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THUCYDIDES.
BUST IN HOLKHAM HALL.
THUCYDIDES

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
CHARLES FORSTER SMITH
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

IN FOUR VOLUMES

III

HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
BOOKS V AND VI

LONDON: WILLIAM HEINEMANN
NEW YORK: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
MCMXXI
THUCYDIDES.
BUST IN HOLLAND HALL
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V
THUCYDIDES

BOOK V
ΤΟΥ ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΩΝ

Ε

1. Τού δὲ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους αἱ μὲν ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελέγοντο μέχρι Πυθίων καὶ ἐν τῇ ἔκεχειρίᾳ Ἀθηναίοι Δῆλους ἀνέστησαν ἐκ Δήλου, ἡγησάμενοι κατὰ παλαιὰν τινα αἰτίαν ὑπὸ καθαροῦ ὄντας ἱερῶσθαι, καὶ ἀμα ἐλλιπῆς σφίσιν εἶναι τοῦτο τῆς καθάρσεως, ἦ πρῶτον μοι δεδήλωται ὡς ἀνελόντες τὰς θήκας τῶν τεθνεῶν ὀρθῶς ἐνόμισαν ποιῆσαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν Δῆλουι Ἀτραμύττειοι Φαρνάκου δῶντος αὐτῶς ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ὑκησαν, οὕτως ὡς ἐκαστος ὄρμητο.

11. Κλέων δὲ Ἀθηναίοις πείσας ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Ὁράκησες χωρία ἐξελπέυσε μετὰ τὴν ἔκεχειρίαν, Ἀθηναίων μὲν ὀπλίτας ἔχων διακοσίους καὶ χιλίους καὶ ἱππέας τριακόσιος, τῶν δὲ ἔξυμαχοι πλείουσ, μιᾶς δὲ τριάκοντα. σχῶν δὲ ἐς Πυθίων πρῶτον ἔτι πολιορκομένην καὶ προσλαβών αὐτόθεν ὀπλίτας τῶν φρουρῶν, κατέπλευσεν ἐς τὸν Κωφὸν λιμένα, τῶν Τορωναίων ἀπέχοντα ὑπὸ πολὺ τῆς

1 The truce had really expired, according to iv. cxviii. 12, the 14th of the Attic month Elaphebolion (about the end of March), but hostilities were not renewed till after the Pythian games, which were celebrated in the Attic month Meta-geitnion (latter half of August and first of September). This seems the most natural interpretation of Thucydides'
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BOOK V

I. The next summer the one-year's truce continued till, and ended with, the Pythian games.\(^1\) During the suspension of arms the Athenians expelled the Delians from Delos, thinking that they had been consecrated\(^2\) while in a state of pollution from some ancient crime, and besides, that they themselves had been responsible for this defect in the purification, in which, as I have before related, they believed they had acted rightly in removing the coffins of the dead. And the Delians settled, according as each man chose,\(^3\) in Atramytteum in Asia, which had been given them by Pharmaces.

II. After the armistice had expired Cleon persuaded the Athenians to let him sail to the cities in Thrace, with twelve hundred Athenian hoplites and three hundred cavalry, and a larger force of the allies, and thirty ships. And touching first at Scione, which was still under siege, and taking on from there some hoplites of the garrison, he then sailed down to the port of Cophus, which is not far distant

language, but many editors render "The next summer the one-year's truce was ended and war was renewed till the Pythian games."

\(^2\) Referring to their purification and consecration to Apollo four years before (iii. 107).

\(^3\) Ὁρ, "was inclined" (\(sc. \ οἶκησαί\)).
3 πόλεως. Εκ δ' αυτοῦ, αἰσθόμενος ὑπ' αὐτομόλων ὅτι οὔτε Βρασίδας ἐν τῇ Τορώνῃ οὔτε οἱ ἐνόντες ἀξιόμαχοι εἶν, τῇ μὲν στρατιᾷ τῇ πεζῇ ἐχώρει ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ναῦς δὲ περιέπεμψε δέκα ἐς τὸν λιμένα περιπλείν. καὶ πρὸς τὸ περιτείχισμα πρῶτον ἀφικνεῖται, ὁ προσπερείβαλε τῇ πόλει ὁ Βρασίδας ἐντὸς βουλόμενος ποιῆσαι τὸ προάστειον καὶ διελών τοῦ παλαιοῦ τείχους μίαν αὐτὴν ἐποίησε πόλιν.

III. Βοηθήσαντες δὲ ἐς αὐτὸ Πασιτελίδας τε ὁ Δακεδαιμόνιος ἄρχων καὶ ἡ παροῦσα φυλακὴ προσβαλέοντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἡμύνοντο. καὶ ὄς ἐβιάζοντο καὶ αἱ νῆς ἀμα περιέπλεον αἲ ἐς τὸν λιμένα περιπεμφθείσαι, δείσας ὁ Πασιτελίδας μὴ αἲ τε νῆς φθάσωσι λαβοῦσαι ἔρημον τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῦ τείχισματος ἀληκομένου ἐγκαταληφθῇ.

2 ἀπολιπὼν αὖτο δρόμῳ ἐχώρει ἐς τὴν πόλιν. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι φθάνουσιν οἱ τε ἀπὸ τῶν ἑλόντες τὴν Τορώνην καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἐπιστόμενος αὐτο-βοεῖ, κατὰ τὸ διηρημένον τοῦ παλαιοῦ τείχους ἐξυπνοεῖσθαι. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν τῶν Πελο-ποννησίων καὶ Τορωνιῶν εὐθὺς ἐν χερσί, τοὺς δὲ ξόντας ἔλαβον καὶ Πασιτελίδαν τὸν ἄρχοντα.

3 Βρασίδας δὲ ἔβοηθεῖ μὲν τῇ Τορώνῃ, αἰσθόμενος δὲ καθ' ὁδὸν ἐκλωκύναν ἀνεχώρησεν, ἀποσχὼν τεσσαράκοντα μᾶλιστα στάδιοις μὴ φθάσαι.

4 ἑλθών. ὁ δὲ Κλέων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τρόπαια τε ἔστησαν δύο, το μὲν κατὰ τὸν λιμένα, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τῷ τειχίσματι, καὶ τῶν Τορωνίων γυναῖκας μὲν καὶ παῖδας ἤνδραπόδισαν, αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ Πελοποννησίους καὶ εἰ τις ἀλλὸς Χαλκιδέων ἦν.

1 ἐς added by Bekker. 2 αἲ added by Haacke.
from the city of Torone. From there, on learning from deserters that Brasidas was not in Torone and that the inhabitants were not a match for him in battle, he advanced with his land-force against the city, but sent ten ships to sail round into the harbour. And first he arrived at the new wall which Brasidas had built round the city for the purpose of taking in the suburb, having pulled down a part of the old wall and made one city of Torone.

III. But Pasitelidas, the Lacedaemonian commander, and the garrison that was present came to the defence of this wall and tried to ward off the Athenian assault. But they were hard pressed and the ships that had been sent round were now sailing into the harbour; so Pasitelidas, in fear that the ships might take the town, undefended as it was, before he could get there, and that if the new fortifications were carried he might be captured in them, left them and hurried back into the town. But the Athenians from the ships forestalled him and took Torone, and their land-force, following close upon him, at the first assault dashed in with him at the breach in the old wall. And they slew some of the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans on the spot in hand to hand fighting, but others they took alive, including Pasitelidas the commander. Brasidas meanwhile was coming to the relief of Torone, but learning on the road that it had fallen he retreated, having missed getting there in time by just about forty stadia. Cleon and the Athenians set up two trophies, one at the harbour, the other at the new wall, and made slaves of the women and children of the Toronaeans, but the men of Torone along with the Peloponnesians, and any that were Chalcidians, all together to the number of
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ξύμπαντας ἐσ ἐπτακοςίους, ἀπέπεμψαν ἐς τὰς Ἁθήνας· καὶ αὐτοῖς τὸ μὲν Πελοποννήσιον ὦστερον ἐν ταῖς γενομέναις σπουδαῖς ἀπῆλθε, τὸ δὲ ἀλλὰ ἐκομίσθη ὑπ’ Ὀλυμπίων, ἀνὴρ ἄντ' 5 ἀνδρὸς λυθεῖς. εἶλον δὲ καὶ Πάνακτον Ἁθηναίων ἐν μεθορίοις τείχοις Βοιωτοῦ ὕπο τῶν αὐτῶν
6 χρόνων προδοσία. καὶ ὁ μὲν Κλέων φυλακῆς καταστησάμενος τῆς Τορώνης ἀρας περιέπλει τὸν Ἀθων ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν.

IV. Φαίαξ δὲ ὁ Ἐρασιστράτου τρίτος αὐτῶς Ἁθηναίων πεμπόντων ναυσὶ δύο ἐς Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν πρεσβευτής ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνον ἐξε- 2 πλευσεν. Δεοντίνοι γὰρ ἀπελθόντων Ἁθηναίων ἐκ Σικελίας μετὰ τὴν ξυμβασιν πολίτας τε ἐπε- γράψαντο πολλοὺς καὶ ὁ δὴμος τὴν γῆν ἐπενόει 3 ἀναδάσσασθαι. οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ αἰσθόμενοι Συρα- κοσίους τε ἐπάγονται καὶ ἐκβάλλουσι τὸν δήμον. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπανήθησαν ὡς ἐκαστοί: οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ ὀμολογήσαντες Συρακοσίους καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐκλειπόντες καὶ ἐρημώσαντες Συρακούσας 4 ἐπὶ πολιτεία ὕκησαν. καὶ ύστερον πάλιν αὐτῶν τινων διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκεσθαι ἀπολιπόντες ἐκ τῶν Συρακοσῶν Φωκέας τα, τῆς πόλεως της δε Λεοντίνων χωρίων καλούμενων, καταλαμβάνοντες καὶ Βοικινίσιαν, ὃς ἐγραμμα ἐν τῇ Λεοντίνῃ, καὶ τῶν τοῦ δήμου τότε ἐκπεσόντων οἱ πολλοὶ ἦλθον ὡς αὐτοῖς, καὶ καταστάντες ἐκ τῶν τείχων ἐπο- 5 λέμουν. ἂ πυθανόμενοι οἱ Ἁθηναίοι τὸν Φαίακα πέμπουσιν, εἰ πως πείσαντες τοὺς φήσιν ὄντας

1 i.e. in exchange for Athenian prisoners. -
2 cf. iv. lxv. init.
seven hundred, they sent to Athens. There, however, the Peloponnesians were afterwards set free in the treaty that was made, but the rest were brought back by the Olynthians, being ransomed man for man.\(^1\) About the same time Panactum, a fortress on the frontier of Attica, was betrayed to the Boeotians. As for Cleon, after setting a guard over Torone, he weighed anchor and sailed round Athos with a view to attacking Amphipolis.

IV. About the same time Phaeax son of Erasistratus and two others were sent by the Athenians with two ships on a mission to Italy and Sicily. For the Leontines, on the departure of the Athenians from Sicily after the general peace,\(^2\) had enrolled many new citizens,\(^3\) and the people were minded to make a redistribution of the land. But the oligarchs, perceiving their intention, brought over the Syracusans and expelled the people. And the latter were scattered in every direction; but the oligarchs, coming to an agreement with the Syracusans and leaving their own city desolated, settled at Syracuse on condition of having the rights of citizenship. But later some of them, owing to discontent, left Syracuse and occupied Phocæa, a quarter so named of the city of Leontini, and Brîcinnia, a stronghold in Leontine territory. These being joined by most of the members of the popular party who had been expelled, they established themselves and carried on war from their strongholds. Hearing of this, the Athenians sent Phaeax to see if perchance they might persuade their own allies there, and the rest of the Siceliots

\(^3\) This was to strengthen the democratic party, and for their benefit a new division of state lands was to be made.
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αὐτῶι ξυμμάχους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἰδι χύνωνται, Σικελιώτας κοινῆ, ὡς Συρακοσίων δύναμιν περιποιομένων, ἐπιστρατεύοι, διασώσειαν τὸν 6 δήμον τῶν Δεοντίων. ὁ δὲ Φαίαξ ἄφικόμενος τοὺς μὲν Καμαρναίους πείθει καὶ 'Ακραγαντίνους, ἐν δὲ Γέλα ἀντιστάντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πράγματος οὐκέτι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔρχεται, αἰσθόμενος οὐκ ἄν πείθειν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλ' ἀναχωρήσας διὰ τῶν Σικελῶν ἐς Κατάνην, καὶ ἀμα ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ καὶ ἐς τὰς Βρικυνίας ἐλθὼν καὶ παραβαροῦσαν, ἀπέπλει.

V. Ἐν δὲ τῇ παρακομιδῇ τῇ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν καὶ πάλιν ἀναχωρήσει καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰταλία τισὶ πόλεσιν ἔχρηματισε περὶ φιλίας τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοις καὶ δοκρών ἐντυγχάνει τοῖς ἐκ Μεσσήνης ἐποίκους ἐκπεπτωκόσιν, οἱ μετὰ τὴν Σικελιωτῶν ὁμολογίαν στασιασάντων Μεσσήνων καὶ ἐπαγαγόμενοι τῶν ἐτέρων δοκρών ἐποίκου εὐσεβέσθησαν καὶ ἐγένετο Μεσσήνη δοκρῶν 2 τινα χρόνον. τούτως οὖν ὁ Φαίαξ ἐντυχῶν κομιζόμενοι 1 οὐκ ἡδίκησεν ἐγέγεντο γὰρ τοῖς δοκρῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμολογία ξυμβάσεως πέρι 3 πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. μόνοι γὰρ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὡς Σικελιώται εὐπλήλασσοντο, οὐκ ἐσπείαντο Ἀθηναίοις, οὐδ' ἂν τότε, εἰ μὴ αὐτοὺς κατείχεν ὁ πρὸς Ἰτωνίας 2 καὶ Μεδμαίους πόλεμος, ὁμόροις τε ὄντας καὶ ἀποίκους. καὶ ὁ μὲν Φαίαξ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας χρόνῳ ὑστερον ἀφίκετο.

1 τοῖς of the MSS. before κομιζόμενοι deleted by Dobree.
2 So corrected by Beloch with the help of coins; MSS. Ἰτωνίας.
BOOK V. iv. 5-v. 3

if possible, to make a common expedition against the Syracusans on the ground of their continual aggression, and thus save the people of Leontini. Phaeax, on his arrival, persuaded the Camarinaeans and Agrigentines; but since his undertaking did not prosper at Gela he did not go on to the other states, perceiving that he could not persuade them, but withdrew through the country of the Sicels to Catana, having visited Bricinnae on the way and encouraged its inhabitants. He then sailed back home.

V. On his voyage along the coast to and from Sicily and in Italy he negotiated with certain cities about friendship with the Athenians. He fell in also with the Locrian settlers who had been expelled from Messene; for these, after the general agreement among the Siceliots, when the Messenians had fallen into discord and one faction had called in the Locrians, had been sent out as colonists, Messene thus coming for a time into the hands of the Locrians. Falling in, then, with these when they were on their way home, he did them no injury, as an agreement had been made with him by the Locrians for a treaty with the Athenians. For they alone of the allies, when the Siceliots became reconciled, made no treaty with the Athenians, nor would they have done so then if they had not been pressed by the war with the Iponieans and Medmaeans, who lived on their borders and were colonists of theirs. And Phaeax some time after this returned to Athens.

1 On his way to Sicily.
VI. Ὅ δὲ Κλέων ὡς τότε ἀπὸ τῆς Τορώνης περιέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν, ὁρμώμενος ἐκ τῆς Ἰενονος Σταγίρης μὲν προσβάλλει Ἀνδρίων ἀποικία καὶ οὐχ εἶλε, Γαληψόν δὲ τὴν Θασίων ἀποικίαν λαμβάνει κατὰ κράτος. καὶ πέμψας ὃς Περδίκκαν πρέσβεις, ὅπως παραγένοιτο στρατιὰ κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν, καὶ ἐς τὴν Ὀράκην ἄλλοις παρὰ Πολλῆν τὸν Ὀδυμάντων βασιλέα, ἄξοντας μισθοῦ Ὀράκας ὡς πλείστους, αὐτὸς ἡσύχαζε περιμένων ἐν τῇ Ἰενον. Βρασίδας δὲ πυνθανόμενος ταῦτα ἀντεκάθητο καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τῷ Κερδυλίῳ ἐστι δὲ τὸ χωρίον τούτο Ἀργυλίων ἐπὶ μετεωρῷ πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχον τῆς Ἀμφίπολες, καὶ κατεβαίνετο πάντα αὐτόθεν, ὡστε οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν ὁρμώμενος ὁ Κλέων τῷ στρατῷ ὅπερ προσεδέχετο ποιήσεων αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν ὑπεριδόντα σφῶν τὸ πλῆθος τῇ παρούσῃ στρατιᾷ ἀναβήσεσθαι. 4 Ἀμα δὲ καὶ παρεσκευάζετο Ὀράκας τε μισθωτοῦ πεντακοσίους καὶ χιλίους καὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας πάντας παρακαλῶν, πελταστὰς καὶ ἱππεῶς καὶ Μυρκεύους καὶ Χαλκιδέων χιλίους πελταστὰς εἰχε πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἀμφίπολει. τὸ δ' ὁπλιτικὸν ἐμπαν ἑροίσθη δισχίλιοι μάλιστα καὶ ἱπποῖς Ἑλλήνες τριακόσιοι. τούτων Βρασίδας μὲν ἔχων ἐπὶ Κερδυλίων ἑκάθητο ἐς πεντακοσίους καὶ χιλίους, οὶ δ' ἄλλοι ἐν Ἀμφίπολει μετὰ Κλεαρίδου ἐτετάχατο. 5 VII. Ὅ δὲ Κλέων τέως μὲν ἡσύχαζεν, ἔπειτα ἡμαγκάσθη ποιήσαι ὅπερ ὁ Βρασίδας προσε-

1 cf. iv. lxxviii. 2. 2 cf. iv. cvii. 3.
THE BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS.

Modern Roads.

Ancient Roads.

1. Thracian Gate.

2. First Gate in the Long Wall.

3. Gate from the town into space inclosed by the Palisade.

4. Gate in the Palisade.
VI. Now when Cleon had sailed round from Torone to Amphipolis, as mentioned above, taking Eion as his base he made an unsuccessful attack upon Stagirus, an Andrian colony, but did take by storm Galepsus, a colony of the Thasians. Then sending envoys to Perdiccas, with a request to join him with an army in accordance with the terms of alliance, and other envoys to Thrace to Polles, king of the Odomantians, to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as possible, he himself kept quiet at Eion. But Brasidas, on hearing of these things, took post over against him at Cerdylium. This place is in the territory of the Argilians, on high ground across the river not far from Amphipolis, and commands a view in all directions, so that Cleon could not move his army without being observed; for Brasidas expected that Cleon in contempt of the small numbers of the Lacedaemonians would go up against Amphipolis, with his present army. At the same time he made further preparations, calling to his aid fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries and all the Edonians, both targeteers and cavalry. And he had also of the Myrcinians and the Chalcidians one thousand targeteers, in addition to the troops in Amphipolis. The whole body of hoplites collected by him was about two thousand in number, and he had three hundred Hellenic horsemen. Of these forces Brasidas took about fifteen hundred and stationed himself at Cerdylium; the rest were posted at Amphipolis under the command of Clearidas.

VII. Cleon kept quiet for a while, then was forced to do just what Brasidas had expected. For when

3 cf. iv. cxxxii. 1.
4 i.e. without waiting for reinforcements.
THUCYDIDES

2 δέχετο. τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν ἀχθομένων μὲν τῇ ἔδρᾳ, ἀναλογιζομένων δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου ἤγερον πρὸς οίνας ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τόλμαν μετὰ οίνας ἀνεπι-ςτημοσύνης καὶ μαλακίας γενήσοιτο καὶ οίκοθεν ὡς ἄκουτες αὐτῷ ἔνυσατο, αἰσθόμενος τὸν θρόνον καὶ οὔ βουλόμενον αὐτοὺς διὰ τὸ ἔν τῷ αὐτῷ καθημένους βαρύνεσθαι, ἀναλαβὼν
3 ἢγεν. καὶ ἔχρησατο τῷ τρόπῳ ὄπερ καὶ ἐς τὴν Πύλον εὐτυχήσας ἔπιστευσε τι φρονεῖν· ἦς μά-χην μὲν γὰρ οὔδε ἦλπισέν οἱ ἐπεξεῖναι οὐδένα, κατὰ θέαν δὲ μᾶλλον ἔφη ἀναβαίνειν τοῦ χωρίου, καὶ τὴν μείζω παρασκευήν περιέμεινεν, οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἄσφαλει, ἢν ἀναγκάζεται, περισσότερον, ἀλλ' ὡς κύκλῳ περιστὰς βίᾳ αἰρήσων τὴν πόλιν.
4 ἔλθων τε καὶ καθίσας ἐπὶ λόφου καρπεροῦ πρὸ τῆς Ἄμφιπόλεως τὸν στρατόν, αὐτὸς ἔθεατο τὸ λιμνῶδες τοῦ Στρυμόνος καὶ τὴν θέσιν τῆς πόλεως
5 ἐπὶ τῇ Θράκη 1 ὡς ἔχοι. ἀπολλεῖ τοῦ νόημιζεν, ὡς οὖν βούληται, ἁμαχεῖ· καὶ γὰρ οὔδε ἐφαίνετο οὔτ' ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους οὔδες οὔτε κατὰ πύλας ἐξῆτε, κεκλημέναι τε ἦσαν πᾶσαι. ὡςτε καὶ μη-χανᾶς ὅτι οὐκ ἀνήλθεν ἔχον, ἀμαρτεῖν ἔδοκεν· ἐλεῖν γὰρ ἀν τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ ἐρήμου.

VIII. Ὅ δὲ Βρασίδας εὐθὺς ὡς εἶδε κινου-μένους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καταβὰς καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ Κερδυλίου ἑσέρχεται ἐς τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν.
2 καὶ ἐπέξοδον μὲν καὶ ἀντίταξιν οὐκ ἐποιήσατο πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, δεδώς τὴν αὐτοὺ παρα-

1 With most MSS.; Hude reads τὴν Θράκη with CGc2.
the soldiers began to be annoyed at sitting still and to discuss the quality of his leadership—what experience and daring there was on the other side and what incompetence and cowardice would be pitted against it, and how unwillingly they had come with him from home—he became aware of their grumbling, and unwilling that they should be exasperated by remaining inactive in the same place, marched out with them. He adopted the same course in which he had been successful at Pylos and so had acquired confidence in his own wisdom; for he had no expectation that anybody would come against him for battle, but he was going up, he said, rather to reconnoitre the place; and in fact he was waiting for the larger force,¹ not with a view to gaining the victory without risk should he be forced to fight, but to surrounding the town and taking it by force of arms. Accordingly he went and posted his force on a strong hill before Amphipolis, and was himself surveying the marshy part of the Strymon and the situation of the city in respect to the surrounding Thracian country, and he thought that he could withdraw whenever he pleased without a battle; for no one was visible on the wall or was seen coming out by the gates, which were all closed. He therefore thought that he had made a mistake in coming up without storming-machines; for he might have taken the town, since it was undefended.

VIII. But Brasidas, as soon as he saw the Athenians stirring, went down himself from Cerdyrium and entered Amphipolis. But he did not march out and draw up against the Athenians, because he mistrusted his own force, believing them

¹ cf. ch. vi. 2.
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σκευήν καὶ νομίζων ὑποδειστέρος εἶναι, οὗ τῷ πλήθει (ἀντίπαλα γάρ πως ἦν), ἄλλα τῷ ἄξιω-
ματι (τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ὀπερ ἐστράτευε κα-
θαρὸν ἔξηλθε, καὶ Δημοκρίνει καὶ Ἰμβρίων τὸ
κράτιστον), τέχνη δὲ παρεσκευάζετο ἐπιθησό-
μενος. εἰ γὰρ δείξει τοῖς ἐναντίοις τὸ τε πλήθος
καὶ τὴν ὁπλίσιν ἀναγκαίαν οὕσαν τῶν μεθ᾽
έαυτοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἤγειτο μᾶλλον περιγενέσθαι ἢ
ἀνευ προούσεως τε αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος
καταφρονήσεως. ἀπολεξάμενος οὖν αὐτὸς πεν-
τήκοντα καὶ ἔκατον ὀπλίτας, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
Κλεαρίδα προστάξας, ἐβουλεύετο ἐπιχειρεῖν
αἰφυδίως, πρὶν ἀπελθεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οὐκ
ἀν νομίζων ὁμοίως αὐτοὺς ἀπολαβεῖν αὐθίς
μεμονωμένους, εἰ τύχοι ἕλθοῦσα αὐτοῖς ἡ βού-
θεια. ξυγκαλέσας δὲ τοὺς πάντας στρατιώτας
καὶ βουλόμενος παραθαρασσαί τε καὶ τὴν ἐπι-
νοιαν φράσαι ἐλεγε τοιάδε.

IX. Ὅσως Πελοποννήσιοι, ἀπὸ μὲν οίς
χώρας ἦκομεν, ὃτι αἰεὶ διὰ τὸ εὐθὺν ἔλευθέρας,
καὶ ὃτι Δωρίης μέλλετε Ἰωσί μάχεσθαι, δὴν
eiwsthe kreisous einai, arkeitw brahéws dedhi-
καταφρονήσει τε ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔπεξαντας
ὁς ἂν ἐπεξέλθοι τις αὐτοῖς ἢ μάχην, ἀναβῆναι
πρὸς τὸ χωρίον καὶ νῦν ἀτάκτως κατὰ θέαν
tetramménous oligokρeíν. ὅστις δὲ τὰς τοιοῦτας
ἀμαρτίας τῶν ἐναντίων κάλλιστα ἰδὼν καὶ ἁμα
to be inferior, not in numbers—as they were about equal—but in quality; for the force that was in the field were Athenians of pure blood and the pick of the Lemnians and Imbrians. So he was preparing to attack by means of a stratagem; for he thought that if he showed the enemy the number and the barely sufficient equipment of the troops with him he should be less likely to gain a victory than if they had no previous sight of his forces and did not look upon them with contempt from seeing their real character. Accordingly, picking out for himself one hundred and fifty hoplites and assigning the rest to Clearidas, he determined to make a sudden attack before the Athenians withdrew, thinking that he could not again cut them off thus isolated if once reinforcements should reach them. So calling together all the soldiers, wishing to encourage them and explain his plan, he spoke to them as follows:

IX. "Men of the Peloponnesus, let it suffice to remind you briefly from what manner of country we have come, that it has ever been free because of its courage, and that you are going to fight, Dorians against Ionians, whom you have been accustomed to vanquish. I will, however, explain to you in what way I intend to make the attack, in order that my plan of fighting in detachments and not in a body may not seem to anyone poor tactics and thus cause discouragement. For I imagine that the enemy ascended the hill in contempt of us and because they could not have expected that anybody would come out for battle against them, and now, with broken ranks and intent upon reconnoitring, are taking small account of us. Now when an assailant having most clearly observed such errors in the enemy also makes
πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ποιεῖται μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀντιπαρα-
ταχθέντος ἢ ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ παρόν ξυμφέροντος,
πλείαρ' ἄν ὀρθοίτο καὶ τὰ κλέματα ταῦτα καλλιστὴν δόξαν ἔχει ἃ τὸν πολέμου μᾶλλον·
Κλεαρίδα, ὦστερον, ὅταν ἀρῥήτη προσεῖμενο καὶ
tοῦ ὑπατεία τὸ πέλεον ἢ τοῦ μένοντος, ἐξ ὧν ἐμοὶ
φαίνονται, τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἐν τῷ ἀνεμένῳ
αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης καὶ πρὶν ἡμετέρην 1 μᾶλλον
τὴν δόξαν, ἐγὼ ἡν ἐχων τοὺς μετ' ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ
θάσας, ἢν δύνωμαι, προσπεσοῦμαι δρόμῳ κατὰ
μέσον τὸ στράτευμα· σὺ δὲ, Κλεαρίδα, ὦστερον,
Αμφιπόλιτι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυμμάχους ἄγων
αισχυνῶς τὰς πύλας ἀνοίγας ἔτεκθειν καὶ ἐπεὶ-
γεσθαί ὃς τάχιστα ξυμμειξαί. ἐπὶς γὰρ ἄμ-
λιστα αὐτοῦς σύντοις φοβηθήναι· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶν
ὥστερον δεινότερον τοῖς πολεμίοις τοῦ παρόντος
9 καὶ μαχομένου. καὶ αὐτὸς τε ἀνὴρ ἄγαθος ἱ-
γνω, ὦστερο σε εἰκὸς ὡστα Σπαρτιάτην, καὶ ἀμείβει,
ἀν ἄνδρες ξύμμαχοι, ἀκολουθήσατε ἀνδρείως, καὶ
νομίζατε τρία 2 εἶναι τοῦ καλῶς πολεμεῖν, τὸ ἔθε-
λέων καὶ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ τὸ 3 τοῖς ἀρχουσι
πείθεσθαι, καὶ τῆς ὡς ἤμιν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὁ ἀγαθὸς
γενομένων ἐλευθερίαν τοὺς υπάρχειν καὶ Δακεδαι-
μονίων ξυμμάχους κεκλήσθαι, ἠ Ἀθηναίων τε
δουλοῖς, ἢν τὰ ἀρίστα ἄνευ ἀνδραποδίσμοι ἢ

1 Krüger's emendation for ξυμμαχήναι of the MSS.
2 Omitted by MSS, but rightly restored by Stahl from
Stobaeus and schol.
3 Added by Krüger.
his attack in accordance with the force at his own disposal, not openly and in array of battle, but as may be advantageous under present circumstances, then he would be most likely to succeed. And those stratagems have won the highest credit by which a man most completely deceives the enemy and helps his friends. While, then, the Athenians, still unprepared, are full of confidence and are thinking, so far as I can see, more of withdrawing than of staying where they are, while their tension of mind is relaxed and before they have got their thoughts together, I will take my own troops and if possible surprise them by a dash upon the centre of their army. Then, Clearidas, the moment you see me pressing on and in all likelihood striking terror into them, do you suddenly throw open the gates and at the head of your own men and the Amphipolitans and the rest of our allies rush out upon them and make all haste to close with them at once. In this way there is the best hope to put them in a panic; for a force that comes up afterwards has always more terror for an enemy than that with which he is already engaged. As for yourself, shew yourself a brave man, as becomes a Spartan; and do you, men of the allies, follow him bravely, and bear in mind that the three virtues of a good soldier are zeal, sense of honour, and obedience to his leaders; and that on this day there is in store for you, if you are brave, freedom and to be called allies of the Lacedaemonians—or else vassals of the Athenians (if you be so fortunate as to escape death or being sold
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θανατώσεως πράξητε, καὶ δουλεῖαν χαλεπωτέραν ἢ πρὶν εἴχετε, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς Ἔλλησι κωλυταῤῥ

10 γενέσθαι ἐλευθερώσεως. ἀλλὰ μήτε ύμεῖς μαλακισθήτε, ὅρωντες περὶ ὅσον ὁ ἀγών ἔστιν, ἐγώ τε
deῖξω οὐ παραινέσαι οἴος τε ὁν μᾶλλον τοῖς πέλας ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔργῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν.

X. Ὅ μὲν Βρασίδας τοσαῦτα εἶπὼν τὴν τε

έξοδον παρεσκευάζετο αὐτὸς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους

μετὰ τοῦ Κλεαρίδα καθίστη ἐπὶ τὰς Θάρκιας

καλουμένας τῶν πυλῶν, ὅπως ὦσπερ εἶρητο ἐπ-

2 εξίοιεν. τῷ δὲ Κλέωνι, φανεροῦ γενομένου αὐτοῦ

ἀπὸ τοῦ Κερδυλίου καταβάντος καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει,

ἔπιθεν ὅψῃ ἔξωθεν, περὶ τὸ ιερὸν τῆς Ἀθη-

ναίας θυμομένου καὶ ταῦτα πράσσοντος, ἀγγέλ-

λεται (προυκεχωρήκει γὰρ τότε κατὰ τὴν θέαν)

ὅτι ἢ τε στρατιὰ ἀπασα φανερά τῶν πολεμίων ἐν
tῇ πόλει καὶ ὑπὸ τὰς πύλας ἵππων τε πόδες

πολλοὶ καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὡς εξίοιτων ὑποθαίνονται.

3 ὃ δὲ ἀκούσας ἐπῆλθε, καὶ ὃς εἶδεν, οὐ βουλόμενος

μάχη διαγωνίσασθαι πρὶν οἱ καὶ τοὺς βοηθοὺς

ήκειν καὶ οἰόμενος φθησεθαι ἀπελθῶν, σημαινεῖν
tε ἡμα ἐκελευ ἄναχωρήσῃ καὶ παρῆγγελλε
tοῖς ἀπιοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας, ὦσπερ

4 μόνον οἶον τ' ἦν, ὑπάγειν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἡλέωνος. ὡς δ' ἀυτὸ ἐδόκει σχολή γέγνεσθαι, αὐτὸς ἐπιστρέψας
tο δεξιὸν καὶ τὰ γυμνὰ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους δους

5 ἀπήγε τὴν στρατιὰν. καὶ τούτῳ Βρασίδας ὡς

ὁρᾷ τὸν καίρον καὶ τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων

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into slavery) and that, too, in a harsher vassalage than you had before, while for the rest of the Hellenes you will prove a barrier to their liberation. Nay, then, seeing how much is at stake, do you on your part not play the coward; and I, for my part, will show that I am not better able to exhort others than to carry out myself in action the advice I give to my fellows."

X. After this brief speech, Brasidas himself prepared for the sally and placed the rest with Clearidas at the gate called Thracian, in order that they might come out to his support according to his orders. But he had been seen when he came down from Cerdylium, and again in the city—which is in full view from outside—while sacrificing at the temple of Athena and busied about these matters; and word was brought to Cleon, who had gone forward at that time for the reconnoissance, that the whole army of the enemy could be clearly seen inside the city, and the feet of men and horses in great numbers were visible under the gates, as though ready for a sally. Hearing this Cleon came nearer; and when he saw it, being unwilling to risk a battle before his reinforcements arrived, and thinking that he could get away in time, he gave orders to sound a retreat and at the same time passed along word to the troops as they set off to go to the left—as alone was possible—upon the road to Eion. But as it seemed to him this was being done too slowly, he himself wheeled the right wing, thus exposing the unarmed side\(^1\) to the enemy, and began to lead off his army. At this moment Brasidas, seeing his opportunity and the army of the Athenians on the

\(^1\) i.e. the right side, the left being covered by the shield.
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κινούμενον, λέγει τοῖς μεθ’ ἕαυτοῦ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπὸ "Ὄι ἄνδρες ἡμᾶς οὐ μένουσιν δὴλοι δὲ τῶν τε δοράτων τῇ κινήσει καὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν τὸς γὰρ ἄν τούτο γίγνεται, οὐκ εἰώθασι μένειν τοὺς ἑπιόντας. ἄλλα τάς τε πύλας τις ἀνοιγότω ἐμοὶ δὲ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐπεξέχωμεν ὡς τάχιστα θαρσοῦντες." καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ σταύρωμα πύλας καὶ τὰς πρώτας τοῦ μακροῦ τείχους τότε ὄντος ἐξελθὼν ἔθει δρόμῳ τὴν ὄδον ταύτην εὐθεῖαν ἦπερ νῦν κατὰ τὸ καρπετότατον τοῦ χωρίου ἱόντι τροπαίων ἑστηκε, καὶ προσβάλων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, πεφοβημένους τε ἃ μα τῇ σφετέρᾳ ἀταξίᾳ καὶ τὴν τόλμαν αὐτοῦ ἐκπεπληγμένους, κατὰ μέσον τὸ στράτευμα, τρέπετε· καί ὁ Κλεαρίδας, ὥσπερ εἴρητο, ἀμα κατὰ τὰς Ἐρακίας πύλας ἐπεξελθὼν τῷ στρατῷ ἐπεφέρετο. Ἐμνέβη τε τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ καὶ ἔξαπλής ἀμφιέρωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους θορυβηθήναι καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐώνυμον κέρας αὐτῶν, τὸ πρὸς τὴν Ἰεόνα ὀπερ δὴ καὶ προσκεκριμένη, εὐθὺς ἀπορράγειν ἐφέυγε (καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας ὑποχρωνυτός ἦδη αὐτοῦ ἐπιταρίων τῷ δεξιῷ τυτρώσκεται, καὶ πεσόντα αὐτῶν οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναίοι οὐκ αἰσθάνονται, οἱ δὲ πλησίον ἄραντες ἅπτεγκαν), τὸ δὲ δεξιὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἔμενε μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ μὲν Κλέων, ός το πρῶτον οὐ διενοεῖτο μένειν, εὐθὺς φεύγων καὶ καταληψθεὶς ὑπὸ Μυρκινίου πελταστῶν ἀποθυνῆςκει, οἱ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἔστραφέντες ὀπλίται ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον τὸν τὲ Κλεαρίδαν ἡμύνοντο καὶ δίς ἡ τρίς προσβαλόντα, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐνέδοσαν 20.
move, said to those immediately about him\(^1\) and to the rest of the troops: "These men will not stand before us; they show it by the wagging of their spears and of their heads; men who do that never await an attack. Somebody open the gates for me as I have ordered and let us boldly get at them as quickly as possible." He went out then by the gate that led to the palisade and by the first gate of the long wall, which was then standing, and advanced at full speed up the straight road where now, as one comes to the steepest part of the hill, a trophy stands, and attacking the centre of the Athenians, who were amazed at his audacity, as well as panic-stricken because of their own disorder, he routed them. At the same moment Clearidas, as he had been ordered, went out at the Thracian gate and bore down with his troops. And so it came to pass that owing to the unexpected and sudden nature of the attack from both sides at once the Athenians were thrown into confusion; and the left wing, on the side toward Eion, which had already gone some distance in advance, was at once cut off, and fled. (It was just when it began to retire that Brasidas, who was pressing forward against the right wing, was wounded, and the Athenians did not observe that he had fallen, but those who were near took him up and carried him from the field.) The right wing of the Athenians stood its ground better. Cleon, indeed, as he had not intended from the first to stand his ground, fled at once, and was overtaken and slain by a Myrcinian targeteer; but the hoplites, rallying at their first position on the hill, twice or thrice repulsed the attack of Clearidas, and did not

\(^1\) i.e. the hundred and fifty (ch. viii. 4).
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πρὶν ἡ τε Μυρκινία καὶ ἡ Χαλκιδικὴ ἵππος καὶ
οἱ πελτασταὶ περιστάντες καὶ ἐσακοντίζοντες
άυτοὺς ἔτρεψαν. οὕτω δὲ τὸ στράτευμα πάν ἦδη
tῶν Ἀθηναίων φυγὼν χαλεπῶς καὶ πολλὰς ὀδοὺς
τραπόμενοι κατὰ ὅρη, ὡσοι μὴ διεθάρησαν ἡ
αὐτίκα ἐν χερσὶν ἢ ὑπὸ τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς ἵππου
καὶ τῶν πελταστῶν, οἱ λοιποὶ ἀπεκομισθῆσαν ἐς
τὴν Ἡιώνα. οἱ δὲ τῶν Βρασίδαν ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς
μάχης καὶ διασώσαντες ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἐτὶ ἐμπνοῦν
ἐσεκόμισαν· καὶ ἠςθετο μὲν ὅτι νικῶσιν οἷς μὲθ᾿
άυτοῦ, οὐ πολὺ δὲ διαλυπῶν ἔτελευτήσεν· καὶ ἡ
ἀλλή στρατιὰ ἀναχωρήσασα μετὰ τοῦ Κλεαρίδου
ἐκ τῆς διώξεως νεκρῶσε τῆς ἐσκύλευσε καὶ τροπαίων
ἔστησεν.

XI. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν Βρασίδαν οἱ ἑύμμαχοι
πάντες ἐξ ὧν ὅπλοις ἐπιστῶμενοι δημοσία ἐθάψαν
ἐν τῇ πόλει πρὸ τῆς νῦ πρὸ ἄγορᾶς οὕσης. καὶ τὸ
λοιπὸν οἱ Ἀμφιπολῖται περιεῖρξαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ
μνημεῖον ὡς ἦρω τε ἐντέμνουσι καὶ τιμᾶς δεδωκα
cασιν ἀγώνας καὶ ἐτησίονς θυσίας, καὶ τὴν ἀποικίαν ὡς ὀἰκιστῇ προσέθεσαν καταβαλόντες τὰ Ἀγνώνεια ὁἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἀφανίσαντες εἰ τοί
μνημόσυνον που ἐμέλλεν αὐτοῦ τῆς ὀἰκίσεως
περιέσθαι, νομίσαντες τὸν μὲν Βρασίδαν σωτηροῦ
τῷ τῷ σφῶν γεγενήσθαι καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἄμα
τὴν τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων ἐννομαζέιν φόβῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων θεραπεύσατε, τὸν δὲ Ἀγνώα κατὰ τὸ
πολέμιον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὥς ἄν ὀμοίως σφίσι
ἐνμφόρως ὁὐδὲ ἄν ἠδὼς τὰς τιμᾶς ἔχειν. καὶ
τοὺς νεκροὺς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἀπέδοσαν. ἀπέθανον

1 δὴ, Krüger’s correction for δὲ of the MSS
2 cf. iv. cii. 3, 4.
give way till the Myrcinian and Chalcidian horse and the targeteers, who surrounded and hurled javelins at them, put them to flight. Then at last the whole Athenian army took to flight, making their way with difficulty and by many routes over the hills, until finally the survivors—all that were not destroyed either at once in hand to hand conflict or by the Chalcidian horse and targeteers—got back to Eion. Brasidas was taken up by his followers and carried safely from the battlefield to the city, still breathing; and he learned that his men were victorious, but after a little interval he died. The rest of the army, after returning with Clearidas from the pursuit, despoiled the dead and set up a trophy.

XI. After this all the allies gave Brasidas a public burial in the city at a spot facing what is now the market-place, following his body in full armour. And the Amphipolitans fenced in his monument and have ever since made offerings to him as a hero, giving honours and instituting games and yearly sacrifices. They also adopted him as founder of the colony, pulling down the edifices of Hagnon and obliterating whatever was likely, if left standing, to be a reminder of his settlement,¹ for at the present moment they courted the alliance of the Lacedaemonians through fear of the Athenians, thinking Brasidas to have been their saviour, whereas Hagnon, in consequence of their hostile attitude towards Athens, would not in like manner as before² receive their honours either with benefit to themselves or with pleasure to himself. The dead they gave back to the Athenians.

¹ cf. iv. cii. 3, 4.
² i.e. as formerly, when their relations with Athens were pleasant. Or the meaning may be, "so advantageously for them as Brasidas would."
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dε Ἀθηναίων μὲν περὶ εξακοσίων, τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων ἑπτά, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐκ παρατάξεως, ἀπὸ δὲ τοιαύτης ξυντυχίας καὶ προεκφοβήσεως τὴν μᾶλλον γενέσθαι. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἀναίρεσιν οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ οἷκὸν ἀπέπλευσαν, οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Κλεαρίδου τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν καθίσταντο.

XII. Καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνων τοῦ θέρους τελευτῶν Ῥαμφίας καὶ Αὐτοχαρίδας καὶ Ἐπικυδίδας Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐστὶ ἐπὶ Ἐράκης χορία βοήθειαν ἔγγον ἐνακοσίων ὀπλιτῶν καὶ ἄφικομενοι ἐπὶ Ἐράκλειαν τὴν ἐν Τραχίῳ καθίσταντο ὁ τι αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν. ἐνδιατριβῶντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἔτυχεν ἡ μάχη αὕτη γενομένη, καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

XIII. Τοῦ δὲ ἐπιγνωμομένου χειμῶνος εὐθὺς μέχρι μὲν Πιερίου τῆς Θεσσαλίας διήλθον οἱ περὶ τῶν Ῥαμφίας, κωλυόντων δὲ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν καὶ ἀμα Βρασίδου τεθνεῶτος, ὑπὲρ ἤγου τὴν στρατιάν, ἀπετράποντο ἐπὶ οἷκον, νομίζοντες οὐδένα καίρον ἔτι εἶναι, τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων ἔσσον ἀπεληλυθότων καὶ οὐκ ἄξιοχρεῶν αὐτῶν οὖν ὑπὸ τέσσαρα ὀκτὼ ὡν κάκειν ἔπενοί. μάλιστα δὲ ἀπῆλθον εἰδότες τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ὦτε ἔξησαν, πρὸς τὴν εἰρήνην μᾶλλον τὴν γνώμην ἔχοντας.

XIV. Ξυνέβη τε εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐν Ἀμφίπολει μάχην καὶ τὴν Ῥαμφίου ἀναχώρησιν ἐκ Θεσσαλίας ὡστε πολέμου μὲν μὴδὲν ἐτὶ ἀγαφαθί μηδετέρους, πρὸς δὲ τὴν εἰρήνην μᾶλλον τὴν γνώμην εἶχον, οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι πληγέντες ἐπὶ τῇ

1 cf. iv. c., ci.
About six hundred of these had been killed, but of their adversaries only seven; for the fight had been made, not as a regular battle, but as the result of such an accident and previous panic as has been described. After taking up the dead the Athenians sailed back home, but Clearidas and his followers remained and set in order the affairs of Amphipolis.

XII. About the same time, towards the close of this summer, Rhamphias, Autocharidas, and Epi-cydidas, who were Lacedaemonians, were on their way with reinforcements, consisting of nine hundred hoplites, to the strongholds in Thrace, and arriving at Heracleia in Trachis they set in order whatever seemed to them amiss. It was while they were staying there that the battle at Amphipolis occurred; and so the summer ended.

XIII. As soon as winter came on Rhamphias and his followers advanced as far as Pierium in Thessaly; but as the Thessalians hindered their progress and Brasidas, to whom they were bringing the army, was now dead, they turned back homeward. They thought the favourable moment was past, for the Athenians had gone away in consequence of their defeat, and they were not competent by themselves to carry out any of Brasidas’ plans. But the chief reason for their return was that they knew that the Lacedaemonians, at the time when they set out, were more than ever inclined to peace.

XIV. It so happened, too, that directly after the battle at Amphipolis and the withdrawal of Rhamphias from Thessaly neither side undertook any further military operations, and both were more inclined to peace. The Athenians were so inclined because they had been beaten at Delium,¹ and again

¹ Delium: A battle fought between Athens and Thebes in 422 BC.
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Δηλίῳ καὶ δἰ ὀλίγου αὖθις ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει, καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν ἐξπίδα τῆς ῥώμης πιστὴν ἔτη, ἦπερ οὗ προσεδέχοντο πρῶτον τὰς σπουδὰς, δοκοῦντες τῇ παρούσῃ εὐνοχίᾳ καθυπέρτεροι γε-νήσεσθαι (καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀμα ἔδεισαν σφῶν μὴ διὰ τὰ σφάλματα ἐπαιρόμενοι ἐπὶ πλέον ἀποστώσθην, μετεμέλουσα τε ὅτι μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πύλῳ 3 καλὸς παρασχῶν οὐ ξυνέβησαν), οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ Δακε-δαιμόνιοι παρὰ γνώμην μὲν ἀποβαίνοντος σφῖς τοῦ πολέμου, ἐν φὸντο ὀλίγων ἐτῶν καθαρ-ρήσειν τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν εἰ τὴν γῆν τέμ-νοιν, περιπεσόντες δὲ τῇ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορὰ, οία οὕτω ἐγεγένητο τῇ Σπάρτῃ, καὶ λῃστευμένης τῆς χώρας ἐκ τῆς Πύλου καὶ Κυθήρων, αὐτομο-λούντων τε τῶν Εἰλώτων καὶ αἰεὶ προσδοκίας οὖσας μή τι καὶ οἱ υπομένοντες τοῖς ἐξω πίσυ οἰ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα σφῆς ὡςπερ καὶ πρῶτον, 4 νεωτερίσωσιν. ξυνεβαινὲ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀρ-γείους αὐτοῖς τὰς τριακοντατεῖς σπουδὰς ἐπ᾽ ἐξόδῳ εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλας οὐκ ἤθελον σπένδεσθαι οἱ Ἀργεῖοι, εἰ μὴ τις αὐτοῖς τὴν Κυνουρίαν γῆν ἀπο-δώσει (ἀδύνατα δ’ ἐναι ἐφαίνετο Ἀργείους καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἀμα πολεμεῖν), τῶν τε ἐν Πελοπον- νῆσῳ πόλεων ὑπόπτευτον τινας ἀποστήσεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους, ὡςπερ καὶ ἐγένετο.

ΧV. Ταῦτ’ οὖν ἀμφοτέροις αὐτοῖς λογιζομένοις ἐδόκει ποιητέα εἶναι ἡ ξύμβασις, καὶ οὐχ ἤσον

1 Stahl’s emendation for ὡστ’ ἀδύνατα of the MSS.

1 i.e. those who had escaped.
2 The great revolt of the Helots, called the Third Messenian War; cf. i. ci.–ciii.
at Amphipolis a little later, and consequently had no longer that confidence in their strength in reliance upon which they had earlier refused to accept the truce, as they then thought that with their existing good luck they would prove superior. They were afraid, too, of their allies, lest, elated over these failures of theirs, the revolt among them might spread, and they repented that they had not come to terms when a good opportunity offered after the affair at Pylos. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, favoured peace because the war was turning out contrary to their hopes. They had expected that in a few years, if they should ravage their territory, they could pull down the power of the Athenians; whereas they had met with the calamity on the island of Sphacteria, such an one as had never before befallen Sparta; their territory was ravaged from Pylos and Cythera; the Helots were deserting, and always there was apprehension that those who remained, relying on those beyond the border, might revolt in the present state of affairs, just as they had done before. It happened also that the thirty years’ truce with the Argives was on the point of expiring, and the Argives were unwilling to make another treaty unless the territory of Cynuria were restored to them; and it seemed impossible to carry on the war with the Argives and the Athenians at the same time. Besides, they suspected that some of the cities in the Peloponnesus would revolt to the Argives, as indeed did happen.

XV. In consideration of these things, both parties thought it advisable to come to an agreement,

— It expired the next year (cf. ch. xxviii. 2), and therefore dated from 457 B.C. — cf. iv. lvi. 2.
τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις, ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς νήσου κομίσασθαι· ἦσαν γὰρ οἱ Σπαρτιάται αὐτῶν πρώτοι τε καὶ ὁμοίως σφίσι ξυγγενεῖς. 2 ἡρξαντο μὲν οὖν καὶ εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἀλώσιν αὐτῶν πράσσειν, ἀλλ’ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐπός ἤθελον, εὐ φερόμενοι, ἐπὶ τῇ ἵση καταλύεσθαι. ὁφαλέντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τῷ Δηλίῳ παραχρήμα οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι γνώντες νῦν μᾶλλον ἀν ἐνδεξαμένους ποιοῦνται τὴν ἐνιαύσιον ἐκεχερίαν, ἐν ἦ ἔδει ξυνιόντας καὶ περὶ τοῦ πλείονος χρόνου βουλεύεσθαι.

XVI. Ἕπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ἦ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει ἦσσα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐγεγένητο καὶ ἐτεθυκέει Κλέων τε καὶ Βρασίδας, οἵπερ ἠμφοτέρωθεν μάλιστα ἡμαντιοῦντο τῇ εἰρήνῃ, ὁ μὲν διὰ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν τε καὶ τιμᾶσθαι ἐκ τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ὁ δὲ γενομένης ἡσυχίας καταφανέστερος νομίζου ἄν εἶναι κακούργων καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων, τότε δὲ ἐκατέρα τῇ πόλει σπεύδοντες τὰ μάλιστ’ αὐτήν 2 Πλειστοάναξ τε ὁ Παυσανίου, βασιλεὺς Δακεδαιμονίων, καὶ Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου, πλείστα τῶν τότε εὗ φερόμενος ἐν στρατηγίας, πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον προμουθωνυμότο, Νικίας μὲν βουλόμενος, ἐν δὲ ἀπαθῆς ἦν καὶ ἤξιοῦτο, διασώσασθαι τὴν εὐτυχίαν,

1 So all the better MSS.; Hude reads δὴ.

2 The vulgate has μάλιστα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν: Stahl deletes ἡγεμονίαν and corrects τὴν to αὐτήν. The vulgate would mean: “then those who in either country were most desirous of taking the lead, namely . . . .”

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especially the Lacedaemonians, because of their desire to recover the men captured at Sphacteria; for the Spartiates among these were men of high rank and all alike kinsmen of theirs. Accordingly, they began negotiations directly after their capture, but the Athenians were not at all inclined, as long as they were getting on well, to make a settlement on fair terms. When, however, the Athenians were defeated at Delium, the Lacedaemonians knew immediately that they would now be more ready to accept offers, and they concluded the truce for a year, during which they were to come together and consult about a treaty for a longer period.

XVI. But when the Athenians had met defeat at Amphipolis also and both Cleon and Brasidas had been killed—the men who on either side had been most opposed to peace, the one because of his success and the reputation he had derived from the war, the other because he thought if quiet were restored he would be more manifest in his villainies and less credited in his calumnies—then it was that Pleistocanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, and Nicias son of Niceratus, who had been of all the generals of his day most successful in his commands—men who had most zealously supported the cause of peace each in the interest of his own state—urged this course with greater zeal than ever. Nicias wished, while his record was still free from disaster and he was held in esteem, to pre-

1 i.e. of the Lacedaemonians in authority. The Spartiates formed a clan; besides their common descent, they were closely connected by intermarriage. Or reading, with the schol., ἦσαν γὰρ οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται αὐτῶν κτλ., “for there were among them some Spartiates of the first rank and related to the most distinguished families.”
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καὶ ἐς τὸ αὐτίκα πόνων πεπαύσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ τοὺς πολίτας παῦσαι, καὶ τῷ μέλλοντι χρόνῳ καταλιπεῖν ὅνομα ὡς οὖδὲν σφίλας τὴν πόλιν διεγένετο, νομίζων ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου τούτῳ ξυμβαίνειν καὶ ὅστις ἐλάχιστα τύχη αὐτῶν παραδίδωσι, τὸ δὲ ἀκινδύνου τὴν εἰρήνην παρέχειν. Πλειστοάναξ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔχθρων διαβαλλόμενος περὶ τῆς καθόδου καὶ ἐς ἑνθυμίαν τοῖς Δακεδαίμονισι ἀιεὶ προβαλλόμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὅποτε τι πταίσειαν, ὡς διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου κάθοδου παρανο-2 μηθείσαν ταῦτα ξυμβαίνοι. τὴν γὰρ πρόμαντιν τὴν ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐπητιώντο αὐτὸν πεῖσαι μετ' Ἀριστοκλέους τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ὡστε χρῆσαι Δακεδαίμονισι ἐπὶ πολὺ τάδε θεωροῖς ἀφικνούμενοι, Δίὸς ὑπὸ ἡμιθέου τὸ σπέρμα ἐκ τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἐς τὴν ἐαυτῶν ἀναφέρειν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἄργυρα εὐλάκα
3 εὐλαξεῖν· χρόνῳ δὲ προτρέψαι τοὺς Δάκεδαιμονίους φεύγοντα αὐτὸν ἐς Λύκαιον διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ποτὲ μετὰ δόρων δοκοῦσαν ἀναχώρησιν καὶ ἡμιοι τῆς οἰκίας τοῦ ἱεροῦ τότε τοῦ Δίος ὀικοῦντα φόβῳ τῷ Δακεδαιμονίῳ, ἔτει ἐνος δέοντι εἰκοστῷ τοῖς ὁμοίοις χοροῖς καὶ θυσίαις καταγαγεῖν ὡσπερ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον Δακεδάιμονα κτίζοντες τοὺς βασιλείας καθίσταντο.

1 i.e. as the schol. explains, there would be a pestilence, and they would buy food at a very high price, as it were using silver tools.
2 427 B.C., since he had left the country in 446. cf. I cxiv. 2 and II. xxi. 1.
serve his good luck to the end, and not only at present both to rest from toil himself and to give his fellow-citizens a rest, but also to hand down to after times a name as of one who had lived his life through without injuring the state; and he thought that a man might achieve such a result by keeping out of danger and by least exposing himself to the caprices of fortune, and that it was peace only that offered freedom from danger. Pleistocline, on the other hand, was for peace, because he was constantly maligned by his enemies about his return from exile, and because, whenever any reverses occurred, he was always spitefully recalled to their thoughts by these persons as though these misfortunes were due to his illegal restoration. For they charged that he, along with his brother Aristocles, had bribed the priestess at Delphi constantly to answer the Lacedaemonians, whenever they came to consult the oracle: "Bring back the seed of the demigod, son of Zeus, from the foreign land to your own; otherwise you shall plough with a silver plough-share"; and that in course of time she had induced the Lacedaemonians to bring him back from banishment in the twentieth year with like dances and sacrifices as when at the founding of Lacedaemon they had first enthroned their kings. For he had fled for refuge to Mt. Lycaenum, on account of his retreat from Attica, that was thought to be due to bribery, and through fear of the Lacedaemonians had occupied at that time a house whereof the half was within the sanctuary of Zeus.

A mountain in Arcadia on which was an ancient sanctuary of Zeus.
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XVII. Ἀχθόμενος οὖν τῇ διαβολῇ ταύτῃ καὶ νομίζων ἐν εἰρήνῃ μὲν οὐδενὸς σφάλματος γιγνομένου καὶ ἀμα τῶν Λακεδαίμονίων τούς ἄνδρας κομιζομένων κἀν αὐτῶς τοῖς ἔχθροῖς ἀνεπίληπτος εἶναι, πολέμου δὲ καθεστῶτος αἰεὶ ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοὺς προύχοντας ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμφορῶν διαβάλλεσθαι, προσθυμήθη τὴν ξύμβασιν.

2 Καὶ τὸν τε χειμῶνα τούτον ἦσαν ἔσοδοι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐαρῆδη παρασκευή τε προεπανεσείςθη ἀπὸ τῶν Λακεδαίμονίων, περιαγγελλομένη κατὰ πόλεις ὡς ἐς ἐπιτειχισμῶν, ὅπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἐσακούοιεν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῶν ξυνόδων ἀμα πολλὰς δικαιώσεις προενεχκόντων ἀλλήλοις ἤτοι ἐνεχωρεῖτο ὡστε ἡ ἐκάτεροι πολέμῳ ἔσχον ἀποδόντας τὴν εἰρήνην ποιείσθαι, Νίσαιαν δ’ ἔχειν Ἀθηναίους (ἀνταπαίτοντοι γὰρ Πλάταιαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἐφα- σαν οὐ βία, ἀλλ’ ὡρμολογίᾳ αὐτῶν προσχωρησάν- των καὶ οὐ προδοτῶν ἔχειν τὸ χωρίον, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ τὴν Νίσαιαν), τότε δὴ παρακαλέσαντες τοὺς ἐαυτῶν ξυμμάχους οἱ Λακε- δαίμονιοι καὶ ψηφισάμενοι πλήν Βοιωτῶν καὶ Κορινθίων καὶ Ἡλείων καὶ Μεγαρῶν τῶν ἄλλων ὡστε καταλύεσθαι (τούτως δὲ οὐκ ἤρεσκε τὰ πρασοῦμενα), ποιοῦνται τὴν ξύμβασιν καὶ ἐστεί- σαντο πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ὁμοσάν, ἐκείνοι τε πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαίμονίους, τάδε.

1 Poppo’s conjecture for ὡς ἐπὶ τειχισμῶν of MSS.

1 cf. iv. lxix. 2 cf. iii. liii. 2.
BOOK V. xvii. 1-2

XVII. Vexed, therefore, by this calumny, and thinking that in time of peace, when no calamity would occur and, moreover, the Lacedaemonians would be recovering their men, he himself would not be exposed to the attack of his enemies, whereas so long as there was war it must always be that the leading men would be maligned in the event of any misfortunes, he became very ardent for the agreement.

During this winter they kept attending conferences; and toward spring there was a menace of warlike preparation on the part of the Lacedaemonians, orders being sent to the cities as though for the erection of a fortress to overawe the territory of the Athenians, that they might be more inclined to listen to terms; and at the same time as the result of their conferences, in which each party had filed many claims against the other, an agreement was finally reached that they should make peace, each party to restore to the other the territories which they had gained by war, though the Athenians were to keep Nisaea.1 (For when they had demanded back Plataea, the Thebans protested that they had obtained possession of the place, not by force, but because the Plataeans had come over to them by agreement and not through betrayal2; and the Athenians claimed to have obtained Nisaea in the same way.) At this time the Lacedaemonians summoned their own allies, and when all the rest had voted to stop hostilities, except the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians—to whom the negotiations were displeasing—they made the agreement, ratifying it by libations and oaths with the Athenians, and the Athenians with them, on the following terms:—

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XVIII. "Σπονδάς ἐποιήσαντο Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Δακεδαμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι κατὰ τάδε, καὶ ὁμοσαν κατὰ πόλεις.

"Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν κοινῶν, θύειν ἔχειναι1 καὶ μαντεύεσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν βουλόμενον καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀδελφῶς.

2 "Τὸ δ’ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν νεῶν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ Δελφοῦς αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ αὐτοδίκους καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆς ἐαυτῶν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια.

3 "’Ετή δὲ εἶναι τὰς σπονδὰς πεντήκοντα Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις, τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Δακεδαμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς Δακεδαμονίων ἄδολοις καὶ ἄθλαβεῖς καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν.

4 "Οπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω εἰπιφέρειν ἐπὶ τημονή μῆτε Δακεδαμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μὴτε Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπὶ Δακεδαμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, μὴτε τέχνη μὴτε ἡμηχανή μηδεμιᾷ. ἦν δὲ τι διάφορον ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, δίκαιοις, χρήσθων καὶ ὀρκοὺς, καθ’ ὃ τι ἄπνοιθναι.

5 "Ἀποδόντων δὲ Ἀθηναίοις Δακεδαμονίου καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι Ἀρμένιοι. ὅσα δὲ πόλεις παρέδοσαν Δακεδαμονίου Ἀθηναίοις ἐξέστω αἰτιέναι ὅπως ἄν βούλωμαι αὐτοῦς καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἐχοντάς. τὰς δὲ πόλεις φεροῦσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπὶ Ἄριστείδον αὐτονόμους εἶναι. ὅπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω εἰπιφέρειν Ἀθηναίους μηδὲ τοὺς

1 Kirchhoff's emendation for καὶ ἑναι of MSS.
BOOK V. xviii. 1-5

XVIII. "The Athenians and the Lacedaemonians and their respective allies have concluded a treaty and sworn to it state by state upon the following terms:

1. "With regard to the common sanctuaries, whoever wishes may offer sacrifices and consult the oracles and attend as a deputy according to the customs of the fathers, both by land and sea, without fear.

2. "The precinct and the temple of Apollo at Delphi and the people of Delphi shall be independent, having their own system of taxation and their own courts of justice, both as regards themselves and their own territory, according to the customs of the fathers.

3. "The truce shall be in force for fifty years between the Athenians and their allies and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, without fraud or hurt, both by land and sea.

4. "It shall not be lawful to bear arms with harmful intent, either for the Lacedaemonians and their allies against the Athenians and their allies, or for the Athenians and their allies against the Lacedaemonians and their allies, by any art or device. And if there be any dispute with one another, they shall have recourse to courts and oaths, according as they shall agree.

5. "The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians. But in the case of cities delivered by the Lacedaemonians to the Athenians, their inhabitants shall be allowed to go away wherever they wish, having their own possessions; and these cities, so long as they pay the tribute that was fixed in the time of Aristeides, shall be independent. And it shall not be lawful for the Athenians and their allies, after the ratification of the treaty,

1 With reference especially to Delphi and Olympia.
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ξυμμάχους ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἀποδιδόντων τὸν φόρον, ἔπειτ' ἀι σπονδαλ ἐγένοντο. εἰσὶ δὲ Ἀργι- λος, Στάγιρος, Ἀκαυθος, Στῶλος, Ὀλυνθος, Σπάρτωλος. ξυμμάχους δ' εἶναι μηδετέρων, μήτε Λακεδαιμονίων μήτε Ἀθηναίων· ἢν δὲ Ἀθηναίοι πείθωσι τὰς πόλεις, θυμομένας ταύτας εξέστω ξυμμάχους ποιεῖσθαι αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναίους.

6 "Μηκυβερναῖοι δὲ καὶ Σαναίους καὶ Σιγγίους ὁμεῖν τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἑαυτῶν, καθάπερ Ὀλυνθοῖο καὶ Ἀκάνθιοι.

7 Ἀποδόντων δὲ Ἀθηναίοις Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι Πάνακτον. ἀποδόντων δὲ καὶ Ἀθη- ναῖοι Λακεδαιμονίοις Κορυφάσιοι καὶ Κύθνα καὶ Μέθανα καὶ Πτελεόν καὶ Ἁταλάντην, καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ὅσοι εἰσὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν τῷ δημοσίῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ ἡ ἀλλοθί ποι ὅσης Ἀθηναίοι ἀρχουσιν ἐν δημοσίῳ καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σκιώνῃ πολιορκομένους Πελοποννησίων ἀφεῖναι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅσοι Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμμαχοι ἐν Σκιώνῃ εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσους Βρασίδας ἔστεπευσε, καὶ εἰ τις τῶν ξυμμάχων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν Ἀθη- ναις ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ δημοσίῳ ἡ ἀλλοθί ποι ἂς Ἀθη- ναιοὶ ἀρχουσιν ἐν δημοσίῳ. ἀποδόντων δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι οὕστως ἐχοσιν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων κατα ταῦτα.

8 "Σκιωναίων δὲ καὶ Τοροναίων καὶ Σερμυλών καὶ εἰ τινα ἄλλην πόλιν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναίοι, Ἀθη-

1 Kirchhoff's correction after inscriptions; MSS. Σκώλος.
2 Kirchhoff's correction for Σιγγίους of the MSS.
3 Stahl's correction for Μεθάνη of MSS.

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to bear arms against the cities to their hurt, so long as they pay the tribute. These cities are Argilus,\textsuperscript{1} Stagirus,\textsuperscript{2} Acanthus,\textsuperscript{3} Stolus, Olynthus,\textsuperscript{4} Spartolus.\textsuperscript{5} These shall be allies neither of the Lacedaemonians nor of the Athenians; but if the Athenians can persuade these cities it shall be lawful for the Athenians to make them, with their own free will and consent, allies to themselves.

6. "The Mecybernaeans and Sanaeans\textsuperscript{6} and Siongians shall dwell in their own towns on the same terms as the Olynthians and Acanthians.

7. "The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore Panactum\textsuperscript{7} to the Athenians. The Athenians shall restore to the Lacedaemonians, Coryphasium,\textsuperscript{8} Cythera,\textsuperscript{9} Methana,\textsuperscript{10} Pteleum, and Atalante\textsuperscript{11}; also they shall set at liberty the Lacedaemonian captives who are in the public prison at Athens or in public prison anywhere else that the Athenians hold sway, and the men of the Peloponnesus who are being besieged in Scione, and all besides who are allies of the Lacedaemonians in Scione,\textsuperscript{12} and those whom Brasidas sent into the place,\textsuperscript{13} as likewise any of the allies of the Lacedaemonians who are in the public prison in Athens, or in public prison anywhere else that the Athenians have sway. In like manner the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore whomsoever they have of the Athenians and their allies.

8. "As to Scione, Torone,\textsuperscript{14} Sermyle, or any other city which the Athenians hold, the Athenians shall

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{1} cf. iv. ciii. 4. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{2} cf. iv. lxxxviii. 2.
\textsuperscript{3} cf. iv. lxxxviii. 1. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{4} cf. i. lviii. 2.
\textsuperscript{5} cf. ii. lxxix. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{6} cf. iv. iii. 2.
\textsuperscript{7} cf. ch. iii. 5. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{8} cf. iv. xlv. 2.
\textsuperscript{8} cf. ii. xxxii. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{9} cf. iv. cxxiii. 4.
\textsuperscript{10} cf. iv. cxxx. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{14} cf. ch. iii. 2.
\end{flushright}
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9 "Ὅρκους δὲ ποιήσασθαι Ἀθηναίους πρὸς Λακε-
δαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους κατὰ πόλεις:
ομνύντων δὲ τῶν ἐπιχώριον ὅρκον ἐκάτεροι τὸν
μέγιστον, ἐπτὰ καὶ δέκα ἕκαστης πόλεως. ὁ
ὁ ὅρκος ἐστὶν ὅδε: Ἐμμενὼ ταῖς ξυμβῆκαις καὶ
taῖς σπονδαῖσ ταῖσδε δικαίως καὶ ἀδόλως.
ἔστω
dὲ Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους κατὰ ταῦτα
ὁρκος πρὸς Ἀθηναίους. τὸν δὲ ὅρκον ἀνανεοῦσθαι
cατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ἀμφοτέρους.

10 "Ὕππλας δὲ στήσαι Ὀλυμπίασι καὶ Πυθοὶ καὶ
Ἰσθμοὶ καὶ Ἀθῆνης ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν Λακε-
dαιμονίῳ ἐν Ἀμυκλαῖῳ.

11 "Εἰ δὲ τι ἀμημονοῦσιν ὀποτεροιοῦν καὶ ὅτου
πέρι, λόγοις δικαιοῖς χρωμένοις εὐροκοι εἶναι
ἀμφοτέρως ταύτη μεταδεῖναι ὅτι ἂν δοκῇ ἀμ-
φοτέροις, Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίσις.

XIX. "Ἀρχεὶ δὲ τῶν σπονδῶν ἐφορὸς Πλει-
stόλας, Ἀρτεμισίου μηνὸς τετάρτῃ φθίνοντος, ἐν
dὲ Ἀθῆναις ἄρχουν Ἀλκαῖος, Ἐλαφηβολῶνος
2 μηνὸς ἐκτῆς φθίνοντος. ἄμμνου δὲ ὅιδε καὶ ἐστέπνη-
δοντο. Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν Πλειστοᾶα, Ἀγις, 
Πλειστόλας, Δαμάγγος, Χίνως, Μεταγείης,
Ακανθός, Δάιθος, Ἰσχαγόρας, Φιλοχαρίδας,
Ζευξίδας, Ἀντιππος, Τέλλις, Ἀλκινάδας, Ἐμ-
pεδίας, Ἡρώης, Λάμπων, Ἀθηναίῶν δὲ ὅδε
Δάμπων, Ἰσθμόνικο, Νικιάς, Δάχης, Εὐθύδη-

1 ἐπτὰ καὶ δέκα, Classen and Stahl assume that 'ι' has
fallen out of the MSS.
2 Πλειστοᾶα, Ἀγις, wanting in all MSS., added from in-
scriptions.
determine about these and the other cities as they may think best.

9. "The Athenians shall bind themselves by oaths with the Lacedaemonians and their allies, city by city; and either party shall swear its customary oath in the form that is most binding,¹ seventeen men representing each city. The oath shall be as follows: 'I will abide by this agreement and this treaty, justly and without deceit.' For the Lacedaemonians and their allies there shall be an oath, in the same terms, with the Athenians. And both parties shall renew the oath year by year.

10. "They shall erect pillars at Olympia, Delphi, the Isthmus, and on the Acropolis at Athens, and at Lacedaemon in the temple of Apollo of Amyclae.²

11. "If either party forgets anything about any matter whatsoever, it shall be consistent with their oath for both, by means of fair discussion, to make a change at any point where it may seem good to both parties, the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians.

XIX. "The treaty begins at Lacedaemon in the ephorate of Pleistolas, on the fourth day from the end of the month Artemisium, and at Athens in the archonship of Alcaeus, on the sixth day from the end of the month Elaphebolion. The following persons took oaths and ratified the treaty: on behalf of the Lacedaemonians, Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcinadas, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus; on behalf of the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches,

¹ The Athenians, in ratifying treaties, swore by Zeus, Demeter and Apollo. See Fränkel, Hermes, xiii. 460. Ullrich suggests for Sparta the Dioscuri.
² Two or three miles from Sparta.
μος, Προκλής, Πυθόδωρος, "Αγνων, Μυρτίλος, Θρασυκλής, Θεαγένης, 'Αριστοκρατής, 'Ιώλκιος, Τιμοκράτης, Λέων, Λάμαχος, Δημοσθένης.”

XX. Αύται αἱ σπουδαῖ έγένοντο τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἁμα ἕκ Λιονυσίων εὐθὺς τῶν ἀστικῶν, αὐτόθεκα ἔτων διελθόντων καὶ ἕμερῶν ὀλίγων παρενεγκουσῶν ἡ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἡ ἐσβολὴ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ πολέμου τούτος 2 ἐγένετο. σκοπείτω δὲ τις κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους καὶ μῆ τῶν ἐκαστάχου ἢ ἀρχόντων ἢ ἀπὸ τιμῆς τινος ἐς τὰ προγεγενημένα σημαίνοντων 1 τὴν ἀπαρίθμησιν τῶν ὄνομάτων πιστεύσας 2 μᾶλλον. οὐ γὰρ ἄκριβες ἔστων, οἷς καὶ ἀρχομένοις καὶ μεσοῦσι καὶ ὁπως 3 ἔτυχέ τι ἐπεγένετο τι. κατὰ θέρη δὲ καὶ χειμῶνας ἄριθμῶν, ὥσπερ γέγραπται, εὐρήσει, ἐξ ἡμισείας ἐκατέρω τοῦ ἐναυτοῦ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχοντος, δέκα μὲν θέρη, ἵσοις δὲ χειμῶνας τῷ πρῶτῳ πολέμῳ τόδε γεγενημένους.

XXI. Δακεδαλύνιοι δὲ (ἔλαχον γὰρ πρῶτοι ἀποδίδονται ἄ εἰχον) τοὺς τε ἄνδρας εὐθὺς τοὺς παρὰ σφίσιν αἰχμαλώτους ἀφίεσαι καὶ πέμψαν- τες ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Ὄρακας πρέσβεις Ἰσχαγόραν καὶ Μηνᾶν καὶ Φιλοχαρίδαν ἐκέλευον τὸν Κλεαρίδαν τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν παραδίδοναι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τάς σπουδάς, ὡς εἰρητὸ ἐκάστοις, 2 δεξήσαται. οἱ δ' οὐκ ἥθελον, νομίζοντες οὐκ ἔπι-

1 ἐς τὰ... σημαίνοντων, the order is according to Arnold's suggestion; in MSS. these words come after ὄνομάτων.
2 Hude corrects to ὑπήσας.
Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtillus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes.”

XX. This treaty was concluded at the end of the winter and the opening of spring immediately after the City Dionysia. Just ten years and a few days had passed since the first invasion of Attica and the beginning of this war. But one must reckon according to the natural divisions of the year, not according to the catalogue of the names of officials in each place, be they archons or others who in consequence of some office mark the dates for past events, in the belief that this method is more to be trusted; for it is really inexact, since an event may have occurred in the beginning of their term of office, or in the middle, or at any other point as it happened. But reckoning by summers and winters, as has been done in this history—inasmuch as each of these divisions is to be reckoned as half a year—it will be found that there have been ten summers and as many winters in this first war.

XXI. Now since the lot fell to the Lacedaemonians to make restoration first of the positions they held, they straightway set at liberty the prisoners of war that were in their hands, and sending Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas as envoys to Thrace ordered Clearidas to give up Amphipolis to the Athenians, and the rest of the allies to accept the treaty, as it had been prescribed for each. But the latter were unwilling to do so, as they thought that the terms were unfavourable to them;

1 The City or Greater Dionysia began before the vernal equinox and lasted several days.
2 Commonly referred to by the Attic orators as the Archidamian War. See Introduction, vol. i., p. xiii.
ΤΗΩΤΕΙΑΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ. ΟΥΔΕ Ο ΚΛΕΑΡΙΔΑΣ ΠΑΡΕΔΩΚΕ ΤΗΝ ΠΟΛΙΝ ΧΑΡΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΤΟΙΣ ΧΑΛΚΙΔΕΥΣΙ, ΛΕΓΩΝ ΌΣ ΟΥ 3 ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ ΕΙΔΗ ΒΙΑ ΕΚΕΙΝΩΝ ΠΑΡΑΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ. ἘΛΘΩΝ ΔΕ ΑΥΤΟΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΆΧΟΣ ΜΕΤΑ ΠΡΕΣΒΕΥΟΝ ΑΥΤΟΒΕΝ ἈΠΟ-
ΛΟΓΗΣΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΤΕ ἜΣ ΤΗΝ ΛΑΚΕΔΑΙΜΟΝΑ, ΗΝ ΚΑΤΗΓΟ-
ΡΩΣΙΝ ΟΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ 'ΙΣΧΑΓΟΡΑΝ ΌΤΙ ΟΥΚ ΕΠΕΙΘΕΤΟ,
ΚΑΙ ΑΜΑ ΒΟΥΛΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ ΕΙ ΕΤΕ ΜΕΤΑΚΙΝΗΤΗ ΕΙΤΗ
Η ὌΜΟΛΟΓΙΑ, ἘΠΕΙΔΗ ΗΤΤΕ ΚΑΤΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΥΣ,1 ΑΥΤΟΣ
ΜΕΝ ΠΑΛΙΝ ΠΕΜΠΟΝΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΛΑΚΕΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΩΝ ΚΑΙ
ΚΕΛΕΥΟΝΤΩΝ ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ ΜΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΧΩΡΙΟΝ ΠΑΡΑ-
ΔΟΥΝΑΙ, ΕΙ ΔΕ ΜΗ, ὍΠΟΙΟΙ ΠΕΛΟΠΟΥΝΗΣΙΟΙ ΕΝΕΙΣΙΝ
ἘΞΑΓΑΓΕΙΝ, ΚΑΤΑ ΤΆΧΟΣ ἘΠΟΡΕΥΕΤΟ.
XXII. ΟΙ ΔΕ ΖΥΜΜΑΧΟΙ ΕΝ ΤΗ ΛΑΚΕΔΑΙΜΟΝΙ
ΑΥΤΟΙ2 ΕΤΙ ΕΤΥΧΟΝ ΟΝΤΕΣ, ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΤΟΥΣ ΜΗ
ΔΕΞΑΜΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΑΣ ΣΠΟΝΔΑΣ ΕΚΕΙΛΕΝΟΙ ΟΙ ΛΑΚΕΔΑΙ-
ΜΟΝΙΟΙ ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ. ΟΙ ΔΕ ΤΗ ΑΥΤΗ ΠΡΟΦΑΣΕΙ, ΥΠΕΡ
ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ἈΠΕΩΣΑΝΤΟ, ΟΥΚ ἘΦΑΣΑΝ ΔΕΞΕΘΑΙ, 2
ἩΝ ΜΗ ΤΙΝΑΣ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΤΕΡΑΣ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΠΟΙΩΝΤΑΙ. ὩΣ ΔΕ
ΑΥΤΩΝ ΟΥΚ ἘΣΗΚΟΥΝ, ΕΚΕΙΝΟΙ ΜΕΝ ἈΠΕΤΕΜΨΑΝ,
ΑΥΤΟΙ ΔΕ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ἈΘΗΝΑΙΟΥΣ ΖΥΜΜΑΧΙΑΝ ἘΠΟΙ-
ΟΥΝΤΟ, ΘΡΟΞΟΝΤΕΣ ΗΚΙΣΤΑ ΔΝ ΣΦΙΣΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΤΕ ἈΡ-
ΓΕΙΟΥΣ,3 ἘΠΕΙΔΗ ΟΥΚ ἩΒΕΛΟΝ ἈΜΠΕΛΙΔΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΧΟΥ
ἘΛΘΟΝΤΩΝ ἘΠΙΣΤΕΥΘΑΙ, ΘΡΟΞΟΝΤΕΣ ΑΥΤΟΥΣ ἌΝΕΥ
ἈΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΟΥ ΔΕΙΝΟΥΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ἈΛΗΝ ΠΕΛΟ-
ΠΟΥΝΗΣΟΝ ΜΑΛΙΣΤ' ἄΝ ΠΟΙΑΣΙΕΙΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΓΑΡ ΑΝ

1 Krüger's correction for κατειλήμμενας of the MSS.
2 αυτοῖς, Krüger's correction for αὐτοί of the MSS., is
adopted by Hude. ἐτι was added by Stahl.
3 Hude inserts ἐπιτίθεσθαι after Ἀργείους, with Madvig.

1 The narrative recurs to the end of ch. xvii.
2 cf. ch. xvii. (end).
BOOK V. xxI. 2—xxII. 2

and Clearidas, to oblige the Chalcidians, did not give up Amphipolis, saying that he was unable to give it up against their will. And he hastened in person, with envoys from the place, to Lacedaemon, in order to defend himself in case Ischagoras and his colleagues should accuse him of disobedience; and he wished also to learn whether the agreement could still be changed. But when he found that they were already bound by oath, he himself went back again in haste, with orders from the Lacedaemonians to give up Amphipolis if possible, or at all events to fetch away whatsoever Peloponnesians were in it.

XXII. The representatives of the allies\(^1\) happened to be still present in person at Lacedaemon, and as many of them as had not accepted the treaty were ordered by the Lacedaemonians to adopt it. But they, on the same pretext for which they had at first\(^2\) rejected it, still refused to accept it unless a fairer treaty were made. Since, then, they would not hearken to them, the Lacedaemonians dismissed them, and proceeded to make an alliance with the Athenians by themselves, thinking that the Argives would by no means make an alliance with Sparta—since they had refused to renew the treaty with them when Ampelidas and Lichas went to Argos—and believing that they would not be dangerous to them without the Athenians, and that the rest of the Peloponnesians would be most likely to remain quiet;\(^3\) for, had it been possible, they might have gone over

\(^1\) The text is surely not in order and numerous emendations have been offered. The rendering above assumes ξυμμαχη\(\nu\) το\(\nu\)είσθαι as predicate of νο\(\mu\)ι\(\sigma\)ντες, and adds κα\(\nu\), before νο\(\mu\)ι\(\sigma\)ντες, as correlative to τε—or, possibly, νο\(\mu\)ι\(\sigma\)ντες may be causal.
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3 τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, εἰ ἔξην, χωρείν. παρόντων οὖν πρέσβεων ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ γενομένων λόγων ἐννέβησαν, καὶ ἐγένοντο ὥρκοι καὶ ἐμμαχία ἦδε.

XXIII. "Κατὰ τάδε ἐξύμαχοι ἔσονται Ἀθηναίοι καὶ Δακεδαιμόνιοι πεντήκοντα ἔτη".

"Ἤν τινες ὑσιν ἐς τὴν γῆν πολέμιοι τὴν Δακεδαιμονίων καὶ κακῶς ποιῶσι Δακεδαιμονίους, ὡφελεῖν Ἀθηναίοις Δακεδαιμονίους τρόπῳ ὅποιῳ ἄν δύνωνται ἱσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. ἢν δὲ δησαντες οἴχωνται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Δακεδαιμονίους καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ὑπὸ ἀμφότερον, καταλύειν δὲ ἄμα ἀμφώ τὸ πόλει. ταύτα δ' εἶναι δικαίως καὶ προθύμως καὶ ἀδόλως.

2 "Καὶ ἢν τινες ἐς τὴν Ἀθηναίον γῆν ὑσι πολέμιοι καὶ κακῶς ποιῶσιν Ἀθηναίοις, ὡφελεῖν Δακεδαιμονίους Ἀθηναίοις τρόπῳ ὅτε ἄν δύνωνται ἱσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. ἢν δὲ δησαντες οἴχωνται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Δακεδαιμονίους καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ὑπ᾽ ἀμφότερον, καταλύειν δὲ ἄμα ἀμφώ τὸ πόλει. ταύτα δ' εἶναι δικαίως καὶ προθύμως καὶ ἀδόλως.

3 "Ὅν δὲ ἡ δουλεία ἐπανίστηται, ἐπικουρεῖν Ἀθηναίοις Δακεδαιμονίοις παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.

4 "Ὀμοῦνται δὲ ταύτα οὐπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας

1 Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ, wanting in MSS., added by Krüger.
2 δ' after ἢν, deleted by Boehme.
3 Ἀθηναίοις added by Ullrich.
to the Athenians. Accordingly since envoys were present from the Athenians, a conference was held and they came to an agreement, and oaths were sworn and an alliance made on the following terms:

XXIII. "The Lacedaemonians and Athenians shall be allies for fifty years on the following conditions:

1. "If any enemy invade the territory of the Lacedaemonians and be doing them harm, the Athenians shall help the Lacedaemonians in whatever way they can most effectively, with all their might; but if the enemy, after ravaging the country, shall have departed, that city shall be the enemy of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, and shall suffer at the hands of both, and neither city shall make peace with it without the other. These conditions shall be observed honestly, zealously, and without fraud.

2. "If any enemy invade the territory of the Athenians and be doing them harm, the Lacedaemonians shall help the Athenians in whatever way they can most effectively, with all their might; but if the enemy, after ravaging the country, shall have departed, that city shall be the enemy of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, and shall suffer at the hands of both, and neither city shall make peace with it without the other. These conditions shall be observed honestly, zealously, and without fraud.

3. "If there shall be an insurrection of slaves, the Athenians shall aid the Lacedaemonians with all their might, to the utmost of their power.

4. "These articles shall be sworn to by the same

\[1\] i.e. if there should be no treaty between Athens and Sparta, any dissatisfied state in the Peloponnesus might join the Athenian alliance and cause trouble. This danger would be removed by entering into the treaty, and also Argos, whose relations continued hostile, would be isolated.
σπονδὰς ὁμονοῦν ἐκατέρων. ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ κατ' ἐνναυτῶν Δακεδαίμονιος μὲν ἰόντας ἐσ 'Αθήνας πρὸς τὰ Διονύσια, 'Αθηναίους δὲ ἰόντας ἐσ Δακεδαίμονα πρὸς τὰ Ῥακίνθια.

5 " Στήλην δὲ ἐκατέρων στήσαι, τὴν μὲν ἐν Δακεδαίμονι παρ' Ἀπόλλωνι ἐν Ἀμυκλαίῳ, τὴν δὲ ἐν 'Αθήναις ἐν πόλει παρ' Ἀθηναίᾳ.

6 " Ἡν δὲ τι δοκῇ Δακεδαίμονίοις καὶ 'Αθηναίοις προσθείναι καὶ ἀφελεῖν περὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας, δι᾽ τι ἂν δοκῇ, εὐθυρακὸν ἀμφοτέροις εἶναι.

XXIV. "Τὸν δὲ ὀρκὸν ὁμονοῦν Δακεδαίμονίων μὲν οἴδε Πλειστοάναξ, Ἀγις, Πλειστόλας, Δαμάγητος, Χίων, Μεταγένης, Ἀκανθος, Δάμη, Ἰσχαγόρας, Φιλοχαρίδας, Ζευξίδας, Ἀντιππος, Ἀλκινάδας, Τέλλης, Εμπεδίας, Μηνᾶς, Δαφίλου, Αθηναίων δὲ Δάμπως, Ἰσθμίονικος, Δάρκης, Νικίας, Εὐθύδημος, Προκλῆς, Πυθόδωρος, Ἀγγων, Μυρτίλος, Ὀρασυκλῆς, Θεαγένης, Ἀριστοκράτης, Ἰώλκιος, Τιμοκράτης, Λεών, Δαμαχος, Δημοσθένης."

2 Αὕτη ἡ ξυμμαχία ἐγένετο μετὰ τὰς σπονδὰς οὗ πολλῷ ύστερον, καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νῆσου ἀπέδοσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῶν Δακεδαίμονιοι, καὶ τὸ θέρος ἢρχε τοῦ ἐνδεκάτου ἔτους. ταῦτα δὲ τὰ δέκα ἐτη ὁ πρῶτος πόλεμος ξυνεχῶς γενόμενος γέγραπται.

XXV. Μετὰ δὲ τὰς σπονδὰς καὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τῶν Δακεδαίμονιον καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, αἱ ἐγένεμον μετὰ τὸν δεκατὸ πόλεμον ἐπὶ Πλειστόλα μὲν ἐν Δακεδαίμονι ἑφόρου, 'Αλκαὶου δ' ἄρχοντος

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1 The City Dionysia; cf. ch. xx. 1.
persons who swore to the other treaty on both sides. They shall be renewed every year, the Lacedaemonians going to Athens at the Dionysia, the Athenians to Lacedaemon at the Hyacinthia.  

5. "Each party shall erect a pillar, that in Lacedaemon by the temple of Apollo of Amyclae, that at Athens on the Acropolis by the temple of Athena.  

6. "If it shall seem good to the Lacedaemonians and Athenians to add or take away anything pertaining to the alliance, it shall be consistent with the oaths of both to do whatever may seem good to both.  

XXIV. "For the Lacedaemonians the following persons took the oath: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcidas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus; for the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtillus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes."

This alliance was made not long after the treaty, and the Athenians restored to the Lacedaemonians the captives taken on the island; and thus began the summer of the eleventh year. During these ten years the first war, of which the history has now been written, was waged continuously.  

XXV. After the treaty and the alliance between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, which were concluded at the end of the ten years' war, in the ephorate of Pleistolas at Lacedaemon and the archonship of Alcaeus at Athens, those who accepted these

\footnote{The festival of Apollo of Amyclae in the month Hyacinthius (Attic Hecatombaion).}
'Αθήναις, τοῖς μὲν δεξαμένοις αὐτὰς εἰρήνη ἦν, οὓς ὠλίνθιοι καὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πόλεων τινὲς διεκίνουν τὰ πεπραγμένα· καὶ εὐθὺς ἄλλη 1 ταραχὴ καθίστατο τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς τὴν Λακε-2 δαίμονα, καὶ ἄμα καὶ τοῖς 'Αθηναίοις οἱ Λακε-δαιμόνιοι προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου ὑποττοὶ ἔγενοντο ἔστιν ἐν οἷς οὐ ποιοῦντες ἐκ τῶν ξυγκειμένων 3 ἂ εἰρήτω. καὶ ἐπὶ ἔξ ἔτη μὲν καὶ δέκα μήνας ἀπέσχοντο μὴ ἔπλη τὴν ἐκατέρων γῆν στρατεύσαι, ἔξωθεν δὲ μετ’ ἀνοκωκήσας οὐ βεβαιῶν ἔβλαπτον ἀλλήλους τὰ μάλιστα· ἔπειτα μέντοι καὶ ἀναγ-κασθέντες λύσαι τὰς μετὰ τὰ δέκα ἔτη σπουδὰς αὕτις ἐς πόλεμον φανερὸν κατέστησαν.

XXVI. Γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὁ αὐτὸς Θουκυ-δίδης 'Αθηναίων ἔξης, ὅς ἔκαστα ἔγενετο, κατὰ θέρη καὶ χειμῶνας, μέχρι οὗ τὴν τε ἀρχὴν κατέ-παυσαν τῶν 'Αθηναίων Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατέλαβον. ἔτη δὲ ἐς τοῦτο τὰ ξύμπαντα ἔγε-2 νοντο τῷ πολέμῳ ἐπτὰ καὶ εἰκοσι. καὶ τὴν διὰ μέσου ξύμβασιν εἰ τις μὴ ἀξιώσει πόλεμον νομίζειν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δικαιώσει. τοῖς τε γὰρ ἔργοις ὃς διήρηται ἀδρεττῷ καὶ εὐρίσκει οὐκ εἰκός δὲν εἰρήνην αὐτὴν κρίνην, ἐν ἦ οὔτε ἀπέδοσαν πάντα οὔτ' ἀπεδέξατο ἀ ἐξανθευτο, ἔξω τε τοῦτων πρὸς τὸν Μαντινικὸν καὶ Ἑπιδαύριον

1 τε, after ἄλλη, inserted by Hude after Stahl.

1 This chapter forms a kind of second introduction, and was probably written after the author enlarged his plan from a history of the first ten years to that of the whole war.

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BOOK V. xxv. i—xxvi. 2

were at peace; but the Corinthians and some of the
cities in the Peloponnesus attempted to disturb the
agreements, and at once other trouble also began be-
tween Lacedaemon and her allies. At the same
time, too, the Lacedaemonians, as time went on,
incurred the suspicion of the Athenians, by not
acting in some matters in accordance with the articles
of the agreement. For six years and ten months the
two powers abstained from invading each other's
territory; in other regions, however, there was only
an unstable cessation of arms and they kept on
doing each other the greatest possible damage. But
at last they were forced to break the treaty which had
been concluded after the first ten years, and again
engaged in open war.

XXVI. 1 The history of these events, also, has been
written by the same Thucydides, an Athenian, in the
chronological order of events, by summers and win-
ters, up to the time when the Lacedaemonians and
their allies put an end to the dominion of the Athen-
ians and took the Long Walls and Peiraeus. 2 Up to
that event the war lasted twenty-seven years in all;
and if anyone shall not deem it proper to include the
intervening truce in the war, he will not judge
aright. For let him but look at the question in the
light of the facts as they have been set forth 3 and he
will find that that can not fitly be judged a state of
peace in which neither party restored or received all
that had been agreed upon. And, apart from that,
there were violations of the treaty on both sides in

2 According to Plutarch, Lysander 15, this took place in
April 404.

3 Or, taking ἥ δια μίσου εἴμβασις as subject of διήρησιν,
"For if he will but observe how the truce was interrupted
by actual military operations.”

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πόλεμον καὶ ἐς ἄλλα ἀμφοτέροις ἀμαρτήματα ἐγένοντο, καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ Θράκης ξύμμαχοι οὐδὲν ἦσσον πολέμοιο ἦσαν, Βοιωτοὶ τε ἐκεχειρίαν 3 δεχήμερον ἦγον. ὡστε ξῦν τῷ πρῶτῳ πολέμῳ τῷ δεκέτει καὶ τῇ μετ' αὐτῶν ὑπόττω ἀνοκωχὴ καὶ τῷ ὕστερον ἔς αὐτῆς πολέμῳ εὐρήσει τις τοσάυτα ἔτη, λογιζόμενοι κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους, καὶ ἦμέρας οὐ πολλὰς παρενεγκούσας, καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ χρησμῶν τι ἱσχυρισάμενοις μόνον δὴ τούτο 4 ἐχυρώσει ξυμβάν. αἰεὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε μέμνημαι, καὶ ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου καὶ μέχρι οὐ ἔτελεύτησε, προφέρομεν ὑπὸ πολλῶν ὅτι τρίς ἐννέα ἔτη 5 δέοι γενέσθαι αὐτῶν. ἐπεβίων δὲ διὰ παντὸς αὐτοῦ, αἰσθανόμενος τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ προσέχων τὴν γνώμην ὅπως ἀκριβές τι εἴσομαι· καὶ ξυνέβη μου φεύγειν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἔτη εἰκοσι μετὰ τὴν ἐς Ἀμφίπολιν στρατηγίαν, καὶ γενομένῳ παρ' ἀμφοτέροις τοὺς πράγμασι, καὶ οὐχ ἦσσον τοῖς Πελοποννησίων διὰ τὴν φυγήν, καθ' ἦσυχαν τι αὐτῶν 6 μᾶλλον αἰσθέσθαι. τὴν οὖν μετὰ τὰ δέκα ἔτη διαφοράν τε καὶ ξύγχυσιν τῶν σπουδῶν καὶ τὰ ἐπείτα ὡς ἐπολεμήθη ἐξηγήσομαι.

XXVII. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αἱ πεντηκονταύτεις σπουδαῖς ἐγένοντο καὶ ὕστερον ή ξύμμαχία, καὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου πρεσβεῖα, ἀιτερ παρεκλήθησαν ἐς αὐτὰ, ἀνεχόμενον ἐκ τῆς Δακεδαίμων. 2 καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀλλοι ἐπὶ οἴκου ἀνήλθον, Κορίνθιοι δὲ ἐς Ἀργὸς τραπόμενοι πρῶτον λόγους ποιοῦνται 50
the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars,\(^1\) as well as in other matters; the allies in Thrace, too, were no less hostile to Athens than before, and the Boeotians observed a truce which had to be renewed every ten days. So that, including the first ten-years’ war, the suspicious truce succeeding that, and the war which followed the truce, one will find that, reckoning according to natural seasons, there were just so many years as I have stated, and some few days over. He will also find, in the case of those who have made any assertion in reliance upon oracles, that this fact alone proved true; for always, as I remember, from the beginning of the war until its close, it was said by many that it was fated to last thrice nine years. I lived through the whole war, being of an age to form judgments, and followed it with close attention, so as to acquire accurate information. It befell me also to be banished from my own country for twenty years after my command at Amphipolis,\(^2\) and being conversant with affairs on both sides, especially with those of the Peloponnesians by reason of my banishment, to gain at my leisure a better acquaintance with the course of events. The difference, then, which arose after the ten years, and the breaking of the truce and the subsequent hostilities, I will now proceed to relate.

XXVII. After the conclusion of the fifty years’ treaty and the subsequent alliance, the embassies from the Peloponnesus, which had been summoned for this business, withdrew from Lacedaemon. The rest went home; but the Corinthians proceeded first to Argos and entered into communication with certain

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\(^1\) For these wars, see chs. xxxiii. f. and liii. f.

\(^2\) cf. iv. civ. 4.
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πρὸς τινὰς τῶν ἐν τέλει ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀργείων ὡς χρή, ἐπειδὴ Δακεδαίμονιοι οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀγαθῷ ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῆς Πελοποννήσου σπουδᾶς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς Ἄθηναίους τοὺς πρὶν ἐχθρίστους πεποίηνται, ὅραν τοὺς Ἀργείους ὅπως σωθῇσται ἡ Πελοποννήσος, καὶ ψηφίσασθαι τὴν βουλομένην πόλιν τῶν Ἕλληνων, ἦτις αὐτόνομος τε ἐστὶ καὶ δίκας ἱσας καὶ ὅμοιας δίδωσι, πρὸς Ἀργείους ξυμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι ὡστε τῇ ἄλλῃ ὅπως ἐπιμαχεῖν, ἀποδεῖξαι δὲ ἄνδρας ὅλους ἀρχὴν αὐτοκράτορας καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τοὺς λόγους εἶναι, τοῦ μὴ καταφανεῖς γίγνεσθαι τοὺς μὴ πείσαντας τὸ πλῆθος. ἔφασαν δὲ πολλοὺς 3 προσχωρῆσθαι μίσει τῶν Δακεδαίμονίων. καὶ οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι διδάξαντες τάντα ἀνεχόρησαν ἐπ’ οἶκον.

XXVIII. Ὁι δὲ τῶν Ἀργείων ἄνδρες ἀκούσαντες ἐπειδὴ ἀνήνεγκαν τοὺς λόγους ἐς τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὸν δῆμον, ἐψηφίσαντο Ἀργείοι, καὶ ἄνδρας εἶλοντο δώδεκα πρὸς οὕς τοὺς βουλόμενον τῶν Ἕλληνων ξυμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι πλὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Δακεδαίμονίων τούτων δὲ μηδετέρως ἐξεῖναι ἀνευ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀργείων σπείρασθαι.

2 ἐδέξαντο τε τάντα οἱ Ἀργείοι μᾶλλον, ὅρωντες τὸν τε Δακεδαίμονίων σφίστο πόλεμον ἐσόμενον (ἐπ’ ἐξόδῳ γὰρ πρὸς αὐτοὺς αἰ σπουδαί ἱκεῖαν) καὶ ἀμα ἐλπίσαντες τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἡγήσεσθαι. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἡ τε Δακεδαίμονι μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἥκουσε καὶ ὑπερῷφθη διὰ τὰς
of the Argive magistrates, saying that, since the
Lacedaemonians had made a treaty and alliance with
the Athenians, hitherto their bitterest enemies, not
for the good of the Peloponnesus but for its enslave-
ment, the Argives ought to be considering how the
Peloponnesus could be saved; and should pass a
decree, that any Hellenic city which is autonomous
and offers settlement of disputes by fair and impartial
trials, may, if it so wishes, make an alliance with
the Argives for mutual defence of their territories;
and that they should appoint a few men with abso-
lutely full powers, and not discuss matters before
the people, so that any who may fail to persuade
the popular assembly may not become known to the
Lacedaemonians. And they asserted that many
would join them through hatred of the Lacedae-
onians. The Corinthians, then, having suggested
these things, went home.

XXVIII. The Argive magistrates, on hearing the
proposals, reported them to their government and
people, and the Argives passed the decree and chose
twelve men with whom any of the Hellenes who
pleased might conclude an alliance, except the
Athenians and the Lacedaemonians; neither of these
should be allowed to make a treaty with Argos with-
out the express consent of the Argive people. These
proposals the Argives accepted the more readily, in
the first place because they saw that they should
have war with the Lacedaemonians—for the treaty
with them was on the point of expiring—and,
moreover, because they had hoped to secure the
hegemony of the Peloponnesus. For at this time
Lacedaemon had fallen into very ill repute and
was despised on account of its misfortunes, while
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ξυμφοράς, οί τε Ἀργεῖοι ἀριστα ἔσχον τοῖς πᾶσιν, οὐ ξυναράμενοι τού Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου, ἀμφοτέροις δὲ μᾶλλον ἔυσπονδοι ὄντες ἐκκαρπωσάμενοι. οί μὲν οὖν Ἀργεῖοι οὕτως ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προσεδέχοντο τοὺς ἑθέλοντας τῶν Ἐλλήνων.

XXIX. Μαντινῆς δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν πρῶτοι προσεχώρησαν δεδιότες τοὺς Ἀκεδαίμονιοις. τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεύσι μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκαδίας κατέστραπτο ὑπῆκοον, ἐτι τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμοι ὄντος, καὶ εὐνόμιζον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀκεδαίμονιοις ἄρχειν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σχολὴν ἤγουν ὃστε ἄσμενοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους ἔτραπτοντο, πόλιν τε μεγάλην νομίζοντες καὶ Ἀκεδαίμονιοις αἰεὶ διάφορον δημοκρατοῦν

2 μένην τε ὀστερ καὶ αὐτοῖ. ἀποστάντων δὲ τῶν Μαντινέων καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Πελοπόννησος ἐς θρόνων καθίστατο ὡς καὶ σφίσι ποιητέον τοῦτο, νομίζοντες πλέον τε τι εἰδώτας μεταστήναι αὐτοῖς καὶ τοὺς Ἀκεδαίμονιοις ἀμα δι' ὅργης ἕχοντες ἐν ἀλλοις τε καὶ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς ταῖς Ἀττικαῖς ἐγέρατο εὐροκῶν εἶναι προσθεῖναι καὶ ἀφελεῖν ὃ τι ἀν ἄμφοι τῶν πόλεων δοκῇ, Λακεδαίμονιοις

3 καὶ Ἀθηναίοι. τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ γράμμα μάλιστα τήν Πελοπόννησον διεθορύβει καὶ ἐς ὑποψίαν καθίστη μὴ μετὰ Ἀθηναίων σφᾶς βούλωνται Λακεδαίμονιοι δυνάμασθαι. δίκαιον γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ξυμμάχοις γεγράφθαι τὴν μετάθεσιν.

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the Argives had attained an excellent position in all respects, having had no part of the burden of the war with Athens, but rather, as they were at peace with both parties, having reaped a harvest from it. Thus the Argives were ready to receive into their alliance any of the Hellenes that were so inclined.

XXIX. The Mantineans and their allies were the first to join them, through fear of the Lacedaemonians. For a part of Arcadia had been reduced to subjection by the Mantineans, while the war with the Athenians was still going on, and they thought that the Lacedaemonians, now that they had leisure, would not suffer them to retain their sovereignty. So they turned gladly to Argos, regarding it as a powerful state, one always at variance with the Lacedaemonians, and under a democratic form of government like themselves. And when the Mantineans had revolted, the rest of the Peloponnesus also began to mutter that they must do the like, thinking that the Mantineans had changed sides because they possessed some superior knowledge. At the same time they were angry with the Lacedaemonians on other grounds, and especially because it was written in the treaty with Athens that it would be consistent with their oaths to add or take away whatever shall seem good to both states, that is, to the Lacedaemonians and Athenians. For it was this article especially that was disturbing the Peloponnesus far and wide and causing suspicion that the Lacedaemonians wished in concert with the Athenians to reduce them all to slavery; for it would have been just, they thought, that the clause should have given the power to alter the articles to all the allies. And
4 ὡστε φοβούμενοι οἱ πολλοὶ ὤρμηντο πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔκαστοι ξυμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι. XXX. Δακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τὸν θρόνον τούτον ἔν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καθεστῶτα καὶ τοὺς Κορίνθιοὺς διδασκάλους τε γενομένους καὶ αὐτοὺς μέλλοντας σπείρασθαι πρὸς τὸ Ἀργος, πέμπουσι πρέσβεις ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον, θευλόμενοι προκαταλαβεῖν τὸ μέλλον, καὶ ἠτίωντο τὴν τε ἐσήγησιν τοῦ παντὸς καὶ εἰ Ἀργείοις σφῶν ἀποστάντες ξύμμαχοι ἔσονται, παραβήσεσθαι τε ἐφασαν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ὥρκους, καὶ ἤδη ἄδικεῖν ὅτι οὐ δέχονται τὰς Ἀθηναίων σπουδὰς, εἰρημένου κύριου εἰναι ὁ τι ἀν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ξυμμάχων ψηφίσηται,
2 ἢν μὴ τι θεῶν ἡ ἡρώων κόλυμα ἦ. Κορίνθιοι δὲ παρόντων σφίσι τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅσοι οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐδέξαντο τὰς σπουδὰς (παρεκάλεσαν δὲ αὐτοὺς αὐτοὶ πρότερον), ἀνέτειλον τοὺς Δακεδαιμόνιοις, ἀ μὲν ἡδικοῦντο, οὐ δηλοῦντες ἀντικρυ, ὅτι οὔτε Σόλλιον σφίσιν ἀπέλαβον παρ' Ἀθηναίων οὔτε Ἀνακτόριον, εἰ τέ τι ἄλλο ἐνόμιζον ἐλασσοῦσθαι, πρόσχημα δὲ ποιοῦμενοι τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης μὴ προδώσειν· ὁμόσαι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὥρκους ἰδίᾳ τε, οὔτε μετὰ Ποταμεῖταν τῷ πρῶτον ἀφίσταντο, καὶ 3 ἄλλους ὑστερον. οὗκον παραβαίνειν τοὺς τῶν ξυμμάχων ὥρκους ἐφασάν οὐκ ἔσιόντες ἐς τὰς τῶν

1 In Acarnania, taken by the Athenians in the first year of the war (II. xxx. 1).
so most of them were afraid and were eager on their own part also to make a separate alliance with the Argives.

XXX. The Lacedaemonians, aware of this murmuring that was going on in the Peloponnesus, and that the Corinthians had been the instigators in this matter and were themselves going to make a treaty with Argos, sent envoys to Corinth, wishing to forestall what was about to happen. And they charged them with starting the whole movement, and said that if they should revolt from them and become allies of the Argives, they would be violating the explicit terms of their oaths, and indeed were already doing wrong in not accepting the treaty with the Athenians, inasmuch as it had been declared that whatever the majority of the allies decreed should be binding, unless there should be some hindrance on the part of gods or heroes. But the Corinthians, in the presence of all their allies who had not themselves accepted the treaty—for they had on their own responsibility summoned them beforehand—in reply to the Lacedaemonians said in what respects they had been wronged, not stating outright that the Lacedaemonians had failed to recover from the Athenians for them Sollium ¹ or Anactorium,² nor mentioning any other matter in which they thought they were getting less than their rights, but making a pretext that they could not give up their allies in Thrace; for they said, they had given their oaths to these people, both privately, when they had first revolted along with the Potidaeans,³ and afterwards. They were therefore, they said, not violating their oaths to their allies by refusing to join in

¹ cf. iv. xlix. ² cf. i. lviii. ¹. ³ cf. i. lviii. 1.
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"Αθηναίων σπουδάς: θεῶν γὰρ πίστεις ὁμόσαντες ἐκείνους οὐκ ἂν εὐροκεῖν προδιόντες αὐτοῖς.
εἰρήσθαι δὲ ὅτι "ἡ μὴ θεῶν ἡ ἡρώων κόλυμα ἥ." "

καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν παλαιῶν ὄρκων τοσάκτα ἐπτευ, περὶ δὲ τῆς Ἀργείων ξυμμαχίας μετὰ τῶν φίλων Βουλευ-
5 σάμενοι ποιήσειν ὅ τι ἂν δίκαιον ἦ. καὶ οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οίκον.
ἔτυχον δὲ παρόντες ἐν Κορίνθῳ καὶ Ἀργείων πρέσβεις, οἳ ἐκέλευσον τοὺς Κορινθίους ἤναι ἐς
tὴν ξυμμαχίαν καὶ μὴ μέλλειν· οἳ δὲ ἐς τὸν ὑπεροπ. ξύλλογον αὐτοῖς τὸν παρὰ σφίσαι προεῖπον ἥκειν.

XXXI. Ἡλθε δὲ καὶ Ἡλείων πρέσβεια εὐ-
thύς καὶ ἐποιήσατο πρὸς Κορινθίους ξυμμαχίαν
tοῦτον, ἔπειτα ἐκεῖθεν ἐς Ἀργοὺς ἐλθόντες,
καθάπερ προείρητο, Ἀργείων ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο·
dιαφερόμενοι γὰρ ἐτύγχανον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις
2 περὶ Δεσπέρου. πολέμου γὰρ γενομένου ποτὲ πρὸς
Ἀρκάδων τινὰς Δεσπεράτας καὶ Ἡλείων παρα-
κληθέντων ὑπὸ Δεσπεράτων ἐς ξυμμαχίαν ἐπὶ τῇ
ἡμισεία τῆς γῆς καὶ λυσάντων τὸν πόλεμον,
Ἡλείοι τὴν γῆν νεμομένους αὐτοῖς τοῖς Δεσπεράταις
τάλαντον ἔταξαν τῷ Διί τῷ Ἑλμυρίῳ ἁποφέρειν.
3 καὶ μέχρι τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου ἀπέφερον, ἔπειτα
παύσαμένων διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου οἱ Ἡλεῖοι
ἐπηνάγκαζον, οἳ δὲ ἐστάλοντο πρὸς τοὺς Δακε-
the treaty with the Athenians; for since they had bound themselves to those allies by pledges sworn in the name of the gods, it would not be consistent with their oaths to betray them. Besides, the words of the agreement were, "if there be no hindrance on the part of gods or heroes"; and it seemed to them that this was a hindrance on the part of the gods. So much they said in regard to their ancient oaths, but as to the Argive alliance they would consult with their friends and do whatever was right. So the envoys of the Lacedaemonians returned home. But there happened to be at Corinth Argive envoys who urged the Corinthians to come into the alliance without delay; the latter, however, told them to come to their next assembly.

XXXI. Soon after there also came an embassy of the Eleans and first concluded an alliance with the Corinthians, and then they proceeded to Argos, as they had been instructed, and made an alliance with the Argives. It seems that at one time the Eleans were at variance with the Lacedaemonians about Lepreum.¹ For when there had been a war between the Lepreates and some of the Arcadians, and the Eleans had been invited by the Lepreates to make an alliance with them, with the offer of half their territory, on the conclusion of the war the Eleans left the Lepreates in possession of their land, but assessed upon them a tax of a talent to be paid to Olympian Zeus. Now up to the war with Athens they regularly paid the tribute; then on the pretext of the war they ceased to pay the tribute, and the Eleans tried to enforce payment, whereupon they had recourse to the Lacedaemonians.

¹ In Triphylia, not far from the boundaries of Elis and Laconia (ch. xxxiv. 1).
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δαμονίους. καὶ δίκης Δακεδαιμονίους ἐπιτραπείσης, ὑποτοπήσαντες οἱ Ἡλεῖοι μὴ ἵσον ἔξειν, ἀνέντες τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν δεπρεατῶν τὴν γῆν ἐτεμον. 4 οἱ δὲ Δακεδαιμόνιοι οὔδὲν ἦσον ἐδίκασαν αὐτονόμους εἶναι δεπρεάτας καὶ ἄδικεὶν Ἡλεῖους, καὶ ως οὐκ ἐμμενάντων τῇ ἐπιτροπῇ φορουρᾶν ὀπλατῶν ἐσέπεμψαν ὡς Δέπρεον. οἱ δὲ Ἡλεῖοι νομίζοντες πόλιν σφῶν ἀφεστηκών δέξασθαι τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους καὶ τὴν ἐνυδήκην προφέροντες ἐν ἕ εἰρητο, ἂ ἐχοντες ἐς τὸν Ἀττικῶν πόλεμον καθίσταντό τινες, ταῦτα ἐχοντας καὶ ἐξελθεῖν, ως οὐκ ἴσων ἐχοντες ἀφίστανται πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους, καὶ τὴν ἐμμαχίαν, ὦσπερ ποιήτη, καὶ οὗτοι ἐποίησαν. 6 ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι εὐθὺς μετ' ἐκείνους καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ Θράκης Χαλκιδῆς Ἀργείων ἐμμαχοι. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντες ἦσυχαζοιν, περιορούμενοι καὶ νομίζοντες σφίς τὴν Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν, αὐτοῖς ὀλγαρχομένοις, ἦσον ἐμμφορον εἶναι τῆς Δακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας.

XXXII. Περὶ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ θέρους τούτου Σκιωναίους μὲν Ἀθηναίοι ἐκπολιορκήσαντες ἀπέκτειναν τοὺς ἥθωντας, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἠνδραπόδισαν καὶ τὴν γῆν Πλαταιαῦσιν ἔδωσαν νέμεσθαι. Δηλίους δὲ κατηγαγον πάλιν ἐς Δήλου, ἐνθυμούμενοι τὰς τε ἐν

1 ὑπὸ τῶν Δακεδαμώνων, in the MSS. after περιορούμενοι, deleted by Dobree. The sense of the verb, “jealously watched” (Jowett), required with that reading, does not occur in Thucydides.
The case having been referred to the Lacedaemonians for arbitration, the Eleans, suspecting that they would not receive fair treatment, renounced the arbitration and ravaged the land of the Lepreates. The Lacedaemonians, nevertheless, gave judgment, to the effect that the Lepreates were independent and the Eleans the aggressors, and as the latter did not abide by the arbitration, sent a garrison of hoplites to Lepreum. But the Eleans, considering that the Lacedaemonians had taken under their protection a city of theirs that was in revolt, cited the agreement in which it was stipulated that whatever places any of the confederates had when they entered the war with Athens they should retain when they came out of it; and on the ground that they had not received fair treatment went over to the Argives, their envoys making the alliance as they had been instructed to do. Immediately after them the Corinthians also and the Chalcidians in Thrace became allies of the Argives. But the Boeotians and Megarians, though holding the same views, kept quiet, awaiting events and thinking the Argive democracy not so advantageous for them, with their oligarchical form of government, as the political constitution of the Lacedaemonians.

XXXII. About the same time during this summer, the Athenians reduced the Scionaeans by siege, slew the adult males, made slaves of the women and children, and gave the land to the Plataeans to occupy; and they brought back the Delians to Delos, taking to heart their mishaps in the battles and

1 In accordance with the decree moved by Cleon two years before (IV. cxxii. 6). At the conclusion of peace they had been left at the mercy of the Athenians (ch. xviii. 8).
2 cf. ch. i.
3 At Delium and Amphipolis.
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ταῖς μάχαις ξυμφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς θεοῦ

2 χρήσαντος. καὶ Φωκῆς καὶ Δοκροὶ ήρξαντο

3 πολεμεῖν, καὶ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι ἤδη ξύμμαχοι δύναται ἐστὶν Τεγέαν ἀποστήσουτες

Δακεδαμονίων, ὥρωντες μέγα μέρος ὦν, καὶ εἰ

σφίσι προσγένοιτο, νομίζοντες ἀπασαν ἀν ἔχειν

4 Πελοπόννησον. ὥς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀν ἔφασαν ἐναντιώθηναι οἱ Τεγέαται Δακεδαμονίοι, οἱ Κορίνθιοι

μέχρι τούτου προβιόμενοι πράσσοντες ἀνείσαν τῆς

φιλονικίας καὶ ἀρρώπησαν μὴ οὔδες σφίσαν ἐτι

5 τῶν ἄλλων προσχρῆς. ὡμοὶ δὲ ἐλθόντες καὶ τοὺς

Βοιωτοὺς ἐδέσατο σφῶν τε καὶ Ἀργεῖοι γίγνεσθαι

ξύμμαχος καὶ τὰλλα κοινὰ πράσσειν ταῦτα τῶν

δεχημέρους ἐπισπονδάσα, αὐτὰς ἠκομοίας καὶ

Βοιωτοὺς πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ πολλῷ ὑστεροῦν γενό-

μεναι αὐτῶν τῶν πεντηκοντοτέρων σπονδῶν,

ἐκέλευσαν οἱ Κορίνθιοι τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἀκολουθή-

σαντας Ἀθηναῖες καὶ σφίσι ποίησα, ὡσπερ

Βοιωτὸς ἐφο, μὴ δεχομένων δὲ Αθηναίων ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἔκεχερίαν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ σπέν-

6 δεσθαὶ ἄνευ αὐτῶν. Βοιωτός δὲ δεσμέον τῶν

Κορινθίων περὶ μὲν τῆς Ἀργείων ξυμμαχίας

ἐπισχέειν αὐτῶς ἐκέλευσα, ἐλθόντες δὲ Ἀθηναῖες

μετὰ Κορινθίων οὐχ ὑδροῦν τὰς δεχημέρους

σπονδὰς, ἄλλῳ ἀπεκρίναντο οἱ Ἀθηναίοι Κοριν-

θίοισ εἶναι σπονδὰς, εἰπέρ Δακεδαμονίοισ εἰς

7 ξύμμαχοι. Βοιωτὸς μὲν οὐν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀπειπῦν

τὰς δεχημέρους, ἄξιοντων καὶ αἰτιωμένων Κοριν-

1 It had always maintained an independent position in Arcadia, and in earlier times had been a powerful opponent of Sparta.

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obeying an oracle of the god at Delphi. Meanwhile the Phocians and the Locrians began hostilities. And the Corinthians and the Argives, being now allies, came to Tegea,¹ hoping to induce it to revolt from the Lacedaemonians, seeing that it was an important part of the Peloponnesus, and thinking if it should be gained to their side they would soon have the whole Peloponnesus. But when the Tegeates refused to oppose the Lacedaemonians, the Corinthians, who up to that time had been working zealously, became slack in their ardour and full of dread that none of the other Peloponnesians would henceforth come over to them. Nevertheless they went to the Boeotians and requested them to become allies of themselves and the Argives, and to act generally in concert with them. And the Corinthians further requested the Boeotians to accompany them to Athens and procure for them also the ten days’ truce ² which had been made between the Athenians and Boeotians not long after the conclusion of the fifty years’ treaty, on the same terms as the Boeotians had obtained, and, if the Athenians did not agree, to renounce the armistice and for the future to make no truce without the Corinthians. The Boeotians, when the Corinthians made these requests, desired them to wait awhile in regard to the Argive alliance, but they went with them to Athens, where however they failed to obtain the ten days’ truce, the Athenians answering them that there was already a truce with the Corinthians, if they were allies of the Lacedaemonians. But the Boeotians did not any the more give up the ten days’ truce, although the Corinthians demanded it and accused them of having

¹ i.e. a truce which had to be renewed every ten days; or, perhaps, “terminable at ten days’ notice,” as Jowett thinks. cf. ch. xxvi. 3.

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θίων ἔννοθέσθαι σφίς. Κορινθίοις δὲ ἀνοκωχῇ ἀσπονδός ἦν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους.

XXXIII. Δακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους πανδημεῖ ἐστράτευσαν, Πλειστοάνακτος τοῦ Παυσανίου Δακεδαιμόνιων βασιλέως ἤγουμένον, τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἰς Παρρασίων Μαντινέων ὑπηκόους ὄντας, κατὰ στᾶσιν ἐπικαλεσαμένων σφᾶς, ἀμα δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν Κυψέλους τεῖχος ἀναιρήσουσε, ἢν δύνωνται, δὲ ἐτείχισαν Μαντινῆς καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφρούρουν, ἐν τῇ Παρρασικῇ κείμενον ἐπὶ τῇ 2 Σκιρίτιδι τῆς Δακωνικῆς. καὶ οἱ μὲν Δακεδαιμόνιοι τὴν γῆν τῶν Παρρασίων ἔδησον, οἱ δὲ Μαντινῆς τὴν πόλιν Ἀργείων φυλαξὶ παραδόντες αὐτοὶ τὴν νεμμαχίαν ἐφρούρουν ἀδύνατοι δ' ὄντες διασώσασι τὸ τε ἐν Κυψέλους τεῖχος καὶ 3 τὰς ἐν Παρρασίωι πόλεις ἀπῆλθον. Δακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τοὺς τε Παρρασίους αὐτοῦμον ποιήσαντες καὶ τὸ τεῖχος καθελόντες ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπὶ οἴκου.

XXXIV. Καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους, ἢδη ἠκόντων αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀπὸ Ὀράκης μετὰ Βρασίδου ἔξελθόντων στρατιωτῶν, οὐς ὁ Κλεαρίδας μετὰ τὰς σπουδὰς ἐκόμισεν, οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἐψηφίσαντο τοὺς μὲν μετὰ Βρασίδου Εἰλώτας μαχεσαμένους ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ οἰκεῖν ὅπου ἄν βούλωνται καὶ ὑστερον οὐ πολλῷ αὐτοὺς μετὰ τῶν νεοδαμῶν ἐς Δέπρεου κατέστησαν, κείμενον ἐπὶ τῆς Δακωνικῆς καὶ τῆς Ἡλείας, ὄντες ἢδη διάφοροι

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1 The mountainous region between the upper Eurotas and the valley of the Oenus, one of the most important districts of the Perioeci.

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agreed with themselves to do so. Between the Corinthians, however, and the Athenians there was a cessation of activities without an actual truce.

XXXIII. The same summer the Lacedaemonians, under the command of Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, made an expedition with all their forces into the territory of the Parrhasians of Arcadia, who were subjects of the Mantineans. They had been called in by the Parrhasians on account of a factional quarrel, and intended also to demolish, if possible, the fort at Cypselia, which, being situated in Parrhasian territory, the Mantineans had constructed and themselves garrisoned for the annoyance of the district Sciritis ¹ in Laconia. The Lacedaemonians proceeded to ravage the land of the Parrhasians, and the Mantineans, giving over the custody of their city to the Argives, tried themselves to guard the territory of their Parrhasian allies. Being unable, however, to save the fort at Cypselia and the towns in Parrhasia, they withdrew. And the Lacedaemonians, after making the Parrhasians independent and pulling down the fort, then returned home.

XXXIV. During the same summer, on the return from Thrace of the troops which had gone out with Brasidas ² and which Clearidas ³ had brought back after the treaty was made, the Lacedaemonians voted that the Helots who had fought with Brasidas should be free and dwell wherever they preferred; and not long afterwards they settled them with the Neodamodes ⁴ at Lepreum on the borders of Laconia and Elis, for they were by this time at variance with

² cf. iv. lxxviii. 1; lxxx. 5. ³ cf. xxi. 3.
⁴ The clans of new citizens formed of Helots emancipated for service in war.
2 Ἡλείοις τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς νῆσου ληφθέντας σφῶν καὶ τὰ ὄπλα παραδόντας, δείσαντες μὴ τι διὰ τὴν ξυμφορὰν νομίσαντες ἐλασσωθήσεσθαι καὶ ὄντες ἐπίτιμοι νεωτερίσωσιν, ἢδη καὶ ἀρχᾶς τινας ἐχούνταις ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν, ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιάνδε ὡστε μήτε ἄρχειν μήτε πριαμένους τι ἡ πωλοῦντας κυρίους εἶναι. ὥστερον δὲ αὖθις χρόνῳ ἐπίτιμοι ἐγένοντο.

XXXV. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ θέρους καὶ Θυσόν τὴν ἐν τῇ Ἀθώιδε Ἀκτῇ Διῆς εἶλον, Ἀθηναίων οὖσαν ξύμμαχον.

2 Καὶ τὸ θέρος τοῦτο πᾶν ἐπιμειξία μὲν ἦσαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις, ὕπόπτευεν δὲ ἄλληλους εὐθὺς μετὰ τὰς σπονδὰς οἱ τε Ἀθηναίοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κατὰ τὴν τῶν χωρίων ἄλληλοι οὐκ ἀπόδοσιν. τὴν γὰρ Ἀμφί- πολίν πρότεροι λαχῶντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀποδι- δόναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα οἱ ἀπεδεδώκεσαν, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης παρεῖχον ξυμμάχους τὰς σπονδὰς δεχομένους οὐδὲ Βοιωτοὺς οὐδὲ Κορινθίους, λέ- γοντες αἰεὶ ὡς μετ’ Ἀθηναίων τούτων, ἢν μὴ ἥθελοι, κοινὴ ἀναγκάσασιν χρόνους τε προῦ- θεντο ἄνευ ξυγγραφῆς ἐν οἷς χρὴ τοὺς μὴ ἔσι-

4 ὀντας ἀμφοτέρους πολέμιους εἶναι. τοῦτων οὖν ὀρῶντες οἱ Ἀθηναίοι οὐδὲν ἔργῳ γιγνόμενον, ὕπόπτευεν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μηδὲν δίκαιον διανοεῖσθαι, ὡστε οὔτε Πύλον ἀπαιτοῦντων αὐ-

1 Ἀκτῇ Διῆς, Meineke’s conjecture for Διηδής of nearly all MSS.

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the Eleans. But as to their men who had been taken on the island and had given up their arms, fearing that these might expect to suffer some degradation because of their misfortune and if they continued in possession of the franchise might attempt a revolution, they disfranchised them, though some of them now held office, and with such a disfranchisement that they could neither hold office nor have the legal right to buy or sell anything. In the course of time, however, they were again enfranchised.

XXXV. During the same summer also the Dians took Thyssus, a town on the promontory of Athos, which was in alliance with the Athenians.

All this summer there was intercourse between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, but both parties began to suspect one another directly after the conclusion of the treaty, owing to their failure to give back to one another the places specified. The Lacedaemonians, though they had drawn the lot to make restoration first, had not restored Amphipolis and the other places; nor had they made their allies in Thrace accept the treaty, nor the Boeotians, nor the Corinthians, though they continually professed that they would join the Athenians in coercing these states, if they were unwilling; and they proposed dates, without making a written agreement, on which those who did not accede to the treaty were to be enemies of both. Seeing, then, that none of these things was actually being done, the Athenians suspected the Lacedaemonians of having no just intentions, and so not only did not restore Pylos when the Lacedaemonians demanded
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tων ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νῆσου
dεσμώτας μετεμέλοντο ἀποδεδωκότες, τά τε ἄλλα
χωρία εἶχον, μένοντες έως σφίσι κάκεινοι ποιή-5
σειαν τά εἰρημένα. Δακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τά μὲν
δυνάτα ἐφασαν πεποιηκέναι τοὺς γὰρ παρὰ
σφίσι δεσμώτας ὄντας Ἀθηναίων ἀποδοῦναι καὶ
τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης στρατιώτας ἀπαγαγεῖν καὶ εἰ
τοῦ ἄλλου ἐγκρατεῖς ἦσαν. Ἀμφιπόλεως δὲ οὐκ
ἐφασαν κρατεῖν ὡστε παραδοῦναι, Βοιωτοὺς δὲ
περάσεσθαι καὶ Κορινθίους ἐς τὰς σπουδὰς
ἐσαγαγεῖν καὶ Πάνακτον ἀπολαβεῖν, καὶ Ἀθη-
ναίων οὐκ ἦσαν ἐν Βοιωτοῖς αἰχμάλωτοι κομεῖν.
6 Πύλου μέντοι ἥξιον σφίσιν ἀποδοῦναι· εἰ δὲ μὴ,
Μεσσηνίους γε καὶ τοὺς Εἰλωτᾶς ἐξαγαγεῖν,
ὡστε καὶ αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ Θράκης, Ἀθηναίους
dὲ φρούρειν τὸ χωρίον αὐτοὺς, εἰ βούλωται.
7 πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων ἐν τῷ
θέρει τούτῳ ἔπεσαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὡστε ἐξαγα-
γεῖν ἐκ Πύλου Μεσσηνίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
Εἰλωτὰς τε καὶ οὕτω ἱπτομολήκεσαν ἐκ τῆς
Δακωνίκης· καὶ κατάκισαν αὐτοὺς ἐν Κρανίοις
8 τῆς Κεφαλληνίας. τὸ μὲν οὖν θέρος τούτῳ ἤσυχία
ἡν καὶ ἐφοδιαὶ παρ’ ἀλλήλους.

XXXVI. Τοῦ δὲ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος (ἐτυ-
χον γὰρ ἐφοροὶ ἔτεροι καὶ οὐκ ἐφ’ ὅλων ἀπὸ τοῦ ντόν καὶ
ἐναντίοι σπουδὰς) ἐλθοῦσών πρεσβεῖων ἀπὸ τῆς
ξυμμαχίδος καὶ παρόντων Ἀθηναίων καὶ Βοιω-
tῶν καὶ Κορινθίων καὶ πολλὰ ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἰπόν-
it, but even repented that they had restored the prisoners taken on the island, and they continued to hold the other places, waiting until the Lacedaemonians should have fulfilled their part of the contract. The Lacedaemonians said that they had done what was possible; for they had restored the prisoners of the Athenians that were in their hands, had brought back their troops in Thrace, and had done whatever else had been in their power. As to Amphipolis, however, they said that they were not in control of it, so as to deliver it up; but they would try to bring the Boeotians and Corinthians into the treaty and to get back Panactum, and would recover all Athenian prisoners that were in the hands of the Boeotians. Pylos, however, they insisted the Athenians should restore to them; or at any rate, they should withdraw the Messenians and the Helots, as they themselves had withdrawn their troops from Thrace, and the Athenians themselves might garrison the place if they wished. After many and frequent conferences had been held during this summer, they persuaded the Athenians to withdraw from Pylos the Messenians, the rest of the Helots, and all who had deserted from Laconia; and these the Athenians settled at Cranii in Cephallenia. This summer, then, there was peace and mutual intercourse.

XXXVI. The following winter the ephors who happened to be in office at Sparta were other than those under whom the treaty had been made, and some of them were even opposed to it. Embassies had come from their allies, and there were present also Athenians, Boeotians, and Corinthians; and after much discussion, without coming to an
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tων καὶ οὐδὲν ξυμβάντων, ὡς ἀπῆσαν ἐπ᾽ οἶκον, τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς καὶ Κορινθίοις Κλεόβουλος καὶ Ἐνάρης, οὗτοι οἴπερ τῶν ἐφόρων ἐβούλουντο μάλιστα διαλύσασι τὰς σπουδάς, λόγους ποιοῦνται ἰδίους, παρανοοῦντες ὅτι μάλιστα ταῦτά τε γιγαντσκείν καὶ πειρᾶσθαι Βοιωτοῖς, Ἀργείων γενομένους πρῶτον αὐτοὺς ξυμμάχους, αὖθις μετὰ Βοιωτῶν Ἀργείους Λακεδαιμονίοις ποιήσαι ξυμμάχους (οὗτος γὰρ ἦκιστ' ἀν ἀναγκασθῆναι Βοιωτοὺς ἐς τὰς Ἀττικὰς σπουδὰς ἐσελθείν). ἐλέσθαι γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίους πρὸ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἐχθρας καὶ διαλύσεως τῶν σπουδῶν Ἀργείους σφίσει φίλους καὶ ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι. τὸ γὰρ Ἀργος αἰεὶ ἦπισταντο ἐπιθυμοῦντας τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καλῶς σφίσι φίλον γενέσθαι, ἡγομένους τὸν

2 ἔξω Πελοποννήσου πόλεμον ράω ἄν είναι. τὸ μέντοι Πάνακτον ἐδέωντο Βοιωτοὺς ὅπως παραδώσουσι Λακεδαιμονίους, ἵνα ἀντ' αὐτοῦ Πύλου, ἢν δύναται, ἀπολαβόντες ράων καθιστῶνται Ἀθηναίοις ἐς πόλεμον.

XXXVII. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Κορίνθιοι ταύτα ἐπεσταλμένοι ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἐνάρους καὶ Κλεόβουλον καὶ ὅσοι φίλοι ἦσαν αὐτοὺς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὡστε ἀπαγγείλαι ἐπὶ τὰ κοινά, 2 ἑκάτεροι ἀνεχόμενοι. Ἀργείων δὲ δύο ἄνδρες τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς μεγίστης ἐπετήρουν ἀπιόντας αὐτοὺς καθ' ὀδοὺν καὶ ξυγγενὸμενοι ἐς λόγους ἠλθοῦν, εἰ πως οἱ Βοιωτοὶ σφίσι ξύμμαχοι γένοιτο, ὡσπερ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Ἡλεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς. νοµίζειν γὰρ

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agreement, as the envoys were on the point of departing for home, Cleobulus and Xenares, the ephors who most desired to annul the treaty, made private proposals to the Boeotians and Corinthians, advising them to adopt as far as possible the same policy, and that the Boeotians should first become allies of the Argives and then try to make the Argives along with themselves allies of the Lacedaemonians. For in this way the Boeotians would be least likely to be forced to come into the treaty with Athens, since the Lacedaemonians would prefer gaining the friendship and alliance of the Argives, counting that more important than the enmity of the Athenians and the disruption of the treaty. For they knew that the Lacedaemonians were always desirous that Argos should be friendly to them on fair terms, thinking that war outside of the Peloponnesus would then be an easier matter for them. Panactum, however, they begged the Boeotians to give up to the Lacedaemonians, in order that they might, if possible, get back Pylos in exchange for it, and so be in a safer position for renewing the war with the Athenians.

XXXVII. The Boeotians and Corinthians, being charged by Xenares and Cleobulus and the Lacedaemonians that were friendly to them with these instructions, which they were to announce to their governments, now returned to their respective cities. But two Argive men of highest official position, who were watching for them by the way as they went off, joined them and made a proposal to them, in the hope that the Boeotians might become allies to them, just as the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans had done; for they thought, if this
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ἀν τούτου προχωρήσαντος ῥαδίως ἦδη καὶ πολεμεῖν καὶ σπεύδεσθαι καὶ πρὸς Δακεδαίμονις, εἰ βούλοιτο, κοινῷ λόγῳ χρωμένους, καὶ εἰ τιμα 3 πρὸς ἄλλον δέοι. τοῖς δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν πρέσβεσιν ἄκούσωσιν ἦρεσκεν κατὰ τύχην γὰρ ἐδόντο τούτων ὄντερ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Δακεδαίμονις αὐτοῖς φίλοι ἐπεστάλκεσαν. καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἀργείων ἄνδρες ὡς ἦσθοντο αὐτοὺς δεχόμενους τῶν λόγων, εἰπόντες ὅτι πρέσβεις πέμψουσιν ἐς 4 Βοιωτοὺς, ἀπῆλθον. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ ἀπήγγειλαν τοῖς βοιωτάρχαις τὰ τέκτης Δακεδαίμονις καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ξυγγενομένων Ἀργείων καὶ οἱ βοιωτάρχαι ἦρεσκοντο τε καὶ πολλῷ προθυμότεροι ἦσαν, ὅτι ἀμφότερωσι ξυνεβαβηκει αὐτοῖς τοὺς τε φίλους τῶν Δακεδαίμονιν τῶν αὐτῶν δεῖσθαι καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους ἐς τὰ ὁμοῖα 5 σπεύδειν. καὶ οὐ πολλῷ ὑστερον πρέσβεις παρῆσαν Ἀργείων τὰ εἴρημένα προκαλούμενοι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀπεπεμψαν ἐπαινέσαντες τοὺς λόγους οἱ βοιωτάρχαι καὶ πρέσβεις ὑποχόμενοι ἀποστελεῖν περὶ τῆς ἐξυμμαχίας ἐς Ἀργοὺς.

XXXVIII. Ἔν δὲ τούτῳ ἐδόκει πρῶτον τοῖς βοιωτάρχαις καὶ Κορινθίοις καὶ Μεγαρεύσι καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Θράκης πρέσβεσιν ὁμόσαι ὅρκους ἀλλήλους ἡ μὴ ἐν τῷ παρατυχόντες ἀμυνὲν τῷ δεσμέων καὶ μὴ πολεμήσειν τῷ μηδὲ ἐξυμβησθέαν ἀνευ κοινῆς γνώμης, καὶ οὕτως ἦδη τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Μεγαρέας (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐποίουν) πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους σπεύδεσθαι. πρὶν δὲ τοὺς ὅρκους γενέσθαι οἱ βοιωτάρχαι ἐκοίμωσαν ταῖς τέσσαρις

1 cf. ch. xxxi. 6.
succeeded, they might then readily, all pursuing a common policy, carry on war or make peace with the Lacedaemonians, if they should wish, or with anyone else with whom it might be necessary. The Boeotian envoys were pleased at hearing these things; for by good luck these men were asking the same things as their friends at Lacedaemon had enjoined upon them. And the Argive men, seeing that they were inclined to accept the proposal, told them they would send envoys to the Boeotians and went away. On coming home the Boeotians reported to the boeotarchs the proposal made at Lacedaemon and also that of the Argives who had met them on the way; and the boeotarchs were pleased and were now far more eager for this arrangement, because matters had turned out to their liking in both directions—their friends among the Lacedaemonians wanting the same things as they did, and the Argives striving for a like end. Not long after this envoys came from the Argives with the proposals that have been mentioned; and the boeotarchs assented to their proposals and sent them away with a promise to dispatch envoys to Argos to negotiate the alliance.

XXXVIII. In the meantime it was determined by the boeotarchs and the Corinthians, the Megarians, and the envoys from Thrace, first, to bind themselves by oaths one to another, that assuredly when occasion offered they would assist the one that needed help and would not go to war with anyone or make peace without a common agreement; and that then and only then the Boeotians and the Megarians—for they were acting in concert—should make a treaty with the Argives. But before the oaths were sworn the boeotarchs communicated
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βουλαίς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ταύτα, αὖπερ ἀπαν τὸ κύρος ἔχουσι, καὶ παρῆνουν γενέσθαι ὅρκους ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὡσι βούλονται ἐπ᾿ ὁφελία σφίσι ξυνο-3 μυνύαι. οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς βουλαίς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ὄντες οὐ προσδέχονται τὸν λόγον, δεδιότες μὴ ἐναντία Δακεδαίμονιοι ποιήσωσι τοῖς ἐκείνων ἀφεστῶσι Κορινθίοις ἡμομυνύντες: οὐ γὰρ εἶπον αὐτοῖς οἱ βοιωτάρχαι τὰ ἐκ τῆς Δακεδαίμονος, ὅτι τῶν τε ἐφόρων Κλεόβουλος καὶ Ξενάρχης καὶ οἱ φίλοι παραίνοΰσιν Αργεῖων πρῶτον καὶ Κορινθίων γενομένων ξυμμάχους ύστερον μετ’ αὐτῶν τῶν 1 Δακεδαίμονίων γίγνεσθαι, οἴομενοι τὴν βουλήν, κἂν μὴ εἴπωσιν, οὐκ ἀλλὰ ψηφιεῖσθαι ἡ σφίσι 4 προδιαγόντες παραίνοσιν. ὡς δὲ ἀντέστη τὸ πράγμα, οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Θράκης πρέσβεις ἀπρακτοὶ ἀπῆλθον, οἱ δὲ βοιωτάρχαι, μέλλοντες πρότερον, εἰ ταῦτα ἔπεισαν, καὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν πειράσεσθαι πρὸς Ἀργεῖους ποιεῖν, οὐκέτι ἐσήνεγκαν περὶ Ἀργεῖων ἐς τὰς βουλάς, οὔτε ἐς τὸ Ἀργὸς τοὺς πρέσβεις οὐς ὑπέσχοντο ἐπεμποῦν, ἀμέλεια δὲ τὶς ἐνὶ καὶ διατριβῇ τῶν πάντων.

XXXIX. Καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνε τοῦτω Μηκύβερναν Ὀλυνθείου Ἀθηναίων φρουροῦντων ἐπιδραμόντες εἶλον.

2 Ἔστὲ δὲ ταῦτα (ἐγγύνοντο γὰρ αἰεὶ λόγοι τοῖς τε Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Δακεδαίμονίοις περὶ ὃν εἰχον

1 met’ αὐτῶν with Stahl, for metὰ τῶν of MSS. as Hude reads.
these resolutions to the four councils of the Boeotians which have supreme authority, and recommended that oaths be exchanged with such cities as wished to take oaths with them for mutual assistance. But the members of the Boeotian council did not accept the proposal, fearing that they might offend the Lacedaemonians by taking oaths with the Corinthians who had seceded from their confederacy. For the boeotarchs did not tell them what had happened at Lacedaemon—that it was the ephors, Cleobulus and Xenares, and their own friends who advised them first to become allies of the Argives and Corinthians, and then in conjunction with these to become allies of the Lacedaemonians; for they thought that the council, without their making any such statement, would not vote for any other course than that which they had previously resolved upon and now recommended. But now, when this difficulty arose, the Corinthians and the envoys from Thrace went away without accomplishing their purpose; and the boeotarchs, who had before intended, if they carried these measures, to try to effect also the alliance with the Argives, did not now bring before the councils the matter concerning the Argives, nor did they send to Argos the envoys they had promised; and there was neglect and delay in the whole business.

XXXIX. In the course of this same winter, the Olynthians by a sudden attack captured Mecyberna, which was garrisoned by the Athenians.

After this, while conferences were continually going on between the Athenians and Lacedae-

1 The four councils here doubtless considered as one body.
2 A port town of Olynthus; cf. ch. xviii. 7.
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άλληλων) ἐλπίζοντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, εἰ Πάνακτον Ἀθηναίοι παρὰ Βοιωτῶν ἀπολάβοιεν, κομίσασθαι δὲ αὐτὸι Πύλον, ἦλθον ἐς τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς πρεσβευόμενοι καὶ ἐδέοντο σφίσι Πάνακτον τε καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίων δεσμώτας παραδοῦναι, 3 ἵνα ἀντὶ αὐτῶν Πύλον κομίσωνται. οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν ἀποδώσειν, ἣν μὴ σφίσι ξυμμαχίαν ἰδίαν ποιήσωσιν ὡσπερ Ἀθηναίοις. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ εἰδότες μὲν ὅτι ἀδικήσουσιν Ἀθηναίους, εἰρημένον ἀνευ ἄλληλων μήτε σπένδεσθαί τῷ μήτε πολεμεῖν, βουλόμενοι δὲ τὸ Πάνακτον παραλαβεῖν ὡς τὴν Πύλον ἀντὶ αὐτῶν κομίσωντο, καὶ ἄμα τῶν ξυγχέαι σπευδόντων τὰς σπονδὰς προθυμομένων τὰ ἐς Βοιωτοὺς, ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, τοῦ χειμῶνος τελευτῶντος ἡδη καὶ πρὸς ἅπα καὶ τὸ Πάνακτον εὑθὺς καθηρεῖτο. καὶ ἐνδέκατον ἐτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

XL. "Ἀμα δὲ τῷ ἠρι εὐθὺς τοῦ ἐπιγεγυμνομένου θέρους οἱ Ἀργεῖοι, ὡς οἱ τε πρέσβεις τῶν Βοιωτῶν οὐκ ἔφασαν πέμψειν οὐχ ἥκον, τὸ τε Πάνακτον ἤσθεντο καθαιρούμενον καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἰδίαν γεγενημένην τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἔδεισαν μὴ μονωθῶσι καὶ ἐς Λακεδαιμόνιους πᾶσα ἡ ξυμμαχία χωρήσῃ, τοὺς γὰρ Βοιωτοὺς ὄντο πεπείθοντες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τὸ τε Πάνακτον καθελεῖν καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναίους σπονδὰς ἔσιναι, τοὺς τε Ἀθηναίους εἰδέναι ταύτα, 76
monians about places belonging to one or the other which they respectively held, the Lacedaemonians, in the hope that, if the Athenians should get back Panactum from the Boeotians, they themselves might recover Pylos, sent envoys to the Boeotians and begged them to deliver up Panactum and the Athenian prisoners to themselves, in order that they might recover Pylos in exchange for these. But the Boeotians refused to give them up, unless they would make a separate alliance with them just as with the Athenians. Now the Lacedaemonians knew that they would thereby be wronging the Athenians, inasmuch as it was stipulated not to make either peace or war with anyone without mutual consent, yet they wished to obtain Panactum in order to recover Pylos in exchange for it. Besides, the party that was eager to break the treaty was zealous for the connection with the Boeotians. So they concluded the alliance, when the winter was closing and the spring at hand; and the demolition of Panactum was immediately begun. So ended the eleventh year of the war.

XL. At the very beginning of the following summer, when the envoys whom the Boeotians promised to send did not come, the Argives, perceiving that Panactum was being demolished and a private alliance had been made by the Boeotians with the Lacedaemonians, began to fear that they would be left alone and the whole confederacy would go over to the Lacedaemonians. For they thought that the Boeotians had been persuaded by the Lacedaemonians to raze Panactum and to accede to the treaty with the Athenians, and that the Athenians knew these things, so that it was no
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όστε οúde πρὸς Ἀθηναίους εἴτε σφίσιν εἶναι ἐξυμ- 
μαχίαι ποιήσασθαι, πρότερον ἐλπίζομενες ἐκ τῶν 
διαφορῶν, εἰ μὴ μείνειαν αὐτοῖς αἱ πρὸς Δακεδαι- 
μονίους σπούδαί, τοῖς γοῦν Ἀθηναίοις ξύμμαχοι
3 ἔσεσθαι. ἀποροῦντες οὖν ταῦτα οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ
φοβοῦμενοι μὴ Δακεδαιμονίους καὶ Τεγεάταις,
Βοιωτοῖς καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἁμα πολεμῶσι, πρότερον
οὐ δεχόμενοι τὰς Δακεδαιμονίων σπονδάς, ἀλλ' ἐν
φρονήματι ὑμεῖς τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἡγήσασθαι,
ἔπεμπον ὡς ἐξώνυμο τάχιστα ἐσ τὴν Δακεδαίμονα
πρέσβεις Ἐὐστροφοῦ καὶ Αἰσώνα, οἱ ἐδόκουν
προσφιλέστατοι αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἡγούμενοι ἐκ τῶν
παρόντων κράτιστα, πρὸς Δακεδαιμονίους σπον-
δᾶς ποιησάμενοι ὅπῃ ἄν ξυγχωρήῃ, ἡσυχίαν
ἐχειν.

XLI. Καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἀφικόμενοι αὐτῶν λόγους
ἐποιούντο πρὸς τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους ἔφ'] ὃ ἀν
2 σφίσιν αἱ σπονδάι γέγονοντο. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον
οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἤξιον δίκης ἐπίτροπῇν σφίσι γενέσθαι
ἡ ἐς πόλιν τινα ἢ ἴδιωτην περὶ τῆς Κυνουρίας γῆς,
ἤς αἰεὶ πέρι διαφέρονται μεθορίας ὁυσὶς (ἐχεῖ δὲ
ἐν αὐτῇ Θυρέαν καὶ Ἀνθήνην πόλιν, νέμονται δ' 
αὐτὴν Δακεδαιμόνιοι). ἔπειτα δ' οὐκ ἐκὼνων Δακε-
δαιμονίων μεμνησθαι περὶ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰ βούλου-
ται σπένδεσθαι ὅσπερ πρότερον, ἐτοίμοι εἶναι, οἱ
Ἀργεῖοι πρέσβεις τάδε ὁμοὶ ἐπηγάγοντο τοὺς
Δακεδαιμονίους ξυγχωρῆσαι, ἐν μὲν τῷ παρόντι
σπονδᾶς ποιήσασθαι ἐτή πεντήκοντα, ἐξεῖναι δ' 
ὁποτεροίσῳν προκάλεσμένοις, μὴ τενόσου ὁυσὶς
μήτε πολέμου Δακεδαίμονι καὶ Ἀργεὶ, διαμά-

1 i.e. of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians.
longer possible for them to make an alliance even with the Athenians; whereas they had formerly hoped that if their treaty with the Lacedaemonians should not continue they might at any rate, in consequence of the differences,\(^1\) become allies of the Athenians. Being then in such perplexity and fearing lest they might have war at once with the Lacedaemonians and Tegeates, the Boeotians and the Athenians, the Argives, who before this had not accepted the treaty with the Lacedaemonians but proudly hoped to have the hegemony of the Peloponnesus, now sent to Lacedaemon in all haste two envoys, Eustrophus and Aeson, who seemed likely to be most acceptable to them, thinking it best under the present circumstances to make a treaty with the Lacedaemonians in whatever way might be feasible and to have quiet.

XLI. On their arrival their envoys made proposals to the Lacedaemonians as to the terms on which the treaty should be concluded. At first the Argives claimed that they should be allowed to submit to the arbitration of some city or private person the matter of the Cynurian territory—a district containing the towns of Thyrea and Anthene and occupied by the Lacedaemonians—which being border ground they were always disputing about. Afterwards, however, although the Lacedaemonians would not permit them to make mention of that district, but said that, if they wished to make a treaty on the same terms as before, they were ready to do so, the Argive envoys did induce the Lacedaemonians to agree to the following terms: for the present that a treaty should be made for fifty years; that, however, either Lacedaemon or Argos, provided there were at the time
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χεσθαί περὶ τῆς γῆς ταύτης, ἀστερ καὶ πρότερον ποτε, ὅτε αὐτοὶ ἐκάτεροι ἤξιωσαν νυκάν, διώκειν δὲ μὴ ἐξεῖναι περαιτέρω τῶν πρὸς Ἀργοὺς καὶ Λακεδαιμόνων ὄρων τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐδόκει μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐπειτα (ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ τὸ Ἀργοὺς πάντως φίλον ἔχειν) ἐυνεχώρησαν ἐφ’ οἷς ἤξιον καὶ ἐυνεγράψαντο. ἐκέλευον δ’ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πρὶν τέλος τι αὐτῶν ἔχειν, ἐς τὸ Ἀργοὺς πρῶτον ἐπαναχωρήσαντας αὐτοὺς δεῖξαι τῷ πλῆθει, καὶ ἤν ἀρέσκοντα ἦ, ἴτις ἐς τὰ Ῥακίνθια τοὺς ὀρκοὺς ποιησομένους καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνεχώρησαν.

XLII. Ἔν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ δ’ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ταύτα ἐπρᾶσσον, οἱ πρέσβεις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων Ἀνδρομένης καὶ Φαίδιμος καὶ Ἀντιμενίδας, οὕς ἔδει τὸ Πάνακτον καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς παρὰ Βοιωτῶν παραλαβόντας Ἀθηναίοις ἀποδοῦναι, τὸ μὲν Πάνακτον ὕπο τῶν Βοιωτῶν αὐτῶν καθηρμένον ήδον, ἐπὶ προφάσει ὡς ἰσάν ποτε Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Βοιωτοῖς ἐκ διαφορᾶς περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρκοπολαιούς μηδετέρους οἰκεῖν τὸ χωρίον ἅλλα κοινὴ νέμειν, τοὺς δ’ ἄνδρας οὓς εἴχον αἰχμαλώτους Βοιωτοὶ Ἀθηναίων παραλαβόντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀνδρομένη ἐκόμισαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ἀπέδοσαν, τοῦ Πάνακτον τὴν καθαίρεσιν ἔλεγον αὐτοῖς, νομίζοντες καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδιδόναι πολέμου γὰρ οὐκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ Ἀθηναίοις οἰκήσειν

1 550 B.C.; cf. Hdt. i. lxxxii.
neither pestilence nor war in either place, might challenge the other to decide by battle the question about this territory—just as once before, when each had claimed to be victorious—but pursuit must not be made beyond the boundaries, between Argos and Lacedaemon. At first this seemed to the Lacedaemonians mere folly, but afterwards, as they desired under any circumstances to have Argos friendly to them, they accepted the conditions demanded and joined in a written agreement. But the Lacedaemonians urged the envoys first, before any of the provisions should be regarded as settled, to return to Argos and lay the matter before the people, and then, if it should be satisfactory to them, to come to the Hyacinthian festival and take the oaths. So they withdrew.

XLII. In the meantime, while the Argives were negotiating these matters, the Lacedaemonian envoys, Andromenes, Phaedimus and Antimenidas, who were to take over Panactum and the prisoners from the Thebans and restore them to the Athenians, found that Panactum had been destroyed by the Boeotians themselves, on the pretext that once in former times, when there had been a quarrel about Panactum, oaths had been exchanged between the Athenians and Boeotians, that neither should inhabit the district, but they should graze it in common. As for the men of the Athenians, however, whom the Boeotians held as prisoners, Andromenes and his colleagues received these from them, and bringing them back restored them to the Athenians. They also told them of the demolition of Panactum, claiming that this, too, was a restoration; for thereafter no one hostile to the Athenians would

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2 οὐδένα. λεγομένων δὲ τούτων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δεινὰ ἐποιοῦν, νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπὸ Δακεδαμινών τοῦ τε Πανάκτου τῇ καθαιρέσει, δὲ ἔδει ὅρθων παραδοῦναι, καὶ πυνθανόμενοι ὅτι καὶ Βοιωτοῖς ἰδίᾳ ξυμμαχίᾳ πεποίηνται φάσκοντες πρότερον κοινῆ τοὺς μὴ δεχομένους τὰς σπονδὰς προσαναγκάσειν. τὰ τε ἅλλα ἐσκόπουν ὅσα ἐξελεύσαντο τῆς ξυνήκης καὶ ἐνόμιζον ἐξηπατήσασθαι, ὡστε χαλεπῶς πρὸς τοὺς πρέσβεις ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀπέπεμψαν.

XLIII. Κατὰ τοιαύτην δὴ διαφορὰν ὅντων τῶν Δακεδαμινῶν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις αὐτούς λύσαι τὰς σπονδὰς εὐθὺς 2 ἐνέκεισσαν. ἦσαν δὲ ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου, ἀνὴρ ἡλικία μὲν ἔτη τοῦτο δὲ νέος ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἡξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμῶμενος. ὃ ἐσόκει μὲν καὶ ἄμεινον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους μᾶλλον χωρεῖν, οὐ μέντοι ἄλλα καὶ φρονήματι φιλονικῶν ἠναντιοῦτο, ὅτι Δακεδαμινῶν διὰ Νικίου καὶ Δάχητος ἔτραχαν τὰς σπονδὰς, ἐαυτοῦν κατὰ τῇ νεότητα ὑπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν προξενίαν ποτὲ οὕσαν οὐ τιμήσαντες, ἢν τού πάππου ἀπειπότος αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἱμαλότους θεραπεύων διενοεῖτο 3 ἀνανεώσασθαι. πανταχόθεν τε νομίζον ἔλασσ—

1 cf. ch. xxxv. 3.
2 Born about 450 B.C., and so now about thirty years of age.
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dwell in it. The moment this was said the Athenians were very indignant, thinking that they were wronged by the Lacedaemonians, both in the demolition of Panactum, which ought to have been restored to them intact, and because they heard that the Lacedaemonians had made a separate alliance with the Boeotians, although they had said before\textsuperscript{1} that they would join in coercing any that did not accept the treaty. And they took into consideration the other matters wherein the Lacedaemonians had failed in their contract and in which they thought they had been deceived; and so they gave the envoys an angry answer and sent them away.

XLIII. As now the Lacedaemonians were thus at variance with the Athenians, the party at Athens that wished to annul the treaty at once became urgent in pressing their views. To this party belonged, among others, Alcibiades son of Cleinias, a man who, though as regards his age he would in any other city have been accounted even at that time as still young,\textsuperscript{2} was held in honour on account of the worth of his ancestors. To him it seemed really to be better to side with the Argives; it was not that alone, however, for he also opposed the treaty because he was piqued in his pride because the Lacedaemonians had negotiated it through Nicias and Laches, overlooking him on account of his youth and not showing him the respect that was due him on account of the old proxeny that once existed\textsuperscript{3} in his family. This relationship, though his grandfather had renounced it, he himself was by his attentions to their captives from Sphacteria now planning to renew. And so considering himself in

\textsuperscript{1} cf. vi. lxxxix. 2; Plut. Alcib. xiv.
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σούσθαι τό τε πρῶτον ἀντείπεν, οὐ βεβαίως φάσκων εἶναι Δακεδαιμονίους, ἀλλ᾿ ἵνα Ὄργείους σφίσι σπεισάμενοι ἐξέλωσι καὶ αὐθεὶς ἐπ᾿ Ἀθηναίους μόνους ἰώσι, τοῦτο ἐνεκα σπένδεσθαι αὐτοῦς, καὶ τότε, ἐπειδὴ ἡ διαφορὰ ἐγεγένητο, πέμπει εὐθὺς ἐς Ὄργος ἵδια, κελεύων ὡς τάχιστα ἐπὶ τήν ξυμμαχίαν προκαλουμένους ἦκειν μετὰ Μαντινέων καὶ Ὡλεῖων, ὡς καροῦ ὄντος καὶ αὐτὸς ξυμπράξων τὰ μάλιστα.

XLIV. Οἳ δὲ Ὅργεῖοι ἀκούσαντες τῆς τε ἀγγελίας καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγνωσαν οὐ μετ᾿ Ἀθηναῖον πραγμενόν την τῶν Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχίαν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐς διαφορὰν μεγάλην καθεστώτας αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους, τῶν μὲν ἐν Δακεδαίμονι πρέσβεων, οὐ σφίσι περὶ τῶν σπουδῶν ἑτυχον ἀπόντες, ἡμέλους, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μάλλον τῆν γνώμην εἶχον, νομίζοντες πόλιν τε σφίσι φιλίαν ἀπὸ πάλαιον καὶ δημοκρατουμένην ὡσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ δύναμιν μεγάλην ἔχουσαν τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ξυμπολεμήσεων σφίσιν, ἣν καθιστῶν·

2 ταῖς ἐς πόλεμον. ἔπεμπον οὖν εὐθὺς πρέσβεις ὡς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους περὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας ξυνεπριστὸν δὲ καὶ Ὡλεῖοι καὶ Μαντινής. ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ Δακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις κατὰ τάχος, δοκοῦντες ἐπιτήδειοι εἶναι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, Φιλοχαρίδας τε καὶ Λέων καὶ Ἐνδίος, δείσαντες μὴ τήν τε ξυμμαχίαν ὡργίζομενοι πρὸς τοὺς Ὅργείους ποιῆσωται, καὶ ἃμα Πύλων ἀπαιτήσετο ἀντὶ 84
every way slighted, he both spoke against the treaty in the first instance, alleging that the Lacedaemonians were not to be trusted, but that their object in making the treaty was, that by concluding a treaty with the Athenians they might utterly overthrow the Argives and then proceed against the Athenians when thus isolated; and at the present time, after the difference had occurred, he promptly dispatched a message to Argos privately, bidding them come as quickly as possible, along with the Mantineans and Eleans, and invite the Athenians to form an alliance, as the moment was favourable and he himself would cooperate to the utmost.

XLIV. When the Argives received this message and realized that the alliance with the Boeotians had been made without the consent of the Athenians, but that these were involved in a serious quarrel with the Lacedaemonians, they took no further thought about their envoys at Lacedaemon, who had gone thither on the matter of the treaty, and gave their attention rather to the Athenians, thinking that a city which had been of old friendly to them and was governed by a democracy, just as they were, and possessed great power on sea, would enter the war along with them, should they be involved in war. Accordingly, they at once sent envoys to Athens to negotiate the alliance; and there went with them also envoys of the Eleans and Mantineans. But thither came, too, in all haste, envoys of the Lacedaemonians who were thought to be acceptable to the Athenians, Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius, for there was fear that the Athenians in their anger might make the alliance with the Argives; and the envoys were also to demand the restoration of Pylos in place of
Πανάκτου, καὶ περὶ τῆς Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχίας απολογησόμενοι ὃς οὐκ ἔπλι κακῷ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐποίησαντο.

XLV. Καὶ λέγοντες ἐν τῇ βουλῇ περὶ τε τούτων καὶ ὡς αὐτοκράτορες ἤκουσιν περὶ πάντων ξυμβῆναι τῶν διαφόρων, τῶν Ἀλκιβιάδην ἔφοβοιν μὴ καὶ, ἂν ἐστὶν δῆμον ταύτα λέγωσιν, ἐπαγάγωνται τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἀπωσθῇ ἡ Ἀργείων ἡ ξυμμαχία. μηχανᾶται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοιόνδε τι ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης: τοὺς Ἀκεδαμίοιοὺς πείθει πίστεν αὐτοῖς δοῦσι, ἢν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ αὐτοκράτορες ήκειν, Πύλων τε αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν (πείσειν γὰρ αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίοις, ὦστερ καὶ νῦν ἀντιλέγειν) καὶ τὰλλα ξυναλλάξειν. Βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοὺς Νικίοι τε ἀποστήσαι ταύτα ἔπρασσε καὶ ὅπως, ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλῶν αὐτοῖς ὅσον οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἐν νῷ ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οὐδέποτε ταύτα, τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ Ἡλείους καὶ Μαντανέας ξυμμάχους ποιήσῃ. καὶ ἐγένετο οὕτως. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐστὶν δῆμον παρελθόντας καὶ ἐπερωτώμενοι οὐκ ἔφασαν ὦστερ ἐν τῇ βουλῇ αὐτοκράτορες ἤκειν, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ἤνείχοντο, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου τολλὺ ἐδώκει καὶ ἀρχηγὸν τῶν Ἀκεδαμιοίων ἐσήκουν τε καὶ ἑτοίμου ἤσαν εὐθὺς παραγαγόντες τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτῶν ξυμμάχους ποιεῖσθαι· σεισμοῦ δὲ γενομένου πρὶν τι ἐπικυρωθῆναι, ἢ ἐκκλησία αὐτή ἀνεβλήθη.

XLVI. Τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὁ Νικίας,
BOOK V. xliv. 3-xlvi. 1

Panactum, and to say at the same time, in excuse for the Boeotian alliance, that it had not been made with a view to injuring the Athenians.

XLV. Speaking in the senate on these points, and saying that they had come with full power to settle all their differences, they filled Alcibiades with alarm lest, if they should say the same things to the assembly, they should win over the people and the Argive alliance might be rejected. So he adopted the following device against them: He persuaded the Lacedaemonians, by pledging them his faith, that, if they would not admit before the assembly that they had come with full powers, he would restore Pylos to them—for he himself would use his influence with the Athenians for them as now he opposed them—and would settle the other points at issue. He resorted to such methods because he wished to detach them from Nicias, and in order that he might accuse them before the assembly of having no sincere intentions and of never saying the same things, and thereby might effect an alliance with the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans. And so it turned out. For when, on coming before the popular assembly and being asked whether they had come with full powers, they answered "No," contrary to what they had said in the senate, the Athenians could endure it no longer, but hearkened to Alcibiades, who inveighed against the Lacedaemonians far more than before, and were ready at once to bring in the Argives and their confederates and conclude an alliance. But before anything was ratified an earthquake occurred, and this assembly was adjourned.

XLVI. In the assembly on the next day, however,
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καίτερ, τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων αὐτῶν ἡπατημένων, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔξηπατημένος περὶ τοῦ μὴ αὐτοκράτορας ὁμολογήσαι ἢκειν, ὡμοὶ τῶν Δακεδαιμονίως ἐφη χρῆναι φίλους μᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἐπισχόντας τὰ πρὸς Ἀργείους πέμψαι ἔτι ὡς αὐτοὺς καὶ εἰδέναι ὅ τι διανοοῦνται, λέγων ἐν μὲν τῷ σφετέρῳ καλῇ, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκείνων ἀπρεπεῖ τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι σφίσι μὲν γὰρ εὐ ἐστῶτων τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς ἐπὶ πλείστον ἀριστον εἶναι διασώσασθαι τὴν εὐπραγίαν, ἐκείνως δὲ δυστυχεῖσιν ὅτι τάχιστα εὐρήμα 2 εἶναι διακινδυνεύσαι. ἔπεισε τε πέμψαι πρέσβεις, δῶν καὶ αὐτὸς ἦν, κελεύσοντας Δακεδαιμονίους εἰ τι δίκαιον διανοοῦνται, Πάνακτον τε ὁρθῶν ἀποδίδοναι καὶ Ἀμφίπολιν, καὶ τὴν Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχίαν ἀνεῖναι, ἣν μὴ ἐς τὰς σπουδὰς ἐσίωσι, καθάπερ εἰρητο ἀνευ ἄλληλων μηδενὶ 3 ξυμβαίνειν. εἰπεῖν τε ἐκέλευον ὅτι καὶ σφέεις, εἰ ἐβούλοντο ἀδικεῖν, ἣδη ἄν Ἀργείους ξυμμάχους πεποίησθαι, ὡς παρεῖναι γὰ αὐτοὺς αὐτοῦ τούτου ἐνεκαίετε τε τῷ ἀλλῳ ἐνεκάλουν, πάντα ἑπιστείλαντες ἀπέπεμψαν τοὺς περὶ τὸν Νικίαν 4 πρέσβεις. καὶ ἀφικομένων αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπαγγειλάντων τά τε ἀλλα καὶ τέλος εἰπόντων ὅτι, εἰ μὴ
Nicias, although, as the Lacedaemonians had themselves been deceived, so he too had been deceived in the matter of their admission that they had not come with full powers, nevertheless still maintained that they ought to become friends with the Lacedaemonians rather than with the Argives; and accordingly he proposed that, deferring the question of the Argive alliance, they should again send envoys to the Lacedaemonians and find out what their intentions were. He urged the view that the postponement of hostile operations was honourable for themselves but humiliating for the Lacedaemonians; for as matters stood well for themselves, it was best to preserve their good fortune as long as possible, whereas for the Lacedaemonians, who were in hard luck, it would be clear gain to risk a decisive contest as quickly as possible. So he persuaded them to send envoys, himself being one, to urge the Lacedaemonians, if they had any just intentions, to restore Panactum intact and Amphipolis, and to give up the alliance with the Boeotians—unless these should accede to the treaty—in accordance with the stipulation which had been arrived at that neither should enter into an agreement with any third party without the consent of the other. The ambassadors were instructed also to say that, if the Athenians had wished to do wrong, they would already have made the Argives allies, as their envoys were present for that very purpose; and any other complaints which they had to make they included in their instructions to Nicias and his colleagues and then despatched them to Sparta. When these had arrived and had finished reciting their other demands, they said in conclusion that, unless the Lacedaemonians
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τὴν ξυμμαχίαν ἀνήσουσι Βοιωτοίς μὴ ἐσιοῦσιν ἐσ τὰς σπονδάς, ποιήσουται καὶ αὐτοὶ Ἅργεῖοι καὶ
tοὺς μετ’ αὐτῶν ξυμμάχους, τὴν μὲν ξυμμαχίαν
οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Βοιωτοῖς, οὐκ ἔφασαν ἀνήσειν,
ἐπικρατοῦντων τῶν περὶ τὸν Ξενάρη τὸν ἔφορον
tαῦτα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης
ήσαν, τοὺς δὲ ὀρκοὺς δεσμένου Νικίου ἀνενεώ-

eroτo ἐφοβεῖτo γὰρ μὴ πάντα ἀτελὴ ἔχων
ἀπέλθῃ καὶ διαβληθῇ, ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο, αὐτὸς

dοκῶν εἶναι τῶν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους σπονδῶν.

5 ἀναγιγήσαντός τε αὐτῶν ὡς ἦκουσαν οἱ Ἅθναιοι
οὐδὲν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίου πεπραγμένου, εὐθὺς δὲ
ὀργῇς εἶχον, καὶ νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι (ἐτυχον

gὰρ παρόντες οἱ Ἅργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξυμμαχοῦντες Ἁλκιβιάδου)
ἐποιήσαντο σπονδάς καὶ
ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς αὐτῶν τήνδε.

XLVII. "Σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο ἐκατόν Ἀθηναίοι
ἔτη καὶ Ἅργεῖοι καὶ Μαντινέας καὶ Ἡλεῖος τρόσ
ἀλλήλους ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων
ων ἀρχουσιν ἐκάτεροι, ἀδόλους καὶ ἀβλαβείς καὶ
κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν.

2 "Οτι δὲ μὴ ἔξεστω ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ πημονὴ μήτε
ปรสิ"Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Ἡλεῖοι καὶ Μαντινέας καὶ τοὺς
ξυμμάχους ἐπὶ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους
ων ἀρχουσιν Ἀθηναίοι, μήτε Ἀθηναίοι καὶ τοὺς
ξυμμάχους ἀρχουσιν Ἀθηναίοι ἐπὶ Ἅργεῖος
καὶ Ἡλεῖος καὶ Μαντινέας καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους,
τέχνη μηδὲ μηχανῇ μηδεμίᾳ.

3 "Κατὰ τάδε ξυμμάχους εἶναι Ἀθηναίοι καὶ

1 πρὸς ἀλλήλους, restored from the inscription recording
2 ὑν ἀρχουσιν Ἀθηναίοι restored by Kirchhoff from the
inscription.
should give up the alliance with the Boeotians, in case these would not accede to the treaty, they themselves would make an alliance with the Argives and their confederates. But the Lacedaemonians refused to give up the alliance with the Boeotians—the party of Xenares the ephor and all the rest that were of that view carrying their point to this effect—but the oaths they renewed on Nicias' request; for he was afraid that he would return with nothing accomplished and be exposed to calumny, as indeed happened, since he was generally regarded as having been responsible for the treaty with the Lacedaemonians. On his return, when the Athenians heard that nothing had been done at Lacedaemon, they flew into a rage, and thinking they had been wronged, when Alcibiades brought in the Argives and their allies, who chanced to be present, they made an alliance with them on the following terms:

XLVII. 1. "The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans have made a treaty with one another for a hundred years, on behalf of themselves and the allies over whom they have authority respectively, to be observed without fraud or hurt both by land and sea.

2. "It shall not be allowed to bear arms with harmful intent, either for the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans and their allies against the Athenians and the allies over whom the Athenians have authority, or for the Athenians and the allies over whom the Athenians have authority against the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans and their allies, by any art or device.

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Αργείους καὶ Ἡλείους καὶ Μαντινέας ἐκατὸν ἔτη ἦν πολέμιοι ἦσσιν ἐς τὴν γῆν τὴν Ἀθηναίων, ῥοθεῖν Ἀργείους καὶ Ἡλείους καὶ Μαντινέας Ἀθήνας, καθ’ ὅ τι ἄν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν Ἀθηναίοι, τρόπῳ ὁπόῳ ἄν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἦν δὲ δησιώτερα οἴχονται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Ἀργείους καὶ Μαντινεύσι καὶ Ἡλεῖος καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ κακοῖς πάσχειν ὑπὸ ἀπασῶν τῶν πόλεων τούτων καταλύειν δὲ μὴ ἐξεῖναι τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς ταύτην τὴν πόλιν μηδεμιὰ τῶν πόλεων, ἦν μὴ ἀπάσαις δοκῆ.

4 “Ῥοθεῖν δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἐς Ἀργος καὶ ἐς Μαντινείαν καὶ ἐς Ἡλείαν, ἦν πολέμιοι ἦσσιν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν τὴν Ἡλείων ἡ τὴν Μαντινέων ἡ τὴν Ἀργείων, καθ’ ὅ τι ἄν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν αἱ πόλεις αὐταί, τρόπῳ ὁποίῳ ἄν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἦν δὲ δησιώτερα οἴχονται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις καὶ Μαντινεύσι καὶ Ἡλείοις καὶ κακοῖς πάσχειν ὑπὸ ἀπασῶν τούτων τῶν πόλεων καταλύειν δὲ μὴ ἐξεῖναι τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς ταύτην τὴν πόλιν μηδεμιὰ τῶν πόλεων, ἦν μὴ ἀπάσαις δοκῆ.

5 “Ὅπλα δὲ μὴ εἶν ἑχουσα διένει ἐπὶ πολέμῳ διδ τῆς γῆς τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐξωμάχων ὑν ἄρχονσι ἐκαστοί, μηδὲ κατὰ βάλασαν, ἦν μὴ ψηφισμένοι τῶν πόλεων ἀπασῶν τὴν διόδον εἶναι, Ἀθηναίοι καὶ Ἀργείων καὶ Μαντινείων καὶ Ἡλείων.

1 Added by Stahl.  2 Added by Stahl.
3 μηδεμιὰ τῶν πόλεων restored by Kirchhoff from the inscription.
4 ταῖς πόλεσιν, after δοκῆ, deleted by Kirchhoff according to the inscription.

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shall be allies for a hundred years on the following terms: If an enemy invade the territory of the Athenians, the Argives, Eleans and Mantineans shall bring aid to Athens, according as the Athenians may send them word, in whatever way they can most effectually, to the limit of their power; but if the invaders shall have ravaged the land and gone, that city shall be hostile to the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, and shall suffer at the hands of all these states; and to discontinue hostilities against that state shall not be allowed to any one of these states, unless all agree.

4. "Likewise the Athenians shall bring aid to Argos and to Mantinea and Elis, if an enemy come against the territory of the Eleans or that of the Mantineans or that of the Argives, according as these states send word, in whatever way they can most effectually, to the limit of their power; but if the invader shall have ravaged the land and gone, that city shall be hostile to the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, and shall suffer ill at the hands of all these states; and to discontinue hostilities against that state shall not be allowed to any one of these states, unless all agree.

5. "It shall not be permitted to pass under arms with hostile intent through their own territory or that of the allies over whom they severally have authority, nor by sea, unless passage shall have been voted by all of these states, Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans."
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6 "Τοῖς δὲ βοηθοῦσιν ἡ πόλις ἡ πέμπουσα παρεχέτω μέχρι μὲν τριάκοντα ἥμερῶν σίτον ἑπὶ ἔλθωσιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἐπαγγελθάσαν βοηθεῖν, καὶ ἀπιοῦσι κατὰ ταύτα. ἦν δὲ πλέον βοῦλωνται χρόνον τῇ στρατιᾷ χρῆσθαι, ἡ πόλις ἡ μεταπεμψαμένη διδότω σίτον, τῷ μὲν ὀπλίτῃ καὶ ψιλῷ καὶ τοξότῃ τρεῖς ὀβολοὺς Ἀιγυπτίων τῆς ἥμερας ἐκάστης, τῷ δ' ἦπει δραχμὴν Ἀιγυπτίων.

7 "Ἡ δὲ πόλις ἡ μεταπεμψαμένη τῇ στρατιᾷ τὴν ἥγημονίαν ἔχετω, ὅταν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ὁ πόλεμος ἦν δὲ ποι ἀπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσι κοινῇ στρατευσθαι, τὸ ἱσον τῆς ἥγημονίας μετείναι ἀπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν.

8 "Ομόσαι δὲ τὰς σπουδὰς Ἀθηναίων μὲν ὑπὲρ τε σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, Ἀργείοι δὲ καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἡλείοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τούτων κατὰ πόλεις ὀμνύντων. ὀμνύντων δὲ τῶν ἐπιχώριον ὄρκον ἔκαστο τὸν μέγιστον κατὰ ἱερῶν τελείων. ὁ δὲ ὄρκος ἐστω ὅδε: 'Εμμενῶ τῇ ξυμμαχίᾳ κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα δικαίως καὶ ἀβλαβῶς καὶ ἀδόλως, καὶ οὐ παραβῆσομαι τέχνη οὐδὲ μηχανὴ οὐδεμιᾶ.

9 "Ομνύντων δὲ Ἀθηναίοι μὲν ἡ βουλὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνδημοί ἄρχαι, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ πρυτάνεις· ἐν Ἀργεί δὲ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ οἱ ὁγδοκούνται καὶ οἱ ἀρτινοῖ, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ ὁγδοκούνται· ἐν δὲ Μαντινείᾳ οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἄρχαι, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ θεωροὶ καὶ οἱ

1 τῇ στρατιᾷ added by van Herwerden.
2 ἀπάσαις according to the inscription; MSS. omit.

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6. "For the relieving force the state which sends for them shall furnish provisions for thirty days after their arrival in the state which sent for succour, and in like manner on their return; but if they wish to use the army for a longer period, the city which sends for it shall furnish provisions for heavy-armed or light-armed troops or bowmen, three Aeginetan obols\(^1\) per day, and for a cavalryman one Aeginetan drachma.\(^2\)

7. "The state which sent for the troops shall have command whenever the war is in its territory. But if it shall seem good to all the states to make a joint expedition anywhere, all the states shall share the command equally.

8. "The Athenians shall swear to the treaty for themselves and their allies, but the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and their allies shall swear to it individually by states. And they shall severally swear the oath that is most binding in their own country, over full-grown victims. And the oath shall be as follows: 'I will abide by the alliance in accordance with its stipulations, justly and without injury and without guile, and will not transgress it by any art or device.'

9. "The oath shall be sworn at Athens by the senate and the home\(^3\) magistrates, the prytanes administering it; at Argos by the senate and the eighty and the artynae, the eighty administering the oath; at Mantinea by the demiurgi and the senate and the other magistrates, the theori and the

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1 About 8d. or 16 cents.
2 About 1s. 4d. or 32 cents.
3 i.e. those whose functions were restricted to the city.
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πολέμαρχοι· εν δὲ Ἡλίδι οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ οἱ ἔξακοσιοὶ, ἔξορκοῦντον δὲ οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ οἱ θεσμοφόρακες.

10 Ὅσα ἐν οἷον οἱ Αθηναῖοι μὲν ἴσταν ἢ Ηλίῳ καὶ ἡ Μαντινεία καὶ ἡ Αργος τριάκοντα ἴμεραι πρὸ Ὀλυμπίαν, Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ Ηλεῖοι καὶ Μαντινέας ἴσταν Ἀθηναῖες δέκα ἴμεραι πρὸ Παναθηναίων τῶν μεγάλων.

11 "Τὰς δὲ ξυνθήκας τὰς περὶ τῶν σπουδῶν καὶ τῶν ὀρκών καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἀναγράψαι εἰν στήλη λιθίνη Ἀθηναίους μὲν εἰν πόλει, Ἀργεῖοι δὲ εἰν ἄγορᾷ εἰν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τῷ ἵερῷ, Μαντινέας δὲ εἰν τοῦ Δίως τῷ ἵερῷ εἰν τῇ ἁγορᾷ καταθέτων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίασι στήλην χαλκὴν κοινὴ Ὀλυμπίαοι τοῖς νυνὶ.

12 "Εὰν δὲ τι δοκῇ ἁμείναι εἶναι ταῖς πόλεσι ταύταις προσθεῖναι πρὸς τοὺς ξυνκειμένους, ὦ τι ἀν δόξῃ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀπάσαις κοινῇ βουλευομέναις, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι.”

XLVIII. Αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ καὶ η ἥξυμμαχία οὕτως ἐγένοντο. καὶ αἱ τῶν Δακεδαίμονών καὶ Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἀπείρητο τούτων ἑνεκα οὐδ’ ὕφ’ ἑτέρων. Κορίνθου δὲ Ἀργείων δυτες ἥξυμμαχοι οὐκ ἐσῆλθον ἢ αὐτάς, ἀλλ’ καὶ γενομένης πρὸ τούτου Ἡλείως καὶ Ἀργεῖος καὶ Μαντινεύσι ἥξυμμαχίας, τοῖς αὐτοῖς πολεμεῖν καὶ εἰρήνην ἀγεῖν, οὐ ἥξυμμασαν, ἀρκεῖν δ’ ἐφασαν σφίσει τὴν

1 καὶ οἱ τὰ τέλη ἔχοντες, in MSS. after δημιουργοί, deleted by Kirchhoff as gloss on that word.

2 ὦ τι ὦ οἱ in MSS., οἱ deleted by Bekker.

1 A fragment of the official document recording this treaty was found by the Archaeological Society at Athens in the 96
polemarchs administering the oath; at Elis by the demiurgi and the six hundred, the demiurgi and the thersomophylaces administering the oath.

10. "For renewal of the oath the Athenians shall go to Elis, to Mantinea, and to Argos, thirty days before the Olympic games; and the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to Athens ten days before the great Panathenaea.

11. "The stipulations respecting the treaty, the oaths, and the alliance shall be inscribed on a stone column, by the Athenians on the Acropolis, by the Argives in the market-place, in the temple of Apollo, by the Mantineans in the market-place, in the temple of Zeus; and a brazen pillar shall be set up by them jointly at the Olympic games of this year.

12. "If it shall seem advisable to these states to add anything further to these agreements, whatever shall seem good to all the states in joint deliberation shall be binding."

XLVIII. Thus the treaty and the alliance were completed; but the treaty between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians was not on this account renounced by either party. The Corinthians, however, although allies of the Argives, did not accede to the new treaty—even before this when an alliance, offensive and defensive, had been made between the Eleans, Argives, and Mantineans, they had not joined it—but said they were content with the first defensive alliance that had been made,

spring of 1877 upon a marble slab on the southern slope of the Acropolis. The text of the inscription has been restored by Kirchhoff, Schöne, Foucart, and Stahl in substantial agreement.
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πρώτην γενομένην ἐπιμαχίαν, ἀλλήλους βοηθεῖν,
3 ξυνεπιστρατεύειν δὲ μηδενί. οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι
οὔτως ἀπέστησαν τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ πρὸς τοὺς
Δακεδαιμονίους πάλιν τὴν γνώμην εἶχον.

XLIX. Ὁλύμπια δὲ ἐγένετο τοῦ θέρους τοῦτο
οἷς Ἀνδροσθένης Ἀρκάς παγκράτιον τὸ πρῶτον
ἐνίκα· καὶ Δακεδαιμόνιοι τοῦ ἱεροῦ ὑπὸ Ἡλεῖων
εἰρχθησαν ὡστε μὴ θείες μηδὲ ἀγωνίζεσθαι, οὐκ
ἔκτινοτες τὴν δίκην αὐτοῖς ἦν ἐν τῷ Ὁλυμπικῷ
νόμῳ Ἡλεῖοι κατεδικάσαντο αὐτῶν, φάσκοντες
σφῶν ἐπὶ Φύρκον τε τεῖχος ὅπλα ἐπενεγκεῖν καὶ
est Ἀέσπρου αὐτῶν ὅπλα ἐσπέρησαν εἰς ταῖς Ὁλυμπικαῖς
σπουδαῖς ἐσπέρψαν. ἡ δὲ καταδίκη δισχίλιαι
μναὶ ἑκατον δύο μυναί,
2 ὡστερ δὲ νόμος ἔχει. Δακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ πρέσβεις
πέμψαντες ἀντέλεγον μὴ δικαίως σφῶν καταδεδι-
κάσθαι, λέγοντες μὴ ἐπηγγέλθαι πω ἐσ Δακεδαί-
μονα τὰς σπουδαῖς, ὅτε ἐσπέρμαζαν τοὺς ὅπλας.
3 Ἡλεῖοι δὲ τὴν παρὰ αὐτοῖς ἐκεχερίαν ἢδη ἔφασαν
εἶναι (πρῶτος γὰρ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπαγγέλλουσι),
kαὶ ἡσυχαζόντων σφῶν καὶ ὦ προσδεχομένων ὡς
4 ἐν σπουδαῖς, αὐτοῖς λαθεῖν ἀδικήσατας. οἱ δὲ
Δακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπελάμβανον ὡς χρεὸν εἶναι αὐτοὺς
ἐπαγγεῖλαι ἔτι ἐσ Δακεδαίμονα, εἰ ἀδικεῖν γε ἢδη
ἐνόμιζον αὐτούς, ἀλλ' οὖν ως νομίζοντας τοῦτο
dράσαι, καὶ ὅπλα ὀυδαμόσε οὖτι αὐτοῖς ἐπενεγκεῖν.

1 The month of the festival was sacred (ἱερομνημία) and all warfare was stopped for that time. To enter the territory of Elis with an armed force during that month was sacrilegious.
namely to aid one another, but not to join in
attacking any other party. Thus, then, the Corin-
thians held aloof from their allies and were turning
their thoughts again to the Lacedaemonians.

XLIX. This summer the Olympic games were held, in which Androstenes an Arcadian won his
first victory in the panctrarium. The Lacedaemonians
were excluded from the sanctuary by the Eleans,
and so could neither sacrifice nor contend in the
games, as they refused to pay the fine which had
been assessed against them according to Olympic law
by the Eleans, who alleged that they had attacked
the Elean fortress of Phyrus, and sent a force of
their hoplites into Lepreum during the Olympic
truce.\(^1\) The fine was two thousand minas,\(^2\) two
minas\(^3\) for each hoplite, as the law ordains. The
Lacedaemonians sent envoys and urged that the fine
had been unfairly imposed upon them, claiming that
the treaty had not been announced at Lacedaemon
when they sent the hoplites into Elis. But the Eleans
said that the truce was already in force in their
country—for they proclaim it among themselves first
—and while they were keeping quiet and not ex-
pecting any attack, as in time of truce, the Lacedae-
monians had done the wrong, taking them by surprise.
The Lacedaemonians replied that they should not
have gone on and announced the truce at Lacedae-
mon if they were of the opinion that the Lacedae-
monians were already wronging them, but they had
done this as though they did not think so, and they
themselves had not kept on bearing arms against
them anywhere after the announcement of the truce.

\(^1\) About £8,125 or $38,840.
\(^2\) About £8 2s. 6d. or $39.
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5 Ἡλεῖοι δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου εἴχοντο, ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἄδικοῦσι μὴ ἀν πεισθῆναι, εἰ δὲ βούλονται σφίσι Λέπτρεων ἀποδοῦναι, τό τε αὐτῶν μέρος ἀφιέναι τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ τῷ θεῷ γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων ἐκτείσειν.

6 Ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἐσήκουν, αὕτης τάδε ἥξιον, Λέπτρεων μὲν μὴ ἀποδοῦναι, εἰ μὴ βούλονται, ἀναβάντας δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν τοῦ Δίος τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου, ἐπειδή προσβυμοῦνται χρῆσθαι τῷ ιερῷ, ἐπομόσαι ἐναντίον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἢ μὴν ἀποδώσειν

2 ὑστερον τὴν καταδίκην. ὡς δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτα ἦθελον, Δακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν εἰργοῦντο τοῦ ιεροῦ θυσίας καὶ ἀγώνων ὁ καὶ οίκοι ἔθνοι, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἑλληνες ἔθεον.

3 Ῥουν πλὴν Λεπτρατῶν. ὡς δὲ οἱ Ἡλεῖοι ἔδεισαν μὴ βιὰς θύσωσι, εἶναι δὴ πλοῦς τῶν νεωτέρων φυλακῆς εἰχον ήλθον δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς, χίλιοι ἐκατέρων, καὶ Ἀθηναίων ἱπτῆς, οἱ ἐν Ἀρ- ὑπέμενον τὴν ἐστήν. δέος δὲ ἐγένετο τῇ πανηγύρει μέγα μὴ εἶναι ὅπλοις ἐλθοῦσιν οἱ Δακε- δαιμόνιοι, ἄλλος τε καὶ ἐπειδῆ καὶ Δίκαιος ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος, Δακεδαιμόνιος, ἐν τῷ ἀγώνι ὑπὸ τῶν Ῥαβδούχων πληγὰς ἐλαβεν, ὅτι νικώτος τοῦ ἑαυ- τοῦ ἐξουσίαν καὶ ἀνακηρυχθέντος Βοιωτῶν δημοσίου κατὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐξουσίαν τῆς ἀγωνίσεως, προελθὼν ἐς τὸν ἀγώνα ἀνέδησε τὸν ἴνιοχον, βουλόμενον

1 θυσίας καὶ ἀγώνων bracketed by Hude following Krüger.
2 Michaelis’ correction for Ἀργεί of the MSS.
BOOK V. XLIX. 5-

But the Eleans persisted in the same statement, saying that they could never be persuaded that the Lacedaemonians were not guilty; if, however, they were willing to restore Lepreum to them, they would give up their own half of the fine, and what was due to the gods they would themselves pay on their behalf.

L. When the Lacedaemonians refused this offer, the Eleans proposed that they should not restore Lepreum, if they objected to that, but, as they eagerly desired to have access to the sanctuary, that they should go up to the altar of Olympian Zeus and swear in the presence of the Hellenes that they would assuredly pay the fine later. But as they were unwilling to do even this, the Lacedaemonians were excluded from the temple, from the sacrifice and the contests, and sacrificed at home; while the rest of the Hellenes, except the Lepreates, sent representatives to the festival. Still the Eleans, fearing that the Lacedaemonians would force their way and offer sacrifice, kept guard with the young men under arms; and there came to their aid also some Argives and Mantineans, a thousand of each, and some Athenian cavalry that were at Arpina¹ awaiting the festival. And great fear came upon the assembly that the Lacedaemonians might come with arms, especially as Lichas son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedaemonian, received blows from the umpires on the course, because, when his own team won and was proclaimed as belonging to the Boeotian state on account of his having no right to contend, he had come upon the course and crowned the charioteer, wishing to show that the

¹ In the valley of the Alpheus, twenty stadia above Olympia.
δηλώσαι ὅτε ἐμφατίζῃ ἂν τὸ ἄρμα: ἀπεστρέφων τῶν πάντων καὶ ἐδόκει τινές ἔσπεραί. οἱ μέν τοι Δακεδαίμονες ἦσὺχατον τε καὶ ἡ ἐφήμημεν οὐτωσὶν ὁδηγηθεν. ἐσθὲ δὲ Κόρινθιον ἔτη τὰ Ὀλύμπια Ἀργείωι τε καὶ οἱ ξύμβαλοι αἰτίον ἔσπερες ἐπὶ λαμβάνει τότε σφαῖς ἔλθεν (καὶ Δακεδαίμονες πρέσβεις ἐτυχον παρόντες)—καὶ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων τέλος οὐδὲν ἐπήραξε, ἀλλὰ σεισμοῦ γενομένου διελύθησαν ἕκαστοι ἐπ' οἴκον. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἠτέλευτα.

II. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνωμένου χειμῶνος Ἡρακλεώτατος τοίς ἐν Τραχύωι μάχη ἐγένετο πρὸς Αἰνιάνας καὶ Δόλοτας καὶ Μηνίας καὶ Θεσσαλῶν τινας. 2 προσοκὼντα γὰρ τὰ ἐθνη ταῦτα τῇ πόλει πολέμια ἢν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' ἄλλη τινὶ γῆ τῇ τούτων τὸ χωρίον ἔτειχίσθη. καὶ ἐνθὺς τε καθισταμένη τῇ πόλει ἤναντίοντο, ἐσθὲ ἠδύναντο φθείροντες, καὶ τότε τῇ μάχῃ ἐνκέισαν τοὺς Ἡρακλεώτας, καὶ Ἑνάρης ο Ἐγίνδιος, Δακεδαίμονες, ἄρχων αὐτῶν ἀπέθανε, διεφθάρχησαν δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν. καὶ ὁ χειμών ἠτέλευτα, καὶ δωδέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἠτέλευτα.

IIII. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνωμένου θέρους εὐθὺς ἄρχομένου τῆν Ἡράκλειαν, ὡς μετὰ τὴν μάχην κακῶς ἐφθείρετο, Βοιωτοὶ παρέλαβον, καὶ Ἡγισπιτίδαιν τὸν Δακεδαίμονον ὧς οὐ καλῶς ἄρχοντα ἐξέπεμψαν. δείσαντες δὲ παρέλαβον τὸ χωρίον μη̇ Δακεδαιμονίων τὰ κατὰ Πελοπόννησον θροβομένων Ἀθηναίοι λάβωσιν· Δακεδαίμονες μέντοι ὕψη ἔξοντο αὐτοῖς.
2 Καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου,
chariot was his. And so everybody was much more afraid, and it seemed that there would be some disturbance. The Lacedaemonians, however, kept quiet, and the festival went through in this way, as far as they were concerned. But after the Olympic games the Argives and their allies came to Corinth, to ask them to join their league. Lacedaemonian envoys also happened to be present. Many proposals were made, but nothing was done; for an earthquake occurred and they dispersed severally to their homes. And the summer ended.

LI. During the following winter, there was a battle between the people of Heracleia in Trachis and the Aenianians, Dolopians, Malians, and some of the Thessalians. For these were neighbouring tribes and hostile to the city of Heracleia, since the fortress there was established as a menace to no other territory but theirs. Accordingly, as soon as the city was founded, they began to show opposition to it, harassing it as much as they could; and at this time they defeated the Heracleotes, Xenares son of Cnides, a Lacedaemonian and their commander, being killed, as well as some of the Heracleotes. And the winter ended, and with it the twelfth year of this war.

LII. At the very beginning of the following summer, as Heracleia was in a grievous plight after the battle, the Boeotians took possession of it and dismissed Hegesippidas, the Lacedaemonian, for misgovernment. They occupied the place through fear that, while the Lacedaemonians were disturbed about matters in the Peloponnesus, the Athenians might take it; the Lacedaemonians, however, were angry at them for this.

During the same summer Alcibiades son of
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στρατηγὸς δὲν Ἄθηναίων, Ἀργείων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ξυμπρασσόντων ἔλθων ἐς Πελοπόννησον μετ’ ὀλίγαν Ἀθηναίων ὀπλιτῶν καὶ τοξοτῶν καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων παραλαβῶν τὰ τε ἄλλα ξυγκαθίστη περὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν διαπορεύομενος Πελοπόννησον τῇ στρατιᾷ καὶ Πατρέας τε τείχη καθεύναι ἔπεισεν ἐς θάλασσαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἔτερον διενεῖτο τειχίσαι ἐπὶ τῷ 'Ρίφῳ τῷ Ἀχαϊκῷ. Κορίνθιοι δὲ καὶ Σικυώνιοι καὶ οἶς ἦν ἐν βλάβῃ τειχισθέντας βοηθήσαντες διεκώλυσαν.

LIII. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ θέρους Ἐπιδαυρίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις πόλεμος ἐγένετο, προφάσει μὲν περὶ τοῦ θύματος τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Πυθαίως,1 δὲ δέον ἀπαγαγεῖν οὐκ ἀπέπεμπον ὑπὲρ βοτανῶν2 Ἐπι- δαύριοι (κυριώτατοι δὲ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἥσαν Ἀργείοι). ἐδόκει δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῆς αἰτίας τὴν Ἐπιδαυρίαν τῷ τε Ἀλκιβιάδη καὶ τοῖς Ἀργείοις προσλαβεῖν, ἣν δύναται, τῆς τε Κορίνθου ἐνεκα ήσυχίας καὶ ἐκ τῆς Αἰγίνης βραχυτέραν ἔσεσθαι τὴν βοήθειαν ἡ Σκύλλαιον περιπλείν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. παρε- σκευάζοντο οὖν οἱ Ἀργείοι ὡς αὐτοὶ ἐς τὴν

1 Correction of C, Πυθαίως AEFM, Πιθέως Β.
2 Stahl's correction for βοτανῶν of MSS.

1 A low point of land at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf; on the opposite side of the strait was the Molycreian Rhium. The fort would have given the Athenians entire control of the entrance to the Gulf.
Cleinias, who was then a general of the Athenians, acting in concert with the Argives and their allies went into the Peloponnesus with a few Athenian hoplites and bowmen, and taking with him some of the allies from that region helped to settle matters pertaining to the alliance as he passed through the Peloponnesus with his army; coming to Patrae he persuaded the inhabitants to carry their walls down to the sea, and intended himself to build another fort at the Achaean Rhium. But the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and all those to whom the fortification of Rhium would have been a menace, went in force and prevented it.

LIII. During the same summer war broke out between the Epidaurians and Argives. The alleged ground for this was that the Epidaurians were not sending the sacrifice to Apollo Pythaeus, which it was incumbent on them to render in payment for pasturage, and the Argives exercised chief authority over the sanctuary; but even apart from this motive Alcibiades and the Argives deemed it advisable, if they could, to bring Epidaurus into the Argive alliance, both for the sake of keeping Corinth quiet, and because they thought the Athenians would be able to bring aid to Argos by a shorter way, from Aegina as base, than by sailing round Scyllaean. The Argives, then, were preparing, as

2 Probably the temple of Apollo Pythaeus referred to is that which alone of all the buildings in Asine the Argives spared when they destroyed that town; cf. Paus. ii. xxxvi. 5

3 A promontory between Hermione and Troezene. The short route was from Aegina to the neighbouring coast of Epidaurus and thence to Argos; if Epidaurus was hostile or neutral, reinforcements had to be carried round Scyllaeeum to the Gulf of Nauplia and thence by land to Argos.
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'Eπίδαυρον διὰ τοῦ θύματος τὴν ἐσπραξίν ἐσβαλοῦντες.

LIV. Ἐξεστράτευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι κατὰ τοὺς αὐτούς χρόνους πανδημεῖ πἐς Δευκταρίας ἔκτις ἐαυτῶν μεθορίας πρὸς τὸ Δύκαιον, Ἄγιδος τοῦ Αρχιδάμου βασιλέως ἡγουμένου ὡδεὶ δὲ οὔδεὶς ὅτι οἱ στρατεύοντες, οὔδεις αἱ πόλεις ἐξ ὧν ἐπέμ- 2 φθησαν. ὡς δ' αὐτοῖς τὰ διαβατήρια θυμένοις οὐ προύχωρει, αὐτοὶ τε ἄπηλθον ἐπ' οἰκου καὶ τοῖς ἔνα- 3 χρησάντων αὐτῶν, τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ Καρνείου μὴν ἐξελθόντες τετράδι φθίνοντο καὶ ἄγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τῶν χρόνων, ἐσέβαλον ἐς 4 τὴν Ἐπιδαυρίαν καὶ ἐδήσουν. Ἐπιδαύριοι δὲ τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἑπιδαύρῳ ἐπεκαλούντο· ὂν τινες οἱ μὲν τὸν μὴν προφασίσαντο, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐς μεθορίαν τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας ἐλθόντες ἑσύχαζον.

LV. Καὶ καθ' ὅν χρόνον ἐν τῇ Ἐπιδαύρῳ οἱ Ἀργείοι ἦσαν, ἢς Μαυτίνειαν προσβεία ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ἐνυήλθον, Ἀθηναῖοι παρακαλεσάντων. καὶ γενομένων' 1 λόγων Ἐυφαμίδας ὁ Κορίνθιος οὐκ ἔφη τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐργοὺς ὁμολογεῖς. σφεῖς μὲν γὰρ περὶ εἰρήνης ἑγκαθεσθαί, τοὺς δ' Ἐπιδαυρί- 1 οὺς καὶ τοὺς ἔναντι καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους μεθ' ὁπλῶν ἀντιτετάχθαι διαλύσαι οἶνον πρῶτον χρη- 1 MSS. γενομένων, Hude γενομένων.

1 The sacrifices offered to Zeus by the Spartan kings before crossing the border.
2 Corresponding to the Attic Metageitnion, nearly our August.
of their own motion, to invade Epidaurus for the exaction of the offering.

LIV. About the same time the Lacedaemonians, too, marched out with all their forces to Leuctra, a place on their own borders opposite Mt. Lycaemum, under the command of King Agis son of Archidamus; and no one knew whither they were marching, not even the cities from which they were sent. But as the sacrifices for crossing the border\(^1\) were not favourable, they went back home themselves, and sent word to their allies, after the coming month—the Carneian month,\(^2\) a holiday among the Dorians—to prepare to take the field. When they withdrew, the Argives set out on the twenty-seventh of the month preceding the Carneian, and continuing to observe that day during the whole time,\(^3\) invaded Epidaurus and proceeded to ravage it. The Epidaurians called upon their allies for help; but some of these made the month an excuse, while the rest went merely to the borders of Epidauria and there remained quiet.

LV. While the Argives were in Epidaurian territory envoys from the different cities came together at Mantinea, on the invitation of the Athenians. And in the course of the conference Euphamidas the Corinthian said that their words did not agree with their deeds; for they were sitting in council on the question of peace, while the Epidaurians with their allies and the Argives were arrayed in arms against each other; they ought to go

\(^3\) They called every day the 27th as long as they were in Epidaurian territory and thus postponed the beginning of the following month until their work was done. Probably the Argives, on religious grounds (as Dorians), took holiday as soon as the Carneian month began.

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ναι ἐφ’ ἑκατέρων ἐλθόντας τὰ στρατόπεδα, καὶ
2 οὗτω πάλιν λέγειν περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης. καὶ πεισ-
θέντες φχοντο καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους ἀπήγαγον ἐκ
tῆς Ἑπιδαυρίας. ὑστερον δὲ ἐσ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐυνελ-
thόντες οὐδ’ ὡς ἐδυνηθησαν ἐξιμβήναι, ἀλλ’ οἱ
Ἀργεῖοι πάλιν ἐσ τήν Ἑπιδαυρίαν ἐσέβαλον καὶ
3 ἐδήσουν. ἐξεστράτευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι
ἐς Καρνας: καὶ ὡς οὐδ’ ἐνταῦθα τὰ διαβατήρια
4 αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο, ἐπανεχώρησαν. Ἀργεῖοι δὲ τεμό-
thες τῆς Ἑπιδαυρίας ὡς τὸ τρίτον μέρος ἀπῆλθον
ἐπ’ οἶκον. καὶ Ἀθηναίοις αὐτοῖς χίλιοι ἐβοη-
θησαν ὅπλιται καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης στρατηγὸς, πυθό-
μενοι δὴ τοὺς Λακεδαιμόνιους ἐξεστρατεύσας
καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἔτι αὐτῶν ἔδει, ἀπῆλθον. καὶ τὸ
θέρος οὗτω διήλθεν.

LVI. Τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Λακεδαι-
μόνιοι λαθόντες Ἀθηναίους φρουροὺς τε τριακο-
σίους καὶ Ἀγησιπίδαν ἀρχοντα κατὰ θάλασσαν
2 ἐσ Ἑπιδαυρον ἐσέπεμψαν. Ἀργεῖοι δ’ ἑλθόντες
παρ’ Ἀθηναίους ἐπεκάλουν ὅτι, γεγραμμένον ἐν
tαῖς στοιχείοις διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐκάστους μὴ ἐὰν
πολεμίου διέναι, ἐάσειαν κατὰ θάλασσαν παρα-
πλεύσας καὶ εἰ μὴ κάκειν ἐς Πύλον κομιοῦσιν
ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμόνιος τοὺς Μεσσηνίους καὶ Ἑλλωτας,
3 ἀδικήσασθαι αὐτοῖ. Ἀθηναίοι δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδου
πείσαντος τῇ μὲν Λακωνικῇ στήλῃ ὑπέγραψαν ὅτι
οὐκ ἐνέμειναι οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς ὅρκοις, ἐς δὲ

1 suprascr. ge, all other MSS. ἀφ’.
2 Hude’s correction for δὲ of the MSS.

1 Or, reading πυθόμενοι δὲ, with the MSS., “but learning that
the Lacedaemonians had left the field”—which the verb means
nowhere else—“and that there was no further need of them.”

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BOOK V. LV. I–LVI. 3

first to the camps of the two parties and disband them, and then they might come back and talk about peace. Adopting this suggestion, they went and induced the Argives to depart from Epidauria. Afterwards they came together again, but not even then were they able to agree, and the Argives again invaded Epidauria and began to ravage it. The Lacedaemonians, too, marched out to Caryae; but as not even there the sacrifices for crossing the boundaries proved favourable, they returned. And the Argives, having ravaged about a third part of Epidauria, also went back home. Moreover, there had come to their aid one thousand Athenian hoplites, under the command of Alcibiades, on learning that the Lacedaemonians had taken the field; as now there was no longer any need of them these withdrew.\(^1\) And so the summer ended.\(^3\)

LVI. During the following winter, the Lacedaemonians, eluding the vigilance of the Athenians, sent a garrison of three hundred men, under the command of Agesippidas, by sea to Epidaurus. And the Argives, coming to Athens, made complaint that, although it was written in the treaty that they were not to allow enemies to go through their respective territories,\(^2\) the Athenians had permitted the Lacedaemonians to go past their territory \(^3\) by sea; unless, then, the Athenians should bring the Messenians and Helots to Pylos to annoy the Lacedaemonians, they themselves would feel aggrieved. So the Athenians, on the advice of Alcibiades, inscribed at the bottom of the Laconian column that the Lacedaemonians had not kept their oaths, and they brought to Pylos

\(^2\) cf. ch. xlvi. 5.

\(^3\) i.e. past Aegina, now Athenian territory.
Πύλων ἐκόμισαν τοὺς ἐκ Κρανίων Εἵλωτας λή-4 ξέσθαι, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἰσόχαζον. τὸν δὲ χειμώνα
tοῦτον πολεμοῦντων Ἀργείων καὶ Ἐπίδαυρίων
μάχῃ μὲν οὐδεμία ἐγένετο ἐκ παρασκευῆς, ἐνέδρατ
δὲ καὶ καταδρομάλ, ἐν αἷς ὡς τύχοιεν ἐκατέρων
5 τινὲς διεφθείροντο. καὶ τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος
πρὸς ἔαρ ἡδὴ κλίμακας ἔχοντες οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἠλθον
ἐπὶ τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον ὡς ἐρήμων οὐσίς διὰ τὸν πό-
λεμον βία αἱρήσοντες· καὶ ἀπρακτοὶ ἀπήλθον.
καὶ ὁ χειμῶν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ τρίτον καὶ δέκατον
ἔτως τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

LVII. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους μεσοῦντος
Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἳ τε Ἐπιδαύριοι ξύμ-
μαχον ὄντες ἐταλαιπώρουν καὶ τάλλα ἐν τῇ Πελο-
ποννήσῳ τὰ μὲν ἀφειστήκει, τὰ δ' οὐ καλῶς εἴχε,
νομίζοντες, εἰ μὴ προκαταλήψονται ἐν τάχει, ἔπὶ
πλέουν χωρήσεσθαι αὐτά, ἐστράτευον αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ
Εἰλωτες πανδημεῖ ἐπὶ ' Ἀργος· ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἀγις ὁ
Ἀρχιδάμου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. Ξυνεστρά-
2 τευνὸν δ' αὐτοῖς Τεγεάται τε καὶ ὄσοι ἄλλοι Ἀρκά-
δῶν Λακεδαιμονίως ξύμμαχοι ἦσαν. οἳ δ' ἐκ τῆς
ἀλλῆς Πελοποννήσου ξύμμαχοι καὶ οἱ ἐξωθεν ἐς
Φλειώνηᾳ ξυνελέγοντο, Βουσοτι μὲν πεντακισχί-
λεοι ὀπλᾶται καὶ τοσοῦτοι ψιλοὶ καὶ ἱππης πεν-
τακόσιοι καὶ ἄμπυτοι ἱσσοί. Κορίνθιοι δὲ δισχίλιοι
ὀπλᾶται, οἳ δ' ἄλλοι ὡς ἔκαστοι, Φλειάσιοι δὲ
πανστρατιά, ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων ἦν τὸ στράτευμα.
the Helots from Cranii,¹ to plunder the country; but in other respects they kept quiet. During this winter, although the Argives and Epidaurians were at war, there was no pitched battle, but there were ambuscades and forays, in which some perished on either side as the chance might be. As winter was closing and spring at hand, the Argives came with scaling-ladders against Epidaurus, supposing, as it was stripped of its defenders by the war, that they could take it by assault; but they accomplished nothing and went back home. And the winter ended and with it the thirteenth year of the war.

LVII. In the middle of the following summer, the Lacedaemonians, seeing that their Epidaurian allies were in distress, and of the other states in the Peloponnesus some had revolted, while others were not well-disposed, and thinking that if measures of precaution were not taken quickly the evil would go yet further, marched against Argos with all their forces, themselves and their Helots, under the leadership of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. And with them went the Tegeates and all the rest of the Arcadians that were allies of the Lacedaemonians. But the allies from the rest of the Peloponnesus and those from outside mustered at Phlius—five thousand Boeotian hoplites and as many light-armed troops, with five hundred cavalry each with his foot-soldier;² two thousand Corinthian hoplites; the rest of the allies in varying numbers, but the Phliasians with their whole force, since the armament was assembled in their territory.

¹ cf. ch. xxxv. 7.
² ἄμαχοι, light-armed men, one with each horseman, running alongside or riding behind.
LXIII. Ἄργειοι δὲ προαισθόμενοι τὸ τε πρῶτον τὴν παρασκευὴν τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶ τὸν Φλειοῦντα βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἄλλοις προσμείξαι ἐχώρουν, τότε δὴ ἐξεστράτευσαν καὶ αὐτοῖ. ἐβοήθησαν δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ Μαντινής ἔχουτε τοὺς σφετέρους ξυμμάχους καὶ Ἡλείων τρισχίλιοι

2 ὁπλίται. καὶ προϊόντες ἀπαντῶσι τοῖς Δακεδαι-

μονίοις ἐν Μεθυδρίῳ τῆς 'Αρκαδίας. καὶ κατα-

λαμβάνουσιν ἐκάτεροι λόφον καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἄργειοι ὡς μεμονωμένοι τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις παρεσκευά-

ζοντο μάχεσθαι, ὃ δὲ Ἄγις τῆς νυκτὸς ἀναστίησας τὸν στρατὸν καὶ λαθῶν ἐπορεύθητο ἐς Φλειοῦντα

3 παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυμμάχους. καὶ οἱ Ἄργειοι ἀισθόμενοι ἀμα ἐφ’ ἑχώρουν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐσ’ Ἄγιος, ἐπειτα δὲ ἦ προσεδέχοντο τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων καταβήσεσθαι, τὴν κατὰ

4 Νεμέαν ὀδόν. Ἄγις δὲ ταύτῃ μὲν ἦν προσε-

δέχοντο οὐκ ἔτραπετο, παραγγείλας δὲ τοῖς Δακε-

δαιμονίοις καὶ Ἰρκάσι καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίοις ἄλλην ἐχώρησε χαλεπὴν καὶ κατέβη ἐς τὸ Ἄργειον πεδίον καὶ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Πελληνής καὶ Φλειάσιοι ὁρθίων ἐτέραν ἐπορεύθητο τοῖς δὲ Βοιωτοῖς καὶ Μεγαρεύσι καὶ Σικυωνίοις εἰρήτο τὴν ἐπὶ Νεμέας ὀδὸν καταβαίνειν, ἢ οἱ Ἄργειοι ἐκάθηντο, ὅπως, εἰ οἱ Ἄργειοι ἐπὶ σφαῖς ἱόντας 1 ἐς τὸ πεδίον

5 βοηθοῦεν, ἐφετέρον ποὺς ἐπίκους χρῆντο. καὶ ὁ μὲν οὕτω διατάξας καὶ ἐσβαλὼν ἐς τὸ πεδίον ἐδήναν Σάμινθόν τε καὶ ἄλλα.

LIX. Οἱ δὲ Ἄργειοι γυνότες ἐβοήθησαν ἡμέρας ἦδη ἐκ τῆς Νεμέας, καὶ περιτυχόντες τῷ Φλειάσιον

1 Badham's correction for ἱόντας of the MSS.
LVIII. The Argives had been aware of the preparations of the Lacedaemonians from the first, and when the latter were on the march to Phlius where they intended to join the rest, they now took the field themselves. And the Mantineans came to their aid with their own allies and three thousand Elean hoplites. As they were going forward they came upon the Lacedaemonians at Methydrium in Arcadia. Each party took position on a hill, and the Argives prepared to fight with the Lacedaemonians, thinking to find them still isolated; but Agis, rousing up his force during the night and eluding detection, marched to Phlius to join the rest of the allies. The Argives, perceiving this, set out at daybreak, marching first to Argos and then taking the road to Nemea, where they expected the Lacedaemonians with their allies to come down. Agis, however, did not take the way they were expecting him to follow, but giving the word to the Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians, he advanced by a more difficult route and descended to the Argive plain. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians advanced by another steep road; while the Boeotians, Megarians and Sicyonians had been told to come down by the road to Nemea, where the Argives were posted, in order that if the Argives should attack their main force as it advanced into the plain, they might hang on their rear and use their cavalry against them. Having, then, so disposed his troops, Agis came down into the plain and proceeded to ravage Saminthus and other places.

LIX. The Argives discovered this and, it being now day, came to the rescue from Nemea, and falling in with the force of the Phliasians and Corinthians
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καὶ Κορινθίων στρατοπέδοι τῶν μὲν Φλειάσιων ὀλιγοὺς ἀπέκτεινεν, ὕπο δὲ τῶν Κορινθίων αὐτοῦ οὐ 2 πολλοὶ πλείους διεφθάρησαν. καὶ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ οἱ Μεγαρῆς καὶ οἱ Σικυώνιοι ἐχώρουν, ὡσπερ εἰρητο ἄυτοῖς, ἐπὶ τὴς Νεμέας, καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους οὐκέτι κατέλαβον, ἀλλὰ καταβάντες, ὡς ἑώρων τὰ ἑαυτῶν δηομένα, ἐς μάχην παρετάσσοντο. ἀνυπαρ- 3 σκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ἀπειλημμένοι ἦσαν οἱ Ἀργείοι· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ πεδίου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι έιργον τῆς πόλεως καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτῶν, καθύπερθεν δὲ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Φλειάσιοι καὶ Πελλήνης, τὸ δὲ πρὸς Νεμέας Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Σικυώνιοι καὶ Μεγαρῆς. ἦποι δὲ αὐτῶς οὐ παρ- ἦσαν· οὐ γὰρ πω οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, μόνοι τῶν ξυμ- 4 μάχων, ἤκουν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πλήθος τῶν Ἀργείων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων οὐχ οὔτω δεινὸν τὸ παρὸν ἐνόμιζον, ἀλλ' ἐν καλῷ ἑδοκει ἡ μάχη ἑσεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπειληφθέναι ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν τε καὶ πρὸς τῇ πόλει. τῶν δὲ Ἀργείων δύο ἄνδρες, Θράσυμος τε, τῶν πέντε στρατηγῶν εἷς ὄν, καὶ Ἀλκίφρων, πρόξενος Λακεδαιμονίων, ἤδη τῶν στρατοπέδων ὅσον οὐ ξυνόντων προσελθόντε "Ἀγιδί διελεγμένη μὴ ποιεῖν μάχην" ἐτοιμός γὰρ εἶναι Ἀργείους δίκας δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι ἱσας καὶ ὀμοίας, εἰ τι ἐπικαλοῦσιν Ἀργείους Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἰρήνην ἄγειν σπου- δᾶς ποιησάμενοι.

LX. Καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα εἶπόντες τῶν Ἀργείων ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν καὶ οὐ τοῦ πλήθους κελεύσαντος εἶπον· 114
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slew a few of the Phliasians, but had rather more of their own men slain by the Corinthians. Meanwhile the Boeotians, Megarians and Sicyonians advanced toward Nemea as they had been ordered, but found the Argives no longer there; for these had gone down and, seeing their country being ravaged, were forming for battle, while the Lacedaemonians were preparing to meet them. The Argives were hemmed in on all sides: in the direction of the plain the Lacedaemonians and their associates shut them off from the city; above were the Corinthians, Phliasians and Pellenians; towards Nemea were the Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Megarians. They had no cavalry at hand, for the Athenians\(^1\) alone of their allies had not yet arrived. The main body of the Argives and their allies thought their present situation was not so very dangerous, but that the battle was likely to be fought under favourable circumstances, and that the Lacedaemonians had been cut off in their country and close to the city of Argos. But two of the Argives—Thrasyllus, one of the five generals, and Alciphron, proxenus of the Lacedaemonians—when the two armies were all but in collision, went to Agis and urged him not to bring on a battle; for the Argives were ready to offer as well as to accept a fair and impartial arbitration of any complaint which the Lacedaemonians had against the Argives, and for the future to make a treaty and keep the peace.

LX. Those of the Argives who said these things spoke on their own authority and not by order of

\(^1\) Upon their cavalry the Argives had relied. Their coming is announced ch. lxi. 1.

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καὶ ὁ Ἀγιός δεξάμενος τοὺς λόγους αὐτὸς, καὶ οὗ μετὰ τῶν πλείονων οὐδὲ αὐτὸς βουλευσάμενος ἀλλ’ ἢ ἐν ἀνδρὶ κοινώσας τῶν ἐν τέλει ξυστρατευομένων, σπέρνεται τέσσαρας μῆνας ἐν οἷς ἔδει ἐπιτελέσαι αὐτοὺς τὰ ῥήθέντα. καὶ ἀπήγαγε τὸν στρατὸν εὐθὺς, οὔδενι φράσας τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων. 1 οἱ δὲ Δακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξυμμαχοὶ εὐποντό μὲν ὡς ἤγειτο διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐν αἰτίᾳ δ’ εἶχον κατ’ ἀλλήλους πολλὴ τὴν Ἀγιον, νομίζοντες, ἐν καλῷ παρατυχὼν σφίσι ξυμβαλεῖν καὶ πανταχόθεν αὐτῶν ἀποκεκλημένων καὶ ὑπὸ ἰππέων καὶ πεζῶν, οὔδεν δράσατες ἂξιον τῆς παρασκευῆς ἀπιέναι. στρατόπεδον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο κάλλιστον Ἑλληνικὸν τῶν μέχρι τούδε ξυνῆλθεν· ἄφθη δὲ μάλιστα ἐως ἐτί ἦν ἀθρόου ἐν Νεμέα, ἐν ὧ Δακεδαιμόνιοι τε πανστρατιὰ ήσαν καὶ Ἀρκάδες καὶ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Σικυώνιοι καὶ Πεληνῆς καὶ Φλειάσιοι καὶ Μεγαρῆς, καὶ οὕτω πάντες λογάδες ἀψ’ ἐκάστων, ἄξιομαχοὶ δοκοῦντες εἶναι οὐ τῆ Ἀργείων μόνον ξυμμαχία, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἄλλῃ ἐτί προσγεγομένη. τὸ μὲν οὖν στρατόπεδον οὕτως ἐν αἰτίᾳ ἔχοντες τὸν Ἀγιον ἀνεχώρουν τε καὶ διελύθησαν ἐπ’ οἴκου ἐκάστου· Ἀργείοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔτι ἐν πολλῷ πλείονι αἰτίᾳ εἶχον τοὺς σπειρασμένοις ἀνευ τοῦ πλῆθους, νομίζοντες κἀκεῖνοι μὴ ἄν σφίσι ποτὲ κάλλιον παρασχόν Δακεδαιμόνιοι διαπεφευγέναι πρὸς τε γὰρ τῇ σφετέρᾳ πόλει καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ξυμμάχων

1 ξυμμάχων, Hude deletes, after Krüger.
the people; and Agis, receiving the proposals for himself alone, not conferring with the majority, and without any deliberation on his own part further than to communicate the matter to a single one of the magistrates who accompanied the expedition, made a truce with the Argives for four months, within which time they were to fulfil their agreement. And so he led off his army at once, without explanation to any of the allies. The Lacedaemonians and their allies followed his guidance out of respect for the law, but among themselves they loudly blamed Agis, considering that when there was opportunity for them to join battle under favourable conditions, and the Argives were cut off on all sides both by cavalry and infantry, they were going back home without doing anything worthy of their preparations. For this was indeed the finest Hellenic force that had come together up to that time; and this was seen especially while it was still united at Nemea, including the Lacedaemonians in full force, the Arcadians, Boeotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megarians, all of them picked men from each nation, who felt themselves to be a match, not for the Argive confederacy only, but even for another such force in addition. The army, then, thus blaming Agis, withdrew and dispersed severally to their homes. But the Argives also on their part held in far greater blame those who had made the truce without consulting the people, as they too thought that the Lacedaemonians had escaped, though circumstances could never be more favourable for themselves; for the contest would have been near their own city and
ΤΗΥΚΥΔΙΔΕΣ

6 τὸν ἄγωνα δὲν γίγνεσθαι. τὸν τε Ὄρασυλλον ἀναχωρήσαντες ἐν τῷ Χαράδρῳ, οὔπερ τὰς ἀπὸ στρατείας δίκας πρὶν ἐστίνα κρίνουσιν, ἦρξαντο λεύειν. ὁ δὲ καταφυγὼν ἑπὶ τὸν βωμὸν περιυγνυεῖ τὰ μέντοι χρήματα ἐδήμευσαν αὐτοῦ.

LXI. Μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ Ἀθηναίων βοηθησάντων χιλίων ὀπλιτῶν καὶ τριακοσίων ἱππέων, δὲν ἐστρατήγουν Δάχης καὶ Νικόστρατος, οἱ Ἀργεῖοι (οἵως γὰρ τὰς σπουδὰς ἔκκουν λῦσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκεδαμιούσοις) ἀπεῖναν ἐκέλευσαν αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς τὸν δήμον οὐ προσήγον βουλομένους χρηματίσαι, πρὶν δὴ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἡλείου (ἐτὶ γὰρ 2 παρῆσαι) κατηγάκασαν δεόμενοι. καὶ ἔλεγον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Ἀλκιβιάδου πρεσβευτοῦ παρόντος ἐν τε τοῖς Ἀργεῖοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις ταῦτα, ὅτι οὐκ ὄρθως αἱ σπουδαὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων καὶ γένοιτο, καὶ νῦν (ἐν καίρῳ γὰρ παρεῖναι σφεῖσ) 3 ἀπετεθαὶ χρῆναι τοῦ πολέμου. καὶ πεῖσαντες ἐκ τῶν λόγων τῶν ξυμμάχων εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ Ὁρχομενὸν τὸν Ἀρκαδικὸν πάντες πλὴν Ἀργεῖων οὕτω δὲ ὁμοίως καὶ πεισθέντες ὑπελείποντο 4 πρῶτον, ἐπειτα δ’ ὑστερον καὶ οὕτω ἦλθον. καὶ προσκαθεζόμενοι τὸν Ὁρχομενὸν πάντες ἐπολιορκοῦν καὶ προσβολὰς ἐποιοῦντο, βουλομένου ἄλλωσ τε προσγενέσθαι σφίσι καὶ ὁμηροὶ ἐκ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἦσαν αὐτὸθι ὑπὸ Ἀκεδαμιούσων κεί- 5 μενοί. οἱ δὲ Ὅρχομενοί δείσαντες τὴν τε τοῦ τείχους ἄσθενειαν καὶ τοῦ στρατοῦ τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ ὡς οὐδεὶς αὐτοῖς ἐβοήθει, μὴ προαπόλωνται,
in concert with numerous and brave allies. And so on their return they began to stone Thrasyllus in the bed of the Charadrus,1 where before they enter the city all causes are tried that arise from an expedition. But he fled for refuge to the altar and was saved; his property however was confiscated.

LXI. After this, when Athenian reinforcements arrived, consisting of one thousand hoplites and three hundred cavalry, under the command of Laches and Nicostratus, the Argives—for they shrunk in spite of all from breaking off the truce with the Lacedaemonians—bade them go away, and would not comply with their wish to be brought before the people for negotiations, until the Mantineans and Eleans, who were still present, constrained them by their entreaties to do so. The Athenians, then, through Alcibiades, who was present as ambassador, protested before the Argives and their allies that it was not right even to have made the truce without the consent of the rest of the allies, and now, since they themselves were present opportunely, they ought to resume the war. Having persuaded the allies by their arguments, all of them except the Argives proceeded at once against Orchomenus in Arcadia; the Argives, though convinced, remained behind at first, then later came on too. Taking post before Orchomenus, they all proceeded to besiege it and to make assaults, being especially desirous of getting possession of it because hostages from Arcadia were deposited there by the Lacedaemonians. But the Orchomenians, fearing the weakness of the wall and the number of the enemy, and being apprehensive lest they might perish before relief came, capitulated on

1 Close under the north-east wall of the city.
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ξυνέβησαν ὡστε ξύμμαχοι τε εἶναι καὶ ὁμήρους
σφῶν τε αὐτῶν δοῦναι Μαντινεύσι καὶ ὁδὸς
κατέθεντο Δακεδαιμόνιοι παραδοῦναι.

LXII. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἔχοντες ἥδη τὸν Ὁρχο-
μενοῦ ἐβουλεύοντο οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐφ' ὁ τι χρή
πρῶτον ἴναι τῶν λοιπῶν. καὶ Ἡλεῖοι μὲν ἔπὶ
Λέπρεον ἐκέλευον, Μαντινῆς δὲ ἐπὶ Τεγέαν καὶ
προσέθεντο οἱ Ἀργείοι καὶ Ἀθηναίοι τοῖς Μαν-
2 τινεύσιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἡλεῖοι ὁργισθέντες ὅτι οὐκ
ἐπὶ Λέπρεον ἐψηφίσαντο, ἀνεχόμεθαν ἐπὶ οἰκον.
οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι παρεσκευάζοντο ἐν τῇ
Μαντινείᾳ ὡς ἐπὶ Τεγέαν ἰόντες, καὶ τινὲς αὐτοῖς
καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ¹ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐνεδίδοσαν τὰ
πράγματα.

LXIII. Δακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἀνεχώρησαν ἐξ
' Ἀργοῦς τὰς τετραμήνους σπουδὰς ποιησάμενοι,
' Ἀγνω ἐν μεγάλῃ αἰτίᾳ εἶχον οὐ χειρωσάμενον
σφίσιν Ἀργος, παρασχῶν καλῶς ὡς οὕτω πρό-
τερον αὐτὸι ἑνόμιζοι· ἄθροος γὰρ τοσοῦτος
ξυμάχους καὶ τοιούτους οὐ βαύνον εἶναι λαβεῖν.
2 ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ περί Ὁρχομενοῦ ἡγγέλλετο ἐαλω-
κέναι, πολλοὶ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐχαλέπταιναι καὶ ἐβού-
λευον εὐθὺς ὑπ' ὀργῆς παρὰ τὸν τρόπον τὸν
ἐαυτῶν ὡς χρὴ τὴν τε οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ κατασκάψαι
3 καὶ δέκα μυριάς δραχμῶν ζημιῶσαι. ὦ δὴ
παρρητεῖτο μηδέν τούτων δράνι· ἐργῇ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ
ρύσεσθαι τὰς αἰτίας στρατευσάμενος, ἦ τὸτε
4 ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ὅ τι βούλονται. οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν
ζημίαν καὶ τὴν κατασκαφῆν ἐπέσχον, νόμον δὲ
ἐθέτο ἐν τῷ παρόντι, δι' οὕτω πρῶτερον ἐγένετο

¹ Stahl and van Herwerden's correction for αὐτῶν Τεγεάτων of the MSS.

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condition that they should be received as allies, should
give hostages for themselves to the Mantineans, and
should deliver up those whom the Lacedaemonians
had deposited with them.

LXII. After this, being now in possession of
Orchomenus, the allies deliberated which of the
remaining places they should next proceed against.
The Eleans were urging them to go against
Lepreum, the Mantineans against Tegea; and the
Argives and Athenians sided with the Mantineans.
The Eleans, then, becoming angry because they did
not vote to go against Lepreum, went off home; but
the rest of the allies began to make preparations at
Mantinea to go against Tegea; and there were even
some of the inhabitants of the town who were in
favour of yielding the place to them.

LXIII. But the Lacedaemonians, on their return
from Argos after making the four months’ truce,
blamed Agis severely for not subduing Argos, when,
in their judgment, the happy opportunity was such
as had never been offered before; for it was not
an easy matter to get together allies so many and so
good. But when the tidings came about the capture
of Orchomenus also, they were far more angry,
and in their wrath, contrary to their habit, at once
resolved to raze his house and to fine him in the sum
of ten thousand drachmas. But he besought them
to do none of these things, promising that he would
wipe out the charges by some brave deed when he
took the field again; if not, they might then do
what they wished. So they refrained from the
fine and the razing of his house, but for the
present enacted a law which had no precedent

1 About £6,730, $32,000.
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αὐτοῖς· δέκα γὰρ ἀνδρὰς Ἀρκαδοὺς προσεύκησε Αὐτὸς ξυμβοῦλος, ἀνέυ δυν ὡς κύριον εἶναι ἀπάγειν στρατιὰν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως.

LXIV. Ἐν τούτῳ δ' ἀφικνεῖται αὐτοῖς ἀγγελία παρὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐκ Τεγέας ὅτι, εἰ μὴ παρεσοῦνται ἐν τάχει, ἀποστήσεται αὐτῶν Τεγέα πρὸς Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ ὅσον ὤκ ἀφε-2 στηκεν. ἔνταθα δὴ βοήθεια τῶν Δακεδαίμονίων γίγνεται αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν Εἰλώτων παυδημεί 3 ὁδεία καὶ ὅσα ὤντω πρότερον. ἐχώρουν δὲ ἐς Ὀρέσθειον τῆς Μανιαλίας· καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀρκάδων σφετέροις οὖσι ξυμμάχοις προεῖπον ἀθροισθεῖσιν ἱέναι κατὰ πόδας αὐτῶν ἢς Τεγέαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ Ὀρέσθειου πάντες ἔλθοντες, ἐκείθεν δὲ τὸ ἐκτον μέρος σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀποπέμψαντες ἐπ' οἴκου, ἐν ὃ τὸ πρεσβύτερον τε καὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἦν, ὡστε τὰ οἴκου φθορεῖν, τῷ λοιπῷ στρατεύματι ἀφίκνονται ἢς Τεγέαν. καὶ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἀπ' Ἀρκάδων παρῆσαν.

4 πέμπτουσι δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον καὶ Βοιωτοῦς καὶ Φωκεᾶς καὶ Δοκρούς, βοηθεῖν κελεύοντες κατὰ τάχος ἢς Μαντίνειαν. ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἢς ξίλῳν τῇ ἐγχύνετο καὶ οὐ ράδιον ἢν μὴ ἀθρόοις καὶ ἀλλήλους περιμεῖναι διελθεῖν τὴν πολέμιαν (ξυνεκληγε γὰρ διὰ μέσου), ἡμώς δὲ ἤπειροντο.

5 Δακεδαίμονιοι δὲ ἀναλαβόντες τοὺς παρόντας Ἀρκάδων ξυμμάχους ἐσέβαλον ἢς τὴν Μαντινικήν, καὶ στρατοπεδευσάμενοι πρὸς τῷ Ἡρακλεῖῳ ἐδήσουν τὴν γῆν.

1 Compare similar proceedings in ii. lxxxv. 1; iii. lxix. 1; viii. xxxix. 2.

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among them, for they chose ten of the Spartiates as counsellors\textsuperscript{1} for him without whose consent it was not lawful for him to lead an army out of the city.

\textit{LXIV.} Meanwhile word came from their friends\textsuperscript{2} in Tegea that, unless they should come quickly, Tegea would go over to the Argives and their allies, and already had all but done so. Whereupon succour was sent, both of the Lacedaemonians themselves and of the Helots, in full force, promptly and on such a scale as never before. These advanced to Orestheum in Maenalia, and gave orders to their allies among the Arcadians to get together and come close upon their heels to Tegea. After going, all together, as far as the Orestheum, they sent home from there a sixth part of their force—in which were included the older and younger men—to keep guard at home, and with the remainder of their army reached Tegea, where not long afterwards the allies from Arcadia arrived. They sent also to Corinth and to the Boeotians, Phocians and Locrians, bidding them bring aid in all haste to Mantinea. But to some this was a sudden call, and it was not easy for them, except in a body and after waiting for one another, to go through the enemy’s country; for that closed the way, lying just between. Nevertheless they hurried on. But the Lacedaemonians, taking up the allies of the Arcadians that were present, invaded Mantinea, and encamping at the sanctuary of Heracles proceeded to ravage the country.

\textsuperscript{2} As opposed to the faction mentioned at the end of ch. lxii.
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LXV. Οἱ δ’ Ἀργείοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὡς εἶδον αὐτοὺς, καταλαβόντες χωρίον ἐρυμνόν καὶ δυσ-
πρόσοδον παρετάξαντο ὡς ἐς μάχην. καὶ οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι εὐθὺς αὐτοῖς ἔπησαν· καὶ μέχρι
μὲν λίθου καὶ ἀκοντίου βολῆς ἐχωρήσαν· ἔπειτα τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τις Ἄγιδε ἐπεβόσηγεν, ὅρῶν
πρὸς χωρίον καρτερὸν ἰόντας σφᾶς, ὥστε διανοεῖται
κακὸν κακῷ ἰάσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἔξω Ἀργοὺς ἐπαι-
tίου ἀναχωρῆσες τὴν παροῦσαν ἀκαίρου προ-
θυμίαν ἀνάληψιν βουλομένην εἶναι. οὐ δὲ, εἰτε
καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐπιβόημα εἰτε καὶ αὐτῷ ἀλλο τῷ ἕτερα
cata τὸ αὐτὸ δόξαν ἐξαίφνης, πάλιν τὸ στρά-
tευμα κατὰ τάχος πρὸς ξυμμείξαι ἀπήγγεν. καὶ
ἀφικόμενος πρὸς τὴν Τεγεάτην τὸ ὕδωρ ἐξέτρεπεν
ἐς τὴν Μαντινικῇ, περὶ οὔτε ὡς τὰ πολλὰ
βλάπτοντος ὑποτέρωσε ἀν ἐστίπτη Μαντινῆς καὶ
Τεγεάται πολεμοῦσιν· ἐβούλετο δὲ τοὺς ἄπο τοῦ
λόφου βοηθοῦντας ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος ἐκτροπῆν,
ἐπειδὰν πῦθωνται, καταβιβάσαι καὶ ἐν τῷ ὀμαιὸ
5 τὴν μάχην ποιεῖσθαι. καὶ οὐ μὲν τὴν ἡμέραν
ταῦτην μείναν αὐτοὶ περὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐξέτρεπεν· οἱ
δ’ Ἀργείοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κατα-
πλαγέντες τῇ ἐξ ὀλίγου αἰφνιδίῳ αὐτῶν ἀναχω-
ρῆσει οὐκ εἶχον· οὐ τι εἰκάσωσι· εἰτ’ ἔπειδη
ἀναχωροῦντες ἐκεῖνοι τε ἀπέκρυψαν καὶ σφεῖς
ἡσύχαζον καὶ οὐκ ἐπηκολούθουν, ἑνταῦθα τοὺς
ἐαυτῶν στρατηγοὺς αὔθις ἐν αὐτίᾳ εἶχον τὸ τε

1 But Hude deletes η, making the sense to be, “had altered his views in a like manner.”
2 τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς ξύμμαχους, in MSS. after καταβιβά-
sai, deleted by van Herwerden.

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LXV. But the Argives and their allies, on seeing them, took up a position that was steep and difficult of access, and drew up for battle. The Lacedaemonians went against them at once, advancing within a stone’s throw or a javelin’s cast; then one of the older men, seeing that they were going against a strong place, called out to Agis that he thought to cure one ill with another, meaning that the motive of his present unseasonable eagerness was to make amends for the culpable retreat from Argos.  

1 Agis, then, whether on account of this call, or because it suddenly struck him, too, that some other course was better than the one he was following, led his army back again in all haste without coming into conflict. Then when he had reached Tegean territory he set about diverting into Mantinean territory the stream of water about which the Mantineans and Tegeates are always warring, on account of the harm it commonly does to whichever country it empties into. He wished to make the troops on the hill 2 come down to prevent the diversion of the water as soon as they should hear about it, and thus force them to fight the battle in the plain. So he lingered for that day in the neighbourhood of the stream and set about diverting it; but the Argives and their allies were at first amazed at their opponents’ sudden withdrawal after coming close, and were at a loss what to make of it; afterwards, however, when the enemy had withdrawn out of sight, while they themselves kept quiet and did not follow after them, they began again to find fault with their own generals

1 cf. ch. lxi. 1; lxiii. 2.
2 i.e. χωρίου ἐρυμον mentioned above.
πρότερον καλῶς ληφθέντας πρὸς Ἀργεία Δακεδαιμονίων ἀφεθήναι καὶ νῦν ὅτι ἀποδιδράσκοντας οὐδεὶς ἐπιδιώκει, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἡσυχίαν οἱ μὲν 6 σφίζονται, σφεῖς δὲ προδίδονται. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ ἐθορυβήθησαν μὲν τὸ παραυτικα, ὑστερον δὲ ἀπάγουσιν αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου καὶ προελθόντες ἐς τὸ ὀμαλὸν ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ὡς ἱόντες ἐπὶ τῶν πολεμίων.

LXVI. Τῇ δ’ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ τε Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἔννετάξαντο, ὡς ἔμελλον μαχεῖσθαι, ἂν περιτύχωσιν οἱ τε Δακεδαιμόνοι ἀπὸ τοῦ ύδατος πρὸς τὸ Ἡράκλειον πάλιν ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ στρατόπεδον ἱόντες ὀρῶσι δὲ ὦλγον τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐν τάξει τε ἥδη πάντας καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου 2 προεληλυθότας. μάλιστα δὲ Δακεδαιμόνοι ἐς δ’ ἐμέμνηντο ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ ἐξεπλάγησαν (διὰ βραχείας γὰρ μελλήσεως ἡ παρασκευὴ αὐτοῖς ἐγίγνετο), καὶ εὐθὺς ὑπὸ σπουδῆς καθίσταντο ἐς κόσμον τῶν ἑαυτῶν, Ἀγιὸς τοῦ βασιλέως ἐκαστὰ 3 ἐξηγουμένου κατὰ τὸν νόμον. βασιλέως γὰρ ἀγοντος ὑπ’ ἑκείνου πάντα ἀρχεῖαι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πολεμάρχοις αὐτὸς φράξει τὸ δέον, οἱ δὲ τοῖς λοχαγοῖς, ἑκεῖνοι δὲ τοῖς πεντηκοντήρων, αὐθεῖς δ’ ὤντοι τοῖς ἐνωμοτάρχαις, καὶ ὤντοι τῇ ἐνωμοτιᾷ. 4 καὶ αἱ παραγγέλσεις, ἣν τι βούλωνται, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ χρονοῦσι καὶ ταχείαι ἔπερχονται· σχεδὸν γὰρ τι πᾶν πλὴν ὦλγον ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν

1 πλὴν ὦλγον, deleted by Hude, after Badham.
because on a previous occasion the Lacedaemonians, when fairly caught near Argos, had been allowed to escape, and now when they were running away no one pursued them; on the contrary, the enemy were quietly making good their safety, while they themselves were being betrayed. The generals were confounded for the moment by the outcry, but afterwards they moved the troops from the hill and going forward into the plain encamped there, with the intention of advancing against the enemy.

LXVI. On the next day the Argives and their allies drew up in the order in which they intended to fight if they fell in with the enemy; and the Lacedaemonians, going away from the stream and back to their old camp at the sanctuary of Heracles, suddenly saw the enemy close at hand, all by that time in order of battle and occupying an advanced position away from the hill. Never had the Lacedaemonians, as far back as they remembered, been in such consternation as on this occasion. Their preparation had to be made on short notice; and at once in haste they fell into their own array, King Agis directing each movement as the law prescribed. For when a king leads all orders are given by him: he himself gives the necessary order to the polemarchs,\(^1\) they to the commanders of battalions, these to the captains of companies, these again to the commanders of Platoons, and these to the Platoons. So the special orders, if they wish to give any, proceed in the same way, and reach their destination quickly; for almost the whole army of the Lacedaemonians consists of officers over

\(^1\) Commanders of the six morae, according to Xen. Resp. Lac. xi. iv.
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Δακεδαιμονίων ἄρχοντες ἄρχόντων εἰσί, καὶ τὸ ἐπιμελές τοῦ δρωμένου πολλοῖς προσήκει.

LXVII. Τότε δὲ κέρας μὲν εὐώνυμον Σκιρῆται αὐτοῖς καθίσταντο, αἰεὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν μόνοι Δακεδαιμονίων ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες· παρὰ δὲ αὐτοῖς οἱ ἀπὸ Θέρακης Βρασίδειοι στρατιώται καὶ νεοδαμώδεις μετὰ αὐτῶν· ἔπειτ’ ἦδη Δακεδαιμονίων αὐτὸι ἔξης καθίστασαι τοὺς λόχους καὶ παρ’ αὐτοὺς Ἀρκάδων Ἡμαιής, μετὰ δὲ τούτους Μαινάλιοι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ διεξίφι κέρας Τεγέαται καὶ Δακεδαιμονίων ὁλίγοι τὸ ἐσχατον ἔχοντες, καὶ οἱ 2 ἵππης αὐτῶν ἐφ’ ἐκατέρφ τῷ κέρας. Δακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν οὕτως ἐτάξαντο· οἱ δὲ ἐναντίοι αὐτοῖς δεξίον μὲν κέρας Μαντινῆς εἶχον, ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων τὸ ἔργον ἐγίγνετο, παρὰ δὲ αὐτοῖς οἱ ξύμμαχοι Ἀρκάδων ἦσαν, ἔπειτα Ἀργείων οἱ χίλιοι λογάδες, οἵς ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλοῦ ἀσκησιν τῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον δημοσίᾳ παρεῖχε, καὶ ἐχόμενοι αὐτῶν οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀργείοι, καὶ μετ’ αὐτοὺς οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν, Κλεωναίοι καὶ Ὀρνέαται, ἔπειτα Ἀθηναίοι ἐσχατοι τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας ἔχοντες καὶ ἵππης μετ’ αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι.

LXVIII. Τάξις μὲν ἦδε καὶ παρασκευή ἀμφοτέρων ἦν, τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον τῶν Δακεδα-2 μονίων μείζων ἐφάνη. ἀριθμὸν δὲ γράψαι, ἡ καθ’ ἐκάστους ἐκατέρων ἡ ξύμπαντας, οὐκ ἀν ἐδυνάμην ἀκριβῶς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ Δακεδαιμονίων πλῆθος διὰ τῆς πολιτείας τὸ κρυπτὸν ἡγοεῖτο, τῶν δὲ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπων κομπώδες ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα πλήθη ἦπι-128
officers, and the responsibility for the execution of orders devolves upon many.

LXVII. On this occasion there were posted on the left wing the Sciritae, who alone of the Lacedaemonians always have that post by themselves; next to them the soldiers who had served with Brasidas in Thrace, and with them the Neodamodes; next the Lacedaemonians themselves, with their battalions posted one after another, and by them the Heraeans of Arcadia; after these the Maenalians; on the right wing the Tegeates, with a few of the Lacedaemonians holding the end of the line; and on either wing the cavalry. The Lacedaemonians were thus arrayed. On their enemy's side the Mantineans had the right wing, because the action was to be fought in their country; by their side were their Arcadian allies; then the thousand picked men of the Argives, for whom the state had for a long time furnished at public expense training in matters pertaining to war; next to them the rest of the Argives; after these their allies, the Cleonaeans and Orneates; then the Athenians last, on the left wing, and with them their own cavalry.

LXVIII. Such was the order and the composition of the two sides. The army of the Lacedaemonians appeared the larger; but the number, either of the separate contingents or of the total on either side, I could not possibly state accurately. For on account of the secrecy of their polity the number of the Lacedaemonians was unknown; and that claimed for the others, on account of men's tendency to boast with regard to their own numbers, was discredited.

1 Inhabitants of the rough hilly country towards the territory of Tegea.
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στείτο. ἐκ μέντοι τοιοῦτο δοξισμοῦ ἔξεστι τῷ σκοπεῖν τὸ Δακεδαίμονιν τότε παραγενόμενον πλήθους. λόχοι μὲν γὰρ ἐμάχοντο ἐπτὰ ἀνευ Σκιριτῶν ἀντωνοὺ ἐξακοσίων, ἐν δὲ ἐκάστῳ λόχῳ πεντηκοστύες ἦσαν τέσσαρες, καὶ ἐν τῇ πεντηκοστῇ ἐνωμοταί τέσσαρες. τῆς τε ἐνωμοτίας ἐμάχοντο ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ ξυγῳ τέσσαρες· ἐπὶ δὲ βάθος ἐτάξαντο μὲν οὐ πάντες ὀμοίως, ἀλλ’ ὡς λοχαγὸς ἐκαστος ἐβούλετο, ἐπὶ πάν δὲ κατέστησαν ἐπὶ ὕκτῳ. παρὰ δὲ ἀπαν πλὴν Σκιριτῶν τετρακόσιοι καὶ δυνοῖν δέοντες πεντήκοντα ἄνδρες ἡ πρώτῃ τάξει ἦν.

LXIX. 'Επεὶ δὲ ξυνείναι ἐμελλὸν ἡδη, ἐνταῦθα καὶ παραινέσεις καθ’ ἐκαστοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων στρατηγῶν τοιαίδε ἐγίγνοντο, Μαυτιεύσα μὲν ὦτι ὕπερ τε πατρίδως ἡ μάχη ἔσται καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς ἀμα καὶ δουλείας, τὴν μὲν μὴ πειρασαμένοις ἄφαιρεθήναι, τῇς δὲ μὴ αὕτης πειρᾶσθαι. Ἀργείωις δὲ ὕπερ τῆς τε παλαιᾶς ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῆς ἐν Πελοποννησῷ ποτὲ ἱσομοιρίας μὴ διὰ παντὸς στερισκομένους ἀνέχεσθαι, καὶ ἄνδρας ἀμα ἐχθροὺς καὶ ἀστυγείτονας ὑπὲρ πολλῶν ἀδικημάτων ἀμύνασθαι· τοῖς δὲ Ἄθηναιοῖς, καλὸν εἶναι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ξυμμάχων ἀγωνιζόμενοι μὴ δενός λείπεσθαι, καὶ ὃτι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ Δακεδαίμονίους νικήσαντες τὴν τε ἁρχὴν ὑβεβαιοτέραν καὶ μείζω ἔξουσι, καὶ οὐ μὴ ποτὲ της αὐτοῖς ἄλλος ἐστὶν γῆν ἔλθῃ. τοῖς μὲν Ἀργείωις καὶ ξυμμάχωι

1 The sum-total of the whole army was 4,184 men
(7 × 4 × 4 × 4 = 448 × 8 = 3,584 + 600 = 4,184).

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However, from the following mode of computation it is allowable to estimate the number of the Lacedaemonians that were then present. There were engaged in the battle seven battalions, without the Sciritae, who numbered six hundred, and in each battalion were four companies of fifty, in each company four platoons. In the first rank of each company fought four men; in depth, however, they were not all drawn up alike, but as each battalion-commander preferred—on the average eight deep. Along the whole line, then, exclusive of the Sciritae, the first rank consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men.¹

LXIX. When they were on the point of engaging, exhortations were made to the several contingents by their own generals to the following effect: The Mantineans were reminded that the battle would be for fatherland, and, moreover, for dominion or servitude—that they should not be deprived of the one after having made trial of it, and should not again experience the other; the Argives, that the contest would be both for their ancient hegemony² and for their old equality of influence³ in the Peloponnese, that they must not brook being deprived of it forever, and at the same time must avenge themselves for many wrongs on men who were enemies and near neighbours at that; the Athenians, that it was glorious, contending along with many and brave allies, to be inferior to none, and that if they should conquer the Lacedaemonians in the Peloponnese they would have a greater empire and hold it more securely, and no one would ever invade their country again. Such were the admonitions

¹ Under Agamemnon. ² Before the Persian Wars.
τοιαῦτα παρηγεῖθ' ό Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ καθ' ἐκάστους τε καὶ μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν νόμων ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς δὲν ἦπισταντο τὴν παρακέλευσιν τῆς μνήμης ἀγαθοῖς οὖσιν ἔποιούντο, εἰδότες ἔργων ἐκ πολλοῦ μελέτην πλείω σφόζουσαν ἡ λόγων δὲ ὀλγοῦ καλῶς ῥηθεῖσαν παραίνεσιν.

LXX. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ ξύνοδος ἦν, 'Αργείοι μὲν καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐντόνως καὶ ὅργῃ χωροῦντες, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ βραδείως καὶ ύπὸ αὐλητῶν πολλῶν νόμω ἐγκαθεστώτων, οὐ τοῦ θείου χάριν, ἀλλ' ἣν ὀμαλῶς μετὰ ρυθμοῦ βαίνοντες προσέλθοιεν καὶ μὴ διασταθεῖτ' αὐτοῖς ἡ τάξις, ὅπερ φιλεῖ τὰ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἐν ταῖς προσόδοις ποιεῖν.

LXXI. Ἐμπνεύστων δ' ἔτι 'Αγις ὁ βασιλεὺς τοιόνδε ἐβουλεύσατο δρᾶσαι. τὰ στρατόπεδα ποιεῖ μὲν καὶ ἀπαντα τούτο: ἔπι τὰ δεξιὰ κέρα τὰ αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς ξυνόδοις μᾶλλον ἐξωθεῖται, καὶ περισσοῦσι κατὰ τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων εὐώνυμον ἀμφότεροι τὸ δεξιόν, διὰ τὸ φοβουμένους προστέλλει τὰ γυμνὰ ἐκαστόν ὡς μάλιστα τῇ τοῦ ἐν δεξίῳ παρατεταγμέναν ἀσπίδι καὶ νομίζειν τὴν πυκνότητα τῆς ξυγκλήσεως εὐσκηπτόστατον εἴναι· καὶ ἤγείται μὲν τῆς αἰτίας ταύτης ὁ πρωτοστάτης τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρας, προθυμούμενος ἐξαλλάσσειν αἰεὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γύμνωσιν, ἔπονται δὲ διὰ τῶν 2 αὐτῶν φόβον καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. καὶ τότε περεῖσχον μὲν οἱ Μαντινῆς πολὺ τῷ κέρα τῶν Σκιρτῶν, ἔτι δὲ πλέον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Τεγεάται τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὅσῳ μεῖον τὸ στράτευμα εἴχον. δεῖσαι δὲ 'Αγις μὴ σφῶν κυκλωθῇ τὸ εὐώνυμον, καὶ

1 With Gellius and the Schol. for προέλθοιεν of the MSS.
BOOK V. LXIX. 2—LXXI. 3

addressed to the Argives and their allies; the Lacedaemonians, however, exhorted one another man by man, using also their war-songs—as brave men to remember what they had learned, knowing that long-continued actual practice meant more for their salvation than any brief admonition, however well spoken.

LXX. After this the conflict commenced, the Argives and their allies advancing eagerly and impetuously, but the Lacedaemonians slowly and to the music of many flute-players placed among them according to custom, not with any religious motive, but in order that they might march up with even step and keeping time without breaking their order, as large armies are apt to do in going into battle.

LXXI. But while they were still closing, King Agis resolved to make the following manœuvre. All armies are apt, on coming together, to thrust out their right wing too much; and both sides extend with their right beyond their opponents' left wing, because in their fear each man brings his uncovered side as close as possible to the shield of the man stationed on his right, thinking that the closer the shields are locked together the better is the protection. And it is the first man on the right wing who is primarily responsible for this, since he always wants to withdraw from the enemy his own uncovered side, and the rest, from a like fear, follow his example. And so on this occasion the Mantineans extended with their right wing far beyond the Sciritae; and the Lacedaemonians and Tegeates further still beyond the Athenians, inasmuch as their army was larger. So Agis, in fear that his left might be encircled, and thinking that
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νομίσας ἀγαν περιέχειν τοὺς Μαντινέας, τοῖς μὲν Σκιρίταις καὶ Βρασιδείοις ἐσήμηνεν ἐπεξαγαγόντας ἀπὸ σφῶν ἐξισώσαι τοῖς Μαντινεῦσιν, ἐς δὲ τὸ διάκενον τοῦτο παρήγγελλεν ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως δύο λόχους τῶν πολεμάρχων Ἰππονοίδα καὶ Ἀριστοκλῆι ἔχουσι παρελθεῖν καὶ ἐσβαλόντας πληρῶσαι, νομίζων τῷ θ’ ἐαυτῶν δεξιῷ ἔτι περιουσίαν ἐσεσθαί καὶ τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Μαντινέας βεβαιότερον τετάξεσθαι.

LXXII. Ἐννέβη οὖν αὐτῷ ἀτε ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἐφόδῳ καὶ ἐξ ὁλίγου παραγγείλαντι τὸν τε Ἀριστοκλέα καὶ τὸν Ἰππονοίδαν μὴ ἑθῆσαι παρελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ αἰτίαμα ύστερον φεύγειν ἐκ Σπάρτης, δόξαντας μαλακισθῆναι, καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους φθάσαι τῇ προσμείζει, καὶ κελεύσαντος αὐτοῦ, ἔπὶ τούς Σκιρίτας ὡς οὐ παρῆλθον οἱ λόχοι, πάλιν αὖ σφίσι προσμείζει, μὴ δυνηθῆναι ἐτι 2 μηδὲ τούτους ἑυγκλῆσαι. ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δὴ κατὰ πάντα τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλασσωθέντες τότε τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἐδείξαν οὐχ ἤσον περιγενόμενοι.

3 ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν χερσίν ἐγίγνοντο τοῖς ἐναντίοις, τὸ μὲν τῶν Μαντινέων δεξίον τρέπει αὐτῶν τοὺς Σκιρίτας καὶ τοὺς Βρασιδείους, καὶ ἐσπεσόντες οἱ Μαντινῆς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων οἱ χίλιοι λογάδες κατὰ τὸ διάκενον καὶ οὐ ἑυγκλησθέν τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους διέφθειρον καὶ κυκλωσάμενοι ἔτρεψαν καὶ ἐξέσωσαν ἐς τὰς ἀμάξας καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τῶν ἐπιτεταγμένων ἀπέ-134
the Mantineans were extending too far beyond it, gave orders to the Sciritae and the soldiers of Brasidas to move out, away from his main body, and make the line equal to that of the Mantineans; then he directed two polemarchs, Hipponoïdas and Aristocles, to cross over with two companies from the right wing, throw themselves in and fill up the gap thus created, thinking that his own right wing would still have more than enough men, and that the line opposed to the Mantineans would be strengthened.

LXXII. It turned out, then, as he gave this order at the very moment of the attack and on a sudden, that Aristocles and Hipponoïdas refused to move over—for which offence they were afterwards exiled from Sparta, as they were considered to have acted as cowards; and that the enemy were too quick for him in coming to close quarters; and then, when the companies did not move over to replace the Sciritae, and he gave orders to the Sciritae to join the main body again, even these were now no longer able to close up the line. Yet in the most striking way the Lacedaemonians, although they were in all respects proved inferior in point of tactical skill, did on this occasion show that they were none the less superior in courage. For when they came to close quarters with the foe, the right wing of the Mantineans routed, it is true, the Sciritae and the Brasideans, and then the Mantineans and their allies and the thousand picked men of the Argives, rushing into the gap that had not been closed, played havoc with the Lacedaemonians; for they surrounded and put them to rout, and drove them in among the wagons, slaying some of the older men
4 κτεινάν τινας. καὶ ταύτη μὲν ἴσσοντο οἱ Δακε-
δαιμόνιοι: τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ στρατοπέδῳ, καὶ μᾶλλον 
τῷ μέσῳ, ἦπερ ο Βασίλεις ἦν Ἄγιος καὶ περὶ 
αὐτῶν οἱ τρικόσιοι ἵπτης καλούμενοι, προσπε-
σόντες τῶν τε Ἀργείων τοῖς προσβυτέροις καὶ 
πεντελόχοις ὄνομασμένοι καὶ Κλεωναῖοι καὶ 
Ὀρνέαται καὶ Ἀθηναίων τοῖς παρατεταγμένοις 
ἐτρεψαν οὖδὲ ἐσ χειράς τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπομείναντας, 
ἂλ' ὡς ἐπήσαν οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι, εὐθὺς ἐνδόντας 
καὶ ἐστιν οὐς καὶ καταπατηθέντας τοῦ μὴ φθηνα 
τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν.

LXXIII. Ὡς δὲ ταύτη ἐνεδεδώκει τὸ τῶν 
Ἀργείων καὶ ξυμμάχων στράτευμα, παρερρή-
γνυντο ἡδὴ ἀμα καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάτερα, καὶ ἀμα τὸ 
δεξιὸν τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων καὶ Τεγεατῶν ἐκυ-
κλοῦτο τῷ περιέχοντι σφῶν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ 
ἀμφοτέροθεν αὐτοὺς κίνδυνος περιεστήκει, τῇ 
μὲν κυκλομένους, τῇ δὲ ἡδὴ ἡσσημένους. καὶ 
μάλιστ' ἀν τοῦ στρατεύματος ἔταλαπτόρησαν, εἰ 
2 μὴ οἱ ἵπτης παρόντες αὐτοῖς ὧφελμοι ἦσαν. καὶ 
ξυνέβη τῶν Ἅγιων, ὡς ἦσθετο τὸ εὐώνυμον σφῶν 
πονοῦν τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Μαντινεάς καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων 
τοὺς χιλίους, παραγγείλαν παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι 
3 χωρῆσαι ἐπὶ τὸ νυκώμενον. καὶ γενομένου τούτου 
οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναίοι ἐν τούτῳ, ὡς παρῆλθε καὶ ἐξέ-
κλινεν ἀπὸ σφῶν τὸ στράτευμα, καθ' ἡσθιαῖαν

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stationed there. In this quarter, then, the Lacedaemonians were worsted; but in the rest of the army, and especially in the centre, where King Agis was, and about him the three hundred who were called knights,\(^1\) they fell upon the older men of the Argives, the so-called five companies, and upon the Cleonaeans, the Orneates, and those of the Athenians that were arrayed with them, and routed them. Most of the enemy did not even wait to come to blows, but when the Lacedaemonians came on gave way at once, some of them being trodden underfoot in their effort to get out of the way before being hemmed in by the Lacedaemonians.

LXXIII. When the army of the Argives and their allies had given way in this quarter, their line was on the point of being broken in both directions; and at the same time the right wing of the Lacedaemonians and the Tegeates was beginning to encircle the Athenians with the outflanking part of their own line; and so danger beset them on both sides, for they were being surrounded in one quarter and had been already defeated in the other. And they would have suffered more than any part of the whole army if their cavalry had not been present and proved helpful to them. It happened, too, that Agis, perceiving that the left of his own forces, which was opposed to the Mantinians and the thousand Argives, was in distress, gave orders for the whole army to go to the assistance of the part that was in danger of defeat. When this was done, the Athenians, as the enemy's force passed on and moved away from them, quietly made their escape,

\(^1\) Chosen from the flower of the Spartan youth and serving as a royal body-guard, on foot as well as on horseback.
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ἐσώθησαν καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων μετ’ αὐτῶν τὸ ἡσσηθὲν. οἱ δὲ Μαντινῆς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων οἱ λογάδες οὐκέτι πρὸς τὸ ἐγκείσθαι τοὺς ἐναντίοις τὴν γνώμην εἶχον, ἀλλ’ ὀρῶντες τοὺς τε σφετέρους νευκηκήμους καὶ τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους ἐπιφερομένους ἐς φυγήν ἐτράποντο. καὶ τῶν μὲν Μαντινέων καὶ πλείους διεφθάρησαν, τῶν δὲ Ἀργείων λογάδων τὸ πολὺ ἐσώθη. ἡ μέντοι φυγὴ καὶ ἀποχώρησις οὐ βίαιος οὐδὲ μακρὰ ἦν· οἱ γὰρ Δακεδαιμόνιοι μέχρι μὲν τοῦ τρέψαι χρονίους τὰς μάχας καὶ βεβαιῶν τῷ μένειν ποιοῦνται, τρέφαντες δὲ βραχείας καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ τὰς διόξεις.

LXXIV. Καὶ ἡ μὲν μάχη τοιαύτη καὶ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων ἐγένετο, πλείστον δὴ χρόνου μεγίστη δὴ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ ὑπὸ ἀξιω-2 λογωτάτων πόλεων ξυνελθοῦσα. οἱ δὲ Δακε- δαιμόνιοι προθέμενοι τῶν πολεμίων νεκρῶν τὰ ὀπλα τροπαίων εὐθὺς ἵστασαν καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐσκύλευον καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν ἀνείλοντο καὶ ἀπῆ- γαγον ἐς Τεγέαν, ὅπερ ἐτάφησαν, καὶ τοὺς τῶν πολεμίων ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν. ἀπέθανον δὲ Ἀργείων μὲν καὶ Ὀρνεάτων καὶ Κλεωναίων ἐπτακόσιοι, Μαντινέων δὲ διακόσιοι, καὶ Ἀθη- ναίων ξὺν Αἰγινήταις διακόσιοι καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀμφότεροι. Δακεδαιμονίων δὲ οἱ μὲν ξύμμαχοι οὐκ ἐταλαιπώρησαν ὡστε καὶ ἄξιολογον τι ἀπο- γενέσθαι· αὐτῶν δὲ χαλεπῶν μὲν ἦν τὴν ἀλή- θειαν πυθέσθαι, ἐλέγοντο δὲ περὶ τριακοσίων ἀποθανεῖν.

LXXV. Τῆς δὲ μάχης μελλούσης ἐσεσθαί καὶ
and with them the part of the Argives that had been worsted. The Mantineans and their allies, on the other hand, and the picked men of the Argives, were no longer disposed to press home the attack on their opponents, but seeing their own side defeated and the Lacedaemonians bearing down upon them, turned to flight. On the part of the Mantineans the losses were more serious, but of the picked men of the Argives the greater part was saved. The flight, however, was not hotly pursued, nor did the retreat extend to any great distance; for the Lacedaemonians fight their battles long and stubbornly, standing their ground until they rout their foes, but when they have routed them their pursuits are brief and only for a little distance.

LXXIV. Such, then, was the battle—or as like as possible to this description—being the greatest that had occurred within a very long time between Hellenic forces, and fought by the most famous states. The Lacedaemonians, halting in front of their enemies' dead, straightway set up a trophy and stripped the slain, then took up their own dead and withdrew to Tegea, where they buried them, giving up under truce those of the enemy. There were slain, of the Argives, Orneates and Cleoneans seven hundred, of the Mantineans two hundred, of the Athenians, together with the Aeginetans, two hundred, and both their generals. On the side of the Lacedaemonians, the allies did not suffer so that any number worth mentioning was missing; about themselves it was difficult to learn the truth, but near three hundred were said to have been killed.

LXXV. As the battle was about to take place,

1 Athenian colonists settled in Aegina; cf. II. xxvii. 1.
Πλειστοαναξ ὁ ἔτερος βασιλεὺς ἔχων τοὺς τε πρεσβυτέρους καὶ νεωτέρους ἐβοήθησε, καὶ μέχρι μὲν Τεγέας ἀφίκετο, πυθόμενος δὲ τὴν νίκην 2 ἀπεχώρησεν. καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ Κορίνθου καὶ ἔξω ἱσθμοῦ ξυμμάχους ἀπέτρεψαν πέμψαντες οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀναχωρήσαντες καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀφέντες (Κάρνεια γὰρ αὐτοῖς 3 ἐτύγχανον ὑντα) τὴν ἔορτὴν ἦγον. καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τότε ἐπιφερομένην αἰτίαν ἐς τε μαλακίαν διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ ἡγὼς ξυμφόραν καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην ἄβουλίαν τε καὶ βραδυτῆτα ἐνὶ ἔργῳ τούτῳ ἀπελύσαντο, τύχῃ μὲν ὡς ἐδόκουν κακι- ξόμενοι, γνώμῃ δὲ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐτὶ ὑντες. 4 Ἡ δὲ προτεραία ἡμέρα ξυνέβη τῆς μάχης ταύτης καὶ τοὺς Ἐπίδαυριους πανδημεῖ ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν ὡς ἔρημον οὐσαν καὶ τοὺς ὑπολοίπους φύλακας τῶν Ἀργείων ἐξελθόντων 5 αὐτῶν διαφθείραι πολλοὺς. καὶ Ἡλείων τρισχε- λίων ὁπλιτῶν βοηθησάντων Μαντινεύουσιν ὑστερον τῆς μάχης καὶ Ἀθηναίων χιλίων πρὸς τοῖς προ- τέροις, ἐστράτευσαν ἀπαντες οἱ ξύμμαχοι οὕτω εὐθὺς ἐπὶ Ἐπίδαυρον, ἐως οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι Κάρ- νεια ἦγον, καὶ διελόμενοι τὴν πόλιν περιείχον. 6 καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἐξεπαύσαντο, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ, ὁσπερ προσετάχθησαν, τὴν ἄκραν τὸ Ἡραῖον εὐθὺς ἐξειργάσαντο. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ξυγκαταλι- πόντες ἀπαντες τῷ τειχίσματι φρουρὰν ἀνεχώρη- σαν κατὰ πόλεις ἐκαστοι. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

1 cf. ch. lxiv. 3. 2 cf. ch. lxiv. 4.
Pleistoanax, the other king, set out with the older and younger men to bring succour, and got as far as Tegea; but learning there of the victory he returned. The allies, too, from Corinth and from outside the Isthmus were turned back by messengers sent by the Lacedaemonians, who then likewise withdrew and, dismissing their allies, celebrated the festival of the Carneia; for it happened to fall at that time. And the charge brought against them at that time by the Hellenes, both of cowardice because of the calamity on the island of Sphacteria, and of general bad judgment and dilatoriness, they had wiped out by this one action; they were thought to have incurred disgrace through ill-luck, but to be still the same in spirit.

The day before this battle it happened also that the Epidaurians in full force invaded the territory of Argos, thinking to find it now undefended, and slew many of those who had been left behind as guards when the main body of the Argives had taken the field. And now, since three thousand Elean hoplites had come to the aid of the Mantineans after the battle, and also one thousand Athenians in addition to their former contingent, all these allies marched at once against Epidaurus, while the Lacedaemonians were celebrating the Carneia, and proceeded to build a wall round the city, dividing up the work. The rest indeed left off, but the Athenians soon finished the fortification of the promontory on which stood the Heraeum, which was the part that had been assigned to them. In this part of the fortification they left a garrison, to which all contributed, and then withdrew to their several cities. And so the summer ended.
LXXVI. Τοῦ δ' ἐπισημανόμενου χειμῶνος ἀρχο-μένου εὖθύς οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἐξεστράτευσαν, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Τεγέαν λόγους προύπερπον ἐς 2 τὸ Ἀργος ξυμβατήριον. ἦσαν δὲ αὐτοῖς πρό-τερον τε ἄνδρες ἐπιτίθεντο καὶ βουλόμενοι τὸν δήμον τὸν ἐν ὧν Ἀργείς καταλύσασι, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἡ μάχη ἐγεγένητο, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐδύναντο πείθεν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐς τὴν ὀμολογίαν. ἐβούλουντο δὲ πρῶτον σπονδάς ποιῆσαντες πρὸς τοὺς Δακεδαι-μονίους αὐθίς ὑστερον καὶ ξυμμαχίαν, καὶ οὕτως 3 ἦδη τῷ δήμῳ ἐπιτίθεσθαι. καὶ ἀφικνεῖται πρό-ξενος ὧν Ἀργείων Δίχασ ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου παρὰ τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων δύο λόγῳ φέρων ἐς τὸ Ἀργος, τὸν μὲν καθότι εἰ βουλόντα τολμεῖν, τὸν δ' ὡς εἰ εἰρήνην ἐγείνῃ, καὶ γενομένης πολλῆς ἀντι- λογίας (ἐτυχε γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης παρὸν) οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις πράσσοντες, ἦδη καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τολμάντες, ἐπείσαν τοὺς ὧν Ἀργείους προσδέξασθαι τὸν ξυμβατήριον λόγον. ἐστὶ δὲ ὧδε.

LXXVII. 2 "Κατήδε δοκεῖ τὰ ἐκκλησία τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων ξυμβαλέσθαι ποτὼς ὧν Ἀργείως. "Ἀποδιδόντας τῶς παῖδας τοῖς Ὀρχομενέσι καὶ τῶς ἄνδρας τοῖς Μαιναλίοις, καὶ τῶς ἄνδρας τῶς ἐν Μαντινεία τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις ἀποδίδοντας. 2 "Καὶ ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρω ἐκβάντας καὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἀναιροῦντας. αἱ δὲ καὶ μῆ ἐϊκώντι τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοι ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρῳ, πολεμίως εἴμεν τοῖς ὧν Ἀργείοις καὶ

1 ἐπειδὴ τὰ Κάρνεια ἦγαγον, in the MSS. after οἱ Δακεδαιμό-νιοι, bracketed by Hude, following Krüger.
2 The dialect in chs. lxxvii. and lxxix. is Doric.

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LXXVI. At the very beginning of the following winter, the Lacedaemonians led out an army and came to Tegea, whence they sent on to Argos proposals for peace. There had been before this partisans of theirs at Argos who wished to put down the democracy there, and after the battle had been fought they were far better able to persuade the people to come to an agreement with Sparta. They wished, after they had first made a treaty with the Lacedaemonians, to conclude later an alliance also, and having done so to attack the democracy. And now there arrived at Argos Lichas son of Arcesilaus, proxenus of the Argives, bringing from the Lacedaemonians two proposals: the one stating on what conditions they should make war, if they wished that; the other, how they should keep the peace, if they preferred that. And after much opposition—for Alcibiades chanced to be present—the men who were working for the Lacedaemonians, venturing now to act openly, persuaded the Argives to accept the proposal for peace, which was as follows:

LXXVII. "It seems good to the assembly of the Lacedaemonians to make an agreement with the Argives on the following terms:

1. "The Argives shall restore to the Orchomenians their children and to the Maenalians their men, and to the Lacedaemonians the men they deposited at Mantinea.

2. "They shall evacuate Epidaurus and demolish the fortification there. And if the Athenians do not withdraw from Epidaurus, they shall be enemies

1 cf. ch. lxi. 5.
2 cf. ch. lxi. 4, though the Maenalians are not expressly mentioned there.  
3 cf. ch. lxi. 5.
ΤΗΥΚΥΔΙΔΗΣ

τοῖς Δακεδαίμονίοις καὶ τοῖς τῶν Δακεδαίμονίων ἐγγὺς καὶ τοῖς τῶν Ἀργείων ἐγγὺς.

3 “Καὶ αὖ τινα τοῖ Δακεδαίμονιοι παῖδα ἔχοντι, ἀποδόμεν ταῖς πολίσσι πᾶσαις.

4 “Περὶ δὲ τῶ σιώ σύμματος, αἱ μὲν λῆν, τοῖς Ἑπιδαυρίοις ὄρκον δόμεν, αἱ δὲ, αὐτῶς ὁμόσαι.

5 “Τὰς δὲ πόλιας τὰς ἐν Πελοπόννασῳ, καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμως ἐλμεν πᾶσας κατὰ πάτρια.

6 “Αἱ δὲ κα τῶν ἐκτὸς Πελοπόννασῳ τις ἐπὶ τὰν Πελοπόννασον γὰν ἢ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἀλεξέμεναι ἀμόθη βουλευσαμένως, ὅπα κα δικαιότατα δοκῇ τοῖς Πελοπόννασίοις.

7 “Οὐσοι δὲ ἐκτὸς Πελοπόννασῳ τῶν Δακεδαίμονίων ἐγγὺς ὑμᾶς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἑσσοῦνται ἐν τῷ πέπτε καὶ τοῖς τῶν Δακεδαίμονίων καὶ τοῖς τῶν Ἀργείων ἐγγὺς ὑμᾶς, τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες.

8 “Ἐπιδείξαντας δὲ τοῖς ἐγγύς ἐγγυνθαῖ, αἱ κα αὐτοῖς δοκῇ. αἱ δὲ τῷ δοκῇ τοῖς ἐγγύς, οί δέ αὐτῆς ἀπείλησιν.”

LXXVIII. Τούτων μὲν τῶν λόγων προσεδέξαντο πρῶτον οἱ Ἀργείοι, καὶ τῶν Δακεδαίμονίων τὸ στράτευμα ἀνεχόμεν ἐκ τῆς Τεγέας ἐπὶ οἰκοῦ·

μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ ἐπιμείξας οὐσης ἦν παρ’ ἄλλη-

λους, οὐ πολλὸ ὡστε ἐπιφανεῖς αὐθεῖς οἱ αὐτοὶ

ἄνδρες ὡστε τὴν Μαντινεών καὶ τὴν Ἀθηναίοιν καὶ

Ἡλείων ἐνεμαχίαν ἀφέντας Ἀργείους σπουδάς
to the Argives and Lacedaemonians, and to the allies of the Lacedaemonians and to the allies of the Argives.

3. "If the Lacedaemonians have in custody any children, they shall restore these in all cases to their cities.

4. "As to the offering to the god,\(^1\) if they wish they shall impose an oath upon the Epidaurians; but if not, they shall swear it themselves.

5. "The cities in the Peloponnesus, both small and great, shall all be independent according to their hereditary usages.

6. "If anyone from outside the Peloponnesus comes against Peloponnesian territory with evil intent, they shall repel the invader, taking counsel together, in whatever way shall seem to the Peloponnesians most just.

7. "Such states as are allies of the Lacedaemonians outside of the Peloponnesus shall be on the same footing as are the other allies of the Lacedaemonians and of the Argives, all retaining their own territory.

8. "They shall communicate this agreement to their allies and make terms with them, if it seem best. But if the allies prefer, they may send the treaty home for consideration."\(^2\)

LXXVIII. The Argives accepted this proposal at first, and the army of the Lacedaemonians returned home from Tegea. But not long after this, when there was now intercourse between them, the same men again brought it about that the Argives renounced the alliance with the Mantineans, Eleans,

\(^1\) Apollo Pythaeus; cf. ch. liii.

\(^2\) i.e. may refer it back to the states for their decision.

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καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ποιήσασθαι πρὸς Δακεδαιμονίους. καὶ ἔγένοντο αἴδε.

LXXIX. "Καταδέ ἐδοξε τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις σπονδᾶς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν εἶμεν πεντήκοντα ἔτη.

"Επὶ τοῖς ἵσοις καὶ ὀμοίοις δίκας διδόντας κατὰ πάτρια· ταὶ δὲ ἄλλαι πόλεις ταῖ ἐν Πελοποννάσῳ κοινανόντων τὰς σπονδὰν καὶ τὰς ξυμμαχίας αὐτοῦνοι καὶ αὐτοπόλεις, τὰν αὐτῶν ἑχοντες, κατὰ πάτρια δίκας διδόντες τὰς ἴσας καὶ ὀμοίας.

2 "Οσοὶ δὲ ἐξω Πελοποννάσω Δακεδαιμονίοις ξύμμαχοι ἔντι, ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐσσοῦνται τοῖσπερ καὶ τοὶ Δακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ τοὶ τῶν Ἀργείων ξύμμαχοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐσσοῦνται τῶπερ καὶ τοὶ Ἀργείοι, τὰν αὐτῶν ἑχοντες.

3 "Αἱ δὲ ποι στρατείας δὲν κοινὰς, βουλεύεσθαι Δακεδαιμονίως καὶ Ἀργείως ὅπα καὶ δικαιότατα κρίναντας τοῖς ξυμμάχοις.

4 "Αἱ δὲ τινὶ τὰν πολίων ἡ ἁμφίλογα, ἡ τῶν ἐντὸς ἡ τῶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννάσῳ, αἰτε περὶ ὄρων αἰτε περὶ ἀλλου τινός, διακριθήμεν. αἰ δε τῶν ξυμμάχων πόλεις πόλις ἐρίζοι, ἐς πόλιν ἐλθεῖν, ἄν τινα ἴσαν ἀμφοὶ ταῖς πολίσεσι δοκεῖοι.

"Τῶς δὲ ἔτας ἑκάτερον τας πάτριας δικαίεσθαι."

LXXX. Αἰ μὲν σπονδαὶ καὶ ἡ ξυμμαχία αὐτὴ ἐγεγένητο· καὶ ὁπόσα ἀλλήλων πολέμω ἢ εἰ τι ἄλλο εἴχον, διελύσαντο. κοινὴ δὲ ἥδη τὰ πράγ-

1 Poppo's correction for τοῖς δὲ ἔτας of the MSS.

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and Athenians and concluded a treaty and an alliance with the Lacedaemonians to this effect:

LXXIX. "It has seemed good to the Lacedaemonians and the Argives to conclude a treaty and an alliance for fifty years on the following terms:

1. "They shall offer settlements by law under conditions that are fair and impartial, according to hereditary usage. The rest of the cities in the Peloponnesus shall share in the treaty and alliance, being independent and self-governed, retaining their own territory, and offering settlements by law that are fair and impartial according to hereditary usage.

2. "Such states as are allies of the Lacedaemonians outside of the Peloponnesus shall stand upon the same footing as the Lacedaemonians; and the allies of the Argives shall be upon the same footing as the Argives, all retaining their own territory.

3. "If there be need to send a common expedition to any quarter, the Lacedaemonians and the Argives shall consult and adjudge to the allies their allotments in whatever way is fairest.

4. "If there be any dispute on the part of any one of the cities, either of those within the Peloponnesus or without, whether about boundaries or anything else, the matter shall be judicially decided. But if any city of the allies quarrel with another, they shall appeal to some city which both deem to be impartial.

5. "Individual citizens shall conduct their suits according to hereditary usage."

LXXX. Such was the treaty and alliance that was concluded; and all the places which either side had acquired from the other in war they restored, or if there was any other ground of difference between them, they came to an agreement about it. Acting
THUCYDIDES

ματα τιθέμενοι ἐψηφίσαντο κήρυκα καὶ πρεσβεῖαν παρὰ Ἀθηναίων μὴ προσδέχεσθαι, ἣν μὴ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἔκώσι τὰ τείχη ἐκλιπόντες, καὶ μὴ ἔμβαίνειν τῷ μηδὲ πολεμεῖν ἀλλ’ ἢ ἀμα. 2 καὶ τὰ τε ἄλλα θυμὸ ἐφερον καὶ ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Ἡράκης χωρία καὶ ὡς Περδίκκαν ἐπεμψαν ἀμφότεροι πρέσβεις. καὶ ἀνέπεσαν Περδίκκαν ἔναν-μόσαι σφίσιν· οὐ μέντοι εὐθὺς γε ἀπέστη τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἀλλὰ διενοεῖτο, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους ἑώρα· ἵνα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἔξ Ἀργος. καὶ τὸς Χαλκίδευσι τοὺς τε παλαιοὺς ὄρκους 3 ἀνενεώσαντο καὶ ἄλλους ὁμοσαν. ἐπεμψαν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ Ἀργεῖοι πρέσβεις, τὸ ἔξ Ἑπιδαύρου τεῖχος κελεύοντες ἐκλιπεῖν· οἱ δ’ ὀρὼντες ὅλιγοι πρὸς πλείους ὄντες τοὺς ἕμφυλακας ἐπεμψαν Δημοσθένη τοὺς σφετέρους εξάγωντα. ὁ δὲ ἀφικόμενος καὶ ἀγωνά τινα πρόφασιν γυμνικῶν ἐξω τοῦ φρουρίου ποιήσας, ὡς ἔξηλθε τὸ ἄλλο φρουρίων, ἀπέκλησε τὰς πύλας. καὶ ὑστερον Ἑπιδαύριος ἀνανεώσαμεν τὰς σπονδὰς αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέδοσαν τὸ τείχισμα.

LXXXI. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων ἀπόστασιν ἐκ τῆς ἕμμαχίας καὶ οἱ Μαντινῆς, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀντέχοντες, ἐπειτ’ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἄνευ τῶν Ἀρ-γείων, ἐνεβήσαν καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς Δακεδαμονίοις 2 καὶ τὴν ἄρχην ἀφείσαν τῶν πόλεων. καὶ Δακε-δαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, χύλου ἐκάτεροι, ἔνστρα-

¹ cf. II. xcix. 3. ² cf. ch. lxxv. 6.
now in concert in their affairs, they voted not to receive herald or embassy from the Athenians, unless they evacuated their forts and withdrew from the Peloponnesus; also not to make peace or carry on war with anyone except together. And not only did they prosecute other matters with energy, but both of them sent envoys to the places in Thrace and to Perdiccas. And they persuaded Perdiccas to swear alliance with them. He, however, did not desert the Athenians at once, but was thinking of it, because he saw the Argives had done so; for he was himself of Argive descent. With the Chalcidians, too, they renewed their ancient oaths, and swore new ones. The Argives also sent envoys to the Athenians bidding them evacuate the fortress at Epidaurus; and these, seeing that their contingent was small in comparison with the rest, sent Demosthenes to bring away their men. On his arrival he made a pretext of some gymnastic contest outside the fort, and when the rest of the garrison had gone out closed the gates behind them. Afterwards the Athenians renewed the treaty with the Epidaurians and of their own accord gave up the fortress.

LXXXI. After the withdrawal of the Argives from the alliance, the Mantineans also, although at first opposed to this course, afterwards, finding themselves unable to hold out without the Argives, likewise made an agreement with the Lacedaemonians and relinquished their sovereignty over the cities. And now the Lacedaemonians and Argives, each a thousand strong, made a joint

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3 i.e. over the Parrhasians and others in Arcadia; cf. ch. xxix. 1; xxxiii. 1; lxii. 1.
teúsantes, tά τ’ έν Σικυώνι ές όλγους μάλλον κατέστησαν αύτοι οί Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλθόντες, καὶ μετ’ ἐκεῖνα ξυναμφότεροι ἦδη καὶ τόν ἐν ’Ἀργεί δήμον κατέλυσαν, καὶ ὀλυγαρχία ἐπιτηδείᾳ τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις κατέστη. καὶ πρός ἔαρ ἦδη ταύτα ἤν τοῦ χειμῶνος λήγοντος, καὶ τέταρτον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

LXXXII. Τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγυνομένου θέρους Διής τε οί ἐν ’Αθῆνας ἀπέστησαν’Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Χαλκιδέας καὶ Δακεδαιμόνιοι τά ἐν ’Αχαΐα ὤν ἐπιτηδείως 2 πρῶτον ἔχοντα καθίσταντο. καὶ ’Ἀργείων ὁ δήμος κατ’ ὀλγόν ἐνυιστάμενός τε καὶ ἀναθαρσή- σας ἐπέθεντο τοῖς ὀλγοῖς, τηρήσαντες αὐτάς τὰς γυμνοπαιδίας τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων. καὶ μάχης γενομένης ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπεκράτησεν ὁ δήμος, καὶ 3 τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ ἐξήλασεν. οί δὲ Δακεδαιμόνιοι, ἔως μὲν αὐτοὺς μετεπέμπτοντο οἱ φίλοι, οὐκ ἦλθον ἐκ πλείονος, ἀναβαλόμενοι δὲ τὰς γυμνοπαιδίας ἐβοθοῦν. καὶ ἐν Τεγέα πυθό- μενοι ὅτι νενίκηται οἱ ὀλγοὶ, προελθεῖν μὲν οὐκέτι ἠθέλησαν δεομένων τῶν διαπεφευγότων, ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἐπὶ οἴκου τὰς γυμνοπαιδίας 4 ἤγον. καὶ ὑστερον ἐλθόντων πρέσβεων ἀπό τε τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἀγγέλων 1 τῶν ἔξω ’Αργείων, παρόντων τε τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ῥηθέντων πολλῶν

1 Müller-Strübing’s order, for ἀγγέλων καὶ of the MSS.

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expedition, the Lacedaemonians first going alone and setting up a more oligarchical form of government in Sicyon, afterwards both together putting down the democracy at Argos and establishing an oligarchy favourable to the Lacedaemonians. These things occurred when the winter was closing and spring was now near at hand; and so ended the fourteenth year of the war.

LXXXII. The next summer the people of Dium on Mount Athos revolted from the Athenians and went over to the Chalcidians; and the Lacedaemonians arranged matters in Achaea, which had before this not been favourable to their interests. And now the popular party at Argos, gradually consolidating its strength and recovering boldness, waited for the celebration of the Gymnopaediae by the Lacedaemonians and attacked the oligarchs. A battle occurred in the city and the popular party got the better of it, slaying some of their enemies and expelling others. The Lacedaemonians, although their friends kept sending for them, did not come for a long time; but at last they put off the Gymnopaediae and went to their aid. But hearing at Tegea that the oligarchs had been conquered, they refused to go further, in spite of the entreaties of the oligarchs who had escaped, and returning home proceeded with the celebration of the Gymnopaediae. Later, when envoys had come from the Argives in the city and messengers from those who had been driven out, and their allies were present, and much had been said on either side, they

1 cf. ch. xxxv. 1.
2 A festival in which boys and men danced naked. While it lasted the Lacedaemonians (as at the Carneia, cf. chs. liv. and lxxv.) abstained from war.
ἀφ’ ἐκατέρων ἐγνωσαν μὲν ἀδικείν τοὺς ἐν τῇ
tόλει καὶ ἐδοξεῖν αὐτοῖς στρατεύειν ἐς Ἀργος,
5 διατριβαὶ δὲ καὶ μελλήσεις ἐγίγνοντο. ὁ δὲ
δῆμος τῶν Ἀργείων ἐν τούτῳ, φοβούμενος τοὺς
Δακεδαμονίους καὶ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἡμιμαχίαν
πάλιν προσαγόμενός τε καὶ νομίζων μέγιστον ἄν
σφᾶς ὄφελησαι, τειχίζει μακρὰ τεῖχη ἐς θάλασ-
σαν, ὅπως, ἂν τῆς γῆς εἰργωνταί, ἡ κατὰ θάλασ-
σαν σφᾶς μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπαγωγὴ τῶν
6 ἐπιτηδείων ὀφελῆς. ξυνήδεσαν δὲ τῶν τειχισμῶν
καὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ τινὲς πόλεων. καὶ οἱ
μὲν Ἀργεῖοι πανδημεῖ, καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ γυναῖκες
καὶ οἰκεῖαι, ἐτείχιζον καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν αὐτοῖς
μὴν τέκτονες καὶ λιθωργοὶ. καὶ τὸ θέρος
ἐτελεύτα.

I LXXXIII. Τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγνωμενοῦ χειμῶνος Δα-
κεδαμονίου ὃς ἦσθοντο τειχιζόντων, ἑστράτευσαν
ἐς τὸ Ἀργος αὐτοὶ τε καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πλὴν
Κορινθίων ὑπῆρχε δὲ τι αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Ἀρ-
γοὺς1 αὐτόθεν πρασσόμενον. ἤγε δὲ τὴν στρατιὰν
Ἀγιὸ Ἀρχιδάμο, Δακεδαμονίων βασιλεὺς.
2 καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως δοκοῦντα προὐπάρχειν
οὗ προκυψῆτο ἐτὶ· τὰ δὲ οἰκοδομοῦμενα τεῖχη
ἐλόντες καὶ καταβαλόντες καὶ Ἡσιᾶς χωρίον τῆς
Ἀργείας λαβόντες καὶ τοὺς ἑλευθέρους ἀπαντας
οὕς ἐλαβον ἀποκτείναντες ἀνεχώρησαν καὶ διε-
3 λύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις. ἑστράτευσαν δὲ μετὰ
τούτῳ καὶ Ἀργεῖοι ἐς τὴν Ἑλεισάιαν, καὶ δησω-
σαντες ἀπῆλθον, ὅτι σφῶν τοὺς φυγάδας ὑπεδέ-
χοντο· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν ἐνταῦθα κατώκηντο.
4 κατέκλησαν δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ Μακε-

1 ἐκ τοῦ Ἀργοὺς deleted by Huker, followed by Hude.
BOOK V. LXXXII. 4–LXXXIII. 4

decided that those in the city 1 were in the wrong and determined to make an expedition to Argos; but delays and postponements occurred. Meanwhile, the democracy at Argos, fearing the Lacedaemonians and again courting the alliance of the Athenians, because they believed that it would be of the greatest benefit to themselves, proceeded to build long walls down to the sea, in order that, should they be cut off from the land, they might with the help of the Athenians have the advantage of importing supplies by sea. Some of the cities in the Peloponnesus, too, were privy to their fortifying. The whole Argive people, men, women, and slaves, set to work upon the walls; and from Athens also there came to them carpenters and stone masons. So the summer ended.

LXXXIII. The following winter, when the Lacedaemonians became aware that they were fortifying Argos, they made an expedition thither, themselves and their allies, except the Corinthians; and there was also a party in Argos itself that was working in their interest. The commander of the army was Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. The support from the city which they expected to find ready failed them, but they seized and demolished the walls that were being built; and they also seized Hysiae, a place in Argive territory, slew all the free men whom they caught, and then withdrew and dispersed to their several cities. After this the Argives in their turn invaded Phliasia and ravaged it before they returned home, because the Phliasians had received fugitives of theirs, most of whom had settled there. Also during the same winter the Athenians

1 The popular party.
δόνας Ἀθηναίοι, Περδίκκα ἐπικαλοῦντες τὴν τε πρὸς Ἀργείους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους γενομένην ἕξυμμοσίαν καὶ ότι παρασκευασμένων αὐτῶν στρατιάν ἁγείν ἐπὶ Χαλκίδεας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης καὶ Ἀμφίπολιν Νικόν τοῦ Νικηράτου στρατηγοῦντος ἔφευγο τὴν ἕξυμμαχίαν καὶ ἢ στρατιὰ μάλιστα διελύθη ἐκείνων ἀπάραντος·¹ πολέμος οὖν ἦν· καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐπελεύστα σύτος, καὶ πέμπτον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐπελεύστα.

LXXXIV. Τού δ' ἐπιγυνημένου θέρους Ἀλκι-βιάδης τε πλεύσας ἐς Ἀργος ναυσίν εἰκοσι Ἀργείων τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἐτί ύπόπτους εἶναι καὶ τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φρονεῖν ἔλαβε, τριακόσιος ἀνδρας, καὶ κατέθεντο αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοι ες τὰς ἐγγύς νήσους ὃν ἤρχον· καὶ ἐπὶ Μήλου τὴν νῆσον Ἀθηναίοι ἐστράτευσαν ναυσίν ἐαυτῶν μὲν τριάκοντα, Χίαις δὲ ἕξι, Λεσβίαιν δὲ δυοὶ, καὶ ὀπλίταις ἐαυτῶν μὲν διακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις καὶ τοξόταις τριακόσιοι καὶ ἱπποτζόταις εἰκοσι, τῶν δὲ ἕξυμμάχων καὶ νησιωτῶν ὀπλίταις μᾶλιστα 2 πεντακόσιοι καὶ χιλίοις. οἱ δὲ Μήλιοι Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν εἰσιν ἄποικοι, τῶν δ' Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἦθελον ὑπακούειν ὡσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι νησιωται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὐδετέρων ὄντες ἡσύχαζον, ἐπειτα ὡς αὐτοὺς ἥγακαζον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐρώτησε τὴν 3 γῆν, ἐς πόλεμον φανερὸν κατέστησαν. στρατο-πεδευσάμενοι οὖν ἐς τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν τῇ παρασκευῇ ταύτη ὁι στρατηγοὶ Κλεομήδης τε ὁ Λυκομήδους καὶ Τείσιας ὁ Τεισιμάχου, πρὶν ἀδικεῖν τι τῆς γῆς, λόγους πρῶτον ποιησμένους ἔπεμψαν πρέσ-βεις. οὖς οἱ Μήλιοι πρὸς μὲν τὸ πλῆθος οὐκ

¹ ἀπάραντος is probably corrupt.
shut off the Macedonians from the sea, charging Perdiccas with the league which he had made with the Argives and the Lacedaemonians; also that when they had prepared to lead an army against the Chalcidians in Thrace and against Amphipolis, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, he had been false to the alliance, and the expedition had been broken up chiefly because of his defection. Accordingly, he was regarded as an enemy. So this winter ended and with it the tenth year of the war.

LXXXIV. The next summer Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships and seized such Argives as seemed to be still open to suspicion and to favour the side of the Lacedaemonians, to the number of three hundred men; and these the Athenians deposited in the adjacent islands over which they had sway. The Athenians also made an expedition against the island of Melos\(^1\) with thirty ships of their own, six Chian and two Lesbian, and twelve hundred Athenian hoplites, three hundred bowmen, and twenty mounted archers, and from their allies and the islanders about fifteen hundred hoplites. Now the Melians are colonists of the Lacedaemonians, and were unwilling to obey the Athenians like the rest of the islanders. At first they remained quiet as neutrals; then when the Athenians tried to force them by ravaging their land, they went to war openly. Accordingly, having encamped in their territory with the forces just mentioned, the Athenian commanders, Cleomedes son of Lycomedes and Teisias son of Teismachus, before doing any harm to the land, sent envoys to make proposals to the Melians. These envoys the Melians did not bring before the popular

\(^1\) cf. iii. xci. 1; xciv. 2.
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ηγαγον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις λέγειν ἐκέλευον περὶ ὧν ἦκουσιν. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ἐλευθον τοιάδε.

LXXXV. "Επειδῆ οὐ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος οἱ λόγοι γίγνονται, ὡσποδὲ μὴ ξυνεχεὶ ῥήσει οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπαγωγὰ καὶ ἀνέλεγκτα ἐστὶ ἀκοῦσαντες ἡμῶν ἀπατηθῶσι (γιγνώσκομεν γὰρ ὅτι τούτῳ φρονεῖ ἡμῶν ἢ ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους ἀγωγῇ), ὑμεῖς οἱ καθήμενοι ἐτί ἀσφαλέστερον ποιήσατε. καθ’ ἐκαστὸν γὰρ καὶ μηδ’ ὑμεῖς ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ μὴ δοκοῦν ἐπιτηδείως λέγεσθαι εὐθὺς ὑπολαμβάνοντες κρίνετε. καὶ πρῶτον εἰ ἀρέσκει ὡς λέγομεν εἴπατε."

LXXXVI. Οἱ δὲ τῶν Μηλίων ξύνεδροι ἀπεκρίναντο. "Ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια τοῦ διδάσκειν καθ’ ἡσυχίᾳ ἀλλήλους οὐ ψέγεται, τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου, παρόντα ἡδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντα, διαφέροντα αὐτοῦ φαίνεται. ὀρῶμεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς τε κριτὰς ἡκουτας ὑμᾶς τῶν λεχθησομένων, καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς περιγενομένοι μὲν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ δι’ αὐτὸ μὴ ἔνδουσι πόλεμον ἡμῖν φέρουσαν, πεισθεὶς δὲ δουλείαν."

LXXXVII. ΑΘ. Εἰ μὲν τοῖνυν ὑπονοοῖα τῶν μελλόντων λογιούμενοι ἡ ἀλλο τι ξυνηκέτε ἢ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων καὶ ὃν ὅρατε περὶ σωτηρίας βουλεύσοντες τῇ πόλει, πανοίμεθ’ ἀν’ εἰ δ’ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, λέγοιμεν ἀν.

1 Probably the chief governing body, a chamber of oligarchs, to which the magistrates (ai ἀρχαί) belonged.

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assembly, but bade them tell in the presence of the magistrates and the few what they had come for. The Athenian envoys accordingly spoke as follows:

LXXXV. "Since our proposals are not to be made before the assembly, your purpose being, as it seems, that the people may not hear from us once for all, in an uninterrupted speech, arguments that are seductive and untested, and so be deceived—for we see that it is with this thought that you bring us before the few—do you who sit here adopt a still safer course. Take up each point, and do not you either make a single speech, but conduct the inquiry by replying at once to any statement of ours that seems to be unsatisfactory. And first state whether our proposal suits you."

LXXXVI. The commissioners of the Melians answered: "The fairness of the proposal, that we shall at our leisure instruct one another, is not open to objection, but these acts of war, which are not in the future, but already here at hand, are manifestly at variance with your suggestion. For we see that you are come to be yourselves judges of what is to be said here, and that the outcome of the discussion will in all likelihood be, if we win the debate by the righteousness of our cause and for that very reason refuse to yield, war for us, whereas if we are persuaded, servitude."

LXXXVII. Ath. "Well, if you have met to argue from suspicions about what may happen in the future, or for any other purpose than to consult for the safety of your city in the light of what is present and before your eyes, we may as well stop; but if you have this end in view, we may speak on."

\(^2\) i.e. not questioned or put to the proof.

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LXXXVIII. ΜΗΔ. Εἰκὸς μὲν καὶ ἔγγυαμι ἐν τῷ τοιῷθε καθεστῶτας ἐπὶ πολλὰ καὶ λέγοντας καὶ δοκοῦντας τρέπεσθαι· ἢ μέντοι ξύνοδος καὶ περὶ σωτηρίας ἢδε πάρεστι, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὅ προκαλεῖσθε τρόπῳ, εἴ δοκεῖ, γυνέσθω.

LXXXIX. ΑΘ. Ἡμεῖς τοίνυν οὕτε αὐτοὶ μετ' ὅνομάτων καλῶν, ὡς ἡ δικαίως τὸν Μήδον καταλύσαντες ἀρχομεν ἢ ἀδικοῦμενοι νῦν ἐπεξερχόμεθα, λόγων μῆκος ἀπίστων παρέξομεν, οὕτ' ὑμᾶς ἀξιοῦμεν ἢ ὅτι Δακεδαιμονίων ἄποικοι ὄντες οὐ ἦσθε παρακατατεύσατε ἢ ὡς ἡμᾶς οὐδέν ἡδικήκατε λέγοντας οἰέσθαι πείσειν, τὰ δυνατὰ δ' ἔξω δὲν ἐκάτεροι ἀληθῶς φρονοῦμεν διαπράσσεσθαι, ἐπισταμένους πρὸς εἰδότας ὅτι δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἱσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἁσθενεὶς ἐνεχροοῦσιν.

ΧC. ΜΗΔ. Ἡμὲν δὲ νομίζομεν γε, χρῆσιμον (ἀνάγκη γάρ, ἐπειδή ὑμεῖς οὕτω παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ξυμφέρον λέγειν ὑπέθεσθε) μὴ καταλύσειν ὑμᾶς τὸ κοινὸν ἁγαθὸν, ἄλλα τῷ αἰεί, ἐν κινδύνῳ γιγνομένῳ εἶναι τὰ εἰκότα καὶ δίκαια καὶ τι καὶ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς πείσαντα τίνα ὀφεληθήναι καὶ πρὸς ὑμῶν ὑχ ἢσσον τοῦτο, ὅσον καὶ ἐπὶ

1 καὶ δίκαια deleted by Hude, after G. Hermann.

1 cf. vi. lxxxi. 2.
2 ἐντὸς τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς, lit. "short of exactness."

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BOOK V. lxxxviii.—xc.

LXXXVIII. Mel. "It is natural and pardonable for men in such a position as ours to resort to many arguments and many suppositions. This conference, however, is here to consider the question of our safety; so let the discussion, if it please you, proceed in the way that you propose."

LXXXIX. Ath. "Well, then, we on our part will make use of no fair phrases, saying either that we hold sway justly because we overthrew the Persians, or that we now come against you because we are injured, offering in a lengthy speech arguments that would not be believed; nor, on the other hand, do we presume that you will assert, either that the reason why you did not join us in the war was because you were colonists of the Lacedaemonians, or that you have done us no wrong. Rather we presume that you aim at accomplishing what is possible in accordance with the real thoughts of both of us, since you know as well as we know that what is just is arrived at in human arguments only when the necessity on both sides is equal, and that the powerful exact what they can, while the weak yield what they must."

XC. Mel. "As we think, at any rate, it is expedient (for we are constrained to speak of expediency, since you have in this fashion, ignoring the principle of justice, suggested that we speak of what is advantageous) that you should not rule out the principle of the common good, but that for him who is at the time in peril what is equitable should also be just, and though one has not entirely proved his point he should still derive some benefit therefrom. And this is not less for your interest than for our own, inasmuch as you, if you shall
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μεγίστη τιμωρία σφαλέντες ἄν τοῖς ἄλλοις παρά-

dειγμα γένοισθε.

XCI. ἌΘ. Ἡμεῖς δὲ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχῆς, ἦν
καὶ πανομούμεν τὴν τελευτήν· οὐ

gὰρ οἱ ἄρχοντες άλλων, ὡσπερ καὶ 

Δακεδαίμονοι,

οὕτω δεινῷ τοῖς νικηθέσιν (ἐστι δὲ οὐ πρὸς 

Δακε-

δαίμονιοι ἡμῖν ὃ ἀγών), ἀλλ' ἦν οἱ ύπήκοοι τὸν
2 τῶν ἀρξάντων αὐτοῦ ἑπιθέμενοι κρατήσωσιν.

καὶ

περὶ μὲν τούτου ἡμῖν ἀφείσθω κινδυνεύεσθαι· ὡς

dὲ ἐπὶ ὥφελία τε πάρεσμεν τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχῆς

καὶ ἔπι σωτηρία νῦν τοὺς λόγους ἐροῦμεν 

τῆς

ὂμετέρας πόλεως, ταύτα δηλώσαμεν, βουλόμενοι

ἀπόνως μὲν ὕμων ἄρξαι, χρησίμως δ' ὑμᾶς ἀμφο-

tέροις σωθῆναι.

XCI. ΜΗΛ. Καὶ πώς χρῆσιμον ἄν ξυμβαίη

ἡμῖν δουλεύσαι, ὡσπερ καὶ ὕμων ἄρξαι;

XCI. ΑΘ. "Ὅτι ὑμῖν μὲν πρὸ τοῦ τὰ δεινό-

tata παθεῖν ὑπακοῦσαι ἄν γένοιτο, ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ 

diaφθειράντες ὑμᾶς κερδάινομεν ἄν.

XCV. ΜΗΛ. "Ωστε δὲ ἡσυχίαν ἁγοντας

ἡμᾶς φίλους μὲν εἶναι ἀντὶ πολεμίων, ξυμμάχους

dὲ μηδετέρων, οὐκ ἢ δέξαισθε;

XCV. ἌΘ. Οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς βλάπτει

ἡ ἔχθρα ὑμῶν ὡσον ἡ φιλία μὲν ἀσθενείας, τὸ δὲ

μίσος δυνάμεως παράδειγμα τοῖς ἄρχομένοις

dηλοῦμεν.

1 i.e. cruel conduct on your part would justify others in

inflicting like punishment upon you should you ever be

defeated.

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ever meet with a reverse, would not only incur the greatest punishment, but would also become a warning example to others." 1

XCI. Αθ. "But we on our part, so far as our empire is concerned, even if it should cease to be, do not look forward to the end with dismay. For it is not those who rule over others, as the Lacedaemonians also do—though our quarrel is not now with the Lacedaemonians—that are a terror to the vanquished, but subject peoples who may per-chance themselves attack and get the better of their rulers. And as far as that is concerned, you must permit us to take the risk. But that it is for the benefit of our empire that we are here, and also the safety of your city that we now propose to speak, we shall make plain to you, since what we desire is to have dominion over you without trouble to ourselves, and that you should be saved to the advantage of both."

XCII. Μελ. "And how could it prove as advantageous for us to become slaves, as it is for you to have dominion?"

XCIII. Αθ. "Because it would be to your advantage to submit before suffering the most horrible fate, and we should gain by not destroying you."

XCIV. Μελ. "And so, you mean, you would not consent to our remaining at peace and being friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither combatant?"

XCV. Αθ. "No; for your hostility does not injure us so much as your friendship; for in the eyes of our subjects that would be a proof of our weakness, whereas your hatred is a proof of our power."
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XCVI. ΜΗΔ. Σκοπούσι δ' ὑμῶν οὔτως ὦ ὑπῆκοοι τὸ εἰκός, ὡστε τούς τε μὴ προσήκοντας καὶ ὁσοὶ ἀποικοὶ ὄντες οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀποστάντες τινὲς κεχείρωνται ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ τιθέασιν;

XCVII. ΑΘ. Δικαιώματι γὰρ οὐδετέρους ἐλλείπειν ἤγονται, κατὰ δύναμιν δὲ τοὺς μὲν περιγίνεσθαι, ἡμᾶς δὲ φόβῳ ὦκ ἐπιέναι· ὡστε ἔξω καὶ τοῦ πλεόνων ἀρξαι καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλές ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι ἀν παράσχοιτε, ἀλλως. τε καὶ νησίωται ναυκρατόρων, καὶ ἀσθενεστέροι ἔτερον ὄντες, εἰ μὴ περιγένευσθε.

XCVIII. ΜΗΔ. 'Εν δ' ἔκεινῳ οὐ νομίζετε ἀσφάλειαν; δεὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, ὡσπερ ὑμεῖς τῶν δικαίων λόγων ἡμᾶς ἐκβιβάσαντες τῷ ὑμετέρῳ κυμφόρῳ ὑπακούειν πείθετε, καὶ ἡμᾶς τὸ ἡμῖν χρήσιμον διδάσκοντας, εἰ τυγχάνει καὶ ὑμῖν τὸ αὐτὸ κυμβαίνον, πειράσθαι πείθειν. ὅσοι γὰρ νῦν μηδετέρους κυμμαχοῦσιν, πῶς οὐ πολεμώσεσθε αὐτοὺς, ὅταν ἐς τάδε βλέψαντες ἥγησονται ποτὲ ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐπὶ σφάς ἤξειν; κἂν τούτῳ τί ἄλλο ἢ τούς μὲν ὑπάρχοντας πολεμίους μεγαλύνετε, τοὺς δὲ μηδὲ μελλῆσαντας ¹ γενέσθαι ἀκούντας ἐπάργασθε;

XCIX. ΑΘ. Οὐ γὰρ νομίζομεν ἡμῖν τούτους δευνότερους, ὅσοι ἥπειρωταί που ὄντες τῶν ἑλευθέρων ² πολλὴν τήν διαμέλλησιν τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς

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¹ Reiske's correction, for μελλῆσαντας of the MSS.
² For τῷ ἑλευθέρῳ of the MSS., Stahl following the Schol.
BOOK V. xcvi.-xcix.

XCVI. Mel. "Do your subjects regard equity in such a way as to put in the same category those that do not belong to you at all and those—your own colonists in most cases and in others revolted subjects—who have been subdued by you?"

XCVII. Athen. "As to pleas of justice, they think that neither the one nor the other lacks them, but that those who preserve their freedom owe it to their power, and that we do not attack them because we are afraid. So that, to say nothing of our enlarging our empire, you would afford us security by being subdued, especially if you, an insular power, and weaker than other islanders, should fail to show yourselves superior to a power which is master of the sea."

XCVIII. Mel. "But do you not think there is security in the other course? For here also it is necessary, just as you force us to abandon all pleas of justice and seek to persuade us to give ear to what is to your own interests, that we, too, tell you what is to our advantage and try to persuade you to adopt it, if that happens to be to your advantage also. How, we say, shall you not make enemies of all who are now neutral, as soon as they look at our case and conclude that some day you will come against them also? And in this what else are you doing but strengthening the enemies you already have, and bringing upon you, against their inclination, others who would never have thought of becoming your enemies?"

XCIX. Athen. "Not so, for we do not reckon those as the more dangerous to us who, dwelling somewhere on the mainland and being free men, will defer for a

1 i.e. in neutrality, referred to in ch. xciv.
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φυλακής ποιήσονται, ἀλλὰ τοὺς νησίωτας τε ποὺ ἀνάρκτους, ὀσπερ ὑμᾶς, καὶ τοὺς ἤδη τῆς ἀρχῆς τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ παροξυσμένους. οὕτω γὰρ πλείοτ' ἄν τῷ ἀλογίστῳ ἐπιτρέψατε σφᾶς τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐς προούπτων κίνδυνον καταστήσειαν.

C. ΜΗΛ. Ἡ ποὺ ἄρα, εἰ τοσαῦτην γε ὑμεῖς τε μὴ παυσήναι ἀρχής καὶ οἱ δουλεύοντες ἢδη ἄπαλλαγήν την παρακινδύνευσιν ποιοῦνται, ἡμῖν γε τοῖς ἔτι ἐλευθέρως πολλή κακότης καὶ δειλία μὴ πᾶν πρὸ τοῦ δουλεύσαι ἐπεξέλθειν.

C. ΑΘ. Οὔκ, ἢν γε σωφρόνως δουλεύσηθεν οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἀνδραγαθίας ὁ ἁγὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵσου ὑμῖν, μὴ αἰσχύνην ὄφλεων, περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας μᾶλλον ἡ βουλή, πρὸς τοὺς κρείσσονας πολλῷ μὴ ἀνθίστασθαι.

CIII. ΜΗΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐπιστάμεθα τα τῶν πολέμων ἕστιν ὅτε κοινοτέρας τὰς τύχας λαμβάνοντα ἢ κατὰ τὸ διαφέρον ἐκατέρων πλῆθος. καὶ ἡμῖν τὸ μὲν εἶξαι εὐθὺς ἀνέλπιστον, μετὰ δὲ τοῦ δρωμένου ἔτι καὶ στήναι ἐλπὶς ὀρθῶς.

CIII. ΑΘ. Ἐλπίς δὲ, κινδύνῳ παραμύθιον οὐσα, τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ περιουσίας χρωμένους αὐτή, καὶ βλάψῃ, οὐ καθεῖλε, τοῖς δὲ ἐς ἀπαν τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀναρρίπτουσι (δάπανος γὰρ φύσει) ἀμα τε γνωσκέται σφαλέντων καὶ ἐν ὀτρ ἔτι φυλά-

1 For πολέμων of the MSS., with Valla.

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long time taking any precautions against us, but rather those who dwell in some of the islands, both those who, like you, are subject to no control, and those who are already exasperated by the necessity of submission to our rule. For it is these who are most likely to give way to recklessness and bring both themselves and us into danger which they cannot but foresee."

C. Mel. "Surely, then, if you and your subjects brave so great a risk, you in order that you may not lose your empire, and they, who are already your slaves, in order that they may be rid of it, for us surely who still have our freedom it would be the height of baseness and cowardice not to resort to every expedient before submitting to servitude."

Cl. Ath. "No, not if you take a sensible view of the matter; for with you it is not a contest on equal terms to determine a point of manly honour, so as to avoid incurring disgrace; rather the question before you is one of self-preservation—to avoid offering resistance to those who are far stronger than you."

CII. Mel. "But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes impartial and not in accord with the difference in numbers. And for us, to yield is at once to give up hope; but if we make an effort, there is still hope that we may stand erect."

CIII. Ath. "Hope is indeed a solace in danger, and for those who have other resources in abundance, though she may injure, she does not ruin them; but for those who stake their all on a single throw—hope being by nature prodigal—it is only when disaster has befallen that her true nature is recognized, and when at last she is known, she leaves the victim no
θετά φιόι γνωρισθείσαν οὐκ ἐλλείπειτο. δὲ ὑμεῖς ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ ἐπὶ ῥοπῆς μᾶς ὄντες μὴ βουλέσθε παθεῖν, μηδὲ ὁμοιωθῆναι τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἷς παρὸν ἄνθρωπεῖς ἔτι σφόξεσθαι, ἐπειδὰν πιε- ξομένους αὐτοὺς ἐπιλίπωσιν αἱ φανερὰ ἐλπίδες, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀφανεῖς καθίστανται, μαντικὴν τε καὶ χρησμοῦ καὶ δσα τοιαύτα μετ᾽ ἐλπίδων λυμαί- νεται.

CIV. ΜΗΔ. Χαλεποῦ μὲν καὶ ἡμεῖς, εὐ ἵστε, νομίζομεν πρὸς δύναμιν τε τὴν ὑμετέραν καὶ τὴν τύχην, εἰ μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἔσται, ἀγωνίζεσθαι· ὅμως δὲ πιστεύομεν τῇ μὲν τύχῃ ἐκ τοῦ θείου μὴ ἔλασσοσεσθαι, ὅτι ὃσιοι πρὸς οὐ δικαίους ἰστά- μεθα, τῆς δὲ δυνάμεως τῷ ἐλλείποντι τὴν Δακο- δαιμονίων ἡμῖν ξυμμαχίαν προσέσεσθαι, ἀνάγκην ἔχουσαν, καὶ εἰ μὴ τοῦ ἄλλου, τῆς γε ἤγγευσις ἐνεκα καὶ αἰσχύνῃ βοηθείν. καὶ οὐ παντάπασιν οὖτω ἀλόγως θρασυνόμεθα.

CV. ΑΘ. Τῆς μὲν τοίνυν πρὸς τὸ θείον εὐμε- νείας οὐδ᾽ ἡμεῖς οἰόμεθα λειψεσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔξω τῆς ἄνθρωπείας τῶν μὲν ἐς τὸ θείον νομίσεως τῶν δὲ ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς βουλήσεως δικαιοῦμεν ἡ 2 πράσσομεν. ἤγοιμεθα γὰρ τὸ το θείον δόξῃ, τὸ ἄνθρωπείον τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας, οὐ ἄν κρατῇ, ἀρχεῖν. καὶ ἡμεῖς οὔτε θέντες τὸν νόμον οὔτε κειμένῳ πρῶτοι χρησάμενοι, ὅτα δὲ παραλαβόντες καὶ ἐσόμενον ἐς αἰεὶ κατα-166
resource wherewith to take precautions against her in future. This fate, we beg of you, weak as you are and dependent on a single turn of the scale, do not willingly incur; nor make yourselves like the common crowd who, when it is possible still to be saved by human means, as soon as distress comes and all visible grounds of hope fail them, betake themselves to those that are invisible—to divination, oracles, and the like, which, with the hopes they inspire, bring men to ruin."

CIV. MEL. "We, too, be well assured, think it difficult to contend both against your power and against fortune, unless she shall be impartial; but nevertheless we trust that, in point of fortune, we shall through the divine favour be at no disadvantage because we are god-fearing men standing our ground against men who are unjust; and as to the matter of power, that the alliance of the Lacedaemonians will supply what we lack, since that alliance must aid us, if for no other reason, because of our kinship with them and for very shame. So our confidence is not altogether so irrational as you may suppose."

CV. ATH. "Well, as to the kindness of the divine favour, neither do we expect to fall short of you therein. For in no respect are we departing from men's observances regarding that which pertains to the divine or from their desires regarding that which pertains to themselves, in aught that we demand or do. For of the gods we hold the belief, and of men we know, that by a necessity of their nature wherever they have power they always rule. And so in our case since we neither enacted this law nor when it was enacted were the first to use it, but found it in existence and expect to leave it in existence for
λείψοντες χρώμεθα αὐτῷ, εἰδότες καὶ ὑμᾶς ἀν καὶ ἄλλους ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει ἦμιν γενομένους δρῶν-3 τας ἀν ταύτῳ. καὶ πρὸς μὲν τὸ θέιον οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος οὐ φοβοῦμεθα ἠλασσωσεσθαι. τῆς δὲ ἐς Λακεδαιμονίους δόξης, ἦν διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν δὴ βοηθήσειν ὑμῖν πιστεύετε αὐτούς, μακαρίσαντες ὑμῶν τὸ ἀπειρόκακον οὐ ξηλοῦμεν τὸ ἄφρον. Λακεδαιμονίοι γὰρ πρὸς σφάς μὲν αὐτούς καὶ τὰ ἐπιχώρια νόμιμα πλείστα ἀρετὴ χρῶνται. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους πολλὰ ἄν τις ἔχων εἰπεῖν ὡς προσφέρονται, ἐυνελὼν μάλιστα ἄν δηλώσειν ὅτι ἐπιφανέστατα δὲν ἵσμεν τὰ μὲν ἢδεα καλὰ νομί-ζουσι, τὰ δὲ εὐμφέροντα δίκαια. καίτοι οὐ πρὸς τῆς ὑμετέρας νῦν ἀλόγου σωτηρίας ἡ τοιαύτη διάνοια.

CVI. ΜΗΛ. Ἡμεῖς δὲ κατ' αὐτὸ τούτῳ ἦδη καὶ μάλιστα πιστεύομεν τῷ εὐμφέροντι αὐτῶν Μηλίων ἀποίκοις ὑπαίτο σὴ βουλήσεσθαι προ-δόντας τοῖς μὲν εὖνοις τῶν Ἑλληνῶν ἀπίστους καταστήναι, τοῖς δὲ πολεμίοις ὑφελίμους.

CVII. ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν οἶδας τὸ εὐμφέρον μὲν μετὰ ἀσφαλείας εἶναι, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν μετὰ κινδύνου δρᾶσθαι. ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἤκιστα ὅς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τολμῶσιν.

CVIII. ΜΗΛ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους τε ἦμῶν ἐνεκα μᾶλλον ἤγούμεθ' ἂν ἐγχειρίσασθαι

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all time, so we make use of it, well aware that both you and others, if clothed with the same power as we are, would do the same thing. And so with regard to the divine favour, we have good reason not to be afraid that we shall be at a disadvantage. But as to your expectation regarding the Lacedaemonians, your confident trust that out of shame sooth they will aid you—while we admire your simplicity, we do not envy you your folly. We must indeed acknowledge that with respect to themselves and the institutions of their own country, the Lacedaemonians practise virtue in a very high degree; but with respect to their conduct towards the rest of mankind, while one might speak at great length, in briefest summary one may declare that of all men with whom we are acquainted they, most conspicuously, consider what is agreeable to be honourable, and what is expedient just. And yet such an attitude is not favourable to your present unreasonable hope of deliverance.”

CVI. Mel. “But we find in this very thing our strongest ground of confidence—that in their own interest the Lacedaemonians will not be willing to betray the Melians who are their colonists, and so incur, on the one hand, the distrust of all the Hellenes who are well-disposed towards them, and, on the other, give aid to their enemies.”

CVII. Ath. “Do you not think, then, that self-interest goes hand in hand with security, while justice and honour are practised with danger—a danger the Lacedaemonians are in general the least disposed to risk?”

CVIII. Mel. “Nay, but even the dangers we believe they would be more ready to incur for our
αὐτοὺς καὶ βεβαιοτέρους ἢ ἐς ἄλλους νομεῖν, ὥσπερ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἔργα τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐγγὺς κεῖμεθα, τῆς δὲ γνώμης τῷ ξυγγενεῖ πιστότεροι ἕτερων ἐσμέν.

CIX. ΑΘ. Τὸ δ' ἐχυρὸν γε τοὺς ξυναγωγισμοῦμένοις οὐ τὸ εὖνοι τῶν ἐπικαλεσαμένων φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἴν τῶν ἔργων τις δυνάμει πολὺ προῦχη· ὁ Δακεδαμώνιοι καὶ πλέον τι τῶν ἄλλων σκοποῦσι (τῆς γούν οἰκείας παρασκευῆς ἀπιστία καὶ μετὰ ξυμμάχων πολλῶν τοῖς πέλας ἐπέρχονται), ὡστε οὐκ εἰκὸς ἐς νῆσον γε αὐτοῦς ἡμῶν ναυκρατόρων ὄντων περαιώθημαι.

CX. ΜΗΛ. Οἱ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους ἀν ἔχουν πέμψαι· πολὺ δὲ τὸ Κρητικόν πέλαγος, δι' οὐ τῶν κρατοῦντων ἀπόροτερος ἡ λήψις ἢ τῶν 2 λαθείων βουλομένων ἡ σωτηρία. καὶ εἰ τούδε σφάλλοντο, τράπωντ' ἄν καὶ ἐς τὴν γην ὑμῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὡςους μὴ Βρασίδας ἐπήλθε, καὶ οὐ περὶ τῆς μὴ προσηκούσης μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς οἰκειοτέρας ξυμμαχίδος τε καὶ γῆς ὁ πόνος ὑμῖν ἔσται.

CXI. ΑΘ. Τούτων μὲν καὶ πεπειραμένους ἂν τι γένοιτο, καὶ υμῖν 1 οὐκ ἀνεπιστήμωσιν ὅτι οὐδ' ἀπὸ μιᾶς πώποτε πολυορκίας Ἀθηναίων δι' ἄλλων 2 φόβον ἀπεχώρησαν. ἐνθυμούμεθα δὲ ὅτι φή-

1 kal in MSS. before οὐκ, deleted by Stahl.

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sakes, and that they would consider them less hazardous than if incurred for others, inasmuch as we lie close to the Peloponnesus when anything is to be undertaken there and on account of affinity of sentiment are more to be trusted than any others."

CIX. Ath. "But for men who are about to take part in a struggle, that which inspires their confidence is clearly not the good will of those who call them to their aid, but such marked superiority in actual power of achievement as they may possess; and to this superiority the Lacedaemonians give heed rather more than do the rest of mankind. At any rate, they so mistrust their own resources that they always associate themselves with many allies when they attack their neighbours; so that it is not likely they will ever cross over to an island while we are masters of the sea."

CX. Mel. "But there are others whom they might send; besides, the Cretan sea is wide, so that upon it the capture of a hostile squadron by the masters of the sea will be more difficult than it would be to cross over in security for those who wish to elude them. And if they should fail in this attempt they could turn against your territory and against any of the rest of your allies whom Brasidas did not reach; and then you would have to exert yourselves, not for the acquisition of territory that never belonged to you, but for the preservation of your own confederacy, aye, and your own country."

CXI. Ath. "Of these contingencies one or another might indeed happen; but they would not be new to our experience, and you yourselves are not unaware that the Athenians have never in a single instance withdrawn from a siege through fear of any foe."
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σαντες περι σωτηρίας βουλευσειν ούδεν ἐν τοσούτῳ λόγῳ εἰρήκατε οἳ ἀνθρωποὶ ἄν πιστεύ- σαντες νομίσειαν σωθήσεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὕς τὰ μὲν ἵσχυρότατα ἐλπιδόμενα μέλλεται, τὰ δ' ὑπάρ-
χουντα βραχέα πρὸς τὰ ἡδή ἀντιτεταγμένα περι-
γίγνεσθαι. πολλήν τε ἁλογίαν τῆς διανοιας παρέχετε, εἰ μὴ μεταστησάμενοι ἔτι ἡμᾶς ἄλλο
3 τι τῶνδε σωφρονέστερον γνώσεθεν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐπὶ γε τὴν ἐν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς καὶ προὕποτοις κινδύ-
νοις πλείστα διαφθείρουσαν ἀνθρώπους αἰσχύνην
tréψεθε. πολλοῖς γὰρ προορομένοις ἔτι ἐς
οἷς φέρονται τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλούμενον ὀνόματος
ἐπαγωγοῦ δυνάμει ἐπεστάσατο, ἥσσηθεῖσι τοῦ
ῥήματος, ἥργῳ ἤμφοραῖς ἀνηκέστοις ἐκόντας
περιπεσεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνῃν αἰσχῶ μετὰ ἄνοιας ἢ
4 τύχης1 προσλαβεῖν. ὡς ύμεῖς, ἢν εὐ βουλεύσηθε,
φυλάξεθε καὶ οὐκ ἄπρεπες νομείτε πόλεως τε
τῆς μεγίστης ἡσσάσθαι μέτρια προκαλομένης,
ἐξυμμάχους γενέσθαι ἔχοντας τὴν ὑμετέραν αὐτῶν
upertinois, καὶ δοθείσης αἰρέσεως πολέμου πέρι
καὶ ἀσφαλείας μὴ τὰ χείρω φιλονικήσαι· ὅς
οὗτος τοῖς μὲν ἴσοις μὴ εἰκουσί, τοῖς δὲ κρείσ-

1 Hude reads τύχη, after Schol.

1 See chs. lxxxvii., lxxxviii.
2 i.e. men who expect to be saved by human means, not by
divine intervention; cf. ch. civ. f.

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However, we cannot but reflect that, although you said that you would take counsel concerning your deliverance, you have not in this long discussion advanced a single argument that ordinary men would put their confidence in if they expected to be delivered. On the contrary, your strongest grounds for confidence are merely cherished hopes whose fulfilment is in the future, whereas your present resources are too slight, compared with those already arrayed against you, for any chance of success. And you exhibit a quite unreasonable attitude of mind if you do not even now, after permitting us to withdraw, come to some decision that is wiser than your present purpose. For surely you will not take refuge in that feeling which most often brings men to ruin when they are confronted by dangers that are clearly foreseen and therefore disgraceful—the fear of such disgrace. For many men, though they can still clearly foresee the dangers into which they are drifting, are lured on by the power of a seductive word—the thing called disgrace—until, the victims of a phrase, they are indeed plunged, of their own act, into irretrievable calamities, and thus incur in addition a disgrace that is more disgraceful, because associated with folly rather than with misfortune. Such a course you will avoid, if you take wise counsel, and you will not consider it degrading to acknowledge yourselves inferior to the most powerful state when it offers you moderate terms—to become allies, keeping your own territory but paying tribute—and, when a choice is given you of war or safety, not to hold out stubbornly for the worse alternative. Since those who, while refusing to submit to their equals, yet comport themselves wisely towards their superiors
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σοσι καλῶς προσφέρονται, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἔσσονσιν
5 μέτριοί εἰσιν, πλείστοι ἀν ὀρθοίντο. σκοπεῖτε οὖν
καὶ μεταστάντων ἡμῶν καὶ ἐνθυμεῖσθε πολλάκις
ὅτι περὶ πατρίδος βουλεύεσθε, ἃς ἵνα μᾶς πέρι καὶ
ἐς μίαν βουλήν τυχοῦσάν τε καὶ μὴ κατορθώ-
σασαν ἔσται.

CXII. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναίοι μετεχώρησαν ἐκ
τῶν λόγων· οἱ δὲ Μῆλιοι κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς
γενόμενοι, ὡς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς παραπλήσια καὶ
2 ἀντέλεγον, ἀπεκρίναντο τάδε. "Οὔτε ἄλλα δοκεῖ
ἡμῖν ἢ ἄπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὡς Ἀθηναίοι, οὔτ' ἐν
ὄλγῳ χρόνῳ πόλεως ἐπτακόσια ἐτῇ ἣδη οἰκο-
μένης τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀφαιρῆσόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τῇ τε
μέχρι τούτῳ σφῶν υἱῆς τύχῃ ἐκ τοῦ θείου αὐτὴν
καὶ τῇ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ 2 Δακεδαιμονίων
τιμωρία πιστεύοντες πειρασόμεθα σφίζεσθαι.
3 προκαλούμεθα δὲ ὑμᾶς φίλοι μὲν εἶναι, πολέμοι
δὲ μηδετέροις, καὶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἡμῶν ἀναχωρήσας
στονδάς ποιησάμενοι αἰτίνες δοκοῦσιν ἐπιτή-
δειοὶ εἶναι ἀμφοτέροις."

CXIII. Οἱ μὲν δὴ Μῆλιοι τοσαῦτα ἀπεκρί-
ναντο· οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι διαλυόμενοι ἤδη ἐκ τῶν
λόγων ἔφασαν "ἀλλ' οὖν μόνοι γε ἀπὸ τούτων
tῶν βουλευμάτων, ὡς ἡμῖν δοκεῖτε, τὰ μὲν μέλ-
λοντα τῶν ὀρωμένων σαφέστερα κρίνετε, τὰ δὲ
ἀφανή τῷ βούλευσαι ὡς γιγνόμενα ἤδη θέασθε·
καὶ Δακεδαίμονίως καὶ τύχῃ καὶ ἐλπίσαι πλεῖστον

1 ἵνα for ἵν, as the Schol. seems to have read.
2 καὶ Δακεδαίμονίων deleted by Hude, after Stahl.
and are moderate towards their inferiors—these, we say, are most likely to prosper. Consider, then, once more after our withdrawal, and reflect many times in your deliberations that your fatherland is at stake, your one and only fatherland, and that upon one decision only will depend her fate for weal or woe.”

CXII. So the Athenians retired from the conference; and the Melians, after consulting together in private, finding themselves of much the same opinion as they had expressed before, answered as follows: “Men of Athens, our opinion is no other than it was at first, nor will we in a short moment rob of its liberty a city which has been inhabited already seven hundred years; but trusting to the fortune which by divine favour has preserved her hitherto, and to such help as men, even the Lacedaemonians, can give, we shall try to win our deliverance. But we propose to you that we be your friends, but enemies to neither combatant, and that you withdraw from our territory, after making such a truce as may seem suitable for both of us.”

CXIII. Such was the answer of the Melians; and the Athenians, as they were quitting the conference, said: “Then, as it seems to us, judging by the result of these deliberations of yours, you are the only men who regard future events as more certain than what lies before your eyes, and who look upon that which is out of sight, merely because you wish it, as already realized. You have staked your all, putting your trust in the Lacedaemonians, in fortune

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1 Evidently a merely general statement, carrying us back to the time of the Dorian invasion. Conon, Narrat. 36, mentions the Spartan Philonomus as founder of Melos, soon after the Dorians settled at Sparta. See Müller, Orchomenos, p. 317.
δη παραβεβλημένοι και πιστεύσαντες πλείστον καὶ σφαλήσεσθε.”

CXIV. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ἀνεχώρησαν ἐστὶ στράτευμα· οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ αὐτῶν, ὃς οὐδὲν ύπήκουν οἱ Μῆλιοι, πρὸς πόλεμον εὐθὺς ἐτρέποντο καὶ διελόμενοι κατὰ πόλεις 2 περιτείχισαν κύκλῳ τοὺς Μῆλιους· καὶ ὑστερον φυλακὴν σφῶν τε αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμάχων καταλύσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀνεχώρησαν τῷ πλείσον τοῦ στρατοῦ· οἱ δὲ λειτόμενοι παραμένουσε ἐπολιόρκοιν τὸ χρώμιον.

CXV. Καὶ Ἀργείῳ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐσβαλόντες ἐστὶ τὴν Φλειασίαν καὶ λοχίσθεντες ὑπὸ τὴν Φλειασίαν καὶ τῶν σφετέρων φυγάδων 2 διεσθάρησαν ὡς ἄγονθέντα. καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου Ἀθηναίοι Δακεδαιμονίων πολλήν λείαν ἔλαβον, καὶ Δακεδαιμόνιοι δι’ αὐτὸ τὰς μὲν σπονδὰς οὐδ’ ὃς ἀφέντες ἐπολέμον αὐτοῖς, ἐκήρυξαν δὲ, εἰ τις 3 βουλεῖται παρὰ σφῶν· Ἀθηναίοις λήξεσθαι. καὶ Κορίνθιοι ἐπολέμησαν ἴδιων τινῶν διαφορῶν ἑνεκα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις· οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι Πελοποννήσιοι ἱσύ- 4 χαζον. εἶλον δὲ καὶ οἱ Μῆλιοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῦ περιτείχισματος τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν προσβαλόντες νυκτὸς, καὶ ἀνδρὰς τε ἀπέκτειναν καὶ ἐςενεγκάμενοι σίτον τε καὶ ὡσα πλείστα ἐδύναντο χρήσιμα ἀναχωρῆσαντες ἱσύχαζον· καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἀμείων τὴν φυλακὴν τὸ ἐπιτειτη παρεσκευά- ξοντο. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

CXVI. Τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγυνημένον χειμῶνος Δακε- δαιμόνιοι μελλήσαντες ἐστὶ τὴν Ἀργείαιαν στρα-
and in fond hopes; and with your all you will come to ruin.”

CXIV. So the Athenian envoys returned to the army; and their generals, as the Melians would not yield, immediately commenced hostilities, and drew a wall round about the city of Melos, distributing the work among the several states. Afterwards, leaving some of their own troops and of their allies to keep guard both by land and by sea, they withdrew with the greater part of the army, while the rest remained behind and besieged the place.

CXV. About the same time the Argives invaded Phliasia; but being ambushed by the Phliasians and the Argive exiles they lost about eighty men. Also the Athenians at Pylos took much booty from the Lacedaemonians; but even this did not move the Lacedaemonians to renounce the treaty and make war upon them. They made proclamation, however, that any one of their own people who wished might make reprisals upon the Athenians. The Corinthians also went to war with the Athenians on account of some private differences; but the rest of the Peloponnesians kept quiet. The Melians, too, took the part of the Athenian wall over against the market-place by a night assault; then having slain some of the men and brought in grain and as many other necessaries as they could, they withdrew and kept quiet. After that the Athenians maintained a better watch. So the summer ended.

CXVI. The following winter the Lacedaemonians were on the point of invading Argive territory, but
ΤΕΥΕΙΝ, ὩΣ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΤΑ ΔΙΑΒΑΣΤΗΡΙΑ ¹ ΟΥΚ ΕΓΙΓΝΕΤΟ, ἈΝΕΧΩΡΗΣΑΝ. ΚΑΙ ΑΡΓΕΙΟΙ ΔΙΔΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΚΕΙΝΩΝ ΜΕΛΗΣΩΝ ΤΩΝ ἘΝ ΤΗ ΠΟΛΕΙ ΤΙΝΑΣ ὙΠΟΠΤΕΥΣΑΝΤΕΣ ² ΤΟΥΣ 2 ΜΕΝ ΞΥΝΕΛΑΒΟΝ, ΟΙ Δ' ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΈΦΥΓΟΝ. ΚΑΙ ΟΙ ΜΗΛΙΟΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΧΡΟΝΟΥΣ ΑΘΘΗΣ ΚΑΘ' ἘΤΕΡΟΝ ΤΙ ΤΟΥ ΠΕΡΙΤΕΙΧΙΣΜΑΤΟΣ ΕΙΛΟΝ ΤΩΝ ἈΘΗ- 3 ΝΑΙΩΝ, ΠΑΡΟΝΤΑΝ ΟΙ ΠΟΛΛῶΝ ΤΩΝ ΦΥΛΑΚΩΝ. ΚΑΙ ἘΛΘΟΥΣΗΣ ΣΤΡΑΤΙΑΣ ΡΨΕΡΟΝ ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ἈΘΗΝῶΝ ἈΛΛΗΣ, ΟΣ ΤΑΙΒΑ ΕΓΙΓΝΕΤΟ, Ἡ ΖΗΡΧΕ ΦΙΛΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ Ὅ ΔΗΜΕΟΥ, ΚΑΙ ΚΑΤΑ ΚΡΑΤΟΣ ἩΔΗ ΠΟΛΙΟΡΚΟΥΜΕΝΟΙ, ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΔΟΣΙΑΣ ΤΙΝΩΣ ἈΦ' ΕΑΥΤῶΝ, ΞΥΝΕ- ΧΩΡΗΣΑΝ ΤΟΙΣ ἈΘΗΝΑΙΟΙΣ ὩΣΤΕ ΕΚΕΙΝΟΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΑΥΤῶΝ 4 ΒΟΥΛΕΥΣΑΙ. ΟΙ ΔΕ ἈΠΕΚΤΕΙΝΑΝ ΜΗΛΙΩΝ ΘΕΟΥΣ ἩΒΩΝΤΑΣ ΞΛΑΒΟΝ, ΠΑΙΔΑΣ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΓΥΝΑΙΚΑΣ ἩΝΔΡΑΠΟΔΙΣΑΝ. ΤΟ ΔΕ ΧΩΡΙΟΝ ΑΥΤΟΙ ΦΚΙΣΑΝ, ³ ἈΠΟΙΚΟΥΣ ΡΨΕΡΟΝ ΠΕΝΤΑΚΟΣΙΟΝ ΠΕΜΨΑΝΤΕΣ.

¹ ἱερὰ ἐν τοῖς ὁρλοίς, in MSS. after διαβαστήρια, deleted by Cobet as a gloss on that word. cf. ch. liv. 2, lv. 3.
² Meineke's conjecture for ὑποπτεύσαντες of the MSS.
³ φκισαν, several good MSS. for the Vulgate φκησαν.

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as the sacrifices for crossing the boundaries were not favourable they returned home. On account of this intention on the part of the Lacedaemonians, the Argives, suspecting certain men in their city, seized some of them, but the rest escaped. About the same time the Melians again at another point took a part of the Athenian encompassing wall, the garrison not being numerous. But later, in consequence of these occurrences, another force came from Athens, of which Philocrates son of Demeas was commander, and the Melians, being now closely besieged—some treachery, too, having made its appearance among them—capitulated to the Athenians on the condition that these should determine their fate. The Athenians thereupon slew all the adult males whom they had taken and made slaves of the children and women. But the place they then peopled with new settlers from Athens, sending thither at a later time five hundred colonists.
I. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ χειμώνος Ἀθηναίοι ἐβούλοντο αὖθις μείξουν παρασκευή τῆς μετὰ Δάχητος καὶ Εὐρυμέδουτος ἐπὶ Σικελίαν πλεύσαντες καταστρέψασθαι, εἰ δύναιντο, ἀπειροὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὄντες τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς νῆσου καὶ τῶν ἐνοικούντων τοῦ πλῆθους καὶ Ἐλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πολλῷ τινὶ ὑποδέστερον πόλεμον ἀνηρόντο ἦ τὸν πρὸς Πελοποννησίους. Σικελίας γὰρ περὶ-2 πλους μὲν ἐστιν ὀλκάδι οὐ πολλῷ τινὶ ἔλασσον ἡ ὁκτὼ ἡμέρων, καὶ τοσαύτῃ ὀσῦσα ἐν εἰκοσισταδίῳ 1 μᾶλιστα μέτρῳ 2 τῆς θαλάσσης διελάγεται τὸ μή ἡπειρος εἶναι.3

II. Ὀμιλίας δὲ ὅσον τὸ ἄρχαίον καὶ τοσάδε ἔθνη ἐσχε τὰ ἔμπαντα. παλαιότατοι μὲν λέγουν- ται εἰς μέρει τινὶ τῆς χώρας Κύκλωπες καὶ Δαιστρυγόνες οἰκήσαι, δόν ἐγὼ οὔτε γένος ἔχω εἰπεῖν οὔτε ὁπόθεν ἐσῆλθον ἡ ὁποία ἀπεχώρησαν· ἀρκεί-τω δὲ ὡς ποιήταις τε εἰρηται καὶ ὡς ἐκαστὸς πῆ 2 γνωρόσκει περὶ αὐτῶν. Σικανοὶ δὲ μετ' αὐτοῦς

1 For the usual εἰκοσι σταδίων (CF corrected, f₃) adopted after M and Schol. Patm., εἰκοσι σταδίως AB.
2 μέτρῳ deleted by Hude as not read by Schol. Patm.
3 εἶναι, so nearly all recent editors following Ὁ (suprascr. man. pr.), Demetrius and Procopius, for ὅσα of the MSS. Shillito, Badham, and others prefer ἥπειρούσθαι.

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BOOK VI

I. *During* the same winter the Athenians wished to sail again to Sicily with a larger armament than that conducted by Laches and Eurymedon,¹ and subdue it, if they could, most of them being ignorant of the great size of the island and of the large number of its inhabitants, Hellenic as well as Barbarian, and that they were undertaking a war not very much inferior to that against the Peloponnesians. For the voyage round Sicily, for a merchantman, is one of not much less than eight days; and although it is so large only a distance of about twenty stadia of the sea divides the island from the mainland.

II. Sicily was settled originally in the following manner, and the whole number of the nations that occupied it were these. Most ancient of all those who are reported to have settled in any part of the island were the Cyclopes and Laistrygonians, as to whom, however, I am able to tell neither their stock nor whence they came nor whither they went; let it suffice as the story has been told by the poets,² and as each man has formed his opinion about them. The Sicaniasts appear to have been the first to settle

¹ Two separate earlier expeditions, one under Laches and Charoeades, 427 B.C. (iii. lxxxvi. 1), the other under Pythodorus, Sophocles and Eurymedon, 424 B.C. (iv. ii.), are here comprised under the one formula.
² Homer, no doubt, especially, as also in i. x. 1; xi. 3; xxi. 1.
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πρῶτοι φαίνονται ἐνοικισάμενοι, ὡς μὲν αὐτοῖ ψασι, καὶ πρότεροι διὰ τὸ αὐτόχθονες εἶναι, ὡς
dὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια εὐρίσκεται, Ἰβηρεῖς ὄντες καὶ ἀπὸ
tοῦ Σικανοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ ἐν Ἰβηρία ὑπὸ Διγύων
ἀναστάντες. καὶ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν Σικανία τότε ἦν
νῆσος ἐκαλεῖτο, πρότερον Τρινακρία καλουμένη, ὀἰκοῦσι
dὲ ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν τὰ πρὸς ἐσπέραν τὴν Σικελίαν.

3 Ἡλίου δὲ ἀλισκομένου τῶν Τρώων τινές διαφυ-
γόντες Ἀχαιοὶς πλοίοις ἀφικνοῦνται πρὸς τὴν
Σικελίαν, καὶ ὁμοροὶ τοῖς Σικανοῖς ὁικήσαντες ἔμυ-
pαντες μὲν Ἐλυμοὶ ἐκλήθησαν, πόλεις δ’ αὐτῶν
Ἐρυξε τε καὶ Ἐγεστα. προσένυκκασαν δὲ αὐτοῖς
cαὶ Φωκέων τινές τῶν ἀπὸ Τροίας τότε χειμῶν
ἐς Διβύην πρῶτον, ἔπειτα ἐς Σικελίαν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς
κατενεχθέντες. Σικελοὶ δὲ ἐξ Ἰταλίας (ἐνταῦθα
γὰρ όκουν) διεβιβάζοντες ἐς Σικελίαν, φεύγοντες Ὀπτε-
κοῦσι, ὡς μὲν εἰκός καὶ λέγεται, ἐπὶ σχεδίαν, τηρή-
sαντες τὸν πορθμὸν κατιόντος τοῦ ἀνέμου, τάχα
ἀν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐσπεύσαντες. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ
νῦν ἐτὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ Σικελοὶ, καὶ ἡ χώρα ἀπὸ
Ἰταλοῦ, βασιλέως τῶν Σικελῶν, τούνομα τουτοῦ
5 ἔχοντος, οὕτω Ἰταλία ἐπωνυμάσθη. ἐλθόντες δὲ
ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν στρατὸς πολὺς τοὺς τε Σικανοὺς
κρατοῦντες μάχῃ ἀνέστειλαν πρὸς τὰ μεσημβρινὰ
καὶ ἐσπέρα καὶ ἀντὶ Σικανίας Σικελίαν
τὴν νῆσον ἐποίησαν καλεῖσθαι, καὶ τὰ κράτιστα
τῆς γῆς φῶκησαν ἔχοντες, ἐτεὶ διέβησαν, ἐτῇ ἐγγὺς
τρικόσια πρὸς Ἕλληνας ἐς Σικελίαν ἐλθεῖν. ἐτὶ
dὲ καὶ νῦν τὰ μέσα καὶ τὰ πρὸς βορρᾶν τῆς νῆσου
6 ἔχουσιν. ὃκουν δὲ καὶ Φοίνικες περὶ πᾶσαν μὲν
τὴν Σικελίαν ἄκρας τε ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ ἀπολαβοῦ-
tες καὶ τὰ ἐπικείμενα νησίδα ἐμπορίας ἕνεκα τῆς
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BOOK VI. ii. 2–6

there after them, indeed, as they themselves assert; even before them, as being indigenous, but as the truth is found to be, they were Iberians and were driven by the Ligurians from the River Sicanus in Iberia. From them the island was then called Sicania, having been called Trinacria before; and they still inhabit the western parts of Sicily. But on the capture of Ilium some of the Trojans, who had escaped the Achaians, came in boats to Sicily, and settling on the borders of the Sicanians were called, as a people, Elymi, while their cities were named Eryx and Egesta. And there settled with them also some of the Phocians, who on their return at that time from Troy were driven by a storm first to Libya and thence to Sicily. The Sicels, again, crossed over from Italy, where they dwelt, to Sicily, fleeing from the Opicans—as is probable and indeed is reported—on rafts, having waited for their passage till the wind was from the shore; or perhaps they sailed thither in some other way also. Even now there are Sicels still in Italy; and the country was named Italy after Italus, a king of the Sicels who had this name. These crossed over to Sicily in a vast horde and conquering the Sicanians in battle forced them back to the southern and western parts of the island, causing it to be called Sicily instead of Sicania. They settled there after they had crossed and held the best parts of the land for nearly three hundred years before the Hellenes came to Sicily; and even now they still hold the central and northern parts of the island. Phoenicians, too, had settlements all round Sicily, on promontories along the sea coast, which they walled off, and on the adjacent islets, for the sake
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πρὸς τοὺς Σικελούς· ἐπειδή δὲ οἱ "Ελληνες πολ-λοὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐπεσέπλεον, ἐκλιπόντες τὰ πλεῖων Μοτύνη καὶ Σολόεντα καὶ Πανόρμου ἐγγὺς τῶν 'Ελύμων ἥλυσαν τὸν, ἓμοικά τε πίσυνοι τῇ τῶν 'Ελύμων καὶ οτι ἔτειθεν ἐλά-
χιστοι πλοῦι Καρχηδόνων Σικελίας ἀπέχει. βάρ-
βαροι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτο Σικελίας καὶ οὕτως ἤφησαν.

III. Ἐλλήνων δὲ πρῶτοι Χαλκιδῆς ἢ Εὐθολαίς πλεύσαντες μετὰ Θουκλεόνθος οἰκιστοῦ Νάξου φίκ-
σαν καὶ Απόλλωνος Ἀρχηγέτου βωμόν, ὡς οὖν ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐστιν, ἠδοναστό, ἐφ' ψ, ὅταν ἐκ
2 Σικελίας θεωροὶ πλέωσι, πρῶτων θύσιν. Συρα-
κούσας δὲ τοῦ ἐχομένου ἐτοὺς Ἀρχίας τῶν Ἡρα-
κλείδων ἐκ Κορίνθου φίκσε, Σικελόλος ἐξελάσσας πρῶτων ἐκ τῆς νῆσου, ἐν ᾗ νῦν οὐκέτι περικλυ-
ζομένη 1 ἡ πόλεις ἡ ἐντὸς ἐστιν· ύστερον δὲ χρόνῳ
καὶ ἡ ἔξω προσευχηθεῖσα πολυάθρωτος ἐγέ-
3 νετο. Θουκλῆς δὲ καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδῆς ἢ Νάξου ἀρμηθέντες ἦτε πέμπτῳ μετὰ Συρακούσας οἰκι-
σθείσας Δεοντίνους τε, πολέμῳ τοὺς Σικελόλος ἐξε-
λάσατε; οἰκίζουσι καὶ μετ' αὐτοὺς Κατάννη-
οικιστὴν δὲ αὐτοὶ Καταναίοι ἐποιήσαντο Εὐαρχο-

IV. Κατὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνου καὶ Δάμις ἐκ
Μεγάρων ἀποικίαν ἄγων ἐς Σικελίαν ἀφίκετο, καὶ

1 With CG, the other MSS. περικλυζομένη.

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1 On the little island of S. Pantaleon near the promontory of Lilybaeum.
2 East of Palermo, now Salanto. 3 Now Palermo.
4 735 B.C. The site was the best point for landing from Hellas, near Tauromenium (Taormina).
5 A leader appointed by a state to conduct the people sent out to establish a colony. He probably received material.
BOOK VI. ii. 6–iv. 1

of trade with the Sicels. But when the Hellenes also began to come in by sea in large numbers, the Phoenicians left most of these places and settling together lived in Motya, Soloeis and Panormus near the Elymi, partly because they trusted in their alliance with the Elymi and partly because from there the voyage from Sicily to Carthage is shortest. These, then, were the barbarians and such was the manner in which they settled in Sicily.

III. Of the Hellenes, on the other hand, the first to sail over were some Chalcidians from Euboea who settled Naxos with Thucles as founder, and built an altar in honour of Apollo Archegetes. This is now outside of the city, and on it the sacred deities, when they sail from Sicily, first offer sacrifice. The following year Syracuse was founded by Archias, one of the Heracleidae from Corinth, after he had first expelled the Sicels from the island, no longer surrounded by water, on which now stands the inner city; and at a later period also the outer city was connected with it by walls and became populous. In the fifth year after the settlement of Syracuse, Thucles and the Chalcidians, setting forth from Naxos, drove out the Sicels in war and settled Leontini, and after it Catana. The Catanaeans, however, chose for themselves Evarchus as founder.

IV. About the same time Lamis also came to Sicily with a colony from Megara and settled in a

privileges and grants while alive, and certainly was paid divine honours—sacrifices and games—after death. If a colony afterwards founded another colony, it was customary to ask a leader from the mother city.

6 So called as "founder" or protector of a new settlement.
7 On missions to games or oracles.
8 734 B.C. 9 729 B.C.
υπὲρ Παντακύνω τε ποταμοῦ Τρώτιλον τι ὄνομα χωρίων οἰκίσας καὶ ὑστερον αὐτόθεν τοῖς Χαλκιδεῖσιν ἐς Δεοντίνους ὁλίγον χρόνον ξυμπολιτεύσας καὶ ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐκπεσον καὶ Θάψου οἰκίσας αὐτὸς μὲν ἀποθηνήσκει, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἐκ τῆς Θάψου ἀνα- στάντες, "Τβλώνος βασιλέως Σικελοῦ παραδόντος τὴν χώραν καὶ καθηγησαμένου, Μεγαρέας φκισαν 2 τοὺς Τβλαίους κληθέντας, καὶ ἑτη οἰκίσαντες πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ διακόσια ὑπὸ Γέλωνος τυράννου Συρακοσίων ἀνέστησαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως καὶ χώρας. πρὶν δὲ ἀναστήσαι, ἔτεσιν ὑστερον ἐκατόν ἢ αὐτοὺς οἰκίσαι, Πάμμιλου πέμψαντες Σελινούντα κτίζουσι, καὶ ἐκ Μεγάρων τῆς ὑπερπόλεως 3 οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἐπελθών ἠγκατάφκισεν. Γέλαν δὲ Ἀντίφημος ἐκ Ῥόδου καὶ Ἐντίμος ἐκ Κρήτης ἔτοικος ἀγαγόντες κοινῆ ἐκτισαν ἔτει πέμπτῳ καὶ τεσσαράκοστῳ μετὰ Συρακοσίων οἰκίσαν. καὶ τῇ μὲν πόλει ἀπὸ τοῦ Γέλα ποταμοῦ τούνομα ἐγένετο, τὸ δὲ χωρίον οὐ νῦν ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ καὶ θ' πρώτον ἔτεισθη Λίνδιοι καλεῖται νόμιμα δὲ 4 Δωρικὰ ἐτέθη αὐτοῖς. ἔτεςι δὲ ἐγχύτατα ὅκτῳ καὶ έκατον μετὰ τὴν σφετέραν οἰκίσιν Γελύοι Ἀλβαγαντά φκισαν, τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀλβαγαντος ποταμοῦ ὑμομάσαντες, οἰκίσατας δὲ ποιή- σαντες Ἀριστόνου καὶ Πυστίλου, νόμιμα δὲ τὰ 5 Γελύων δώντες. Ζάγκλη δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ Κύμης τῆς ἐν Ὀπικίᾳ Χαλκιδικῆς πόλεως ηστών ἀριστομένων φκίσθη, ὑστερον δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ Χαλκίδος καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Εὔβοιας πλήθος ἐλθον ἠγκατανει-

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1 A peninsula just north of Syracuse (now called Isola di Magnisi).
place called Trotilus, beyond the river Pantacyas; but afterwards, having removed from there and joined the settlement of the Chalcidians at Leontini, he was a little later driven out by them, and then after colonizing Thapsus\textsuperscript{1} met his death. His followers were expelled from Thapsus and settled then at a place called Megara Hyblaea,\textsuperscript{2} since Hyblon, a Sicel king, gave up the land to them and led them to the site. After dwelling there two hundred and forty-five years, they were driven out of the town and country by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse. But before they were driven out, a hundred years after they had settled there, they founded Selinus,\textsuperscript{3} sending thither Pamphilus, who came from the mother-city Megara and joined in the settlement. In the forty-fifth year after the settlement of Syracuse Gela\textsuperscript{4} was founded by Antiphemus from Rhodes and Entimus from Crete, who together led out the colony. The city got its name from the river Gela, but the place where the acropolis now is and which was the first to be fortified is called Lindii.\textsuperscript{5} The institutions given it were Dorian. Just about one hundred and eight years after their own foundation, the Geloans colonized Acragas\textsuperscript{6}; and they named the city after the river Acragas, making Aristonous and Pystilus founders, and giving it the institutions of the Geloans. Zancle was settled, in the beginning, by pirates who came from Cyme, the Chalcidian city in Opicia; but afterwards a large number of colonists came from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea and shared the land with them,

\textsuperscript{1} 728 B.C. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{2} 628 B.C. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{3} 689 B.C. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{4} So called evidently from Lindus in Rhodes; cf. Hdt. vii. cliii. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{5} 581 B.C.
μαντό τὴν γῆν· καὶ οἰκισταὶ Περιήρης καὶ Κραταιμένης ἐγένετο αὐτῆς, ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ Κύμης, ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ Χαλκίδος. ὄνομα δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον Ζάγκλη ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν Σικελῶν κληθεῖσα, ὅτι δρεπανοειδεῖς τὴν ἱδέαν τὸ χωρίον ἔστι (τὸ δὲ δρέπανον οἱ Σικελοὶ ζάγκλου καλοῦσιν), ὑστερον δὲ αὐτοὶ μὲν ὑπὸ Σαμίων καὶ ἄλλων Ἰώνων ἐκπίπτουσιν, οἳ Μήδους φεύγοντες προσέβαλον Σικελία, τοὺς δὲ Σαμίους Ἀναξίλας Ἐρηγίνων τύραννοι οὐ πολλῷ υστερον ἐκβαλὼν καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶς ξυμμείκτων ἀνθρώπων οἰκίσας Μεσσήνην ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἀρχαῖον πατρίδος ἀντωνόμασεν.

V. Καὶ Ἰμέρα ἀπὸ Ζάγκλης φικίσθη ὑπὸ Εὐκλείδου καὶ Σίμου καὶ Σάκωνος, καὶ Χαλκιδῆς μὲν οἱ πλείστοι ἤλθον ἐς τὴν ἀποκίνη, ξυνώκισαν δὲ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐκ Συρακοσῶν φυγάδες στάσει νικηθέντες, οἱ Μυλητίδαι καλούμενοι· καὶ φωνή μὲν μεταξὺ τῆς τε Χαλκιδέων καὶ Δωρίδως ἐκράθη, νόμιμα δὲ τὰ Χαλκιδικὰ ἐκράτησεν.

2 Ἀκραὶ δὲ καὶ Κασμέναι ὑπὸ Συρακοσῶν φικίσθησαν, Ἀκραὶ μὲν ἐβδομήκοντα ἔτεσι μετὰ Συρακοῦσας, Κασμέναι δὲ ἐγγὺς εἴκοσι μετὰ Ἀκραί.

3 Ἀκραὶ, καὶ Καμάρως τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ Συρακοσῶν φικίσθη, ἔτεσιν ἐγγύτατα πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν μετὰ Συρακοῦσων κτίσιν· οἰκισταὶ δὲ ἐγένοντο αὐτῆς Δάσκων καὶ Μενέκωλος. ἀναστάτων δὲ Καμαριναίων γενομένων πολέμῳ ὑπὸ Συρακοσῶν δι’ ἀπόστασιν, χρόνῳ Ἰπποκράτης υστερον Γέλας τύραννος, λυτρα ἀνδρῶν Συρακοσῶν αἰχμαλώτων λαβὼν τὴν γῆν τὴν Καμαριναίων, αὐτῶς οἰκιστής γενόμενος κατῴκισε

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the founders being Perieres and Crataemenes, the one from Cyme, the other from Chalcis. Its name at first was Zancle, and it was so called by the Sicels because the place is sickle-shaped: for the Sicels call a sickle "zanclon." Afterwards these settlers were driven out by Samians and other Ionians, who in their flight before the Persians landed in Sicily; but the Samians were expelled not long afterwards by Anaxilus, tyrant of Rhegium, who colonized the place with a mixed population and changed its name to Messene after his own original fatherland.

V. Himera was colonized from Zancle by Euclidean, Simus and Sacon. Most of the colonists were Chalcidians; but there settled with them also fugitives from Syracuse who had been vanquished in a factional quarrel, the Myletidae as they were called. Their language was a mixture of Chalcidic and Doric, but Chalcidic institutions prevailed. Acrae and Casmenae were colonized by the Syracusans: Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, Casmenae nearly twenty years after Acrae. Camarina was first colonized by the Syracusans, just about one hundred and thirty-five years after the foundation of Syracuse, its founders being Dascon and Meneclus. But the Camarinaeans were driven out by the Syracusans in a war which arose from a revolt, and some time later Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, receiving the territory of the Camarinaeans as ransom for some Syracusan prisoners of war, himself became founder and recolonized Camarina.

1 cf. Hdt. vi. xxii., xxiii. 2 730 B.C.
3 648 B.C. 4 664 B.C. 5 644 B.C.
6 599 B.C. 7 Dates 498-491.
THUCYDIDES

Καμάριναν, καὶ αὕτη ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνάστατος γενομένη τὸ τρίτον κατοκίσθη ὑπὸ Γελώνων. 1

VI. Τοσαῦτα ἔθνη Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων Σικελίαν οἶκει, καὶ ἔτι τοσὰνδε οὕσαν αὐτὴν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι στρατεύειν ὁμηρυκτό, ἐφιέμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει τῆς πάσης ἀρέξα, θοιεῖν δὲ ἄμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἔαντὼν εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς προσγεγενήμενοι 2 Ἑλληνικοὶ.

2 μάλιστα δ’ αὐτοὺς ἐξόρμησαν Ἑγεσταίων 3 πρέσβεις παρόντες καὶ προθυμότερον ἐπικαλούμενοι. ὅμοροι γὰρ οὕτε τοῖς Σελενουντίοις ἐς πόλεμον καθέστασαν πέρι τε γαμικῶν τινῶν καὶ περὶ γῆς ἀμφισβητήτου, καὶ οἱ Σελενούντιοι Συρακοσίους ἐπαγαγόμενοι Ξυμμάχους κατείργων αὐτοὺς τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ὑπὸ τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ Δάκητος καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πολέμου Λεοντίνων 4 οἱ Ἑγεσταίοι Ξυμμάχιαν ἀναμμηνήσκοντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔδεσσαν ὅσοιν ναῦς πέμψαντας ἐπαμύνας, λέγοντες ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ κεφάλαιον, εἰ Συρακοσίοι Λεοντίνους τε ἀναστήσαντες ἄτιμορητοὶ γευσθοῦνται καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἕπι Ξυμμάχους αὐτῶν διαφθείροντες 5 αὐτὸ τὴν ἄπασαν δύναμιν τῆς Σικελίας σχῆσουσι, κινδύνου εἶναι μὴ ποτὲ μεγάλη παρασκευὴ Δωρίδος τε δωρεύσα ταῦτα τῷ Ξυγγενῶς καὶ ἄμα ἀποικοί τοὺς ἐκπέμψασι Πελοποννησίοις 6 βοη-

1 Dodwell’s conjecture for Γέλωνος of the MSS.
2 With EGM and Valla; Hude reads προσγεγενήμενοι with the other MSS.
3 τε after Ἑγεσταίων omitted with three inferior MSS.
4 Λεοντίνων, Hude deletes, following Classen.
5 διαφθείροντες, Hude reads διαφθείραντες with Cod. Clarend.
6 Πελοποννησίοις, Hude deletes, following Cobet.
And again the place was depopulated by Gelon, and was then colonized for the third time by the Geloans.

VI. Such were the nations, Hellenic and barbarian, that inhabited Sicily; and such was the magnitude of the island which the Athenians were bent upon invading. To give the truest explanation, they were eager to attain to empire of the whole of it, but they wished at the same time to have the fair pretext of succouring their own kinsmen and their old allies. But most of all they were instigated by envoys of the Egestaeans who were present and invoked their aid more earnestly than ever. For bordering as they did on the Selinuntians they had got into war with them about certain marriage rights and about disputed territory; and the Selinuntians, bringing in the Syracusans as allies, were pressing them hard in the war both by land and by sea. And so the Egestaeans, reminding the Athenians of their alliance which had been made with the Leontines in the time of Laches and the former war, begged them to send ships to their relief; saying many other things but chiefly this, that if the Syracusans should go unpunished for depopulating Leontini, and by destroying those of their allies that were still left should get the whole of Sicily into their power, there was danger that some time, lending aid with a great force, both as Dorians to Dorians on account of kinship, and at the same time as colonists to the Peloponnessians that had sent them out, they might

1 Or, reading προσγεγεννημένοις,—"the allies they had acquired besides"—the Camarinaeans and Agrigentines (v. iv. 6) and some of the Sicels (III. ciii. 1).
2 cf. III. lxxxvi. 1.
THUCYDIDES

θήσαντες καὶ τὴν ἐκείνων δύναμιν ξυγκαθέλωσιν. 4
σώφρον δὲ εἶναι μετὰ τῶν ὑπολοίπων ἔτι ξυμ-
μάχων ἀντέχειν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, ἀλλως τε καὶ
χρήματα σφῶν παρεξόντων ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἰκανά.

3 ὁν ἀκούοντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῶν
tε Ἐγερσταίων πολλάκις λεγόντων καὶ τῶν ξυμα-
gορεύόντων αὐτοῖς ἐξηγήσαντο πρόσβεις πέμψαι
πρὸ τὸν ἐς τὴν Ἐγέρσαν περὶ τε τῶν χρημάτων
σκεψουμένως εἰ υπάρχει, ὥσπερ φασίν, ἐν τῷ
κοινῷ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἴεροῖς, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἄμα
πρὸς τοὺς Σελευκουντίους ἐν ὑπὸ ἔστιν εἰσομένους.

VII. Καὶ οἱ μὲν πρόσβεις τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπε-
stάλησαν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ
τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πλὴν Κο-
ριθίων στρατεύοντες ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν τῆς τε
γῆς ἔτεμον οὐ πολλὴν καὶ σίτων ἀνεκομίσαντο
τινα ζεύγη κομίσαντες, καὶ ἐς Ὠρνέας κατοικί-
σαντες τοὺς Ἀργείων φυγάδας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης
στρατιᾶς παρακαταλιπόντες αὐτοῖς ὀλίγους, καὶ
σπειράμενοι τινα χρόνων ὡστε μῆ ἀδικεῖν Ὠρνέα-
tας καὶ Ἀργείας τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀπεχώρησαν τῷ

2 στρατῷ ἐπὶ οἰκου. ἔλθοντων δὲ Ἀθηναίων οὐ
πολλῷ ύστερον ναυσὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ἔξακοσίως
ὁπλίταις, οἱ Ἀργεῖοι μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων παν-
στρατιὰς ἐξελθόντες τοὺς μὲν ἐν Ὠρνεαῖς μίαν
ήμεραν ἐπολιορκοῦν. υπὸ δὲ νῦκτα, αὐλοσαμένου
τοῦ στρατεύματος ἄπωθεν, ἐκδιδράσκοντι οἱ ἐκ
τῶν Ὠρνεῶν. καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ὡς
ἦσθοντο, κατασκάψαντες τὰς Ὠρνεᾶς ἄνεχορησαν
καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ύστερον ταῖς ναυσὶ ἐπὶ οἰκου.

3 Καὶ ἐς Μεθώνην τὴν ὄμορον Μακεδονία ἱππέας
help to pull down the power of the Athenians. It would be wise, therefore, with their allies that were still left, to oppose the Syracusans, especially as the Egestaeans would furnish money sufficient for the war. And the Athenians, hearing in their assemblies these arguments of the Egestaeans and their supporters, who constantly repeated them, voted first to send envoys to Egesta to see whether the money was on hand, as they said, in the treasury and in the temples, and at the same time to ascertain how matters stood with reference to the war with the Selinuntians.

VII. Accordingly the Athenian envoys were despatched to Sicily. But during the same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, except the Corinthians, invaded the Argive territory, ravaged a small part of the land and carried off some corn in wagons which they had brought with them; then having settled the Argive fugitives at Orneae, leaving with them also a small body of troops, after they had made a truce for a certain time, on condition that the Orneates and Argives were not to injure one another’s land, they went home with the rest of their force. When the Athenians came not long afterwards with thirty ships and six hundred hoplites, the Argives, in company with the Athenians, went out in full force and besieged the garrison at Orneae for a single day; but under cover of night, when the besieging army had bivouacked at a distance, the garrison of Orneae escaped. The next day the Argives, on learning this, razed Orneae to the ground and withdrew, and later the Athenians also went home with their ships.

The Athenians also conveyed by sea some of their
κατὰ θάλασσαν κομίσαντες Ἀθηναίοι σφόν τε αὐτῶν καὶ Μακεδόνων τοὺς παρὰ σφίσι φυγάδας ἐκακούργουν τὴν Περδίκκαν. Δακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ πέμψαντες παρὰ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης, ἄγοντας πρὸς Ἀθηναίους δεχημέρους σπουδάς, ἐξυμπολεμεῖν ἐκέλευον Περδίκκα: οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἤθελον. καὶ ὁ χειμών ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ἔκτον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷ δὲ Ὑσσυκιδίδης ξυνηγραφεῖν.

VIII. Τού δὲ ἐπιγυνομένου θέρους ἀμα ἦρι οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ἦκον ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας καὶ οἱ Ἐγερσταίοι μετ' αὐτῶν ἄγοντες ἔξηκοντα τάλαντα ἄσημου ἀργυρίου ὡς ἐς ἔξηκοντα ναῦς μηνὸς μισθὸν, ὡς ἔμελλον δεήσεσθαι πέμπειν.

2 καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκκλησίαν ποιήσαντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες τῶν τὲ Ἐγερσταίων καὶ τῶν σφετέρων πρέσβεων τά τε ἄλλα ἐπαγωγά καὶ οὐκ ἄληθή, καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ὡς εἰ ἔτοῖμα ἐν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, ἐψηφίσαντο ναῦς ἔξηκοντα πέμπειν ἐς Σικελίαν καὶ στρατηγοὺς αὐτοκράτορας Ἀλκιβιάδην τε τὸν Κλεινίου καὶ Νικίαν τὸν Νικηράτου καὶ Δάμαχον τὸν Ξενοφόντος, βοηθοὺς μὲν Ἐγερσταίοις πρὸς Σελινούντιους, ξυγκατοικίσσατο δὲ καὶ Δεοτίνους, ἦν τι περιγύρηται αὐτοῖς τοῦ πολέμου, καὶ τάλα τά ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πράξας ὅπῃ ἀν γιγνώσκοιν ἀρίστα

3 Ἀθηναίοις. μετὰ δὲ τούτο ἡμέρα πέμπτη ἐκκλησία αὕθις ἐγίγνετο, καθ' ὃ τὶ χρῆ τὴν παρασκευὴν ταῖς ναυσὶ τάχιστα ἄγγελε θαυμάστε, καὶ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς, εἰ τοῦ προσδέουντο, ψηφισθήσεται ἐς

1 Hude inserts τε after ἦν.
own cavalry and the Macedonian exiles that were with them to Methone, which borders on Macedonia, and ravaged the country of Perdiccas. And the Lacedaemonians sent to the Chalcidians in Thrace, who were observing a truce renewable every ten days with the Athenians, and urged them to join Perdiccas in the war; but they were unwilling. So the winter ended, and with it the sixteenth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

VIII. The next year at the opening of spring the Athenian envoys returned from Sicily, and with them the Egestaeans, bringing sixty talents\(^1\) of uncoined silver as a month's pay for sixty ships, which they were to ask the Athenians to send. And the Athenians, calling an assembly and hearing from the Egestaeans and their own envoys other things that were enticing but not true, and that the money was ready in large quantity in the temples and in the treasury, voted to send to Sicily sixty ships, with Alcibiades son of Cleinias, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Lamachus son of Xenophanes as generals with full powers, to aid the Egestaeans against the Selinuntians, and also to join in restoring Leontini, in case they should have any success in the war; and further to settle all other matters in Sicily as they might deem best for the Athenians. But on the fifth day after this a meeting of the assembly was again held, to determine in what way the ships could be equipped most speedily, and in case the generals should need anything further for the

\(^1\) £12,000, $57,360.
ΤΟΣ ΕΚΠΛΟΥΝ. ΚΑΙ ὁ ΝΙΚΙΑΣ ἈΚΟΥΣΙΟΣ ΜΕΝ ἩΡΗ-
ΜΕΝΟΣ ἈΡΧΕΙΝ, ΝΟΜΙΖΩΝ ΔΕ ΤΗΝ ΠΟΛΙΝ ΟΝΚ ὍΡΘΩΣ
ΒΕΒΟΥΛΕΥΣΑΙ, ἈΛΛΑ ΠΡΟΦΑΣΕΙ ΒΡΑΧΕΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΕΥ-
ΠΡΕΠΕΙ ΤΗΣ ΣΙΚΕΛΙΑΣ ΑΦΑΣΗΣ, ΜΕΓΑΛΟΥ ἘΡΓΟΥ,
ΕΦΛΕΣΑΙ, ΠΑΡΕΙΘῶΝ ἈΠΟΤΡΕΨΑΙ ἘΒΟΥΛΕΤΟ ΚΑΙ
ΠΑΡΗΝΕΙ ΤΟΙΣ ἈΘΗΝΑΙΟΙΣ ΤΟΙΑΔΕ.

IX. "Ἡ μὲν ἐκκλησία περὶ παρασκευής τῆς
ἡμετέρας ἢδε ξυνελέγη, καθ’ ὃ τι χρή ἐσι Σικελίαν
ἐκπλείν· ἐμὸν μέντοι δοκεῖ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦτον
ἐτι χρήναι σκέψασθαι, εἰ καὶ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν
ἐκπέμπειν τὰς ναύς, καὶ μὴ οὖτως βραχείᾳ βουλῇ
περὶ μεγάλων πραγμάτων ἀνδράσιν ἀλλοφύλοις
πειθομένους πόλεμον οὐ προσήκοντά αἴρεσθαι.

2 καίτοι ἔγωγε καὶ τιμῶμαι ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτον καὶ
ハウス ἐτέρων περὶ τῷ ἐμαυτοῦ σώματι ὅρρωδώ,
νομίζων ὁμοίως ἄγαθὸν πολίτην εἶναι δὴ ἂν καὶ
τοῦ σώματός τι καὶ τῆς υστίας προωητὴν μᾶ-
λιστα γὰρ ἂν το τοιοῦτος καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως δι’
ἔαυτον βούλευτο ὀρθούσθαι. ὅμως δὲ οὔτε ἐν τῷ
πρότερον χρόνῳ διὰ τὸ προτιμᾶσθαι εἰπὼν παρὰ
γνώμην οὔτε νῦν, ἀλλὰ ἢ ἂν ἡ 1 γεγυνώσκω βέλτιστα
3 ἔρῳ. καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς ἴμητέρους
ἀσθενής ἂν μου ὁ λόγος εἰ, εἰ τὰ τε ὑπάρχοντα
σφίζων παρανοιήν καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἑτοίμοις περὶ τῶν
ἀφανῶν καὶ μελλόντων κινήσειν· ὡς δὲ οὔτε ἐν

1 ἀλλὰ ἢ ἂν, with the MSS., Hude adopts ἀλλ’ ἢ ἂν from
Reiske and Madvig.

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expedition, to vote it for them. And Nicias, who had been elected to the command against his will, and thought the city had not come to a right decision, but that, with a slight and specious pretext, it was the conquest of all Sicily, a great undertaking, at which they aimed, came forward with the purpose of averting this, and advised the Athenians as follows:—

IX. "This assembly was convoked with reference to our armament, to consider in what way we should make the expedition to Sicily; to me, however, it seems that we ought to consider yet again this very question, whether it is best to send the ships at all, and that we ought not, on such slight deliberation about matters of great importance, at the instigation of men of alien race, to undertake a war that does not concern us. And yet from such an enterprise I for my part get honour, and have less dread than others about my life,¹ although I consider that he is quite as good a citizen who takes some forethought for his life and property; for such an one would, for his own sake, be most desirous that the affairs of the city should prosper. But nevertheless neither in the past have I, for the sake of being preferred in honour, spoken contrary to my judgment, nor shall I do so now, but I shall speak just as I deem best. Against tempers, indeed, like yours my words would be unavailing, if I should exhort you to preserve what you have already and not to hazard present possessions for things that are unseen and in the future; that, however, neither is your haste timely,

¹ He may have been suffering already from the kidney trouble of which he complained the next summer in his letter to the Athenians (vii. xv. 1).
καίρῷ σπεύδετε οὔτε ράδιά ἔστι κατασχεῖν ἐφ’ ἄφρημηθε, ταῦτα διδάξω.

Χ. "Φημὶ γὰρ ύμᾶς πολεμίους πολλοὺς ἐνθάδε ύπολυτόντας καὶ ἔτερους ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐκείσε πλεύσαις δεύρῳ ἐπαγαγόσθαι. καὶ ὀιεσθὲ ἵσως τὰς γενομένας ὑμῖν σπουδὰς ἔχειν τι βέβαιον· αἱ ἱσυχαζόντων μὲν ἴμων ὁνόματι σπουδαῖ ἐσονται (οὔτω γὰρ ἐνθένδε τε ἀνδρεὶς ἐπραξαν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἑναντίων), σφαλέντων δὲ ποι ἀξιόχρεῳ δυνάμει ταχεῖαν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἡμῖν οἱ ἐχθροὶ ποιήσονται, οἷς πρὸτον μὲν διὰ ἕμφορον ἡ ἔμμαθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αἰσχίνος ἡ ἴμων κατ’ ἀνάγκην ἐγένετο, ἐπειτα ἐν αὐτῇ ταύτῃ πολλὰ τὰ 3 ἀμφισβητούμενα ἔχομεν. εἰσὶ δ’ οἱ οὗ ὑπὲρ ταύτην πω τὴν ὀμολογίαν ἐδέξαντο, καὶ οὐχ οἱ ἀσθενεῖστατοι. ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἀντικρυ πολεμοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ Δακεδαιμονίους ἐτὶ ἱσυχάζειν δεχὴν 4 μέροις σπουδαῖς καὶ αὐτοὶ κατέχονται. τάχα δ’ ἰν ἵσως, εἰ διὰ ἴμων τὴν δύναμιν λάβοιεν, ὀπερ νῦν σπεύδομεν, καὶ πάντων ἀν ἐνεπιθοῦντο μετὰ Σικελιωτῶν, οὐς πρὸ πολλῶν ἀν ἐτιμήσαντο ἕμμ. 5 μάχους γενέσθαι ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ. ὡστε χρῆστε ἑκεῖν τινα αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ μετεώρῳ τῇ πόλει ἄξιον κινδυνεύειν καὶ ἀρχῆς ἀλλῆς ὄρεγοσθαί πρὶν ἡν ἔχομεν βεβαιωσόμεθα, εἰ Χαλκιδῆς γε οἱ ἐπὶ Θράκης, ἐπὶ τοσαύτα ἀφεστῶτες ἴμων, ἐπὶ ἀχειροτοί εἰσι καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς κατὰ τὰς ἥπειρους 200
BOOK VI. ix. 3–x. 5

nor is it easy to attain what you are striving for, this I shall show.

X. "I say, then, that you, leaving behind you many enemies here, are bent upon sailing there and bringing upon you here still other enemies. And you think perhaps that the treaty which has been made affords you some security—a treaty which indeed, as long as you are quiet, will be a treaty in name (for so certain men here and among our enemies have managed these matters); but should you perchance suffer defeat with a considerable force, our foes will be quick to make their attack upon us. For the compact in the first place was concluded by them under compulsion through stress of misfortune and with less credit to them than to us; and, besides, in the compact itself there are many disputed points. There are also some states which have not as yet accepted even this agreement, and these not the weakest; on the contrary, some of them are at open war with us, while others again, merely because the Lacedaemonians still keep quiet, are themselves also kept in restraint by a truce renewable every ten days. But very probably, if they should find our power divided—the very thing we are now so anxious to bring about—they would eagerly join in an attack upon us along with the Siceliots, whose alliance they would heretofore have given much to obtain. And so we must consider these matters and resolve not to run into danger while the state is still amid the waves, and reach out after another empire before we have secured that which we have, seeing that the Chalcidians in Thrace, after so many years of revolt from us, are still unsubdued, while others at various points on
ἐνδοιαστώς ἀκροδῶται. ἢμεῖς δὲ Ἔγεσταίοις δὴ
οὐσι ἐνεμάχοις ὡς ἀδικουμένοις ὃς ἔπειτα βοηθοῦμεν,
υφ’ ὅτι δ’ αὐτοὶ πάλαι ἀφεστώτων ἀδικούμεθα,
ἐτι μέλλομεν ἀμύνεσθαι.

XI. “Καίτοι τοὺς μὲν κατεργασάμενοι καὶ κατά
σχοιμεν τῶν δ’ εἰ καὶ κρατήσαμεν, διὰ πολλοῦ γε
καὶ πολλῶν ὄντων χαλεπῶς ἂν ἄρχειν δυναίμεθα.
ἀνόητον δ’ ἐπὶ τοιούτους ιέναι δὴ κρατήσας τε μὴ
κατασχῆσει τις καὶ μὴ κατορθώσας μὴ ἐν τῷ ὀμοίῳ
2 καὶ πρὶν ἐπιχειρῆσαι ἔσται. ἩΣικελώτῳ δ’ ἂν
μοι δοκοῦσιν, ὡς γε νῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ ἐτι ἂν ἥσουν
deinοι ἡμῖν γενέσθαι, εἰ ἄρχειαν αὐτῶν Συρακόσιοι,
ὅπερ οἱ Ἔγεσταίοι μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἔκφοβοισιν.
3 νῦν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐλθοιεν ἵσως Δακεδαιμονίων ἐκα-
στοι χάριτι, ἐκεῖνος δ’ οὐκ εἰκὸς ἄρχην ἐπὶ ἄρχην
στρατεύσαι· φ’ γὰρ ἂν τρόπῳ τὴν ἡμετέραν μετὰ
Πελοποννησίων ἀφέλωνται, εἰκὸς ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν
καὶ τὴν σφετέραν διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καθαρεθῆναι.
4 ἡμᾶς δ’ ἂν οἱ ἐκεῖ Ἑλληνες μάλιστα μὲν ἐκπε-
πλημένοι εἰς, εἰ μὴ ἄφικομεθα, ἐπείτα δὲ καὶ
ἐπεδίκιαις τὴν δύναμιν δ’ ὀλίγου ἀπέλθοιμεν
(τὰ γὰρ διὰ πλείστου πάντες ἵσμεν θαυμαξόμενα
καὶ τὰ πείραν ἦκιστα τῆς ἄξιος δόντα). εἰ δὲ
σφαλείμεν τι, τάχιστ’ ἂν ὑπεριδόντες μετὰ τῶν

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the mainland render us a dubious allegiance. But we, it seems, must rush to bring aid to Egestaeans, being, forsooth, our allies, on the ground that they are wronged, while on those by whose revolt we ourselves have long been wronged we still delay to inflict punishment.

XI. "And yet these, if once brought under control, we might also keep under control; but the Siceliots, even if we should get the better of them, we should find it hard to govern, far off as they are and formidable in numbers. But it is folly to go against men when victory will not bring control over them and failure will not leave matters in the same condition as before the attack was made. The Siceliots, moreover, it seems to me, at least as things now stand, would be even less dangerous to us if the Syracusans should acquire rule over them—that prospect with which the Egestaeans especially try to terrify us. For now they might perhaps come against us singly out of regard for the Lacedaemonians, but in the other case, it is not likely that an imperial city would make war against an imperial city; for by whatsoever means they, in concert with the Peloponnesians, might despoil us of our sway, by the same means very likely would their own empire be pulled down by these same Peloponnesians. And as to us, the Hellenes there would be most in awe, first, if we should not come at all; next, if after showing our power we should after a brief interval depart. For it is, as we all know, things that are farthest off and least allow a test of their reputation which excite wonder; but if we should suffer a defeat, they would very quickly

1 i.e. in case the Syracusans acquired sway over them.
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5 ἑυθάδε ἐπίθοιντο. ὅπερ νῦν ἥμεῖς, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐσraftedaious καὶ τοὺς ἔμμαχους πεπόνθατε, διὰ τὸ παρὰ γνώμην αὐτῶν ἥδις ἐφοβεῖσθε τὸ πρῶτον, περιγεγενήσαντες καταφρονήσαντες ἧδη καὶ 6 Σικελίας ἐφίεσθε.1 χρῆ δὲ μὴ πρὸς τὰς τύχας τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπαιρεσθαί, ἀλλὰ τὰς διανολὰς κρατήσαντας ἡρασίων, μηδὲ ἔκακοις ἀλλὸ τὶ ἡγήσασθαι ἢ διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν σκοπεῖν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἠτι καὶ νῦν, ἦν δύνωνται, σφηλαντες ἡμᾶς τὸ σφέτερον ἀπρεπὲς εὐθύσων, δοσφι καὶ περὶ πλείστου καὶ διὰ πλείστου δόξαν ἀρετῆς μελετήσων 7 τῶν. ὡστε οὐ περὶ τῶν ἔν Σικελία Ἑγεσταίων ἡμῖν, ἀνδρῶν βαρβάρων, ὁ ἅγων, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ ὡσ πόλιν δὲ ὀλγαρχίας ἐπιβουλεύονσαν ὄξεως φυλαξόμεθα.

XII. "Καὶ μεμνησθαί χρῆ ἡμᾶς ὅτι νεωτί ἀπὸ νόσου μεγάλης καὶ πολέμου βραχύ τι λε- λωφήκαμεν, ὡστε καὶ χρῆμα καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἡγίασθαι καὶ τάντα ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν δίκαιον ἑυθάδε ἀναλοῦν, καὶ μὴ ὑπὲρ ἀνδρῶν φυγάδων τῶν ἐπικούριας δεομένων, οἷς τὸ τε ψεύσασθαι καλῶς χρῆσιμον, καὶ τὸ τοῦ πέλας κινδύνῳ, αὐτοὺς λόγους μόνον παρασχομένους, ἵ κατορθῶσαν τὰς χάριν μὴ ἄξιαν εἰδέναι ἢ πταίσαντάς τοῦς 2 φίλους ἔμπολέσαι.2 εἰ τὲ τις ἁρχεῖν ἄσμενος αἰρεθεὶς παραινεῖ ὑμῖν ἐκπλείν, τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνου

1 For ἐφίεσθαι of the MSS., after Schol.
2 For ἔμπολέσαι of the MSS., Reiske's correction.

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BOOK VI. xi. 4—xii. 2

despise us and join our enemies here in attacking us. And just this has been your experience, men of Athens, with regard to the Lacedaemonians and their allies: because you have got the better of them beyond your expectation—in comparison with what you feared at first—you despise them now and aim even at the conquest of Sicily. You have no right, however, to be elated at the misfortunes of your opponents, but only when you have mastered their spirits should you feel confidence; nor must you believe that the Lacedaemonians, on account of their humiliation, have anything else in view than to discover in what way they may even yet defeat us and retrieve their own dishonour—the more so as they have been in the highest degree and for the longest time courting a reputation for valour. And so the issue before us, if we are prudent, is not the fate of the Egestaeans, a barbaric people in Sicily, but how we shall keep a sharp watch upon a state which is intriguing against us with the devices of oligarchy.

XII. “And we should remember that we have but lately recovered somewhat from a great pestilence and war, so as to recruit our strength both in money and in men; and these resources it is but right to expend for ourselves here, and not for these fugitives that are begging our aid, whose interest it is to lie cleverly, and, at their neighbour’s cost, supplying nothing but words themselves, either, in case of success, to show no proper gratitude, or, in the event of failure, to involve their friends in ruin. And if there be anyone here who, elated at being chosen to command, exhorts you to sail, considering—especially as he is too

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σκοπῶν, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ νεώτερος ὡν ἔτι ἐς τὸ ἀρχεῖν, ὅπως θαυμασθῇ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἱπποτροφίας, διὰ δὲ πολυτέλειαν καὶ ὠφελθῇ τι ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς, μηδὲ τούτῳ ἐμπαράσχητε τῷ τῆς πόλεως κυνδύνῳ ἴδιᾳ ἐλλαμπρύνεσθαι, νομίσατε δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους τὰ μὲν δημόσια ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ ἴδια ἀναλοῦν, καὶ τὸ πράγμα μέγα εἶναι καὶ μὴ οἷον νεωτέρῳ ¹ λουλεύσασθαί τε καὶ ὄξεως μεταχειρίσαι.

XIII. ²Οδὲ ἔγω ὡρῶν νῦν ἐνθάδε τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ παρακελευστοὺς καθημένους φοβοῦμαι, καὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἀντιπαρακελεύομαι μὴ κατασχυνθῆναι, εἰ τῷ τις παρακαθηταί τῶνδε, ὅπως μὴ δοξεῖ, ἄν μὴ ψηφίζηται πολεμεῖν, μαλακὸς εἶναι, μηδὲ ὅπερ ἄν αὐτῷ πάθοιεν, δυσέρωτας εἶναι τῶν ἀπόντων, γνώντας ὅτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν ἔλαχιστα κατορθοῦνται, ² προνοίᾳ δὲ πλεύστα, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος, ὡς μέγιστον ἢ τῶν πρὶν κίνδυνον ἀναρριπτούσης, ἀντιχειροτονεῖ καὶ ψηφίζεσθαι τοὺς μὲν Σικελιώτας οὐσπερ νῦν ὁροὶ χρωμένους πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐ μεμπτοῖς, τῷ τε Ἰονίῳ κόλπῳ, παρὰ γῆν ἢν τις πλῆθος, καὶ τῷ Σικελικῷ, διὰ πελάγους, τὰ αὐτῶν νεμομένους καθ' αὐτοὺς καὶ ² ξυμφέρεσθαι γ' τοῖς δὲ Ἐγερσταίων ἴδια εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδὴ ἄνευ Αθηναίων καὶ ξυνήψαν πρὸς Σελυνυντίους τὸ πρῶτον πόλεμον, μετὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ καταλύσεσθαι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ξυμμάχους μὴ ποιεῖσθαι, οὕσπερ εἰώθαμεν, οἷς κακῶς μὲν πρά-

¹ MSS.; Hude adopts Pluygers' correction, νεωτέρους.
² κατορθοῦνται MSS., κατορθοῦται Goeller's conjecture.
young to command—only his own interest, how he may get admiration for his raising of fine horses, and then, because that is very expensive, how he may also get some profit from his command, do not afford this man, at the cost of the state, opportunity to make a personal display, but rather consider that such men damage the public interest while they waste their own property, and that the matter is one of great seriousness, and not such as a youth may decide and rashly take in hand.

XIII. "It is of such youths, when I see them sitting here in answer to the appeal of this same man, that I am afraid; and I make a counter-appeal to the older men, if any of you sit by one of these, not to be shamed into fear lest he may seem to be a coward if he do not vote for war, and not, though that may be their feeling, to have a morbid craving for what is out of reach, knowing that few successes are won by greed, but very many by foresight; on the contrary, on behalf of our country, which is now running the greatest risk it has ever run, hold up your hands in opposition and vote that the Siceliots, keeping the same boundaries with respect to us as at present—boundaries no one can find fault with—namely, the Ionian Sea, if one sail along the coast, and the Sicilian, if one cross the open deep—shall enjoy their own possessions and settle their own quarrels among themselves. But tell the Egestaeans in particular that, as they went to war with the Selinuntians in the first place without the Athenians, so they must bring it to an end by themselves; and for the future let us not make allies, as we are wont to do, whom we must assist when they fare ill, but from whom
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ξασιν ἄμυνομεν, ὥφελίας δ' αὐτοὶ δεηθέντες οὐ τευχόμεθα.

ΧΙΒ. "Καὶ σὺ, ὦ πρύτανι, ταῦτα, εἰπερ ἤγει
σοι προσήκειν κήδεσθαι τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ βούλει
γενέσθαι πολίτης ἀγαθός, ἐπιψήφιζε καὶ γνώμας
προτίθης αὐξίς Ἄθηναῖοις, νομίζας, εἰ ὅρρωδεῖς τοῦ
ἀναψηφίσαι, τὸ 1 μὲν λύειν τοὺς νόμους μὴ μετὰ
tοσῶν ἀν μαρτύρων αἰτίαν σχεῖν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως
βουλευσμένης 2 ἰατρός ἀν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ καλὸς
ἀρξαι τοῦτ' εἶναι, ὅσ ἀν τὴν πατρίδα ὥφελησθη ὡς
πλεῖστα ἢ ἐκῶν εἶναι μηδὲν βλάψῃ."

ΧΕ. 'Ο μὲν Νικίας τοιαύτα εἶπεν· τῶν δὲ
'Αθηναίων παρόντες οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι στρατεύειν
παρῆκαν καὶ τὰ ἐψηφισμένα μὴ λύειν, οὶ δὲ τινὲς
καὶ αὐτέλεγον. ἕνηγε δὲ προθυμότατα τῆς στρα-
τείαν Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου, βουλόμενος τῷ τῇ
Νικίᾳ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὅν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα διάφορος
tὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῦ διαβόλως ἐμνήσθη, καὶ
μάλιστα στρατηγῆσαί τε ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ ἐπιτίξων
Σικελίαν τῇ δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεθαι
καὶ τὰ ἰδία ἀμα εὐτυχῆς ἔχομαι τε καὶ δόξη
ὡφελήσειν. ὃν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι ὕπ' τῶν ἁστῶν,
ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζονι ἡ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν
οὐσίαν ἔχρητο ἐς τὰς ἱπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς
ἀλλὰς δαπάνας· ὅπερ καὶ καθεῖλεν ὑστερον τὴν
τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν οὐχ ἤκιστα. φοβηθέντες
γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἐαυτοῦ
σῶμα παρανομίας ἐς τὴν διάιταν καὶ τῆς διανοίας

1 τὸ μὲν λύειν, Hude substitutes τοῦ, following van Her-
werden.

2 βουλευσαμένης, inferior MSS. and the Scholiast κακῶς
βουλευσαμένης.

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we shall get no help when we are ourselves in need.

XIV. "And do you, Mr. President, if you think it your duty to care for the state and you wish to prove yourself a good citizen, bring these matters again to a vote and lay the question once more before the Athenians. If you fear to put the issue to vote again, reflect that it would involve no guilt to break the law in the presence of so many witnesses, but that you would thus become a physician for the state when it has taken evil counsel; and remember that this is the part of a good governor—to benefit his country as much as possible, or willingly at least to do it no harm."

XV. Thus Nicias spoke. Most of the Athenians that came forward advised the people to make the expedition and not to rescind the vote, while some spoke against it. But most zealous in urging the expedition was Alcibiades son of Cleinias, wishing as he did to oppose Nicias, because, along with their general political disagreement, Nicias had made invidious reference to him,¹ and above all he was eager to be made general and hoped thereby to subdue both Sicily and Carthage, and in case of success to promote at the same time his private interests in wealth as well as in glory. For being held in high esteem by his townsmen, he indulged desires beyond his actual means, in keeping horses as well as in his other expenses. And it was precisely this sort of thing that most of all later destroyed the Athenian state. For the masses, afraid of the greatness of his lawless and sensual self-indulgence in his manner of living, as also of his

¹ cf. ch. xii. 2.
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δὲν καθ’ ἐν ἑκαστον ἐν ὁτρ γήγνοιτο ἔπρασσεν, ὡς
tυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι πολέμιοι καθέστασαν, καὶ
dημοσία κράτιστα διαθέντε τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἰδία
ἑκαστοι τοῖς ἑπιτηθεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεθέντες
καὶ ἀλλοι ἑπιτρέψαντες οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἐσφηλιῶν
tὴν πόλιν. τότε δ’ οὖν παρελθὼν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις
παρῆνε τοιάδε.

XVI. "Καὶ προσήκει μοι μᾶλλον ἔτερων, ὁ
Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄρχειν (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν ἄρξασθαι,
ἐπειδή μου Νικίας καθήψατο), καὶ ἄξιος ἀμα
νομίζω εἰναι. δὲν γὰρ πέρι ἑπιβότος εἰμι, τοῖς
μὲν προγόνοις μου καὶ ἐμοὶ δόξαν φέρει ταῦτα, τῇ
2 δὲ πατρίδι καὶ ὠφελίαν. οἱ γὰρ Ἑλληνες καὶ
ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἠμῶν τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμιζαν τῷ
ἔμῳ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπίαζε θεωρίας, πρότερον
ἐλπίζοντες αὐτὴν καταπεπολεμήσασθαι, διότι ἀρμα-
τα μὲν ἐπὶ καθήκα, ὅσα οὔδεὶς πὼ ἱδιώτης πρό-
τερον, ἐνίκησα δὲ καὶ δεύτερος καὶ τέταρτος ἐγε-
νόμην καὶ τὰλα ἄξιως τῆς νίκης παρεσκευασάμην.
νόμῳ μὲν γὰρ τιμή τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὅρωμένου
3 καὶ δύναμις ἀμα ὑπονοεῖται. καὶ ὅσα ἀυ ἐν τῇ
πόλει χορηγίαις ἡ ἄλλο τῷ λαμπρύνομαι, τοῖς μὲν
ἀστοῖς φθονεῖται φύσει, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ξένους καὶ

1 Probably 416 B.C.; though Thirlwall assumes 424, Grote 420.
2 i.e. at the public festivals and especially at dramatic exhibitions. Choruses were provided by well-to-do public-
spirited citizens, called Choregi, appointed to this duty by
the state, these securing the choristers and their trainers

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BOOK VI. xv. 4–xvi. 3

designs as revealed in every single intrigue in which he was involved, became hostile to him on the ground that he was aiming at a tyranny; and, though publicly he managed the affairs of the war most excellently, in his private life every man had been offended at his practices, and so entrusting the city to other hands after no long time they brought it to ruin. He now came forward and advised the Athenians as follows:—

XVI. "It belongs to me more than to others, Athenians, to have command—for I must needs begin with this, since Nicias has attacked me—and I think, too, that I am worthy to command. For those things for which I am railed at bring glory to my ancestors and myself, as well as advantage to my country. For the Hellenes, who had previously hoped that our state had been exhausted by the war, conceived an idea of its greatness that even transcended its actual power by reason of the magnificence of my display as sacred deputy at Olympia, because I entered seven chariots, a number that no private citizen had ever entered before, and won the first prize and the second and the fourth, and provided everything else in a style worthy of my victory. For by general custom such things do indeed mean honour, and from what is done men also infer power. And again, although whatever display I made in the city, by providing choruses or in any other way, naturally causes jealousy among my townsmen, yet in the eyes of strangers this too gives an impression of

and defraying all their expenses for dress, maintenance and training. As choregi generally vied with each other in bringing out choruses with all possible splendour, such service was costly, sometimes exhausting a man's whole patrimony.

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αὕτη ἰσχύς φαίνεται. καλ οὐκ ἄχρηστος ἢδ' ἢ ἁνοια, δε ἀν τοῖς ἰδίοις τέλεσι μὴ ἕαυτόν μόνον,
4 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὠφελῇ, οὐδὲ γε ἄδικον ἐφ' ἕαυτῷ μέγα φρονοῦντα μὴ ἵσον εἶναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ
κακῶς πράσσων πρὸς οὐδένα τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ἱσομοιρεῖ. ἀλλ' ὀστερ δυστυχοῦντες οὐ προσαγορεύμεθα, ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τις ἀνεχέσθω καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν
ἐυπραγοῦντων ὑπερφρονούμενος, ἢ τὰ ἴσα νέμων
5 τὰ ὁμοῖα ἀνταξιοῦτω. Νοῦδα δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους, καὶ ὅσος ἐν τινος λαμπρότητι προέσχοι, ἐν μὲν τῷ
κατ' αὐτοὺς βίῳ λυπηροὺς ὄντας, τοῖς ὁμοίοις μὲν
μάλιστα, ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔννοιτας, τῶν
dε ἐπειτα ἀνθρώπων προσποιησίν τε ἐξυγγενείας
τις καὶ μὴ οὐσαν καταλιπόντας, καὶ ἂς ἂν ὁσι
πατρίδος, ταύτῃ αὐχεσιν, ὡς οὐ περὶ ἀλλοτρίων
οὐδ' ἀμαρτόντων, ἀλλ' ὡς περὶ σφετέρων τε καὶ
6 καλὰ πραξάντων.  Ὄν ἐγὼ ὄρεγόμενος καὶ διὰ
ταύτα τὰ ἱδια ἐπιθυμῶμεν τὰ δημόσια σκοπεῖτε
eί τοῦ χείρον μεταχειρίζο. Πελοποννησίων γὰρ
τὰ δυνατότατα ἑυστήςας ἀνευ μεγάλου ὑμῖν
κινδύνου καὶ δαπάνης Δακεδαιμονίως ἐς μίαν
ἡμέραν κατέστησα ἐν Μαντινείᾳ περὶ τῶν ἅπαν-
tων ἀγωνίσασθαι. ἐξ οὗ καὶ περιγενόμενοι τῇ
μάχῃ οὐδέπο καὶ νῦν βεβαιῶς θαρσοῦσιν.

XVII. "Καὶ ταύτα ἤ ἐμὴ νεότης καὶ ἁνοια
καὶ παρὰ φύσιν δοκοῦσα εἶναι ἐς τὴν Πελοποννησίων
δύναμιν λόγοις τε πρέπονσιν ὡμίλησε καὶ ὀργῇ

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strength. And that is no useless folly, when a man by his private expenditures benefits not himself only but also his state. Nor is it unfair, either, that one who has a high opinion of himself should refuse to be on an equality with others, since he who fares ill finds no one to be an equal participator in his evil plight. On the contrary, just as in misfortune we receive no greetings, in like manner let a man submit even though despised by those who prosper; or else, let him mete out equal measure to all, and then claim the like in turn. I know, however, that men of this stamp, and all others who have in any way stood out as illustrious, are indeed in their own lifetime an offence, most of all to their equals, then also to others, while still among them, but that they leave behind to those who come after the claiming of kinship even where there is none; and, whatever their fatherland, to it they leave exultant pride in them, as men who are not aliens or offenders, but who are their own and have done well. And such being my ambition and these the grounds on which I am decried in my private life, look at my public acts and see whether I execute them worse than another. I brought together the greatest powers\(^1\) of the Peloponnesus without great danger to you or expense and forced the Lacedaemonians to stake all upon a single day at Mantinea\(^2\); and in consequence of this, though victorious in the field, even yet they have not firm confidence.

XVII. ‘Thus did my youthfulness and my seemingly abnormal folly cope with the power of the Peloponnesians in fitting words and with a spirit that

\[^{1}\] Argos, Mantinea and Elis; cf. v. xlvi., lii.
\[^{2}\] cf. v. lxvi. ff.
τίστων παρασχομένη ἔπεισε· καὶ νῦν μὴ πεφόβησθε αὐτὴν, ἀλλ' ἐως ἐγώ τε ἔτι ἀκμάζω μετ' αὐτῆς καὶ ὁ Νικίας εὐτυχής δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀποχρήστε ἑκατέρου ἢμῶν ὦφελία. καὶ τὸν ἐστὶν Ἡλείαν πλοῦν μὴ μεταγιγνώσκετε ὡς ἐπὶ μεγάλην δύναμιν ἐσόμενον. ὃ χλοῖς τε γὰρ ἐξυμμείκτοις πολυανδροῦσι αἱ πόλεις καὶ ῥάδιας ἔχουσι τῶν πολιτῶν 1 τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ ἐπιδοχάς· καὶ οὕτως δὴ αὐτὸ ὃς περὶ οἰκείας πατρίδος οὔτε τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὅπλοις ἐξήρτυται οὔτε τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ μονίμοις 2 κατασκευαῖς, ο ὃ τι δὲ ἔκαστος ἢ ἐκ τοῦ λέγων πείθειν οὔτε ἢ στασιάζων ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ λαβῶν ἄλλην γῆν, μὴ κατορθώσας, οἰκῆσει, ταῦτα ἐτοιμάζεται. καὶ οὐκ εἰκὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ὄμιλον οὕτε λόγου μιᾷ γνώμῃ ἀκροάθαι οὔτε εἰς τὰ ἔργα κοινῶς τρέπεσθαι· ταχὺ δὲ ἄν ὃς ἔκαστοι, εἰ τι καθ' ἥδουν λέγοιτο, προσχωροῦν, ἄλλως τε καὶ 5 εἰ στασιάζονυιν, ὅσπερ πυνθανόμεθα. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ὁπλῖται οὔτε ἐκείνοις ὅσπερ κομποῦσι, οὕτε οἱ ἄλλοι Ἔλληνες διεφάνησαν τοσοῦτοι ὄντες ὅσοις ἔκαστοι σφᾶς αὐτούς ἠρίθμουν, ἄλλα μεγίστων δὴ αὐτούς ἐψευσμένη ἡ Ἔλλας μόλις ἐν 6 τῷ ὑδέ τῷ πολέμῳ ἱκανῶς ὑπλίσθη. τά τε οὖν ἐκεῖ ἔρχεται δὲν ἐγὼ ἀκοφεὶ αἰσθάνομαι τοιαύτα καὶ ἔτι εὐπο-
inspired faith win assent. And now be not afraid of it, but while I am still in the flower of youth, and Nicias has the reputation of good luck, make the most of the services of us both. And as to the voyage to Sicily, do not change your minds on the ground that you are going against a formidable power. For it is only with a mixed rabble that the cities there\(^1\) are populous, and changes and accessions in the body of their citizens\(^2\) are easy. And for this reason no one is equipped, as he would be in behalf of his own country, either with arms for personal protection or with permanent improvements for the cultivation of his land; but whatever each one thinks he can obtain from the common stock by persuasive oratory or by sedition, in the expectation that if he fails he will settle in some other land, this he provides himself with. And it is not likely that a rabble of this kind would either listen to counsel with one mind or turn to action with a common purpose; but quickly, if anything were said to please them,\(^3\) they would each for himself come over to our side, especially if they are in a state of revolution as we hear. Further, as regards hoplites neither have they as many as they boast; nor have the rest of the Hellenes proved to have such numbers as they each reckon; on the contrary, Hellas has been very greatly deceived in its estimates of hoplites and in this war has with difficulty been adequately equipped with them. Such, then, is the situation in Sicily, to judge from what I learn by report, and it is likely to be

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1 Referring to Syracuse and its dependencies.
2 Or, reading πολιτείαν, "changes in old forms of government and adoption of new."
3 i.e. by Athenian representatives.
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ρώτερα ἔσται (βαρβάρους 1 γὰρ πολλοὺς ἔξομεν
οἱ Συρακοσίων μέσει ξυνεπιθήκονται αὐτοῖς), καὶ
τὰ εὐθάδε οὐκ ἐπικολύσει, ἢν ὑμεῖς ὅρθος βουλεύ-
ησθε. οἱ γὰρ πατέρες ἠμῶν τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους
οὐσπερ νῦν φασί πολεμίους ὑπολειπόντας ἃν ἠμᾶς
πλεῖν καὶ προσέτι τὸν Μῆδουν ἔχθρον ἔχοντες τὴν
ἀρχὴν ἔκτησαν, οὐκ ἀλλὰ τινὶ ἢ τῇ περιονοίᾳ
8 τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἰσχύοντες, καὶ νῦν οὔτε ἀνέλιπστοί
πω μᾶλλον Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπὶ ἠμᾶς ἐγένοντο, εἰ
tε καὶ πάνυ ἔρρωνται, τὸ μὲν ἐς τὴν γῆν ἠμῶν
ἐσβάλλειν, καὶ μὴ ἐκπλεύσωμεν, ἵκανοι εἰσὶ, τῷ
δὲ ναυτικῷ οὐκ ἂν δύναυτο βλάπτειν ὑπολοιπὸν
γὰρ ἦμῖν ἐστὶν ἀντίπαλον ναυτικοῦ.

XVIII. "Ὥστε τί ἄν λέγοντες εἰκὸς ἢ αὐτοὶ
ἀποκνοῦμεν ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκεί ἔσωμον σκηπτό-
μενοι μὴ βοηθοῖμεν; οἷς χρεῶν, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ
ξυνωμόσαμεν, ἔπαιναν καὶ μὴ ἀντιτίθεναι ὅτι
οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνοι ἠμῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἦνα δεύρο ἀντιβοηθῶσι
προσεθέμεθα αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἦνα τοῖς ἐκεί ἔχθρις
ἡμῶν λυτηροὶ οὔτε δεύρο κωλύσωσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπ-
2 ἱέναι. τὴν τε ἀρχὴν οὗτος ἐκτησάμεθα καὶ ἡμεῖς
καὶ ὁσοὶ δὴ ἄλλοι ἡρξαν, παραγγελμένοι προθύμως
τοῖς αἰεὶ ἡ βαρβάρους ἢ" Ἐλλησιν ἐπικαλομένους,
ἐπεῖ, εἰ γε ἠπυχαζόμεθα πάντες 2 ἢ φυλοκρινοῦμεν
οἷς χρεῶν βοηθεῖν, βραχὺ ἂν τι προσκεῖμενοι
αὐτῇ περὶ αὐτῆσ ἄν ταύτης μᾶλλον κινδυνεύομεν.
τὸν γὰρ προῦχοντα οὐ μόνον ἐπιόντα τις ἀμύνεται,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως μὴ 3 ἐπεισὶ προκαταλαμβάνει.

1 τε of the MSS. after βαρβάρους bracketed by Haacke.
2 πάντες, Hude emends the MSS. reading to πάντες.
3 Transposing μὴ ὅπως of the MSS., after Krüger.
still more easy to deal with—for we shall have many barbarians, who from hatred of the Syracusans will join us in attacking them; and matters here will be no actual hindrance, if you are rightly advised. For our fathers had as enemies these same men whom, as they say, you would be leaving behind if you should sail thither, and the Persian besides as a foe, yet acquired their empire without being strong in anything else than in the superiority of their fleet. As for the present, never were the Peloponnesians more hopeless against us; and let them be never so confident, they can invade us only by land—and that they can do even if we do not make this expedition; but with their fleet they cannot hurt us, for we have in reserve a fleet that is a match for them.

XVIII. "On what reasonable plea, then, can we hold back ourselves, or make excuse to our allies there for refusing to aid them? We ought to assist them, especially as we have actually sworn to do so, and may not object that they did not help us, either. For we took them into our alliance, not that they might bring aid here, but in order that by annoying our enemies there they might hinder them from coming hither against us. It was in this way that we acquired our empire—both we and all others that have ever won empire—by coming zealously to the aid of those, whether barbarians or Hellenes, who have at any time appealed to us; whereas, if we should all keep quiet or draw distinctions of race as to whom we ought to assist, we should add but little to our empire and should rather run a risk of losing that empire itself. For against a superior one does not merely defend oneself when he attacks, but even takes precaution that he shall not attack at all.
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3 καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ταμειεύσθαι ἐς ὅσον βουλόμεθα ἀρχεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη, ἐπειδήπερ ἐν τῷ δὲ καθέσταμεν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπιβουλευέν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἀνείναι, διὰ τὸ ἀρχήγηκαν ἂν ύφ' ἐτέρων αὐτοῖς κίνδυνον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἄλλων ἀρχομεν. καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπισκεπτόντων ὑμῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἱσυχοῦν, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐς τὸ ὀμοῖον μεταλήψεθε.

4 “Δογμάσαμενοι οὖν τάδε μὰλλον αὐξῆσειν, ἐπ' ἐκείνα ἢν ἰώμεν, ποιόμεθα τὸν πλοῦν, ἵνα Πελοποννησίων τε ποτέσωμεν τῷ φρόνημα, εἰ δόξομεν ὑπεριδόντες τὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἱσυχίαν καὶ ἐπὶ Σικελίαν πλεύσαι, καὶ ἀμα ἡ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, τῶν ἐκεῖ προσγενομένων, πάσης τῷ εἰκότι ἄρξωμεν, ἢ κακῶσωμεν γε Συρακοσίους, ἐν δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ

5 οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὅφελησόμεθα. τὸ δὲ ἀσφαλές, καὶ μένειν, ἢν τι προχωρῇ, καὶ ἀπελθεῖν, αἱ νῆσες παρέξουσιν ναυκράτορες γὰρ ἐσόμεθα καὶ ξυμπάντων

6 Σικελιώτῶν. καὶ μὴ ἦμᾶς ἡ Νίκιον τῶν λόγων ἀπραγμοσύνη καὶ διάστασις τοῖς νεώτερος ἐς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἀποτρέψῃ, τῷ δὲ εἰσθαὶ κόσμῳ, ὡσπερ καὶ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν ἀμα νέοι γεραιτέρους βουλεύοντες ἐς τάδε ἦραν αὐτά, καὶ νῦν τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ πειράσθη προσαγαγεῖν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ νομί-

1 The other Hellenic states, it would seem, were preaching the doctrine of non-interference or self-determination; Athens, according to Alcibiades, cannot accept this doctrine.
And it is not possible for us to exercise a careful stewardship of the limits we would set to our empire; but, since we are placed in this position, it is necessary to plot against some and not let go our hold upon others, because there is a danger of coming ourselves under the empire of others, should we not ourselves hold empire over other peoples. And you cannot regard a pacific policy in the same light as other states might, unless you will change your practices also to correspond with theirs.\(^1\)

"Calculating, then, that we shall rather strengthen our power here if we go over there, let us make the voyage, that we may lay low the haughty spirit of the Peloponnesians, as we shall if we let men see that in contempt of our present peaceful condition\(^2\) we even sail against Sicily; and that we may, at the same time, either acquire empire over all Hellas, as in all probability we shall, when the Hellenes there have been added to us, or may at least cripple the Syracusans, whereby both ourselves and our allies will be benefited. And as to safety—both to remain, if things go well, and to come away—our ships will provide that; for we shall be masters of the sea even against all the Siceliots combined. And let not the policy of inaction that Nicias proposes, or his putting the younger at variance with the older men, divert you from your purpose; but in our usual good order, just as our fathers, young men taking counsel with older men, raised our power to its present height, do you now also in the same way strive to without accepting the consequences and relinquishing her empire.

\(^1\) Which was in reality an armed truce renewable every ten days.
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σατε νεότητα μὲν καὶ γῆρας ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδὲν δύνασθαι, ὀμοῦ δὲ τὸ τε φαύλου καὶ τὸ μέσου καὶ τὸ πάνω ἀκριβές ἄν ἵσταρες ψυχὴν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἂν μὲν ἑσύχαξα, τρίψεσθαι τε αὐτὴν περὶ αὐτῆς ὠσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι, καὶ πάντων τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐγγράφεσθαι, ἀγωνιζόμενη δὲ ἀεὶ προσλήψεσθαι τε τὴν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ ἀμύ-
νεσθαι οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ’ ἐργῇ μᾶλλον ἔννοιας ἡχειν.

γ' παράπαν τε γιγνώσκω πόλιν μη ἀπράγμονα τά- χιστ' ἂν μοι δοκεῖν ἀπραγμοσύνης μεταβολῆ διαφθαρῆναι, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀσφαλέστατα τούτοις οἰκεῖν οὐ ἃν τοῖς παροῦσιν ἂθεσι καὶ νόμοις, ἂν καὶ χείρω ἦν, ἢ κιστὰ διαφόρως πολι-
τεύωσιν.

XIX. Τοιαῦτα δὲ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης εἶπεν. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἐκείνου τε καὶ τῶν Ἐγε-
σταίων καὶ Λεοντίνων φυγάδων, οἲ παρελθόντες ἐδε-
οντό τε καὶ τῶν ὄρκων ὑπομενήσκοντες ἰκέτευον βοηθῆσαι σφίσι, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἡ πρότερον ὄρη-

2 μηντος στρατεύειν. καὶ ὁ Νικίας γνωρὶς ὅτι ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων οὐκ ἃν ἐτὶ ἀποστρέψει, παρα-
σκευῆς δὲ πλήθει, εἴ πολλὴν ἐπιτάξει, τάχ' ἃν μεταστῆσειν αὐτοῦσ, παρελθὼν αὐτοῖς ἄθεος ἐλεγε
tοιάδε.

XX. "Επειδὴ πάντως ὥρῳ ἤματι, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὁμολημένους στρατεύειν, ξυνενέγκοι μὲν ταῦτα ὡς 

βουλόμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ παρόντι ἄ παρὰ ἀνάξω σημαντῶ. 2 ἐπὶ γὰρ πόλεις, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκοὴν ἀισθάνομαι, μέλλο-

μεν ιέναι μεγάλας καὶ οὐδ' ὑπηκόους ἀλλήλων 

οὐδ' δεσμένας μεταβολῆς, ἦν ἐκ βιαίου τις δου-

λείας ἀσμενοῖς ἐς ῥά μετάστασιν χαροῦσι, οὕτ' ἀν 

tὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν ἡμετέραν εἰκότως ἀντ' ἐλευθερίας

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advance the state. And consider that youth and age without one another avail nothing, but that the simple, the mediocre, and the very subtle tempered together will have most strength; and that the state, if she remain at peace, will, like anything else, wear herself out upon herself, and her skill in all pursuits will grow old; whereas, if she is continually at conflict, she will always be adding to her experience, and will acquire more, not in word but in deed, the habit of defending herself. In short, I declare that a state which is accustomed to activity would very quickly be ruined by a change to inactivity; and that those men live most securely whose political action is least at variance with existing habits and institutions, even when these are not the best."

XIX. Thus Alcibiades spoke. After hearing him and the Egestaeans and some Leontine exiles, who coming forward, besought them and implored them for succour, reminding them of their oaths, the Athenians were far more eager for the expedition than before. And Nicias, seeing that he could no longer deter them with the same arguments, but thinking that by the magnitude of the armament, if he insisted upon a large one, he might possibly change their minds, came forward and spoke as follows:

XX. "Since I see, men of Athens, that you are wholly bent upon the expedition, I pray that these matters may turn out as we wish; for the present juncture, however, I will show what my judgment is. The cities we are about to attack are, as I learn by report, large, and neither subject to one another nor in need of any such change as a person might be happy to accept in order to escape from enforced servitude to an easier condition, nor likely to accept our rule in
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προσδεξαμένας, τό τε πλήθος, ώς ἐν μιᾷ νήσῳ,
3 πολλάς τάς Ἑλληνιδάς. πλὴν γὰρ Νάξου καὶ
Κατάνης, ἃς ἐλπίζω ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ Δεοντίνων ἔφυγε
γενέσ προσέσεθαι, ἀλλ᾽ αἰσχὰν ἑπτὰ, καὶ παρε-
σκευασμέναι τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοιοτρόπως μάλιστα τῇ
ἡμετέρᾳ δυνάμει, καὶ οὐχ ἦκιστα ἐπὶ ἃς μᾶλλον
4 πλέομεν, Σελενούς καὶ Συράκουσαί. πολλοὶ μὲν
γὰρ ὀπλίται ἔνεισι καὶ τοξόται καὶ ἀκοντισταί,
πολλαὶ δὲ τριήρεις καὶ ὄχλος ὁ πληρώσων αὐτῶς.
χρήματα τ᾽ ἔχουσι, τὰ μὲν ἰδια, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ἱεροῖς ἔστι Σελενοντίοις. Συρακοσίοις δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ
βαρβάρων τινῶν ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς φέρεται. 1 δὲ μᾶλιστα
ἡμῶν προύχουσιν, ὅπποις τε πολλοὺς κέκτησαν
καὶ σίτῳ οἰκείῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐπακτῷ ἠρωταί.

XXI. "Πρὸς οὖν τοιαύτην δύναμιν οὐ ναυ-
tικῆς καὶ φαύλου στρατιᾶς μόνον δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ
πεζῶν πολλῶν ἐμπλεῖν, εἰπερ βουλόμεθα ἄξιον τῆς
dιανοίας δρᾶν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ἰππέων πολλῶν εἰργε-
σθαι τῆς γῆς, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ εἰ ἕξυστᾶσιν αἱ πόλεις
φοβηθεῖσαι καὶ μὴ ἀντιπαράχωσιν ἡμῖν φίλοι
tινες γενόμενοι ἀλλοί ἢ Ἐγερσταίοι ὃ ἀμυνούμεθα
2 ἰππικῶν" ἀσχορὸν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν ἢ ὑστε-
ρον ἐπιμεταπέμπεσθαι τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκεπτῶς βου-
λευσμένους. ἀυτὸθεν δὲ 2 παρασκευὴ ἀξιόχρεω
ἐπιέναι, γνόντας ὅτι πολὺ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας

1 ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς φέρεται, the reading of G (adopted by some of
the best editors), for ἀπαρχῆς φέρεται ABCEFM, ἀπαρχὴ
 φέρεται vulg.
2 Understanding de from § 1, which Hude inserts with
van Herwerden and Madvig.
place of liberty; and the number is large, for a single island, of cities of Hellenic origin. For except Naxos and Catana, which I expect will side with us on account of their kinship to the Leontines, there are seven others;¹ and these are equipped with everything in a style very like to our own armament, and not least those against which our expedition is more immediately directed, Selinus and Syracuse. For they can supply many hoplites, archers and javelin-men, and possess many triremes and a multitude of men to man them. They have wealth, too, partly in private possession and partly in the temples at Selinus; and to the Syracusans tribute has come in from time immemorial from certain barbarians also; but their chief advantage over us is in the fact that they have many horses, and use grain that is home-grown and not imported.

XXI. "To cope with such a power we need not only a naval armament of such insignificant size, but also that a large force for use on land should accompany the expedition, if we would accomplish anything worthy of our design and not be shut out from the land by their numerous cavalry; especially if the cities become terrified and stand together, and some of the others, besides Egesta, do not become our friends and supply us cavalry with which to defend ourselves against that of the enemy. And it would be shameful to be forced to return home, or later to send for fresh supplies, because we had made our plans at first without due consideration. So we must start from home with an adequate armament, realizing that we are about to sail, not only far from our

¹ Syracuse, Selinus, Gela, Agrigentum, Messene, Himera, Camarina (Schol.).
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αὐτῶν μέλλομεν πλεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ στρατευόμενοι καὶ ἔτι τῷ τῆς ὑπηκοόνοις ξύμμαχοι ἦλθετε ἐπὶ τινα, ὅθεν ῥάδιαi αἷ κομμαδα ἐκ τῆς φιλίας ὁν προσέδει, ἄλλα ἐς ἀλλοτρίων πᾶσαν ἀπαρτήσαντες, εἰ ὡς μηνῶν οὐδὲ τεσσάρων τῶν χειμερινῶν ἄγγελον ῥάδιον ἔλθειν.

XXII. Ὑπείκεια τα ὅνο πολλούς μοι δοκεῖ χρήμα ήμῶς ἄγειν καὶ ἡμῶς αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, τῶν τε ὑπηκόων καὶ ἡν τινα ἐκ Πελοποννήσου δυνώμεθα ἡ ποιήσαι ἡ μισθό προσαγαγόμεθα, καὶ τοξότας πολλούς καὶ σφενδονήτας, ὅπως πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖνων ἵππων ἀντέχως, ναυσί οὐ καὶ πολύ περευνά, ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεῖα βῶν ἐσκομιζόμεθα, τὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸθεν σίτου ἐν ὀλκαίᾳ, πυρῶν καὶ πεφρυγμένας κριθᾶς, ἄγειν καὶ σιτοποιοῦς ἐκ τῶν μυλών πρὸς μέρος ἡναγκασμένους ἐμμίσθους, ἵνα, ἂν ποὺ ὑπὸ ἀπλοῖας ἀπολαμβανόμεθα, ἔχη ἡ στρατιὰ τὰ ἐπιτηδεῖα (πολλη γὰρ οὖσα ὡς πάσης ἐσται πόλεως υποδεξασθαι), τὰ τὸ ἀλλὰ ὅσον δυνατὸν ἐτοιμάσασθαι καὶ μὴ ἔπι ἐτέρων γίγνεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ χρήματα αὐτόθεν ὡς πλείστα ἕχειν. τὰ δὲ παρ’ Ἐγερείαν, ἀ λέγεται ἐκεῖ ἑτοῖμα, νομίσαστε καὶ λόγῳ ἀν μάλιστα ἑτοῖμα εἶναι.

XXIII. Ἡν γὰρ αὐτὸι ἐλθὼμεν ἐνθένδε μὴ ἀντίπαλον μόνων παρασκευαζόμενοι, πλὴν γε πρὸς τὸ μάχημαυτῶν τὸ ὅπλων, ἄλλα καὶ ὑπερ-

1 καὶ εἰ for καὶ οὐκ ἐν of the MSS., with Classen.
2 ἀπαρτήσαντες, with ABF and Schol. (ἀντὶ τῶν ἀπαρτηθέντες, ἀπελθόντες), ἀπαρτήσαντες CEM.

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own land, but also on a campaign that will be carried on under no such conditions as if you had gone against an enemy as allies of your subject-states over here, where it would be easy to get whatever further supplies you needed from the friendly territory; nay, you will have removed into an utterly alien land, from which during the winter it is not easy for a messenger to come even in four months.

XXII. "And so it seems to me that we ought to take hoplites in large numbers, both of our own and of our allies, and from our subjects, as well as any from the Peloponnesus that we can attract by pay or persuade; many bowmen, and also slingers, in order that they may withstand the cavalry of the enemy. And in ships we must have a decided superiority, in order that we may bring in our supplies more easily. And we must also take with us in merchantmen the grain in our stores here, wheat and parched barley, together with bakers requisitioned for pay from the mills in proportion to their size, in order that, if perchance we be detained by stress of weather, the army may have supplies. For the force will be large, and it will not be every city that can receive it. And all other things so far as possible we must get ready for ourselves, and not come to be at the mercy of the Siceliots; but we must especially have from here as much money as possible; for as to that of the Egestaeans, which is reported to be ready there, you may assume that it is indeed chiefly by report that it will ever be ready.

XXIII. "For if we go from here provided with an equipment of our own that is not only equal to theirs—except indeed as regards their fighting troops of heavy-armed men—but that even surpasses it in all
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βάλλοντες τοῖς πᾶσι, μόλις οὖτως οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα
2 τῶν μὲν κρατεῖν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διασώσαι. πόλιν τε
νομίσαι χρῆ ἐν ἀλλοφύλοις καὶ πολεμώις οἰκιο-
οῦντας ἰέναι, οὐς πρέπει τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἦ ἂν
κατάσχωσιν εὐθὺς κρατεῖν τῆς γῆς ἦ εἰδέναι ὅτι,
3 ἢν σφάλλονται, πάντα πολέμα ξέουσιν. ὅπερ
ἐγὼ φοβοῦμενος καὶ εἰδῶς πολλὰ μὲν ἡμᾶς δέον εὗ
βουλεύσασθαι, ἔτι δὲ πλείω εὐτυχῆσαι, χαλεπῶν
δὲ ἀνθρώπων ὄντας, ὅτι ἐλάχιστα τῇ τύχῃ παρα-
δοὺς ἐμαυτὸν βούλομαι ἐκπλεῖν, παρασκευή δὲ
4 ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκότων ἀσφαλῆς.1 ταῦτα γὰρ τῇ τε
ξυμπάσχῃ πόλει βεβαιώταται ἡγοῦμαι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς
στρατευσομένοις σωτηρία. εἰ δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ δοκεῖ,
παρῆμι αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχήν.

XXIV. Ὅ μὲν Νικίας τοσαύτα εἶπε, νομίζων
τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῷ πλήθει τῶν πραγμάτων ἢ
ἀποτρέψειν ἢ, εἰ ἀναγκάζοιτο στρατεύεσθαι, μά-
2 λιστ ἂν οὖτως ἀσφαλῶς ἐκπλεύσαι. οἱ δὲ τῷ μὲν
ἐπιθυμοῦν τοῦ πλοῦν οὐκ ἔξηρέθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ
ὄχλους τῆς παρασκευῆς, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ὁρ-
μηντὸ καὶ τοῦναντίον περιέστη αὐτῷ· εὗ τε γὰρ
παραίνεσαι ἐδοξε καὶ ἀσφάλεια νῦν δὴ καὶ πολλῇ
3 ἐσέσθαι. Ἡκαὶ ἔρως ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως
ἐκπλεύσαι, τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πρεσβυτέροις ὡς ἡ κατα-
τρεψθημένοις ἐφ᾽ ἂν ἐπλευν η οὐδὲν ἂν σφαλεῖσαν
μεγάλην δύναμιν, τοῖς δὲ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ τῆς τε ἀπού-

1 ἐκπλεύσαι of the MSS., after ἀσφαλῆς, deleted by
Kriüger.

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respects, scarcely even so shall we be able to conquer Sicily or indeed to preserve our own army. It is, in fact, as you must believe, a city that we are going forth to found amid alien and hostile peoples, and it behooves men in such an enterprise to be at once, on the very day they land, masters of the soil, or at least to know that, if they fail in this, everything will be hostile to them. Fearing, then, this very result, and knowing that to succeed we must have been wise in planning to a large extent, but to a still larger extent must have good fortune—a difficult thing, as we are but men—I wish, when I set sail, to have committed myself as little as possible to fortune, but so far as preparation is concerned to be, in all human probability, safe. For these precautions I regard as not only surest for the whole state but also as safeguards for us who are to go on the expedition. But if it seem otherwise to anyone, I yield the command to him."

XXIV. So much Nicias said, thinking that he would deter the Athenians by the multitude of his requirements, or, if he should be forced to make the expedition, he would in this way set out most safely. They, however, were not diverted from their eagerness for the voyage by reason of the burdensomeness of the equipment, but were far more bent upon it; and the result was just the opposite of what he had expected; for it seemed to them that he had given good advice, and that now certainly there would be abundant security. And upon all alike there fell an eager desire to sail—upon the elders, from a belief that they would either subdue the places they were sailing against, or that at any rate a great force could suffer no disaster; upon those in the flower of their
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σης πόθω ὅψεως καὶ θεωρίας, καὶ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες
σωθῆσοντι, ὥς ὥς πολὺς ὀμιλος καὶ στρατιώτης
ἐν τῇ παρόντι ἀργύριοι οἴσεως καὶ προσκήτησεν
σθαὶ δύναμιν ὅθεν ἁίδιοι μισθοφορὰν ὑπάρξει

4 ὥστε διὰ τὴν ἄγαν τῶν πλειόνων ἐπιθυμίαν, εἰ τῷ
ἀρα καὶ μὴ ᾦρεσκε, δεδώς μὴ ἀντιχειροτονῶν
κακόνους δόξεις εἰναι τῇ πόλει ἡσυχίαν ἤγεν.

XXV. Καὶ τέλος παρελθόν τις τῶν Ἀθηναίων
καὶ παρακάλεσας τὸν Νικίαν οὐκ ἔφη χρήναι
προφασίζεσθαι οὐδὲ διαμέλλειν, ἀλλ’ ἐναντίον
ἀπάντων ἢδη λέγειν ἡμῖνα αὐτῷ παρασκευὴ

2 Ἀθηναίοι ψηφίσωσιν τι. ὅ δὲ ἀκὼν μὲν εἶπεν ὅτι
καὶ μετὰ τῶν εὐναρχόντων καθ’ ἡσυχίαν μᾶλλον
βουλεύσωτο, ὡσα μεντοι ἡδὴ δοκεῖν αὐτῷ, τρυπ-
ρεσι μὲν οὐκ ἔλασσον ἡ 1 ἕκατον πλευστεὰ εἶναι
(αὐτῶν δ’ 2 Ἀθηναίων ἔσεσθαι ὀπλιταγγεύον ὅσα
ἀν δοκῶσι, καὶ ἄλλας ἐκ τῶν εὐμμάχων μετα-
pεμπτέας εἶναι), ὀπλίταις δὲ τοῖς ξυμπασιν Ἀθη-
nαίων καὶ τῶν εὐμμάχων πεντακισχιλίων μὲν οὐκ
ἐλάσσοσιν, ἤν δὲ τι δύνωνται, καὶ πλείοσιν: τὴν
δὲ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ὡς κατὰ λόγον καὶ τοξοτῶν
τῶν αὐτόθεν καὶ ἑκ Κρήτης καὶ σφενδονητῶν καὶ
ἡν τι ἁλλο πρέπον δοκῆ εἶναι ἔτοιμασάμενοι ἄξειν.

XXVI. Ἀκούσαντες δ’ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἐψηφίσαντο
εὐθὺς αὐτοκράτορας εἶναι καὶ περὶ στρατιῶν πλή-
θους καὶ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πλοῦ των στρατηγοὺς

1 ἡ Hude omits with E.
2 δ’ Hude brackets and inserts ἄν after Ἀθηναίων, on
Krüger’s suggestion.

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age, through a longing for far-off sights and scenes, in good hopes as they were of a safe return; and upon the great multitude—that is, the soldiers \(^1\)—who hoped not only to get money for the present, but also to acquire additional dominion which would always be an inexhaustible source of pay. And so, on account of the exceeding eagerness of the majority, even if anyone was not satisfied, he held his peace, in the fear that if he voted in opposition he might seem to be disloyal to the state.

XXV. Finally a certain Athenian came forward and, calling upon Nicias, said he ought not to be making excuses and causing delays, but should say at once before them all what force the Athenians should vote him. He then, though reluctantly, said that he would prefer to deliberate with his colleagues more at their leisure; so far, however, as he could see at present, they must sail with not fewer than one hundred triremes—there would also have to be as many transports as should be determined upon, furnished by the Athenians themselves and others they must call upon their allies to supply—and with hoplites, both of the Athenians and their allies, in all not fewer than five thousand, and more if possible; and the rest of the armament which they must get ready and take with them must be in proportion—bowmen from home and from Crete, and slingers, and whatever else should be determined upon.

XXVI. Upon hearing this, the Athenians straight-way voted that the generals should have full powers, with regard both to the size of the armament

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\(^1\) Taking στρατιώτης as predicate; or, "the great multitude and the soldiery were hoping to get money for the present," etc.

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πράσσειν ἦ ἂν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ ἀριστα εἶναι Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ παρασκευὴ ἐγύρνετο, καὶ ἐσ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπεμπον καὶ αὐτόθεν καταλόγους ἐποιοῦντο. ἀρτὶ δ’ ἀνειλήφη ἡ πόλις ἐαυτὴν ἀπὸ τῆς νόσου καὶ τοῦ ξυνεχοῦς πολέμου ἐσ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ πλήθος ἐπηγενημένης καὶ ἐσ χρημάτων ἅθροισιν διὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, ὡστε ρᾶν πάντα ἔπορίζετο. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν παρασκευῇ ἦσαν.

XXVII. 'Εν δὲ τούτῳ, ὅσοι Ἐρμαῖ ἦσαν λιθινοὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ Ἀθηναίᾳ (εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπιχώριον ἡ τετράγωνος ἐργασία¹ πολλοὶ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις προθύροι καὶ ἐν ἰεροῖς) μιᾶ μυκτὶ οἱ πλείστοι 2 περιεκόπησαν τὰ πρόσωπα. καὶ τοὺς δράσαντας ἦδει οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ μεγάλοις μηνύτορις δημοσίᾳ οὕτοι τε ἔξητοῦντο καὶ προσέτει ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλο τι οἶδεν ἁσέβημα γεγενημένον, μηνύειν ἄδεως τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων καὶ 3 δοῦλων. καὶ τὸ πράγμα μειζόνως ἐλάμβανον τοῦ τε γὰρ ἔκπλου οἰωνὸς ἔδοκε εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ἀμα νεωτέρων πραγμάτων καὶ δήμου καταλύσεως γεγενημέναι. ¹ XXVIII. μηνύεται οὖν ἀπὸ μετοίκων τὲ τινων καὶ ἀκολούθων περὶ μὲν τῶν Ἐρμῶν οὐδέν, ἄλλων δὲ ἀγαλμάτων περικοπαί τίνως πρότερον ὕπο νεωτέρων μετὰ παιδίας καὶ οἶνου γεγενημέναι, καὶ τὰ μυστήρια ἄμα ὡς ποιεῖται ἐν οἰκίαις ἐφ’ ὑβρεῖ. ὅν καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην 2 ἐπητιῶντο. καὶ αὐτὰ ὑπολαμβάνοντες οἱ μάλιστα

¹ ἡ τετράγωνος ἐργασία, deleted by Hude, as not read by Schol. Patm.

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and to the whole expedition, to act in whatever way might seem to them best for Athens. After this the preparation was begun; and they sent notice to their allies and made levies at home. Now the city had just recovered from the plague and from the continuous war, both in point of the multitude of young men who had grown up and of the money that had accumulated in consequence of the truce, so that everything was provided more easily. So the Athenians were engaged in preparation.

XXVII. But in the meantime the stone statues of Hermes in the city of Athens—they are the pillars of square construction which according to local custom stand in great numbers both in the doorways of private houses and in sacred places—nearly all had their faces mutilated on the same night. No one knew the perpetrators, but great rewards were publicly offered for their detection; and it was voted, besides, that if anyone, citizen or stranger or slave, knew of any other profanation that had been done, whoever would might fearlessly give information. The matter was taken very seriously; for it seemed to be ominous for the expedition and to have been done withal in furtherance of a conspiracy with a view to a revolution and the overthrow of the democracy. XXVIII. Accordingly, information was given by certain metics and serving-men, not indeed about the statues of Hermes, but to the effect that before this there had been certain mutilations of other statues perpetrated by younger men in drunken sport, and also that the mysteries were being performed in private houses in mockery; and Alcibiades, among others, was implicated in the charges. They
Τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ ἀχθόμενοι ἐμποδῶν ὄντι σφίσι μὴ αὐτοῖς τοῦ δήμου βεβαιῶς προεστάναι, καὶ νομί-
σαντες, εἰ αὐτὸν ἐξελάσειαν, πρῶτοι ἂν εἶναι, ἐμεγά-
λυνον καὶ ἐβόων ὡς ἐπὶ δήμου καταλύσει τά τε
μυστικά καὶ ἦ τῶν Ἑρμόν περικοπὴ γένοιτο καὶ
οὐδὲν εἴη αὐτῶν ὅ τι οὐ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου ἐπράχθη,
ἐπιλέγοντες τεκμήρια τὴν ἄλλην αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἑπι-
τηδεύματα οὐ δημοτικὴν παρανομίαν.

XXIX. Ὅ δὲ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πρὸς τὰ μηνύ-
ματα ἀπελογεῖτο καὶ ἐτοῖμος ἦν πρὸν ἐκπλείν
κρίνεσθαι, εἰ τι τούτων εἰργασμένοι ἦν (ἢ ἴδῃ γὰρ
καὶ τὰ τῆς παρασκευῆς ἐπετόριστο), καὶ εἰ μὲν
toύτων τι εἰργαστὸ, δίκην δοῦναι, εἰ δὲ ἀπολυθείη,·
2 ἀρχεῖν. καὶ ἐπεμαρτύρητο μὴ ἀπόντος περὶ αὐτοῦ
diaβολὰς ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἴδῃ ἀποκτείνει, εἰ
ἀδικεῖ, καὶ ὅτι σωφρονεστέρον εἴη μὴ μετὰ τοιαύ-
τῆς αἰτίας, πρὶν διαγνωσί, πέμπειν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ
3 τοσούτῳ στρατεύματι. οἱ δὲ ἔχθροι δεδίστε σῷ
τε στράτευμα μὴ εὑνοῦν ἔχῃ, ἥν ἴδῃ ἀγωνίζεται,
ὁ τε δήμος μὴ μαλακίζεται, θεραπεύων ότι δι᾽
ἐκείνου οὗ τ᾽ Ἀργείων ἐζυνεστράτευον καὶ τῶν Μαν-
τινέων τινές, ἀπέτρεπον καὶ ἀπέσπευδον, ἀλλοὺς
ῥήτορας ἐνέλετε οὗ ἔλεγον νῦν μὲν πλεῖν αὐτῶν
καὶ μὴ κατασχεῖν τὴν ἀναγωγὴν, ἐλθόντα δὲ
κρίνεσθαι ἐν ἡμέραις ῥηταῖς, βουλόμενοι ἐκ μει-
were taken up by those who were most jealous of him\(^1\)
as an obstacle in the way of their secure preeminence
among the people; and these men, thinking that if
they could get rid of him they would have first
place, magnified the matter and shouted that both
the mockery of the mysteries and the mutilation of
the Hermae had been committed with a view to the
overthrow of the democracy, and that there was none
of these things but had been done in collusion with
him, citing as further proofs other instances of his
undemocratic lawlessness of conduct.

XXIX. He defended himself at the time against
the informers' charges, and was ready before sailing
—for already the preparations had been completed—
to be tried on the question of his having done any of
these things, and if he had been guilty of any of them
to pay the penalty, but demanded that if he were
acquitted he should keep his command. And he
protested that they should not accept slanderous
charges against him in his absence, but should put
him to death at once if he were guilty, and that it
was wiser not to send him at the head of so great
an army, under such an imputation, until they had
decided the question. But his enemies, fearing that
the army might be favourable to him if he were
brought to trial at once and that the populace might
be lenient, inasmuch as it favoured him because it
was through his influence that the Argives and some
of the Mantineans were taking part in the campaign,
were eager to postpone the trial, suborning other
orators who insisted that he should sail now and not
delay the departure of the expedition, but that he
should come back and be tried at an appointed time.
Their purpose was to have a more slanderous charge
ΤΗ Ναυαγώγη ἠγιγνέτο ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἅμα ἄλλης ποῖος καὶ ταῖς σιταγωγοῖς ὀλκάσι καὶ τόσο πλοῖος καὶ ὅση ἄλλη παρασκευὴ ἄναθε σαθαί. καὶ ἐδοξεὶ πλεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην.

XXX. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα βέρους μεσοῦντος ἔδη ἡ ἀναγωγή ἠγιγνέτο ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἅμα ἄλλης ποῖος καὶ ταῖς σιταγωγοῖς ὀλκάσι καὶ τόσο πλοῖος καὶ ὅση ἄλλη παρασκευὴ ἄναθε σαθαί, ὡς ἐκεῖθεν ἄθροος ἐπὶ ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν τὸν Ἰώιον διαβαλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ εἰ τινὲς τῶν ἅμα ποῖος καὶ τῶν Πειραιῶν καταβάντες ἐν ἠμέρα ῥητῇ ἁμα ἐφ ἐπλήρουν τὰς 2 ναῦς ὡς ἀναξόμενοι. ἄνακατεβῇ δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὁμίλος ἄπας ὅσα ἐπιείκε ὁ ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἁστῶν καὶ ἄνω τω ὦν, οἱ μὲν ἐπιχώριοι τοὺς σφυτέρους αὐτῶν ἐκαστοὶ προπέμποντες, οἱ μὲν ἐταίροις, οἱ δὲ ἄνακατεβῇ δὲ νῦες ὑμεῖς, καὶ μετ' ἐλπίδωσ τε ἁμα ἴοντες καὶ ὀλοφυρμῶν, τὰ μὲν ὡς κτήσωσι τούς δὲ ἐι ποτε ὅψοντο, ἐνθυμοῦμενοι ὅσον πλούν ἐκ τῆς σφυτέρας ἀπεστέλλοντο. καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ, ὡς ἀνακατεβῇ ἐν οἰμοῖς καὶ καὶ κυδῶν ἀλλήλους ἀπολυτείν, μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς ἄσημα τὰ δεινὰ ἢ ὅστε ἐγνηφίζοντο πλεῖν ὁμοίς δὲ τῇ παρούσῃ ῥώμῃ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἐκάστων ὄν ἐώρων τῇ ὅψει,

1 τῇ ὅψει, Hude inserts ὑν.
—and this they would find it easier to procure in his absence—and then to have him recalled and brought home for trial. So it was determined that Alcibiades should sail.

XXX. After that, when it was already midsummer, the departure for Sicily was made. Orders had been given beforehand for most of the allies, as well as for the provision-ships and smaller boats and all the rest of the armament that went with them, to assemble at Coryra, with the intention that from there they should all cross the Ionian Gulf to the promontory of Iapygia in one body. But the Athenians themselves and the allies that were present went down to the Peiraeus at dawn on a day appointed and proceeded to man the ships for the purpose of putting to sea. And with them went down also all the general throng, everyone, we may almost say, that was in the city, both citizens and strangers, the natives to send off each their own, whether friends or kinsmen or sons, going at once in hope and with lamentations—hope that they would make conquests in Sicily, lamentations that they might never see their friends again, considering how long was the voyage from their own land on which they were being sent. And at this crisis, when under impending dangers they were now about to take leave of one another, the risks came home to them more than when they were voting for the expedition; but still their courage revived at the sight of their present strength because of the abundance of everything they saw before their eyes. The strangers on the other hand and the rest of the multitude had come for a spectacle, in the feeling that the enterprise was noteworthy and surpassing belief.
XXXI. Παρασκευή γὰρ αὕτη ἡ 1 πρώτη ἐκπλεύσασα μᾶς πόλεως δυνάμει Ἐλληνικῆς πολυτελεστάτη δὴ καὶ εὐπρεπεστάτη τῶν ἐς 2 ἐκείνων τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο. ἀριθμῷ δὲ νεὼν καὶ ὀπλιτῶν καὶ ἡ ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον μετὰ Περικλέους καὶ ἡ αὕτη ἐς Ποταίδαιαν μετὰ "Ἀγνωνος οὐκ ἐλάσσων ἢν" τετράκες γὰρ χίλιοι ὀπλίται αὐτῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τριακόσιοι ἱππῆς καὶ τριήμεροι ἐκατὸν καὶ Δεσβίων καὶ Χίων πεντήκοντα καὶ ξύμμαχοι ἐτὶ πολλοὶ ξυνεπλέυσαν.

3 ἄλλα ἔπε τε βραχεῖ πλοῦ ὀρμήθησαν καὶ παρασκευὴ φαύλη, οὕτως δὲ ὁ στόλος ὡς χρόνος τε ἐσώμενος καὶ καὶ ἀμφότερα, οὐ ἂν δὲ, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεξῷ ἀμι ἐξαιρθεῖτο, τὸ μὲν ναυτικὸν μεγαλαίς δαπάναις τῶν τε τριηράρχων καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐκπονεθέν, τῷ μὲν δημοσίου δραχμῆς τῆς ἡμέρας τῷ ναύτῃ ἐκάστῳ διδόντος καὶ ναύσ παρασχόντος κενὰς ἐξήκοντα μὲν ταχείας, τεσσαράκοντα δὲ ὀπλιταγωγοῦς καὶ ὑπηρεσίας ταῦται τὰς κρατικίστας, τῶν δὲ 3 τριηράρχων ἐπιφοράς τε πρὸς τῷ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθῷ διδόντων τοῖς βραχεῖς τῶν ναυτῶν 4 καὶ τάλλα σημείως καὶ κατασκευάζει πολυτελεία χρησμαίνων, καὶ ἐς τὰ μακρότατα προθυμηθέντος ἐνὸς ἐκάστον ὅπως αὕτῳ τινι εὐπρεπείᾳ τῇ ναύσι μάλιστα προέξει καὶ τῷ ταχυναυτεῖν, τὸ δὲ πεξὸν καταλόγοις τε χρηστοῖς ἐκκριθέν καὶ ὀπλῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα σκέυων μεγάλη σπουδὴ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

1 ἡ added by Dobree.
2 Ἐλληνικῆς, Hude writes Ἐλληνικῆς, after Haacke
3 δὲ adopted from Schol. Patm.
4 καὶ ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις after τῶν ναυτῶν is deleted as not read by the Scholiast.

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XXXI. For this first armament that sailed for Sicily was the costliest and most splendid, belonging to a single city and with a purely Hellenic force, that had ever up to that time set sail. In number of ships, however, and of hoplites the expedition against Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same one afterwards under Hagnon against Potidæa, was not inferior; for in that voyage four thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred knights and one hundred triremes had participated, and from Lesbos and Chios fifty triremes, and allied troops besides in large numbers. But they had set off for a short voyage with a poor equipment; whereas this expedition, as one likely to be of long duration, was fitted out for both kinds of service, according as there might be need of either, with ships and also with land-forces. The fleet was built up at great expense on the part both of the trierarchs and of the city: the state giving a drachma per day for each sailor and furnishing sixty empty\(^1\) warships and forty transports, with crews to man them of the very best; the trierarchs giving bounties to the thranitae\(^2\) or uppermost bench of the sailors in addition to the pay from the state, and using, besides, figure-heads and equipments that were very expensive; for each one strove to the utmost that his own ship should excel all others both in fine appearance and in swiftness of sailing. The land-forces were picked out of the best lists, and there was keen rivalry among the men in the

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\(^1\) *i.e.* empty hulls without equipment, which the trierarch was to furnish.

\(^2\) In the trireme there were three ranks of oars: the thranites rowed with the longest oars; the zygites occupied the middle row; the thalamites the lowest row, using the shortest oars and drawing least pay.
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4 ἀμιλληθέν. ἦπερ γενότομοι ἁμα ἐριν γενέσθαι, ὦ τίς ἐκαστός προσετάχθη, καὶ ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας ἐπίδειξιν μᾶλλον εἰκασθήναι τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ ἐξουσίας ἢ ἐπὶ πολέμους παρασκευήν! εἰ γάρ τις ἐλογίσατο τὴν τε τῆς πόλεως ἀνάλωσιν δημοσίαν καὶ τῶν στρατευμένων τὴν ἱδίαν, τῆς μὲν πόλεως ὡσα τε ἦδη προτετελέκει καὶ ἐξοντας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἀπέστελλε, τῶν δὲ ἱδωτῶν ἢ τε περὶ τὸ σῶμα τις καὶ τριήραρχος ἐς τὴν ναῦν ἀνηλώκει καὶ ὡσα ἐστὶ ἐμελλὲν ἀναλώσειν, χωρὶς δ' ἃ εἰκὸς ἢν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθοῦ πάντα τινὰ παρασκευάσασθαι ἐφόδιον ὡς ἐπὶ χρόνον στρατείαν, καὶ ὡσα ἐπὶ μεταβολῆ τις ἡ στρατιώτης ἢ ἐμπορος ἔχων ἐπλεί, πολλὰ ἀν τάλαντα ηὐρέθη ἐκ τῆς πόλεως τα πάντα ἔξαγόμενοι. καὶ ὁ στόλος ὦν ἦσον τόλμης τε θάμβει καὶ ὄψεως λαμπρότητι περιβόητος ἐγένετο ἡ στρατιάς πρὸς ὡς ἔπησαν ύπερβολῆ, καὶ ὅτι μέγιστος ἦδη διάπλους ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας καὶ ἐπὶ μεγίστῃ ἐλπίδι τῶν μελλόντων πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπεχειρήθη.

XXXII. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἅν νῆς πλήρεις ἦσαν καὶ ἐσέκειτο πάντα ἢδη ὡσα ἔχοντες ἔμελλον ἀνάξεσθαι, τῇ μὲν σάλπυγι σιωπή ὑπεσημάνθη, εὔχας δὲ τὰς νομεζομένας πρὸ τῆς ἄναγωγῆς οὐ 238
matter of arms and personal equipment. And so it came about that among themselves there was emulation, wherever each was assigned to duty, and the whole thing seemed more like a display of wealth and power before the rest of the Hellenes than an undertaking against enemies. For if one had reckoned the public expenditure on the part of the state and the private outlay of those who made the expedition—on the part of the city, both what it had already advanced and what it was sending in the hands of the generals, and on the part of private individuals whatever a man had expended on his own person or, if trierarch, on his ship, and what they were going to spend still, and, besides, the money we may suppose that everyone, even apart from the pay he received from the state, provided for himself as travelling expenses, counting upon an expedition of long duration, and all the articles for barter and sale merchant or soldier took with him on the voyage—it would have been found that many talents in all were taken from the city. And the fame of the armament was noised abroad, not less because of amazement at its boldness and the splendour of the spectacle than on account of its overwhelming force as compared with those whom they were going against; and also because it was the longest voyage from home as yet attempted and undertaken with the highest hopes for the future as compared with their present resources.

XXXII. When the ships had been manned and everything had at last been put aboard which they were to take with them on the voyage, the trumpeter proclaimed silence, and they offered the prayers that were customary before putting out to sea, not
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κατὰ ναῦν ἐκάστην, ξύμπαντες δὲ ὑπὸ κήρυκος ἐποιοῦντο, κρατήρας τε κεράσαντες παρ’ ἀπαν τὸ στράτευμα καὶ ἐκπόμασι χρυσοῖς τε καὶ ἄργυροῖς οἱ τε ἐπιβάται καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες στρέψοντες.

2 ξυνεπηύχοντο δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὁμίλος ὁ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τῶν τε πολιτῶν καὶ εἰ τίς ἄλλος εὐνοοῦσον πάρῃς σφίσιν. παιανίσαντες δὲ καὶ τελεώσαντες τὰς σπουδὰς ἀνήγοντο, καὶ ἐπὶ κέρως τὸ πρῶτον ἐκπλεύσαντες ἄμμιλλαν ἕδη μέχρι Αἰγίνης ἐποιοῦντο. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν, ἐνθαπερ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα τῶν ξυμμάχων ξυνέλεγετο, ἢπείγοντο ἀφικέσθαι.

3 Ἕς δὲ τὰς Συρακούσας ἠγγίξατο μὲν πολλαπλύσθεν τὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐπίπλου, οὕτως μέντοι ἐπιστευότοι ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον οὐδὲν, ἀλλὰ καὶ γενομένης ἐκκλησίας ἐλέχθησαν τοιοῦτα λόγοι ἀπὸ τοὺς ἄλλους, τῶν μὲν πιστευόντων τὰ περὶ τῆς στρατείας τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, τῶν δὲ τὰ ἐναντία λεγόντων, καὶ Ἐρμοκράτης ὁ Ἐρμωνος παρελθὼν αὐτοῖς ὡς σαφῶς οἰόμενος εἰδέναι τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν, ἔλεγε καὶ παρῄει τοιάδε.

XXXIII. "Ἀπιστα μὲν ὡς, ὃσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς, δόξω χῦδ᾽ ὑμῶν περὶ τοῦ ἐπίπλου τῆς ἀληθείας λέγειν, καὶ γιγανώσκω ὅτι οἱ τὰ μῆ πιστὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι η λέγοντες η ἀπαγγέλλοντες οὐ μόνον οὐ πείθουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄφρονες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· ὦμοι δὲ οὐ καταφοβηθεῖσις ἐπισχῖσθης κινδυνευοῦσης τῆς πόλεως, πείθων γε ἐμαυτὸν σαφέστερόν τι ἔτέρου εἰδῶς λέγειν. Ἀθηναίοι γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ύμᾶς, ὃ

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ship by ship but all together, led by a herald, the mariners as well as the officers throughout the whole army making libations with golden and silver cups from wine they had mixed. And the rest of the throng of people on the shore, both the citizens and all others present who wished the Athenians well, also joined in the prayers. And when they had sung the paean and had finished the libations, they put off, and sailing out at first in single column they then raced as far as Aegina. The Athenian fleet, then, was pressing on to reach Corcyra, where the rest of the armament of the allies was assembling.

But meanwhile reports of the expedition were coming to Syracuse from many quarters, but were not believed at all for a long time. Nay, even when an assembly was held speeches to the following effect\(^1\) were made on the part of others, some crediting the reports about the expedition of the Athenians, others contradicting them, and Hermocrates son of Hermon came forward, in the conviction that he knew the truth of the matter, and spoke, exhorting them as follows:

XXXIII. "Possibly it will seem to you that what I and certain others say about the reality of the expedition against us is incredible, and I am aware that those who either make or repeat statements that seem not credible not only do not carry conviction but are also regarded as foolish; but nevertheless I will not be frightened into holding my tongue when the state is in danger, persuaded as I am that I speak with more certain knowledge than my opponents. For it is indeed against you, much

\(^1\) *i.e.* like those of Hermocrates and Athenagoras.
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πάνυ θαυμάζετε, πολλῇ στρατιᾷ ὀρμηταὶ καὶ ναυτικῇ καὶ πεζικῇ, πρόφασιν μὲν Ἑγεσταίων ἀγμαμαχία καὶ Δεοντίνων κατοικίσει, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς Συκελίας ἐπιθυμία, μάλιστα δὲ τῆς ἕμετέρας πόλεως, ἡγούμενοι, εἰ ταύτην σχοῖνεν, ῥαδίως καὶ τάλλα ἔξειν. ὡς οὖν ἐν τάχει παρεσομένων, ὀράτη ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὅτι τρόπῳ κάλλιστα ἀμυνεῖσθε αὐτοὺς καὶ μήτε καταφρονήσαντες ἀφαρκτοί ληφθήσεσθε μήτε ἀπιστήσαντες τοὺς ἑὑμπάντος ἀμελήσετε. εἰ δὲ τῷ καὶ πιστά, τὴν τόλμαν αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν μὴ ἐκπλαγῇ. οὔτε γὰρ βλάπτειν ἡμᾶς πλεῖον οἷοί τ' ἔσονται ἡ πάσχειν, οὔθ' ὅτι μεγάλῳ στόλῳ ἐπέρχονται, ἀνωφέλεις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τε τοὺς ἄλλους Συκελίωτας πολὺ ἀμεινον (μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐθελήσουσιν ἐκπλαγέντες ἡμῖν ἀγμαμαχεῖν), καὶ ἦν αὐτὸς ἡ κατεργασώμεθα αὐτοὺς ἡ ἀπράκτους ὅν ἐφίενται ἀπώσωμεν (οὐ γὰρ δὴ μὴ τύχωσι γε ὅν προσδέχονται φοβοῦμαι), κάλλιστον δὴ ἔργων ἡμῖν ἔμμβησεται καὶ οὐκ ἅνελπιστον ἐμοίγε. οὐλόγοι γὰρ δὴ στόλοι μεγάλοι ἢ Ἑλλήνων ἢ βαρβάρων πολὺ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐαυτῶν ἀπάραντες κατώρθωσαν. οὔτε γὰρ πλείονς τῶν ἐνοικούντων καὶ ἀστυγειτώνων ἐρχονται (πάντα γὰρ ὑπὸ δέος ἐννιόσταται), ἡν τε δὲ ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ γῇ σφαλώσι, τοῖς ἐπιβουλευθέσιν ὁνόμα, κἀν περὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τὰ

1 ἀνωφέλεις, Dobree's correction, for ἀνωφέλεις of the MSS., which Hude retains.

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as you wonder at it, that the Athenians have set out with a large armament for use on land as well as on the sea, on the pretext of an alliance with the Egestaeans and the restoration of the Leontines, but in truth with a covetous desire for Sicily, and above all for our city, thinking that once in possession of it they would easily get possession of the rest also. With the certainty, then, that they will soon be here, consider in what way with your present resources you can best ward them off, and may neither by despising them be caught off your guard nor through incredulity neglect the whole matter. If, however, anyone does find my words credible, let him not be dismayed at their daring and power. For neither will they be able to inflict more injury upon us than they will suffer, nor is it without advantage for us that they are coming with a great armament; on the contrary, it is far better so as regards the rest of the Siceliots, for in their consternation they will be more inclined to join our alliance; and if in the end we either overpower them or drive them off baffled in their designs—for I certainly have no fear as to their attaining the success they anticipate—it will prove the most glorious of achievements for us, and one which I at least do not despair of. For few great armaments, whether of Hellenes or of barbarians, when sent far from their own land, have been successful. The reason is that they are not, in the first place, superior in numbers to the people against whom they go and the neighbours of these—for fear always brings about union; and if, in the second place, they fail on account of lack of supplies in a foreign land, they leave a proud name to those whom they plotted against, even though their failure
6 πλείω πταίσωσιν, ὡμως καταλείπουσιν. ὡπερ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι 1 αὐτοὶ οὖτοι, τοῦ Μήδου παρὰ λόγον πολλὰ σφαλέντος, ἐπὶ τῷ ὄνοματι ὡς ἐπὶ Ἀθήνας ἱεῖ ηὐξήθησαν, καὶ ἡμῖν οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον τὸ τοιοῦτον ξυμβήναι.

XXXIV. "Θαρσοῦντες οὖν τά τε αὐτοῦ παρασκευαζόμεθα καὶ ἐς τοὺς Σικελίους πέμπτουν τοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον βεβαιωσόμεθα, τοῖς δὲ φιλίαιν καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πειρώμεθα ποιεῖσθαι, ἐς τε τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν πέμπτομεν πρὸςβείσ, δηλοῦντες ὡς κοινὸς ὁ κίνδυνος, καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ὅπως ἡ ξυμμαχία ποιώμεθα ἡμῖν ἢ μὴ δέχωνται Ἀθηναίους. δοκεῖ δὲ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἀμεινοῦν εἰναι πέμψαι. οὗ γὰρ ἀνέλπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ διὰ φόβον εἰσὶ μὴ ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσιν, ὡστε τάχ' ἂν ἰσως νομίσαντες, εἰ τάδε προῆσονται, καὶ ἂν σφεῖς ἐν πόνῳ εἴναι, ἐθελήσειν ἡμῖν ἢτοι κρύφα γε ἡ φανερῶς ἡ ἐξ ἔνος γέ του τρόπου ἀμύναι. δυνατοὶ δὲ εἰσὶ μάλιστα τῶν ὑπ' ἄργυρον πλείστον κέκτηται, ὦθεν οἱ τὸ πόλεμος καὶ τάλλα εὐπορεῖ. πέμπτομεν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Δακεδαίμονα καὶ ἐς Κόρινθον, δεόμενοι δεύρο κατὰ τάχος βοήθειν καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον κινεῖν.

4 ὢ δὲ μάλιστα ἐγὼ τε νομίζω ἐπίκαιρον ὑμεῖς τε διὰ τὸ ξύνθησαν ἡσυχὸν ἤκιστ' ἂν ὄξεως πείθοισθε, ὡμος εἰρήσεται. Σικελιώται γὰρ εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν ξύμπαντες, εἰ δὲ μῆ, ὧτι πλείστοι μεθ' ἡμῶν,

1 Ἀθηναῖοι, Hude deletes with Badham.
be due chiefly to themselves. These very Athenians, for example, when the Persians contrary to expectation signally failed, grew great on the repute that it was Athens they went against; so in our case a like issue is not beyond hope.

XXXIV. "With confidence, then, let us make our preparations here, but also send envoys to the Sicels, to confirm the allegiance of some and to endeavour to make friendship and alliance with others; and let us despatch envoys to the rest of Sicily, to show that the danger is a common one, and to Italy, that we may either secure their alliance for ourselves or else prevent their receiving the Athenians. And to me it seems best to send also to Carthage. For the Carthaginians are not without expectation, or rather they are always in fear, that some time the Athenians may come against their city; and so they will probably feel that if they shall leave things here to their fate, they may be in trouble themselves, and therefore will be inclined to assist us, secretly perhaps, or openly, or by some means or other. And they, of all men of the present day, are the most able to do so, if they will; for they have an abundance of gold and silver, by which war and everything else is expedited. And let us send also to Lacedaemon and to Corinth, begging them to bring aid here with all speed, and to stir up the war over there. And now the measure which I think would be most opportune, but which you on account of your habitual love of ease would be least likely to adopt promptly, shall nevertheless be proposed. If we Siceliots—all together, or, in default of this, as many as will join us—were willing to launch all our
καθελκύσαντες ἀπαν τὸ ὑπάρχον ναυτικὸν μετὰ δυνῶν μηνοῖ τροφῆς ἀπαντήσαι Ἀθηναίως ἡς Τάραντα καὶ ἄκραν Ἰατυγίαν, καὶ δὴλον ποιήσαι αὐτοῖς ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῆς Σικελίας ἡς προτερον ἔσται ὁ ἀγὼν ἡ τοῦ ἐκείνους περαιωθήναι τῶν Ἰόνυν, μάλιστ' ἄν αὐτοὺς ἐκπλήξασθαι καὶ ἐς λογισμὸν καταστήσασθαι ὅτι ὅρμῳ μὲν ἐκ φίλως χώρας φύλακες (ὑποδέχεται γὰρ ἡμᾶς Τάρας), τὸ δὲ πέλαγος αὐτοῖς πολὺ περαιούσθαι μετὰ πάσης τῆς παρασκευῆς, χαλεπὸν δὲ διὰ πλοῦ μῆκος ἐν τάξει μείναι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἄν εὐπτέθετος εἰη, βραδεῖά ὧν τε καὶ κατ' ὅλιγον προσπίπτουσα. εἰ δ' αὐ τῷ τῷ ταχυναυτοῦντι ἄθρωτερῷ κοιφισάντες προσβάλοντες, εἰ μὲν κόπαις χρῆσαιντο, ἐπιθοίμεθα ἀν κεκμηκόσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ δοκοίη, ἐστί καὶ ὑποχωρήσαι ἡμῖν ἢς Τάραντα· οἱ δὲ μετ' ὅλιγων ἐφοδίων ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχία περαιωθέντες ἀποροίεν ἄν κατὰ χώρα ἐρήμα, καὶ ἡ μένοντες πολιορκοῦστο ἅν ἡ περώμενοι παραπλείν τὴν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἀπολείποιεν ἄν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων οὐκ ἄν βέβαια ἐξοντες, εἰ ὑποδέξοιτο, ἄθυμοι. ὡστ' ἔγγυῃ τούτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ ἧγομαι ἀποκλημένους αὐτοὺς οὐδ' ἄν ἀπάραι ἀπὸ Κερκύρας, ἀλλ' ἢ διαβουλευσάμενος καὶ κατασκοπαῖς χρωμένους ὁπόσοι τ' ἐσμέν καὶ ἐν ὃ χωρίῳ, ἐξωσθήναι ἄν τῇ ἡρα ἐσ

1 περὶ τῆς Σικελίας, Duker's correction for περὶ τῆς Σικελία of the MSS.

1 The Athenians would naturally expect to cross from Coreyra to Tarentum, then follow the coast to Messene. By 246
available naval force and with two months' provisions go to meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the promontory of Lapygia, and make plain to them that the contest will not be first for Sicily, but before that for their passage across the Ionian Sea, we should mightily astound them and force them to reflect that we have as our base a friendly country from which to keep watch and ward—for Tarentum is ready to receive us—whereas for them the open sea is a wide one to cross with all their armament, and it is difficult on account of the length of the voyage to keep in formation; consequently, coming up slowly and few at a time, they would be at the mercy of our attack. But if on the other hand they should lighten their ships and attack with the swift-sailing part of their fleet in a more compact body, then, in case they used their oars, we should set upon them when weary with rowing; or if it did not seem wise to attack them, we could retire to Tarentum again. They, however, having crossed with slender supplies in the prospect of a naval engagement, would be in distress in uninhabited regions, and either would remain and be blockaded, or trying to sail along the coast would leave behind the rest of their equipment, and, having no certainty as to the temper of the cities, whether they would receive them or not, would be discouraged. And so I for my part am of opinion that, deterred by this consideration, they would not even put out from Corcyra, but either, after taking time for deliberation and spying out how many we are and in what position, would be driven into winter-quarters making Tarentum their base the Siceliots would force the Athenians to cross the open sea—a hazardous undertaking.
ΤΗΥΚΥΔΙΔΕΣ

χειμώνα, ἢ καταπλαγέντας τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ κατα-
λύσαι ἄν τὸν πλοῦν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ ἐμ-
πειροτάτου τῶν στρατηγῶν, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκούω,
ἀκούως ἡγουμένου καὶ ἀσμένου ἄν πρόφασιν
λαβόντος, εἰ τι ἄξιόχρεων ἀφ' ἡμῶν ὄφθειν.
7 ἀγγελλούμεθα δ' ἂν εὐ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον τῶν
δ' ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τα λεγόμενα καὶ αἰ γνώμαι
illiseconds, καὶ τοὺς προσπειροῦντας ἢ τοῖς ἔς-
ἐπιχειροῦσι προδηλοῦντας ὅτι ἀμυνοῦνται μᾶλλον
πεφόβησται, ἰσοκινδύνους ἡγούμενοι. οὕτε ἂν νῦν
8 Ἀθηναίου πάθοιεν. ἐπέρχονται γὰρ ἡμῖν ὡς οὐκ
ἀμυνομένοις, δικοῖς κατεγνωκότες ὅτι αὐτούς οὐ
μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐφθείρομεν· εἰ δ' ἦδοιεν παρὰ
γνώμην τολμήσαντας, τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ μᾶλλον ἀν
καταπλαγείειν ἢ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς δυνάμει.
9 "Πείθεσθε οὖν, μάλιστα μὲν ταῦτα τολμή-
σαντες, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι τάχιστα τάλλα ἐς τὸν
πόλεμον ἐτοιμᾶξειν, καὶ παραστήναι πατὶ τὸ
μὲν καταφρονεῖν τοὺς ἔπιοντας ἐν τῶν ἔργων τῇ
ἀλκή δείκνυσθαι, τὸ δ' ἦδη τὰς μετὰ φόβου
παρασκευὰς ἁσφαλεστάτας νομίσαντας ὡς ἐπὶ
κινδύνου πρόσσεων χρησιμώτατον ἀν ξυμβήναι.
οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες καὶ ἐπέρχονται καὶ ἐν πλῆς ἐν οἶδ'
ὅτι ἦδη εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσον οὕπω πάρεισιν."

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by the lateness of the season, or in dismay at the unexpected turn of events would abandon the expedition, especially as the most experienced of their generals takes command, as I hear, against his will, and would gladly seize upon an excuse to abandon it if any considerable opposition on our part were observed. And reports of our strength would, I am convinced, be exaggerated; the opinions of men are apt to veer according to what they are told; and those who are first to attack, or those at any rate who in advance make it clear to the aggressors that they will defend themselves, inspire the greater fear in the foe, who thinks them equal to the emergency. And precisely this would be the effect at this time upon the Athenians. For they are coming against us in the belief that we shall not defend ourselves, rightly contemning us because we did not join the Lacedaemonians in the effort to destroy them. But if they should see us unexpectedly displaying courage, they would be more dismayed by this unlooked for resistance than by our real power.

"Be persuaded, then, as best of all to take this bold step, but if not that, to make all other preparations for the war with all speed; and let it come home to everyone that contempt of invaders is shown by valour in actual conflict, but that at this present time, realizing that preparations made with fear are safest, it would prove most advantageous so to act as though in imminent danger. For the Athenians are surely coming against us; they are, I am quite certain, already under sail, and all but here."

1 Or, "by an energetic defence."
XXXV. Καί ὁ μὲν Ἐρμοκράτης τοσάῦτα εἶπεν. τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ πρὸς ἄλλη-λοις ἐριδί ἦσαν, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐδεὶ ἄν τρόπῳ ἔλθοιεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲ ἀληθῆ ἔστιν ἀ λέγεται, οἱ δὲ, εἰ καὶ ἔλθοιεν, τί ἂν δράσειαν αὐτοῖς ὦ τι οὐκ ἂν μείζον ἀντιπάθοιες; ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ πάνω καταφρονοῦντες ἐς γέλωτα ἔτρεπον τὸ πράγμα. ὅλογον δ’ ἦν τὸ πιστεύον τῷ Ἐρμοκράτει καὶ
2 φοβοῦμενον τὸ μέλλον. παρελθὼν δ’ αὐτοῖς Ἀθη- 
ναγόρας, ὃς δήμου τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ 
παρόντι πιθανότατος τοὺς πολλοῖς, ἔλεγε τοιάδε. 
XXXVI. “Τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους ὅστις μὴ βού- 
λεται οὕτως κακῶς φρονῆσαι καὶ ὑποχείριος 
ὁμίν γενέσθαι ἐνθάδε ἐλθόντας, ἢ δειλὸς ἐστιν ἢ 
ἡ πόλει οὐκ εὔνους τοὺς δὲ ἀγγέλλουντας τὰ 
τουαῦτα καὶ περιφόβους ύμᾶς ποιοῦντας τῆς μὲν 
τόλμης οὐ θαυμάζω, τῆς δὲ ἄξυνεσίας, εἰ μὴ 
2 οἶνονται ἐνδηλοι εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ δεδιότες ἱδία 
τι βούλονται τὴν πόλιν ἐς ἐκπλήξιν καθιστάναι, ὡ 
ὀπως τῷ κοινῷ φόβῳ τὸ σφέτερον ἑπιλυγάζωνται. 
καὶ νῦν αὐταί αἱ ἀγγέλλα τοῦτο δύνανται, αἱ ὡς 
οὐκ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου, ἐκ δὲ ἄνδρῶν οὔτε ἀιεὶ 
3 τάδε κινοῦσιν ἔξυγκειται. ὡμεῖς δὲ ἦν εὗ βου- 
λεύσθησα, οὐκ ἐξ ὧν οὕτω ἀγγέλλουσι σκοποῦντες 
λογεῖσθαι τὰ εἰκότα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἂν ἄνθρωποι δεινοὶ 
καὶ πολλών ἑμπειροί, ὡσπερ ἄγω Ἀθηναίοις 
4 ἄξιοι, δράσειαν. οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰκὸς Πελοπο- 
νησίος τε ὑπολιπόντας καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον 
μὴ πεβαίνω καταλεμπένους ἐπ᾽ ἄλλον πόλε- 
μον οὐκ ἔλασσον ἐκόντας ἐλθεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἐγώγη

1 at added by Classen.
XXXV. Such was the speech of Hermocrates. But the Syracusan people were at great strife among themselves: some maintained that the Athenians would not come at all and that the reports were not true; others asked, even if they did come, what could they do to them that they would not themselves suffer still more; others quite contemptuously turned the matter into ridicule. There were, however, a few who believed Hermocrates and feared what was coming. But Athenagoras, who was a popular leader and at the present time most influential with the masses, came forward and addressed them as follows:—

XXXVI. "As to the Athenians, whoever does not wish them to be so ill witted as to come here and fall into our hands, is either a coward or not loyal to the state; as to the men, however, who tell such stories and fill you with fear, I do not wonder at their audacity so much as at their simplicity, if they fancy we do not see through them. For men who have some private grounds of fear wish to plunge the city into consternation, in order that in the common fear their own may be overshadowed. So now this is the meaning of these reports, which are not spontaneous, but have been concocted by men who are always stirring up trouble here. But you, if you are well advised, will examine and form your estimate of what is probable, not from what these men report, but from what shrewd men of much experience, such as I deem the Athenians to be, would be likely to do. For it is not probable that they would leave the Peloponnesians behind them before they have yet brought the war there surely to an end, and voluntarily come here to prosecute
ἀγαπάν οὖσαν αὐτοὺς ὅτι οὐχ ἦμεις ἐπ’ ἐκείνους ἐρχόμεθα, πόλεις τοσαῦται καὶ οὕτω μεγάλαι.

XXXVII. “Εἰ δὲ δὴ, ὦσπερ λέγονται, ἐξόφυμεν, ἱκανοτέρον ἡγούμαι Σικελίαν Πελοποννήσου δια-
πολεμήσαι ὅσοι κατὰ πάντα ἀμείνων ἕξηρτυται,
τὴν δὲ ἡμετέραν πόλιν αὐτὴν τῆς ἕων στρατιᾶς,
ὡς φασίν, ἐπιούσης, καὶ εἰ δὶς τοσαύτη ἐλθοι,
πολὺ κρείσσω εἶναι. οἶς γ’ ἐπίσταμαι οὔθε ἵπποις
ἀκολουθήσοντας οὐδ’ αὐτόθεν πορισθησομένοις εἰ
μὴ ὄλγους τινὰς παρὰ Ἑγεσταίων, οὔθ’ ὠπλίταις
ἰσοπλήθεις τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἐπὶ νεῶν-γέ ἐλθόντας
(μέγα γὰρ τὸ καὶ αὐταῖς ταῖς ναυσὶ κούφαις
τοσοῦτον πλοῦν δεύρω κομισθήναι), τὴν τε ἀλλήν
παρασκευήν, ὡς τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ πόλιν τοσίνδε πορί-
2 σθῆναι, οὐκ ὄλγην οὖσαν. ὡστε (παρὰ τοσοῦτον
γυνώσκω) μόλις ἄν μοι δοκοῦσιν, εἰ πόλιν ἐτέραν
τοσαύτην ὡς Συράκουσαι εἰσίν ἐλθοιείν ἔχοντες
καὶ ὁμοίας οἰκήσαντες τὸν πόλεμον ποιοῦντο, οὐκ
ἀν παντάπασι διαφθορᾶ, ᾗ ποῦ γε δὴ ἐν πάσῃ
πολεμίᾳ Σικελία (ξυστήσεται γὰρ) στρατοπέδῳ
τε ἐκ νεῶν ἱδρυθέντε καὶ ἐκ σκηνιδίων καὶ
ἀναγκαῖας παρασκευῆς, οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑπὸ τῶν
ἡμετέρων ἵππεων ἔχοντες. τὸ τε ξύμπαν οὖθ’ ἄν
κρατήσαι αὐτοὺς τῆς γῆς ἡγούμαι τοσοῦτῳ τὴν
ἡμετέραν παρασκευὴν κρείσσῳ νομίζω.

XXXVIII. “Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ὦσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ο’
te Ἀθηναίοι γυγώσκοντες τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν εὑ
ούθ’ ὅτι σφόξουσι, καὶ ἐνθεύει αὐðρες οὕτε οὕτα οὕτε
ἀν γενόμενα λογοποιοῦσιν, οὕς ἐγὼ οὗ νῦν πρῶτον,
another war quite as great; for I myself think that they are content that we do not come against them, being so numerous and so powerful.

XXXVII. "If, however, they should come, as it is reported, I think Sicily more competent to carry the war through than the Peloponnesus, inasmuch as it is better provided in all respects, and that our city by itself is much stronger than this army which now, as they say, is coming on—aye, even if it should come in twice the number. For I know that neither horses will accompany them—and from here also none will be provided, except a few from Egesta—nor hoplites equal in number to ours, since they have to come on ships; for it is a great thing to make the long voyage to Sicily even with their ships alone, lightly laden. And the rest of the equipment which must be provided against so large a city as ours is not small. So much, then, do I differ in my judgment from these men that it seems to me, if they brought with them another city as large as Syracuse and settling here on our borders should wage the war, they would hardly fail to be utterly destroyed; much less, then, when all Sicily is hostile—for it will be united—and they are in a camp pitched just after landing from the ships and cannot venture far from their wretched tents and meagre supplies by reason of our cavalry. In short, I think they would not even get a foothold on the land; so much do I judge our forces to be superior.

XXXVIII. "But of these things, as I maintain, the Athenians are aware and they are, I am quite sure, taking care of their own interests, and men from here are fabricating stories neither true nor possible, men whom not now for the first time but always I have
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2 ἀλλ’ αἱ ἐπίσταμαι ἦτοι λόγοις γε τοιοῦσθε καὶ ἐτὶ τούτων κακοεργοτέροις ἡ ἔργοισ βουλομένους καταπλήξαντας τὸ ὑμέτερον πλήθος αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως ἀρχεῖν. καὶ δέδοικα μέντοι μὴ ποτὲ πολλὰ πειρώντες καὶ κατορθώσωσιν ἤμεῖς δὲ κακοί, πρὶν ἐν τῷ παθεῖν ὅμεν, προφυλάγασθαι τε καὶ 3 αἰσθόμενοι ἐπεξελθείν. τοιγάρτοι δ’ αὐτὰ ἡ πόλις ἤμων ὀλιγάκις μὲν ὣσυχάζει, στάσεις δὲ πολλὰς καὶ ἀγώνας οὐ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους πλείονας ἢ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀναίρεται, τυραννίδας δὲ ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ 4 δυναστείας ἀδίκους. ὃν ἐγὼ πειράσομαί, ἢ γε ἤμεῖς ἐθέλητε ἐπεσθαί, μήποτε ἐφ’ ἤμων τι περιδείν γενέσθαι, ὑμᾶς μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς πείθων τοὺς δὲ 1 τὰ τοιαῦτα μηχανωμένους κολάζων, μὴ μόνον αὐτοφώρους (χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνειν), ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅν βούλονται μὲν δύνανται δ’ οὔ (τὸν γὰρ ἔχθρον οὐχ ὃν δρά μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς διανοίας προαμύνεσθαι χρῆ, εἴπερ καὶ μὴ προφυ-
lαξάμενος τις προπείσεται), τοὺς δ’ αὐθ’ ὀλίγους τὰ μὲν ἐλέγχων, τὰ δὲ φυλάσσων, τὰ δὲ καὶ διδά-
sκων’ μάλιστα γὰρ δοκῶ ἂν μοι οὕτως ἀπο-
5 τρέπειν τῆς κακουργίας. καὶ δῆτα, ὃ πολλάκις ἐσκεψάμην, τί καὶ βούλεσθε, ὃ νεώτεροι; πότερον ἀρχεῖν ἢδή; ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐννοοῦν. ὃ δὲ νόμος ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ὑμᾶς μᾶλλον ἢ δυναμένους ἐτέθη ἀτιμάζειν. ἀλλὰ δὴ μὴ μετὰ τῶν 2 πολλῶν ἰσο-

1 Hude follows Weil in bracketing δὲ and changing κολά-
ζων to κολάζειν.
2 τῶν added by Hude as probably read by the Scholiast.

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known to be wishing, either by reports such as these and still more mischievous than these, or by overt acts, to frighten the mass of you and themselves dominate the city. And I fear, moreover, that some day, by dint of repeated attempts, they may actually succeed; for we are poor hands at taking precautions before we are at their mercy, and, if we have discovered their plots, at dealing conclusively with the plotters. Therefore it is on this very account that our city is seldom quiet, but is subject to frequent feuds and conflicts—not so much with the enemy as with itself—and sometimes to tyrannies and wicked oligarchies. But if you will only follow me, I will try to see to it that never in our time shall any of these things come to pass, persuading you who are the mass of the people, but chastising the men who devise such things, not only when they are caught in the act—as it is difficult to come upon them—but even for what they would but cannot do. For an enemy one must forestall, not only in what he does, but even in his designs, since indeed a man who is not first to safeguard himself will be first to suffer. As to the oligarchs, on the other hand, I shall sometimes expose them, and sometimes watch them, but sometimes also I shall instruct them, for in this way I think I could best deter them from evil-doing. And now—a question which I have often asked myself—what do you want, you young men? To hold office already? But that is not lawful; and the law was enacted in consequence of your incompetency, rather than to keep you from office when competent. Well, then, you do not want to be on an
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νομείσθαι; καὶ πῶς δίκαιον τὸν αὐτοῦς μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι;

XXXIX. "Φήσει τις δημοκρατίαν οὕτε ἐνενετῶν οὗτ' ἵσον εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἐχοντας τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἀρχεῖν ἄριστα βελτίως, ἐγὼ δὲ φημὶ πρώτα μὲν δῆμον ἔμπαν ἀνομάσθαι, ὀλγαρχίαν δὲ μέρος, ἐπειτὰ φύλακας μὲν ἄριστους εἶναι χρημάτων τοὺς πλουσίους, βουλεύσαι δ' ἀν βέλτιστα τούς ἐνενετούς, κρίναι δ' ἀν ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλούς, καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ ἔμπαντα ἐν δημοκρατία ἱσομοιορεῖν. ὀλγαρχία δὲ τῶν μὲν κινδύνων τοῖς πολλοῖς μεταδίδοσι, τῶν δ' ὕφελμων οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔμπαντ' ἀφελομένη ἔχει: ὃ ὑμὸν οὔ τε δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ νέοι προθυμοῦνται, ἀδύνατα ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει κατασχεῖν.

XL. "Ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν, οὐ πάντων ἀξινεωτατοί, ὅν ἔγω οἶδα Ἐλλήνων, εἰ μὴ μανθάνετε κακὰ σπεύδουτε, ἦ ἀδικώτατοι, εἰ εἰδότες τολμᾶτε, ἀλλ' ἦτοι μαθόντες γε ἡ μεταγρύντες τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἔμπασι κοινὸν αὐξητε, ἡγησάμενοι τούτο μὲν ἄν καὶ ἵσον καὶ πλέον οἵ ἀγαθοὶ ὑμῶν ἦτερ τὸ τῆς πόλεως πλῆθος ἐμπαίστε, εἰ δ' ἀλλα βουλήθησεθε, καὶ τοῦ παντοῦ κινδύνευσαι στερήθηναι καὶ τῶν τοιῶν ἀγγελιῶν ὡς πρὸς αἰσθανομένους καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέψοντας ἀπαλλάγητε. ἣ γὰρ πόλις ἤδε, καὶ εἰ ἔρχονται Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀμυνεῖται αὐτοῦς ἀξίως αὐτῆς, καὶ στρατηγοὶ εἰσιν ἡμῖν οἱ

1 ἦ ἀμαθίστατοι ἔστε, before ἦ ἀδικώτατοι in the MSS., deleted by Dobree and Madvig.
2 ἦτερ τὸ τῆς πόλεως πλῆθος, Hude deletes, following Krüger.

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equality with the many? And how is it right that the same folk should not be deemed worthy of the same privileges?

XXXIX. "Some will say that a democracy is neither wise nor equitable, and that those that have property are more competent to rule best. But I say, first, that democracy is a name for all, oligarchy for only a part; next, that while the wealthy are the best guardians of property, the wise would be the best counsellors, and the many, after hearing matters discussed, would be the best judges; and that these classes, whether severally or collectively, enjoy a like equality in a democracy. An oligarchy, on the other hand, gives the many a share of the dangers, but of the advantages it not merely claims the lion's share, but even takes and keeps all. And this is what the powerful among you and the young men are bent upon—a thing impossible to attain in a great city.

XL. "Still, even now, O ye most senseless of all Hellenes that I know, if you do not see that your designs are wicked, or most criminal, if you know and yet dare to persist in them,—even now, I say, either learn wisdom or repent of your folly and strive to advance the common interests of the state for the good of all, reflecting that the good among you would share this in equal or larger measure than the mass of the people, whereas if you have other aims you will run the risk of losing all. So have done with such reports, understanding that you are dealing with men who are aware of your designs and will not put up with them. For this city, even if the Athenians come, will ward them off in a manner worthy of herself; and we have generals who will
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σκέψονται αυτά. καὶ εἰ μὴ τι αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἐστιν, ὦσπερ οὐκ οἴομαι, οὐ πρὸς τὰς ὑμετέρας ἀγγελίας καταπλαγεῖσα καὶ ἐλομένη ὑμᾶς ἀρχον
tας αὐθαίρετον δουλείαν ἐπιβαλεῖται, αὐτὴ δ’ ἐφ’ αὐτῆς σκοποῦσα τοῖς τε λόγοις ἀφ’ ὕμων ὡς ἔργα
βουλομένους κρινεῖ καὶ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐλευθε-
ρίαν οὐχὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἀφαιρεθήσεται, ἐκ δὲ
tοῦ ἔργῳ φυλασσομένη μὴ ἐπιτρέπει τινες πειράσεται
σφίξειν.”

XLI. Τοιαῦτα δὲ Ἄθηναγόρας εἶπεν. τῶν δὲ
στρατηγῶν εἰς ἀναστὰς ἄλλου μὲν οὐδένα ἐτι
eἴασε παρελθεῖν, αὐτὸς δὲ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἔλεξε
2 τοιάδε. "Διαβολὰς μὲν οὐ σώφρον οὔτε λέγει
τινὰς ἐς ἄλληλους οὔτε τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἀποδέ-
χεσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐσαγγελλόμενα μᾶλλον ὁρᾶν,
ὁπως εἰς τε ἔκαστος καὶ η ἡξύμπασα πόλις καλῶς
3 τοῖς ἐπιόντας παρασκευασόμεθα ἀμύνεσθαι. καὶ
ἡν ἄρα μηδὲν δεήσῃ, οὐδεμία βλάβη τοῦ τε τὸ
κοινὸν κοσμηθῆναι καὶ ἰπποῖς καὶ ὀπλοῖς καὶ τοῖς
ἀλλοῖς οἷς ὁ πόλεμος ἀγάλλεται (τὴν δ’ ἐπιμέ-
λειαν καὶ ἐξέτασιν αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς ἐξομεν) καὶ τῶν
πρὸς τὰς πόλεις διαπομπῶν ἁμα ἐς τας κατασκοπὴν
καὶ ἢν τι ἄλλο φαίνεται ἐπιτήδειον. τὰ δὲ καὶ
ἐπιμεμελήμεθα ἡδη καὶ ὃ τι ἄν αὐσθώμεθα ἐς ὑμᾶς
οίσομεν.”

Καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι τοσάτα ἐπίντος τοῦ
στρατηγοῦ διελύθησαν ἐκ τοῦ ἔνισθον.

XLII. Οἱ δ’ Ἄθηναιοι ἦδη ἐν τῇ Κερκύρα αὐτοῖ
te καὶ οἱ ἡξύμμαχοι ἀπαντεῖς ἦσαν καὶ πρῶτον
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BOOK VI. XL. 2—XLII. 1

look after these matters. And if none of these things be true—as indeed I think they are not—the state will not, through terror at your reports and by choosing you as rulers, place on her neck, of her own choice, the yoke of slavery, but looking at the matter for herself she will pass judgment on your words as if they were deeds; and will not by listening to such reports be deprived of her present liberty, but will try to preserve it by taking active precautions so as to frustrate your designs."

XLI. Such was the speech of Athenagoras. Whereupon one of the generals rose up and forbade any one else to come forward, but himself spoke as follows with reference to the matter in hand: "Personal imputations it is not wise either for any speaker to utter against another or for those who hear to tolerate; but in view of the reports that are coming in, we should rather see how we, each person and the city as a whole, shall prepare to defend ourselves effectively against the invaders. And if after all there shall be no need of it, there is no harm in the commonwealth being equipped with horses and arms and all other things wherein war takes pride—the provision and inspection of such equipment we shall have in charge—and in sending men round to the cities for observation as well as for any other purpose that may seem expedient. These provisions we have in part already made, and whatever we find out we will bring before you."

And the Syracusans, when the general had said thus much, dispersed from the assembly.

XLII. Meanwhile the Athenians themselves and all their allies also were already at Corecyra. And
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μὲν ἐπεξέτασιν τοῦ στρατεύματος καὶ ξύνταξιν ὀσπέρ ἐμελλὼν ὀρμεισθαί τε καὶ στρατοπεδεύσεσθαι οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐποιήσαντο, καὶ τρία μέρη νεῖμαντες ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐκλήρωσαν, ὅπη νῆμα ἀμα πλέοντες ἀπορῶσιν ὑδατος καὶ λιμένων καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐν ταῖς καταγωγίσι, πρὸς τε τάλλα εὐκοσμότεροι καὶ ῥάνους ἄρχειν ὁσι, κατὰ τέλη 2 στρατηγῷ προστεταγμένου ἔπειτα δὲ προὔτεμψαν καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν τρεῖς ναῦς εἰσομένας αἰτίνες σφᾶς τῶν πόλεων δέξονται καὶ εἰρήνη αὐταῖς προσπαντᾶν, ὅπως ἐπιστάμενοι καταπλέωσιν.

XLIII. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοσίδε ἡδὴ τῇ παρασκευῇ Ἀθηναίοι ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς Κερκύρας ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ἐπεραιώντω, τριήρεσι μὲν ταῖς πάσαις τέσσαρες καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ἕκατον καὶ δυοῖν Ῥόδιων πεντήκονταρ (τούτων Ἀττικαὶ μὲν ἦσαν ἐκατόν, ὅπερ ἀκοὴς ἐκείνης, αἰ, δ' ἄλλαι στρατιώτides, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ναυτικὸν Χίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζυμμαχῶν), ὀπλίταις δὲ τοῖς ξύμπασιν ἐκατόν καὶ πεντακις χίλιοις (καὶ τούτων Ἀθηναίων μὲν αὐτῶν ἦσαν πεντακόσιοι μὲν καὶ χίλιοι ἐκ καταλόγου, ἐπτακόσιοι δὲ θῆτες ἐπιβάται τῶν νεῶν, ξύμμαχοι δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι ξυνε- στράτευσι, οἱ μὲν τῶν ὑπηκόων, οἱ δ' Ἀργείων πεντακόσιοι καὶ Μαντινέων καὶ μισθοφόρων πεν- τήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι), τοξόταις δὲ τοῖς πᾶσιν ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ τετρακόσιοις (καὶ τούτων Κρήτες οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα ἦσαν), καὶ σφενδονήταις Ῥόδιων 260
first the generals held a final review of the armament and made disposition in what order the forces were to anchor and to encamp. Making three divisions they allotted one to each general, in order that they might not, by sailing together, be at a loss for water and ports and provisions when they put in to shore, and that they might in general be more orderly and easy to control, being thus assigned in divisions to separate commanders. And next they sent forward to Italy and Sicily three ships, to ascertain which of the cities would receive them. And orders were given to these ships to come back to meet them, that they might know before putting to shore.

XLIII. After this the Athenians weighed anchor and crossed over from Corcyra to Sicily with a force that was now of this strength: Of triremes there were in all one hundred and thirty-four, and two Rhodian fifty-oared galleys—one hundred of these Attic, sixty of which were swift vessels, the others transports for soldiers, the rest of the fleet being furnished by the Chians and the other allies. Of hoplites there were all together five thousand one hundred—and of these, fifteen hundred were Athenians from the muster-roll and seven hundred Thetes \(^1\) serving as marines on the ships, and the rest allies who shared in the expedition, some from the subject-states, others from the Argives to the number of five hundred, and of Mantineans and other mercenaries two hundred and fifty. Of bowmen there were in all four hundred and eighty, and eighty of these were Cretans; of slingers, seven hundred Rhodians; one

\(^1\) Citizens of the lowest property-class, who served usually as oarsmen, but in extraordinary cases, as here, served as marines with hoplite armour.
ὁπτακοσίοις, καὶ Μεγαρεῦσι ψιλοῖς φυγάσιν εἶκοσι καὶ ἐκατόν, καὶ ἵππαι γωγὰ μιὰ τριάκοντα ἀγοῦση ἱππέας.

XLIV. Τοσαύτη ἡ πρώτη παρασκευὴ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον διέπλει, τούτως δὲ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἀγοῦσαι ὀλκάδες μὲν τριάκοντα σιταγωγοῖ, καὶ τοὺς σιτοποιοὺς ἔχονσαι καὶ λιθολόγους καὶ τέκτονας καὶ ὅσα εἰς τεῖχισμὸν ἐργαλεῖα, πλοία δὲ ἐκατόν, ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετὰ τῶν ὀλκάδων ἔμπλει πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πλοία καὶ ὀλκάδες ἐκουσιοὶ ἔμηκολούθον τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐμπορίας ἔνεκα· ἢ τότε πάντα ἐκ τῆς Κερκύρας ξυν-2 διέβαλλε τὸν Ἰώνιον κόλπον, καὶ προσβαλοῦσα ἡ πᾶσα παρασκευὴ πρὸς τε ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ πρὸς Τάραντα καὶ ὡς ἔκαστοι ἦπτόρησαν, παρεκομίζοντο τῇ Ἰταλικᾷ, τῶν μὲν πόλεων οὐ δεχομένων αὐτοὺς ἀγορᾶ οὐδὲ ἀστεὶ, ὦδατι δὲ καὶ ὀμοὶ, Τάραντος δὲ καὶ Λοκρῶν οὐδὲ τούτως, ἔως ἡφίκοντο ἐς Ῥήγιον τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀκρωτήριον. καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἢδη ἥθροιζοντο, καὶ ἔξω τῆς πόλεως, ὡς αὐτοὺς ἔσω οὐκ ἐδέχοντο, στρατόπεδον τε-κατε-σκευάζαντο ἐν τῷ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερῷ, οὗ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀγορὰν παρέχουν, καὶ τὰς ναύς ἀυλελκύσαντες ἵσυχασαν. καὶ πρὸς 1 τοὺς Ῥήγιον ἔντυσον ἐποιήσαντο, ἀξιόυντες Χαλκίδεας οὐτας Χαλκι-δεύσιν οὐσί Δεσπότων βοηθεῖν; οἱ δὲ οὐδὲ μεθ' ἑτέρων ἐφασαν ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὁ τι ἄν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἰταλιώταις ξυνδοκῆ, τούτω ποιήσειν. οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πράγματα ἐσκόπουν ὅτω τρόπῳ ἀριστα προσοίκονται· καὶ τὰς πρό-

1 τε of the MSS., after πρός, deleted by Krüger.
hundred and twenty light-armed Megarian exiles; and one horse-transport carrying thirty cavalry.

XLIV. Such was the strength of the first armament that sailed over for the war.¹ And for these, thirty food-bearing transports brought supplies, having also bakers, stone-masons, carpenters, and all tools for wall-building; and there sailed also one hundred boats that were pressed into service, along with the transports. But many boats besides, as well as transports, voluntarily accompanied the expedition, for the sake of trade. All these, at that time, sailed together from Corcyra across the Ionian Gulf. And when the whole armament reached the Iapygian promontory, or Tarentum, or wherever they severally found opportunity to make land, they sailed along the coast of Italy—some of the cities not receiving them with a market nor into the town, though furnishing them with water and anchorage, and Tarentum and Locri not even with these—until they came to Rhegium, a promontory of Italy. There they now assembled, and, as the Rhegians did not admit them within the walls, they pitched a camp outside of the town in the precinct of Artemis; where a market also was provided for them; and so drawing up their ships on shore they took a rest. And they also held a conference with the Rhegians, claiming that they as Chalcidians² should aid the Leontines who were Chalcidians. They, however, said that they would be neutral, but would do whatever the rest of the Italiots should decide. The Athenians now considered what would be the best course to take with reference to affairs in Sicily; and at the same time

¹ cf. ch. xxxi. 1.
² cf. Strabo vi. 257 c, κτίσμα ἐστὶ τῷ Ῥήγιον Χαλκιδέων.
πλούς ναύς ἐκ τῆς Ἑγέστης ἁμα προσέμενον, βουλόμενοι εἰδέναι περὶ τῶν χρημάτων εἰ ἔστιν ἡ ἐλεγον ἐν ταῖς Ἀθηναῖαις οἱ ἄγγελοι.

XLV. Τοὺς δὲ Συρακοσίους ἐν τούτῳ πολλαχόθεν τε ἤδη καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν κατασκόπων σαφῆ ἠγγέλλετο ὅτι ἐν Ῥηγίῳ αἱ νῆσες εἴσι, καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τούτοις παρεσκευάζοντο πᾶση τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ οὐκέτι ἦπιστον. καὶ ἐς τε τοὺς Σικέλους περιέπεμπον, ἐνθα μὲν φύλακας, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις, καὶ ἐς τὰ περιπόλια τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ φρουρᾶς ἐσκόμμουν, τὰ τε ἐν τῇ πόλει ὅπλων ἐξετάσει καὶ ὑπῶν ἐσκόπουν εἰ ἑντελῇ ἔστι, καὶ τάλλα ὡς ἐπὶ ταχεὶ πολέμῳ καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρόντι καθίσταντο.

XLVI. Αἱ δὲ εἰς τῆς Ἑγέστης τρεῖς νῆσες αἰ πρόπλου παραγίγγονται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὸ Ῥῆγιον, ἀγγέλλουσαί ὅτι τάλλα μὲν οὐκ ἔστι χρήματα ἀ ὑπέσχοντο, τριάκοντα δὲ τάλαντα 2 μόνα φαίνεται. καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ εὐθὺς εἰν ἀθυμία ἦσαν ὅτι αὐτοὶς τούτῳ τε πρῶτον ἀντεκεκρούκει καὶ οἱ Ῥηγίοι οὐκ ἐθελήσαντες ἐνεστατεύειν, οὐσ πρῶτον ἥξαντο πείθεν καὶ εἰκὸς ἦν μάλιστα, Δεοντίνων τε ξυγγενεῖς ὅντας καὶ σφίστων αἰεὶ ἐπιτηδεῖους. καὶ τῷ μὲν Νικίᾳ προσδεχομένῳ ἦν τὰ παρὰ τῶν Ἑγεσταίων, τοῖν δὲ έτέρων καὶ ἀλογώ-3 τερα. οἱ δὲ Ἑγεσταίοι τούνδε τι ἐξετεχνήσαντο τότε ὅτε οἱ πρῶτοι πρέσβεις τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἠλθον 264
they were awaiting the arrival from Egesta of the ships that had been sent ahead, wishing to know about the money, whether there actually was what the messengers had reported at Athens.

XLV. Meanwhile, through spies, as well as from many other sources, positive information was already coming in to the Syracusans that the Athenian fleet was at Rhegium; and under these conditions they began to make preparations with all zeal, and were no longer incredulous. They sent around also to the Sicels, to some places guards, to others envoys; they brought garrisons into the forts in the outlying districts; as to affairs in the city, they made an inspection of arms and of horses, to see whether everything was up to full strength; and all other matters they were arranging with a view to a war that was imminent and all but upon them.

XLVI. The three ships that had gone ahead to Egesta met the Athenians at Rhegium, announcing that the rest of the money which the Egestaeans had promised was not there, but only thirty talents were to be found. And the generals were at once out of spirits, both because this had turned out contrary at the start, and because the Rhegians, the first people whom they had tried to persuade to join the expedition and with whom it was most likely they should succeed, seeing that they were kinsmen of the Leontines and always friendly to the Athenians, refused their consent. Nicias, indeed, was expecting this news from the Egestaeans, but for the other two it was actually somewhat of a surprise. The fact was that the Egestaeans had resorted to the following device at the time when the first envoys of the Athenians came to them to see about
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αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν κατασκοπὴν τῶν χρημάτων. ἐς τὸ ἐν Ἔρυκι ἴερὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀγαγόντες αὐτοὺς ἐπέδειξαν τὰ ἀναθήματα, φιάλας τε καὶ οἶνοχόας καὶ θυματήρια καὶ ἄλλην κατα-
σκευὴν οὐκ ὀλίγην, ἀ οὖντα ἀργυρὰ πολλὰ πλεῖων
τὴν ὄψιν ἀπ’ ὀλίγης δυνάμεως χρημάτων παρεί-
χετο, καὶ ἱδία ἐξενίσεις ποιούμενοι τῶν τριηρίτων
τά τε ἐς αὐτής Ἐγέστης ἐκπώματα καὶ χρυσᾶ
καὶ ἀργυρᾶ ξυλλέξαντες καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς
πόλεων καὶ Φοινικίων καὶ Ἑλληνίδων αἰτη-
σάμενοι ἐσέφερον ἐς τὰς ἐστιάσεις ὡς οἴκεια

4 ἔκαστοι, καὶ πάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς αὐτοῖς
χρωμένων καὶ πανταχοῦ πολλῶν φαινομένων
μεγάλην τὴν ἐκπλήξιν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριήρων Ἀθη-
ναίοις παρεῖχε, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὰς Ἀθηνᾶς

5 διεθρόησαν ὡς χρήματα πολλὰ ἕδοιεν. καὶ οἱ μὲν
αὐτοῖ τε ἀπατηθέντες καὶ τούς ἄλλους τότε πεί-
σαντες, ἐπειδὴ δῆλοθεν ὁ λόγος ότι οὐκ εἰς ἐν τῇ
Ἐγέστη τὰ χρήματα, πολλὴν τὴν αὐτίναν εἶχον ὑπὸ
tῶν στρατιωτῶν· οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ πρὸς τὰ πα-


XLVII. Καὶ Νικίσον μὲν ἦν γνώμη πλεῖν ἐπὶ
Σεληνοῦντα πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ, ἐφ’ ὅπερ μάλιστα
ἐπέμφθησαν, καὶ ἦν μὲν παρέχομεν χρήματα
παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι Ἐγεσταίοι, πρὸς ταῦτα
βουλεύεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ταῖς ἐξήκοντα ναυσίν,
διασπερ ἤτήσαντο, ἦξιοι διδόναι αὐτοὺς τροφὴν,
καὶ παραμείναντας Σεληνοῦντιοι ἡ βία ἡ ἐμ-
βάσει διαλλάξας αὐτοῖς, καὶ οὕτω, παραπλεύ-
sαντας τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις καὶ ἐπιδείξαντας μὲν
tὴν δύναμιν τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως, δηλώσαντας

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the money: they brought them into the temple of Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them the dedicatory offerings—bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and not a little other table-furniture, which being of silver made, though of small value in money, a much greater display. And in giving private entertainments for the crews of the triremes, they not only collected the gold and silver drinking-cups from Egesta itself, but borrowed those from the neighbouring cities, both Phoenician and Hellenic, and brought them each to the banquets as though they were their own. And as all used for the most part the same vessels and there was a great display of them everywhere, it caused great astonishment to the Athenians from the triremes, and they on returning to Athens spread the report of how much treasure they had seen. And these men who had been themselves deceived and had at the time persuaded the rest, later, when the story got out that the money was not at Egesta, were much blamed by the soldiers. The generals, however, took counsel in view of the present situation.

XLVII. It was the judgment of Nicias that they should sail with their whole armament against Selinus, which was the object for which they had chiefly been sent out, and if the Egestaeans should furnish money for the whole army, they should then determine accordingly; otherwise, they should demand that they give maintenance for sixty ships, the number they had asked for, and remaining there they should reconcile the Selinuntians to the Egestaeans, either by force or by agreement. This being accomplished, the Athenians should sail along by the other cities, displaying the power of the city of Athens and making manifest their zeal towards their
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dè tìn ès tòus fílous kai xýmmáchos prothumían, 
átopleíw oíkade, ἥν μὴ τε δι' ὀλίγου καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ 
adokhíntou ἡ Δεσυτínous oIo tê òswiò ὕφελήσαι ἡ 
tòw álław tìná póleow pròsagagésthai, kai tê 
pólēi dapañwntas tâ oìkeia mì kíndunveíen.

XLVIII. 'Alkebiádhs dè oûk èfhi xhrími tòso-
aúth dynámei ékplēsasantas aìschrósw kai áprrák-
tous ápeltéiwh, all' ès te tás póleis épikhe-
rrukêsai plèn Sélinoúntos kai Sýrakousón 
tàs állass, kai peirásthai kai tòus Síkelous tòus 
meûn afístánai atop tòn Sýrakousoûn, tòus dè 
fílous poíèsthai, òna sóton kai stratiàv parré-
khosi, pròtwon dè peíè then Meßsíniouûs (en pórfy 
gâr màlissta kai pròsbolò èiina au'tòûs tîs 
Sikelías, kai lìmëna kai efòrmhsh tî stratiàv 
ìkanótàthn èsèsthai), pròsagagómènous dè tás 
pólèis, eìdòtas meb' òn tis polemïshèi, ou'tòs hòdò 
Sýrakousais kai Sélinoúnti épícheirein, hèn mè 
oi 
meûn 'Egesstaloi xýmbaínwsoûn, oî dè Deusynous 
ésoi katoukîxein.

XLIX. Lámaçhs dè ántikrûs èfhi xhrímai plèiwh 
ép Sýrakousais kai pròs tê póleis òs tâxista 
tînh màxhnh poíèsthai, èws èti àpáraskevòi tê 
2 èisî kai màlissta èkpeptlphyménoi. Tò gâr pròw-
ton pâv strátèmata deivòtaton èiina: hèn dè xhro-
nísh priîn ès òfwn elthèi, tê gnomh ànadharpountas 
ándhrophous kai 

1 kal, Hude reads kàv after van Herwerden.
friends and allies, and then should sail back home—
unless perchance they should be able quickly and
unexpectedly either to aid the Leontines, or to bring
over some of the other cities—and not imperil the
safety of the state at the expense of their own
resources.¹

XLVIII. Alcibiades insisted that they ought not,
after sailing out with so great an armament, to go
back in disgrace without effecting anything; but urged
rather that they send heralds to the other cities, except
Selinus and Syracuse, and try to detach some of the
Sicels from the Syracusans, and to make friends of
others, in order that these might furnish grain and
troops, but first of all that they try to persuade the
Messenians; for their city, he urged, was most con-
veniently situated on a line of traffic ² and at the
approach to Sicily and would be a harbour and a
most suitable watch-station for the armament. Then,
after they had brought over these cities and knew
with whose assistance they would carry on the war,
they should proceed to attack Syracuse and Selinus,
unless the latter came to terms with the Egestaeans,
and the former permitted them to restore the
Leontines.

XLIX. Lamachus maintained that they ought to
sail direct for Syracuse and as soon as possible make
the fight near the city, while the Syracusans were still
unprepared and their consternation was at its height.
For every army, he argued, is always most formid-
able at first, but if it delay before coming into sight,
men recover their spirit and even at the sight of it
are more inclined to despise than to fear it. But

¹ As opposed to those of the Egestaeans.
² εὖ πόρω is used of the position of Corinth, i. cxx. 2.
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αἰφνίδιοι δὲ ἦν προσπέσωσιν, ἔως ἔτι περιδεείς προσδέχονται, μάλιστ' ἂν σφεῖς περιγενέσθαι καὶ κατὰ πάντα ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκφοβήσαι, τῇ τε ὄψει (πλείστοι γὰρ ἂν νῦν φανῆναι) καὶ τῇ προσδοκίᾳ ὧν πείσονται, μάλιστα δὲ ἂν τῷ αὐτίκα κινδύνῳ 3 τῆς μάχης. εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς πολλοῖς ἀπολυθήναι ἔξω διὰ τὸ ἀπιστεῖν σφαῖς μη ἦξειν, καὶ ἐσκομιζομένων αὐτῶν τὴν στρατιάν ὁμ ἄπορήσειν χρημάτων, ἢν πρὸς τῇ πόλει κρατοῦσα καθέξηται. τούτως τε ἄλλως Συκελωτάς οὕτως ἢδη μᾶλλον καὶ ἐκεῖνος οὐ ξυμμαχήσειν καὶ σφίσι προσιέναι καὶ οὐ διαμελλῆσειν περι-

4 σκοποῦντας ὅποτεροι κρατήσουσιν. ναῦσταθμον δὲ ἐπαναχωρήσαντας καὶ ἐφορμησιν τὰ 1 Μέγαρα ἔφη χρῆναι ποιεῖσθαι, ἢ ἦν ἔρημα, ἀπέχοντα Συρακουσῶν οὔτε πλοῦν πολύν οὔτε ὄδον.

Ι. Λάμαχος μὲν ταῦτα εἶπὼν ὄμως προσέθετο αὐτὸς τῇ Ἀλκιβιάδου γνώμῃ. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Ἀλκιβιάδης τῇ αὐτοῦ νη ἀπαλέυσας ἐσ Μεσ-

σήνην καὶ λόγους ποιησάμενος περὶ ξυμμαχίας πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ὥς οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ἀλλ' ἀπεκρίναντο πόλει μὲν ἂν οὐ δέξασθαι, ἀγορὰν δ' ἔξω παρέξειν,

2 ἀπέπλει ὡς τὸ Ῥήγων. καὶ εὐθὺς ξυμπληρῶσαν-

tes ἔξηκοντα χαὶ ἂν πασῶν οἱ στρατηγοί καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια λαβόντες παρέπλεους ἐς Νάξου, τὴν ἄλλην στρατιὰν ἐν Ῥήγῳ καταλιπόντες καὶ ἔνα

3 σφῶν αὐτῶν. Ναξίων δὲ δεξαμένων τῇ πόλει παρέπλεους ἐς Κατάνην. καὶ ὡς αὐτοὺς οἱ Κατα-

1 ἐφορμησιν τά, Boehme's correction for ἐφορμησθέντας of the MSS. Schaefer's conjecture, ἐφορμησθέντας, gives the same sense.

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if it attack suddenly, while the enemy are still in terror of its coming, it will have the best chance for victory and in every way will strike fear into them, both by the sight of it—for at this moment it would appear most numerous—and by the expectation of the fate in store for them, but most of all by the immediate peril of the battle. And, he added, probably many people have been left behind on their farms outside the city on account of the disbelief that the Athenians will come, and while they are bringing in their property the army will not lack supplies, if it once controls the land and invests the city. And as for the rest of the Sicelios, if we follow this course they will at once be more likely, not to make an alliance with the enemy, but to come over to us, and not to make delays, looking about to see which side will be the stronger. And he said, finally, that they should return and make a naval base and a watch-station at Megara, since it was uninhabited, and not far from Syracuse either by sea or by land.

L. Lamachus, though speaking to this effect, nevertheless gave his support to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this Alcibiades sailed in his own ship over to Messene and made proposals to the Messenians for an alliance; but as they could not be persuaded, answering that they would not receive him within the city, but would furnish a market outside, he sailed back to Rhegium. Then the generals straightway manned sixty ships out of their whole number, and taking provisions sailed along the coast to Naxos, leaving at Rhegium the rest of the army and one of the generals. The Naxians received them into their city, and they sailed on then to Catana.
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ναίοι οὐκ ἐδέχοντο (ἐνῆσαν γὰρ αὐτόθι ἄνδρες τὰ Συρακοσίων βουλόμενοι), ἐκομίσθησαν ἐπὶ τὸν Τηρίαν ποταμὸν, καὶ αὐλισάμενοι τῇ ύστεραιᾳ ἐπὶ Συρακούσας ἐπέλεον, ἐπὶ κέρως ἔχοντες τὰς ἄλλας ναῦς. δέκα δὲ τῶν νεῶν προσπεμψαν ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα πλεύσα τε καὶ κατασκέψασθαι εἰ τι ναυτικὸν ἐστι καθεῖλκυσμένον, καὶ κηρύξας ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν προσπλεύσαντας ὅτι Ἀθηναίοι ἢκουσι Δεσπότην ὡς τὴν έαυτῶν κατοικίων τα κατὰ ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ξυγγέειαν τοὺς ὁποῖους ὑπάρχει ἐν Συρακούσαις Δεσπότῃς ὡς παρὰ φίλους καὶ 5 εὐνεργεῖται Αθηναίους ἀδεῶς ἀπιέναι. ἐπεὶ δ` ἐκείρυξθη καὶ κατεσκέψαντο τὴν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν, ἦς ἂν αὐτοῖς ὁμοφωμένοις πολεμητέα ἦν, ἀπέπλευσαν πάλιν ἐς Κατάνην.

Λ. Καὶ ἐκκλησίας γενομένης τὴν μὲν στρατιὰν οὐκ ἐδέχοντο οἱ Καταναῖοι, τοὺς δὲ στρατηγοὺς ἐσελθόντας ἐκέλευον, εἰ τι βουλοῦνται, εἰπεῖν. καὶ λέγοντος τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρὸς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τετραμέμενον οἱ στρατιῶται πυλίδα τινὰ ἐνφιλοδομημένην κακῶς ἔλαθον διε- 2 λόντες καὶ ἐσελθόντες ἡγόραζον. ἡ τῶν δὲ Κατα- ναίων οἱ μὲν τὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων φρονοῦντες ὡς εἶδον τὸ στράτευμα ἐνδοῦ, εὐθὺς περιδείησε γενόμενοι ὑπεξήλθουν οὐ πολλοὶ τίνες, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἐψηφί- σαντο τε ξυμμαχίαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τὸ ἄλλο 3 στράτευμα ἐκέλευον ἐκ Ἡρίγοιον κομίζειν. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο πλεύσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἐς τὸ Ἡρίγιον, πίση

1 εἰς τὴν πόλιν, after ἡγόραζον in the MSS., deleted by van Herwenberden.

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the Catanaeans would not receive them—for there were in that place men who favoured the cause of the Syracusans—they moved on to the river Terias, and having bivouacked there sailed next day to Syracuse with all their ships in single file, except ten, for this number they had sent forward to sail into the Great Harbour and observe whether any fleet was launched. After sailing up the commanders of these were to proclaim from the ships that the Athenians had come to reinstate the Leontines in their own country on the ground of alliance and kinship; any Leontines therefore who were in Syracuse should come over without fear to the Athenians as friends and benefactors. When this proclamation had been made and they had observed the city and the harbours and the features of the country which they would have to make their base for warlike operations, they sailed back to Catana.

LI. An assembly being held there, the Catanaeans would not receive the army but bade the generals come in and say what they wanted. While, then, Alcibiades was speaking, and the attention of the people in the city was wholly directed to the assembly, the soldiers, breaking unobserved through a postern-gate that had been badly built into the wall, entered and were walking about in the market-place. Those Catanaeans who were partisans of the Syracusans, seeing the soldiers inside, at once became much frightened and slipped away, not in any large numbers; the others voted alliance with the Athenians and bade them bring the rest of their army from Rhegium. After this the Athenians sailed back to Rhegium, then putting out from there with their whole
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ηδη τη στρατιά ἀραντες ἐς την Κατάνην, ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο, κατεσκευάζοντο τὸ στρατόπεδον.

LIII. Ἑσσηγγέλλετο δὲ αὐτοῖς ἕκ τε Καμαρίνης ὡς, εἰ ἔλθοιεν, προσχωροῖεν ἄν καὶ ὁτι Συρακόσιοι πληροῦσι ναυτικόν. ἀπάση οὖν τῇ στρατιᾷ παρέπλευσαν πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ Συρακούσας· καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἦρον ναυτικὸν πληρούμενον, παρεκμίζοντο ἀθικε ἐπὶ Καμαρίνης καὶ σχόντες ἐς τὸν αἰγιαλὸν ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο. οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐδέχοντο, λέγοντες σφίσι τὰ ὁρκία εἶναι μᾶ ὑπὶ καταπλεῦντων Ἀθηναίων δέχεσθαι, ἢν μὴ αὐτοὶ πλείους

2 μεταπέμπωσιν. ἀπρακτοὶ δὲ γενόμενοι ἀπέπλευσι καὶ ἀποβάντες κατὰ τὶ τῆς Συρακοσίας καὶ ἀρπαγὴν ποιησάμενοι καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἵππεων βοηθησάντων καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν τινῶς ἐσκεδασμένους διαφθειράντων ἀπεκομίσθησαν ἐς Κατάνην.

LIII. Καὶ καταλαμβάνομει τὴν Σαλαμίναν ναῦν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἦκουσαν ἐπὶ τε Ἀλκιβιάδην, ὡς κελεύσοντας ἀποπλεῖν ἐς ἀπολογίαν ὅπωστε ἐνεκάλει, καὶ ἐπὶ ἄλλους τινὰς τῶν στρατιωτῶν, τῶν μὲν ἕτερα μεμηχυμένων περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων ὡς ἀσβοῦντων, τῶν δὲ καὶ περὶ

2 τῶν Ἐρμῶν. οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναίοι, ἐπειδὴ ἢ στρατιὰ ἀπέπλευσαν, οὐδὲν ἦσσον ξύτης ἐποιεύοντο τῶν περὶ τὰ μυστηρία καὶ τῶν περὶ τῶν Ἐρμῶν δρασθέντων, καὶ οὐ δοκιμάζοντες τοὺς μηνυτάς,

1 μὲν added by Hude.
armament for Catana, on their arrival they set about arranging their camp.

LII. Meanwhile news came from Camarina that if the Athenians would go thither the Camarinaeans would join them, and also that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. Accordingly they proceeded with their whole army along the coast, first to Syracuse; and when they found no fleet was being manned, they again continued along the coast to Camarina and putting to shore sent forward a herald. The Camarinaeans, however, would not receive them, saying that the terms of their oath were to receive the Athenians only if they put in with a single ship, unless they themselves sent for more. So the Athenians sailed away without accomplishing anything; and after landing at a point in Syracusan territory and making raids, when the Syracusan cavalry had come to the rescue and killed some of their light-armed troops that were straggling they went back to Catana.

LIII. There they found that the galley Salaminia\(^1\) had come from Athens for Alcibiades— to order him to come home and make his defence against the charges which the city was bringing— and for certain of the soldiers also, some of them having been denounced with him as guilty of profanation with regard to the mysteries, and some also with regard to the Hermae. For after the armament sailed, the Athenians had been pursuing with no less zeal than before their investigation of what had been done in the matter of the mysteries as well as the Hermae; and as they did not test the witnesses, but in their

\(^1\) One of the two swift Athenian state triremes kept always manned ready for extraordinary occasions and purposes.
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...
state of suspicion accepted everything, on the credit of bad men they arrested and threw into prison very excellent citizens, thinking it more expedient to sift the matter to the bottom and find out the truth, than that anybody, even one reputed to be good and accused only through the villainy of an informer, should escape without close investigation. For the people, knowing by tradition that the tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons had become galling at the last, and moreover had been put down, not by themselves and Harmodius, but by the Lacedaemonians,\textsuperscript{1} were in constant fear and regarded everything with suspicion.

LIV. Now the daring deed of Aristogeiton\textsuperscript{2} and Harmodius was undertaken on account of a love affair, and by relating this at some length I shall prove that neither the Hellenes at large nor even the Athenians themselves give an accurate account about their own tyrants or about this incident. For when Peisistratus died,\textsuperscript{3} as an old man, in possession of the tyranny, it was not Hipparchus, as most suppose, but Hippias, as eldest son, that succeeded to the sovereignty. And Harmodius, being then in the flower of youthful beauty, had as his lover Aristogeiton, a citizen of the middle class. An attempt to seduce him having been made by Hipparchus son of Peisistratus without success, Harmodius denounced him to Aristogeiton. And he, lover-like, deeply resented it, and fearing the power of Hipparchus, lest he might take Harmodius by force, at once plotted, with such influence as he possessed, to overthrow the tyranny. Meanwhile Hipparchus,

\begin{itemize}
  \item [\textsuperscript{1}] Under Cleomenes, 510 B.C.
  \item [\textsuperscript{2}] 514 B.C.
  \item [\textsuperscript{3}] Probably 527 B.C.
\end{itemize}
ΤΟΥ 'Ιππίου τού τυραννεύσαντος υίος, τοῦ πάππου ἔχων τούνομα, ὃς τῶν δώδεκα θεῶν βωμῶν τὸν ἐν τῇ ἁγορᾷ ἅρχων ἁνέθηκε καὶ τὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἐν Πυθίου. καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐν τῇ ἁγορᾷ προσωκοδομήσας ύστερον ὁ δήμος Ἀθηναίων μείζον μήκος ἡφάνισε τοῦπύγαρμα· τοῦ δὲ ἐν Πυθίου ἑτὶ καὶ νῦν δῆλον ἐστὶν ἀμυνδροῖς γράμμασι λέγου τάδε·

μνήμα τὸδ' ἦς ἅρχης Πεισίστρατος Ἰππίου υίος θηκεν Ἀπόλλωνος Πυθίου ἐν τεμένει.

I.V. "Ὅτι δὲ πρεσβύτατος ὡς Ἰππίας ἦρξεν, εἰδὼς μὲν καὶ ἀκοὴ ἀκριβεστέροις ἄλλων ἰσχυρίζομαι,

1 Levesque's correction for τόπῳ of the MSS.
2 τοῦ βωμοῦ, in the MSS. after μήκος, deleted by Krüger.

1 This seems to point to a near relationship of the historian with the family of the Peisistratidae, so that more
having in a second attempt met with no better success in persuading Harmodius, although he had no intention of offering violence, yet laid a plan to insult him in some covert way, as though it were not for this reason. For he did not generally so exercise his authority as to be oppressive to the mass of the people, but maintained it without giving offence. And indeed the Peisistratidae carried the practice of virtue and discretion to a very high degree, considering that they were tyrants, and although they exacted from the Athenians only five per cent. of their incomes, not only had they embellished their city, but they also carried on its wars and provided sacrifices for the temples. In other respects the city itself enjoyed the laws before established, except in so far that the tyrants took precaution that one of their own family should always be in office. Amongst others of them who held the annual archonship at Athens was Peisistratus, a son of the Hippias who had been tyrant. He was named after his grandfather and, when he was archon, dedicated the altar of the twelve gods in the Agora and that of Apollo in the Pythian precinct. The people of Athens afterwards, in extending the length of the altar in the Agora, effaced the inscription; but that on the altar of the Pythian Apollo can still be seen in indistinct letters, reading as follows:

"This memorial of his office Peisistratus son of Hippias
Set up in the precinct of Pythian Apollo."

LV. That it was Hippias who, as eldest son, succeeded to the sovereignty I positively affirm because I know it even by tradition more accurately than others,¹ exact knowledge had come to him by word of mouth (μαθηματικά) ; cf. Marcellinus, § 18, and Schol. on i. xx. 2.

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γροῖς δ' ἂν τις καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ παιδεῖς γὰρ αὐτῷ μόνον φαίνονται τῶν γυναῖκῶν ἄδελφων γενόμενοι, ὥς ὁ τε βωμὸς σημαίνει καὶ ἡ στῆλη περὶ τῆς τῶν τυράννων ἀδικίας, ἢ ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀκρο-πόλει σταθείσα, ἐν ἡ Θεσσαλῶν μὲν οὖν Ἰππάρχος οὔδεὶς παῖς γέγραπται, Ἰππίου δὲ πέντε, οἱ αὐτῷ ἐκ Μυροίς τῆς Καλλίου τοῦ Ἰπποκρίδου θυγατρὸς εὐγένους εἰκὸς γὰρ ἢν τὸν 2 πρεσβύτατον πρῶτον γῆμαι. καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ στήλῃ πρῶτος γέγραπται μετὰ τὸν πατέρα, οὐδὲ τοῦτῷ ἀπεκότως διὰ τὸ πρεσβεύειν τε ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τυραννεύσαι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν ἂν κατασχεῖν μοι δοκεῖ ποτε Ἰππίας τὸ παραχρήμα ράδιως τὴν τυραννίδα, εἰ Ἰππάρχος μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὑπὸ ἀπεθανείν, αὐτὸς δὲ φύθημερον καθίστατο· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἔξυνθες τοῖς μὲν πολίταις φοβερῶν, ἐς δὲ τοὺς ἐπικούρους ἀκριβές, πολλῷ τῷ περιώτιτι τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς κατεκράτησε, καὶ οὖν ὡς ἄδελφος νεώτερος δὲν ἠπόρησεν, ἐν ὃ οὐ πρῶτον ἔξυνθες 3 ὀμιλήκης τῇ ἀρχῇ. Ἰππάρχῳ δὲ ξυνέβη τοῦ πά- θου τῷ δυστυχίᾳ δυναμοσθέντα καὶ τὴν δόξαν τῆς τυραννίδος ἐς τὰ ἔπειτα προσλαβεῖν.

LVI. Τὸν δ' οὖν Ἀρμοδίου ἀπαρηθέντα τὴν πείρασιν, ὁσπέρ δεινοείτο, προνυπηλάκεσεν· ἄδελφην γὰρ αὐτοῦ κόρην ἐπαγγείλαντες ἕκειν κανοῦν οἶσουσαν ἐν ποιμῆ τινι, ἀπῆλασαν λέγοντες οὐδὲ 2 ἐπαγγείλαι τὴν ἀρχήν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀξίαν εἶναι. χαλε- πῶς δὲ ἐνεγκόντος τοῦ Ἀρμοδίου πολλῷ δὴ μάλλον 280
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and anyone might be convinced of it also by this simple fact—he alone of the legitimate brothers appears to have had children, as not only the altar signifies, but also the column commemorating the wrong-doing of the tyrants that was set up on the acropolis of Athens, on which no child of Thessalus or of Hipparchus is inscribed, but of Hippias five, who were borne to him by Myrrhine daughter of Callias son of Hyperochidas; for it was natural for the eldest to marry first. And on this same column his name is written first after his father's, this also not unnaturally, as he was the eldest after him and had been tyrant. Nor yet again would Hippias, as it seems to me, have obtained the tyranny at once with ease, if Hipparchus had been in power when killed, and had had to establish himself therein on the same day. Nay, it was owing to the habitual fear which before that he had inspired in the citizens, and the strict discipline he had maintained in the bodyguard, that he got the upper hand with superabundant security and was at no loss, as a younger brother would have been, since in that case he would not previously have been regularly used to power. Hipparchus, however, as it fell out, having become famous by his tragic fate, obtained in after-time the credit also of having been tyrant.

LVI. So, then, when Harmodius had repulsed his suit, Hipparchus insulted him, as he intended. For after summoning a maiden-sister of his to serve as a basket-bearer in some procession, they rejected her, declaring they had never summoned her at all, because she was unworthy. As Harmodius was indignant at

1 This service of carrying at festivals baskets containing the requisites for religious ceremonies was a great distinction, so that the rejection of the maiden was regarded as a bitter insult to the family.
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δι’ ἐκείνων καὶ ὁ Ἀριστογείτων παρωξύνετο. καὶ αὐτοῖς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς ξυνεπιθησομένους τῷ ἔργῳ ἐπέτρακτο, περιέμενον δὲ Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα, ἐν ἦ μόνον ἡμέρᾳ οὐχ ὑποπτὸν ἐγίνετο ἐν ὁπλοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς τὴν πομπῆν πέμψοντας ἄθροός γενέσθαι· καὶ ἐδεί ἄρξαι μὲν αὐτοὺς, ξυνεπαμύνειν δὲ εὐθὺς τὰ πρὸς τοὺς δορυφόρους ἐκεῖνοι. ἦσαν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ οἱ ξυνομωμοκότες ἀσφαλείας ἐνεκα. ἦλπιξον γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ προειδότας, εἰ καὶ ὁποσοιοῦν τολμήσειαν, ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα, ἔχοντάς γε ὅπλα, ἐθελήσειν σφάς αὐτοὺς ξυνελευθεροῦν.

LVII. Καὶ ὡς ἐπῆλθεν ἡ ἔορτή, Ἐπίπλας μὲν ἔξω ἐν τῷ Κεραμεικῷ καλουμένῳ μετὰ τῶν δορυφόρων διεκόσμη τὸς ἐκαστὰ ἐχρῆν τῆς πομπῆς προϊέναι· ὃ δὲ Ἀρμόδιος καὶ ὁ Ἀριστογείτων ἔχοντες ἥδη τὰ ἐγχειρίδια ἐς τὸ ἔργον προῆσαν. 2 καὶ ὡς εἶδόν τινα τῶν ξυνωμοτῶν σφίσι διαλεγόμενον οἰκείως τῷ Ἐπίπλα (ὅν δὲ πᾶσιν ἐντούσας ὁ Ἐπίπλας), ἔδεισαν καὶ ἐνόμισαν μεμηνύσθαι τε 3 καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἦδη ξυλληφθῆσθαι. τῶν λυπήσαντα σὺν σφάς καὶ δι’ ὅπερ πάντα ἐκινδύνευον ἐβούλησαν πρότερον, εἰ δύναιντο, προτιμωρήσασθαι, καὶ ὡσπερ εἶχον ὄρμησαν ἐνοῦ τῶν πυλῶν, καὶ περιέτυχον τῷ Ἐπίπλαρχῳ παρὰ τὸ Δεωκέρειον καλούμενον. εὐθὺς δὲ ἄπειροσκέπτως προσπεσόντες καὶ ὡς ἄν μάλιστα δι’ ὀφίης, ὁ μὲν

1 δ’ added by Pontus.
this, Aristogeiton for his sake was far more exasperated. And now the details had been arranged by them with those who were to take part in the execution of their scheme; but they were waiting for the great Panathenaea, for on that day only it excited no suspicion for the citizens who were to take part in the procession to be assembled in arms. They were themselves to begin the attack, but the others were to join them at once in dealing with the bodyguard. The conspirators were not many, for better security; for they hoped that, if ever so few made the bold attempt, at once even those who were not before privy to it, having arms in their hands, would be inclined to bear a part in winning their own freedom.

LVII. And when the festival came on, Hippias with his bodyguard was outside the walls, in the place called the Cerameicus, arranging the order in which the several parts of the procession were to go forward; and Harmodius and Aristogeiton, who were ready with their daggers, stepped forward to put their scheme in effect. But when they saw one of their accomplices talking familiarly with Hippias, who was accessible to all, they took fright, thinking that they had been informed upon and would in a moment be arrested. So wishing first to take vengeance, if they could, upon the one who had aggrieved them and because of whom they were risking all, they rushed, just as they were, within the gates and came upon Hipparchus at the place called Leocorium. And at once falling upon him recklessly and as men will in extreme wrath, the one

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1 The sanctuary of the daughters of Leos, an ancient Attic king, who in a famine were sacrificed for the state. It was in the Inner Cerameicus, near the temple of Apollo Patroos.
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ἐρωτικής, ὁ δὲ ύβρισμένος, ἐτυπτοὺς καὶ ἀποκτεῖν 4 νουσιν αὐτὸν. καὶ ὁ μὲν τοὺς δορυφόρους τὸ αὐτικὰ διαφέυγει, ὁ Ἀριστογείτων, ἤνυδραμόντος τοῦ ὄχλου, καὶ ὑστερον ληφθεῖς οὐ βαδίως διετέθη Ἄρμοδιος δὲ αὐτὸν παραχρήμα ἀπόλλυται.

LVIII. Ἀγγελθέντος δὲ Ἰππία ἐς τὸν Κεραμεικόν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ γενόμενον ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοὺς πομπείας τοὺς ὁπλίτας, πρότερον ἡ αἰσθέσθαι αὐτοὺς ἀπωθεῖν δυνατόν, εὐθὺς ἐχώρησε, καὶ ἀδήλως τῇ ὁψι πλασάμενος πρὸς τὴν ξυμφορὰν ἐκέλευσεν αὐτοὺς, δείξεις τι χωρίον, ἀπελθεῖν ἐς 2 αὐτὸ ἀνευ τῶν ὁπλῶν. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπεχώρησαν οἰόμενοι τι ἐρείν αὐτὸν, ὁ δὲ τοῖς ἔπικοιροις φράσας τὰ ὅπλα ὑπολαβεῖν ἐξελέγετο εὐθὺς οὐς ἐπητιάτο καὶ εἰ τὶς ηὐρέθη ἐγχειρίδιον ἔχων· μετὰ γὰρ ἀσπίδος καὶ δόρατος εἰώθεσαν τὰς πομπὰς ποιεῖν.

LIX. Τοιοῦτο μὲν τρόπῳ δι' ἐρωτικῆς λύπην ἢ τε ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ ἡ ἀλογιστος τόλμα ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα περιδεόυσ Ἄρμοδίῳ 2 καὶ Ἀριστογείτοις ἐγένετο. τοῖς δ' Ἀθηναίοις χαλεπώτερα μετὰ τούτο ἡ τυραννίς κατέστη, καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας διὰ φόβου ἤδη μᾶλλον ὅν τῶν τε πολιτῶν πολλοὺς ἔκτεινε καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἔξω ἀμα διεσκοπεῖτο, εἰ ποθεν ἀσφάλειαν τινα 3 ὀρφή μεταβολῆς γενομένης ύπάρχουσαν οί. Ἰππίκλου γοῦν τοῦ Δαμψακηνοῦ τυράννου Λιαντίδη τῷ παιδὶ θυγατέρα ἑαυτοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα Ἀρχεδίκην, Ἀθηναίος ὁν Δαμψακηνος, ἐδωκεν,

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inflamed by jealousy, the other by insult, they smote and slew him. Aristogeiton, indeed, escaped the guards for the moment, as the crowd ran together, but afterwards was caught and handled in no gentle manner; but Harmodius perished on the spot.

LVIII. When the news was brought to Hippias in the Cerameicus, he went at once, not to the scene of action, but to the hoplites in the procession, before they, being some distance away, had become aware of what had happened, and, disguising his looks so as to betray nothing in regard to the calamity, pointed to a certain place and ordered them to go thither without their arms. So they withdrew, thinking that he had something to say to them; while he, ordering the mercenaries to take up the arms of the others, immediately picked out those whom he held guilty, and anyone besides who was found with a dagger; for it was customary to march in the processions armed with shield and spear only.

LIX. It was in such wise, for an affront in love, that the plot of Harmodius and Aristogeiton was first conceived and their reckless attempt made under the influence of their momentary alarm. After this the tyranny became harsher for the Athenians, and Hippias, being now in greater apprehension, not only put to death many of the citizens, but also began to look abroad, to see if in any quarter he might find any door of safety open to him in case of a revolution. At any rate after this he gave his own daughter Archedice in marriage to Aeauitides son of Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus—an Athenian to a Lampsacene!—perceiving that this family had
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αἰσθανόμενος αὐτοῦς μέγα παρὰ βασιλεῖ Δαρείῳ δύνασθαι. καὶ αὐτὴς σῆμα ἐν Δαμψάκῳ ἦστιν ἐπίγραμμα ἔχον τὸ δε.

ἀνδρὸς ἀμφετύσαντος ἐν 'Ελλάδι τῶν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ Ἰππίου 'Αρχέδίκην ἦδε κέκευθε κόνις: ἡ πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ' οὖσα τυράννων παίδων τ' οὐκ ἦρθη νοῦν ἐς ἀτασθαλίην.

4 τυραννεύσας δὲ ἔτη τρία Ἰππίας ἔτι Ἀθηναίων καὶ παυσθεὶς ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ ὑπὸ Δακεδαιμονίων καὶ Ἀλκμεωνιδῶν τῶν φευγόντων ἐχώρει ὑπόσποφος ἐς τε Σίγειον καὶ παρ' Αιαντίδην ἐς Λάμψακον, ἐκείδεθε δὲ ὡς βασιλέα Δαρείον, ὅθεν καὶ ὁμώμενος ἐς Μαραθῶνα ύστερον ἔτει εἰκοστῷ ἴδαι γέρων ὑπὲρ Μήδων ἐστράτευσεν.

—LX. ὅν εὐθυμοῦμενος ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ μιμησκόμενος ὁ σα ἀκοῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἁπίστατο, χαλεπός ἢν τότε καὶ ὑπόπτης ἐς τοὺς περὶ τῶν μυστικῶν τὴν αἰτίαν λαβόντας, καὶ πάντα αὐτοὺς ἐδόκει ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσία ὀλγαρχικῇ καὶ τυραννικῇ 2 πεπράχθαι. καὶ ὡς αὐτῶν διὰ τῷ τοιούτῳ ὀργιζομένων πολλοὶ τε καὶ ἢξιόλογοι ἄνθρωποι ἦδη ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ἦσαν καὶ οὐκ ἐν παύλη ἐφαίνετο, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπεδέδοσαν μᾶλλον ἐς τὸ ἀγριώτερον τε καὶ πλείους ἐτὶ ἄκαλλαμβάνειν, ἐνταῦθα ἀναπείθεται εἰς τῶν δεδεμένων, ὅσπερ

1 Ascribed to Simonides of Ceos (Aristotle, Rhet. i. 9).
2 510 B.C.

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great influence with King Darius. And there is at Lampsacus a monument of her bearing this inscription:

"This dust covers Archedice daughter of Hippias, who was foremost in Hellas among the men of his time: Her father and husband, her brothers and children were tyrants, Yet was not her mind lifted up to vainglory."

Hippias, however, after being tyrant for three years more at Athens, was then deposed in the fourth year by the Lacedaemonians and the exiled Alcmaeonidae, and retired under truce to Sigeium, from there to Aeantides at Lampsacus, and thence to the court of King Darius; whence twenty years later, being already an old man, he went with the Persians on the expedition to Marathon.

LX. With these events in mind and recalling all that they knew of them by report, the Athenian people were in an ugly temper at this time and suspicious towards those who had incurred blame in the matter of the mysteries; and the whole thing seemed to them to have been done in connection with a conspiracy that aimed at an oligarchy or a tyranny. So when, in consequence of their anger on this account, many noteworthy men were already imprisoned and there seemed to be no end of the matter, but day by day they were growing more savage and still more men were being arrested, then at last one of the men in confinement, the one in fact who

3 The orator Andocides, who gives his account of the matter in his speech De Mysteriis. The man who persuaded him was, according to Andocides, his cousin Charmides; according to Plutarch (Alcib. ii.), it was Timaeus.
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ἐδόκει αἰτιώτατος εἶναι, ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνδεσμωτῶν τινὸς εἶτε ἄρα καὶ τὰ ὄντα μηνύσαι εἰτε καὶ οὔ· ἔτι ἀμφότερα γὰρ εἰκάζεται, τὸ δὲ σαφὲς οὐδεὶς οὔτε τότε οὔτε ὑστερον ἔχει εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν 3 δρασάντων τὸ ἔργον. λέγουν δὲ ἐπείσεν αὐτόν ὡς χρή, εἰ μή καὶ δέδρακεν, αὐτὸν τε ἀδειαν ποιησάμενον σῶσαι καὶ τὴν πόλιν τῆς παροῦσης ὑποψίας παύσαι· βεβαιοτέραν γὰρ αὐτῷ σωτηρίαν εἶναι ὠμολογήσαντι μετ᾽ ἀδείας ή ἀρνηθέντι 4 διὰ δίκης ἔλθειν. καὶ ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς τε καθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ’ ἄλλον μηνύει τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν· ὁ δὲ δήμος ὦ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἁσμενος λαβών, ὡς φέτο, τὸ σαφὲς καὶ δεινὸν ποιούμενοι πρότερον, εἰ τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας σφῶν τῷ πλῆθει μὴ εἰσοῦνται, τῶν μὲν μηνυτὴν εὐθὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὡςων μὴ κατηγορήκει ἐλυσαν, τους δὲ καταιτιαθέντας κρίσεις ποιήσαντες τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, ὅσοι ξυνελήφθησαν, τῶν δὲ διαφυγόντων θάνατον καταγώντες ἐπανεἶπον ἀργύριον 5 τῷ ἀποκτείναντι. κἂν τοῦτῳ οἱ μὲν παθόντες ἄδηλον ἦν εἰ ἀδίκως ἐτετιμώρητο, ἡ μέντοι ἄλλη πόλις ἐν τῷ παρόντι περιφαινόν ὁφέλητο.

LXI. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐναγόντων τῶν ἐχθρῶν, οἷπερ καὶ πρὶν ἑκπλείν αὐτὸν ἐπέθεντο, χαλέπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐλάμβανον· καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν φόντο σαφὲς ἔχειν, πολὺ δὴ μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ μυστικά, ὧν ἐπαύτιος ἦν, μετὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ

1 ὦ τῶν Ἀθηναίων Krüger deletes, followed by Hude.

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was regarded as the most guilty, was persuaded by one of his fellow-prisoners to make a confession, which may have been true or not; for there are conjectures both ways, but no one has been able, either then or afterwards, to tell the truth with reference to those who did the deed. At any rate, the other prisoner persuaded this man that, even if he had not done the deed, he ought, having first secured immunity,¹ to save himself and free the state from the prevailing suspicion; for, he said, he had a surer chance of saving his life by confessing, with the promise of immunity, than by denying the charge and undergoing trial. Accordingly he informed against himself and others in the affair of the Hermae; and the people, delighted at getting the truth, as they thought, and already making much ado that they should not discover those who were plotting against the democracy, at once set free the informer and with him all the rest whom he had not denounced; but with regard to those who were accused they instituted trials and put to death all who had been arrested, while on those who had fled they passed sentence of death, offering a reward in money to anyone who killed them. And in all this it was uncertain whether those who suffered had not been punished unjustly; the city at large, however, at the time was clearly benefited.

LXI. With regard to Alcibiades, the Athenians took the matter seriously, being urged on by his enemies, the men who had attacked him before he sailed. And thinking now that they had the truth about the Hermae, they were far more convinced that the profanation of the mysteries also, in which he was implicated,

¹ i.e. promise of a free pardon.
THUCYDIDES

λόγον καὶ τῆς ξυνωμοσίας ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ ἀπ’ ἑκείνου ἔδοκει πραχθῆναι. καὶ γὰρ τις καὶ στρατιὰ Δακεδαμονίων οὐ πολλὴ ἔτυχε κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἐν ὧν περὶ ταῦτα ἐθορυβοῦντο μέχρι ἱσθμοῦ προελθοῦσα πρὸς Βοιωτοὺς τι πράσσοντες. ἔδοκει οὖν ἑκείνῳ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ Βοιωτῶν ἔνεκα ἀπὸ ξυνθήματος ἦκειν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐφθασαν δὴ αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὸ μήνυμα ξυλλαβόντες τοὺς ἀνδρας, προδοθῆναι ἄν ἡ πόλεις. καὶ τυν μίαν νύκτα καὶ κατεδαρθοῦν ἐν Ὑσσαίῳ τῷ ἐν πόλει ἐν ὑπόλοις. οἱ τε ἔξοι τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου οἱ ἐν Ἀργείᾳ κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ χρόνον ὑπωπτεύθησαν τῷ δήμῳ ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ὁμήρους τῶν Ἀργείων τοὺς ἐν ταῖς νήσοις κειμένους οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τότε παρέδοσαν τῷ Ἀργείων δῆμῳ διὰ ταύτα διαχρῆσασθαι. πανταχόθεν τε περιειστήκει ὑποψία ἐς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην. ὡστε βουλόμενοι αὐτὸν ἐς κρίσιν ἄγαγοντες ἀποκτεῖναι, πέμπουσιν οὕτω τὴν Σαλαμινίαν ναῦν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ἐπὶ τε ἑκείνου καὶ ὅν πέρι ἀλλῶν ἐμεμήνυτο. ἔρημτο δὲ προειπεῖν αὐτῷ ἀπολογησομένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, ξυλλαμβάνειν δὲ μή, θεραπεύσαντες τὸ τε πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ στρατιῶτας τε σφετέρους καὶ πολεμίους μὴ θωρυβεῖν, καὶ ὅν ήκιστα τοὺς Μαντινέας καὶ Ἀργείους βουλόμενοι παραμεῖναι, δι’ ἑκείνου νομίζοντες πεισθῆναι σφίσι ξυστρατεύειν. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχων τὴν ἐαυτοῦ ναῦν καὶ οἱ ξυνδια-
BOOK VI. lxi. 1–6

had been committed by him with the same intent, that is of conspiring against the people. For it so happened that a small Lacedaemonian force, at the moment when they were in commotion about these matters, had come as far as the Isthmus in pursuance of some arrangement with the Boeotians. The opinion prevailed, therefore, that it had come on agreement at his instigation, and not in the interest of the Boeotians; and that, if they had not themselves been beforehand in arresting the men on the strength of the information given, the city would have been betrayed. And once for a whole night they lay under arms in the precinct of Theseus within the walls. Furthermore, the friends of Alcibiades at Argos were at the same time suspected of a design to attack the people; and on this account the Argive hostages who had been deposited in the islands¹ were at that time delivered by the Athenians to the Argive people to be put to death. Thus from all sides suspicion had gathered about Alcibiades. And so, wishing to bring him to trial and put him to death, they had sent the Salaminia to Sicily for him and for the others who had been informed upon. And the orders were to give him formal summons to follow, that he might make his defence, but not to arrest him; for they were solicitous about both their own soldiers in Sicily and the enemy, not wishing to stir up excitement among them, and they were especially desirous that the Mantineans and Argives should remain with them, thinking that it was through him that they had been persuaded to join in the expedition. So he, in his own ship, and those who were accused with him, sailed off in

¹ cf. v. lxxiv. 1.
θυκυδίδης

βεβλημένοι ἀπέπλευσαν μετὰ τῆς Σαλαμωνίας ἐκ

τῆς Σικελίας οὐς ἐσ τὰς Ἀθηναίας· καὶ ἐπειδή

ἐγένοντο ἐν Θουρίως, οὐκέτι ξυνείποντο, ἀλλ

ισπελθόντες ἀπὸ τῆς νεῶς οὔ χαρόν ἦσαν, δεῖ

σαντες τὸ ἐπὶ διαβολῆς ἐς δίκην καταπλέυσαι.

7 οἱ δ᾽ έκ τῆς Σαλαμωνίας τέως μὲν ἐξήτουν τὸν

Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ τοὺς μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ· ὡς δ᾽ οὐδαμοῦ

φανεροὶ ἦσαν, χόντο ἀποπλέουσαν. ὁ δὲ Ἀλκι-

βιάδης ἦδη φυγᾶς ἄν γραφότον ἄπειρο οὕς

πλοίων ἐπεραιῶθη ἐς Πελοπόννησον ἐκ τῆς Θου-

ρίας· οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναίοι ἐρήμη δίκη θάνατον κατέ

γνώσαν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν μετ᾽ ἐκείνου.

LXII. Μετὰ δὲ ταύτα ἦι λοιπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων

στρατηγοῦ ἐν τῇ Σικελία, δυὸ μέρη ποιῆσαντες

τοῦ στρατεύματος καὶ λαχών ἐκάτερος, ἐπλευρ

ζύμπαντε ἔπὶ Σελινούντως καὶ 'Εγεστής, βουλό-

μενοι μὲν εἴδέναι τὰ χρήματα· εἰ δόσουσιν οἱ

'Εγεσταίοι, κατασκέψασθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν Σελινο-

ντίων τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὰ διάφορα μαθεῖν τὰ

2 πρὸς 'Εγεσταίους. παραπλέουσαν δ᾽ ἐν ἀριστερὰ

τὴν Σικελίαν, τὸ μέρος τὸ πρὸς τῶν Τυρσηνικὸν

κόλπων, ἔσχον ἐς Ἰμέραν, ἦπερ μόνη ἐν τούτῳ τῷ

μέρει τῆς Σικελίας 'Ελλάς πόλει ἐστὶν· καὶ ἐς

3 οὕκ ἐδέχοντο αὐτοὺς, παρεκομίζοντο. καὶ ἐν τῷ

παράπλω αἱροῦσιν 'Ρκκαρα, πόλισμα Σικανίκον

μέν, Ἐγεσταίοις δὲ πολέμου· ἦν δὲ παραθαλασ-

σίδιον. καὶ ἀνάρροπος τοῖς πόλεις παρέδοσαν

'Εγεσταίους (παρεγένοντο γὰρ αὐτῶν ἱππῆς), αὐτοὶ

dὲ πάλιν τῷ μὲν πεζῷ ἐξώρουν διὰ τῶν Σικελῶν,

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company with the Salaminia from Sicily, as if for Athens. When, however, they reached the territory of the Thurians, they followed no further, but left their ship and disappeared, being afraid to sail home for trial in the face of the existing prejudice. The crew of the Salaminia sought for Alcibiades and his companions for some time; but when these were nowhere to be found, they sailed home. Alcibiades, however, being now an outlaw, not long afterwards crossed over by boat from Thurii to the Peloponnesus; and the Athenians through a judgment by default\(^1\) sentenced him and his companions to death.

LXII. After this the two generals who were left in Sicily, making two divisions of the army and each taking one by lot, sailed with the whole force for Selinus and Egesta, wishing to know whether the Egestaeans would give the promised money, and to look into the affairs of the Selinuntians and learn their points of contention with the Egestaeans. So sailing along the coast, with Sicily—that is, the part of it which faces the Tyrrenian gulf—on their left hand, they put into Himera, which is the only Hellenic city in that part of Sicily; and as Himera would not receive them, they proceeded along the coast. On their passage they took Hyccara, a petty town by the seaside, which, though Sicanian, was yet hostile to the Egestaeans. They enslaved the inhabitants, and turned the town over to the Egestaeans, some of whose cavalry had joined them, but themselves went back with their land-force through the territory of the Sicels until they came to Catana,

\(^1\) Given in cases where the person indicted failed to appear for trial.
THUCYDIDES

ἐὼς ἀφίκοντο ἐς Κατάννη, αἱ δὲ νῆσες περιέπλευσαν
4 τὰ ἀνδράποδα ἄγουσαν. Νικλας δὲ εὐθὺς ἐξ
Τεκάρων ἔπὶ Ἑγέστης παραπλεύσας καὶ τὰλλα
χρηματίσας καὶ λαβὼν τάλαντα τριάκοντα παρῆν
ἐς τὸ στράτευμα· καὶ τανδράποδα ἀπέδοσαν, καὶ
ἐγένοτο ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰκοσι καὶ ἐκατὸν τάλαντα.
5 καὶ ἐς τῶν Σικελῶν τοὺς ἕμμαχους περιέπλευσαν,
στρατιὰν κελεύοντες πέμπτειν· τῇ τε ἕμισεία τῆς
ἐαυτῶν ἥλθον ἐπὶ "Τῆβαν τὴν Γέλεατίν πολεμίαν
οὕσαν καὶ οὐχ εἶλον· καὶ τὸ θέρος ἔτελεύτα.

LXIII. Τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγεγυμνόμενου χειμῶνος εὐθὺς
τὴν ἔφοδον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔπὶ Συρακούσας παρε-
σκευάζοντο, οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅς ἐπ’
2 ἐκείνους ἱόντες. ἔπειδη γὰρ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸν
πρῶτον φόβον καὶ τὴν1 προσδοκίαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι
οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπέκειντο, κατὰ τε τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκάστην
προιόυσαν ἀνεθάρσουν μᾶλλον, καὶ ἔπειδη πλέ-
οντες τε τὰ ἐπ’ ἐκείνα τῆς Σικελίας πολύ ἀπὸ
σφῶν ἐφαίνοντο καὶ πρὸς τὴν "Τῆβαν ἐλθόντες
καὶ πειράσαντες οὐχ εἶλον βία, ἔτη πλέον κατε-
φρόνησαν καὶ ἥξιον τοὺς στρατηγοὺς, οἴον δὴ
ὀχλος φιλεῖ θαρσήσας ποιεῖν, ἄγειν σφᾶς ἐπὶ
Κατάννη, ἔπειδη οὐκ ἐκείνοι ἐφ’ ἐαυτῶς ἔρχονται.
3 ἵππης τε2 προσελαύνοντες αἰεὶ κατάσκοποι τῶν
Συρακοσίων πρὸς τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων
ἐφύβριζον ἄλλα τε καὶ εἰ ξυνοικίσασσας σφῶι
αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον ἠκοίν ἐν τῇ ἄλλοτρίᾳ ή Δεοτίνιους
ἐς τὴν οἰκεῖαν κατοικιώντες.

LXIV. "Α γιγνώσκοντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν
Ἀθηναίων καὶ βουλόμενοι αὐτοὺς ἄγειν πανθεμεί

1 τὴν, Hude deletes with E.
2 τε is indispensable, but omitted in all MSS.

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while the ships sailed round to Catana with the captives. Nicias, however, had sailed at once\(^1\) from Hyccara for Egesta, and after transacting his other business and receiving thirty talents had rejoined the army. Their slaves they sold, receiving for them one hundred and twenty talents. They sent round also to their allies among the Sicels, bidding them send troops; and with half of their own force went against Hybla Geleatis, a hostile town, but failed to take it. And so the summer ended.

LXIII. The following winter the Athenians began at once to prepare for the advance upon Syracuse, and the Syracusans also, on their side, to go against them. For when the Athenians did not, in accordance with their first alarm and expectation, at once attack them, with each successive day their courage revived; and when the Athenians sailed along the opposite coast of Sicily and showed themselves only at a distance from Syracuse, and going against Hybla failed in the attempt to take it by storm, the Syracusans had still greater contempt for them, and, as a crowd is wont to do when it has become elated, demanded that their generals should lead them against Catana, since the Athenians would not come against them. Moreover, mounted Syracusan scouts constantly rode up to the Athenian army and amongst other insults asked them: “Are you come to settle yourselves here with us, on land which belongs to other people, instead of resettling the Leontines on their own?”

LXIV. The Athenian generals were aware of all this and purposed to draw the whole of the Syra-

\(^1\) i.e. without waiting for Hyccara to be reduced and its inhabitants disposed of.
THUCYDIDES

ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὑπ' ἐκείνην ἐν τοσοῦτος ὑπὸ νῦκτα παραπλεύσαντες στρατό-
πεδον καταλαμβάνειν ἐν ἐπιτηδείῳ καθ' ἰσοχίαν,
eἰδότες οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως δυνηθέντες, 1 εἰ καὶ τῶν νεῶν
πρὸς παρεσκευασμένους ἐκβιβάζοιεν ἢ κατὰ γῆν
ιόντες γνωσθέντες (τοὺς γὰρ ἂν ψίλους τοὺς σφῶν
καὶ τὸν ὄχλον τῶν Συρακοσίων τοὺς ἱππέας
πολλοὺς ὄντας, σφίσι δ' οὐ παρόντων ἱππέων,
βλάπτειν ἂν μεγάλα· οὐτ' δὲ ἰήσεσθαι χωρίον
ὀθὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων οὐ βλάψωνται ἄξια λόγουν·
ἐδίδασκον δ' αὐτοῖς περὶ τοῦ πρὸς τῷ Ὀλυμπιαῖῳ
χωρίῳ, ὅπερ καὶ κατέλαβον, Συρακοσίων φυγάδες
οἱ ξυνείποντο), τοιώνδε τι οὖν πρὸς Ἀββούλοντο οἷ
2 στρατηγοὶ μηχανῶταί. πέμπτουσιν ἄνδρα σφίσι
μὲν πιστῶν, τοῖς δὲ τῶν Συρακοσίων στρατηγοῖς
τῇ δοκήσει οὐχ ἤσσον ἐπιτηδείουν. ἤν δὲ Κατα-
ναίος ὁ ἀνήρ, καὶ ἄτρ' ἄνδρῶν ἐκ τῆς Κατάνης
ηθεῖν ἐφ' ὃν ἐκεῖνοι τὰ ὑδόματα ἐγκύνωσκον καὶ
ηπίσταντο ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ ὑπολοίπους ὄντας τῶν
3 σφίσιν εὖνων. ἔλεγε δὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίοις αὐτὸ-
ζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ὁπλῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ εἰ βου-
λονται ἐκεῖνοι πανδημεῖν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ῥήτῃ ἀμα ἐφ' ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα ἐλθέων, αὐτοῖς μὲν ἀποκλήσειν
τοὺς παρὰ σφίσι καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐμπρήσειν, ἐκείνους
dὲ ῥαδίως τὸ στράτευμα προσβαλόντας τῷ σταυ-
ρώματι αἰρῆσειν· εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ξυνδρά-
σοντας πολλοὺς Κατανάιων καὶ ἠτοιμάσθαι ἂδη,
ἀφ' ὃν αὐτὸς ἦκειν.

1 καὶ, before εἰ in MSS., ignored by Valla and the Scholiast.

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cusian force as far as possible away from the city, and themselves meanwhile to sail down under cover of night and undisturbed to occupy a camp at a suitable place, knowing that they would not be able to do this so well if they should disembark from their ships in the face of an enemy prepared to meet them, or should be detected going by land. For being without horsemen themselves, their own light-armed troops and their mob of camp-followers would, they thought, suffer great harm at the hands of the numerous Syracusan cavalry; but in the way proposed they would take a position where they would not suffer any harm worth mentioning from the cavalry; and certain Syracusan exiles who were with them gave them information as to the position close to the Olympieum, which in fact they subsequently occupied. So then, in furtherance of their plan, the generals devised some such scheme as this: They sent a man loyal to themselves, but in the opinion of the Syracusan generals no less a friend of theirs. The man was a Catanaean, and said that he had come from men at Catana whose names they recognized and whom they knew to be the remnant of those who were still loyal to them in the city. He said that the Athenians were in the habit of passing the night in the city away from their arms, and if the Syracusans would come in full force at dawn on an appointed day against their army, they would close the gates on the Athenians in their city and set fire to the ships, and the Syracusans could attack the stockade and easily take the whole army; for there were many Catanaeans who would help them in this undertaking, and the men from whom he himself had come were ready now.
THUCYDIDES

LXV. Oi ἔργα τῶν Συρακοσίων, μετὰ τοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα θαρσεῖν καὶ εἶναι ἐν διανοίᾳ καὶ ἀνευ τούτων ἠνατί ἐπὶ Κατάνην, ἐπιστευσάν τε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πολλῷ ἀπειροκειμένων καὶ εὐθὺς ἦμέραν ἐξυνθέμενον ἡ παρέστων ἀπέστειλαν ἀντί, καὶ αὐτοὺς (ἡδὴ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἡμερῶν Σελενοῦν-
τοι καὶ ἀλλοι τινὲς παρῆσαν) προείπον παυάμει πάσιν ἔξειν Ἕρμηνεία. ἔπει δὲ ἔτοίμα αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ τῆς παρασκευῆς ἦν καὶ αἱ ἦμεραι ἐν αἷς ἤνεβεντο ἤδειν ἐγγύς ἦσαν, πορευόμενοι ἐπὶ Κατάνης ἡπίσαντο ἐπὶ τῷ Συμαῖῳ ποταμῷ ἐν

2 τῇ Δεσσαλίᾳ. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ὡς ἤσθωντο αὐτοὺς προσιόντας, ἀναλαβόντες τὸ τε στράτευμα ἀπαν τὸ ἐαυτὸν καὶ ὅσοι Σωκῆλος αὐτοῖς ὡς ἀλλος τις προσεληφθείς καὶ ἐπιβιβάσαντες ἐπὶ τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ πλοῖα, ὑπὸ νῦκτα ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τὰς Συρα-

κούσας. καὶ οἱ τῇ Ἀθηναῖο ἄμα ἐρ ἐξεξαίνων ἐς τὸ 2 κατὰ τὸ Ἀλκιμπεῖον ὡς στρατόπεδον καταληψάμενοι, καὶ οἱ ἱππης ὁι Συρακοσίων πρῶτοι προσελήφτας ἐς τὴν Κατάνην 3 καὶ αἰσθόμενοι ὅτι τὸ στράτευμα ἀπαν ἀνήλθαν, ἀπο-

στρέφαντες ἀγγέλλουσι τοῖς πεῖροις, καὶ ἐμπαντες ἦδη ἀποτρεπτόμενοι ἔβοιβον ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν.

LXVI. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, μακράς οὐσίας τῆς ὁδοῦ αὐτοῖς, καθ' ἧσους καθίσαν τὸ στρα-

τεύμα ἐς χωρίον ἐπίτηδειον καὶ ἐν ὁ μάχης τοῦ ἂρξευ ἐμελλον ὑπὸ τεθύλαυτο καὶ οἱ ἱππης τῶν Συρακοσίων ἦκιστ 4 αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ καὶ

1 παρεσκευάζονται, in MSS. after ἠνατί, deleted by Dobree.
2 With Ε, all other MSS. τῶν.
3 ἐς τὴν Κατάνην, Hude corrects to τῇ Κατάνη.
4 ἀν, after ἦκιστ in MSS., deleted by Stahl.

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BOOK VI. LXV. I—LXVI. I

LXV. And the Syracusan generals, who were already confident as to the general situation, and intended even without this help to go against Catana, trusted the fellow much too incautiously, and at once, agreeing upon a day on which they would be there, sent him back; and themselves—the Selinuntians and some others of their allies being already present—made proclamation for the whole force of the Syracusans to take the field. And when their preparations were made and the days were near on which they had agreed to come, they proceeded towards Catana and bivouacked at the River Simaethus in the territory of Leontini. But the Athenians, when they learned of their approach, took all their own army and such of the Sicels or others as had joined them, and embarking on their ships and boats sailed under cover of night against Syracuse. And they disembarked at daybreak at a point opposite the Olympieum, where they proposed to occupy a camping-place; but the Syracusan horsemen, who were the first to reach Catana and found there that the whole army was gone, turned about and announced this to the infantry, and all then turned back at once and hastened to bring aid to the city.

LXVI. Meanwhile the Athenians, undisturbed, as the Syracusans had a long way to go, settled their army in a suitable position, where they could begin a battle whenever they wished and the Syracusan horsemen would annoy them the least either in the
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πρὸ αὐτοῦ λυπήσεις. τῇ μὲν γὰρ τειχία τε καὶ οἰκίαι εἰργον καὶ δένδρα καὶ Λιμνη, παρὰ δὲ τὸ 2 κρημνοί. καὶ τὰ ἐγγὺς δένδρα κόψαντες καὶ κατενεγκόντες ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν παρὰ τε τὰς ναῦς σταύρωμα ἔπηξαν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ Δάσκωνοι ἔρμιμα τε, ἡ εὐεφοδάτατον ἦν τοῖς πολεμίοις, λίθοις λογάδην καὶ ξύλοις διὰ ταχέων ὀρθῶσαν καὶ τὴν 3 τοῦ Ἀνάπου γέφυραν ἔλυσαν. παρασκευαζομένων δὲ ἐκ μὲν τῆς πόλεως ὦδείς ἐξὶν ἐκώλυε, πρωτοῖ τὸν ὑπερεσβοθήσαν, ἔπειτα δὲ ὑστερον καὶ τὸ πεζὸν ἀπαν ἐμπέληγῃ. καὶ προσήλθον μὲν ἐγγὺς τοῦ στρατεύματος τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ πρῶτον, ἐπειτά δὲ, ὡς οὖν ἀντιπρόσεχαν αὐτοῖς, ἀναχωρήσαντες καὶ διαβάντες τὴν Ἐλορίνην ὀδὸν ἀπῆλθαν.

LXVII. Τῇ δ’ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι παρασκευάζοντο ὡς ἐς μάχην καὶ ἐμπέλησεν τὸν ἔγγοιν μὲν κέρας Ἀργείων εἶχον καὶ Μαντινῆς, Ἀθηναίοι δὲ τὸ μέσον, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο οἱ ξύμμαχοι οἱ ἄλλοι. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἡμίσυ αὐτοὺς τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἦν, τεταγμένον ἐπὶ ὁκτὼ, τὸ δὲ ἡμίσυ ἐπὶ ταῖς εὐναῖς ἐν πλαίσιῳ, ἐπὶ ὁκτὼ καὶ τούτο τεταγμένον οὗς εἰρήτη, ἦ ἄν τοῦ στρατεύματος τι πονή μάλιστα, ἔφεροντάς παραγίνεσθαι. καὶ τοὺς σκευοφόρους ἐντὸς τοῦ 2 τῶν τῶν ἐπιτάκτων ἐποίησαντο. οἱ δὲ Συρακοσίοι ἔταξαν τοὺς μὲν ὀπλίτας πάντας ἐφ’ ἐκκαίδεκα, δυνατόν τοὺς πανδημεί Συρακοσίους καὶ ὅσι ξύμμαχοι παρῆσαν (ἐβοθήσαν δὲ αὐτοῖς Σελευκούντιοι μὲν

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actual fighting or before; for on one side walls and houses and trees and a swamp furnished a barrier, on the other side a line of cliffs. They also cut down the trees near at hand and bringing them down to the sea built a stockade by the ships; and at Dascon, where the place was most accessible to the enemy, they quickly erected a bulwark of stones picked up in the fields and of timbers, and pulled down the bridge over the Anapus. While they were making these preparations nobody came out from the city to hinder them; the first that came against them were the horsemen of the Syracusans, but afterwards the infantry also gathered in full force. And at first they drew near the Athenian camp, but later, when these did not come out against them, they withdrew across the Elorine road and spent the night.

LXVII. On the next day the Athenians and their allies made preparations for battle, and were drawn up in the following order: On the right were the Argives and Mantineans, the Athenians had the centre, the other allies the rest of the line. Half of their army was in the van, arrayed eight deep; the other half near their sleeping-places, formed in a hollow square, these too arrayed eight deep; and the orders of the latter were, to be on the alert to support any part of the army that was most in distress. And the baggage-carriers they put inside the body of reserves. The Syracusans, on the other hand, arranged all their hoplites sixteen deep, that is, the whole force of the Syracusans and as many of their allies as were present; for they had received some reinforcements, chiefly from the Selinuntians,
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μάλιστα, ἐπειτὰ δὲ καὶ Γελώφων ἴππης, τὸ ξύμπαν ἐς διακοσίους, καὶ Καμαρνιάων ἴππης ὅσον ἐίκοσι καὶ τοξόται ως πεντήκοντα), τοὺς δὲ ἰππέας ἐπε-
tάξαντο ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ, οὐκ ἔλασσον ὄντας ἂ
διακοσίους καὶ χιλίους, παρὰ δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς
3 ἀκοντιστάς. μέλλουσι δὲ τοῖς Ἡθηναῖοι προ-
tέρους ἐπιχειρήσειν ὁ Νικίας κατά τε ἔθνη
ἐπιπαριῶν καὶ ἔμπασι τοιάδε παρεκ-
λεύετο.

I X V I I . "Πολλῇ μὲν παρανίσει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τί
dei χρησθαι, οἱ πάρεσμεν ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἅγωνα;
αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ παρασκευὴ ἱκανωτέρα μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι
θάρσος παρασχεῖν ἡ καλῶς λεχθέντες λόγοι μετὰ
2 ἀσθενοῦσι στρατοπέδου. ὅτου γὰρ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ
Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἡθηναῖοι καὶ νησιώτων οἱ πρῶτοι
ἐσμέν, πῶς οὐ χρῆ μετὰ τοιῶνδε καὶ τοσῶνδε
ξυμμάχων πάντα τινὰ μεγάλην τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς
νίκης ἔχειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημεί
tε ἀμνομένους καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὡσπερ καὶ
ἡμᾶς, καὶ προσέτε Σικελιώτας, οἱ ὑπερφρονοῦσι
μὲν ἡμᾶς, ὑπομενοῦσι δὲ οὐ, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐπιστήμην
3 τῆς τόλμης ἡσσω ἔχειν. παραστήτῳ δὲ των κα
τὸς, πολὺ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ
πρὸς γῆ ὑδεμα φιλία, ήπτινα μὴ αὐτοὶ μαχόμενοι
κτήσεσθε. καὶ τοῦνατίων ὑπομυμήςκο ὑμᾶς ἢ
οἱ πολέμων σφίσιν αὐτοῖς εὐ οἴδ᾽ ὅτι παρακελεύ-
ονται: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι περὶ πατρίδος ἔσται ὁ ἅγων,
ἐγὼ δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἐν πατρίδι, ἢ ἣ κρατεῖν δεῖ ἢ μὴ
ῥάδιως ἀποκατεῖν. οἱ γὰρ ἰππής πολλοὶ ἐπικεῖ-
4 σονται. τῆς τε οὗν ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν ἄξιας μνη-

1 τὸν αὐτὸν, Hude changes to τοιοῦτον.

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but next to them some cavalry from the Geloans, about two hundred in all, and also from the Camarinaeans about twenty horsemen and fifty bowmen. Their cavalry, which was not less than twelve hundred in number, they placed on the right, and on its flank the javelin-men. As the Athenians were on the point of beginning the attack, Nicias went along the line and exhorted them, nation by nation as well as all together, in the following manner:

LXVIII. "What need is there, soldiers, of long exhortation, when we are all here for one and the same contest? Our array of itself seems to me more calculated to inspire confidence than well chosen words with a weak army. For where are Argives and Mantineans and Athenians and the best of the islanders, why should not everyone, in company with allies so brave and so numerous, have great hope of victory, especially against men that meet us in a mob and are not picked men as we ourselves are, and against Siceliots, moreover, who scorn us, indeed, but do not stand their ground against us, because the skill they have is not equal to their daring. This, too, must be fixed in the mind of everyone, that we are far from our own land and not near to any friendly country, unless you shall win such by your own swords. And my admonition is the opposite of the exhortation which, I am sure, the enemy is addressing to his troops; for they urge that the contest will be for fatherland, but I remind you that it will be, not in our fatherland, but where you either must win victory or may not easily get away; for their cavalry will be upon us in great numbers. Be mindful, therefore, of your own repu-
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σθέντες ἐπέλθητε τοῖς ἐναντίοις προθύμως καὶ τὴν παροῦσαν ἀνάγκην καὶ ἀπορίαν φοβερωτέραν ἤγησάμενοι τῶν πολεμίων.”

LXIX. Ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοιαύτα παρακελευσάμενος ἐπήγα τὸ στρατόπεδον εὐθύς. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἀπροσδόκητοι μὲν εἰ τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ ἦσαν ὡς ἢδη μαχούμενοι, καὶ τινες αὐτῶς ἐγγύς τῆς πόλεως οὖσις καὶ ἀπεληλύθεσαν οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ σπουδῆς προσβοηθοῦντες δρόμῳ ὑστέριξον μὲν, ὡς δὲ ἐκαστὸς πη τοῖς πλείσσι προσμείξει καθίσταντο. οὐ γὰρ δὴ προθυμία ἔλλειπες ἦσαν οὐδὲ τόλμη οὔτ᾽ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μάχῃ οὔτ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν ἀνδρείᾳ οὐχ ἦσσος ἐς ὅσον ἤ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀντέχοι, τῷ δὲ ἔλλειποντι αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν βούλησιν ἀκόντες προνύμεσαν ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενοι σφίσι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους προτέρους ἐπελθεῖν καὶ διὰ τάχους ἀναγκαζόμενοι ἀμύνασθαι 2 ἀναλάβοντες τὰ ὀπλα εὐθὺς ἀντεπῆσαν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκατέρων οἳ τε λειοβόλοι καὶ σφενδονῆται καὶ τοξόται προμάχωτο καὶ τροπάς, οἷς εἰκὸς ψιλοῦσ, ἀλλὰ ἐκ τῆς ἐποίουν ἔπειτα δὲ μάντεις τε σφάγια προὐφερον τὰ νομίζόμενα καὶ σαλπίκται ξύνοδον ἐπώτηραν τοῖς ὀπλίταις, οἳ 3 δὲ ἐχώρουν, Συρακόσιοι μὲν περὶ τε πατρίδος μαχούμενοι καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἐκαστος τὸ μὲν αὐτίκα σωτηρίας, τὸ δὲ μέλλουν ἐλευθερίας, τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων Ἀθηναίοι μὲν περὶ τε τῆς ἀλλοτρίας οἰκείαν σχεῖν καὶ τὴν οἰκείαν μὴ βλάψαι ἢπατομενοί, Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἕκκαθικῶν οἱ αὐτόνωμοι 304
tation, and attack the enemy with spirit and with the thought that our present necessity and the straits in which we stand are more to be feared than our foes."

LXIX. After such an exhortation Nicias straightway led on his army; but the Syracusans were not expecting to fight at just that moment, and some of them, as the city was near them, had even gone home; and these, though they came running to the lines as fast as they could, were late, and had to fall in wherever each one happened to reach the main body. For they were not lacking in zeal nor in daring either in this battle or in those which followed; nay, in bravery they were not inferior to their enemies, so far as they had experience, but through their lack of experience in spite of themselves they failed to do justice to their good intentions. Nevertheless, though they did not expect the Athenians to be the first to attack, and though they were forced to defend themselves in haste, they took up their arms at once and went against them. And at first the stone-throwers and slingers and bowmen skirmished, driving each other back, first one side and then the other, as light-armed troops would be likely to do. Afterwards the soothsayers brought forward the customary sacrifices and trumpeters stirred the hoplites to the charge. So they advanced—the Syracusans, to fight for fatherland and every man for his own present safety and future freedom; on the other side the Athenians, to fight for an alien land in order to win it for their own and to save their own land from the disaster of defeat; the Argives and those of the allies that were independent, to help the Athenians in securing

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ξυγκτήσασθαί τε ἐκείνοις ἐφ᾽ ἡλθον καὶ τὴν ἑπάρχουσαν σφίσι πατρίδα νυκήσαντες πάλιν ἐπιδείην τὸ δ᾽ ὑπήκουν τῶν ξυμμάχων μέγιστον μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτίκα ἀνελπίστου σωτηρίας, ἥν μὴ κρατῶσι, τὸ πρόθυμον ἔχον, ἑπείτα δὲ ἐν παρέργῳ καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο ξυγκαταστρεψάμενον ῥάν ἅυτοίς ὑπακούσεται.

LXX. Γενομένης δὲ ἐν χερσὶ τῆς μάχης ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντείχον ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ξυνέβη θροντάς τε ἁμα τινὰς γενέσθαι καὶ ἀστραπὰς καὶ ὑδωρ πολὺ, ὡστε τοῖς μὲν πρῶτον μαχομένους καὶ ἐλάχιστα πολέμῳ ὀμιληκόσι καὶ τοῦτο ξυν- ἐπιλαβέσθαι τὸν φόβον, τοῖς δὲ ἐμπεριστέρως τὰ μὲν γεγονόμενα καὶ ὄρα ἔτοὺς περαίνεσθαι δοκεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθεστῶτας πολὺ μείζω ἐκπλήξειν μὴ 2 νικομένους παρέχειν. ὡσμένων δὲ τῶν Ἀργείων πρῶτον τὸ εὑώνυμον κέρας τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτούς τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ κατὰ σφάς αὐτούς, παρερρήγυντο ἦδη καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα τῶν 3 Συρακοσίων καὶ ἔσ φυγὴν κατέστη. καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν οὐκ ἐδιώξαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι (οἱ γὰρ ἰππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων πολλοὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀσβεστοὶ εἰργον καὶ ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τοὺς ὀπλίτας αὐτῶν, εἰ τινὰς προδιώκοντας ἰδοιεν, ἀνέστηλλον), ἐπακολουθήσαντες δὲ ἄθροι ὅσον ἀσφαλῶς εἰκε πάλιν 4 ἐπανεχώρουν καὶ τροπαίον ἱστασαν. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἄθροισθέντες ἐς τὴν Ἐλωρίνην ὀδὸν καὶ ὡς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ξυνταξάμενοι ἐς τε τὸ Ὀλυμ- 306
the objects for which they had come, and having won victory to see again their own fatherland; the subject-allies, above all zealous for their own immediate safety, for which there was no hope unless they conquered, then also with the secondary motive that having helped the Athenians to overthrow another power they might find the terms of their own subjection milder.

LXX. When they had come to close combat, they held out for a long time against one another; and there chanced to occur at the same time some claps of thunder and flashes of lightning and much rain, so that this too contributed to the fear of those who were fighting for the first time and were but little conversant with war, whereas to those who were more experienced 1 the storm seemed of course to be due merely to the season of the year, but the fact that their antagonists were not overcome caused them far greater alarm. When, however, the Argives had first driven back the left wing of the Syracusans, and after them the Athenians had repulsed their own opponents, then the rest also of the Syracusan line began to break and was reduced to flight. But the Athenians did not pursue far; for the Syracusan cavalry, being numerous and undefeated, held them in check, and falling upon their hoplites, if they saw any ahead in pursuit, drove them back. They only followed up in a body as far as it was safe, and then drew back and set up a trophy. The Syracusans, on the other hand, collecting on the Elorine road and drawing up as well as possible under the circumstances, in spite of their defeat sent some of their

1 i.e. the Athenians.
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πιεῖον ὁμιῶσεν σφῶν αὐτῶν παρέπεμψαν φυλακῆς, δείσαντες μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῶν χρημάτων ἢ ἦν αὐτὸθι κινήσωσι, καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ἐπανεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν.

LXXI. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἱερὸν οὐκ ἠλθοὺν, ξυγκομίσαντες δὲ τοὺς ἐαυτῶν νεκροὺς καὶ ἐπὶ πυρᾶν ἐπιθέντες ἴλισαν ἀυτοῦ. τῇ δ’ ύστερᾳ τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις ἀπέδοσαν υποστόνδους τοὺς νεκρούς (ἀπέθανον δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων περὶ ἐξήκοντα καὶ διακοσίους), τῶν δὲ σφετέρων τὰ ὀστὰ ἀνέλεξαν (ἀπέθανον δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὡς πεντήκοντα), καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων σκύλα ἐξοντες ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Κατάννην.

2 χειμώνες τοῦ γὰρ ἦν καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτὸθεν ποιεῖσθαι οὗτω έδόκει δυνατόν εἶναι, πρὶν ἄν ἰππέας τε μεταπέμψωσιν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων ἀγείρωσιν, ὡς μὴ παντάπασιν ἰπποκρατῶνται, καὶ χρήματα δὲ ἀμα αὐτόθεν τε ξυλλέξωσι καὶ παρ’ Ἀθηναίων ἔλθη, τῶν τε πόλεων τινας προσαγάγωνται, ὡς ἦλπίζουσαν μετὰ τὴν μάχην μᾶλλον σφῶν ὑπακούσεσθαι, τὰ τε ἄλλα, καὶ σῖτον καὶ ὄσων δέοι, παρασκευάσωνται, ὡς ἐς τὸ ἔαρ ἐπιχειρῆσοντες ταῖς Συρακοσίαις.

LXXII. Καὶ οἱ μὲν ταύτη τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν Νάξον καὶ Κατάννην διαχειμάσοντες. Συρακοσίοι δὲ τοὺς σφετέρους αὐτῶν νεκροὺς θάψαντες 2 ἐκκλησίαν ἐποιοῦν. καὶ παρελθὼν αὐτοῖς Ερμοκράτης ὁ "Ερμωνος, ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐς τὰλλα ξύνεσιν οὐδενός λειπόμενος καὶ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐμπειρία τε ἑκανός γενόμενος καὶ ἀνδρεὶς ἐπιφανῆς, ἔθαρ-
own men to the Olympieum as a guard, fearing that the Athenians might disturb some of the treasures which were there; and the rest withdrew to the city.

LXXI. The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple, but collecting their own dead and placing them on a pyre they passed the night where they were. But on the next day they gave back under truce the Syracusan dead, of whom and of their allies about two hundred and sixty were slain; then gathering up the bones of their own dead—of themselves and their allies about fifty—and taking with them the spoils of the enemy, they sailed back to Catana. For it was winter, and it seemed as yet impossible to carry on the war from this base until they should send to Athens for horsemen, besides collecting them from their allies in Sicily, that they might not be altogether at the mercy of the enemy’s cavalry. And they wanted at the same time to collect money from the island itself, and to have a supply come from Athens; also to bring over some of the cities, which they hoped would be more ready to listen to them since the battle; and to prepare other things, both food and whatever was needed, with a view to attacking Syracuse the next spring.

LXXII. With this purpose they sailed away to Naxos and Catana to spend the winter. The Syracusans, on the other hand, after burying their own dead, called an assembly. And there came before them Hermocrates son of Hermon,1 a man who was in general second to none in point of intelligence, and had shown himself in this war both competent by reason of experience and conspicuous for courage.

1 cf. iv. lviii.; vi. xxxiii.
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συνέ τε καὶ οὐκ εἶδα τῷ γεγενημένῳ ἐνδιδόναι.
3 τὴν μὲν γὰρ γνώμην αὐτῶν οὐχ ἦσθησαν, τὴν δὲ ἀταξίαν βλάψατι. οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον γε λειφθήναι ὅσον εἰκὸς εἶναι, ἄλλως τε τοῖς πρῶτοις τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἐμπειρία, ἰδιώτας ὡς εἰπεῖν χειρο-
4 τέχναις, ἀνταγωνισάμενοι. μέγα δὲ βλάψαι καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ τὴν πολυναρχίαν (ἡςαν γὰρ πέντε καὶ δέκα οἱ στρατηγοὶ αὐτοῖς), τῶν τε πολλῶν τὴν ἀξίντακτον ἀναρχίαν. ἂν δὲ ὀλίγοι τε στρατηγοὶ γέγονονται ἐμπειροὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ χειμώνι τούτῳ παρασκευάσωσι τὸ ὁπλικὸν, οἷς τε ὅπλα μὴ ἔστων ἐκπορίζοντες, ὅπως ως πλείστοι ἔσονται, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ μελέτῃ προσαναγκάζοντες, ἔφη κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς κρατήσει σφῶς τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀνδρείας μὲν σφίσιν ὑπαρχοῦσης, εὐταξίας δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ ἔργα προσγενομένης· ἐπιδόσειν γὰρ ἀμφότερα αὐτά, τὴν μὲν μετὰ κινδύνῳ μελετώμενη, τὴν δὲ εὐψυχίαν αὐτὴν ἐαυτῆς μετὰ τοῦ πιστοῦ τῆς
5 ἐπιστήμης θαρσαλεωτέραν ἔσεσθαι. τοὺς τε στρα-

tηγοὺς καὶ ὀλίγους καὶ αὐτοκράτορας χρῆναι ἐλέσθαι καὶ ὁμόσαι αὐτοῖς τὸ ὅρκιον ἢ μὴν ἐάσειν ἀρχεῖν ὅτι ἄν ἐπίστωνται· οὔτω γὰρ ἃ τε κρύπ-

tεσθαι δεῖ μᾶλλον ἀν στέγεσθαι καὶ τάλλα κατὰ κόσμον καὶ ἀπροφασίστως παρασκευασθῆναι.

1 τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude.

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He encouraged them and protested against their giving way because of what had happened: their spirit, he told them, was not defeated; it was their lack of discipline that had done mischief. They had not, however, been so much inferior as might have been expected, especially as they had been pitted against troops who were the foremost among the Hellenes in experience, mere tiros so to speak against skilled craftsmen. Much mischief had also been caused by the large number of the generals and the division of command—for they had fifteen generals—and the disorder and anarchy among the troops. If only a few men of experience should be chosen as generals, and during this winter they should get the hoplite-force ready, providing arms for those who had none, in order that the number might be as large as possible, and enforcing the general training, in all likelihood, he said, they would get the better of the enemy, if to courage, which they had already, discipline were added when it came to action. For both these things would improve of themselves; their discipline would be practised in the midst of dangers, and their courage, in proportion as their confidence in their skill increased, would prove more self-reliant than ever. The generals, then, whom they should elect ought to be few in number and clothed with full powers and they should give them their oath that they would in very truth allow them to command according to their judgment; for in this way whatever ought to be kept secret would be better concealed, and their preparations in general would be made in an orderly way and without evasions.
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LXXIII. Καί οἱ Συρακοσιοι αὐτοῦ ἀκούσαντες ἐψηφίσαντο τε πάντα ὡς ἐκέλευε καὶ στρατηγὸν αὐτόν τε εἰλοντο τὸν Ἑρμοκράτη καὶ Ἡρακλείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου καὶ Σικανᾶν τὸν Ἐξηκέστουν, 2 τούτους τρεῖς, καὶ ἐς τὴν Κόρυθον καὶ ἐς τὴν Δακεδαιμονίαν πρέσβεις ἀπέστειλαν, ὡς κυμα-χία τε αὐτοῦ παραγένηται καὶ τὸν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πόλεμον βεβαιότερον πείθωσι ποιεῖσθαι ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς ὑπὲρ σφῶν τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους, ἵνα ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας ἀπαγόρωσιν αὐτοὺς ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἐν Σικελίᾳ στράτευμα ἔσον ὁφελίαιν ἀλλην ἐπιτείμπωσιν.

LXXIV. Τὸ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Κατάνῃ στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιλευσαν εὐδός ἐπὶ Μεσσήνην ὡς προ- δοθησομένην. καὶ ἀ μὲν ἐπράσετο ὁυκ ἐγένετο: Ἀλκιβιάδης γὰρ ὅτι ἀπῆε ἐκ τῆς ἄρχῆς ἢ ἡ μετάπεμπτος, ἐπιστάμενος ὅτι φεύξοτο, μηνύει τῶν τῶν Συρακοσίων φίλοις τοῖς ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ ἐνειδωσι τὸ μέλλον: οἱ δὲ τοὺς τε ἀνδρὰς διεφθεί- ραν πρότερον καὶ τότε στασιάζοντες καὶ ἐν ὁπλοῖς ὄντες ἐπεκράτουν μὴ δέχεσθαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους 2 οἱ ταῦτα βουλόμενοι. ήμέρας δὲ μείναντες περὶ τρεῖς καὶ δέκα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὡς ἕχειμάζοντο καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια σκοτι αὐτῶν εἶχον καὶ προς χώροι φεύγοντο, ἀπελθόντες ἐς Νάξον καὶ ὅραι καὶ σταυρώματα περὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ποιησάμενοι αὐτοῦ διεξε- μαχζον καὶ τρίηρῃ ἀπέστειλαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐπὶ τε χρήματα καὶ ἵππεας, ὅπως ἀμα τῷ ἤρι παραγένωνται.

LXXV. Ἐτείχιζον δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακοσιοὶ ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι πρὸς τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς
BOOK VI. LXXIII. 1—LXXV. 1

LXXIII. The Syracusans, when they had heard him, voted everything as he advised, and chose three generals, Hermocrates himself, Heracleides son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus son of Exestus. They also sent envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon to induce an allied force to join them, and to persuade the Lacedaemonians to prosecute the war with the Athenians openly in their behalf and more persistently, in order that they might either draw them away from Sicily, or else to some extent prevent their sending reinforcements to their army in Sicily.

LXXIV. The Athenian army at Catana, directly after its return,¹ sailed to Messene, in the hope that it would be betrayed to them. But the negotiations were not successful. For as soon as Alcibiades left his command under summons from home, knowing that he would be an exile, he gave information of the plot, of which he was cognizant, to the friends of the Syracusans at Messene; these had previously put the conspirators to death, and at this time, when the Athenians arrived, those who were of this faction, being already in revolt and under arms, were strong enough to prevent their admission. So the Athenians stayed there about thirteen days, and as they were vexed by storms and without provisions and were making no progress at all, they retired to Naxos, and constructing dock-yards and building stockades round their camp, went into winter-quarters there. They also sent a trireme to Athens for money and cavalry, that these might be on hand at the opening of spring.

LXXV. During this winter the Syracusans also proceeded to build a wall next to the city, along

¹ cf. ch. lxxii. 1.
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ποιησάμενοι, τείχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἑπι-
pολῶς ὁρῶν, ὅπως μὴ δι’ ἐλάσσονος εὐαπτοεἶχοντο ἄσιν, ἢν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, καὶ τὰ Μέγαρα φρού-
ριον καὶ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπιείῳ ἄλλο· καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν
2 προοσταύρωσαν πανταχῆ ἠ ἀποβάσεις ἦσαν. καὶ
tοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἰδότες ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ χειμάρρους
ἐστράτευσαν παυνήμει ἐπὶ τὴν Κατάνην, καὶ τῆς
tε γῆς αὐτῶν ἔτεμον καὶ τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων
σκηνὰς καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἑμπρήσαντες ἀνεχὼ-
3 ρησαν ἐπὶ οἶκου. καὶ πυνθανόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναί-
ους ἐς τὴν Καμάρων κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Δάχητος
γενομένην ξυμμαχίαν πρεσβεύεσθαι, εἰ πως προσ-
αγάγωντο αὐτούς, ἀντεπρεσβεύοντο καὶ αὐτοὶ·
ῄσαν γὰρ ὑποπτοι αὐτοῖς οἱ Καμαριναῖοι μὴ προ-
θύμως σφίσι μὴτ’ ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην μάχην πέμψαι
ἄμεμπαι, ἔσε τὸ λουπὸν μὴ οὐκέτι βούλωνται
ἀμόνειν, ὁρῶντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῇ μάχῃ εἰυ
πράξαντας, προσχωρῶσι δ’ αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν προ-
4 τέραν φιλίαν πεισθέντες. ἀφικομένων οὖν ἐκ μὲν
Συρακοσσῶν Ἐρμοκράτους καὶ ἄλλων ἐς τὴν
Καμάρων, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων Εὐφήμου μεθ’
ἐτέρων, ὁ Ἐρμοκράτης ξυλλόγου γενομένου τῶν
Καμαριναίων βουλόμενος προδιαβάλλειν τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

LXXVI. "Οὔ τὴν παροῦσαν δύναμιν τῶν
Ἀθηναίων, ὃ Καμαριναὶοι, μὴ αὕτην καταπλα-
the entire extent that faces Epipolae, taking in the Temenites precinct,¹ in order that, in case of a possible reverse, they might not be so easily shut in as if the circuit of the town were smaller; and they also put a garrison at Megara and another at the Olympicum, and fixed palisades on the sea-shore at all points where landings were possible. And knowing that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they went out with all their forces against Catana and ravaged some of its territory, then having set fire to the tents and the camp of the Athenians they returned home. Moreover, on learning that the Athenians had, in accordance with an alliance concluded with the Camarinaeans in the time of Laches,² sent envoys to these, in the hope that they might win them to their side, they themselves sent a counter-embassy; for they had suspicions that the Camarinaeans had not been zealous in sending such help as they had sent for the first battle, and might not wish to aid them in future, seeing that the Athenians had fared well in the fight, but might rather be induced, on the plea of their former friendship, to go over to the Athenians. Accordingly, when Hermocrates and others had arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and from the Athenians Euphemus and the rest, an assembly of the Camarinaeans was held and Hermocrates, wishing to prejudice them against the Athenians, spoke as follows:

LXXVI. "We have come on this embassy, men of Camarina, not because we feared that you will be

¹ The temple of Apollo Temenites and the suburb which had grown up about it, the later Neapolis.
² 427 B.C.; cf. III. lxxxvi. 2.
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γῆτε δείσαντες ἐπρεσβευσάμεθα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀπ' αὐτῶν λόγους, πρὶν τι καὶ 2 ἡμῶν ἀκοῦσαι, μὴ ύμᾶς πείσωσιν. ἦκουσι γὰρ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν προφάσει μὲν ἦ πυνθάνεσθε, διανοίᾳ δὲ ἤν πάντες ὑπονοούμεν· καὶ μοι δοκοῦσιν οὐ Λεοντίνους βούλεσθαι κατοικίσαςι, ἄλλ' ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον ἐξοκίσαι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ εὐλογον τὰς μὲν ἐκεῖ πόλεις ἀναστάτους ποιεῖν, τὰς δὲ ἐνθάδε κατοικίζειν, καὶ Λεοντίνων μὲν Χαλκιδέων οὕτων κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς κήδεσθαι, Χαλκιδέας δὲ τούς ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ, ὃν οἶδε ἀποικοὶ εἰσί, δουλωσαμένως 3 ἐχειν. τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ ἱδέα ἐκεῖνα τε ἔσχον καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νῦν πειρῶνται· ἥγεμόνει γὰρ γενόμενοι ἐκόντων τῶν τε Ἰώνων καὶ ὅσοι ἀπὸ σφῶν ἦσαν ξύμμαχοι ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ Μῆδου τιμωρία, τοὺς μὲν λιποστρατίας, τοὺς δὲ ἐπ' ἀλλήλους στρατεύειν, τοῖς δ' ὡς ἐκάστως τινὰ εἶχον αἰτίαν εὐπρεπή 4 ἐπενεγκώντες κατεστρέψαντο. καὶ οὐ περὶ τῆς ἔλευθερίας ἄρα οὔτε οὕτοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὔθ' οἱ Ἑλληνες τῆς ἐαυτῶν τῷ Μῆδῳ ἀντέστησαν, περὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν σφίσιν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐκεῖνος καταδουλώσεως, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ δεσποτῷ μεταβολῆ ὡς ἐξυνετωτέρου, κακοξυνετωτέρου δὲ.

LXXVII. "Ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων εὐκατηγόρητον οὐσαν πόλιν νῦν ἢκομεν ἀποφα- 316
dismayed by the presence of the Athenian force, but rather through fear of the words that are going to be said on their part, lest these persuade you before you hear anything from us. For they are come to Sicily on the pretext that you hear, but with the design that we all suspect; and to me they seem to wish, not to resettle the Leontines, but rather to unsettle us. For surely it is not reasonable to suppose that, while desolating the cities in their own country, they are resettling the cities of Sicily, and that they care for the Leontines, on the score of kinship, as being Chalcidians, while holding in slavery the Chalcidians in Euboea, of whom these are colonists. Nay, one and the same design has guided them in acquiring their possessions over there and is now guiding them in their endeavour to acquire possessions here: after they had become leaders, by the free choice of their associates, both of the Ionians and of all those, descendants of the Ionians, who were members of the alliance that was concluded, avowedly, for revenge upon the Persians, they charged some with refusal to serve, others with warring upon one another, others with whatever specious charge they had at hand, and so reduced them to subjection. And so, after all, it was not for 'freedom' that they withstood the Persians, neither the Athenians to win it for the Hellenes nor the Hellenes to win it for themselves, but they fought for the enslavement of the rest to themselves, and the Hellenes for a change of master, not to one more unwise, but more wickedly wise.

LXXVII. "But we are not come now, easy though it be to denounce the Athenian state, to declare before those who know already how many are its mis-
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νοῦντες ἐν εἶδόσιν ὡσα ἄδικεῖ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἦμᾶς αὐτοὺς αἰτιασόμενοι ὅτι ἔχοντες παραδείγματα τῶν τ᾽ ἐκεῖ Ἑλλήνων ὡς ἐδουλώθησαν, οὐκ ἀμύνοντες σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, καὶ νῦν ἐφ᾽ ἦμᾶς ταύτα παρόντα σοφίσματα, Δεοντίνων τε ξυγγενῶν κατοικίσεις καὶ Ἑγεσταίων ξυμμάχων ἐπικουρίας, οὐ̄ς υστεραφέντες βουλόμεθα προθυμότερον δεῖξαι αὐτοῖς ὅτι οὐκ Ἰωνες τάδε εἰσίν οὐδ᾽ Ἑλλησπόντιοι καὶ νησιώται, οὐ δεσπότηι ἡ Μῆδον ἡ ἔνα γέ τινα αἰεὶ μεταβάλλοντες δουλοῦνται, ἀλλὰ Δωρίης, ἐλεύθεροι ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦμοι τῆς Πελοπον-

2 νῆσου τὴν Σικελίαν οἰκοῦντες. ἡ μένομεν ἔως ἂν ἐκαστὸι κατὰ πόλεις ληφθῶμεν, εἰδότες ὅτι ταῦτη μόνον ἀλωτοὶ ἐσμεν καὶ ὀρῶντες αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸ εἶδος τρεπομένους ὡστε τοὺς μὲν λόγους ἦμῶν διεστάναι, τοὺς δὲ ξυμμάχῳ ἐπιτίε ἐκπολεμοῦν πρὸς ἄλληλοις, τοὺς δὲ ὡς ἐκάστοις τι προσηνὲς λέγοντες δύνανται κακουργεῖν; καὶ οἰόμεθα τοῦ ἀπωθεῖνοι κυνοῖκον προαποπλημένου οὐ καὶ ἐς αὐτῶν τινα ἥξειν τὸ δεινὸν, πρὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πάσχοντα καθ᾽ ἑαυτῶν δυστυχεῖν;

LXXVIII. “Καὶ εἰ τῷ ἁρὰ παρέστηκε τὸν μὲν Συρακόσιον, ἑαυτὸν δ᾽ οὐ πολέμομαι εἰναι τῷ Ἀθη-

ναίῳ, καὶ δεινὸν ἤγεται ύπὲρ γε τῆς ἐμῆς κινδυνεύειν, ἐνθυμηθήτω οὐ περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς μᾶλλον, ἐν ἱσῳ δὲ καὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀμα ἐν τῇ ἐμῇ μαχούμενος, τοσοῦτῳ δὲ καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον δοσϑάν προδεισφάρ-
deeds; but much more to blame ourselves, because, though we have warning examples in the way that the Hellenes over there have been enslaved because they would not defend one another, and though the same sophisms are now practised upon us—restorings, of Leontine kinsmen and succourings of Egestaean allies!—we are unwilling to combine together and with more spirit show them that here are not Ionians nor yet Hellespontines and islanders, who are always taking some new master, Persian or whoever it may be, and continue in a state of slavery, but Dorians, free men sprung from independent Peloponnesus, and now dwelling in Sicily. Or are we waiting until we shall be taken one at a time, city by city, when we know that in this way only can we be conquered, and when we see them resorting to this policy, endeavouring to cause division among some of us by means of cunning words, to set others at war one with another by the hope of obtaining allies, and to ruin others in whatever way they can by saying something alluring to each? And do we think that, when a distant compatriot perishes before us, the same danger will not come also to ourselves, but rather that whoever before us meets with disaster merely incurs misfortune by himself alone?

LXXVIII. "And if the thought has occurred to anyone that it is the Syracusans, not himself, who are enemies to the Athenians, and thinks it preposterous that he should incur danger for our country, let him reflect that it will not be chiefly for our country, but equally for his own at the same time that he will fight in our land, and with the greater safety, too, inasmuch as he will enter the contest, not when we have already been ruined,
μένου ἐμοῦ, ἔχων δὲ ἔξυμμαχον ἐμὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐρήμος ἁγωνιέται, τὸν τε Ἀθηναίον μὴ τὴν τοῦ Συρακοσίου ἐχθραν κολάσασθαι, τῇ δὲ ἐμῆ προφάσει τὴν ἑκείνου φιλίαν οὐχ ἦσον βεβαιώσασθαι

2 ἐβούλεσθαι. εἰ τε τις φθονεῖ μὲν ἢ καὶ φοβεῖται (ἀμφότερα γὰρ τάδε πάσχει τὰ μείζων), διὰ δὲ αὐτὰ τὰς Συρακοσίας κακωθῆναι μὲν, ἵνα σωφρονισθῶμεν, βούλεται, περιγενέσθαι δὲ ἑνεκα τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀσφαλείας, οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνης δυνάμεως βούλησιν ἑλπίζει. οὐ γὰρ ἦν τε ἁμα τῆς τε ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τῆς τύχης τὸν αὐτοῦ ὀμοίως ταμίαν

3 γενέσθαι. καὶ εἰ γνώμη ἀμάρτων, τοῖς αὐτοῦ κακοῖς ὀλοφυρθεῖς τάχ', ἀν Ἰσως καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποτε βουληθεὶς αὐχίς φθονῆσαι. ἀδύνατον δὲ προεμένῳ καὶ μὴ τοὺς αὐτοὺς κινδύνουσ, οὐ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἔργων, ἐθελήσαντι προσλαβεῖν. λόγῳ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡμετέραν δύναμιν σφόζοι ἀν τις, ἐργῷ δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ

4 σωτηρίαν. καὶ μάλιστα εἰκὸς ἢ ὑμᾶς, ὦ Καμαριναιοί, ὀμόρους ὄντας καὶ τὰ δεύτερα κινδυνεύσοντας, προσφόρασθαι αὐτά καὶ μὴ μαλακῆς ἀσπερ νῦν ἔξυμμαχεῖν, αὐτοὺς δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον ἱόντας, ἀπερ, εἰ ἐς τὴν Καμαριναίαν πρῶτον ἀφίκοιτο οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, δεόμενοι ἄν ἐπεκαλεῖσθε, ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ ὅμοίου καὶ νῦν παρακελευομένους, ὅπως μηδὲν ἐνδώσομεν, φαίνεσθαι. ἀλλ', οὐθ' ὑμεῖς νῦν γέ πω οὐθ' οἱ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ ταύτα ὀρμήσετε.

LXXIX. “Δειλία δὲ ἵσως τὸ δίκαιον πρὸς τε ἡμᾶς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιόντας θεραπεύσετε, λέγοντες

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1 ἐρήμος, the reading of some inferior MSS., seems to be rightly preferred by Bekker, Stahl, and Hude to ἐρήμον of all the better MSS.
and not isolated himself, but having us as allies; and that the object of the Athenians is not to punish the enmity of the Syracusans, but having us as a pretext to make your ‘friendship’ still more secure. If, moreover, anyone is envious, or even afraid of us—for greater states are exposed to both these passions—and for this reason wishes that the Syracusans shall be humbled, indeed, in order that we may be sobered, but shall survive for the sake of his own safety, he indulges a wish that is not within human power to attain. For it is not possible for the same person to be in like measure the controller of his own desires and of fortune; and if he should err in judgment, when he has to lament his own ills he may perhaps some day wish once more to become envious of our good fortune. But that will be impossible, if he abandons us and does not consent to incur the same dangers, which are not about names but about facts; for though nominally a man would be preserving our power, in fact he would be securing his own safety. And most of all it were fitting that you, men of Camarina, who are on our borders and will incur danger next, should have foreseen these things and not be, as now, slack in your alliance, but rather should have come to us of yourselves, and just as you, in case the Athenians had come against Camarina first, would be calling upon us and begging us not to yield an inch, so should you be seen in like manner now also using the same exhortation. But neither you, so far at least, nor the rest have bestirred yourselves for this.

LXXIX. "But through timidity, perhaps, you will make much of the point of right as between us and
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ξυμμαχίαν εἶναι ύμην πρὸς Ἀθηναίους· ἢν γε οὐκ ἔπι τοῖς φίλοις ἐποιήσασθε, τῶν δὲ ἐξήρων ἦν τίς ἔφ' ὑμᾶς ἤγ, καὶ τοῖς γε Ἀθηναίοις βοηθεῖν, ὅταν ὑπ' ἄλλων, καὶ μη αὐτοὶ ὠσπερ ὑπί τοὺς πέλας ἀδικῶσιν, ἔπεις οὖν· οἱ Ῥηγῖνοι ὄντες Χαλκιδῆς Χαλκιδέας ὄντας δεούντως ἐθέλουσιν ξυγκατοικίζειν. καὶ δεινὸν εἰ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τὸ ἔργον τοῦ καλοῦ δικαιώματος ὑποπτεύοντες ἀλόγως σωφρονοῦσιν, ὑμεῖς δ' εὐλόγω διεσάσατε τοὺς μὲν φύσει πολεμόμους βούλεσθε ὡφελεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον φύσει

3 ξυγγενεῖς μετὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν διαφθείρατι. ἀλλ' οὐ δίκαιον, ἀμύνειν δὲ καὶ μη φοβεῖσθαι τὴν παρασκευὴν αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ, ἢν ὑμεῖς ἄμεστως πάντες, δεινὴ ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἢν, ὅπερ οὕτω σπεύδουσι, ταναντία διαστῶμεν, ἔπεις οὖν· πρὸς ἡμᾶς μόνους ἑλθόντες καὶ μάχῃ περιγενόμενοι ἐπηράζον ἄ ἐβοῦλοντο, ἀπήλθον δὲ διὰ τάχους.

LXXX. "Ωστε οὐ όθρούς γε ὄντας εἰκὸς ἄθυμειν, ἤναι δὲ ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προθυμότερον, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου παρεσομένης ὦφελίας, οὐ τῶνυ κρείσσους εἰσὶ τὸ παράπαν τὰ πολέμια· καὶ μη ἑκείνην τὴν προμηθίαν δοκεῖν τῷ ἡμῖν μὲν ἵσιν εἶναι, ὑμῖν δὲ ἄσφαλῆ, τὸ μηδετέρος δὴ ὡς καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ὄντας ξυμμάχους βοηθεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἐργὼ ἱσόν ὄσπερ τῷ δικαιώματι

1 ἀδικώτατα is to be understood. For similar ellipses, c.f. 1. lxxviii. 10; ii. xi. 34; vii. lxix. 3.
the invaders, alleging that you have an alliance with the Athenians. That alliance, however, you made, not against your friends, but in the event of any of your enemies attacking you; and you were to aid the Athenians only when they were wronged\(^1\) by others, and not when, as now, they are themselves wronging their neighbours. Why, not even the Rhetians, themselves Chalcidians, are willing to help to restore the Leontines who are Chalcidians. And it is monstrous if they, suspicious of what this fine plea of right really means in practice, are unreasonably prudent,\(^2\) while you, on a speciously reasonable pretext, desire to aid those who by nature are your enemies, and in concert with your bitterest foes to ruin those who by a still closer tie of nature are your kinsmen.\(^3\) Nay, that is not right; but it is right to aid us and not be afraid of their armament. For if we all stand together, it is not formidable. The only danger is—and this is just what they are eager for—that we may stand opposed to each other; for not even when they came against us alone and proved superior in battle did they effect what they wished, but quickly went away.

LXXX. "So then, if only we be united, we have reason not to be disheartened, but rather to enter into the proposed alliance more heartily, especially as aid is sure to come from the Peloponnesians, who are altogether superior to these people in matters of war. And no one should regard as fair to us, while safe for you, that prudent course of yours—to aid neither, forsooth, as being allies of both. Indeed it is not as fair in fact, as when urged to justify

\(^1\) i.e. discard logic and obey policy.
\(^2\) As Dorians and Sicilians.
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ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ δὲ ὑμᾶς μὴ ξυμμαχήσαντας οὐ τε παθῶν σφαλήσεται καὶ ὁ κρατῶν περιέσται, τι ἀλλο ἢ τῇ αὐτῇ ἀπουσίᾳ τοῖς μὲν οὐκ ἠμύνατε σωθῆναι, τοὺς δὲ οὐκ ἐκολύσατε κακοὺς γενέσθαι; καίτοι κάλλιον τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις καὶ ἀμα ξυγγενέσι προσθεμένους τὴν τε κοινὴν ὁφελίαν τῇ Σικελίᾳ φυλάξαι καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους φίλους δὴ ὄντας μὴ ἐάσαι ἀμαρτείν.

3 "Ευνελόντες τε λέγομεν οἱ Συρακοσιοί ἐκδιδάσκειν μὲν οὐδὲν ἔργον εἶναι σαφῶς οὔτε ὑμᾶς οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ οὐδὲν χείρον γιγνώσκετε δεόμεθα δὲ καὶ μαρτυρόμεθα ἁμα, εἰ μὴ πείσομεν, ὃτι ἐπιβουλεύσαμεν μὲν ὑπὸ Ἰώνων αἰεὶ πολεμίοις, προδιδόμεθα δὲ ὑπὸ ὑμῶν Δωρίδης

4 Δωρίδης. καὶ εἰ καταστρέψουται ἡμᾶς Ἀθηναίοι, ταῖς μὲν ὑμετέραις γνώμαις κρατήσουσι, τῷ δ' αὐτῶν ὑπόματι τιμηθήσονται, καὶ τῆς νίκης οὐκ ἄλλον τινὰ ἄθλον ἢ τὸν τὴν νίκην παρασχόντα λήψονται· καὶ εἰ αὐ ἡμεῖς περιεσόμεθα, τῆς αἰτίας τῶν κινδύνων οἱ αὐτοὶ τὴν τιμωρίαν ύφε- 5 ἔτε. σκοπεῖτε οὖν καὶ αἰρεῖσθε ἡδὴ ἢ τὴν αὐτίκα ἄκινδυνος δουλείαν ἢ κἂν περιγενόμενοι μεθ' ἡμῶν τούσδε τε μὴ αἰσχρῶς δεσπότας λαβεῖν καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐχθρὰν μὴ ἄν βραχεῖαν γενομένην διαφυγεῖν." LXXXI. Τοιαύτα μὲν ὁ Ἐρμοκράτης εἶπεν, ὁ

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you.\textsuperscript{1} For if through your failure to take sides as allies the sufferer shall be defeated and the conqueror shall prevail, what else have you done by this selfsame standing aloof but refused to aid the one to secure his salvation and to prevent the other from incurring guilt? And yet it were more honourable for you, by siding with those who are being wronged\textsuperscript{2} and are at the same time your kinsmen, at once to guard the common interest of Sicily and not suffer the Athenians, seeing that they are your ‘good friends,’ to make a serious mistake.

"Summing up, then, we Syracusans say that it is no hard matter to demonstrate, either to you or to others, what you yourselves know as well as we; but we do entreat you, and at the same time we protest, if we fail to persuade you, that while we are plotted against by Ionians,\textsuperscript{3} our inveterate enemies, we are betrayed by you, Dorians by Dorians. And if the Athenians shall subdue us, it is by your decisions that they will prevail, but it is in their own name that they will be honoured, and the prize of victory they will take will be none other than those who procured them the victory; if, on the other hand, we shall conquer, you also will have to pay the penalty of being the cause of our perils. Reflect, therefore, and choose here and now, either immediate slavery with no danger or, if you join us and prevail, the chance of not having to take, with disgrace, these men as masters, and also, as regards us, of escaping an enmity that would not be transitory."

LXXXI. Such was the speech of Hermocrates;

\textsuperscript{1} Or, "as the plea of right represents it."
\textsuperscript{2} The Syracusans.
\textsuperscript{3} The Athenians.
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δ' Εὐφήμος ο Τῶν Αθηναίων πρεσβευτῆς μετ' αὐτῶν τοιάδε.

LXXXII. "Αφικόμεθα μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας ἐξουκαρίας ἀνανεῶσει, τοῦ δὲ Συρακοσίου καθαφαμένου ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἰπέων 2 ὡς εἰκότως ἔχομεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν μέγιστον μαρτύ- ριον αὐτῶς εἶπεν, ὅτι οἱ Ἰωνεῖς αἰεί ποτὲ πολέμου τοῖς Δωρινεύσιν εἰσιν. ἔχει δὲ καὶ οὕτως. ἡμεῖς γὰρ Ἰωνεῖς οὕτως Πελοποννησίως Δωρινεύσι, καὶ πλείοσον οὕσι καὶ παροικούσιν, ἐσκεφάμεθα ἀτὸν 3 τρόπῳ ἡκισταὶ ὑπακονσόμεθα: καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδίκα ναὶς κτησάμενοι τῆς μὲν Δακεδαιμονίων ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡγεμονίας ἀπηλλάγημεν, οὐδὲν προσή- κον μᾶλλον τὶ εἰκονίζων ἥμιν ἢ καὶ ήμᾶς ἐκεῖνος ἐπιτάσσει, πλὴν καθ' ὅσον ἐν τῷ παρόντι μεῖξον ἱσχυον, αὐτοὶ δὲ τῶν ὑπὸ βασιλεία πρότερον ὑπο- τού ἡγεμόνες καταστάντες οἰκούμενοι, νομίσαντες ἡκιστ' ἀν ὑπὸ Πελοποννησίους οὕτως εἰσαί, δύναμιν ἔχουσιν ἡ ἀμυνούμεθα, καὶ ὡς τὸ ἀκριβῆς εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ ἀδίκως καταστρεφάμενοι τοὺς τε Ἰωνας καὶ νησίωτας, οὐδεὶς ἔγγυγνης φασιν οὕτως ἡμᾶς Συρα- 4 κόσιοι δεδουλώσθαι. ἴλθον γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν μητρό- πολιν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς μετὰ τοῦ Μήδου καὶ οὐκ ἐτόλμη- σαν ἀποστάντες τὰ οἰκεῖα φθείρας, ὡσπερ ἡμεῖς ἑκλαπόντες τὴν πόλιν, δουλείαν δὲ αὐτοὶ τε ἐβού- λοντο καί ἡμῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπενεγκεῖν.

1 αὐτῶν, in MSS. before ἡκιστα, deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude.
2 αὐτοῖ, Hude emends to αὐτονομοί.

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after him Euphemus, the envoy of the Athenians, spoke as follows:—

LXXXII. "We had come here for the renewal of the alliance\(^1\) which formerly existed, but as the Syracusan has attacked us it is necessary to speak also about our empire, showing how rightly we hold it. Now the strongest proof of this the speaker himself stated—that Ionians have always been enemies to the Dorians. It is even so. Accordingly, we, being Ionians, considered in what way we should be least subject to the Peloponnesians who are Dorians and not only more numerous than we but our near neighbours.\(^2\) And after the Persian wars we acquired a fleet and rid ourselves of the rule and supremacy of the Lacedaemonians, it being not in any way more fitting that they give orders to us than we to them, except in so far as they at the time were stronger. Having, then, ourselves become leaders of those who were before subject to the King, we so continue, thinking that we should in this way be least subject to the Peloponnesians, because we have power with which to defend ourselves. And to say the exact truth, not unjustly, either, did we subdue both the Ionians and the islanders, whom the Syracusans say we have enslaved though they are our kinsmen. For they came against us, their mother-city, along with the Persians, and had not the courage to revolt and sacrifice their homes, as we did when we abandoned our city, but chose slavery for themselves and wished to impose the same condition upon us.

\(^1\) *cf.* ch. lxxv. 3.

\(^2\) Or, retaining *avταν*, "For we, being Ionians in the eyes of Peloponnesians who are Dorians, not only more numerous than we but also our near neighbours, considered in what way we should be least subject to them."

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LXXXIII. "Ἀνθ᾽ ὄν ἄξιοι τε ὄντες ἀμα ἄρχομεν, ὅτι τε ναυτικὸν πλείστον τε καὶ προσθμίαν ἀπροφάσιστον παρεσχόμεθα ἐς τοὺς Ἐλλήνας, καὶ διότι καὶ τῷ Μῆδῳ ἔτοιμος τοῦτο δρῶτες οὗτοι ἡμᾶς ἐβλαπτοῦν, ἀμα δὲ τῆς πρὸς Πελοποννήσιος

2 ἵσχυος ὑρεγόμενοι. καὶ εὐκαλλίστουμεθα ῥως ἡ τῶν βάρβαρον μόνοι καθελόντες εἰκότως ἄρχομεν ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερία τῇ τῶν ἔμπαντων τε καὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ αὐτῶν κινδυνεύσαντες. πάσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὴν προσήκουσαν σωτηρίαν ἐκπορίζεσθαι. καὶ νῦν τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀσφαλείας ἐνεκα καὶ ἐνθάδε παρόντες ὅρωμεν καὶ ὑμῖν ταῦτα

3 ξυμφέροντα. ἀποφαίνομεν δὲ ἐξ ὄν οἴδε τε διαβάλλουσι καὶ ὑμεῖς μάλιστα ἐπὶ τὸ φοβερότερον ὑπονοεῖτε, εἰδότες τοὺς περιδεῶς ὑποπτεύουσάς τι λόγον μὲν ἠδονή τὸ παραυτίκα τερπομένους, τῇ δὲ ἐγχειρήσει ύστερον τὰ ξυμφέροντα πράσσοντας.

4 τὴν τε γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀρχὴν εἰρήκαμεν διὰ δέος ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢκειν μετὰ τῶν φίλων ἀσφαλῶς καταστησόμενοι, καὶ οὐ δουλωσόμενοι, μὴ παθεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτο κωλύσοντες.

LXXXIV. "Τοπολάβῃ δὲ μηδείς ὡς οὔθεν προσήκοιν ὑμῶν κηδόμεθα, γνοὺς ὅτι σφρημένων ὑμῶν καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀσθενεῖς ὑμᾶς ὅτας ἀντέχειν Συρακοσίους ἦσον ἀν τούτων πεμψάντων τινὰ δύναμιν Πελοποννήσιοι ἤμεῖς βλαπτούμεθα. καὶ 2 ἐν τούτω προσήκετε ἣδη ὑμῖν τὰ μέγιστα. δι'
BOOK VI. LXXXIII. I—LXXXIV. 2

LXXXIII. "We have dominion, therefore, both because we are worthy of it—seeing that we furnished the largest fleet and unhesitating zeal toward the Hellenes, and that they, readily taking the course they did in the interest of the Persians, were doing us harm—and at the same time because we aimed at strength with which to resist the Peloponnesians. And we do not say in fine phrases that we deserve to rule either because we alone overthrew the Barbarian or because we incurred danger for the liberty of these men more than for that of all the Hellenes, including our own. But no one can be reproached because he makes provision for his proper safety. And now when for the sake of our own security we have come here also, we see that your interests also are the same as ours. And this we prove to you both from these men's calumnies and from those suspicions of yours which most tend to undue alarm, because we know that those who are suspicious through excessive fear may indeed take delight for the moment in seductive speech, but afterwards when it comes to action consult their own interests. For just as we have said that we hold our dominion over there because of fear, so we say that for the same reason we have come here with the help of our friends to place your affairs on a footing of safety for us, and not to enslave you, but rather to prevent your being enslaved."

LXXXIV. "And let no one object that we are solicitous for you when it does not concern us; let him reflect that, if you are preserved and by not being weak are able to offer resistance to the Syracusans, we should be less liable to injury through their sending a force to aid the Peloponnesians. And herein you become at once our chief concern.
ὁπερ καὶ τοὺς Δεοντίνους εὐλογον κατοικίζειν, μὴ ὑπηκόους ὡσπερ τοὺς ξυγγενεῖς αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐν Βυβοίᾳ, ἀλλ’ ὡς δυνατώτατους, ἵνα ἐκ τῆς σφετέρας ὄμοροι ὄντες τοίσδε ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν λυτηροὶ 3 ὦσιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκεὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀρκούμεν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεύς, διὰ ἀλόγως ἡμᾶς φησι δουλωσαμένους τοὺς ἐνθάδε ἑλευθεροῦν, ξύμφορος ἡμῖν ἀπαράσκευος ὃν καὶ χρήματα μόνον φέρων, τὰ δὲ ἐνθάδε καὶ Δεοντίνοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι φίλοι ὁτι μᾶλιστα αὐτονομοῦμενοι.

LXXXV. "Ανδρὶ δὲ τυράννῳ ἢ πόλει ἄρχὴν ἔχοισθη οὐδὲν ἀλογον ὃ τι ξυμφέρον οὐδ’ οἰκεῖον ὃ τι μὴ πιστῶν πρὸς ἐκαστα δὲ δεὶ ἢ ἐχθρὸν ἢ φίλον μετὰ καιροῦ γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦτο ὠφελεὶ ἐνθάδε, οὐκ ἦν τοὺς φίλους κακώσωμεν, ἀλλ’ ἦν οἱ ἐχθροὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν φίλων ῥώμην 2 ἀδύνατοι ὦσιν. ἀπιστεῖν δὲ οὐ χρήκα λαρ τοὺς ἐκεὶ ξυμμάχους ὃς ἐκαστοι χρήσιμοι ἐξηγοῦμεθα, Χίους μὲν καὶ Μηθυμναίους νεῶν παροκωχῆ αὐτονόμους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς χρημάτων βιαιότερον φορᾶ, ἄλλους δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἑλευθέρους ξυμμαχοῦντας, καίπερ ἡσιώτατα ὄντας καὶ εὐλήπτους, διότι ἐν χωρίοις ἐπικαίροις εἰςι περὶ τὴν Πελο-

3 πόνησον. ὅστε καὶ ταύθαδε εἰκὸς πρὸς τὸ λυσιτελοῦν καὶ, ὅ λέγομεν, ἐσ Συρακοσίους δέος καθίστασθαι. ἄρχης γὰρ ἐφίεναι ὑμῶν καὶ

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For this very cause, too, it is reasonable that we should restore the Leontines, so that they shall not be subjects like their kinsmen in Euboea, but shall be as powerful as possible, in order that, bordering as they do on the Syracusans, they may from their own territory be troublesome to these in our behalf. For as to matters in Hellas, we by ourselves are a match for our enemies, and in regard to the Chalcidians, whom he says we are inconsistent in freeing here after enslaving them at home, it is to our interest that they should possess no armament and should contribute money only; but as to matters here, it is to our interest that both the Leontines and our other friends should enjoy the fullest measure of independence.

LXXXV. "To an autocrat or an imperial city nothing is inconsistent which is to its interest, nor is anyone a kinsman who cannot be trusted; in every case one must be enemy or friend according to circumstances. And in Sicily it is to our advantage, not that we should weaken our friends, but that our enemies should be powerless because of the strength of our friends. And you must not mistrust us; for we lead our allies in Hellas as they are each useful to us: the Chians and Methymnaeans as independent, on the condition of furnishing ships; the majority on more compulsory terms, with payment of tribute in money; others, though islanders and easy to be reduced, on terms of absolute freedom as our allies, because they occupy strategic positions along the coast of the Peloponnese. So that it is natural that matters here also should be ordered with an eye to our advantage, and, as we say, with reference to our fear of the Syracusans. For they aim at
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βούλονται ἐπὶ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ ξυστῆσαντες ὑμᾶς ὑπόπτῳ, βλα ἦ καὶ κατ’ ἐρημᾶς, ἀπράκτων ἡμῶν ἀπελθόντων, αὐτοὶ ἄρξαι τῆς Σικελίας. ἀνάγκη δὲ, ἣν ξυστήσε πρὸς αὐτούς· οὔτε γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐτι ἔσται ἵσχυς τοσαύτη ἐκ ἢν ξυστάσα εὐμεταχείριστος, οὔθ’ οὐδ’ ἀσθενείς ἀν ἡμῶν μὴ παρόντων πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἶν.

LXXXVI. “Καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα μὴ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ τό ἐργον ἔλεγχε. τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον ἡμᾶς ἐπηγαγόσθη οὐκ ἀλλον τινα προσέινετε φόβον ἦ, εἰ περισφόμεθα ὑμᾶς ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων γενε-2 σθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν. καὶ νῦν οὔ δίκαιον, ὅπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἥξιοντε λόγῳ πείθειν, τῷ αὐτῷ ἀπιστεῖν, οὔθ’ ὅτι δυνάμει μείζονι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐσχῆν πάρεσεμεν ὑπόπτηεσθαι, πολὺ 3 δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖσδε ἀπιστεῖν. ἡμεῖς μὲν γε οὔτε ἐμμείναι δυνατοὶ μὴ μεθ’ υμῶν, εἰ τε καὶ γενόμενοι κακοὶ κατεργασαίμεθα, ἀδύνατοι κατασχεῖν διὰ μὴκος τε πλοῦ καὶ ἀπορίας φυλακής πόλεων μεγάλων καὶ τῇ παρασκευῇ ἥτερωτίδων οἴιδε δὲ οὔ στρατοπέδῳ, πόλει δὲ μείζονι τῆς ἡμετέρας παρουσίας ἐπικοίνωντες υμῖν αἰεὶ τε ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ, ὅταν καιρὸν λάβωσιν ἐκαστοῦ, οὔκ ἄνισον (ἐδειξαν δὲ καὶ ἀλλὰ ἦδη καὶ τὰ ἐς Λεοντίνους).

4 καὶ νῦν τολμῶσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ταῦτα κωλύοντας καὶ

1 In 427 B.C., when Camarina stood with the Leontines and other Chalcidians against Syracuse; cf. iii. lxxxvi. 2.
2 i.e. with infantry and cavalry, our forces being purely naval.
dominion over you, and wish, after uniting you with themselves on the ground of your suspicion of us, then by force, or because of your isolation when we shall have gone away unsuccessful, themselves to rule Sicily. And that is sure to happen if you unite with them; for neither will so great a force, if once combined, be any longer easy for us to handle, nor would the Syracusans lack strength to deal with you if we should not be present.

LXXXVI. "And if there be anyone who does not accept this view, that which has taken place will itself prove his error. For you brought us over before, flaunting in our faces no other terror but this, that we ourselves should be in danger if we should permit you to come under the power of the Syracusans. And it is not right for you now to distrust the very argument by which you thought it right to persuade us then, nor to be suspicious because we are present with a force out of all proportion to the strength of the Syracusans; far more should you distrust them. We certainly are not able to maintain ourselves in Sicily without you; and even if we should prove false and subdue Sicily, we should be unable to hold it on account of the length of the voyage and the difficulty of guarding cities that are as large and well equipped as continental cities; whereas these Syracusans, in hostile proximity to you, not with a mere army in the field, but a city greater than our present force, are always plotting against you, and whenever they get an opportunity against you singly, do not let it slip, as they have shown several times already and especially in their dealings with the Leontines; and now they make bold to urge you to oppose those who seek to
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ἀνεχοντας την Σικελίαν μέχρι τούδε μη ὑπ’ αὐτοὺς εἰναι παρακαλεῖν ὑμᾶς ὡς ἀναισθήτους.

5 πολὺ δὲ ἐπὶ ἀληθεστέραν γε σωτηρίαν ἡμεῖς ἀντιπαρακαλοῦμεν, δεόμενοι τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἀπ’ ἄλληλων ἀμφοτέροις μὴ προδιδόναι, νομίζαι τε τοῦσδε μὲν καὶ ἀνεν ξυμμάχων οἷεὶ ἐφ’ ὑμᾶς ἐτοίμην διὰ τὸ πλήθος εἰναι ὅδον, ὑμῖν δ’ οὐ πολλάκις παρασχήσειν μετὰ τοσῆς ἐπικουρίας ἀμύνασθαι· ἢν εἰ τῷ ὑπόπτῳ ἡ ἀπρακτον εάσετε ἀπελθεῖν ἢ καὶ σφαλεῖσαν, ἔτι βουλήσεσθε καὶ πολλοστὸν μόριον αὐτῆς ἰδεῖν, ὅτε οὐδὲν ἔτι περανεὶ παραγενόμενον ὑμῖν.

LXXXVII. "Ἀλλὰ μήτε ὑμεῖς, ὦ Καμαριναῖοι, ταῖς τῶν διαβολαῖς ἀναπείθεσθε μήτε οἱ ἄλλοι· εἰρήκαμεν δ’ ὑμῖν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ἀν ὑποπτευόμεθα, καὶ ἔτι ἐν κεφαλαίοις ὑπομνήσαντες ἀξιώσομεν πείθειν. φαμὲν γὰρ ἄρχειν μὲν τῶν ἐκεῖ, ἵνα μὴ ὑπακούομεν ἄλλου, ἐλευθερῶν δὲ τὰ ἐνθάδε, ὅπως μὴ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν βλαπτόμεθα, πολλὰ δ’ ἀναγκάζεσθαι πράσσειν, διότι καὶ πολλὰ φυλασσόμεθα, ξύμμαχοι δὲ καὶ νῦν καὶ πρότερον τοῖς ἐνθάδε ὑμῶν ἀδικομένοις ὅκ αἰκλητοί, παρακληθέντες δὲ ἢκεῖν. καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμῖν ὡς δικασταί γενόμενοι τῶν ὑμῶν ποιουμένων μὴ’ ὡς σοφρο- 

1 τε, Hude reads δ’ with M.

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1 πολλὰ πράσσειν, as well as πολυπραγμοσύνη below, is used in a good sense, characterizing the policy of the Athenians at their acme, as described by Pericles in the funeral oration, ii. 40, 41.

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prevent these things and who up to this time have kept Sicily from being under their dominion, as though you were without sense. But it is to a safety far more real that we in our turn invite you, begging you not to throw away that safety which we both derive from one another; and to consider that for them, even without allies, the way is always open against you because of their numbers, whereas for you the opportunity will not often present itself to defend yourselves with the help of so great an auxiliary force. But if through your suspicions you suffer this force to depart with its object unaccomplished, or, worse still, defeated, you will hereafter wish that you could see even the merest fraction of it when its presence will no longer avail you aught.

LXXXVII. “Nay, be not moved, men of Camarina, either you or the other peoples of Sicily, by the calumnies of these men. We have told you the whole truth concerning the matters of which we are suspected, and now again briefly recalling to your minds the chief points of our argument, we fully expect to convince you. We say, namely, that we hold sway over the cities in Hellas in order that we may not have to obey some other power, but that we are trying to free those here, in order that we may not be injured by them. We are obliged to be active in many matters,¹ because we have many dangers to guard against; and we come as allies, now as before, to those of you here who are wronged, not uninvited, but by your express invitation. And do not you, by constituting yourselves either judges of our conduct or by tutoring us in moderation²—a hard task at

¹ σωφρονισταί as in iii. lxv. 3 ; viii. xlviii. 6 ; cf. Plato, Rep. 471 α ευμενώς σωφρονισθείς, ούκ ἐπὶ δουλείας κολάζοντες, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ ἀλέθρῳ, σωφρονισταί δειτε, οὐ πολέμιοι.

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νισταί, ὁ χαλεπὸν ἤδη, ἀποτρέπειν πειρᾶσθε, καθ’ ὅσον δὲ τι ὑμῖν τῆς ἡμετέρας πολυπραγμοσύνης καὶ τρόπον τὸ αὐτὸ ξυμφέρει, τούτῳ ἀπολαβόντες χρῆσασθε, καὶ νομίσατε μὴ πάντας ἐν ἵσῳ βλάπτειν αὐτά, πολὺ δὲ πλείους τῶν Ἐλλήνων καὶ 4 ὀφελεῖν. ἐν παντὶ γὰρ πᾶς χωρίω, κἂν ὃ μὴ ὑπάρχομεν, ὁ τε οἶομενος ἀδικήσεσθαι καὶ ὁ ἐπιβουλεύων διὰ τὸ ἐτοιμὴν ὑπείναι ἐλπίδα τῷ μὲν ἀντιτυχείν ἐπικουρίας ἀφ’ ἥμων, τῷ δὲ, εἰ ἦξομεν, μὴ ἄδεει εἶναι κινδυνεύειν, ἀμφότεροι ἀναγκάζονται ὁ μὲν ἄκων σωφρονεῖν, ὁ δ’ ἀπραγ-5 μόνως σφίξεσθαι. ταῦτην οὖν τὴν κοινὴν τῷ τε δεομένῳ καὶ ὑμῖν νῦν παροῦσαν ἀσφάλειαν μὴ ἀπώσησθε, ἀλλ’ ἐξισώσαντες τοῖς ἀλλοίς μεθ’ ἥμων τοὺς Συρακοσίους, ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰεὶ φυλάσσεσθαι αὐτούς, καὶ ἀντεπιβουλεύσατε ποτὲ ἑκ τοῦ ὁμοίου μεταλάβετε.”

LXXXVIII. Τοιαῦτα δὲ ὁ Εὐφήμος εἶπεν. οἱ δὲ Καμαριναῖοι ἐπεπόνθεσαν τοιόνδε. τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις εἰνοὶ ἦσαν, πλὴν καθ’ ὅσον 2 τὴν Σικελίαν φύοντο αὐτοὺς δουλώσεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ Συρακοσίοις αἰεὶ κατὰ τὸ ὀμορον διάφοροι· δεδι-ότες δ’ οὖν ἦσον τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἐγγύς ὄντας μὴ καὶ ἄνευ σφῶν περιγένονται, τὸ τε πρῶτον αὐτοῖς τοὺς ὁλίγους ἐπιπέδας ἐπεμψαν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς ὑπουργεῖν μὲν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις

1 διὰ τὸ ἐτοιμὴν ὑπείναι ἐλπίδα... σφίξεσθαι, the text is probably corrupt. Hude follows van Herwerden in reading ἀν[τ]ὶ τυχεῖν, and, with Krüger, emends ἄδεεις of the MSS. to ἄδεει, and deletes κινδυνεύειν. Steup, as also Stahl, adopts Reiske's conjecture ἄδεεις and deletes κινδυνεύειν.

2 εἰ, after καθ’ ὅσον in MSS., deleted by Reiske, followed by Krüger.
this late day!—make any attempt to divert us, but in so far as anything in our busy activity and our character is at the same time to your interest, take this and make use of it; and think, not that these qualities of ours are hurtful alike to all, but that they are even profitable to far the greater part of the Hellenes. For everyone in every place, even where we are not already present, both he that thinks he will suffer wrong, and he that plots to do wrong—on account of the certain prospect that is ever present in their minds, in the one case that he will obtain succour from us in return for his allegiance, in the other that, if we shall come, he will run the risk of not escaping unscathed for his wrongdoings—are both alike under constraint, the latter to be moderate however unwilling, the former to be saved without effort of his own. This common safety, then, which is now offered to anyone who may ask for it as well as to you, reject not; but availing yourselves of it as others do, join forces with us and instead of having always to be on your guard against the Syracusans, change your course and at length plot against them even as they have plotted against you.”

LXXXVIII. Thus Euphemus spoke. But what the Camarinaeans had felt was this: They were well disposed to the Athenians, except in so far as they thought that these would enslave Sicily; but with the Syracusans, as is usual with next-door neighbours, they were always at variance. And it was because they were more afraid of the Syracusans, as being so near, that they had in the first instance sent them the few horsemen,\(^1\) lest they might prove superior to the Athenians even without their aid; and they

\(^1\) Ch. lxvii. 2.
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μᾶλλον ἔργῳ, ὡς ἄν δύνωνται μετριώτατα, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι, ἵνα μηδὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐλασσόν
dοκῶσι νεῖμαι, ἐπειδή καὶ ἐπικρατέστεροι τῇ μάχῃ
2 ἐγένοντο, λόγῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ἵσα ἀμφοτέρους. καὶ
οὕτω βουλευσάμενοι ἀπεκρίναντο, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει
ἀμφοτέρους οὔσι ξυμμάχοις σφόν πρὸς ἀλλήλους
πόλεμος ἄν, εὐφορκὸν δοκεῖν εἶναι σφίσιν ἐν τῷ
παρόντι μηδετέροις ἁμένειν. καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἐκατέρων ἀπήλθον.
3 Καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι τὰ καθ' ἕαυτος ἔθερτύ-
οντο ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ
ἐστρατοπεδευμένοι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Σικελῶν ἔπρασ-
σον, ὅπως αὐτοῖς ὡς πλείστοι προσχωρήσονται.
4 καὶ οἱ μὲν πρὸς τὰ πεδία μᾶλλον τῶν Σικελῶν,
ὑπῆκοι δ' ῥετὰς τῶν Συρακοσιῶν, οὐ̃̃οι πολλοὶ ἀφει-
στήκασαν τῶν δὲ τῆς μεσόγειαν ἐχόντων αὐτονομοὶ
οὖσαι καὶ πρότερον αἰὲν αἰ̃̃ ν οἰκήσεις εὐθὺς, πλὴν
δλίγοι, μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἦσαν, καὶ σιτόν τε
κατεκόμμιζον τῷ στρατεύματι καὶ εἰς ὅι καὶ
5 χρήματα. ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς μὴ προσχωροῦντας οἱ
Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύσαντες τοὺς μὲν προσημάγκαζον,
tους δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων, φρουροὺς τ'̃
ἐσπερμόντων καὶ βοηθόντων, ἀπεκωλύμενο. τόν
τε χειμῶνα μεθορμισάμενοι ἐκ τῆς Νάξου ἐς τὴν
Κατάνη καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ὁ κατεκαύθη ὑπὸ
tῶν Συρακοσίων αὐτῆς ἀνωρθώσαντες διεχέιμαζον.
6 καὶ ἐπεμψαν μὲν ἐς Καρχηδόνα τριήρη περὶ φιλίας,
εἰ δύναντο τι ὡφελεῖσθαι, ἐπεμψαν δὲ καὶ ἐς
Τυρσηνίαν, ἐστὶν ὅν πόλεων ἐπαγγελλομένων καὶ

1 Canter's correction for οἱ πολλοὶ of the MSS.
2 αἱ added by Bekker.

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now resolved for the future to keep on giving to them rather than to the Athenians assistance in fact, though as moderately as possible, and for the present, in order that they might not seem to show less favour to the Athenians, especially since these had proved the stronger in the battle, to give in word the same answer to both. Having thus determined, they made answer, that, as they were allies of both parties that were at war, it seemed to them to be consistent with their oath to aid neither at present. So the envoys of both sides went away.

The Syracusans on their side were getting ready for the war, while the Athenians who were encamped at Naxos were negotiating with the Sicels, in the effort to bring over as many of them as possible. Now, of the Sicels that lived more toward the flat country and were subjects of the Syracusans not many had revolted; but the Sicel settlements in the interior, which even before had always been independent, with few exceptions straightway sided with the Athenians, bringing down grain for the army and in some cases money also. Against those that did not come over the Athenians took the field, and compelled some to do so, but were kept from compelling others by the Syracusans, who sent garrisons to their relief. Removing also the anchorage of their fleet from Naxos to Catana, and restoring the camp which had been burned by the Syracusans, they passed the winter there. They sent also a trireme to Carthage on a mission of friendship, in the hope that they might be able to get some aid; and they sent one also to Tyrrenia, as some of the cities there offered of

1 Or, retaining οἱ πολλοί, "most had held aloof," i.e. from the alliance with the Athenians.
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αὐτῶν εὐμπολεμεῖν. περιήγγελλον δὲ καὶ τοῖς Σικελοῖς καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἐγέρσαν πέμψαντες ἐκέλευσαν ἵππους σφίσιν ὡς πλείστους πέμπειν, καὶ τάλλα ἐς τὸν περιτειχισμόν, πλυθία 1 καὶ σίδηρον, ἡτοίμαζον, καὶ ὁσα ἔδει, ὡς ἄμα τῷ ἴρι ἐξόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου.

7 Οἱ δὲ ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον καὶ Δακεδαίμονα τῶν Συρακοσίων ἀποσταλέντες πρέσβεις τοὺς τῇ Ἰταλί-ώτας ἀμα παραπλέουσες ἐπειρώντο πείθειν μὴ περιορᾶν τὰ γιγνόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὡς καὶ ἐκείνοις ὁμοίως ἐπιβουλευόμενα, καὶ ἔπειδῆ ἐν τῇ Κόρινθῳ ἐγένοτο, λόγους ἐποιούντο ἀξιόντες σφίσι κατὰ τὸ ἐκγιγενὲς βοηθείαν. καὶ οἱ Κορίν-θιοι, εὐθὺς ψηφισάμενοι αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι ὥστε πᾶση προθυμία ἀμύνειν, καὶ ἐς τὴν Δακεδαίμονα ξυγαπ-έστελλον αὐτοῖς πρέσβεις, ὅπως καὶ ἐκείνους ἰππαναπείθοιεν τὸν τε αὐτοῦ πόλεμον σαφέστερον ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν

8 ὀφελίαν τινὰ πέμπειν. καὶ οἳ τε ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου πρέσβεις παρῆσαν ἐς τὴν Δακεδαίμονα καὶ Ἀλκι-βιάδης μετὰ τῶν ξυμφυγάδων, περαιωθεῖς τότε εὐθὺς ἐπὶ πλοίον φορτικὸν ἐκ τῆς Θουρίας ἐς Κυλλήνην τῆς Ἡλείας πρῶτον, ἐπειτα ὕστερον ἐς τὴν Δακεδαίμονα αὐτῶν τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων μεταπεμψάντων ὑπόστοπος ἐλθὼν ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν Μαντινικῶν πρᾶξιν. καὶ ἤνθεβη ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων τοὺς τε Κορινθίους καὶ τοὺς Συρακοσίους τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην δεομένους πείθειν τοὺς Δακεδαι- μονίους. καὶ διανοούμενοι τῶν τε ἐφόρων καὶ

1 Hude writes πλυθία, after the Schol. Patm. (τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ἅλα, ὡς τὰς πλυθόσας κατεσκέψασαν).

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themselves to join them in the war. They also despatched messengers to the various Sicel tribes, and sending to Egesta urged them to send as many horsemen as possible; and they were getting ready for the circumvallation bricks and iron and whatever else was needful, with a view to taking the war in hand as soon as spring opened.

Meanwhile the Syracusan envoys, who had been sent to Corinth and Lacedaemon, as they sailed along the coast tried to persuade the Italiots not to tolerate the conduct of the Athenians, as the plot was aimed equally against them; and when they reached Corinth they made an appeal to the Corinthians, urging them to send them aid on grounds of kinship. And the Corinthians at once took the lead in voting to aid them with all zeal themselves, and also sent envoys along with them to Lacedaemon, to help in persuading them not only to prosecute the war at home more openly against the Athenians, but also to send aid in some form to Sicily. Accordingly there were present at Lacedaemon these envoys from Corinth, and also Alcibiades with his fellow-exiles. He had, at the time of which we have spoken, at once crossed over on a freight-boat from Thuria, going first to Cyllene in Elis, and had afterwards, on the summons of the Lacedaemonians themselves, come to Lacedaemon under safe-conduct; for he feared them on account of his intrigues in the affair of the Mantineans. So it happened that in the Lacedaemonian assembly the Syracusans, the Corinthians, and Alcibiades, making the same appeal, were prevailing upon the Lacedaemonians. The ephors indeed and others in

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1 Greek colonists settled in the part of Italy called Magna Graecia.
2 cf. ch. lxi. 6.
Τῶν ἐν τέλει ὄντων πρέσβεις πέμπτειν ἐς Συοκούσας κωλύοντας μὴ ξυμβαίνειν Ὁθεναιόις, βοηθεῖν δὲ ὡς προθύμων ὄντων, παρελθὼν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης παρώξυνε τε τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους καὶ ἐξώρμησε λέγον τοιάδε.

LXXXIX. "Ἡ Ἀναγκαῖος περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς διαβολῆς πρῶτον ἐς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μὴ χεῖρον τὰ 2 κοινὰ τῷ ὑπότηρι μου ἀκροάσησθε. τῶν δὴ ἐμῶν προγόνων τὴν προξενίαν ὑμῶν κατὰ τι ἐγκλημα ἀπειπότων αὐτὸς ἐγὼ πάλιν ἀναλαμβάνων θεράπευσαν ὑμᾶς ἄλλα τε καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐκ Πύλου ξυμφοράν. καὶ διατελοῦντός μου προθύμου ὑμεῖς πρὸς Ὁθεναιοὺς καταλαβασθόμενοι τοῖς μὲν ἐμοῖς ἔχθροῖς δύναμιν, δὲ ἐκείνων πράξαντος, ἐμοὶ δὲ 3 ἀτιμίαν περιέθετε. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δικαιώς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ πρὸς τε τὰ Μαντινέων καὶ Ὁργείων τραπομένου καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἤναντιούμην ὑμῖν ἐβλάπτεσθε καὶ νῦν, εἰ τις καὶ τότε ἐν τῷ πάσχειν οὔκ εἰκότως ὁργίζετο μοι, μετὰ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς σκοπῶν ἀναπειθέσθω. ἢ εἰ τις, διότι καὶ τῷ δήμῳ προσεκείμην μᾶλλον, χείρω με ἐνόμιζε, μηδ' οὕτως ἠγήσηται 4 ὅρθως ἀχθεσθαι. τοῖς γὰρ τυράννοις αἰεὶ ποτὲ διάφοροι ἔσμεν (πάν δὲ τὸ ἐναντιούμενον τῷ δυναστεύοντι δῆμος ὀνομασται), καὶ ὁ ἐκεῖνον ξυμπαρέμεινεν ἡ προστασία ἥμων τοῦ πλῆθους. ἀμα δὲ καὶ τῆς πόλεως δημοκρατουμένης τὰ πολλὰ

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authority were already intending to send envoys to Syracuse to prevent their making terms with the Athenians, but were not disposed to send them aid; Alcibiades, however, coming forward, inflamed the Lacedaemonians and goaded them on, speaking as follows:

LXXXIX. "It is necessary first of all to speak to you about the prejudice against me, in order that you may not through suspicion of me give a less favourable hearing to matters of public concern. When my ancestors on account of some complaint had renounced their office as your proxenoi, I myself, seeking to revive the relationship, courted your favour in other matters and especially in regard to your misfortune at Pylos.\(^1\) And although I continued zealous, you, in making peace with the Athenians, by negotiating through my personal enemies conferred power upon them but brought dishonour upon me. For these reasons you deserved the injury you suffered when I turned to the side of the Mantineans and Argives, and when I opposed you in other matters.\(^2\) And if anyone at the actual moment of suffering was unduly angry at me, let him now look at it in the light of the truth and be led to a different conviction; or if anyone thought worse of me because I was more inclined to the cause of the people, let him not even on that ground suppose that he was rightly offended. For my family have always been at variance with tyrants, and as all that is opposed to despotic power has the name of democracy, so from the fact of that opposition of ours the leadership of the people has remained with us. Besides, while the city was a democracy, it was necessary in

\(^1\) cf. v. xliii. 2. \(^2\) cf. v. liii. ff.
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5 ἀνάγκη ἦν τοῖς παροῦσιν ἐπεσθαί. τῆς δὲ ὑπαρ-
χούσης ἀκολασίας ἐπειρώμεθα μετρώτεροι εἰς τὰ
πολιτικὰ εἶναι. ἄλλοι δὲ ἦσαν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πάλαι
καὶ νῦν οὐ ἐπὶ τὰ πονηρότερα ἔξηγον τὸν ὄχλον.
6 οὗτος καὶ ἔμη ἔξηγασαν. ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ ξύμπαντος
προὔστημεν, δικαίωντες ἐν ὧ σχῆματι μεγίστη ἡ
πόλις ἐτύγχανε καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτη οὐσα καὶ ὅπερ
ἐδέξατό τις, τούτο ξυνδιασώζειν (ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίαν
γε ἐγγυνώσκομεν οἱ φρονοῦντές τι, καὶ αὐτὸς
οὗδεν ἃν χείρον, ὅσοι καὶ ἱκονοράσαιμι. ἀλλὰ
περὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας οὐδέν ἃν καίων λέ-
γοιτο), καὶ τὸ μεθιστάναι αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔδοκε ήμῖν
ἁσφαλὲς εἶναι ὑμῶν πολεμίων προσκαθημένων.

ΧC. "Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐς τὰς ἐμὰς διαβολὰς τοιαύτα
ξυνέβη· περὶ δὲ ὧν ὑμῖν τε βουλευτέον καὶ ἐμοί,
2 εἰ τι πλεόν οἶδα, ἐσηγητέον, μάθετε ἡδη. ἐπλεύ-
σαμεν ἐς Σικελίαν πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ δυναίμεθα,
Σικελιῶτας καταστρεφόμενοι, μετὰ δὲ ἐκείνους
αὐθίσ καὶ Ἰταλιώτας, ἐπείτα καὶ τῆς Καρχη-
3 δονίων ἀρχής καὶ αὐτῶν ἀποπειράσοντες. εἰ δὲ
προχωρήσειε ταῦτα ἡ πάντα ἡ καὶ τὰ πλεῖο, ἡδὴ
tῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἐμέλλομεν ἐπιχειρήσειν, κομί-
σαντες ξύμπασαν μὲν τὴν ἐκείθεν προσγενομένην
dύναμιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πολλοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους
μισθωσάμενοι καὶ ἱβηρας καὶ ἄλλους τῶν ἐκεί
ὁμολογουμένως νῦν βαρβάρων μαχιμωτάτους,

1 Hude writes ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίας γε καταγιγνώσκομεν οἱ φρο-
νοῦντές τι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὗδεν ἃν χείρον, ὅσοι καὶ λοιδορήσαμι,
which must be about the meaning of the passage.

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most respects to conform to existing conditions. We tried, however, to pursue a moderate course in politics in contrast with the prevailing licence. But there have been others, both in the time of our forefathers and now, who led the masses into more evil ways; and these are the very men who have driven me out. But it was of the whole people that we were leaders, deeming it right to help to preserve that form of government under which the state had, as it chanced, attained its highest greatness and completest freedom, and which had come down to us—for as to democracy of course, all of us who have any sense well understood what it was, and I better than anyone, inasmuch as I have greater cause to abuse it; but indeed nothing new can be said about an admitted folly—and it did not seem to us wise to change our democratic constitution when you, our enemies, were waiting at our gates.

XC. "With regard, then, to the prejudices against me, that is how things fell out; but with reference to the matters about which you must take counsel and which I, if I have any superior knowledge, must bring to your notice, give me now your attention. We sailed to Sicily, first, to subdue the Siceliots, if we could, and after them the Italiots also; and then to make an attempt upon the empire of the Carthaginians and upon the city itself. If these things, either all, or at least the greater part of them, succeeded, then we intended to attack the Peloponnesus, bringing here the whole Hellenic force that had joined us there, hiring besides many barbarians, both Iberians and others of the peoples there that are admittedly the most warlike of the barbarians at the present
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τρίτης τε πρὸς ταῖς ἡμετέραις πολλὰς ναυπηγήσαμενοι, ἔχουσις τῆς Ἰταλίας ξύλα ἄφθονα, αἷς τὴν Πελοπόννησον περίξ πολυρκοῦντες καὶ τῷ πεζῷ ἀμα ἐκ γῆς ἐφορμαῖς τῶν πόλεων τὰς μὲν βίας λαβόντες, τὰς δ' ἐντειχίσαμενοι ῥαδίως ἡπτίζομεν καταπολεμήσεια καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦ 4 ξύμπαντος Ἑλληνικοῦ ἄρξειν. χρήματα δὲ καὶ σῖτον, ὡστε εὐπορότερον γίγνεσθαι τι αὐτῶν, αὐτὰ τὰ προσγενόμενα ἐκεῖθεν χωρία ἐμελλε διαρκῆ ἄνευ τῆς ἐνθένδε προσόδου παρέξειν.

ΧCΙ. "Τοιαύτα μὲν περὶ τοῦ νῦν οἰχομένου στόλου παρὰ τοῦ τὰ ἀκριβέστατα εἶδότος ὡς διενοχθήμεν ἀκήκοατε· καὶ ὁσοὶ ὑπόλοιποι στρατηγοὶ, ἦν δύσωνται, ὁμοίως αὐτὰ πράξουσιν. ὡς δὲ, εἰ μὴ βοηθήσετε, οὐ περιέσται τάκει, μάθετε 2 ἡδη. Σικελιῶται γὰρ ἀπειρότεροι μὲν ἔσσιν, ὁμοίως δ' ἄν εὐστραφέντες ἄθροοι καὶ νῦν ἔτι περιγένοιτο· Συρακόσιοι δὲ μόνοι μάχη τε ἡδη πανδημεῖ ἥσσημενοι καὶ ναυσίν ἄμα κατειργόμενοι ἀδύνατοι ἐσονται τῇ νῦν Ἀθηναίων ἐκεῖ 3 παρασκευῇ ἀντίσχειν. καὶ εἰ αὐτὴν ἡ πόλις ληφθήσεται, ἔχεται καὶ τῇ πάσᾳ Σικελία, καὶ εὐθύς καὶ Ἰταλία· καὶ ὅν ἄρτι κίνδυνον ἐκεῖθεν 4 προεῖπον, οὐκ ἄν διὰ μακροῦ ὑμᾶς ἐπιτίθοι. ὡστε μὴ περὶ τῆς Σικελίας τῆς οἰέσθω μόνον βουλεύειν, ἄλλα καὶ περὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου, εἰ μὴ ποιήσετε τάδε ἐν τάχει, στρατιάς τε ἐπὶ νεῶν πέμψετε τοιαύτην ἐκεῖστε οἴτινες αὐτέρεται κοιμισθέντες καὶ ὀπλιτεύσουσιν εὐθύς, καὶ δ' τῆς στρατιᾶς ἔτι 346
day, and building many triremes in addition to our own, as Italy has timber in abundance. Laying a blockade with these triremes round the Peloponnesus, and at the same time attacking it with our infantry by land, having thus taken some of its cities by assault and walled in others, we expected easily to reduce it, and after that to have sway over the whole Hellenic race. As to money and food, for making any of these projects more feasible, the additional territory acquired in Sicily would of itself furnish these in sufficient quantity, independently of our home revenues.

XCI. "That such were the objects of the expedition which has sailed, you have heard now from one who knows most accurately what we purposed; and the rest of the generals will, if they can, carry out these plans without change. But that the people over there cannot hold out unless you aid them, let me now show you. The Siceliots have indeed less military experience than the Athenians, yet if they were united in one body they could, even as it is, gain the victory. But the Syracusans alone, being already worsted in battle with their full force and at the same time hemmed in at sea, will be unable to withstand the army of the Athenians now there. And if this city shall be taken, all Sicily is theirs, and so presently will Italy be also; nor will it be long before the danger which I have just now predicted from that quarter would fall upon you. Therefore let nobody think that you are deliberating about Sicily only, but about the Peloponnesus also, unless you do quickly the following things: send thither by ship such a body of troops as, after working their own passage at the oar, can at once serve as hoplites; also what I
Joshua, a man of Gibeon, stood before Barak, who said to him, "You shall be before me as myoin the battle of the Lord against Sisera, for you have commanded Israel to do this."

The occupation of Deceleia took place in 413 B.C. (cf. vii. xix.).

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consider even more indispensable than the army, a Spartan as commander, that he may organize the forces already present and press into service those that are unwilling. For in this way the friends you have already will be encouraged, and those who are in doubt will come over with less misgiving. And the war here you must at the same time prosecute more openly, in order that the Syracusans, convinced that you are really concerned, may offer greater resistance, and the Athenians be less able to send reinforcements to their own troops. You ought likewise to fortify Deceleia in Attica, the very thing the Athenians are always most in dread of and reckon the only peril of which they have not made full trial in this war. And the surest way in which anyone can hurt his enemies is this: acting on certain information, he should inflict upon them that which he perceives they most fear; for it is natural that every man should have the most accurate knowledge of his own dangers and should fear them accordingly. But as to the benefits which you yourselves will gain by this menacing stronghold and will prevent your opponents from obtaining, I will pass over many and sum up only the most important. Whatever their country is stocked with will for the most part come into your hands, either by capture or by voluntary surrender. And the revenues of the Laureian silver mines and whatever profits they now derive from their land and from their courts, they will at once be deprived of, and above all of the tribute from their allies, that would be less

aὐτόματα, refers to slaves, who were part of the "stock."

The fees and fines arising from the adjudication of cases brought by the allied states.
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μένης, οἱ τὰ παρ' ὑμῶν νομίσαντες ἥδη κατὰ κράτος πολεμεῖσθαι ὀλγωρήσουσιν.

XCI. "Γέγεσθαι δὲ τι αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν τάχει καὶ προθυμότερον ἐν ὑμῖν ἔστιν, ὦ Δακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπεὶ ὥς γε δυνατά (καὶ οὐχ ἀμαρτίσεσθαι οἶμαι 2 γνώμης) πάνω θαρσῷ. καὶ χείρων οὐδενὶ ἄξιῶ δοκεῖν ὑμῶν εἶναι, εἰ τῇ ἦμαυτοῦ μετὰ τῶν πολε-μωτάτων, φιλόπολίς ποτε δοκῶν εἶναι, νῦν ἐγκρατῶς ἐπέρχομαι, οὐδὲ ὑποπτεύεσθαί μου ἐς 3 τὴν φυγαδικήν προθυμίαν τὸν λόγον. φυγᾶς τε γάρ εἰμι τῆς τῶν ἕξελασάντων πονηρίας καὶ οὐ τῆς ὑμετέρας, ἂν πείθησθε μοι, ὦφελίας· καὶ πολεμώτεροι οὐχ οἱ τοὺς πολεμίους ποιν βλά-ψαντες ὑμεῖς ἢ οἱ τοὺς φίλους ἀναγκάσαντες 4 πολεμίους γενέσθαι. τὸ τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ὧδε ἀδικοῦμαι ἐχὼ, ἀλλ' ἐν ὧ δίσφαλως ἐπολιτεύθην. οὐδὲ ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὕσαν ἔτι ἡγοῦμαι νῦν ἑναι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν οὐκ οὕσαν ἀνακτᾶσθαι. καὶ φιλόπολες οὕτως ὀρθῶς, οὐχ ὃς ἄν τὴν ἦμαυτοῦ ἀδίκως ἀπολέσας μὴ ἐπίθη, ἀλλ' ὃς ἄν ἐκ παντοῦ τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν πειράθη αὐτῆς ἀναλαβεῖν. 5 οὕτως ἐμοὶ τε ἄξιῶ ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐς κίνδυνον καὶ ἐς ταλαπωρίαν πᾶσαν ἀδεώς χρησθαί, ὦ Δακε-δαιμόνιοι, γνόντας τοῦτον δὴ τὸν ὑφ' ἄπαντων προβαλλόμενον λόγον ὡς, εἰ πολέμιος γε ὧν σφόδρα ἔβλαπτον, κἀν φίλος ὧν ἰκανῶς ὥφελοις, ὡς τὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίων οἶδα, τὰ δ' ὑμέτερα ἴκαζον, 350
regularly brought in; for these, convinced that the war is now being prosecuted on your part with all your might, will take their obligations lightly.

XCII. "The accomplishment of any of these projects promptly and more zealously depends, men of Lacedaemon, upon you, for that they are possible—and I do not think that I shall prove wrong in my judgment—I am fully assured. And I claim that no one of you shall think more harshly of me because I, who seemed once to be a lover of my city, now make assault with all my might upon her, in concert with her bitterest enemies; nor do I think that my word should be suspected on the score of the outcast's zeal. For outcast as I am from the villainy of those that expelled me, I am not ousted from doing you good service, if you will but hearken to me; and the worse enemies are not those who, like you, have merely hurt their enemies, but those who have forced their friends to become foes. And as to love of country—I have it not when I am wronged, but had it when I possessed my civil rights in security. And it is not, as I conceive, against a country still my own that I am now going, but far rather one no longer mine that I am seeking to recover. And the true patriot is not the man who, having unjustly lost his fatherland, refrains from attacking it, but he who in his yearning for it tries in every way to get it back. So I urge you, Lacedaemonians, to use me without misgiving for any danger and for any hardships, recognising that, according to the saying which is on everybody's lips, if as an enemy I did you exceeding injury, I might also be of some sufficient service to you as a friend, in so far as I know the affairs of the Athenians, while I could only conjecture yours. And I urge, too,
καὶ αὐτοὺς νῦν, νομίσαντας περὶ μεγίστων δὴ τῶν διαφερόντων βουλευέσθαι, μὴ ἀποκυνεῖν τὴν ἐσ ἡ τὴν Σικελίαν τε καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν στρατεύειαν. ἦν τά τε ἐκεῖ βραχεῖ μορίῳ ξυμπαραγεγενόμενοι μεγάλα σώστε καὶ Ἀθηναίων τὴν τε οὐσαν καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν δύναμιν καθέλτε, καὶ μετὰ ταύτα αὐτοὶ τα ἁσφαλῶς οἰκήτε καὶ τῆς ἀπάσης Ἑλλάδος ἐκούσης καὶ οὐ βία, κατ' εὐνοιαν δὲ ἡγήσησθε.

ΧΞΠ. Ὁ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδης τοσαῦτα εἶπεν. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι διανοούμενοι μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ πρότερον στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας, μέλλοντες δὲ ἔτι καὶ περιορώμενοι, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπερ- ρώσθησαν διδάχαντος τάντα ἐκαστὰ αὐτοῦ καὶ νομίσαντες παρὰ τοῦ σαφέστατα εἰδότος ἀκη- 2 κοέναι· ὥστε τῇ ἐπιτειχίσει τῆς Δεκελείας προσ- εἴχον ἡδὴ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ παραντικά καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πέμπειν τινὰ τιμωρίαν. καὶ Γύλεπ- πον τὸν Κλεάνδρίδου προστάξαντες ἀρχοῦτα τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἐκέλευον μετ' ἐκείνων καὶ τῶν Κο- ρινθίων βουλευόμενον ποιεῖν ὅτη ἐκ τῶν παρόντων μᾶλιστα καὶ τάχιστα τὶς ὠφελία ἧξει τοῖς ἐκεῖ.

3 ο ὃ δὲ δύο μὲν ναῦς τοὺς Κορινθίους ἡδὴ ἐκέλευεν οἱ πέμπειν ἐς Ἡσύλην, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς παρασκεύα- ξεθαί ὅσα διανοοῦται πέμπειν καὶ, ὅταν καιρὸς ἦ, ἔτοιμας εἶναι πλεῖν. ταύτα δὲ ἤξυνθέμενοι ἀνεχόρουν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαιμονος.

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that you yourselves now, convinced that you are deliberating about interests that are of the greatest importance, shrink not from sending an expedition into Sicily, and also into Attica, in order that, by keeping a small detachment on the island, you may preserve the large interests you have over there and may overthrow the power of the Athenians both present and prospective, and after that may yourselves live in security and be accepted by all the Hellenes of their free will, not by force but through affection, as their leaders."

XCIII. Such was the speech of Alcibiades; and the Lacedaemonians, who had already before this been disposed to make an expedition against Athens, but were still hesitating and looking about them, were now far more encouraged when Alcibiades himself explained these matters in detail, thinking that they had heard them from the one man who had most certain knowledge. And so they now turned their attention to the fortification of Deceleia and, in particular, to sending immediately some assistance to the Sicilians. Having appointed Gylyppus son of Cleandridas commander of the Syracusan forces, they ordered him, in consultation with the envoys of the Syracusans and Corinthians, to devise how under present circumstances help might come to the Syracusans in the best and quickest way. And Gylyppus bade the Corinthians send to him at once at Asine¹ two ships, and to equip all the rest they intended to send, and to be ready to sail whenever opportunity offered. Having made these arrangements the envoys left Lacedaemon and set out for home.

¹ Probably the harbour in Messenia (iv. xiii. 1).

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4 Ἀφίκετο δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας τριήρης τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἦν ἀπεστειλάν οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐπὶ τε χρήματα καὶ ἱππεῖς. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἐψηφίσαντο τὴν τε τροφήν πέμπτειν τῇ στρατιᾷ καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἔτελεύτα, καὶ ἐβδομὸν καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἔτελεύτα τόδε διὸ Ἁθοκύδιδης ξυνέγραψεν.

XCIV. "Ἀμα δὲ τῷ ἡρὶ εὐθὺς ἀρχομένῳ τοῦ ἐπιγυνομένου θέρους οἱ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀραντες ἐκ τῆς Κατάνης παρέπλευσαν ἐπὶ Μεγάρων,1 οὐς ἐπὶ Γέλωνος τοῦ τυράννου, ὡσπερ καὶ πρότερον μοι εἴρηται, ἀναστήσαντες Συρακοσίου 2 αὐτοῦ ἔχουσι τὴν γῆν. ἀποβάντες δὲ ἐδήσασαν τοὺς τε ἀγροὺς καὶ ἐλθόντες ἐπὶ ἐρυμά τι τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ οὐχ ἐλόντες αὐθίνες καὶ πεζῷ καὶ ναυσὶ παρακομισθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Τηρίαν ποταμῶν τὸ τε πεδίον ἀναβάντες ἐδήσων καὶ τὸν σίτων ἐνεπίμπρασαν, καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων περιτυχόντες τισιν οὐ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀποκτείναντες τε τινας καὶ τροπαίον στήσαντες ἄνεχορήσαν ἐπὶ τὰς ναύς. 3 καὶ ἀποπλεύσαντες ἐς Κατάνην, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐπιστισάμενοι πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ Κεντόριτα, Σικελῶν πόλισμα, καὶ προσαγαγόμενοι ὀμολογία ἀπῆσαν, πιμπράντες ἀμα τὸν σίτων τῶν 4 τε Ἰνησαίων καὶ τῶν Τήλαιῶν. καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Κατάνην καταλαμβάνουσι τοὺς τε ἱππεὰς ἦκοντας ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίους ἄνευ τῶν ἱππῶν μετὰ σκευῆς, ὡς αὐτὸθεν 1 τῶν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ, after Μεγάρων in MSS., deleted by Krüger.

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BOOK VI. xciii. 4-xciv. 4

At this time also there arrived at Athens from Sicily the trireme that had been sent by the generals for money and cavalry. And the Athenians, hearing their request, voted to send to the army both the supplies and the cavalry. And the winter ended, and with it the seventeenth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

XCIV. At the very beginning of the following spring, the Athenians in Sicily set out from Catana and proceeded along the coast toward Megara, from which, as has been stated before,\(^1\) the Syracusans in the time of the tyrant Gelon had expelled the inhabitants, holding their territory themselves. Here they landed and ravaged the fields; then, attacking a stronghold of the Syracusans without success, they went back again along the coast with both land-force and fleet to the river Terias, and going inland ravaged the plain and set fire to the grain. Meeting with a small force of Syracusans, they killed some of them and after setting up a trophy withdrew to their ships. Having sailed back then to Catana and supplied themselves with provisions from there, they advanced with their whole army to Centoripa,\(^2\) a Sicel town; and when they had brought it over by capitulation they returned, burning at the same time the grain of the Inessians\(^3\) and Hyblaeans.\(^4\) On their arrival at Catana they found that the horsemen had come from Athens, two hundred and fifty in number—with accoutrements but without the horses, for it was expected that horses would be procured.

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\(^1\) cf. ch. iv. 2.
\(^2\) Now Centorbi, twenty-seven miles north-west from Catana and near Mt. Aetna.
\(^3\) The site of Inessa is doubtful (cf. III. ciii. 1).
\(^4\) Hybla Geleatis (ch. lxii. 5).
ΤΗΞΥΚΩΙΔΗΣ

ἐπὶ ποιμήσαιιν τοῖσιν καὶ ἢποτοξιτας τριάκοντα καὶ τάλαντα ἄργυρίου τριακόσια.

XCV. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ ἠρος καὶ ἔπ' Ἀργος στρατεύσαντες Λακεδαιμόνιοι μέχρι μὲν Κλεωνῶν ἤλθον, σεισμοῦ δὲ γενομένου ἀπεχώρησαν. καὶ Ἀργείοι μετὰ ταῦτα ἐσβαλόντες ἐσ τῆν θυρεάτων ὤμον οὖσαν λείαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πολλὴν ἔλαβον, ἢ ἐπράθη ταλάντων ὦκ ἔλασσον πέντε 2 καὶ εἷκοσι. καὶ ὁ Θεσπιῶν δήμος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει οὐ πολὺ ὦστερον ἐπιθέμενος τοῖσι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν οὐ κατέσχεν, ἀλλὰ βοηθησάντων Θηβαίων 1 οἱ μὲν ξυνεληφθήσαν, οἱ δ' ἔξεπεσον Ἀθήνα.  

XCVI. Καὶ οἱ Συρακοσίοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους ὡς ἐπούθυνο τούσι τε ἵπτεας ἢκοντας τοῖσι Ἄθηναίοις καὶ μέλλοντας ἡδὴ ἐπὶ σφάς ἰέναι, νομίσαντες, ἐὰν μὴ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν κρατήσωσιν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, χωρίον ἀποκρήμνου τε καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως εὐθὺς κειμένου, οὐκ ἄν ῥαδίως σφάζει, οὔτ' εἰ κρατούντο μάχη, ἀποτελείσθηναι, διενοῦντο τὰς προσβάσεις αὐτῶν φιλάσσειν, ὅπως μὴ κατὰ 2 ταῦτα λάθωσι σφάς ἀναβάντες οἱ πολέμοι οὐ γὰρ ἅν ἀλλή ἄρτος δυνηθηναι. ἐξήρτηται γὰρ τὸ ἄλλο χωρίον, καὶ μέχρι τῆς πόλεως ἐπικλινές τε ἐστι καὶ ἐπιφανεῖς πάν ἔσω καὶ ὁμόμασται ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων διὰ τὸ ἐπιπολήθης 3 τοῦ ἄλλου εἶναι Ἐπιπολαί. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἔξελ-

1 Θηβαίων, so B alone correctly against Ἀθηναίων of all the other MSS., which gives no satisfactory sense; for in case of a real interference on the part of the Athenians, which would have meant an infraction of existing peace relations with the Boeotians (cf. v. xxxii. 5), more exact information was to be expected.

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in Sicily—as well as thirty mounted archers and three hundred talents\(^1\) of silver.

XCV. During the same summer the Lacedaemonians, making an expedition to Argos, got as far as Cleonae, but when an earthquake occurred they retired. After this the Argives invaded the Thyreatis, which lies on their borders, and took much booty from the Lacedaemonians, which was sold for not less than twenty-five talents.\(^2\) And in the course of the same summer, not long afterwards, the people of Thespiae attacked the government but did not succeed; for succour came from Thebes and some were arrested, while others fled for refuge to Athens.

XCVI. During the same summer the Syracusans, on learning that the Athenians had received their cavalry and that they were about to march against them immediately, thinking that unless the Athenians should get possession of Epipolae, a precipitous place lying directly above the city, they themselves, even if they were defeated in battle, could not easily be walled in, determined to guard the approaches to it, in order to prevent the enemy from ascending secretly by that way, since they could not possibly do so by any other road. For at all other points the place overhangs the city and slopes right down to it, the whole height being visible from it; and it is called Epipolae by the Syracusans because it lies as an upper surface above the rest of the country. So they went out at daybreak in full

\(^1\) £60,000, $344,160. \(^2\) £6,000, $28,680.
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θόντες παιδημεῖ ἐς τὸν λειμῶνα τὸν 1 παρὰ τὸν 'Αναπον ποταμὸν ἀμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ (ἐτύγχανον γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐρμοκράτῃ στρατηγοὶ ἄρτι παρειληφότες τὴν ἀρχήν), ἐξέτασιν τε ὁπλων ἐποιοῦντο καὶ ἐξακοσίους λογάδας τῶν ὀπλιτῶν ἐξέκρυναν πρότερον, ὡν ἦρχε Διόμιλος, φυγᾶς ἐξ 'Ανδρον, ὅπως τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν εἶνεν φύλακες καὶ, ἦν ἐς ἀλλο τι δέη, ταχὺ ξυνεστώτες παραγιγνωνται.

ΧCVII. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς, 2 τῇ ἐπιγυμνομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἐξητάζοντο, ἔλαθον 3 αὐτοὺς παντὶ ἢδη τῷ στρατεύματι ἐκ τῆς Κατάνης σχόντες κατὰ τὸν Λέωντα καλούμενον, διὰ ἀπέχει τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἢ ἐπτὰ στάδιον, καὶ τοὺς πεζοὺς ἀποβιβάζοντες ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν Θάψον καθορμισάμενοι. ἔσται δὲ χερσόνησος μὲν ἐν στενῷ ἱσθμῷ προύχοντα ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, τῆς δὲ Συρακοσίων πόλεως οὕτω πλοῦν οὕτε οὖν ὁδὸν 2 πολλὴν ἀπέχει. καὶ ὁ μὲν ναυτικὸς στρατὸς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Θάψῳ διασταυρωσάμενος τῶν ἱσθμοῦ ἁσύγαζεν. ὁ δὲ πεζὸς ἐχώρει εὐθὺς δρόμῳ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς καὶ φθάνει ἀναβὰς κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύχλου πρὶν τῶν Συρακοσίων ἀισθομένους ἐκ τοῦ λειμῶνος καὶ τῆς ἐξετάσεως παραγενέσθαι.

3 ἔβοσθον δὲ ὁ τε ἄλλοι ὡς ἐκαστὸς τάχος εἶχε καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Διόμηλον ἐξακοσίους στάδιοι δὲ πρὶν προσμεῖξαι ἐκ τοῦ λειμῶνος ἐγίγνοντο αὐτοῖς 4 οὐκ ἔλασσον ἡ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι. προσπέσοντες οὖν αὐτοῖς τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ἀτακτότερον καὶ μάχη νικηθέντες οἱ Συρακοσίοι ἐπὶ ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς

1 Added by Krüger. 2 Added by Madvig. 3 καὶ, before ἔλαθον in the MSS., deleted by Madvig.
force to the meadow along the river Anapus—for Hermocrates and his fellow-generals, as it chanced, had just come into office—and proceeded to hold a review of the hoplites. And they selected first six hundred picked men of these, under the command of Diomilus, a fugitive from Andros, that these might be a guard for Epipolae, and if there were need of them anywhere else might be quickly at hand in a body.

XCVII. And the Athenians during the night preceding the day on which the Syracusans held their review, came from Catana with their whole force and put in unobserved at the place called Leon, which is six or seven stadia distant from Epipolae, disembarking the land-force there and anchoring their ships at Thapsus. That is a peninsula, with a narrow isthmus, extending into the sea and not far distant from the city of Syracuse, either by sea or by land. The naval force of the Athenians, having run a stockade across the isthmus, lay quiet on Thapsus; but the land-force advanced at once at a run to Epipolae, and got up by way of Euryelus before the Syracusans, when they became aware of it, could come up from the review which they were holding in the meadow. They brought aid, however, everyone with what speed he could, the others as well as the six hundred under Diomilus; but they had not less than twenty-five stadia to go, after leaving the meadow, before they reached the enemy. Consequently the Syracusans fell upon the Athenians in considerable disorder, and being defeated in battle
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ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν· καὶ δὲ τε Διόμιλος
5 ἀποθνῄσκει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς τριακόσιοι. καὶ
μετὰ τούτῳ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τροπαίον τε στήσαντες
καὶ τους νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀποδόντες τοὺς
Συρακοσίους, πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ
ἐπικαταβάντες, ὡς οὐκ ἐπεξήγαν αὐτοῖς, ἑπανα-
χωρήσαντες φρούριον ἐπὶ τῷ Δαβδάλῳ ὕκοδό-
μησαν ἐπὶ ἄκροι τοῖς κρημνοῖς τῶν Ἐπιτολῶν
ὁρῶν πρὸς τὰ Μέγαρα, ὡς εἰπὶ αὐτοῖς, ὅποτε
προῖοιν ἢ μαχούμενοι ἢ τείχισθεντες, τοῖς τε
σκέυεσι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν ἀποθήκη.

XCVIII. Καὶ οὐ πολλῷ ὑστερον αὐτοῖς ἦλθον
ἐκ τῆς Ἑγέστης ἰπτῆς τριακόσιοι καὶ Σικελῶν
καὶ Ναξίων καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ὡς ἐκατόν· καὶ
Ἀθηναίων ὑπῆρχον πεντήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι, οἷς
ἐπιευηθοὺς τοὺς μὲν παρ’ Ἑγεσταίων καὶ Καταναίων
ἐλαβον, τοὺς δ’ ἐπρίαντο, καὶ ξυμπαντες πεντή-
2 κοντα καὶ ἐξακόσιοι ἰπτῆς ξυνελέγησαν. καὶ
καταστήσαστες ἐν τῷ Δαβδάλῳ φυλακῇ ἔχορον
πρὸς τὴν Συκῆν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, ἔναπερ καθεξόμενοι
ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους. καὶ ἔκπληξιν
τοῖς Συρακοσίοις παρέσχου τῷ τάχει τῆς ὀἰκοδο-
μίας. καὶ ἐπεξελθόντες μάχην διενοθύτο ποι-
3 εἰςθαί καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν. καὶ ἦδη ἀντιπαρατασ-
σομένων ἀλλήλοις οἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων στρατηγοὶ
ὡς ἐώρων σφίσι τὸ στράτευμα διεσπασμένον τε
καὶ οὐ ῥαδίως ξυντασσόμενον, ἀνήγαγον πάλιν ἐς

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on Epipolae, retired into the city, Diomilus and about three hundred of the rest being slain. After this the Athenians, having set up a trophy and given up their dead under truce to the Syracusans, next day went down against the city itself; but when the enemy did not come out against them they withdrew and built a fort at Labdalum, on the verge of the bluffs of Epipolae looking towards Megara, that it might serve as a magazine for their baggage and stores whenever they advanced either to fight or to work at the wall.

XCVIII. Not long afterwards there came from Egesta three hundred horsemen, and from the Sicels, Naxians, and some others about one hundred; and the Athenians had already two hundred and fifty, for whom they received some horses from the Egestaeans and Catanaeans and purchased others; so that altogether six hundred and fifty cavalry were mustered. Placing a garrison at Labdalum, the Athenians advanced to Syce, where they took position and built the round fort\(^1\) with all speed. The Syracusans were struck with consternation by the rapidity of their building; and they went out against them, determined to give battle and not look on idly. And when they were already drawing up for the conflict the generals of the Syracusans, seeing that their own army had become disordered and did not readily get into line, led them back to the city, all save a

1 Syke (i.e. a place set with fig-trees; see Steph. s.v. ξυκαί) is probably to be located in the middle of the plateau of Epipolae. Here the Athenians built first a circular fort, which later was the starting-point for the wall of circumvallation extending northward towards Trogilus and southward to the Great Harbour. See Map, and also Holm ii. 387 and Freeman, Sic. iii. 662 ff.
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tην πόλιν πλήν μέρους τινὸς τῶν ἵππεων· οὕτωι
de ὑπομένοντες ἐκόλυνον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους λιθο-
4 φορεῖν τε καὶ ἀποσκίδνασθαι μακροτέραν. καὶ
tῶν Ἀθηναίων φυλή μία τῶν ὀπλιτῶν καὶ οἱ
ιππῆς μετ' αὐτῶν πάντες ἔτρεψαντο τοὺς τῶν
Συρακοσίων ἵππεας προσβαλόντες, καὶ ἀπέκτει-

 XCIX. Καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν ἐτείχιζον τῶν
Ἀθηναίων τὸ πρὸς βορέαν τοῦ κύκλου τείχος, οἱ
δὲ λίθους καὶ ξύλα ἐξυμφοροῦντες παρεβαλλοῦν
ἐπὶ τὸν Τρώγιλον καλούμενον, αἰεὶ ἂπερ βραχύ-

2 ἐπὶ τὴν ἐτέραν θάλασσαν τὸ ἀποτείχισμα. οἱ δὲ
Συρακόσιοι οὐχ ἢκιστα Ἐρμοκράτους τῶν στρα-
τηγῶν ἐστηγησάμενον μάχαις μὲν πανδημεῖ πρὸς
Ἀθηναίοις οὐκέτι ἐβούλουντο διακινδυνεύειν, ὑπο-
τείχιζειν δὲ ἀμείνων ἑδόκει εἶναι ἢ ἐκεῖνοι ἐμελλοῦν
ἀξεῖν τὸ τείχος καὶ, εἰ φθάσειν, ἀποκλήσεις

1 γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἀμα καὶ ἐν τούτῳ εἰ ἐπιφθοῖεν,
μέρος ἀντιπέμπτειν αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατιᾶς καὶ

3 πάντας ἀπὸ πρὸς σφᾶς τρέπεσθαι. ἐτείχιζον οὖν
ἐξελθόντες ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρας πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι,

1 aŭtov, Bekker's conjecture, for àutov of the MSS.
part of the cavalry. These remained behind and tried to prevent the Athenians from bringing stones and scattering to any great distance. But one tribal division of the Athenian hoplites, and with these all their cavalry, attacked and routed the Syracusan cavalry, killed some, and set up a trophy of the cavalry fight.

XCIX. On the next day some of the Athenians proceeded to build the wall to the north of the round fort, while others brought together stones and wood and began to lay these down along the line towards the place called Trogilus, in which direction the line of circumvallation would be shortest from the Great Harbour to the outer sea. But the Syracusans, at the suggestion of their generals, and especially of Hermocrates, were no longer inclined to risk pitched battles with their whole force against the Athenians. It seemed better to build a wall across the line where the Athenians were going to bring their wall, so that if they got ahead of them the Athenians would be blocked off, and they decided at the same time, if the Athenians should attack them while at this work, to send a part of the army against them; and they expected that they would get ahead of the Athenians in occupying the approaches with their stockades, and that they would cease from their work and all turn against them. Accordingly they went out and proceeded to build, starting from the city and carrying a cross-wall below the round fort of the Athenians, chopping down the olive-trees of the precinct and setting up wooden towers. The

1 φυλή is here used for ῥάξις, the term being borrowed from the civil classification. Each of the ten tribes furnished a division (ῥάξις).
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dὲ νῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὖτω ἐκ τῆς Θάψου περιπεπελύκεσαν ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα, ἀλλ' ἐτι οἱ Συρακοσίωι ἐκράτουν τῶν περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, κατὰ γῆν δὲ ἐκ τῆς Θάψου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ ἐπιτίθεντα ἐπιρρήγοντο.

C. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἀρκοῦντος ἐδόκει ἔχειν ὅσα τε ἑσταυρώθη καὶ φυκοδομήθη τοῦ ὑποτείχισματος, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτούς οὐκ ἠλθον κωλύσοντες, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσαι δίχα γιγνομένους ὑπὸ μάχωνται, καὶ ἀμα τὴν καθ' αὐτούς περιτείχισαι ἐπεγόμενοι, οἱ μὲν Συρακοσίοι φυλὴν μίαν καταλιπόντες φύλακα τοῦ οἰκοδομήματος ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι τοὺς τε ὁχετοὺς αὐτῶν, οὐ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ὑπονομήδον ποτόν ὑδατος ἡγμένοι ἦσαν, διέφθειραν, καὶ τηρήσαντες τοὺς τε ἄλλους Συρακοσίους κατὰ σκηνάς ὅντας ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ καὶ τῶν καὶ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἀποκεχωρηκότας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ σταυρώματι ἀμελῶς φυλάσσοντας, τριακόσιοις μὲν σφῶν αὐτῶν λογάδας καὶ τῶν ψυλῶν τῶν ἐκλεκτοὺς ὑπλισμένους προύταξαν θείων δρόμων ἔξαπεν πρὸς τὸ ὑποτείχισμα, ὡς ἦ δὲ ἀλλὴ στρατιά δίχα, ἡ μὲν μετὰ τοῦ ἔτερου στρατηγοῦ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, εἰ ἐπιβοῆθουσί, ἐκώρουν, ἡ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ἔτερου πρὸς τὸ σταύρωμα τὸ 2 παρὰ τὴν πυλίδα. καὶ προσβαλόντες οἱ τριακόσιοι αἰροῦσι τὸ σταύρωμα καὶ οἱ φύλακες αὐτὸ ἐκλυπόντες κατέφυγον ἐς τὸ προτείχισμα τὸ περὶ τῶν Τεμενίτην. καὶ αὐτοῖς ξυνεσπέσασον οἱ διώκοντες, καὶ ἐντὸς γενόμενοι βίᾳ ἐξεκρούσθησαν πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων, καὶ τῶν

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Athenian ships had not yet sailed round from Thapsus into the Great Harbour, but the Syracusans were still masters of the parts about the sea, and the Athenians brought their supplies from Thapsus by land.

C. When it seemed to the Syracusans that enough of their counter-wall had been constructed with stone-work and stockade,¹ and the Athenians did not come to hinder them—for they feared that the enemy might more easily deal with them if their forces were divided, and at the same time they were pushing on their own wall of circumvallation—leaving one division as a guard for their cross-wall, they withdrew to the city. Meanwhile the Athenians destroyed their pipes which ran underground into the city and supplied it with drinking-water. Then watching when most of the Syracusans were in their tents at midday—some of them having even gone to their homes in the city—and when those at the stockade were guarding the place carelessly, they stationed in front three hundred picked Athenians and a chosen body of the light-armed troops in heavy armour to go at a run suddenly against the counter-wall; while the rest of the army advanced in two divisions, one with one general against the city, in case they should come to the rescue, the other with the other general to that part of the stockade which is by the postern gate. The three hundred attacked and took the stockade, the guards leaving it and fleeing to the outwork around Temenites.² And their pursuers burst in with them; but these, after getting in, were forced out again by

¹ The ἰποτέχισμα seems to have consisted partly of palisading and partly of stone-work. ² cf. ch. lxxv. 1.
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'Αργείων τινές αὐτόθι καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐ 3 πολλοὶ διεφθάρμασαν. καὶ ἐπαναχωρήσασα ἡ πάσα στρατιά τὴν τε ὑποτείχισιν καθεῖλον καὶ τὸ σταύρωμα ἀνέσπασαν καὶ διεφόρησαν τοὺς σταυροὺς παρ' ἑαυτούς, καὶ τροπαίου ἐστήσασαν.

C]. Τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ἐτείχιζον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν κρημνὸν τὸν ύπερ τοῦ ἔλους, δὲ τῶν Ἐσπιτολῶν τάυτῃ πρὸς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα ὀρᾶ, καὶ ἤπερ αὐτοῖς βραχύτατον ἐγίγνετο καταβάσις διὰ τοῦ ὀμαλοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἔλους ἐς τὸν λιμένα 2 τὸ περιτείχισμα. καὶ οἱ Συρακώσιοι ἐν τούτῳ ἐξελθόντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀπεστάρυφον αὐθίνες ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως διὰ μέσου τοῦ ἔλους καὶ τάφρον ἀμα παρὼρυσσόν, ὅπως μὴ οἶν τε ἥ τοῖς

3 Ἀθηναίοις μέχρι τῆς θαλάσσης ἀποτείχισαν. οἱ δ' ἐπειδὴ τὸ πρὸς τὸν κρημνὸν αὐτοῖς ἐξείρησα στο, ἐπιχειροῦσιν αὐθίσι τῷ τῶν Συρακώσιων σταυρώματι καὶ τάφρῳ, τᾶς μὲν νάις κελεύσαντες περίπλευσαι ἐκ τῆς Θάψου ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα τὸν τῶν Συρακώσιων, αὐτοὶ δὲ περὶ ὀρθρὸν καταβάντες ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐσπιτολῶν ἐς τὸ ὀμαλὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἔλους, ἦ πηλώδες ἦν καὶ στερμφώτατον, θύρας καὶ ξύλα πλατέα ἐπιθέντες καὶ ἔπ' αὐτῶν διαβαδίσαντες, αἴροντιν ἀμα ἕω τὸ τε σταύρωμα πλὴν ὀλίγου καὶ τὴν τάφρον, καὶ ύστερον καὶ τὸ 4 ὑπολευθὲν εἶλον καὶ μάχῃ ἑγένετο, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνίκων οἱ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ τῶν Συρακώσιων οἱ μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ἑχοντες πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἐφυγον, οἱ δ' ἔπει τῷ εὐνοῦμῳ παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν. καὶ αὐτοῖς βουλόμενοι ἀποκλήσασθαι τῆς διαβάσεως οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τριακόσιοι λογάδες ὁρμῶ 5 ἥπειροντο πρὸς τὴν γέφυραν. δείσαντες δὲ οἱ
the Syracusans, some of the Argives and a few of
the Athenians being slain there. Then the whole
army withdrew and pulled down the counter-wall
and tore up the stockade, bringing the stakes over
to their own lines, and set up a trophy.

CII. The next day the Athenians, starting from
the round fort, began to fortify the bluff which is
above the marsh,\(^1\) where on this side of Epipolae
it looks toward the Great Harbour, and where
they would find the line of circumvallation shortest
as they came down through the level ground and
the marsh to the harbour. The Syracusans mean-
while also went out and proceeded to build another
stockade, starting from the city, through the middle
of the marsh; and they dug at the same time a
ditch alongside, that it might not be possible for
the Athenians to complete their wall to the sea.
But the latter, when their wall to the bluff was
finished, again attacked the stockade and ditch of
the Syracusans, having ordered their ships to sail
around from Thapsus into the Great Harbour at
Syracuse and themselves gone down about daybreak
from Epipolae to the level ground. Laying down
doors and planks through the marsh where the soil
was clayey and firmest and crossing over on these,
they took at daylight the ditch, and all but a little
of the stockade, and later the remaining part. A
battle occurred also, in which the Athenians were
victorious, those of the Syracusans on the right
wing fleeing to the city, those on the left along
the river. Wishing to cut off the latter from the
crossing, the three hundred picked men of the
Athenians pushed on at a run to the bridge. But

\(^1\) The Lysimeleia.
Συρακόσιοι (ἡσαν γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἰππέων αὐτοῖς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τῇ θάλασσᾳ) ὡμόσε χρωύσι τοῖς τρικαλόσιοις τούτοις, καὶ τρέπουσι τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐσβάλλουσιν ἐς τὸ δεξίῳ κέρας τῶν Ἀθηναίων. καὶ προσπεποσότων αὐτῶν ξυνεφοβήθη καὶ ἡ πρώτη φυλή 6 τοῦ κέρως. ἵδιν δὲ ὁ Δάμαχος παρεβοήθη ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐωνύμου τοῦ ἑαυτῶν μετά τοξοτῶν τε οὐ πολλῶν καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους παραλαβόντων, καὶ ἐπιδιαβαστὰς τάφρον τινὰ καὶ μονωθείς μετ’ ἀλίγων τῶν ξυνδιαβάντων ἀποδονήσκει αὐτοὺς τε καὶ πέντε ἡ ἐξ τῶν μετ’ αὐτοῦ. καὶ τούτους μὲν οἱ Συρακόσιοι εὐθὺς κατὰ τάχος φθάνουσιν ἀρπάσαντες πέραν τοῦ πτοσμοῦ ἐς τὸ ἀσφαλές, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐπιόντος ἤδη καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου στρατεύματος τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπεχώρουν.

CIII. Ἔν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν τὸ πρῶτον καταφυγόντες ὡς ἐώρων ταῦτα γιγνόμενα, αὐτοὶ τε πάλιν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀναδάσσομεν—ἀντετάξαντο πρὸς τοὺς κάτω σφάς Ἀθηναῖος, καὶ μέρος διὰ τῶν πέμπουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν κύκλον τῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς Ἑπιπολαιδῖς, ἤγομοντο ἐρήμοι αἱρὴν—2 σειν. καὶ τὸ μὲν δεκάπλεθρον προτείχισσα αὐτῶν αἱροῦσι καὶ διεπορθήσαν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν κύκλων Νικίας διεκόλυσσεν ἐνυχθε γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ δι’ ἀσθενείαν ὑπολείμμονος: τὸς γὰρ μηχανᾶς καὶ ἔγινεν ὁ ὁποῖος ὑπὸ τοῦ τείχους ἴδια καταβεβλήμενα, ἐμπρήσαν τοὺς ὑπηρέτας ἐκέλευσαν, ὡς ἔγιναν ἀδυνάτους ἐσομένους ἔρημία ἀνδρῶν ἄλλω τρόπῳ 3 περιγενέσθαι. καὶ ἄμηση ὁποῖος οὐ γὰρ ἔτι προσήλθον οἱ Συρακόσιοι διὰ τὸ τύρ, ἄλλα ἀπεχώρουν πάλιν. καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν κύκλον

1 ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως, omitted by Hude with C.
the Syracusans became alarmed, and, as most of their cavalry was there, closed with these three hundred, routed them, and attacked the right wing of the Athenians. On their charge the first division of this wing also became involved in the panic. And Lamachus, seeing this, came to their aid from his own place on the left wing, with a few bowmen and the Argives, whom he took with him; and advancing across a ditch and being cut off with a few of those who had crossed with him, he was killed himself and five or six of his followers. These the Syracusans at once hastily snatched up and succeeded in carrying over the river to safety, themselves retreating when the rest of the Athenian army began now to advance.

CII. Meanwhile those of them who had fled at first to the city, seeing what was going on, themselves took courage, and coming back from the city drew up against the Athenians in front of them; and they sent a part of their number against the round fort on Epipolae, thinking that they would find it without defenders and be able to take it. And they did indeed take and demolish their outwork of one thousand feet in length, but the round fort itself Nicias prevented their taking; for he happened to have been left behind there on account of illness. He ordered the attendants to set fire to the engines and wood that had been thrown down before the wall, seeing that they would be unable through lack of men to be saved in any other way. And it turned out so; for the Syracusans, coming no nearer because of the fire, now retreated. And, besides, reinforcements were already coming up to

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βοήθεια ἦδη κάτωθεν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀποδιω-ξάντων τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐπανῆφη, καὶ αἱ νῆσος ἁμα αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς Θάλεως ἀπερ θύρητο, κατέπλευσι ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα. ἄ ὁρώντες οἱ ἀνώθεν κατὰ τάχους ἄπηχαν καὶ ἡ ξύμπασα στρατιᾶ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐς τὴν πόλιν, νομίσαντες μὴ ἂν ἔτι ἀπὸ τῆς παρ- σύσης σφίσι δυνάμεως ἰκανοὶ γενέσθαι κωλύσαι τὸν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν τείχισμον.

ΣΠ. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαίον ἔστησαν καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέ- δοσαν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Λαμά- χου καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκομίσαντο. καὶ παρόντος ἦδη σφίσι παντὸς τοῦ στρατεύματος, καὶ τοῦ ναυ- τικοῦ καὶ τοῦ πεζοῦ, ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑπιπολῶν καὶ τοῦ κρημνώδους ἀρξάμενοι ἀπετείχιζον μέχρι τῆς θαλάσσης τείχει διπλῶ τοὺς Συρακοσίους. τὰ δὲ ἐπιτήδεια τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐσήγητο ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας πανταχόθεν. ἦλθον δὲ καὶ τῶν Σκελῶν πολλοὶ ξύμμαχοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, οἱ πρότερον περιεω- ρώντο, καὶ ἐκ τῆς Τυρσηνίας ὑπὲρ πεντηκόντεροι τρεῖς. καὶ τὰλλα προνόαρει αὐτοῖς ἐσπίδας.

καὶ γὰρ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πολέμῳ μὲν οὐκέτι ἐνό- μεν ἂν περιγενέσθαι, ὡς αὐτοῖς οὔ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ὄφελια οὐδεμία ἦκε, τοὺς δὲ λόγους ἐν τε σφῖσι αὐτοῖς ἐποίοιτο ἐξυμβα- τικοῦς καὶ τῶν Νικίαν οὕτως γὰρ δὲ μόνος ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀρχῆς καὶ κύρωσις μὲν οὐδεμία ἐγένετο, οἷα δὲ εἰκὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποροῦντο καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὶν 1 πολυορκομένων, πολλὰ ἐλέγητο πρὸς τε ἐκεῖνον καὶ πλείω ἔτι

1 πρὶν, Hude omits, with C.
BOOK VI. cii. 3—ciii. 4

the round fort from the Athenians below, who had chased away the enemy there, and their ships at the same time were sailing down, as they had been ordered, from Thapsus into the Great Harbour. Seeing these things, the men on the heights and the main army of the Syracusans hastily withdrew into the city, thinking that with the force they then had at their disposal they could no longer prevent the building of the wall to the sea.

CIII. After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored their dead to the Syracusans under truce, themselves getting back the bodies of Lamachus and his men. The whole of their armament being now present, both fleet and land-force, starting from the bluff of Epipolae they proceeded to cut off the Syracusans by a double wall down to the sea. Provisions were coming in for the army from all quarters of Italy. And there came also as allies to the Athenians many of the Sicels, who before had been hesitating, and from Tyrrhenia three fifty-oared galleys. And other matters were progressing according to their hopes. For the Syracusans no longer thought they could win at war, as no aid had come to them even from the Peloponnesus; and indeed they were discussing terms of agreement, not only among themselves, but even with Nicias, who now since the death of Lamachus had sole command. No decision was reached; but, as is natural when men are in perplexity and more straitly besieged than before, many proposals were made to

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κατὰ τὴν πόλιν. καὶ γὰρ τινὰ καὶ ὑποψίαν ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἐστὶν ἀλλήλους εἰχον, καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τε ἐφ’ αὐτῶν ταύτα εἰνέβη ἐπαν- σαν, ὡς ἡ δυστυχία ἡ προδοσία τῇ ἐκείνων βλαπτόμενοι, καὶ ἄλλους ἀνθείλοντο, Ἡρακλεί- δην καὶ Εὐκλέα καὶ Τελλίαν.

CIV. Ἕν δὲ τούτῳ Γύλιππος ὁ Δακεδαιμόνιος καὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Κορίνθου νῆες περὶ Δευκάδα ἦδη ἤσαν, Βουλόμενοι ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν διὰ τάχους βοηθῆσαι. καὶ ὡς αὐτοῖς αἱ ἀγγελίαι ἐφοίτων δειναὶ καὶ πᾶσαι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐφευσμέναι ὡς ἦδη παντελῶς ἀποτετειχισμέναι αἱ Συράκουσαι εἰσί, τῆς μὲν Σικελίας οὐκέτι ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν εἴχεν ὁ Γύλιππος, τὴν δὲ Ἰταλίαν Βουλόμενος περι- ποίησαι, αὐτὸς μὲν καὶ Πυθὴν ὁ Κορίνθιος ναυσὶ δυοῖν μὲν Δακωνικαίν, δυὸν δὲ Κορινθίαν ὅτι τάχιστα ἐπεραιώθησαν τὸν Ἴονιον ἐς Τάραντα, οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι πρὸς ταῖς σφετέραις δέκα Δευκά- δίας δύο καὶ Ἁμπρακιώτιδας τρεῖς προσπληρώ- 2 σαντε ὑστερον ἔμελλον πλεύσεσθαι. καὶ ὁ μὲν Γύλιππος ἐκ τοῦ Τάραντος ἐς τὴν Θυριάν πρώτον προσβευσάμενος κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρός ποτε πολιτείαν καὶ οὗ δυνάμενος αὐτοῖς προσ- αγαγέσθαι, ἀρας παρέπλευ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καὶ ἀρ- πασθεὶς ὑπ’ ἄνεμου, ὅς ἐκπνεύτα ταύτῃ μέγας κατὰ βορέαν ἑστηκὼς, ἀποφέρεται ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, καὶ πάλιν χειμασθεὶς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα τῷ Τάραντῳ προσμίζει: καὶ τὰς ναυὶς ὃσια ἐπονήσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ 3 χειμῶνος ἀνελκύσας ἐπεσκεύαζεν. ὁ δὲ Νίκιας πυθόμενος αὐτὸν προσπλέουσα ὑπερείδε τὸ πλῆθος 1 κατὰ τὸν Τερυναῖον κόλπον, in MSS. after ἄνεμου, deleted by Goeller.
him, and still more were discussed in the city. For under their present evils they had some suspicion even of one another; and the generals under whose lead these things had happened were deposed, on the ground that their disasters were due to their ill-luck or treachery, and in their stead were chosen Heracleides, Eucles, and Tellias.

CIV. Meanwhile Gylippus the Lacedaemonian and the ships from Corinth were already at Leucas, proposing to bring aid to Sicily in all haste. As the reports that were coming to them were alarming and all to the same false purport, that Syracuse had already been completely walled off, Gylippus no longer had any hope of Sicily, but wishing to save Italy, he himself and Pythen the Corinthian, with two Laconian vessels and two Corinthian, crossed the Ionian gulf to Tarentum as quickly as possible; while the Corinthians, after manning, in addition to their own ten, two Leucadian and three Ambracian ships, were to sail later. From Tarentum, Gylippus, after first going on a mission to Thuria, on account of his father having been once a citizen there, and failing to win them over, weighed anchor and sailed along the coast of Italy. Caught by a wind, which settling in the north blows violently in that region, he was carried out to sea, and then after a most violent storm again reached Tarentum; and there hauling ashore all of his ships that had suffered from the storm he set to repairing them. But Nicias, although he heard that he was sailing up, despised

1 cf. ch. xciii. 3.

2 Or, reading, with BH, καὶ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀνανεωσάμενος, "and having revived the sometime citizenship of his father."
τῶν νεῶν, ὡτε οἱ Θούριοι ἔπαθον, καὶ λιστικῶτερον ἐδοξε παρεσκευασμένους πλεῖν καὶ οὐδεμίαν φυλακήν πιθέποιεῖτο.

CV. Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τούτου τοῦ θέρους καὶ Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἐστὶ Ἀργοὺς ἐσέβαλον αὐτοὶ τε καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ τῆς γῆς τὴν πολλὴν ἐδήσαν. καὶ Ἡθναῖοι Ἀργεῖοι τριάκοντα ναυσίν ἐβοήθησαν, αὐτὲρ τὰς σπουδὰς φανερώτατα τὰς πρὸς Δακεδαιμόνιος αὐτοῖς ἔλυσαν.

2 πρῶτορος μὲν γὰρ ληστείας ἐκ Πύλου καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐστὶ τὴν Δακωνικῆν ἀποβαίνοντες μετά τε Ἀργείων καὶ Μαντινέων ξυνεπολέμουν, καὶ πολλάκις Ἀργείων κελεύοντος ὅσον σχόντας μὸνον ἔτι κατά τὴν Δακωνικὴν καὶ τὸ ἔλαχιστον μετὰ σφῶν δηνόσαντας ἀπελθεῖν οὐκ ἦθελον. τότε δὲ Πυθοδώρου καὶ Λαιστοδίου καὶ Δημαράτου ἄρχοντος ἀποβιάντες ἐστὶ Ἐπίδαυρον τὴν Διμηρᾶν καὶ Πρασίας καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐδήσαν τῆς γῆς, καὶ τοὺς Δακεδαιμόνιους ἢδη εὔπροφασίστου μᾶλλον τὴν αἰτίαν ἐστὶ τοὺς Ἡθναίους τοῦ ἀμύνεσθαι ἐποίησαν. ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ τῶν Ἡθναίων ἐκ τοῦ Ἀργοῦς ταῖς ναυσὶ καὶ τῶν Δακεδαιμόνιων οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἐσέβαλον καὶ τὴν Φλεισίαν τῆς τε γῆς αὐτῶν ἔτεμον καὶ ἀπέκτεινάν τινας, καὶ ἀπῆλθον ἐπ’ οἶκου.
the small number of his ships, just as the Thurians had done, and thinking they were coming equipped rather as privateers than as men-of-war, he took as yet no precautions.

CV. About the same time in this summer, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Argos and ravaged most of the country. And the Athenians brought succour to the Argives with thirty ships, an act which violated their treaty with the Lacedaemonians in the most overt manner. For before this they waged the war, in cooperation with the Argives and Mantineans, by predatory excursions from Pylos and by making landings round the rest of the Peloponnesus rather than in Laconia; and although the Argives frequently urged them only to make a landing with arms on Laconian territory, devastate in concert with them even the least part, and then go away, they refused. But at this time, under the command of Pythodorus, Laespodias, and Demaratus, they landed at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiae, and other places, and laid waste some of their territory, and so gave the Lacedaemonians from now on a more plausible excuse for defending themselves against the Athenians. After the Athenians had withdrawn from Argos with their ships, and the Lacedaemonians also had retired, the Argives made an incursion into Phliasia, ravaging part of their land and killing some of the inhabitants, and then returned home.
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
THE CORNWALL PRESS, LTD., PARIS GARDEN,
STAMFORD STREET, LONDON, S.E. I