PREFACE

The Greek text in this volume is based upon the Codex Clarkianus and the Codex Venetus. Deviations from the readings of these manuscripts are noted in the margin at the foot of the page. In most instances disagreement between these two manuscripts, and occasionally readings found in inferior manuscripts or in ancient quotations, as well as emendations offered by modern scholars, are noted, even when they have not affected the text chosen. The following abbreviations are employed:

B = Codex Clarkianus or Bodleianus, written A.D. 895.
T = Codex Venetus, Append. class. 4, cod. 1; twelfth century.
W = Codex Vindobonensis 54, Suppl. graec. 7.
D = Codex Venetus 185.
G = Codex Venetus, Append. class 4, cod. 54.
B T W = later hands of B T W.

The brief introductions aim merely at supplying such information as may aid the reader to appreciate these particular dialogues.

Harold N. Fowler.
CONTENTS

THEAETETUS ........................................... 1

SOPHIST ............................................. 259
THEAETETUS
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEAETETUS

In the Theaetetus Eucleides the Megarian repeats to his friend Terpsion a conversation between Socrates, the mathematician Theodorus, and the youth Theaetetus, who was himself a mathematician of note. The subject is the nature of knowledge, and the discussion is interrupted and furthered by two digressions, one concerning midwives, in which Socrates likens his method of investigation to the activities of the midwife, the other contrasting the lawyer and the philosopher.

The definition of knowledge is hard to attain, and is, in fact, not attained in this dialogue. The confusion between knowledge and various kinds or applications of knowledge is first cleared up, and then the discussion centres upon three definitions: (1) Knowledge is sensible perception; (2) Knowledge is true opinion; (3) Knowledge is true opinion with reasoned explanation.

The discussion of the first definition contains as one of its most important parts the refutation of the doctrine of Protagoras that "man is the measure of all things"; but it includes also a discussion of the doctrine of Heracleitus, that all things are always in
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEAETETUS

motion. Here Plato distinguishes two kinds of motion—movement in space and change of quality—and asserts that constant motion of the first kind must be accompanied by change, because otherwise the same things would be at the same time both in motion and at rest. This obvious fallacy Plato appears to ascribe to Heracleitus and his school. The result of this discussion is that if nothing is at rest, every answer on whatever subject is equally correct.

The possibility of false opinion is discussed in connexion with the second definition. This part of the dialogue contains many subtle distinctions and interesting comparisons. The errors of memory are illustrated by the wax tablets which, on account of their imperfections, fail to receive and preserve clear impressions from sensible objects, and the confusion of our recollections by the aviary, the possessor of which takes in his hand one bird when he wishes to take another, though all the birds have previously been caught and imprisoned by him.

The third definition is explained in various ways, none of which is found to be satisfactory, and the dialogue closes with its avowed purpose—the complete definition of knowledge—unaccomplished. Nevertheless the rejection of the definitions proposed is a gain in itself, and the dialogue may be said to prepare the way for the acceptance of the theory of ideas. It serves also as an example of the importance of the dialectic method, and shows Plato's interest in combating the theories of other philosophers.

The Theaetetus contains many interesting similes and comparisons, and is, like the Sophist and the
INTRODUCTION TO THE *THEAETETUS*

*Statesman*, pervaded by a subtle and at the same time ponderous kind of humour which is rather irritating to some, at least, among modern readers. The reasoning is careful and accurate, but the exposition is somewhat too prolix for modern taste.

The date of the *Theaetetus* is uncertain, but it cannot be one of the early dialogues. The mention of the Athenian army at Corinth makes any date much earlier than 390 impossible. At the very end the reader is prepared for a continuation of the conversation, and this takes place in the *Sophist*, but that dialogue and the *Statesman* may very well have been written some years later than the *Theaetetus*, from which they differ considerably in style.

There are separate editions of the *Theaetetus* by Lewis Campbell (Oxford, 1861 and 1883) and B. H. Kennedy (Cambridge, 1881 and 1894), both with translation and notes.
ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΤΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΘΕΑΙΤΗΣ

Α  I.  ΕΤ.  "Αρτι, ὃ Τερψίων, ἦ πάλαι ἢ πάρει ἢ ἂν χρόνον;
ΤΕΡ. Ἐπεικῶς πάλαι. καὶ σὲ γε ἐξήτων καὶ ἄγοραν καὶ ἔθαυμαξον ὅτι οὐ χρόνος τῇ ἢ εὑρέων.
ΕΤ. Οὐ γὰρ ἢ κατὰ πόλιν.
ΤΕΡ. Ποῦ μὴν;
ΕΤ. Εἰς λιμένα καταβάινων Θεαίτητω ἐνέτυχον φερομένῳ ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Ἀθήνας.
ΤΕΡ. Ζῶντι ἢ τετελευτήκοτι;

Β  ΕΤ.  Ζῶντι καὶ μᾶλα μόλις. χαλεπῶς μὲν γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτὸν αἴρει τὸ γεγονός νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι.
ΤΕΡ. Μῶν ἢ δυσεντηρία;
ΕΤ.  Ναί.
ΤΕΡ. Ὅλον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι.
ΕΤ.  Καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν, ὃ Τερψίων, ἐπεὶ τοι
THEAETETUS
[or ON KNOWLEDGE, TENTATIVE]

CHARACTERS

Eucleides, Terpsion, Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus

EU. Just in from the country, Terpsion, or did you come some time ago?

TERP. Quite a while ago; and I was looking for you in the market-place and wondering that I could not find you.

EU. Well, you see, I was not in the city.

TERP. Where then?

EU. As I was going down to the harbour I met Theaetetus being carried to Athens from the camp at Corinth.

TERP. Alive or dead?

EU. Just barely alive; for he is suffering severely from wounds, and, worse than that, he has been taken with the sickness that has broken out in the army.

TERP. You mean the dysentery?

EU. Yes.

TERP. What a man he is who you say is in danger!

EU. A noble man, Terpsion, and indeed just now I
PLATO

καὶ νῦν ἥκονόν τινων μάλα ἐγκωμιαζόντων αὐτὸν περὶ τὴν μάχην.

τερ. Καὶ οὐδέν γ’ ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον, εἰ μὴ τοιούτος ἦν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὐκ C αὐτοῦ Μεγαροὶ κατέλυεν;

ετ. Ἡπείγετο οἶκαδε’ ἐπεὶ ἐγνω’ ἐδεόμην καὶ συνεβούλευον, ἀλ’ οὐκ ἦθελεν. καὶ δῆτα προπεμ- ψας αὐτόν, ἀπιών πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ θαύμασα Σωκράτους, ὃς μαντικῶς ἅλλα τε δὴ εἶπε καὶ περὶ τούτου. δοκεὶ γάρ μοι ὅλον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐνυχεῖν αὐτῷ μειρακὰς ὄντι, καὶ συγγενόμενος τε καὶ διαλέξθεις πᾶν πάν ἀγασθήναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. καὶ μοι ἐλθόντι Αθήναζε τοὺς τε λόγοις ὅσ D διελέξθη αὐτῷ διηγήσατο, καὶ μάλα ἄξιοις ἄκοίης, εἴπε τε, ὅτι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη εἰς τούτον ἐλλόγιμον γενέσθαι, εἴπερ εἰς ἡλικίαν ἐλθοί.

τερ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴπεν. ἀτὰρ τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχουσ ἂν διηγήσασθαι;

ετ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, οὐκοινος οὐτω γε ἀπὸ στό- 143 ματος’ ἀλλ’ ἐγραψάμην τὸτ’ εὐθὺς οἶκαδ’ ἐλθὼν υπομνήματα, ύστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμμη- σκὸμενος ἐγραφον, καὶ σοκίς Αθήναζε ἀφικώμην, ἐπανηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτη δ’ μὴ ἐμεμνήσην, καὶ δεύο ἐλθὼν ἐπηροθούμην· ὡστε μοι σχεδὸν τι πῶς ὁ λόγος γέγραπταί.

τερ. Ἀληθῆ’ ἥκουσα σοι καὶ πρῶτον, καὶ μέντοι ἂεί μέλλων κελέσεων ἐπιδείξαι διατέρφα δεύο. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει νῦν ἡμᾶς διελθεῖν; πάντως ἐγνυε καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι, ὡς εξ ἄγρου ἡκὼν.

B ετ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μέχρι Ἑρωνοῦ
THEAETETUS

heard some people praising him highly for his conduct in the battle.

T ERP. That is not at all strange; it would have been much more remarkable if he had not so conducted himself. But why did he not stop here in Megara?

EU. He was in a hurry to get home; for I begged and advised him to stop, but he would not. So I went along with him, and as I was coming back I thought of Socrates and wondered at his prophetic gift, especially in what he said about him. For I think he met him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a mere boy, and as a result of acquaintance and conversation with him, he greatly admired his qualities. When I went to Athens he related to me the conversation he had with him, which was well worth hearing, and he said he would surely become a notable man if he lived.

T ERP. And he was right, apparently. But what was the talk. Could you relate it?

EU. No, by Zeus, at least not offhand. But I made notes at the time as soon as I reached home, then afterwards at my leisure, as I recalled things, I wrote them down, and whenever I went to Athens I used to ask Socrates about what I could not remember, and then I came here and made corrections; so that I have pretty much the whole talk written down.

T ERP. That is true. I heard you say so before; and really I have been waiting about here all along intending to ask you to show it to me. What hinders us from reading it now? Certainly I need to rest, since I have come from the country.

EU. And I myself went with Theaetetus as far as
PLATO

Θεαίτητον προϋπεμψα, ὡστε οὐκ ἂν ἂηδὼς ἀνα-
παινοήηη. ἀλλ' ἰώμεν, καὶ ἥμων ἂμα ἀναπαυομένων ὁ 
παῖς ἄναγνώσεται.

τερ. Ἡ Ὀρθώς λέγεις.

ετ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ βιβλίον, ὦ Τερψίων, τοῦτιν 
ἐγραφάμην δὲ δὴ ὄντως τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἔμοι 
Σωκράτη διηγούμενον ὡς διηγείτο, ἀλλὰ δια-
λεγόμενον ὁίς ἐφη διαλεχθήναι. ἐφη δὲ τῷ τε 
γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδώρῳ καὶ τῷ Θεαίτητῳ. ἢν οὖν 
C ἐν τῇ γραφῇ μὴ παρέχοιεν πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ 
tῶν λόγων διηγήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ τε ὅποτε λέγοι ὁ 
Σωκράτης, οἶον, καὶ ἐγὼ ἐφην ἡ καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, 
ἡ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου, ὅτι συνέφη ἡ οὐχ 
ὡμολόγει, τοῦτων ἔνεκα ὡς αὐτὸν αὐτοῖς διαλεγό-
μενον ἐγραφα, ἐξελὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα.

τερ. Καὶ οὐδὲν γε ἃπο τρόπον, ὡς Εὐκλείδη.

ετ. Ἡ Ἀλλά, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε.

D 2. εἰ. Εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρῆνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκη-
δόμην, ὡς Θεόδωρε, τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν σε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων 
ἂν ἠρώτων, εἰ τινες αὐτοῦ περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινα 
αὐτὴν φιλοσοφίαν εἰς τῶν νέων ἐπιμέλειαι ποιοῦ-
μενοι νῦν δὲ ἦττον γὰρ ἐκείνους ἢ τούτῳ φιλῶ, 
καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμοῦν εἴδειν τινες ἂν τῶν νέων 
ἐπίδοξοι γενέσθαι ἐπιεικεῖας· ταῦτα δὴ αὐτὸς τε 
σκοπῶ καὶ τὸ ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔρωτῶ 
οὶς ἂν ὄρῳ τοὺς νέους ἐδέλουτας συγγίγνεσθαι. 
οὐ δὲ ὡς ὡς ὑμιστὸι πλησιάζουσιν, καὶ δικαίως· 
Εὐδίος γὰρ τὰ τὸ ἄλλα καὶ γεωμετρίας ἔνεκα. εἰ
THEAETETUS

Erineum,\(^1\) so I also should not be sorry to take a rest. Come, let us go, and while we are resting, the boy shall read to us.

**TERP.** Very well.

**EU.** Here is the book, Terpsion. Now this is the way I wrote the conversation: I did not represent Socrates relating it to me, as he did, but conversing with those with whom he told me he conversed. And he told me they were the geometrician Theodorus and Theaetetus. Now in order that the explanatory words between the speeches might not be annoying in the written account, such as “and I said” or “and I remarked,” whenever Socrates spoke, or “he agreed” or “he did not agree,” in the case of the interlocutor, I omitted all that sort of thing and represented Socrates himself as talking with them.

**TERP.** That is quite fitting, Eucleides.

**EU.** Come, boy, take the book and read.

**SOC.** If I cared more for Cyrene and its affairs, Theodorus, I should ask you about things there and about the people, whether any of the young men there are devoting themselves to geometry or any other form of philosophy; but as it is, since I care less for those people than for the people here, I am more eager to know which of our own young men are likely to gain reputation. These are the things I myself investigate, so far as I can, and about which I question those others with whom I see that the young men like to associate. Now a great many of them come to you, and rightly, for you deserve it on account of your geometry, not to speak of other

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\(^1\) Erineum was between Eleusis and Athens, near the Cephissus. Apparently Eucleides had walked some thirty miles.
δή οὖν τινι ἐνέτυχες ἂξιω λόγου, ἡδέως ἂν πυ-θοίμην.

Tho. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοὶ τε εἴπεῖν καὶ σοὶ ἀκούσαι πάνυ ἄξιον, οὐχ ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν μειρακίω ἐντετύχηκα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἢν καλὸς, ἐφοβοῦμην ἂν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καὶ τῷ δόξῳ ἐν ἑπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ εἶναι· νῦν δὲ—καὶ μὴ μοι οὕθου—οὐκ ἔστι καλὸς, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τὴν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὁμιλῶν· ἦττον δὲ ἦ σὺ ταῦτα·

144 ἔχει. ἄδεωσ δὴ λέγω. εὐ γὰρ ἵσθι ὅτι ὅλθ πῶς ὑποτε ἐνέτυχον—καὶ πάνυ πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα—οὐδένα πω Ἰσθημών οὖτω θαυμαστῶς εὐ πεφυκότα. τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα, ὡς ἄλλω χαλεπῶν, πρᾶον αὐτὸ ἐναὶ διαφερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀνδρεῖον παρ᾽ ὄντυνον, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ' ἀν ὕμνη γενέσθαι οὕτε ὅρῳ γιγνόμενον. ἀλλ' οἱ τε ὄξείς ὃσπερ οὖν τοι καὶ ἂγχίνοι καὶ μνήμονες ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς δύρρωποι εἰς, καὶ ἄτοντες φέρονται Β ὃσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα, καὶ μανικώτεροι ἡ ἀνδρείωτεροι φύσται, οἱ τε αὐτὸ ἐμβριθέστεροι νυθροὶ πως ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λήθης γέμοντες. ὁ δὲ οὖντω λείώς τε καὶ ἀπαίστως καὶ ἀνυσίμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος, οἷον ἐλαῖον ἱεύμα ἁμοφητί ρέοντος, ὦστε θαυμάσαι τὸ τηλικὸτον ὄντα οὖτως ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι.

Εὐ. Εὐ ἄγγελλεις. τίνος δὲ καὶ ἐστὶ τῶν πολιτῶν;

Tho. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ οὐ.

C ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τώνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ

1 γιγνόμενον T ut videtur, Burnet; γιγνομένου B, Berol.
THEAETETUS

reasons. So if you have met with any young man who is worth mentioning, I should like to hear about him.

THEO. Truly, Socrates, it is well worth while for me to talk and for you to hear about a splendid young fellow, one of your fellow-citizens, whom I have met. Now if he were handsome, I should be very much afraid to speak, lest someone should think I was in love with him. But the fact is—now don’t be angry with me—he is not handsome, but is like you in his snub nose and protruding eyes, only those features are less marked in him than in you. You see I speak fearlessly. But I assure you that among all the young men I have ever met—and I have had to do with a great many—I never yet found one of such marvelously fine qualities. He is quick to learn, beyond almost anyone else, yet exceptionally gentle, and moreover brave beyond any other; I should not have supposed such a combination existed, and I do not see it elsewhere. On the contrary, those who, like him, have quick, sharp minds and good memories, have usually also quick tempers; they dart off and are swept away, like ships without ballast; they are excitable rather than courageous; those, on the other hand, who are steadier are somewhat dull when brought face to face with learning, and are very forgetful. But this boy advances toward learning and investigation smoothly and surely and successfully, with perfect gentleness, like a stream of oil that flows without a sound, so that one marvels how he accomplishes all this at his age.

SOC. That is good news; but which of our citizens is his father?

THEO. I have heard the name, but do not remember it. However, it does not matter, for the youth is
PLATO

μέσω. ἀρτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ ἠλείφωντο ἐταῖροί τε τίνες οὕτωι αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, νῦν δὲ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλευσάμενοι δεύτερο οἶναι. ἄλλα σκόπει, εἰ γιγνώσκεις αὐτὸν.

Σ. Γιγνώσκω· ὁ τοῦ Σομνίων Ἐυφρονίου ἔστιν, καὶ πάνυ γε, ὡς φίλε, ἀνδρὸς οἶον καὶ σὺ τούτων διηγεῖ, καὶ ἄλλως εὐδοκίμου, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὖσιάν μᾶλα πολλὴν κατέλιπεν. τὸ δ’ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ μειρακίου.

D ἩΕΟ. Θεαίτητος, ὡ Σώκρατες, τὸ γε οὖνα· τὴν μέντοι οὖσιάν δοκοῦσι μοι ἐπίτροποι τίνες διεφθαρκέων· ἄλλ’ ὄμως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθερίητα βαγμαστός, ὡ Σώκρατες.

Σ. Γενικὸν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα· καὶ μοι κέλευε αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίζεσθαι.

ΗΕΟ. Ἔσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεύτερο παρὰ Σωκράτη.

Σ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ὡ Θεαίτητε, ἵνα κάγω ἑμαυτὸν ἀνασκέψωμαι, ποιόν τι ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον. Εφησίν γὰρ Θεόδωρος ἔχεω με σοὶ ὄμοιον. ἀτὰρ εἰ νῦν ἑκόντων ἐκεῖρον λύραν ἐφ’ αὐτὰς ἡμόσθαι ὑμῶις, πότερον εὖθυς ἂν ἐπιστευόμεν ἡ ἐπεσκεψάμεθ’ ἂν, εἰ μονακὸς ἂν λέγει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐπεσκεψάμεθ’ ἂν.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εὐρόντες ἐπειδόμεθ’ ἂν, ἁμοῦνον δέ, ἡπιστούμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

Σ. Νῦν δέ γ’, οἶμαι, εἰ τι μέλει ἢμῖν τῆς τῶν 145 προσώπων ὄμοιότητος, σκεπτέον, εἰ γραφικὸς ὃν λέγει ἡ οὖ.
THEAETETUS

the middle one of those who are now coming toward us. He and those friends of his were anointing themselves in the outer course, and now they seem to have finished and to be coming here. See if you recognize him.

soc. Yes, I do. He is the son of Euphronius of Sunium, who is a man of just the sort you describe, and of good repute in other respects; moreover he left a very large property. But the youth's name I do not know.

theo. Theaetetus is his name, Socrates; but I believe the property was squandered by trustees. Nevertheless, Socrates, he is remarkably liberal with his money, too.

soc. It is a noble man that you describe. Now please tell him to come here and sit by us.

theo. I will. Theaetetus, come here to Socrates.

soc. Yes, do so, Theaetetus, that I may look at myself and see what sort of a face I have; for Theodorus says it is like yours. Now if we each had a lyre, and he said we had tuned them to the same key, should we take his word for it without more ado, or should we inquire first whether he who said it was a musician?

theaet. We should inquire.

soc. Then if we found that he was a musician, we should believe him, but if not, we should refuse to take his word?

theaet. Yes.

soc. But now, if we are concerned about the likeness of our faces, we must consider whether he who speaks is a painter, or not.

1 The scene is evidently laid in a gymnasiurn; the young men have been exercising.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι.
ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ᾠγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐχ, ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι.
ΣΩ. Ἀρ’ οὐδὲ γεωμετρικὸς;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως δήπον, ὃ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἀστρονομικός καὶ λογιστικός τε καὶ
μουσικός καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σώματός τι ὁμοίους
φησίν εἶναι ἐπαινών τῇ ἡ ψέγων, οὐ πάνυ αὐτῷ ἄξιον
τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἰσως οὐ.

Β ΣΩ. Τί δ’, εἰ ποτέρου τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπαινοῖ πρὸς
ἀρετὴν τε καὶ σοφίαν; ἄρ’ οὐκ ἄξιον τῷ μὲν
ἀκούσαντι προθυμεῖσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἐπαινε-
θέντα, τῷ δὲ προθύμως ἐαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύναι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὃ Σώκρατες.

3. ΣΩ. Ὀμηρα τοῖνυν, ὁ φίλε Θεαίτητε, σοὶ μὲν
ἐπιδεικνύναι, ἔμοι δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι. ὡς εἶ ἵσθι δὴ
Θεόδωρος πολλοὺς δὴ πρὸς μὲ ἐπανέσας ξένους
τε καὶ ἀστούς οὐδένα πω ἐπήνευσεν ὡς σὲ νῦν δή.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐδ’ ἄν ἔχοι, ὃ Σώκρατες. ἀλλ’ ὃ ὅρα μὴ
Σ παίξων ἔλεγεν.

ΣΩ. Ὡχι οὕτως ὁ τρόπος Θεοδώρου. ἀλλὰ μὴ
ἀναθύνω τὰ ὁμολογημένα σκηπτόμενος παῖζοντα
λέγειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῇ μαρτυρεῖν:
πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκήψει αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν
ἔμμενε τῇ ὁμολογία.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι. μανθάνεις πον παρὰ Θεοδώρου
γεωμετριας ἄττα;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώγε.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. I think we must.
soc. Well, is Theodorus a painter?
THEAET. Not so far as I know.
soc. Nor a geometrician, either?
THEAET. Oh yes, decidedly, Socrates.
soc. And an astronomer, and an arithmetician, and a musician, and in general an educated man?
THEAET. I think so.
soc. Well then, if he says, either in praise or blame, that we have some physical resemblance, it is not especially worth while to pay attention to him.
THEAET. Perhaps not.
soc. But what if he should praise the soul of one of us for virtue and wisdom? Is it not worth while for the one who hears to examine eagerly the one who is praised, and for that one to exhibit his qualities with eagerness?
THEAET. Certainly, Socrates.
soc. Then, my dear Theaetetus, this is just the time for you to exhibit your qualities and for me to examine them; for I assure you that Theodorus, though he has praised many foreigners and citizens to me, never praised anyone as he praised you just now.
THEAET. A good idea, Socrates; but make sure that he was not speaking in jest.
soc. That is not Theodorus’s way. But do not seek to draw back from your agreement on the pretext that he is jesting, or he will be forced to testify under oath; for certainly no one will accuse him of perjury. Come, be courageous and hold to the agreement.
THEAET. I suppose I must, if you say so.
soc. Now tell me; I suppose you learn some geometry from Theodorus?
THEAET. Yes.
PLATO

D ἡμ. Καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἀρμονίας καὶ λογισμοῦς;

ὁεαί. Προθυμοῦμαι γε δή.

ἡμ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔγω, ὠ παῖ, παρὰ γε τούτου καὶ παρ’ ἄλλων, οὐς ἀν οὐκομαί τι τούτων ἐπατειν. ἄλλ’ ὃμως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, σμικρὸν δὲ τι ἄπορῶ, δ’ μετὰ σοῦ τε καὶ τώνδε σκεπτέον. καὶ μοι λέγε· ἄρ’ οὖ τὸ μανθάνειν ἔστὶν τὸ σοφώτερον γίγνεσθαι περὶ δ’ μανθάνει τις;

ὁεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ἡμ. Σοφία δὲ γ’, οἶμαι, σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοὶ.

ὁεαί. Ναὶ.

E ἡμ. Τοῦτο δὲ μῶν διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης;

ὁεαί. Τὸ ποῖον;

ἡμ. Ἡ σοφία. Ἡ οὐχ ἄπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοὶ;

ὁεαί. Τί μὴν;

ἡμ. Ταῦτον ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία;

ὁεαί. Ναὶ.

ἡμ. Τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ τοῦν ἔστὶν ὁ ἄπορῶ καὶ οὐ δύναμαι λαβεῖν ἵκανὸς παρ’ ἐμαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμη ὁ τί 146 ποτε τυγχάνει ἄν. ἄρ’ οὖν δὴ ἔχομεν λέγειν αὐτό; τι φατέ; τίς ἄν ἡμῶν πρῶτος εἴποι; ὁ δὲ ἀμαρτών, καὶ ὃς ἄν ἀεὶ ἀμαρτάνῃ, καθεδείται, ἠπερ φασὶν οἱ πάθεις οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος· ὃς δ’ ἄν περιγένηται ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύσει ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπιτάξει ὁ τί ἄν βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. τί συγάτε; οὐ τί που, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἐγώ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἀγροκίζομαι, προθυμούμενος ἡμᾶς 1 ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε καὶ προσηγόρους ἄλλη- λοις γίγνεσθαι;

1 ἡμᾶς] ὑμᾶς Τ.
THEAETETUS

soc. And astronomy and harmony and arithmetic?
theaet. I try hard to do so.
soc. And so do I, my boy, from him and from any
others who I think know anything about these things.
But nevertheless, although in other respects I get
on fairly well in them, yet I am in doubt about one
little matter, which should be investigated with your
help and that of these others. Tell me, is not
learning growing wiser about that which one
learns?
theaet. Of course.
soc. And the wise, I suppose, are wise by wisdom.
theaet. Yes.
soc. And does this differ at all from knowledge?
theaet. Does what differ?
soc. Wisdom. Or are not people wise in that
of which they have knowledge?
theaet. Of course.
soc. Then knowledge and wisdom are the same
thing?
theaet. Yes.
soc. Well, it is just this that I am in doubt about
and cannot fully grasp by my own efforts—what know-
ledge really is. Can we tell that? What do you say?
Who of us will speak first? And he who fails, and
whoever fails in turn, shall go and sit down and be
donkey, as the children say when they play ball; and
whoever gets through without failing shall be our
king and shall order us to answer any questions
he pleases. Why are you silent? I hope, Theodorus,
I am not rude, through my love of dis-
cussion and my eagerness to make us converse and
show ourselves friends and ready to talk to one
another.
PLATO

Β θεο. Ἡκιστά μέν, ὧν Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν εἴη ἄγροικον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μερακλῶν τι κέλευε σοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἁθής τῆς τοιαύτης διαλέκτου, καὶ οὖδ᾿ αὐτὸν ἐθελήσεσθαι ἧλικίᾳν ἔχω· τούτῳ δὲ πρέποι τε ἂν τούτῳ καὶ πολὺ πλέον ἐπιδιδοίειν τῷ γὰρ ὄντι η νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσων ἔχει. ἀλλ᾿ ὥσπερ ἦρξυ, μὴ ἀφίσσο τοῦ Θεατήτου, ἀλλ᾿ ἐρώτα.

σπ. Ἀκούεις; θεαί, ὧν Θεαίτητε, ἡ λέγει Θεόδωρος, ζ ἰ ἀπείδειν, ὃς ἐγώ οἴμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐθελήσεις, οὔτε θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάπτομι νεώτερον ἀπείδειν. ἀλλ᾿ εὗ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ· τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην;

θεαί. Ἀλλὰ χρή, ὧν Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς κελέυετε. πάντως γὰρ, ἂν τι καὶ ἀμάρτω, ἐπαν-orthwste.

4. σπ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἂν πέρ γε οἶοί τε ᾧμεν.

θεαί. Δοκεῖ τοῖνυν μοι καὶ ἂ παρὰ Θεοδώρου ἂν τις μᾶθοι ἐπιστήμην εἴναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἃς νῦν δὴ σὺ διήλθες, καὶ ἂς σκυτότομη τε καὶ

D αἰ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν τέχνην, πάσαι τε καὶ ἐκάστη τούτων, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ ἐπιστήμη εἴναι.

σπ. Γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδόρως, ὡς φιλε, εὐν αἰτηθεῖς πολλὰ δίδωσ καὶ ποικίλα ἀνθ᾽ ἀπλοῦ.

θεαί. Πῶς τι τούτο λέγεις, ὧν Σώκρατες;

σπ. Ἰος μὲν οὖδέν· ὃ μέντοι οἴμαι, φράσω. ὅταν λέγης σκυτικὴν, μὴ τι ἂλλο φράζεις ἡ ἐπι- stήμην ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίας;

θεαί. Οὐδέν.

Ε σπ. Τί δ᾽, ὅταν τεκτωνικὴν; μὴ τι ἂλλο ἡ ἐπιστήμην τῆς τῶν ξυλίων σκευῶν ἐργασίας;

1 ἀπείδειν W; ἀπιστεῖν BT; ἀπελθεῖν al.
THEAETETUS

theo. That sort of thing would not be at all rude, Socrates; but tell one of the youths to answer your questions; for I am unused to such conversation and, moreover, I am not of an age to accustom myself to it. But that would be fitting for these young men, and they would improve much more than I; for the fact is, youth admits of improvement in every way. Come, question Theaetetus as you began to do, and do not let him off.

soc. Well, Theaetetus, you hear what Theodorus says, and I think you will not wish to disobey him, nor is it right for a young person to disobey a wise man when he gives instructions about such matters. Come, speak up well and nobly. What do you think knowledge is?

theaet. Well, Socrates, I must, since you bid me. For, if I make a mistake, you are sure to set me right.

soc. Certainly, if we can.

theaet. Well then, I think the things one might learn from Theodorus are knowledge—geometry and all the things you spoke of just now—and also cobblerly and the other craftsmen’s arts; each and all of these are nothing else but knowledge.

soc. You are noble and generous, my friend, for when you are asked for one thing you give many, and a variety of things instead of a simple answer.

theaet. What do you mean by that, Socrates?

soc. Nothing, perhaps; but I will tell you what I think I mean. When you say “cobblerly” you speak of nothing else than the art of making shoes, do you?

theaet. Nothing else.

soc. And when you say “carpentry”? Do you mean anything else than the art of making wooden furnishings?
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

ΣΠ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἄμφοῖν, οὐ ἑκατέρα ἑπιστήμη, τοῦτο δρίζεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΣΠ. Τὸ δὲ γὰρ ἐρωτηθέν, ὡς Θεαίτε, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν, τίνων ἡ ἑπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὅποισι τωσ· οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμήσαι αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἡρόμεθα, ἀλλὰ γνώναι ἑπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὁ τί ποτ’ ἐστίν. ἦν οὐδὲν λέγω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ὅρθως.

147 ΣΠ. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἰ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ προχείρων ἐρωτοῖ, οἶον περὶ πηλοῦ, ὁ τί ποτ᾿ ἐστίν, εἰ ἀποκριαῖμεθα αὐτῶν πηλός ὁ τῶν χυτρέων καὶ πηλός ὁ τῶν ἰπποπλαθῶν καὶ πηλός ὁ τῶν πλυνθοργῶν, οὐκ ἄν γελοῖοι εἴμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. "Ἰσως.

ΣΠ. Πρῶτον μὲν γε ποι οἰόμενοι συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τὸν ἐρωτώντα, ὅταν εἰπωμεν πηλός, εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες Β εἴτε ἄλλων ὄντων ὅντων δημιουργῶν. ἦ, οἰεὶ, τίς τι συνίησίν τινος ὅνομα, ὁ μὴ οὖν τί ἐστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΠ. Οὐδὲ ἄρα ἑπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνήσιον ὁ ἑπιστήμην μὴ εἰδῶς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γάρ.

ΣΠ. Σκυτεῖν ἄρα οὐ συνίησιν ὅσ ἄν ἑπιστήμην ἀγνοῇ, οὐδὲ τινα ἄλλην τέχνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εστιν οὖτως.

ΣΠ. Γελοῖα ἄρα ἡ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἐπιστήμη τί ἐστιν, ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τέχνης τινός.

1 τὸ δὲ γὰρ ἐρωτηθέν Burnet; τὸ δὲ γε ἐρωτηθέν W, Berol.; τ’ ἐπερωτηθέν ΒΤ.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Nothing else by that, either.
SOC. Then in both cases you define that to which each form of knowledge belongs?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. But the question, Theaetetus, was not to what knowledge belongs, nor how many the forms of knowledge are; for we did not wish to number them, but to find out what knowledge itself really is. Or is there nothing in what I say?
THEAET. Nay, you are quite right.
SOC. Take this example. If anyone should ask us about some common everyday thing, for instance, what clay is, and we should reply that it is the potters' clay and the oven-makers' clay and the brickmakers' clay, should we not be ridiculous?
THEAET. Perhaps.
SOC. Yes; in the first place for assuming that the questioner can understand from our answer what clay is, when we say "clay," no matter whether we add "the image-makers'" or any other craftsmen's. Or does anyone, do you think, understand the name of anything when he does not know what the thing is?
THEAET. By no means.
SOC. Then he does not understand knowledge of shoes if he does not know knowledge.
THEAET. No.
SOC. Then he who is ignorant of knowledge does not understand cobblerly or any other art.
THEAET. That is true.
SOC. Then it is a ridiculous answer to the question "what is knowledge?" when we give the name of
PLATO

C ὄνομα. τινὸς γὰρ ἑπιστήμην ἀποκρίνεται οὐ τούτ’ ἐρωτηθεῖς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡς άουκεν.

ΣΧ. Ἐπειτά γε ποι ἔξον φαύλως καὶ βραχέως ἀποκρίνασθαι περιέχεται ἀπέραντον ὁδὸν. οἶον καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει φαύλον που καὶ ἀπλοῦν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γῆ ὑγρῶ φυτασσά πηλὸς ἄν εἴη, τὸ δ’ οὗν εἶν χαίρειν.

5. ΘΕΑΙ. Ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατε, νῦν γε οὖτω φαινεται: ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύεις ἑρωτάν οἶον καὶ αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν ἐναγχος εἰσῆλθε διαλεγομένος, ἐμοί Δε καὶ τῷ σῷ ὁμονύμῳ τοῦτῳ Σωκράτει.

ΣΧ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Περὶ δυνάμεων τι ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὁδὲ ἔγραψε, τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος ἀποφαίνων ὁτι μήκει οὐ σύμμετροι τῇ ποδαίᾳ, καὶ οὖτω κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην προαιρομένος μέχρι τῆς ἐπτακαιδεκάποδος. ἐν δὲ ταύτη τωρ ἔνεσχετο. ἡμῖν οὖν εἰσῆλθε τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειροί τὸ πλῆθος αἴ δυνάμεις ἐφαίνοντο, πειραθήναι συλλαβεῖν Ε εἰς ἐν, ὅτι πάσας ταῦτας προσαγορεύσουμεν τὰς δυνάμεις.

1 ἀποφαίνων om. T; Burnet brackets.

1 A simple form of the first statement would be: The square roots of 3, 5, etc., are irrational numbers or surds. The word δύναμες has not the meaning which we give in English to “power,” namely the result of multiplication of a number by itself, but that which we give to “root,” i.e. the number which, when multiplied by itself, produces a given result. Here Theaetetus is speaking of square roots only; and when he speaks of numbers and of equal factors 24.
THEAETETUS

some art; for we give in our answer something that knowledge belongs to, when that was not what we were asked.

THEAET. So it seems.

SOC. Secondly, when we might have given a short, everyday answer, we go an interminable distance round; for instance, in the question about clay, the everyday, simple thing would be to say "clay is earth mixed with moisture" without regard to whose clay it is.

THEAET. It seems easy just now, Socrates, as you put it; but you are probably asking the kind of thing that came up among us lately when your namesake, Socrates here, and I were talking together.

SOC. What kind of thing was that, Theaetetus?

THEAET. Theodorus here was drawing some figures for us in illustration of roots, showing that squares containing three square feet and five square feet are not commensurable in length with the unit of the foot, and so, selecting each one in its turn up to the square containing seventeen square feet; and at that he stopped. Now it occurred to us, since the number of roots appeared to be infinite, to try to collect them under one name, by which we could henceforth call all the roots.¹

he evidently thinks of rational whole numbers only, not of irrational numbers or fractions. He is not giving an exhaustive presentation of his investigation, but merely a brief sketch of it to illustrate his understanding of the purpose of Socrates. Toward the end of this sketch the word ἀρίθμος is limited to the square roots of "oblong" numbers, i.e. to surds. The modern reader may be somewhat confused because Theaetetus seems to speak of arithmetical facts in geometrical terms. (Cf. Gow, Short History of Greek Mathematics, p. 85.)
PLATO

σπ. Ἡ καὶ ἡ ῥετεί τι τοιοῦτον; 
θεαί. Ἡμοιγε δοκοῦμεν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σὺ. 
σπ. Λέγε.

θεαί. Τὸν ἁριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν· τὸν 
μὲν δυνάμενον ἵσον ἰσάκις γίγνεσθαι τῷ 
τετραγώνῳ τὸ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνον 
τε καὶ ἰσό- 
πλευρον προσεῖπομεν.

σπ. Καὶ εὖ γε.

θεαί. Τὸν τοίνυν μεταξὺ τούτου, ὃν καὶ τὰ 
148 τρία καὶ τὰ πέντε καὶ πάς ὃς ἄδύνατος ὅσο 
ἰσάκις γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἣ πλεῖων ἐλαττοῦν 
ἐλάττων πλεονάκις γίγνεται, μείζων δὲ καὶ ἐλάττων 
ἀεὶ πλευρὰ αὐτῶν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προμῆκει αὖ 
σχῆματι ἀπεικάσαντες προμῆκη ἁριθμὸν ἐκαλέ- 
σαμεν.

σπ. Κάλλιστα. ἀλλὰ τι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; 
θεαί. Ὑσαι μὲν γραμμαί τὸν ἰσόπλευρον καὶ 
ἐπίπεδον ἁριθμόν τετραγωνίζουσι, μῆκος ὕρισά- 
μεθα, ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἔτερομήκη, δυνάμεις, ὡς μὴ 
μὲν οὐ ἐσυμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ἂ 
δύναται. καὶ περὶ τὰ στερεὰ ἀλλο τοιοῦτον.

σπ. Ἄριστα γ' ἀνθρώπων, ὃ παιδές· ὅστε 
μοι δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἕνοχος τοῖς ψευδομαρ- 
τυρίοις ἔσεσθαι.

θεαί. Καὶ μὴν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὃς ἐρωτᾶς περὶ 
ἐπιστήμης, οὐκ ἀν δυναίμην ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὡσπερ 
περὶ τοῦ μῆκος καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως. καίτοι σὺ 
γέ μοι δοκεῖς τοιοῦτον τι ζητεῖν· ὅστε πάλιν αὐ 
φαίνεται ψευδής ὁ Θεόδωρος.

26
THEAETETUS

soc. And did you find such a name?
THEAET. I think we did. But see if you agree.
soc. Speak on.
THEAET. We divided all number into two classes. The one, the numbers which can be formed by multiplying equal factors, we represented by the shape of the square and called square or equilateral numbers.
soc. Well done!
THEAET. The numbers between these, such as three and five and all numbers which cannot be formed by multiplying equal factors, but only by multiplying a greater by a less or a less by a greater, and are therefore always contained in unequal sides, we represented by the shape of the oblong rectangle and called oblong numbers.
soc. Very good; and what next?
THEAET. All the lines which form the four sides of the equilateral or square numbers we called lengths, and those which form the oblong numbers \textit{we called surds}, because they are not commensurable with the others in length, but only in the areas of the planes which they have the power to form. And similarly in the case of solids.\footnote{That is, cubes and cube roots.}
soc. Most excellent, my boys! I think Theodorus will not be found liable to an action for false witness.

THEAET. But really, Socrates, I cannot answer that question of yours about knowledge, as we answered the question about length and square roots. And yet you seem to me to want something of that kind. So Theodorus appears to be a false witness after all.
PLATO

C Ἐ. Τι δέ; εἰ σε πρὸς δρόμον ἐπανύν μηδενι ὑπὸ δρομικῷ ἐφη τῶν νέων έντετυχηκέναι, εἶτα διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχιστοῦ ἤττήθης, ἦττον τι ἂν οὐεὶ ἀληθή τούδ' ἐπαινέσαι;

θεαί. Οὐκ ἐγώγη.

Ἐ. Ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, σμικρὸν τι οὔεὶ εἶναι ἐξευρεῖν καί οὗ τῶν πάντη ἀκρων;

θεαί. Νὴ τὸν Δι' ἐγώγη καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων.

Ἑ. Θάρρει τούνων περὶ σαυτῶ καὶ τι οῖον

D Θεόδωρον λέγειν, προθυμίηθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπω τῶν τε ἀλλων περὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τι ποτε τυχάναι ὅν.

θεαί. Προθυμίας μὲν ἔνεκα, ὁ Σώκρατες, φανεῖται.

ἔ. Ἐ. Ἡθι δή—καλὼς γὰρ ἄρτι ὑφηγήσω—πειρῶ μμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρισιν, ὥσπερ ταύτας πολλὰς οὕσας ἐνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες, οὕτω καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐνὶ λόγῳ προσεπείδων.

Ε ἡθ. Ἀλλ' εὖ ἱσθι, ὁ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ αὐτὸ ἐπεχειρήσασα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ σοῦ ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις. ἔλλα γὰρ οὗτος δύναμαι πείσαι ἐμαυτὸν ὡς ἴκανῶς τι λέγω, οὗτ' ἄλλου ἀκούσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς οὐ διακελεῦει· οὐ μὲν δὴ αὑ' οὖν ἀπαλλαγήναι τοῦ μέλεων; 1

Ἑ. Ἡθ. Ὡδίνεις γὰρ, ὁ φίλε Θεαίτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κενὸς ἀλλ' ἐγκύμων εἶναι.

θεαί. Οὐκ οἴδα, ὁ Σώκρατες· ὁ μέντοι πέπονθα λέγω.

1 μέλεων B, Berol. et γρ. W (and Burnet); μέλλεων Τ; εὐρείων W.
THEAETETUS

soc. Nonsense! If he were praising your running and said he had never met any young man who was so good a runner, and then you were beaten in a race by a full grown man who held the record, do you think his praise would be any less truthful?

THEAET. Why, no.

soc. And do you think that the discovery of knowledge, as I was just now saying, is a small matter and not a task for the very ablest men?

THEAET. By Zeus, I think it is a task for the very ablest.

soc. Then you must have confidence in yourself, and believe that Theodorus is right, and try earnestly in every way to gain an understanding of the nature of knowledge as well as of other things.

THEAET. If it is a question of earnestness, Socrates, the truth will come to light.

soc. Well then—for you pointed out the way admirably just now—take your answer about the roots as a model, and just as you embraced them all in one class, though they were many, try to designate the many forms of knowledge by one definition.

THEAET. But I assure you, Socrates, I have often tried to work that out, when I heard reports of the questions that you asked, but I can neither persuade myself that I have any satisfactory answer, nor can I find anyone else who gives the kind of answer you insist upon; and yet, on the other hand, I cannot get rid of a feeling of concern about the matter.

soc. Yes, you are suffering the pangs of labour, Theaetetus, because you are not empty, but pregnant.

THEAET. I do not know, Socrates; I merely tell you what I feel.
PLATO

149 εἰτα, ὁ καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὡς ἐγὼ εἰμι ὅσοι μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαναρέτης;

 thần. Ἡδη τούτο γε ἡκουσα.

 θεα. Ἀρα καὶ, ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην, ἀκήκοας;

 θεα. Οὐδαμῶς.

 ζην. Ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι μὴ μέντοι μου κατείπης πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους. λέληθα γάρ, ὃ ἐταίρη, ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην· οί δὲ, ἀτικνίητος, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἔμοι, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοποπώτατος εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν. ἦ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκήκοας;

 Β θεα. Ἡγωγε.

 ζην. Εἴπω οὖν σοι τὸ αἰτίον;

 θεα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

 ζην. Ἐννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἀπαν ὡς ἔχει, καὶ ραν μαθήσεις ὁ βουλομαι. οἰσθα γάρ πον ὡς οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἐτι αὐτὴ κυῖσκομένη τε καὶ τίκτουσα ἄλλας μαιεύεται, ἀλλ' αἱ ἦδη ἀδύνατοι τίκτειν.

 θεα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

 ζην. Αἰτίαν δὲ γε τοῦτο φασίν εἶναι τὴν Ἀρ- τεμίν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν ἁλκείαν εἶληκε. στερεί-

 ζην. Ζ φαίς μὲν οὖν ἀρα οὐκ ἐδωκε μαιεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἡ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὁν ἄν ἡ ἀπειρος ταῖς δὲ δι' ἥλικιαν ἀτόκοις προσέταξε τιμώσα τὴν αὐτῆς ὁμοιότητα.

 θεα. Εἰκός.

 ζην. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸδε εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον,
THEAETETUS

soc. Have you then not heard, you absurd boy, that I am the son of a noble and burly midwife, Phaenarete?

THEAET. Yes, I have heard that.

soc. And have you also heard that I practise the same art?

THEAET. No, never.

soc. But I assure you it is true; only do not tell on me to the others; for it is not known that I possess this art. But other people, since they do not know it, do not say this of me, but say that I am a most eccentric person and drive men to distraction. Have you heard that also?

THEAET. Yes, I have.

soc. Shall I tell you the reason then?

THEAET. Oh yes, do.

soc. Just take into consideration the whole business of the midwives, and you will understand more easily what I mean. For you know, I suppose, that no one of them attends other women while she is still capable of conceiving and bearing but only those do so who have become too old to bear.

THEAET. Yes, certainly.

soc. They say the cause of this is Artemis, because she, a childless goddess, has had childbirth allotted to her as her special province. Now it would seem she did not allow barren women to be midwives, because human nature is too weak to acquire an art which deals with matters of which it has no experience, but she gave the office to those who on account of age were not bearing children, honouring them for their likeness to herself.

THEAET. Very likely.

soc. Is it not, then, also likely and even necessary,
PLATO

τὰς κνούσας καὶ μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν μαίων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων;

θεαῖ. Πάνω γε.

ζην. Καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαι γε αἱ μαίαι φαρμάκια

καὶ ἐπάδουσαι δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ἀδίνας καὶ

μαθηκωτέρας, ἂν βούλωνται, ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτεων

τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἕαν νέον ὁνὲ ἄξη

ἀμβλίσκεων, ἀμβλίσκουσιν;

θεαῖ. Ἡστι ταῦτα.

ζην. Ἀρ' οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἡσθησαι, ὧν

καὶ προμνήστριαι εἰσὶ δεινόταται, ὡς πάσοσοι

οὖσαι περὶ τοῦ γνῶναι ποιαν χρή ποιῶ ἄνδρὶ

συνοῦσαι ὡς ἄριστον παῖδας τίκτεων;

θεαῖ. Οὐ πάνω τούτο οἶδα.

ζην. Ἀλλ' ἵσθι οὖν ἐπὶ τούτῳ μεῖζον φρονοῦσιν

Ε ὡς ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμηληθημίᾳ. ἐννόει γάρ τῆς αὐρῆς

ἢ ἄλλης οἷς τέχνης εἶναι θεραπείαν τε καὶ συγκο-μαδὴν τῶν ἐκ γῆς καρπῶν καὶ ἀν τὸ γιγνώσκειν εἰς

ποιαν γῆν ποιον φυτὸν τε καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητέον;

θεαῖ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς.

ζην. Εἰς γυναῖκα δὲ, ὁ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἷς τοῦ
tουστοῦ, ἄλλην δὲ συγκομιδής;

θεαῖ. Οὕκοιν εἰκός γε.

150 ζην. Οὐ γάρ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἀδικοῦν τε καὶ

ἀπεχθών συναγωγῆς ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ἢ δὴ

πραγμαγιὰ ὅνομα, φεύγουσι καὶ τῆς προμνηστικῆς

ἀτε σεμναὶ οὖσαι αἱ μαίαι, φοβοῦμεναι μὴ εἰς

ἐκεῖνην τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ ταύτην ἐμπέσωσιν· ἐπεὶ

1 νέον ὁνὲ of the mss. is impossible; Schanz suggests νόμων “lawful,” Adam ἕνδον “the womb.” Possibly Plato wrote ἀνέτον “permissible.”
THEAETETUS

that midwives should know better than anyone else who are pregnant and who are not?

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. And furthermore, the midwives, by means of drugs and incantations, are able to arouse the pangs of labour and, if they wish, to make them milder, and to cause those to bear who have difficulty in bearing; and they cause miscarriages if they think them desirable.

THEAET. That is true.

SOC. Well, have you noticed this also about them, that they are the most skilful of matchmakers, since they are very wise in knowing what union of man and woman will produce the best possible children?

THEAET. I do not know that at all.

SOC. But be assured that they are prouder of this than of their skill in cutting the umbilical cord. Just consider. Do you think the knowledge of what soil is best for each plant or seed belongs to the same art as the tending and harvesting of the fruits of the earth, or to another?

THEAET. To the same art.

SOC. And in the case of a woman, do you think, my friend, that there is one art for the sowing and another for the harvesting?

THEAET. It is not likely.

SOC. No; but because there is a wrongful and unscientific way of bringing men and women together, which is called pandering, the midwives, since they are women of dignity and worth, avoid match-making, through fear of falling under the charge of pander-
PLATO

tαῖς γε ὄντως μαίας μόναις ποὺ προσήκει καὶ προμνήσασθαι ὀρθῶς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

σό. Τὸ μὲν τοῖνυν τῶν μαίων τοσοῦτον, ἐλαττον δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος. οὐ γὰρ πρόσεστι γυναῖξιν

Β ἐνίοτε μὲν εἰδωλα τίκτευν, ἐστι δὲ ὅτι ἀληθινά, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ράδιον εἶναι διαγράμα. εἰ γὰρ

προσήν, μέγιστον τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον ἦν ἂν ταῖσ μαίας τὸ κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς τε καὶ μῆ. ἦ

οὐκ οἶει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡς ἔγραψε.

7. σο. Τῇ δὲ γ' ἐμῆ ἐπεξεργαζόμενα μαίας τὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ ὑπάρχει ὡσα ἐκεῖνα, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ

τῇ ἀνδρᾷ ἀλλὰ μὴ γυναῖκας μαίευσθαι καὶ τῷ

ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὐτῶν τικτοῦσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ

τὰ σώματα. μέγιστον δὲ τούτ' ἐν τῇ ἁμαρχῇ

C τέχνη, βασανίζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ,

πότερον εἰδωλον καὶ ψεύδεσις ἀποτίκτει τοῦν ή

διάνοια ἡ γόνυμον τε καὶ ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε

καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει, ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις'. ἄγονος εἴμι

σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἂ�ὴ πολλοὶ μοι ὑπενείδισαν, ὡς

τόσο σοῦ γὰρ ἐστὶν, ἂν ἐνδού ἀποκρί

νομαὶ περὶ ὑπόθεσιν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφῶν,

ἀληθῶς ὑπενείδισαν. τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο τόδε.

μαίευσθαι μὲ ὅ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώ

λυσεῖ. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάντω τοῖς σοφῶς.

D οὐδὲ τί μοι ἐστὶν εὐρήμα τοιοῦτον γεγονός τῆς

ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἔγκοιν. οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ συγγενώμενοι τὸ

μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται ἐκοίνοι μὲν καὶ πάντω ἀμαθεῖς,

πάντες δὲ πρὸ τοῦτο τῆς ἱστούσιας, οἴσπερ Ῥ ὁ

θεὸς παρείκη, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς.
THEAETETUS

ing. And yet the true midwife is the only proper match-maker.

THEAET. It seems so.

SOC. So great, then, is the importance of midwives; but their function is less important than mine. For women do not, like my patients, bring forth at one time real children and at another mere images which it is difficult to distinguish from the real. For if they did, the greatest and noblest part of the work of the midwives would be in distinguishing between the real and the false. Do you not think so?

THEAET. Yes, I do.

SOC. All that is true of their art of midwifery is true also of mine, but mine differs from theirs in being practised upon men, not women, and in tending their souls in labour, not their bodies. But the greatest thing about my art is this, that it can test in every way whether the mind of the young man is bringing forth a mere image, an imposture, or a real and genuine offspring. For I have this in common with the midwives: I am sterile in point of wisdom, and the reproach which has often been brought against me, that I question others but make no reply myself about anything, because I have no wisdom in me, is a true reproach; and the reason of it is this: the god compels me to act as midwife, but has never allowed me to bring forth. I am, then, not at all a wise person myself, nor have I any wise invention, the offspring born of my own soul; but those who associate with me, although at first some of them seem very ignorant, yet, as our acquaintance advances, all of them to whom the god is gracious make wonderful progress, not only
αὕτως τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσιν καὶ τούτῳ ἐναργεῖς ὅτι παρ' ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐτῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ εὑρόντες τε καὶ τεκόντες.1 τῆς μέντοι μαυείας ὁ θεός τε καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος. ὃδε δὲ δὴλον πολλόι ἦδη

Ε τούτῳ ἀγνοήσαντες καὶ έαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἡ αὕτως ἡ ὑπ' ἄλλων πειθόντες ἀπήλθον πρωαίτερον τοῦ δεόντος, ἂπελθόντες δὲ τὰ τε λοιπὰ εξήμβλωσαν διὰ πονηρῶν συννοικίων καὶ τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μαυευθέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν, τευεύδη καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἄλθους, τελευτῶντες δ' αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδοξαί ἄμαθεῖς εἴναι. ὃν εἷς γέγονεν

151 Ἄριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάνω πολλοί· οἷς, ῥημαὶ πάλιν ἐλθώσι δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς συννοικίας καὶ θεωματὰ δράωσιν, ἐνίοτε μὲν τὸ γηγυνόμενον μοι δαμόνιον ἀποκωλύει συνεῖναι, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἐά, καὶ πάλιν οὖτοι 2 ἐπιδιδόσι. πάσχοι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ συγγυνόμενοι καὶ τούτῳ ταύτῳ ταῖς τικτούσαις· ὑδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπήπι- πλανναι νῦκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἦ ἐκεῖνας.3 ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὑδίνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀποπαύειν ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται. καὶ οὖτοι μὲν

Β δὴ οὖτοι. ἐνίοτε 4 δέ, ὁ Θεαίττης, οἱ οὗ τι καὶ μὴ δόξωσι πῶς ἐγκύμονες εἴναι, γνοὺς ὑπὶ οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δεόνται, πάνω εὕμερος προμνῆμαι καὶ, σὺν

1 καὶ τεκόντες W, Berol.; κατέχοντες Β.Τ.
2 οὖτοι Τ; αὐτοὶ Β.
3 ἐκεῖνα B; κεῖνα T.
4 ἐνίοτε Berol., Burnet; ἐνίοτε ΒΤ; ἐνίοτε W.

36
THEAETETUS

in their own opinion, but in that of others as well. And it is clear that they do this, not because they have ever learned anything from me, but because they have found in themselves many fair things and have brought them forth. But the delivery is due to the god and me. And the proof of it is this: many before now, being ignorant of this fact and thinking that they were themselves the cause of their success, but despising me, have gone away from me sooner than they ought, whether of their own accord or because others persuaded them to do so. Then, after they have gone away, they have miscarried thenceforth on account of evil companionship, and the offspring which they had brought forth through my assistance they have reared so badly that they have lost it; they have considered impostures and images of more importance than the truth, and at last it was evident to themselves, as well as to others, that they were ignorant. One of these was Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus, and there are very many more. When such men come back and beg me, as they do, with wonderful eagerness to let them join me again, the spiritual monitor that comes to me forbids me to associate with some of them, but allows me to converse with others, and these again make progress. Now those who associate with me are in this matter also like women in childbirth; they are in pain and are full of trouble night and day, much more than are the women; and my art can arouse this pain and cause it to cease. Well, that is what happens to them. But in some cases, Theaetetus, when they do not seem to me to be exactly pregnant, since I see that they have no need of me, I act with perfect goodwill
PLATO

θεῷ εἰπεῖν, πάνω ἴκανῶς τοπάζων οῖς ἂν συγγενώμενοι ὄναμτο· ἂν πολλοὺς μὲν δὴ ἐξεδωκα Προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις σοφοῖς τε καὶ θεσσαρείοις ἄνδράςι.

Ταύτα δὴ σου, ὦ ἄριστε, ἐνεκα τούτῳ ἐμὴκυνα, ὑποπτεύων 1 σε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἶει, ὃδιεν ταῦτα κυνύντα ἔδω. προσφέρειν οὖν πρὸς με ὅς πρὸς θαλάς ὑποήλος καὶ αὐτὸν μαζευτικός, καὶ ἄν ἐρωτών προβαθμὸν ὅπως οἶος τ’, εἰ ὅτως ἀποκρίνασθαι· καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σκοπούμενος τι ἂν ἂν λέγηση ἢ ἢκης—μαίρει ἐδώλων καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἴτη ὑπεξαιρώμαι καὶ ἀποβάλλω, 2 μὴ ἀγριάων ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτότοκοι πέρι τὰ παιδά. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἔδω, ὦ θαυμάστε, πρὸς με οὔτω διετέθησαν, ὡστε ἀτεχνῶς δάκρυνεν ἐτοιμοὶ εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα λήσων αὐτῶν ἄφαιρώμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἴνωτε με εὐνοία τούτο ποιεῖν,

ἀ σώρῳ ὅντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεῖς θεὸς δύσνοις ἄνθρωποις, οὔδ’ ἑγὼ δυσνοίᾳ τοιούτοιν οὔτε ἄνθρωπος ἄλλα μοι ἰγνός τε συγχωρήσῃ καὶ ἀληθῆς ἀφαιρήσῃ οὐδαμῶς θέμας. πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὦ Θεοίτητος, ὦ τι ποτ’ ἐστίν ἐπιστήμη; πειρῶ λέγειν· ὡς δ’ οὖχ οἶος τ’ εἰ, μηδέποτε εἴπης. ἐὰν γὰρ θεὸς ἐθέλῃ καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ, οἶος τ’ ἔσει.

8. θει. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σωκράτε, σοῦ γε οὔτω παρακελευμένον αἰσχρὸν μὴ οὐ παντὶ ἐτρόπῳ προδεικνύεσθαι ὦ τι τις ἔχει λέγειν. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὃ ἑπιστήμων τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὁ ἐπιστήσαται, καὶ ὡς γε νῦν φαίνεται, οὐκ ἀλλ’ τί ἐστιν ἑπιστήμη ἢ αἰσθήσις.

1 ὑποπτεύων B; ὑποπτεύω al.
2 ἀποβάλλω T; ὑποβάλλω B; ἀποβάλλω W.
as match-maker and, under God, I guess very successfully with whom they can associate profitably, and I have handed over many of them to Prodicus, and many to other wise and inspired men.

Now I have said all this to you at such length, my dear boy, because I suspect that you, as you yourself believe, are in pain because you are pregnant with something within you. Apply, then, to me, remembering that I am the son of a midwife and have myself a midwife’s gifts, and do your best to answer the questions I ask as I ask them. And if, when I have examined any of the things you say, it should prove that I think it is a mere image and not real, and therefore quietly take it from you and throw it away, do not be angry as women are when they are deprived of their first offspring. For many, my dear friend, before this have got into such a state of mind towards me that they are actually ready to bite me, if I take some foolish notion away from them, and they do not believe that I do this in kindness, since they are far from knowing that no god is unkind to mortals, and that I do nothing of this sort from unkindness, either, and that it is quite out of the question for me to allow an imposture or to destroy the true. And so, Theaetetus, begin again and try to tell us what knowledge is. And never say that you are unable to do so; for if God wills it and gives you courage, you will be able.

THETAET. Well then, Socrates, since you are so urgent it would be disgraceful for anyone not to exert himself in every way to say what he can. I think, then, that he who knows anything perceives that which he knows, and, as it appears at present, knowledge is nothing else than perception.
PLATO

ςν. ἐγ γε καὶ γενναῖως, ὦ παῖ· χρῆ γὰρ οὕτως ἀποφαίνουμενον λέγειν. ἄλλα φέρε δὴ αὐτὸ κοινὴ σκεψώμεθα, γόνιμον ἢ ἀνέμαιον τυγχάνει ὄν. αἰσθήσεις, φύς, ἐπιστήμη;

θεαί. Ναί.

ςν. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὕτως φαίλον εἰρη-152 κέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἄλλ' ὅν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωτ-αγόρας. τρόπον δὲ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησί γὰρ ποι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρωπὸν εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἐστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἐστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γὰρ ποι;

θεαί. Ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.

ςν. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἐκαι-στα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἐστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὐ σοί· ἀνθρωπὸς δὲ σὺ τε κἀγὼ;

θεαί. Λέγει γὰρ οὐν οὕτω.

Β ςν. Εἰκός μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν· ἐπι-ακολούθησομεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἄρ' οὐκ ἔνιοτε πνεόν-τος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὦ μὲν ἡμῶν ρίγοι, ὦ ὦ σοί; καὶ ὦ μὲν ἡρέμα, ὦ δὲ σφόδρα;

θεαί. Καὶ μάλα.

ςν. Πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἔφ' ἕαυτοῦ τὸ πνεύμα ψυχρόν ἢ οὖ ψυχρόν φήσομεν; ἡ πεισόμεθα τῶ Πρωταγόρα ὅτι τῶ μὲν ρυγοῦντι ψυχρόν, τῶ δὲ μὴ οὖ;

θεαί. Ἔοικεν.

ςν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτω ἐκατέρφω;

θεαί. Ναί.

1 ἕαυτοῦ W, Berol.; ἕαυτὸ BT.
socr. Good! Excellent, my boy! That is the way one ought to speak out. But come now, let us examine your utterance together, and see whether it is a real offspring or a mere wind-egg. Perception, you say, is knowledge?

Theaet. Yes.

socr. And, indeed, if I may venture to say so, it is not a bad description of knowledge that you have given, but one which Protagoras also used to give. Only, he has said the same thing in a different way. For he says somewhere that man is "the measure of all things, of the existence of the things that are and the non-existence of the things that are not." You have read that, I suppose?

Theaet. Yes, I have read it often.

socr. Well, is not this about what he means, that individual things are for me such as they appear to me, and for you in turn such as they appear to you—you and I being "man"?

Theaet. Yes, that is what he says.

socr. It is likely that a wise man is not talking nonsense; so let us follow after him. Is it not true that sometimes, when the same wind blows, one of us feels cold, and the other does not? or one feels slightly and the other exceedingly cold?

Theaet. Certainly.

socr. Then in that case, shall we say that the wind is in itself cold or not cold; or shall we accept Protagoras's saying that it is cold for him who feels cold and not for him who does not?

Theaet. Apparently we shall accept that.

socr. Then it also seems cold, or not, to each of the two?

Theaet. Yes.
PLATO

ηπ. Τὸ δὲ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐστὶν; 
θεαὶ. Ἐστὶν γὰρ.

C ηπ. Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἰσθήσις ταύτων ἐν τε 
θερμοῖς καὶ πάσι τοῖς τοιούτους. οἷς γὰρ αἰσθάνε- 
ται ἐκαστὸς, τοιαῦτα ἐκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι. 
θεαὶ. Ἐοικεν.

ηπ. Αἰσθήσις ἄρα τοῦ ὅντος ἀεὶ ἐστὶν καὶ 
ἀψευδὴς ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὕσα.
θεαὶ. Φαίνεται.

ηπ. Ἀρ' οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσοσοφός τις ἦν ὁ 
Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τούτῳ ἦμιν μὲν ἡνίξατο τῷ 
πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ 
τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν;

D θεαὶ. Πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις;
ηπ. Ἔγω ἔρω καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαίλον λόγον. ὡς 
ἄρα ἐν μὲν αὐτῷ καὶ αὐτῷ οὐδέν ἐστὶν, οὐδ' ἂν τι 
προσείποις ὀρθώς οὐδ' ὅποιον ὄν τι, ἀλλ', ἐὰν ὡς 
μέγα προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ συμφώνοιν φανεῖται, καὶ 
ἐὰν μαρύ, κουφον, ἐμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς 
ὄντος ἐνόσ μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὅποιον· ἐκ δὲ δὴ 
φοράς τε καὶ κνήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα 
γίγνεται πάντα α' δὴ φαίνει εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς 
προσαγορεύσεις· ἐστὶν μὲν γὰρ οὕδετον οὐδέν, ἀεὶ 
E δὲ γίγνεται· καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντως ἑξίς οἱ σοφοὶ 
πλὴν Παρμενίδου συμφερέσθων, ἡγεμόνας καὶ Ἠράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιη-
τῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιῆσεως ἐκατέρας, κωμῳδίας 
μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὀμήρος, δὲ ἐπίτων 
'Ωκεανὸν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθᾶν

1 συμφερέσθων B (ut videtur), Burnet; συμφέρεσθον TW, Berol., Eus.; συμφέρωντα Stobaeus.
2 ὅς add. Heindorf.
THEAETETUS

soc. But "seems" denotes perceiving?
THEAET. It does.
soc. Then seeming and perception are the same
thing in matters of warmth and everything of that
sort. For as each person perceives things, such they
are to each person.
THEAET. Apparently.
soc. Perception, then, is always of that which
exists and, since it is knowledge, cannot be false.
THEAET. So it seems.
soc. By the Graces! I wonder if Protagoras,
who was a very wise man, did not utter this dark
saying to the common herd like ourselves, and tell
the truth¹ in secret to his pupils.
THEAET. Why, Socrates, what do you mean by that?
soc. I will tell you and it is not a bad description,
either, that nothing is one and invariable, and you
could not rightly ascribe any quality whatsoever to
anything, but if you call it large it will also appear
to be small, and light if you call it heavy, and every-
thing else in the same way, since nothing whatever
is one, either a particular thing or of a particular
quality; but it is out of movement and motion and
mixture with one another that all those things become
which we wrongly say "are"—wrongly, because
nothing ever is, but is always becoming. And on
this subject all the philosophers, except Parmenides,
may be marshalled in one line—Protagoras and Hera-
cleitus and Empedocles—and the chief poets in the
two kinds of poetry, Epicharmus, in comedy, and in
tragedy, Homer, who, in the line

Oceanus the origin of the gods, and Tethys their mother²

¹ An allusion to the title of Protagoras's book, Truth.
² Homer, Iliad, xiv. 201, 302.
PLATO

πάντα εϊρήκεν ἐκγόνα ροής τε καὶ κινήσεως. ἦ
οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν;

THEAI. Ἐμοίγε.

9. ἔπ. Τίς οὖν ἄν ἑτὶ πρὸς γε τοσοῦτον
153 στρατόπεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν. Όμηρον δύνατο
ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ οὐ 1 καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι;
THEAI. Οὐ ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ἔπ. Οὐ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἔπει καὶ τάδε τῷ
λόγῳ σημεῖα ἰκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ
γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ
ἀπόλλυσθαι ἴσουχία. τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν τε καὶ πῦρ,
ὅ τι καὶ τάλλα γεννᾶ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶ-
tαι ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως. τούτω 2 δὲ κινήσει.
ἡ οὖχ αὕται γενέσεις πυρός;

B THEAI. Αὕτα μὲν οὖν.

ἔπ. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε τῶν ζῴων γένος ἐκ τῶν
αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται.

THEAI. Πῶς δὲ οὖ;

ἔπ. Τί δὲ; ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἔξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἴσου-
χίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ
καὶ κινήσεων ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ 3 σύζεται;

THEAI. Ναι.

ἔπ. 'Ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως
μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεων ὄντων, 4 κτάται τε
μαθήματα καὶ σύζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ
δ' ἴσουχίας, ἀμελητρίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας οὕσης,
C οὔτε τι μανθάνει ἃ τε ἂν μάθῃ ἐπιλαμβάνεται;

1 μὴ οὐ W, Eus., Stobaeus; μὴ BT.
2 τοῦτω B⁴ W, Berol.; τοῦτο BT, Stobaeus.
3 ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ B, Stobaeus; ὦς ὀπλὸ T (ὡς above the
   line); ὀπλὸ Burnet.
4 κινήσεων οὖσῶν Stobaeus; κινησίων δυτοῦn Buttmann.

44
THEAETETUS

has said that all things are the offspring of flow and motion; or don't you think he means that?

THEAET. I think he does.

SOC. Then who could still contend with such a great host, led by Homer as general, and not make himself ridiculous?

THEAET. It is not easy, Socrates.

SOC. No, Theaetetus, it is not. For the doctrine is amply proved by this, namely, that motion is the cause of that which passes for existence, that is, of becoming, whereas rest is the cause of non-existence and destruction; for warmth or fire, which, you know, is the parent and preserver of all other things, is itself the offspring of movement and friction, and these two are forms of motion. Or are not these the source of fire?

THEAET. Yes, they are.

SOC. And furthermore, the animal kingdom is sprung from these same sources.

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. Well, then, is not the bodily habit destroyed by rest and idleness, and preserved, generally speaking, by gymnastic exercises and motions?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And what of the habit of the soul? Does not the soul acquire information and is it not preserved and made better through learning and practice, which are motions, whereas through rest, which is want of practice and of study, it learns nothing and forgets what it has learned?
PLATO

THEAI. Kai μάλα.

Σ. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθὸν κίνησις κατὰ τε φυχὴν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τοῦναντίον;

THEAI. Ἐοικεν.

Σ. Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τουαύτα, οτι αἰ μὲν ἡσυχίας σήμουσι καὶ ἀπολλύσει, τὰ δὲ ἐτερα σώζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφώνα ἀναγκάζων προσβιβάζων, τὴν χρυσῃν σειρὰν ὥς οὐδὲν ἀλλο ἢ τὸν ἤλιον Ὀμήρος λέγει, δ καὶ δηλοὶ ὅτι ἐως μὲν ἢ περιφορὰ ἢ κυνομένη καὶ ὁ ἤλιος, πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ σώζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις, εἰ δὲ σταῖῃ τοῦτο ὠσπέρ δεῖθεν, πάντα χρήματ' ἀν διαφθορεῖτ καὶ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα;

THEAI. Ἀλλ' ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες, ταῦτα δηλοῦν, ἄπερ λέγεις.

10. Σ. Ἐπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὡς ἄριστε, οὐτωσί· κατὰ τὰ ὁμομάτα πρῶτον, δ ὅτι καλείς χρώμα λευκὸν, μὴ εἰναι αὐτὸ ἐτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὁμομάτων μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὁμομάσιι· μηδὲ τιν' αὐτῷ
Ε χώραν ἀποτάξῃς. ἦνη γὰρ ἂν εἰς τὸ δήποτε ἐν
τάξει καὶ μένον ἂν οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο.

THEAI. Ἀλλὰ πῶς;

1 ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων TW, Berol.; ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων B, Stobaeus; προσβιβάζω (omitting ἀναγκάζω) Cobet, followed by Burnet. Possibly ἀναγράφω προσβιβάζων.

2 δήποτε Schanz; ἂν τοῦ BT.

3 καὶ μένον Stobaeus; κειμένοι pr. B (corr. καὶ μένοι); κειμένον T.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Certainly.
soc. Then the good, both for the soul and for the body, is motion, and rest is the opposite?
THEAET. Apparently.
soc. Now shall I go on and mention to you also windless air, calm sea, and all that sort of thing, and say that stillness causes decay and destruction and that the opposite brings preservation? And shall I add to this the all-compelling and crowning argument that Homer by "the golden chain" 1 refers to nothing else than the sun, and means that so long as the heavens and the sun go round everything exists and is preserved, among both gods and men, but if the motion should stop, as if bound fast, everything would be destroyed and would, as the saying is, be turned upside down?
THEAET. Yes, Socrates, I think he means what you say he does.
soc. Then, my friend, you must apply the doctrine in this way: first as concerns vision, the colour that you call white is not to be taken as something separate outside of your eyes, nor yet as something inside of them; and you must not assign any place to it, for then it would at once be in a definite position and stationary and would have no part in the process of becoming.
THEAET. But what do you mean?

1 Homer, Iliad, viii. 18 ff., especially 26. In this passage Zeus declares that all the gods and goddesses together could not, with a golden chain, drag him from on high, but that if he pulled, he would drag them, with earth and sea, would then bind the chain round the summit of Olympus, and all the rest would hang aloft. This "crowning argument" is a reductio ad absurdum of the habit of using texts from Homer in support of all kinds of doctrine.
PLATO

ση. Ἐπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἐν ὧν τιθέντες· καὶ ἦμιν οὕτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ὁς οὖν ἄλλο χρώμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φοράν φανεῖται γεγενημένον, καὶ δ’ ἡ ἔκαστον εἶναι 154 φαίμεν χρώμα, οὕτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὕτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ τι ἐκάστῳ ἑαυτῷ γεγονός· ἢ οὐ διωχῦσαι ἃν ὡς, οἷον σοι φαίνεται ἔκαστον χρώμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὁμοίων ζῴῳ;

θεαί. Μὰ Δί’ ὅυκ ἔγνωγε.

ση. Τί δέ; ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀρ’ ὁμοίον καὶ σοι φαίνεται ὁμοίων; ἔχεις τούτῳ ὁμοίως, ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅτι οὕτε σοι αὐτῷ ταύτῳ διὰ τὸ μηδεποτε ὁμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν;

θεαί. Τοῦτο μᾶλλον μοι δοκεῖ ἡ ἐκεῖνο.

ση. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν φ’ 1 παραμετρούμεθα ἡ οὐ Β ἐφαπτόμεθα, μέγα ἡ λευκὸν ἡ θερμὸν ἡν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἄλλῳ προσπεσόν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγεγόνει, αὐτῷ γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλων· εἰ δὲ αὐτὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἐφαπτόμενον ἔκαστον ἤν τούτων, οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἄλλο προσελθόντος ἢ τι παθόντως αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθῶν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγένετο. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, ὡς φίλε, θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοία εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν, ὡς φαίη ἢν Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνῳ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν.

1 φ mss. ; δ Cornarius.
THEAETETUS

soc. Let us stick close to the statement we made a moment ago, and assume that nothing exists by itself as invariably one: then it will be apparent that black or white or any other colour whatsoever is the result of the impact of the eye upon the appropriate motion, and therefore that which we call colour will be in each instance neither that which impinges nor that which is impinged upon, but something between, which has occurred, peculiar to each individual. Or would you maintain that each colour appears to a dog, or any other animal you please, just as it does to you?

THEAET. No, by Zeus, I wouldn't.

soc. Well, does anything whatsoever appear the same to any other man as to you? Are you sure of this? Or are you not much more convinced that nothing appears the same even to you, because you yourself are never exactly the same?

THEAET. Yes, I am much more convinced of the last.

soc. Then, if that with which I compare myself in size, or which I touch, were really large or white or hot, it would never have become different by coming in contact with something different, without itself changing; and if, on the other hand, that which did the comparing or the touching were really large or white or hot, it would not have become different when something different approached it or was affected in some way by it, without being affected in some way itself. For nowadays, my friend, we find ourselves rather easily forced to make extraordinary and absurd statements, as Protagoras and everyone who undertakes to agree with him would say.
PLATO

\(\textit{θεαί.} \ Πώς δὴ καὶ ποιὰ λέγεις;\\
C \ επ. \ Σμικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα εἶσει ἃ βούλομαι. ἀστραγάλους γὰρ που ἔξ, ἂν μὲν τέταρτον αὐτοῖς προσενέγκῃς, πλεῖους φαμὲν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων καὶ ἡμιολίους, ἕαν δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις· καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν· ἢ σὺ ἀνέξει;\\
\textit{θεαί.} \ Οὐκ ἔγωγε.\\
\epsilonπ. \ Τί οὖν; ἂν σὲ Πρωταγόρας ἔρθαι ἢ τις ἄλλος· ὁ Θεαίτητε, ἐσθ' ὅπως τι μεῖζον ἢ πλέον γίγνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθὲν; τί ἀποκρυνεῖ;\\
\textit{θεαί.} \ Ἐὰν μὲν, ὁ Σωκράτης, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς D τὴν νῦν ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὃτι οὐκ ἔστων. ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἰπω, ὃτι ἔστων.\\
\epsilonπ. \ Εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἡραν, ὁ φίλε, καὶ θείως. ἀτάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐὰν ἀποκρίνῃ ὅτι ἔστων, Ἐὐριπί- δειόν τι ἐμβηκησαί· ἢ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἠμῖν ἐσται, ἢ δὲ φρήν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος.\\
\textit{θεαί.} \ Ἀληθῆ.\\
\epsilonπ. \ Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἢμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἔξητακότες, ἥδη ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας ἄλληλων ἀποτελέσματοι, Εὐσυνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἄλλη- λων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν· νῦν δὲ ἄτε ἰδιώται πρῶτον βουλησόμεθα θεάσοσθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά, τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἡ διανοούμεθα, πάτερον ἡμῖν ἄλληλους ἐμφανεῖ ἢ οὐδ' ὀπωσδεύον.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. What do you mean? What statements?
SOC. Take a little example and you will know all
I have in mind. Given six dice, for instance, if you
compare four with them, we say that they are more
than the four, half as many again, but if you compare
twelve with them, we say they are less, half as
many; and any other statement would be inadmiss-
ible; or would you admit any other?
THEAET. Not I.
SOC. Well then, if Protagoras, or anyone else, ask
you, “Theaetetus, can anything become greater or
more in any other way than by being increased?”
what reply will you make?
THEAET. If I am to say what I think, Socrates,
with reference to the present question, I should
say “no,” but if I consider the earlier question, I
should say “yes,” for fear of contradicting myself.
SOC. Good, by Hera! Excellent, my friend!
But apparently, if you answer “yes” it will be in
the Euripidean spirit; for our tongue will be un-
convinced, but not our mind.¹
THEAET. True.
SOC. Well, if you and I were clever and wise and
had found out everything about the mind, we should
henceforth spend the rest of our time testing each
other out of the fulness of our wisdom, rushing
together like sophists in a sophistical combat, batter-
ing each other’s arguments with counter arguments.
But, as it is, since we are ordinary people, we shall
wish in the first place to look into the real essence of
our thoughts and see whether they harmonize with
one another or not at all.

¹ Eurip. Hippol. 612, ἡ γλῶσσα δημώοχ' ἡ δὲ φήμη ἀνώμορος,
“my tongue has sworn, but my mind is unsworn.”
PLATO

θεα. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε τούτ' ἂν βουλοίμην.

II. σκ. Καὶ μὴν ἐγώ. οὐτέ δ' οὕτως ἔχει,

ἀλλ' ὁτι ἡ ἡρέμα, ἂς πάνω πολλὴν σχολὴν ἁγοντες,

155 πάλιν ἐπανασκεφόμεθα, οὐ δυσκολάινοντες, ἀλλὰ
tῶι ὁντὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἔξετάζοντες, ἄτατα ποτ' ἐστὶ
tαῦτα τὰ φάσματα ἐν ἡμῖν; ὃν πρῶτον ἑπισκο-
πούντες φήσομεν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν
ἀν μείζον μηδὲ ἐλάττων γενέσθαι μήτε ὁγκῷ μήτε
ἀριθμῷ, ἐως ἵναν εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ. οὐχ οὕτως;

θεα. Ναι.

σκ. Δεύτερον δὲ γε, ὃ μήτε προστιθοῦτο μήτε
ἀφαιρεῖτο, τούτῳ μήτε αὐξάνεσθαι ποτὲ μήτε
φθίνειν, ἀεὶ δὲ ἵναν εἴναι.

θεα. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

Β σκ. 'Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ οἷς καὶ τρίτον, δ' μὴ πρότερον ἦν,

ὑστερον ἀλλὰ τοῦτο εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ
gίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον;

θεα. Δοκεῖ γε δή.

σκ. Ταῦτα δὴ, οἶμαι, ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται
αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν
ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν, ἡ ὅταν φῶμεν ἐμὲ τηλικόνδε
ὅντα, μήτε αὐξηθέντα μήτε τούναντιαν παθόντα, ἐν
ἐνιαυτῷ σοῦ τοῦ νέου νῦν μὲν μείζω εἴναι, ὑστερον
dὲ ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὅγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος

C ἀλλὰ σοῦ αὐξηθέντος. εἰμὶ γὰρ δὴ ὑστερον ὁ

πρότερον οὐκ ἤ, οὐ γενόμενος: ἀνεῖ γὰρ τοῦ γί-
gνεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπολλύς τοῦ
ὁγκοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐγιγνόμην ἐλάττων. καὶ ἀλλα
dὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίων οὕτως ἔχει, εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα

1 ὑστερον ἀλλὰ BT (schol. ὁ Πρόκλος το ἀλλὰ παρέλκειν λέγει,
i.α. ἀλλὰ is transposed to the second place); ἀλλὰ ὑστερον
Stephanus et al.

52
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Certainly that is what I should like.

SOC. And so should I. But since this is the case, and we have plenty of time, shall we not quietly, without any impatience, but truly examining ourselves, consider again the nature of these appearances within us? And as we consider them, I shall say, I think, first, that nothing can ever become more or less in size or number, so long as it remains equal to itself. Is it not so?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And secondly, that anything to which nothing is added and from which nothing is subtracted, is neither increased nor diminished, but is always equal.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. And should we not say thirdly, that what was not previously could not afterwards be without becoming and having become?

THEAET. Yes, I agree.

SOC. These three assumptions contend with one another in our minds when we talk about the dice, or when we say that I, who do not, at my age, either increase in size or diminish, am in the course of a year first larger than you, who are young, and afterwards smaller, when nothing has been taken from my size, but you have grown. For I am, it seems, afterwards what I was not before, and I have not become so; for it is impossible to have become without becoming, and without losing anything of my size I could not become smaller. And there are countless myriads of such contradictions; if we are to accept these that I have mentioned. You follow
PLATO

παραδεξόμεθα. ἐπει 1 γὰρ που, ὡ Θεαίτητε·
δοκεῖς γοῦν μοι οὐκ ἀπειρος τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι.

Θεαί. Καὶ νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς γε, ὡ Σώκρατες, ὑπερ-
φυῶς ὡς θαυμάζω τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐνίοτε
ὡς ἀληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινῶι.

Δ ἡ. Θεόδωρος γὰρ, ὡ φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς
tοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεως σου. μάλα γὰρ φιλο-
σόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ
ἀλλή ἄρχη φιλοσοφίας ἡ αὐτὴ, καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν
Ὀρν Θαύμαντος ἐκγονον φήσαι οὐ κακῶς γενεα-
λογεῖν. ἀλλὰ πότερον μανθάνεις ἢ ὅτι ὁ ταῦτα
τοιαῦτ’ ἐστίν ἢ λέγει τῶν Πρωταγόραν φαμὲν
λέγειν, ἢ οὕτω.

Θεαί. Οὔπω μοι δοκῶ.

Ἐ. Χάριν ὅν μοι εἴσει, ἔάν σοι ἀνδρός, μᾶλ-
λον δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὄνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν
ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν;

Θεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εἴσομαι, καὶ πᾶν γε πολλήν;

12. ἡ. Ἄρθρει δὴ περισκοπῶν μὴ τις τῶν
ἀμυντῶν ἑπακούῃ. εἰσίν δὲ οὕτωι οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο
οἴκεμεν εἶναι ἢ οὐ δὴν δύνασίται ἄπριξ τῶν χερῶν
λαβέσθαι, πράξεις δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἄόρα-
tον οὐκ ἀποδεξόμενοι ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει.

Θεαί. Καὶ μὲν δή, ὡ Σώκρατες, σκληροῦσι γε
156 λέγεις καὶ ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους.

Ἐ. Εἰσὶν γὰρ, ὡ παῖ, μᾶλ’ εἰ ἄμοισοι· ἀλλοὶ
dὲ πολὺ κομψότεροι, ὡς μέλλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια
λέγειν. ἄρχη δὲ, ἐξ ἦς 2 καὶ ἀ νῦν ἦ δὲ ἐλέγομεν
πᾶντα ἡρτίται, ἦδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦ
καὶ ἀλλο παρὰ τούτῳ οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο

1 ἐπει Heindorf; εἰσὲ BT.
2 ἐξ ἦς Wªb; ἐξῆς BTW.

54
me, I take it, Theaetetus, for I think you are not new at such things.

THEAET. By the gods, Socrates, I am lost in wonder when I think of all these things, and sometimes when I regard them it really makes my head swim.

SOC. Theodorus seems to be a pretty good guesser about your nature. For this feeling of wonder shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy, and he who said that Iris was the child of Thaumas\(^1\) made a good genealogy. But do you begin to understand why these things are so, according to the doctrine we attribute to Protagoras, or do you not as yet?

THEAET. Not yet, I think.

SOC. And will you be grateful to me if I help you to search out the hidden truth of the thought of a famous man or, I should say, of famous men?

THEAET. Of course I shall be grateful, very grateful.

SOC. Look round and see that none of the uninitiated is listening. The uninitiated are those who think nothing is except what they can grasp firmly with their hands, and who deny the existence of actions and generation and all that is invisible.

THEAET. Truly, Socrates, those you speak of are very stubborn and perverse mortals.

SOC. So they are, my boy, quite without culture. But others are more clever, whose secret doctrines I am going to disclose to you. For them the beginning, upon which all the things we were just now speaking of depend, is the assumption that everything is real motion and that there is nothing besides this,

\(^1\) Hes. *Theog.* 780. Iris is the messenger of heaven, and Plato interprets the name of her father as "Wonder" (θαύμα).
PLATO

εἶδη, πλήθει μὲν ἀπειρον ἐκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὀμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἐκγόνον πλήθει μὲν ἀπειρα, δίδυμα δὲ, τὸ μὲν Ἄισθητόν, τὸ δὲ Ἀισθησίς, ἀεὶ συνεκτίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ Ἀισθητοῦ. αἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀισθήσεις τὰ τοιάδε ἦμιν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὀφεῖς τε καὶ ἄκοαι καὶ ὀφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις τε καὶ καὔσεις καὶ ἕδοι τε καὶ λίπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκλημέναι καὶ ἄλλαι, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἰ ἀνώνυμοι, παμπληθὲσης δὲ αἱ ὀνομασμέναι· τὸ δ' αὖ Ἀισθητὸν γένος τούτων ἐκάστως ὀμόγονον, ὀφεῖς μὲν χρώ-ματα παντοδαπαίς παντοδαπά, ἄκοαι δὲ ὁσαύτως

ἐφοναί, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις Ἀισθήσεις τὰ ἄλλα Ἀισθητὰ ξυγηγηθή γεγονόμενα. τὰ δ' οὖν ἦμιν βουλεῖται οὕτως ὁ μῦθος, ὑ Θεαίτητε, πρὸς τὰ πρώτηρα; ἄρα ἐννοεῖς;

θεᾶ. Οὐ πάνω, ὡς Σωκράτες.

ζη. Ἀλλ' ἀθρεί, εάν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ. βουλεῖται γὰρ δὴ λέγειν ὡς ταῦτα πάντα μὲν, ὦσπερ λέγομεν, κινεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδύτης ἐνι τῇ κινήσει αὐτῶν. ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τῆν κίνησιν ἵσχει καὶ οὕτω δὴ

ἀγεννᾷ, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ θάττω ἐστίν. φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ὀμια καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτων ἴσω-μέτρων πλησιάσων γεννήσῃ τὴν λευκότητα τε καὶ Ἀισθησιν αὐτῇ ἐξισμυθυτυν, ὁ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐγένετο ἐκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο ἑλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξύ φερομένων τῆς μὲν ὀφείς πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλ-
but that there are two kinds of motion, each infinite in the number of its manifestations, and of these kinds one has an active, the other a passive force. From the union and friction of these two are born offspring, infinite in number, but always twins, the object of sense and the sense which is always born and brought forth together with the object of sense. Now we give the senses names like these: sight and hearing and smell, and the sense of cold and of heat, and pleasures and pains and desires and fears and so forth. Those that have names are very numerous, and those that are unnamed are innumerable. Now the class of objects of sense is akin to each of these; all sorts of colours are akin to all sorts of acts of vision, and in the same way sounds to acts of hearing, and the other objects of sense spring forth akin to the other senses. What does this tale mean for us, Theaetetus, with reference to what was said before? Do you see?

THEAET. Not quite, Socrates.

SOC. Just listen; perhaps we can finish the tale. It means, of course, that all these things are, as we were saying, in motion, and their motion has in it either swiftness or slowness. Now the slow element keeps its motion in the same place and directed towards such things as draw near it, and indeed it is in this way that it begets. But the things begotten in this way are quicker; for they move from one place to another, and their motion is naturally from one place to another. Now when the eye and some appropriate object which approaches beget whiteness and the corresponding perception—which could never have been produced by either of them going to anything else—then, while sight from the eye and white-
PLATO

Ε μάθε, τής δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ συναπτικτοντος τὸ χρώμα, ο μὲν ὀφθαλμός ἄρα ὄψεως ἔμπλευς ἐγένετο καὶ ὄρα δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ τι ὄψιν ἀλλ' ὀφθαλμός ὅρων, τὸ δὲ ἐνγεινήσαν τὸ χρώμα λευκότητος περιπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὐτὸς λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὅτου στΩν 1 ἕννεθι χρώμα 2 χρωσθήναι τῷ τοιοῦτῳ χρώματι. καὶ τάλα δὴ οὖν, σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ 157 μηδὲν εἶναι, δ' δὴ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὠμιλία πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἐνός νοῆσαι, ὡς φασιν, οὕτω εἶναι παγίως. οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἀν τῷ πάσχοντι συνελθῇ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἀν τῷ ποιοῦντι τὸ τε τινι συνελθὼν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλως αὐτὸ προσπεσον πάσχον ἀνεφάνη. ὅστε εἴ τοῖς ἀπάνω τοῦτων, ὅπερ εἴ αρχὴς ἐλέγομεν, οὖν δὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τινι οἷον γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι ἐκ πανταχόθεν ἐξαρτετέον, οὕτω ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἡνακάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρήσαται αὐτῶ. τὸ δ' οὐ δει, ὡς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὕτε τι συγχωρεῖν οὔτε τοῦ οὐτ' ἐμοῦ οὔτε τὸν τόδε οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὔδέν ὅνομα ὁ τι ἀν ἱστῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα· ὡς εάν τι τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐέλεγκτος δ' τούτο

1 ὅτουοιν Schanz; οὕτω οὖν BT; ὅτωοιν Campbell; ὅτιοιν vulg., Burnet.
2 χρώμα BA; χρῆμα Heindorf, Burnet; σχῆμα Schanz.

58
ness from that which helps to produce the colour are moving from one to the other, the eye becomes full of sight and so begins at that moment to see, and becomes, certainly not sight, but a seeing eye, and the object which joined in begetting the colour is filled with whiteness and becomes in its turn, not whiteness, but white, whether it be a stick or a stone, or whatever it be the hue of which is so coloured. And all the rest—hard and hot and so forth—must be regarded in the same way: we must assume, we said before, that nothing exists in itself, but all things of all sorts arise out of motion by intercourse with each other; for it is, as they say, impossible to form a firm conception of the active or the passive element as being anything separately; for there is no active element until there is a union with the passive element, nor is there a passive element until there is a union with the active; and that which unites with one thing is active and appears again as passive when it comes in contact with something else. And so it results from all this, as we said in the beginning, that nothing exists as invariably one, itself by itself, but everything is always becoming in relation to something, and "being" should be altogether abolished, though we have often—and even just now—been compelled by custom and ignorance to use the word. But we ought not, the wise men say, to permit the use of "something" or "somebody's" or "mine" or "this" or "that" or any other word that implies making things stand still, but in accordance with nature we should speak of things as "becoming" and "being made" and "being destroyed" and "changing"; for anyone who by his mode of speech makes things
PLATO

ποιῶν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὖτω λέγειν καὶ
περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ὃ δὴ ἀθροίσματι
C ἄνθρωπον τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἐκαστὸν ζῷόν
tε καὶ εἴδος. ταῦτα δή, ὥς Θεάτητε, ἀρ’ ήδέα
dοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ γενοῦι ἂν αὐτῶν ὡς ἄρεσ-
κόντων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡς οὖν οἶδα ἐγώγα, ὡς Σώκρατες καὶ γὰρ
οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι, πότερα δοκοῦντά
σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἡ ἐμοὶ ἀποπείρᾳ.

ΣΠ. Οὐ μνημονεύεις, ὥς φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὖτ’
oίδα οὔτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν, ἀλλ’
eἰμὶ αὐτῶν ἄγονος, σὲ δὲ μαιεύσομαι καὶ τούτον ἔνεκα
ἐπάδω τε καὶ παρατίθημι ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπο-

D γεύσασθαι, ἐως ἅν εἰς φῶς τὸ σὸν δόγμα ξυν-
εχαγάγω· ἐξαχθέντος δὲ τῷ ἦδη σκέφομαι εἰτ’
ἀνεμαίοιν εἴτε γόνυμον ἀναφανήσεται. ἀλλὰ
θαρρῶν καὶ καρτερῶν εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀποκρίνον
ἀ ἂν φαίνηται σοι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἑρωτῶ.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Ερώτα δή.

13. ΣΠ. Λέγε τοῖνυν πάλιν, εἴ σοι ἄρεσκει
tὸ μὴ τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἄει ἄγαθὸν καὶ
καλὸν καὶ πάντα ἃ ἄρτι διῆμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ’ ἐμοῦγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκοῦ ὡς οὖτω
διεξιότος, θαυμασίως φαίνεται ἃς ἢ χεῖν λόγον
καὶ ὑποληπτέον ἃπερ διελήλυθας.

Ε SP. Μῇ τοῖνυν ἀπολύσωμεν ὥσον ἔλλειπον
αὐτοῦ. λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνών τε περὶ καὶ νόσων,
tῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ μανίας, ὡσα τε παρακούειν
ἡ παρορᾶν ἡ τι ἄλλο παρασθάνεσθαι λέγεται.

1 ἄγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν mss.; seecl. Ast.
THEAETETUS

stand still is easily refuted. And we must use such expressions in relation both to particular objects and collective designations, among which are “mankind” and “stone” and the names of every animal and class. Do these doctrines seem pleasant to you, Theaetetus, and do you find their taste agreeable?

THEAET. I don’t know, Socrates; besides, I can’t tell about you, either, whether you are preaching them because you believe them or to test me.

SOC. You forget, my friend, that I myself know nothing about such things, and claim none of them as mine, but am incapable of bearing them and am merely acting as a midwife to you, and for that reason am uttering incantations and giving you a taste of each of the philosophical theories, until I may help to bring your own opinion to light. And when it is brought to light, I will examine it and see whether it is a mere wind-egg or a real offspring. So be brave and patient, and in good and manly fashion tell what you think in reply to my questions.

THEAET. Very well; ask them.

SOC. Then say once more whether the doctrine pleases you that nothing is, but is always becoming —good or beautiful or any of the other qualities we were just enumerating.

THEAET. Why, when I hear you telling about it as you did, it seems to me that it is wonderfully reasonable and ought to be accepted as you have presented it.

SOC. Let us, then, not neglect a point in which it is defective. The defect is found in connexion with dreams and diseases, including insanity, and everything else that is said to cause illusions of sight and hearing and the other senses. For of course
οἶσθα γὰρ ποῦ ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ὀμολογουμένως ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὅν ἂρτι διήμεν λόγον, ὡς πάντος 158 μᾶλλον ἦμιν ψευδεῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐν αὐτοῖς γυγνομένας, καὶ πολλοῦ δεὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστῳ ταύτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάν τούναντίον ὁυδὲν ὃν φαίνεται εἶναι.

theid. Ἁλθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σῶκρατες.

sn. Τίς δὴ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, λείπεται λόγος τῷ τὴν αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμην τιθεμένῳ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστῳ ταύτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ὃ φαίνεται;

theid. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ὡς εἰπεῖν ὃτι οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, διότι μοι νῦν ἤ δέ ἐπέπληξας εἰπόντι B αὐτό. ἐπεὶ ὃς ἀληθῶς γε οὐκ ἃν δυνάμην ἄμφισβητήσαι ὅσι μανάμενοι ἢ οἱ ὑνεφωτότοντες οὐ ψευδὴ δοξάζουσιν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν θεοί αὐτῶν οἴσονται εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πτηνοὶ τε καὶ ὃς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ διανοοῦνται.

sn. Ἄρ' οὖν οὔδε τὸ τούτον ἄμφισβήτημα ἐννοεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοῦ ὄνομα τε καὶ ὑπαρ;

theid. Τὸ ποῖον;

sn. ὁ πολλάκις σε οἴμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτῶντων, τί ἄν τις ἔχω τεκμήριον ἀποδείξαι, εἴ τις ἔροιτο νῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πότερον καθεύδομεν καὶ πάντα ἀ διανοούμεθα ὑνεφωτούμεν, ἡ ἐγρηγοραμέν C τε καὶ ὑπαρ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμεθα.

theid. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἀπορόν γε ὅτ' χρή ἡ ἐπιδείξαι τεκμήριον τά πάντα γὰρ ὃσπερ ἀντιστροφα τὰ αὐτά παρακολουθεῖ. ἀ τέ γὰρ νῦν διελέγμεθα, οὔδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ δοκεῖν

1 δεὶ mss.; δεὶ Heindorf, followed by Schanz and Wohlrab.
2 χρή TW; χρόνῳ χρῆ B; χρεών Hultsch.

62
you know that in all these the doctrine we were just presenting seems admittedly to be refuted, because in them we certainly have false perceptions, and it is by no means true that everything is to each man which appears to him; on the contrary, nothing is which appears.

THEAET. What you say is very true, Socrates.

SOC. What argument is left, then, my boy, for the man who says that perception is knowledge and that in each case the things which appear are to the one to whom they appear?

THEAET. I hesitate to say, Socrates, that I have no reply to make, because you scolded me just now when I said that. But really I cannot dispute that those who are insane or dreaming have false opinions, when some of them think they are gods and others fancy in their sleep that they have wings and are flying.

SOC. Don’t you remember, either, the similar dispute about these errors, especially about sleeping and waking?

THEAET. What dispute?

SOC. One which I fancy you have often heard. The question is asked, what proof you could give if anyone should ask us now, at the present moment, whether we are asleep and our thoughts are a dream, or whether we are awake and talking with each other in a waking condition.

THEAET. Really, Socrates, I don’t see what proof can be given; for there is an exact correspondence in all particulars, as between the strophe and antistrophe of a choral song. Take, for instance, the conversation we have just had: there is nothing to prevent us from imagining in our sleep also that we
PLATO

アルバム διαλέγεσθαι· καὶ ὅταν δὴ ὃναρ ὀνείρατα
dοκῶμεν διηγείοσθαι, ἀτοπος ἡ ὁμοιότης τοῦτων
ἐκεῖνος.

Ἐν. Ὁρᾶς οὖν ὅτι τὸ γε ἀμφισβητήσαι οὐ χαλε-

πόν, ὅτε καὶ πότερον ἐστὶν ὑπαρ ἡ ὅναρ ἀμφισβή-

τεῖται, καὶ δὴ ἵσου ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου ἰν καθεύδομεν
ψύχη τὰ ἀεί παρόντα δόγματα παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι
ἀληθῆ, ὥστε ἵσου μὲν χρόνον τάδε φαμὲν ὄντα
eῖναι, ἵσου δὲ ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ὀμοίως ἐφ’ ἐκατέρως
dιαπεριζόμεθα.

Ἐθεί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Ἐν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ
ἀυτὸς λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου ὁτι οὐχὶ ἵσος;

Ἐθεί. Ὡρῶς.

Ἐν. Τί οὖν; πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλγότητι τὸ
ἀληθῆς ὁρισθήσεται;

Ἐθεί. Γελοίον μέντ’ ἂν εἰη πολλαχῇ.

Ἐν. Ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφῆς εἰδείξασθαι,
ὅποια τοῦτων τῶν δοξασμάτων ἀληθῆ;

Ἐθεί. Οὐ μοι δοκῶ.

14. Ἐν. Ἕμοι τοῖνυν ἀκούει σοι περὶ αὐτῶν
ἀν λέγουν οἱ τὰ ἀεὶ δοκουντα δριζόμενου τῷ δοκοῦντι
εἰναι ἀληθῆ. λέγουσι δὲ, ὡς ἕγω οἶμαι, οὕτως
ἐρωτῶντες. “ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὃ ἂν ἔτερον ἢ παντά-

πασιν, μὴ τῇ τινα δύναμιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔξει τῷ
έτέρῳ; καὶ μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταύτων εἰναι
ὁ ἐρωτῶμεν, τῇ δὲ ἔτερον, ἀλλ’ ὅλως ἔτερον.”

Ἐθεί. Ἀδύναται τοῖνυν ταύτων τι ἔχειν ἦ ἐν

64
are carrying on this conversation with each other, and when in a dream we imagine that we are relating dreams, the likeness between the one talk and the other is remarkable.

soc. So you see it is not hard to dispute the point, since it is even open to dispute whether we are awake or in a dream. Now since the time during which we are asleep is equal to that during which we are awake, in each state our spirit contends that the semblances that appear to it at any time are certainly true, so that for half the time we say that this is true, and for half the time the other, and we maintain each with equal confidence.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. And may not, then, the same be said about insanity and the other diseases, except that the time is not equal?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Well, then, shall truth be determined by the length or shortness of time?

THEAET. That would be absurd in many ways.

soc. But can you show clearly in any other way which of the two sets of opinions is true?

THEAET. I do not think I can.

soc. Listen, then, while I tell you what would be said about them by those who maintain that what appears at any time is true for him to whom it appears. They begin, I imagine, by asking this question: "Theaetetus, can that which is wholly other have in any way the same quality as its alternative? And we must not assume that the thing in question is partially the same and partially other, but wholly other."

THEAET. It is impossible for it to be the same in
PLATO

159 δυνάμει ἡ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὁτιωθοῦν, ὅταν ἦ κομιδὴ ἔτερον.

σημ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀναγκαίον τὸ τοιούτον ὁμολογεῖν;

θεαι. Ἕμουγε δοκεῖ.

σημ. Εἴ ἄρα τι συμβαίνει ὁμοίων τῷ γίγνεσθαι ἦ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἕαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταύτων φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνόμοιούμενον δὲ ἔτερον;

θεαι. Ἀνάγκη.

σημ. Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἰ ἡ τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἀπειρα, ὡςαύτως δὲ γε τὰ πάντασχοντα;

θεαι. Ναὶ.

σημ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμιγνύμενον καὶ ἄλλω οὐ ταῦτα ἄλλα ἔτερα γεννησει;

Β θεαι. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

σημ. Λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμὲ τε καὶ σε καὶ τάλλα ήδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, Σωκράτῃ υγιάνοντα καὶ Σωκράτη αὐτὸ ἀσθενοῦντα. πότερον ὁμοίων τούτ’ ἐκείνω ἦ ἀνόμοιον φήσομεν;

θεαι. Ἄρα τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα Σωκράτη, ὅλων τούτο λέγεις ὅλω ἐκείνω, τῷ υγιάνοντι Σωκράτει;

σημ. Κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες· αὐτὸ τούτῳ λέγω.

θεαι. Ἀνόμοιον δὴποι.

σημ. Καὶ ἔτερον ἄρα οὗτως ὀππερ ἀνόμοιον;

θεαι. Ἀνάγκη.

σημ. Καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἐ νῦν δὴ 1 ὡς διήλθομεν, ὡςαύτως φήσεις;

1 νῦν δὴ Heindorf; νῦν BT.
THEAETETUS

anything, either in quality or in any other respect whatsoever, when it is wholly other.

soc. Must we not, then, necessarily agree that such a thing is also unlike?

THEAET. It seems so to me.

soc. Then if anything happens to become like or unlike anything—either itself or anything else—we shall say that when it becomes like it becomes the same, and when it becomes unlike it becomes other?

THEAET. We must.

soc. Well, we said before, did we not, that the active elements were many—infinité in fact—and likewise the passive elements?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And furthermore, that any given element, by uniting at different times with different partners, will beget, not the same, but other results?

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Well, then, let us take me, or you, or anything else at hand, and apply the same principle—say Socrates in health and Socrates in illness. Shall we say the one is like the other, or unlike?

THEAET. When you say "Socrates in illness" do you mean to compare that Socrates as a whole with Socrates in health as a whole?

soc. You understand perfectly; that is just what I mean.

THEAET. Unlike, I imagine.

soc. And therefore other, inasmuch as unlike?

THEAET. Necessarily.

soc. And you would say the same of Socrates asleep or in any of the other states we enumerated just now?
PLATO

gινομένην καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν
οὐ πικρότητα ἄλλα πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὖκ αἴσθησιν
ἀλλ’ αἰσθανόμενον;

θεαὶ. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.

σὲ. Ὅμως ἐγὼ τε οὖδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι
οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη αἰσθήσεως,
160 καὶ ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων ποιεῖ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον·
οὕτ’ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μὴ ποτ’ ἄλλω συνελθόν
ταύτῃ γεννήσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ
ἄλλου ἄλλο γεννήσαν ἄλλοιον γενήσεται.

θεαὶ. Ἡστι ταῦτα.

σὲ. Οὔτε μὴν ἐγὼ γε γενήσομαι ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτος, ἐκεῖνο
τε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται.

θεαὶ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

σὲ. Ἀνάγκη δέ γε ἐμὲ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν
αἰσθανόμενος γίγνωμαι· αἰσθανόμενον γὰρ, μηδε-
νὸς δὲ αἰσθανόμενον ἄδιάνατον γίγνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνὸ
Β τέ τινι γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὴ ἢ πικρὸν ἢ τι τοιοῦ-
τον γίγνηται· γλυκὸ γὰρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὸ ἄδιάνα-
τον γενέσθαι.

θεαὶ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

σὲ. Δεῖ πεται δὴ, οἷοι καὶ ἡμῖν ἄλληλοις, εἴτ’
ἐσμέν, εἰναι, εἴτε γιγνόμεθα, γίγνεσθαι, ἐπείπερ
ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὕσιαν συνδεῖ μὲν, συνδεῖ δὲ
οὖδεν τῶν ἄλλων, οὔδ’ αὐτ’ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἄλληλοις
δὴ λεῖπεται συνδεδέσθαι· ὥστε εἰτὲ τις εἰναι τι
ὀνομάζει, των εἰναι ἡ τινὸς ἡ πρὸς τι ῥητέον αὐτῷ,
ness, and in the wine—a bitterness which is engendered there and passes over into the other; the wine is made, not bitterness, but bitter, and I am made, not perception, but perceptive.

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Then I shall never have this perception of any other thing; for a perception of another thing is another perception, and makes the percipient different and other: nor can that which acts on me ever by union with another produce the same result or become the same in kind; for by producing another result from another passive element it will become different in kind.

Theaet. That is true.

Soc. And neither shall I, furthermore, ever again become the same as I am, nor will that ever become the same as it is.

Theaet. No.

Soc. And yet, when I become percipient, I must necessarily become percipient of something, for it is impossible to become percipient and perceive nothing; and that which is perceived must become so to someone, when it becomes sweet or bitter or the like; for to become sweet, but sweet to no one, is impossible.

Theaet. Perfectly true.

Soc. The result, then, I think, is that we (the active and the passive elements) are or become, whichever is the case, in relation to one another, since we are bound to one another by the inevitable law of our being, but to nothing else, not even to ourselves. The result, then, is that we are bound to one another; and so if a man says anything "is," he must say it is to or of or in relation to something,
PLATO

εἰτε γίγνεσθαι· αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ’ αὐτῷ τι ἢ ὁν ἢ
Ὁ γιγνόμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον οὔτ’ ἄλλου λέγοντος
ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁν διεληλύθαμεν σημαίνει.

ἡ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ἑπ. Ὡνκοῦν ὦτε δὴ τὸ ἐμὲ ποιοῦν ἔμοι ἐστὶν
καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος
δ’ οὐ;

ἡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ἑπ. Ἀληθῆς ἢρα ἔμοι ἢ ἐμὴ αἰσθησίας· τῆς γὰρ
ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἂεὶ ἐστὶν· καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν
Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἔμοι, ὡς ἔστι, καὶ τῶν
μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἐστίν.

ἡ. Ἕοικεν.

D 15. ἑπ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν ἀμφιθής ὁν καὶ μὴ
πταίων τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα οὐκ
ἐπιστήμων ἂν εἴην ὄντερ αἰσθητής;

ἡ. Οὐδαμῶς ὅπως οὐ.

ἑπ. Παγκάλως ἢρα σοι εἰρηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη
οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσθησίας, καὶ εἰς ταὐτὸν συμ-
πέτατεκεν, κατὰ μὲν Ὀμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ
πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φύλον οἰον ῥέματα κωνείσθαι τὰ
πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφῶτατον
πάντων χρημάτων ἀνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ
Ε δὲ Θεαίτητον τούτων οὐτως ἑχόντων αἰσθησιον
ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι. ἦ γὰρ, ὃ Θεαίτητε; φῶμεν
tοῦτο σόν μὲν εἶναι οἰον νεογενῆς παιδίον, ἐμὸν
dὲ μαίεμα; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

ἡ. Ὅντως ἀνάγκη, ὡ Σώκρατες.

ἑπ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἐοικεν, μόλις ποτὲ ἔγεν-

THEAETETUS

and similarly if he says it "becomes"; but he must not say it is or becomes absolutely, nor can he accept such a statement from anyone else. That is the meaning of the doctrine we have been describing.

THEAET. Yes, quite so, Socrates.

SOC. Then, since that which acts on me is to me and to me only, it is also the case that I perceive it, and I only?

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. Then to me my perception is true; for in each case it is always part of my being; and I am, as Protagoras says, the judge of the existence of the things that are to me and of the non-existence of those that are not to me.

THEAET. So it seems.

SOC. How, then, if I am an infallible judge and my mind never stumbles in regard to the things that are or that become, can I fail to know that which I perceive?

THEAET. You cannot possibly fail.

SOC. Therefore you were quite right in saying that knowledge is nothing else than perception, and there is complete identity between the doctrine of Homer and Heracleitus and all their followers—that all things are in motion, like streams—the doctrine of the great philosopher Protagoras that man is the measure of all things—and the doctrine of Theaetetus that, since these things are true, perception is knowledge. Eh, Theaetetus? Shall we say that this is, so to speak, your new-born child and the result of my midwifery? Or what shall we say?

THEAET. We must say that, Socrates.

SOC. Well, we have at last managed to bring this
νήσαμεν, ὃ τι δὴ ποτε τυγχάνει ὃν. μετὰ δὲ τὸν τόκον τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἄλθως ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτέον τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπούμενος μὴ λάθη ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἁξίων ὦν τροφῆς τὸ γυνόμενον, ἄλλα ἄνεμαίον τε καὶ ψεύδος. ἦ σὺ οἶει πάντως δεῖν τὸ γε σὸν τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι, ἦ καὶ ἄνεξει ἐλεγχόμενον ὄρων, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανεῖς, εάν τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτοτοκοῦ αὐτὸ ὑφαιρῇ;

θεό. Ἄνεξεται, ὦ Σώκρατε, Θεάτητος· οὐδαμῶς γὰρ δύσκολος. ἄλλα πρὸς θεῶν εἰπέ, ἦ αὖ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

σπ. Φιλόλογος γ' εἶ ἀτεχνώς καὶ χρηστός, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ο että με οἶει λόγων τινὰ εἰναι θύλακον καὶ ῥάδιως ἑξελόντα ἑρεῖν ὡς οὐκ αὖ ἔχει οὕτως ταῦτα. Β'τὸ δὲ γυνόμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἑξέρχεται παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀλλ' ἀεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ προσδιαλεγομένου, ἐγὼ δὲ οὕδεν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος, ὃς οὖν λόγον παρ' ἔτερον σοφοὺ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως. καὶ νῦν τούτο παρὰ τούδε πειράσομαι, οὐ τι αὐτὸς εἰπέναι.

θεό. Σὺ κάλλιον, ὦ Σώκρατε, λέγεις· καὶ ποιεὶ οὕτως.

16. σπ. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὃ θαυμάζω τοῦ ἔταρφον σου Πρωταγόρου;

C θεό. Τὸ ποιοῦν;

1 The rite called amphiidromia took place a few days after the birth of a child. After some ceremonies of purification the nurse, in the presence of the family, carried the
THEAETETUS

forth, whatever it turns out to be; and now that it is born, we must in very truth perform the rite of running round with it in a circle—the circle of our argument—and see whether it may not turn out to be after all not worth rearing, but only a wind-egg, an imposture. But, perhaps, you think that any offspring of yours ought to be cared for and not put away; or will you bear to see it examined and not get angry if it is taken away from you, though it is your first-born?

THEO. Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates, for he is not at all ill-tempered. But for heaven's sake, Socrates, tell me, is all this wrong after all?

SOC. You are truly fond of argument, Theodorus, and a very good fellow to think that I am a sort of bag full of arguments and can easily pull one out and say that after all the other one was wrong; but you do not understand what is going on: none of the arguments comes from me, but always from him who is talking with me. I myself know nothing, except just a little, enough to extract an argument from another man who is wise and to receive it fairly. And now I will try to extract this thought from Theaetetus, but not to say anything myself.

THEO. That is the better way, Socrates; do as you say.

SOC. Do you know, then, Theodorus, what amazes me in your friend Protagoras?

THEO. What is it?

infant rapidly about the family hearth, thereby introducing him, as it were, to the family and the family deities. At this time the father decided whether to bring up the child or to expose it. Sometimes, perhaps, the child was named on this occasion. In the evening relatives assembled for a feast at which shell-fish were eaten.
Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνυ ἤδεως εἰρηκεν, ὡς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ ἑστὶν. τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς ἀληθείας ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ὡς ἢ κυνοκέφαλος ἢ τι ἀλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων ἁλθῆς, ἣν μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς ἤρξατο ἡμῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὁπερ θεον ἑθαμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφία, ὁ δὲ ἄρα ἔτυγχανεν ὕπνῳ εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδέν.

D belitówn batróchou yuvínou, μὴ ὅτι ἄλλου του ἄνθρωπων. η πῶς λέγωμεν, Ἠ Θεόδωρε; εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐκάστῳ ἁλθής ἐσται ὅ ὅν δὴ αἰσθήσεις δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βελτίων διακρίνει; μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἐσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἐτέρου τὴν ἑτέρου, ὁρθή ἡ ψευδής, ἀλλ' ὁ πολλάκις εἴρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἐκαστος μόνος δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὁρᾶ καὶ ἁλθῆθι, τὶ δὴ ποτε, ὅν ἐταῖρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ὡστε καὶ ἄλλων

Ε διδάσκαλος ἀξιούσθαι δικαίως μετὰ μεγάλων μυθῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἁμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἢν παρ' ἐκείνου, μέτρῳ δινὶ αὐτῷ ἐκάστῳ τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας; ταῦτα πῶς μὴ φῶμεν δημοῦμεν λέγειν τὸν Πρωταγόραν; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μαυεύτικῆς σιγῆ, ὡς γέλωτα ὀφλισκάνομεν; οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία. τὸ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν εἰλήχειν τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας τε καὶ δόξας, ὀρθὰς ἐκάστου όυσας, οὐ μακρά

1 λέγωμεν BT; λέγωμεν vulg.
2 διακρίνει most editors; διακρίνη B (emendation) T.
3 ἐπιχειρεῖν TW; om. B.
THEAETETUS

soc. In general I like his doctrine that what appears to each one is to him, but I am amazed by the beginning of his book. I don't see why he does not say in the beginning of his *Truth*¹ that a pig or a dog-faced baboon or some still stranger creature of those that have sensations is the measure of all things. Then he might have begun to speak to us very imposingly and condescendingly, showing that while we were honouring him like a god for his wisdom, he was after all no better in intellect than any other man, or, for that matter, than a tadpole. What alternative is there, Theodorus? For if that opinion is true to each person which he acquires through sensation, and no one man can discern another's condition better than he himself, and one man has no better right to investigate whether another's opinion is true or false than he himself, but, as we have said several times, each man is to form his own opinions by himself, and these opinions are always right and true, why in the world, my friend, was Protagoras wise, so that he could rightly be thought worthy to be the teacher of other men and to be well paid, and why were we ignorant creatures and obliged to go to school to him, if each person is the measure of his own wisdom? Must we not believe that Protagoras was "playing to the gallery" in saying this? I say nothing of the ridicule that I and my science of midwifery deserve in that case,—and, I should say, the whole practice of dialectics, too. For would not the investigation of one another's fancies and opinions, and the attempt to refute them, when each man's must be

¹ *Truth* was apparently the title, or part of the title, of Protagoras's book.
PLATO

162 μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἀληθῆς ἢ ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βιβλίου ἐφθέγξατο;

καὶ ὁ Σώκρατες, φίλος ἀνήρ, καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἔλεπτος. οὐκ ἂν οὖν δεικμήν δι᾽ ἐμὸν ὁμολογούντος ἐλέγχεσθαι Πρωταγόραν, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ σοι παρὰ δοξαίναι ἀντιτείνειν. τὸν οὖν Θεαίττην πάλιν λαβὲ πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ μᾶλθ ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν.

ἐπ. Ἀρὰ κἂν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἔλθων, ὁ Θεό-Β δώρη, πρὸς τὰς παλαῖστρὰς ἄξιοῖς ἄν ἄλλους θεώμενος γυμνοῦς, ἐνίοτε φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντιεἰπεῖκυναι τὸ εἶδος παραποδούμενος;

καὶ Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἴπερ μέλλονέν μοι ἐπιτρέψει καὶ πείσεσθαι; ὡσπερ νῦν οἴμαι ὑμᾶς πείσεων ἐμὲ μὲν εὰν θεᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐλκεῖν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον σκληρὸν ἢ ἄλλο, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε καὶ νυστέρῳ ὑπῆρξιν προσπαλαίειν.

17. ἐπ. Ἀλλ’ εἰς οὕτως, ὁ Θεόδωρε, σοὶ καὶ Σ φίλον, οὐδ’ ἐμοὶ ἐχθρόν, φασὶν οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι. πάλιν δὴ οὐν ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίττην ἵπτεον. λέγε 

νῦν, ὁ Θεαίττης, πρῶτον μὲν ἂ νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν, ἄρα οὐ συνθαυμάζεις 1 εἰ εξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήσει μηδὲν χεῖρων εἰς σοφίαν ὁτούν ἀνθρώπων ἢ καὶ θεῶν; ἢ ἠττον τι οἱ τὸ Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἢ οἱ ἀνθρώπους λέγεσθαι;

καὶ Ἕλλην. Μά δι’ οὐκ ἐγώγη καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐρωτᾶς, πάνυ θαυμάζω. ἡμίκα γὰρ διήθυεν ὃν τρόπον 

Δ λέγων τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἰναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνυ μοί εἰς ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ τοῦ ναντίον τάχα μεταπέπτωκεν.

1 συνθαυμάζεις VT; σφθαυμάζεις W.
THEAETETUS

right, be tedious and blatant folly, if the Truth of Protagoras is true and he was not jesting when he uttered his oracles from the shrine of his book?

Theo. Socrates, the man was my friend, as you just remarked. So I should hate to bring about the refutation of Protagoras by agreeing with you, and I should hate also to oppose you contrary to my real convictions. So take Theaetetus again; especially as he seemed just now to follow your suggestions very carefully.

Soc. If you went to Sparta, Theodorus, and visited the wrestling-schools, would you think it fair to look on at other people naked, some of whom were of poor physique, without stripping and showing your own form, too?

Theo. Why not, if I could persuade them to allow me to do so? So now I think I shall persuade you to let me be a spectator, and not to drag me into the ring, since I am old and stiff, but to take the younger and nimbler man as your antagonist.

Soc. Well, Theodorus, if that pleases you, it does not displease me, as the saying is. So I must attack the wise Theaetetus again. Tell me, Theaetetus, referring to the doctrine we have just expounded, do you not share my amazement at being suddenly exalted to an equality with the wisest man, or even god? Or do you think Protagoras's "measure" applies any less to gods than to men?

Theaet. By no means; and I am amazed that you ask such a question at all; for when we were discussing the meaning of the doctrine that whatever appears to each one really is to him, I thought it was good; but now it has suddenly changed to the opposite.
Πλάτων. Νέος γάρ εί, ὃς φίλε παί. τὴς οὖν δημηγορίας ὁξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθεις. πρὸς γάρ ταῦτα ἐρεῖ Πρωταγόρας ἡ τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ· ὦ γενναίοι παῖδες τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε συγκαθεδρόμενοι, θεοὺς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀγοντες, οὐς ἐγὼ ἐκ τε τοῦ λέγει καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ

Ε αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰσίν ἡ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν, ἐξαιρῷ, καὶ ἡ οἱ πολλοὶ ἂν ἀποδέχοντο ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα, ὡς δεινὸν εἰ μηδὲν διοίσει εἰς σοφίαν ἐκαστὸς τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκήματος ὡτούν· ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ’ ἦντινον λέγετε, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρήσθε, ὦ εἰ ἔθελεν Θεόδωρος ἡ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖ, ἀξίως οὐδ’ ἐνὸς μόνου 1 ἂν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σὺ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος, εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογία τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ 163 τηλικούτων 2 λεγομένους λόγους.

θεαί. Ἅλλ’ οὖν δίκαιον, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὔτε οὐ σὺ οὔτε ἂν ἥμεις φαίμεν.

σπ. Ἀλλή δὲ σκεπτέον, ὡς οὐκει, ὡς ὅ τε σὸς καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρου λόγος.

θεαί. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἅλλῃ.

σπ. Τίθε δὲ σκοπῶμεν εἰ ἄρα ἐστίν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ αἰσθήσεις ταῦτον ἢ ἐπερον. εἰς γάρ τούτο ποι σὸς ο λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινεν, καὶ τούτου χάριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα ἑκνύσαμεν. οὐ γάρ;

θεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Β σπ. Ἡ οὖν ὁμολογήσουμεν, ἃ τῷ ὄραν αἰσθανόμεθα ἡ τῷ ἀκούειν, πάντα ταῦτα ἁμα καὶ ἐπισταθαί; ὅλον τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν πότερον οὐ φήσομεν ἀκούειν, ὅταν φθέγγονται, ἢ

2 τηλικούτων Τ; τούτων Β.
THEAETETUS

soc. You are young, my dear boy; so you are quickly moved and swayed by popular oratory. For in reply to what I have said, Protagoras, or someone speaking for him, will say, "Excellent boys and old men, there you sit together declaiming to the people, and you bring in the gods, the question of whose existence or non-existence I exclude from oral and written discussion, and you say the sort of thing that the crowd would readily accept—that it is a terrible thing if every man is to be no better than any beast in point of wisdom; but you do not advance any cogent proof whatsoever; you base your statements on probability. If Theodorus, or any other geometer, should base his geometry on probability, he would be of no account at all. So you and Theodorus had better consider whether you will accept arguments founded on plausibility and probabilities in such important matters.

theaet. That would not be right, Socrates; neither you nor we would think so.

soc. Apparently, then, you and Theodorus mean we must look at the matter in a different way.

theaet. Yes, certainly in a different way.

soc. Well, then, let us look at it in this way, raising the question whether knowledge is after all the same as perception, or different. For that is the object of all our discussion, and it was to answer that question that we stirred up all these strange doctrines, was it not?

theaet. Most assuredly.

soc. Shall we then agree that all that we perceive by sight or hearing we know? For instance, shall we say that before having learned the language of foreigners we do not hear them when they speak,
PLATO

άκούειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἀ λέγουσι; καὶ αὐθεν ταῖς ηπιστάμενοι, βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον ὅχ̄ ὅραν ὣ ἐπίστασθαι εἴπερ ὅρμεν δι-ισχυροῦμεθα;

θεαί. Αὐτὸ γε, ὁ Σωκράτης, τούτῳ αὐτῶν, ὅπερ ὅρμεν τε καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν· τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρῶμα ὅραν τε καὶ ὁ ἐπίστασθαι, τῶν δὲ τὴν ὀξύτητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἀκούειν τε ἁμα καὶ εἴδειν· ὡ δὲ οἱ τε γραμματι- σταί περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἐρμηνεῖς διδάσκουσι, οὔτε αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ ὅραν ἢ ἀκούειν οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι.


θεαί. Τὸ ποίον δὴ;

ση. Τὸ τοιόνδε· εἰ τις ἔρουτο, "ἄρα δυνατόν, ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτο ποτε, ἔτι ἔχοντα ὁ μνήμην αὐτοῦ τούτου καὶ σωζόμενον, τότε ὅτε μέμνηται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τούτο ὁ μέμνηται;" μακρολογῶ δὲ, ὡς ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι, εἰ μαθῶν τίς τι μεμνημένος μὴ οἴδε.

θεαί. Καὶ πῶς, ὁ Σωκράτης; τέρας γὰρ ἃν εἰη ὃ λέγεις.

ση. Μὴ οὖν ἐγὼ ληρῶ; σκόπει δὲ. ἄρα τὸ ὅραν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὦψιν αἰσθήσων;

θεαί. Ἔγωγε.

ση. Οὔκοιν ὁ ἰδὼν τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνου γέγονεν Ε ὃ εἴδεν κατὰ τὸν ἅρτο λόγον;

82
THEAETETUS

or that we both hear and know what they say? And again, if we do not know the letters, shall we maintain that we do not see them when we look at them or that if we really see them we know them?

THEAET. We shall say, Socrates, that we know just so much of them as we hear or see: in the case of the letters, we both see and know the form and colour, and in the spoken language we both hear and at the same time know the higher and lower notes of the voice; but we do not perceive through sight or hearing, and we do not know, what the grammarians and interpreters teach about them.

SOC. First-rate, Theaetetus! and it is a pity to dispute that, for I want you to grow. But look out for another trouble that is yonder coming towards us, and see how we can repel it. percepton aut scannij

THEAET. What is it?

SOC. It is like this: If anyone should ask, "Is it possible, if a man has ever known a thing and still has and preserves a memory of that thing, that he does not, at the time when he remembers, know that very thing which he remembers?" I seem to be pretty long winded; but I merely want to ask if a man who has learned a thing does not know it when he remembers it.

THEAET. Of course he does, Socrates; for what you suggest would be monstrous.

SOC. Am I crazy, then? Look here. Do you not say that seeing is perceiving and that sight is perception?

THEAET. I do.

SOC. Then, according to what we have just said, the man who has seen a thing has acquired knowledge of that which he has seen?
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΝ. Τι δέ; μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΝ. Πότερον οὔδενός ἢ τυνός;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τυνός δήποροι.

ΣΝ. Οὐκοῦν ὃν ἔμαθε καὶ ὃν ἦσθετο, τοιούτων των;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τι μήν;

ΣΝ. "Ο δὴ εἰδὲ τις, μέμνηται ποὺ ἐνίοτε;
ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνηται.

ΣΝ. 'Η καὶ μύσας; ἦ τοῦτο δράσας ἐπελάθετο;
ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλὰ δεινόν, ὡς Σώκρατες, τοῦτο γε φάναι.

164 ΣΝ. Δεὶ γε μέντοι, εἴ σώσομεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον· εἴ δὲ μή, οὐχεῖται.
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἐγώ, νὴ τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μήν ἰκανῶς γε συννοώ· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ πη.

ΣΝ. Τῇ δὲ· ὃ μὲν ὄρων ἐπιστήμων, φαμέν, τούτῳ γέγονεν οὔτερ ὄρων· ὅπως γὰρ καὶ αἰσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταύτων ὑμολογηται.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΝ. "Ὁ δὲ γε ὄρων καὶ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς οὐ ἔωρα, ἐὰν μύση, μέμνηται μέν, οὐχ ὄρα δὲ αὐτὸ. ἦ γάρ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

Β ΣΝ. Τὸ δὲ γε οὐχ ὄρα οὐκ ἐπιστατάι ἔστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ὄρα ἐπιστατάι.
ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αληθῆ.

ΣΝ. Συμβαίνει ἄρα, οὗ τις ἐπιστήμων ἔγενετο,

1 σώσομεν Dissen; σώσομεν BT.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Yes.
SOC. Well, then, do you not admit that there is such a thing as memory?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. Memory of nothing or of something?
THEAET. Of something, surely.
SOC. Of things he has learned and perceived—that sort of things?
THEAET. Of course.
SOC. A man sometimes remembers what he has seen, does he not?
THEAET. He does.
SOC. Even when he shuts his eyes, or does he forget if he does that?
THEAET. It would be absurd to say that, Socrates.
SOC. We must, though, if we are to maintain our previous argument; otherwise, it is all up with it.
THEAET. I too, by Zeus, have my suspicions, but I don't fully understand you. Tell me how it is.
SOC. This is how it is: he who sees has acquired knowledge, we say, of that which he has seen; for it is agreed that sight and perception and knowledge are all the same.
THEAET. Certainly.
SOC. But he who has seen and has acquired knowledge of what he saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers it, but does not see it. Is that right?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. But "does not see" is the same as "does not know," if it is true that seeing is knowing.
THEAET. True.
SOC. Then this is our result. When a man has acquired knowledge of a thing and still remembers
PLATO

ἐτι μεμνημένον αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὅρα. ὃ τέρας ἐφαμεν ἃν εἶναι εἰ γίγνοιτο.

 theano. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

σο. Τῶν ἀδινάτων δὴ τι συμβαίνειν φαίνεται, εάν τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθησιν ταύτων φη εἶναι.

 theano. Ἐοικεν.

σο. Ἀλλο ἀρα ἐκάτερον φατέον.

 theano. Κινδυνεύει.

σο. Τί οὖν δὴν ἂν εἰη ἐπιστήμη; πάλιν εἴ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἐοικεν, λεκτέον. καίτοι τί ποτε μέλλομεν, ὡ Θεαίτητε, ὅραν;

 theano. Τίνος πέρι;

σο. Φαινόμεθά μοι ἀλέκτρυνον ἁγενοῦς δίκην πρὶν νενικηκέναι ἀποποθηήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἔδειν.

 theano. Πῶς δὴ;

σο. Ἀντιλογικῶς εὑρίκαμεν πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὁμο-μάτων ὁμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιοῦτω των περιγενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου ἁγαπᾶν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες ἁγωνισταὶ ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι λαν-

D θάνομεν ταύτα ἐκείνους τοὺς δεινοὺς ἀνδρᾶς ποιοῦντες.

 theano. Οὐτω μανθάνω ὅπως λέγεις.

σο. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δηλῶσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ γε δὴ νοῶ. ἦρομεθα γάρ δὴ, εἰ μαθῶν καὶ μεμη-

μένος τίς τι μη ἐπίσταται, καὶ τὸν ἰδόντα καὶ μύσαντα μεμνημένον ὡρᾶντα δὲ οὐ ἀποδείξαντες,

οὐκ εἰδότα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἁμα μεμημένον τοῦτο. δ' εἶναι ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὐτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος, καὶ ὁ σὸς ἁμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, ὦτι ταύτων ἐστιν.

86
THEAETETUS

it, he does not know it, since he does not see it; but we said that would be a monstrous conclusion.

THEAET. Very true.

SOC. So, evidently, we reach an impossible result if we say that knowledge and perception are the same.

THEAET. So it seems.

SOC. Then we must say they are different.

THEAET. I suppose so.

SOC. Then what can knowledge be? We must, apparently, begin our discussion all over again. And yet, Theaetetus, what are we on the point of doing?

THEAET. About what?

SOC. It seems to me that we are behaving like a worthless game-cock; before winning the victory we have leapt away from our argument and begun to crow.

THEAET. How so?

SOC. We seem to be acting like professional debaters; we have based our agreements on the mere similarity of words and are satisfied to have got the better of the argument in such a way, and we do not see that we, who claim to be, not contestants for a prize, but lovers of wisdom, are doing just what those ingenious persons do.

THEAET. I do not yet understand what you mean.

SOC. Well, I will try to make my thought clear. We asked, you recollect, whether a man who has learned something and remembers it does not know it. We showed first that the one who has seen and then shuts his eyes remembers, although he does not see, and then we showed that he does not know, although at the same time he remembers; but this, we said, was impossible. And so the Protagorean tale was brought to naught, and yours also about the identity of knowledge and perception.
Ε θει. Φαίνεται.

ση. Οὐ τι ἀν, οἶμαι, ὡ φίλε, εἰπέρ γε ὁ πατήρ τοῦ ἐτέρου μῦθου ἐξῆ, ἀλλά πολλὰ ἂν ἦμυνε·

νῦν δὲ ὀρφανὸν αὐτὸν ἤμεις προσπηλακίζομεν. καὶ

γὰρ οὐδέ οἱ ἐπίτροποι, οὗς Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπεν,

βοηθεῖν ἐθέλουσιν, ὅν Θεόδωρος ἐς ὅδε. ἀλλὰ

ἡ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσωμεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκ' αὐτῶν

βοηθεῖν.

θει. Οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ, ὡ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον

165 Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονικός τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπίτροπος·

ἡμεῖς δὲ πως θάττον ἐκ τῶν ψυλῶν λόγων πρὸς

τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. χάριν γε μέντοι

σοί ἔξομεν, ἓν αὐτῷ βοηθῆσαι.

ση. Καλώς λέγεις, ὡ Θεόδωρε. σκέψαι σοιν

τὴν γ' ἐμὴν βοηθείαν. τῶν γὰρ ἄρτι δεινότερα

ἀν τις ὀμολογήσεις ἡ μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι

τὸν νοῦν, ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπο-

αρνεῖσθαι. σοί λέγω ὅπη, ἡ Θεαῖτής;

θει. Εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ ὁ

Β νεώτερος· σφαλεῖσ γὰρ ἦττον ἁσχημονησί.

19. ση. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα·

ἔστι δὲ, οἶμαι, τοιώνδε τι· ἀρα οἶν τοῦ τῶν αὐτοῦ

εἰδότα τι τοῦτο ὡς ἐιδέναι;

θει. Τί δή οὖν ἀποκρινούμεθα, ὡ Θεαίτης;

ση. Ἀδύνατον ποι, οἶμαι ἐγώγε.

ση. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ ὀρᾶν γε ἐπιστασθαί θήσεις. τι

1 πολλὰ om. Τ. 2 eis om. Τ. 3 soi om. Β.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Evidently.

SOC. It would not be so, I fancy, my friend, if the father of the first of the two tales were alive; he would have had a good deal to say in its defence. But he is dead, and we are abusing the orphan. Why, even the guardians whom Protagoras left—one of whom is Theodorus here—are unwilling to come to the child's assistance. So it seems that we shall have to do it ourselves, assisting him in the name of justice.

THEO. Do so, for it is not I, Socrates, but rather Callias the son of Hipponicus, who is the guardian of his children. As for me, I turned rather too soon from abstract speculations to geometry. However, I shall be grateful to you if you come to his assistance.

SOC. Good, Theodorus! Now see how I shall help him; for a man might find himself involved in still worse inconsistencies than those in which we found ourselves just now, if he did not pay attention to the terms which we generally use in assent and denial. Shall I explain this to you, or only to Theaetetus?

THEO. To both of us, but let the younger answer; for he will be less disgraced if he is discomfited.

SOC. Very well; now I am going to ask the most frightfully difficult question of all. It runs, I believe, something like this: Is it possible for a person, if he knows a thing, at the same time not to know that which he knows?

THEO. Now, then, what shall we answer, Theaetetus?

THEAET. It is impossible, I should think.

SOC. Not if you make seeing and knowing identical.
PLATO

γὰρ χρήσει ἀφύκτως ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν
φρέατι συνεχόμενος, ὅταν ἐρωτᾶ ἀνέκπληκτος
ἀνήρ, καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ σοῦ τὸν ἑτερον ὀφθαλμόν,
C εἰ δρᾶς τὸ ἰμάτιον τῷ κατελημμένῳ;

θεαί. Οὖν φήσω, οἶμαι, τούτῳ γε, τῷ μέντοι
ἐτέρῳ.

ση. Οὔκοιν ὅρᾶς τε καὶ οὐχ ὅρᾶς ἀμα ταύτων;

θεαί. Οὔτω γε πως.

ση. Οὐδέν ἐγώ, φήσει, τούτῳ οὔτε τάττῳ οὔτ'
ήρόμην τὸ ὅπως, ἄλλῳ εἰ ὁ ἐπίστασαι, τούτῳ καὶ
οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. νῦν δὲ ὁ οὐχ ὅρᾶς ὅρῶν φαίνει.
ἀμολογηκώς δὲ τυγχάνεις τὸ ὅραν ἐπίστασαι καὶ
τὸ μὴ ὅραν μὴ ἐπίστασαι. ἐξ οὖν τούτων λογίζου,
τί σοι συμβαίνει.

D θεαί. Ἀλλὰ λογίζομαι ὅτι τάναντια οἷς ὑπε-

θέμην.

ση. Ἡσος δὲ γ', ὃς θαυμάσει, πλεῖω ἄν τοιαύτ' ἔπαθε, εἰ τίς σε προσηρώτα, εἰ ἐπίστασαι ἐστι
μεν οξύ, έστι δέ ἀμβλύ', καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασαι,
πόρρωθεν δὲ μή, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἱρέμα το αὐτό,
καὶ άλλα μυρία, ἐ ἐλλοχών 2 ἃν πελταστικὸς ἀνήρ
μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις ἔρόμενος, ἡνίκ' ἐπιστήμην καὶ
αἰσθήσεων ταύτων ἕθου, ἐμβαλὼν ἄν εἰς τὸ ἄκοινεν
καὶ ὀφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις,

Ε ἢλεγχεν ἃν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἄνιεσ πρὶν θαυμάσας
τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν συνεποδίσθης ὅπ' αὐτοῦ,
οὐ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενός τε καὶ συνδήσας ἦδη ἃν

1 συνεχόμενος B; συναχόμενος BΤ.
2 ἐλλοχὼν bt; ἐλλοχῶν BT.
THEAETETUS

For what will you do with a question from which there is no escape, by which you are, as the saying is, caught in a pit, when your adversary, unabashed, puts his hand over one of your eyes and asks if you see his cloak with the eye that is covered?

THEAET. I shall say, I think, “Not with that eye, but with the other.”

SOC. Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time?

THEAET. After a fashion.

SOC. “That,” he will reply, “is not at all what I want, and I did not ask about the fashion, but whether you both know and do not know the same thing. Now manifestly you see that which you do not see. But you have agreed that seeing is knowing and not seeing is not knowing. Very well; from all this, reckon out what the result is.”

THEAET. Well, I reckon out that the result is the contrary of my hypothesis.

SOC. And perhaps, my fine fellow, more troubles of the same sort might have come upon you, if anyone asked you further questions—whether it is possible to know the same thing both sharply and dully, to know close at hand but not at a distance, to know both violently and gently, and countless other questions, such as a nimble fighter, fighting for pay in the war of words, might have lain in wait and asked you, when you said that knowledge and perception were the same thing; he would have charged down upon hearing and smelling and such senses, and would have argued persistently and uneasingly until you were filled with admiration of his greatly desired wisdom and were taken in his toils, and then, after subduing and binding you he would
PLATO

tότε ἐλύτρου χρημάτων ὡσων σοί γε κάκεινως ἔδοκει. τίν πούν δή ὁ Πρωταγόρας, φαίης ἃν ἴσως, λόγον ἐπίκουρον τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἔρει; ἀλλο τι πειρώμεθα λέγειν;

θεαί. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

20. σα. Ταῦτά τε δή πάντα ὁσα ἥμεις ἐπα- 
166 μύνοντες αὐτῷ λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε, οἶμαι, χωρῆ- 
σεται καταφρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων· "οὔτος δή 
ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ χρηστός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι 
ἐρωτηθὲν ἔδεισεν εἰ οἶον τε τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ 
μεμνήσθαι ἄμα καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαι ἀπέφησεν 
διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ 
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξεν. τὸ δὲ, ὃ ραθυμότατε 
Σωκράτες, τῇ δ’ ἐχει· ὅταν τι τῶν ἐμῶν δι’ ἐρωτη- 
σεως σκοπῆς, εὰν μὲν ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς οἶαπερ ἂν ἐγὼ 
ἀποκριναίμην ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλληται, ἐγὼ ἠλέγ- 

Β χομαι, εἰ δὲ ἄλλοια, αὐτὸς ὁ ἐρωτηθεῖς. αὐτίκα 
γὰρ δοκεῖσ τινά σοι συγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην 
παρεῖναι τῷ ἄν ἔπαθε, τοιοῦτον τι οὖσαν πάθος 
οἶον ὅτε ἑπασχε, μηκέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ γε 
δεῖ. ἡ αὐτά ἀποκήτασεν ὁμολογεῖν οἶον τ’ εἶναι 
eἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτό; ἡ ἔἀνθρ 
τοῦτο δείσῃ, δώσεων ποτὲ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν 
ἀνομοιόμενον τῷ πρὶν ἀνομοιότιθαι ὅντι; μᾶλλον 
δὲ τὸν εἶναι τινα, ἀλλ’ οὐχί τούς, καὶ τούτους 
γενομένους ἀπείρους, ἐάνθρ ἄνομοισις γίγνεται. 
C εἰ δὴ ὀνομάτων γε δεήσει θηρεύσεις διευλαβεῖσθαι
THEAE'TETUS

at once proceed to bargain with you for such ransom as might be agreed upon between you. What argument, then, you might ask, will Protagoras produce to strengthen his forces? Shall we try to carry on the discussion?

THEAE'T. By all means.

SOC. He will, I fancy, say all that we have said in his defence and then will close with us, saying contemptuously, "Our estimable Socrates here frightened a little boy by asking if it was possible for one and the same person to remember and at the same time not to know one and the same thing, and when the child in his fright said 'no,' because he could not foresee what would result, Socrates made poor me a laughing-stock in his talk. But, you slovenly Socrates, the facts stand thus: when you examine any doctrine of mine by the method of questioning, if the person who is questioned makes such replies as I should make and comes to grief, then I am refuted, but if his replies are quite different, then the person questioned is refuted, not I. Take this example. Do you suppose you could get anybody to admit that the memory a man has of a past feeling he no longer feels is anything like the feeling at the time when he was feeling it? Far from it. Or that he would refuse to admit that it is possible for one and the same person to know and not to know one and the same thing? Or if he were afraid to admit this, would he ever admit that a person who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike? In fact, if we are to be on our guard against such verbal entanglements, would he admit that a person is one at all, and not many, who become infinite in number, if the process of becoming
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ἀλλήλων; ἀλλ’, ὦ μακάρε,“ φήσει, “γενναιοτέρως ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἐλθὼν ὁ λέγω, εἰ δύνασαι, ἐξέλεγξον ὅσ’ οὐχὶ ἰδιαί αἰσθήσεις ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν γίγνονται, ἦ ὅσ’ ἰδίων γιγνομένων οὐδὲν τι ἄν μᾶλλον τὸ φαινόμενον μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ γίγνοιτο, ἦ εἰ εἶναι δεὶ ὀνομάζειν, εἰῃ ὑπερ φαινεται. ὸς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκεφάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ὑπερεῖς, ἅλλα καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας τοῦτο δράν εἰς τὰ συγγράμματά δ’ μου ἀναπείθεις, οὐ καλῶς ποιῶν. ἐγὼ γάρ φημὶ μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα· μέτρον γάρ ἔκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μὴ· μυρίον μέντοι διαφέρειν ἐπερον ἐτέρον αὐτῷ τοῦτω, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἅλλα ἐστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἅλλα. καὶ σοφίαν καὶ σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἅλλ’ αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ λέγω σοφὸν, ὅσ’ ἄν τι ν ἡμῶν, ὦ φαινεται καὶ ἐστὶ κακά, μεταβάλλων ποιήσε ἅγαθα φαίνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι.

Ἐτὸν δὲ λόγον αὐτὸ τῷ ῥήματι μου δίωκε, ἅλλ’ ὦδε ἐστὶ σαφέστερον μάθε τὶ λέγω. οἷον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνῆσθητι, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαινεῖται ἄ ἐσθίει καὶ ἐστι, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνοντι τάναντι ἐστὶ καὶ φαίνεται. σοφώτερον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ ποιῆσαι—οὐδ’ 

167 γὰρ δυνατὸν—οὐδ’ κατηγορητέον ὅσ’ ὦ μὲν κάμινων ἀμαθῆς ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὀ δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφὸς ὅτι ἄλλοις· μεταβλητέον δ’ ἐπὶ θάτερα· ἀμείνων 94
THEAETETUS

different continues? But, my dear fellow," he will say, "attack my real doctrines in a more generous manner, and prove, if you can, that perceptions, when they come, or become, to each of us, are not individual, or that, if they are individual, what appears to each one would not, for all that, become to that one alone—or, if you prefer to say 'be,' would not be—to whom it appears. But when you talk of pigs and dog-faced baboons, you not only act like a pig yourself, but you persuade your hearers to act so toward my writings, and that is not right. For I maintain that the truth is as I have written; each one of us is the measure of the things that are and those that are not; but each person differs immeasurably from every other in just this, that to one person some things appear and are, and to another person other things. And I do not by any means say that wisdom and the wise man do not exist; on the contrary, I say that if bad things appear and are to any one of us, precisely that man is wise who causes a change and makes good things appear and be to him. And, moreover, do not lay too much stress upon the words of my argument, but get a clearer understanding of my meaning from what I am going to say. Recall to your mind what was said before, that his food appears and is bitter to the sick man, but appears and is the opposite of bitter to the man in health. Now neither of these two is to be made wiser than he is—that is not possible—nor should the claim be made that the sick man is ignorant because his opinions are ignorant, or the healthy man wise because his are different; but a change must be made from the one condition to
PLATO

γὰρ ἡ ἐτέρα ἔξις. οὔτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἑτέρας ἔξεις ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείων μεταβλητέον. ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ἱατρὸς φαρμάκωις μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς λόγους. ἐπει δὲ γε ἐπειδὴ δοξάζοντά τις τινα ὑστερον ἀληθῆ ἐποίησε δοξάζειν. οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνάτων δοξάζας, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ’ ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ· ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ. ἄλλ’ οἰμαί, πονηρὰ

Β ᾠνχής ἐξει δοξάζοντα 2 συγγενή ἐαυτῆς 3 χρηστὴ ἐποίησε δοξάζασαι ἑτερα τοιαύτα, ἃ δὴ τινές τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπερίας ἀληθῆς καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίων μὲν τὰ ἑτέρα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀληθεστέρα δὲ οὐδέν. καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς, ὃ φίλε Σώκρατες, πολλοὺ δεός βατράχους λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἱατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργοὺς.

φημὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτοις τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενή, χρηστάς καὶ

C ὡς εἰναις αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς 4 ἔμποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γε σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ᾑτητοις τοῖς πόλει τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οἶδα γ’ ἂν ἐκάστη πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῆ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῆ, ἐως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ. ἀλλ’ ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς τοὺς παιδευομένους οὔτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν σοφὸς τε καὶ

D ἐξίς πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευθείσοις καὶ οὔτω σοφότεροι τε εἶναι ἑτεροὶ ἑτέρων καὶ οὐδεὶς

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1 πονηρὰ Aldina; πονηρᾶς BT.
2 δοξάζοντα Tb; δοξάζοντας B.
3 ἐαυτῆς BT; αὐτῆς some mss. and editors.
4 ἀληθεῖς BT; ἀληθείας Schleiermacher.
the other, for the other is better. So, too, in education a change has to be made from a worse to a better condition; but the physician causes the change by means of drugs, and the teacher of wisdom by means of words. And yet, in fact, no one ever made anyone think truly who previously thought falsely, since it is impossible to think that which is not or to think any other things than those which one feels; and these are always true. But I believe that a man who, on account of a bad condition of soul, thinks thoughts akin to that condition, is made by a good condition of soul to think correspondingly good thoughts; and some men, through inexperience, call these appearances true, whereas I call them better than the others, but in no wise truer. And the wise, my dear Socrates, I do not by any means call tadpoles; when they have to do with the human body, I call them physicians, and when they have to do with plants, husbandmen; for I assert that these latter, when plants are sickly, instil into them good and healthy sensations, and true ones instead of bad sensations, and that the wise and good orators make the good, instead of the evil, seem to be right to their states. For I claim that whatever seems right and honourable to a state is really right and honourable to it, so long as it believes it to be so; but the wise man causes the good, instead of that which is evil to them in each instance, to be and seem right and honourable. And on the same principle the teacher who is able to train his pupils in this manner is not only wise but is also entitled to receive high pay from them when their education is finished. And in this sense it is true that some men are wiser than others, and that
PLATO

ψευδὴ δοξάζει, καὶ σοί, ἡν τε βούλη ἐὰν τε μὴ, ἀνεκτέον ὅντι μέτρω· σῳζεται γάρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος οὗτος. ὁ δὲ σὺ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητεῖ, ἀμφισβητεῖ λόγως ἀντιδιεξελθὼν. εἰ δὲ δι’ ἐρωτήσεως βούλει, δι’ ἐρωτήσεως οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο φευκτέον, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέον τῷ νοὺν ἔχοντι. ποιεῖ μέντοι οὐτωσὶς μὴ ἀδίκει

Ε ἐν τῷ ἐρωτάν· καὶ γὰρ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν ἄλλ᾽ ἢ ἀδικοῦντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν. ἀδικεῖν δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρίς μὲν ὑπὸ ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιήται, χωρίς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίζῃ τε καὶ σφάλλῃ καθ᾽ ὅσον ἂν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγομεν, ἐκεῖνα μόνα αὐτῷ ἐνδεικνύμενοι τὰ σφάλματα, ὃ αὐτὸς ύφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ

168 τῶν προτέρων συνοφυών παρεκέκρουστο. ἂν μὲν γὰρ οὕτω ποιήσῃ, ἐαυτοῦς αἰτιάσονται οἱ προσδιατρίβοντες σοι τῆς αὐτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ σὲ, καὶ σὲ μὲν διωξόνται καὶ φιλήσουσιν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μυσθουσί καὶ φεύγονται ἢ ἑαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, ἢ ἀλλοι γενόμενοι ἀπαλλαγόω τῶν οὶ πρότερον ἦσαν· ἐὰν δὲ τὰναντία τούτων δρᾶς ὦσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ, τάναντία ἑμβηκόρεια σοι καὶ τοὺς συνόντας ἀντὶ φιλοσόφων μισοῦντας τούτο

Β τὸ πράγμα ἀποφανεῖς, ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτεροι γένωνται. ἔδων οὖν ἔμοι πέθη, ὁ καὶ πρότερον ἔρρηθη, οὐ δυσμενῶς οὐδὲ μαχητικῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἑλεῖ τῇ διανοιᾳ συγκαθεῖσ ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψει τί ποτε λέγομεν, 98
no one thinks falsely, and that you, whether you will or no, must endure to be a measure. Upon these positions my doctrine stands firm; and if you can dispute it in principle, dispute it by bringing an opposing doctrine against it; or if you prefer the method of questions, ask questions; for an intelligent person ought not to reject this method, on the contrary, he should choose it before all others. However, let me make a suggestion: do not be unfair in your questioning; it is very inconsistent for a man who asserts that he cares for virtue to be constantly unfair in discussion; and it is unfair in discussion when a man makes no distinction between merely trying to make points and carrying on a real argument. In the former he may jest and try to trip up his opponent as much as he can, but in real argument he must be in earnest and must set his interlocutor on his feet, pointing out to him those slips only which are due to himself and his previous associations. For if you act in this way, those who debate with you will cast the blame for their confusion and perplexity upon themselves, not upon you; they will run after you and love you, and they will hate themselves and run away from themselves, taking refuge in philosophy, that they may escape from their former selves by becoming different. But if you act in the opposite way, as most teachers do, you will produce the opposite result, and instead of making your young associates philosophers, you will make them hate philosophy when they grow older. If, therefore, you will accept the suggestion which I made before, you will avoid a hostile and combative attitude and in a gracious spirit will enter the lists with me and inquire what we really mean.
κωνεῖσθαι τε ἀποφαινόμενοι τὰ πάντα, τὸ τε δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτο καὶ εἶναι ἰδιώτη τε καὶ πόλει. καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψει, εἶτε ταῦταν εἶτε καὶ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἰσθήσεις, ἀλλ’ οὐχ, ὡσπερ ἄρτι, ἐκ συνηθείας ῥημάτων τε καὶ ᾠνομάτων, ὃ ὁ πολλοὶ ὅπη ἢν τύχωσιν ἐλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντο-δαπάσει παρέχουσι.” ταῦτα, ὃ Θεὸδωρε, τῷ ἐταίρῳ σου εἰς βοήθειαν προσηρξάμην κατ’ ἐμὴν δύναμιν, σμικρά ἀπὸ σμικρῶν· εἰ δ’ αὐτὸς ἔξη, μεγαλειό-τερον ἂν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔβοηθησέν.

21. Θεό. Παίζεις, ὃ Σώκρατες· πάνυ γὰρ νεανικῶς τῷ ἄνδρι βεβοήθηκασ.

Σω. Ἐδ λέγεις, ὃ ἐταίρε. καὶ μοι εἰπέ· ἐνενόη-σάς που λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου καὶ οὐνείδι-1 ζοντος ἦμῖν ὅτι πρὸσ παιδίον τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦ-μενοι τῷ τοῦ παιδὸς φόβως ἀγωνιζόμεθα εἰς τὰ ἔαυτοῦ, καὶ χαριευτισμὸν τινα ἀποκάλων, ἀποσεμ-νώνων δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρον, σπουδάσαι ἦμᾶς διεκελεύσατο περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγου;

Θεό. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, ὃ Σώκρατες;

Σω. Τὶ οὖν; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ;

Θεό. Σφόδρα γε.

Σω. Ὅρας οὖν ὅτι τάδε πάντα πλὴν σοῦ παιδία ἔστιν. εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἄνδρι, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ ἀγωνιζόμεθα Β· ἀγωνιζόμεθα Τ.
THEAETETUS

when we declare that all things are in motion and that whatever seems is to each individual, whether man or state. And on the basis of that you will consider the question whether knowledge and perception are the same or different, instead of doing as you did a while ago, using as your basis the ordinary meaning of names and words, which most people pervert in haphazard ways and thereby cause all sorts of perplexity in one another.” Such, Theodorus, is the help I have furnished your friend to the best of my ability—not much, for my resources are small; but if he were living himself he would have helped his offspring in a fashion more magnificent.

theo. You are joking, Socrates, for you have come to the man’s assistance with all the valour of youth.

soc. Thank you, my friend. Tell me, did you observe just now that Protagoras reproached us for addressing our words to a boy, and said that we made the boy’s timidity aid us in our argument against his doctrine, and that he called our procedure a mere display of wit, solemnly insisting upon the importance of “the measure of all things,” and urging us to treat his doctrine seriously?

theo. Of course I observed it, Socrates.

soc. Well then, shall we do as he says?

theo. By all means.

soc. Now you see that all those present, except you and myself, are boys. So if we are to do as
ΠΛΑΤΟ

Ε δεῖ ἐρωτῶντας τε καὶ ἀποκρινομένους ἀλλήλους ὁπονδάσαι αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ὡς μὴ τοι 
τοῦτό γε ἔχῃ ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παίζοντες πρὸς 
μειράκια διεσκεψάμεθ' αὐτοῦ τὸν ² λόγον. 

θέο. Τί δ' ἐσθ' οὖ πολλῶν τοι Θεαίτητος μεγάλους 
πόγωνας ἔχοντων ἀμεινὸν ἃν ἐπακολουθήσει εἰς 
λόγῳ διερευνωμένων; 

σο. Ἄλλ' οὗ τι σοῦ γε, ὥ Θεόδωρε, ἀμεινον. 
μὴ οὖν σοι ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ σῷ ἑταίρῳ τετελευτηκότι 
169 δεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαρμύνειν, σὲ δὲ μηδενὶ, ἀλλ' 
Ἰθι, δὲ ἄριστο, ὅλιον ἐπίσπου, μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ 
ἐως ἂν εἰδώμεν εἴτε ἀρὰ σὲ δὲ διαγραμμάτων 
πέρι μέτρου εἶναι, εἴτε πάντες ὁμοίως σοὶ ἰκανοὶ 
ἔαυτοῖς εἰς τε ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τὰλλα ὑν δὴ σοῦ 
πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρειν.

θέο. Οὗ βάδιον, ὥ Σῶκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθή- 

c 
μενον μὴ διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρελήφησα 
φάσκων σε ἐπιτρέψειν μοι μὴ ἀπὸδυέσθαι, καὶ ὅσχι 
ἀναγκάσεων καθ' ἀπὸ Λακεδαίμονιο: σοὶ δὲ μοι 

c 
δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. Λακε- 
Β δαμόνιοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπίνει τῇ ἀπὸδυέσθαι κελεύονσι, 
οὐ δὲ κατ᾽ Ἀνταίον τὰ μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δρᾶμα 

c 
d
ἀρνήτ' τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἄν ³ 
ἀναγκάσης ἀπὸδύσας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προσπαλαίσαι. 

σο. Ἀριστά γε, ὥ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μοι ἀπῄ- 

κασας. ἰχνορικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἑκείνων. μυριο 

1 τοι τοῦτο γε B; τοι τόγε T; τοῦτο γε W. 
2 αὐτοῦ τὸν απογρ. Coislinianum 155; αὖ τοῦ τὸν B; αὖ 
τοῦτον τὸν T. 
3 πρὶν ἄν Heindorf; πρὶν BT. 

102
THEAETETUS

the man asks, you and I must question each other and make reply in order to show our serious attitude towards his doctrine; then he cannot, at any rate, find fault with us on the ground that we examined his doctrine in a spirit of levity with mere boys.

theo. Why is this? Would not Theaetetus follow an investigation better than many a man with a long beard?

soc. Yes, but not better than you, Theodorus. So you must not imagine that I have to defend your deceased friend by any and every means, while you do nothing at all; but come, my good man, follow the discussion a little way, just until we can see whether, after all, you must be a measure in respect to diagrams, or whether all men are as sufficient unto themselves as you are in astronomy and the other sciences in which you are alleged to be superior.

theo. It is not easy, Socrates, for anyone to sit beside you and not be forced to give an account of himself and it was foolish of me just now to say you would excuse me and would not oblige me, as the Lacedaemonians do, to strip; you seem to me to take rather after Sciron.¹ For the Lacedaemonians tell people to go away or else strip, but you seem to me to play rather the rôle of Antaeus; for you do not let anyone go who approaches you until you have forced him to strip and wrestle with you in argument.

soc. Your comparison with Sciron and Antaeus pictures my complaint admirably; only I am a more

¹ Sciron was a mighty man who attacked all who came near him and threw them from a cliff. He was overcome by Theseus. Antaeus, a terrible giant, forced all passers-by to wrestle with him. He was invincible until Heracles crushed him in his arms.
PLATO

γὰρ ἦδη μοι Ὑρακλέες τε καὶ Ὑῆσες ἐνυχώντες τοὺς καρτεροὺς πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλιστα ἐν ἕγιγνε κάποιος, ἀλλὰ ἐγώ οὖν ἦδη τοὺς μᾶλλον ἀφιστάμαι. οὕτως τὸς Ἐρώς δεινὸς ἐνδέδωκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γνωματιασίας. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσῃς προσανατριψάμενος σαυτόν τε ἁμα καὶ ἐμὲ ὁνήσαι.

ὦτο. Οὖνδέ οὕτα ἄντιλέγω, ἀλλὰ ἄγε ὅπῃ θέλεις· πάντως τὴν περὶ ταῦτα εἰμιμάηθην ἢν ἢν ὑπὲρ ἑπικλώσης δει ἀναλημνᾷ ἑλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὃν προτίθεσαι οἶος τῷ ἔσομαι παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτὸν σοι.

ἢπ. Ἀλλὰ ἄρκει καὶ μέχρι τούτων. καὶ μοι πάνω τῆς τοῦτον, μὴ ποιν πανδικὸν το θάνωμεν

D εἰδὸς τῶν λόγων ποιοῦμεν, καὶ τὶς πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτό ὁμοιότητα.

ὦτο. Ἀλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαι γε καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύναι.

22. ἔπ. Τοῦδε τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν ἀντιλαβόμεθα οὕτω τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἵκουμεν ὀρθῶς ἢν οὖν ὀρθῶς ἐνυχθεραίωμεν ἐπιτμιώντες τῶν λόγων ἢτι αὐτάρκη ἐκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἑποίει· καὶ ἡμῖν συνεχώρησεν ὁ Πρωταγόρας περὶ τοῦ ἀμείνου καὶ χείρονον διαφέρειν τινάς, οὕς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφοῖς. οὕχι;

ὦτο. Ναὶ.

ἢπ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς παρὼν ὁμολογεῖ, ἀλλὰ Ἔ μὴ ἡμεῖς βοηθοῦμες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὔτεν ἂν πάλιν ἐδει ἑπαναλάβοντος βεβαιοῦτοι· νῦν δὲ τὰχ᾽ ἂν τὰς ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθείη τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ὁμολογίας. διὸ καλλιώνων ἐχει σαφέι

1 ἐνυχώντες Τ.; ἐνυχράνοντες Β.
2 καρτεροὶ Β.; κρατεροὶ Τ.
3 ἢν οὐ W; ἢν ΒΤ.

104
THEAETETUS

stubborn combatant than they; for many a Heracles and many a Theseus, strong men of words, have fallen in with me and belaboured me mightily, but still I do not desist, such a terrible love of this kind of exercise has taken hold on me. So, now that it is your turn, do not refuse to try a bout with me; it will be good for both of us.

THEO. I say no more. Lead on as you like. Most assuredly I must endure whatsoever fate you spin for me, and submit to interrogation. However, I shall not be able to leave myself in your hands beyond the point you propose.

SOC. Even that is enough. And please be especially careful that we do not inadvertently give a playful turn to our argument and somebody reproach us again for it.

THEO. Rest assured that I will try so far as in me lies.

SOC. Let us, therefore, first take up the same question as before, and let us see whether we were right or wrong in being displeased and finding fault with the doctrine because it made each individual self-sufficient in wisdom. Protagoras granted that some persons excelled others in respect to the better and the worse, and these he said were wise, did he not?

THEO. Yes.

SOC. Now if he himself were present and could agree to this, instead of our making the concession for him in our effort to help him, there would be no need of taking up the question again or of reinforcing his argument. But, as it is, perhaps it might be said that we have no authority to make the agreement for him; therefore it is better to make the
PLATO

στερον περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι. οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἡ ἄλλως.

ἐσο. Λέγεις ἀλήθη.

ζη. Μὴ τοίνυν δι’ ἄλλων ἄλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου
170 λόγου οὐσ διὰ βραχυτάτων λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν.

ἐσο. Πῶς;

ζη. Οὕτωσι’ τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτο καὶ
εἰναι φησί που ὦ δοκεῖ;

ἐσο. Φησί γὰρ οὖν.

ζη. Οὔκοιν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπου,
μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν,
καὶ φαμεν οὐδένα ὄντων οὐ τὰ μὲν αὐτὸν ἤγεισθαι
τῶν ἄλλων σοφῶτερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἐαυτοῦ, καὶ
ἐν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις
ἡ νόσοις ἢ ἐν θαλάσσῃ χειμάζωνται, ὡσπερ πρὸς
θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἁρχοντας, σωτῆρας,

Β σφών προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαφέροντας
ἡ τῷ εἰδέναι. καὶ πάντα που μεστὰ τὰνθρώπων
ζητοῦντων διδασκάλους τε καὶ ἁρχοντας ἐαυτῶν
tε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν τε ἐργασιῶν, οἰομένων
τε αὐτάκι ἰκανῶν μὲν διδάσκειν, ἰκανῶν δὲ ἁρχεῖν εἶναι.
καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀπασφαλείς τὸ ἄλλο φήσομεν ἡ αὐτοῦ
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἤγεισθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν
εἶναι παρὰ σφῶν;

ἐσο. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ζη. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν
ἡγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδή δόξαν;

C ἐσο. Τί μὴν;

ζη. Τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, χρησόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ;

106
agreement still clearer on this particular point; for it makes a good deal of difference whether it is so or not.

THEO. That is true.

SOC. Let us then get the agreement in as concise a form as possible, not through others, but from his own statement.

THEO. How?

SOC. In this way: He says, does he not? "that which appears to each person really is to him to whom it appears."

THEO. Yes, that is what he says.

SOC. Well then, Protagoras, we also utter the opinions of a man, or rather, of all men, and we say that there is no one who does not think himself wiser than others in some respects and others wiser than himself in other respects; for instance, in times of greatest danger, when people are distressed in war or by diseases or at sea, they regard their commanders as gods and expect them to be their saviours, though they excel them in nothing except knowledge. And all the world of men is, I dare say, full of people seeking teachers and rulers for themselves and the animals and for human activities, and, on the other hand, of people who consider themselves qualified to teach and qualified to rule. And in all these instances we must say that men themselves believe that wisdom and ignorance exist in the world of men, must we not?

THEO. Yes, we must.

SOC. And therefore they think that wisdom is true thinking and ignorance false opinion, do they not?

THEO. Of course.

SOC. Well then, Protagoras, what shall we do
PLATO

πότερον ἀληθῆ φώμεν ἂεὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δοξάζειν, ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, ποτὲ δὲ ψευδῆ; ἦς ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ που συμβαίνει μὴ ἂεὶ ἀληθῆ ἂλλ' ἀμφότερα αὐτοὺς δοξάζειν. σκόπει γὰρ, ὠ Θεόδωρε, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἢν τις τῶν ἄμφι Πρωταγόρας ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι ὡς οὐδεὶς ἥγειται ἑτέροις ἑτέρον ἀμαθῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.

θεο. 'Αλλ' ἀπιστον, ὡ Σώκρατες.

δ. σν. Καὶ μήν εἰς τούτῳ γε ἀνάγκης ὁ λόγος ἦκει ὁ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπων λέγων.

θεο. Πῶς δή;

σν. "Ὅταν συ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ πρὸς με ἀποφαίνῃ περὶ τυνό σοὶ δόξαν, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τούτο κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον ἀληθῆς ἔστω, ἣμιν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἔστων κριταίς γενέσθαι, ἢ ἂεὶ σε κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεων; ἢ μυρίοι ἐκάστοτε σου μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἥγοιμενοι ψευδῆ κρίνεις τε καὶ οἰςθαί;

Ε. θεο. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὡ Σώκρατες, μάλα μυρίοι δήτα, φησίν Ὅμηρος, οἱ γε μοι τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα παρέχουσιν.

σν. Τί οὖν; βούλει λέγωμεν ὡς σοὶ τὸτε σαυτῷ μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῆ;

θεο. "Εσύκεν ἢκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

σν. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρα; ἀρ' οὐχὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ζέτο μέτρον εἶναι ἀνθρώπων μηδὲ οἱ πολλοί, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ οἰςθαί, μηδὲν δὴ εἶναι ταύτῃ τῇ ἀλήθειᾳ ἂν ἑκείνος ἔγραψεν; Εἰ 108
THEAETETUS

about the doctrine? Shall we say that the opinions which men have are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false? For the result of either statement is that their opinions are not always true, but may be either true or false. Just think, Theodorus; would any follower of Protagoras, or you yourself, care to contend that no person thinks that another is ignorant and has false opinions?

THEO. No, that is incredible, Socrates.

SOC. And yet this is the predicament to which the doctrine that man is the measure of all things inevitably leads.

THEO. How so?

SOC. When you have come to a decision in your own mind about something, and declare your opinion to me, this opinion is, according to his doctrine, true to you; let us grant that; but may not the rest of us sit in judgement on your decision, or do we always judge that your opinion is true? Do not myriads of men on each occasion oppose their opinions to yours, believing that your judgement and belief are false?

THEO. Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, countless myriads in truth, as Homer¹ says, and they give me all the trouble in the world.

SOC. Well then, shall we say that in such a case your opinion is true to you but false to the myriads?

THEO. That seems to be the inevitable deduction.

SOC. And what of Protagoras himself? If neither he himself thought, nor people in general think, as indeed they do not, that man is the measure of all things, is it not inevitable that the "truth" which he wrote is true to no one? But if he himself thought

¹ Homer, Odyssey, xvi. 121, xvii. 432, xix. 78.

109
PLATO

171 δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ῥετο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίηται, 
οἷοθ' ὑπὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὅσοι πλείονοι οἷς μὴ δοκεῖ ἡ 
οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσοῦτοι μᾶλλον οὖκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστων.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη, εἶπερ γε καθ' ἕκαστην δόξαν 
ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.

ΣΝ. ᾿Επειτά γε τοῦτ' ἔχει κομψότατον. ἐκεῖνος 
μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οἵσεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων 
οἰςων, ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἡγοῦνται ψεύδεσθαι, ἐνγχωρεῖ 
του ἀληθῆ εἴναι ὀμολογῶν τὰ οὖνα δοξάζεων 
ἀπαντᾶς.

ΘΕΟ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Β ΣΝ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἄν ψευδὴ συγχωροῖ; εἰ 
τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτοῦ ψεύδεσθαι ὀμολογεῖ 
ἀληθῆ εἴναι;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΝ. Οί δὲ γ' ἄλλοι οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἐαυτοῖς ψεύ-

déσθαι;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΝ. 'Ο δὲ γ' αὖ ὀμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τὴν 
δόξαν ἐξ ὃν γεγραφε.

ΘΕΟ. Φαινεται.

ΣΝ. Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἄρξα-

μένων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπὸ γε ἐκεῖνον 
ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τάναντι λέγοντι συγχωρῇ 
ἀληθῆ αὐτῶν δοξάζεων, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας 
C αὐτὸς συγχωρήσεται μήτε κύνα μήτε τον ἐπι-

tυχόντα ἀνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἔνος 
οὐν μὴ μάθηι. οὖχ οὔτως;

ΘΕΟ. Οὔτως.

ΣΝ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδῆ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, 
οὔτειν ἂν εἰς ἢ Πρωταγόρου "ἀλήθεια" ἀληθῆς, 
οὔτε τινὶ ἄλλω οὔτ' αὐτῷ ἐκεῖνω.
THEAETETUS

it was true, and people in general do not agree with him, in the first place you know that it is just so much more false than true as the number of those who do not believe it is greater than the number of those who do.

THEO. Necessarily, if it is to be true or false according to each individual opinion.

SOC. Secondly, it involves this, which is a very pretty result; he concedes about his own opinion the truth of the opinion of those who disagree with him and think that his opinion is false, since he grants that the opinions of all men are true.

THEO. Certainly.

SOC. Then would he not be conceding that his own opinion is false, if he grants that the opinion of those who think he is in error is true?

THEO. Necessarily.

SOC. But the others do not concede that they are in error, do they?

THEO. No, they do not.

SOC. And he, in turn, according to his writings, grants that this opinion also is true.

THEO. Evidently.

SOC. Then all men, beginning with Protagoras, will dispute—or rather, he will grant, after he once concedes that the opinion of the man who holds the opposite view is true—even Protagoras himself, I say, will concede that neither a dog nor any casual man is a measure of anything whatsoever that he has not learned. Is not that the case?

THEO. Yes.

SOC. Then since the "truth" of Protagoras is disputed by all, it would be true to nobody, neither to anyone else nor to him.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

θεο. Ἅγαν, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἐταίρον μου καταθέομεν.

σπ. Ἀλλά τοι, ὃ φίλε, ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ παραθέομεν τὸ ὅρθον. εἰκός γε ἂρα ἐκείνων πρεσβύτερον

D ὄντα σοφότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι· καὶ εἰ αὐτικὰ ἐντεύθεν ἀνακύψειε μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἂν ἔμε τε ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα, καταδύς ἂν οὐχοῖτο ἀποτρέχων. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη, οἷμαι, χρῆσθαι ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς, ὁποῖοι τινὲς ἐσμεν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἄει ταῦτα λέγειν. καὶ δήτα καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν ἂν τοῦτό γε ὄντινον, τὸ εἶναι σοφότερον ἐτερον ἐτέρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον;

θεο. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

23. σπ. Ἡ καὶ ταύτη ἂν μάλιστα ἴστασθαι τὸν λόγον, ἢ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες

Ε Πρωταγόρα, ὡς τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἢ δοκεῖ, ταύτη καὶ ἐστὶν ἐκάστω, θερμά, ξηρά, γλυκέα, πάντα ὃσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου· εἰ δὲ που εὖ τισι συγχωρήσεται διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλον, περὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἐθελήσαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πᾶν γύναιν καὶ παιδιόν, καὶ θηρίον δέ, ἵκανον εἶναι ἴασθαι αὑτὸ γυνώδικον ἐαυτῷ τὸ ὑγιεινόν, ἄλλα ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον ἄλλου διαφέρειν, ἐπερ που;

θεο. Ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

172 σπ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα καὶ ὁσα καὶ μή, οἷα ἂν ἐκάστη πόλις οἰῆθεισά ἦταν νόμιμα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐκάστῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφότερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῷ συμφέροντα ἐαυτῇ
THEAETETUS

THEO. I think, Socrates, we are running my friend too hard.

SOC. But, my dear man, I do not see that we are running beyond what is right. Most likely, though, he, being older, is wiser than we, and if, for example, he should emerge from the ground, here at our feet, if only as far as the neck, he would prove abundantly that I was making a fool of myself by my talk, in all probability, and you by agreeing with me; then he would sink down and be off at a run. But we, I suppose, must depend on ourselves, such as we are, and must say just what we think. And so now must we not say that everybody would agree that some men are wiser and some more ignorant than others?

THEO. Yes, I think at least we must.

SOC. And do you think his doctrine might stand most firmly in the form in which we sketched it when defending Protagoras, that most things—hot, dry, sweet, and everything of that sort—are to each person as they appear to him, and if Protagoras is to concede that there are cases in which one person excels another, he might be willing to say that in matters of health and disease not every woman or child—or beast, for that matter—knows what is wholesome for it and is able to cure itself, but in this point, if in any, one person excels another?

THEO. Yes, I think that is correct.

SOC. And likewise in affairs of state, the honourable and disgraceful, the just and unjust, the pious and its opposite, are in truth to each state such as it thinks they are and as it enacts into law for itself, and in these matters no citizen and no state is wiser than another; but in making laws that are advan-
PLATO

ἡ μὴ συμφέροντα τίθεσθαι, ἐνταῦθ', εἴπερ ποι, αὐτὸς ὁμολογήσει σύμβουλόν τε συμβουλοῦν διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἔτεραν ἐτέρας πρὸς ἀληθείαν,

Β καὶ οὐκ ἂν πάνω τολμήσεις φήσαι, ἃ ἂν θῇται πόλις συμφέροντα οἰνθείασα αὐτῇ, παντὸς μᾶλλον ταύτα καὶ συνοίσεις. ἄλλ' ἐκεῖ οὐ λέγω, ἐν τοίς δικαίοις καὶ ἄδικοις καὶ ὀσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἴσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἐστί φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἐαυτοῦ ἔχον ἀλλὰ τὸ κοῦρτο δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθὲς τότε ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον· καὶ ὅσοι γε δή μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγουσιν, ὧδε πως τῇ σοφίᾳ ἄγουσι. λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὡς Θεόδωρε, ἐκ

C λόγου μείζων εἰς ἑλάττωνος καταλαμβάνει.

θεο. Οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἀγομεν, ὡς Σώκρατες;

ἐπ. Φαινόμεθα. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν γε δή, ω δαμόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενόησα, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν, ὡς εἰκότως οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολύν χρόνον διατρίψαντες εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ιόντες γελοίοι φαινονται ρήτορες.

θεο. Πῶς δή οὖν λέγεις;

ἐπ. Κυνιδεύονσιν οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν

D φιλοσοφία καὶ τῇ τοιαῦτα διατριβῇ τεθραμμένον ὡς οἰκεῖται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι.θεο.

πὴ δὴ;

ἐπ. Ἡ τοῖς μὲν τούτῳ ὃ σὺ εἶπες ἂεὶ πάρεστι, σχολῇ, καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται. ὃσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνί τρίτον ἡδί λόγον

1 καὶ ἄδικοι W; om. BT. 2 δὴ BT; ἀν Schanz. 3 λέγουσιν Naber, with inferior mss.; λέγοσιν BT. 4 τεθράφθαι W; τεθράφθαι BT.
tageous to the state, or the reverse, Protagoras again will agree that one counsellor is better than another, and the opinion of one state better than that of another as regards the truth, and he would by no means dare to affirm that whatsoever laws a state makes in the belief that they will be advantageous to itself are perfectly sure to prove advantageous. But in the other class of things—I mean just and unjust, pious and impious—they are willing to say with confidence that no one of them possesses by nature an existence of its own; on the contrary, that the common opinion becomes true at the time when it is adopted and remains true as long as it is held; this is substantially the theory of those who do not altogether affirm the doctrine of Protagoras. But, Theodorus, argument after argument, a greater one after a lesser, is overtaking us.

Theo. Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure, have we not?

Soc. Apparently we have. And that makes me think, my friend, as I have often done before, how natural it is that those who have spent a long time in the study of philosophy appear ridiculous when they enter the courts of law as speakers.

Theo. What do you mean?

Soc. Those who have knocked about in courts and the like from their youth up seem to me, when compared with those who have been brought up in philosophy and similar pursuits, to be as slaves in breeding compared with freemen.

Theo. In what way is this the case?

Soc. In this way: the latter always have that which you just spoke of, leisure, and they talk at their leisure in peace; just as we are now taking up
PLATO

ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κάκεϊνοι, ἐὰν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθών τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον καθάπερ ἡμᾶς ἀρέσῃ· καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἃν μόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὄντος· οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε ἂεὶ λέγουσι—κατεπείγει γὰρ ὑδωρ ῥέον

Ε—καὶ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ἢ ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκεν καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγγειωσκομένην, ὥν ἐκτὸς οὐ βητέον· ἦν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν·

οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἂεὶ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δεσπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρὶ των δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ ἀγώνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλην ἀλλ’ ἂεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ· πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος.

173 ὥστε ἐξ ἀπόντων τούτων ἔντονοι καὶ δριμεῖς γίγνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεύσαι καὶ ἔργῳ χαρίσασθαι, σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὁρθοὶ τὰς ψυχὰς. τὴν γὰρ αὔξην καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἢ ἕκ νέων δουλεία ἀφήγηται, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολιά, μεγάλους κινδύνουσα καὶ φόβους ἐτὶ ἀπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλουσα, οὕς οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἄληθος ὑποφέρειν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ φεῦδος τε καὶ τὸ ἄλλον ἀνταδικεῖν τρεπόμενοι πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ

1 ἦν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν mss.; om. Abresch et al.
2 χαρίσασθαι BT; ὑπελθεῖν Cobet from Themistius.
3 τὸ ἔλευθερον BT; τὸ ἔλευθερον Themistius.
THEAETETUS

argument after argument, already beginning a third, so can they, if, as in our case, the new one pleases them better than that in which they are engaged; and they do not care at all whether their talk is long or short, if only they attain the truth. But the men of the other sort are always in a hurry—for the water flowing through the water-clock urges them on—and the other party in the suit does not permit them to talk about anything they please, but stands over them exercising the law's compulsion by reading the brief, from which no deviation is allowed (this is called the affidavit);¹ and their discourse is always about a fellow slave and is addressed to a master who sits there holding some case or other in his hands; and the contests never run an indefinite course, but are always directed to the point at issue, and often the race is for the defendant's life. As a result of all this, the speakers become tense and shrewd; they know how to wheedle their master with words and gain his favour by acts; but in their souls they become small and warped. For they have been deprived of growth and straightforwardness and independence by the slavery they have endured from their youth up, for this forces them to do crooked acts by putting a great burden of fears and dangers upon their souls while these are still tender; and since they cannot bear this burden with upright ness and truth, they turn forthwith to deceit and to requiting wrong with wrong, so that they become

¹ In Athenian legal procedure each party to a suit presented a written statement—the charge and the reply—at a preliminary hearing. These statements were subsequently confirmed by oath, and the sworn statement was called διωμοσία or ἀντωμοσία, which is rendered above by "affidavit" as the nearest English equivalent.
PLATO

Β συγκλώνται, ὡσθ' ύψιστοι οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς ἰδιονόσεις ἐις ἄνδρας ἐκ μειρακίων τελευτῶσι, δεινοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τουτούτω, ὁ Θεόδωρε· τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χρόου πότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἦ ἐάσαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπόμεθα, ἵνα μὴ καὶ, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, λίγαν πολὺ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ μεταλήψῃ τῶν λόγων καταχρώμεθα;

θεό. Μηδαμώς, ὡ Σώκρατε, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες.

C πάνυ γὰρ εὖ τοῦτο εἰρήκας, ὅτι οὐχ ἦμεις οἱ ἐν τῷ τούτῳ χορεύοντες τῶν λόγων ὑπηρέται, ἀλλ' οἱ λόγοι ἡμετέροι 1 ὅσπερ οἰκεῖται, καὶ έκαστος αὐτῶν περιμένει ἀποτελεσθῆναι ὅταν ἡμῖν δοκῇ· οὔτε γὰρ δικαστὴς οὔτε θεατὴς ὅσπερ ποιητᾶς ἐπιτιμήσων τε καὶ ᾠδῶν ἐπιστατεῖ παρ' ἡμῖν.

24. Ἐν. Λέγωμεν δὴ, ὡς ἔσχεν, ἐπεὶ σοὶ γε δοκεῖ, περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων· τί γὰρ ἂν τις τούς γε φαύλως διατρίβοντας εἰς φιλοσοφία λέγοι; οὖτοι δὲ ποι ἢ νέων πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν

D ὅδον, οὖν ὅπου δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἢ τι κοινὸν ἀλλὸ τῆς πόλεως συνέδριον· νόμοις δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὀρθῶς οὔτε ἀκούοντο· σπουδαὶ δὲ ἐταρων ἐπ' ἀρχαῖος καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κώμοι, οὖν ἄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς. εὖ δὲ ἡ κακῶς τις 2 γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἢ τι τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν ἢ προγόνων γεγονός ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέγει θεία ὁ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης Ἐλευθερίας καὶ ταύτα πάντ' οὖν ὁτι οὐκ

1 ἡμετέρου W; οἱ ἡμετέρου BT.  
2 τις W, IambL, Clem.; τι BT.
THEAETETUS

greatly bent and stunted. Consequently they pass from youth to manhood with no soundness of mind in them, but they think they have become clever and wise. So much for them, Theodorus. Shall we describe those who belong to our band, or shall we let that go and return to the argument, in order to avoid abuse of that freedom and variety of discourse, of which we were speaking just now?

THEO. By all means, Socrates, describe them; for I like your saying that we who belong to this band are not the servants of our arguments, but the arguments are, as it were, our servants, and each of them must await our pleasure to be finished; for we have neither judge, nor, as the poets have, any spectator set over us to censure and rule us.

SOC. Very well, that is quite appropriate, since it is your wish; and let us speak of the leaders; for why should anyone talk about the inferior philosophers? The leaders, in the first place, from their youth up, remain ignorant of the way to the agora, do not even know where the court-room is, or the senate-house, or any other public place of assembly; as for laws and decrees, they neither hear the debates upon them nor see them when they are published; and the strivings of political clubs after public offices, and meetings, and banquets, and revelings with chorus girls—it never occurs to them even in their dreams to indulge in such things. And whether anyone in the city is of high or low birth, or what evil has been inherited by anyone from his ancestors, male or female, are matters to which they pay no more attention than to the number of pints in the sea, as the saying is. And all these things the philosopher does not even know that he does not
PLATO

οἶδεν, οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπνότο πόλει κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἥγησαμεν ἐρμήρια καὶ οὐδὲν, ἀτυμάσασα πανταχῇ φέρεται ¹ κατὰ Πίνδαρον, "τὰς ² τε γὰρ ὑπένερθε" καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, "οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπερ ἀστρονομοῦσα, καὶ πᾶσαι τὰ σάμαντα ἐν φύσιν ἐρευνημένη τῶν ὀντων ἐκάστου ὦλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν αὐτὴν συγκαθιεῖσα.

θεο. Πώς τούτο λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες;

ἲπ. Ὡσπερ καὶ Θαλῆν ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὁ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἀνώ βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Ὁράττα τις ἐμελής καὶ χαρίεσσα θεραπαινία ἀποσκώψαι λέγεται, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ δὲ ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνουν αὐτὸν. ταῦτον δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκώμμα ἐπὶ πάντας ὅσοι Β ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγνουσι. τῷ γὰρ ὑπτὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ὁ μὲν πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτων λέηθεν, οὐ μόνον δὲ τι πράττει, ἀλλὰ ὅλου καὶ εἰ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο θρέμαμα. τὶ δὲ ποτὲ ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπός καὶ τί τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει προσήκει διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγματ' ἔχει διερευνώμενος. μανθάνεις γὰρ ποι, ὁ Θεόδωρε. ἦς οὖ;

θεο. Ἐγώγει καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ἲπ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὁ φίλε, ἵδια τε συγγεγρώμενος ὁ

¹ φέρεται BT; πέτεται B<sup>α</sup>W, Iambl., Clem., Euseb.
² τὰι Campbell from Clement; τὰ C; τὰ T.

120
THEAETETUS

know; for he does not keep aloof from them for the sake of gaining reputation, but really it is only his body that has its place and home in the city; his mind, considering all these things petty and of no account, disdains them and is borne in all directions, as Pindar\(^1\) says, "both below the earth," and measuring the surface of the earth, and "above the sky," studying the stars, and investigating the universal nature of every thing that is, each in its entirety, never lowering itself to anything close at hand.

THEO. What do you mean by this, Socrates?

SOC. Why, take the case of Thales, Theodorus. While he was studying the stars and looking upwards, he fell into a pit, and a neat, witty Thracian servant girl jeered at him, they say, because he was so eager to know the things in the sky that he could not see what was there before him at his very feet. The same jest applies to all who pass their lives in philosophy. For really such a man pays no attention to his next door neighbour; he is not only ignorant of what he is doing, but he hardly knows whether he is a human being or some other kind of a creature; but what a human being is and what is proper for such a nature to do or bear different from any other, this he inquires and exerts himself to find out. Do you understand, Theodorus, or not?

THEO. Yes, I do; you are right.

SOC. Hence it is, my friend, such a man, both in

\(^1\) This may refer to Nem. x. 87 f.—

\begin{quote}
\textit{ήμιον} μὲν κε πνεύοις γαλας υπένερθεν ἐὼν,  
\textit{ήμιον} δ’ οὐρανοῦ ἐν χρυσέοις οἴκοις,
\end{quote}

"Thou (Polydeuces) shalt live being half the time under the earth and half the time in the golden dwellings of heaven," but it may be a quotation from one of the lost poems of Pindar.
PLATO

toióntos ēkαstw kai deimoiá, òper áρchómenos
C ēlēgou, ótan ev dikasthriw ò pou álloθ ònagka-
sthî peri tów para pódas kai tów ev óφhalaioís
dialēgešthai, gēwta parēχei ou múon Òrráttas
alla kai tâ allw òxhλw, eis frēstâ te kai pássan
âporiâv èmpipâttov upò âpeirias, kai hè ásgkhsounh
dein, dóxan âbêlêriâs parêkomeîn. ën te gâr
taîs loidoríâs ïðion ëxei ouðe̱n ouðe̱n loidorêw,
at ouk eidw̱s kakôn ouðe̱n ouðe̱nès ëk toû ìk
mēmêlêthkêna. âporâw ouv geloîos fâînetai. ën
D te toîs épâïnous kai taîs tłów allw megalaunhías,
où prôspouhtâs, alla tâ ònti gêlw̱n èvðhλ̱os
ghnîmênos lepôðh dôkeî eînâi. tûranâw te
gâr hè basileâ ègkwmiajómênon èva tłów nômêw,
oîn suβwî̱n hè pômêna hè tîa boukôlôw, ëgêî̱tai
ákouèn eùdaiâmojómênon polû bêdâllontâ. dûs-
kolôteron dê ëkeîîwn òzôw kai épîboulosêrêon
pômâîṉe te kai bêdâḻlw nômîζë aûîòûs, aûrôkôw
dê kai âpâîdêwûn upò âsgkhsîas ouðe̱n ëttôn tów
E nômêwv tów toiîwv ònagkâiôn gînveshîaî, shkôw
ën òrêî to teîxhîs perîbëblhîmêwv. ãîs dê òtan
mûria pîlêthra hè êti pîlew âkouèi ìs tîs ára
ektemênos thãumastà plîîte këkêthîaî, pànsmikra
dôkeî âkouèw eîs âpâsaw eîwthwvs tîn ãîn blêpewv.
tâ dê ðh ãêñh ùmûwîntwv, ñs geñnâiòs tis èptà
pàâppovz plουsiîvs ëçwv âpòfînaw, pantzâpazw
âmblû kai êpi smikrûn òrûntwv ãëgêîtaw tîw
175 êpâînaw, upò âpâîdêwûsîaî ouv dûnâmêwv eîs to
THEAETETUS

private, when he meets with individuals, and in
public, as I said in the beginning, when he is obliged
to speak in court or elsewhere about the things at
his feet and before his eyes, is a laughing-stock not
only to Thracian girls but to the multitude in general,
for he falls into pits and all sorts of perplexities
through inexperience, and his awkwardness is terrible,
making him seem a fool; for when it comes to
abusing people he has no personal abuse to offer
against anyone, because he knows no evil of any
man, never having cared for such things; so his
perplexity makes him appear ridiculous; and as to
laudatory speeches and the boastings of others, it
becomes manifest that he is laughing at them—not
pretending to laugh, but really laughing—and so he
is thought to be a fool. When he hears a panegyric
of a despot or a king he fancies he is listening to the
praises of some herdsman—a swineherd, a shepherd,
or a neatherd, for instance—who gets much milk from
his beasts; but he thinks that the ruler tends and
milks a more perverse and treacherous creature than
the herdsmen, and that he must grow coarse and un-
civilized, no less than they, for he has no leisure and
lives surrounded by a wall, as the herdsmen live in
their mountain pens. And when he hears that
someone is amazingly rich, because he owns ten
thousand acres of land or more, to him, accustomed
as he is to think of the whole earth, this seems very
little. And when people sing the praises of lineage
and say someone is of noble birth, because he can
show seven wealthy ancestors, he thinks that such
praises betray an altogether dull and narrow vision
on the part of those who utter them; because of
lack of education they cannot keep their eyes fixed
πάν ἄει βλέπειν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἐκάστω γεγόνασιν ἀναρίθμητοι, ἐν αἰσ πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ δούλου βάρβαροι τε καὶ "Ελληνες πολλάκις μυρίοι γεγόνασιν ὤτοιν· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμνομομένων καὶ ἀναφερόντων εἰς Ἡρακλεά τὸν Ἀμφιτρύώνος ἀτόπα αὐτῷ καταφαινεῖται τῆς σιμικρολογίας, ὅτι Ὁ δὲ ὁ Ἀμφιτρύώνος εἰς τὸ ἄνω πεντεκα-εικοστός τοιοῦτος ἢν οί συνεβαίνεν αὐτῷ τῆς, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστός ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, γελᾶ οὐ δυναμένων λογί-ζεσθαι τε καὶ χαυνότητα ἀνοίγτου ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττενε. ἐν ἀπασὶ δὴ τούτοις ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελάται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' ἐν ποσίν ἁγνῶν τε καὶ ἐν ἐκάστους ἀπορῶν. θεό. Παντάπασι τὰ γιγνόμενα λέγεις, ὥστε ἄρκητε. 25. Ἠντ' ὃτα τριάδας, ὡς φίλε, ὁ ἔκλυσθ' ἄνω, καὶ ἐθελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ ἐκβήναι ἐκ τοῦ "τ' ἑγὼ σὲ ἀδικώ ἢ σὺ ἑμε';" εἰς σκέψαιν αὐτής δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας, τί τε ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ τί ὑπὸ πάντων ἡ ἄλλη συναφέρετον, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ "εἰ βασιλείας εὐδαιμων," "κεκτημένους τ' αὐ πολυ' χρυσίον," βασιλείας πέρι καὶ ἄνθρω-πίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέψαι, ποιῶ τε τινὲς ἔστον καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσῆκε τὸ μὲν κτήσεσθαι 2 αὐτοῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀποφυγεῖν—πειρ' τούτων ἀπάντων.

D ὃταν αὖ δέχῃ λόγον διδόναι τὸν σμικρὸν ἔκεινον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ δρμῶν καὶ δικαίων, πάλιν αὖ τὰ

1 τολύ Euseb., Iamb.; om. BT.
2 κτήσασθαι Bl, Iamb., Euseb.; κτήσεσθαι BT.
THEAETETUS

upon the whole and are unable to calculate that every man has had countless thousands of ancestors and progenitors, among whom have been in any instance rich and poor, kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks. And when people pride themselves on a list of twenty-five ancestors and trace their pedigree back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, the pettiness of their ideas seems absurd to him; he laughs at them because they cannot free their silly minds of vanity by calculating that Amphitryon's twenty-fifth ancestor was such as fortune happened to make him, and the fiftieth for that matter. In all these cases the philosopher is derided by the common herd, partly because he seems to be contemptuous, partly because he is ignorant of common things and is always in perplexity.

Theo. That all happens just as you say, Socrates.

Soc. But when, my friend, he draws a man upwards and the other is willing to rise with him above the level of "What wrong have I done you or you me?" to the investigation of abstract right and wrong, to inquire what each of them is and wherein they differ from each other and from all other things, or above the level of "Is a king happy?" or, on the other hand, "Has he great wealth?" to the investigation of royalty and of human happiness and wretchedness in general, to see what the nature of each is and in what way man is naturally fitted to gain the one and escape the other—when that man of small and sharp and pettifogging mind is compelled in his turn to give an account of all these

125
PLATO

ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδοσιν. ἦλθαν τε ἀπὸ ύψηλον κρεμασθεὶς καὶ βλέπων μετέωρος ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἀθείας ἄδημον τε καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ βατταρίζων
γέλωτα Θράττανε μὲν οὐ παρέχει οὕτω ἄλλῳ ἀπαι-δεύτῳ οὐδενὶ, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τοῖς δὲ ἐναντίως ἦ σχάδαντοι τραφεῖσιν ἄπασιν. οὕτος δὴ ἐκατέρω τρόπος, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὦ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν
Ε ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, ὅν δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς, ὦ ἀνεμέσθητον εὐθείαν δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ εἶναι ὅταν εἰς δοξικὰ ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα, οἷον στρωματόδεσμον μὴ ἐπισταμένου συσκευά-σασθαι μηδὲ ὁφὸν ὑδύναι ἡ θάπας λόγον. οὐ δὲ αὐτὸ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα πάντα δυναμένου τοῖς τε καὶ ὁξέως διακονέων, ἀναβάλλοντος δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἑπιδέξει αἴλευθέρως οὐδὲ γ’ ἀρμονίαν λόγων

176 λαβόντος ὀρθῶς ὑμνήσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἄληθῆ. ὑποθεσαχ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθοις ὁ λέγεις ὅτε περὶ ἐμὲ, πλεῖων ἄν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάπτω
cατ’ ἀνθρώπων εἰς.

ἐπ. Ἀλλ’ οὖτ’ ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε. ὑπεναντίων γὰρ τι τῷ ἄγαθῳ ἄει εἶναι ἀνάγκη. οὖτ’ ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ θυτητῆς φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἔξ

1 βατταρίζων Themistius; βαρβαρίζων BT.
2 τραφεῖσιν ἄπασιν B; τραφεῖσι πᾶσι T, Iamb., Euseb.
3 οὐ δ’ t, Iamb.; οὐ δ’ BT.
4 ἐλευθέρως BT; ἐλευθερίας Athenaeus.
5 ἄληθῆ om. Athenaeus.

126
things, then the tables are turned; dizzied by the
new experience of hanging at such a height, he
gazes downward from the air in dismay and per-
plexity; he stammers and becomes ridiculous, not in
the eyes of Thracian girls or other uneducated
persons, for they have no perception of it, but in
those of all men who have been brought up as free
men, not as slaves. Such is the character of each
of the two classes, Theodorus, of the man who has
truly been brought up in freedom and leisure, whom
you call a philosopher—who may without censure
appear foolish and good for nothing when he is
involved in menial services, if, for instance, he does
not know how to pack up his bedding, much less
to put the proper sweetening into a sauce or a fawn-
ing speech—and of the other, who can perform all
such services smartly and quickly, but does not know
how to wear his cloak as a freeman should, properly
draped,¹ still less to acquire the true harmony of
speech and hymn aright the praises of the true life
of gods and blessed men.

théo. If, Socrates, you could persuade all men
of the truth of what you say as you do me, there
would be more peace and fewer evils among mankind.
soc. But it is impossible that evils should be done
away with, Theodorus, for there must always be
something opposed to the good; and they cannot
have their place among the gods, but must inevitably
hover about mortal nature and this earth. Therefore

¹ The Athenians regarded the proper draping of the
cloak as a sign of good breeding. The well-bred Athenian
first threw his cloak over the left shoulder, then passed it
round the back to the right side, then either above or below
the right arm, and finally over the left arm or shoulder. See Aristophanes, Birds, 1567 f., with Blaydes's notes.

127
PLATO

ἀνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε
Β ἑφύρειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ
κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὁσιὸν
μετὰ φρονήσεως γενόταται. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὦ ἄριστε,
οὐ πάνυ \footnote{1} ῥάδιον πεῖσαι ὃς ἀρα οὐχ ὧν ἐνεκα οἱ
πολλοὶ φασὶ δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν ἑφύρειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ
dιώκειν, τοῦτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτιθευτέων, τὸ δ' οὖ,
ὅν μὴ \footnote{2} κακὸς καὶ ὃν ἄγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι· τὰῦτα
γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῦν ύθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ
C φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ ἄληθὲς ὃδε λέγωμεν. θεὸς
οὐδαμὴ οὐδαμῶς ἀδικος, ἀλλ' ὃς οἴον τε δικαιό-
tatos, καὶ οὔκ ἐστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοίοτερον οὔδέν ἢ ὃς
ἀν ἡμῶν αὐ γένηται ὑπὶ δικαιότατος. περὶ τοῦτο \footnote{3}
καὶ ἡ ὃς ἄληθῶς δεινὸτης ἄνδρος καὶ οὐδενίᾳ τε
καὶ ἀνανδρία. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο γνώσις σοφία καὶ
ἀρετὴ ἄληθινη, ἡ δὲ ἀγνοΐα ἀμαθία καὶ κακία
ἐναργῆς· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι δεινοτήτες τε δικοῦσαι καὶ
σοφία ἐν μὲν πολιτικᾶς δυναστείαις γιγνόμεναι
φορτικά, ἐν δὲ τέχναις βάναυσοι. τῷ οὖν ἄδι-
D κοῦντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέγοντι ἡ πράττοντι μακρῷ
ἀριστ' ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχωρεῖν δεινῷ ὑπὸ πανοργίας
eἶναι· ἀγάλλονται γὰρ τῷ οὐνείδει καὶ οἰονται
ἀκουέν ὃτι οὐ λήροι εἰσὶ, γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἀλλ' ἄνδρες
οἴους δεί ἐν πόλει τοὺς σωθησομένους.
λεκτέον οὖν τάληθες, ὅτι τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον εἰσώ
οἰο οὐκ οἴονται, ὃτι οὐχὶ οἰονται· ἀγνοϊοῦσι γὰρ
ζημίαν ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἥκιστα ἀγνοεῖν. οὐ γὰρ

\footnote{1} πάνυ Β; πάνυ τι Τ. \footnote{2} ὃν μὴ Β; ὃν δὴ μὴ Τ.
\footnote{3} τοῦτο Euseb., Iamb., Stob.; τοῦτο ΒΤ.
128
we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling
of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to
become like God, so far as this is possible; and to
become like God is to become righteous and holy
and wise. But, indeed, my good friend, it is not at
all easy to persuade people that the reason generally
advanced for the pursuit of virtue and the avoidance
of vice—namely, in order that a man may not seem
bad and may seem good—is not the reason why the
one should be practised and the other not; that,
I think, is merely old wives' chatter, as the saying
is. Let us give the true reason. God is in no
wise and in no manner unrighteous, but utterly
and perfectly righteous, and there is nothing so like
him as that one of us who in turn becomes most
nearly perfect in righteousness. It is herein that
the true cleverness of a man is found and also his
worthlessness and cowardice; for the knowledge of
this is wisdom or true virtue, and ignorance of it is
folly or manifest wickedness; and all the other kinds
of seeming cleverness and wisdom are paltry when
they appear in public affairs and vulgar in the arts.
Therefore by far the best thing for the unrighteous
man and the man whose words or deeds are impious
is not to grant that he is clever through knavery;
for such men glory in that reproach, and think it
means that they are not triflers, "useless burdens
upon the earth;" ¹ but such as men should be who
are to live safely in a state. So we must tell them
the truth—that just because they do not think they
are such as they are, they are so all the more truly;
for they do not know the penalty of unrighteousness,
which is the thing they most ought to know. For

¹ Homer, Iliad, xviii. 104; Odyssey, xx. 379.
PLATO

ἐστι ἂν δοκοῦσι, πληγαὶ τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὥς ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὔδεν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ ἂν ἀδύνατον Ε ἐκφυγεῖν.

θεο. Τίνα δὴ λέγεις;

σπ. Παραδειγμάτων, ὃ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὁντι ἔστώτων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἄθεου ἀθλιωτάτου, οὐχ ὄρωντες ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὧπο ἡλιθιότητος τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι 177 τῷ μὲν ὁμοιόμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιόμενοι. οὐ δὴ τίνος δίκην ζώντες τοῦ εἰκότα βίον ὃ ὁμοιόται. εἶν αὐτοὶ εἰπὼμεν ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγώς τῆς δευτέρου, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὃ τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος οὐ δέχεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγής ἂει ἔχουσι, κακοὶ κακοὶς συνόντες, ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὃς δεινοὶ καὶ πανοῦργοι ἀνοητῶν τινῶν ἀκούσονται.

θεο. Καὶ μάλα δὴ, ὃ Σώκρατες.

σπ. Οἴδα τοι, ὃ έταίρε. ἐν μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς συμβεβήκειν. ὅταν ὁδιὰ λόγον δέχοντας τε καὶ δέχονται καὶ γινόμεναι ἵνα γίνονται, καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀν- 1 ὄρη ὡς πολὺν χρόνων ὑπομείνω καὶ μὴ ἀνάργρως φυγεῖν, ὁτάτοις, ὃ δαιμόνιος, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἀρέσκων αὐτοῦ αὐτοῖς περὶ ὁν πέφευγον, καὶ ἡ ρητορική ἐκείνη πῶς ἀπομαινεῖ, ἢτοι παῖδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδή καὶ πάρεργα τυχανεὶς ἔγομένα, αποστώμεν—ἐι δὲ Σ μὴ, πλεῖον αἰεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἦμῶν τῶν

1 ὅτ' ἄν W, Iamb. ; ὦτ' ἄν BT.
2 φυγεῖν W ; φεύγειν BT, Iamb.
it is not what they think it is—scourgings and death, which they sometimes escape entirely when they have done wrong—but a penalty which it is impossible to escape.

**Theo.** What penalty do you mean?

**Soc.** Two patterns, my friend, are set up in the world, the divine, which is most blessed, and the godless, which is most wretched. But these men do not see that this is the case, and their silliness and extreme foolishness blind them to the fact that through their unrighteous acts they are made like the one and unlike the other. They therefore pay the penalty for this by living a life that conforms to the pattern they resemble; and if we tell them that, unless they depart from their "cleverness," the blessed place that is pure of all things evil will not receive them after death, and here on earth they will always live the life like themselves—evil men associating with evil—when they hear this, they will be so confident in their unscrupulous cleverness that they will think our words the talk of fools.

**Theo.** Very true, Socrates.

**Soc.** Yes, my friend, I know. However, there is one thing that has happened to them: whenever they have to carry on a personal argument about the doctrines to which they object, if they are willing to stand their ground for a while like men and do not run away like cowards, then, my friend, they at last become strangely dissatisfied with themselves and their arguments; their brilliant rhetoric withers away, so that they seem no better than children. But this is a digression. Let us turn away from these matters—if we do not, they will come on like
PLATÔ

ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγου—ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἐμπροσθεν ἰώμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

θεο. Ἐμοὶ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὐ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀγαθότερα ἀκούειν· ρᾴ δὲ γὰρ τηλικώδε οὖτι ἐπακολουθεῖν· εἰ μέντοι δοκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανίσθωμεν.

26. ση. Οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθα που ἧμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν οἴ δ᾽ ἐφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ δοκεῖ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑθέλειν δισχυρίας ἔχοντας, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὡς πάντος μᾶλλον ἂν ἥτιταί πόλεις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, τοῖτα καὶ ἐστὶ δίκαια τῇ θεμένῃ, ἑωστερὶ ἂν κέρταί· περὶ δὲ τάγαθος ὁυδένα ἀνδρείοιο ἔθε οὐτώς εἶναι, ὡστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ἂν ὃφελμα οὐκ οὐθείσα πόλεις έαυτῇ θηταί, καὶ ἐστὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον οὐκ οὖν ἂν κέρτα οὐφελμα, πλὴν εἰ τυς τὸ ὄνομα λέγον· τούτῳ δὲ που σκῶμι ἂν εἰη πρὸς ὁ λέγομεν. οὐχὶ;

θεο. Πάνω γε.

Ε ση. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὄνομα ζόμενον θεωρεῖτω. 2

θεο. Μὴ γὰρ.

ση. Ἄλλο δ' ἂν τοῦτο ὄνομαζη, τούτου δήπου στοχάζεται νομοθετομένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους, καθ' ὅσον οἴεται τε καὶ δύναται, ὡς ὃφελματάτους ἐαυτῇ τίθεται· ἐπὶ πρὸς ἀλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθετεῖται;

1 τάγαθος BW; τάγαθα TW.
2 τὸ ὄνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖτω W; ὁ ὄνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖται B; λεγέτω . . . μὴ γὰρ om. T.

132
THEAETETUS

an ever-rising flood and bury in silt our original argument—and let us, if you please, proceed.

Theo. To me, Socrates, such digressions are quite as agreeable as the argument; for they are easier for a man of my age to follow. However, if you prefer, let us return to our argument.

Soc. Very well. We were at about the point in our argument where we said that those who declare that only motion is reality, and that whatever seems to each man really is to him to whom it seems, are willing to maintain their position in regard to other matters and to maintain especially in regard to justice that whatever laws a state makes, because they seem to it just, are just to the state that made them, as long as they remain in force; but as regards the good, that nobody has the courage to go on and contend that whatever laws a state passes thinking them advantageous to it are really advantageous as long as they remain in force, unless what he means is merely the name "advantageous"¹; and that would be making a joke of our argument. Am I right?

Theo. Certainly.

Soc. Yes; for he must not mean merely the name, but the thing named must be the object of his attention.

Theo. True.

Soc. But the state, in making laws, aims, of course, at advantage, whatever the name it gives it, and makes all its laws as advantageous as possible to itself, to the extent of its belief and ability; or has it in making laws anything else in view?

¹ The legislator may call his laws advantageous, and that name, if it is given them when they are enacted, will belong to them, whatever their character may be.
178 ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΨ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει ἄει, ἣ πολλὰ καὶ δια-μαρτάνει ἐκάστην;

ΘΕΟ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ ἄμαρτάνειν.

ΣΨ. Ἐτὶ τούτων ἐνθένδε ἂν μᾶλλον πᾶς τις ὁμολογήσειν ταύτα ταύτα, εἰ περὶ παντὸς τις τοῦ εἴδους ἐρωτήσῃ, ἐν ὧδε καὶ τὸ ὕφελμον τυγχάνει ὅν· ἐστὶ δὲ ποὺ καὶ περὶ τὸν μελλόντα χρόνον. ὅταν γὰρ νομοθετόμεθα, ὡς ἐσομένους ὕφελμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέμεθα εἰς τὸν ἐπειτὸ χρόνον· τοῦτο δὲ μέλλον ὡς ἐν λέγοιμεν.

Β ΘΕΟ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΨ. Ἡθὶ δὴ, οὐτωσὶ ἐρωτῶμεν Πρωταγόραν ἣ ἂλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐκείνων τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων· πάντων μέτρων ἀνθρωπός ἦστιν, ὡς φατέ, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, λευκῶν, βαρέων, κούφων, οὐδενὸς ὁτου ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων· ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οἱ πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἴόμενος, ἀληθῆ τε οἴεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὅντα. οὐχ οὔτωσι.

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτω.

ΣΨ. Ἡ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, φήσομεν, ὃ Πρωταγόρα, ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ὁνείρη ἔσεσθαίς, ταύτα καὶ γίγνεται ἐκείνω τῷ οἰγθέντι; οἷον θερμᾶ, ἄρ' ὅταν τις οἰγθή ἰδιώτης αὐτὸν πυρετὸν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ ἔτερος, ἰατρὸς δὲ, ἀντοιχῆ, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δοξάν φῶμεν τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσεσθαι; ἣ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφοτέρως, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἰατρῷ οὐ

1 ἐκάστη W; ἐκάστη BT.
2 μέλλον W; μᾶλλον BT.
THEAETETUS

THEO. Certainly not.

SOC. And does it always hit the mark, or does every state often miss it?

THEO. I should say they do often miss it!

SOC. Continuing, then, and proceeding from this point, every one would more readily agree to this assertion, if the question were asked concerning the whole class to which the advantageous belongs; and that whole class, it would seem, pertains to the future. For when we make laws, we make them with the idea that they will be advantageous in after time; and this is rightly called the future.

THEO. Certainly.

SOC. Come then, on this assumption, let us question Protagoras or someone of those who agree with him. Man is the measure of all things, as your school says, Protagoras, of the white, the heavy, the light, everything of that sort without exception; for he possesses within himself the standard by which to judge them, and when his thoughts about them coincide with his sensations, he thinks what to him is true and really is. Is not that what they say?

THEO. Yes.

SOC. Does he, then, also, Protagoras, we shall say, possess within himself the standard by which to judge of the things which are yet to be, and do those things which he thinks will be actually come to pass for him who thought them? Take, for instance, heat; if some ordinary man thinks he is going to take a fever, that is to say, that this particular heat will be, and some other man, who is a physician, thinks the contrary, whose opinion shall we expect the future to prove right? Or perhaps the opinion
PLATO

θερμῶς οὐδὲ πυρέττων γενήσεται, ἐαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφότερα;

 theano. Γελοῦν μέντ᾽ ἄν εἴη.

 σπ. 'Αλλ', οἷμαι, περὶ οὗ οὐκ ὑλικύττητος καὶ

 Ν αὐστηρότητος μελλούσης ἐσεθαί η τοῦ γεωργοῦ

 δόξα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἦ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ κυρία.

 theano. Τί μήν;

 σπ. Οὐδ᾽ ἂν αὐ τοῖς ἀναρμόστων τε καὶ εὐαρ-

 μόστων ἐσομένου παιδοτρίβης ἄν βέλτιον δοξάσεων

 μουσικοῦ, δ᾽ καὶ ἐπευτα αὐτῷ παιδοτρίβη δόξει

 εὐάρμοστον εἶναι.

 theano. Οὐδαμῶς.

 σπ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστιάσεσθαι μὴ

 μαγειρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θοίνης, ἀκροτέρα

 ἡ κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὕψωτοιο περὶ τῆς ἕσομένης

 Ἐρατονής. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἡδῆ ὄντος ἐκάστῳ

 ἡ δεός ἡ γεγονότος μηδὲν πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώ-

 μεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐκάστῳ καὶ δόξει

 καὶ ἐσεθαί πότερον αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἄριστος κριτής,

 ἡ σὺ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τό γε ἐπερὶ λόγου πιθανῶν

 ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον

 ἄν προδοξάσασθι τὰ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὄστισον;

 theano. Καὶ μᾶλα, ὦ Σώκρατε, τούτῳ γε

 σφόδρα ὑποςχέετο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτός.

 σπ. Νῦ Δία, ὦ μέλε, ἡ οὐδεὶς γ᾽ ἄν αὐτῷ διε-

 179 λέγετο διδοὺς πολὺ ἄργυριον, εἰ μή τοὺς συνόντας

 ἐπεθευν ὃτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐσεθαί τε καὶ δόξειν

 1 δ᾽ om. T. 2 τό γε W; τότε BT.
of both, and the man will become, not hot or feverish to the physician, but to himself both?

THEO. No, that would be ridiculous.

SOC. But, I imagine, in regard to the sweetness or dryness which will be in a wine, the opinion of the husbandman, not that of the lyre-player, will be valid.

THEO. Of course.

SOC. And again, in a matter of discord or tunefulness in music that has never been played, a gymnastic teacher could not judge better than a musician what will, when performed, seem tuneful even to a gymnastic teacher himself.

THEO. Certainly not.

SOC. Then, too, when a banquet is in preparation the opinion of him who is to be a guest, unless he has training in cookery, is of less value concerning the pleasure that will be derived from the viands than that of the cook. For we need not yet argue about that which already is or has been pleasant to each one; but concerning that which will in the future seem and be pleasant to each one, is he himself the best judge for himself, or would you, Protagoras—at least as regards the arguments which will be persuasive in court to each of us—be able to give an opinion beforehand better than anyone whatsoever who has no especial training?

THEO. Certainly, Socrates, in this, at any rate, he used to declare emphatically that he himself excelled everyone.

SOC. Yes, my friend, he certainly did; otherwise nobody would have paid him a high fee for his conversations, if he had not made his pupils believe that neither a prophet nor anyone else could judge
PLATO

όυτε μάντις ούτε τις ἄλλος ἁμείνον κρίνειν ἂν ἡ αὐτός.  

θεό. Ἀληθεστάτα.

ἐπ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἰ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὕφελμον περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐστὶ, καὶ πάς ἂν ὁμολογοὶ νομοθετομεμένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοῦ ὕφελμωτάτου ἀποτυγχάνειν;

θεό. Μάλα γε.

ἐπ. Μετρίως ἄρα Ἡμῶν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν ὑμᾶς εἰρήσσεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῶν ὁμολογεῖν σοφώτερόν τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιούτον μέτρον εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιστήμον μηδὲ ὅπωσιον ἀνάγκην εἶναι μέτρων γίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἀρτι μὲ ἡνάγκαζεν ὁ υπὲρ ἐκείνου λόγος, εἰτ' ἐβουλόμην εἰτε μη, τοιούτον εἶναι.

θεό. Ἐκείνη μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες, μάλιστα ἀλόγως ὁ λόγος, ἀλογόμενος καὶ ταύτη, ἣ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὖται δὲ ἐφάνησαν τοὺς ἐκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀλήθεις ἤγούμεναι.

C ἐπ. Πολλάχι, ὡς Θεόδωρος, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἂν τὸ γε τοιοῦτον ἀλοίπῃ μὴ πάσαν παντὸς ἀλήθῃ δόξαν εἶναι: περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὅν αἱ ἀισθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξας γίγνονται, χαλεπώτερον ἔλειν ὡς οὐκ ἀλήθεις. ἦσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω, ἀνάλωτον γάρ, εἰ ἔτυχον, εἰςίν, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμας τάχα ἂν ὁντα λέγοιεν, καὶ Θεαίτητος δὲ πάντων ἄν ἄλλο σκοποῦ εὑρηκέν αἰσθησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμης ταύτον.

D θέμενος. προσείτων οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, ὡς ὁ υπὲρ

1 αὐτός αὐτῷ mss.; αὐτῷ om. Schleiermacher.
THEAETETUS

better than himself what was in the future to be and seem.

THEO. Very true.

SOC. Both lawmaking, then, and the advantageous are concerned with the future, and everyone would agree that a state in making laws must often fail to attain the greatest advantage?

THEO. Assuredly.

SOC. Then it will be a fair answer if we say to your master that he is obliged to agree that one man is wiser than another, and that such a wise man is a measure, but that I, who am without knowledge, am not in the least obliged to become a measure, as the argument in his behalf just now tried to oblige me to be, whether I would or no.

THEO. In that respect, Socrates, I think that the argument is most clearly proved to be wrong, and it is proved wrong in this also, in that it declares the opinions of others to be valid, whereas it was shown that they do not consider his arguments true at all.

SOC. In many other respects, Theodorus, it could be proved that not every opinion of every person is true, at any rate in matters of that kind; but it is more difficult to prove that opinions are not true in regard to the momentary states of feeling of each person, from which our perceptions and the opinions concerning them arise. But perhaps I am quite wrong; for it may be impossible to prove that they are not true, and those who say that they are manifest and are forms of knowledge may perhaps be right, and Theaetetus here was not far from the mark in saying that perception and knowledge are identical. So we must, as the argument in behalf of
PLATO

Πρωταγόρου λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκέπτεον τὴν
φερομένην ταύτην ὃνθιαν διακρούοντα, ἐὰν ὑγιὲς
eíte σαθρὸν φθέγγεται. μάχη δ' οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ
φαύλῃ οὖδ' ὁλίγοις γέγονεν.

27. θεο. Πολλοὶ καὶ δὲῖ φαύλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
περὶ μὲν τὴν 'Ἰωνίαν καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ. οἱ
γὰρ τοῦ 'Ἡρακλείτου ἔταξαν χορηγοῦσι τούτου
τοῦ λόγου μάλα ἐρρωμένως.

σω. Τῷ τοι, ὦ φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκέπτεον
Ε καὶ ἔξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ύποτείνονται.

θεο. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ γὰρ, ὦ Σώκρατες,
περὶ τούτων τῶν 'Ἡρακλείτεων ἡ, ὥσπερ σοῦ
λέγεις, Ὀμηρείων καὶ ἔτι πολαιστέρων, αὐτοῖς
μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἐφεσον, ὡςοι προστοιοῦνται
ἔμπειροι εἶναι, οὔδὲν μᾶλλον οἶον τε διαλεχθῆναι
ἡ τοῖς οἰστρῶσιν. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμ-
ματα φέρονται, τὸ δ' ἐπιμείναν ἐπὶ λόγῳ καὶ
ἔρωτήματι καὶ ἱστοχύτες ἐν μέρει ἀποκρίνασθαι
καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἢττον αὐτοῖς ἐν ἢ τὸ μηδὲν. μᾶλλον
dὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὖθ' οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρὸν
ἐνείναι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἱστοχύτες. ἀλλ' ἂν τινὰ τὶ
ἐρπῃ, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματισκία αἰνεματῶδη
ἀνασπώντες ἀποτελεῖον, καὶ τούτων ζητῆς λόγον
λαβεῖν τὶ εἰρήκει, ἔτερῳ πεπλήξει κανὼς μετ-
ωνομασμένῳ. περανεῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδέν πρὸς
οὐδένα αὐτῶν. οὐδέ γε ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλή-
βλος, ἀλλ' εὖ πάνω φιλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βεβαιον

1 διακρούοντα TW; ἀκούοντα B.
2 ἔμπειροι εἶναι Vindob. 21; ἔμπειροι BT, Euseb.
THEAETETUS

Protagoras\(^1\) enjoined upon us, come up closer and examine this doctrine of motion as the fundamental essence, rapping on it to see whether it rings sound or unsound. As you know, a strife has arisen about it, no mean one, either, and waged by not a few combatants.

THEO. Yes, far from mean, and it is spreading far and wide all over Ionia; for the disciples of Heraclitus are supporting this doctrine very vigorously.

SOC. Therefore, my dear Theodorus, we must all the more examine it from the beginning as they themselves present it.

THEO. Certainly we must. For it is no more possible, Socrates, to discuss these doctrines of Heraclitus (or, as you say, of Homer or even earlier sages) with the Ephesians themselves—those, at least, who profess to be familiar with them—than with madmen. For they are, quite in accordance with their text-books, in perpetual motion; but as for keeping to an argument or a question and quietly answering and asking in turn, their power of doing that is less than nothing; or rather the words "nothing at all" fail to express the absence from these fellows of even the slightest particle of rest. But if you ask one of them a question, he pulls out puzzling little phrases, like arrows from a quiver, and shoots them off; and if you try to get hold of an explanation of what he has said, you will be struck with another phrase of novel and distorted wording, and you never make any progress whatsoever with any of them, nor do they themselves with one another, for that matter, but they take very good care to allow nothing to be settled either

\(^1\) See 168 b.

141
PLATO

ἐάν εἶναι μήτ’ ἐν λόγῳ μήτ’ ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἢγούμενοι, ὃς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσιμον εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ πάνω πολεμοῦσιν, καὶ καθ’ ὅσον δύνανται πανταχόθεν ἐκβάλλουσιν.

ζη. Ἱσως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἀνδρας μαχομένους ἕωρακας, εἰρηνεύοντο δὲ οὐ συγγέγονα· οὐ γὰρ σοὶ ἑταῖροι εἶσον· ἂλλ’, οἶμαι, τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζουσιν, οὐδὲ ἂν βουλώνται ὁμοίους αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι.

θεο. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαμόνε, οὐδὲ γίνεται τῶν τοιούτων ἐτέρωσ’ ἐτέρω μαθητής, ἂλλ’ αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται, ὅποθεν ἂν τόχῃ ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν ἐνθουσιάσας, καὶ τὸν ἐτέρων ὃ ἐτέρωσ οὐδὲν ἤγειται εἰδέναι. παρὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ ἂν ἔρων, οὐκ ἂν ποτε λάβοις λόγον οὔτε ἐκόντων οὔτ’ ἀκόντων· αὐτοῖς δὲ τοὺς παραλαβόντας ὅσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι.

ζη. Καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τὸ γε δὴ πρόβλημα ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων μετὰ D πουήσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλούς, ὡς ἡ γένεσις τῶν ἅλλων πάντων Ὄκεανός τε καὶ Τήθος ῥέματα τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστήκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ύστερων ἀτε σοφωτέρων ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυμένων, ἦν καὶ οἱ σκυτοτόμοι αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν μάθωσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ παύσωνται ἡλιθίως οἰό- μενοι τά μὲν ἐστάναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὀντῶν, μαθόντες δὲ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται τιμῶσιν αὐτοὺς; ὅλγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι τοῦ τάναντα τοῦτος ἀπεφήναντο,
in an argument or in their own minds, thinking, I suppose, that this is being stationary; but they wage bitter war against the stationary, and, so far as they can, they banish it altogether.

soc. Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen the men when they are fighting, but have not been with them when they are at peace; for they are no friends of yours; but I fancy they utter such peaceful doctrines at leisure to those pupils whom they wish to make like themselves.

theo. What pupils, my good man? Such people do not become pupils of one another, but they grow up of themselves, each one getting his inspiration from any chance source, and each thinks the other knows nothing. From these people, then, as I was going to say, you would never get an argument either with their will or against it; but we must ourselves take over the question and investigate it as if it were a problem of mathematics.

soc. Yes, what you say is reasonable. Now as for the problem, have we not heard from the ancients, who concealed their meaning from the multitude by their poetry, that the origin of all things is Oceanus and Tethys, flowing streams, and that nothing is at rest; and likewise from the moderns, who, since they are wiser, declare their meaning openly, in order that even cobblers may hear and know their wisdom and may cease from the silly belief that some things are at rest and others in motion, and, after learning that everything is in motion, may honour their teachers? But, Theodorus, I almost forgot that others teach the opposite of this,
οἶον ἂκινητον τελέθειν ἡ πάντε ὄνομ' εἶναι,
καὶ ἄλλα ὡςα Μέλισσοι τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναν-
tιούμενοι πᾶσι τούτοις διαχωρίζονται, ὡς ἐν τε-
pάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἐστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔχου-
χώραν ἐν ἧ κινεῖται. τούτοις οὖν, ὡ ἑταίρη, πᾶσι
τὶ χρησόμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν γὰρ προϊόντες λελη-
θαμεν ἀμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον πεπτωκότες, καὶ

ἀν μὴ πὴ ἄμυνόμενοι διαφύγωμεν, δίκην δώσομεν
ὡςπερ οἶ ἐν ταῖς παλαιστραῖς διὰ γραμμῆς
παίζοντες, ὅταν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ληφθέντες ἐλκυνόντα
εἰς τάναντια. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τοὺς ἑτέρους πρότερον
σκεπτέον, ἐφ' οὔσιν ὑμῆςαμεν, τοὺς ῥέοντας:
καὶ ἐὰν μὲν τι φαίνωνται λέγοντες, συνέλξονεν μετ'
αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς ἑτέρους ἐκφυγείν πειρὼ-
μενοῖς. ἐὰν δὲ οἱ τὸν ὅλον οὐσίωτα ἄληθεστερα
λέγειν δοκῶςι, φευξόμεθα παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὐ τῶν.

Β τὰ ἂκινητα κινοῦντων. ἀμφότεροι δ' ἂν φανῶσι
μηδὲν μέτριον λέγοντες, γελοῦσι έσομέθα ἡγούμενοι
ἡμᾶς μὲν τι λέγειν φαύλους ὄντας, παμπαλαίους δὲ
καὶ πασοῦφοις ἄνδρας ἀποδεδοκιμακτες. ὅρα οὖν,
ὁ Θεόδωρε, εἰ λυστελεὶ εἰς τοσοῦτον προϊέναι
κίνδυνον.

θεο. Οὔδὲν μὲν οὖν ἄνεκτόν, ὡς Ἔκληρτος, μὴ
οὐ διασκέψᾳς τι λέγουσιν ἐκάτεροι τῶν ἄνδρῶν.

1 τελέθειν Stallbaum; τελέθει BT.
2 παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὐ τῶν Schleiermacher; παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὐ τῶν τῶν W; ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν παρ' αὐτοὺς B; τῶν παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὐ τῶν T.
THEAETETUS

So that it is motionless, the name of which is the All,¹ and all the other doctrines maintained by Melissus and Parmenides and the rest, in opposition to all these; they maintain that everything is one and is stationary within itself, having no place in which to move. What shall we do with all these people, my friend? For, advancing little by little, we have unwittingly fallen between the two parties, and, unless we protect ourselves and escape somehow, we shall pay the penalty, like those in the palaestra, who in playing on the line are caught by both sides and dragged in opposite directions.² I think, then, we had better examine first the one party, those whom we originally set out to join, the flowing ones, and if we find their arguments sound, we will help them to pull us over, trying thus to escape the others; but if we find that the partisans of “the whole” seem to have truer doctrines, we will take refuge with them from those who would move what is motionless. But if we find that neither party has anything reasonable to say, we shall be ridiculous if we think that we, who are of no account, can say anything worth while after having rejected the doctrines of very ancient and very wise men. Therefore, Theodorus, see whether it is desirable to go forward into so great a danger.

THEO. Oh, it would be unendurable, Socrates, not to examine thoroughly the doctrines of both parties.

¹ Parmenides, line 98 (ed. Mullach). In its context the infinitive is necessary; but Plato may have quoted carelessly and may have used the indicative.

² In the game referred to (called διελκυστινὸδα by Pollux, ix. 112) the players were divided into two parties, each of which tried to drag its opponents over a line drawn across the palaestra.

145
28. σπ. Σκεπτεόν ἂν εἴη σοῦ γε ὡς τῷ προβυ-
πομομένου. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ἀρχῆ εἶναι τῆς σκέψεως
C κινήσεως πέρι, ποιῶν τί ποτε ἄρα λέγοντές φασὶ
tὰ πάντα κινεῖται. βουλομαι δὲ λέγεω τὸ τοιόντε·
pότερον ἐν τῷ εἶδος αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ἥ, ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ
φαίνεται, δύο; μὴ μέντοι μονὸν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖτω,
ἀλλὰ συμμέτεχε καὶ σὺ, ἣν κωνῆ πάσχωμεν, ἂν
tι καὶ δέη. καὶ μοι λέγε· ἄρα κινεῖται καλεῖς,
ὅταν τί χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ ἥ καὶ ἐν τῷ
ἀυτῷ οὕτως οὐρένται;
θεο. Ἔγουσκε.

σπ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοῖνν ἐν ἑστω εἴδος. ὅταν δὲ
D ἡ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηρᾶσκη δὲ, ἡ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ
ἡ σκληρῶν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνεται, ἡ τινὰ ἄλλην
ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοιώται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄξιον ἔτερον εἴδος
φάναι κινήσεως;
θεο. Ἐμοῦγε δοκεῖ.¹

σπ. Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν.² δύο δὴ λέγω τούτῳ
ἐνδικη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ φοράν.³
θεο. Ὄρθως γε λέγων.

σπ. Τοῦτο τοῖνν ὡς διελόμενοι διαλεγόμεθα
ἡ ὅτι τοῖς τὰ πάντα φάσκουσιν κινεῖται καὶ ἔρω-
tῶμεν· πότερον πάν fατε ᾽αμφοτέρως κινεῖται,
Εὐφρόμενον τε καὶ ἀλλοιωμένου, ἥ τὸ μὲν τί ἄμφο-
tέρως, τὸ δ’ ἕτερως;
θεο. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δῆ ἔγουσκε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν·
οἶμαι δ’ ἄν φάναι ἀμφοτέρως.

σπ. Εἰ δὲ γε μη, ὥ ἔταηρε, κυνούμενα τε αὐτοῖς.⁴

¹ ἐμοῦγε δοκεῖ om. Stobaeus.
² ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν given to Theodorus by B.
³ φοράν W; περιφοράν BT, Stobaeus.
⁴ αὐτοῖς W; ἐαυτοῖς BT.
THEAETETUS

soc. Then they must be examined, since you are so urgent. Now I think the starting-point of our examination of the doctrine of motion is this: Exactly what do they mean, after all, when they say that all things are in motion? What I wish to ask is this: Do they mean to say that there is only one kind of motion or, as I believe, two? But it must not be my belief alone; you must share it also, that if anything happens to us we may suffer it in common. Tell me, do you call it motion when a thing changes its place or turns round in the same place?

THEO. Yes.

soc. Let this, then, be one kind of motion. Now when a thing remains in the same place, but grows old, or becomes black instead of white, or hard instead of soft, or undergoes any other kind of alteration, is it not proper to say that this is another kind of motion?

THEO. I think so.

soc. Nay, it must be true. So I say that there are these two kinds of motion: "alteration," and "motion in space."

THEO. And you are right.

soc. Now that we have made this distinction, let us at once converse with those who say that all things are in motion, and let us ask them, "Do you mean that everything moves in both ways, moving in space and undergoing alteration, or one thing in both ways and another in one of the two ways only?"

THEO. By Zeus, I cannot tell! But I think they would say that everything moves in both ways.

soc. Yes; otherwise, my friend, they will find that things in motion are also things at rest, and it will
καὶ ἔστῶτα φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὅρθως ἔξει εἰπεῖν ὅτι κυνεῖται τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἐστήκεν.

Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ὢ. Ὅμοιόν ἐστὶν κινεῖσθαι αὐτά δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐνεῖναι μηδενὶ, πάντα δὴ πᾶσαν 182 κύνησιν ἀδίν κινεῖται.

Ἀνάγκη.

ἂν. Σκόπει δὴ μοι tὸδε αὐτῶν τῆς θερμότητος ἡ λευκότητος ἡ οὐσία γένεσιν οὐχ ὦτω πως ἐλεγομεν χάναι αὐτοῦς, φέρεσθαι ἡ καστον τοίτων ἀμα αἰσθήσεις μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιούντος τε καὶ πάσχοντος, καὶ τὸ μὲν πάσχον αἰσθητικὸν ἄλλ' οὐκ αἰσθησίαν γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιῶν τι ἄλλ' οὐ ποιότητα; ἵσως οὖν ἡ ποιότης ἀμα ἀλλόκοτον τε φαίνεται δόσιμα καὶ οὐ μανθάνεις ἄθροον λεγόμενον. κατὰ Ἄρτη οὖν ἄκουε, τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν οὔτε θερμότης οὔτε λευκότης, θερμῶν δὲ καὶ λευκὸν γίγνεται, καὶ τάλλα οὕτως πέμνησαι γὰρ που καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὀτι οὕτως ἐλέγομεν, ἐν μηδέν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, μηδ' αὖ το ποιοῦ ἢ πάσχων, ἄλλ' εὖ ἀμφοτέρων πρός ἄλληλα συγγεγυνομένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθήτα ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ μὲν ποῖα 4 ἄττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

Ἄσθημι πώς δ' οὖ;

ἢ. Τὰ μὲν τοῖνυν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐάσωμεν, εἰτε Α ἄλλως εἰτε οὕτως λέγουσιν; οὐ δ' ἐνεκα λέγομεν, τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττωμεν, ἐρωτώντες κινεῖται καὶ ἐδ' ὃς φατε, τὰ πάντα; ἢ γάρ;

1 ἐνεῖναι W; ἐν εἰναι BT.
2 αἰσθητικὸν Burnet; αἰσθητικὸν BT; αἰσθητὴν Buttmann; αἰσθανάμενον Heindorf.
3 αἰσθησίαν W; αἰσθησίαν ἐτι BT. 4 ποῖα BT; ποι BT.

148
be no more correct to say that all things are in motion than that all things are at rest.

THEO. What you say is very true.

SOC. Then since they must be in motion, and since absence of motion must be impossible for anything, all things are always in all kinds of motion.

THEO. Necessarily.

SOC. Then just examine this point of their doctrine. Did we not find that they say that heat or whiteness or anything you please arises in some such way as this, namely that each of these moves simultaneously with perception between the active and the passive element, and the passive becomes percipient, but not perception, and the active becomes, not a quality, but endowed with a quality? Now perhaps quality seems an extraordinary word, and you do not understand it when used with general application, so let me give particular examples. For the active element becomes neither heat nor whiteness, but hot or white, and other things in the same way; you probably remember that this was what we said earlier in our discourse, that nothing is in itself unvaryingly one, neither the active nor the passive, but from the union of the two with one another the perceptions and the perceived give birth and the latter become things endowed with some quality while the former become percipient.

THEO. I remember, of course.

SOC. Let us then pay no attention to other matters, whether they teach one thing or another; but let us attend strictly to this only, which is the object of our discussion. Let us ask them, "Are all things, according to your doctrine, in motion and flux?" Is that so?
PLATO

θεο. Ναί.

σπ. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφοτέρας ὑπὶ διειλόμεθα κινήσεις, 
φερόμενα τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα;

θεο. Πῶς δ' οў; εἶπερ γε δὴ τελέως κινή-

σεται.

σπ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἥλλοιούτω δὲ 
μὴ, εἰχόμεν ἂν που εἰπεῖν οἷα ἄττα ρεῖ τὰ φερό-

μενα· ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν 1;

θεο. Οὔτως.

D σπ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὔδὲ τοῦτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν 
ρέων τὸ ῥέων, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει, ἀστε καὶ αὐτοῦ 
τούτου εἰσαι ροήν, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν 
eis ἄλλην χρόαν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλώ ταύτη μένον, ἀρά 
pote οἶν τέ τι προσεπείν χρώμα, ὄστε καὶ 
ὅρθως προσαγορεύειν;

θεο. Καὶ τὶς μηχανή, ὥς Σώκρατες; ἢ ἄλλο γἐ 
ti tōn toioūtōn, εἰπερ ἀei λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, 
ἀτε δὴ ῥέουν;

σπ. Τι δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐρούμεν ὁποιασοῦν, 
οἶν τῆς τοῦ ὀρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν; μένειν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῷ 
Ε τῷ ὀρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν;

θεο. Οὐκοῦν δεῖ γε, εἰπερ πάντα κινεῖται.

σπ. Οὐτε ἁρα ὀρᾶν προσρητέων τι μᾶλλον ἢ μῆ 
ὁρᾶν, οὐδὲ τιν' ἄλλην αἰσθησιν μᾶλλον ἢ μῆ, πάντων 
γε πάντως κινούμενων.

θεο. Οὐ γάρ οὖν.

σπ. Καὶ μὴν αἰσθησις γε ἐπιστήμη, ὡς ἔφαμεν 
ἐγὼ τε καὶ Θεαίητητος.

θεο. Ἡν ταῦτα.
THEAETETUS

THEO. Yes.
SOC. Have they then both kinds of motion which we distinguished? Are they moving in space and also undergoing alteration?
THEO. Of course; that is, if they are to be in perfect motion.
SOC. Then if they moved only in space, but did not undergo alteration, we could perhaps say what qualities belong to those moving things which are in flux, could we not?
THEO. That is right.
SOC. But since not even this remains fixed—that the thing in flux flows white, but changes, so that there is a flux of the very whiteness, and a change of colour, that it may not in that way be convicted of remaining fixed, is it possible to give any name to a colour, and yet to speak accurately?
THEO. How can it be possible, Socrates, or to give a name to anything else of this sort, if while we are speaking it always evades us, being, as it is, in flux?
SOC. But what shall we say of any of the perceptions, such as seeing or hearing? Does it perhaps remain fixed in the condition of seeing or hearing?
THEO. It must be impossible, if all things are in motion.
SOC. Then we must not speak of seeing more than not-seeing, or of any other perception more than of non-perception, if all things are in all kinds of motion.
THEO. No, we must not.
SOC. And yet perception is knowledge, as Theaetetus and I said.
THEO. Yes, you did say that.
PLATO

ζη. Ούδεν ἂρα ἐπιστήμην μάλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρινόμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι ὁ τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμην.

183 θεο. Ἑοίκατε.

ζη. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν συμβαίνοι τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προβυπηθείσων ἀποδείξαι ότι πάντα κινεῖται, ἵνα δὴ ἐκεῖνη ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὀρθὴ φανῇ. τὸ δ', ὡς ἔσθήνε, ἐφάνη, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πάσα ἀπόκρισις, περὶ ὅσον ἂν τὶς ἀποκρίνηται, ὠμοίως ὀρθὴ εἶναι, οὔτω τ' ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὔτω, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ.

θεο. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ζη. Πλὴν γε, ὡ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι "οὔτω" τε εἶπον καὶ "οὐχ οὔτω." δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο "οὔτω" λέγειν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι κυνικῶς "οὔτω." οὐδ' αὖ "μὴ οὔτω." οὐδὲ γὰρ "τοῦτο" κνησιν ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον τοῖς τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λέγονσιν, ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ρήματα, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ "οὔ" ὅπως. ¹ μάλιστα δ' οὔτως ² ἂν αὐτοῖς ἅρμοτοι, ἀπειρὸν λεγόμενον.

θεο. Ὁικειοτάτη γοῦν διάλεκτος αὐτῷ αὐτοῖς.

ζη. Οὐκοῦν, ὡΘεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταίρου ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὔτω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ' ἄνδρα πάντων χρημάτων μέτρων εἶναι, ἃν μὴ C φρόνιμος τις ἢ. ἐπιστήμην τε αἰσθησιν οὐ συγχωροῦμεν κατά γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον, εἰ μὴ ³ τι πως ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ὁδε λέγει.

θεο. Ἀριστ' εἰρηκας, ὡ Σώκρατες τοῦτων γὰρ περαιτέρων καὶ ἐμὲ δεῖ ἀπηλλάξαθαι σοι

1 ὅπως BT; οὖτως W.
2 δ' οὔτως om. W.
3 εἰ μὴ W; ἢ εἰ μὴ BT.
THEAETETUS

soc. Then when we were asked "what is knowledge?" we answered no more what knowledge is than what not-knowledge is.

THEO. So it seems.

soc. This would be a fine result of the correction of our answer, when we were so eager to show that all things are in motion, just for the purpose of making that answer prove to be correct. But this, I think, did prove to be true, that if all things are in motion, every answer to any question whatsoever is equally correct, and we may say it is thus or not thus—or, if you prefer, "becomes thus," to avoid giving them fixity by using the word "is."

THEO. You are right.

soc. Except, Theodorus, that I said "thus," and "not thus"; but we ought not even to say "thus"; for "thus" would no longer be in motion; nor, again, "not thus." For there is no motion in "this" either; but some other expression must be supplied for those who maintain this doctrine, since now they have, according to their own hypothesis, no words, unless it be perhaps the word "nohow." That might be most fitting for them, since it is indefinite.

THEO. At any rate that is the most appropriate form of speech for them.

soc. So, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend, and we do not yet concede to him that every man is a measure of all things, unless he be a sensible man; and we are not going to concede that knowledge is perception, at least not by the theory of universal motion, unless Theaetetus here has something different to say.

THEO. An excellent idea, Socrates; for now that this matter is settled, I too should be rid of the duty
PLATO:

ἀποκρινόμενον κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ
tοῦ Πρωταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοίνη.

29. θεαί. Μή, πρὶν γ’ ἂν, ὡς Θεόδωρε, Σω-

θνί κράτης τε καὶ σὺ τοὺς φάσκοντας αὖ τὸ πᾶν ἐστά-

ναι διέλθητε, ὥσπερ ἄρτι προὔθεσθε.

θεο. Νέος ἄν, ὡς Θεαίτης, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους

ἄδικείν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαίνοντας; ἀλλὰ

παρασκευάζου ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκράτει

dώσεις λόγον.

θεαί. Ἡ ἐντερ γε βούληται. ἤδιστα μέντ' ἂν

ὥκουσα περὶ ὧν λέγω.

θεο. Ἰππέας εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖ Σωκράτη εἰς

λόγους προκαλούμενος: ἔρωτα οὖν καὶ ἀκούσει.

ς. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκῶ, ὡς Θεόδωρε, περὶ γε ὧν

Ε κελεύει Θεαίτητος οὐ πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ.

θεο. Τι δὴ οὖν οὐ πείσεσθαι;

ς. Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἱ ἐν ἐστὸς

λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνόμενοι μὴ φορτικῶς σκο-

πῶμεν, ἢττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἑνα ὅντα Παρμενίδην.

Παρμενίδης δὲ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τούτο ὁμήρου,

"αἰδοῖος τέ μοι" εἴναι ἀμα "δεινὸς τε." συμπροσ-

έμεξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἄνδρι πάνυ νέος πᾶν πρεσβύτη,

καὶ μοι ἑφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναίον.

184 φοβοῦμαι οὖν μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα ἐμνιῶμεν, τί

tε διαινοούμενος εἰπε πολὺ πλέον λειπόμεθα, καὶ

tὸ μέγιστον, οὐ ἕνεκά ὁ λόγος ὑμνηται, ἐπιστήμης

πέρι, τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ἀσκεπτον γένηται ὑπὸ τῶν

154
THEAETETUS

of answering your questions according to our agree-
ment, since the argument about Protagoras is ended.

THEAET. No, Theodorus, not until you and
Socrates have discussed those who say all things are
at rest, as you proposed just now.

THEO. A young man like you, Theaetetus, teach-
ing your elders to do wrong by breaking their agree-
ments! No; prepare to answer Socrates yourself
for the rest of the argument.

THEAET. I will if he wishes it. But I should have
liked best to hear about the doctrine I mentioned.

THEO. Calling Socrates to an argument is calling
cavalry into an open plain. Just ask him a question
and you shall hear.

SOC. Still I think, Theodorus, I shall not comply
with the request of Theaetetus.

THEO. Why will you not comply with it?

SOC. Because I have a reverential fear of examining
in a flippant manner Melissus and the others who
teach that the universe is one and motionless, and
because I reverence still more one man, Parmenides.
Parmenides seems to me to be, in Homer’s words,
“one to be venerated” and also “awful.” For I
met him when I was very young and he was very
old, and he appeared to me to possess an absolutely
noble depth of mind. So I am afraid we may not
understand his words and may be still farther from
understanding what he meant by them; but my
chief fear is that the question with which we started,
about the nature of knowledge, may fail to be
investigated, because of the disorderly crowd of

1 A proverbial expression. An open plain is just what
cavalry desires.

2 Iliad, iii. 172; Odyssey, viii. 22; xiv. 234.
PLATO

ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων, εἰ τις αὐτοῖς πείσεται·
ALLYS TAE KAI otionEvent γνῶν εὐγείρομεν πλῆθει ἄμηχανον,
εἰτε τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέφθεται, ἀνάξι ἂν πάθοι,
εἰτε ἰκανῶς, μηκυνὸμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης
ἀφανεί· δεὶ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτησιν ὄν

Β κεῖ περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειράσθαι ἦμᾶς τῇ μαεμτικῇ
τέχνῃ ἀπολύσαι.

ΘΕΩ. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν.

ΣΝ. Ἔτι τοίνυν, ὡ Θεαίτης, τοσοῦτο περὶ τῶν
ἐιρημένων ἐπίσκεψαι. αἰσθησιῶν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην
ἀπεκρίνω· ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΝ. Εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὡδ' ἐρωτάτη· "τῷ τὰ λευκὰ
καὶ μέλαν ὡρᾶ ἀνθρωπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὄξεα καὶ
βαρέα ἂνοιξει;" εἴποις αὖ, ὁμαι, "ὁμασί τε
καὶ ὅσιν."

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώγυε.

C ΣΝ. Τὸ δὲ εὐχερές τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥη-
μάτων καὶ μῆ μὴ ἄκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν
πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦτο ἐναντίον
ἀνελεύθερον, ἐστι δὲ ὄτε ἄναγκαιον, οἷον καὶ νῦν
ἀνάγκη ἐνελαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἢν ἀποκρίνει,
ἡ οὖν ὀρθή· σκόπει γάρ, ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα
ορθοτέρα, ὦ ὀρῶμεν, τούτῳ εἶναι ὀφθαλμοῦς, ἢ
δὲ οὗ ὀρῶμεν, καὶ ὃ ἀκούομεν, ὡτα, ἢ δὲ οὗ ἀκούομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δι' οὖν ἕκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐμοίγυε δοκεῖ,
ὡ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς.

D ΣΝ. Δεινὸν γὰρ που, ὡ παῖ, εἰ πολλαὶ τινὲς
ἐν ἡμῖν, ὦσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἤποιοι, αἰσθήσεις

156
arguments which will burst in upon us if we let them in; especially as the argument we are now proposing is of vast extent, and would not receive its deserts if we treated it as a side issue, and if we treat it as it deserves, it will take so long as to do away with the discussion about knowledge. Neither of these things ought to happen, but we ought to try by the science of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of the thoughts about knowledge with which he is pregnant.

Theo. Yes, if that is your opinion, we ought to do so.

Soc. Consider, then, Theaetetus, this further point about what has been said. Now you answered that perception is knowledge, did you not?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. If, then, anyone should ask you, "By what does a man see white and black colours and by what does he hear high and low tones?" you would, I fancy, say, "By his eyes and ears."

Theaet. Yes, I should.

Soc. The easy use of words and phrases and the avoidance of strict precision is in general a sign of good breeding; indeed, the opposite is hardly worthy of a gentleman, but sometimes it is necessary, as now it is necessary to object to your answer, in so far as it is incorrect. Just consider; which answer is more correct, that our eyes are that by which we see or that through which we see, and our ears that by which or that through which we hear?

Theaet. I think, Socrates, we perceive through, rather than by them, in each case.

Soc. Yes, for it would be strange indeed, my boy, if there are many senses ensconced within us, as if
PLATO

ἐγκάθηται, ἄλλα μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἱδέαν, εἰτε ψυχήν εἰτε ὁ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ξυντείνει, ἢ διὰ τούτων οἶον ὄργανων αἰσθανόμεθα ὡσα αἰσθητά.

θεαί. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω μᾶλλον ἡ ἐκείνως.

ση. Τούδε τοι ἐνεκα αὐτὰ σοι διακριβοῦμαι, εἰ τινὶ ήμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφικνούμεθα λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἔλλων ἐτέρων αὐ τινῶν, καὶ ἔξεις ἐρωτάμενος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ σώμα ἀναφέρειν. ἵσως δὲ βέλτιον σὲ λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἔμε ὑπὲρ σοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν. καὶ μοι λέγει τερμαὶ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκέα δι' ὁν αἰσθάνει, ἀρα οὐ τοῦ σώματος ἐκαστα τίθης; ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς;

θεαί. Οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.

ση. Ἡ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολογείν, ἢ δι’ ἐτέρας 185 δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι’ ἄλλης ταύτ’ αἰσθέσθαι, οἶον ἢ δι’ ἀκοῆς, δι’ ὦψεως, ἢ ἢ δι’ ὦψεως, δι’ ἀκοῆς;

θεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω;

ση. Εἰ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἂν διὰ γε τοῦ ἐτέρου ὄργανον, οὐδ’ αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι’ ἂν.

θεαί. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ση. Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χρόας πρῶτον μὲν
THEAETETUS

we were so many wooden horses of Troy, and they
do not all unite in one power, whether we should
call it soul or something else, by which we per-
ceive through these as instruments the objects of
perception.

THEAET. I think what you suggest is more likely
than the other way.

SOC. Now the reason why I am so precise about
the matter is this: I want to know whether there is
some one and the same power within ourselves by
which we perceive black and white through the eyes,
and again other qualities through the other organs,
and whether you will be able, if asked, to refer all
such activities to the body. But perhaps it is better
that you make the statement in answer to a question
than that I should take all the trouble for you.
So tell me: do you not think that all the organs
through which you perceive hot and hard and light
and sweet are parts of the body? Or are they parts
of something else?

THEAET. Of nothing else.

SOC. And will you also be ready to agree that it is
impossible to perceive through one sense what you
perceive through another; for instance, to perceive
through sight what you perceive through hearing,
or through hearing what you perceive through
sight?

THEAET. Of course I shall.

SOC. Then if you have any thought about both
of these together, you would not have perception
about both together either through one organ or
through the other.

THEAET. No.

SOC. Now in regard to sound and colour, you have,
PLATO

αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ διανοεῖ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἔστον;

ὦ θεί. "Εγώγε.

ζη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρω μὲν ἔτερον, ἐαυτῷ δὲ ταὐτὸν;

Β ὥ θεί. Τί μήν;

ζη. Καὶ ὁτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἐκάτερον δὲ ἐν;

ὦ θεί. Καὶ τοῦτο.

ζη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰτε ἀνομοῖο εἰτε ὁμοίῳ ἀλλήλων, δυνατὸς εἰ ἐπισκέπασθαι;

ὦ θεί. Ἰσοψ.

ζη. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτῶν διανοεῖ; οὔτε γὰρ δι᾿ ἀκοῆς οὔτε διʿ ὁμεσὶς οἷον τε τὸ κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε τεκμήριον περὶ οὐ λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ δυνατὸν εἰτη ἀμφοτέρω σκέψασθαι, ἄρ’ ἐστὸν ἀληθῶ ἢ οὔ, οἶνθ’ ὅτι ἔξεις εἰπεὶν ὃ ἐπισκέψει, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε οὐς οὔτε ἀκοὴ φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο.

ὦ θεί. Τί δ’ οὔ μέλλει; ἦ γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης δύναμις.

ζη. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἦ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις τό τ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τό ἐπὶ τοῦτοις δηλοῖ σοι, ὃ τὸ "ἔστων" ἐπονομάξεις καὶ τὸ "οὐκ ἔστι," καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἡρωτῶμεν περὶ αὐτῶν; τοῦτοις πᾶσι ποια ἀποδώσεις ὀργανά δι’ ἃν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ ἀισθανόμενον ἑκαστα;

ὦ θεί. Οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοίω-
THEAETETUS

in the first place, this thought about both of them, that they both exist?

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. And that each is different from the other and the same as itself?

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. And that both together are two and each separately is one?

THEAET. Yes, that also.

SOC. And are you able also to observe whether they are like or unlike each other?

THEAET. May be.

SOC. Now through what organ do you think all this about them? For it is impossible to grasp that which is common to them both either through hearing or through sight. Here is further evidence for the point I am trying to make: if it were possible to investigate the question whether the two, sound and colour, are bitter or not, you know that you will be able to tell by what faculty you will investigate it, and that is clearly neither hearing nor sight, but something else.

THEAET. Of course it is,—the faculty exerted through the tongue.

SOC. Very good. But through what organ is the faculty exerted which makes known to you that which is common to all things, as well as to these of which we are speaking—that which you call being and not-being, and the other attributes of things, about which we were asking just now? What organs will you assign for all these, through which that part of us which perceives gains perception of each and all of them?

THEAET. You mean being and not-being, and like-
ΠΛΑΤΟ

τητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν τε καὶ τὸ
D ἔτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἐν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ
αὐτῶν. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἄριστον τε καὶ περιττὸν
ἐρωτᾶς, καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἔπεται, διὰ τῶν
ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα.

σὰ. 'Ὑπέρευ, ὡ Θεαίτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστων
ἀ ἑρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

θεαί. Ἁλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὡ Σώκρατε, ἐγὼν ὡν
ἂν ἔχωμι εἰπεῖν, πλὴν γ' ὅτι μοι δοκεὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν
όυν ἐναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὀργανον ἱδιων
ὡσπερ ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ δ' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχή τὰ
Ε κοινὰ μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεὶν.

σὰ. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὡ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς
ἐλεγε Θεόδωρος, οἰσχρός· ὃ γὰρ καλὸς λέγων
καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθός. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εἰ ἐποίησάς
μὲ μᾶλα συνχων λόγων ἀπαλλάξας, εἰ φαίνεται σοι
τὰ μὲν αὐτὴ δ' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχή ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ
διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων. τούτο γὰρ ἦν
ἡ καὶ αὐτῶ μοι ἕδοκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ
δόξαι.

186 θεαί. Ἁλλὰ μὴν φαίνεται γε.

30. σὰ. Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο
γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται.

θεαί. 'Εγὼ μὲν ὅν αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχή καθ' αὐτῆν
ἐπορέγεται.

σὰ. 'Ἡ καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον καὶ τὸ
ταὐτὸν καὶ ἔτερον;

θεαί. Ναι.

σὰ. Τί δὲ; καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ
κακὸν;

θεαί. Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα
πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογ-
ness and unlikeness, and identity and difference, and also unity and plurality as applied to them. And you are evidently asking also through what bodily organs we perceive by our soul the odd and the even and everything else that is in the same category.

soc. Bravo, Theaetetus! you follow me exactly; that is just what I mean by my question.

theaet. By Zeus, Socrates, I cannot answer, except that I think there is no special organ at all for these notions, as there are for those others; but it appears to me that the soul views by itself directly what all things have in common.

soc. Why, you are beautiful, Theaetetus, and not, as Theodorus said, ugly; for he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. But besides being beautiful, you have done me a favour by relieving me from a long discussion, if you think that the soul views some things by itself directly and others through the bodily faculties; for that was my own opinion, and I wanted you to agree.

theaet. Well, I do think so.

soc. To which class, then, do you assign being; for this, more than anything else, belongs to all things?

theaet. I assign them to the class of notions which the soul grasps by itself directly.

soc. And also likeness and unlikeness and identity and difference?

theaet. Yes.

soc. And how about beautiful and ugly, and good and bad?

theaet. I think that these also are among the things the essence of which the soul most certainly
PLATO

ζομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα
Β πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα.

σω. Ἐχε δή ἄλλο τι τού μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν
σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθησεῖται, καὶ τοῦ
μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὁσαύτως;

θεαί. Ναι.

σω. Τὴν δὲ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὃ τι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν
ἐναντίότητα πρὸς ἄλληλον καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὖ τῆς
ἐναντίότητος αὐτῇ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπαινεῖται καὶ συμβάλλει
λουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πειρᾶται ἡμῖν.

θεαί. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

σω. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένους πάρεστι

C φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὡσια
diὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχήν τείνεις.
tā δὲ περὶ τοῦτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὐσίαν
cαι ωφελείαν μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμι
cάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται οἷς ἃν καὶ
παραγίγνηται;

θεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

σω. Οἶνον τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ὡς μηδὲ οὐσίας;

θεαί. Ἀδύνατον.

σω. Οὗ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τοῦτον
ἐπιστήμων ἔσται;

D θεαί. Καὶ πώς ἂν, ὁ Σῶκρατες;

σω. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἐν ἐπισ
stήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἑκείνων συλλογίσμῳ
οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μὲν, ὡς ἔοικε,
dυνατὸν ἀξιάσθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον.

θεαί. Φαίνεται.

σω. Ἡ οὖν ταύτων ἑκείνῳ τε καὶ τοῦτο 1 καλεῖς,
tosautas diaforas ἔχοντε;

1 τοῦτο] ταύτῳ T; ταύτῳ B.
THEAETETUS

views in their relations to one another, reflecting within itself upon the past and present in relation to the future.

soc. Stop there. Does it not perceive the hardness of the hard through touch, and likewise the softness of the soft?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But their essential nature and the fact that they exist, and their opposition to one another, and, in turn, the essential nature of this opposition, the soul itself tries to determine for us by reverting to them and comparing them with one another.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Is it not true, then, that all sensations which reach the soul through the body, can be perceived by human beings, and also by animals, from the moment of birth; whereas reflections about these, with reference to their being and usefulness, are acquired, if at all, with difficulty and slowly, through many troubles, in other words, through education?

THEAET. Assuredly.

soc. Is it, then, possible for one to attain "truth" who cannot even get as far as "being"?

THEAET. No.

soc. And will a man ever have knowledge of anything the truth of which he fails to attain?

THEAET. How can he, Socrates?

soc. Then knowledge is not in the sensations, but in the process of reasoning about them; for it is possible, apparently, to apprehend being and truth by reasoning, but not by sensation.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. Then will you call the two by the same name, when there are so great differences between them?
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκ οὖν δὴ δίκαιον γε.

ΣΠ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐκεῖνω ἀποδίδως ονόμα, τῶ ὁρᾶν, ἀκούειν, δοφραίνεσθαι, ψύχεσθαι, θερμαίνεσθαι;

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγονε· τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

ΣΠ. Ξύμπαν ἂρ' αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἰσθήσων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΠ. Ὡμι γε, φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἁφαίσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὐν.

ΣΠ. Ὡδ' ἂρ' ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ.

ΣΠ. Ὡκ ἂρ' ἂν εἰ̂η ποτέ, ὡ Θεαίτητε, αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταῦτων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται, ὡ Σώκρατεσ. καὶ μάλιστα γε νῦν καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο ὅν αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη.

187 ΣΠ. Ἀλλ' οὖ τι μὲν δὴ τούτῳ γε ἔνεκα ἡρχόμεθα διαλεγόμενοι, ἢν εὐρωμεν τί ποτ' οὐκ ἔστ' ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ τί ἔστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτον γε προβεβηκαμεν, ὡστε μὴ ξητεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκεῖνῳ τῷ ὄνοματι, ὡ τι ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τούτῳ γε καλεῖται, ὡ Σώκρατεσ, ὡς ἐγώμαι, δοξάζειν.

ΣΠ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οἱ αὐτοὶ, ὡ φίλε. καὶ ὃρα δὴ νῦν Β πάλιν ἔξ ἄρχης, πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλεύψας, εἰ τι μᾶλλον καθορᾶς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προελήμεθα. καὶ λέγει αὕτης τὶ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη.

31. ΘΕΑΙ. Δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν εἰπεῖν, ὡ Σώ-
TEAETETUS

TEAET. No, that would certainly not be right.
SOC. What name will you give, then, to the one which includes seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold, and being hot?
TEAET. Perceiving. What other name can I give it?
SOC. Collectively you call it, then, perception?
TEAET. Of course.
SOC. By which, we say, we are quite unable to apprehend truth, since we cannot apprehend being, either.
TEAET. No; certainly not.
SOC. Nor knowledge either, then.
TEAET. No.
SOC. Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge could never be the same.
TEAET. Evidently not, Socrates; and indeed now at last it has been made perfectly clear that knowledge is something different from perception.
SOC. But surely we did not begin our conversation in order to find out what knowledge is not, but what it is. However, we have progressed so far, at least, as not to seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in some function of the soul, whatever name is given to it when it alone and by itself is engaged directly with realities.
TEAET. That, Socrates, is, I suppose, called having opinion.
SOC. You suppose rightly, my friend. Now begin again at the beginning. Wipe out all we said before, and see if you have any clearer vision, now that you have advanced to this point. Say once more what knowledge is.
TEAET. To say that all opinion is knowledge is 167
PLATO

κρατεῖ, ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ψευδής ἐστὶ δόξα·
καὶ πρὸς τὸ γαρ μὴ δυνάμει δέ ἡ ἀλήθεια δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καὶ
καὶ μοι τὸν τε ἀποκεκρίκθη. ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ φανῇ προ-
κούσιν, οὐκ ἐπὶ γάρ τὸν, ἀλλὰ τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν.

ς. Οὔτω μέντοι χρή, ὃ Θεαίτητε, λέγεις προβο-
μοις μᾶλλον, ἣ ὦ τὸ πρῶτον ἅκινες ἀποκλίνεσθαι.
ἐὰν γὰρ οὔτω δρώμεν, δυοὶ θάτερα, ἡ εὐρήσωμεν

C ἐφ᾽ ὁ ἐρχόμεθα, ἥ ἄττον φωνούμεθα εἰδέναι ὁ μιθαμὴ
ἰσμεν" καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσὶν μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος.
καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί φῆς; δυοὶ ὄντοις εἰδέοις
dόξης, τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευδοῦς δὲ τοῦ ἐτέρου,

τῆν ἀληθὴ δόξαν ἐπιστῆμην ὀρίζει:

 theano. Ἐγγωγε: τούτῳ γὰρ αὐτὸν νῦν μοι φαίνεται.

ς. Ἀρ' οὖν ἢ τ' ἄξιον περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν

πάλιν—;

 theano. Τὸ ποιον δὴ λέγεις;

ς. Ὁράτει μὲ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολ-

D λάκης, ὥστ' ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ
πρὸς ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπὲν τι ποτ'

ἐστι τούτῳ τὸ πάθος παρ' ἥμιν καὶ τίνα τρόπον

ἐγγυνώμενον.

 theano. Τὸ ποιον δὴ;

ς. Τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῆ. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ
νῦν ἢτι διστάζων, πότερον εάσωμεν αὐτὸ ἡ ἐπισκε-
ψώμεθα ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὁλίγον πρότερον.

 theano. Τὶ μὴν, ὦ Σάκρατες, εἴπερ γε καὶ ὅπη-

τιοῦν ἕναντι 1 φαίνεται δεῖν; ἄρτι γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ

1 ὅπητιοι Burnet; ὅπητιοι B; ὅπη γοὺν W; ὅπη τη T.
impossible, Socrates, for there is also false opinion; but true opinion probably is knowledge. Let that be my answer. For if it is proved to be wrong as we proceed, I will try to give another, just as I have given this.

soc. That is the right way, Theaetetus. It is better to speak up boldly than to hesitate about answering, as you did at first. For if we act in this way, one of two things will happen: either we shall find what we are after, or we shall be less inclined to think we know what we do not know at all; and surely even that would be a recompense not to be despised. Well, then, what do you say now? Assuming that there are two kinds of opinion, one true and the other false, do you define knowledge as the true opinion?

theaet. Yes. That now seems to me to be correct.

soc. Is it, then, still worth while, in regard to opinion, to take up again—?

theaet. What point do you refer to?

soc. Somehow I am troubled now and have often been troubled before, so that I have been much perplexed in my own reflections and in talking with others, because I cannot tell what this experience is which we human beings have, and how it comes about.

theaet. What experience?

soc. That anyone has false opinions. And so I am considering and am still in doubt whether we had better let it go or examine it by another method than the one we followed a while ago.

theaet. Why not, Socrates, if there seems to be the least need of it? For just now, in talking about
καὶ Θεόδωρος ἔλεγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοι κατεπείγει.

Ε ση. Ὅρθως ύπέμνησας. ἵσως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ καιροῦ πάλιν ὥσπερ ἵχνος μετελθεῖν. κρεῖττον γὰρ που σμικρὸν εὔ ἡ πολὺ μὴ ἰκανῶς περᾶναι.

 nghìn. Τί μὴν;

PDOException. Πῶς οὖν; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ψευδὴ φαμεν ἐκάστοτε εἰναι δόξαν, καὶ τινα ἦμων δοξάζειν ψευδή, τὸν δ' αὐ ἀληθή, ὡς φύσει οὕτως ἐχόντων;

 nghè. Φαμέν γὰρ δή.

188 ση. Οὐκοῦν τόδε γʼ ἔσθ’ ἦμων περὶ πάντα καὶ καθ’ ἐκαστον, ἦτοι εἰδέναι ἡ μὴ εἰδέναι; μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὁντα χαίρειν λέγω εν τῷ παρόντι. νῦν γὰρ ἦμων πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν οὖδὲν.

 wrześ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὥ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὸ γʼ οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἐκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἡ μὴ εἰδέναι.

PDOException. Οὐκοῦν ἦδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἡ ὁν τι οἴδεν ἡ μὴ οἴδεν;

 wrześ. Ἀνάγκη.

PDOException. Καὶ μὴν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡ μὴ

B εἰδότα εἰδέναι ἄδυνατον.

ultureInfo. Πῶς δ’ οὖ;

PDOException. Ἀρ’ οὖν ὁ τὰ ψευδὴ δοξάζων, ἁ οἴδε, ταῦτα οἴεται οὐ ταῦτα εἰναι ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἄττα ὃν οἴδε, καὶ ἀμφότερα εἰδὼς ἀγνοεῖ ἀμφότερα;

170
leisure, you and Theodorus said very truly that there is no hurry in discussions of this sort.

soc. You are right in reminding me. For perhaps this is a good time to retrace our steps. For it is better to finish a little task well than a great deal imperfectly.

THEAET. Of course.

soc. How, then, shall we set about it? What is it that we do say? Do we say that in every case of opinion there is a false opinion, and one of us has a false, and another a true opinion, because, as we believe, it is in the nature of things that this should be so?

THEAET. Yes, we do.

soc. Then this, at any rate, is possible for us, is it not, regarding all things collectively and each thing separately, either to know or not to know them? For learning and forgetting, as intermediate stages, I leave out of account for the present, for just now they have no bearing upon our argument.

THEAET. Certainly, Socrates, nothing is left in any particular case except knowing or not knowing it.

soc. Then he who forms opinion must form opinion either about what he knows or about what he does not know?

THEAET. Necessarily.

soc. And it is surely impossible that one who knows a thing does not know it, or that one who does not know it knows it.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Then does he who forms false opinions think that the things which he knows are not these things, but some others of the things he knows, and so, knowing both, is he ignorant of both?
PLATO

θεαί. 'Αλλ' ἀδύνατον, οὐ Σωκράτης.

σο. 'Αλλ' ἄρα, ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἢγεῖται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἄττα ὃν μὴ οἶδε, καὶ τούτ' ἐστι τῷ μὴτε Θεαίτητον μὴτε Σωκράτης εἰδότι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν ὡς οὐ Σωκράτης Θεαίτητος ἢ οὐ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης;

C. θεαί. Καὶ πῶς ἂν;

σο. 'Αλλ' οὐ μὴν, ἃ γέ τις οἶδεν, οὐεῖται ποῦ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' αὖ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἃ οἴδεν.

θεαί. Τέρας γὰρ ἔσται.

σο. Πῶς οὖν ἂν ἔτι ψευδή δοξάσειν; ἐκτὸς γὰρ τούτων ἀδύνατον ποῦ δοξάζων, ἐπείπερ πάντ' ἢ ἵσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἵσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτως οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται δυνατὸν ψευδή δοξάσαι.

θεαί. 'Αληθέστατα.

σο. 'Αρ' οὖν οὐ ταύτῃ σκεπτόμεν ὁ ἡθοῦμεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἴονται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ D τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ;

θεαί. Πῶς λέγεις;

σο. Μὴ ἀπλοῦν ἢ ὅτι τὸ τὰ μὴ δοντα περὶ ὅτου ὅν τοὺς δοξάζων οὐκ ἔσθ' ὡς οὐ ψευδή δοξάσει, κἂν ὅπωσοφι άλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχη.

θεαί. Εἰκός γ' αὖ, οἶ Σωκράτης.

σο. Πῶς οὖν; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, εάν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνῃ: "δυνατὸν δὲ ὅτωσον δ' λέγεται, καὶ τις ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὧν δοξάσει, εἴη περὶ τῶν ὄντων του εἴη αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό"; καὶ ἡμεῖς

172
THEAETETUS

THEAET. That is impossible, Socrates.

SOC. Well then, does he think that the things he does not know are other things which he does not know—which is as if a man who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates should conceive the idea that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?

THEAET. That is impossible.

SOC. But surely a man does not think that the things he knows are the things he does not know, or again that the things he does not know are the things he knows.

THEAET. That would be a monstrous absurdity.

SOC. Then how could he still form false opinions? For inasmuch as all things are either known or unknown to us, it is impossible, I imagine, to form opinions outside of these alternatives, and within them it is clear that there is no place for false opinion.

THEAET. Very true.

SOC. Had we, then, better look for what we are seeking, not by this method of knowing and not knowing, but by that of being and not being?

THEAET. What do you mean?

SOC. We may simply assert that he who on any subject holds opinions which are not, will certainly think falsely, no matter what the condition of his mind may be in other respects.

THEAET. That, again, is likely, Socrates.

SOC. Well then, what shall we say, Theaetetus, if anyone asks us, "Is that which is assumed in common speech possible at all, and can any human being hold an opinion which is not, whether it be concerned with any of the things which are, or be entirely independent of them?" We, I fancy, shall...
PLATO

Ε δή, ὥς ἑοικεν, πρὸς ταῦτα φήσομεν· "ὅταν γε μὴ ἄληθῆ οὐχι οἰόμενος·" ἣ πῶς ἔρομεν;

τεαί. Οὐτως.

σον. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθι που τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔστων;

τεαί. Τὸ ποῖον;

σον. Εἰ τις ὄρᾳ μὲν τι, ὄρᾳ δὲ οὐδὲν.

τεαί. Καὶ πῶς;

σον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἐν γέ τι ὄρᾳ, τῶν ὄντων τι ὄρᾳ. ἢ σὺ οἷς ποτὲ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν οἶναι;

τεαί. Οὐκ ἔγωγη.

σον. Ὁ ἄρα ἐν γέ τι ὄρῳ ὄν τι ὄρᾳ.

τεαί. Φαίνεται.

σον. Καὶ ὁ ἄρα τι ἀκούων ἐν γέ τι ἄκουει καὶ ὅν ἄκουει.

τεαί. Ναι.

σον. Καὶ ὁ ἀπτόμενος δὴ του, ἐνός γέ του ἀπτε- ται καὶ ὄντος, εἴπερ ἐνός;

τεαί. Καὶ τοῦτο.

σον. Ὅ δη δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἐν τι ᾖ δοξάζει;

τεαί. Ἀνάγκη.

σον. Ὅ δ' ἐν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ὄν τι;

τεαί. Συγχωρῶ.

σον. Ὅ ἄρα μὴ ὄν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει.

τεαί. Οὐ φαίνεται.

σον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει.

τεαί. Δήλον, ὥς ἑοικεν.

1 ἐν τι BT; ἐν γέ τι W.
THEAETETUS

reply, "Yes, when, in thinking, he thinks what is not true," shall we not?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And is the same sort of thing possible in any other field?

THEAET. What sort of thing?

SOC. For instance, that a man sees something, but sees nothing.

THEAET. How can he?

SOC. Yet surely if a man sees any one thing, he sees something that is. Or do you, perhaps, think "one" is among the things that are not?

THEAET. No, I do not.

SOC. Then he who sees any one thing, sees something that is.

THEAET. That is clear.

SOC. And therefore he who hears anything, hears some one thing and therefore hears what is.

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And he who touches anything, touches some one thing, which is, since it is one?

THEAET. That also is true.

SOC. So, then, does not he who holds an opinion hold an opinion of some one thing?

THEAET. He must do so.

SOC. And does not he who holds an opinion of some one thing hold an opinion of something that is?

THEAET. I agree.

SOC. Then he who holds an opinion of what is not holds an opinion of nothing.

THEAET. Evidently.

SOC. Well then, he who holds an opinion of nothing, holds no opinion at all.

THEAET. That is plain, apparently.
PLATO

Β ἡμ. Οὔκ ἄρα οἷῶν τε τὸ μὴ ὃν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν οὐτῶν οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό.

ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ἡμ. Ἀλλ’ τι ἂρ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδὴ δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ μὴ οντα δοξάζειν.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ἀλλο ἔσκεκεν.

ἡμ. Ὡς γὰρ οὕτως οὔτε ὡς ὅλγον πρότερον ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδὴς ἐστι δόξα ἐν ἡμῖν.

ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὐν δὴ.

32. ἡμ. Ἀλλ’ ἄρα ὡδε γηγομένων τοὐτο προσαγορεύομεν;

ΤΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ἡμ. Ἀλλοδοξίαν τωδ’ οὐσαν ψευδὴ φαμεν εἰναι C δόξαν, ὅταν τίς τι 1 τῶν οὐτῶν ἄλλο αὐτ’ τῶν οὐτῶν ἀντιλλαξάμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ φή εἰναι. οὕτω γὰρ ὃν μὲν ἂει δοξάζει, ἐτέρον δὲ ἄνθ’ ἐτέρου, καί ἀμαρτάνων οὐ ἐσκόπαι δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ψευδή δοξάζων.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ὀρθότατα μοι νῦν δοκεῖσ εἰρηκέναι. ὅταν γὰρ τίς ἀντὶ καλοῦ αἰσχρόν ἢ ἀντὶ αἰσχροῦ καλὸν δοξάζῃ, τότε ὡς ἀληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδὴ.

ἡμ. Δήλος εἰ, ὡς θεαίτητε, καταφρονῶν μου καί οὐ δεδιῶς.

ΤΕΑΙ. Τί μάλιστα;

ἡμ. Οὔκ ἂν, οἷμαι, σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψευ-

D δοὺς ἀντιλαβέσθαι, ἐρόμενος εἰ οἷῶν τε ταχὺ βραδέως ἢ κούφων βαρέως ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἄλλα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίον

1 τι ομ. ΒΤ.
THEAETETUS

soc. Then it is impossible to hold an opinion of that which is not, either in relation to things that are, or independently of them.

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. Then holding false opinion is something different from holding an opinion of that which is not.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. Then false opinion is not found to exist in us either by this method or by that which we followed a little while ago.

THEAET. No, it certainly is not.

soc. But does not that which we call by that name arise after the following manner?

THEAET. After what manner?

soc. We say that false opinion is a kind of interchanged opinion, when a person makes an exchange in his mind and says that one thing which exists is another thing which exists. For in this way he always holds an opinion of what exists, but of one thing instead of another; so he misses the object he was aiming at in his thought and might fairly be said to hold a false opinion.

THEAET. Now you seem to me to have said what is perfectly right. For when a man, in forming an opinion, puts ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, he does truly hold a false opinion.

soc. Evidently, Theaetetus, you feel contempt of me, and not fear.

THEAET. Why in the world do you say that?

soc. You think, I fancy, that I would not attack your "truly false" by asking whether it is possible for a thing to become slowly quick or heavily light, or any other opposite, by a process opposite to itself, in accordance, not with its own nature, but with that

177
PLATO

gίγνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ ἑναντίως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, ἵνα
μη μάτην θαρρήσῃς, ἀφίμη. ἀρέσκει δὲ, ὡς φῆς,
tὸ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἄλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι;

THEAI. Ἐμοίγε.

ΣΝ. Ἐστιν ἄρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἔτερον τι
ὡς ἔτερον καὶ μή ὡς ἐκεῖνο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι.

THEAI. Ἐστι μέντοι.

ΣΝ. Ὅταν οὖν τοῦθ' ἡ διάνοια του δρᾶ, οὐ καὶ
Ε ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν ἦτοι ἀμφότερα ἡ τὸ ἔτερον δια-
νοεῖσθαι;

THEAI. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν· ἦτοι ἄμα γε ἡ ἐν μέρει.

ΣΝ. Κάλλιστα. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἄρ όπερ
ἐγὼ καλεῖς;

THEAI. Τί καλῶν;

ΣΝ. Δόγον δὲν αὐτῇ πρὸς αὐτήν ἡ ὕψη διεξέρ-
χεται περὶ ὧν ἀν σκοπή. ὡς γε μὴ εἰδῶς σοι ἀπο-
φαίνομαι. τούτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοομένη
οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἔρωτῶσα
190 καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα.
ἐταν δὲ ὀρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον
ἐπάξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἢδη φῆ καὶ μὴ δυστάξῃ, δόξαν
tαύτην τίθεμεν αὐτής. ώστ' ἐγὼγε τὸ δοξάζειν
λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ
μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἄλλα συγῇ πρὸς
αὐτῶν· οὐ δὲ τι;

THEAI. Κἀγώ.

ΣΝ. Ὅταν ἄρα τις τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον δοξάζῃ, καὶ
φησίν, ὡς έσοικε, τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν.

Β ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

178
THEAETETUS

of its opposite. But I let this pass, that your courage may not fail. You are satisfied, you say, that false opinion is interchanged opinion?

THEAET. I am.

SOC. It is, then, in your opinion, possible for the mind to regard one thing as another and not as what it is.

THEAET. Yes, it is.

SOC. Now when one’s mind does this, does it not necessarily have a thought either of both things together or of one or the other of them?

THEAET. Yes, it must; either of both at the same time or in succession.

SOC. Excellent. And do you define thought as I do?

THEAET. How do you define it?

SOC. As the talk which the soul has with itself about any subjects which it considers. You must not suppose that I know this that I am declaring to you. But the soul, as the image presents itself to me, when it thinks, is merely conversing with itself, asking itself questions and answering, affirming and denying. When it has arrived at a decision, whether slowly or with a sudden bound, and is at last agreed, and is not in doubt, we call that its opinion; and so I define forming opinion as talking and opinion as talk which has been held, not with someone else, nor yet aloud, but in silence with oneself. How do you define it?

THEAET. In the same way.

SOC. Then whenever a man has an opinion that one thing is another, he says to himself, we believe, that the one thing is the other.

THEAET. Certainly.
PLATO

ση. ἐναμμυνήσκου δὴ εἰ πῶποτ’ εἶπες πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ καλὸν αἰσχρὸν ἔστιν ἢ τὸ ἀδικὸν δίκαιον, ἢ καί, τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον, σκόπει εἰ ποτ’ ἐπεχείρησας σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον ἔστιν, ἢ πάν τούναντίον οὐδ’ ἐν ὑπνο πῶποτε ἐτόλμησας εἰπεῖν πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὡς παντάπασιν ἀρα τὰ περιττὰ ἀρτιὰ ἔστιν ἢ τ’ ἀλλ’ τοιοῦτον.

θεά. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

C ση. Ἀλλ’ ὅπως οἶει ὑμαίνοντα ἡ μανώμενον τολμήσαι σπουδὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰπεῖν ἀναπειθόντα αὐτὸν, ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν βοῶν ὕππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἐν;

θεά. Μᾶ Δι’ οὐκ ἔγνυε.

ση. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοξάζειν ἔστιν, οὔδεὶς ἀμφότερά γε λέγων καὶ δοξάζων καὶ ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἶποι ἢ καὶ δοξάσειν ὡς τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον ἔστιν. ἐστέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ βήμα 2 περὶ τοῦ ἔτερου. λέγω γὰρ αὐτὸ τῆς, μηδένα δοξάζειν ὡς τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλὸν ἢ ἐν τῶν τοιοῦτων.

θεά. Ἀλλ’, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐώς τε καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις.

ση. Ἀμφω μὲν ἄρα δοξάζοντα ἁδύνατον τὸ γε 3 ἔτερον ἔτερον δοξάζειν.

θεά. Ἐοικεν.

ση. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ ἔτερον γε μόνον δοξάζων, τὸ

1 καὶ om. T.

2 After βήμα B adds ἐνί τῶν ἐν μέρει, ἐπειδὴ τὸ βήμα ἔτερον τῷ ἔτερῳ κατὰ βήμα ταῦταν ἔστιν, applied to things in succession, since the word “one” is, as a word, the same as “other” (i.e. the Greek uses ἔτερον for “one” and “other”).

3 τὸ γε Heindorf; τότε B; τὸ ** T.

180
THEAETETUS

soc. Now call to mind whether you have ever said to yourself that the beautiful is most assuredly ugly, or the wrong right, or—and this is the sum of the whole matter—consider whether you have ever tried to persuade yourself that one thing is most assuredly another, or whether quite the contrary is the case, and you have never ventured, even in sleep, to say to yourself that the odd is, after all, certainly even, or anything of that sort.

THEAET. You are right.

soc. Do you imagine that anyone else, sane or insane, ever ventured to say to himself seriously and try to persuade himself that the ox must necessarily be a horse, or two one?

THEAET. No, by Zeus, I do not.

soc. Then if forming opinion is talking to oneself, no one who talks and forms opinion of two objects and apprehends them both with his soul, could say and have the opinion that one is the other. But you will also have to give up the expression "one and other." This is what I mean, that nobody holds the opinion that the ugly is beautiful, or anything of that sort.

THEAET. Well, Socrates, I do give it up; and I agree with you in what you say.

soc. You agree, therefore, that he who holds an opinion of both things cannot hold the opinion that one is the other.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. But surely he who holds an opinion of one
PLATO

dε ἐτερον μηδαμὴ, οὐδέποτε δοξάσει τὸ ἐτερον εἶναι.

θεαι. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις: ἀναγκάζοιτο γὰρ ἐν ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ οὐ μὴ δοξάζει.

σπ. Οὔτ' ἄρ' ἀμφότερα οὔτε τὸ ἐτερον δοξάζοντι ἔγχωρει ἄλλοδοξεῖν. ὡστ' εἰ τις ὁρεῖται δόξαν εἶναι ψευδῆ τὸ ἐτεροδοξεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι. οὔτ' ἄρα ταύτῃ οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδῆς ἐν ἦμιν οὔσα δόξα.

θεαι. Οὐκ ἔσκεϊν.

33. σπ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὥθε Θεαίητε, εἰ τοῦτο μὴ φανῆσεται ὅν, πολλὰ ἀναγκασθήσομεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ἀτοπα.

θεαι. Τὰ ποῖα δῆ; οὐκ ἔρω σοι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ πειραθῶ σκοπῶν. αἰσχυνοίμην γὰρ ἂν ὑπὲρ ἦμων, ἐν ὃ ἀποροῦμεν, ἀναγκαζομένων ὁμολογεῖν οἰα λέγω. ἀλλ' ἐὰν εὑρωμεν καὶ ἐλεύθεροι γενώμεθα, τότ' ήδη περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐροῦμεν ὡς πασχότων αὐτὰ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γελοίου ἐστῶτες. ἐὰν δὲ πάντη ἀπορήσωμεν, ταπεινωθέντες, οἴμαι, τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ὡς ναυτιώντες πατεῖν τε καὶ χρῆσθαι δὲ ἂν βούληται. ἦς οὖν ἐτί πόρον τινὰ εὑρίσκω τοῦ ζητήματος ἦμιν, ἄκουε.

θεαι. Λέγε μόνον.

σπ. Οὐ φήσω ἡμᾶς ὁρθῶς ὁμολογῶς, ἦνίκα ὁμολογήσαμεν ἂ τις οἴδεν, ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ὡς Ὁβίδεν εἶναι αὐτὰ καὶ ψευδῆναι. ἀλλὰ πη δύνατον.
THEAETETUS

only, and not of the other at all, will never hold the opinion that one is the other.

THEAET. You are right; for he would be forced to apprehend also that of which he holds no opinion.

SOC. Then neither he who holds opinion of both nor he who holds it of one can hold the opinion that a thing is something else. And so anyone who sets out to define false opinion as interchanged opinion would be talking nonsense. Then neither by this method nor by our previous methods is false opinion found to exist in us.

THEAET. Apparently not.

SOC. But yet, Theaetetus, if this is found not to exist, we shall be forced to admit many absurdities.

THEAET. What absurdities?

SOC. I will not tell you until I have tried to consider the matter in every way. For I should be ashamed of us, if, in our perplexity, we were forced to make such admissions as those to which I refer. But if we find the object of our quest, and are set free from perplexity, then, and not before, we will speak of others as involved in those absurdities, and we ourselves shall stand free from ridicule. But if we find no escape from our perplexity, we shall, I fancy, become low-spirited, like seasick people, and shall allow the argument to trample on us and do to us anything it pleases. Hear, then, by what means I still see a prospect of success for our quest.

THEAET. Do speak.

SOC. I shall deny that we were right when we agreed that it is impossible for a man to have opinion that the things he does not know are the things which he knows, and thus to be deceived. But there is a way in which it is possible.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα λέγεις ὅ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπώπτευσα, ἣν' αὐτῷ ἔφαμεν τοιούτοις εἶναι, ὅτι ἐνίοτε ἐγὼ γνωστάκων Σωκράτη, πόρρωθεν δὲ ὁρὼν ἄλλον ὅν οὐ γνωστόκω, ὃς ήδη εἶναι Σωκράτη ὅν οἶδα; γίγνεται γὰρ δὴ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ὁ οἶνος λέγει.

ΣΑ. Οὐκοῦν ἀπέστημεν αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ὁ ἴσος ἐποίει ἡμᾶς εἰδότας μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΑ. Μὴ γὰρ οὕτω τιθῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὅδε ἰσος ὁ πὴ ἡμῖν συγχωρήσεται, ἰσος δὲ ἀντιτενεῖ. ἄλλα γὰρ ἐν τοιούτῳ ἑξώμεθα, ἐν οὗ ἀνάγκη πάντα μετα-στρέφοντα λόγον βασανίζειν. σκόπει οὐν εἰ τι λέγω. ἀρα ἐστιν μὴ εἰδότα τι πρῶτον ύστερον μαθεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐστι μὲντοι.

ΣΑ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὖθις ἐτερον καὶ ἐτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὖ;

ΣΑ. Θεσ δὴ μοι λόγον ἑνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνόν κήρυν ἐκμαγεύοι, τῷ μὲν μείζον, τῷ δ' ἐλαττον, καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρῳ κηροῦ, τῷ δ' κοπρώδεστῳ, καὶ σκληροτέρῳ, εὗνοις δὲ

D ύγροτέρου, ἐστι δ' οἷς μετρίως ἐχοντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίθημι.

ΣΑ. Δώρων τοίνυν αὐτῷ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Μοῦσῶν μητρὸς Μηνημοσύνης, καὶ ἐς τούτο, ὦ τι ἣν βουληθόμεν μνημονεύσαί ἄν ἄν ἔδωμεν; ἢ ἀκούσωμεν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐνοπόσιμον, ὑπέχονται αὐτῷ ταῖς αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἐννοιαίς, ἀποτυπώσθαι, ὡσπερ δακτυλίως σημεῖα ἐνσημανομένους καὶ ὃ μὲν

1 εἴδώμεν B.

2 ἀκούσωμεν BT.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Do you mean what I myself suspected when we made the statement to which you refer, that sometimes I, though I know Socrates, saw at a distance someone whom I did not know, and thought it was Socrates whom I do know? In such a case false opinion does arise.

SOC. But did not we reject that, because it resulted in our knowing and not knowing the things which we know?

THEAET. Certainly we did.

SOC. Let us, then, not make that assumption, but another; perhaps it will turn out well for us, perhaps the opposite. But we are in such straits that we must turn every argument round and test it from all sides. Now see if this is sensible: Can a man who did not know a thing at one time learn it later?

THEAET. To be sure he can.

SOC. Please assume, then, for the sake of argument, that there is in our souls a block of wax, in one case larger, in another smaller, in one case the wax is purer, in another more impure and harder, in some cases softer, and in some of proper quality.

THEAET. I assume all that.

SOC. Let us, then, say that this is the gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses, and that whenever we wish to remember anything we see or hear or think of in our own minds, we hold this wax under the perceptions and thoughts and imprint them upon it, just as we make impressions from seal rings;
PLATO

ἄν ἐκμαγή, μνημονεύειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἕως ἄν ἐνὶ τὸ εἰδωλὸν αὐτοῦ· δὴ ἂν ἔξαλειφθῇ ἢ Ε ἡ μὴ ὅλον τε γένηται ἐκμαγήναι, ἐπιλείψασθαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι.

throat. Ἔστω οὖτως.

 XPath. Ὅ τοινν ἐπιστάμενος μὲν αὐτά, σκοπῶν δὲ τι ἄν ὅρα ἢ ἀκοῦει, ἄθρει εἰ ἀρα τουῳδε τρόπῳ ψευδή ἄν δοξάσαι.

throat. Ποίῳ δὴ τινὶ;

 XPath. Ἄ οἶδεν, οἰηθεῖς εἶναι τοτὲ μὲν ὁ οἶδε, τοτὲ δὲ ὁ μή. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐ καλῶς ὄμολογήσαμεν ὄμολογουντες ἀδύνατα.

throat. Ὅτὸν δὲ πῶς λέγεις;

192 XPath. Δεῖ οἶδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν εἰς ἀρχής διοριζομένους, ὅτι δὲ μὲν τις οἶδεν σχῶν ᾖ αὐτοῦ μνημεῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μὴ, τοῦτο ὁ οἰηθήναι ἐτερών τι ἄν οἶδεν, ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκείνου τύπου, αἰσθανόμενον δὲ μὴ, ἀδύνατον. καὶ δὲ γε οἶδεν αὐτὸ, οἰηθήναι εἶναι δὴ μὴ οἶδε μὴ ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα· καὶ δη μὴ οἶδεν, δὴ μὴ οἶδεν αὐτοῦ· καὶ δη μὴ οἶδεν, δὴ οἶδε· καὶ δη αἰσθάνεται γε, ἐτερών τι ἄν αἰσθάνεται οἰηθήναι εἶναι· καὶ δη αἰσθάνεται, ἄν τι μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ δη μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ἄν μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ δη μὴ B αἰσθάνεται, ἄν αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ἔτι γε αὐτὸ ἄν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν

1 δὲ δὴ ἢν B; δὴ οὖν B; δὴ δὲ Τ.  
2 σχῶν BT; ἐχῶν W.  
3 τοῦτο B; om. al.  
4 καὶ . . . δὴ αἰσθάνεται om. B.
and whatever is imprinted we remember and know as long as its image lasts, but whatever is rubbed out or cannot be imprinted we forget and do not know.

THEAET. Let us assume that.

SOC. Now take a man who knows the things which he sees and hears, and is considering some one of them; observe whether he may not gain a false opinion in the following manner.

THEAET. In what manner?

SOC. By thinking that the things which he knows are sometimes things which he knows and sometimes things which he does not know. For we were wrong before in agreeing that this is impossible.

THEAET. What do you say about it now?

SOC. We must begin our discussion of the matter by making the following distinctions: It is impossible for anyone to think that one thing which he knows and of which he has received a memorial imprint in his soul, but which he does not perceive, is another thing which he knows and of which also he has an imprint, and which he does not perceive. And, again, he cannot think that what he knows is that which he does not know and of which he has no seal, nor that what he does not know is another thing which he does not know; nor that what he does not know is what he knows; nor can he think that what he perceives is something else which he perceives; nor that what he perceives is something which he does not perceive; nor that what he does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive; nor that what he does not perceive is something which he perceives. And, again, it is still more impossible, if that can be, to think that a thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has an imprint which accords
PLATO

αἰσθησιν, οἰηθήναι αὖ ἑτερόν τι ὅν οἶδε καὶ ἀισθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὖ καὶ ἐκείνου τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν, ἀδυνατώτερον ἔτι ἐκείνων, εἰ οἶνον τε. καὶ ὃ οἶδε καὶ ἀισθάνεται ἐχὼν τὸ μνημεῖον ὀρθῶς, ὃ οἶδεν οἰηθήναι ἀδύνατον· καὶ ὃ οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἐχὼν κατὰ ταὐτά, ὃ C αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ αὖ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται. ² πάντα ταῦτα ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς ψευδῇ τῶν δοξάσαι. λειπεται δὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις, εἴπερ ποὺ ἀλλοθεῖ, τὸ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι.

θεαί. Ἐν τίσι δή; ἕαν ἄρα εὖ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον μᾶθω· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἔστομαι.

ἐπ. Ἐν οἷς οἶδεν, οἰηθήναι αὐτὰ ἑτέρ' ἄττα εἶναι ὅν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται· ἡ ὅν μὴ οἶδεν, αἰσθάνεται δὲ· ἡ ὅν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ὅν D οἶδεν αὖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται.

θεαί. Νῦν πολὺ πλέον ἀπελεύθην ἡ τοῦτε.

34. ἐπ. Ὀδε δὴ ἀνάπαλιν ἀκοὐε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεόδωρον καὶ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ μεμνημένος οἶδος ἐστι, καὶ Θεαίτητον κατὰ ταὐτά, ἄλλο τι ἐνίοτε μὲν ὀρθὸς αὐτοῦς, ἐνίοτε δὲ ὅ, καὶ ἀποτελεῖ ποτ' αὐτῶν,

1 After καὶ the mss. read ὡ, expunged by Bonitz.
2 τὸ μνημεῖον . . . ἐχὼν om. BT; add. B2T in marg.
3 δ μὴ οἶδε . . . μὴ αἰσθάνεται om. B.
with the perception is another thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has an imprint which accords with the perception. And he cannot think that what he knows and perceives and of which he has a correct memorial imprint is another thing which he knows; nor that a thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has such an imprint is another thing which he perceives; nor again that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he neither knows nor perceives; nor that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he does not know; nor that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he does not perceive. In all these cases it is impossible beyond everything for false opinion to arise in the mind of anyone. The possibility that it may arise remains, if anywhere, in the following cases.

THEAET. What cases are they? I hope they may help me to understand better; for now I cannot follow you.

SOC. The cases in which he may think that things which he knows are some other things which he knows and perceives; or which he does not know, but perceives; or that things which he knows and perceives are other things which he knows and perceives.

THEAET. Now I am even more out of the running than before.

SOC. Then let me repeat it in a different way. I know Theodorus and remember within myself what sort of a person he is, and just so I know Theaetetus, but sometimes I see them, and sometimes I do not,
PLATO

tote δ' οὖ, καὶ ἀκούω ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθήσεων αἰσθάνομαι, tote δ' αἰσθήσεων μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω περὶ ύμῶν, μέμνημαι δὲ ύμάς οὐδὲν ἤττον καὶ ἐπισταμαι αὐτὸς ἐν ἐμαυτῷ;

Ε ὦ ἔστι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

σπ. Τοῦτο τοῖνυν πρῶτον μάθε ὅπως βουλομαι δηλώσαι, ὡς ἔστι μὲν ἂ οἶδε μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔστι δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι.

ὦ ἔστι. Ἀληθῆ.

σπ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἂ μὴ οἶδε, πολλάκις μὲν ἔστι μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνον;

ὦ ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο.

σπ. Ἰδὲ δὴ ἐάν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπίστη. Σωκρά- 193 της εἰ γιγνώσκει το θεόδωρον καὶ Θεάητην, ὅρα δὲ μηδέτερον, μηδὲ ἄλλη αἰσθήσεως αὐτών πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐν ἐαυτῷ δοξάσειν ως ὁ Θεάητης ἔστι Θεόδωρος. λέγω τί ἡ οὐδέν;

ὦ ἔστι. Ναί, ἀληθῆ γε.

σπ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοῖνυν ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἢν ὅν ἐλέγον.

ὦ ἔστι. Ἕν γάρ.

σπ. Δεύτερον τοῖνυν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν γιγνώσκων ύμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ γιγνώσκων, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μηδέτερον, οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτὶ οἰηθεὶν δὲν οἶδα εἶναι ὅν μὴ οἶδα.

ὦ ἔστι. Ὀρθῶς.

σπ. Τρίτον δὲ, μηδέτερον γιγνώσκων μηδὲ Β αἰσθανόμενος οὐκ ἂν οἰηθεὶν ὅν μὴ οἶδα ἐτερόν τιν' εἶναι δὲν μὴ οἶδα. καὶ τάλλα τὰ πρότερα πάνθ' ἔξης νῦμίζε πάλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτ' ἐστι... μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι below om. B.

2 εἰ γιγνώσκει W; ἐπιγιγνώσκει BT.
THEAETETUS

sometimes I touch them, sometimes not, sometimes I hear them or perceive them through some other sense, and sometimes I have no perception of you at all, but I remember you none the less and know you in my own mind. Is it not so?

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. This, then, is the first of the points which I wish to make clear. Note that one may perceive or not perceive that which one knows.

THEAET. That is true.

SOC. So, too, with that which he does not know—he may often not even perceive it, and often he may merely perceive it?

THEAET. That too is possible.

SOC. See if you follow me better now. If Socrates knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither of them and has no other perception of them, he never could have the opinion within himself that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Am I right or wrong?

THEAET. You are right.

SOC. Now that was the first of the cases of which I spoke.

THEAET. Yes, it was.

SOC. The second is this: knowing one of you and not knowing the other, and not perceiving either of you, I never could think that the one whom I know is the one whom I do not know.

THEAET. Right.

SOC. And this is the third case: not knowing and not perceiving either of you, I could not think that he whom I do not know is someone else whom I do not know. And imagine that you have heard all the other cases again in succession, in which I
PLATO

ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ καὶ Θεοδώρου τὰ ψευδή δοξάσω, οὔτε γιγνώσκων οὔτε ἁγνῶν ἄμφω, οὔτε τὸν μέν, τὸν δ' οὐ γιγνώσκων καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεων κατὰ ταύτα, εἰ ἄρα ἔπει.

θεαί. Ἡμέραμε.

σα. Δεῦτε τοίνυν τὰ ψευδή δοξάσαι ἐν τῷ δὲ, οὔταν γιγνώσκων σὲ καὶ Θεοδώρων, καὶ ἔχων ἐν C ἐκείνῳ τῷ κηρίνῳ ὡσπερ δακτυλίων σφῶν ἄμφοι τὰ σημεῖα, διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ἰκανῶς ὄρον ἄμφω προθυμηθῶ, τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐκατέρω σημείου ἀποδοὺς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὀψεῖ, ἐμβιβάσας προσαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἵχνος, ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις, εἴτε τούτων ἀποτυχῶν καὶ ὡσπερ οἱ ἐμπαλώ ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξας προσβάλω τὴν ἐκατέρω ὀψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημεῖον, ἢ καὶ οὐ τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὀψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταρρέουσις, D ταῦταν παθὼν διαμάρτων· τότε δὴ συμβαίνει ἡ ἐτεροδοξία καὶ τὸ ψευδή δοξάζειν.

θεαί. Ἑοίκε γάρ, οὐ Σωκράτες· θαυμασίως ὡς λέγεις τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος.

σα. Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ οὔταν ἀμφοτέρους γιγνώσκων τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ γιγνώσκειν αἰσθάνομαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ, τὴν δὲ γνώσιν τοῦ ἐτέρου μὴ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσεων ἔχω, δὲ εἰ τοῖς πρόσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον καὶ μοι τότε οὐκ ἐμάνθανες.

192
THEAETETUS

could never form false opinions about you and Theodorus, either when I know or do not know both of you, or when I know one and not the other; and the same is true if we say "perceive" instead of "know." Do you follow me?

THEAET. I follow you.

SOC. Then the possibility of forming false opinion remains in the following case: when, for example, knowing you and Theodorus, and having on that block of wax the imprint of both of you, as if you were signet-rings, but seeing you both at a distance and indistinctly, I hasten to assign the proper imprint of each of you to the proper vision, and to make it fit, as it were, its own footprint, with the purpose of causing recognition;¹ but I may fail in this by interchanging them, and put the vision of one upon the imprint of the other, as people put a shoe on the wrong foot; or, again, I may be affected as the sight is affected when we use a mirror and the sight as it flows makes a change from right to left, and thus make a mistake; it is in such cases, then, that interchanged opinion occurs and the forming of false opinion arises.

THEAET. I think it does, Socrates. You describe what happens to opinion marvellously well.

SOC. There is still the further case, when, knowing both of you, I perceive one in addition to knowing him, but do not perceive the other, and the knowledge which I have of that other is not in accord with my perception. This is the case I described in this way before, and at that time you did not understand me.

¹ Aeschylus, Choeoph. 197 ff., makes Electra recognize the presence of her brother Orestes by the likeness of his footprints to her own.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΠ. Τοῦτο μὴν ἔλεγον, ὅτι γυγνῶσκων τῶν Ἐ ἑτερον καὶ αἰσθανόμενος, καὶ τὴν γνώσιν κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν αὐτοῦ ἔχων, οὐδέποτε οὐσεται εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἑτερόν τινα ἃν γυγνῶσκει τε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ τὴν γνώσιν αὐ καὶ ἐκείνου ἔχει κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν. ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναῖ.

ΣΠ. Παρελείπετο δὲ γέ που τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἐν δὲ δὴ φαμεν τὴν ψευδὴ δόξαν γίνεσθαι τὸ ἄμφω γυγνῶσκοντα καὶ ἄμφω ὅρωντα ἥ τινα ἄλλην 194 αἰσθήσιν ἔχοντα ἄμφοτε τῷ σημείῳ μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ αἰσθήσιν ἑκάτερον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οἶον τοξότην φαύλον ἕντα παραλάβῃ τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ψεύδος ἀρχ ὁμόμασται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκότως γε.

ΣΠ. Καὶ ὅταν τοῖνυν τῷ μὲν παρὴ αἰσθασίς τῶν σημείων, τῷ δὲ μῆ, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀποφής αἰσθήσεως τῆς παροῦσῃ προσαρμόσῃ, πάντῃ ταύτῃ ψεύδεται ἡ διάνοια. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ δὲ ἐν μὲν μῆ οἴδε τις Β μηδὲ ἰθετο 2 πώποτε, οὐκ ἔστων, ὡς ἔσκεπτε, οὕτε ψεύδεσθαι οὕτε ψεύδῃς δόξα, εἰ τὸ νῦν ἡμίς νικὲς λέγομεν· περὶ δὲ ὅν ἵσμεν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις στρέφεται καὶ ἐλίπτεται ἡ δόξα ὑπονοεῖ καὶ ἀληθῆς γυγνομένη, καταντικρῦ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἴκεια συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους ἀληθῆς, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιά ψευδῆς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατε, λέγεται;

1 τῷ σημείῳ α. Heusde; τῷ σημείῳ TW²; τῷ σημείῳ BW.
2 μηδὲ ἤσθετο TW; μηδὲ ἐπείθετο ἐπῆθετο B; μηδ' ἐπῆθετο Β².

194
THEAETETUS

THEAET. No, I did not.

SOC. This is what I meant, that if anyone knows and perceives one of you, and has knowledge of him which accords with the perception, he will never think that he is someone else whom he knows and perceives and his knowledge of whom accords with the perception. That was the case, was it not?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. But we omitted, I believe, the case of which I am speaking now—the case in which we say the false opinion arises: when a man knows both and sees both (or has some other perception of them), but fails to hold the two imprints each under its proper perception; like a bad archer he shoots beside the mark and misses it; and it is just this which is called error or deception.

THEAET. And properly so.

SOC. Now when perception is present to one of the imprints but not to the other, and the mind applies the imprint of the absent perception to the perception which is present, the mind is deceived in every such instance. In a word, if our present view is sound, false opinion or deception seems to be impossible in relation to things which one does not know and has never perceived; but it is precisely in relation to things which we know and perceive that opinion turns and twists, becoming false and true—true when it puts the proper imprints and seals fairly and squarely upon one another, and false when it applies them sideways and aslant.

THEAET. Well, then, Socrates, is that view not a good one?
PLATO

C ζ. Είτε τοίνυν καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἔρεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τάληθες δοξάζειν καλόν, τὸ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι αἰσχρόν.

ΤΕΙ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;  
ζ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν φασὶν ἐνθέντε γίγνεσθαι. ὅταν μὲν ὁ κηρός του ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθὺς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ λεῖος καὶ μετρίως ὄργασμένος ἡ, τὰ ἱόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἐνοποιώμενα εἰς τούτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, ὁ ἔφη Ομήρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις

D καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα ἐγγυνόμενα καὶ ἴκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρώματα τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, ἔπειτα μνήμονες, εἰτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεῖα ἀλλὰ δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὅταν ταχὺ διανέμουσιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκαστα ἐκμαγεία, ἄ δὴ ὅτα καλεῖται, καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὐτοὶ καλοῦνται. ἡ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΤΕΙ. Ὕπερφυσῶς μὲν οὖν.

Ε ζ. Ὅταν τοίνυν λάσιον τοῦ τὸ 2 κέαρ ἡ, δὴ ἐπήνεσεν ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής, ἡ ὅταν κοπρῶδες καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἡ ψυχῶν σφόδρα ἡ σκληρών, ὥν μὲν ψυχῶν, εὐμαθεῖς μὲν, ἐπιλήσιμονες δὲ γίγνονται, ὥν δὲ σκληρῶν, τὰναντία. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον καὶ τραχὺ λυθῶμες τι ἡ γῆς ἡ κόπρου συμ-

1 ὄργασμένοι Suidas, Timaeus; εἰργασμένοι ΒΤ.
2 τοῦ τὸ] τοῦτο τὸ Β.
THEAETETUS

soc. After you have heard the rest, you will be still more inclined to say so. For to hold a true opinion is a good thing, but to be deceived is a disgrace.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. They say the cause of these variations is as follows: When the wax in the soul of a man is deep and abundant and smooth and properly kneaded, the images that come through the perceptions are imprinted upon this heart of the soul—as Homer calls it in allusion to its similarity to wax—; when this is the case, and in such men, the imprints, being clear and of sufficient depth, are also lasting. And men of this kind are in the first place quick to learn, and secondly they have retentive memories, and moreover they do not interchange the imprints of their perceptions, but they have true opinions. For the imprints are clear and have plenty of room, so that such men quickly assign them to their several moulds, which are called realities; and these men, then, are called wise. Or do you not agree?

THEAET. Most emphatically.

soc. Now when the heart of anyone is shaggy (a condition which the all-wise poet commends), or when it is unclean or of impure wax, or very soft or hard, those whose wax is soft are quick to learn, but forgetful, and those in whom it is hard are the reverse. But those in whom it is shaggy and rough and stony, infected with earth or dung which is mixed

1 The similarity is in the Greek words κέρας or κηρ, heart, and κηρός, wax. The shaggy heart is mentioned in the Iliad, ii. 851; xvi. 554. The citation of Homer, here and below, is probably sarcastic—in reference to the practice of some of the sophists who used and perverted his words in support of their doctrines.
μυγείσης ἐμπλευν ἔχοντες ἁσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα ἰσχουσιν. ἁσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σκηνά. βάθος γὰρ οὐκ ἐν. ἁσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ ύγρα. ὑπὸ γὰρ 195 τοῦ συγχείσθαι ταχύ γίγνεται ἀμυνδρά. ἦν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσι τούτοις ἐπ' ἀλλήλων συμπεπτυκότα ή ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας, ἦν τοῦ σμικρὸν ή τὸ ψυχάριον, ἔτι ἁσαφεστέρα ἐκείνων. πάντες οὖν οὗτοι γίγνονται οίοι δοξάζειν ψευδή. ὅταν γὰρ τι ὀρῶσιν ή ἀκούσωσιν ή ἐπινοῶσιν, έκαστα 1 ἀπονέμειν ταχύ ἐκάστοις οὐ δυνάμειν βραδείς τέ εἰσι καὶ ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες παρορώσι τε καὶ παρακούοντι καὶ παρανοοῦν πλείστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὖ οὗτοι ἐξευσμένου τε ἄτι τῶν ὅντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖς.

B ὁειαὶ. Ὅρθοτατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ὡ Σώκρατες.

σα. Φῶμεν ἄρα ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δόξας εἶναι;

ὁειαὶ. Σφόδρα γε.

σα. Καὶ ἁληθεῖς δή;

ὁειαὶ. Καὶ ἁληθεῖς.

σα. Ἡδη οὖν οἰόμεθα ἰκανῶς ἀμολογήσωμαι ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρα τούτω τῷ δόξα;

ὁειαὶ. Ἑπερφύωσι μὲν οὖν.

35. σα. Δεῦν τε, ὡ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἁληθῶς κινδυνεῦει καὶ ἄθιδες εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀδολέσχης.

ὁειαὶ. Τί δὲ; πρὸς τί τούτ’ εἶπες;

C σα. Τὴν ἐμνεϋοι δυναμιθὰν δυσχεράναι καὶ ὡς ἁληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν. τί γὰρ ἂν τὶς ἀλλο θεῖτο οὖνα, ὅταν ἄνω κατώ τοὺς λόγους ἐλείπῃ τις ὑπὸ νωθείας οὐ δυνάμενος πεισθήναι, καὶ ἂ δυσαπάλ- λακτος ἀφ’ ἐκάστοι λόγου;

ὁειαὶ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ τὶ δυσχεραίνεις;

1 ἐκασταὶ ἐκαστοὶ ΒΤ.
THEAETETUS

in it, receive indistinct imprints from the moulds. So also do those whose wax is hard; for the imprints lack depth. And imprints in soft wax are also indistinct, because they melt together and quickly become blurred; but if besides all this they are crowded upon one another through lack of room, in some mean little soul, they are still more indistinct. So all these men are likely to have false opinions. For when they see or hear or think of anything, they cannot quickly assign things to the right imprints, but are slow about it, and because they assign them wrongly they usually see and hear and think amiss. These men, in turn, are accordingly said to be deceived about realities and ignorant.

THEAET. You are right as right could be, Socrates.
SOC. Shall we, then, say that false opinions exist in us?
THEAET. Assuredly.
SOC. And true opinions, no doubt?
THEAET. And true ones also.
SOC. Then now at last we think we have reached a valid agreement, that these two kinds of opinion incontestably exist?
THEAET. Most emphatically.
SOC. Truly, Theatetus, a garrulous man is a strange and unpleasant creature!
THEAET. Eh? What makes you say that?
SOC. Vexation at my own stupidity and genuine garrulity. For what else could you call it when a man drags his arguments up and down because he is so stupid that he cannot be convinced, and is hardly to be induced to give up any one of them?
THEAET. But you, why are you vexed?
PLATO

σα. Οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον, ἄλλα καὶ δέδοικα, ὁ τι ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἂν τις ἔρθῃ με· "ὡς Ἐὔκρατες, ηὔρηκας δὴ ψευδὴ δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεωι ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειας οὔτε ἐν ταῖς διάνοιαις, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαι;" φήσω δὲ ἑγώ, οἴμαι, καλλωπιζόμενος ὡς τι ηὔρηκό- των ἡμῶν καλὸν.

ὁεαί. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὡς Ἐὔκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον.

σα. "Οὐκοῦν," φήσει, "λέγεις ὅτι αὐ τὸν ἀνθρώπου, ὃν διανοοῦμεθα μόνον, ὅρωμεν ὃ οὐ, ἱππον οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἰηθείμεν εἶναι, ὅτι αὐ οὗτο ὅρωμεν οὔτε ἀπτόμεθα, διανοοῦμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αἰσθανόμεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ;" ταῦτα, οἴμαι, φήσω λέγειν.

ὁεαί. Καὶ ὅρθως γε.

Ε σα. "Τὰ οὖν," φήσει, 1 "τὰ ἐνδεκα, ἃ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ διανοεῖται τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτοι του λόγου οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἰηθεί δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μόνον αὐ διανοεῖται;" ἵτι οὖν ὅθ', συ ἀποκρύνω.

ὁεαί. Ἀλλ' ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ὅτι ὅρων μὲν ἂν τις ἢ ἐφαπτόμενοι οἰηθεί Τ ἐνδεκα δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μέντοι ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα δοξάσειν οὕτως.

σα. Τὰ οὖν; οἴει τινὰ πῶς ποτὲ αὐτῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πέντε καὶ ἐπτά, λέγω δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπους ἐπτά καὶ πέντε προβείσιν οκοπεῖν μηδ' ἀλλ' τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἐπτά, ἃ φαμέν ἐκεί μην ἡμεῖς ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγεῖσθα εἴναι καὶ ψευδὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι, ταύτα αὐτὰ εἰ τις ἀνθρώπων ἡδὴ

1 φήσει Stephanus; φῆς B; φήσι Burnet.
THEAETETUS

soc. I am not merely vexed, I am actually afraid; for I do not know what answer to make if anyone asks me: "Socrates, have you found out, I wonder, that false opinion exists neither in the relations of the perceptions to one another nor in the thoughts, but in the combination of perception with thought?" I shall say "yes," I suppose, and put on airs, as if we had made a fine discovery.

THEAET. It seems to me, Socrates, that the result we have now brought out is not half bad.

soc. "Do you go on and assert, then," he will say, "that we never could imagine that the man whom we merely think of, but do not see, is a horse which also we do not see or touch or perceive by any other sense, but merely think of?" I suppose I shall say that I do make that assertion.

THEAET. Yes, and you will be right.

soc. "Then," he will say, "according to that, could we ever imagine that the number eleven which is merely thought of, is the number twelve which also is merely thought of?" Come now, it is for you to answer.

THEAET. Well, my answer will be that a man might imagine the eleven that he sees or touches to be twelve, but that he could never have that opinion concerning the eleven that he has in his mind.

soc. Well, then, do you think that anyone ever considered in his own mind five and seven,—I do not mean by setting before his eyes seven men and five men and considering them, or anything of that sort, but seven and five in the abstract, which we say are imprints in the block of wax, and in regard to which we deny the possibility of forming false opinions—taking these by themselves, do you imagine
PLATO

πώποτε ἐσκέψατο λέγων πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἐρωτῶν πόσα ποτ’ ἔστιν, καὶ ὁ μὲν τις ἐίπεν οὐθεὶς ἐνδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα, ἥ πάντες λέγουσι τε καὶ οἴονται δώδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι;

 theano. Οὗ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἄλλα πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν-

B δεκα. ε ἂν δὲ γε ἐν πλεῖστι ἀριθμῷ τις σκοπήται,

μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἶμαι γὰρ σε περὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἕνεκος ἄριθμον λέγειν.

σπ. Ὄρθως γὰρ οἶει: καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ μὴ τι τότε γίγνεται ἄλλο γάρ αὐτὰ τὰ δώδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ ενδεκα οἰηθῆναι.  

 theano. Ἐσθικὲ γε.

σπ. Ὅυκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρωτοὺς πάλιν ἀνήκει λόγους; ὃ γὰρ τούτο παθῶν, ὃ οἶδε, ἔτερον αὐτῷ οἶεται εἶναι ὃν αὐτός, ὃς οἴης ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ C τούτω αὐτῷ ἤπαγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδὴ δόξαν, ἢν μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ διὸς ἀναγκάζοιτο εἰδὼς μὴ εἰδέναι ἄμα.

 theano. Ἀλθέστατα.

σπ. Ὅυκοῦν ἄλλʼ ὅτιον δὲι ἀποφαίνει τὸ τὰ ψευδὴ δοξάζειν ἡ διανοίασι πρὸς αἰσθησιν παραλλα-

γήν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ’ ἢ, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς διανοήσιν ἐφευδόμεθα. νῦν δὲ ήτοι οὐκ ἐστὶ ψευδῆς δόξη, ἡ ἀ τὶς οἴδεν, οἴον τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων πότερα 3 αἱρέι;

 theano. Ἀπορον αἴρεσιν προτίθης, δι Σώκρατες.

D σπ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερά γε κινδυνεύει ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἐάσειν. ὅμως δέ, πάντε γὰρ τολμητέον, τί εἰ ἑπιχειρήσαιμεν ἀνασχυντεῖν;

 theano. Πῶς;

 1 μᾶλλον om. W. 2 τότε W; ποτε BT. 3 πότερα W; ποτέραν BT.

202
THEAETETUS

that anybody in the world has ever considered them, talking to himself and asking himself what their sum is, and that one person has said and thought eleven, and another twelve, or do all say and think that it is twelve?

THEAET. No, by Zeus; many say eleven, and if you take a larger number for consideration, there is greater likelihood of error. For I suppose you are speaking of any number rather than of these only.

SOC. You are right in supposing so; and consider whether in that instance the abstract twelve in the block of wax is not itself imagined to be eleven.

THEAET. It seems so.

SOC. Have we not, then, come back again to the beginning of our talk? For the man who is affected in this way imagines that one thing which he knows is another thing which he knows. This we said was impossible, and by this very argument we were forcing false opinion out of existence, that the same man might not be forced to know and not know the same things at the same time.

THEAET. Very true.

SOC. Then we must show that forming false opinion is something or other different from the interchange of thought and perception. For if it were that, we should never be deceived in abstract thoughts. But as the case now stands, either there is no false opinion or it is possible for a man not to know that which he knows. Which alternative will you choose?

THEAET. There is no possible choice, Socrates.

SOC. And yet the argument is not likely to admit both. But still, since we must not shrink from any risk, what if we should try to do a shameless deed?

THEAET. What is it?
PLATO

σημ. 'Εθελήσαντες εἰπεῖν ποιόν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι.

Θεαί. Καὶ τι τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον;

σημ. 'Εσοκάς οὐκ ἐννοεῖν ὅτι πᾶς ἦμιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος ᾠδήσεις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμη, ὡς οὐκ εἰδοῦσι τί ποτ' ἐστὶν.

Θεαί. 'Εννοῶ μὲν οὖν.

σημ. 'Επειτ' οὐκ ἀναίδες δοκεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷον ἐστών; Ε ἄλλα γὰρ, ὡ Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλεω τὸν μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυρίκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ "γιγνώσκομεν" καὶ "οὐ γιγνώσκομεν," καὶ "ἐπιστάμεθα" καὶ "οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα," ὡς τι συνιέντες ἀλλήλων ἐν ᾧ ἐτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν· "εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεχρήμεθα αὐτῷ "ἀγνοεῖν" τε καὶ "συνιέναι," ὡς προσήκον αὐτῶις χρησάμεθα, εἴπερ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης.

Θεαί. Ἀλλα τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὡ Σώκρατε, τούτων ἀπεχμόδενοι;

197 σημ. Οὐδένα ὡν γε ὅσ εἰμι· εἰ μέντοι ἴν ἀντιλογικός, οἶος ἀνήρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τούτων τ' ἂν ἔφη ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ύμῖιν σφόδρ' ἄν α ἐγώ λέγω ἐπέπληττεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμὲν φαύλοι, βούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν οἷον ἐστι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; φαίνεται γάρ μοι προύργουν τι ἄν γενέσθαι.

Θεαί. Τόλμα τοίνυν νὴ Δία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχομένω σοί ἐσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη.

36. σημ. Ἀκήκοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσιν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι;

Θεαί. Ἡσώς· οὐ μέντοι ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεύω.

Β σημ. Ἐπιστήμης που ἔξων φασίν αὐτῷ εἶναι.

204
THEAETETUS

soc. To undertake to tell what it really is to know.
theaet. And why is that shameless?
soc. You seem not to remember that our whole talk from the beginning has been a search for knowledge, because we did not know what it is.
theaet. Oh yes, I remember.
soc. Then is it not shameless to proclaim what it is to know, when we are ignorant of knowledge? But really, Theaetetus, our talk has been badly tainted with uncleanness all along; for we have said over and over again "we know" and "we do not know" and "we have knowledge" and "we have no knowledge," as if we could understand each other, while we were still ignorant of knowledge; and at this very moment, if you please, we have again used the terms "be ignorant" and "understand," as though we had any right to use them if we are deprived of knowledge.
theaet. But how will you converse, Socrates, if you refrain from these words?
soc. Not at all, being the man I am; but I might if I were a real reasoner; if such a man were present at this moment he would tell us to refrain from these terms, and would criticize my talk scathingly. But since we are poor creatures, shall I venture to say what the nature of knowing is? For it seems to me that would be of some advantage.
theaet. Venture it then, by Zeus. You shall have full pardon for not refraining from those terms.
soc. Have you heard what they say nowadays that knowing is?
theaet. Perhaps; however, I don't remember just at this moment.
soc. They say it is having knowledge.

205
ΠΛΑΤΟ

Θεά. Ἀληθῆ.
ζω. Ἡμεῖς τοίνυν σμικρὸν μεταδώμεθα καὶ εἴπωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτήσιν.
Θεά. Τί οὖν δὴ φήσεις τούτο ἐκεῖνον διαφέρειν; ζω. Ἰσως μὲν οὐδὲν. ὧ δὲ οὖν δοκεῖ, ἀκούσας συνδοκίμαζέ.
Θεά. Ἕλπις γε οἶός τ᾽ ὦ.
ζω. Οἷς τοίνυν μοι ταύτῶν φαίνεται τῶ κεκτήσαι τὸ ἔχειν. οἶον εἰ ἕι 1 ἱμάτιον πριάμενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατῆς ὡν μὴ φοροῖ; 2 ἔχειν μὲν οὖκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτό, κεκτήσας γε μην 3 φαίμεν.
Θεά. Ὄρθως γε.
C ζω. Ὅρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατόν οὖτω κεκτημένον μη ἔχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ εἰ τις ὀρνιθὰς ἀγρίας, περιστερὰς ἢ τι ἀλλο, θηρεύσας οἶκοι κατασκευασάμενος περιστερεῶνα τρέφοι. τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἂν πού τινα φαίμεν αὐτὸν αὐτὸς ἢ εἰ ἔχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτηται. ἡ γάρ;
Θεά. Ναί.
ζω. Τρόπον δὲ γ᾽ ἀλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτὰς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἰκείῳ περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίως ἐποιήσατο, λαβεῖν καὶ σχεῖν, ἐπειδὰν βούληται, θηρευσάμενος ὡν ἂν ἢ εἰδελθή, καὶ πάλιν ἀφίνεαι· καὶ τούτῳ ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν, ὀποσάκις ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ.
Θεά. Ἡστι ταῦτα.
ζω. Πάλιν δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρυκον τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατασκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὡ τι πλάσμα, νῦν αὖ ἐν ἐκάστη ψυχή ποιήσωμεν

1 el vulg. ex emend. apogr. P; om. BTW.
2 φοροῖ vulg.; φορῶν b; φορῶ B; φορῷ TW.
3 γε μην W; γε δὴ B; γε T; δὲ γε vulg.

206
THEAETETUS

THEAET. True.

SOC. Let us make a slight change and say possessing knowledge.

THEAET. Why, how will you claim that the one differs from the other?

SOC. Perhaps it doesn't; but first hear how it seems to me to differ, and then help me to test my view.

THEAET. I will if I can.

SOC. Well, then, having does not seem to me the same as possessing. For instance, if a man bought a cloak and had it under his control, but did not wear it, we should certainly say, not that he had it, but that he possessed it.

THEAET. And rightly.

SOC. Now see whether it is possible in the same way for one who possesses knowledge not to have it, as, for instance, if a man should catch wild birds—pigeons or the like—and should arrange an aviary at home and keep them in it, we might in a way assert that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And yet in another way that he has none of them, but that he has acquired power over them, since he has brought them under his control in his own enclosure, to take them and hold them whenever he likes, by catching whichever bird he pleases, and to let them go again; and he can do this as often as he sees fit.

THEAET. That is true.

SOC. Once more, then, just as a while ago we contrived some sort of a waxen figment in the soul, so now let us make in each soul an aviary stocked
ΠΛΑΤΩΝ

περιστερεώνα τινα παντοδαπῶν ὅρνιθων, τὰς μὲν κατ’ ἄγελας οὐσας χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατ’ ὀλύγας, ἔνιας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι πετομένας.

Ε θεῖ. Πεποιήσοθω δή. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτεύθεν;

ζ. Παιδίων μὲν ὄντων φάναι χρῆ εἶναι τούτῳ τὸ ἄγγειον κενὸν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὅρνιθων ἐπιστήμασι νοῆσαι. ἢν δ’ ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθείρξῃ εἰς τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἢ ἑρημεύσει τὸ πράγμα ὣς ἢν αὐτὴ ἢ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτ’ εἶναι.


θεῖ. Ἠστω.

198 ζ. Τὸ τοῖνυν πάλιν ἢν ἂν βούληται τῶν ἐπιστημῶν θηρεύεις καὶ λαβόντα ἱσχείν καὶ αὖθις ἀφιέναι, σκόπει τίνων δεῖται ὄνομάτων, εἶτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὅπου τὸ πρῶτον ὅπε ἐκτάτο εἶτε ἔτερον. μαθήσει δ’ ἐνθένθε 1 σαφέστερον τί λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴ ἡ μὲν γὰρ λέγεις τέχνη.

θεῖ. Ναί.

ζ. Ταύτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστημῶν ἀρτίον τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντός.

θεῖ. Ἰπολαμβάνω.

ζ. Ταύτην δὴ, οἴμαι, τῆς τέχνης αὐτὸς τε ὑπο-Β χειρίς τᾶς ἐπιστήματι τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἔχει καὶ ἄλλω παραδίδουσιν ὁ παραδιδοῦς.

θεῖ. Ναί.

ζ. Καὶ καλοῦμέν γε παραδίδοντα μὲν διδάσκειν, παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ ἡ τῷ κεκτηθεῖαι ἐν τῷ περιστερεών εἰκόνω επίστασθαι.

1 ἐνθένθε] ἐντεύθεν B.
THEAETETUS

with all sorts of birds, some in flocks apart from the rest, others in small groups, and some solitary, flying hither and thither among them all.

THEAET. Consider it done. What next?

SOC. We must assume that while we are children this receptacle is empty, and we must understand that the birds represent the varieties of knowledge. And whatsoever kind of knowledge a person acquires and shuts up in the enclosure, we must say that he has learned or discovered the thing of which this is the knowledge, and that just this is knowing.

THEAET. So be it.

SOC. Consider then what expressions are needed for the process of recapturing and taking and holding and letting go again whichever he please of the kinds of knowledge, whether they are the same expressions as those needed for the original acquisition, or others. But you will understand better by an illustration. You admit that there is an art of arithmetic?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. Now suppose this to be a hunt after the kinds of knowledge, or sciences, of all odd and even numbers.

THEAET. I do so.

SOC. Now it is by this art, I imagine, that a man has the sciences of numbers under his own control and also that any man who transmits them to another does this.

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And we say that when anyone transmits them he teaches, and when anyone receives them he learns, and when anyone, by having acquired them, has them in that aviary of ours, he knows them.

209
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἡδη πρὸςοχὲς τὸν νοῦν. ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὁν τελέως ἀλλὰ τι πάντας ἀριθμοὺς ἐπίσταται; πάντων γὰρ ἀριθμῶν εἰςιν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ἕνυχῃ ἐπιστήμῃ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. *Η οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμοὶ ἂν ποτὲ τι ἡ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὰ ἢ ἀλλο τι τῶν ἔξω ὡσα ἔχει ἀριθμὸν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν γε οὐκ ἀλλο τι θῆσομεν τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὡς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἀρα ἐπίσταται, σκοπούμενος φαίνεται ὡς οὐκ εἰδώς, δόν ἀμαλαμβάνων ἄπαντα ἀριθμὸν εἰδέναι. ἀκούεις γὰρ ποῖς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητή- τήσεις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε.

37. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν Δ περιστρέφουν κτῆσει τε καὶ θῆρα ἔροιμεν ὅτι δυττὴ χιν ἡ θῆρα, ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτήσατο ἕνεκα. ἡ δὲ κεκτημένη τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερσίν ἀ πάλαι ἐκέκτητο. οὕτως δὲ καὶ οὖν πάλαι ἐπιστήμαι ἃσαν αὐτῷ μαθόντι καὶ 1 ἡπί- στατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἐστι καταμαθάνει ταυτά ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐκάστῳ καὶ ἠχόντα, ἢν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δ’ οὖκ εἴχε τῇ διαινοίᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΕΓ. Τούτω δὴ ἄρτι ἡμῶν, ὅπως χρῆ τοῖς

1 μαθόντι καὶ W; μαθόντι BT.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. Now pay attention to what follows from this. Does not the perfect arithmetician understand all numbers; for he has the sciences of all numbers in his mind?

THEAET. To be sure.

SOC. Then would such a man ever count anything—either any abstract numbers in his head, or any such external objects as possess number?

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. But we shall affirm that counting is the same thing as considering how great any number in question is.

THEAET. We shall.

SOC. Then he who by our previous admission knows all number is found to be considering that which he knows as if he did not know it. You have doubtless heard of such ambiguities.

THEAET. Yes, I have.

SOC. Continuing, then, our comparison with the acquisition and hunting of the pigeons, we shall say that the hunting is of two kinds, one before the acquisition for the sake of possessing, the other carried on by the possessor for the sake of taking and holding in his hands what he had acquired long before. And just so when a man long since by learning came to possess knowledge of certain things, and knew them, he may have these very things afresh by taking up again the knowledge of each of them separately and holding it—the knowledge which he had acquired long before, but had not at hand in his mind?

THEAET. That is true.

SOC. This, then, was my question just now: How
PLATO

όνομασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἀριθμητώς ἢ ὁ ἀριθμητικός ή τὶ ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμματικός, ὥσ ἐπιστάμενος ἢ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν ἔρχεται μαθησόμενος παρέ ἑαυτὸν ἀ ἐπίσταται;

oriously, ἀλλ’ ἀτοπον, ὁ Ἡσίκρατης.

ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἢ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν έρχεται μαθησόμενος παρέ ἑαυτὸν ἀ ἐπίσταται;

219 ὅπως ἀλλ’ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἄλογον.

ὡς ὑπειράζει ὁμοῦ λέγομεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὑνομάτων οὐδὲν ἤμιν μέλει, ὅτι τὸ χαίρει ἔλκων τῷ ἐπιστασθαί καὶ μανθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑρισάμεθα ἔτερον ἡ σφαιραῖ τῷ τὸ κεκτήσαθα τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὅ μὲν τὸς ἐκτίθατι μὴ κεκτήθαι ἄδυνατόν φαμέν εἶναι, ὡστε οὐδέποτε σύμβαινε ὅ τὸ ὑπὸν μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδὴ μὲν τούτοι δόξαι οἷον τ’ εἶναι περὶ

Β ἀντὶ λαβείν; μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ τοῦτου οἷον τε, ἀλλ’ ἐτέραν ἄντ’ ἐκείνης, ὅταν θηρεύων τοια ποῦ ποτ’ ἐπιστήμῃ διαπετομένων ἄνθ’ ἐτέρας ἐτέραν ἀμαρτῶν λάβῃ, τότε ἡ ἐν τῇ ἐντέκει ἐντεκα δῶδεκα ὑπήκοα ἐνέκα, τῇ τῶν ἐντεκα ἐπιστήμῃ ἄντ’ τῆς τῶν δῶδεκα λαβών τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον ἐπίσταται ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς.

oriously, ἡ ἐκεὶ γὰρ οἷον λόγον.

ὡς ὁταν δὲ γε ήν ἐπιχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβη, ἀφευρεῖ τε καὶ τὰ ὅντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἀληθὴ τε καὶ ψευδὴ δοξαν, καὶ ἰν ἐν τοῖς

Πρόσθεν ἐν ὑποκεραίωμεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδῶν γίγνεσθαι; ἦσως οἷον μοι συμφήσεις. ἡ πῶς ποιήσεις;

1 ποῦ ποτ’ ἢ ἄτ’ αὐτοῦ ΒΤ.
2 τότε ἢ τοῖς ΒΤ.
THEAETETUS

should we express ourselves in speaking about them when an arithmetician undertakes to count or a man of letters to read something? In such a case shall we say that although he knows he sets himself to learn again from himself that which he knows?

THEAET. But that is extraordinary, Socrates.

SOC. But shall we say that he is going to read or count that which he does not know, when we have granted that he knows all letters and all numbers?

THEAET. But that too is absurd.

SOC. Shall we then say that words are nothing to us, if it amuses anyone to drag the expressions "know" and "learn" one way and another, but since we set up the distinction that it is one thing to possess knowledge and another thing to have it, we affirm that it is impossible not to possess what one possesses, so that it never happens that a man does not know that which he knows, but that it is possible to conceive a false opinion about it? For it is possible to have not the knowledge of this thing, but some other knowledge instead, when in hunting for some one kind of knowledge, as the various kinds fly about, he makes a mistake and catches one instead of another; so in one example he thought eleven was twelve, because he caught the knowledge of twelve, which was within him, instead of that of eleven, caught a ringdove, as it were, instead of a pigeon.

THEAET. Yes, that is reasonable.

SOC. But when he catches the knowledge he intends to catch, he is not deceived and has true opinion, and so true and false opinion exist and none of the things which formerly annoyed us interferes? Perhaps you will agree to this; or what will you do?
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐτως.

ζην. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἀ ἐπιστανται μὴ ἐπί-
στασθαι ἀπηλλάγμεθα· ἃ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ
κεκτήσανεν οὐδαμοῦ ἐτε συμβαίνει, οὐτε ἰενοῦθε
tuos oûte μή. δενότερον μὲντοι πάθος ἄλλο
παραφαίνεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιον;

ζην. Εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγὴ ψευδῆς
γενῆσεται ποτε δόξα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς δὴ;

D ζην. Πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τινος ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην
τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἄγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνησμοῦν ἀλλα τῇ
ἔστωτο ἐπιστήμησεν ἐπετε ἐτερον αὐτῷ δοξα-
ζεν, τὸ δ' ἐτερον τοῦτο, πῶς οὐκ ἅλογια,
ἐπιστήμης παραγενομένης γνώναι μὲν τὴν ψυχήν
μηδέν, ἄγνοησαι δὲ πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ
λόγου κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ ἄγνοιαι παραγενομένην
γνώναι τι ποιησαί καὶ τυφλότητα ἱδεῖν, εἴπερ
καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἄγνοησαι ποτε τῶν ποιησεῖ.

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Ἰσως γὰρ, ὦ Σώκρατε, οὐ καλῶς τὰς
ὄρνιθας ἐτίθεμεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἐδει
dὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνας τιθέναι ὁμοί συνδιαπε-
tομένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτὲ μὲν
ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντα, τοτὲ δ' ἀνεπιστημοσύνη
tοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι ψευδῆ μὲν δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστη-
μοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.

ζην. Οὐ γάρδιον γε, ὦ Θεαῖτη, μὴ ἐπανεῖν σε·
d μέντοι εἰπες πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἐστω μὲν γὰρ

214
THEAETETUS

THEAET. I will agree.

SOC. Yes, for we have got rid of our difficulty about men not knowing that which they know; for we no longer find ourselves not possessing that which we possess, whether we are deceived about anything or not. However, another more dreadful disaster seems to be coming in sight.

THEAET. What disaster?

SOC. If the interchange of kinds of knowledge should ever turn out to be false opinion.

THEAET. How so?

SOC. Is it not the height of absurdity, in the first place for one who has knowledge of something to be ignorant of this very thing, not through ignorance but through his knowledge; secondly, for him to be of opinion that this thing is something else and something else is this thing—for the soul, when knowledge has come to it, to know nothing and be ignorant of all things? For by this argument there is nothing to prevent ignorance from coming to us and making us know something and blindness from making us see, if knowledge is ever to make us ignorant.

THEAET. Perhaps, Socrates, we were not right in making the birds represent kinds of knowledge only, but we ought to have imagined kinds of ignorance also flying about in the soul with the others; then the hunter would catch sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance of the same thing, and through the ignorance he would have false, but through the knowledge true opinion.

SOC. It is not easy, Theaetetus, to refrain from praising you. However, examine your suggestion once more. Let it be as you say: the man who
PLATO

200 ὡς λέγεις· ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην λαβῶν
ψευδὴ μὲν, φής, δοξάσει. ἢ γάρ;

θεαὶ. Ναὶ.

ἐπ. Οὐ δὴ ποιοῦ καὶ ἡγήσεται γε ψευδὴ δοξάζειν.

θεαὶ. Πῶς γάρ;

ἐπ. Ἀλλ' ἄλθη γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδὼς διακείσεται
περὶ ὧν ἐφευρεῖ.

θεαὶ. Τί μήν;

ἐπ. Ἐπιστήμην ἀρα οἴησεται τεθηρευκὼς ἔχειν,
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην.

θεαὶ. Δῆλον.

ἐπ. Ὡςκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ
tὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὃ γάρ ἐλεγκτικὸς
Β ἐκεῖνος γελάσας φήσει: 'πότερον, ὡς βέλτιστοι,
ἀμφοτέρας τις εἰδώς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστη-
μοσύνην, ἢν οἶδεν, έτέραν αὐτὴν οἴησα τις εἶναι
ὡν οἶδεν; ἢ οὐδετέραν αὐτοὶν εἰδὼς, ἢν μὴ οἴδε,
doξάζει έτέραν ὡν οὐκ οἴδεν; ἢ τὴν μὲν εἰδώς,
tὴν δ' οὔ, ἢν οἴδεν, ἢ μὴ οἴδεν; ἢ τὴν μὴ οἴδεν,
ἂν οἴδεν ήγεῖται; ἢ πάλιν αὐτοὶ έρείτε ὅτι τῶν
ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην εἰςαν αὐτοποιήσατε,
ἂν ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἑτέροις τις γελοῖος περιστε-
C ρεῖσιν ή κηρίνοις πλάσμασι καθείρξας, ἔσωσπερ
ἂν κεκτήται ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ προχείρως
ἐκχ έν τῇ ψυχῇ; καὶ οὔτω δὴ ἀναγκασθή-
σεσθε εἰς ταύτων περιτρέχειν μυριάκοις οὖδεν πλέον
ποιοῦντες;' τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ Θεαῖτης, ἀπο-
kρυνομέθεα;

1 αὐτοῖς] αὐτὴν BT; om. W.
THEAETETUS

catches the ignorance will, you say, have false opinion. Is that it?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. But surely he will not also think that he has false opinion.

THEAET. Certainly not.

SOC. No, but true opinion, and will have the attitude of knowing that about which he is deceived.

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. Hence he will fancy that he has caught, and has, knowledge, not ignorance.

THEAET. Evidently.

SOC. Then, after our long wanderings, we have come round again to our first difficulty. For the real reasoner will laugh and say, "Most excellent Sirs, does a man who knows both knowledge and ignorance think that one of them, which he knows, is another thing which he knows; or, knowing neither of them, is he of opinion that one, which he does not know, is another thing which he does not know; or, knowing one and not the other, does he think that the one he does not know is the one he knows; or that the one he knows is the one he does not know? Or will you go on and tell me that there are kinds of knowledge of the kinds of knowledge and of ignorance, and that he who possesses these kinds of knowledge and has enclosed them in some sort of other ridiculous aviaries or waxen figments, knows them, so long as he possesses them, even if he has them not at hand in his soul? And in this fashion are you going to be compelled to trot about endlessly in the same circle without making any progress?" What shall we reply to this, Theaetetus?
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλὰ μὰ Δί', ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἐγώγει οὐκ ἔχω τί χρῆ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἦμιν, ὁ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει, καὶ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι οὐκ ὄρθως ψευδή δόξαι προτέραν ζητούμεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκεῖνην ἀφ'-D ἐντες; τὸ δ' ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γνώναι, πρὶν ἂν τις ἐπιστήμην ἰκανῶς λάβῃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὡς λέγεις οἴεσθαι.

38. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τις ἐρεῖ πάλιν εξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γὰρ ποι ἀπεροῦμέν γε πτώ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ κιστα, εἶνερ μή σὺ γε ἀπαγορεύῃς.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δή, τί ἂν αὐτὸ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἦκιστ' ἂν ἦμιν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθείμεν;

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁπερ ἑπεχειροῦμεν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἐγώγει ἀλλὸ οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. ἀναμάρτητον γε ποῦ ἐστιν τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὅ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ἔφη ἃρα δεῖξειν αὐτό· καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ἴστε ἐρευνᾶμεν, τάχι ἂν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ 201 φύνευς τὸ ζητούμενον, μένουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἰωμέν γε καὶ σκοπώμεν.

218
THEAETETUS

THEAET. By Zeus, Socrates, I don't know what to say.

SOC. Then, my boy, is the argument right in rebuking us and in pointing out that we were wrong to abandon knowledge and seek first for false opinion? It is impossible to know the latter until we have adequately comprehended the nature of knowledge.

THEAET. As the case now stands, Socrates, we cannot help thinking as you say.

SOC. To begin, then, at the beginning once more, what shall we say knowledge is? For surely we are not going to give it up yet, are we?

THEAET. Not by any means, unless, that is, you give it up.

SOC. Tell us, then, what definition will make us contradict ourselves least.

THEAET. The one we tried before, Socrates; at any rate, I have nothing else to offer.

SOC. What one?

THEAET. That knowledge is true opinion; for true opinion is surely free from error and all its results are fine and good.

SOC. The man who was leading the way through the river, Theaetetus, said: "The result itself will show;" and so in this matter, if we go on with our search, perhaps the thing will turn up in our path and of itself reveal the object of our search; but if we stay still, we shall discover nothing.

THEAET. You are right; let us go on with our investigation.

1 A man who was leading the way through a river was asked if the water was deep. He replied αὐτὸ δεῖξαι, "the event itself will show" (i.e. you can find out by trying). The expression became proverbial.
PLATO

εν. Οὐκοῦν τούτο γε βραχείας σκέψεως· τέχνη γάρ σοι ὅλη σημαίνει μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτό.
θεαὶ. Πῶς δὴ; καὶ τίς αὐτή;
εν. Ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, οὓς δὴ καλοῦσιν ῥήτοράς τε καὶ δικανικούς. οὕτωι γάρ που τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνη πείθουσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται. ἢ σὺ οἴει δεινοὺς τυπῶς οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι, ὥστε οἷς B μὴ παρεγένοντο τινες ἀποστερουμένους χρήματα ἢ τὶ ἀλλο βιαζομένους, τούτοις ¹ δύνασθαι πρὸς ὑδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἰκανῶς τῶν γενομένων τῇν ἀλήθειαν;
θεαὶ. Οὐδαμῶς ἐγώγε οἴμαι, ἀλλὰ πεῖσαι μὲν.
εν. Τὸ πεῖσαι δ’ οὐχὶ δοξάζει λέγεις ποιῆσαι;
θεαὶ. Τί μὴν;
εν. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσιν δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι ² μόνον ἐστιν εἰδέναι, ἀλλως δὲ μὴ, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν C λαβόντες, ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης ἐκρίναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν;
θεαὶ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
εν. Οὐκ ἂν, ὁ φίλε, εἰ γε ταύτον ἦν δόξα τε ἀληθῆς κατὰ ³ δικαστήρια ⁴ καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὀρθὰ ποτ’ ἄν δικαστῆς ἄκρος ἐδοξάζειν ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης· νῦν δὲ ἐοικεν ἄλλο τι ἐκάτερον εἶναι.

¹ τούτοις] τούτους T.
² ἰδόντι] εἰδον τι B; εἰδότι W.
³ κατὰ Jowett; καὶ mss.; om. Heindorf.
⁴ δικαστηρία] δικαστήριον T; om. Heindorf.

220
THEAETETUS

soc. Well, then, this at least calls for slight investigation; for you have a whole profession which declares that true opinion is not knowledge.

THEAET. How so? What profession is it?

soc. The profession of those who are greatest in wisdom, who are called orators and lawyers; for they persuade men by the art which they possess, not teaching them, but making them have whatever opinion they like. Or do you think there are any teachers so clever as to be able, in the short time allowed by the water-clock,¹ satisfactorily to teach the judges the truth about what happened to people who have been robbed of their money or have suffered other acts of violence, when there were no eyewitnesses?

THEAET. I certainly do not think so; but I think they can persuade them.

soc. And persuading them is making them have an opinion, is it not?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. Then when judges are justly persuaded about matters which one can know only by having seen them and in no other way, in such a case, judging of them from hearsay, having acquired a true opinion of them, they have judged without knowledge, though they are rightly persuaded, if the judgement they have passed is correct, have they not?

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. But, my friend, if true opinion and knowledge were the same thing in law courts, the best of judges could never have true opinion without knowledge; in fact, however, it appears that the two are different.

¹ The length of speeches in the Athenian law courts was limited by a water-clock.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅ γε ἔγω, ὦ Σωκράτες, εἰπόντος του ἀκούσας ἔπελελήσμην, νῦν δ’ ἐννοῶ. ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, δ’ τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὁ μὲν μὴ ἔστι λόγος, οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὔτωσι καὶ ὄνομα-ζων, ἀ δ’ ἔχει, ἐπιστητά.

Σπ. Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις. τά δ’ ἰδί ἐπιστητὰ ταύτα καὶ μὴ πιθεὶ διήρει, λέγε, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταύτα σύ τε καγω ἀκηκόαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ’ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ ἔξευρῆσω· λέγοντος μεντ’ ἃν ἐτέρου, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀκολουθήσαιμ’ ἃν.\footnote{ἀκολουθήσαιμ’ ἃν Schanz; ἀκολούθησαιμ’ ΒΤ; ἀκολούθησαιμ al.}

39. Σπ. Ἀκουε δὴ ὁναρ ἀντὶ ὀνείρατος. ἐγὼ Ε γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐδοκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἴνωπερ εἰς τοιχεία, εἰ δὲν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τάλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἐκα- στὸν ὄνομάσαι μόνον εἰη, προσεπείη δὲ οὐδὲν ἀλλο δυνατὸν, οὐθ’ ὡς ἔστω, οὐθ’ ὡς οὐκ ἔστων. 202 ἣδη γὰρ ἃν οὐσίαν ἢ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτὸν προστίθεσθαι, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσφέρειν, εἴπηρ αὐτὸ ἑκείνω μόνον τις ἄρει. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ “αὐτὸ” οὐδὲ τὸ “ἑκεῖνο” οὐδὲ τὸ “ἑκαστὸν” οὐδὲ τὸ “μόνον” οὐδὲ “τοῦτο” προσοιστέον οὕτω ἀλλὰ πολλὰ τοιαύτα· ταύτα μὲν γὰρ περιπρέχοντα πάσι προσφέρεσθαι, ἔτερα δὲν ἑκείνων οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δὲ, εἴπηρ ὅτι δυνατὸν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ἀνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὅτι οὐ τῶν πρῶτων ἤθηναι

222
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Oh yes, I remember now, Socrates, having heard someone make the distinction, but I had forgotten it. He said that knowledge was true opinion accompanied by reason, but that unreasoning true opinion was outside of the sphere of knowledge; and matters of which there is not a rational explanation are unknowable—yes, that is what he called them—and those of which there is are knowable.

SOC. I am glad you mentioned that. But tell us how he distinguished between the knowable and the unknowable, that we may see whether the accounts that you and I have heard agree.

THEAET. But I do not know whether I can think it out; but if someone else were to make the statement of it, I think I could follow.

SOC. Listen then, while I relate it to you—"a dream for a dream." I in turn used to imagine that I heard certain persons say that the primary elements of which we and all else are composed admit of no rational explanation; for each alone by itself can only be named, and no qualification can be added, neither that it is nor that it is not, for that would at once be adding to it existence or non-existence, whereas we must add nothing to it, if we are to speak of that itself alone. Indeed, not even "itself" or "that" or "each" or "alone" or "this" or anything else of the sort, of which there are many, must be added; for these are prevalent terms which are added to all things indiscriminately and are different from the things to which they are added; but if it were possible to explain an element, and it admitted of a rational explanation of its own, it would have to be explained apart from everything else. But in fact none of the primal elements can be ex-
PLATO

Βλόγψ· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἄλλη ἢ ὅνομαξεθαι μόνον· ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν· τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἦδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὄνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα λόγον γεγο-
νέαι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου 
οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἁλογα καὶ ἀγνώστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δὲ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς 
γνωστὰς τε καὶ ῥητάς καὶ ἀληθεὶ δόξη δοξαστάς. 
ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν 
twos 
C τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ 
αὐτὸ, γυγνώσκειν δ' οὖ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον 
δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμου εἶναι 
περὶ τούτου· προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατὸν 
τε 
taútὰ 
pάντα 
γεγονέναι καὶ 
teleίως 
prὸs 
ἐπιστήμην 
έχειν. 
οὔτω 
σὺ 
to 
ἐνύπτυ 
ἡ 
ἄλλως 
ἀκήκοας;

θεαὶ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν.

επ. Ἀρέσκει οὖν σὲ καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτῃ, δόξαν 
ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι;

θεαὶ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.

D επ. Ἀρ', ὁ Θεάττητε, νῦν οὕτω τῇ 
ἡμέρᾳ εἰλήφαμεν δ' πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν 
ζητοῦντες πρὸς εὐρείων κατεγράσαν;

θεαὶ. Ἐμοί γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες, καλῶς 
λέγονται τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν.

επ. Καὶ εἰκός γε αὐτῷ τούτῳ οὕτως ἔχειν· τίς 
γὰρ ἄν καὶ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην εἰς χωρὶς τοῦ λόγου 
τε καὶ ὀρθῆς δόξης; ἐν μέντοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων 
ἀπαρέσκει.

θεαὶ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ;
THEAETETUS

pressed by reason; they can only be named, for they have only a name; but the things composed of these are themselves complex, and so their names are complex and form a rational explanation; for the combination of names is the essence of reasoning. Thus the elements are not objects of reason or of knowledge, but only of perception, whereas the combinations of them are objects of knowledge and expression and true opinion. When therefore a man acquires without reasoning the true opinion about anything, his mind has the truth about it, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a rational explanation of a thing is without knowledge of it; but when he has acquired also a rational explanation he may possibly have become all that I have said and may now be perfect in knowledge. Is that the version of the dream you have heard, or is it different?

THEAET. That was it exactly.

SOC. Are you satisfied, then, and do you state it in this way, that true opinion accompanied by reason is knowledge?

THEAET. Precisely.

SOC. Can it be, Theaetetus, that we now, in this casual manner, have found out on this day what many wise men have long been seeking and have grown grey in the search?

THEAET. I, at any rate, Socrates, think our present statement is good.

SOC. Probably this particular statement is so; for what knowledge could there still be apart from reason and right opinion? One point, however, in what has been said is unsatisfactory to me.

THEAET. What point?
PLATO

σω. "Ο καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα, ὡς τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος Εγνωστόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκοιν ὅρθως;

σω. Ἰστέον δή: ὡσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους έχομεν τοῦ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα, οἷς χρώμενος εἶπε πάντα ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποία δή;

σω. Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεία τε καὶ συλλαβάς. ἡ οἷς ἄλλος ή τούτου βλέποντα ταῦτα εἶπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἄ λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ’ εἰς ταῦτα.

203 40. σω. Βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὕτως ἡ οὖν οὕτως γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον ὅ ἡμῖν συλλαβαί λόγον ἔχομεν, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡσως.

σω. Πάνω μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοί φαίνεται. Σωκράτους γοῦν εἰ τις ἔρωτο τὴν πρῶτην συλλαβὴν οὕτως: "ὡς Θεαίτητη, λέγε τι ἐστι σω;" τι ἀποκρινεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅτι σίγμα καὶ ὅ.

σω. Οὔκοιν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγνωγε."Μὴ λέγεις μὲν, ἄν ἐπεί καὶ τὸν τοῦ σίγμα λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πώς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἑρεῖ στοιχεῖα; καὶ γὰρ δή, ὅ Σωκρατεσ, τὸ τε σίγμα τῶν ἀφώνων

226
THEAETETUS

... soc. Just that which seems to be the cleverest; the assertion that the elements are unknowable and the class of combinations is knowable.
THEAET. Is that not right?
... soc. We are sure to find out, for we have as hostages the examples which he who said all this used in his argument.
THEAET. What examples?
... soc. The elements in writing, the letters of the alphabet, and their combinations, the syllables; or do you think the author of the statements we are discussing had something else in view?
THEAET. No; those are what he had in view.
... soc. Let us, then, take them up and examine them, or rather, let us examine ourselves and see whether it was in accordance with this theory, or not, that we learned letters. First then, the syllables have a rational explanation, but the letters have not?
THEAET. I suppose so.
... soc. I think so, too, decidedly. Now if anyone should ask about the first syllable of Socrates; "Theaetetus, tell me, what is SO?" What would you reply?
THEAET. I should say "S and O."
... soc. This, then, is your explanation of the syllable?
THEAET. Yes.
... soc. Come now, in the same manner give me the explanation of the S.
THEAET. How can one give any elements of an element? For really, Socrates, the S is a voiceless

1 Στοιχεῖον and συλλαβή, originally general terms for element and combination, became the common words for letter and syllable.

227
PLATO

ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἶδον συμπτούσης τῆς γλώττης. τοῦ δ’ αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνή οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων. ὥστε πάνω εὗ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἀλογα, ὃν γε τὰ ἐναργέστατα αὐτὰ τὰ ἐπτὰ φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδ’ ὄντινοιν.

σ. Τούτι μὲν ἄρα, ὃ ἕταρε, κατωρθώκαμεν περὶ ἐπιστήμης.

ὁει. Φαινόμεθα.

C

σ. Τί δέ; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον, ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβὴν ἃρ’ ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα;

ὁει. Εἰκὸς γε.

σ. Φέρε δὴ, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγωμεν 1 τὰ ἀμφότερα στοιχεία, καὶ ἐὰν πλεῖον ἢ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἡ μίαν τινὰ ἴδεαν γεγονόταν συντεθέντων αὑτῶν;

ὁει. Τὰ ἀπαντά ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν.

σ. Ὡρα δὴ ἐπὶ δυνόν, σύγμα καὶ ὁ. ἀμφότερά ἐστιν ἡ πρώτῃ συλλαβῇ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὁνόματος. ἀλλ’ τι ὁ γιγνώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει;

D

ὁει. Τί μὴν;

σ. Τὸ σύγμα καὶ τὸ ὁ ἄρα γιγνώσκει.

ὁει. Ναι.

σ. Τί δ’; ἐκάτερον ἃρ’ ἄγνοει, καὶ οὐδέτερον οἴδως ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει;

ὁει. Ἀλλὰ δεῖνον καὶ ἀλογον, ὃ Σώκρατες.

σ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἰ γε ἀναγκὴ ἐκάτερον γιγνώσκει, ἐίππερ ἀμφότερά τις γνώσεται, προγιγνώσκειν

1 λέγωμεν B; λέγομεν T et al.
letter, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing; B again has neither voice nor noise, nor have most of the other letters; and so it is quite right to say that they have no explanation, seeing that the most distinct of them, the seven vowels, have only voice, but no explanation whatsoever.

soc. In this point, then, my friend, it would seem that we have reached a right conclusion about knowledge.

THEAET. I think we have.

soc. But have we been right in laying down the principle that whereas the letter is unknowable, yet the syllable is knowable?

THEAET. Probably.

soc. Well then, shall we say that the syllable is the two letters, or, if there be more than two, all of them, or is it a single concept that has arisen from their combination?

THEAET. I think we mean all the letters it contains.

soc. Now take the case of two, S and O. The two together are the first syllable of my name. He who knows it knows the two letters, does he not?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. He knows, that is, the S and the O.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. How is that? He is ignorant of each, and knowing neither of them he knows them both?

THEAET. That is monstrous and absurd, Socrates.

soc. And yet if a knowledge of each letter is necessary before one can know both, he who is

1 The distinction here made is that which we make between vowels and consonants. The seven Greek vowels are a, e, η, ι, o, υ, ω, called φωνήεντα.
τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντι ποτὲ
γνώσεσθαι συλλαβήν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς
λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰκήσεται.

Ε ἦει. Καὶ μάλα γε ἐξαιτήμης.

σφ. Οὐ γάρ καλῶς αὐτῶν φυλάττομεν. χρήν
γάρ ἠσχὸς τὴν συλλαβήν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα,
ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνων ἐν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν
αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον, ἐτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων.

θεαί. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ τάχα γ' ἂν μᾶλλον
οὕτως ἢ 'κείνως ἔχων.

σφ. Σκεπτέον καὶ οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀν-
ἀνδρως μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον.

θεαί. Οὐ γάρ οὖν.

204 σφ. Ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμεν, μία ἰδέα ἐξ
ἐκάστων τῶν συναρμοτότων στοιχείων γνω-
μείη ἡ συλλαβή, ὅμοιως ἐν τε γράμμασι καὶ ἐν
τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασί.

θεαί. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

σφ. Οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι.

θεαί. Τί δή.

σφ. Ὅτι οὐ ἂν ἡ μέρη, τὸ ὄλον ἀνάγκη τὰ
πάντα μέρη εἶναι. ἡ καὶ τὸ ὄλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν
λέγεις γεγονὸς ἐν τι εἶδος ἐτερον τῶν πάντων
μερῶν;

θεαί. Ἐγγει.

σφ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάν καὶ τὸ ὄλον πότερον ταύτων
Β καλεῖς ἡ ἐτερον ἐκάτερον;

θεαί. Ἐχω μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, ὅτι δὲ κελεύεις
προθῆμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυνεύων λέγω
ὅτι ἐτερον.

σφ. Ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὡς Θεαίτητε, ὁρθή· εἰ
dὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόκρισις, σκεπτέον.

230
ever to know a syllable must certainly know the letters first, and so our fine theory will have run away and vanished!

THEAE. And very suddenly, too.

SOC. Yes, for we are not watching it carefully. Perhaps we ought to have said that the syllable is not the letters, but a single concept that has arisen from them, having a single form of its own, different from the letters.

THEAE. Certainly; and perhaps that will be better than the other way.

SOC. Let us look into that; we must not give up in such unmanly fashion a great and impressive theory.

THEAE. No, we must not.

SOC. Let it be, then, as we say now, that the syllable or combination is a single form arising out of the several conjoined elements, and that it is the same in words and in all other things.

THEAE. Certainly.

SOC. Therefore there must be no parts of it.

THEAE. How so?

SOC. Because if there are parts of anything, the whole must inevitably be all the parts; or do you assert also that the whole that has arisen out of the parts is a single concept different from all the parts?

THEAE. Yes, I do.

SOC. Do you then say that all and the whole are the same, or that each of the two is different from the other?

THEAE. I am not sure; but you tell me to answer boldly, so I take the risk and say that they are different.

SOC. Your boldness, Theaetetus, is right; but whether your answer is so remains to be seen.
PLATO

οἴει. Δεῖ δὲ γε δὴ. 1

41. ση. Οὐκοῦν διαφέροι ἃν τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος;

οἴει. Ναὶ.

ση. Τί δὲ δή; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔσθε ὁ τύ διαφέρει; οἶον ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν ἐν, δύο, τρία, C τέταρτα, πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ ἐάν διὸς τρία ἡ τρις δύο ἡ τέταρτα τε καὶ δύο ἡ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἡ ἑτέρον λέγομεν;

οἴει. Το αὐτὸ.

ση. Ἀρ' ἄλλο τι ἡ ἕξ;

οἴει. Οὔδέν.

ση. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἐξ εἰρήκαμεν;

οἴει. Ναὶ.

ση. Πάλιν δ' οὐχ ἐν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες;

οἴει. Ἀνάγκη.

ση. Ἀρ' ἄλλο τι ἡ τὰ ἐξ;

οἴει. Οὔδέν.

D ση. Ταῦταν ἄρα ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἔστι, τὸ τε πᾶν προσαγωρεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἀπαντά;

οἴει. Φαίνεται.

ση. Ὡδε δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγωμεν. ὁ τοῦ πλε-θροῦν ἀριθμός καὶ τὸ πλεθρον ταῦτὸν· ἡ γάρ;

οἴει. Ναὶ.

ση. Καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὦσαύτως.

οἴει. Ναὶ.

ση. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπεδοῦ γε καὶ τὸ

1 δὲ γε δή BT; γε δὴ W.
2 πάντα τὰ BT; πάντα W.
3 πάλιν δ' οὐχ ἐν Hermann; πάλιν δ' οὔδέν BT; πᾶν δ' οὔδέν Burnet, after Campbell.

232
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Yes, certainly, we must see about that.
SOC. The whole, then, according to our present view, would differ from all?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. How about this? Is there any difference between all in the plural and all in the singular? For instance, if we say one, two, three, four, five, six, or twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we in all these forms speaking of the same or of different numbers?
THEAET. Of the same.
SOC. That is, of six?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. Then in each form of speech we have spoken of all the six?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. And again do we not speak of one thing when we speak of them all?
THEAET. Assuredly.
SOC. That is, of six?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. Then in all things that are made up of number, we apply the same term to all in the plural and all in the singular?
THEAET. Apparently.
SOC. Here is another way of approaching the matter. The number of the fathom and the fathom are the same, are they not?
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. And of the furlong likewise.
THEAET. Yes.
SOC. And the number of the army is the same.
PLATO

στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως; ὁ γὰρ ἄριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ὅν πᾶν ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν ἔστιν.

θεαί. Ναί.

σὺ. 'Ο δὲ ἐκαστῶν ἄριθμὸς μᾶλλον τῇ ἕμερᾷ ἐστίν;

θεαί. Οὐδέν.

σὺ. 'Οσα άρα ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἃν εἰη; θεαί. Φαίνεται.

σὺ. Τὰ δὲ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὁμολόγηται,1 εἰπὲρ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἄριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἐσται.

θεαί. Οὔτως.

σὺ. Τὸ ὅλον ἀρ' οὐκ ἐστιν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἃν εἰη τὰ πάντα ὅν μέρη.

θεαί. Οὔκ ἔοικεν.

σὺ. Μέρος δ' ἔσθ' ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστίν ὑπὲρ ἐστίν ἕ τοῦ ὅλου;

θεαί. Τοῦ παντὸς γε.

205 σὺ. Ἀνδρικῶς γε, ὧδε θεάτητε, μάχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὤταν μηδὲν ἀπῆ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστιν;

θεαί. Ἀνάγκη.

σὺ. Ὁλον δὲ οὗ ταῦτον τοῦτο ἔσται, οὗ ἃν μηδὲν ἀποστατῆ, οὗ δ' ἃν ἀποστατῆ, οὕτε ὅλον οὕτε πᾶν, ᾧ ἅμα γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτό;

θεαί. Δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδέν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον.

σὺ. Οὔκοιν ἔλεγομεν ὡς τοῦ ἃν μέρη ἥ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται;

θεαί. Πάνυ γε.

1 ὁμολόγηται Τ; ὁμολογεῖται Β.
THEAETETUS

as the army, and all such cases are alike? In each of them all the number is all the thing.

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. And is the number of each anything but the parts of each?

THEAET. No.

SOC. Everything that has parts, accordingly, consists of parts, does it not?

THEAET. Evidently.

SOC. But we are agreed that the all must be all the parts if all the number is to be the all. ¹

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. Then the whole does not consist of parts, for if it consisted of all the parts it would be the all.

THEAET. That seems to be true.

SOC. But is a part a part of anything in the world but the whole?

THEAET. Yes, of the all.

SOC. You are putting up a brave fight, Theaetetus. But is not the all precisely that of which nothing is wanting?

THEAET. Necessarily.

SOC. And is not just this same thing, from which nothing whatsoever is lacking, a whole? For that from which anything is lacking is neither a whole nor all, which have become identical simultaneously and for the same reason.

THEAET. I think now that there is no difference between all and whole.

SOC. We were saying, were we not, that if there are parts of anything, the whole and all of it will be all the parts?

THEAET. Certainly.

¹ Cf. 204 b.

235
ΠΛΑΤΟ

σημ. Πάλων δή, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἰπέρ ἡ συλλαβή μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἔστω, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆν B μὴ ὡς μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἡ ταῦτον οὐσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνους γνωστὴν εἶναι;

τεῖα. Οὕτως.

σημ. Οὕκοιν τούτο ὅποι μὴ γένηται, ἔτερον αὐτῶν αὐτῆν ἐθέμεθα;

τεῖα. Ναὶ.

σημ. Τί δ'; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἕστω, ἔχεις ἀλλ' ἀττα εἰπέιν ἃ μέρη μὲν ἐστὶ συλλαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεῖα γ' ἐκείνης;

τεῖα. Οὐδαμῶς. εἰ γάρ, ὡς Σώκρατες, μόρι ἀττα αὐτῆς ¹ συγχρονίην, γελούσον ποὺ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ' ἄλλα ἰέναι.

τοῦ σημ. Παντάπασι δ', ὡς Θεαίτητε, κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τὶς ἱδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβῆ ἀν εἴη.

τεῖα. Ἡ ἕκειν.

σημ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὡς φίλε, ὅτι ὅλον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν πρῶτων οὐκ εἰδότα λόγος ἐξ ὧν τὰλλα συγκεῖται, διότι αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ ἐκαστον εἰδὸς σύνθετον, καὶ οὔδε τὸ "εἰναι" περὶ αὐτοῦ ὁρθῶς ἔχοι προσφέ- ροντα εἰπέιν, οὔδε "τοῦτο," ὅσ ἔτερα καὶ ἄλλοτρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὐτὴ δὴ ἡ αὐτία ἁλογόν τε καὶ ἀγνωστον αὐτῷ ποιοὶ;

τεῖα. Μέμνησαι.

τοῦ σημ. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλη τὶς ἡ αὐτὴ ἡ αὐτία τοῦ μονο- ειδές τε ² καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτῷ εἶναι; ἔγω μὲν γὰρ οὖξ ὀρθῶ ἄλλην.

¹ μόρι 'ἀττα αὐτῆς W; μόρια ταύτης BT.
² τε W in ras. B; τι T.

236
THEAETETUS

soc. Once more, then, as I was trying to say just now, if the syllable is not the letters, does it not follow necessarily that it contains the letters, not as parts of it, or else that being the same as the letters, it is equally knowable with them?

theaet. It does.

soc. And it was in order to avoid this that we assumed that it was different from them?

theaet. Yes.

soc. Well then, if the letters are not parts of the syllable, can you mention any other things which are parts of it, but are not the letters\(^1\) of it?

theaet. Certainly not. For if I grant that there are parts of the syllable, it would be ridiculous to give up the letters and look for other things as parts.

soc. Without question, then, Theaetetus, the syllable would be, according to our present view, some indivisible concept.

theaet. I agree.

soc. Do you remember, then, my friend, that we admitted a little while ago, on what we considered good grounds, that there can be no rational explanation of the primary elements of which other things are composed, because each of them, when taken by itself, is not composite, and we could not properly apply to such an element even the expression "be" or "this," because these terms are different and alien, and for this reason it is irrational and unknowable?

theaet. I remember.

soc. And, is not this the sole reason why it is single in form and indivisible? I can see no other.

\(^{1}\) The reader is reminded that the words \(\sigma\tau\omicron\chi\epsilon\omicron\omicron\nu\) and \(\sigma\upsilon\lambda\alpha\beta\acute{\upsilon}\) have the meanings "element" and "combination" as well as "letter" and "syllable.”
PLATO

θεαί. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται.

ΣΠ. Οὔκοιν εἰς ταύτον ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβή εἶδος ἐκείνω, εἶπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα;

θεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΠ. Εἰ μὲν ἀρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβή ἐστιν καὶ ὅλον τι, μέρη δ' αὐτῆς ταύτα, ὁμοίως αἱ τε συλλαβαὶ γνωσταί καὶ ῥηταί καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπειπέρ τὰ πάντα μέρη τῷ ὀλῷ ταύτῳ ἐφάνη.

Ε ἦθεα. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΠ. Εἰ δὲ γε ἐν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὁμοίως μὲν συλλαβή, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχεῖον ἁλογόν τε καὶ ἀγνωστον ἡ γὰρ αὐτή αἰτία ποιήσει αὑτὰ τοιαύτα.

θεαί. Όυκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν.

ΣΠ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀρα μὴ ἀποδεχόμεθα, δὲ ἂν λέγῃ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ ῥητον, στοιχεῖον δὲ τοιναντίον.

θεαί. Μὴ γὰρ, εἴπερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα.

ΣΠ. Τί δ' αὖ; τοιναντίον λέγοντος ἀρ' οὐ μᾶλλον ἂν ἀποδέξαυο ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς σύνοισθα σαντῷ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει;

θεαί. Τὸ ποῦν;

ΣΠ. Ὅς οὔδεν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας ἡ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τε τῇ ὃμει διαγιγνώσκειν πειρώμενος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτὸ ἔκαστον, ἢν μὴ ἡ θέσεις σε ταράττοι λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων.

θεαί. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΠ. Ἐν δὲ κιθάριστοι τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μῶν Β' ἄλλο τι ἢν ἢ τὸ τῷ φθόγγῳ ἐκάστω δύνασθαι

1 γνωστὸν W; ἀγνωστὸν pr. BT.
2 τε W; om. BT.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. There is no other to be seen.

SOC. Then the syllable falls into the same class with the letter, if it has no parts and is a single form?

THEAET. Yes, unquestionably.

SOC. If, then, the syllable is a plurality of letters and is a whole of which the letters are parts, the syllables and the letters are equally knowable and expressible, if all the parts were found to be the same as the whole.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. But if one and indivisible, then syllable and likewise letter are equally irrational and unknowable; for the same cause will make them so.

THEAET. I cannot dispute it.

SOC. Then we must not accept the statement of any one who says that the syllable is knowable and expressible, but the letter is not.

THEAET. No, not if we are convinced by our argument.

SOC. But would you not rather accept the opposite belief, judging by your own experience when you were learning to read?

THEAET. What experience?

SOC. In learning, you were merely constantly trying to distinguish between the letters both by sight and by hearing, keeping each of them distinct from the rest, that you might not be disturbed by their sequence when they were spoken or written.

THEAET. That is very true.

SOC. And in the music school was not perfect attainment the ability to follow each note and tell

239
επακολουθεῖν, ποίας χρόνης εἶ; ἀ δὴ στοιχεῖα 
πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογήσεις μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι;
θεαί. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

σπ. Ὡν μὲν ἄρ' αυτοὶ ἐμπειροὶ ἐσμὲν στοιχείων 
καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἶ δὲ ἀπὸ τοὺτων τεκμαίρεσθαι 
καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος 
éναργεστέραν τε τὴν γνώσιν ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ 
kυριωτέραν τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως 
ἐκαστὸν μάθημα, καὶ εάν τις φη συλλαβῆς μὲν 
gνωστόν, ἀγνωστόν δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχείον, ἐκόντα 
ἡ ἀκοντα παίζειν ἁγισμέθ' αὐτὸν.

θεαί. Κομίδη μὲν οὖν.

C 42. σπ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτου μὲν ἐτί κἂν ἄλλα 
φανεῖν ἀποδείξεως, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ προκεί-
μενον μὴ ἐπιλαθώμεθα δι' αὐτά ἰδεῖν, ὦ τι δὴ ποτὲ 
καὶ λέγεται τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοὺς λόγους προσ-
γενόμενον τὴν τελεωτήτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.

θεαί. Οὐκοῦν χρή ὅραν.

σπ. Φέρε δή, τί ποτε βουλεταί τὸν λόγον ἡμὶ 
σημαίνει; τριῶν γὰρ εἶν τί μοι δοκεὶ λέγειν.

θεαί. Τίνων δὴ;

D σπ. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰδὴν ἂν τὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ διά-
νοιαν ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ρημάτων 
καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὡσπερ εἰς κάτωτρον ἡ ὑδωρ τὴν 
δόξαν ἐκτυποῦμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος 
ῥοὴν. ἡ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἰναι;

θεαί. Ἐμοιγε. τῶν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν 
φαμέν.

σπ. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θάττον 
ἡ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδεῖξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἐκάστου

1 γοῦν W; οὖν BT.

240
THEAETETUS

which string produced it; and everyone would agree that the notes are the elements of music?

THEAET. Yes, that is all true.

SOC. Then if we are to argue from the elements and combinations in which we ourselves have experience to other things in general, we shall say that the elements as a class admit of a much clearer knowledge than the compounds and of a knowledge that is much more important for the complete attainment of each branch of learning, and if anyone says that the compound is by its nature knowable and the element unknowable, we shall consider that he is, intentionally or unintentionally, joking.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. Still other proofs of this might be brought out, I think; but let us not on that account lose sight of the question before us, which is: What is meant by the doctrine that the most perfect knowledge arises from the addition of rational explanation to true opinion?

THEAET. No, we must not.

SOC. Now what are we intended to understand by "rational explanation"? I think it means one of three things.

THEAET. What are they?

SOC. The first would be making one's own thought clear through speech by means of verbs and nouns, imaging the opinion in the stream that flows through the lips, as in a mirror or water. Do you not think the rational explanation is something of that sort?

THEAET. Yes, I do. At any rate, we say that he who does that speaks or explains.

SOC. Well, that is a thing that anyone can do sooner or later; he can show what he thinks about
PLATO

αὐτῷ, ὁ μὴ ἐνεὼς ἢ κωφὸς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς: καὶ οὐτως
Ε ὤσι τι ὅρθων δοξάζουσι, πάντες αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου
φανοῦνται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοὶ ἐτὶ ὅρθη δόξα
χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης γενήσεται.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Μή τοίνυν ῥᾳδίως καταγγε Cherokee τὸ
μηδὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὅ
νῦν σκοτοῦμεν. Ἰσως γὰρ ὁ λέγων ὁ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν,
ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τὶ ἐκαστὸν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν
207 ἀπόκρυσιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἑρω-
μένῳ.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ὁ λον τὸ λέγεις, ὡ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὁ λον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἀμάξης λέγει τὸ
"ἐκαστὸν δὲ τε δούραθ' ἀμάξης." ὁ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ
ἂν δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἴμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σὺ. ἀλλ' ἂγα-
πώμεν ἂν ἐρωτηθέντες ὅ τι ἐστὶν ἀμάξα, εἰ ἔχουμεν
εἰπεῖν τροχοὶ, ἄξων, ὑπερτερία, ἀντυγες, ζυγὸν.

ΤΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. 'Ο δὲ γε ἢσως οἰου' ἂν ἑμᾶς, ὅσπερ ἂν τὸ
σὸν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ
Β οὐλαβῆν, γελοίους εἶναι, ὅρθως μὲν δοξάζοντας
καὶ λέγοντας ὅ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικοὺς
εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν
τοῦ Θεατήτου ὁνόματος λόγον. τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι
ἐπιστήμοινος οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὶν ἂν διὰ τῶν στοι-
χείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἐκαστὸν περαίνῃ
τίς, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε ποῦ ἑρρῆθη.

1 ὑπερτερία Kuhn; ὑπερτερία B; ὑπερτήμα T.
242
THEAETETUS

anything, unless he is deaf or dumb from the first; and so all who have any right opinion will be found to have it with the addition of rational explanation, and there will henceforth be no possibility of right opinion apart from knowledge.

THEAET. True.

SOC. Let us not, therefore, carelessly accuse him of talking nonsense who gave the definition of knowledge which we are now considering; for perhaps that is not what he meant. He may have meant that each person if asked about anything must be able in reply to give his questioner an account of it in terms of its elements.

THEAET. As for example, Socrates?

SOC. As, for example, Hesiod, speaking of a wagon, says, "a hundred pieces of wood in a wagon." Now I could not name the pieces, nor, I fancy, could you; but if we were asked what a wagon is, we should be satisfied if we could say "wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke."

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. But he, perhaps, would think we were ridiculous, just as he would if, on being asked about your name, we should reply by telling the syllables, holding a right opinion and expressing correctly what we have to say, but should think we were grammarians and as such both possessed and were expressing as grammarians would the rational explanation of the name Theaetetus. He would say that it is impossible for anyone to give a rational explanation of anything with knowledge, until he gives a complete enumeration of the elements, combined with true opinion. That, I believe, is what was said before.

1 *Works and Days*, 456 (454).
PLATO

raphics γάρ.

ὦν ὅρθὴν ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἐκατόν ἐκεῖνων
C δυνάμενον διελθεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν οὔσιαν, προσλα-
βόντα τούτο, λόγον τε προσευληφέναι τῇ ἀληθεί
🐎 γι καὶ ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικῶν τε καὶ ἑπιστή-
μονα περὶ ἀμάξης οὔσιας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων
τὸ ὀλον περάναντα.

ὦς. Ὅνικοιν εὖ δοκεῖ σοι, Ὡ Σωκράτες;

ὦς. Εἰ σοι, Ὡ ἔταίρη, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχει τὴν
διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἐκάστου λόγου εἰναι,
τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβᾶς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ἐτὶ
D ἀλογίαν, τοῦτο μοι λέγε, ἵνα αὐτὸ ἐπισκοπῶμεν.

ὦς. Ἀλλὰ τάνυ ἀποδέχομαι.

ὦς. Πότερον ἠγούμενος ἑπιστήμων εἰναι ὄντω-
νοιν ὅτουν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ ¹ μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ
δοκῇ αὐτῷ εἰναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἔτερου, ἢ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ
αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἔτερου, τοτὲ δὲ ἔτερου δοξάζῃ;

ὦς. Μᾶ Δί; οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ὦς. Εἰτὰ ἁμημονεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων
μαθῆσει καὶ ἀρχαὶ σαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
δρώντας αὐτά;

ὦς. Ἀρὰ λέγεις τῆς αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν
Ε ἔτερου, τοτὲ δὲ ἔτερου ἠγούμενος γράμμα, καὶ
τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ
εἰς ἄλλην τιθέντας συλλαβῆς;

ὦς. Ταῦτα λέγω.

ὦς. Μᾶ Δί; οὐ τῶν ἁμημονῶ, οὐδὲ γε
τοι ἠγούμαι ἐπίστασθαι τῶν ὀντῶς ἔχοντας.

¹ τοτὲ] τότε W; ὅτε BT.

244
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Yes, it was.

SOC. So, too, he would say that we have right opinion about a wagon, but that he who can give an account of its essential nature in terms of those one hundred parts has by this addition added rational explanation to true opinion and has acquired technical knowledge of the essential nature of a wagon, in place of mere opinion, by describing the whole in terms of its elements.

THEAET. Do you agree to that, Socrates?

SOC. If you, my friend, agree to it and accept the view that orderly description in terms of its elements is a rational account of anything, but that description in terms of syllables or still larger units is irrational, tell me so, that we may examine the question.

THEAET. Certainly I accept it.

SOC. Do you accept it in the belief that anyone has knowledge of anything when he thinks that the same element is a part sometimes of one thing and sometimes of another or when he is of opinion that the same thing has as a part of it sometimes one thing and sometimes another?

THEAET. Not at all, by Zeus.

SOC. Then do you forget that when you began to learn to read you and the others did just that?

THEAET. Do you mean when we thought that sometimes one letter and sometimes another belonged to the same syllable, and when we put the same letter sometimes into the proper syllable and sometimes into another?

SOC. That is what I mean.

THEAET. By Zeus, I do not forget, nor do I think that those have knowledge who are in that condition.

VOL. II R 245
PLATO

σο. Τί οὖν; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καυρῷ "Θεαίτητον" γράφων τις θήτα καὶ εἰ οὖνται 1 τε δεῖν 208 γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, καὶ αὕ "Θεόδωρον" ἐπιχείρῶν γράφειν ταύτα καὶ εἰ οὖνται 1 τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, ἄρ' ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν αὐτὸν τὴν πρῶτην τῶν ὑμετέρων ὄνοματων συλλαβήν;

θεαί. 'Αλλ' ἅρτι ὠμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὖτως ἔχοντα μήπω εἰδέναι.

σο. Καλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλλαβήν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὖτως ἔχειν τὸν αὐτὸν;

θεαί. Οὐδέν γε.

σο. 'Αρ' οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἔχων γράψει "Θεαίτητον" μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν ἔξης γράφῃ;

θεαί. Δήλον δὴ.

Β σο. Οὐκοῦν ἐτί ἀνεπιστήμων ἄν, ὀρθὰ δὲ δοξάζων, ὡς φαμεν;

θεαί. Ναι.

σο. Λόγον γε ἔχων μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης· τὴν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχων ἐγραφεῖν, ἡν δὴ λόγον ὠμολογήσαμεν.

θεαί. 'Αληθῆ.

σο. 'Εστιν ἄρα, ὡ ἑταῖρε, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθῆ δόξα, ἡν οὖπω δεῖ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν.

θεαί. Κινδυνεύει.

43. σο. 'Οναρ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπλουτίσαμεν οὐσίεντες ἔχειν τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον.

ἡ μήπω κατηγορῶμεν; ἢ τώς γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο τις

1 οὖνταί] οἴεται ΒΤ.
THEAETETUS

soc. Take an example: When at such a stage in his progress a person in writing "Theaetetus" thinks he ought to write, and actually does write, TH and E, and again in trying to write "Theodorus" thinks he ought to write, and does write, T and E, shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names?

THEAET. No, we just now agreed that a person in such a condition has not yet gained knowledge.

soc. Then there is nothing to prevent the same person from being in that condition with respect to the second and third and fourth syllables?

THEAET. No, nothing.

soc. Then, in that case, he has in mind the orderly description in terms of letters, and will write "Theaetetus" with right opinion, when he writes the letters in order?

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. But he is still, as we say, without knowledge, though he has right opinion?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Yes, but with his opinion he has rational explanation; for he wrote with the method in terms of letters in his mind, and we agreed that that was rational explanation.

THEAET. True.

soc. There is, then, my friend, a combination of right opinion with rational explanation, which cannot as yet properly be called knowledge?

THEAET. There is not much doubt about it.

soc. So it seems that the perfectly true definition of knowledge, which we thought we had, was but a golden dream. Or shall we wait a bit before we condemn it? Perhaps the definition to be adopted
PLATO

Ως οὖν ἔρειται, ἄλλα τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος τῶν τριῶν, ὡς ἐν γέ τι ἐφαμεν λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὀριζόμενον δόξαν εἶναι ὀρθὴν μετὰ λόγου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡρθῶς ὑπέμνησας· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν λοιπὸν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ ὡσπερ εἰδώλων, τὸ δ’ ἄρτι λεχθὲν ἀπὰ στοιχείον ὅδος ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον τί λέγεις;

ἈΝ. "Οπερ ἄν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἴπειν ὁ τῶν ἀπαντῶν διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶλον τίνα τίνος ἔχεις μοι λόγον εἴπειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶλον, εἰ βούλει, ἥλιον πέρι ἴκανον ὃμαι σοι ἐναι ἀποδεξασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατον ἔστι τῶν κατὰ τὸν ὄφραν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως μὲν οὖν.

ἈΝ. Λαβὲ δὴ οὐ χάριν εἴρηται. ἔστι δὲ ὁπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἀρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἐκάστου ἄν λαμβάνῃς ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὡς φασί τινες, λήψει· ἔως δ’ ἂν κοινῷ τίνος ἐφάπτῃ, ἐκείνων πέρι σοι ἐσται ὁ λόγος ὃν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ἢ. ΕΘΕΑΙ. Μανθάνω· καὶ μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν λόγον τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν.

ἈΝ. "Ως δ’ ἂν μετ’ ὀρθῆς δόξης περὶ ὀποιοῦ τῶν ὄντων τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ,
THEAETETUS

is not this, but the remaining one of the three possibilities one of which we said must be affirmed by anyone who asserts that knowledge is right opinion combined with rational explanation.

THEAET. I am glad you called that to mind. For there is still one left. The first was a kind of vocal image of the thought, the second the orderly approach to the whole through the elements, which we have just been discussing, and what is the third?

SOC. It is just the definition which most people would give, that knowledge is the ability to tell some characteristic by which the object in question differs from all others.

THEAET. As an example of the method, what explanation can you give me, and of what thing?

SOC. As an example, if you like, take the sun: I think it is enough for you to be told that it is the brightest of the heavenly bodies that revolve about the earth.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. Understand why I say this. It is because, as we were just saying, if you get hold of the distinguishing characteristic by which a given thing differs from the rest, you will, as some say, get hold of the definition or explanation of it; but so long as you cling to some common quality, your explanation will pertain to all those objects to which the common quality belongs.

THEAET. I understand; and it seems to me that it is quite right to call that kind a rational explanation or definition.

SOC. Then he who possesses right opinion about anything and adds thereto a comprehension of the difference which distinguishes it from other things
PLATO

αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων γεγονός ἔσται, οὐ πρῶτον ἢν
dοξαστήσῃ.

ἡει. Φαμέν γε μὴν οὔτω.

ἐπ. Νῦν δῆτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἐγώγε,1
ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὀσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ
λεγομένου, ἐξυνίμη οὐδὲ συμκρόν. ἔως δὲ ἀφεστήκη
πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνετο τί μοι λέγεσθαι.

ἡει. Πῶς τί τοῦτο;

209 ἐπ. Φράσω, εὰν οἶδος τε γένωμαι. ὁρθὴν
ἐγώγε 2 ἐχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, εὰν μὲν προσλάβω
τόν σοῦ λόγον, γιγνώσκω δὴ σε, εἰ δὲ μὴ, δοξάζω
μόνον.

ἡει. Ναί.

ἐπ. Δόγμου δὲ γε ἢν ἢ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος
ἐρμηνεία.

ἡει. Οὔτως.

ἐπ. Ἦνικ' οὖν ἑδόξαζον μόνον, ἄλλο τι ὧ τῶν
ἀλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενός ἤπτομην τῇ
diανοια;

ἡει. Οὐκ ἔσκεν.

ἐπ. Τῶν κοινῶν τι ἁρα διενοούμην, δὲν οὐδὲν
οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ τις ἀλλος ἔχει.

Β ἡει. Ἀνάγκη.

ἐπ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διώς· πῶς ποτὲ ἐν τῷ
tουτῶν σε μᾶλλον ἑδόξαζον ἢ ἄλλον ὀντωνίον;
θες γὰρ μὲ διανοούμενον ὡς ἔστιν οὕτος Θεαίτητος,
ὅσ ἂν ἢ τε ἀνθρωπος καὶ ἔχη ρῖνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοῦς
καὶ στόμα καὶ οὔτω δὴ ἐν ἐκαστον τῶν μελῶν.
αὕτη οὖν ἢ διάνοια ἐσθ' ὦ τι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με

1 παντάπασιν ἐγώγε W; παντάπασι γε ἐγώ Τ.
2 ἐγώγε W; ἐγώ Τ.
THEAETETUS

will have acquired knowledge of that thing of which he previously had only opinion.

THEAET. That is what we affirm.

SOC. Theaetetus, now that I have come closer to our statement, I do not understand it at all. It is like coming close to a scene-painting. While I stood off at a distance, I thought there was something in it.

THEAET. What do you mean?

SOC. I will tell you if I can. Assume that I have right opinion about you; if I add the explanation or definition of you, then I have knowledge of you, otherwise I have merely opinion.

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. But explanation was, we agreed, the interpretation of your difference.

THEAET. It was.

SOC. Then so long as I had merely opinion, I did not grasp in my thought any of the points in which you differ from others?

THEAET. Apparently not.

SOC. Therefore I was thinking of some one of the common traits which you possess no more than other men.

THEAET. You must have been.

SOC. For heaven’s sake! How in the world could I in that case have any opinion about you more than about anyone else? Suppose that I thought “That is Theaetetus which is a man and has nose and eyes and mouth” and so forth, mentioning all the parts. Can this thought make me think of Theaetetus any

1 In which perspective is the main thing.

251
καὶ τῶν λεγομένων Μυσών τῶν ἔσχατον;

συ. 'Αλλ' εἶν δὴ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἐχοντα βίνα καὶ

C ὀφθαλμοὺς διανοηθῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν σμόν τε καὶ

ἐξόφθαλμον, μή τι σὲ αὐ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἢ ἐμαυτὸν

ἡ δοσι τουσύτοι;

συ. Οὐδέν.

συ. 'Αλλ' οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἴμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν

ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἃν ἡ σωμότης αὕτη τῶν

ἀλλων συμπτήτων ὅν ἐγώ ἐῷρακε διάφορόν τι

μημείον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνοπημαμένη κατάθηται, καὶ

τάλλα οὕτω εἴς ὃν εἰ σύ· ἡ ἐμὲ,¹ καὶ ἐὰν αὐριον

ἀπαντήσω, ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὅρθα δοξάζων

περὶ σοῦ.

συ. Ἀληθέστατα.

D συ. Περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὁρθὴ

dόξα ἂν εἴη ἐκάστου περὶ.

συ. Φαίνεται γε.

συ. Τὸ οὐν προσλαβεῖν λόγον τῇ ὁρθῇ δόξῃ τὶ

ἀν ἐτι εἴη; εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ἢ διαφέρει

ti tων ἄλλων, πάνυ γελοία γίγνεται ἢ ἐπίταξις.

συ. Πῶς;

συ. Ὡν ὁρθὴν δόξαν ἔχουμεν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων δια-

φέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει ἡμᾶς ὁρθὴν
dόξαν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὕτως ἡ μὲν

¹ ei σύ· ἡ ἐμὲ Wohlrab; ei οὗ· ἡ με W (but ἡ added later);

ei σύ ἐμὲ B; elσει ἐμὲ T.

252
THEAETETUS

more than of Theodorus or of the meanest of the Mysians,¹ as the saying is?

THEAET. Of course not.

SOC. But if I think not only of a man with nose and eyes, but of one with snub nose and protruding eyes, shall I then have an opinion of you any more than of myself and all others like me?

THEAET. Not at all.

SOC. No; I fancy Theaetetus will not be the object of opinion in me until this snubnosedness of yours has stamped and deposited in my mind a memorial different from those of the other examples of snubnosedness that I have seen, and the other traits that make up your personality have done the like. Then that memorial, if I meet you again tomorrow, will awaken my memory and make me have right opinion about you.

THEAET. Very true.

SOC. Then right opinion also would have to do with differences in any given instance?

THEAET. At any rate, it seems so.

SOC. Then what becomes of the addition of reason or explanation to right opinion? For if it is defined as the addition of an opinion of the way in which a given thing differs from the rest, it is an utterly absurd injunction.

THEAET. How so?

SOC. When we have a right opinion of the way in which certain things differ from other things, we are told to acquire a right opinion of the way in which those same things differ from other things! On this

¹ The Mysians were despised as especially effeminate and worthless.
PLATO

σκυτάλης ἢ ὑπέρου ἢ ὤτου δὴ λέγεται περιτροπὴ. Εἰ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι, τυφλοῦ δὲ παρακέλευσις ἂν καλοῖτο δικαίοτερον. τὸ γὰρ, ἃ ἔχωμεν, ταύτα προσλαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἵνα μάθωμεν ἃ δοξᾶζομεν, πάνω γενναίως ἐσικεὶν ἐσκοτωμένων.

theid. Εἴπε δὴ τι νῦν δὴ ὡς ἔρων ἐπιθυόν;

ε. Εἰ τὸ λόγον, ὥ παί, προσλαβεῖν γνώναι κελεύει, ἄλλα μὴ δοξᾶσαι τὴν διαφορότητα, ἢ δὲ χρῆμα ἂν εἴη τοῦ καλλίστον τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγου. τὸ γὰρ γνώναι ἐπιστήμην ποι λαβεῖν 210 ἐστιν ἢ γὰρ;

theid. Ναί.

ε. Οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθεῖς, ὡς ἐοικε, τι ἐστιν ἐπιστήμην, ἀποκρινεῖται ὅτι δόξα ὅρθη μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. λόγου, γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη κατ' ἐκεῖνον.

theid. Ἡ οἰκείν.

ε. Καὶ παντάπασι γε εὐθές, ξητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὅρθην εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης εἰτε διαφορότητος εἰτε ὄτουοιν. οὔτε ἄρα αἰσθήσις, ὁ Θεάσθη, οὔτε δόξα ἄληθής οὔτε μετ' Β ἀληθοῦς δόξης λόγος προσγεγρόμενος ἐπιστήμην ἂν εἴη.

theid. Οὐκ ἐοικεῖν.

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1 εἰπὲ δὴ Τ (and W in marg.) ; εἰ γε δὴ Β ; εἰ γε δὴ Β²W.

254
THEAETETUS

plan the twirling of a scytale\(^1\) or a pestle or anything of the sort would be as nothing compared with this injunction. It might more justly be called a blind man's giving directions; for to command us to acquire that which we already have, in order to learn that of which we already have opinion, is very like a man whose sight is mightily darkened.

THEAET. Tell me now, what did you intend to say when you asked the question a while ago?

SOC. If, my boy, the command to add reason or explanation means learning to know and not merely getting an opinion about the difference, our splendid definition of knowledge would be a fine affair! For learning to know is acquiring knowledge, is it not?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. Then, it seems, if asked, "What is knowledge?" our leader will reply that it is right opinion with the addition of a knowledge of difference; for that would, according to him, be the addition of reason or explanation.

THEAET. So it seems.

SOC. And it is utterly silly, when we are looking for a definition of knowledge, to say that it is right opinion with knowledge, whether of difference or of anything else whatsoever. So neither perception, Theaetetus, nor true opinion, nor reason or explanation combined with true opinion could be knowledge.

THEAET. Apparently not.

\(^1\) A σκυτάλη was a staff, especially a staff about which a strip of leather was rolled, on which dispatches were so written that when unrolled they were illegible until rolled again upon another staff of the same size and shape.
PLATO

Ζω. Ἡ οὖν ἔτι κυνοῦμεν τι καὶ ὄδύνομεν, ὦ φίλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἡ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν;

Θεαί. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δῖ ἔγυγγε πλεῖω ὡ ὂσα εἶχον ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σὲ εἰρήκα.

ζω. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἡ μαυευτικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη ἀνεμαία φησι γεγενήθηκαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τροφῆς;

Θεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

44. Ζω. Ἐὰν τοῖνυν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπιχειρήσει γίγνεσθαι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἶντε C γίγνη, δειλινών έσει πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἔξετασιν, εἶντε κενὸς ἂς, ἢττον έσει βαρὺς τοῖς συνοδοί καὶ ἁμερωτερος, σωφρόνως οὐκ οἱόμενοι εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ οἶσθαι. τοσοῦτον γὰρ μόνον ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὔθε τι οίδα ὡς οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄνδρες εἰσὶ τε καὶ γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ μακείαν ταύτην ἔγει τε καὶ ἡ μητήρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἡ μὲν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν νέων τε καὶ γενναίων καὶ ὅσοι καλοί.

D Νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, ἢν μὲ γέγραπται· ἐσθεν δὲ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, δεύρο πάλιν ἀπαντῶμεν.
THEAETETUS

soc. Are we then, my friend, still pregnant and in travail with knowledge, or have we brought forth everything?

THEAET. Yes, we have, and, by Zeus, Socrates, with your help I have already said more than there was in me.

soc. Then does our art of midwifery declare to us that all the offspring that have been born are mere wind-eggs and not worth rearing?

THEAET. It does, decidedly.

soc. If after this you ever undertake to conceive other thoughts, Theaetetus, and do conceive, you will be pregnant with better thoughts than these by reason of the present search, and if you remain barren, you will be less harsh and gentler to your associates, for you will have the wisdom not to think you know that which you do not know. So much and no more my art can accomplish; nor do I know aught of the things that are known by others, the great and wonderful men who are to-day and have been in the past. This art, however, both my mother and I received from God, she for women and I for young and noble men and for all who are fair.

And now I must go to the Porch of the King, to answer to the suit which Meletus has brought against me. But in the morning, Theodorus, let us meet here again.

1 Meletus was one of those who brought the suit which led to the condemnation and death of Socrates.
THE SOPHIST
INTRODUCTION TO THE SOPHIST

In The Sophist Theodorus and Theaetetus meet Socrates in accordance with the agreement made in the final paragraph of the Theaetetus. They bring with them an Eleatic Stranger, who presently agrees to undertake, with the aid of Theaetetus, the definition of the Philosopher, the Statesman, and the Sophist. Thereupon, after selecting the Sophist as the first of the three to be defined, he proceeds to illustrate his method by defining the angler, on the ground that the Sophist is a difficult subject and that practice on an easier and slighter matter is desirable. The method employed in defining first the angler and then the Sophist is that of comparison and division successively into two parts. This method was probably, at the time when this dialogue was written, something of a novelty, and is employed also in The Statesman, which is closely connected with The Sophist both in form and substance. It must be admitted that the process of dichotomy becomes very tedious, which may possibly be one of Plato's reasons for making the Stranger, not Socrates, the chief speaker in these two dialogues. The definition of the Sophist—the avowed purpose of the dialogue—is
INTRODUCTION TO THE SOPHIST

carried on in a satirical and polemic spirit which is abundantly evident even when it is no longer possible to name the particular persons against whom the attack is directed.

But all this occupies only the opening and concluding passages. It is interrupted by what is in form a long digression, but is really the most serious and important part of the whole. In this (236 d—264 b) the method of dichotomy is given up and abstract questions are treated in a quite different manner. The Sophist has been found to be a juggler and deceiver, and the question arises whether deception or falsehood does not involve the assumption of Not-Being, which was persistently opposed by Parmenides and the Eleatic philosophers in general. Plato refutes the doctrine that Not-Being cannot exist by showing that it has a relative existence—that in each particular instance it denotes a difference or condition of being other than that in connexion with which it is said to exist. It is not mere negation—the opposite of Being—but becomes the positive notion of Difference. This is the most important doctrine promulgated in this dialogue.

Hereupon follows the discussion of the nature of Being, and the conclusion is reached that everything which possesses any power, either to produce a change or to be affected by a cause, has existence (247 d), i.e., that power—whether active or passive—is Being.

The problem of predication—of the possibility of assertion—is solved by making the distinction between verbs and nouns and defining the sentence as a combination of those two. If that combination corresponds to reality, the assertion is true, if not, it
INTRODUCTION TO *THE SOPHIST*

is false. How far this is original with Plato is difficult to determine. Other subjects discussed in this dialogue are the theory of knowledge, the relation between reality and appearance, and that between the one and the many. The introduction of the five "forms" or categories—Being, Motion, Rest, Same and Other—is an interesting feature which may be interpreted as marking a stage in the development of the theory of ideas. This dialogue is important in content, though not especially attractive in form.

The date of *The Sophist* cannot be earlier, and may be considerably later, than that of the *Theaetetus*.

There is an edition of *The Sophist and Politicus*, with English notes, by Lewis Campbell (Oxford, 1864).
ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ

[Ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ· ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΞΕΝΟΣ ΕΛΕΑΤΗΣ, ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ

1. ΘΕΟ. Κατὰ τὴν χθές ὀμολογίαν, ὦ Σώκρατε, ἦκομεν αὐτοῖ τε κοσμίως καὶ τόνδε τινὰ ξένων ἄγομεν, τὸ μὲν γένος ἐξ Ἐλέασ, ἑταῖρον δὲ τῶν ἀμφὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα,1 μάλα δὲ ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον.

ἐπ. Ἀρ' οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, οὐ ξένον ἄλλα των θεῶν ἄγων κατὰ τὸν Ὤμηρον λόγον λέληθας; οὐ δὲ φήσω ἄλλους τε θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁπόσοι μετέχουσιν αἰδοὺς δικαίας, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ξένων οὐχ ἦκοτα θεῶν συνοπαδὸν γιγνόμενον ἱβρεις τε καὶ εὐνομίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθορᾶν. τοῖς οὖν ἄν καὶ σοὶ τις οὔτως τῶν κρειττῶν συνέποιτο, φαύλους ἠμᾶς οὕτως ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐποιήμενός τε καὶ ἔλεγξιν, θεὸς οὖν τις ἐλεγκτικὸς.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐχ οὔτος ο ἐτρόπως, ὦ Σώκρατε, τοῦ

1 Ζήνωνα ἐταίρων mss.; ἐταίρων om. Upton.
THE SOPHIST
[or ON BEING: LOGICAL]

CHARACTERS

Theodorus, Socrates, an Elean Stranger, Theaetetus

Theo. According to our yesterday's agreement, Socrates, we have come ourselves, as we were bound to do, and we bring also this man with us; he is a stranger from Elea, one of the followers of Parmenides and Zeno, and a real philosopher.

Soc. Are you not unwittingly bringing, as Homer says, some god, and no mere stranger, Theodorus? He says that the gods, and especially the god of strangers, enter into companionship with men who have a share of due reverence and that they behold the deeds, both violent and righteous, of mankind. So perhaps this companion of yours may be one of the higher powers, who comes to watch over and refute us because we are worthless in argument—a kind of god of refutation.

Theo. No, Socrates, that is not the stranger's

1 A modified quotation from Odyssey, ix. 271; xvii. 485-7.
ξένου, ἄλλα μετριώτεροι τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐριδὰς ἔσπουδακότων. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ θεός μὲν ἄνὴρ
Οὐδαμῶς εἶναι, θεῖος μὴν πάντας γὰρ ἔγω τοὺς φιλοσόφους τοιούτους προσαγορεῖν.

ζ. Καλῶς γε, ὡς φίλε. τούτο μέντοι κινδυνεύει τὸ γένος οὐ πολὺ τι βρῶν, ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν, εἶναι
diakrίνειν ἢ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ. πάνυ γὰρ ἄνδρες οὔτωι παντοῖοι φανταζόμενοι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγνοιαν
ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόλεις, οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἁλλ' ὄντως
φιλόσοφοι, καθορῶντες ψώθεν τὸν τῶν κάτω βίον,
kαὶ τοῖς μὲν δοκοῦσι εἶναι τοῦ μηδενὸς τίμιοι,
toῖς δ' ἄξοι τοῦ παντός. καὶ τοτὲ μὲν πολιτικοὶ
D φαντάζομαι, τοτὲ δὲ σοφισταί, τοτὲ δ' ἐστων
οἷς δόξαν παράσχουσιν ἂν ὡς παντάπασιν ἔχοντες
μανικῶς. τοῦ μέντοι ξένου ἡμῶν ἡδέως ἄν πωθα-
νοῖμην, εἰ φίλον αὐτῷ, τί ταύθ' οἱ περὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ

217 τόπον ἡγοῦντο καὶ ὠνόμαζον.

ἰ. Τὰ ποία δῆ; Σοφιστήν, πολιτικῶν, φιλόσοφον.

θ. Τί δὲ μάλιστα καὶ τὸ ποίον τι περὶ αὐτῶν
diaπορηθεῖν εἶρεσθαι διενοθής;

ζ. Τόδε: πότερον ἐν πάντα ταῦτα ἐνόμιζον
ἡ δύο, ἡ καθάπερ τὰ ὀνόματα τρία, τρία καὶ γένη
diaηρούμενοι καθ' ἐν ὀνόμα γένος ἐκάστῳ προσ-
ήπτον;

θ. Ἀλλ' οὔδεισ, ὡς ἐγὼ μαι, φθόνος αὐτῷ
dιελθεῖν αὐτά: ἡ πῶς, ἡ ἕνε, λέγωμεν;

Β ζε. Οὕτως, ὡς Θεόδωρε. φθόνος μὲν γὰρ
οὔδεις οὖδὲ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γε τρ' ἡγοῦντο·

1 ἄνηρ Bekker; ἄνηρ VT.
2 ἄνδρες Bekker; ἄνδρες VT.
character; he is more reasonable than those who devote themselves to disputation. And though I do not think he is a god at all, I certainly do think he is divine, for I give that epithet to all philosophers.

soc. And rightly, my friend. However, I fancy it is not much easier, if I may say so, to recognize this class, than that of the gods. For these men—I mean those who are not feignedly but really philosophers—appear disguised in all sorts of shapes, thanks to the ignorance of the rest of mankind, and visit the cities, beholding from above the life of those below, and they seem to some to be of no worth and to others to be worth everything. And sometimes they appear disguised as statesmen and sometimes as sophists, and sometimes they may give some people the impression that they are altogether mad. But I should like to ask our stranger here, if agreeable to him, what people in his country thought about these matters, and what names they used.

theo. What matters do you mean?

soc. Sophist, statesman, philosopher.

theo. What particular difficulty and what kind of difficulty in regard to them is it about which you had in mind to ask?

soc. It is this: Did they consider all these one, or two, or, as there are three names, did they divide them into three classes and ascribe to each a class, corresponding to a single name?

theo. I think he has no objection to talking about them. What do you say, stranger?

str. Just what you did, Theodorus; for I have no objection, and it is not difficult to say that they

\[1 \text{ Cf. Od. xvii. 485-7.} \]
καθ' ἐκαστὸν μὴν διορίσασθαι σαφῶς τι ποτέ ἔστω, οὔ σμικρὸν οὐδὲ ράδιον ἔργον.

θεό. Καὶ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τύχην γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, λόγων ἐπελάβοι παραπλησίων ὥν καὶ πρὶν ἡμᾶς δεύτερ' ἐλθεῖν διερωτῶντες αὐτὸν ἐτυγχάνομεν. ὃ δὲ ταύτα ἀπερ πρὸς σὲ νῦν, καὶ τότε ἐσκῆτπετο πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἐπεὶ διακηκοέναι γε φησιν ἰκανῶς καὶ οὐκ ἀμημονεῖν.

C 2. ἗λ. Μὴ τοῖνυν, ὃ ξένε, ἡμῶν τὴν γε πρώτην αἰτησάντων χάριν ἀπαρνηθεὶς γένη, τοσόνδε δὴ ἡμῶν φραξε. ποτέρον εἰσώας ἥδιον αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξεῖνα λέγων τούτῳ δὲ ἂν ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ θουληθής, ἡ δὲ ἔρωτήσεως, οἶνον ποτὲ καὶ Παρμενίδη χρωμένω καὶ διεξέντη λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενομὴν ἐγὼ νέος ὑπ' ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ ἄντος πρεσβύτου;

ἐ. Τῷ μὲν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλύπῳς τε καὶ

D εὐνύως προσδιαλεγομένῳ ῥᾶν οὐτώ, τὸ πρὸς ἄλλον· εἰ δὲ μη, τὸ καθ' αὐτόν.

ἑπ. Εἴξεο τοῖνυν τῶν παρόντων ὃν ἂν βουληθής ἐκλέξασθαι. πάντες γὰρ ὑπακούονται σοι πράως· συμβούλῳ μὴν ἐμοὶ χρώμενος τῶν νέων τινὰ αἰρῆσει, Θεαίτητον τόνδε, ἡ καὶ τῶν ἂλλων εἰ τις σου κατὰ νοῦν.

ἐ. Ω Σώκρατες, αἰδῶς τίς μ' ἔχει τὸ νῦν πρῶτον συγγενόμενον ὡμίν μὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἔπος πρὸς ἐπός ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συνουσίαν, ἀλλ' ἐκτειναντα ἀπομηκύνεις λόγον συνήν κατ' ἐμαυτόν, ἐείτε καὶ πρὸς ἐτερον, οἷον ἕπιδειξεν ποιοῦμεν· τῷ γὰρ ὃντι τὸ νῦν ἔθηκεν οὐχ ὡσον ὅδε ἐρωτηθηκαν ἐλπίσσειν ἀν αὐτὸ εἶναι τις, ἀλλὰ τυχχάνει λόγου

1 οἷον Ast.; δοὺν ΒΤ.
THE SOPHIST

considered them three. But it is no small or easy task to define clearly the nature of each.

THEO. The fact is, Socrates, that by chance you have hit upon a question very like what we happened to be asking him before we came here; and he made excuses to us then, as he does now to you; though he admits that he has heard it thoroughly discussed and remembers what he heard.

SOC. In that case, stranger, do not refuse us the first favour we have asked; but just tell us this: Do you generally prefer to expound in a long uninterrupted speech of your own whatever you wish to explain to anyone, or do you prefer the method of questions? I was present once when Parmenides employed the latter method and carried on a splendid discussion. I was a young man then, and he was very old.

STR. The method of dialogue, Socrates, is easier with an interlocutor who is tractable and gives no trouble; but otherwise I prefer the continuous speech by one person.

SOC. Well, you may choose whomever you please of those present; they will all respond pleasantly to you; but if you take my advice you will choose one of the young fellows, Theaetetus here, or any of the others who suits you.

STR. Socrates, this is the first time I have come among you, and I am somewhat ashamed, instead of carrying on the discussion by merely giving brief replies to your questions, to deliver an extended, long drawn out speech, either as an address of my own or in reply to another, as if I were giving an exhibition; but I must, for really the present subject is not what one might expect from the form of the question, but is a matter for very long speech. On
παμμήκουσ ὃν. τὸ δὲ αὖ σοὶ μὴ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ
tοιοῦδε, ἀλλὰ τε καὶ σοῦ λέξαντος ὡς εἶπες,
ἀξένον τι καταφαίνεται μοι καὶ ἀγριον. ἐπεὶ
218 Θεαίτητον γε τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον εἶναι δέχομαι
παντάπασιν ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς τε πρότερον διείλεγμαι
καὶ σὺ τὰ νῦν μοι διακελεύει.

θεαί. Ἄρα τοίνυν, ὃ ξένε, οὖτω καὶ καθάπερ
εἰπε Σωκράτης πάσι κεχαρισμένοις ἔσει;

ἐε. Κινδυνεύει πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔτι λεκτέον
εἶναι, Θεαίτητε. πρὸς δὲ σὲ ἡδὴ τὸ μετὰ τούτο,
ὡς ἐοικε, γίγνοιτο ἃν ὁ λόγος. ἂν δ’ ἄρα τι τῷ
μήκει ποιῶν ἄξθη, μὴ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσθαι τούτων, ἀλλὰ
tούσδε τοὺς σοὺς ἐταῖρους.

Β θεαί. Ἄλλ’ οἶμαι μὲν δὴ νῦν οὖτως οὐκ ἄπ-
ερεῖν. ἂν δ’ ἄρα τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται, καὶ τόνδε
παραληψόμεθα Σωκράτη, τὸν Σωκράτους μὲν
ὀμώνυμον, ἐμὸν δὲ ἡλικιώτην καὶ συγγυμναστὴν,
ὅσ συνδιαπονεῖν μετ’ ἐμοῖ τὰ πολλὰ οὐκ ἁγθεῖς.

3. ἐε. Εὗ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἵδια βουλεύσει
προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου κοινὴ δὲ μετ’ ἐμοὶ σοι
συσκεπτέον ἄρχομενο πρῶτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται,
νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ, ζητοῦντι καὶ ἐμπανίζοντι

C λόγῳ τὸ ποτ’ ἔστι. νῦν γὰρ δὴ σὺ κἀγὼ τούτου
πέρι τοῦνομα μόνον ἔχομεν κοινῆ. τὸ δὲ ἐργὸν
ἐφ’ ὃ καλοῦμεν ἐκάτερος τάχ’ ἂν ἴδια παρ’ ἡμῖν
αὐτοῖς ἔχομεν. δεὶ δὲ ἄει παντὸς πέρι τὸ πρᾶγμα
αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἂ τοῦνομα μόνον συνομο-
λογῆσασθαι χωρίς λόγου. τὸ δὲ φύλον δ’ νῦν ἐπι-
νουόμεν ζητεῖν οὐ πάντων ρᾷστον συλλαβεῖν τί
270
THE SOPHIST

The other hand it seems unfriendly and discourteous to refuse a favour to you and these gentlemen, especially when you have spoken as you did. As for Theaetetus I accept him most willingly as interlocutor in view of my previous conversation with him and of your present recommendation.

THEAET. But, stranger, by taking this course and following Socrates's suggestion will you please the others too?

STR. I am afraid there is nothing more to be said about that, Theaetetus; but from now on, my talk will, I fancy, be addressed to you. And if you get tired and are bored by the length of the talk, do not blame me, but these friends of yours.

THEAET. Oh, no, I do not think I shall get tired of it so easily, but if such a thing does happen, we will call in this Socrates, the namesake of the other Socrates; he is of my own age and my companion in the gymnasium, and is in the habit of working with me in almost everything.

STR. Very well; you will follow your own devices about that as the discussion proceeds; but now you and I must investigate in common, beginning first, as it seems to me, with the sophist, and must search out and make plain by argument what he is. For as yet you and I have nothing in common about him but the name; but as to the thing to which we give the name, we may perhaps each have a conception of it in our own minds; however, we ought always in every instance to come to agreement about the thing itself by argument rather than about the mere name without argument. But the tribe which we now intend to search for, the sophist, is not the easiest thing in the world to catch and define, and

271
PLATO

ποτ' ἐστιν, ὃ σοφιστὴς· ὅσα δ' αὖ τῶν μεγάλων
dei diaponeίσθαι καλῶς, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δέδοκ-
tαι πᾶσιν καὶ πάλαι τὸ πρότερον ἐν σμικροῖς
D καὶ βάσιων αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾶν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς
μεγίστοις. νῦν οὖν, ὥ Θεαίτητε, ἐξωγε καὶ νῦν
οὕτω συμβουλεύω, χαλεπὸν καὶ δυσθήρευτον ἡγη-
sαμένου εἶναι τὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ γένος πρότερον ἐν
ἄλλω βάσιν τὴν μέθοδον αὐτοῦ προμελετᾶν, εἰ
μὴ σύ ποθὲν εὐπτεστέραν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ἄλλην ὃδὸν.
θεῖ. 'Αλλ' οὐκ ἔχω.
ε. Βούλει δήτα περὶ τινὸς τῶν φαίλων μετιόντες
πειραθῶμεν παραδείγματι αὐτὸ θέσθαι τοῦ μείζονος;
Ε θεῖ. Ναι.
ε. Τι δήτα προταξάιμεθ' ἃν εὐγνωστὸν μὲν καὶ
σμικρόν, λόγον δὲ μηδενὸς ἐλάττωνα ἔχων τῶν
μείζονων; οἶνον ἀσπαλιεύτης: ἂρ' οὐ πᾶσι τε
γνώριμον καὶ σπουδῆς οὐ πάντα τι πολλῆς τινος
ἐπάξιον;
θεῖ. Οὐτός.

219 ε. Μέθοδον μήν αὐτὸν ἐλπίζω καὶ λόγον οὐκ
ἀνεπιτήδειον ἥμιν ἔχεω πρὸς δ' θουλόμεθα.
θεῖ. Καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι.
4. ε. Φέρε τή, τῇ δέ αρχώμεθα αὐτοῦ καὶ
μοὶ λέγε· πότερον ὡς τεχνίτην αὐτὸν ἣ τινα ἄτεχ-
νον, ἄλλην δὲ δύναμιν ἔχοντα βήσομεν;
θεῖ. Ἡκιστά γε ἄτεχνον.
ε. 'Αλλὰ μήν τῶν γε τεχνῶν πασῶν σχεδὸν
eἰδή δύο.
θεῖ. Πῶς;
ε. Γεωργία μὲν καὶ ὅση περὶ τὸ θυτὸν πᾶν
σώμα θεραπεία, τὸ τε αὖ περὶ τὸ σύνθετον καὶ
Β πλαστόν, δ' ὅθ' σκεῖος ὄνομάκαμεν, ἢ τε μημητική,
THE SOPHIST

everyone has agreed long ago that if investigations of great matters are to be properly worked out we ought to practise them on small and easier matters before attacking the very greatest. So now, Theaetetus, this is my advice to ourselves, since we think the family of sophists is troublesome and hard to catch, that we first practise the method of hunting in something easier, unless you perhaps have some simpler way to suggest.

THEAET. I have not.

STR. Then shall we take some lesser thing and try to use it as a pattern for the greater?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Well, then, what example can we set before us which is well known and small, but no less capable of definition than any of the greater things? Say an angler; is he not known to all and unworthy of any great interest?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. But I hope he offers us a method and is capable of a definition not unsuitable to our purpose.

THEAET. That would be good.

STR. Come now; let us begin with him in this way: Tell me, shall we say that he is a man with an art, or one without an art, but having some other power?

THEAET. Certainly not one without an art.

STR. But of all arts there are, speaking generally, two kinds?

THEAET. How so?

STR. Agriculture and all kinds of care of any living beings, and that which has to do with things which are put together or moulded (utensils we call

273
ПЛАТО

ξύμπαντα ταῦτα δικαιότατ' ἄν ἐνὶ προσαγο-ρεύοντ' ἄν ὅνόματι.

θεαί. Πῶς καὶ τίνι;

εἰ. Πᾶν ὅπερ ἄν μὴ πρῶτερον τις ὅν ὑστερον εἰς οὑσίαν ἄγη, τὸν μὲν ἄγοντα ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀγό- μενον ποιεῖσθαι ποὺ φαμεν.

θεαί. ὂρθῶς.

εἰ. Τὰ δὲ γε νῦν δὴ ἃ διήλθομεν ἀπαντα εἰχαν εἰς τοῦτο τὴν αὐτῶν δύναμιν.

θεαί. Ἐξε γὰρ οὖν.

εἰ. Ποιητικὴν τοίνυν αὐτὰ συγκεφαλαιωσάμενοι προσείπωμεν.

C θεαί. Ἔστω.

εἰ. Τὸ δὲ μαθηματικὸν αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰδὸς ὅλον καὶ τὸ τῆς γνωρίσεως τὸ τε χρηματιστικὸν καὶ ἀγωνιστικὸν καὶ θηρευτικὸν, ἐπειδὴ δημοιργεῖ μὲν οὐδὲν τούτων, τὰ δὲ ὅντα καὶ γεγονότα τὰ μὲν χειροται λόγοις καὶ πράξεις, τὰ δὲ τοὺς χειρουμένους οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει, μάλιστ' ἃν που διὰ ταῦτα ξυνάπαντα τὰ μέρη τέχνη τις κτητικὴ λεχθείσα ἄν διαπρέψειεν.

θεαί. Ναί: πρέποι γὰρ ἄν.

5. εἰ. Κτητικὴς δὴ καὶ ποιητικῆς ξύμπασῶν

D οὐσῶν τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν ποτέρα τῆς ἀσπαλιευτικῆς, ὥ Θεαίτητε, τιθῶμεν;

θεαί. Ἐν κτητικῇ ποὺ δῆλον.

εἰ. Κτητικῆς δὲ ἃρ' οὐ δύο εἶδη; τὸ μὲν ἐκόν-των πρὸς ἐκόντας μεταβλητικὸν ὅν διά τε δωρεῶν καὶ μισθώσεως καὶ ἀγοράσεως, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἢ

1 δικαιότατ' ἄν BT; δικαιότατα W, Stobaeus.
2 α om. BTW.
THE SOPHIST

them), and the art of imitation—all these might properly be called by one name.

THEAET. How so, and what is the name?

STR. When anyone brings into being something which did not previously exist, we say that he who brings it into being produces it and that which is brought into being is produced.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Now all the arts which we have just mentioned direct their energy to production.

THEAET. Yes, they do.

STR. Let us, then, call these collectively the productive art.

THEAET. Agreed.

STR. And after this comes the whole class of learning and that of acquiring knowledge, and money making, and fighting, and hunting. None of these is creative, but they are all engaged in coercing, by deeds or words, things which already exist and have been produced, or in preventing others from coercing them; therefore all these divisions together might very properly be called acquisitive art.

THEAET. Yes, that would be proper.

STR. Then since acquisitive and productive art comprise all the arts, in which, Theaetetus, shall we place the art of angling?

THEAET. In acquisitive art, clearly.

STR. And are there not two classes of acquisitive art—one the class of exchange between voluntary agents by means of gifts and wages and purchases, and the other, which comprises all the rest of
PLATO

κατ' ἑργα ἢ κατὰ λόγους χειρούμενον ξύμπαυ χειρωτικὸν ἂν εἶη;

τεαί. Φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

τε. Τί δέ; τὴν χειρωτικὴν ἄρ' οὐ διχῇ τιμητέου;

τεαί. Πή.

τε. Τὸ μὲν ἀναφανδὸν ὅλον ἀγωνιστικὸν θέντας,¹

Ε τὸ δὲ κρυφαίον αὐτῆς πάν θηρευτικὸν.

τεαί. Νά.

τε. Τὴν δέ γε μὴν θηρευτικὴν ἁλογον τὸ μὴ οὐ
tέμνεν διχῇ.

τεαί. Λέγε ὅπη.

τε. Τὸ μὲν ἁμύχου γένους διελομένους, τὸ δ' ἐμψύχου.

τεαί. Τί μὴν; εἴπερ ἔστον γε ἁμφω.

220 τε. Πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἔστον; καὶ δεῖ γε ἡμᾶς τὸ
mὲν τῶν ἁμύχων, ἀνώνυμον ὅν ἂ πλὴν κατ' ἐνια
tῆς κολυμβητικῆς ἀττα μέρη καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄλλα
βραχέα, χαίρειν ἐάσαι, τὸ δέ, τῶν ἐμψύχων ξώων
οὔσαν θήραν, προσεπεῖν ξωοθηρικὴν.

τεαί. Ἑστώ.

τε. Ζωοθηρικῆς δὲ ἄρ' οὐ διπλοῦν εἴδος ἄν λέ-
gυοτο ἐν δίκη, τὸ μὲν πεζοῦ γένους, πολλοὺς εἴδει
καὶ ἄνωμας διηρημένον, πεζοθηρικὸν, τὸ δ' ἔτερον
νευστικὸν ξώον πάν ἐνυγροθηρικὸν;

τεαί. Πάνω γε.

Β τε. Νευστικῷ μὴν τὸ μὲν πτηνὸν φύλον ὀρω-
μεν, τὸ δὲ ἐνυδρον;

τεαί. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

τε. Καὶ τοῦ πτηνοῦ μὴν γένους πᾶσα ἡμῶν ἡ
θήρα λέγεται ποὺ τις ὁρυθεοτική.

¹ θέντας Stobaeus; θέντες BT.
² ὅν Heindorf; ἐὰν BTW.
THE SOPHIST

acquisitive art, and, since it coerces either by word or deed, might be called coercive?

THEAET. It appears so, at any rate, from what you have said.

STR. Well then, shall we not divide coercive art into two parts?

THEAET. In what way?

STR. By calling all the open part of it fighting and all the secret part hunting.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. But it would be unreasonable not to divide hunting into two parts.

THEAET. Say how it can be done.

STR. By dividing it into the hunting of the lifeless and of the living.

THEAET. Certainly, if both exist.

STR. Of course they exist. And we must pass over the hunting of lifeless things, which has no name, with the exception of some kinds of diving and the like, which are of little importance; but the hunting of living things we will call animal-hunting.

THEAET. Very well.

STR. And two classes of animal-hunting might properly be made, one (and this is divided under many classes and names) the hunting of creatures that go on their feet, land-animal hunting, and the other that of swimming creatures, to be called, as a whole, water-animal hunting?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And of swimming creatures we see that one tribe is winged and the other is in the water?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And the hunting of winged creatures is called, as a whole, fowling.
Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν.

Τοῦ δὲ ἐνύδρου σχεδὸν τὸ σύνολον ἀληθικὴν.

Ναὶ.

Τῇ δὲ; ταύτην αὐτῇ τῇν θύραν ἄρ' οὖν ἄν κατὰ μέγιστα μέρη δύο διελοίμην;

Κατὰ ποία;

Καθ' ἃ τὸ μὲν ἔρκεσιν αὐτὸθεν ¹ ποιεῖται τῇν θύραν, τὸ δὲ πληγὴ.

Πῶς λέγεις, καὶ τῇ διαμορφομένον ἐκάτερον;

Τὸ μὲν, ὅτι πᾶν ὄσον ἄν ἔνεκα κωλύσεως εἰργῇ τι περιέχον, ἔρκος εἰκὸς οὐνομάζειν.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Κύρτους δὴ καὶ δίκτυα καὶ βρόχους καὶ πόρκους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μῶν ἄλλο τὶ πλὴν ἔρκη χρῆ προσαγορεύειν;

Οὐδέν.

Τούτῳ μὲν ἄρα ἐρκοθηρικὸν τῆς ἄγρας τὸ μέρος φῆσομεν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον.

Ναί.

Τὸ δὲ ἀγκίστρως καὶ τριόδουσι πληγῇ γιγνόμενον ἐπέρων μὲν ἐκείνου, πληκτικὴν δὲ τινα

θύραν ἡμᾶς προσεπείδειν ἐνι λόγῳ νῦν χρεών· ἢ τί τις ἂν, Θεαίτητε, εἴποι κάλλιον;

Ἀμελῶμεν τοῦ ὀνόματος· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τούτο.

Τῆς τοιῶν πληκτικῆς τὸ μὲν νυκτερινῶν, οἶμαι, πρὸς τυρός φῶς γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αυτῶν τῶν περὶ τὴν θύραν πυρευτικὴν ῥήθηναι συμβέβηκεν.

Πάνυ γε.

Τὸ δὲ γε μεθημερινῶν, ὡς ἔχοντιν ἐν ἀκροὶς ἄγκιστρα καὶ τῶν τριοδόντων, πᾶν ἄγκιστρευτικὸν.

¹ αὐτόθεν al.; αὐτόθι BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. It is.

STR. And the hunting of water creatures goes by the general name of fishing.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And might I not divide this kind of hunting into two principal divisions?

THEAET. What divisions?

STR. The one carries on the hunt by means of enclosures merely, the other by a blow.

THEAET. What do you mean, and how do you distinguish the two?

STR. As regards the first, because whatever surrounds anything and encloses it so as to constrain it is properly called an enclosure.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. May not, then, wicker baskets and seines and snares and nets and the like be called enclosures?

THEAET. Assuredly.

STR. Then we will call this division hunting by enclosures, or something of that sort.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And the other, which is done with a blow, by means of hooks and three pronged spears, we must now—to name it with a single word—call striking; or could a better name be found, Theaetetus?

THEAET. Never mind the name; that will do well enough.

STR. Then the kind of striking which takes place at night by the light of a fire is, I suppose, called by the hunters themselves fire-hunting.

THEAET. To be sure.

STR. And that which belongs to the daytime is, as a whole, barb-hunting, since the spears, as well as the hooks, are tipped with barbs.
Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν.

6. ΞΕ. Τοῦ τοῖνυν ἀγκιστρευτικοῦ τῆς πληκτικῆς τὸ μὲν ἄνωθεν εἰς τὸ κάτω γυνόμενον διὰ τὸ τοῖς τριῶσιν οὖτω μᾶλλον χρῆσθαι τριῶσιν τις, οἷμαι, κέκληται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φασὶ γοῦν τινές.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ γε λοιπὸν ἐστὶν ἐν ἐτὶ μόνον ὡς εἰπεῖν εἴδος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιὸν;

ΞΕ. Τὸ τῆς ἐναντίας ταύτης πληγῆς, ἀγκιστρου
tε γυνόμενον καὶ τῶν ἱχθῶν οὐχ ἂ τις ἀν τύχη
221 τοῦ σώματος, ὅσπερ τοῖς τριῶσι εἰς τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ θηρευθέντος ἐκάστοτε, καὶ κάτωθεν εἰς τούναντίον ἁνω βάθοις καὶ καλάμους ἀνασπώμενον· οὐ τῇ φήσωμεν, ὡς Θεαίτητε, δεῖν τοῦνομα λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκῶ μὲν, ὅσπερ ἄρτι προσδέμεθα δεῖν ἔξωρεῖν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ νῦν ἀποτετελέσθαι.

7. ΞΕ. Νῦν ἀρα τῆς ἀσταλευτικῆς πέρι σὺ 1

Β τε κάγῳ συνωμολογήκαμεν οὗ μόνον τοῦνομα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λόγον περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦργον εἰλήφαμεν ἰκανῶς. Ξυμπάσης γὰρ τέχνης τὸ μὲν ἔτι μέρος κτητικῶν ἢ κτητικῶν δὲ χειρωτικῶν, χειρωτικῶν δὲ θερευτικῶν, τοῦ δὲ θηρευτικοῦ ζωοθηρικοῦ, ζωοθηρικοῦ δὲ ζωοθηρικοῦ, ζωοθηρικοῦ δὲ ζωοθηρικοῦ, τοῦ δὲ θηρευτικοῦ, τοῦ δὲ θηρευτικοῦ ζωοθηρικοῦ, ζωοθηρικοῦ δὲ ζωοθηρικοῦ, ζωοθηρικοῦ δὲ ζωοθηρικοῦ, τοῦ δὲ θηρευτικοῦ, τοῦ δὲ θηρευτικοῦ τοῦ δὲ θηρευτικοῦ· εἰπεῖν δὲ οὗ περὶ τὴν κάτωθεν ἄνω πληγῆν ἀνασπώμενην,

1 σὺν Heindorf; οὔ σὺν BT.

1 Plato’s etymology—ἀσταλευτική from ἀνασπάσθαι—is hardly less absurd than that suggested in the translation.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes, it is so called.

STR. Then of striking which belongs to barb-hunting, that part which proceeds downward from above, is called, because tridents are chiefly used in it, tridentry, I suppose.

THEAET. Yes, some people, at any rate, call it so.

STR. Then there still remains, I may say, only one further kind.

THEAET. What is that?

STR. The kind that is characterized by the opposite sort of blow, which is practised with a hook and strikes, not any chance part of the body of the fishes, as tridents do, but only the head and mouth of the fish caught, and proceeds from below upwards, being pulled up by twigs and rods. By what name, Theaetetus, shall we say this ought to be called?

THEAET. I think our search is now ended and we have found the very thing we set before us a while ago as necessary to find.

STR. Now, then, you and I are not only agreed about the name of angling, but we have acquired also a satisfactory definition of the thing itself. For of art as a whole, half was acquisitive, and of the acquisitive, half was coercive, and of the coercive, half was hunting, and of hunting, half was animal hunting, and of animal hunting, half was water hunting, and, taken as a whole, of water hunting the lower part was fishing, and of fishing, half was striking, and of striking, half was barb-hunting, and of this the part in which the blow is pulled from below upwards at an angle has a name in the very

The words at an angle are inserted merely to give a reason in English for the words which follow them.
PLATO

C αὖτις τῆς πράξεως ἀφομοιωθέν τοῦνομα, ἢ νῦν ἀσταλευτικὴ ζητηθείσα ἐπίκλην γέγονεν.

θεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τούτῳ γε ἴκανός δι- δήλωται.

8. Ε. Φέρε δή, κατὰ τούτο τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐπιχειρῶμεν εὑρεῖν, ὃ τί ποτ’ ἐστιν.

θεαί. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.

Ε. Καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖνο γ’ ἣν τὸ ζῷτημα πρῶτον, πότερον ἱδιώτην ἢ τινα τέχνην ἔχοντα θετέον εἶναι τὸν ἀσπαλευτήν.

θεαί. Ναί.

Ε. Καὶ νῦν δ’ τούτον ἱδιώτην θήσομεν, ὦ

D Θεαίτητε, ἡ παντάπασιν ὡς ἀληθῶς σοφιστήν;

θεαί. Οὐδαμῶς ἱδιώτην: μανθάνω γὰρ ὁ λέγεις, ὡς πάντως δεῖ τοιοῦτος 1 εἶναι τὸ γε ὅνομα τοῦτο ἔχων.

Ε. *Ἀλλὰ τινὰ τέχνην αὐτὸν ἢμῶν ἔχοντα, ὡς έιουκε, θετέον.

θεαί. Τίνα ποτ’ οὖν δὴ ταύτην;

Ε. *Ἀρ’ ὥς πρὸς θεῶν ἡγνοήκαμεν τάνδρος τὸν ἀνδρα ὑντα ξυγγενή;

θεαί. Τίνα τού;

Ε. Τὸν ἀσπαλεύτην τοῦ σοφιστοῦ.

θεαί. Πη;

Ε. Ὀρευτά τινες καταφαίνεσθον ἅμφω μοι.

Ε θεαί. Τίνος θήρας ἄτερος; τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἔτερον εἶπομεν.

Ε. Δίχα που νῦν δὴ διείλομεν τὴν ἄγραν πάσαν, νευστικοῦ μέρους, τὸ δὲ πεζοῦ τέμνοντες.

1 πάντως δεῖ τοιοῦτος Winckelmann; πάντως δεῖ τοιοῦτο B; πάντως δεῖ τοιοῦτον T. 2 νῦν δὴ T; νῦν B.

282
THE SOPHIST

likeness of the act and is called angling, which was the object of our present search.

THEAET. That at all events has been made perfectly clear.

STR. Come, then, let us use this as a pattern and try to find out what a sophist is.

THEAET. By all means.

STR. Well, then, the first question we asked was whether we must assume that the angler was just a man or was a man with an art.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Now take this man of ours, Theaetetus. Shall we assume that he is just a man, or by all means really a man of wisdom?

THEAET. Certainly not just a man; for I catch your meaning that he is very far from being wise, although his name implies wisdom.

STR. But we must, it seems, assume that he has an art of some kind.

THEAET. Well, then, what in the world is this art that he has?

STR. Good gracious! Have we failed to notice that the man is akin to the other man?

THEAET. Who is akin to whom?

STR. The angler to the sophist.

THEAET. How so?

STR. They both seem clearly to me to be a sort of hunters.

THEAET. What is the hunting of the second? We have spoken about the first.

STR. We just now divided hunting as a whole into two classes, and made one division that of swimming creatures and the other that of land-hunting.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΕΕ. Καὶ τὸ μὲν δυσθόμεν, δοσὺν περὶ τὰ νευστικὰ τῶν ἐνύδρων· τὸ δὲ πεζὸν εἰάσαμεν ἀσχιστὸν, εἰπόντες ὅτι πολυειδεῖς εἶχ.

222 ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΕΕ. Μέχρι μὲν τῶν ἐνταῦθα ὅ σοφιστής τε καὶ ὁ ἀσπαλευτὴς ἃμα ἀπὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης πορεύεσθοι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡσίκατον γοῦν.

ΕΕ. Ἑκτρέπεσθον δὲ γε ἀπὸ τῆς ζωοθηρικῆς, ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ θάλαττάν που καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ λίμνας, τὰν τούτους ζώα θηρευσόμενος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ἡμῶν;

ΕΕ. Ὁ δὲ γε ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ ποταμοὺς ἐτέρους ἀπὶ τινας, πλούτου καὶ νεότητος οἶον λειμῶνας ἀφθόνους, τὰν τούτους θρέμματα χειρωσόμενος.

ΒΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΕΕ. Τῆς πεζῆς θήρας γίγνεσθον δύο μεγίστω τινες μέρῃ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖον ἐκάτερον;

ΕΕ. Τὸ μὲν τῶν ἡμέρων, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄγριων.

9. ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰτ’ ἐστὶ τις θήρα τῶν ἡμέρων;

ΕΕ. Εἰπέρ γε ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἡμερὸν ζῶον. θῆς δὲ ὅπῃ ξαίρεις, εἴτε μηδὲν τυδεὶς ἡμερὸν, εἴτε ἄλλο μὲν ἡμερὸν τι, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄγριον, εἴτε ἡμερὸν μὲν λέγεις αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἄνθρωπον δὲ μηδεμίαν ἥγει θήραν· τούτων ὁπότερ’ ἄν ἡγῇ φίλον εἰρηθῶσαί σοι, τούτο ἡμῖν διόρισον.

CΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ’ ἡμῶς τε ἡμερον, ὃ ξένε, ἡγοῦμαι ζῶον, θήραν τε ἄνθρωπον εἶναι λέγω.

284
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And the one we discussed, so far as the swimming creatures that live in the water are concerned; but we left the land-hunting undivided, merely remarking that it has many forms.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Now up to that point the sophist and the angler proceed together from the starting-point of acquisitive art.

THEAET. I think they do.

STR. But they separate at the point of animal-hunting, where the one turns to the sea and rivers and lakes to hunt the animals in those.

THEAET. To be sure.

STR. But the other turns toward the land and to rivers of a different kind—rivers of wealth and youth, bounteous meadows, as it were—and he intends to coerce the creatures in them.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. Of land-hunting there are two chief divisions.

THEAET. What are they?

STR. One is the hunting of tame, the other of wild creatures.

THEAET. Is there, then, a hunting of tame creatures?

STR. Yes, if man is a tame animal; but make any assumption you like, that there is no tame animal, or that some other tame animal exists but man is a wild one or that man is tame but there is no hunting of man. For the purpose of our definition choose whichever of these statements you think is satisfactory to you.

THEAET. Why, Stranger, I think we are a tame animal, and I agree that there is a hunting of man.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ἐ. Δυτικὴν τοινν καὶ τὴν ἡμεροθηρικὴν εἶπωμεν.

昼夜. Κατὰ τι λέγοντες;

ἐ. Τὴν μὲν ληστικὴν καὶ ἀνδραποδιστικὴν καὶ
tυραννικὴν καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πολεμικὴν, ἐν πάντα
βίαιον θήραν ὀρισάμενοι.

昼夜. Καλῶς.

ἐ. Τὴν δὲ γε δικανικὴν καὶ δημηγορικὴν καὶ
προσομιλητικὴν, ἐν αὐτοὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον, πυθανουργικὴν

Δ τὰ μίαν τέχνην προσειπόντες.

昼夜. Ἄρρητο.

ἐ. Τῆς δὴ πυθανουργικῆς διὰτὰ λέγωμεν γένη.

昼夜. Ποία;

ἐ. Τὸ μὲν ἐτερον ἴδια, τὸ δὲ δημοσία γιγνόμε-

νον.

昼夜. Προσειπόντες.

ἐ. Οὐκοῦν αὖ τῆς ἴδιοθηρευτικῆς τὸ μὲν
μυσταρητικῶν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ δωροφορικῶν;

昼夜. Οὐ μανθάνω.

ἐ. Τῇ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν θήρα τὸν νοῦν, ὡς ἔσκας,

οὐπω προσέσχειjs.

昼夜. Τοῦ πέρι;

Ε ἐ. "Οτι τοῖς θηρευθεῖσι δώρα προσεπιδιδόασον.

昼夜. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ἐ. Τούτῳ μὲν τοίνν ἐρωτικῆς τέχνης ἔστω

ἐίδος.

昼夜. Πάνυ γε.

ἐ. Τοῦ δὲ γε μυσταρητικῶν τὸ μὲν προσομ-

λοῦν διὰ χάριτος καὶ παντάπασι δι’ ἡδονῆς τὸ

δέλεαρ πεποιημένον καὶ τὸν μυσθὸν πραττόμενον
tροφὴν ἑαυτῷ μόνον κολακικὴν, ὡς ἐγιμαί.
THE SOPHIST

STR. Let us, then, say that the hunting of tame animals is also of two kinds.

THEAET. How do we justify that assertion?

STR. By defining piracy, man-stealing, tyranny, and the whole art of war all collectively as hunting by force.

THEAET. Excellent.

STR. And by giving the art of the law courts, of the public platform, and of conversation also a single name and calling them all collectively an art of persuasion.

THEAET. Correct.

STR. Now let us say that there are two kinds of persuasion.

THEAET. What kinds?

STR. The one has to do with private persons, the other with the community.

THEAET. Granted; each of them does form a class.

STR. Then again of the hunting of private persons one kind receives pay, and the other brings gifts, does it not?

THEAET. I do not understand.

STR. Apparently you have never yet paid attention to the lovers' method of hunting.

THEAET. In what respect?

STR. That in addition to their other efforts they give presents to those whom they hunt.

THEAET. You are quite right.

STR. Let us, then, call this the amatory art.

THEAET. Agreed.

STR. But that part of the paid kind which converses to furnish gratification and makes pleasure exclusively its bait and demands as its pay only maintenance, we might all agree, if I am not mis-
ΠΛΑΤΟ

223 πάντες φαίμεν· άν Ἡ ἡ δυνατή τινα τέχνην εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς γὰρ οὖ; 

Ἑ. Τὸ δὲ ἑπαγγελλόμενον μὲν ὡς ἄρετῆς ἕνεκα τὰς ὁμολίας ποιούμενον, μισθὸν δὲ νόμισμα πραττό-

μενον, ἀρα οὐ τοῦτο τὸ γένος ἐτέρῳ προσειπεῖν ἄξιον ὀνόματι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς γὰρ οὖ; 

Ἑ. Τινὶ δὴ τούτῳ; πειρῶ λέγειν. 

ΘΕΑΙ. Δήλον δὴ· τὸν γὰρ σοφιστὴν μοι δοκούμεν ἀνηρρηκέναι. τοῦτο οὖν ἔγωγε εἰπών τὸ προσήκον ὄνομα ἀν ἡγούμαι καλεῖν αὐτὸν.

Β 10. Ἑ. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν νῦν, ὥς Θεαίτητε, λόγον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τέχνης οἰκειωτικῆς, χειρωτικῆς, 2 θηρευτικῆς, ζωοθηρίας, 3 χερσαίας, ἠμεροθηρικῆς, ἀνθρωποθηρίας, ἰδιοθηρίας, μισθαρνικῆς, νομισμα-

τοπωλικῆς, δοξοπαιδευτικῆς, νέων πλουσίων καὶ ἐνδόξων γιγνομένη θήρᾳ προσρητέον, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος ἦμιν συμβαίνει, σοφιστικῆ. 

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Ἑ. Ἡ ἄτι δὲ καὶ τῆδε ἰδομεν4· οὐ γὰρ τι φαύλης

C μετοχὸν ἐστὶ τέχνης τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον, ἀλλ' εὖ μάλα ποικίλη. καὶ γὰρ οὖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν εἰρημένοις φάντασμα παρέχεται, μὴ τοῦτο ὁ νῦν αὐτὸ ἡμεῖς φαμεν ἀλλ' ἐτερον εἶναι τι γένος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πὴ δὴ;

Ἑ. Τὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης διπλῶν ἦν εἶδος

που, τὸ μὲν θηρευτικὸν μέρος ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ἄλλακτικὸν.

1 Ἡ Heindorf; Ἡ om. mss.
2 χειρωτικῆς add. Aldina; κτητικῆς mss.; secl. Schleiermacher.
3 ζωοθηρίας πεζοθηρίας mss.; πεζοθηρίας secl. Schleiermacher.
4 ἰδομεν W; εἰδομεν BT.

288
THE SOPHIST

taken, to call the art of flattery or of making things pleasant.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But the class which proposes to carry on its conversations for the sake of virtue and demands its pay in cash—does not this deserve to be called by another name?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And what is that name? Try to tell.

THEAET. It is obvious; for I think we have discovered the sophist. And therefore by uttering that word I think I should give him the right name.

STR. Then, as it seems, according to our present reasoning, Theaetetus, the part of appropriative, coercive, hunting art which hunts animals, land animals, tame animals, man, privately, for pay, is paid in cash, claims to give education, and is a hunt after rich and promising youths, must—so our present argument concludes—be called sophistry.

THEAET. Most assuredly.

STR. But let us look at it in still another way; for the class we are now examining partakes of no mean art, but of a very many-sided one. And we must indeed do so, for in our previous talk it presents an appearance of being, not what we now say it is, but another class.

THEAET. How so?

STR. The acquisitive art was of two sorts, the one the division of hunting, the other that of exchange.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν γὰρ οὖν.

ΕΕ. Τής τούνν ἀλλακτικής δύο εἴδη λέγωμεν, τὸ μὲν δωρητικὸν, τὸ δὲ ἐτερον ἀγοραστικὸν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰρήσθω.

ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν αὖ φήσομεν ἀγοραστικὴν διχῇ τε-μνεσθαι.

ΔΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ;

ΕΕ. Τήν μὲν τῶν αὐτουργῶν αὐτοπωλικὴν δια-ρούμενοι, τήν δὲ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἔργα μεταβαλλομένην μεταβλητικὴν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΕΕ. Τί δὲ; τῆς μεταβλητικῆς οὐχ ἢ μὲν κατὰ πόλιν ἀλλαγῆ, σχεδὸν αὐτῆς ἥμισυ μέρος οὖ, καπη-λική ¹ προσαγορεύεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΕΕ. Τὸ δὲ γε εξ ἄλλης εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν διαλλατ-τόμενον ² ὑνὴ καὶ πράσει ἐμπορική;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὖ;

ΕΕ. Τής δ' ἐμπορικῆς ἄρ' οὐκ ἤσθημεθα ὅτι τὸ Ἐ μὲν ὅσοις τὸ σώμα τρέφεται καὶ χρηται, ³ τὸ δὲ ὅσοις ἡ ψυχὴ πωλοῦν διὰ νομίσματος ἀλλάττεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πᾶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΕΕ. Τὸ περὶ τήν ψυχήν ἵσως ἄγνοούμεν, ἐπει τὸ γε ἐτερόν που ἔφυγεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

224 ΕΕ. Μουσικήν τε τούνν ξυνάπασαν λέγωμεν,

ⁱ καπηλικὴ bt; καὶ πηλίκη BT.
² διαλαττόμενον] διαλαττομένων BT; διαλάττων W.
³ καὶ χρηται Heindorf; κέχρηται BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes, it was.
STR. Now shall we say that there are two sorts of exchange, the one by gift, the other by sale?
THEAET. So be it.
STR. And we shall say further that exchange by sale is divided into two parts.
THEAET. How so?
STR. We make this distinction—calling the part which sells a man’s own productions the selling of one’s own, and the other, which exchanges the works of others, exchange.
THEAET. Certainly.
STR. Well, then, that part of exchange which is carried on in the city, amounting to about half of it, is called retailing, is it not?
THEAET. Yes.
STR. And that which exchanges goods from city to city by purchase and sale is called merchandising?
THEAET. Certainly.
STR. And have we not observed that one part of merchandising sells and exchanges for cash whatever serves the body for its support and needs, and the other whatever serves the soul?
THEAET. What do you mean by that?
STR. Perhaps we do not know about the part that has to do with the soul; though I fancy we do understand the other division.
THEAET. Yes.
STR. Take, therefore, the liberal arts\(^1\) in general

\(^1\) The word μουσική, here rendered “liberal arts,” is much more inclusive than the English word “music,” designating, as it does, nearly all education and culture except the purely physical. In the Athens of Socrates’ day many, possibly most, of the teachers of music in this larger sense were foreigners, Greeks, of course, but not Athenians.
PLATO

ἐκ πόλεως ἐκάστοτε εἰς πόλιν ἐνθὲν μὲν ὁνηθεῖσαι, ἔτερωσε δὲ ἀγομένην καὶ πιπρασκομένην, καὶ
γραφικὴν καὶ θαυματοποιικὴν καὶ πολλὰ ἐτερα
tῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ μὲν παραμυθίας, τὰ δὲ καὶ σπουδῆς
χάρων ἀχθέντα καὶ πωλούμενα, τὸν ἄγοντα καὶ
πωλοῦντα μηδὲν ἢττον τῆς τῶν στίων καὶ ποτῶν
πράσεως ἐμπορον ὀρθῶς ἀν λεγόμενον παρασχεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

B ἘΕ. Οὐκόν καὶ τὸν μαθήματα ξυνωνομενον
πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα ταυτὸν
προσερεῖς ὄνομα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

II ἘΕ. Τῆς δὴ ψυχεμπορικῆς ταύτης ἀρ’ οὐ
tὸ μὲν ἐπιδεικτικὴ δικαιότατα λέγοιτ’ ἂν, τὸ δὲ
gελοῖον μὲν οὐκ ἢττον τοῦ πρόσθεν, ὡμως δὲ μαθη-
μάτων οὐσιν πράσιν αὐτὴν ἀδελφῷ τῳ τῆς πρά-
ξεως οὐνόματι προσειπείν ανάγκη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ἘΕ. Ταύτης τοινυν τῆς μαθηματοποιικῆς τὸ
C μὲν περὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν μαθήματα ἐτέρωι,
tὸ δὲ περὶ τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄλλω προσρητέουν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ἘΕ. Τεχνοτεχνικὸν μὴν τὸ γε περὶ τάλλα ἀν
ἀρμόττοι· τὸ δὲ περὶ ταύτα σὺ προθυμῆσῃ
λέγειν ὄνομα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τῷ τοῖς ἀν ἄλλο ὄνομα εἰπὼν οὐκ ἂν
πλημμελοῖ πλὴν τὸ νῦν ξητούμενον αὐτὸ εἶναι
τὸ σοφιστικὸν γένος;

ἘΕ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο. ἰθὶ δὴ νῦν ἕνω ὑπαγάγωμεν
αὐτὸ λέγοντες ὡς τὸ κτητικῆς, μεταβλητικῆς;

1 ἰθὶ νῦν BT (ἡ above the line T); ἰθὶ δὴ W.
2 μεταβλητικῆς] μεταβλητικὸν BT.
THE SOPHIST

that constantly go about from city to city, bought in one place and carried to another and sold—painting, and conjuring, and the many other things that affect the soul, which are imported and sold partly for its entertainment and partly for its serious needs; we cannot deny that he who carries these about and sells them constitutes a merchant properly so called, no less than he whose business is the sale of food and drink.

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Then will you give the same name to him who buys up knowledge and goes about from city to city exchanging his wares for money?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. One part of this soul-merchandising might very properly be called the art of display, might it not? But since the other part, though no less ridiculous than the first, is nevertheless a traffic in knowledge, must we not call it by some name akin to its business?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Now of this merchandising in knowledge the part which has to do with the knowledge of the other arts should be called by one name, and that which has to do with virtue by another.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. The name of art-merchant would fit the one who trades in the other arts, and now do you be so good as to tell the name of him who trades in virtue.

THEAET. And what other name could one give, without making a mistake, than that which is the object of our present investigation—the sophist?

STR. No other. Come then, let us now summarize the matter by saying that sophistry has appeared a
PLATO

D ἀγοραστικῆς, ἐμπορικῆς,1 ψυχεμπορικῆς περὶ λόγους καὶ μαθήματα, ἀρετῆς πωλητικῶν δεύτερον ἀνεφάνη σοφιστικῆ.

 theano. Μάλα γε.

εἰ. Τρίτον δέ γ’ οἶμαι σε, κἂν εἴ τις αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος ἐν πόλει, τὰ μὲν ἄνωμένες, τὰ δὲ καὶ τεκτανόμενοι αὐτὸς μαθήματα περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταύτα καὶ πωλῶν ἐκ τούτου τὸ ζῆν προούταξατο, καλεῖν οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν ὅπερ νῦν δή.

 theano. Τί δ’ οὖ μέλλω;

εἰ. Καὶ τὸ κτητικῆς ἀρα μεταβλητικῶν, ἀγορα-

Ε στικῶν, κατηλικῶν εἰτε αὐτοπωλικῶν, ἀμφοτέρως, ὅτι περὶ αὐτὴ τὰ τοιαύτα μαθηματοπωλικῶν γένος, ἀεὶ σὺ προσέρεις, ὡς φαίνει, σοφιστικῶν.

 theano. Ἀνάγκη τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ δεῖ συνακολου-

θεῖν.

12. εἰ. Ἔτι δὴ σκοπῶμεν, εἰ τινὶ τοιῷδε προσέοικεν ἀρὰ τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον γένος.

225 theano. Ποίω δή;

εἰ. Τῆς κτητικῆς ἀγωνιστικῆ τι μέρος ἡμᾶς ἢν.

 theano. Ἡν γὰρ οὖν.

εἰ. Όνικ ἀπὸ τρόπου τοίνυν ἐστὶ διαρεῖν αὐτῆν

δίχα.

 theano. Καθ’ ὅποια λέγε.

εἰ. Τὸ μὲν ἄμμελητικὸν αὐτῆς τυθέντας, τὸ δὲ

μαχητικὸν.

 theano. Ἡστιν.

εἰ. Τῆς τοίνυν μαχητικῆς τῷ μὲν σώματι

1 ἐμπορικῆς] ἐμπορικοῦ ΒΤ.
THE SOPHIST

second time as that part of acquisitive art, art of exchange, of trafficking, of merchandising, of soul-merchandising which deals in words and knowledge, and trades in virtue.

THEAET. Very well.

STR. But there is a third case: If a man settled down here in town and proposed to make his living by selling these same wares of knowledge, buying some of them and making others himself, you would, I fancy, not call him by any other name than that which you used a moment ago.

THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. Then also that part of acquisitive art which proceeds by exchange, and by sale, whether as mere retail trade or the sale of one's own productions, no matter which, so long as it is of the class of merchandising in knowledge, you will always, apparently, call sophistry.

THEAET. I must do so, for I have to follow where the argument leads.

STR. Let us examine further and see if the class we are now pursuing has still another aspect, of similar nature.

THEAET. Of what nature?

STR. We agreed that fighting was a division of acquisitive art.

THEAET. Yes, we did.

STR. Then it is quite fitting to divide it into two parts.

THEAET. Tell what the parts are.

STR. Let us call one part of it the competitive and the other the pugnacious.

THEAET. Agreed.

STR. Then it is reasonable and fitting to give to 295
PLATO

πρὸς σῶματα γυνομένω σχεδὸν εἰκὸς καὶ πρέπουν ὅνομα λέγειν τι τουοῦτον τιθεμένους οἶλον βιαστικὸν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

Ἑ. Τῷ δὲ λόγοις πρὸς λόγους τι τις, ὦ Θεαί-Βτητε, ἄλλο εἰπῇ πλὴν ἀμφισβητητικὸν; ¹

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

Ἑ. Τὸ δὲ γε περὶ τὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις θετέον διττόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πη;

Ἑ. Καθ' οὖν μὲν γὰρ γίγνεται μῆκεσί τε πρὸς ἑναντία μῆκη λόγων καὶ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἀδικα δημοσία, δικανικὸν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

Ἑ. Τὸ δὲ ἐν ἰδίοις αὖ καὶ κατακεκεραματισμένον ἐρωτήσει πρὸς ἀποκρίσεις μῶν εἰθίσμεθα καλεῖν ἀλλο πλὴν ἀντιλογικὸν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

Ἑ. Τοῦ δὲ ἀντιλογικοῦ τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰ C ξυμβόλαια ἀμφισβητεῖται μὲν, εἰκῇ δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνως περὶ αὐτὸ πράττεται, ταῦτα ² θετέον μὲν εἰδος, ἐπεὶ περὶ αὐτὸ διέγνωκεν ὡς ἐτερον ὄν ὁ λόγος, ἀτὰρ ἐπωνυμίας οὖθ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἐτυχεὶν οὔτε νῦν ὑπ' ἡμῶν τυχεῖν ἄξιον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ' κατὰ σμικρὰ γὰρ λίαν καὶ παντοδαπὰ δήμρηται.

Ἑ. Τὸ δὲ γε ἐντεχνον, καὶ περὶ δικαίων αὐτῶν καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλλων ὅλως ἀμφισβητοῦν, ἀρ' οὖκ ἐριστικὸν αὖ λέγειν εἰθίσμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

¹ ἀμφισβητητικὸν Stephanus; ἀμφισβητητικὸν BTW.
² τὰ om. TW.
³ ταῦτα BT; τοῦτο al.

296
THE SOPHIST

that part of the pugnacious which consists of bodily contests some such name as violent.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And what other name than controversy shall we give to the contests of words?

THEAET. No other.

STR. But controversy must be divided into two kinds.

THEAET. How?

STR. Whenever long speeches are opposed by long speeches on questions of justice and injustice in public, that is forensic controversy.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. But that which is carried on among private persons and is cut up into little bits by means of questions and their answers, we are accustomed to call argumentation, are we not?

THEAET. We are.

STR. And that part of argumentation which deals with business contracts, in which there is controversy, to be sure, but it is carried on informally and without rules of art—all that must be considered a distinct class, now that our argument has recognized it as different from the rest, but it received no name from our predecessors, nor does it now deserve to receive one from us.

THEAET. True; for the divisions into which it falls are too small and too miscellaneous.

STR. But that which possesses rules of art and carries on controversy about abstract justice and injustice and the rest in general terms, we are accustomed to call disputation, are we not?

THEAET. Certainly.
PLATO

D ΕΕ. Τοῦ μὴν ἐρωτικοῦ τὸ μὲν χρηματοφορικόν, τὸ δὲ χρηματιστικόν ὑπ' τυγχάνει.
ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι γε.
ΕΕ. Τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τοῖνυν, ἢν ἐκάτερον δεῖ καλεῖν αὐτῶν, πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρή.
ΕΕ. Δοκῶ μὴν τὸ γε ¹ δι' ἴδιον ἤν τῆς περὶ ταῦτα διατριβης ἅμελες τῶν οἰκείων γυγνόμενον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀκούοντων οὐ μεθ' ἴδιον ἅμελες ἀκούομενον καλεῖσθαι κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμὴν οὐχ ἔτερον ἁδολεσχικὸν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Δέχεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτω πως.
ΕΕ. Τούτου τοῖνυν τούναντίων, ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν ἐρίδων χρηματιζόμενον, ἐν τῷ μέρει οὐ πειρῶ νῦν εἰπεῖν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τί ² τις ἂν αὐτοὶ εἰπών ἔτερον οὐκ ἔξαμάρτοι πλὴν γε τὸν θαυμαστὸν πάλιν ἐκεῖνον ἢκεῖν αὐτῷ νῦν τέταρτον τὸν μεταδιωκόμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν σοφιστῆς;
ΕΕ. Οὔδεν ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ χρηματιστικὸν γένος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐρωτικῆς ὑπ' τέχνης, τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς, τῆς ἁμφισβητητικῆς, τῆς μαχητικῆς, τῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς, τῆς κτητικῆς ἐστιν, ὥς ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ μεμήνυκε νῦν, ὁ σοφιστής.
ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.
13. ΕΕ. Ὅρας οὖν ὡς ἀληθῇ λέγεται τὸ ποικίλον εἶναι τούτῳ τὸ θηρίον καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον οὐ τῇ έτέρᾳ ληπτών ⁴;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν ἄμφοιν χρή.

¹ τὸ γε vulg.; τόδε BT; τὸ δὲ W. ² τί add. Heindorf. ³ ἁμφισβητητικῆς ἁμφισβητητικῆς BTW. ⁴ ληπτῶν W; ληπτέων BT.
THE SOPHIST

STR. Well, of disputation, one sort wastes money, the other makes money.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then let us try to tell the name by which we must call each of these.

THEAET. Yes, we must do so.

STR. Presumably the kind which causes a man to neglect his own affairs for the pleasure of engaging in it, but the style of which causes no pleasure to most of his hearers, is, in my opinion, called by no other name than garrulity.

THEAET. Yes, that is about what it is called.

STR. Then the opposite of this, the kind which makes money from private disputes—try now, for it is your turn, to give its name.

THEAET. What other answer could one give without making a mistake, than that now again for the fourth time that wonderful being whom we have so long been pursuing has turned up—the sophist!

STR. Yes, and the sophist is nothing else, apparently, than the money-making class of the disputatious, argumentative, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive art, as our argument has now again stated.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Do you see the truth of the statement that this creature is many-sided and, as the saying is, not to be caught with one hand?

THEAET. Then we must catch him with both.

299
PLATO

ἐν. Ἡρὶ γὰρ οὖν, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν γε οὕτως ποιητέον, τοιόνδε τι μεταθέοντας ἵνας αὐτοῦ, καὶ μοι λέγε· τῶν οἰκετικῶν ὄνοματων καλοῦμεν ἀττα ποι;  
Θεαί. Καὶ πολλά· ἀταρ ποία δὴ τῶν πολλῶν πυρβάνει;  
ἐν. Τὰ τοιάδε, οἶον διηθεὶν τε λέγομεν καὶ διαταῖν καὶ βράττειν καὶ διακρίνειν.  
Θεαί. Τί μὴν;  
ἐν. Καὶ πρὸς γε τούτοις ἔτι ξαίνει, κατάγειν, κερκίζειν, καὶ μυρία ἐν ταῖς τέχναις ἄλλα τοιαύτα ἐνόντα ἐπιστάμεθα. ἢ γὰρ;  
Θεαί. Τὸ ποῖον αὕτων πέρι βουληθεὶς δηλώσαι C παραδείγματα προθεὶς ταῦτα κατὰ πάντων ἦρου;  
ἐν. Διαρικτικά ποι τὰ λεχθέντα εἰρηται ξύμπαντα.  
Θεαί. Ναί.  
ἐν. Κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν τοῖνυν λόγον ὡς περὶ ταῦτα μίαν ουσιν ἐν ἀπασι τέχνην ἐνὸς ὀνόματος ἄξιω- σομεν αὐτὴν.  
Θεαί. Τίνα προσεπόντες;  
ἐν. Διακριτικὴν.  
Θεαί. Ἡρὶ ἀτω.  
ἐν. Σκόκει τῇ ταύτης αὖ δύο ἢ πο πυνώμεθα κατιδείν εἴδη.  
Θεαί. Ταχεῖαν ὡς ἐμοὶ σκέψιν ἐπιτάττεις.  
D ἐν. Καὶ μὴν ἐν γε ταῖς εἰρημέναις διακρισεῖν τὸ μὲν χείρον ἀπὸ βελτίων άποχωρίζειν ἤν, τὸ δ' ὁμοίον ἀφ' ὁμοίου.  

1 διακρίνειν] many emendations have been suggested, none entirely satisfactory, and all probably unnecessary.
THE SOPHIST

STR. Yes, we must, and must go at it with all our might, by following another track of his—in this way. Tell me; of the expressions connected with menial occupations some are in common use, are they not?

THEAET. Yes, many. But to which of the many does your question refer?

STR. To such as these: we say "sift" and "strain" and "winnow" and "separate." \(^1\)

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And besides these there are "card" and "comb" and "beat the web" and countless other technical terms which we know. Is it not so?

THEAET. Why do you use these as examples and ask about them all? What do you wish to show in regard to them?

STR. All those that I have mentioned imply a notion of division.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Then since there is, according to my reckoning, one art involved in all of these operations, let us give it one name.

THEAET. What shall we call it?

STR. The art of discrimination.

THEAET. Very well.

STR. Now see if we can discover two divisions of this.

THEAET. You demand quick thinking, for a boy like me.

STR. And yet, in the instance of discrimination just mentioned there was, first, the separation of worse from better, and, secondly, of like from like.

\(^1\) Apparently a term descriptive of some part of the process of weaving; cf. Cratylus, 338 B.

301
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδὸν οὕτω νῦν λεχθὲν φαίνεται.

ΕΕ. Τῆς μὲν τοῖνοι ὄνομα οὐκ ἔχω λεγόμενον·
tῆς δὲ καταλειπούσης μὲν τὸ βέλτιον διακρίσεως,
tὸ δὲ χείρον ἀποβαλλούσης ἔχω.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε τι.

ΕΕ. Πάσα ἡ τοιαύτη διάκρισις, ὡς ἔγω ξυννοῦ,
λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρμός τις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν.

ΕΕ. Οὐκόν τὸ γε καθαρτικὸν εἶδος αὐθ διπλῶν ὃν πᾶς ἄν ἰδοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ, κατὰ σχολὴν γε ἰσως· οὐ μὴν ἔγωγε
καθορῶ νῦν.

14. ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν τὰ περὶ τὰ σώματα πολλὰ
εἴδη καθάρσεων ἐν περιλαβεῖν ὀνόματι προσήκει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖα καὶ τίνι;

ΕΕ. Τὰ τῶν ζῴων, ὡσα ἐντὸς σωμάτων ὑπὸ
γυμναστικῆς ἱατρικῆς τε ὀρθῶς διακρινόμενα
καθαίρεται καὶ περὶ τάκτος, εἰπεῖν μὲν φαῦλα,
ὡς ἐναντινικῆ παρέχεται· καὶ τῶν ἁψίχων
σωμάτων, ὃν γναφευτικὴ καὶ ξύμπασα κοσμητικὴ
tὴν ἐπιμέλειαν παρεχομένη κατὰ σμικρὰ πολλὰ
καὶ γελοῖα δοκοῦντα ὀνόματα ἐσχεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μάλα γε.

ΕΕ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ᾧ Θεάιτητε. ἀλλὰ γὰρ
τῷ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγοστικῆς ἡ φαρμακο-
ποσίας οὐδὲν ἦττον οὐδὲ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον,
eἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρά, τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ἡμᾶς ὥφελει καθαί-

1 περὶ τάκτος] περιτάκτος B; τὰ περὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς Ἀ Τ.

302
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes, as you now express it, that is pretty clear.

STR. Now I know no common name for the second kind of discrimination; but I do know the name of the kind which retains the better and throws away the worse.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. Every such discrimination, as I think, is universally called a sort of purification.

THEAET. Yes, so it is.

STR. And could not anyone see that purification is of two kinds?

THEAET. Yes, perhaps, in time; but still I do not see it now.

STR. Still there are many kinds of purifications of bodies, and they may all properly be included under one name.

THEAET. What are they and what is the name?

STR. The purification of living creatures, having to do with impurities within the body, such as are successfully discriminated by gymnastics and medicine, and with those outside of the body, not nice to speak of, such as are attended to by the bath-keeper's art; and the purification of inanimate bodies, which is the special care of the fuller's art and in general of the art of exterior decoration; this, with its petty subdivisions, has taken on many names which seem ridiculous.

THEAET. Very.

STR. Certainly they do, Theaetetus. However, the method of argument is neither more nor less concerned with the art of medicine than with that of sponging, but is indifferent if the one benefits us little, the other greatly by its purifying. It en-
PLATO

Β ρον. τού κτήσασθαι γὰρ ἕνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ ἔμμενες καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔμμενες κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη τιμὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔξ ἢ σου πάσας, καὶ βάτερα τῶν ἐτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὀμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἣγείται γελοιότερα, σεμνότερον δὲ τί τῶν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἡ θείαριστικῆς δηλούντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νεώμικεν, ἀλλὰ ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαυνότερον. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὅπερ ἦρον, τί προσεροῦμεν ὄνομα ἡμιπάσας δυνάμεις, ὃσι αὐτὰ εἰτε ἠμφυχον εἰτε ἠμφυχον εἰλήχασιν ¹ καθαίρειν, οὐδὲν αὐτὴ δυοίσει, ποῖον τι C λεξέθεν εὐπρεπέστατον εἶναι δόξει: μόνον ἑκάτω χωρίς τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεων πάντα ξυνδήσαν, ὅσα ἄλλα τύ καθαίρει. τὸν γὰρ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν καθαρμὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπικεχείρηκεν ἁφορίσασθαι τὰ νῦν, εἰ γε ὅπερ βούλεται μανθάνομεν.

θεάι. Ἀλλὰ μεμάθηκα, καὶ συγχωρῶ δύο μὲν εἰδὴ καθάρσεως, ἐν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐδοὺ εἶναι, τοῦ περὶ τὸ σῶμα χωρὶς ὅν.

ἐε. Πάντων κάλλιστα. καὶ μοι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο D ἐπάκουε πειρώμενος αὖ τὸ λεγέθην διχῇ τέμνειν.

θεάι. Καθ' ὁποῖ' ἣν ψηφιγῇ πειράσομαι σοι συντέμνειν.

15. ἐε. Πονηρίαν ἔτερον ἀρετῆς ἐν ψυχῇ λέγομέν τι;

θεάι. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ἐε. Καὶ μὴν καθαρμὸς ἢν τὸ λείπειν ² μὲν βάτερον, ἐκβάλλειν δὲ ὅσον ἃν ἢ ποῦ τί φλαῦρον.

θεάι. Ἑν γὰρ οὖν.

ἐε. Καὶ ψυχῆς ἀρα, καθ' ὅσον ἃν εὑρίσκωμεν

¹ εἰλήχασι Ψ.; εἰλήφασι ΒΤ.
² λείπειν Ηεινόρδ; λείπειν ΒΤ.
THE SOPHIST

deavours to understand what is related and what is not related in all arts, for the purpose of acquiring intelligence; and therefore it honours them all equally and does not in making comparisons think one more ridiculous than another, and does not consider him who employs; as his example of hunting, the art of generalship, any more dignified than him who employs the art of louse-catching, but only, for the most part, as more pretentious. And now as to your question, what name we shall give to all the activities whose function it is to purify the body, whether animate or inanimate, it will not matter at all to our method what name sounds finest; it cares only to unite under one name all purifications of everything else and to keep them separate from the purification of the soul. For it has in our present discussion been trying to separate this purification definitely from the rest, if we understand its desire.

THEAET. But I do understand and I agree that there are two kinds of purification and that one kind is the purification of the soul, which is separate from that of the body.

STR. Most excellent. Now pay attention to the next point and try again to divide the term.

THEAET. In whatever way you suggest, I will try to help you in making the division.

STR. Do we say that wickedness is distinct from virtue in the soul?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And purification was retaining the one and throwing out whatever is bad anywhere?

THEAET. Yes, it was.

STR. Hence whenever we find any removal of evil
PLATO

κακίας ἀφαίρεσιν τινα, καθαρμὸν αὐτὸν λέγοντες ἐν μέλει φθεγξόμεθα.

θεία. Καὶ μᾶλα γε.

ἐ. Δύο μὲν εἴδη κακίας περὶ ψυχῆν ῥητέον.

θεία. Ποία;

228 ἐ. Τὸ μὲν οἶον νόσον ἐν σώματι, τὸ δὲ οἶον ἀλάχος ἐγγυνόμενον.

θεία. Όὐκ ἐμαθον.

ἐ. Νόσον ἵσως καὶ στάσειν οὐ ταῦτάν νενόμικας; θεία. Οὐδὲ αὖ πρὸς τούτο ἔχω τί χρῆ με ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ἐ. Πότερον ἄλλο τι στάσιν ἴγγυμενος ἢ τήν τοῦ φύσιν ἱγγενοῦς ἐκ τινὸς διαφθόρας διαφοράν; θεία. Οὐδέν.

ἐ. Ἅλλ᾽ ἀλάχος ἄλλο τι πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσείδες ἐνὸν γένος; θεία. Οὐδαμῶς ἄλλο.

ἐ. Τί δὲ; ἐν ψυχῇ δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμὸν ἱδοναῖς καὶ λόγον λύπαις καὶ πάντα ἄλληλοις ταῦτα τῶν φλαύρωσ ἐχόντων οὐκ ἵσθημεν διαφερόμενα; θεία. Καὶ σφόδρα γε.

ἐ. Θυγγενῆ γε μὴν εἰς ἀνάγκης ξύμπαντα γέγονεν.

θεία. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ἐ. Στάσιν ἄρα καὶ νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρίαν λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν.

θεία. ὘ρθώτατα μὲν οὖν.

C ἐ. Τί δὲ; δὸσ ἄν κινήσεως μετασχόντα καὶ σκοπόν τινα θέμενα πειρώμενα τοῦτον τυγχάνειν

1 διαφθόρας διαφοράν Galen; διαφοράς διαφθόραν BT, Stobaeus.
2 ἐνον Schleiermacher; ἐν ∆ν Stobaeus; ἐν ∆ν t; ἐν BT.
3 δὸ δὲν Cobet; δὸa BT.

306
THE SOPHIST

from the soul, we shall be speaking properly if we call that a purification.

THEAET. Very properly.

STR. We must say that there are two kinds of evil in the soul.

THEAET. What kinds?

STR. The one is comparable to a disease in the body, the other to a deformity.

THEAET. I do not understand.

STR. Perhaps you have not considered that disease and discord are the same thing?

THEAET. I do not know what reply I ought to make to this, either.

STR. Is that because you think discord is anything else than the disagreement of the naturally related, brought about by some corruption?

THEAET. No; I think it is nothing else.

STR. But is deformity anything else than the presence of the quality of disproportion, which is always ugly?

THEAET. Nothing else at all.

STR. Well then; do we not see that in the souls of worthless men opinions are opposed to desires, anger to pleasures, reason to pain, and all such things to one another?

THEAET. Yes, they are, decidedly.

STR. Yet they must all be naturally related.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then we shall be right if we say that wickedness is a discord and disease of the soul.

THEAET. Yes, quite right.

STR. But if things which partake of motion and aim at some particular mark pass beside the mark

\[^{\text{4}}\text{πειρώμενα T, Galen, Stobaeus; πειρώμεθα W; om. B.}\]

307
PLATO

καθ’ ἑκάστην ὀρμὴν παράφορα αὐτοῦ γίγνεται ¹ καὶ ἀποτυγχάνῃ; ² πότερον αὐτὰ φήσομεν ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα η ἀμετρίας ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας αὐτὰ πάσχειν;

θελ. Δῆλον ὡς ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας.

ἐπ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ψυχὴν γε ἵσμεν ἀκούσαν πᾶσαν πᾶν ἀγνοοῦσαν.

θελ. Σφόδρα γε.

ἐπ. Τὸ γε μὴν ἄγνοεῖν ἐστιν ἐπ’ ἀλήθειαν ὀρμῶν—

μένης ψυχῆς, παραφόρου συνέσεως γνωμομένης, ουδὲν ἄλλο πλῆν παραφροσύνη.

θελ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ἐπ. Ψυχὴν ἀρα ἀνόητον αἰσχρὰν καὶ ἀμετρον θετέον.

θελ. Ἑοίκεν.

ἐπ. Ἑστὶ δὴ δύο ταῦτα, ὡς φαίνεται, κακῶν ἐν αὐτῇ γένη, τὸ μὲν πονηραὶ καλοῦμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, νόσος αὐτῆς σαφέστατα ὢν.

θελ. Ναὶ.

ἐπ. Τὸ δὲ γε ἄγνοιαν μὲν καλοῦσι, κακίαν δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ψυχῇ μόνον γνωμομένον οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ὀμολογεῖν.

Ε ἡθελ. Κομιδῆ συγχωρητέον, δὲ νῦν δὴ λέξαντος ἡμφεγνόσα σου, τὸ δύο εἶναι γένη κακίας ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ δειλίαν μὲν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν εὐμπαινα ἡγητέον νόσον ἐν ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἄγνοιας πάθος αἴσχος θετέον.

¹ γίγνεται BT; γίγνεται al.
² ἀποτυγχάνῃ T; ἀποτυγχάνει B et al.

308
THE SOPHIST

and miss it on every occasion when they try to hit it, shall we say that this happens to them through right proportion to one another or, on the contrary, through disproportion? ¹

THEAET. Evidently through disproportion.

STR. But yet we know that every soul, if ignorant of anything, is ignorant against its will.

THEAET. Very much so.

STR. Now being ignorant is nothing else than the aberration of a soul that aims at truth, when the understanding passes beside the mark.

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Then we must regard a foolish soul as deformed and ill-proportioned.

THEAET. So it seems.

STR. Then there are, it appears, these two kinds of evils in the soul, one, which people call wickedness, which is very clearly a disease.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And the other they call ignorance, but they are not willing to acknowledge that it is vice, when it arises only in the soul.

THEAET. It must certainly be admitted, though I disputed it when you said it just now, that there are two kinds of vice in the soul, and that cowardice, intemperance, and injustice must all alike be considered a disease in us, and the widespread and various condition of ignorance must be regarded as a deformity.

¹ The connexion between disproportion and missing the mark is not obvious. The explanation that a missile (e.g. an arrow) which is not evenly balanced will not fly straight, fails to take account of the words πρὸς ἀλληλα. The idea seems rather to be that moving objects of various sizes, shapes, and rates of speed must interfere with each other.
PLATO

16. ΗΕ. Οὖκον ἐν σώματί γε περὶ δύο παθήματε
toutw δύο τέχνα τινὲ εγενέσθην;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνε τούτω;

229 ΗΕ. Περὶ μὲν αἰσχος γυμναστικὴ, περὶ δὲ νόσου
ιατρική.
ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεσθον.

ΗΕ. Οὖκον καὶ περὶ μὲν ὑβριν καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ
deuλιαν ἡ κολαστικὴ πέφυκε τεχνῶν μάλιστα δὴ
πασῶν προσήκουσα Δίκη 1;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ γοῦν εἰκὸς, ὡς εἰπεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρω-
píνην δόξαν.

ΗΕ. Τί δὲ; περὶ ξύμπασαν ἁγνοιαν μῶν ἅλλην
tinā ἡ διδασκαλικὴ ὁρθότερον εἴποι τις ἄν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδεμίαν.

ΗΕ. Φέρε δὴ; διδασκαλικὴς δὲ ἀρα ἐν μονὸν
Β γένος φατέον εἶναι ἡ πλείω, δυὸ δὲ των αὐτῆς
eίναι μεγίστω, σκόπει.
ΘΕΑΙ. Σκοπῶ.

ΗΕ. Καὶ μοι δοκοῦμεν τῆδε ἀν πη τάχιστα εὑρέων.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ;

ΗΕ. Τὴν ἁγνοιαν ἰδόντες εἰ πη κατὰ μέσον αὐτῆς 2
tomην ἐχει τινα. διπλή γὰρ αὐτὴ γυγνομένη δῆλον
ὅτι καὶ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν δύο ἀναγκάζει μόρια ἐχειν,
ἔν ἐφ' ἐνι γένει τῶν αὐτῆς ἐκατέρω.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί οὖν; καταφανές πη σοι τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον;

Ο. Ἀγνοιας γοῦν 3 μέγα τι μοι δοκῶ καὶ
χαλεπῶν ἀφωρισμένον ὅραν εἴδος, πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις
αὐτῆς ἀντίσταθμον μέρεσιν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίον δῆ;

ΗΕ. Τὸ μῆ κατειδότα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι· δὲ οὗ

1 Δίκη Cobet; Δίκη BT, Stobaeus.
2 αὐτῆς W; αὐτῆς BT.
3 γοῦν W; 8' οὖν BT.

310
THE SOPHIST

str. In the case of the body there are two arts which have to do with these two evil conditions, are there not?

theaet. What are they?

str. For deformity there is gymnastics, and for disease medicine.

theaet. That is clear.

str. Hence for insolence and injustice and cowardice is not the corrective art the one of all arts most closely related to Justice?

theaet. Probably it is, at least according to the judgement of mankind.

str. And for all sorts of ignorance is there any art it would be more correct to suggest than that of instruction?

theaet. No, none.

str. Come now, think. Shall we say that there is only one kind of instruction, or that there are more and that two are the most important?

theaet. I am thinking.

str. I think we can find out most quickly in this way.

theaet. In what way?

str. By seeing whether ignorance admits of being cut in two in the middle; for if ignorance turns out to be twofold, it is clear that instruction must also consist of two parts, one for each part of ignorance.

theaet. Well, can you see what you are now looking for?

str. I at any rate think I do see one large and grievous kind of ignorance, separate from the rest, and as weighty as all the other parts put together.

theaet. What is it?

str. Thinking that one knows a thing when one
κινδυνεύει πάντα ὁσα διανοια σφαλλόμεθα γίγνεσθαι πάσων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΕΕ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτω γε οἶμαι μόνω τῆς ἁγνοίας ἀμαθίαν τοῦνομα προσφηῆναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω γε.

ΕΕ. Τί δὲ δὴ τῷ τῆς διδασκαλίκης ἀρα μέρει τῷ τούτῳ ἀπαλλάττουτι λεκτέον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶμαι μὲν οὖν, ὥς ἔσεν, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο δημιουργικός διδασκαλίας, τούτῳ δὲ ἐνθάδε γε παίδειαν δι’ ἠμῶν κεκληθαι.

ΕΕ. Καὶ γὰρ σχεδόν, ὡς Θεαίτητε, ἐν πάσω Ἐλλησι. ἄλλα γὰρ ἠμῶν ἔτι καὶ τούτῳ σκεπτέον, εἰ ἄτομον ἤδη ἐστὶ πάν ἡ τινα ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἄξιαν ἐπωνυμίας.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀυκοῦν χρῆ σκοπεῖν.

17. ΕΕ. Δοκεῖ τοῖνυν μοι καὶ τοῦτο ἐτὶ τῇ σχίζεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κατὰ τί;

ΕΕ. Τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διδασκαλίκης ἡ μὲν Ετραχυτέρα τις ἐουκεν ὅδος εἶναι, τὸ δ’ ἐτέρον αὐτῆς μόριον λειώτερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ τούτων ἐκάτερον λέγωμεν;

ΕΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἀρχαιοπρεπὲς τι πάτριον, ὡς πρὸς τοὺς νῦεσ μάλιστ’ ἐχρώντο τε καὶ ἐτι πολλοὶ χρώντα τὰ νῦν, ὅταν αὐτοὶς ἐξαμαρτάνοι τι, τὰ μὲν 230 χαλεπαίνοντες, τὰ δὲ μαλβακωτέρως παραμυθοῦ-μενοι τὸ δ’ οὖν ἔμπαν αὐτὸ ὁρθότατα εἰποὶ τις ἀν νουθητηκήν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀμηθίνων οὖτως.

ΕΕ. Τὸ δὲ γε, εἶξασι 1 τινες αὐξ λόγον ἑαυτοῖς

1 εἶξασι BT, Stobaeus; ὡς εἶξασι vulg.

312
THE SOPHIST

does not know it. Through this, I believe, all the
mistakes of the mind are caused in all of us.

THEAET. True.

STR. And furthermore to this kind of ignorance
alone the name of stupidity is given.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Now what name is to be given to that part
of instruction which gets rid of this?

THEAET. I think, Stranger, that the other part is
called instruction in handicraft, and that this part
is here at Athens through our influence called
education.

STR. And so it is, Theaetetus, among nearly all
the Hellenes. But we must examine further and see
whether it is one and indivisible or still admits of
division important enough to have a name.

THEAET. Yes, we must see about that.

STR. I think there is still a way in which this also
may be divided.

THEAET. On what principle?

STR. Of instruction in arguments one method
seems to be rougher, and the other section smoother.

THEAET. What shall we call each of these?

STR. The venerable method of our fathers, which
they generally employed towards their sons, and
which many still employ, of sometimes showing
anger at their errors and sometimes more gently
exhorting them—that would most properly be called
as a whole admonition.

THEAET. That is true.

STR. On the other hand, some appear to have con-
PLATO

δόντες ἡγῆσασθαι πᾶσαν ἀκούσιον ἀμαθίαν εἶναι, καὶ μαθεῖν οὐδὲν ποτ’ ἂν ἔθελεν τὸν οἴομενον εἶναι
σοφὸν τούτων διὶ οὐκοτο περὶ δεινὸς εἶναι, μετὰ δὲ
πολλοὶ πόνου τὸ νουθετητικὸν εἴδος τῆς παιδείας
σμικρὸν ἀνύτειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὄρθως γε νομίζοντες.

Β. Τῷ τοι ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἐπὶ ἐκβολήν ἄλλω
τρόπῳ στέλλονται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνι δή;

Ε. Διερωτῶσιν ὃν ἂν οὐρταί τὸν τι πέρι λέγειν
λέγων μηδὲν· εἶθ’ ἀτε πλανωμένων τὸς δόξας
ῥαδίως ἑξετάζοντι, καὶ συνάγωντες δὴ τοῖς λόγοις
εἰς ταῦταν τιθέασι παρ’ ἄλληλας, τιθέντες δὲ
ἐπιδεικνύοντι αὐτὰς αὐτάς 1 ἀμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταῦτα ἑναντίας· οἱ δ’ ὀρῶντες
ἐαυτοῖς μὲν χαλεπαίνοντι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους
ἡμεροῦνται, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τῷ τρόπῳ τῶν περὶ

C αὐτοὺς μεγάλων καὶ σκληρῶν δοξῶν ἀπαλλάττονται

πασῶν 2 ἀπαλλαγῶν ἄκουειν τε ἡδιστὴν καὶ τῷ
πάσχοντι βεβαιῶτατα γιγνομένην. νομίζοντες γάρ,
ὅ παί φίλε, οἱ καθαίροντες αὐτοὺς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ
tὰ σώματα ἱατροὶ νεομίκας μὴ πρότερον ἂν τῆς
προσφερεμένης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σῶμα,
πρὸς ἄν τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα ἐν αὐτῶς ἐκ βάλῃ, ταύτων
καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς διενοθήσαν ἐκεῖνοι, μὴ πρότερον
αὐτὴν ἑξειν τῶν προσφερεμένων μαθημάτων ἄνησον,

D πρὸς ἂν ἐλέγχων τὺς τῶν ἐλεγχόμενων εἰς αὐχύνειν
καταστῆσαι, τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμπόδιοις δόξας
ἐξελών, καθαρὸν ἀποφήγη καὶ ταύτα ἱγνοῦμενον,
ἀπερ ὀλθεν, εἰδέναι μόνα, πλείω δὲ μη.

1 αὐταῖς} αὐταῖς BT.
2 πασῶν Stobaeus; πασῶν τε BT.
vinced themselves that all ignorance is involuntary, and that he who thinks himself wise would never be willing to learn any of those things in which he believes he is clever, and that the admonitory kind of education takes a deal of trouble and accomplishes little.

THEAET. They are quite right.

STR. So they set themselves to cast out the conceit of cleverness in another way.

THEAET. In what way?

STR. They question a man about the things about which he thinks he is talking sense when he is talking nonsense; then they easily discover that his opinions are like those of men who wander, and in their discussions they collect those opinions and compare them with one another, and by the comparison they show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things and in respect to the same things. But those who see this grow angry with themselves and gentle towards others, and this is the way in which they are freed from their high and obstinate opinions about themselves. The process of freeing them, moreover, affords the greatest pleasure to the listeners and the most lasting benefit to him who is subjected to it. For just as physicians who care for the body believe that the body cannot get benefit from any food offered to it until all obstructions are removed, so, my boy, those who purge the soul believe that the soul can receive no benefit from any teachings offered to it until someone by cross-questioning reduces him who is cross-questioned to an attitude of modesty, by removing the opinions that obstruct the teachings, and thus purges him and makes him think that he knows only what he knows, and no more.
PLATO

ἡ Θελίστη γούν καὶ σωφρονεστάτη τῶν ἔξεων αὐτῆ.

Ἑ. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ἦμιν, ὡς Θεαίτητε, καὶ τὸν ἐλεγχόν λεκτέον ὡς ἄρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεων ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὐνομιστέον, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνῃ βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ὡς, Ἐτὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα, ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν γεγονέναι ταῦτα, ἀ καθαρώτατον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπετεῖ τὸν ὄντως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.

Θε. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

18. Ἑ. Τὸ δὲ; τὸύς ταύτας χρωμένους τῇ τέχνῃ 231 τίνος φύσομεν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ φοβοῦμαι σοφιστᾶς φᾶναι.

Θε. Τὸ δή;

Ἑ. Μὴ μείξον αὐτοῖς προσάπτωμεν γέρας.

Θε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν προσέοικε τοιοῦτω τινὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα.

Ἑ. Καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἠμερωτάτω. τὸν δὲ ἀσφαλῆ δεῖ πάντων μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ὀμοιότητας αἰεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τῆν φυλακὴν. ὁ λοιπὸν ἀπαίδευτον γὰρ τὸ γένος. ὃμως δὲ ἔστωσαν οὐ γὰρ περὶ σμικρῶν ὀρῶν τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν οἴομαι γενήσεσθαι
Β τὸτε ὅποταν ἰκανῶς φυλάττωσιν.

Θε. Οὔκουν τὸ γε εἰκός.

Ἑ. Ἐστῶ δὴ διακριτικὴ τέχνης καθαρτικὴ, καθαρτικὴς δὲ τὸ περὶ ψυχῆν μέρος ἀφωρίσθω, τούτου δὲ διδασκαλικῆ, διδασκαλικῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς τῆς ἀπαίδευτικῆς ὧν περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γνωμόνεος ἐλεγχὸς ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανέντι μὴ δὲν ἂλλ' ἦμιν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική.

316
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. That is surely the best and most reasonable state of mind.

STR. For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must assert that cross-questioning is the greatest and most efficacious of all purifications, and that he who is not cross-questioned, even though he be the Great King, has not been purified of the greatest taints, and is therefore uneducated and deformed in those things in which he who is to be truly happy ought to be most pure and beautiful.

THEAET. Perfectly true.

STR. Well then, who are those who practise this art? I am afraid to say the sophists.

THEAET. Why so?

STR. Lest we grant them too high a meed of honour.

THEAET. But the description you have just given is very like someone of that sort.

STR. Yes, and a wolf is very like a dog; the wildest like the tamest of animals. But the cautious man must be especially on his guard in the matter of resemblances, for they are very slippery things. However, let us agree that they are the sophists; for I think the strife will not be about petty discriminations when people are sufficiently on their guard.

THEAET. No, probably not.

STR. Then let it be agreed that part of the discriminating art is purification, and as part of purification let that which is concerned with the soul be separated off, and as part of this, instruction, and as part of instruction, education; and let us agree that the cross-questioning of empty conceit of wisdom, which has come to light in our present discussion, is nothing else than the true-born art of sophistry.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Δειγμάτω μέν· ἀπορῶ δὲ ἔγραψε ἢδη διὰ τὸ πολλὰ πεφάνθαι, τί χρή ποτὲ ὡς ἀλήθη λέγοντα καὶ δισχυρίζομενον ἐπειών ὄντως εἶναι τοῖς σοφιστήν.

Ε. Εἰκὸτως γε σὺ ἀπορῶν. ἀλλὰ τοι κακεῖνον ἡγεῖσθαι χρή νῦν ἢδη σφόδρα ἀπορεῖν ὅτι ποτὲ ἐτι διαδύσεται τὸν λόγον· ὀρθὴ γὰρ ἡ παροιμία, τὸ τὰς ἀπάσας μὴ ὀδίων εἶναι διαφεύγειν. νῦν οὖν καὶ μᾶλιστα ἐπιθετέον αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς λέγεις.

19. Ε. Πρώτων δὴ στάντες οἶον ἐξαναπνεύσωμεν, καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλογισώμεθα ἁμα ἀνα-καταγωγισμένου, φέρε, ὅποσα ἡμῖν ὁ σοφιστὴς πέφανται. δοκῶ μὲν γὰρ, τὸ πρώτων ἡμέρθη νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἐξεμμισθος θηρευτῆς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

Ε. Τὸ δὲ γε δεύτερον ἐμπορός τις περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω γε.

Ε. Τρίτων δὲ ἄρα οὐ περὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα κάπηλος ἀνεφάνη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί, καὶ τέταρτον γε αὐτοπώλης περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡμῖν ἢν. ²

Ε. Ὅρθως ἐμνημονεύσας. πέμπτων δὲ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι μνημονεύειν· τῆς γὰρ ἀγωνιστικῆς Ε. περὶ λόγους ἢν τις ἁθλητής, τῆν ἐρυστικῆν τέχνην ἀφωρισμένος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν γὰρ οὖν.

Ε. Τὸ γε μὴν ἐκτὸν ἀμφιβηθήσομον μὲν, ὡμως δ' ἐθεμεν αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχῆς καθαρτὴν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνταπασι μὲν οὖν.

1 γάρ W; γάρ ἀν BT. ² ἢ add. Heindorf.

318
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Let us agree to all that; but the sophist has by this time appeared to be so many things that I am at a loss to know what in the world to say he really is, with any assurance that I am speaking the truth.

STR. No wonder you are at a loss. But it is fair to suppose that by this time he is still more at a loss to know how he can any longer elude our argument; for the proverb is right which says it is not easy to escape all the wrestler's grips. So now we must attack him with redoubled vigour.

THEAET. You are right.

STR. First, then, let us stop to take breath and while we are resting let us count up the number of forms in which the sophist has appeared to us. First, I believe, he was found to be a paid hunter after the young and wealthy.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And secondly a kind of merchant in articles of knowledge for the soul.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And thirdly did he not turn up as a retailer of these same articles of knowledge?

THEAET. Yes, and fourthly we found he was a seller of his own productions of knowledge.

STR. Your memory is good; but I will try to recall the fifth case myself. He was an athlete in contests of words, who had taken for his own the art of disputation.

THEAET. Yes, he was.

STR. The sixth case was doubtful, but nevertheless we agreed to consider him a purger of souls, who removes opinions that obstruct learning.

THEAET. Very true.
PLATO

232 Ἕ. Ἀρ'] οὖν ἐννοεῖς, ὅταν ἑπιστήμων τις πολλῶν φαίνεται, μᾶς δὲ τέχνης ὁνόματι προσ- αγορεύεται, τὸ φάντασμα τοῦτο ὡς οὐκ ἔσθ' ὑγίες, ἀλλὰ δὴλον ὡς ὁ πάσχων αὐτὸ πρὸς τινα τέχνην οὐ δύναται κατιδεῖν ἐκεῖνο αὐτής εἰς ὁ πάντα τὰ μαθήματα ταῦτα βλέπει, διὸ καὶ πολλοὶς ὁνόμασιν ἀνθ' ἐνὸς τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὰ προσαγορεύει;

ต้น1. Κινδυνεύει τοῦτο ταύτη τῇ μάλιστα πεφυ- κέναι.

Β 20. Ἕ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἥμεις γε αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ξητήσει δι' ἄργιαν πάσχωμεν, ἀλλ' ἀναλάβωμεν πρῶτον τι τῶν περὶ τὸν σοφιστήν εἰρημένων. ἐν γὰρ τι μοι μάλιστα κατεφάνη αὐτὸν μηνύον.

τ. Τὸ ποιῶν;

ἕ. Ἀντιλογικόν αὐτὸν ἐφαμεν εἰναι ποι.

τ. Ναὶ.

ἕ. Τί δ'; οὐ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῦ τούτου διδα- σκαλον γίγνεσθαι;

τ. Τί μὴν;

ἕ. Σκοπῶμεν δή, περὶ τίνος ἄρα καὶ φασίν οι τοιοῦτοι ποιεῖν ἀντιλογικούς. ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν ἐξ C ἀρχῆς ἔστω τῇ δὲ πη. φέρε, περὶ τῶν θείων, δόθ' ἀφανῇ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἃρ' ἰκανοὺς ποιοῦσι τοῦτο δράν;

τ. Δέγεται γοῦν 1 δή περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα.

ἕ. Τί δ'; ὡσα φανερὰ γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

τ. Τί γάρ;

ἕ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν γε ταῖς ἱδίαις συνονοσίαις, ὁπόταν γενέσεως τε καὶ οὐσίας πέρι κατὰ πάντων

1 γοῦν W; οὖν BT.
THE SOPHIST

str. Then do you see that when a man appears to know many things, but is called by the name of a single art, there is something wrong about this impression, and that, in fact, the person who labours under this impression in connexion with any art is clearly unable to see the common principle of the art, to which all these kinds of knowledge pertain, so that he calls him who possesses them by many names instead of one?

theaet. Something like that is very likely to be the case.

str. We must not let that happen to us in our search through lack of diligence. So let us first take up again one of our statements about the sophist. For there is one of them which seemed to me to designate him most plainly.

theaet. Which was it?

str. I think we said he was a disputer.

theaet. Yes.

str. And did we not also say that he taught this same art of disputing to others?

theaet. Certainly.

str. Now let us examine and see what the subjects are about which such men say they make their pupils able to dispute. Let us begin our examination at the beginning with this question: Is it about divine things which are invisible to others that they make people able to dispute?

theaet. That is their reputation, at any rate.

str. And how about the visible things of earth and heaven and the like?

theaet. Those are included, of course.

str. And furthermore in private conversations, when the talk is about generation and being in
Γλένται τι, ξύνομεν ως αυτοί τε άντειπείν δενοί
tούσ τε ἄλλους ὅτι πουούσιν ἀπερ αυτοῖ δυνατοῖς;
θεαί. Παντάπασι γε.

D ΞΕ. Τί δ' αὖ περί νόμων καὶ ξυμπάντων τῶν
πολιτικῶν, ἃρ' οὐχ ὑποσχοῦνται ποιεῖν ἀμφισβη-
tητικοὺς;
θεαί. Οὔδεις γὰρ ἂν αυτοῖς, ὡς ἐποσ εἰπεῖν,
dιελέγετο μὴ τούτο ὑποσχομένοις.

ΞΕ. Τά γε μὴν περί πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν
ἐκάστην τέχνην, ἃ δεὶ πρὸς ἐκαστον αὐτῶν τὸν
δημοσαυρίαν ἀντειπεῖν, διενομοῦσαμένα που καταβε-
βλήται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν.
θεαί. Τά Πρωταγόρεια μοι φαίνει περὶ τε πάλης
Ε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν εἰρήκεναι.

ΞΕ. Καὶ πολλῶν γε, ὡς μακάρις, ἐτέρων. ἀτάρ
dὴ τὸ τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης ἃρ' οὐκ ἐν κεφαλαίω
περὶ πάντων πρὸς ἀμφισβήτησιν ἴκανή τις δύναμις
ἔοικ' εἶναι;
θεαί. Φαίνεται γοὺς σχεδὸν οὐδὲν ὑπολίπειν.

ΞΕ. Σὺ δὴ πρὸς θεῶν, μὴ παί, δυνατὸν ἡγεῖ τοῦτο;
tάχα γὰρ ἃν ὑμεῖς μὲν ὥστερον οἱ νέοι πρὸς αὐτὸ
βλέποιτε, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμβλυτέρον.

233 θεαί. Τὸ ποίον, καὶ πρὸς τί μάλιστα λέγεις; οὐ
γὰρ πὼ κατανοῶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

ΞΕ. Εἰ πάντα ἐπίστασθαι τω ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ
δυνατόν.
θεαί. Μακάριον μὲντ' ἂν ἡμῶν, ὡς ἔτε, ἂν τὸ
γένος.

ΞΕ. Πώς οὖν ἂν ποτὲ τις πρὸς γε τὸν ἐπιστά-
μενον αὐτὸς ἀνεπιστήμων ὅν δύναι τὸ ὑμεῖς τι
λέγων ἀντειπεῖν;

1 ἀμφισβητητικοὺς] ἀμφισβητητικοὺς Τ.
THE SOPHIST

general, we know (do we not?) that they are clever disputants themselves and impart equal ability to others.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And how about laws and public affairs in general? Do they not promise to make men able to argue about those?

THEAET. Yes, for nobody, to speak broadly, would attend their classes if they did not make that promise.

STR. However in all arts jointly and severally what the professional ought to answer to every opponent is written down somewhere and published that he who will may learn.

THEAET. You seem to refer to the text-books of Protagoras on wrestling and the other arts.

STR. Yes, my friend, and to those of many other authors. But is not the art of disputation, in a word, a trained ability for arguing about all things?

THEAET. Well, at any rate, it does not seem to leave much out.

STR. For heaven's sake, my boy, do you think that is possible? For perhaps you young people may look at the matter with sharper vision than our duller sight.

THEAET. What do you mean and just what do you refer to? I do not yet understand your question.

STR. I ask whether it is possible for a man to know all things.

THEAET. If that were possible, Stranger, ours would indeed be a blessed race.

STR. How, then, can one who is himself ignorant say anything worth while in arguing with one who knows?
PLATO

σε. Τί ποτ' οὖν ἂν εἴη τὸ τῆς σοφιστικῆς δυνάμεως θαύμα;

σε. Τοῦ δὴ πέρι;

β σε. Καθ' ὅν τινα τρόπον ποτὲ δυνατὸι τοῖς νέοις δόξαι παρασκευάζεσθαι, ὡς εἰδοὶ πάντα πάντων αὐτοὶ σοφώτατοι. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ μήτε ἀντέλεγον ὀρθῶς μήτε ἐκείνους ἐφάνοντο, φαινόμενοι τε εἰ μηδὲν αὐ μᾶλλον ἐδόκουν διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἶναι φρόνιμοι, τὸ σὸν ἢ τοῦτο, σχολὴ ποτ' ἂν αὐτοῖς τις χρήματα διδοὺς ἦθελεν ἂν τούτων αὐτῶν μαθητὴς γίγνεσθαι.

σε. Σχολὴ μὲν' ἂν.

σε. Νῦν δὲ γ' ἑθέλουσιν;

σε. Καὶ μάλα.

σε. Δοκοῦσι γὰρ, οἷμαι, πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπιστημονῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀπερ ἀντιλέγουσιν.

σε. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

σε. Δρῶσι δὲ γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἀπαντᾷ, φαμέν;

σε. Ναί.

σε. Πάντα ἄρα σοφοὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς φαίνονται.

σε. Τί μήν;

σε. Οὐκ ἄντες γε' ἀδύνατον γὰρ τοῦτο γε ἐφάνη.

σε. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀδύνατον;

21. σε. Δοξαστικήν ἄρα τινὰ περὶ πάντων ἐπιστήμην ὁ σοφιστής ἦμιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀλήθειαν ἔχων ἀναπέφανται.

1 τὸ σὸν] τόσον ΒΤ\ arabic_numeral
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. He cannot at all.

STR. Then what in the world can the magical power of the sophistical art be?

THEAET. Magical power in what respect?

STR. In the way in which they are able to make young men think that they themselves are in all matters the wisest of men. For it is clear that if they neither disputed correctly nor seemed to the young men to do so, or again if they did seem to dispute rightly but were not considered wiser on that account, nobody, to quote from you, ¹ would care to pay them money to become their pupil in these subjects.

THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. But now people do care to do so?

THEAET. Very much.

STR. Yes, for they are supposed, I fancy, to have knowledge themselves of the things about which they dispute.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And they do that about all things, do they not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Then they appear to their pupils to be wise in all things.

THEAET. To be sure.

STR. Though they are not; for that was shown to be impossible.

THEAET. Of course it is impossible.

STR. Then it is a sort of knowledge based upon mere opinion that the sophist has been shown to possess about all things, not true knowledge.

¹ Cf. 232 d.
PLATO

D θεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, καὶ κινδυνεύει γε τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον ὀρθότατα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρήσθαι.

Ε. Λάβωμεν τοῖνυν σαφέστερόν τι παράδειγμα περὶ τούτων.

θεαί. Τὸ ποίον δὴ;

Ε. Τόδε. καὶ μοι πειρῶ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εὖ μάλα ἀποκρίνασθαι.

θεαί. Τὸ ποίον;

Ε. Εἰ τις φαίη μὴ λέγειν μηδ’ ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν καὶ δράν μιᾷ τέχνῃ ξυνάπαντα ἐπίστασθαι πράγματα.

Ε. θεαί. Πῶς πάντα εἰπεῖς;

Ε. Τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ρηθέντος σὺ γὰρ ἡμῖν εὐθὺς ἀγνοεῖς. τὰ γὰρ ξύμπαντα, ὡς ἔοικας, οὐ μανθάνεις.

θεαί. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ε. Λέγω τοῖνυν σὲ καὶ ἔμε τῶν πάντων καὶ πρὸς ἡμῖν τὰλλα ζῷα καὶ δένδρα.

θεαί. Πῶς λέγεις;

Ε. Εἰ τις ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰλλα φυτὰ πάντα ποιήσειν φαίη.

θεαί. Τίνα δὴ λέγων τὴν ποιήσων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ 234 γεωργὸν γε ἔρεις τινα. καὶ γὰρ ζῴων αὐτῶν εἰπεῖς ποιήσων.

Ε. Φημὶ, καὶ πρὸς γε θαλάττης καὶ γῆς καὶ ὀδορανοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμπάντων· καὶ τοῖνυν καὶ ταχὺ ποιήσας αὐτῶν ἐκαστα πάνω σμικροῦ νομίσματος ἁποδίδοται.

θεαί. Παιδιὰν λέγεις τινά.

Ε. Τί δὲ; τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι πάντα οἶδε καὶ

1 ποιήσειν W; ποιήσων ΒΤ. 2 καὶ γῆς W; om. ΒΤ.

326
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Certainly; and I shouldn't be surprised if that were the most accurate statement we have made about him so far.

STR. Let us then take a clearer example to explain this.

THEAET. What sort of an example?

STR. This one; and try to pay attention and to give a very careful answer to my question.

THEAET. What is the question?

STR. If anyone should say that by virtue of a single art he knew how, not to assert or dispute, but to do and make all things—

THEAET. What do you mean by all things?

STR. You fail to grasp the very beginning of what I said; for apparently you do not understand the word "all."

THEAET. No, I do not.

STR. I mean you and me among the "all," and the other animals besides, and the trees.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. If one should say that he would make you and me and all other created beings.

THEAET. What would he mean by "making"? Evidently you will not say that he means a husbandman; for you said he was a maker of animals also.

STR. Yes, and of sea and earth and heaven and gods and everything else besides; and, moreover, he makes them all quickly and sells them for very little.

THEAET. This is some joke of yours.

STR. Yes? And when a man says that he knows all things and can teach them to another for a small
ταύτα ἔτερον ἄν διδάξειν ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ
χρόνῳ, μῦν οὐ παιδιὰν νομιστεόν;
ἐκαῖ. Πάντως πού.

Β ἔκα. Παιδιὰς δὲ ἔχεις ἢ τι τεχνικότερον ἢ καὶ
χαριότερον εἶδος ἢ τὸ μιμητικὸν;
ἐκαῖ. Οὐδαμῶς. πάμπολυ γὰρ εἰρηκας εἶδος
ἐὰς ἐν πάντα ἐκλαβῶς καὶ σχεδον ποικιλώστατον.

22. ἔκα. Οὐκοῦν τὸν γὰρ ὑποχνούμενον δυνατὸν
εἶναι μυᾷ τέχνη πάντα ποιεῖν γιγνώσκομεν ποιοῦ
τούτο, ὅτι μιμήματα καὶ διάμωνοι τῶν ὄντων
ἀπεγραζόμενοι τῇ γραφικῇ τέχνῃ δυνατός ἐσται
τούς ἀνοῆτους τῶν νέων παιδῶν, πόρρωθεν τὰ
γεγραμμένα ἐπιδεικνύς, λανθάνειν ὡς ὀτιπερ ἄν
βουλήθη δρᾶν, τούτῳ ἱκανώτατος ὡν ἀποτελεῖν
ἐγραφή.

C ἐκαῖ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ἔκα. Τί δὲ δῆ; περὶ τούς λόγους ἃρ’ οὗ προσ-
δεχόμεν εἶναι τῶν ἄλλην τέχνην, ἢ ἀδ’ δυνατὸν ὃν
τυγχάνει τοῦς νέους καὶ ἕτει πόρρω τῶν πραγμάτων
τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφεστῶτας διὰ τῶν ὡτῶν τοὺς λόγους
γοητευέων, δεικνύωτας εἴδωλα λεγόμενα περὶ πάντων,
ὡςτε ποιεῖν ἀλήθη δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸν λέγοντα
δὴ σοφότατον πάντων ἀπαντ’ εἶναι;

D ἐκαῖ. Τί γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἰη ἄλλη τῆς τοιαύτη
tέχνη;

ἔκα. Τοὺς πολλοὺς οὖν, ὡ Θεαίτητε, τῶν τότε
ἀκοῦόντων ἃρ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη χρόνου τε ἐπελθόντος
αὐτῶς ἱκανοῦ καὶ προούσης ἡλικίας τοῖς τε ὅσοι
προσπίπτοντας ἐγγύθεν καὶ διὰ παθημάτων ἀναγκα-
ζομένους ἔναργιας ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μετα-

1 ἢ ἀδ’ δυνατὸν ὃν τυγχάνει Burnet; ἢ (ἢ T) οὗ δυνατὸν αὐ
tυγχάνειν BT; ἢ ὃν δυνατὸν αὐ τυγχάνει Madvig.

328
THE SOPHIST

price in a little time, must we not consider that a joke?

THEAET. Surely we must.

STR. And is there any more artistic or charming kind of joke than the imitative kind?

THEAET. Certainly not; for it is of very frequent occurrence and, if I may say so, most diverse. Your expression is very comprehensive.

STR. And so we recognize that he who professes to be able by virtue of a single art to make all things will be able by virtue of the painter's art, to make imitations which have the same names as the real things, and by showing the pictures at a distance will be able to deceive the duller ones among young children into the belief that he is perfectly able to accomplish in fact whatever he wishes to do.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Well then, may we not expect to find that there is another art which has to do with words, by virtue of which it is possible to bewitch the young through their ears with words while they are still standing at a distance from the realities of truth, by exhibiting to them spoken images of all things, so as to make it seem that they are true and that the speaker is the wisest of all men in all things?

THEAET. Why should there not be such another art?

STR. Now most of the hearers, Theaetetus, when they have lived longer and grown older, will perceive come closer to realities and will be forced by sad experience⁠¹ openly to lay hold on realities; they

¹ Apparently a reference to a proverbial expression. Cf. Hesiod, Works, 216 ἐγὼ παθὼν; Herodotus, i. 207 τὰ παθήματα μαθήματα.
PLATO

βάλλειν τὰς τότε γενομένας δόξας, ὡστε σμικρὰ μὲν φαίνεσθαι τὰ μεγάλα, χαλεπὰ δὲ τὰ ράδια, καὶ 
Επάντα πάντη ἀνατετράφθαι τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις 
φαντάσματα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐργῶν 
παραγενομένων;

 epsilon. Οἷς γοῦν ἐμοὶ τηλικῷ δέ ὁντι κρῆναι. οἴμαι 
δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἐπὶ πόρωθεν ἀφεστηκότων εἶναι.

 epsilon. Τοιγαροῦν ἥμηες σε οἴδε πάντες πειρασόμεθα 
καὶ νῦν πειρώμεθα ὡς ἐγγύτατα ἀνευ τῶν παθημάτων 
προσάγειν. περὶ δὲ οὖν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ τόδε μοι 
235 λέγε· πότερον ἤδη τοῦτο σαφές, ὅτι τῶν γοητῶν 
ἐστι τις, μμητῆς ων τῶν ὄντων, ἡ διστάζομεν ἐτι 
μή περὶ ὅσωνπερ ἀντιλέγειν δοκεῖ δυνατὸς εἶναι, 
περὶ τοσοῦτων καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀληθῶς ἐχῶν 
τυχάνει;

 epsilon. Καὶ πῶς ἂν, ὥς ἐγε· ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἤδη 
σαφές ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι τῶν τῆς παιδιᾶς μετ- 
εχόντων ἐστὶ τις εἰς. 1

 epsilon. Γόητα μὲν δὴ καὶ μμητῆν ἀρα θετέων 
αὐτοῦ τυια.

 epsilon. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ θετέον;

23. epsilon. Ἀγε δὴ, νῦν ἡμετέρον ἐργον ἤδη τὸν 
Β θῆρα μηκῆ ἀνέιναι· σχεδὸν γὰρ αὐτῶν περιειλή- 
φαμεν ἐν ἀμφιβληστρικῷ τῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις 
περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὄργανων, ὡστε οὐκέτ’ 2 ἐκφεύξεται 
τόδε γε.

 epsilon. Τὸ 3 ποῖον;

1  τις εἰς Heusde; τις μερῶν εἰς BT (giving εἰς to the stranger);
   τις μερῶν εἰς W.
2  οὐκέτ’ W; οὐκ εἰς B; οὐκ T.
3  τὸ W; om. BT.

330
THE SOPHIST

will have to change the opinions which they had at first accepted, so that what was great will appear small and what was easy, difficult, and all the apparent truths in arguments will be turned topsy-turvy by the facts that have come upon them in real life. Is not this true?

THEAET. Yes, at least so far as one of my age can judge. But I imagine I am one of those who are still standing at a distance.

STR. Therefore all of us elders here will try, and are now trying, to bring you as near as possible without the sad experience. So answer this question about the sophist: Is this now clear, that he is a kind of a juggler, an imitator of realities, or are we still uncertain whether he may not truly possess the knowledge of all the things about which he seems to be able to argue?

THEAET. How could that be, my dear sir? Surely it is pretty clear by this time from what has been said that he is one of those whose business is entertainment.

STR. That is to say, he must be classed as a juggler and imitator.

THEAET. Of course he must.

STR. Look sharp, then; it is now our business not to let the beast get away again, for we have almost got him into a kind of encircling net of the devices we employ in arguments about such subjects, so that he will not now escape the next thing.

THEAET. What next thing?
PLATO

εἴ. Τὸ μὴ οὗ τοῦ γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θαυματοποιῶν τις εἶ.

θεαί. Κάμοι τούτο γε οὕτω περὶ αὐτοῦ ξυνδοκεῖ. εἴ. Δέδοκται 1 τοίνυν ὅτι τάχιστα διαμείνει τὴν εἰσωλοποιηκὴν τέχνην, καὶ καταβάντας εἰς αὐτῆν, ἐὰν μὲν ἡμᾶς εὐθὺς ὁ σοφιστής ὑπομείνη, συλλαβεῖν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὰ ἑπεσταλμένα ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ Κ λόγου, κάκεινος παραδόντας ἀποφήναι τὴν ἀγαθήν· εὰν δ' ἄρα κατὰ μέρη τῆς μυθικῆς δύναϊ τή, ἔμνευκολούθειν αὐτῷ διαμορφώτας ἀεὶ τὴν ὑποδεχομένην αὐτὸν μοιράν, ἔωσπερ ἄν ληφθῇ. πάντως οὔτε οὗτος οὔτε ἄλλο γένος οὐδὲν μὴ ποτὲ ἐκφυγόν ἐπεύξηται τήν τῶν οὕτω δυναμένων μετιέναι καθ' ἐκαστάς τε καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα μέθοδον.

θεαί. Δέγεις εὖ, καὶ ταῦτα ταῦτῃ ποιητέον.

εἴ. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν παρεληθότα τρόπον τῆς θυρήσεως ἔγνωγε μοι καὶ νῦν φαίνομαι δύο καθορᾶν εἴδη τῆς μυθικῆς· τὴν δὲ ἔκτοιμην ἱδέαν, ἐν ὅποτέρω ποθ' ἡμῖν οὔσα τυγχάνει, καταμαθεῖν οὐδέπω μοι δοκῶ νῦν δυνατός εἶναι.

θεαί. Σὺ δ' ἀλλ' εἰπέ πρῶτον καὶ δίελε ἡμῖν, τίνε τῷ δύο λέγεις.

εἴ. Μίαν μὲν τὴν εἰκαστικὴν ὁρῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τέχνῃ. ἔστι δ' αὐτῇ μάλιστα, ὅποταν κατὰ τὰς τοῦ παραδείγματος συμμετρίας τις ἐν μήκει καὶ πλάτει καὶ βάθει, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐτί χρώματα Ε ἀποδιδοὺς τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστοι, 2 τὴν τοῦ μυθίσματος γένεσιν ἀπεργάζῃται.

θεαί. Τί δ; οὐ πάντες οἱ μμούμμενοι τι τούτ' ἐπικειροῦσιν ὄραν;

1 δέδοκται] δέδεικται BT; δεδείκται W.
2 ἐκάστοις Stobaeus, W; ἐκάστοις BT.
THE SOPHIST

STR. The conclusion that he belongs to the class of conjurers.

THEAET. I agree to that opinion of him, too.

STR. It is decided, then, that we will as quickly as possible divide the image-making art and go down into it, and if the sophist stands his ground against us at first, we will seize him by the orders of reason, our king, then deliver him up to the king and display his capture. But if he tries to take cover in any of the various sections of the imitative art, we must follow him, always dividing the section into which he has retreated, until he is caught. For assuredly neither he nor any other creature will ever boast of having escaped from pursuers who are able to follow up the pursuit in detail and everywhere in this methodical way.

THEAET. You are right. That is what we must do.

STR. To return, then, to our previous method of division, I think I see this time also two classes of imitation, but I do not yet seem to be able to make out in which of them the form we are seeking is to be found.

THEAET. Please first make the division and tell us what two classes you mean.

STR. I see the likeness-making art as one part of imitation. This is met with, as a rule, whenever anyone produces the imitation by following the proportions of the original in length, breadth, and depth, and giving, besides, the appropriate colours to each part.

THEAET. Yes, but do not all imitators try to do this?
PLATO

ΕΕ. Οὕκουν ὅσοι γε τῶν μεγάλων ποὺ τι πλάττου- 
σιν ἔργων ἢ γράφουσιν. εἰ γὰρ ἀποδιδοῖεν τὴν τῶν 
καλῶν ἀληθινῆς συμμετρίας, οἷοθ’ ὅτι σμικρότερα 
236 μὲν τοῦ δέοντος τὰ ἀνώ, μείζω δὲ τὰ κάτω 
φαίνοντ’ ἂν διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν πὁρρωθέν, τὰ δὲ ἐγγύθε 
ὑφ’ ἡμῶν ὀρᾶσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.1

ΕΕ. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ χαίρει τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔσαντες οἱ 
δημιουργοί νῦν οὐ τὰς οὗσας συμμετρίας, ἀλλὰ τὰς 
δοξούσας εἶναι καλὰς τοῖς εἰδώλοις ἐναπεργάζονται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.2

ΕΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἔτερον οὖ δύκαιον, εἰκὸς γε ὧν, 
eἰκόνα καλεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

Β ΕΕ. Καὶ τῆς γε μυμητικῆς τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος 
κλητέον, ὅπερ εἴπομεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, εἰκαστικῆν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κλητέον.

ΕΕ. Τί δέ; τὸ φαινόμενον μὲν διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐκ 
καλοῦ θέαν ἐοικέναι τῷ καλῷ, δύναμιν δὲ οἷ τοῖς 
λάβοι τὰ τηλικάτα ἱκανῶς ὀρᾶν, μηδ’ εἰκὸς ὃ 
φησιν ἐοικέναι, τί καλοῦμεν; ἄρ’ οὖκ, ἔπειπέρ 
φαίνεται μὲν, ἑοικε δὲ οὖ, φαντασμα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΕΕ. Οὕκοιν πάμπολυ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ζωγραφίαν 
C τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ ἐξύμπασαν μυμητικήν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ’ οὖ;

ΕΕ. Τὴν δὴ φαντασμα 3 ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰκόνα ἀπεργα- 
ζομένην τέχνην ἄρ’ οὐ φανταστικῆν ὄρθοτατ’ ἂν 
προσαγορέωμεν;

1 πάνυ μὲν οὖν T, Stobaeus; om. B.
2 πάνυ μὲν οὖν BT; παντάπατι γε W.
3 φαντασμα W; φαντάσματα BT.

334
THE SOPHIST

str. Not those who produce some large work of sculpture or painting. For if they reproduced the true proportions of beautiful forms, the upper parts, you know, would seem smaller and the lower parts larger than they ought, because we see the former from a distance, the latter from near at hand.

theaet. Certainly.

str. So the artists abandon the truth and give their figures not the actual proportions but those which seem to be beautiful, do they not?

theaet. Certainly.

str. That, then, which is other, but like, we may fairly call a likeness, may we not?

theaet. Yes.

str. And the part of imitation which is concerned with such things, is to be called, as we called it before, likeness-making?

theaet. It is to be so called.

str. Now then, what shall we call that which appears, because it is seen from an unfavourable position, to be like the beautiful, but which would not even be likely to resemble that which it claims to be like, if a person were able to see such large works adequately? Shall we not call it, since it appears, but is not like, an appearance?

theaet. Certainly.

str. And this is very common in painting and in all imitation?

theaet. Of course.

str. And to the art which produces appearance, but not likeness, the most correct name we could give would be "fantastic art," would it not?
PLATO

θεαί. Πολύ γε.

ΕΕ. Τούτω τοίνυν τώ δύο ἔλεγον εἰδὴ τῆς εἰδωλοποικῆς, εἰκαστικῆν καὶ φανταστικῆν.

θεαί. Ὅρθως.

ΕΕ. "Ὁ δὲ γε καὶ τότε ἡμιφεννόουν, ἐν τοῦ σοφιστήν θετέον, οὔδὲ νῦν πω δύναμαι θεάσασθαι. Ὁ ςθαί σαφῶς, ἀλλ' ὄντως θαυμαστός ἁνήρ καὶ κατιδεύν παγχάλεπος, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν μάλα εὖ καὶ κομψῶς εἰς ἁπορόν εἰδος διερευνήσασθαι καταπέφευγεν.

θεαί. Ἕσουκεν.

ΕΕ. Ἀρ' οὖν αὐτὸ γεγονός ἡμίφης, ἢ σε οἰον ῥύμη τις ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου συνεδριαμένων συνεπεσπάσατο πρὸς τὸ ταχὺ ἡμίφής.

θεαί. Πῶς καὶ πρὸς τί τοῦτο ἐφηκας;

24. ΕΕ. "Ὅντως, ἃ μακάριε, ἐσμὲν ἐν παντά-Επασι χαλεπῇ σκέψει. τὸ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι τούτο καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν, εἰναι δὲ μή, καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὲν ἄττα, ἀληθὴ δὲ μή, πάντα ταῦτα ἐστὶ μεστὰ ἁπορίας ἂει ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ καὶ νῦν. ὅπως γὰρ εἰπόντα χρῆ ὑποθέτη λέγειν ἢ δοξάζειν ὄντως εἰναι, καὶ τοῦτο φθεγξάμενον ἐναντιολογίᾳ μὴ συνέχεσθαι, παντά-

237 πασιν, ὃ Θεατήτη, χαλεπών.

θεαί. Τί δή;

ΕΕ. Τετόλμηκεν ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὑποθέσατι τὸ μή ὅν εἰναι. ὑπόθεσις γὰρ οὕκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔγινεν δὲν. Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὃ παί, παισίν ἡμῖν οὖσω

1 ἐν add. Bessarionis liber.
2 ποτέρα B; ποτέρα TW.
3 ἁνήρ Bekker; ἁνήρ BT.
4 συνεπεσπάσατο W; νῦν ἐπεσπάσατο BT.
5 τί W; δτι BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. By all means.

STR. These, then, are the two forms of the image-making art that I meant, the likeness-making and the fantastic.

THEAET. You are right.

STR. But I was uncertain before in which of the two the sophist should be placed, and even now I cannot see clearly. The fellow is really wonderful and very difficult to keep in sight, for once more, in the very cleverest manner he has withdrawn into a baffling classification where it is hard to track him.

THEAET. So it seems.

STR. Do you assent because you recognize the fact, or did the force of habit hurry you along to a speedy assent?

THEAET. What do you mean, and why did you say that?

STR. We are really, my dear friend, engaged in a very difficult investigation; for the matter of appearing and seeming, but not being, and of saying things, but not true ones—all this is now and always has been very perplexing. You see, Theaetetus, it is extremely difficult to understand how a man is to say or think that falsehood really exists and in saying this not be involved in contradiction.

THEAET. Why?

STR. This statement involves the bold assumption that not-being exists, for otherwise falsehood could not come into existence. But the great Parmenides, my boy, from the time when we were children to
PLATO

ἀρχόμενός τε καὶ διὰ τέλους τούτο ἀπεμαρτύρατο, ρεξή τε ἦδε ἐκάστοτε λέγων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων·

οὐ γὰρ μὴ ποτε τούτο δαμῇ, φησίν, εἶναι μὴ ἔντα. ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆδε ἄφ' ὄδοι διϊκήμενος εἰργε νόημα.

Β) παρ' ἀκείνου τε ὡσ μαρτυρεῖται, καὶ μᾶλλον γε δὴ πάντων ὁ λόγος αὐτός ἂν δηλώσειε μέτρια βασανισθείς. τοῦτο οὖν αὐτῷ πρῶτον θεασώμεθα, εἰ μὴ τί σοι διαφέρει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ὅτῃ βούλει τίθεσο, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἢ βέλτιστα διέξειιι σκοπῶν αὐτὸς τε ἢτι κάμε κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὅδον ἄγε.

25. ἘΕ. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ δρᾶν ταῦτα. καὶ μοι λέγε, τὸ μηδαμώς ὃν τολμῶμεν που φθέγγονται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΕΕ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἔριδος ἐνεκα μηδὲ παιδιᾶς, ἀλλὰ εἰ σπουδῆ ἰδεί συνανθαντὰ τῶν ἀποκρίνασθαι τῶν ἀκροατῶν ποὶ χρῆ τούνομ' ἐπιφέρειν τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ὅν. τί δοκούμεν ἃν εἰς τί καὶ ἐπὶ ποῖνον αὐτῶν τε καταχρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ πυθαγομένῳ δεικνύαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Χαλεπὸν ἦρον καὶ σχεδὸν εἰπεῖν οὐς γε ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἀπορον.

ΕΕ. Ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ τί τι τὸ μὴ ὅν οὐκ οἰστέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπείσερον οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ὅν, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὸ τί φέρων ὀρθῶς ἃν τις φέροι.

1 τοῦτο δαμῇ Simplicius; τοῦτ' οὐδαμῇ BT.
2 διϊκήμενος BTW (διϊκήσιον 258 D).
3 αὐτῶς W; οὕτως BT.
4 ἀλλ' εἰ σπουδῆ Bekker; ἀλλ' ποῦ δὴ Β; ἀλλ' σπουδῆ T.
5 τί] δη TW.
6 τι om. BT.

338
THE SOPHIST

the end of his life, always protested against this and constantly repeated both in prose and in verse:

Never let this thought prevail, saith he, that not-being is;
But keep your mind from this way of investigation.

So that is his testimony, and a reasonable examination of the statement itself would make it most absolutely clear. Let us then consider this matter first, if it's all the same to you.

THEAET. Assume my consent to anything you wish. Consider only the argument, how it may best be pursued; follow your own course, and take me along with you.

STR. Very well, then. Now tell me; do we venture to use the phrase absolute not-being?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. If, then, not merely for the sake of discussion or as a joke, but seriously, one of his pupils were asked to consider and answer the question "To what is the designation ‘not-being’ to be applied?" how do we think he would reply to his questioner, and how would he apply the term, for what purpose, and to what object?

THEAET. That is a difficult question; I may say that for a fellow like me it is unanswerable.

STR. But this is clear, anyhow, that the term "not-being" cannot be applied to any being.

THEAET. Of course not.

STR. And if not to being, then it could not properly be applied to something, either.

339
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δή;

D ΕΕ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἦṃῶν που φανερόν, ὡς καὶ τὸ "τί" τοῦτο βῆμα ἐπὶ ὀντὶ λέγομεν ἐκάστοτε: μὸνον γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγειν, ὥσπερ γυμνὸν καὶ ἀπηρημω- μένου ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων, ἀδύνατον ἢ γὰρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΕΕ. Ὅρα τῇδε σκοπῶν ξύμφης ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν τι λέγοντα ἐν γε τι λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐτωσ.

ΕΕ. Ἐνῶσ γὰρ δὴ τὸ γε "τί" φήσεις σημεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ "τινὲς" δυοῦν, τὸ δὲ "τινὲς" πολλῶν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΕΕ. Τὸν δὲ δὴ μὴ τι λέγοντα ἀναγκαίοτατον, ὡς ἑοκε, παντάπασι μηδὲν λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀναγκαίοτατον μὲν οὖν.

ΕΕ. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐδὲ τοῦτο συγχωρητέον, τὸ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγειν μὲν, λέγειν μὲντοι μηδέν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ λέγειν φατέον, ὦς γ’ ἂν ἐπιχειρῆ μή ὅν φθέγ- γεθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τέλος γοῦν ἂν ἀπορίας ὁ λόγος ἔχοι.

238

ΕΕ. Μήπως μέγ’ εἴπης: ἔτι γὰρ, ὡ μα- κάριε, ἔστι, καὶ ταῦτα γε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἡ μεγίστη καὶ πρώτη. περὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδα τυγχάνει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς φής; λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀποκνήσης.

ΕΕ. Τῷ μὲν ὄντι που προσγένουτ’ ἂν τι τῶν ὄντων ἐτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΕΕ. Μὴ ὄντι δὲ τὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀρὰ προσγίγνεσθαι φήσομεν δυνατὸν εἶναι;

1 μὲν τὶ BT; τι om. Schleiermacher.
2 ὃντι δὲ τὶ δὲ δὲ τὶ B; ὃντι δὲ τὶ T.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. How could it?

STR. And this is plain to us, that we always use the word "something" of some being, for to speak of "something" in the abstract, naked, as it were, and disconnected from all beings is impossible, is it not?

THEAET. Yes, it is.

STR. You assent because you recognize that he who says something must say some one thing?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And you will agree that "something" or "some" in the singular is the sign of one, in the dual of two, and in the plural of many.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And he who says not something, must quite necessarily say absolutely nothing.

THEAET. Quite necessarily.

STR. Then we cannot even concede that such a person speaks, but says nothing? We must even declare that he who undertakes to say "not-being" does not speak at all?

THEAET. The argument could go no further in perplexity.

STR. Boast not too soon! For there still remains, my friend, the first and greatest of perplexities. It affects the very beginning of the matter.

THEAET. What do you mean? Do not hesitate to speak.

STR. To that which is may be added or attributed some other thing which is?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. But shall we assert that to that which is not anything which is can be attributed?
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;
ΕΕ. Ἀριθμὸν δὴ τὸν ἐξομπαντα τῶν ὄντων τίθημεν.
Β ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰτέρ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι θετέον ὡς ὦν.
ΕΕ. Μὴ τοῖνυν μηδ' ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἀριθμοῦ μήτε πλῆθος μήτε τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὁν προσφέρειν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὗκοιν ἂν ὅρθως γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιχειρῶμεν, ὡς φησίν ὁ λόγος.
ΕΕ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν ἡ διὰ τοῦ στόματος φθέγξαιτο ἂν τις ἡ καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ παράπαν λάβοι τὰ μὴ ὅντα ἡ τὸ μὴ ὁν χωρίς ἀριθμοῦ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε νεῖ;
ΕΕ. Μὴ ὅντα μὲν ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν, ἀρα οὐ πλῆθος
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἀριθμοῦ προστιθέναι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;
ΕΕ. Μὴ δὲν ἄρα οὐ τὸ ἐν αὐ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Σαφέστατά γε.
ΕΕ. Καὶ μήν οὔτε δίκαιον γε οὔτε ὅρθων φαμεν ὅν ἐπιχειρεῖν μὴ ὅντι προσαρμόττεν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις ἀληθέστατα.
ΕΕ. Συννοεῖς οὖν ὡς οὔτε ἐπῄειν οὔτε διανοῆσαι τὸ μὴ ὁν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ἐστιν ἀδιανοητόν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀφθεγκτον καὶ ἀλογον;
ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

D ΕΕ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐψευσάμην ἄρτι λέγων τὴν μεγίστην ἀπορίαν ἐρεῖν αὐτοῦ πέρι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ δὲ 1 ἢτι μείζων τινὰ λέγειν ἄλλην ἔχομεν;
ΕΕ. Τί δὲ, ὡς θαυμάσως; οὐκ ἐννοεῖς αὐτοὶς τοῖς

1 τοῦ δὲ in marg. T; τὸν de BT; τὸ δὲ W; τὶ δὲ in marg. al.; τὸ δὲ (τὶ δὲ) . . . ἔχομεν attributed to the Stranger by Winckelmann and others.
2 τὶ δὲ B; τὶ δαι T; τίνα δὴ Winckelmann and others.

342
THE SOPHIST

THETAET. Certainly not.
STR. Now we assume that all number is among the things which are.
THETAET. Yes, if anything can be assumed to be.
STR. Then let us not even undertake to attribute either the singular or the plural of number to not-being.
THETAET. We should, apparently, not be right in undertaking that, as our argument shows.
STR. How then could a man either utter in speech or even so much as conceive in his mind things which are not, or not-being, apart from number?
THETAET. Tell me how number is involved in such conceptions.
STR. When we say "things which are not," do we not attribute plurality to them?
THETAET. Certainly.
STR. And in saying "a thing which is not," do we not equally attribute the singular number?
THETAET. Obviously.
STR. And yet we assert that it is neither right nor fair to undertake to attribute being to not-being.
THETAET. Very true.
STR. Do you see, then, that it is impossible rightly to utter or to say or to think of not-being without any attribute, but it is a thing inconceivable, inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational?
THETAET. Absolutely.
STR. Then was I mistaken just now in saying that the difficulty I was going to speak of was the greatest in our subject?
THETAET. But is there a still greater one that we can mention?
STR. Why, my dear fellow, don't you see, by the
PLATO

λεχθείσων ὅτι καὶ τὸν ἐλέγχοντα εἰσ ἀπορίαν καθιστοῦ τὸ μὴ ὅν ὀντώς, ὡστε, ὅπόταν αὐτῷ ἐπιχειρῆ τις ἐλέγχειν, ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὐτῷ περὶ ἐκεῖνο ἀναγκάζεσθαι λέγειν;

Θεαί. Πῶς φῆς; εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον.

Σς. Οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸ σαφέστερον ἐν ἐμοὶ σκοπεῖν. Ε ἔγω μὲν γὰρ ὑποθέμενος οὔτε ἕνος οὔτε τῶν πολλῶν τὸ μὴ ὅν δεῖν μετέχειν, ἀρτὶ τε καὶ νῦν ὀντώς ἐν αὐτὸ εἰρήκας τὸ μὴ ὅν γὰρ φημί. ξυνίσχ τοι;

Θεαί. Ναί.

Σς. Καὶ μὴν αὕ καὶ σμικρὸν ἐμπρόσθεν ἀφθεγ-κτὸν τε αὐτὸ καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀλογον ἑφην εἰναι. ξυνέπει;

Θεαί. Εὐνέπομαι. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Σς. Οὐκόν τὸ γε εἶναι προσάπτειν πειρώμενος 239 ἐναντία τοῖς προσθεν ἐλεγον;

Θεαί. Φαινεί.

Σς. Τί δέ; τοῦτο προσάπτων οὐχ ὡς ἐνι διελε-γόμην;

Θεαί. Ναί.

Σς. Καὶ μὴν ἀλογον τε λέγων καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀφθεγκτον ὡς γε πρὸς ἐν τὸν λόγον ἐποιούμην.

Θεαί. Πῶς δ` οὐ;

Σς. Φαιμὲν δέ γε δεῖν, εἰπερ ὅρθως τις λέξει, μήτε ῥως ἐν μήτε ῥως πολλὰ διορίζειν αὐτὸ, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν αὐτὸ καλεῖν· ἐνὸς γὰρ εἴδει καὶ κατὰ ταύτην ἀν τὴν πρόσρησιν προσαγορεύοιτο.

Θεαί. Παντάπασι γε.
THE SOPHIST

very arguments we have used, that not-being reduces him who would refute it to such difficulties that when he attempts to refute it he is forced to contradict himself?

THEAET. What do you mean? Speak still more clearly.

STR. You must not look for more clearness in me; for although I maintained that not-being could have nothing to do with either the singular or the plural number, I spoke of it just now, and am still speaking of it, as one; for I say "that which is not." You understand surely?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And again a little while ago I said it was inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational. Do you follow me?

THEAET. Yes, of course.

STR. Then when I undertook to attach the verb "to be" to not-being I was contradicting what I said before.

THEAET. Evidently.

STR. Well, then; when I attached this verb to it, did I not address it in the singular?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And when I called it irrational, inexpressible, and unspeakable, I addressed my speech to it as singular.

THEAET. Of course you did.

STR. But we say that, if one is to speak correctly, one must not define it as either singular or plural, and must not even call it "it" at all; for even by this manner of referring to it one would be giving it the form of the singular.

THEAET. Certainly.
PLATO.

27. Ε. Τὸν μὲν τοῖνυν ἐμέ γ' ἔτι τι τις ἄν λέγοι; καὶ γὰρ πάλαι καὶ τὰ νῦν ἥττημένοι ἂν εὑροί περὶ τὸν τοῦ μὴ ὅταν ἐλέγχων. ὥστε ἐν ἔμοιγε λέγοντι, καθάπερ εἶπον, μὴ σκοπώμεν τὴν ὀρθολογίαν περὶ τὸ μὴ ὅν, ἀλλ' εἶα δὴ νῦν ἐν σοι σκεφώμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς φῆς;

Ε. 'Ἰθι ἡμῖν εὖ καὶ γενναῖως, ἀτέ νέος ὦν, ὅτι μάλιστα δύνασαι συντείνας πειράθητι, μήτε οὐσίαν μήτε τὸ ἐν μήτε πλήθος ἀριθμοῦ προστιθεῖς τῷ μὴ ὄντι, κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν 3 φθέγξασθαί τι περὶ αὐτοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πολλὴ μέντ' ἂν με καὶ ἀτοπος ἔχοι προθυμία τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως, εἰ σὲ τοιαῦθ' ὅρων πάσχοντα αὐτὸς ἐπιχειροῦν.

Ε. 'Αλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, σὲ μὲν καὶ ἐμὲ χαίρειν εἴομεν· εῶς δ' ἂν τινι δυναμένω δρᾶν τοῦτο ἐντυγχάνωμεν, μέχρι τούτου λέγωμεν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πανούργως εἰς ἀπορον ὁ σοφιστής τόπον καταδεδυκεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ φαίνεται.

Ε. Τοιαροῦν εἰ τινα φήσομεν αὐτὸν ἔχειν φαν-

D ταστικὴν τέχνην, ῥαδίως ἐκ ταύτης τῆς χρείας τῶν λόγων ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἡμῶν εἰς τούνατιον ἀποστρέψει 4 τοὺς λόγους, ὅταν εἰδωλοποιοῦν αὐτὸν καλώμεν, ἀνεροτῶν τί ποτε τὸ παράπαν εἰδωλον λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν οὖν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, χρῆ, τίς τῷ νεανίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρυνεῖται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν τὰ τέ ἐν τοῖς υδάσαι καὶ κατόπτροις εἰδωλα, ἐτί καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ τὰ τετυπωμένα καὶ τάλλα ὅσα ποι τοιαῦτ' ἐσοθ' ἐτερα.

1 ἐμὲ γ' ἔτι τι τις] ἐμέ τε τι τις B; ἐμὲ γ' ἔτι τις T; ἐμὲ ἔτι τι τις W. 2 εἶα Bessarion's copy; ἔνιa BT.
THE SOPHIST

str. But poor me, what can anyone say of me any longer? For you would find me now, as always before, defeated in the refutation of not-being. So, as I said before, we must not look to me for correctness of speech about not-being. But come now, let us look to you for it.

THEAET. What do you mean?

str. Come, I beg of you, make a sturdy effort, young man as you are, and try with might and main to say something correctly about not-being, without attributing to it either existence or unity or plurality.

THEAET. But I should be possessed of great and absurd eagerness for the attempt, if I were to undertake it with your experience before my eyes.

str. Well, if you like, let us say no more of you and me; but until we find someone who can accomplish this, let us confess that the sophist has in most rascally fashion hidden himself in a place we cannot explore.

THEAET. That seems to be decidedly the case.

str. And so, if we say he has an art, as it were, of making appearances, he will easily take advantage of our poverty of terms to make a counter attack, twisting our words to the opposite meaning; when we call him an image-maker, he will ask us what we mean by “image,” exactly. So, Theaetetus, we must see what reply is to be made to the young man’s question.

THEAET. Obviously we shall reply that we mean the images in water and in mirrors, and those in paintings, too, and sculptures, and all the other things of the same sort.

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8 τὸ ὄρθον B; τὸν ὄρθον λόγον T.
4 ἀποστρέψει corr. T; ἀποστρέψει BTW.
PLATO

Ε 28. εε. Φανερός, ὃ Θεαίτητε, εἰ σοφιστὴν ὦχ ἑωρακώς.

Θεαί. Τί δή;

εε. Δοξεί σοι μέν ἡ παντάπασιν ὦκ ἔχειν ὃμματα.

Θεαί. Πῶς;

εε. Τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὅταν οὖτως αὐτῷ διδός ἐὰν ἐν κατοπτροῖς ἡ πλάσμασι λέγης τι, καταγελάστεαι σοῦ τῶν λόγων, ὅταν ὃς βλέποντι λέγης αὐτῷ, 240 προσποιούμενος οὔτε κάτοπτρα οὔτε ὑδάτα γυγνώσκειν οὔτε τὸ παράπαν ὄψιν, τὸ δ' ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐρωτήσει σε μόνον.

Θεαί. Πολύν;

εε. Τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἃ πολλὰ εἰπὼν ἡξίωσας ἐνι προσεπεῖν ὀνόματι φθεγξάμενος εἴδωλον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὃς ἐν ὄν. λέγε μοῖν καὶ ἀμύνου μηδὲν ὑποχώρων τὸν ἄνδρα.

Θεαί. Τί δήτα, ὃ ἔενε, εἴδωλον ἂν φαίμεν εἴναί πλήν γε τὸ πρὸς τάληθινον ἀφωμοιωμένον ἕτερον τοιούτοις;

εε. Ἐτερον δὲ λέγεις τοιούτον ἀληθινόν, ἢ ἐπὶ Γ τίνι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἴπεις;

Θεαί. Οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινὸν γε, ἄλλ' εὐκός μέν.

εε. Ἄρα τὸ ἀληθινὸν οὖτως ὃν λέγων;

Θεαί. Οὖτως.

εε. Τί δέ; τὸ μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἄρ' ἐναντίον ἀληθοὺς;

Θεαί. Τί μήν;

εε. Οὐκ οὖτως ὁν 1 ἢ οὖ 2 ἀρα λέγεις τὸ εὐκός, εἴπερ αὐτὸ γε μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἐρείς.

1 οὖτως W; οὐτως B; om. T.
2 ὁν T; οὐκόν B; οὐκ δὲ W.
THE SOPHIST

STR. It is evident, Theaetetus, that you never saw a sophist.
THEAET. Why?
STR. He will make you think his eyes are shut or he has none at all.
THEAET. How so?
STR. When you give this answer, if you speak of something in mirrors or works of art, he will laugh at your words, when you talk to him as if he could see. He will feign ignorance of mirrors and water and of sight altogether, and will question you only about that which is deduced from your words.
THEAET. What is that?
STR. That which exists throughout all these things which you say are many but which you saw fit to call by one name, when you said "image" of them all, as if they were all one thing. So speak and defend yourself. Do not give way to the man at all.
THEAET. Why, Stranger, what can we say an image is, except another such thing fashioned in the likeness of the true one?
STR. Do you mean another such true one, or in what sense did you say "such"?
THEAET. Not a true one by any means, but only one like the true.
STR. And by the true you mean that which really is?
THEAET. Exactly.
STR. And the not true is the opposite of the true?
THEAET. Of course.
STR. That which is like, then, you say does not really exist, if you say it is not true.

349
PLATO

THAI. 'Αλλ' ἐστι γε μὴν πως.¹

EE. Οὐκοῦν ἂληθῶς γε, φήσ.

THAI. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν· πλὴν γ' εἰκὼν ὄντως.

EE. Οὐκ δὲν ἄρα ὄντως ἐστὶν ὄντως ἢν λέγομεν εἰκόνα;

C THAI. Κινδυνεύει τοιαύτην τινὰ πεπλέχθαι συμπλοκὴν τὸ μὴ ὅν τῷ ὄντι, καὶ μάλα ἄτοπον.

EE. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν ἄτοπον; ὦρᾶς γοῦν ὦτι καὶ νῦν διὰ τῆς ἐπαλλάξεως ταύτης ὁ πολυκέφαλος σοφιστής ἦνἀγκακεν ἤμας τὸ μὴ ὅν οὐχ ἐκόντας ὀμολογεῖν εἶναι πως.

THAI. 'Ορῶ καὶ μάλα.

EE. Τί δὲ δή; τὴν τέχνην αὐτοῦ τίνα ἀφορίσαντες ἤμων αὐτοῖς συμφωνεῖν οἶοι τε ἐσθιμαθίᾳ;

THAI. Πῇ καὶ τὸ ποιόν τι φοβούμενος ὀντω λέγεις;

D EE. 'Οταν περὶ τὸ φάντασμα αὐτὸν ἀπατῶν φῶμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην εἶναι τινὰ ἀπατητικῆν αὐτοῦ, τότε πότερον ψευδὴ δοξάζειν τὴν ψυχήν ἦμων φήσομεν υπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου τέχνης, ἢ τί ποτ᾿ εροῦμεν;

THAI. Τούτῳ· τι γὰρ ἀν ἄλλο εἰπαίμεν;

EE. Ψευδῆς δ᾿ αὐτὸ δόξα ἐσται τάναντια τοῖς οὖσι δοξάζουσα, ἢ πῶς;

THAI. Τάναντια.

EE. Λέγεις ἄρα τὰ μὴ ὅντα δοξάζειν τὴν ψευδὴ δόξαν;

THAI. 'Ανάγκη.

E EE. Πότερον μὴ εἶναι τὰ μὴ ὅντα δοξάζουσαν, ἢ πῶς εἶναι τὰ μηδαμῶς ὅντα;

¹ πως Hermann; πῶς; BT (the previous words being given to the stranger).
² οὐκοῦν W; οὐκοῦν T; οὐκὸν B.

350
THE SOPHIST

THEÆT. But it does exist, in a way.
str. But not truly, you mean.
THEÆT. No, except that it is really a likeness.
str. Then what we call a likeness, though not really existing, really does exist?
THEÆT. Not-being does seem to have got into some such entanglement with being, and it is very absurd.
str. Of course it is absurd. You see, at any rate, how by this interchange of words the many-headed sophist has once more forced us against our will to admit that not-being exists in a way.
THEÆT. Yes, I see that very well.
str. Well then, how can we define his art without contradicting ourselves?
THEÆT. Why do you say that? What are you afraid of?
str. When, in talking about appearance, we say that he deceives and that his art is an art of deception, shall we say that our mind is misled by his art to hold a false opinion, or what shall we say?
THEÆT. We shall say that. What else could we say?
str. But, again, false opinion will be that which thinks the opposite of reality, will it not?
THEÆT. Yes.
str. You mean, then, that false opinion thinks things which are not?
THEÆT. Necessarily.
str. Does it think that things which are not, are not, or that things which are not at all, in some sense are?

3 οὐκ ἄν] οὐκάν B; οὐκ οὐν T.
4 ἄρα Badham; ἄρα οὗκ BT.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἶναι πῶς τὰ μὴ ὄντα δεῖ γε, εἶπερ ψεύ-
σεῖ τοὺς τὸς τι καὶ κατὰ βραχῦ.
ΕΣ. Τὶ δ΄; οὐ καὶ μηδαμώς εἶναι τὰ πάντως ὄντα
dοξάζεται;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΕΣ. Καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψεύδος;
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο.
ΕΣ. Καὶ λόγος, οἶμαι, ψευδὴς οὐτω κατὰ ταῦτα
241 νομισθήσεται τὰ τε ὄντα λέγων μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ
ὄντα εἶναι.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως τοιοῦτος γένοιτο;
ΕΣ. Σχεδὸν οὐδαμῶς. ἄλλα ταῦτα οἱ σοφιστὶς
οὐ φήσει. ἢ τὸς μηχανὴ συγχωρεῖν των τῶν εὗ
φρονοῦντων, ὅταν ἄφθεγκτα καὶ ἄρρητα καὶ ἄλογα
καὶ ἀδιανόητα προδιωμολογημένα 3 ἢ τὰ πρὸ
tούτων ὀμολογηθέντα; μανθάνομεν, ὡς Θεάτητε,
ἀ λέγει 4;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν ὅτι τὰναντία
φήσει λέγειν ἡμᾶς τοῖς νῦν δή, ψευδὴ τομημάτασ
εἰπεῖν ὡς ἐστών ἐν δόξαις τε καὶ κατὰ λόγους; τῶν
Β γὰρ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὁ προσάπτειν ἡμᾶς πολλάκις
ἀναγκάζομαι, διωμολογημένους νῦν δή που τούτο
εἶναι πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον.

29. ΕΣ. Ὅρθως ἀπεμνημόνευσας. ἄλλ’ ὥρα 5
dὴ βουλεύσασθαι 6 τί χρή δραίν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ πέρι·
tὰς γὰρ ἀντιλήψεις καὶ ἀπορίας, εἰν αὐτὸν διε-
ρευνώμεν ἐν τῇ τῶν ψευδουργῶν καὶ γοητῶν τέχνη
τιθέντες, ὀρᾶε ώς εὔποροι καὶ πολλαὶ.

1 ταῦτα Stobaeus; ταῦτα ταῦτα B; ταῦτα T; ταῦτα ταῦτα W.
2 ἄλλως W, Stobaeus; ἄλλος BT.
3 προδιωμολογημένα T; προσδιωμολογημένα B; ἄφθεγκτα . .
ἀδιανόητα om. Madvig, Schanz, Burnet.
352
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. It must think that things which are not in some sense are—that is, if anyone is ever to think falsely at all, even in a slight degree.

STR. And does it not also think that things which certainly are, are not at all?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And this too is falsehood?

THEAET. Yes, it is.

STR. And therefore a statement will likewise be considered false, if it declares that things which are, are not, or that things which are not, are.

THEAET. In what other way could a statement be made false?

STR. Virtually in no other way; but the sophist will not assent to this. Or how can any reasonable man assent to it, when the expressions we just agreed upon were previously agreed to be inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational, and inconceivable? Do we understand his meaning, Theaetetus?

THEAET. Of course we understand that he will say we are contradicting our recent statements, since we dare to say that falsehood exists in opinions and words; for he will say that we are thus forced repeatedly to attribute being to not-being, although we agreed a while ago that nothing could be more impossible than that.

STR. You are quite right to remind me. But I think it is high time to consider what ought to be done about the sophist; for you see how easily and repeatedly he can raise objections and difficulties, if we conduct our search by putting him in the guild of false-workers and jugglers.

* λέγει[ ἔγεις BT. 5 ὑπα] ὑπα BT.
* βουλεύσασθαι T; βουλεύσθαι B; om. Burnet.
ΘΕΙ. Καὶ μάλα.
ΕΕ. Μικρόν μέρος τοῖν πριν αὐτῶν διεληλύθαμεν, ως ἕπος εἴπειν ἀπεράντων.
ΘΕΙ. Ἀδύνατον γ' ἂν, ἃς ἔοικεν, εἰ ἂν τὸν σοφιστὴν ἔλειν, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει.
ΕΕ. Τί οὖν; ἀποστησόμεθα νῦν μαθακισθέντες;
ΘΕΙ. Οὐκοιν ἔγωγε φημι δεῖν, εἰ καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν οἷοὶ τ' ἐπιλαβέσθαι πη τἀνδρός ἐσμεν.
ΕΕ. Ἐξεις οὖν συγγνώμην καὶ καθάπερ νῦν εἴπες ἀγαπήσεις εάν πη καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ παρασπασώμεθα οὕτως ἴσχυρον λόγον;
ΘΕΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν έξω;  
D ΕΕ. Τόδε τοῖν εἰτί μᾶλλον παρατούμαι σε.
ΘΕΙ. Το ποίον;  
ΕΕ. Μὴ με οἶνον πατραλοίαν ὑπολάβης γίγνεσθαι τίνα.  
ΘΕΙ. Τί δή;  
ΕΕ. Τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαίον ἢμιν ἀμυνομένους ἐσται βασανίζειν, καὶ βιάζεσθαι τὸ τ' μὴ ὄν ὡς ἐστὶ κατὰ τι καὶ τὸ ὅν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὖν ἐστὶ πη.
ΘΕΙ. Φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον διαμαχητέον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.
ΕΕ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ φαίνεται καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον δή τοῦτο τυφλῷ; τούτων γὰρ ἔλεγχθέντων ἔ μήτε ὑμολογηθέντων σχολῆ ποτέ τις οἶδε σε ἐστιν περὶ λόγων ψευδῶν λέγων ἡ δόξης, εἴτε εἰδώλων εἴτε εἰκόνων εἴτε μιμητῶν εἴτε φαντασμάτων αὐτῶν, ἢ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν τῶν οἷοι περὶ ταῦτα εἰπε, μὴ καταγέλαστος εἶναι τὰ ἐναντία ἀναγκαζόμενος αὐτῶ λέγειν.

1 γ' ἃν Burnet; γάρ BT; ἃρ W; γάρ ἃν al.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Yes, we have gone through only a small part of them, and they are, if I may say so, infinite.

THEAET. It would, apparently, be impossible to catch the sophist, if that is the case.

STR. Well, then, shall we weaken and give up the struggle now?

THEAET. No, I say; we must not do that, if we can in any way get the slightest hold of the fellow.

STR. Will you then pardon me, and, as your words imply, be content if I somehow withdraw just for a short distance from this strong argument of his?

THEAET. Of course I will.

STR. I have another still more urgent request to make of you.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. Do not assume that I am becoming a sort of parricide.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. In defending myself I shall have to test the theory of my father Parmenides, and contend forcibly that after a fashion not-being is and on the other hand in a sense being is not.

THEAET. It is plain that some such contention is necessary.

STR. Yes, plain even to a blind man, as they say; for unless these statements are either disproved or accepted, no one who speaks about false words, or false opinion—whether images or likenesses or imitations or appearances—or about the arts which have to do with them, can ever help being forced to contradict himself and make himself ridiculous.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αληθέστατα.

242 ΕΕ. Διὰ ταῦτα μέντοι τολμητέον ἐπιτίθεσθαι
tῷ πατρικῷ λόγῳ νῦν, ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἑστέον, εἰ
tοῦτό τις εὑρεῖ δρᾶν ὅκνος.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ' ἢμᾶς τοῦτό γε μηδὲν μηδαμὴ εἰρέῃ.
ΕΕ. Τρίτον τοίνυν ἔτι σε σμικρὸν τι παραιτή-

σομαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δέγε μόνον.

ΕΕ. Εἴπον ποι νῦν δὴ λέγων ὡς πρὸς τὸν περὶ
tαὐτ' ἐλέγχον αἰεὶ τε ἀπειρηκῶς ἐγὼ τυγχάνω καὶ
δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἴπεσ.

ΕΕ. Φοβοῦμαι δὴ τὰ εἰρημένα, μὴ ποτε διὰ ταῦτά
σου μανικὸς εἶναι δόξω παρὰ πόδα μεταβαλών
Β ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω. σὴν γὰρ δὴ χάριν ἐλέγχεω
τὸν λόγον ἐπιθησόμεθα, ἐὰνπερ ἐλέγχωμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡς τοινν ἐμοῦγε μηδαμῇ δόξων μηδὲν
πλημμελεῖν, ἂν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐλέγχον τοῦτον καὶ τὴν
ἀπόδειξιν ἵς, θαρρῶν ἵκι τοῦτον γε ἑνεκα.

30. ΕΕ. Φέρε δὴ, τίνα ἄρχῃ τις ἂν ἀρξαυτο
παρακινδυνευτικοῦ λόγου; δοκῶ μὲν γὰρ τὴν'd', ὡ
παί, τὴν ὅδον ἀναγκαστάτην ἢμῖν εἶναι τρέπεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίαν δή;

ΕΕ. Τὰ δοκοῦντα νῦν ἐναργῶς ἔχειν ἐπισκέψασθαι
C πρῶτον, μὴ πὴ τεταραγμένοι μὲν ὄμεν 1 περὶ
tαῦτα, ῥαδίως δ' ἀλλήλους ὀμολογῶμεν ὃς εὐκρινῶς
ἐχούτες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δέγε σαφέστερον δ' λέγεις.

ΕΕ. Εὐκόλως μοι δοκεῖ Παρμενίδης ἦμων διει-
λέχθαι καὶ πᾶς ὁστὶς πώποτε ἐπὶ κρίσιν ὄρμησε

1 μὲν ὄμεν W; μένωμεν BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Very true.

STR. And so we must take courage and attack our father's theory here and now, or else, if any scruples prevent us from doing this, we must give the whole thing up.

THEAET. But nothing in the world must prevent us.

STR. Then I have a third little request to make of you.

THEAET. You have only to utter it.

STR. I said a while ago that I always have been too faint-hearted for the refutation of this theory, and so I am now.

THEAET. Yes, so you did.

STR. I am afraid that on account of what I have said you will think I am mad because I have at once reversed my position. You see it is for your sake that I am going to undertake the refutation, if I succeed in it.

THEAET. I certainly shall not think you are doing anything improper if you proceed to your refutation and proof; so go ahead boldly, so far as that is concerned.

STR. Well, what would be a good beginning of a perilous argument? Ah, my boy, I believe the way we certainly must take is this.

THEAET. What way?

STR. We must first examine the points which now seem clear, lest we may have fallen into some confusion about them and may therefore carelessly agree with one another, thinking that we are judging correctly.

THEAET. Express your meaning more clearly.

STR. It seems to me that Parmenides and all who ever undertook a critical definition of the number
PLATO

tou ta ontai diorísaontai posa te kai poia estin.

tha. Phei;

e. Muthon tina ekastos faivetai moi diygheisathai
pawon ws oumov heiwn, o mewn ws tria ta ontai,
polemei de allhlois einote autoun atta phe, tote de
D kai filia ginymene gamos to kai tokous kai
trofhas touton ekhounon parheketai: duo de etereos
eipton, ungRon kai xeroun hei thermou kai psyron, syn-
oukei te auta kai ekididosi: to de parheiwn 1
'Eleuatikon ethnos, atop Xenofoanous te kai eti
proseben arzamevon, ws einos ontos touton panton
kalummenon ouvoun diezexeketai tois muus. 'Iades
dei kai Sikelai tines iosteron Mousoi xinenvhsan 2
E oti smiplakein anfaleostatou amfoteru kai legew
ws to on polla te kai en estin, eixhara de kai filia
sinechetai. diaferomevnon gar aei ximphretai, fasow
ai suntontaterei touton Mousoyn. aei de malakwtera
eto men aei tautta ouvou exh ein exhalasan, en merei de
tote men en einai fasai to pao kai filoyn up' 3
Afro-
ditai, toto de polla kai polyimon auton autou dia
veikos. Ti. tautta de pantai ei men allhos tis hei
mu touton eirhke, xalpen kai plhmelon ouvou
megalal kleinov kai palaios andraous epitimain
ekewo, de anepifthonon apofhiasethai.

tha. To poou;

e. "Oti Iain touton pollonon heiwn uperidontes

1 hein al. Eusebius; hein BTW.
2 xinenvhsan T, Eusebius, Simplicius; xinenvhsan B.
358
THE SOPHIST

and nature of realities have talked to us rather carelessly.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Every one of them seems to tell us a story, as if we were children. One says there are three principles, that some of them are sometimes waging a sort of war with each other, and sometimes become friends and marry and have children and bring them up; and another says there are two, wet and dry or hot and cold, which he settles together and unites in marriage. And the Eleatic sect in our region, beginning with Xenophanes and even earlier, have their story that all things, as they are called, are really one. Then some Ionian and later some Sicilian Muses reflected that it was safest to combine the two tales and to say that being is many and one, and is (or are) held together by enmity and friendship. For the more strenuous Muses say it is always simultaneously coming together and separating; but the gentler ones relaxed the strictness of the doctrine of perpetual strife; they say that the all is sometimes one and friendly, under the influence of Aphrodite, and sometimes many and at variance with itself by reason of some sort of strife. Now whether any of them spoke the truth in all this, or not, it is harsh and improper to impute to famous men of old such a great wrong as falsehood. But one assertion can be made without offence.

THEAET. What is that?

STR. That they paid too little attention and con-

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1 This refers apparently to Pherecydes and the early Ionians.
2 Heracleitus and his followers.
3 Empedocles and his disciples.
PLATO

ωλυγώρησαν· οὐδὲν γὰρ φροντίσαντες εἶτ’ ἐπ’ ακολουθοῦμεν αὐτῶς λέγουσι εἶτε ἀπολειπόμεθα,
Β περαινοῦσι τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν ἔκαστοι.

θεαί. Πῶς λέγεις;

εἰ. Ὅταν τις αὐτῶν φθέγξηται λέγων ὡς ἔστιν ἥ γέγονεν ἥ γίγνεται πολλὰ ἡ ἐν ἡ δύο, καὶ θερμὸν αὐτὸ ψυχρῷ συγκερανυμένου, ἄλλοθι τῇ διακρίσεις καὶ συγκρίσεις ὑποτηθεῖς, τούτων, ὃ Θεαίητη, ἐκάστοτε τοῦ πρὸς θεῶν ξυνίης ὡς τὶ λέγουσιν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἦν νεώτερος, τοῦτο τῆς νῦν ἀπορούμενον ὅποτε τις εἴποι, τὸ μὴ ὃν, ἀκριβῶς ὥμην ξυνίειν. νῦν δὲ ὅρας ἵν’ ἐσμὲν αὐτοῦ πέρι τῆς ἀπορίας.

C θεαί. Ὅρω.

εἰ. Τάχα τοῖνυν ἱσως οὐχ ἥττων κατὰ τὸ ὡν ταὐτῶν τοῦτο πάθος εἰληφότες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ μὲν τοῦτο εὔπορεῖν φαμέν καὶ μανθάνειν ὅποταν τις αὐτὸ φθέγξηται, περὶ δὲ θάτερον οὗ, πρὸς ἀμφότερα ὑμοὶ ἑχοντες.

θεαί. Ἦσως.

εἰ. Καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῶν ταὐτῶν τοῦτο εἰρήσθω.

θεαί. Πάνυ γε.

31. εἰ. Τῶν μὲν τοῖνυν πολλῶν πέρι καὶ δ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεφόμεθ’, ἃν δόξηι, περὶ δὲ τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ ἀρχηγοῦ πρῶτον νῦν σκεπτέον.

θεαί. Τίνος δὴ λέγεις; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὃν φῆς πρῶτον δεῖν διερευνήσασθαι τί ποθ’ οἱ λέγοντες αὐτὸ δηλοῦν ἡγούμενα;

360
THE SOPHIST

consideration to the mass of people like ourselves. For they go on to the end, each in his own way, without caring whether their arguments carry us along with them, or whether we are left behind.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. When one of them says in his talk that many, or one, or two are, or have become, or are becoming, and again speaks of hot mingling with cold, and in some other part of his discourse suggests separations and combinations, for heaven's sake, Theaetetus, do you ever understand what they mean by any of these things? I used to think, when I was younger, that I understood perfectly whenever anyone used this term "not-being," which now perplexes us. But you see what a slough of perplexity we are in about it now.

THEAET. Yes, I see.

STR. And perhaps our minds are in this same condition as regards being also; we may think that it is plain sailing and that we understand when the word is used, though we are in difficulties about not-being, whereas really we understand equally little of both.

THEAET. Perhaps.

STR. And we may say the same of all the subjects about which we have been speaking.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. We will consider most of them later, if you please, but now the greatest and foremost chief of them must be considered.

THEAET. What do you mean? Or, obviously, do you mean that we must first investigate the term "being," and see what those who use it think it signifies?
κατὰ πόδαν γε, ὡς Θεαίτητε, ὑπέλαβες. λέγω γὰρ δὴ ταύτῃ δεῖν πουεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον ἡμᾶς, οἷον αὐτῶν παρόντων ἀναπτυθαυμοένοις ὡδε. φέρε, ὅποσοι θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἡ τινε ὄντως τὰ πάντα εἴναι φατε, τί ποτε ἂρα τούτῳ ἐπί. 

Ε ἀμφοῖν φθέγγεσθε, λέγοντες ἀμφω καὶ ἐκάτερον εἴναι; τί τὸ εἴναι τούτῳ ὑπολάβωμεν ὑμῶν; πότερον τρίτον παρὰ τὰ δύο ἐκεῖνα, καὶ τρία τὸ πᾶν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο ἐτί καθ’ ὑμᾶς τιθόμεν; οὐ γὰρ ποι ἄνα δυόν καλοῦντες θάτερον ὁ ἀμφότερα ὅμοιός εἴναι λέγετε: σχεδὸν γὰρ ἂν ἀμφοτέρως εἴν, ἀλλ’ οὐ δύο εἶτην.

244 εἰς. 'Αλλ', ὃ φίλοι, φήσομεν, κἂν οὕτω τὰ δύο λέγοιτ' ἐν σαφέστατα ἐν.

εἰς. 'Ορθότατα εἴρηκας. 

εἰς. 'Ἐπειδὴ τοῖνυν ἡμεῖς ἤπορήκαμεν, ὑμεῖς αὐτὰ ἠμῶν ἐμφανίζετε ἰκανῶς τί ποτε βουλέσθησθε σημαίνειν ὅπετάν ὁ φθέγγηθε. δήλοι γὰρ ὡς ὑμεῖς μὲν ταύτα πάλαι γγυνώσκετε, ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν φόμεθα, νῦν δ’ ἤπορήκαμεν. διδάσκετε οὖν πρῶτον τούτῳ αὐτὸ ἡμᾶς, ἵνα μὴ δοξάζωμεν μανθάνειν μὲν τὰ λεγόμενα παρὰ ὑμῶν, τὸ δὲ τούτων γίγνεται πάν τι συναντίον. ταύτα δὴ λέγοντες τε καὶ αξιοῦντες παρά τε τούτων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὁσοί πλείον ἐνός λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν εἴναι, μῶν, ὃ παῖ, τί πλημμελήσομεν;

1 πόδαν T (emend.) W; πολλά B pr. T.  
2 οὕτως W; εἶτην BT.  
3 λέγοιτ'] λέγοιτ B; λέγετε T; λέγετ' W.
THE SOPHIST

str. You have caught my meaning at once, Theaetetus. For I certainly do mean that this is the best method for us to use, by questioning them directly, as if they were present in person; so here goes: Come now, all you who say that hot and cold or any two such principles are the universe, what is this that you attribute to both of them when you say that both and each are? What are we to understand by this “being” (or “are”) of yours? Is this a third principle besides those two others, and shall we suppose that the universe is three, and not two any longer, according to your doctrine? For surely when you call one only of the two “being” you do not mean that both of them equally are; for in both cases¹ they would pretty certainly be one and not two.

THEAET. True.

str. Well, then, do you wish to call both of them together being?

THEAET. Perhaps.

str. But, friends, we will say, even in that way you would very clearly be saying that the two are one.

THEAET. You are perfectly right.

str. Then since we are in perplexity, do you tell us plainly what you wish to designate when you say “being.” For it is clear that you have known this all along, whereas we formerly thought we knew, but are now perplexed. So first give us this information, that we may not think we understand what you say, when the exact opposite is the case.—If we speak in this way and make this request of them and of all who say that the universe is more than one, shall we, my boy, be doing anything improper?

¹ “In both cases,” i.e. whether you say that one only is or that both are, they would both be one, namely being.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡκιστά γε.

32. ΞΕ. Τί δέ; παρὰ τῶν ἐν τὸ πᾶν λεγόν-των ἄρ’ οὐ πευστέον εἰς δύναμιν τί ποτε λέγουσι τὸ ὄν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γάρ οὗ;

ΞΕ. Τόδε τοίνυν ἀποκρινέσθων.1 ἐν ποῦ φατε μόνον εἶναι; φαμέν γάρ, φήσουσιν. ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; ὡν καλεῖτε τι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

C ΞΕ. Πότερον ὁπερ ἐν, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρώ-

μενοι δυοῖν ὄνομασιν, ἦ πῶς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίς οὖν αὐτοῖς ἡ μετὰ τοῦτ', ὡ ξένε, ἀπό-

κρισις;

ΞΕ. Δῆλον, ὡ Θεαίτης, ὃ τῷ ταύτῃ τῇ ὑπό-

θεσιν ὑποθεμένῳ πρὸς τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθέν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ὅτι οὐν ἐν πάντων ῥάστων ἀποκρίμασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Τὸ τε δύο ὄνοματα ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι μηδὲν

θέμενον πλὴν ἐν καταγέλαστον ποιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὗ;

ΞΕ. Καὶ τὸ παράπαν γε ἀποδέχεσθαι τοῦ 2

D λέγοντος ὡς ἔστω ὄνομά τι, λόγον οὐκ ἄν ἔχον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πὴ;

ΞΕ. Τιθείς τε τοῦνομα τοῦ πράγματος ἔτερον δύο

λέγει ποὺ τινε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἂν ταύτῶν γε αὐτῶι τιθῇ τοῦνομαι,

1 ἀποκρινέσθων Simplicius; ἀποκρινέσθωσαν BTW.

2 τοῦ Hermann; τοῦ BT.

364
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Not in the least.

STR. Well then, must we not, so far as we can, try to learn from those who say that the universe is one what they mean when they say "being"?

THEAET. Of course we must.

STR. Then let them answer this question: Do you say that one only is? We do, they will say; will they not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Well then, do you give the name of being to anything?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Is it what you call "one," using two names for the same thing, or how is this?

THEAET. What is their next answer, Stranger?

STR. It is plain, Theaetetus, that he who maintains their theory will not find it the easiest thing in the world to reply to our present question or to any other.

THEAET. Why not?

STR. It is rather ridiculous to assert that two names exist when you assert that nothing exists but unity.

THEAET. Of course it is.

STR. And in general there would be no sense in accepting the statement that a name has any existence.

THEAET. Why?

STR. Because he who asserts that the name is other than the thing, says that there are two entities.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And further, if he asserts that the name is 1 The Eleatic Zeno and his school.
PLATO

ἡ μηδενὸς ὄνομα ἀναγκασθῆσαι λέγειν, εἰ δὲ τινὸς αὐτὸ φήσει, συμβῆσαι τὸ ὄνομα ὄνοματος ὄνομα μόνον, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενὸς ὄν.

 theano. Οὔτως.

εἴ. Καὶ τὸ ἐν γε, ἕνὸς ὄνομα ὅν ἔν τοῦ ὄνοματος αὐτὸ ἔν ὄν.

 theano. 'Ανάγκη.

εἴ. Τί δὲ; τὸ δὸλον ἐτερον τοῦ ὄντος ἕνος ἡ ταύτον φήσουι τούτῳ; Εἴ θεαί. Πῶς γὰρ ὦ φήσουι τε καὶ φασίν;

εἴ. Εἰ τοίνυν δὸλον ἐστίν, ὡσπερ καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγει,

πάντοθεν εὐκύκλῳ σφάρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ, μεσοθέν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ. τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μείζων οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῇ τῇ,

τοιοῦτον γε ὅν τὸ ὅν μέσον τε καὶ ἐσχάτα ἔχει, ταύτα δὲ ἔχουν πᾶσα ἀνάγκη μέρη ἔχειν. ἡ πῶς;

 theano. Οὔτως.

245 εἴ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε μεμερισμένον πάθος μὲν τοῦ ἔνος ἔχειν ἐπὶ τοῖς μέρεσι πᾶσιν οὐδὲν ἀποκλυμεῖ, καὶ ταύτῃ δὴ πᾶν τε ὅν καὶ δὸλον ἐν εἶναι.

 theano. Τί δ’ οὔ;

εἴ. Τὸ δὲ πεπονθὸς ταύτα ἀρ’ οὐκ ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ γε τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ εἶναι;

 theano. Πῶς;

1 ὄνομα ὅν Απελτ.; ἐν ὅν μόνον Β.; ὅν μόνον Τ.

2 τοῦ BW; τοῦτο Τ.

3 αὐτὸ Schleiermacher; αὐτὸ BTW.

4 σφάρης Simplicius; σφάρας BT.

5 ἔχει] ἔχειν al.
THE SOPHIST

the same as the thing, he will be obliged to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says it is the name of something, the name will turn out to be the name of a name merely and of nothing else.

THEAET. True.

STR. And the one will turn out to be the name of one and also the one of the name.1

THEAET. Necessarily.

STR. And will they say that the whole is other than the one which exists or the same with it?

THEAET. Of course they will and do say it is the same.

STR. If then the whole is, as Parmenides says,

On all sides like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally weighted in every direction from the middle; for neither greater nor less must needs be on this or that,

then being, being such as he describes it, has a centre and extremes, and, having these, must certainly have parts, must it not?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But yet nothing hinders that which has parts from possessing the attribute of unity in all its parts and being in this way one, since it is all and whole.

THEAET. Very true.

STR. But is it not impossible for that which is in this condition to be itself absolute unity?

THEAET. Why?

1 In other words, "one," considered as a word, will be the name of unity, but considered as a reality, it will be the unity of which the word "one" is the name. The sentence is made somewhat difficult of comprehension, doubtless for the purpose of indicating the confusion caused by the identification of the name with the thing.

367
PLATO

ζε. Ἀμερῆς δῆπον δεῖ παντελῶς τό γε ἀληθῶς ἐν κατὰ τόν ὄρθων λόγων εἰρήθαι.

ще. Δεῖ γάρ οὖν.

β ζε. Τὸ δὲ γε τοιοῦτον ἐκ πολλῶν μερῶν δὲν οὐ συμφωνῆσαι τῷ λόγῳ. ¹

ще. Μανθάνω.

ζε. Πότερον δὴ πάθος ἔχουν τό δὲν τοῦ ἐνὸς οὔτως ἐν τέ ἐσται καὶ ὅλον, ἣ παντάπασι μὴ λέγωμεν ὅλον εἶναι τό δὲν ²;

ще. Χαλεπὴν προβέβληκας αἴρεσιν.

ζε. Ἀληθέστατα μέντοι λέγεις. πεπονθός τε γάρ τό δὲν ἐν εἶναι πως, οὐ ταύτων δὲν τῷ ἐνι φανεῖται ³ καὶ πλέονα δὴ τὰ πάντα ἐνὸς ἐσται.

ще. Ναί.

ζε. Καὶ μὴν εάν γε τό δὲν ἢ μὴ ὅλον διὰ τό C πεπονθέναι τό ὑπ' ἐκείνου πάθος, ἢ δὲ αὐτό τό ὅλον, ἐνδεὲς τό δὲν ἐαυτοῦ ἐξυμβαίνει.

ще. Πάνω γε.

ζε. Καὶ κατὰ τούτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἐαυτοῦ στερομένου οὐκ δὲν ἐσται τό δὲν.

ще. Οὔτως.

ζε. Καὶ ἐνὸς γε αὖ πλεῖὼ τὰ πάντα γίγνεται, τοῦ τε ὅντος καὶ τοῦ ὅλου χωρὶς ἰδίαν ἐκατέρου φύσων εἰληφότος.

ще. Ναί.

ζε. Μὴ ὅντος δὲ γε τὸ παράπαν τοῦ ὅλου, ταύτα τε ταύτα ὑπάρχει τῷ ὅντι καὶ πρὸς τῷ μὴ εἶναι D μηδ' ἂν γενέσθαι ποτὲ δὲν.

¹ τῷ λόγῳ Simplicius (codd. EF); τῷ δὲ λόγῳ B; τῷ λόγῳ δὲ λόγῳ T, Simplic. (cod. D).
² ὅν Schleiermacher; ὅλον BT.
³ φανεῖται Simplicius; φαίνεται BT.

368
THE SOPHIST

str. Why surely that which is really one must, according to right reason, be affirmed to be absolutely without parts.

THEAET. Yes, it must.

str. But such a unity consisting of many parts will not harmonize with reason.

THEAET. I understand.

str. Then shall we agree that being is one and a whole because it has the attribute of unity, or shall we deny that being is a whole at all?

THEAET. It is a hard choice that you offer me.

str. That is very true; for being, having in a way had unity imposed upon it, will evidently not be the same as unity, and the all will be more than one.

THEAET. Yes.

str. And further, if being is not a whole through having had the attribute of unity imposed upon it, and the absolute whole exists, then it turns out that being lacks something of being.

THEAET. Certainly.

str. And so, by this reasoning, since being is deprived of being, it will be not-being.

THEAET. So it will.

str. And again the all becomes more than the one, since being and the whole have acquired each its own nature.

THEAET. Yes.

str. But if the whole does not exist at all, being is involved in the same difficulties as before, and besides not existing it could not even have ever come into existence.

369
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή;

ἘΕ. Τὸ γενόμενον ἀεὶ γέγονεν ὅλον· ὥστε οὕτε 
οὐσίαν οὕτε γένεσιν ὡς οὕσαν δεῖ προσαγορεύειν 
τὸ ὅλον 1 ἐν τοῖς οὐσι μὴ τιθέντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασιν ἐσικε ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὤποσονοῦν τι δεῖ τὸ μὴ ὅλον 
εἶναι. ποσόν τι γὰρ ὅν, ὄποσον ἢ, τοσοῦτον ὅλον 
ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ 2 εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδὴ γε.

ΕΕ. Καὶ τοῖς ἀλλα μυρία ἀπεράντους ἀπορίας
Ἐξακοστὸν εἰληφός φανεῖται τῷ τὸ ὃν εἴτε δύο τινὲ 
εἴτε ἐν μόνον εἶναι λέγοντι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δηλοὶ σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ νῦν ὑποφαίνοντα·
συνάπτεται γὰρ ἐτερον ἕξ ἄλλου, μείζῳ καὶ χαλέ-
πωτέραν φέρον περὶ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν αἰεὶ ῥηθέντων
πλάνην.

33. ἘΕ. Τούς μὲν τούν ἰακρὶμβολογομεύειν
ὅντος τε πέρι καὶ μὴ πάντας 3 μὲν οὐ 
διεληλυθαμεν, ὥσις ἐδε ἴκανὸς ἐκέτω· τοὺς ἐκ ἄλλος λέγοντας
ἀθετέων, ἴν ἐκ πάντων εἰδώμεν ὅτι τὸ ὃν τοῦ μὴ
246 ὅντος οὐδὲν εὐπορώτερον εἶπεῖν ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡσὶν πορεύεσθαι χρὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους.

ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἐσικε γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οἶλον γιγαντο-
μαχίας εἰς εἶναι διὰ τῆς ἀμφισβήτησιν περὶ τῆς
οὐσίας πρὸς ἄλλης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

1 τὸ ὅλον Bekker; τὸ ἢ τὸ ὅλον BT.
2 αὐτὸ W, Simplicius; om. BT.
3 πάντας Eusebius; πάνυ BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. What do you mean?
STR. That which comes into existence always comes into existence as a whole. Therefore no one who does not reckon the whole among things that are can speak of existence or generation as being.

THEAET. That certainly seems to be true.
STR. And moreover, that which is not a whole cannot have any quantity at all; for if it has any quantity, whatever that quantity may be, it must necessarily be of that quantity as a whole.

THEAET. Precisely.
STR. And so countless other problems, each one involving infinite difficulties, will confront him who says that being is, whether it be two or only one.

THEAET. The problems now in sight make that pretty clear; for each leads up to another which brings greater and more grievous wandering in connexion with whatever has previously been said.

STR. Now we have not discussed all those who treat accurately of being and not-being¹; however, let this suffice. But we must turn our eyes to those whose doctrines are less precise, that we may know from all sources that it is no easier to define the nature of being than that of not-being.

THEAET. Very well, then, we must proceed towards those others also.

STR. And indeed there seems to be a battle like that of the gods and the giants going on among them, because of their disagreement about existence.

THEAET. How so?

¹ The Ionic philosophers, the Eleatics, Heracleitus, Empedocles, the Megarians, Gorgias, Protagoras, and Antisthenes all discussed the problem of being and not-being.
PLATO

ΕΕ. Οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἐλκοσα, ταῖς χεραῖν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ
δρῶς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτό-
μενοι πάντων διωχυρίζονται τούτο εἰναι μόνον δ
παρέχει προσβολήν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταύτων σῶμα
Β καὶ οὐσίαν ὄριζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἰ τίς τί 1
φῆσει 2 μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἰναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ
παράπαν καὶ οὔδεν ἑθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ δεινοὶ εὐρηκας ἀνδρας. ἦδη γὰρ καὶ
ἐγὼ τούτων συχνώς προσέτυχον.

ΕΕ. Τοιγαροῖν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες
μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἀνωθὲν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται,
 svnstis atia kai asomata edh biazómenoi thn
ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἰναι: tā dē ἐκείνων σώματα kai
tīn legomēnīn ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατά σμικρά
C διαθραύνοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἀντ' οὐσίας
φερομένην τινὰ προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ
tauta ἀπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις, ὡς Θεαίτητε, ἀεὶ
ἐξυνέστηκεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΕΕ. Παρ' ἀμφοῖν τοῖνυν τῶν γενοῦν κατὰ μέρος
λάβωμεν λόγον ὑπὲρ ἢς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ ληψόμεθα;
ΕΕ. Παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἐν εἶδεσιν αὐτὴν τιθεμένων

1 τι al.; om. BT.
2 φῆσει B, Eusebius; φῆσι T.
THE SOPHIST

STR. Some of them¹ drag down everything from heaven and the invisible to earth, actually grasping rocks and trees with their hands; for they lay their hands on all such things and maintain stoutly that that alone exists which can be touched and handled; for they define existence and body, or matter, as identical, and if anyone says that anything else, which has no body, exists, they despise him utterly, and will not listen to any other theory than their own.

THEAET. Terrible men they are of whom you speak. I myself have met with many of them.

STR. Therefore those who contend against them defend themselves very cautiously with weapons derived from the invisible world above, maintaining forcibly that real existence consists of certain ideas which are only conceived by the mind and have no body. But the bodies of their opponents, and that which is called by them truth, they break up into small fragments in their arguments, calling them, not existence, but a kind of generation combined with motion. There is always, Theaetetus, a tremendous battle being fought about these questions between the two parties.

THEAET. True.

STR. Let us, therefore, get from each party in turn a statement in defence of that which they regard as being.

THEAET. How shall we get it?

STR. It is comparatively easy to get it from those

¹ The atomists (Leucippus, Democritus, and their followers), who taught that nothing exists except atoms and the void. Possibly there is a covert reference to Aristippus who was, like Plato, a pupil of Socrates.
PLATO

ρῶν· ἡμερώτεροι γάρ· παρὰ δὲ τῶν εἰς σῶμα
D πάντα ἐλκόντων βίας χαλεπώτερον, ἵσως δὲ καὶ
σχεδὸν ἀδύνατον. ἀλλ’ ὁδὲ μοι δεῖν δοκεῖ περὶ
αὐτῶν δράν.

τεῖα. Πῶς;

ἑ. Μάλιστα μὲν, εἰ τῇ δυνατόν ἦν, ἐργῷ βελ-
τίους αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ τούτῳ μὴ ἐγχώρει,
λόγῳ ποιῶμεν, ὑποτιθέμενοι νομιμώτερον αὐτοὺς
ἡ νῦν ἐθέλοντας ἀν ἀποκρίνασθαι. τὸ γὰρ ὀμολο-
γηθὲν παρὰ βελτίων που κυριώτερον ἢ τὸ παρὰ
χειρόνων· ἥμεις δὲ οὐ τούτων φροντίζομεν, ἀλλὰ
tάληθες ξηποῦμεν.

Ε τεῖα. 'Ορθότατα.

34. ἑ. Κέλευε δὴ τοὺς βελτίους γεγονότας
ἀποκρίνασθαι σοι, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν παρ’ αὐτῶν ἀφε-
μήνευε.

τεῖα. Ταῦτ’ ἐσται.

ἑ. Δειγόντων δὴ θυητόν ζῶνεν εἰ φασίν εἶναι τι.

τεῖα. Πῶς δ’ οὖ;

ἑ. Τούτῳ δὲ οὐ σῶμα ἐμψυχον ὀμολογοῦσιν;

τεῖα. Πάνυ γε.

ἑ. Τιθέντες τι τῶν ὄντων ψυχήν;

247 τεῖα. Ναί.

ἑ. Τί δὲ; ψυχήν οὐ τὴν μὲν δικαίαν, τὴν δὲ
ἀδικών φασίν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνιμον, τὴν δὲ
ἀφρονα;

τεῖα. Τί μὴν;

ἑ. 'Αλλ’ οὐ δικαιοσύνης ἔξει καὶ παρουσία τοι-
THE SOPHIST

who say that it consists in ideas, for they are peace-
ful folk; but from those who violently drag down
everything into matter, it is more difficult, perhaps
even almost impossible, to get it. However, this is
the way I think we must deal with them.

THEAET. What way?

STR. Our first duty would be to make them really
better, if it were in any way possible; but if this
cannot be done, let us pretend that they are better,
by assuming that they would be willing to answer
more in accordance with the rules of dialectic than
they actually are. For the acknowledgement of
anything by better men is more valid than if made
by worse men. But it is not these men that we
care about; we merely seek the truth.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Now tell them, assuming that they have
become better, to answer you, and do you interpret
what they say.

THEAET. I will do so.

STR. Let them tell whether they say there is
such a thing as a mortal animal.

THEAET. Of course they do.

STR. And they agree that this is a body with a
soul in it, do they not?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Giving to soul a place among things which
exist?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Well then, do they not say that one soul is
just and another unjust, one wise and another foolish?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And do they not say that each soul becomes
just by the possession and presence of justice, and

375
PLATO

αὕτην αὐτῶν ἐκάστην γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν ἐναντίαν;

Θεαὶ. Ναὶ, καὶ ταῦτα ξύμφασιν.

ἐξ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε δυνατόν τῳ 1 παραγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι πάντως εἶναι τι φήσουσιν.

Θεαὶ. Φασὶ μὲν οὖν.

Β ἐξ. Οὔσης οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἄρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ δὴ καὶ ψυχῆς ἐν ἡ ταῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, πότερον ὁρυτὸν καὶ ἀπτὸν εἶναι φασὶ τι αὐτῶν ἡ πάντα ἁράτα;

Θεαὶ. Σχέδον οὖδὲν τούτων γε ὀρατὸν.

ἐξ. Τί δὲ τῶν τοιούτων; μῶν σῶμα τι λέγουσιν ἰσχεων;

Θεαὶ. Τούτῳ οὐκέτι κατὰ ταῦτα 2 ἀποκρίνονται πάν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ψυχήν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σωμά τι κεκτήσαντι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστον ὅν ἡρωτηκας, ἀσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν ἡ μηδὲν τῶν C ὀντῶν αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν ἡ πάντ' εἶναι σωματα διασχυρίζεσθαι.

ἐξ. Σαφῶς γὰρ ἦμιν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, βελτίωσ γεγόνασιν ἄνδρες 3. ἐπεὶ τούτων οὐδ' ἂν ἐν ἐπισχυθεῖσιν οἴ γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοί τε καὶ αὐτὸ- χθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνοντ' ἂν πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶν ἐξυμπιέζεσιν εἰσὶν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὖδὲν τὸ παρά- παν ἔστιν.

Θεαὶ. Σχέδον οἷα διανοοῦνται λέγεις.

ἐξ. Πάλιν τοῖνοι ἀνερωτώμενοι αὐτούς· εἰ γὰρ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἀσώ-

1 τῳ τῷ BT; τῷ W.
2 ταῦτα] τὰ αὐτὰ W; ταῦτα BT.
3 ἄνδρες Bekker; ἄνδρες BT.
THE SOPHIST

the opposite by the possession and presence of the opposite?

THEAET. Yes, they agree to this also.

STR. But surely they will say that that which is capable of becoming present or absent exists.

THEAET. Yes, they say that.

STR. Granting, then, that justice and wisdom and virtue in general and their opposites exist, and also, of course, the soul in which they become present, do they say that any of these is visible and tangible, or that they are all invisible?

THEAET. That none of them is visible, or pretty nearly that.

STR. Now here are some other questions. Do they say they possess any body?

THEAET. They no longer answer the whole of that question in the same way. They say they believe the soul itself has a sort of body, but as to wisdom and the other several qualities about which you ask, they have not the face either to confess that they have no existence or to assert that they are all bodies.

STR. It is clear, Theaetetus, that our men have grown better; for the aboriginal sons of the dragon's teeth 1 among them would not shrink from any such utterance; they would maintain that nothing which they cannot squeeze with their hands has any existence at all.

THEAET. That is pretty nearly what they believe.

STR. Then let us question them further; for if they are willing to admit that any existence, no

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1 This refers to the story of Cadmus, who killed a dragon and then sowed its teeth, from which sprang fierce warriors to be his companions. Born of the dragon's teeth and of earth, they would naturally be of the earth, earthy.
PLATO

Δ ματον, ἔχαρκει. τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ τε τούτοις ἀμα καὶ ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνοις ὡσα ἔχει σῶμα ἔξυμφνης γεγονός, εἰς οὐ βλέποντες ἀμφότερα εἰναι λέγουσι, τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ῥητέον. τάχ’ οὖν ἵσως ἂν ἀποροίην· εἰ δὴ τι τοιοῦτον πεπόνθασι, σκόπει, προτευομένων ἥμων, δὴ ἐθέλοιεν ἂν δέχεσθαι καὶ ὁμολογεῖν τοιοῦτ’ εἶναι τὸ ὅν.

Θεαί. Τὸ ποίον δὴ; λέγε, καὶ τάχα εἰσόμεθα.

ζη. Λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὅποιαν τίνα κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἰτ’ εἰς ¹ τὸ ποιεῖν έτερον ὑπὸ τοῦ περικλάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰς ἀπαξ, πάν τοῦτο ὄντως εἰναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζειν τὰ ὅντα, ὡς ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλῆθ δύναμις.

Θεαί. Ἄλλα ἐπείπερ αὐτοὶ γε οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τούτοις βέλτιον λέγειν, δέχονται τοῦτο.

ζη. Καλῶς. Ἡσαυ γὰρ ἂν εἰς υπότην ἥμων τῇ καὶ τούτως έτερον ἂν φανεῖν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτως τούτῳ ἥμων ἐνταῦθα μενέτως ξυνομολογηθέν.

Θεαί. Μένει.

35. ζη. Πρὸς δὴ τοὺς έτερους ἱσμεν, τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους. σὺ δ’ ἥμων καὶ τὰ παρὰ τούτων ἀφερμήνευε.

Θεαί. Ταῦτ’ ἐσται.

ζη. Γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ οὕσιν χωρίς που διελόμενοι λέγεστε; ἡ γὰρ;

¹ εἰτ’ εἰς W; εἰ τις BT.

¹ i.e., between the process of coming into existence and existence itself. It is difficult to determine exactly who the idealists are whose doctrines are here discussed. Possibly
THE SOPHIST

matter how small, is incorporeal, that is enough. They will then have to tell what that is which is inherent in the incorporeal and the corporeal alike, and which they have in mind when they say that both exist. Perhaps they would be at a loss for an answer; and if they are in that condition, consider whether they might not accept a suggestion if we offered it, and might not agree that the nature of being is as follows.

THEAET. What is it? Speak, and we shall soon know.

STR. I suggest that everything which possesses any power of any kind, either to produce a change in anything of any nature or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause, though it be only on one occasion, has real existence. For I set up as a definition which defines being, that it is nothing else than power.

THEAET. Well, since they have at the moment nothing better of their own to offer, they accept this.

STR. Good; for perhaps later something else may occur both to them and to us. As between them and us, then, let us assume that this is for the present agreed upon and settled.

THEAET. It is settled.

STR. Then let us go to the others, the friends of ideas; and do you interpret for us their doctrines also.

THEAET. I will.

STR. You distinguish in your speech between generation and being, do you not?¹

Plato is restating or amending some of his own earlier beliefs.

379
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΕΕ. Καὶ σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσει δι’ αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῆ πρὸς τὴν ὀντὸς οὐσίαν, ἢν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὡσαύτως ἔχειν φατέ, γένεσιν δὲ ἄλλως ἄλλως.

Β ἩΕΑΙ. Φαμέν γὰρ οὖν.

ΕΕ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ κοινωνεῖν, ὅ πάντων ἀριστοί, τί τοῦθ’ ὑμᾶς ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν λέγειν φῶμεν; ἃρ’ οὐ τὸ νῦν δὴ παρ’ ἡμῶν ῥηθέν;  ἩΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΕΕ. Πάθημα ἡ ποίημα ἐκ δυνάμεως τινος ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἐξυνότων γυγνόμενον. τάχ’ οὖν, ὡ Θεαίτητε, αὐτῶν τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπόκρισιν οὐ μὲν οὐ κατακοῦεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἵσως διὰ συνήθειαν.

ἙΕΑΙ. Τίν’ οὖν δὴ λέγουσι λόγον;

C ΕΕ. Οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέν πρὸς τοὺς γγενεῖσι οὐσίας περί.

ἙΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΕΕ. Ἰκανὸν ἔθεμεν ὅρον ποὺ τῶν ὄντων, ὡται τῷ παρῇ ἡ τοῦ πάσχειν ἡ δρᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότατον δύναμις;

ἙΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΕΕ. Πρὸς δὴ ταύτα τόδε λέγουσιν, ὅτι γενέσει μὲν μέτεστι τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως, πρὸς δὲ οὐσίαν τούτων οὐδετέρου τὴν δύναμιν ἀρμόττειν φασίν.

ἙΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν λέγουσι τι;

ΕΕ. Πρὸς ὁ γε λεκτέον ἡμῖν ὡτὶ δεόμεθα παρ’

D αὐτῶν ἐτί πυθέσθαι σαφέστερον εἰ προσομολογοῦσι τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν γυγνόσκειν, τὴν δ’ οὐσίαν γυγνόσκεσθαι.

380
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes, we do.

STR. And you say that with the body, by means of perception, we participate in generation, and with the soul, by means of thought, we participate in real being, which last is always unchanged and the same, whereas generation is different at different times.

THEAET. Yes, that is what we say.

STR. But, most excellent men, how shall we define this participation which you attribute to both? Is it not that of which we were just speaking?

THEAET. What is that?

STR. A passive or active condition arising out of some power which is derived from a combination of elements. Possibly, Theaetetus, you do not hear their reply to this, but I hear it, perhaps, because I am used to them.

THEAET. What is it, then, that they say?

STR. They do not concede to us what we said just now to the aboriginal giants about being.

THEAET. What was it?

STR. We set up as a satisfactory sort of definition of being, the presence of the power to act or be acted upon in even the slightest degree.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. It is in reply to this that they say generation participates in the power of acting and of being acted upon, but that neither power is connected with being.

THEAET. And is there not something in that?

STR. Yes, something to which we must reply that we still need to learn more clearly from them whether they agree that the soul knows and that being is known.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Φασί μὴν τούτο γε.

ΕΞ. Τί δέ; τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἢ τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φατε ποίημα ἢ πάθος ἢ ἀμφότερον; ἢ τὸ μὲν πάθημα, τὸ δὲ θάτερον; ἢ παντάπασιν οὐδέτερον οὐδέτέρῳ τούτων μεταλαμβάνειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερον οὐδέτερον· τάναντία γὰρ ἂν τοῖς ἑμπροσθεν λέγοιεν.¹

ΕΞ. Μανθάνω· τόδε γε, ὡς τὸ γιγνώσκειν Ε ἔτηρ ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖςιν πάσχειν. τὴν ουσίαν ὑπ' ἣν κατὰ τὸν λόγον τούτον γιγνωσκομένην ὕπο τῆς γνώσεως, καθ' ὅσον γιγνωσκέται, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινεῖται διὰ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ δ' φαμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέωθαι περὶ τὸ ἱμεροῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡρθῶς.

ΕΞ. Τί δέ πρὸς Δίος; ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἢ ῥαδίως πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῷ ὡς τοιαὶ μὴ παρέσαι, μὴδε ζην αὐτὸ μηδὲ 249 φρονεῖν, ἄλλα σεμνὸν καὶ ἄγιον, νοοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀκίνητον ἐστός εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δεινόν μὲν τ' ἂν, ὦ ξένε, λόγον συγχωροῖμεν.

ΕΞ. Ἀλλὰ νοῦν μὲν ἔχειν, ζωὴν δὲ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΕΞ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀμφότερα ἐνόντα αὐτῷ λέγομεν, οὐ μὴν ἐν ψυχῇ γε φήσομεν αὐτὸ ἔχειν αὐτά;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τίν' ἂν ἔτερον ἐχου τρόπον;

ΕΞ. Ἀλλὰ δῆτα νοῦν μὲν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν

¹ δῆλον . . . λέγοιεν first attributed to Theaetetus by Heindorf.
² τόδε γε] τὸ δέ γε Τ; τὸ δὲ Β.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. They certainly assent to that.

STR. Well then, do you say that knowing or being known is an active or passive condition, or both? Or that one is passive and the other active? Or that neither has any share at all in either of the two?

THEAET. Clearly they would say that neither has any share in either; for otherwise they would be contradicting themselves.

STR. I understand; this at least is true, that if to know is active, to be known must in turn be passive. Now being, since it is, according to this theory, known by the intelligence, in so far as it is known, is moved, since it is acted upon, which we say cannot be the case with that which is in a state of rest.

THEAET. Right.

STR. But for heaven's sake, shall we let ourselves easily be persuaded that motion and life and soul and mind are really not present to absolute being, that it neither lives nor thinks, but awful and holy, devoid of mind, is fixed and immovable?

THEAET. That would be a shocking admission to make, Stranger.

STR. But shall we say that it has mind, but not life?

THEAET. How can we?

STR. But do we say that both of these exist in it, and yet go on to say that it does not possess them in a soul?

THEAET. But how else can it possess them?

STR. Then shall we say that it has mind and
PLATO

έχειν 1 ἀκίνητον μέντοι τὸ παράπαν ἐμψυχον ὅν ἑστάναι;

Β  θεάι. Πάντα ἐμοιγε ἀλογα ταῦτ’ εἰναι φαίνεται.

ἐ. Καὶ τὸ κινούμενον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν συγχωρή

τέον ὡς ὄντα.

θεάι. Πῶς δ’ οὐ;

ἐ. Ξυμβαίνει δ’ οὖν, ὡ Θεάιτητε, ἀκινήτων τε ὄντων νοῦν μηδενὶ περὶ μηδενὸς εἶναι μηδαμοῦ.

θεάι. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ἐ. Καὶ μὴν ἐὰν αὖ φερόμενα καὶ κινούμενα πάντ’ εἶναι συγχωρῶμεν, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ 

ταὐτὸν τούτῳ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἐξαιρήσομεν.

θεάι. Πῶς;

ἐ. Τὸ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαίτως καὶ περὶ τὸ 

C αὐτὸ δοκεῖ σοι χωρὶς στάσεως γενέσθαι ποτ’ ἄν;

θεάι. Οὐδαμῶς.

ἐ. Τί δ’; ἄνευ τούτων νοῦν καθορῆσα ὄντα ἢ 

γενόμενον ἄν καὶ ὅποιον;

θεάι. "Ηκιστα.

ἐ. Καὶ μὴν πρός γε τούτον παντὶ λόγῳ μαχετέον, 

ὅσ ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ νοῦν ἀφανίζων 

ἰσχυρίζηται περὶ τινος ὅπηον.

θεάι. Σφόδρα γε.

ἐ. Τῷ δὴ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τιμῶντι 

πᾶσα, ὡς έοικεν, ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα μήτε τῶν ἐν 

ἡ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἴδη λεγόντων τὸ πᾶν ἐστηκός 

D ἀποδέχεσθαι, τῶν τε αὖ πανταχῆ τὸ ὃν κινούντων

1 ἐχειν add. Schleiermacher.
THE SOPHIST

life and soul, but, although endowed with soul, is absolutely immovable?

THEAET. All those things seem to me absurd.

STR. And it must be conceded that motion and that which is moved exist.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then the result is, Theaetetus, that if there is no motion, there is no mind in anyone about anything anywhere.

THEAET. Exactly.

STR. And on the other hand, if we admit that all things are in flux and motion, we shall remove mind itself from the number of existing things by this theory also.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Do you think that sameness of quality or nature or relations could ever come into existence without the state of rest?

THEAET. Not at all.

STR. What then? Without these can you see how mind could exist or come into existence anywhere?

THEAET. By no means.

STR. And yet we certainly must contend by every argument against him who does away with knowledge or reason or mind and then makes any dogmatic assertion about anything.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then the philosopher, who pays the highest honour to these things, must necessarily, as it seems, because of them refuse to accept the theory of those who say the universe is at rest, whether as a unity or in many forms, and must also refuse utterly to listen to those who say that being is universal
μηδὲ τὸ παράπτων ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν παίδων εὐχήν, ὅσα ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκινημένα, τὸ ὦν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν ξυναμφότερα λέγειν.

Θεαί. Ἀληθέστατα.

36. Ἔν. Τί οὖν; ἄρ’ οὐκ ἐπιεικῶς ἦδη φαινόμεθα περιείληφέναι τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ὦν;

Θεαί. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ἔν. Βασιλεί μὲντ’ ἂν ἄρα, ὥς Θεαίτητε, ὥς μοι δοκοῦμεν νῦν αὐτοῦ γνώσεσθαι περὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς σκέψεως.

Ε Ἔν. Πῶς αὖ καὶ τί τοὺτ’ εἰρήκασ;...

ἔν. Ἡμεῖς μακάριε, οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι νῦν ἔσμεν ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ τῇ πλείστῃ περὶ αὐτοῦ, φαινόμεθα δὲ τι λέγειν ἥμιν αὐτοῖς;

Θεαί. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν’ ὅτι δ’ αὖ λελήθαμεν οὕτως ἐχοντες, οὐ πάνω ξυνήμι.

ἔν. Σκόπει δὴ σαφέστερον, εἰ ταῦτα νῦν ξυν-250 χρήσης δικαίως ἂν ἐπερωτηθῇμεν ἀπέρ αὐτοὶ τότε ἡρωτώμεν τοὺς λέγοντας εἰναι τὸ πᾶν θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν.

Θεαί. Ποιά; ὑπόμνησον με.

ἔν. Πάνω μὲν οὖν καὶ πειράσομαι γε δρᾶν τούτο, ἐρωτῶν σὲ καθάπερ ἐκείνους τότε, ἢν ἄμα τι καὶ προῖκωμεν.

Θεαί. Ὡρθῶς.

ἔν. Εἶνεν δὴ, κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν ἄρ’ οὐκ ἐναν-τιώτατα λέγεσι ἄλληλοις;

Θεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;
THE SOPHIST

motion; he must quote the children's prayer,¹ "all things immovable and in motion," and must say that being and the universe consist of both.

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Do we not, then, seem to have attained at last a pretty good definition of being?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But dear me, Theaetetus! I think we are now going to discover the difficulty of the inquiry about being.

THEAET. What is this again? What do you mean?

STR. My dear fellow, don't you see that we are now densely ignorant about it, but think that we are saying something worth while?

THEAET. I think so, at any rate, and I do not at all understand what hidden error we have fallen into.

STR. Then watch more closely and see whether, if we make these admissions, we may not justly be asked the same questions we asked a while ago of those who said the universe was hot and cold.²

THEAET. What questions? Remind me.

STR. Certainly; and I will try to do this by questioning you, as we questioned them at the time. I hope we shall at the same time make a little progress.

THEAET. That is right.

STR. Very well, then; you say that motion and rest are most directly opposed to each other, do you not?

THEAET. Of course.

¹ Nothing further seems to be known about this prayer. Stallbaum thought the reference was to a game in which the children said ὅσα ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκινημένα εἴη, "may all unmoved things be moved."

² Cf. 242 D above.
PLATO

καὶ μὴν εἴναι γε ὅμοιος φῆς ἀμφότερα αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκάτερον;

Β θεαί. Φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.
καὶ κινεῖσθαι λέγων ἀμφότερα καὶ ἐκάτερον, οὕτως εἶναι ἀναγχὼς;
θεαί. Οὐδαμῶς.
καὶ ἄλλ' ἑστάναι σημαίνεις λέγων αὐτὰ ἀμφότερα εἶναι;
θεαί. Καὶ πῶς;
καὶ τρίτον ἄρα τι παρὰ τάντα τὸ ὅτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τιθεῖσι, ὡς ὑπ' ἐκείνου τὴν τό στάσιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν περιεχομένην, συλλαβῶν καὶ ἀπιδῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν τῆς οὐσίας κοινωνίαν, οὕτως εἶναι προσείπες ἀμφότερα;

C θεαί. Κινδυνεύομεν ὡς ἀληθῶς τρίτον ἀπομακτεύσομαι τι τὸ ὅτι, ὅταν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν εἴναι λέγωμεν.
καὶ τρίτον ἄρα κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἐστὶ ξυν-ἀμφότερον τὸ ὅτι, ἄλλ' ἑτερον δὴ τοῦτων.
θεαί. 'Εσικεῖν.
ἐς. Κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἄρα τοῦ ὅτι οὕτω ἑστήκειν οὔτε κινεῖται.
θεαί. Σχεδόν.
ἐς. Ποὶ δὴ χρὴ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔτι τρέπειν τὸν βουλόμενον ἑναργῆς τὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ παρ' ἑαυτῷ βεβαιώσασθαι;
θεαί. Ποὶ γὰρ;
ἐς. Οἴμαι μὲν οὖν οὐδαμόσε ἔτι βάδιον. εἰ γὰρ τι 

388
THE SOPHIST

STR. And yet you say that both and each of them equally exist?
THEAET. Yes, I do.
STR. And in granting that they exist, do you mean to say that both and each are in motion?
THEAET. By no means.
STR. But do you mean that they are at rest, when you say that both exist?
THEAET. Of course not.
STR. Being, then, you consider to be something else in the soul, a third in addition to these two, inasmuch as you think rest and motion are embraced by it; and since you comprehend and observe that they participate in existence, you therefore said that they are. Eh?
THEAET. We really do seem to have a vague vision of being as some third thing, when we say that motion and rest are.
STR. Then being is not motion and rest in combination, but something else, different from them.
THEAET. Apparently.
STR. According to its own nature, then, being is neither at rest nor in motion.
THEAET. You are about right.
STR. What is there left, then, to which a man can still turn his mind who wishes to establish within himself any clear conception of being?
THEAET. What indeed?
STR. There is nothing left, I think, to which he can turn easily. For if a thing is not in motion, it must surely be at rest; and again, what is not at rest, must surely be in motion. But now we find that being has emerged outside of both these classes. Is that possible, then?
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν ἀδυνατώτατον.
Ε. Τόδε τοίων μηνηθήματι δίκαιων ἐπὶ τούτως.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον;
Ε. Ὅτι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐρωτηθέντες τούνομα ἔφ’ ὁ τί ποτε δεὶ φέρειν, πάση συνεσχόμεθα ἀπορία.
Μέμνησαι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
Ε. Μῶν οὖν ἐν ἐλάττονί τινι νῦν ἔσμεν ἀπορία
Ε περὶ τὸ ὅν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν, ὦ ἕξεν, εἰ δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν, ἐν
πλείονι φαινόμεθα.
Ε. Τούτῳ μὲν τοῖς ἐνταῦθα κείσθω διηπορη-
μένον. ἔπειθ᾽ ἔδε ἐξ ἵσου τὸ τε ὅν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀπο-
ρίας μετειλήφατον, νῦν ἐλπίς ἴδῃ καθ᾽ ἀπερ ἀν
αύτῶν θάτερον εἴτε ἀμυδρότερον εἴτε σαφέστερον
ἀναφαίνηται, καὶ θάτερον οὔτως ἀναφαίνεσθαι. καὶ
251 ἐὰν αὕτη δέκτερον ἰδεῖν δυνώμεθα, τὸν γοῦν λόγον
δηθησθῇ ἀν οἷοι τε ὃμεν εὐπρεπέστατα διωσῶμεθα
οὔτως ἀμφοῖν ἁμα.
ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς.
Ε. Λέγωμεν δὴ καθ᾽ ὄντως ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς
νόμοις ταύτον τοῦτο ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύομεν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶον δὴ τί; παράδειγμα εἰπέ.
37. Ε. Λέγομεν ἀνθρωπον δὴ που πόλλ᾽ ἄττα
ἐπονομάζοντες, τὰ τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ
καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἁρετᾶς,
Β ἐν οἷς πᾶσι καὶ ἐπεροὶς μυρίοις οὐ μόνον ἀνθρωπον
αὐτὸν εἰναὶ φαίμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἁγαθὸν καὶ ἐπείρα
ἀπειρά, καὶ τάλλα δὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως
ἐν ἑκαστὸν ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς
νόμοις ὀνόμασι λέγομεν.

390
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. No, nothing could be more impossible.
STR. Then there is this further thing which we ought to remember.
THEAET. What is it?
STR. That when we were asked to what the appellation of not-being should be applied, we were in the greatest perplexity. Do you remember?
THEAET. Of course I do.
STR. Well, then, are we now in any less perplexity about being?
THEAET. It seems to me, stranger, that we are, if possible, in even greater.
STR. This point, then, let us put down definitely as one of complete perplexity. But since being and not-being participate equally in the perplexity, there is now at last some hope that as either of them emerges more dimly or more clearly, so also will the other emerge. If, however, we are able to see neither of them, we will at any rate push our discussion through between both of them at once as creditably as we can.
THEAET. Good.
STR. Let us, then, explain how we come to be constantly calling this same thing by many names.
THEAET. What, for instance? Please give an example.
STR. We speak of man, you know, and give him many additional designations; we attribute to him colours and forms and sizes and vices and virtues, and in all these cases and countless others we say not only that he is man, but we say he is good and numberless other things. So in the same way every single thing which we supposed to be one, we treat as many and call by many names.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄληθῆ λέγεις.

ἘΕ. "Θέν γε, οίμαι, τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀφθαλμέσι θάνην παρεσκευάκαμεν· εἰ δὲς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ὡς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλά ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ που χαίροντον οὐκ ἔώντες ἁγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον,

καὶ τὸ μὲν ἁγαθὸν ἁγαθὸν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον, ἐντυγχάνεις γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ μιαί πολλάκις τὰ τουαίτα ἐσπουδακόσιν, ἐνωπὶ πρεσβυτέρου ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τουαίτα τεθαμμακόσι, καὶ δὴ τι καὶ πάσσοφον οἴομένοι τούτω αὐτὸ ἀνηρηκέναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ἘΕ. "Ινα τοίνυν πρὸς ἀπαντᾷ ἢμῖν ὁ λόγος ἂν τοὺς πώποτε περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὦτοις διαλεχθᾶτας,

δέστω καὶ πρὸς τούτους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς οὗτοι ἐμπροσθεν διειλέγεμεθα, τὰ νῦν ὡς ἐν ἑρωτήσει λεχθησόμενα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ποιὰ δή;

ἘΕ. Πότερον μήτε τὴν οὐσίαν κινήσει καὶ στάσει προσάπτωμεν μήτε ἄλλο ἄλλω μηδὲν μηδενεῖ, ἄλλῳ ὡς ἀμίκτα ὀντα καὶ ἀδύνατον μεταλαμβάνειν ἄλληλων οὕτως αὐτὰ ἐν τοῖς παρ’ ἢμῖν λόγοις τιθῶμεν; ἡ πάντα εἰς ταύτων ἐξουάγωμεν ὡς δυνατὰ ἐπικυννώνειν ἄλληλοι; ἡ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δὲ μή; τούτων, ὡς 392
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. True.

STR. And it is in this way, I fancy, that we have provided a fine feast for youngsters and for old men whose learning has come to them late in life; for example, it is easy enough for anyone to grasp the notion that the many cannot possibly be one, nor the one many, and so, apparently, they take pleasure in saying that we must not call a man good, but must call the good good, and a man man. I fancy, Theaetetus, you often run across people who take such matters seriously; sometimes they are elderly men whose poverty of intellect makes them admire such quibbles, and who think this is a perfect mine of wisdom they have discovered.\(^1\)

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then, to include in our discussion all those who have ever engaged in any talk whatsoever about being, let us address our present arguments to these men as well as to all those with whom we were conversing before, and let us employ the form of questions.

THEAET. What are the arguments?

STR. Shall we attribute neither being to rest and motion, nor any attribute to anything, but shall we in our discussions assume that they do not mingle and cannot participate in one another? Or shall we gather all things together, believing that they are capable of combining with one another? Or are some capable of it and others not? Which of these

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\(^1\) Those are here satirized who deny the possibility of all except identical predication. Such were Antisthenes, Euthydemus, and Dionysodorus. The two last are probably those referred to as old men whose learning came late in life.
Ε Θεαίτητε, τί ποτ’ ἂν αὐτοὺς προαιρεῖσθαι φη-σαμεν;

θεαί. Ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχω πρὸς ταύτα ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ζέ. Τί οὗν οὐ καθ’ ἐν ἀποκρινόμενος ἐφ’ ἐκάστου τὰ εὐμβάλοντα ἐσκέψω; ¹

θεαί. Καλῶς λέγεις. ²

ζέ. Καὶ τιθῶμεν γε αὐτοὺς λέγειν, εἰ βούλειι, πρῶτον μηδὲν μηδὲν μηδεμίων δύναμιν ἔχειν κοινωνίας εἰς μηδέν. οὐκοῦν κίνησις τε καὶ στάσις οὐδαμῆ μεθέξετον οὐσίας;

252 θεαί. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ζέ. Τί δέ; ἔσται πότερον αὐτῶν οὐσίας μὴ προσ-κοινωνοῦν. ³

θεαί. Οὐκ ἔσται.

ζέ. Ταχὺ δὴ ταύτῃ γε τῇ συνομολογίᾳ πάντα ἀνάστατα γέγονεν, ὡς έοικεν, ἃμα τε τῶν τὸ πᾶν κινούμενον καὶ τῶν ὡς ἐν ἱστάντων καὶ οὐσία κατ’ εἶδη τὰ ὅντα κατὰ ταύτα ὁμοῦτως ἔχοντα εἶναι φασιν ἀεί. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τὸ γε εἶναι προσ-ἀπτούσιν, οἱ μὲν ὅντως κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ ὅντως ἐστηκότ’ εἶναι.

θεαί. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.

ζέ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅσοι τοτὲ μὲν ἐκντιθέασι τὰ πάντα, τοτὲ δὲ διαιροῦσιν, εἰτε εἰς ἐν καὶ εἰς ἐνὸς ἀπειρα εἰτε εἰς πέρας ἔχοντα στοιχεῖα διαιροῦμενοι καὶ ἐκ τούτων συντιθέντες, ὡμοίως μὲν εὰν ἐν μέρει τούτῳ τιθῶσι γιγνόμενον, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ εὰν ἀεί,

¹ τί οὖν . . . ἐσκέψω; attributed to the Stranger by Badham.
² καλῶς λέγεις attributed to Theaetetus by Badham.
³ προσκοινωνοῦν W; προσκοινωνεόν BT.
THE SOPHIST

alternatives, Theaetetus, should we say is their choice?

THEAET. I cannot answer these questions for them.

STR. Then why did you not answer each separately and see what the result was in each case?

THEAET. A good suggestion.

STR. And let us, if you please, assume that they say first that nothing has any power to combine with anything else. Then motion and rest will have no share in being, will they?

THEAET. No.

STR. Well, then, will either of them be, if it has no share in being?

THEAET. It will not.

STR. See how by this admission everything is overturned at once, as it seems—the doctrine of those who advocate universal motion, that of the partisans of unity and rest, and that of the men who teach that all existing things are distributed into invariable and everlasting kinds. For all of these make use of being as an attribute. One party says that the universe “is” in motion, another that it “is” at rest.

THEAET. Exactly.

STR. And further, all who teach that things combine at one time and separate at another, whether infinite elements combine in unity and are derived from unity or finite elements separate and then unite, regardless of whether they say that these changes take place successively or without interrup-
PLATO

κατὰ πάντα ταύτα λέγοιεν ἃν οὐδὲν, εἰπερ μηδεμία ἐστι ξύμμεξις.

θεαι. Ἡρμῆς.

ἐς. Ἑτὶ τοίνυν ἃν αὐτοὶ πάντων καταγελαστῶτα μετίοιεν 1 τὸν λόγον οἱ μηδὲν ἑωτερες κοινωνία παθήματος ἑτέρου θάτερον προσαγορεύειν.

C θεαι. Πῶς;

ἐς. Τῷ τε ἐλναί’ που περὶ πάντα ἀναγκάζονται χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ “χωρίς” καὶ τῷ “τῶν ἄλλων” 2 καὶ τῷ “καθ’ αὐτό” καὶ μυρίους ἑτέρους, ὁν ἀκρατεῖς ἕωτες εὐργεσθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ ἄλλων δέονται τῶν ἑξελεγόντων, ἀλλὰ τὸ λεγόμενον οὐκοθεν τῶν πολέμων καὶ ἐναντιωσόμενον ἔχοντες, ἐντὸς ὑποθεγγόμενον ὁπερ τὸν ἄποτον Εὐρυκλέα περιφέροντες ἀεὶ πορεύονται.

D θεαι. Κομιδὴ λέγεις ὅμοιον τε καὶ ἄληθες.

ἐς. Τί δ’, ἃν πάντα ἄλληλοις ἑώμεν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἐπικοινωνίας;

θεαι. Τοῦτο μὲν οἶδος τε κἀγὼ διαλύειν.

ἐς. Πῶς;

θεαι. Ὅτι κίνησις τε 3 αὕτη παντάπασιν ἵστατ’ ἃν καὶ στάσις αὐτ’ πάλιν αὕτη κυνῖτο, εἰπερ ἐπιγυνοῖσθην ἐπ’ ἄλληλον.

ἐς. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τούτῳ γέ που ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνάγκαις ἀδύνατον, κίνησιν τε ἱστασθαι καὶ στάσιν κυνεῖσθαι;

θεαι. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

ἐς. Τὸ τρίτον δὴ μόνον λοιπόν.

θεαι. Ναὶ.

1 μετίοιεν] μετίομεν BTW.
2 τῶν ἄλλων B; ἄλλων T.
3 τε] γε BTW.
tion, would be talking nonsense in all these doctrines, if there is no intermingling.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Then, too, the very men who forbid us to call anything by another name because it participates in the effect produced by another, would be made most especially ridiculous by this doctrine.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Because they are obliged in speaking of anything to use the expressions "to be," "apart," "from the rest," "by itself," and countless others; they are powerless to keep away from them or avoid working them into their discourse; and therefore there is no need of others to refute them, but, as the saying goes, their enemy and future opponent is of their own household whom they always carry about with them as they go, giving forth speech from within them, like the wonderful Eurycles.¹

THEAET. That is a remarkably accurate illustration.

STR. But what if we ascribe to all things the power of participation in one another?

THEAET. Even I can dispose of that assumption.

STR. How?

THEAET. Because motion itself would be wholly at rest, and rest in turn would itself be in motion, if these two could be joined with one another.

STR. But surely this at least is most absolutely impossible, that motion be at rest and rest be in motion?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then only the third possibility is left.

THEAET. Yes.

¹ Eurycles was a ventriloquist and soothsayer of the fifth century, cf. Aristophanes, Wasps, 1019.
PLATO

E 38. εἰ. Καὶ μήν ἔν γε τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον, ἤ πάντα ἤ μηδὲν ἤ τά μὲν ἐθέλειν, τά δὲ μὴ συμμιγνυσθαί.

τέλαι. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
εἰ. Καὶ μὴν τά γε δύο ἀδύνατον εὐρέθη.
τέλαι. Ναί. 1
εἰ. Πάς ἄρα ὁ βουλόμενος ὁρθῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν τριῶν θήσει.
τέλαι. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.
εἰ. Ἡτε δὴ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει τούτο δράν, τὰ δὲ οὐ,
253 σχεδὸν οἶνον τὰ γράμματα πεπονθότι ἄν εἰη. καὶ
gαρ ἐκείνων τὰ μὲν ἀναρμοστεῖ ποὺ πρὸς ἄλληλα,
tά δὲ ξυναρμόττει.
τέλαι. Πῶς δ’ οὖ;
εἰ. Τά δὲ γε φωνήσατα διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων
οἶνον δεσιμὸς διὰ πάντων κεχώρηκεν, ὥστε ἄνευ τινὸς
αὐτῶν ἀδύνατον ἀρμόττει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔτερον
ἐτέρω.
τέλαι. Καὶ μάλα γε.
εἰ. Πάς οὖν οἶδεν ὅποια ὅποιος δυνατὰ κοινω-
νεῖν, ἡ τέχνης δεὶ τῷ μέλλοντι δράν ἰκανῶς αὐτά;
τέλαι. Τέχνης.
εἰ. Ποῖας;
τέλαι. Τῆς γραμματικῆς.
εἰ. Τί δέ; περὶ τοὺς τῶν ὁξέων καὶ βαρέων
Β φθόγγοις ἄρ’ οὖχ οὕτως; ὁ μὲν τοὺς συγκεραννυ-
μένους τε καὶ μὴ τέχνην ἔχων γιγνώσκειν μουσικός,
ό δὲ μὴ ἐξυνείς ἀμοῦσος;
τέλαι. Οὕτως.

1 εὐρέθη. va1 Heindorf; εὐρεθήναι BT; εὐρεθήναι: va1 W.

398
THE SOPHIST

STR. And certainly one of these three must be true; either all things will mingle with one another, or none will do so, or some will and others will not.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And certainly the first two were found to be impossible.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Then everybody who wishes to answer correctly will adopt the remaining one of the three possibilities.

THEAET. Precisely.

STR. Now since some things will commingle and others will not, they are in much the same condition as the letters of the alphabet; for some of these do not fit each other, and others do.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And the vowels, to a greater degree than the others, run through them all as a bond, so that without one of the vowels the other letters cannot be joined one to another.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Now does everybody know which letters can join with which others? Or does he who is to join them properly have need of art?

THEAET. He has need of art.

STR. What art?

THEAET. The art of grammar.

STR. And is not the same true in connexion with high and low sounds? Is not he who has the art to know the sounds which mingle and those which do not, musical, and he who does not know unmusical?

THEAET. Yes.
PLATO

ΞΕ. Καί κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τεχνῶν καὶ ἀτεχνών τοιαῦτα εὑρήσομεν ἐτέρα.

ΘΕΩΙ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Τί δ᾽; ἔπειδή καὶ τὰ γένη πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ ταύτα μίξεως έχειν ὁμολογήκαμεν, ἃρ' οὐ μετ’ ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἀναγκαίον διὰ τῶν λόγων πορεύεσθαι τὸν ὀρθῶς μέλλοντα δείξειν ποία ποιῶς συμφωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποία ἄλληλα οὐ δέχεται;

C καὶ δὴ καὶ διὰ πάντων εἰ συνέχοντ᾽ ἀττ᾽ αὐτ᾽ ἔστων, ὡστε συμμίγνυσθαι δυνατὰ εἶναι, καὶ πάλιν ἐν ταῖς διαφέρεσιν, εἰ δὴ ὀλων ἔτερα τῆς διαφερέσεως αἰτία;

ΘΕΩΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιστήμης δεί, καὶ σχεδὸν ἔνοικος τῆς μεγίστης;

39. ΞΕ. Τίν᾽ οὖν αὖ προσεροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ταύτῃ; ἡ πρὸς Διὸς ἐλάθομεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐμπεσόντες ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κινδυνεύομεν ξητοῦντες τὸν σοφιστὴν πρότερον ἀνηρηκέναι τὸν ἀγίον Φιλόσοφον;

ΘΕΩΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

Δ ΞΕ. Τὸ κατὰ γένη διαφερεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ταύτων εἶδος ἔτερον ἢγγίσασθαι μὴτε ἔτερον ὃν ταύτων μῶν οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φύσεως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι;

ΘΕΩΙ. Ναὶ, φύσομεν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν ὃ γε τούτῳ δυνατὸς δρᾶν μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἐνὸς ἑκάστου κειμένου χωρίς, πάντη διατεταμένη ἰκανῶς διαισθάνεται, καὶ πολλὰς ἐτέρας ἄλληλων ὑπὸ μᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας, καὶ μίαν αὖ δὴ ὀλων πολλῶν ἐν ἐν ἐπικρατοῦσαν, καὶ

1 συνέχοντ᾽ ἀττ᾽ αὐτ᾽ Wagner; συνέχοντα ταὐτ᾽ BTW.
THE SOPHIST

STR. And we shall find similar conditions, then, in all the other arts and processes which are devoid of art?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Now since we have agreed that the classes or genera also commingle with one another, or do not commingle, in the same way, must not he possess some science and proceed by the processes of reason who is to show correctly which of the classes harmonize with which, and which reject one another, and also if he is to show whether there are some elements extending through all and holding them together so that they can mingle, and again, when they separate, whether there are other universal causes of separation?

THEAET. Certainly he needs science, and perhaps even the greatest of sciences.

STR. Then, Theaetetus, what name shall we give to this science? Or, by Zeus, have we unwittingly stumbled upon the science that belongs to free men and perhaps found the philosopher while we were looking for the sophist?

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. Shall we not say that the division of things by classes and the avoidance of the belief that the same class is another, or another the same, belongs to the science of dialectic?

THEAET. Yes, we shall.

STR. Then he who is able to do this has a clear perception of one form or idea extending entirely through many individuals each of which lies apart, and of many forms differing from one another but included in one greater form, and again of one form evolved by the union of many wholes, and of many
PLATO

Επολλάς χωρὶς πάντη διωρισμένας· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστιν, ἢ τε κοινωνεῖν ἐκαστα δύναται καὶ ὑπ’ μή, διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι.

ὁ θεά. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ἐς. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλῳ διώσεις, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, πλὴν τῶν καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι.

ὁ θεά. Πώς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ δοῖς τις;

ἐς. Τὸν μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφον ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ τόπῳ καὶ νῦν καὶ ἑπείτα ἀνευρήσομεν, ἐὰν ζητῶμεν, ἵδειν 254 μὲν χαλέπον ἐναργῶς καὶ τούτων, ἐπερον μὴν τρόπον ἢ τε τοῦ σοφίστοι χαλεπότητης ἢ τε τούτου.

ὁ θεά. Πώς;

ἐς. Ὅ μὲν ἀποδιδράσκων εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὅντος σκοτεινότητα, τριβῇ προσαπτόμενος αὐτῆς, διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν τοῦ τόπου κατανοῆσαι χαλεπός· ἢ γὰρ;

ὁ θεά. Ἔοικεν.

ἐς. Ὅ δὲ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὅντος αἰεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἵδεά, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὐ τῆς χώρας οὖδαμῶς εὐπετῆς ὄφθηναι· τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν Β πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὀμματα καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θείον ἀφορώντα ἄδινα.

ὁ θεά. Καὶ ταῦτα εἰκὸς οὐχ ἢττον ἐκείνων οὕτως ἔχειν.

ἐς. Οὐκοίν περὶ μὲν τούτου καὶ τάχα ἐπισκεψόμεθα σαφέστερον, ἂν ἐτι βουλομένους ἦμιν ἢ. περὶ δὲ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ ποὺ δήλον ὡς οὐκ ἀνετέον, πρὶν ἄν ἵκανῶς αὐτὸν θεασώμεθα.

402
THE SOPHIST

forms entirely apart and separate. This is the knowledge and ability to distinguish by classes how individual things can or cannot be associated with one another.

THEAET. Certainly it is.

STR. But you surely, I suppose, will not grant the art of dialectic to any but the man who pursues philosophy in purity and righteousness.

THEAET. How could it be granted to anyone else?

STR. Then it is in some region like this that we shall always, both now and hereafter, discover the philosopher, if we look for him; he also is hard to see clearly, but the difficulty is not the same in his case and that of the sophist.

THEAET. How do they differ?

STR. The sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, feeling his way in it by practice,¹ and is hard to discern on account of the darkness of the place. Don't you think so?

THEAET. It seems likely.

STR. But the philosopher, always devoting himself through reason to the idea of being, is also very difficult to see on account of the brilliant light of the place; for the eyes of the soul of the multitude are not strong enough to endure the sight of the divine.

THEAET. This also seems no less true than what you said about the sophist.

STR. Now we will make more accurate investigations about the philosopher hereafter, if we still care to do so; but as to the sophist, it is clear that we must not relax our efforts until we have a satisfactory view of him.

¹ By practice, i.e., by empirical knowledge as opposed to reason.

403
PLATO

ΘΕΛΩ. Καλώς είπες.

40. ΞΕ. "Ότ' οὖν δὴ τὰ μὲν ἦμιν τῶν γενῶν ὤμο- λόγηται κοινωνεῖν ἑθελεῖν ἄλληλοις, τὰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπ' ὁλίγον, τὰ δ' ἐπὶ πολλά, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν πάντων οὖσεν κωλύειν τοὺς πάσιν κεκοιμωνηκέναι, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ξυνεπιστώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ τῇ δε σκυπούντες, μὴ περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδών, ἦν μὴ ταραττώμεθα ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ προελάμβανοι τῶν μεγίστων λεγομένων ἄττια, πρῶτον μὲν ποία ἐκαστὰ ἐστίν, ἕπειτα κοινωνίας ἄλληλων πῶς ἔχει δυνάμεως, ἵνα τὸ τε ὦν καὶ μὴ ὦν εἰ μὴ πάση σαφεῖς. δυνάμεος λαβεῖν, ἀλλ' οὖν λόγου γε ἐνδεεῖς μηδὲν γεγονόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, καθ' ὦσον ὁ τρόπος ἐνδέχεται τῆς νῦν σκέψεως, ἔδω ἢμῖν πη D παρεικάθη 1 τὸ μὴ ὅτι λέγουσιν ὡς ἐστὶν ὄντως μὴ ὦν ἄθυοις ἀπαλλάττειν.

ΘΕΛΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρή.

ΞΕ. Μέγιστα μὴν τῶν γενῶν, ἃ νῦν δὴ διήμεν, τὸ τε ὦν αὐτὸ καὶ στάσις καὶ κίνησις.

ΘΕΛΩ. Πολὺ γε.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν τῷ γε δύο φαμὲν αὐτοῖς ἀμίκτων πρὸς ἄλληλων.

ΘΕΛΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ γε ὄν μικτῶν ἀμφοῖν ἐστίν γὰρ ἀμφῶς που.

ΘΕΛΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ; 

ΞΕ. Τρία δὴ γίγνεται ταύτα.

ΘΕΛΩ. Τι μὴν;

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸν τοὺς μὲν δυοῖν ἔτερον ἐστίν, αὐτὸ δ' ἑαυτῷ ταύτῶν.

1 παρεικάθη Boeckh; παρεικασθη BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. You are right.

STR. Since, therefore, we are agreed that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not, and some will mingle with few and others with many, and that there is nothing to hinder some from mingling universally with all, let us next proceed with our discussion by investigating, not all the forms or ideas, lest we become confused among so many, but some only, selecting them from those that are considered the most important; let us first consider their several natures, then what their power of mingling with one another is, and so, if we cannot grasp being and not-being with perfect clearness, we shall at any rate not fail to reason fully about them, so far as the method of our present inquiry permits. Let us in this way see whether it is, after all, permitted us to say that not-being really is, although not being, and yet come off unscathed.

THEAET. Yes; that is the proper thing for us to do.

STR. The most important, surely, of the classes or genera are those which we just mentioned; being itself and rest and motion.

THEAET. Yes, by far.

STR. And further, two of them, we say, cannot mingle with each other.

THEAET. Decidedly not.

STR. But being can mingle with both of them, for they both are.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then these prove to be three.

THEAET. To be sure.

STR. Each of them is, then, other than the remaining two, but the same as itself.
Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΕΕ. Τί ποτ’ αὖ νῦν οὕτως εἰρήκαμεν τὸ τε ταύτων καὶ θάτερον; πότερα δύο γένη τινὲς αὐτῶν, τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἄλλως, ξυμμειγμένων μήν ἐκείνως ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἰεί, καὶ περὶ πέντε ἄλλ’ οὖ περὶ τριῶν ὡς ὅντων αὐτῶν σκεπτέον, ἢ τὸ τε ταύτων τοῦτο καὶ θάτερον ὡς ἐκείνων τι προσαγορεύοντες λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἰσως.

ΕΕ. ‘Ἀλλ’ οὖ τι μὴν κίνησις γε καὶ στάσις οὖθ’ ἔτερον οὔτε ταύτων εστι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΕΕ. Ὅτιπερ ἄν κοινὴ προσεἴπωμεν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν, τοῦτο οὐδὲτερον αὐτῶν οἷον τε εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δὴ;

ΕΕ. Κίνησις τε στήσεται καὶ στάσις αὖ κινηθήσεται· περὶ γὰρ ἀμφότερα θάτερον ὁποτερονοῦν γιγνόμενον αὐτῶν ἀναγκάσει μεταβάλλειν αὖ θάτερον ἐπὶ τούναντιον τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως, ἀτε Β μετασχόν τοῦ ἐναντίον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδὴ γε.

ΕΕ. Μετέχετον μὴν ἀμφῶς ταύτων καὶ θατέρων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΕΕ. Μὴ τοίνυν λέγομεν κίνησιν γ’ εἶναι ταύτων ἡ θάτερον, μηδ’ αὖ στάσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ γὰρ.

ΕΕ. Ἀλλ’ ἄρα τὸ ὅν καὶ τὸ ταύτων ὡς ἐν τι διανοητέον ἡμῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἰσως.

ΕΕ. Ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ ὅν καὶ τὸ ταύτων μηδὲν διάφορον σημαίνετον, κίνησιν αὖ πάλιν καὶ στάσιν ἀμφότερα

1 αὐτῶ] αὐτοῦ Β; αὐτοῦ Τ.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes.

STR. But what do we mean by these words, "the same" and "other," which we have just used? Are they two new classes, different from the other three, but always of necessity mingled with them, and must we conduct our inquiry on the assumption that there are five classes, not three, or are we unconsciously speaking of one of those three when we say "the same" or "other"?

THEAET. Perhaps.

STR. But certainly motion and rest are neither other nor the same.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Whatever term we apply to rest and motion in common cannot be either of those two.

THEAET. Why not?

STR. Because motion would be at rest and rest would be in motion; in respect of both, for whichever of the two became "other" would force the other to change its nature into that of its opposite, since it would participate in its opposite.

THEAET. Exactly so.

STR. Both certainly partake of the same and the other.¹

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Then we must not say that motion, or rest either, is the same or other.

THEAET. No.

STR. But should we conceive of "being" and "the same" as one?

THEAET. Perhaps.

STR. But if "being" and "the same" have no difference of meaning, then when we go on and say ¹ i.e., sameness and difference can be predicated of both.
εἶναι λέγοντες ἀμφότερα οὕτως αὐτά ταύτων ὡς
κάτω προσερούμεν.

Θεῖαι. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἁδύνατον.

ζέ. Ἀδύνατον ἄρα ταύτων καὶ τὸ ὦν ἐν εἶναι.

Θεῖαι. Σχεδόν.

ζέ. Τέταρτον δὴ πρὸς τοὺς τρισίν εἴδεσιν ¹ τὸ
ταύτων τιθώμεν;

Θεῖαι. Πάντως μὲν οὖν.

ζέ. Τι δέ; τὸ θάτερον ἡμῖν λεκτέων πέμπτων;

ζέ. τὸ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὦν ὡς δῦ ἀττα ὀνόματα ἐτ' ἐνε γένει
dιανοεῖσθαι δεῖ;

Θεῖαι. Τάχ' ἄν.

ζέ. Ἀλλ' οἶμαι σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὦντων τὰ μὲν
αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ² ἄει λέγεσθαι.

Θεῖαι. Τι δ' οὖν;

ζέ. Τὸ δ' ἐτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἐτερον· ἡ γάρ;

Θείαι. Οὕτως.

ζέ. Οὐκ ἄν, εἶ γε τὸ ὦν καὶ τὸ θάτερον μὴ
πάμπυλυ διεφερέτην· ἀλλ' εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν
μετεῖχε τοῖν εἴδοιν ὡσπερ τὸ ὦν, ἣν ἄν ποτὲ τι καὶ
τῶν ἐτέρων ἐτερον οὐ πρὸς ἐτερον· νῦν δὲ ἄτεχνῶς
ἡμῖν, διπερ ἄν ἐτερον Ἐ, συμβεβηκεν εἴ ἀνάγκης
ἐτέρου τούτο ὁπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι·.

Θεῖαι. Λέγεις καθάπερ ἔχει.

ζέ. Πέμπτων δὲ τὴν θάτερον φύσιν λεκτέον ἐν
Εἰρετω εἴδεσιν οὕσαν, ἐν οἷς προαρούμεθα.

Θεῖαι. Ναί.

ζέ. Καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτήν αὐτῶν φύσομεν
eἶναι διεληλυθύναν· ἐν ἑκαστον γάρ ἐτερον εἶναι

¹ εἴδεσι BT; εἴδεσιν εἶδος W.
² ἄλλα TW; ἄλληα B.
THE SOPHIST

that both rest and motion are, we shall be saying that they are both the same, since they are.

THEAET. But surely that is impossible.

STR. Then it is impossible for being and the same to be one.

THEAET. Pretty nearly.

STR. So we shall consider "the same" a fourth class in addition to the other three?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then shall we call "the other" a fifth class? Or must we conceive of this and "being" as two names for one class?

THEAET. May be.

STR. But I fancy you admit that among the entities some are always conceived as absolute, and some as relative.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And other is always relative to other, is it not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. It would not be so, if being and the other were not utterly different. If the other, like being, partook of both absolute and relative existence, there would be also among the others that exist another not in relation to any other; but as it is, we find that whatever is other is just what it is through compulsion of some other.

THEAET. The facts are as you say.

STR. Then we must place the nature of "the other" as a fifth among the classes in which we select our examples.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And we shall say that it permeates them all; for each of them is other than the rest, not by reason
τῶν ἄλλων οὖν διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, ἄλλα διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἱδέας τῆς θατέρου.

στοιχείον καὶ τὸν κόσμον τὰ πεπερασμένα λέγομεν ἐπὶ τῶν πέντε καθὲν ἀναλαμβάνοντες.

πῶς;

πρώτον μὲν κίνησιν, ὡς ἂστι παντάπασιν ἑτέρους στάσεως. ἧ πῶς λέγωμεν;

οὕς.

οὗ στάσις ἄρ' ἂστιν.

οὐδαμῶς.

ἐστι δὲ γε διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τοῦ ὄντος.

ἐστιν.

ἄδεις δὴ πάλιν ἡ κίνησις ἑτέρου ταυτοῦ ἔστιν.

σχεδὸν.

οὗ ταυτὸν ἀρα ἂστιν.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὴ γ' ἢν ταυτὸν διὰ τὸ μετέχειν αὐτῷ πάντ' αὐτοῦ.

καὶ μάλα.

τὴν κίνησιν δὴ ταυτὸν τε εἶναι καὶ μὴ ταυτὸν ὁμολογητέον καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον. οὐ γὰρ ὅταν εἴπωμεν αὐτὴν ταυτὸν καὶ μὴ ταυτὸν, ὁμοίως εἰρήκαμεν, ἀλλ' ὅποταν μὲν ταυτὸν, διὰ τὴν μέθεξιν ταυτοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν οὗτω λέγομεν, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ταυτὸν, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὐθερεύον, δι' ἡν ἀποχωριζομένη ταυτοῦ γέγονεν οὐκ έκεινο ἀλλ' ἑτέρον, ὅστε ὦρθως αὐτὴ λέγεται πάλιν οὗ ταυτὸν.

πάνω μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν κἂν εἰ πη μετελάμβανεν αὐτὴν λέγωμεν W; λέγωμεν BT.
THE SOPHIST

of its own nature, but because it partakes of the idea of the other.

THEAET. Exactly.

STR. Let us now state our conclusions, taking up the five classes one at a time.

THEAET. How?

STR. Take motion first; we say that it is entirely other than rest, do we not?

THEAET. We do.

STR. Then it is not rest.

THEAET. Not at all.

STR. But it exists, by reason of its participation in being.

THEAET. Yes, it exists.

STR. Now motion again is other than the same.

THEAET. You're about right.

STR. Therefore it is not the same.

THEAET. No, it is not.

STR. But yet we found it was the same, because all things partake of the same.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then we must admit that motion is the same and is not the same, and we must not be disturbed thereby; for when we say it is the same and not the same, we do not use the words alike. When we call it the same, we do so because it partakes of the same in relation to itself, and when we call it not the same, we do so on account of its participation in the other, by which it is separated from the same and becomes not that but other, so that it is correctly spoken of in turn as not the same.

THEAET. Yes, certainly.

STR. Then even if absolute motion partook in
PLATO

κίνησις στάσεως, ουδ'έν αν άτοπον ἢ στάσιμον αὐτῆν προσαγορεύειν;

ὁ Θεῖ. Ὅρθότατά γε, εἰπέρ τῶν γενῶν συνχαρητομέθα τα μέν ἄλληλοις ἐθέλειν μίγνυσθαι, τὰ δὲ μὴ.

ἑ. Καὶ μὴν ἐπὶ γε τὴν τούτου πρότερον ἀπὸ δειξιν ἢ τῶν νῦν ἀφικόμεθα, ἐλέγχοντες ώς ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν ταύτη.

ὁ Θεῖ. Πᾶς γὰρ οὖ; ἢ. Δέλεγμεν δὴ πάλιν. ἢ κίνησις ἐστὶν ἔτερον τοῦ ἔτερου, καθάπερ ταύτοι τε ἦν ἄλλο καὶ τῆς στάσεως;

ὁ Θεῖ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ἕ. Οὔχ ἔτερον ἄρ' ἐστὶν πη καὶ ἔτερον κατὰ τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγον.

ὁ Θεῖ. Ἀληθῆ.

ἕ. Τί οὖν δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; ἄρ' αὐτὶ τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἔτερον αὐτὴν φήσομεν εἰναι, τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μὴ φώμεν, ὁμολογήσσαντες αὐτὰ εἶναι πεντεῖ, περὶ δ' ἂν καὶ ἐν οἷς προδέμεθα σκοπεῖν;

ὁ Θεῖ. Καὶ πῶς; ἀδύνατον γὰρ συγκρωπεῖν ἐλάττω τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τοῦ νῦν δὴ φανέντος.

ἕ. Ἀδεώς ἄρα τὴν κίνησιν ἔτερον εἶναι τοῦ ἄντως διαμαχόμενοι λέγομεν;

ὁ Θεῖ. Ἀδεόστατα μὲν οὖν.

ἕ. Οὐκοῦν δὴ σαφῶς ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἐστι καὶ οὐ, ἐπείπερ τοῦ ὄντος μετέχει;

ὁ Θεῖ. Σαφέστατα γε.

ἕ. Ἐστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐπὶ τε κινήσεως εἰναι καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη. κατὰ πάντα ἕνατ' ἐπεργαζομένῃ τοῦ

1 ἂν Heindorf; οὐ BT.
THE SOPHIST

any way of rest, it would not be absurd to say it was at rest?

THEAET. It would be perfectly right, if we are to admit that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not.

STR. And surely we demonstrated that before we took up our present points; we proved that it was according to nature.¹

THEAET. Yes, of course.

STR. Then let us recapitulate: Motion is other than the other, just as we found it to be other than the same and than rest. Is that true?

THEAET. Inevitably.

STR. Then it is in a sense not other and also other, according to our present reasoning.

THEAET. True.

STR. Now how about the next point? Shall we say next that motion is other than the three, but not other than the fourth,—that is, if we have agreed that the classes about which and within which we undertook to carry on our inquiry are five in number?

THEAET. How can we say that? For we cannot admit that the number is less than was shown just now.

STR. Then we may fearlessly persist in contending that motion is other than being?

THEAET. Yes, most fearlessly.

STR. It is clear, then, that motion really is not, and also that it is, since it partakes of being?

THEAET. That is perfectly clear.

STR. In relation to motion, then, not-being is. That is inevitable. And this extends to all the classes; for in all of them the nature of other so operates as to make each one other than being, and

¹ See 251 e ff.
PLATO

όντος ἐκαστὸν οὐκ ὦν ποιεῖ, καὶ ξύμπαντα δὴ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτως οὐκ ὦν τὰ ὀρθῶς ἔροῦμεν, καὶ πάλιν, ὅτι μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος, εἶναι τε καὶ ὄντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ οὔτε ἐκεῖνοι.

ΕΕ. Περὶ ἐκαστοῦ ἄρα τῶν εἴδων πολὺ μὲν ἔστι τὸ ὄν, ἀπεραντῶ δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικεν.

257 ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὄν αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἔτερον εἶναι λεκτέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΕΕ. Καὶ τὸ ὄν ἄρ’ ἡμῖν, ὄσαπέρ ἔστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὄν ὑπὲρ αὐτὸ ἔστων, ἀπεραντᾶ δὲ τὸν ἁριθμὸν τὰ ἄλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὐ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδὸν οὕτως.

ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ ταῦτα οὐ δυσχεραντέον, ἐπεὶ περ ἔχει κοινωνίαν ἄλληλοις ἡ τῶν γενόμενοι φύσις. εἰ δὲ τις ταῦτα μὴ συγχωρεῖ, πείσας ημῶν τοὺς ἐμπροσθεν λόγους οὕτω πειθέτω τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δικαίωτα εἰρήκας.

Β ΕΕ. Ἰδοὺμεν 1 δὴ καὶ τόδε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΕΕ. Ὠπόταν τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγωμεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τί λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος, ἄλλ’ ἔτερον μόνον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

1 Ἰδοὺμεν W; εἰδοὺμεν B; εἰδοὺμεν Τ.

1 Being is many, for each and every thing in all the classes is; but not-being is infinite, for not only is it true that every thing in each of the classes is not, but not-being extends also to all conceptions which do not and cannot have any reality.

414
therefore not-being. So we may, from this point of view, rightly say of all of them alike that they are not; and again, since they partake of being, that they are and have being.

THEAET. Yes, I suppose so.

STR. And so, in relation to each of the classes, being is many, and not-being is infinite in number.¹

THEAET. So it seems.

STR. Then being itself must also be said to be other than all other things.

THEAET. Yes, it must.

STR. And we conclude that whatever the number of other things is, just that is the number of the things in relation to which being is not; for not being those things, it is itself one, and again, those other things are not unlimited in number.

THEAET. That is not far from the truth.

STR. Then we must not be disturbed by this either, since by their nature the classes have participation in one another. But if anyone refuses to accept our present results, let him reckon with our previous arguments and then proceed to reckon with the next step.²

THEAET. That is very fair.

STR. Then here is a point to consider.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. When we say not-being, we speak, I think, not of something that is the opposite of being, but only of something different.

THEAET. What do you mean?

² i.e., if he will not accept our proof that being is not, etc., he must disprove our arguments respecting the participation of ideas in one another, and then proceed to draw his inference.
PLATO

ΞΕ. Οἶνον ἐπειπωμέν τι μὴ μέγα, τότε μᾶλλον τί σοι φανώμεθα τὸ σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ἵσον δηλοῦν τῷ ῥήματι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΞΕ. Όυκ ἀρ’, ἕναντίον ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγηται σημαίνειν, συγχωρησόμεθα, τοσοῦτον δὲ μόνον, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τί μηνύει τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὐ προτιθέμενα C τῶν ἐπιόντων ὀνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμά- των περὶ ἀττ’ ἄν κεῖται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγύμενα ύστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὀνόματα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

42. ΞΕ. Τόδε δὲ διανοηθώμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Ἡθατέρου μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακεκερ- ματίσθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Μία μὲν ἐστὶ ποιοῦ καὶ ἐκείνη, 1 τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ τῷ γυνόμενον μέρος αὐτῆς ἐκαστὸν ἀφορισθέν ἐπω- Λ νυμίαν ἵσχει τινὰ ἐαυτῆς ἵδιαν. διὸ πολλαὶ τέχναι τ’ εἰσι 2 λεγόμεναι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως μόρια μιᾶς οὕσις ταῦτον πέπονθε τούτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τάχ’ ἀν’ ἄλλ’ ὁπῃ δὴ 3 λέγωμεν.

ΞΕ. Ἡ ἐστὶ τῷ καλῷ τὶ θατέρου μόριον ἀντιτιθέ- μενον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ ἐστιν.

ΞΕ. Τούτ’ οὖν ἀνώνυμον ἐρουμέν ἢ τιν’ ἐχον ἐπωνυμιάν;

1 ἐκείνη ΒΤ.; ἐκείνη ΒΤ. 2 τέ εἰσι Β.; τείσι Τ.; τισιν Β. 3 ἀλλ’ ὁπῃ δὴ Β.; ἀλλὸ πῃ Τ.; ἀλλὸ πῇ Β.

416
THE SOPHIST

STR. For instance, when we speak of a thing as not great, do we seem to you to mean by the expression what is small any more than what is of middle size?

THEAET. No, of course not.

STR. Then when we are told that the negative signifies the opposite, we shall not admit it; we shall admit only that the particle "not"\(^1\) indicates something different from the words to which it is prefixed, or rather from the things denoted by the words that follow the negative.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Let us consider another point and see if you agree with me.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. It seems to me that the nature of the other is all cut up into little bits, like knowledge.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. Knowledge, like other, is one, but each separate part of it which applies to some particular subject has a name of its own; hence there are many arts, as they are called, and kinds of knowledge, or sciences.

THEAET. Yes, certainly.

STR. And the same is true, by their nature, of the parts of the other, though it also is one concept.

THEAET. Perhaps; but let us discuss the matter and see how it comes about.

STR. Is there a part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?

THEAET. There is.

STR. Shall we say that this is nameless or that it has a name?

\(^1\) The two particles \(\ddot{a}u\) and \(\mu\dot{h}\) in Greek.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

θεαί. Ἐχον δὲ γὰρ μὴ καλὸν ἐκάστοτε φθεγ-γόμεθα, τὸύτο οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἔτερον ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φύσεως.

ε. Ἰθι νῦν τόδε μοι λέγε.

θεαί. Τὸ ποίον;

ε. Ἀλλο τι τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἕνὸς γένους ἀφορισθέν καὶ πρὸς τι τῶν ὄντων αὖ πάλιν ἀντιτεθὲν οὔτω ξυμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ καλὸν;

θεαί. Οὔτως.

ε. Ὅντος δὴ πρὸς ὅν ἀντιθεσις, ὡς ἔοικ', εἶναι τις συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλὸν.

θεαί. Ὄρθοτατα.

ε. Τί οὖν; κατὰ τούτον τὸν λόγον ἀρα μᾶλλον μὲν τὸ καλὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων, ἢττον δὲ τὸ μὴ καλὸν;

θεαί. Οὔδέν.

258 ε. Ὅμοιοις ἄρα τὸ μὴ μέγα καὶ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι λεκτέον;

θεαί. Ὅμοιοι.

ε. Ὁκοῦν καὶ τὸ μὴ δίκαιον τῷ δικαίῳ κατὰ ταύτα θετέον πρὸς τὸ μηδέν τι μᾶλλον εἶναι θατέρου θατέρου;

θεαί. Τί μὴν;

ε. Καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ ταύτῃ λέξομεν, ἐπείπερ ἢ θατέρου φύσις ἐφάνῃ τῶν ὄντων οὐδα, ἐκεῖνης δὲ οὐσίας ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς μηδενὸς ἢττον ὃντα τιθέναι.

θεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν;

β. ε. Ὅκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τῆς θατέρου μορίου φύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντι-

1 ἕνὸς γένους Τ.; γένους Β.
2 ξυμβεβηκέναι εἶναι Stephanus; ξυμβεβηκέναι VT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. That it has one; for that which in each case we call not-beautiful is surely the other of the nature of the beautiful and of nothing else.

STR. Now, then, tell me something more.

THEAET. What?

STR. Does it not result from this that the not-beautiful is a distinct part of some one class of being and also, again, opposed to some class of being?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Then, apparently, it follows that the not-beautiful is a contrast of being with being.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Can we, then, in that case, say that the beautiful is more and the not-beautiful less a part of being?

THEAET. Not at all.

STR. Hence the not-great must be said to be no less truly than the great?

THEAET. No less truly.

STR. And so we must recognize the same relation between the just and the not-just, in so far as neither has any more being than the other?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And we shall, then, say the same of other things, since the nature of the other is proved to possess real being; and if it has being, we must necessarily ascribe being in no less degree to its parts also.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then, as it seems, the opposition of the nature of a part of the other, and of the nature of being, when they are opposed to one another, is no

3 ὅν D; ὅν BT.
4 τις Apelt; τί BT.

419
κειμένων ἀντίθεσις οὐδέν ἦττον, εἴθεμι εἰπεῖν, αὐτὸν τοῦ ὄντος οὐσία ἔστιν, οὐκ ἑναντίον ἐκείνῳ σημαίνουσα, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ἔτερον ἐκείνου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σαφέστατά γε.

Ε. Τίν’ οὖν αὐτὴν προσέπωμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὴ οὖν, δ’ διὰ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐξητούμεν, αὐτὸ ἔστι τούτο.

Ε. Πότερον οὖν, ὦσπερ εἶπες, ἐστιν οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων οὐσίας ἐλλειπόμενον, καὶ δεῖ θαρροῦντα ἦδη λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μὴ δὲν βεβαιῶσ’ ἔστι τὴν αὐτοῦ

C φύσις ἔχων, ὦσπερ τὸ μέγα ἦν μέγα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἦν καλὸν καὶ τὸ μῆ μέγα μῆ μέγα ¹ καὶ τὸ μῆ καλὸν μῆ καλὸν, ² οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μῆ δὲν κατὰ ταύτον ἦν τε καὶ ἔστι μῆ ὄν, ἐνάρθυμον τῶν πολλῶν οἷτων εἴδος ἐν;

H τινα ἔτι πρὸς αὐτό, ὦ Θεαίτης, ἀπιστίαν ἔχομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδεμίαν.

43. Ε. Οὐσθ’ οὖν ὅτι Παρμενίδη μακροτέρως τῆς ἀπορρήσεως ἡπιστήκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δὴ;

Ε. Πλείον ἡ ’κεινος ἀπείπε σκοπεῖν, ἥμεις εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ἡτήσαντες ἀπεδείξαμεν αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς;

D • Ε. Ἡς ὅ μὲν ποὺ φησιν,

οὐ γὰρ μὴ ποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, ³ εἴναι μὴ ἐόντα, ⁴ άλλὰ σὺ τῆς ἀφ’ ὀδοῦ διζήσιος ⁵ εἴργε νόμμα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.

¹ μῆ μέγα add. Boeckh.
² μῆ καλὸν add. Boeckh.
³ τοῦτο δαμῇ Simplicius; τούτ’ οὕδαμῇ BT.
⁴ ἐόντα Aristot.; ἐόντα BT.
⁵ διζήσιος BT (cf. 237 ι).
THE SOPHIST

less truly existence than is being itself, if it is not wrong for me to say so, for it signifies not the opposite of being, but only the other of being, and nothing more.

THEAET. That is perfectly clear.

STR. Then what shall we call this?

THEAET. Evidently this is precisely not-being, which we were looking for because of the sophist.

STR. And is this, as you were saying, as fully endowed with being as anything else, and shall we henceforth say with confidence that not-being has an assured existence and a nature of its own? Just as we found that the great was great and the beautiful was beautiful, the not-great was not-great and the not-beautiful was not-beautiful, shall we in the same way say that not-being was and is not-being, to be counted as one class among the many classes of being? Or have we, Theaetetus, any remaining distrust about the matter?

THEAET. None whatever.

STR. Do you observe, then, that we have gone farther in our distrust of Parmenides than the limit set by his prohibition?

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. We have proceeded farther in our investigation and have shown him more than that which he forbade us to examine.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Because he says somewhere¹:

Never shall this thought prevail, that not-being is; Nay, keep your mind from this path of investigation.

THEAET. Yes, that is what he says.

¹ Parmenides, 52 f., ed. Mullach.
PLATO

εε. Ἡμεῖς δὲ γε ὦ γον ὡς ἦστι τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἀπεδείχαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἴδος ὦ τυγχάνει ὅν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀπεφηνάμεθα. τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν ἀποδείξαντες οὐδὲν τε καὶ κατακεκερματισμένην Ἐ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὅν ἐκαστὸν 1 μόριον αὐτῆς ἀντιτιθέμενον ἐτολμήσαμεν εἰπεῖν ὡς αὐτὸ τούτο ἦστιν ὄντως τὸ μὴ ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ παντάπασι γε, ὦ ξένε, ἀληθεστάτα μοι δοκοῦμεν εἰρηκέναι.

εε. Μὴ τούνιν ἡμὸς εἰπῆ τις ὅτι τοῦνανιόν τοῦ ὄντος τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀποφανώμενοι τολμῶμεν λέγειν ὡς ἦστιν. ἡμεῖς γὰρ περὶ μὲν ἐναντίον τινὸς αὐτῇ χαρέων πάλαι λέγομεν, εἰτ' ἦστιν εἰτε μή, λόγον 259 ζηχὸν ἡ καὶ παντάπασιν ἄλογον. ὃ δὲ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἡ πεισάτω τις ὡς οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν ἔλεγχος, ἡ μέχριπερ ἀν ἀδυνατη, λεκτέω καὶ ἐκεῖνω καθάπερ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ὅτι συμμίγνυται τε ἀλλήλως τὰ γένη καὶ τὸ τε ὅν καὶ θατέρου διὰ πάντων καὶ δι' ἀλλήλων διεληλυθότα τὸ μὲν ἐτέρου μετασχόν τοῦ ὄντος ἦστι μὲν διὰ ταύτην τὴν μεθεξίν, οὐ μὴν ἐκεῖνο γε ὦ δι' ἐκείσχεν ἄλλ' ἐτερον, ἐτερον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ὃν ἦστι σαφέστατα εἰς ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὄν.

Β' τὸ δὲ ὅν αὐθατέρου μετειληφός ἐτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἄν εἰς γενών, ἐτερον δ' ἐκείσχεν αὐτῶν ὃν οὐκ ἦστιν ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ἔξωπαντα τὰ ἄλλα πλὴν αὐτὸ, ὡστε τὸ ὅν ἀναμφισβητήτως αὐθ αὐρία ἐπὶ μυρίων οὐκ ἦστι, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ καθ' ἐκαστὸν οὕτω καὶ ἔξωπαντα πολλαχῇ μὲν ἦστι, πολλαχῇ δ' οὐκ ἦστι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

1 ἐκαστὸν Simplicius; ἐκάστου ΒΤ.
THE SOPHIST

STR. But we have not only pointed out that things which are not exist, but we have even shown what the form or class of not-being is; for we have pointed out that the nature of the other exists and is distributed in small bits throughout all existing things in their relations to one another, and we have ventured to say that each part of the other which is contrasted with being, really is exactly not-being.

THEAET. And certainly, Stranger, I think that what we have said is perfectly true.

STR. Then let not anyone assert that we declare that not-being is the opposite of being, and hence are so rash as to say that not-being exists. For we long ago gave up speaking of any opposite of being, whether it exists or not and is capable or totally incapable of definition. But as for our present definition of not-being, a man must either refute us and show that we are wrong, or, so long as he cannot do that, he too must say, as we do, that the classes mingle with one another, and being and the other permeate all things, including each other, and the other, since it participates in being, is, by reason of this participation, yet is not that in which it participates, but other, and since it is other than being, must inevitably be not-being. But being, in turn, participates in the other and is therefore other than the rest of the classes, and since it is other than all of them, it is not each one of them or all the rest, but only itself; there is therefore no doubt that there are thousands and thousands of things which being is not, and just so all other things, both individually and collectively, in many relations are, and in many are not.

THEAET. True.
PLATO

ΕΕ. Καὶ ταύτας δὴ ταῖς ἐναντιώσεσιν εἶτε ἀπιστεῖ τις, σκεπτεόν αὐτῷ καὶ λεκτέον βέλτιον τι τῶν Σνῦν εἰρημένων: εἶτε ὡς τι χαλεπὸν κατανεονήκως χαίρει τοτε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τοτε δ’ ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἔλκων, οὐκ ἄξια πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐσπουδάκετον, ὡς οἳ νῦν λόγοι φασί. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὔτε τι κομψὸν οὔτε χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν, ἐκείνο δ’ ἤδη καὶ χαλεπὸν ἁμα καὶ καλὸν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῦν;

ΕΕ. "Ο καὶ πρόσθεν εἰρηται, τὸ ταῦτα ἐάσαντα ὡς δυνατὰ τοῖς λεγομένοις οἶδον τ’ εἶναι καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἐλέγχοντα ἐπακολουθεῖν, ὅταν τέ τις ἔτερον ὃν τῇ ταῦτῃ εἶναι φή καὶ ὅταν ταὐτὸν ὃν ἔτερον, ἐκείνη καὶ κατ’ ἐκείνο ὃ φησι τούτων πεποιθέναι πότερον. τὸ δὲ ταῦταν ἔτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἀμὴ γε πῃ καὶ τὸ θάτερον ταῦτῳ καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρόν καὶ τὸ ὁμοίων ἀνόμου, καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω τᾶναντία ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὔτε τις ἐλεγχος οὕτος ἀληθινὸς ἀρτί τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δήλος νεογενῆς ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομψὴ μὲν οὖν.

44. ΕΕ. Καὶ γὰρ, ὡγαθέ, τὸ γε πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποχωρίζειν ἀλλος της οὐκ ἐμιμελεῖς Ε καὶ δὴ καὶ παντὰ παιρνεῖ ἀμοῦσον τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δὴ;

ΕΕ. Τελευτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλυεῖν ἐκαστὸν ἀπὸ πάντων· διὰ γὰρ τὴν

1 δυνατὰ BTW; δυνατῶτα Schanz; ἀνήνυτα Badham; δυνατὸν μάλιστα Campbell; δέον αὐτὰ? Apelt.; δυνατὰ is certainly wrong. Possibly οὐκ δυντα or οὐκ άξια (the interpretation adopted in the translation).
THE SOPHIST

STR. And if any man has doubts about these oppositions, he must make investigations and advance better doctrines than these of ours; or if he finds pleasure in dragging words about and applying them to different things at different times, with the notion that he has invented something difficult to explain, our present argument asserts that he has taken up seriously matters which are not worth serious attention; for this process is neither clever nor difficult, whereas here now is something both difficult and beautiful.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. What I have spoken of before—the ability to let those quibbles go as of no account and to follow and refute in detail the arguments of a man who says that other is in a sense the same, or that the same is other, and to do this from that point of view and with regard for those relations which he presupposes for either of these conditions. But to show that in some sort of fashion the same is the other, and the other the same, and the great small, and the like unlike, and to take pleasure in thus always bringing forward opposites in the argument,—all that is no true refutation, but is plainly the newborn offspring of some brain that has just begun to lay hold upon the problem of realities.

THEAET. Exactly so.

STR. For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate everything from everything else is not only not in good taste but also shows that a man is utterly uncultivated and unphilosophical.

THEAET. Why so?

STR. The complete separation of each thing from all is the utterly final obliteration of all discourse.
PLATO

άλληλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἥμων.

ΘΕAI. Ἀλθῆ.

260 ΞE. Σκόπευ τούτων ὡς ἐν καιρῷ νῦν δὴ τοῖς
tοιούτους διεμαχόμεθα καὶ προσηναγκάζομεν εἶν
ἐπερον ἐτέρῳ μίγνυσθαι.

ΘΕAI. Πρὸς δὴ τί;

ΞE. Πρὸς τὸ τὸν 1 λόγον ἥμων τῶν ὄντων ἐν τι
γενών εἰναι. τούτοις γὰρ στερηθέντες, τὸ μὲν
μέγιστον, φιλοσοφία ἂν στερηθεῖμεν, ἔτι δὲ ἐν τῷ
παρόντι δεὶ λόγον ἥμας διωμολογήσασθαι τί ποτ' ἔστων, εἰ
dὲ ἀφηρέθημεν αὐτὸ μηδὲ εἰναι τὸ παράπαν,
οὐδὲν ἀν ἔτι που λέγειν οἷοι τ' ἴμεν· ἀφηρέθημεν
Βδ' ἀν, εἰ συνεχωρήσαμεν μηδεμίαν εἰναι μίξῳ
μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδέν.

ΘΕAI. Ὅρθως τούτο γε· λόγον δὲ δι' ὅ τι νῦν
διωμολογητέον οὐκ ἐμαθον.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλ' ἴσως τῇδ' ἐπόμενος ῥᾴστ' ἀν μάθοις.

ΘΕAI. Πῆ;

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ μηδὲ ὃν ἥμων ἐν τι τῶν ἀλλῶν
gένος ὃν ἀνεφάνη, κατὰ πᾶντα τὰ ὄντα διεσπαρμένον.

ΘΕAI. Οὗτως.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τούτῳ σκεπτέον εἰ δόξῃ τε
καὶ λόγω μίγνυται.

ΘΕAI. Τί δῆ;

1 τὸν W; om. BT.

1 The denial, that is to say, of all interrelations of ideas
leads to purely negative results. Examples of this are the
exclusive antithesis of being and not-being and the mutual
exclusion of rest and motion. The difficulty is solved at
426
THE SOPHIST

For our power of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas with one another.¹

THEAET. True.

STR. Observe, then, that we have now been just in time in carrying our point against the supporters of such doctrine, and in forcing them to admit that one thing mingles with another.

THEAET. What was our object?

STR. Our object was to establish discourse as one of our classes of being. For if we were deprived of this, we should be deprived of philosophy, which would be the greatest calamity; moreover, we must at the present moment come to an agreement about the nature of discourse, and if we were robbed of it by its absolute non-existence, we could no longer discourse; and we should be robbed of it if we agreed that there is no mixture of anything with anything.

THEAET. That is true enough; but I do not understand why we must come to an agreement about discourse just now.

STR. Perhaps the easiest way for you to understand is by following this line of argument.

THEAET. What line?

STR. We found that not-being was one of the classes of being, permeating all being.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. So the next thing is to inquire whether it mingles with opinion and speech.

THEAET. Why?

once when we recognize that positive and negative are necessarily interwoven in the nature of things, that the negative has only a relative existence and is not the opposite of the positive, but only different from it.
PLATO

Μὴ μυγμυμένου μὲν αὐτοῦ τούτοις ἀναγκαίον ἄληθῆ πάντ' εἶναι, μυγμυμένου δὲ δόξα τε ψευδής γίγνεται καὶ λόγος· τὸ γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἢ λέγειν, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ ποὺ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν διανοίᾳ τε καὶ λόγοις γινόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΕΞ. Ὅντος δὲ γε ψεῦδος ἐστών ἀπάτη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΕΞ. Καὶ μὴ ἀπάτης οὐσίας εἰδόλων τε καὶ εἰκώνων ἡδῆ καὶ φαντασίας πάντα ἀνάγκη μεστά εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΕΞ. Τὸν δὲ γε ἕν σοφιστήν ἐφαμεν ἐν τούτῳ ποιηθεὶς κατατευθυνέως μὲν, ἐξαρνοῦν δὲ γεγονότα τὸ παράπαν μηδέ εἶναι ψεῦδος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ οὔτε διανοεῖσθαι τινα οὔτε λέγειν· οὐσίας γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδαμῆ τὸ μὴ ὄν μετέχειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν ταῦτα.

ΕΞ. Νῦν δὲ γε τούτῳ μὲν ἐφάνη μετέχον τοῦ ὄντος, ὡστε ταύτης μὲν ἵσως οὐκ ἂν μάχοιτο ἐτιοῦτα ὡς αὐτὴ τῶν εἰδών τὰ μὲν μετέχειν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ταὶ δ' οὖ, καὶ λόγον δὴ καὶ δόξαν εἶναι τῶν οὐ μετεχόντων, ὡστε τὴν εἰδωλοποιίκην καὶ φανταστικήν, ἐν ἣ φαμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, διαμάχοιτ' ἂν πάλιν ὡς παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔστων, ἐπεὶδ' ἀμφαῖ καὶ λόγος οὐ κοινωνεί τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· ψεῦδος γὰρ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ εἶναι ταύτης μὴ συνισταμένης τῆς κοινωνίας. διά ταύτ' οὖν λόγον πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν καὶ φαντασίαν διερευνητέον ὁ τί ποτ' ἐστών, ἢν 1 δὲ γε W; δὲ BT.

1 The English word "fancy," though etymologically identical with the Greek φαντασία, has lost the close con-
THE SOPHIST

STR. If it does not mingle with them, the necessary result is that all things are true, but if it does, then false opinion and false discourse come into being; for to think or say what is not—that is, I suppose, falsehood arising in mind or in words.

THEAET. So it is.

STR. But if falsehood exists, deceit exists.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And if deceit exists, all things must be henceforth full of images and likenesses and fancies.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. But we said that the sophist had taken refuge in this region and had absolutely denied the existence of falsehood: for he said that not-being could be neither conceived nor uttered, since not-being did not in any way participate in being.

THEAET. Yes, so it was.

STR. But now not-being has been found to partake of being, and so, perhaps, he would no longer keep up the fight in this direction; but he might say that some ideas partake of not-being and some do not, and that speech and opinion are among those which do not; and he would therefore again contend that the image-making and fantastic art, in which we placed him, has absolutely no existence, since opinion and speech have no participation in not-being; for falsehood cannot possibly exist unless such participation takes place. For this reason we must first inquire into the nature of speech and opinion and fancy,¹ in order that when they are made clear we may perceive

nexion with “seeming” (φαίνεται) which the Greek retains. The Greek word is therefore more comprehensive than the English, denoting that which appears to be, whether as the result of imagination or of sensation. Cf. 235 d ff.

429
PLATO

φανέντων καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὐτῶν τῷ μῇ ὅπι
261 κατίδωμεν, κατιδόντες δὲ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅν ἀποδείκ
ξωμεν, ἀποδείκνυμεν, ἀποδείκνυμεν, καὶ τοῦ σοφιστὴν εἰς αὐτὸ 1 ένδησομεν, εἰπερ ἐνοχὸς ἐστὶν, ἥ καὶ ἀπολύσας
τὸ ἀλλῳ γένει ζητῶμεν.

θεὰ. Κομμῆ γε, 2 ὃ Ξένε, ἔοικεν ἄληθὴς εἶναι
τὸ περὶ τοῦ σοφιστῆν κατ’ ἀρχὰς λεγέναι, ὥστι δυσθή
ρευνον είν τὸ γένος. φαίνεται γὰρ οὐν προβλημάτων
γέμεων, ὅν ἐπειδὴ τὸ προβάλη, τοῦτο πρὸ τοῦ ἄναγκαὶ
διαμάχεσθαι πρὶν ἐπὶ αὐτὸν ἀκείνον ἀφικέσθαι.

μόνον γὰρ μόνον μὲν τὸ μὴ ὅν ὡς οὐκ

Β ἐστὶ προβληθὲν διεπεράσαμεν, ἐτερον δὲ προβὴ
βλήται, καὶ δεὶ ὃς ψεῦδος ὡς ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ λόγον
καὶ περὶ δόξαν ἀποδείξει, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἱσως
ἐτερον, καὶ ἐτ’ ἀλλῳ μετ’ ἀκείνοι καὶ πέρας, ὡς

ἔοικεν, οὐδὲν φανήσεται ποτε.

ε. Θαρρεῖν, ὁ Θεαίτητα, χρῆ τοῦ καὶ συμφων
τὶ δυνάμενον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἀεὶ προίκειν. τι γάρ ὁ
γ’ ἀθυμὼν ἐν τούτωι δράσειν ἀν ἐν ἄλλως, ἦ μιθὲν
ἐν ἔκεινοις ἀνύτων ἤ καὶ πάλιν εἰς τούπισθεν ἀπ-

ωσθεῖς; σχολῇ που, τὸ κατὰ τὴν παρομιαν λεγό-

C μενον, ὁ γε τοιοῦτο ἀν ποτε ἔλοι πόλιν. 

νῦν δ’ ἔπει, ὅγαθε, τοῦτο ὃ λέγεις διαπεράσαται, τὸ τοι
μέγιστον ἡμῖν τείχος ἦρμημένον ἀν εἰς, τὰ δ’ ἀλλα

ηδη ράω καὶ συμφώνερα.

θεὰ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

45. ε. Λόγον δὴ πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν, καθάπερ ἔρρητη νῦν δὴ, λάβωμεν, ἢν ἐναργέστερον ἀπο-

λογισώμεθα 3 πότερον αὐτῶν ἀπτεται τὸ μὴ ὅν ἦ

1 αὐτὸ W; αὐτὸν BT.

2 γε TW; δὲ γε B.

3 ἀπολογισώμεθα Heindorf; ἀπολογισώμεθα BT.

430
THE SOPHIST

that they participate in not-being, and when we have perceived that, may prove the existence of falsehood, and after proving that, may imprison the sophist therein, if he can be held on that charge, and if not, may set him free and seek him in another class.

THEAET. It certainly seems, Stranger, that what you said at first about the sophist—that he was a hard kind of creature to catch—is true; for he seems to have no end of defences, and when he throws one of them up, his opponent has first to fight through it before he can reach the man himself; for now, you see, we have barely passed through the non-existence of being, which was his first prepared line of defence, when we find another line ready; and so we must prove that falsehood exists in relation to opinion and to speech; and after this, perhaps, there will be another line, and still another after that; and it seems no end will ever appear.

STR. No one should be discouraged, Theaetetus, who can make constant progress, even though it be slow. For if a man is discouraged under these conditions, what would he do under others—if he did not get ahead at all or were even pressed back? It would be a long time, as the saying is, before such a man would ever take a city. But now, my friend, since we have passed the line you speak of, the main defences would surely be in our hands, and the rest will now be smaller and easier to take.

THEAET. Good.

STR. First, then, let us take up speech and opinion, as I said just now, in order to come to a clearer understanding whether not-being touches

1 Perhaps a sort of pun is intended, for πρόβλημα was already beginning to have the meaning of “problem.”

431
PLATO

παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμφότερα ταῦτα
ψεῦδος δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδέτερον.

θεαί. Ὀρθῶς.

D ΞΕ. Φέρε δή, καθάπερ περὶ τῶν εἴδων καὶ τῶν
γραμμάτων ἐλέγομεν, περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων πάλιν
ὡς αὐτὸς ἐπισκεψόμεθα. φαίνεται γάρ τη ταύτῃ
tὸ νῦν ἔτηομενον.

θεαί. Τὸ ποῖον οὖν δή περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπο-
ακουστέον;

ΞΕ. Εἴτε πάντα ἀλλήλους εὐναρμόττει εἴτε
μηδὲν, εἴτε τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δὲ μὴ.

θεαί. Δῆλον τούτο γε, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ
δὲ οὐ.

ΞΕ. Τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις ἵσως, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἑφεξῆς
Εἰς ἡγόμενα καὶ δηλοῦντα τι εὐναρμόττει, τὰ δὲ τῇ
συνεχεία μηδὲν σημαίνοντα ἀναρμοστεῖ.

θεαί. Πῶς τί τούτ’ εἴπερ;

ΞΕ. Ὓπερ ὑπήθην ὑπολαβόντα σε προσομολογεῖν.
ἐστὶ γάρ ἡμῖν ποὺ τῶν τῇ φωνῇ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν
δηλωμάτων διηττῶν γένος.

θεαί. Πῶς;

262 ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ὀνόματα, τὸ δὲ ρήματα κληθέν.

θεαί. Εἰπὲ ἐκάτερον.

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεων ὃν ἡλωμα ρήμα
πο λέγομεν.

θεαί. Ναί.

1 ξυναρμόττει W; εὐναρμόττειν BT.

1 The science of language, in all its branches, was young
in the time of Plato. Words of general meaning were
necessarily used in a technical sense. So here ὀνόμα and
ῥῆμα are used as parts of grammatical terminology in the
432
THE SOPHIST

them, or they are both entirely true, and neither is ever false.

THEAET. Very well.

STR. Then let us now investigate names, just as we spoke a while ago about ideas and letters; for in that direction the object of our present search is coming in sight.

THEAET. What do we need to understand about names?

STR. Whether they all unite with one another, or none of them, or some will and some will not.

THEAET. Evidently the last; some will and some will not.

STR. This, perhaps, is what you mean, that those which are spoken in order and mean something do unite, but those that mean nothing in their sequence do not unite.

THEAET. How so, and what do you mean by that?

STR. What I supposed you had in mind when you assented; for we have two kinds of vocal indications of being.

THEAET. How so?

STR. One called nouns, the other verbs.¹

THEAET. Define each of them.

STR. The indication which relates to action we may call a verb.

THEAET. Yes.

sense of "verb" and "noun," though Plato elsewhere employs them with their ordinary meanings. Similarly the distinction between vowels and consonants (Theaetetus, 203; cf. The Sophist, 253) was at least relatively new, as was that between the active and the passive voice. How important Plato's part was in the development of linguistic study can no longer be accurately determined.

433
PLATO

Ε. Τὸ δὲ γ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἕκεινα πράττουσιν
σημεῖον τῆς φωνῆς ἐπιτεθὲν ὄνομα.
ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.
Ε. Οὐκοῦν ἔξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχῶς
λεγομένων οὐκ ἐστὶν ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδ’ αὖ ῥημάτων
χωρίς ὀνομάτων λεγόμενων.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ταῦτ’ οὖκ ἔμαθον.
Β. Ε. Δὴ λοι κακός ἤ ἐπὶ ἐνεργόν τι βλέπων ἄρτι
ἐξεισαγωγής ἐπ’ οὖτ’ αὐτὸ ἐβούλημην εἰπεῖν,
ὅτι συνεχῶς ἡδὲ λεγόμενα ταύτα οὐκ ἐστὶ λόγος.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;
Ε. Οἷον “βαδίζει,” “τρέχει,” “καθεξεῖ,”
καὶ τάλλα ὁσα πράξεις σημαίνει ῥήματα, καὶ
πάντα τις ἐφεξῆς αὐτ’ εἰπή, λόγον οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον
ἀπεργάζεται.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ;
Ε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πάλιν ὅταν λέγηται “λέων,”
“ἐλαφος,” “ἵππος,” ὅσα τε ὀνομάτα τῶν τῶν
πράξεις αὐτὶ πραττόντων ἀνομάσθη, καὶ κατὰ
C ταῦτην δὴ τὴν συνεχείαν οὐδὲν τω ἐξεισαγωγής λόγος:
οὐδεμίαν γὰρ οὔτε οὕτως οὔτε ἕκεινὸς πράξειν οὐδ’
ἀπραξεῖν οὐδὲ οὕσιαν ὅντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὅντος δηλοὶ τὰ
φωνηθέντα, πρὸν ἀν τις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰ ῥήματα
κεράσῃ: τότε δ’ ἤρμοσεν τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο
εὐθὺς ἡ πρώτη συμπλοκή, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων ὁ
πρῶτος τε καὶ 2 σμικρότατος.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς ἄρ’ ὅδε λέγεις;
Ε. “Ὅταν εἶπη τις: “ἀνθρωπος μανθάνει,”
λόγον εἶναι φής τούτου ἐλάχιστον τε καὶ πρῶτον;
D ΘΕΑΙ. “Εγώγε.

1 αὐτοῖς τοῖς B, Stobaeus; αὐτοῖς T.
2 τε καὶ W, Stobaeus; εἴ καὶ T; καὶ B.

434
THE SOPHIST

str. And the vocal sign applied to those who perform the actions in question we call a noun.

THEAET. Exactly.

str. Hence discourse is never composed of nouns alone spoken in succession, nor of verbs spoken without nouns.

THEAET. I do not understand that.

str. I see; you evidently had something else in mind when you assented just now; for what I wished to say was just this, that verbs and nouns do not make discourse if spoken successively in this way.

THEAET. In what way?

str. For instance, "walks," "runs," "sleeps" and the other verbs which denote actions, even if you utter all there are of them in succession, do not make discourse for all that.

THEAET. No, of course not.

str. And again, when "lion," "stag," "horse," and all other names of those who perform these actions are uttered, such a succession of words does not yet make discourse; for in neither case do the words uttered indicate action or inaction or existence of anything that exists or does not exist, until the verbs are mingled with the nouns; then the words fit, and their first combination is a sentence, about the first and shortest form of discourse.

THEAET. What do you mean by that?

str. When one says "a man learns," you agree that this is the least and first of sentences, do you not?

THEAET. Yes.
PLATO

ἐκ. Δῆλοι γὰρ ἦδη που τότε περὶ τῶν οὖν ἢ γυγνομένων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, καὶ οὐκ ὀνομάζει μόνον, ἀλλὰ τι περαίνει, συμπλέκων τὰ ρήματα τοῖς ὁνόμασι. διὸ λέγειν τε αὐτὸν ἀλλ’ οὗ μόνον ὀνομάζειν εἴπομεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ πλέγματι τούτῳ τὸ οἶνομα ἐφθεγξάμεθα λόγον.

θεαί. Ὅρθως.

ἀδ. ἐκ. Οὕτω δὴ καθάπερ τὰ πράγματα 2 τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλων ἠμοττε, τὰ δὲ οὐ, καὶ περὶ τὰ τῆς φωνῆς αὐτή σημεῖα τὰ μὲν οὐχ ἁμοττε, τὰ δὲ Ε ἁμοττοντα αὐτῶν λόγον ἀπειργάσατο.

θεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ἐκ. "Ετι δὴ συμκρόν τόδε.

θεαί. Τὸ ποιόν;

ἐκ. Λόγον ἄναγκαίον, δτανπερ ἢ, τινὸς εἶναι λό-

γον, μὴ δὲ τινὸς ἄδυνατον.

θεαί. Οὖτως.

ἐκ. Ὄνικοιν καὶ ποιόν τινα αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ;

θεαί. Πῶς δὲ οὐ;

ἐκ. Προσέχωμεν δὴ τὸν νοῦν ἦμῖν αὐτοῖς.

θεαί. Δὲ έ γοῦν.

ἐκ. Λέξιο τοῖνυν οὐλ λόγον συνθείς πράγμα πρά-

ξει δὴ ὀνόματος καὶ ρῆματος. ὅτου δ’ ἄν ὁ λόγος ἢ, οὐ μοι φράζειν.

263 θεαί. Ταυτ’ ἐσται κατὰ δύναμιν.

ἐκ. Θεαίτητος κάθηται. μῶν μὴ μακρὸς ὁ

λόγος;

θεαί. Οὐκ, ἄλλα μέτριος.

ἐκ. Σὸν ἔργον δὴ φράζειν περὶ οὖ τ’ ἐστὶ καὶ

ἀτοῦ.

θεαί. Δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ ἐμός.

1 εἴπομεν Stobaeus; εἴπομεν ΒΤ.

436
THE SOPHIST

str. For when he says that, he makes a statement about that which is or is becoming or has become or is to be; he does not merely give names, but he reaches a conclusion by combining verbs with nouns. That is why we said that he discourses and does not merely give names, and therefore we gave to this combination the name of discourse.

theaet. That was right.

str. So, then, just as of things some fit each other and some do not, so too some vocal signs do not fit, but some of them do fit and form discourse.

theaet. Certainly.

str. Now there is another little point.

theaet. What is it?

str. A sentence, if it is to be a sentence, must have a subject; without a subject it is impossible.

theaet. True.

str. And it must also be of some quality, must it not?

theaet. Of course.

str. Now let us pay attention to each other.

theaet. Yes, at any rate we ought to do so.

str. Now, then, I will speak a sentence to you in which an action and the result of action are combined by means of a noun and a verb, and whatever the subject of the sentence is do you tell me.

theaet. I will, to the best of my ability.

str. “Theaetetus sits.” It isn’t a long sentence, is it?

theaet. No, it is fairly short.

str. Now it is for you to say what it is about and what its subject is.

theaet. Clearly it is about me, and I am its subject.

\[ \text{\footnotesize πράγματα BTW; γράμματα, letters, Bury (cf. 253).} \]

Vol. II 2 F 437
PLATO

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ ὅδ' αὖ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖος;
ΞΕ. Θεάτητος, ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι, πέτεται.
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτον οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἀλλως εἶποι πλή
ἔμον τε καὶ περὶ ἔμοι.
ΞΕ. Ποιὸν δὲ γέ τινά φαμεν ἀναγκαίον ἐκαστον
εἶναι τῶν λόγων.

Β ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Τούτων δὴ ποιόν τινὰ ἐκάτερον φατέον εἶναι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν μὲν ψευδὴ ποι, τὸν δὲ ἀληθῆ.
ΞΕ. Δέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθῆς τὰ ὄντα ὡς
ἐστὶ περὶ σοῦ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;
ΞΕ. Ὅ δὲ δὴ ψευδὴς ἔστερα τῶν ὄντων.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει.
ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδὸν.
ΞΕ. "Ὅντων ἕ γε ὄντα ἔστερα περὶ σοῦ. πολλὰ
μὲν γὰρ ἔφαμεν ὄντα περὶ ἐκαστον εἶναι ποι, πολλὰ
δὲ οὐκ ὄντα.
ΘΕΑΙ. Κομίδη μὲν οὖν.

C ΞΕ. "Ὅν ὑπερεφον δὴ λόγον εἰρήκα περὶ σοῦ,
πρῶτον μὲν, ἐξ ὧν ὡρισάμεθα τί ποτ' ἐστι λόγος,
ἀναγκαίοτατον αὐτὸν ἔνα τῶν βραχυτάτων εἶναι.
ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν δὴ γοῦν ταύτῃ ξυνωμολογήσαμεν.
ΞΕ. "Ἐπείτα δὲ γε τινός.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔτως.
ΞΕ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι σοῦ, οὐκ ἄλλου γε οὔδενός.

1 ὅντων Cornarius; ὅντως BT.
THE SOPHIST

STR. And how about this sentence?
THEAET. What one?
STR. "Theaetetus, with whom I am now talking, flies."
THEAET. Every one would agree that this also is about me and I am its subject.
STR. But we agree that every sentence must have some quality.
THEAET. Yes.
STR. Now what quality shall be ascribed to each of these sentences?
THEAET. One is false, I suppose, the other true.
STR. The true one states facts as they are about you.
THEAET. Certainly.
STR. And the false one states things that are other than the facts.
THEAET. Yes.
STR. In other words, it speaks of things that are not as if they were.
THEAET. Yes, that is pretty much what it does.
STR. And states with reference to you that things which are other than things which actually are; for we said, you know, that in respect to everything there are many things that are and many that are not.
THEAET. To be sure.
STR. Now the second of my sentences about you is in the first place by sheer necessity one of the shortest which conform to our definition of sentence.
THEAET. At any rate we just now agreed on that point.
STR. And secondly it has a subject.
THEAET. Yes.
STR. And if you are not the subject, there is none.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς γάρ;

ς. Μηδενός δέ ὃν οὐδ' ἂν λόγος εἰη τὸ παρά-παν' ἀπεφήναμεν γάρ ὅτι τῶν ἄδυνάτων ἢν λόγον ὄντα μηδενός εἶναι λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθότατα.

Δ. ΘΕ. Περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα, λεγόμενα μέντοι θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ ὄντα ὃς ὄντα, παντά-

πασὶν εὐκεν ἢ τοιαύτῃ σύνθεσις ἢ το ῥημάτων γιγνομένη καὶ ὄνομάτων ὄντως τε καὶ ἄληθῶς
gίγνεσθαι λόγος ψευδής.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.

47. ΘΕ. Τί δὲ δὴ; διάνοια τε καὶ δόξα καὶ

φαντασία, μῶν οὐκ ἦδη δῆλον ὅτι ταύτα τὰ γένη

ψευδή τε καὶ ἄληθή πάνθ' ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς

ἐγγίγνεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς;

ς. Ὄδ' εἴσεi βάσων, ἄν πρῶτον λάβης αὐτά,4 τί

Εποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἐκαστὰ ἀλλήλων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δίδου μόνον.

ς. Οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταύτων· πλήν

ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ

φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη,

διάνοια;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ς. Τὸ δὲ γ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος

ἰὸν μετὰ φθόγγον κέκληται λόγος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ς. Καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις αὐτὸ ἵσμεν ὅν—

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιον;

ς. Φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν.

1 δὲ emend. apogr. Parisinum 1811; γὲ BT; ἢ δὲ or δὲ γε

Heindorf.

840
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. And if there is no subject, it would not be a sentence at all; for we showed that a sentence without a subject is impossible.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Now when things are said about you, but things other are said as the same and things that are not as things that are, it appears that when such a combination is formed of verbs and nouns we have really and truly false discourse.

THEAET. Yes, very truly.

STR. Is it, then, not already plain that the three classes, thought, opinion, and fancy, all arise in our minds as both false and true?

THEAET. How is it plain?

STR. You will understand more easily if you first grasp their natures and the several differences between them.

THEAET. Give me an opportunity.

STR. Well, then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought. Is not that true?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech?

THEAET. True.

STR. And in speech we know there is just—

THEAET. What?

STR. Affirmation and negation.

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2 λεγόμενα add. Badham.
3 έοικεν W; ώς έοικεν BT.
4 αὐτὰ W, Stobaeus; om. BT.

441
θεαί. "Ισμεν.
264 ξε. Ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὃ τι προσεῖπης αὐτό;
θεαί. Καὶ πῶς;
ξε. Τί δ' ὅταν μὴ καθ' αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ δ' αἰσθήσεως παρῇ τινι τὸ τοιοῦτον αὖ πάθος, ἄρ' ὅλον τε ὅρθως εἰπεῖν ἐτερὸν τι πλὴν φαντασίαν;
θεαί. Οὐδὲν.
ξε. Οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ λόγος ἀληθῆς ἦν καὶ ψευδῆς, τούτων δ' ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς ξανθήν ψυχήν διάλογος, δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις, Β "φαίνεται" δὲ ὃ λέγομεν σύμμεσις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δ' ὧ καὶ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ ξυγγενῶν ὄντων ψευδῆ τε αὐτῶν ἐνια καὶ ἐνίοτε εἶναι.
θεαί. Πῶς δ' οὖ;
ξε. Κατανοεῖς οὖν ὅτι πρότερον ηὗρεθ' ψευδῆς δόξα καὶ λόγος ἦ κατὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν ἦν ἐφοβήθηθημεν ἄρτι, μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνήμυτον ἔργον ἐπιβαλλοὶμεθα ζητούντες αὐτό;
θεαί. Κατανοῶ.
48. ξε. Μὴ τοίνυν μηδ' εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ ἀθυ.
ξε. Μὴ τοίνυν μηδ' εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ ἀθυ.
θεαί. Ποίων δή;
ξε. Διελόμεθα τῆς εἰδωλοποικῆς εἴδη δύο, τὴν μὲν εἰκαστικῆν, τὴν δὲ φανταστικῆν.
θεαί. Ναὶ.
ξε. Καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἴπομεν ὡς ἀποροῖμεν εἰς ὁποτέραν θήσομεν.

1 αὐτὸ Stobaeus; αὐτὴν BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes, we know that

STR. Now when this arises in the soul silently by way of thought, can you give it any other name than opinion?

THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. And when such a condition is brought about in anyone, not independently, but through sensation, can it properly be called anything but seeming, or fancy?

THEAET. No.

STR. Then since speech, as we found, is true and false, and we saw that thought is conversation of the soul with itself, and opinion is the final result of thought, and what we mean when we say "it seems" is a mixture of sensation and opinion, it is inevitable that, since these are all akin to speech, some of them must sometimes be false.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Do you see, then, that false opinion and false discourse were found sooner than we expected when we feared a few moments ago that in looking for them we were undertaking an endless task?

THEAET. Yes, I see.

STR. Then let us not be discouraged about the rest of our search, either; for now that these points are settled, we have only to revert to our previous divisions into classes.

THEAET. What divisions?

STR. We made two classes of image-making, the likeness-making and the fantastic.¹

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And we said that we did not know to which of the two the sophist should be assigned.

¹ See 235 n ff.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν ταῦτα.

ΕΕ. Καὶ τοῦθ' ἡμῶν ἀπορουμένων ἐτὶ μείζων κατεχόνθη σκοτοδινία, φανέντως τοῦ λόγου τοῦ πάσην ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὡς οὔτε εἰκὼν οὔτε εἰδώλον Δ οὔτε φάντασμα εἰς τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ μηδαμῶς μηδέποτε μηδαμοῦ ψεῦδος εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις ἁληθὴ.

ΕΕ. Νῦν δὲ γ' ἐπειδὴ πέφανται μὲν λόγος, πέφανται δ' οὐδα δόξα ψευδῆς, ἐγχωρεί δὴ μμηματα τῶν ὁντων εἶναι καὶ τέχνην ἐκ ταύτης γίγνεσθαι τῆς διαθέσεως ἀπατητικῆς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγχωρεί.

ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν οτι γ' ἢν ὁ σοφιστής τοῦτων πότερον, διωμολογημένον ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἢν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΕΕ. Πάλιν τοίνυν ἐπιχειρῶμεν, σχίζοντες διχῇ τὸ Ε̣ προτεθὲν γένος, πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τούτων δεξίως ἀεί μέρος τοῦ τιμηθέντος, ἐχόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σοφιστοῦ κοινωνίας, ἔως ἂν αὐτοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πάντα περιελόντες, τὴν οἰκείαν λιπόντες φύσιν ἐπιδείξωμεν μάλιστα 265 μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐγγυτάτω γένει τῆς τοιαύτης μεθόδου πεφυκόσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν τότε μὲν ἡρχόμεθα ποιητικὴν καὶ κτητικὴν τέχνην διαρούμενοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΕΕ. Καὶ τῆς κτητικῆς ἐν θηρευτικῇ καὶ ἀγωνίᾳ καὶ ἐμπορικῇ καὶ τισιν ἐν τοιούτως εἴδεσθα ἐφαντάζεθ᾽ ἡμῖν;

444
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. You are right.

STR. And in the midst of our perplexity about that, we were overwhelmed by a still greater dizziness when the doctrine appeared which challenges everybody and asserts that neither likeness nor image nor appearance exists at all, because falsehood never exists anywhere in any way.

THEAET. True.

STR. But now, since the existence of false speech and false opinion has been proved, it is possible for imitations of realities to exist and for an art of deception to arise from this condition of mind.

THEAET. Yes, it is possible.

STR. And we decided some time ago that the sophist was in one of those two divisions of the image-making class.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Then let us try again; let us divide in two the class we have taken up for discussion, and proceed always by way of the right-hand part of the thing divided, clinging close to the company to which the sophist belongs, until, having stripped him of all common properties and left him only his own peculiar nature, we shall show him plainly first to ourselves and secondly to those who are most closely akin to the dialectic method.

THEAET. Right.

STR. We began by making two divisions of art, the productive and the acquisitive, did we not?¹

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And the sophist showed himself to us in the arts of hunting, contests, commerce, and the like, which were subdivisions of acquisitive art?

¹ See §19.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΕΕ. Νῦν δὲ γ' ἐπειδή μμητικὴ περιείληφεν αὐτὸν τέχνη, δῆλον ὡς αὐτὴν τὴν ποιητικὴν δίκα Β διαρετέον πρῶτην. ἡ γὰρ ποὺ μέμισε ποίησις τὸς ἐστὶν, εἰδῶλων μέντοι, φαμέν, ἀλλ' οὖκ αὐτῶν ἕκαστῶν· ἡ γὰρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΕΕ. Ποιητικῆς δὴ πρῶτον δύο ἐστὶν μέρη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίω;

ΕΕ. Τὸ μὲν θείον, τὸ δ' ἀνθρώπινον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω μεμάθηκα.

49. ΕΕ. Ποιητικῆς, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα τὰ κατ' ἀρχὰς λεχθέντα, πᾶσαν ἐφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν ἂν ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ύστερον γίγνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μεμνήμεθα.

Κ Ἡς δὴ πάντα θνητὰ καὶ φυτὰ δόσα τ' ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ρίζῶν φύεται καὶ δόσα ἄψυχα ἐν γῇ ξυνισταται σώματα τηκτὰ καὶ ἀτηκτὰ, μᾶν ἄλλοι τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσωμεν ύστερον γίγνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; ἡ τῶν τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι χρώμενοι—

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίω;

ΕΕ. Τῷ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννᾷ ἀπὸ τινὸς αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἀνευ διανοιας φυσικῆς, ἡ μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γνωμονεῖν;

D ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ μὲν ἵσως διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν πολλὰς ἀμφότερα μεταδοξάζω· νῦν μὴν 1 βλέπων εἰς σὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων οἴεσθαι σὲ κατὰ γε θεὸν αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι, ταύτῃ καὶ αὐτὸς νενόμικα.

ΕΕ. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε· καὶ εἰ μὲν γέ σε

1 μὴν b; μὴ BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But now, since imitative art has taken him over, it is clear that our first step must be the division of productive art into two parts; for imitative art is a kind of production—of images, however, we say, not of real things in each case. Do you agree?

THEAET. By all means.

STR. Then let us first assume two parts of productive art.

THEAET. What are they?

STR. The divine and the human.

THEAET. I don't yet understand.

STR. We said, if we remember the beginning of our conversation, that every power is productive which causes things to come into being which did not exist before.

THEAET. Yes, we remember.

STR. There are all the animals, and all the plants that grow out of the earth from seeds and roots, and all the lifeless substances, fusible and infusible, that are formed within the earth. Shall we say that they came into being, not having been before, in any other way than through God's workmanship? Or, accepting the commonly expressed belief—

THEAET. What belief?

STR. That nature brings them forth from some self-acting cause, without creative intelligence. Or shall we say that they are created by reason and by divine knowledge that comes from God?

THEAET. I, perhaps because I am young, often change from one opinion to the other; but now, looking at you and considering that you think they are created by God, I also adopt that view.

STR. Well said, Theaetetus; and if I thought you
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ήγονύμεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἄλλως πως δοξαζόντων εἶναι, νῦν ἃν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίας ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολογεῖν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ σου καταμανθάνω τὴν φύσιν, ὧτι καὶ ἄνευ τῶν Ἐπαρ’ ἡμῶν λόγων αὐτή 1 πρόσεισιν ἐφ’ ἄπειρ νῦν ἐλκεσθαί φής, εάσω. χρόνος γὰρ ἐκ περιττοῦ γίγνοιτ’ ἄνν ἄλλα θῆσω τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θεία τέχνη, τὰ δ’ ἐκ τούτων ὑπ’ ἄνθρωπων ἐξωστάμενα ἄνθρωπίνη, καὶ κατὰ τούτον δὴ τὸν λόγον δύο ποιητικῆς γένη, τὸ μὲν ἄνθρωπινον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ θεῖον.

ὁεαί. Ὀρθῶς.

ἐς. Τέμυνε δὴ διοῦν οὐσιν δίχα ἐκατέραν αὖθις.

ὁεαί. Πῶς;

266 ἐς. Οἶον τότε μὲν κατὰ πλάτος τέμνον τὴν ποιητικὴν πάσαν, νῦν δὲ αὐτὰ κατὰ μῆκος.

ὁεαί. Τετμῆσθω.

ἐς. Τέτταρα μὴν αὐτῆς οὕτω τὰ πάντα μέρη γίγνεται, δύο μὲν τὰ πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἄνθρωπεα, δύο δ’ αὐτὰ πρὸς θεῶν, θεία.

ὁεαί. Ναῖ.

ἐς. Τὰ δὲ γ’ ὡς ἐτέρως αὖ διηρημένα, μέρος μὲν ἐν ἀφ’ ἐκατέρας τῆς μερίδος αὐτοποιητικοῦ, τῶ δ’ ὑπολοίπῳ σχεδὸν μάλιστ’ ἂν λεγοῦσθην εἰδωλοποιικῶν: καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάλιν ἡ ποιητικὴ διχὴ διαρέιται.

Β ὁεαί. Λέγε ὅπῃ 2 ἐκατέρα αὖθις.

50. ἐς. 'Ημεῖς μὲν που καὶ τὰλλα ζῶα καὶ ἔξω τὰ πεφυκότ’ ἔστι, πῦρ καὶ υδωρ καὶ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφά, θεοὶ γεννήματα πάντα ἴσοι μὲν αὐτὰ ἀπειργασμένα ἐκατα. ἥ πῶς;

1 αὖθι W; αὖθ B; αὖν T. 2 ὅπῃ inferior mss.; ὅτιio ΒΤ. 448
THE SOPHIST

were one of those who would think differently by and by, I should try now, by argument and urgent persuasion, to make you agree with my opinion; but since I understand your nature and see that it of itself inclines, without any words of mine, towards that to which you say you are at present attracted, I will let that go; for it would be a waste of time. But I will assume that things which people call natural are made by divine art, and things put together by man out of those as materials are made by human art, and that there are accordingly two kinds of art, the one human and the other divine.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Now that there are two, divide each of them again.

THEAET. How?

STR. You divided all productive art widthwise, as it were, before; now divide it lengthwise.

THEAET. Assume that it is done.

STR. In that way we now get four parts in all; two belong to us and are human, and two belong to the gods and are divine.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And again, when the section is made the other way, one part of each half has to do with the making of real things, and the two remaining parts may very well be called image-making; and so productive art is again divided into two parts.

THEAET. Tell me again how each part is distinguished.

STR. We know that we and all the other animals, and fire, water, and their kindred elements, out of which natural objects are formed, are one and all the very offspring and creations of God, do we not?
PLATO

θεαι. Οὕτως.

ἐν. Τούτων δὲ γε ἐκάστων εἴδωλα, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὰ παρέπετα, δαιμονία καὶ ταῦτα μηχανὴ γεγονότα.

θεαι. Ποια;

ἐν. Τά τε ἐν τοῖς υπνοις καὶ ὅσα μεθ' ἤμεραν φαντάσματα αὐτοφυή λέγεται, σκιὰ μὲν ὅταν ἐν C τῷ πυρὶ σκότος ἐγγύνηται, διπλοῦν δὲ ήνίκ' ἂν φῶς οἰκεῖον τε καὶ ἀλλότριον περὶ τὰ λαμπρὰ καὶ λεία εἰς ἐν ξυνελθὼν τῆς ἐμπροσθεν εἰσόδους οὕσως ἐναντίαν αἰσθησιν παρέχουν εἴδος ἀπεργάζεται.

θεαι. Δύο γὰρ οὖν ἐστι ταῦτα θείας ἔργα ποιήσεως, αὐτὸ τε καὶ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν εἴδωλον ἐκάστω.

ἐν. Τί δὲ τὴν ἠμετέραν τέχνην; ἄρ' οὖν αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομική φῆσομεν ποιεῖν, γραφικὴ δὲ των ἑτέρων, ὁποῖον ὅναρ ἀνθρώπων ἐγρηγοροῦν ἀπειργασμένην;

D θεαι. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ἐν. Όφθην καὶ ταλάα οὖσα κατὰ δύο διστὰ ἔργα τῆς ἠμετέρας αὐτοποιήσας πράξεως, τὸ μὲν αὐτό, φαμέν, αὐτοφυῆ, 1 τὸ δὲ εἴδωλον εἰδωλοποιήκη. 2

θεαι. Νῦν μάλλον ἐμαθοῦν, καὶ τίθημι δύο διχῇ ποιητικῆς εἰδῆς θείαν 3 μὲν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην 4 κατὰ θάτερον τομῆσα, κατὰ δὲ θάτερον τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ὦν, τὸ δὲ ὀμοιωμάτων τινῶν γέννημα.

1 αὐτοφυή Heindorf; αὐτοφυῆ BT.
2 εἰδωλοποιήκη Heindorf; εἰδωλοποιήκη BT.
3 θεία Heindorf; θεία B; θεία T.
4 ἀνθρωπίνη Heindorf; ἀνθρωπίνη B; ἀνθρωπίνη T.

1 This was the current explanation of reflection. Mirrors and smooth objects were supposed to contain a luminous principle which met on the smooth surface with the light.
THE SOPHIST

theaet. Yes.

str. And corresponding to each and all of these there are images, not the things themselves, which are also made by superhuman skill.

theaet. What are they?

str. The appearances in dreams, and those that arise by day and are said to be spontaneous—a shadow when a dark object interrupts the firelight, or when twofold light, from the objects themselves and from outside, meets on smooth and bright surfaces and causes upon our senses an effect the reverse of our ordinary sight, thus producing an image.¹

theaet. Yes, these are two works of divine creation, the thing itself and the corresponding image in each case.

str. And how about our own art? Shall we not say that we make a house by the art of building, and by the art of painting make another house, a sort of man-made dream produced for those who are awake?

theaet. Certainly.

str. And in the same way, we say, all the other works of our creative activity also are twofold and go in pairs—the thing itself, produced by the art that creates real things, and the image, produced by the image-making art.

theaet. I understand better now; and I agree that there are two kinds of production, each of them twofold—the divine and the human by one method of bisection, and by the other real things and the product that consists of a sort of likenesses.

coming from the object reflected. So in the act of vision the fire within the eye united with the external fire (Timaeus, 46 η). The words τῆς ἐμπροσθεν . . . ἐναντίων αἰσθησιν refer to the transposition of right and left in the reflection (cf. Theaetetus, 193 c).

451
51. Ἑ. Τῆς τούνν εἰδωλουργικῆς ἀναμνησθο-μεν ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐικαστικόν, τὸ δὲ φανταστικὸν ἐμελ-Ε λεν εἶναι γένος, εἰ τὸ ψεύδος ὄντως ὃν ψεύδος καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐν τῷ φανείᾳ πεφυκός.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν γὰρ οὖν.

Ἑ. Οὐκοῦν ἐφάνη τε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ κατ-αριθμήσομεν αὐτῶ ¹ νῦν ἀναμφισβητήτως εἴδη δυὸ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

267 Ἑ. Τὸ τούνν φανταστικὸν αὖθις διορίζωμεν δίχα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῆ; 

Ἑ. Τὸ μὲν δι’ ὄργανον γιγνόμενον, τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ παρέχοντος ἐαυτὸν ὄργανον τοῦ ποιοῦντος τὸ φάντασμα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς φῆς; 

Ἑ. Ὅταν, οὐμαί, τὸ σῶν σχῆμα τις τῷ ἐαυτοῦ χρώμενος σώματι προσόμοιον ἢ φωνὴν φωνὴ φαίνεσθαι ποιῆ, μίμησις τούτῳ τῆς φανταστικῆς μάλιστα κέκληται ποι. 

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

Ἑ. Μιμητικὸν δὴ τούτῳ αὐτῆς προσεπόντες ἀπονειμώμεθα ². τὸ δ’ ἄλλο πᾶν ἀφῶμεν μαλακι-Β σθέντες καὶ παρέντες ἐτέρῳ συναγαγεῖν τε εἰς ἐν καὶ πρέπουσαν ἐπωνυμιὰν ἀποδοῦναι τιν’ αὐτῷ. 

ΘΕΑΙ. Νενεμήσθω, τὸ δ’ μεθείσθω. 

Ἑ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τούτῳ ἐτί διπλοῦν, ὡς Θεάιτητε, ἄξιον ἥγεῖοιν; δι’ ἄ δε, σκόπει. 

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε. 

Ἑ. Τῶν μημομένων οἳ μὲν εἰδότες ὃ μιμοῦνται

¹ αὐτῷ  αὐτῷ  βτ.

² ἀπονειμώμεθα ᾽ω; ἀπονειμώμεθα  βτ.
THE SOPHIST

STR. We must remember that there were to be two parts of the image-making class, the likeness-making and the fantastic, if we should find that falsehood really existed and was in the class of real being.

THEAET. Yes, there were.

STR. But we found that falsehood does exist, and therefore we shall now, without any doubts, number the kinds of image-making art as two, shall we not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Let us, then, again bisect the fantastic art.

THEAET. How?

STR. One kind is that produced by instruments, the other that in which the producer of the appearance offers himself as the instrument.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. When anyone, by employing his own person as his instrument, makes his own figure or voice seem similar to yours, that kind of fantastic art is called mimetic.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Let us, then, classify this part under the name of mimetic art; but as for all the rest, let us be so self-indulgent as to let it go and leave it for someone else to unify and name appropriately.

THEAET. Very well, let us adopt that classification and let the other part go.

STR. But it is surely worth while to consider, Theaetetus, that the mimetic art also has two parts; and I will tell you why.

THEAET. Please do.

STR. Some who imitate do so with knowledge of that which they imitate, and others without such
PLATO

tοῦτο πράττοις, οSizer δ’ οὐκ εἰδότες. καίτων τίνα
μείζων διαίρεσιν ἀγνωσίας τε καὶ γνώσεως θῆσομεν;
θεαί. Οὐδεμίαν.

ζε. Οὐκών τὸ γε ἄρτι λεχθέν εἰδότων ἢν μέμημα;
tὸ γὰρ σὸν σχῆμα καὶ σὲ γιγνώσκων ἂν τις μιμή-
σαιτο.

C θεαί. Πῶς δ’ οὐ;

ζε. Τί δὲ δικαίοσύνης τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ὅλης εὐλλη-
βηθην ἁρετῆς; ἃρ’ οὐκ ἀγνοούντες μὲν, δοξάζοντες
dὲ την, σφόδρα ἐπιχειροῦσι πολλοὶ τὸ δοκοῦν σφίσι
tοῦτο ὡς ἐνὸν αὐτοῖς προθυμεῖσθαι φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν,
ὅτι μάλιστα ἔργοι τε καὶ λόγοι μιμοῦμενοι;
θεαί. Καὶ πάνυ γε πολλοί.

ζε. Μῶν οὖν πάντες ἀποτυγχάνονσι τοῦ δοκεῖν
eίναι δίκαιοι μηδαμῶς οὖντες; ἡ τούτου πάν τοῦναν-
tοῖν;
θεαί. Πάν.
ζε. Μιμητὴν δὴ τούτον γε ἔτερον ἑκεῖνου
D λεκτέον οίμαι, τὸν ἀγνοοῦντα τοῦ γιγνώσκωτος.
θεαί. Ναί.

52. ζε. Πόθεν οὖν ὄνομα ἐκατέρω τις αὐτῶν
λήπτεαι πρέπον; ἡ δὴ λοι τὸ χαλεπὸν ὡς, διότι τῆς
tῶν γενῶν κατ’ εἰδὴ διαιρέσεως παλαιά τις, ὡς
ξοκεῖν, ἀργία 1 τοὺς ἐμπρόσθεν καὶ ἀσύνον παρῆν,
ὡστε μηδὲ ἐπιχειρεῖν μηδένα διαιρεῖσθαι: καθὸ
δὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀναγκῇ μὴ σφόδρα εὑπορεῖν.
ὁμως δὲ, κἂν εἰ τολμηρότερον εἰρῆσθαι, διαγνώσεως
ἐνεκα τὴν μὲν μετὰ δόξης μίμησιν δοξομομητικὴν

1 ἀργία Madvig; altria BT.
THE SOPHIST

knowledge. And yet what division can we imagine more complete than that which separates knowledge and ignorance?

THEAET. None.

STR. The example I just gave was of imitation by those who know, was it not? For a man who imitates you would know you and your figure.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. But what of the figure of justice and, in a word, of virtue in general? Are there not many who have no knowledge of it, but only a sort of opinion, and who try with the greatest eagerness to make this which they themselves think is virtue seem to exist within them, by imitating it in acts and words to the best of their ability?

THEAET. Yes, there are very many such people.

STR. Do all of them, then, fail in the attempt to seem to be just when they are not so at all? Or is quite the opposite the case?

THEAET. Quite the opposite.

STR. Then I think we must say that such an imitator is quite distinct from the other, the one who does not know from the one who knows.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Where, then, can the fitting name for each of the two be found? Clearly it is not an easy task, because there was, it seems, among the earlier thinkers a long established and careless indolence in respect to the division of classes or genera into forms or species, so that nobody even tried to make such divisions; therefore there cannot be a great abundance of names. However, even though the innovation in language be a trifle bold, let us, for the sake of making a distinction, call the imitation which is
Επροσείπωμεν, τήν δὲ μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἱστορικῆς τινα μέμησιν.

Θεαί. Ἡ ἕστων.

Σε. Θατέρῳ τοῖνυν χρηστεύων· ο γὰρ σοφιστής
ουκ ἐν τοῖς εἰδόσι ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μιμομένοις δή.

Θεαί. Καὶ μάλα.

Σε. Τὸν δοξομιμητὴν δὴ σκοπώμεθα ἔσσει
σίδηρον, εἴτε ἡγησε εἴτε διπλῆν ἔτ' ἔχον τις
ἐστιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

Θεαί. Σκοπώμεν.

268 Σε. Ἡ ἕσει τοῖνυν καὶ μάλα συχνῆν. ο μὲν γὰρ
εὐθύνης αὐτῶν ἐστιν, οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ταύτα ἄ
δοξάζει: τὸ δὲ θατέρου σχῆμα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς
λόγοις κυλίνδησιν ἔχει πολλὴν ὑποψίαν καὶ φόβον,
ὡς ἀγνοεῖ ταύτα ἀ πρὸς τοὺς ἀλλοὺς ἐως εἰδῶς
ἐσχημάτισται.

Θεαί. Πάνω μὲν σὺν ἐστιν ἐκατέρου γένους ων
εἰρηκας.

Σε. Οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν ἀπλοῦν μιμητὴν τινα, τὸν
δὲ εἰρωνικὸν μιμητὴν θέσομεν;

Θεαί. Εἰκὸς γοῦν.

Σε. Τούτου δ' αὖ τὸ γένος ἐν ἡ δύο φῶμεν;

Θεαί. Ὡρα σύ.

Β Σε. Σκοπῶ· καὶ μοι διττῷ καταφαίνεσθον
tινε· τὸν μὲν δημοσία τε καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς
πλήθη δυνατὸν εἰρωνεύεσθαι καθορῷ, τὸν δὲ ιδίᾳ
tε καὶ βραχέσι λόγοις ἀναγκάζοντα τὸν προσδια-
λεγόμενον ἐναντιολογεῖν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ.

Θεαί. Λέγεις ὀρθότατα.

456
THE SOPHIST

based on opinion, opinion-imitation, and that which is founded on knowledge, a sort of scientific imitation.

THEAET. Agreed.

STR. We must therefore apply ourselves to the former, for we found that the sophist was among those who imitate but was not among those who know.

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Then let us examine the opinion-imitator as if he were a piece of iron, and see whether he is sound or there is still some seam in him.

THEAET. Let us do so.

STR. Well, there is a very marked seam. For some of these imitators are simple-minded and think they know that about which they have only opinion, but the other kind because of their experience in the rough and tumble of arguments, strongly suspect and fear that they are ignorant of the things which they pretend before the public to know.

THEAET. Certainly the two classes you mention both exist.

STR. Then shall we call one the simple imitator and the other the dissembling imitator?

THEAET. That is reasonable, at any rate.

STR. And shall we say that the latter forms one class or two again?

THEAET. That is your affair.

STR. I am considering, and I think I can see two classes. I see one who can dissemble in long speeches in public before a multitude, and the other who does it in private in short speeches and forces the person who converses with him to contradict himself.

THEAET. You are quite right.
Τίνα οὖν ἀποφαίνωμεθα τὸν μακρολογώτερον εἶναι; πότερα πολιτικὸν ἢ δημολογικὸν;

Θεαί. Δημολογικὸν.

ε. Τί δὲ τὸν ἔτερον ἔρομεν; σοφὸν ἢ σοφιστικὸν;

Θεαί. Τὸ 1 μὲν ποὺ σοφὸν ἀδύνατον, ἐπείπερ οὐκ εἰδότα αὐτὸν ἐθεμεν· μμητῆς δ' ὁν τοῦ σοφοῦ δῆλον ὅτι παρωνύμοιο αὐτοῦ τι λήψεται, καὶ σχεδὸν ἢδη μεμάθηκα ὅτι τούτων δεὶ προσεπείν ἀληθῶς αὐτὸν ἐκείνων τὸν παντάπασιν ὄντως σοφιστήν.

ε. Οὕκον συνδήσομεν αὐτοῖ, καθάπερ ἐμ- προσθεν, τούνομα συμπλέξαντες ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐπ' ἀρχήν;

Θεαί. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ε. Τὸ 2 δὴ τῆς ἐναντιοποιολογικῆς εἰρωνικοῦ μέρους τῆς δοξαστικῆς μμητικῶν, τοῦ φανταστι-

Δ. κοῦ γένους ἀπὸ τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς οὐ θείων ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπικῶν τῆς ποιήσεως ἀφωρισμένων ἐν λόγῳ τὸ θαυματοποιικὸν μόριον, ταύτης τῆς γενεᾶς τε καὶ αἵματος δὲ ἄν φη τὸν ὄντως σοφιστὴν εἶναι, τάληθεστατα, ὃς ἔουκεν, ἐρεῖ.

Θεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
THE SOPHIST

STR. And what name shall we give to him who makes the longer speeches? Statesman or popular orator?

THEAET. Popular orator.

STR. And what shall we call the other? Philosopher or sophist?

THEAET. We cannot very well call him philosopher, since by our hypothesis he is ignorant; but since he is an imitator of the philosopher, he will evidently have a name derived from his, and I think I am sure at last that we must truly call him the absolutely real and actual sophist.

STR. Shall we then bind up his name as we did before, winding it up from the end to the beginning?

THEAET. By all means.

STR. The imitative kind of the dissembling part of the art of opinion which is part of the art of contradiction and belongs to the fantastic class of the image-making art, and is not divine, but human, and has been defined in arguments as the juggling part of productive activity—he who says that the true sophist is of this descent and blood will, in my opinion, speak the exact truth.

THEAET. Yes, he certainly will.