command of a senior officer, who directed them to use fire against these constructions. The text is a historical account likely from the time of the Peloponnesian War. The reference to the construction of fortifications and the use of fire suggests a tactical maneuver during a siege or battlefield scenario. The narrative is vivid and strategic, highlighting the methods and thought processes used by the Greeks in their military operations.
such violence and fury on the actual apparatus for advancing the engines, that it shook the protecting sheds from their foundations and carried away the wooden towers in front of these by its force. During the gale it struck some of the Greek mercenaries that here was an admirable opportunity for destroying the works, and they communicated their notion to the general, who approved it and made all suitable preparations for the enterprise. The soldiers in several bodies threw fire on the works at three separate points. The whole apparatus being old and readily inflammable, and the wind blowing very strongly on the actual towers and engines, the action of the flames as they spread was most effective, whereas the efforts of the Romans to succour and save the works were quite the reverse, the task being most difficult. The defenders were indeed so terrified by the outbreak that they could neither realize nor understand what was happening, but half blinded by the flames and sparks that flew in their faces and by the dense smoke, many of them succumbed and fell, unable even to get near enough to combat the actual conflagration. The difficulties that the enemy encountered for these various reasons were immense, while the exertions of the incendiaries were correspondingly facilitated. Everything that could blind or injure the enemy was blown into flame and pushed at them, missiles and other objects hurled or discharged to wound the rescuers or to destroy the works being easily aimed because the throwers could see in front
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diā τὸ γίνεσθαι σφοδρὰν τὴν πληγήν, συνεργούσης
9 τοῖς βάλλοντι τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος βίας. τὸ δὲ πέρας
τοιαύτην συνεβῆ γενέσθαι τὴν παντελεῖν τῆς κατα-
θθορᾶς ὦστε καὶ τὰς βάσεις τῶν πύργων καὶ τὰ
10 στύπῃ τῶν κριῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ἀχρεωθῆναι. τοῦ-
των δὲ συμβάντων, τὸ μὲν ἐτί διὰ τῶν ἔργων πο-
λιορκείν ἀπέγνωσαν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι. περιταφρεύσαντες
dὲ καὶ κόρακε περιλαβόντες κύκλῳ τὴν πόλιν, ἐτί
dὲ τῆς ἰδίας στρατοπεδείας τείχων προβαλάμενοι, τῷ
11 χρόνῳ παρέδοσαν τὴν πρᾶξιν. οἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ Διο-
βαίῳ τὸ πεπτυκός ἐξοικοδομησάμενοι τείχος εὐθαρ-
σώς ὑπέμενον ἡδὲ τὴν πολιορκίαν.

49 Εἰς δὲ τὴν Ῥώμην προσπεοντῶν τούτων, καὶ
μετὰ ταῦτα πλειόνων ἀναγγελλόντων διόστι συμβαί-
νει τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου πληρωμάτων τὸ πλεῦστον
μέρος ἐν τε τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ τῇ καθόλου πολιορκίᾳ
2 διεθάρθαι, σπουδὴ κατέγραφον ναῦτας, καὶ συνα-
θροίσαντες εἰς μυρίους ἐξέπεμψαν εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν.
3 ὁ δὲ τοῦ πορθμοῦ περαιπεθέντων καὶ πεξῆ παρα-
γενομένων εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον, συναγαγὼν τοὺς
χιλιάρχους ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων Πόπλιος
Κλαύδιος ἐφθασεν καὶ εἶναι πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ Δρέπανα
4 παντὶ τῶν στόλων. τὸν γὰρ στρατηγὸν τῶν Καρχη-
δονίων Ἀτάρβαν τὸν τεταγμένον ἐπὶ αὐτῶν ἀπαρά-
σκευου ἐναι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, ἀγνοοῦντα μὲν τὴν
παροισίαν τῶν πληρωμάτων, πεπεισμένον δὲ μὴ
dύνασθαι πλεῖν τῶν αὐτῶν στόλου διὰ τὴν γεγενημέ-
νην ἐν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ καταφθορὰν τῶν ἀνδρῶν. προ-
5 χείρισι δὲ αὐτῶν συγκατατηθεμένων, εὔθεως ἐνέβι-
βαζε τὰ τε προϊπάρχοντα καὶ τὰ προσφάτως παρα-
γεγονότα πληρωμάτα, τοὺς δὲ ἐπιβάτας ἐκ παντὸς
ἐπέλεξε τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐθελοντὴν τοὺς ἀριστους,
of them, while the blows were most effective as the strong wind gave them additional force. At the end the completeness of the destruction was such that the bases of the towers and the posts that supported the battering-rams were rendered useless by the fire. After this the Romans gave up the attempt to conduct the siege by works, and digging a trench and erecting a stockade all round the city, at the same time building a wall round their own encampment, they left the result to time. But the garrison of Lilybaeum rebuilt the fallen portions of the wall and now confidently awaited the issue of the siege.

49. On the news reaching Rome, and on it being reported from various quarters that the greater part of the crews of their fleet had perished in the works or in the siege operations in general, they set about actively enlisting sailors, and when they had collected about ten thousand dispatched them to Sicily. These reinforcements were ferried over the straits and thence proceeded on foot to the camp, where on their arrival the Roman Consul, Publius Claudius 249 B.C. Pulcher, called a meeting of the Tribunes and told them that now was the time to attack Drepana with the whole fleet. The Carthaginian general Adherbal who commanded there was, he said, unprepared for such a contingency, as he was ignorant of the arrival of the crews, and convinced that their fleet was unable to take the sea owing to the heavy loss of men in the siege. On the Tribunes readily consenting, he at once embarked the former crews and the new arrivals, and chose for marines the best men in the whole army, who readily volunteered as the
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άτε δή τοῦ μὲν πλοῦ σύνεγγυς ὄντος, τῆς δ' ὦφε-
λείας ἐποίμου προφαινομένης. ταῦτα δὲ παρα-
σκευασάμενος ἀνήχθη περὶ μέσας νύκτας, λαθῶν τοὺς
πολεμίους. καὶ τὰς μὲν ἄρχας ἄθροις ἔπλευ, δεξιάν
7 ἔχων τὴν γῆν. ἀμα δὲ τῷ φωτὶ τῶν πρῶτων ἐπὶ
tὰ Δρέπανα νεῶν ἐπιφαινομένων, κατιδών Ἀτάρ-
βας τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐξενίθθη διὰ τὸ παράδοξον.
8 ταχὺ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος, καὶ νοῆσας τὸν ἐπὶ-
πλουν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἐκρινε παντὸς ἔργον πεῖ-
ραν λαμβάνειν καὶ πάν ὑπομένειν χάριν τοῦ μὴ
περιδειν οὕτως εἰς πρόδηλον συγκλεισθέντας πο-
λιορκίαν. διὸπερ εὐθέως τὰ μὲν πληρώματα συν-
10 ἤγει πρὸς τὸν αἰγιαλόν, τοὺς δ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως
μισθοφόρους ἢθοιότε μετὰ κηρύγματος. τῶν δὲ
συλλεχθέντων, ἐπεβάλετο διὰ βραχέων εἰς ἔννοιαν
αὐτοὺς ἄγειν τῆς τε τοῦ νικῶν ἔπλοιδος, εάν τολμή-
σωσι ναυμαχεῖν, καὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ δυσχρη-
11 στίας, ἐὰν καταμελλήσωσι προϊδόμενοι τὸν κίνδυ-
νον. ἐτοίμως δ' αὐτῶν παρομοιότεν τῷ τὴν
ναυμαχίαν, καὶ βοώντων ἄγειν καὶ μὴ μέλλειν,
ἐπανέσας καὶ δεξάμενος τὴν ὀρμὴν παρῆγγειλε κατὰ
12 τάχος ἐμβαίνειν, καὶ βλέποντος πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν
ναῦν ἔπεσθαι ταύτῃ κατὰ πρώμαν. διασαφῆσας
dὲ τὰ προερημένα κατὰ σπουδὴν πρῶτος ἐποίητο
τὸν ἀνάπλουν, ὕπ' αὐτὸς τὰς πέτρας ἐπὶ θάτερα
50 μέρη τοῦ λιμένος ἔξαγων τοῦ τῶν πολεμίων εἰσ-
πλου. Πότιος δ' ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγὸς, θεσ-
ρῶν τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν δόξαν οὐτ'
2 εἰκοντας οὐτε καταπεπληγμένους τὸν ἐπιπλου, ἀλλὰ
πρὸς τῷ ναυμαχεῖν ὄντας, τῶν δὲ σφετέρων νεῶν
τὰς μὲν ἐντὸς ἡδῆ τοῦ λιμένος οὐσας, τὰς δ' ἐν
αὐτῶ τῷ στόματι, τὰς δὲ φερόμενα ἐπὶ τὸν εἴσ-
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voyage was but a short one and the prospect of booty seemed certain. After making these preparations he put to sea about midnight unobserved by the enemy, and at first sailed in close order with the land on his right. At daybreak when the leading ships came into view sailing on Drepana, Adherbal was at first taken by surprise at the unexpected sight, but soon recovering his composure and understanding that the enemy had come to attack, he decided to make every effort and incur every sacrifice rather than expose himself to the certitude of a blockade. He therefore at once collected the crews on the beach and summoned by crier the mercenaries from the city. On all being assembled he tried in a few words to impress on their minds the prospect of victory if they risked a battle, and the hardships of a siege should they delay now that they clearly foresaw the danger. Their spirit for the fight was readily aroused, and on their calling on him to lead them on and not delay, he thanked them, praised their zeal, and then ordered them to get on board at once, and keeping their eyes on his ship, to follow in his wake. Having made these orders quite clear to them he quickly got under weigh and took the lead, making his exit close under the rocks on the opposite side of the harbour from that on which the Romans were entering. 50. Publius, the Roman commander, had expected that the enemy would give way and would be intimidated by his attack, but when he saw that on the contrary they intended to fight him, and that his own fleet was partly inside the harbour, partly at the very mouth, and partly still sailing up to enter,
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3 πλουν, πάσας ἀναστρέφειν παρήγγειλε καὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὸν πλοῦν ἐξ ἐλάνῳ. ἔνθα δὴ τῶν μὲν ἐν τῷ λιμένι, τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὸν εἰσπλοῦν ἐκ τῆς μεταβολῆς συμπιπτούσων, οὐ μόνον θόρυβος ἦν ἐκ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀπλετος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ταρσοὺς ἔθραυσε οὐδὲν αἵ νήσεις ἀλλήλαις συγκρούονται. ὃμως δὲ οὖν ἂεὶ τοὺς ἀνατρέχοντας ἐκτάττοντες οἱ τριήμαρχοι παρ’ αὐτὴν τὴν γῆν ταχέως ἐποίουν ἀντιπρώρρους τοῖς πολεμίοις. ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος αὐτὸς ἐπέπλευε μὲν ἄρχθην κατόπιν ἐπὶ παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ, τότε δὲ ἐπιστρέφας κατ’ αὐτὸν τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος ἔλαβε τὴν εὐώνυμον τῆς ὅλης δυνάμεως τάξιν. Ἀτάρβας δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καρφὸν ὑπέράρα τὸ λαιὸν τῶν πολεμίων [Ῥωμαίων], ἔχων πέντε ναῦς ἐπίπλους, ὑπέστησε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ναῦν ἀντίπρωρρον τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ πέλαγος μέρους. ἀμα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων ἂεὶ τοῖς συνάπτουσι προσεπιταττομένοις ταύτῳ ποιεῖν παραγγείλας διὰ τῶν ὑπηρετῶν, καταστάντων δὲ πάντων εἰς μέτωπον σημήνας διὰ τῶν συνθημάτων, τάς μὲν ἄρχας ἐποιεῖτο τὸν ἐπίπλουν ἐν τάξει, μενόντων πρὸς τῇ γῆ τῶν Ῥωμαίων διὰ τὸ προσδέχεσθαι τὰς ἐκ τοῦ λιμένος ἀνατρεχούσας ναῦς. ἔξι οὖν συνέβαινε μὲ-

γάλα τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐλαττωθήναι πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ γῇ ποιησαμένους τὴν συμπλοκήν. ἐπεὶδὴ δὲ σύνεγγυς 2 αὐτῶν ἤσαι, ἄρθεντων τῶν συνθημάτων ἐφ’ ἐκατέρας τῆς ναυαρχίδος, συνέβαλλον ἄλληλοις. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἰσορροποῦν ἢν ο κύδυνος, ὡς ἂν 3 ἀμφοτέρων τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἐκ τῆς πεζικῆς δυνάμεως ἐπιβάταις χρωμένων. ἂεὶ δὲ μᾶλλον ὑπερείγον οἱ 4 Καρχηδόνιοι διὰ τὸ πολλὰ προτερήματα παρ’ ὅλον ἔχειν τὸν ἀγώνα. τῷ τε γὰρ ταχυναυτεῖν πολὺ

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he gave orders for them all to put about and sail out again. On the ships already in the harbour fouling those which were entering owing to their sudden turn there was not only great confusion among the men but the ships had the blades of their oars broken as they came into collision. The captains, however, bringing the ships as they cleared the harbour into line, soon drew them up close to the shore with their prows to the enemy. Publius himself from the start had been bringing up the rear of the entire fleet, and now veering out to sea without stopping his course, took up a position on the extreme left. At the same time Adherbal, outflanking the enemy’s left with five beaked ships, placed his own ship facing the enemy from the direction of the open sea. As the other ships came up and joined getting into line, he ordered them by his staff officers to place themselves in the same position as his own, and when they all presented a united front he gave the signal to advance that had been agreed upon and at first bore down in line on the Romans, who kept close to the shore awaiting those of their ships that were returning from the harbour. This position close inshore placed them at a great disadvantage in the engagement. 51. When the two fleets approached each other, the signals for battle were raised on both the admirals, and they closed. At first the battle was equally balanced, as the marines in both fleets were the very best men of their land forces; but the Carthaginians gradually began to get the best of it as they had many advantages throughout the whole struggle. They
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περιήγαν διὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῆς ναυπηγίας καὶ τὴν τῶν πληρωμάτων ἔξω, ἢ τε χώρα μεγάλα συνεβάλ-5 λετ' αὐτοῖς, ἢτε πεποιημένων τὴν ἐκταξίαν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸ πέλαγος τόπων. εἰτε γὰρ πιεζοιτῶ τινες ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, κατόπτων ἀνεχόμον ἀσφαλῶς
6 διὰ τὸ ταχυναυτεῖν εἰς τὸν ἀναπεπταμένον τόπον· κάπετ' ἐκ μεταβολῆς τοῖς προσπίπτουσι τῶν διω-κόντων, τοτὲ μὲν περιπλέοντες, τοτὲ δὲ πλάγιοι προσπίπτοντες στρεφομένοι καὶ δυσχρηστοῦσι διὰ τὸ βάρος τῶν πλοίων καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν 7 πληρωμάτων ἐμβολάς τε συνεχείς ἐδίδοσαν καὶ πολλὰ τῶν σκαφῶν ἔβαπτοι. εἰτε κινδυνεύου τις τῶν συμμάχων, ἔτοιμος παρεβοήθουν ἔξω τοῦ δει-νοῦ καὶ μετ' ἀσφαλείας, παρὰ τὰς πρύμνας κατὰ
8 τὸ πέλαγος ποιούμενοι τὸν πλοῦν. τοῖς γε μὴν
Ῥωμαίοις τάναντια τούτων συνέβαινε· τοῖς τε γὰρ πιεζομένοις οὐκ ἦν εἰς τούπισθεν δυνατὸν ἀποχω-ρεῖν, πρὸς τῇ γῇ ποιούμενοι τὸν κίνδυνον, αἰὲ δὲ τὸ θλιβόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν κατὰ πρόσωπον σκάφος ἢ τοῖς βραχέσι περιπίπττον ἐκαθύζε κατὰ πρύμναν ἢ
9 πρὸς τὴν γῆν φερόμενον ἐπώκελλε. διεκπλεῖν μὲν
οὐν διὰ τῶν πολεμίων νεὼν καὶ κατόπιν ἐπιφαίνεθαι τοῖς ἤδη πρὸς ἑτέρους διαμαχομένοις, ὁπερ ἐν τῷ ναυμαχεῖν ἐστὶ πρακτικώτατον, ἀδυνάτως
ἐχον, διά τε τὴν βαρύτητα τῶν πλοίων, προσέτη
10 δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν πληρωμάτων. οὐδὲ μὴν
ἐπιβοθεῖν τοῖς δεομένοις κατὰ πρύμναν ἐδύναντο
diὰ τὸ συγκεκλεῖσθαι πρὸς τῇ γῇ καὶ μὴ δὲ μικρὸν
ἀπολείπεσθαι τόπον τοῖς βουλαμένοις ἐπαρκεῖν τῷ
11 δεομένῳ. τοιαυτῆς δὲ δυσχρησίας ὑπαρχούσης περὶ
much surpassed the Romans in speed, owing to the superior build of their ships and the better training of the rowers, and their position was very favourable to them, as they had freely developed their line in the open sea. For if any ships found themselves hard pressed by the enemy it was easy for them owing to their speed to retreat safely to the open water and from thence, fetching round on the ships that pursued and fell on them, they either got in their rear or attacked them on the flank, and as the enemy then had to turn round and found themselves in difficulty owing to the weight of the hulls and the poor oarsmanship of the crews, they rammed them repeatedly and sunk many. Again if any other of their own ships were in peril they were ready to render assistance with perfect security to themselves, as they were out of immediate danger and could sail in open water past the sterns of their own line. It was, however, just the opposite with the Romans. Those in distress could not retire back-wards, as they were fighting close to the land, and the ships, hard pressed by the enemy in front, either ran on the shallows stern foremost or made for the shore and grounded. To sail on the one hand through the enemy’s line and then appear on the stern of such of his ships as were engaged with others (one of the most effective manoeuvres in naval warfare) was impossible owing to the weight of the vessels and their crews’ lack of skill. Nor again could they give assistance where it was required from astern, as they were hemmed in close to the shore, and there was not even a small space left for those who wished to come to the rescue of their comrades in distress. Such being their difficult
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tὸν ὅλον ἀγώνα, καὶ τῶν μὲν καθιζόντων ἐν τοῖς βραχέσι, τῶν δὲ ἐκπιπτόντων σκαφῶν, κατιθῶν ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων τὸ συμβαίνον, ἀρμῆσε πρὸς φυγήν, ἀπὸ τῶν εὐωνύμων παρὰ τὴν γῆν ἐξελίξας, καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ περὶ τριάκοντα νῆες, αὔτερ
12 ἐτυχὸν ἐγγύς οὖσα. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν σκαφῶν, ὄντων ἐνενήκοντα καὶ τριῶν, ἐκρίευσαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων, ὅσοι μὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰς ναῦς εἰς τὴν γῆν ἐκβαλόντες ἀπεχώρησαν.

52 Γενομένης δὲ τῆς ναυμαχίας τοιαύτης, Ἀτάρβας μὲν εὐδοκίμει παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδόνιοι, ὡς δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἱδίαν πρόνοιαν καὶ τόλμαν κατωρθώ-2 κὼς, Πόπλιος δὲ παρὰ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἦδοξει καὶ διεβέβλητο μεγάλως, ὡς εἰκῇ κάλογοντως τοῖς πράγμασι κεχρημένος, καὶ τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸν οὐ μικροὶς
3 ἐλαττώμασι περιβεβληκώς τὴν Ῥώμην Διὸ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα μεγάλαις ζημίαις καὶ κινδυνοὺς κρίθεις περιέστεσσεν.

4 Οὐ μὴν οἱ γε Ῥωμαίοι, καίπερ τοιούτων συμβεβηκότων, διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων φιλοτιμίαν οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπον τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, ἀλλ’ εἶχοντο τῶν ἐξῆς πραγμάτων. διὸ καὶ συνάψαντος τοῦ κατὰ τὰς ἀρχαίρεσιας χρόνου, στρατηγοῦς ὑπάτους καταστήσαντες παρατήρα τὸν ἔτερον αὐτῶν ἐξέπεμ-5 5πον Λεύκιον Ἰούνιον, τάς τε σιταρχίας παρακομίζοντα τοῖς τὸ Λυκία ιαον πολυρκοῦσι καὶ τάς ἄλλας ἀγoras καὶ χορηγίας τῷ στρατοπέδῳ πρὸς δὲ καὶ παραπομποὺς τούτους ἐπιλήρωσαν ἐξήκοντα ναῦς.

6 ὁ δ’ Ἰούνιος ἀφικόμενος εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην, καὶ προσλαβών τὰ συννητήκοτα τῶν πλοίων ἀπὸ τε τοῦ στρατοπέδου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Σικελίας, παρεκομίσθη κατὰ σπουδὴν εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας, ἐχὼν ἐκατὸν
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position in every part of the battle, and some of the ships grounding on the shallows while others ran ashore, the Roman commander, when he saw what was happening, took to flight, slipping out on the left along shore, accompanied by about thirty of the ships nearest to him. The remainder, ninety-three in number, were captured by the Carthaginians, including their crews, with the exception of those men who ran their ships ashore and made off.

52. The battle having resulted so, Adherbal gained a high reputation at Carthage, the success being regarded as due to his foresight and boldness. Publius, on the contrary, fell into ill repute among the Romans, and there was a great outcry against him for having acted rashly and inconsiderately and done all a single man could to bring a great disaster on Rome. He was accordingly brought to trial afterwards, condemned to a heavy fine, and narrowly escaped with his life.

Yet so determined were the Romans to bring the whole struggle to a successful issue, that, notwithstanding this reverse, they left undone nothing that was in their power, and prepared to continue the campaign. The time for the elections was now at hand, and accordingly when the new Consuls were appointed they dispatched one of them, Lucius Junius Pullus, with corn for the besiegers of Lilybaeum and such other provisions and supplies as the army required, manning sixty ships to act as a convoy to him. Junius, on arriving at Messene and being joined by the ships from Lilybaeum and the rest of Sicily, coasted along with all speed to Syracuse,

\[a\] This is a mistake; L. Junius was one of the consuls of 249 B.C., the colleague of Publius.
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εἴκοσι σκάφη καὶ τὴν ἄγορὰν σχεδὸν ἐν ὅκτακο-7 σίας ναῦνι φορτηγοῖς. ἑνετέθεν δὲ παραδόσει τοῖς
tαμίαις τὰς ἡμισελαῖς φορτηγοὺς καὶ τινὰ τῶν μα-
κρῶν πλοίων ἐξαπέστειλε, διακομισθῆναι σπουδά-
8 ξων τῷ στρατόπεδῳ τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν. αὐτὸς
dὲ ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις ὑπέμενε, τοὺς τε κατὰ
πλοῖν ἀφυστεροῦντας ἐκ τῆς Μεσσήνης ἀναδεχό-
μενος καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς μεσογαίου συμμάχων
σῖτον προσαναλαμβάνων.
53 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καυροὺς Ἀτάρβας μὲν ἄν-
δρας τοὺς ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ ληφθέντας καὶ τὰς αἴ-
χαλωτὰς νῆσας ἐξαπέστειλεν εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα,
2 Καρθάλωνα δὲ τὸν συνάρχοντα δοὺς τριάκοντα ναῦς
ἐξέστησεν πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐκὼν αὐτὸς ἐβδομήκοντα κατ-
3 ἐπλευσε, προστάξας ἄφνω προσπεσόντα ταῖς ὀρμού-
σαις παρὰ τὸ Διλύβαιον τῶν πολεμίων ναύσιν, ἀν
μὲν ἀν δυνατὸς ἡ κυριεύει, ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς πῦρ
4 ἐμβαλεῖν. πεισθέντος δὲ τοῦ Καρθάλωνος καὶ
ποιησαμένου τὸν ἐπίπλουν ὑπὸ τὴν ἐωθινῆν, καὶ τὰ
μὲν ἐμπυρώντος τῶν πλοίων, μεγάλην συνέπεσε γενέσθαι ταραχὴν περὶ τὸ τῶν
5 Ῥωμαίων στρατόπεδον. προσβοηθοῦντων γὰρ αὐ-
tῶν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ γνωμένης κραυγῆς, συν-
νοήσας Ἰμίλκων ὁ τῷ Διλύβαιον τηρῶν, καὶ θεωρῶν
ηδὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ὑποφανούσης τὸ συμβαίνον, ἐτ-
8 ἀποστέλλει τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως μισθοφόρους. οἱ δὲ
Ῥωμαῖοι, τοῦ δεινοῦ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς περιστάν-
τος, οὐκ εἰς μικρὰν οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἥλθον
7 διατροπὴν. ὁ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναύαρχος, ὀλίγα
tῶν σκαφῶν τὰ μὲν ἀποσπάσας, τὰ δὲ συντρίψας,
μετὰ ταῦτα μικρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ Διλύβαιον παρακομι-
σθεῖς ὥς ἐφ’ Ἡρακλείας ἔτηρει, βουλόμενος διακω-
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having now a hundred and twenty ships and the supplies in about eight hundred transports. There he entrusted half the transports and a few of the war-ships to the Quaestors and sent them on, as he was anxious to have what the troops required conveyed to them at once. He himself remained in Syracuse waiting for the ships that were left behind on the voyage from Messene and procuring additional supplies and corn from the allies in the interior.

53. At about the same time Adherbal sent the prisoners from the naval battle and the captured ships to Carthage, and giving Carthalo his colleague thirty vessels in addition to the seventy with which he had arrived, dispatched him with orders to make a sudden descent on the enemy's ships that were moored near Lilybaeum, capture all he could and set fire to the rest. When Carthalo acting on these orders made the attack at dawn and began to burn some of the ships and carry off others, there was a great commotion in the Roman camp. For as they rushed to rescue the ships with loud cries, Himilco, the commander of the garrison, heard them, and as day was just beginning to break, he saw what was happening, and sent out the mercenaries from the town to attack the Romans also. The Romans were now in danger from all sides and in no little or ordinary distress. The Carthaginian admiral, having made off with a few ships and broken up others, shortly afterwards left Lilybaeum, and after coasting along for some distance in the direction of Heraclea remained on the watch, as his design was to intercept
8 λύειν τοὺς ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον πλέοντας. προσαγ- γειλάντων δὲ τῶν σκοπῶν πλήθος ἤκανον πλοίων προσφέρεσθαι παντοδαπῶν καὶ συνεγγίζειν, ἀν- αχθεὶς ἔπλευ, συμμίξας σπεῦδων διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν τῶν 'Ῥωμαίων ἐκ τοῦ προγεγενημένου προτερήμα- τος. ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν Συρακοῦσῶν προ- απεσταλμένοις ταμίαις ἀνήγγειλαν οἱ προπλεύν ἐι-
10 θισμένοι λέμβοι τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν ὑπεναντίων. οἱ δὲ νομίζοντες οὐκ ἄξιοχρεωσ εἶναι αὐτοὺς πρὸς ναυμαχίαν, καθωρμισθηκόν πρὸς τι πολισμάτων τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτούς ταττομένων, ἀλμενόν μὲν, σάλους δ’ ἔχουν καὶ προβολάς περικλειόοσ ἐκ τῆς γῆς.
11 εὐφυεῖς. οὐ ποιησάμενοι τὴν ἀπόβασιν, καὶ τοὺς τε καταπέλτας καὶ τοὺς πετροβόλους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστήσαντες, προσεδόκη τῶν ἐπίπλουν
12 τῶν ὑπεναντίων. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνοι συνεγγίζαν-
tες τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεβάλοντο πολιορκεῖν τούτοις, ὑπολαβόντες τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας καταπλαγέντας εἰς τὸ πολισμάτων ἀποχωρήσειν, τῶν δὲ πλοίων ἀσφαλῶς
13 κυριεύσεω. οὐ προχωρούσης δὲ τῆς ἐλπίδος, ἀλλὰ τούναντιν ἀμυνομένων γενναίως, καὶ τοῦ τόπου πολλάς ἔχοντος καὶ παντοδαπᾶς δυσχρησίας, ὁλίγα τῶν τὰς ἀγορὰς ἐχόντων πλοίων ἀποσπάσσατε ἀπ’ ἐπελευσαν πρὸς τινα ποταμόν, ἐν δὲ καθορμισθέντες ἐπετρήσαν τὸν ἀνάπλουν αὐτῶν.

54 Ο’δ’ ἐν ταῖς Συρακοῦσαις ὑπολειφθεῖς στρατη-
γόσ, ἔπει τὰ κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν ἐπετέλεσε, κάμψας τοῦν Πάχυνον ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοίων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ Διλύ-
βαιον, οὔδὲν εἰδός τῶν περὶ τοὺς προπλεύντας συμ-
2 βεβηκότων. ο’ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναύαρχος, ση-
the ships that were on their way to join the army. When his look-out men reported that a considerable number of ships of every variety were approaching and at no great distance, he got under weigh and sailed towards them eager to engage them, as after the recent success he had great contempt for the Romans. The approach of the enemy was also announced by the light boats that usually sail in front of a fleet to the Quaestors who had been sent on in advance from Syracuse. Considering themselves not strong enough to accept a battle, they anchored off a certain small fortified town subject to the Romans, which had indeed no harbour, but a roadstead shut in by headlands projecting from the land in a manner that made it a more or less secure anchorage. Here they disembarked, and setting up the catapults and mangonels procured from the fortress, awaited the enemy’s attack. The Carthaginians on their approach at first thought of besieging them, supposing that the crews would be afraid and retreat to the city, and that they would then easily possess themselves of the ships; but when their hopes were not realized, the enemy on the contrary making a gallant defence, and the situation of the place presenting many difficulties of every kind, they carried off a few of the ships laden with provisions and sailed away to a certain river where they anchored, and waited for the Romans to put out to sea again.

54. The Consul, who had remained in Syracuse, when he had concluded his business there, rounded Cape Pachynus and sailed in the direction of Lilybaeum in entire ignorance of what had befallen the advance force. The Carthaginian admiral, when his
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μηνάντων τῶν σκοπῶν αὐτῷ πάλιν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἀναχθεῖς ἔπλει μετὰ σπουδῆς, βουλόμενος αὐτοῖς ὡς πλείστον ἀπέχουσι τῶν οἷ-

3 κεῖνῳ νεῶν συμβάλειν. ὁ δὲ Ἰούνιος κατιδών ἐκ πολλοῦ τῶν στόλων τῶν τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σκαφῶν, οὐτε συμβαλεῖν τολμῶν οὔτ' ἐκφυγεῖν ἐτί δυνάτος ἦν διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐγκλίνας εἰς τόπους τραχεῖς καὶ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐπισφαλεῖς καθωρμίσθη, κρίνων αἱ-

4 ρετύτερον ὑπάρχειν ὃ τι δέοι παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς πολεμίοις αὐτανδρόν τὸ σφέτερον στρατόπεδον ὑπο-

5 χείριν ποιῆσαι. συνιδῶν δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τούτου γεγονός οὗ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναυάρχως, τὸ μὲν παρα-

βάλλοθαι καὶ προσάγειν τοιούτως τόπους ἀπεδο-

κίμασε, λαβὼν δὲ ἀκραν τινα καὶ προσορμισθεὶς ταύτῃ, μεταξὺ τῶν στόλων ἐτήρει καὶ προσεῖχε τὸν

8 νοῦν ἀμφοτέροις. ἐπιγενομένου δὲ χειμῶνος καὶ περιστάσεως προφανομένης ἐκ τοῦ πελάγους ὀλ-

σχεστέρας, οἱ μὲν τῶν Καρχηδονίων κυβερνήται διὰ τε τὴν τῶν τόπων καὶ τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἐμ-

πειράς προορώμενοι τὸ μέλλον καὶ προλέγοντες τὸ συμβοηθόμενον, ἐπεισαν τὸν Καρθάλωνα φυ-

γεῖν τὸν χειμῶνα καὶ κάμψαι τὴν ἄκραν τοῦ Πα-

7 χύνον. πευτθέντος δὲ νουνεχῶς, οὐτοὶ μὲν πολλὰ μοχθόσαντες καὶ μόλις ὑπεράντας τὴν ἄκραν ἐν

8 ἀσφαλεῖ καθωρμίσθησαν, οἰ δὲ τῶν Ἡρωμάιων στο-

λοι, τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐπιγενομένου καὶ τῶν τόπων εἰς τέλος ὑπαρχόντων ἀλμενών, οὕτως διεφθάρθησαν ὡς τοῦ τῶν ναυαγίων μηδὲ γενέσθαι χρήσιμον, ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρους αὐτοὺς ἄρθην καὶ παραλόγως ἀχρεωθῆναι.

55 Τούτου δὲ συμβάντος, τά μὲν τῶν Καρχηδο-

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look-outs again reported that the enemy were in sight, put to sea and sailed with all haste, as he wished to engage them at as great a distance as possible from their own ships. Junius had sighted the Carthaginian fleet for some time, and noticed the number of their ships, but he neither dared to engage them nor could he now escape them, as they were so near. He therefore diverted his course to a rugged and in every way perilous part of the coast and anchored there, thinking that, no matter what happened to him, it would be preferable to his whole force of ships and men falling into the hands of the enemy. The Carthaginian admiral, on seeing what Junius had done, decided not to incur the risk of approaching such a dangerous shore, but, gaining a certain cape and anchoring off it, remained on the alert between the two fleets, keeping his eye on both. When the weather now became stormy, and they were threatened with a heavy gale from the open sea, the Carthaginian captains who were acquainted with the locality and with the weather signs, and foresaw and prophesied what was about to happen, persuaded Carthalo to escape the tempest by rounding Cape Pachynus. He very wisely consented, and with great labour they just managed to get round the cape and anchor in a safe position. But the two Roman fleets, caught by the tempest, and the coast affording no shelter at all, were so completely destroyed that not even the wrecks were good for anything. In this unlooked for manner, then, the Romans had both their fleets annihilated.

55. Owing to this occurrence the hopes of the
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νίων αὖθις ἀνέκυψε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιρρεπεστέρας εἶχε 2 τὰς ἑλπίδας, οἱ δὲ Ὁρμαῖοι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ πο-
σὸν ἠτυχηκότες, τότε δὲ ὀλοσκερῶς, ἕκ μὲν τῆς θα-
λάττης ἐξέβησαν, τῶν δὲ ὑπαίθρων ἐπεκράτουν.
Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τῆς μὲν θαλάττης ἐκυρίευον, τῆς δὲ 3 γῆς οὐχ ὅλως ἀπῆλπιζον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάντες ἔπὶ μὲν τοῖς ὅλως ἐσχετλίζον, οὐ δὲ ἐν τῇ Ὁρμῇ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ Λυκῆβαυνον στρατόπεδα, διὰ τὰ προ-
4 ειρημένα συμπτώματα. τῆς γε μὴν προθέσεως οὐκ ἀφίσταντο τῆς κατὰ τὴν πολυρκίαν, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἔχοντά γε καὶ γῆν ἀπροβασίστως, οἱ δὲ προσ-
5 εκαρτέρουσα τάυτη κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. ὁ δὲ Ἰουνίους, ἀνακομισθεὶς ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐκ τῆς ναυαγίας καὶ περιπάθης ὡς, ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸ καινοτομήσαι τι καὶ πράξει τῶν δεόντων, σπουδάζων ἀναιρεθέ-
6 σασθαι τὴν γεγενημένην περιπέτειαν. διὸ καὶ βρα-
χείας αὐτῷ παραπεσοῦσας ἀφορμῆς, καταλαμβάνειν πραξικοπήσας τὸν Ὁρυκα, καὶ γίνεται τοῦ τε τῆς 7 Ἀφροδίτης ἔροι καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐγκρατῆς. ὁ δὲ Ἡρῦξ ἔστι μὲν ὅρος παρὰ θάλατταν τῆς Σικελίας ἐν τῇ παρὰ τῆς Ἰταλίαν κειμένη πλευρά μετάξυ Δρεπάνων καὶ Πανόρμου, μᾶλλον δὲ ὅμορον καὶ συνάπτων πρὸς τὰ Δρέπανα, μεγέθει δὲ παρὰ πολὺ διαφέρον τῶν κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ὅρον πλῆν τῆς 8 Αἰτνης. τούτου δὲ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς μὲν τῆς κορυφῆς, οὔ-
σης ἐπιπέδου, κεῖται τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης τῆς Ἡρυ-
κινῆς ἔρον, διὸ ὅμολογουμένως ἐπιφανεστατόν ἐστὶ τῷ τε πλούτῳ καὶ τῇ λοιπῇ προστασίᾳ τῶν κατὰ 9 τῆν Σικελίαν ἔρων. ὃς δὲ πόλις ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς κο-
ρυφῆς τέταται, πάνω μακρὰν ἔχουσα καὶ προσάντη 10 πανταχόθεν τῆς ἀνάβασιν. ἔπὶ τε δὴ τῆς κορυφῆς ἐπιστήσας φυλακὴν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ Δρεπάνων.
BOOK I

Carthaginians rose again, and it seemed to them that the fortune of war was inclining in their favour, while the Romans, on the contrary, who had been previously to a certain extent unlucky but never had met with so complete a disaster, relinquished the sea, while continuing to maintain their hold on the country. The Carthaginians were now masters of the sea and were not hopeless of regaining their position on land. Subsequently, though all, both at Rome and in the army at Lilybaeum, continued to lament their whole situation after these recent defeats, yet they did not abandon their purpose of pursuing the siege, the government not hesitating to send supplies over land, and the besiegers keeping up the investment as strictly as they could. Junius, returning to the army after the shipwreck in a state of great affliction, set himself to devise some novel and original step that would be of service, being most anxious to make good the loss inflicted by the disaster. Therefore on some slight pretext offering itself, he surprised and occupied Eryx, possessing himself both of the temple of Venus and of the town. Eryx is a mountain near the sea on that side of Sicily which looks towards Italy. It is situated between Drepana and Panormus, or rather it is adjacent to Drepana, on the borders, and is much the biggest mountain in Sicily after Etna. On its summit, which is flat, stands the temple of Venus Erycina, which is indisputably the first in wealth and general magnificence of all the Sicilian holy places. The city extends along the hill under the actual summit, the ascent to it being very long and steep on all sides. He garrisoned the summit and also the approach from Drepana, and

\[\text{This is not a fact.}\]
nων πρόσβασιν, ἐτήρει φιλοτίμως ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς τόπους, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τὸν τῆς ἀναβολῆς, πεπεισμένος οὔτως καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀσφαλῶς καὶ τὸ σύμπαν ὀρὸς ψ' αὐτὸν ἔξειν.

56 Ὄδε Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ ταῦτα στρατηγὸν καταστήσαντες αὐτῶν Ἄμιλκαν τὸν Βάρκαν ἐπικαλοῦν· μεν, τούτῳ τα κατὰ τὸν στόλον ἐνεχείρησαν· δὲ παραλαβὼν τὰς ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις ὃρμησε πορθήσων τὴν Ἰταλίαν. ἔτος δ' ἦν ὄκτωκαθάδεκατον τῶν πολέμων. κατασύρας δὲ τὴν Δοκρίδα καὶ τὴν Βρεττιανὴν χώραν, ἀποπλέον ἐνετεύθεν κατῆρε παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ πρὸς τὴν Πανόρμητα, καὶ καταλαμβάνει τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἐιρκτῆς λεγόμενον τόπον, δὲ κεῖται μὲν Ἐρυκος καὶ Πανόρμου μεταξὺ πρὸς θαλάσση, πολὺ δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ δοκεί διαφέρειν τῶπων ἐπιτηδεύοντης πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν στρατηγικῶν καὶ χρονιῶν.

4 ἔστι γὰρ ὅρος περίτομον ἐξανεστηκός εἰς τῆς περικεμένης χώρας εἰς ὑψος Ικανόν. τούτου δ' ἡ περίμετρος τῆς ἀνω στεφάνης οὐ λείπει τῶν ἐκατόν σταδίων, ύφ' ἦς ὁ περιεχόμενος τόπος εὐμορπός ὑπάρχει καὶ γεωργήσιμος, πρὸς μὲν τὰς πελαγίους πνοιὰς εὐφυῶς κείμενος, θανασίμως δὲ θηρίων εἰς τέλος ἀμοιρον. περιέχεται δὲ κρημνοῖς ἀπροσίτους ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ βαλατταν μέρους καὶ τοῦ πάρα τὴν μεσόγαιαν παρῆκοντος, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων ἐστὶν ὀλίγης καὶ βραχείας δεόμενα κατασκευὴς. ἔχει δ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ μαστός, δὲ ἀμα μὲν ἀκρόπολες, ἀμα δὲ σκοπῆς εὐφυῶς λαμβάνει τὰς κατὰ τῆς υποκειμένης χώρας. κρατεῖ δὲ καὶ λιμένος εὐκαίρου πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ Δρεπάνων καὶ Λυκυβαίου δρόμον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ἐν ὧν πλῆθος ύδατος ἀφθόνον ὑπάρχει. προσόδους δὲ τὰς πάσας ἔχει τριττὰς δυσχερεῖς,
jealously guarded both these positions, especially the latter, in the conviction that by this means he would securely hold the city and the whole mountain.

56. The Carthaginians shortly afterwards appointed 247 B.C. Hamilcar surnamed Barcas to the command and entrusted naval operations to him. He started with the fleet to ravage the Italian coast (this, I should say, was in the eighteenth year of the war) and after laying waste Locris and Bruttium quitted those parts and descended with his whole fleet on the territory of Panormus. Here he seized on a place called Hercte lying near the sea between Eryx and Panormus, and thought to possess peculiar advantages for the safe and prolonged stay of an army. It is an abrupt hill rising to a considerable height from the surrounding flat country. The circumference of its brow is not less than a hundred stades and the plateau within affords good pasturage and is suitable for cultivation, being also favourably exposed to the sea-breeze and quite free of animals dangerous to life. On the side looking to the sea and on that which faces the interior of the island, this plateau is surrounded by inaccessible cliffs, while the parts between require only a little slight strengthening. There is also a knoll on it which serves for an acropolis as well as for an excellent post of observation over the country at the foot of the hill. Besides this Hercte commands a harbour very well situated for ships making the voyage from Drepana and Lilybaeum to Italy to put in at, and with an abundant supply of water.\footnote{Now Monte Pellegrino.} The hill has only three approaches,\footnote{This cannot be the harbour of Palermo, which was in the hands of the Romans, and must be looked for on the opposite side of Monte Pellegrino.}
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dύο μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας, μίαν δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης.
9 ἐν ὧν καταστρατοπεδεύσας παραβόλως Ἄμιλκας, ὃς ἂν μὴτε πόλεως οἰκείας μὴτ ἄλλης ἐλπίδος μηδεμᾶς ἀντέχόμενος, εἰς μέσους δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους ἔαυτον δεδωκὼς, ὃμως οὗ μικρὸς οὐδὲ τοὺς τυχόντας Ἄρωμαίων ἁγώνας καὶ κινδύνους παρεσκέυασε.
10 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐντεύθεν ὄρμωμενος κατὰ τάλατταν τὴν παραλίαν τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐπορθεὶ μέχρι τῆς
11 Κυμαίων χώρας, δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ γῆν παραστρατοπεδευσάντων αὐτῶν Ἄρωμαίων πρὸ τῆς Πανομίτων πόλεως ἐν ίσως πέντε σταδίους, πολλοὺς καὶ ποικίλους ἁγώνας συνεστήσατο κατὰ γῆν σχεδὸν ἐπὶ τρεῖς ἔναισεφοις. περὶ δὲν οὐχ οἶμαι τε διὰ τῆς γρα-
57 φῆς τὸν κατὰ μέρος ἀποδοθεῖ σύνον καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν διαφερόντων πυκτῶν καὶ ταῖς γενναιό-
tησι καὶ ταῖς εὐεξίαις, ὅταν εἰς τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στεφάνου συγκαταστάντες καιρὸν διαμάχωνται πληγὴν ἐπὶ πληγῇ τιθέντες ἀδιαπαύστως, λόγον μὲν ἡ προνοιαν ἔχειν ὑπὲρ ἐκάστης ἐπιβολῆς καὶ πλη-
γῆς οὔτε τοῖς ἁγωνιζομένοις οὔτε τοῖς θεωμένοις
2 ἐστὶ δυνατόν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς καθολού τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐνερ-
γείας καὶ τῆς ἐκατέρου φιλοτιμίας ἐστὶ καὶ τῆς ἐμ-
πειρίας αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐυφυχίας, ἐκαίνην ἐννοιαν λαβεῖν, οὐτώς δὲ καὶ περὶ
3 τῶν νῦν λεγομένων στρατηγῶν. τὰς μὲν γὰρ αἰ-
tίας ἢ τοὺς τρόπους, δι᾽ ἃν ἄν ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἐποιούντο κατ᾽ ἄλληλων ἐνέδρας, ἀντενέδρας, ἐπι-
θέσεις, προσβολάς, οὕτ᾽ ἂν ὁ γράφων ἐξαρθμοῦ-
μενος ἐφίκουτο, τοῖς τ᾽ ἀκούοσιν ἀπέραντος ἀμα ᾧ ἀνωφελῆς ἂν ἐκ τῆς ἀναγνώσεσις γίνοιτο χρεία.
4 ἐκ δὲ τῆς καθολικῆς ἀποφάσεως περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ
tέλους τῆς φιλοτιμίας μάλλον ἂν τὸς οἰς ἐννοιαν ἐξη-

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all difficult, two on the land side and one from the sea. Here Hamilcar established his quarters, at great risk indeed, since he had neither the support of any of their own towns nor any prospect of support from elsewhere, but had thrown himself into the midst of the enemy. Notwithstanding this, the peril to which he put the Romans, and the combats to which he forced them, were by no means slight or insignificant. For in the first place he would sally out with his fleet from this place, and devastate the coast of Italy as far as Cyme, and next, after the Romans had taken up a position on land in front of the city of Panormus and at a distance of about five stades from his own camp, he harassed them by delivering during almost three years constant and variously contrived attacks by land. These combats I am unable to describe in detail here. 57. For as in a boxing-match when two champions, both distinguished for pluck and both in perfect training, meet in the decisive contest for the prize, continually delivering blow for blow, neither the combatants themselves nor the spectators can note or anticipate every attack or every blow, but it is possible, from the general action of each, and the determination that each displays, to get a fair idea of their respective skill, strength, and courage, so it was with these two generals. The causes or the modes of their daily ambuscades, counter-ambuscades, attempts, and assaults were so numerous that no writer could properly describe them, while at the same time the narrative would be most tedious as well as unprofitable to the reader. It is rather by a general pronouncement about the two men and the result of their rival efforts that a notion of the facts
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5 θεί τῶν προειρημένων. οὕτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἱστορίας
στρατηγικάτων οὕτε τῶν ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ καὶ τῆς
ὑποκειμένης περιστάσεως ἐπινοημάτων οὕτε τῶν εἰς
παράβολον καὶ βίαιον ἀνιχνόντων τόλμαν οὐδὲν παρ-
6 ελείφθη. κρίσιν γε μὴν ὅλοσχερὴ γενέσθαι διὰ πλεί-
ους αὐτίκας οὐχ ὄλον τ’ ἦν· αἱ τε γὰρ δυνάμεις ἀμ-
φοτέρων ἦσαν ἑφαμμένοι, τὰ τε κατὰ τοὺς χάρακας
ὀμοίως ἀπρόστατα διὰ τὴν ὀχυρώστητα, τὸ τε διάστημα
7 τῶν στρατοπέδων βραχὺ παντελῶς. ὅπερ αὐτίκοι ἦν
μάλιστα τοῦ τᾶς μὲν κατὰ μέρος συμπτώσεις ἀπαύ-
στους γίνεσθαι καθ’ ἤμεραν, ὅλοσχερές δὲ συν-
8 τελείωσθαι μηδὲν. τούτους γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ συνέβαινε
διαφθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὰς συμπλοκὰς, τοὺς ἐν χειρῶν
νόμῳ περιπετέσθαι· οἱ δ’ ἀπαξ ἑγκλίναντες εὐθέως
ἐκτὸς τοῦ δευτοῦ πάντας ἦσαν ὑπὸ ταῖς αὐτῶν
ἀσφαλείαις, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἐκκυνήθησαν.

58 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἢσπερ ἀγαθὸς βραβευτὴς ἢ τίχη
μεταβιβάσασα παραβόλως αὐτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ προερη-
μένου τόπου καὶ τοῦ προϋπάρχοντος ἀθλήματος εἰς
παραβολῶτερον ἀγώνισμα καὶ τόπον ἑλάττω συν-
2 ἐκλεισεν. ὁ γὰρ Ἀμίλκας, τῶν Ῥωμαίων τῶν Ἑρυκα
τηροῦντων ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς κορυφῆς καὶ παρὰ τὴν βίζαν,
καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κατελάβετο τῇ πόλιν τῶν Ἑρυ-
κίνων, ἢτοι ἢν μεταξὺ τῆς τε κορυφῆς καὶ τῶν πρός
3 τῇ βίζῃ στρατοπεδευσάντων. ἐξ οὐ συνεβαίνει παρα-
βόλως μὲν ὑπομένει καὶ διακύνδυνεν τοὺς πολιορ-
κομένους τοὺς τῆς κορυφῆς κατέχοντας τῶν Ῥω-
μαίων, ἀπίστως δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀντέχειν, τῶν
τε πολεμίων πανταχόθεν προσκειμένων καὶ τῶν χο-
ρημῶν οὐ ῥᾴδιως αὐτοῖς παρακομιζομένων, ὡς ἂν
τῆς θαλάττης καθ’ ἑνα τόπου καὶ μίν πρόσοδον
ἀντεχομένους. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐνταῦθα πάσας
can be conveyed. Nothing was neglected; neither traditional tactics nor plans suggested by the occasion and by actual pressure of circumstances, nor those strokes which depend on a bold and strong initiative. Yet there were several reasons why no decisive success could be obtained. For the forces on each side were evenly matched; their trenches were so strong as to be equally unapproachable, and they were at a quite small distance from each other, this being the chief reason why there were daily conflicts at certain points, but no decisive engagement. The losses in these combats consisted only of those who fell in the hand-to-hand fighting, while the side which once gave way used to get out of danger at once behind their defences, from whence they would issue again and resume the fight.

58. But Fortune, however, like a good umpire, unexpectedly shifted the scene and changed the nature of the contest, confining both in a narrower field, where the struggle grew even more desperate. The Romans, as I said, had garrisons at Eryx on the summit of the mountain and at the foot. Hamilcar now seized the town which lies between the summit and the spot at the foot where the garrison was. The consequence of this was that the Romans on the summit—a thing they had never expected—remained besieged and in considerable peril, and that the Carthaginians, though it is scarcely credible, maintained their position though the enemy were pressing on them from all sides and the conveyance of supplies was not easy, as they only held one place on the sea and one single road connecting with it. However, here again both sides employed
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4 μὲν ἀμφότεροι ταῖς πολυρκητικαῖς ἐπινοίαις καὶ βί- 
αις χρησάμενοι κατ’ ἄλληλων, πάν Ἔγερος ἔννειας ἀνασχόμενοι, πάσης δ’ ἐπιθέσεως καὶ máχης πείραν 
5 λαβόντες, τέλος οὖχ, ὡς Φάβιος φησίν, ἐξαδυνα- 
toúntes καὶ περικακοῦντες, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἂν ἀπαθεῖς 
καήττητοι τινες ἄνδρες, ἵερον ἐποίησαν τὸν οτέφα- 
nov. πρότερον γὰρ ἢ ’κείνους ἄλληλων ἐπικρατή- 
σαι, καίπερ δυ” ἐτη πάλιν ἐν τούτω τῷ τόπῳ δι- 
ἀγωνισμένους, δι’ ἄλλου τρόπου συνήθη λαβεῖν τὸν 
pόλεμον τὴν κρίσιν.

7 Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Ἕρωκα καὶ τὰς πεζικας 
δυνάμεις τουαίνην ἔσχε διάθεσιν. τὰ δὲ πολιτεύ- 
ματ’ ἢ ἀμφότερων παραπλήσια τοῖς ψυχομαχοῦσι 
8 τῶν εὐγενῶν ὀργίδων. ἐκεῖνοι τε γὰρ πολλάκις 
ἀπολωλεκότες τὰς πτέρυγας διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν, 
αὐτὴ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ μένοντες ἐκβάλλουσι τὰς πληγὰς, 
ἐσω ἂν αὐτομάτως ποτὲ περιπεσόντες αὐτοῖς και- 
ρίσις ἄλληλων διαδράξωνται, κάπετα τούτου γενο- 
μένου συμβῆ τὸν ἐτερον αὐτῶν προπεσεῖν· οἱ τε 
Ῥωμαίοι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι κάμνοντες ἤδη τοῖς πό- 
νοις διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν κυνδύνων εἰς τέλος 
ἀπῆλγουν, τὴν τε δύναμιν παρελέυντο καὶ παρεῖντο 
59 διὰ τὰς πολυχρονίους εἰσφορὰς καὶ δαπάνας. ὅμως 
δὲ Ῥωμαίοι ψυχομαχοῦντες, καίπερ ἢτη σχεδον ἢδη 
πέντε τῶν κατὰ θάλαταν πραγμάτων ὀλοσχέρως 
ἀφεστήκες διὰ τὰς περιπετείας καὶ διὰ τὸ πε- 
πείθειν δι’ αὐτῶν τῶν πεζικῶν δυνάμεων κρυνεῖν 
2 τὸν πόλεμον, τότε συνορῶντες οὐ προχωροῦν αὐτοῖς 
tοῦργον κατὰ τοὺς ἐκλογισμοὺς καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν 
τόλμαν τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἣγεμόνος, ἔκρυναν τὸ 
τρίτον ἀντιποίησασθαι τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυτικαῖς δυνά- 
3 μεσῳ ἐλπίδων, ὑπολαμβάνοντες διὰ τῆς ἐπινοιας 
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every device and effort that the siege demanded: both endured every kind of privation and both essayed every means of attack and every variety of action. At length not, as Fabius Pictor says, owing to their exhaustion and sufferings, but like two uninjured and invincible champions, they left the contest drawn. For before either could get the better of the other, though the struggle in this place lasted for another two years, the war had been decided by other means.

Such then was the condition of affairs at Eryx and as far as regarded the land forces. We may compare the spirit displayed by both states to that of game cocks engaged in a death-struggle. For we often see that when these birds have lost the use of their wings from exhaustion, their courage remains as high as ever and they continue to strike blow upon blow, until closing involuntarily they get a deadly hold of each other, and as soon as this happens one or other of the two will soon fall dead. 59. So the Romans and Carthaginians, worn out by their exertions owing to the continual fighting, at length began to be apathetic, their strength paralysed and their resources exhausted by protracted taxation and expense. But, in spite of all, the Romans, as if fighting for their lives, although they had for nearly five years utterly withdrawn from the sea owing to their disasters and their belief that they would be able to decide the war by the aid of their land forces alone, now, when they saw that chiefly owing to the bold action of the Carthaginian general they were not making the progress on which they had reckoned, decided again for the third time to court the prospect of success at sea. They thought that this course, if they could
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taútēs, εἰ καἰρίως ἄφαντο τῆς ἔπιβολῆς, μόνως ἀν
οὔτως πέρας ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ πολέμῳ συμφέρον. ὃ
καὶ τέλος ἐποίησαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον ἐξεχώρη-
σαν τῆς θαλάττης εἴσαντες τοῖς ἐκ τῆς τύχης συμ-
πτώμασι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐλαττωθέντες τῇ περὶ τὰ
5 Δρέπανα ναυμαχία. τότε δὲ τρίτην ἐποιήσατο ταύ-
την τὴν ἐπιβολήν, δι' ἰδία νικήσαντες καὶ τὰ περὶ
tὸν Ἐρυκα στρατόπεδα τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀποκλεί-
sαντες τῆς κατὰ θαλάτταν χορηγίας τέλος ἐπέθηκαν
6 τοῖς διοισ. ἢν δὲ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τὸ πλείων ψυχο-
μαχία. χορηγία μὲν γὰρ συν ὑπήρχε πρὸς τὴν πρό-
θεσιν ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν
προστώτων ἀνδρῶν εἰς τὰ κοινὰ φιλοτιμίην καὶ
7 γενναιότητα προσευρέθη πρὸς τὴν συντελείαν. κατὰ
γὰρ τὰς τῶν βίων εὐκαιρίας καθ' ἕνα καὶ δύο καὶ
τρεῖς ὑφίσταντο παρέξεν πεντήρη κατηρτισμένων,
ἤφ' ὅ τὴν δαπάνην κοιμοῦνται, κατὰ λόγον τῶν
8 πραγμάτων προχωρησάντων. τῷ δὲ τουούτῳ τρόπῳ
tαχέως ἐτοιμασθέντων διακοσίων πλοίων πεντηρι-
kών, ὅν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ναυπηγίαν πρὸς [παρά-
δειγμα] τὴν τοῦ Ῥοδίου ναϊν, μετὰ ταύτα στρατη-
γὸν καταστήσαντες Γάιον Λυτάτιον ἔξεπεμψαν ἄρ-
9 χομένης τῆς θερείας. ὅσ καὶ παραδόξος ἐπιφανεῖς
toῖς κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν τόποις τὸν τε περὶ τὰ Δρέ-
pανα λιμένα κατέσχε καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὸ Διλύβαιον
όμοιος, παντὸς ἀνακεχωρηκότος εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν τοῦ
10 τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναυτικοῖ. συντηρόμενος δὲ περὶ
τὴν ἐν τοῖς Δρέπανοις πόλιν ἔργα καὶ τάλλα πρὸς
11 τὴν πολιορκίαν παρασκευάσαμεν, ἀμα μὲν ταύτη
προσεκαρτέρει τὰ δυνατὰ πολῶν, ἀμα δὲ προορώ-
μενος τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ Καρχηδονίων στόλου, καὶ
μνημονεύων τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς προθέσεως ὅτι μόνως
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but strike a deadly blow, was the only way of bringing the war to a favourable conclusion. And this they finally accomplished. It was yielding to the blows of Fortune that they had retired from the sea on the first occasion; the second time it was owing to their defeat at Drepana, but now they made this third attempt, and through it, by gaining a victory and cutting off the supplies from the sea of the Carthaginian army at Eryx, they put an end to the whole war. The attempt was indeed of the nature of a struggle for existence. For there were no funds in the public treasury for this purpose; but yet, owing to the patriotic and generous spirit of the leading citizens, enough was found to carry out the project; as either one, two, or three of them, according to their means, undertook to provide a quinquereme fully equipped on the understanding that they would be repaid if all went well. In this way a fleet of two hundred quinqueremes was rapidly got ready, all built on the the model of the "Rhodian's" ship. They then appointed Gaius Lutatius to the command and dispatched him at the beginning of summer. Suddenly appearing off the coast of Sicily, he seized on the harbour of Drepana and the roadsteads near Lilybaeum, the whole Carthaginian navy having retired to their own country. First of all he constructed works round the city of Drepana and made all preparations for its siege, but while continuing to prosecute this by every means in his power, he foresaw that the Carthaginian fleet would arrive, and was not forgetful of the original motive of the expedi-
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dύναται διὰ τοῦ κατὰ θάλασσαν κωδύνου κρίσεως
tὰ ὅλα τυχεῖν, οὐκ ἄρχειον οὐδ’ ἄργον εἶν αὐτείς
12 σθαὶ τὸν χρόνον, ἀλ’ ἀν’ ἐκάττην ἥμεραν ἀναπείρας
cαὶ μελέτας ποιῶν τοῖς πληρώμασιν οἰκείως τῆς
ἐπιβολῆς, τῇ τε λοιπῇ τῇ κατὰ τὴν δίαιταν ἐπι-
μελεῖα προσκαρτέρων, ἄθλητας ἀπετέλεσε πρὸς τὸ
προκείμενον ἐν πάνι βραχεῖ χρόνῳ τοὺς ναῦτας.

60 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, παρὰ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν προσ-
πεσόντος αὐτοῦ τοῦ πεπλευκέναι στόλῳ τοὺς Ἐρ-
μαίους καὶ πάλιν ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τῆς θαλάττης, παρ-
2 αὐτίκα κατήρτιζον τὰς ναῦς, καὶ πληρώσαντες σί-
tον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, εξέπεμπον τὸν στό-
λον, βουλόμενοι μηδὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἐρυκα
3 στρατόπεδα τῶν ἀναγκαίων. κατέστησαν δὲ καὶ
στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως Ἅννωνα. ὁς
ἀναχθεὶς καὶ κατάρας ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰερών καλομεῖνην
νήσον ἔσπευδε τοὺς πολεμίους λαθὼν διακομισθή-
ναι πρὸς τὸν Ἐρυκα, καὶ τὰς μὲν ἄγορὰς ἀποθέ-
σθαι καὶ κοψίσαι τὰς ναῦς, προσλαμβάνει ἐπὶ ἐπιβά-
tασ ἐκ τῶν μισθοφόρων τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους καὶ Βάρ-
καν μετ’ αὐτῶν, οὕτως συμμίσχειν τοὺς ὑπεναντίος.

4 οἱ δὲ Λυκατίως συνελθησὶ τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν περὶ τὸν
"Ἀννωνα, καὶ συλλογισάμενος τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῶν,
ἀναλαβὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ πεζοῦ στρατεύματος τοὺς ἀρί-
stοὺς ἀνδρὰς ἐπέλευσε πρὸς τὴν Ἀἰγούσαιαν νῆσον
5 τὴν πρὸ τοῦ Λιλυβαίου κειμένην. καὶ ταῦτα παρα-
kαλέσας τὰ πρέποντα τῷ καρφῷ τὰς δυνάμεις δι-
esάφει τοῖς κυβερνῆταις ὡς ἐσομένης εἰς τὴν αὔριον
6 ναυμαχίας. ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἐωθινήν, ἥδη τῆς ἡμέρας
ὑποθαλάσσεις, ὅρων τοῖς μὲν ἐναντίοις φοροῖ ἄνε-
μων καταρρέοντα καὶ λαμπρόν, σφίξει δὲ δυσχερῆ
γνώμενον τὸν ἀνάπλου πρὸς ἄντιον τὸ πνεῦμα,
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tion, the belief that it was only by a sea battle that the war could be decisively finished. He did not, then, allow the time to pass uselessly and idly, but every day was spent in exercising and practising the crews properly for this purpose. He also paid unremitting attention to the matter of training, so that in a very short time he got his sailors into perfect condition for the anticipated battle.

60. When the unexpected news reached Carthage that the Romans were at sea with a fleet and were again disputing the naval supremacy, they at once got their ships ready, and filling them with corn and other provisions, dispatched their fleet on its errand, desiring that the troops at Eryx should be in no need of necessary supplies. Hanno, whom they had appointed to the command, set sail and reached the so-called Holy Isle from whence he designed to cross as soon as possible to Eryx, unobserved by the enemy, and, after lightening the ships by disembarking the supplies, to take on board as marines the best qualified mercenaries together with Barcas himself and then engage the enemy. Lutatius, learning of Hanno's arrival and divining his intentions, took on board a picked force from the army and sailed to the island of Aegusa which lies off Lilybaeum. There, after exhorting his troops as became the occasion, he informed the captains that the battle would take place next day. In the early morning, just as day was breaking, he saw that a brisk breeze was coming down favourable to the enemy, but that it had become difficult for himself to sail up against the wind, the
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κοίλησ καὶ τραχείας οὖσας τῆς θαλάττης, τὸ μὲν
7 πρῶτον διηπόρει τί δεί χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι. συλ-
λογιζόμενος δ’ ὡς ἐὰν μὲν παραβάλληται χειμῶνος
ὀντος, πρὸς Ἀννωνα ποιήσεται τὸν ἁγώνα καὶ πρὸς
8 αὐτὰς τὰς ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις καὶ πρὸς ἔτι γέμοντα
τὰ σκάφη, ἐὰν δὲ τηρῶν εὐδίαν καὶ καταμέλλων
έαση διάρρηκτο καὶ συμμίξου τοῖς στρατοπέδοις τοὺς
πολεμίους, πρὸς τὰς ναῦς εὐκινήτους καὶ κεκο-
φυσμένας ἀγωνιεῖται πρὸς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας
τῶν ἐκ τοῦ πεζοῦ στρατευμάτων, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον
πρὸς τὴν Ἀμίλκου τόλμαν, ἢς ουδὲν ἦν τότε φο-
βερώτερον. διότι περὶ ἑκρίμενι μὴ παρεῖναι τὸν ἐνεστῶτα
καρὸν· συνίδων δὲ τὰς πολεμίων ναὐς ἱστοο-
δρομοῦσας, ἀνήγετο μετὰ σπουδῆς. τῶν δὲ πλη-
ρωμάτων εὐχερῶς ἀναφέροντων τὸν κλύδωνα ταῖς
εὔξειασ, ταχέως ἐπὶ μίαν ἐκτείνας ναῦν ἀντίπρωρ-
61 ρον κατέστησε τοῖς πολεμίοις τὸν στόλον. οἱ δὲ
Καρχηδόνιοι κατιδόντες τὸν διάπλουν αὐτῶν προ-
katέχοντας τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, καθελόμενοι τοὺς ἱστοὺς
καὶ παρακαλέσατες κατὰ ναῦν σφᾶς αὐτούς, συν-
2 ἔβαλλον τοὺς ἦπερντους. τῆς δ’ ἑκατέρων παρα-
σκευῆς τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔχουσης διάθεσιν τῇ περὶ τὰ
Ḍρεπάνα γενομένη ναυμαχία, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἑκατέρους
3 τῆς μάχης εἰκότως ἐναντίον ἀπέβη. οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι
μὲν γὰρ τὴν τε ναυπηγίαν μετειλήφεσαν, καὶ τὰ βάρη
πάντα χωρίς τῶν πρὸς τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἐπιτηδεῖων
ἐξετέθειτο· τὰ τε πληρώματα συγκεκροτημένα δια-
φέρουσαν αὐτοῖς τὴν χρείαν παρείχετο, τοὺς τ’ ἐπιβάτας κατ’ ἐκλογὴν ἄνδρας ἀπαρχαχωρήτους ἐκ
4 τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων εἶχον. περὶ δὲ τοὺς
Καρχηδόνιοι τάναντα τούτους ὑπῆρχεν. αἱ μὲν
γὰρ νῆς γέμουσαι δυσχρήστως διέκειτο πρὸς τὸν
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sea too being heavy and rough. At first he hesitated much what to do under the circumstances, but reflected that if he risked an attack now that the weather was stormy, he would be fighting against Hanno and the naval forces alone and also against heavily laden ships, whereas if he waited for calm weather and by his delay allowed the enemy to cross and join the army, he would have to face ships now lightened and manageable as well as the pick of the land forces and above all the bravery of Hamilcar which was what they dreaded most at that time. He therefore decided not to let the present opportunity slip. When he saw the Carthaginian ships under full sail he at once got under weigh. As his crews easily mastered the waves owing to their good training, he soon brought his fleet into a single line with their prows to the enemy. 61. The Carthaginians, seeing that the Romans were intercepting their crossing, lowered their masts and cheering each other on in each ship closed with the enemy. As the condition of each force was just the reverse of what it had been at the battle of Drepana, the result also was naturally the reverse for each. The Romans had reformed their system of shipbuilding and had also put ashore all heavy material except what was required for the battle; their crews rendered excellent service, as their training had got them well together, and the marines they had were men selected from the army for their steadfastness. With the Carthaginians it was just the opposite. Their ships, being loaded, were not in a serviceable condition for battle, while
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κίνδυνον, τά δὲ πληρώματα τελέως ἢν ἀνάσκητα καὶ πρὸς καυρὸν ἐμβεβλημένα, τὰ δὲ ἐπιβατικὰ νεο-
σύλλογα καὶ πρωτόπειρα πάσης κακοπαθείας καὶ
δ' παντὸς δεινοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μηδέποτ' ἢν ἐτὶ τοὺς
Ῥωμαίους ἐλπίσαι τῆς θαλάττης ἀντιποιήσασθαι
catafronήσαντες ὠλιγώρουν τῶν ναυτικῶν δυνά-
μεν. τοιγαροῦν ἀμα τῷ συμβαλεῖν κατὰ πολλὰ
μέρη τῆς μάχης ἐλαττούμενοι ταχέως ἐλείφθησαν,
καὶ πεντήκοντα μὲν αὐτῶν ναὸς κατέδυσαν, ἐβδο-
μήκοντα δὲ ἐάλωσαν αὐτάνδροι. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλη-
θος ἐπαράμενον τοὺς ἠποίεοι καὶ κατουρώσαν αὖθις
ἀπεχώρησι πρὸς τὴν Ἰεράν νῆσον, εὐτυχῶς καὶ παρα-
δόξως ἐκ μεταβολῆς αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸν δεόντα καὶ-
8 ρόν τοῦ πνεύματος συνεργήσαντος. ὁ μὲν οὖν
Ῥωμαίων στρατηγὸς ἀποπλεύσασ πρὸς τὸ Διλύ-
βαιον καὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα περὶ τῆς τῶν αἱχμαλώτων
πλοίων καὶ τῶν σωμάτων οἰκονομίαν ἐγίνετο,
μεγάλην οὖσαν. οὐ γὰρ πολὺ τῶν μυρίων ἔλειπε
σωμάτων τὰ λαθέντα ἱωγρίᾳ κατά τὸν κίνδυνον.

62 Ὅσεὶς Καρχηδόνιοι, προσπεσουσίς αὐτοῖς ἀπρο-
δοκήτως τῆς ἡττῆς, ταῖς μὲν ὀρμαῖς καὶ ταῖς φιλο-
timiaῖς ἁκμὴν ἐτοιμοὶ πολεμεῖν ἦσαν, τοῖς δὲ λογι-
2 σμοῖς ἐξηπότοισ. οὐτὲ γὰρ χορηγεῖν ἐτὶ ταῖς ἐν τῇ
Σικελία δυνάμεσιν οἷοί τ' ἤσαν, κρατούντων τῆς
θαλάττης τῶν ὑπεναντίων. ἀπογνόντες δὲ ταύτας,
kai μφρώτα τρόπον τινά γενόμενοι, ποῖας χερσίν
3 ἡ ποίοις ἤγεμόσι πολεμήσειαν ὅνι εἶχον. διόπερ
ἐξέως διαπεμψάμενοι πρὸς τὸν Βάρκαν ἐπέτρεψαν
ἐκεῖνω περὶ τῶν ὁλων. ὁ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἐποίησεν
4 ἔργον ἤγεμόνος ἁγαθοῦ καὶ φρονίμου. μέχρι μὲν
γὰρ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἢν τις ἐλπίς ἐν τοῖς ὑποκει-
μένοις, οὐδὲν τῶν παραβόλων ἡ δεινὰν δοκούντων
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the crews were quite untrained, and had been put on board for the emergency, and their marines were recent levies whose first experience of the least hardship and danger this was. The fact is that, owing to their never having expected the Romans to dispute the sea with them again, they had, in contempt for them, neglected their navy. So that immediately on engaging they had the worst in many parts of the battle and were soon routed, fifty ships being sunk and seventy captured with their crews. The remainder raising their masts and finding a fair wind got back to Holy Isle, very fortunate in the wind having unexpectedly gone round and helping them just when they required it. As for the Roman Consul he sailed away to Lilybaeum and the legions, and there occupied himself with the disposal of the captured ships and men, a business of some magnitude, as the prisoners made in the battle numbered very nearly ten thousand.

62. Even on hearing of this unexpected defeat the Carthaginians, had they let themselves be guided by passion and ambition, would readily have continued the war, but when it came to a matter of cool calculation they were quite at a loss. For one thing they were no longer able to send supplies to their forces in Sicily as the enemy commanded the sea, and if they abandoned and in a manner betrayed them, they had neither other men nor other leaders with whom to pursue the war. They therefore at once sent a message to Barcas giving him full powers to deal with the situation. Hamilcar acted thoroughly like the good and prudent leader he was. As long as there had been some reasonable hope in the situation he had left no means, however perilous and
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eînai parèlupen, allà pásas tás toû nikân én tû polèmèiv ἔλπίδας, eî kai tûs allòs ἡγεμόνων, ἐξ-
5 ἡλεγξέν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιέστη tâ prágmata, kai tôn kata lógôn ouèn ēti kateleípeto pròs tû syûzêiv
tôs úpotaattoménous, pánu nounehês kai prágma-
tikôs èxâs toûs paroûson ùpér spoudôn kai dia-
6 lûsewv èxapèstelle prèsebèntâs. tû gár autôû
nomósteôn ἡγεμόνος eînai to dûnàsthai blèpein tòn te
7 tû nikân, òmôwos dê kai tòn leipètestoi kaiîrôn.
tû dê Luntâtîou prôsthymos dejâmênu tâ paraka-
loûmena dià to suneidénu tîs sphetêrou prâgmâsi
tetruêmevoi kai kâmnuouin ἕδη tû polèmou, suneûth-
telos èpitheîn tî diaphorâ toînûtwn tînîn synûth-
kôn diagrafeiswv: "ἐπὶ τοίοτε φιλīav eînai Kar-
χηδονίou kai 'Ρωμαίou, èn kai tû dîmou tîn
'Ρωμαιôwn synôdôkê. èkxwreîn Sikeîlìas ēpàsís
Karχηδονίou kai mh polèmèin 'Iêróúni mnê 'épi-
férein óplâ Sýrakouâsîous mnê tîn Sýrakouâsîn
9 sümâmâoi. ἀποδôûnai Karχηδονίou 'Ρωμαίou
χwris lûtrwv âpantas toûs aîxhmalôtous. âr-
gyriôu kataenegeîv' Karχηδονίou 'Ρωμαίou èn
ētsew eîkôsi diîshilia kai diakôsia tâlant'
63 Eîfboîkâ." toûtwn ð' èpaneugenêtovn eîs tîn
'Ρâmîn, ou prosoedézato tâs synêthâs dîmou, âll'èx-
apèstileuân ândras déka toûs èpiskephômênuv
2 ùpér tûn prâgmâtov. oî kai paragênômenoi tûn
mèn oûdênu ēti metêthêkavn, brazhêa dê prospêtei-
vân toûs Karçhêdoníous. tûn te gár chrônou tûn
fôrâv èpotoîsáv ëmâsvn, xîlia tâlantâ prosbêntes,
tûn te vîsou èkxwreîv Karçhêdoníous prosbênta-
exan, ðsai metaxú tîs 'Italâs keînai kai tîs
Sikeîlìas.

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venturesome it seemed, unemployed, and if there ever was a general who put to proof in a war every chance of success, it was he. But now that fortunes were reversed and there was no reasonable prospect left of saving the troops under his command, he showed his practical good sense in yielding to circumstance and sending an embassy to treat for peace. For our opinion should be that a general ought to be qualified to discern both when he is victorious and when he is beaten. Lutatius readily consented to negotiate, conscious as he was that the Romans were by this time worn out and enfeebled by the war, and he succeeded in putting an end to the contest by a treaty more or less as follows. "There shall be friendship between the Carthaginians and Romans on the following terms if approved by the Roman people. The Carthaginians to evacuate the whole of Sicily and not to make war on Hiero or bear arms against the Syracusans or the allies of the Syracusans. The Carthaginians to give up to the Romans all prisoners without ransom. The Carthaginians to pay to the Romans by instalments in twenty years two thousand two hundred Euboean talents." 63. But when these terms were referred to Rome, the people did not accept the treaty, but sent ten commissioners to examine the matter. On their arrival they made no substantial changes in the terms, but only slight modifications rendering them more severe for Carthage: for they reduced the term of payment by one half, added a thousand talents to the indemnity, and demanded the evacuation by the Carthaginians of all islands lying between Sicily and Italy.
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4 Ὅ μὲν οὖν Ῥωμαίοι καὶ Καρχηδονίοις συντάσσερο τοίχως πόλεμος ἐπὶ τοιούτους καὶ τοιούτων ἐσχε τὸ τέλος, ἐτη πολεμθεῖσι εἰκοσὶ καὶ τέτταρα συνεχῶς, πόλεμος ὃν ἦμεῖς ἴσμεν ἀκοῆς μαθόντες
5 πολυχρονιώτατος καὶ συνεχέστατος καὶ μέγιστος.

ἐν δὲ χωρίς τῶν λοιπῶν ἀγώνων καὶ παρασκευῶν,
καθάπερ εἶπομεν ἄνωτέρων, ἀπαξ μὲν οἱ συνάμφω
πλείσσον ἡ πεντακοσίους, πάλιν δὲ μικρῷ λειπουσί
ἐπτακοσίους σκάψει πεντηρικοῖς ἐναιμάχχεσαν πρὸς

6 ἄλληλους. ἀπέβαλον γε μὴν Ῥωμαίοι μὲν ἐν τῷ
πολέμῳ τούτῳ πεντήρεις μετὰ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυ-
γίαις διαφθαρεσθὼς εἰς ἐπτακοσίας, Καρχηδόνιοι δὴ

7 εἰς πεντακοσίας. ὡστε τοὺς θαυμάζοντας τὰς Ἀν-
τιγόνου καὶ Πολεμαίου καὶ Δημητρίου ναυμαχίας
καὶ τοὺς στόλους εἰκότως ἄν περὶ τούτων ἱστορή-

8 σαντας ἐκπεπλήχθαι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῶν πράξεων.

εἰ δὲ τις βουλήσει συλλογίσασθαι τὴν διαφορὰν
tῶν πεντηρικῶν πλοίων πρὸς τὰς τριήρεις, αἰς οἱ

9 τε Πέρσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας καὶ πάλιν Ἀθηναίοι
καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς ἄλληλους ἐναιμάχουσιν, οὐδὲν
καὶ καθόλου δυνηθεῖ τηλικώτας δυνάμεις εὑρεῖν

ἐν θαλάσσῃ διηγώνυμεναί. εἴς ἄν δῆλον τὸ προ-

τεθὲν ἠμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὡς οὐ τύχη Ῥωμαίοι, καθάπερ

ἐννοεῖ δοκοῦσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐδὲ αὐτομάτως, ἀλλὰ
cαι λίναι εἰκότως ἐν τοιούτοις καὶ τηλικούτοις πράγ-

μαισι ἐναιμάχταντες οὐ μόνον ἐπεβάλοντο τῇ τῶν

ὡλων ἡγεμονία καὶ δυναστεία τολμηρός, ἀλλὰ καὶ

καθίκοντο τῆς προθέσεως. καὶ τί διήπτω ἐστι τὸ

αίτιον, ἀπορῆσαι τις τὸν, ὅτι κεκρατηκότες τῶν ὡλων
καὶ πολλαπλασίαν ἔχουσιν ὑπεροχὴν νῦν ἡ πρόσθεν

ουτ' ἂν πληρώσαι τοσαύτας ναις οὔτ' ἀναπλέσαι

2 τηλικούτοις στόλους δυνηθεῖν; οὐ μὴν ἄλλα περὶ

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Such then was the end of the war between the Romans and Carthaginians for the possession of Sicily, and such were the terms of peace. It had lasted without a break for twenty-four years and is the longest, most uninterrupted, and greatest war we know of. Apart from all the other battles and armaments, the total naval forces engaged were, as I mentioned above, on one occasion more than five hundred quinqueremes and on a subsequent one very nearly seven hundred. Moreover the Romans lost in this war about seven hundred quinqueremes, inclusive of those that perished in the shipwrecks, and the Carthaginians about five hundred. So that those who marvel at the great sea-battles and great fleets of an Antigonus, a Ptolemy, or a Demetrius would, if I mistake not, on inquiring into the history of this war, be much astonished at the huge scale of the operations. Again, if we take into consideration the difference between quinqueremes and the triremes in which the Persians fought against the Greeks and the Athenians and Lacedaemonians against each other, we shall find that no forces of such magnitude ever met at sea. This confirms the assertion I ventured to make at the outset that the progress of the Romans was not due to chance and was not involuntary, as some among the Greeks choose to think, but that by schooling themselves in such vast and perilous enterprises it was perfectly natural that they not only gained the courage to aim at universal dominion, but executed their purpose. 64. Some of my readers will wonder what can be the reason why, now that they are masters of the world and far more puissant than formerly, they could neither man so many ships, nor put to sea with such large fleets.
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μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας σαφῶς ἔξεσται τὰς αἰτίας κατανοεῖν, ὅταν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξήγησιν αὐτῶν τῆς πολιτείας ἐξελθομεν· ὑπὲρ ἡς οὖθε ἦμιν ἐν παρέγραψι ἡ·
3 τέον οὑτε τοῖς ἀκούοντιν ἀργῶς προσεκτέον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ θέαμα καλὸν, σχεδὸν δ' ὡς ἐποιοι εἶπεύν ἀγνωστον ἐως τοῦ νῦν, χαριν τῶν περὶ αὐτῆς συγ-
4 γεγραφῶν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡγονῆκασι, οἰ δ' ἀσαφῆ
5 καὶ τελέως ἄνωφελὴ πεποίηται τὴν ἐξήγησιν. πλὴν ἐν γε τῷ προειρημένῳ πολέμῳ τὰς μὲν τῶν πολι-
τευμάτων ἀμφότερων προαρέσεις ἐφαμίλλους εὑροὶ
tis ἂν γεγενημένας, οὐ μόνον ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, ἀλλὰ
cαι ταῖς μεγαλοψυχίαις, μάλιστα δὲ τῇ περὶ τῶν
6 πρωτείων φιλοτιμία, τοὺς γε μὴν ἀνδρας οὐ μικρῷ,
pολλῷ δὲ γενναοτέρους ἐν παντὶ Ῥωμαίοις· ἤγε-
μόνα δὲ και γνώμῃ και τόλμῃ θετέον ἀριστον Ἁμίλ-
cκαν τῶν τότε γεγονέναι τὸν Βάρκαν ἐπικαλούμενον,
pατέρα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν Ἀννίβου τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα
πολεμήσαντος Ῥωμαίοις.

65 Μετὰ δὲ τὰς διαλύσεις ταύτας ἤδιν τι καὶ
2 παραπλῆσιον ἀμφότεροι συνέβη παθεῖν. ἐξεδέξατο
gάρ πόλεμος ἐμφύλιος Ῥωμαίοις μὲν ὁ πρὸς τοὺς
Φαλίσκους καλουμένους, ὃν ταχεῶς καὶ συμφόροντως
ἐπετέλεσαν, ἐν οἷς ἡμέραις ἐγκρατεῖς γενόμενοι
3 τῆς πόλεως αὐτῶν, Καρχηδονίους δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐ-
tὸν καιρὸν οὐ μικρὸς οὐδ' εὐκαταφρόνητος ὁ πρὸς
tοὺς έξένους καὶ τοὺς Νομάδας καὶ τοὺς ἀμα τοὺ-
4 τοὺς ἀποστάντας Δήμας, ἐν οὐ πολλοὺς καὶ μεγά-
lους ὑπομείναντες φόβους τέλος οὐ μόνον ὑπὲρ τῆς
χώρας ἐκκυνδυνευσάν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν
5 καὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἔδαφους. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν πόλεμον
τοῦτον ἐπιστήσασι μὲν ἄξιον διὰ πλείους αἰτίας, ἐπὶ
κεφαλαίου δὲ καὶ διὰ βραχέων αὐτοῦ ποιήσασθαι
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Those, however, who are puzzled by this, will be enabled to understand the reason clearly when we come to deal with their political institutions, a subject not to be treated incidentally by the writer or followed inattentively by the reader. It offers a noble spectacle and one almost wholly unrevealed hitherto, owing to the incompetence of the authors who have dealt with it, some of whom sinned from lack of knowledge, while the account given by others is wanting in clearness and entirely unprofitable. As regards, however, the war of which we are speaking, one will find its purpose and prosecution on the part of the two states equally characterized on both sides by enterprise, by lofty spirit, and above all by ambition for supremacy. In individual courage indeed the Romans were far superior, but the general to whom the palm must be given both for daring and for genius is Hamilcar called Barcas, the actual father of that Hannibal who afterwards made war on the Romans.

65. Shortly after this treaty it so happened that both states found themselves placed in circumstances peculiarly similar. For at Rome there followed a civil war against the Falisci, but this they brought to a speedy and favourable conclusion, taking Falerii in a few days. But the war the Carthaginians had to face was no little or contemptible one, being against their mercenaries, the Numidians and those Libyans who joined in the revolt. In this war they encountered many great perils and finally were in danger of losing not only their territory, but their own liberty and the soil of their native town. For several reasons I think it worth my while to call attention to this war, and, according to the plan I stated at the outset, to give a summary and brief
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8 τὴν ἔξήγησιν κατὰ τὴν ἔξ ἄρχης πρόθεσιν. τὸν τε γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς πολλοῖς λεγόμενον ἀσπονδὸν πόλε- 
μον, τίνα φύσιν ἔχει καὶ διάθεσιν, μάλιστ' ἃν τις
7 ἐκ τῶν τότε γεγονότων ἐπιγνοίη, τοὺς τε χρωμε- 
νους μισθοφορικαίς δυνάμει τίνα δεῖ προορᾶσθαι 
καὶ φυλάττεσθαι μακρόθεν ἐναργείσταν ἃν ἐκ τῆς 
tότε περιστάσεως συνθεωρήσει, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις 
tι διαφέρει καὶ κατὰ πόσον ἦθη σύμμικτα καὶ βάρ-
8 βαρα τῶν ἐν παιδείαις καὶ νόμοις καὶ πολιτικοῖς 
ἔθεσιν ἑκτεθραμμένων τὸ δὲ μέγιστον τὰς αἰτίας 
ἐκ τῶν ἐν ἑκείνοις τοῖς καυροῖς πεπραγμένων κατα-
νοήσει, δι’ ἄς ὁ κατ’ Ἀννίβαν συνέστη Πρωμαίος
9 καὶ Καρχηδονίους πόλεμος. ὑπὲρ οὗ διὰ τὸ μὴ μό-
νον παρὰ τοὺς συγγραφέους, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς 
πεπολεμηκόσιν ἔτι νῦν ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι τὰς αἰτίας, 
χρῆσιμον ἐστὶ τὴν ἀληθινωτάτην παραστήσαι διά-
ληψιν τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσι.

66 Ὅς γὰρ θάττων ἐπιτελεσθεισῶν τῶν προειρημε-
νων διαλύσεων ἀποκατέστησε τὰς περὶ τὸν Ἠρυκα 
δυνάμεις εἰς τὸ Διλύβαιον ὁ Βάρκας, εὐθέως αὐ-
τὸς μὲν ἀπέθετο τὴν ἄρχην, ὃ δὲ ἔπι τῆς πόλεως 
στρατηγὸς Γέσκων ἐγίνετο περὶ τὸ περαιοῦ τοὺς 
2 στρατιώτας εἰς τὴν Λιβύην. προϊόδεμος δὲ τὸ 
μέλλον ἐμφρόνως ἐνεβίβαζε κατὰ μέρη διαμιρῶν αὐ-
3 τοὺς καὶ διαλείμματα ποιών τῆς ἐξαποστολῆς, βου-
λόμενος ἀναστροφὴν διδόναι τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις εἰς 
τὸ τοὺς καταπλεύσαντας καὶ μισθοδοτηθέντας τὰ 
προσφειλόμενα τῶν ὦμων ὕπαθεις ἀπαλλαττο-
μένους ἐκ τῆς Καρχηδόνος εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν πρὶν ἡ 
4 τοὺς ἔξης περαιομένους ἑπικαταλαβεῖν. ὁ μὲν οὖν 
Γέσκων ἐχόμενος ταύτης τῆς ἐννοιας οὔτως ἔχειρίζε 
5 τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐξαποστολὴν. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνοι τὰ
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narrative of it. In the first place one could not find a better illustration of the nature and character of what is vulgarly known as a truceless war than the circumstances of this one, and secondly one can see very clearly from all that took place what kind of dangers those who employ mercenary forces should foresee and take early precautions to avert, as well as in what lies the great difference of character between a confused herd of barbarians and men who have been brought up in an educated, law-abiding, and civilized community. But the most important thing is that from these events one can get an idea of the causes of the Hannibalic war. As it is still a matter of dispute, not only among historians, but among the combatants, what were the actual causes of this latter war, it will be useful to students of history if I lay before them the explanation that is nearest to the truth.

66. It is this. When, at once on the conclusion of the treaty, Barcas had transferred his forces from Eryx to Lilybaeum he immediately resigned his command, and Gesco the commandant there took steps for sending the troops over to Africa. Foreseeing what was likely to happen, he very wisely embarked them in detachments and at certain intervals in order to give the Carthaginians time to pay them their arrears as they arrived and to pack them off to their own countries before the next batch that crossed could catch them up. Such was the idea Gesco had, and he managed to dispatch the troops in this manner, but the Carthaginians
μὲν οὖκ εὐποροῦμενοι χρημάτων διὰ τὰς προγεγνημένας δαπάνας, τὰ δὲ καὶ πεπεισμένοι παραιτησθαί τοὺς μισθοφόρους μέρος τῶν προσοφειλομένων ὑψωνίων, ἐὰν καὶ συναθροίσωσι καὶ δέξωνται πάντας εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα, παρακατείχον ἐκεῖ τοὺς καταπλέοντας διὰ ταῦτην τὴν ἐλπίδα καὶ συν-
8 εἶχον ἐν τῇ πόλει. γνωμένων δὲ πλειώνων ἄδικημάτων καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ᾽ ἦμεραν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑποδόμενοι τὸν ὥχλον καὶ τὴν συμβαίνουσαν ἀκρασίαν ἤξιωσαν τοὺς ἤγεμόνας, ἐὼς ἂν ἐτοιμασθῇ μὲν τὰ κατὰ τὰς συταρχίας αὐτοῖς, προσδέξωνται δὲ τοὺς ἀπολειπομένους, ἀναχωρῆσαι πάντας εἰς τινα πόλιν τὴν προσαγορευμένην Σίκκαν, λαβόν-
7 τας εἰς τὰ κατεστείγοντα χρυσοῦν ἐκαστὸν. προθύμως δὲ συνυπακουόντων πρὸς τὴν ἔξοδον, καὶ βουλομένων αὐτοῦ καταλεῖπεν τὰς ἀποσκευὰς, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ὑπῆρχον, ὡς ὅτι τὸν ἐσομένης τῆς ἐπανοδὸν πρὸς τοὺς ὑψωτικούς,
8 ἀγωνιῶντες οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι μῆποτὲ διὰ χρόνου παραγεγονότες, καὶ τινὲς μὲν τέκνων, ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ γυναικῶν ἰμείροντες, οἱ μὲν οὖκ ἐκπορευθῶσι τὸ παράπαν, οἱ δὲ ἐκπορευθέντες αὖθις ἀνακάμπτωσι πρὸς ταῦτα, καὶ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τρόπῳ μηδὲν ἦττον ἄδικημα γίνεται κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, ταῦτα προορώμε-
9 νοι μετὰ πολλῆς ἀπεχθείας οὐδαμῶς βουλομένους τοὺς ἀνδρῶπους ἤγαγκασαν τὰς ἀποσκευὰς μεθ᾽
10 ἑαυτῶν ἀπαγαγεῖν. οἱ δὲ μισθοφόροι συνανακήθεν
tes εἰς τὴν Σίκκαν, καὶ διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου τετευχότες ἀνέσεως καὶ σχολῆς, ὅπερ ἀφεστατον ὑπάρχει ξενικαῖς δυνάμεις, καὶ σχέδον ὡς εἰπεῖν ἄρχηγον καὶ μόνον αὐτοῖο γίνεται στάσεως, διηγον
11 ἀδεώς. ἀμα δὲ ῥαθυμοῦντες, τινὲς μὲν αὐτῶν ἔξη-
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partly because, owing to their recent outlay, they were not very well off for money, and partly because they were convinced that the mercenaries would let them off part of their arrears of pay, once they had got them all collected in Carthage, detained them there on their arrival in this hope, confining them to the city. As they committed frequent offences there both by night and by day, the government in the first place, suspicious of their numbers and their present licentious spirit, asked their commanding officers, until arrangements had been made for paying them in full and those who were still missing had arrived, to withdraw them all to a town called Sicca, each man receiving a gold stater for pressing expenses. The troops readily consented to leave the capital, but wished to leave their baggage there, as they had formerly done, thinking that they would be soon returning to be paid off. The Carthaginians, however, were afraid lest, longing to be with their wives or children after their recent protracted absence, they might in many cases refuse to leave Carthage, or, if they did, would come back again to their families, so that there would be no decrease of outrages in the city. In anticipation then of this, they compelled the men, much against their will and in a manner calculated to cause much offence, to take their baggage with them. The mercenaries, when assembled in Sicca, lived in a free and easy manner, having not enjoyed for a long time relaxation of discipline and leisure, things most prejudicial to a force raised abroad, and nearly always the very arch-instigators and sole causes of mutiny. At the same time, as they had nothing else to do, some of them began
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eλογίζοντο τὰ προσοφελόμενα σφίσι τῶν ὁψωνίων ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον, καὶ συγκεφαλαιούμενοι πολλαπλάσια
tῶν καθηκόντων, ταῦτα ἔφασαν δεῖν ἁπατεῖν τοὺς
12 Καρχηδονίους. πάντες δ’ ἀναμμηνησκόμενοι τῶν
ἐπαγγελμάτων, ἂν οἱ στρατηγοὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἐπισφαλεῖς
tῶν καυρῶν παρακαλοῦντες σφᾶς ἐπεποίητο, μεγά
λας εἶχον ἐλπίδας καὶ μεγάλην προσδοκίαν τῆς ἐσο-
67 μένης περὶ αὐτοῦς ἐπανορθώσεως. διόπερ ἀμα τῷ
συλλεχθῆναι πάντας εἰς τὴν Σικκαν, καὶ παρα-
γενόμενον Ἀννωνα τὸν ὑπάρχοντα στρατηγόν ἐν τῇ
Διβύν τότε τῶν Καρχηδονίων μὴ οἶδον τὰς ἐλπίδας
καὶ τὰς ἐπαγγελίας ἐκπληροῦν, ἀλλὰ τοῦντάν
λέγοντα τὸ βάρος τῶν φόρων καὶ τὴν καθόλου
στενοχωρίαν τῆς πόλεως ἐγχειρεῖν παραιτεῖσθαι
μέρος τι τῶν ἐξ ὀμολόγου προσοφελομένων ὀψω-
2 νίων, εὐθέως διαφορὰ καὶ στάσις ἐγενότα καὶ συν-
δρομαί συνεχεῖς ἐγένοντο, ποτὲ μὲν κατὰ γένη, ποτὲ
3 δ’ ὀμοῦ πάντων. ὡς δ’ ἂν μὴ ὑμεθ’ ὀμοιοθύνων καὶ ὥθη
ὀμογλώττων ὑπαρχόντων, ἃν ἄμμιας καὶ γορύμα
καὶ τῆς λειψανομένης τύρβης πλῆρες τὸ στρατόπεδον.
4 Καρχηδόνιοι γὰρ ἀεὶ χρώμενοι ποικίλας καὶ μισθο-
φορικαῖς δυνάμεις, πρὸς μὲν τὸ μῆτα συμ-
φρονήσαντας ἀπειθεῖν μηδὲ δυσκαταπλήκτους εἶναι
τοῖς ἤγουμένοις ὑργῳς στοχάζονται, ποιοῦντες ἐκ
5 πολλῶν γενών τῆς δύναμιν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ γενομένης
ὁργῆς ἢ διαβολῆς ἢ στάσεως διδάσκαι καὶ πραξὶ
καὶ μεταβεῖν τοὺς ἤγουμένοις ὀλοσχερῶς ἀστο-
6 χοῦσιν. οὐ γὰρ οἶον ἀνθρωπίνῃ χρήσθαι κακία
συμβαίνει τοῖς τοιαύταις δυνάμεις, ὅταν ἀπαξ εἰς
ὁργῆν καὶ διαβολὴν ἐμπέσωσι πρὸς τινας, ἀλλ’ ἀπο-
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reckoning up the total pay due to them, all to their own advantage, and having arrived at a most exorbitant result, submitted that this was the sum they should demand from the Carthaginians. The whole force remembered the promises the generals had made to them in critical situations, and had great hopes and indeed quite expected that the government would thus correct in their favour the account of the sum they had earned. 67. The consequence was that when the total force was assembled at Sicca, and when Hanno, who was then commander-in-chief in Africa, came there and not only said that it was impossible to meet their claims and fulfil their hopes, but on the contrary tried by dwelling on the present heavy taxation and general distress of Carthage to induce them to renounce some of their stipulated wage, it produced at once a spirit of dissension and sedition, and the soldiers began to hold constant meetings, sometimes of particular nations and sometimes general. As they were neither all of the same nationality nor spoke the same language, the camp was full of confusion and tumult and what is known as τύρβη or turbulence. For the Carthaginian practice of employing hired troops of various nationalities is indeed well calculated to prevent them from combining rapidly in acts of insubordination or disrespect to their officers, but in cases of an outburst of anger or of slanderous rumours or disaffection it is most prejudicial to all efforts to convey the truth to them, to calm their passions, or to conciliate the culprits. Indeed, such forces, when once their anger is aroused against anyone, or slander spreads among them, are not content with mere human wickedness, but end by becoming like

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θηριώσθαι τὸ τελευταῖον καὶ παραστατικὴν λαμ- 7 βάνειν διάθεσιν. ὃ καὶ τὸ τευχεύσει γενέσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ· ἦσαν γὰρ οἱ μὲν Ἱβηρεῖς, οἱ δὲ Κελτοί, των δὲ Λιγυστῶν καὶ Βαλαρεῖς, οὐκ ὅλοι δὲ μεζέλληνες, ὅπη οἱ πλεῖσιν αὐτόμολοι καὶ δοῦλοι. 8 τὸ δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτῶν ἦν Δίβυνες. διόπερ οὔτ' ἐκκλησιάσασι συναρθροῦσαντα πάντας ὁμοῦ δυ- νατον ἢν οὔτ' ἄλλην οὔδεμιαν εὑρέσθαι πρὸς τοῦτο 9 μηχανήν. πῶς γὰρ οἶλον τε; τὸν μὲν γὰρ στρατηγὸν εἰδέναι τὰς ἐκάστων διαλέκτους ἄδυνατον· διὰ πλείονον δ' ἐρμηνεῖν ἐκκλησιάζεων, ἀμα τετράκις καὶ πεντάκις περὶ ταύτων λέγουτα πράγματος, σχε- 10 δόν ὡς εἰπέν ἐπὶ τοῦ προσέθεν ἄδυνατώτερον. λοι- πόν ἦν διὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀξιώσεις καὶ παρακλήσεις· ὅπερ ἐπειράτο τότε συνεχῶς 11 ποιεῖν ὁ Ἀννων. ἀκμῆν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον συνέβαινεν ἀ μὲν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν λεγομένων, ὃ δὲ καὶ συναινέσαντας ἐνίοτε τῷ στρατηγῷ τάναντία πρὸς 12 τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀναγγέλλειν, τοὺς μὲν δ᾽ ἄγνοιαν, τοὺς δὲ διὰ κακίαν· εἴ δὲ ἦν ἁσαφείας, ἀπιστίας, ἀμέ- 12 είς, ἀπαιτά πλήρη. πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς ἄλλους ὄντω καὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐπίτηδες τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας στρατηγοῦς τὰς γεγενημένας χρείας κατὰ Σικελίαν εἴς αὐτῶν, καὶ πεποιημένους σφίζει τὰς ἐπαγγελίας, οὐκ ἐξαποστέλλειν ὡς αὐτούς, τὸν δὲ μηδενὶ τού- 13 των παρηκολουθηκότα τοῦτον ἐκπεπομφέναι. τέλος 8' οὖν ἀπαξιώσαντες μὲν τὸν Ἀννων, διαπιστη- σάντες δὲ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἡγεμόνως, ἔξοργισθέντες δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, ὠρμησαν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν· καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν ἀπέχοντες ὡς ἄν ἐκατον καὶ εἰκοσι στάδια τῆς Καρχηδόνος ἐπὶ τῷ καλομένῳ Τύνητι, πλείους ὄντες τῶν δισμυρίων.
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wild beasts or men deranged, as happened in the present case. Some of these troops were Iberians, some Celts, some Ligurians, and some from the Balearic islands; there were a good many Greek half-breeds, mostly deserters and slaves, but the largest portion consisted of Libyans. It was therefore impossible to assemble them and address them as a body or to do so by any other means; for how could the general be expected to know all their languages? And again to address them through several interpreters, repeating the same thing four or five times, was, if anything, more impracticable. The only means was to make demands or entreaties through their officers, as Hanno continued to attempt on the present occasion, and even these did not understand all that was told them, or at times, after seeming to agree with the general, addressed their troops in just the opposite sense either from ignorance or from malice. The consequence was that everything was in a state of uncertainty, mistrust and confusion. For one thing, they thought the Carthaginians had acted purposely in not communicating with them through the generals who were acquainted with their performances in Sicily and who had made them the promises of bounties, but in sending one who had not been present on any of those occasions. At length, then, refusing to treat with Hanno, thoroughly distrusting their divisional officers, and highly indignant with the Carthaginians, they marched on the capital and encamped at a distance of about one hundred and twenty stades from Carthage at the place called Tunis. They were more than twenty thousand in number.
68 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὸτε πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔλαμβαν τὴν αὐτῶν ἄγνωσιν, ὅτ' ἦν οὐδὲν ὅφελος. μεγάλα μὲν γὰρ ἦμαρτον, εἰς ἕνα τόπον ἀθροίσαντες τοσοῦτο πλῆθος μισθοφόρων, ἔχοντες οὐδεμίαν ἔλπιδα πολεμικῆς χρείας εἰς ταῖς πολιτικαῖς δυνάμεις, τούτου δὲ μείζον ἔτη, προέμενοι τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναίκας καὶ σὺν τούτοις τὰς ἀποσκευὰς. οἷς ἐξῆν ὁμήρους χρησαμένους ἀσφαλέστερον μὲν αὐτοὺς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ὑποπτότων, εὔπειθεστέροις δὲ ἐκεῖνοι χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸ παρακαλοῦν μενον, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ καταπλαγέντες τὴν στρατοπεδείαν πᾶν ὑπέμενον, σπουδάζοντες ἐξιλάσασθαι τὴν ἄρχην αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἔπιτηδεῖς ἀγορὰς ἐκπέμποντες δαμιλεῖς ἐπώλουν, καθὼς ἐκεῖνοι βουλοῦντο καὶ τάπτοντες τὰς τιμᾶς, τῶν τῇ γερουσίᾳ ἅν αἰνείν ἔξαπεστελλον πρέσβεις, ὑποχνοῦμενοι πούς ἐν τῷ ποτ' ἄν αὐτοὺς ἄξιώσαειν εἰ κατὰ δύναμιν. ἦν δὲ πολὺ τὸ καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν παρὰ τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἐπινοοῦμενον, ἀτε δὴ καταπεθαρρηκότων μὲν καὶ συντεθεωρηκότων τὴν κατάπληξιν καὶ πτοίαν τῶν Καρχηδονίων, περιφρονηματισμένων δὲ καὶ πεπεισμένων διὰ τοὺς προγεγονότας αὐτοὺς ἐν Σικελίᾳ πρὸς τὰ Ῥωμαῖκα στρατόπεδα κυνύδως μὴ οἷον Καρχηδονίους ἀντοφθαλμῆσαι ποτ' ἀν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὁπλοῖς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδένα ῥαδίως. διότι ἂμα τῷ συγχωρήσαι τὰ περὶ τῶν ὑψωτικῶν αὐτοὺς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους εὐθέως ἐπέβαινον, καὶ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἱππῶν ἄπήτους τὰς ἄξιας. προσδεξαμένων δὲ καὶ τούτῳ, πάλιν τῇ προσοφειλομένῃ σιτομετρίᾳ ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου τὴν μεγίστην γεγονυῖαν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τιμὴν ἐφασκον αὐτοὺς δειν 184
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68. Now, when there was no mending, it was brought home to the Carthaginians how blind they had been. For they had committed two great mistakes. The first was in collecting at one place so large a body of mercenaries while themselves they could hope for nothing from the fighting power of their civic force. Their second error was even more serious, to let out of their hands the women and children of the mercenaries as well as their movables, all which would have served as hostages, giving themselves greater security in their deliberations about the circumstances and ensuring a more favourable reception for their demands. Still now, in their alarm at the troops encamping so near, they were ready to put up with anything in their eagerness to propitiate them, sending out lavish supplies of provisions which they sold to them at any price they chose to pay and constantly dispatching envoys from the Senate, promising to meet all their demands as far as it was in their power. These increased daily, the mercenaries continuing to invent new claims, gaining confidence as they witnessed the terror and cowardice of the Carthaginians, and being convinced in their arrogance, owing to their success in Sicily against the Roman legions, that not only the Carthaginians, but any other people in the world would not readily face them in arms. When, therefore, the Carthaginians had agreed to their claims for pay, they went a step further and asked for the value of the horses they had lost. This also was conceded, whereupon they maintained that they ought to get the value of the rations of corn due to them for a considerable time at the highest price corn had stood

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10 κομίζεσθαι. καθόλου δ’ ἄει τι νέον καὶ καινὸν προσεξύρισκον, εἰς ἀδύνατον ἐκβάλλοντες τὴν διάλυσιν, διὰ τὸ πολλοῦς καχέκτας καὶ στασιώδεις ἐν
11 αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα πάν τὸ δυνατὸν ὑποσχουμένων τῶν Καρχηδονίων, κατένευσαν ἐπιτρέψειν περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητομένων ἐν τῶν ἐν
12 Σικελία γεγονότων στρατηγῶν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν Ἀμίλκαν τὸν Βάρκαν, μεθ’ οὐ δυνατένα οὐχ ἔληκον διά καταγομένως, τῷ μήτη προσβείν μετὰ αὐτοῦ τίν τοις στρατηγίας έκουσώς
13 δοκεῖν ἀποτεθεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ Γέσκωνα πάνω διέκειτο φιλανθρωπίας, ὃς εὐγενέως μὲν ἐν Σικελίᾳ στρατηγότα, ἐπεποίησε δ’ αὐτῶν πρόνοιαν τίν ἐν
δεχομένην ἐν τῷ ταῖς ἀλλοις καὶ καίλεστα περὶ τίν ἀνακομιδήν. διόπερ ἐπέτρεψαν τοῦτω περὶ τῶν
69 ἀμφισβητομένων. οὐ παραγενόμενοι κατὰ θάλατταν μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων, καὶ προσπέλασα πρὸς τὸν Τύνητα, τοῦ μὲν πρῶτον λαμβάνων τοὺς ἦγε
μόνας, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συναθροῖζων κατὰ γένη τοὺς
2 πολλοὺς, ὃ μὲν ἐπετίμα περὶ τῶν γεγονότων, δ’ ἐδιδάσκειν ἐπειρᾶτο περὶ τῶν παρόντων. τὸ δὲ πλεῖον
3 υπάρχει τοῖς ζείδαις μυσθοδόταις. τέλος δ’ ἠρ
μήσε τοῦ διαλύειν τὰ προσοφειλόμενα τῶν ὁψιωνίων, κατὰ γένη ποιούμενος τὴν μυσθοδοσίαν.
4 ἤν δὲ τὸς Καμπανὸς ἑτυμολόγως παρὰ τῶν Ῥω
μαίων δοῦλος, ἔχων σωματικὴν δύναμιν καὶ τόλμαν
ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς παράβολαν, ὅνομα Σπέννιος.
5 οὖτος εὐλαβούμενος μὴ παραγενόμενος αὐτὸν ὁ
δεσπότης κομίσεται, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς Ῥωμαίων νόμους
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at during the war. In short they always went on devising some new claim, putting matters off so as to make it impossible to come to terms, a great many of them being disaffected and mutinous. However, on the Carthaginians promising to concede everything in their power, they agreed to refer the disputed points to one of the generals who had been present in Sicily. Now to Hamilcar Barcas, with whom they had served there, they were ill disposed, thinking that it was largely his fault that they had been slighted, since he never came himself as an envoy to them and was believed to have resigned his command voluntarily. But being very favourably inclined to Gesco, who had been general in Sicily and had been full of attention to them in other matters and in that of their transport, they submitted the points in dispute to him. 69. Gesco, on reaching Tunis by sea bringing the money, at first conferred privately with the officers, and subsequently held meetings of the troops according to their nationalities. He rebuked them for their past conduct, attempted to enlighten them about the present, but most of all dwelt on the future, begging them to show themselves well-disposed to those in whose pay they had been from the outset. Finally he proceeded to discharge their arrears, paying off each nationality separately. There was a certain Campanian, a runaway Roman slave, called Spendius, a man of great physical strength and remarkable courage in war. He was afraid of his master coming to claim him, when, if given up, he would by Roman law be tortured and put to death. He therefore hesitated at nothing in his endeavour both by speech
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πράττειν, σπουδάζων διακόψαι τὰς διαλύσεις τὰς
6 πρὸς Καρχηδόνιον. ἡμα δὲ τούτω καὶ Λίβυς τις Μάθως, δὲ ἦν μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ τῶν συνεστρατεύ-
μένων, πλείστα δὲ κεκινήκως κατὰ τὰς προερημένας
tαραχάς. ἀγωγῶν οὖν μὴ τίσῃ καὶ τὴν ὑπέρ τῶν
λοιπῶν δίκην, ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐγένετο γνώμης τοῖς
7 περὶ τὸν Σπένδιον. καὶ λαμβάνων τοὺς Λίβυας
ὑπεδείκνυε διότι μετὰ τὸν ὀφωνιασμὸν χωρισθέντων
tῶν ἄλλων γενῶν εἰς τὰς πατρίδας ἀπερείσονται
καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων ὀργήν εἰς αὐτοὺς οἱ Καρχη-
δόνιοι, καὶ βουλήσονται διὰ τῆς εἰς σφᾶς τιμωρίας
8 ἀπαντᾶς καταπλήξασθαι τοὺς ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ. ταχὺ
dὲ προσανασεισθέντες οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς τουότοις λό-
gοις, καὶ λαμβανόμενοι βραχείας ἀφορμής εκ τοῦ
tῶν Γέσκωνα τὰ μὲν ὄψινα διαλύειν, τὰς δὲ τιμὰς
tοῦ τε σιτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἱππῶν ὑπερτίθεσθαι, σων-
9 ἐτερχον εὐθέως εἰς ἐκκλησίαν. καὶ τοῦ μὲν Σπεν-
dίου καὶ τοῦ Μάθω διαβαλλόντων καὶ κατηγοροῦν-
tων τοῦ τε Γέσκωνος καὶ τῶν Καρχηδόνιων ἦκουν,
καὶ προσείχον ἐπιμελῶς τὸν νῦν τοῖς λεγομένοις.
10 εἰ δὲ τις ἐτερος προπορευθεὶς συμβουλεύωσιν, οὐδὲ
αὐτὸ τοῦτο περιμείναστε ἐως τοῦ γνῶναι πότερον
ἀντερῶν ή συνηγορήσων πάρεστι τοῖς περὶ τὸν
Σπένδιον, παραχρῆμα βάλλοντες τοῖς λίθοις ἀπ-
11 έκτενων. καὶ πολλοὺς δὴ τῷ τουότῳ τρόπῳ κατὰ
tὰς συνδρομὰς καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ τῶν ἵδιωτῶν
12 διέφθειρον. καὶ μόνον τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦτο κοινὴ συν-
ίσσαν τὸ βάλλε διὰ τὸ συνεχῶς αὐτὸ πράττειν. μά-
λιστα δὲ τούτ’ ἐποίουν, ὅπως μεθυσθέντες ἀπὸ
13 τῶν ἄριστων συνδράμομεν. διόπερ ὅτε τίς ἀρξαυτὸ
βάλλε λέγειν, οὕτως ἐγίνετο πανταχόθεν ἁμα καὶ
tαχέως ὡστε μηδένα δύνασθαι διαφυγεῖν τῶν ἀπαξ
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and action to break off the negotiations with the Carthaginians. He was supported by a Libyan called Matho, who was indeed a freeman and a member of the force, but had taken a leading part in the late disturbances. Consequently he stood in great fear of being singled out to bear the whole penalty and therefore was of one mind with Spendidus. Taking the Libyans aside, he pointed out to them that when the other nations departed to their own countries after being paid off, they would be left to bear the whole weight of the wrath of the Carthaginians, whose object it would be by the punishment they inflicted on them to terrorize all their Libyan subjects. The men were soon stirred by such arguments, and availing themselves of the slender pretext that Gesco while discharging their pay postponed the compensation for the horses and corn, they at once held a meeting. When Spendidus and Matho began to traduce and accuse Gesco and the Carthaginians, they were all ears, and listened with great attention, but if anyone else came forward to offer an opinion, they did not even wait to find out if he were going to speak in favour of Spendidus or against him, but at once stoned him to death. Numbers both of the officers and privates perished thus in the different meetings, and in fact this phrase "Stone him" was the only one that became intelligible to all the different nations, owing to the frequency of the act. They used to behave thus mostly when they held meetings after their morning meal in a drunken condition, so that the moment anyone called out "Stone him," the stones flew from all sides and so quickly that it was impossible for anyone who once came forward to address them to escape. As,
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14 προελθόντων. πλὴν οὐδενός ἐτί τολμῶντος συμ-
bouleύειν διὰ ταύτην τὴν αὐτήν, κατέστησαν αὐτῶν
στρατηγοὺς Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον.

70 ὁ δὲ Γέσκων ἔωρα μὲν τὴν ὅλην ἀκαταστασίαν
καὶ παραχῆν, περὶ πλείστου δὲ ποιούμενος τὸ τῆ
πατρίδι συμφέρον, καὶ θεωρών ὅτι τοὺτων ἀποθημιω-
θέντων κινδυνεύονσι προφανῶς οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι τοῖς

2 ὅλοις πράγμασι, παρεβάλλετο καὶ προσεκαρτέρει,
pοτὲ μὲν τοὺς προσετῶτας αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας

3 λαμβάνων, ποτὲ δὲ κατὰ γένη συναθροίζων καὶ
παρακαλῶν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα τῶν Διβύων οὐδὲν
κεκομισμένων τὰς σιταρχίας, οὐκομένων δὲ ἰδίων
ἀποδεδόσθαι σφίζει, καὶ προσιόντων θρασέως,
βουλόμενος δὲ Γέσκων ἐπιπλῆξε τὴν προπέτειαν
αὐτῶν, Μάθω τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀπαίτειν ἐκέλευεν.
οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωργίοθησαν ὡστ’ οὔδὲ τὸν

4 τυχόντα χρόνον ἀναστροφὴν δόντες ὃρμησαν τὸ μὲν
πρῶτον ἐπὶ τὸ διαρτάζειν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν χρημά-
των, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συλλαμβάνειν τὸν τε Γέσκωνα
καὶ τοὺς μετ’ αὐτῶν Καρχηδόνιος. οἱ δὲ περὶ

5 τὸν Μάθω καὶ τὸν Σπένδιον ὑπολαμβάνοντες τάχιστο
ἀν οὕτως ἐκκαυνθῆλα τὸν πόλεμον, εἰ παράνομον το
πράξειαν καὶ παράσπονδον, συνήρχεν ταῖς τῶν
ὄχλων ἀπονοίας, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀποσκευὴν τῶν Καρχη-
δονίων ἀμα τοῖς χρήμασι διήρπαον, τὸν δὲ Γέσκωνα
καὶ τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ δήσαντες ὑβριστικῶς εἰς φυλακὴν

6 παρεδίδοσαν. καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπολέμουν ἡδη φανερῶς
πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους, συνωμοσίας ἀσεβεῖς καὶ
παρὰ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔθη ποιησάμενοι.

7 Ὁ μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς ξένους καὶ Διβύκος ἐπι-
kληθεῖσι πόλεμοι διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαύτην ἔλαβε τὴν

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for this reason, no one dared any longer to express an opinion, they appointed Matho and Spendius Generals.

70. Gesco saw how complete was the disorganization and disturbance, but valuing more than anything the interest of his country and foreseeing that if these troops became utterly deaf to all considerations of humanity, Carthage would evidently be in the gravest danger, he persisted, at great personal risk, in his conciliatory efforts, sometimes conferring privately with their officers, and at other times summoning and addressing meetings of the separate nations. The Libyans, however, had not yet received their pay, and considering it overdue, came to him to demand it in a very insolent manner, when Gesco, thinking to rebuke their presumption, told them to go and ask Matho their "General" for it. This aroused their anger to such a pitch, that without a moment's delay they, first of all, seized on what money they could lay their hands on, and next arrested Gesco and the Carthaginians who were with him. As for Matho and Spendius, thinking that the most expeditious means of fanning the flame would be to commit some violation of law or good faith, they co-operated in the excesses of the soldiery, plundering the personal effects as well as the money-chests of the Carthaginians, and after subjecting Gesco and those with him to the outrage of putting them in fetters, sent them to prison. From this time forward they were at open war with Carthage, having bound themselves by certain impious oaths contrary to the principles recognized by all mankind.

Such then was the origin and beginning of the 240 B.C. war against the mercenaries, generally known as the
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8 ἀρχέν. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάθων συντελεσάμενοι τὰ προευρημένα παραντίκα μὲν ἐξαπέστελλον πρόσβεσις ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην πόλεις, παρακαλοῦντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ δεόμενοι σφίσι βοηθεῖν καὶ συνεπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων. μετὰ δὲ ταύτα πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην ἐτοίμως συνυποκουσάντων αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπόστασιν, καὶ τὰς τε χορηγίας καὶ τὰς βοηθείας προδομίως ἐξαποστελλόντων, διελόντες σφαῖς πολιορκεῖν ἐνεχείρησαν οἱ μὲν τὴν 'Ιτύκην, οἱ δὲ τοὺς 'Ἰππακρίτας, διὰ τὸ ταύτας τὰς πόλεις μὴ βούλεσθαι μετασχεῖν αὐτοῖς τῆς ἀποστάσεως.

71 Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τοὺς μὲν κατ’ ἴδιαν βίους ἀεὶ διεξαγαγόντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας γεννημάτων, τὰς δὲ κοινὰς παρασκευὰς καὶ χορηγίας ἀθροίζοντες ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην προσόδων, ἔτι δὲ πολεμεύνειν εἰθισμένοι ξενικαῖς δυνάμεις, τότε πάντων ἀμα τούτων οὐ μόνον ἐστερημένοι παραλόγως, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ’ αὐτῶν ὅρων ἐκαστα τῶν προειρημένων ἐπιστρέφοντα, τελέως ἐν μεγάλῃ δυναμίᾳ καὶ δυσελπιστὶ καθέστασαι, ἄτε παρὰ τὴν προοδοκίαν αὐτοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀποβεβηκότων. τετρυμένοι γὰρ ἐν τῷ περὶ Συκελίας πολέμῳ συνεχώς, ἡπίζον ἐπιτελεσθείσων τῶν διαλύσεων ἀναπνοῆς τῶς τεῦξεσθαι καὶ καταστάσεως εὐδοκομῆσες. συνέβαινε δ’ αὐτοῖς τάναιτα: μειζόνοι γὰρ ἐνίσχυσε πολέμου καταρχῆς καὶ φοβερωτέρον. πρόσθεν μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ Συκελίας ἡμιφιλίτην 'Ῥωμαίοις, τότε δὲ περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἐμελλον κυνονεύσεως, πόλεμον ἀναλαμβάνοντες ἐμφύλιον. πρὸς δὲ τούτως οὐχ ὄπλων πλῆθος, οὐ ναυτικὴ δύναμις, οὐ πλοίων κατασκευῇ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἦν, ὡς ἂν τοσαύτας ναυμα-
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Libyan war. Matho, having so far carried out his purpose, at once sent envoys to the Libyan towns urging them to strike a blow for liberty and imploring their support and practical assistance. Hereupon, when nearly all the Libyans had agreed to join in the revolt against Carthage and willingly contributed troops and supplies, they divided their forces into two and undertook the sieges of Utica and Hippacritae, since these cities had refused to participate in the rebellion.

71. The Carthaginians had ever been accustomed to depend for their private supplies on the produce of the country, their public expenses for armaments and commissariat had been met by the revenue they derived from Libya, and they had always been in the habit of employing hired soldiers. At the present moment not only did they find themselves deprived of all these resources at one blow, but actually saw them turned against themselves. Consequently they fell into a state of utter depression and despondency, things having turned out quite otherwise than they expected. For they had been much worn by the long continued war for Sicily, and had hoped that the peace would procure them some rest and a grateful period of tranquillity, and what happened was just the reverse, as they were now threatened by the outbreak of a greater and more formidable war. In the former case they were disputing the dominion of Sicily with the Romans, but now they were about to fight for their own existence and that of their native city. Besides neither had they a sufficient supply of arms, nor a proper navy, nor the material left to construct one, so many had been the battles in which they
χίας περιπετειών. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ χορηγιῶν διά-
θεσις οὐδὲ φίλων οὐδὲ συμμάχων τῶν βοηθησόντων
7 ἔξωθεν ἐλπὶς οὐδὲ ἤτισον ὑπῆρχε. διὸ καὶ τὸτε
σαφῶς ἐγνώσαν ἡλίκην ἔχει διαφορὰν ἕνεκός καὶ
8 διαπόντως πόλεμος ἐμφυλίου στάσεως καὶ ταραχῆς.

72 Οὐχ ἦκιστα δ’ αὐτὸι σφῖσι τῶν τοιοῦτων καὶ τη-
λικοῦτων κακῶν ἐγεγόνεσαν αὐτοί. κατὰ γὰρ τῶν
προγεγονότα πόλεμον εὐλόγους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ὑπο-
λαμβάνοντες, πικρῶς ἐπεστάτησαν τῶν κατὰ τὴν
2 Λιβύην ἄνθρωπων, παραρυθμεῖοι μὲν τῶν ἄλλων
πάντων τῶν καρπῶν τοὺς ἡμίσεις διπλασίους δὲ
tαῖς πόλεις τοὺς φόρους ἢ πρὶν ἐπιτάττοντες, συγ-
γνώμην δὲ τοὺς ἀπόρους ἡ συμπεριφορὰν οὐδ’ ἦν-
3 τινοῦ ἐπ’ οὖν εἰς τῶν πραττομένων διδόντες, θαυ-
μᾶζοντες δὲ καὶ τιμῶντες τῶν στρατηγῶν οὐ τοὺς
πράως καὶ φιλανθρώπως τῷ πλήθει χρωμένους,
ἀλλὰ τοὺς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἐτοιμάζοντας πλείστας χορη-
γίας κάπισκευάς, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πικρὸ-
4 τατα χρωμένους, ὅν εἰς ἣν Ἀιννων. τοιγαροδὼν οἱ
μὲν ἄνδρες οὐχ οἴον παρακλήσεως πρὸς τὴν ἀπό-
5 στασιν, ἀλλ’ ἀγγελοῦ μόνον ἐδείχθησαν. αἱ δὲ γυ-
ναῖκες αἱ τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνου ἀπαγομένους περι-
ορῶσαι τοὺς σφετέρους ἄνδρας καὶ γυνεῖς πρὸς τὰς
εἰσφορὰς, τότε συνομνύσατε κατὰ πόλεις ἐφ’ ὡς
μηδὲν κρύψῃ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐταῖς, ἀφαιροῦ-
μεναί τὸν κόσμον εἰσέφερον ἀπροφασίστως εἰς τοὺς
6 ὁψωνιασμοῖς. καὶ τοιαύτην παρασκεύασαν εὐπορίαν
τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ Ἡσυνίδιον ὅστε μὴ μόνον
dιαλύσαι τὰ προσοφελέμενα τῶν ὁψωνίων τοῖς μυ-
σθοφόροις κατὰ τὰς ἐπαγγελίας, ὅ ἐποίησατο πρὸς
7 τὴν ἀπόστασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ συνεχὲς εὐπορή-
6 καὶ χορηγίας. οὕτως οὐδέποτε δέι πρὸς τὸ παρὸν
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had been engaged at sea. They had not even the means of providing supplies and not a single hope of external assistance from friends or allies. So it was now that they thoroughly realized how great is the difference between a war against a foreign state carried on over sea and civil discord and disturbance.

72. They had chiefly themselves to thank for all these grievous mischances. During the former war they had thought themselves reasonably justified in making their government of the Libyans very harsh. They had exacted from the peasantry, without exception, half of their crops, and had doubled the taxation of the townsmen without allowing exemption from any tax or even a partial abatement to the poor. They had applauded and honoured not those governors who treated the people with gentleness and humanity, but those who procured for Carthage the largest amount of supplies and stores and used the country people most harshly—Hanno for example. The consequence was that the male population required no incitement to revolt—a mere message was sufficient—while the women, who had constantly witnessed the arrest of their husbands and fathers for non-payment of taxes, solemnly bound themselves by oath in each city to conceal none of their belongings, and stripping themselves of their jewels contributed them ungrudgingly to the war fund. Matho and Spendius were thus so well off that not only could they pay the soldiers their arrears, as they had promised in inciting them to mutiny, but found themselves furnished with ample means for a protracted war. This teaches us that it is the right policy not only to look to the
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μόνον, ἐτὶ δὲ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀποβλέπειν ἂεὶ τοὺς ὀρθῶς βουλευομένους.

73 Οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καίπερ ἐν τοιούτοις κακοῖς οὗτες οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, προστηγμένοι τὸν Ἀννωνα στρατηγὸν διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν τούτον καὶ πρότερον αὐτοῖς τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἐκατοντάπυλον τῆς Λιβύης καταστρέφασθαι, συνήθροιζον μὲν μισθοφόρους, καθώσπευζον δὲ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις τῶν πολιτῶν ἐγύμναζον δὲ καὶ συναύτεταττον τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ὑπεξης· παρασκευάζον δὲ καὶ τὰ περιλίπτη τῶν πλοίων, τριήρεις καὶ πεντήκοντάρια καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀκατίων. Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάθων, παραγενομένων αὐτοῖς εἰς ἐπτὰ μυριάδας Λιβύων, ἐπιδιελόντες τούτους ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολυόρκουν τοὺς Ἰτυκαίους καὶ τοὺς Ἰππακρίτας, βεβαιῶς δὲ τῇ ἐν τῷ Τύνητι στρατοπεδεῖαι κατείχον, ἀποκεκλείκεσαν δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀπάσης τῆς ἐκτὸς Λιβύης. Ἡ γὰρ Καρχηδὼν αὐτῇ μὲν ἐν κόλπῳ κεῖται, προτεινούσα καὶ χερρονησίζουσα τῇ θέσει, τὸ μὲν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, τὸ δὲ τὶ καὶ λίμνῃ περιέχομεν κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον· οὗ δὲ συνάπτων ἱσθμὸς αὐτὴν τῇ Λιβύη τοῦ πλάτος ὡς εἰκοσὶ καὶ πέντε σταδίων ἐστὶ. τούτου δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος νεώντος μέρους οὐ μακρὰν ἥ τῶν Ἰτυκαίων κεῖται πόλεις, ἐπὶ δὲ θατέρου παρὰ τὴν λίμνην τῇ Τύνης. ἔφε δὲν ἐκατέρων τοῖς στρατοπεδεύσαντας οἱ μισθοφόροι, καὶ διακλείοντες ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, λοιπὸν ἐπεβούλευσαν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἡμέρας, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ νύκτωρ παραγωγόμενοι πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος, εἰς φόβους καὶ θορύβους ὀλοσχερεῖς ἐνεβαλλον τοὺς ἐνδον.

74 Ἀννων δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐνδεχομένως ἐγίνετο· καὶ γὰρ ἤν πρὸς τούτῳ τὸ μέρος εὐφυῆς·
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present, but to look forward still more attentively to the future.

73. Yet, although the Carthaginians were in such straits, they first of all appointed Hanno to the command, as he had, they thought, on a former occasion brought matters concerning Hecatompylus in Libya to a satisfactory conclusion; they next busied themselves with enrolling mercenaries and arming the citizens of military age. They also mustered and drilled their civic cavalry and got ready what ships they had left, consisting of triremes, quinqueremes and the largest of their skiffs. Meanwhile Matho, when about seventy thousand Libyans had joined him, divided them into several forces with which he maintained unmolested the sieges of Utica and Hippacritae, secured his main camp at Tunis and thus shut out the Carthaginians from all outer Libya. Carthage, I should explain, lies in a gulf, on a promontory or peninsula surrounded mostly by the sea and in part by a lake. The isthmus which connects it with Libya is about twenty-five stades in width and on the side of this isthmus which faces the sea, at no great distance from the capital, lies Utica, while Tunis is on the other side by the lake. So that the mutineers, encamped now as they were before both of these towns and thus shutting off Carthage from the land, continued to threaten the capital itself, appearing before the walls sometimes by day and sometimes by night and creating the utmost terror and commotion within.

74. Hanno was doing fairly well in the matter of outfit, his talent lying in that direction, but
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έξορμήσας δὲ μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἔτερος ἦν· καὶ
2 γὰρ τοῖς καιροῖς ἀστόχως ἔχρητο καὶ τοῖς ὀλοις
πράγμασιν ἀπείρως καὶ νωθρῶς. διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν
3 πρῶτον εἰς Ἰτύκην παραβοθήσας τοῖς πολιορκο-
μένοις καὶ καταπληξάμενος τοὺς ὑπεναντίους τῷ
πλήθει τῶν θηρίων· εἶχε γὰρ οὐκ ἑλάττους ἐκατὸν
ἐλεφάντων· καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα λαβὼν προτερήματος
ἀρχὴν ὀλοσχεροὺς οὕτως ἔχρησατο κακῶς ὅστε
κινδυνεύσαι προσαπολέσαι καὶ τοὺς πολιορκο-
μένους. κομίσας γὰρ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς κατα-
4 πέλτας καὶ τὰ βέλη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀπάσας τὰς
πρὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν παρασκευάζει, καὶ στρατοπε-
δεύσας πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ἔνεχείρησε προσβάλλειν
πρὸς τὸν τῶν ὑπεναντίων χάρακα. τῶν δὲ θηρίων
5 βιασμένων εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν, ον δυνάμενον
tὸ βάρος οὐδὲ τὴν ἑφοδον οἱ πολέμουι μείναι,
πάντες ἐξέπεσον ἕκ τῆς στρατοπεδεύσιας. καὶ πολλοὶ
μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον τρωθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων,
6 τὸ δὲ διασωζόμενον μέρος πρὸς τῶν λόφων ἐρω-
μὸν καὶ σύμφυτον ἔμενε, πιστεύον ταῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν
7 τῶν τόπων ἀσφαλείαις. ὥ δ' Ἀλκυν., εἰδομένον
Νομάσω καὶ Δίβνου πολεμεῖν, ούτως ὅταν ἀπαξ ἐγ-
κλίνωσιν, ποιοῦνται τὴν φυγὴν ἐπὶ δ' ἡμέρας καὶ
τρεῖς ἐκτοπίζοντες αὐτούς, ὑπολαβὼν καὶ τότε πέ-
ρας ἔχειν τοῦ πολέμου καὶ νεκρικοῖν τοῖς ὀλοίς,
8 τῶν μὲν στρατιωτῶν ὀλγιώργησε καὶ καθόλου τῆς
παρεμβολῆς, αὐτὸς δ' εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐγι-
9 νετό περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑπορείαν. οἱ δὲ συμ-
πεφυγότες τῶν μισθοφόρων εἰς τὸν λόφον, σύν-
τροφοί μὲν γεγονότες τῆς Βάρκα τόλμης, συνήθεις
δ' ἐκ τῶν κατὰ Σικελίαν ἀγώνων πολλάκις τῆς αὐ-
tῆς ἡμέρας ποτὲ μὲν ὑποχωρείν, ποτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἐκ
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when it came to taking the field with his forces, he was another man. He had no idea how to avail himself of opportunities and generally showed an entire lack of experience and energy. For instance, as regards Utica, he began by coming to the help of the besieged and terrify the enemy by his strong force of elephants, of which he had no less than a hundred; but when, in consequence of this, he had a chance of gaining a decisive success, he made such poor use of his advantage that he very nearly brought a catastrophe on the besieged, as well as on himself. For bringing from Carthage catapults, missiles and all requirements for a siege and encamping before the city he undertook the assault of the enemy’s entrenched camp. When the elephants forced their way into the camp, the enemy unable to face the weight of their attack all evacuated it. Many of them were mangled and killed by the elephants, but those who escaped rallied on a steep hill overgrown with brushwood, relying on the natural security of the position. Hanno had been accustomed to fight with Numidians and Libyans, who once they give way continue their flight for two or three days, trying to get as far away as possible. Thinking then, on the present occasion too, that the war was over and he had secured a complete victory he took no precaution for the safety of his army and camp, but entered the city and occupied himself with the care of his person. The mercenaries, who had rallied on the hill, were men schooled in the daring tactics of Barcas and accustomed from their fighting in Sicily to make in one day repeated retirements followed by fresh
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10 μεταβολῆς ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, καὶ τότε συνιδόντες τὸν μὲν στρατηγὸν ἀπηλλαγμένον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς διὰ τὸ προτέρημα ῥαθυμοῦντας ἐκ τῆς στρατοπεδείας, συνομορᾷντες ἐπιτίθενται τῷ χάρακι, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ λουποὺς ἤναγκασαν φυσικῶς ἑπιτίθενται τῷ χάρακι ἐπιτίθενται τῷ χάρακι, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ λουποὺς ἤναγκασαν φυσικῶς. 

12 γεῖν αἰσχρῶς ὑπὸ τὰ τείχη καὶ τὰς πύλας· ἐκυρίευσαν δὲ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς ἀπάσχος καὶ τῆς τῶν πολιορκομένων παρασκευῆς. ἦν ἂν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκκομίσας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐποίησε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὑποχείριον. οὐ μόνον δὲ περὶ τοῦτον τὸν καυρὸν ὀὕτως ἀνεστράφη νοθρῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετ’ ὅλης ἡμέρας περὶ τὴν καλουμένην Γόρζαν ἀντιστρατοπεδευόμενον, ἀντιστρατοπεδευόμενον, ἀντιστρατοπεδευόμενον, ἀντιστρατοπεδευόμενον, ἀντιστρατοπεδευόμενον, ἀντιστρατοπεδευόμενον, λαβών καυρὸς δὲς μὲν ἐκ παρατάξεως εἰς τὸ νικᾶν, δές δὲ εἴς ἐπιθέσεως, ἄνεντι σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἀμφοτέρους δοκεῖ τούτους εἰκῇ καὶ παραλόγως προέσθαι.

13 τῆς ἐπίσεως, οτὲ καὶ στρατοπεδευόμενων σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἀμφοτέρους δοκεῖ τούτους εἰκῇ καὶ παραλόγως προέσθαι.

75 Διότερ οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, θεωροῦντες αὐτὸν κακῶς χειρίζοντα τὰς πράξεις, Ἀμήλκαν τὸν ἐπικαλοῦσαν μὲν Βάρκαν ἀδίσταστην ὁμολογίαν, καὶ τοῦτον ἔρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον στρατηγὸν, δόντες ἐβδομήκοντα μὲν ἐλέφαντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπισυνηγμένους τῶν μισθοφόρων καὶ τοὺς ἀντιστρατοπεδεύομενους ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, ἀμαμακοῦντας ἀμφότερος εἰς πεπερατώμενος αὐτῶν. 

3 υπάρχει ν. ὅσι κατὰ τὴν πρώτην εὐθέως ἔξοδον καταπληξίμενος τῷ παραδόξῳ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἤττησε μὲν τᾶς ψυχᾶς τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἐλυσε δὲ τὴν τῆς Ἠττῆς πολιορκίαν, ἐβάναυσα  ᾧ ἀξιόν τῶν προγεγονότων ἔργων καὶ τῆς παρὰ τῷ πλήθει προσδοκίας. 

4 τὸ δὲ πραξθέν ἢν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ περὶ τὴν χρείαν ταύτῃ.
attacks. At present, on seeing that the general was absent in the city, while the troops were at their ease owing to their success and streaming out of their camp, they drew themselves up and attacked the camp, putting many to the sword and compelling the rest to take refuge ignominiously under the walls and at the gates. They captured all the baggage and all the artillery of the besieged, which Hanno had brought out of the town and added to his own, thus putting it in the enemy's hands. This was not the only occasion on which he acted so negligently, but a few days later at a place called Gorza, when the enemy were encamped opposite him and owing to their proximity he had four opportunities of beating them, twice in a pitched battle and twice by a surprise attack, he is said in each case to have thrown them away by his heedlessness and lack of judgement.

75. The Carthaginians, in consequence, seeing that he was mismanaging matters, again appointed Hamilcar Barcas to the command and dispatched him to this war, giving him seventy elephants, all the additional mercenaries they had been able to collect, and the deserters from the enemy, besides their burgher forces, horse and foot, so that in all he had about ten thousand men. Hamilcar, on his very first expedition, struck terror into the enemy by the unexpectedness of the attack, cowing their spirit, raising the siege of Utica, and showing himself worthy of his past exploits and of the high expectations of the populace. What he accomplished in this campaign was as follows. On
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τὴν τοιοῦτον. τῶν γεωλόφων τῶν ἐπιζευγνύτων τὸν άχένα τὸν συνάπτοντα τὴν Καρχηδόνα πρὸς τὴν Διβύῃν οὖν τῶν δυσβάτων, καὶ χειροποιήτους ἔχόντων διεκβολάς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν, συνέβαλε τοὺς περὶ τὸν Μάθω πάντας τοὺς διὰ τῶν προειρημένων λόφων εὐκαίρως κειμένους τόπους φυλακαίς διε-5 ἐιληφέναι, πρὸς δὲ τούτους τοὺς προσαγορευομένου Μακάρα ποταμοῖ διεύργοντος κατὰ τινας τόπους παραπλησίως τὴν ἔπι τὴν χώραν τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἔξοδον, καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ βεῦματος ἅβατου κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ὑπάρχοντος, μᾶς δ' οὔσης ἐπ' αὐτῷ γεφύρας, καὶ ταύτην τηρεῖν τὴν δίοδον ἀσφα-6 λῶς, πόλιν ἐπ' αὐτῆς ὁκοδομηκότας. εἰς ὁν συν-έβαλε τοὺς Καρχηδονίους μὴ οἶον στρατοπέδω τῆς χώρας ἐπιβάλειν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς κατ' ίδιαν θέ-λοντας διαπεσεῖν ῥαδίως αὖ δύνασθαι λαθεῖν τοὺς 7 ὑπεναντίους. εἰς ἅ βλέπων Ἀμίλκας, καὶ παντὸς πράγματος καὶ καρυοῦ πείραν λαμβάνων διὰ τὸ δυσ-χρηστεῖν περὶ τὴν ἔξοδον, διενοήθη τι τοιοῦτον.

8 τοῦ προειρημένου ποταμοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰς θάλατταν ἐκβολὴν συνθεωρήσας κατὰ τινας ἀνέμων στάσεις ἀποθυνομένου τὸ στόμα καὶ τεναγώδη γυνομένην τὴν παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ στόμα πάροδον, ποὺσας εὑρέσυτ' τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἔξοδον, καὶ κρύπτων ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν, ἔτηρε τὸ προειρημένον 9 σύμπτωμα. παραπεσόντος δὲ τοῦ καρυοῦ, νυκτὸς ἔξορμῆσας ἔλαβε πάντας ἀμά τῷ φωτὶ τὸν προ-10 ειρημένου τοῦτον διαβιβάσας τὴν δύναμιν. παρα-δόξου δὲ τοῦ πράγματος φανέντος καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, ο μὲν Ἀμίλκας προήγε διὰ τοῦ πεδίου, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ τοὺς 76 τὴν γέφυραν φυλάττοντας. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐπέν-202
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the neck of land connecting Carthage with Libya is a chain of hills difficult of access and with several passes to the country artificially cut in them. Matho had posted guards in all those spots which were favourable for the passage of the hills. In addition to this there is a river called Macaras which shuts off in certain places the access from the town to the country. This river is for the most part unfordable owing to the volume of water, and there is only one bridge, which Matho had also secured, building a town at the bridge-head. So that not only was it impossible for the Carthaginians to reach the country with an army, but it was not even an easy matter for single persons wishing to get through to elude the vigilance of the enemy. Hamilcar, seeing all these obstacles, after passing in review every means and every chance of surmounting this difficulty about a passage, thought of the following plan. He had noticed that when the wind blew strongly from certain quarters the mouth of the river got silted up and the passage became shallow just where it falls into the sea. He therefore got his force ready to march out, and keeping his project to himself, waited for this to occur. When the right time came he started from Carthage at night, and without anyone noticing him, had by daybreak got his army across at the place mentioned. Both those in the city and the enemy were taken by surprise, and Hamilcar advanced through the plain making for the guardians of the bridge. 76.

* The same as Bagraclas.
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διον συνέντες τὸ γεγονός ἀπήντων εἰς τὸ πεδίον καὶ παρεβοήθουν ἄλληλοις, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὴν γέφυραν πόλεως ὄντες οὐκ ἐλάττουσι μυρίων, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰτύκης ὑπὲρ τοὺς μυρίους καὶ πεντακοσί-2 λίους. ἐπεὶ δ’ εἰς σύνοπτον ἦκον ἄλληλοις, νομίζοντες ἐν μέσῳ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀπειληθέναι, σπουδὴ παρηγγύων ἀμα παρακαλοῦντες σφᾶς αὐτῶς 3 καὶ συνήπτουν τοῖς πολεμίοις. ὁ δ’ Ἀμίλκας ἤγε μὲν τὴν πορείαν πρῶτους ἔχων τοὺς ἑλέφαντας, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τοὺς ὑπειπεῖ καὶ τοὺς εὐξάνουσι, τελευ-4 ταία δὲ τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὀπλῶν. κατιδών δὲ προχειροτερον ἐπιφερομένους τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἀναστρέ-5 φεῖν παρήγγειλε πᾶσι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς πρωτοπορείας ἀναστρέψαντας σπουδὴ ποι- εῖσθαι τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ἐκείνης. τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς 6 οὐραγίας ἐξ ἀρχῆς υπάρχοντας ἐξ ἐπιστροφῆς περι- στῶν ἐξέτατε πρὸς τὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιφάνειαν. 8 οἱ δὲ Λίβνες καὶ μισθοφόροι, νομίζοντες αὐτῶς καταπεπληγμένους φυγεῖν, λύσαντες τὴν τάξιν ἐπι- ἐκεντοῦ καὶ συνήπτουν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἐρρωμένως, 7 ἀμα δὲ τῶν τοὺς ὑπειπεῖς συνεγίσαντας τοῖς παρα- τεταγμένοις ἐκ μεταβολῆς ὑποστῆναι, τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἐπάγειν, ἐκπλαγεῖσι γυνόμενοι διὰ τὸ παρά- δοξον οἱ Λίβνες ἐγκλίναντες εὐθέως ἔθεν γονυ, ὡς 8 ἀν εἰκῇ καὶ σποράδην ἐπικείμενοι. λοιπὸν οἱ μὲν τοῖς κατόπων ἐπιφερομένοις περιπτότοντες ἐςφάλ- λοντο, καὶ διέφθειον αὐτοῦς τε καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους· 9 οἱ δὲ πλείους συνεπατήθησαν, ἐκ χειρὸς τῶν ἱπ-

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Spendius, on learning what had happened, put his two forces in movement to meet in the plain and render mutual assistance to each other, those from the town near the bridge being not less than ten thousand in number and those from Utica over fifteen thousand. When they got in sight of each other, thinking that they had caught the Carthaginians in a trap between them, they exhorted each other with loud shouts and advanced to attack. Hamilcar was advancing in the following order. In front were the elephants, after them the cavalry and light-armed troops and last of all the heavy-armed. When he saw that the enemy were attacking him in such precipitation he ordered his whole force to face about. He bade those in front, after facing about, retire with all speed, and reversing the order of those who originally were in the rear he deployed them to await the onslaught of the enemy. The Libyans and mercenaries, thinking that the Carthaginians were afraid of them and retreating, broke their ranks and fell on them vigorously. But when the cavalry, on approaching the line of hoplites, wheeled round again and faced the Libyans, while at the same time the remainder of the Carthaginian army was coming up, the enemy were so much surprised that they at once turned and fled panic-stricken, in the same loose order and confusion in which they had advanced. Consequently some of them came into collision with their comrades who were advancing in their rear with disastrous effect, causing the destruction both of themselves and the latter, but the larger number were trampled to death, the cavalry and elephants attacking them at close quarters.
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όλοντο μὲν οὖν εἰς ἐξακισχιλίους τῶν Λιβύων καὶ τῶν ξένων, ἐάλωσαν δὲ περὶ δισχίλιους· οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν εἰς τὴν πρὸς τῇ γεφύρα πόλιν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς Ἑτύκη παρεμβολὴν. Ἀμίλκας δὲ ποιήσας τὸ προτέρημα τὸν προειρημένον τρόπον, εἰπετο κατὰ πόδας τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς γεφύρας πόλιν εξ ἐφόδου κατέσχε, προεμένων καὶ φευγόντων εἰς τὸν Τύνητα τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πολεμίων, τὴν δὲ λουτὴν χῦραν ἔπισπευόμενον τὰς μὲν προσήγετο, πλείοντας δὲ κατὰ κράτος ἐξήρει. τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδονίοις βραχύ τι θάρσους ἐνεργάσατο καὶ τόλμης, ἐπὶ ποσὸν αὐτοὺς ἀπαλλάξας τῆς προγενενημένης δυσελπιστίας.

77 ὦ δὲ Μάθως αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑπακριτῶν πολιορκίας ἐπέμενε, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὸν Αὐτάριτον τὸν τῶν Γαλατῶν ἠγεμόνα καὶ Σπένδιον 2 ἐξεσθαὶ τῶν ὑπεναντίων συνεβούλευε, τὰ μὲν πεδία φεύγοντας διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ὑπεναντίως ἵππων καὶ θηρίων, ταῖς δ' ὑπωρείαις ἀντιπαράγοντας καὶ συνεπιτυθμένους κατὰ τὰς ὑποπτούσας ἀεὶ δυσχερείας. οὕτω δὲ ταῖς ἐπινοοῖσιν ταύταις καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Νομάδας καὶ τοὺς Λίβνας ἐξέπεμπε, δεόμενος βοηθεῖν σφίσι καὶ μὴ κατα- 4 προῆσθαι τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας καίρους. ὦ δὲ Σπένδιος, προσλαβὼν ἐκ τοῦ Τύνητος ἀφ' ἐκάστου τῶν γενῶν τοὺς πάντας εἰς ἐξακισχιλίους, προῆγε, ταῖς ὑπωρείαις ἀντιπαράγων τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, ἔχων οίμα τοῖς προειρημένοις καὶ τοὺς μετ' Αὐτα-
5 ρίτου Γαλάτας, ὅντας εἰς δισχίλιους. τὸ γὰρ λοιπὸν μέρος αὐτῶν τοῦ κατ' ἀρχὰς συστήματος ἡπτομο-
λήκει πρὸς τοὺς Ὀρμαίους ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸν Ἐρυκα
6 στρατοπεδείαις. τοῦ δ' Ἀμίλκου παρεμβεβληκότος
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About six thousand Libyans and mercenaries fell and nearly two thousand were made prisoners. The rest escaped, some to the town by the bridge and some to the camp before Utica. Hamilcar after this victory followed closely on the retreating enemy and took the town by the bridge, the enemy in it deserting it and flying to Tunis. He next traversed the rest of the country, winning over some towns and taking others by assault. He thus restored some confidence and courage to the Carthaginians, delivering them in a measure from their previous despondency.

77. Matho for his own part continued to prosecute the siege of Hippacritae, advising Autaritus, the leader of the Gauls, and Spendius to harass the enemy, keeping away from the plains owing to the numbers of the cavalry and elephants opposed to them but marching along the foothills parallel to the Carthaginians and descending on them whenever they were on difficult ground. While adopting this plan he at the same time sent messages to the Numidians and Libyans, begging them to come to his assistance and not lose the chance of gaining their freedom. Spendius, taking with him from Tunis a force of about six thousand men drawn from all the nationalities, advanced along the slopes parallel to the Carthaginians. He had also with him Autaritus and his Gauls numbering only about two thousand, the rest of the original corps having deserted to the Romans when encamped near Eryx. Hamilcar
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ἐν τοῖς πεδίοις πανταχόθεν ὀρεσὶ περιεχομένων, συνέβη τὰς παρὰ τῶν Νομάδων καὶ Διβύων βοσθείας εἰς τὸν καιρὸν τούτον συνάψαι τοὺς περὶ τὸν Σπένδιον. γενομένης δὲ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τῆς μὲν τῶν Διβύων ἐπιστατοποιείας αἰφνιδίῳ καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον, τῆς δὲ τῶν Νομάδων ἀπ’ οὐρᾶς, τῆς δὲ περὶ τὸν Σπένδιον ἐκ πλαγίου, μεγάλην αὐτοῖς ἀπορίαν συνέβη περιστήναι καὶ δυσέκφευκτον.

78 Κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τούτον Ναράς, ὁς ἦν μὲν Νομᾶς τῶν ἐνδοξότατών εἰς, ἢν δὲ καὶ πλήρης ὄρμης πολεμικῆς, οὕτως ἀεὶ μὲν οἰκεῖως διέκειτο πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, πατρικὴν ἔχων σύστασιν, τότε δὲ μᾶλλον παρωμῆθη διὰ τὴν Ἀμίλκου τοῦ 2 στρατηγοῦ καταξίωσιν. διὸ καὶ νοµίσας ἔχειν εὐφυή καιρόν πρὸς ἐντευξίν αὐτῷ καὶ σύστασιν, 3 ἴκεν εἰς τὴν στρατοπεδείαν, ἔχων περὶ αὐτὸν Νομάδας εἰς ἐκατόν. καὶ συνεγγίσας τῷ χάρακι τολμηρῶς ἔμενε, κατασειών τῇ χειρὶ. τοῦ γὰρ Ἀμίλκου θαυμάσαντος τὴν ἐπιβολὴν, καὶ προπέμψαντος τινὰ τῶν ἰππόν, εἰς λόγους ἔφη βουλέσθαι 5 συνελθεῖν τῷ στρατηγῷ. διαποροῦντος δὲ ἀκμῆς καὶ διαπιστοῦντος τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἠγεμόνος, παραδοῦν ὁ Ναράς τὸν ἰππὸν καὶ τὰς λόγχας τοῖς 6 μεθ’ αὐτοῦ, παρῆν ἄνοπλος εὐθαρσῶς εἰς τὴν παρεμβολὴν. οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἑθαύμαζον, τὰ δὲ κατε- 7 πλήττοντο τὴν τόλμαν. ὡμοι δὲ προσεδέχαντο καὶ συνῆλθον εἰς τὰς χεῖρας. ὁ δὲ παραγενόμενος εἰς λόγους ἔφη πᾶσι μὲν Καρχηδονίοις εὐνοείν, μάλιστα δὲ ἐπιθύμειν Βάρκα γενέσθαι φίλος· διὸ καὶ νῦν παρεῖναι συσταθησόμενος αὐτῷ καὶ κοινωνήσων 8 ἀδόλως παντὸς ἐγγὺς καὶ πάσης ἐπιβολῆς. Ἅμιλκας δὲ ταύτ’ ἀκούσας οὔτως ἦσθη μεγάλος ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ
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had established his camp in a plain surrounded by mountains, and just at this time Spendius was joined by the Numidian and Libyan reinforcements. The Carthaginians, suddenly finding the additional force of Libyans in their front, and that of the Numidians in their rear, while Spendius was on their flank, were in a very difficult situation, from which it was not easy to extricate themselves.

78. There was a certain Naravas, a Numidian of high rank and full of martial spirit. He had always had that attachment to the Carthaginians which was traditional in his family, and it was now strengthened by his admiration for Hamilcar. Thinking that this was a favourable opportunity for meeting Hamilcar and introducing himself, he rode up to the camp escorted by about a hundred Numidians. Coming close to the palisade he remained there quite fearlessly making signals with his hand. Hamilcar was much astonished at his venturesomeness and sent out a horseman to meet him, when he said that he desired an interview with the general. The Carthaginian leader remaining still much amazed and distrustful, Naravas handed over his horse and his spears to his attendants, and very boldly came into the camp unarmed. The Carthaginians looked on in mingled admiration and amazement at his daring, but they met and received him, and when he was admitted to the interview, he said that he wished all the Carthaginians well but particularly desired the friendship of Barcas, and this was why he had come to introduce himself and offer his cordial assistance in all actions and enterprises. Hamilcar, on hearing this, was so delighted at the young man's courage in
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κατὰ τὴν παρουσίαν θάρσει, καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἐντευξὶν ἀπλότητι τοῦ νεανίσκου, ὡς οὗ μόνον εὐδόκησε κοινωνὸν αὐτὸν προσλαβέσθαι τῶν πράξεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν θυγατέρα δωσειν ἐπηγγείλατο μεθ' ὅρκου, διαφυλάξαντος αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς Καρχηδονίους πίστιν.

Γενομένων δὲ τῶν ὁμολογῶν, ὁ μὲν Ναραύας ἤκε τοὺς ύφ᾽ αὐτὸν τεταγμένους ἔχων Νομάδας, ὁντας εἰς δυσχίλους, ὁ δ᾽ Ἀμίλκας, προσγενομένης αὐτῷ τῆς χειρὸς ταύτης, παρετάξατο τοῖς πολεμίοις. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Σπένδιον συνάψαντες ἐπὶ ταυτὸ τοῖς Δίβυσι καὶ καταβάντες εἰς τὸ πεδίον συνεβάλλον τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις.

γενομένης δὲ μάχης ἱσχυρᾶς, ἐνίκων οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀμίλκαν, καλῶς μὲν τῶν θηρίων ἀγωνισμένων, ἐπιφανεστάτην δὲ τοῦ Ναραύα παρασχομένου

χρείαν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Αὐτάρριτος καὶ Σπένδιος διέφυγον, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἔπεσον μὲν εἰς μυρίους, ἐάλωσαν δὲ εἰς τετρακυκλίους. ἐπιτελεσθέντος δὲ τοῦ κατορθώματος, Ἀμίλκας τοῖς μὲν βουλομένους τῶν αἰχμαλωτῶν μεθ᾽ ἐαυτοῦ συστρατευέν εξοισίαν ἔδωκε καὶ καθώπλιξε τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν

πολεμίων σκύλοις, τοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους ἀθροίσας παρεκάλει, φάσκων, ἐως μὲν τοῦ νῦν συγγνώμην αὐτοῖς ἔχειν τῶν ἡμαρτήμενων. διὸ καὶ συγχωρεῖν τρέπεσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἴδιας ὀρμᾶς οὐ ποτ' ἀν ἑκάστος αὐτῶν προαιρήται. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διηπειλῆσατο μηθένα φέρειν ὅπλον πολέμιον κατ᾽ αὐτῶν, ὡς, ἐὰν ἀλῷ τις, ἀπαραιτήτου τευξόμενον τιμωρίας.

79 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς οἱ τὴν Σαρδόνα [τὴν νῆσον] παραφυλάττοντες τῶν μυσθοφόρων,
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coming to him and his simple frankness at their interview that not only did he consent to associate him in his undertakings but swore to give him his daughter in marriage if he remained loyal to Carthage.

The agreement having thus been made, Naravas came in with the Numidians under his command, about two thousand in number, and Hamilcar, thus reinforced, offered battle to the enemy. Spendius, after effecting a junction with the Libyans, descended into the plain and attacked the Carthaginians. The battle was a stubborn one, but ended in the victory of Hamilcar, the elephants fighting well and Naravas rendering brilliant services. Autaritus and Spendius escaped, but with the loss of about ten thousand killed and four thousand prisoners. After the victory Hamilcar gave permission to those of the prisoners who chose to join his own army, arming them with the spoils of the fallen enemies; those who were unwilling to do so he collected and addressed saying that up to now he pardoned their offences, and therefore they were free to go their several ways, wherever each man chose, but in future he threatened that if any of them bore arms against Carthage he would if captured meet with inevitable punishment.

79. About the same time the mercenaries who garrisoned Sardinia, emulous of the exploits of Matho
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ζηλώσαντες τοὺς περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον, 2 ἐπιτίθενται τοῖς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ Καρχηδονίους. καὶ τὸν μὲν τὸτε παρ’ αὐτοῖς δυτι βοηθάρχον Βώσταρον συγκλέισαντες εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν μετὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ 3 πολιτῶν ἀπέκτειναν. αὕτης δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγοῦ ἐξαποστειλάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως Ἀννω- να, κάπειτα καὶ τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων ἐγκαταλύουν- 4 σῶν τὸν Ἀννωνα, καὶ μεταθεμένων πρὸς σφάς, γενόμενοι ζωγρία κύριοι τοῦ προερημένου, παρατί- κα τούτον μὲν ἀνεσταύρωσαν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παρηλ- λαγμένος ἐπινοοῦντες τιμωρίας, πάντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ 5 νῆσῳ Καρχηδονίους στρεβλοῦντες ἀπέκτειναν· καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ήδη ποιησάμενοι τὰς πόλεις ύπ’ έαυτοῦς εἰς 6 ἐξοχὸν ἐγκρατῶς τὴν νῆσον, ἐως οὗ στασιάσαντες πρὸς τοὺς Σαρδόνιους ἔξεπεσον υπ’ ἐκεῖνων εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν. ἦ μὲν οὖν Σαρδῶν τούτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπηλλοτριώθη Καρχηδονίων, νῆσος καὶ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῇ πολυανθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς γεννήμασι δια- 7 φέρουσα. τῶ δὲ πολλοῖς καὶ πολῦν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς πεπούχθαι λόγον οὐκ ἀναγκαίων ἡγούμεθ’ εἶναι ταυτολογεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀμολογουμένων. 8 Ἔπως δὲ καὶ Σπένδιος, ὅμως δὲ τούτως Ἀντίτοτος ὁ Γαλάτης, ὑπιδόμενοι τὴν Ἀμίλκου ψυλανθρωπίαν εἰς τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους, καὶ φοβηθέντες μὴ τῷ 9 τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ψυχαγωγηθέντες ὀρμήσωσι πρὸς τὴν ὑποδεικνυμένην ἀσφάλειαν οἰ τε Δίβνες καὶ τὸ τῶν μισθοφόρων πλῆθος, ἐβουλεύοντο πῶς ἀν καινοτομή- σαντες τι τῶν πρὸς ἀσβεσθαί εἰς τέλος ἀποθηρώ- 10 σειαν τὰ πλῆθη πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς συναθροῖσαι τοὺς πολλοὺς. γενομένου δὲ τούτου γραμματοφόρον εἰσήγαγον, ὡς ἀπεσταλ- μένου ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Σαρδόνος αἴρετιστῶν. ἦ δὲ 212
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and Spendius, attacked the Carthaginians in the island. They began by shutting up in the citadel and putting to death Bostar, the commander of the foreign contingent, and his compatriots. Next, when the Carthaginians sent Hanno over in command of a fresh force, this force deserted him and joined the mutineers, who thereupon took him prisoner and at once crucified him. After this, devising the most exquisite torments, they tortured and murdered all the Carthaginians in the island, and when they had got all the towns into their power continued to hold forcible possession of Sardinia, until they quarrelled with the natives, and were driven out by them to Italy. Thus was Sardinia lost to the Carthaginians, an island of great extent, most thickly populated and most fertile. Many authors have described it at length, and I do not think it necessary to repeat statements which no one disputes.

Matho and Spendius, as well as the Gaul Autaritus, 239 B.C., were apprehensive of the effect of Hamilcar’s leniency to the prisoners, fearing that the Libyans and the greater part of the mercenaries might thus be won over and hasten to avail themselves of the proffered immunity. They therefore set themselves to devise some infamous crime which would make the hatred of the troops for Carthage more savage. They decided to call a general meeting and at this they introduced a letter-bearer supposed to have been sent by their confederates in Sardinia. The letter
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έπιστολή διεσάφει τὸν τε Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς μετ’ αὐτοῦ πάντας, οὓς παρεσπόνδησαν ἐν τῷ Τύνητι, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προείπον, φυλάττειν ἑπιμελῶς, ὡς πραττόντων τινῶν ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου τοὺς Καρχη-

11 δονίους ύπερ τῆς τούτων σωτηρίας. λαβόμενος δὲ τῆς ἀφορμῆς ταύτης ὁ Σπένδιος, πρῶτον μὲν παρεκάλει μὴ πιστεύειν τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων γεγενημένην ψυχραιμίαν πρὸς τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους· ὥστε γὰρ σώσαι προαιρούμενον αὐτὸν ταύτα βεβολεύθαι περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἄλλα διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων ἁφέσεως ἡμῶν ἐγκρατὴ γενέσθαι σπουδάζοντα, πρὸς τὸ μὴ τυφάς, ἄλλα πάντας ἡμᾶς ἀμια μιμωρήσασθαι πιστεύσαντας αὐτῷ. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ψυχραιμία παρῆκε μὴ προέμενοι τοὺς περὶ τὸν Γέσκωνα καταφρονηθῶσι μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, μεγάλα δὲ βλάψως τὰς ἱδίας πράξεις, ἀνδρα τοιοῦ-

12 τοῦ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἁγαθὸν ἐάσαντες διαφυγεῖν, δὸν εἰκὸς ἐχθρὸν αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι φοβερῶτατον. ἔτι δὲ ταῦτα λέγοντος αὐτοῦ παρῆκ ἀλλος γραμματοφόρος, ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Τύνητος ἀπεσταλμένοι, παρα-

13 πλῆσια τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Σαρδῶνος διασαφῶν. ἐφ’ ὅν Αὐτάριτος οἱ Γαλάτης ἐπιβαλὼν μίαν ἔφη σωτηρίαν εἶναι τοῖς ἐαυτῶν πράγμασι τὸ πάσας ἀπογνώναι τὰς ἐν Καρχηδονίως ἐλπίδας· ἐως δ’ ἂν ἀντέχηται τῆς ἐκείνων ψυχραιμίας, ὡς δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ἀληθῶν γενέσθαι τὸν τοιοῦτον σύμμαχον. διόπερ ἡξίου τούτων πιστεύειν, τούτως ἀκούειν, τοῖς τοι-

14 ούτωσι προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, οἰτίνες ἄν ἀεὶ τί τῶν ἀπεχθεστάτων καὶ πυροπότων εἰσαγγελλοῦσα κατὰ Καρχηδονίων τοὺς δ’ ἐναντία τούτως λέγοντας προδότας καὶ πολεμίους ἥγεσθαι παρῆκ. ταῦτα δ’ εἰπών συνεβούλευε τὸν τε Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς 214
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advised them to keep careful guard over Gesco and all the others whom they had, as above narrated, treacherously arrested at Tunis, since some persons in the camp were negotiating with the Carthaginians about their release. Spendius, seizing on this pretext, begged them in the first place to have no reliance on the Carthaginian general's reported clemency to the prisoners. "It is not," he said, "with the intention of sparing their lives that he has taken this course regarding his captives, but by releasing them he designs to get us into his power, so that he may take vengeance not on some, but on all of us who trust him." Moreover, he warned them to take care lest by giving up Gesco and the others they incur the contempt of their enemies and seriously damage their own situation by allowing to escape them so able a man and so good a general, who was sure to become their most formidable enemy. He had not finished his speech when in came another post supposed to be from Tunis with a message similar to that from Sardinia. 80. Autaritus the Gaul was the next speaker. He said that the only hope of safety for them was to abandon all reliance on the Carthaginians. Whoever continued to look forward to clemency from them could be no true ally of their own. Therefore he asked them to trust those, to give a hearing to those, to attend to those only who bring the most hateful and bitterest accusations against the Carthaginians, and to regard speakers on the other side as traitors and enemies. Finally, he recommended them to torture and put to
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μετ’ αυτοῦ συλληφθέντας καὶ τοὺς ἄστερον γενομένους αἰχμαλώτους τῶν Καρχηδόνων αἰκισμένους ἀποκτείνατο. πρακτικώτατος δ’ ἦν οὗτος ἐν ταῖς συμβουλίαις διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ συνιέναι. πάλαι γὰρ στρατεύματος ἦδει διαλέγονται φοινικιστὲς. ταύτη δὲ πῶς οἱ πλείστοι συνεσαίνοντο τῇ διαλέκτῳ διὰ τὸ μῆκος τῆς προγεγενήτης στρατείας. διόπερ ἐπαινέαντος αὐτοῦ ὁμοθυμαδὸν τοῦ πλῆθους, οὗτος μὲν εὐδοκιμῶν ἀνέχθησε. πολλῶν δὲ προπορευμένων ἀφ’ ἐκάστου γένους ἄμα, καὶ βουλομένων αὐτὴν παραίτεσθαι τὴν αἰκίαν διὰ τὰς γεγεγυμένας ἐκ τοῦ Γέσκωνος εἰς αὐτοὺς εὐργεσίας, οὔτε μὴν τῶν λεγόμενων οὐθὲν ἦν σωτένων, ὥς ἂν ἄμα πολλῶν, ἐκάστου δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἵδιαν διάλεκτον συμβουλεύοντος· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ παρεγυμνωθῆ διότι τὴν τιμωρίαν παρατείνεται, καὶ τις ἐκ τῶν καθημένων ἐπεὶ Βάλλε, πάντας ἄμα κατέλευσαν τοὺς προπορευθέντας. καὶ τούτους μὲν, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ θηρίων διεφθαρμένους, ἐξέφερον οἱ προσήκοντες. τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν Γέσκωνα λαβόντες, ὡντας εἰς ἐπτακοσίους, ἦγον ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος οἱ περὶ τὸν Σπένδιον· καὶ προαγάγοντες βραχῦ πρὸ τῆς στρατοπεδείας πρῶτον μὲν ἀπέκοπτον τὰς χειρὰς, ποιούμενοι τὴν ἁρχήν ἀπὸ τοῦ Γέσκωνος, δι’ ἄρμαν πρὸτερον ἐκ πάντων Καρχηδόνων προκρίναντες ἀνέδειξαν μὲν εὐφρενοτέροις αὐτῶν, ἐπετρέψαν δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀμφιβολής τούτων. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰς χειρὰς ἀπέκοψαν, ἡκρωτηριάζων τοὺς ταλαιπώρους κολοβώσαντες δὲ καὶ συντρίβαντες τῷ σκέλε ἔτι ζῶντας ἐρρυῖαν εἰς τινὰ τάφρον.

81 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνοι, τοῦ δυστυχήματος αὐτοῖς 216
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depth not only Gesco and those arrested with him, but all the Carthaginians they had subsequently taken prisoners. He was much the most effective speaker in their councils, because a number of them could understand him. He had been a long time in the service and had learned Phoenician, a language which had become more or less agreeable to their ears owing to the length of the previous war. His speech therefore met with universal approbation, and he retired from the platform amid applause. Numerous speakers from each nationality now came forward all together, maintaining that the prisoners should be spared at least the infliction of torture in view of Gesco's previous kindness. Nothing, however, they said was intelligible, as they were all speaking together and each stating his views in his own language. But the moment it was disclosed that they were begging for a remission of the sentence someone among the audience called out "Stone them," and they instantly stoned all the speakers to death. These unfortunates, mangled as if by wild beasts, were carried off for burial by their friends. Spendidus and his men then led out from the camp Gesco and the other prisoners, in all about seven hundred. Taking them a short distance away, they first of all cut off their hands, beginning with Gesco, that very Gesco whom a short time previously they had selected from all the Carthaginians, proclaiming him their benefactor and referring the points in dispute to him. After cutting off their hands they cut off the wretched men's other extremities too, and after thus mutilating them and breaking their legs, threw them still alive into a trench.

81. The Carthaginians, when news came of this
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ἀναγγελθέντος, ποιεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν εἶχον, ἐσχετλία-ζον δὲ, καὶ περιπαθεῖς γινόμενοι τῇ συμφορᾷ πρὸς μὲν Ἀμίλκαν καὶ τὸν ἔτερον τῶν στρατηγῶν Ἀν-νωνα προσβευτὰς ἐξέπεμπτον, δεόμενοι βοηθεῖν καὶ 2 τιμωρεῖν τοὺς ἡτυχηκόσι. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἰσεβηκότας κήρυκας ἐξαπέστελλον περὶ τῆς τῶν νεκρῶν ἀναι-3 ρεσίων. οἱ δὲ οὐτ' ἔδοσαν, προείπον τε τοῖς παρ-οὕς μήτε κήρυκα πέμπει τρὸς σφᾶς μήτε πρε-σβευτὴν, ὡς τῆς αὐτῆς κολάσεως ὑπομενοῦσης τοὺς 4 παραγενομένους ἦς νῦν Γέσκων τέτευχε. πρὸς δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐδογματοποίησαν καὶ παρήγησαν αὐτοῖς, δν μὲν ἂν λάβωσι Καρχηδονίων, τιμωρησαμένους ἀποκτείνειν. ὅν δ' ἂν τῶν συμμαχώντων αὐτοῖς, ἀποκόψαντας τὰς κείρας ἄθλης εἰς Καρχηδόν ἀπο-πέμπειν. οἱ δὲ καὶ διετέλεσαν ἐπιμελῶς ποιοῦντες. 5 διότερ εἰς ταῦτα βλέπων οὐκ ἂν τις εἰπεῖν ὁκνή-σειν ὡς ὦν μόνον τὰ σώματα τῶν ἄνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς γεννωμένων ἑλκών καὶ φυμά-των ἀποθηροῦσαι συμβαίνει καὶ τελεῖς ἀβοήθητα 6 γίνεσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα τὰς ψυχάς. ἐπὶ τε γὰρ τῶν ἑλκῶν, ἐὰν μὲν θεραπεῖαν τοῖς τοιούτοις προσ-ἀγη τις, ὅτ' αὐτῆς ἐνιοτε τάς ἐρεθιζόμενα θάτ-τον ποιεῖται τὴν νομήν. ἐὰν δὲ πάλιν ἅφη, κατὰ τὴν εξ αὐτῶν φύσιν φθείροται τὸ συνεχές οὐκ ἵσχει 7 παύλαν, ἐως ἂν ἀφανίσῃ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ταῖς τε 8 ψυχαῖς παραπλησίως τοιαύται πολλάκις ἐπιφύονται μελανίαι καὶ σηπεδόνες ὡστε μηδὲν ἀσβέστερον ἄνθρωπον μηδ' ὑμότερον ἀποτελείσθαι τῶν ζῶν. 9 οἰς ἐὰν μὲν συγγνώμην τινὰ προσάγῃς καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν, ἐπιβουλήν καὶ παραλογισμὸν ἠγούμενοι τὸ συμβαίνον ἀπιστότερον καὶ δυσμενόστερον γί- νονται πρὸς τοὺς φιλανθρωποῦντας. ἐὰν δ' ἀντι-218
unhappy event, could take no action, but their indignation was extreme, and in the heat of it they sent messengers to Hamilcar and their other general Hanno imploring them to come and avenge the unfortunate victims. To the assassins they sent heralds begging that the bodies might be given up to them. Not only was this request refused but the messengers were told to send neither herald nor envoy again, as they would meet with the same fate that had just befallen Gesco. With regard to treatment of prisoners in the future, the mutineers passed a resolution and engaged each other to torture and kill every Carthaginian and send back to the capital with his hands cut off every ally of Carthage, and this practice they continued to observe carefully. No one looking at this would have any hesitation in saying that not only do men's bodies and certain of the ulcers and tumours afflicting them become so to speak savage and brutalized and quite incurable, but that this is true in a much higher degree of their souls. In the case of ulcers, if we treat them, they are sometimes inflamed by the treatment itself and spread more rapidly, while again if we neglect them they continue, in virtue of their own nature, to eat into the flesh and never rest until they have utterly destroyed the tissues beneath. Similarly such malignant lividities and putrid ulcers often grow in the human soul, that no beast becomes at the end more wicked or cruel than man. In the case of men in such a state, if we treat the disease by pardon and kindness, they think we are scheming to betray them or take them in, and become more mistrustful and hostile to their would-be benefactors, but if, on the
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τιμωρή, διαμιλλώμενοι τοίς θυμοίς οὐκ ἔστι τι τῶν ἀπειρημένων ἡ δεινῶν ὑποῖον οὐκ ἁναδέχονται, σὺν καλῷ τιθέμενοι τὴν τοιαύτην τόλμαν· τέλος δ' ἀποθηρωθέντες εξέστησαν τὴς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως. 10 τῆς δὲ διαθέσεως ἀρχηγοῦ μὲν καὶ μεγίστην μερίδα νομιστέον ἔθη μοχθήρα καὶ τροφήν ἐκ παιδῶν κακήν, συνεργά δὲ καὶ πλείω, μέγιστα δὲ τῶν συνεργῶν, τὰς ἀεὶ τῶν προεστῶτῶν ὑβρείς καὶ πλεονεξίας. ἄ δὴ τότε συνέβαινε καὶ περὶ μὲν τὸ σύστημα τῶν μισθοφόρων, ἐτὶ δὲ μᾶλλον περὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας αὐτῶν ύπάρχειν.

82 Ἄμιλκας δὲ, δυσχρηστούμενος τῇ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπονοίᾳ, τὸν μὲν Ἀνωνα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐκάλει, πεπεσμένος άθροισθέντων ὑμῶν τῶν στρατοπέδων 2 βάττον ἐπιθήσεως τέλος τοῖς ὀλοίς. τῶν δὲ πολεμίων οὖς ποτὲ κρατήσειε, τοὺς μὲν ἐν χειρῶν νόμω διέφθειρε, τοὺς δὲ ζωγρία πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰσαναχθέντας ὑπέβαλλε τοῖς θηρίοις, μίαν ἄρῳς λύσιν ταύτην, εἰ δυνηθεὶς τοὺς ἕχθροις ἅρδην ἀφανίσαι.

3 Δοκούντων δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐπικυδιστήρας ἐπίδας ἔχειν ἦδη κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, γίνεται τις ὀλοσχερὴς καὶ παράδοξος περὶ αὐτούς παλίρροια τῶν 4 πραγμάτων. οἱ τε γὰρ στρατηγοὶ συνελθόντες ἐπὶ ταῦτα διεστάσαισαν πρὸς σφάς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὡστε μὴ μόνον τοὺς κατὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν παραλπεῖν καὶ ρούσα, ἀλλὰ καὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν πολλὰς ἀφορμὰς διδόναι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους 5 φιλονεκίαν. ἀ δὴ καὶ συνέντες οἱ Καρχηδόνοι τῷ μὲν ἐνὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι προσέταξαν, τῷ δ' ἐτέρῳ μένειν, δόν ἂν αἱ δυνάμεις προκρίνω- 6 σιν. ἀμα δὲ τούτους καὶ τὰς παρακομιζομένας ἀγο-
contrary, we attempt to cure the evil by retaliation
they work up their passions to outtrivial ours, until
there is nothing so abominable or so atrocious that
they will not consent to do it, imagining all the
while that they are displaying a fine courage. Thus
at the end they are utterly brutalized and no longer
can be called human beings. Of such a condition
the origin and most potent cause lies in bad manners
and customs and wrong training from childhood, but
there are several contributory ones, the chief of which
is habitual violence and unscrupulousness on the part
of those in authority over them. All these conditions
were present in this mercenary force as a whole and
especially in their chiefs.

82. This desperation of the enemy made Hamilcar
anxious, and he begged Hanno to join him, being
convinced that if both armies united, an end would
be put sooner to the whole war. Meanwhile he
continued to put to the sword those of the enemy
who were conquered in the field, while those brought
to him captive prisoners he threw to the elephants
to be trampled to death, as it was clear to him that
the rebellion would never be stamped out until the
enemy were utterly exterminated.

The prospects of the Carthaginians now seemed
much brighter, but the tide suddenly turned
completely against them. For when the two
generals met, they quarrelled so seriously, that this
difference caused them not only to neglect many
opportunities of striking a blow at the enemy, but
to afford many such to the latter. The Carthaginians
perceiving this, ordered one of the two to leave his
post and the other to remain in sole command,
leaving the choice to the troops. In addition to this
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ρὰς ἐκ τῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς καλομέμενων Ἐμπορίων, ἅψ’
αῖς εἶχον τὰς μεγίστας ἑλπίδας περὶ τε τῆς τροφῆς
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, διαφθερῆναι συνέβη
7 κατὰ θάλατταν ὀλοσχερῶς ὑπὸ χειμῶνος. τὰ δὲ
catat tēn Sardōna, kathāper ἐπάνω προείπαιν, ἐτύγ-
χανεν ἀπηλλοτριωμένα, μεγάλας αὐτοῖς αἰὲ ἕτοι
χρείας παρεχομένης τῆς νήσου ταύτης κατὰ τὰς
8 περιστάσεις. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἢ τῶν Ἰππακριτῶν
καὶ τῶν Ἰτυκαίων ἀπέστη τόλησ, αὐτχεῖς ἐτύγχανον
μόνα τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην οὐ μόνον τὸν ἐνεστῶτα
πόλεμον ἀναδεδεγμένην γενναίος, ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς
κατ’ Ἀγαθοκλέα καιροὺς καὶ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἔφοδον
ἐνυγνωσὑπομεμενήκυια, καὶ συλλήβδην οὐδέποτε
9 βεβουλευμένηι Καρχηδονίου οὐδέν ὑπεναντίον. τότε
δὲ χωρὶς τῆς ἀλόγου πρὸς τοὺς Δίβους ἀποστάσεως
καὶ διὰ τῆς μεταβέσεως εὐθέως τούτου μὲν τὴν
μεγίστην οἰκείστην καὶ πίστιν ἐναπεδείξαντο, πρὸς
δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀπαραίτητον ὄργῃν ἐνεστή-
10 σαντο καὶ μίσος. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ παραβεβοηθηκότας
ἀυτοῖς παρ’ ἐκείνων, ὅντας εἰς πεντακοσίους, καὶ
τὸν ἡγεμόνα τούτων ἀποκτείναντες ἀπαντα ἔρρη-
ψαν κατὰ τοῦ τείχους, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐνεχείρισαν τοῖς
Δίβου; τοῖς γε μὴν Καρχηδονίοις οὐδὲ θάψαι συν-
11 εχώρησαν τοὺς ἠτυχηκότας αὐτομέμενοι. τούτων δὲ
συμβαίνοντων, οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ Σπέν-
διον, ἔπαρθέντες τοὺς συμβεβηκόσι, πολιορκεῖν
12 ἐνεχείρησαν αὐτὴν τῆς Καρχηδόνα. Βάρκας δὲ
παραλαβῶν Ἀννίβαν τὸν στρατηγόν· τοῦτον γὰρ
ἐξαπέστειλαν οἱ πολίται πρὸς τὰς δυνάμεις, ἐπεί
τὸν Ἀννίβα τὸ στρατόπεδον ἔκρυνε δεῖν ἀπαλ-
λάττεσθαι, κατὰ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων αὐτοῖς

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they suffered the total loss at sea in a storm, of the supplies they were conveying from the place they call Emporiae, supplies on which they entirely relied for their commissariat and other needs. And again, as I said above, they had lost Sardinia, an island which had always been of great service to them in difficult circumstances. The severest blow of all, however, was the defection of Hippocrates and Utica, the only two cities in Libya which had not only bravely faced the present war, but had gallantly held out during the invasion of Agathocles and that of the Romans; indeed they never had on any occasion given the least sign of hostility to Carthage. But now, apart from their unjustifiable defection to the cause of the Libyans, their sympathies so suddenly changed, that they exhibited the greatest friendship and loyalty to the rebels, while beginning to show every symptom of passionate and determined hatred of Carthage. After butchering the troops the Carthaginians had sent to assist them, about five hundred in number, together with their commander, they threw all the bodies from the wall, and surrendered the city to the Libyans. They would not even give the Carthaginians the permission they requested to bury their unfortunate compatriots. Matho and Spendius in the meantime, elated by these events, undertook the siege of Carthage itself. Barcas had now been joined in the command by Hannibal, the general whom the citizens had dispatched to the army, on the soldiers voting that Hanno should be the one to retire, when the decision was left in their hands by the Carthaginians at the
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dοθεῖσαν ἐπιτροπὴν περὶ τὰς γενομένας τῶν στρατηγῶν στάσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. διότι ἄμελκας, ἔχων τούτων τε καὶ Ναραίαν, ἐπήει τὴν χώραν, διακλείων τὰς χορηγίας τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιων, μεγίστην αὐτῶν παρεχομένου χρείαν περὶ τε ταύτα καὶ τάλα Ναραία τοῦ Νομάδος.

14 Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ὑπαίθρους δυνάμεις ἐν τούτοις ἦν. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνωι περικλεώμενοι πανταχόθεν ἦναγκάζοντο καταφεύγειν ἐπὶ τὰς συμμαχεῖς χώρες πόλεως ἐλπίδας. 'Ιέρων δὲ ἀεὶ μὲν ποτὲ κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον μεγάλην ἐποίητο σπουδὴν εἰς πάν τὸ παρακαλούμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν, τότε δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐφιλοτιμεῖτο, πεπεσμένοις συμφέρειν εαυτῶ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ δυναστείαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν Ἡρώμαιων φιλίαν τὸ σύμβους Καρχηδόνιον, ἵνα μὴ παντάπασιν ἕξοδον ἀκούσῃς συντελεῖσθαι τοῖς ἴσχυσι, πάνω φρονίμως καὶ νουνεχώς λογο- 4 φήμενος. οὐδὲποτε γὰρ χρῄ ἦν τὰ τοπία παροβαίνειν, οὐδὲ τηλικαίὴν οὔδενι συγκατασκευάζειν δυναστείαν, πρὸς ἴνα οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ὀμολογομένων ἐξ- 5 ἕσται δικαίων ἀμφισβητεῖν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' Ἡρώμαιοι τηροῦντες τὰ κατὰ τὰς συνθῆκας δίκαια προθυμίας οὔδεν ἀπέλειπον. εὐν ἄρχαῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο τις ἀμφισβήτησις ἐξ ἀμφοῖν διὰ τῶν 7 τοιαύτας αἰτίας. τῶν Καρχηδόνίων τοὺς πλέοντας ἐξ Ἰταλίας εἰς Λιβύνην καὶ χορηγοῦντας τοῖς πολεμίοις καταγόντων ὡς αὐτοὺς, καὶ σχεδόν ἄθροισθέντων τούτων εἰς τὴν φυλακὴν εἰς τοὺς πεντακοσίοις, 8 ήγανάκτησαν οἱ Ἡρώμαιοι. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαπρεσβευσάμενοι, καὶ κομμασάμενοι διὰ λόγου πάντας, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εὑρίσκουσαν ὡστε παραχρῆμα τοῖς Καρχη- 224
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time the two generals had quarrelled. Accompanied then by this Hannibal and by Naravas, Hamilcar scoured the country, intercepting the supplies of Matho and Spandius, receiving the greatest assistance in this and all other matters from the Numidian Naravas.

Such were the positions of the field forces. 83. The Carthaginians, being shut in on all sides, were obliged to resort to an appeal to the states in alliance with them. Hiero during the whole of the present war had been most prompt in meeting their requests, and was now more complaisant than ever, being convinced that it was in his own interest for securing both his Sicilian dominions and his friendship with the Romans, that Carthage should be preserved, and that the stronger Power should not be able to attain its ultimate object entirely without effort. In this he reasoned very wisely and sensibly, for such matters should never be neglected, and we should never contribute to the attainment by one state of a power so preponderant, that none dare dispute with it even for their acknowledged rights. But now the Romans as well as Hiero observed loyally the engagements the treaty imposed on them. At first there had been a slight dispute between the two states for the following reason. The Carthaginians when they captured at sea traders coming from Italy to Africa with supplies for the enemy, brought them in to Carthage, and there were now in their prisons as many as five hundred such. The Romans were annoyed at this, but when on sending an embassy, they recovered all the prisoners by diplomatic means, they were so much gratified, that in return they gave back to the Carthaginians all
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αὐτοῖς αἰχμαλώτους ἐκ τοῦ περὶ Σικελίαν πολέμου.
9 ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου τοῦ καιροῦ πρὸς ἐκαστα τῶν παρακαλουμένων ἐτοίμως καὶ φιλανθρώπως ὑπῆκουν.
10 διὸ καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους ἐπέτρεψαν τοῖς ἐμπόρους ἔξαγαγεῖν αἰεὶ τὸ κατεπείγον, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους ἐκώλυσαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ Σαρδώνι μισθοφόρων, καθ’ ὄν καίρον ἀπὸ τῶν Καρχηδόνιων ἀπέστησαν, ἐπισπωμένων αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν νῆσον οὐχ ὑπῆκουσαν. τῶν δ’ Ἰτυκαίων ἐγχειριζόντων σφᾶς, οὐ προσεδέξαντο, τηροῦντες τὰ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας δίκαια.
12 Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν οὖν τῆς παρὰ τῶν προειρημένων φιλών τυχάνοντες ἐπικουρίας ὑπέμενον τὴν πολυρκίαν. τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον οὐχ ἦτον πολυρκεύσας συνεβαίνειν ή πολυρκεύν.
84 εἰς τοιαύτην γὰρ αὐτοὺς οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀμίλκαν ἐνθειαν καθίστασαν τῶν ἐπιτηθείων, ὡστ’ ἀναγκα- 2 σθῆναι τέλος αὐτοὺς διαλύσας τὴν πολυρκίαν. μετὰ δὲ τινα χρόνων ἂθροίσαντες τῶν τε μισθοφόρων τοὺς ἀρίστους καὶ Λιβύων, τοὺς ἀπαντας εἰς πεντακισμύριον, μεθ’ ἄν ἢ καὶ Ζάρζας ὁ Λίβιος ἐχων τοὺς ὑφ’ αὐτὸν ταττομένους, ὠρμήσαν αὐθίς ἀντι- παράγετε εἰς τοὺς ὑπαίθρους καὶ τηρεῖν τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀμίλκαν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πεδινῶν τόπων ἀπεί- χοντο, καταπελθημένοι τὰ θηρία καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ναραιάν ἔπεισαν, τοὺς δ’ ὄρεως καὶ στενοὺς ἐπειρόντο προκαταλαμβάνειν. ἐν οἷς καιροῖς συν- ἐβη ταῖς μὲν ἐπιβολαις καὶ τόλμαις μηδὲν αὐτοὺς λείποσθαι τῶν ὑπεναντίων, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπειρίαν 5 πολλάκις ἐλαττούσθαν. τότε γὰρ ἢν, ὡς εἴοικε, συν- ὑδεῖν ἐπ’ αὐτής τῆς ἀληθείας πηλίκην ἔχει διαφορὰν ἐμπειρία μεθοδική καὶ στρατηγική δύναμις ἀπειρίας 226
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the remaining prisoners from the Sicilian war and henceforth gave prompt and friendly attention to all their requests. They gave permission to their merchants to export all requirements for Carthage, but not for the enemy, and shortly afterwards, when the mercenaries in Sardinia on revolting from Carthage invited them to occupy the island, they refused. Again on the citizens of Utica offering to surrender to them they did not accept, but held to their treaty engagements.

The Carthaginians, then, on thus obtaining assis-
tance from their allies continued to withstand the siege. 84. But Matho and Spendius were just as much in the position of besieged as of besiegers. Hamilcar had reduced them to such straits for supplies that they were finally forced to raise the siege. A short time afterwards, collecting a picked force of mercenaries and Libyans to the number of about fifty thousand and including Zarzas the Libyan and those under his command, they tried again their former plan of marching in the open parallel to the enemy and keeping a watch on Hamilcar. They avoided level ground, as they were afraid of the elephants and Naravas' horse, but they kept on trying to anticipate the enemy in occupying positions on the hills and narrow passes. In this campaign they were quite equal to the enemy in courage and enterprise, but were often worsted owing to their want of tactical skill. This was, it seems, an opportunity for seeing by the light of actual fact, how much the methods gained by experience and the skill of a general, differ from a soldier's inexperience
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7 καὶ τριβῆς ἀλόγου στρατωτικῆς. πολλοὺς μὲν γὰρ
αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς κατὰ μέρος χρείας ἀποτεμόμενοι
καὶ συγκλείσων ὠσπερ ἀγαθὸς πεπεπτυθῆς, ἀμαχεὶ
8 διέφθειρε, πολλοὺς δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὁλοσχερεῖς κυνδύνοις
τοὺς μὲν εἰς ἐνέδρας ἀνυπονοήτους ἐπαγόμενοι
ἀνήρει, τοὺς δὲ ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως ποτὲ μὲν
μεθ’ ἡμέραν, ποτὲ δὲ νύκτωρ, ἐπιφαινόμενος ἐξ-
ἐπληττέν. ὃν ὅσοις λάβοι ζωγρία, πάντας παρέβαλ-
9 λε τοῖς θηρίοις. τέλος δ’ ἐπιστρατοπεδεύσας αὐτοῖς
ἀνυπονοήτως ἐν τόποις ἀφύσει μὲν πρὸς τὴν ἐκεί-
νων χρείαν, εὐφυέσι δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἐαυτοῦ δύναμιν,
εἰς τοῦτ’ ἤγαγε περιστάσεως ἀκτε μήτ’ διακιν-
δυνεύειν τολμῶντας μήτ’ ἀποδράναι δυναμένοις διὰ
τὸ τάφρῳ καὶ χάρακι περιειλήφθαι πανταχόθεν τέ-
λος ὑπὸ τῆς λυμοῦ συναγομένους ἐσθίεν άλλήλων
10 ἀναγκασθῆναι, τοῦ δαμοῦνι τὴν οἰκείαν ἀμοιβὴν
αὐτοῖς ἐπιφέροντος τῇ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας ἀσεβείας καὶ
11 παρανομίας. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸν κίνδυνον οὐκ ἐτόλ-
μων ἐξείναι, προδήλου τῆς θητῆς καὶ τῆς τιμωρίας
τοῖς ἀλυσκομένοις ὑπάρχουσας, περὶ δὲ διαλύσεως
οὐδ’ ὑπενόον ποιεῖσθαι μνήμην, συνειδότες σφίσι
12 τὰ πεπραγμένα. προσανέχοντες δ’ ἀεὶ ταῖς ἐκ τοῦ
Τύνητος βοηθείας διὰ τὰς τῶν ἡγουμένων ἐπαγ-
γελίας πάν ὑπέμενον ποιεῖν κατὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν.

85 ἔπει δὲ κατεχρήσαντο μὲν ἀσεβῶς τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους,
τροφῆ ταύτης χρώμενοι, κατεχρήσαντο δὲ τὰ δοῦ-
λικὰ τῶν σωμάτων, ἐβοήθει δ’ ἐκ τοῦ Τύνητος οὐ-
2 δεῖς, τότε προδήλου τῆς αἰκίας διὰ τὴν περικάκη-
σιν ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν τοὺς ἡγεμόνων ὑπάρχουσας, ἐκρι-
ναν οἱ περὶ τὸν Αὐτάριτον καὶ Ζάρζαν καὶ Σπέν-
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in the art of war and mere unreasoning routine. For in many partial engagements, Hamilcar, like a good draught-player, by cutting off and surrounding large numbers of the enemy, destroyed them without their resisting, while in the more general battles he would sometimes inflict large loss by enticing them into unsuspected ambuscades and sometimes throw them into panic by appearing when they least expected it by day or by night. All those he captured were thrown to the elephants. Finally, taking them by surprise and encamping opposite to them in a position unfavourable for action on their part but favouring his own strong point—generalship—he brought them to such a pass, that not daring to risk a battle and unable to escape, as they were entirely surrounded by a trench and palisade, they were at last driven by famine to eat each other—a fitting retribution at the hands of Providence for their violation of all law human and divine in their treatment of their neighbours. They did not venture to march out and do battle, as they were faced by the certainty of defeat and condign punishment for all captured, and they did not even think of asking for terms, as they had their evil deeds on their conscience. Always expecting the relief from Tunis that their leaders continued to promise them, there was no crime against themselves that they scrupled to commit. 85. But when they had used up their prisoners in this abominable manner by feeding on them, and had used up their slaves, and no help came from Tunis, and their leaders saw that their persons were in obvious danger owing to the dreadful extremity to which the soldiers were reduced, Autaritus, Zarzas and Spendius decided to
διον ἐγχειρίζετο ἐαυτοὺς τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ δια-
λαλεῖν περὶ διαλύσεως Ἀμήλκα. πέμψαντες οὖν
κήρυκα καὶ λαβόντες συγχώρημα περὶ προσβείας,
 ilişki δέκα πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. πρὸς
οὐς Ἀμήλκας ὁμολογίας ἐποιήσατο τοιαύτας· ἦξι
εἶναι Καρχηδονίους ἐκλέξασθαι τῶν πολεμίων οὐς
ἀν αὐτοὶ βούλωνται δέκα· τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἄφ-
ιναι μετὰ χιτῶνος. γενομένων δὲ τούτων, εὐθέως
Ἀμήλκας ἐφ᾽ οὐς παρόντας ἐκλέγεσθαι κατὰ τὰς
ὁμολογίας. τῶν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Αὐτάρκην καὶ
Σπένδιον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἱγε-
μόνων τούτων τὸν τρόπον ἐκκυρίευσαν οἱ Καρχηδό-
νοι. τῶν δὲ Λεβύων, ἐπεὶ τὴν σύλληψιν ἡδονοῦ
τῶν ἱγεμόνων, νομισάντων, αὐτοὺς παρεσπονδήσατας
διὰ τὸ τὰς συνθήκας ἁγνοεῖν, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν
7 αἰτίαν ὁρμησάντων ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα, περιστήσας αὐτοῖς
Ἀμήλκας τὰ τε θηρία καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἀπαν-
τας διέφθειρε πλείους ὄντας τῶν τετρακασιμιρίων
περὶ τὸν τόπον τὸν Πρίονα καλούμενον· ὅν συμ-
βαίνει διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ σχήματος πρὸς τὸ νῦν
εἰρημένον ὀργανὸν ταύτης τετευχέναι τῆς προση-
γορίας.

86 Πράξας δὲ τὰ προδεδηλωμένα τοῖς μὲν Καρχη-
δονίους αὖθις ἐλπίδα παρέστησε μεγάλην πρὸς τὸ
βέλτιον, καίπερ ἀπεγνωκόσιν ἢδη τὴν σωτηρίαν·
αὐτός δὲ μετὰ Ναραία καὶ μετ᾽ Ἀναίβου τὴν χώ-
2 ραν ἐπῆει καὶ τὰς πόλεις. προσχωροῦντων δὲ καὶ
μετατιθέμενων πρὸς αὐτοὺς τῶν Λεβύων διὰ τὸ
γεγονός εὐτύχημα, ποιησάμενοι τὰς πλείστας πόλεις
ὑφ᾽ ἐαυτοῦς ἦκον ἐπὶ τὸν Τύνητα, καὶ πολιορκεῖν
3 ἐνεχείρησαν τοὺς περὶ τὸν Μάθω. κατὰ μὲν οὖν
τὴν ἀπὸ Καρχηδόνος πλευρὰν προσεστρατοπέδευσεν
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give themselves up to the enemy and discuss terms with Hamilcar. They therefore dispatched a herald, and when they had obtained leave to send envoys, they went, ten in all, to the Carthaginians. The terms Hamilcar made with them were, that the Carthaginians might choose from the enemy any ten they wished, the remainder being free to depart with one tunic apiece. These terms having been agreed to, Hamilcar at once said that by virtue of them he chose the ten envoys. By this means the Carthaginians got into their power Autaritus, Spendius, and the other principal leaders. The Libyans, when they learnt of their officers' arrest, thought they had been betrayed, as they were ignorant of the treaty, and rushed to arms, but Hamilcar, surrounding them with his elephants and the rest of his forces, cut them all to pieces. They numbered more than forty thousand. The scene of this slaughter was a place called the Saw from its resemblance to that tool.

86. By this achievement Hamilcar again made the Carthaginians very hopeful of better fortune, although by this time they had nearly given up all for lost. In conjunction with Naravas and Hannibal he now raided the country and its towns. The Libyans in general gave in and went over to them owing to the recent victory, and after reducing most of the cities, they reached Tunis and began to besiege Matho. Hannibal encamped on the side of
'Αννίβας, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπέναντι ταύτης Ἀμίλκας.
4 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα προσαγαγόντες πρὸς τὰ τείχη τοὺς περὶ τὸν Σπενδίουν αἰχμαλώτους ἐσταύρωσαν ἐπὶ- 
5 φανῶς. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάθω, κατανοήσαντες τὸν Ἀννίβαν ῥαθύμως καὶ κατατεθαρρηκότως ἀναστρε- 
φόμενον, ἐπιθέμενοι τῷ χάρακι πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν 
Καρχηδονίων ἀπέκτειναν, πάντας δὲ ἐξέβαλον ἐκ 
τῆς στρατοπεδείας, ἐκυρίευσαν δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς 
ἀπάσης, ἔλαβον δὲ καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν Ἀννίβαν ζω- 
6 γρία. τούτων μὲν οὖν παραχρῆμα πρὸς τὸν τοῦ 
Σπενδίουν σταυρὸν ἀγαγόντες καὶ τιμωρησάμενοι 
πικρῶς, ἐκείνον μὲν καθεὶλον, τούτων δὲ ἀνέθεσαν 
ζῶντα καὶ περικατέσφαξαν τριάκοντα τῶν Καρχηδο- 
νίων τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους περὶ τὸ τοῦ Σπενδίου
7 σώμα, τῆς τύχης ὠσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἐκ παραθέσεως 
ἀμφοτέρος ἐναλλὰξ διδούσας ἀφορμᾶς εἰς ὑπερβο-
8 λή τῆς κατ᾽ ἄλληλον τιμωρίας. ὁ δὲ Βάρκας ὡψὲ 
μὲν συνῆκε τὴν ἐπίθεσιν τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως διὰ 
τὴν ἀπόστασιν τῶν στρατοπέδων· οὐδὲ μὴν συνεὶσ 
οὐδ᾽ οὕτως κατετάχει πρὸς τὴν βοήθειαν διὰ τὰς
9 μεταξὺ δυσχωρίας. διόπερ ἀναζεύγας ἀπὸ τοῦ Τύ- 
νητος, καὶ παρελθὼν ἐπὶ τὸν Μακάραν ποταμόν, 
κατεστρατοπέδευσε πρὸς τῷ στόματι τοῦ ποταμοῦ 
καὶ τῇ θαλάττῃ.
87 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, παραδόξου τῆς περιπετείας 
αὐτοῖς φανείσις δυσθύμως καὶ δυσελπίστως ἐξῆκ 
πάλιν· ἄρτι γὰρ ἀναθαρροῦντες ταῖς ψυχαῖς παρὰ 
2 πόδας ἐπιπτοῦν αὖθις ταῖς ἐλπίσιν. οὐ μὴν ἀφ-
3 ἱσταντο τοῦ ποιεῖν τὰ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν. διὸ καὶ 
τριάκοντα μὲν τῆς γερουσίας προχειρισάμενοι, καὶ 
μετὰ τούτων τὸν πρότερον μὲν ἀπελθόντα στρα-
τηγὸν Ἀννώνα, (τότε δὲ ἐπαναγαγόντα) σὺν δὲ
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the town next Carthage and Hamilcar on the opposite side. Their next step was to take Spendius and the other prisoners up to the walls and crucify them there in the sight of all. Matho noticed that Hannibal was guilty of negligence and over-confidence, and attacking his camp, put many Carthaginians to the sword and drove them all out of the camp. All the baggage fell into the rebel's hands and they made Hannibal himself prisoner. Taking him at once to Spendius' cross they tortured him cruelly there, and then, taking Spendius down from the cross, they crucified Hannibal alive on it and slew round the body of Spendius thirty Carthaginians of the highest rank. Thus did Fortune, as if it were her design to compare them, give both the belligerents in turn cause and opportunity for inflicting on each other the cruellest punishments. Owing to the distance between the two camps it was some time before Hamilcar heard of the sortie and attack, and even then he was slow to give assistance owing to the difficult nature of the interjacent ground. He therefore broke up his camp before Tunis and on reaching the river Macaras, encamped at its mouth by the seaside.

87. The suddenness of this reverse took the Carthaginians by surprise, and they became again despondent and low-spirited. It was only the other day that their spirits had begun to revive; so they at once fell again. Yet they did not omit to take steps for their safety. They appointed a committee of thirty senators and dispatched them to Hamilcar accompanied by Hanno, the general who had previously retired from command, but now resumed it,
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toútois toûs υπολοίπους tòn eîn tais ἡλικίαις καθ- 4 ἐστελλὼν πρὸς τὸν Βάρκαν, ἐντειλάμενου πολλὰ τοὺς τῆς γερουσίας κατὰ πάντα τρόπον διαλύσαι τοὺς στρατηγούς ἐκ τῆς προγεγενημένης διαφορᾶς καὶ συμφρονεῖν σφᾶς ἀναγκάσαι, βλέψαντες εἰς τὰ παρ- 5 ὄντα τῶν πραγμάτων. δὲν πολλοὺς καὶ ποικίλους διαθεμένων λόγους, ἐπειδὴ συνήγαγον ὡμός τοὺς στρατηγούς, ἤγαγκάσθησαν συγχυρεῖν καὶ πείθε- σθαι τοὺς λεγομένους οἱ περὶ τῶν Ἀνωνα καὶ τὸν 8 Βάρκαν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἦδη συμφρονήσαντες μὴ γνώµη πάντα κατὰ νοῦν ἔπραττον τοῖς Καρχηδο- 7 νίοις, ὥστε τοὺς περὶ τὸν Μάθω, δυσχρηστομένους ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος κυνύνοις; πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐποίη- σαντο περὶ τὴν Δέπτων προσαγορευμένην καὶ τινὰς τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων, τέλος ἐπὶ τὸ διὰ μάχης κρίνειν ὅρμησαι τὰ πράγματα, προθυμὸς ἔχοντων 8 πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος καὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων. διὸσπερ ἀμφότεροι τούτο προθέμενοι παρεκάλουν μὲν πάν- 9 τας τοὺς συμμάχους πρὸς τὸν κυνύνον, συνήγον δὲ τὰς φρούρας ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ὡς ἄν μέλλοντες ἐκκυβεύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὄλων. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκατέρως ἦν τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἔτοιμα, παραταξάμενοι συν- 10 ἐβαλον ἀλλήλοις ἐξ ὀμολόγου. γενομένου δὲ τοῦ νικήταις κατὰ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, οἱ μὲν πλείστοι τῶν Λιβύων ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ κυνύῳ διεφθάρσαν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τινὰ πόλιν συμφυγόντες μετ’ οὐ πολὺ παρέδοσαν ἑαυτοὺς, ὅ δὲ Μάθως ὑποχείριος ἐγένετο τοῖς ἔθροις ἡγιρίᾳ.

88 Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα μέρη τῆς Λιβύης μετὰ τὴν 2 μάχην εὐθέως ὑπῆκουσε τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ὡ δὲ τῶν Ἰππακριτῶν καὶ τῶν Ἰτυκαϊῶν πόλις ἔμενον, 234
and by all their remaining citizens of military age, whom they had armed as a sort of forlorn hope. They enjoined these commissioners to put an end by all means in their power to the two generals’ long-standing quarrel, and to force them, in view of the circumstances, to be reconciled. The senators, after they had brought the generals together, pressed them with so many and varied arguments, that at length Hanno and Barcas were obliged to yield and do as they requested. After their reconciliation they were of one mind, and consequently everything went as well as the Carthaginians could wish, so that Matho, unsuccessful in the many partial engagements which took place around Leptis and some other cities, at length resolved to decide matters by a general battle, the Carthaginians being equally anxious for this. Both sides then, with this purpose, called on all their allies to join them for the battle and summoned in the garrisons from the towns, as if about to stake their all on the issue. When they were each ready to attack, they drew up their armies confronting each other and at a preconcerted signal closed. The Carthaginians gained the victory, most of the Libyans falling in the battle, while the rest escaped to a certain city and soon afterwards surrendered, but Matho himself was taken prisoner.

88. The rest of Libya at once submitted to Carthage after the battle, but Hippacritae and Utica
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οὐδεμίαν ἄφορμὴν ἔχουσαι πρὸς διάλυσιν διὰ τὸ μὴ καταλείπεσθαι σφῖα τόπον ἐλέους μηδὲ συγγνώ.

3 μῆς κατὰ τὰς πρώτας ἐπιβολάς. οὔτως καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα τὰς ἀμαρτίας μεγάλην ἔχει διαφορὰν ἡ μετριότης καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἀνήκεστον ἐπιτηδεύειν ἐκούσιως. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ παραστρατοπεδεύσαντες ἢ μὲν Ἀινων, ἢ δὲ Βάρκας, ταχέως ἧναγκαζαν αὐτοὺς ὁμολογίας ποιῆσασθαι καὶ διαλύσεις εὐδοκομένας Καρχηδονίοις.

5 Ο μὲν οὖν Λιβυκὸς πόλεμος εἰς τοιαῦτην ἀγα
gών περίστασιν Καρχηδονίους τοιοῦτον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, ὅπερ μὴ μόνον κυριεύσαι πάλιν τῆς Λιβύης τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τῆς ἀπο-

6 στάσεως τιμωρήσασθαι καταξίωσι: τὸ γάρ πέρας ἀγα
gόντες οἱ νέοι τὸν θρίαμβον διὰ τῆς πόλεως πᾶσαν

7 αἰκίαν ἐναπεδείξαντο τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάθω. τρία μὲν οὖν ἔτη καὶ τέταρτα που μὴν ἐπολέμησαν οἱ μισθοφόροι πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους πόλεμον ὃν ἡμεῖς ἰσμεν ἀκοὴ μαθόντες πολὺ τι τοὺς ἄλλους

8 ἀμόητητι καὶ παρανομία διενεργοῦτα. Ὁ Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τούτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Σαρδόνος αὐτομολησάντων μισθοφόρων πρὸς σφᾶς ἐκκληθέν
tes ἐπεβάλοντο πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν προειρημένην νῆσον.

9 τῶν δὲ Καρχηδόνιων ἀγανακτοῦντων, ὡς αὐτοῖς καθηκούσης μᾶλλον τῆς τῶν Σαρδώνων δυναστείας, καὶ παρασκευαζομένων μεταπορεύσθαι τοὺς ἀπο-

10 στήσαντας αὐτῶν τὴν νῆσον, λαβόμενοι τῆς ἄφορ
mῆς ταύτης οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι πόλεμον ἐψηφίσαντο πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους, φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐπὶ Σαρδόνιος, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ σφᾶς ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παρα-

11 σκευῆν. οἱ δὲ παραδόξως διαπεφευγότες τὸν προ-
BOOK I

still held out, feeling they had no reasonable grounds to expect terms in view of their having been so proof to all considerations of mercy and humanity when they first rebelled. This shows us that even in such offences it is advantageous to be moderate and abstain from unpardonable excesses. However, Hanno besieging one town and Barcas the other soon compelled them to accept such terms and ransom as the Carthaginians thought fit to impose.

This Libyan war, that had brought Carthage into such peril, resulted not only in the Carthaginians regaining possession of Libya, but in their being able to inflict exemplary punishment on the authors of the rebellion. The last scene in it was a triumphal procession of the young men leading Matho through the town and inflicting on him all kinds of torture. This war had lasted for three years and four months, and it far excelled all wars we know of in cruelty and defiance of principle.

The Romans about the same time, on the invitation of the mercenaries who had deserted to them from Sardinia, undertook an expedition to that island. When the Carthaginians objected on the ground that the sovereignty of Sardinia was rather their own than Rome’s, and began preparations for punishing those who were the cause of its revolt, the Romans made this the pretext of declaring war on them, alleging that the preparations were not against Sardinia, but against themselves. The Carthaginians, who had barely escaped destruction in this
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eιρημένον πόλεμον, κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀφυώς δια-
κείμενοι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν πρὸς τὸ πάλιν ἀναλαμβά-
νεων τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἀπέχθειαν, εἰξαντες τοῖς
καιροῖς οὐ μόνον ἀπέστησαν τῆς Σαρδόνους, ἀλλὰ
καὶ χίλια τάλαντα καὶ διακόσια προσέθηκαν τοῖς
Ῥωμαίοις, ἐφ’ ὃ μὴ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἀναδέξασθαι
τὸν πόλεμον. ταῦτα μὲν οὔτως ἐπράχθη.
BOOK I

last war, were in every respect ill-fitted at this moment to resume hostilities with Rome. Yielding therefore to circumstances, they not only gave up Sardinia, but agreed to pay a further sum of twelve hundred talents to the Romans to avoid going to war for the present.
Β’

1 Ἐν μὲν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης βύβλῳ διεσαφήσαμεν πότε Ῥωμαίοι συστησάμενοι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἐγχειρεῖν ἥραντο πράγμασιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτους πῶς εἰς Σικελίαν διέβησαν καὶ δι’ ἀς αἰτίας τὸν περὶ τῆς προειρημένης νῆσου συνεστήσαντο πόλεμον πρὸς Καρχηδονίους, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πότε πρῶτον συνίστασθαι ναυτικὰς ἥραντο δυνάμεις, καὶ τὰ συμβάντα κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκατέρους ἔως τοῦ τέλους, ἐν ὅ Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ἐξεχώρησαν πάντες Σικελίας, Ῥωμαίοι δὲ ἐπεκράτησαν τῆς ὅλης νῆσου πλῆθος τῶν ὑφ’ Ἰέρωνα ταττομένων μερῶν.

2 εἴς δὲ τούτους ἐπέβαλομεθα λέγειν πῶς στασιάσαντες οἱ μισθοφόροι πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους τὸν προσαγορευθέντα Λιβυκὸν πόλεμον ἔσχασαν, καὶ τὰ συμβάντα κατὰ τούτον ἀσεβήματα μέχρι τίνος προύθη καὶ τίνα διέσοδον ἔλαβε τὰ παράλογα τῶν ἐργών, ἔως τοῦ τέλους καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἐπικρατείας. νυνὶ δὲ τὰ συνεχῆ τούτους πειρασόμεθα δηλοῦν κεφαλαίως ἐκάστων ἐπιφανείας κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν.

3 Καρχηδόνιοι γὰρ ὡς θάττον κατεστήσαντο τὰ κατὰ τὴν Λιβυήν, εὐθέως Ἀμιλκαῖον ἐξαπέστελλον δυνάμεις συστησάντες εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν τόπους. ὁ δὲ ἀναλαβὼν τὰ στρατόπεδα καὶ τὸν νεόν 240
BOOK II

1. In the preceding book I stated in the first place at what date the Romans having subjected Italy began to concern themselves in enterprises outside the peninsula; next I narrated how they crossed to Sicily and what were their reasons for undertaking the war with Carthage for the possession of that island. After relating when and how they first built a navy, I pursued the history of the war until its end, at which the Carthaginians evacuated all Sicily, and the Romans acquired the whole island except Hiero’s dominions. In the next place I set myself to describe how the mercenaries mutinied against Carthage and set ablaze the so-called Libyan war; I described all the terrible atrocities committed in this war, all its dramatic surprises, and their issues, until it ended in the final triumph of Carthage. I will now attempt to give a summary view, according to my original project, of the events immediately following.

The Carthaginians, as soon as they had set the affairs of Libya in order, dispatched Hamilcar to Spain entrusting him with an adequate force. Taking with him his army and his son Hannibal now about
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'Ανέβαν, δι' αυτό τάτα κατὰ τὴν ἠλικίαν ἔτων ἔννεα, καὶ διαβάζαν κατὰ τάς Ἡρακλεός στῆλας ἀνεκτάτο τά κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν πράγματα τοῖς Καρχηδόνιοις. 7 διατρήψας δὲ ἐν τοῖς τόποις τούτοις ἐπὶ σχεδὸν ἐννέα, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν πολέμω, πολλοὺς δὲ πειθοὶ πουήσας Ἰβηρίων ὑπηκόους Καρχηδόνι, κατέστρεψε 8 τὸν βίον ἀξίως τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων. πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς ἄνδρωδεστάτους καὶ μεγίστην δύναμιν ἔχοντας παραταττόμενος, καὶ χρώμενος τολμηρός καὶ παραβόλως ἐαυτῷ κατά τὸν τοῦ κινδύνου και- 9 ρόν, ἔρρωμενς τὸν βίον μετῆλλαξε. τὴν δὲ στρα- τηγίαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι παρέδοσαν Ἀσδρούβα, τῷ 10 κείνῳ κηδεστῇ καὶ τριηράρχῃ.

2 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους Ἦρωμαιοι τὴν πρώ- την διάβασαν εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα καὶ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη τῆς Εὐρώπης ἐπεβάλοντο ποιεῖσθαι μετὰ δυνάμεως. 2 ἀπερ οὐ παρέγραψα, ἀλλὰ μετ’ ἑπιστάσεως θεωρη- τέον τοὺς βουλομένους ἀληθῶς τὴν τε πρόθεσιν τὴν ἡμετέραν συνθεάσασθαι καὶ τὴν αὐξήσαι καὶ 3 κατασκευήν τῆς Ἦρωμαίων δυναστείας. ἔγνωσαν δὲ 4 διαβαίνειν διὰ τινας τοιαύτας αἰτίας. Ἀγρων ὁ τῶν 5 Ἰλλυριῶν βασιλεὺς ἦν μὲν υἱὸς Πλευράτου, δύνα- μον δὲ πεζῆν καὶ ναυτικῆς μεγίστην ἐσχε τῶν πρὸ 6 αὐτών βεβασιλευκότων ἐν Ἰλλυρίωι. οὕτως ὁποῖος Δη- μητρίου τοῦ Φιλίππου πατρὸς πεισθεὶς χρήμασιν ὑπέσχετο βοηθήσει Mediwνιους ὑπ’ Ἀιτωλῶν πο- 6 λιορκουμένους. Αἰτωλοὶ γὰρ οὐδَاμῶς δυνάμενοι πείσαι Mediwνιους μετέχειν σφίσα τῆς αὐτῆς πολι- 7 τείας, ἐπεβάλοντο κατὰ κράτος ἔλειν αὐτούς. στρα- τεύσαντες οὖν πανδημεῖ, καὶ περιστρατοπεδέυσαν- τες αὐτῶν τὴν πόλιν, κατὰ τὸ συνεχές ἑπολιορκοῦν, 8 πᾶσαν βίαν προσφέροντες καὶ μηχανήν. συνάψαν- 242
BOOK II

nine years of age, he crossed the straits of Gibraltar
and applied himself to subjugating Spain to the
Carthaginians. In this country he spent about nine 228-229
B.C. years during which he reduced many Iberian tribes
to obedience either by force of arms or by diplomacy,
and finally met with an end worthy of his high
achievements, dying bravely in a battle against one
of the most warlike and powerful tribes, after freely
exposing his person to danger on the field. The
Carthaginians handed over the command of the army
to Hasdrubal his son-in-law and chief naval officer.

2. It was at this period that the Romans first
crossed with an army to Illyria and that part of
Europe. This is a matter not to be lightly passed
over, but deserving the serious attention of those
who wish to gain a true view of the purpose of this
work and of the formation and growth of the Roman
dominion. The circumstances which decided them 223-222
B.C. to cross were as follows: Agron, king of Illyria,
was the son of Pleuratus, and was master of stronger
land and sea forces than any king of Illyria before
him. Demetrius, the father of Philip V., had induced
him by a bribe to go to the assistance of the town
of Medion which the Aetolians were besieging.
The Aetolians being unable to persuade the Medion-
i ans to join their league, determined to reduce them
by force. Levying all their forces they encamped
round the city and strictly besieged it, employing
every forcible means and every device. The date

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tos ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου τῶν ἀρχαιοεἰσίων, καὶ δέον στρατηγὸν ἔτερον αἱρεῖσθαι, καὶ τῶν πολιορκουμένων ἢ δῆ ἔδωσεν ἐνδώσεων ἐαυτοὺς, ὁ προϊστάμενος στρατηγὸς προσφέρει λόγον τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς, φάσκων, ἐπειδὴ τὰς κακοπαθείας καὶ τοὺς κυνᾶς ἀναδεικνύει τοὺς κατὰ τὴν πολιορκίαν, δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τῶν λαφύρων, ἐπὶ κρατήσωσι, καὶ τὴν ἐπίγραφὴν τῶν ὅπλων ἐαυτῷ συγχωρεῖσθαι.

10 τοῦ ὅτι καὶ μάλιστα τῶν προϊστάμενων πρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀμφισβητοῦντων πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ παρακαλοῦντων τὰ πλήθει μὴ προδιαλαμβάνειν, ἀλλ' ἀκέραιον ἔτι, ὡς ποτὲ ἂν ἡ τύχη βουλθῇ περι-
11 θείαι τοῦ τοῦτον τὸν στέφανον, ἔδοξε τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς, ὅσ ἂν ἐπικατασταθήσει στρατηγὸς κρατήσῃ τῆς πόλεως, κοινῆς ποιεῖν τῷ προϊστάμενῳ καὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τῶν λαφύρων καὶ τὴν ἐπίγραφὴν τῶν ὅπλων.

3 Δεδομένων δὲ τούτων, καὶ δέον τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρα γενέσθαι τὴν αἰρέσιν καὶ τὴν παράληψιν τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθάπερ ἐδοθα ἐστὶν Αἰτωλοῖς, προσπλέουσι τῆς νυκτὸς ἑκατὸν λέμβοι πρὸς τὴν Μεσσηνίαν, κατὰ τοὺς ἐγχυστὰ τόπους τῆς πόλεως, ἐφ' ἓν ἢ σαν Ἰλ-2 λυροὶ πεντακισχίλιοι. καθορισθέντες δὲ, καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπιγενομένης ἐνεργὸν καὶ λαβραίαν ποιησά-
3 μεν τὴν ἀπόβασιν, καὶ χρησάμενοι τῇ παρ' αὐ-
τοῖς ἐθίσμενη τάξει, προῆγων κατὰ στείρας ἐπὶ τὴν
4 τῶν Αἰτωλῶν στρατοπεδεῖαν. οἱ δ' Αἰτωλοὶ, συν-
"έντες τὸ γενόμενον, ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ παραδόξῳ καὶ τῇ
tόλμῃ τῶν Ἰλυρῶν ἤσαν ἐκπλαγεῖσ' πεφρονημα-
tισμένοι δ' έκ πολλοῦ χρόνου, και καταπιστεύσαν-
tες ταῖς ἱδίαις δυνάμεσι, κατὰ ποσόν εὐθαρσῶς εἰ-
4 χον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πολὺ μέρος τῶν ὀπλιτῶν καὶ τῶν
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of the annual elections was now at hand, and they had to choose another Strategus. As the besieged were in the utmost extremity and were expected to surrender every day, the actual Strategus addressed the Aetolians, maintaining that as it was he who had supported the dangers and hardships of the siege, it was only just, that, on the town falling, he should have the privilege of dealing with the booty and inscribing with his name the shields dedicated in memory of the victory. Some, more especially the candidates for the office, disputed this, and begged the people not to decide the matter in advance, but leave it, as things stood, to Fortune to determine to whom she should award this prize. The Aetolians hereupon passed a resolution, that if it was the new Strategus whoever he might be, to whom the city fell, he should share with the present one the disposition of the booty and the honour of inscribing the shields.

3. This decree had been passed, and next day the election was to be held, and the new Strategus was to enter at once into office, as is the practice of the Aetolians, when that night a hundred boats containing a force of five thousand Illyrians arrived at the nearest point on the coast to Medion. Anchoring there they landed, as soon as it was daylight, with promptitude and secrecy, and forming in the order customary in Illyria, advanced by companies on the Aetolian camp. The Aetolians, on becoming aware of it, were taken aback by the unexpected nature and boldness of the attack, but having for many years ranked very high in their own estimation and relying on their strength, they were more or less confident. Stationing the greater part of their
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ιππέων αυτοῦ πρὸ τῆς στρατοπεδείας ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις παρενεβάλλον, μέρει δὲ τῶν τῆς ἵππου καὶ τοῖς εὐξώνιοι τοὺς ὑπερδεξίους καὶ πρὸ τοῦ χάρακος εὐφυοῖς κεμένους τόπους προκατελάμβανον. 5 οἱ δὲ Ἰλλυροῖ τοὺς μὲν ἐλαφροὺς ἕξ ἑφόδου προσπεσόντες τῷ τε πλήθει καὶ τῷ βάρει τῆς συντάξεως ἐξέσωσαν, τοὺς δὲ μετὰ τούτων ἰππεῖς συγκινδυνεύοντας ἦναγκασαν ἀποχωρῆσαι πρὸς τὰ βαρέα τῶν 8 ὀπλών. λοιπὸν ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου ποιούμενοι τήν ἐφοδον ἐπὶ τούς ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ τεταγμένους, ταχέως ἐτρέψαντο, συνεπιθεμένων τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς ἁμα καὶ τῶν 7 Μεδιώνων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν, ἐτί δὲ πλεῖοις αἰχμαλωτοὺς ἔλαβον· τῶν δὲ ὀπλῶν καὶ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς ἐγένοντο 8 πάσης ἐγκρατείας. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἰλλυροὶ πράξαντες τὸ συνταχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως, καὶ διακομίσαντες τὴν ἀποσκευήν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὑφελειάν ἐπὶ τοὺς λέμβους εὐθέως ἀνήγοντο, ποιούμενοι τὸν 4 πλοῦν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν. οἱ δὲ Μεδιώνοι τετευχότες ἀνελπίστου σωτηρίας, ἀθροισθέντες εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐβουλεύουντο περὶ τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ περὶ τῆς 2 τῶν ὀπλῶν ἐπιγραφῆς. ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς κοινὴν ποιῆσεων τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἔχοντο καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸ μέλλον προπορευ- 3 ὁμένων κατὰ τὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν δόγμα, τῆς τύχης ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκείνων συμβαίνοντων ἐνδεικνυμένης τὴν αὐτῆς δύ- 4 ναμών. ἀ γὰρ υπὸ τῶν ἔχθρων αὐτοῖς προσεδόκων ὡσον γῇ πείσεσθαι, ταῦτα πράττειν αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις παρέδωκεν ἐν πάνι βραχεὶ χρόνω κατὰ τῶν 5 πολεμίων. Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ τῇ παραδόξῳ χρησάμενοι συμφορᾶ πάντας ἐδίδαξαν μηδέποτε βουλεύεσθαι
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hoplites and cavalry on the level ground just in front of their lines, they occupied with a portion of their cavalry and their light-armed infantry certain favourable positions on the heights in front of the camp. The Illyrians, charging the light infantry, drove them from their positions by their superior force and the weight of their formation, compelling the supporting body of cavalry to fall back on the heavy-armed troops. After this, having the advantage of attacking the latter, who were drawn up on the plain, from higher ground, they speedily put them to flight, the Medionians also joining in the attack from the city. They killed many Aetolians and took a still larger number of prisoners, capturing all their arms and baggage. The Illyrians, having thus executed the orders of their king, carried off to their boats the baggage and other booty and at once set sail for home. 4. The Medionians, thus unexpectedly saved, met in assembly and discussed, among other matters, that of the proper inscription for the shields. They decided, in parody of the Aetolian decree, to inscribe them as won from and not by the present Aetolian chief magistrate and the candidates for next year's office. It seemed as if what had befallen this people was designed by Fortune to display her might to men in general. For in so brief a space of time she put it in their power to do to the enemy the very thing which they thought the enemy were just on the point of doing to themselves. The unlooked-for calamity of the Aetolians was a lesson to mankind never to
perί του μέλλοντος ὃς ἦδη γεγονότος, μηδε προ-
κατελπίζειν βεβαιουμένους ὑπὲρ διν ἀκμῇν ἐνδεχό-
μενόν ἔστιν ἄλλως γενέσθαι, νέμειν δὲ μερίδα τῷ
παραδόξῳ πανταχῇ μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὄντας, μάλιστα
δὲ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς.
6 Ὅ δὲ βασιλεὺς Ἀγριαν, ἔπει κατέπλευσαν οἱ
λέμβοι, διακούσας τῶν ἡγεμόνων τὰ κατὰ τὸν κύρ-
δυνον, καὶ περιχαρῆς γενόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ δοκεῖν Αἰτω-
λοὺς τούς μέγιστον ἔχοντας τὸ φρούμα νενικηκέ-
ναι, πρὸς μέθασα καὶ τινὰς τοιαύτας ἄλλας εὐσχίας
τραπείς ἐνέπεσεν εἰς πλευρῖτιν. εκ δὲ ταύτης ἐν
7 ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις μετῆλαξε τὸν βιον. τὴν δὲ βασι-
λείαν ἡ γυνὴ Τεύτα διαδεξαμένη τὸν κατὰ μέρος
χειρισμὸν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐποιεῖτο διὰ τῆς τῶν
8 φίλων πίστεως. χρωμένη δὲ λογισμῶις γνωακείοις,
καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ γεγονός εὐτύχημα μόνον ἀπο-
βλέπουσα, τῶν δὲ ἐκτὸς οὐδὲν περισκεπτομένη,
πρῶτον μὲν συνεχώρησε τοῖς κατ᾽ ἰδίαι πλέουσι
9 λήξεσθαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας, δεύτερον δὲ ἀθροίσασα
στόλον καὶ δύναμιν ὅλου ἐλάττω τῆς πρότερον ἐξ-
ἐπεμβαίνεται, πάσαν γῆν ἀποδείξασα πολεμίαν τοῖς ἡγο-
5 μένοις. οἱ δὲ ἐξαποσταλέντες τὴν μὲν πρῶτην ἐπι-
βολήν ἔσχον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡλείαν καὶ τὴν Μεσσηνίαν
ταῦτα γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰς χώρας Ἰλλυριοὶ πορθοῦντες δι-
2 ετέλουν. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μῆκος τῆς παραλίας καὶ διὰ τὸ
μεσογαίους εἰναι τὰς δυναστευόσας ἐν αὐταῖς πό-
λεις μακραὶ καὶ βραδεῖας λίαν ἐγίνοντο τοῖς προ-
ειρημένοις αἱ παραβοῆσαι πρὸς τὰς ἀποβάσεις τῶν
Illyriῶν. οθὲν ἀδεῶς ἐπέτρεψεν καὶ κατέσυμνον ἀεὶ
3 ταῦτα τὰς χώρας. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα τὸτε γενόμενοι
tῆς Ἡπείρου κατὰ Φωκίκην προσέσχον ἐπιστισμοῦ
4 χάριν. συμμίξαντες δὲ τῶν Γαλατῶν τινῶν, οἱ
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discuss the future as if it were the present, or to have any confident hope about things that may still turn out quite otherwise. We are but men, and should in every matter assign its share to the unexpected, this being especially true of war.

King Agron, when the flotilla returned and his officers gave him an account of the battle, was so overjoyed at the thought of having beaten the Aetolians, then the proudest of peoples, that he took to carousals and other convivial excesses, from which he fell into a pleurisy that ended fatally in a few days. He was succeeded on the throne by his wife Teuta, who left the details of administration to friends on whom she relied. As, with a woman’s natural shortness of view, she could see nothing but the recent success and had no eyes for what was going on elsewhere, she in the first place gave letters of marque to privateers to pillage any ships they met, and next she collected a fleet and a force of troops as large as the former one and sent it out, ordering the commanders to treat all countries alike as belonging to their enemies. 5. The expedition began by making a descent on Elis and Messenia, lands which the Illyrians had always been in the habit of pillaging, because, owing to the extent of their sea-board and owing to the principal cities being in the interior, help against their raids was distant and slow in arriving; so that they could always overrun and plunder those countries unmolested. On this occasion, however, they put in at Phoenice in Epirus for the purpose of provisioning themselves. There they fell in with certain Gaulish soldiers, about eight hundred
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μισθοφοροῦντες παρὰ τοὺς Ὁπειρώτας διέτριβον ἐν τῇ Φοινίκῃ, τὸ πλῆθος οὐντες εἰς ὀκτακοσίους, καὶ κοινολογηθέντες τούτοις περὶ προδοσίας τῆς πόλεως ἐξέβησαν, συγκαταθεμένων σφίσι τῶν προειρημένων, καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐξ ἐφόδου καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ κύριοι κατέστησαν, συνεργησάντων ἔσωθεν αὐτοῖς τῶν Γαλατῶν. οί δὲ Ὁπειρώται πυθόμενοι τὸ γεγονός ἐβοήθουν πανδημεί μετὰ σπουδῆς. παραγενόμενοι δὲ πρὸς τὴν Φοινίκην, καὶ προβαλόμενοι τὸν παρὰ τὴν πόλιν ῥέοντα ποταμὸν, ἔστρατοπέδευσαν, τῆς ἐπὶ αὐτῷ γεφύρας ἀναπάσαντες τὰς σα- νίδας ἀσφαλείας χάριν. προσαγγελθέντος δ’ αὐτοῖς Σκερδυλαίδαν ἔχοντα πεντακισχιλίους Ἰλλυρίους παραγίνεσθαι κατὰ γῆν διὰ τῶν παρ’ Ἀντιγόνειαν στενῶν, μερίσαντες αὐτῶν τινάς ἐξαπέστειλαν παραφυλάξοντας τὴν Ἀντιγόνειαν. αὐτοὶ δὲ τὰ τε λοιπὰ ραθύμως διήγον, ἀπολαύοντες τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀνέδην, τῶν τε κατὰ τὰς φυλακὰς καὶ προκοι- τίας ὑλιγώρουν. οί δὲ Ἰλλυροὶ συνέντευς τὸν μερί- σμον αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν ραθύμιαν, ἐκπορεύονται νυκτὸς. καὶ τῇ γεφύρᾳ σανίδας ἐπιβαλόντες τὸν τε ποταμὸν ἀσφαλῶς διέβησαν καὶ λαβόντες ὄχυρον τόπουν ἔμειναν τὸ λοιπὸν μέρος τῆς νυκτὸς. ἐπι- γενομένης δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ παραταξαμένων ἀμφο- τέρων πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, συνέβη λειψθήναι τοὺς Ὁπειρώτας, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν πεσεῖν, ἔτι δὲ πλείους ἀλώναι, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς διαφυγεῖν ὡς ἐπ’ Ἀττιτά- νων.

6 Οὕτως μὲν οὕν τουτοῖς περιπεσόντες ἀτυχή- μασι, καὶ πάσας ἀπολέσαντες τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπί- δας, ἐπρέσβευον πρὸς τοὺς Ἀιτωλοὺς καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνος, δεόμενοι μεθ’ ἱκετηρίας σφίσι βοή- 250
in number, at present in the employ of the Epirotes. They approached these Gauls with a proposal for the betrayal of the city, and on their agreeing, they landed and captured the town and its inhabitants by assault with the help from within of the Gauls. When the Epirotes learnt of this they hastened to come to help with their whole force. On reaching Phoenice they encamped with the river that runs past the town on their front, removing the planking of the bridge so as to be in safety. On news reaching them that Scerdilaïdas with five thousand Illyrians was approaching by land through the pass near Antigonia, they detached a portion of their force to guard Antigonia, but they themselves henceforth remained at their ease, faring plenteously on the produce of the country, and quite neglecting night and day watches. The Illyrians, learning of the partition of the Epirot force and of their general remissness, made a night sortie, and replacing the planks of the bridge, crossed the river in safety and occupied a strong position where they remained for the rest of the night. When day broke, both armies drew up their forces in front of the town and engaged. The battle resulted in the defeat of the Epirots, many of whom were killed and still more taken prisoners, the rest escaping in the direction of Atintania.

6. The Epirots, having met with this misfortune and lost all hope in themselves, sent embassies to the Aetolians and to the Achaean league imploring their
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2 θείν. οἱ δὲ κατελείσαντες τὰς συμφορὰς αὐτῶν ὑπῆκουσαν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα παραβοήθουντες ἦκον
3 εἰς Ἐλικρανοῦ. οἱ δὲ τὴν Φωνίκην κατασχόντες, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον παραγενόμενοι μετὰ Σκερδιλαίδου πρὸς τὸ χωρίον παρεσχετοπέδευσαν τοὺς βεβοήθηκος.
4 θηκόστην, βουλόμενοι συμβαλεῖν. δυσχρηστοῦμενοι δὲ διὰ τὰς δυσχωρίας τῶν τόπων, ἀμα δὲ καὶ προσπε- σόντων παρὰ τῆς Τεύτας γραμμάτων, δι' ὁν ἠτερον δὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ταχίστην εἰς οἶκον ἀναχωρεῖν διὰ τὸ τυχαί τῶν Ἰλυρῶν, ἀφεστηκέναι πρὸς τοὺς Καρ- 
5 δανεῖς, οὕτω λεηστῆσαντες τὴν Ἡπειρον ἀνοχᾶς
6 ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς τοὺς Ἡπειρώτας. ἐν αἷς τὰ μὲν ἐλεύθερα σώματα καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀπολυτρώσαντες αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ δουλικὰ καὶ τὴν λουτὴν σκευὴν ἀνα- λαβόντες εἰς τοὺς λέμβους, οἱ μὲν ἀπέπλευσαν, οἱ
7 δὲ περὶ τὸν Σκερδιλαίδαν πεζῷ πάλιν ἀνεχώρησαν
8 διὰ τῶν παρὰ τὴν Ἀντιγόνειαν στενῶν, οὐ μικρὰν οὐδὲ τὴν τυχόδασαν κατάπληξιν καὶ φόβουν ἐνεπογασά- μενοι τοὺς τὰς παραλίας οἰκούν τῶν Ἐλλήνων.
9 ἐκαστοι γὰρ θεωροῦντες τὴν ὀχυρωτάτην ἁμα καὶ δυνατώτατην πόλιν τῶν ἐν Ἡπειρῷ παραλόγως οὕτως ἐξηγήγαντο διασυνεργεῖσθην, οὐκέτι περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας ἡγώνιων, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν χρό- νοις, ἀλλὰ περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν πόλεων.
10 Οἱ δ' Ἡπειρῶται παραδόξως διασεσσωμένοι, το- 
11 σοῦτον ἀπείχον τοὺς πειράζειν ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς ἡδι- κηκότας ἢ χάρων ἀποδίδοντι τοὺς βοηθήσασιν, ἃς ἔ 

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succour. Both leagues took pity on their situation and consented, and shortly afterwards this relieving force reached Helicranum. The Illyrians in Phoenice at first united with Scerdilaidas, and advancing to Helicranum encamped opposite the Achaeans and Aetolians, and were anxious to give battle. But the ground was very difficult and unfavourable to them, and just at this time a dispatch came from Teuta ordering them to return home by the quickest route, as some of the Illyrians had revolted to the Dardanians. They therefore, after plundering Epirus, made a truce with the Epirots. By the terms of this they gave up to them the city and its free population on payment of a ransom; the slaves and other goods and chattels they put on board their boats, and while the one force sailed off home, Scerdilaidas marched back through the pass near Antigonia. They had caused the Greek inhabitants of the coast no little consternation and alarm; for, seeing the most strongly situated and most powerful town in Epirus thus suddenly taken and its population enslaved, they began to be anxious not, as in former times, for their agricultural produce, but for the safety of themselves and their cities.

The Epirots, thus unexpectedly saved, were so far from attempting to retaliate on the wrongdoers or from thanking those who had come to their relief, that, on the contrary, they sent an embassy to Teuta, and together with the Acarnanians entered into an alliance with Illyria, engaging in future to co-operate with the Illyrians and work against the Achaeans and Aetolians. Their whole conduct showed them
μὲν κεχρημένοι τότε τοὺς ευεργέτας, ἀφρόνως δὲ ἐξ ἀρχής βεβουλευμένοι περὶ τῶν καθ’ αὐτοὺς πραγ-μάτων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ὄντας παραλόγως περιπεσεῖν τινι τῶν δεινῶν οὐ τῶν παθόντων, τῆς 2 τύχης δὲ καὶ τῶν πραξάντων ἐστὶν ἔγκλημα, τὸ δ’ ἀκριτικός καὶ προφανῶς περιβαλέοι αὐτοῖς ταῖς μεγίσταις συμφοραῖς ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστι τῶν πασχόν-3 των ἀμάρτημα. διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τύχης πταίουσιν ἔλεος ἐπεται μετὰ συγγνώμης κάπικουρία, τοῖς δὲ διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀβουλίαν ὁνείδος καταστήμησις 4 συνεξακολουθεῖ παρὰ τοῖς εὐ φρονοῦσιν. ἄ δὴ καὶ τότε παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰκότως ἀν τοῖς 5 Ἡπειρώταις ἀπηντήθη. πρῶτον γὰρ τίς οὐκ ἂν τὴν κοινὴν περὶ Γαλατῶν φήμην ὑποδόμενος εὐλαβθεὶς τούτοις ἐγχείρισαι πόλιν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πολ-6 λὰς ἀφορμὰς ἔχουσαν εἰς παρασπόνδησιν; δεύτερον τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐφυλάξατο τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ συστήματος εἰκείνου προαίρεσιν; οἱ γε τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν ἐξέπεσον ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας, συνδραμόντων ἐπ’ αὐτούς τῶν ὁμο-εθνῶν, διὰ τὸ παρασπόνδησαι τοὺς αὐτῶν οἰκείους 7 καὶ συγγενεῖς. ὑποδέξαμένων γε μὴν αὐτούς Καρχη-δονίων διὰ τὸ κατεπείγεσθαι πολέμῳ, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον γενομένης τινος ἀντιρρήσεως τοῖς στρατιώταις πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ὑπὲρ ὁμολογίας εξ αὐτῆς ἐπεβάλ·λοντο διαρπάξων τὴν τῶν Ἀκραγαντίων πόλιν, φυλακῆς χάριν ἑισαχθέντες εἰς αὐτὴν, ὄντες τότε 8 πλείους τῶν τρισχιλίων μετὰ δὲ ταύτα παρεσ-αγαγόντων αὐτοὺς πάλιν εἰς Ἐρυκα τῆς αὐτῆς χρείας ἐνεκεν, πολυρροκούντων τὴν πόλιν Ἡρωμαίων, ἐπε-εχείρησαν μὲν καὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς συμπολιορ-9 κουμένους προδοῦναι. τῆς δὲ πράξεως ταύτης ἀπο-
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not only to have acted now towards their benefactors without judgement, but to have blundered from the outset in the management of their own affairs. 7. For we are but men, and to meet with some unexpected blow is not the sufferer’s fault, but that of Fortune and those who inflict it on him; but when we involve ourselves by sheer lack of judgement and with our eyes open in the depth of misfortune, everyone acknowledges that we have none to blame but ourselves. It is for this reason that those whom Fortune leads astray meet with pity, pardon and help, but if their failures are due to their own indiscretion, all right-thinking men blame and reproach them. And in this case the Greeks would have been amply justified in their censure of the Epirotes. To begin with would not anyone who is aware of the general reputation of the Gauls, think twice before entrusting to them a wealthy city, the betrayal of which was easy and profitable? In the second place who would not have been cautious in the case of a company with such a bad name? First of all they had been expelled from their own country by a general movement of their fellow-countrymen owing to their having betrayed their own friends and kinsmen. Again, when the Carthaginians, hard pressed by the war, received them, they first availed themselves of a dispute about pay between the soldiers and generals to pillage the city of Agrigentum of which they formed the garrison, being then about three thousand strong. Afterwards, when the Carthaginians sent them on the same service to Eryx, then besieged by the Romans, they attempted to betray the city and those who were suffering siege in their company, and when this plan fell through, they deserted to
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tυχόντες ἑυτομόλησαν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους· παρ᾽ ὁς πιστευόντες πάλιν ἐσύλησαν τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδί- 
10 τῆς Έρυκίνης ἱερόν. διὸ σοφῶς ἐπεγνωκότες Ἦρωμαῖοι τὴν ἀσέβειαν αὐτῶν, ἀμα τὰ διαλύσασθαι τὸν πρὸς Καρχηδονίους πόλεμον οὐδὲν ἐποιήσαντο προυργιαίτερον τοῦ παραπλήσασται αὐτοῖς ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς πλοῖα καὶ τῆς Ἰταλίας πάσης ἔξοριστους κατα-
11 στήσα. οὕς Ἡπειρῶται τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῶν νόμων φύλακας ποιησάμενοι, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονε-
στάτην πόλιν ἐγχειρίσαντες, πῶς οὐκ ἄν εἰκότως φανεῖσαν αὐτοί τῶν συμπτωμάτων αὐτοῖς αἰτίοι 
γενότες;

12 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Ἡπειρωτῶν ἁγνοίας, καὶ περὶ 
τοῦ μηδέποτε δεῖν τοὺς εὐ φρονοῦντας ἱσχυροτέραν 
eιςάγεσθαι φυλακῆν ἄλλως τε καὶ βαρβάρων, ἔπι 
8 τοσοῦτον ἐκρινον ποιήσασθαι μνήμην. οἱ δ’ Ἡλυ-
ριοι καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνωτέρω μὲν χρόνους συνεχῶς 
2 ἡδίκουν τοὺς πλοῖζομένους ἀπ’ Ἰταλίας· καθ’ οὕς 
δὲ καίρος περὶ τὴν Φοινίκην διέτριβον, καὶ πλεῖ-
ους ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου χωριζόμενοι πολλοὺς τῶν Ἰτα-
λικῶν ἐμπόρων ἐσθ’ οὓς μὲν ἐσύλησαν, οὓς δ’ 
ἀπέσφαξαν, οὓς ὀλίγους δὲ καὶ ζωγρα τῶν ἀλισκο-
3 μένων ἄνηγον. οἱ δὲ Ἦρωμαιοι, παρακούοντες τὸν 
πρὸ τοῦ χρόνου τῶν ἐγκαλοῦντων τοῖς Ἡλυριοῖς, 
τότε καὶ πλεῖον ἐπελθόντων ἐπὶ τὴν σύγκλητον, 
κατέστησαν προσβευτὰς εἰς τὴν Ἡλυρίδα τοὺς ἐπὶ-
σκεψὶν ποιησομένους περὶ τῶν προετριμένων Γαίον 
4 καὶ Λευκίων Κορογκανίος. ἡ δὲ Τεύτα, καταπλευ-
σάντως πρὸς αὐτὴν τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἡπείρου λέμβων, 
καταπλαγεῖσα τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος τῆς ἀγομέ-
νης κατασκευῆς· πολὺ γὰρ Ἡ Φοινίκη διέβερε τότε 
tῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἡπείρον πόλεων εὐδαιμονία· διπλα-
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the Romans. The Romans entrusted them with the guard of the temple of Venus Erycina, which again they pillaged. Therefore, no sooner was the war with Carthage over, than the Romans, having clear evidence of their infamous character, took the very first opportunity of disarming them, putting them on board ship and banishing them from the whole of Italy. These were the men whom the Epirots employed to guard their laws and liberties and to whom they entrusted their most flourishing city. How then can they be acquitted of the charge of causing their own misfortunes?

I thought it necessary to speak at some length on this subject in order to show how foolish the Epirots were, and that no people, if wise, should ever admit a garrison stronger than their own forces, especially if composed of barbarians. 8. To return to the Illyrians. For a long time previously they had been in the habit of maltreating vessels sailing from Italy, and now while they were at Phoenice, a number of them detached themselves from the fleet and robbed or killed many Italian traders, capturing and carrying off no small number of prisoners. The Romans had hitherto turned a deaf ear to the complaints made against the Illyrians, but now when a number of persons approached the Senate on the 230 B.C. subject, they appointed two envoys, Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius, to proceed to Illyria, and investigate the matter. Teuta, on the return of the flotilla from Epirus, was so struck with admiration by the quantity and beauty of the spoils they brought back (Phoenice being then far the wealthiest city there), that she
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σίως ἐπερρώσθη πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄδικαν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα τὸτε μὲν ἔπεσχε διὰ τὰς ἔγχωριον ταραχὰς, καταστησαμένη δὲ ταχέως τὰ κατὰ τοὺς ἀποστάντας Ἰλλυριοῦς ἐπολιόρκει τὴν Ἰσσαν διὰ τὸ ταύτην ἔτι μόνον ἀπεδείχθη. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τούτων κατέπλευσαν οἱ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρέσβεις· καὶ δοθέντος αὐτοῖς καιροὺ πρὸς ἐντευξιὰν διελέγοντο περὶ τῶν ἐκ αὐτῶν γεγονότων ἀδικημάτων. ἦ δὲ Τεύτα καθόλου μὲν παρ᾽ ὄλην τὴν κοινολογίαν ἀγερώχως καὶ λίαν ὑπερηφάνως αὐτῶν δυνάκουν. καταπαυσάντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, κοινῇ μὲν ἐφ᾽ εἰρᾶσθαι φροντίζειν ἵνα μηδὲν ἀδίκημα γίνηται Ῥωμαίοις ἐξ Ἰλλυρίων. ἦδαι γε μὴν οὐ νόμιμον εἶναι τοῖς βασιλεῦσι κωλύειν Ἰλλυρίωις τὰ παρ᾽ 

θάλατταν ὑφελείας. ὦ δὲ νεώτερος τῶν πρεσβευτῶν, δυσχεράνας ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἔχρησατο παρατηρεῖν καθηκούση μὲν, οὐδαμῶς δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν. ἐπε γὰρ ὅτι Ῥωμαίοις μὲν, ὁ Τεύτα, κάλλιστον ἕθος ἐστὶ τὰ κατ᾽ ἴδιαν ἀδικήματα κοινῇ μετα- 

πορεύεσθαι καὶ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις· πειρασόμεθα δὴ θεοῦ βουλομένου σφόδρα καὶ ταχέως ἀναγκάσαι σὲ τὰ βασιλικὰ νόμιμα διορθώσασθαι πρὸς Ἰλλυρίωις. ἦ δὲ γυναικοθύμως καλογίστως δεξαμενὴ τὴν παρατηρίαν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐξωργίσθη πρὸς τὸ ῥηθὲν ὡς ὀλυγωρήσασα τῶν παρ᾽ ἀνθρώποις ὀρισμένων δικαίων ἀποπλέουσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπαποστείλαι τινὰς τὸν παραστησάμενον τῶν πρέσβεων ἀπο-

κτεῖναι. προσπεσόντος δὲ τοῦ γεγονότος εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, διοργισθέντες ἐπὶ τῇ παρανομίᾳ τῆς γυναικὸς εὐθέως περὶ παρασκευὴν ἐγίνοντο, καὶ στρατιωτικὸς ἐτού τούτῳ συνήθροιζον.

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was twice as eager as before to molest the Greeks. For the present, however, she had to defer her projects owing to the disturbance in her own dominions; she had speedily put down the revolt elsewhere, but was engaged in besieging Issa, which alone still refused to submit to her, when the Roman ambassadors arrived. Audience having been granted them, they began to speak of the outrages committed against them. Teuta, during the whole interview, listened to them in a most arrogant and overbearing manner, and when they had finished speaking, she said she would see to it that Rome suffered no public wrong from Illyria, but that, as for private wrongs, it was contrary to the custom of the Illyrian kings to hinder their subjects from winning booty from the sea. The younger of the ambassadors was very indignant at these words of hers, and spoke out with a frankness most proper indeed, but highly inopportune: "O Teuta," he said, "the Romans have an admirable custom, which is to punish publicly the doers of private wrongs and publicly come to the help of the wronged. Be sure that we will try, God willing, by might and main and right soon, to force thee to mend the custom toward the Illyrians of their kings." Giving way to her temper like a woman and heedless of the consequences, she took this frankness ill, and was so enraged at the speech that, defying the law of nations, when the ambassadors left in their ship, she sent emissaries to assassinate the one who had been so bold of speech. On the news reaching Rome, the outrage created great indignation and they at once set themselves to prepare for an expedition, enrolling legions and getting a fleet together.
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9 Ἡ δὲ Τεύτα, τῆς ὥρας ἐπιγενομένης, ἐπισκευάσασα λέμβους πλείους τῶν πρότερον ἐξαπέστειλε πάλιν εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τόπους. ὅπερος δὲ τι προσέσχε τὸν τῶν Ἑπιδαμνῶν λιμένα, λόγῳ μὲν ὑδρείας καταστείσμου χάρων, ἔργῳ δ’ ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ πράξεως ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν. τῶν δ’ Ἑπιδαμνῶν ἀκάκως ἀμα καὶ βαθύμως αὐτοὺς παραδεξαμένων, εἰσελθόντες ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς περί-ζώμασιν ὡς ὑδρευσόμενοι, μαχαῖρας ἔχοντες ἐν τοῖς κεραμίοις, οὕτως κατασφάζαντες τοὺς φυλάττοντας τὴν πύλην ταχέως ἐγκρατείς ἐγένοντο τοῦ πυλώνος. 4 ἐπιγενομένης δὲ κατά τὸ συντεταγμένον ἐνεργῶς τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν πλοίων βοηθείας, παραδεξαμένου τού- 5 τούς ῥαδίως κατείχον τὰ πλείοτα τῶν τειχῶν. τῶν δ’ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπαρασκεύως μὲν διὰ τὸ παρα-δοξοὶ, ἐκθύμως δὲ βοηθούντων καὶ διαγωνιζομένων, συνέβη τοὺς Ἰλλυρίους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἀντιποι- 6 σαμένους τέλος ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. Ἐπι- δάμνους μὲν ὃν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πράξει διὰ μὲν τὴν ὀλγωρίαν ἐκυψεύσαν ἀποβαλεῖν τὴν πατρίδα, διὰ δὲ τὴν εὐπυργίαν ἀβλαβῶς ἐπαιδεύθησαν πρὸς τὸ 7 μέλλον. τῶν δ’ Ἰλλυρίων οἱ προεστῶτες κατὰ σπου- δὴν ἀναχέντες, καὶ συνάφαντες τοῖς προπλέουσι, κατήραν εἰς τὴν Κέρκυραν καὶ ποιησάμενοι κατα- πληκτικὴν τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἐνεχείρησαν πολιορκεῖν τὴν 8 πόλιν. ὃν συμβαίνοντων οἱ Κέρκυραιοί, δυσχη- στούμενοι καὶ δυσελπίστως διακείμενοι τοῖς ὀλοῖς, ἐπρεσβεύσαντο πρὸς τε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ τοὺς Αἰτω- λοὺς, ἀμα δὲ τούτοις Ἀπολλωνίαται καὶ Ἐπιδά- μνοι, δεόμενοι σφίσι βοηθεῖν κατὰ σπουδὴν καὶ μὴ περιδείν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναστάτους γενομένους ὑπὸ 260
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9. Teuta, when the season came, fitted out a larger number of boats than before and dispatched them to the Greek coasts. Some of them sailed through the strait to Corcyra, while a part put in to the harbour of Epidamnus, professedly to water and provision, but really with the design of surprising and seizing the town. They were received by the Epidamnians without any suspicion or concern, and landing as if for the purpose of watering, lightly clad but with swords concealed in the water-jars, they cut down the guards of the gate and at once possessed themselves of the gate-tower. A force from the ships was quickly on the spot, as had been arranged, and thus reinforced, they easily occupied the greater part of the walls. The citizens were taken by surprise and quite unprepared, but they rushed to arms and fought with great gallantry, the result being that the Illyrians, after considerable resistance, were driven out of the town. Thus the Epidamnians on this occasion came very near losing their native town by their negligence, but through their courage escaped with a salutary lesson for the future. The Illyrian commanders hastened to get under weigh and catching up the rest of their flotilla bore down on Corcyra. There they landed, to the consternation of the inhabitants, and laid siege to the city. Upon this the Corcyreans, in the utmost distress and despondency, sent, together with the peoples of Apollonia and Epidamnus, envoys to the Achaean and Aetolians, imploring them to hasten to their relief and not allow them to be driven from
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9 τῶν Ἰλλυρίων. οἱ δὲ διακούσαντες τῶν πρέσβεων, καὶ προσδέχαμεν τοὺς λόγους, ἐπιλήφθωσαν κοινῆ τὰς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν δέκα ναύς καταφράκτους, καταρτίσαντες δὲ ἐν ὁλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐπέλεγον ἐπὶ τῆς Κερ-κύρας, ἐπίπλοντες λύσειν τὴν πολυρκίαν. οἱ δὲ Ἰλλυριοί, συμπαραλαβόντες Ἀκαρνάνων ναύς κατὰ τὴν συμμοχὰν οὕσα ἐπτὰ καταφράκτους, ἀντανακλάντες συνέβαλον τοῖς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σκάφεσι περὶ 2 τοὺς καλομεμένους Παξοὺς. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀκαρνάνες καὶ τῶν Ἀχαικῶν νεῶν αἱ κατὰ τοῦτος ταχθεῖσαι πάρισον ἐποίουν τὸν ἀγώνα καὶ διέμενοι ἀκέραιοι κατὰ τὰς συμπλοκᾶς πλῆθος τῶν εἰς αὐτοὺς τοὺς 3 ἀνδρὰς γυνομένων τραυμάτων. οἱ δὲ Ἰλλυριοὶ ξεύξαντες τοὺς παρ’ αὐτῶν λέμβος ἀνὰ τέταρτας συνεπλέκοντο τοῖς πολεμίοις. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἰδίων ὀλγισμοῦ, καὶ παραβάλλοντες πλαγίους συνήργουν 4 ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς τῶν ὑπεναντίων. διὸ δὲ τρώσαντα καὶ δεθέντα κατὰ τὰς ἐμβολὰς δυσχρήστως (διέκειτο πρὸς τὸ παρὸν) τὰ τῶν ἀντιπάλων σκάφη, προσκρεμαμένων αὐτοῖς περὶ τοὺς ἐμβόλους τῶν ἐξευνέμενων λέμβων, τὸτ’ ἐπιπηδῶντες ἐπὶ τὰ καταστρώματα τῶν Ἀχαικῶν νεῶν κατεκράτουν διὰ τὸ πλῆ- 5 θος τῶν ἐπιβατῶν. καὶ τούτω τῷ τρόπῳ τεττάρων μὲν πλοίων ἐκιρήσαντα τετρήμηκαν, μίαν δὲ πεν- τήρια σὺν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐβύθισαν, ἐφ’ ἦς ἔπλει Μάργος ὁ Καρνεύος, ἀνὴρ πάντα τὰ δίκαια τῷ κοινῷ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτεύματι πεποιηκός μέχρι 6 τῆς καταστροφῆς. οἱ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαρνάνας δια- γωνίζομεν, συνδόντες τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Ἰλλυρίους προτέρημα, καὶ πιστεύοντες τῷ ταχυναυτεῖν, ἐποι- ρώσαντες ἀσφαλῶς τὴν ἀποχώρησιν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν 7 ἐποιήσαντο. τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἰλλυρίων πλῆθος, φρονη- 262
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their homes by the Illyrians. The two Leagues, after listening to the envoys, consented to their request, and both joined in manning the ten decked ships belonging to the Achaean. In a few days they were ready for sea and sailed for Corcyra in the hope of raising the siege. 10. The Illyrians, now reinforced by seven decked ships sent by the Acarnanians in compliance with the terms of their treaty, put to sea and encountered the Achaean ships off the island of Pæsi. The Acarnanians and those Achaean ships which were told off to engage them fought with no advantage on either side, remaining undamaged in their encounter except for the wounds inflicted on some of the crew. The Illyrians lashed their boats together in batches of four and thus engaged the enemy. They sacrificed their own boats, presenting them broadside to their adversaries in a position favouring their charge, but when the enemy's ships had charged and struck them and getting fixed in them, found themselves in difficulties, as in each case the four boats lashed together were hanging on to their beaks, they leapt on to the decks of the Achaean ships and overmastered them by their numbers. In this way they captured four quadrirremes and sunk with all hands a quinquereme, on board of which was Margos of Caryneia, a man who up to the end served the Achaean most loyally. The ships that were engaged with the Acarnanians, seeing the success of the Illyrians, and trusting to their speed, made sail with a fair wind and escaped home in safety. The Illyrian forces, highly elated by their
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ματισθὲν ἐπὶ τῷ προτερῆματι, λουπὸν ἢδη ῥαδίως ἔχρησατο τῇ πολιορκίᾳ καὶ τεθαρρηκότως. οἱ δὲ
8 Κερκυραῖοι, δυσελπιστήσαντες τοῖς ὁλοῖς ἐκ τῶν συμβεβηκότων, βραχὺν ἔτι χρόνων ὑπομείναντες τῇ
πολιορκίᾳ, συνέθεντο τοῖς Ἰλλυρίοις, καὶ παρεδέ-
ξαντο φρουρὰν καὶ μετά τῆς φρουρᾶς Δημήτριον
9 τὸν Φάριον. τοῖς δὲ πραξάντων εὐθέως οἱ
tῶν Ἰλλυρῶν προεστῶτες ἀνήγοντο· καὶ κατάρα-
tες εἰς τὴν Ἑπίδαμον ταύτῃ πόλιν ἐπέβαλοντο
πολιορκεῖν τὴν πόλιν.
11 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καίρους τῶν τὰς ὕπατους
ἀρχὰς ἔχοντων Γνάιος μὲν Φουλούς ἐξέπλευ παυσὶ
dιακοσίαις ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης, Ἀδλός δὲ Ποστούμιος τὰς
2 πεζικὰς ἔχων δυνάμεις ἔξωμα. τὴν μὲν οὖν πρώ-
tὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἐσχε πλεῖν ὁ Γνάιος ἐπὶ τῆς Κερκύ-
ρας, ὑπολαμβάνων ἐτὶ καταλήψεσθαι τῇ πολιορ-
3 κίαν ἀκριτον. ὑστερήσας δὲ τῶν καίρων ὅμως ἐπὶ
tὴν νήσον ἐπλευ, βουλόμενος ἁμα μὲν ἐπιγνώμαι
σαφῶς τὰ γεγονότα περὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἁμα δὲ πείραν
λαβεῖν τῶν παρὰ τοῦ Δημήτριον προσαγγελλομέ-
4 νων. ὁ γὰρ Δημήτριος ἐν διαβολαῖς ὦν καὶ φο-
βούμενος τὴν Τεύταν διεπέμπετο πρὸς τοὺς Ῥω-
μαίους, ἐπαγγελλόμενος τὴν τε πόλιν ἐγχειρεῖν καὶ
tὰ λοιπὰ πράγματα παραδώσειν, ὥν ἦν αὐτὸς κύ-
5 ριος. οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν Ῥω-
μαίων ἂμενός Ἰδόντες, τὴν τε φρουρᾶν παρέδοσαν
tῶν Ἰλλυρῶν μετὰ τῆς τοῦ Δημήτριον γνώμης, αὐτοῖς
tὰ σφῶς ὀμοΘυμαῖν ἔως καὶ παρακληθέντες
eἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν, μιὰ ταύτῃ ὑπολα-
βόντες ἀσφάλειαι αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα
6 χρόνον πρὸς τὴν Ἰλλυρῶν παρανομάν. Ῥωμαῖοι
de προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς Κερκυραίους εἰς τὴν φιλίαν
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success, continued the siege with more security and
confidence, and the Corcyreans, whose hopes were
 crushed by the repulse of their allies, after enduring
the siege for a short time longer, came to terms with
the Illyrians, receiving a garrison under the command
of Demetrius of Pharos. After this the Illyrian
commanders at once sailed off and coming to anchor
at Epidamnus, again set themselves to besiege
that city.

11. At about the same time one of the Consuls,
Gnaeus Fulvius, sailed out from Rome with the two
hundred ships, while the other, Aulus Postumius,
left with the land forces. Gnaeus’ first intention
had been to make for Corcyra, as he supposed
he would find the siege still undecided. On
discovering that he was too late, he none the less
sailed for that island, wishing on the one hand
to find out accurately what had happened about the
city, and on the other hand to put to a test the
sincerity of communications made to him by Demet-
rius. Accusations had been brought against the
latter, and being in fear of Teuta he sent messages
to the Romans undertaking to hand over to them
the city and whatever else was under his charge.
The Corcyreans were much relieved to see the
Romans arrive, and they gave up the Illyrian garrison
to them with the consent of Demetrius. They
unanimously accepted the Romans’ invitation to
place themselves under their protection, considering
this the sole means of assuring for the future their
safety from the violence of the Illyrians. The
Romans, having admitted the Corcyreans to their

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ἐπλευν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀπολλωνίας, ἔχοντες εἰς τὰ κατά-
λοιπα τῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεμόνα τὸν Δημήτριον.
7 κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καρδόν καὶ Ποστούμιος τὰς πε-
ζικὰς διεβίβαζε δυνάμεις ἐκ τοῦ Βρεστεσίου, πεζοὺς
8 μὲν εἰς δισμυρίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ περὶ δισχιλίους. ἀμα
δὲ τῷ προσέχειν ἐκατέρας ὡμοῖ τὰς δυνάμεις πρὸς
τὴν Ἀπολλωνίαν ὁμοίως καὶ τούτων ἀποδεξαμένων
καὶ δόντων ἕαυτος εἰς τὴν ἔπιτροπὴν παραχρῆμα
πάλιν ἀνήχθησαν, ἀκούοντες πολυνεκοῦθα τήν
9 Ἐπίδαμμον. οἱ δὲ Ἰλλυριοὶ συνέντευ τὴν ἔφοδον
τῶν Ῥωμαίων, οὐδεμι κόσμῳ λύσαντες τὴν πολυ-
κίαν ἐφυγον. Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἐπιδαμνίους
παραλαβόντες εἰς τὴν πίστιν, προῆγον εἰς τοὺς εἰσω
τόπους τῆς Ἰλλυρίδος, ἀμα καταστρεφόμενοι τοὺς
10 Ἀρδιαίους. συμμεξάντων δὲ πρεσβευτῶν αὐτοῖς καὶ
πλείονοι, δὴν οἱ παρὰ τῶν Παρθίων ἤκου ἐπιτρέ-
ποντες τὰ καθ’ αὐτοῖς, δεξάμενοι τούτοις εἰς τὴν
φιλίαν, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τῶν Ἀτιν-
τάνων προσελθόντος προῆγον ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰσσαν,
διὰ τὸ καὶ ταύτην ὑπὸ τῶν Ἰλλυρίων πολυκεῖ-
11 οθαί τὴν πόλιν. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ καὶ λύσαντες τὴν
πολυρκίαν, προσεδέχαντο καὶ τοὺς Ἰσσαίους εἰς τὴν
12 ἕαυτῶν πίστιν. ἐλον δὲ καὶ πόλεις τινὸς Ἰλλυρί-
δας εἰς τῷ παράπλω κατὰ κράτος. ἐν αἷς περὶ Νο-
ντρίαν οὐ μόνον τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀπέβαλον πολλοὺς,
13 ἄλλα καὶ τῶν χιλιάρχων τινὰς καὶ τὸν ταμίαν. ἐκυ-
ρίευσαν δὲ καὶ λέμβων εἰκοσι τῶν ἀποκομλζόντων
14 τὴν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ωφέλειαν. τῶν δὲ πολυρκούν-
των τὴν Ἰσσαν οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Φάρω διὰ τὸν Δημή-
τριον ἀβλαβεῖς ἔμεναν, οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι πάντες ἐφυγον
15 εἰς τὸν Ἀρβώνα σκεδασθέντες. ἡ δὲ Τεύτα πάντω
μετ’ ὀλίγων εἰς τὸν Ρίζονα διεσώθη, πολισμάτιον
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friendship, set sail for Apollonia, Demetrius in future acting as their guide. Simultaneously Postumius was bringing across from Brundisium the land forces consisting of about twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse. On the two forces uniting at Apollonia and on the people of that city likewise agreeing to put themselves under Roman protection, they at once set off again, hearing that Epidamnus was being besieged. The Illyrians, on hearing of the approach of the Romans, hastily broke up the siege and fled. The Romans, taking Epidamnus also under their protection, advanced into the interior of Illyria, subduing the Ardiaei on their way. Many embassies met them, among them one from the Parthini offering unconditional surrender. They admitted this tribe to their friendship as well as the Atintanes, and advanced towards Issa which was also being besieged by the Illyrians. On their arrival they forced the enemy to raise the siege and took the Issaeans also under their protection. The fleet too took several Illyrian cities by assault as they sailed along the coast, losing, however, at Nutria not only many soldiers, but some of their military tribunes and their quaestor. They also captured twenty boats which were conveying away agricultural produce to save it from pillage. Of the besiegers of Issa those now in Pharos were allowed, through Demetrius’ influence, to remain there unhurt, while the others dispersed and took refuge at Arbo. Teuta, with only a few followers, escaped to
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εῦ πρὸς ὀχυρώτητα κατεσκευασμένον, ἀνακεχωρηκός μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης, ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δὲ κείμενον τῷ Ῥίζον ποταμῷ. ταῦτα δὲ πράξαντες, καὶ τῷ Δημητρίῳ τοὺς πλείστους ὑποτάξαντες τῶν Ἰλλυρῶν, καὶ μεγάλην αὐτῷ περιθέντες δυναστείαν ἀνεχώρησαν εἰς τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον ἀμα τῷ στόλῳ καὶ τῇ πεζικῇ δυνάμει. Γνάως μὲν οὖν Φουλύνος εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἀπέπλευσε, τὸ πλείον ἔχων μέρος τῆς τε ναυτικῆς καὶ πεζικῆς στρατιᾶς. ὅ δὲ Ποστούμιος, ὑπολειπόμενος τετταράκοντα σκάφης, καὶ στρατόπεδον ἐκ τῶν περικεμένων πόλεων ἀθροίσας, παρεχείμαζε, συνεφεδρεύων τῷ τε τῶν Ἀρδιαίων ἔθνει καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς δεδωκόσιν ἐαυτοὺς εἰς τὴν πίστιν. ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἐρυθρήν ὥραν ἡ Τεύτα διαπρεσβευσαμένη πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ποιεῖται συνθήκας, εἰς αἷς εὐδοκησε φόρους τε τοὺς διαταχθέντας οἴσεων πάσης τ’ ἀναχωρήσεων τῆς Ἰλλυρίδος πλὴν ὀλίγων τόπων, καὶ τὸ συνέχον δ’ ἱάμιστο πρὸς τοὺς Ἔλληνας διέτεινε, μὴ πλεύσεων πλέουν ἡ δυσὶ λέμβοις ἔξω τοῦ

4 Δίσσου, καὶ τούτους ἀνόπλους. ἄν συντελεσθέντων δ’ Ποστούμιος μετὰ ταῦτα προσβεβευτὰς ἔξαπεσέτειλε πρὸς τοὺς Αἴτωλοὺς καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνος· οἱ καὶ παραγενόμενοι πρῶτον μὲν ἀπελογίσαντο τὰς αἰτίας τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῆς διαβάσεως, ἔξῆς δὲ τούτους τὰ πεπραγμένα διεξῆλθον, καὶ τὰς συνθήκας παρανέγαγωσαν, ἀς ἐπεποίητο πρὸς τοὺς Ἰλλυρίους.

5 τυχόντες δὲ παρ’ ἑκατέρου τῶν ἔθνων τῆς καθηκούσης φιλανθρωπίας αὐθίς ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Κέρκυραν, ἵκανοι τῶν ἀπολελυκότας φόβου τοὺς Ἐλληνας διὰ τὰς προειρημένας συνθήκας. οὐ γὰρ τούτων, ἀλλὰ πάσι, τότε κοινοὺς ἔχθροὺς εἶναι συνέβαλε τοὺς Ἰλλυρίους.

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Rhizon, a small place strongly fortified at a distance from the sea and situated on the river Rhizon. After accomplishing so much and placing the greater part of Illyria under the rule of Demetrius, thus making him an important potentate, the Consuls returned to Epidamnus with the fleet and army. 12. Gnaeus Fulvius now left for Rome with the greater part of both forces, and Postumius, with whom forty ships were left, enrolled a legion from the cities in the neighbourhood and wintered at Epidamnus to guard the Ardiaeans and the other tribes who had placed themselves under the protection of Rome. In the early spring Teuta sent an embassy to the Romans and made a treaty, by which she consented to pay any tribute they imposed, to relinquish all Illyria except a few places, and, what mostly concerned the Greeks, undertook not to sail beyond Lissus with more than two unarmed vessels. When this treaty had been concluded Postumius sent legates to the Aetolian and Achaean leagues. On their arrival they first explained the causes of the war and their reason for crossing the Adriatic, and next gave an account of what they had accomplished, reading the treaty they had made with the Illyrians. After meeting with all due courtesy from both the leagues, they returned to Corcyra, having by the communication of this treaty, delivered the Greeks from no inconsiderable dread; for the Illyrians were then not the enemies of this people or that, but the common enemies of all.

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7 Ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη διάβασις Ῥωμαίων μετὰ δυνάμεως εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα καὶ ταύτα τὰ μέρη τῆς Εὐρώπης, ἔτι δ’ ἐπιπλοκῇ μετὰ προσβείς εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τόπους, τοιάδε καὶ διὰ ταύτας ἐγένετο τὰς αὐτίας. ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης τῆς καταρχῆς Ῥωμαίοι μὲν εὐθέως ἅλλους προσβεντάς ἔσπαστει- λαν πρὸς Κορινθίους καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ὅτε δὴ καὶ Κορινθιοὶ πρῶτον ἀπεδέξαντο μετέχειν Ῥω- μαίους τοῦ τῶν Ἰσθμίων ἀγώνος.

13 Ἀσδρούβας δὲ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους, ἐν γὰρ τούτους ἀπελάπτομεν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, γνω- εχῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς χειρίζοντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐν τε τοῖς ὅλοις μεγάλην ἐποιεῖτο προκοπῆν τὴν τε παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Καρχηδόνα, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Καννη- πόλει προσαγορευμένην κατασκευάσας, οὐ μικρὰ, μεγάλα δὲ συνεβάλλετο Καρχηδονίους εἰς πραγμά- των λόγον, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τοῦ τό- που πρὸς τε τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν πράγματα καὶ πρὸς τὰ κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην, περὶ δὴ ἡμεῖς εὐφυε- στερον καιρὸν λαβόντες υποδείξομεν τὴν θέσιν αὐ- τῆς καὶ τὴν χρείαν, ἣν ἀμφοτέρως δύναται παρ- 3 ἔχεισθαι ταῖς εὑρημέναις χώραις. ὑπὸ καὶ θεωροῦντες Ῥωμαίοι μείζων καὶ φοβερωτέραν ἢδη συνιστάμενον δυναστείαν, ὄρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν τὰ

4 κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν. εὐρώτες δὲ σφᾶς ἐπικεκομι- μένους ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν χρόνοις καὶ προεμόνους εἰς τὸ μεγάλην χείρα κατασκευάσασθαι Καρχηδο- νίους, ἀνατρέχων ἐπειρώντο κατὰ δύναμιν. αὐτόθεν μὲν οὖν ἐπιτάττειν ἡ πολεμεῖν οὐ κατετόλμων τοῖς Καρχηδονίους διὰ τὸ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Κελτῶν φόβον ἐπικρέμασθαι τοῖς σφήτεροις πράγμασι καὶ μόνον οὐ καθ’ ἐκάστην ἡμέραν προσδοκᾶν τὴν ἔφοδον

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Such were the circumstances and causes of the Romans crossing for the first time with an army to Illyria and those parts of Europe, and of their first coming into relations through an embassy with Greece. But having thus begun, the Romans immediately afterwards sent envoys to Athens and Corinth, on which occasion the Corinthians first admitted them to participation in the Isthmian games.

13. We have said nothing of affairs in Spain during these years. Hasdrubal had by his wise and practical administration made great general progress, and by the foundation of the city called by some Carthage, and by others the New Town, 228 B.C. made a material contribution to the resources of Carthage, especially owing to its favourable position for action in Spain or Africa. On a more suitable occasion we will describe its position and point out the services it can render to both these countries. The Romans, seeing that Hasdrubal was in a fair way to create a larger and more formidable empire than Carthage formerly possessed, resolved to begin to occupy themselves with Spanish affairs. Finding that they had hitherto been asleep and had allowed Carthage to build up a powerful dominion, they tried, as far as possible, to make up for lost time. For the present they did not venture to impose orders on Carthage, or to go to war with her, because the threat of a Celtic invasion was hanging over them, the attack being indeed expected
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6 αὐτῶν. καταψήσαντες δὲ καὶ πραύναντες τὸν Ἅ-
σσυρίμβαν οὖτως ἐκριναν ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς Κελτοῖς
καὶ διακινδυνεύειν πρὸς αὐτοὺς, οὐδέποτε ἂν ὑπο-
λαμβάνοντες οὗχ οἶον δυναστεύσαι τῶν κατὰ τὴν
Ἰταλίαν, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἀσφαλῶς οἰκήσαι τὴν έαυτῶν
7 πατρίδα τούτους ἔχοντες ἐφέδρους τοὺς ἄνδρας.
διόπερ ἄμα τῷ διαπρεσβευσάμενοι πρὸς τὸν Ἅ-
σσυρίμβαν ποιήσασθαι συνθήκας, ἐν αἷς τὴν μὲν ἄλλην
Ἰβηρίαν παρεσώπησαν, τὸν δὲ καλούμενον Ἰβηρα
ποταμόν οὐκ ἔδει Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπὶ πολέμῳ δια-
βαίνειν, εὐθέως ἐξῆγεν γαν τὸν πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν
Ἰταλίαν Κελτοὺς πόλεμον.

14 Ὅπερ οὖν δοκεῖ μοι χρήσιμον εἶναι κεφαλαίωδὴ μὲν
ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐξήγησιν, ἣν τὸ τῆς προκατασκευὴς
οἰκεῖον συσσώρωμεν κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν,
ἀναδραμεῖν δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐξ ὅτι
2 κατέσχον οἱ προειρημένοι τὴν χώραν. ἦγούμει γὰρ
τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν ἱστορίαν οὐ μόνον ἀξίαν εἶναι
γνώσεως καὶ μνήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ τελέως ἀναγκαίαν,
χάριν τοῦ μαθεῖν τίνι μετὰ ταῦτα πιστεύσας ἀνδράσι
καὶ τόπους Ἀννίβας ἐπεβάλετο καταλείπειν τὴν
3 Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν. πρῶτον δὲ περὶ τῆς χώρας
ῥητέον ποιὰ τίς ἐστι καὶ πῶς κεῖται πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην
Ἰταλίαν. οὗτως γὰρ ἔσται καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις
diaphéronta katanoeĩn bèleion, upografeĩntos tōn
perī te toutos tòpous kai tηn χώραn idiomátωn.

4 Τῆς δὴ συμπάθεις Ῥωμαίας τῷ σχῆματι τριγωνο-
eidous ὑπαρχοῦσης, τὴν μὲν μίαν ὀρίζει πλευρὰν
αὐτῆς τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἀνατολὰς κεκλιμένην ὁ τ᾿ Ἰόνιος
póros kai katà tō synthēs ē kata tōn Ἀδρὶαν κόλ-
pos, tīn dē prōs me新动能ίαν kai δυσμᾶς tētram-

5 mēn tō Sikélı́kon kai Turrhnikón pēlagos. αὐται
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from day to day. They decided, then, to smooth down and conciliate Hasdrubal in the first place, and
then to attack the Celts and decide the issue by
arms, for they thought that as long as they had
these Celts threatening their frontier, not only
would they never be masters of Italy, but they
would not even be safe in Rome itself. Accordingly,
after having sent envoys to Hasdrubal and made a
treaty, in which no mention was made of the rest of
Spain, but the Carthaginians engaged not to cross the
Ebro in arms, they at once entered on the struggle
against the Italian Celts.

14. I think it will be of use to give some account
of these peoples, which must be indeed but a
summary one, in order not to depart from the
original plan of this work as defined in the preface.
We must, however, go back to the time when they
first occupied these districts. I think the story is
not only worth knowing and keeping in mind, but
quite necessary for my purpose, as it shows us who
were the men and what was the country on which
Hannibal afterwards relied in his attempt to destroy
the Roman dominion. I will first describe the
nature of the country and its position as regards the
rest of Italy. A sketch of its peculiarities will help
us better to comprehend the more important of the
events I have to relate.

Italy as a whole has the shape of a triangle of
which the one or eastern side is bounded by the
Ionian Sea and then continuously by the Adriatic
Gulf, the next side, that turned to the south and
west, by the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian Seas. The
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δ' αἱ πλευραὶ συμπίπτουσαι πρὸς ἄλληλας κορυφῆν ποιοῦσι τὸν τριγώνον τὸ προκείμενον ἀκρωτήριον τῆς Ἰταλίας εἰς τὴν μεσημβρίαν, δ' προσαγορεύεται μὲν Κόκυνθος, διακρεῖ δὲ τὸν Ἰόνιον πόρον καὶ τὸ

6 Ἠκέλικον πέλαγος. τὴν δὲ λουτὴν τὴν παρὰ τε τὰς ἄρκτους καὶ τὴν μεσόγαιαν παρατείνουσαν ὅρι－ζει κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἡ τῶν Ἀλπεων παρώρεια, λαμπβάνουσα τὴν μὲν ἄρχην ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ τὸ Σαρδῶν πέλαγος τόπων, παρῆκουσα δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρι πρὸς τὸν τοῦ παντὸς Ἀδριὰν μυχὸν, πλὴν βραχέος, δ' προκαταλήγουσα λειτεί τοῦ μὴ

7 συνάπτειν αὐτῷ. παρὰ δὲ τὴν προειρημένην παρώρειαν, ἢ δὲ νοεῖν ὃς ἂν εἰ βάσον τοῦ τριγώνου, παρὰ τάυτην ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας ὑπόκειται πεδία τῆς συμπάσης Ἰταλίας τελευταία πρὸς τὰς ἄρκτους, ὑπὲρ ὧν δ' ἡ λόγος, ἄρετῆ καὶ μεγίθει διαφέροντα τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην, δοὺς πεπτωκεν

8 ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἱστορίαν. ἦστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὄλον ἐίδος καὶ τῆς ταύτα τὰ πεδία περιγραφοῦσιν γραμμῆς τριγωνοειδές. τοῦτον δὲ τοῦ σχῆματος τὴν μὲν κορυφὴν ἢ τε τῶν Ἀπεννίνων καλουμένων ὀρῶν καὶ τῶν Ἀλπεων σύμπτωσις οὐ μακρὰν ἀπὸ τοῦ

9 Σαρδῶνος πελάγους ὑπὲρ Μασσαλίας ἀποτελεῖ τῶν δὲ πλευρῶν παρὰ μὲν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄρκτων, ὡς ἐπάνω προείπον, τὰς Ἀλπεῖς αὐτὰς ἐπὶ διοικοῦσιν

10 καὶ διακοσίους σταδίους παρῆκες συμβαίνει, παρὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας τῶν Ἀπεννίνων ἐπὶ τρισχι－

11 λίους ἐξακοσίους. βάσεως γε μὴν τἀξιν λαμβάνει τὸν παντὸς σχῆματος ἢ παραλία τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Ἀ－

12 δρίαν κόλπον· τὸ δὲ μέγεθος τῆς βάσεως ἔστω ἀπὸ πόλεως Σήμης ἐως ἐπὶ τὸν μυχὸν ὑπὲρ τοὺς διοικ－

λίους σταδίους καὶ πεντακοσίους, ἤστω τὴν πᾶσαν 274
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apex of the triangle, formed by the meeting of these two sides, is the southernmost cape of Italy known as Cocynthus and separating the Ionian Strait from the Sicilian Sea. The remaining or northern and inland side of the triangle is bounded continuously by the chain of the Alps which beginning at Marseilles and the northern coasts of the Sardinian Sea stretches in an unbroken line almost to the head of the whole Adriatic, only failing to join that sea by stopping at quite a short distance from it. At the foot of this chain, which we should regard as the base of the triangle, on its southern side, lies the last plain of Italy to the north. It is with this that we are now concerned, a plain surpassing in fertility any other in Europe with which we are acquainted. The general shape of the lines that bound this plain is likewise triangular. The apex of the triangle is formed by the meeting of the Apennines and Alps not far from the Sardinian Sea at a point above Marseilles. Its northern side is, as I have said, formed by the Alps themselves and is about two thousand two hundred stades in length, the southern side by the Apennines which extend for a distance of three thousand six hundred stades. The base of the whole triangle is the coast of the Adriatic, its length from the city of Sena to the head of the gulf being more than two thousand five hundred stades; so that the whole circumference of

*Siniglia.*
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15 περίμετρον τῶν προειρημένων πεδίων μὴ πολύ λέι-

2 ἐλύμου γε μῆν καὶ κέγχρου τελέως ὑπερβάλλουσα
dαμήλεια γίνεται παρ’ αὐτοῖς. τὸ δὲ τῶν βαλά-

3 τεκμήριαιοτε λείστουν γὰρ ὑικῶν ἱερείων κοππομέ-

4 αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν. περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ μέρος εὐωνίας
καὶ δαμήλειας τῶν πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν ἀνθρώπων οὖ-

5 τῶς ἃν τῆς ἀκριβεστάτα κατανοήσεις· ποιοῦνται γὰρ
tὰς καταλύσεις οἱ διοδεύοντες τὴν χώραν ἐν τοῖς
πανδοκεῖοις, οὐ συμφωνοῦντες περὶ τῶν κατὰ μέ-
ρος ἐπιτηδείων, ἀλλὰ ἐρωτῶντες πόσον τὸν ἄνδρα

6 δέχεται. ὡς μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ παρίειν τοὺς
καταλύσεις οἱ πανδοκεῖοι, ὡς ἤκαν πάντ' ἔχειν τὰ
πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, ἡμιασσαρίον· τούτο δ' ἐστὶ τέταρ-
τον μέρος ὑβολοῦ· σπανίως δὲ τοῦτό ὑπερβαίνουσι.

7 τὸ γε μὴν πλῆθος τῶν ἄνδρῶν, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ
κάλλος τῶν σωμάτων, ἐτὶ δὲ τήν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις
τόλμων, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πράξεων σαφῶς ἔσται κατα-
μαθεῖν.

8 Τῶν δ' ἂλπεων ἐκατέρας τῆς πλευρᾶς, τῆς ἐπὶ
tῶν Ῥωδανῶν ποταμῶν καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ προειρημένα
πεδία νευόσης, τοὺς βουνῶδεις καὶ γεώδεις τόπους
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the plain is not much less than ten thousand stades. 15. Its fertility is not easy to describe. It produces such an abundance of corn, that often in my time the price of wheat was four obols per Sicilian medimnus and that of barley two obols, a metretes of wine costing the same as the medimnus of barley. Panic and millet are produced in enormous quantities, while the amount of acorns grown in the woods dispersed over the plain can be estimated from the fact that, while the number of swine slaughtered in Italy for private consumption as well as to feed the army is very large, almost the whole of them are supplied by this plain. The cheapness and abundance of all articles of food will be most clearly understood from the following fact. Travellers in this country who put up in inns, do not bargain for each separate article they require, but ask what is the charge per diem for one person. The innkeepers, as a rule, agree to receive guests, providing them with enough of all they require for half an as per diem, i.e. the fourth part of an obol, the charge being very seldom higher. As for the numbers of the inhabitants, their stature and beauty and their courage in war, the facts of their history will speak.

16. The hilly ground with sufficient soil on both slopes of the Alps, that on the north towards the Rhone and that towards the plain I have been

a About 5 Roman modii or 10 gallons. The metretes of wine was about 9 gallons.
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cataiko[vsi, tovs mén épi tov 'Rodanov kai tás ăr-
ktonos estramménous Galátai Tranasaínpou proso-
agoreúmenoi, tovs dé épí tā pedía Taurískoi kai
9 'Agōnes kai pleiów géna pharpharwn étera. Tranasa-
alpínou ge mēn ou diá tēn tōv génon, allá diá
thn tōv tônous diaforon prosgoreúontai, to gár
trás éxeýmeneúmenon ésti pēravn. diò tovs ép-
10 ékeina tōn 'Alpewn Tranasaínpous kalouši. tā dé
ákra diá te tēn traχútera kai to plēbos tēs épi-
menvoushēs aei chiónos aóiketa tēléws ésti. tōn dé
16 'Apenínou ápò mēn tēs ărkhēs tēs upéρ Masa-
lían kai tēs prōs tās 'Alpeis sumpptúsews Dianu-
stínou kataiko[vsi, kai tēn ép tō Turrēnikou pé-
lagous autōv plereván keklipēn kai tēn ép tā
2 pedía, para thalattan mēn méχri pôleos Písēs,
ē prōtē keîtai tēs Turrēnias ωs prōs tās du-
smás, kata dé tēn mezosqían éws tēs 'Arptíwn
3 χwras. éxeis dé Turrēnoi: tōutos dé swnekeis éka-
teron tō klímma némon tōn proeirhtménon Ṽrōn
4 "Oμbrōi. lōvōn dé mēn 'Apenínos, ápēchwn tēs kata
tóv 'Adrian thalattēs stádiouws ὡς ēn eī pentakos-
sións, apoleípe tā pedía, deziws ápounek, kai diá
mēsēs tēs loutēs 'Italiais diýkous eis tō Skkelikōn
5 kataetei pēlagos. tō dé aposteiplon móros
pedión tēs plereías épi thalattan kai pólon kathēkei
6 Sήn. dé dé Pádos potamós, ὑπὸ tōv poihtōn
'Hrodanov throuleúmenos, ēchei mēn tās thugás apὸ
tōn 'Alpewn ὡς prōs tēn korufh māllon tōu
proeirhtménu schēmatos, katafērētai dé eis tā pedía,
7 pououmenos tēn rūsin ὡς ép tē meσhmērían. afikō-
menos dé eis tōvs épistēsous tōpous, ōkklynαs tis
reúmati prōs ēw fērētai di' autōwn. pouēi dé tēn
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describing, is inhabited in the former case by the Transalpine Gauls and in the latter by the Taurisci, Agones and several other barbarous tribes. Transalpine is not a national name but a local one, trans meaning "beyond," and those beyond the Alps being so called. The summits of the Alps are quite uninhabitable owing to their ruggedness and the quantity of snow which always covers them. 16. The Apennines, from their junction with the Alps above Marseilles, are inhabited on both slopes, that looking to the Tyrrhenian sea and that turned to the plain, by the Ligurians whose territory reaches on the seaboard-side as far as Pisa, the first city of western Etruria, and on the land side as far as Arretium. a Next come the Etruscans, and after them both slopes are inhabited by the Umbrians. After this the Apennines, at a distance of about five hundred stades from the Adriatic, quit the plain and, turning to the right, pass along the centre of the rest of Italy as far as the Sicilian sea, the remaining flat part of this side of the triangle continuing to the sea and the city of Sena. The river Po, celebrated by poets as the Eridanus, rises in the Alps somewhere near the apex of the triangle and descends to the plain, flowing in a southerly direction. On reaching the flat ground, it takes a turn to the East and flows through the plain,

a Arezzo.
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ἐκβολὴν δυσὶ στόμασιν εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὸν Ἄδριαν τόπους· τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἀποτέμεναι μέρος τῆς πε- διάδος χώρας εἰς τὰς Ἀλπεῖς καὶ τῶν Ἀδριατικῶν 8 μυχῶν. ἄγει δὲ πλῆθος ὑδάτων οὐδενὸς ἔλαττον τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ποταμῶν, διὰ τὸ τὰς ρύσεις τὰς ἐπὶ τὰ πεδία νεούσας ἀπὸ τε τῶν Ἀλπεων καὶ τῶν Ἀπεννίνων ὄρων εἰς τοῦτον ἐμπίπτειν ἀπάσας 9 καὶ παντοχόθεν. μεγίστω δὲ καὶ καλλίστω ρεύ- ματι φέρεται περὶ κινὸς ἐπιτολήν, αὐξόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ πληθοῦς τῶν ἀνατηκομένων χιόνων ἐν τοῖς 10 προειρημένως ὀρέσιν. ἀναπλεῖται δ' ἐκ βαλάττης κατὰ τὸ στόμα τὸ καλοῦμένον Ὀλανα σχεδὸν ἐπὶ 11 δισχιλίους σταδίους. τὴν μὲν γὰρ πρώτην ἐκ τῶν πηγῶν ἔχει ρύσιν ἀπλῆν, σχίζεται δ' εἰς δύο μέρη κατὰ τοὺς προσαγορευομένους Τριγαβόλους· τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔτερον στόμα προσονομάζεται 12 Παδόα, τὸ δ' ἔτερον Ὀλανα. κεῖται δ' ἐπὶ τοῦτω λιμήν, οὐδενὸς τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἄδριαν ἦττω παρ- εχόμενος ἀσφαλείαν τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ καθορμιζομένοις. παρά γε μὴν τοῖς ἐγχωρίοις ὁ ποταμὸς προσαγο- 13 ρεῖται Βόδεγκος. τὰλλα δὲ τὰ περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τοῦτον ἰστορούμενα παρὰ τοῖς Ἐλλησι, λέγω δὴ τὰ περὶ Φαέθοντα καὶ τὴν ἐκείνον πτώσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὰ δάκρυα τῶν αἰγείρων καὶ τοὺς μελανείμονας τοὺς περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν οἰκούντας, οὐς φασί τὰς ἐσθή- τας εἰσέτι νῦν φορεών τοιαύτα ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ Φαέ- 14 θοντα πένθους, καὶ πάσαν δὴ τὴν τραγικὴν καὶ ταύτη προσεοκυίαν ὕλην, ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ παρόντος ὑπερθησόμεθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ λίαν καθήκεν τῷ τῆς προκατασκευῆς γένει τὴν περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων ἀκρι- 15 βολογίαν. μεταλαβότας δὲ καὶν ἀρμόττοντα ποιησόμεθα τὴν καθήκουσαν μνήμην, καὶ μάλιστα 280
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falling into the Adriatic by two mouths. It cuts off the larger half of the plain, which thus lies between it on the south and the Alps and head of the Adriatic on the north. It has a larger volume of water than any other river in Italy, since all the streams that descend into the plain from the Alps and Apennines fall into it from either side, and is highest and finest at the time of the rising of the Dog-star, as it is then swollen by the melting of the snow on those mountains. It is navigable for about two thousand stades from the mouth called Olana; for the stream, which has been a single one from its source, divides at a place called Trigaboli, one of the mouths being called Padua and the other Olana. At the latter there is a harbour, which affords as safe anchorage as any in the Adriatic. The native name of the river is Bodencus. The other tales the Greeks tell about this river, I mean touching Phaëthon and his fall and the weeping poplar-trees and the black clothing of the inhabitants near the river, who, they say, still dress thus in mourning for Phaëthon, and all similar matter for tragedy, may be left aside for the present, detailed treatment of such things not suiting very well the plan of this work. I will, however, when I find a suitable occasion make proper mention of all

a Middle of July.

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dia tēn Timaion perὶ toûs proeirēmēnous tōpous āννον.

17  Pλὴν ταῦτα γε τὰ πεδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἐνσυντο
Tuρρηνοί, καθ‘ οὕς χρόνους καὶ τὰ Φλεγραῖα ποτε
kaloumena τὰ περὶ Καπύην καὶ Νόλην· ἀ δὴ καὶ
diὰ τὸ πολλοὶς ἐμποδῶν εἶναι καὶ γνωρίζονται, με-
2 γάλην ἔπ’ ἀρετὴ δόξαν εἶληφε. διὸ καὶ τῶν ἵστο-
ροῦντας τὰς Τυρρηνῶν δυναστείας οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖ-
σθαι τὴν ἀναφοράν ἐπὶ τὴν νῦν κατεχομένην ὑπ’
αὐτῶν χώραν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τὰ προειρημένα πεδία καὶ
3 τὰς ἐκ τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀφορμάς. οἷς ἐπιμιγ-
νύμενοι κατὰ τὴν παράθεσιν Κελτῶν καὶ περὶ τὸ
kάλλος τῆς χώρας ὀφθαλμάσαντες, ἐκ μικρᾶς προ-
φάσεως μεγάλη στρατιά παραδόξως ἐπελθόντες ἐξ-
ἐβαλον ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὸν Πάδου χώρας Τυρρηνοὺς καὶ
4 κατέσχον αὐτοὶ τὰ πεδία. τὰ μὲν οὖν πρῶτα καὶ
περὶ τὸν ἀνατολᾶς τοῦ Πάδου κείμενα Λάοι καὶ
Λεβέκιοι, μετὰ δὲ τούτους Ἰννομβρεῖς κατώκησαν, δ’
mégiston ἔθνος ὧν αὐτῶν. εξῆς δὲ τούτως παρὰ
5 τὸν ποταμὸν Γονομάνοι. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν Ἀδριάν
ἡδὸν προσήκοντα γένος ἀλλο πάνυ παλαιὸν διακατ-
έσχε· προσαγορεύονται δ’ Oὐενέτοι, τοῖς μὲν ἔθεσιν
καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ βραχὺ διαφέροντες Κελτῶν, γλώττη
6 δ’ ἄλλοις χρώμενοι. περὶ ὅν οἱ τραγῳδιογράφοι
πολὺν τινα πεποίηται λόγον καὶ πολλὴν διατέθειν-
7 τα τερατείαν. τὰ δὲ πέραν τοῦ Πάδου τὰ περὶ
tὸν Ἀπεννῖνον πρῶτοι μὲν Ἀναρεῖς, μετὰ δὲ τού-
8 τοὺς Βοῦτοι κατώκησαν· εξῆς δὲ τούτων ὡς πρὸς
tὸν Ἀδριάν Λίγγονες, τὰ δὲ τελευταία πρὸς
θελάττη Σήμνωνες.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐπιφανεστάτα τῶν κατασχόντων τοὺς
9 προειρημένους τόπους ἐθνῶν ταῦτ’ ὑπῆρχεν. ἤκουν
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this, especially as Timaeus has shown much ignorance concerning the district.

17. The Etruscans were the oldest inhabitants of this plain at the same period that they possessed also that Phlegraean plain in the neighbourhood of Capua and Nola, which, accessible and well known as it is to many, has such a reputation for fertility. Those therefore who would know something of the dominion of the Etruscans should not look at the country they now inhabit, but at these plains and the resources they drew thence. The Celts, being close neighbours of the Etruscans and associating much with them, cast covetous eyes on their beautiful country, and on a small pretext, suddenly attacked them with a large army and, expelling them from the plain of the Po, occupied it themselves. The first settlers at the eastern extremity, near the source of the Po, were the Laevi and Lebecii, after them the Insubres, the largest tribe of all, and next these, on the banks of the river, the Cenomani. The part of the plain near the Adriatic had never ceased to be in the possession of another very ancient tribe called the Veneti, differing slightly from the Gauls in customs and costume and speaking another language. About this people the tragic poets tell many marvellous stories. On the other bank of the Po, by the Apennines, the first settlers beginning from the west were the Anares and next them the Boii. Next the latter, towards the Adriatic, were the Lingones and lastly, near the sea, the Senones.

These are the names of the principal tribes that settled in the district. They lived in unwalled
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10 δὲ κατὰ κώμας ἀτείχίστους, τῆς λοιπῆς κατασκευῆς ἁμισοῖς καθεστῶτες. διὰ γὰρ τὸ στιβαδοκοιτεῖν καὶ κρεαφαγεῖν, ἔτι δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὰ κατὰ γεωργίαν ἁσκεῖν, ἄπλοὺς εἶχον τοὺς βίους, οὕτ' ἐπιστήμης ἄλλης οὔτε τέχνης παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸ παράπαν γυμνοσκομένης. ὑπαρξίς γε
11 μὴν ἐκάστοις ἤνθ᾽ θρέμματα καὶ χρυσὸς διὰ τὸ μόνα ταῦτα κατὰ τᾶς περιστάσεως βαδίως δύνασθαι πανταχῇ περιαγαγεῖν καὶ μεθιστάναι κατὰ τᾶς αὐτῶν προαρέσεις. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἑταρείας μεγίστην σπουδὴν ἐποιούντο διὰ τὸ καὶ φοβερώτατον καὶ δυνατώτατον εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς τοὺτον ὅσ ἂν πλείστους ἔχειν δοκῇ τοὺς θεραπεύοντας καὶ συμπεριφέρομένους αὐτῷ.

18 Τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς οὐ μόνον τῆς χώρας ἐπεκράτουν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν σύνεγγυς πολλοὺς ὑπηκόους ἐπεποίηντο, τῇ τόλμῃ καταπεταλημένοι. μετὰ δὲ τινα χρόνου μάχη νικήσαντες Ἦρωμαίους καὶ τοὺς μετὰ τούτων παραταξάμενους, ἐπόμενοι τοῖς φεύγουσι τριοί τῆς μάχης ἡμέραις ύστερον κατέσχον αὐτὴν
3 τὴν Ἦρωμην πλὴν τοῦ Καπετωλίου. γενομένου δὲ ἀντισπάσματος, καὶ τῶν Οὐνέτων ἐμβαλόντως εἰς τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν, τότε μὲν ποιησάμενοι συνήθεις πρὸς Ἦρωμαίους καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀποδόντες, ἐπαν-4 ἴθαν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοῖς ἐμφυλίοις συνείχοντο πολέμους, ἐνοι δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἡλείων κατοικούντων ὁμός ἐποιούντο, καὶ συνηθροίζοντο πολλάκις ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, θεωροῦντες ἐκ παραθέσεως
5 τὴν παραγεγενημένην αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίαν. ἐν ὦ καὶ Ἡρωμήν τὴν τε σφετέραν δύναμιν ἀνέλαβον καὶ τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Λατίνους αὔθια πράγματα συν-
8 εστήσαντο. παραγεγενομένων δὲ πάλιν τῶν Κελτῶν
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villages, without any superfluous furniture; for as they slept on beds of leaves and fed on meat and were exclusively occupied with war and agriculture, their lives were very simple, and they had no knowledge whatever of any art or science. Their possessions consisted of cattle and gold, because these were the only things they could carry about with them everywhere according to circumstances and shift where they chose. They treated comradeship as of the greatest importance, those among them being the most feared and most powerful who were thought to have the largest number of attendants and associates.

18. On their first invasion they not only conquered 390 B.C. this country but reduced to subjection many of the neighbouring peoples, striking terror into them by their audacity. Not long afterwards they defeated the Romans and their allies in a pitched battle, and pursuing the fugitives, occupied, three days after the battle, the whole of Rome with the exception of the Capitol, but being diverted by an invasion of their own country by the Veneti, they made on this occasion a treaty with the Romans, and evacuating the city, returned home. After this they were occupied by domestic wars, and certain of the neighbouring Alpine tribes, witnessing to what prosperity they had attained in comparison with themselves, frequently gathered to attack them. Meanwhile the Romans re-established their power and again became masters of Latium. Thirty years 360 B.C.
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eis Ἀλβαν στρατεύματι μεγάλω μετὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως κατάληψιν ἦτε τριακοστῷ, τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐτόλμασαν ἀντεξαγαγεῖν Ἡρωμαῖοι τὰ στρατόπεδα, διὰ τὸ παραδόξου γενομένης τῆς ἔφοδου προκαταληφθῆναι καὶ μὴ καταταχθῆναι τὰς τῶν συμμάχων ἀθροίσαντας δυνάμεις. ἀδύνατος δὲ ἐπιβολῆς ἔτέρας ἦτε δωδεκάτῳ μετὰ μεγάλης στρατιάς ἐπιπορευμένων, προαιθομένωι καὶ συναγείραντες τοὺς συμμάχους, μετὰ πολλῆς προθυμίας ἀπήντων, σπεύδοντες συμβαλεῖν καὶ διακινδυνεύσαι περὶ τῶν ὄλων. οἱ δὲ Γαλάται καταπλαγέντες τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτῶν καὶ διαστάσαντες πρὸς σφᾶς, νυκτὸς ἐπιγενομένης φυγῆς παραπληγίαν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου τοῦ φόβου τριακαίδεκα μὲν ἔτη τὴν ἰσχίαν ἐσχόν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνορώντες αὐξανομένη τὴν Ἡρωμαῖων δύναμιν, εἰρήνην ἐποιήσαντο καὶ συνθήκας. ἐν αἷς ἔτη τριάκοντα μεῖναντες ἐμπεδῶς, αὖθις γενομένοιν κινήματος ἐκ τῶν Τρανσαλπίων, δεῖσαντες μὴ πόλεμος αὐτοῖς ἐγερθῆ βαρὺς, ἀπὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐτρεφὼν τὰς ὀρμᾶς τῶν ἐξαισιομένων, δωροφοροῦντες καὶ προτιθέμενοι τὴν συγγένειαν, ἐπὶ δὲ Ἡρωμαίων παράξυναν καὶ μετέσχον αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατείας. ἐν ἦ τὴν ἔφοδον ποιησάμενοι διὰ Τυρρηνίας, ὁμοῦ συστρατευσάμενων σφῖσι Τυρρηνῶν, καὶ περιβάλομενοι λείας πλῆθος, ἐκ μὲν τῆς Ἡρωμαίων ἐπαρχίας ἀσφαλῶς ἔπανηλθον. εἰς δὲ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀφικόμενοι, καὶ στασίάσαντες περὶ τὴν τῶν εἰλημμένων πλεονεξίαν, τῆς τε λείας καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν δυνάμεως τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος διέφθειραν. τούτῳ δὲ σύνηθες ἦστι Γαλάταις πράττειν, ἐπειδὰν σφετερίσωσιν τι τῶν πέλας, καὶ μᾶλιστα διὰ τὰς ἀλόγους οἰνοφλυγίας καὶ πλησμονάς.
after the occupation of Rome, the Celts again appeared before Alba with a large army, and the Romans on this occasion did not venture to meet them in the field, because, owing to the suddenness of the attack, they were taken by surprise and had not had time to anticipate it by collecting the forces of their allies. But when, twelve years later, the 348 B.C. Celts again invaded in great strength, they had early word of it, and, assembling their allies, marched eagerly to meet them, wishing for nothing better than a decisive battle. The Gauls, alarmed by the Roman advance and at variance among themselves, waited until nightfall and then set off for home, their retreat resembling a flight. After this panic, they kept quiet for thirteen years, and then, as they saw how rapidly the power of the Romans was 334 B.C. growing, they made a formal peace with them, to the terms of which they adhered steadfastly for thirty years. 19. But then, when a fresh movement began among the Transalpine Gauls, and they feared 299 B.C. they would have a big war on their hands, they deflected from themselves the inroad of the migrating tribes by bribery and by pleading their kinship, but they incited them to attack the Romans, and even joined them in the expedition. They advanced through Etruria, the Etruscans too uniting with them, and, after collecting a quantity of booty, retired quite safely from the Roman territory, but, on reaching home, fell out with each other about division of the spoil and succeeded in destroying the greater part of their own forces and of the booty itself. This is quite a common event among the Gauls, when they have appropriated their neighbour’s property, chiefly owing to their inordinate drinking and
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5 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἔτει τετάρτῳ συμφρονήσαν
tes ἀμα Σαυνίται καὶ Γαλάται παρετάξαντο Ἡρώ-
μαίοις ἐν τῇ Καμερτίνῳ χώρᾳ καὶ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν
6 ἐν τῷ κινδύνῳ διέφθειραν. ἐν δὲ καιρῷ προσ-
φυλονεκήσαντες πρὸς τὸ γεγονὸς ἐλάττωμι αὐτῶν
Ῥωμαίοι μετ' ὁλίγας ἡμέρας ἐξῆλθον, καὶ συμβα-
λόντες πάσι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις ἐν τῇ τῶν Σεντυνατῶν
χώρᾳ πρὸς τοὺς προειρημένους τοὺς μὲν πλείστους
ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ λουποὺς ἤναγκασαν προτρόπα-
7 δὴν ἐκάστους εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν φυγεῖν. διαγεν-
μένων δὲ πάλιν ἐτῶν δέκα παρεγένοντο Γαλάται
μετὰ μεγάλης στρατιάς, πολιορκήσοντες τὴν Ἀρρη-
τίνων πόλιν. Ῥωμαίοι δὲ παραβοηθήσαντες, καὶ
συμβαλόντες πρὸς τῆς πόλεως, ἠττήθησαν. ἐν δὲ
τῇ μάχῃ ταύτῃ Λευκίου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τελευτ-
9 σαντος Μάνιον ἐπικατέστησαν τὸν Κόριον. οὗ
προσβεντᾶς ἐκπέμψαντος εἰς Γαλατίαν ὑπὲρ τῶν αἰχ-
μαλῶτων, παρασπονδύσαντες ἐπανείλατο τοὺς πρέ-
10 σβεῖς. τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων ὑπὸ τὸν θυμὸν ἐκ χειρὸς
ἐπιστρατευσάμενων, ἀπαντήσαντες συνέβαλον οἱ Σή-
11 νωνες καλοῦμενοι Γαλάται. Ῥωμαίοι δὲ ἐκ παρα-
τάξεως κρατήσαντες αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀπ-
ἐκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ λουποὺς ἐξέβαλον, τῆς δὲ χώρας
12 ἐγένοντο πάσης ἐγκρατείας. εἰς ἄν καὶ πρώτην τῆς
Γαλατίας ἀποκιάν ἔστειλαν τὴν Σήνην προσαγο-
ρευμένην πόλιν, ὡμόνυμον οὗσαν τοὺς πρότερον
13 αὐτὴν κατοικοῦσι Γαλάταις, ὑπὲρ ἡς ἄρτις διεσα-
φήσαμεν, φάσκοντες αὐτὴν παρὰ τὸν Ἄδριαν ἐπὶ
tῷ πέρατι κεῖσθαι τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδίων.
20 οἱ δὲ Βοῖοι, θεωροῦντες ἐκπεπτωκότας τοὺς Σή-
νωνας, καὶ δείσαντες περὶ σφῶν καὶ τῆς χώρας,
μὴ πάθωσι τὸ παραπλήσιον, ἐξεστράτευσαν παν-
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surfeiting. Four years later the Gauls made a league with the Samnites, and engaging the Romans in the territory of Camerinum inflicted on them considerable loss; but the Romans, determined on avenging their reverse, advanced again a few days after with all their legions, and attacking the Gauls and Samnites in the territory of Santinum, put the greater number of them to the sword and compelled the rest to take precipitate flight each to their separate homes. Again, ten years afterwards, the Gauls appeared in force and besieged Arretium. The Romans, coming to the help of the town, attacked them in front of it and were defeated. In this battle their Praetor Lucius Caecilius fell, and they nominated Manius Curius in his place. When Manius sent legates to Gaul to treat for the return of the prisoners, they were treacherously slain, and this made the Romans so indignant that they at once marched upon Gaul. They were met by the Senones, whom they defeated in a pitched battle, killing most of them and driving the rest out of their country, the whole of which they occupied. This was the first part of Gaul in which they planted a colony, calling it Sena after the name of the tribe who formerly inhabited it. This is the city I mentioned above as lying near the Adriatic at the extremity of the plain of the Po. 20. Hereupon the Boii, seeing the Senones expelled from their territory, and fearing the same fate for themselves and their own land, implored the aid of the Etruscans and
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2 δημει παρακαλέσαντες Τυρηνούς. ἀθροισθέντες δὲ περὶ τὴν Ὄαδμονα προσαγορευομένην λίμνην παρ-
3 ετάξαντο Ῥωμαῖοι. ἐν δὲ τῇ μάχῃ τούτῃ Τυρη-
νῶν μὲν οἱ πλείστοι κατεκόπτησαν, τῶν δὲ Βοιῶν
4 τελέως ὁλίγοι διέφυγον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῶ κατὰ πό-
δας ἐνιαυτῷ συμφρονήσαντες αὔθες οἱ προειρημέ-
νοι καὶ τοὺς ἀρτί τῶν νέων ἤβωντας καθοπλίσαν-
5 τες παρετάξαντο πρὸς Ῥωμαῖους. ἤττηθέντες δὲ
ὅλουχρῶς τῇ μάχῃ μόλις εἰξαν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, καὶ δια-
πρεβεβεβάμενοι περὶ σπουδῶν καὶ διαλύσεων, συν-
8 θήκας ἔθεντο πρὸς Ῥωμαῖους. ταῦτα δὲ συνέβαινε
γίνεσθαι τῷ τρίτῳ πρότερον ἔτει τῆς Πύρρου δια-
βάσεως εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, πέμπτῳ δὲ τῆς Γαλατῶν
7 περὶ Δελφοῦς διαφθορᾶς. ἐν γὰρ τούτων ἡ τύχη
toῖς καιροῖς ὡς ἕνεκα λοιμικῆς των πολέμου διάθεσιν
8 ἐπέστησε πάνιν Γαλάταις. έκ δὲ τῶν προειρημένων
ἀγώνων δύο τὰ κάλλιστα συνεκύρησε Ῥωμαῖοι· τοῦ
gαρ κατακόπτεσθαι συνήθειαν ἐσχηκότες ὑπὸ Γα-
λατῶν οὐδὲν ἠδόναντο δεινότερον ὅδειν οὐδὲ προς-
9 δοκήσαι τῶν αὐτοῖς ἡδη πεπραγμένων. έξ ὧν πρὸς
tε τὸ Πύρρον ἀθληταὶ τέλεοι γεγονότες τῶν κατὰ πό-
10 λεμον ἔργων συγκατέστησαν τὴν τε Γαλατῶν τόλ-
μαν ἐν καρφὶ καταπληξάμενοι λοιπῶν ἀπεριστάτως
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον πρὸς Πύρρον περὶ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐπο-
λέμουν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς Καρχηδονίους ὑπὲρ τῆς
Σικελιωτῶν ἀρχῆς διηγωνίζοντο.
21 Γαλάται δ’ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἐλαττωμάτων
ἐτη μὲν πέντε καὶ τετταράκοντα τὴν ἤπων ἐσχον,
2 εἰρήνην ἄγοντες πρὸς Ῥωμαῖους. ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ μὲν
αὐτοῖς παρασι καὶ τετταράκοντα τὴν ἤπων ἐσχον,
2 εἰρήνην ἄγοντες πρὸς Ῥωμαῖους. ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ μὲν
αὐτοῖς παρασι καὶ τετταράκοντα τὴν ἤπων ἐσχον,
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αὐτοῖς παρασι καὶ τετταράκοντα τὴν ἤπων ἐσχον,
2 εἰρήνην ἄγοντες πρὸς Ῥωμαίοι. ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ μὲν
αὐτοῖς παρασι καὶ τετταράκοντα τὴν ἤπων ἐσχον,
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marched out in full force. The united armies gave battle to the Romans near Lake Vadimon, and in this battle most of the Etruscans were cut to pieces while only quite a few of the Boii escaped. But, notwithstanding, in the very next year these two peoples once more combined and arming their young men, even the mere striplings, again encountered the Romans in a pitched battle. They were utterly defeated and it was only now that their courage at length gave way and that they sent an embassy to sue for terms and made a treaty with the Romans. This took place three years before the crossing of Pyrrhus to Italy and five years before the destruction of the Gauls at Delphi; for it really seems that at this time Fortune afflicted all Gauls alike with a sort of epidemic of war. From all these struggles the Romans gained two great advantages. In the first place, having become accustomed to be cut up by Gauls, they could neither undergo nor expect anymore terrible experience, and next, owing to this, when they met Pyrrhus they had become perfectly trained athletes in war, so that they were able to daunt the courage of the Gauls before it was too late, and henceforth could give their whole mind first to the fight with Pyrrhus for Italy and afterwards to the maintenance of the contest with Carthage for the possession of Sicily.

21. After these reverses, the Gauls remained quiet and at peace with Rome for forty-five years. But when, as time went on, those who had actually witnessed the terrible struggle were no more, and a younger generation had taken their place, full of unreflecting passion and absolutely without experi-
3 τὸς κακὸν καὶ πάσης περιστάσεως, αὖθις ἤρξαντο τὰ καθεστώτα κινεῖν. Ὁ φύσις ἔχει γίνεσθαι, καὶ τραχύνεσθαι μὲν ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων πρὸς Ἦρωμαῖος, 4 ἐπισπάσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Ἀλπεων Γαλάτας. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον χωρὶς τοῦ πλήθους διὰ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔγχυμεν ἐν ἀπορρήτω ἐπράττετο τὰ προειρή-μένα. διὸ καὶ παραγενομένων τῶν Τραγαλπίνων ἐως Ἀρμίνου μετὰ δυνάμεως, διαπιστήσαντα τὰ πλήθη τῶν Βοϊών καὶ στασίσαντα πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν προεστῶτας καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παραγενούτας, ἀνείλλον μὲν τοὺς ἰδίους βασιλεῖς Ἀττι καὶ Γάλα-τον, κατέκοψαν δὲ ἄλλης, συμβαλόντες ἐκ παρα-τάξεως. ὦτε δὲ καὶ Ἦρωμαῖοι κατάφοβοι γενόμενοι τὴν ἑθοδον, ἐξήλθον μετὰ στρατοπεδίου συνέντες δὲ τὴν αὐθαίρετον καταφθορὰν τῶν Γαλατῶν, 7 αὖθις ἀνεχώρησαν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν. μετὰ δὲ τοῦ-τον τὸν φόβον ἔτει πέμπτω, Μάρκου Λεσέδου στρα-τηγοῦντος, κατεκληροῦσαν ἐν Γαλατία Ἦρωμαῖοι τὴν Πικεντίνην προσαγορευμένην χώραν, ἐξ ἦς νυκτήσαντες ἐξέβαλον τοὺς Σήμνωνας προσαγορευμέ-νους Γαλάτας, Γατοῦ Φλαμινίου ταύτην τὴν δημο-αγωγίαν εἰσηγησαμένον καὶ πολιτείαν, ἢν δὲ καὶ Ἦρωμαῖοι ὡς ἐποίησέν φατέον ἄρχηγον μὲν γε-νέσθαι τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ χήμου διαστροφῆς, αἰτίαν δὲ καὶ τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα πολέμου υστάντος 8 αὐτοὶ πρὸς τοὺς προειρημένους. πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν Γαλατῶν ὑπεδύντο τὴν πράξιν, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ Βοϊοὶ, διὰ τὸ συντερμοῦντα τῇ τῶν Ἦρωμαίων χώρᾳ, νομίσαντες οὖν ὑπὲρ ἤγεμονίας ἐτὶ καὶ δυ- ναστείας Ἦρωμαίοις τὸν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ποιήσασθαι πόλεμον, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ ὀλοσχεροῦ ἐξαναστάσεως καὶ καταφθορᾶς.

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ence of suffering or peril, they began again, as was natural, to disturb the settlement, becoming exasperated against the Romans on the least pretext and inviting the Alpine Gauls to make common cause with them. At first these advances were made secretly by their chiefs without the knowledge of the multitude; so that when a force of Transalpine Gauls advanced as far as Ariminum the Boian populace were suspicious of them, and quarrelling with their own leaders as well as with the strangers, killed their kings, Atis and Galatus, and had a pitched battle with the other Gauls in which many fell on either side. The Romans had been alarmed by the advance of the Gauls, and a legion was on its way; but, on learning of the Gauls' self-inflicted losses, they returned home. Five years after this alarm, in the consulship of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the Romans divided among their citizens the territory in Gaul known as Picenum, from which they had ejected the Senones when they conquered them. Gaius Flaminius was the originator of this popular policy, which we must pronounce to have been, one may say, the first step in the demoralization of the populace, as well as the cause of the war with the Gauls which followed. For what prompted many of the Gauls and especially the Boii, whose territory bordered on that of Rome, to take action was the conviction that now the Romans no longer made war on them for the sake of supremacy and sovereignty, but with a view to their total expulsion and extermination.

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22 Διόπερ ευθέως τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἔθνων, τὸ τε τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων καὶ Βοίων, συμφρονήσαντα διεπέμποντο πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὰς Ἀλπεῖς καὶ περὶ τὸν Ῥοδανὸν ποταμὸν κατοικοῦντας Γαλάτας, προσαγορευόμενοι δὲ διὰ τὸ μισθὸν στρατεύειν Γασσάτους.

3 ἡ γὰρ λέξις αὕτη τούτο σημαίνει κυρίως. δὲν τοὺς βασιλεὺς Κογκολιτάνω καὶ Ἀντροέστῳ παρατίκα μὲν χρυσίον προτείνατε πλῆθος, εἰς τὸ μέλλον δ’ ὑποδεικνύτε τὸ μέγεθος τῆς Ῥωμαίων εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἐὰν κρατήσωσι, προλέγοντο καὶ παρώξυνον πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ Ῥωμαίους στρατεύειν. βαδίσεις δέ ἐπεισαγ., ἀμα τοῖς προερημένοις διδόντες μὲν τὰ πιστὰ περὶ τῆς αὐτῶν συμμαχίας, ἀναμμηνήσκοντες δὲ τῇς τῶν ἰδίων προγόνων πράξεως αὐτούς. εὺς ἡ ἱκεῖοι στρατεύσαντες οὐ μόνον ἐνίκησαν μαχόμενοι Ῥωμαίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐξ ἐφόδου κατέσχοντο τῇ Ῥώμῃς γενόμενοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀπάντων ἐγκρατεῖς, καὶ τῆς πόλεως αὐτῆς ἐπτὰ μήπας κυριεύσαντες, τέλος ἐθελοῦσι καὶ μετὰ χάριτος παραδόντες τὴν πόλιν, ἀδραυστοὶ καὶ σωεῖς ἔχοντες τὴν ὑφέλεων ἐις τὴν οἰκείαν ἐπὶ ἀνήλθον. δὲν ἀκούσατε οἱ περὶ αὐτούς ἠγέμονες οὕτω παρωρμήθησαν ἐπὶ τὴν στρατεύειν ὡστε μηδὲν ἡτο μήπες μήπες ἐνδοξότερος μήτε μαχιμωτέρος ἄνδρας ἐξελθεῖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν τόπων τῆς Γαλατίας. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καίρους τούτους Ῥωμαῖοι τὰ μὲν ἀκούσαντες, τὰ δὲ καταμαντεύμενοι τὸ μέλλον, εἰς φόβους ἐνέπιπτον συνεχεῖς καὶ ταραχὰς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὡστε ποτὲ μὲν στρατόπεδα καταγράφει καὶ ὁτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ποιεῖσθαι παρασκευάζειν, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἐξάγειν ἐπὶ τούς
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22. The two largest tribes, therefore, the Insubres 231 B.C. and Boii, made a league and sent messengers to the Gauls dwelling among the Alps and near the Rhone, who are called Gaesatae because they serve for hire, this being the proper meaning of the word. They urged and incited their kings Concolitanus and Aneroestus to make war on Rome, offering them at present a large sum in gold, and as to the future, pointing out to them the great prosperity of the Romans, and the vast wealth that would be theirs if they were victorious. They had no difficulty in persuading them, as, in addition to all this, they pledged themselves to be loyal allies and reminded them of the achievement of their own ancestors, who had not only overcome the Romans in combat, but, after the battle, had assaulted and taken Rome itself, possessing themselves of all it contained, and, after remaining masters of the city for seven months, had finally given it up of their own free will and as an act of grace, and had returned home with their spoil, unbroken and unscathed. When the kings had been told all this, they became so eager for the expedition that on no occasion has that district of Gaul sent out so large a force or one composed of men so distinguished or so warlike. All this time, the Romans, either hearing what was happening or divining what was coming, were in such a state of constant alarm and unrest, that at times we find them busy enrolling legions and making provision of corn and other stores, at times marching to the
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οὗτος, ὡς ἢδη παρόντων εἰς τὴν χώραν τῶν πολε-
μίων, οὗτος κεκεκνηκότων ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας τῶν Κελ-
τῶν. οὐκ ἔλαχιστα δὲ συνήργησε καὶ Καρχηδο-
νίοις τούτοις τὸ κύνημα πρὸς τὸ κατασκευάζον 
κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἀσφαλῶς. Ἡρωμαίοι γάρ, ὡς καὶ 
πρόσθεν ἦμιν εἰρηταί, κρίνοντες ἀναγκαίωτερα ταῦτα 
dιὰ τὸ πρὸς ταῖς πλευραῖς αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν παρορῶν 
ἵνα γιγάζοντο τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, σπουδάζοντες 
πρὸς οὖν ἐν καλῷ θέσθαι τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Κελτοὺς. 

διὰστέρ ἀσφαλισάμενοι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους 
dιὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν ὁμολογῶν, ὑπὲρ ὧν 
ἄρτοι δεδηλώκαμεν, ἐνεχείρησαν ὁμοθυμαῖον ἐν τούτοις 
τοῖς καρποῖς πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολε-
μίους, νομίζοντες συμφέρειν σφίξι τῷ διακριθῆναι 
πρὸς τούτους.

23 Οἱ δὲ Γαλαται Γαλάται συντηρόμενοι δύναμιν 
pολυτελῆ καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἤκον ὑπεράραντες τὰς Ἀλ-
πεισ εἰς τὸν Πάδουν ποταμὸν ἔτει μετὰ τὴν τῆς χώ-
ρας διάδοσιν ὁγδών. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν Ἰονόμβρων 
καὶ Βοῖων γένος ἐμεινε γενναῖως εἰ ταῖς ἔξ ἀρχῆς 
ἐπιβολαῖς, οἱ δὲ Οὐενετοὶ καὶ Γονομάνοι, διαπρε-
βευσάμενοι Ῥωμαίων, τούτοις εἴλοντο συμμαχεῖν. 

3 διὸ καὶ μέρος τι τῆς δυνάμεως καταλιπεῖν ἡγαγκά-
σθησαν οἱ βασιλεῖς τῶν Κελτῶν φυλακῆς χάριν τῆς 
χώρας πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ τούτων φόβον. αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐξ-
αραντες παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι κατασταθηκτὸς 
ὦρμησαν, ποιούμενοι τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ Τυρρη-
νίας, ἔχοντες πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς πεντακισμυρίους, ἵπ-

4 καὶ πεῖς δὲ καὶ συνωρίδας εἰς δισμυρίους. Ἡρωμαῖοι δὲ 
ὡς θάττων ἠκούσαν τοὺς Κελτοὺς ὑπερβεβληθέκεναι 
τᾶς Ἀλπείς, Δεύκιοι μὲν Ἀμίλιον ὑπατον μετὰ 
δυνάμεως ἔξαπέστειλαν ὡς ἐπὶ Ἄρμινον, τηρήσοντα 

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frontier, as if the enemy had already invaded their territory, while as a fact the Celts had not yet budged from their own country. This movement of the Gauls contributed in no small measure to the rapid and unimpeded subjugation of Spain by the Carthaginians; for the Romans, as I stated above, regarded this matter as of more urgency, since the danger was on their flank, and were compelled to neglect the affairs of Spain until they had dealt with the Gauls. They therefore secured themselves against the Carthaginians by the treaty with Hasdrubal, the terms of which I stated above, and threw their whole effort into the struggle with their enemies in Italy, considering it their main interest to bring this to a decisive conclusion.

23. The Gaesatae, having collected a richly equipped and formidable force, crossed the Alps, and descended into the plain of the Po in the eighth year after the partition of Picenum. The Insubres and Boii held stoutly to their original purpose; but the Veneti and Cenomani, on the Romans sending an embassy to them, decided to give them their support; so that the Celtic chiefs were obliged to leave part of their forces behind to protect their territory from invasion by these tribes. They themselves marched confidently out with their whole available army, consisting of about fifty thousand foot and twenty thousand horse and chariots, and advanced on Etruria. The Romans, the moment they heard that the Gauls had crossed the Alps, sent Lucius Aemilius, their Consul, with his army to Ariminum to await

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tautē tōn ēnantiōn tīn ἔφοδον, ēna de tōn ēxa-
8 pelēkewn eis Turrhniān. ó mēn γὰρ ēteros tōn
upatōn Gaïos Ἄτιλιος προεξεληλυθὼς ἔτυχεν eis
7 Σαρδόνα μετὰ tōn stratopeōdōn, oī d’ ēn tē Ἡρώμη
pántes periđeeiç Ἰσσαν, méγαν kai foberοn autoiç
υπολαμβάνοντες ἐπιφέρεσθαι κύδωνον. ἔπασχον de
τοῦτ’ εἰκότως, ἔτι περὶ Γαλατῶν ἐγκαθημένου ταῖς
8 ψυχαῖς αὐτῶν τοῦ παλαιοῦ φόβου. διό καὶ πρὸς
tautēn ἀναφέροντες τὴν ἐννοιαν τὰ μὲν συνήθροι-
ζον, tā de katēγραφον stratopeδa, tοῖς d’ ētoîmous
9 eînai parēγγελλον τῶν συμμάχων. καθόλου de toîs
υποτεγμένοις ἀναφέρειν ἐπέταξαν ἀπογραφὰs tῶν
ἐν ταῖς ἥλικίαις, σπουδάζοντες εἰδέναι τὸ σύμπαν
10 πλῆθος τῆς ὑπαρχοῦσης αὐτοῖς δυνάμεως. σιτὸν
de kai béloûn kai tῆς ἄλλης ἐπιτηδειότητος πρὸς
πόλεμον tηλικαύτην ἐποίησαντο κατασκευὴν ἥλικην
11 oúdeis pôw mnemoneûei próteron. συναργεῖτο d’
12 autoĩs pânta kai pautaĥóthev ētoîmos. katape-
pellēgménoi γὰρ oí tῆν Ἰταλίαν οἰκουντες τῆν τῶν
Γαλατῶν ἔφοδον, οὐκέτι Ἡρωμάιοι ἠγοῦντο συμμα-
χεῖν oúde peri tῆς tōútων ἡγεμονίας γίνεσθαι tῶν
πόλεμον, ἀλλὰ peri sfōn ἐνόμιζον ἐκαστοι kai tῆς
idías pōlew kai χώραs ἐπιφέρεσθαι tῶν κύδωνον.
13 diúper ētoîmos tōis parageγγελλομένοις ὑπῆκουν.
24 Ἰνα de συμφανὲς ἐπὶ autoĩs gēntai tῶν εὐρων
ήλικους Ἀννίβας ἐτόλμησε πράγμασιν ἐπιθέσθαι
[μετὰ de taútā] kai prōs ἥλικην δυναστείαν παρα-
βάλωs ἀντοφθαλμῆsas ēπὶ τοσοῦτο καθίκεtο tῆς
προθέσεως ὥστε tοῖς μεγίστοις συμπτώμασι περὶ-
2 bάλλειν Ἡρωμάιοι, ῥητέον ἄν εἴη tῆν παρασκευὴν
kai tὸ πλῆθος tῆς ὑπαρχοῦσης αὐτοῖς tότε δυνά-
3 mew. metà mēn dὴ tῶν υπάτων ἐξεληλύθει τέταρα
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the attack of the enemy, and one of their Praetors to Etruria, their other Consul, Gaius Atilius, being absent in Sardinia with his legions. There was great and general alarm in Rome, as they thought they were in imminent and serious peril, and this indeed was but natural, as the terror the old invasion had inspired still dwelt in their minds. Being, therefore, in this state of profound apprehension, they busied themselves mustering and enrolling their own legions and ordered those of the allies to be in readiness. All their subjects in general were commanded to supply lists of men of military age, as they wished to know what their total forces amounted to. Of corn, missiles and other war material they had laid in such a supply as no one could remember to have been collected on any previous occasion. On every side there was a ready disposition to help in every possible way; for the inhabitants of Italy, terror-struck by the invasion of the Gauls, no longer thought of themselves as the allies of Rome or regarded this war as undertaken to establish Roman supremacy, but every man considered that the peril was descending on himself and his own city and country. So there was great alacrity in obeying orders.

24. But, that it may appear from actual facts what a great power it was that Hannibal ventured to attack, and how mighty was that empire boldly confronting which he came so near his purpose as to bring great disasters on Rome, I must state what were their resources and the actual number of their forces at this time. Each of the Consuls was in
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στρατόπεδα Ἡρωμαίκα, πεντάκις μὲν χιλίους καὶ
diakosίους peξίκοўς, ἰππεῖς δὲ τριακοσίους ἔχουν
4 ἐκαστον. οὐμαχοὶ δὲ μὲθ ἐκατέρων ἦσαν οἱ συν-
άμφω πεζοὶ μὲν τρισμύριοι, διαχύλιοι δ᾽ ἰππεῖς.
5 τῶν δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ καυροῦ προσβοηθησάντων εἰς τὴν
Ῥώμην Σαβίνων καὶ Τυρρηνῶν ἰππεῖς μὲν ἦσαν
eis tetrakiasxilious, peξοι δὲ πλείον τῶν pentaxi-
8 μυρίων. τούτως μὲν ἄθροισαντες ὡς ἐπὶ Τυρρη-
νίας προεκάθισαν, ἐξαπέλεκαν αὐτοῖς ἢγεμόνα συ-
7 στήσαντες. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἄπεννίνων κατοικοῦντες Ὠμ-
βροὶ καὶ Σαρωνικοὶ συνήχθησαν εἰς δισμύριος,
μετὰ δὲ τούτων Οὐένετοι καὶ Γονομάνι δισμύριοι.
8 τούτως δὴ ἔταξαν ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρών τῆς Γαλατίας, ὡς
ἐμβαλόντες εἰς τὴν τῶν Βοίων χώραν ἀντιπερι-
σπῶσι τοὺς ἐξεληλυθότας. τὰ μὲν ὅπω προκαθ-
9 ἴμενα στρατόπεδα τῆς χώρας ταῦτ᾽ ἦν. ἐν δὲ τῇ
Ῥώμη διέτριβον ἡτομασμένοι χάριν τῶν συμβαι-
νόντων ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις, ἑφεδρείας ἐχοντες τάξιν,
Ῥωμαίων μὲν αὐτῶν πεζοὶ δισμύριοι, μετὰ δὲ
tούτων ἰππεῖς χιλιοὶ καὶ pentaxiκόποι, τῶν δὲ συμ-
10 μάχων peξοὶ μὲν τρισμύριοι, δισχίλιοι δ᾽ ἰππεῖς.
καταγραφαὶ δὴ ἀνηχθησαν Λατίνων μὲν ὀκτακισ-
μύριοι peξοὶ, pentaxiκιλιοὶ δ᾽ ἰππεῖς, Σαμνίων
δὲ peξοὶ μὲν ἐπτακισμύριοι, μετὰ δὲ τούτων ἰππεῖς
11 ἐπτακισχίλιοι, καὶ μὴν Ἰατύγων καὶ Μεσσαπίων
συνάμφω peξῶν μὲν πέντε μυρίας, ἰππεῖς δὲ μύ-
12 ροὶ σὺν ἐξακισχίλιοις, Λευκανῶν δὲ peξοὶ μὲν τρισ-
μύριοι, τρισχίλιοι δ᾽ ἰππεῖς, Μαρσῶν δὲ καὶ Μαρ-
ρωκίων καὶ Φρεντανῶν, ἔτι δ᾽ Οὐεστίων, peξοὶ
μὲν δισμύριοι, tetrakiasxiliosoi δ᾽ ἰππεῖς. ἔτι γε
13 μὴν κἀν Σικελία καὶ Τάραντι στρατόπεδα δύο παρ-
εφήδρευεν, ὃν ἐκάτερον ἦν ἀνὰ tetrakiasxilious
300
command of four legions of Roman citizens, each consisting of five thousand two hundred foot and three hundred horse. The allied forces in each Consular army numbered thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse. The cavalry of the Sabines and Etruscans, who had come to the temporary assistance of Rome, were four thousand strong, their infantry above fifty thousand. The Romans massed these forces and posted them on the frontier of Etruria under the command of a Praetor. The levy of the Umbrians and Sarsinatae inhabiting the Apennines amounted to about twenty thousand, and with these were twenty thousand Veneti and Cenomani. These they stationed on the frontier of Gaul, to invade the territory of the Boii and divert them back from their expedition. These were the armies protecting the Roman territory. In Rome itself there was a reserve force ready for any contingency consisting of twenty thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, all Roman citizens, and thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse furnished by the allies. The lists of men able to bear arms that had been returned were as follows. Latins eighty thousand foot and five thousand horse, Samnites seventy thousand foot and seven thousand horse, Iapygians and Messapians fifty thousand foot and sixteen thousand horse, Lucanians thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse, Marsi, Marrucini, Frentani, and Vestini twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse. In Sicily and Tarentum were two reserve legions, each consisting of four thousand
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14 καὶ διακοσίους πεζούς, ἵππεῖς δὲ διακοσίους. Ῥωμαῖων δὲ καὶ Καμπανῶν ἡ πλῆθος πεζῶν μὲν εἰς εἶκοσι καὶ πέντε κατελέχθησαν μυριάδες, ἵππεών δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς δύο μυριάσιν ἐπῆσαν ἐτί τρεῖς χιλιάδες. 15 ὡστ' εἶναι τὸ [κεφάλαιον τῶν μὲν προκαθημένων τῆς Ῥώμης δυνάμεων πεζοῖς μὲν ὑπὲρ πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδες, ἵππεῖς δὲ εἰς ἐπτά μυριάδας. ἐφ' οὐσ 'Αννίβας ἐλάττως ἔχων δισμυρίων ἐπέβαλεν εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐν τοῖς ἐξής σαφέστερον ἐκποιήσει κατανοεῖν.

25 Οἱ δὲ Κέλτοι κατάρατες εἰς τὴν Τυρρηνίαν ἐπεροέυντο τὴν χώραν, πορθοῦντες αἰδεώς· οὐδενὸς δ' αὐτοῖς ἀντιταττομένου, τέλος ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἀρμηςαν 2 τὴν Ῥώμην. ἦδη δ' αὐτῶν περὶ πόλιν δυτών ἦ καλεῖται μὲν Κλούσιον, ἀπέχει δ' ἡμερῶν τριῶν δύον ἀπὸ τῆς Ῥώμης, προσαγγέλλεται διότι κατόπιν αὐτοῖς ἐπονται καὶ συνάπτουσιν αἱ προκαθήμεναι 3 τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐν τῇ Τυρρηνίᾳ δυνάμεις. οἱ δ' ἀκουσάντες ἔξ ὑποστροφῆς ἀπήντηντο, σπεύδουντες τούτοις 4 συμβαλεῖν. ἐγγίσαντες δ' ἀλλήλους ἤδη περὶ δυ- σμάς ἡλίου, τότε μὲν ἐν συμμέτρῳ διαστήματι κατα- 5 στρατοπεδεύσαντες ηὐλίσθησαν ἀμφότεροι. τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς ἐπιγενομένης πῦρ ἀνακαύσαντες οἱ Κέλτοι τοὺς μὲν ἵππεῖς ἀπέλιπον, συντάξαντες ἁμα τῶν φωτὶ συμφανεῖσι γενομένους τοῖς πολεμίοις ὑποχωρεῖν κατὰ 6 τῶν αὐτῶν στίβον. αὐτοὶ δὲ λαθραίαν ποιησάμενοι τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ὡς ἐπὶ πόλιν Φαισόλαν, αὐτοὶ παρενέβαλον, πρόβεσιν ἔχοντες ἁμα μὲν ἐκδέχεσθαι τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἵππεις, ἁμα δὲ παραδόξως ἐνοχλήσατι 302
two hundred foot and two hundred horse. Of Romans and Campanians there were on the roll two hundred and fifty thousand and about twenty-three thousand horse; so that the total number of Romans and allies able to bear arms was more than seven hundred thousand foot and seventy thousand horse, while Hannibal invaded Italy with an army of less than twenty thousand men. 25. On this matter I shall be able to give my readers more explicit information in the course of this work.

The Celts, descending on Etruria, overran the country without let or hindrance and, as nobody appeared to oppose them, they marched on Rome itself. When they had got as far as Clusium, a city three days' journey from Rome, news reached them that the advanced force which the Romans had posted in Etruria was on their heels and approaching. On hearing this, they turned to meet it, eager to engage it. At sunset the two armies were in close proximity, and encamped for the night at no great distance from each other. After nightfall, the Celts lit their camp-fires, and, leaving orders with their cavalry to wait until daybreak and then, when visible to the enemy, to follow on their track, they themselves secretly retreated to a town called Faesulae and posted themselves there, their intention being to wait for their cavalry, and also to put unexpected difficulties in the way of the enemy's
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7 τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἐφοδον. οἱ δὲ Ἰρωμαῖοι τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπυγενομένης συνιδότητας τοὺς ἵππεις αὐτοὺς, καὶ νομίσαντες τοὺς Κελτῶν ἀποδεδρακέναι, κατὰ σπουδὴν ἥκολοῦσθην τοῖς ἱππεύσαι κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνων ἀποχώρησιν. ἀμα δὲ τῷ συνεγγίζειν τοῖς πολεμίωσι διαναστάντων τῶν Κελτῶν, καὶ συμπεσότων αὐτοῖς, ἦν ἄγων τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ἀμφότερος. τέλος δὲ καθ-υπερεχόμενων τῶν Κελτῶν τῇ τόλμῃ καὶ τῷ πλῆθει, συνέβη διαφθαρῆναι μὲν τῶν Ἰρωμαίων ὅλην ἐλάττωσιν ἀξιωτότων ἀποκατελλῆσαν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς φεύγειν· ὅπως οἱ πλεῖοις πρὸς τινὰ τόπων ἔρυμνὸν ἀποχωρήσαντες ἐμενον, οὕς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἱ Κελτοὶ πολιορκεῖν ἑπεβάλοντο· κακῶς δ’ ἀπαλλάττοντες ἐκ τῆς προγεγεγενήμενης ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ πορείας καὶ κακοπαθείας καὶ ταλαιπωρίας, ὑμηρέσαν πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν καὶ θεραπεῖαν, φυλακὴν ἀπολιπόντες τῶν ἰδίων ἱππῶν περὶ τοῦ λόφου, πρόθεσιν ἔχοντες κατὰ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν πολιορκεῖν τοὺς συμπεσόργανας, ἐὰν μὴ παραδώσωσιν ἕαυτος ἐκουσίως.

26 Κατὰ δὲ τὸν καυρὸν τοῦτον Λεύκιος Αἰμίλιος δ’ προκαθήμενος ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν τῶν ἄκουσας τοὺς Κελτοὺς διὰ Τυρρηνίας ἐμβεβληκότας συνεγγόντας τῇ Ἰρωμη, παρῆν βοηθῶν κατὰ σπουδὴν εὐτυχῶς εἰς δέοντα καυρόν. καταστρατοπεδεύσαντος δ’ αὐτοῦ σύνεγγυς τῶν πολεμίων, κατιδόντες τὰ πυρά καὶ νόησαντες τὸ γεγονός οἱ συμπεφευγότες ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον, ταχεῖως ἀναθάρρησαντες ἐξε- απεστειλαν αὐτῶν τινὰς τῆς νυκτὸς ἀνόπλους διὰ τῆς ὕλης ἀναγκελοῦντας τῷ στρατηγῷ τῷ συμβεβη- 3 κὸς. δ’ ἔδει διακούσας, καὶ θεωρῶν οὓδε διαβούλιον αὐτῶ καταλειπόμενον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐνεστῶτων, τοῖς μὲν χιλιάρχοις ἀμα τῷ φωτὶ παρῆγγειλε τοὺς πεζοὺς.
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attack. At daybreak, the Romans, seeing the cavalry alone and thinking the Celts had taken to flight, followed the cavalry with all speed on the line of the Celts' retreat. On their approaching the enemy, the Celts issued from their camp and attacked them, and a conflict, at first very stubborn, took place, in which finally the numbers and courage of the Celts prevailed, not fewer than six thousand Romans falling and the rest taking to flight. Most of them retreated to a hill of some natural strength where they remained. The Celts at first attempted to besiege them, but as they were getting the worst of it, fatigued as they were by their long night march and the suffering and hardships it involved, they hastened to rest and refresh themselves, leaving a detachment of their cavalry to keep guard round the hill, intending next day to besiege the fugitives, if they did not offer to surrender.

26. At this very time Lucius Aemilius, who was in command of the advanced force near the Adriatic, on hearing that the Celts had invaded Etruria and were approaching Rome, came in haste to help, fortunately arriving in the nick of time. He encamped near the enemy, and the fugitives on the hill, seeing his camp-fires and understanding what had occurred, immediately plucked up courage and dispatched by night some unarmed messengers through the wood to announce to the Consul the plight they were in. On hearing of it and seeing that there was no alternative course under the circumstances, he ordered his Tribunes to march
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εξάγεναι, αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς ἅπαντις ἀναλαβὼν καθηγεῖτο τῆς δυνάμεως, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ τὸν 4 προειρημένον βουνόν. οἱ δὲ τῶν Γαλατῶν ἡγε- μόνες, ἀφορώντες τὰ πυρὰ τῆς νυκτὸς καὶ συλλογι- ζόμενοι τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν πολεμίων συνήδρευν. 5 οἱ 'Ἀνηροέστης ὁ βασιλεὺς γνώμην εἰσέφερε λέγων ὅτι δεῖ τοσαῦτη λείας ἐγκρατεῖς γεγονότας, ἣν γὰρ, ὥσ ἔοικε, καὶ τὸ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ θρεμμάτων πλῆθος, ἐτι δὲ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς ης εἶχον, ἀμύθητον. 6 διόπερ ἔφη δεῖν μὴ κινδυνεύειν ἐτι μηδὲ παραβάλλε- σθαι τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἀδεῶς ἐπανάγειν ταῦτα δ’ ἀποσκευασάμενος καὶ γενομένους εὐ- ξόνους αὕθις ἐγχειρεῖν ὀλοσχερῶς, ἔαν δοκῇ, τοῖς 7 'Ῥωμαίων πράγμασι. δόξαντος δὲ σφίζει κατὰ τὴν 'Ἀνηροέστου γνώμην χρήσασθαι τοῖς παροῦσι, οὔτοι μὲν τῆς νυκτὸς ταῦτα βουλευσάμενοι, πρὸ φωτος ἀναλυζάντες προῆγον παρὰ θάλατταν διὰ τῆς 8 Τυρρηνῶν χώρας. οἱ δὲ Λεύκιος, ἀναλαβὼν ἐκ τοῦ βουνοῦ τὸ διασωζόμενον τοῦ στρατοπέδου μέρος ἀμα τοῖς ἱδίαις δυνάμεις, τὸ μὲν διακινδυνεύειν ἐκ παρα- τάξεως οὐδαμῶς ἐκρίνε συμφέρειν, ἐπιτηρεῖν δὲ μάλλον καιροὺς καὶ τόπους εὐφνείς, ἑπομένους, ἐάν ποῦ τι βλάψαι τοὺς πολεμίους ἢ τῆς λείας ἀπο- στάσαι δυνηθῇ.'

27 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους ἐκ Σαρδόνος μετὰ τῶν στρατοπέδων Γάιος Ἀτίλιος ὑπατος εἰς Πίσας καταπεπλευκὼς προῆγε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς 'Ῥώμην, ἐναντία ποιοῦμενος τοῖς πολεμίοις τὴν 2 πορείαν. ἦδη δὲ περὶ Τελαμώνα τῆς Τυρρηνίας τῶν Κελτῶν ὑπαρχόντων, οἱ προνομεύοντες εἴς αὐτῶν ἐμπεσόντες εἰς τοὺς παρὰ τοῦ Γαῖου προπο- 3 ρευμένους ἐάλωσαν· καὶ τά τε προγεγονότα διεσά- 306
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out the infantry at daybreak, he himself proceeding in advance with the cavalry towards the hill. The leaders of the Gauls, on seeing the camp-fires at night, surmised that the enemy had arrived and held a council at which the King Aneroestes expressed the opinion, that having captured so much booty (for it appears that the quantity of slaves, cattle and miscellaneous spoil was enormous), they should not give battle again nor risk the fortune of the whole enterprise, but return home in safety, and having got rid of all their encumbrances and lightened themselves, return and, if advisable, try issues with the Romans. It was decided under the circumstances to take the course recommended by Aneroestes, and having come to this resolution in the night, they broke up their camp before daybreak and retreated along the sea-coast through Etruria. Lucius now took with him from the hill the survivors of the other army and united them with his other forces. He thought it by no means advisable to risk a general battle, but decided to hang on the enemy's rear and watch for times and places favourable for inflicting damage on them or wrestling some of the spoil from their hands.

27. Just at this time, Gaius Atilius, the other Consul, had reached Pisa from Sardinia with his legions and was on his way to Rome, marching in the opposite direction to the enemy. When the Celts were near Telamon in Etruria, their advanced guard encountered that of Gaius and were made prisoners. On being examined by the Consul they
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Ifon ἀνακρινόμενοι τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ τὴν παρουσίαν ἀμφοτέρων τῶν στρατοπέδων ἀνήγγελλον, σημαίνοντες διότι τελείως σύνεγγυς εἰσὶν οἱ Κελτοὶ καὶ τοῦτων κατόπων οἱ περὶ τὸν Λεύκιον. ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν ξενοθεῖς ἐπὶ τοῖς προσπίπτουσιν, τὰ δ’ εὐελπισμένοις ἐπὶ τῷ δοκεῖν μέσους κατὰ πορείαν ἀπειληφέναι τοὺς Κελτοὺς, τοὺς μὲν χιλιάρχους παρῆγγελε τάττευν τὰ στρατόπεδα, καὶ βάδην εἰς τούμπροσθεν προάγειν, καθ’ ὅσον ἂν οἱ τόποι προσδέχωνται τὴν μετωπηδὸν ἔφοδον. αὐτὸς δὲ συνθεωρήσεις εὐκαίρως λόφον κείμενον ὑπὲρ τὴν ὁδόν, ὡς ὅπερ παραπορευθήναι τοὺς Κελτοὺς, ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς ἱππεῖς, ἱρμηνευόμενος σπεύδων προκαταλαβέσθαι τὴν ἀκρολοφίαν καὶ πρῶτος κατάρχει τοῦ κινδύνου, πεπεισμένος τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς τῶν ἐκβαινόντων πλείοντος οὐτω τις κληρονομεῖν.

οἱ δὲ Κελτοὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀτίλιον ἀγνοοῦντες, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος ὑπολαμβάνοντες τοὺς περὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον περιπεπειρᾶσθαι τὴν νύκτα τοῖς ἱππεύσι καὶ προκαταλαβάνεσθαι τοὺς τόπους, ευθέως ἐξαπέστελλον τοὺς παρ’ αὐτῶν ἱππεῖς καὶ τινὰς τῶν εὐξώνων, ἀντιποιησομένους τῶν κατὰ τὸν βουνὸν τὸπων. ταχύ δὲ συνέντευξιν τὴν τοῦ Γαίου παρουσίαν ἔκ τινος τῶν ἀχθέντων αἰχμαλώτων, σπουδὴ παρενήθαλον τοὺς πεξοῦς, ποιοῦμενοι τὴν ἐκταξὶν ἀμα πρὸς ἐκατέρων τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν, καὶ τὴν ἄπτ’ οὐρᾶς καὶ τὴν κατὰ πρόσωπον οὐς μὲν γὰρ ἦδεσαν ἐπομένους αὐτοῖς, οὕς δὲ κατὰ τὸ στόμα προσεδόκων ἀπαντήσεως, ἐκ τε τῶν προσαγγελλομένων τεκμαιρόμενοι καὶ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὸν τὸν καιρὸν συμβαίνοντων. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἀκηκοότες μὲν τὸν εἰς τὰς Πίσας κατάπλου τῶν στρατοπέδων, οὕτω δὲ προσδοκῶν.
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narrated all that had recently occurred and told him of the presence of the two armies, stating that the Gauls were quite near and Lucius behind them. The news surprised him but at the same time made him very hopeful, as he thought he had caught the Gauls on the march between the two armies. He ordered his Tribunes to put the legions in fighting order and to advance thus at marching pace in so far as the nature of the ground allowed the attack in line. He himself had happily noticed a hill situated above the road by which the Celts must pass, and taking his cavalry with him, advanced at full speed, being anxious to occupy the crest of the hill before their arrival and be the first to begin the battle, feeling certain that thus he would get the largest share of credit for the result. The Celts at first were ignorant of the arrival of Atilius and imagined from what they saw, that Aemilius' cavalry had got round their flank in the night and were engaged in occupying the position. They therefore at once sent on their own cavalry and some of their light-armed troops to dispute the possession of the hill. But very soon they learnt of Gaius' presence from one of the prisoners brought in, and lost no time in drawing up their infantry, deploying them so that they faced both front and rear, since, both from the intelligence that reached them and from what was happening before their eyes, they knew that the one army was following them, and they expected to meet the other in their front. 28. Aemilius, who had heard of the landing of the legions at Pisa but had not any idea that they were already
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tes auta synegyzein, tote safws ekei peri ton
lophon agonos egnwasan diosti telews egnus einai
2 symbainei tas oikeias auton dynameis. dio kai
touz mwen ipheis parantika bothismantas eza-
estellon touz en tow lofow diagwviziomenvous, autoi
de kata tas ethismenas tazies diakosmiasantes touz
3 peizous proghon epi touz upenantious. oi de Kelt-
toi touz men ekei twn "Alpewn Gaissatous pros-
agorevomeinous etaixan pros twn apt' oubras epiwsan
h prosedokon touz peri ton Aimiton, epi de tou-
4 touz twn "Issoniberas" pros de twn kata prosopton
touz Tauriskous kai touz epi tade tou Pado
katoikountas Boious paranebalon, twn enantian
men stasewn exontas tois proerevmenous, blesontas
de prois twn tou Gaio stratopedefes ebodon.
5 tas de amazas kai synorides ekto ekaterou tou
kepatos paroesthasan, twn de leian eis ti twn para-
keiemewn oroun phylakhi periosthasantes ethroioun.
6 genomeias de amfistomou tis twn Keltwv dyna-
meous, ou monon kataplektikwn, allai kai praktikon
7 einai synetheina twn tazewn. ois men oin "Issoniberes
kai Boious tais anakuridas exontes kai touz evneiweis
8 twn sagwv peri autous exetaxan. ois de Gaissatai
dia te twn filodoxian kai to tharrosa taute aporr-
ysantes gynnoi met' autov twn oplwn prwtoi tis
dynames katosthasan, upolabontes owtos esosehai
praktikwtaioi, dia tis tinas twn topwn bateides
ontas emplekesethai tois efammasi kai parapodiagn
9 tis twn oplwn xreiai. to men oin prwton autous
o kata twn lofon eneisistikei kindunos, apasw ou
synottos, ws an ama tosoioun plhous ippewn
af ekasto twn stratopedefwn anamix allhlois
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so near him, now, when he saw the fight going on round the hill, knew that the other Roman army was quite close. Accordingly, sending on his cavalry to help those who were fighting on the hill, he drew up his infantry in the usual order and advanced to attack. The Celts had drawn up facing their rear, from which they expected Aemilius to attack, the Gaesatae from the Alps and behind them the Insubres, and facing in the opposite direction, ready to meet the attack of Gaius' legions, they placed the Taurisci and the Boii from the left bank of the Po. Their wagons and chariots they stationed at the extremity of either wing and collected their booty on one of the neighbouring hills with a protecting force round it. This order of the Celtic forces, facing both ways, not only presented a formidable appearance, but was well adapted to the exigencies of the situation. The Insubres and Boii wore their trews and light cloaks, but the Gaesatae had discarded these garments owing to their proud confidence in themselves, and stood naked, with nothing but their arms, in front of the whole army, thinking that thus they would be more efficient, as some of the ground was overgrown with brambles which would catch in their clothes and impede the use of their weapons. At first the battle was confined to the hill, all the armies gazing on it, so great were the numbers of cavalry from each host com-
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10 συμπεπτωκότοσ. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ καρῷ συνέβη Γάιον μὲν τὸν ὑπατον παραβόλος ἀγωνιζόμενον ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ τελευτάσαι τὸν βιον, τὴν δὲ κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ πρὸς τοὺς βασιλέας ἐπανενεχθῆναι τῶν Κελτῶν. τοὺς δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἱππεῖς, κινδυνεύοντας ἐρρωμένως τέλος ἐπικρατήσας τοῦ τόπου καὶ τῶν
11 ὑπεναντίων. μετὰ δὲ ταύτα τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων ἦδη σύνεγγυς ὄντων ἄλληλοις ὑδίον ἂν καὶ θαυμαστὸν τὸ συμβαῖνον οὐ μόνον τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ καρῷ τότε παρούσιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ποτὲ μετὰ ταύτα δυναμένοις ὑπὸ τὴν ὀψιν λαμβάνειν ἐκ τῶν
29 λεγομένων τῷ γεγονός. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν στρατοπεδῶν τῆς μάχης συνυσταμένης, δῆλον ὡς ἥχην καὶ παραλαγμένην εἰκὸς καὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν
2 καὶ τὴν χρείαν φαίνεσθαι τοῦ συντεταγμένου. δεύτερον δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀπορήσας τις καὶ νῦν καὶ τότε παρ’ αὐτῶν ὅτι τὸν καρὸν πότερον οἱ Κέλτοι τὴν ἐπισκέψεως τῷ ἐξοχον χώραν, εἰς ἀμφοῖν τῶν
3 μερῶν ἄμα τῶν πολεμίων ἑπαγόντων αὐτῶν, ἡ τούτων τὴν ἐπιτευκτικώτατην, ἄμα μὲν ἀγωνιζόμενοι πρὸς ἀμφότερος, ἄμα δὲ τὴν ἀφ’ ἑκατέρων ἀσφάλειαν ἐκ τῶν ὁπίσθεν αὐτοῖς παρακενδύνωτες, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἀποκεκλεμένης πάσης τῆς εἰς τοῦτο πισθὲν ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ λείπεσθαι
4 σωτηρίας; ἡ γὰρ τῆς ἀμφιστόμου τάξεως ἰδιότης
5 τοιαύτῃ ἔχει τὴν χρείαν. τοὺς γε μήν Ῥωμαίους τὰ μὲν εὐθαρσεῖς ἐποίησε τὸ μέσους καὶ πάντοθεν περιεληφθεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους, τὰ δὲ πάλιν ὁ κόσμος αὐτοὺς καὶ θόρυβος ἐξέπλητε τῆς τῶν Κέλτων
6 δυνάμεως. ἀναρίθμητον μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ τῶν βυ- καντῶν καὶ σαλπυγκτῶν πλῆθος. οἶς ἄμα τοῦ παντὸς στρατοπεδοῦς συμπαίκνιζοντος τηλικαύτην
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bating there pell-mell. In this action Gaius the Consul fell in the melleay fighting with desperate courage, and his head was brought to the Celtic kings; but the Roman cavalry, after a stubborn struggle, at length overmastered the enemy and gained possession of the hill. The infantry were now close upon each other, and the spectacle was a strange and marvellous one, not only to those actually present at the battle, but to all who could afterwards picture it to themselves from the reports. 29. For in the first place, as the battle was between three armies, it is evident that the appearance and the movements of the forces marshalled against each other must have been in the highest degree strange and unusual. Again, it must have been to all present, and still is to us, a matter of doubt whether the Celts, with the enemy advancing on them from both sides, were more dangerously situated, or, on the contrary, more effectively, since at one and the same time they were fighting against both their enemies and were protecting themselves in the rear from both, while, above all, they were absolutely cut off from retreat or any prospect of escape in the case of defeat, this being the peculiarity of this two-faced formation. The Romans, however, were on the one hand encouraged by having caught the enemy between their two armies, but on the other they were terrified by the fine order of the Celtic host and the dreadful din, for there were innumerable trumpeters and horn-blowers, and, as the whole army were shouting their war-cries at the same
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καὶ τοιαύτην συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι· κρανγὴν ὡστε μὴ μόνον τὰς σάλπιγγας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς παρακεμένους τόπους συνηχοῦντας έξ αὐτῶν
7 δοκεῖν προσέθαι φωνήν. ἐκπληκτικὴ δ᾿ ἦν καὶ τῶν γυμνῶν προστῶτων ἀνδρῶν ἢ τ᾿ ἐπιφάνεια καὶ κίνησις, ὡς ἃν διαφερόντων ταῖς ἀκμαῖς καὶ
8 τοῖς εἶδει. πάντες δ᾿ οἴ τὰς πρώτας κατέχοντες σπείρας χρυσοῖς μανιάκαις καὶ περικείροις ἦσαν
9 κατακεκοσμημένοι. πρὸς δ᾿ αὐτοὺς ὁ Ρωμαῖοι τὰ μὲν ἐξεπλήττοντο, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ λυστελοῦν ἔλπιδος ἀγόμενοι διπλασίως παρωξύνοντο πρὸς τὸν
30 κίνδυνον. πλὴν ἀμα τοὺς ἀκόντιστας προελθόντας ἐκ τῶν Ρωμαϊκῶν στρατοπέδων κατὰ τὸν ἑθισμὸν εἰσακοντίζειν ἐνεργοῖς καὶ πυκνοῖς τοῖς βέλεσι, τοῖς μὲν ὁπίσω τῶν Κελτῶν πολλῆν εὐχρηστίαν
2 στιὰν οἱ σάγχοι μετὰ τῶν ἀναξυρίδων παρεῖχον· τοῖς δὲ γυμνοῖς προστώσει παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν τοῦ πράγματος συμβαίνοντος τάναντα πολλὴν ἀπορίαν
3 καὶ δυσχρηστίαν παρεῖχε τὸ γινόμενον. οὐ γὰρ δυναμένου τοῦ Γαλατικοῦ θυρεοῦ τὸν ἄνδρα περισκέπτειν, ὡσε γυμνὰ καὶ μείζω τὰ σώματα ἢν, τοσοῦ-
4 τῶν συνέβαινε μᾶλλον τὰ βέλη πίπτειν ἐνδον. τέλος δ᾿ οὐ δυνάμενοι μὲν ἀμύνοσθαι τοὺς εἰσακοντίζοντας διὰ τὴν ἀπόστασιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πιπτῶντων βελῶν, περικακοῦντες δὲ καὶ δυσχρηστούμενοι τοῖς παροῦσι, οἱ μὲν εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀλογιστίας εἰκῆ προπίπτοντες καὶ διδόντες σφᾶς αὐτοῖς ἐκουσίως ἀπέθνησκον, οἱ δ᾿ εἰς τούς φίλους ἀναχωροῦντες ἐπὶ πόδα καὶ προδηλῶς ἀπο-
5 δεισιώντες διέστρεφον τοὺς κατόπιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν
1 τῶν Γαϊσατῶν φρόνημα παρὰ τοῖς ἀκόντισταις
6 τοῦτο τῷ τρόπῳ κατελύθη, τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἰνομμβρων
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time, there was such a tumult of sound that it seemed that not only the trumpets and the soldiers but all the country round had got a voice and caught up the cry. Very terrifying too were the appearance and the gestures of the naked warriors in front, all in the prime of life, and finely built men, and all in the leading companies richly adorned with gold torques and armlets. The sight of them indeed dismayed the Romans, but at the same time the prospect of winning such spoils made them twice as keen for the fight. 30. But when the javelineers advanced, as is their usage, from the ranks of the Roman legions and began to hurl their javelins in well-aimed volleys, the Celts in the rear ranks indeed were well protected by their trews and cloaks, but it fell out far otherwise than they had expected with the naked men in front, and they found themselves in a very difficult and helpless predicament. For the Gaulish shield does not cover the whole body; so that their nakedness was a disadvantage, and the bigger they were the better chance had the missiles of going home. At length, unable to drive off the javelineers owing to the distance and the hail of javelins, and reduced to the utmost distress and perplexity, some of them, in their impotent rage, rushed wildly on the enemy and sacrificed their lives, while others, retreating step by step on the ranks of their comrades, threw them into disorder by their display of faint-heartedness. Thus was the spirit of the Gaesatae broken down by the javeliners; but the main body of the Insubres,

" Literally "so that the more naked and the bigger they were ..." 

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καὶ Βοίων ἐτὶ δὲ Ταυρίσκων πλῆθος ἁμι τῷ τῶν Ὀρμαῖοις δεξιμένους τοὺς ἐαυτῶν ἀκοντιστάς προσβάλλειν σφίσα τὰς σπέιρας συμπεσοῦν τοῖς 7 πολεμίοις ἐκ χειρὸς ἐποίει μάχην ἐχυράν. διακοπ- 
τόμενοι γὰρ ἔμενον ἐπὶ ἵσον ταῖς ψυχαῖς, αὐτῷ τοῦτῳ 
καὶ καθόλου καὶ κατ’ ἄλλα λειτόμενοι, ταῖς τῶν 
8 ὀπλῶν κατασκευαίς. οἱ μὲν οὖν θυρεοὶ πρὸς ἀσφά- 
λειαν, οἱ δὲ μάχαιρα πρὸς πράξει μεγάλην διαφοράν 
. . . ἔχειν, τὴν δὲ Γαλατικὴν καταφοράν ἔχειν μό- 
νον. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔξω αὐτοῖς καὶ κατὰ κέρας οἱ τῶν 
Ῥωμαίων ἔππεισ ἐμβαλόντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου προσέ- 
φερον τὰς χεῖρας ἐρρωμένωσι, τὸθ' οἱ μὲν πεζοὶ τῶν 
Κελτῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς παρατάξεως τόπῳ κατεκό- 
πησαν, οἱ δ’ ἔππεισ πρὸς φυγήν ὠρμῆσαν.

31 Ἀπέθανον μὲν οὖν τῶν Κελτῶν εἰς τετρακισμυ- 
ρίους, ἐάλωσαν δ’ οὐκ ἑλάττους μυρίων, ἐν οἷς καὶ 
2 τῶν βασιλέων Κογκολιτάνος. δ’ ἔτερος αὐτῶν 
Ἄνηρόστος εῖς τινα τόπον συμφυγὼν μετ’ ὀλίγων 
προσήγεικε τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοις. 
3 ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων τὰ μὲν σκύλα συν- 
αθροίσας εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἀπέστειλε, τὴν δὲ λείαν 
4 ἀπέδωκε τοῖς προσήκουσιν. αὐτὸς δ’ ἀναλαβὼν τὰ 
στρατόπεδα καὶ διελθὼν παρ’ αὐτῇ τὴν Δινυστι- 
κὴν εἰς τὴν τῶν Βοίων ἐνέβαλε χώραν. πληρώσας 
δὲ τὰς ὀρμάς τῶν στρατοπέδων τῆς ὀφελείας ἐν 
ὀλίγαις ἁμέραις ἤκει μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων εἰς τὴν 
5 Ῥώμην. καὶ τὸ μὲν Καπετύλλων ἐκόµµησε ταῖς τε 
σημαίαις καὶ τοῖς μανάκαις. τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶ χρυσοῦν 
ψέλιον, ὁ φοροῦσι περὶ τὸν πράξηλον οἱ Γαλάται. 
6 τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς σκύλοις καὶ τοῖς αἰχμαλώτοις πρὸς 
tὴν ἔσοδον ἐχρῆσατο τὴν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ 
θριάμβου διακόσμησιν.

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Bœi, and Taurisci, once the javeliners had withdrawn into the ranks and the Roman maniples attacked them, met the enemy and kept up a stubborn hand-to-hand combat. For, though being almost cut to pieces, they held their ground, equal to their foes in courage, and inferior only, as a force and individually, in their arms. The Roman shields, it should be added, were far more serviceable for defence and their swords for attack, the Gaulish sword being only good for a cut and not for a thrust. But finally, attacked from higher ground and on their flank by the Roman cavalry, which rode down the hill and charged them vigorously, the Celtic infantry were cut to pieces where they stood, their cavalry taking to flight.

31. About forty thousand Celts were slain and at least ten thousand taken prisoners, among them the king Concolitanus. The other king, Aneroestes, escaped with a few followers to a certain place where he put an end to his life and to those of his friends. The Roman Consul collected the spoils and sent them to Rome, returning the booty of the Gauls to the owners. With his legions he traversed Liguria and invaded the territory of the Bœi, from whence, after letting his legions pillage to their heart's content, he returned at their head in a few days to Rome. He sent to ornament the Capitol the standards and torques (the gold necklets worn by the Gauls), but the rest of the spoil and the prisoners he used for his entry into Rome and the adornment of his triumph.
7. Ἡ μὲν οὖν βαρυτάτη τῶν Κελτῶν ἐφοδος οὕτω καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ διεφθάρη, πάσι μὲν Ἰταλιώταις, μάλιστα δὲ Ῥωμαίοις, μέγαν καὶ φοβερόν ἐπικρεμάσασα κίνδυνον. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ κατορθώματος τούτου κατελπίσαντες Ῥωμαίοι δυνῆσθαι τοὺς Κελτοὺς ἐκ τῶν τόπων τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον ὀλοσχερῶς ἐκβαλεῖν, τοὺς τε μετὰ ταύτα κατασταθέντας ὑπάτους Κόιντον Φόλουν καὶ Τίτου Μάλιν ἀμφοτέρους καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις μετὰ παρασκευῆς με-9 γάλης ἔξαπεστελαν ἐπὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς. οὐτοὶ δὲ τοὺς μὲν Βοῖοις ἐξ ἐφόδου καταπληξάμενοι συνηγάγασαν εἰς τὴν Ρωμαίων ἑαυτοῦ δοῦναι πῖστιν, 10 τὸν δὲ λυπὸν χρόνον τῆς στρατείας, ἐπιγενομένων ὀμβρων ἔξαισιῶν, ἐτὶ δὲ λομικῆς διαθέσεως ἐμπεσοῦσας αὐτοῖς, εἰς τέλος ἢπρακτὸν εἶχον.

32 Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτοι κατασταθέντες Πόλιος Φούριος καὶ Γάιος Φλαμίνιος άθεος ἐνέβαλον εἰς τὴν Κελτικὴν διὰ τὴς τῶν Ἀνάρων χώρας, οἶς συμβαίνει μὴ μα-2 κρᾶν ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας ἔχειν τὴν οἰκίσην. οὐς εἰς τὴν φιλίαν προσαγαγόμενοι διέβησαν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἰν- σόμβρων γῆν κατὰ τὰς συρροίας τοῦ τ’ Ἀδόα καὶ 3 Πάδου ποταμοῦ. λαβόντες δὲ πληγὰς περὶ τε τὴν διάβασιν καὶ περὶ τὴν στρατοπεδείαν, παρατικὰ μὲν ξεμαναν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα σπεισάμενοι καθ’ όμο-4 λογίαις ἀνέλυσαν ἐκ τῶν τόπων. περιελθόντες δὲ πλείους ἡμέρας, καὶ διελθόντες τὸν Κλούσιον πο-ταμόν, ἤλθον εἰς τὴν τῶν Γονομάνων χώραν, καὶ προσλαβόντες τούτους, ὄντας συμμάχους, ἐνέβαλον πάλιν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὰς Ἀλπεῖς τόπων εἰς τὰ τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων πεδία καὶ τὴν τε γῆν ἔδησαν καὶ τὰς 5 κατοικίας αὐτῶν ἐξεπόρθουν. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων προεστῶτες, θεωροῦντες ἢμετάθετον οὐσαν τὴν ἐπι- 318
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Thus were destroyed these Celts during whose invasion, the most serious that had ever occurred, all the Italians and especially the Romans had been exposed to great and terrible peril. This success encouraged the Romans to hope that they would be able entirely to expel the Celts from the plain of the Po; and the Consuls of the next year, Quintus Fulvius and Titus Manlius, were sent against them with a formidable expeditionary force. They surprised and terrified the Boii, compelling them to submit to Rome, but the rest of the campaign had no practical results whatever, owing to the very heavy rains, and an epidemic which broke out among them.

32. Next year's Consuls, however, Publius Furius and Gaius Flaminius, again invaded the Celtic territory, through the country of the Anares who dwell not far from Marseilles. Having admitted this tribe to their friendship, they crossed into the territory of the Insubres, near the junction of the Po and Adda. Both in crossing and in encamping on the other side, they suffered some loss, and at first remained on the spot, but later made a truce and evacuated the territory under its terms. After a circuitous march of some days, they crossed the river Clusius and reached the country of the Cenomani, who were their allies, and accompanied by them, again invaded from the district at the foot of the Alps the plains of the Insubres and began to lay the country waste and pillage their dwellings. The chieftains of the Insubres, seeing that the
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βολὴν τῶν Ἦρωμαιῶν, ἔκριναν τῇς τύχῃς λαβεῖν πείραν καὶ διακινδυνεύσαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὀλοσχερῶς. 8 συναθροίσατο σὺν ἀπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις ἐπὶ ταῦτα, καὶ τὰς χρυσὰς σημαίας τὰς ἀκινήτους λεγομένας καθελόντες ἐκ τοῦ τῆς Ἄθηνας ἱεροῦ, καὶ τάλλα παρασκευασάμενοι δεόντως, μετὰ ταῦτα τεθαρρηκότως καὶ καταπληκτικῶς ἀντεστρατεύσαντες τοὺς πολεμίους, ὄντες τὸ πλῆθος εἰς 7 πέντε μυρίας. οἱ δὲ Ἦρωμαιοι, τὰ μὲν ὀράντες σφάς ἐλάττους ὄντας παρὰ πολὺ τῶν ἑναντίων, ἐβούλουντο συγχρῆσθαι ταῖς τῶν συμμαχοῦσι τοῖς Κελτῶν δυνάμεις· τὰ δὲ συλλογισμένως τῆς τε Γαλατικῆς ἁθεσίας καὶ διότι πρὸς ὁμοφόρους τῶν προσλαμβανομένων μέλλουσι ποιεῖσθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, εὐλαβοῦντο τοιούτου ἀνδράς τοιοῦτον 9 καιρὸν καὶ πράγματος κοινωνεῖν. τέλος δὲ οὖν αὐτοὶ μὲν ὑπέμειναν ἐντὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ, τοὺς δὲ τῶν Κελτῶν σφίσι συνόντας διαβιβάζαντες εἰς τὸ πέραν ἀνέσπασαν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ ῥεῖθρου γε- 10 φύρας, ἂμα μὲν ἀσφαλιζόμενοι τὰ πρὸς ἐκεῖνος, ἂμα δὲ μίαν ἕαυτος ἀπολείποντες ἐλπίδα τῆς σωτηρίας τὴν ἐν τῷ νικᾷ, διὰ τὸ κατόπιν αὐτοῖς ἅβατον ὄντα παρακείθαι τὸν προειρημένον ποτα- 11 μόν. πράξαντες δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς τῷ διακινδυνεύειν ἤσαν.

33 Δοκούσι δὲ ἐμφρόνως κεχρῆσθαι τῇ μάχῃ ταύτῃ Ἦρωμαιοι, τῶν χιλιάρχων ὑποδειξάντων ὡς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὸν ἀγώνα κοινῆ καὶ κατ’ ἰδίαν ἐκάστους. 2 συνεωρακότες γὰρ ἐκ τῶν προγεγονότων κινδύνων ὅτι τοῖς τε θυμοὶς κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον, ἔως ἂν ἀκέραιον ἦ, φοβερώτατόν ἐστι πᾶν τὸ Γαλατικὸν 3 φύλον, αὗτα μάχαιρα ταῖς κατασκευαῖς, καθάπερ 320
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Romans adhered to their purpose of attacking them, decided to try their luck in a decisive battle. Collecting all their forces in one place, they took down the golden standards called "immovable" from the temple of Minerva, and having made all other necessary preparations, boldly took up a menacing position opposite the enemy. They were about fifty thousand strong. The Romans, on the one hand, as they saw that the enemy were much more numerous than themselves, were desirous of employing also the forces of their Celtic allies, but on the other hand, taking into consideration Gaulish fickleness and the fact that they were going to fight against those of the same nation as these allies, they were shy of asking such men to participate in an action of such vital importance. Finally, remaining themselves on their side of the river, they sent the Celts who were with them across it, and demolished the bridges that crossed the stream, firstly as a precaution against their allies, and secondly to leave themselves no hope of safety except in victory, the river, which was impassable, lying in their rear. After taking these measures they prepared for battle.

33. The Romans are thought to have managed matters very skilfully in this battle, their commanding officers having instructed them how they should fight, both as individuals and collectively. For they had observed from former battles that Gauls in general are most formidable and spirited in their first onslaught, while still fresh, and that, from the way
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eîrhtai próteron, míaν ἔχουσι τὴν πρώτην κατα-
φορὰν καιρίαν, ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης εὐθέως ἀποξυστροῦ-
tαι, καμπτόμεναι κατὰ μῆκος καὶ κατὰ πλάτος ἐπὶ
tossoúton ὅστ' ἦν μὴ δῶ τις ἀναστροφὴν τοῖς χρω-
ménois, ἐρέισαντες πρὸς τὴν γῆν ἀπευθύναι τῷ
ποδὶ, τελέως ἀπρακτοί εἶναι τὴν δευτέραν πληγήν
4 αὐτῶν· ἀναδόντες οὖν οἱ χιλιάρχοι τὰ τῶν τριαρίων
dóraτα τῶν κατόπιν ἐφεστῶτας ταῖς πρώταις σπεί-
rais, καὶ παραγγείλαντες ἐκ μεταλήψεως τοῖς ἐξ-
φεσι χρῆσθαι, συνέβαλον ἐκ παρατάξεως κατὰ πρό-
5 σωπὸν τοῖς Κελτοῖς. ἀμα δὲ τῷ πρὸς τὰ δόρατα
taῖς πρώταις καταφοραὶ χρωμένων τῶν Παλατῶν
ἀχρεωθηκὴν ταῖς μαχαίραις συνδραμόντες εἰς τὰς
χεῖρας τοὺς μὲν Κελτοὺς ἀπράκτους ἐποίησαν, ἀφ-
ελόμενοι τὴν ἐκ διάρθεως αὐτῶν μάχην, ὅπερ ἰδίον
ἐστὶ Παλατικῆς χρείας, διὰ τὸ μηδαμῶς κέντημα τὸ
6 ἔχωσιν· αὐτοὶ δὲ οὖν ἐκ καταφορᾶς, ἀλλ' ἐκ
dialήψεως ἄρθαις χρωμένωι ταῖς μαχαίραις, πρα-
κτικοῦ τοῦ κεντήματος περὶ αὐτὰς ὑπάρχοντος, τύ-
ποντες εἰς τὰ στέρνα καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ πληγὴν
ἐπὶ πληγὴ φέροντες, διέφθειραν τοὺς πλείστους τῶν
παρατάξαμένων διὰ τὴν τῶν χιλιάρχων πρόνοιαν.
7 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὁριζόντος Φλαμίνιος οὐκ ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ
κεχρησάς τῷ προερημένῳ κινδύνῳ. παρ' αὐτὴν
γὰρ τὴν ὄφραν του ποταμοῦ ποιησάμενος τὴν ἐκ-
ταξίν διέφθειρε τὸ τῆς Ῥωμαίκης μάχης ἵδιον, οὐχ
ὑπολειπόμενοι τόπον πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ πόδα ταῖς σπεί-
8 ραῖς ἀναχώρησιν. εἰ γὰρ συνέβη βραχὺ μόνων πιε-
σθήναι τῇ χώρᾳ τοὺς ἀνδρας κατὰ τὴν μάχην, ῥί-
pτειν ἄν εἰς τὸν ποταμόν αὐτοὺς ἔδει διὰ τὴν ἀστο-
χίαν τοῦ προερήμωτος. οὔ μὴν ἄλλα γε πολλῷ νική-
santes ταῖς σφετέραις ἀρεταῖς, καθάπερ εἶπον, καὶ
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their swords are made, as has been already explained, only the first cut takes effect; after this they at once assume the shape of a strigil, being so much bent both length-wise and side-wise that unless the men are given leisure to rest them on the ground and set them straight with the foot, the second blow is quite ineffectual. The tribunes therefore distributed amongst the front line the spears of the triarii who were stationed behind them, ordering them to use their swords instead only after the spears were done with. They then drew up opposite the Celts in order of battle and engaged. Upon the Gauls slashing first at the spears and making their swords unserviceable the Romans came to close quarters, having rendered the enemy helpless by depriving them of the power of raising their hands and cutting, which is the peculiar and only stroke of the Gauls, as their swords have no points. The Romans, on the contrary, instead of slashing, continued to thrust with their swords which did not bend, inflicting very effectual penetrating wounds. Thus, striking one blow after another on the breast or face, they slew the greater part of their adversaries. This was solely due to the foresight of the tribunes, the Consul Flaminius being thought to have mismanaged the battle by deploying his force at the very edge of the river-bank and thus rendering impossible a tactical movement peculiar to the Romans, as he left the cohorts no room to fall back gradually. For had the troops been even in the slightest degree pushed back from their ground during the battle, they would have had to throw themselves into the river, all owing to their general's blunder. However, as it was, they gained a decisive victory by their own skill and valour, as I said, and
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παμπληθοῦσι μὲν λείας, οὐκ ὀλίγων δὲ σκύλων κρατήσαντες, ἐπανήλθον εἰς τὴν 'Ῥώμην.

34 Τῷ δ’ ἔξῆς ἔτει, διαπρεσβευσάμενων τῶν Κελτῶν ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης καὶ πᾶν ποιήσεων ὑπουργομένων, ἐσπευσαν οἱ κατασταθέντες ὑπαιτοὶ Μάρκος Κλαύδιος καὶ Γνάιος Κορνήλιος τοῦ μὴ συγχωρηθῆναι. θῆναι τὴν εἰρήνην αὐτοῖς. οἱ δ’ ἀποτυχοῦσιν, καὶ κρίναντες ἐξελέγχασι τὰς τελευταίας ἐλπίδας, αὖθις ὀρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ μισθοῦσα τῶν περὶ τὸν Ῥώδανον Γαυσάτων Γαλατῶν εἰς τρισμυρίους. οὐσ παραλαβόντες εἶχον ἐν ἐτοῖμω καὶ προσεδόκων τὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἐφόδου. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγοί, τῆς ἁρας ἐπιγενομένης, ἀναλαβόντες τὰς δυνάμεις ἤγγον εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἰνσομβρῶν χώραν. παραγενόμενοι δὲ καὶ περιστρατοπεδεύσαντες πόλιν 'Αχέρρας, ἢ μεταξύ κεῖται τοῦ Πάδου καὶ τῶν Ἀλπειῶν ὅρων, ἐπολιόρκουν ταύτην. οἱ δ’ Ἰνσομβρες, βοηθεῖν μὲν οὐ δυνάμενοι, διὰ τὸ προκαταληφθῆναι τοὺς εὐφυεῖς τόπους, σπεύδοντες δὲ λύσας τὴν πολιορκίαν τῶν Ἀχερρῶν, μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως διαβιβάζασας τὸν Πάδου εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἀνάρων χώραν ἐπολιόρκου τὸ προσαγορευόμενον Κλαστίδιον. προσπεσόντος δὲ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος τοῖς στρατηγοῖς, ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς ἵππεῖς Μάρκος Κλαύδιος καὶ τινὰς τῶν πεζικῶν ἥπειροι, σπεύδων βοηθήσας τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις. οἱ δὲ Κελτοὶ, πυθόμενοι τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, λύσαντες τὴν πολιορκίαν ὑπηρτῶν καὶ παρετάξαντο. τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἵπποις τοιὸν ἐξ ἐφόδου τομημέος σφίσι προσπεσόντων, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἀντεῖχον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περισταμένων καὶ κατὰ νότον καὶ κατὰ κέρας, δυσχερησοῦμενοι τῇ μάχῃ, τέλος ἐτράπησαν ὑπ’ 324
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returned to Rome with a quantity of booty and many trophies.

34. Next year the Celts sent ambassadors begging 222 B.C. for peace and engaging to accept any conditions, but the new Consuls Marcus Claudius and Gnaeus Cornelius strongly urged that no peace should be granted them. On meeting with a refusal, the Celts decided to resort to their last hope and again appealed to the Gaesatae on the Rhone, and hired a force of about thirty thousand men. When they had these troops they kept them in readiness and awaited the attack of the enemy. The Roman Consuls, when the season came, invaded the territory of the Insubres with their legions. Encamping round a city called Acerrae lying between the Po and the Alps, they laid siege to it. The Insubres could not come to the assistance of the besieged, as the Romans had occupied all the advantageous positions, but, with the object of making the latter raise the siege, they crossed the Po with part of their forces, and entering the territory of the Anari, laid siege to a town there called Clastidium. On the Consuls learning of this, Marcus Claudius set off in haste with the cavalry and a small body of infantry to relieve the besieged if possible. The Celts, as soon as they were aware of the enemy’s arrival, raised the siege and advancing to meet them, drew up in order of battle. When the Romans boldly charged them with their cavalry alone, they at first stood firm, but afterwards, being taken both in the rear and on the flank, they found themselves in difficulties and were finally put to rout by the cavalry unaided,
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9 αὐτῶν τῶν ἵππεων. καὶ πολλοὶ μὲν εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν ἐμπεσόντες ὑπὸ τοῦ ῥεῦματος διεφθάρσαν, οἱ δὲ πλείους ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων κατεκόπτησαν. ἔλαβον δὲ καὶ τὰς 'Ἄχερρας οἱ 'Ῥωμαῖοι σίτου γεμούσας, ἐκχωρήσαντων εἰς τὸ Μεδιόλανον τῶν Γαλατῶν, ὅσπερ ἐστὶ κυριώτατος τόπος τῆς τῶν 'Ἰνόμβρων χώρας. οὶς ἥκε γοῦδος ἐπακολουθήσαντο τοῦ Γναῖου, καὶ προσβαλόντος ἄφνῳ πρὸ τὸ Μεδιόλανον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἄτυχον ἔσχον ἀπολυμένου δὲ αὐτοῦ πάλιν εἰς τὰς 'Ἄχερρας, ἐπεξελθόντες καὶ τῆς οὐραγίας ἀφάμενοι θρασέως πολλοὺς μὲν νεκροὺς ἐποίησαν, μέρος δὲ τι καὶ φυγεῖν αὐτῶν ἠμάγκασαν, ἔως ὁ Γνάιος ἀνακαλέσαμενος τόσον ἤκε τῆς πρωτεπορείας παρώρμησε στῆναι καὶ συμβάλειν τοῖς πολέμοισι. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀχερραῖοι, πειθαρχήσαντες τῷ στρατηγῷ, διεμάχοντο πρὸς τοὺς ἔπικειμένους εὐρύστως. οἱ δὲ Κελτοὶ, διὰ τὸ παρὸν εὐπρόχημα μείναντες ἐπὶ ποσοῦ εὐθαρσῶς, μετ' οὗ πολὺ τραπέντες ἔσχον εἰς τὰς παρωρείας. δὲ Γνάιος ἐπακολουθήσας τῆν τε χώραν ἔπροθει καὶ τὸ Μεδιόλανον ἐφείτα κατὰ κράτος. οὐ συμβαίνοντοι οἱ προεστῶτες τῶν Ἰνόμβρων, ἀπογινόμεντες τὰς τῆς σωτηρίας ἐλπίδας, πάντα τὰ καθ' αὐτοῦ ἐπέτρεψαν τοῖς Ἀχερραῖοις.

2 Ὅ μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς Κελτοὺς πόλεμος τουρίκετο ἐσχῆ τὸ τέλος, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἀπόνοιαν καὶ τόλμαν τῶν ἄγων ζωμένων ἀνδρῶν, ἐτὶ δὲ κατὰ τὰς μάχας καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπολλυμένων καὶ παραταττομένων, οὐδὲνος καταδεεστερος τῶν ἱστορικῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ τὴν ἀκροίαν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος χειρισμοῦ τελεύσει ἐφικταφρόνητος, διὰ τὸ μὴ τὸ πλεῖον, ἀλλὰ συλλήβδην ἅπαν τὸ γινόμενον.

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many of them throwing themselves into the river and being swept away by the current, while the larger number were cut to pieces by the enemy. The Romans now took Acerrae, which was well stocked with corn, the Gauls retiring to Mediolanum, the chief place in the territory of the Insubres. Gnaeus followed close on their heels, and suddenly appeared before Mediolanum. The Gauls at first did not stir, but, when he was on his way back to Acerrae, they sallied out, and made a bold attack on his rear, in which they killed a considerable number of the Romans and even forced a portion of them to take to flight, until Gnaeus, calling back the forces in advance, urged the fugitives to rally and withstand the enemy. After this the Romans, on their part obeying their Consul, continued to fight vigorously with their assailants, and the Celts after holding their ground for a time, encouraged as they were by their momentary success, were shortly put to flight and took refuge on the hills. Gnaeus, following them, laid waste the country and took Mediolanum itself by assault, (35) upon which the chieftains of the Insubres, despairing of safety, put themselves entirely at the mercy of the Romans.

Such was the end of the war against the Celts, a war which, if we look to the desperation and daring of the combatants and the numbers who took part and perished in the battles, is second to no war in history, but is quite contemptible as regards the plan of the campaigns, and the judgement shown in executing it, not most steps but
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μενον ὑπὸ τῶν Γαλατῶν θυμῷ μᾶλλον ἡ λογισμῷ

4 βραβεύεσθαι. περὶ ἀν ἡμεῖς συνθεωρήσαντες μετ’

όλιγον χρόνον αὐτούς ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον πε-

dίων ἐξωσθέντας, πλὴν ολίγων τόπων τῶν ὑπ’

αὐ-

tάς τὰς "Ἀλπεῖς κειμένων, οὐκ ὠθήσαν δεῖν οὔτε

tὴν ἐξ ἀρχής ἐφόδου αὐτῶν ἀμημόνευτον παραλι-

πεῖν οὔτε τάς μετὰ ταῦτα πράξεις οὔτε τὴν τελεύ-

ταίαν ἐξανάστασιν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες οἰκεῖον ἱστορίας

ὑπάρχειν τὰ τοιαῦτ’ ἐπεισόδια τῆς τύχης εἰς μνή-

8 μὴν ἄγειν καὶ παράδοσιν τοῖς ἐπιγνωμένοις, ἴνα μὴ

tελέως οἱ μεθ’ ἡμᾶς ἀνενόητοι τοῦτων ὑπάρχοντες

ἐκπληττόμεθα τὰς αἰφνιδίους καὶ παραλόγους τῶν

βαρβάρων ἐφόδους, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ ποσῶν ἐν νῷ λαμβά-

νοντες ὡς ὀλιγοχρόνων ἔστι καὶ λίαν εὐθαρσῶν

<τὸ τοιοῦτον>, τὴν ἐφόδου αὐτῶν ὑπομένωσι καὶ

πάσας ἐξελέγχωσι τὰς σφετέρας ἐλπίδας πρότερον

7 ἡ παραχώρησα τινος τῶν ἀναγκαῖων. καὶ γὰρ τοὺς

tὴν Περσῶν ἐφόδουν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ Γαλατῶν

ἐπὶ Δελφοὺς εἰς μνήμην καὶ παράδοσιν ἡμῶν ἀγαγό-

νας οὖ μικρά, μεγάλα δ’ οἴομαι συμβεβληθῆσαι πρὸς

8 τοὺς υπὲρ τῆς κούνης τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας ἀγώ-

νας. οὔτε γὰρ χορηγῶν οὔθ’ ὅπλων οὔτ’ ἀνδρῶν

πλῆθος καταπλαγεὶς ἃν τις ἀποσταίη τῆς τελευταῖας

ἐλπίδος, τοῦ διαγωνίζομαι περὶ τῆς σφετέρας χώρας

καὶ πατρίδος, λαμβάνων πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τὸ παρά-

δοξὸν τῶν τότε γενομένων, καὶ μημονεύσας ὅσας

μυριάδας καὶ τῶν τόλμωσι καὶ πηλίκας παρασκευάς

ἡ τῶν σὺν νῷ καὶ μετὰ λογισμοῦ κινδυνεύοντων

9 αἴρεσις καὶ δύναμις καθελεῖν. ὥ δ’ ἀπὸ Γαλατῶν

φόβος οὐ μόνον τὸ παλαιόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ’ ἡμᾶς

10 ἡ ἡ πλεονάκις ἐξέπληξε τοὺς Ἑλλήνας. διὸ καὶ
every single step that the Gauls took being commended to them rather by the heat of passion than by cool calculation. As I have witnessed them not long afterwards entirely expelled from the plain of the Po, except a few communities close under the Alps, I did not think it right to make no mention either of their original invasion or of their subsequent conduct and their final expulsion; for I think it is the proper task of History to record and hand down to future generations such episodes of Fortune, that those who live after us may not, owing to entire ignorance of these incidents, be unduly terrified by sudden and unexpected invasions of barbarians, but that, having a fair comprehension of how short-lived and perishable is the might of such peoples, they may confront the invaders and put every hope of safety to the test, before yielding a jot of anything they value. For indeed I consider that the writers who chronicled and handed down to us the story of the Persian invasion of Greece and the attack of the Gauls on Delphi have made no small contribution to the struggle of the Hellenes for their common liberty. For there is no one whom hosts of men or abundance of arms or vast resources could frighten into abandoning his last hope, that is to fight to the end for his native land, if he kept before his eyes what part the unexpected played in those events, and bore in mind how many myriads of men, what determined courage and what armaments were brought to nought by the resolve and power of those who faced the danger with intelligence and coolness. It is not only in old times but more than once in my own days that the Greeks have been alarmed by the prospect of a Gaulish invasion; and this especially
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μάλλον ἔγωγεν παρωρμήθην ἐπὶ τὸ κεφαλαίῳ ὁ μὲν, ἀνέκαθεν δὲ ποιήσασθαι τὴν ὑπὲρ τούτων ἔξηγησιν.

36 Ἀσδρούβας δ’ ὁ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγός, ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτων παρεξέβημεν τῆς ἔξηγήσεως, ἐτη 

χειρίσας ὄκτῳ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ἐτελεύτησε δο-

λοφονθῆσις ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῷ καταλύμασι νυκτὸς ὑπὸ 

τινος Κέλτων τὸ γένος ἴδιων ἔνεκεν ἀδικημάτων,

2 οὐ μικράν, ἀλλὰ μεγάλην ποιήσας ἐπίδοσιν τοῖς 

Καρχηδονίοις πράγμασιν, οὐχ οὕτω διὰ τῶν πολε-

3 μίων ἔργων ὡς διὰ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δυνάστας ὁμιλίας. 

τὴν δὲ στρατηγίαν οἱ Καρχηδονίοι τῶν κατὰ τὴν 

Ἰβηρίαν Ἀννίβα περιέθεσαν, ὅντι νέω, διὰ τὴν ὑπο-

φαινομένην ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ἄγχων αὐτοῦ καὶ 

4 τόλμαν. ὃς παραλαβὼν τὴν ἀρχήν εὐθέως δῆλος 

ἥν ἐκ τῶν ἐπινοημάτων πόλεμον ἔχοις Ῥωμαίοις. 

ὁ δὴ καὶ τέλος ἐποίησε, πάνυ βραχὺν ἐπισχῶν χρό-

5 νοῦ. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ Καρχηδονίους καὶ Ῥωμαίους 

ἀπὸ τούτων ἢδη τῶν καιρῶν ἐν ὑποψίαις ἤν πρὸς 

6 ἀλλήλους καὶ παρατριβαῖς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπεβουλεύον, 

ἀμύνασθαι σπεύδοντες διὰ τὰς περὶ Σικελίαν ἐλατ-

τώσεις, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαίοι διηπίστοιν, θεωροῦντες αὐ-

7 τῶν τὰς ἐπιβολάς. ἔξ ὅν δῆλον ἢν τοῖς ὀρθῶς 

σκοποῦμένοις ὃτι μέλλουσι πολεμεῖν ἀλλήλους οὐ 

μετὰ πολὺν χρόνον.

37 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καρποὺς Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ Φί-

λιππος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀμα τοῖς ἀλλοῖς συμμάχοις συν-

ισταντο τὸν πρὸς Λιβύην πόλεμον τὸν προσαγο-

2 ῥευθέντα συμμαχικόν. ἡμεῖσι δ’ ἔπειθῃ τὰς τε περὶ 

Σικελίαν καὶ Λιβύην καὶ τὰς ἑξῆς πράξεις διεξήν-

τες κατὰ τὸ συνεχές τῆς προκατασκευής ἱκομέν ἐπὶ 

τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ τε συμμαχικοῦ καὶ τοῦ δευτέρου 

συστάντος μὲν Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις πολέμου,
was my motive for giving here an account of these events, summary indeed, but going back to the beginnings.

36. This digression has led us away from the affairs of Spain, where Hasdrubal, after governing the country for eight years, was assassinated at night in his lodging by a certain Celt owing to wrongs of a private nature. He had largely increased the power of Carthage, not so much by military action as by friendly intercourse with the chiefs. The Carthaginians appointed Hannibal to the chief command in Spain, although he was still young, owing to the shrewdness and courage he had evinced in their service. From the moment that he assumed the command, it was evident from the measures he took that he intended to make war on Rome, as indeed he finished by doing, and that very shortly. The relations between Carthage and Rome were henceforth characterized by mutual suspicion and friction. The Carthaginians continued to form designs against Rome as they were eager to be revenged for their reverses in Sicily, while the Romans, detecting their projects, mistrusted them profoundly. It was therefore evident to all competent judges that it would not be long before war broke out between them.

37. It was about this same time that the Achaeans and King Philip began the war against the Aetolians known as the Social War. I have now given a continuous sketch, suitable to this preliminary part of my book, of events in Sicily, Libya and so forth down to the beginning of the Social War and that second war between the Romans and Carthaginians
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προσαγορευθέντος δὲ παρὰ τοὺς πλείστους Ἀννιβακοῦ, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦτων τῶν καρών ἐπηγγειλάμεθα ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀρχήν.

3 τῆς ἐαυτῶν συντάξεως, πρέπον ἢν εἰς τούτων ἀφεμένους ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα μεταβαίνειν πράξεως, ἵνα πανταχόθεν ὁμοίως ποιησάμενοι τὴν προκατασκευὴν καὶ τὴν ἐφοδοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς οὖτως ἤδη [τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ] τῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς ἱστορίας ἀρχώμεθα. ἔτει γὰρ οὐ τινὰς πράξεως, καθάπερ οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν, οἴον τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς Ἡ Περσικὰς, ὥστε δὲ τὰς ἐν τοῖς γνωρίζομένως μέρεσι τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀναγράφειν ἐπικεχειρήκαμεν, διὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἵνα τι συμβεβλήθηται τοὺς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς καρόντας, ὑπὲρ ὡς ὑπὲρ τὸν ἐστεροῦν ἐν ἐτέρους δηλώσομεν, δεόν ἢν εἰς καὶ πρὸ τῆς κατασκευῆς ἐπὶ βραχὺ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων καὶ γνωρίζομένων ἐθνῶν καὶ τόπων ἐφαίμασθαι τῆς οἰκουμένης. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀγγυπτον ἀρκοῦντως ἢν ἔχοι ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνάμνησιν ἀπὸ τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων καὶ τῶν, διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν προγεγονότων παρ᾽ αυτοῖς ἱστορίαν ὑπὸ πλείστων ἐκδεδοσθαί καὶ γνώριμον ὑπάρχειν ἀπασιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς καροῖς μηδὲν αὐτοῖς ἐξηλαμβανέων ἀπηντήσαθαι μηδὲ παράλογον ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης, ὡστε προσδείσθαι τῆς τῶν προγεγονότων ὑπομνήσεως. περὶ δὲ τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαίων ἐθνῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς Μακεδόνων οἰκίας ἀρμόση διὰ βραχέων ἀναδραμεῖν τοῖς χρόνοις, ἐπειδὴ περὶ μὲν ταὐτην ὅλοσχερης ἐπαναίρεσιν, περὶ δὲ τοὺς Ἀχαίους, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, παράδοξος αὐξῆσις καὶ συμφρόνησις ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς καιροῖς γέγονε. πολλῶν γὰρ ἐπιβαλομένων ἐν τοῖς 332
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usually known as the Hannibalic War. This, as I stated at the outset, is the date at which I purpose to begin my history itself, and, now bidding goodbye for the present to the West, I must turn to the affairs of Greece, so that everywhere alike I may bring down this preliminary or introductory sketch to the same date, and, having done so, start on my detailed narrative. For as I am not, like former historians, dealing with the history of one nation, such as Greece or Persia, but have undertaken to describe the events occurring in all known parts of the world—my own times having, as I will more clearly explain elsewhere, materially contributed to my purpose—I must, before entering on the main portion of my work, touch briefly on the state of the principal and best known nations and countries of the world. As for Asia and Egypt, it will suffice to mention what took place there after the above date, since their previous history has been written by many and is familiar to all, besides which in our own times Fortune has wrought no such surprising change in these countries as to render any notice of their past necessary. But as regards the Achaean nation and the royal house of Macedon it will be proper to refer briefly to earlier events, since our times have seen, in the case of the latter, its complete destruction, and in the case of the Achaeans, as I said above, a growth of power and a political union in the highest degree remarkable. For while many
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παρεληλυθώσι χρόνοις ἐπὶ ταῦτο συμφέρον ἀγαγεῖν Πελοποννησίους, οὖδενὸς δὲ καθικέσθαι δυνηθέντος, διὰ τὸ μὴ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐνεκεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς σφετέρας δυναστείας χάριν ἐκάστους ποιεῖσθαι

10 τὴν σπουδήν, τοιαύτην καὶ τηλικαύτην ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἡμᾶς καιροῖς ἔσχε προκοπὴν καὶ συντέλειαν τούτο τὸ μέρος ὡστε μὴ μόνον συμμαχικὴν καὶ φιλικήν κοινωνίαν γεγονέναι πραγμάτων περὶ αὐτοῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ νόμως χρῆσθαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ σταθμῶς καὶ μέτροις καὶ νομίσμασι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄρχονσι, 11 βουλευταῖς, δικασταῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς, καθόλου δὲ τούτω μόνῳ διαλλάττειν τῷ μὴ μᾶς πόλεως διάθεσιν ἔχειν σχεδον τὴν σύμπασαν Πελοπόννησον τῷ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν περίβολον ὑπάρχειν τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν αὐτήν, τάλλα δ’ εἶναι καὶ κοινῆ καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἐκάστους ταυτά καὶ παραπλήσια.

38 Πρῶτον δὲ πῶς ἐπεκράτησε καὶ τίνι τρόπω τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ὅνομα κατὰ πάντων Πελοποννησίων

2 οὐκ ἀχρηστῶν μαθεῖν. οὔτε γὰρ χώρας καὶ πόλεων πληθεὶ διαφέρουσαν οἱ πάτριοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔχοντες τὴν προσθηροφιάν ταύτην οὔτε πλούτους οὔτε ταῖς τῶν 3 ἀνδρῶν ἄρεταις. τὸ τε γὰρ τῶν Ἀρκάδων ἔθνος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ τῶν Δακώνων, πληθεὶ μὲν ἀνδρῶν καὶ χώρας οὔδὲ παρὰ μικρὸν ὑπέρεχει καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν τῆς ἀνδραγαθίας πρωτείων οὐδενὶ τῶν Ἐλλήνων οἷοι τ’ εἰσίν οὐδέποτε παραχωρεῖν οἱ 4 προειρημένοι. πῶς οὖν καὶ διὰ τὶ νῦν εὐδοκοῦσιν οὗτοι τε καὶ τὸ λουτρὸν πλῆθος τῶν Πελοποννησίων, ἀμα τὴν πολιτείαν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ τὴν προσθηροφιάν 5 μετειληφότες; δῆλον ός τύχην μὲν λέγειν οὐδαμῶς ἂν εἰς πρέπον φαύλον γὰρ: αἰτιαν δὲ μᾶλλον ἦτεῖν. χωρίς γὰρ ταύτης οὔτε τῶν κατὰ λόγον
have attempted in the past to induce the Peloponnesians to adopt a common policy, no one ever succeeding, as each was working not in the cause of general liberty, but for his own aggrandizement, this object has been so much advanced, and so nearly attained, in my own time that not only do they form an allied and friendly community, but they have the same laws, weights, measures and coinage, as well as the same magistrates, senate, and courts of justice, and the whole Peloponnesus only falls short of being a single city in the fact of its inhabitants not being enclosed by one wall, all other things being, both as regards the whole and as regards each separate town, very nearly identical.

38. In the first place it is of some service to learn how and by what means all the Peloponnesians came to be called Achaeans. For the people whose original and ancestral name this was were distinguished neither by the extent of their territory, nor by the number of their cities, nor by exceptional wealth or the exceptional valour of their citizens. Both the Arcadian and Laconian nations far exceed them, indeed, in population and the size of their countries, and certainly neither of the two could ever bring themselves to yield to any Greek people the palm for military valour. How is it, then, that both these two peoples and the rest of the Peloponnesians have consented to change not only their political institutions for those of the Achaeans, but even their name? It is evident that we should not say it is the result of chance, for that is a poor explanation. We must rather seek for a cause, for every event whether probable or improbable must
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οὕτε τῶν παρὰ λόγον εἰναι δοκοῦντων οὐδὲν οἶνον τε συντελεσθήναι. ἦστι δὲ οὖν, ὡς ἐμὴ δόξα, τοι-
6 αὕτη τις. ἰσχυρίας καὶ παρρησίας καὶ καθόλου δημοκρατίας ἀληθινῆς σύστημα καὶ προαιρέσιν εἰλι-
κρινεστέραν οὐκ ἂν εὑροί τις τῆς παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς
7 ὑπαρχοῦσης. αὕτη τινάς μὲν ἔθελοντήν αἱρετιστάς
ἐδρε Πελοποννησίων, πολλοὺς δὲ πειθοί καὶ λόγω
προσηγάγετο· τινὰς δὲ βιασμένη σὺν καιρῷ παρα-
χρήμα πάλιν εὐδοκείν ἐποίησεν αὕτη τοὺς ἀναγκα-
8 σθέντας. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ὑπολειπομένη πλεον-
έκτημα τῶν ἔξ ἄρχης, ἵσα δὲ πάντα ποιοῦσα τοῖς ἀεὶ
προσλαμβανομένιοις, ταχέως καθικεῖτο τῆς προκει-
μένης ἐπιβολῆς, δύο συνεργοὺς χρωμένη τοῖς ἱσχυ-
9 ροτάτοις, ἰσότητι καὶ φιλανθρωπία. διὸ ταύτην
ἄρχηγον καὶ αἰτίαν ἤγγειον τοῦ συμφρονήσαντας
Πελοποννησίων τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίαν
καταστήσασθαι.

10 Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς προαιρέσεως καὶ τὸ τῆς πο-
λιτείας ἱδίωμα τὸ νῦν εἰρημένου καὶ πρότερον
11 ὑπήρχε παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς. δῆλον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ δι’
έτερων μὲν πλεονών, πρὸς δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἀρκέσει
πίστεως χάριν ἐν ἦ καὶ δεύτερον λῃθέν τελτύριον.
39 καθ’ οὖσ γὰρ καίροὺς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν
tόποις κατὰ τὴν Μεγάλην Ἑλλάδα τότε προσαγο-
ρευμένην ἐνεπρήσθη τὰ συνεδρία τῶν Πυθαγορείων,
2 μετὰ ταύτην γενομένου κινήματος ὁλοσχεροῦς περὶ
tὰς πολιτείας, ὅπερ εἰκόσι, ὡς ἂν τῶν πρώτων
ἀνδρῶν ἐξ ἑκάστης πόλεως οὕτω παραλόγως δια-
3 φθαρέντων, συνέβη τὰς κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους
Ἑλληνικὰς πόλεις ἀναπλησθῆναι φόνον καὶ στάσεως
4 καὶ παντοδαπῆς ταραχῆς. ἐν οἷς καίροῖς ἀπὸ τῶν
πλεῖστων μερῶν τῆς Ἑλλάδος προσβεβοῦτον ἔπει
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have some cause. The cause here, I believe to be more or less the following. One could not find a political system and principle so favourable to equality and freedom of speech, in a word so sincerely democratic, as that of the Achaean league. Owing to this, while some of the Peloponnesians chose to join it of their own free will, it won many others by persuasion and argument, and those whom it forced to adhere to it when the occasion presented itself suddenly underwent a change and became quite reconciled to their position. For by reserving no special privileges for original members, and putting all new adherents exactly on the same footing, it soon attained the aim it had set itself, being aided by two very powerful coadjutors, equality and humanity. We must therefore look upon this as the initiator and cause of that union that has established the present prosperity of the Peloponnese.

These characteristic principles and constitution had existed in Achaea from an early date. There is abundant testimony of this, but for the present it will suffice to cite one or two instances in confirmation of this assertion. 39. When, in the district of Italy, then known as Greater Hellas, the club-houses of the Pythagoreans were burnt down, there ensued, as was natural, a general revolutionary movement, the leading citizens of each city having thus unexpectedly perished, and in all the Greek towns of the district murder, sedition, and every kind of disturbance were rife. Embassies arrived from most parts of Greece offering their services as peace-

\[ ^a \text{"Magna Graecia" in Latin. When the name was first given, Hellas cannot have meant the whole of Greece.} \]
tás dialúseis, Ἀχαιοίς καὶ τῇ τούτων πίστει συν- 
εχρήσαντο πρὸς τὴν τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἐξ-
αγωγήν. οὐ μόνον δὲ κατὰ τούτους τοὺς καίρους
5 ἀπεδέξαντο τὴν αἱρέσιν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ
τινας χρόνους ὀλοσχερῶς ὅρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ μιμηταί
6 γενέσθαι τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῶν. παρακαλέσαντες γὰρ
σφᾶς καὶ συμφρονήσαντες Κροτωνιάται, Συβαρίται,
Καυλωνιάται, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπέδεξαν Διὸς Ἀμαρίου
κοινὸν ἱερὸν καὶ τόπον, ἐν ὃ τάσ τε συνόδους καὶ
τὰ διαβούλια συνετέλουν, δεύτερον τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς
καὶ νόμους ἐκλαβόντες τοὺς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπεβά-
λοντο χρήσθαι καὶ διοικεῖν κατὰ τούτους τὴν
7 πολιτείαν. ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς Διονυσίου Σωρακοσίου
δυναστείας, ἔτι δὲ τῆς τῶν περιοικούντων βαρβάρων
ἐπικρατείας ἐμποδισθέντες, οὐχ ἐκουσίως, ἀλλὰ κατ’
8 ἀνάγκην αὐτῶν ἀπέστησαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Λακε-
δαιμονίων μὲν παραδόξως πτασάντων περὶ τὴν ἐν
Λεύκτρως μάχην, Θηβαίων δ’ ἀνελπίστως ἀντιποιη-
σαμένων τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας, ἣν ἀκρισία
περὶ πάντας μὲν τοὺς Ἑλλήνας, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοὺς
προερημένους, ὡς ἄν τῶν μὲν μὴ συγχωροῦντων
ἡττήσατο, τῶν δὲ μὴ πιστεύοντων ὅτι νεικήκασιν.
9 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ γε περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητομένων ἐπέτρε-
ψαν Θηβαίοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μόνοις τῶν Ἑλλή-
10 νων Ἀχαιοῖς, οὐ πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν ἀποβλέψαντες
σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐλαχίστην τότε δὴ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθε-
τὸ δὲ πλείον εἰς τὴν πίστιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην καλο-
kάγαθιαν. ὀμολογομένως γὰρ δὴ τότε ταῦτην
περὶ αὐτῶν πάντες ἐλευθέρως ἡ ὁδεγεῖν.

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makers, but it was the Achaeans on whom these cities placed most reliance and to whom they committed the task of putting an end to their present troubles. And it was not only at this period that they showed their approval of Achaean political principles; but a short time afterwards, they resolved to model their own constitution exactly on that of the League. The Crotonians, Sybarites and Caulonians, having called a conference and formed a league, first of all established a common temple and holy place of Zeus Amarius* in which to hold their meetings and debates, and next, adopting the customs and laws of the Achaeans, decided to conduct their government according to them. It was only indeed the tyranny of Dionysius of Syracuse and their subjection to the barbarian tribes around them which defeated this purpose and forced them to abandon these institutions, much against their will. Again, subsequently, when the Lacedaemonians 371 B.C. were unexpectedly defeated at Leuctra, and the Thebans, as unexpectedly, aspired to the hegemony of Greece, great uncertainty prevailed in the whole country and especially among these two peoples, the Lacedaemonians not acknowledging their defeat, and the Thebans not wholly believing in their victory. They, however, referred the points in dispute to the Achaeans alone among all the Greeks, not taking their power into consideration, for they were then almost the weakest state in Greece, but in view of their trustworthiness and high character in every respect. For indeed this opinion of them was at that time, as is generally acknowledged, held by all.

* Such as the Achaean League had.
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11 Τότε μὲν οὖν ψιλῶς αὐτὰ τὰ κατὰ τὴν προ-

cραισιν ὑπήρχε παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἀποτέλεσμα δ’ η

πράξεις ἀξιόλογος πρὸς αὐξήσεις τῶν ἰδίων ἀνήκουσα

12 πραγμάτων οὐκ ἔγινετο, τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι φῦναι

προστάτην ἀξίαν τῆς προαιρέσεως, ἀεὶ δὲ τὸν ὑπο-

dειξαντα ποτὲ μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχῆς

ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι καὶ καλώσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ μᾶλλον ὑπὸ

40 τῆς Μακεδονίων. ἔπει δὲ ποτὲ σὺν καιρῷ προστά-

tas ἀξιόχρεως εὑρε, ταχέως τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν

ἐποίησε φανεράν, ἐπιτελεσμένη τὸ κάλλιστον έρ-

2 γον, τὴν Πελοποννησίων ὅμονοιαν. ἦς ἄρχηγὸν

μὲν καὶ καθηγεμόνα τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς Ἀρατόν

νομιστέον τὸν Σικυόνων, ἀγωνιστὴν δὲ καὶ τελεσι-

ουργὸν τῆς πράξεως Φιλοπούμενα τὸν Μεγαλοπολί-

την, βεβαιωτὴν δὲ τοῦ μόνομον αὐτὴν ἐπὶ ποσὸν

gενέσθαι Δυκόρταν καὶ τοὺς ταῦτα τούτω προελμε-

3 νος ἄνδρας. τίνα δ’ ἦν ἐκάστοις τὰ πραξθέντα καὶ

πῶς καὶ κατὰ ποιόν καιροὺς πειρασόμεθα δηλοῦν,

ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ πρέπον τῇ γραφῇ πουούμενοι τὴν

4 ἐπίστασιν. τῶν μέντοι γ’ Ἀράτων διωκτημένων καὶ

νῦν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν ἐπικεφαλαιούμενοι μη-

νοθήσομεθα διὰ τὸ καὶ λίαν ἄλθνοις καὶ σαφεῖς

ἐκείνων περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συντεταχέαν πράξεων ὑπο-

5 μνηματισμοὺς, τῶν δὲ τοίς ἄλλοις ἀκριβεστέραν καὶ

μετὰ διαστολῆς ποιησόμεθα τὴν ἐξήγησιν. ὑπολαμ-

βάνω δὲ βᾶσταν ἐμοὶ τ’ ἀν γενέσθαι τὴν διήγησιν

καὶ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνονσι εὐπαρακολούθησιν τὴν μά-

θησιν, εἰ ποιησάμεθα τὴν ἐπίστασιν ἀπὸ τούτων

τῶν καιρῶν, ἐν τοῖς κατὰ πόλιν διαλυθέντος τοῦ

tῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνος ὑπὸ τῶν ἑκ Μακεδονίας βασι-

λεών ἀρχὴ πάλιν ἐγένετο καὶ σύνενοις τῶν πόλεων

6 πρὸς ἀλλήλας. ἀφ’ ἦς αὐξανόμενον κατὰ τὸ συν-

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Up to now, these principles of government had merely existed amongst them, but had resulted in no practical steps worthy of mention for the increase of the Achaean power, since the country seemed unable to produce a statesman worthy of these principles, anyone who showed a tendency to act so being thrown into the dark and hampered either by the Lacedaemonian power or still more by that of Macedon. 40. When, however, in due time, they found statesmen capable of enforcing them, their power at once became manifest, and the League achieved the splendid result of uniting all the Peloponnesian states. Aratus of Sicyon should be regarded as the initiator and conceiver of the project; it was Philopoemen of Megalopolis who promoted and finally realized it, while Lycortas and his party were those who assured the permanency, for a time at least, of this union. I will attempt to indicate how and at what date each of the three contributed to the result, without transgressing the limits I have set to this part of my work. Aratus' government, however, may be dealt with here and in future quite summarily, as he published a most valuable and clearly written memoir of his own career; but the achievements of the two others must be narrated in greater detail and at more length. I think it will be easiest for myself to set forth the narrative and for my readers to follow it if I begin from the period when, after the dissolution of the Achaean League by the kings of Macedonia, the cities began again to approach each other with a view to its renewal. Henceforward the League continued to grow until

\[ a \] The father of Polybius.
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εχέσ το έθνος εἰς ταύτην ἥλθε την συντέλειαν, εν ἣ καθ ἡμᾶς ἦν, ύπερ ἡς κατὰ μέρος ἄρτιως εἰπον.

41 Ὀλυμπιῶς μὲν ἦν εἰκοστῇ καὶ τετάρτῃ πρὸς ταῖς ἑκατόν, οτὲ Πατρεῖς ἤξαντο συμφρονεῖν καὶ Δυ-2 μαῖοι, καιροὶ δὲ καθ' οὕς Πολεμαίος ὁ Λάγου καὶ Δυσίμαχος, ἐτὶ δὲ Σέλευκος καὶ Πολεμαῖος ὁ Κε-ρανός μετῆλλαξαν τοῦ βίον. πάντες γὰρ οὕτωι περὶ την προειρημένην ὀλυμπιάδα τὸ ζήν εξέλυσον.

3 τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἀνώτερον τούτων χρόνων τοιαῦτη 4 τις ἦν ἤ περὶ τὸ προειρημένον έθνος διάθεσις. ἀπὸ γὰρ Τισαμενοῦ βασιλεὐθέντες, δὲ ἦν Ὀρέστου μὲν νιός, κατὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἡρακλεῖδῶν κάθοδον ἐκπε-5 σών τῆς Σπάρτης κατέσχε τοὺς περὶ Ἀχαϊαν τόπους, ἄπο τοῦτον κατὰ τὸ συνεχές καὶ κατὰ τὸ γένος ἔως Ὀμυγοῦ βασιλεὐθέντες, μετὰ ταῦτα δυσαρεστήσαν-6 τες τοῖς τοῦ προειρημένου ταιοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ νομί-7 μως, ἀλλὰ δεσποτικῶς αὐτῶν ἄρχευν, μετέστησαν εἰς δημοκρατίαν τὴν πολιτείαν. λοιπὸν ἦδη τους ἐξῆς χρόνους μέχρι τῆς Ἀλέξανδρου καὶ Φιλίππου δυνα-8 στείας ἄλλοτε μὲν ἄλλως ἔχωρε τὰ πράγματ' αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὰς περιστάσεις, τὸ γε μὴν κοινὸν πολίτευμα, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν, ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ συνέχεια επει-7 ράντο. τούτῳ δ' ἦν ἐκ δώδεκα πόλεων, ἀς ἔτι καὶ νῦν συμβαίνει διαμένειν, πλὴν Ὀλένου καὶ Ἐλίκης τῆς πρὸ τῶν Δευτερικῶν ὑπὸ τῆς Θαλάττης κατ-8 αποθείσης. αὐταὶ δ' εἰσὶ Πάτραι, Δύμη, Φαραϊ, Τριταία, Λεόντιον, Αἴγιον, Αἴγειρα, Πειλήνη, 9 Βοῦρα, Καρύνεια. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς υστέρους μὲν τῶν κατ' Ἀλέξανδρον καιρῶν, προτέρους δὲ τῆς ἀρτι ῥηθείσης ὀλυμπιάδος, εἰς τοιαῦτην διαφορὰν καὶ καχείσιαν ἐνέπεσον, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τῶν ἐκ Μακε-342
it reached in my own time the state of completion
I have just been describing.

41. It was in the 124th Olympiad that Patrae and Dyme took the initiative, by entering into
a league, just about the date of the deaths of Ptolemy son of Lagus, Lysimachus, Seleucus, and
Ptolemy Ceraunus, which all occurred in this Olympiad. The condition of the Achaean nation
before this date had been more or less as follows. Their first king was Tisamenus the son of Orestes,
who, when expelled from Sparta on the return of the Heraclidae, occupied Achaea, and they continued
to be ruled by kings of his house down to Ogyges. Being dissatisfied with the rule of Ogyges’ sons, which
was despotical and not constitutional, they changed their government to a democracy. After this, down
to the reigns of Alexander and Philip, their fortunes varied according to circumstances, but they always
endeavoured, as I said, to keep their League a democracy. This consisted of twelve cities, which
still all exist with the exception of Olenus and of Helice which was engulfed by the sea a little before
the battle of Leuctra. These cities are Patrae, Dyme, Pharai, Tritaea, Leontium, Aegium, Aegira, Pellene,
Bura, and Caryneia. After the time of Alexander and previous to the above Olympiad they fell, chiefly
thanks to the kings of Macedon, into such a state
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donías basileón, ἐν ἤ συνέβη πάσας τὰς πόλεις χωρισθείσας ἀφ’ αὐτῶν ἐναντίως τὸ συμφέρον
10 ἁγεῖν ἀλλήλαις. ἐξ ὦν συνέπεσε τὰς μὲν ἐμφρούρους αὐτῶν γενέσθαι διὰ τε Δημητρίου καὶ Κασσάνδρου, καὶ μετὰ ταύτα δι’ Ἀντιγόνου τοῦ Γονατᾶ, τὰς δὲ καὶ τυραννεῖται. πλείστους γὰρ ἡ μονάρ-
11 χος οὖσαν ἐμφυτεύοντο δοκεῖ τοῖς Ἐλλησι. περὶ δὲ τὴν εἰκοστὴν καὶ τετάρτην ὀλυμπιάδα πρὸς ταῖς ἕκατον, καθαπερ ἑπάνω προεῖπον, ἀδικὴ ἥρξαντο μετανοήσαντες συμφρονεῖν. ταύτα δ’ ἦν κατὰ τὴν
12 Πύρρου διάβασιν εἰς Ἰταλίαν. καὶ πρώτοι μὲν συνέστησαν Δυμαίοι, Πατρεῖς, Τριταίες, Φαραιεῖς· διόπερ οὐδὲ στήλην ὑπάρχειν συμβαίνει τῶν πόλεων
13 τούτων περὶ τῆς συμπολιτείας. μετὰ δὲ ταύτα μάλιστα πως ἔτει πέμπτη τὴν φρουράν ἐκβαλόντες Αἰγινεῖς μετέσχον τῆς συμπολιτείας· ἐξῆς δὲ τούτως
14 Βούριου, τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείναντες. ἀμα δὲ τού-
15 τως Καρνείς ἀποκατέστησαν. συνιδὼν γὰρ Ἰσέας ὁ τῆς Καρνείας τότε τυραννεύων ἐκπεπτωκυίαν μὲν ἐξ Αἰγίου τῆς φρουράν, ἀπολωλότα δὲ τὸν ἐν τῇ Βούρᾳ μόναρχον διὰ Μάργου καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ἔστη ἐντὰ πανταχόθεν ὅραν ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη πολε-
16 μηθησόμενον, ἀποθέμενος τὴν ἄρχην καὶ λαβὼν τὰ πιστὰ παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀσφαλείας προσέθηκε τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σύ-

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of discord and ill-feeling that all the cities separated from the League and began to act against each others’ interests. The consequence was that some of them were garrisoned by Demetrius and Cassander and afterwards by Antigonus Gonatas, and some even had tyrants imposed on them by the latter, who planted more tyrannies in Greece than any other king. But, as I said, about the 124th Olympiad they began to repent and form fresh leagues. (This was just about the date of Pyrrhus’ crossing to Italy.) The first cities to do so were Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae, and for this reason we do not even find any formal inscribed record of their adherence to the League. About five years afterwards the people of Aegium expelled their garrison and joined the League, and the Burians were the next to do so, after putting their tyrant to death. Caryneia joined almost at the same time, for I seas, its tyrant, when he saw the garrison expelled from Aegium, and the tyrant of Bura killed by Margus and the Achaeans, and war just about to be made on himself by all the towns round, abdicated and, on receiving an assurance from the Achaeans that his life would be spared, added his city to the League.

42. Why, the reader will ask, do I go back to these times? It is, firstly, to show which of the original Achaean cities took the first steps to re-form the League and at what dates, and, secondly, that my assertion regarding their political principle may
καὶ δὴ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων πίστεως τυχάνη,
3 διότι μία τις ἄει τῶν Ἀχαίων αἴρεσις ὑπήρχε, καθ’
ὴν προτείνοντες μὲν τὴν παρ’ αὐτῶς ἱσηγορίαν καὶ
παρρησίαν, πολεμοῦντες δὲ καὶ καταγωνιζόμενοι
συνεχῶς τοὺς ἢ δὴ αὐτῶν ἡ διὰ τῶν βασιλέων τὰς
σφέτερας πατρίδας καταδουλουμένους, τούτῳ τῷ
τρόπῳ καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ προθέσει τούτῳ τούργον ἐπι-
ετέλεσαν, τὰ μὲν δὴ αὑτῶν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν συμ-
4 μάχων. καὶ γὰρ τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων συνεργήματα γεγο-
νότα πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐν τοῖς ἔξης χρόνοις ἐπὶ
5 τὴν τῶν Ἀχαίων προϊσυνέτος ἀνοιστέον. πολλοὺς
γὰρ κοινωνήσαντες πραγμάτων, πλείστων δὲ καὶ
καλλίστων Ῥωμαίοις, οὐδὲποτε τὸ παράπαλ ἐπεθύ-
μησαν ἐκ τῶν κατορθωμάτων οὐδένος ἑδονή λυσίτε-
6 λοὺς, ἀλλ’ ἀντὶ πάσης τῆς ἑαυτῶν φιλοτημίας, ἣν
παρεῖχοντο τοῖς συμμάχοις ἀντικατηλλάττοντο τὴν
ἐκάστων ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν κοινὴν ὁμόνοιαν Πελο-
7 πονηρίας. σαφέστερον δ’ ὑπὲρ τούτων ἔσται δια-
λαμβάνειν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐνεργη-
μάτων.

43 Εἰκοσι μὲν οὖν ἔτη τὰ πρῶτα καὶ πέντε συν-
επολιτεύσαντο μεθ’ ἑαυτῶν αἱ προειρημέναι πόλεις,
γραμματέα κοινὸν ἐκ περιόδου προχειριζόμεναι καὶ
2 δύο στρατηγούς. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἐδοξεῖν αὐ-
τοῖς ἑνα καθιστάνειν καὶ τούτῳ πιστεύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν
3 ὅλων. καὶ πρῶτος ἔτυχε τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης Μάργος
ὁ Καρυνεύς. τετάρτῳ δ’ ύστερον ἔτει τοῦ προει-
ρημένου στρατηγοῦντος Ἀρατος ὁ Σικυώνιος, ἔτη
μὲν ἔχουν εἰκοσι, τυραννούμενη δ’ ἐλευθερώσας
τὴν πατρίδα διὰ τῆς ἄρετῆς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τόλμης,
προσένεμε πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιών πολιτείαν, ἄρχη-
θεν εὐθὺς ἔραςτης γενόμενος τῆς προαιρέσεως
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be confirmed by the actual evidence of facts. What I asserted was that the Achaeans always followed one single policy, ever attracting others by the offer of their own equality and liberty and ever making war on and crushing those who either themselves or through the kings attempted to enslave their native cities, and that, in this manner and pursuing this purpose, they accomplished their task in part unaided and in part with the help of allies. For the Achaean political principle must be credited also with the results furthering their end, to which their allies in subsequent years contributed. Though they took so much part in the enterprises of others, and especially in many of those of the Romans which resulted brilliantly, they never showed the least desire to gain any private profit from their success, but demanded, in exchange for the zealous aid they rendered their allies, nothing beyond the liberty and concord of the Peloponnesians. This will be more clearly evident when we come to see the League in active operation.

43. For twenty-five years, then, this league of cities continued, electing for a certain period a Secretary of state and two Strategi. After this they decided to elect one Strategus and entrust him with the general direction of their affairs, the first to be nominated to this honourable office being Margus of Caryneia. Four years later during his term of office, Aratus of Sicyon, then only twenty years of age, freed his city from its tyrant by his enterprise and courage, and, having always been a passionate admirer of the Achaean polity, made his own city a member of the League. Eight years
4 αὐτῶν. ὁγδόω δὲ πάλιν ἔτει στρατηγὸς αἱρέθεις τὸ δεύτερον, καὶ πραξικοπήσας τὸν Ἀκροκόρυθον, Ἀντιγόνου κυριεύόντος, καὶ γενόμενος ἐγκρατής, μεγάλου μὲν ἀπέλυσε φόβου τοὺς τὴν Πελοπόννησον κατοικοῦντας, ἐλευθερώσας δὲ Κορινθίους προσήκοιτο πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείαν. ἔπι δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως Διαμ. 5 πραξάμενος προσένεμε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς. ταῦτά τ’ ἐγίνηντο τῷ πρότερον ἔτει τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἡττησις, ἐν ηνιαὶ καθόλου Σικελίας ἐκχωρήσαντες πρῶτον ὑπέμειναν. 7 τότε φόρους ἐνεγκείνει Ῥωμαίοις. μεγάλην δὲ προκοπὴν ποιήσας τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἐν ὅλῳ χρόνῳ, λοιπὸν ἦδη διετέλει προστάτων μὲν τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐθνος, πάσος δὲ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πράξεις πρὸς τούς ἀναφέρων· τοῦτο δ’ ἦν τὸ Μακεδόνας μὲν ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, τὰς δὲ μοναρχίας καταλῦσαι, βεβαιῶσαν δ’ ἐκάστος τὴν κοινὴν καὶ πά- 8 τριον ἐλευθερίαν. μέχρι μὲν αὐτὸν ἦν Ἀντιγόνος ὁ Γονατᾶς, πρὸς τε τὴν ἐκείνου πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ πρὸς τὴν Ἀιτωλῶν πλεονεξίαν ἀντιταττόμενος διε- 9 τελείου, πραγματικῶς ἐκαστα ἁευρίζων, καίστερ εἰς τοῦτο προβάντων ἀμφοτέρων ἄδικιας καὶ τόλμης ὡστε ποιήσασθαι συνβήκασι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπὲρ διαιρέσεως τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐθνος. Ἀντιγόνου δὲ μεταλλάξαντος, καὶ συνθεμένων τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ συμμαχίαι πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ μετασχόντων εὐ- γενῶς σφίζοντο πρὸς Δημήτριον πολέμου, τὰ μὲν τῆς ἀλλοτριότητος καὶ δυσμενείας ἤρθη κατὰ τὸ παρόν, ὑπεγένετο δὲ κοινωνικὴ καὶ φιλικὴ τῆς αὐ- 10 τοῖς διάθεσις. Δημήτριον δὲ βασιλεύσαντος δέκα μόνον ἔτη, καὶ μεταλλάξαντος τὸν βίον περὶ τὴν πρώτην διάβασιν εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα Ῥωμαίων, ἐγέ- 348
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after this, during his second term of office as Strategus, he contrived to get into his hands the citadel of Corinth which was held by Antigonus, thus delivering the Peloponnesians from a great source of fear, and induced the city he had liberated to join the League. He next obtained the adhesion of Megara by the same means. These events took place in the year before that defeat of the Carthaginians which forced them to evacuate Sicily and submit for the first time to pay tribute to Rome. Having in so short a space of time thus materially advanced his projects, he continued to govern the Achaean nation, all his schemes and action being directed to one object, the expulsion of the Macedonians from the Peloponnese, the suppression of the tyrants, and the re-establishment on a sure basis of the ancient freedom of every state. During the life of Antigonus Gonatas he continued to offer a most effectual opposition both to the meddlesomeness of this king and the lust for power of the Aetolians, although the two were so unscrupulous and venturesome that they entered into an arrangement for the purpose of dissolving the Achaean League. 44. But, on the death of 239 B.C. Antigonus, the Achaean made an alliance with the Aetolians and supported them ungrudgingly in the war against Demetrius, so that, for the time at least, their estrangement and hostility ceased, and a more or less friendly and sociable feeling sprang up between them. Demetrius only reigned for ten years, his death taking place at the time the Romans 229 B.C. first crossed to Illyria, and after this the tide of
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νετό τις εὐροία πραγμάτων πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ
3 βολὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. οἱ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ μόναρχοι, δυσελπιστήσαντες ἐπὶ τῷ μετηλαχέναι μὲν τὸν Δημήτριον, ὦς ἦν αὐτοῖς οἶον ἐκ χορηγῶν καὶ μυθοδότης, ἐπικείσανται δὲ τὸν Ἀρατον, οἰό-
μενον δεῖν σφᾶς ἀποτίθεσθαι τὰς τυραννίδας, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πεισθεὶσι μεγάλας δωρεὰς καὶ τιμὰς προ-
teίνοντος, τοῖς δὲ μὴ προσέχουσιν ἐτὶ μεῖζος ἐπι-
ανατεινομένου φόβους καὶ κινδύνους διὰ τῶν
4 ο Ἀχαιῶν, ὁμομένων ἐπὶ τὸ πεισθέντες ἀποθέσθαι μὲν
τὰς τυραννίδας, ἔλευθερῶσαν δὲ τὰς ἐαυτῶν πατρί-
das, μετασχεῖν δὲ τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείας. Λυ
diάδας μὲν οὖν ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης ἔτι ζῶντος Δημήτριον,
κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαιρέσεων, πάνυ πραγματικῶς καὶ
φρονίμως προϊδόμενος τὸ μέλλον, ἀπετέθει τὴν τυρα
νίδα, καὶ μετασχῆκε τῆς
5 ἔθνικῆς συμπολιτείας. Ἀριστόμαχος δὲ τῶν Ἀργείω
ν τύραννος καὶ Ἐκένων ο τῶν Ἐρμιονέων καὶ
Κλεώνυμος ο τῶν Φιλασίων τὸν ἀποθέμενοι τὰς
μοναρχίας ἐκοινώνησαν τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν δημο-
κρατίας.

6 Ὁλοσχεροστέρας δὲ γενομένης αὐξῆσεως διὰ
ταύτα καὶ προκοπῆς περὶ τὸ ἔθνος, Αἰτωλοὶ διὰ τὴν
ἔμφυτον ἄδικιαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν φθονίσαντες, τὸ
de πλεῖον ἐλπίσαντες καταδιελέσθαι τὰς πόλεις,
καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον τὰς μὲν Ἀκαρνάνων διενεί-
μαντο πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον, τὰς δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπ-
2 εβάλοντο πρὸς Ἀντίγονον τὸν Γονατᾶν, καὶ τότε
παραπλησίαις ἐλπίσως ἐπαρθέντες, ἀπετόλμησαν
Ἀντιγόνῳ τε τῷ κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς προ-
estwthi Μακεδόνων, ἐπιτροπεύοντι δὲ Φιλίππου παι-
dὸς ὄντος, καὶ Κλεομένει τῷ βασιλεῖ Λακεδαίμονίων
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events seemed to flow for a time in favour of the Achaeans' constant purpose; for the Peloponnesian tyrants were much cast down by the death of Demetrius, who had been, so to speak, their furnisher and paymaster, and equally so by the threatening attitude of Aratus, who demanded that they should depose themselves, offering abundance of gifts and honours to those who consented to do so, and menacing those who turned a deaf ear to him with still more abundant chastisement on the part of the Achaeans. They therefore hurried to accede to his demand, laying down their tyrannies, setting their respective cities free, and joining the Achaean League. Lydiades of Megalopolis had even foreseen what was likely to happen, and with great wisdom and good sense had forestalled the death of Demetrius and of his own free will laid down his tyranny and adhered to the national government. Afterwards Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos, Xenon, tyrant of Hermione, and Cleonymus, tyrant of Phlius, also resigned and joined the League.

45. The League being thus materially increased in extent and power, the Aetolians, owing to that unprincipled passion for aggrandizement which is natural to them, either out of envy or rather in the hope of partitioning the cities, as they had partitioned those of Acarnania with Alexander and had previously proposed to do regarding Achaea with Antigonus Gonatas, went so far as to join hands with Antigonus, then regent of Macedonia and guardian to Philip,
κοινωνεῖν, καὶ συμπλέκειν ἁμφοτέροις ἀμα τὰς χεῖ-3 ρας. ὄρωντες γὰρ τὸν Ἀντίγονον, κυριεύοντα μὲν τῶν κατὰ Μακεδονίαν ἁσφάλως, ὁμολογούμενον δὲ καὶ πρόδηλον ἐχθρὸν ὅντα τῶν Ἀχαιῶν διὰ τὸ 4 τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον προξίς κοπῆσαντας καταλαβεῖν, ύπέλαβον, εἰ τοὺς Λακεδαμονίους προσλαβόντες ἔτι κοινωνοὺς φίλου τῆς ἐπιβολῆς προεμβιβάσανεν εἰς τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἐθνὸς ἀπέχειαι, ραδίως ἀν καταγω- νίσασθαι τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐν καιρῷ συνεπιθέμενοι καὶ 5 πανταχόθεν περιστάσαντες αὐτοῖς τὸν πόλεμον. δὴ καὶ ταχέως ἂν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἐπετέλεσαν, εἰ μή τὸ κυριώτατον παρεῖδον τῆς προθέσεως, οὐ συλλογισάμενοι διότι ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς Ἀρατὸν ἐξου- σιών ἀνταγωνιστήν, ἀνδρα δυνάμενον πάρης εὐστο- 6 χεῖν περιστάσεως. τοιγαροῦν ὀρμῆσαντες ἐπὶ τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν καὶ χειρῶν ἁρχεῖν ἀδίκων οὐχ ὦν ἦνναν τι τῶν ἐπιστηθέντων, ἀλλὰ τούναντι καὶ τὸν Ἀρατὸν τότε προεστῶτα καὶ τὸ ἐθνὸς ἐσωματοποιή- σαν, πραγματικῶς ἀντιπεριστάσαντος ἑκείνου καὶ 7 λυμημένου τὰς ἐπιβολὰς αὐτῶν. ὡς δὲ ἐχειρίσθη τὰ ὅλα δήλον ἐσταὶ διὰ τῶν λέγεσθαι μελλόντων. 46 Θεωρῶν γὰρ τοὺς Ἀιτωλοὺς ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ τὸν μὲν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς αὐτοὺς αἰσχυνομέ- νους ἀναλαβεῖν ἐκ τοῦ φαινοῦν διὰ τὸ καὶ λίαν εἶναι προσφάτους τὰς ἐκ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐνεργείας 2 περὶ τὸν Δημητριακὸν πόλεμον εἰς αὐτοὺς, συμβου- λευμένοις δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαμονίους καὶ φθονοῦν- τας τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὡστε Κλεομένους πεπραξικοπηκότος αὐτοὺς καὶ παρηρμημένου Τεγέαν, Μαντίνειαν, Ὀρχομενόν, τὰς Αἰτωλοῖς οὐ μόνον συμμαχίδας ὑπαρχοῦσας, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμπολιτευο- μένοις τότε πόλεις, οὐχ ὦν ἄγανακτοῦντας ἐπὶ 352 .
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who was still a child, and Cleomenes, king of Sparta. They saw that Antigonus was undisputed master of Macedonia and at the same time the open and avowed enemy of the Achaeans owing to their seizure by treachery of the Acrocorinthus, and they supposed that if they could get the Lacedaemonians also to join them in their project, exciting first their animosity against the League, they could easily crush the Achaeans by attacking them at the proper time all at once and from all quarters. This indeed they would in all probability soon have done, but for the most important factor which they had overlooked in their plans. They never took into consideration that in this undertaking they would have Aratus as their opponent, a man capable of meeting any emergency. Consequently the result of their intrigues and unjust aggression was that not only did they entirely fail in their designs, but on the contrary consolidated the power of the League, and of Aratus who was then Strategus, as he most adroitly diverted and spoilt all their plans. How he managed this the following narrative will show.

46. Aratus saw that the Aetolians were ashamed of openly declaring war on them, as it was so very recently that the Achaeans had helped them in their war against Demetrius, but that they were so much of one mind with the Lacedaemonians and so jealous of the Achaeans that when Cleomenes broke faith with them and possessed himself of Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus, cities which were not only allies of the Aetolians, but at the time members of their league, they not only showed no resentment, but
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3 τούτοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ βεβαιοῦντας αὐτῷ τὴν παράληψιν, καὶ τοὺς πρότερον κατὰ τῶν μηδὲν ἂδικούντων πάσαν ἱκανὴν πουσιμένους πρόφασιν εἰς τὸ πολεμεῖν διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν τὸτε συνορῶν ἐκουσίως παρα-
σπουδομένους καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀπολλύντας πόλεις ἔθελον τὴν ἐφ’ ὡς μόνον ἀξιόχρεων γενόμενον
4 ἀνταγωνιστὴν Κλεομένη τοὺς Ἀχαιοῖς, ἔγνω δὲν εἰς ταῦτα βλέπων οὔτος τε καὶ πάντες ὅμοιοι οἱ
προεστῶτες τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτεύματος πολέμου
μὲν πρὸς μηδὲν κατάρχειν, ἐνιστασθαί δὲ ταῖς τῶν
5 Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπιβολαις. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐπὶ
tούτων ἦσαν τῶν διαλήψεων. θεωροῦντες δὲ κατὰ
τοὺς ξένης χρόνους τὸν Κλεομένη θρασεῖς ἐποικο-
dομοῦντα μὲν τὸ καλοῦμενον Ἀθήναιον ἐν τῇ τῶν
Μεγαλοπολίτῶν χώρᾳ, πρόδηλον δὲ καὶ πικρὸν ἀνα-
6 δεικνύντα σφίσι πολέμου ἐαυτόν, τότε δὴ συνα-
θροίσαντες τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐκριναν μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς
ἀναλαμβάνειν φανερῶς τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμο-

47 νίους ἀπέχθειαν.
7 ο μὲν οὖν Κλεομενικὸς προσαγορευθεὶς πόλε-

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actually set their seal to his occupation. It was evident that they, who on previous occasions, owing to their lust of aggrandizement, found any pretext adequate for making war on those who had done them no wrong, now allowed themselves to be treacherously attacked and to suffer the loss of some of their largest cities simply in order to see Cleomenes become a really formidable antagonist of the Achaeans. Aratus, therefore, and all the leading men of the Achaean League decided not to take the initiative in going to war with anyone, but to resist Spartan aggression. This at least was their first resolve; but when shortly afterwards Cleomenes began to fortify against them the so-called Athenaeum in the territory of Megalopolis, and to show himself their avowed and bitter enemy, they called the Council of the League together and decided on open war with Sparta.

This was the date at which the war known as 227 B.C. the Cleomenic war began; and such was its origin. 47. The Achaeans at first decided to face the Lacedaemonians single-handed, considering it in the first place most honourable not to owe their safety to others but to protect their cities and country unaided, and also desiring to maintain their friendship with Ptolemy owing to the obligations they were under to him, and not to appear to him to be seeking aid elsewhere. But when the war had lasted for some time, and Cleomenes, having overthrown the ancient polity at Sparta and changed the constitutional 225 B.C.
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eis turañvida metaστήσαντος, xρωμένου δὲ καὶ ταῖ
4 poléμω πρακτικῶς καὶ παραβόλως, προορώμενος
"Araτος τὸ μέλλον, καὶ δεδιώς τὴν τε τῶν Αἴτω-
λῶν ἀπόνοιαν καὶ τόλμαν, ἐκρυεῖ πρὸ πολλοῦ λυ-
5 μαίνεσθαι τὴν ἐπιβολὴν αὐτῶν. κατανοῶν δὲ τῶν
'Αντίγονον καὶ πράξει ἔχοντα καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ πι-
στεως ἀντιποιούμενον, τοὺς δὲ βασιλείς σαφῶς εἰδὼς φύσει μὲν οὐδένα νομίζοντας οὐτε φίλιον
οὔτε πολέμιον, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος ψήφοις αἰεὶ μετροῦντας τὰς ἔχθρας καὶ τὰς φιλίας,
6 ἐπεβάλετο λαλεῖν πρὸς τὸν εἰρήμενον βασιλεά καὶ
συμπλέκειν τὰς χείρας, ὑποδεικνύων αὐτῷ τὸ συμ-
7 βησόμενον ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων. προδήλως μὲν οὖν
αὐτὸ πράττειν ἀσύμφορον ἡγεῖτο διὰ πλεῖους αἰτίας.
tὸν τε γὰρ Κλεομένη καὶ τοὺς Αἴτωλους ἀνταγωνι-
8 στάς παρασκευάζειν ἦμελλε πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν, τοὺς
tε πολλοὺς τῶν 'Αχαιῶν διατρέψειν, καταφεύγων
ἐπὶ τοὺς ἔχθροὺς καὶ δοκῶν ὀλοσχέρως ἀπεγνωκέναι
tὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας. ὅπερ ἦκιστα φαίνεσθαι πράτ-
9 τῶν ἐβούλετο. διόπερ ἔχον τοιαύτην πρόθεσιν ἀδή-
10 λως αὐτὰ διενοεῖτο χειρίζειν. ἔξι οὖ πολλά παρά
τὴν ἐαυτοῦ γνώμην ἡγαγκάζετο καὶ λέγεν καὶ ποιεῖν
πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός, δι' ἄδυν ἦμελλε τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐμ-
φασιν ὑποδεικνύων ταύτην ἐπικρύψεσθαι τὴν οἰ-
11 κονομίαν. ὅπερ ἀρχαῖα τούτων οὖδ' ἐν τοῖς ὑπο-
μνήμαις κατέταξεν.

48 Eἰδὼς δὲ τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας κακοπαθοῦντας
μὲν τῷ πολέμῳ διὰ τὸ παρακειμένους τῇ Δακεδαλ-
μονὶ προπολεμεῖν τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ τυχανοῦντας δὲ
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kingship into a tyranny, showed great energy and
daring in the conduct of the campaign, Aratus;
foreseeing what was likely to happen and dreading
the reckless audacity of the Aetolians, determined
to be beforehand with them and spoil their plans.
He perceived that Antigonus was a man of energy
and sound sense, and that he claimed to be a
man of honour, but he knew that kings do not
regard anyone as their natural foe or friend, but
measure enmity and friendship by the sole standard
of expediency. He therefore decided to approach
that monarch and put himself on confidential terms
with him, pointing out to him to what the present
course of affairs would probably lead. Now for
several reasons he did not think it expedient to
do this overtly. In the first place he would thus
expose himself to being outbidden in his project by
Cleomenes and the Aetolians, and next he would
damage the spirit of the Achaean troops by thus
appealing to an enemy and appearing to have
entirely abandoned the hopes he had placed in
them—this being the very last thing he wished
them to think. Therefore, having formed this plan,
he decided to carry it out by covert means. He
was consequently compelled in public both to do
and to say many things quite contrary to his real
intention, so as to keep his design concealed by
creating the exactly opposite impression. For this
reason there are some such matters that he does not
even refer to in his Memoirs.

48. He knew that the people of Megalopolis were
suffering severely from the war, as, owing to their
being on the Lacedaemonian border, they had to
bear the full brunt of it, and could not receive proper
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tῆς καθηκούσης ἐπικουρίας ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν διὰ τὸ κάκεινος δυσχρηστεῖθαι θλίβομένος ὑπὸ τῆς 2 περιστάσεως, σαφῶς δὲ γινόσκων οἰκείως διακει-
μένους αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν ἐκ τῶν 3 κατὰ τὸν Ἀμύντων Φίλιππων εὐεργεσίων, διειλήφηε
dioτι ταχέως ἃν ὑπὸ τοῦ Κλεομένου πιεζόμενοι καταφύγιοι ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον καὶ τὰς Μακεδόνων 4 ἐλπίδας· κοινολογηθεὶς οὐν δὲ ἀπορρήτων περὶ τῆς
δῆς ἐπιβολῆς Νικοφάνει καὶ Κερκίδα τοῖς Μεγα-
λοπολίταις, οἶτινες ἦσαν αὐτοῦ πατρικοὶ ξένοι καὶ 5 πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν εὐφυείς, ῥαδίως διὰ τούτων
ομίην παρέστησε τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις εἰς τὸ πρε-
σβευέως πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαίους καὶ παρακαλεῖν πρὸς 6 τῶν Ἀντίγονον ὑπὲρ βοηθείας. οἱ μὲν οὖν Μεγαλο-
πολίται κατέστησαν αὐτοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Νικο-
φάνη καὶ τὸν Κερκίδᾶν πρεσβευτὰς πρὸς τὸν 7 Ἀχαίον, καὶ κάκειθη εὐθέως πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον, ἃν
7 αὐτοῖς συγκατάθηται τὸ ἔθνος. οὐ δὲ Ἀχαιοὶ συν-
8 εχώρησαν πρεσβευέντων τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις. σπουδή
δὲ συμμίξαντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη τῷ βασιλεῖ
dιελέγοντο περὶ μὲν τῆς ἔσων πατρίδοις αὐτὰ
τάναγκαὶ διὰ βραχέως καὶ κεφαλαιώδος, τὰ δὲ
49 πολλὰ περὶ τῶν ὅλων κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς Ἀράτον
καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις. αὐταὶ δὲ ἦσαν ὑποδεικνύον
tὴν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ Κλεομένους κοινοπραγίαν τὶ δύνα-
tαι καὶ ποὶ τείνει, καὶ δηλοῦν ὅτι πρῶτοι μὲν
2 αὐτοῖς Ἀχαιοὶ εὐλαβητέον, ἔζησι δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον
Ἀντιγόνως. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ὡς Ἀχαιοὶ τὸν ἐξ ἀμ-
φοῖν πόλεμον οὐκ ἀν ὑπενέγκαιεν εὐθεώρητων εἶναι
πάσι, τοῦτο δὲ ἢ Αἰτωλοὶ καὶ Κλεομένης κρατήσαν-
tες τούτων οὐκ εὐδοκήσουσιν οὐδὲ μὴ μείνωσιν ἐπὶ
tῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐτὶ τοῦ πρόσθεν ρᾶον εἶναι τῷ
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assistance from the Achaians, as the latter were themselves in difficulties and distress. As he also knew for a surety that they were well disposed to the royal house of Macedon ever since the favours received in the time of Philip, son of Amyntas, he felt sure that, hard pressed as they were by Cleomenes, they would be very ready to take refuge in Antigonus and hopes of safety from Macedonia. He therefore communicated his project confidentially to Nicophanes and Cercidas of Megalopolis who were family friends of his own and well suited for the business, and he had no difficulty through them in inciting the Megalopolitans to send an embassy to the Achaians begging them to appeal to Antigonus for help. Nicophanes and Cercidas themselves were appointed envoys by the Megalopolitans, in the first place to the Achaians and next, if the League consented, with orders to proceed at once to Antigonus. The League gave its permission and the ambassadors hastened to meet the king. They said no more than was strictly necessary on the subject of their own city, treating this matter briefly and summarily, but dwelt at length on the general situation, in the sense that Aratus had directed and prompted. 49. He had charged them to point out the importance and the probable consequences of the common action of the Aetolians and Cleomenes, representing that in the first place the Achaians were imperilled by it and next and in a larger measure Antigonus himself. For it was perfectly evident to all that the Achaians could not hold out against both adversaries, and it was still more easy for any person of intelligence to see that, if the Aetolians and Cleomenes were successful, they
3 νοῦν ἔχοντι συνιδεῖν. τὴν τε γὰρ Ἀιτωλῶν πλεον- 
εξίαν οὐχ οἶον τοῖς Πελοποννησίων ὁροῖς εὐ-
δοκῆσαι ποτ' ἂν περιληθεῖσαν, ἀλλ' οὔδε τοῖς τῆς 
4 Ἐλλάδος, τὴν τε Κλεομένους φιλοδοξίαν καὶ τὴν 
ὀλην ἐπιβολὴν κατὰ μὲν τὸ παρὸν αὐτῆς ἐφίεσθαι 
τῆς Πελοποννησίων ἁρχῆς, τυχόντα δὲ ταύτης τὸν 
προερημένον κατὰ πόδας ἀνθέξεθαι τῆς τῶν Ἕλλή-
5 νων ἡγεμονίας. ἦς οὖχ οἶον τε καθικέσθαι μή οὐ 
6 πρόσθεν καταλύσαντα τὴν Μακεδόνων ἁρχήν. σκο-
πεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν ἦξιόν, προοράμενον τὸ μέλλον,
πότερον συμφέρει τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι μετ' 
Ἀχαιῶν καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πρὸς Κλεο-
μένην πολεμεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἕλληνων ἡγεμονίας ἢ 
προέμενον τὸ μέγιστον ἐθνὸς διακινδυνεύειν ἐν Θετ-
tαλίᾳ πρὸς Αἰτωλοῦς καὶ Βοιωτοὺς, ἔτι δ' Ἀχαιοὺς 
καὶ Λακεδαίμονίους, ὑπὲρ τῆς Μακεδόνων ἁρχῆς. 
7 εὰν μὲν οὖν Αἰτωλοὶ τὴν ἑκ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν εἰς αὐτοὺς 
γεγενημένην εὔνοιαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Δημήτριον καροῖς 
ἐντρεπόμενοι τὴν ἱσυχίαν ἁγεῖν ὑποκρίνονται, καθά-
περ καὶ νῦν, πολεμήσειν αὐτοὺς ἐφασαν τοὺς Ἀχαι-
ούς πρὸς τὸν Κλοεμένη. κἂν μὲν ἡ τύχη συνεπι-
λαμβάνηται, μὴ δεῖσθαι χρείας τῶν βοηθησόντων· 
8 ἂν δὲ ἀντιπίπτητα τὰ τῆς τύχης, Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ συνεπι-
τίθωνται, προσέχειν αὐτὸν παρεκάλουν τοῖς πράγ-
μασι, ἵνα μὴ προήηται τῶν καροῖς, ἔτι δὲ δυνα-
9 μένους σύζεσθαι Πελοποννησίους ἐπαρκέσῃ. περὶ δὲ 
πίστεως καὶ χάριτος ἀποδόσεως ῥᾶθμεῖν αὐτὸν 
ἔνοτο δειν. τῆς γὰρ χρείας ἐπιτελούμενης αὐτὸν 
eὑρίσκειν τὸν. Ἀρατόν εὐδοκουμένας ἀμφοτέρους 
10 ὑποσχυόντο πίστεις. ὁμοίως δ' ἐφασαν καὶ τὸν 
καροῦ τῆς βοηθείας αὐτὸν ὑποδείξειν.
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would push their advantage further. The Aetolian schemes of territorial aggrandizement would never stop short of the boundaries of the Peloponnese or even those of Greece itself, while Cleomenes' personal ambition, and far-reaching projects, though for the present he aimed only at supremacy in the Peloponnese, would, on his attaining this, at once develop into a claim to be over-lord of all Hellas, a thing impossible without his first putting an end to the dominion of Macedon. They implored him then to look to the future and consider which was most in his interest, to fight in the Peloponnese against Cleomenes for the supremacy of Greece with the support of the Achaean and Boeotians, or to abandon the greatest of the Greek nations to its fate and then do battle in Thessaly for the throne of Macedonia with the Aetolians, Boeotians, Achaean, and Spartans all at once. Should the Aetolians, still pretending to have scruples owing to the benefits received from the Achaean in their war with Demetrius, continue their present inaction, the Achaean alone, they said, would fight against Cleomenes, and, if Fortune favoured them, would require no help; but should they meet with ill-success and be attacked by the Aetolians also, they entreated him to take good heed and not let the opportunity slip, but come to the aid of the Peloponnnesians while it was still possible to save them. As for conditions of alliance and the return they could offer him for his support, they said he need not concern himself, for once the service they demanded was being actually rendered, they promised him that Aratus would find terms satisfactory to both parties. Aratus himself, they said, would also indicate the date at which they required his aid.
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50 Ὅ μὲν οὖν Ἀντίγονος ἀκούσας ταῦτα, καὶ δόξας ἀληθινῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς ὑποδεικνύναι τὸν Ἀρατον, προσείχε τοῖς ἔχῃς πραττομένοις ἐπιμελῶς. 2 ἔγραψε δὲ καὶ τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας, ἐπαγγελλόμενος βοηθῆσεν, ἐὰν καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τότε βουλο- 3 μένοις ἦ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη καὶ Κερκιδὰν ἐπανελθόντων εἰς οἶκον, καὶ τάς τε παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπιστολὰς ἀποδόντων καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν εὖ- 4 νοιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ προθυμίαν διασαφοῦντων, μετεωρισθέντες οἱ Μεγαλοπολίται προθύμους ἔσχον ἱέναι πρὸς τὴν σύνοδον τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἐπισπάσασθαι τὸν Ἀντίγονον καὶ τὰ πράγματα κατὰ 5 σπουδὴν ἐγχειρίζειν αὐτῷ. οὗ δ’ Ἀρατος, διακούσας κατ’ ἰδίαν τῶν περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη τὴν τοῦ βασι- λέως αἴρεσιν, ἢν ἔχου τρός τε τούς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ 6 πρὸς αὐτοῦ, περιχαρῆς ἢν τῷ μὴ διακενήσει πεποιηθαί τὴν ἐπίνοιαν μηδ’ εὐρήθαι κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰ- τωλῶν ἐλπίδα τὸν Ἀντίγονον εἰς τέλος ἀπηλλοτριώσ- 7 μένοιν ἕαυτοῦ. πάνυ δὲ πρὸς λόγον ἡγεῖτο γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας προθύμους εἶναι διά τῶν Ἀχαιῶν φέρειν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον τὰ πράγματα. 8 μάλιστα μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐπάνω προείπον, ἔσπευδε μὴ προσδεηθῆναι τῆς βοηθείας. εἰ δ’ εἶ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τοῦτο δέοι καταφεύγειν, οὐ μόνον ἡμοῦλετο δ’ αὐ- τοῦ γενέσθαι τὴν κλῆσιν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον εἶ ἀπάν- των τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. ἡγονία γάρ, εὶ παραγενόμενος ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ κράτήσας τῷ πολέμῳ τοῦ Κλεομέ- νους καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἄλλοις τετελεύσοιτο περὶ τῆς κοινῆς πολιτείας, μὴ ἤπειρον τὸ ὁμο- λογουμένως τῶν συμβαινόντων αὐτοῖς ἀναλάβῃ τὴν 9 αἰτίαν, δὸξαντος δικαίως τούτῳ πράττειν διὰ τὴν εἰς αὐτοῦ προγεγενημένην ἀδικίαν περὶ τῶν Ἀκροκό- 362
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50. Antigonus, having listened to them, felt convinced that Aratus took a true and practical view of the situation, and carefully considered the next steps to be taken, promising the Megalopolitans by letter to come to their assistance if such was the wish of the Achaeans too. Upon Nicophanes and Cercidas returning home and delivering the king's letter, assuring at the same time their people of his goodwill towards them and readiness to be of service, the Megalopolitans were much elated and most ready to go to the Council of the League and beg them to invite the aid of Antigonus and at once put the direction of affairs in his hands. Aratus had private information from Nicophanes of the king's favourable inclination towards the League and himself, and was much gratified to find that his project had not been futile, and that he had not, as the Aetolians had hoped, found Antigonus entirely alienated from him. He considered it a great advantage that the Megalopolitans had readily consented to approach Antigonus through the Achaeans; for, as I said above, what he chiefly desired was not to be in need of asking for help, but if it became necessary to resort to this, he wished the appeal to come not only from himself personally, but from the League as a whole. For he was afraid that if the king appeared on the scene and, after conquering Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians, took any measures the reverse of welcome regarding the League, he himself would be universally blamed for what happened, as the king would seem to have justice on his side owing to Aratus' offence against the house of Macedon in
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10 μινθον εἰς τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν. διότερ ἄμα τῷ
παρελθόντας τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας εἰς τὸ κοινὸν βου-
λευτήριον τὰ τε γράμματα τοῖς Ἀχαϊοῖς ἐπιδεικνύ-
ναι καὶ διασαφεῖν τὴν ὄλην εὖνοιαν τοῖς βασιλέως,
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄξιοιν ἐπιστάσασθαι τὸν Ἀντί-
γονον τὴν ταχιστὴν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τῆς

11 αὐτῆς ὀρμῆς, προελθὼν Ἀρατός, καὶ τὴν τοῦ
βασιλέως προθυμίαν ἀποδεξάμενος καὶ τὴν τῶν πολ-
λών διάληψιν ἐπαινέσας, παρεκάλει διὰ πλεῖστον
μάλιστα μὲν πειρᾶσθαι δὲ ἀυτῶν σύζευγ καὶ τὰς
πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν· οὐδὲν γὰρ εἶναι τούτου κάλ-
λιον οὐδὲ συμφόροτερον· ἔαν δ’ ἄρα πρὸς τὸ τοῦ
τὸ μέρος ἀντιβαίνῃ τὰ τῆς τύχης, πρὸτερον ἐφη
dεῖν ἐξελέγχαντας πᾶσας τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας τότε

51 καταφεύγειν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν φίλων βοηθείας. ἐπισημη-

ναμένου δὲ τοῦ πλῆθους, ἐδοξεῖ μὲνεν ἐπὶ τῶν
ὑποκειμένων καὶ δ’ αὐτῶν ἐπιτελεῖν τὸν ἐνεστὼτα

2 πόλεμον. ἐπεὶ δὲ Πτολεμαῖος ἀπογνώσεις μὲν τὸ
ἔθνος Κλεομένει χρησιμεῖ ἐπεβάλετο, βουλόμενος
αὐτῶν ἐπαλείφειν ἐπὶ τῶν Ἀντίγονον διὰ τὸ πλείον
ἐλπίδας ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἦπερ ἐν τοῖς
Ἀχαιοῖς τοῦ δύνασθαι διακατέχειν τὰς τῶν ἐν Μακε-

3 δονία βασιλέων ἐπιβολάς, οἱ δ’ Ἀχαιοὶ τὸ μὲν
πρῶτον ἠλπιτόθησαν περὶ τὸ Λύκαιον, συμπλα-
κέντες κατὰ πορείαν τῷ Κλεομένει, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον
ἐκ παρατάξεως ἠττήθησαν ἐν τοῖς Λαδοκείοις καλο-
μένοις τῆς Μεγαλοπολίτιδος, οὐτ’ ἄρα καὶ Λυκιάδας
ἐπεσε, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὀλοσχερῶς ἔπτασαν ἐν τῇ
Δυναῖᾳ περὶ τὸ καλούμενον Ἑκατόμβαιον, παν-

4 δημεὶ διακυβεύοντες, τότ’ ἤδη τῶν πραγμάτων
οὐκέτι διδόντων ἀναστροφὴν ἡμᾶς ἡ γαλακτε ἐπὶ περι-
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the case of the Acrocorinthus. Therefore, when the Megalopolitans appeared before the General Council of the League, and showing the king's letter, assured them of his friendly sentiments, at the same time begging the Achaecans to ask for his intervention at once, and when Aratus saw that this was the inclination of the Achaecans also, he rose, and after expressing his gratification at the king's readiness to assist them and his approval of the attitude of the meeting, he addressed them at some length, begging them if possible to attempt to save their cities and country by their own efforts, that being the most honourable and advantageous course, but, should adverse fortune prevent this, then, but only when they had no hope left in their own resources, he advised them to resort to an appeal to their friends for aid. 51. The people applauded his speech, and a decree was passed to leave things as they were for the present and conduct the war unaided. But a series of disasters overtook them. In the first place Ptolemy threw over the League and began to give financial support to Cleomenes with a view of setting him on to attack Antigonus, as he hoped to be able to keep in check more effectually the projects of the Macedonian kings with the support of the Lacedaemonians than with that of the Achaecans. Next the Achaecans were worsted by Cleomenes while on the march near the Lycaem and again in a pitched battle at a place in the territory of Megalopolis called Ladoceia, Lydiades falling here, and finally their whole force met with utter defeat at the Hecatombaum in the territory of Dyme. Circumstances now no longer permitting delay, they were compelled by their position to
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eστώτα καταφεύγεν ὁμοθυμαδόν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον.
5 ἐν δὲ καὶρῷ προσβενὴν τὸν υἱὸν ἐξαποστείλας
"Ἀρατός πρὸς Ἀντίγονον ἐβεβαιώσατο τὰ περὶ τῆς
6 βοσκείας. παρείχε δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀπορίαν καὶ δυσχη-
στίαν μεγίστην τὸ μέτε τὸν βασιλέα δοκεῖν ἣν
βοηθήσαι χωρίς τοῦ κομίσασαί τοῦ Ἀκροκόρινθον
καὶ λαβεῖν ὄρμητήριον πρὸς τὸν ἐνεστώτα πόλεμον
tὴν τῶν Κορινθίων πόλιν, μὴτούς Ἀχαιῶς ἃν
τολμήσαι Κορινθίους ἀκούσας ἐγχειρίσαι Μακεδόσι.
7 διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὑπέρθεσσ᾽ ἐσχε τὸ διαβούλιον
χάρι τῆς περὶ τῶν πίστεων ἐπισκέψεως.

52 Ὅ δὲ Κλεομένης, καταπληξάμενος τοῖς προειρη-
μένοις εὐτυχήμαις, λοιπὸν ἀδεῖως ἐπεπορεύετο τὰς
πόλεις, ἃς μὲν πείθων, αἰς δὲ τὸν φόβον ἀνατενω-
2 μεν. προσλαβὼν δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ Καφύας,
Πελλήνην, Φενεόν, Ἀργον, Φλιοῦντα, Κλεωνᾶς,
Ἐπίδαιρον, Ἐρμόνα, Τροίζηνα, τελευταίον Κό-
ρωνθον, αὐτὸς μὲν προσεστρατοπέδευσε τῇ τῶν
Σικυωνίων πόλει, τοὺς δὲ Ἀχαιῶς ἀπέλυσε τοὺς
3 μεγίστου προβλήματος. τῶν γὰρ Κορινθίων τῷ
μὲν Ἀράτῳ στρατηγοῦντι καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς
παραγγειλάντων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπαλλάττεσθαι,
πρὸς δὲ τὸν Κλεομένη διαπεμπομένων καὶ καλοῦμ-
των, παρεδόθη τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀφορμή καὶ πρόφασις
4 εὐλογος. ἦς ἐπιλαβόμενος ὁ Ἀτατός καὶ προτείνας
Ἀντιγόνως τοῦ Ἀκροκόρινθον, κατεχόντων Ἀχαιῶν
τότε τὸν τόπον τούτον, ἐλυσε μὲν τὸ γεγονός
ἐγκλῆμα πρὸς τὴν οἰκίαν, ἵκαν γὰρ πάσην παρ-
έσχετο τῆς πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα κοινωνίας, τὸ δὲ
συνέχειν, ὄρμητήριον παρεσκεύασεν Ἀντιγόνως πρὸς
5 τὸν κατὰ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλεμον.

'Ο δὲ Κλεομένης, ἐπιγνώσας τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς συν-
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appeal with one voice to Antigonus. Aratus on this occasion sent his son as envoy to the king and ratified the terms of the alliance. They were, however, in considerable doubt and difficulty about the Acrocorinthus, as they did not think Antigonus would come to their assistance unless it were restored to him, so that he could use Corinth as a base for the present war, nor could they go to the length of handing over the Corinthians against their will to Macedon. This even caused at first an adjournment of the Council for the consideration of the guarantees they offered.

52. Cleomenes, having inspired terror by the victories I mentioned, henceforth made an unimpeded progress through the cities, gaining some by persuasion and others by threats. He annexed in this manner Caphyae, Pellene, Pheneus, Argos, Phlius, Cleonae, Epidaurus, Hermione, Troezen, and finally Corinth. He now sat down in front of Sicyon, but he had solved the chief difficulty of the Achaeans; for the Corinthians by ordering Aratus, who was then Strategus, and the Achaeans to quit Corinth, and by sending to invite Cleomenes, furnished the Achaeans with good and reasonable ground for offering to Antigonus the Acrocorinthus then held by them. Availing himself of this, Aratus not only atoned for his former offence to the royal house, but gave sufficient guarantee of future loyalty, further providing Antigonus with a base for the war against Lacedaemon.

Cleomenes, when he became aware of the under-
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tιθεμένους τὰ πρὸς τὸν Ἄντιγονον, ἀναξεύξας ἀπὸ τοῦ Σικυώνος, κατεστρατοπέδευσε περὶ τὸν Ἰσθμόν, διαλαβὼν χάρακι καὶ τάφρων τὸν μεταξὺ τόπον τοῦ τ' Ἀκροκορίνθου καὶ τῶν Ὀνείων καλομένων ὁρῶν, πάσαν ἦδη βεβαιώς περιεληφώς ταῖς ἐλπίσι τῆς Ἁράτου. Ἀντίγονος δὲ πάλαι μὲν ἦν ἐν παρασκευῇ, καραδοκῶν τὸ μέλλον κατὰ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς Ἀράτου· τότε δὲ συλλογιζόμενος ἐκ τῶν προσπιπτόντων ὅσον ὦπω παρεῖναι τὸν Κλεομένη μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς Ἑλλάδαν, διαπεμψάμενος πρός τε τὸν Ἅρατον καὶ τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὁμολογημένων, ἤκεν ἐξων τὰς δυνάμεις διὰ τῆς Ἑὐβοιάς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰσθμόν. οἱ γὰρ Αἰτωλοὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τότε βουλόμενοι κωλύσαι τὸν Ἀντίγονον τῆς βοηθείας, ἀπεἶπον αὐτῷ πορεύεσθαι μετὰ δυνάμεως ἐντὸς Πυλῶν· εἰ δὲ μή, διότι κωλύσουσι μεθ' ὅπλων αὐτοῦ τὴν δίοδον.

'Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἄντιγονος καὶ Κλεομένης ἀντεστρατοπέδευσαν ἀλλήλοις, δὲ μὲν εἰσελθείν σπουδάζων εἰς Πελοπόννησον, δὲ Κλεομένης κωλύσαι τῆς εἰσ-53 ὁδοῦ τὸν Ἄντιγονον. οἱ δ' Ἀχαιοὶ, καίπερ οὐ μετρίως ἠλαττωμένοι τοῖς ὀλοί, ὡμως οὐκ ἀφίσταντο τῆς προθέσεως οὐδ' ἐγκατέλειπον τάς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλ-2 πίδας, ἀλλ' ἀμα τῶν Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν Ἀργείων ἐπαναστήναι τοῖς Κλεομενισταῖς, βοηθήσαντες καὶ παρεισπεσόντες μετὰ Τιμογένου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, 3 κατέλαβον την τῶν Ἀργείων πόλιν. ὃ δὴ καὶ νο-μιστέον αἰτιώτατον γεγονόντα πραγμάτων κατορθώ-σεως. τὸ γὰρ ἐπιλαβόμενον τῆς ὄρμης τοῦ Κλεο-μένους καὶ προετήσαν τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν δυνάμεων τούτ' ἦν, ὡς εἰ αὐτῶν φανερὸν ἐγένετο τῶν πραγ-4 μάτων. καὶ γὰρ τόπους εὐφυεστέρους προκατέχων, 368
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standing between the Achaeans and Antigonus, left Sicyon and encamped on the Isthmus, uniting by a palisade and trench the Acrocorinthus and the mountain called the Ass's Back, regarding confidently the whole Peloponnese as being henceforth his own domain. Antigonus had been for long making his preparations, awaiting the turn of events, as Aratus had recommended, but now, judging from the progress of events that Cleomenes was on the point of appearing in Thessaly with his army, he communicated with Aratus and the Achaeans reminding them of the terms of their treaty, and passing through Euboea with his forces, reached the Isthmus, the Aetolians having, in addition to other measures they took to prevent his assisting the Achaean, forbidden him to advance with an army beyond Thermopylae, threatening, if he attempted it, to oppose his passage.

Antigonus and Cleomenes now faced each other, 224 B.C. the former bent on penetrating into the Peloponnesse and the latter on preventing him. 53. The Achaean, although they had suffered such serious reverses, yet did not abandon their purpose or their self-reliance, but on Aristoteles of Argos revolting against the partisans of Cleomenes, they sent a force to his assistance and entering the city by surprise under the command of their Strategus, Timoxenus, established themselves there. We should look on this achievement as the principal cause of the improvement in their fortunes which ensued. For events clearly showed that it was this which checked Cleomenes' ardour and subdued in advance the spirit of his troops. Though his position was
ΤΑ ΗΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΗΣ ΟΦ ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

καὶ χορηγίας δαμαλεστέρας 'Αντιγόνου χρώμενος,
καὶ τόλμη καὶ φιλοτιμία μείζον παρωρημένον,
δόμως ἄμα τῷ προσπεσεῖν αὐτῷ διότι κατελήφθαι
συμβαίνει τῇ τῶν Ἀργείων πόλιν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν,
εὐθὺς ἀνάσπαστος, ἀπολιπὼν τὰ προδεδηλωμένα
προτερήματα, φυγῇ παραπλησίαν ἐποιεῖτο τῇ ἀπο-
χώρησιν, δείσας μὴ πανταχόθεν αὐτὸν περιστῶν
οἱ πολέμοι. παραπεσὼν δ' εἰς Ἀργος, καὶ κατὸ
ποσὸν ἀντιποιησάμενος τῆς πόλεως, μετὰ ταῦτα
γεννάως μὲν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, φιλοτιμῶς ἐφ' ὧν Ἀρ-
γείων ἐκ μεταμελείας αὐτὸν ἀμυναμένων, ἀποπε-
σῶν καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, καὶ ποιησάμενος τῇ
πορείᾳ διὰ Μαντωνείας, οὕτως ἔπανηλθεν εἰς τὴν
Σπάρτην.

54 Ὁ δ' 'Αντίγονος ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὴν Πελοπόννησον
εὑσελθὼν παρέλαβε τὸν Ἀκροκόρωνθον, οὐδένα δὲ
χρόνον μείνας εἰχετο τῶν προκειμένων καὶ παρὴν
2 εἰς Ἀργος. ἐπαινέσας δὲ τοὺς Ἀργείους, καὶ
καταστησάμενος τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, αὕτης εκ
ποδὸς ἐκίνησε, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπ᾽ Ἀρ-
καδίας. ἐκβάλων δὲ τὰς φρουρὰς ἐκ τῶν ἐποικο-
δομηθέντων χωρίων ὑπὸ Κλεομένου κατὰ τῇ
Ἀγιώτιν καὶ Βελμανῶν χώραν, καὶ παραδοῦσα τὰ
φρούρια Μεγαλοπολίταις, ἤκε πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν
4 σύνοδον εἰς Αἰγίνον. ἀπολογισάμενος δὲ περὶ τῶν
καθ' αὐτὸν καὶ χρηματίσας περὶ τῶν μελλόντων,
ἐτι δὲ κατασταθεὶς ἡγεμῶν ἀπάντων τῶν συμ-
5 μάχων, μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνον μὲν τίνα παραχειμαζόν
διέτριβε περὶ Σικυώνα καὶ Κόρινθον. τῆς δ' ἐστὶν
νῆσος οὕτως ἐνσταμένης ἀναλαβὼν τὰς συνάμεις
6 προήγε. καὶ διανύσας τριταῖος πρὸς τὴν τῶν Τε-
γεατῶν πόλιν, ἀπηνηκότων καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔν-
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stronger than that of Antigonus, and he was much better off for supplies, as well as animated by greater courage and ambition, no sooner did the news reach him that Argos had been seized by the Achaeans than he instantly took himself off, abandoning all these advantages, and made a precipitate retreat, fearing to be surrounded on all sides by the enemy. Gaining entrance to Argos he possessed himself of part of the city, but, on the Achaeans making a gallant resistance, in which the Argives joined with all the zeal of renegades, this plan broke down too, and, marching by way of Mantinea, he returned to Sparta.

54. Antigonus now safely entered the Peloponnese and took possession of the Acrocorinthus and, without wasting any time there, pushed on and reached Argos. Having thanked the Argives and put matters in the city on a proper footing, he moved on again at once, making for Arcadia. After having ejected the garrisons from the forts that Cleomenes had built there to command the country in the territory of Aegys and Belbina, and handed over these forts to the Megalopolitans, he returned to Aegium where the Council of the Achaean League was in session. He gave them an account of the measures he had taken and arranged with them for the future conduct of the war. They hereupon appointed him generalissimo of all the allied forces, and after this he retired for a short time to his winter quarters 228 B.C. near Sicyon and Corinth. Early in spring he advanced with his army and reached Tegea in three days. Here the Achaeans joined him, and the
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taiðha, periòstratopedèusas ἧξατο πολιορκεῖν αὐτῇ τὴν. τῶν δὲ Μακεδόνων ἐνεργῶς χρωμένων τῇ τε λοιπῇ πολιορκίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ὀρύγμασι, ταχέως ἀπελπίζαντες οἱ Τεγεάται τὴν σωτηρίαν παρέδοσαν αὐτῷ τούς. ὃ δὲ Ἀντίγονος, ἀσφαλισάμενος τὰ κατά τὴν πόλιν, εἰχετο κατὰ τὸ συνέχει τῶν ἔξης, καὶ προῆγεν κατὰ σπουδὴν εἰς τὴν Λακωνίκην. ἑγγύσας δὲ τῷ Κλεομένει προκαθήμενῳ τῆς ἐαυτοῦ χώρας κατεπείραζε, καὶ συνιστάτο τυπας ἀκροβολισμοὺς. προσπεφυλαξότος δὲ διὰ τῶν κατασκόπων αὐτῷ τοὺς εἶς Ὁρχομένου στρατιώτας παραβεβηκότας πρὸς τὸν Κλεομένην, παρανύκτικα ποιησάμενος ἀναζψευσκήν ἤπειρον. καὶ τὸν μὲν Ὁρχομένου εἴς ἐφόδον κατά κράτος εἶλε· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα periòstratopedèusas την τῶν Μακινέων ἐπολιορκεῖ πόλιν. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ταύτην καταπληξαμένων τῶν Μακεδόνων καὶ λαβόντων ὑποχείριον, ἀναζέυξας προῆγε τὴν ἐφ’ Ἡραίας καὶ Τελφούσης. παραλαβόνδε καὶ ταῦτα τὰς πόλεις, ἐθελοντὴν προσχωρησάντων αὐτῷ τῶν κατοικοῦντων, οὕτως ἢ δὴ συνάπτοντος τοῦ χειμῶνος παρῆν εἰς Αἰγίνον πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σύνοδον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν Μακεδόνας ἐπ’ οἴκου διαφθινεῖ πάντας εἰς τὴν χειμασίαν, αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς Ἀχαιοῖς διελέγετο καὶ συνεισενείτο περὶ τῶν ἐνεστῶτων. 55 Κατὰ δὲ τούς καιροὺς τούτους συνθεωρῶν ὁ Κλεομένης τὰς μὲν δυνάμεις διαφεμένας, τὸν δὲ Ἀντίγονον μετὰ τῶν μισοθφόρων ἐν Αἰγίνῳ διατριβοντα, καὶ τριῶν ἡμερῶν οὖν ἀφεστῶτα τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ταύτην εἰδὼς δυσφύλακτον οὖσαν διὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν, τότε δὲ καὶ βαθύμως τηρουμένην διὰ τὴν Ἀντιγόνου παρουσίαιν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἀπολωλότας τοὺς 372
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siege of the city was opened. The Macedonians conducted the siege energetically, especially by mining, and the Tegeans soon gave up all hope of holding out and surrendered. Antigonus, after securing the city, continued to pursue his plan of campaign and advanced rapidly on Laconia. He encountered Cleomenes posted on the frontier to defend Laconia and began to harass him, a few skirmishes taking place; but on learning from his scouts that the troops from Orchomenus had left to come to the aid of Cleomenes, he at once hastily abandoned his position and, breaking up his camp, withdrew. He surprised Orchomenus, and captured it by assault, and after this he laid siege to Mantinea which likewise the Macedonians soon frightened into submission, and then he advanced on Heraea and Telphusa which the inhabitants surrendered to him of their own accord. The winter was now approaching. Antigonus came to Aegium to be present at the meeting of the Achaean Synod, and dismissing all his Macedonians to their homes for the winter, occupied himself in discussing the present situation with the Achaeps and making joint plans for the future.

55. Cleomenes at this juncture had observed that Antigonus had dismissed his other troops and, keeping only his mercenaries with him, was spending the time at Aegium at a distance of three days' march from Megalopolis. He knew that this latter city was very difficult to defend, owing to its extent and partial desolation, that it was at present very carelessly guarded owing to the presence of Antigonus in the Peloponnese, and above all that it had lost the
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πλείστους τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸ
3 Δύκαιον καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τῇ περὶ Λαδόκεια μάχη, λαβὼν συνεργούς των τῶν ἐκ Μεσσήνης φυγάδων, οἳ διατριβοῦντες ἐπίγχανον ἐν τῇ Μεγάλῃ πόλει, παρεισήλθε διὰ τούτων λάθρα νυκτὸς ἐντὸς τῶν
4 τειχῶν. τῆς δ᾿ ἡμέρας ἐπιγενομένης παρ᾿ ὁλόγον ἦλθε τοῦ μη μόνον ἔκπεσεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ὄλοις κυνδυνεύσαι διὰ τὴν εὐψυχίαν τῶν Μεγαλοπολίτῶν. 5 δ᾿ ὅτι καὶ τρισὶ μησὶ πρότερον αὐτῷ συνέβη παθεῖν παρεισπεσόντι κατά τὸν Κωλαιών προσαγορεύμενον
6 τόπον τῆς πόλεως. τότε δὲ τῷ πλήθει τῆς δυνα-
7 μεως καὶ τῷ προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τοὺς εὐκαίρους τόπους καθίκετο τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, καὶ πέρας ἕκβαλεν τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας κατέσχε τῇ πόλιν. γενόμενος δ᾿ ἐγκρατὴς οὕτως αὐτὴν πικρῶς διεἴδθειρε καὶ δυσμενῶς ὃστε μηδενὶ ἐλπίσαι μηδένα διότι δύνατ᾿
8 ἂν συνοικισθῆναι πάλιν. τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσαι μοι
dokeῖ διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὰς τῶν καιρῶν περιστάσεις παρὰ
9 μόνοις Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ Στυμφαλίως μηδέποτε δυνηθῆναι μὴ ἄριστοτην καὶ κοινωνὸν τῶν ἰδίων ἐλπίδων μήτε προδότην κατασκευάσασθαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ Κλειτορίων φιλελεύθερον καὶ γενναίον εἶν
ἀνήρ κατήχομεν διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κακίαν, Θεάρκης·
10 ὅτε εἰκότως ἐξαρνοῦνται Κλειτόριοι μὴ φῦναι παρὰ
σφῖς, γενέσθαι δ᾿ ὑποβολαιαίον ἐξ Ἰρχομενοῦ τῶν
ἐπτυλίδων τῶν στρατιωτῶν.

56 Ἡπεῖ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τούς αὐτοὺς καρούς Ἀράτων
11 γεγραφότων παρ᾿ ἐνὶος ἀποδοχῆς ἀξίοῦται Φιλαρ-
χος, ἐν πολλοῖς ἀντιδοξῶν καὶ τάναντία γράφων
2 αὐτῷ, χρήσιμον ἄν εἰ, μᾶλλον δ᾿ ἀναγκαῖον ἥμιν,
'Ἀράτω προφητικότως κατακολουθεῖν περὶ τῶν Κλεο-

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greater part of its citizens of military age in the battles at the Lycaeum and at Ladoceia. He therefore procured the co-operation of certain Messenian exiles then living in Megalopolis and by their means got inside the walls secretly by night. On day breaking, he came very near not only being driven out, but meeting with complete disaster owing to the bravery of the Megalopolitans, who had indeed expelled and defeated him three months previously when he entered the city by surprise in the quarter called Colaeum. But on this occasion, owing to the strength of his forces, and owing to his having had time to seize on the most advantageous positions, his project succeeded, and finally he drove out the Megalopolitans and occupied their city. On possessing himself of it, he destroyed it with such systematic cruelty and animosity, that nobody would have thought it possible that it could ever be re-inhabited. I believe him to have acted so, because the Megalopolitans and Stymphalians were the only peoples from among whom in the varied circumstances of his career he could never procure himself a single partisan to share in his projects or a single traitor. For in the case of the Clitorians their noble love of freedom was sullied by the malpractices of one man Thearces whom, as one would expect, they naturally deny to have been a native-born citizen, affirming that he was the son of a foreign soldier and foisted in from Orchomenus.

56. Since, among those authors who were contemporaries of Aratus, Phylarchus, who on many points is at variance and in contradiction with him, is by some received as trustworthy, it will be useful or rather necessary for me, as I have chosen to rely on Aratus' narrative for the history of the Cleomenic
μενικῶν, μην παραλιπεῖν ἀσκεπτον τούτο τὸ μέρος, ἵνα μην τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμαισιν ἱσοδύνα-μοῦν ἀπολείπωμεν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν. καθόλου μὲν ὁ συγγραφέας οὗτος πολλὰ παρ’ ὀλην τὴν 4 πραγματείαν εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν εἴρηκε. πλὴν περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἵσως οὐκ ἄναγκαιον ἐπιτμαίν κατὰ τὸ παρὸν οὐδ’ ἔξακριβοῦν. ὁσα δὲ συνεπιβάλλει τοῖς ύψ’ ἡμῶν γραφομένοις καρφοῖς, ταῦτα δ’ ἔστι τὰ περὶ τὸν Κλεομενικὸν πόλεμον, ὑπὲρ τούτων 5 ἄναγκαιον ἐστὶν ἡμῖν διευκρινεῖν. ἔσται δὲ πάντως ἀρκοῦντα ταῦτα πρὸς τὸ καὶ τὴν ὄλην αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν καὶ δύναμιν ἐν τῇ πραγματείᾳ κατὰ 6 μαθεῖν. βουλόμενος δὴ διασαφεῖν τὴν ὁμότητα τὴν Ἀντιγόνου καὶ Μακεδόνων, ἀμα δὲ τούτους τὴν Ἀράτου καὶ τῶν Ἁχαιῶν, φησὶ τοὺς Μαντινέας γενομένους ὑποχειρίους μεγάλοις περιπετεσέν ἀτυχή-μασι, καὶ τὴν ἀρχαιότητα καὶ μεγίστην πόλιν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἁρκαδίαν τηλικαύταισι παλαίσαι συμψη- ραίς ὡστε πάντας εἰς ἐπιστάσιον καὶ δάκρυα τοὺς 7 Ἐλληνας ἀγαγεῖν. σπουδάζων δ’ εἰς ἔλεον ἐκκα- λείσθαι τοὺς ἀναγνώσκοντας καὶ συμπαθεῖσ ποιεῖν τοῖς λεγομένοις, εἰσάγει περιπλοκάς γυνακών καὶ κόμας διερρημμένας καὶ μαστῶν ἐκβολάς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις δάκρυα καὶ θρήνους ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ἀναμίξ τέκνωι καὶ γονεύεις γηραιοῦ ἀπαγομένων. 8 ποιεῖ δὲ τούτο παρ’ ὀλην τὴν ἱστορίαν, πειρόμενος ἐν ἐκάστοις ἀεὶ πρὸ ὀφθαλμών τιθέναι τὰ δεινά. 9 τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγεννεῖς καὶ γυναικῶδες τῆς αἱρέσεως αὐτοῦ παρείσθω, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἱστορίας οἰκεῖον ἀμα 10 καὶ χρήσιμων ἐξετάζεσθω. δεῖς τοιγαροῦν οὐκ ἐκ- πλήττετε τὸν συγγραφέα τερατεύμονον διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας τοὺς ἐντυγχάνωτας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐνδεχομέ-
war, not to leave the question of their relative credibility undiscussed, so that truth and falsehood in their writings may no longer be of equal authority. In general Phylarchus through his whole work makes many random and careless statements; but while perhaps it is not necessary for me at present to criticize in detail the rest of these, I must minutely examine such as relate to events occurring in the period with which I am now dealing, that of the Cleomenic war. This partial examination will however be quite sufficient to convey an idea of the general purpose and character of his work. Wishing, for instance, to insist on the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians and also on that of Aratus and the Achaeans, he tells us that the Mantineans, when they surrendered, were exposed to terrible sufferings and that such were the misfortunes that overtook this, the most ancient and greatest city in Arcadia, as to impress deeply and move to tears all the Greeks. In his eagerness to arouse the pity and attention of his readers he treats us to a picture of clinging women with their hair dishevelled and their breasts bare, or again of crowds of both sexes together with their children and aged parents weeping and lamenting as they are led away to slavery. This sort of thing he keeps up throughout his history, always trying to bring horrors vividly before our eyes. Leaving aside the ignoble and womanish character of such a treatment of his subject, let us consider how far it is proper or serviceable to history. A historical author should not try to thrill his readers by such exaggerated pictures, nor should he, like a tragic

a Clinging either to each other or to the altars of their gods.

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νους λόγους ζητεῖν καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἐξαριθμεῖσαι, καθάπερ οἱ τραγῳδιογράφοι, τῶν δὲ πραξθέντων καὶ ῥήθεντων κατ’ ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν μνημονεύειν πάμπαν, καὶ πάνω μέτρια
11 τυγχάνωσιν ὑντα. τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἱστορίας καὶ τραγῳδίας οὐ ταυτὸν, ἀλλὰ τούναντιν. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ διὰ τῶν πιθανωτάτων λόγων ἐκπληξαὶ καὶ ψυχαγωγῆσαι κατὰ τὸ παρόν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ἐνθάδε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἐργῶν καὶ λόγων εἰς τὸν πάντα χρόνον διδάξαι καὶ πεῖσαι τοὺς φιλομαθοῦν-
12 τας, ἐπειδὴ ὅπερ ἐν ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἤγείται τὸ πιθανόν, κἂν ἢ ψεύδος, διὰ τὴν ἀπάτην τῶν θεωμένων, ἐν
13 δὲ τοῦτοι τάλπῃς διὰ τὴν ὁφέλειας τῶν φιλο-
μαθῶντος. χωρίς τε τούτων τὰς πλείστας ἢμῖν ἔξηγείται τῶν περιπετειῶν, οὐχ ὑποτεθεὶς αἰτίαν καὶ τρόπον τοῖς γνωμένοις, ὡς χωρὶς οὔτ᾽ ἔλεεῖν εὐ-
14 λόγως οὔτ᾽ ὀργίζεσθαι καθηκόντως δυνατόν ἐπ᾽
15 οὖνεν τῶν συμβαίνοντων. ἐπεὶ τίς ἀνθρώπων οὐ
δειν ἤγείται τύπτεσθαι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους; ἀλλ᾽
ὁμως, εὰν μὲν ἄρχων ἀδίκων χειρῶν πάθη τις
tοὐτο, δικαίως κρίνεται πεποιθέναι ἐὰν δ᾽ ἐπὶ
διορθώσει καὶ μαθῆσαι ταῦτα τοῦτο γίνηται, προσ-
έτι καὶ τιμῆς καὶ χάρατος οἱ τύπτοντες τοὺς ἐλευ-
16 θέρους ἄξιονται. καὶ μὴν τὸ γε τοὺς πολίτας ἀπο-
κτείνωσι μέγιστον ἀσέβθημα τίθεται καὶ μεγίστων
ἀξίων προστίμων. καίτοι γε προφανῶς ὃ μὲν τὸν
kλέπτην ἢ μοιχὸν ἀποκτείνας ἀθώος ἐστών, ὃ δὲ τὸν
πρόδοτην ἢ τύραννον τιμῶν καὶ προεδρίας τυγ-
16 χάνει παρὰ πᾶσιν. οὔτως ἐν παντὶ τὸ τέλος κεῖται

* Literally “a reserved seat in the theatre or elsewhere.”
poet, try to imagine the probable utterances of his characters or reckon up all the consequences probably incidental to the occurrences with which he deals, but simply record what really happened and what really was said, however commonplace. For the object of tragedy is not the same as that of history but quite the opposite. The tragic poet should thrill and charm his audience for the moment by the verisimilitude of the words he puts into his characters' mouths, but it is the task of the historian to instruct and convince for all time serious students by the truth of the facts and the speeches he narrates, since in the one case it is the probable that takes precedence, even if it be untrue, the purpose being to create illusion in spectators, in the other it is the truth, the purpose being to confer benefit on learners. Apart from this, Phylarchus simply narrates most of such catastrophes and does not even suggest their causes or the nature of these causes, without which it is impossible in any case to feel either legitimate pity or proper anger. Who, for instance, does not think it an outrage for a free man to be beaten? but if this happen to one who was the first to resort to violence, we consider that he got only his desert, while where it is done for the purpose of correction or discipline, those who strike free men are not only excused but deemed worthy of thanks and praise. Again, to kill a citizen is considered the greatest of crimes and that deserving the highest penalty, but obviously he who kills a thief or adulterer is guiltless, and the slayer of a traitor or tyrant everywhere meets with honour and distinction. So in every such case the final criterion
57 Μαντινέως τούς το μὲν πρῶτον ἐγκαταλειπόντες τὴν μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείαν ἐθέλοντιν Αίτωλοις ἐνεχείρισαν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν πατρίδα, μετὰ 2 δὲ ταῦτα Κλεομένει. γεγονότες δ’ ἐπὶ τοιαύτης προαιρέσεως καὶ μετέχοντες τῆς Λακεδαιμονίως πολιτείας ἐτεταρτὶ πρῶτερον τῆς Ἀντιγόνου παρουσίας ἐάλωσαν κατὰ κράτος ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν,
3 Ἀράτου πραξικοπήσαντος αὐτῶν τὴν πόλιν. ἐν δὲ καιρῷ τοσούτῳ ἀπέσχον τοῦ παθείν τι δεινόν διὰ τὴν προερημεύμεναν ἀμαρτίαν, ὥσι καὶ περιβόητον συνεχείς θεοῦ γενέσθαι τὸ πραξάν διὰ τὴν ὃξυτητά τῆς κατὰ 4 τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀμφοτέρων μεταβολῆς. ἀμα γὰρ τῷ κατασχεῖν τὴν πόλιν Ἀράτος παρατικά μὲν τοῖς υἱῷ αὐτοῦ ταττομένως παρήγγειλε μηδένα μηδενός 5 ἀπεστάλημεν ἀλλοτρίων, ἔξης δὲ τούτοις τοὺς Μαντινέας συναθροίσας παρεκάλεσε θαρρεῖν καὶ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων· ὑπάρξειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν 6 πολιτευόμενοι μετα τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. τοῖς δὲ Μαντινέως ἀνυπονοήτου καὶ παραδόξου φαινόμενης τῆς ἐπίδος, παρατικά πάντες ἐπὶ τῆς ἐννίας ἐγένοντο φιλοφοσοφικαὶ. καὶ πρὸς οὖς μικρῷ πρῶτον μαχόμενοι πολλοὶ μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπείδου ἀπολλυμένους, οὐκ ὀλίγοις δ’ αὐτῶν βιαῖος τραύμα περισσότας, τούτοις εἰς τὰς ἱδίας οἰκίας εἰσαγόμενοι καὶ ποιησάμενοι σφίνα καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοίς ἀναγκαίοις ὁμοστίους, οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπον τῆς μετ’ ἀλλήλων 7 φιλοφροσύνης. καὶ τοῦτ’ εἰκότως ἐποίησε· οὐ γὰρ ὀδός εἰ τινὲς ἀνθρώπων εὐγνωμονεστέρους ἐνέτυχον πολεμίους οὖν εἰ τινὲς ἀβλαβέστερον ἐπάλαλαν τοῖς 380
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of good and evil lies not in what is done, but in the different reasons and different purposes of the doer.

57. Now the Mantineans had, in the first instance, deserted the Achaean League, and of their own free will put themselves and their city into the hands first of the Aetolians and then of Cleomenes. They had deliberately ranged themselves on his side and been admitted to Spartan citizenship, when, four years before the invasion of Antigonus, their city was betrayed to Aratus and forcibly occupied by the Achaeans. On this occasion, so far from their being cruelly treated owing to their recent delinquency, the circumstances became celebrated because of the sudden revulsion of sentiments on both sides. For immediately Aratus had the city in his hands, he at once issued orders to his troops to keep their hands off the property of others, and next, calling an assembly of the Mantineans, bade them be of good courage and retain possession of all they had; for if they joined the Achaean League he would assure their perfect security. The prospect of safety thus suddenly revealed to them took the Mantineans completely by surprise, and there was an instantaneous and universal reversal of feeling. The very men at whose hands they had seen, in the fight that had just closed, many of their kinsmen slain and many grievously wounded, were now taken into their houses, and received into their families with whom they lived on the kindest possible terms. This was quite natural, for I never heard of any men meeting with kinder enemies or being less injured by what is considered the greatest of
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μεγίστοις δοκούσιν εἶναι συμπτώμασι Μαντινέων
dιὰ τὴν Ἀράτου καὶ τῶν Ἀχαίων εἰς αὐτοὺς φιλαν-
θρωπίαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα προορώμενοι τὰς ἐν αὐ-
τοῖς στάσεις καὶ τὰς ὑπ' Ἀἰτωλῶν καὶ Λακεδαίμο-
νῶν ἐπιβουλάς, προσβεύσαντες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαίοις

1 ἦξίωσαν δοῦναι παραφυλακῆν αὐτοῖς. οἱ δὲ πει-


3 σωτηρίαν. σὺν δὲ τούτων καὶ μισθοφόρους διακο-

4 τὴν ὑποκειμένην αὐτοῖς κατάστασιν. μετ' οὗ πολὺ

dὲ στασιάσαντες πρὸς σφᾶς οἱ Μαντινεῖς, καὶ Λα-
kedaimouiois ἐπισπασάμενοι, τὴν τε πόλιν ἐνεχείρι-

5 δεινοτέρον οὖν εἰπεῖν εὐμαρέσ. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἔδοξε

6 τὸτε γὰρ καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἔθεος ἐστὶ συγχωρεῖ-

7 οἱ δ' ἦνα Κλεομένει καὶ Λακεδαίμονίσι ἱκανὴν παρά-

8 σχωνται πίστιν πρὸς τὴν ἑνεκτώσαν ἐπιβολήν, τὰ
koumata τῶν ἄνθρωπων δικαια παραβάντες τὸ μέγι-

9 ρίαν ἐφιλαττον, πηλικης ὀργῆς ἔστων ἄξιον; τί δ' ἄν ψαθόντες οὗτοι δίκην δόξαιν ἀρμόζουσαν δε-
calamities than the Mantineans, all owing to their humane treatment by Aratus and the Achaeans. 58. Subsequently, as they foresaw discord among themselves and plots by the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians, they sent an embassy to the Achaeans asking for a garrison. The Achaeans consented and chose by lot three hundred of their own citizens, who set forth, abandoning their own houses and possessions, and remained in Mantinea to watch over the liberty and safety of its townsmen. At the same time they sent two hundred hired soldiers, who aided this Achaean force in safeguarding the established government. Very soon however the Mantineans fell out with the Achaeans, and, inviting the Lacedaemonians, put the city into their hands and massacred the garrison the Achaeans had sent them. It is difficult to find words to characterize the magnitude and atrocity of this act of treachery. For in resolving to forswear their friendship and gratitude, they should at least have spared the lives of these men and allowed them all to depart under terms. Such treatment is, by the common law of nations, accorded even to enemies; but the Mantineans, simply in order to give Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians a satisfactory guarantee of their good faith in this undertaking, violated the law recognized by all mankind and deliberately committed the most heinous of crimes. Vengeful murderers of the very men who previously on capturing their city had left them unharmed, and who now were guarding their liberties and lives—against such men, one asks oneself, can any indignation be too strong? What should we consider to be an adequate punishment for them? Someone might
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δωκέναι; τυχὸν ῥίσως εἶποι τις ἂν, πραθέντες μετὰ
tékwn kai γυναικῶν, ἔπει κατεπολεμήθησαν. ἄλλα
10 τοῦτό γε καὶ τοῖς μηθέν ἀσεβεῖς ἐπιτελεσμένοις
catà toûs tou pólemuv nómuov úpókeintai pateíwv.
oúkouv òloocherostéras tîn kai meîxovos tûchein
11 ἦσαν ἄξιοι τιμωρίας, ὥστ' εἴπερ ἔπαθον ἀ Φύλαρ-
χός φήσων, οὐκ ἔλεον εἰκὸs ἵν συνεξακολουθεῖν
autôs para twûn 'Ellhînov, ἔπανου dê kai συγ-
katáthsein màllon toûs práttoûs kai métapórevo-
12 mánois tûn āsbeiein autûn. ἄλλ' ὤμωs òúdenos
peraiîs er συνεξακολουθήςαντος Μαντυνεύσι katà
tûn periπéseiean plîn tou diarphâînai toûs bíous
kai prâthnai toûs èleuvhêrous, d' sughagrafeas autîs
ûs te rateías harîn ou mànon pseûdos eîsînègeke to
13 òlou, ãllâ kai to pseûdos âpîhânou, kai dia tûn ùpper-
bolhûn tûs ângnoiás ouûdê to parakeîmênon ñdunhê
suneîsthîsai, pôs ou autôi katal toûs autûs kai-
rous kuriëuvaîntes Tegestaûn katal krâtous òûdên
14 tûn òmoiôn ûpraçan. kàritoi y êî mên ãtûwv prar-
tôn tôwv ìmôthês ãtîa, kai toûtous eikôs ãn pê-
povthnai taûtâ tôuû ùpô toû autûn ùpopepêwkoûs
15 kairôn. êî dê peri móous gêgône Mântuneîs ã
diâfora, fanevûn âti kai tûn âtîaûn tûs õrghês
âánâkhy diâphêruvan gegônénav peri toûtous.

59 Pàlin 'Aristómânacû tûn 'Argeîôn fêsou àndra
tûs épifavanâstûs osiîas ùpàrchnaî, kai têtravan-
niikôta mên 'Argeíwv, pevukôta d' èk tûrânûwv,
ûpoxeîrôûn 'Antuynôû kai toîs 'Achauîs gêvûmenwv,
eîs Keghreîs àparakhían kai strefllômêen àpo-
thanêîn, âddukwtaî kai deînôtaî pâthôta pânwv
2 ànthrôpôn. têrwv dê kai peri taûtûn tûn prâzîn
ô sughagrafeas to kath' autûn ìdîuma, fowâs tûnas
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perhaps say that now when they were crushed by armed force they should have been sold into slavery with their wives and children. But to this fate the usage of war exposes those who have been guilty of no such impious crime. These men therefore were worthy of some far heavier and more extreme penalty; so that had they suffered what Phylarchus alleges, it was not to be expected that they should have met with pity from the Greeks, but rather that approval and assent should have been accorded to those who executed judgement on them for their wickedness. Yet, while nothing more serious befel the Mantineans, in this their hour of calamity, than the pillage of their property and the enslavement of the male citizens, Phylarchus, all for the sake of making his narrative sensational, composed a tissue not only of falsehoods, but of improbable falsehoods, and, owing to his gross ignorance, was not even able to compare an analogous case and explain how the same people at the same time, on taking Tegea by force, did not commit any such excesses. For if the cause lay in the barbarity of the perpetrators, the Tegeans should have met with the same treatment as those who were conquered at the same time. If only the Mantineans were thus exceptionally treated, we must evidently infer that there was some exceptional cause for anger against them.

59. Again he tells us that Aristomachus of Argos, a man of most noble birth, having himself been tyrant of Argos and being descended from tyrants, was led away captive to Cenchreae and there racked to death, no man deserving less such a terrible fate. Exercising in this case too his peculiar talent, the
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πλάττει διὰ τῆς νυκτὸς αὐτοῦ στρεβλουμένου προσπεπτούσας τοῖς σύνεγγυς κατοικούσιν, ὃν τοὺς μὲν ἐκπληττομένους τὴν ἀσέβειαν, τοὺς δ′ ἀπιστούντας, τοὺς δ′ ἀγανακτούντας ἐπὶ τοῖς γνωμένοις προστρέχει πρὸς τὴν οἰκίαν φησὶ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης τερατείας παρείσθω. δεδήλωται γὰρ ἄριστως. ἐγὼ δ′ Ἀριστομαχον, εἰ καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἔτερον ἤμαρτε, κατὰ γε τὴν τοῦ βίου προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν εἰς πατρίδα παρανομίαν τῆς μεγίστης ἁξιών κρίνων τιμωρίας. καίτερ δ′ συγγραφεύς, βουλόμενος αὐξεῖν αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ παραστήσασθαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας εἰς τὸ μάλλον αὐτῶν συναγανακτεῖν ἐφ᾽ οίς ἔπαθεν, οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν φησὶ γεγονέναι τύραννον, ἀλλὰ κάκων τυράννων πεφυκέναι. ταῦτης δὲ μείζων κατηγορίαν ἦ πυκνοτέραν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ῥᾴδιως δύναιτ᾽ οὐδείς. αὐτὸ γὰρ τούνομα περέχει τὴν ἀσεβεστάτην ἐμφάσιν καὶ πάσας περιείληφε τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικίας καὶ παρανομίας. Ἀριστομαχος δ′ εἰ τὰς δεινοτάτας ὑπέμεινε τιμωρίας, ὡς οὕτως φησιν, ὡμως οὐχ ἵκανην ἐδωκεν δίκην μιᾶς ἡμέρας, ἐν ἡ παρεισπεσόντος εἰς τὴν πόλιν Ἀράτου μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, καὶ μεγάλους ἀγώνας καὶ κινδύνους ὑπομείναντος ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀργείων ἔλευθερίας, τέλος δ᾽ ἐκπεσόντος διὰ τὸ μηδένα συγκινήθηκαί τῶν ἐσωθεν αὐτῶ ταξα-9 μένων, διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ τυράννου φόβου, Ἀριστομαχος, ἀφορμῇ ταύτη καὶ προφάσει ἐχρησάμενος, ὡς τῶν συνειδότων τὰ περὶ τὴν ἔσοδον τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ὁγοδηκοντα τοὺς πρῶτους τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἀδικήσαντας στρεβλώσας ἐναντίον τῶν ἀναγκαῖων κατ-10 ἐσφαξε. παρίμητα τὰ παρ᾽ ὅλον τὸν βίον αὐτοῦ καὶ
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author gives us a made-up story of his cries when on the rack having reached the ears of the neighbours, some of whom, horrified at the crime, others scarcely crediting their senses and others in hot indignation ran to the house. About Phylarchus’ vice of sensationalism I need say no more, for I have given sufficient evidence of it; but as for Aristomachus, even if he had been guilty of no other offence to the Achaeans, I consider that the general tenor of his life and his lawless violence at Argos rendered him worthy of the most severe punishment. Our author, it is true, with the view of magnifying his importance and moving his readers to share his own indignation at his fate, tells us that he “not only had been a tyrant himself but was descended from tyrants.” It would be difficult for anyone to bring a graver or more bitter accusation against a man. Why! the very word “tyrant” alone conveys to us the height of impiety and comprises in itself the sum of all human defiance of law and justice. Aristomachus, if it is true that he was subjected to the most terrible punishment, as Phylarchus tells us, did not get his full deserts for the doings of one day; I mean the day on which when Aratus with the Achaeans had gained entrance to the town and fought hard to free the Argives at great risk, but was finally driven out, because none of those inside the city who had agreed to join him ventured to stir owing to their fear of the tyrant, Aristomachus, availing himself of the pretext that certain persons were cognisant of the entrance of the Achaeans, put to death eighty of the leading citizens who were quite innocent, after torturing them before the eyes of their relatives. I say nothing of the crimes that he and his ancestor were

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60 τῶν προγόνων ἀσεβήματα· μακρὸν γὰρ. διόσπερος οὖκ εἰ τυι τῶν ὁμοίων περιέπεσε δεινὸν ἴητέον, πολὺ δὲ δεινότερον, εἰ μὴ δεινὸς τούτων πείραν λαβὼν
2 ἀθώος ἀπέθανεν. οὖδ' Ἀντιγόνος προσαπτέον οὖδ'
Ἀράτῳ παρανομίαν, ὅτι λαβόντες κατὰ πόλεμον
ὑποχείριον τὐραννον στρεβλώσαντες ἀπέκτειναν, οὐν
γε καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν εἰρήνην τοὺς ἀνελοῦσι καὶ
tιμωρησαμένους ἔπαινος καὶ τιμὴ συνεξηκολούθει
3 παρὰ τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις. οτε δὲ χωρὶς τῶν
προειρημένων καὶ τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς παρεπόνδησε, τί
4 παθεῖν ἦν ἄξιος; ἔκεινοι γὰρ ἀπέθετο μὲν τὴν
τυραννίδα χρόνοις οὐ πολλοὶς πρότερον, ὑπὸ τῶν καὶ
ρῶν συγκλειόμενοι διὰ τὸν Δημητρίου θάνατον,
ἀνεπίστως δὲ τῆς ἀσφαλείας ἔτυχε περισταλεῖς ὑπὸ
5 τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πράοτητος καὶ καλοκαγαθίας· οἰ-
tunes οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν τῶν ἐκ τῆς τυραννίδος ἀσε-
βημάτων ἄξιμοιν ἐποίησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσλαβόντες
eἰς τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μεγίστην τιμὴν περεδέσωσαν,
ηγεμόνα καὶ στρατηγὸν καταστήσαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν.
6 ὅ δ' ἐπιλαθόμενος τῶν προειρημένων φιλανθρώπων
παρὰ πόδας, ἐπεὶ μικρὸν ἐπικυνδεστέρας ἔσχε τὰς
ἐλπίδας ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐν Κλεομένει, τὴν τε
πατρίδα καὶ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν ἀποστάσας ἀπὸ
τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαστάτοις καιροῖς προσ-
7 ἐνεμε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. ὅτι ὑποχείριον γενόμενον οὐκ
ἐν Κεγχρεαῖς ἔδει τὴν νῦκτα στρεβλούμενον ἀπο-
θανεῖν, ὡς Φύλαρχος φησί, περιαγόμενον δ' εἰς τὴν
Πελοπόννησον καὶ μετὰ τιμωρίας παραδειγματιζό-
8 μενον οὔτως ἐκλιπεῖν τὸ ζῆν. ἀλλ' ὀμος τουοῦτος
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guilty of all through their lives: it would be too long a story. 60. We must not therefore think it shocking if he met with treatment similar to what he had inflicted: it would have been much more so had he died in peace, without experiencing any such. Nor should we charge Antigonus and Aratus with criminal conduct, if having captured him in war they had tortured and put to death a tyrant, any man who killed and punished whom even in time of peace would have been applauded and honoured by all right-thinking people. When I add that in addition to all his other offences he broke his faith with the Achaean, what fate shall we say was too bad for him? Not many years previously he had laid down his tyranny, finding himself in an embarrassed position owing to the death of Demetrius, and quite contrary to his expectation suffered no harm, being protected by the Achaean, who showed themselves most lenient and generous; for not only did they inflict no punishment on him for the crimes he had committed during his tyranny, but receiving him into their League they invested him with the highest dignity, making him their Strategus and Commander-in-chief. But instantly dismissing from his mind all these benefits, the moment it seemed to him that his prospects would be somewhat more brilliant if he sided with Cleomenes, he broke away from the Achaean, transferring from them to the enemy at a most critical time his personal support and that of his country. Surely when they got him into their hands, he should not have been racked to death at night in Cenchreae, as Phylarchus says, but should have been led round the whole Peloponnesus and tortured as a spectacle for the public until dead.
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δὲν οὔδενὸς ἐτυχεὶ δεινοῦ πλῆν τοῦ καταποντισθῆναι διὰ τῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς Κεγχρεαῖς τεταγμένων.

61 Χωρίς τε τούτων τὰς μὲν Μαντινέων ἡμῶν συμφορὰς μετ’ αὐξήσεως καὶ διαθέσεως ἐξηγήσατο, δὴλον ὦτι καθήκειν ὑπολαμβάνων τοῖς συγγραφεῦσι 2 τὰς παρανόμους τῶν πράξεων ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ Μεγαλοπολίτῶν γενναιότητος, ἤ περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἑχρῆσαντο καιροῦς, οὐδὲ κατὰ ποσὸν ἐποιή- 3 σατο μνήμην, ὡσπερ τὸ τὰς ἀμαρτίας ἐξαρθμεῖσθαι τῶν πραξάντων οἰκεῖοτερον ὑπάρχον τῆς ἱστορίας τοῦ τὰ καλὰ καὶ δίκαια τῶν ἐργῶν ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, ἢ τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι ήττόν τι διορθομένους ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ ξηλώσων ἐργῶν ἤπερ ὑπὸ τῶν παρανόμων καὶ φευκτῶν πρά- 4 ἔσεων. ὦ δὲ πῶς μὲν ἠλαβὲ Κλεομένης τὴν πόλιν καὶ πῶς ἀκέραιον διαφυλάξας ἐξαπέστειλε παρα- χρῆμα πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην γραμματοφόρους, ἄξιῶν αὐτοὺς ἀβλαβῆς κομισμα- μένους τὴν έαυτῶν πατρίδα κοινωνήσαι τῶν ἱδίων πραγμάτων, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἐδήλωσε, βουλόμενος ὑποδείξαι τὴν Κλεομένους μεγαλοπυχίαν καὶ μετριό- 5 τητα πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους. ἔτι δὲ πῶς οἱ Μεγαλο- πολίται τῆς ἐπιστολῆς ἀναγνωσκομένης οὐκ ἐά- σαιεν εἰς τέλος ἀναγνωσθῆναι, μικρὸν δὲ καταλεύ- σαιεν τοὺς γραμματοφόρους, ἦσος τοῦτο διεσφήσε. 6 τὸ δ’ ἀκόλουθον καὶ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας ἱδίων ἀφείλε, τὸν ἔπαινον καὶ τὴν ἐπ’ ἀγαθῶν μνήμην τῶν ἁξιο- 7 λόγων προαιρέσεων. καίτοι γ’ ἐμποδίων ἤν. εἰ γὰρ τοὺς λόγους καὶ δόγματι μόνον ὑπομείνατας πόλεμον ὑπὲρ φιλῶν καὶ συμμάχων ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς νομί- ξομεν, τοῖς δὲ καὶ χώρας καταφθορὰν καὶ πολιορ- κίαις ἀναδεξαμένοις οὐ μόνον ἔπαινον, ἀλλὰ καὶ 390
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Yet notwithstanding his abominable character, all the harm he suffered was to be drowned in the sea by the officers in command at Cenchreae.

61. To take another instance, Phylarchus, while narrating with exaggeration and elaboration the calamities of the Mantineans, evidently deeming it a historian's duty to lay stress on criminal acts, does not even make mention of the noble conduct of the Megalopolitans at nearly the same date, as if it were rather the proper function of history to chronicle the commission of sins than to call attention to right and honourable actions, or as if it were less improving to read of that good conduct which we should emulate than of that criminal conduct which we should shun. He tells us how Cleomenes took the city, and before doing any damage to it, sent at once a post to the Megalopolitans at Messene offering to hand it back to them uninjured on condition of their throwing in their lot with him. So much he lets us know, wishing to show the magnanimity of Cleomenes and his moderation to his enemies, and he goes on to tell how when the letter was being read out they would not allow the reader to continue until the end, and how they came very near stoning the letter-bearers. So far he makes everything quite clear to us, but he deprives us of what should follow and what is the special virtue of history, I mean praise and honourable mention of conduct noteworthy for its excellence. And yet this was obviously demanded here. For if we consider those men to be good who by speeches and resolutions only expose themselves to war for the sake of their friends and allies, and if we bestow not only praise but lavish thanks and
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8 χάριτας καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς μεγίστας ἀπονέμομεν, τίνα
gε χρὴ περὶ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν ἔχειν διάληψιν; ἀρ'
9 οὐχὶ τὴν σεμνοτάτην καὶ βελτίστην; οἱ πρῶτον μὲν
tὴν χώραν Κλεομένιει προείνοι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν
ὅλοσχερῶς ἔπταυσαν τῇ πατρίδι διὰ τὴν πρὸς
tοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς αἴρεσιν, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον, δοθεὶσας
ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίας ἀβλαβῆ
ταύτην ἀπολαβεῖν, προείλαντο στέρεσθαι χώρας,
tάφων, ιερῶν, παρίδος, τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἀπάντων
συλλήβδην τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀναγκαστάτων,
χάριν τοῦ μὴ προδοῦναι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους
πίστιν. οὐ τί κάλλιον ἔργον ἢ γέγονεν ἢ γένοιτ' ἂν;
ἐπὶ τί δ' ἂν μᾶλλον συγγραφεὺς ἐπιστήσαι τοὺς
ἀκούοντας; διὰ τίνος δ' ἔργον μᾶλλον ἂν παρορμήσαι
πρὸς φυλακὴν πίστεως καὶ πρὸς ἀληθινῶν
πραγμάτων καὶ βεβαιῶν κοινωνίας; ὃν ουδεμίαν
12 ἐποιήσατο μνήμην Φύλαρχος, τυφλῶττων, ὦς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, περὶ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστα συγγραφεῖ καθήκοντα τῶν ἔργων.

62 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τούτοις ἐξῆς φησιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ
tῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως λαφύρων ἐξακισχίλια τάλαντα
toῖς Λακεδαιμονίους πεσεῖν, ὅταν δισχίλια Κλεο-
2 μένει δοθήμητα κατὰ τοὺς ἐθισμούς. ἐν δὲ τούτοις
πρῶτον μὲν τίς οὐκ ἂνθαμάσῃ τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ
tὴν ἄγνοιαν τῆς κοινῆς ἐννοίας ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἐλ-
ληνικῶν πραγμάτων χρηγής καὶ δυνάμεως; ἡ μά-
3 λίστα δεῖ παρὰ τοὺς ἱστοριογράφους ὑπάρχειν. ἐγὼ
gάρ οὐ λέγω κατ’ ἐκεῖνος τοὺς χρόνους, ἐν οἷς
ὑπὸ ταῖς ἐν Μακεδονία βασιλέως, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον
ὑπὸ τῆς συνεχείας τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολέμων ἄρ-
4 δὴν κατέθαρτο τὰ Πελοποννησίων, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς
καθ' ἡμᾶς καιροῖς, ἐν οἷς πάντες ἐν καὶ ταῦτο λέ-
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gifts on those who have suffered their country to be laid waste and their city besieged, what should we feel for the Megalopolitan? Surely the deepest reverence and the highest regard. In the first place they left their lands at the mercy of Cleomenes, next they utterly lost their city owing to their support of the Achaeans, and finally, when quite unexpectedly it was put in their power to get it back undamaged, they preferred to lose their land, their tombs, their temples, their homes, and their possessions, all in fact that is dearest to men, rather than break faith with their allies. What more noble conduct has there ever been or could there be? To what could an author with more advantage call the attention of his readers, and how could he better stimulate them to loyalty to their engagements and to true and faithful comradeship? But Phylarchus, blind, as it seems to me, to the most noble actions and those most worthy of an author’s attention, has not said a single word on the subject.

62. Further he tells us that from the booty of Megalopolis six thousand talents fell to the Lacedaemonians, of which two thousand were given to Cleomenes according to usage. Now in this statement one marvels first at his lack of practical experience and of that general notion of the wealth and power of Greece so essential to a historian. For, not speaking of those times, when the Peloponnese had been utterly ruined by the Macedonian kings and still more by continued intestinal wars, but in our own times, when all are in complete
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gontes megíosthēn karpoúsathai dokouánv euðamouías, ómws ék Peloponnehoun pásthēs éz autánw táw épi-
plwv xwrís swmatówv oux oíon te sunaxhēnai to-
5 sóuto pléthos chrēmatówv. kai diótì touto nív ouk
eikê, lýpw dé tini mállon apofainómēba, dhloun ék
6 toutwn. tis gár úpér 'Athenaiów oux ístórhoke di-
7 óti kath' oux kairophs metà Thēbais eis tôn prós
Lakedaimoníous énévainon plólemov, kai múrivos mé
7 ëxépemvōn stratiwótas, ekatóvn ð' épilhrōn trýh-
8 reis, óti tóte krýntantès apó tês 'áξias poieúthai
tás eis tôn plólemov eisforás ëtemhásantò tìn te
9 xwran tôn 'Attikhîn àpasaun kai tás oikías, òmowís
dè kai tìn loupíhn ouðíavn. ìlì òmws tò sómpavan
8 tîmhma tês 'áξias ènêlup twv ëxakwvlyîwv diáko-
8 sóiws kai pëntikónta talántovs. éz ìn ouk ãpeoi-
kós ãn faneì th perì Peloponnehíovn ãrti rhrðèn
9 úp' ñmov. kata ð' ekéinovs toux kairoúv ëz autîh
9 òs Megálhîs plólews úpperbolîkôs apofainómenvos
10 ouk ãn tis eisêtv toûlhméthi plêiv geonôthi trav-
11 kosoíwn, ëpeidhîper òmowgoumévnoî ëstì diótî kai
12 twv eleusitówv kai twv doûlikwv swmatówv tâ plês-
13 sta suvèbhi diafugvèi eis tìn Mêsosîhnh. mégoaston
14 ðè twv prôeëtrmphenwv tekhrívon. ouðînovs gam'
utés deútérou twv 'Arokâdovn Mantineîs ouste kató
15 tìn ðíwamín ouste kató tìn periusiánh, òs autôs
16 oútos ðhêsw, ék poloukías ðè kai parándôsews álón-
utês, ñoste múîte diafugwèi múðéna múîte diaklath-
17 nai bâðísws múðéna, òmws tò ðan láfuron èpôihsan
18 metâ twv swmatówv kató toux autous kairophs
tâlantâ triakósiâ.

63 To ðè suvexhez toutw tis ouk ãn ëti mállon
19 thamáseie; tauta gár apofainômenos légei prô tîs
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unison and enjoy, it is thought, very great prosperity, I assert that a sale of all the goods and chattels, apart from slaves, in the whole Peloponnese would not bring in such a sum. That I do not make this assertion lightly but after due estimate will be evident from the following consideration. Who has not read that when the Athenians, in conjunction with the Thebans, entered on the war against Sparta, sending out a force of ten thousand men and manning a hundred triremes, they decided to meet the war expenses by a property-tax and made a valuation for this purpose of the whole of Attica including the houses and other property. This estimate, however, fell short of 6000 talents by 250, from which it would seem that my assertion about the Peloponnese at the present day is not far wide of the mark. But as regards the times of which we are dealing, no one, even if he were exaggerating, would venture to say that more than three hundred talents could be got out of Megalopolis, since it is an acknowledged fact that most of the free population and the slaves had escaped to Messene. But the best proof of what I say is the following: Mantinea, both in wealth and power, was second to no city in Arcadia, as Phylarchus himself says, and it surrendered after a siege, so that it was not easy for anyone to escape or for anything to be stolen, but yet the value of the whole booty together with slaves amounted at this very period to but three hundred talents.

63. What he tells us next is still more astounding; for after this assertion about the booty, he
ΤΑ ΟΒΕΙΟΥ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ

παρατάξεως δέχ' ἡμέρας μάλιστα τὸν παρὰ Πτολεμαίου προσβετὴν ἐλθεῖν ἀγγέλλοντα πρὸς τὸν Κλεομένη διότι Πτολεμαῖος τὸ μὲν χρηγεῖσι ἀπολέγει, διαλύσθαι δὲ παρακαλεῖ πρὸς τὸν 'Αντί-2 γονον. τὸν δ' ἀκούσαντα φησὶ κρῖναι διότι δεὶ τὴν ταχύτητα ἐκκυβεύειν τοῖς ὁλοί πρὸ τοῦ συνείναι τὰ προσπεπτωκότα τὰς δυνάμεις, διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις πράγμασιν ἐλπίδα τοῦ δύνα-3 σθαι μισθοδοτεῖν. ᾀλλ' εἴπερ ἐξαικυσιλών ἐγκρατής ἐγεγονεὶ ταλάντων κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς, τὸν Πτολεμαίον αὐτὸν ἤδυνατο ταῖς χρηγίαις ὑπερ-4 θέσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τὸν 'Αντίγονον, εἰ μόνον τριακο-σίων ὑπῆρχε κύριος, καὶ λίαν ἴκανος ἦν ἀσφαλῶς
5 ὑπομένων τρίβειν τὸν πόλεμον. τὸ δ' ἀμα μὲν πάσας ἀποφαίνει τῷ Κλεομένει τὰς ἐλπίδας ἐν Πτολεμαίῳ διὰ τὰς χρηγίας, ἀμα δὲ τοσοῦτων χρημάτων αὐτὸν φάναι κύριον γεγονον κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς, πῶς οὐ τῆς μεγίστης ἀλογίας, ἐτι
6 δ' ἀσκείλας ἐστὶ σημεῖον; πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἐτέρα τῷ συγγραφεῖ τοιαῦτα, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὑποκειμένους καιροὺς καὶ παρ' ὅλην τὴν πραγματείαν κατα-τέτακται, ἐρι ὀν ἀρκεῖν ὑπολαμβάνω κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα.

64 Μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως ἄλωσιν 'Αντι-γόνον παραχεμάζοντος ἐν τῇ τῶν 'Αργείων πόλει, συναγαγὼν Κλεομένης ἀμα τῷ τὴν ἑαυτὴν ὅραν ἐνίστασθαι καὶ παρακλήσας τὰ πρέποντα τοῖς και-ροῖς, ἐξαγαγὼν τὴν στρατιὰν ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τήν τῶν
2 'Αργείων χώραν, ὡς μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐδόκει, παρα-βόλως καὶ τολμηρῶς διὰ τὴν ὀχυρωτητά τῶν κατὰ τὰς εἰσόδους τόπων, ὡς δὲ τοῖς ὀφθας 'λογιζομένοις, 3 ἀσφαλῶς καὶ νουνεχώς. ὅρων γὰρ τὸν 'Αντίγονον
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states that just ten days before the battle an envoy from Ptolemy reached Cleomenes informing him that that king withdrew his subvention and requested him to come to terms with Antigonus. He says that Cleomenes on hearing this resolved to stake his all on a battle before it reached the ears of his troops, as he had no hope of being able to meet their pay from his own resources. But if at this very time he had six thousand talents at his command, he could have been more generous than Ptolemy himself in the matter of subventions; and if he could only dispose of three hundred talents it was enough to enable him to continue the war against Antigonus with absolute financial security. But to state in one breath that Cleomenes depended entirely on Ptolemy for money and that at the very same time he was in possession of such a large sum, is a sign of the greatest levity and want of reflection. Phylarchus has made many similar statements not only about this period but all through his work. I think, however, that what I have said at such length as the plan of this history allows should suffice.

64. After the capture of Megalopolis, while 222 B.C. Antigonus was still in winter quarters at Argos, Cleomenes at the beginning of spring collected his troops, and after addressing them in terms suitable to the occasion, led them out and invaded Argolis. Most people think that this was rash and hazardous on his part, owing to the strength of the frontier, but if we judge rightly it was really a safe and wise course. For as he saw that Antigonus had dis-
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diafeikóta tás dynámēis, ἦδει σαφῶς ὡς πρῶτον μὲν τὴν εἰσβολὴν ἀκινδύνως ποιήσεται, δεύτερον ἔτι τῆς χώρας καταφθειρομένης ἔως τῶν τειχῶν ἀνάγκη τοὺς Ἀργείους θεωροῦντας τὸ γινόμενον ἀσχάλλεων 4 καὶ καταμέμβρεθαι τὸν Ἀντίγονον. εἰ μὲν οὖν συμβαίνῃ μὴ δυνάμενον αὐτὸν ὑποφέρειν τὸν ἐπιρραπησμὸν τῶν ὦχλων ἔξελθείν καὶ διακινδυνεύσαι τοῖς παροῦσι, πρόσθηλον ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἦν αὐτῷ 5 διότι νικήσει βαδίως. εἰ δ' ἐμείναις τοῖς λογισμοῖς ἀφησώκαζοι, καταπληξίας ὑπεναντίους καὶ ταῖς ἰδίαις δυνάμεις θάρσος ἐνεργασάμενοι ἀσφαλῶς ὑπελαβεῖς ποιήσοσαθι τὴν ἀναχώρησιν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν. 6 ὦ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. τῆς γὰρ χώρας δημομένης οἱ μὲν ὦχλοι συστρεφόμενοι τοῖς Ἀντίγονον ἐλοιδοροῦν. ὦ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἤγεμον ὑπὸ καταστροφῆς πολείονος ποιούμενος τοῦ κατὰ λόγον 7 ἐκ Χρήσασθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν ἄνεγε τῇ ἡ συχναίν. ὦ δὲ Κλεομένης κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν καταφθείρας μὲν τὴν χώραν, καταπληξίας δὲ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, εὐθαρσεῖς δὲ πεποιηκάς τὰς ἐαυτοῦ δυνάμεις πρὸς τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον κίνδυνον, ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐπανήλθε.

65 Τοὺς δὲ θέρους ἐνισταμένου καὶ συνελθόντων τῶν Μακεδόνων καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐκ τῆς χειμασίας ἀναλαβὼν τὴν στρατιὰν Ἀντίγονος προῆγε μετὰ τῶν 2 χιλιῶν εἰς τὴν Δακωνικήν, ἔχον Μακεδόνας μὲν τοὺς εἰς τὴν φάλαγγα μυρίους, πελταστάς δὲ τρισχιλίους, ἐπιτείς δὲ τριακοσίους, Ἀγριάνας δὲ σὺν τοὺς χιλίους καὶ Γαλάτας ἄλλους τοσοῦτοις, μεθοφόρους δὲ τοὺς πάντας πεζοὺς μὲν τρισχιλίους, 3 ἐπιτείς δὲ τριακοσίους, Ἀχαϊῶν δὲ ἐπιλεκτος πεζοὺς μὲν τρισχιλίους, ἐπιτείς δὲ τριακοσίους, καὶ Μεγαλο- 398
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missed his forces, he knew well that, in the first place, he would be exposed to no danger in invading, and secondly, that, if the country were laid waste up to the walls, the Argives on seeing it would certainly be much vexed and lay the blame on Antigonus. If, therefore, unable to support the reproaches of the people, he marched out and risked a battle with such forces as he had, the probabilities were in favour of Cleomenes gaining an easy victory; but if, adhering to his plan, he remained quiet, he thought he could, after terrifying his enemies and inspiring his own troops with fresh courage, effect a safe retreat to Laconia, as actually happened. For, when the country was being laid waste, the populace held meetings in which they heaped abuse on Antigonus; but he, like a true general and prince, paid no attention to anything but a wise conduct of affairs, and remained quiet, while Cleomenes, having carried out his intention of devastating the country and thus striking terror into the enemy and encouraging his own troops to face the coming danger, retired in safety to his own country.

65. Early in summer, on the Macedonians and Achaeans rejoining from their winter quarters, Antigonus advanced with his own army and the allies into Laconia. His Macedonian forces consisted of ten thousand to form the phalanx, three thousand peltasts, and three hundred horse. He had besides a thousand Agrianians, and a thousand Gauls, while his mercenary force numbered three thousand foot and three hundred horse. The Achaeans furnished three thousand picked infantry and three hundred horse. There were also a
polítas χιλίους εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον καὶ
ωπλισμένους, ὥς ἤγειτο Κερκιδᾶς Μεγαλοπολίτης
4 τῶν δὲ συμμάχων Βοωτῶν μὲν πεζοῦς δισχιλίοι
ιππεῖς δὲ διακόσιοι, Ὡπειρωτῶν πεζοὺς χιλιοῦ
ιππεῖς πεντήκοντα, Ἀκαρνάνων ἄλλους τοσούτου
Ἰλλυρίων χιλίους ἕξακοσίους, ἐφ’ ὧν ἦν Δημήτριος
5 ὁ Φάριος, ὥστε εἶναι πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν πεζοῦ
μὲν εἰς δισμυρίους ὄκτακοσιχιλίους, ἵππεις δὲ χιλιοῦ
6 καὶ διακόσιους. ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης, προσδιοκῶν τῇ
ἐφοδίω, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας τὰς εἰς τὴν χώραν εἰσβολή
ἡσφαλίσατο φυλακαίσι καὶ τάφρους καὶ δενδρών ἐκ
7 κοπαίς, αὐτὸς δὲ κατὰ τὴν Σελλασίαν καλουμένη
μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐστρατοπέδευε, τῆς πάσης ὑπάρ
χούσης αὐτῶς στρατιάς εἰς δύο μυριάδας, στοχαζό
μενός ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ταύτη ποιήσασθαι τοὺς
8 ὑπεναντίους τὴν εἰσβολήν· δὲ καὶ συνεκύρησε. δύο
δὲ λόφων ἐπὶ αὐτῆς τῆς εἰσόδου κειμένων, ὥς τοὺς
μὲν Εὔαν, τὸν δ’ ἐπέρον ὁ Ολυμπὸς καλεῖσθαι συμ-
9 βαίνει, τῆς δ’ ὁδοῦ μεταξὺ τούτων παρὰ τὸν
Οἰνούντα ποταμὸν φερούσης εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην, ὃ
μὲν Κλεομένης, τῶν προειρημένων λόφων συνάμφω
τάφρον καὶ χάρακα προβαλόμενον, ἐπὶ μὲν τὸν Εὔαν
έταξε τοὺς περιοίκους καὶ συμμάχους, ἐφ’ ὧν ἐπέ-
στησε τὸν ἀδελφὸν Εὐκλείδαν, αὐτὸς δὲ τὸν ὁλυμ-
πον κατείχε μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν μισθο-
10 φόρων. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν
ἐφ’ ἐκάτερα τῆς ὁδοῦ τοὺς ἱππεῖς μὲτα μέρους
11 τῶν μισθοφόρων παρενέβαλεν. Ἀντίγονος δὲ
παραγενόμενος καὶ συνθεωρήσας τὴν τε τῶν τόπων
ὀχυρότητα καὶ τὸν Κλεομένην πᾶσι τοῖς οἰκείοις με-
ρεσι τῆς δυνάμεως οὖτως εὐστόχως προκατεληφότα
τὰς εὐκαιρίας ὥστε παραπλήσιον εἶναι τὸ σύμπαν
400
thousand Megalopolitans armed in the Macedonian manner under the command of Cercidas of Megalopolis. The allies consisted of two thousand Boeotian foot and two hundred horse, a thousand Epirot foot and fifty horse, the same number of Acarnanians, and one thousand six hundred Illyrians under the command of Demetrius of Pharos. His total force thus amounted to twenty-eight thousand foot and one thousand two hundred horse. Cleomenes, who expected the invasion, had occupied the other passes into Laconia, placing garrisons in them and fortifying them by means of trenches and barricades of trees, and himself encamped at a place called Sellasia, with a force of twenty thousand men, as he conjectured that the invaders would most likely take this route, as in fact they did. At the actual pass there are two hills, one called Euas and the other Olympus, the road to Sparta running between these along the bank of the river Oenous. Cleomenes, having fortified both of these hills with a trench and palisade, posted on Euas the perioeci and allies under the command of his brother Eucleides, while he himself held Olympus with the Spartans and mercenaries. On the low ground beside the river on each side of the road he drew up his cavalry and a certain portion of the mercenaries. Antigonus on his arrival observed the great natural strength of the position and how Cleomenes had so cleverly occupied the advantageous points with the portions of his force suitable in each case, that his
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σχήμα τῆς στρατοπεδείας τῆς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὀπλο-
12 μάχων προβολῆς. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπέλειπτε τῶν πρὸς ēπίδεισιν ἄμα καὶ φυλακῆς, ἀλλ’ ἦν ὁμοῦ παράταξις
66 ἑνεργὸς καὶ παρεμβολή δυσπρόσδος. διὸ καὶ τὸ
μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου καταπείραζεν καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι
προχείρως ἀπέγνω, στρατοπεδεύσας δ’ ἐν βραχεῖ
διαστήματι, καὶ λαβὼν πρόβλημα τὸν Γοργύλου
καλούμενον ποταμόν, τινὰς μὲν ἡμέρας ἐπιμένων
συνεθεώρει τὰς τε τῶν τόπων ἴδιότητας καὶ τὰς
2 τῶν δυνάμεων διαφοράς, ἀμα δὲ καὶ προδεικνύων
τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἐξεκαλεῖτο τὰς τῶν
3 ὑπεναντίων ἐπινοίας. οὐ δυνάμενος δὲ λαβεῖν οὐ-
dὲν ἀργὸν οὖθ’ ἐξοπλοῦν διὰ τὸ πρὸς πᾶν ἐτοίμως
4 ἀντικειμέναι τῷ Κλεομένῃ, τῆς μὲν τουαύτης ἐπι-
nοίας ἀπέστη, τέλος δ’ ἐξ ὀμολόγου διὰ μάχης ἀμ-
φότεροι προέθεντο κρίνεις τὰς πράξεις. πάνυ γὰρ
εὐφυεῖς καὶ παραπλησίους ἡγεμόνας ἡ τυχὴ συν-
5 ἐβαλε τούτων τοὺς ἄνδρας. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς
cατὰ τὸν Εὐαὶ βασιλεὺς ἀντέταξε τῶν τε Μακε-
dόνων τοὺς χαλκάσσιδας καὶ τοὺς Ἰλυριοὺς, κατὰ
σπείρας ἐναλλὰξ τεταγμένας, Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν
6 Ἀκμήτου καὶ Δημήτριον τὸν Φάριον ἐπιστῆσας. ἐπὶ
dὲ τούτων τοὺς Ἀκαρνάννας καὶ Κρήτας ἐπέβαλε
tούτων δὲ κατόπιν ἦσαν διυχίλιοι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν,
7 ἐφεδρίας λαμβάνοντες τάξιν. τοὺς δ’ ἐπεῖς περὶ
tὸν Ὀίνοντα ποταμὸν ἀντέθηκε τῷ τῶν πολεμίων
ἱππικῷ, συστήσας αὐτοῖς Ἀλέξανδρον ἡγεμόνα καὶ
συμπαραθεῖς πεζοῦς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν χιλίων καὶ Με-
8 γαλοπόλετα τοὺς ἰσους. αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς μισθοφό-
ρους ἐχῶν καὶ τοὺς Μακεδόνας κατὰ τὸν Ὀλυμποῦν
πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Κλεομένη διέγνω ποιεῖσθαι τὴν
9 μάχην. προτάξας οὖν τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἐπέστησε
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whole formation resembled the attitude of a good heavy-armed fighter ready for combat. For attack and defence alike nothing was wanting, the position being at one and the same time a fortified camp difficult to approach and a line of battle ready for action. Antigonus therefore decided to make no hasty attempt to force the position and come to blows with the enemy, but encamped at a short distance with the river Gorgylus on his front, and for several days remained there noting the peculiar features of the country and the character of the forces, while at the same time, by threatening certain movements, he attempted to make the enemy show his hand. But being unable to find any weak or unprotected spot, since Cleomenes always checked him at once by a counter-movement, he abandoned this project, and finally the kings agreed to try issues in a battle: for they were very gifted and evenly-matched, these two generals whom Fortune had thus brought face to face. To confront those on Euas Antigonus drew up the brazen-shielded Macedonians and the Illyrians in alternate lines, placing them under the command of Alexander son of Acmetus, and Demetrius of Pharos. Behind these stood the Acarnanians and Cretans, and in the rear as a reserve were two thousand Achaeans. His cavalry he opposed to that of the enemy by the river Oenous under the command of Alexander and supported by a thousand Achaean and as many Megalopolitan infantry. He himself in person decided to attack Cleomenes on Olympus with the mercenaries and the rest of the Macedonians. Putting
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dιφαλαγγίαν ἐπάλληλον τῶν Μακεδόνων· ἔποιει δὲ
10 τούτο διὰ τὴν στενότητα τῶν τόπων. σύνθημα δὲ
ξυ τοῦ μὲν Ἰλλυριοίς τότε ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρχήν τῆς
πρὸς τὸν λόφον προσβολῆς, ὅταν ἓδωσιν ἅρθεὶσαι
ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν ’Ολυμπον τόπων σινδόνα· προσ-
ηρτημένοι γὰρ ἦσαν οὐτοί νυκτὸς ἐν τῷ Γοργύλῳ
ποταμῷ πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ τοῦ λόφου ρίζῃ· τοῖς δὲ
Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ τοῖς ἵππευσι παραπλησίως,
ἐπειδὰν φωικίς ἔξαρθῇ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως.

67 ’Επειδὴ δὲ ὁ μὲν καρπὸς ἦκε τῆς χρείας, τὸ δὲ
σύνθημα τοῖς Ἰλλυριοῖς ἀπεδόθη, παρήγγειλαν δὲ
ποιεῖν τὸ δέον οἶς ἐπιμελές, πάντες εὐθέως ἀνα-
δείξαντες αὐτοὺς κατήχοντο τῆς πρὸς τὸν βουνὸν
2 προσβολῆς. οἱ δὲ μετὰ τῶν Κλεομένους ἵππεων ἐξ
ἀρχῆς ταχέτερες εὐζωνοὶ, θεωροῦντες τὰς σπείρας
τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐρήμους ἐκ τῶν κατόπιν οὐσις, κατ’
οὐρὰν προσπέπτοντες εἰς ὀλοσχερὴ κίνδυνον ἤγον
3 τοὺς πρὸς τὸν λόφον βιαζομένους, ὡς ἂν τῶν μὲν
περὶ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου κατὰ πρόσωπον
αὐτοῖς ἐφεστῶτων, τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων κατόπιν ἐπι-
κειμένων καὶ προσφερόντων τὰς χείρας ἔρρωμένως.
4 ἐν όι καιρῷ συννόησα τὸ γνώμενον, ἀμα δὲ προ-
ορώμενος τὸ μέλλον, Φιλοποίημεν ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑποδεικνύειν ἐπεβάλλετο τοῖς προ-
5 εστῶσι τὸ συμβησμένον· οὐδὲνος δὲ προσέχοντος
αὐτῷ διὰ τὸ μῆτ’ ἐφ’ ἡγεμονίας τετάχθαι μηδεπῶ-
ποτε κομιδῆ τε νέον υπάρχειν αὐτόν, παρακαλέσας
tους ἐαυτοῦ πολίτας ἐνέβαλε τοῖς πολεμίοις τολμῆ-
6 ρῶς. οὐ γενομένου ταχέως οἱ προσκείμενοι μισθο-
φόροι κατ’ οὐρὰν τοῖς προσβαίνουσιν, ἀκούσαντες
tῆς κραυγῆς καὶ συνιδόντες τήν τῶν ἱππέων συμπλο-
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the mercenaries in front, he drew up the Macedonians behind them in two phalanxes with no interval between, the narrowness of the space rendering this necessary. It was arranged that the Illyrians were to begin their assault on the hill upon seeing a white flag waved from the neighbourhood of Olympus, for in the night they had succeeded in taking up a position close under the hill in the bed of the river Gorgylus. The signal for the Megalopolitans and cavalry was to be a red cloak waved by the king.

67. When the time to begin the action came, the signal was given to the Illyrians, and, the officers calling on their men to do their duty, they all instantly showed themselves and began the attack on the hill. The light-armed mercenaries, who had been posted near Cleomenes’ cavalry, upon seeing that the rear of the Achaean line was exposed, attacked them from behind, and the whole force that was pressing on to the hill was thus threatened with a serious disaster, as Eucleides’ troops were facing them from above while the mercenaries were vigorously attacking their rear. At this critical moment Philopoemen of Megalopolis, who saw what was happening and foresaw what was likely to happen, first attempted to call the attention of the commanding officers to it, but as no one paid any attention to him, since he had never held any command and was quite a young man, he called on his own fellow-citizens to follow him and boldly fell upon the enemy. Upon this the mercenaries who were attacking the assailants of the hill in the rear, hearing the clamour and seeing the
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κήν, ἀφέμενοι τῶν προκειμένων ἀνέτρεξον εἰς τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς τάξεις καὶ προσεβοήθουν τοῖς παρ᾿ αὐτῶν ἐπιπεύσι. τούτου δὲ συμβάντος, ἀπερίστατον γενό-7 μενον τὸ τε τῶν Ἰλλυρίων καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ τῶν ἀμα τούτως προσβαίνοντων πλήθος ἐκθύμως ὠρ-8 μησε καὶ τεθαρρηκότως ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. εἰς οὖ καὶ μετὰ ταύτα φανερὸν ἐγενήθη διότι τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν προτερήματος αὐτίος ἐγίνετο Φιλοποίμην.

68 οδεν καὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον φασὶ μετὰ ταύτα κατα-πειράζοντα πυθαίνεσθαι τοῦ ταχθέντος ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπ-πέων Ἀλεξάνδρου διὰ τί πρὸ τοῦ παραδόθητα τὸ 2 σύνθημα τοῦ κινδύνου κατάρξαι τοῦ δὲ ἀρνο-μένου, φάσκοντος δὲ μειράκιον τι Μεγαλοπολιτικόν προεχειρήσαι παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην, εἰπεὶ διότι τὸ μὲν μειράκιον ἔργον ἰγαθοῦ ποιῆσαι, συνθεωσάμενον τὸν καιρόν, ἔκεινος δὲ ἡγεμών ὑπ-ἀρχῶν μειράκιον τοῦ τυχόντος.

3 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾿ οἱ γε περὶ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν ὁρῶντες προσβαίνοντας τὰς σπείρας, ἀφέμενοι τοῦ χρῆθαι 4 ταῖς τῶν τόπων εὐκαιρίαις· τοῦτο δὲ ἦν ἐκ πολλοῦ συναντώντα καὶ προσπίπτοντας τόις πολεμίοις τὰ μὲν ἔκεινον στίφη συνταράττει καὶ διαλύειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ ὑποχωρεῖν ἐπὶ πόδα καὶ μεθίστασθαι πρὸς 5 τοὺς ὑπερδέξεσθαι ἀεὶ τόπους ἀσφαλῶς· οὔτω γὰρ ἂν προλυμηνάμενοι καὶ συγχέαντες τὸ τοῦ καθοπλασμοῦ καὶ τῆς συντάξεως ἰδίωμα τῶν ὑπεναντίων ῥαδίως 6 αὐτοὺς ἐτέρψαντο διὰ τὴν τῶν τόπων εὐφυίαν· τούτων μὲν οὔδὲν ἐποίησαν, καθάπερ δὲ ἐξ ἐτοίμου 7 σφίζει τῆς νίκης ὑπαρχούσης τουναντίον ἔπραξεν. κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς στάσιν ἔμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ὡς ἀνωτάτως σπεύδοντες λαβεῖν τοὺς ὑπ-εναντίους, εἰς τὸ τὴν φυγὴν ἐπὶ πολὺ καταφερῇ

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cavalry engaged, abandoned what they had in hand and running back to their original position came to the aid of their cavalry. The Illyrians and Macedonians and the rest of this attacking force were now disengaged, and threw themselves with great dash and courage on the enemy. Thus, as became evident afterwards, the success of the attack on Eucleides was due to Philopoemen. 68. Hence it is said that subsequently Antigonus asked Alexander, the commander of the cavalry, to tease him, why he had begun the battle before the signal was given. On Alexander denying this and saying that a stripling from Megalopolis had begun it contrary to his own judgement, the king said that this stripling had acted like a good general and Alexander himself, the general, like an ordinary stripling.

To continue our narrative, Eucleides' troops, on seeing the enemy's lines advancing, cast away the advantage the ground gave them. They should have charged the enemy while still at a distance, thus breaking his ranks and throwing them into disorder, and then retreating slowly, have returned in safety to the higher ground. Thus having in the first instance spoilt and broken up that peculiar serried formation of the enemy so well adapted to their special equipment, they would easily have put them to flight owing to their favourable position. Instead of doing this, they acted as if the victory were already in their hand and did exactly the opposite. They remained, that is, at the summit in their original position with the view of getting the enemy as high up the hill as possible so that their flight would be for a long distance down the steep and precipitous
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8 καὶ κρημνώδη γενέσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους. συνέβη δ’, ὅπερ εἰκὸς ἦν, τούναντίον. οὐ γὰρ ἀπολυπόντες αὐτοὶς ἁναχώρησιν, προσδεξάμενοι δ’ ἀκεραίους ἁμα καὶ συνεστώσας τὰς σπείρας, εἰς τοῦτο δυσχρηστίας ἦλθον ἅστε δι’ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ λόφου κορυφῆς δια-9 μάχεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς βιαζομένους. λοιπὸν ὅσον ἐκ ποδὸς ἐπισέθησαν τῷ βάρει τοῦ καθοπλισμοῦ καὶ τῆς συντάξεως, εὐθέως οἱ μὲν Ἰλλυροῖ τὴν κατά-στασιν ἐλάμβανον, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἑυκλείδαν τὴν ὑπὸ πόδα, διὰ τὸ μὴ καταλείπεσθαι τόπον εἰς ἁναχώρη-
10 σι καὶ μετάστασιν ἐαυτοῦς. έξ’ οὗ ταχέως συνέβη τραπέντας αὐτοὺς ὀλθριώ χρήσασθαι φυγῇ, κρη-
mνώδη καὶ δύσβατον ἐχόντων ἐπὶ πολὺ τὴν ἁνα-
χώρησιν τῶν τόπων.
69 Ἀμα δὲ τούτους ὁ περὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς συνετελεῖτο κίνδυνος, ἐκπρεπὴ ποιομένων τὴν χρείαν τῶν Ἀχαϊ-
kῶν ἱππέων ἀπάντων, μάλιστα δὲ Φιλοπούλεως,
διὰ τὸ περὶ τῆς αὐτῶν ἐλευθερίας συνεστάναι τὸν 2 ὀλον ἁγώνα. καθ’ δὲν καίρον τῷ προειρημένῳ συν-
έβη τὸν μὲν ἱππον πεσεῖν πληγέντα καιρίως, αὐτὸν
de πεζομαχοῦντα περιπεσεῖν τραύματι βιαίῳ δι’ ἁμ-
3 φοῖν τοῖν μηροῖν. οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς κατὰ τὸν Ὀλυμπο-
πον τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐποιοῦντο διὰ τῶν εὐξώνων καὶ
μισθοφόρων τὴν συμπλοκὴν, παρ’ ἐκατέροις σχεδὸν
4 ύπαρχόντων τούτων εἰς πεινακισχίλους. ὥν ποτὲ
mὲν κατὰ μέρη, ποτὲ δ’ ὀλοχερῶς συμπεπτόντων,
διαφέρουσαν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὴν ἐξ ἁμφοῖν
χρείαν, ὢμοι τῶν τε βασιλέων καὶ τῶν στρατοπέ-
5 δων ἐν συνόψει ποιομένων τὴν máχην. ἁμλλῶντο
de πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ κατ’ ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ τάγμα
6 ταῖς εὐψυχίαις. ὁ δὲ Κλεουμένης, ὅρων τοὺς μὲν
περὶ τὸν ἄδελφον πεφυγότας, τοὺς δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐπι-
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slope. As might have been expected, the result was just the reverse. They had left themselves no means of retreat and on being charged by the Macedonian cohorts which were still fresh and in good order, they were so hard put to it that they had to fight with the assailants for the possession of the extreme summit. From now onwards, wherever they were forced back by the weight of their adversaries' weapons and formation, the Illyrians at once occupied the place where they had stood, while each backward step they took was on to lower ground, since they had not left themselves any room for orderly retreat or change of formation. The consequence was that very soon they had to turn and take to a flight which proved disastrous, as, for a long distance, it was over difficult and precipitous ground.

69. At this same time the cavalry action was going on, all the Achaean horsemen, and especially Philopoemen, rendering most distinguished service, as the whole struggle was for their liberty. Philopoemen's horse fell mortally wounded, and he, fighting on foot, received a serious wound through both thighs. Meanwhile the two kings at Olympus opened the battle with their light-armed troops and mercenaries, of which each had about five thousand. These, now attacking each other in detachments and now along the whole line, exhibited the greatest gallantry on both sides, all the more so as they were fighting under the eyes of the kings and their armies. Man therefore vied with man and regiment with regiment in a display of courage. Cleomenes, seeing his brother's troops in flight and the cavalry on the
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πέδοις ἵππεῖς ὅσον οὕτω κλῖνοντας, καταπλαγῇς ὅν μὴ πανταχόθεν προσδέξηται τοὺς πολεμίους, ἦναγ-καζέτο διασπᾶν τὰ προτειχίσματα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν ἦξάγειν μετωπικῶς κατὰ μίαν πλευρὰν τῆς 7 στρατοπεδείας. ἀνακληθέντων δὲ τῶν παρ’ ἐκατέ-ροις εὐξώνων ἔκ τοῦ μεταξὺ τόπου διὰ τῆς σάλπιγ-γος, συναλαξασαί καὶ καταβαλόουσα τὰς σαρή- 8 σας συνέβαλλον αἱ φάλαγγες ἀλλήλαις. ἀγώνος δὲ γενομένου κραταῖα, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ πόδα ποιου-μένων τὴν ἀναχώρησιν καὶ πιεζομένων ἐπὶ πολύ τῶν Μακεδόνων ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν Λακώνων εὐψυχίας, ποτὲ δὲ τῶν Λακεδαίμονών ἐξωθουμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ βά- 9 ρους τῆς τῶν Μακεδόνων τάξεως, τέλος οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἄντιγονον συμφράζαντες τὰς σαρίσας, καὶ χρησά- μενοι τῷ τῆς ἐπαλλήλου φάλαγγος ἰδιώματι, βία προσπεσότες ἐξέσωσαν ἐκ τῶν ὄχυρωμάτων τοὺς 10 Λακεδαιμονίους. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἄλλο πλῆθος ἐφευγε προτροπάδην φονεύομενον, ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης ἵππεῖς τυνας ἤχων περί ἐαυτὸν ἀπεχώρησε μετὰ τούτων 11 ἄσφαλῶς εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην. ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς νυκτός καταβᾶς εἰς Γύθιον, ἦτοιμωμένων αὐτῶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν πλοῦν ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου πρὸς τὸ συμ-βαίνον, ἀπήρε μετὰ τῶν φίλων εἰς Ἀλεξάνδρειαν. 70 Ἄντιγονος δ’ ἐγκρατὴς γενόμενος ἐξ ἐφόδου τῆς Σπάρτης, τὰ τε λοιπὰ μεγαλοψύχως καὶ φιλανθρω- πως ἐχρήσατο τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, τὸ τε πολίτευμα τὸ πάτριον αὐτοῖς ἀποκαταστήσας ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἀνέζευξε μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, προσ- αγγελθέντος αὐτῶ τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς εἰσβεβληκότας 2 εἰς Μακεδονίαν πορθεῖν τὴν χώραν. οὕτως ἀεὶ ποθ’ ἡ τύχη τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων παρὰ λό- 3 γον εἰσωθε κρίνειν. καὶ γὰρ τὸτε Κλεομένης, εἶτε 410
level ground on the point of giving way, was afraid of being charged from all sides and was compelled to pull down part of his defences and to lead out his whole force in line from one side of the camp. Each side now recalled by bugle their light-armed troops from the space between them, and shouting their war-cry and lowering their lances, the two phalanxes met. A stubborn struggle followed. At one time the Macedonians gradually fell back facing the enemy, giving way for a long distance before the courage of the Lacedaemonians, at another the latter were pushed from their ground by the weight of the Macedonian phalanx, until, on Antigonus ordering the Macedonians to close up in the peculiar formation of the double phalanx with its serried line of pikes, they delivered a charge which finally forced the Lacedaemonians from their stronghold. The whole Spartan army now fled in rout, followed and cut down by the enemy; but Cleomenes with a few horsemen reached Sparta in safety. At nightfall he went down to Gythion, where all had been prepared some time previously for the voyage in view of contingencies, and set sail with his friends for Alexandria.

70. Antigonus having attacked and taken Sparta, treated the Lacedaemonians in all respects with great generosity and humanity, and, after restoring the ancient form of government, left the city in a few days with his whole army, as he had received news that the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia and were ravaging the country. Thus ever is it the way of Fortune to decide the most weighty issues against rule and reason. For on this occasion Cleomenes,
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tά κατά τὸν κίνδυνον παρείλκυσε τελέως ὀλίγας ἡμέρας, εἰτ' ἀναχωρήσας ἀπὸ τῆς μάχης εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ βραχὺ τῶν καιρῶν ἀντεποίησατο, δια-κατέσχεν ἄν τὴν ἀρχήν.

4 Οὐ μήν ἂλλ' ὡς Ἀργοῦνος παραγενόμενος εἰς Τεγέαν, καὶ τούτοις ἀποδοοὺς τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν, δευτεραῖος ἐντεῦθεν εἰς "Ἀργος ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἦλθε τὴν τῶν Νεμέων πανηγύριν. ἐν ἡ τυχών πάντων τῶν πρὸς ἀθάνατον δόξαν καὶ τιμήν ἀνήκοντων ὑπὸ τε τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἀχαίων καὶ κατ' ἑδίαν ἐκάστης τῶν πόλεων, ὀρμησε κατὰ σπουδὴν εἰς Μακεδονίαν.

6 καταλαβὼν δὲ τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ συμβαλὼν ἐκ παρατάξεως, τῇ μὲν μάχῃ κατώρθωσε, τῇ δὲ παρακλήσει καὶ κραυγῇ τῇ κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν κίνδυνον ἑκθύμως χρησάμενος εἰς αἴματος ἀναγωγὴν καὶ τινά τουαύτην διάθεσιν ἐμπέσων μετ' οὐ πολὺ

7 νόσῳ τὸν βίον μετῆλλαξε, καλὰς ἐλπίδας ὑποδείξας ἐν αὐτῷ πάσι τοῖς "Ελλησισιοι, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς υπαίθριοι χρείαι, ἐτὶ δὲ μάλλον κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην

8 ἀφεσιν καὶ καλοκαγαθίαιν. τὴν δὲ Μακεδόνων βασιλείαν ἀπέλυτε Φιλίππω τῷ Δημητρίου.

71 Τύνος δὲ χάριν ἐποιησάμεθα τὴν ἐπὶ πλείον

2 ύπὲρ τοῦ προειρημένου πολέμου μνήμην; διὸ τῶν καιρῶν τούτων συναπτόντων τοῖς υφ' ὑμῶν ἱστορεῖ-σθαι μέλλουσι χρήσιμον ἐδοκεῖ, μάλλον δ' ἀναγκαίον εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν τὸ ποιῆσαι πάσιν ἐναργὴ καὶ γνώριμον τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν περὶ

3 Μακεδόνας καὶ τοὺς Ἐλλήνας τότε κατάστασιν. περὶ δὲ τούς αὐτούς καίρους καὶ Πτολεμαίου νόσῳ τὸν βίον μεταλλάξαντος Πτολεμαίος ὁ κληθεὶς

4 Φιλοπάτωρ διεδέξατο τὴν βασιλείαν. μετῆλλαξε δὲ καὶ Σέλενικος ὁ Σελεύκον τοῦ Καλλινίκου καὶ
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had he deferred giving battle for merely a few days, or had he, on returning to Sparta after the battle, waited ever so short a time to avail himself of the turn of events, would have saved his crown.

Antigonus however, on reaching Tegea, restored the old form of government there also, and two days later arrived at Argos just in time for the Nemean festival, at which the Achaean League and each several city heaped on him every honour they could think of to immortalize his memory. He then hastily left for Macedonia, where he found the Illyrians. Engaging them in a pitched battle, he was victorious, but in the course of the fight he strained himself so much by shouting to his troops to cheer them on that from a rupture of a blood-vessel or some such accident he fell sick and died shortly afterwards. He had aroused high hopes of himself throughout Greece, not so much by his success in the field as by his general high principles and excellence. He was succeeded on the throne of Macedon by Philip son of Demetrius.

71. Now to explain why I have dealt with this war at such length. As this period immediately precedes those times, the history of which I am about to write, I thought it would be of service, or rather that the original plan of this work made it necessary for me, to make clearly known to everyone the state of affairs in Macedonia and Greece at this time. Just about the same time Ptolemy Euergetes fell sick and died, being succeeded by Ptolemy surnamed Philopator. Seleucus, the son of the Seleucus surnamed Callinicus or Pogon, also died at this
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Πώγωνος ἐπικλήθεντος. Ἀντίοχος δὲ διεδέξατο τὴν
ἐν Συρίᾳ βασιλείαν, ἀδελφὸς ὄν αὐτοῦ. παραπλή-
σιον γὰρ δὴ τι συνέβη τούτοις καὶ τοῖς πρῶτοις μετὰ
tὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτην κατασχοῦσι τὰς ἀρχάς
tαύτας, λέγω δὲ Σελεύκω, Πτολεμαίω, Αλυσίμαχω.
6 ἐκεῖνοι τε γὰρ πάντες περὶ τὴν εἰκοστὴν καὶ τετάρ-
tην πρὸς ταῖς ἑκατὸν ὀλυμπιάδα μετήλλαξαν, καθά-
περ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, οὕτω τε περὶ τὴν ἐνάτην καὶ
tριακοστήν.

7 Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐπειδὴ τὴν ἐπίστασιν καὶ προκατασκευὴν
tῆς ὅλης ιστορίας διεληλύθαμεν, δι’ ἃς ὑποδέδεικτα
πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ δι’ ἃς αὖτις τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν
cratήσαντες Ῥωμαίοι πρῶτον ἐγχειρεῖν ἤρξαντο
tοῖς ἐξ ἐκείνων πράγμασι, καὶ πρῶτον ἐτόλμησαν ἄμφισβη-
8 τείν Καρχηδονίοις τῆς θαλάττης, ἃς δὲ τούτοις
καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας καὶ Μακεδόνας, ὅμοιοις
9 δὲ καὶ περὶ Καρχηδονίους ὑπάρχουσαν τότε κατά-
στασιν δεδηλώκαμεν, καθήκον ἂν εἰπαργεγονότας
ἐπὶ τοὺς καρποὺς τούτους κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
πρόθεσιν, ἐν ὅλοις ἐξελλοῦν οἱ μὲν Ἑλλήνες τῶν
συμμαχικῶν, Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ τῶν Ἀννιβιακῶν, οἱ δὲ
κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν βασιλείς τὸν περὶ Κοίλης Συρίας
10 ἐνίστασθαι πόλεμον, καὶ τὴν βυβλον ταύτην
ἀφορίζουσιν ἀκολούθως τῇ τε τῶν προαγεγονότων πραγ-
μάτων περιγράφῃ καὶ τῇ τῶν κεχειρικῶτων τὰ πρὸ
tοῦ δυναστῶν καταστροφῆ.
time, his brother Antiochus succeeding him. The same thing in fact occurred in the case of these three kings, as in that of the first successors of Alexander in the three kingdoms, Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus, who all, as I stated above, died in the 124th Olympiad, while these kings died in the 139th.

I have thus completed this Introduction or preliminary part of my History. In it I have shown in the first place when, how, and why the Romans first entered on enterprises outside Italy and disputed the command of the sea with the Carthaginians, and next I have dealt with the state of Greece and Macedonia and with that of Carthage. So having, as was my original purpose, reached the date at which the Greeks were on the eve of the Social War, the Romans on the eve of the Hannibalic War, and the kings of Asia about to enter on the war for Coele-Syria, I must now bring this Book to its close, which coincides with the final events preceding these wars and the death of the three kings who had up to now directed affairs.

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