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Thucydides

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THUCYDIDES

II
THUCYDIDES

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
CHARLES FORSTER SMITH
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IN FOUR VOLUMES
II

HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
BOOKS III AND IV

LONDON : WILLIAM HEINEMANN
NEW YORK : G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
MCMXX

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ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ ἙΣΤΟΡΙΑΙ

Γ

I. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἁμα τῷ σίτῳ ἀκμάζοντες ἐστράτευσαν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν (ήτειτο δὲ αὐτῶν Ἀρχιδαμὸς ὁ Ζευξιδάμου, Δακεδαίμονι ἐνάρευσαν), καὶ ἐγκαθεσθομενοι ἔδησαν τὴν γῆν καὶ προσβολαίῳ, ὥσπερ εἰσώθεσαν, ἐγίγνοντο τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἰππέων ὑπὲρ παρεῖκοι, καὶ τὸν πλείστον ὁμιλοῦ τῶν ψυλῶν εἰργοῦ τὸ μὴ προεξόντας τῶν ὁπλῶν τὰ ἐγγύς τῆς πόλεως κακουργεῖν. ἐμμείναντες δὲ χρόνων οὐ εἰχον τὰ σιτία ἀνεχώρησαν καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις.

II. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐσβολὴν τῶν Πελοποννησίων εὐθὺς Δέσβος πλῆν Μηθύμνης ἀπέστη ἀπὸ Ἀθηναίων, βουληθέντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου (ἀλλὰ οἱ Δακεδαίμονι οὐ προσεδέξαντο), ἀναγκασθέντες δὲ καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπόστασιν πρὸτερον ἡ διενοοῦντο ποιήσασθαι. τῶν τε γὰρ λιμένων τὴν χώσιν καὶ τειχῶν οἰκοδόμησιν καὶ νεῶν

1 Mytilene was an oligarchical state, with dependent towns, Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, only Methymna on the northern coast retaining its democratic constitution and its connection with Athens. For the revolt, cf. Diod. Sic. xii.
I. During the following summer, when the grain was ripening, the Peloponnesians and their allies made an expedition into Attica under the leadership of Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and settling in camp proceeded to ravage the land. And sallies were made as usual by the Athenian cavalry wherever opportunity offered, thus preventing the great mass of the enemy's light-armed troops from going beyond their watch-posts and laying waste the districts near the city. The invaders remained as long as their provisions lasted, then withdrew and dispersed to their several cities.

II. Directly after the invasion of the Peloponnesians, all Lesbos, except Methymna, revolted from Athens. The Lesbians had wished to do this even before the war, but the Lacedaemonians had not taken them into their alliance, and even in this instance they were forced to revolt sooner than they had intended. For they were waiting until the work should be finished of blocking their harbours,

45. The complaint of the Mytileneans was founded on the Athenian attempt to prevent their centralisation. See W. Herbst, Der Abfall Mytilenes, 1861; Leithäuser, Der Abfall Mytilenes, 1874.
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ποίησιν ἐπέμενον τελεσθῆναι, καὶ ὃσα ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου ἔδει ἀφικέσθαι, τοξότας τε καὶ σῖτον, 3 καὶ ἃ μεταπεμπόμενα ἦσαν. Τενέδιοι γὰρ ὄντες αὐτοῖς διάφοροι καὶ Μηθυμναῖοι καὶ αὐτῶν Μυτιληναίων ἴδιοι ἄνδρες κατὰ στάσιν, πρόξενοι Ἀθηναίων, μὴν ταῖς ἴσην τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὅτι ξυνηκίζουσι τε τὴν Δέσβου εἰς τὴν Μυτιλήνην βία καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν ἀπασαν μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν ξυνηκών ὄντων ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει ἐπέγονται καὶ εἰ μὴ τις προκαταλήψει ἤδη, στερῆσεται αὐτοῖς Δέσβου.

III. Οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναίοι (ἦσαν γὰρ τεταλαίπωροι μένοι ὑπὸ τε τῆς νόσου καὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἀρτι καθισταμένου καὶ ἀκμάζοντος) μέγα μὲν ἔργον ἡγούμενο εἶναι Δέσβου προσπολεμόσασθαι ναυτικῶν ἔχουσαν καὶ δύναμιν ἀκέραιον, καὶ οὐκ ἀπεδέχοντο τὸ πρῶτον τὰς κατηγορίας μείζον μέρος νέμοντες τῷ μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀλήθη εἶναι ἐπειδὴ μέντοι καὶ πέμψαντες πρέσβεις οὐκ ἐπείθον τοὺς Μυτιληναίους τὴν τε ξυνοίκισιν καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν διαλύειν, δείχνοντες προκαταλήψει 2 λαβεῖν ἐβούλοντο. καὶ πέμπουσιν ἐξαιτιαίως τεσσαράκοντα ναὸς, αἱ ἔτυχον περὶ Πελοπόννησον παρεσκευασμέναι πλεῖν. Κλεῖστης δὲ 3 ὁ Δευνίου τρίτος αὐτὸς ἐστρατηγεί. ἐσηγγέλθη γὰρ αὐτὸς ὡς εἴη Ἀπόλλωνος Μαλόντος ἔξω

1 The word means literally “public guest,” or “friend.” Under the condition of entertaining and assisting ambassadors and citizens of the state they represented they enjoyed
BOOK III. ii. 2–iii. 3

building walls, and constructing ships, and until the arrival of what they needed from Pontus—archers and grain, and whatever else they were sending for. But the people of Tenedos, who were at variance with them, and of Methymna, and some of the Mytilenaes themselves, men in private station who were proxeni¹ of the Athenians, were moved by partisanship to turn informers and notify the Athenians that the Mytilenaes were attempting to bring all Lesbos into a political union centred in Mytilene; that all their preparations were being hurried forward, in concert with the Lacedaemonians and with their kinsmen the Boeotians, with the purpose of revolting; and that unless someone should forestall them forthwith, Lesbos would be lost to Athens.

III. But the Athenians, distressed by the plague as well as by the war, which had recently broken out and was now at its height, thought it a serious matter to make a new enemy of Lesbos, which had a fleet and power unimpaired; and so at first they would not listen to the charges, giving greater weight to the wish that they might not be true. When, however, the envoys whom they sent could not persuade the Mytilenaes to stop their measures for political union and their preparations, they became alarmed and wished to forestall them. So they suddenly despatched forty ships, which happened to be ready for a cruise around the Peloponnesus, under the command of Cleippides son of Deinias and two others; for word had come to them that there was a
certain privileges from that state, and answered pretty nearly to our Consula and Residentia, though the proxenus was always a member of the state where he served.
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tῆς πόλεως ἐορτῆ, ἐν ᾗ πανδημεῖ Μυτιληναῖοι ἐορτάζουσι, καὶ ἐπίδεια εἶναι ἐπειθέντας ἐπιπεσείν ἄφνων καὶ ἢ μὲν ξυμβῆ ἢ πείρα: εἴ δὲ μή, Μυτιληναῖοις εἶπείν ναῦς τε παραδοῦναι καὶ τείχη καθελεῖν, μὴ πειθομένων δὲ πολεμεῖν.

4 καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆσες φόνον τὰς δὲ τῶν Μυτιληναίων δέκα τριήρεις, αἱ ἔτυχον βοηθοὶ παρὰ σφᾶς κατὰ τὸ εξυμμαχικὸν παροῦσαί, κατέσχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ τούς ἄνδρας ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐς

5 φυλακὴν ἐποίησαντο. τοῖς δὲ Μυτιληναίοις ἥμη ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν διαβᾶς ἐς Εὐβοιαν καὶ πεζῇ ἐπὶ Γερασσατῶν ἐλθὼν, ὄλκαδος ἀναγομένης ἐπιτυρχόν, πλωτὴ χρησάμενος καὶ τριταῖος ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἀφικόμενος ἀγγέλλει τὸν

6 ἐπίπλουν. οἱ δὲ οὔτε ἐς τὸν Μαλόεντα ἔξηλθον τά τε ἀλλὰ τῶν τειχῶν καὶ λιμένων περὶ τά ἤμιτέλεστα φαρξάμενοι ἐφύλασσον.

IV. Καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ πολὺ ὄστερον καταπλεύσαντες ὡς ἑώρων, ἀπήγγειλαν μὲν οἱ στρατηγοὶ τά ἐπεσταλμένα, οὐκ ἐσακουόντων δὲ τῶν

2 Μυτιληναίων ἐς πόλεμον καθίσταντο. ἀπαράσκευοι δὲ οἱ Μυτιληναίοι καὶ ἔξαιρος ἀναγκασθέντες πολεμεῖν ἐκπλουν μὲν τῶν ἐποίησαντο τῶν νεὼν ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν ὅλγον πρὸ τοῦ λιμένος, ἔπειτα καταδιωχθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεὼν λόγους ἥδη προσέφερον τοῖς στρατηγοῖς, βουλόμενοι τάς ναύς τὸ παρανύκτικα, εἰ δύναντο, ὁμολογία τινὶ ἐπιεικεὶ ἀποτελμα-

3 σθαι. καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπεδέ-

---

1 i.e. Apollo, god of Malea, the place north of the city (cf. ch. iv. 5), where Apollo had a temple.
festival of Apollo Maloeis outside Mytilene at which the whole populace kept holiday, and that they might hope to take them by surprise if they should make haste. And if the attempt succeeded, well and good; but if not, the generals were to order the Mytilenaeans to deliver up their ships and pull down their walls, and if they disobeyed, to go to war. So the ships set off; and as there happened to be at Athens at the time ten Mytilenaean triremes serving as auxiliaries in accordance with the terms of their alliance, the Athenians detained them, placing their crews in custody. But the Mytilenaeans got word of the expedition through a man who crossed over from Athens to Euboea, went thence by land to Geraestus, and, chancing there upon a merchantman that was putting to sea, took ship and on the third day after leaving Athens reached Mytilene. The Mytilenaeans, accordingly, not only did not go out to the temple of Apollo Maloeis, but barricaded the half-finished portions of the walls and harbours and kept guard.²

IV. When not long afterwards the Athenians arrived and saw the state of affairs, their generals delivered their orders, and then, as the Mytilenaeans did not hearken to them, began hostilities. But the Mytilenaeans, being unprepared for war and forced to enter upon it without warning, merely sailed out a short distance beyond their harbour, as though offering battle; then, when they had been chased to shore by the Athenian ships, they made overtures to the generals, wishing, if possible, to secure some sort of reasonable terms and thus to get rid of the fleet for the present. The Athenian commanders accepted

² Or, with Krüger, "but also guarded the other points after throwing barricades around the half-finished portions of the walls and harbours."
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ξαντο, καὶ αὐτοὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ ὅχι ἴκανοι ὁσι
4 Δέσβῳ πάσῃ πολέμειν. καὶ ἀνοκωχὴν ποιησά-
μενοι πέμπουσιν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι
tῶν τε διαβαλλόντων ἐνα, ὥμετρελευ ἢδη, καὶ
ἄλλοις, εἰ πως πείσειαν τὰς ναῦς ἀπελθεῖν ὡς
5 σφῶν οὖν ἑυτὶ νεωτεριούντων. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἀπο-
στέλλουσι καὶ ἐς τὴν Δακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις
tριήρει λαθόντες τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναυτικών, οἱ
ἀρμοῦν εἰ τῇ Μαλέα πρὸς βορέαν τῆς πόλεως
οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστευνον τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προ-
6 χωρῆσιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν Δακεδαίμονα
tαλαντώρως διὰ τοῦ πελάγους κοιμηθέντες αὐτοῖς
ἐπρασσοῦν ὅπως τις βοήθεια ἦξει.

V. Οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν πρέσβεις ὡς οὖν
ῆλθον πράξαντες, ἐς πόλεμον καθίσαντο οἱ
Μυτιληναῖοι καὶ ἡ ἅλλη Δέσβος πλὴν Μη-
θύμνης οὕτω δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίωσ ἔβεβοηθήκεσαν
καὶ Ἰμβριοι καὶ Δήμιοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄλγοι
2 τινὲς ξυμμάχων. καὶ ἔξοδον μὲν τινα παιδημεῖ
ἐποιήσαντο οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων
στρατόπεδον, καὶ μάχη ἐγένετο, εἰ ἦ ὄνει ἐλάσσον
ἔχοντες οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι οὕτε ἐπηνιλίσαντο οὕτε
ἐπίστευσαν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἀνεχώρησαν
3 ἐπειτα οἱ μὲν ἕσυχαυτοῦ, ἐκ Πελοποννήσου καὶ
μετὰ ἄλλης παράσκευης βουλόμενοι εἰ προσ-
4 γένοιτο τι κινδυνεύειν καὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς Μελέας
Δάκων ἀφικνεῖται καὶ Ἑρμισόνδας Θηβαῖος,
oἱ προαιστάλθησαν μὲν τῆς ἀποστάσεως, φθάσαι
dὲ οὐ δυνάμενοι τὸν τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιπλοῦν
cρύφα μετὰ τὴν μάχην ὕστερον ἐπιπλέουσι
τριήρει, καὶ παρῆνοιν πέμπειν τριήρη ἄλλην καὶ
BOOK III. iv. 3–v. 4

their proposals, being themselves afraid that they were not strong enough to make war against all Lesbos. So the Mytileneans, having concluded an armistice, sent envoys to Athens, among whom was one of the informers who was by now repentant, in the hope that they might persuade them to recall their fleet, on the understanding that they themselves would not start a revolution. Meanwhile they also sent envoys to Lacedaemon in a trireme, which eluded the Athenian fleet lying at anchor at Malea north of the town; for they had no confidence in the success of their negotiations with the Athenians. These envoys, arriving at Lacedaemon after a hard voyage through the open sea, began negotiating for some aid for their countrymen.

V. But when the envoys to Athens returned without having accomplished anything, the people of Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, except Methymna, began war; the Methymnaeans, however, supported the Athenians, as did also the Imbrians, Lemnians, and a few of the other allies. The Mytileneans made a sortie in full force against the camp of the Athenians, and a battle occurred in which the Mytileneans had the advantage; nevertheless they did not have enough confidence in themselves to bivouac on the field, but withdrew. From this time on they kept quiet, being unwilling to risk an engagement without reinforcements from Peloponnesus and elsewhere. Such reinforcements they expected, for there had come to them Meleas a Laconian and Hermæondas a Theban, who had been sent out before the revolt, but being unable to arrive before the Athenian expedition, had sailed in secretly after the battle in a trireme, and now advised them to send a second
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πρέσβεις μεθ' έαυτών· καὶ ἐκπέμπουσιν. VI. οἱ
dὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πολὺ ἐπιρρωσθέντες διὰ τὴν τῶν
Μυτιληναίων ἰσχίαν ἐισφέροντο παρῆσαν ὄραντες οὐδὲν
ἰσχυρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Λεσβίων, καὶ περιορισμένοι
καὶ τὸ πρὸς νότον τῆς πόλεως ἐτείχισαν στρατο-
πεδαὶ δίοι ἐκατέρωθεν τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοὺς
ἐφόροις ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρους τῶν λιμέσιν ἐποιοῦντο.
καὶ τῆς μὲν βαθάσσης εἰργοῦν μὴ χρῆσθαι τοὺς
Μυτιληναίους, τῆς δὲ γῆς τῆς μὲν ἀλλῆς ἐκρά-
τουν οἱ Μυτιληναίοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Λεσβίοι
προσβαλλότακτες ἢ ὅ, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰ στρατό-
pεδαὶ οὐ πολὺ κατείχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ναύσταθ-
μον δὲ μᾶλλον ἢν αὐτοῖς πλοῖοι καὶ ἀγορᾶς ἢ
Μαλέα. καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Μυτιλήνην ὅτεως
ἐπολεμεῖστο.

VII. Κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦ θέρους
tουτοῦ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ περὶ Πελοπόννησον ναύς
ἀπέστειλαν τριάκοντα καὶ Ἀσώπιοι τῶν Φορ-
μίωνος στρατηγόν, κελευσάμενοι Ἀκαρνάνων τῶν
Φορμίωνος τινα σφίσι πέμψαι ἢ νιόν ἣν ἔλαβεν
καὶ παραπλέουσαι αἱ νῆσαι τῆς Δακω-
νικῆς τὰ ἐπιθαλάσσια χωρία ἐπόρθησαν. ἔπειτα
τὰς μὲν πλείους ἀποτείμη τῶν νεῶν πάλιν ἐπ'
οἶκον ὁ Ἀσώπιος, αὐτῶς δ' ἔχων δῶδεκα ἄρικ-
καὶ ἐς Ναύπακτου, καὶ ὕστερον Ἀκαρνάνας
ἀναστήσας παντομεῖ στρατεύει ἐπ', Οἰνιάδας καὶ
ταῖς τε ναυσὶ κατὰ τὸν Ἀχελῶν ἐπελευσε καὶ
ὁ κατὰ γῆν στρατὸς ἐδήμου τῆς χώρας
προσεχώρουν, τὸν μὲν πεζῶν ἄφις.
trireme and some envoys to accompany them. And this the Mytilenaeans did. VI. Meanwhile the Athenians, much encouraged by the inactivity of the Mytilenaeans, summoned their allies, who put in an appearance the more quickly as they saw that no energetic measures were being taken by the Lesbians. They also placed their ships at anchor round the southern part of the town, and established a blockade against both harbours. Thus they excluded the Mytilenaeans from the use of the sea; but as for the land, the Mytilenaeans and the other Lesbians, who had now come to their aid, dominated all the island, except the small strip held by the Athenians in the neighbourhood of their camps, and it was Malea rather than their camps that they used as a station for boats and supplies. Such was the course of the war at Mytilene.

VII. About the same time during this summer the Athenians sent also on a cruise round the Peloponnesus thirty ships with Asopius son of Phormio as commander; for the Acarnanians had requested them to send them as commander either a son or some other kinsman of Phormio's. And the ships as they sailed past ravaged the coast of Laconia. Afterwards Asopius sent most of the ships back home, but had twelve with him when he reached Naupactus. Then later, having called out all the forces of the Acarnanians, he made an expedition against Oeniadae, sailing with the ships up the Achelous, while his army on land ravaged the country. As, however, the inhabitants would not come over to him, he dismissed
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πλεύσας ἐς Δευκάδα καὶ ἀπόβασις ἐς Νήρικον
ποησάμενος ἀναχωρῶν διαφθείρεται αὐτὸς τε
καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς τι μέρος ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτόθεν τε
ξυμβοηθησάντων καὶ φρουρῶν τινῶν ὄλγων.
6 καὶ ὕστερον ὑποστόνδους τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀποπλεύ-
sαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι παρὰ τῶν Δευκάδιων ἐκομί-
sαντο.

VIII. Οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης νεῶς ἐκπεμφθέντες
Μυτιληναίων πρέσβεις, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἱ Δακεδαι-
μόνοι εἶπον Ὀλυμπίας παρεῖναι, ὅπως καὶ οἱ
ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι ἀκούσαντες βουλεύσωσιν, ἀφικ-
νοῦνται ἐς τὴν Ὀλυμπίαν· ἢν δὲ Ὀλυμπίας ἡ
Δωριέως Ῥόδιος τὸ δεύτερον ἐνίκα. καὶ ἐπειδὴ
μετὰ τὴν ἐορτὴν κατέστησαν ἐς λόγους, εἶπον
τοιάδε.

IX. "Τὸ μὲν καθεστῶς τοῖς Ἑλλησὶ νόμμοιν,
ὦ Δακεδαίμονοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, ἵσμεν· τοὺς γὰρ
ἀφισταμένους ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ξυμμαχίαν
tὴν πρὶν ἀπολείποντας οἱ δεξάμενοι, καθ' ὅσον
μὲν ὅφελοῦνται, ἐν ἡδονὴ ἔχουσι, νομίζοντες δὲ
ἐναι προδότας τῶν πρὸ τοῦ φίλων χείροις
2 ἡγοῦνται. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος αὐτὴ ἡ ἀξίωσις ἐστὶν,
εἰ τύχουει πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ τε ἄφισταμενοι καὶ
ἀφ’ ὃν διακρίνοιντο ἵσοι μὲν τῇ γνώμῃ ὄντες καὶ
εὐνοία, ἀντίπαλοι δὲ τῇ παρασκευῇ καὶ δυνάμει,

1 Foreigners (φρουρῶν as opposed to τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμβοηθη-
sάντων), possibly Corinthians.
2 Dorius son of Diagoras was victor three times in suc-
cession at Olympia (Paus. vi. vii. 1), as well as in numerous
his army, but himself sailed to Leucas and made a
descent upon Nericus. On his way back from
Nericus he and part of his army were slain by the
people of that place, who rallied to its defence, and
by a few guards. The Athenians first stood out to
sea and then later recovered their dead from the
Leucadians under a truce.

VIII. Meanwhile the Mytilenaean envoys who
had been sent on the first ship, having been told by
the Lacedaemonians to present themselves at Olym-
pia, in order that the other members of the alliance
also might hear them and take counsel, came to
Olympia. It was the Olympiad in which Dorius the
Rhodian won his second victory. After the festival
the Peloponnesians met in council, and the envoys
spoke as follows:

IX. "We are not unaware, men of Lacedaemon
and members of the alliance, of the traditional feeling
of the Hellenes towards men who revolt in time of
war and abandon their former alliance: those who
accept them as allies are indeed pleased with them
in so far as they derive advantage, but they regard
them as traitors to their former friends and therefore
think the worse of them. And this estimate is not
unjust, provided that those who revolt and those
from whom they secede held the same political views
and were actuated by the same feeling of good will
toward one another, and were evenly matched in
preparation for war and in power, and provided also

other contests (Paus. vi. vii. 4). He fought in the Decelean
war on the Spartan side (viii. xxxv. 1; Xen. Hell. i. i. 2),
and was captured by the Athenians, but on account of his
fame as an athlete was released without ransom (Xen. Hell.
i. v. 19; Paus. vi. vii. 4, 5).
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πρόφασις τε ἐπιεικῆς μηδεμία υπάρχου τῆς ἀπο-
stάσεως· ὃ καὶ ἥμιν καὶ Ἂθηναίοις ὦκ ἦν, μηδὲ
tῷ χείρους δοξώμεν εἶναι, εἰ ἐν τῇ εἰρήνη τιμώ-
μενοι ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀφιστάμεθα.

X. "Περὶ γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀρετῆς πρῶτον,
ἀλλὰς τε καὶ ἐνυμαχίας δεόμενοι, τοὺς λόγους
ποιησόμεθα, εἰδότες οὕτε φιλίαν ἰδιώταις βέβαιον
γνωμόνυμην οὕτε κοινωνίαν πόλεσιν ἐς οὔδεν, εἰ
μὴ μετ' ἀρετῆς δοκούσης ἐς ἀλλήλους γέγονοι
καὶ τὰλλα ὑμιστροτοποὶ εἶεν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ διαλλάσ-
σοντι τῆς γνώμης καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν ἔργων
καθίσταναι.

2 "Ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἐνυμαχία ἐγένετο
πρῶτον ἀπολιπόντων μὲν ὑμῶν ἐκ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ
πολέμου, παραμεινάντων δὲ ἐκείνων πρὸς τὰ

3 ὑπόλοιπα τῶν ἔργων. Ἐνυμαχοὶ μέντοι ἐγενό-
μεθα οὐκ ἔτι καταδούσθησε τῶν Ἐλλήνων
Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐλευθερώσει ἀπὸ τοῦ Μηδοῦ

4 τοῖς Ἐλλησιν. καὶ μέχρι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου
ἡγοῦντο, προθύμως εἰπόμεθα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐωρῶμεν
ἀυτοὺς τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μηδοῦ ἔχθραν ἀνέντας, τὴν

5 δὲ τῶν ἐνυμαχῶν δούλωσιν ἐπειγομένους, 1 οὐκ

6 ἀδειώς ἔτι ἴμεν. ἀδύνατοι δὲ όντες καθ' ἐν γενό-

7 μενοι διὰ πολυψηφίαν ἀμύνασθαι οἱ ἐνυμαχοὶ

6 ἐδούλωσθαν πλὴν ἴμων καὶ Χίων· ὑμεῖς δὲ

8 αὐτονόμους δὴ όντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνόματι

9 ξυνεστρατεύσαμεν. καὶ πιστοὺς οὐκέτι εἰχόμεν

1 ἐπειγομένους, Ross' conjecture for ἐπαγομένους of the MSS.

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that there were no reasonable excuse for their revolt. But these conditions did not obtain between us and the Athenians; therefore, let no one think the worse of us on the ground that we were honoured by them in time of peace and now revolt from them in time of danger.

X. "We will first discuss the question of justice and rectitude, especially as we are seeking an alliance, for we know that neither does friendship between men prove lasting, nor does a league between states come to aught, unless they comport themselves with transparent honesty of purpose towards one another and in general are of like character and way of thinking; for differences in men’s actions arise from the diversity of their convictions.

"Now between us and the Athenians an alliance was first made when you withdrew from the Persian war but they remained to finish the work. We became allies, however, not to the Athenians for the enslavement of the Hellenes, but to the Hellenes for their emancipation from the Persians. And as long as they maintained their hegemony on terms of equality we heartily followed their lead; but when we saw them relaxing their hostility to the Persians and eager for the enslavement of the allies, we were no longer without alarm. And the allies, being unable, on account of the number of those who had votes, to unite for self-defence, were all enslaved except ourselves and the Chians; while we shared their campaigns as presumably “independent” and enjoying at least the name of freedom. And we could no longer regard the Athenians as trustworthy leaders, taking as warning examples the
μένοις χρώμενοι· ού γάρ εἰκὸς ἢν αὐτοὺς οἷς μὲν μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐνσπόνδους ἐποιήσαντο καταστρέψασθαι, τοὺς δὲ ὑπολοίπους, εἰ ποτε ἀρα δυνηθεῖν,1 μὴ δρᾶσαι τοῦτο.

XI. "Καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτόνομοι ἔτι ἦμεν ἄπαντες, βεβαιότεροι ἂν ἦμιν ἦσαν μηδὲν νεωτερεῖν· ὑπο- χειρίους δὲ ἔχοντες τοὺς πλείους, ἦμιν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵσου ὀμιλοῦντες, χαλεπώτερον εἰκότως ἔμελλον οἴσειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ πλέον ἤδη εἰκὸν τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἔτι μόνου ἀντισουμένου, ἀλλὸς τε καὶ ὅσοι δυνατῶτεροι αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν ἐγύγνωστο καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐρημώτεροι. τὸ δὲ ἀντίπαλον δέος μόνον πιστῶν ἐς ξυμμαχίαν· ο γὰρ παραβαίνειν τι βουλόμενος
2 τῷ μή προύχων ἀν ἐπελθεῖν ἀποτρέπεται. αὐτόνομοι τε ἐλείφθημεν οὐ δὲ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅσον αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν ἄρχην εὐπρεπεῖα τε λόγον καὶ γνώμης μᾶλλον ἔφοδος ἢ ἱσχύος τὰ πράγματα ἐφαίνετο
3 καταληπτά· ἀμα μὲν γάρ μαρτυρίῳ ἔχρωντο μὴ ἂν τοὺς γε ἰσοψύχους ἄκοντας, εἰ μὴ τι ἡδίκουν οἷς ἐπήσαν, ἡυστρατεύειν· ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ καὶ τὰ κράτιστα ἐπὶ τε τοὺς ὑποδεεστέρους πρώτους ἐξενεπήγον καὶ τελευταῖα2 λιπόντες τοῦ ἄλλου περιηγημένου ἀσθενεστέρα ἔμελλον ἔξειν. εἰ δὲ ἀφ’ ἡμῶν ἤρξαντο, ἐχόντων ἐτι τῶν πάντων

1 δυνηθεῖν, Dobree’s conjecture for δυνήθησαν of the MSS.
2 [τὰ] τελευταῖα· τὰ deleted with Krüger.

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events of the past; for it was not likely that they, after subjugating those with whom they had entered into treaty relations together with us, would not do the same to those who were left, if ever they should possibly have the power.

XI. "Again if we had all remained independent we should have had better assurance that they would make no violent change in our status; having, however, the majority under their hands, while still associating with us on an equal footing, they would naturally find it more irksome that our state alone still maintained its equality as compared with the majority that had already yielded, especially since they were becoming more powerful in proportion as we became more isolated. Indeed it is only the fear that arises from equality of power that constitutes a firm basis for an alliance; for he that would transgress is deterred by the feeling that he has no superiority wherewith to make an attack. And we were left independent for no other reason than because they clearly saw that with a view to empire they must get control of affairs by fair-seeming words and by attacks of policy rather than of force. For, on the one hand, they had as evidence in their favour that surely those who have an equal voice with themselves would never have taken part in their campaigns had not those whom they attacked been guilty of some wrong; and on the other hand, they also brought the united strength of the strongest states against the less powerful first, and leaving the former to the last they counted upon finding them weaker when all the rest had been removed from around them. But if they had begun with us, while the whole body of allies were not only still strong in
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αὐτῶν τε ἰσχύν καὶ πρὸς ὃ τι χρῆ στῆναι, οὐκ
4 ἀν ὁμοίως ἐχειρώσαντο. τὸ τε ναυτικὸν ἧμῶν
παρεῖχὲ τινα φόβον μή ποτε καθ᾽ ἐν γενόμενον
ἡ ὑμῖν ἢ ἄλλο τῷ προσθέμενον κίνδυνον σφίσι
5 παράσχῃ. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ θεραπείας τοῦ τε
κοινοῦ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν αἰεὶ προεστῶτων περιεγ-
6 γνόμεθα. οὐ μὲντοι ἐπὶ πολὺ γ᾽ ἂν ἔδοκούμεν
δυνηθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ὁ πόλεμος ὄθε κατέστη, παρα-
δεῖγμασι χρώμενοι τοῖς ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους.

XII. “Τῆς οὖν αὐτῆς ἡ φιλία ἐγίγνετο ἡ ἐλευ-
θερία πιστῆ, ἐν ἡ παρὰ γνώμην ἄλληλους ὑπε-
δεχόμεθα καὶ οἱ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδιότες
ἐθεράπευον, ἥμεις δὲ ἐκεῖνοι ἐν τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ τὸ
αὐτὸ ἑποιούμεν· ὅ τε τοῖς ἄλλοις μᾶλιστα εὕνοια
πίστιν βεβαιοῖ, ἡμῖν τούτῳ ὁ φόβος ἐχυρὸν
παρεῖχε, δέει τε τὸ πλέον ἡ φιλία κατεχόμενοι
ξύμμαχοι ἦμεν· καὶ ὅποτέροις θάσσον παράσχοι
ἀσφάλεια θάρσος, οὕτωι πρότεροι τι καὶ παρα-
2 βῆσεσθαι ἐμελλον. ὡστε εἰ τῷ δοκοῦμεν ἀδικεῖν
προαιροστάντες διὰ τὴν ἐκεῖνων μέλλησιν τῶν ἐς
ἡμᾶς δεινῶν, αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἀντανακλάντες σαφῶς
3 εἰδέναι εἰ τι αὐτῶν ἐσται, οὐκ ὅρθως σκοπεῖ. εἰ
γὰρ δυνατοὶ ἦμεν ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ἀντεπιβου-
λεύσαι, καὶ ἀντιμελήσαι τι ἐδει ἡμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ
ὁμοίου ἑπ᾽ ἐκείνους λέναι· ἑπ᾽ ἐκείνοις δὲ ὄντος
αἰεὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν εἶναι δεὶ τὸ
προαιροστάσθαι.

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BOOK III. xi. 3-xii. 3

their own strength, but also had a leader to rally to, they would not have got the mastery so easily. Besides, our navy caused them some fear, lest it should some day be augmented by being united either with yours or another's and thus become a menace to themselves. To some extent also we owe our salvation to the court we paid to the Athenian people and to the political leaders of the day. But we could not have expected to be able to survive for long, if we may judge by their conduct toward the other allies, unless this war had broken out.

XII. "Was this then a friendship or a freedom to put faith in, where we violated our real feelings whenever we treated each other as friends? They courted us in time of war only because they were afraid of us, while we acted in the same manner toward them in time of peace; and good faith, which in most cases is made steadfast by good will, was in our case made secure by fear, and it was fear rather than friendship that held us both to the alliance; and whichever of us should soonest gain boldness through a feeling of security was bound to be the first to commit some act of transgression also. If, therefore, anyone thinks that, just because they postponed the measures we dreaded, we do wrong in revolting first, without having waited on our side until we were quite sure that any of our suspicions would come true, he is in error. For if we were in a position to meet their plotting by counter-measures on equal terms with them, it was indeed incumbent upon us on our part to postpone likewise our offensive against them; but since the power of attack is always in their hands, the right of acting betimes in our own defence must necessarily be in ours.
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XIII. "Τοιαύτας ἔχοντες προφάσεις καὶ αἰτίας, ὦ Δακεδαμόνοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, ἀπέστημεν, σαφεῖς μὲν τοῖς ἄκούσας γυναῖς ὡς εἰκότως ἐξηρᾶσαμεν, ἵκανας δὲ ἦμᾶς ἐκφοβήσαι καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειάς τινα τρέψαι, Βουλομένους μὲν καὶ πάλαι, ὅτε ἔτι ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ ἐπέμψαμεν ὡς ὑμᾶς περὶ ἀποστάσεως, ὑμῶν δὲ οὐ προσδεξαμένων κωλυθέντας· νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ Βοιωτοὶ προεκαλέσαντο, εὐθὺς ὑπηκούσαμεν, καὶ ἐνομίζομεν ἀποστήσεθαί διπλὴν ἀπόστασιν, ἀπὸ τοῦ 'Ελλήνων μὴ ἄνων κακῶς ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς μετ' 'Αθηναίων, ἄλλα ξυνελευθερῶν, ἀπὸ τοῦ 'Αθηναίων μὴ αὐτοὶ διαφθαρῆναι ὑπὸ ἐκείνων ἐν ὑστέρῳ, ἀλλὰ προ-

2 ποιῆσαι. ἢ μέντοι ἀπόστασις ὑμῶν θάσσον γεγένηται καὶ ἀπαράσκευος· ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον χρὴ ξυμμάχους δεξαμένους ἦμᾶς διὰ ταχέων βοήθειαν ἀποστέλλειν, ἵνα φαίνησθε αμύωντες τε οἷς δέι καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοὺς πολεμίους βλάπ-

3 τούτως. καιρὸς δὲ ὡς οὕτω πρότερον. νόσῳ τε γὰρ ἐφθάραται Ἀθηναίοι καὶ χρημάτων δαπάνη, νήσες τε αὐτοῖς αἱ μὴν περὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν εἰσίν, 4 αἱ δ' ἐφ' ἦμῖν τετάχαται· ὥστε οὐκ εἰκὸς αὐτοὺς περιουσίαν νεῶν ἔχειν, ἡν ὑμεῖς ἐν τῷ θέρει τόδε ναυσὶ τε καὶ πεζῷ ἀμα ἐπεσβάλητο τὸ δεύτερον, ἀλλ' ἢ ὑμᾶς οὐκ ἀμυνοῦνται ἐπιπλέοντας ἢ ἀπ' 5 ἀμφοτέρων ἀποχωρήσουται. νομίσῃ τε μηδεῖς

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1 This has not been definitely stated above, but it is implied in ch. ii. 3, v. 4.

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BOOK III. xiii. 1-5

XIII. "Such were the motives and reasons, Lacedaemonians and allies, which led us to revolt, and they are clear enough to convince all who hear them that we had good grounds for our action, and cogent enough to alarm us and impel us to seek some means of safety. This we long ago wished to do while you were still at peace, when we sent envoys to you suggesting that we should revolt, but were prevented from doing so because you would not receive us. But now, when the Boeotians invited us we responded promptly. It was our intention to make at once a double withdrawal—from the Hellenes and thus aid in liberating them instead of joining the Athenians to do them wrong; and from the Athenians, and thus destroy them first instead of being ourselves destroyed by them afterwards. Our revolt, however, has been made prematurely and without preparation; wherefore it is the more incumbent upon you to receive us as allies and quickly send us aid, in order that all men may see that you protect those whom you ought to protect and at the same time harm your enemies. And it is an opportunity such as never has been before. For the Athenians have been ruined by pestilence as well as by heavy expenses. Part of their fleet is cruising about your coasts, part is arrayed against us; so that it is not likely that they have any ships to spare if you attack them this coming summer a second time, by sea as well as by land; but they will either not resist you when you sail against them, or else they will have to withdraw their fleets both from our waters and from yours. And let no one think that he will be incurring a risk

2 i.e. from the Delian Confederacy.
3 cf. ch. vii. 2.
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ἀλλοτρίας γῆς πέρι ὁικεῖον κίνδυνον ἔχειν. ο箢 γὰρ δοκεῖ μακρὰν ἀπεῖναι ἡ Λέσβος, τὴν ὑφελίαν αὐτῇ ἐγγύθεν παρέξει. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἦσται ὁ πόλεμος, ὡς τις οἴεται, ἀλλὰ δὴ ἢ ἢ
6 Ἀττικὴ ὕφελεῖταί. ἔστι δὲ τῶν χρημάτων ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἡ πρόσοδος, καὶ ἐτὶ μείζων ἦσται, εἰ ἡμᾶς καταστρέψονται οὔτε γὰρ ἀποστήσεται ἀλλὸς τά τε ἡμέτερα προσγενήσεται, πάθοιμον
7 τὸ ἀν δεινότερα ἢ οἱ πρὶν δουλεύοντες. βοηθη-
σάντων δὲ υμῶν προθύμως πόλιν τε προσλήψεσθε
ναυτικόν ἔχουσαν μέγα, οὔτε υμῖν μάλιστα
προσδεῖ, καὶ Ἀθηναίους ῥᾴδιν καθαιρήσετε ύφαι-
ροῦντες αὐτῶν τοὺς ξυμμάχους (θρασύτερον γὰρ
πᾶς τις προσχωρήσεται), τὴν τε αἰτίαν ἄπο-
φεύξεσθε ἢν εἰχετε μὴ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ὑφισταμένοις,
ハウ ἐλευθεροῦντες φαίνησθε, τὸ κράτος τοῦ
πολέμου βεβαιῶτερον ἔχετε.

XIV. “Αἰσχυνθέντες οὖν τὰς τῶν Ἐλλήνων
ἐς ἡμᾶς ἐλπίδας καὶ Δία τῶν Ὀλύμπιων, ἐν οἷ
τῷ ἱερῷ ἢσα καὶ ικέται ἐσμέν, ἐπαμύνατε Μυτιλη-
ναῖοις ξύμμαχοι γενόμενοι, καὶ μὴ πρόησθε ἡμᾶς,
ἰδιόν μὲν τὸν κίνδυνον τῶν σωμάτων παραβαλλο-
μένους, κοινὴν δὲ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ κατορθῶσι ὑφελίαν ἀπασί δώσοντας, ἔτι δὲ κοινότερα τὴν βλάβην,
2 εἰ μὴ πεισθέντων υμῶν σφαλησόμεθα. γιγνεσθε
δὲ ἄνδρες οὐσσετε υμᾶς οἴ τε Ἐλληνες ἀξιοῦσι
καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον δέος βούλεται.”

1 οὖκ is inserted by Hude.
of his own for the country of another. For though
Lesbos seems to him to be a long way off, the help
she will bring him will be close at hand. For the war
will not be in Attica,\(^1\) as some think, but in those
countries from which Athens derives its support.
The revenues of Athens come from her allies, and
they will be still greater if they shall subdue us; for
for not only will no one else revolt, but our resources
will be added to hers, and we should be treated with
greater rigour\(^2\) than those who have long been slaves.
But if you give us your hearty support, you will add
to your league a state that has a large navy, a thing
of which you still stand most in need, and you will
find it easier to overthrow the Athenians by gradually
drawing their allies away from them—for every one
will be emboldened to come over to your side—and
you will free yourselves of the reproach under which
you have heretofore laboured, of refusing\(^3\) to aid
those who revolt from the Athenians. But if you
openly play the part of liberators,\(^4\) the more certain
will be your victory in the war.

XIV. “Reverencing, then, not only the hopes
which the Hellenes place in you, but also that Olym-
piam Zeus in whose temple we are even as suppliants,
succour the Mytilenaeans by entering on this alliance;
and do not abandon us when we are hazarding our
lives in a risk all our own, but shall bring to all a
general benefit if we succeed—and a still more
general injury if through your refusal we shall fail.
Prove yourselves, therefore, men such as the Hellenes
account you and our fears would have you be.”

\(^1\) i.e. the war will not be decided in Attica.
\(^2\) Especially as regards the tribute which would be exacted.
\(^3\) cf. I. lxix. 1, 5. \(^4\) cf. II. viii. 4.
THUCYDIDES

XV. Τοιαύτα μὲν οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι ἔπινον. οἱ δὲ Δακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπειδὴ ἦκουσαν, προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς λόγους ξυμμάχους τε τοὺς Δεσβίους ἐποίησαντο καὶ τὴν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβολὴν τοῖς τε ξυμμάχους παροῦν κατὰ τάχος ἔφραξον ἵναν ἐς τὸν ἱσθμὸν τοὺς δύο μέρεσιν ὡς ποιησόμενοι, καὶ αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι ἀφίκοντο, καὶ ὅλκους παρεσκεύαζον τῶν νεῶν ἐν τῷ ἱσθμῷ ὡς υπεροίσουτε ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου ἐς τὴν πρὸς Ἀθήνας θάλασσαν καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ ἀμα 2 ἐπιόντες. καὶ οἱ μὲν προθύμως παῦτα ἔπρασσον· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι βραδέως τε ξυνελέγοντο καὶ ἐν καρπῷ ξυγκομιδὴ ἦσαν καὶ ἀρρωστίᾳ τοῦ στρατεύειν.

XVI. Αἰσθομένοι δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ κατάγνωσιν ἀσθενείας σφῶν παρασκευαζόμενοι, δηλῶσαι βουλόμενοι ὅτι οὔκ ὅρθως ἐγνώκασιν, ἀλλ' οἵ τε εἰσὶ μὴ κινούντες τὸ ἐπὶ Δέσβῳ ναυτικόν καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἐπὶ τὸν ῥαδίως ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐπιλήψασαν ναῦς ἕκατον ἐσβάντες αὐτοὶ τε πλὴν ἰππέων καὶ πεντακοσιομεῖδιμων καὶ οἱ μέτοικοι, καὶ παρὰ τὸν ἱσθμὸν ἀναγαγόντες ἐπὶ δεξιὰ τὸ ἐποινύντο καὶ ἀπο- 2 βάσεις τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἢ δοκοίν αὐτοῖς. οἱ δὲ Δακεδαιμόνιοι ὁρῶντες πολὺν τῶν παράλογον τά τε ὑπὸ τῶν Δεσβίων ῥηθέντα ἥγουντο οὐκ

1 cf. ii. x. 2.
2 Of citizens usually only the θῆτες, who were light-armed troops on land, served in the fleet (vi. xliii); but in 'critical
XV. Thus spoke the Mytileneans. The Lacedaemonians and their allies, after they had heard them, accepted their proposals, and received the Lesbians as allies. Those allies who were there present were directed to assemble with all speed at the Isthmus with two-thirds of their forces for the purpose of making the proposed invasion of Attica; and the Lacedaemonians themselves arrived first and proceeded to construct on the Isthmus hauling-machines with which to transfer the ships from Corinth to the sea on the Athenian side, in order to attack Athens both by sea and by land. They set to work zealously at these things, but the rest of the allies collected slowly, since they were busy gathering in their harvest and were in no mood for campaigning.

XVI. Meanwhile the Athenians, perceiving that the enemy, in making their preparations, were acting upon a conviction of their own weakness, and wishing to show that they were mistaken in their judgment, and that without moving the fleet at Lesbos they could easily ward off the new force coming from the Peloponnesus, manned one hundred ships, the citizens,—except the knights and the highest class—embarking as well as the resident aliens. Then putting out to sea they displayed their strength along the coast of the Isthmus and made descents upon the Peloponnesus wherever they pleased. As for the Lacedaemonians, when they saw how greatly they had miscalculated, they concluded that the reports of the Lesbians were untrue, and regarding the

times members of the three upper classes, whose regular duty was hoplite service, might be pressed into service in the fleet (vii. xxiv. 2).

3 cf. ch. xiii. 3, 4.
THUCYDIDES

ἀληθῆ καὶ ἄπορα νομίζοντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ ἐξύμμαχοι ἂμα οὐ παρῆσαν καὶ ἡγέσιτον καὶ αἱ περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον τριάκοντα νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὴν περιοικίδα αὐτῶν πορθοῦσα, ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπὶ οἰκίαν. Ὑστερον δὲ ναυτικὸν παρασκευαζὼν ὦ τι πέμψωσιν ἐς τὴν Δέσβον καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἐπῆγγελον τεσσαράκοντα νεῶν πλῆθος καὶ ναῦαρχον προσέταξαν Ἀλκίδαν, ὅς ἐμελλείν ἐπιπλεύσεσθαι. ἀνεχώρησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς ἐκατόν ναυσίν, ἐπειδή καὶ ἐκείνους εἶδον.

XVII. Καὶ 1 κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τούτον ὅν ἂι νήσει ἐπέλευν ἐν τοῖς πλείσται δὴ νῆες ἀμί αὐτοῖς ἐνεργοὶ κάλλει 2 ἐγένοντο, παραπλήσιαι 2 δὲ καὶ ἔτι πλείους ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου. τὴν τε γὰρ Ἀττικὴν καὶ Εὔβοιαν καὶ Σαλαμίνα ἐκατόν ἐφύλασσον καὶ περὶ Πελοπόννησον ἐσέρα ἐκατόν ἶσαν, χωρὶς δὲ αἱ περὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις χωρίοις, ὥστε αἱ πᾶσαι ἀμα ἐγίγνοντο ἐν ἐνὶ θέρει διακόσιαι καὶ πεντήκοντα. 3 καὶ τὰ χρήματα τούτο μάλιστα ὑπάνωσε μετὰ Ποτίδαιας, τὴν τε γὰρ Ποτίδαιαν διδραχμοὶ ὀπλίται ἐφρούρων (ἀυτῷ γὰρ καὶ ὑπηρέτη δραχμῆν ἐλάμβανε τῆς ἡμέρας), τρισχίλιοι μὲν οἱ πρῶτοι, ὃν οὐκ ἐλάσσους διεπολίρκησαν, ἐξακόσιοι δὲ καὶ χίλιοι μετὰ Φορμίων, οἱ προαπῆλθον νῆες τε αἱ πᾶσαι τὸν αὐτῶν μισθὸν

1 This whole chapter is condemned as spurious by Steup, followed by Hude.
2 Untranslatable in this context: Stahl writes καὶ ἄλλη, van Herwerden ἄλλαι ἄλλη, Cullinan κάλλαι, L. Herbst σ’ καὶ λ’.

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expedition as impracticable, since their allies had not yet arrived, and, besides, word had come to them that the thirty\(^1\) ships which were cruising around the Peloponnese were ravaging their own country districts, they went back home. Later,\(^2\) however, they prepared a fleet which was to be dispatched to Lesbos and sent orders to the allied states for forty ships, appointing Alcidas who was to sail as admiral of this fleet. And when the Athenians saw that the enemy had withdrawn, they also returned home with their hundred ships.

XVII. At the time when these ships were at sea about the largest number the Athenians ever had at once were on active service, though there were as many or even more at the beginning of the war. For one hundred ships were guarding Attica, Euboea and Salamis, and another hundred were cruising off the Peloponnesus, besides those at Potidaea and in other places, so that the number in service at the same time in a single summer was all told two hundred and fifty. It was this effort, together with Potidaea, that chiefly exhausted their resources of money. For in the siege of Potidaea the hoplite received a wage of two drachmas a day, one for himself and one for his attendant; and there were at first three thousand of these, and the number was not less than this throughout the siege, besides sixteen hundred who came with Phormio, but went away before the siege was over; and the sailors on the ships all drew the same pay as the soldiers.

\(^1\) cf. ch. vii. 1. \(^2\) cf. ch. xxv. 1; xxvi. 1.
THUCYDIDIMES

4 ἔφερον. τὰ μὲν οὖν χρήματα οὕτως ὑπαναλώθη
tὸ πρῶτον, καὶ νής τοσαύται δὴ πλεῖσται
ἐπληρώθησαν.

XVIII. Μυτιληναῖοι δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρό-
νον ὃν οἱ Δακεδαμόνιοι περὶ τὸν ἱσθμὸν ἔσαν
ἐπὶ Μήθυμναν ὡς προδιδομένην ἐστράτευσαν
κατὰ γῆν αὐτοὶ τε καὶ οἱ ἐπίκουροι καὶ προσ-
βαλόντες τῇ πόλει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ προκύψει ἢ
προσεδέχοντο, ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ Ἀντίσσης καὶ Πύρρας
καὶ Ἐρέσου, καὶ καταστησάμενοι τὰ ἐν ταῖς
πόλεσι ταύταις βεβαιότερα καὶ τείχῃ κρατύ-

2 ναυτες διὰ τάχους ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἰκου. ἐστρά-
τευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Μήθυμναιοὶ ἀναχωρησάντων
αὐτῶν ἐπ᾽ Ἀντίσσαν καὶ ἐκβοηθείας τινὸς γενο-
μένης πληγέντες ύπὸ τε τῶν Ἀντισσαίων καὶ
τῶν ἐπίκουρων ἀπέθανον τε πολλοὶ καὶ ἀνεχῶ-

3 ρησαν οἱ λοιποὶ κατὰ τάχος. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι
πυνθανόμενοι ταῦτα, τοὺς τε Μυτιληναίους τῆς
γῆς κρατοῦντας καὶ τοὺς σφετέρους στρατιῶτας
οὐχ ἰκανοὺς οὕτως εἰργεῖν, πέμπουσι περὶ τὸ
φθινόπωρον ὡς ἄρχομενον Πάχητα τὸν Ἑπι-
κούρου στρατηγὸν καὶ χιλίους ὀπλίταις ἐαυτῶν.

4 οἱ δὲ αὐτοῖς πλεύσαντες τῶν νεὼν ἀφυκνοῦνται
καὶ περιτείχίζουσι Μυτιλήνην ἐν κύκλῳ ἀπλῶ
τείχει φρούρια δ᾽ ἐστιν οἱ ἐπὶ τῶν καρτερῶν

5 ἐγκατεισχούμεναι. καὶ ἡ μὲν Μυτιλήνη κατὰ
κράτος ἦδη ἀμφισβέτηθην καὶ ἐκ γῆς καὶ ἐκ
θαλάσσης εἰργετο, καὶ ὁ χειμῶν ἥρχετο γί-
γνεσθαι.

XIX. Προσδεόμενοι δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι χρημάτων
ἐς τὴν πολισσίαν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐσενεγκόντες τότε

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BOOK III. xvii. 3—xix. 1

It was in this way, then, that their money was exhausted at first, and this was the largest number of ships manned by them.

XVIII. While the Lacedaemonians were at the Isthmus, the Mytilenaeans and their auxiliaries \(^1\) marched with their army against Methymna, which they supposed was being betrayed into their hands; and they assaulted the city, but when their attempt did not succeed as they had expected, they went off to Antissa, Pyrrha and Eresus, and after establishing their interests in these cities on a firmer basis and strengthening the walls, went home in haste. As soon, however, as they had withdrawn, the Methymnaeans in their turn made an expedition against Antissa; but a sortie was made by the inhabitants of Antissa and the auxiliary troops in which the Methymnaeans were defeated and many of them slain, whereupon the rest withdrew in haste. Now when the Athenians learned that the Mytilenaeans were masters of the country and that their own soldiers were not numerous enough to keep them within their walls, about the beginning of autumn they sent Paches son of Epicurus in command of a thousand Athenian hoplites, who also served as rowers.\(^2\) When they arrived at Mytilene, they encircled it with a single wall, in which forts were built at a number of strong positions. Mytilene was thus at last completely cut off both by sea and land just as the winter set in.

XIX. Now the Athenians, finding themselves in need of additional funds for the siege, having then

\(^1\) Foreign mercenaries; cf. ch. ii. 2.

\(^2\) The fact of hoplites serving at the oars—evidently for economical reasons (cf. ch. xix. 1)—is especially emphasised. cf. i. x. 4; vi. xci. 4.
THUCYDIDES

πρώτον ἐσφορὰν διακόσια τάλαντα, ἐξεπεμψαν καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀργυρολόγους ναῦς δώδεκα καὶ Δυσικλέα πέμπτον αὐτῶν στρατηγόν.

2 ὁ δὲ ἄλλα τε ἡργυρολόγει καὶ περιέπλει, καὶ τῆς Καρίας ἐκ Μυσούντος ἀναβᾶς διὰ τοῦ Μαιάνδρου πεδίου μέχρι τοῦ Σανδίου λόφου, ἐπιθεμένων τῶν Καρών καὶ Ἀναιτῶν, αὐτὸς τε διαφθείρεται καὶ τῆς ἄλλης στρατιάς πολλοῖ.

XX. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος οἱ Πλαταῖοι (ἐτε γὰρ ἐπολυορκοῦντο ὑπὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Βουωτῶν) ἐπειδὴ τῷ τε σήμερον ἐπιλείποντι ἐπιέζοντο καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν οὐδεμιὰ ἔλπις ἢ τιμωρίας οὐδὲ ἄλλη σωτηρία ἐφαίνεστο, ἐπιβουλεύοντοι αὐτοὶ τε καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι οἱ ξυμπολυορκούμενοι πρῶτον μὲν πάντες ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ὑπερβηθῆναι τὰ τείχη τῶν πολεμίων, ἢν δύνωνται βιάσασθαι, ἐσηγησαμένων τὴν πεῖραν αὐτοῦς Θεαιεντοῦ τε τοῦ Τολμίδου, ἄνδρος μάντεως, καὶ Ἐὐπομπίδου 2 τοῦ Δαῖμαχου, δς καὶ ἐστρατήγει ἐπειτα οἱ μὲν ἡμίσεις ἀπόκυνησάν πως τὸν κίνδυνον μέγαν ἠγησάμενοι, ἢς δὲ ἄνδρας διακοσίως καὶ εἰκοσι μάλιστα ἐνέμειναν τῇ ἔξοδῷ ἐθελοντα τρόπῳ 3 τού καθ. κλίμακας ἐποιήσαντο ἵσας τῷ τείχῃ τῶν πολεμίων. ξυνεμετρήσαντο δὲ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς τῶν πλίνθων, ἢ ἔτυχε πρὸς σφᾶς ὡς ἐξαληθομένου τὸ τείχος αὐτῶν. ἤριθμοῦντο δὲ πολλοὶ ἀμα τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ ἐμελλον οἱ μὲν τινες

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for the first time resorted to a property tax\(^1\) upon themselves to the amount of two hundred talents, also sent to the allies twelve ships under the command of Lysicles and four others, to collect money from them. He cruised about and collected money at various places; but on his way inland from Myus in Caria through the plain of the Meander, after he had reached the hill of Sandius, he was attacked by the Carians and the Anaeitans and slain, together with many of his army.

XX. During the same winter the Plataeans, who were still\(^2\) being besieged by the Peloponnesians and the Boeotians, began to be distressed by failure of their supply of food, and since there was no hope of aid from Athens nor any other means of safety in sight, they and the Athenians who were besieged with them planned to leave the city and climb over the enemy’s walls, in the hope that they might be able to force a passage. The attempt was suggested to them by Theaenetus son of Tolmides, a soothsayer, and Eupompidas son of Daïmachus, who was one of the generals. At first all were to take part, but afterwards half of them somehow lost heart, thinking the risk too great, and only about two hundred and twenty voluntarily persisted in making the sortie, which was carried out in the following way. They made ladders equal in height to the enemy’s wall, getting the measure by counting the layers of bricks at a point where the enemy’s wall on the side facing Plataea happened not to have been whitewashed. Many counted the layers at the same time, and while

\(^1\) The ἔσφαρδ was an extraordinary tax levied only in war time. See Boeckh, *Public Economy*, p. 612.

\(^2\) For previous discussion of this siege, see II. lxxi.–lxxviii.
THUCYDIDES

ἀμαρτήσεσθαι, οί δὲ πλείους τεύξεσθαι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς λόγισμοῦ, ἀλλαὶ τε καὶ πολλάκις ἀριθμοῦντες καὶ ἁμα οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχοντες, ἀλλὰ ῥαδίως καθορωμένου ἐστι ἐδειγμοῦτο τοῦ τείχους.

4 τὴν μὲν οὖν ἐξμέτρησιν τῶν κλιμάκων οὕτως ἔλαβον ἐκ τοῦ πάχους τῆς πλάνης εἰκάσαντες τὸ μέτρον.

XXI. Τὸ δὲ τείχος ἦν τῶν Πελοποννησίων τοιώντι τῇ οἰκοδομήσει. ἐπὶ μὲν δύο τοὺς περιβόλους, πρὸς τε Πλαταιῶν καὶ εἰ τῖς εἴσωθεν ἀπ' Ἀθηνῶν ἐπίοι, διείχον δὲ οἱ περιβόλοι ἐκκαίδεκα.

2 πόδας μάλιστα ἄπτε ἀλλήλως. τὸ οὖν μεταξὺ τοῦτο οἱ ἐκκαίδεκα πόδες 1 τοῖς φύλαξιν οἰκήματα διανευμένα φιλοδόμητο, καὶ ἢν ξυνεχὴ 2 ὅστε ἐν φαίνεσθαι τείχος παχὺ ἐπάλξεις ἔχον ἀμφότερος. διὰ δεκα δὲ ἐπάλξεων πῦργων ἦσαν μεγάλοι καὶ ἰσοπλατείς τῷ τείχει, διήκοντες ἐστὶ τὸ τοῦ ἐσω μέτωπον αὐτοῦ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὸ ἔξω, ὅστε πάροδον μὴ εἶναι παρὰ πῦργον, 3 ἀλλὰ δὶ 4 αὐτῶν μέσων ἁγίασαν. ἥτας οὖν νύκτας, ὧποτέ χειμῶν εἰς νυστέρος, τὰς μὲν ἐπάλξεις ἀπέλειπτον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πῦργων οὕτως δὶ ὀλίγου καὶ ἀνωθέν στεγανῶν τῇ φυλακῇ ἐποιοῦντο. τὸ μὲν οὖν τείχος ὁ περιμετρουμένοι οἱ Πλαταιῆς τοιοῦτον ἦν.

XXII. Οἱ δ', ἐπειδὴ παρεσκεύαστο αὐτοῖς, τηρήσαντες νύκτα χειμέριον ὧδατι καὶ ἀνέμῳ καὶ ἀμ' ἀσέλινῳ ἐξῆσαν. ήγοῦντο δὲ οὐτερ καὶ τῆς

1 oι ἐκκαίδεκα πόδες deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude.
2 ξυνεχὴ with all MSS. except C, which Hude follows.
3 παρὰ πῦργον deleted by Naber, followed by Hude.
BOOK III. xx. 3–xxii. 1

some were sure to make a mistake, the majority were likely to hit the true count, especially since they counted time and again, and, besides, were at no great distance, and the part of the wall they wished to see was easily visible. The measurement of the ladders, then, they got at in this way, reckoning the measure from the thickness of the bricks.

XXI. The wall of the Peloponnesians was built in the following fashion. It had two encircling lines, the inner looking towards Plataea, the outer to guard against attack from the direction of Athens, and the two circuits were distant about sixteen feet from one another. This interval of sixteen feet had in building been divided up into rooms assigned to the guards; and the whole structure was continuous,¹ so as to appear to be a single thick wall furnished with battlements on both sides. And at every tenth battlement there were high towers of the same width as the wall, extending both to the inner and outer faces of it, so that there was no passage left at the sides of the towers, but the guards had to go through the middle of them. Now at night when the weather was rainy the guards left the battlements and kept watch from the towers, which were not far apart and were roofed overhead. Such, then, was the wall by which the Plataeans were beleaguered.

XXII. After the Plataeans had finished their preparations, they waited for a night that was stormy with rain and wind and at the same time moonless, and then went forth. They were led by the men

¹ i.e. the two περιβάλλοι were joined together by a roof.
THUCYDIDES

πείρας αἰτίων ἦσαν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν τάφρον διέβησαν ἣ περιεῖχεν αὐτοὺς, ἔπειτα προσέμειξαν τῷ τείχει τῶν πολεμίων λαθόντες τοὺς φύλακας, ἀνὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν μὲν οὗ προϊόντων αὐτῶν, ψόφῳ δὲ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ προσέναι αὐτοὺς ἀντιπαταγοῦντος 2 τοῦ ἀνέμου οὐ κατακουσάντων· ἀμα δὲ καὶ διέ- χοντες πολὺ ἦσαν, ὅπως τὰ ὄπλα μὴ κρούσιμα πρὸς ἀλληλα αἰσθησιν παρέχοι. (ἡσαν δὲ εὐστα- λεῖς τε τῇ ὀπλίσει καὶ τὸν ἀριστερὸν μόνον πόδα ὑποδεδεμένοι ἀσφαλείας ένεκα τῆς πρὸς τὸν 3 πτηλόν. κατὰ οὖν μετατύργιον προσέμισσον πρὸς τὰς ἐπάλξεις εἰδότες ὦτὶ ἐρήμοι εἰσὶ, (πρῶτον μὲν οἱ τὰς κλίμακας φέροντες, καὶ προσέθεσαν ἔπειτα ἤψιλοι δώδεκα ἔναν εἰςιν ἐφιδιῶ καὶ θώρακι ἀνέβαινον, ὅν ἡγεῖτο Ἀμμέας ὁ Κοροίβου καὶ πρῶτος ἀνέβη, μετὰ δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ ἐπόμενοι ἐξ ἐφ’ ἐκάτερον τῶν πύργων ἀνέβαινον. ἔπειτα ψιλοῖ. ἄλλοι μετὰ τούτοις ἔναν δορατίους ἐξώρουν, οἷς ἑτεροι κατόπιν τὰς ἀστίδας ἐφερον, ὅπως ἐκεῖνοι βῶν προσβαί- νοιεν, καὶ ἐμελλὼν δῶσειν ὅποτε πρὸς τοῖς πολε- 4 μίοις εἶν. (ὡς δὲ ἄνω πλείους ἐγένοντο, ἦσθοντο οἱ ἐκ τῶν πύργων φύλακες· κατέβαλε γὰρ τις τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπάλξεων 5 κεραμίδα, ἦ πεσοῦσα δούπον ἐποίησεν. καὶ αὐτίκα βοὴ ἦν, τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον ἐπὶ τὸ τείχος ὥρμησεν) οὐ γὰρ ἤδει ὁ τι ἦν τὸ δεινὸν σκοτεινῆς νυκτὸς καὶ χειμῶνος ὄντος, καὶ ἀμα οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν Πλαταιῶν ὑπολειμμένοι ἐξελθόντες προσέ- βαλλον τῷ τείχει τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἐκ τούμ-
who were the authors of the enterprise. First they crossed the ditch which surrounded the town, then reached the foot of the enemy's wall unobserved by the guards, who in the all-pervading darkness could not see ahead and could not hear because the clatter of the wind drowned the noise of their approach; and, besides, they kept a good distance apart as they advanced, in order that their arms might not rattle against each other and cause detection. And they were not only lightly armed but also had only the left foot sandalled, for security against slipping in the mud. So they came up to the battlements at a space between two towers, knowing that the battlements were deserted. First came the men with the ladders, who set them against the wall; next came twelve light-armed men, with dagger and corslet only, who mounted the ladders. These were led by Ammeas son of Coroebus, who was the first to ascend, and after him his followers ascended, six men going against each of the adjoining towers. Next after these came other light troops armed with short spears, their shields being borne by another group which followed, that the former might advance more easily; and their shields were to be handed them when they were close to the enemy. Now when several had got up, the sentinels on the towers became aware of their presence; for one of the Plataeans in laying hold of the battlements threw down a tile, which fell with a thud. And immediately there was an outcry, and the garrison rushed to the wall; for they did not know what the danger was, as the night was dark and stormy, and at the same time the Plataeans who had been left behind in the town went out and attacked the wall of the Peloponnesians on the side.
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παλιν ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες αὐτῶν ὑπερέβαινον, ὡς 6 ἦκιστα πρὸς αὐτούς τὸν νοῦν ἔχοιεν. ἔθορυβόυντο μὲν οὖν κατὰ χώραν μένοντες, βοηθεῖν δὲ οὐδείς ἑτόλμα ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φυλακῆς, ἄλλῳ ἐν ἀπόρῳ 7 ἦσαν εἰκάσαι τὸ γιγνόμενον. καὶ οἱ τρικόσιοι αὐτῶν, οἷς ἐτέτακτο παραβοθήθειν εἶ τι δέοι, ἑκόρουν ἐξοθεν τοῦ τείχους πρὸς τὴν βοήν, 8 φρυκτοὶ τῇ ἑροντο ἐς τὰς Ὁμήρας πολέμιου παρανἰσχῦν δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Πλαταιῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους φρυκτοὺς πολλοὺς πρότερον παρεσκευασμένους ἐς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὡς ἀσαφῆ τὰ σημεῖα τῆς φυκτωρίας τοῖς πολεμίοις ἢ καὶ μὴ βοηθοῦν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς νομίζοντες τὸ γιγνόμενον εἰναι ἢ τὸ ὠν, πρὸν σφῶν οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἐξοίχοτες διαφύγοιεν καὶ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς ἀντιλάβοιτο.

XXIII. Οἱ δ᾿ ὑπερβαινοντες τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἐν τούτῳ, ὡς οἱ πρῶτοι αὐτῶν ἀνεβεβήκεσαν καὶ τοῦ πύργου ἐκατέρω τοὺς φύλακας διαφθείραντες ἐκεκρατήκεσαν, τὰς τε διόδους τῶν πύργων ἑνστάντες αὐτοῖς ἐφύλασσον μνήμα δι’ αὐτῶν ἐπιβοθείν, καὶ κλίμακας προσθέντες ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους τοῦ πύργου καὶ ἑπαναβιβάζαντες ἄνδρας πλείους, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων τοὺς ἐπιβοθοῦντας καὶ κάτωθεν καὶ ἀνώθεν εἰργοὺς βάλλοντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ πλείους πολλὰς προσθέντες κλίμακας ἄμα καὶ τὰς ἑπάλξεις ἀπώσαντες διὰ 2 τοῦ μεταπυργίον ὑπερέβαινον. ὃ δὲ διακομιζόμενος αἰεὶ ἱστατο ἐπὶ τοῦ χείλους τῆς τάφρου

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opposite that over which their men were climbing, to distract attention from them as far as possible. Now the sentinels remained at their posts, though in a state of excitement, no one daring to leave his station and lend aid, but all being at a loss to conjecture what was going on. Furthermore, the three hundred, who had been appointed to bring aid wherever it was needed, proceeded outside of the wall in the direction of the outcry, and beacon fires indicating danger from the enemy were flashed towards Thebes. But the Plataeans in the town at the same time raised from their wall many beacons, which had been prepared beforehand for this very purpose, that the enemy’s beacon signals might be rendered unintelligible and that the Thebans, thinking that the situation was different from what it really was, might defer bringing aid until the Plataeans who were leaving should have made good their escape and reached safety.

XXIII. Meanwhile, when the foremost of the Plataeans who were scaling the walls had mounted, slain the guards, and got possession of the two towers, they themselves took position inside the towers and guarded the passageways, that no one might come through these against them. Then from the top of the wall they placed ladders against the towers, got up a number of men, and kept all assailants away from the towers, shooting at them from below and above. Meanwhile the others, the main body, had put up a large number of ladders and thrown down the battlements, and were climbing over through the space between the towers. And as each one got over he halted on the edge of the ditch; and

1 i.e. from the tops of the towers and from the wall at their base.
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καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐτὸξευόν τε καὶ ἦκόντιξον, εἰ τις παραβοθήδων παρὰ τὸ τεῖχος καλυτῆς γίγνοιτο 3 τῆς διαβάσεως. ἔπει δὲ πάντες διεπεπεραιώντο, οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων χαλεπῶς οἱ τελευταίοι καταβαίνοντες ἔχωρον ἐπὶ τὴν τάφρον, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ τριακόσιοι αὐτοῖς ἐπεφέροντο λαμπάδας 4 ἔχοντες. οἱ μὲν οὖν Πλαταιῆς ἐκείνους ἐδὼρων μᾶλλον ἐκ τοῦ σκότους ἑστώτες ἐπὶ τοῦ χείλους τῆς τάφρου, καὶ ἐτὸξευόν τε καὶ ἐσηκώντιξον ἐς τὰ γυμνά, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἄφανεί  ὄντες ἤσσον διὰ τὰς λαμπάδας καθεωρώντο, ὡστε φθάνουσι τῶν Πλαταιῶν καὶ οἱ ὀστατοί διαβάντες τὴν τάφρον, 5 χαλεπῶς δὲ καὶ βιαῖως· κρύσταλλός τε γὰρ ἐπετηγεῖ οὐ δέσαιας ἐν αὐτῇ ὦστ' ἐπελθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἶος ἀπηλώτου ἡ βορέου 1 ύδατόδης μᾶλλον, καὶ ἡ νῦς τοιοῦτο ἀνέμω ὑπονειφομένη (πολὺ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεποίηκε, ὃ μόλις ὑπερέχοντες ἐπεραιώθησαν,) ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ ἡ διάφευξις αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον διὰ τοῦ χειμώνος τὸ μέγεθος.

XXIV. Ὀρμήσαντες δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τάφρου οἱ Πλαταιῆς ἐχώρουν ἅθροι τὴν ἐς Θῆβας φέρουσαν ὅδον ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸ τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτους ἢρόν, νομίζοντες ἢκιστ' ἀν σφᾶς ταύτην αὐτοὺς ὑποτοπήσαι τραπέζαι τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολεμίους· καὶ ἀμα ἐφὼν τοὺς Πελοποννησίους την πρὸς Κιθαρώνα καὶ Δρυὸς κεφαλᾶς τὴν ἐπ' Ἀθηνῶν 2 φέρουσαν μετὰ λαμπάδων διώκοντας. καὶ ἔπι μὲν ἐξ ἡ ἐπτὰ στάδιονς οἱ Πλαταιῆς τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν Θηβῶν ἐχώρησαν, ἐπειδ' ὑποστρέφαντες ἤσαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὅρος φέρουσαν ὅδον. ἐς Ἐρύθρας καὶ

1 ἡ βορέων, deleted by Dobree, followed by Hude. Poppo would transpose ὑδατόδης μᾶλλον, or bracket ὑδατόδης.
from there they shot arrows and hurled javelins at any enemy who tried to approach along the wall and interfere with their crossing. And when all these had reached the other side, the men who had held the towers, the last of whom descended with difficulty, advanced toward the ditch; and at the same time the three hundred bore down upon them, carrying torches. Now the Plataeans, as they stood on the edge of the ditch, saw them better out of the darkness, and kept launching arrows and javelins at their uncovered sides, while they themselves, being in the shadow, were rendered less visible by the enemy’s torches. Consequently even the last of the Plataeans got safely across the ditch, though only with difficulty and after a hard struggle; for in the ditch ice had formed that was not firm enough to walk on but mushy, such as is formed when the wind is east instead of north; and since the night, the wind being from that quarter, was somewhat snowy, the water in the ditch had become so deep that they could scarcely keep their heads above it as they crossed. It was, however, chiefly the violence of the storm that enabled them to escape at all.

XXIV. Starting from the ditch, the Plataeans advanced in a body along the road toward Thebes, having on their right the shrine of the hero Androcles; for they thought that no one would ever suspect them of having taken this road, which led towards their enemies; besides, they saw the Peloponnesians, torches in hand, taking in pursuit the road toward Cithaeron and Dryoscephalae, which is the road to Athens. And for six or seven stadia the Plataeans proceeded on the road toward Thebes, then turned and followed that leading towards Erythrae and
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Τοιαύτα, καὶ λαβόμενοι τῶν ὅρων (διαφεύγουσιν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, ἄνδρες δώδεκα καὶ διακόσιοι ἀπὸ πλείστων) εἰς γὰρ τινες αὐτῶν οἱ ἀπετράποντος ἐς τὴν πόλιν πρὶν υπερβαίνειν, εἰς δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ ἕξω τάφῳ τοξῶσις ἐλήφθη. οἱ μὲν οὖν Πελο- ποννησίωι κατὰ χώραν ἐγένοντο τῆς βοσθείας παυσάμενοι: οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Πλαταίης τῶν μὲν γεγενημένων εἰδότες οὐδέν, τῶν δὲ ἀποτραπο- μένων σφίσιν ἀπαγγειλάντων ὡς οὔδεις περίεστι, κήρυκα ἐκτέμψαντες, ἐπεὶ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, ἐσπέν- δοντο ἀναίρεσιν τοῖς νεκροῖς, μαθόντες δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπαύσαντο, οἱ μὲν δὴ τῶν Πλαταίων ἄνδρες οὔτω υπερβάντες ἐσώθησαν.

XXV. Ἔκ δὲ τῆς Δακεδαίμονος τοῦ αὐτοῦ χει- μῶνος τελευτῶντος ἐκτέμπεται Σάλαιθος ὁ Δακε- δαίμωνος ἐς Μυτιλήνην τριήρει. καὶ πλεύσας ἐς Πύρραν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς πεζῇ κατὰ χαράδραν τινά, ἔπεσεν ὑπερβατὸν ἡ τὸ περιτείχισμα, διαλαθὼν ἐσέρχεται ὑπὸ τὴν Μυτιλήνην, καὶ ἔλεγε τοῖς προέδροις ὅτι ἐσβολή τε ἀμα ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν ἔσται καὶ αἱ τεσσαράκοντα νῆσει παρέσονται ἢς ἔδει βοηθῆσαι αὐτοῖς, προσποπεμφθήναι τε αὐτὸς τούτων ἔνεκα καὶ ἀμα τῶν ἅλλων ἐπιμελη- 2 σόμενος. καὶ οἱ μὲν Μυτιληναιοὶ ἐθάρσουν τε καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἤσσον εἴχον τὴν γνώμην ὡστε ξυμβαίνειν. ὃ τε χειμῶν ἐτελεύτα ἐντός, καὶ τέταρτον ἔτος τοῦ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τάδε ὁν Θουκυδίδης ξυνεγραψεν.

XXVI. Τοῦ δὲ ἐπιγυγομένου θέρους οἱ Πελο- ποννησιοὶ ἐπείδη τάς ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην 2 τεσ-

1 Van Herwerden suggests ὑποβατόν, followed by Hude.
2 δῦν καὶ of the MSS. before τεσσαράκοντα suspected by Krüger and deleted by van Herwerden.
Hysiae, and reaching the mountains escaped to Athens. They were only two hundred and twelve men out of a larger number; for some had turned back to the town without trying to climb the wall, and one man, an archer, had been taken at the outer ditch. The Peloponnnesians, then, desisted from the pursuit and returned to their post. But the Plataeans in the town, knowing nothing of what had really happened, but informed by those who had turned back that no one survived, sent a herald at daybreak and asked for a truce that they might take up their dead; on learning the truth however, they desisted. So these Plataeans got over the wall in the manner described and reached safety.¹

XXV. Toward the close of the same winter, Salae-thus the Lacedaemonian was sent in a trireme from Lacedaemon to Mytilene. Landing at Pyrrha and proceeding thence on foot, he followed the bed of a ravine, where the circuit-wall could be crossed, and came undetected into Mytilene. He told the magistrates that there would be an invasion of Attica and that simultaneously the forty ships ² which were to come to their aid would arrive, adding that he himself had been sent ahead to make these announcements and also to take charge of matters in general. Accordingly the Mytilenaeans were encouraged and were less inclined than ever to make terms with the Athenians. So this winter ended, and with it the fourth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

XXVI. During the following summer the Peloponnesians first despatched the forty ships which they

¹ For the fate of the city and of the Plataeans who remained in it, see chs. lii.–lxviii.
² cf. ch. xvi. 3.
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σαράκοντα ναître ἀπεστειλαν ἁρχοντα Ἀλκίδαν,
δε ἦν αὐτῶις ναύαρχος, προστάξαντες, αὐτὸι ἐσ
tὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ οἱ ξύμαχοι ἐσέβαλον, ὅπως
οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν θορυβούμενοι ἦσσον
tαῖς ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην καταπλεοὺσαις

2 ἐπιβοηθήσωσιν. ἢγεῖτο δὲ τῆς ἐσβολῆς ταύτης
Κλεομένης ὑπὲρ Παυσανίου τοῦ Πλειστοάνκτος
νιέος βασιλέως ὄντος καὶ νεωτέρου ἐτι, πατρὸς

3 δὴ ἀδελφὸς ὁν. ἐδήσαν δὲ τῆς Ἀττικῆς τά
τε πρότερον τετμημένα,1 εἰ τι ἔβεβλαστήκει,
καὶ ὁσα ἐν ταῖς πρὶν ἐσβολαῖς παρελέειπτο·
καὶ ἡ ἐσβολὴ αὐτὴ χαλεπωτάτη ἐγένετο τοῖς

4 Ἀθηναῖοις μετὰ τὴν δευτέραν. ἐπιμένοντες γὰρ
αἰεὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Δέσβου τι πεῦσεθαί τῶν νεὼν
ἔργον ὡς ἥδη πεπεραιωμένων ἐπεξήλθουν τὰ πολλὰ
τέμνοντες. ὡς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀπέβαινεν αὐτῶις ὁν
προσεδέχοντο καὶ ἐπελεοῦτει ὁ σῖτος, ἀνεχό-
ρησαν καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις.

XXVII. Οἱ δὲ Μυτιληναῖοι ἐν τούτῳ, ὡς αἶ τε
νῆς αὐτῶις ὃν ἦκον ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου, ἀλλὰ
ἐνεχρόνιξαν, καὶ ὁ σῖτος ἐπελεοῦτελ, ἀναγκά-

2 ἔσταται ξυμβαίνειν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διὰ τάδε.
ὁ Σάλαιθος καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ προσδεχόμενος ἔτι τὰς
ναύς ὀπλίζει τὸν δῆμον πρότερον ψιλὸν ὄντα ὅσ

1 καὶ of the MSS. before ἐτι deleted by Dindorf.

1 cf. Π. lvii. 2.
2 It is implied that the Lacedaemonians planned this
summer, as on previous invasions, to ravage certain districts

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had promised to Mytilene, appointing in command of them Alcidas, who was the Lacedaemonian admiral, and then invaded Attica, themselves and their allies, in order that the Athenians, threatened on both sea and land, might be deterred from sending a force to attack the fleet that was on its way to Mytilene. The leader of this invasion was Cleomenes, regent for his nephew Pausanias son of Pleistoanax, who was king but still a minor. And they ravaged the parts of Attica that had been laid waste before, wherever any new growth had sprung up, as well as those that had been left untouched in the former invasions. And this invasion proved more grievous to the Athenians than any except the second;¹ for the enemy, who were momentarily expecting to hear from Lesbos of some achievement of their fleet, which they supposed had already got across, went on and on, ravaging most of the country. But when they found that nothing turned out as they expected and their food was exhausted, they withdrew and dispersed to their several cities.²

XXVII. Meanwhile the Mytilenaesians, seeing that the fleet had not arrived from the Peloponnesus but was loitering on the way, and that their food was exhausted, were compelled to make terms with the Athenians by the following circumstances. Salaethus, who himself no longer expected the fleet to come, equipped the commons with heavy armour,³ instead of their former light arms, intending to attack the and then, after hearing of the success of the fleet at Lesbos, to withdraw. But they were kept in Attica longer than they had intended by the delay on the part of the fleet.

³ With shield and spears and breast-plate. The light-armed troops wore no defensive armour and carried spear or bow.
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3 ἐπεξιῶν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις· οί δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἔλαβον ὅπλα, οὔτε ἥκροντο ἐτὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, κατὰ ξυλλόγους τε γιγνόμενοι ἢ τὸν σῶτον ἐκέλευον τοὺς δυνατοὺς φέρειν ἢ τὸ φανερὸν καὶ διανέμειν ἀπασιν, ἢ αὐτὸν ξυγχωρήσαντες πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἔφασαν παραδώσειν τὴν πόλιν. XXVIII. γνώντες δὲ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν οὔτε ἀποκωλυόν δυνατοὶ ὄντες, εἶ τ' ἀπομονωθήσονται τῆς ξυμβάσεως, κιν- δυνεύσοντες, ποιοῦντα κοινὴ ὑμολογίαν πρὸς τε Πάχητα καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, ὡστε Ἀθηναίους μὲν ἐξείναι βουλεύσαι περὶ Μυτιληναίων ὑποίον ἄν τι βούλωνται καὶ τὴν στρατίαν ἢ τὴν πόλιν δέχεσθαι αὐτοὺς, πρεσβείαν δὲ ἀποστέλλειν ἢς τὰς Ἀθήνας Μυτιληναίους περὶ ἐαυτῶν ἐν ὅσῳ δ' ἄν πάλιν ἔλθοις, Πάχητα μέτε δήσαι Μυτιληναίων μηδένα μηδὲ ἀνδραπόδισαι μήτε ἀποκτείναι. ἢ μὲν ξύμβασις αὐτὴ ἐγένετο. οἱ δὲ πράξαντες πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μάλιστα τῶν Μυτιληναίων περιδεεῖς ὄντες, ὡς ἡ στρατιὰ ἐσήλθεν, οὐκ ἦνεσχότο, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοὺς βωμοὺς ὁμοῦ καθίζουσιν· Πάχης δ' ἀναστήσας αὐτοὺς ὡστε μὴ ἀδικήσαι, κατατίθεται ἐς Τένεδον μέχρι 3 οὗ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὸ δόξη· πέμψας δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἀντίσσαν τρήρεις προσεκτήσατο καὶ ταλλα ἄν περὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον καθίστατο ἢ αὐτῷ ἔδοκει. XXIX. Οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶ Πελοποννησίοι, οὓς ἔδει ἐν τάχει παραγενέσθαι, πλέοντες περὶ τε αὐτὴν τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐνδιέ-
Athenians; but the commons, as soon as they had got arms, would no longer obey their commanders, but gathered in groups and ordered the aristocrats to bring out whatever food there was and distribute it to all; otherwise, they said, they would come to terms with the Athenians independently and deliver up the city. XXVIII. Thereupon the men in authority, realizing that they could not prevent this and that they would be in peril if excluded from the capitulation, joined the commons in making an agreement with Paches and his army. The conditions were that the Athenian state should have the power to decide as they pleased about the fate of the Mytileneans and that the besieging army should be admitted into the city; but it was conceded that the Mytileneans might send an embassy to Athens to treat for terms, Paches, meanwhile, until the return of the embassy, agreeing not to imprison or enslave or put to death any Mytilenean. Such was the agreement. But those of the Mytileneans who had been most involved in the intrigue with the Lacedaemonians were in great terror when the army entered the town, and could not keep quiet, but notwithstanding the agreement took refuge at the altars. Paches, however, induced them to leave the altars, promising to do them no injury, and placed them for safe keeping in Tenedos until the Athenians should reach a decision. He also sent triremes to Antissa and took possession of it, and made such other dispositions with reference to the army as seemed best to him.

XXIX. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the forty ships, who ought to have arrived speedily at Mytilene, wasted time on their voyage round the
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τριψαν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον πλοῦν σχολαῖοι κομισθέντες τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Ἀθηναίους λανθάνουσι, πρὶν δὴ τῇ Δήλῳ ἔσχον, προσμείξαντες δὲ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς τῇ Ἰκάρῳ καὶ Μυκόνῳ πυν-2 θάνονται πρῶτον ὅτι ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἑάλωκεν. Βου-λόμενοι δὲ τὸ σαφῆς εἰδέναι κατέπλευσαν ἐς Ὁμβατόν τῆς Ὑπαθραίας. ἡμέραι δὲ μάλιστα ἦσαν τῇ Μυτιλήνῃ ἑαυλωκιὰ ἐπτὰ ὦτε ἐς τὸ Ὁμβατόν κατέπλευσαν. πυθόμενοι δὲ τὸ σαφῆς ἐβουλεύοντο ἐκ τῶν παρόντων καὶ ἔλεξεν αὐτοῖς Τεντίλαπλος ἀνὴρ Ἡλεῖος τάδε.

XXX. ὡς Ἀλκίδα καὶ Πελοποννησίων ὅσοι πάρ-εσμεν ἄρχοντες τῆς στρατιᾶς, ἔμοι δοκεῖ πλεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ Μυτιλήνῃ πρὶν ἑκτύστους γενέσθαι,
2 ὀςπέρ ἔχομεν. κατὰ γὰρ τὸ εἰκός ἄνδρῶν νεωστὶ πόλιν ἐχόντων πολὺ τὸ ἀφύλακτον εὐρήσομεν, κατὰ μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ πάνυ, ἢ ἐκεῖνοι τε ἀνέλ-πιστοι ἐπιγενέσθαι ἄν τινα σφίσι πολέμῳ καὶ ἡμῶν ἢ ἀλκὴ τυγχάνει μάλιστα οὕσα· εἰκὸς δὲ καὶ τὸ πεζὸν αὐτῶν κατ’ οἰκίας ἀμελέστερον ὡς κεκρα-
3 τηκότων διεσπάρθαι. εἰ οὖν προσπέσοιμεν ἄφινω τε καὶ νυκτὸς, ἐλπίζω μετὰ τῶν ἐνδο, εἰ τὶς ἀρα ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ὑπόλοιπος εἶνος, καταληφθῆναι ἀν
4 τὰ πράγματα. καὶ μὴ ἀποκυνήσωμεν τῶν κίνδυνον, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ καίνων τοῦ πολέμου ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον· ὃ εἰ τὶς στρατηγὸς ἐν τε
BOOK III. xxix. i–xxx. 4

Peloponnesus and on the rest of the way proceeded leisurely. They were unobserved by the Athenian home fleet until they reached Delos; but when after leaving Delos they touched at Icaros and Myconos they received the first tidings that Mytilene had been taken. Wishing however to know the exact situation they sailed to Embatum in Erythraea; and it was about seven days after the capture of Mytilene that they came to Embatum. Now that they had learned the truth, they took counsel in view of the present emergency, and Teultiplus, an Elean, spoke to them as follows:

XXX. “Alcidas, and you who, like myself, are present here as commanders of the Peloponnesian forces, it seems to me that we should sail to Mytilene before our approach becomes known, without a moment’s delay. For in all probability we shall find that men who have but lately come into possession of a city are very much off their guard. At sea, indeed, they will be altogether so, where they have no expectation of any possible hostile attack and our rôle is chiefly to act on the defensive;¹ and on land also their forces are probably scattered among the houses all the more carelessly because they believe that they are victors. If, then, we should fall upon them suddenly and at night, I believe that, in concert with our supporters inside, if any are left, we should find ourselves masters of the situation. And let us not shrink from the danger, remembering that the element of surprise in warfare is precisely of this nature.² And if a general guards against such surprises in his own case, and, whenever he

¹ Or, “while on our side it is just here that our strength lies.”
² i.e. dangerous.
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αὐτῷ φυλάσσοντο καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐνορῶν ἑπιχειροὶ, πλείστ' ἄν ὀρθοῖτο."

XXXI. 'Ο μὲν τοσαῦτα εἰπὼν οὐκ ἐπειθεὶ τὸν Ἀλκίδαν. ἄλλοι δὲ τινες τῶν ἀπ' Ἰωνίας φυγάδων καὶ οἱ Δέσβιοι οἱ ἵμμπλέοντες παρήγοι, ἐπειδή τοῦτον τὸν κύδυνον φοβεῖται, τῶν ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ πόλεων καταλαβεῖν τινα ἡ Κύμην τὴν Αἰολίδα, ὅπως ἐκ πόλεως ὅρμωμεν τῇ Ἰωνίαι ἀποστήσωσιν (ἐλπίδα δ' εἶναι οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἀκουσίως ἀφίχθαι), καὶ τὴν πρόσοδον ταύτην μεγίστην οὕσαν Ἀθηναίων ὑπ' ὑφέλωσι καὶ ἅμα, ἢν ἐφορμώσι σφίσιν, αὐτοῖς δαπάνη γίγνηται:2 πείσειν τε σοίσθαι καὶ Πισσούθην ὡστε ξυμπολέμειν. ὥ δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτα ἐνεδέχετο, ἀλλὰ τὸ πλείστον τῆς γνώμης εἶχεν, ἐπειδὴ τῆς Μυτιλήνης ύστερήκει, ὅτι τάχιστα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πάλιν προσμείξαι.

XXXII. "Ἀρας δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Ἐμβάτου παρέπλει, καὶ προσσχῶν Μυσσάρι ἡ Τηίνων τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους οὐς κατὰ πλοῦν εἰλήφει ἀπέσφαξε τοὺς

1 οἱ before ξυμπλέοντες added by Madvig, followed by Hude.

2 καὶ τὴν πρόσοδον... γίγνηται. The first part of this vexed passage is in accord with the essentially unanimous tradition of the MSS., except that Dobree's conjecture, ἵν' ὑφέλωσι, is substituted for ἦν ὑφέλωσι. The second part (καὶ ἄμα... γίγνηται) is in agreement with van Herwerden and Müller-Strübing, Thuk. Forsch., p. 97, after Codex M and a Schol. (τὸ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς οὐχ ἄμα ἀναγνωστέον, ἀλλὰ διαμετέον, καὶ κατὰ τὸ σφίσιν ὑποστικτέον). Most MSS. have ἐφορμώσι αὐτοῖς (or αὐτοῖσ) δαπάνη σφίσι γίγνηται (Β γίγνεται); G ἐφορμώσιν αὐτοῖσ σφίσι δαπάνη γίγνηται. Dobree's conjecture (i'na) not only gives a good construction for ὑφέλωσι—
sees an opportunity to employ them in the case of the enemy, makes the attempt, he will win the greatest success."

XXXI. Thus he spoke, but could not win Alcidas to his plan. Then some others, exiles from Ionia, and the Lesbians\(^1\) who were with the fleet, advised him, since he feared the risk of this enterprise, to seize one of the cities in Ionia, or Cyme in Aeolia, in order that they might have a city as their base and bring Ionia to revolt (and that there was a prospect of success, seeing that everyone welcomed his coming) and might thus steal from the Athenians this the greatest source of their revenue, and at the same time the Athenians might be put to expense, in case they should attempt to blockade their base. They thought, moreover, that they could persuade Pissuthnes to join them in the war. Alcidas, however, would not accept these proposals, either, but his chief concern, now that he was too late for Mytilene, was to get back to Peloponnesus as quickly as possible.

XXXII. So he set sail from Embatam and skirted the coast; and putting in at Myonnesus in the country of the Teians he butchered most of the captives whom he had taken on the voyage. Then

\(^1\) The πρέσβεις of chs. iv., v.

without altering the essential meaning of the sentence—but obviates the necessity of making γινώσκει dependent on δέως, which is too far off and separated from it by too many subordinate clauses. If ἢν ὑφέλοιοι be retained, with most editors, the sense would be: "and if they could steal from the Athenians this the greatest source of their revenue, these might also at the same time, in case they should blockade them [the Peloponnesians], be put to expense."
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2 πολλούς. καὶ ἐσ τὴν Ἐφέσου καθορμισμένου αὐτοῦ Σαμίων τῶν ἔξ 'Ἀναίων ἄφικαμεν πρέσβεις ἐλεγον οὐ καλῶς τὴν Ἐλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν αὐτοῦ, εἰ ἄνδρας διέφθειρεν οὐτε χείρας ἀνταρμένους οὐτε πολεμίους, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ξυμιάχους· εἰ τε μὴ παύσηται, ὁλίγους μὲν αὐτὸν τῶν ἔχθρων ἐς φιλίαν προσάξεσθαι, πολὺ δὲ

3 πλείους τῶν φίλων πολεμίους ἔξειν. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐπείσθη τε καὶ Χίων ἄνδρας ὅσους εἶχεν ἐτί ἀφήκε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινάς· ὅρωντες γὰρ τὰς ναῦς οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἐφευγον, ἀλλὰ προσεχώρουν μᾶλλον ὡς Ἀττικαῖς καὶ ἐλπίδα οὔδὲ τὴν ἑλάχιστην εἶχον μὴ ποτε Ἀθηναίων τῆς θαλάσσης κρατοῦντων ναῦς Πελοποννησίων ἐς Ἰωνίαν παραβαλεῖν.

XXXIII. Ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Ἐφέσου ὁ Ἀλκίδας ἔπλει κατὰ τάχος καὶ φυγῆν ἐποιεῖτο· ὅφθη γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς Σαλαμνίας καὶ Παράλου ἐτί περὶ Κλάρον ὀρμῶν (αἵ δὲ ἀπ' Ἀθηνῶν ἔτυχον πλέουσαι), καὶ δεδώς τῆν δίωξιν ἔπλει διὰ τοῦ πελάγους ὡς γῆ ἐκούσιος

2 οὐ σχῆσων ἄλλη ἡ Πελοποννήσῳ. τῷ δὲ Πάχητι καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἤλθε μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑρυθραίας ἀγγελία, ἀφικνεῖτο δὲ καὶ πανταχόθεν ἀτειχίστου γὰρ οὕσης τῆς Ἰωνίας μέγα τὸ δέος

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1 These were probably the Samians who settled at Anaea, on the coast opposite the island, after the overthrow of Samos in 439 B.C. (cf. i. cxvii. 3). They are referred to in ch. xix. 2 as "Anaeitans."

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he anchored at Ephesus, where he was visited by envoys of the Samians who were settled at Anae,
who said that it was an ill way he had of freeing Hellas, to destroy men who were not lifting their hands against him and were not enemies, but were merely allies of the Athenians under compulsion; and unless he abandoned this course he would win few enemies over into friendship and would turn far more friends into enemies. Alcidas was persuaded, and set free all the Chians whom he still held and some of the others. It should be explained that the people of the coast, when they saw the Peloponnesian ships, made no attempt to flee, but came near, supposing that they were Athenian ships; and they had not the slightest expectation that while the Athenians dominated the sea the Peloponnesian fleet would ever venture over to Ionia.

XXXIII. From Ephesus Alcidas sailed in haste and took to flight; for while still at anchor near Clarus he had been sighted by the Salaminia and Paralus, which happened to be on a voyage from Athens, and in fear of pursuit he sailed through the open sea, determined that he would not, unless obliged to do so, put into land anywhere except in the Peloponnesus. Reports of him had been brought from Erythraea to Paches and the Athenians, and now kept coming from all quarters. For since Ionia was unfortified, a great alarm arose everywhere lest

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{2}} \text{ i.e. the Greeks of whom Alcidas had taken so many prisoners.} \]

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{3}} \text{ i.e. while on his way from Embatum to Ephesus.} \]

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{4}} \text{ The two swift Athenian state triremes kept always manned ready for extraordinary service. Alcidas knew that these two boats would notify the main Athenian fleet under Paches of his whereabouts, and that Paches would make pursuit.} \]
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ἐγένετο μὴ παραπλέοντες οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, εἰ καὶ δὲ μὴ διενοοῦντο μένειν, πορθῶσιν ἀμα προσπίπτοντες τὰς πόλεις. ἀυτάγγελοι δ’ αὐτῶν ἰδοῦνται ἐν τῇ Κλάρῳ ἢ τῇ Πάραλος καὶ ἢ 3 Σαλαμινία ἔφρασαν. ὃ δὲ ὑπὸ σπουδῆς ἐποιεῖτο τὴν δίωξιν καὶ μέχρι μὲν Πάτμου τῆς νῆσου ἐπεδίωξεν, ὡς δ’ οὐκέτι ἐν καταλήψει ἐφαίνετο, ἐπανεχώρει. κέρδος δὲ ἐνόμισεν, ἐπειδὴ οὐ μετεώροις περιέτυχεν, ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ ἐγκαταλη- φθείσαι ἡμαγκάσθησαν στρατόπεδον τε ποιείσθαι καὶ φυλακὴν σφίζει καὶ ἐφόρμησιν παρασχεῖν.

XXXIV. Παραπλέων δὲ πάλιν ἐσχε καὶ ἐς Νό- τιον τὸ Κολοφονίων, οὗ κατάκτησεν Κολοφώνοι τῆς ἄνω πόλεως ἔαλωκυίας ὑπὸ Ἰταμάνους καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων κατὰ στάσιν ἱδία ἐπαχθέντων· ἐάλω δὲ μάλιστα αὐτὴ ὅτε ἡ δεύτερα Πελοποννησίων 2 ἑσβολὴ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἔγινετο. ἐν οὖν τῷ Νοτῖῳ οἱ καταφυγόντες καὶ κατοικήσαντες αὐτῶι αὖθις στασίασαντες, οἱ μὲν παρὰ Πισσοῦθουν ἐπικούρους Ἀρκάδων τε καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐπαγαγόμενοι ἐν διατειχίσματι εἰχον (καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἄνω πόλεως Κολοφωνίων οἱ μηδίσαντες ξυνεσελθόντες ἐπολίτευν), οἱ δὲ ὑπεξελθόντες τούτους καὶ ὄντες φυγάδες τὸν Πάχητα ἐπάγονται.

1 i.e. since they were only cruising.
2 Such a blockade would not only have been costly, but would also have kept the fleet from carrying on its work at Lesbos.
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the Peloponnesians, while following the coast—even if, under the circumstances,\(^1\) they had no intention of remaining—might in passing fall upon their cities and plunder them. And finally the Paralus and the Salaminia brought the news that they had themselves seen him at Clarus. So Paches eagerly undertook the pursuit; and he followed him as far as the island of Patmos, but when it was clear that Alcidas could no longer be overtaken he turned back again. And since he had not come up with the Peloponnesian fleet in the open sea, he considered it a piece of good fortune that they had not been overtaken in some port and compelled to set up a camp there, thus giving the Athenian fleet the trouble of watching and blockading them.\(^2\)

XXXIV. On the way back as he sailed along the coast he put in at Notium, the port of the Colophonians, where the Colophonians had settled when the upper town had been taken by Itamenes and the barbarians,\(^3\) who had been called in on account of party discord by one of the factions. And this place had been taken about the time when the second Peloponnesian invasion of Attica was made.\(^4\) Now those who had fled for refuge to Notium and settled there again fell into sedition. One party called in mercenaries, both Arcadian and barbarian, whom they had obtained from Pissuthnes, and kept them in a space walled off from the rest of the city, and the Colophonians from the upper town who were in sympathy with the Persians joined them there and were admitted to citizenship; the other party had secretly made their escape, and, being

\(^1\) i.e. the Persians. Itamenes is otherwise unknown.
\(^2\) In the spring of 430 B.C.
3 ὁ δὲ προκαλεσάμενος ἐς λόγους Ἰππίαν τῶν ἐν τῷ διατείχίσματι Ἀρκάδων ἀρχοντα, ὡστε, ἤν μηδὲν ἀρέσκον λέγη, πάλιν αὐτὸν καταστήσεις ἐς τὸ τείχος σῶν καὶ ὑγίᾳ, ὦ μὲν ἔξηλθε παρ' αὐτὸν, ὦ δὲ ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἐν φυλακῇ ἀδέσμῳ εἶχεν, αὐτὸς δὲ προσβαλῶν τῷ τείχισματι ἔξαπναίως καὶ οὐ προσδεχομένων αἴρει, τοὺς τε Ἀρκάδας καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ὅσοι ἐνῆσαν διαφθείρει· καὶ τὸν Ἰππίαν ὕστερον ἐσαγαγὼν ὡσπερ ἐσπεῖσατο· ἐπειδὴ ἐνδοὺ ἦν, ξυλλαμβάνει καὶ κατατοξεύει.

4 Κολοφωνίως δὲ Νότιον παραδίδωσι πλὴν τῶν μηδισάντων. καὶ ὕστερον Ἀθηναίοι οἰκιστὰς πέμψαντες κατὰ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νόμους κατόκισαν τὸ Νότιον, εἰςαγαγόντες πάντας ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, εἰ ποὺ τις ἦν Κολοφωνίων.

XXXV. ὁ δὲ Πάχης ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην τὴν τε Πύρραν καὶ Ἐρέσου παραστήσατο, καὶ Σάλατον λαβὼν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸν Ἀκεδαιμόνιον κεκρυμμένον ἀποπέμπει ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Τενέδου Μυτιληναίων ἄνδρας ἀμα υς κατέθετο καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος αὐτῷ αἰτίας ἐδόκει

2 εἰναι τῆς ἀποστάσεως· ἀποπέμπει δὲ καὶ τῆς στρατιάς τὸ πλέον. τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ὑπομένων καθίστατο τὰ περὶ τὴν Μυτιλήνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Δέσβουν ἢ αὐτῷ ἐδόκει.

XXXVI. Ἀφικομένων δὲ τῶν ἄνδρῶν καὶ τοῦ Σάλατον οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τὸν μὲν Σάλατον εὐθὺς ἀπέκτειναν, ἐστὶν ἀ παρεχόμενον τά τ' ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ Πλαταιῶν (ἐτι γὰρ ἐπολιορκοῦντο) ἀπάξειν
now in exile, called in Paches. And he summoned Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians in the fortified quarter, to a conference, on condition that if his proposals were unsatisfactory he would restore him safe and sound to the fortress. But when Hippias came out to him, he kept him under guard but unfettered while he himself made a sudden and unexpected attack upon the fortress, captured it, and put to death all the Arcadians and barbarians that were in it. As for Hippias, he afterward took him into the fortress just as he had agreed to do, and as soon as he was inside seized him and shot him down. He then delivered Notium to the Colophonians, excepting, however, the Persian sympathizers. The Athenians afterwards sent a commission and re-colonized Notium, giving it their own institutions, after they had first brought together all the Colophonians from cities where any of them were to be found.

XXXV. After returning to Mytilene Paches reduced Pyrrha and Eresus, and having caught Salaethus the Lacedaemonian in hiding in the town sent him off to Athens, as also the Mytilenaean men whom he had placed for safe-keeping in Tenedos, and any others who seemed to him to blame for the revolt. He also sent back most of his army; with the rest he remained, and proceeded to settle the affairs of Mytilene and of Lesbos in general as seemed best to him.

XXXVI. When Salaethus and the others arrived at Athens, the Athenians at once put Salaethus to death, although he offered among other things to induce the Peloponnesians to abandon Plataea, which
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2 Πελοποννησίους· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γυνῶνας ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ ὑπὸ ὀργῆς ἐδοξεῖν αὐτοῖς οὐ τοὺς παρόντας μόνον ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀπαντὰς Μυτιληναίους δόσιν ἡβῶσι, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἀνδραπόδισαι, ἐπικαλοῦντες τὴν τε ἄλλην ἀπόστασιν ὅτι ὦκ ἄρχόμενοι ὃσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐποιήσαντο, καὶ προσέξουνεάντο τούτο οὐκ ἔλαχιστον τῆς ὄρμης αἱ Πελοποννησίων νῆες ἐς Ἰωνίαν ἐκείνοις βοηθοὶ τολμήσασι παρακιν- 

3 τὴν ἀπόστασιν ποιῆσασθαι. πέμπτους ὑπὸ τριήρης ὡς Πάρχητα ἄγγελον τῶν δεδομένων, κατὰ τάχος κελεύοντες διαχρήσασθαι Μυτιληναίους· καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετάνοιᾳ τῆς εὐθύς ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναλογισμὸς ὁμόν τὸ βούλευμα καὶ μέγα ἐγνώσθαι, τόλιν ὄλην διαφθείραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὔ 

4 τοὺς αἰτίους. ὡς δὲ Ἰώσθοντο τοῦτο τῶν Μυτιλη- 

5 ναίων οὶ παρόντες πρέσβεις καὶ οἱ αὐτοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξυμπράσσοντες, παρεσκεύασαν τοὺς ἐν τέλει ὡστε αὕτης γυνῶνας προθείναι καὶ ἐπεισάν ῥᾶν, διὸ καὶ ἐκείνοις ἔνδικην ἦν βουλό- 

6 μονὸν τὸ πλέον τῶν πολιτῶν αὐθίς τινας σφίσων ἀποδοῦναι βούλευσασθαι. καταστάσεις δὲ εὐθύς ἐκκλησίας ἀλλαὶ τε γυνῶνας ἀφ’ ἐκάστων ἐλέ- 

γοντο καὶ Κλέων ὁ Κλειανήτου, ὃσπερ καὶ τὴν προτέραν ἐνεικήξει ὡστε ἀποκτεῖναι, ὃν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἀλλὰ βιαιότατος τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ τε δήμῳ.
was still under siege; as to the others they held a
debate, and under the impulse of anger finally deter-
mined to put to death, not only the Mytileneans who
were there in Athens, but also all who were of adult
age, and to enslave their women and children. The
general charge which they brought against them was
that they had made this revolt in spite of the fact that
they were not held in subjection like the other allies;
and what contributed not least to their fury was that
the Peloponnesian fleet had dared to venture over to
Ionia to their support; for from this they thought
the revolt had been made after long deliberation.
Accordingly they sent a trireme to Paches to an-
nounce what had been determined upon, and bidding
him to despatch the Mytileneans with all haste; but
on the very next day a feeling of repentance came
over them and they began to reflect that the design
which they had formed was cruel and monstrous, to
destroy a whole city instead of merely those who
were guilty. And when this became known to the
Mytilenean\(^1\) envoys who were present and their
Athenian supporters, they induced those in authority
to bring the question before the people again; and
they found less difficulty in persuading them because
it was evident to them also that the greater part of
the citizens wished that another opportunity should
be given them to consider the matter. A meeting
of the assembly was held immediately, at which
various opinions were expressed by the several
speakers. One of these was Cleon son of Cleaenetus,
who had been successful in carrying the earlier
motion to put the Mytileneans to death. He was
not only the most violent of the citizens, but at that

\(^1\) cf. ch. xxviii. 1.
parà polû ἐν τῷ τῶτε πιθανότατος, παρελθὼν αὐθίς ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

XXXVII. “Πολλάκις μὲν ἦδη ἔγογκε καὶ ἄλλοτε ἔγον ἐκεῖνοι δημοκρατίαι ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἐστὶν ἐτέρων ἀρχεῖν, μάλιστα δ` ἐν τῇ νῦν ὑμετέρᾳ
2 περὶ Μυτιληναίων μεταμελείας. διὰ γὰρ τὸ καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀδέες καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἄλληλους καὶ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχετε, καὶ ὃ τι ἂν ἢ λόγῳ πεισθέντες ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἀμάρτητε ἢ οὐκτῷ ἐνδότε, οὐκ ἐπικινδύνως ἤγεισθε ἐς υμᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἐς τὴν τῶν ξυμμάχων χάριν μαλακίζεσθαι, οὐ σκοποῦντες ὅτι τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἁρχήν καὶ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύουσας αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀκοντας ἀρχομένους, οἱ1 οὐκ ἔξ ὃν ἂν χαρίζησθε βλαπτόμενοι αὐτοὶ ἀκροδῶται υμῶν, ἀλλ’ ἔξ ὃν ἂν ἰσχύι μᾶλλον ἡ τῇ ἐκείνῳ ἐννοίᾳ περιγενήσθηε.
3 πάντων δὲ δεινότατον εἰ βέβαιοι ἡμῖν μὴ δέν καθεστήξει δων ἂν δόξῃ πέρι, μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι χεῖρος νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλεις κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἡ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύρους, ἀμαθία τε μετὰ σωφροσύνης ὄφελιμωτέρον ἢ δεξιότης μετὰ ἀκολασίας, οἶ τε φαυλότεροι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιστέωτέρους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον ἀμεινον
4 οἴκουσι τὰς πόλεις. οἷ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφότεροι βούλονται φαίνεσθαι τῶν τε αἰεὶ λεγομένων ἐς τὸ κοινὸν περιγενῆσθαι, ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις μείζοσιν οὐκ ἂν δηλώσαντες τὴν γνώμην,

1 of wanting in all better MSS., but adopted by Bekker, Krüger, and Hude.

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time had by far the greatest influence with the people. He now came forward a second time and spoke as follows:

XXXVII. "On many other occasions in the past I have realized that a democracy is incompetent to govern others, but more than ever to-day, when I observe your change of heart concerning the Mytilenaeans. The fact is that, because your daily life is unaffected by fear and intrigue in your relations to each other, you have the same attitude towards your allies also, and you forget that whenever you are led into error by their representations or yield out of pity, your weakness involves you in danger and does not win the gratitude of your allies. For you do not reflect that the empire you hold is a despotism imposed upon subjects who, for their part, do intrigue against you and submit to your rule against their will, who render obedience, not because of any kindnesses you may do them to your own hurt, but because of such superiority as you may have established by reason of your strength rather than of their goodwill. But quite the most alarming thing is, if nothing we have resolved upon shall be settled once for all, and if we shall refuse to recognize that a state which has inferior laws that are inviolable is stronger than one whose laws are good but without authority; that ignorance combined with self-restraint is more serviceable than cleverness combined with recklessness; and that simpler people for the most part make better citizens than the more shrewd. The latter always want to show that they are wiser than the laws, and to dominate all public discussions, as if there could never be weightier

1 cf. II. xxxvii. 2.  2 cf. II. lxiii. 2.
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καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτον τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλοντι τὰς πόλεις. οἱ δὲ ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ ἔξι ἐαυτῶν ξυνέσει 
ἀμαθέστεροι μὲν τῶν νόμων ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀδυνατότεροι δὲ τὸν τοῦ καλῶς εἰπόντος μέμψασθαι 
λόγον, κρίταλ δὲ ὄντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱσού μᾶλλον ἢ 
5 ἀγωνισταὶ ὁρθοῦνται τὰ πλείω. ὅσον οὖν χρῆ καὶ 
ἡμᾶς ποιοῦντας μὴ δεινότητι καὶ ξυνέσεως ἀγώνι 
ἐπαρομένους παρὰ δόξαι τῷ ὕμετέρῳ πλήθει 
παραινεῖν.

XXXVIII. "Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς εἰμὶ τῇ 
γνώμῃ καὶ θαυμάζω μὲν τῶν προθέτοιν αὐθίς 
περὶ Μυτιληναίων λέγειν καὶ χρόνου διατριβήν 
ἐμποιησάντων, ὁ ἐστι πρὸς τῶν ἥδικοτῶν 
μάλλον (ὁ γὰρ παθῶν τῷ δρᾶσαντι ἀμβλυτέρα 
τῇ ὀργῇ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀμύνεσθαι δὲ τῷ παθεῖν 
ὁτι ἐγχυτάτῳ κατείχον ἀντίπαλον ὃν ἡ 
μάλιστα 
τὴν 
τιμορίαν λαμβάνει), θαυμάζω δὲ καὶ ὅστις 
ἐσται ὁ ἀντερῶν καὶ ἄξιώσων ἀποφαίνει τὰς 
μὲν 
Μυτιληναίων ἀδικίας ἡμῖν ὁφελίμους οὕσας, τὰς 
δὲ 
ἡμετέρας ἐρμοφοράς τοῖς ἐξεμαχός βλάβας 
2 καθισταμένας. καὶ δήλον ὅτι ἡ 
τῶν 
λέγειν 
πιστεύσας τὸ πᾶν δοκοῦν ἀνταποφηγήναι ὡς σύκ 
ἐγνωστοὶ ἀγωνισάτ' ἄν, ἡ κέρδει ἐπαιρόμενος τὸ 
ἐνπρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου ἐκπονήσας παράγειν πειρά- 
3 σεται. ἡ 
δὲ πόλες ἕκ 
τῶν 
τοιώδε 
ἀγώνων τὰ 
μὲν ἀθλα 
ἐτέρος δίδωσιν, αὐτὴ 
δὲ 
τῶς 
καινύνου 
4 ἀναφέρει. αὐτοὶ δ' ὑμεῖς κακῶς ἀγωνθετοῦντες,
BOOK III. xxxvii. 4–xxxviii. 4

questions on which to declare their opinions, and as a consequence of such conduct they generally bring their states to ruin; the former, on the contrary, mistrusting their own insight, are content to be less enlightened than the laws and less competent than others to criticise the words of an able speaker, but being impartial judges rather than interested contestants they generally prosper. Thus, then, we ought to act and not be so excited by eloquence and combat of wits as to advise the Athenian people contrary to our own judgment.

XXXVIII. "As for me, I have not changed my opinion, and I wonder at those who propose to debate again the question of the Mytilenaeans and thus interpose delay, which is in the interest of those who have done the wrong; for thus the edge of the victim's wrath is duller when he proceeds against the offender, whereas the vengeance that follows upon the very heels of the outrage exacts a punishment that most nearly matches the offence. And I wonder, too, who will answer me and undertake to prove that the wrong-doings of the Mytilenaeans are beneficial to us but that our misfortunes prove injurious to our allies. Manifestly he must either have such confidence in his powers of speech as to undertake to show that what is universally accepted as true has not been established,¹ or else, incited by gain, will by an elaborate display of specious oratory attempt to mislead you. But in contests of that kind the city bestows the prizes upon others, while she herself undergoes all the risks. And you are yourselves to blame, for your management of

¹ Or, "your absolute resolve has really not been adopted."
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οἰτίνες εἰώθατε θεαταὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων γύγνεσθαι, ἀκροαταὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων, τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα ἔργα ἀπὸ τῶν εὐ εἰπόντων σκοποῦντες ὡς δυνατὰ γύγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πεπραγμένα ἦδη, οὐ τὸ δρασθὲν πιστότερον ὑφει λαβόντες ή τὸ ἀκουσθὲν, ἀπὸ 5 τῶν λόγων καλῶς ἐπιτιμησάντων καὶ μετὰ καινότητος μὲν λόγου ἀπατᾶσθαι ἄριστοι, μετὰ δὲ δοκιμασμένου δὲ μή ξυνέπεσθαι ἑθέλειν, δουλοὶ δυντες τῶν αἰεὶ ἀτόπων, ὑπερόπται δὲ τῶν εἰσβοτῶν, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὸς εἰπεὶν ἐκαστὸς βουλόμενος δύνασθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνταγωνιζόμενοι τοῖς τοιαύτα λέγουσι μὴ ύστεροι ἀκολουθήσαι δοκεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ, ἥξεσι δὲ τι λέγοντος προπανέσαι, καὶ προαιρέσθαι τε πρόθυμοι 1 τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ προνοῆσαι βραδεῖς τὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποβησόμενα, 7 ξητοῦντες τε ἄλλο τις εἰπεῖν ἡ ἐν ὅσι χῶμεν, φρονοῦντες δὲ ύπὸ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἰκανώς ἀπλῶς τε ἀκοῆς ἡδονῆ ἡ σοφόμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν θεατῶς ἐνεκότες καθημένοις μᾶλλον ἡ περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένοις.

XXXIX. "achuset ἐγὼ πειρόμενον ἀποτρέπειν ὑμᾶς ἀποφαίνω Μυτιληναίων μάλιστα δὴ μίαν 2 πόλιν ἡδικηκότας ὑμᾶς. ἐγὼ γὰρ, οἰτίνες μὲν μὴ δυνατὸν φέρειν τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀρχὴν ἢ οἰτίνες ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀναγκασθέντες ἀπέστησαν, ἐγγυγνώμην ἑχον νῆσον δὲ οἰτίνες ἔχοντες μετὰ τείχον καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν μόνον φοβούμενοι τοὺς ὑμετέρους πολεμίους, ἐν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸι τριήμερον παρασκευῆς ώς ἄφαρκτοι ἦσαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς,

1 εἰναι after πρόθυμοι, deleted by Poppo, followed by Hude.

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these contests is wrong. It is your wont to be spectators of words and hearers of deeds, forming your judgment of future enterprises according as able speakers represent them to be feasible, but as regards accomplished facts, not counting what has been done more credible, because you have seen it, than what you have heard, you are swayed in judgment by those who have made an eloquent invective. You are adepts not only at being deceived by novel proposals but also at refusing to follow approved advice, slaves as you are of each new paradox and scorners of what is familiar. Each of you wishes above all to be an orator himself, or, failing that, to vie with those dealers in paradox by seeming not to lag behind them in wit but to applaud a smart saying before it is out of the speaker's mouth; you are as quick to forestall what is said as you are slow to foresee what will come of it. You seek, one might say, a world quite unlikely that in which we live, but give too little heed to that which is at hand. In a word, you are in thrall to the pleasures of the ear and are more like men who sit as spectators at exhibitions of sophists than men who take counsel for the welfare of the state.

XXXIX. "And it is from these ways that I seek to turn you when I attempt to prove that Mytilene has done you more injury than any single state. I can make allowance for men who resorted to revolt because they were unable to bear your rule or because they were compelled by your enemies to do so; but men who inhabited a fortified island and had no fear of our enemies except by sea, and even there were not without the protection of a force of their own triremes, who moreover were independent and
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αὐτόνομοι τε οἰκοῦντες καὶ τιμώμενοι ἢ τὰ πρῶτα ὑπὸ ἡμῶν τοιαῦτα εἰργάσαντο, τῷ ἄλλῳ οὕτως ἦ ἐπεβούλευσάν τε καὶ ἑπανέστησαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπέστησαν (ἀπόστασις μὲν γε τῶν βιαίων τι πασχόντων ἐστὶν), ἐξήτησάν τε μετὰ τῶν πολεμιστῶν ἡμᾶς στάντες διαφθείραι; καίτοι δεινότερον ἐστιν ἦ ἐκαθ' αὐτοὺς δύναμιν κτώμενοι

3 ἀντεπολέμησαν. παράδειγμα δὲ αὐτοῖς οὗτε αἱ τῶν πέλας ξυμφοράς ἐγένοντο, ὅσοι ἀποστάντες ἦδη ἡμῶν ἐχειρώθησαν, οὔτε ἡ παροῦσα εὐδαιμονία παρέσχεν ὅκινον μὴ ἔλθειν ἢ τὰ δεινὰ γενόμενοι δὲ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον θρασεῖς καὶ ἐπίσαντες μακρότερα μὲν τῆς δυνάμεως, ἐλάσσω δὲ τῆς βουλήσεως, πόλεμον ἦραντο, ἵσχυν ἀξιώσαντες τοῦ δικαίου προθείναι ἐν ὑδραῖς ἠθησάν περιέστεθαί, ἐπέθεντο ἡμῖν οὐκ ἀδικοῦμενοι.

4· εἰσθε δὲ τῶν πόλεων αἰς ἀν μάλιστα ἀπροσδόκητος καὶ δι' ἐλαχίστου εὐπραξία ἐλθῃ, ἢ υβριν τρέπειν· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ κατὰ λόγον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εὐτυχοῦντα ἀσφαλέστερα ἤ παρὰ δόξαν, καὶ κακοπραγίαν ὡς εἰπεῖν ράον ἀπωθοῦνται ἤ εὐδαιμονία διασφόζονται. χρήν δὲ Μυτιληναίους καὶ πάλαι μηδὲν διαφερόντως τῶν ἅλλων ὑφ' ἡμῶν τετιμῆσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἦ τοῦτο ἐξύβρισαν· πέφυκε γὰρ καὶ ἅλλως ἀνθρώπος τὸ μὲν θεραπεύον ὄπερφρονεὶν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὑπείκον θαυμάζειν.

5· “Κολασθέντων δὲ καὶ νῦν ἀξίως τῆς ἀδικίας καὶ μὴ τοῖς μὲν ὅλογοις ἥ αἰτία προστεθῇ, τὸν δὲ

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were treated by us with the highest consideration, when these men have acted thus, what else is it but conspiracy and rebellion rather than revolt—for revolt is the work of those who suffer oppression—and a deliberate attempt by taking their stand on the side of our bitterest enemies to bring about our destruction? And yet this is assuredly a more heinous thing than if they had gone to war against us by themselves for the acquisition of power. The calamities of their neighbours who had already revolted from us and been subdued proved no warning to them; nor did the good fortune which they enjoyed make them hesitate to take the perilous step; on the contrary, becoming over-confident as to the future, and conceiving hopes which, though greater than their powers, were less than their ambition, they took up arms, presuming to put might before right; for the moment they thought they should prove superior they attacked us unprovoked. And indeed it is the rule, that such states as come to unexpected prosperity most fully and most suddenly, do turn to insolence, whereas men generally find success less precarious when it comes in accordance with reasonable calculations than when it surpasses expectation, and more easily, as it seems, they repel adversity than maintain prosperity. But the Mytileneans from the first ought never to have been treated by us with any more consideration than our other allies, and then they would not have broken out into such insolence; for it is human nature in any case to be contemptuous of those who pay court but to admire those who will not yield.

“Let them be punished, therefore, even now, in a manner befitting their crime, and do not put the
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δήμον ἀπολύσητε. πάντες γὰρ ύμῖν γε ὁμοίως ἐπέθεντο, οἷς γ' ἐξήν ὡς ἡμᾶς τραπομένους νῦν πάλιν ἐν τῇ πόλει εἶναι· ἀλλὰ τὸν μετὰ τὸν ὁλίγων κίνδυνον ἡγησάμενοι βεβαιότερον ξυναπ-7 ἔστησαν. τῶν τε ἔξωμάχων σκέψασθε εἰ τοῖς τε ἀναγκασθεῖσιν ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ τοῖς ἐκούσιν ἀποστάσι τὰς αὐτὰς ζημίας προσθήσετε, τίνα οἴεσθε οὐτενικὸν οὐ βραχεία προφάσει ἀποστή-σεσθαι, ὅταν ἡ κατορθώσατι ἐλευθέρωσις ἢ ἢ 8 σφαλέντι μηδὲν παθεῖν ἀνήκεστον; ἢμῖν δὲ πρὸς ἐκάστην πόλιν ἀποκεκινδυνεύσεται τά τε χρήματα καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ· καὶ τυχόντες μὲν πόλιν ἐφθαρ-μένην παραλαβόντες τῆς ἐπείτα ἱ προσόδου, δι' ἢν ἰσχύσμεν, τὸ λοιπὸν στερήσεσθε, σφαλέντες δὲ πολεμίους πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ἔξομεν, καὶ ὅν χρόνον τοῖς νῦν καθεστηκόσι δεὶ ἐχθροῖς ἀν-θίστασθαι, τοῖς οἰκείοις ξυμμάχους πολεμήσομεν.

XLI. "Οὐκον δεὶ προθεῖναι ἡλπίδα οὕτε λόγῳ πιστῆν οὕτε χρῆμασιν ὑγιῆν, ως ξυγγυμνήν ἀμαρτεῖν ἀνθρωπίνως λήψονται. ἄκοντες μεν γὰρ οὐκ ἐβλαψαν, εἰδότες δὲ ἐπεβούλευσαν. ξύγ-2 γνώμον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον. ἐγώ μὲν οὖν καὶ τότε πρῶτον καὶ νῦν διαμάχομαι μὴ μεταγνωσί αὐτὰ τὰ προδεδογμένα, μηδὲ τρισὶ τοῖς ἄξιμο-φορωτάτοις τῇ ἀρχῇ, οἴκτω καὶ ἥδονή λόγων καὶ

1 ἐπείτα, Hude adopts ἐπετέλας, van Herwerden and H. Weil ἐπετείου.
2 προθεῖναι, Hude retains προσθεῖναι, with BC.

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blame upon the aristocrats and exonerate the common people. For they all alike attacked you, even the commons, who, if they had taken our side, might now have been reinstated in their city; but they thought there was less risk in sharing the dangers of the oligarchs, and so joined them in the revolt. Consider, moreover, your allies: if you inflict upon those who wilfully revolt no greater punishment than upon those who revolt under compulsion from our foes, which of them, think you, will not revolt on a slight pretext, when the alternatives are liberty if he succeeds or a fate not irreparable if he fails? We, on the other hand, shall have to risk our money and our lives against each separate state, and when we succeed we shall recover a ruined state and be deprived for the future of its revenue, the source of our strength, whereas if we fail we shall be adding fresh enemies to those we have already, and when we should be resisting our present foes we shall be fighting our own allies.

XL. "We must not, therefore, hold out to them any hope, either to be secured by eloquence or purchased by money, that they will be excused on the plea that their error was human. For their act was no unintentional injury but a deliberate plot; and it is that which is unintentional which is excusable. Therefore, I still protest, as I have from the first,¹ that you should not reverse your former decision or be led into error by pity, delight in eloquence, or clemency, the three

¹ Referring to what happened in the assembly of the day before, in which, however, he had urged the action that was taken; its reconsideration was not urged till the present meeting.
3 ἐπιεικεία, ἀμαρτάνειν. ἔλεος τε γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους δίκαιος ἀντιδίδοσθαι καὶ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς οὔτ' ἀντοικτιοῦντας ἢ ἀνάγκης τε καθεστώτας αἰεὶ πολεμίους· οὐ τε τέρποντες λόγῳ ἰτήροπες¹ ἔξοντι καὶ ἐν ἄλλους ἐλάσσοσιν ἄγώνα, καὶ μὴ ἐν ὧν ἡ μὲν πόλις βραχέα ἡσθείσα μεγάλα ζημιώσεται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ εὖ εὑπεῖν τὸ παθεῖν εὖ ἀντιλήψονται· καὶ ἐπιείκεια πρὸς τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐπιτηδείους καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐσεθαι μᾶλλον δίδοται ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίως τε καὶ οὔδὲν ἤσσον πολεμίους ὑπολειπομένους.

4 "Ἐν τε ξυνελὼν λέγω· πιθόμενοι μὲν ἕμοι τά τε δίκαια ἐς Μυτιληναίους καὶ τά ξύμφορα ἀμα ποιήσετε, ἄλλως δὲ γνώντες τοὺς μὲν οὐ χαριεῖσθε, ὑμᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον δικαιώσεσθε. εἰ γὰρ οὗτοι ὀρθῶς ἀπέστησαν, ὑμεῖς ἂν οὗ χρεῶν ἄρχοντε. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ οὗ προσήκον ὁμῶς ἄξιοῦτε τοῦτο δράν, παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς τοι καὶ τούσδε ξυμφόρως δεὶ κολάξεσθαι, ἢ παύσεσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδυόνου ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι. τῇ τε αὐτῇ ζημίᾳ ἄξιώσατε ἁμύνεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀναλγητότεροι οἱ διαφυγόντες τῶν ἐπιβουλευσάντων φανῆναι, ἐνθυμηθέντες δὲ εἰκός ἢν αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι κρατήσαντας ύμῶν, ἄλλως τε καὶ προὐπάρξαντας

¹ ἰτήροπες, deleted by Naber, followed by Hude.
influences most prejudicial to a ruling state. For compassion may rightly be bestowed upon those who are likewise compassionate and not upon those who will show no pity in return but of necessity are always enemies. As to the orators who charm by their eloquence, they will have other opportunities of display in matters of less importance, and not where the city for a brief pleasure will pay a heavy penalty while they themselves get a fine fee for their fine speaking. And clemency would better be reserved for those who will afterwards be faithful allies than be shown to those who remain just what they were before and no whit the less our enemies.

"I can sum up what I have to say in a word. If you take my advice, you will do not only what is just to the Mytileneans but also at the same time what is expedient for us; but if you decide otherwise, you will not win their gratitude but will rather bring a just condemnation upon yourselves; for if these people had a right to secede, it would follow that you are wrong in exercising dominion. But if, right or wrong, you are still resolved to maintain it, then you must punish these people in defiance of equity as your interests require; or else you must give up your empire and in discreet safety practise the fine virtues you preach.\(^1\) Resolve also to punish them with the same penalty that has already been voted,\(^2\) and that those who have escaped the plot shall not appear to have less feeling than those who framed it, bearing in mind what they would probably have done to you had they won the victory, especially since they

\(^1\) For the thought, cf. II. lxiii. 2.

\(^2\) So Steup explains. Most editors explain, "with the same penalty they would have inflicted," following the schol. ἦν ἐπιμωρησαντο καὶ αὐτῷ ὑμᾶς, περιγενθέμενοι ὑμῶν.
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6 ἀδικίας. μάλιστα δὲ οἱ μὴ ἔχουν προφάσει τινὰ κακῶς ποιοῦντες ἐπεξέρχονται καὶ διολλύναι,1 τὸν κίνδυνον ύφορῶμενοι τοῦ ύπολειπομένου ἐχθροῦ· ὁ γὰρ μὴ ἔχων ἀνάγκη τι παθῶν χαλεπώτερος διαφυγών τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ἱσης ἐχθροῦ.

7 “Μὴ οὖν προδόται γένησθε ύμῶν αὐτῶν, γενόμενοι δ’ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ὡς πρὸ παντὸς ἀν ἐτιμήσασθε αὐτοὺς χειρώσασθαι, νῦν ἀνταπόδοτε μὴ μαλακισθέντες πρὸς τὸ παρόν αὐτίκα μηδὲ τοῦ ἐπικρεμασθέντος ποτὲ δεινοῦ ἀμνησμοῦντες. κολάσατε δὲ ἄξιώς τούτος τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔμμαχους παράδειγμα σαφὲς καταστήσατε, δι’ ἂν ἀφίστηται, θανάτῳ ἥμωσόμενον. τὸδε γὰρ ἡ γνώσις, ἢςον τῶν πολεμῶν ἀμελήσαντες τοῖς ὑμετέρως αὐτῶν μαχεῖσθε ἔμμαχοι.”

XLII. Τοιαύτα μὲν ὁ Κλέων εἶπεν. μετὰ δ’ αὐτὸν Διόδοτος ὁ Εὐκράτους, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἀντέλεσε μάλιστα μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι Μυτιληναίους, παρελθὼν καὶ τότε ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

XLII. “Οὕτε τοὺς προδέντας τῇ διαγνώμην αὕθεις περὶ Μυτιληναίων αἰτιῶμαι οὕτε τοὺς μεμφομένους μὴ πολλάκις περὶ τῶν μεγίστων βουλεύσεις ἐπαινῶ, νομίζω δὲ δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα εὐβοιλία εἶναι, τάχος τε καὶ ὁργήν, ὅν τὸ μὲν μετὰ ἀνοίας φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ μετὰ ἀπαίς δευσίας καὶ βραχύτητος γνώμης. τοὺς τε λόγους ὅστις διαμάχεται μὴ διδασκάλους τῶν πραγμά-

1 διολλύναι, Stahl’s conjecture, followed by Hude and others, for διόλλυνται of the MSS.
were the aggressors. Indeed it is generally those who wrong another without cause that follow him up to destroy him utterly, perceiving the danger that threatens from an enemy who is left alive; for one who has been needlessly injured is more dangerous if he escape than an avowed enemy who expects to give and take.

“Do not, then, be traitors to your own cause, but recalling as nearly as possible how you felt when they made you suffer and how you would then have given anything to crush them, now pay them back. Do not become tender-hearted at the sight of their present distress, nor unmindful of the danger that so lately hung over you, but chastise them as they deserve, and give to your other allies plain warning that whoever revolts shall be punished with death. For if they realise this, the less will you have to neglect your enemies and fight against your own allies.”

XLIII. Such was Cleon’s speech. After him Diodotus son of Eucrates, who in the earlier meeting had been the principal speaker against putting the Mytileneans to death, came forward now also and spoke as follows:

XLIII. “I have no fault to find with those who have proposed a reconsideration of the question of the Mytileneans, nor do I commend those who object to repeated deliberation on matters of the greatest moment; on the contrary, I believe the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion, of which the one is wont to keep company with folly, the other with an undisciplined and shallow mind. As for words, whoever contends\(^1\) that they are not to be guides of our actions is either dull

\(^1\) Directed at Cleon’s remarks, ch. xxxviii. 4 ff.
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των γίγνεσθαι, ἡ ἀξύνετος ἔστιν ἡ ἱδίᾳ τι αὐτῷ διαφέρει· ἀξύνετος μὲν, εἰ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἤγείται περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐμφανοῦς φράσαι, διαφέρει δ' αὐτῷ, εἰ βουλόμενος τι αἰσχρὸν πείσαι εὐ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἄν ἤγείται περὶ τοῦ μὴ καλοῦ δύνασθαι, εὖ δὲ διαβαλῶν ἑκπλήξαι ἄν τοὺς τε ἀντεροῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκού-3 σομένους. χαλεπώτατοι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ χρήμασι προκατηγοροῦντες ἐπίδειξίν τινα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀμαθίαν κατηγιώντω, ὁ μὴ πείσας ἀξιστόρεος ἀν δόξας εἶναι ἢ ἄδικώτερος ἀπεχώρει· ἀδικίας δ' ἐπιφερομένης πείσας τε ὑποπτοὺς γίγνεται καὶ 4 μὴ τυχῶν μετὰ ἀξιστίας καὶ ἀδίκου. ἢ τε πόλεις οὐκ ὥρθελεῖται ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε· φόβῳ γὰρ ἀποπερίπτεται τῶν ξυμβοῦλων. καὶ πλείοτ' ἀν ὀρθοῦτο ἀδυνάτους λέγειν ἔχουσα τοὺς τοιούτους τῶν πολιτῶν· ἐλάχιστα γὰρ ἄν πεισθείησαν

5 ἀμαρτάνειν. χρή δὲ τὸν μὲν ἁγάθον πολίτην μὴ ἐκφοβοῦντα τοὺς ἀντεροῦντας, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑσον φαίνεσθαι ἁμεινον λέγοντα, τὴν δὲ σώφρονα πόλιν τῷ τε πλείστα εὐ βουλεύοντι μὴ προστιθέναι τιμήν, ἀλλὰ μηδ' ἐλασσόν τῆς ὑπαρχοῦσης, καὶ τὸν μὴ τυχόντα γνώμης οὐχ ὅπως ξημιωθῶν, ἀλλὰ 6 μηδ' ἀτιμάζειν. οὕτω γὰρ ὅ τε καταρθῶν ἡκιστα ἄν ἐπὶ τῷ ἐτὶ μειζόνων ἀξιοῦσθαι παρὰ γνώμην

1 πεισθείησαν, Hude adopts Madvig's conjecture πεισθείν ξυναμαρτάνειν.
of wit or has some private interest at stake—dull, if he thinks it possible by any other means to throw light on that which still belongs to the dim and distant future; self-interested, if, wishing to put through a discreditable measure, he realizes that while he cannot speak well in a bad cause, he can at least slander well and thus intimidate both his opponents and his hearers. Most dangerous of all, however, are precisely those who charge a speaker beforehand with being bribed to make a display of rhetoric. For if they merely imputed ignorance, the speaker who failed to carry his audience might go his way with the repute of being dull but not dishonest; when, however, the charge is dishonesty, the speaker who succeeds becomes an object of suspicion, whereas if he fails he is regarded as not only dull but dishonest as well. And all this is a detriment to the state, which is thus robbed of its counsellors through fear. Indeed it would prosper most if its citizens of this stamp had no eloquence at all, for then the people would be least likely to blunder through their influence. But the good citizen ought to show himself a better speaker, not by trying to browbeat those who will oppose him, but by fair argument; and while the wise city should not indeed confer fresh honours upon the man whose advice is most often salutary, it certainly should not detract from those which he already has, and as for him whose suggestion does not meet with approval, so far from punishing him, it should not even treat him with disrespect. For then it would be least likely that a successful speaker, with a view to being counted worthy of still greater honours,

1 Like Cleon, ch. xxxviii. 2; xl. 1, 3.
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τι καὶ πρὸς χάριν λέγοι, οὐ τε μὴ ἐπιτυχωῦν ὀρέγοντο τῷ αὐτῷ, χαριζόμενός τι καὶ αὐτὸς, προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος.

ΧΛΙΠ. Ὡν ἡμεῖς τάναντία δρῶμεν, καὶ προσέτι, ἢν τις καὶ ὑποπτεύεται κέρδους μὲν ἔνεκα, τὰ βέλτιστα δὲ ὅμως λέγειν, φθονήσαντες τῆς οὖ βεβαιοῦν δοκήσεως τῶν κερδῶν τὴν φανερῶν

2 ὥφελιν τῆς πόλεως ἀφαιρούμεθα. καθέστηκε δὲ τάγαθα ἅπο τοῦ εὐθέος λεγόμενα μηδὲν ἀνυποπτότερα εἶναι τῶν κακῶν, ὡστε δεῖν ὁμοίως τὸν τε τὰ δεινότατα βουλόμενον πεῖσαι ἀπάτη προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸν τὰ ἀμείνω λέ-

3 γοντα ψευσάμενον πιστῶν γενέσθαι. μόνην τε πόλιν διὰ τὰς περινοίας εὑ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ προ-

φανοῦς μὴ ἐξαπατήσαντα ἀδύνατον· ὁ γὰρ διδοὺς φανερῶς τι ἀγαθὸν ἀνθυποπτεύεται ἀφανῶς τῇ

4 πλέον ἔξειν. χρῆ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἐν τῷ
toιὼδε ἄξιοιν τι 1 ἡμᾶς περαιτέρω προνοοῦντας

λέγειν ύμῶν τῶν δὲ ὁλίγου σκοπούντων, ἀλλος
tε καὶ ὑπεύθυνον τὴν παραίνεσιν ἔχοντας πρὸς

5 ἀνεύθυνον τὴν ύμετέραν ἀκρόασιν. εἰ γὰρ ὁ τε

πείσας καὶ ὁ ἐπισπόμενος ὁμοίως ἐβλάπτοντο,

σωφρονέστερον δὲν ἐκρίνετε· νῦν δὲ πρὸς ὀργῆν

1 Conjecture of Krüger and Haase, confirmed by ABFM, for the Vulgate ἄξιοιν, with CEG.
BOOK III. xlii. 6—xlIII. 5

would speak insincerely and for the purpose of winning favour and that the unsuccessful speaker would employ the same means, by courting favour in his turn in an effort to win the multitude to himself.

XLIII. But we pursue the opposite course, and, moreover, if a man be even suspected of corruption, albeit he give the best counsel, we conceive a grudge against him because of the dubious surmise that he is corrupt and thus deprive the state of an indubitable advantage. And it has come to such a pass that good advice frankly given is regarded with just as much suspicion as the bad, and that, in consequence, a speaker who wants to carry the most dangerous measures must resort to deceit in order to win the people to his views, precisely as the man whose proposals are good must lie in order to be believed. And because of this excessive cleverness Athens is the only state where a man cannot do a good service to his country openly and without deceiving it; for whenever he openly offers you something good you requite him by suspecting that in some way he will secretly profit by it. Yet even so, in view of the very great interests at stake, and in so grave a matter, we who advise must regard it as our duty to look somewhat further ahead than you who give matters only a brief consideration, especially since we are responsible advisers,1 while you are irresponsible listeners. Indeed, if not only those who gave advice but also those who followed it had to suffer alike, you would show greater prudence in your decisions; but as it is, whenever you meet with

1 It was open to any Athenian citizen to impeach any law or decree, as contrary to some existing law or as unjust or inexpedient, by a proceeding called ἥγραφη παρανομών.
ΤΗΣ ΣΟΛΩΝΟΤΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΟΝ ΠΟΛΛΑΙ ΟΥΣΑΙ ΕΥΝΕΞΗΜΑΡΤΟΝ.

ΧΙΛΙΩΝ. Ἐγὼ δὲ παρῆλθον οὔτε ἀντερῶν περὶ Μυτιληναίων οὔτε κατηγορήσων. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἑκείνων ἀδικίας ἦμῖν ὁ ἁγών, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἂν καὶ ἐχοντάς τι ξυγγυγόμης, ἕαν, εἰ τῇ πόλει μὴ ἀγαθῶν φαίνοντο. νομίζω δὲ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον βουλεύσθαι ἢ τοῦ παρόντος. καὶ τούτῳ δὲ μᾶλλον Ἀθηναῖοι ἀνωτέρως, ἐστὶν τὸ λοιπὸν ξυμφέρον ἐσεθαί πρὸς τὸ ἴσον αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς περὶ τοῦ ἡμῶν καλῶς ἐχοντος ἀντισχυριζόμενος τὰ--

3 ναντία γιγαντικά. καὶ οὐκ ἂξιώ ὑμᾶς τῷ εὐπρεπεῖ τοῦ ἑκείνου λόγου τὸ χρῆσιμον τοῦ ἑμοῦ ἀπώσασθαι. δικαιότερος γὰρ διστασία τῆς λόγου πρὸς τὴν ὑψὸς ἑμεῖς ἢ Μυτιληναίως τάχι ἀν ἑπίσπασιν. ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ δικαζόμεθα πρὸς αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τῶν δικαίων δείω, ἀλλὰ βουλευόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, ὁπως χρησίμως ἔξουσιν.

XLV. Ἔφη οὖν ταῖς πόλεσι πολλῶν θανάτου ξημείαι πρόκειται καὶ οὐκ ἵσων τῷ ἔλπιδι, ἄλλοι ἐλασσόνων ἀμαρτημάτων, ὅμως δὲ τῇ ἑλπίδι

1 ἕαν, Lindau's conjecture for eis of the MSS.
BOOK III. xliii. 5–xliv. 1

a reverse you give way to your first impulse and punish your adviser for his single error of judgment instead of yourselves, the multitude who shared in the error.

XLIV. "But I have come forward neither as an advocate of the Mytilenaeans in opposition to Cleon nor as their accuser. For the question for us to consider, if we are sensible, is not what wrong they have done, but what is the wise course for us. For no matter how guilty I show them to be, I shall not on that account bid you to put them to death, unless it is to our advantage; and if I show that they have some claim for forgiveness, I shall not on that account advise you to spare their lives, if this should prove clearly not to be for the good of the state. In my opinion we are deliberating about the future rather than the present. And as for the point which Cleon especially maintains, that it will be to our future advantage to inflict the penalty of death, to the end that revolts may be less frequent, I also in the interest of our future prosperity emphatically maintain the contrary. And I beg you not to be led by the speciousness of his argument to reject the practical advantages in mine. For embittered as you are toward the Mytilenaeans, you may perhaps be attracted by his argument, based as it is on the more legal aspects of the case; we are, however, not engaged in a law-suit with them, so as to be concerned about the question of right and wrong; but we are deliberating about them, to determine what policy will make them useful to us.

XLV. "Now the death-penalty has been prescribed in various states for many offences which are not so serious as this is, nay, for minor ones; but
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ἐπαιρώμενοι κινδυνεύουσι, καὶ οὐδές τω καταγγελεῖ, μὴ περιέσεσθαι τῷ ἐπιβουλεύματι
2 ἦλθεν ἐς τὸ δεινόν. πόλις τε ἄφισταμένη τής τῶν ἱσσων τῇ δοκήσει ἔχουσα τὴν παρασκευὴν, ἢ οἰκείαν ἢ ἄλλων ἔμμαχία, τούτῳ ἐπεχείρησε;
3 πεφύκασι τε ἀπαντες καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία ἀμαρτάνειν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι γόμος ὡς οἵτις ἀπείρξει τοῦτον, ἐπεὶ διεξεληλύθασι γε διὰ πασῶν τῶν ἔμιοι ἢ ἄνθρωποι πρωτοστάντες, εἰ πως ἦσσον ἄδικοντο ὑπὸ τῶν κακούργων. καὶ εἰκὸς τὸ πάλαι τῶν μεγίστων ἄδικημάτων μάλακτέρας κείθαι αὐτὰς, παραβαινομένων δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῖς τολμαί ἀνήκουσιν καὶ τάκτα
4 ὁμοὶς παραβαίνεται. ἡ τοῖνυν δεινότερον τι τοῦτον δεσ τες εὐρετέων ἐστίν· ἡ τόδε γε οὐδὲν ἐπίσχει, ἀλλὰ ἢ μεν πενιὰ ἀνάγκη τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα, ἢ δ’ ἐξουσία ὑβρεί τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φρονήματι, αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι ξυντυχίαι ὄργη τῶν ἄνθρωπων, ὡς ἐκάστη τις κατέχεται ὡς ἄνη-
κέστον τῶν κρείσσονος, ἐξάγουσιν ἐς τοὺς
5 κινδύνους. ἡ τε ἡλπίς καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐπὶ παντί, ὁ μὲν ἡγούμενος, ἡ δ’ ἐφεπομένη, καὶ ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιβουλήν ἐκφροντίζων, ἡ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίαν τῆς τύχης ὑποτιθείσα πλείστα βλάπτουσι, καὶ ὅτα
6 ἀφανὴ κρείσσω ἐστὶ τῶν ὁρμέμων δεινῶν. καὶ ἡ τύχη ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἐλάσσον ἔμμαχία ἔστι τὸ ἐπαίρειν: ἄδοκήτως γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε παρα-
σταμένη καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑποδεστέρων κινδυνεύειν τινά

1 πρωτοστάντες MSS., Krüger πρωτοστάντες, followed by Hude.
2 Hude’s correction. Or, reading καὶ τοῦτο with the MSS., “and still even this is disregarded.”
3 ὄργη MSS., Stahl ὄργην, followed by Hude.
nevertheless men are so inspired by hope as to take the risk; indeed, no one ever yet has entered upon a perilous enterprise with the conviction that his plot was condemned to failure. And as to states, what one that was meditating revolt ever took the decisive step in the belief that the resources at hand, whether its own or contributed by its allies, were inadequate for success? All men are by nature prone to err, both in private and in public life, and there is no law which will prevent them; in fact, mankind has run the whole gamut of penalties, making them more and more severe, in the hope that the transgressions of evil-doers might be abated. It is probable that in ancient times the penalties prescribed for the greatest offences were relatively mild, but as transgressions still occurred, in course of time the penalty was seldom less than death. But even so there is still transgression. Either, then, some terror more dreadful than death must be discovered, or we must own that death at least is no prevention. Nay, men are lured into hazardous enterprises by the constraint of poverty, which makes them bold, by the insolence and pride of affluence, which makes them greedy, and by the various passions engendered in the other conditions of human life as these are severally mastered by some mighty and irresistible impulse. Then, too, Hope and Desire are everywhere; Desire leads, Hope attends; Desire contrives the plan, Hope suggests the facility of fortune; the two passions are most baneful, and being unseen phantoms prevail over seen dangers. Besides these, fortune contributes in no less degree to urge men on; for she sometimes presents herself unexpectedly and thus tempts men
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προάγει καὶ οὐχ ἥσον τὰς πόλεις, ὡσπερ περὶ τῶν μεγιστῶν τε, ἐλευθερίας ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς, καὶ μετὰ πάντων ἔκαστος ἀλογίστως ἐπὶ πλέον τι αὐτὸν 7 ἐδόξασεν. ἀπλῶς τε ἀδύνατον καὶ πολλῆς εὐθείας, ὡστει οἴεται, τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὀρμομένης προθύμως τι πρᾶξαι, ἀποτροπὴν τινα ἔχειν ἢ νόμων ἱσχύν ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ δεινῷ.

XLVI. “Οὐκον χρῆ οὔτε τοῦ θανάτου τῇ ξημίᾳ ὡς ἑχεγγύῃ πιστεύσαντας χείρον βουλεύσασθαι, οὔτε ἀνέλπιστον καταστήσαι τοῖς ἀποστάσιν ὡς οὐκ ἔσται μεταγενῶναι καὶ ὅτι ἐν 2 βραχυτάτῳ τῇ ἀμαρτίᾳ καταλῦσαι. σκέψασθε γὰρ ὅτι νῦν μέν, ἢν τις καὶ ἀποστάσα πόλις γινῇ μὴ περιεσομένῃ, ἐλθοὶ ἄν ἐς ξύμβασιν δυνατὴ οὔσα ἐτὶ τὴν δαπάνην ἀποδοῦναι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν υποτελείν ἐκεῖνως δὲ τίνα οἴεσθε ἢμινα οὐκ ἀμεινον μὲν ἢ νῦν παρασκευάσεσθαι, πολυρκίας δὲ παρατενεῦσθαι εἰς τοῦσχατον, εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ δύνα- 3 ται·σχολῇ καὶ ταχὺ ξυμβῆναι; ἡμῖν τε πὼς οὐ βλάβη δαπανᾶν καθημένοις διὰ τὸ ξύμβατον, καὶ ἢν ἔλομεν, πόλιν ἐφθαρμένην παραλαβεῖν καὶ τῆς προσόδου τὸ λοιπὸν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς στέρεσθαι; ἵσχυ- 4 ομεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους τῷ δε. ὡστε οὐ δικα- στὰς ὅτας δεὶ ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον τῶν ξαμαρτανόντων ἀκριβείας βλάπτεσθαι ἢ ὀρᾶν ὅπως ἐς τὸν ἐπείτα 80
to take risks even when their resources are inadequate, and states even more than men, inasmuch as the stake is the greatest of all—their own freedom or empire over others—and the individual, when supported by the whole people, unreasonably overestimates his own strength. In a word, it is impossible, and a mark of extreme simplicity, for anyone to imagine that when human nature is wholeheartedly bent on any undertaking it can be diverted from it by rigorous laws or by any other terror.

XLVI. "We must not, therefore, so pin our faith to the penalty of death as a guarantee against revolt as to make the wrong decision, or lead our rebellious subjects to believe that there will be no chance for them to repent and in the briefest time possible put an end to their error. Consider now: according to your present policy\(^1\) if a city has revolted and then realizes that it will fail, it may come to terms while still able to pay the indemnity and to keep up its tribute in the future; but, in the other case, what city, think you, will not prepare itself more thoroughly than now, and hold out in siege to the last extremity, if it makes no difference whether it capitulates quickly or at its leisure? And as for us, how can we fail to suffer loss, incurring the expense of besieging a city because it will not surrender, and, if we capture it, recovering one that is ruined, and losing thereafter the revenue from it—the source of our strength against our enemies? We must not, therefore, be such rigorous judges of the delinquents as to suffer harm ourselves, but we must rather see how for the time to come, by punishing

\(^1\) Athens had not been accustomed to treat secession from the alliance as treason punishable with death for the men and slavery for the women and children.
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χρόνον μετρίως κολάζοντες ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔξομεν ἐς χρημάτων λόγον ἰσχυούσας χρῆσθαι, καὶ τὴν φυλακὴν μὴ ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων τῆς δεινότητος ἄξιον ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἐπιμελείας.

5 οὐ νῦν τούναντίον δράντες, ἤν τινα ἐλεύθερον καὶ βία ἀρχόμενον εἰκότως πρὸς αὐτονομίαν ἀποστάντα χειρωσώμεθα, χαλεπῶς οἵμεθα χρῆμα

6 τιμωρεῖσθαι. χρὴ δὲ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους οὐκ ἀφισταμένους σφόδρα κολάζειν, ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἀποστήμαι σφόδρα φυλάσσειν καὶ προκαταλαμβάνειν ὁπως μηδ’ ἐσ ἐπίνοιαν τούτον ἱσσι, κρατήσαντάς τε δὴ ἐπ’ ἐλάχιστον τὴν αὐτίαν ἐπιφέρειν.

XLVII. "Τμεῖς δὲ σκέφασθε ὅσον ἂν καὶ τοῦτο

2 ἀμαρτάνοιε Κλέωνι πειθόμενοι. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὑμῖν ὁ δήμος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν εὐνους ἐστὶ καὶ ἤοι συναφίσταται τοῖς ὁλίγοις ἡ, ἐὰν βιασθῇ, ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀποστήσασι πολέμιος εὐθύς, καὶ τῆς ἀντικαθιστάμενης πόλεως τὸ πλῆθος ξύμμαχον ἔχοντες ἐς πόλεμον ἐπέρχεσθε.

3 εἰ δὲ διαφθερεῖτε τὸν δήμον τὸν Μυτιληναίων, ὅσο ὡστε μετέσχε τῆς ἀποστάσεως, ἐπειδὴ τε ὅπλων ἐκράτησεν, ἐκὼν παρέδωκε τὴν πόλιν, ἀρχισόμενον μὲν ἀδικήσετε τοὺς ἐνεργούς κτείνοντες, ἐπειτα καταστήσετε τοῖς δυνατοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων δ’ ἑούλωται μάλιστα: ἀφιστάντες γὰρ τὰς πόλεις τὸν δήμον εὐθὺς ξύμμαχον ἔξουσι προδεικνύοντον ὑμῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ξημίαν τοῖς τε ἀδικοῦσιν ὁμοίως
moderately, we may have at our service dependent cities that are strong in material resources; and we must deem it proper to protect ourselves against revolts, not by the terror of our laws, but rather by the vigilance of our administration. At present we do just the opposite: whenever a free people that is forced into subjection revolts, as it naturally will, in order to recover its independence, we think that, as soon as we have subdued it, we must punish it severely. We ought, on the contrary, instead of rigorously chastising free peoples when they revolt, to watch them rigorously before they revolt, and thus forestall their even thinking of such a thing; and when we have subdued a revolt, we ought to put the blame on as few as possible. ¹

XLVII. "And do you consider, too, how great a mistake you would make in another point also by following Cleon’s advice. At the present time the populace of all the cities is well disposed to you, and either does not join with the aristocrats in revolting, or, if forced to do so, is hostile from the beginning to those who stirred up the revolt; and so, when you go to war, you have the populace of the rebellious city as your allies. If, however, you destroy the populace in Mytilene, which took no part in the revolt, and which voluntarily put the city into your hands as soon as it got hold of arms, in the first place you will be guilty of killing your benefactors, and, in the second place, you will bring about what the influential men most wish: the next time they instigate a revolt among our allies they will at once have the populace on their side, because you will have published it abroad that the same punishment

¹ In answer to Cleon’s demand, ch. xxxix. 6.
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4 κεῖσθαι καί τοῖς μή. δεῖ δέ, καί εἳ ἡδίκησαν, μὴ προσποιεῖσθαι, ὅπως δὲ μόνον ἡμῶν ἐτὶ εὖμμαχόν 5 ἐστι μὴ πολέμιον γένηται. καί τούτω πολλῷ ἡμῖνφορώτερον ἡγούμαι ἐς τὴν κάθεξιν τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐκόντας ἡμᾶς ἀδικηθήμην ἡ δικαιῶς οὐς μὴ δει διαφθείραι· καί τὸ Κλέωνος τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖνφορον τῆς τιμωρίας οὐχ εὐρίσκεται ἐν αὐτῷ δυνατὸν ὁν ἁμα γίγνεσθαι.

XLVIII. "Τμεῖς δὲ γνώντες ἀμείνων τάδε εἶναι καί μήτε οἴκτω πλέον νείμαντες μήτ' ἐπιεικεία, οἷς οὐδὲ ἐγὼ ἐὼ προσάγεσθαι, ἀπ' αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν παρανομεών πείθεσθε μοι Μυτιληναίων οὖς μὲν Πάχης ἀπέπεμψεν ὡς ἀδικοῦντας κρίναι καθ' 2 ἰσυχίαι, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἐὰν οίκεῖν. τάδε γὰρ ἔστω τὸ μέλλον ἀγαθὰ καί τοῖς πολεμίως ἡδη φοβερά· δοσις γὰρ εὖ βουλεύεται πρὸς τούς ἔναντίον κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἡ μετ' ἐργῳ ἱσχύος ἀνοίᾳ ἐπιφώς.

XLIX. Τοιαύτα δὲ ὁ Διόδωτος εἶπεν. ὅπερ θεισών δὲ τῶν γνωμῶν τούτων μάλιστα ἀντιπάλων πρὸς ἄλληλας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἠθέθον μὲν ἐσ ἀγῶνα ὡμος ἐτὶ δοξῆς καὶ ἑγένοντο ἐν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ ἀγχώμαλοι, ἐκράτησε δὲ τού Διο- 2 δότου. καὶ τρίηρη εὐθὺς ἄλλην ἀπέστελλον κατὰ σπουδήν, ὅπως μὴ φθασάς τῆς προτέρας ἐσφυρωσι διεφθαρμένην τὴν πόλιν προείχε δὲ 3 ἤμέρα καὶ νυκτὶ μάλιστα. παρασκευασάντων δὲ τῶν Μυτιληναίων πρέσβεων τῇ νη ὀίων καὶ

1 ὡμος, with MSS. Bredow emends to ὡμοὶ, followed by Hude.
2 πρωτέρας, generally adopted, Valla and a few MSS., against δευτέρας or ἐτέρας of other MSS.

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is ordained for the innocent and for the guilty. Why, even if they were guilty, you should pretend not to know it, to the end that the only class that is still friendly to us may not become hostile. And it is, I think, far more conducive to the maintenance of our dominion, that we should willingly submit to be wronged, than that we should destroy, however justly, those whom we ought not to destroy. And whereas Cleon claims\(^1\) that this punishment combines justice and expediency, it appears that in such a policy the two cannot be combined.

XLVIII. "Do you, then, recognize that mine is the better course, and without being unduly swayed by either pity or clemency—for neither would I have you influenced by such motives—but simply weighing the considerations I have urged, accede to my proposal: pass sentence at your leisure upon the Mytileneans whom Paches sent here as guilty,\(^2\) but let the rest dwell in peace. Such a course will be best for the future, and will cause alarm among our enemies at once; for he who is wise in counsel is stronger against the foe than he who recklessly rushes on with brute force."

XLIX. Such was the speech of Diodotus. And after these opinions had been maintained with nearly equal force, the one against the other, the Athenians, in spite of the reaction, experienced such a conflict of opinion that in the show of hands they were about equally divided; but the view of Diodotus prevailed. They then immediately despatched a second trireme with all haste, hoping that the first trireme, which had the start by about a day and a night, might not arrive first and the city be found destroyed. The Mytilenean envoys provided wine

\(^1\) cf. ch. xl. 4.  \(^2\) cf. ch. xxxv. 1.
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άλφιτα καὶ μεγάλα ὑποσχομένων, εἰ φθάσειαν, ἐγένετο σπουδὴ τοῦ πλοῦ τοιαύτη ὡστε ἣσθιόν τε ἀμα ἐλαύνοντες οἶνῳ καὶ ἐλαίῳ ἀλφίτα πεφυρ-μένα, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὑπνοῦ ἥροῦτο κατὰ μέρος, οἱ
4 δὲ ἡλαύνου. κατὰ τύχην δὲ πνεύματος οὐδενὸς ἐναντιωθέντως καὶ τῆς μὲν προτέρας νεῶς οὐ
σπουδὴ πλεούσης ἐπὶ πρᾶγμα ἀλλόκοτον, ταύτης
dὲ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ἐπευγομένης, η μὲν ἐφθασε
tοσοῦτον ὅσον Πάχητα ἀνεγνωκέναι τὸ ψῆφισμα
καὶ μέλλειν δράσειν τὰ δεδογμένα, η δὲ ὑστέρα
αὐτῆς ἐπικατάγεται καὶ διεκώλυσε μὴ διαφθείραι.
 paraphosous mēn ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἠλθε κινδύνου.

I. Τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἄνδρας οὔς ὁ Πάχης ὑπέ-
πεμψεν ὡς αἰτιοτάτους οὕτας τῆς ἀποστάσεως
Κλέωνος γνώμη διέφθειραν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι (ἡσαν δὲ
ὁλίγῳ πλείον χιλίων), καὶ Μυτιληναίων τείχη
2 καθείλον καὶ ναῦς παρέλαβον. ὕστερον δὲ φόρον
μὲν οὐκ ἔταξαν Λεσβίοις, κλήρους δὲ ποιήσαντες
tῆς γῆς πλὴν τῆς Μηθυμναίων τρισχιλίων, τρια-
kosίους μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐξείλον, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς
ἄλλους σφῶν αὐτῶν κληρούχους τοὺς λαχώντας
ἀπεπεμψαν. οἷς ἀργύριον Λέσβιοι ταξάμενοι τοῦ
κλήρου ἐκάστοτο τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύο μναῖς φέρειν

1 Usually the barley-meal was mixed with water and oil.
2 A crew ordinarily stopped for meals and rested at anchor
    at night.
3 Paches was accused of shameful deeds of violence toward
    Lesbian men and women (Agath. Epigr. Ivii.), and when
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and barley for the crew and promised a large reward if they should arrive in time; and such was their haste on the voyage that they kept on rowing as they ate their barley-cakes, kneaded with wine and oil, and took turns at sleeping and rowing. And since by good fortune no contrary wind arose, and the earlier ship was sailing in no hurry on so horrible a business, while the second pressed on in the manner described, although the former did in fact arrive first, so that Paches had just time enough to read the decree and was about to execute the orders, the second put in close after it and prevented the destruction of the city. By just so much did Mytilene escape its peril.

L. The rest of the men, however, whom Paches had sent to Athens as chief authors of the revolt, numbering somewhat more than a thousand, were put to death by the Athenians on the motion of Cleon. They also pulled down the walls of Mytilene and took possession of the Mytilenaean fleet. Afterwards, instead of imposing a tribute upon the Lesbians, they divided all the land except that of the Methymnaeans into three thousand allotments, and reserving three hundred of these as sacred to the gods they sent out Athenian colonists, chosen by lot, to occupy the rest. With these the Lesbians made an arrangement to pay a rental of two minas a year for each lot, they themselves to cultivate the

brought to trial committed suicide in the presence of his judges.

4 On the ground that so large a number is incompatible with ch. xxviii. 1, 2; xxxv. 1, Steup conjectures τριακοντα (A for Α).

5 The whole rental amounting to 90 talents; £18,000; $87,300.
3 αὐτοὶ εἰργάζοντο τὴν γῆν. παρέλαβον δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ πολίσματα οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ὅσων Μυτιληναίοι ἐκράτουν, καὶ ὑπῆκοουν ὑστερον Ἀθηναίων. τὰ μὲν κατὰ Δέσβων οὕτως ἐγένετο.

LI. Ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει μετὰ τὴν Δέσβου ἀλώσων Ἀθηναίοι Νικίου τοῦ Νικηράτου στρατηγοῦντο ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Μινώαν τὴν νῆσον, ἡ κεῖται πρὸ Μεγάρων. ἔχρωντο δὲ αὐτῇ πῦργον

2 ἐνοικοδομήσαντες οἱ Μεγαρῆς φρουρίῳ. ἐβούλευσον δὲ Νικίας τὴν φυλακὴν αὐτὸθεν δι' ἐλάσσονος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ Βουδόρου καὶ τῆς Σαλαμίνος εἶναι, τοὺς τε Πελοποννησίους ὅπως μὴ ποιῶνται ἐκπλους αὐτόθεν λανθάνουσι τριήρων τε, οἶνου καὶ τοῦ πρῶν γενόμενον, καὶ λῃστῶν ἐκπομπαῖς, τοῖς τε Μεγαρεύσιν

3 ἀμα μηδὲν ἐσπλεῖν. ἐλὼν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς Νισαιας πρῶτον δύο πῦργω προύχοντε μηχαναῖς ἐκ θαλάσσης καὶ τὸν ἐσπλοῦν ἑς τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς νῆσου ἐλευθερώσας ἀπετείχιζε καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἡπείρου, ἡ κατὰ γέφυραν διὰ τενάγους ἐπιβοήθεια

4 ἣν τῇ νῆσῳ οὐ πολὺ διεχούσῃ τῆς ἡπείρου. ὡς δὲ τούτῳ ἐξειργάσαντο ἐν ἡμέραις ὀλύγαις, υστερον δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ τείχος ἑγκαταλιπὼν καὶ φρουρᾶν ἀνεχώρησε τῷ στρατῷ.

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1 τείχος—the text is probably corrupt, the verb being omitted.

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1 cf. iv. liii. 3, where they are called ἄκταὶ πάλεις.
2 Referring to Brasidas' attempt, described ii. xciii., xcv.
BOOK III. L. 2-I. I. 4

land. The Athenians also took possession of all the towns on the mainland which the Mytileneans controlled,¹ and these were thereafter subject to the Athenians. Such was the course of events at Lesbos.

L. I. In the same summer, after the capture of Lesbos, the Athenians, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, made an expedition against the island of Minoa, which lies in front of Megara and was used as a garrison-station by the Megarians, who had built a tower upon it. But Nicias was desirous that the watch which the Athenians kept should be maintained at that point, which would be at closer range for them, instead of at Budorum in Salamis, the purpose of the watch being to prevent the Peloponnesians from using the harbour of Megara as a base from which to send out unobserved either triremes, as they had done once before,² or expeditions of privateers, and at the same time to see to it that nothing was brought in by sea for the Megarians. Accordingly, by an attack from the sea he took by means of engines of war two projecting towers—first that on the island opposite Nisaea—and when he had thus cleared the way into the channel between the island and the mainland he walled off also the point on the side toward the mainland, where by a bridge across a morass aid could be brought to the island, which is not far distant from the mainland.³ And when, after a few days, this work was completed, Nicias built a fort on the island also, left a garrison in it, and then withdrew his army to Athens.

³ This seems to be the sense intended. The passage is very much condensed or corrupt. The two towers seem to have stood on the strait between Minoa and the mainland, one on each side, at the end of dams built out to narrow the strait.
THUCYDIDES

LII. Ἄπο δὲ τούς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ θέρους τούτου καὶ οἱ Πλαταῖοι ὑπέτει ἔχουσιν σίτιον οὐδὲ δυνάμενοι πολιορκεῖσθαι ξυνεβησαν τοῖς
2 Πελοποννησίοις τοίνυν τρόπῳ. προσέβαλον αὐτῶν τῷ τείχει, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἀμύνεσθαι. γνωσὶ δὲ ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἄρχων τὴν ἀσθένειαν αὐτῶν βία μὲν οὐκ ἐβούλετο ἐλεῖν (εἰρημένον γὰρ ἦν 1 αὐτῷ ἐκ Λακεδαιμόνοις, ὅπως, εἰ σπουδαῖς γίγνωστο ποτὲ πρὸς Ὁθεναίους καὶ ξυγχωροῖν ὅσα πολέμω χωρίᾳ ἔχουσιν ἐκάτεροι ἀποδίδοσθαι, μὴ ἀνάδοτος εἶ ἡ Πλάταα ὡς αὐτῶν ἐκόντων προσχωρησάντων), προσπέμπει δὲ αὐτοῖς κήρυκα λέγοντα, εἰ βούλονται παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν ἐκόντες τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ δικασταίς ἐκείνοις χρήσασθαι, τοὺς τε ἀδικοὺς κολάσειν, παρὰ δικήν
3 δὲ οὐδένα. τοσαύτα μὲν ὁ κήρυξ εἶπεν οἳ δὲ (ἡσαν γὰρ ἡδὴ ἐν τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ) παρέδωσαν τὴν πόλιν. καὶ τοὺς Πλαταῖας ἔτρεφον οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἡμέρας τινάς, ἐν δὲ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίους δικασταί, πέντε ἀνδρεῖς, ἀφίκοντο.
4 ἔλθαντων δὲ αὐτῶν κατηγορία μὲν οὐδεμία προντεθὴ, ἤρωτι δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐπικαλεσάμενοι τοσοῦτον μόνον, εἰ τι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ καθεστῶτι ἄγαθον τε εἰργασ. 5 μένου εἰσίν. οἱ δὲ ἔλεγον αἰτησάμενοι μακρότερα εἰπεῖν καὶ προτάξαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν Ἀστύμαχον τε τὸν Ἀσωπολάου καὶ Δάκωνα τὸν Αἰειμνήστου,

1 ἦν, bracketed by Hude, as not read by the Scholiasct.

90
LII. During this summer and about the same time, the Plataeans, who were now without food and could endure the siege no longer, surrendered to the Peloponnesians. It happened in the following manner. An assault was in progress upon their wall and they were unable to repel it. The Lacedaemonian commander recognised their weakness; but he did not wish to take Plataea by storm, for he had received orders to this effect from Sparta, to the end that, if ever a treaty of peace should be made with the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians should consent that all the places each had taken in war should be given back, Plataea might not have to be given up, on the ground that its inhabitants had gone over to Sparta voluntarily. So he sent a herald to them to say that if they would of their own accord deliver their city into the hands of the Lacedaemonians and submit to their decisions they would punish the guilty, but none contrary to justice. The herald made this proposal, and they, since they were now in the last stage of weakness, surrendered the city. And the Peloponnesians fed the Plataeans for some days, until the judges, five in number, arrived from Lacedaemon. When they came no accusation was brought against the Plataeans, but they were summoned by the judges and asked this single question: "Have you rendered any good service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the present war?" The Plataeans, however, begged to be allowed to speak at greater length, and appointed as their spokesmen Astymachus son of Asopolaus and Lacon son of Aeimnestus, who was a proxenus of the

1 Resuming the narrative from the end of ch. xxiv.
THUCYDIDES

πρόξενον ὄντα Δακεδαιμονίων· καὶ ἐπελθόντες ἔλεγον τοιάδε.

ΛΠΝ. "Τὴν μὲν παράδοσιν τῆς πόλεως, ὡς Δακεδαιμόνιοι, πιστεύσαντες ὡς ἔποιησάμεθα, οὐ τοιάδε δίκην οἰόμενοι υφέξειν, νομιμωτέραν δὲ τινὰ ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ἐν δικασταῖς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοις δεξάμενοι, ὦσπερ καὶ ἐσμὲν, γενέσθαι ἡ ὡμῖν, 2 ἡγούμενοι τὸ ἴσον μᾶλιστ' ἄν φέρεσθαι. νῦν δὲ φοβοῦμεθα μὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμα ἡμαρτήκαμεν· τὸν τε γὰρ ἁγὸνα περὶ τῶν δεινοτάτων εἶναι εἰκόνως ὑποπτεύομεν καὶ ὡμᾶς μὴ οὐ κουιοὶ ἀποβιῆτε, τεκμαιρόμενοι προκατηγορίας τε ἠμῶν οὐ προγιγμενήν ἢ χρῆ ἀντεπεῖν (ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ λόγοι ἡτησάμεθα) τὸ τε ἐπερώτημα βραχὺ ὅν, ὅ τὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνασθαι ἐναντία γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ

3 ψευδὴ ἔλεγχον ἔχει. πανταχόθεν δὲ ἀποροι καθεστῶτες ἀναγκαζόμεθα καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον δοκεῖ εἶναι εἰπόντας τι κινδυνεύειν· καὶ γὰρ ὃ μὴ ῥηθεὶς λόγος τοῖς ὅδ' ἔχουσιν αἰτίαν ἄν παρά- 4 σχοι ὥσ', εἰ ἐλέξηθη, σωτήριος ἄν ἦν. χαλεπῶς δὲ ἔχει ἡμῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ ἡ πειθώ. ἀγνώτες μὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἀλλήλων ἐπεσενεγκάμενοι μαρτύρια δὲν ἀπειροὶ ἦτε ὑφελοῦμεθ' ἃν νῦν δὲ πρὸς εἰδότας πάντα λελέξεται, 2 καὶ δέδιμεν οὐχὶ

1 ἡ ὡμῖν, bracketed by Hude, as seemingly not read by the Scholiast. 2 λελέξεται, Hude reads λέξεται with C.

1 Public host or consul. He had commanded the Plataean contingent at Marathon.
BOOK III. LII. 5-LIII. 4

Lacedaemonians. These men came forward and spoke as follows:

LIII. "When we surrendered our city, Lacedaemonians, trusting in your good faith, we had no thought that we should have to undergo a trial like this, but supposed it would be a more regular procedure; and when we consented to be on trial before you and you alone as judges, as we now are, we believed that we should be most likely to obtain fair treatment. But now we fear that we have been disappointed in both expectations; for we have good reason to suspect, not only that the issues involved in the trial are of the gravest nature but also that you will not prove to be impartial judges. These inferences we draw from the fact that no accusation was first brought against us requiring a plea in defence, but we have had to ask leave to speak, and that the question which is put to us is so curt that a truthful answer to it is against our interests, while a false one can be exposed at once. But beset as we are with perplexities on every hand, we are forced, as indeed seems to be the safer course, to say something and take the risk; for to men in our condition not to have spoken would cause us afterwards to reproach ourselves with the thought that, had the word been spoken, it would have saved us. A further difficulty in our position is the task of convincing you. For if we were strangers to each other, we might find it to our advantage to introduce evidence on matters with which you were unacquainted; but as it is, anything that we shall say is already known to you, and what we fear is, not that

\[1\text{ i.e. that their very lives were at stake, whereas they had expected, after capitulation, that in the formal trial there could be no question of capital punishment.}\]
THUCYDIDES

μὴ προκαταγνώντες ἡμῶν τὰς ἁρετὰς ἡσυχας εἶναι
tῶν ὑμετέρων ἐγκλῆμα αὐτὸ ποιήτε, ἀλλὰ μὴ
ἀλλοις χάριν φέροντες ἐπὶ διεγνωσμένην κρίσιν
cαθιστώμεθα.

LIV. "Παρεχόμενοι δὲ ὅμως ἃ ἐχομεν δίκαια
πρὸς τε τὰ Ὀηβαίων διάφορα καὶ ἐς ὑμᾶς καὶ
τους ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, τῶν εὗ δεδραμένων ὑπό-
μνησιν ποιησόμεθα καὶ πείθειν πειρασόμεθα.

2 φαμὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἐρώτημα τὸ βραχὺ, εἰ τι
Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐν τῷ πολέ-
μῳ τάδε ἀγαθὸν πεποιήκαμεν, εἰ μὲν ὡς πολεμί-
ους ἔρωτάτε, οὐκ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς μὴ εὗ παθόν-
tας, φίλους δὲ νομίζωντας αὐτοὺς άμαρτάνειν

3 μᾶλλον τοὺς ἡμῶν ἐπιστρατεύσαντας. τὰ δὲ ἐν
τῇ εἰρήνῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸν Μήδον ἀγαθοὶ γεγενήμεθα,
tὴν μὲν οὐ λύσαντες νῦν πρότεροι, τῷ δὲ ξυμπε-
θέμενοι τότε ἐς ἐλευθερίαν τῆς Ἕλλαδος μόνοι

4 Βοιωτῶν. καὶ γὰρ ἠπερώτατε τε ὅντες ἐναυμαχή-
σαμεν ἐπ᾿ Ἀρτεμισίῳ, μάχη τε τῇ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ
ὑγιῆ γενομένῃ παρεγενόμεθα ὑμῖν τε καὶ Παυσανίᾳ·
eί τε τι ἄλλο κατ᾿ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο
ἐπικίνδυνον τοῖς Ἕλλησι, πάντων παρὰ δύναμιν

5 μετέσχομεν. καὶ ὑμῖν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἵδια,
οτερπ ὅτι μέγιστος φόβος περίεστὶ τὴν Σπάρτην
μετὰ τὸν σεισμὸν τῶν ἐς Ἰθόμην Εἰλιώτων ἀπο-

1 Referring to the achievements of the Plataeans in the Persian wars.

2 i.e. the Thebans. With bitter irony the Plataeans ascribe to themselves the evident purpose of the
you have already judged our virtues to be inferior to your own and now make that a charge against us, but that in order to gratify others we are to appear before a court that has already decided against us.

LIV. "Nevertheless, we shall present whatever just claims we have, both as regards our quarrel with the Thebans and as touching you and the rest of the Hellenes, and thus, by reminding you of our public services, shall try to persuade you. In reply to the curt inquiry of yours, whether we have rendered any good service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in this war, if you ask us as enemies, we say that you are not wronged if you did not receive benefit at our hands; but if in asking it you regard us as friends, we reply that you yourselves rather than we are at fault, in that you made war upon us. But in the war against the Persians and during the peace which followed we have proved ourselves good and true men; we have not now been the first to break the peace, and then we were the only Boeotians who rallied to defend the freedom of Hellas. For though we are an inland people, we took part in the sea-fight at Artemision; in the battle that was fought here in our own land we stood side by side with you and Pausanias; and whatever perils arose to threaten the Hellenes in those days, we bore our part in them all beyond our strength. And to you in particular, Lacedaemonians, at that critical moment when after the earthquake Sparta was encompassed by a mighty terror owing to the revolt of the Helots - Lacedaemonians—by standing trial before a prejudiced court they will 'do a favour to the Thebans.'

Rhetorical inaccuracy, for the Thespians did the same (Hdt. vii. cxxii.; viii. i.).

THUCYDIDES

στάντων, τὸ τρίτον μέρος ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐξεπέμψαμεν ὡς ἐπικουρίαν. ὦν οὐκ εἰκὸς ἠμνημονεῖν.

LIV. "Καὶ τὰ μὲν παλαιὰ καὶ μέγιστα τοιούτοι ἠξιώσαμεν εἶναι, πολέμοι δὲ ἐγενόμεθα ύστερον. ὑμεῖς δὲ αὐτοὶ δεομένων γὰρ ξυμμαχίας ὅτε Ἡθβαιοι ἡμᾶς ἐβιάσαντο, ὑμεῖς ἀπεώσασθε καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐκελεύετε τραπέζθαι ὡς ἐγγὺς 2 ὄντας, ὑμῶν δὲ μακρὰν ἀποικοῦντων. ἐν μέντοι τῷ πολέμῳ οὖδὲν ἐκπρεπέστερον ὑπὸ ἡμῶν οὔτε 3 ἐπάθετε οὔτε ἐμελλῆσατε. εἰ δὲ ἀποστῆναι Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἠθελήσαμεν ὑμῶν κελευσάντων, οὐκ ἠδικοῦμεν καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ἐβοηθοῦν ἡμῖν ἓναντία θεοθαίοις ὅτε ὑμεῖς ἐπικυνεῖτε, καὶ προδοῦναι αὐτοὺς οὐκέτι ἤν καλὸν, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ οὗς εὖ παθῶν τις καὶ αὐτὸς δεόμενος προσηγάγετο ξυμμάχους καὶ πολιτείας μετέλαβεν, ἴναι δὲ ἐς 4 τὰ παραγγελλόμενα εἰκὸς ἢ προθύμως. ἄ δὲ ἐκάτεροι ἐξηγεῖσθε τοῖς ξυμμάχοις, οὐχ οἱ ἐπόμενοι αὐτοῖς εἰ τι μὴ καλῶς ἐδράτο, ἀλλ’ οἱ ἄγοντες ἐπὶ τὰ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντα.

LVI. "Ἡθβαιοὶ δὲ πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἀλλὰ ἡμᾶς ἠδίκησαν, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον αὐτοὶ ξύνιστε, δι’ ὅπερ 2 καὶ τάδε πάσχομεν. πόλιν γὰρ αὐτοὺς τὴν ἡμετέραν καταλαμβάνοντας ἐν σπουδαῖς καὶ προσέτει ἱερομηνίᾳ ὀρθῶς τε ἐτιμωρησάμεθα κατὰ τὸν πᾶσι νόμον καθεστῶτα, τὸν ἐπίοντα πολέμουν ὅσιον
and their occupation of Ithome, we sent a third part of our citizens to bring aid. These are things you ought not to forget.

LV. "Such was the part we were proud to play in the great actions of the past. It was not until later that we became your enemies, and for this you yourselves were to blame; for when the Thebans oppressed us and we sought alliance with you, you rebuffed us and bade us apply to the Athenians, because they were near, whereas you lived far away. In the course of this war, however, you have neither suffered, nor were ever in danger of suffering, any extraordinary harm at our hands. And if we refused to revolt from the Athenians at your bidding, we were not in the wrong; for they helped us against the Thebans when you held back. After that it would not have been honourable for us to desert them, above all when we were their debtors and when at our own request we had been admitted to their alliance and had shared the rights of citizenship with them. On the contrary, there was every reason why we should heartily obey their commands. And whatever measures either you or they have initiated for your allies, it is not the followers who are to blame for any wrong that has been done, but those who have led them into evil courses.

LVI. "As for the Thebans, they have done us many wrongs in the past, and you yourselves are well aware of this crowning outrage, which has brought us into our present plight. They attempted to seize our city in time of peace, and furthermore on a day of festival; therefore we were justified in punishing them in accordance with the law which has universal sanction, that it is right to repel him who comes
THUCYDIDES

eίναι ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ νῦν οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως δι᾽ αὐτοῦς
3 βλαπτοῖμεθα. εἰ γὰρ τῷ αὐτίκα χρησίμῳ ὑμῶν
tε καὶ ἐκείνων πολεμίῳ 1 τὸ δίκαιον λήψεσθε, τοῦ
μὲν ὀρθοῦ φανείσθη εὖ, ἀλληθείς κριταὶ ὃντες, τὸ
4 δὲ ξυμφέρον μᾶλλον θεραπεύοντες. καίτοι εἰ νῦν
ὑμῖν ὧφελίμοι δοκοῦσιν εἰναι, πολὺ καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ
οἱ ἄλλοι "Ελλήνες μᾶλλον τότε ὃτε ἐν μείζονι
κινδύνῳ ἦτε. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐτέροις υμεῖς ἐπερχεσθε
δεινοί, ἐν ἐκείνῳ δὲ τῷ καιρῷ, ὃτε πάσι δουλείαν
5 ἐπέφερεν ὁ βάρβαρος, οἴδε μετ’ αὐτοῦ ἡσαν. καὶ
dίκαιον ἡμῶν τῆς νῦν ἀμαρτίας, εἰ ἄρα ἡμᾶρτηται
tι, ἀντιδεῖναι τὴν τότε προσβημὰν, καὶ μείζω τοῦ
πρὸς ἐλάσσω εὑρίσσετε καὶ ἐν καιρῷ οἷς στάναι
ην τῶν 'Ελλήνων τινὰ ἀρετὴν τῇ Ἐρέξου δυνάμει
ἀντιτάξασθαι, ἐπηνοοῦντο τε μᾶλλον οἱ μὴ τὰ
ξύμφορα πρὸς τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτοῖς 2 ἀσφαλεία
πράσσοντες, ἑθέλοντες δὲ τολμᾶν μετὰ κινδύνων
6 τὰ βέλτιστα. δὲν ἡμεῖς γενόμενοι καὶ τιμηθέντες
ἐς τὰ πρῶτα νῦν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς δέδιμεν μη δια-
θυράμωμεν, Ἀθηναίους ἐλόμενοι δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ
7 ψιὰς κερδαλέως. καίτοι χρὴ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν ὁμοίως φαίνεσθαι γιγνώσκοντας καὶ τὸ
ξυμφέρον μὴ ἄλλο τι νομίζαι, ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων
tοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἐτὰν αἰεὶ βέβαιον τὴν χάριν τῆς

1 πολεμίῳ, bracketed by Hude, as derived from a gloss (πολεμίῳ).
2 αὐτοῖς, Bekker and most editors with Μ, Hude αὐτοῖς.
BOOK III. LVI. 2–7

against you as an enemy; and now we cannot reasonably be made to suffer on their account. For if you shall decide the question of justice by such considerations as your immediate advantage and their hostility, you will show yourselves to be, not true judges of what is right, but rather to be mere slaves of expediency. And yet if the Thebans seem serviceable to you now, we and the rest of the Hellenes were of far greater service to you when you were in greater danger. For now you are attacking others and are a menace to them, but in that crisis, when the barbarian was threatening us all with slavery, these men were on his side. And it is only fair that you should set our present error, if error there has been, over against the zeal we showed then; if you do, you will find, not only that the zeal outweighs the offence, but also that it was shown at a time when it was a rare thing for Hellenes to oppose their courage to the power of Xerxes. At that time the greater praise was given to those who, instead of intriguing in security for their own advantage with reference to the invasion,¹ were ready to hazard the noblest course though fraught with danger. With these we took our stand and were honoured among the foremost; but now, for the same conduct, we fear lest we are to be destroyed, in that we have chosen the Athenians from regard to right rather than you for profit. And yet you ought to show yourselves consistent, giving the same judgment concerning the same things, and to consider your true advantage to be only this—to cherish an ever-enduring gratitude

¹ As the Thebans did. If ἀντίσθεν should be read, with nearly all MSS., it must be construed with ἡφασσον, “working to further the invasion of the enemy.”
THUCYDIDES

ἀρετῆς ἔχουσι 1 καὶ τὸ παραντίκα που ὑμῖν 2 ὥφελιμον καθίστηται.

LVII. "Προσακέψασθε 3 τε ὅτι νῦν μὲν παρά-
δειγμα τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄνδραγαθίας
νομίζεσθε; εἰ δὲ περὶ ἡμῶν γνώσεσθε μὴ τὰ εἰκότα
(οὐ γὰρ ἄφαντι κρίνει τὴν δίκην τὴν δὲ ἐπινοο-
μενοι δὲ περὶ οὐδὲ ἡμῶν μεμπτῶν), ὥρατε ὅτι ὅπως ὑμὶ
οὐκ ἀποδέξωμαι ἄνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν πέρι αὐτοὺς
ἀμείνους ὑμᾶς ἀπρεπές τι ἐπιγνώσαι, οὐδὲ πρὸς
ἀιροῖς τοὺς κοινοῖς σκῦλα ἀπὸ ἡμῶν τῶν εὐρυγείτῶν
2 τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀνατεθήναι. δεινὸν δὲ δόξει εἶναι
Πλάταιαν Λακεδαιμονίου πορθήσει, καὶ τοὺς μὲν
πατέρας ἀναγγάλαις ἐς τὸν τρίποδα τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς
dι’ ἀρετὴν τὴν πόλιν, ὑμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ
Ἑλληνικοῦ πανοικισμα διὰ Θηβαίων ἐξαλείψαι.
3 ἐς τούτῳ γὰρ δὴ ἕσμεν ἐκοιμηθῆκαμεν,
οὕτως Μηδών τε κρατησάντων ἀπολλύμεθα καὶ
νῦν ἐν ὑμῖν τοῖς πρὸν φιλτάτοις Θηβαίων ἡς-
σώμεθα καὶ δίου ἀγώνις τοὺς μεγίστους ὑπέστημεν,
tότε μὲν, τὴν πόλιν εἰ μὴ παρέδομεν, λεῖμῷ δια-
4 φθαρήσαι, νῦν δὲ θανάτου δίκη κρίνεσθαι. καὶ
περιεώσμεθα ἐκ πάντων Πλαταϊς, οἱ παρὰ
δύναμιν πρόθυμοι ἐς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας, ἐρῆμοι καὶ
ἀτμιώρητοι: καὶ οὕτω τῶν τότε ἔξωμάξων ὠφελεὶ
οὐδεῖς, ἡμεῖς τε, ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἡ μόνη ἐλπίς,
δέδημεν μὴ οὐ βέβαιοι ἦτε.

1 Heilmann’s correction for ἔχουσι of the MSS.
2 Jowett prefers ὑμῖν, with M, in which case the sense
would be general: “while (as a matter of course) our own
immediate interests are sufficiently secured.” With ὑμῖν
there is a return to the particular, i.e. the case of the
Lacedaemonians.
3 προσακέψασθε, Meineke’s conjecture for προσακέψασθε of
the MSS.

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toward the best of your allies for their valour, while also securing what may be to your advantage at the present moment.

LVII. "Consider, too, that you are now regarded by most of the Hellenes as an example of uprightness; but if the verdict you give concerning us shall be inequitable, beware (since the case you are deciding here is not obscure, but you the judges are the object of men's praise and we the defendants are of no mean repute), beware, I say, lest men repudiate an unseemly sentence passed upon good men by men still better and resent the dedication in the common temples of spoils taken from us, the benefactors of Hellas. Monstrous will it seem that the Lacedaemonians should sack Plataea, and that you, whose fathers inscribed the name of our city on the tripod at Delphi in commemoration of her valour, should blot her out, house and home, from the map of Hellas—to please the Thebans! For to this depth of misfortune have we come, we who, when the Persians prevailed, were on the verge of ruin,¹ and now when we plead before you, formerly our closest friends, we are beaten by Thebans; and we have had to face two supreme dangers, at that time of perishing by starvation if we had not surrendered our city, and now of standing trial for our lives. And we have been thrust aside by all, we men of Plataea, who were zealous toward the Hellenes beyond our strength, and are now desolate and undefended. No one of our former allies now aids us, and as for you, Lacedaemonians, our only hope, we fear that you are not steadfast.

¹ The reference is to the burning of their city by Xerxes; see Hdt. viii. 1.
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LVIII. "Καὶ τοι ἄξιον μὲν γε καὶ θεῶν ἐνεκα
τῶν ἔμματαν ποτὲ γενομένων καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς
τῆς ἐσ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας καμφρήναι ὑμᾶς καὶ μετα-
γυνοῖα εἰ τι υπὸ Θῆβαιών ἐπείσθητε, τὴν τε δω-


4


3
4
5


2
1


1 ἡμᾶς, bracketed by Hude, because omitted in M.
2 δὲ, Hude reads τε, with C.

1 The Thebans had demanded that the Plataeans be put to death.
BOOK III. LVIII. 1-5

LVIII. "And yet we adjure you, for the sake of the gods who of old sanctioned our alliance and for our good service in the cause of the Hellenes, to relent and change your minds, if you have been in any way won over by the Thebans,¹ and in your turn to ask of them the boon not to put to death those whom it ill becomes you to slay, that you may thus receive an honest instead of a shameful gratitude, and may not in giving pleasure to others get in return ignominy for yourselves. It is a simple matter to take our lives, but a grievous task to blot out the infamy of it; for we are not enemies whom you would have a right to punish, but good friends who were forced into war with you. You would, therefore, render a righteous judgment if you guaranteed us security of life and if you bore in mind, before it is too late, that it was in voluntary surrender and with outstretched hands that you received us (and the usage of the Hellenes forbids the slaying of suppliants); and, moreover, that we have always been your benefactors. Turn your eyes upon the sepulchres of your fathers, slain by the Persians and buried in our land, whom we have honoured year by year with a public offering of raiment² and other customary gifts; the first fruits, too, of all that the earth each year has produced have been brought them, the tribute of kindly hands from a friendly land and of allies to those who were once their companions in arms. All this you would reverse by an unjust verdict. Reflect: when Pausanias buried

² For garments as offerings to the dead, cf. Soph. El. 452; Eur. Or. 123, 1436; Tac. A. iii. 2. But some understand ἐσθήμασι to refer to mourning garments. See also Plut. Aristides, xxi.
THUCYDIDES

σανία μὲν γὰρ ἔθαπτεν αὐτοὺς νομίζων ἐν γῇ τε φιλία τιθέναι καὶ παρ᾽ ἀνδράσι τοιούτως· ὑμεῖς δὲ εἰ κτενεῖτε ἡμᾶς καὶ χώραν τὴν Πλαταιάδα Θηβαίδα ποιῆσετε, τί ἀλλο ἢ ἐν πολεμίᾳ τε καὶ παρὰ τοὺς αὐθέντας πατέρας τοὺς ὑμετέρους καὶ ξυγγενεῖς ἀτίμους γερῶν ἄν νῦν ἵσχουσι καταλείψετε; πρὸς δὲ καὶ γῆν ἢ ἣ ἡλευθερώθησαν οἱ Ἑλληνες δουλώσετε, ίερά τε θεῶν οἷς ευξάμενοι Μήδων ἐκράτησαν ἐρημοῦντε ἕκατος πατρίας τῶν ἐσσαμένων καὶ κτισάντων ἀφαιρήσεσθε.

LIX. "Οὐ πρὸς τῆς ὑμετέρας δόξης, ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τάδε, οὐτε ἐς τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμμα καὶ ἐς τοὺς προγόνους ἀμαρτάνειν οὔτε ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἐνεργέτας ἀλλοτρίας ἐνεκα ἐχθρας μὴ αὐτοὺς ἀδικηθέντας διαφθείραι, φείσασθαι δὲ καὶ ἐπικλασθῆναι τῇ γνώμῃ οὐκτον σώφρων λαβόντας μὴ ἄν πεισόμεθα μόνον δεινότητα κατανοοῦντας, ἀλλ’ ὅλοι τε ἄν ὤντες πάθοιμεν καὶ ὡς ἀστάθμητον τὸ τῆς ἐγκλήματος φτινὰ ποτ’ ἄν καὶ ἀναξίως 2 ξυμπέσοι. ὑμεῖς τε, ὥς πρόποι ἡμῖν καὶ ὡς ἡ χρεία προάγει, αἰτούμεθα ἡμᾶς, θεοὺς τοὺς ὁμοθωμούς καὶ κοινός τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπιβοῶμεν, πεῖσαι τάδε, προφερομενοὶ ἕκατος πατέρας ὑμῶν ὄμοιος ἅμην ἀμνησμονεῖν ικέται

1 ἐρημοῦε, Hude adopts Stahl’s conjecture ἐρημοῦντες, because of the striking present between two futures.
2 ὅ after προφερόμενοι is Stahl’s conjecture, adopted by Hude.

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them he thought he was laying them in a friendly land and among friends; but you, if you put us to death and make the territory of Plataea a Theban province, will you not be leaving them in a hostile land and among their murderers—these your fathers and kinsmen—and dispossessed of the honours they now enjoy? Nay more, you will be enslaving the very land in which the Hellenes gained their liberty; you will be bringing desolation upon the temples of the gods to whom they prayed when they conquered the Persians; and you will be robbing of their hereditary sacrifices the people who founded and established them.

LIX. “These things are not consistent with your honour, Lacedaemonians, nor can it be so to offend against the common usage of the Hellenes and against your ancestors, or to put us, your benefactors, to death because of the enmity of others, when you have not been wronged yourselves. Nay, your good name demands that you should spare us and be softened in heart, regarding us with a dispassionate pity and bearing in mind, not only how terrible will be our fate, but who we are that must suffer, and how uncertain is fortune, whose strokes sometimes fall even upon the innocent. And we, as befits our condition and as our sore need demands, entreat you in the name of the common gods of the Hellenic race whom we invoke, gods worshipped by us all at the same altars, to listen to our prayers; and at the same time, appealing to the oaths wherein your fathers swore that they would never forget us, we become suppliants

1 The Thebans are called their murderers because they had sided with the Persians against the Hellenic allies.
THUCYDIDES

γυγνόμεθα ύμων τῶν πατρῶν τάφων καὶ ἐπικαλούμεθα τοὺς κεκμηκότας μὴ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ Θῆβαιοις μηδὲ τοῖς ἐχθρίστοις φίλτατοι ὤντες παραδοθήναι, ἡμέρας τε ἀναμμυσκομεν ἐκεῖνης ἢ τὰ λαμπρότατα μετ’ αὐτῶν πράξαντες νῦν ἐν 3 τῇ δὲ δεινότατα κινδυνεύομεν παθεῖν. ὅπερ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον τε καὶ χαλεπώτατον τοῖς ὤδε ἔχουσι, λόγον τελευτᾶν, διότι καὶ τοῦ βίου ὁ κινδύνος ἐγγὺς μετ’ αὐτοῦ, παύσαμεν λέγομεν ἡδή ὅτι οὐ Θῆβαιοις παρέδομεν τὴν πόλιν (εἰλόμεθα γὰρ ἂν πρὸς γε τοῦτο τῷ αἰσχύστῳ ὀλέθρῳ λυμῷ τελευτῆσαι), ὡμίν δὲ πιστεύσαντες προσήλθομεν (καὶ δίκαιον, εἰ μὴ πείθομεν, ἐς τὰ αὐτὰ καταστήσαντας τὸν ξυντυχόντα κινδύνον ἔσασιν ἡμᾶς 4 αὐτοὺς ἔλεσθαι), ἐπισκήπτομέν τε ἀμα μὴ Πλαταιῆς ὤντες, οἱ προθυμότατοι περὶ τοὺς “Ελλήνας γενόμενοι, Θῆβαιοις τοὺς ἡμῖν ἐχθρίστοις ἐκ τῶν ὑμετέρων χειρῶν καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας πίστεως ἱκέται ὤντες, δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, παραδοθήναι, γενέσθαι δὲ σωτηρίας ἡμῶν καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους “Ελλήνας ἐλευθεροῦσας ἡμᾶς διολέσατο.”

LX. Τοιαύτα μὲν οἱ Πλαταιῆς εἶπον. οἱ δὲ Θῆβαιοι δείσαντες πρὸς τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν μὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τι ἐνδόσαι, παρελθόντες ἔφασαν καὶ αὐτοὶ βούλεσθαι εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐκείνοις παρὰ ἱγνώμην τὴν αὐτῶν μακρότερος λόγος ἐδόθη τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἐρώτημα ἀποκρίσεως. ὡς δ’ ἐκέλευσαν, ἔλεγαν τοιάδε.

LXI. “Τοὺς μὲν λόγους οὐκ ἂν ἦτησάμεθα

1 parelθόντες, Hude adopts Ullrich’s conjecture προσελθόντες.
before your ancestral tombs and call upon the departed not to suffer us to come into the power of Thebans or permit us, who were their dearest friends, to be delivered into the hands of their bitterest foes. We also remind you of that day on which we shared with them in the most brilliant deeds, we who now on this day are on the brink of the most awful fate. And now, bringing our plea to an end—and this must be, howbeit for men in our condition it is the hardest thing of all, seeing that with its ending our mortal peril also draws near—we say that we did not surrender our city to the Thebans—in preference to that our choice would have been to die of starvation, the most horrible of deaths—but capitulated to you because we trusted you. And it is but right, if we fail in our plea, that you should restore us to our former position and let us choose for ourselves the danger that shall confront us. And we likewise adjure you, Plataeans that we are, people who were most zealous for the cause of Hellas, and are now your suppliants, O Lacedaemonians, not to deliver us out of your hands and your good faith to the Thebans, our bitterest foes, but to become our saviours, and not, while liberating the rest of the Hellenes, to bring utter destruction upon us.”

LX. Thus the Plataeans spoke. And the Thebans, fearing lest the Lacedaemonians might be so moved by their plea as to yield somewhat, came forward and said that they, too, wished to speak, since, against their own judgment, the Plataeans had been granted leave to speak at greater length than the answer to the question required. And when the judges assented, they spoke as follows:

LXI. “We should not have asked permission to
eἶπεῖν, εῦ καὶ αὐτοὶ βραχέως τὸ ἐρωτηθέν ἀπεκρίναντο καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ ἡμᾶς τραπόμενοι κατηγορίαν ἐποιήσαντο καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἔξω τῶν προκειμένων καὶ ἀμα όυδὲ ἡταμένων πολλῆς τὴς ἀπολογίας καὶ ἐπαινοῦν ὃν όυδεὶς ἐμέμψατο. ὡν δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀντειπεῖν δεῖ, τῶν δὲ ἐλεγχον ποιησασθαί, ἢν μήτε ἡ ἡμετέρα αὐτοῦς κακία ὥφελη μήτε ἡ τούτων δόξα, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἀκούσαντες κρίνητε.

2 "Ἦμεις δὲ αὐτοῖς διάφοροι ἐγενόμεθα τὸ πρῶτον ὅτι ἡμῶν κτισάντων Πλάταιαν ὕστερον τῆς ἀλλῆς Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία μετ' αὐτῆς, ἅξιμείκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες ἐσχόμεν, οὐκ ἡξίουν οὕτω, ὅσπερ ἐπάχθη τὸ πρῶτον, ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἐξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια, ἐπειδὴ προσηπναγκάζοντο, προσεχώρησαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ μετ' αὐτῶν πολλὰ ἡμᾶς ἐβλασπτον, ἀνθ' ὅν καὶ ἀντέπασχον. Λ.Χ.Ι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ὁ βάρβαρος ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, φασὶ μόνοι Βοιωτῶν ὑπὸ μηδίσαι, καὶ τούτῳ μάλιστα αὐτοὶ 2 τε ἀγάλλονται καὶ ἡμᾶς λοιδοροῦσιν. ἥμεις δὲ μηδίσαι μὲν αὐτούς οὐ φαμεν διότι οὐδ' Ἀθηναίους, τῇ μέντοι αὐτῇ ἰδέα ὕστερον ἴδντον Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἐλλήνας μόνοις αὐ Βοιωτῶν 3 ἀττικίσαι. καὶ τοις σκέψασθε ἐν οἷω εἴδει ἐκάτεροι

1 Strabo mentions Pelasgians, Thracians, Hyantians.
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make this speech, if the Plataeans had briefly answered the question, and had not turned upon us and accused us, at the same time setting up a long defence of themselves on matters foreign to the issue and on which no charge whatever had been made against them, and praising themselves where nobody had blamed them. But as it is, we must answer their charges and expose their self-praise, in order that neither our baseness nor their good repute may help them, but that you may hear the truth about us both before you decide.

"The quarrel we had with them began in this way: after we had settled the rest of Boeotia and had occupied Plataea and other places of which we got possession by driving out a mixed population, these Plataeans disdained to submit to our leadership, as had been agreed upon at first, and separating themselves from the rest of the Boeotians and breaking away from the traditions of our fathers went over to the Athenians as soon as an attempt was made to force them into obedience, and in conjunction with the Athenians did us much harm, for which they also suffered in return. LXII. Again, they say that when the barbarians came against Hellas they were the only Boeotians who did not medize, and for this especially they plume themselves and abuse us. We say, however, that the only reason they did not medize was because the Athenians also did not, and that, moreover, on the same principle, when the Athenians afterwards assailed all Hellas, they were the only Boeotians who atticized. And yet consider

2 Ever since the Persian war medize and medism had been terms of bitter reproach in Hellas; in the mouths of the Thebans atticize and atticism have a like invidious meaning.
ΤΗΘΥΚΟΔΙΔΕΣ

ήμων τοῦτο ἐπράξαν. ἦμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἡ πόλις τότε ἐτύγχανεν οὔτε κατ’ ὀλυγαρχίαν ἰσόνομον πολιτεύουσα οὔτε κατὰ δημοκρατίαν. ὅπερ δὲ ἐστὶ νόμοις μὲν καὶ τῷ σωφρονεστάτῳ ἐναντιώτατον, ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τυράννου, δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν 1

εἶχε τὰ πράγματα. καὶ οὗτοι ἵδιᾳ δυνάμεις ἐπίπλασαντες ἐτὶ μᾶλλον σχῆσειν, εἰ τὰ τοῦ Μήδου κρατήσειν, κατέχοντες ἰσχύι τὸ πλῆθος ἐπηγάγοντο αὐτόν καὶ ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις οὐκ αὐτοκράτωρ οὔσα ἐαυτῆς τοῦτ’ ἐπράξειν, οὐδ’ ἄξιον αὐτὴ ὁνείδισαι δὲν μὴ μετὰ νόμων ἤμαρτεν.

5 ἐπείδῃ γοῦν ὁ τε Μήδος ἄπηλθε καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔλαβε, σκέψασθαι χρῆ, Ἀθηναίων ὑστερον ἐπιώντων τὴν τε ἄλλην Ἐλλάδα καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραις χῶραν πειρωμένων ύφ’ αὐτοῖς ποιεῖσθαι καὶ κατὰ στάσιν ἢδη ἔχοντων αὐτῆς τὰ πολλά, εἰ μαχόμενοι ἐν Κορωνείᾳ καὶ νικήσαντες αὐτοὺς ἱλευθερώσαμεν τὴν Βοιωτίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους νῦν προθύμως ξυνελευθεροῦμεν, ἵππους τε παρέχοντες καὶ παρασκευήν ὅσην οὐκ ἄλλοι τῶν ξυμμάχων. 6 καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐς τὸν μηδισμὸν τοσάῦτα ἀπολογοῦμεθα.

ΛΥΧΜ. "Ὡς δὲ ύμεῖς μᾶλλον τοὺς ἡδικήκατε τοὺς Ἐλληνας καὶ ἄξιώτεροι ἐστε πάσης ζημίας, 2 πειρασόμεθα ἀποφαίνειν. ἐγένεσθε ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμε-
the circumstances under which we each acted as we did. For the constitution of our city at that time was, as it happened, neither an oligarchy under equal laws\(^1\) nor yet a democracy; but its affairs were in the hands of a small group of powerful men—the form which is most opposed to law and the best regulated polity, and most allied to a tyranny. These men, hoping to win still greater power for themselves if the fortunes of the Persian should prevail, forcibly kept the people down and brought him in. The city as a whole was not in control of its own actions when Thebes took the course it did, nor is it fair to reproach it for the mistakes it made when not under the rule of law. At any rate, after the Persian departed and Thebes obtained its lawful government, and when subsequently the Athenians became aggressive and were trying to bring not only the rest of Hellas but also our country under their own sway and, owing to factions amongst us, were already in possession of most of it,\(^2\) pray observe whether we fought and defeated them at Coronea\(^3\) and thus liberated Boeotia, and whether we are now zealously helping\(^4\) to liberate the other peoples, furnishing more cavalry and munitions of war than any of the other allies. Such is our defence against the charge of medism.

LXIII. "We will now try to show that you Plataeans have wronged the Hellenes more than we and are more deserving of any punishment, however severe. You became allies and citizens of Athens

\(^2\) After the battle at Oenophyta, 458 B.C. cf. i. cviii. 2, 3.
\(^3\) 446 B.C. cf. i. cxiii. 2.
\(^4\) This is mentioned with a view to influencing Spartan judges.
Τέρα τιμωρία, ώσ φατέ, Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι καὶ πολίται. οὐκοῦν χρῆν τὰ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μόνον ὡμᾶς ἑπάγεσθαι αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ ἥξυνεπεῖναι μετ᾿ αὐτῶν ἄλλοις, ὑπάρχον γε ὑμῖν, εἰ τι καὶ ἀκούτες προσήγεσθε ὑπ᾿ Ἀθηναίων, τῆς τῶν Λακεδαίμονίων τῶν ἡδὴ ἐπὶ τῷ Μήδῳ ξύμμαχίας γεγενημένης, ἢν αὐτὸι μάλιστα προβάλλεσθε ἵκανη γε ἢ ἡμᾶς τε ὑμῶν ἀποτρέπειν καὶ, τὸ μέγιστον, ἀδεῶς παρέχειν βουλεύσθαι. ἀλλ᾿ ἑκόντες καὶ οὐ βιαζόμενοι ἐτι εἴλεσθε μᾶλλον τὰ Ἀθηναίων.

3 καὶ λέγετε ὡς αἰσχρὸν ἢ προδοῦν τοὺς εὐεργέτας; πολὺ δὲ γε αἰσχιον καὶ ἀδικότερον τοὺς πάντας Ἐλλήνας καταπροδοῦναι, ὡς ἐξουμοῦσατε, ἢ Ἀθηναίους μόνους, τοὺς μὲν καταδουλομένους τὴν Ἐλλάδα, τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθεροῦντας. καὶ οὐκ ἵσην αὐτοῖς τὴν χάριν ἀνταπέδοτε οὐδὲ αἰσχύνης ἀπηλλαγμένην ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀδικούμενοι αὐτούς, ὡς φατέ, ἑπηγάγεσθε, τοῖς δὲ ἀδικοῦσιν ἄλλους ἡμεροῖς κατέστητε. καίτοι τὰς ὠμοίας χάριτας μὴ ἀντιδίδοιναι αἰσχρῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς μετὰ δικαιοσύνης μὲν ὀφειλθείσας, εἰς ἀδικίαν δὲ ἀποδιδομένας.

1 ἴκανη γε, Hude reads ἴκανη γάρ, with Cod. Graev.

1 cf. ch. lv. 1.
2 The alliance of the Lacedaemonians that is in mind here would seem to be the general league of the Hellenes in the Persian War, in which the Lacedaemonians were leaders; but in ch. lviii. 1 the Plataeans use the words θεῶν τῶν ξυμμαχικῶν ποτὲ γενομένων especially with reference to the compact mentioned in ii. lxxi., where it is said that the allies, at the instance of Pausanias, after the battle of
that you might, as you claim, obtain protection against us. In that case you ought only to have invoked their aid against us, instead of assisting them in their aggressions against others; such a course was certainly open to you, in case you were ever being led on by the Athenians against your will, since the alliance of the Lacedaemonians here had already been organized against the Persians—the alliance of which you are always reminding us. That would have been enough to keep us from interfering with you, and, what is more important, to enable you to take your own counsel without fear. Nay, it was willingly and not now under compulsion that you embraced the Athenian cause. You say, however, that it would have been dishonourable to betray your benefactors; but it was far more dishonourable and wicked to betray to their destruction all the Hellenes, with whom you had sworn alliance, than merely the Athenians, when they were endeavouring to enslave Hellas, the others to liberate her. And the recompense you made them is not equal, nor indeed free from dishonour. For you were being wronged, as you claim, when you invoked their aid, but they were wronging others when you became their helpers. And yet, surely, not to repay favours with like favours is dishonourable; but it is not so when, though the debt was incurred in a just matter, it can only be repaid by wrong-doing. Plataea, mutually guaranteed the independence of all the Hellenic states, and of the Plataeans in particular.

pl. Cicero, de Off. 1. 15. 48, non reddere viro bono non licet, modo id facere possit sine injuria. The whole sentence serves to substantiate the words οὐδὲ αἰσχύνης ἀπηλλαγμένην, the charge τὰς δύο μας χάρινα μὴ ἀντιδίδοναι being, according to the Theban speakers, applicable to the Plataeans.
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LXIV. "Δήλον τε ἐποιήσατε οὖδὲ τότε τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἕνεκα μόνοι οὐ μηδίσαντες, ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ οὖν ’Αθηναίοι ἥμεισ ἐκ δε τοῖς μὲν ταῦτα βουλό-2 μενοὶ πολεῖν, τοῖς δὲ τάναντια. καὶ νῦν ἄξιούτε, ἁφ’ ὑπ’ ἐνεργοῦ ἐγένεσθε ἁγαθοί, ἀπὸ τούτων ὠφελεῖσθαι. ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰκός: ὡσπερ δὲ ’Αθηναί-ους εἶδεσθε, τούτους ἐξυγνωμίζεσθε, καὶ μὴ προ-φέρετε τὴν τότε γενομένην ἔμνωσις, ὅς χρή
3 ἀπ’ αὐτῆς νῦν σφοξίζεσθαι. ἀπελίπετε γὰρ αὐτὴν καὶ παραβάντες ἐξυγκατεδοῦλοῦσθε μᾶλλον Αἰ-γινῆτας καὶ ἄλλους των τῶν ἐμοικοτάτων ἢ διεκεκρύμενε, καὶ ταῦτα οὕτε ἄκοντες ἔχοντες τε τοὺς νόμους οὕσπερ μέχρι τοῦ δεύρου καὶ οὐδενὸς ἦμας βιασαμένου, ὡσπερ ἦμας. τὴν τελευταῖαν τε πρὶν περιτειχίζεσθαι πρόκλησιν ἐς ἱσυχίαν ἦμῶν, ὡστε μηδετέροις ἄμυνεις, οὐκ ἐδέχεσθε.
4 τίνες ἀν οὖν ὑμῶν δικαιότερον πᾶσι τοῖς Ἐλλησι-σιούτοι, οὕτως ἐπὶ τῷ ἔκεινου κακῷ ἀνδραγα-θίας προὔθεσθε; καὶ ἃ μὲν ποτε χρηστοὶ ἐγέ-
νεσθε, ὡς φατε, οὐ προσήκοντα νῦν ἐπεδείξατε, ἃ δὲ ἡ φύσις αἰεὶ ἐβούλετο, ἐξηλέγχθη ἐς τὸ ἄλη-θὲς; μετὰ γὰρ ’Αθηναίων ἄδικον ὁδὸν ἴσην
5 ἐχωρίσατε. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐς τὸν ἡμέτερον τε ἄκου-σίου μηδίσμον καὶ τὸν ὑμέτερον ἐκούσιον ἀττικι-σμὸν τοιαῦτα ἀποφαίνομεν.

LXV. "Α ὁ δὲ τελευταία φατε ἀδικηθήμην (παρανόμως γὰρ ἐλθεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐν σπουδαῖς καὶ

1 ἥμεισ, with the majority of the best MSS.; Hude reads ἥμεισ with CG.
BOOK III. LXIV. I—LXV. I

LXIV. "You have, therefore, made it clear that even then it was not for the sake of the Hellenes that you alone of the Boeotians refused to medize, but merely because the Athenians also refused while we did not, and you preferred to act with the one party and against the other. And now you expect to be rewarded for the virtuous conduct that was due to the inspiration of others! But that is unreasonable; as you chose the Athenians, continue to fight on their side. And do not keep reminding us of the alliance you made then, and claim that it ought to save you now. For you have abandoned it and in violation of its principles have constantly aided, instead of trying to prevent, the enslavement of the Aeginetans¹ and other members of the alliance; and that, too, not against your will, since you then enjoyed the laws under which you have lived till now and were not, like us, under compulsion by another. Moreover, you refused to accept the last proposal we made you before Plataea was invested²—to leave you unmolested if you would aid neither side. Who, then, would more justly be hated by all the Hellenes than you, who displayed your virtue in order to compass their injury? Furthermore, those noble qualities which, as you claim, you once displayed you have now made plain were not properly yours, but your natural longings have been put to the proof and shown in their reality; for you have followed the Athenians when they walked in the way of iniquity. Such, then, is our affirmation regarding our unwilling medism and your willing atticism.

LXV. "As to your last charge of wrong-doing on our part—that we unlawfully attacked your city in

¹ cf. I. cv., eviii.; II. xxvii. ² cf. II. lxxii. 1.

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ιερομηνίας ἐπὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν πόλιν, οὐ νομίζομεν
2 οὐδ' ἐν τούτοις ὑμῶν μᾶλλον ἀμαρτεῖν. εἰ μὲν
γὰρ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ πρὸς τε τὴν πόλιν ἐλθόντες ἐμα-
χόμεθα καὶ τὴν γῆν ἑδροῦμεν ὡς πολέμιοι, ἀδι-
κοῦμεν· εἰ δὲ ἄνδρες ὑμῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι
καὶ γένει, βουλόμενοι τῆς μὲν ἐξῳ ξυμμαχίας
ὑμᾶς παύσαι, ἐς δὲ τῇ κοινῇ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν
πάτρια καταστήσαι, ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἐκόντες, τί
ἀδικοῦμεν; οἱ γὰρ ἄγοντες παρανομοῦσι μᾶλλον
3 τῶν ἐπομένων. ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἐκεῖνοι, ὡς ἡμεῖς κρί-
νομεν, οὔτε ἡμεῖς· πολίται δὲ ὄντες ὃσπερ ύμεῖς
καὶ πλείω παραβαλλόμενοι, τὸ ἐαυτῶν τείχος
ἀνοίξαντες καὶ ἐς τὴν αὐτῶν πόλιν φιλῆς, οὐ
πολεμίοις ¹ κομίσαντες ἐβουλοῦμεν τοὺς τε ὑμῶν
χείροις μηκέτι μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, τοὺς τε ἁμείνους
τὰ ἀξία ἔχειν, σωφρονισταί ὄντες τῆς γνώμης καὶ
τῶν σωμάτων τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἄλλοτροφοῦστε, ἀλλ'
ἐς τὴν ξυγγένειαν οἰκειούντες, ἔχθροις οὐδεὶς
καθιστάντες, ἀπασί δ' ὁμοίως ἐνυπόννους.

LXVI. "Τεκμηρίον δὲ ὡς οὐ πολεμίως ἐπράσ-
σομεν· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδικήσαμεν οὐδένα, προεῖπομέν
τε τὸν βουλόμενον κατὰ τὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν
2 πάτρια πολιτεύειν ἴεναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς. καὶ ὑμεῖς
ἀσμενοι χαρήσαντες καὶ ξύμβασιν ποιησάμενοι
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἥσυχάζετε, ύστερον δὲ κατανοή-

¹ filious οὐ πολεμίους, Steup's correction for φιλῶς οὗ
πολεμίους of the MSS.

¹ cf. II. ii. 2. ² Parody on ch. lv. 4.
time of peace and on a day of festival—we do not think that in this matter, either, we are more at fault than you. If it was of our own motion that we went to your city, fought you, and ravaged your land as enemies, we are in the wrong; but if some of your countrymen, the leading men in both wealth and family,¹ wishing to put an end to your alliance with an outsider and to restore you to the traditions of our fathers which are common to all the Boeotians, of their own free will invoked our aid, of what wrong are we guilty? For it is those who lead that break the laws rather than those who follow.² But in my judgment neither they nor we did wrong. They, who are just as much citizens as you and had more at stake, opened their gates and conducted into their own city friends, not enemies, because they wished that the baser sort among you should not become still worse, and that the better sort should have their deserts, being the censors of your political principles and not seeking to deprive the state of your persons, but rather bringing you back into a natural union with your kindred, and that without making you an enemy of anyone but restoring you to peace with all alike.

LXVI. "The proof that we acted in no hostile spirit is that we wronged nobody, and made a proclamation that anyone who wished to be a citizen according to the hereditary ways of all the Boeotians should come over to us. And you came gladly, and entering into an agreement with us you kept quiet at first; but afterwards, when you became aware that

³ σωφρονιστας, regulators or censors, those who bring others to a right mind and are a check on vice and lawlessness. It was a technical term applied to magistrates, ten in number, at Athens, who superintended the morals of the youth.
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σαντες ἡμᾶς ὀλίγους οὖνας, εἰ ἀρα καὶ ἐδοκούμεν τι ἀνεπιεικέστερον πράξαι οὐ μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους ὑμῶν ἐσελθόντες, τὰ μὲν ὤμοια οὐκ ἀνταπέδοτε ἡμῖν, μὴτε νεωτερίσαι ἐργα λόγοις τε πείθειν ὡστε ἐξελθεῖν, ἐπιθέμενοι δὲ παρὰ τὴν ξύμβασιν, οὔς μὲν ἐν χερσὶν ἀπεκτείνατε, οὐχ ὤμοίως ἀλγοῦμεν (κατὰ νόμον γὰρ δὴ τινὰ ἔπασχον), οὔς δὲ χεῖρας προϊσχομένους καὶ σωρήσαντες ὑποσχόμενοι τε ἡμῖν ὑστερον ὑπετείνουσαν τοῦτον παρανόμως διεφθέρατε, πῶς οὐ δεινά εἰργασθε; 3 καὶ ταῦτα τρεῖς ἀδικίας ἐν ὀλίγῳ πράξαντες, τὴν τε λυθεῖσαν ὁμολογίαν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὸν ὑστερον θάνατον καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν ἡμῖν μὴ κτενεῖν ψευσθεῖσαν ὑπόσχεσιν, ἢν τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄγροις ὑμῖν μὴ ἀδικώμεν, ὁμοὶς φατε ἡμᾶς παρανομήσαι 4 καὶ αὐτὸλ ἀξιοῦτε μὴ ἀντιδοῦναι δίκην. οὐκ, ἢν γε οὐτοὶ τὰ δρα ἐγκώσκωσιν· πάντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐνεκα κολασθήσεσθε.

LXVII. "Καὶ ταῦτα, ὁ Δακεδαιμόνιοι, τοῦτον ἐνεκα ἐπεξῆλθομεν καὶ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ ἡμῶν, ἵνα ὑμεῖς μὲν εἰδήτε καὶ δικαίως αὐτῶν καταγγεισό- 2 καὶ, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐτί σιωτερον τετιμωρημένοι. καὶ ὑπετείνουσαν ἀρετάς, εἰ τὸν αρὰ καὶ ἐγένετο, ἀκούσας ἐπικλασθῆτε, ὡς χρῆ τοῖς μὲν ἀδικομένοις ἐπικούρους εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ ἀισχρῶν τι δρῶσι δι- πλασίας ζημίας, ὡς οὐκ ἔκ προσηκόντων ἀμαρ- τάνουσι, μηδὲ ὀλοφυρμῷ καὶ οίκτῳ ὀφελείσθων,

1 ὑστερον μὴ κτενεῖν, Hude transposes μὴ κτενεῖν ὑστερον, against the MSS.

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we were few in number—even supposing we might seem to have acted somewhat inconsiderately in entering your town without the consent of the popular party—you did not repay us in kind, resorting to no act of violence but endeavouring by arguments to induce us to withdraw, but you assailed us in violation of your agreement. Now as to those whom you killed in hand-to-hand conflict we are not so much grieved—for they suffered, we grant you, by a kind of law—but as regards those whom you spared when they stretched out their hands to you, and then, though you afterwards promised us that you would not kill them, lawlessly butchered—was not that an abominable deed? And after committing these three wrongs within a short space of time—the violation of your agreement, the subsequent murder of our men, and the breaking of your promise to us not to kill them if we spared your property in the fields—you nevertheless assert that we were the transgressors, and claim exemption from punishment for yourselves! No, not if these judges decide aright; but for all these crimes you must be chastised.

LXVII. “We have discussed these matters at length, Lacedaemonians, both for your sakes and our own, in order that you, for your part, may know that you will justly condemn them, and we that we have still more righteously exacted vengeance. And let not your hearts be softened when you hear them speak of their ancient virtues, if indeed they ever had any; for virtues might well be a succour to the victims of wrong, but should bring a two-fold penalty upon the authors of a shameful deed, because their offence is out of keeping with their character. And let not their lamentation and pitiful wailing
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πατέρων τε τάφους τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐπιβοῶμενοι
καὶ τὴν σφατέραν ἐρημίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἀνταποθεωροῦμεν πολλῷ δεινότερα παθοῦσαν τὴν ὑπὸ τούτων ἤλικίαν ἤμῶν διεφθαρμένην, δὲν πατέρες οἱ μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἀγοντες ἀπέθανον ἑν Κορωνείᾳ, οἱ δὲ πρεσβύται λειλεμμένοι κατ’ οἰκίας ἔρημοι πολλῷ δικαιοτέραν ὑμῶν ἴκετείαν ποιοῦνται τοὺσδε τιμωρήσασθαι. οἴκτον τε ἁξιώτεροι τυγχάνειν οἱ ἀπρεπεῖς τι πάσχοντες τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἱ δὲ δικαίως, ὡσπερ οἴδε, τὰ ἐναντία ἐπίχαρτοι εἶναι. καὶ τὴν νῦν ἐρημίαν δι’ ἐαυτοὺς ἔχουσιν τοὺς γὰρ ἀμείνους ξυμμάχους ἐκόντες ἀπεώσαντο. παρενόμησαν τε οὗ προπαθόντες υφ᾽ ἡμῶν, μέσει δὲ πλέον ἡ δίκη κρίναντες, καὶ οὐκ ἀνταποδόντες νῦν τὴν ἴσην τιμωρίαν. ἐννομα γὰρ πείσονται καὶ οὐχὶ ἐκ μάχης χείρας προσχόμενοι, ὡσπερ φασίν, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ ἔννομας ἐς δίκην σφᾶς αὐτοὺς παραδόντες.

ἀμύνατε οὖν, ὦ Δακεδαίμονι, καὶ τῷ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμῳ ὑπὸ τῶνδε παραβαθέντι καὶ ἡμῖν ἄνωμα παθοῦσαν ἀνταπόδοτε ἵνα χάριν δικαίαν δὲν πρόθυμοι γεγενήμεθα καὶ μὴ τοῖς τῶνδε λόγοις περισσοθῶμεν εἰν ἡμῖν, ποιήσατε δὲ τοῖς Ἑλλήσι παράδειγμα οὗ λόγων τοὺς ἀγώνας προβῆσοντες. ἀλλ’ ἔργον, δὲν ἀγαθῶν μὲν ὄντων βραχεία ἡ

1 κατ’ οἰκίας, Stahl’s emendation for καὶ οἰκία of the MSS.
2 δὲν ἀνταπόδοτε, Dobree added δὲν.
3 ἀνταπόδοτε, Hude ἀνταπόδοτε τε, after Gertz.

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avail them, nor their appeals to the sepulchres of your fathers and their own desolate state. For in answer we too would point out that a far more dreadful fate befell our young men who were butchered by them, of whose fathers some died at Coronea\(^1\) trying to win Boeotia to your cause, while others, left desolate at home in their old age, with far greater justice make supplication to you to take vengeance upon these men. Pity is more worthily bestowed upon those who suffer an unseemly fate, but those who, like these Plataeans, deserve their fate afford on the contrary a subject for rejoicing. As for their present desolation, that also is their own fault; for of their own free will they rejected the better alliance. They acted unlawfully without having received provocation at our hands, but through hatred rather than according to a just judgment, and they could not possibly pay now a penalty equal to their guilt, for they will suffer a lawful sentence; and they are not, as they claim,\(^2\) stretching out supplicant hands on the field of battle, but have delivered themselves up to justice under formal agreement. Vindicate, therefore, Lacedaemonians, the law of the Hellenes which has been transgressed by these men, and render to us who have suffered by their lawlessness a just recompense for the services we have zealously given, and let us not because of their words be thrust aside when we plead before you,\(^3\) but make it plain to the Hellenes by an example that the trials you institute will be of deeds, not words, and that, if the deeds are good, a

\(^1\) As at ch. lxii. 5, a reminder flattering to the Lacedaemonians.

\(^2\) cf. ch. lviii. 3.

\(^3\) Note the mocking quotation of phrases in the speech of the Plataeans, ch. lvii. 3, 4.
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ἀπαγγελία ἀρκεῖ, ἀμαρτανομένων δὲ λόγοι ἔπεσι
7 κοσμηθέντες προκαλύμματα γίγνονται. ἀλλ’ ἦν
οἱ ἡγεμόνες, ὥσπερ νῦν ἴμεῖς, κεφαλαιώσαντες
πρὸς τοὺς ξύμπαντας διαγγώμας ποιήσασθε,
ἡσσὸν τις ἐπ’ ἀδίκους ἔργοις λόγους καλοὺς
ξητῆσεί.”

LXVIII. Τοιαύτα δὲ οἱ Θηβαῖοι εἶπον. οἱ δὲ
Δακεδαίμονες δικασταὶ νομίζοντες τὸ ἑπερότημα
σφίσιν ὅρθως ἔζειν, εἰ τι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν
ἀγαθὸν πεπόνθασι, διότι τὸν τε ἄλλον χρόνον
ἡξιοῦν δήθεν αὐτοὺς κατὰ τὰς παλαιὰς Παυ-
σανίων μετὰ τὸν Μήδον σποῦντας ἥσυχαζεν καὶ
ὅτε ύστερον ἀ πρὸ τοῦ περιτείχισθαι προεί-
χοντό αὐτοῖς, καυχός εἶναι κατ’ ἐκείνας,1 οὐκ ἐδέ-
ξαντο, ἡγούμενοι τῇ ἕαυτῶν δικαία βουλῆσει
2 ἐκσποῦνδοι ἦδη ὑπ’ αὐτῶν κακῶς πεπονθέναι,
αὖθις τὸ αὐτὸ ἔνα ἐκαστὸν παραγγέτας καὶ
ἐρωτώντες, εἰ τι Δακεδαίμονες καὶ τοὺς ξυμμά-
χους ἀγαθὸν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδρακότες εἰςίν,
ὅπως μὴ φαίειν, ἀπάγοντες ἀπέκτεινον καὶ ἐξαί-
3 ρετον ἑποιήσαντο οὐδένα. διεφθειραν δὲ Πλα-
ταιῶν μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐλάσσονς διακοσίων, Ἄθη-
ναιῶν δὲ πέντε καὶ εἰκοσὶ, οἱ ξυνεπολυορκοῦντο
γυναῖκας δὲ ἡνδραπόδισαν. τῇ δὲ πόλιν ἐνιαυ-

1 κατ’ ἐκείνας, Badham's conjecture for κατ’ ἐκεῖνα ὡς of
the MSS.

1 Referring to the ἑπερότημα βραχῦ of ch. l.ii. 4; liii. 2.
Possibly πρὸς τοὺς ξύμπαντας goes with διαγγώμας ποιήσασθε,
“and then as a warning to all pass sentence.”

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brief recital of them suffices, but if they are wrong, speeches decked out with phrases are but veils to hide the truth. Nay, if all leaders, like you in the present instance, should first state the facts briefly for all concerned,¹ and then pass sentence, there will be less seeking of fair words after foul deeds."

LXVIII. Such was the speech of the Thebans. And the Lacedaemonian judges decided that their question, whether they had received any benefit from the Plataeans in the war, would be a fair one for them to put; for they had at all other times urged them, they claimed, to maintain neutrality in accordance with the old covenant which they had made with Pausanias after the Persian defeat; and when afterwards, before the investment of Plataea was undertaken, their proposal to the Plataeans that they remain neutral in accordance with the earlier agreement had not been accepted,² they thought themselves thenceforth released from all obligations of the treaty because their own intentions had been honourable, and considered that they had been wronged by the Plataeans. So they caused them to come forward again, one at a time, and asked them the same question, whether they had rendered any good service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the war, and when they said "no" they led them off and slew them, exempting no one. The number of the Plataeans that perished was not less than two hundred, and of the Athenians who had taken part in the siege twenty-five; and the women were sold as slaves. As for the city itself, they gave occupation of

² The text is certainly corrupt. Badham's slight change, adopted by Hude, seems to be the simplest solution of the difficulty.
ΤΟΝ ΜΕΝ ΤΙΝΑ ΜΕΓΑΡΕΩΝ ἈΝΔΡΑΣΙ ΚΑΤΑ ΣΤΑΣΙΝ ΕΚΠΕΠΤΩΚΟΣΙ ΚΑΙ ὌΣΟΙ ΤΑ ΣΦΕΤΕΡΑ ΦΡΟΝΟΥΝΤΕΣ ΠΛΑΤΑΙΩΝ ΠΕΡΙΣΘΑΝΕΝ ΕΔΟΣΑΝ ἕΝΟΙΚΕΙΝ. ὩΣΤΕΡΟΝ ΔΕ ΚΑΘΕΛΟΝΤΕΣ ΑὐΤΗΝ ΕΣ ἘΔΑΦΟΣ ΠΑΣΑΝ ἘΚ ΤΩΝ ΘΕΜΕΛΙΩΝ ΦΙΚΟΔΟΜΗΣΑΝ ΠΡΟΣ Τῷ ΗΡΑΙῷ ΚΑΤΑΓΩΓΙΟΝ ΔΙΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ ΠΟΔῶΝ ΠΑΝΤΑΧῂ ΚΥΚΛῂ ΟΙΚῂΜΑΤΑ ἘΧΟΝ ΚΑΤΩΘΕΝ ΚΑΙ ἌΝΩΘΕΝ, ΚΑΙ ὈΡΟΦΑΪΣ ΚΑΙ ΘΥΡΩΜΑΣΙ ΤΟῂΣ ΤΩΝ ΠΛΑΤΑΙΩΝ ἘΧΡΗΣΑΝΤΟ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟῂΣ ἅΛΙΟΥΣ ὉΝ ἜΝ Τῷ ΤΕΙΧΕΙ ἘΠΙΤΥΛΑ, ΧΑΛΚΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΣΙΔΗΡΟΣ, ΚΛΙΝΑΣ ΚΑΤΑΣΚΕΥΑΣΑΝΤΕΣ ΑΝΕΘΕΣΑΝ Τῂ ἩΡᾳ, ΚΑΙ ΤῂΝ ΕΚΑΤΟΜΜΕΣΟΝ ΛΙΘΙΝΟΝ ΦΙΚΟΔΟΜΗΣΑΝ ΑὐΤῂ. ΤῂΝ ΔΕ ΓῂΝ ΘΗΜΟΣΙΩΤΑΝΤΕΣ ἈΠΕΜΙΘΘΕΣΑΝ ἘΠῚ ΔΕΚΑ 4 ἘΤῂ, ΚΑΙ ΕΝΕΜΟΝΤΟ ΘΕΒΑΙῂ ΧΕΘῂΝ. ΣΧΕΘῂΝ ΔΕ Τῂ ΚΑΙ Τῂ ΕΞURRENTΑΝ ΠΕΡῚ ΠΛΑΤΑΙΩΝ ΟΗ ΔΑΚΕΙΔΙΜΟΝΙΟΝ ΟΤῸΣ ΑΠΟΤΕΤΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΙ ΕΓΕΝΟΝΤΟ ΘΕΒΑΙῂ ἘΝΕΚΑ, ΝΟΜῂ ΖΟΝΤΕΣ ἘΣ ΤῂΝ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΝ ΑὐΤΟῂΣ ἍΡΤῂ ΤῸΣ ΚΑΘΙΣΤΑῚ 5 ΜΕΝΟΝ ὩΦΕΛΙΜΟΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ. ΚΑΙ Τῂ ΜΕΝ ΚΑΤᾂ ΠΛΑΤΑΙᾲΝ ΕΤΕΙ ΤΡῂΤῂ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΕΝΗΚΟΣΤῂ ἘΠΕΙΔῂ ἈΘΗΝΑΙῂ ΕΞURRENTΑ ΕΓΕΝΟΝΤΟ ΟΤῸΣ Ε☾ΕΛΕΝΤῂΣΕΝ.

LXIX. ΑῚ ΔΕ ΤΕΣΣΑΡΑΚΟΝΤΑ ΝῂΕΣ ΤῂΝ ΠΕΛΟΠΟΝΝΗΣΙΩΝ ΑῚ ΔΕΣΒΙΟΙ ΒΟΘῂΟΙ ἘΛΘΟΟ΢ΑΙ, ὍΣῂ ΤΟῂ ΦΕΥΓΟΟ΢ΑΙ ΔΙᾲ ΤῸΝ ΠΕΛΑΓΟ΢ΟΝ ἘΚ ΤῸΝ ἈΘΗΝΑΙῂΝ ἘΠΙΔΙΩΧΘΕΙΣΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟ΢ Τῂ ΚΡῂΤῂ ΧΕΙΜΑΣΘΕΙΣΑΙ ΚΑῚ ἈΠῸ ΑὐΤῂΣ ΣΠΟΡΑΔΕΣ ΠΡΟ΢ ΤῂΝ ΠΕΛΟΠΟΝΝΗΣΟΝ ΚΑΤΗΝΕΧΘΕΙΣΑΝ, ΚΑΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΟ΢ΑΙ ἘΝ Τῂ ΚΥΛΛῂΝ ΤΡΕΙΣ ΚΑῚ ΚΑῚ ΔΕΚΑ ΤΡΙΗΕΙΣ ΔΕΝΚΙΔΙΟΝ ΚΑῚ ἈΜΠΡΑΚΙΩΝ ΚΑῚ ΒΡΑΣΙΩΝ ΤῸΝ ΤΕΛΙΔΟΣ ΕΞURRENTΟΝ

2 ἈΛΚῂΔΑ ἘΠΕΛΗΛΥΘΟ΢Α. ἘΒΟΥΛΟΝΤΟ ΓᾂΡ Οῂ ΑΔΑΙΔΙΜΟΝΙΟΝ, ὍΣῂ Τῂς ΔΕΣΒΙΟΝ ΗΜΑΡΤΗΚΕΣΑΝ, ΠΛΕΟΝ ΤῸ

1 ΘΕΒΑΙῂ before ΜΕΓΑΡΕΩΝ, deleted by Classen.
2 καὶ, omitted by Classen, followed by Hude.
it for about a year to some men of Megara who had been driven out in consequence of a sedition, and also to such of the surviving Plataeans as favoured the Lacedaemonian cause. Afterwards, however, they razed it entirely\(^1\) to the ground, and built, in the neighbourhood of the sanctuary of Hera, an inn two hundred feet square, with rooms all around, above and below, using for this purpose the roofs and doors of the Plataeans; and with the rest of the material inside the walls, articles of copper and iron, they fashioned couches, which they dedicated to Hera; and they also built for her a stone temple one hundred feet long. But the land they confiscated and leased for ten years, and the Thebans occupied it. Indeed it was almost wholly for the sake of the Thebans that the Lacedaemonians in all their dealings with the Plataeans showed themselves so thoroughly hostile to them, thinking that the Thebans would be serviceable in the war then just beginning. Such was the fate of Plataea, in the ninety-third year after they became allies of Athens. 519 B.C.

LXIX. Meanwhile\(^2\) the forty Peloponnesian ships, which had gone to the relief of the Lesbians and were at that time traversing the open sea in flight, after they had first been pursued by the Athenians and had been caught in a storm off Crete, had come straggling back to the Peloponnesus, where they found, at Cyllene, thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot triremes and Brasidas son of Tellis, who had come as adviser to Alcidas. For after they had failed to capture Lesbos the Lacedaemonians wished to strengthen

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\(^1\) Or, taking \(\epsilonκ\ τῶν\ θεμέλιων\) with \(φιλακτιμένων\), as Steup and others do, "they built on the old foundations."

\(^2\) Resuming the narrative interrupted at ch. xxxiii. 1.
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ναυτικῶν ποιήσαντες εἰς τὴν Κέρκυραν πλέουσαι στασιάζουσαν, δώδεκα μὲν ναυσὶ μόναισ παρόντων Ἀθηναίων περὶ Ναύπακτον, πρὶν δὲ πλέον τι ἐπιβοηθῆσαι ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ναυτικῶν, ὅπως προφθάσωσι, καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο ὁ τε Βρασίδας καὶ ὁ Ἀλκίδας πρὸς ταῦτα.

LXX. Οἱ γὰρ Κερκυραῖοι ἑστασίαζον, ἐπειδὴ οἱ αἰχμάλωτοι ήλθον αὐτοῖς οἱ ἐκ τῶν περὶ Ἑπίδαμμον ναυμαχίαιν ὑπὸ Κορινθίων ἀφεθέντες, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ ὁκτακοσίων ταλάντων τοῖς προξένοις διηγηματίᾳ, ἔργῳ δὲ πεπεισμένου Κορινθίων Κέρκυραν προσποίησαι. καὶ ἐπρασσόν οὗτοι ἐκαστὸν τῶν πολιτῶν μετιόντες, ὅπως ἀποστήσωσιν Ἀθηναίων τὴν πόλιν. καὶ ἀφικομένης Ἀττικῆς τε νεῶς καὶ Κορινθίας πρέσβεις ἀγούσων καὶ ἐς λόγους καταστάντων ἐψηφίσαντο Κερκυραῖοι Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν ξύμμαχοι εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα, Πελοποννησίως δὲ φίλοι ὀστερότερος καὶ πρότερος. καὶ (ἡ γὰρ Πειθίας ἕθελον ῥόζενός τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοῦ δήμου προειστῆκει) ὑπάγουσιν αὐτῶν οὕτω οἱ ἄνδρες ἐς δίκην, λέγοντες Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν Κέρκυραν καταδουλοῦν. ὅ δὲ ἀποφυγὼν ἀνθυπάγει αὐτῶν τοὺς πλουσιοτάτους πέντε ἄνδρας, φάσκων τέμνειν χάρακας ἐκ τοῦ τε Δίως τοῦ τεμένους καὶ τοῦ Ἀλκίνου. ξημάδα δὲ καθʼ ἐκάστην χάρακα ἐπέκειτο στατήρ. ὀφλόντων

1 cf. i. xlvii. - lv. 2 £160,000, $776,000. 3 The agreement was for a defensive alliance (ἰππαχία); cf. i. xli. 1.

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their fleet and to sail to Corcyra, which was in the throes of a revolution. The Athenians had a fleet of only twelve ships at Naupactus, and the Lacedaemonians desired to reach Corcyra before a larger fleet could come from Athens to re-enforce them. It was with this end in view that Brasidas and Alcidas set about making their preparations.

LXX. The Corcyraeans had been in a state of revolution ever since the home-coming of the captives who had been taken in the two sea-fights off Epidamnus¹ and had been released by the Corinthians. They had nominally been set free on bail in the sum of eight hundred talents² pledged by their proxenoi, but in fact they had been bribed to bring Corcyra over to the Corinthian side. And these men had been going from citizen to citizen and intriguing with them, with a view to inducing the city to revolt from Athens. And on the arrival of an Attic and Corinthian ship bringing envoys, and after the envoys had held conferences with them, the Corcyraeans voted to continue to be allies to the Athenians according to their agreement,³ but on the other hand to renew their former friendship with the Peloponnesians. Thereupon the returned prisoners brought Peithias, a volunteer proxenus of the Athenians and leader of the popular party, to trial, charging him with trying to bring Corcyra into servitude to Athens. But he, being acquitted, brought suits in turn against the five wealthiest men of their number, alleging that they were cutting vine-poles from the sacred precincts of Zeus and Alcinous, an offence for which a fine of a stater⁴ for each stake was fixed by

¹ If of gold, about 16s.; if the silver Athenian stater, about 2s. 8d.; if the silver Corinthian stater, about 1s. 4d.
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de autōn kai pròs tā ierā iketōn kathexoménōn
diā plēthos tēs zēmias, ópws taξámeinó apodóswin,
o Peithias (ētýγhane γar kai bouλhēs ōn) peithēi

6 óste tō vómo chrēsasēsai. oi d' ēpeidhē tō te
vómo eξeirγhontō kal āma eπυνxhānontō tōn Peithiān,
exēs ēti bouλhēs ēstī, mellexe to plēthos anax-
peisei toûs autōús 'Aθnaiōus fílous te kai
ēχhρous νomīζeis, xynīstαntō te kai laβhontes
ēγxeirīdīa eξapīnaiwos ēs tēn bouλhēn eσelhōntes
tōn te Peithiān kteínousi kai āllous tōn te
bouleutān kai idwotōn ēs eξhkhontā. οi d' tīnes
téς autēs gnvómois tō Peithiā dīlγoi ēs tēn 'Aτtī-
kēn trhē kαtēfughōn ēti parousan.

LXXI. Drāsantès dē tōutō kai xynīkalēsantès
Kerkuρaiōus eǐpou òti tautē kai βēltištα ēi̇
kai ēkisīt' ān dουlōsēιn ōp' 'Aθnaiōn, tō te
loipōn mēdētrōus dēxhēsthai āll' h miā vēi ḥsugkā-
zhontas, tō dē plēōn pοlēmōn hγeisthai. ēs dē
eĩpou, kai épikurwosai ḥnāγkasan té̇n gnvōmēn.

2 pēmptousoi dē kai ēs tās 'Aθhēnas eũbōs prēsbeis
perί tē tōn pepragmēnōn dīdāzhontas ōs xynēfere
kai toûs ēkei kαtαpefughōtαs peίsoνταs mēdei̇n
άνεπιτήδει̇on prāsseis, ópws mē tēs ēpisthōphē
gēnētai. LXXII. ēlθōntων dē oi 'Aθnaiōi toûs

1 Or, perhaps, ēpisthōphē = animadversio, "that no attention should be paid"—by way of punishment for the change in Corcyraean policy.

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law. When they had been convicted and because of the excessive amount of the fine took refuge at the temples as suppliants, that they might arrange for the payment of the fine by instalments, Peithias persuaded the senate, of which he was also a member, to let the law take its course. The condemned men, seeing that they were debarred by the law from carrying out their proposal and at the same time learning that Peithias, so long as he continued to be a member of the senate, would persist in his attempt to persuade the populace to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the Athenians, banded together and suddenly rushing into the senate with daggers in their hands killed Peithias and others, both senators and private persons, to the number of sixty. A few, however, who held the same political views as Peithias, took refuge in the Attic trireme that was still in the harbour.

LXXI. After they had taken these measures the conspirators called the Coreclyreans together and told them that it was all for the best, and that now they would be least likely to be enslaved by the Athenians; and in future they should remain neutral and receive neither party if they came with more than one ship, regarding any larger number as hostile. Having thus spoken they compelled the people to ratify their proposal. They also sent at once to Athens envoys to explain recent events at Corecyra, showing how these were for the interests of Athens, and to persuade those who had taken refuge there to do nothing prejudicial to them, in order that there might not be a reaction against Corecyra.1 LXXII. But when the envoys arrived, the Athenians arrested them as revolutionists, and
ΤΕΠΡΟΒΕΙΣ ΨΩΣ ΝΕΩΤΕΡΙΖΟΝΤΑΣ ΞΥΛΛΑΒΟΝΤΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΟΣΟΥΣ ΕΠΕΙΣΑΝ ΚΑΤΕΘΕΝΤΟ ἘΣ ΑΛΓΙΝΑΝ.

2 Ἑν δὲ τούτῳ τῶν Κερκυραίων οἱ έχοντες τὰ πράγματα ἐλθούσης τριήρους Κορινθίας καὶ Δακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεων ἐπιτίθενται τῷ δῆμῳ καὶ μαχόμενοι ἐνίκησαν. Ἀφικομένης δὲ νυκτὸς ὁ μὲν δήμος ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ τὰ μετέωρα τῆς πόλεως καταφεύγει καὶ αὐτοῦ ξυλλεγείς ἱδρύθη, καὶ τὸν Ἑλλαίκον λιμένα ἔχον· οἱ δὲ τὴν τε ἀγορὰν κατέλαβον, οὐπερ οἱ πολλοὶ φίκουν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸν λιμένα τὸν πρὸς αὐτὴ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἥπειρον. ΛΞΧΙΙΙ. τῇ δ’ ὑστεραίᾳ ἦκροβολίσαντό τε ὀλίγα καὶ ἐς τοὺς ἀγροὺς περιέπεμπον ἀμφότεροι, τούς δούλους παρακαλοῦντές τε καὶ ἐλευθερίαν ὑπισχυόμενοι· καὶ τῷ μὲν δήμῳ τῶν οἰκετῶν τὸ πλῆθος παρεγένετο ξύμμαχον, τοῖς δ’ ἐτέροις ἐκ τῆς ἥπειρος ἐπίκουροι ὀκτακόσιοι. ΛΞΧΙV. διαλπούσης δ’ ἡμέρας μάχη αὐθίς γίγνεται, καὶ νικᾶ ὁ δήμος χωρίων τε ἵσχυι καὶ πλήθει προύχων· αἳ τε γυναῖκες αὐτοῖς τολμηρῶς ξυνεπελάβοντο Βάλλουσαι ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκίων τῷ κεράμῳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπομένουσαι τὸν θόρυβον. 

2 ΒΟΥ. γενομένης δὲ τῆς τροπῆς περὶ δείλην ὁψίαν δείσαντες οἱ ὀλίγοι μὴ αὐτοβοεῖ ὁ δήμος τοῦ τε νεωρίου κρατήσειεν ἑπελθὼν καὶ σφᾶς διαφθείρειεν, ἐμπιπράσι τὰς οἰκίας τὰς ἐν κύκλῳ τῆς ἀγορᾶς καὶ τὰς ξυνοικίας, ὅπως μὴ ἦ ἔφοδος, φειδόμενοι οὔτε οἰκείας οὔτε ἀλλοτρίας, ὡστε καὶ 130
deposited them in Aegina, together with such of the fugitives as they had won over.

Meanwhile the dominant party at Corcyra, on the arrival of a Corinthian trireme with Lacedaemonian envoys, attacked the people and were victorious in the fight. But when night came on the people fled for refuge to the acropolis and the high places of the city, and getting together in a body established themselves there. They held also the Hyllaic harbour,\(^1\) while the other party seized the quarter of the market-place where most of them lived, and the harbour\(^2\) adjacent to it which faces the mainland. LXXIII. On the next day they skirmished a little, and both parties sent messengers round into the fields, calling upon the slaves and offering them freedom; and a majority of the slaves made common cause with the people, while the other party gained the support of eight hundred mercenaries from the mainland. LXXIV. After a day’s interval another battle occurred, and the people won, as they had the advantage in the strength of their position as well as in numbers. The women also boldly took part with them in the fight, hurling tiles from the houses and enduring the uproar with a courage beyond their sex. But about twilight, when their forces had been routed, the oligarchs, fearing lest the people, if they came on, might at the first onset get possession of the arsenal and put them to the sword, set fire to the dwelling-houses around the market-place and to the tenements,\(^3\) in order to prevent an assault, sparing neither their own houses nor those of others. The result was that much merchandise

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\(^1\) Probably the present bay Chalikiopulon.  
\(^2\) Now bay of Kastradu.  
\(^3\) Large buildings rented to several poor families (\(= \text{insulae at Rome}\)).
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χρήματα πολλὰ ἐμπόρων κατεκαύθη καὶ ἡ πόλις ἐκινδύνευσε πᾶσα διαφθαρῆναι, εἰ ἀνέμος ἔπε-3 γένετο τῇ φλογὶ ἐπίφορος ἐς αὐτὴν. καὶ οἱ μὲν παυσάμενοι τῆς μάχης ὡς ἐκάτεροι ἤσυχάσαντες τὴν νῦκτα ἐν φυλακῇ ἦσαν· καὶ ἡ Κορωνία ναὸς τοῦ δήμου κεκρατηκότος ὑπεξανήγετο, καὶ τῶν ἐπικούρων οἱ πολλοὶ ἐς τὴν ἁπειρον λαθόντες διεκομίσθησαν.

LXXV. Τῇ δὲ ἐπιγυνωμένῃ ἡμέρᾳ Νικόστρατος ὁ Διοιτέρφους, Ἀθηναίων στρατηγός, παραγίγνεται βοηθῶν ἐκ Ναυπάκτου δώδεκα ναυσὶ καὶ Μεσσηνίων πεντακοσίων ὀπλίταις· ξύμβασιν τε ἐπράσσε καὶ πείθει ὡστε ξυγχωρῆσαι ἀλλήλοις δέκα μὲν ἄνδρας τοὺς αἰτιωτάτους κρίναι, οἱ οὐκέτι ἔμειναν, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους οἰκεῖν σπουδᾶς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιησαμένους καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθρούς καὶ φίλους νομίζειν. 2 καὶ ὁ μὲν ταύτα πράξας ἐμελλεν ἀποπλεύσεσθαι· οἱ δὲ τοῦ δήμου προστάται πείθουσιν αὐτὸν πέντε μὲν ναῦς τῶν αὐτοῦ σφίσι καταλιπτεῖν, ὥσπερ ἠσσόν τι ἐν κινήσει ὡσιν οἱ ἐναντίοι, ἵσας δὲ αὐτοὶ πληρώσαντες ἐκ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐμπέμψειν. 3 καὶ ὁ μὲν ξυνεχώρησεν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κατέλεγον ἐς τὰς ναῦς. δείσαντες δὲ ἐκεῖνοι μὴ ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναὶς ἀποπεμφθῶσι καθίζονσιν ἐς τὸ τῶν 4 Διοσκόρων ἱερόν. Νικόστρατος δὲ αὐτοὶς ἀνίστη τε καὶ παρεμυθεῖτο. ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ὁ δήμος ὀπλισθεὶς ἐπὶ τῇ προφάσει ταύτη, ὡς οὔδεν

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was burned up and that the whole city was in imminent danger of being entirely destroyed if a wind blowing toward the city had sprung up to reinforce the flames. And during the night, after they had desisted from battle, both parties rested but remained on the alert; and now that the people had got the upper hand the Corinthian ship slipped out to sea, and most of the mercenaries were secretly conveyed over to the mainland.

LXXV. On the following day Nicostratus son of Diitrophes, general of the Athenians, came to their assistance from Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred Messenian hoplites. He tried to negotiate a settlement between the factions, and succeeded in persuading them to come to a mutual agreement: that the twelve men who were chiefly to blame should be brought to trial (whereupon they fled at once) and that the rest should make peace with each other and dwell together, and enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with the Athenians. When he had accomplished this, he was about to sail away; but the leaders of the people persuaded him to leave them five of his ships, that their opponents might be somewhat less inclined to disturbance, agreeing on their part to man and send with him an equal number of their own ships. He agreed, and they began to tell off their personal enemies as crews for the ships. But these, fearing that they might be sent off to Athens, sat down as suppliants in the temple of the Dioscuri. Nicostratus, however, urged them to rise and tried to reassure them. But when he could not induce them to rise, the people took this pretexts to arm themselves, interpreting their distrust and refusal to sail
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αὐτῶν ὑγίες διανοοῦμένων τῇ τοῦ μὴ ἔμπλεῖν ἀπιστίᾳ, τά τε ὅπλα αὐτῶν ἐκ τῶν ὦκιών ἔλαβε καὶ αὐτῶν τιμαὶ οὓς ἐπέτυχον, εἰ μὴ Νικόστρατος ἔκωλυσε, διεύθειραν ἃν. ὀρῶντες δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι τὰ γνωρόμενα καθίζουσιν ἐς τὸ Ἡραίον ἴκεται καὶ γίγνονται οὐκ ἑλάσσους τετρακοσίων. ὁ δὲ δήμος δείσας μὴ τι νεωτερίσωσιν ἀνίστησί τε αὐτοὺς πείσας καὶ διακομίζει ἐς τὴν πρὸ τοῦ Ἡραίου νῆσον καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐκείσε αὐτοῖς διεσέμπετο.

LXXVI. Τῆς δὲ στάσεως ἐν τούτῳ οὐσίας τετάρτη ἡ πέμπτη ἡμέρα μετὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐς τὴν νῆσον διακομίδην αἱ ἐκ τῆς Κυλλήνης Πελοποννησίων νῆες, μετὰ τὸν ἐκ τῆς Ἰωνίας πλοῦν ἐφορμοὶ οὐσαι, παραγίγνονται τρεῖς καὶ πεντήκοντα. ἤρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Ἁλκιδᾶς, δόσπερ καὶ πρότερον, καὶ Βρασίδας αὐτῷ ξύμβουλος ἐπέπλει. ὁμοσάμενοι δὲ ἐς Σύβοτα λιμένα τῆς ἱππείρου ἅμα ἐφ ἐπέπλεουν τῇ Κερκύρᾳ. LXXVII. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ θορύβῳ καὶ πεφοβημένοι τά τ' ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὸν ἐπίπλουν παρεσκευάζοντο τε ἅμα ἐξήκοντα ναῦς καὶ τὰς αἰεὶ πληρομένας ἐξέπεμπον πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους, παραγονότων Ἀθηναίων σφᾶς τε ἐᾶσαι πρῶτον ἐκπλεύσαι καὶ 2 ὑστερον πάσας ἅμα ἐκείνους ἐπιγενέσθαι. ὡς δὲ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἦσαν σποράδες αἱ νῆες, δύο μὲν εὐθὺς ἡτομόλησαν, ἐν ἐτέραις δὲ ἄλληλοις οἱ ἐμπλέουντες ἐμάχοντο. ἦν δὲ οὔδεις

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with Nicostratus as proof that their intentions were anything but good. Accordingly they took arms from their houses, and would have slain some of the oligarchs whom they chanced to meet, if Nicostratus had not prevented them. The rest, seeing what was going on, sat down as suppliants in the temple of Hera, and they were not less than four hundred in number. But the people, fearing that they might start a revolution, persuaded them to rise and conveyed them over to the island which lies in front of the temple of Hera; and provisions were regularly sent to them there.

LXXVI. At this stage of the revolution, on the fourth or fifth day after the transfer of the men to the island, the Peloponnesian ships arrived\(^1\) from Cyllene, where they had been lying at anchor since their voyage from Ionia, being fifty-three in number; and Alcidas was in command of them as before, with Brasidas on board as his adviser. They came to anchor first at Sybota, a harbour of the mainland, and then at daybreak sailed for Corcyra. LXXVII. But the Corcyraeans,\(^2\) being in great confusion and thrown into a panic by the state of affairs in the city as well as by the approaching fleet, proceeded to equip sixty ships and at the same time to send them out against the enemy as fast as they were manned, although the Athenians urged that they themselves be permitted to sail out first, and that the Corcyraeans should come out afterwards with all their ships in a body. But when their ships were near the enemy, scattered here and there, two of them deserted immediately, while in others the crews were fighting one another; and there was no order in anything

\(^1\) cf. ch. lxix. 1.

\(^2\) i.e. the democratic party, now in control.
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3 κόσμος τῶν ποιουμένων. ἴδοντες δὲ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τὴν ταραχὴν εἰκοσὶ μὲν ναυσὶ πρὸς τοὺς Κερκυραίους ἐτάξαντο, ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς πρὸς τὰς δώδεκα ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὅν ἦσαν αἱ δύο ἡ 1 Σαλαμινία καὶ Πάραλος.

LXXVIII. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Κερκυραίοι κακῶς τε καὶ κατ’ ὀλίγας προσπέπτουντες ἔταλαιπώρουν τὸ καθ’ αὐτούς. οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναίοι φοβούμενοι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὴν περικύκλωσιν ἀθρόαις μὲν οὐ προσέππυτον οὐδὲ κατὰ μέσον ταῖς ἐφ’ ἔαυτοὺς τεταγμέναις, προσβαλόντες δὲ κατὰ κέρας καταδύοντο μίαν ναῦν. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα κύκλου ταξιμένων αὐτῶν περιέπλεον καὶ ἐπειρώντο θορυβέων.

2 γνόντες δὲ οἱ πρὸς τοὺς Κερκυραίους καὶ δείσαντες μὴ ὅπερ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ γένοιτο, ἐπιβοηθοῦσι, καὶ γενόμεναι ἀθροῖ αἱ νῆσε ἀμα τὸν ἐπίπλουν 3 τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐποιοῦντο. οἱ δ’ ὑπεχώρουν ἡδὴ πρόμιναν κρουόμενοι καὶ ἀμα τὰς τῶν Κερκυραίων ἐβούλουντο προκαταφυγεῖν ὑπὶ μάλιστα, ἐαυτῶν σχολή τε ὑποχωροῦντων καὶ πρὸς σφᾶς τεταγ- 4 μένων τῶν ἐναντίων. ἡ μὲν οὖν ναυμαχία τοιαύτη γενομένη ἐτελεύτα ἐς ἡλίου δύσιν.

LXXIX. Καὶ οἱ Κερκυραίοι δείσαντες μὴ σφίσιν ἐπιπλεύσαντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ὡς κρατοῦντες οἱ πολέμιοι ἡ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νῆσου ἀναλάβωσιν ἡ καὶ ἄλλο τι νεωτερίσωσι, τοὺς τε ἐκ τῆς νῆσου πάλιν ἐς τὸ Ἡραιον διεκόμισαν καὶ τὴν

1 ἢ added by Krüger.
they did. And when the Peloponnesians saw their confusion they arrayed only twenty ships against the Corecyraeans, and all the rest against the twelve Athenian ships, among which were the two sacred ships, the Salaminia and the Paralos.

LXXVIII. Now the Corecyraeans, since they were attacking in disorder and with few ships at a time, were having trouble in their part of the battle; and the Athenians, fearing the enemy's superior numbers and seeing the danger of being surrounded, did not attack the whole body together nor the centre of the ships that were arrayed against them, but charged upon one of the wings and sank a single ship. And then, when the Peloponnesians after this move formed their ships in a circle, they kept sailing round the Peloponnesian fleet, trying to throw it into confusion. But those who were facing the Corecyraeans, perceiving this manoeuvre and fearing a repetition of what happened at Naupactus,1 came to the rescue, and the whole fleet, now united, advanced simultaneously upon the Athenians. Thereupon the Athenians began to retire, backing water,2 hoping at the same time that the Corecyraean ships might as far as possible escape into harbour,3 as they themselves retired slowly and the enemy's attacks were directed only against them. Such then was the course of the battle, which lasted till sunset.

LXXIX. The Corecyraeans, fearing that the enemy, confident of victory, might sail against the city and either take on board the prisoners on the island or commit some other act of violence, transferred these prisoners once more to the temple of

1 cf. II. lxxxiv. 2 i.e. keeping their faces to the enemy. 3 i.e. with as many ships as possible; as it was they lost thirteen ships.
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2 πόλιν ἐφύλασσον. οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν πλεύσαι κρατοῦντες τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ, τρεῖς δὲ καὶ δέκα ναῦς ἔχοντες τῶν Κερκυραίων ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν ἥπειρον ὀθενπερ ἀνηγάγοντο.

3 τῇ δ’ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν πόλιν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑπέπλευον, καὶ περὶ ἐπολλὴ ταραχῇ καὶ φόβῳ ὄντας καὶ Βρασίδου παραίνοντος, ὡς λέγεται, 'Αλκίδα, ἵσοψήφου δὲ οὐκ ὄντος· ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν Λευκίμμην τὸ ἀκρωτήριον ἀποβάντες ἐπόρθουν τοὺς ἄγρους.

LXXX. 'Ο δὲ δήμος τῶν Κερκυραίων ἐν τούτῳ περιδεῖς γενόμενος μὴ ἐπιπλεύσωσιν αἱ νῆσε, τοὺς τε ἰκέταις ἱσαν ἐς λόγους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅπως σωθήσεται ἡ πόλις. καὶ τινας αὐτῶν ἐπεισαν ἐς τὰς ναὺς ἐσβήναν· ἐπιλήρωσαν γὰρ ὅμως τριά-2 κοντα.1 οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι μέχρι μέσου ἡμέρας δηώσαντες τὴν γῆν ἀπέπλευσαν, καὶ ὑπὸ νῦκτα αὐτῶς ἔφρυκτωρήθησαν ἐξήκουντα νῆσες 'Αθηναίων προσπλέουσιν ἀπὸ Δευκάδος· ἄς οἱ 'Αθηναίοι πυνθανόμενοι τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὰς μετ' 'Αλκίδου ναῦς ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν μελλοῦσας πλεῖν ἀπέστειλαν καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα τὸν Θουκλέους στρατηγόν.

'LXXXI. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς νυκτὸς εὔθως κατὰ τάχος ἐκομίζοντο ἐπὶ οἰκον παρὰ τὴν γῆν· καὶ ὑπερενεκόντες τῶν Δευκάδιων ἵσθομον τὰς ναῦς, ὅπως μὴ περιπλέουσας ὀφθώσων,

1 Some MSS. give προσδεχόμενοι τὸν ἐπίπλουν after τριά-κοντα, most editors omit.
Hera and then took measures to protect the city. The Peloponnesians, however, although they were the victors in the naval battle, did not venture to attack the city, but with thirteen Corcyraean ships which they had taken sailed back to the harbour on the mainland from which they had set out. On the next day they were no more inclined to attack the city, though the inhabitants were in a state of great confusion and fear, and though Brasidas, it is said, urged Alcidas to do so, but did not have equal authority with him. Instead, they merely landed on the promontory of Leucimne and ravaged the fields.

LXXX. Meanwhile the people of Corcyra, becoming alarmed lest the ships should attack them, conferred with the suppliants and also with the other members of the opposite faction on the best means of saving the city. And some of them they persuaded to go on board the ships; for in spite of all the Corcyraeans had manned thirty ships. But the Peloponnesians, after ravaging the land till midday, sailed away, and toward night a signal was flashed to them that forty Athenian ships were approaching from Leucas. These ships had been sent by the Athenians, under the command of Eurymedon son of Thucles, when they learned of the revolution at Corcyra and that the fleet under Alcidas was about to sail thither.

LXXXI. The Peloponnesians accordingly set sail that very night for home, going with all speed and keeping close to the shore; and hauling their ships across the Leucadian isthmus, in order to avoid being seen, as they would be if they sailed around, they got

1 This isthmus was the ἄκτη ἱππεῖον of Homer (ο 378), now Santa Maura, the neck of land, about three stadia in width, joining Leucas with the mainland.
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2 ἀποκομίζονται. Κερκυραῖοι δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τὰς τε Ἀττικὰς ναὸς προσπλεύσας τὰς τε τῶν πολε-
μίων οἴχομένας, λαβόντες τοὺς τε Μεσσηνίους ἡς τὴν πόλιν ἤγαγον πρότερον ἔξω δύτας, καὶ τὰς
ναὸς περιπλέυσαι κελεύσαντες ἃς ἐπιλήψασαν ἢς τὸν Ἰλλαίκον λιμένα, ἐν ὅσοι περιεκομίζοντο, τῶν ἔχθρῶν εἰ τινα λάβοιεν, ἀπέκτεινον καὶ ἐκ τῶν
νεὼν ὅσους ἐπείσαν ἐσβήναι ἐκβιβάζοντες ἄπε-
χρώντο, ἐς τὸ Ὡμαίων τε ἐλθόντες τῶν ἱετῶν ὡς πεντήκοντα ἄνδρας δίκην ὑποσχεῖν ἐπείσαν
3 καὶ κατέγνωσαν πάντων θάνατον. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ
tῶν ἱετῶν, ὅσοι ὅποι ἐπείσθησαν, ὡς ἔξωρον τὰ
γιγνόμενα, διέφθειρον αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἀλλήλοις
καὶ ἐκ τῶν δεύδρων τινὲς ἀπήγχοντο, οἱ δ’ ὡς
4 ἐκαστοὶ ἐξύπνατο ἀνηλοῦντο. ἡμέρας τε ἐπτά, ὡς
ἀφικόμενος ὁ Ἐυρυμέδων ταῖς ἐξήκοντα ναυσὶ
παρέμεινε, Κερκυραῖοι σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἔχθροὺς
dοκοῦντας εἶναι ἐφόνευον, τὴν μὲν αἰτίαν ἐπι-
φέροντες τοῖς τὸν δήμον καταλύσαν, ἀπέθανον
dε τινὲς καὶ ἰδίας ἔχθρας ἐνεκα, καὶ ἄλλοι χρη-
μάτων σφίσιν ὅφειλομένων ὑπὸ τῶν λαβόντων.
5 πάσα τε ἣδεα κατέστη θανάτου, καὶ ὅποι φιλεῖ ἐν
tῷ τοιούτῳ γίγνεσθαι, οὐδὲν ὃ τι ὁ ὕνεβη καὶ
ἔτι περαιτέρω. καὶ γὰρ πατήρ παῖδα ἀπέ-

1 λαβόντες, Hude’s conjecture for λαβόντες of the MSS.

1 The 500 whom Nicostratus had brought, the object
being doubtless merely the intimidation of the oligarchs.

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away. Now the Corcyraeans had no sooner perceived that the Athenian fleet was approaching and that the enemy's fleet had gone than they secretly brought the Messenians,1 who had till then been outside the walls, into the city, and ordered the ships which they had manned to sail round into the Hyllaic harbour 2; then while these were on their way thither they slew any of their personal enemies whom they could lay hands upon. They also put ashore and despatched all those on board the ships whom they had persuaded to go aboard, then went into the temple of Hera, persuaded about fifty of the suppliants there to submit to trial, and condemned them all to death. But most of the suppliants, not having consented to be tried, when they saw what was happening set about destroying one another in the sacred precinct itself, while a few hanged themselves on trees, and still others made away with themselves as best they could. And during the seven days that Eurymedon, after his arrival, stayed there with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans continued slaughtering such of their fellow-citizens as they considered to be their personal enemies. The charge they brought was of conspiring to overthrow the democracy, but some were in fact put to death merely to satisfy private enmity, and others, because money was owing to them, were slain by those who had borrowed it. Death in every form ensued, and whatever horrors are wont to be perpetrated at such times all happened then—aye, and even worse. For father slew son, men were dragged

2 The object was that the oligarchs on them might be cut off from their friends in the neighbourhood of the agora and in the temple of Hera.
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κτείνε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν ἀπεστάντο καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐκτείνοντο, οἱ δὲ τινες καὶ περιοικοδομηθέντες ἐς τοῦ Διονύσου τῷ ἱερῷ ἀπέθανον.

LXXXII. Οὕτως ὡμὴ ἡ στάσις 1 προσφέρησε, καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς πρώτῃ ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ὑστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τῷ Ἐλληνεῖκῳ ἐκκοινόθη διαφορῶν σὺνὶν ἐκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δῆμων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὑλίγοις τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους. καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνη ὡς ἂν ἐχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδὲ ἐτοίμων παρακαλεῖν αὐτοὺς, πολεμουμένων δὲ καὶ ἐκμαχίας ἀμα ἐκάτεροι τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κακώσει καὶ σφίνον αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσποιῆσαι ῥάδιως αἰ ἐπαγωγαί τοῖς νεοτερίζειν τι θυρολο- 2 μένοις ἐπορίζοντο. καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεις, γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἔως ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ἦ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἑσυχαίτερα καὶ τοῖς εἰδέοι διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἐκασται 2 αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ἐννυτυχῶν ἐφιστῶται. ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνη καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἰ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδίωται ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκούσιοις ἀνάγκας πίπτειν· ο δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελῶν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδασκάλως καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργάς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοὶ.

3 Ἐστασίαξε τε σὺν τὰ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντα πον πῦστει τῶν προγενομένων

1 ἡ στάσις, for στάσις of the MSS., Krüger with Schol.
2 ἐκασταί, Hude alters to ἐκάστας.
BOOK III. LXXI. 5—LXXXII. 3

from the temples and slain near them, and some were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and perished there.

LXXXII. To such excesses of savagery did the revolution go; and it seemed the more savage, because it was among the first that occurred; for afterwards practically the whole Hellenic world was convulsed, since in each state the leaders of the democratic factions were at variance with the oligarchs, the former seeking to bring in the Athenians, the latter the Lacedaemonians. And while in time of peace they would have had no pretext for asking their intervention, nor any inclination to do so, yet now that these two states were at war, either faction in the various cities, if it desired a revolution, found it easy to bring in allies also, for the discomfiture at one stroke of its opponents and the strengthening of its own cause. And so there fell upon the cities on account of revolutions many grievous calamities, such as happen and always will happen while human nature is the same, but which are severer or milder, and different in their manifestations, according as the variations in circumstances present themselves in each case. For in peace and prosperity both states and individuals have gentler feelings, because men are not then forced to face conditions of dire necessity; but war, which robs men of the easy supply of their daily wants, is a rough schoolmaster and creates in most people a temper that matches their condition.

And so the cities began to be disturbed by revolutions, and those that fell into this state later, on hearing of what had been done before, carried to
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πολὺ ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας τῶν τῇ ἐπιχειρήσεως περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀτοπία. Ἐπεὶ τὴν εἰλικρινὲς ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει. τόμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθῆς δειλία εὔπρεπῆς, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἄπαν ἐμνενόμην ἐπὶ πάν ἄργον τὸ δ’ ἐμπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνήρ μόρα προσετέθη, ἀσφαλεία δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπήσεις πρόφασις εὐλογος. καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίνων πιστος αἰει, ὁ δ’ ἀντιλέγων αὐτὸ ὑπόπτος. ἐπιβουλεύσας δὲ τις τυχών ἐμνενόμην καὶ ὑπονοήσας ἐτί δεινότερος προβουλεύσας δὲ ὅπως μηδὲν αὐτῶν δεήσει, τῆς τε ἐταιρίας διαλυτῆς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐκπεταλημένοις. ἀπλῶς τε ὁ φθάσας τὸν μέλλουτα κακὸν τι δρᾶν ἐπηνειτο καὶ ὁ ἐπι- κελεύσας τὸν μὴ διανοούμεναν. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ ἐμνενόμης τοῦ ἐταιρικοῦ ἀλλοτριωτέρου ἐγένετο διὰ τὸ ἐτοιμότερον εἶναι ἀπροφασίστως τολμᾶν οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὡφελία ἢ οὶ τοιαύται ἐνυόνοι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς καθεστῶτας πλεονεξία. καὶ τὰς ἐς σφαῖς αὐτοὺς πίστεις οὐ τῷ θείῳ νόμῳ μᾶλλον ἐκρατύνοντο ή τῷ κοινῷ τι παρανομῆσαι. τα τε ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων καλῶς λεγόμενα ἐνεδέχοντο ἔργων φυλακῆς, εἰ προύχολεν, καὶ οὐ γενναιότητι. ἀντιτιμωρήσασθαί τε τινα

1 ἀσφάλεια δὲ τοῦ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι Hude.
2 ὡφελία, Poppo for ὡφελίας of the MSS.

i.e. either of plotting or of detecting plots.

Or, “Fair words proffered by their opponents they re-

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still more extravagant lengths the invention of new devices, both by the extreme ingenuity of their attacks and the monstrousness of their revenges. The ordinary acceptation of words in their relation to things was changed as men thought fit. Reckless audacity came to be regarded as courageous loyalty to party, prudent hesitation as specious cowardice, moderation as a cloak for unmanly weakness, and to be clever in everything was to do naught in anything. Frantic impulsiveness was accounted a true man’s part, but caution in deliberation a specious pretext for shirking. The hot-headed man was always trusted, his opponent suspected. He who succeeded in a plot was clever, and he who had detected one was still shrewder; on the other hand, he who made it his aim to have no need of such things was a disrupter of party and scared of his opponents. In a word, both he that got ahead of another who intended to do something evil and he that prompted to evil one who had never thought of it were alike commended. Furthermore, the tie of blood was weaker than the tie of party, because the partisan was more ready to dare without demur; for such associations are not entered into for the public good in conformity with the prescribed laws, but for selfish aggrandisement contrary to the established laws. Their pledges to one another were confirmed not so much by divine law as by common transgression of the law. Fair words proffered by opponents, if these had the upper hand, were received with caution as to their actions and not in a generous spirit. To get revenge on some one was received, if they had the upper hand, by vigilant action rather than with frank generosity.”
περὶ πλείονος ἢν ἢ αὐτὸν μὴ προπαθεῖν. καὶ ὅρκοι εἶ ποι ἂρα γένοιτο ξυναλλαγῆς, ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα πρὸς τὸ ἀπορον ἐκατέρω διδόμενοι ἵσχυον, οὐκ ἔχοντων ἀλλοθεν δύναμιν ἐν δὲ τῷ παρατυχόντι ὁ φθάσας θαραήσαι, εἰ ἵδοι ἄφαρκτον, ἥδιον δὲ τὴν πίστιν ἐτιμωρεῖτο ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς, καὶ τὸ τε ἀσφαλές ἐλογίζετο καὶ ὅτι ἀπάτη περιγενόμενοι ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα προσελάμβανεν. ράν δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ κακοῦργοι ὄντες δεξιοὶ κέκληνται ἢ ἀμάθεις ἀγαθοὶ, καὶ τῷ μὲν αἰσχύνονται, ἕπτε δὲ τῷ ἀγάλλονται.

8 Πάντων δ’ αὐτῶν αἰτίων ἡ ἡ δια πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν, ἐκ δ’ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐσ τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόβυμον. οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεις προστάντες μετ’ οὐνόματος ἐκάτεροι εὑρεποῦς, πλῆθος τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιμήσει, τὰ μὲν κοινὰ λόγω θεραπεύουσε τὰ θελα ἐποίουντο, παντὶ δὲ τρόπῳ ἄγωνιζόμενοι ἀλλήλων περιγίγνεσθαι ἐτόλμησάν τε τὰ δεινότατα, ἐπεξῆγαν τε τὰς τιμωρίας ἄτι μείζους, οὐ μέχρι τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῆς πόλει χυμφόρου προστιθέντες, ἕς δὲ τὸ ἐκάτερος που αἰεὶ Ἴδον ἤχον ὅρίζοντες, καὶ ἦ μετὰ

1 αἰτίων, Hude deletes, with Madvig.
2 ἡ, Hude deletes.
3 προστιθέντες, Dion. Hal. for προτιθέντες of the MSS.

1 Or, omitting ὄντες, “And in general men are more willing to be called clever rogues than good simpletons.”

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more valued than never to have suffered injury oneself. And if in any case oaths of reconcilement were exchanged, for the moment only were they binding, since each side had given them merely to meet the emergency, having at the time no other resource; but he who, when the opportunity offered and he saw his enemy off his guard, was the first to pluck up courage, found his revenge sweeter because of the violated pledge than if he had openly attacked, and took into account not only the greater safety of such a course, but also that, by winning through deceit, he was gaining besides the prize of astuteness. And in general it is easier for rogues to get themselves called clever than for the stupid to be reputed good,\(^1\) and they are ashamed of the one but glory in the other.

The cause of all these evils was the desire to rule which greed and ambition inspire, and also, springing from them, that ardour\(^2\) which belongs to men who once have become engaged in factious rivalry. For those who emerged as party leaders in the several cities, by assuming on either side a fair-sounding name, the one using as its catch-word "political equality for the masses under the law," the other "temperate aristocracy,"\(^3\) while they pretended to be devoted to the common weal, in reality made it their prize; striving in every way to get the better of each other they dared the most awful deeds, and sought revenges still more awful, not pursuing these within the bounds of justice and the public weal, but limiting them, both parties alike, only by the moment's

\(^1\) Or, τὸ πράσαμον, "party-spirit."

\(^2\) For the objectionable terms "democracy" (δημοκρατία) and "oligarchy" (ολιγαρχία).
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ψήφων ἄδικον καταγνώσεως ἢ χειρί κτώμενοι τὸ κρατεῖν ἐτοίμοι ἔσαυν τὴν αὐτίκα φιλονικίαν ἐκτιμπλάναι. ὥστε εὐσεβεία μὲν οὐδέτεροι ἐνόμιζον, εὐπρεπεία δὲ λόγου οἷς ξυμβαίνῃ ἐπιφθόνως τι διαπράξασθαι, ἁμείνων ἦκουν. τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ὅτι οὐ ξυπνηγονίζοντο ἢ φθόνῳ τοῦ περείναι διεφθείροντο.

LXXXIII. Οὕτω πᾶσα ἣδεα κατέστη κακοποτίας διὰ τὰς στάσεις τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ, καὶ τὸ εὐθῦς, οὐ τὸ γενναῖον πλεῖστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἡφανίζθη, τὸ δὲ ἀντιτετάχθαι ἀλλήλους 2 τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπίστως ἐπὶ πολὺ διήνεγκεν οὗ γὰρ ἢν ὁ διαλύσων οὔτε λόγος ἔχυρος οὔτε ὅρκος φοβερός, κρείσσους δὲ οὕτε ἀπαντες λογισμός ἐστὶ ἀνέλπιστου τοῦ βεβαίου μὴ παθεῖν μᾶλλον προνεκρόποις ή πιστεῦσαι ἐδύναντο. καὶ οἱ φαιλότεροι γνώμην ὡς τὰ πλεῖον περιεγγράφοντο· τῷ γὰρ δεδείμαι τὸ τε αὐτῶν ἐνδὲς καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐξιστῶν, μὴ λόγοις τε ἡσοῦς ὅσις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πολυτρόπου αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης φθάσωσι προεπιβουλεύμενοι, τολμηρῶς πρὸς τὰ ἔργα ἐχώρουν. 4 οἱ δὲ καταφρονοῦντες κἂν προαισθέσθαι καὶ ἔργῳ οὔτε σφαῖς δεῖν λαμβάνειν ἢ γνώμη ἔξεστιν, ἀφαρκτοὶ μᾶλλον διεφθείροντο.

1 καταγνώσεως, Hude deletes, with van Herwerden.

1 Or, as Shilleto, “leaning in calculation to considering that security was hopeless, they rather took precautions . . .” cf. Schol., ἐπαντεῖς δὲ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῖς λογισμοῖς πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλπίζειν τινὰ πιστίν καὶ βεβαιότητα.

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caprice; and they were ready, either by passing an unjust sentence of condemnation or by winning the upper hand through acts of violence, to glut the animosity of the moment. The result was that though neither had any regard for true piety, yet those who could carry through an odious deed under the cloak of a specious phrase received the higher praise. And citizens who belonged to neither party were continually destroyed by both, either because they would not make common cause with them, or through mere jealousy that they should survive.

LXXXIII. So it was that every form of depravity showed itself in Hellas in consequence of its revolutions, and that simplicity, which is the chief element of a noble nature, was laughed to scorn and disappeared, while mutual antagonism of feeling, combined with mistrust, prevailed far and wide. For there was no assurance binding enough, no oath terrible enough, to reconcile men; but always, if they were stronger, since they accounted all security hopeless, they were rather disposed to take precautions against being wronged than able to trust others. And it was generally those of meaner intellect who won the day; for being afraid of their own defects and of their opponents' sagacity, in order that they might not be worsted in words, and, by reason of their opponents' intellectual versatility find themselves unawares victims of their plots, they boldly resorted to deeds. Their opponents, on the other hand, contemptuously assuming that they would be aware in time and that there was no need to secure by deeds what they might have by wit, were taken off their guard and perished in greater numbers.
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LXXXIV. Ἐν δὲ ὅπεῖ ἑνὶ Κερκύρᾳ τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν προετολμήθη, καὶ ὅπος ἄν ὑβρεί μὲν ἄρχόμενοι τὸ πλέον ἢ σωφροσύνη ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν τιμωρίαν παρασχόντων οἱ ἀνταμυνόμενοι δράσειν, πενίας δὲ τῆς εἰωθεῖας ἀπαλλαξεῖοντες τινες, μᾶλιστα δὲ ἄν διὰ πάθους ἐπιθυμοῦντες τὰ τῶν πέλας ἔχειν, παρὰ δίκην γυγώσκοιεν, ἀεὶ μὴ ἐπὶ πλεονεξία, ἀπὸ ἴσου δὲ μᾶλιστα ἐπιόντες ἀπαίδευσι τρήγης πλείστον ἐκφερόμενοι ἡμῶς καὶ ἀπαρατήτως ἐπέλθοιεν. ἦνταραχθέντος τε τοῦ βίου ἐς τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον τῇ πόλει καὶ τῶν νόμων κρατήσασα η ἀνθρωπελα φύσις, εἰωθεῖα καὶ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἀδικεῖν, ἀσμένη ἐδηλωσεν ἀκρατης μὲν ὁργήσας οὐσα, κρεῖσσων δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, πολεμία δὲ τοῦ προύχοντος. οὐ γὰρ ἄν τοῦ τε ὅπλον τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι προτάθεσαν τοῦ τε μὴ ἀδικεῖν τὸ κερδαῖνειν, ἐν μὴ βλάπτουσαν 3 ἵσχυν εἰχέ το φθονεῖν. ἔδιοιτο τε τοὺς κοινοὺς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ νόμους, ἀφ' ὅν ἀπασιν ἐλπίς ὑπόκειται σφαλεῖσι καὶ αὐτοὺς διασφάζεσθαι, ἐν ἄλλων τιμωρίας προκαταλύειν καὶ μὴ ὑπολείπεσθαι, εἰ ποτὲ ἄρα τὶς κινδυνεύσας τινὸς διῆσεται αὐτῶν.

1 ὅπος ἄν, Hude's correction for ὅποσ of the MSS.

This chapter is bracketed as spurious by Hude and nearly all recent commentators, because it is condemned by I50
LXXXIV. It was in Corcyra, then, that most of these atrocities were first committed—all the acts of retaliation which men who are governed with high-handed insolence rather than with moderation are likely to commit upon their rulers when these at last afford them opportunity for revenge; or such as men resolve upon contrary to justice when they seek release from their accustomed poverty, and in consequence of their sufferings are likely to be most eager for their neighbours' goods; and assaults of pitiless cruelty, such as men make, not with a view to gain, but when, being on terms of complete equality with their foe, they are utterly carried away by uncontrollable passion. At this crisis, when the life of the city had been thrown into utter confusion, human nature, now triumphant over the laws, and accustomed even in spite of the laws to do wrong, took delight in showing that its passions were ungovernable, that it was stronger than justice and an enemy to all superiority. For surely no man would have put revenge before religion, and gain before innocence of wrong, had not envy swayed him with her blighting power. Indeed, men do not hesitate, when they seek to avenge themselves upon others, to abrogate in advance the common principles observed in such cases—those principles upon which depends every man's own hope of salvation should he himself be overtaken by misfortune—thus failing to leave them in force against the time when perchance a man in peril shall have need of some one of them.

the ancient grammarians, is not mentioned by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and is obelised in Codex F.

2 Or, μάλιστα δ' ἂν δὲὶ πάθους ἐπιθυμοῦντες, "would be above all men passionately eager for . . ."

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LXXXV. Οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν Κερκυραιοί τουαύταις ὀργαῖς ταῖς πρῶταις ἐς ἀλλήλους ἔχρησαντο, καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδας καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέπλευσαν ταῖς ναυσίν ύστερον δὲ οἱ φεύγοντες 2 τῶν Κερκυραιῶν (διεσώθησαν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐς πεντακοσίους) τείχη τε λαβόντες, ἀ ἦν εν τῇ ἡπείρῳ, ἐκράτουν τῆς πέραν οἰκείας γῆς καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς ὠρμώμενοι ἔληξοντο τοὺς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ καὶ πολλὰ ἔβλαττον, καὶ λιμὸς ἰσχυρός ἐγένετο ἐν τῇ πόλει.
3 ἔπρεπε βεύνοντο δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Δακεδαίμονα καὶ Κόρινθον περὶ καθόδου καὶ ὁς οὔδεν αὐτὸς ἐπράσσετο, ύστερον χρόνῳ πλοῖα καὶ ἐπικούρους παρασκευασάμενοι διέβησαν ἐς τὴν νῆσον ἕξακο-
4 σιοι μάλιστα οἱ πάντες, καὶ τὰ πλοῖα ἐμπρήσαντες, ὅπως ἀπόγονα ἦ τοῦ ἄλλο τι ἦ κράτειν τῆς γῆς, ἀναθάντες ἐς τὸ ὅρος τὴν Ἰοτώνη, τεῖχος ἐνοικοδομησάμενοι ἐφθειρον τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τῆς γῆς ἐκράτουν.

LXXXVI. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος Ἀθηναίοι εἴκοσι ναὸς ἐστείλαν ἐς Σικελίαν καὶ Δάχητα τῶν Μελανώπου στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν καὶ 2 Χαροϊάδην τῶν Εὐφιλήτου. οἱ γὰρ Συρακόσιοι καὶ Λεοντίνοι ἐς πόλεμον ἀλλήλους καθέστασαν. ξύμμαχοι δὲ τοῖς μὲν Συρακόσιοῖς ἦσαν πλην Καμαρναίοι αἱ ἄλλαι Δωρίδες πόλεις, αἵτερ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων τὸ πρῶτον ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου ξυμμαχιὰν ἐτάχθησαν, οἷς μέν-τοι ἐξεπολέμησαν γε' τοῖς δὲ Λεοντίνοις αἱ Χαλκιδικαὶ πόλεις καὶ Καμάρινα· τῆς δὲ Ἰταλίας ἰσχύος μὲν Συρακοσίων ἦσαν, Ῥηγῖνοι δὲ κατὰ 3 τὸ ξυγγενὲς Λεοντίνου. ἐς οὖν τὰς Ἀθῆνας
LXXXV. Such then were the first outbreaks of passion which the Corecyraeans who remained at home indulged in toward each other; and Eurymedon sailed away with the Athenian fleet. Later, however, the Corecyraean fugitives, of whom about five hundred\(^1\) had got safely across to the mainland, seized some forts there, and thus dominating the territory belonging to Corecyra on the opposite coast made it a base from which they plundered the people of the island and did them much harm, so that a severe famine arose in the city. They also sent envoys to Lacedaemon and Corinth to negotiate for their restoration; but since nothing was accomplished by these they afterwards procured boats and mercenaries and crossed over to the island, about six hundred in all. They then burned their boats, in order that they might despair of success unless they dominated the country, and went up to Mt. Istone, and after building a fort there began to destroy the people in the city, exercising dominion over the country.

LXXXVI. Toward the close of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty ships to Sicily under the command of Laches son of Melanopus and Charoeades son of Euphiiletus. For the Syracusans and the Leontines were now at war with each other. In alliance with the Syracusans were all the Dorian cities except Camarina—the cities which at the outbreak of the war had joined the Lacedaemonian alliance, although they had taken no active part in the war—while the Chalcidian cities and Camarina were allies of the Leontines. In Italy the Locrians allied themselves with the Syracusans, and the Rhegians with the Leontines, because they were kinsmen.\(^2\) The Leontines and their allies sent an

\(^1\) cf. ch. xx. 2. \(^2\) cf. vi. xlv. 3.
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πέμψαντες οἱ τῶν Λεοντίνων ξύμμαχοι κατὰ τε
παλαιάν ξύμμαχιαν καὶ ὅτι Ἰωνεῖς ἦσαν, πεί-
θουσι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πέμψαι σφίσι ναῦς· ὑπὸ
γὰρ τῶν Συρακοσίων τῆς τε γῆς εἰργοῦντο καὶ τῆς
4 θαλάσσης. καὶ ἔπεμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τῆς μὲν
οἰκείοτητος προφάσει, βουλόμενοι δὲ μήτε σῖτον
ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἄγεσθαι αὐτῶθεν πρὸτειράν
τε ποιούμενοι εἰ σφίσι δυνατὰ εἶ ὅτα ἐν τῇ
5 Σικελίᾳ πράγματα ὑποχείρια γενέσθαι. κατα-
στάντες οὖν ἐς Ρήγιον τῆς Ἰταλίας τοῦ πόλεμον
ἐποιοῦντο μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων. καὶ τὸ θέρος
ἐπελεύστα.

LXXXVII. Τοῦ δ’ ἐπηγγυγομένου χειμῶνος ἡ
νόσος τὸ δεύτερον ἐπέπεσε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ἐκλε-
πούσα μὲν οὐδένα χρόνον τὸ παυτάπασιν, ἐγένετο
2 δὲ τις ὁμοί διοικεῖ. παρέμεινε δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑστε-
ρον οὐκ ἔλασσον ἐνιαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ πρὸτειρόν καὶ
dῦο ἔτη, ὡστε Ἀθηναίους γε μὴ εἶναι ο τὸ μᾶλ-
lον τοῦτο ἐπὶσε καὶ ἐκάκωσε τὴν δύναμιν.
3 τετρακοσίων γὰρ ὀπλιτῶν καὶ τετρακυσχιλίων
οὐκ ἔλασσος οὔπερθον ἐκ τῶν τάξεων καὶ τρια-
kosίων ἰππεῶν, τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου ὄχλου ἀνεξεύρετος
4 ἁρμόμενος. ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ σεισμοὶ τότε
τῆς γῆς ἐν τῇ Ἀθήναις καὶ ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ καὶ ἐν
Βοιωτοῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν Ὀρχομενῷ τῷ Βοιωτῖο.

LXXXVIII. Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι
καὶ Ῥηγίνοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος τριάκοντα ναυσὶ

1 At the head of this embassy was the celebrated rhetori-
cian Gorgias.

2 cf. C.I.A. i. 33 for some fragments of treaties of alliance
renewed under the archon Apsedus (433–432 B.C.).

3 cf. II. xlvii. ff.

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embassy\textsuperscript{1} to Athens and urged them, both on the ground of an earlier alliance\textsuperscript{2} and because they were Ionians, to send them ships; for they were being excluded from both the land and the sea by the Syracusans. And the Athenians sent the ships, professedly on the ground of their relationship, but really because they wished to prevent the importation of grain from Sicily into the Peloponnesus, and also to make a preliminary test whether the affairs of Sicily could be brought under their own control. So they established themselves at Rhegium in Italy and proceeded to carry on the war in concert with their allies. And the summer ended.

LXXXVII. In the course of the following winter the plague again\textsuperscript{3} fell upon the Athenians; and indeed it had not died out at any time entirely, though there had been a period of respite. And it continued the second time not less than a year, having run for two full years on the previous occasion, so that the Athenians were more distressed by it than by any other misfortune and their power more crippled.\textsuperscript{4} For no fewer than four thousand four hundred of those enrolled as hoplites died and also three hundred cavalry, and of the populace a number that could not be ascertained. It was at this time also that the great number of earthquakes occurred at Athens, in Euboea, and in Boeotia, and especially at Orchomenus in Boeotia.

LXXXVIII. The same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians made an expedition with thirty

\textsuperscript{4} This statement may have been written without a knowledge of the later events of the war, especially the unhappy issue of the Sicilian expedition (see Introd. p. xiii.)—unless δυναμείς be taken to mean "fighting strength," or something narrower than "power."
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στρατεύουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰόλου νῆσους καλουμένας· θέρους γὰρ δὲ ἀνυδρίαν ἅδυναται ἥν ἐπιστρατεύειν.

2 νέμονται δὲ Διπαραῖοι αὐτάς, Κυδίων ἄποικοι ὄντες. οἶκοι δὲ ἐν μία τῶν νῆσων οὐ μεγάλη, καλεῖται δὲ Διπάρα· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐκ ταύτης ὁμώμενοι γεωργοῦσι, Διδύμην καὶ Στρογγύλην

καὶ Ἰεράν. νομίζοντες δὲ οἱ ἑκεῖνη ἀνθρώποι ἐν τῇ Ἰερᾷ ὡς ὁ Ἡφαιστος χαλκεύει, ὁτι τὴν νύκτα φαίνεται πῦρ ἀναδίδουσα πολὺ καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν κατινών. κεῖται δὲ αἱ νῆσοι αὐταὶ κατὰ τὴν Σικελῶν καὶ Μεσσηνίων γῆν, ξύμμαχοι δὲ ἦσαν

4 Συρακοσίων τεμόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν γῆν, ὡς οὐ προσεχόρουν, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὸ Ῥήγιον. καὶ ὁ χειμών ἐτελεύτα, καὶ πέμπτον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷ δὲ Ῥήγιον ἔστη εἰς Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

LXXXIX. Τοῦ δὲ ἐπιγνωμένου θέρους Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι μέχρι μὲν τοῦ ἱσθμοῦ ἤλθον ὡς ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἑσβαλοῦντες Ἀγίδος τοῦ Ἀρχιδάμου ἡγουμένου, Δακεδαιμονίων βασιλέως, σεισμῶν δὲ γενομένων πολλῶν ἀπετράπη τοῦ πάλιν καὶ οὐκ ἐγένετο ἑσβολή. καὶ περὶ τούτων τῶν χρόνων, τῶν σεισμῶν κατεχόντων, τῆς Εὐβοίας ἐν Ὀροβίαις ἡ θάλασσα ἐπανελθοῦσα ἀπὸ τῆς τότε οὖσης γῆς καὶ κυματωθεῖσα ἐπῆλθε τῆς πόλεως μέρος τι, καὶ τὸ μὲν κατέκλυσε, τὸ δὲ ὑπενόστησε, καὶ θάλασσα νῦν ἐστὶ πρῶτον οὖσα

1 Strabo names three more, modern geographers eleven or twelve. Strongyle, the modern Stromboli, seat of an active

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ships against the islands of Aeolus, as they are called; for it was impossible to invade them in the summer time on account of the lack of water there. These islands are occupied by the Liparaeans, who are colonists of the Cnidians. They have their homes on one of the islands, which is not large, called Lipara, and from this go out and cultivate the rest, namely Didyme, Strongyle and Hiera. The people of this region believe that Hephaestus has his forge in Hiera, because this island is seen to send up a great flame of fire at night and smoke by day. The islands lie over against the territory of the Sicels and the Messenians, and were in alliance with the Syracusans; the Athenians, therefore, laid waste their land, but since the inhabitants would not come over to their side they sailed back to Rhegium. And the winter ended, and with it the fifth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

LXXXIX. In the following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, led by Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, advanced as far as the Isthmus with the intention of invading Attica; but a great many earthquakes occurred, causing them to turn back again, and no invasion took place. At about the same time, while the earthquakes prevailed, the sea at Oroibiae in Euboea receded from what was then the shore-line, and then coming on in a great wave overran a portion of the city. One part of the flood subsided, but another engulfed the shore, so that what was land before is volcano, has recently become especially notable on account of its nearness to Messina and Reggio, where the great earthquake occurred, Dec. 28, 1908.
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γῆς καὶ ἀνθρώπους διέφθειρεν ὅσοι μὴ ἐδύναντο

3 φθήναι πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα ἀναδραμόντες. καὶ

περὶ Ἀταλάντην τὴν ἐπὶ Δοκροῖς τοῖς Ὀπουντίοις

νήσου παραπλησία γίγνεται ἐπίκλυσις, καὶ τοὺ
tε φρουρίου τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρεῖλε καὶ δύο νεῶν

4 ἀνείλλυσμένοι τὴν ἔτεραν κατέαξεν. ἐγένετο δὲ

καὶ ἐν Πεπαρῆθο κύματος ἐπαναχώρησίς τις, οὐ

μέντοι ἐπέκλυσε γε καὶ σεισμὸς τοῦ τείχους τι

κατέβαλε καὶ τὸ πρυτανεῖον καὶ ἄλλας οἰκίας

5 ὀλύγας. αὐτοῖς δ’ ἐγὼ πρὸς νομίζω τοῦ τοιούτου,

ἡ ἰσχυρότατος ἡ σεισμὸς ἐγένετο, κατὰ τούτο

ἀποστέλλειν τῇ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἔξωπης πάλιν

ἐπισπώμενη 1 βιοίτερον τὴν ἐπίκλυσιν πολείν

ἀνευ δὲ σεισμοῦ οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτο

ξυμβῆναι γενέσθαι.

ΧΞ. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐπολέμουν μὲν καὶ

ἄλλοι, ὡς ἐκάστοις ξυνέβαινεν, ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ καὶ

αὐτὸι οἱ Σικελίωται ἐπ’ ἄλληλους στρατεύετο

καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἡν τοῖς σφετέροις ξυμμάχοις.

ἀ δὲ λόγου μάλιστα ἡξία ἡ μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων

οἱ ξυμμαχοὶ ἔπραξαν ἡ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους

2 οἱ ἀντιπόλεμοι, τούτων μισθησομαι. Χαρολάδου

γὰρ ἦδη τοῦ Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῦ τεθνηκότος

ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων πολέμῳ, Δάμας ἀπεσαν ἔχουν

tῶν νεῶν τὴν ἀρχήν ἐστράτευσε μετὰ τῶν ξυμ-

μάχων ἐπὶ Μύλας τὰς Μεσσηνίων. ἐτύχον δὲ

1 Madvig reads ἐπισπώμενοι, after Schol., followed by

Hude.

1 cf. II. xxxii.

2 "Thucydides is pointing out the connection between the

earthquake and the inundation. Where the earthquake was

most violent, there the inundation was greatest. But the

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now sea; and it destroyed of the people as many as could not run up to the high ground in time. In the neighbourhood also of the island of Atalante, which lies off the coast of Opuntian Locris, there was a similar inundation, which carried away a part of the Athenian fort there,¹ and wrecked one of two ships which had been drawn up on the shore. At Peparethos likewise there was a recession of the waters, but no inundation; and there was an earthquake, which threw down a part of the wall as well as the prytaneum and a few other houses. And the cause of such a phenomenon, in my own opinion, was this: at that point where the shock of the earthquake was greatest the sea was driven back, then, suddenly returning² with increased violence, made the inundation; but without an earthquake, it seems to me, such a thing would not have happened.

XC. During the same summer war was being waged in Sicily, not only by other peoples as they each had occasion to do so, but also by the Siceliots themselves, who were campaigning against one another, and likewise by the Athenians in concert with their allies; but I shall mention only the most memorable things done by the Athenians in concert with their allies, or against the Athenians by their opponents. After Charoeades, the Athenian general, had been slain in battle by the Syracusans, Laches, being now in sole command of the fleet, made an expedition with the allies against Mylae, a town belonging to the Messenians. It so happened that two divisions

effect was indirect, being immediately caused by the recoil of the sea after the earthquake was over; hence τὴν θάλασσαν, and not, as we might expect, τὸν σεισμὸν, is the subject of ποιεῖν. ἀποστέλλειν either active or neuter.” (Jowett.)
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dύο φυλαὶ ἐν ταῖς Μύλαις τῶν Μεσσηνίων φρου-
ρούσαι καὶ τινὰ καὶ ἐνέδραν πεποιημέναι τοῖς ἀπὸ
3 τῶν νεῶν. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξυμμαχοὶ τοὺς
tε ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας τρέπουσι καὶ διαφθείρουσι
πολλοὺς, καὶ τῷ ἐρύματι προσβαλόντες ἴναγ-
κασαν ὁμολογία τὴν τε ἀκρόπολιν παραθύναι καὶ
4 ἐπὶ Μεσσήνην ξυστρατεύσαι. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο
ἐπελθόντων οἱ Μεσσήνιοι τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων καὶ
tῶν ξυμμάχων προσεχώρησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ, ὁμήρους
tε δόντες καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πιστὰ παρασχόμενοι.

XCI. Τοῦ δὲ αὐτοῦ θέρους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τριά-
kοντα μὲν ναῦς ἐστειλαν περὶ Πελοπόννησον, ὡς
ἐστρατήγηεν Δημοσθένης τε ὁ Ἀλκισθένεως καὶ
Προκῆς ὁ Θεοδώρου, ἐξήκοντα δὲ ἐς Μῆλον καὶ
dισχίλιοι ὀπλῖται, ἐστρατήγηεν δὲ αὐτῶν Νικίας
2 ὁ Νικηράτου. τοὺς γὰρ Μῆλοις ὄντας νησιώτας
καὶ σὺν ἐσθέλωσαν ὑπακούειν οὐδὲ ἐς τὸ αὐτῶν
3 ξυμμαχικὸν ἴναι ἐβούλουσαν προσαγαγέσθαι. ὡς
δὲ αὐτοὶς δημομένης τῆς γῆς οὐ προσεχώρουν,
ἀραντες ἐκ τῆς Μῆλος αὐτοί μὲν ἔπλευσαν ἐς
'Ωρωπῶν τῆς Γραίκης, ὧπο νῦκτα δὲ σχόντες εὐθὺς
ἐπορεύοντο οἱ ὀπλῖται ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζῆ ἐς
4 Τάναγραν τῆς Βοιωτίας. οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως
πανδημεῖε Αθηναῖοι, Ἰππονίκου τε τοῦ Καλλίου
στρατηγούντος καὶ Εὐρυμέδουντος τοῦ Θουκλέους,
5 ἀπὸ σημείου ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ γῆν ἀπήντων. καὶ
στρατοπεδευσάμενοι ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐν τῇ
Τανάγρα ἐδήσοντο καὶ ἐνηυλίσαντο. καὶ τῇ ὑστε-
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of the Messenians were in garrison at Mylae, and that these had laid an ambush against the men who had landed from the ships. The Athenians and their allies, however, put to rout the ambushing troops, slaying many of them; then, assaulting the fortification, they compelled its defenders to surrender the acropolis by agreement and march with them against Messene. After this, on the approach of the Athenians and their allies, the Messenians also submitted, giving hostages and offering the other customary pledges of good faith.

XCI. That same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships round the Peloponnesus under the command of Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes and Procles son of Theodorus, and sixty ships and two thousand hoplites under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, to Melos. For the Melians, although they were islanders, were unwilling to be subject to Athens or even to join their alliance, and the Athenians wished to bring them over. But when they would not submit, even after their land had been ravaged, the Athenians left Melos and sailed to Oropus in the territory of Graia, and the hoplites, landing there at nightfall, proceeded at once by land to Tanagra in Bocotia. There they were met by the Athenians from the city in full force, who, under the command of Hipponicus son of Callias and Eurymedon son of Thucles, came overland upon a concerted signal and joined them. And after they had made camp they spent that day in ravaging the territory of Tanagra, and also passed the night there. On the next day

1 The Melians and Theraeans, as Laconian colonists (v. lxxxiv. 2), alone in the Cyclades held aloof from the Athenian alliance.
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ραία μάχη κρατήσαντες τοὺς ἐπεξελθόντας τῶν Ταναγραίων καὶ Θηβαίων τινὰς προσβεβοθηκότας καὶ ὅπλα λαβόντες καὶ τροπαίον στήσαντες ἀνεχόρησαν, οἱ μὲν ἔσ τὴν πόλιν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς 6 ναῦς. καὶ παραπλεύσας ὁ Νικίας ταῖς ἐξήκοντα ναυσὶ τῆς Δοκρίδου τὰ ἐπιθαλάσσια ἐτεμε καὶ ἀνεχώρησεν ἐπὶ οἰκοῦ.

XCI. Ἡπὸ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τούτον Λακεδαιμονίου Ἡράκλειαν τὴν ἐν Τραχύνια ἀποικίαιν καθίσαντο 2 ἀπὸ τοιᾶσδε γνώμης. Μηλής οἱ ξύμπαντες εἰσὶ μὲν τρία μέρη, Παράλλος, Ἱερής, Τραχύνιος τούτων δὲ οἱ Τραχύνιοι πολέμω εἴθαρμενοι ὑπὸ Οἰταιῶν ὁμόρων ὅτων, τὸ πρῶτον μελλῆσαντες Ἀθηναίοις προσθείναι σφᾶς αὐτούς, δεῦσαντες δὲ μὴ οὐ σφίσα πιστοὶ ὡσι, πέμπουσιν ἐς Λακε-
3 δαλμόνα ἐλόμενοι προσβεντῆν Τεισαμενών. ξυνε-
4 προσβευόντο δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ Δωρίδας, ἡ μητρόπολις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, τῶν αὐτῶν δεόμενοι ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν Οἰταιῶν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφθείροντο. ἀκούσαντες δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίοι γνώμην εἶχον τὴν ἀποικίαν ἐκπέμπειν, τοῖς τε Τραχύνιοις βουλόμενοι καὶ τοῖς Δωριέσσι τιμωρεῖν. καὶ ἀμα τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίος πολέμου καλῶς αὐτοὶ ἐδόκει ἡ πόλις καθίστα-
5 σθαι ἐπὶ τα γὰρ τῇ Εὐβοίᾳ ναυτικὸν παρα-
σκευασθῆναι ἂν, ἀστ᾽ ἐκ βραχέος τὴν διάβασιν
gίγνεσθαι, τῆς τε ἐπὶ Ὄρκης παρόδου χρησίμως ἐξειν. τὸ τε ξύμπαν ὁμήρυντο τὸ χωρίον κτίζειν. τὸ τε ξύμπαν ὁμήρυντο τὸ χωρίον κτίζειν. τὸ τε ξύμπαν ὁμήρυντο τὸ χωρίον κτίζειν. τὸ τε ξύμπαν ὁμήρυντο τὸ χωρίον κτίζειν.
they defeated in battle the men of Tanagra who came out against them, as well as some Thebans who had come to their aid, then taking possession of the arms of the fallen and setting up a trophy they returned, the one party to the city, the other to the ships. And Nicias sailed along the coast with his sixty ships, ravaged the seaboard of Locris, and then returned home.

XCII. It was about this time that the Lacedaemonians established Heracleia, their colony in Trachinia, with the following object in view. The people of Malia, considered as a whole, consist of three divisions, Paralians, Hieraeans, and Trachinians. Of these the Trachinians, after they had been ruined in war by their neighbours the Oetaeans, at first intended to attach themselves to the Athenians, but, fearing that these might not be loyal, sent to Lacedaemon, choosing Teisamenus as their envoy. And envoys from Doris, the mother city of the Lacedaemonians, also took part in the embassy, making the same request, for they too were being ruined by the Oetaeans. After hearing their appeal, the Lacedaemonians were of the opinion that they should send out the colony, wishing to aid both the Trachinians and the Dorians. At the same time, the site of the proposed city seemed to them well adapted for carrying on the war against Athens; for a fleet could be equipped there for an attack upon Euboea and the crossing thus made from a short distance away, and the place would also be useful for expeditions along the coast towards Thrace. In short, they were eager to found the settlement. They therefore first consulted the god at Delphi, and at his bidding sent out the colonists, consisting of both Spartans and
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te kai twn perioikwn, kai twn alloan 'Ellhnwn twn boulomenon ekelenon epilesthai plhn 'Iwoun kai 'Akhaiwn kai estin oin alloan ethwn. oikistai
de treis Lakedaimonion hagnantos, Lewn kai
6 'Alkidas kai Damagwn. katastantes de eteichisan
tin polin ek kainhs, h vin 'Hrakleia kaleita,
apexousa Thermostulon stadious maliota tessa-
rapounta, tis de thelasis eikosi. neophia te
paraskenazonto kai eirzai to kat'a Thermostulas
kat' auto to stenon, opws eufulakta autois
eih.

XCIII. Oi de 'Athenaioi ths polelw s tauntis
xunoikizomenhs to protwn edeisakan te kai evomisan
etin th Euboia maliota kathistatai, oti brachys
esin o diapoulos pro's to Kynaiwn ths Euboias.
epita mventoi parad doxan autois apebh' ou gar
2 egeneto apo auths deinwn oudein. aution de h
th te Theesoloi en dynamei ontes twv taunti chwriwn
kai ou eti th ghe ektyevo, fobovmeno me sfis
megalh ischi pareaivw, eftheiron kai dia
pantos etopolemon andrhois neokatastatois,
ws efetromwsws gevomenous to protwn kai pain
pollous (pas gar tws Lakedaimonion oikizontwn
3 thersalwos hei, theiai nomizw ton polin): ou
mventi hkiata oi arkontes autonw twn Lakeda-
imonion oif akinoymevoi ta pragmati te eftheiron
kai es oluganvrwpiain katesthsan, ekphosphantes
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Perioeci, and they invited any other Hellenes who so desired to accompany them, except Ionians and Achaeans and certain other races. The founders of the colony in charge of the expedition were three Lacedaemonians, Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. When they had established themselves they built a new wall about the city, which is now called Heracleia, and is about forty stadia distant from Thermopylae and twenty from the sea. They then proceeded to build dockyards, and in order that the place might be easy to guard fenced off the approach on the side toward Thermopylae by a wall across the pass itself.

XCIII. As for the Athenians, while the colonists were being gathered for this city, they at first became alarmed, thinking it was being established chiefly as a menace to Euboea, because it is only a short distance across from here to Cenaeum in Euboea. Afterwards, however, the matter turned out contrary to their expectations; for no harm came from the city. And the reasons were as follows: the Thessalians, who were the paramount power in those regions and whose territory was being menaced by the settlement, fearing that their new neighbours might become very powerful, began to harry and make war continually upon the new settlers, until they finally wore them out, although they had at first been very numerous; for, since the Lacedaemonians were founding the colony, everybody came boldly, thinking the city secure. One of the principal causes, however, was that the governors sent out by the Lacedaemonians themselves ruined the undertaking and reduced the population to a handful, frightening most of the settlers away by

1 The old inhabitants, chiefly of Achaean stock, who had been reduced to a condition of dependence (not slavery) by the Dorians.
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touς πόλλους χαλεπῶς τε καὶ ἔστιν ὁ οὐ καλῶς ἔξηγούμενοι, ὥστε ῥᾶν ἦδη αὐτῶν οἱ πρόσοικοι ἐπεκράτουν.

XCIV. Τοῦ δ' αυτοῦ θέρους, καὶ περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ὃν ἐν τῇ Μήλῳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι κατείχοντο, καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα νεὼν Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ Πελοπόννησον ὄντες πρῶτον ἐν Ἑλλομενῷ τῆς Δενκαδίας φρονοῦσι τινὰς λοχήσαντες διέφθειραν, ἐπειτὰ ὑστερον ἐπὶ Δευκάδα μείζονι στόλῳ ἔλθον, Ἀκαρνασὶ τε πᾶσιν, οἱ πανδημεῖ πλὴν Οἰνιαδῶν ξυνέσποντο, καὶ Ζακυνθίοις καὶ Κεφαλήσι καὶ Κέρκυραίων πέντε καὶ δέκα οἰκεῖοι.

2 καὶ οἱ μὲν Δευκαδίοις, τῆς τε ἐξὸς γῆς δημομένης καὶ τῆς ἐντὸς τοῦ ἱσθμοῦ, ἐν ἡ καὶ ἡ Δευκᾶς ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος, πλήθει βιαζόμενοι ξυναχάζον· οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρνανεὶς ἕξιον Δημοσθένη τὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀποτειχίζειν αὐτούς, νομίζοντες ῥαδίως γὰρ ἐν ἐκπολιορκῆσαι καὶ 3 πόλεως αἰεὶ σφίσι πολεμίας ἀπαλλαγῆναι. Δημοσθένης δὲ ἀναπείθεται κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τούτον ὡς Μεσσηνίων ὁς καλὸν αὐτῷ στρατιάς τοσαύτης ξυνείλεγμένης Αἰτωλοῖς ἐπιθέσατο, Ναυπάκτῳ τε πολεμίως οὕσι, καὶ ἦν κρατήσῃ αὐτῶν, ῥαδίως καὶ τὸ ἄλλο ἡπειρωτικὸν τὸ ταύτη Ἀθη- 4 ναίοις προσποιήσειν. τὸ γὰρ ἐθνος μέγα μὲν

1 This isthmus, which at this time connected the island with the mainland, had been previously cut through by the Corinthians (Strabo, p. 452c); but it had been filled with

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their harsh and sometimes unjust administration, so that at length their neighbours more easily prevailed over them.

XCIV. During the same summer, and at about the time when the Athenians were detained at Melos, the troops of the thirty Athenian ships that were cruising round the Peloponnesus first set an ambush at Ellomenus in Leucadia and killed some of the garrison, and then, later on, went against Leucas with a greater armament, which consisted of all the Acarnanians, who joined the expedition with their entire forces (with the exception of the people of Oeniadeae), some Zacynthians and Cephalenians, and fifteen ships from Corcyra. The Leucadians, finding themselves outnumbered, were obliged to remain quiet, although their lands were being ravaged both without and within the isthmus,¹ where stands Leucas and the temple of Apollo; but the Acarnanians tried to induce Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to shut them in by a wall, thinking they could easily reduce them by siege and thus rid themselves of a city that was always hostile to them. But just at this time Demosthenes was persuaded by the Messenians that it was a fine opportunity for him, seeing that so large an army was collected, to attack the Aetolians, because they were hostile to Naupactus, and also because, if he defeated them, he would find it easy to bring the rest of the mainland in that region into subjection to the Athenians. The Aetolians, they explained, were, it was true, a great and warlike

sand before the Peloponnesian war, as is evident from constant allusions to hauling ships across. It is clear from the context that the territory of the Leucadians included a part of the mainland of Acarnania.

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εἶναι τὸ τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν καὶ μάχιμον, οίκοιν δὲ κατὰ κώμας ἀτείχίστους, καὶ ταύτας διὰ πόλλοι, καὶ σκεῦη ψιλῆ χρώμενον οὐ χαλεπῶν ἀπέφαινον, 5 πρὶν ξυμβοηθῆσαι, καταστραφῆναι. ἑπιχειρεῖν δὲ ἐκέλευσον πρῶτον μὲν Ἀποδωτοῖς, ἔπειτα δὲ Ὀφιονεῦσι, καὶ μετὰ τούτους Ἐυρυτᾶσιν, ὅπερ μέγιστον μέρος ἑστὶ τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν, ἀγωνιστῶν δὲ γλῶσσαν καὶ ὠμοφάγοι εἰσίν, ὡς λέγονται. τούτων γὰρ ληφθέντων ῥαδίως καὶ τάλλα προσ- χωρῆσειν.

ΧCV. Ὅ δὲ τῶν Μεσσηνίων χάριτι πεισθεὶς καὶ μάλιστα νομίσας ἀνευ τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεως τοῖς ἀπειρώταις ξυμμάχοις μετὰ τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν δύνασθαι ἀν κατὰ γῆν ἔλθειν ἐπὶ Βοιω- τοὺς διὰ Δοκρῶν τῶν Ὀξολῶν ἐς Κυτίνων τὸ Δωρικόν, ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχων τὸν Παρνασσόν, ἔως καταβαίνῃ ἐς Φωκέας, οἱ προθύμως ἐδόκουν κατὰ τὴν Ἀθηναίων αἰεὶ ποτὲ φιλίαν ξυστρατεύσειν ἡ κὰν βία προσαχθῆναι (καὶ Φωκεύσι ἣδη ὀμορὸς ἡ Βοιωτία ἐστίν), ἀρας οὖν ἐξύμπαντε τῷ στρατεύ- ματι ἀπὸ τῆς Δευκάδος ἀκόντων τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων 2 παρέπλευσεν ἐς Σόλλων. κοινόσας δὲ τὴν ἐπί- νοιαν τοῖς Ἀκαρνάσιων, ως οὐ προσεδέξαντο διὰ τῆς Δευκάδος τὴν οὐ περιτείχισιν, αὐτὸς τῇ λοιπῇ στρατιᾷ, Κεφαλλῆς καὶ Μεσσηνίως καὶ Ζακυν- θίως καὶ Ἀθηναίων τριακοσίως τοῖς ἑπιβάταις τῶν σφετέρων νεῶν (αἰ γὰρ πέντε καὶ δέκα τῶν

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people, but as they lived in unwalled villages, which, moreover, were widely separated, and as they used only light armour, they could be subdued without difficulty before they could unite for mutual defence. And they advised him to attack the Apodotians first, then the Ophioneans, and after them the Eurytanians. These last constitute the largest division of the Aetolians, their speech is more unintelligible than that of the other Aetolians, and, according to report, they are eaters of raw flesh. If these tribes were subdued, they said, the rest would readily yield.

XCV. Demosthenes was induced to make this decision, not only by his desire to please the Messenians, but chiefly because he thought that, without help from Athens, he would be able with his allies from the mainland, once the Aetolians had joined him, to make an overland expedition against the Boeotians by passing through the country of the Ozolian Locrians to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Parnassus on the right, until he should descend into Phocian territory. The Phocians would presumably be eager to join the expedition in view of their traditional friendship with Athens, or else could be forced to do so; and Phocis is on the very borders of Boeotia. So he set sail from Leucas with his whole armament in spite of the unwillingness of the Acarnanians and went along the coast to Sollium. There he made his plan known to the Acarnanians, but they would not agree to it because of his refusal to invest Leucas; he therefore set out upon his expedition against the Aetolians without them, taking the rest of his army, which consisted of Cephalenians, Messenians, Zacynthians, and three hundred Athenian marines from his own ships—for
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Κερκυραίων ἀπήλθον νῆες), ἐστράτευσεν ἐπ’ 3 Αἴτωλοὺς. ὠρμάτω δὲ ἔξι Οἰνεώνος τῆς Δοκρίδος. οἱ δὲ ὦξόλαι οὗτοι Δοκροὶ ἔσπυρσαν ἥσαν, καὶ ἔδει αὐτοὺς πανστρατιά ἀπαντήσαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὴν μεσόγειαν ὄντες γὰρ ὀμοροί τοῖς Αἴτωλοῖς καὶ ὀμόσκευοι μεγάλη ὥφελια ἔδοκον εἶναι ἕσπεραῖοτες μάχης τε ἐμπειρίᾳ τῆς ἐκείνων καὶ χωρίων.

XCVI. Αὐλισάμενος δὲ τῷ στρατῷ ἐν τοῦ Δίως τοῦ Νεμείου τῷ ἱερῷ, ἐν φω 'Ησίοδος ὁ ποιήτης λέγεται ὑπὸ τῶν ταύτη ἀποθανεῖν, χρησθὲν αὐτῷ ἐν Νεμέα τούτῳ παθεῖν, ἀμα τῇ ἔφῃ ἄρας 2 ἐπορεύετο ἐς τὴν Αἴτωλίαν. καὶ ἀιρεῖ τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ Ποτιδανίαν καὶ τῇ δευτέρᾳ Κροκύλειον καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ Τεῖχοι, ἔμενε τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν λείαν ἐς Εὐπάλλων τῆς Δοκρίδος ἀπέπεμψεν τὴν γὰρ γνώμην εἰς τὰ ἄλλα καταστρεφόμενοι οὕτως ἐπὶ Ὀφιονέας, εἰ μὴ βούλοιντο ξυγχωρεῖν, ἐς Ναύ- 3 πάκτων ἐπαναχωρήσας στρατεύσαι ὑστερον. τοὺς δὲ Αἴτωλοὺς οὐκ ἐλάνθανεν αὐτῇ ἢ παρασκευή οὕτε ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεβουλεύετο, ἐπειδὴ τε ὁ στρατὸς ἐσεβεβλήκει, πολλὴ χειρὶ ἐπεβοήθουν πάντες, ὡστε καὶ οἱ ἐσχατοὶ Ὀφιονέων οἱ πρὸς τὸν Μηλικάν κόλπον καθήκοντες, Βωμῆς καὶ Καλλής, ἐβοήθησαν.

XCVII. Τῷ δὲ Δημοσθένει τοιόνδε τι οἱ Μεσ- σήνοι παρῆκαν, ὦτε καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀναδιά- σκοντες αὐτὸ τῶν Αἴτωλῶν ὡς εἶχ ῥάδια ἡ 170
the fifteen Corecyraean ships had gone back home. The base from which he started was Oeneon in Locris. The people of this country, Ozolian Locris, were allies, and they with their whole force were to meet the Athenians in the interior; for since they were neighbours of the Aetolians and used the same sort of arms, it was believed that their help would be of great service on the expedition on account of their knowledge both of the Aetolian manner of fighting and of the country.

XCVI. He bivouacked with his army in the precinct of Nemean Zeus, where the poet Hesiod\(^1\) is said to have been killed by the men of that region, an oracle having foretold to him that he should suffer this fate at Nemea; then he set out at daybreak for Aetolia. On the first day he took Potidania, on the second Crocyleum, on the third Teichium. There he remained, sending his booty back to Eupalium in Locris; for his intention was to subdue the other places first, and then, in case the Ophioneans would not submit, to return to Naupactus and make a second expedition against them. But all these preparations did not escape the notice of the Aetolians, either when the design was first being formed or afterwards; indeed his army had no sooner invaded their country than they all began to rally in great force, so that help came even from the remotest tribes of the Ophioneans, who stretch as far as the Maliac Gulf, and from the Bomians and Callians.

XCVII. The Messenians, however, gave Demosthenes about the same advice as at first: informing him that the conquest of the Aetolians was easy,

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αἴρεσις, ἵναι ἐκέλευον ὅτι τάχιστα ἔπε τὰς κώ-

μας καὶ μῆ μένειν ἔως ἂν ξύμπαντες ἀθροισθέντες

ἀντιτάξωται, τὴν δ’ ἐν ποσὶν αἰεὶ πειρᾶσθαι

2 αἱρεῖν. ὁ δὲ τούτως τε πεισθεὶς καὶ τῇ τύχῃ

ἐλπίσας, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτῷ ἦναντίοντο, τοὺς Δο-

κροὺς οὐκ ἀναμείνας οὐς αὐτῷ ἔδει προσβοηθῆσαι

(ψυλῶν γὰρ ἀκοντιστῶν ἐνδεής ἦν μάλιστα) ἔχο-

ρει ἐπὶ Αἰγίτιον, καὶ κατὰ κράτος αἴρεῖ ἐπιών.

ὑπέφευγον γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ τῶν

λόφων τῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως· ἦν γὰρ ἐφ’ υψηλῶν

χωρίων ἀπέχουσα τῆς θαλάσσης ὑγιοκοντα

3 σταδίων μάλιστα. οἱ δὲ Αἰτωλοὶ (βεβοηθηκότες

γὰρ ἤδη ἦσαν ἐπὶ τὸ Αἰγίτιον) προσέβαλλον τοὺς

Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους καταθέντες ἀπὸ

τῶν λόφων ἄλλοι ἄλλοθεν καὶ ἑσκόντιζον, καὶ

ὅτε μὲν ἔπιοι τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον,

ὑπεχώρουν, ἀναχωροῦσι δὲ ἐπέκειντο· καὶ ἦν ἐπὶ

πολὺ τοιαύτη ἡ μάχη, διώξεις τε καὶ ὑπαγογαί,

ἐν οἷς ἀμφοτέρως ἦσσος ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι.

ΧCVIII. Μέχρι μὲν οὖν οἱ τοξόται εἰχόν τε τὰ

βέλη αὐτῶν καὶ οἶοι τε ἦσαν χρήσθαι, οἱ δὲ

ἀντεῖχον (τοξευόμενοι γὰρ οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ, ἄνθρωποι

ψιλοὶ, ἀνεστέλλοντο)· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τού τε τοξάρχου

ἀποδανόντος οὕτως διεσκεδάσθησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ

ἐκεκρῆκεσαν καὶ ἔπι πολὺ τῷ αὐτῷ πόνῳ ἔννε-

χόμενοι, οἳ τε Αἰτωλοὶ ἐνέκειντο καὶ ἑσκόντιζον,

οὕτω δὴ τραπόμενοι ἔφευγον, καὶ ἑστίπτοντες ἐς

τε χαράδρας ἄνεκβάτους καὶ χωρία ὧν ὅκκ ἦσαν

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they urged him to proceed as quickly as possible against the villages, not waiting until they should all unite and array themselves against him, but trying to take the first village in his way. Yielding to their advice and being hopeful because of his good fortune, since he was meeting with no opposition, he did not wait for the Locrians, who were to have brought him reinforcements—for he was greatly in need of light-armed men that were javelin-throwers—but advanced against Aegitium and took it by storm at the first onset. For the inhabitants secretly fled and took post on the hills above the city, which stood on high ground about eighty stadia from the sea. But the Aetolians, who by this time had come to the rescue of Aegitium, attacked the Athenians and their allies, running down from the hills on every side and showering javelins upon them, then retreating whenever the Athenian army advanced and advancing whenever they retreated. Indeed, the battle continued for a long time in this fashion, alternate pursuits and retreats, and in both the Athenians had the worst of it.

XCVIII. Now so long as their bowmen had arrows and were able to use them the Athenians held out, for the Aetolian troops were light-armed and so, while they were exposed to the arrows, they were constantly driven back. But when the captain of the archers had been killed and his men scattered, and the hoplites were worn out, since they had been engaged for a long time in the unremitting struggle and the Aetolians were pressing them hard and hurling javelins upon them, they at last turned and fled, and falling into ravines from which there was no way out and into places with which they were unacquainted,
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ἐμπειροὶ διεφθείροντο· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἠγεμόνων αὐτοῖς τῶν ὁδῶν Χρόμων ὁ Μεσσήνος ἔτυγχανε τεθνη-
2 κῶς. οἱ δὲ Αἰτωλοὶ ἐσακουσάντες πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ τροπῇ κατὰ πόδας αἱροῦντες, ἄνθρω-
ποί ποδώκεις καὶ ψυλοί, διεφθείρουν, τοὺς δὲ πλείους τῶν ὁδῶν ἀμαρτάνοντας καὶ ἐς τὴν ὕλην ἐσφερομένους, θεῖα διέξοδοι τοὺς ἦσαν, πῦρ κομ-
3 σάμενοι περιπέμποντες· πᾶσα τε ιδέα κατέστη τῆς φυγῆς καὶ τοῦ ὀλέθρου τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μόλις τε ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τὸν Οἰνεώνα τῆς Δοκρίδος, ὠθεντὸς καὶ ὄρμηθαν,
4 οἱ περιγεγομένοι κατέφυγον. ἀπέθανον δὲ τῶν τε ἐνυμμάχων πολλοὶ καὶ αὐτῶν Ἀθηναίων ὀπλίται περὶ ἔκοσι μάλιστα καὶ ἑκατὸν, τοσοῦτοι μὲν τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἡλικία ἡ αὐτῆς 1 οὕτωι βέλτιστοι δὴ ἀνδρεῖς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν οὔκ ἐκ τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως διεφθαρήσαν· ἀπέθανε δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐτερος 5 στρατηγὸς Προκλῆς. τοὺς δὲ νεκροὺς ὑποστόιν-
δοὺς ἄνελόμενοι παρὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ ἀνα-
χωρῆσαντες ἐς Ναῦπακτον ὑστερον ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναῖς ταῖς ναυσίν ἐκομίσθησαν. Δημοσθένης δὲ περὶ Ναῦπακτον καὶ τὰ χωρία ταῦτα ὑπελείφθη τοῖς πετραγμένοις φοβοῦμενος τοὺς Ἀθηναίους.

ΧCIX. Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους καὶ οἱ περὶ Σικελίαν Ἀθηναίοι πλεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Δοκ-
ρίδα ἐν ἀποβάσει τέ τινι τοὺς προσβοηθήσαντας Δοκρῶν ἐκράτησαν καὶ περιπόλοιοι αἱροῦσιν δὴ ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀληκι ποταμῷ.

C. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους Αἰτωλοὶ προσπέμψαντες πρότερον ἐς τε Κόρινθον καὶ ἐς Δακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις, Τόλοφών τε τὸν Ὄφιονέα καὶ Βοριάδην 1 ἡ αὐτῆ, Hude ἡ πρώτη.

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they perished; for Chromon, the Messenian, who had been their guide on the way, had unfortunately been killed. The Aetolians kept plying their javelins, and being swift of foot and lightly equipped, following at their heels they caught many there in the rout and slew them; but the greater number missed the roads and got into the forest, from which there were no paths out, and the Aetolians brought fire and set the woods ablaze around them. Then every manner of flight was essayed and every manner of destruction befell the army of the Athenians, and it was only with difficulty that the survivors escaped to the sea at Oeneon in Locris, whence they had set out. Many of the allies were slain, and of the Athenians themselves about one hundred and twenty hoplites. So great a number of men, and all of the same age, perished here, the best men in truth whom the city of Athens lost in this war; and Procles, one of the two generals, perished also. When they had received back their dead from the Aetolians under a truce and had retreated to Naupactus, they were afterwards taken back by the fleet to Athens. Demosthenes, however, remained behind in Naupactus and the region round about, for he was afraid of the Athenians because of what had happened.

XCIX. About the same time the Athenian forces over in Sicily sailed to Locris\(^1\) and disembarking there defeated the Locrians who came against them and took a guard-house which was situated on the river Halex.

C. During the same summer the Aetolians, who had previously sent three envoys to Corinth and Lace-daemon, namely Tolophus the Ophionean, Boriades

\(^1\) i.e. the territory of the Epizephyrian Locri, north of Rhegium in Italy.
Τὸν Εὐρυτάνα καὶ Τείσανδρον τὸν Ἀποδωτόν, πείθουσιν ὡστε σφίσι πέμψαι στρατιὰν ἐπὶ Ναυ-
2 πακτὸν διὰ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπαγωγὴν. καὶ ἔξερεμψαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι περὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον
τρισχίλιαν ὀπλίτας τῶν ἔμμιμαχων. τούτων ἦσαν πεντακόσιοι ἐξ Ἡρακλείας, τῆς ἐν Τραξῖν
πόλεως τὸτε νεοκτίστου οὖσης. Σπαρτιάτης δ' ἤρχετο Εὐρύλοχος τῆς στρατιᾶς, καὶ ἐνυπερού-
θουν αὐτῷ Μακάριος καὶ Μενεδαίοι οἱ Σπαρ-
τιάται. Κ. ξυλλεγέντος δὲ τοῦ στρατεύματος
ἐς Δελφοὺς ἐπεκηρυκεύετο Εὐρύλοχος Δοκροῖς
τοῖς 'Οξόλαις: διὰ τούτων γὰρ ἡ ὄδος ἦν ἐς Ναῦ-
pακτον, καὶ ἀμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐβούλετο ἀπο-
2 στῆσαι αὐτούς. ξυνέπρασσον δὲ μάλιστα αὐτῷ
τῶν Δοκρῶν Ἀμφισσής διὰ τὸ τῶν Φωκέων
ἐχθισι δεδιότες· καὶ αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι δόντες ὦμῆρους
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπείσαν δοῦναι φοβούμενους τὸν
ἐπίνητα στρατὸν, πρῶτον μὲν ὀνύ τοὺς ὄμορους
αὐτῶς Μυόνέας (ταύτη γὰρ δυσσεβολῶτατος ἡ
Δοκρίς), ἐπείτα Ἰπνεάς καὶ Μεσσαπίως καὶ
Τριταίες καὶ Χαλαίους καὶ Τολοφώνιους καὶ
'Ησσίους καὶ Οίλανθεάς. οὕτου καὶ ἐξυπερβάτευον
πάντες. Ὀλμαῖοι δὲ ὦμῆρους μὲν ἔδοσαν, ἢκολού-
θουν δὲ ὀνύ καὶ 'Ταῖοι ὀκ ἔδοσαν ὦμῆρους πρὶν
αὐτῶν ἔλον κόμην Πόλιν ὄνομα ἄρχονταν.

Κ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ παρεσκεύαστο πάντα καὶ τοὺς
ὄμηρους κατέθετο ἐς Κυτίνιον τὸ Δωρίκων, ἔχωρει
τῷ στρατῷ ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον διὰ τῶν Δοκρῶν,
καὶ πορευόμενος Οἰνεώνα αἱρεῖ αὐτῶν καὶ Εὐ-
2 πάλιν ὄν γὰρ προσεκώρησαν. γενόμενοι δ' ἐν
τῇ Ναυπακτίᾳ καὶ οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ ἀμα ἦδη προσβε-
the Eurytanian, and Teisander the Apodotian, urged them to send an army against Naupactus because this city had brought the Athenians against them. So towards autumn the Lacedaemonians sent three thousand hoplites of their allies, among whom were six hundred from Heracleia, the city which had recently been founded in Trachis. The commander of the expedition was Eurylochus a Spartan, who was accompanied by the Spartans Macarius and Menedaïus, Cl. And when the army was collected at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Ozolian Locrians; for the road to Naupactus lay through their territory, and he also wished to induce them to revolt from Athens. Of the Locrians the people of Amphissa co-operated with him chiefly, these being afraid on account of their enmity to the Phocians; and after these had taken the lead in giving him hostages they persuaded the rest, who were afraid of the invading army, to do likewise—first their neighbours the Myoneans, who held the country from which Locris was most difficult of access, then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritaeans, Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hessians and Oeantheans. All these tribes also took part in the expedition. The Olpaeansts gave hostages, but did not take the field with the others; and the Hyaeans refused to give hostages until a village of theirs, Polis by name, was taken.

CII. When all preparations had been made, and the hostages had been deposited at Cythinium in Doris, Eurylochus advanced with his army against Naupactus through the Locrian territory, taking on his march two of their towns, Oeneon and Eupalium, which refused to yield. And when they reached the territory of Naupactus, the Aetolians meanwhile
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βοηθηκότες, ἐδέχον τὴν γῆν καὶ τὸ προάστειον ἀτείχιστον δὺ εἶλου ἐπὶ τε Μολύκρειον ἐλθόντες, τὴν Κορινθίων μὲν ἀποικίαν, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὑπῆκουν, αἱροῦσιν. Δημοσθένης δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος (ἐτι γὰρ ἑτυγχανεν δὺ μετὰ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Αἰτωλίας περὶ Ναύπακτον) προαιρομένους τοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ δείσις περὶ αὐτῆς, ἐλθὼν πείθει Ἀκαρνάνας, χαλέπῳς διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Δευκάδος ἀναχώρησιν.

4 βοηθῆσαι Ναύπακτῳ. καὶ πέμπτοι μετ’ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν χιλίους ὀπλίτας, οἱ ἐσελθόντες περιποιησάντω τὸ χωρίον δεινὸν γὰρ ἤν μή, μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ τείχους, ὄλγων δὲ τῶν ἄμυνομένων, 5 οὐκ ἀντίσχωσιν. Εὐρύλοχος δὲ καὶ οἱ μετ’ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἤσθοντο τὴν στρατιὰν ἐσέληνυσαν καὶ ἀδύνατον δὺ τὴν πόλιν βίᾳ ἐλείν, ἀνεχώρησαν οὐκ ἐπὶ Πελοποννήσου, ἀλλ’ ἐς τὴν Αἰολίδα τὴν νῦν καλομένην, Καλυδῶνα καὶ Πλευράνα καὶ ἐς τὰ ταύτῃ χωρία, καὶ ἐς Πρόσχιον τῆς Αἰτωλίας.

6 οἱ γὰρ Ἀμπρακιώται ἐλθόντες πρὸς αὐτοὺς πείθουσιν ὡστε μετὰ σφῶν Ἀργεί τε τῷ Ἀμφιλοχικῷ καὶ Ἀμφιλοχίᾳ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἐπιχειρῆσαι καὶ Ἀκαρνανία ἁμα, λέγοντες ὅτι, ἦν τούτων κρατήσωσι, πᾶν τὸ ἡπειρωτικὸν Δακεδαμονίους ξύμμαχον καθεστήσει. καὶ ὁ μὲν Εὐρύλοχος πεισθείς καὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ἄφεις ἑσύκαζε τῷ στρατῷ περὶ τοὺς χώρους τούτους, ἐως τοῖς Ἀμπρακιώταις ἐκστρατευσαμένοις περὶ τὸ Ἀργος δέοι βοηθεῖν. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

1 i.e. the fleet of the Acarnanians themselves; the thirty Athenian ships, which Demosthenes had commanded, had
BOOK III. cii. 2-7

having come to their support, they ravaged the land and took the outer town, which was not fortified; and advancing against Molycreium, a colony founded by the Corinthians but subject to Athens, they took it. But Demosthenes the Athenian, who happened to have remained in the neighbourhood of Naupactus after his retreat from Aetolia, got information of the expedition, and fearing for the town went and persuaded the Acarnanians, though with difficulty on account of his withdrawal from Leucas, to come to the aid of Naupactus. And they sent with him on board the fleet 1 one thousand hoplites, who entered the place and saved it; for there was danger that they might not be able to hold out, since the walls were extensive and the defenders few in number. Eurylochus and his men, perceiving that the army had entered and that it was impossible to take the town by storm, now withdrew, not to the Peloponnese, but to the district of Aeolis, as it is now called, to Calydon, namely, and Pleuron, and the other towns of that region, and to Proschium in Aetolia. For the Ambraciots came and urged him to join them in an attack upon Amphilocheian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia, and at the same time upon Acarnania, saying that if they got control of these places all the mainland would be brought into alliance with the Lacedaemonians. Eurylochus was persuaded, and dismissing the Aetolians remained inactive, keeping his army in these regions until the Ambraciots should take the field and the time should come for him to join them in the neighbourhood of Argos. And the summer ended.

returned to Athens (ch. xciii. 5), while those mentioned ch. cv. 3 did not come till later.

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CIII. Οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναίοι τοῦ ἐπιγινόμενον χειμάρρων ἐπελθόντες μετά τῶν Ἑλλήνων ξυμμάχων καὶ ὁσοὶ Σικελῶν κατὰ κράτος ἀρχόμενοι ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμαχοῦσι ὄντες ἀποστάντες αὐτοῖς ἦν ξυνεπολέμουν, ἐπ' Ἰνήσαν τῷ Σικελικῷ πόλισμα, οὗ τῆν ἀκρόπολιν Συρακόσιοι εἰχον, προσεβαλλον, καὶ ὃς οὖν ἐδύναντο ἔλειν, ἀπῆσαν.

2 ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀναχωρήσει ὑστέρους Ἀθηναίων τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ἀναχωροῦσιν ἐπιτίθενται οἱ ἐκ τοῦ τεχνίσματος Συρακόσιοι, καὶ προσπέσοντες τρέπουσι τε μέρος τι τοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ ἀπέκτειναν 3 οὗκ ὅλονος, καὶ μετὰ τούτο ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ὁ Δάχης καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἔστε τῇ Δοκρίδα ἀποβάσεις τινὰς ποιησάμενοι κατὰ τὸν Καϊκὺν ποταμὸν τοὺς προσβοηθοῦντας Δοκρίδην μετὰ Προξένου τοῦ Κασάτωνος ὡς τριακοσίους μάχη ἐκράτησαν καὶ ὅπλα λαβόντες ἀπεχώρησαν.

CIV. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ χειμώνος καὶ Δῆλον ἐκάθηραν Ἀθηναίοι κατὰ χρησμὸν δὴ τινα. ἐκάθηρε μὲν γὰρ καὶ Πεισίστρατος ὁ τύραννος πρότερον αὐτήν, οὐχ ἀπασαν, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἐφευράτῳ τῆς νήσου τότε δὲ πᾶσα ἐκαθάρθη 2 τοιἀδε τρόπω. θῆκαι ὅσα ἦσαν τῶν τεθνεωτῶν ἐν Δήλῳ, πάσας ἀνείλον, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν προεῖπον μήτε ἐναποθήκησειν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ μήτε ἐντίκειν, ἀλλ' ἐς τὴν Ῥήνειαν διακομίζετο. ἀπέχει δὲ ἡ Ῥήνεια τῆς Δῆλου οὕτως ὅλιγον ὡστε Πολυκράτης, ὁ Σαμίων τύραννος, ἵσχύσας τινὰ χρόνον ναυτικὸ καὶ τῶν τε ἄλλων νήσων ἀρξας καὶ τὴν Ῥήνειαν ἐλὼν ἀνέδηκε τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Δηλίῳ

1 ἀπὸ Συρακοσίων after αὐτοῖς, deleted by van Herwerden.

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BOOK III. CIII. 1—CIV. 2

CIII. The following winter the Athenians in Sicily, with their Hellenic allies and such of the Sicels as had been unwilling subjects and allies of the Syracusans but had now revolted from them and were taking sides with the Athenians, attacked the Sicel town Inessa, the acropolis of which was held by the Syracusans, but being unable to take it they departed. On their retreat, however, the allies, who were in the rear of the Athenians, were attacked by the Syracusan garrison of the fort, who fell upon them and put to flight part of the army, killing not a few of them. After this Laches and the Athenians took the fleet and made several descents upon Locris; and at the river Caëcinus they defeated in battle about three hundred Locrians who came out against them, under the command of Proxenus son of Capato, took the arms of the fallen, and returned to Rhegium.

CIV. During the same winter the Athenians purified Delos in compliance with a certain oracle. It had been purified before by Peisistratus the tyrant, not indeed the whole of the island but that portion of it which was visible from the temple; but at this time the whole of it was purified, and in the following manner. All the sepulchres of the dead that were in Delos they removed, and proclaimed that thereafter no one should either die or give birth to a child on the island, but should first be carried over to Rheneia. For Rheneia is so short a distance from Delos that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, who for some time was powerful on the sea and not only gained control of the other islands but also seized Rheneia, dedicated this island to the Delian Apollo,

1 First tyranny 560 B.C.; death 527 B.C.
2 The Cyclades.

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ἀλύσει δήσας πρὸς τὴν Δήλου. καὶ τὴν πεντηρίδα τότε πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐποίησαν 3 οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. ἦν δὲ ποτε καὶ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλη ξύνοδος ἐς τὴν Δήλου τῶν Ἰῶνων τε καὶ περικτικῶν νησιωτῶν ξύν τε γὰρ γυναιξὶ καὶ παισὶν ἔθεωρον, ὡσπερ νῦν ἐς τὰ Ἑφέσια Ἰωνες, καὶ ἀγῶν ἐποιεῖτο αὐτῷ καὶ γυμνικὸς καὶ μουσικός, χοροὺς τε ἀνὴγον αἱ πόλεις. δηλοὶ δὲ μάλιστα Ὀμηρὸς ὦ στι τοιαῦτα ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι τοῖσιν ἡ ἐστιν ἐκ προοιμίου Ἀπόλλωνος.

ἀλλοτε Ἡλίῳ, Φοῖβε, μάλιστα γε θυμὸν ἐτέρφης,
ἔνθα τοι ἐλκεχίτων Ἰῶνες ἤγερθονται
σὺν σφοίσιν τεκέσσοι γυναιξὶ τε σῆν ἐς ἄγιανν.
ἔνθα σε πυγμαχίη καὶ ὀρχιστὶ καὶ ἀοίδη
μυησάμενοι τέρπουσιν, ὅταν καθέσωσιν ἄγωνα.

5 ὅτι δὲ καὶ μουσικῆς ἀγῶν ἦν καὶ ἄγωνούμενοι
ἐφοίτων ἐν τοίσιν αὐ δηλοὶ, ἡ ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
προοιμίου. τὸν γὰρ Δηλιακὸν χορὸν τῶν γυναι-

1 τὰ δήλια, after οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude.
2 ἀλλοτε, Camerarius' conjecture, now generally adopted, for the Vulgate ἀλλὰ ὡτε, which Hude retains.

1 “As a symbolical expression of indissoluble union” (Curtius).
2 i.e. celebrated every fifth year.
3 Homer is clearly regarded by Thucydides as the author of the hymn here cited. How definite a personality he was

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and bound it with a chain to Delos.\textsuperscript{1} It was at this time, after the purification, that the Athenians first celebrated their penteteric\textsuperscript{2} festival in Delos. There had indeed in ancient times been a great gathering at Delos of the Ionians and the inhabitants of the neighbouring islands; and they used to resort to the festival with their wives and children, as the Ionians now do to the Ephesian games; and a contest was formerly held there, both gymnastic and musical, and choruses were sent thither by the cities. The best evidence that the festival was of this character is given by Homer\textsuperscript{3} in the following verses, which are from the hymn to Apollo:\textsuperscript{4}

"At other times, Phoebus, Delos is dearest to thy heart, where the Ionians in trailing robes are gathered together with their wives and children in thy street; there they delight thee with boxing and dancing and song, making mention of thy name, whenever they ordain the contest."

And that there was a musical contest also to which men resorted as competitors Homer once more makes clear in the following verses from the same hymn. After commemorating the Delian chorus of to Thucydides is shown by the words "in which he also mentions himself."

\textsuperscript{4} προολυμα, proem or introduction. In connection with epic poems the hymns were called προολυμα, because they were sung before other poems, \textit{i.e.} by the rhapsodists as preludes to their rhapsodies. Schol. ἐξ ὑμνου τοὺς γὰρ ὑμνοὺς προολυμα ἐκάλουν. The question has been raised whether the hymn was a prelude to the rhapsodies or was, as \textit{e.g.} here, in itself a rhapsody. The citations here made by Thucydides are from the \textit{Hymn to the Delian Apollo}, 146 ff. and 165 ff.
κὼν ὑμνήσας ἐτελεύτα τοῦ ἐπαίνου ἐς τάδε τὰ ἐπη, ἐν ὦς καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπεμνήσθη.

ἀλλ' ἄγεθ', ἰλήκοι μὲν Ἄπολλων Ἀρτέμιδι ξὺν, χαίρετε δ' ὑμεῖς πᾶσαι. ἐμεῖο δὲ καὶ μετόπισθε μνήσασθ', ὅππότε κέν τις ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων ἐνθάδ' ἀνείρηται ταλαπείρως ἄλλος ἐπελθὼν. "Ὤ κούραι, τίς δ' ὑμῖν ἁνήρ ἕδιστος ἀοιδῶν ἐνθάδε πωλεῖται καὶ τέφ τέρπεσθε μάλιστα;" ὑμεῖς δ' εὐ μάλα πᾶσαι ὑποκρίνασθαι εὐφήμως. ¹

"Τυφλὸς ἁνήρ, οἴκεῖ δὲ Χίω ἐνι παιπαλοέσσῃ." 6

Τοσάντα μὲν "Ομήρος ἐτεκμηρίωσεν ὅτι ἂν καὶ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλῃ ξύνοδος καὶ ἐορτή ἐν τῇ Δήλῳ ὑστερον δὲ τοὺς μὲν χοροὺς οἱ νησιώται καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι μεθ' ιερὸν ἐπεμπον, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀγώνας καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατελύθη ὑπὸ ξυμφόρων, ὡς εἰκὸς, πρὶν δὴ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τὸτε τῶν ἀγώνα ἐποίησαν καὶ ἰπποδρομίας, ὁ πρῶτον οὐκ ἦν.

CV. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Ἀμπρακίωται, ὡσπερ ὑποσχόμενοι Εὐρυλόχῳ τὴν στρατίαν κατέσχον, ἐκστρατεύοντα ἐπὶ Ἀργος τὸ Ἀμφιλοχικὸν τρισχύλιον ὑπάλληλος, καὶ ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν καταλαμβάνουσιν Ὀλπας, τεῖχος ἐπὶ λόφου ἱσχυρὸν πρὸς τῇ θαλάσσῃ, ὃ ποτὲ Ἀκαρνάνες τειχισάμενοι κοινῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἠχρώντο. ἀπέχει δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀργείων πόλεως

¹ εὐφήμως, Hude ἀφήμως.

¹ i.e. either a federal court of the Acarnanians, as Steup maintains (see Schoemann, Gr. Alterthümer, ii3, p. 76), or a court of justice common to the Acarnanians and Amphilo-
women he ends his praise of them with the following verses, in which he also mentions himself:

"Come now, let Apollo be gracious and Artemis likewise, and farewell, all ye maidens. Yet remember me even in after times, whenever some other toil-enduring man, a dweller upon the earth, shall visit this isle and ask: 'O maidens, what man is the sweetest of minstrels to you of all who wander hither, and in whom do you take most delight?' Do you make answer, all with one accord, in gentle words, 'The blind man who dwells in rugged Chios.'"

Such is Homer's testimony, showing that in ancient times also there was a great concourse and festival in Delos. And in later times the people of the islands and the Athenians continued to send their choruses with sacrifices, but the contests, and indeed most of the ceremonies, fell into disuse in consequence, probably, of calamities, until the Athenians, at the time of which we now speak, restored the contests and added horse-races, of which there had been none before.

CV. During the same winter the Ambraciots, fulfilling the promise by which they had induced Eurylochus to keep his army there, made an expedition against Amphilochain Argos with three thousand hoplites, and invading its territory took Olpae, a stronghold on the hill near the sea, which the Acarnanians had fortified and had at one time used as a common tribunal of justice; and it is

chians (see Kruse, Hellas, ii. p. 333), as Classen explains. The latter view has the support of Steph. Byz.: 'Ολπαί· φρού
ριον, κοινὸν Ἀκασάνων καὶ Ἀμφιλόχων δικαστήριον, Θεοκυδίδης τρίτη.
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ἐπιθαλασσίας οὖσης πέντε καὶ εἰκοσι σταδίους
2 μάλιστα. οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρνάνες οἱ μὲν ἐς Ἁργος
ξυνεβοήθουν, οἱ δὲ τῆς Ἀμφιλοχίας ἐν τούτῳ τῷ
χωρίῳ ὅ Κρήναι καλεῖται, φυλάσσοντες τοὺς
μετὰ Εὐρυλόχου Πελοποννησίους μὴ λάθωσι πρὸς
τοὺς Ἀμπρακιώτας διελθόντες, ἑστρατοποιεύ-
3 σαντο. πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ Δημοσθένη τὸν ἐς
τὴν Αἰτωλίαν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγήσαντα, ὅπως
σφίσιν ἤγεμὼν γύγνηται, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς εἰκοσὶ ναῦς
Ἀθηναίων αἱ ἑτυχοῦν περὶ Πελοπόννησον οὖσαι,
ἀν ἠρχει Ἀριστοτέλης τε ὁ Τιμοκράτους καὶ
4 Ἰεροφῶν ὁ Ἀντιμήστου. ἀπέστειλαν δὲ καὶ
ἀγγελοῦν οἱ περὶ τὰς Ὀλπας Ἀμπρακιώτας ἐς
τὴν πόλιν κελεύσοντες σφίσι βοηθεῖν πανδημεῖς,
δεδιότες μὴ οἱ μετ' Εὐρυλόχου οὐ δύνανται διελ-
θεῖν τοὺς Ἀκαρνάνας καὶ σφίσιν ἡ μονωθεῖσιν
ἡ μάχη γένηται ἡ ἀναχώρεῖν βουλομένοις οὐκ ἡ
ἀσφαλές.

CVI. Οἱ μὲν οὖν μετ' Εὐρυλόχου Πελοπο-
νησίοι ως ἤσθοντο τοὺς ἐν Ὀλπαῖς Ἀμπρακιώτας
ηκοντας, ἀραντες ἐκ τοῦ Προσχίου ἐβοήθουν κατὰ
τάχος, καὶ διαβάτες τὸν Ἀχελώον ἐχώρουν δι' Ἀκαρνάνας
οὔσης ἐρήμου διὰ τὴν ἐς Ἁργος
βοήθειαν, ἐν δεξιὰ μὲν ἔχοντες τὴν Στρατίων
πόλιν καὶ τὴν φουράν αὐτῶν, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ δὲ τὴν
2 ἄλλην Ἀκαρνάνιαν. καὶ διελθόντες τὴν Στρα-

1 After the return of the thirty ships (ch. xcviii. 5), these
twenty had been sent out again round the Peloponnesus.
BOOK III. CV. I–CVI. 2

about twenty-five stadia from the city of Argos, which is by the sea. Meanwhile some of the Acarnanian troops came to the relief of Argos, while the rest encamped at a place in Amphilochnia which is called Crenae, keeping guard to prevent the Peloponnesians with Eurylochus from passing through unobserved to join the Ambraciots. They also sent for Demosthenes, who had led the army of the Athenians into Aetolia, to come and be their leader, as well as for the twenty Athenian ships¹ which happened to be off the coast of Peloponnesus under the command of Aristotle son of Timocrates and Hierophon son of Antimnestus. A messenger was also sent by the Ambraciots at Olpae to the city of Ambracia with a request that all the forces of the town should be dispatched to their aid, for they feared that Eurylochus and his troops might not be able to make their way through the Acarnanians, and, in that case, that they themselves would either have to fight single-handed, or, if they wished to retreat, would find that unsafe.

CVI. Now the Peloponnesian forces under Eurylochus, when they learned that the Ambraciots had arrived at Olpae, set out from Proschium with all speed to reinforce them, and crossing the Acheloïs advanced through Acarnania, which was without defenders because of the reinforcements which had been sent to Argos, and as they advanced they had the city of Stratus with its garrison on their right, and the rest of Acarnania on their left. Then traversing the territory of the Stratians they advanced through

Their real goal was Naupactus (ch. cxiv. 2), but answering the appeal of the Acarnanians they turned aside for the moment to the Ambracian Gulf (ch. cvii. 1).
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tίων γῆν ἑχόρουν διὰ τῆς Φυτίας καὶ αὖθις Μεδεώνος παρ᾽ ἐσχατα, ἔπειτα διὰ Λυμναίας· καὶ ἐπέβησαν τῆς Ἀγραίων, οὐκέτι Ἀκαρνανίας,
3 φιλίας δὲ σφίσιν. ὁλβόμενοι δὲ τοῦ Θυάμου ὄρους, ὦ ἐστιν Ἀγραίκον, ἑχόρουν δι᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατέβησαν ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν νυκτὸς ἦδη, καὶ
dιεξελθόντες μεταξὺ τῆς τε Ἀργείαν πόλεως καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ Κρήναις Ἀκαρνάνων φυλακῆς ἐλαθόν καὶ προσέμειξαν τοὺς ἐν Ὀλπαις Ἀμπρακιώτας.
CVII. Γενόμενοι δὲ ἄθροοι ἄμα τῇ ἄμερᾳ
cαθίζουσιν ἔπὶ τὴν Μητρόπολιν καλουμένην καὶ
στρατόπεδον ἐποίησαντο. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ταῖς
eἰκοσι ναυσὶν οὐ πολλῷ ύστερον παραγίγνονται
ἐς τὸν Ἀμπρακικοῦ κόλπον βοηθούντες τοῖς Ἀρ-
γείοις, καὶ Δημοσθένης Μεσσηνίων μὲν ἔχων
dιακοσίων ὀπλίτας, ἔξηκοντα δὲ τοξότας Αθη-
2 ναίων. καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆς περὶ τὰς Ὀλπας τὸν
λόφον ἕκαθαλάσσης ἐφώρμον· οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρνάνες
καὶ Ἀμφιλόχων ὀλίγοι (οἵ γὰρ πλείους ὑπὸ
Ἀμπρακικωτῶν βίᾳ κατείχοντο) ἐς τὸν Ἀργος ἦδη
ξυνεκληροῦσιν παρασκευάζοντο ὡς μαχομένου
τοῖς ἑναντίοις, καὶ ἡγεμόνα τοῦ παντὸς ἐξαμα-
χικοῦ αἴρονται Δημοσθένη μετὰ τῶν σφετέρων
3 στρατηγῶν. ὃ δὲ προσαγαγὼν ἐγγὺς τῆς Ὀλπης
ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο· χαράδρα δὲ αὐτοῦ μεγάλη
dιείργεν, καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν πέντε ἧσυχαζον, τῇ δὲ
ἐκτη ἐτάσσοντο ἀμφότεροι ὡς ἐμαχη. καὶ
(μείζων γὰρ ἐγένετο καὶ περιέσχε τὸ τῶν Πελο-
pοννησίων στρατόπεδον) ὁ Δημοσθένης δεῖσας

1 Ἀγραίκον, for ἀγροίκον or ἀγραῖκον of the MSS., corrected by O. Mueller.
2 τῶν λόφον, deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude.
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Phytia, from there skirted the borders of Medeon, and then passed through Limnaea; and finally they reached the country of the Agraean, being now outside of Acarnania and in a friendly country. Arriving next at Mt. Thyamus, which belongs to the Agraean, they went through the pass over it and came down into Argive territory after nightfall, whence they succeeded in passing unobserved between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian guard at Crenae, finally joining the Ambraciots at Olpae.

CVII. After the two armies had effected a junction, at daybreak they took post at a place called Metropolis and made camp. Not long afterwards the Athenians with their twenty ships arrived in the Ambracian Gulf, reinforcing the Argives; and Demosthenes also came with two hundred Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian bowmen. The ships lay at sea about the hill of Olpae, blockading it; but the Acarnanians and a few of the Amphilocheians—for most of these were kept from moving by the Ambraciots—had already gathered at Argos and were preparing for battle with their opponents, having chosen Demosthenes to command the whole allied force in concert with their own generals. And he, leading them close to Olpae, encamped; and a great ravine separated the two armies. For five days they kept quiet, but on the sixth both sides drew up in order of battle. Now the army of the Peloponnesians was larger than that of Demosthenes and outflanked it; he, therefore, fearing that he
μὴ κυκλώθη λοχίζει ἐς ὁδὸν τινα κοίλην καὶ λοχμώδη ὁπλίτας καὶ ψιλοὺς ἐμαμφοτέρους ἐς τετρακοσίους, ὅπως κατὰ τὸ ὑπερέχον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐν τῇ ξυνόδῳ αὐτῇ ἐξαναστάντες οὕτως κατὰ 4 νότου γύμνωνται. ἐπεὶ δὲ παρεσκεύαστο ἀμφοτέρως, ἦσαν ἐς χεῖρας, Δημοσθένης μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ἔχων μετὰ Μεσσηνίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων ὀλίγων· τὸ δὲ ἄλλο Ἀκαρνάνες ὡς ἐκαστοι τεταγμένοι ἐπείχον καὶ Ἀμφιλόχοι οἱ παρόντες ἀκοντιστὰι. Πελοποννήσιοι δὲ καὶ Ἀμπρακιὼται ἀναμίξε τεταγμένοι πλην Μαντινέων οὕτως δὲ ἐν τῷ εὐωνύμῳ μᾶλλον καὶ οὐ τὸ κέρας ἀκρον ἔχουσε ἄθροι ἦσαν, ἀλλ' Εὐρύλοχος ἐσχατον εἰχε τὸ εὐώνυμον καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ, κατὰ Μεσσηνίους καὶ Δημοσθένην.

CVIII. Ὁς δ' ἐν χερσὶν ἦδη ὄντες περιέσχον τῷ κέρα τοι Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ ἐκυκλοῦντο τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν ἐναντίων, οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας Ἀκαρνάνες ἐπιγενόμενοι αὐτοῖς κατὰ νότον προσπίπτουσι τε καὶ τρέπουσιν, ὡστε μήτε ἐς ἀλκήν ὑπομείναι φοβηθέντας τε ἐς φυγήν καὶ τὸ πλέον τοῦ στρατεύματος καταστήσαι ἐπειδή γὰρ εἴδον τὸ κατ' Εὐρύλοχον καὶ δ' κράτιστον ἴνα διαφθειρόμενον, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐφοβοῦντο. καὶ οἱ Μεσσηνίοι ὄντες ταύτῃ μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους τὸ πολὺ τοῦ 2 ἔργου ἐπεξήλθον. οἱ δὲ Ἀμπρακιὼται καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ἐνίκων τὸ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς καὶ πρὸς τὸ Ἀργος ἐπεδίωξαν.1 καὶ γὰρ μαχειμῶτατοι

1 ἐπεδίωξαν, for ἐπεδίωξαν of the MSS., Haase's conjecture.
might be surrounded, stationed in a sunken road overgrown with bushes an ambush of hoplites and light-troops, about four hundred all together, his purpose being that in the very moment of collision these troops should leap from their hiding-place and take the enemy in the rear at the point where his line overlapped. When both sides were ready they came to close quarters. Demosthenes with the Messenians and a few Athenian troops had the right wing; the rest of the line was held by the Acarnanians, arrayed by tribes, and such Amphilochian javelin-men as were present. But the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were mingled together, except the Mantineans; these were massed more on the left wing, though not at its extremity, for that position, which was opposite Demosthenes and the Messenians, was held by Eurylochus and the troops under him.

CVIII. When finally the armies were at close quarters and the Peloponnesians outflanked with their left the right wing of their opponents and were about to encircle it, the Acarnanians, coming upon them from their ambush, fell upon their rear and routed them, so that they did not stand to make resistance and in their panic caused the greater part of their army to take to flight also; for when they saw the division under Eurylochus, their best troops, being cut to pieces, they were far more panic-stricken. And it was the Messenians, who were in this part of the field under the command of Demosthenes, that bore the brunt of the battle. On the other hand, the Ambraciots and those on the enemy's right wing defeated the troops opposed to themselves, and pursued them to Argos; and indeed
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τῶν περὶ ἐκείνα τὰ χωρία τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες.

3 ἐπαναχωροῦντες δὲ ὡς ἐώρων τὸ πλέον νευκηκέμένον καὶ οἱ ἥλιοι Ἄκαρνάνες σφίζει προσέκειντο, χαλεπῶς διεσφόξεντο ἐς τὰς Ὀλτας, καὶ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον αὐτῶν, ἀτάκτως καὶ οὐδεὶς κόσμῳ προσπίπτουντες πλὴν Μαντινέων· οὕτως δὲ μάλιστα ἔνυπταιγμένοι παντὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀνεχώρησαν· καὶ ἡ μὲν μάχη ἐτελεύτη ἐς ὄψε.

CIX. Μενεδαίος δὲ τῇ υστεραίᾳ Εὐρυλόχου τεθνέωτος καὶ Μακαρίου αὐτὸς παρειληφῶς τὴν ὀρχὴν καὶ ἄπορῶν μεγάλης τῆς ἡσσῆς γεγενημένης ὡς τρόπῳ ἡ μένων πολιορκησταί, ἐκ τῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ταῖς Ἀττικαῖς ναυσὶν ἀποκεκλημένος, ἡ καὶ ἀναχώρων διασωθήσεται, προσφέρει λόγον περὶ σπουδῶν καὶ ἀναχωρήσεως Δημοσθένει καὶ τοῖς Ἄκαρνάνων στρατηγοῖς καὶ 2 περὶ νεκρῶν ἁμα ἀναιρέσεως. οἱ δὲ νεκρῶν μὲν ἀπέδοσαν καὶ τροπαίον αὐτοῖς ἔστησαν καὶ τοὺς ἐαυτῶν τριάκοσίους μάλιστα ἀποθανόντας ἀνείλοντο· ἀναχώρησιν δὲ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ προφανοῦς οὐκ ἐσπείραμεν ἀπασί, κρύφα δὲ Δημοσθένης μετὰ τῶν ἑυστρατήγων τῶν Ἄκαρνάνων σπένδοντας Μαντινεύσι καὶ Μενεδαίῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄρχουσι τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ ἀσοὶ αὐτῶν ἔσαν ἀξιολογώτατοι ἀποχωρεῖν κατὰ τάχος, θεολόμενος ψηλώσαι τοὺς Ἀμπρακίωτας τε καὶ τὸν μισθοφόρον ὅχλον, μάλιστα δὲ Δακεδαι-

1 tῆς added by Hude.
2 τῶν, before Ἄκαρνάνων, added by Krüger, followed by Hude.
3 τὸν ἕνεκόν, given in MSS. after ὅχλον, deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude.

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these are the best fighters of all the peoples of that region. When, however, they returned and saw that their main army had been defeated, and the victorious division of the Acarnanians began to press hard upon them, they made their escape with difficulty to Olpae; and many of them were killed, for they rushed on with broken ranks and in disorder, all except the Mantineans, who kept their ranks together during the retreat better than any other part of the army. And it was late in the evening before the battle ended.

CIX. On the next day, since Eurylochus and Macarius had been slain, Menedæus had on his own responsibility assumed the command, but the defeat had been so serious that he was at his wit's end how, if he remained, he could stand a siege, blockaded as he was by both land and sea by the Athenian fleet, or, if he retreated, could get away safely. He therefore made overtures to Demosthenes and the Athenian generals regarding a truce for his retreat and also about the recovery of his dead. And they gave back the dead, set up a trophy themselves, and took up their own dead, about three hundred in number. They would not, however, openly agree to a retreat for the whole army, but Demosthenes with his Acarnanian colleagues secretly agreed that the Mantineans and Menedæus and the other Peloponnesian commanders and the most influential men among them might go back home, if they did so speedily. Their object was to isolate the Ambraciots and the miscellaneous crowd of mercenaries,¹ and above all to

¹ Opinions differ as to who are meant. They were probably mercenaries from the neighbouring Epirote tribes in the pay of the Ambraciots.
μονίους καὶ Πελοποννησίους διαβαλεῖν ἐς τοὺς ἐκεῖνη χρῆσιν Ἐλληνας ὡς καταπροδότες τὸ
3 έαυτῶν προοριαίτερον ἐποιήσαντο. καὶ οἱ μὲν τοὺς τε νεκροὺς ἀνείλοντο καὶ διὰ τάχους ἔθαπτον,
ὡσπερ ὑπῆρχε, καὶ τὴν ἀποχωρήσιν κρύφα οἶς ἔδεδοτο ἐπεζούλευον.

CX. Τῷ δὲ Δημοσθένει καὶ τοῖς Ἀκαρνανίσιν ἀγγέλλεται τοὺς Ἀμπρακίωτας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως πανδημεῖ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐκ τῶν Ὤλπων ἀγγελίαιν ἐπιβοηθεῖν διὰ τῶν Ἀμφι-
λόχων, βουλομένους τοῖς ἐν Ὅλπαις ξυμμείξαι
2 εἰδότας οὖν δὲ τῶν γεγενημένων. καὶ πέμπτε
εὐθὺς τοῦ στρατοῦ μέρος τάς ὠθοὺς προλο-
χιοῦντας καὶ τὰ καρτερὰ προκαταληψιμένους,
καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ στρατιᾷ ἀμα παρεσκευάζετο βοη-
θεῖν ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς.

CXI. Ἐν τούτῳ δ’ οἱ Μαντινηῖς καὶ οἱ ἐσπευστο
πρόφασιν ἐπὶ λαχανισμῶν καὶ φρυγάνων ξυλ-
λογὴν ἐξελθόντες ὑπαπῆσαν καὶ ὅλγους, ἀμα
ἐκλάγεοντες ἐφ’ ἀ εξήλθον δὴθεν προκεχωρη-
κότες δὲ ἢδη ἀπώθεν τῆς Ὀλπης ψάσσον ἀπε-
2 χώρου. οἱ δ’ Ἀμπρακίωται καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι
μὲν1 ἐτύγχανον οὕτως ἄθροι ἐξελθόντες, ὡς
ἐγνωσαν ἀπίστως, ἀρμηναὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἔθεον
3 δρόμῳ, ἐπικαταλαβεῖν βουλόμενοι. οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρ-
νάνες τὸ μὲν πρῶτον καὶ πάντας ἐνόμισαν ἀπεῖναι

1 Hude reads ὅσοι μη ἐτύγχανον τούτοις ἄθροι ἐξελθόντες.

1 As distinguished from the Ambraciots who after the battle were shut up in Olpae (ch. cxi. 2).
2 The text is most probably corrupt. Classen offers the best remedy: οἱ δὲ Ἀμπρακίωται καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι
μονοῦμενοι ἐτύγχανον οὕτως, ἄθροι ἐξελθότες ὃς ἐγνωσαν

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discredit the Lacedaemonians and the Peloponnesians with the Hellenes of this region, on the ground that they had committed an act of treachery through preference for their own selfish interests. Accordingly the Peloponnesians took up their dead and hastily buried them as best they could, while those who had permission began secretly to plan their retreat.

CX. Word was now brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians that the inhabitants of the city of Ambracia,¹ in response to the first message that came from Olpae, were marching in full force through the Amphilocheian territory, wishing to join the forces in Olpae, and that they were quite unaware of what had happened. So he immediately sent a part of his army to forestall these troops by setting ambuscades along the roads and occupying the strong positions, and at the same time began preparations to lead the rest of the army against them.

CXI. In the meantime the Mantineans and the others who were included in the agreement, leaving camp on the pretext of gathering pot-herbs and firewood, stole away in small groups, gathering at the same time what they pretended to have gone to seek; then when they had already got some distance from Olpae they quickened their pace. But the Ambraciots and all the others who happened to have come together in a body, when they realized that these were taking their departure, also set out themselves and ran at full speed, wishing to overtake them.² But the Acarnanians at first thought that all the fugitives were going away without covenant

¹ πραττασ, ἀρμησαν καὶ αὑτοὶ ..: "But the Ambraciots and all the others who chanced to be left came together in a body, and when they realised that they were taking their departure set off also themselves .."
ἀσπόνδους δμοίως καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ἐπεδίωκον, καὶ τινὰς αὐτῶν τῶν στρατηγῶν κωλύοντας καὶ φάσκοντας ἐσπεῖσθαι αὐτοῖς ἥκόντισέ τις, νομίσας καταπροδίδοσθαι σφᾶς· ἔπειτα μὲντοι τοὺς μὲν Μαυτινέας καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ἀφίσαν, τοὺς δ' Ἀμπρακίωτας ἐκτεινον.

καὶ ἦν πολλή ἐρις καὶ ἄγνοια εἶτε Ἀμπρακιώτης τις ἐστιν εἶτε Πελοποννήσιος. καὶ ἐς διακοσίους μὲν τινὰς αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν· ἐς τῇ Ἀγραΐδα ὀμορον οὖσαν, καὶ Σαλύνθιος αὐτοὺς ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἀγραιῶν φίλος ὁμ ὑπεδέξατο.

ΣΧΙ. Οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Ἀμπρακιώται ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπὶ Ἰδομενίην. ἔστον δὲ δύο λόφων ἡ Ἰδομένη υψηλώ· τούτων τῶν μὲν μείζω νυκτῶς ἐπιγενομένης οἱ προαποσταλέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ Δημοσθένους ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἐλαθὼν τε καὶ ἐφθάσαν προκαταλαβόντες, τὸν δ' ἐλάσσῳ ἵνα ἐντυχον ὁ Ἀμπρακιώται προαναβάντες καὶ ἡμῖν ἐσπερισμόντες ἐγγεγεινέναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ 2 σαντο. οἱ δὲ Δημοσθένης διεπιγδήσας ἐχόρευε καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα ἀπὸ ἐσπέρας εὔθυς, αὐτὸς μὲν τὸ ἣμισον ἔχων ἐπὶ τῆς ἐσβολῆς, τὸ δ' ἄλλο

διὰ τῶν Ἀμφιλοχικῶν ὄρων. καὶ ἀμα ὀρθρὸν ἐπιπίπτει τοῖς Ἀμπρακιώταις ἐτί ἐν ταῖς εὐναῖς καὶ οὐ προσθημένοις τὰ γεγενημένα, ἀλλὰ πολὺ 3 μᾶλλον νομίσασι τοὺς ἐαυτῶν εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους πρώτους ἐπίτηδες ὁ Δημοσθένης προύπαξε καὶ προσαγορεύειν ἐκέλευεν, Δωρίδα τε γλώσσαν ἴντας καὶ τοὺς προφύλαξε πίστιν παρεχομένους, ἀμα δὲ καὶ οὐ καθορμένους τῇ ὁψεῖ

ἐς is inserted before τὸν δ' ἐλάσσῳ by Hude, following Krüger.
or truce and therefore set off in pursuit of the Peloponneseans; and when some of the generals tried to prevent this, saying that a truce had been made with them, someone hurled javelins at them, believing that they had been betrayed. Afterwards, however, they let the Mantineans and Peloponneseans go, but began to kill the Ambraciots. And there was much dispute and uncertainty as to whether a man was an Ambraciot or a Peloponnesian. About two hundred of the Ambraciots were slain; the rest of the fugitives escaped into the neighbouring country of Agraea, and were received by Salynthius the king of the Agraeans, who was friendly to them.

CXII. Meanwhile the troops from the city of Ambracia arrived at Idomene. Now it consists of two lofty hills, and of these the higher had already been seized unobserved during the night by the troops which Demosthenes had sent forward from his main army; but the lower had previously, as it chanced, been ascended by the Ambraciots, who spent the night there. After dinner Demosthenes and the rest of the army set out immediately after nightfall, he himself with half of them making for the pass, while the rest took the road through the Amphilochnian mountains. And at dawn he fell upon the Ambraciots, who were still in their beds and had no knowledge at all of what had previously happened. On the contrary, they supposed these troops to be their own men, for Demosthenes had purposely put the Messenians in front and directed them to accost the enemy in the Doric dialect, thus getting themselves trusted by the outposts; besides, they were indistinguishable to the sight, since it was still dark.
5 νυκτὸς ἦτε οὖσης· ὡς οὖν ἔπεπεσε τῷ στρατεύ-ματι αὐτῶν, τρέπουσι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς αὐτοῦ διέφθειραν, οἵ δὲ λοιποὶ κατὰ τὰ ὄρη ἐς
6 φυγὴν ὁρμήσαν. προκατειλημμένων δὲ τῶν ὄδῶν, καὶ ἀμα τῶν μὲν Ἀμφιλόχων ἐμπείρων ὄντων τῆς ἐαυτῶν γῆς καὶ φιλῶν πρὸς ὀπλίτας, τῶν δὲ ἀπείρων καὶ ἀνεπιστημόνων ὅτι τράπωνται, ἐσπίπτοντες ἐς τε χαράδρας καὶ τὰς προλελο-
7 χισμένας ἐνέδρας διεφθείρωντο. καὶ ἐς πᾶσαν ἰδέαν χωρήσαντες τῆς φυγῆς ἐτράποντό τινες καὶ ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχουσαν, καὶ ὡς εἰδον τὰς Ἀττικὰς ναῦς παραπλεύσας ἀμα τοῦ ἐργού τῇ ἐξυντυχίᾳ, προσένευσαν, ἤγησάμενοι ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα φόβῳ κρείσσον εἶναι σφίσιν ύπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν, εἰ δὲ, διαφθαρῆναι ἢ ύπὸ τῶν
8 βαρβάρων καὶ ἔχθιστων Ἀμφιλόχων. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀμπρακιώτας τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ κακωθέντες ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐσώθησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν, Ἀκαρνάνες δὲ σκυλεύσαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ τροπαία στήσαντες ἀπεχώρησαν ἐς Ἀργος.

CXIII. Καὶ αὐτοῖς τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἦλθε κῆρυξ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐς Ἀγραιόν καταφυγόντων ἐκ τῆς Ὀλυν πριν Ἀμπρακιωτῶν, ἀναίρεσιν αἰτήσων τῶν νεκρῶν οὐς ἀπέκτειναν ύστερον τῆς πρώτης μάχης, ὅτε μετὰ τῶν Μαντίνεων καὶ τῶν ὑποσπόν-
2 δῶν ξυνεξῆσαν ἀσπονδοί. ἴδον δὲ ὁ κῆρυξ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως Ἀμπρακιωτῶν ἔθαυ-
μαζε τὸ πλῆθος· οὐ γὰρ ᾧδει τὸ πάθος, ἀλλ’ ἤτο

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So they fell upon the army of the Ambraciots and put them to rout, slaying the majority of them on the spot; the rest took to flight over the mountains. But as the roads had already been occupied, and as, moreover, the Amphilochians were well acquainted with their own country and were light infantry opposing heavy-armed troops, whereas the Ambraciots were ignorant of the country and did not know which way to turn, under these circumstances the fleeing men fell into ravines and into ambushes which had previously been set for them and perished. And some of them, after resorting to every manner of flight, even turned to the sea, which was not far distant, and seeing the Athenian ships, which were sailing along the coast at the very time when the action was taking place, swam toward them, thinking in the panic of the moment that it was better for them to be slain, if slain they must be, by the crews of the ships than by the barbarian and detested Amphilochians. In this manner, then, the Ambraciots suffered disaster, and but few out of many returned in safety to their city; the Acarnanians, on the other hand, after stripping the dead and setting up trophies, returned to Argos.

CXIII. On the next day a herald came to the Athenians from the Ambraciots who had escaped from Olpae and taken refuge among the Agraeans, to ask for the bodies of those who had been slain after the first battle, at the time when unprotected by a truce these attempted to leave Olpae along with the Mantineans and the others who were included in the truce. Now when the herald saw the arms taken from the Ambraciots who came from the city, he was amazed at their number; for he did not know of the recent disaster, but thought that
3 τῶν μετὰ σφόντος εἶναι. καὶ τις αὐτῶν ἦρετο ὁ τε θαυμάζω καὶ ὑπόσοι αὐτῶν τεθνάσιν, οἴομενος αὐ ὁ ἐρωτῶν εἶναι τὸν κήρυκα ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἰδομεναῖς. ὁ δ' ἔφη διακοσίων μάλιστα. ὑπολαβών δ' ὁ ἐρωτῶν εἶπεν. "Οὐκον τὰ διπλα ταύτης διακοσίων¹ φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ πλέον ἡ χιλίων." αὖθις δὲ εἶπεν ἐκείνος. "Οὐκ ἄρα τῶν μεθ' ἧμῶν μαχομένων ἐστίν." ὁ δ' ἀπεκρίνατο. "Εἰπερ γε ἦμεῖς ἐν Ἰδομενῇ χθές ἐμάχησθε." "Ἀλλ' ἦμεῖς γε οὐδενὶ ἐμαχομέθα χθές, ἀλλὰ πρόην ἐν τῇ ἀποχωρήσει." "Καὶ μὲν δὴ τούτως γε ἦμεῖς χθές ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως βοηθήσασι τῆς Ἀμπρακιω- τῶν ἐμαχομέθα." ὁ δὲ κήρυξ ὡς ἦκουσε καὶ ἔγνω ὅτι ἦ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως βοηθεῖα διέφθαρται, ἀνοιμόξας καὶ ἐκπλαγεῖσ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν παρόν- των κακῶν ἀπῆλθεν εὐθὺς ἄπρακτος καὶ οὐκέτε 6 ἀπήρτε τοὺς νεκροὺς. πάθος γὰρ τούτο μιᾷ πό- λει Ἐλληνίδε ἐν ἵσαις ἤμέραις μέγιστον δὴ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε ἐγένετο. καὶ ἀριθμὸν οὐκ ἐγραφα τῶν ἀποθανόντων, διότι ἀπιστον τὸ πλῆθος λέγεται ἀπολέσθαι ὡς πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως. Ἀμπρακίαν μὲντοι οἴδα ὅτι, εἰ ἐβουλήθησαν Ἀκαρνάνες καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι Ἀθη- ναίοι καὶ Δημοσθένει πειθόμενοι ἐπελθεῖν, αὐ- τοβοεὶ ἄν εἶλον νῦν δ' ἐδεισαν μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι

¹ διακοσίων, added by Krüger.
the arms belonged to the men of his own division. And someone asked him why he was amazed, and how many of his comrades had been slain, the questioner on his part supposing that the herald had come from the forces which had fought at Idomene. The herald answered, "About two hundred." The questioner said in reply, "These arms, though, are clearly not those of two hundred men, but of more than a thousand." And again the herald said, "Then they are not the arms of our comrades in the battle." The other answered, "They are, if it was you who fought yesterday at Idomene." "But we did not fight with anyone yesterday; it was the day before yesterday, on the retreat." "And it is certain that we fought yesterday with these men, who were coming to your aid from the city of the Ambraciots." When the herald heard this and realized that the force which was coming to their relief from the city had perished, he lifted up his voice in lamentation and, stunned by the magnitude of the calamity before him, departed at once, forgetting his errand and making no request for the dead. Indeed this was the greatest calamity that befell any one Hellenic city in an equal number of days during the course of this whole war. The number of those who fell I have not recorded, seeing that the multitude reported to have perished is incredible when compared with the size of the city. I know, however, that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochnians had been willing to hearken to the Athenians and Demosthenes and had made an attack upon Ambracia they would have taken it at the first onset; but as it was, they were afraid that the Athenians, if they
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έχοντες αὐτὴν χαλεπώτεροι σφίσι πάροικοι ὅσιν.

CXLIV. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τρίτον μέρος νείμαντες τῶν σκύλων τοῖς 'Αθηναίοις τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὰς πόλεις διείλοντο. καὶ τὰ μὲν τῶν 'Αθηναίων πλέοντα ἕαλω, τὰ δὲ νῦν ἀνακείμενα ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς ιεροῖς Δημοσθένει εξηρέθησαν τριακόσιαι πανοπλίαι, καὶ ἄγων αὐτὰς κατέπλευσεν· καὶ ἐγένετο ἀμα αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Αἰτωλίας ξυμφοράν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς πράξεως ἀδεστέρα ἡ 2 κάθοδος. ἀπῆλθον δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐν ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυσὶν 'Αθηναίοι ἔς Ναύπακτον. 'Ακαρνάνες δὲ καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι ἀπελθόντων 'Αθηναίων καὶ Δημοσθένους τοῖς ὡς Σαλυνθίον καὶ Ἀγραίους καταφυγοῦσιν 'Αμπρακιώταις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ἀναχώρησιν ἐστείλαντο ἐξ Οἰνιδῶν οὕτε καὶ μεταν-3 ἐστησαν παρὰ Σαλυνθίον. καὶ ἐς τὸν ἐπειτὸν χρόνον στονδάς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο ἐκα-τὸν ἐτή 'Ακαρνάνες καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι πρὸς Ἀμπρακιώτας ἐπὶ τοίςδε, ὡστε μῆτε Ἀμπρακιώτας μετὰ 'Ακαρνάνων στρατεύειν ἐπὶ Πελοποννησίους μῆτε 'Ακαρνάνας μετὰ 'Αμπρακιωτῶν ἐπὶ 'Αθη-ναίους, βοηθεῖν δὲ τῇ ἀλλήλῃ, καὶ ἀποδοῦναι Ἀμπρακιώτας ὡπόσα ἡ χωρία ἡ ὀμήρους Ἀμφι-λόχων ἔχουσι, καὶ ἐπὶ Ἀνακτόριον μὴ βοηθεῖν 4 πολέμοιν ὑπὸ 'Ακαρνᾶσιν. ταῦτα ξυνθέμενοι διέ- λυσαν τὸν πόλεμον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Κορίνθιοι 202
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had the town in their possession, would be more troublesome neighbours than the Ambraciots.

CXIV. After this the Acarnanians apportioned a third of the booty to the Athenians and distributed the rest among their cities. The portion which fell to the Athenians was captured from them on the voyage home; but the dedicatory offerings now to be seen in the Athenian temples, consisting of three hundred panoplies, were set apart as Demosthenes’ share, and were brought home by him when he returned. Furthermore, his return could now, in consequence of this exploit, be made with less apprehension after his earlier misfortune in Aetolia. The Athenians in the twenty ships also departed, returning to Naupactus. As for the Acarnanians and Amphilochnians, after the Athenians and Demosthenes had gone home, they concluded a truce with the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had taken refuge with Salynthius and the Agraecans, allowing them to withdraw from Oeniadae, whither they had gone after leaving Salynthius. The Acarnanians and Amphilochnians also concluded for the future a treaty of alliance with the Ambraciots to last for one hundred years, on the following terms: The Ambraciots were not to join the Acarnanians in any expedition against the Peloponnesians; nor were the Acarnanians to join the Ambraciots against the Athenians, but they were to give aid in defence of one another’s territory; the Ambraciots were to restore all places or hostages belonging to the Amphilochnians which they now held; and they were not to give aid to Anactorium, which was hostile to the Acarnanians. On these terms of agreement they brought the war to an end. But
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φυλάκην ἑαυτῶν ἐς τὴν Ἀμπρακίαν ἀπεστειλαν ἐς τριακοσίους ὀπλίτας καὶ Ἐπανοκλέαδαν τὸν Ἐυθυκλέους ἀρχονταί. οἱ κομιζόμενοι χαλεπῶς διὰ τῆς ἑπείρου ἀφίκοντο. τὰ μὲν καὶ Ἀμπρακίαν οὔτως ἐγένετο.

ΟΣΕ. Οἱ δ’ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναίοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος ἐς τὴν Ἰμεραίαν ἀπόβασιν ἐποίησαν ἐκ τῶν νεῶν μετὰ τῶν Σικελῶν τῶν ἀνωθεν ἐσβεβληκότων ἐς τὰ ἔσχατα τῆς Ἰμεραίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰόλους νῆσους ἐπλευσαν. ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἐς Ρήγιον Πυθόδωρον τὸν Ἰσολόχου, Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸν, καταλαμβάνουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς διάδοχον ὅν ὁ Δάχης ἦρχεν. οἱ γὰρ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ξύμμαχοι πλεύσαντες ἐπεισαγαγοῦσιν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους βοηθεῖν σφύσι πλεῖοσι ναυσίν τῆς μὲν γὰρ γῆς αὐτῶν οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐκράτουν, τῆς δὲ θαλάσσης ὀλίγαις ναυσίν εἰργόμενοι παρεσκευάζοντο ναυτικὸν ξυναγείροντες ὡς οὔ περι-

οψόμενοι. καὶ ἐπλήρουν ναύς τεσσαράκοντα οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ὡς ἀποστελοῦντες αὐτοῖς, ἀμα μὲν ἡγούμενοι θάσσουν τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον καταλυθῆσεθαί, ἀμα δὲ βουλόμενοι μελέτην τοῦ ναυτικοῦ 5 ποιεῖσθαι. τὸν μὲν οὖν ἔνα τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπεστειλαν Πυθόδωρον ὀλίγαις ναυσί, Σοφοκλέα δὲ τὸν Σωστρατίδου καὶ Ἐυρυμέδουτα τὸν Θουκλέος ὑπομενοῦν τῶν πλείονοι νεῶν ἀποπέμψεις ἔμελλον. ὁ δὲ Πυθόδωρος ᾧδη ἔχουμεν τὴν τοῦ Δάχητος τῶν νεῶν ἀρχὴν ἐπλευσε τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος 204
after this the Corinthians sent to Ambracia a garrison of their own troops, consisting of about three hundred hoplites, under the command of Xenocleidas son of Euthycles, who, making their way with difficulty across he mainland, finally reached their destination. Such was the course of events at Ambracia.

CXV. During the same winter the Athenians in Sicily made a descent from their ships upon the territory of Himera, in concert with the Sicels from the interior who had invaded the extreme border\(^1\) of Himeraea; and they also sailed against the islands of Aeolus. Returning thence to Rhegium, they found that Pythodorus son of Isolochus, an Athenian general, had come to succeed Laches in command of the fleet. For their allies in Sicily had sailed to Athens and persuaded them to aid them with a larger fleet; for though their territory was dominated by the Syracusans, yet since they were kept from the sea by only a few ships they were collecting a fleet and making preparations with the determination not to submit. And the Athenians manned forty ships to send to them, partly because they believed that the war in Sicily could sooner be brought to an end in this way, and partly because they wished to give practice to their fleet. Accordingly they despatched one of their generals, Pythodorus, with a few ships, and were planning later on to send Sophocles son of Sostratidas and Eurymedon son of Thucles with the main body of the fleet. Pythodorus, now that he had taken over the command of Laches' ships, sailed toward the end of the winter against the Locrian fort which

\(^1\) i.e. toward the interior.
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ἐπὶ τὸ Δοκρῶν φρούριον ὁ πρότερον Δάχης εἶλεν καὶ νικηθεὶς μάχῃ ὑπὸ τῶν Δοκρῶν ἀπεχώρησεν.

CXVI. Ἐρρύη δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔρα τούτῳ ὁ ἤλιος τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκ τῆς Αἴτνης, ὡσπερ καὶ πρότερον. καὶ γῆν τινα ἔφθειρε τῶν Καταναλῶν, οἱ ὑπὸ τῇ Αἴτνῃ τῷ ὄρει οἰκοῦσιν, ὡσπερ μέγιστὸν 2 ἐστιν ὄρος ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ. λέγεται δὲ πεντῆκοστῇ ἔτει ὅτι τοῦτο μετὰ τὸ πρότερον ῥέμα, τὸ δὲ ἔχει ἀναλύει τρῖς γεγενήσθαι τὸ ῥέμα αἱ τρεῖς οὐ 3 Σικελία ὑπὸ Ἐλλήνων οἰκεῖται. ταῦτα μὲν κατὰ τοῦ χειμῶνα τούτον ἐγένετο, καὶ ἔκτον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἔτελευτα τοῦτος δὲ ἐν Θουκυδίδης ἐξυπνάγας.
BOOK III. cxv. 6–cxvi. 3

Laches had previously captured;¹ but he was defeated in battle by the Locrians and returned to Rhegium.

CXVI. At the beginning of the following spring the stream of fire burst from Aetna, as it had on former occasions. And it devastated a portion of the territory of the Catanaeans who dwell on the slope of Mount Aetna, the highest mountain in Sicily. This eruption took place, it is said, fifty years after the last preceding one;² and three eruptions all told are reported to have occurred since Sicily has been inhabited by the Hellenes.³ Such was the course of events in this winter, and therewith ended the sixth year of this war of which Thucydides composed the history.

is clear that Thucydides, when he wrote this passage, could have had no knowledge of an eruption later than 425 B.C. He must therefore have died before that of 396 B.C. or, if he lived after that date, never revised this passage.
³ i.e., since the eighth century; see the account at the beginning of Book vi.
BOOK IV
Δ

1. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους περὶ σίτου ἐκβολῆν Συρακοσίων δέκα νῆες πλεύσασαι καὶ Δοκρίδες ἵσαι Μεσσήνην τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ κατέλαβον, αὐτῶν ἐπαγαγομένων, καὶ ἀπέστη Μεσσήνη

2 Ἀθηναίων. ἔπραξαν δὲ τούτο μάλιστα οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ὁρῶντες προσβολὴν ἔχον τὸ χωρίον τῆς Σικελίας καὶ φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν ὁρμώμενοι ποτὲ σφίσι μείζον παρασκευὴ ἐπέλθωσιν, οἳ δὲ Δοκροὶ κατὰ ἔχθος τὸ Ῥηγῶν, βουλόμενοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν αὐτοὺς κατα-

3 πολέμειν. καὶ ἐσεβεβλήκεσαν ἀμα ἐς τὴν Ῥηγί-

νων οἱ Δοκροὶ πανστρατιά, ὡς μὴ ἐπιβοηθῶσι τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις, ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἐναπαγόντων Ῥηγί-

νων φυγάδων, οἳ ἦσαν παρ’ αὐτοῖς τὸ γὰρ Ῥήγων ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐστασίαζε καὶ ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοὺς Δοκροὺς ἀμύνεσθαι, ἃ καὶ 4 μᾶλλον ἐπετίθεντο. δησάντες δὲ οἱ μὲν Δοκροὶ τῷ πεζῷ ἀπεχώρησαν, αἱ δὲ νῆες Μεσσήνην ἐφρούρουν καὶ ἄλλαι 1 πληρούμεναι ἔμελλον αὐ-

τός ἐγκαθορμισάμεναι τὸν πόλεμον ἐντεῦθεν ποιήσεσθαι.

1 αἱ, in the MSS. before πληροῦμεναι, deleted by Classen, followed by Hude.

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BOOK IV

I. The next summer, about the time of the earing of the grain, ten Syracusan and as many Locrian ships sailed to Messene in Sicily and occupied it, going thither on the invitation of the inhabitants; and Messene revolted from Athens. The chief reason for this act, on the part of the Syracusans, was that they saw that the place offered a point of attack upon Sicily and were afraid that the Athenians might some time make it a base from which to move against Syracuse with a larger force; the motive of the Locrians was their hostility to the Rhegians, whom they desired to subdue by both land and sea. And, indeed, the Locrians had at this same time invaded the territory of the Rhegians with all their forces in order to prevent them from giving any aid to the Messenians; and, besides, some Rhegians who were living in exile among the Locrians also urged them to make the invasion; for Rhegium had for a long time been in a state of revolution, and it was impossible at the moment to make any defence against the Locrians, who were consequently the more eager to attack. The Locrians first ravaged the country and then withdrew their land forces, but their ships continued guarding Messene; and still other ships were now being manned to be stationed at Messene and to carry on war from there.
THUCYDIDES

II. Ἡπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτούς χρόνους τοῦ ἢρος, πρὶν τὸν σίτων ἐν ἀκμῇ εἶναι, Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ἐξύμμαχοι ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν 'Αττικὴν (ἥγειτο δὲ Ἀγις ὁ Ἀρχιδάμου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεὺς), καὶ ἐγκαθεξόμενοι ἔδησαν τὴν γῆν. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τὰς τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς ἐς Σικελίαν ἀπέστειλαν, ὡσπερ παρεσκευάζοντο, καὶ στρατηγοὺς τοὺς ὑπολοίπους Εὐρυμέδουν καὶ Σοφοκλέα. Πυθόδωρος γὰρ ὁ τρίτος αὐτῶν ἦδη προσαφίκτο ἐς Σικελίαν. εἰπὼν δὲ τούτους καὶ Κερκυραίων ἀμα παραπλέοντας τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιμεληθήναι, οἱ ἐληστεύοντο ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ὁ ὅρει φυγάδων· καὶ Πελοποννησίων αὐτόσε νῆς ἐξήκοντα παρεπεπλεύκεσαν τοῖς ἐν τῷ ὅρει τιμωροὶ καὶ λιμοῦ ὁντος μεγάλου ἐν τῇ πόλει νομίζοντες κατασχῆ-σειν ῥαδίος τὰ πράγματα. Δημοσθένει δὲ ὁντι ἱδιώτη μετὰ τήν ἀναχώρησιν τήν ἐξ Ἀκαρνανίας αὐτῶ δεσθέντι εἰπὼν χρήσθαι ταῖς ναυσὶ ταύταις, ἥν βούληται, περὶ τήν Πελοπόννησον.

III. Καὶ ὡς ἐγένοντο πλέοντες κατὰ τὴν Δακωνικὴν καὶ ἐπυνθάνοντο ὅτι αἱ νῆς ἐν Κερκύρα ἦδη εἰσὶ τῶν Πελοποννησίων, ὁ μὲν Εὐρυμέδου καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἠπείγομεν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν, ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἐς τὴν Πύλον πρῶτον ἐκέλευε σχόντας αὐτοὺς καὶ πρᾶξαντας ἔ δει τὸν πλοῦν ποιεῖσθαι ἀντιλιγόντων δὲ κατὰ τύχην χειμῶν ἐπιγευόμενος κατήνεισκε τὰς ναύς ἐπὶ τὴν Πύλον. καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης εὐθὺς ἥξιον τειχίζεσθαι τὸ

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II. About the same time that spring, before the grain was ripe, the Peloponnesians and their allies made an invasion of Attica, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians; and encamping there they ravaged the land. But the Athenians despatched the forty ships\(^1\) to Sicily, as they had previously planned, together with the two remaining generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles, who were still at home; for Pythodorus, the third general, had already arrived in Sicily. These had instructions, as they sailed past Corcyra, to have a care for the inhabitants of the city, who were being plundered by the exiles on the mountain,\(^2\) and the Peloponnesians with sixty ships had already sailed thither, with the purpose of aiding the party on the mountain and also in the belief that, since a great famine prevailed in the city, they would easily get control of affairs. Demosthenes also, who had retired into private life after his return from Acarnania,\(^3\) now, at his own request, received permission from the Athenians to use the forty ships at his discretion in operations about the Peloponnesus.

III. Now when the Athenians arrived off the coast of Laconia and learned that the Peloponnesian fleet was already at Corcyra, Eurymedon and Sophocles were for pressing on to Corcyra, but Demosthenes urged them to put in at Pylos first, do there what was to be done, and then continue their voyage. They objected; but a storm came on, as it happened, and carried the fleet to Pylos. And Demosthenes at once urged them to fortify the place, as it was for

\(^1\) cf. III. cxv. 4. \(^2\) cf. III. lxxxv. 4. \(^3\) cf. III. cxiv. 1.
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χωρίον (ἐπὶ τούτο γὰρ ξυνεκπλεῦσαι), καὶ ἀπέ-
φανε πολλὴν εὐπορίαν ξύλων τε καὶ λίθων καὶ
φύσει καρπέρων ὤν καὶ ἑρήμουν αὐτὸ τε καὶ ἔτι
πολὺ τῆς χώρας: ἀπέχει γὰρ στάδιους μᾶλιστα ἡ
Πύλος τῆς Σπάρτης τετρακοσίων καὶ ἐστιν ἐν τῇ
Μεσσηνία ποτὲ οὔσῃ γῆ, καλοῦσι δὲ αὐτὴν οἱ
3 Δακεδαιμόνιοι Κορυφάσιον. οἱ δὲ πολλὰς ἔφα-
σαν εἶναι ἀκρας ἑρήμους τῆς Πελοποννήσου, ἢν
βούληται καταλαμβάνων, τὴν πόλιν δαπανῶν.
τῷ δὲ διάφορον τι ἐδόκει εἶναι τούτῳ τὸ χωρίον
ἐτέρου μᾶλλον, λιμένος τε προσόντος καὶ τοὺς
Μεσσηνίους οἰκείους ὡντας αὐτῷ τὸ ἀρχαῖον καὶ
ὁμοφώνους τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις πλείστι ἀν βλάπ-
τειν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὁρμωμένους καὶ βεβαιῶς ἁμα τοῦ
χωρίου φύλακας ἐσεσθαι.

IV. Ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἔπειθεν οὔτε τοὺς στρατηγοὺς
οὔτε τοὺς στρατιώτας, ἤστερον καὶ τοῖς ταξιάρ-
χοις κοινώσας, ἡσύχαζον ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας, μέχρι
αὐτοῖς τὸ στρατιώταις σχολάζουσιν ὁμὴ ἐνέ-
2 πεσε περιστάσιω ἐκτειχίσαι τὸ χωρίον. (καὶ
ἐγχειρήσαντες εἰργάζοντο, σιδῆρα μὲν λιθουργὰ
οὐκ ἔχοντες, λογάδην δὲ φέροντες λίθους, καὶ
ξυνετίθεσαν ὡς ἔκαστῶν τι ξυμβαίνοι καὶ τὸν
πηλόν, εἰ ποὺ δέοι χρήσθαι, ἀγγείων ἀπορία ἐπὶ
τοῦ νύστου ἐφερον ἐγκεκυφότες τε, ὡς μάλιστα
μέλλοι ἐπιμένειν, καὶ τῷ χείρε ἐς τοῦπίσω ξυμ-
this purpose that he had sailed with them; and he showed them that there was at hand an abundance of wood and stone, that the position was naturally a strong one, and that not only the place itself but also the neighbouring country for a considerable distance was unoccupied; for Pylos is about four hundred stadia distant from Sparta and lies in the land that was once Messenia; but the Lacedaemonians call the place Coryphasium. The other generals said there were many unoccupied headlands in the Peloponnesus, which he could seize if he wished to put the city to expense. Demosthenes, however, thought that this place had advantages over any other; not only was there a harbour close by, but also the Messenians, who originally owned this land and spoke the same dialect as the Lacedaemonians, would do them the greatest injury if they made this place their base of operations, and would at the same time be a trustworthy garrison of it.

IV. But Demosthenes could not win either the generals or the soldiers to his view, nor yet the commanders of divisions to whom he later communicated his plan; the army, therefore, since the weather was unfavourable for sailing, did nothing. But at length the soldiers themselves, having nothing to do, were seized with the impulse to station themselves around the place and fortify it. So they set their hands to this task and went to work; they had no iron tools for working stone, but picked up stones and put them together just as they happened to fit; and where mortar was needed, for want of hods, they carried it on their backs, bending over in such a way as would make it stay on best, and clasping both hands behind them to prevent it from falling
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3 πλέκοντες, ὡς μὴ ἀποπίπτοι, παντὶ τε τρόπῳ ἢπείγοντο φθέναι τοὺς Δακεδαίμονίως τὰ ἐπιμαχώτατα ἐξεργασάμενοι πρὶν ἐπιβοηθῆσαι. τὸ γάρ πλέον τοῦ χωρίου αὐτὸ καρτερὸν ὑπήρχε καὶ οὐδὲν ἔδει τείχους. V. οἱ δὲ ἔορτῆς των ἐτυχου ἄγοντες, καὶ ἀμα πυθανόμενοι ἐν ὀλυγορίᾳ ἐποιοῦντο, ὡς, ὅταν ἐξελθόσιν, ἡ οὐχ ὑπομενούνται σφᾶς ἡ ῥάδιως ληψόμενοι βία καὶ τι καὶ αὐτοῦ ὁ στράτος ἐτί ἐν ταῖς Ἀθηναῖς ὅπως ἔπέσχεν.

2 τειχίζοντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῦ χωρίου τὰ πρὸς ἠπειρον καὶ ἀ μάλιστα ἔδει ἐν ἡμέραις ἐξ τῶν μὲν Δημοσθένη μετὰ νεῶν πέντε αὐτῶν φύλακα καταλείπουσι, ταῖς δὲ πλείσθι ναυοὶ τῶν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πλοῦν καὶ Σικελίαν ἠπείγοντο.

VI. Οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ Ἁττικῇ ὅντες Πελοποννησίως ὡς ἐπύθοντο τῆς Πύλου κατειλήμμενης, ἀνεχώρουν κατὰ τάχος ἐπ᾽ οἷον, νομίζοντες μὲν οἱ Δακεδαίμονικαὶ Ἀγις ὁ βασιλεὺς οἰκεῖον σφίσι τὸ περὶ τὴν Πύλον ἅμα δὲ πρὸ ἐσβάλοτας καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἐτί χλωροῦ ὅντος ἐσπάνιον τροφῆς τοῖς πολλοῖς, χειμῶν τε ἐπιγενόμενος μείζων παρὰ τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν ὧραν ἐπισῆς τὸ στράτευμα.

2 ὡστε πολλαχοθεν ξυνεβή ἀναχωρήσαι τε θάσσουν αὐτῶς καὶ βραχυτάτην γενέσθαι τὴν ἐσβολήν ταύτην ἡμέρας γάρ πέντε καὶ δέκα ἔμειναν ἐν τῇ Ἁττικῇ.

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off. 7 And in every way they made haste that they might complete the fortification of the most vulnerable points before the Lacedaemonians came out against them; for the greater part of the place was so strong by nature that it had no need of a wall. 8

V. As for the Lacedaemonians, they happened to be celebrating a festival when they got word of the undertaking, and made light of it, thinking that the Athenians would not await their attack when they got ready to take the field, or, if they should, that they could easily take the place by force; and the fact also that their army was still in Attica had something to do with their delay. The Athenians in six days completed the wall on the side toward the land and at such other points as most needed it, and left Demosthenes there with five ships to defend it; they then took the main body of the fleet and hastened on their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.

VI. But the Peloponnesians who were in Attica, when they heard that Pylos had been occupied, returned home in haste; for King Agis and the Lacedaemonians thought that the Athenian operations at Pylos were a matter of deep concern to them. And at the same time, since they had made their invasion early in the season when the grain was still green, most of them 1 were short of food, and bad weather, which came on with storms of greater violence than was to be expected so late in the spring, distressed the army. Consequently there were many reasons why they hastened their retirement from Attica and made this the shortest of their invasions; for they remained there only fifteen days.

1 Each division had its own commissariat, and some were better provisioned than the main body. Claassen explains, "were short of food for so large an army" (τοῖς πολλοῖς).
VII. Κατὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνων Σιμωνίδης Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς Ἡλίων τὴν ἐπὶ Θράκης Μενδαίων ἀποκιάν, πολεμίαν δὲ οὐσαν, ἐγκαὶ ᾧς Ἀθηναίως τε ὅλων ἐκ τῶν φρουρῶν καὶ τῶν ἑκείνης ἕμμαχων πλῆθος προδιδομένην κατέλαβεν. καὶ παραχρῆμα ἐπιβοθηθησάντων Χαλκιδῶν καὶ Βοττιάων ἐξεκρούσθη τε καὶ ἀπέβαλε πολλούς τῶν στρατιωτῶν.

VIII. Ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς Πελοποννησίων οί Σπαρτιάται αὑτοὶ μὲν καὶ οἱ ἐγγύτατα τῶν περιοίκων εὐθὺς ἐβοηθοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν Πύλον, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Δακεδαμοῦ οί βραδυτέρα ἐγίγνοτο ἡ ἕξοδος, ἀρτι ἀφιγμένων ἀφ' ἑτέρας 2 στρατείας. περιγεγέλλον δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν Πελοπόννησον βοηθεών ὅτι τάχιστα ἐπὶ Πύλον καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Κερκύρᾳ ναῦς σφῶν τὰς ἐξήκοντα ἐπεμψαν, αἱ ὑπερενεχθεῖσαι τῶν Δευκαδίων ἵσθιμον καὶ λαθοῦσαι τὰς ἐν Ζακύνθῳ Ἀττικὰς ναῦς ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπὶ Πύλον παρῇ δὲ ἦδη καὶ ὁ 3 πεζὸς στράτος. Δημοσθένης δὲ προσπλεύστων ἐτὶ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ὑπεκἐμπει φθάσας δύο ναῦς ἀγγεῖλαι Εὐρυμέδοντες καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν ἐν Ζακύνθῳ Αθηναίοις παρεῖναι ὃς τοῦ χωρίου 4 κινδυνεύοντος. καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆς κατὰ τάχος ἔπλεον κατὰ τὰ ἐπισταλμένα ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους· οἱ δὲ Δακεδαμοῦντα παρεσκευάζοντο ὃς τῷ τεχνὸ-ματὶ προσβαλοῦντες κατὰ τά γῆν καὶ κατὰ θά- λασσαν, ἐπιξοντες ὑβίως αἱρῆσειν οἰκοδόμημα διὰ ταχέως εἰργασμένοι καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγων 218
BOOK IV. vii.—viii. 4

VII. About the same time Simonides, an Athenian general, getting together a few Athenians from the garrisons in Thrace and a large force from the allies in that neighbourhood, got, by the treachery of its inhabitants, possession of Eion in Thrace, a colony of the Mendaean and hostile to Athens. But succour came promptly from the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans and he was driven out with the loss of many of his soldiers.

VIII. On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans themselves and the Perioeci who were in the neighbourhood of Pylos at once came to its relief; but the other Lacedaemonians were slower in coming, since they had just got back from another campaign. Word was also sent round to the states of the Peloponnesus, summoning them to come to the relief of Pylos as quickly as possible, and also to the sixty ships that were at Corcyra.¹ These were hauled across the Leucadian isthmus, and without being discovered by the Attic ships, which were now at Zacynthus, reached Pylos, where their land forces had already arrived. But before the Peloponnesian fleet had yet reached Pylos, Demosthenes managed to send out secretly ahead of them two ships which were to notify Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus to come at once to his aid, as the place was in danger. And so the fleet proceeded in haste in compliance with Demosthenes' summons; meanwhile, however, the Lacedaemonians were busy with their preparations to attack the fortification both by land and by sea, and they thought that they would have no difficulty in capturing a structure which had been built hastily and was occupied by only a few

¹ cf. ch. ii. 3.
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5 ἐνόπτων. προσδεχόμενοι δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Ζακύνθου τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν βοήθειαν ἐν νῷ εἶχον, ἦν ἀρα μὴ πρότερον ἔλωσι, καὶ τοὺς ἐσπλοὺς τοῦ λιμένος ἐμφάρξαι, ὅπως μὴ ἡ τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοις ἐφορμίσασθαι ἐσ αὐτῶν.

6 Ἡ γὰρ νῆσος ἡ Σφακτηρία καλομένη τὸν τε λιμένα, παρατείνουσα καὶ ἐγγύς ἐπικειμένη, ἐχυρῶν ποιεῖ καὶ τοὺς ἐσπλοὺς στενοὺς, τῇ μὲν δυσιν νεῶν διάπλουν κατὰ τὸ τείχισμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὴν Πύλην, τῇ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην ἥπειρον ὀκτὼ ἢ ἐννέα ὑπὸ ἕρημα ἢ καὶ μέγεθος περὶ πέντε καὶ δέκα

7 σταδίους μάλιστα. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἐσπλοὺς ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀντιπρόφοροι βύζην κλῆσειν ἐμελλοῦν τῇν δὲ νῆσον ταύτην φοβούμενοι μὴ ἐξ αὐτῆς τὸν

1 The harbour of Pylos is regarded by Classen and nearly all recent commentators as identical with the modern Bay of Navarino, the ἔσπλοι τοῦ λιμένος being the entrances north and south of Sphacteria or Sphagia. But the entrance to the harbour of Navarino south of Sphagia is now—and must have been in Thucydides’ time—a channel more than three-quarters of a mile wide, and deep all the way across, so that it does not answer to Thucydides’ description of a passage only wide enough to admit eight or nine triremes; rather, as Arnold says, “a hundred Greek ships might have found room to sail abreast quite as easily as eight or nine.” Clearly, then, Thucydides could not have been personally acquainted with the scene, and was misled as to the breadth of the harbour’s mouth, as Leake supposed. Or we must assume that the dimensions of the entrances mentioned by Thucydides were rather of those north and south of Coryphasium, the modern Palæo-Kastro, and the “harbour” was not the Bay of Navarino, as Thucydides sup-
men. But since they expected the Athenian fleet to arrive soon from Zacynthus, it was their intention, in case they should fail to take the place before these came, to block up the entrances to the harbour and thus make it impossible for the Athenians to anchor inside and blockade them.

Now the island called Sphacteria stretches along the mainland, lying quite close to it, and thus makes the harbour safe and the entrances to it narrow; on one side, opposite the Athenian fortifications and Pylos, there is only room for two ships to pass through, on the other side, next to the other part of the mainland, there is room for eight or nine. The whole island was covered with timber and, since it was uninhabited, had no roads, its length being somewhere near fifteen stadia. Now it was the intention of the Lacedaemonians to close up the entrances tight by means of ships placed with their prows outward; and as for the island, since they were afraid that the Athenians would use it as posed, but the Lagoon or Lake of Osmyn Aga, north of the bay, and now cut off from it by a sandbar. This is the view of Grundy—who in August, 1895, spent fourteen days there making a survey—as to the lower entrance. The upper entrance, he thinks, was closed already in Thucydides' time, and the historian seems never to have apprehended that fact. Grundy's view as to the lagoon being the harbour meant by Thucydides is accepted by Steup, but he does not approve of Grundy's assumption that Thucydides, without personal knowledge of the region, following at different points reports of different informants, confused statements with reference to the harbour of Pylos and as to the bay as referring to one and the same. See Arnold in App. to Book iv. on Sphacteria; Grundy, "Investigation of the Topography of the Region of Sphacteria and Pylos," in *Journal of Hellen. Studies*, xvi. 1–54; Steup, App. on iv. viii. 5.
ΤΗΘΕΙΔΗΣ

πόλεμου σφίσι ποιώνται, ἰπλίτας διεβίβασαν ἐς αὐτὴν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἤπειρον ἄλλους ἔταξαν.
8 οὖτω γὰρ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὴν τε νῆσου πολέμιαν ἐσεσθαι τὴν τε ἢπειρον ἀπόβασιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν
(τὰ γὰρ αὐτὴς τῆς Πύλου ἔξω τοῦ ἐσπλοῦ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος ἀλίμενα ὅντα οὐχ ἔξειν ὅθεν ὁμομενοὶ ὑφελήσουσι τοὺς αὐτῶν), σφεῖς δὲ ἀνευ τε

ναυμαχίας καὶ κινδύνου ἐκπολυρκήσειν τὸ χωρίον κατὰ το εἰκός, σίτου τε οὐκ ἐνόντος καὶ δί ὀλίγης

9 παρασκευής κατειλημένου. ὥς δ’ ἔδοκει αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, καὶ διεβίβαξαν ἐς τὴν νῆσον τοὺς ὀπλίτας ἀποκληρώσαστε ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν λόχων. καὶ

διέβησαν μὲν καὶ ἄλλοι πρότερον κατὰ διαδοχὴν, οἶ δὲ τελευταῖοι καὶ ἐγκαταληφθέντες εἴκοσι καὶ
tετρακόσιοι ἦσαν καὶ Ἐιὼτες οἱ περὶ αὐτούς· ἠρχε δ’ αὐτῶν Ἔπιτάδας ὁ Μολόβρου.

IX. Δημοσθένης δὲ ὅρων τοὺς Δακεδαλομινίους μέλλοντας προσβάλλειν ναυσί τε ἁμα καὶ πεζῷ, παρεκαβάζετο καὶ αὐτός, καὶ τὰς τρίηρεις αἱ

περιήγαν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῶν καταλειφθεισῶν ἀναστάσας ὑπὸ τὸ τείχισμα προσεστάρωσε, καὶ
tοὺς ναύτας ἐξ αὐτῶν ὀπλισεν ἀσπίδιον 1 φαῦλαις καὶ ὀισυναίς ταῖς πολλαῖς· οὐ γὰρ ἤν ὀπλα ἐν

χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ πορίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ἐκ

1 τε, after ἀσπίδιο in the MSS., deleted by Hude as not read by Suidas.

1 i.e., north of the entrance, on the western side.

2 Only three: five had been left him (ch. v. 2), but two of these he had sent to warn the squadron at Zacynthus.

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a base for carrying on the war against them, they conveyed some hoplites across, at the same time posting others along the mainland. By these measures, they thought, the Athenians would find not only the island hostile to them, but also the mainland, since this afforded no landing-place; for there were no harbours along the shore of Pylos itself outside the entrance,¹ on the side toward the sea, and therefore the Athenians would have no base from which they could aid their countrymen. Consequently the Lacedaemonians believed that, without running the risk of a battle at sea, they could probably reduce the place by siege, since it had been occupied on short notice and was not supplied with provisions. As soon as they reached this conclusion they proceeded to convey the hoplites over to the island, drafting them by lot from all the companies. Several detachments had before this time crossed over, one group relieving another; the last to do so—and this is the force that was captured—numbering four hundred and twenty, besides the Helots who accompanied them, and they were under the command of Epitadas son of Molobrus.

IX. Meanwhile Demosthenes also, seeing that the Lacedaemonians intended to attack him by sea and by land at the same time, set about making his preparations. He drew ashore, close up under the fortification, the triremes² remaining to him out of those which had been left in his charge and enclosed them in a stockade; he then armed their crews with shields—poor ones, indeed, most of which were made of plaited willow; for it was not possible to procure arms in an uninhabited country, and such

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ληστρικὴς Μεσσηνίων τριακοντέρου καὶ κέλητος ἔλαβον, οὐ ἔτυχον παραγενόμενοι. ὑπλίται τε τῶν Μεσσηνίων τούτων ὡς τεσσαράκοντα ἑγέ-2 νυντο, οἷς ἔχρητο μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων. τοὺς μὲν οὖν πολλοὺς τῶν τε ἀόπλων καὶ ὁπλισμένων ἐπὶ τὰ τετειχισμένα μάλιστα καὶ ἐχυρὰ τοῦ χωρίου πρὸς τὴν ἡπειρον ἔταξε, προειτῶν ἀμύνασθαι τοῦ πεζῶν, ἢν προσβάλητοι αὐτὸς δὲ ἀπολεξάμενοι ἐκ πάντων ἔξηκοντα ὀπλίτας καὶ τοξότας ὀλίγους ἐχώρει ἔξω τοῦ τείχους ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, ἡ μάλιστα ἐκεῖνος προσεδέχετο πειράσειν ἀπο-βαίνειν, ἐσ χωρία μὲν χαλεπὰ καὶ πετρώδη πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τετραμμένα, σφίσι δὲ τοῦ τείχους ταύτη ἀσθενεστάτου ὄντος ἐσβιάσασθαι1 αὐτῶς 3 ἤγειτο προθυμήσεσθαι: οὔτε γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐπι-ζουτές ποτε ναυσὶ κρατήσεσθαι οὐκ ἵσχυρον ἔτειχιζον, ἐκείνος τε βιαζομένωσι τὴν ἀπόβασιν 4 ἀλώσιμον τὸ χωρίον γύγνεσθαι. κατὰ τούτο οὖν πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν θάλασσαν χωρῆσας ἔταξε τοὺς ὀπλίτας ὡς εἰρέων, ἡν δύνηται, καὶ παρεκελεύ-σατο τοιάδε.

Χ. Ὅντε οἱ μεναράμενοι τούδε τοῦ κινδύ-νου, μηδεὶς ὤμων ἐν τῇ τοιάδε ἀνάγχῃ ἕξοντος βουλέσθω δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐκλογιζόμενοι ἀπὰ τὸ περιεστὸς ἡμᾶς δεινὸν, μᾶλλον ἡ ἀπερισκέπτως εὐελπὶς ὃμοσε χωρῆσαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀν περιγενόμενος. ὅσα γὰρ ἐς ἀνάγκην

1 ἐσβιάσασθαι: so Hude, after Leeuwen, for ἐπισπάσασθαι.

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as they had they took from a thirty-oared privateer and a light boat belonging to some Messenians who chanced to come along, and included among them about forty hoplites, whom Demosthenes used along with the rest. He then posted the greater part of his troops, the unarmed as well as the armed, at the best fortified and strongest points of the place, on the side toward the mainland, giving them orders to ward off the enemy's infantry if it should attack. But he himself selected from the whole body of his troops sixty hoplites and a few archers, and with them sallied forth from the fort to the point on the seashore where he thought that the enemy would be most likely to attempt a landing. The ground, indeed, was difficult of access and rocky where it faced the sea, yet since the Athenian wall was weakest at this place the enemy would, he thought, be only too eager to make an assault there; in fact the Athenians themselves had left their fortification weak at this spot merely because they never expected to be defeated at sea, and Demosthenes knew that if the enemy could force a landing there the place could be taken. Accordingly he posted his hoplites at this point, taking them to the very brink of the sea, determined to keep the enemy off if he could; and then he exhorted them as follows:

X. "Soldiers, my comrades in this present hazard, let no one of you at such a time of necessity seek to prove his keenness of wit by calculating the full extent of the danger that encompasses us; let him rather come to grips with the enemy in a spirit of unreflecting confidence that he will survive even these perils. For whenever it has come, as now
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ἀφίκται ὡσπερ τάδε, λογισμόν ἢκιστα ἐνδεχό-
2 μενα, κινδύνου τοῦ ταχύστου προσδείται. ἐγὼ δὲ
cαὶ τὰ πλεῖω ὅρῳ πρὸς ἡμῶν ὄντα, ἣν ἔθελωμέν γε
μείναι καὶ μή τῷ πλήθει αὐτῶν καταπλαγέντες
tὰ ὕπαρχοντα ἡμῖν κρείσσω καταπροδούναι.
3 τοῦ τε γὰρ χωρίου τὸ δυσέμβατον ἡμέτερον

υομίζω, δὲ 1 μενόντων μὲν ἡμῶν ξύμμαχον γίγνε-
tαι, ὑποχωρήσασι 2 δὲ καῖπερ χαλεπὸν δὲν εὐ-

ποροῦν ἔσται μηδενὸς κωλύοντος, καὶ τὸν πολέμιον

δεινότερον ἐξομεν μὴ ῥάδιας αὐτῷ πάλιν σύζησ.

τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως, ἢν καὶ ύφ’ ἡμῶν βιάζηται ἐπὶ

gὰρ ταῖς ναυσὶ βάστοι εἰσίν ἀμύνεσθαι, ἀπο-

βάντες δ’ ἐν τῷ ἱσῷ ἡδη. τὸ τε πλήθος αὐτῶν οὐκ

ἀγαν δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ ἔλγον γὰρ μαχεῖται

καῖπερ πολὺ δὲν ἀπορία τῆς προσομίσεως, καὶ

οὐκ ἐν γῇ στρατός ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου μείζων,

ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ νεῶν, αἷς πολλὰ τὰ καίρια δεῖ ἐν τῇ

θαλάσσῃ ξυμβῆναι. ὡστε τὰς τούτων ἀπορίας

ἀντιπάλους ἡγοῦμαι τῷ ἡμετέρῳ πλῆθει, καὶ ἃμα

ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς, Ἀθηναίοις ὄντας καὶ ἐπισταμένους

ἐμπειρία τῆς ναυτικῆς ἐπ’ ἄλλους ἀπάσασιν ὅτι,

eἰ τις ὑπομένοι καὶ μὴ φόβῳ ῥοθίου καὶ νεῶν
dεινότητος κατάπλου ὑποχωροὶ, οὐκ ἂν ποτε

βιάζοιτο, καὶ αὐτοὺς νῦν μείναι τε καὶ ἀμυνομέ-

1 ὡστε τὰς τούτων ἀπορίας ἀντιπάλους ἡγοῦμαι τῷ ἡμετέρῳ πλῆθει, καὶ ἃμα ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς, Ἀθηναίοις ὄντας καὶ ἐπισταμένους ἐμπειρία τῆς ναυτικῆς ἐπ’ ἄλλους ἀπάσασιν ὅτι, εἰ τις ὑπομένοι καὶ μὴ φόβῳ ῥοθίου καὶ νεῶν δεινότητος κατάπλου ὑποχωροὶ, οὐκ ἂν ποτε βιάζοιτο, καὶ αὐτοὺς νῦν μείναι τε καὶ ἀμυνομέ-

1 Τότε ταῖς τούτων ἀπορίας ἀντιπάλους ἡγοῦμαι τῷ ἡμετέρῳ πλῆθει, καὶ ἃμα ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς, Ἀθηναίοις ὄντας καὶ ἐπισταμένους ἐμπειρία τῆς ναυτικῆς ἐπ’ ἄλλους ἀπάσασιν ὅτι, εἰ τις ὑπομένοι καὶ μὴ φόβῳ ῥοθίου καὶ νεῶν δεινότητος κατάπλου ὑποχωροὶ, οὐκ ἂν ποτε βιάζοιτο, καὶ αὐτοὺς νῦν μείναι τε καὶ ἀμυνομέ-

2 ἀποχωρήσασι, the genitive was to be expected after μενόντων, and Poppo conjectures ὑποχωρησάντων. It is dative of relation.

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with us, to a case of necessity, where there is no room for reflection, what is needed is to accept the hazard with the least possible delay. However, as I see the matter, the odds are on our side, if we are resolved to stand our ground and are not so terrified by their numbers as to sacrifice the advantages we possess. As regards the position, the difficulty of approach I regard as in our favour, since if we stand firm that becomes a support, but once we give way, even though the ground be rugged it will be easy of access when there is none to resist; and we shall then find the enemy more formidable, since it will be no easy matter for them to turn and retreat, if they should be hard-pressed by us; for though very easily repelled while on board their ships, when once they have landed they are on an equal footing with us. And, as regards their numbers, we need have no very great fear; for however numerous they are, they will have to fight in small detachments on account of the difficulty of bringing their ships to shore. And we have not to deal with an army, which, though superior in numbers, is fighting on land under like conditions with ourselves, but fighting on ships, and these require many favouring circumstances on the sea.\(^1\) I therefore consider that their disadvantages counterbalance our inferiority in point of numbers. At the same time I call now upon you, who are Athenians and know by experience that it is impossible to force a landing from ships against an enemy on shore, if the latter but stand their ground and do not give way through fear of the splashing oars and of the awe-inspiring sight of ships bearing down upon them—I call upon you, in your turn to stand your

\(^1\) e.g. a fair wind, space for manœuvring, etc.


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νοῦς παρ’ αυτὴν τὴν ῥαχίαν σφώνειν ύμᾶς τε αυτῶς καὶ τὸ χωρίον.”

XI. Τοσαῦτα τοῦ Δημοσθένους παρακελευσά-
μένου οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἔθαρσάν τε μᾶλλον καὶ
ἐπικαταβάντες ἐτάξαντο παρ’ αὐτὴν τὴν θάλασ-
σαν. οἱ δὲ Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἄραντες τῷ τε κατὰ
γῆν στρατῷ προσέβαλλον τῷ τειχίσματι καὶ
ταῖς ναοῖς ἄμα οὔσας τεσσαράκοντα καὶ τρισὶ,
ναύαρχοι δὲ αὐτῶν ἐπέπλει Ὀρασυμηδίδας ὁ
Κρατησικλέους, Σπαρτιάτης. προσέβαλλε δὲ
3 ἦπερ ὁ Δημοσθένης προσεδέχετο. καὶ οἱ μὲν
Ἀθηναίοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν, ἐκ τε γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσ-
σης, ἡμύνοντο. οἱ δὲ κατ’ ὁλίγας νὰύας διελόμενοι,
διότι οὐκ ἦν πλείοσι προσχεῖν, καὶ ἀναπαύοντες
ἐν τῷ μέρει τούς ἐπίπλους ἑποιοῦντο, προθυμία
τε πάση χρώμενοι καὶ παρακελευσομφῷ, εἰ πῶς
ὡςμένοι ἔλοιεν τὸ τειχισμα. πάντων δὲ φανε-
4 ρώτατος Βρασίδας ἐγένετο. τριηθρῶν γὰρ καὶ
ὁ ῥῶν τοῦ χωρίου χαλεποῦ ὄντος τοὺς τριηθρῶνος
καὶ κυβερνήτας, εἴ ποι καὶ δοκοῖ δυνατῶν εἶναι
χεῖν, ἀποκοινώνας καὶ φυλασσόμενος τῶν νεὼν
μὴ ἐξυπνάσωσιν, ἐβόα λέγων ὡς οὐκ εἰκός εἰ ἡ
ἐξώλων φειδομένους τῶν πολεμίους ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ
περιδεῖν τείχος πεποιημένους, ἀλλὰ τάς τε σφε-
τέρας νὰύας βιαζόμενος τὴν ἀπόβασιν καταγγύ-
ναι ἐκέλευε καὶ τοὺς ξυμαχάνους μὴ ἀποκηνύας
ἀντὶ μεγάλων ἐνεργειῶν τὰς ναύς τοῖς Δακεδαι-
μονίοις ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐπιδοῦναι, ἀκείλαθας δὲ
καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀποβάντας τῶν τε ἀνδρῶν καὶ

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ground, and, warding off the foe at the very water’s edge, to save both yourselves and the stronghold.”

XI. Thus encouraged by Demosthenes, the Athenians became yet more confident and going still nearer the water took up their position at the very brink of the sea. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, moved forward, and attacked the fortification at the same time with their land-army and with their ships, of which there were forty-three, the admiral in command of them being Thrasydemidas son of Cratesicles, a Spartan. And he attacked just where Demosthenes expected. The Athenians, on their part, proceeded to defend themselves in both directions, by land and by sea; but the enemy, dividing their ships into small detachments, because it was impossible for a larger number to approach the shore, and resting by turns, kept charging upon the Athenians, showing no lack of zeal and cheering each other on, in the hope that they might force the enemy back and take the fortification. Brasidas showed himself most conspicuous of all. Being captain of a galley, he noticed that the captains and pilots, because the shore was rocky, were inclined to hesitate and be careful of their ships, even when it seemed to be practicable to make a landing, for fear of dashing them to pieces. He would therefore shout that it ill became them through being thrifty of timber to allow their enemy to have built a fort in their country; nay, he urged, they must break their own ships so as to force a landing; and the allies he bade, in return for great benefits received from the Lacedaemonians, not to shrink from making them a free gift of their ships in the present emergency, but to run them aground, get ashore in any
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tου χωρίου κρατήσαι. XII. καὶ ὁ μὲν τοὺς τε ἀλλοὺς τοιαύτα ἑπέσπερχε καὶ τὸν ἐαυτὸν κυβερνήτην ἀναγκάσας ὁκεῖλαι τὴν ναῦν ἐχώρει ἐπὶ τὴν ἀποβάθραν· καὶ πειρώμενος ἀποβαίνειν ἀνεκόπτη ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τραυματισθεῖς πολλὰ ἐλπισθύχησε τε καὶ πεσόντος αὐτοῦ ἐσ τὴν παρεξειρεσίαν ἢ ἀσπίς περιερήξε ἐσ τὴν θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐξενεχθείσης αὐτῆς ἐσ τὴν γῆν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀνελόμενοι ὑστερον πρὸς τὸ τροπαίον ἐχρήσαςτο ὁ ἐστησαν τῆς προσβολῆς ταύτης.

2 Οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι προσθυμοῦντο μὲν, ἀδύνατοι δ' ἦσαν ἀποβῆναι τῶν τε χωρίων χαλεπότετη καὶ τῶν
3 Ἀθηναίων μενόντων καὶ οὐδὲν ὑποχωροῦντων. ἐσ τούτῳ τε περιέστη ἢ τύχῃ ὡστε Ἀθηναίοις μὲν ἐκ γῆς τε καὶ ταύτης Δακωνικῆς ἀμύνεσθαι ἐκείνους ἐπιπλέοντας, Δακεδαιμονίους δὲ ἐκ νεῶν τε καὶ ἐς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πολεμίαν οὐσαν ἐπ' Ἀθηναίους ἀποβαίνειν· ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ ἐποίηε τῆς δόξης ἐν τῷ τότε τοῖς μὲν ἡπειρώταις μᾶλιστα εἶναι καὶ τὰ πεζὰ κρατίστους, τοῖς δὲ θαλασσίους τε καὶ ταῖς ναυαῖ πλείστον προύχειν.

XIII. Ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τῆς ὑστεραίας μέρος τι προσβολάς ποιησάμενοι ἐπέπαυντο· καὶ τῇ τρίτη ἔπι ξύλα ἐς μηχανὰς παρέπεμψαν τῶν νεῶν τινας ἐς Ἀσίνην, ἐλπίζοντες τὸ κατὰ τὸν χιλιάδα τείχος ὑπὸς μὲν ἔχον, ἀπο-
2 βάσεως δὲ μᾶλιστα οὐσῆς ἐλείν ἀν 1 μηχανὰς. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ αἱ ἐκ τῆς Ζακύνθου νῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων

1 ἀν added by Madvig.
way they could, and master both the men and the place. XII. And he not only urged on the rest in this way, but, compelling his own pilot to beach his ship, he made for the gangway; and in trying to land he was knocked back by the Athenians, and after receiving many wounds fainted away. As he fell into the forward part of the ship his shield slipped off into the sea, and, being carried ashore, was picked up by the Athenians, who afterward used it for the trophy which they set up in commemoration of this attack.

The crews of the other Peloponnesian ships showed no lack of zeal, but were unable to land, both by reason of the difficulty of the ground and because the Athenians stood firm and would not give way at all. In such fashion had fortune swung round that the Athenians, fighting on land, and Laconian land at that, were trying to ward off a Lacedaemonian attack from the sea, while the Lacedaemonians, fighting in ships, were trying to effect a landing upon their own territory, now hostile, in the face of the Athenians. For at this time it was the special renown of the Lacedaemonians that they were a land power and invincible with their army, and of the Athenians that they were seamen and vastly superior with their fleet.

XIII. After making attacks that day and part of the next the Peloponnesians desisted. On the third day they sent some of the ships to Asine for wood with which to make engines, hoping that by means of engines they should be able to take the wall opposite the harbour in spite of its height, since here it was quite practicable to make a landing. Meanwhile, the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus arrived,
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παραγίγνονται πεντήκοντα· προσέβοθησαν γὰρ τῶν τε φρουρίδων τινὲς αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐκ Ναιπάκτου 3 καὶ Χίαι τέσσαρες. ὡς δὲ εἶδον τὴν τε ἦπειρον ὀπλιτῶν περίπλευσων τὴν τε νῆσον, ἐν τε τῷ λιμένι οὖσας τὰς ναῦς καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλεούσας, ἀπορήσαντες ὅτι καθορμίσωνται, τότε μὲν ἐς Πρωτὴν τὴν νῆσον, ἢ οὖ πολὺ ἀπέχει ἔρημος οὖσα, ἐπλευσαν καὶ ἡνίκαντο, τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ παρασκευασάμενοι ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν ἀνήγγειλον, ἢ μὲν ἀντεκπλεῖν ἑθέλωσι σφίσιν ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, εἰ δὲ μῆ, ὡς αὐτοὶ ἐπεσπλευσούμενοι.

4 Καὶ οἱ μὲν οὔτε ἀντανήγγυτον οὔτε διενοθήσαν, φάρσαί τούς ἐσπλούσι, ἔτυχον ποιήσαντες, ἴσης ἐσακτίων δὲ ἐν τῇ γῇ τὰς τε ναῦς ἐπιλήπτην καὶ παρεσκευαζόντω, ἢν ἐσπλῆγη τις, ὡς ἐν τῷ λιμένι ὄντι οὖ σμικρῷ ναυμαχήσοντες. Χ. ὁ Θηναίοι γρόνες καθ᾽ ἐκάτερον τὸν ἐσπλοῦν ὁμμησάν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὰς μὲν πλείους καὶ μετεώρους ἂν τῶν νεόν καὶ ἀντιπρόφυς προσπεσόντες ἐς φυγήν κατέστησαν, καὶ ἐπιδιώκοντες ὡς διὰ βραχέος ἐτρώσαν μὲν πολλάς, πέντε δὲ ἐλαβον καὶ μίαν τούτων αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν· ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς ἐν τῇ γῇ κατατεφευγήσαις ἐνέβαλλον. αἱ δὲ καὶ πληρούμεναι ἐτί πρὶν ἀνάγεσθαι ἐκόπτοντο· καὶ τινὰς καὶ ἀναδούμενοι κενὰς εἶλκον τῶν ἀν-2 δρῶν ἐς φυγῆν ὅμοιοίς. ἀ όρωντες οἱ Δακεδα-
now numbering fifty ships, for it had been reinforced by some of the ships on guard at Naupactus and by four Chian vessels. But they saw that both the mainland and the island were full of hoplites, and that the Lacedaemonian ships were in the harbour and not intending to come out; they therefore, being at a loss where to anchor, sailed for the present to Prote, an uninhabited island not far from Pylos, and bivouacked there. The next day they set sail, having first made preparations to give battle in case the enemy should be inclined to come out into the open water to meet them; if not, they intended to sail into the harbour themselves.

Now the Lacedaemonians did not put out to meet the Athenians, and somehow they had neglected to block up the entrances as they had purposed; on the contrary, they remained inactive on the shore, engaged in manning their ships and making ready, in case any one sailed into the harbour, to fight there, since there was plenty of room. XIV. As for the Athenians, when they saw the situation, they rushed in upon them by both entrances and falling upon their ships, most of which were by now afloat and facing forward, put them to flight, and since there was only a short distance for the pursuit,¹ not only damaged many of them but also captured five, one of them with all her crew; the rest they kept on ramming even after they had fled to the shore. Yet other ships were being cut to pieces while still being manned, before they could put to sea; and some they took in tow empty, their crews having taken to flight, and began to haul them away. At this sight the

¹ Or, “giving chase so far as the short distance allowed, not only damaged . . .”

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μόνοι καὶ περιαλαγοῦντες τῷ πάθει, ὡσπερ αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖς ἀπελαμβάνοντο ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ, παρεβοήθησαν, καὶ ἔπεσαίνωντες ἐσ τὴν θάλασσαν ξύνον τοῖς ὁπλοῖς ἀνθελλοκοῦ ἐπιλαμβανόμενοι τῶν νεών· καὶ ἐν τούτῳ κεκωλύσθαι ἐδόκει ἕκαστος ὁ μή 3 τινι καὶ αὐτὸς ἔργον παρῆν. ἔγενετο τε ὁ θόρυβος μέγας, καὶ ἀντηλλαγμένου τοῦ ἐκατέρων τρόπου περὶ τᾶς ναῦς· οὗ τε γὰρ Δακεδαίμονιοι ὑπὸ προθυμίας καὶ ἐκπλήξεως ὡς εἰπείν ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἦ ἐκ γῆς ἐναυμάχουν, οὗ τ᾿ Ἀθηναίοι κρατοῦντες καὶ βουλόμενοι τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ ὡς ἐπὶ πλείστον 4 ἐπεξελθεῖν ἀπὸ νεῶν ἐπεζομάχουν. πολὺν τε πόνον παρασχόντες ἄλληλοι καὶ τραυματίσαντες διεκρίθησαν, καὶ οἱ Δακεδαίμονιοι τὰς κενάς ναῦς 5 πλὴν τῶν τὸ πρῶτον λῃθεσίῶν διέσωσαν. καταστάντες δὲ ἐκάτεροι ἐσὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον οἱ μὲν τροπαῖοι τε ἔστησαν καὶ νεκροῖς ἀπέδοσαν καὶ ναυαγίων ἐκράτησαν, καὶ τὴν νῆσον εὐθὺς περιέπλεον καὶ ἐν φυλακῇ εἶχον, ὡς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀπειλημμένων· οὗ δ’ ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων ἡδη βεβοθηθηκότες ἔμενον κατὰ χώραν ἐπὶ τῇ Πύλῳ.

XV. Ἐς δὲ τὴν Ἐπάρτην ὡς ἡγγέλθη τὰ γεγενημένα περὶ Πύλου, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ ξυμφορᾷ μεγάλῃ τὰ τέλη καταβάντας ἐσὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον 2 Βουλεύειν παραχρῆμα ὄρωντας ὁ τι ἄν δοκῇ. καὶ ὡς εἶδον ἄδυνατον ἐν τιμωρεῖν τοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ
Lacedaemonian soldiers on the shore, beside themselves with grief at the impending calamity, in that their comrades were being cut off on the island, rushed to the rescue, and going down into the sea in full armour took hold of the ships and tried to drag them back. Indeed, each man felt that no progress was being made where he himself was not at hand to help. The tumult that arose was great, especially since in this battle for the ships each side adopted the other's manner of fighting; for the Lacedaemonians in their eagerness and excitement were virtually waging a sea-fight from the land, while the Athenians, who were winning and wanted to follow up their success to the utmost while their good fortune lasted, were fighting a land-battle from their ships. Finally, after causing each other great distress and inflicting much damage, they separated, the Lacedaemonians saving all their empty ships except those which had been taken at first. Both sides then returned to their camps. The Athenians thereupon set up a trophy, gave back the dead, secured possession of the wrecks, and immediately began to sail round the island and keep it under guard, considering that the men on it were now cut off; on the other hand, the Peloponnesians on the mainland, and the reinforcements that had now arrived from all directions, remained in position at Pylos.

XV. At Sparta, when they received the news of what had happened at Pylos, regarding it as a great calamity they decided that the magistrates should go down to the camp, see the situation for themselves, and then determine on the spot what should be done. Now when these saw that no help could be given to the men on the island, and at the same
κινδυνεύειν οὐκ ἐβούλοντο ἢ ὑπὸ λιμοῦ τι παθεῖν αὐτοῖς ἢ ὑπὸ πλῆθους βιασθέντας κρατηθῆναι, ἐδοξεῖν αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἢν ἐθέλωσε, σπονδᾶς ποιησάμενος τὰ περὶ Πύλων ἀποστείλαι ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναίας πρέσβεις περὶ ξυμβάσεως καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρὰς ὡς τάχιστα πειράσθαι κομίσασθαι.

ΧΥ. Δεξαμένων δὲ τῶν στρατηγῶν τὸν λόγον ἐγίγνοντο σπονδαὶ τοιαίδες. Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν τὰς ναῦς ἐν αἷς ἐναυμάχησαν καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Δακωνίκῃ πάσας, ὅσα ἦσαν μακρὰ, παραδοῦναι κομίσαντας ἐς Πύλων Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ὁ πλὴν μὴ ἐπιφέρειν τῇ τευχίσματι μήτε κατὰ γῆν μήτε κατὰ θάλασσαν, Ἀθηναίους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ ἀνδράς σῖτον ἕαν τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ Λακεδαιμονίους ἐσπέμπειν τακτὸν καὶ μεμαγμένου, δύο χοϊνικάς ἐκάστῳ Ἀττικαῖς ἀλφίτων καὶ δύο κοτύλας οἴνου καὶ κρέας, θεράποντὶ δὲ τούτων ἡμίσεια: ταῦτα δὲ ὅρων τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐσπέμπειν καὶ πλοῖον μηδὲν ἐσπλέιν λάθρα: φυλάσσειν δὲ καὶ τὴν νῆσον Ἀθηναίους μηδὲν ὑσσον, ὅσα μὴ ἀποβαίνοντας, καὶ ὁ πλὴν μὴ ἐπιφέρειν τῷ Πελοποννησίων στρατῷ μήτε κατὰ γῆν μήτε κατὰ 2 θάλασσαν. ὁ τε δ' ἂν τούτων παραβᾶνον ἐκάτεροι καὶ ὅτιοι, τότε λελύσθαι τὰς σπονδᾶς. ἐσπείρατε δὲ αὐτὰ μέχρι οὗ ἐπανέλθωσιν οἱ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηναίων Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις: ἀποστείλαι δὲ αὐτοῖς τριήρει Ἀθηναίους καὶ πάλιν κομίσαι. ἐλθόντων δὲ τὰς τῶν σπονδῶν λελύσθαι ταύτας καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἄποδοῦναι Ἀθηναίους ἡμοῖας οἷασπερ ἂν

1 κρατηθήναι, CG, ἢ κρατηθῆναι, ABFM.
BOOK IV. xv. 2–xvi. 2

time were unwilling to run the risk of their being starved to death or forced to succumb to superior numbers, they decided, so far as Pylos was concerned, to conclude a truce with the Athenian generals, if they should consent, and to send envoys to Athens to propose an agreement, and thus try to recover their men as quickly as possible.

XVI. The generals accepted the proposal and a truce was concluded upon the following terms: The Lacedaemonians were to surrender to the Athenians the ships in which they had fought the battle, and were to bring to Pylos and deliver to them all the other ships of war which were in Laconia, and they were not to attack the fortification either by land or by sea. The Athenians were to permit the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send flour to the men on the island, a fixed amount and already-kneaded, for each soldier two quarts ¹ of barley-meal and a pint of wine and a ration of meat, and for each servant half as much; and they were to send these things to the island under the supervision of the Athenians, and no boat was to sail thither secretly. The Athenians were to go on guarding the island as before, but without landing on it, and were not to attack the army of the Peloponnesians either by land or sea. If either party should violate this agreement in any particular whatsoever, the truce should forthwith be at an end. The truce was to hold good until the Lacedaemonian envoys should get back from Athens; and the Athenians were to conduct them thither in a trireme and bring them back. On their return this truce was to be at an end, and the Athenians were then to restore the ships in as good condition as when

¹ The choinix was about two pints, dry measure; the cotyle, about half a pint.
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3 παραλάβωσιν. αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ ἐπὶ τούτους ἐγένοντο, καὶ αἱ νῆσος παρεδόθησαν οὕσας περὶ ἐξήκοντα, καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἀπεστάλησαν. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἐς τὰς Ἁθηναῖς ἔλεξαν τοιάδε.

XVII. "Επεμψαν ἡμᾶς Δακεδαίμονιοι, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι, περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ ἀνδρῶν πράξοντας ὃ τι ἄν ὑμῖν τε ἀφέλιμον ὅν τὸ αὐτὸ πεῖθομεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐς τὴν ξυμφορὰν1 ὡς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων κόσμων μάλιστα μέλλησιν. τοὺς δὲ λόγους μακροτέρους οὐ παρὰ τὸ εἰσοδῆς μηκυνούμεν, ἀλλ' ἐπιχώριον ὅν ἡμῖν οὐ μὲν βραχεῖς ἀρκώσι μὴ πολλοῖς χρήσθαι, πλείοσι δὲ ἐν φῶ ἄν καιρὸς ἡ διδάσκοντάς τι τῶν προύργου λόγους τὸ δεόν πράσσειν. λάβετε δὲ αὐτοὺς μὴ πολεμίως μηδ' ὡς αξύνετοι διδασκόμενοι, ὑπόμνησιν δὲ τοῦ καλῶς.

4 δουλεύσασθαι πρὸς εἰδότας ἡγησάμενοι. ὑμῖν γὰρ εὐτυχίαν τὴν παροῦσαν ἔξεστι καλῶς θέσθαι, ἔχουσι μὲν δὲν κρατεῖτε, προσλαβοῦσι δὲ τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν, καὶ μὴ παθεῖν ὅπερ οἱ ἁθήνως τι ἀγαθῶν λαμβάνοντες τῶν ἀνθρώπων. αἱ γὰρ τοῦ πλέονος ἐξπίδει ὁρέγονται διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰ παρόντα ἀδοκήτως εὐτυχήσαι. οἷς δὲ πλεῖσται μεταβολαὶ ἐπ' ἀμφότερα ξυμβεβήκασι, δικαίως εἰσὶ καὶ ἀπιστότατοι εἶναι ταῖς εὐπραγίαις. ὅ τῇ τε ὑμετέρα πόλει δὲ ἐμπερίαν καὶ ἡμῖν μάλιστ' ἂν ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος προσέῃ.

1 ἐς τὴν ξυμφορὰν, bracketed by Hude.

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they received them. The truce was concluded on these terms, the ships, sixty in number, were delivered up, and the envoys dispatched. When they arrived at Athens they spoke as follows:

XVII. "The Lacedaemonians, men of Athens, have sent us to arrange, in behalf of our men on the island, such terms as we may show to be at once advantageous to you and also most likely under present circumstances, in view of our misfortune, to bring credit to ourselves. If we speak at some length we shall not be departing from our custom; on the contrary, though it is the fashion of our country not to use many words where few suffice, yet, whenever occasion arises to expound an important matter and thereby to accomplish by speech the end we have in view, we use words more freely. And do not receive what we say in a hostile spirit, nor feel that you are being instructed as though you were without understanding, but regard our words as merely a reminder to men who know how to come to a good decision. For it is in your power to turn your present favourable fortune to good account, not only keeping what you have got, but acquiring honour and reputation besides. You may thus avoid the experience of those who achieve some unwonted success; for these are always led on by hope to grasp at more because of their unexpected good fortune in the present. And yet those who have most often undergone a change of fortune for better or for worse have best reason to be distrustful of prosperity; and this would naturally hold true of both your state and ours in an exceptional degree, in view of our past experience."
THUCYDIDES

XVIII. "Γνώτε δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς ἡμετέρας νῦν ξυμφορὰς ἀπιδόντες, οἰτινές ἄξιωμα μέγιστον τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἔχοντες ἦκομεν παρ' ὑμᾶς, πρῶτερον αὐτοὶ κυριώτεροι νομίζοντες εἶναι δοῦναι ἑφ' ἂ νῦν ἀφεγμένοι ὑμᾶς αἰτοῦμεθα. καίτοι οὔτε δυνάμεως ἐνδεία ἔπαθομεν αὐτὸ οὔτε μείζονος προσγενομένης ὑβρίσαντες, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν αἰεὶ ὑπαρχόντων γνώμη σφαλέντες, ἐν ὃ πάσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει. ὅστε οὖκ εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς διὰ τὴν παρασκευὴν ζών ῥώμην πόλεως τε καὶ τῶν προσγεγενημένων καὶ τὸ τῆς τύχης οἰσθαί αἰεὶ μὲθ' ὑμῶν ἐσεσθαι. σωφρόνων δὲ ἀνδρῶν οἰτινὲς τάγαθα ἐσ ἁμφίβολον ἀσφαλῶς ἐθεντό (καὶ ταῖς ξυμφοραίς οἱ αὐτοὶ εὐξυνετώτερον ἄν προσφέροιτο), τὸν τε πόλεμον νομίσωσι μή καθ' ὅσον ἀν τίς αὐτοῦ μέρος βουληται μεταχειρίζειν, τούτῳ ξυνείναι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀν αἱ τύχαι αὐτῶν ἡγήσονται, καὶ ἐλάχιστ' ἀν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πταίοντες διὰ τὸ μή τῷ ὅρθομενῳ αὐτοῦ πιστεύοντες ἐπαίρεσθαι ἐν τῷ εὐτυχεῖν ἄν μάλιστα καταλύοιτο. ὁ νῦν ὑμῖν, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι, καλῶς ἔχει πρὸς ἡμᾶς πράξαι, καὶ μῆποτε ὑστερον, ἂν ἀρα μή πειθόμενοι σφαλήτε, ἂ πολλά ἐνδεχεται, νομίσθηναι τύχῃ καὶ τὰ νῦν προχωρήσαντα κρατήσαι.

1 ἁμφίβολον, MSS.; Hude reads ἀναμφίβολον.

1 Or, "make sure of their advantages having regard to changes of luck.”

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XVIII. "To be convinced of this, you need only look at our present misfortunes. We who of all the Hellenes formerly were held in the highest consideration have come before you, although we have been wont to regard ourselves as better entitled to confer such favours as we have now come to beg of you. And yet it was neither through lack of power that we met with this misfortune, nor because our power became too great and we waxed insolent; nay, our resources were what they always were and we merely erred in judgment—a thing to which all are alike liable. Accordingly there is no reason why you, because of the strength both of your city and of its new acquisitions at the present moment, should expect that the favour of fortune will always be with you. Prudent men take the safe course of accounting prosperity mutable— the same men, too, would deal more sagaciously with misfortunes—and consider that when anyone is at war he may not limit his participation to whatever portion of it he may choose to carry on, but that he must follow where his fortune leads. Such men are least likely to come to grief, since they do not allow themselves to become elated by overconfidence in military success, and are therefore most likely to seize the moment of good fortune for concluding peace. And this, Athenians, is the policy which it is good for you to adopt towards us to-day, and not at some future time, should you perchance through rejecting our overtures incur disaster—and of this there are many possibilities—be credited with having won even your present successes through good fortune, when it is possible to

\[2\] i.e. in warfare one cannot accept only the successes and avoid the reverses by stopping before the latter set in; one is in the hands of fortune.
ΤΗΥΟΩΔΗΣ

ἐξόν ἀκίνδυνον δόκησιν ἵσχύος καὶ ξυνέσεως ἐστὶ ἐπειτα καταλιπτεῖν.

XIX. "Δακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ύμᾶς προκαλοῦνται ἐς στοπάδας καὶ διάλυσιν πολέμου, διδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλήν καὶ οἰκείωσιν ἐς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν, ἀνται-τούντες δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νῆσου ἄνδρας, καὶ ἄμεινον ἡγούμενοι ἀμφοτέροις μὴ διακινδυνεύεσθαι, εἰτε βία δὲν ἡ διαφύγοιεν παρατυχοῦσας τινὸς σωτηρίας εἰτε καὶ ἐκπολιορκηθέντες μᾶλλον ἂν χειρωθεῖν.

2 νομίζομεν τε τὰς μεγάλας ἔχθρας μάλιστ' ἂν διαλύσθαι βεβαιῶς, οὐκ ἂν ἀνταμυνόμενος τις καὶ ἐπικρατήσας τὰ πλέον τοῦ πολέμου κατ’ ἀνάγκην ὅρκοις ἐγκαταλαμβάνων μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ξυμβῆ, ἄλλ’ ἂν, παρὸν τὸ αὐτὸ δράσαι πρὸς τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, καὶ ἀρετὴ αὐτῶν νικήσας παρὰ δ

3 προσεδέχετο μετρίως ξυναλλαγῆ. ὦφειλων γὰρ ἦδη ο ἐναντίος μὴ ἀνταμύνεσθαι ὡς βιασθεῖς, ἄλλ’ ἀνταποδοῦναι ἄρετὴν, ἐτοιμότερος ἐστὶν

4 αἰσχύνη ἐμένεν ὁς ξυνέθετο. καὶ μᾶλλον πρὸς τοὺς μειώσως ἔχθροις τοῦτο δρῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς μέτρια διενεχθέντας· πεφύκασι τε τοῖς μὲν ἐκουσίοις ἐνδούσιν ἀνθησασθαι μεθ’ ἡδονῆς, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ὑπεραυχοῦντα καὶ παρὰ γνώμην διακινδυνεύειν.

1 ἄν, Krüger's conjecture.
leave to posterity an unhazarded reputation at once for strength and sagacity.

XIX. "The Lacedaemonians therefore invite you to accept terms and bring the war to an end, offering you peace and alliance, and apart from this the maintenance of hearty friendship and intimacy one with the other; and asking on their side merely the return of the men on the island. They think it better for both parties not to take the risk either of the besieged making their escape in spite of you, should some chance of safety present itself, or of their being reduced by siege to a still harder lot. We believe, too, that a permanent reconciliation of bitter enmities is more likely to be secured, not when one party seeks revenge and, because he has gained a decided mastery in the war, tries to bind his opponent by compulsory oaths and thus makes peace with him on unequal terms, but when, having it in his power to secure the same result by clemency, he vanquishes his foe by generosity also, offering him terms of reconciliation which are moderate beyond all his expectations. For the adversary, finding himself now under obligation to repay the generosity in kind, instead of striving for vengeance for having had terms forced upon him, is moved by a sense of honour and is more ready to abide by his agreements. Furthermore, men are more inclined to act thus toward their more serious enemies than toward those with whom they have had but trifling differences. And, finally, it is natural for men cheerfully to accept defeat at the hands of those who first make willing concessions, but to fight to the bitter end, even contrary to their better judgment, against an overbearing foe.
THUCYDIDES

XX. "Ἡμῖν δὲ καλός εἶπερ ποτὲ, ἔχει ἀμφοτέροις ἡ ξυνάλλαγη, πρὶν τι ἄνηκεστον διὰ μέσου γενόμενον ἡμᾶς καταλαβεῖν, ἐν οἷ ἀνάγκη ἀῤῥιον ἡμῖν ἔχθραν πρὸς τῇ κοινῇ καὶ ἱδίαν ἔχειν, 2 ὡμᾶς ὅπερ στερηθῇ τὸν νῦν προκαλούμεθα. ἔτι δ' ὄντων ἀκρίτων καὶ ὡμῖν μὲν δόξης καὶ ἡμετέρας φιλίας προσγυγομένης, ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸ αἰσχροῦ τινος τῆς ἐμφυράς μετρίως κατατιθεμένης διαλλαγῶμεν, καὶ αὐτοῖς τε ἀντὶ πολέμου εἰρήνην ἐλώμεθα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις "Εὐλησίων ἀνάπαυσιν κακῶν ποιήσωμεν· οἱ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὡμᾶς αἰτιωτέρους ἡγήσωμαι. πολεμοῦνται μὲν γὰρ ἀσαφῶς ὁποτέρως ὑπέρ ἄντων καταλύσεως δὲ γενόμενης, ἢς νῦν ὑμείς τὸ πλέον κύριοι ἐστε, τὴν χάριν 3 ωμῖν προσθήσουσιν. ἢν τε γρώτε, Ὁλακεδάμονίοις ἐξεστὶν ὡμῖν φίλους γενέσθαι βεβαιῶς, αὐτῶν τε προκαλεσαμένων χαρισαμένοις τε μᾶλλον ἡ βιασμένοις. 3 καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὰ ἐνώπια ἀγαθὰ σκοπεῖτε ὡσα εἰκός εἶναι ὡμῶν γὰρ καὶ ὡμῶν ταῦτα λεγόντων τὸ γε ἄλλο Ἐλληνικὸν ἰστε ὅτι ὑποδεέστερον ὅν τὰ μέγιστα τιμῆσει.

XXI. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Ὁλακεδαμόνες τοσαῦτα εἶπον, νομίζοντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ σπονδῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖν, σφῶν δὲ ἐναντιομένων κολύσεσαι, διδομένης δὲ εἰρήνης ἀσμέ-

1 ἡμῖν, with F. Haase and Classen; Hude retains the MSS. reading ὡμῖν, with Stahl, following the Scholiast.
2 Hude reads ὡμᾶς, with C.
3 Hude reads βιασμένων, with C.

1 Or, reading ὡμῖν . . . ἡμᾶς δὲ, as Hude does, "you Athenians would have our undying hatred . . . and we Spartans would be deprived of the advantages we now offer."
BOOK IV.  XX.  1–XXI.  1

XX. "Now, if ever, reconciliation is desirable for us both, before some irreparable disaster has come upon either of us and prevented it; should that befall, we shall inevitably cherish toward each other an undying personal hatred, over and above that which we now feel as public enemies, and you will be deprived of the advantages we now offer. While, therefore, the issue of the war is still in doubt, while your reputation is enhanced and you may have our friendship also, and while our disaster admits of a reasonable settlement and no disgrace as yet has befallen us, let us be reconciled; and let us for ourselves choose peace instead of war, and give a respite from evils to all the other Hellenes. And they will count you especially the authors of the peace; for although they were drawn into the war without knowing which of us began it, yet if a settlement is effected, the decision of which at this time rests chiefly with you, it is to you they will ascribe their gratitude. And so, if you decide for peace, it is in your power to win the steadfast friendship of the Lacedaemonians, which they freely offer and you may secure by acting, not with violence, but with generosity. Pray consider all the advantages which may well be involved in such a course; for if you and we agree be assured that the rest of the Hellenic world, since it will be inferior to us in power, will pay us the greatest deference."

XXI. Such were the words of the Lacedaemonians. They thought that, since the Athenians had at an earlier period been eager to end the war and had been prevented by the opposition of Sparta, they

1 i.e. peace, alliance, intimate friendship (ch. xix. 1).
2 i.e. after the plague and the second invasion of Attica, in 430 B.C. cf. II. lix.
THUCYDIDES

νους δέξεσθαι τε καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀποδώσειν.
2 οἱ δὲ τὰς μὲν σπουδάς, ἔχοντες τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, ἦδη σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον ἐτοίμους εἶναι, ὅποταν βούλωνται ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς, τοῦ δὲ πλέονος
3 ὥρέγοντο. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐνήγγει Κλέων ὁ
Κλεανώτων, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν
χρόνον ἄν\\u03b1 τῷ πλήθει πιθανὸτατος· καὶ ἐπεισεν
ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς χρῆ τα μὲν ὅπλα καὶ σφᾶς
αὐτοὺς τους ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ παραδόντας πρὸτον
κομισθήναι Ἀθηναῖες, ἐλθόντων δὲ ἀποδόντας
Δακεδαμονίους Νίσαιαν καὶ Πηγᾶς καὶ Τροζήνα
καὶ Ἀχαιῶν, α ὁ πολέμῳ ἐλαβον, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ
τῆς προτέρας ξυμβάσεως Ἀθηναίων ξυγχωρη-
σάντων κατὰ ξυμφοράς καὶ ἐν τῷ τότε δεομένων
τι μᾶλλον σπουδάς, κομίσασθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας· καὶ
σπουδάς ποιήσασθαι ὁπόσον ἄν 
δοκῇ Χρόνου
ἀμφιτέρως.

XXII. Οἱ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἀπόκρισιν οὓδὲν
ἀντεῖπον, ξυνέδρους δὲ σφίσιν ἐκέλευον ἔλεσθαι
οὕτως λέγοντες καὶ ἀκούοντες περὶ ἐκάστου
ξυμβήσουσιν κατὰ ἡσυχίαν ὃ τι ἄν πείθωσιν
2 ἀλλήλους· Κλέων δὲ ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολὺς ἐνέκειτο,
λέγων γνωσθέσκειν μὲν καὶ πρὸτερον οὗδὲν ἐν ὑπὸ
ἐγνώται δίκαιον αὐτοὺς, σαφὲς δ' εἶναι καὶ νῦν,
oὕτως τῷ μὲν πλήθει οὗδὲν ἐθέλουσιν εἰπεῖν,
ὅλῳς δὲ ἀνδράσι ξυνέδροι βούλονται γίγνεσθαι·
ἀλλὰ εἰ τι γιγάς διανοοῦνται, λέγειν ἐκέλευσεν
3 ἀπασιν. ὁρῶντες δὲ οἱ Δακεδαμόνοι οὕτε σφίσιν
οἶν τε ὃν ἐν πλήθει εἰπεῖν, εἰ τι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς

1 kal, before τῷ πλήθει, deleted by Krüger.
2 Hude inserts ἐν before ἀπασιν, with Cobet.

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BOOK IV. xxi. 1–xxii. 3

would, if peace were offered to them, gladly accept it and give up the men. But the Athenians believed that, since they held the men on the island, peace could be theirs the moment they cared to make it, and meanwhile they were greedy for more. They were urged to this course chiefly by Cleon son of Cleaenetus, a popular leader at that time who had very great influence with the multitude. He persuaded them to reply that the men on the island must first give up themselves and their arms and be brought to Athens; on their arrival, the Lacedaemonians must give back Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaeia, which had not been taken in war but had been ceded by the Athenians in an agreement made some time before as a result of misfortunes, when they were somewhat more eager for peace than now. They could then recover the men and make a treaty which should be binding for as long a time as both parties should agree.

XXII. To this reply the envoys said nothing, but they requested the appointment of commissioners who should confer with them, and after a full discussion of all the details should at their leisure agree upon such terms as they could mutually approve. Thereupon Cleon attacked them violently, saying that he had known before this that they had no honourable intention, and now it was clear, since they were unwilling to speak out before the people, but wished to meet a few men in conference; he bade them, on the contrary, if their purpose was honest, to declare it there before them all. But the Lacedaemonians, seeing that it was impossible to announce in full assembly such concessions as they

\[1\text{ cf. i. cxv. 1.}\]
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ξυμφορᾶς ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς ξυγχωρεῖν, μὴ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους διαβληθῶσιν εἰπόντες καὶ οὐ τυχόντες, οὐτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ μετρίοις ποιήσοντας ἄ προνικαλοῦντο, ἀνεχώρησαν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἀπερακτοι.

XXIII. Ἀφικομένων δὲ αὐτῶν διελέυντο 1 εὐθὺς αἱ σπονδαὶ αἱ περὶ Πύλου, καὶ ταῖς ναῦσι οἱ Ἀκαδεμιώοι ἀπῆτουν, καθάπερ ξυνεκεῖτο. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι ἐγκλήματα ἔχοντες ἐπεδρομήν τε τῷ τειχίσματι παράστονδον καὶ ἀλλὰ ὡς ἀξιόλογα δοκοῦντα εἶναι ὡς ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἵσχυρίζομεν ὦτι δὴ εἰρήτο, καὶ καὶ οὕτων παραβαθή, λελύσθαι τὰς σπονδάς. οἱ δὲ Ἀκαδεμιώοι ἀντέλεγον τε καὶ ἄδικημα ἐπικαλέσαντες τὸ τῶν νεῶν ἀπελ-2 θόντες ἐς πόλεμον καθίσταντο. καὶ τὰ περὶ Πύλου ὑπ’ ἀμφότεροι κατὰ κράτος ἐπολεμείτο, Ἀθηναίοι μὲν δυοὶ νεῶν ἐναντίαν αἰεὶ τὴν νῆσον περιπλέοντες τῆς ἦμέρας (τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς καὶ ἀπασαι περιώρου τι χολής, πλὴν τὰ πρὸ τὸ πέλαγος, ὡθότε ἄνεμος εἰς καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν αὐτοῖς εἰκοσὶ νῆς ἀφίκοντο ἐς τὴν φυλακήν, ὡθέ τι πᾶσαι ἐξομήκοντα ἐγένοντο), Πελοποννήσου δὲ ἐν τῷ ἡπείρῳ στρατοπεδευόμενοι καὶ προσβολὰς ποιούμενοι τῷ τείχει, σκοποῦντες καὶ ἐν τῶν παραπέσοι ὡς τοὺς ἀνδρὰς σώσαι.

XXIV. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ 2 ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πρὸς ταῖς ἐν Μεσσήνῃ φρουρούσαις ναυσὶ τὸ ἀλλο ναυτικὸν δ Παρσκευ-άζοντο προσκόμισαντες τὸν πόλεμον ἐποιοῦντο ἐκ

1 With Cobet, for διελύοντο of the MSS.
2 οἱ of the MSS., before ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ, deleted by Hude.

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might think it best to make in view of their misfortune, lest they might be discredited with their allies if they proposed them and were rebuffed, and seeing also that the Athenians would not grant their proposals on tolerable conditions, withdrew from Athens, their mission a failure.

XXIII. When they returned, the truce at Pylos was terminated at once, and the Lacedaemonians demanded the return of their ships according to the agreement; but the Athenians accused them of having made a raid against the fort in violation of the truce, and of other acts that do not seem worth mentioning, and refused to give up the ships, stoutly maintaining that it had been stipulated that, if there should be any violation of the truce whatsoever, it should be at an end forthwith. The Lacedaemonians contradicted this, and after protesting that the detention of the ships was an act of injustice went away and renewed the war. And so the warfare at Pylos was carried on vigorously by both sides. The Athenians kept sailing round the island by day with two ships going in opposite directions, and at night their whole fleet lay at anchor on all sides of it, except to seaward when there was a wind; while to assist them in the blockade twenty additional ships came from Athens, so that they now had seventy in all. As for the Peloponnesians, they were encamped on the mainland, and kept making assaults upon the fort, watching for any opportunity which might offer of rescuing their men.

XXIV. Meanwhile in Sicily the Syracusans and their allies, having reinforced the ships which were keeping guard at Messene by bringing up the other naval force which they had been equipping,¹ were

¹ cf. ch. i. 4.
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2 τῆς Μεσσήνης (καὶ μάλιστα ἐνήγον οἱ Δοκροί τῶν Ἀργείων κατὰ ἔχθραν, καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ἐσεβεβῆς-
3 κεσαν πανδημεῖ ἐς τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν), καὶ ναυ-
μαχίας ἀποπειράσθαι ἐβούλοντο, ὀρὸντες τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὰς μὲν παροῦσας ναῦς ὄλγας, ταῖς δὲ πλείσσι καὶ μελλοῦσαι ἤξειν πυθανόμενοι
4 τὴν νῆσον πολιορκεῖσθαι. εἰ γὰρ κρατήσειαν τῷ ναυτικῷ, τὸ Ῥήγιον ἠπίσθη πεζῇ τε καὶ
ναυσίν ἐφορμοῦντες ραδίως χειρώσεσθαι, καὶ ἤδη
σφῶν ἵσχυρὰ τὰ πράγματα γίνεσθαι. ξύνεγγυς
γὰρ κειμένου τοῦ τῆς Ῥήγιου ἀκρωτηρίου τῆς Ἰταλίας τῆς τῆς Μεσσήνης τῆς Σικελίας, τοῖς
Ἀθηναίοις 1 οὐκ ἂν εἶναι ἐφορμεῖ καὶ τοῦ
πορθμοῦ κρατεῖν. ἔστι δὲ ὁ πορθμὸς ἤ μεταξὺ
Ῥηγίου θάλασσα καὶ Μεσσήνης, ὑπὲρ βραχύ-
τατον Σικελία τῆς ἥπειρον ἀπέχει· καὶ ἔστιν ἡ
Χάρυβδις κληθείσα τούτο, ἡ Ὄδυσσεος λέγεται
διαπλεύσαι. διὰ στενότητα δὲ καὶ ἐκ μεγάλων
πελαγῶν, τοῦ τε Τυροσηνικοῦ καὶ τοῦ Σικελικοῦ,
ἐστίπτουσα ήθάλασσα ἐς αὐτὸ 2 καὶ ῥοώδης
οὕσα εἰκότως χαλεπὴ ἐνομίσθη.

XXV. Ἐν τούτῳ οὖν τῷ μεταξὺ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ναυσίν ὀλίγῳ πλείοσιν ἤ τριά-
κοντα ἡμαγκάσθησαν ὡς ἡ τῆς ἡμέρας ναυμαχήσαι
περὶ πλοίου διαπλέοντος, ἀντεπαναγόμενοι πρὸς
τε Ἀθηναίων ναυς ἐκκαίδεκα καὶ Ῥηγίνας ὄκτω.

2 καὶ νικηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τάχους
ἀπέπλευσαν ὡς ἐκαστοὶ ἔτυχον ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα στρα-

1 τε, after Ἀθηναίοις in all MSS. except Cod. Danicus, is bracketed by all later editors.
2 aπτὰ the MSS.; Hude emends to ταῦτα.
carrying on the war from Messene. To this they were instigated chiefly by the Locrians on account of their hatred of the Rhegians, whose territory they had themselves invaded in full force. The Syracusans wanted also to try their fortune in a sea-fight, seeing that the Athenians had only a few ships at hand, and hearing that the most of their fleet, the ships that were on the way to Sicily, were employed in blockading the island of Sphacteria. For, in case they won a victory with the fleet, they could then invest Rhegium both by land and by sea and, as they believed, capture it without difficulty; and from that moment their situation would be a strong one, since Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy, and Messene in Sicily are only a short distance apart, and so the Athenians would not be able to keep a fleet there\(^1\) and command the strait. Now the strait is that arm of the sea between Rhegium and Messene, at the point where Sicily is nearest the mainland; and it is the Charybdis, so called, through which Odysseus is said to have sailed. On account of its narrowness and because the water falls into it from two great seas, the Etruscan and the Sicilian, and is full of currents, it has naturally been considered dangerous.

XXV. Now it was in this strait that the Syracusans and their allies were compelled one day toward evening to fight for a vessel which was making the passage; and with thirty odd ships they put out against sixteen Athenian and eight Rhegian ships. They were defeated by the Athenians, and hastily sailed back, each contingent as best it could, to their own

\(^1\) i.e. in case Rhegium were taken by the Syracusans.
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τόπεδα¹ μίαν ναύν ἀπολέσαντες· καὶ νῦξ ἐπεγέ- 3 νετο τῷ ἔργῳ. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Λοκροὶ ἀπῆλθον ἐκ τῆς Ῥηγίνων, ἔπε δὲ τὴν Πελοπίδα τῆς Μεσσήνης ξυλλέγεισαι αἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχους νῆς ὄρμουν καὶ ὁ πεζὸς αὐτοῖς 4 παρῆν. προσπλεύσαντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Ῥηγίνοι ὀρῶντες τὰς ναῦς κενὰς ἐνέβαλον, καὶ χειρὶ σιδηρά ἐπιβληθείση μίαν ναύν αὐτοῖ ἀπὸ- 5 λεσαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀποκολαμβηκότων. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐσβάνων ἐς τὰς ναῦς καὶ παραπλεύσοντων ἀπὶ κάλω ἐς τὴν Μεσσήνην, αὖθις προσβαλόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀποσιμωσάντων ἐκεῖνων καὶ προεμβαλόντων, ἔτεραν ναύν ἀπολ- 6 λύουσιν. καὶ ἐν τῷ παράπλω καὶ τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τοιούτοτρόπῳ γενομένη οὐκ ἔλαθαν ἔχοντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι παρεκκομίσθησαν ἐς τὸν ἐν τῇ Μεσ- σήνῃ λιμένα.

7 Καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι, Καμαρίνης ἀγγελθείσης προδίδοσθαι Συρακοσίοις ὑπ' Ἀρχίου καὶ τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ, ἐπλευσαν ἐκεῖσ. Μεσσήνιοι δ' ἐν τούτῳ πανδημελ κατὰ γῆν καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἄμα ἑστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Νάξου τὴν Χαλκιδικήν ὄμορον 8 οὐσαν. καὶ τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ τειχῆρεις ποιή- σαντες τοὺς Νάξους ἐδίωκαν τὴν γῆν, τῇ δ' ὑστε- ραίᾳ ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ περιπλεύσαντες κατὰ τὸν Ἀκεσίνην ποτάμων τὴν γῆν ἔδίωκαν, τῷ δὲ πεζῷ 9 πρὸς τὴν πόλιν προσέβαλλον.² ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Σικελοί³ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄκρων πολλοὶ κατέβαινον

¹ τό τε ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ καὶ ἐν τῷ Ῥηγίῳ, in the MSS. after στρατόπεδα, rejected by Hude, after Stahl and van Herwerden.
² For ἐνέβαλλον of the MSS., Poppo’s correction, accepted by most editors.

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camps, having lost one ship; and night came on while they were in action. After this the Locrians left the territory of the Rhetians; and the ships of the Syracusans and their allies assembled at Peloris in Messene, where they anchored and were joined by their land-forces. The Athenians and the Rhetians sailed up, and seeing that the Syracusan ships were unmanned attacked them; but they themselves lost one ship, which was caught by a grappling-iron cast upon it, the crew having leaped overboard. After this the Syracusans embarked and their ships were being towed along the shore by ropes toward Messene when the Athenians attacked again, but lost another ship, since the Syracusans made a sudden turn outwards and charged them first. In the passage along the shore, then, and in the sea-fight that followed in this unusual fashion, the Syracusans had the best of it, and at length gained the harbour at Messene.

But the Athenians, on the report that Camarina was to be betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his faction, sailed thither. The Messenians meanwhile took all their land-forces and also the allied fleet and made an expedition against Naxos, the Chalcidian settlement on their borders. On the first day they confined the Naxians within their walls and ravaged their lands; on the next day, while their fleet sailed round to the river Acesines and ravaged the land there, their army assaulted the city of Naxos. Meanwhile the Sicels came down over the heights in

3 οἱ, before ὑπὲρ, Krüger’s suggestion following a scholium (ἀντὶ τοῦ οἱ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκρῶν δυτες κ.τ.λ.), is adopted by Hude.
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βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους. καὶ οἱ Νάξιοι ὡς εἰδοὺ, θαρσήσαντες καὶ παρακελευόμενοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὡς οἱ Δεοντῖνοι σφίζει καὶ οἱ Ἀλλοὶ Ἐλλήνες ξύμμαχοι ἐς τιμωρίαν ἐπέρχονται, ἐκδραμόντες ἀφ' ἑ τῆς πόλεως προσπίπτουσι τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις, καὶ τρέψαντες ἀπέκτειναν τε ὑπὲρ χιλίους καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ χαλέποι ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπὶ οἰκοῦ· καὶ γὰρ οἱ βάρβαροι ἐν ταῖς ὀδοῖς ἐπιπεσόντες τοὺς πλείστους διέβησαν. καὶ οἱ νῆς σχοῦσαί ες τὴν Μεσσήνην ὑστερον ἐπ' οἰκοῦ ἐκασταὶ διεκρίθησαν. Δεοντῖνοι δὲ εὖθυς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ἐς τὴν Μεσσήνην ὡς κεκακωμένην ἐστράτευον, καὶ προσβάλλοντες οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ τὸν λιμένα ταῖς ναυσὶ ἐπείρουν, ὁ δὲ πεζὸς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. ἔπεκδρομήν δὲ ποιησάμενοι οἱ Μεσσηνίοι καὶ Δοκρῶν τινες μετὰ τοῦ Δημοτέλους, οἱ μετὰ τὸ πάθος ἐγκατελείφθησαν φρουροῦ, ἐξαιπιναῖως προσπεσόντες τρέποντας τοῦ στρατεύματος τῶν Δεοντίων τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἀπέκτειναν πόλλος. ἱδόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ ἀποβάντες ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἔβοηθουν, καὶ κατεδώξαν τοὺς Μεσσηνίους πάλιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν, τεταραγμένοι εἴσηγημένοι καὶ τροπαίοι στήσαντες ἀνεχώρησαν ες τὸ Ρήγην. μετὰ δὲ τούτο οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Ἐλλήνες ἀνευ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατὰ γῆν ἐστράτευον ἐπὶ ἀλλῆλοις.

XXVI. Ἔν δὲ τῇ Πύλῳ ἔτι ἐπολιόρκουν τοὺς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ Δακεδαμοιόνοι οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἥπειρῳ στρατόπεδον τῶν Πελοποννησίων κατὰ χώραν ἔμενεν. ἐπίπονος δὲ ἦν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἡ φυλακὴ σιτῶν τε ἀπορία καὶ ὑδάτως· οὐ
large numbers to help in resisting the Messenians. When the Naxians saw them coming, they took heart, and calling to each other that the Leontines and their other Hellenic allies were approaching to defend them rushed suddenly out of the city and fell upon the Messenians, putting them to flight and killing over a thousand of them. The rest got back home with difficulty; for the barbarians attacked them in the roads and killed most of them. And the allied fleet, after putting in at Messene, dispersed to their several homes. Thereupon the Leontines and their allies, in company with the Athenians, immediately made an expedition against Messene, believing it to be weakened, and attempted an assault upon it, the Athenians attacking with their ships on the side of the harbour, while the land forces moved against the town. But the Messenians and some of the Locrians, who, under the command of Demoteles, had been left there as a garrison after the disaster at Naxos, made a sortie, and falling suddenly upon them routed the larger part of the army of the Leontines and killed many of them. Seeing this the Athenians disembarked and came to their aid, and attacking the Messenians while they were in disorder pursued them back into the city; they then set up a trophy and withdrew to Rhegium. After this the Hellenes in Sicily, without the cooperation of the Athenians, continued to make expeditions against one another by land.

XXVI. At Pylos, meanwhile, the Athenians were still besieging the Lacedaemonians on the island, and the army of the Peloponnesians on the mainland remained in its former position. The blockade, however, was harassing to the Athenians on account of the lack of both food and water; for there was only
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γὰρ ηὗν κρήνη ὅτι μη μία ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκροπόλει τῆς Πύλου καὶ αὐτῇ οὐ μεγάλη, ἀλλὰ διαμόμενοι τὸν κάχληκα οἱ πλείστοι ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ ἔπινον
3 οἶον εἰκὸς ὕδωρ. στενοχωρία τε ἐν ὅλῳ όρατο-
πεδευμένως ἐγήγεντο, καὶ τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἔχουσῶν ὀρμον αἱ μὲν σῖτον ἐν τῇ γῇ Ἰροῦντο κατὰ μέρος,
4 αἱ δὲ μετέωροι ὄρμουν. ἀθυμίαν τε πλεῖστην ὁ
χρόνος παρεῖχε παρὰ λόγον ἐπιγγυομένους, οὐς
φοντὸ ἡμερῶν ὅλων ἐκπολιορκήσειν, ἐν νήσῳ τε
5 ἐρήμῳ καὶ ὑδατὶ ἅλμυρῳ χρωμένους. αὐτοὶ δὲ
ἡν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προειπόντες ἐς τὴν νῆσον
ἐσάγεις σῖτον τε τὸν βουλόμενον ἀληλεμένου καὶ
οίνου καὶ τυρόν καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο βρῶμα, οἳ ἀν ἐς
πολιορκίαν ἐχυμφέρῃ, τάξαντες ἀργυρίον πολλοῦ
καὶ τῶν Εἰλώτων τῷ ἐσαγαγόντες ἐλευθερίαν ὑπί-
6 σχυομένου. καὶ ἐσῆγον ἀλλοι τε παρακινδυνεύ-
οντες καὶ μάλιστα οἱ Εἰλώται, ἀπαίροντες ἀπὸ
τῆς Πελοποννήσου ὁπόθεν τύχοιεν καὶ καταπλέ-
οντες ἐτὶ νυκτὸς ἐς τὰ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τῆς νῆσος.
7 μάλιστα δὲ ἐτήρουν ἀνέμων καταφέρεσθαι· ῥάλιν
γὰρ τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν τριήρων ἔλανθανον, ὅποτε
πνεῦμα ἐκ πόντου εἰς ἀπορομακρύνειν, τοῖς δὲ ἀφειδῆς ὁ
catáplous kathēstikē
ἐπώκελλον γὰρ τὰ πλοῖα τετιμημένα χρημάτων,
cαὶ οἱ ὀπλῖται περὶ τὰς κατάρσεις τῆς νῆσου

1 The reference is to the ships which kept up a patrol round the island. There was no anchorage near the shore.

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one spring, high up on the acropolis of Pylos, and a
small one at that, and the soldiers for the most part
scraped away the shingle upon the beach and drank
water such as one might expect to find there. And
there was scant room for them, encamping as they
did in a small space, and since there was no anchor-
age for the ships, the crews would take their food on
land by turns, while the rest of the fleet lay at anchor
out at sea. Very great discouragement, too, was
caused by the surprisingly long duration of the siege,
whereas they had expected to reduce the enemy in
a few days, since they were on a desert island and
had only brackish water to drink. But the cause of
their holding out was that the Lacedaemonians had
called for volunteers to convey to the island ground
corn and wine and cheese and other food such as might
be serviceable in a siege, fixing a high price and
also promising freedom to any Helot who should
get food in. Many took the risk, especially the
Helots, and actually brought it in, putting out from
any and every point in the Peloponnesus and coming
to shore during the night on the side of the island
facing the sea. If possible they waited for a wind
to bear them to the shore; for they found it easier
to elude the guard of triremes when the breeze was
from the sea, since then it was impossible for the
ships to lie at their moorings off the island, whereas
they themselves ran ashore regardless of conse-
quences, as a value had been set upon the boats
which they drove upon the beach, and the hop-
lites would be on watch for them at the landing-
on the seaward side (ch. viii. 8), so at meal-times the crews
of one part of the fleet would make a landing somewhere and
eat, while the other part would be out at sea on guard.
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ἐφύλασσον. ὦσοι δὲ γαλήνη κινδυνεύσειαν, ἡλί-8 σκοντο. ἐσέενον δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα κολυμ-βηταὶ ὑφυδροί, καλοδιώ ἐν ἄσκοις ἐφέλκοντες μήκονα μεμελιτωμένην καὶ λίνου στέρμα κεκομ-μένους ὁ το πρῶτον λαυθανόντων φυλακαὶ 9 ὑστερον ἐγένοντο. παντί τε τρόπῳ ἐκάτεροι ἐτεχνώντο, οἱ μὲν ἐσπέμπειν τὰ σιτία, οἱ δὲ μὴ λαυθάνειν σφᾶς.

XXVII. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἀθήναις πυθανόμενοι περὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς ὅτι ταλαπωρεῖται καὶ σῖτος τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ὅτι ἐσπλεῖ, ἦπορον καὶ ἐδεδοί-κεσαν μὴ σφῶν χειμῶν τὴν φυλακὴν ἐπιλάβοι, ὄρωντες τῶν τε ἐπιτριθείων τὴν περὶ τὴν Πελο-πόννησον κομιδὴν ἀδύνατον ἐσομένην, ἀμα ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ καὶ συὸ ἐν θερεί οἷοι τε ὄντες ἰκανὰ περιπέμπειν, τὸν τε ἔφορον χωρίων ἀλλιμένων ὄντων οὐκ ἐσομένου, ἀλλ’ ἡ σφῶν ἄνεντων τὴν φυλακὴν περιγενήσεσθαι τοὺς ἀνδρὰς ἤ τοῖς πλοί-οις ἅ τὸν σῖτον αὐτοῖς ἤγε χειμῶνα τηρήσαντας 2 ἐκπλεύσεσθαι. πάντων τε ἐφοβοῦντο μάλιστα τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους, ὅτι ἔχοντας τι ἵσχυρον αὐ-τοὺς ἐνόμιζον οὐκετί σφίσιν ἐπικηρυκεύσθαι· καὶ 3 μετεμέλοντο τὰς σπουδὰς οὐ δεξάμενοι. Κλέων δὲ γνοὺς αὐτῶν τὴν ἐς αὐτῶν ὑποψίαν περὶ τῆς κωλύμης τῆς ξυμβάσεως οὐ τάληθ ἐφη λέγειν τοὺς ἕξαγγέλλοντας.¹ παραμισθῶν δὲ τῶν ἀφιγ-

¹ So the MSS.: Hude adopts Krüger’s conjecture, ἰσαγ-γέλλοντας.

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places on the island. All, on the other hand, who made the venture in calm weather were captured. At the harbour, too, there were divers who swam to the island under water, towing after them by a cord skins filled with poppy-seed mixed with honey and bruised linseed; at first they were not discovered, but afterwards watches were set for them. And so both sides kept resorting to every device, the one to get food in, the other to catch them doing it.

XXVII. At Athens, meanwhile, when they heard that their army was in distress and that food was being brought in to the men on the island, they were perplexed and became apprehensive that the winter would overtake them while still engaged in the blockade. They saw that conveyance of supplies round the Peloponnesus would be impossible—Pylos being a desolate place at best, to which they were unable even in summer to send round adequate supplies—and that, since there were no harbours in the neighbourhood, the blockade would be a failure. Either their own troops would relax their watch and the men on the island would escape, or else, waiting for bad weather, they would sail away in the boats which brought them food. Above all they were alarmed about the attitude of the Lacedaemonians, thinking that it was because they had some ground for confidence that they were no longer making overtures to them; and they repented having rejected their proposals for peace. But Cleon, knowing that their suspicions were directed against him because he had prevented the agreement, said that the messengers who had come from Pylos were not telling the truth. Whereupon these messengers advised, if their own
μένων, εἰ μὴ σφόσι πιστεύουσι, κατασκόπους τινὰς πέμψαι, ἥρεθη κατάσκοπος αὐτὸς μετὰ
4 Θεογένους ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων. καὶ γνοὺς ὅτι ἀναγκασθῆσεται ἡ ταύτα λέγειν οἷς διέβαλλεν ἡ τά-
ναντία εἰπὼν ψευδῆς φανήσεθαι,1 παρὴμεί τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ ωρμημένους τι τὸ
πλέον τῇ γνώμῃ στρατεύειν, ὡς χρὴ κατασκόπους μὲν μὴ πέμπειν μηδὲ διαμέλλειν καίρον παριέντας,
εἰ δὲ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ ἀγγελλόμενα,
5 πλεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας. καὶ ἐς Νικίαν τὸν Νικη-
ράτου στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἀπεσῆμαινεν, ἐχθρὸς ὦν καὶ ἐπιτιμῶν, ῥάδιον εἶναι παρασκευῇ, εἰ ἄνδρες
εἶν οἱ στρατηγοὶ, πλεύσαντας λαβεῖν τοὺς ἐν
τῇ νῆσῳ, καὶ αὐτὸς γ' ἁν, εἰ ἃρχη, ποιήσαι
tούτο.

XXVIII. Ὅ δὲ Νικίας τῶν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τι
ὑποθορυβησάντων ἐς τὸν Κλέωνα, ὃ τι οὐ καὶ νῦν
πλεῖ, εἰ ῥάδιον γε αὐτῷ φαίνεται, καὶ ἀμα ὅρῶν
αὐτὸν ἐπιτιμῶντα, ἐκέλευεν ἡμῖνα βούλεται δύ-
2 ναμίν λαβόντα τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς εἶναι ἐπιχειρεῖν. ὡ δὲ
τὸ μὲν πρώτον οἰόμενος αὐτὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἀφιέναι,
ἐτοίμος ἦν, γνοὺς δὲ τῷ ὅτι παραδωσεῖντα ἀνε-
χώρει καὶ οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἄλλ' ἐκείνων στρατη-
γεῖν, δεδώκε πρὶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενος οἱ αὐτὸν
3 τολμήσαι υποχωρήσαι. αὕτης δὲ ὁ Νικίας ἐκέ-
λευε καὶ ἐξίστατο τῆς ἐπὶ Πύλῳ ἄρχης καὶ μάρ-

1 So all MSS. except B (γενήσεσθαι): Hude adopts, with
Krüger, Rauchenstein’s conjecture φανήσεται.

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reports were not believed, that commissioners be sent
to see for themselves, and Cleon himself was chosen by
the Athenians, with Theagenes as his colleague.
Realizing now that he would either be obliged to bring
the same report as the messengers whose word he
was impugning, or, if he contradicted them, be con-
victed of falsehood, and also seeing that the Athenians
were now somewhat more inclined to send an ex-
pedition, he told them that they ought not to send
commissioners, or by dallying to let slip a favourable
opportunity, but urged them, if they themselves
thought the reports to be true, to send a fleet and
fetch the men. And pointing at Nicias son of
Niceratus, who was one of the generals and an
enemy of his, and taunting him, he said that it was
an easy matter, if the generals were men, to sail
there with a proper force and take the men on the
island, declaring that this was what he himself would
have done had he been in command.

XXVIII. The Athenians thereupon began to
clamour against Cleon, asking him why he did not sail
even now, if it seemed to him so easy a thing; and
Nicias, noticing this and Cleon's taunt, told him that
as far as the generals were concerned he might take
whatever force he wished and make the attempt.
As for Cleon, he was at first ready to go, thinking it
was only in pretence that Nicias offered to relinquish
the command; but when he realized that Nicias
really desired to yield the command to him, he
tried to back out, saying that not he but Nicias was
general; for by now he was alarmed, and never
thought that Nicias would go so far as to retire in
his favour. But again Nicias urged him to go and
offered to resign his command of the expedition
Τυχαίαν έποιεῖτο. οἱ δὲ, οίον ὁχλὸς φίλει ποιεῖν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ὁ Κλέως ὑπέφευγε τῶν πλούν καὶ ἐξανεχώρει τὰ εἰρημένα, τόσῳ ἐπεκελεύοντο τῷ Νικίᾳ παραδίδοναι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ 4 ἐκείνῳ ἐπεβόων πλεῖς; ὅστε οὐκ ἔχουν ὅπως τῶν εἰρημένων ἔτι ἐξαπαταλαγῇ, ὑφίσταται τῶν πλούν, καὶ παρελθὼν οὔτε φοβείσθαι ἔφη Δακεδαιμονίους πλεύσεσθαι τε λαβὼν ἐκ μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὐδένα, Λημνίοις δὲ καὶ Ἰμβρίοις τοὺς παρόντας καὶ πελταστὰς οὐ ἥσαν ἐκ τε Λίμνου βεβοηθήκτες καὶ ἄλλοθεν ταξίτας τετρακοσίους· τεῦτα δὲ ἔχων ἔφη ἕπερ τοῖς ἐν Πύλῳ στρατιώταις ἐντὸς ἡμερῶν εἰκοσὶ ἢ ἄξειν Δακεδαιμονίους ἥξϊτας ἢ 5 αὐτοῦ ἀποκτενεῖν· τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἐνέπεσε μὲν τι καὶ γέλωτος τῇ κουφολογία αὐτοῦ, ἀσμένους δὲ ὅμως ἐγίγνετο τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, λογιζομένοι δυοίν ἁγαθοῖν τοῦ ἐτέρου τεύξεσθαι, ἢ Κλέωνος ἀπαλαγήσεσθαι, ἢ μᾶλλον ἡλπίζον, ἢ σφαλεῖσι γνώµης Δακεδαιμονίους σφίσι χειρώσεσθαι. 2

XXIX. Καὶ πάντα διαπραξάμενοι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ ψηφισμαζόμενοι Ἀθηναίων αὐτῷ τῶν πλούν, τῶν τε ἐν Πύλῳ στρατηγῶν ἦνα προσέλομεν, Δημοσθένη, τὴν ἀναγωγὴν διὰ τάχους 2 ἐποιεῖτο. τὸν δὲ Δημοσθένη προσέλαβε πυθανόμενος τὴν ἀπόβασιν αὐτὸν ἐς τὴν νῆσον διανοεῖσθαι. οἱ γὰρ στρατιῶται κακοπαθοῦντες τοῦ χωρίου τῇ ἀπορίᾳ καὶ μᾶλλον πολιορκούμενοι ἢ πολιορκοῦντες ἀρμῆντο διακινδυνεύσαι. καὶ αὐτῷ

1 Omitted by Hude, following M.
2 χειρώσεσθαι ABFM.
against Pylos, calling the Athenians to witness that he did so. And the more Cleon tried to evade the expedition and to back out of his own proposal, the more insistently the Athenians, as is the way with a crowd, urged Nicias to give up the command and shouted to Cleon to sail. And so, not knowing how he could any longer escape from his own proposal, he undertook the expedition, and, coming forward, said that he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians, and that he would sail without taking a single Athenian soldier, but only the Lemnian and Imbrian troops which were in Athens and a body of targeteers which had come from Aenos, and four hundred archers from other places. With these, in addition to the troops now at Pylos, he said that within twenty days he would either bring back the Lacedaemonians alive or slay them on the spot. At this vain talk of his there was a burst of laughter on the part of the Athenians, but nevertheless the sensible men among them were glad, for they reflected that they were bound to obtain one of two good things—either they would get rid of Cleon, which they preferred, or if they were disappointed in this, he would subdue the Lacedaemonians for them.

XXIX. When he had arranged everything in the assembly and the Athenians had voted in favour of his expedition, he chose as his colleague Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, and made haste to set sail. He selected Demosthenes because he had heard that he was planning to make his landing on the island. For his soldiers, who were suffering because of the discomforts of their position, where they were rather besieged than besiegers, were eager to run all risks. And Demosthenes himself had also
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ἐτι ρώμην καὶ ἡ νήσος ἐμπρησθείσα παρέσχεν.
3 πρότερον μὲν γὰρ ὦσης αὐτῆς ὕλῶδος ἐπὶ τὸ
pολὺ καὶ ἀτριβοῦς διὰ τὴν αἰεὶ ἔρημιαν ἐφοβεῖτο
καὶ πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων τοῦτο ἐνόμιζε μᾶλλον
ἐναι: πολλῷ γὰρ ἐν στρατοπέδῳ ἀποβάντι ἐξ
ἀφανὸς χωρίου προσβάλλοντας αὐτοὺς βλάπ-
tειν. σφίσει μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἐκείνων ἀμαρτίας καὶ
παρασκευήν ὑπὸ τῆς ἕλης οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως δῆλα
ἐναι, τοῦ δὲ αὐτῶν στρατοπέδου καταφανῆ ἂν
ἐναι πάντα τὰ ἀμαρτήματα, ὡστε προσπίπτειν
ἀν αὐτοὺς ἄπροσδοκήτως ἡ βούλοιντο. ἐπ'
4 ἐκείνων γὰρ ἐναι ἂν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν. εἰ δ' ἂν
ἐσ ἢστιν χωρίον βιάζοιτο ὁμόσε ἔναι, τοὺς
ἐλάσσους, ἐμπείρους δὲ τῆς χώρας, κρείσσους
ἐνόμιζε τῶν πλεόνων ἀπείρων· λαυθάνειν τε ἂν
τὸ ἐαυτῶν στρατόπεδον πολὺ ἄν διαφθείρομενον,
οὐκ ὦσης τῆς προσόψεως ἡ χρήν ἀλλῆλοις
ἐπιβοσθείν.

XXX. Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰτωλικοῦ πάθους, ὃ διὰ
tὴν ἔλην μέρος τι ἐγένετο, οὐχ ἦκιστα αὐτῶν
2 ταῦτα ἔσηε. τῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν ἀναγκασθέντων
diὰ τὴν στενοχωρίαν τῆς νῆσου τοῖς ἐσχάτοις
προσίσχοσας ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι διὰ προφυλακῆς
καὶ ἐμπρησαντός τινος κατὰ μικρὸν τῆς ἕλης
ἀκοντος καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦτον πνεύματος ἐπιγενομένου
3 τὸ πολὺ αὐτῆς ἐλαθε κατακανθέν. οὕτω δὴ .

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been emboldened by a conflagration which had swept the island. For hitherto, since the island was for the most part covered with woods and had no roads, having never been inhabited, he had been afraid to land, thinking that the terrain was rather in the enemy's favour; for they could attack from an unseen position and inflict damage upon a large army after it had landed. To his own troops, indeed, the mistakes and the preparations of the enemy would not be equally clear by reason of the woods, whereas all their own mistakes would be manifest to their opponents, and so they could fall upon them unexpectedly wherever they wished, since the power of attack would rest with them. If, on the other hand, he should force his way into the thicket and there close with the enemy, the smaller force which was acquainted with the ground would, he thought, be stronger than the larger number who were unacquainted with it; and his own army, though large, would be destroyed piece-meal before he knew it, because there was no possible way of seeing the points at which the detachments should assist one another.

XXX. It was especially owing to his experience in Aetolia, when his reverse was in some measure due to the forest, that these thoughts occurred to Demosthenes. But the soldiers were so cramped in their quarters that they were obliged to land on the edge of the island and take their meals under cover of a picket, and one of their number accidentally set fire to a small portion of the forest, and from this, when a breeze had sprung up, most of the forest was burned before they knew it. Thus it happened that

1 cf. III. xcvi., xcviii.
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tòús te Δακεδαίμονίους μᾶλλον κατιδών πλείους ὄντας, ὑπονοῶν πρότερον ἐλάσσοσι τὸν σίτου ἀυτοῦς ἐσπέμπτειν, τὴν τε νῆσον εὐαποβατω-
tέραν οὖσαν, τότε ὡς ἐπ’ ἀξίωρεων τοὺς Ἀθη-
vαίους μᾶλλον σπουδήν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιχεί-
ρησιν παρεσκευάζετο, στρατιάν τε μεταπέμπτων
ἐκ τῶν ἐγγύς ξυμμάχων καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐτοιμάζων.

4 Κλέων δὲ ἐκείνῳ τε προπέμψας ἀγγελοὺς ὡς ἦξων καὶ ἔχων στρατιὰν ἡ τῇ ἡτήσατο, ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Πύλον. καὶ ἅμα γενόμενοι πέμπτους πρῶτον ἐς τὸ ἐν τῇ ἥπειρῳ στρατόπεδον κήρυκα, προκα-
λούμενοι, εἰ βούλοιτο, ἀνευ κινδύνου τους ἐν τῇ
νῆσῳ ἀνδρᾶς σφίσι τὰ τε ὅπλα καὶ σφᾶσ αὐτοῦς
κελεύειν παραδοῦναι, ἐφ’ ὃ φυλακῇ τῇ μετρίᾳ
τηρήσονται, ἔως ἃν τι περὶ τοῦ πλέονος ξυμβάθῃ.

XXXI. οὐ προσδέξαμένων δὲ αὐ μίαν μὲν
ήμεραν ἐπέσχον, τῇ δ’ ὑστεραιά ἀνηγάγοντο μὲν
νυκτὸς ἐπ’ ὀλίγας ναῦς τοὺς ὀπλίτας πάντας
ἐπεβιβάζοντες, πρὸ δὲ τῆς ἐω ὀλίγον ἀπέβαινον
τῆς νῆσου ἐκατέρωθεν, ἐκ τε τοῦ πελάγους καὶ
πρὸς τοῦ λιμένος, ὁκτακόσιοι μάλιστα ὄντες
ὅπλεια, καὶ ἔχωροιν δρόμῳ ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον

2 φυλακτήριον τῆς νῆσου. ὧδε γὰρ διετετάχατο,
ἐν ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ ὃς φυλακῇ ὃς τριάκοντα
ήσαν ὀπλίται, μέσον δὲ καὶ ὀμαλώσατον τε καὶ

1 Bekker’s conjecture for αὐτοῦ of the MSS. Hude reads
αὐτός, with Krüger.

2 Hude deletes, with Krüger.

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Demosthenes, who could now get a better view of the Lacedaemonians, found that they were more numerous than he had thought; for he had previously suspected that the number for which they were sending provisions was smaller than they stated.\textsuperscript{1} He also found that the island was less difficult to make a landing upon than he had supposed. He now, therefore, believing that the object in view was well worth a more serious effort on the part of the Athenians, began preparations for the attempt, summoning troops from the allies in the neighbourhood and getting everything else ready.

Cleon, meanwhile, having first sent word to Demosthenes that he would soon be there, arrived at Pylos, bringing the army for which he had asked. As soon as they had joined forces, they sent a herald to the enemy's camp on the mainland, giving them the option, if they wished to avoid a conflict, of ordering the men on the island to surrender themselves and their arms, on condition that they should be held in mild custody until some agreement should be reached about the main question.\textsuperscript{2} XXXI. This offer being rejected, the Athenians waited for one day, but on the next day while it was still dark they embarked all their hoplites on a few vessels and put off, landing a little before dawn on both sides of the island, on the side toward the open sea and on that facing the harbour, their number being about eight hundred, all hoplites. They then advanced at a run against the first guard-post on the island. For the forces of the enemy were disposed as follows: in this, the first post, there were about thirty hoplites; the central and most level part of the island, near their

\textsuperscript{1} cf. ch. xvi. 1. \textsuperscript{2} i.e. a general peace.
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περὶ τὸ ὕδωρ οἱ πλείστοι αὐτῶν καὶ Ἐπιτάδας ὁ ἄρχων εἶχε, μέρος δὲ τι οὐ πολὺ αὐτὸν ὁ ἔσγατον ἐφύλασσε τῆς νῆσου τὸ πρὸς τὴν Πύλου, ὃ ἦν ἐκ τε θαλάσσης ἀπόκρημνον καὶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἥκιστα ἐπίμαχοι καὶ γάρ τι καὶ ἔρυμα αὐτόθι ἦν παλαιῶν Λίθων λογαθην πεποιημένοι, ὃ ἐνόμιζον σφίσιν ὥφελιμον ἄν εἶναι, εἰ καταλαμβάνοι ἀναχώρησις βιωτέρα. οὕτω μὲν τεταγμένοι ἦσαν.

XXXII. Ὅι δὲ Ἀθηναίοι τοὺς μὲν πρῶτους φύλακας, οῖς ἐπέδραμον, εὐθὺς διαφθείρουσιν, ἐν τε ταῖς εὐναῖς ἔτι καναλαμβάνονται τὰ ὅπλα καὶ λαθόντες τὴν ἀπόβασιν, οἰομένων αὐτῶν τὰς ναῦς κατὰ τὸ ἔθος ἐς ἐφόρμου τῆς νυκτὸς πλείων.

2 ἄμα δὲ ἔφο γνυνομένη καὶ ὁ ἄλλος στρατὸς ἀπέβαινον, ἐκ μὲν νεῦν ἐβδομήκοιτα καὶ ὅλῳ πλείόνων πάντες πλὴν θαλαμίων, ὡς ἐκαστοι ἐσκευασμένοι, τοξότατοι δὲ ὀκτακόσιοι καὶ πελτασταὶ οὐκ ἐλάσσοντας τούτων, Μεσσηνίων τε οἱ βεβοσθηκότες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι περὶ Πύλου κατείχον πάντες πλὴν τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους φυλάκων.

3 Δημοσθένους δὲ τάξαντος δέστησαν κατὰ διακοσίους καὶ πλείους, ἐστι δὲ ἢ ἐλάσσονς, τῶν χωρίων τὰ μετεωρότατα λαβόντες, ὅπως ὅτι πλείστη ἀπορία ἢ τοῖς πολέμιοις παινακόθεν κεκυκλωμένοι καὶ μὴ ἔχωσι πρὸς ὃ τι ἀντιτά-

1 αὐτὸ, Bauer's correction; MSS. αὐτοῦ.

1 cf. ch. xxvi. 4.
2 Not hewn, but brought just as they picked them out.
3 cf. ch. xxiii. 2.
4 The θαλαμίων, or oarsmen of the lowest tier. At this
water supply,1 was held by the main body of troops, under the command of Epitadas; and a small detachment guarded the very extremity of the island where it looks toward Pylos. This point was precipitous on the side toward the sea and least assailable toward the land; there was also here an old fortification, built of stones picked up,2 which the Lacedaemonians thought would be useful to them in case they should have to retreat under strong pressure. Such, then, was the disposition of the enemy's forces.

XXXII. As for the Athenians, they immediately destroyed the men of the first post, upon whom they charged at full speed, finding them still in their beds or endeavouring to snatch up their arms; for they had not noticed the Athenians' landing, supposing that the ships were merely sailing as usual to their watch-station for the night.3 Then as soon as day dawned the rest of the army began to disembark. These were the crews of somewhat more than seventy ships (with the single exception of the rowers of the lowest benches4), equipped each in his own way, besides eight hundred archers and as many targeteers, and also the Messenians who had come to reinforce them, and all the others who were on duty about Pylos except the men left to guard the fort. Under Demosthenes' direction they were divided into companies of two hundred more or less, which occupied the highest points of the island, in order that the enemy, being surrounded on all sides, might be in the greatest possible perplexity and not know which

time a trireme was manned by fifty-four θαλαμίται, fifty-four ζυγίται (occupants of the middle bank), sixty-two θραυσίται (upper bank), and thirty περίνες (reserve oarsmen), including ἕπηρται and ἐπιβάται.

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Ξωνται, ἀλλ’ ἀμφίβολοι γίγνονται τῷ πλήθει, εἰ μὲν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐπίσιεν, ὑπὸ τῶν κατόπιν
βαλλόμενοι, εἰ δὲ τοῖς πλαγίοις, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκατέ
ρωθεν παρατεταγμένων. κατὰ νῶτον τε αἰεὶ
ἐμελλον αὐτοῖς, ἢ χωρήσειαν, οἱ πολέμιοι ἔσεσθαι
ψυλοί, καὶ οἱ ἀπορώτατοι, τοξεύμασι καὶ ἄκον-
tίους καὶ λίθους καὶ σφενδόναις ἐκ πολλοῦ
ἐχοντες ἁλκήν· οίς μηδὲ ἐπελθεῖν οἶνον τε ἃν
φεύγοντες τε γὰρ ἐκράτουν καὶ ἀναχωροῦσιν
ἐπέκειντο. τοιαύτῃ μὲν γνώμῃ ὁ Δημοσθένης τὸ
τε πρῶτον, τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἐπενόει καὶ εν τῷ ἔργῳ
ἐταξεν.

XXXIII. Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐπιτάδαν καὶ ὅπερ
ἠν πλείστον τῶν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, ὡς εἶδον τὸ τε
πρῶτον φυλακτήριον διεφθαρμένον καὶ στρατὸν
σφίσων ἐπίστατο, ξυνετᾶξαντο καὶ τοῖς ὀπλάταις
τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπῆσαν, θυμὸνεν αὐτῶν ἐξ ἑλθὲιν·
ἐξ ἐναντίας γὰρ ὦτοι καθειστήκεσαν, ἐκ
τὸν πλαγίον δὲ οἱ ψυλοὶ καὶ κατὰ νῶτον. τοῖς μὲν
οὐν ὀπλάταις οὐκ ἐδυνήθησαν προσμεῖξαι οὐδὲ τῇ
σφετέρᾳ ἐμπειρίᾳ χρῆσασθαι· οἱ γὰρ ψυλοὶ
ἐκατέρωθεν βάλλοντες εἰργον, καὶ ἀμα ἐκεῖνοι
οὐκ ἀντεπῆσαν, ἀλλ’ ἐσύγχαζον. τοὺς δὲ ψυλῶν,
ἡ μάλιστα αὐτοῖς προσθέοντες προσκέοιτο, ἔτρε-
πον, καὶ οἱ ὑποστρέφοντες ἡμύνοντο, ἀνθρωποὶ
κόψως τε ἐσκευασμένοι καὶ προλαμβάνοντες

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attack to face, but be exposed to missiles on every side from the host of their opponents—if they attacked those in front, from those behind; if those on either flank, from those arrayed on the other. And they would always find in their rear, whichever way they moved, the light-armed troops of the enemy, which were the most difficult to deal with, since they fought at long range with arrows, javelins, stones, and slings. Nay, they could not even get at them, for they were victorious even as they fled, and as soon as their pursuers turned they were hard upon them again. Such was the idea which Demosthenes had in mind when he devised the plan of landing, and such were his tactics when he put this into effect.

XXXIII. Now when the troops under Epitadas, constituting the main body of the Lacedaemonians on the island, saw that the first outpost was destroyed and that an army was advancing against them, they drew up in line and set out to attack the Athenian hoplites, wishing to come to close quarters with them; for these were stationed directly in front of them, while the light-armed troops were on their flank and rear. They were not able, however, to engage with the hoplites or to avail themselves of their own peculiar skill in fighting; for the light-armed troops kept attacking them with missiles from either side and thus held them in check, and at the same time the hoplites did not advance against them, but remained quiet. They did, however, put the light-armed troops to flight wherever they pressed most closely upon them in their charges; and then these latter would wheel about and keep fighting, being lightly equipped and therefore finding it easy

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ράδιως τῆς φυγῆς χωρίων τε χαλεπότητι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς πρὶν ἐρημίας τραχέων ὄντων, ἐν οἷς οἱ Δακεδαίμονιοι οὐκ ἐδύναντο διώκειν ὅπλα ἐχοντες.

XXXIV. Χρόνον μὲν οὖν τινὰ ὀλίγον οὕτω πρὸς ἄλληλος ἱκροβολίσαντο· τῶν δὲ Δακεδαιμονίων οὐκέτι οξέως ἐπεκθεῖν ἢ προσπίπτοιεν δυναμένων, γνώντες αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔνιοι βραδυτέρους ἦδη ὄντας τῷ ἀμύνασθαι, καὶ αὐτοὶ τῇ τε ὄψει τοῦ θαρσείν τὸ πλείστων εἰληφότες πολλαπλάσιοι φαινόμενοι καὶ ξυνειδισμένοι μᾶλλον μηκέτι δεινοὺς αὐτοὺς ὁμοίως σφίζαν φαίνεσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ εὐθὺς ἡ προσδοκία ἐπεπόνθεσαν, ὡσπερ ὅτε πρῶτον ἀπέβαινον τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ Δακεδαιμονίους, καταφρονήσαντες καὶ ἐμβοήσαντες ἅθροις ὁρμησαν ἐπὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔβαλλον λίθοις τε καὶ τοξεύμασι καὶ ἀκοντίοις, ὡς ἔκαστὸς τι πρόχειρον εἶχεν. γενομένης δὲ τῆς βοῆς ἁμα τῇ ἐπιδρομῇ ἐκπλήξεις τε ἐνέπεσεν ἄνθρωπος ἁγέσθε τοιαύτης μάχης καὶ ὁ κοινοτός τῆς ὕλης νεωστὶ κεκαμψμένης ἐχώρει πολὺς ἄνω, ἀποροῦν τε ἢν ἰδεῖν τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν τοξευμάτων καὶ λίθων ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἄνθρωπων μετὰ τοῦ κοινοτοῦ ἂμα φερομένων. τὸ τε ἔργον ἐνταῦθα χαλεπὸν τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις καθίστατο. οὔτε γὰρ οἱ πῖλοι ἔστεγον τὰ τοξεύματα, δοράτια τε ἐναπε-

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to take to flight in good time, since the ground was
difficult and, because it had never been inhabited,
was naturally rough. Over such a terrain the Lacedaemonians, who were in heavy armour, were unable
to pursue them.

XXXIV. For some little time they skirmished thus
with one another; but when the Lacedaemonians
were no longer able to dash out promptly at the point
where they were attacked, the light-armed troops
noticed that they were slackening in their defence,
and also conceived the greatest confidence in them-
selves, now that they could see that they were
undoubtedly many times more numerous than the
enemy, and, since their losses had from the outset been
less heavy than they had expected, they had gradu-
ally become accustomed to regarding their opponents
as less formidable than they had seemed at their first
landing when their own spirits were oppressed by
the thought that they were going to fight against
Lacedaemonians. Conceiving, therefore, a contempt
for them, with a shout they charged upon them in a
body, hurling at them stones, arrows or javelins,
whichever each man had at hand. The shouting
with which the Athenians accompanied their charge
caused consternation among the Lacedaemonians,
who were unaccustomed to this manner of fighting;
and the dust from the newly-burned forest rose in
clouds to the sky, so that a man could not see what
was in front of him by reason of the arrows and
stones, hurled, in the midst of the dust, by many
hands. And so the battle began to go hard with
the Lacedaemonians; for their felt cuirasses afforded
them no protection against the arrows, and the points
of the javelins broke off and clung there when the

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κέκλαστο βαλλομένων, εἰκόν τε οὐδὲν σφίσων αὐτοῖς χρήσασθαι ἀποκεκλημένοι μὲν τῇ ὁψεὶ τοῦ προορᾶν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεῖξονος βοής τῶν πολεμίων τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς παραγγελλόμενα οὐκ ἐσακούοντες, κινδύνου τε πανταχόθεν περιεστῶτος καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐπίδια καθ’ ὅ τι χρὴ ἀμυνο-
μένους σωθῆναι.

XXXV. Τέλος δὲ τραυματιζομένων ἦδη πολλῶν διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀναστρέφεσθαι, ἦνγκλη-
σαντες ἔχρησαν ἐς τὸ ἔσχατον ἔρυμα τῆς νῆσου,
2 ὁ οὐ πολὺ ἀπέιχε, καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν φύλακας. ὡς
dὲ ἐνέδοσαν, ἑνταῦθα ἦδη πολλῷ ἔτι πλέον βοὴ
tεθαρσηκότες οἱ ψυλοὶ ἐπέκειντο, καὶ τῶν Δακε-
δαίμονιν ὅσοι μὲν ὑποχωροῦντες ἐγκατελαμβα-
νοῦσι, ἀπέθνησκον, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ διαφυγόντες ἐς
tὸ ἔρυμα μετὰ τῶν ταύτῃ φυλάκων ἑτάξαντο
3 παρὰ πάν ὡς ἀμυνούμενοι ἦπερ ἦν ἑπίμαχον. καὶ
οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπιστόμενοι περίδον ἐν ἀυτῶν καὶ
κύκλωσιν χωρίων ἱσχύν οὐκ εἶχον, προσιστῶντες δὲ
ἐξ ἐναντίας ἔσασθαι ἐπειρῶντο, καὶ χρόνον μὲν
πολὺν καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας τὸ πλεῖστον ταλαιπωροῦ-
μενοι ἀμφότεροι υπό τε τῆς μάχης καὶ δίψης καὶ
ἡλίου ἀντείχον, πειρώμενοι οἱ μὲν ἐξελάσασθαι
ἐκ τοῦ μετεώρου, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἐνδούναι· ράον δ’ οἱ
Δακεδαμόνοι ἡμύνοντο ἢ ἐν τῷ πρίν, οὐκ οὔσῃς
σφῶν τῆς κυκλώσεως ἐς τὰ πλάγια.

XXXVI. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀπέραντον ἦν, προσελθὼν
ὁ τῶν Μεσσηνίων στρατηγὸς Κλέωνι καὶ Δημο-
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men were struck. They were, therefore, quite at their wits' end, since the dust shut off their view ahead and they could not hear the word of command on their own side because the enemy's shouts were louder. Danger encompassed them on every side and they despaired of any means of defence availing to save them.

XXXV. At last when they saw that their men were being wounded in large numbers because they had to move backwards and forwards always on the same ground, they closed ranks and fell back to the farthermost fortification on the island, which was not far distant, and to their own garrison stationed there. But the moment they began to give way, the light-armed troops, now emboldened, fell upon them with a louder outcry than ever. Those of the Lacedaemonians who were intercepted in their retreat were slain, but the majority of them escaped to the fortification, where they ranged themselves with the garrison there, resolved to defend it at every point where it was assailable. The Athenians followed, but the position was so strong that they could not outflank and surround the defenders. They, therefore, tried to dislodge them by a frontal attack. Now for a long time, and indeed during the greater part of the day, in spite of the distress from the battle, from thirst, and from the heat of the sun, both sides held out, the one trying to drive the enemy from the heights, the other merely to hold their ground; the Lacedaemonians, however, now found it easier than before to defend themselves, since they could not be taken in flank.

XXXVI. But when the business seemed interminable, the general 1 of the Messenians came to Cleon

1 Named Comon, according to Paus. iv. xxvi. 2.
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σθένει ἄλλως ἐφη πονεῖν σφᾶς· εἰ δὲ βούλονται ἐαυτῷ δοῦναι τῶν τοξοτῶν μέρος τι καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν περιέναι κατὰ νώτου αὐτοῖς ὅδε γὰρ ἂν αὐτὸς εὑρή, δοκεῖν βιάσασθαι τὴν ἔφοδον.

2 λαβὼν δὲ ἡ ὑτήσατο, ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς ὀρμήσας ὡστε μὴ ἰδεῖν ἔκεινος, κατὰ τὸ αἰεὶ παρεῖκον τοῦ κρημνώδους τῆς νῆσου προβαίνων καὶ ἦν οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι χωρίον ἰσχύι πιστεύσαντες οὐκ ἐφύλασσον, χαλεπὸς τε καὶ μόλις περιελθὼν ἔλαθε, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μετεώρου ἔξαπίνησε ἀναφανεῖς κατὰ νώτου αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν τῷ ἄδοκήτῳ ἐξέπληξε, τοὺς δὲ ἀ προσεδέχοντο ἰδόντας πολλοὶ μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωσεν. καὶ οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι βαλλόμενοι τε ἀμφότερωθεν ἦδη καὶ γιγνόμενοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔμπροσθεν, ὡς μικρὸν μεγάλῳ εἰκάσαι, τῷ ἐν Θερμοπύλαις (ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ τῇ ἄτραπῳ περιελθόντων τῶν Περσῶν διεφθάρησαν οὕτω τε), ἀμφίβολοι ἦδη οὕτε οὐκέτι ἀντεῖχον, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶς τε ὀλίγοι μαχόμενοι καὶ ἀσθενείᾳ σῳμάτων διὰ τὴν σιτοδείαν ὑπεχώρουν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἐκράτουν ἦδη τῶν ἐφόδων.

XXXVII. Γινοῦσ τὲ ὁ Κλέων καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης, εἰ καὶ ὀποσονοῦν μᾶλλον ἐνδώσουσιν, διαφθαρήσομένους αὐτούς ὑπὸ τῆς σφετέρας στρατιᾶς, ἔπαυσαν τὴν μάχην καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἀπείρξαν, βουλόμενοι ἀγαγεῖν αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίων ξώντας, εἰ

1 As the MSS.; Hude βιάσασθαι, after Madvig.

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and Demosthenes and said that their side was wasting its pains; but if they were willing to give him a portion of their bowmen and light-armed troops, so that he could get round in the enemy's rear by some path or other which he might himself discover, he thought that he could force the approach. Obtaining what he asked for, he started from a point out of the enemy's sight, so as not to be observed by them, and advanced along the precipitous shore of the island, wherever it offered a foothold, to a point where the Lacedaemonians, trusting to the strength of the position, maintained no guard. Thus with great difficulty he barely succeeded in getting round unobserved and suddenly appeared on the high ground in the enemy's rear, striking them with consternation by this unexpected move, but far more encouraging his friends, who now saw what they were expecting. The Lacedaemonians were now assailed on both sides, and—to compare a small affair with a great one—were in the same evil case as they had been at Thermopylae; for there they had perished when the Persians got in their rear by the path, and here they were caught in the same way. Since, then, they were now assailed on both sides they no longer held out, but, fighting few against many and withal weak in body from lack of food, they began to give way. And the Athenians by this time were in possession of the approaches.

XXXVII. But Cleon and Demosthenes, realizing that if the enemy should give back ever so little more they would be destroyed by the Athenian army, put a stop to the battle and held back their own men, wishing to deliver them alive to the Athenians

1 cf. Hdt. vii. 213.
πως τοῦ κηρύγματος ἀκούσαντες ἐπικλασθεὶς τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ ἡσσηθεὶς τοῦ παρόντος δεινοῦ, ἔκρημέναν τε, εἰ βούλονται, τὰ ὅπλα παραδοῦναι καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοῦς Ἀθηναίους ὡστε βουλεύσαι ὃ τι ἄν ἐκεῖνος δοκῇ.

XXXVIII. Οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες παρεῖσαν τὰς ἀσπίδας οἱ πλείστοι καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἀνέσεισαν δηλοῦντες προσίεσθαι τὰ κεκηρυγμένα. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα γενομένης τῆς ἀνοκωξῆς ξυνήλθον ἐς λόγος ὁ τε Κλέων καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης καὶ ἐκεῖνων Στύφων ὁ Φάρακος, τῶν πρῶτον ἄρχοντων τοῦ μὲν πρῶτον τεθυνκότος, Ἐπιτάδου, τοῦ δὲ μετ’ αὐτῶν Ἰππαγρέτου ἐφηρημένου ἐν τοῖς νεκροῖς ἐτὶ ἡπτῶν κειμένου ὡς τεθνεότος, αὐτὸς τρίτος ἐφηρημένος ἀρχεῖν κατὰ νόμον, εἰ τι ἐκεῖνοι πάσχοιεν. ἔλεξε δὲ ὁ Στύφων καὶ ὁ μετ’ αὐτοῦ ὃτι βούλονται διακηρυκεύσασθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ Δακε-3 δαμονίους ὃ τι χρῆ σφᾶς ποιεῖν. καὶ ἐκεῖνως μὲν οὐδένα ἀφιέντων, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καλοῦντων ἐκ τῆς ἡπείρου κήρυκας καὶ γενομένων ἐπεροτήσεων διὰ τῆς τριάς, ὁ τελευταῖος διαπλέυσας αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἡπείρου Δακεδαμονίων ἀνήρ ἀπήγγειλεν ὅτι “Δακεδαμόνιοι κελεύουσιν ύμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ ύμῶν αὐτῶν βουλεύσασθαι μηδὲν αἰσχρῶν ποιοῦντας.” οἱ δὲ καθ’ ἐαυτοῦς βουλευσάμενοι τὰ ὅπλα παρέδοσαν καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς.

1 After τῇ γνώμῃ the MSS. have τὰ ὅπλα παραδοῦναι, which most recent editors delete, after Krüger.

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and in hopes that possibly, when they heard the herald’s proclamation, they would be broken in spirit and submit to the present danger. Accordingly, they caused the herald to proclaim that they might, if they wished, surrender themselves and their arms to the Athenians, these to decide their fate as should seem good to them.

XXXVIII. When the Lacedaemonians heard this, most of them lowered their shields and waved their hands, indicating that they accepted the terms proposed. An armistice was then arranged and a conference was held, Cleon and Demosthenes representing the Athenians and Styphon son of Pharax the Lacedaemonians. Of the earlier Lacedaemonian commanders the first, Epitadas, had been slain and Hippagretas, who had been chosen as next in succession, now lay among the fallen and was accounted dead, though he was still alive; and Styphon was third in succession, having been originally chosen, as the law prescribed, to be in command in case anything should happen to the other two. He then, and those with him, said that they wished to send a herald over to the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to ask what they must do. The Athenians, however, would not let any of them go, but themselves summoned heralds from the mainland; then, after interrogatories had been exchanged two or three times, the last man who came over to them from the Lacedaemónians on the mainland brought this message: “The Lacedaemonians bid you decide your case for yourselves, but do nothing dishonourable.” So they took counsel with one another and then surrendered themselves and their arms. During
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4 καὶ ταύτην μὲν τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τὴν ἐπιστούσαν νύκτα ἐν φυλακῇ εἶχον αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναίοι. τῇ δ’ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναίοι τροπαίουν στήσαντες ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ τάλλα διεσκευάζοντο ὡς ἐς πλοῦν καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς τριηράρχους διέδοσαν ἐς φυλακήν, οἱ δὲ Δακεδαμίμοι κηρύκα πέμψαντες τοὺς 5 νεκροὺς διεκομίσαντο. ἀπέθανον δ’ ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ καὶ ζώντες ἐλήφθησαν τοσοίτε: εἶκοσι μὲν ὀπλίται διέβησαν καὶ τετρακόσιοι οἱ πάντες· τούτων ζώντες ἐκομίσθησαν ὅκτω ἀποδέοντες τριακόσιοι, οἱ δὲ ἅλλοι ἀπέθανον. καὶ Σπαρταῖοι τούτων ἦσαν τῶν ζώντων περὶ εἶκοσι καὶ ἐκατόν. Ἀθηναίων δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ διεφθάρησαν· ἡ γὰρ μάχη οὐ σταδία ἦν.

XXXIX. Χρόνος δὲ ὁ ξύμπας ἐγένετο ὡςον οἱ ἄνδρες ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ ἐπολιορκήθησαν, ἀπὸ τῆς ναυμαχίας μέχρι τῆς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ μάχης, ἕβδομῆ- 2 κατὰ ἡμέρα καὶ δύο. τούτων περὶ εἶκοσι ἡμέρας, ἐν αἷς οἱ πρόσβεσις περὶ τῶν σπουδῶν ἀπή- σαν, ἐσιτοδοτοῦντο, τὰς δὲ ἅλλας τοῖς ἐσπλέουσι λάθρα διετρέφοντο· καὶ ἦν σύτος τὸς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ καὶ ἅλλα βρώματα ἐγκατελήφθη· ὁ γὰρ ἄρχων Ἕπιτάδας ἐνδεεστέρως ἐκάστῳ παρεἰχεν ἡ πρὸς τὴν ἐξουσίαν.

3 Οἱ μὲν δὴ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ οἱ Πελοποννησίοι ἀνεχώρησαν τῷ στρατῷ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου ἐκάτεροι ἐπὶ οἶκου, καὶ τοῦ Κλέωνος καὶ περ μαχώδης οὗτα ἤ ὑπόσχεσις ἀπέβη· ἐντὸς γὰρ εἶκοσι ἡμερῶν ἤγαγε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ὥσπερ ὑπέστη. Χλ. παρὰ γνώμην τε δὴ μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτο τοὺς "Ἐλλησιν ἐγένετο· τοὺς γὰρ

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that day and the following night the Athenians kept them under guard; but on the next day, after setting up a trophy on the island, they made all their preparations to sail, distributing the prisoners among the trierarchs for safe-keeping; and the Lacedaemonians sent a herald and brought their dead to the mainland. The number of those who had been killed or taken alive on the island was as follows: four hundred and twenty hoplites had crossed over in all; of these two hundred and ninety two were brought to Athens alive; all the rest had been slain. Of those who survived one hundred and twenty were Spartans.\textsuperscript{1} Of the Athenians, however, not many perished; for it was not a pitched battle.

XXXIX. The time during which the men on the island were under blockade, from the sea fight up to the battle on the island, amounted all told to seventy-two days. For about twenty of these days, the period during which the envoys were absent negotiating the truce, they were regularly provisioned, but the rest of the time they lived on what was smuggled in. And indeed some grain was found on the island at the time of the capture, as well as other articles of food; for the commander Epitadas was accustomed to give each man a scantier ration than his supplies would have allowed.

The Athenians and Peloponnesians now withdrew from Pylos and returned home with their respective forces, and Cleon's promise, mad as it was, had been fulfilled; for within twenty days he brought the men as he had undertaken to do. XL. Of all the events of this war this came as the greatest surprise to the Hellenic world; for men could not conceive that the

\textsuperscript{1} i.e. citizens of Sparta, the rest being from the neighbouring towns of the Perioeci; cf. ch. viii. 1.

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Συνεχίζοντας, ούτε λιμᾷ οὔτε ἀνάγκη οὐδεμᾶ
 ἥξιον τὰ ὄπλα παραδοῦναι, ἀλλὰ ἐχοῦται καὶ
 2 μαχομένους ἕως ἐδύνατο ἀποθυγάζειν, ἀπιστοῦντες 1 μὴ εἶναι τοὺς παραδόντας τοῖς τεθνεώσιν ὦμοίους. καὶ τινὸς ἐρομένου ποτὲ ύστερον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμάχων δι' ἀχθηδόνα 2 ἔνα τῶν ἐκ τῆς νήσου αἰχμαλώτων εἰ ὦ τεθνεώτες αὐτῶν καλοὶ κάγαθοι, ἀπεκρίνατο αὐτῷ πολλοὶ ἄν ἄξιον εἶναι τὸν ἀτρακτοῦ, λέγον τὸν οίιστόν, εἰ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς διεσύγγνωσκε, δήλωσιν ποιούμενος ὦτι ὦ ἐντυγχάνων τοῖς τε λίθοις καὶ τοξεύμασι διεφθείρετο.

ΧΧΙ. Κομισθέντων δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβούλευσαν δεσμοῦς μὲν αὐτοὺς φυλάσσειν μέχρι ὅτε τὴν ξυμβώσιν, ἂν δὲ οἱ Πελοπόννησοι πρὸ τοῦτον ἐσὶ τὴν γῆν ἐσβάλλουσι, ἔξαγαγόντες 2 ἀποκτεῖναι. τῆς δὲ Πύλου φυλακὴν κατεστῆσαντο, καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Ναυπάκτου Μεσσήνωι ὁς ἐσὶ πατρίδα τάυτην (ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ Πύλος τῆς Μεσσηνίδος ποτὲ οὐδεὶς γῆς) τέμναντες σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἐλήξουσι τε τῆν Δακωνίκην 3 καὶ πλείστα ἐξβλαπτοῦν ὁμόφωνοι ὄντες. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ ληστεία καὶ του τοιοῦτο πολέμου, τῶν τε Εἰλῶτων αὐτομολούντων καὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ μακρότερον σφίσι τι νέωτεροθῇ τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν, οὐ ραδίως ἐφεροῦν, ἀλλὰ, καίπερ οὐ βοηλόμενοι ἐνδηλοὶ εἰναι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ἐπρεσ-

1 So Hude, with M; most other MSS. ἀπιστοῦντες τε.
2 δι' ἀχθηδόνα, deleted by Hude, after Rutherford.

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BOOK IV. xl. i—xli. 3

Lacedaemonians would ever be induced by hunger or any other compulsion to give up their arms, but thought that they would keep them till they died, fighting as long as they were able; and they could not believe that those who had surrendered were as brave as those who had fallen. And when one of the Athenian allies sometime afterwards sneeringly asked one of the captives taken on the island, whether the Lacedaemonians who had been slain were brave men and true,¹ the answer was, that the shaft, meaning the arrow, would be worth a great deal if it could distinguish the brave, intimating that it was a mere matter of chance who was hit and killed by stones and bow-shots.

XLI. When the captives were brought to Athens, the Athenians determined to keep them in prison until some agreement should be reached, but if before that the Peloponnesians should invade their territory, to bring them out and put them to death. They also placed a garrison in Pylos, and the Messenians at Naupactus, regarding this territory as their fatherland—for Pylos belongs to the country that was once Messenia—sent thither such of their own number as were best fitted for the task and proceeded to ravage the Laconian territory, and they did a great deal of damage, since they were men of the same speech as the inhabitants. As for the Lacedaemonians, they had never before experienced predatory warfare of this kind, and therefore, when the Helots began to desert and there was reason to fear that the revolutionary movement might gain still further headway in their territory, they were uneasy, and, in spite of their desire not to betray their alarm

¹ Implying that the survivors were not.
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βεύνοντο παρ’ αὐτοῦς καὶ ἐπειρᾶντο τὴν τε Πύλον
καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρὰς κομίζεσθαι. οἱ δὲ μειξόνων τε
ὡρέγοντο καὶ πολλάκις φοιτῶντων αὐτοῦς ἀπράκ-
τους ἀπέπεμπον. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ περὶ Πύλον
γενόμενα.

XLII. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ θέρους μετὰ ταῦτα εὐθὺς
'Αθηναίοι ἐς τὴν Κορινθίαν ἐστράτευσαν ναυσίν
ὀγδοῆκοντα καὶ δισχιλίοις ὀπλίταις ἑαυτῶν καὶ
ἐν ἵππαργῳν καὶ διακισίοις ἱππεύσιν ἰκο-
λούθον δὲ καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Μιλήσιοι καὶ
'Ανδριοὶ καὶ Καρύστιοι, ἐστρατήγηε δὲ Νικίας
ὁ Νικηφάτου τρίτος αὐτός. πλέοντες δὲ ἀμα ἢρ
ἐσχόν μεταξὺ Χερσονήσου τε καὶ Ἡράτου ἐς τὸν
ἀιγιαλὸν τοῦ χωρίου ὑπέρ οὐ ὁ Σολύγειος λόφος
ἐστίν, ἐφ’ δὴ Δωρίης τὸ πάλαι ἰδρυθέντες τοῖς ἐν
τῇ πόλει Κορινθίοις ἐπολέαμον οὕσων Αὐστεύσιν,
καὶ κόμη νῦν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ Σολύγεια καλουμένη
ἐστίν. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ τοῦτον ἔθηκα αἱ ὅρις
κατέσχον ἡ μὲν κόμη αὐτὴ δῶδεκα σταδίους
ἀπέχει, ἡ δὲ Κορινθιών πόλις ἐξῆκοντα, ὃ δὲ
3 ἵσθμος εἴκοσι. Κορίνθιοι δὲ προπυθόμενοι ἐξ
'Ἀργοὺς ὅτι ἡ στρατιὰ ἤξει τῶν 'Αθηναίων ἐκ
πλείονοι ἐβοήθησαν ἐς ἵσθμον πάντες πλὴν τῶν
ἐξω ἵσθμον. καὶ ἐν Ἀμπρακία καὶ ἐν Λευκάδι
ἀπήσαν αὐτῶν πεντακόσιοι φρουροὶ· οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι
πανδημεῖ ἐπετήρουν τοὺς 'Αθηναίους οἱ κατα-

1 At the time when the Dorians, under the leadership of
the Heracleidae, got possession of the Peloponnesus (cf. i.
xii. 3). See Busolt, Gr. Gesch. i2. 208.

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BOOK IV. xli. 3—xlIII. 3

to the Athenians, kept sending envoys to them in the endeavour to recover Pylos and the prisoners. But the Athenians constantly made greater demands and the envoys, although they came again and again, were always sent home unsuccessful. Such were the events at Pylos.

XLII. During the same summer and directly after these events the Athenians made an expedition into Corinthian territory with eighty ships and two thousand Athenian hoplites, together with two hundred cavalry on board horse-transport; allied forces also went with them, namely Milesian, Andrian, and Carystian troops, the whole being under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus and two others. These sailed and at day-break landed midway between the peninsula Chersonesus and the stream Rheitus, at a point on the beach over which rises the Solygeian hill—the hill where the Dorians in olden times¹ established themselves when they made war upon the Corinthians in the city, who were Aeolians; and there is still on the hill a village called Solygeia. From this point on the beach where the ships put in to shore this village is twelve stadia distant, the city of Corinth sixty, and the Isthmus twenty. But the Corinthians, having previous information from Argos that the Athenian army would come, had long before occupied the Isthmus with all their forces, except those who dwelt north of the Isthmus and five hundred Corinthians who were away doing garrison duty in Ambracia² and Leucas; all the rest to a man were now there, watching to see where the Athenians

² Three hundred of these had been sent the previous winter to Ambracia, which was a Corinthian colony; cf. III. cxiv. 4.
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4 σχήσουσιν. ώς δὲ αὐτοὺς ἔλαθον νυκτὸς κατα-πλεύσαντες καὶ τὰ σημεῖα αὐτοῖς ἦρθη, καταλι-πόντες τοὺς ἡμίσεις αὐτῶν ἐν Κεγκρείᾳ, ἦν ἀρα
οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ τὸν Κρομμυώνα ἠσσίν, ἐβοήθουν
κατὰ τάχος.

XLIII. Καὶ Βάττος μὲν ὁ ἄτερος τῶν στρατη-
γῶν (δύο γὰρ ἦσαν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ οἱ παρόντες)
λαβὼν λόχον ἠλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Σολύγειαν κώμην
φυλάξων ἀτείχιστον οὕτων, Δυκόφρων δὲ τοῖς
2 ἄλλοις ξυνέβαλεν. καὶ πρῶτα μὲν τῷ δεξιῷ
κέρα τῶν Ἀθηναίων εὐθὺς ἀποβεβηκότι πρὸ τῆς
Χερσονήσου οἱ Κορινθιοὶ ἐπέκειντο, ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ
τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατεύματι. καὶ ἦν ἡ μάχη καρτερὰ
3 καὶ ἐν χερσὶ πᾶσα. καὶ τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν
'Αθηναίων καὶ Καρυστίων (οὗτοι γὰρ παρα-
τεταγμένοι ἦσαν ἑσχατοί) ἐδέξαντό τε τοὺς
Κορινθίους καὶ ἐώσαντο μόλις· οἱ δὲ ὑποχωρή-
σαντες πρὸς αἰμασίαν (ἡν γὰρ τὸ χωρίον πρόσ-
αντες πάν) βάλλοντες τοὺς λίθους καθύπερθεν
ὀντες καὶ παιανίσαντες ἐπῆσαν αὕτις, δεξαμένων
δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν χερσὶν ἦν πάλιν ἡ μάχη.

4 λόχος δὲ τις τῶν Κορινθίων ἐπιβοηθῆσας τῷ
εὐωνύμῳ κέρα ἐαυτῶν ἔτρεφε τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ
δεξιὸν κέρας καὶ ἐπεδίωξεν ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν
πάλιν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἀνέστρεψαν οἱ τε 'Αθη-
ναίοι καὶ οἱ Καρυστίοι. τὸ δὲ ἄλλο στρατόπεδον
ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐμάχετο ξυνεχώς, μάλιστα δὲ τὸ
δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Κορινθίων, ἐφ᾽ ὧν ὁ Δυκόφρων

1 The Corinthian eastern haven, seventy stadia from the
city.
2 The chief place on this coast-line between the Isthmus

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would land. But when the Athenians eluded them by making their landing by night and the Corinthians were notified by the raising of fire-signals, these left half of their troops at Cenchraeae, in case the Athenians should after all go against Crommyon, and in haste rushed to the defence.

XLIII. Thereupon Battus, one of the two Corinthian generals present at the battle, took a company and went to the village of Solygeia, which was unwalled, to guard it, while Lycophron attacked with the remainder of their troops. Now at first the Corinthians assailed the right wing of the Athenians, which had just disembarked in front of Chersonesus, and afterwards engaged the rest of the army also. The battle was stubbornly contested throughout and fought at close quarters. The Athenian right wing, at whose extremity were stationed the Carystians, received the charge of the Corinthians and drove them back, though with difficulty; but the latter retreated to a stone fence and, since the ground was everywhere a steep slope, pelted the Athenians with stones, being on higher ground, and then, raising the paean, charged a second time. The Athenians received the charge and the battle was again waged at close quarters. Then a company of the Corinthians, reinforcing their own left wing, routed the right wing of the Athenians and pursued it to the sea; but again upon reaching the ships the Athenians and Carystians rallied. The other divisions of the two armies were continuously engaged, especially the right wing of the Corinthians, where Lycophron was in command against the

and Megara, some 120 stadia from Corinth, known as the haunt of the wild boar killed by Theseus (Paus. i. xxvii. 9; ii. i. 3).
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διν κατὰ τὸ ευώνυμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἡμύνετο· ἥλπιζον γὰρ αὐτούς ἐπὶ τὴν Σολύγειαν κῶμην πειράσειν.

XLIV. Χρόνων μὲν οὖν πολὺν ἀντείχον οὐκ ἐνδιδόντες ἄλληλοι· ἔπειτα (ἠσαν γὰρ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις οἱ ἱππῆς ὠφέλιμοι ξυμμαχόμενοι, τῶν ἔτερων οὐκ ἐχοῦτων ἱπποὺς) ἑτράποντο οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ ὑπεχώρησαν πρὸς τὸν λόφον καὶ ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα 2 καὶ οὐκέτι κατέβαινον, ἀλλ' ἥσυχαζον. ἐν δὲ τῇ τροπῇ ταύτῃ κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας οἱ πλείστοι τε αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον καὶ Λυκόφρων ὁ στρατηγὸς. ἦ δὲ ἄλλη στρατιά τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ οὐ κατὰ διώξιν πολλὴν οὐδὲ ταχείας φυγῆς γενομένης, ἐπεὶ ἐβιάσθη, ἐπαναχωρήσατο πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα ὕδρυθη. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι, ὡς οὐκέτι αὐτοῖς ἐπήσαν 3 ἐς μάχην, τοὺς τε νεκροὺς ἐσκύλευον καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἀνηροῦντο, ὑποτείνοντες εὐθεῖας ἔστησαν. 4 τοῖς δ' ἠμίσεσι τῶν Κορινθίων, οἱ ἐν τῇ Κεγχρείᾳ ἐκάθηντο φύλακες, μὴ ἐπὶ τῶν Κρομμυδώνα πλεῦσώσι, τούτοις οὐ κατάδηλος ἢ μάχη ἤν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄρους τοῦ Ὀνείον· κοινοτάν δὲ ὡς εἶδον καὶ ὡς ἐγνώσαν, ἐβοήθεον εὐθὺς. ἐβοήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πρεσβύτεροι τῶν Κορινθίων αἰσθό- 5 μενοι τὸ γεγενημένον. ἱδόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξύμπαντας αὐτοὺς ἐπιόντας καὶ νομίζαντες τῶν ἐγγὺς ἀστυνειτώνων Πελοποννησίων βοήθειαν ἐπιέναι, ἄνεχόρουν κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, ἔχοντες τὰ σκυλεύματα καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νεκροὺς πλὴν δυσῶν, οὐς ἐγκατέλιπον οὐ δυνάμενοι εὑρέων.

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Athenian left and kept it in check; for they expected the Athenians to make an attempt against the village of Solygeia.

XLIV. For a long time they held out, neither side yielding to the other. Then as the Athenians had an advantage in the support of their cavalry, whereas the other side had no horses, the Corinthians turned and retired to the hill, where they halted, and did not come down again but remained quiet. In this repulse it was on their right wing that most of the Corinthians that were lost were killed, among them Lycophron the general. But the rest of the Corinthian army retired in this manner—there was no long pursuit nor hasty flight, but when it was forced back, it withdrew to the higher ground and there established itself. As for the Athenians, when the enemy no longer came against them and offered battle, they stripped the corpses, took up their own dead, and straightway set up a trophy. Meanwhile the other half of the Corinthian forces, which was stationed at Cenchraeae as a garrison to prevent the Athenians from making a descent upon Crommyon, were unable to see the battle because Mt. Oneium intervened; but when they saw the cloud of dust and realized what was going on, they rushed thither at once, as did also the older men in the city of Corinth when they perceived what had happened. But the Athenians, seeing the whole throng advancing and thinking it to be a detachment of the neighbouring Peloponnesians coming to assist the Corinthians, withdrew in haste to their ships, having their spoils and the bodies of their own dead, except two, which they left behind because they were not able to find them.
6 καὶ ἀναβάντες ἐπὶ τὰς ναύς ἐπεραιώθησαν ἐς τὰς ἐπικείμενας νῆσους, ἐκ δὲ αὐτῶν ἐπικηρυκευσάμενοι τοὺς νεκροὺς οὕς ἐγκατέλιπσαν ὑποστόνδους ἀνείλοντο. ἀπέθανον δὲ Κορινθιῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ μίχῃ δώδεκα καὶ διακόσιοι, Ἄθηναιῶν δὲ ὀλίγοι ἐλάσσονες πεντήκοντα.

XLV. Ἀραντες δὲ ἐκ τῶν νῆσων οἱ Ἄθηναιοι ἐπλευσαν αὐθημερῶν ἐς Κρομμυώνα τῆς Κορινθίας. ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς πόλεως εἰκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν σταδίων. καὶ καθορμισάμενοι τὴν τε γῆν ἐδήσαν 2 καὶ τὴν νύκτα ἑλίσαντο. τῇ δὲ ἀστεραίᾳ παραπλεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδαύριαν πρῶτον καὶ ἀπόβασιν τινα ποιησάμενοι ἄφικοντο ἐς Μέθανα τὴν μεταξὺ Ἐπιδαύρου καὶ Τροχήνος, καὶ ἀπολαβόντες τὸν τῆς χερσονήσου ἱσθμὸν ἐτείχισαν ἐν ἡ ἡ Μέθανα ἔστι. καὶ φρούριον καταστήσαντο ἐλήστευον τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον τὴν τε Τροχήνιαν γῆν καὶ Ἄλιάδα καὶ Ἐπιδαύριαν. ταῖς δὲ ναυσίν, ἐπειδὴ ἐξετείχισαν τὸ χώριον, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐπὶ οἴκου.

XLVI. Κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον, καθ’ δὲ 2 ταῦτα ἐγίγνετο, καὶ Εὐρυμέδων καὶ Σοφοκλῆς, ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου ἀπήραν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ναυσίν Ἀθηναίων, ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Κέρκυραν ἐστράτευσαν μετά τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὀρεί τῆς Ἰστώνης Κερκυραίων καθιδρυμένους, οἱ τότε μετὰ τὴν στάσιν διαβάντες ἐκράτουν τε τῆς 2 γῆς καὶ πολλὰ ἐξβλάπτουν. προσβάλοντες δὲ τὸ

1 MSS. give Μέθανη, but Strabo states that the true name is Μέθανα. Lower down the MSS. read ἐν δὴ Ἡ Μέθανη ἔστι, which many editors bracket. If it is retained, ἐν δὴ must be read for ἐν δ’, as Μέθανα lay, not on the Isthmus, but on the west coast of the peninsula. 2 καθ’ δὲ, with CGM, omitted by ABCEF.
BOOK IV. xlv. 6—xlvi. 2

So they embarked and crossed over to the adjacent islands, and sending thence a herald recovered under truce the bodies which they had left behind. There were slain in this battle two hundred and twelve of the Corinthians, and of the Athenians somewhat fewer than fifty.

XLV. Setting out from the islands, the Athenians sailed the same day to Crommyon in Corinthian territory, which is distant a hundred and twenty stadia from the city, and coming to anchor ravaged the land and bivouacked during the night. The next day sailing along the coast they came first to the territory of Epidaurus, where they made a landing, and then to Methana, between Epidaurus and Troezen, where they walled off the neck of the peninsula on which Methana lies. Here they left a garrison, which afterward occupied itself with marauding excursions into the territory of Troezen, Haliae, and Epidaurus. But the fleet sailed back to Athens as soon as the fortifications at Methana had been completed.

XLVI. It was at this time, while these events were occurring, that Eurymedon and Sophocles, setting sail from Pylos for Sicily with an Athenian fleet, arrived at Corcyra. There they took part with the men from the city in an expedition against the Corcyraeans who had established themselves on Mt. Istone, and who at this time, after crossing over thither subsequently to the revolution, were dominating the country and doing a great deal of damage. The stronghold was taken by assault, but the men in

1 cf. ch. viii. 3; xxix. 1.
2 The democrats who had held the city since 427 B.C. (cf. iii. lxxv.).
THUCYDIDES

μὲν τείχισμα εἶλον, οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες καταπεφευγότες ἀθρόοι πρὸς μετέωρόν τι ξυνέβησαν ὡστε τοὺς μὲν ἐπικούρους παραδούναι, περὶ δὲ σφῶν τὰ ὑπλα παραδόντων τὸν Ἀθηναίων δήμου διαγρώναι.

3 καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐς τὴν νῆσον οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν Πτυχίαν ἐς φυλακὴν διεκόμισαν ὑποσπόνδους, μέχρι οὗ Ἀθήνας πεμφθῶσιν, ὡστε ἕαν τις ἀλῆ ἀποδίδαις, ἀπασι λελύσθαι τὰς σπουδὰς. οἱ δὲ τοῦ δήμου προστάται τῶν Κερκυραίων, δεδιότες μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς ἐλθόντας σὺν ἀποκτείνωσι, μὴ ἵνα ἀπανωτέρωσι τοιοῦτοι τῶν ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ τινὰς ὄλγους, ὑποπέμψαντες φίλους καὶ διδάκτιους ὡς κατ’ εὐνοίαν ἄλλοι δὲ λέγειν ὤτι κρατίστον αὐτοῖς εἰθεὶ ὡς τάχιστα ἀποδρᾶναι, πλοῖον δὲ τι αὐτοὶ ἐποιμάσειν μέλλειν γὰρ δὴ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων παραδώσειν αὐτοὺς τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Κερκυραίων. XLVII. ὅσο δὲ ἐπείσθησαν καὶ μηχανησαμένοι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκπέλευτες ἐλήφθησαν, ἐλένυντο τε αἱ σπουδαὶ καὶ τοῖς Κερκυραίοις 2 παρεδόντοι οἱ πάντες. ξυνελάβοντο δὲ τοῦ τοιούτου οὖν ἡκιστα, ὡστε ἀκριβῶς τὴν πρόφασιν γενέσθαι καὶ τοὺς τεχνησαμένους ἀδεέστερον ἐγχειρῆσαι, οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατάδηλοι ὄντες τοὺς ἄνδρας μὴ ἀν βούλεσθαι ὡπ’ ἄλλων κομισθέντας, διότι αὐτοὶ ἐς Σικελίαν ἔπλεον, τῇ τιμήν τοῖς ἁγούσι προσποίησαν.

3 παραλαβόντες δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐς οἰκήμα
it fled in a body to some high ground and there capitulated, on condition that they should surrender their mercenary troops and give up their arms, leaving it to the Athenian people to decide upon their own fate. The generals accordingly conveyed the men under truce to the island of Ptychia\(^1\) to be kept under custody there until they should be sent to Athens, and the understanding was that if anyone should be caught trying to run away the truce should be regarded as broken for them all. But the leaders of the popular party at Corcyra were afraid that the Athenians would not put them to death on their arrival at Athens, and therefore resorted to the following stratagem. They first tried to persuade a few of the men on the island to run away, by secretly sending thither friends who were instructed to say, with a show of good will, that the best course for them was to do this with no loss of time, and promising to have a boat ready; for the Athenian generals, they explained, were intending to deliver them up to the Corcyraean populace. XLVII. And when the men had been persuaded, and were caught sailing away in the boat which the others had provided, the truce was broken and the whole party was delivered up to the Corcyraeans. But what chiefly contributed to such a result, so that the pretext seemed quite plausible and that those who devised the scheme felt little fear about putting it into effect, was the fact that the Athenian generals showed that they would not be willing, as they were bound for Sicily themselves, to have the men conveyed to Athens by others, who would thus get the credit for conducting them. Now the Corcyraeans took over the prisoners and shut them

\(^1\) cf. III. lxxv. 5; now called Vido.
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μέγα κατείρξας, καὶ ύστερον ἐξάγοντες κατὰ εἴκοσι ἄνδρας διήγον διὰ δυοῖν στοιχῶν ὀπλιτῶν ἐκατέρωθεν παρατεταγμένων, δεδεμένως τε πρὸς ἄλληλους καὶ παιομένους καὶ κεντομένους ὑπὸ τῶν παρατεταγμένων, εἰ πού τίς τίνα ἵδοι ἔχθρον ἕαντοι· μαστυγοφόροι τε παριώντες ἐπετάχυνον τῆς ὁδοῦ τοὺς σχολαίτερον προῖόντα.

XLVIII. Καὶ ἐς μὲν ἄνδρας ἐξῆκοντα ἐλαθον τοὺς ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐξαγαγόντες καὶ διαφθείραντες (ὑπὸ τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦς μεταστήσοντάς ποι ἄλλος ἐξάγειν). ὅς δὲ ἤσθοντο καὶ τις αὐτοὶς ἐδήλωσε, τοὺς τε Ἀθηναίους ἑπεκαλοῦντο καὶ ἐκέλευον σφᾶς, εἰ βούλονται, αὐτοὺς διαφθείρειν, ἐκ τοῦ οἰκήματος οὐκέτι ἦθελον ἐξιέναι, οὐδ᾽ ἐσιέναι ἐφασαν κατὰ δύναμιν περιό-2 ψεσθαι οὐδένα. οἱ δὲ Κερκυραίοι κατὰ μὲν τὰς θύρας οὐδ᾽ αὐτοὶ διενοῦντο βιάζονται, ἀναβάντες δὲ ἔπι τὸ τέγος τοῦ οἰκήματος καὶ διελόντες τὴν ὀροφὴν ἐβάλλουν τῷ κεράμῳ καὶ ἑτοξέουν κάτω.

3 οἵ δὲ ἐφιλάσσοντο τε ὡς ἐδύναντο καὶ ἀμα οἱ πολλοὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρον, οἰστοὺς τε οὗ ἀφίεσαν ἔκεινοι ἐσ τὰς σφαγὰς καθίεντες καὶ ἐκ κλινῶν τινων, αἱ ἔτυχοι αὐτοὶς ἐνοῦσαι, τοῖς σπάρτοις καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἰματίων παραιρήματα ποιοῦντες ἀπαγχόμενοι. παντὶ τε τρόπῳ τὸ πολὺ τῆς νυκτὸς (ἐπεγένετο γὰρ νυξ τῷ παθήματι) ἀνα- λούντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ βαλλόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν

1 τε added by Poppo.
up in a large building; afterwards they led them out in groups of twenty and marched them down between two lines of hoplites stationed on either side, the prisoners being bound to one another and receiving blows and stabs from the men who stood in the lines, if any of these perchance saw among them a personal enemy; and men with scourges walked by their sides to quicken the steps of such as proceeded too slowly on the way.

XLVIII. In this manner about sixty men were led out and killed without the knowledge of the men who remained in the house, who supposed that their companions were being led out in order to be transferred to some other place. But when they perceived what was going on, or were told by somebody, they appealed to the Athenians and urged them, if they wished to kill them, to do so with their own hands; and they refused thenceforth to leave the house, and declared that they would not allow anyone to enter if they could prevent it. Nor had the Corcyraeans themselves any intention of trying to force their way in by the doors, but climbing on to the top of the building and breaking through the roof they hurled tiles and shot arrows upon them from above. The men inside tried to defend themselves as best as they could, and at the same time most of them set to work to destroy themselves by thrusting into their throats the arrows which the enemy had shot or by strangling themselves with the cords from some beds that happened to be in the place or with strips made from their own garments. Thus for the greater part of the night—for night fell upon their misery—dispatching themselves in every fashion and struck by the missiles of the men on
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4 ἀνω διεφθάρησαν. καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Κερκυραίοι, ἐπειδὴ ἦμερα ἐγένετο, φορμηδὸν ἐπὶ ἀμάξας ἐπιβαλόντες ἀπῆγαγον ἐξ ἑνὶ τῆς πόλεως. τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας, ὡσαί ἐν τῷ τειχίσματι ἑάλωσαν,

5 ἡμιδραποδίσαντο. τοιούτῳ μὲν τρόπῳ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ ὄρους Κερκυραίοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου διεθάρησαν, καὶ ἡ στᾶσις πολλὴ γενομένη ἐτελεύτησεν ἐς τοῦτο, ὡσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τούδε· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἦν

6 ὑπόλοιπον τῶν ἑτέρων ὁ τι καὶ ἀξιόλογον. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ἵναπερ τὸ πρῶτον ὄρμητο, ἀποπλεύσαντες μετὰ τῶν ἑκεί ξυμμάχων ἐπολέμουν.

XLIX. Καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ Ἄκαρνάνες ἀμα τελευτῶντος τοῦ θέρους στρατευσάμενοι Ἀνακτόριον Κορινθίων πόλιν, ἢ κεῖται ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ Ἀμπρακικοῦ κόλπου, ἐλάβουν προδοσία· καὶ ἐκπέμψαντες Κορινθίους ¹ αὐτὸι Ἀκαρνάνες οἰκήτορας ² ἀπὸ πάντων ἔσχον τὸ χωρίον· καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτατα.

Ι. Τοῦ δὲ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Ἀριστείδης ὁ Ἀρχίππος, ἐις τῶν ἄργυρολογῶν νεῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγός, αἱ ἐξεπέμφθησαν πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους, Ἀρταφέρνη, ἀνδρὰ Πέρσην, παρὰ βασιλέας πορεύόμενον ἐς Δακεδαίμονα ἀνθλαμβάνει

2 ἐν Ἡμίων τῇ ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι. καὶ αὐτοῦ κομισθέντος οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τὰς μὲν ἐπιστολὰς μεταγραφάμενοι ἐκ τῶν Ἀσσυρίων γραμμάτων ἀνέγερσαν, ἐν αἷς πολλῶν ἄλλων γεγραμμένων κεφάλαιον ἦν πρὸς Δακεδαίμονις οὐ γεγυώσκειν δὲ τοι βουλοῦνται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων πρέσβεων οὐδένα ταύτα

¹ Hude deletes Κορινθίους, after Dobree.
² Hude reads οἰκήτορας, with CE.

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the roof, they perished. When day came the Corcyraeans loaded the bodies on wagons, laying them lengthwise and crosswise, and hauled them out of the city; but the women who had been captured in the fort were sold into captivity. In such fashion the Corcyraeans from the mountain were destroyed by the popular party, and the revolution, which had lasted long, ended thus, so far at least as this war was concerned; for there were no longer enough of the oligarchs left to be of any account. But the Athenians sailed for Sicily, whither they had set out in the first place, and proceeded to carry on the war in conjunction with their allies in the island.

XLIX. At the end of the same summer the Athenians at Naupactus and the Acarnanians made a campaign, and took by the treachery of its inhabitants Anactorium, a city belonging to the Corinthians which is situated at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf; and the Acarnanians, expelling the Corinthians, occupied the place with colonists drawn from all their tribes. And the summer ended.

L. During the following winter Aristides, son of Archippus, one of the commanders of the Athenian ships which had been sent to the allies to collect the revenues, arrested at Eion on the Strymon Artaphernes, a Persian, who was on his way from the King to Lacedaemon. He was conveyed to Athens, and the Athenians caused his letters to be transcribed from the Assyrian characters and read them. Many other matters were touched upon therein, but the most important, with reference to the Lacedaemonians, was that the King did not know what they wanted; for though many envoys had come to him, no two

1 Mentioned again ch. lxxv. 1 as general in these waters.
λέγειν· εἰ οὖν τι βούλονται σαφὲς λέγειν, πέμψαι
3 μετὰ τοῦ Πέρσου ἀνδρας ὡς αὐτῶν. τὸν δὲ Ἀρτα-
φέρνη ὑστερον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποστέλλουσι τριήρει
ἐς Ἐφεσον καὶ πρέσβεις ἀμα· οἱ πυθόμενοι αὐτόθι
βασιλέα Ἀρτοζέρξην τὸν Ἐξρξου νεωστὶ τεθνη-
κότα (κατὰ γὰρ τούτον τὸν χρόνον ἔτελεύτησεν)
ἐπ ὁικὸν ἀνεχώρησαν.

I. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ Χίοι τὸ τείχος
περιείλον τὸ καιῶν κελευσάντων Ἀθηναίων καὶ
ὑποπτευσάντων ἐς αὐτούς τι νεωτεριεῖν, ποιη-
σάμενοι μέντοι πρὸς 'Ἀθηναίους πίστεις καὶ
βεβαιότητα ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν μηδὲν περὶ σφάς
νεότερον θουλεύσεων. καὶ ὁ χειμῶν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ
ἐβδομον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷ δὲ ὅν
Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

II. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους εὐθὺς τοῦ τε
ἡλίου ἔκλιπτες τι ἐγένετο περὶ νουμηνίαν καὶ τοῦ
2 αὐτοῦ μηνὸς ισταμένου ἔσεισεν. καὶ οἱ Μυτι-
ληναῖων φυγάδες καὶ τῶν ἅλλων Λεσβίων, ὅμω-
μενοι οἱ πολλοί ἐκ τῆς ἥπειρου καὶ μισθωσάμενοι
ἐκ τοῦ Πελοποννήσου ἐπικουρικὸν καὶ αὐτόθεν
ξυναγείραντες, αἱροῦσι 'Ῥοίτειον, καὶ λαβόμενες
dισχείλους στατήρας Φωκάττας ἀπέδοσαν πάλιν,
3 οὐδὲν ἀδικήσαντες· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔπὶ Ἀντανδροῦ
στρατεύσαντες προδοσίας γενομένης λαμβάνουσι
τὴν πόλιν. καὶ ἦν αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τὰς τε ἄλλας

1 After a reign of forty years (465–425 b.c.).

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told the same tale; if therefore they had any definite proposal to make, they should send men to him in company with the Persian. As for Artaphernes, the Athenians afterwards sent him to Ephesus in a trireme, together with some envoys; these, however, hearing there of the recent death of King Artaxerxes son of Xerxes—for he died about that time—returned to Athens.

LI. The same winter the Chians demolished their new wall at the bidding of the Athenians, who suspected them of planning an insurrection against themselves; they, however, obtained from the Athenians pledges and such security as they could that they would adopt no harsh measures against them. And the winter ended, and with it the seventh year of this war of which Thucydides composed the history.

LII. At the very beginning of the next summer a partial eclipse of the sun took place at new moon, and in the early part of the same month an earthquake. Also the citizens of Mytilene and of the other cities of Lesbos who were in exile, the majority of them setting out from the mainland, hired some mercenaries from the Peloponnesus, gathered still others on the spot, and took Rhoeteum; but they restored it again without having done any damage, on receiving two thousand Phocaean staters. After this they made an expedition against Antandros and took the city through treachery on the part of the inhabitants. It was, in fact, their plan to free the

\[\text{\# The Phocaean stater was notorious for the badness of the gold (or rather electron); cf. Dem. xi. 36. It was worth about twenty-three silver drachmas. See Hultsch, Gr. und röm. Metrologie, 184.}\]
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πόλεις τὰς Ἀκταίας καλουμένας, ὡς πρῶτον Μυτιληναίων νεμομένων Ἀθηναῖοι εἶχον, ἐλευθεροῦν, καὶ πάντων μᾶλιστα τὴν Ἀντανδροῦ καὶ κρατουμένου αὐτῆς (ὡς τε γὰρ εὐπορία ἦν ποιεῖσθαι, αὐτόθεν ξύλων ὑπαρχόντων καὶ τῆς Ἰδης ἐπικειμένης, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα σκεύη) ῥαδίως ἀπ' αὐτῆς ὁμοφέρων τὴν τε Δέσβον ἐγγὺς οὖσαν κακώσειν καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ἴπτερῳ Αἰολικὰ πολίσματα χειρώσεσθαι, καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα παρασκευάζονται ἐμελλον.

LIII. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει ἐξήκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ δισχιλίοις ὄπλησις ἱππεύσι τε ὀλύγοις καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερών Μιλησίους καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἄγοντες ἑστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Κύθηρα· ἐστρατήγησι δὲ αὐτῶν Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ Νικόστρατος ὁ Διετρέφους καὶ Ἀὐτοκλῆς ὁ Τολμαῖος. τὰ δὲ Κύθηρα νήσου ἑστιν, ἐπίκεισθαι δὲ τῇ Δακωνικῇ κατὰ Μαλέαν· Δακεδαιμόνιοι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν περιοικῶν, καὶ κυθροδίκης ἄρχῃ ἐκ τῆς Σπάρτης διέβαινεν αὐτὸς κατὰ ἔτος, ὀπλιτῶν τε φρουρὰν διέπεμπον αἰεὶ καὶ πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιοῦντο.

3 ἦν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν τε ἀπ' Ἀγώνπου καὶ Διβύς ὄλκαδων προσβολῆ, καὶ λησταὶ ἀμα τὴν Δακωνικὴν Ἰσσον ἔλυσεν ἐκ θαλάσσης, ἦπερ μόνον οἶνον τε ἦν κακοουργεῖσθαι· πᾶσα γὰρ ἀνέχει πρὸς τὸ Σικελικὸ καὶ Κρητικὸν πέλαγος. LIV. κατασχόντες οὖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῷ στρατῷ δέκα

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1 i.e. of the ἄκτη or promontory of the mainland north of Lesbos. These had been taken from Mytilene by Paches (cfr. III. l. 3). They are mentioned also C.I.A. i. 37.
2 i.e. if Cythera were well guarded.

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rest of the cities known as the Actaean cities, which had hitherto been in the possession of the Athenians, though inhabited by Mytilenaesans, and above all Antandros. Having strengthened this place, where there was every facility for building ships—timber being available on the spot and Ida being near at hand—as well as for providing other equipments of war, they could easily, making it the base of their operations, not only ravage Lesbos, which was near, but also master the Aeolic towns on the mainland. Such were the plans upon which they were preparing to embark.

LIII. During the same summer the Athenians with sixty ships, two thousand hoplites, and a small detachment of cavalry, taking with them also some Milesians and others of their allies, made an expedition against Cythera. In command of the expedition were Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes, and Autocles son of Tolmaeus. Now Cythera is an island adjacent to Laconia, lying off Malea; its inhabitants are Lacedaemonians of the class of the Perioeci, and an official called the Bailiff of Cythera used to cross over thither once a year from Sparta; they also used regularly to send over a garrison of hoplites and paid much attention to the place. For it served them as a port of call for merchant ships from Egypt and Libya, and, moreover, pirates would be less likely to annoy Laconia from the sea, on which side alone it could be harmed; for the whole coast runs out towards the Sicilian and the Cretan seas. LIV. So then the Athenians, putting in at Cythera with their armament, consisting of ten

8 Others take παρα of the island, which forms as it were a bastion "running out into the Sicilian and Cretan seas."
μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ δισχίλιοις Μιλησίων ὀπλίταις τὴν ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πόλιν Σκάνδειαν καλου-
μένην αἰροῦσι, τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ στρατεύματι ἀπο-
βάντες τῆς νῆσου ἐς τὰ πρὸς Μαλέαν τετραμ-
μένα ἐγώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης 1 πόλιν
τῶν Κυθηρίων, καὶ ήγουν εὐθὺς αὐτοὺς ἐστρα-
τοπεδευμένους ἀπαντας. καὶ μάχης γεγομένης
ὅλιγον μὲν τινα χρόνου ὑπέστησαν οἱ Κυθῆριοι,
ἐπειτα τραπόμενοι κατέφυγον ἐς τὴν ἄνω πόλιν,
καὶ ὑστερον ξυνέβησαν πρὸς Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς
ξυνάρχοντας Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιτρέψαι περὶ σφῶν
3 αὐτῶν πλην θανάτου. ἦσαν δὲ τινες καὶ γεγομένουι
τῷ Νικία λόγου πρότερον πρὸς τινας τῶν Κυθη-
ρίων, δι’ δὲ καὶ θάσσον καὶ ἐπιτητείθερον τὸ τε
παραντικα καὶ τὸ ἐπειτα τὰ 2 τῆς ὁμολογίας
ἐπράξθη αὐτοῖς· ἀνέστησαν γὰρ ἄν 3 οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι
Κυθηρίους, Δακεδαιμονίους τε ὄντας καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ
4 Δακονικῇ τῆς νῆσου οὕτως ἐπικειμένης. μετὰ δὲ
τὴν ξύμβασιν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆν τε Σκάνδειαν τὸ
ἐπὶ τῷ λιμένι πόλισμα παραλαβόντες καὶ τῶν
Κυθῆρων φυλακῆν ποιησάμενοι ἐπλέυσαν ἐς τε
ἡ Ἀσίνην καὶ Ἔλος καὶ τὰ πλείστα τῶν περὶ
θάλασσαν, καὶ ἀποβάσεις ποιούμενοι καὶ ἐναυλι-

1 Stahl's conjecture for ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ of the MSS., which is
deleted by Hude, following Krüger.
2 τὰ, omitted by the best MSS. ἄν, added by Heilmann.

1 An incredibly large number. In viii. xxv. 2, where
they are in their own land, the Milesians can oppose to the
enemy only 800 hoplites. Nor would ten ships suffice for so
many epibatae. Perhaps there is a confusion in the numeri-
cal sign, due to a抄yist.
2 The haven of Cythera, some ten stadia distant from that
city.

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ships and two thousand Milesian hoplites,1 took the city by the sea called Scandeia;2 then, with the rest of their forces landing on the part of the island which looks toward Malea, they advanced against the city of Cythera which is away from the sea,3 where they found that all the inhabitants had immediately established themselves in camp. A fight ensued, in which the Cytherians stood their ground for some little time, then turned and fled to the upper town, but afterwards capitulated to Nicias and his colleagues, agreeing to leave the question of their own fate, except as to a penalty of death, to the arbitration of the Athenians. Some negotiations between Nicias and certain of the Cytherians had already taken place, and for this reason the settlement of the terms, both for the present and the future, was arranged more speedily and with better advantage to them; for otherwise the Athenians would have expelled the inhabitants, since they were Lacedaemonians and the island lay in that position on the coast of Laconia. After the capitulation the Athenians took possession of Scandeia, the town at the harbour, and having taken precautions for guarding Cythera, then sailed to Asine, Helus, and most of the other towns on the seacoast; here they made raids or bivouacked at whatever place they

3 It seems necessary to adopt Stahl’s conjecture ἀνὴρ ἑλάντας, or delete ἐπὶ ἑλάντας. "One division of the Athenian force landed at Scandeia, another, disembarking on the N.E. coast, marched on the capital. The second force found the Cytherians prepared to meet them; in the battle which ensued the Cytherians were routed, and fled to the upper city, i.e. the capital. This explanation is borne out by existing remains. See Frazer’s Pausanias, iii. 385, 386; also Weil in Mittheil. d. Arch. Inst. in Athen. v. 224–243." (Spratt.)
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ξώμενοι τῶν χωρίων οὐ καίρος εἰη ἐδήσουν τὴν γῆν ἡμέρας μάλιστα ἐπτά.

LV. Οἱ δὲ Δακεδαίμονιοι, ἰδόντες μὲν τὸν Ἄθηναίους τὰ Κύθηρα ἔχοντας, προσδεχόμενοι δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν σφῶν ἀποβάσεις τοιαύτας ποιήσεσθαι, ἀθρόω μὲν οὐδαμοῦ τῇ δυνάμει ἀντετάξαντο, κατὰ δὲ τὴν χώραν φρουρᾶς διέπεμψαν, ὅπλων πλήθος, ὥς ἐκασταχόσε ἐδει, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν φυλακῇ πολλῇ ἦσαν, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσαι νεώτερον τι γένηται τῶν περὶ τὴν κατάστασιν, γεγενημένου μὲν τοῦ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πάθους ἀνελπίσστου καὶ μεγάλου, Πύλου δὲ ἔχομένης καὶ Κυθήρων καὶ πανταχόθεν σφᾶς περιεστότος πολέμου 2 ταχέος καὶ ἀπροφυλάκτου, ἀςτε παρὰ τὸ εἰώθος ἴππεας τετρακοσίους κατεστήσαντο καὶ τοξότας, ἐς τὰ πολεμικά, εἴπερ ποτὲ, μάλιστα δὴ ὅκυνηρότεροι ἐγένοντο ξυνεστώτες παρὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν σφῶν ἰδέαν τῆς παρασκευῆς ναυτικῆς ἀγώνι, καὶ τοῦτῳ πρὸς Ἄθηναίους, ὡς τὸ μὴ ἐπιχειρούμενον αἰεὶ ἐλλιπῆς ἣν τῆς δοκήσεως τι πράξεων 3 καὶ ἄμα τὰ τῆς τύχης πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ὅλῳ ἄγως ἔμμβαντα παρὰ λόγον αὐτοῖς ἐκπληξίν μεγίστην παρείχε, καὶ ἐδέδουσαν μὴ ποτὲ αὕθις ἔμφορά τις 4 αὐτοῖς περιτύχη ὧδα καὶ ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ, ἀτολμότεροι δὲ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐς τὸς máχας ἦσαν καὶ πᾶν ὅ τοι κυνήσεων φόντο ἀμαρτήσεσθαι διὰ τὸ τὴν γνώμην ἀνεχέγγυνον γεγενήσθαι ἐκ τῆς πρὶν ἀνθείας τοῦ κακοπραγείν.

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found convenient, and ravaged the land for about seven days.

LV. The Lacedaemonians, though they saw the Athenians in possession of Cythera and expected them to make such descents upon their own territory, nowhere massed their forces to oppose them, but sent garrisons here and there throughout the country, determining the number of hoplites by the strength needed at each point, and otherwise were very watchful, fearing lest some revolution should take place which would affect their constitution; for the calamity which had befallen them at the island of Sphacteria had been great and unexpected, Pylos and Cythera were occupied, and on all sides they were encompassed by a war which moved with a swiftness which defied precaution. Consequently they organized, contrary to their custom, a force of four hundred cavalry and bowmen, and in military matters they now became more timid than at any time before they were involved in a naval struggle which was outside their own existing scheme of military organisation, and that too against Athenians, with whom an attempt foregone was always so much lost of what they had reckoned on accomplishing.\(^1\) Besides, the reverses of fortune, which had befallen them unexpectedly in such numbers and in so short a time, caused very great consternation, and they were afraid that some time a calamity might again come upon them like that which had happened on the island; and on this account they showed less spirit in their fighting, and whatever move they might make they thought would be a failure, because they had lost all self-confidence in consequence of having been hitherto unused to adversity.

\(^1\) \textit{cf.} I. lxx. 7.
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LVII. Τούτος δὲ Ἀθηναίοις τότε τὴν παραθαλάσσιον δησοῦι τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἴσχασαν, ὡς καθ’ ἐκάστην φρουράν γίγνοιτο τις ἀπόβασις, πλῆθει τε ἐλάσσους ἔκαστοι ἤγομενοι εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ μία δὲ φρουρά, ἦπερ καὶ ἡμύνατο περὶ Κοτύραν καὶ Ἀφροδιτίαν, τὸν μὲν ὄχλον τῶν γυνῶν ἐσκεδασμένον ἐφόβησεν ἐπιδρομή, τῶν δὲ ὀπλιτῶν δεξαμένων ὑπεχώρησε πάλιν, καὶ ἄνδρες τέ τινες ἀπέθανον αὐτῶν ὄλγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἐλήφθη, τροπαίοιν τε στήσαντες οἳ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέπλευσαν ἔς Κύθηρα. ἐκ δὲ αὐτῶν περιέπλευσαν ἐς Ἔπιδαυρον τὴν Διμηράν, καὶ δησάντες μέρος τι τῆς γῆς ἄφικονται ἐπὶ Θυρέαν, ἥ ἐστι μὲν τῆς Κυνουρίας γῆς καλουμένης, μεθορία δὲ τῆς Ἀργείας καὶ Δακωνικῆς. νεμόμενοι δὲ αὐτὴν ἔδωσαν Δακεδαλίμοιοι Ἀιγινήταις ἐκπεσοῦσιν ἐνοκείων διά τε τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν σεισμῶν σφίσι γενομένας καὶ τῶν Εἰλώτων τὴν ἐπανάστασιν εὐργεσίας καὶ ὅτι Ἀθηναίοις ὑπακούοντες ὃμως πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων γνώμην αἰεὶ ἐστάσιν.

LVIII. Προσπλέοντων όν εἴτε τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ Ἀιγινήται τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ δ ἐστιν οἱκοδομοῦντες τεῖχος ἐκλείπουσιν, ἐς τὴν ἄνω πόλιν, ἐν ή ὄκονων, ἀπεχώρησαν ἀπέχουσαν σταδίους μάλιστα δέκα τῆς θαλάσσης. καὶ αὐτοὶ τῶν Δακεδαλίμοιον φρουρά μία τῶν περὶ τὴν χώραν, ἦπερ καὶ ξυνετείχε, ξυνεσελθείν μὲν ἐς τὸ τεῖχος οὐκ ἠθέλησαν δεομένων τῶν Ἀιγινήτων, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὶς κίνδυνος ἐφαίνετο ἐς τὸ τεῖχος κατακλήσει οὐκ ἀναχωρήσαντες δέ ἐπὶ τὰ μετέωρα ὡς οὐκ ἐνόμιζον ἀξιόμαχοι εἶναι, ἡσύχασον. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι 306
LVI. Accordingly, while the Athenians were at that time ravaging their seaboard, they generally kept quiet when any descent was made upon any particular garrison, each thinking itself inferior in number and there being such depression. One garrison, however, which offered resistance in the region of Cotyrrta and Aphrodisia, frightened the scattered crowd of light-armed troops by a charge, but when it encountered hoplites retreated again, a few of their men being killed and some of their arms taken; and the Athenians, after setting up a trophy, sailed back to Cythera. From there they sailed to Epidaurus Limera, and after ravaging some part of the land came to Thyrea, which belongs to the district called Cynuria, on the border between the Argive and Laconian territories. This district the Lacedaemonians who occupied it had given to the expelled Aeginetans to dwell in, on account of the kind services shown themselves at the time of the earthquake and the uprising of the Helots, and because they had always sided with their policy, in spite of being subject to the Athenians.

LVII. While, then, the Athenians were still sailing up, the Aeginetans left the fort by the sea which they happened to be building and withdrew to the upper town, where they dwelt, at a distance of about ten stadia from the sea. Now a detachment of the Lacedaemonian troops which were distributed in garrisons about the country was assisting the Aeginetans to build this fort. But they refused to enter the fort with them, as they requested, since it seemed to them dangerous to be cooped up in it; but retreating to high ground they kept quiet, thinking themselves no match for the enemy. Meanwhile the
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κατασχόντες καὶ χωρήσαντες εὕθυς πάση τῇ στρατιᾷ αἱροῦσι τὴν Θυρέαν. καὶ τὴν τε πόλιν κατέκαυσαν καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα ἐξεπόρθησαν, τοὺς τε Αἰγινήτας, ὅσοι μὴ ἐν χερσὶ διεφθάρησαν, ἄγοντες ἀφίκοντο ἐς τὰς ’Αθήνας καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα ὅσ παρ’ αὐτοὺς ἦν τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων, Τάνταλον τὸν 4 Πατροκλέους· ἐξωγρήθη γὰρ τετρωμένος. ἦγον δὲ τινὰς καὶ ἐκ τῶν Κυθήρων ἄνδρας ὀλίγους, οὐς ἐδόκει ἀσφαλείας ἔνεκα μεταστῆσαι. καὶ τοὺς μὲν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβουλεύσαντο καταβῆσθαι ἐς τὰς νῆσους, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Κυθηρίους οἴκοιντας τὴν ἐαυτῶν φόρον τέσσαρα τάλαντα φέρειν, Αἰγινήτας δὲ ἀποκείναι πάντας ὅσοι ἐάλωσαν διὰ τὴν 5 προτέραν αἰεὶ ποτὲ ἔχθραν, Τάνταλον δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ 1 Δακεδαιμονίους καταδῆσαι.

LVIII. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐν Σικελία Καμαρίναιος καὶ Γέλαιος ἐκεχειρία γίγνεται πρῶτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους· εἶτʼ ὁ οὐς Σικελίωται ἔμελθόντες ἐς Γέλαν, ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων πρέσβεις, ἐς λόγους κατέστησαν ἀλλήλους, εἰ πως ἔμελθοντες. καὶ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ γνώμαι ἔλεγοντο ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα, διαφορομένους καὶ ἄξιοιντων, ὡς ἐκαστὸ τι ἐλασφοῦσθαι ἐνόμιζον, καὶ Ἔρμοκράτης ὁ Ἐρμωνος Συρακόσιος, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐπιείσε μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς, ἐς τὸ κοινὸν τοιοῦτος δὴ λόγους εἶπεν.

LIX. “Οὔτε πόλεως ὅν τελαξίης, ὁ Σικελίωται, τοὺς λόγους ποιήσομαι οὔτε πονουμένης μᾶλλον τῷ πολέμῳ, ἐς κοινὸν δὲ τὴν δοκοῦσαν

1 τοὺς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ, Hude deletes, after van Herwerden.

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BOOK IV. LVII. 3—LIX. 1

Athenians landed, and advancing straightway with their whole force took Thyrea. They burned the city and pillaged what was in it; but they carried to Athens all the Aeginetans who did not perish in the action, together with their Lacedaemonian commander who was present, Tantalus son of Patrocles, who was wounded and taken prisoner. They brought also a few men from Cythera, whom they thought best to remove for the sake of safety. These the Athenians determined to place for safe-keeping on the islands, and to permit the rest of the Cytherians to occupy their own territory on payment of a tribute of forty talents,¹ but to put to death all the Aeginetans who had been captured, because of their former inveterate enmity, and to imprison Tantalus along with the other Lacedaemonians captured on the island of Sphacteria.

LVIII. During the same summer, in Sicily, an armistice was first concluded between the Camarinaeans and Geloans; then representatives from all the other Sicilian cities came together in Gela and held a conference, to see whether they might not become reconciled. Many opinions were expressed for and against, the several envoys disputing and making demands according as they believed that their own rights were being prejudiced; and among the rest Hermocrates son of Hermon, the Syracusan, whose word proved to have the greatest weight with the others, spoke in the general interest ² words to this effect:

LIX. “The city which I represent, Siceliots, is not the weakest, nor is it suffering most in the war; but I propose to speak in the general interest, declaring

¹ £800, $3,840. ² Or, “before the meeting.”
μοι βελτίστην γρώμην εἶναι ἀποφαινόμενος τῇ
2 Σικελία πάση. καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ὡς
χαλεπὸν τί ἂν τις πάν τὸ ἐνὸν ἐκλέγων ἐν εἰδόσι
μακρηγοροῖς; οὖδεὶς γὰρ οὔτε ἁμαθία ἀναγκά-
ζεται αὐτὸ δράν, οὔτε φόβῳ, ἣν οἴηται τι πλέον
σχῆσειν, ἀποτρέπεται. ξυμβαινεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν
τὰ κέρδη μείζων φαίνεσθαι τῶν δεινῶν, οἳ δὲ τοὺς
κινδύνους ἔθελουσιν υφίστασθαι πρὸ τοῦ αὐτικὰ
3 τι ἐλασσοῦσθαι αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰ μὴ ἐν καιρῷ
τύχοιν ἐκάτεροι πρᾶσσοντες, αἱ παραίνεσεις
4 τῶν ξυναλλαγῶν ὡφέλειμοι. ὃ καὶ ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ
παρόντι πειθομένοις πλείστον ἂν ἄξιον γένοιτο·
tὰ γὰρ ἱδία ἔκαστοι εὑ βουλόμενοι δὴ θέσθαι τό
tε πρῶτον ἐπολεμήσαμεν καὶ νῦν πρὸς ἄλληλους
dι’ ἀντιλογίων πειρώμεθα καταλαλαγῆναι καὶ, ἢν
ἀρα μὴ προχωρήσῃ ἵσον ἐκάστῳ ἠχοντι ἀπελθεῖν,
pάλιν πολεμήσομεν.

LX. “Καίτοι γυνῶν ἔρη ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῶν
ἱδίων μόνον, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἡ ξύνοδος ἔσται,
ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐπιβουλευομένη τὴν πᾶσαν Σικελίαν,
ὡς ἐγὼ κρίνω, ὕπ’ Ἀθηναίων δυνητόμεθα ἐτι
dιασώσαι, καὶ διαλακτᾶς πολύ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων
ἀναγκαιοτέρους περὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίους νοµίζαι,
οἱ δύναμιν ἠχοντες μεγίστην τῶν Ἐλλήνων τὰς
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the opinion which seems to me the best for Sicily as a whole. As for the miseries which war entails, why should one by expressly stating all that can be said make a long harangue in the presence of those who know? For no one is either forced to make war through ignorance of what it is, or deterred from making it by fear, if he thinks he will get some advantage from it. What really happens is this, that to one side the gains appear greater than the terrors, while the other deliberately prefers to undergo the dangers rather than submit to a temporary disadvantage; but if it should turn out that these two lines of action are both inopportune, each for the side which adopts it, then some profit may come from exhortations which advise a compromise. And so with us at the present time, if we could be persuaded of the wisdom of this course it would be to our great advantage; for each of us began the war in the first place because we desired to promote our private interests. So now let us endeavour by setting forth our conflicting claims to become reconciled with each other; and then, if we do not after all succeed in securing, each of us, what is fair and just before we part, we shall go to war again.

LX. “And yet we should recognise the fact that the subject of our conference will not, if we are wise, be our private interests merely, but rather the question whether we shall still be able to save Sicily as a whole, for it is against it, in my judgment, that the Athenians are plotting; and we must consider that we have an argument far more cogent to bring us together on these matters than my words, namely, the Athenians, who possess a military power greater than that of any other Hellenic state and are now at
ΤΗΟΥΘΙΔΗΣ

tε ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν ἡρῴων ὀλγάις ναυσὶ παρόντες, καὶ ὁνόματι ἐννόμῳ ξυμμαχίας τὸ φύσει πολέμιον εὐπρεπῶς ἢ τὸ ἔμφερον καθίστανται.

2 πόλεμον γὰρ αἱρομένων ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπαγομένων αὐτούς, ἀνδρᾶς οἱ καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐπικαλομένοις αὐτοῖς ἐπιστρατεύσατε, κακῶς τε ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ποιοῦντων τέλεσι τοῖς οἰκείοις, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀμα προκοπτόντων ἐκείνους, εἰκός, ὅταν γνῶσιν ἡμᾶς τετρυχωμένους, καὶ πλέον ποτε στόλῳ ἐλθόντας αὐτοὺς τάδε πάντα πειράσασθαι ὑπὸ σφᾶς ποιεῖσθαι.

LXI. “Καίτοι τῇ ἔαυτῶν ἐκάστους, εἰ σωφρονούμεν, χρὴ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα ἐπικτωμένους μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ἑτοῖμα βλάπτοντας ξυμμάχους τε ἐπαγέσθαι καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους προσλαµβάνειν, νοµίζαι τε στάσιν μᾶλιστα φθείρειν τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν Σικελίαν, ἢ γε οἱ ἑνοκοι ξύµπαντες μὲν 2 ἐπιβουλεύοµεθα, κατὰ πόλεις δὲ διέσταμεν. ἡ χρὴ γρόντας καὶ ἱδιωτὴν ἱδιωτὴ καταλλαγῆναι καὶ πόλιν πόλει, καὶ πειράσθαι κοινὴ σφοῖξιν τὴν πᾶσαν Σικελίαν, παρεστάναι δὲ μηδὲν ὡς οἱ μὲν Δωρίης ἡμῶν πολέμοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τὸ 3 δὲ Χαλκείδικον τῇ Ἰάδι ἐξυγγενεία ἁσφάλεις. οὐ γὰρ τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, ὅτι δίχα πέφυκε, τοῦ ἐτέρου ἔθερι ἐπίσιων, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἀγαθῶν 4 ἐφίμενοι, δὲ κοινὴ κεκτήμεθα. ἐδήλωσαν δὲ νῦν ἐν τῇ τοῦ Χαλκείδικοῦ γένους παρακλήσει· τοῖς γὰρ οὐδεπώποτε σφίσι κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν
hand with a few ships watching for our mistakes, and under the lawful name of alliance are speciously trying to turn to their own advantage our natural hostility to them. For if we begin war and call them in—men who of their own accord are ready enough to intrude their forces even on those who do not ask for their intervention—and if we spend our own revenues in doing hurt to ourselves, and at the same time pave the way for their supremacy, we may well expect them, when they see that we are worn out, to come sometime with a larger armament and try to bring everything here under their sway.

LXI. "And yet, if we are prudent, we ought, each of us in behalf of his own state, to call in allies and incur dangers only when we are seeking to win what does not belong to us and not when we imperil what is already ours; and we should remember that faction is the chief cause of ruin to states and indeed to Sicily, seeing that we her inhabitants, although we are all being plotted against, are disunited, each city by itself. Recognizing these facts, we must be reconciled with each other, citizen with citizen and state with state, and join in a common effort to save all Sicily. And let no one imagine that only the Dorians among us are enemies of the Athenians, while the Chalcidians, because of their kinship with the Ionians, are safe. For it is not through hatred of one of the two races into which we are divided that they will attack us, but because they covet the good things of Sicily which we possess in common. They have just made this clear by their response to the appeal which the people of Chalcidic stock made to them;¹ for to those who have never given them aid

¹ cf. iii. lxxxvi. 3.
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προσβοηθήσασιν αὐτοῖ τὸ δίκαιον μᾶλλον τῆς
5 ξυνθήκης προθύμως παρέσχοντο. καὶ τοὺς μὲν
'Αθηναίους ταῦτα πλεονεκτεῖν τε καὶ προνοεῖσθαι
πολλὴ ξυγγνώμη, καὶ οὐ τοῖς ἄρχειν βουλομένωις
μέμφομαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑπακοῦειν ἔτοιμοτέροις
οὕσων πέφυκε γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον διὰ παντὸς
ἄρχειν μὲν τοῦ εἰκονος, φυλάσσεσθαι δὲ τὸ
6 ἐπίον. ὃσοι δὲ γυγνώσκοντες αὐτὰ μὴ ὀρθῶς
προσκοποῦμεν, μηδὲ τοῦτο τις πρεσβύτατον ἦκει
crinas, τὸ κοινὸς φοβερὸν ἀπαντᾶς εὐθέαθα,
7 ἀμαρτάνομεν. τάχιστα δὴ ἀν ἀπαλλαγῇ αὐτοῦ
gένοιτο, εἰ πρὸς ἄλληλους ἐξομβαῖμεν· οὐ γὰρ
ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῶν ὀρμῶνται 'Αθηναίοι, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς
8 τῶν ἐπικαλεσαμένων. καὶ οὕτως οὐ πόλεμος
πολέμῳ, εἰρήνῃ δὲ διαφοραὶ ἀπραγμόνως παύ-
ουνται, οὗ τ’ ἐπίκλητοι εὔπρεπῶς ἀδικοὶ ἐλθόντες
εὐλόγως ἀπρακτοὶ ἀπέσιν.

LXII. "Καὶ τὰ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς 'Αθηναίους
tososontan ἄγαθον εὐ βουλομένως εὐρίσκεται;
2 τῆν δὲ ὑπὸ πάντων ὀμολογουμένην ἀριστον εἶναι
eirhēn pòws ou χρῆ καὶ ἐν Ἦμων αὐτῶς ποιή-
sasai; ἢ δοκεῖ γε, εἰ τῷ τι ἔστιν ἄγαθον ἢ εἰ
tw tâ evantia, ouc hσυχία mâllon h pólemos to
mên pàusai ān ekaterph, to dê xundiaswsai, kai
tâs tîmâs kai λαμπρότητâs akinduvoterâs xêchiv
thē eirhēn, allâ tē òsa ēn mîkei logyvn ān tîs
according to the terms of their alliance they of their own accord have fulfilled an ally's obligations with a zeal exceeding their compact. That the Athenians entertain these designs of aggrandisement is quite pardonable; and I have no word of blame for those who wish to rule, but only for those who are too ready to submit; for it is an instinct of man's nature always to rule those who yield, but to guard against those who are ready to attack. If any of us, knowing how matters really stand, fails to take proper precautions, or if anyone has come here not accounting it of paramount importance that we must all together deal wisely with the common peril, we are making a mistake. The speediest relief from this peril would be gained by our entering into an understanding with one another; for the base from which the Athenians propose to move is not their own territory, but that of the people who asked them to intervene. And if we follow this course, war will not end in another war, but without trouble quarrels will end quietly in peace, and those who have been invited to intervene, having come with a fair pretext for injustice, will depart home with a fair plea for failure.

LXII. "So far, then, as the Athenians are concerned, this is the great advantage we win if we are well advised; but as to the question of peace, which all men agree is a most desirable thing, why should we not make it here among ourselves? Or, think you, if one person now enjoys a blessing and another labours under adversity, it is not tranquillity far more than war that will put an end to the latter and perpetuate the former? And has not peace its honours and less hazardous splendours, and all the
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διέλθοι ὁσπερ περὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν;1 ἀ χρὴ σκέψα-
mένους μὴ τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους ὑπεριδεῖν, τὴν δὲ
αὐτοῦ τινα σωτηρίαν μᾶλλον ἀπ’ αὐτῶν προῖδεῖν.
3 καὶ εἰ τις βεβαίως τι ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ βίᾳ πράξειν
οἴσται, τῷ παρ’ ἐλπίδα μὴ χαλεπῶς σφαλλέσθω,
γνῶς ὅτι πλείους ἦδη, καὶ τιμωρίαις μετιόντες
τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ ἐλπίσαντες ἔτεροι δυνάμει τι
πλεονεκτῆσειν, οἱ μὲν οὐχ ὅσον οὐκ ἠμύναντο
ἀλλ’ οὖν ἐσώθησαν, τοὺς δ’ ἄντι τοῦ πλέον ἔχειν
4 προσκαταλειπεῖν τὰ αὐτών ξυνέβη. τιμωρία γὰρ
οὐκ εὐνυχεῖ δικαίως, ὅτι καὶ ἀδίκειται οὐδὲ ἱσχὺς
βέβαιον, διότι καὶ εὐελπί. τὸ δὲ ἀστάθμητον τοῦ
μέλλοντος ὡς ἐπὶ πλείστων κρατεῖ, πάντων τε
σφαλερώτατον ὅν ὃμως καὶ χρησιμώτατον φαίνε-
tαι. εἴ ἵσον γὰρ δεδιότες προμηθία μᾶλλον ἐπ’
ἀλλήλους ἐρχόμεθα.

LXIII. “Καὶ νῦν τοῦ ἀφανοὺς τε τούτου διὰ τὸ
ἀτέκμαρτον δέος καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδῆ, φοβεροὺς παρόν-
tas Ἀθηναίους, κατ’ ἀμφότερα ἐκπλαγέντες, καὶ
tὸ ἐλλεπῆ τῆς γνώμης ὃν ἔκαστος τι φήσημεν
πράξειν ταῖς κωλύμασι ταύταις ἰκανῶς νομίσαντες
εἰρχθῆναι, τοὺς ἑφεστῶτας πολεμίους ἐκ τῆς
χώρας ἀποπέμπωμεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλοτα μὲν ἐσ
אידίουν ξυμβώμεν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, χρόνον ὡς πλείστου
σπεισάμενοι τὰς ἰδίας διαφορὰς ἐσ αὐθίς ἀνα-

1 ὁσπερ περὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν, deleted by Hude, after Krüger.

1 i.e. “most of our plans are baffled by the uncertainty of
the future.”

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other advantages on which one might dilate as easily as on the horrors of war? Considering these things, you should not overlook my advice, but should rather look forward each to his own salvation thereby. And if any of you cherishes the confident belief that he can gain anything either by insisting on his rights or by an appeal to force, let him not, through the baffling of his hopes, suffer a grievous disappointment; for he knows that many men ere now, whether pursuing with vengeance those who have wronged them, or in other cases, hoping to gain some advantage by the exercise of power, have, on the one hand, not only not avenged themselves but have not even come out whole, and, on the other hand, instead of gaining more, have sacrificed what was their own. For revenge has no right to expect success just because a wrong has been done; nor is strength sure just because it is confident. But as regards the future, it is uncertainty that for the most part prevails,¹ and this uncertainty, utterly treacherous as it is, proves nevertheless to be also most salutary; for since both sides alike fear it, we proceed with a greater caution in attacking one another.

LXIII. "So let us now, taking alarm on account of both these things—the vague fear of this hidden future and the immediate fear of the dread Athenian presence—and charging to these obstacles, as effectually blocking our way, any failure in the plans which any one of us had hoped to realize, let us dismiss from the country the enemy who is at our gates, and if possible let us make peace among ourselves for evermore; but if that may not be, let us conclude a truce for the longest practicable period, and put off our
2 βαλώμεθα. τὸ ξύμπαν τε δὴ γνώμεν τιθόμενοι μὲν ἕμοι πόλιν ἐξοντες ἐκαστὸς ἐλευθέραν, ἀφ᾿ ὧς αὐτοκράτορες ὅντες τῶν εὑ καὶ κακῶς δρῶντα ἔξ ἵσον ἀρετὴ ἀμυνούμεθα, ἢν δ᾿ ἀπιστήσαντες ἄλλοις ὑπακοούσωμεν, οὐ περὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι τίνα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄγαν εἰ τύχοιμεν, φίλοι μὲν ἄν τοῖς ἐχθρίστοις, διάφοροι δὲ οἷς οὐ χρῆ κατ᾿ ἀνάγκην γνυνούμεθα.

LXIV. "Καὶ ἔγω μὲν, ἀπερ καὶ ἀρχόμενος εἰπὼν, πόλιν τε μεγίστην παρεχόμενος καὶ ἐπίων τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀμυνομένοις ἢξιῶν προϊδόμενος ἀυτῶν ἐνγχωρεῖν, καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἐναντίους οὕτω κακῶς δρᾶν ὥστε αὐτὸς τὰ πλεῖά βλάπτεσθαι, μηδὲ μορία φιλονικών ἡγεῖσθαι τῆς τε οἰκείας γνώμης ὁμοίως αὐτοκράτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἢς οὐκ ἂρχω τύχης, ἀλλ᾿ ὅσον εἰκὸς ἡσσάσθαι. καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δικαίω ταῦτό μοι ποιῆσαι, ὅφ᾿ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ὅπο τῶν πολεμίων τοῦτο παθεῖν.

3 οὔδεν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν οἰκείος οἰκείοις ἡσσάσθαι, ἢ Δωρίᾳ τινα Δωρίῳς ἢ Χαλκιδεά τῶν ἐνγχωρεών, τὸ τε ξύμπαν γείτονας ὄντας καὶ ἐνυποίκους μιᾶς χώρας καὶ περιφύτον καὶ ὁνόμα ἐν κεκλημένους Σικελίωτας· οὗ πολεμήσομεν τε, οἷοι, ὅταν ξυμβῆ, καὶ ἐνγχωρησόμεθα γε πάλιν καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς

4 αὐτοὺς λόγοις κοινοὶ χρώμενοι τοὺς δὲ ἄλλο-φύλους ἐπελθόντας ἄθροοι αἰεί, ἢν σωφρονῶμεν, ἀμυνούμεθα, εἰπερ καὶ καθ᾿ ἑκάστους βλαπτό-μενοι ξύμπαντες κινδυνεύομεν, ξυμμάχους δὲ

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1 ἀμυνόμενοι, Hude followed by Steup, for ἀμυνόμενοι of the MSS.
2 προϊδόμενος... ὅστε αὐτὸς, Reiske and Dobree, for προϊδόμενοι... ὅστε αὐτὸς of the MSS.
private differences to some other day. In fine, let us feel assured that if my advice is followed we shall each keep our city free, and from it, since we shall be arbiters of our own destiny, we shall with equal valour ward off both him who comes to benefit and him who comes to harm. But if, on the other hand, my advice is rejected and we give heed to others, it will not be a question of our taking vengeance on anybody, but, even if we should be never so successful, we should perforce become friends to our bitterest foes and at variance with those with whom we should not be.

LXIV. "As for me, as I said in the beginning, although I represent a most powerful city and am more ready for attacking another than for self-defence, I deem it my duty, with these dangers in view, to make concessions, and not to harm my enemies in such a way as to receive more injury myself, or in foolish obstinacy to think that I am as absolutely master of Fortune, which I do not control, as of my own judgment; nay, so far as is reasonable I will give way. And I require of the rest of you to follow my example and submit to this, not at the hands of the enemy, but of yourselves. For there is no disgrace in kinsmen giving way to kinsmen, a Dorian to a Dorian or a Chalcidian to men of the same race, since we are, in a word, neighbours and together are dwellers in a single land encircled by the sea and are called by a single name, Siceliots. We shall go to war, no doubt, whenever occasion arises—yes, and we shall make peace again by taking common counsel among ourselves; but when alien peoples invade us, we shall always act in concert, if we are prudent, and repel them, seeing that any injury suffered by one of us brings danger to us all; but never
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οὐδέποτε τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπαξόμεθα οὐδὲ διαλλακτᾶς. 5 τάδε γὰρ ποιοῦντες ἐν τε τῷ παρόντι δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν ὑπὲρ ἑυθὺν τὴν Σικελίαν, Ἀθηναίων τε ἀπαλλαγῆναι καὶ οἰκεῖου πολέμου, καὶ ἐς τὸ ἔπειτα καθ’ ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦ έλευθέραν νεμούμεθα καὶ ὑπὸ ἀλλῶν ἢσον ἐπιβουλευομένην."  

LXV. Τοιαῦτα τοῦ Ἐρμοκράτους εἰπόντος πειθόμενοι οἱ Σικελιώται αὐτῷ μὲν κατὰ σφάς αὐτοὺς ξυνήχθησαν γνώμῃ ὅστε ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι τοῦ πολέμου ἔχοντες ἄ ἐκαστῶν ἔχουσι, τοῖς δὲ Καμαριναῖοι Μοργαντῖνην εἶναι ἀργύριον τακτῶν 2 τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἀποδοῦσιν οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι παρακαλέσαντες αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐν τέλει δύναται εἴπον ὅτι ξυμβιβασάντες καὶ αἱ σπουδαὶ ἔσονται κάκεινοι κοιναί. ἔπαινες ἀντῶν δὲ αὐτῶν ἐποιοῦντο τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ, καὶ αἱ νῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπέπλευσαν μετὰ ταῦτα ἐκ Σικελίας. 3 ἐλθόντας δὲ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς οἱ ἐν τῇ πολεί Ἀθηναίοι τοὺς μὲν φυγῇ ἐξημίσασιν, Πυθόδωρον καὶ Σοφοκλέα, τὸν δὲ τρίτον Εὐρυμέδοντα χρήματα ἐπράξαντο, ὡς ἔξω αὐτῶς τὰ ἐν Σικελίᾳ καταστρέψασθαι δῷροις πεισθέντες ἀποχωρήσεις. 4 σείου, οὐτω τῇ γε παρούσῃ εὐτυχίᾳ χρώμενοι ἤξιον σφίσι μηδὲν ἐναντιόυσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δυνάτα ἐν ἱσω καὶ τὰ ἀπορώτερα μεγάλη τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐνδεεστέρα παρασκευή κατεργάσθαι. αἰτία δ’ ἢν ἡ παρὰ λόγον τῶν πλειόνων εὐπραγία αὐτοῖς ὑποτίθειτα ἰσχύν τῆς ἐλπίδος. 

LXVI. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ θέρους Μεγαρῆς οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει πιεζόμενοι ὑπὸ τε Ἀθηναίων τῷ πολέμῳ, 320
henceforth shall we ask outsiders to intervene, either as allies or as mediators. If we follow this policy, we shall at the present time not rob Sicily of two desirable things—getting rid of the Athenians and escaping from civil war—and for the future we shall dwell here by ourselves in a land that is free and less exposed to the plotting of others.”

LXV. After Hermocrates had spoken to this effect the Siceliots, accepting his advice, came to an understanding among themselves. They agreed to end the war, each city keeping what it had, except that the Camarinaeans were to have Morgantina on payment of a stated sum of money to the Syracusans. The Sicilian allies of the Athenians then summoned the Athenian generals and said that they proposed to make peace and that the treaty would also include them. And when the generals assented, they proceeded to make the agreement, whereupon the Athenian fleet sailed away from Sicily. But when it arrived at Athens, the Athenians sentenced to exile two of the generals, Pythodorus and Sophocles, and fined Eurymedon, the third, on the charge that when it had been in their power to subdue Sicily they had been bribed to withdraw from it. To such an extent, because of their present good fortune, did they expect to be thwarted in nothing, and believed that, no matter whether their forces were powerful or deficient, they could equally achieve what was easy and what was difficult. The cause of this was the amazing success which attended most of their undertakings and inspired them with strong confidence.

LXVI. The same summer the people of the city of Megara, being harassed in the war by the Athenians,
κατὰ ἐτος ἐκαστον δις ἐσβαλλόντων παν-
στρατιὰ ἐς τὴν χώραν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σφετέρων
φυγάδων τῶν ἐκ Πηγῶν, οἱ στασισάσαντων ἐκ-
pεσόντες ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους χαλεποὶ ἦσαν λη-
στεύωντες, ἐποιοῦντο λόγους ἐν ἀλλήλοις ὡς χρῆ
δεξαμένους τοὺς φεύγουτας μὴ ἀμφιτέρωθεν τὴν
2 πόλιν φθείρειν. οἱ δὲ φίλοι τῶν ἔξω τῶν θροῦν
αἰσθόμενοι φανερῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καὶ αὐτοὶ
3 ἡξίουν τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου ἔχεσθαι. γυνότες δὲ
οἱ τοῦ δήμου προστάται οὐ δυνατὸν τὸν δήμον
ἔσομεν ὑπὸ τῶν κακῶν μετὰ σφῶν καρτερεῖν,
pοιοῦντα λόγους δείσαντες πρὸς τοὺς τῶν Ἀθη-
ναίων στρατηγοὺς, Ἰπποκράτη τε τὸν Ἀρίφρονος
καὶ Δημοσθένη τὸν Ἀλκισθένους, βουλόμενοι
ἐνδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν καὶ νομίζοντες ἔλασσος σφίζῃ
τὸν κίνδυνον ἢ τοὺς ἐκπεσόντας ὑπὸ σφῶν κατελ-
4 θείων. Ἐννεβησάν τε πρῶτα μὲν τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἔλειν
Ἀθηναίους (ὅν δὲ στάδιων μάλιστα ὠκτῶ ἀπὸ τῆς
πόλεως ἐπὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν τὸν λιμένα αὐτῶν), ὡς
μὴ ἐπιβοηθήσωσιν ἐκ τῆς Νισαιάς οἱ Πελοπο-
νήσιοι, ἐν ἡ αὐτοῦ μόνοι ἐφρούρουν βεβαιότητος
ἐνεκά τῶν Μεγάρων, ἐπειτὰ δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀνω πόλιν
πειράσσεθαι ἐνδοῦναι· ῥὰν δὲ ἡ ἡ ζέμελλον προσ-
χωρήσειν τοῦτο γεγενημένου.

LXVII. Οἱ οὖν Ἀθηναίοι, ἔπειδὴ ἀπὸ τε τῶν
ἐργῶν καὶ τῶν λόγων παρεσκεύαστο ἀμφιτέρως,
ἃ ἄξια πλεύσαντες ἐς Μινώαν τὴν Μεγαρέων
νῆσον ὀπλίταις ἐξακοσίοις, δὲν Ἰπποκράτης ἦρ-
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who regularly invaded their country in full force twice every year, and also by their own exiles in Pegae, who had been expelled in a revolution by the popular party and kept annoying them by raiding the country, began to say to one another that they ought to receive the fugitives back, so that the city should not be exposed to ruin from both directions at once. And the friends of the exiles, noticing the murmuring of the people, all began more openly than before to urge that this proposal be adopted. But the leaders of the popular party, realizing that the populace under the pressure of their distress would not be able to hold out with them, became frightened and made overtures to the Athenian generals, Hippocrates son of Ariphron and Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, proposing to surrender the city to them; for they thought that this course would be less dangerous to themselves than the restoration of the citizens whom they had banished. They agreed, in the first place, that the Athenians should take possession of the long walls (the distance between the city and the harbour at Nisaea was about eight stadia), in order to prevent the Peloponnesians from sending reinforcements from Nisaea, where they formed the sole garrison to keep their hold on Megara, and, in the second place, that they would do their best to hand over to them the upper-town as well, believing that, as soon as this was done, their fellow-citizens would more readily go over to the Athenian side.

LXVII. So, then, as soon as due preparations, both in word and act, had been made by both parties, the Athenians sailed under cover of night to Minoa, the island which lies off Megara, taking six hundred hoplites under the command of Hippocrates, and took
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χεν, ἐν ὧρύγματι ἐκαθέξοντο, ὃθεν ἐπλάνθενον τὰ 2 τείχη καὶ ἀπείχεν οὐ πολὺ· οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένου τοῦ ἑτέρου στρατηγοῦ Πλαταῖος τε ψιλοὶ καὶ ἔτεροι περίπολοι ἐνήδρευσαν ἐς τὸ Ἑμνάλιον, ὃ ἐστὼ ἔλασσον ἀπωθεν. καὶ ἔσθετο οὐδεὶς εἰ μὴ οἱ ἀνδρὲς οῖς ἐπιμελεῖς ἂν εἰδέναι τὴν 3 νύκτα ταῦτην. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἔως ἐμελλὲ γίγνεσθαι, οἱ προδιδόντες τῶν Μεγαρέων 1 οὕτω τοιόνυμε ἐποίησαν. ἀκάτιον ἀμφηρικὸν ὡς. λήσται, ἐκ πολλοῦ τεθεραπευκότες τὴν ἀνοίξιν τῶν πυλῶν, εἰσόθεσαν ἐπὶ ἀμάξῃ, πείθοντες τὸν ἄρχοντα, διὰ τῆς τάφρου κατακομβεῖν τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἐκπλεῖν· καὶ πρὶν ἡμέραν εἶναι πάλιν αὐτὸ τῇ ἀμάξῃ κομίσαντες ἐς τὸ τείχος κατὰ τὰς πύλας ἐσῆγον, ὅτως τοῖς ἔκ τῆς Μινώας Ἀθηναίων ἀφάνης δὴ εἰ ἡ φυλακή, μὴ ὄντως 4 ἐν τῷ λιμένι πλοίου φανεροῦ μηδενός. καὶ τότε πρὸς ταῖς πύλαις ἡδη ἦν ἡ ἀμάξα, καὶ ἀνοιχθεισῶν κατὰ τὸ εἰσόθις ὡς τῷ ἀκατίῳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι (ἐγίγνετο γὰρ ἀπὸ ξυνθήματος τὸ τοιοῦτον) ἴδοντες ἔδεων δρόμῳ ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας, βουλόμενοι φθάσαι πρὶν ξυγκλησθῆναι πάλιν τὰς πύλας καὶ ἐως ἐτὶ ἡ ἀμάξα ἐν αὐταῖς ἦν, κόλυμα οὕσα προσθειναι· καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀμα καὶ οἱ ξυμπράσοντες Μεγαρής τοὺς κατὰ πύλας φύλακας κτείνουσιν. 5 καὶ πρῶτον μὲν οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημοσθένη Πλαταῖος τε καὶ περίπολοι ἐσέδραμον οὐ νῦν τὸ τροπαῖαν ἐστι, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐντὸς τῶν πυλῶν (ἳσθοντο γὰρ

1 οἱ προδιδότες τῶν Μεγαρέων, deleted by Hude.

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cover in a ditch, not far from the town, where bricks had been made for the walls. A second company consisting of light-armed Plataeans and frontier-patrols under the command of the other general, Demosthenes, set an ambuscade at Enyalius, which is somewhat nearer. And all that night no one perceived what was going on except the men whose business it was to know. Then, at the approach of dawn, these would-be Megarian traitors began their work as follows. For a long time before this they had been carefully preparing for the opening of the gates by regularly assuming the guise of pirates and taking a sculling boat, drawn on a cart, through the ditch and down to the sea, where they would put out. This they did every night, first securing the consent of the commander. Then before daybreak they would cart the boat back into the fortifications, taking it in by way of the gates, their object being, as they pretended, to keep the Athenian garrison, which was stationed at Minoa, in the dark, as no boat would be visible in the harbour. On the night in question the cart was already at the gates, and when these were opened as usual as if to let the boat pass through, the Athenians, who were acting throughout in accordance with an agreement, seeing it, ran at top speed from their ambush, wishing to get there before the gates were closed again and while the cart was still in the passage, thus forming an obstacle to the shutting of the gates; and at the same time their Megarian accomplices killed the guards at the gates. And first the Plataeans and the patrols under Demosthenes' command rushed into the place where the trophy now stands, and as soon as they were inside the gates the Plataeans engaged with the

\[1\] i.e., of the Peloponnesian garrison.
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οἱ ἐγγύτατα Πελοποννήσιοι] μαχόμενοι τοὺς προσβοηθοῦντας οἱ Πλαταϊκὴς ἐκράτησαν καὶ τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὀπλῖτας ἐπιφερομένους βεβαιός τὰς πύλας παρέσχον. LXXVIII. ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἤδη ὁ αἰεὶ ἐντὸς γυγνόμενος χωρεῖ 2 ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος. καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι φρούροι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀνυσχόντες ἡμύνωντο ὦλανοι, καὶ ἀπέθανον τινες αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ πλείους ἐς φυγὴν κατέστησαν, φοβηθέντες ἐν υγκτὶ τε πολεμίων προσπεπτωκότων καὶ τῶν προδεδομένων Μεγαρέων ἀντιμαχομένων νομίσαντες τοὺς ἀπαντας σφάς 3 Μεγαρέας προδεδωκέναι. ξυνέπεσε γὰρ καὶ τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων κήρυκα ὁ ἐαυτοῦ γνώμης κηρύξαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἢναί Megareów metà Ἀθηναίων θησόμενον τὰ ὄπλα. οἱ δ’ ὅς ἦκουσαν, οὐκέτι ἀνέμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὃντι νομίσαντες κοινῆ 4 πολεμεῖσθαι κατέφυγον ἐς τὴν Νίσαιαν. ἀμα δὲ ἔως ἐνωκότων ἢ ὅτι τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει Μεγαρέων ἀρνοῦμενοι οἱ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πράξαντες καὶ ἀλλο. μετ’ αὐτῶν πλῆθος, ὃ ξυνήθει, ἐφανα χρὴν αἰνούγειν τὰς 5 πύλας καὶ ἐπεξεύρεσα ἐς μάχην. ξυνέκειτο δὲ αὐτοῖς τῶν πυλῶν ἀνοιχθεισῶν ἐσπίπτειν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, αὐτοὶ δὲ διάδηλοι ἔμελλον ἔσεθαί (λίπα γὰρ ἀλείψεθαι), ὅπως μὴ ἄδικωνται. ἀσφάλεια δὲ αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἐγίγνετο τῆς ἀνοίξεως· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἕλευσίνος κατὰ τὸ ξυγκείμενον τετρακισχίλιοι ὄπλιται τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ 326
reinforcements which came up—for the nearest Peloponnesians had become aware of what was going on—and defeated them, thus securing the gates for the onrushing Athenian hoplites. LXVIII. After that every Athenian who got inside immediately made for the wall. A few of the Peloponnesian garrison at first stood their ground and defended themselves, some of them being killed, but most of them took to flight, being seized with panic, both because the enemy had attacked them at night, and also because they thought the Megarian traitors were fighting against them; and they supposed that all the Megarians had betrayed them. For it so happened also that the Athenian herald, acting on his own responsibility, made a proclamation that any Megarian who so desired might espouse the cause of the Athenians. When the garrison heard this proclamation it no longer held out, but, verily believing that a concerted attack was being made upon them, fled to Nisaea. And at daybreak, when the walls had already been taken and the Megarians in the city were in a tumult, those who had negotiated with the Athenians, and a large number besides who were privy to the plot, expressed the opinion that they ought to open the gates and go out to battle. It had, in fact, been agreed between them and the Athenians, that as soon as the gates were opened the Athenians should rush in, and, in order that they might themselves escape injury, they were to be distinguished from the rest by being anointed with oil. They were also to have additional security in thus opening the gates, since the men who according to the compact were to march by night from Eleusis, four thousand Athenian
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ιππής ἔξακοσίοι οἱ τὴν νύκτα πορευόμενοι 1
6 παρῆσαν. ἀληλιμμένων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὀντὼν ἡ ἤδη
περὶ τὰς πύλας καταγορεύει της ἔννειδος τοῖς
ἐτέροις τὸ ἐπιβούλευμα. καὶ οἱ ἔντεραφέντες
ἀθρόοι ἦλθον καὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν χρῆναι οὔτε
ἐπεξεέναι (οὐδὲ γὰρ πρότερον πω τούτο ἵσχύοντες
μᾶλλον τολμήσαι) οὔτε ἐς κίνδυνον φανερὸν τὴν
πόλιν καταγαγεῖν. εἰ τε μὴ πείσεται τις, αὐτοῦ
tὴν μάχην ἔσεσθαι. ἔδήλουν δὲ οὐδὲν ὃτι ἴσασι
τὰ πρασόμενα, ἀλλὰ ὡς τὰ βέλτιστα βουλεύ̄
οντες ἱσχυρίζοντο, καὶ ἀμα περὶ τὰς πύλας
παρέμενον φυλάσσοντες, ἄστε οὐκ ἐγένετο τοῖς
ἐπιβουλεύσασι πρᾶξαι ὃ ἐμελλόν.

LXIX. Γνώτες δὲ οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ
ὅτι ἐναντίωμά τι ἐγένετο καὶ τὴν πόλιν βία οὐχ
οἶοι τε ἔσονται λαβεῖν, τὴν Νίσαιαν εὐθὺς περιε-
τείχιζον, νομίζοντες, εἰ πρὶν ἐπιβοθηθῆσαι τινάς
ἐξέλοιεν, θᾶσσον ἄν καὶ τὰ Μέγαρα προσχωρή-
2 σαι (παρεγένετο δὲ σίδηρός τε ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν
ταχὺ καὶ λιθούργοι καὶ τάλλα ἐπιτήδεια).
ἀρξά-
μενοι δ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους ὃ ἐχὼν καὶ διοικοδομη-
σαντες τὸ πρὸς Μεγαρέας, ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἐκατέρωθη
ἐς θάλασσαν τῆς Νισαίας 2 τάφρον τε καὶ τείχος
διελομένη ἠγεν 3 ἡ στρατιά, ἐκ τε τοῦ προστείου
λίθων καὶ πλίνθως χρώμενοι, καὶ κόπτοντες τὰ
dενδρα καὶ ὕλην ἀπεσταύρουν εἰ τῇ δεότο τι·

1 πορευόμενοι, Rutherford's conjecture for παρεῡμενοι of
the MSS. 2 Hude deletes τῆς Νισαίας, after Stahl.
3 ἠγεν added by Stahl and Rauchenstein.
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hoplites and six hundred cavalry, were now at hand.\footnote{Or, retaining πορευόμενοι with the MSS. and rejecting of before τὴν νίκτα, "since the men from Eleusis, four thousand Athenian hoplites and six hundred cavalry, according to the compact had marched all night and were now at hand."}

But after they had anointed themselves and were already near the gates, an accomplice divulged the plot to the other party. And they, gathering in a body, came and declared that they ought neither to march out to fight—for they had never ventured to do such a thing before, even when they were stronger—nor to bring the city into manifest danger; and, they added, should anyone refuse to obey, the fight would take place on the spot. But they gave no signs whatever that they were aware of the plot which was going on, but stoutly maintained that their advice was for the best, and at the same time stayed about the gates keeping watch, so that the plotters had no opportunity to carry out their intentions.

LXIX. The Athenian generals, however, saw that some obstacle had arisen and that they would not be able to take the city by force, and therefore at once began to invest Nisaea with a wall, thinking that, if they could take this town before any succour came, Megara also would soon capitulate. A supply of iron quickly arrived from Athens, as well as stonemasons and whatever else was needed. Beginning then at the part of the fortification which they already held and building a cross-wall on the side of it facing Megara, from that point they built out on either side of Nisaea as far as the sea, the army apportioning among them the ditch and the walls and using stones and bricks from the suburbs. Moreover, they cut down fruit-trees and forest-wood and built stockades.
καὶ αἱ οἰκίαι τοῦ προαστείου ἑπάλξεις λαμβάνονται αὐταὶ ὑπῆρχον ἐρυμα. καὶ ταύτην μὲν 3 τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην εἰργάζοντο· τῇ δὲ ὑστεραῖα περὶ δείλην τὸ τεῖχος ὅσον οὐκ ἀπετετέλεστο, καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Νισαίᾳ δείσαντες, σίτου τε ἀπορία (ἐφ᾽ ἡμέραν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ἀνώ πόλεως ἑχρῶντο) καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους οὐ νομίζοντες ταχὺ ἐπιβοηθήσειν, τοὺς τε Μεγαρέας πολεμίους ἤγομενοι, ἵνα μὴ ἡμῖν ἀπολυθῆναι ὡπλα παραδόντας, τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις, τῷ τε ἄρχοντι καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος ἐνήν, χρήσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ὅ τι ἀν βούλωνται. ἐπὶ τούτων ὡμολογήσαντες ἐξήλθον. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τὰ μακρὰ τεῖχη ἀπορρήξαντες ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως καὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν παραλαβόντες τάλλα παρεσκευάζοντο.

LXX. Βρασίδας δὲ ὁ Τέλλιδος Λακεδαιμόνιος κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἔτυγχανε περὶ Σικυώνα καὶ Κόρινθον ὃν, ἐπὶ Θράκης στρατεύαν διασκευαζόμενος. καὶ ὃς ὦσθεν τῶν τειχῶν τὴν ἀλωσιν, δείσας περὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ Νισαίᾳ Πελοποννησίους καὶ μὴ τὰ Μέγαρα ληφθῆν, πέμπει ἔστε τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς κελεύων κατὰ τάχος στρατιῶν ἀπαντῆσαι ἐπὶ Τριποδίσκουν (ἔστε δὲ κόμη τῆς Μεγαρίδος ὦν οὐκοῦ τοῦτο ἔχουσα ὑπὸ τῷ ὁμεὶ τῇ Γερανείᾳ), καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχων ἠλθεν ἐπτακοσίους μὲν καὶ δισχίλιους Κορινθίων ὀπλίτας, Φλειασίων δὲ τετρακοσίους, Σικυώνων δὲ ἐξακοσίους καὶ τοὺς
wherever they were needed; and the houses of the suburbs with the addition of battlements of themselves furnished a rampart. They worked the whole of this first day, but on the next day toward evening when the wall was all but finished the garrison of Nisaea, becoming alarmed by the shortage of food, seeing that they received provisions from the upper-city for only a day at a time, and not anticipating any speedy relief from the Peloponnnesians, and believing the Megarians to be hostile, capitulated to the Athenians on condition that they should give up their arms and pay a ransom of a stipulated amount for each man; as for the Lacedaemonians in the garrison, the commander or anyone else, they were to be disposed of as the Athenians might wish. On these terms they came to an agreement and marched out. The Athenians then made a breach in the long walls in order to separate them from the wall of the city of Megara, took possession of Nisaea, and proceeded with their other preparations.

LXX. At this time Brasidas son of Tellis, a Lacedaemonian, happened to be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, preparing a force for use in the region of Thrace. And when he heard of the capture of the walls, fearing for the safety of the Peloponnnesians in Nisaea and apprehensive lest Megara should be taken, he sent to the Boeotians requesting them to come in haste with an army and to meet him at Tripodiscus, which is the name of a village in the district of Megara at the foot of Mount Geraneia. He himself set out with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian hoplites, four hundred from Phlius, seven hundred from Sicyon, and such troops
μεθ' αὐτοῦ ὅσοι ἦδη ξυνελεγμένοι ἦσαν, οἶμενος
2 τὴν Νίσαιαν ἐτί καταλήψεσθαι ἀνάλωτον. ὡς δὲ
ἐπύθετο, (ἔτυχε γὰρ νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὸν Τριποδίσκον
ἐξελθὼν) ἀπολέξας τρικασίους τού στρατοῦ, πρὶν
ἐκπυστὸς γενέσθαι, προσήλθε τῇ τῶν Μεγαρέων
πόλει λαθὼν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὄντας περὶ τὴν
θάλασσαν, βουλόμενος μὲν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀμαίνο
δύναιτο ἔργῳ τῆς Νισαιᾶς πειρᾶσαι, τὸ δὲ μέγις-
τον, τὴν τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλιν ἐσελθὼν βεβαιώ-
σασθαι. καὶ ἥξιον δὲξασθαι σφᾶς λέγων ἐν
ἐλπίδι εἶναι ἀναλαβεῖν Νίσαιαν. LXXI. αἱ δὲ
τῶν Μεγαρέων στάσεις φοβοῦμεναι, οἱ μὲν μὴ
τοὺς φεύγοντας σφῆναι ἐσαγαγὼν αὐτοὺς ἐκβάλη,
οἱ δὲ μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁ δῆμος δεῖσας ἐπίθεται
σφῆσι καὶ ἡ πόλις ἐν μάχῃ καθ' αὐτὴν οὐσα ἐγγύς
ἔφηδρεντων Ἀθηναίων ἀπόληται, οὐκ ἔδεξαντο,
ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέροις ἐδόκει ἰσχύασαι τὸ μέλλον
2 περιμέν. ἦλπιζον γὰρ καὶ μάχην ἐκάτεροι
ἐσεθαί τῶν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τῶν προσβοηθη-
σάντων, καὶ οὔτω σφῆναι ἀσφαλεστέρως ἔσχεν,
οὐς τις εἰς εὔνους, κρατήσας προσκυρῆσαι· ὁ δὲ
Βρασίδας ὡς οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ἀνεχώρησε πάλιν ἐς τὸ
ἀλλο στρατέμα.

LXXII. Ἀμα δὲ τῇ ἤφοι νοι Βοιωτοὶ παρῆσαν,
διανενοημένοι μὲν καὶ πρὶν Βρασίδαν πέμψαι
βοηθεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ Μέγαρα, ὡς οὐκ ἀλλοτρίου ὄντος
tοῦ κινδύνου, καὶ ἦδη ὄντες πανστρατιά Πλα-
tαιᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἦλθεν ὁ ἄγγελος, πολλοὶ
μᾶλλον ἔρρωσθησαν, καὶ ἀποστειλαντες διακο-

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of his own as had already been levied, thinking that he would arrive before Nisaea had been taken. But when he learned the truth—for he happened to have gone out by night to Tripodiscus—he selected three hundred of his own army, and before his approach was known reached the city of Megara unobserved by the Athenians, who were down by the sea. His plan was, ostensibly—and really, too, if it should prove possible—to make an attempt upon Nisaea, but most of all to get into the city of Megara and secure it. And he demanded that they should receive him, saying that he was in hopes of recovering Nisaea. LXXI. But the rival factions of Megara were afraid, the one that he might bring in the exiles and drive them out, the other that the populace, fearing this very thing, might attack them, and that the city, being at war with itself, while the Athenians were lying in wait near at hand, might be ruined. They, therefore, did not admit Brasidas, both parties thinking it best to wait and see what would happen. For each party expected that there would be a battle between the Athenians and the relieving army, and so it was safer for them not to join the side which anyone favoured until it was victorious. So then Brasidas, when he could not persuade them, withdrew once more to his own army.

LXXII. At daybreak the Boeotians arrived. They had intended, even before Brasidas summoned them, to go to the aid of Megara, feeling that the danger was not alien to them, and were already at Plataea with all their forces; but when the summons actually came, they were greatly strengthened in their purpose, and sent on two thousand two hundred hoplites
σίους καὶ δισχιλίους ὀπλῖτας καὶ ἱππέας ἑξακο-
2 σίους τοῖς πλείσσιν ἀπῆλθον πάλιν. παρόντος
dὲ ἦδη ἔμπαντος τοῦ στρατεύματος, ὀπλιτῶν
οὐκ ἔλασσον ἐξαισχύλων, καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων
tῶν μὲν ὀπλιτῶν περὶ τε τὴν Νίσαιαν ὄντων καὶ
tὴν θάλασσαν ἐν τάξει, τῶν δὲ ψιλῶν ἀνὰ τὸ
πεδίον ἐσκεδασμένων, οἱ ἱππητὶς οἱ τῶν Βοιωτῶν
ἀπροσδοκήτως ἐπιπεσόντες τοῖς ψιλῶις ἔτρεψαν
ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν (ἐν γὰρ τῷ πρὸ τοῦ οὐδεμία
βοήθεια πο ὑπὸ τοῖς Μεγαρεύσιν οὐδαμόθεν ἐπῆλθεν).
3 ἀντεπεξελάσαντες δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἔς
χεῖρας ἤσαν, καὶ ἐγένετο ἱππομαχία ἐπὶ πολὺ, ἐν
4 ᾗ ἀξιούσιον ἐκάτεροι οὐχ ἦσσος γενέσθαι. τῶν
μὲν γὰρ ἵππαρχοι τῶν Βοιωτῶν καὶ ἄλλων των
οὐ πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν Νίσαιαν προσελά-
σαντας1 οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ἀποκτείναντες ἐσκύλευ-
σαν, καὶ τῶν τε νεκρῶν τούτων κρατήσαντες
ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν καὶ τροπαῖον ἔστησαν.
οὐ2 μέντοι ἐν γε τῷ παντὶ ἔργῳ ἑβδαίως οὐδέτε-
ροι τελευτήσαντες ἀπεκρίθησαν ἄλλοι3 οἱ μὲν
Βοιωτοὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν.

LXXIII. Μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ Βρασίδας καὶ τὸ
στράτευμα ἔχωρουν ἐγχυτέρω τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ
τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως, καὶ καταλαβόντες
χωρίον ἐπιτίθειον παραταξάμενοι ἡσύχαζον,
οἰόμενοι σφίσιν ἐπιέναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς
Μεγαρέας ἐπιστάμενοι περιορωμένους ὀποτέρων ἡ
2 νίκη ἔσται. καλῶς δὲ ἐνομίζον σφίσιν ἀμφότερα
ἐχειν, ἀμα μὲν τὸ μὴ ἑπιχειρεῖν προτέρους μηδὲ

1 Portus' correction for προσελάσαντες of the MSS.
2 Hude adopts Rutherford's conjecture οὐδέν.
3 ἄλλο, Hude deletes, as not translated by Valla.

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and six hundred cavalry, returning home with the larger part of their army. Then, finally, when their whole army was at hand, consisting of not less than six thousand hoplites, and the Athenian hoplites were in line about Nisaea and the sea, while the light-armed troops were scattered up and down the plain, the Boeotian cavalry fell upon the latter and drove them to the sea. The attack was unexpected, for hitherto no reinforcements had ever come to the Megarians from any quarter. But the Athenian horsemen charged upon them in turn and a prolonged cavalry action ensued, in which both sides claimed to have held their own. The Athenians did succeed in killing the commander of the Boeotian cavalry and a few others who had charged to the very walls of Nisaea and despoiled them, and having got possession of their bodies they gave them back under a truce and set up a trophy; in the action as a whole, however, neither side finally gained a decisive advantage, and so they separated, the Boeotians going to their own army, the Athenians to Nisaea.

LXXIII. After this Brasidas and his army advanced nearer to the sea and the city of Megara, and there, taking up an advantageous position, they drew up their lines and kept quiet, thinking that the Athenians would come against them, and feeling assured that the Megarians would wait to see which side would be victorious. And they thought that matters stood well with them in both of two respects: in the first place, they were not forcing an
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μάχης καὶ κυνόνον ἐκοντα ἀρξαί, ἐπειδὴ γε ἐν
φανερῷ ἐδείξαν ἑτοίμων οὖντες ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ
αὐτοῖς ὀσπερ ἀκονιτὶ τὴν νίκην δικαίως ἀνατίθε-
σθαι. ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαρέας

3 ὀρθῶς ξυμβαίνειν εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ὄφθησαν
ἐλθόντες, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῇ γένεσθαι σφίσιν, ἀλλὰ
σαφῶς ἂν ὀσπερ ἡσσηθέντων στερηθῆναι εὕθως
τῆς πόλεως· τάν δὲ καὶ τυχεῖν αὐτοῦς Ἀθηναίους
μὴ βουληθέντας ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ὥστε ἀμαχητὶ ἂν
περιγενέσθαι αὐτοῖς ὃν ἑνέκα ἥλθον. ὀσπερ καὶ

4 ἐγένετο. οἱ γὰρ Μεγαρῆς, ὡς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι
ἔταξαντο μὲν παρὰ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἐξελθόντες,
ἡσύχαζον δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ μὴ ἐπιόντων, λογιζόμενοι
καὶ οἱ ἔκεινων στρατηγοὶ μὴ ἀντίπαλον εἶναι
σφίς τῶν κυνοῦν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πλείω αὐτοῖς
προκεχωρήκειν, ἀρξασὶ μάχης πρὸς πλείονας
αὐτῶν ἡ λαβεῖν νικήσαντας Μέγαρα ἡ σφαλέντας
τῷ βελτίστῳ τοῦ ὀπλιτικοῦ βλαφθῆναι, τοῖς δὲ
ξυμπάσῃς τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τῶν παρόντων μέρος
ἐκαστὸν κυνουεύειν εἰκότως ἑθέλειν τολμᾶν,
χρόνον δὲ ἐπισχόντες καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἀφ’ ἐκατέρων
ἐπεχειρεῖτο, ἀπήλθον πρότεροι οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς
τὴν Νίσαιαν καὶ αὐθες οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ὅθεντερ
ἀρμήθησαν· οὔτω δὴ τῷ μὲν Βρασίδα αὐτῷ καὶ

1 Apparently there is an anacolouthon, the sentence be-
ginning as if τῷ Βρασίδα ἀναλύοντοι τὰς πύλας were to be the
predicate, but after the long parenthesis the subject is
resumed in partitive form, οἱ τῶν φυγάδων φίλοι Μεγαρῆς.

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engagement and had not deliberately courted the risk of a battle, although they had at least plainly shown that they were ready to defend themselves, so that the victory would justly be accredited to them almost without a blow; and at the same time they thought that things were turning out right as regards the Megarians also. For if they had failed to put in an appearance there would have been no chance for them, but they would clearly have lost the city at once just as though they had been defeated; but by this move there was the possible chance that the Athenians themselves would not care to fight, with the result that they would have gained what they came for without a battle. And this is just what happened. For the Megarians did what was expected of them.\(^1\) When the Athenians came out and drew up their lines before the long walls, they too kept quiet, since the Peloponnesians did not attack, and their generals also reckoned that they were running an unequal risk, now that almost all their plans had turned out well, to begin a battle against larger numbers, and either be victorious and take Megara, or, if defeated, have the flower of their hoplite force damaged; whereas the Peloponnesians would naturally be willing to risk an engagement which would involve, for each contingent, only a portion of the entire army or of the troops there at hand.\(^2\) Both armies therefore waited for some time, and when no attack was made from either side, the Athenians were the first to withdraw, retiring to Nisaea, and next the Peloponnesians, returning to the place from which they had set out. So then, finally, the Megarians who were friends of the exiles

\(^2\) The text is clearly corrupt, but the general sense seems to be that given above.
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tοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ἀρχοῦσιν οἱ τῶν φευγόντων
φίλοι Μεγαρῆς, ὡς ἐπικρατήσαντι καὶ τῶν
Ἀθηναίων οὐκέτι ἐθελησάντων μάχεσθαι, θαρ-
σοῦντες μᾶλλον ἀνοίγουσί τε τὰς πύλας καὶ
dεξάμενοι καταπεπληγμένων ἢδη τῶν πρὸς τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους πραξάντων ἐς λόγους ἔρχονται.

LXXIV. Καὶ ὠστερον ὁ μὲν διαλυθέντων τῶν
ξυμμάχων κατὰ πόλεις ἐπανελθὼν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς
τὴν Κόρινθον, τὴν ἐπὶ Θράκης στρατεύαν παρε-
2 σκεύασεν, ἱναπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὀρμήτορι πολεῖ
τῇ ἐν τῇ πόλει Μεγαρῆς, ἀποχωρησάντων καὶ τῶν
Ἀθηναίων ἐπ’ οἴκου, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων πρὸς
τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μάλιστα μετέσχον, εἰδότες ὅτι
ὁφθήσαν ευθὺς ὑπεξήλθον, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι κοινολο-
γησάμενοι τοῖς τῶν φευγόντων φίλοις κατάγοντο
τοὺς ἐκ Πηγῶν, ὀρκώσαντες πίστει μεγάλαις
μηδὲν μνησικακήσειν, βουλεύοντει δὲ τῇ πόλει τὰ
3 ἀριστα. οἱ δὲ ἐπειδῆ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγένοντο καὶ
ἐξέτασιν ὅπλων ἐποίησαντο, διαστήσαντες τοὺς
λόχους ἐξελέξαντο τῶν τε ἔχθρων καὶ οἱ ἐδόκουν
μάλιστα ξυμπράξαι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους,
ἀνδρᾶς ὡς ἐκατόν, καὶ τούτων πέρι ἀναγκάσαντες
tῶν δῆμον ψῆφον φανερὰν διενεγκείν, ὡς κατε-
γνώσθησαν, ἔκτειναν, καὶ ἐς ὀλυγαρχίαν τὰ
4 μάλιστα κατέστησαν τὴν πόλιν. καὶ πλείστον
dὴ χρόνον αὑτῇ ὑπ’ ἐλαχίστων γενομένῃ ἐκ στά-
σεως μετάστασις ξυνέμειν.
plucked up courage, and opened the gates to Brasidas and the commanders from the various cities, in the feeling that he had won the victory and that the Athenians had finally declined battle. And receiving them into the town they entered into a conference with them, the party which had been intriguing with the Athenians being now quite cowed.

LXXIV. Afterwards, when the Peloponnesian allies had been dismissed to their several cities, Brasidas went back to Corinth and began preparations for the expedition to Thrace, whither he had originally been bound. But when the Athenians also returned home, all the Megarians who had been most implicated in the negotiations with the Athenians, knowing that they had been detected, immediately withdrew secretly from the city, while the rest, communicating with the friends of the exiles, brought them back from Pegae, after first binding them on their oath by strong pledges not to harbour ill-will, but to consult for the best interests of the city. But as soon as these men attained office and had made an inspection of arms, separating the companies they selected about one hundred of their personal enemies and of those who seemed to have had the largest part in the negotiations with the Athenians, and compelling the popular assembly to take an open vote concerning these, when they had been condemned, slew them, and established an extreme oligarchy in the city. And there was never a change of government, effected by so small a number of men through the triumph of a faction, that lasted so long.

1 Or, adopting Rutherford’s conjecture, ἔθελησόντων, “and that the Athenians would not care to fight again.”
ΤΗΥΚΥΔΙΔΗΣ

LXXV. Τού δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους τῆς Ἀντάνδρου ὑπὸ τῶν Μυτιληναίων, ὀστέρ διενούντο, μελ-
λούσῃς κατασκευάζεσθαι, οἱ τῶν ἀργυρολόγων Ἀθηναίων νεῶν στρατηγοῖ, Δημόδοκος καὶ Ἀρι-
στείδης, ὄντες περὶ Ἑλλήσποντον (ὁ γὰρ τρίτος αὐτῶν Δάμαχος δέκα ναυσὶν ἔς τῶν Πόντου ἔσεπεπλεύκει) ὡς ἠσθάνοντο τὴν παρασκευὴν τοῦ χωρίου καὶ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς δεινὸν εἶναι μὴ ὀστέρ 
tὰ Ἀναία ἐτὶ τῇ Σάμῳ γένηται, ἐνθα οἱ φεύγον-
tες τῶν Σαμίων καταστάντες τοὺς τε Πελοπο-
νησίους ὠφέλουν ἐς τὰ ναυτικὰ κυβερνήτας πέμ-
pοντες καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει Σαμίων ἐς ταραχὴν 
καθίστασαν καὶ τοὺς ἐξιόντας ἐδέχοντο. οὐτὸ δὴ 
ξυναγείραντες ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχως στρατιῶν καὶ 
πλεύσαντες, μάχῃ τε νικήσαντες τοὺς ἐκ τῆς 
Ἀντάνδρου ἐπεξελθόντας, ἀναλαμβάνουσι τὸ 

2 χωρίον πάλιν. καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὅστερον ἔς τῶν 
Πόντου ἐσπλεύσας Δάμαχος, ἐν τῇ Ἡρακλεώτιδι 
ὀρμίσας ἐς τὸν Κάλητα ποταμὸν ἀπόλλυσι τᾶς 
ναῦς ὥδετος ἀνωθὲν γενομένου καὶ κατελθόντος 
αἰφνιδίου τοῦ ῥεύματος. αὐτὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ 
πεζῆ διὰ Βιθυνῶν Ὀρακῶν, οἱ εἰς πέραν ἐν τῇ 
Ἀσίᾳ, ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Καλχηδόνα, τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ 
στόματι τοῦ Πόντου Μεγαρέων ἀποκιάν.

LXXVI. Ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει καὶ Δημοσθένης 
Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶν ἀφικ-

2

νεῖται ἐς Ναύπακτον, εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς 
Μεγαρίδος ἀναχώρησιν. τῷ γὰρ Ἰπποκράτει καὶ 
ἐκείνῳ τὰ Βοιωτία πράγματα ἀπὸ τινῶν ἀνδρῶν 

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LXXV. During the same summer, when Antandros was about to be strengthened\(^1\) by the Mytileneans as they had planned, the generals in command of the Athenian ships which were collecting the tribute, namely, Demodocus and Aristides, who were in the neighbourhood of the Hellespont—for Lamachus, their colleague, had sailed into the Pontus with ten ships—heard of the fortification of the place and thought that there was danger of its becoming a menace to Lesbos, just as Anaea was to Samos\(^2\); for the Samian exiles, establishing themselves at Anaea, kept aiding the Peloponnesians by sending them pilots for their fleet, and also brought the Samians who lived in the city into a state of turmoil and continually offered a refuge to those who were sent into exile. The Athenian generals, therefore, collected an army from among the allies, sailed thither, defeated in battle those who came out against them from Antandros, and recovered the city. And not long afterwards Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus and anchored in the river Cales in Heraclean territory, lost his ships in consequence of a rain which fell in the uplands and brought down a sudden flood. He and his army, however, going by land through the Bithynian Thracians, who were on the other side, in Asia, arrived at Chalcedon, the Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus.

LXXVI. During the same summer, immediately after the Athenians retired from Megara, Demosthenes, the Athenian general, arrived with forty ships at Naupactus. For he and Hippocrates were engaged in negotiations about affairs in Boeotia, at the

\(^1\) cf. ch. lii. 3.  
\(^2\) cf. iii. xix. 2, xxxii. 2.
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ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐπράσετο, βουλομένων μετα-
στήσαι τὸν κόσμον καὶ ἐς δημοκρατίαν ὀσπερ
οἵ Ἀθηναίοι ἀρέσκεται καὶ Πτοιοδώρου μάλιστ' ἀνδρὸς φυγάδος ἡκ Θηβῶν ἐσηγομένου τάδε
3 αὐτοῖς παρεσκευάσθη. Σίφας μὲν ἐμελλόν τινες
προδώσειν (αἱ δὲ Σίφαι εἰσὶ τῆς Θεσπικῆς γῆς ἐν
τῷ Κρισαίῳ κόλπῳ ἐπιθαλασσίδοι). Χαιρόνειαν
δὲ, ἡ ἐς Ὀρχομενοῦ τὸν Μινύειον πρῶτον καλοῦ-
μενον, νῦν δὲ Βοιώτιον, ξυντελεῖ, ἄλλου εὖ Ὀρχο-
μενοῦ ἐνεδίσσαν, καὶ οἱ Ὀρχομενίων φυγάδες.
ξυνεπράσσουν τὰ μάλιστα καὶ ἀνδρᾶς ἐμποθοῦντο
ἐκ Πελοποννήσου (ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ Χαιρόνεια ἔσχατον
τῆς Βοιωτίας πρὸς τῇ Φανοῦδε τῆς Φωκίδος), καὶ
4 Φωκέων μετείχον τινες. τοὺς δὲ Ἀθηναίος ἔδει
Δῆλον καταλαβεῖν, τὸ ἐν τῇ Ταναγραίᾳ πρὸς
Εύβοιαν τετραμμένον Ἀπόλλωνος ἱερόν, ἀμα δὲ
ταῦτα ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ῥητῇ γίγνεσθαι, ὅπως μὴ ξυμβο-
θήσωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ Δῆλον οἱ Βοιωτοὶ ἄθροι, ἀλλ' 5 ἐπὶ
tὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν ἐκαστοι κινούμενα. καὶ εἰ
κατορθοῖτο ἡ πείρα καὶ τὸ Δῆλον τείχισθείη,
ῥάδιως Ἱλπίζουσιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ παρατικα νεωτερίζοιτο
τι τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας τῶν Βοιωτῶν, ἔχο-
mένων τούτων τῶν χωρίων καὶ ληστευομένης τῆς
γῆς καὶ ὁσιὰς ἐκάστοις διὰ βραχέος ἀποστροφῆς,
οὐ μενεῖν κατὰ χῶραν τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ
tῶν Ἀθηναίων μὲν προσιότων τοῖς ἀφεστηκόσι,
1 ὀσπερ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, bracketed by Hude, after Rutherford.
instance of certain men in several cities who wished to bring about a change in their form of government and to transform it into a democracy, such as the Athenians had. The leading spirit in these transactions was Ptoeodorus, an exile from Thebes, through whom Demosthenes and Hippocrates had brought about the following state of affairs. Siphæ, a town on the shore of the Crisaean Gulf in the territory of Thespiae, was to be betrayed by certain men; and Chaeronea, a city which is tributary to Orchomenus—the city which was formerly called Minyan, but is now called Boeotian—was to be put into the hands of the Athenians by others, the fugitives from Orchomenus, who also took into their pay some Peloponnesians, being especially active in the conspiracy. Some Phocians also had a share in the plot, Chaeronea being on the borders of Boeotia, and adjacent to Phanotis, which is in Phocis. The Athenians were to occupy Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo which is in the territory of Tanagra and opposite Euboea; and all these events were to take place simultaneously on an appointed day, in order that the Bocotians might not concentrate their forces at Delium, but that the several states might be occupied with their own disaffected districts. And if the attempt should succeed and Delium should be fortified, they confidently expected, even if no immediate change occurred in the constitutions of the Boeotian states, nevertheless, so long as these places were in their possession, from which Boeotian territory could be ravaged and where everyone might find a convenient place of refuge, the situation would not remain as it was, but in time, when the Athenians should come to the support of the rebels and the forces of the
τοῖς δὲ οὐκ οὕσης ἄθροιας τῆς δυνάμεως, κατα-
στήσειν αὐτὰ ἐς τὸ ἐπιτήδειον.

LXXVII. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιβουλὴ τοιαύτη παρε-
σκευάζετο. ὃ δὲ Ἰπποκράτης αὐτὸς μὲν ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως δύναμιν ἔχων, ὅπως καιρὸς εἶχη, ἔμελλε
στρατεύειν ὡς τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς, τὸν δὲ Δημοσθένη
προσπέστειλε ταῖς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν
Ναύπακτον, ὅπως ἕξ ἑκείνων τῶν χωρίων στρατὸν
ξυλλέξας Ἀκαρνάνων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμ-
μάχων πλέοι ἐπὶ τὰς Σίφας ὡς προδοθησόμενος·
ημέρα δὲ αὐτοῖς εἴη ἐπὶ ταῦτα πράσσειν.

2 καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης ἀφικόμενος, Οἰνιάδας δὲ
ὑπὸ τε Ἀκαρνάνων πάντων κατηγοροῦμενος
καταλαβὼν ἐς τὴν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχίαν καὶ
αὐτὸς ἀναστήσας τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν τὸ ἑκείνη πᾶν,
ἐπὶ Σαλύνθιον καὶ Ἀγραίους στρατεύσας πρῶτον
καὶ προσποιησόμενος τάλλα ἦτοιμωτέρος ὡς ἐπὶ
τὰς Σίφας, ἡταν δὲν, ἀπανθησόμενος.

LXXVIII. Βρασίδας δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον
τοῦ θέρους πορεύμενος ἐπτακοσίους καὶ χιλίους
ὀπλίτας ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης ἐπειδὴ ἐγένετο ἐν
Ἡρακλείᾳ τῇ ἐν Τραχίνι καὶ, προπέμψατος
αὐτοῦ ἄγγελον ἐς Φάρσαλον παρὰ τοὺς ἐπιτη-
δείους ἄξιοῦντος διάγειν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν στρατιάν,
ἡλθον ἐς Μελίτειαν τῆς Ἀχαίας Πάναιρὸς τε καὶ
Δώρος καὶ Ἰππολοχίδας καὶ Τορύλαος καὶ Στρό-
φακος πρόξενοι ὡς Χαλκιδῶν, τότε δὴ ἐπορεύετο.

2 ἦγον δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Θεσσαλῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ἐκ Δαρί-
BOOK IV. LXXVI. 5–LXXVIII. 2

Oligarchs were scattered, they could settle matters to their own advantage.

LXXVII. Such was the plot which was then under way. It was the purpose of Hippocrates, when the proper moment should arrive, to take troops from Athens and in person make an expedition into Boeotia; meanwhile he was sending Demosthenes in advance with a fleet of forty ships to Naupactus, in order that he should first collect in this region an army of Acarnanians and of other allies of Athens and then sail to Siphae, in expectation of its being betrayed; and a day was agreed upon between the two generals for doing these two things simultaneously. Upon his arrival at Naupactus, Demosthenes found that Oeniadæ had already been forced by all the rest of the Acarnanians to join the Athenian alliance; he himself then raised all the allied forces in that district, and after first making an expedition against Salynthius and the Agraean¹ and securing these, proceeded with his other preparations so as to be present at Siphae when needed.

LXXVIII. About the same time in the course of this summer, Brasidas, who was on his way to Thrace with one thousand seven hundred hoplites, reached Heracleia in Trachis and sent forward a messenger to his friends at Pharsalus requesting them to conduct him and his army through. Accordingly he was met at Meliteia in Achaia by Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaüs, and Strophacus, who was proxenus of the Chalcidians, and then proceeded on his march. He was conducted by several Thessalians also, among whom were Niconidas of Larisa, a

¹ cf. III. cxi. 4; cxiv. 2.
σὺς Νικονίδας Περδίκκα ἐπιτήδειος ὁ ὅν. τὴν γὰρ 
Θεσσαλίαν ἀλλὰς τε οὐκ εὑποροῦ ἦν διεύναι ἀνευ 
ἀγωγοῦ καὶ μετὰ δόπλων γε δὴ, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσι γε 
ὀμοίως Ἐλλησιν ὑποπτοὺν καθειστήκει τὴν τῶν 
πέλας μὴ πείσαντας διεύναι· τοῖς τε Ἀθηναίοις 
αἰεὶ ποτὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Θεσσαλῶν εὔνους ὑπήρ- 
χεν. ὡστε εἰ μὴ δυναστεία μᾶλλον ἢ ἱσονομία 
ἐχρώντο τὸ ἐγχώριοι 1 οἱ Θεσσαλοὶ, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ 
προῆλθεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τότε πορευόμενοι αὐτῷ ἀπαν- 
τήσαντες ἄλλοι τῶν τάναντία τούτοις βουλομένων 
ἐπὶ τῷ Ἔνυπεὶ ποταμῷ ἐκώλυν καὶ ἀδικεῖν ἐφα- 
4 σαν ἀνευ τοῦ πάντων κοινοῦ πορευόμενον. οἱ δὲ 
ἀγοντες οὔτε ἀκόντων ἐφασαν διάξειν, αἱφνιδίων 
τε παραγενόμενον ξένου ὠντες κομίζειν. ὑλογε ᾦ 
καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Βρασίδας τῇ Θεσσαλῶν γῆ καὶ αὐτοῖς 
φίλος ὃν ἴναι καὶ Ἀθηναίοις πολεμίως ὀυσι καὶ 
οὐκ ἐκεῖνοι ὅπλα ἐπιφερείν, Θεσσαλοὶ τε οὐκ 
eἰδέναι καὶ Δακεδαιμονίος ἔχθραν ούσαν ὡστε τῇ 
ἀλλήλων γῆ μὴ χρήσθαι, νῦν τε ἀκόντων ἐκείνων 
οὐκ ἂν προελθεῖν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι), οὐ 
5 μέντοι ἄξιοιν γε εἰργεσθαι· καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀκούσαντες 
ταῦτα ἀπήλθον· ὦ δὲ κελεύοντων τῶν ἀγωγῶν, 
πρῖν τι πλέον ἐξυστηναί τὸ κωλύσον, ἐχώρει οὐδὲν 
ἐπισχῶν δρόμῳ· καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἥ ἐκ 

1 τὸ ἐγχώριοι, Hude changes to ἐγχώριφ, after τῷ ἐγχώριφ of Dion. Hal.

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friend of Perdiccas. Indeed, Thessaly was not in any case an easy country to traverse without an escort, and especially with an armed force; and among all the Hellenes alike to traverse the territory of neighbours without their consent was looked on with suspicion. Besides, the common people of Thessaly had always been well disposed to the Athenians. If, therefore, the Thessalians had not been under the sway of a few powerful men, as is usual in that country, rather than under a free democracy, Brasidas would not have made headway; even as it was, he was confronted on his march, when he reached the river Enipeus, by other Thessalians belonging to the opposite party. These tried to stop him, warning him that he was doing wrong in proceeding without the consent of the whole people. But his conductors reassured them, saying that, if they were unwilling, they would not conduct him further, and that they were merely playing the part of hosts in escorting an unexpected visitor. Brasidas himself explained that he came as a friend to Thessaly and its inhabitants and was bearing arms against the Athenians, who were enemies, and not against them; moreover, he was not aware of any such hostility between the Thessalians and the Lacedaemonians as to debar them from access to each other’s territory, but if in this instance they were unwilling, he would go no further, nor indeed could he do so; he hoped, however, that they would not bar his progress. On hearing this the Thessalians departed; but Brasidas, taking the advice of his escort, before a larger force could be collected to hinder him, set out at full speed and without making any halt. In fact, he finished the journey to Pharsalus.
Τῆς Μελιτείας ἀφόρμησεν, ἐς Φάρσαλον τε ἑτέλεσε καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο ἐπὶ τῷ 'Ἀπιδανῳ ποταμῷ, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐς Φάκιον, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐς Περραιβίαν.

6 ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου ἦδη οἱ μὲν Θεσσαλῶν ἅγιοι πάλιν ἀπῆλθον, οἱ δὲ Περραιβοὶ αὐτῶν, ὑπήκουοι ὄντες Θεσσαλῶν, κατέστησαν ἐς Δίον τῆς Περδίκκου ἀρχῆς, δ' ὑπὸ τῷ Ὁλύμπῳ Μακεδονίας πρὸς Θεσσαλοὺς πόλισμα κεῖται.

LXXIX. Τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ Βρασίδας Θεσσαλίαν φθάσας διέδραμε πρὸν τινα κωλύειν παρασκευάσασθαι, καὶ ἄφικε τὸς Περδίκκαν καὶ ἐσ 2 τὴν Χαλκιδικήν. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς Πελοποννήσου, ὡς τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἦτούχει, δείσαντες οἱ τε ἐπὶ Θράκης ἀφεστῶτες Ἀθηναίων καὶ Περδίκκας ἐξῆγαγον τὸν στρατόν, οἱ μὲν Χαλκιδῆς νομίζοντες ἐπὶ σφάς πρῶτον ὀρμήσειν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους (καὶ ἄμα αἱ πλησιόχωροι πόλεις αὐτῶν αἱ οὐκ ἀφεστηκυῖαι ξυνεπῆγον κρύφα), Περδίκκας δὲ πολέμοις μὲν οὐκ ὄν ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ, φοβοῦμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ παλαιὰ διάφορα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ μᾶλιστα βουλόμενος Ἀρράβαιον τὸν Δυνη-3 στῶν βασιλέα παραστήσασθαι. ἕγνεβη δὲ αὐτῶι ὡστε ῥᾴδον ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου στρατὸν ἐξαγα- γεῖν, ἡ τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων ἐν τῷ παρόντι κακο- πραγία.

LXXX. Τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ἐγκειμένων τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ οὐχ ἢκίστα τῇ ἐκείνων γῇ, ἥλπιζον ἀποτρέψειν αὐτοὺς μᾶλιστα, εἰ ἀντι- παραλυποίεν πέμψαντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐξυμμάχους.

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on the same day on which he had set out from Meliteia, and encamped on the river Apidanus; thence he proceeded to Phaciaum, and from there to Perrhaebia. Here his Thessalian escort at length turned back, and the Perrhaebians, who are subjects of the Thessalians, brought him safely to Dium in the dominions of Perdiccas, a small town in Macedonia at the foot of Mt. Olympus, facing Thessaly.

LXXIX. It was in this manner that Brasidas succeeded in rushing through Thessaly before anyone could get ready to hinder him and reached Perdiccas and the Chalcidic peninsula. The reason why the peoples in Thrace who had revolted from Athens had, in conjunction with Perdiccas, brought this army all the way from the Peloponnesus was that they were filled with alarm at the success of the Athenians. The Chalcidians thought that the Athenians would take the field against them first, and the cities in this neighbourhood which had not yet revolted nevertheless took part secretly in inviting the Peloponnesians to intervene. As for Perdiccas, although he was not yet openly hostile to Athens, he also was afraid of the long-standing differences between himself and the Athenians, and above all he was anxious to reduce Arrhabaeus, the king of the Lyncestians. A further circumstance which rendered it easier for them to procure an army from the Peloponnesus was the evil fortune which at the present time attended the Lacedaemonians.

LXXX. For since the Athenians kept harassing the Peloponnesians, and especially the territory of the Lacedaemonians, the latter thought that the best way of diverting them would be to retaliate by sending an army against their allies, especially since
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αὐτῶν στρατιάν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων τρέφειν τε καὶ ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει σφᾶς ἐπικαλοῦντα 2 μένων. καὶ ἀμα τῶν Εἰλώτων βουλομένων ἢν ἐπὶ προφάσει ἐκπέμψα, μὴ τι πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τῆς Πύλου ἑχομένης νεωτερίσωσιν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ δὲ ἔπραξαν φοβούμενοι αὐτῶν τὴν νεότητα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος (αιεὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Λακεδαίμονίοις πρὸς τοὺς Εἰλώτας τῆς φυλακῆς πέρι μάλιστα καθέστηκαν), προεῖπον αὐτῶν ὅσοι ἄξιούσιν ἐν τοῖς πολεμίοις γεγενήθαι σφίσιν ἀριστοί, κρίνεσθαι, ὡς ἐλευθερώσωσιν, πείραι ποιούμενοι καὶ ἠγούμενοι τούτους σφίσιν ὑπὸ φρονήματος, οἵτε καὶ ἧξιώσαν πρῶτος ἐκαστὸς ἐλευθεροῦσθαι, μάλιστα ἂν καὶ ἐπιθέσθαι. καὶ προκρινάντων ἐς δισχῖλλον οἱ μὲν ἐστεφανῶσαντό τε καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ περιήλθον ὡς ἐλευθερωμένοι, οἱ δὲ οὐ πολλῷ ὑστεροῦ ἡφάνυσάν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ οὕδεις ἤθετο ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἐκαστὸς διεφθάρη. καὶ τότε προβιόμοις τῷ Βρασίδᾳ αὐτῶν ξυνεπέμψαν ἐπτακοσίους ὀπλίτας, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου μισθὸ πείσας ἐξήγαγεν.

LXXXI. Αὐτὸν τε Βρασίδαν βουλόμενον 1 μάλιστα Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀπέστειλαν (προνθυμήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χαλκεῖς), ἀνδρὰ ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ.

1 βουλόμενον, with the MSS. Hude reads βουλόμενοι.

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these allies were ready to maintain an army and were calling upon the Lacedaemonians for help in order that they might revolt. Furthermore, the Lacedaemonians were glad to have an excuse for sending out some of the Helots, in order to forestall their attempting a revolt at the present juncture when Pylos was in the possession of the enemy. Indeed, through fear of their youth \(^1\) and numbers—for in fact most of their measures have always been adopted by the Lacedaemonians with a view to guarding against the Helots—they had once even resorted to the following device. They made proclamation that all Helots who claimed to have rendered the Lacedaemonians the best service in war should be set apart, ostensibly to be set free. They were, in fact, merely testing them, thinking that those who claimed, each for himself, the first right to be set free would be precisely the men of high spirit who would be the most likely to attack their masters. About two thousand of them were selected and these put crowns on their heads and made the rounds of the temples, as though they were already free, but the Spartans not long afterwards made away with them, and nobody ever knew in what way each one perished. So, on the present occasion, the Spartans gladly sent with Brasidas seven hundred Helots as hoplites, the rest of his forces being drawn from the Peloponnesus by the inducement of pay.

LXXXI. As for Brasidas himself, the Lacedaemonians sent him chiefly at his own desire, though the Chalcidians also were eager to have him. He was a man esteemed at Sparta as being energetic in

\(^1\) Most MSS. read νεφότητα, B σκαιφότητα, but some word meaning "boldness" or "recklessness" seems to be required. Hude adopts Wiedmann's conjecture καινότητα.
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dókouvta draštýrion einai ēs tā pánta kai ēpeidhē
ēxēlthe pleïóstou áxion Lakedaimoníous genómēnon.
2 tō te gár parantíka éauton paraschōn díkaiou
kai métrion ēs tās pōleis ēpέstηse tā pollá, tā
dē prōodosía èlle tōn χωρίωn, óste tois Lakedaimoníous
γýnveshaix̱ xýmbaínein te bouloμénois,
óper époíēsan, ántapódosin kai ápodokhēn χωρίων
kai toû polémon ēpô tēs Peloponýhson lóφhēsin
ēs tē tōn χρόνωn ýsteron metà tā ēk Sikelías
pōlemon h tōte Brasídou ēretē kai xýnēsia, tōn
mēn peīra aiðthoméno, tōn dē akōn xomíasantōn,
Mάlsta ëteiðhmiān ènepoiεi tois 'Αθηναίωn xým-
μάχοis ēs tōus Lakedaimoníous. prōtōs gár ëxeil-
θōn kai dóxas ēnai kata pánta ágamôs èlπída
ègkatélîte bēβaion òs kai oi álloi toioûtoj
ēisēn.

LXXXII. Tōte d' oûn afikoménon autōv ēs tā
ēπi Θράκηs oi 'Aθηναίoi piðhōmenoi tōn te Per-
díkkav polémon poiòntai, xomíasantes aîteon
ēnai tēs paródou, kai tōn taûtē xûmamákōn
φυλακῆn pλέona kâteπtēsan. LXXXIII. Per-
díkkas dē Brasídān kai tēn stratiān eûthōs xavbōn
metà tēs ēautou dûnámewos stratēuei ēπi 'Ar-
râbaino tōn Bromerou, Lavgkastōn Makēdōnōn
bāsileā, òmoran òneta, diαforak ς te autōf oúth
2 kai bouloμénon kátastrέψaθai. ēpete dē ëggêneto
τē stratōf metà tōu Brasídou ēpeti tē èsβolê tēs

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everything he did, and indeed, after he had gone abroad, he proved invaluable to the Lacedaemonians. For, at the present crisis, by showing himself just and moderate in his dealings with the cities he caused most of the places to revolt, and secured possession of others by the treachery of their inhabitants, so that when the Lacedaemonians wished to make terms with Athens, as they did ultimately, they had places to offer in exchange for places they wished to recover and were able to secure for the Peloponnesus a respite from the war; and in the later part of the war, after the events in Sicily, it was the virtue and tact which Brasidas had displayed at this time—qualities of which some had had experience, while others knew of them by report—that did most to inspire in the allies of the Athenians a sentiment favourable to the Lacedaemonians. For since he was the first Lacedaemonian abroad who gained a reputation for being in all respects a good man, he left behind him a confident belief that the other Lacedaemonians also were of the same stamp.

LXXXII. On the arrival of Brasidas in Thrace at the time referred to, the Athenians, on hearing of it, declared Perdiccas an enemy, regarding him as responsible for his coming, and they established a stricter watch over their allies in that region. LXXXIII. But Perdiccas immediately took Brasidas and his army, together with his own forces, and made an expedition against his neighbour Arrhabaeus, son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestian Macedonians; for he had a quarrel with him and wished to subdue him. But when he and Brasidas arrived with their combined armies at the pass leading

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1 421 B.C.; cf. v. xvii.  2 cf. ch. lxxix. 1.
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Λύγκου, Βρασίδας ἐς λόγους ἔφη βούλεσθαι πρῶτον ἐλθὼν πρὸ πολέμου Ἄρραβαίον ἐξῆμμαχον
3 Λακεδαιμονίων, ἥν δύνηται, ποιήσαι. καὶ γάρ τι καὶ Ἄρραβαίος ἐπεκηρυκεύετο, ἐτοῖμος ὡς Βρασίδα
μέσῳ δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπειν καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδέων προσβείς ξυμπαρόντες ἐδίδασκον αὐτῶν μὴ ύπεξ-
ελείν τῷ Περδίκκα τὰ δεινά, ἵνα προθυμοτέρῳ
4 ἔχοιεν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἐαυτῶν χρῆσθαι. ἀμα δὲ τι καὶ
eιρήκεσαν τοιοῦτον οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Περδίκκου ἐν τῇ
Λακεδαιμονί, ὡς πολλὰ αὐτοῖς τῶν περὶ αὐτῶν
χωρίων ἐξῆμμαχα ποιήσοι, ὡστε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτον
κοινῇ μᾶλλον ὁ Βρασίδας τὰ τοῦ Ἀρραβαίου
5 ἡξίου πράσσειν. Περδίκκας δὲ οὔτε δικαστὴν ἔφη
Βρασίδαν τῶν σφετέρων διαφορῶν ἀγαγεῖν, μᾶλ-
λον δὲ καθαιρέτην ὅπε ἀν αὐτῶς ἀποφαίνῃ πολε-
μίων, ἀδικήσειν τε εἰ αὐτῶν τρέφοντος τὸ Ἦμισιν
6 τοῦ στρατοῦ ἥγεσται Ἀρραβαίῳ. ὁ δὲ ἀκοντος
καὶ ἐκ διαφοράς ξυγγίγνεται, καὶ πείσθεις τοῖς
λόγοις ἀπῆγαγε τὴν στρατιὰν πρὶν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς
τὴν χώραν. Περδίκκας δὲ μετὰ τούτο τρίτον
μέρος ἀνθ’ ἦμίσεος τῆς τροφῆς ἐδίδοι, νομίζουν
ἀδικεῖσθαι.

LXXXIV. Ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει εὕθυς ὁ
Βρασίδας ἔχων καὶ Χαλκιδέας ἐπὶ Ἀκάνθῳ τὴν
'Ανδρίων ἀποικίαν ὁλίγον πρὸ τρυγῆτον ἐστρά-
2 τευσεν. οἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ δέχεσθαι αὐτῶν κατ'
1 ἐς λόγους, van Herwerden's correction for λόγοι of the MSS.
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to Lyncus, Brasidas said that he wished, before appealing to arms, to have a conference with Arrhabaeus and make him an ally of the Lacedaemonians, if he could. For it seemed that Arrhabaeus had made some overtures and was ready to submit the question at issue to Brasidas' arbitration; the Chalcidian envoys who were present also kept urging him not to remove the difficulties from the path of Perdiccas, since they wished to have in him a more zealous helper in their own affairs. Furthermore, the envoys of Perdiccas, when they were at Lacedaemon, had given a hint to the effect that he would bring many of the places in his neighbourhood into alliance with the Lacedaemonians; consequently Brasidas was inclined to insist upon having a freer hand in dealing with Arrhabaeus. But Perdiccas said that he had not brought Brasidas to be a judge of their quarrels, but rather to be a destroyer of any enemies whom he himself might designate, and that Brasidas would do wrong if, when he himself maintained half the army, he should parley with Arrhabaeus. But Brasidas, in spite of Perdiccas and after a quarrel with him, held the conference, and finding the king's arguments convincing, withdrew his army without invading his country. After this Perdiccas contributed only a third instead of one-half of the maintenance, considering himself to be aggrieved.

LXXXIV. Immediately afterwards during the same summer and a short time before the vintage season, Brasidas took some Chalcidians in addition to his own force and made an expedition against Acanthus, the colony of the Andrians. But on the question of admitting him the Acanthians were
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άλληλους ἐστασίαζον, οὗ τε μετὰ τῶν Χαλκιδέων ἔμελπάγοντες καὶ ὁ δήμος. ὅμως δὲ διὰ τοῦ καρποῦ τὸ δέος ἔτι ἔξω ὄντος πεισθέν τὸ πλῆθος ὑπὸ τοῦ Βρασίδου δέξασθαι τε αὐτῶν μόνων καὶ ἀκούσαντες βουλεύσασθαι, δέχεται καὶ καταστὰς ἐτὶ τὸ πλῆθος (ἡ δὲ οὐδὲ ἀδύνατος, ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιος, εἶπεῖν) ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

LXXXV. Ἄρα μὲν ἐκπεμψεις μου καὶ τῆς στρατιάς ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὡς Ἀκάνθιου, γεγένηται τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπαληθεύουσα ἢν ἀρχόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου προείπομεν, Ἀθηναίοις ἐλευθερούντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα πολεμήσειν· εἰ δὲ χρόνῳ ἐπηλθομεν, σφαλέντες τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑκεῖ πολέμου δόξης, ἦ διὰ τάχους αὐτοῖς ἀνευ τοῦ υμετέρου κυνόνου ἡλπίσαμεν Ἀθηναίοις καθαιρήσειν, μηδεὶς μεμφθῇ νῦν γὰρ, ὅτε παρέσχεσθε, ἀφιγμένοι καὶ μετὰ ὑμῶν πειρασόμεθα κατεργάζεσθαι αὐτοῖς.

3 θαυμάζω δὲ τῇ τε ἀποκλησίῳ μου τῶν πυλῶν καὶ εἰ μὴ ἀσμένοις ὑμῖν ἀφίγμα. ἦμείς μὲν γὰρ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οἰόμενοι τε παρὰ ξυμμάχους, καὶ πρὶν ἔρρημον ἀφικέσθαι, τῇ γοῦν γνώμῃ ἦξεν καὶ βουλομένοις ἔσεσθαι, κυνδύνῳ τε τοσοῦτο ἀνερρίψαμεν διὰ τῆς ἀλλοτρίας πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ὃδον ἱόντες καὶ πάν το πρόθυμον παρεχόμεθα· 1

5 ὑμεῖς δὲ εἰ τί ἄλλο ἐν νῦ ἔχετε ἢ εἰ ἐναντιώσεσθε τῇ τε υμετέρᾳ αὐτῶν ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων

1 Rutherford’s correction for παρεχόμενοι of the MSS.

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divided among themselves, on the one side being those who, in concert with the Chalcidians, asked him to intervene, and on the other side the popular party. However, when Brasidas urged them to admit him unattended and then, after hearing what he had to say, to deliberate on the matter, the populace consented, for they had fears concerning the grapes, which had not yet been gathered. So he came before the people—and indeed, for a Lacedaemonian, he was not wanting in ability as a speaker—and addressed them as follows:

LXXXV. “Citizens of Acanthus, the Lacedaemonians have sent me and my army to prove the truth of what we proclaimed at the beginning to be the cause of the war, when we said that we were going to war with the Athenians for the liberation of Hellas. But if we have arrived late, disappointed as we have been with regard to the war at home, where we had hoped to destroy the Athenians quite speedily, by our own efforts and without involving you in the danger, do not blame us; for we are here now, having come as soon as opportunity offered, and together with you we shall try to subdue them. But I am amazed at the closing of your gates against me, and that my coming has been unwelcome to you. For we Lacedaemonians, thinking, even before we actually came, that we should find ourselves among men who were allies in spirit at least and that we should be welcomed, have hazarded the great danger of travelling a journey of many days through an alien territory and have shown all possible zeal. But if you have aught else in mind, or intend to stand in the way of your own freedom and that of the rest of the Hellenes, that would be
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6 Ἐλλήνων, δεινῶν ἄν εἴη. καὶ γὰρ οὐχ ὁτι αὐτοὶ ἀνθίστασθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ οίς ἄν ἐπίω, ἦσον τις ἐμοὶ πρόσεις, δυσχερὲς ποιούμενοι εἰ ἐπὶ οὖς πρῶτον ἤλθον ὑμᾶς, καὶ πόλιν ἄξιόχρεων παρεχόμενοι καὶ ξύσειν δοκοῦντας ἔχειν, μὴ ἔδεξασθε, καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐ δόξω 1 πιστὴν ἀποδεικνύναι, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἀδικοὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐπιφέρειν ἢ ἀσθενῆς καὶ ἀδύνατος τιμωρήσαι τὰ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἦν 7 ἐπίσωσιν, ἀφίχθαι. καίτοι στρατιὰ γε τῇδ’ ἢν νῦν ἔχω ἐπὶ Νίσαιαν ἐμοῦ βοηθήσαντος σοῦ ἡθέλησαν Ἀθηναίοι πλέονες ὄντες προσμείβαι, ὡστε οὕκ εἰκός νητή 2 γε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἐν Νισαια ἐστρατῷ ἵνα πλῆθος ἐφ’ ὑμᾶς ἀποστείλαι.

LXXXVI. "Αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἐπ’ ἐλευθερώσει δὲ τῶν Ἐλλήνων παρελήλυθα, ὄρκοις τε Δακεδαιμονίων καταλαβὼν τὰ τέλη τοῖς μεγίστοις ἢ μὴν οὐς ἀν ἔγωγε προσαγάγωμαι ξυμμάχους ἔσεσθαι αὐτούμοις, καὶ ἀμα οὐχ ἢν ξυμμάχους ὑμᾶς ἔχωμεν ἢ βία ἢ ἀπάτη προσλαβόντες, ἀλλὰ τούπαντιον ὑμῖν δεδουλωμένοι ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων 2 ξυμμαχήσοντες. οὐκοιν ἄξιώ ὡς αὐτός ὑποπτεύσωσιν, πίστεις γε δίδους τὰς μεγίστας, οὔτε τιμωρὸς ἀδύνατος νομισθήναι, προσχωρεῖν δὲ ὑμᾶς θαρσήσαντας.

3 "Καὶ εἰ τις ἱδίᾳ τίνα δεδίως ἃρα, μὴ ἐγὼ τεις προσθῶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀπρόθυμος ἐστι, πάντων

1 Sauppe’s correction for οὐχ ἔχω of the MSS.
2 So the MSS.; Hude emends to νητήν.
3 For ἐν Νίσαια Hude adopts ἐκεῖ, with E, against the other MSS.

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monstrous. For it is not merely that you yourselves oppose me, but that all to whom I may apply will be less inclined to join me, raising the objection that you to whom I first came, representing as you do an important city and reputed to be men of sense, did not receive me. And it will seem that the reason which I give for your refusal is not to be believed, but that either the freedom I offered you is not honourable, or that when I came to you I was powerless and unable to defend you against the Athenians if they should attack you. And yet when I brought aid to Nisaea with the very army which I now have, the Athenians were unwilling, though superior in numbers, to engage us, so that they are not likely to send against you by sea a number equal to the armament they had at Nisaea.

LXXXVI. "As for myself, I have come here not to harm but to liberate the Hellenes, having bound the government of the Lacedaemonians by the most solemn oaths that in very truth those whom I should win as allies should enjoy their own laws; and further, we are come, not that we may have you as allies, winning you over either by force or fraud, but to offer our alliance to you who have been enslaved by the Athenians. I claim, therefore, that I ought not either myself to be suspected, offering as I do the most solemn pledges, or to be accounted an impotent champion, but that you should boldly come over to me.

"And if anyone, possibly, being privately afraid of somebody is half-hearted through fear that I may put the city into the hands of some party or

¹ Or, reading ὅ τι ἐξώ, "And I shall have to submit to the charge of not being able to give a reason for your refusal that can be believed, but of offering, etc."

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4 μάλιστα πιστευσάτω. οὐ γὰρ ξυστασιάσων ἥκω, οὔδε ἂν σαφῆ ́ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν, εἰ τὸ πάτριον παρείς τὸ πλέον τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἢ τὸ ἐλασσόν τοῖς πάσι δουλώσαιμι.

5 χαλεπωτέρα γὰρ ἂν τῆς ἀλλοφύλου ἄρχης εἰ, καὶ ἦμῖν τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις οὐκ ἂν ἀντὶ πόνων χάρις καθίστατο, ἀντὶ δὲ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης αἰτία μᾶλλον· οἷς τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐγκλήμασι καταπολεμοῦμεν, αὐτοὶ ἂν φαινοίμεθα ἐχθῖνα.

6 ἢ ὁ μὴ ὑποδέξας ἀρετὴν κατακτώμενοι. ἀπάτη γὰρ εὐπρεπεὶ αἰσχίνοι τοῖς γε ἐν ἀξιώματι πλεονεκτήσας ἢ βία ἐμφανεὶ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἴσχυος δικαιώσει, ἢν τὸ τύχη ἑδωκεν, ἐπέρχεται, τὸ δὲ γνώμης ἀδίκου ἐπιβουλῆ. LXXXVII. οὕτω πολλὴν περιωτὴν τῶν ἦμῖν 3 ἐς τὰ μέγιστα διαφόρων ποιούμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν μείζω πρὸς τοῖς ὅρκοις ἑβεβαιώσει λάβοιτε, ἢ 4 οἷς τὰ ἔργα ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἀναθροῦμεν δόκησιν ἀναγκαίαν παρέχεται ὡς καὶ ξυμφέρει ὀμοίως ὡς εἶπον.

2 "Εἰ δὲ ἐμοῦ ταῦτα προϊσχομένου ἀδύνατοι μὲν φῆσετε εἶναι, εὑνοί δὲ ὄντες ἀξιώσετε μὴ κακούμενοι διοθεῖσθαι, καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν μὴ ἀκινδύνου ὑμῖν φαίνεσθαι, δικαίον τε εἶναι, οἷς καὶ δυνατὸν δέχεσθαι αὐτὴν, τούτοις καὶ ἐπιφέρειν, ἀκοντα δὲ

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1 ἂν σαφῆ, Bauer’s correction for ἄσαφῆ of the MSS.
2 Hude writes ἀσχίόν τι, after Stobaeus.
3 Hude writes ὑμῖν, with Stahl. 4 Deleted by Hude.
other,\(^1\) let him most of all have confidence. For I am not come to join a faction, nor do I think that the freedom I am offering would be a real one if, regardless of your ancestral institutions, I should enslave the majority to the few or the minority to the multitude. That would be more galling than foreign rule, and for us Lacedaemonians the result would be, not thanks for our pains, but, instead of honour and glory, only reproach; and the very charges on which we are waging war to the death against the Athenians we should be found to be bringing home to ourselves in a more odious form than the power which has made no display of virtue. For it is more shameful, at least to men of reputation, to gain advantage by specious deceit than by open force; for the one makes assault by the assertion of power, which is the gift of fortune, the other by the intrigues of deliberate injustice. LXXXVII. Consequently we Lacedaemonians use great circumspection as regards matters that concern us in the highest degree\(^2\); and you could not get better security, in addition to our oaths, than where you have men whose actions scrutinized in the light of their professions furnish the irresistible conviction that their interests are indeed exactly as they have said.

"But if you meet these offers of mine with the plea that you cannot join us, but, because you are well-disposed to us, claim that you should not suffer by your refusal, and maintain that the liberty I offer seems to you to be not without its dangers, and that it is right to offer it to those who can receive it but not to force

\(^1\) i.e. the dreaded ὅληγου.

\(^2\) Referring to Sparta’s reputation for justice.
μηδένα προσαναγκάζειν, μάρτυρας μὲν θεοὺς καὶ ἤρως τοὺς ἐγχωρίους ποιήσομαι ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθῇ ἦκων οὐ πείθω, γῆν δὲ τὴν ὑμετέραν δὴν πειρά-3 σομαί βιάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν ἔτι νομίμω, προσεῖναι δὲ τί μοι καὶ κατὰ δύο ἀνάγκας τὸ εὐλογον, τῶν μὲν Δακεδαιμονίων, ὅπως μὴ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ εὖν, εἰ μὴ προσαχθήσεσθε, τοῖς ἀπὸ ὑμῶν χρήμασι φερομένοις παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίοις βλάπτωνται, οἱ δὲ Ἐλληνες ἴνα μὴ κωλύσωνται ύφ᾽ 4 ὑμῶν δουλείας ἀπαλλαγῆναι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἰκότως γ᾽ ἤν τάδε πράσσομεν, οὐδὲ ὅφειλομεν οἱ Δακε-5 δαιμόνιοι μὴ κοινῷ τινος ἀγαθοῦ αἰτία τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους ἐλευθεροῦν· οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἄρχης ἐφέμεθα, παῦσαι δὲ μᾶλλον ἔτερον στεύδοντες τοὺς πλείους ἂν ἀδικοῖμεν, εἰ ξύμπασιν αὐτονομίαι ἐπιφέροντες ὑμᾶς τοὺς ἐναντιομένους περιέδοιμεν. 6 πρὸς ταῦτα βουλεύεσθε εὖ, καὶ ἀγονίσασθε τοῖς τε Ἐλλησών ἀρχαῖ πρῶτοι ἐλευθερίας καὶ ἀδίδουν δόξαν καταθέσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸ τά τε ἰδία μὴ βλαφθῆναι καὶ ξυμπάσῃ τῇ πόλει τὸ κάλλιστον ὅνομα περιθεῖναι.”

LXXXVIII. Ὁ μὲν Βρασίδας τοσαῦτα εἶπεν. οὶ δὲ Ἀκάνθοι, πολλῶν λεχθέντων πρότερον ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα, κρύφα διαψαφισάμενοι, διὰ τὸ τὸ ἐπαγωγὰ εἰπεῖν τὸν Βρασίδαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ καρποῦ φόβῳ ἔγνωσαν οἱ πλείους ἀφίστασθαι Ἀθηναίων, καὶ πιστώσαντες αὐτὸν τοὺς ὦρκοις οἷς τὰ τέλη τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων ὁμόσαντα αὐτὸν ἐξέπεμψαν, ἡ μὲν ἔσεσθαι ἐξεμάχους αὐτονόμους

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it on anyone against his will, I shall make the gods and heroes of your country my witnesses that, though I come for your good, I cannot persuade you, and I shall try, by ravaging your territory, to compel you; and in that case I shall not consider that I am doing wrong, but that I have some justification, for two compelling reasons: first, in the interest of the Lacedaemonians, that with all your professed good-will toward them they may not, in case you shall not be brought over, be injured by the money you pay as tribute to the Athenians; secondly, that the Hellenes may not be prevented by you from escaping bondage. For otherwise we should not be justified in acting thus, nor are we Lacedaemonians bound, except on the plea of some common good, to confer liberty on those who do not wish it. Nor, again, are we seeking after empire, but rather we are eager to stop others from acquiring it; and we should do wrong to the majority, if, when we are bringing independence to all, we permitted you to stand in the way. In view of these things, deliberate wisely, and strive to be the first to inaugurate freedom for the Hellenes and to lay up for yourselves undying fame; thus you will save your own property from injury and confer upon your whole state the fairest name."

LXXXVIII. Such was the speech of Brasidas. But the Acanthians, after much had been said on both sides of the question, took a secret vote, and, on account of Brasidas’ impassioned words and their fears about the harvest, the majority decided to revolt from the Athenians; then having bound him with the oaths which the authorities of the Lacedaemonians swore when they sent him out, namely, that those
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οδὴ δὲν προσαγάγηται, οὔτω δὲχονται τὸν στρατόν. 2 καὶ οὗ πολὺ ύστερον καὶ Στάγιρος Ἄνδριὼν ἀποκία ξυναπέστη. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εὖ τῷ θέρει τοῦτῳ ἐγένετο.

LXXXIX. Τοῦ δὲ ἐπιγυνωμένου χειμώνος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου, ὡς τῷ Ἰπποκράτει καὶ Δημοσθένει στρατηγοῖς οὐσίν Ἀθηναίων τὰ ἐν τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς ἐνεδίδοτο καὶ ἔδει τὸν μὲν Δημοσθένη ταῖς ναυσίν ἐς τὰς Σίφας ἀπαντήσαι, τὸν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον, γενομένης διαμαρτίας τῶν ήμερῶν ἐς ὃς ἔδει ἀμφότερος στρατεύειν, ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης πρότερον πλεύσας πρὸς τὰς Σίφας καὶ ἔχων ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν Ἀκαρνάνας καὶ τῶν ἐκεί πόλλων ἐμμαμάχων, ἀπρακτὸς γίγνεται μηνυθέντος τοῦ ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι ὑπὸ Νικομάχου, ἀνδρὸς Φωκεῶς ἐκ Φανοτέως, δὲ Λακεδαιμονίως ἐπιτεῦ, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ 2 Βοιωτοῖς· καὶ βοηθείας γενομένης πάντων Βοιωτῶν (οὐ γὰρ τῷ Ἰπποκράτης παρελύτη ἐν τῇ γῇ ὃν) προκαταλαμβάνονται αἱ τές Σίφαι καὶ ἡ Χαρώνεια. ὡς δὲ ἠθείον οἱ πράσσοντες τὸ ἀμάρτημα, οὐδὲν ἐκίνησαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

ΧC. Ὁ δὲ Ἰπποκράτης ἀναστήσας Ἀθηναίοις πανδημεῖ, αὐτοὺς καὶ τῶν μετοίκους καὶ ξένων ὅσιν παρῆσαν, ύστερος ἀφικνεῖται ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον, ἡδὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀνακεχωρηκότων ἀπὸ τῶν Σιφῶν· καὶ καθίσας τὸν στρατόν Δήλιον ἐτέχεξε 2 τοιῷδε τρόπῳ. 1 τάφρον μὲν κύκλῳ περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τῶν νεῶν ἐσκαπτόν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὀρύγματος ἀνέβαλλον ἀντὶ τείχους τῶν χοῦν, καὶ σταυροὺς

1 τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος, after τρόπῳ in the MSS., deleted by Dobree.

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whom he might win over should be autonomous allies, they finally received the army. And not long afterwards Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, joined in the revolt. Such then, were the events of that summer.

LXXXIX. At the very beginning of the following winter, when the places in Boeotia were to be delivered to Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the Athenian generals, Demosthenes was to have been present with his ships at Siphae, the other general at Delium. But a mistake was made as to the days when both were to start, and Demosthenes sailed too soon to Siphae, having Acarnanians and many allies from that region on board, and so proved unsuccessful; for the plot had been betrayed by Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanotis, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they the Boeotians. Accordingly succour came from all the Boeotians—for Hippocrates was not yet in their country to annoy them—and both Siphae and Chaeronea were occupied in advance; and the conspirators, learning of the mistake, attempted no disturbance in the towns.

XC. Meanwhile Hippocrates levied all the forces of Athens, both citizens and resident aliens, and such foreigners as were in the city. But he arrived at Delium too late, after the Boeotians had already withdrawn from Siphae. Then, after settling his army in camp, he proceeded to fortify Delium in the following manner. They dug a ditch round the temple and the sacred precinct and threw up the earth from the ditch to serve for a wall, fixing stakes along

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1 About twelve miles north of Acanthus, known also as Stageira, the birthplace of Aristotle.

2 Resumption of the narrative of ch. lxxxix.
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παρακαταπηγώνουτες ἀμπελοῦν κόπτοντες τὴν περὶ
tὸ ἱέρον ἐσέβαλλον καὶ λίθους ἀμα καὶ πλίνθον
ὲκ τῶν οἰκοπέδων τῶν ἐγγὺς καθαιροῦντες, καὶ
παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐμετεώριζον τὸ ἔρυμα. πύργους τε
ξυλίνους κατέστησαν ἥ καιρὸς ἦν καὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ
οἰκοδόμημα οὐδὲν ὑπήρχεν ὡπερ γὰρ ἦν στοὰ
3 κατεπτώκει. ἡμέρα δὲ ἀρξάμενοι τρίτη ὡς
οἰκοθεν ὁρμησαν ταύτην τε εἰργάζοντο καὶ τὴν
4 τετάρτην καὶ τῆς πέμπτης μέχρι ἀρίστου. ἔπειτα,
ὡς τὰ πλείστα ἀπετελέστο, τὸ μὲν στρατόπεδον
προαπεχώρησσεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Δηλίου οἶον δέκα
στάδιοι ὡς ἐπ' οἴκου πορεύομενον, καὶ οἱ μὲν
ψυλοὶ οἱ πλείστοι εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν, οἱ δὲ ὀπλίται
θέμενοι τὰ ὅπλα ἥσυχαζον 'Ἰπποκράτης δὲ
ὑπομένων ἔτι καθίστατο φυλακάς τε καὶ τὰ περὶ
tὸ προτείχισμα, ὅσα ἦν ὑπόλοιπα, ὡς χρῆν
ἐπιτελέσαι.

XCI. Οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις ταύταις
ξυνελέγοντο ὡς τὴν Τάναγραν καὶ ἔπειθή
ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεως παρῆσαν καὶ ἔσθα-
νοντο τοὺς 'Ἀθηναίους προχωροῦντας ἐπ' οἴκου,
tῶν ἀλλῶν Βοιωταρχῶν, οἱ εἰσίν ἐνδέκα, οἱ
ξυνεπαινούντων μάχεσθαι, ἔπειθή οὐκ ἐν τῇ
Βοιωτία ἐτὶ εἰσὶ (μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς
'Ωρωπίας οἱ 'Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν, ὅτε ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα),
Παγώνδας οἱ Αἰολάδου Βοιωταρχῶν ἐκ Θηβῶν
μετ' 'Αριανθίδου τοῦ Δυσιμαχίδου καὶ ἡγεμονίας
ουσης αὐτοῦ βουλόμενοι τὴν μάχην ποιῆσαι καὶ
νομίζων ἂμεινον εἶναι κινδυνεύσαι, προσκαλῶν
ἐκάστους κατὰ λόχους, ὅπως μὴ ἄθροι ἐκλίπτοιεν
τὰ ὅπλα, ἐπειδὴ τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἐναὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς
'Ἀθηναίους καὶ τὸν ἄγωνα ποιεῖσθαι, λέγων τοιάδε.

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BOOK IV. xc. 2—xci.

it; and cutting down the grape-vines round the sanctuary, they threw them in, as well as stones and bricks from the neighbouring homesteads which they pulled down, and in every way strove to increase the height of the fortification. Wooden towers, too, were erected wherever there was occasion for them and no temple-structure was ready to hand; for the cloister that once existed had fallen down. Beginning on the third day after they started from home, they worked that day and the fourth and until dinner-time on the fifth. Then, when most of it had been finished, the main body withdrew from Delium about ten stadia on their way home; and most of the light-armed troops went straight on, while the hoplites grounded arms and halted there. Hippocrates, however, remained behind and was busy posting pickets and arranging to complete whatever was unfinished about the outwork.

XCI. But during these days the Boeotians were gathering at Tanagra; and when they had come in from all the cities and perceived that the Athenians were going home, the rest of the eleven Boeotarchs disapproved of fighting, as the enemy were no longer in Boeotia—for the Athenians were just about on the borders of Oropia when they halted. But Pagondas son of Aeolidas, who, with Arianthidas son of Lysimachidas, was Boeotarch from Thebes and then in chief command, wishing to bring on the battle and thinking it was better to take the risk, called the men by companies one after another, that they might not leave their arms all at once, and tried to persuade the Boeotians to go against the Athenians and bring on the contest, speaking as follows:
THUCYDIDES

XCI. "Χρήν μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Βοιωτοῖ, μηδ’ ἐσ’ ἐπίνοιαν τινα ἡμῶν ἐλθεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων ὡς οὐκ εἰκός Ἀθηναίοις, ἢν ἀρα μή ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ ἔτι καταλάβωμεν αὐτοὺς, διὰ μάχης ἐλθεῖν. τὴν γὰρ Βοιωτίαν ἐκ τῆς ὀμόρου ἐλθόντες τείχος ἐνοικοδομησάμενοι μέλλουσι φθείρειν, καὶ εἰς ἔτη πολέμωι ἐν ὃ τε ἀν χωρίς καταληφθῶσιν 2 καὶ ὃθεν ἐπελθόντες πολέμια ἐδρασαν. γνώριμο δ’ εἰ τῷ καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον ἔδοξεν εἶναι, μεταγιγνώτω. οὐ γὰρ τὸ προμηθέον, οἷς ἀν ἄλλος ἐπίθη, περὶ τῆς σφετέρας ὁμοίως ἐνδέχεται λογισμὸν καὶ ὅστις τὰ μὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχει, τοῦ πλείονος δὲ ὀρέγο- 3 μενος ἐκόνων τινὶ ἐπέρχεται. πάτριον τε ὑμῖν στρατὸν ἀλλόφυλον ἐπελθόντα καὶ ἐν τῇ ὁἰκείᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν πέλας ὁμοίως ἀμύνεσθαι. Ἀθη- ναίοις δὲ καὶ προσέτι ὁμόρους ὄντας πολλοί 4 μᾶλιστα δεῖ. πρὸς τε γὰρ τοὺς ἀστυνεῖτονας πᾶσι τὸ ἀντίπαλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καθίσταται, καὶ πρὸς τούτους τὶ τοῦ ὁ, οὐ καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἐγγὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀποθεῖν πειρώματι θεοῦνθαι, πῶς οὐ χρῆ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐσχάτον ἀγώνος ἐλθεῖν (παρα- δειγμα δὲ ἔχομεν τούς τοῦ ἀντιπέρας Εὐβοέας καὶ τῆς Ἀλλης Ἑλλάδος τὸ πολὺ ὡς αὐτοῖς διάκειται), καὶ γνώναι ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις οἱ πλησιόχωροι περὶ γῆς ὀρων τὰς μάχας ποιοῦνται, ἢμῖν δὲ ἐς πᾶσαν, ἢν νικηθώμεν, εἰς ὄρος οὐκ ἀντίλεκτος παγήσεται ἐπελθόντες γὰρ βία τὰ ἡμέτερα 5 ἔξουσιν. τοσούτῳ ἔπικυνδυνοτέραν ἐτέρων τὴν

1 Duker's correction for τούτους of the MSS.
BOOK IV. xcii. 1–5

XCII. “It should never, men of Boeotia, have even entered the mind of any of us who are in command that we ought not to come to battle with the Athenians unless we should overtake them while still on Boeotian soil. For it was to ravage Boeotia that they came from across the frontier and built a fort in our territory, and they are assuredly equally our enemies wherever they may be caught, and especially on that soil from which they advanced to do the work of enemies. But as matters stand, if anyone did indeed think that course safer, let him change his mind. For where men are attacked prudence does not admit of such nice calculation regarding their own land as is permitted to those who, secure in their own possessions, in their greed for more wantonly attack others. Furthermore, it is hereditary with you when an alien army comes against you to ward it off, alike in your own land and in that of your neighbours; and most of all when the invaders are Athenians and moreover upon your borders. For in dealing with neighbours, it is always equality of force that guarantees liberty; and when the contest is against men like these, who are trying to enslave not only those near by but those far away, is it not necessary to fight to the very last? We have as a warning example their policy toward the Euboeans across the strait as well as toward the greater part of Hellas, and must realize that, whereas others make war with their neighbours about territorial boundaries, for us, if we are conquered, one boundary beyond dispute will be fixed for our whole land; for they will come and take by force all that we have. So much more dangerous is the neighbourhood of the Athenians
παροίκησιν τών δέ ἔχομεν. εἰώθασί τε οἱ ἵσχυοι
πον θράσει τοῖς πέλασ, ὅσπερ Ἀθηναίοι νῦν,
ἐπιώντες τὸν μὲν ἂνυχίζουντα καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐαυτοῦ
μόνον ἀμυνόμενον ἀδεέστερον ἐπιστρατεύειν, τὸν
δὲ ἔξω ὅρων προαπαντῶντα καὶ, ἢν καιρὸς ἦ,
6 πολέμου ἄρχοντα ἦσσον ἐτοίμως κατέχειν. πεί-
ραν δὲ ἔχομεν ἡμεῖς αὐτοῦ ἐς τούσδε· νικήσαντες
γὰρ ἐν Κόρωνείᾳ αὐτούς, ὅτε τὴν γῆν ἡμῶν
στασιαζόντων κατέσχον, πολλὴν ἄδειαν τῇ
7 Βοιωτιᾷ μέχρι τοῦ δέ κατεστῆσαμεν. ὃν χρὴ
μνησθέντας ἡμᾶς τοὺς τε πρεσβυτέρους ὀμοιο-
θήναι τοῖς πρίν ἔργοις, τοὺς τε νεωτέρους πατέρων
τῶν τότε ἀγαθῶν γενομένων παίδας πειρᾶσθαι μὴ
αισχύναι τὰς προσηκούσας ἅρετάς, πιστεύσαντας
δὲ τῷ θεῷ πρὸς ἡμῶν ἔσεσθαι, οὐ τὸ ἱερὸν ἀνόμως
tειχίσαντες νέμονται, καὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἡ ἡμῶν
θυσιαμένοις καλὰ φαίνεται, ὅμως χωρίσατο τοῖς
dὲ καὶ δεῖξαι ὅτι ὅν μὲν ἔφεισαν πρὸς τοὺς μὴ
ἀμυνομένους ἐπιώντες κτάσθων, οἷς δὲ γενναίον
τὴν τε αὐτῶν αἰεὶ ἑλευθεροῦν μάχη καὶ τὴν
ἄλλων μὴ δουλούθαι ἀδίκως, ἀνασταγώνιστοι
ἀπ' αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀπίάσθην.”

ΧCIII. Τοιαῦτα ὁ Παγώνδας τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς
παραπέσασας ἔπεισεν ἴναι ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους.
καὶ κατὰ τάχος ἀναστήσας ἦγε τοῦ στρατῶν (ἡδη
γὰρ καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ὡς ἦν), καὶ ἐπειδὴ προσέ-
μείξειν ἐνεῖς τοῦ στρατεύματος αὐτῶν, ἐς χωρίον
καθίσας ἰδὸν λόφον ὅντος μεταξὺ οὐκ ἐθεώρων
ἄλληλος, ἔτασσε τε καὶ παρεσκευάζετο ὡς ἐς
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than that of others. Besides, people who in the confidence of strength attack their neighbours, as the Athenians now do, are wont to march more fearlessly against one who keeps quiet and defends himself only in his own land, but are less ready to grapple with him who meets them outside of his own boundaries and, if opportunity offers, makes the first attack. We have a proof of this in these Athenians; for at Coronea,\textsuperscript{1} when owing to our internal dissen-
sions they had occupied our land, we defeated them and won for Boeotia great security which has lasted to this day. Remembering these things, let the older men among us emulate their former deeds, and the younger, sons of fathers who then were brave, try not to disgrace the virtues which are their heritage. Trusting that the god whose sanctuary they have impiously fortified and now occupy will be on our side, and relying on the sacrifices, which appear to be propitious to us, who have offered them, let us advance to meet them and show that if they would get what they covet they must attack those who will not defend themselves, but that men whose noble spirit impels them always to fight for the liberty of their own land and not to enslave that of others unjustly will never let them depart without a battle."

XCIII. With such exhortations Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to attack the Athenians, then quickly broke camp and led on his army, for it was already late in the day. When he drew near their army he halted at a place from which, because of an intervening hill, the two armies could not see each other, and there drew up and prepared for battle.

\textsuperscript{1} 447 B.C.; cf. I. cxiii. 2; III. lxii. 5.
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2 μάχην. τῷ δὲ Ἰπποκράτει 1 ὅντι περὶ τὸ Δήλιον ὡς αὐτῷ ἡγέλθῃ ὅτι Βοιωτοὶ ἐπέχρονται, πέμπει ἐς τὸ στράτευμα κελεύων ἐς τάξιν καθίστασθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ πολλῷ ύστερον ἔπηλθε, καταλυτῶν ὡς τριακοσίους ἱππέας περὶ τὸ Δήλιον, ὅπως φύλακές τε ἀμα εἰεν, εἰ τίς ἑπὶ οὐκ αὐτῷ, καὶ τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς καὶρὸν φυλάξαντες ἐπηγεύνοντο ἐν τῇ.

3 μάχῃ. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντικατέστησαν τους ἀμυνομένους, καὶ ἐπεδίδῃ καλῶς αὐτοῖς εἰχὲν, ὑπερεφάνησαν τὸν λόφον καὶ ἔθειτο τὰ ὑπόλα τεταγμένοι ὧστερ ἐμελλόν, ὅπληται ἐπτακισχίλιοι μάλιστα καὶ ψελοὶ ὑπὲρ μυρίους, ἵππης δὲ χίλιοι καὶ πελτασταὶ πεντακόσιοι.

4 εἰχὼν δὲ δεξίων μὲν κέρας Θηβαίοι καὶ οἱ ξύμοροι αὐτοῖς. μέσοι δὲ Ἄλαρτικοὶ καὶ Κορωναῖοί καὶ Ἡρωπαῖος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ περί τὴν λίμνην τὸ δὲ εὐώνυμον εἰχὼν Θεσπίης καὶ Ταναγραῖοι καὶ Ὁρχομένιοι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ κέρα ἐκατέρφο οἱ ἵππης καὶ ψελοὶ ἤσαν. ἔπ᾽ ἀσπίδας δὲ πέντε μὲν καὶ εἰκοσι Θηβαίοι ἐτάξαντο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ὡς

5 ἕκαστον ἔτυχον. αὕτη μὲν Βοιωτῶν παρασκευὴ καὶ διάκοσμος ἦν.

XCIV. Ἀθηναίοι δὲ οἱ μὲν ὀπλῖται ἐπὶ ὁκτὼ πᾶν τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐτάξαντο ὅντες πλήθει ἰσοπαλεῖς τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἵππης δὲ ἐφ᾽ ἐκατέρφῳ τῷ κέρα. ψελοὶ δὲ ἐκ παρασκευῆς μὲν ὀπλίσμενοι ὦτε τότε παρῆσαν ὦτε ἐγένοντο τῇ πόλει· οὐπερ δὲ ξυνεσέβαλον, ὅντες πολλαπλασίοι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀσπίδοι τε πολλοὶ ἰκολούθησαν, ἀτε πανστρατίας ξένων τῶν παρόντων 2

1 Hude inserts ἐπὶ before ὅντι, with Rutherford, and deletes αὐτῷ before ἡγέλθη, with Krüger.
2 Deleted by Hude.
Meanwhile Hippocrates, who was at Delium, on being informed that the Boeotians were coming on, sent orders to the army to fall in line, and himself not long afterwards joined them, leaving about three hundred cavalry at Delium, to guard it in case of attack and also to watch for an opportunity to fall upon the Boeotians in the course of the battle. But the Boeotians set a detachment to ward these off. Then when everything was ready they appeared over the hill and halted, drawn up in the order in which they were to fight, about seven thousand hoplites, over ten thousand light-armed troops, one thousand cavalry, and five hundred peltasts. On the right were the Thebans and their allies; in the centre the Haliartians, Coroneans, Copaeans, and the other people around the lake;¹ on the left the Thespians, Tanagraeans and Orchomenians. On either wing were the cavalry and the light-armed troops. The Thebans were marshalled in ranks twenty-five shields deep, the rest as chance directed in each case. Such were the preparations of the Boeotians and their order of battle.

XCIV. On the Athenian side the whole body of hoplites, who were equal in number to those of the enemy, were marshalled eight deep, and the cavalry on either wing. But light-armed troops, regularly armed, were neither then present, nor did the city possess any; but such lighter forces as had joined in the invasion, while they were many times more numerous than the enemy, followed in large part without arms, as there had been a levy in mass of strangers that were in them as well as of citizens;

¹ Lake Copais.
καὶ ἀστῶν γενομένης, καὶ ως τὸ πρῶτον ὄρμησαν
2 επ’ οἴκου, οὐ παρεγένοντο ὃτι μὴ ὅληγοι. καθεστώτων δὲ ἐσ τὴν τάξιν καὶ ῥῆθη μελλόντων
ξυνιέναι, Ἱπποκράτης ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπιπαριὼν τὸ
στρατόπεδον τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρεκελεύετο τε καὶ
ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

XCV. “Ω’ Ἀθηναῖοι, δι’ ὅληγον μὲν ἡ παραί
νεσες γίγνεται, τὸ ἱσον δὲ πρὸς γε τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς
ἀνδρας δύναται καὶ ὑπόμνησιν μᾶλλον ἔχει ἢ
2 ἐπικέλευσιν. παραστῇ δὲ μηδενι ὕμων ὡς ἐν τῇ
ἀλλοτρίᾳ οὗ προσήκον τοσόνδε κίνδυνον ἀναρρι
πτοῦμεν. ἐν γὰρ τῇ τοῦτον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ὁ
ἀγών ἔσται καὶ ἢ νικήσωμεν, οὐ μὴ ποτὲ ὑμῖν
Πελοποννήσιοι ἐσ τὴν χώραν ἀνευ τῆς τῶν ἰ
ἵππου εἰς/ἀλῶσιν, ἐν δὲ μιᾶ μάχη τήνδε τε
προσκτάσθε καὶ ἐκείνην μᾶλλον ἔλευθερούτε.
3 χορήσατε οὖν ἄξιως ἐς αὐτοὺς τής τε πόλεως,
η κέκαστος πατρίδα ἔχων πρώτην ἐν τοῖς “Ελλη
σίν ἀγάλλεται, καὶ τῶν πατέρων, οὐ τούσδε μάχη
κρατοῦντες μετὰ Μυρωνίδου ἐν Οινοφύτους τὴν
Βοιωτίαν ποτὲ ἔσχον.”

XCVI. Τοιαύτα τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους παρακε
λευμένου καὶ μέχρι μὲν μέσον τοῦ στρατοπέδου
ἐπελθόντος, τὸ δὲ πλέον οὐκέτι φθάσαντο, οἱ
Βοιωτοὶ, παρακελευσαμένου καὶ σφίζων ὡς διὰ
tαχέων καὶ ἐνταῦθα Παγώνδου, παιανίσαντες
ἐπῆσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου. ἀντετῆςαν δὲ καὶ οἱ
2 Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ προσέμειξαν δρόμῳ. καὶ ἐκατέρω
τῶν στρατοπέδων τὰ ἐσχατα οὐκ ἠλθεν ἐς χείρας,
ἀλλὰ το αὐτὸ ἔπαθεν· ρύκας γὰρ ἐκόλυσαν.
τὸ δὲ ἄλλο καρτερὰ μάχη καὶ ὀθισμῷ ἀστιδῶν
3 ξυνειστήκει. καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐώνυμον τῶν Βοιωτῶν
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and, having once started homewards, they were not present at the action, except a few. When they were arranged in line and were about to engage, Hippocrates the general, passing along the Athenian line, exhorted them and spoke as follows:

XCV. "Men of Athens, my exhortation will not be long, but to brave men it will mean as much, and will be a reminder rather than an appeal. Let none of you think that because we are on foreign soil it is without cause that we are hazarding this great danger. For though the contest is on Boeotian soil, it will be in defence of our own; and, if we win, the Peloponnesians, deprived of the Boeotian cavalry, will never again invade your territory, and in one battle you not only win this land but make more sure the freedom of your own. Advance to meet them, therefore, in a spirit worthy both of that state, the foremost in Hellas, which every one of you is proud to claim as his fatherland, and of the fathers who under Myronides vanquished these men at Oenophyta,\(^1\) and became at one time masters of Boeotia."

XCVI. Hippocrates was thus exhorting his men and had got as far as the centre of the army, but no further, when the Boeotians, after they too had again been briefly harangued by Pagondas, raised the paean and came on from the hill. And the Athenians also advanced against them and met them on a run. The extremities of the line on either side never came to close quarters, for both had the same difficulty—they were hindered by swollen torrents. The rest were engaged in stubborn conflict, with shield pressed against shield. And the Boeotian left, as

\(^1\) 456 B.C.
καὶ μέχρι μέσου ἡσσάτο ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐπίεσαν τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταύτη καὶ οὔχ ἦκιστα τοὺς Θεσπιάς. ὑποχωρησάντων γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν παρατεταγμένων καὶ κυκλωθέντες ἐν ὀλίγῳ, οὔπερ διεθάρησαν Θεσπιῶν, ἐν χερσὶν ἄμυνο-μενοι κατεκόπησαν καὶ τινες καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τὴν κύκλωσιν παραχθέντες ἰγνώσαν τε καὶ ἀπέκτειναν ἄλληλοι. τὸ μὲν οὖν ταύτη ἡσσάτο τῶν Βοιωτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μαχόμενον κατέφυγε, τὸ δὲ δεξιόν, ὡς Θηβαῖοι ἦσαν, ἔκρατε τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ὄσαμενοι κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπηκολουθοῦν. καὶ ξυνέβη, Παγώνυδον περιπέμψαντος δύο τέλη τῶν ἱππεῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς περὶ τῶν λόφων, ὡς ἔπονε τὸ εὐώνυμον αὐτῶν, καὶ ἑπερφανέντων αἰφνιδίως, τὸ νικῶν τῶν Ἀθηναίων κέρας, νομίζαν ἄλλο στράτευμα ἐπιείναι, ἐς φόβον καταστήναι καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἡδή, ὑπὸ τε τοῦ τοιοῦτον καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων ἐφεσμένων καὶ παραρρηγώντων, φυγὴ καθεστήκη παντὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. καὶ οἱ μὲν πρὸς τὸ Δηλίων τε καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν ἀφομησαν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ὀρνυτόν, ἄλλοι δὲ πρὸς Πάρνηθα τὸ ὄρος, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἔκαστοι τινα εἴχον ἐπὶ διὰ σωτηρίας. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ ἐφεσμένοι ἔκτεινον, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἵππησ οἱ τε αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ Δοκροὶ βεβοσθηκότες ἀρτι τῆς τροπῆς γεγομένης νυκτὸς δὲ ἐπιλαβούσας τὸ ἔργον βᾶον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν φευγόντων διεσώθη. καὶ τῇ ὑστερεῖ τε ἐκ τοῦ Ὀρνυτοῦ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Δηλίου νυκτῆσαν (εἶχον γὰρ αὐτὸ ὃμως ἐτί) ἀποκομίσθησαν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐπὶ οἰκου.
far as the centre, was worsted by the Athenians, who pressed hard upon all the rest in that quarter, and especially upon the Thespians. For when they saw that the ranks on either side had given way and that they were surrounded, those of the Thespians who perished were cut down fighting hand to hand. And some also of the Athenians, getting into confusion owing to their surrounding the enemy, mistook and killed one another. Here, then, the Boeotians were defeated and fled to the part of their army which was still fighting; but the right wing, where the Thebans were, had the better of the Athenians, and pushing them back step by step at first followed after them. It happened also that Pagondas, when their left was in distress, sent two squadrons of cavalry round the hill from a point out of sight, and when these suddenly appeared, the victorious wing of the Athenians, thinking that another army was coming on, was thrown into a panic. At this time, consequently, owing both to this manœuvre\(^1\) and to the Thebans following them up and breaking their line, a rout of the whole Athenian army ensued. Some hastened to Delium and the sea, others toward Oropus, others to Mt. Parnes, others wherever each had any hope of safety. And the Boeotians, especially their cavalry and that of the Loerians who had come up just as the rout began, followed after and slew them; but when night closed down upon the action the mass of the fugitives escaped more easily. On the next day the troops from Oropus and those from Delium, leaving a garrison at the latter place, which they still held, were conveyed home by sea.\(^2\)

\(^1\) i.e. the attack of the two squadrons of cavalry.

\(^2\) It is interesting to know that Socrates fought in the battle of Delium and saved Alcibiades' life (Plato, *Symp.* 221 e).
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XCVII. Καὶ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ τροπαίοι στήσαντες καὶ τοὺς ἐαυτῶν ἀνελόμενοι νεκροὺς τοὺς τε τῶν πολεμίων σκυλεύσαντες καὶ φυλακὴν καταλιπόντες ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν Τάναγραν, καὶ τῷ 2 Δηλίῳ ἐπεβούλευον ὡς προσβαλοῦντες. ἐκ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κήρυξ πορευόμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀπαντᾷ κήρυκι Βοιωτῷ, ὅς αὐτὸν ἀποστρέψας καὶ εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐδὲν πράξει πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸς ἀναχωρήσῃ πάλιν, καταστὰς ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔλεγε τὰ παρὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν, ὅτι οὐ δικαίως δράσειαν παραβαίνοντες τὰ νόμιμα τῶν 3 Ἐλλήνων πάσι γὰρ εἶναι καθεστηκὸς ἴντας ἐπὶ τὴν ἄλληλων ἱερῶν τῶν ἐνότων ἀπέχεσθαι, Ἀθηναίους δὲ Δήλιον τείχισαντας ἑνοικεῖν, καὶ ὅσα ἀνθρώποι ἐν βεβήλῳ δρώσι πάντα γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς, ὃ ὅτι ἡ ἄγαυστον σφίσι πλὴν πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ χέρνιβι χρῆσθαι, ἀνασπάσαντας υδρεύσθαι ἐσθαίον ὅστε ὑπὲρ τῆς θεοῦ καὶ ἐαυτῶν Βοιωτοῦς, ἐπικαλομένους τοὺς ὁμολογεῖν δαίμονας καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα, προσαγορεύειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἀπίοντας ἀποφέρεσθαι τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν.

XCVIII. Τοσαῦτα τοῦ κήρυκος εἰπόντος οἱ Ἀθηναίοι πέμψαντες παρὰ τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἐαυτῶν κήρυκα τοῦ μὲν ἱεροῦ οὔτε ἄδικήσαι ἐφασαν οὐδὲν οὔτε τοῦ λοιποῦ ἐκούντες βλάψειν οὔδὲ γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐσελθεῖν ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ἄλλ᾽ ἵνα εἴς αὐτοῦ τοὺς 2 ἄδικούντας μᾶλλον σφᾶς ἀμύνωνται. τὸν δὲ 378
XCVII. The Boeotians set up a trophy and took up their own dead; then, having stripped the dead of the enemy and left a guard over them, they retired to Tanagra, and there planned an assault upon Delium. Meanwhile a herald from Athens, coming to ask for their dead, met a Boeotian herald, who turned him back, telling him he would accomplish nothing until he himself returned. The latter then came before the Athenians and gave them the message from the Boeotians: that they had not done right in transgressing the usages of the Hellenes; for it was an established custom of them all, when invading one another's country to abstain from the sanctuaries therein, whereas the Athenians had fortified Delium and now dwelt in it, doing there whatsoever men do in a profane place, even drawing for common use the water which was untouched by themselves except for use in lustrations connected with the sacrifices. Wherefore the Boeotians, in behalf of the god and of themselves, invoking the deities worshipped at the common altars and also Apollo, gave them notice to come out themselves from the temple and carry off what belonged to them.

XCVIII. When the herald had spoken, the Athenians sent a herald of their own to the Boeotians, saying that they had done no injury to the temple, and would not damage it wilfully in the future; for they had not entered it at the outset with any such intent, but rather that from it they might defend themselves against those who were wronging them. And the law of the

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1 i.e. to the Boeotian camp from the Athenian, to which he was carrying a message.  
2 i.e. their dead.
νόμον τοῖς Ἑλλησίων εἰναι, ὥν ἂν ἀν ἦ τὸ κράτος τῆς γῆς ἐκάστης, ἢν τε πλέον ἢν τε βραχυτέρας, τούτων καὶ τὰ ιερὰ αἰεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τρόποις θεραπευόμενα οἷς ἂν πρὸ τοῦ εἰσθοσὶ καὶ 3 δύνανται. καὶ γὰρ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἐξαναστήσαντες τινα βία νέμονται γῆν, ἀλλοτρίοις ιεροὶ τὸ πρῶτον 4 ἑπελθόντας οἰκεία νῦν κεκτήσθαι. καὶ αὐτοὶ, εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον δυνηθῆναι τῆς ἐκείνων κρατῆσαι, τούτ᾽ ἂν ἔχειν νῦν δὲ ἐν ὃ μέρει εἰσίν, ἐκόντες 5 εἰναι ὡς ἐκ σφετέρου οὐκ ἀπείναι. ὡδώρ τε ἐν τῇ ἀνάγκῃ κινήσαι, ἢν οὐκ αὐτοὶ ύβρει προσθέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους προτέρους ἐπὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἐλθόντας ἀμυνόμενοι βιάζεσθαι χρή- 6 σθαι. πάν δ' εἰκὸς εἰναι τὸ πολέμῳ καὶ δεινῷ τινι κατειργόμενον ἕμμηγγωμὸν τι γίγνεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τοῦ θεοῦ. καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων καταφυγῆν εἰναι τοὺς βωμοὺς, παρανομάναν τε ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ ἀνάγκῃ κακοῖς ὄνομασθῆναι καὶ οὐκ 7 ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμφορῶν τι τολμήσασιν. τοὺς τε νεκροὺς πολὺ μειξόσως ἐκείνους ἀντὶ ιερῶν ἀξιοῦντας ἀποδιδόναι ἁσβείν ἢ τοὺς μὴ ἔθελον- 8 τας ιεροῖς τὰ πρέποντα κομίζεσθαι. σαφῶς τε ἐκέλευον σφίσιν εἰπεῖν μὴ ἀπιούσιν ἐκ τῆς

1 Stahl's conjecture for πρὸς τοῖς of the MSS.

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Hellenes was, they said, that whosoever had dominion over any country, be it larger or smaller, to them the sanctuaries also always belonged, to be tended, so far as might be possible, with whatsoever rites had hitherto been customary. Indeed the Boeotians, and most others who had driven out any people and taken forcible possession of their country, had at first attacked the temples as alien but now possessed them as their own. And they themselves, if they had been able to conquer more of the Boeotian territory, would have held it; but as it was, they would not depart from that portion in which they were, at least of their free will, considering it their own. The water, moreover, they had disturbed in their sore need, which they had not wantonly brought upon themselves; they had been forced to use the water while defending themselves against the Boeotians who had first invaded their land. And anything done under the constraint of war and danger might reasonably meet with some indulgence, even from the god. For altars were a refuge in cases of involuntary misdeeds, and transgression was a term applied to those who do evil without compulsion and not to those who are driven by misfortunes to some act of daring. Moreover, the Boeotians in presuming to give up the bodies of the dead in return for temples were impious in a much higher degree than they who refused by the exchange of temples to procure that which they had a right to recover. And they bade the Boeotians plainly tell them they might take up their dead, not

1 Or, reading πρὸς τὸὺς εἰσώθοι with the MSS., "to be tended, besides the usual rites, with such others as they might be able to use."
ΘΥΟΥΔΙΔΗΣ

Βοιωτῶν γῆς (οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων ἔτι εἶναι, ἐν ἂν δὲ δορὶ ἐκτήσαντο), ἄλλα κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τοὺς νεκροὺς σπένδουσιν ἀναιρεῖσθαι.

XCIX. Οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἀπεκρίναντο, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ εἰσίν, ἀπιόντας ἐκ τῆς ἐαυτῶν ἀποφέρεται τὰ σφέτερα, εἰ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων, αὐτῶσ γεγονόσειν τὸ ποιητέον, νομίζοντες τὴν μὲν Ὄρωπίαν, ἐν ἂν τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐν μεθοδίῳς τῆς μάχης γενομένης κεῖσθαι ξυνέβη, Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὸ ὑπῆκοον εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν αὐτῶσ βίᾳ σφῶν κρατήσαι αὐτῶν (οὐδ' αὐ ἐσπένδοντο δὴθεν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων 1)· τὸ δὲ “ἐκ τῆς ἐαυτῶν” εὐπρεπεῖς εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι “ἀπίόντας καὶ ἀπολαβεῖν ἃ ἀπαιτοῦσιν.” ὁ δὲ κήρυξ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀκούσας ἀπῆλθεν ἀπράκτος.

C. Καὶ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ εὐθὺς μεταπεμφάμενοι ἐκ τε τοῦ Μηλιῶς κόλπου ἀκοντιστασ καὶ σφενδονήτας, καὶ βεβοηθηκότων αὐτῶς μετὰ τὴν μάχην Κορινθίων τε δυσχελίων ὀπλιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκ Νυσαίας ἐξεληλυθότων Πελοποννησίων φοινακῶν καὶ Μεγαρέως ἀμα, ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλον καὶ προσέβαλον τῷ τειχίσματι, ἄλλῳ τε τρόπῳ πειράσαντες καὶ μηχανῆν προσήγαγον, ἤπερ εἶλεν αὐτό, τοιάνδε.

2 κεραίαν μεγάλην διὰ πρόσαντες ἐκοίλαναν ἀπασαν καὶ εὐνήρμοσαν πάλιν ἀκριβῶς ὡσπερ αὐλόν, καὶ ἐπὶ ἂκραν λέβητα τε ἦρτησαν ἀλύσει καὶ ἀκροφύσιον ἀπὸ τῆς κεραίας σιδηροῦν ἐς αὐτῶν νεῦν καθεῖτο, καὶ ἐσειδήρωτο ἔπι μέγα

1 Parenthetical according to Poppo.
2 ὡσπερ αὐλόν, deleted by Hude.
BOOK IV. xcviIII. 8–c. 2

"on condition of quitting Boeotia"—for they were no longer in Boeotian territory, but in land which they had won by the spear,—but "on making a truce according to ancestral custom."

XCIX. The Boeotians made answer, if they were in Boeotia, they might carry off their dead on quitting their land; but if they were in their own territory, they could determine themselves what to do. For they thought that though Oropia, in which the bodies happened to be lying—for the battle occurred on the boundaries—belonged to the Athenians by right of its subjection, yet that they could not get possession of the bodies without their leave (nor indeed were they going to make a truce, forsooth, about territory belonging to the Athenians); but they thought it was fair to answer, "when they had quitted Boeotian territory they could get back what they asked for." And the herald of the Athenians, on hearing this, went away without accomplishing his object.

C. The Boeotians sent off at once for darters and slingers from the Malia Gulf, and with two thousand Corinthian hoplites, who reinforced them after the battle, as well as the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated Nisaea, and some Megarians also, made an expedition against Delium and attacked the fortification. After trying other forms of assault they took it by bringing up an engine made in the following manner. Having sawed in two a great beam they hollowed it throughout, and fitted it together again nicely like a pipe; then they hung a cauldron at one end of it with chains, and into the cauldron an iron bellows-pipe was let down in a curve\(^1\) from the beam, which was itself in great part plated

\(^1\) i.e. it was bent into the cauldron.
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3 καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου ξύλου. προσήγον δὲ ἐκ πολλοῦ ἀμάξας τῷ τείχει, ή μάλιστα τῇ ἀμπέλῳ καὶ τοῖς ξύλοις φικοδόμητο· καὶ ὁπότε ἔγγυς, φύσας μεγάλας ἐσθέντες ἐς τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτῶν ἄκρον τῆς κεραίας ἐφύσων. ἢ δὲ πνοῇ ἱοῦσα στεγανὸς ἐς τὸν λέβητα, ἔχοντα ἄνθρακας τε ἡμένους καὶ θείου καὶ πίσσων, φλόγα ἐποίει μεγάλην καὶ ἢγε τοῦ τείχους, ὡστε μηδένα ἐτι ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ μεῖναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπολεπόντας ἐς φυγὴν καταστήναι καὶ τὸ τείχισμα τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἀλώναι. τῶν δὲ φρουρῶν οἱ μὲν ἅπεθανον, διακόσιοι δὲ ἐληφθέσαν· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τὸ πλῆθος ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβαν ἀπεκομίσθη ἐπ᾽ οἶκου.

CII. Τοῦ δὲ Δηλίου ἐβδόμῃ καὶ δεκάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ληφθέντος μετὰ τὴν μάχην καὶ τοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κήρυκος οὐδὲν ἑπισταμένου τῶν γεγενημένων ἐλθόντος οὐ πολὺ ὑστερον αὖθις περὶ τῶν νεκρῶν, ἀπέδοσαν οἱ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ οὐκέτι ταῦτα ἀπεκρίναντο. ἅπεθανον δὲ Βοιωτῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους πεντακοσίων, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους χιλίων καὶ Ἰπποκράτης ὁ στρατηγὸς, ψιλῶν δὲ καὶ σκευοφόρων πολὺς ἀριθμός.

3 Μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην ταῦτην καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης ὀλίγῳ ύστερον, ἃς αὐτῷ τότε πλεύσαντι τὰ περὶ τὰς Σίφας τῆς προδοσίας πέρι οὐ προνεάρχησεν, ἔχων τὸν στρατὸν ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν τῶν τε Ἀκαρνάνων καὶ Ἀγραίων, καὶ Ἀθηναίων τετρακοσίων ὀπλίτας, ἀπόβασιν ἐποίησατο ἐς τὴν Σικυωνίαν.

4 καὶ πρὶν πώσας τὰς ναῦς καταπλεύσαι βοηθήσαντες οἱ Σικυώνιοι τοὺς ἀποβεβηκότας ἔτρεψαν καὶ κατεδίωξαν ἐς τὰς ναῦς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄπε-

1 Krüger’s correction for ἐπτακαιδεκάτη of the MSS.
with iron. This engine they brought up from a distance on carts to the part of the wall where it was built chiefly of vines and wood; and when it was near, they inserted a large bellows into the end of the beam next to them and blew through it. And the blast passing through the air-tight tube into the cauldron, which contained lighted coals, sulphur, and pitch, made a great blaze and set fire to the wall, so that no one could stay on it longer, but all left it and took to flight; and in this way the fortification was taken. Of the garrison some were slain, and two hundred were captured; but most of the rest got on board their ships and were conveyed home.

CI. So Delium was taken seventeen days after the battle, and when the Athenian herald, who knew nothing of what had happened, came back not long after to ask for the dead, the Boeotians did not again make the same answer but gave them up. And there were slain in the battle, of the Boeotians a little more than five hundred, of the Athenians a little less than one thousand, including Hippocrates their general, besides a great number of light-armed troops and baggage-carriers.

Not long after this battle Demosthenes, since he had failed in his negotiations about the betrayal of Siphae, when he sailed thither at the time mentioned above, took on his ships his force of Acarnanians and Agraeanes and four hundred Athenian hoplites and made a descent upon the territory of Sicyon. But before all his ships had come to shore the Sicyonians came to the rescue, and routing those who had disembarked pursued them to their ships,

1 cf. ch. lxxxix. 1.
κτειναν, τοὺς δὲ ξόντας ἐλαβον. τροπαίων δὲ στηράτας τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποστόνδοις ἀπέδοσαν.

5 Ἀπέθανε δὲ καὶ Σιτάλκης Ὀδρυσῶν βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμέρας τοὺς ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, στρατεύσας ἐπὶ Τριβαλλούς καὶ νικηθείς μάχῃ. Σεύθης δὲ ὁ Σπαραδόκου ἄδελφιδος αὐτοῦ ἐβασίλευσεν Ὀδρυσῶν τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ὁράκης ἱστερ καὶ ἐκείνως.

CII. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ χειμάνων Βρασύδας ἔχων τοὺς ἐπὶ Ὁράκης ἐμμάχον ἐστράτευσεν ὡς Ἀμφίπολιν τὴν ἐπὶ Στρυμόνιον ποταμῶν Ἀθη-

2 ναίων ἀποικίαν. τὸ δὲ χωρίον τοῦτο ἐφ' οὗ νῦν ἡ πόλις ἐστὶν ἐπείρασε μὲν πρότερον καὶ Ἀριστογόρας ὁ Μιλήσιος φεύγων βασιλέα Δαρείου κατοικίσαι, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ Ἡδώνων ἐξεκρούσθη, ἐπειδὰ δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἐτεσί δύο καὶ τρία-

κοντα ὑπετερον, ἐποίκους μυρίους σφῶν τε αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν βουλόμενον πέμψαντες, οἱ 3 διεθάρησαν ἐν Δραβησκῷ ὑπὸ Ὁρακῶν. καὶ ἀνθίς ἐνος δεόντι τριακόστῳ ἐτεί ἑλθόντες οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, "Αγνωνος τοῦ Νικίου οἰκιστοῦ ἐκπεμ-

φέντος, Ἡδώνας ἐξελάσαντες ἐκτισάν τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο, ὅπερ πρότερον Ἐννέα ὁδοί ἐκαλοῦντο. 4 ὁμομῶντο δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἡλίνως, ἢν αὐτοὶ εἰχον ἐμ-

πόριον ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἑπιθαλάσ-

σιον, πέντε καὶ εἰκοσι σταδίους ἀπέχον ἀπὸ τῆς νῦν πόλεως, ἢν Ἀμφίπολιν "Ἀγνων ὀνόμασεν, δι' ἐπὶ ἀμφότερα περιρρέοντος τοῦ Στρυμόνος ἕν τείχει μακρῷ ἀπολαβὼν ἐκ ποταμοῦ ἐς ποταμὸν

1 διὰ τὸ περιέχειν αὐτὴν ("with a view to enclosing it"), in the MSS. after Στρυμόνος, deleted by Dobree.

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BOOK IV. cl. 4–clii. 4

killing some and taking others alive. Then setting up a trophy they gave up the dead under truce.

Sitalces,1 too, king of the Odrysians, was killed about the same time as the events at Delium, having made an expedition against the Triballi,2 who defeated him in battle. Seuthes,3 son of Sparadocus, his nephew, now became king of the Odrysians and of the rest of Thrace over which Sitalces had reigned.

Cl. During the same winter, Brasidas, with his allies in Thrace, made an expedition against Amphilopolis, the Athenian colony on the river Strymon. This place, where the city now stands, Aristagoras4 the Milesian had tried to colonize before,5 when fleeing from the Persian king, but he had been beaten back by the Edonians. Thirty-two years afterwards the Athenians also made another attempt, sending out ten thousand settlers of their own citizens and any others who wished to go; but these were destroyed by the Thracians at Drabescus. Again, twenty-nine years later, the Athenians, sending out Hagnon son of Nicias as leader of the colony, drove out the Edonians and settled the place, which was previously called Ennea-Hodoi or Nine-Ways. Their base of operations was Eion, a commercial seaport which they already held, at the mouth of the river, twenty-five stadia distant from the present city of Amphipolis,6 to which Hagnon gave that name, because, as the Strymon flows round it on both sides, he cut off the site by a long wall running from one point of the river to another, and

1 cf. II. lxvii., xcv., cl. 2 cf. II. xcvi.
3 cf. II. cl. 5. 4 cf. Hdt. v. 126. 5 497 B.C.
6 The name means "a city looking both ways."
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περιφανὴ εἰς θάλασσαν τε καὶ τὴν ἦπειρον ἤκουσεν.

CIII. Ἐπὶ ταύτην οὖν ὁ Βρασίδας ἀρας ἐξ Ἄρνων τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς ἐπορεύετο τῷ στρατῷ. καὶ ἀφικόμενος περὶ δεῖλην ἐπὶ τὸν Αὐλώνα καὶ Βρομίσκου, ἡ Ἡ Βόλβη λίμνη ἡξίησεν εἰς θάλασσαν, καὶ δειπνοποιησάμενος ἐχώρει τὴν νύκτα. 2 χειμῶν δὲ ἦν καὶ ὑπένειφεν ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ὀρμήσει, βουλόμενος λαθεῖν τούς ἐν τῇ Ἄμφι-

3 πόλει πλὴν τῶν προδότων. ἦσαν γὰρ Ἀργιλίων τε ἐν αὐτῇ οἰκήτορες (εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ Ἀργιλίοι Ἀνδρίων ἀποικοί) καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ ξυνέπρασσον ταῦτα, οἱ μὲν Περδίκκα πεθόμενοι, οἱ δὲ Χαλκι-

4 δεύσιν. μάλιστα δὲ οἱ Ἀργιλίοι, ἔγγυς τε προσοικοῦντες καὶ αἰεὶ ποτέ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὑποττοὶ καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τῷ χωρίῳ, ἐπειδὴ παρέτυχεν ὁ καιρὸς καὶ Βρασίδας ἠλθεν, ἔπραξαν τε ἐκ πλείονος πρὸς τοὺς ἐμπολιτεύοντας σφῶν ἐκεῖ ὅπως ἐυδοθήσεται ἡ πόλις, καὶ τότε δεξάμενοι αὐτὸν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἀποστάντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκείνη τῇ νυκτί κατέστησαν τὸν στρατὸν πρὸ ἔως ἐπὶ τὴν γέφυραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ (ἀπέχει δὲ τὸ πό-

5 λισμα πλέον τῆς διαβάσεως). καὶ οὐ καθεῖτο τείχι πόλεων νῦν, φυλακὴ δὲ τῆς βραχείας καθει-

στήκει, ἡν βιασάμενος ῥαδίως ὁ Βρασίδας, ἀμα μὲν τῆς προδοσίας οὕσης, ἀμα δὲ καὶ χειμῶνος ὄντος καὶ ἀπροσδόκητος προστεσθῶν, διέβη τὴν γέφυραν, καὶ τὰ ἔξω τῶν Ἀμφιπολιτῶν οἰκούντων κατὰ πάν τὸ χωρίον εὐθὺς εἶχεν.
so established a city which was conspicuous both seaward and landward.

CIII. Against this place Brasidas marched with his army, setting out from Arnae in Chalcidice. Arriving about dusk at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbe has its outlet into the sea, he took supper and then proceeded by night. The weather was bad and somewhat snowy, and for this reason he made the more haste, wishing to escape the notice of the people in Amphipolis, except those who were to betray it. For there were in the place some settlers from Argilus, an Andrian colony; these and some others were his accomplices in this intrigue, some instigated by Perdiccas, others by the Chalcidians. But the chief plotters were the Argilians, who dwelt near by, were always suspected by the Athenians, and were secret enemies of the place; now that opportunity offered and Brasidas had come, they had some time before negotiated with their countrymen who resided in Amphipolis with a view to the surrender of the place. So at this time they received Brasidas into their town, revolted from the Athenians that same night, and before dawn brought his army down to the bridge over the river, which is some distance from the town and not connected with it by walls as now. Brasidas easily forced the small guard stationed at the bridge, partly because there was treachery, partly because he had fallen upon them in stormy weather and unexpectedly; and as soon as he had crossed the bridge he was at once master of the property of the Amphipolitans outside the walls; for they had houses all over the neighbourhood.

1 According to tradition, the scene of the death of Euripides.
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CIV. Τῆς δὲ διαβάσεως αὐτοῦ ἀφω τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει γεγενημένης, καὶ τῶν ἔξω πολλῶν μὲν ἄλισκομένων, τῶν δὲ καὶ καταφευγόντων ἐς τὸ τείχος, οἱ Ἀμφιπολῖται ἐς θόρυβον μέγαν κατέστησαν, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ὑποτείνοντες καὶ λέγεται Βρασίδαν, εἰ ἠθέλησε μὴ ἔφ' ἀρπαγὴν τῷ στρατῷ τραπέσθαι, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἠρχὴ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πόλεως, δοκεῖν δὲν ἔλειν. νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν ἱδρύσας τοῦ στρατοῦ, ἔπει τὰ ἔξω ἐπέδραμε καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῷ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔνδον ὡς 3 προσεδέχετο ἀπέβαινεν, ἡς χρησίμοις τῷ στρατηγοῦ, δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν παρῆν αὐτοῖς φύλαξ τοῦ χωρίου, ἐπὶ τῶν ἔτερον στρατηγὸν τῶν ἐπὶ Ὀλόρου, δὲ τάδε ἐξουσίας ὁντα περὶ Θάσου (ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ νῆσος Παριῶν ἀποκεφαλεῖ, ἀπέχουσα τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως ἐκ μέσος ἡμέρας μάλιστα πλοῦν), 5 κελεύοντες σφίσι βοηθεῖν, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκούσας κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ ναυοῦν ἀι ἐτυχῶν παροῦσαι ἐπλεί, καὶ ἐβούλετο φθάσαι μάλιστα μὲν ὀχὴ τῆς Ἀμφίπολος, πρὸν τι ἐνδοῦναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τήν Ἡλέλενα προκαταλαβῶν.

CV. 'Εν τούτῳ δὲ ὁ Βρασίδας δεδὼς καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Θάσου τῶν νεῶν βοήθειαν καὶ πυθανόμενος τῶν Θουκυδίδην κτῆσιν τε ἔχειν τῶν χρυσείων μετάλλων ἐργασίας ἐν τῇ περὶ ταῦτα Ὀλόρου καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν ἡπειρωτῶν, ἦπε' εὔγενος προκατασχεῖν, εἰ δύναιτο, τὴν πόλιν, μὴ ἀφικουμένου αὐτοῦ τῷ πλήθος τῶν Ἀμφιπολίτῶν, ἐλπίσαν ἐκ θαλάσσης καὶ ἀνεφελεὶ ἐπί τὴν Ἰμνᾶν προκαταλάβων.
BOOK IV. CIV. I–CV. I

CIV. His crossing had surprised the people inside the city, and of those outside many were captured, while others took refuge within the walls; hence the Amphipolitans were thrown into great confusion, especially as they were suspicious of each other. Indeed the general impression was, it is said, that if Brasidas, instead of turning to pillage with his army, had decided to march straight against the city, he could have taken it. But as it was, when he had overrun the country outside and found that none of his plans were being carried out by his friends within the city, he merely settled his army in camp and kept quiet. Meanwhile the opponents of the traitors, being numerous enough to prevent the gates being opened to him at once, acting in concert with Eucles the general, who had come from Athens as warden of the place, sent to the other commander of the Thracian district, Thucydides son of Olorus, the author of this history, who was at Thasos, a Parian colony, about a half-day's sail from Amphipolis, and urged him to come to their aid. And he, on hearing this, sailed in haste with seven ships which happened to be at hand, wishing above all to secure Amphipolis before it yielded, or, failing in that, to seize Eion.

CV. Meanwhile, Brasidas, fearing the arrival of the ships from Thasos, and hearing that Thucydides possessed the right of working the gold-mines in that part of Thrace and in consequence had influence among the first men of the mainland, made haste to seize the city if possible before he should come; for he was afraid that, if Thucydides should arrive, the popular party in Amphipolis, in the expectation that
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ξυμμαχικὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Θράκης ἀγείραντα αὐτὸν
2 περιποίησειν σφᾶς, οὐκέτι προσχωροῖ, καὶ τὴν
ξύμβασιν μετρίαν ἐποιεῖτο, κήρυγμα τὸ δὲ ἀνείπων,
Ἀμφιπόλιτῶν καὶ Ἀθηναίων τῶν ἐνόττων
tὸν μὲν βουλόμενου ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ τῆς ἱσης καὶ
ὄμοιας μετέχοντα μένειν, τὸν δὲ μὴ ἐθέλοντα
ἀπιέναι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἐκφερόμενον πέντε ἡμερῶν.

CVI. Οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀλλοιότεροι ἐγένοντο τὰς γνώμας, ἄλλως τε καὶ βραχὺ μὲν Ἀθηναίων ἐμπολιεύον, τὸ δὲ πλέον ξύμμεικτον, καὶ τῶν ἔξω ληφθέντων συχνός οἰκείοι ἐνδον ἦσαν καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα πρὸς τὸν φόβου δίκαιον εἶναι ἐλάμβανον, οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ τὸ ἄσμενοι ἄν ἑξελθεῖν, ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἐν ὀμοίῳ σφίσι τὰ
δεινὰ εἶναι καὶ ἀμα οὐ προσεδέχόμενοι βοήθειαν ἐν
tάχει, ὃ δὲ ἄλλος ὅμιλος πόλεως τε ἐν τῷ ἱσῷ ὦ
στερισκόμενοι καὶ κινδύνον παρὰ δόξαν
2 ἀφιέμενοι. ἢστε τῶν πρασσόντων τῷ Βρασίδα
ήδη καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ διαδικαιοῦντων αὐτά,
ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἑώρων τετραμμένον καὶ τοῦ
παρόντος Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῦ οὐκέτι ἀκροὼ
μενον, ἐγένετο ἡ ὁμολογία καὶ προσεδέξαντο ἐφ
3 οἷς ἐκήρυξεν. καὶ οἱ μὲν τὴν πόλιν τοιοῦτο
τρόπῳ παρέδοσαν, ὃ δὲ Ἡσοκυδίδης καὶ οἱ νῆς
ταύτῃ τῇ ἱμέρᾳ ὡς κατέπλευεν ἐς τὴν Ἡιώνα.
4 καὶ τὴν μὲν Ἀμφιπόλιν Βρασίδας ἀρτι εἰχε, τὴν
dὲ Ἡιώνα παρὰ νύκτα ἐγένετο λαβεῖν εἰ γὰρ
μὴ ἐβοήθησαν αἱ νῆς διὰ τάχους, ἀμα ἐφ ἀμ
εἰχετο.
he would collect an allied force from the islands and from Thrace and relieve them, would refuse to yield. Accordingly, he offered moderate terms, making proclamation to this effect, that any citizen of Amphipolis or any resident Athenian, if he chose, might remain there, retaining possession of his own property and enjoying full equality; but that anyone who was not inclined to stay might go away within five days and take his property with him.

CVI. On hearing this the majority became irresolute, especially as few of the citizens were Athenians, the greater number being a mixed multitude, and a considerable number of those who had been captured outside had relatives inside the city. As compared with their fears they conceived the proclamation to be fair—the Athenians, because they were only too glad to be able to leave, since they realized that their share of the dangers was greater, and besides, did not expect any speedy relief; the general multitude, because they were not to lose their civil rights but to retain them as before and also, contrary to their expectation, were to be released from peril. And so, as the partisans of Brasidas were already quite openly justifying his proposals, since these saw that the populace had changed its attitude and no longer hearkened to the Athenian general who was in the city, the capitulation was made, and Brasidas was received on the terms of his proclamation. In this way they gave up the city, and on the evening of the same day Thucydides and his ships sailed into Eion. Brasidas had just got possession of Amphipolis, and he missed taking Eion only by a night; for if the ships had not come to the rescue with all speed, it would have been taken at dawn.
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CVII. Μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ ὁ μὲν τὰ ἐν τῇ Ἡιώνι καθίστατο, ὡς καὶ τὸ αὐτικά, ἢν ἐπὶ ὁ Βρασίδας, καὶ τὸ ἐπειτὰ ἄσφαλὼς ἔξει, δεξάμενος τοὺς ἐθελήσαντας ἐπιχωρήσαι ἀνωθέν κατὰ τὰς 2 σπουδὰς· ὁ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν Ἡιώνα κατὰ τῇ τῶν ποταμῶν πολλοῖς πλοίοις ἄφων καταπλεύσας, εἰ πως τὴν προὐχοῦσαν ἀκραν ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους λαβὼν κρατοῖ τοῦ ἔσπλου, καὶ κατὰ γῆν ἀπο- πειράσας ἄμα, ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἀπεκρούσθη, τὰ δὲ 3 περὶ τὴν Ἄμφιπολιν ἔξηρτυετο. καὶ Μύρικνος τε αὐτῷ προσεχώρησεν, Ἡδωνικῆ πόλις, Πιτ- τακοῦ τοῦ Ἡδώνων βασιλέως ἀποθανόντος ὑπὸ τῶν Γοάξιος παῖδων καὶ Βραυροῦ τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ Γαληψίς οὐ πόλλῳ ὠστερον καὶ Οἰσύμη· εἰσὶ δὲ αὐταὶ Θασίων ἀποικίαι· παρὼν δὲ καὶ Περδίκκας εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἀλωσιν ξυγ- καθίστη ταῦτα.

CVIII. Ἐξομένης δὲ τῆς Ἄμφιπόλεως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς μέγα δεός κατέστησαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅτι ἡ πόλις ἢν αὐτοῖς ωφέλιμοι ξύλων τε ναυπηγησίμων πομπῇ καὶ χρημάτων προσόδῳ, καὶ ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦ Στρυμόνος ἡ πάροδος Θεσσαλῶν διαγόντων ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους σφῶν τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις, τῆς δὲ γεφύρας μῆ κρα- τοῦτοι, ἀνωθέν μὲν μεγάλης οὔσης ἐπὶ πολὺ λίμνης τοῦ ποταμοῦ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς Ἡιώνα τριήρεσι τηρουμένων,1 οὐκ ἂν δύνασθαι προελθεῖν· τότε δὲ

1 Hude emends to τηρουμένων.
BOOK IV. cvii. 1–cviii. 1

CVII. After this Thucydides proceeded to arrange matters at Eion, in order to insure its safety for the present, if Brasidas should attack, and also for the future, receiving those who chose to come thither from the upper town according to the terms of the truce. And Brasidas suddenly sailed down the river to Eion with many boats, in the hope that by taking the point which juts out from the wall he might gain command of the entrance, and at the same time he made an attempt by land; but he was beaten back at both points, and then proceeded to put matters in order at Amphipolis. Myrcinus also, an Edonian town, came over to him, Pittacus, the king of the Edonians, having been killed by the sons of Goaxis and his own wife Brauro; and not long afterwards Galepsus and Oesume, colonies of the Thasians, also came over. Perdiccas, too, came to Amphipolis directly after its capture and joined in arranging these matters.

CVIII. The Athenians were greatly alarmed by the capture of Amphipolis. The chief reason was that the city was useful to them for the importation of timber for ship-building and for the revenue it produced, and also that, whereas hitherto the Lacedaemonians had possessed, under the guidance of the Thessalians, access to the Athenian allies as far as the Strymon, yet as long as they did not control the bridge—the river for a long way above the town being a great lake and triremes being on guard in the direction of Eion—they could not have advanced further; but now at last the matter

1 cf. ch. cv. 2.
2 Now evidently reconciled with Brasidas, with whom he had quarrelled (ch. lxxxvi. 3); cf. ch. ciii. 3.
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ράδια ἤδη γεγενήσθαι, καὶ τοὺς ἐξμμάχουσ
2 ἐφοβοῦντο μὴ ἀποστῶσιν. ὁ γὰρ Βρασίδας ἐν
toῖς ἀλλοις μέτριον ἔαυτὸν παρεῖχε καὶ ἐν
τοῖς λόγοις πανταχοῦ ἐδήλου ὡς ἐλευθερώσαν
3 τὴν Ἐλλάδα ἐκπεμφθεῖν. καὶ αἱ πόλεις πυν-
θανόμεναι αἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπῆκοι τῆς τε
Ἀμφιπόλεως τὴν ἀλωσιν καὶ ἅ παρέχεται, τὴν
tὴν ἐκεῖνον πραότητα, μάλιστα δὴ ἐπηρήθησαν ἐς
tὸ νεωτέριες, καὶ ἐπεκηρυκέντο πρὸς αὐτὸν
cρύφα, ἐπιταριέναι τὴν κελεύοντες καὶ βουλόμενοι
4 αὐτοὶ ἐκαστὸς πρῶτοι ἀποστῆναι. καὶ γὰρ καὶ
ἀδεια ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς, ἐψευσμένοι μὲν τῆς
Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὅση ὑστερον
dieφάνη, τὸ δὲ πλέον βουλήσει κρίνοντες ἁσαφεὶ
ἡ προνοία ἁσφάλει, εἰωθότες οἱ ἀνθρώποι οὐ μὲν
ἐπηυμοῦσιν ἐλπίδι ἀπερικέπτω διδόναι, δὲ
μὴ προσέλθαι λογισμῷ αὐτοκράτορι διωθεῖσθαι.
5 ἀμα δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς νεωστὶ
πεπιληγμένων καὶ τοῦ Βρασίδου ἐφολκα καὶ οὐ
tὸ ὄντα λέγοντος, ὡς αὐτὸ ἔπτι Νίσαιαν τῇ
ἕαυτού μόνῃ στρατιᾷ 5 οὐκ ἤθελησαν οἱ Ἀθηναιοὶ
ξυμ-βαλεῖν, ἐθάρσουν καὶ ἔπιστευν μηδένα ἄν ἐπὶ
σφᾶς βοηθῆσαι. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, διὰ τὸ ἥδων
ἐχον ἐν τῷ αὐτικα καὶ ὦτὶ τὸ πρῶτον Δακεδαι-
μονίων ὀργῶντων ἐμμέλλων πειράσεσθαι, καὶ
δυνεύειν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐτοίμοι ἦσαν. δὲν αἰσθανό-

1 Kistemacher's correction for ράδια or ράδια of the MSS.
2 Supply in thought here ενόμιζων before γεγενήσθαι. Most
MSS. have ενόμιζεν (Vulg. ενομίζετο); Kistemacher deletes.
3 αὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπῆκοι, Hude deletes.
4 Hude reads ἐψευσμένοι, with E.
5 Linwood, followed by Stahl and Hude, inserts βοηθή-
sαιντ, as indeed seems to have been in the mind of the
author.

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BOOK IV. cviii. 1–6

had become easy.¹ And they feared, too, the revolt of their allies. For Brasidas in other things showed himself moderate, and in his declarations everywhere made plain that he had been sent out for the liberation of Hellas. And the cities that were subject to Athens, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis and the assurances that were offered, and of the gentleness of Brasidas, were more than ever incited to revolution, and sent secret messengers to him, urging him to come on to them, and wishing each for itself to be the first to revolt. For it seemed to them that there was little ground for fear, since they estimated the Athenian power to be far less great than it afterwards proved to be, and in their judgment were moved more by illusive wishing than by cautious foresight; for men are wont, when they desire a thing, to trust to unreflecting hope, but to reject by arbitrary judgment whatever they do not care for. Furthermore, because of the recent defeat of the Athenians in Boeotia and the enticing but untrue statements of Brasidas,² that the Athenians had been unwilling to engage him when he came to the relief of Nisaea with only his own army, they grew bold, and believed that nobody would come against them. Above all, they were so moved by the pleasurable anticipations of the moment, and by the fact that they were now for the first time going to have a proof of what the Lacedaemonians would do when on their mettle, that they were ready to take any risk. Being aware of

¹ Or, retaining ἐπὶ of the MSS. and the Vulgate reading εὐπολίστο, “but now the access was thought to have become easy.”
² cf. ch. lxxiii.; lxxxv. 7.

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μενοι οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι φυλακάς, ὡς ἐξ ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν χείμωνι, διέσπερτον ἦσ τὰς πόλεις, ὁ δὲ ἐς τὴν Ἀκρόπολιν ἐφιέμενος στρατιῶν τε προσαποστέλλει ἐκέλευε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Στρυμόνι

ναυτηγίαιν τριήρων παρεσκευάζετο. οἱ δὲ Δακεδαίμονει τὰ μὲν καὶ φόνῳ ἀπὸ τῶν πρῶτων ἀνδρῶν οὐχ ὑπηρέτησαν αὐτῷ, τὰ δὲ καὶ βουλόμενοι μᾶλλον τοὺς τε ἄνδρας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νῆσου κομίσασθαι καὶ τὸν πόλεμον καταλύσαι.

CIX. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ χειμώνος Μεγαρῆς τε τὰ μακρὰ τείχη, ἡ σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἶχον, κατεσκαφας ἐλόντες ἐς ἔδαφος, καὶ Βρασίδας μετὰ τὴν Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀλώσιν ἐχοι τοὺς ξυμμάχους

2 στρατεύει ἑπὶ τὴν Ἀκτὴν καλουμένην. ἔστι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως διορύγματος ἄσω προύχουσα, καὶ ὁ Ἄθως αὐτῆς ὅρος ψηλὸν τελευτᾷ ἐς τὸ

3 Ἀιγαίου πέλαγος. πόλεις δὲ ἔχει Σάνη μὲν Ἀνδρίων ἀποικίαιν παρ’ αὐτὴν τὴν διώρυχα, ἄτο τὸ πρὸς Εὐβοίαν πέλαγος τετραμμένην, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Θυσσόν καὶ Κλεούνας καὶ Ἁκροθῆον καὶ

4 Ὀλύμφεων καὶ Διῶν. αἱ οἰκοῦνται ξυμμείκτοις ἔθνεσι βαρβάρων δυνάμεσσαν, καὶ τι καὶ Χαλκιδικὸν ἐνι βραχὺ, τὸ δὲ πλείστον Πελασγικόν, τῶν καὶ Λήμνον ποτε καὶ Ἀθῆνας Τυρσηνῶν οἰκησάντων, καὶ Βισαλτικόν καὶ Κρηστωνικόν καὶ Ἡδῶνες. κατὰ δὲ μικρὰ πολίσματα οἰκοῦσιν.

5 καὶ οἱ μὲν πλείους προσεχώρησαν τῷ Βρασίδᾳ, Σάνη δὲ καὶ Διόν ἀντέστη, καὶ αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν ἐμμείνας τῷ στρατῷ ἔδησον.

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these things, the Athenians, so far as was possible at short notice and in the winter season, sent out garrisons among the cities; while Brasidas sent to Lacedaemon and urgently begged them to send him reinforcements, and was himself making preparations for building ships in the Strymon. The Lacedaemonians, however, did not comply with his request, partly on account of the jealousy of the foremost men, partly also because they wished rather to recover the men taken on the island and to bring the war to an end.

CIX. The same winter the Megarians took and razed to the ground their long walls\(^1\) which the Athenians had held; and Brasidas, after the capture of Amphipolis, made an expedition with his allies against the district called Acte. It is a promontory projecting from the King's canal\(^2\) on the inner side of the isthmus, and its terminus at the Aegean Sea is the lofty Mt. Athos. Of the cities it contains, one is Sane, an Andrian colony close to the canal, facing the sea which is toward Euboea; the others are Thyssus, Cleonae, Acrothoï, Oolphyxus and Dion, which are inhabited by mixed barbarian tribes speaking two languages. There is in it also a small Chalcidic element; but the greatest part is Pelasgic—belonging to those Etruscans that once inhabited Lemnos and Athens\(^3\)—Bisaltic, Crestonic, and Edonian; and they live in small towns. Most of these yielded to Brasidas, but Sane and Dion held out against him; so he waited there with his army and laid waste their territory.

\(^1\) cf. ch. lxix. 4. \(^2\) Xerxes' canal; cf. Hdt. vii. 22 ff. \(^3\) According to Herodotus (vi. 137 ff.), they were expelled from Attica, and afterwards, by Miltiades, from Lemnos.
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CX. Ὡς δ’ οὐκ ἔσθικον, εὐθὺς στρατεύει ἐπὶ Τορώνην τὴν Χαλκιδικῆν, κατεχομένην ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων καὶ αὐτῶν ἄνδρες ὀλίγοι ἐπήγγεντο, ἔτοιμοι ὅντες τὴν πόλιν παραδοῦναι. καὶ ἀφικόμενοι νυκτὸς ἔτι καὶ περὶ ὀρθῶν τῷ στρατῷ ἐκαθέζετο πρὸς τὸ Διοσκόρειον, δὲ ἀπέχει τῆς 2 πόλεως τρεῖς μᾶλιστα σταδίους. τὴν μὲν οὖν ἄλλην πόλιν τῶν Τορωναίων καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τοὺς ἐμφρουροῦντας ἐλαθεν’ οἱ δὲ πράσσοντες αὐτῷ εἰδότες ὅτι ἦξοι, καὶ προελθόντες τινὲς αὐτῶν λάθρα ὀλίγοι ἔτηρον τὴν πρόσοδον, καὶ ὡς ἠσθοντο παρόντα, ἐσκομίζοντο παρ’ αὐτοὺς ἐγχειρίδια ἔχοντας ἄνδρας ψιλοὺς ἐπτά (τοσοῦτοι γὰρ μόνοι ἄνδρῶν εἰκοσι τὸ πρῶτον ταχέωταν οὐ κατέδειξαν ἑσελθεῖν ἢρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Δυσίστρατος Ὁλύνθιος), οἱ διαδύντες διὰ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τεῖχος καὶ λαθόντες τοὺς τε ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνωτάτῳ φυλακτηρίῳ φρουροῦς, οὕτως τῆς πόλεως πρὸς λόφου, ἀναβάντες διέφθειραν καὶ τὴν κατὰ Καναστραίον πυλίδα διήρων.

CXI. Ὅ δὲ Βρασίδας τῷ μὲν ἄλλῳ στρατῷ ἠσύχαζεν ὀλίγον προελθὼν, ἐκατὸν δὲ πελτάστας προπέμπει, ὅπως, ὅποτε πῦλαι τινὲς ἄνοιξθείν καὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἅρθεθη ἢ ξυνέκειτο, πρῶτοι 2 ἐσδράμοιεν. καὶ οἱ μὲν χρόνου ἐγγυγομένου καὶ θαυμάζοντες κατὰ μικρὸν ἐτυχον ἐγγύς τῆς πόλεως προελθόντες· οἱ δὲ τῶν Τορωναίων ἐνδοθεὶ παρασκευάζοντες μετὰ τῶν ἑσεληλυ-400
CX. Since, however, they would not yield he marched at once against Torone, in Chalcidice, which was held by the Athenians; for a few men, who were ready to betray the town, had invited him over. Arriving with his army toward dawn, but while it was still dark, he encamped near the temple of the Dioscuri, which is about three stadia distant from the city. The rest of the town of Torone and the Athenians of the garrison were unaware of his approach, but his partisans, knowing that he would come, and some few of them having secretly gone forward to meet him, were watching for his approach; and when they perceived that he was there, they introduced into the town seven light-armed men with daggers, under the command of Lysistratus an Olynthian, these men alone of the twenty first assigned to the task not being afraid to enter. These slipped through the seaward wall and escaping the notice of the guard at the uppermost watch-post of the town, which is on the slope of a hill, went up and slew these sentinels, and broke open the postern on the side towards the promontory of Canastraeum.

CXI. Meanwhile Brasidas, having gone forward a little, kept quiet with the rest of his army, but sent forward one hundred targeteers, in order that as soon as any gates were opened and the signal agreed upon was raised they might rush in first. These now, as time elapsed, were wondering at the delay and had come up little by little close to the town. Meanwhile the Toronaeans inside who were co-operating with the party which had entered, when the postern

1 The chief town on the Sithonian peninsula. See Map at i. lvi.
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θότων, ὡς αὐτοῖς ἦ τε πυλῆς διήρητο καὶ αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν πύλαι τοῦ μοχλοῦ διακοπέντος ἀνεῴ
gυντο, πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ τὴν πυλίδα τινὰς περιαγαγόντες ἐσεκόμισαν, ὡπὸς κατὰ νότον καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει οὐδὲν εἰδότας ἐξαπίνης φοβήσειαν, ἔπειτα τὸ σημεῖον τε τοῦ πυρὸς, ὡς εἰρητο, ἀνέσχον καὶ διὰ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν πυλῶν τοὺς λοιποὺς ἦδη τῶν πελταστῶν ἐσεδέχοντο.  

CXII. καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας ἵδιν τὸ ἐξύπνημα ἔθει δρόμῳ, ἀναστήσας τὸν στρατὸν ἐμβοηθησάντας τε ἀθρόον καὶ ἐκπλήξιν πολλῆς 2 τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει παρασχόντας. καὶ οἱ μὲν κατὰ τὰς πύλας εὐθὺς ἐσέπτιττον, οἳ δὲ κατὰ δοκοῦν τετραγώνους, αἰ ἔτυχον τῷ τείχει πεπτωκότι κἀκοικοδομομέμφῳ πρὸς λίθων ἀνολκήν προσκεί
ing  

3 μεναί. Βρασίδας μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εὐθὺς ἀνω καὶ ἑπὶ παντα μετέωρα τῆς πόλεως ἐτράπετο, βουλόμενος καὶ ἀκρας καὶ βεβαιῶς ἔλειν αὐτήν ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ὁμιλος κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιος ἐπικαὶ

CXIII. Τῶν δὲ Τοροναίων γιγανομένης τῆς ἀλώσεως τοὶ μὲν πολὺ οὐδὲν εἰδὸς ἐθορυβεῖτο, οἳ δὲ πράσσουντες καὶ οἱς ταύτα ἱρεσκε μετὰ τῶν 2 ἐσελθόντων εὐθὺς ἔσαν. οἳ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι (ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ὁπλίται καθεύδοντες ὡς πεντηκοῦντα) ἐπειδὴ ἔσθοντο, οἱ μὲν τινες ὀλίγοι διαφθείρονται ἐν χερσὶν αὐτῶν, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν οἱ μὲν πεζῆ, οἳ δὲ ἐς τὰς ναίς, αἱ ἐφρούρουν δύο, καταφυγόντες διασώζονται ἐς τὴν Δήκυθον τὸ φρούριον, δε εἶχον αὐτοὶ καταλαβόντες, ἀκρον τῆς πόλεως ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ἀπειλημμένον ἐν στενῷ.
had been broken down and the gates near the market-place had been opened by cutting the bar, first brought some men around to the postern and let them in, in order that they might take the townsmen unawares by a sudden attack in their rear and on both sides and throw them into a panic; after that they raised the fire-signal agreed upon and received the rest of the targeteers through the gates near the market-place. CXII. Brasidas, on seeing the signal, set off at a run, calling up his force, and they with one voice raised a shout and caused great dismay to the townsmen. Some burst in immediately by the gates, others over some square beams which chanced to have been placed, for the purpose of drawing up stones, against the wall that had fallen in and was now being rebuilt. Brasidas, then, and the main body made at once for the high points of the town, wishing to make its capture complete and decisive; but the rest of the multitude\(^1\) scattered in all directions.

CXIII. While the capture was being effected, most of the Toronnaeans, who knew nothing of the plot, were in a tumult, but the conspirators and such as were in sympathy with the movement at once joined those who had entered. When the Athenians became aware of it—for about fifty of their hoplites happened to be sleeping in the market-place—though some few of them were slain in hand-to-hand conflict, the rest fled, some by land, others to the two ships which were on guard, and got safely into the fort of Lecythus, which had been occupied and was held by their own men. It is the citadel of the city, projecting into the sea—a separate section\(^2\) on a

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\(^1\) Macedonian and Thracian irregulars.

\(^2\) There was probably a wall across the isthmus.
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3 ἵσθιμφ. κατέφυγον δὲ καὶ τῶν Τορωναίων ἐσ
自主 οὐκ ήσαν σφύσιν ἐπιτήδειοι.

ΟΧΙΝ. Γεγενημένης δὲ ἡμέρας ἤδη καὶ βεβαιῶς
τῆς πόλεως ἐχωμένης ὁ Βρασίδας τοῖς μὲν μετὰ
τῶν Ἀθηναίων Τορωναίως καταπεφυγόσι κή-
ρυγμα ἐποιήσατο τὸν βουλόμενον ἐπὶ τὰ ἔαυτοῦ
ἐσελθόντα ἄδεως πολιτεύειν, τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις
κήρυκα προσπέμψας ἐξεναὶ ἐκέλευεν ἐκ τῆς
Δηκύθου ὕποσπόνδους καὶ τὰ ἐαυτῶν ἔχοντας ὡς
2 οὐσῆς Χαλκίδεων. οἱ δὲ ἐκλείψαναν μὲν οὐκ
ἐφασαν, σπείσασθαι δὲ σφύσιν ἐκέλευον ἡμέραν
τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀνελέσθαι. οὐ δὲ ἐπείσατο δύο.
ἐν ταύταις δὲ αὐτὸς τε τὰς ἐγγυς οἰκίας ἐκρατύ-
3 νατο καὶ Ἀθηναίοι τὰ σφετερά. καὶ ξύλλογον
τῶν Τορωναίων ποιῆσας ἔλεξε τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀκάνθῳ
παραπλήσια, ὅτι οὐ δίκαιον εἶν οὔτε τοὺς πρά-
ξαντας πρὸς αὐτῶν τὴν λήψιν τῆς πόλεως χείρος
οὔτε προδότας ἤγεϊσθαι (οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ δουλεία ὤν
χρήσιμα πεισθέντας δρᾶσαι τούτω, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ
ἀγαθῷ καὶ ἑλευθερίᾳ τῆς πόλεως), οὔτε τοὺς μὴ
μετασχόντας οἴεσθαι μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν τεύξεσθαι
ἀφίκησα γὰρ οὐ διαφθερῶν ῥνε ὀπλών οὔτε ἠδῶ-
4 τὴν οὐδένα. τὸ δὲ κήρυγμα ποιῆσασθαι τοῦτον
ἐνεκα τοῖς παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίοις καταπεφυγόσιν, ὡς
ηγούμενος οὐδὲν χείρος τῇ ἐκείνων φιλίας οὐδὲ
ἀν σφῶν περασαμένως αὐτοῖς τῶν Δακεδαι-
μονίων δοκεῖν ἦσον, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ὡσφ

1 τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων, deleted by Cobet, followed by Hude.
narrow isthmus. And such of the Toroneans as were friendly to the Athenians took refuge there also.

CXIV. When day had come and the town was securely in his possession, Brasidas made proclamation to the Toroneans who had taken refuge with the Athenians, that whoever wished might return to his property and exercise citizenship without fear; but to the Athenians he sent a herald, ordering them to come out of Lecythus under truce, bringing all their property, as the place belonged to the Chalcidians. They, however, refused to leave, but requested him to make a truce with them for a day, that they might take up their dead. He granted a truce for two days, during which he himself fortified the houses near by and the Athenians strengthened their defences. Then calling a meeting of the Toroneans, Brasidas spoke to them much as he had done to the people at Acanthus.\(^1\) He said that it was not just either to regard as villains or as traitors those who had negotiated with him for the capture of the town—for they had done this, not to enslave it, nor because they were bribed, but for the welfare and freedom of the city—or to think that those who had not taken part would not get the same treatment as the others; for he had not come to destroy either the city or any private citizen. He explained that he made his proclama-
tion to those who had taken refuge with the Athenians for the reason that he thought none the worse of them for their friendship with these; and when they had proved his countrymen, the Lacedaemonians, they would not, he thought, be less but rather far more kindly disposed toward them than toward the

\(^1\) cf. chs. lxxxv.–lxxxvii.
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δικαιότερα πράσσουσιν, εὖνος δὲ σφίσι γενέσθαι,
ο ἀπειρά δὲ νῦν πεφοβηθεῖσαι. τοὺς τε πάντας
παρασκευάζεσθαι ἐκέλευσιν ὡς βεβαιοῦσ' τε ἐσο-
μένους ξυμμάχους καὶ τὸ ἀπό τοῦδε ἦδη ὃ τι ἂν
ἀμαρτάνωσιν αὐτίνας ἔξωτας· τὰ δὲ πρώτερα ὦν
σфаῖς ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνοις μᾶλλον ὑπ’ ἄλλων
κρεισσόνων, καὶ ἐννυγνόμην εἰναι εἰ τι ἡναντιοῦντο.

CXV. Καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαῦτα εἰπὼν καὶ παραθαρ-
σύνας διελθοῦσών τῶν σπουδῶν τὰς προσβολὰς
ἐποιεῖτο τῇ Δηκύθῃ. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἧμύνοντό τε
ἐκ φαύλου τευχήσματος καὶ ἀπ’ οἰκίων ἐπάλξεις
ἐχουσῶν, καὶ μίαν μὲν ἠμέραν ἀπεκρούσαντο.

2 τῇ δ’ ὑπεραιά μηχανής μελλουσῆς προσαχεῖσθαι
αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀφ’ ὧς πῦρ ἐνήσεων
dιενοῦντο ἐς τὰ ἔξωτα παραφράγματα, καὶ
προσιόντος ἦδη τοῦ στρατεύματος, ἦ φοντο
μάλιστα αὐτοὺς προσκομιέων τὴν μηχανήν καὶ ἦν
ἐπιμαχότατον, πῦργον ἔζωλον ἐς’ οἰκήμα ἀντέ-
stησαν, καὶ ὡδας ἀμφορέας πολλοὺς καὶ πίθους
ἀνεφόρησαν καὶ λίθους μεγάλους, ἀνθρωποῖ τε
3 πολλοὶ ἀνέβησαν. τὸ δὲ οἰκήμα λαβῶν μεῖζον
ἄχθος ἔξωπής κατερράγη καὶ ψόφου πολλοῦ
γενομένου τοὺς μὲν ἐγγὺς καὶ ὀράντας τῶν
Ἀθηναίων ἐλύπησε μᾶλλον ἢ ἐφόβησεν, οἱ δὲ
ἀπωθεῖαν καὶ μάλιστα οἱ διὰ πλείστου, νομίζοντες
ταύτη ἐαλωκέναι ἦδη τὸ χωρίον, ψυγὴν ἐς τὴν
θάλασσαν καὶ τὰς ναῖς ὀρμησαν.

CXVI. Καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας ὡς ἦσθετο αὐτοὺς
ἀπολείποντας τε τὰς ἐπάλξεις καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον
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Athenians, inasmuch as their conduct was more just; whereas now they had been afraid of them through inexperience. Moreover, he told them all to prepare to show themselves staunch allies and to be held responsible for whatever mistakes they might make from this time on; as to their former actions, it was not the Lacedaemonians who had been wronged by them, but the Toronaéans rather by others\(^1\) who were stronger, and it was pardonable if the Toronaéans had made any opposition to him.

CXV. Having said such things and encouraged them, when the truce expired he proceeded to make assaults upon Lecythus; but the Athenians defended themselves from a paltry fort and from such houses as had battlements, and beat them back for one day. On the next day, however, when the enemy were about to bring against them an engine from which it was intended to throw fire upon the wooden defences, and the army was already coming up, they set up a wooden tower on a house at the point where they thought the enemy most likely to bring up his engine and where the wall was most assailable, and carried up many jars and casks of water and big stones, and many men also ascended. But the house, being over-weighted, collapsed suddenly and with a great noise, annoying rather than frightening the Athenians who were near and saw it; but those who were at a distance, and especially those furthest off, thinking that in that quarter the place had already been taken, set off in flight for the sea and their ships.

CXVI. When Brasidas perceived that they were leaving the battlements and saw what was going on,

\(^1\) The Athenians.
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όρων, ἐπιφερόμενος τῷ στρατῷ εὐθὺς τὸ τείχισμα λαμβάνει, καὶ ὄσους ἐγκατέλαβε διεφθείρειν. 2 καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς τε πλοίοις καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐκλιπόντες τὸ χωρίον ἐς Παλλήνην διεκομίσθησαν ὃ δὲ Βρασίδας (ἔστι γὰρ ἐν τῇ Δηκύθῳ Ἀθηναίας ίερόν, καὶ ἔτυχε κηρύξας, ὅτε ἐμελλε προσβάλλειν, τῷ ἐπιβάντι πρῶτῳ τοῦ τείχους τριάκοντα μνᾶς ἀργυρίου δώσειν) νομίζας ἄλλω τού τρόπῳ ἢ ἀνθρωπεῖσι τὴν ἀλώσιν γενέσθαι, τάς τε τριάκοντα μνᾶς τῇ θεῷ ἀπέδωκεν ἕς τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὴν Δήκυθον καθελὼν καὶ ἀνασκευάσας τέμενος ἀνήκεν ἀπαν. 3 καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ χειμῶνος ἂ τε ἐλεξε τῶν χωρίων καθίστατο καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπεβούλευεν καὶ τού χειμῶνος διελθόντος οὐδούν ἔτος ἐτελεύτα τῷ πολέμῳ.

CXXVII. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀμα ἕρι τοῦ ἐπιγγυμομένου θέρους εὐθὺς ἐκεχειρίαν ἐποιήσαντο ἐνιαύσιον, νομίζαντες Ἀθηναίοι μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τὸν Βρασίδαν σφῶν προσαποστήσασαι οὐδὲν πρὶν παρασκευάσασι καθ’ ἱσυχίαν, καὶ ἀμα, εἰ καλῶς σφίσων ἔχοι, καὶ ξυμβῆναι τὰ πλεῖον, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ταῦτα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἠγούμενοι ἀπερ ἐδέδωσιν φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ γενομένης ἀνοικώχης κακῶν καὶ ταλαιπωρίας μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμήσεις αὐτοῦς πειρασαμένους ξυπαλλαγῆναι τε καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρὰς σφίσιν ἀποδόντας σπουδᾶς

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he bore down at once with the army and took the fort, destroying all that he found in it. And so the Athenians left the place in their small boats and ships and were thus conveyed to Pallene. Now there is a temple of Athena in Lecythus, and it chanced that Brasidas, when he was on the point of making the assault, had proclaimed that he would give thirty minas\(^1\) in silver to him who first mounted the wall; but thinking now that the capture had been effected by some other means than human, he paid the thirty minas to the goddess for the temple, and after razing Lecythus and clearing the ground consecrated the whole place as a sacred precinct. Then for the rest of the winter he proceeded to set in order the affairs of the places that he held and to plot against the other towns; and with the conclusion of this winter ended the eighth year of the war.

\(\perp\) CXVII. But at the opening of spring in the following summer season, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians at once concluded an armistice for a year. The Athenians believed that Brasidas would thus not be able to cause any more of their allies to revolt and they meanwhile could make preparations at their leisure, and at the same time that, should it be to their advantage, they might make further agreements; the Lacedaemonians, on their part, thought that the Athenians were moved by precisely the fears which actuated them,\(^2\) and that, when once they had enjoyed a respite from troubles and hardships, they would, after such an experience, be more anxious to be reconciled, restore their men and make

\(^1\) £122, $580.
\(^2\) i.e., if an armistice did not intervene, Brasidas might detach still other allies from them.
2 ποιησασθαι καὶ ἐς τὸν πλεῖον χρόνον. τοὺς γὰρ δὴ ἄνδρας περὶ πλείονος ἐποιοῦντο κομίσασθαι, ἔως ἔτει Βρασίδας ηὐτύχει. καὶ ἔμελλον ἂπλὶ μεῖζον χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος τῶν μὲν στέρεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἰσού ἀμυνόμενοι κινδυνεῦειν, εἰ καὶ κρατήσειαν.

3 γίγνεται σὺν ἐκεχειρίᾳ αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ἦδεν.

OXVIII. "Περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαντείου τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Πυθίου δοκεῖ ἡμῖν χρῆσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἅδωλος καὶ ἄδεως κατὰ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους. τοῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίως ταῦτα δοκεῖ καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς παρούσιν. Βουωτοὺς δὲ καὶ Φωκέας πείσεσιν φασίν ἐκ δύναμιν προσκερυμένους.

4 "Περὶ δὲ τῶν χρημάτων τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιμέλεσθαι ὅπως τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἐξευρήσαμεν, ὅρθως καὶ δικαίως τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρωμένοι καὶ ὑμεῖς καὶ ἥμεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ βουλόμενοι, τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρωμένοι πάντες. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐδοξῆ Λακεδαιμονίας καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις κατὰ ταῦτα.

"Τάδε δὲ ἐδοξῆ Λακεδαιμονίας καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις, ἐὰν σπονδᾶς ποιῶνται οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῶν μένειν ἐκατέρους ἔχοντας ἀπερ νῦν ἔχομεν, τοὺς μὲν ἐν τῷ Κορυφασίῳ ἐν τοῖς τῆς Βουφράδος καὶ τοῦ Τομέως μένοντας, τοὺς δὲ ἐν

1 ἔως, so Hude and van Herwerden from schol. on Ar. Pax 479; MSS. ὄσ.
2 eι καὶ κρατήσειαν, Madvig’s conjecture, for καὶ κρατήσειν of the MSS.
a truce for a longer time. For it was their men they made a special point of recovering, while Brasidas was still in good luck. If he were still further successful and established the contending forces on an even footing, the likelihood was that they would still be deprived of these men, and it would be doubtful whether, fighting on equal terms, they could prevail with the remainder. Accordingly an armis-tice was concluded for them and their allies on the following terms:

CXVIII. "Concerning the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, we agree that whosoever will shall consult it without fraud and without fear, according to the usages of our forefathers. These things seem good to the Lacedaemonians and the allies that are present; and they promise to send heralds to the Boeotians and Phocians and persuade them so far as they can.

"Concerning the treasure of the god we agree to take care to find out all wrong-doers, rightly and justly following the usages of our forefathers, you and we and all others that wish to do so, all following the usages of our forefathers. Concerning these things, then, it is so agreed by the Lacedaemonians and the rest of the confederates on such terms.

"The following agreements also are made by the Lacedaemonians and the rest of the confederates, that in case the Athenians make a treaty, we shall each of us remain on our own territory, keeping what we now have: the Athenian garrison in Coryphan-sium¹ shall keep within Buphras and Tomeus;

¹ The Lacedaemonian name of Pylos (ch. iii. 2). Buphras and Tomeus were two high points on the coast.
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Κυθήροις μὴ ἐπιμισγομένους ἐσ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, μήτε ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς, μήτε αὐτούς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τοὺς δὲ ἐν Νίσαλι καὶ Μινῷ μὴ ὑπερβαινοντας τὴν ὀδὸν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν τῶν παρὰ τοῦ Νίσου ἐπὶ τὸ Ποσειδώνιον, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Ποσειδώνιου εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὴν γέφυραν τὴν ἐς Μινώαν (μηδὲ Μεγαρέας καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ὑπερβαίνειν τὴν ὀδὸν ταύτην), καὶ τὴν νῆσον, ἦπερ ἐλαβον οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, ἔχοντας, μηδὲ ἐπιμισγομένους μηδετέρους μηδετέρωσε, καὶ τὰ ἐν Τροζῆνι, ὃσπερ νῦν ἔχουσι καθ᾽ ἄξυνθεντο πρὸς Ἀθηναίους.

5 "Καὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ χρωμένους, ὅσα ἄν κατὰ τὴν ἐαυτῶν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, Δακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους πλεῖν μὴ μακρὰ νῆς, ἀλλὰ δὲ κωπήρει πλοῦτος ἐς πεντακόσια τάλαντα ἀγοντι μέτρα.

6 "Κήρυκε δὲ καὶ πρεσβεία καὶ ἀκολούθους, ὅπόσοις ἄν δοκή, περὶ καταλύσεως τοῦ πολέμου καὶ δικῶν ἐς Πελοπόννησον καὶ Ἀθήναξε σπουδᾶς εἶναι ἱοῦσι καὶ ἁπιοῦσι, καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν.

7 "Τοὺς δὲ αὐτομόλους μὴ δέχεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, μήτε ἐλεύθερον μήτε δοῦλον, μήτε ὑμᾶς μήτε ἡμᾶς.

8 "Δίκας τε διδόναι ὑμᾶς τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς ὑμῖν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, τὰ ἀμφίλογα δίκη διαλύοντας ἀνευ πολέμου.

1 M reads ἀπὸ τοῦ Νίσαλος.
2 Kirchhoff's correction for καὶ ὅλα of the MSS.
that in Cythera\(^1\) shall have no communication with the territory of the Lacedaemonian allies, neither we with them nor they with us; that in Nisaea\(^2\) and Minoa\(^3\) shall not cross the road leading from the gates of the shrine of Nisus\(^4\) to the Poseidonium, and from the Poseidonium straight to the bridge\(^5\) at Minoa (nor shall the Megarians or their allies cross this road); as to the island\(^6\) which the Athenians took, they shall retain it, and neither party shall communicate with the other; and finally, in the territory of Troezen,\(^7\) the Athenians shall retain whatever they now have in accordance with the agreements which the Troezenians have made with the Athenians.

"As to the use of the sea, in so far as they use it along their own coast and along that of their confederacy, the Lacedaemonians and their allies may sail, not with a ship of war, but with any rowing-vessel up to five hundred talents burden.\(^8\)"

"There shall be safe conduct for herald and envoys and their attendants, as many as shall seem proper, on their way to the Peloponnesus and to Athens for the purpose of bringing the war to an end and for the arbitration of disputes, both going and coming, by land and by sea.

"Deserters shall not be received during this time, whether freemen or slaves, either by you or by us.

"You shall give satisfaction to us and we to you according to our ancestral customs, settling disputed points by arbitration without war.

\(^1\) Connecting Minoa with the mainland; cf. III. li. 3.
\(^2\) Probably Atalante is meant; cf. III. lxxxix. 3; v. xviii. 7.
\(^3\) The Athenian fortification on the isthmus of Methana; cf. ch. xlv. 2.
\(^4\) About 12\(\frac{1}{2}\) tons.
"Τοίς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ταῦτα δοκεῖ· εἰ δὲ τι υμῶν εἰτε κάλλιον εἰτε δικαιότερον τοῦτων δοκεῖ εἶναι, ιόντες ἐσε Δακε- 
δαίμονα διδάσκετε· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἀποστῆσονται, 
ὅσα ἂν δίκαια λέγητε, οὔτε οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι 
οὔτε οἱ ξύμμαχοι. οἱ δὲ ιόντες τέλος ἔχοντες 
ιόντων, ἥπερ καὶ ύμεῖς ἡμᾶς ἐκελεύετε. αἰ δὲ 
σπονδαὶ ἐναιντον ἔσονται."

11 Ἐδοξεν τῷ δῆμῳ, Ἀκαμάντις ἐπρυτάνευε, 
Φαῦνππος ἐγραμμάτευε, Νικιάδης ἐπεστάτηκε. 
Δάκης εἶπε, τύχη ἁγαθῇ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, ποιεῖσθαι 
τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, καθ' ἧν ἕνγχωρον Δακεδαιμόνιοι 
καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν καὶ ὁμολόγησαν ἐν τῷ 
12 δήμῳ τῆν ἑκεχειρίαν εἶναι ἐναιντον, ἀρχεῖν δὲ 
τήντε τὴν ἡμέραν, τετράδα ἐπὶ δέκα τοῦ Ἐλαφη- 
13 βολῶνος μενός. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ ιόντας ὡς 
ἀλλήλους πρέσβεις καὶ κήρυκας ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς 
λόγους, καθ' ὧν τι ἐσται ἡ καταλύσεις τοῦ πολέμου. 
14 ἐκκλησίαι δὲ ποιήσαντας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς καὶ 
τοὺς πρυτάνευς τῷ πρῶτῳ περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης βουλεύ- 
σασθαι Ἀθηναίοις καθ' ὧν ἂν ἐσι̣̃ ἡ προσβεία 
περὶ τῆς καταλύσεως τοῦ πολέμου. σπείρασον 
δὲ αὐτῖκα μᾶλα τὰς προσβείας ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τας 
παρούσας ἡ μὴ ἔμμενειν ἐν ταῖς σπονδαίς τοὺ 
ἐναιντον.

CXIX. Ταῦτα ξυνέθεντο Δακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ 
ξύμμαχοι Ἄθηναιοι καὶ τοῖς

1 Hude inserts ὡς, after Kirchhoff.
2 The change of subject implies a relative clause; something like ἐν ἰπο that may have dropped out.
3 Hude reads ἄν ἐσιν, after Kirchhoff.
4 καὶ ξύμμαχον (Vulg. καὶ ὁμολόγησαν) deleted by Hude, after Kirchhoff.
"To the Lacedaemonians and their allies these things seem good; but if anything seems to you fairer or juster than these things, come to Lacedaemon and set forth your view; for neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies will reject any just proposal you may make. And let those who come come with full powers, as you also desired of us. And the truce shall be for a year."

1 Decreed by the people. The tribe Acamantis held the prytany, Phaeinippus was clerk, Niciades was president. Laches, invoking good fortune for the people of Athens, moved to conclude the armistice according to the terms to which the Lacedaemonians and their allies had consented; and it was agreed in the popular assembly that the armistice should be for a year, and should begin on that day, the fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion. During this time envoys and heralds were to go from one state to the other and discuss proposals looking to the termination of the war. And the generals and prytanes were to call an assembly in which the Athenians should deliberate first of all about peace, on what terms the Lacedaemonian embassy for ending the war should be admitted. And the embassies now present should pledge themselves at once, in the presence of the people, to abide by the truce for the year.

CXIX. These agreements the Lacedaemonians and their allies made with the Athenians and their allies

1 The prescript of the Athenian decree which ratified the truce is quoted verbatim (italics above).
THUCYDIDES

ξυμμάχους μηνὸς ἐν Δακεδαίμονι Γεραστίου
διδεκάτῃ. ξυνετίθεντο δὲ καὶ ἐσπένδοντο Δακε-
δαιμονίῳς μὲν οἴδε. Ταῦρος 'Εχετιμίδα, Ἀθη-
ναῖος Περικλείδα, Φιλοχαρίδας 'Ερυξιλάδα-
Κορινθίων δὲ Αἰνέας Ὡκύτου, Εὐφαμίδας
'Αριστοπύμου. Σικυωνίων δὲ Δαμότιμος Ναυ-
κράτους, 'Ονασίμος Μεγακλέους. Μεγαρέων δὲ Νικα-
σος Κεκάλου, Μενεκράτης 'Αμφιδώρου,
'Επιδαυρίων δὲ 'Αμφίας Εὐπαλίδα.1 Ἀθηναίων δὲ
ὁ στρατηγὸς Νικόστρατος Διειπρέφους, Νικίας
Νικηράτου, Ἄυτοκλῆς Τολμαίου.

3 Ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐκεχειρία αὐτὴ ἐγένετο, καὶ ξυνῆσαν
ἐν αὐτῇ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων σπουδῶν διὰ παντὸς
ἐς λόγους.

CXX. Περὶ δὲ τὰς ἡμέρας ταύτας αἱς ἐπήρ-
χοντο Σκιώνη ἐν τῇ Παλλήνῃ πόλις ἀπέστη ἀπ’
Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Βρασίδαν. φασὶ δὲ οἱ Σκιωναῖοι
Πελληνῆς μὲν εἶναι ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, πλέοντας
ἢ ἀπὸ Τροίας σφῶν τοὺς πρῶτους κατενεχθῆναι
ἐς τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο τῷ χειμῶνι δὲ ἐγχρῆσαντο

2 Ἀχαιῶν, καὶ αὐτοῦ σικῆσαι. ἀποστᾶσι δ’ αὐτοῖς
ὁ Βρασίδας διέπλευσε νυκτὸς ἐς τὴν Σκιώνην,
τριήρει μὲν φιλία προπλευσή, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐν κελη-
τίῳ ἀπώθεν ἐφεπόμενος, ὡς, εἰ μὲν τινι τοῦ

1 Hude’s conjecture; Bekker Εὐπαλίδη, for Εὐπαλίδη of
most MSS.

1 Grote is probably right in assuming that the twelfth of
Gerastius corresponded to the fourteenth of Elaphebolion.
2 These consisted of formal libations.
and ratified them by oath at Lacedaemon on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius. And those who concluded and ratified the truce on behalf of the Lacedaemonians were the following: Taurus son of Echetimidas, Athenaeus son of Pericleidas, Philocharidas son of Eryxilaidas; on behalf of the Corinthians, Aeneas son of Ocytus, Euphamidas son of Aristonymus; on behalf of the Sicyonians, Demotimus son of Naucrates, Onasimus son of Megacles; on behalf of the Megarians, Nicasus son of Cecalus, Menocrates son of Amphidorus; on behalf of the Epidaurians, Amphias son of Eupalidas; on behalf of the Athenians, the generals Nicostratus son of Diotrephes, Nicias son of Niceratus, Autocles son of Tolmaeus.

Such, then, were the terms on which the armistice was concluded, and during its continuance they were constantly conferring about a truce of longer duration.

CXX. About the very time when they were performing the rites of confirmation, Scione, a city in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians and went over to Brasidas. The Scionaeans assert that they came originally from Pellene in the Peloponnesus, and that the first settlers in Scione were driven to this place on their way back from Troy by the storm which the Achaeans encountered, and settled here. On their revolt, Brasidas crossed over by night to Scione, a friendly trireme sailing ahead and he himself following in a skiff at some distance behind. His idea was that, if he should meet with any boat

3 Pellene was in Achaea, near Sicyon; the people are mentioned as allies of Sparta in II. ix. 2.
4 Referred to again in vi. ii. 3.
5 i.e. from Torone.
κέλητος μείζονι πλοίῳ περιτυγχάνοι, ἢ τριήρης ἄμυνοι αὐτῷ, ἀντιπάλου δὲ ἄλλης τριήρους ἐπιγενομένης οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἔλασσον νομίζων τρέφεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ αὐτὸν διασώσειν. περαιώθεις δὲ καὶ ξύλλογον ποιῆσας τῶν Σκιωναίων ἔλεγεν ἡ τῇ Ἀκάνθῳ καὶ Τορώνῃ, καὶ προσέτε πάντων ἀξιωτάτους αὐτοὺς εἰναι ἐπαίνου, οὕτως τῆς Παλ-λήνης ἐν τῷ ἱσθμῷ ἀπειλημμένης ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων Ποιτείδαιαν ἐχοῦσαν καὶ ὄντες οὖδ' ἀλλο ἡ νησίωται αὐτεπάγγελτοι ἐχώρησαν πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ οὐκ ἀνέμεναν ἀτολμία ἀνάγκην σφισι προσγενέσθαι περὶ τοῦ φανερῶς οἰκεῖον ἀγαθοῦ σημείον τ' εἶναι τοῦ καὶ ἀλλο τι ἀν αὐτοῦ τῶν μεγατών ἀνδρείως ὑπομείναιν εἰ τε τεθήσεται κατὰ νοῦν τὰ πράγματα, πιστοτάτους τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἡγήσεσθαι αὐτοῖς Δακεδαιμονίων φίλους καὶ τάλλα τιμήσειν.

CXXI. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Σκιωναῖοι ἐπήρθησαν τε τοῖς λόγοις καὶ θαρσήσαντες πάντες ὁμοίως, καὶ ὅσ πρότερον μὴ ἢρεσκε τὰ πρασσόμενα, τόν τε πόλεμον δεινοῦστο προθύμως οἰσειν καὶ τῶν Βρασίδαν τὰ τ' ἄλλα καλῶς ἐδέξαντο καὶ δημοσίᾳ μὲν χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἀνέδησαν ὡς ἐλευθεροῦντα τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἱδία δὲ ἐταινίον τε καὶ προσήρχοντο ὑστερ ἀθλητῇ. ὁ δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ παραυτικά φυλακῆ τινα αὐτῶις ἐγκαταλιπὼν διέβη πάλιν καὶ ὑστερον οὐ πολλῷ στρατιῶν πλείων

1 The corrected reading of two minor MSS.; all the better MSS. ἀντὶ. Hude deletes, after Poppo.
2 πάντων, Hude adopts Krüger's conjecture, φάσκων.
3 τε added by Krüger.
larger than a skiff, the trireme would protect him, but if another trireme of equal strength should come along it would turn, not against the smaller boat, but against the ship, and in the meantime he could get safely across. He succeeded in crossing, and having called a meeting of the Scionaeans repeated what he had said at Acanthus and Torone, adding that their own conduct had been most praiseworthy of all because, when Pallene was cut off at the isthmus by the Athenians who held Potidaea and when they were nothing but islanders, they had not supinely awaited the compulsion of necessity in a matter that was manifestly for their own good, but had of their own free will taken the side of freedom; and that, he said, was a proof that they would endure like men any other peril however great; and if things should be settled according to his wish, he would consider them in very truth most loyal friends of the Lacedaemonians and would honour them in other respects.

CXXI. The Scionaeans were elated at his words, and all alike, even those who before were not satisfied with what was being done, took courage and determined to carry on the war with spirit. Brasidas they not only welcomed with other honours but publicly crowned him with a golden crown as liberator of Hellas, and privately decked him with garlands and made offerings as for a victor in the games. And he, leaving them a guard for the present, crossed back, but not long afterwards he led over a
ėπεραιωσε, βουλόμενος μετ' αυτών τής τε Μένδης και τής Ποτειδαίας ἀποπειρᾶσαι, ἤγομενος καὶ τοὺς Ἄθηναίους βοηθῆσαι ἅν ως ἐς νῆσον καὶ βουλόμενος φθάσαι· καὶ τι αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπράσσετο ἐς τὰς πόλεις ταύτας προδοσίας πέρι.

CXXII. Καὶ ο μὲν ἐμέλλειν ἐγχειρήσειν ταῖς πόλεσιν ταύταις· ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τριήρει στρατεύετο ἐκείνην περιμεγελοῦντες ἀφικνοῦνται παρ' αὐτόν, Ἀθηναίων μὲν Ἀριστώνυμος, Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ Ἀθηναίας. καὶ η μὲν στρατιά πάλιν διέβη ἐς Τορόκην, οἱ δὲ τῷ Βρασίδα ἀνήγγελλον τὴν ξυνθήκην, καὶ ἐδέσαυτον πάντες οἱ ἐπὶ Θράκης.

3 ξύμμαχοι Λακεδαιμονίων τὰ πεπραγμένα. Ἀριστώνυμος δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους κατήγει, Σκιωναίους δὲ αἰσθόμενος ἐκ λογισμοῦ τῶν ἡμερῶν ὡς υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἀφεστήκοιεν, οὐκ ἔφη ἐνσπόνδους ἔσεσθαι. Βρασίδας δὲ ἀντέλευε πολλά, ὡς 4 πρότερον, καὶ οὐκ ἄφει τὴν πόλιν. ὡς δ’ ἀνήγγελεν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ὁ Ἀριστώνυμος περὶ αὐτῶν, οἱ Ἀθηναίοι εὐθὺς ἔτοιμοι ἦσαν στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τὴν Σκιωνήν. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοι πρόσβεβεν πέμψαντες παραβῆσθαι ἐφασαν αὐτοὺς τὰς σπουδὰς, καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀντεποιοῦντο Βρασίδα πιστεύοντες, δική τε ἔτοιμοι ἦσαν περὶ 5 αὐτῆς κρίνεσθαι. οἱ δὲ δίκη μὲν οὐκ ἦθελον κινδυνεῦειν, στρατεύειν δὲ ὡς τάχιστα, ὀργήν ποιούμενοι εἰ καὶ οἱ ἐν ταῖς νῆσοις ἤδη όντες ἄξιον σφῶν ἀφίστασθαι, τῇ κατὰ γῆν Λακε- 6 δαιμονίων ἵσχυ ἀνωφελεῖ πιστεύοντες εἰχε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια περὶ τῆς ἀποστάσεως μᾶλλον ἦ

1 τῷ deleted by Hude, after Stahl.
larger army, wishing in concert with them to make an attempt upon Mende and Potidaea; for he thought the Athenians would bring succour to Pallene as though it were an island, and he wished to anticipate them; besides, he was negotiating with these towns with a view to their betrayal.

CXXII. So he was about to attack these towns; but in the meantime those who were carrying round the news of the armistice arrived at his headquarters in a trireme, Aristonymus from Athens and Athenaeus from Lacedaemon. Whereupon his army crossed back to Torone; and the messengers formally announced the agreement to Brasidas, and all the Thracian allies of the Lacedaemonians acquiesced in what had been done. Aristonymus assented for the other places, but, finding on a calculation of the days that the Scioaeans had revolted after the agreement, he said that they would not be included in the truce. Brasidas, however, earnestly maintained that they had revolted before, and would not give up the city. Whereupon Aristonymus sent word to Athens about these matters, and the Athenians were ready at once to make an expedition against Scione. But the Lacedaemonians sent envoys, saying that the Athenians would be violating the truce, and trusting the word of Brasidas they laid claim to the town and were ready to arbitrate about it. The Athenians, however, were inclined, not to risk arbitration, but to make an expedition as quickly as possible, being enraged to think that even the inhabitants of the islands now presumed to revolt, relying on the strength which the Lacedaemonians had on land, useless though it was to them. Moreover, the truth about the

1 Because the Athenians commanded the sea.
THUCYDIDES

οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐδικαίουν δύο γὰρ ἡμέραις ὑπεροχαρίας 
ἀπέστησαν οἱ Σκιωναίοι. ψήφισμά τ᾿ εὐθὺς ἐποίησαντο, 
Κλέωνος γνώμη πείσθέντες, Σκιωναίοις ἐξελεύν τε καὶ ἄποκτεναί. καὶ τὰλλα 
ησυχάζοντες ἐς τοῦτο παρεσκευάζοντο.

CXXIII. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Μένη ἀφίσταται 
αὐτῶν, πόλεις ἐν τῇ Παλλήνῃ, Ὑπετριῶν ἀποικία. 
καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐθέσατο ὁ Βρασίδας, οὐ νοµίζων 
ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐκεχειρίᾳ φανερῶς προσε- 
χώρησαν ἐστι γὰρ ὃ καὶ αὐτὸς ἑνεκάλει τοῖς
2 Ἀθηναίοις παραβαίνειν τὰς σπουδὰς. δι’ ὃ καὶ 
ὁ Μενδαῖος μᾶλλον ἐτολμησαν, τὴν τε τοῦ 
Βρασίδου γνώμην ὁρῶντες ἐτοιμήν, τεκμαιρόμενοι 
καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Σκιώνης ὅτι οὐ προνεῖδον, καὶ ἀμα 
tῶν πρασσόντων σφίσιν ὁλῶν τε ὄντων καὶ 
ὡς τότε ἐμέλλησαν, ὅπετε ἀνέντων, ἀλλὰ περὶ 
σφίσιν αὐτοῖς φοβουμένων τὸ κατάδηλον καὶ 
kαταβιάσαμεν παρὰ γνώμην τοὺς πολλοὺς.
3 οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι εὐθὺς πυθόμενοι, πολλῷ ἔτι 
mᾶλλον ὀργισθέντες παρεσκευάζοντο ἐπὶ ἀμφοτέ-

4 ρας τὰς πόλεις. καὶ Βρασίδας προσδεχόμενος 
tῶν ἐπίπλοιν αὐτῶν ὑπεκκομίζει ἐς Ὀλυνθὸν τὴν 
Χαλκιδικήν παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας τῶν Σκιωναίων 
καὶ Μενδαίων, καὶ τῶν Πελοποννησίων αὐτοῖς 
πεντακοσίων ὁπλίτας διεσπερῆ καὶ πελταστὰς 
τριακοσίων Χαλκιδέων, ἀρχοντά τε τῶν ἀπάντων 
Πολυδαμίδαν. καὶ οἱ μὲν τὰ περὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς, 
ὡς ἐν τάχει παρεσομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων, κοινῇ 
ηὐτριπτίζοντο.

CXXIV. Βρασίδας δὲ καὶ Περδίκκας ἐν τούτῳ 
στρατεύουσιν ἀμα ἐπὶ Ἀρράβαιον τὸ δεύτερον

1 σφίσιν. Krüger deletes, followed by Hude.
revolt was rather as the Athenians claimed; for the Scionaeans revolted two days after the agreement. The Athenians, then, immediately passed a vote, on the motion of Cleon, to destroy Scione and put the citizens to death. And so, keeping quiet in other matters, they made preparations for this.

CXXIII. Meanwhile Mende revolted from them, a city in Pallene, and an Eretrian colony. And Brasidas received them, thinking they were not doing wrong in coming over to him, though clearly it was in the time of the armistice; for there were some points in which he himself charged the Athenians with breaking the truce. Wherefore the Mendaeans also became more bold, for they saw the resolute attitude of Brasidas, and also inferred it from the fact that he did not give up Scione. Moreover, the conspirators among them were few in number, and, once they had formed the design, from that moment showed no slackness, but were in fear of their lives in case of detection and coerced the multitude even against their will. But the Athenians, when they heard the news, were far more enraged, and straightforward made preparations against both cities. And Brasidas, expecting their coming, conveyed away to Olynthus in Chalcidice the women and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans, and sent over to protect them five hundred Peloponnesian hoplites and three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, with Polydamidas as commander of the whole. And the two cities together made preparations for their defence, in the belief that the Athenians would soon be at hand.

CXXIV. Brasidas and Perdiccas meanwhile marched together a second time\(^1\) to Lyncus against

\(^1\) cf. ch. lxxiii.
THUCYDIDES

ἐς Δύνκον. καὶ ἤγγον ὁ μὲν ὁ ἐκράτει Μακε-
δόνων τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τῶν ἐνοικοῦντων Ἑλλήνων
ὀπλάτας, ὃ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς περιλαύνοις τῶν
Πελοποννησίων Χαλκιδέας καὶ Ἅκανθίων καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ δύναμιν ἑκάστων. ξύμπαν δὲ
τὸ ὀπλιτικὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τρισχίλιοι μάλιστα,
ἰπτής δὲ οἱ πάντες ἱκελοῦθον Μακεδόνων ἕκα
Χαλκιδεύσιν ὀλίγου ἐς χιλίους, καὶ ἄλλος ὡμολο
tῶν βαρβάρων πολύς. ἐσβαλόντες δὲ ἐς τὴν
Ἀρραβαίου καὶ εὐρόντες ἀντεστρατοπεδευμένους
αὐτοῖς τοὺς Ἰλυριστάς, ἀντεκαθέζοντο καὶ
3 αὐτοῖ. καὶ ἐχόντων τῶν μὲν πεζῶν λόφων ἐκατέ-
ρωθεν, πεδίου δὲ τοῦ μέσου ὄντος, οἱ ἱππης ἐς
αὐτὸ καταδραμόντες ἱππομάχησαν πρῶτα ἄμφο-
τέρων, ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας καὶ ὁ Περδίκκας,
προελθόντων προτέρων ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου μετὰ τῶν
ἱππέων τῶν Δυνακηστῶν ὀπλιτῶν καὶ ἑτοίμων
ὄντων μάχεσθαι, ἀντεπαγαγόντες καὶ αὐτοῖς ξυν-
έβαλον καὶ ἔτρεψαν τοὺς Δυνακηστάς, καὶ πολ-
λοὺς μὲν διέφθειραν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ διαφυγόντες
4 πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα ἃςύχαζον. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο
tροπαίων στῆγαντες δύο μὲν ἡ τρεῖς ἡμέρας
ἐπέσχον, τοὺς Ἰλυριοῦς μένοντες, οἱ ἐνυχθοῦ
τῷ Περδίκκα μυσθοῦ μέλλοντες ἔσχον. ἐπειτα
ὁ Περδίκκας ἐβούλετο προϊέναι ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ
Ἀρραβαίου κώμας καὶ μὴ καθήσθαι, Βρασίδας δὲ
τῆς τε Μένδης περιορώμενος, μὴ τῶν Ἀθηναίων
πρότερον ἐπιπλευσάντων τι πάθη, καὶ ἂμα τῶν
Ἰλυριῶν οὐ παρόντων, οὐ πρόθυμος ἦν, ἀλλὰ
ἀναχωρεῖν μᾶλλον.

CXXV. Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ διαφερομένων αὐτῶν
ἡγγήθη ὅτι καὶ οἱ Ἰλυριοὶ μετ᾽ Ἀρραβαίον,
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Arrhabaeus. The latter led the force of the Macedonians, over whom he held sway, and a body of Hellenic hoplites resident among them; the former led not only the Peloponnesian troops which were left in the country, but also such forces from Chalcidice, Acanthus and the other towns as they could each furnish. The total Hellenic force was about three thousand; the cavalry that went with them, Macedonians and Chalcidians, were all told a little less than one thousand, and there was besides a great multitude of barbarians. Invading the country o. Arrhabaeus and finding the Lyncestians encamped against them, they also took up a position facing them. The infantry occupied a hill on either side, with a plain between, while the cavalry of both armies at first galloped down into the plain and engaged in battle; then Brasidas and Perdiccas, after the Lyncestian hoplites had come forward from the hill in conjunction with their own cavalry and were ready to fight, advanced also in their turn and joined battle, routing the Lyncestians and destroying many, while the rest escaped to the high places and kept quiet. After this they set up a trophy and halted for two or three days, awaiting the Illyrians, who had been hired by Perdiccas and were momentarily expected. Then Perdiccas wished, on their arrival, to go forward against the villages of Arrhabaeus instead of sitting idle; but Brasidas was solicitous about Mende, fearing that it might suffer some harm if the Athenians should sail there before his return; and, besides, the Illyrians had not appeared, so that he was not eager to go on, but rather to retreat.

CXXV. Meanwhile, as they were disputing, it was announced that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdiccas
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προδόντες Περδίκκαν, γεγένηται· ὡστε ἢδη ἄμφοτέροις μὲν δοκοῦν ἀναχωρεῖν διὰ τὸ δέος αὐτῶν, ὡς των ἀνθρώπων μαχίμως, κυριωθέν δὲ οὐδὲν ἐκ τῆς διαφορᾶς ὁπνείκα χρὴ ὅρμασθαι, νυκτὸς τε ἐπιγενομένης, οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν βαρβάρων εὐθὺς φοβηθέντες, ὅπερ φιλεῖ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἀσαφῶς ἐκπλήγυνσθαι, καὶ νομίζοντες πολλαπλασίους μὲν ἡ ἡλίον ἐπιέναι, ὅσον δὲ οὐτῶν παρεῖναι, καταστάντες ἐς αἰφνίδιον φυγῇ ἐχόμεν ἐπὶ οἰκον, καὶ τὸν Περδίκκαν τὸ πρῶτον οὐκ αἰσθανόμενον, ὡς ἔγγῳ, ἡνάγκασαν πρὶν τὸν Βρασίδαν ἰδεῖν (ἀποθεῖν γὰρ πολὺ

2 ἀλλήλων ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο) προαπελθεῖν. Βρασίδας δὲ ἀμα τῇ ἔφ᾽ ὡς εἶδε τοὺς Μακεδόνας προκεχωρηκότας, τοὺς τε Ἰληρίους καὶ τὸν Ἀρράβαν μέλλοντας ἐπιέναι, ξυναγαγὼν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς τετράγωνον τάξιν τοὺς ὀπλίτας καὶ τὸν ψιλὸν ὡμίλον ἐς μέσον λαβών, διενεοῖτο ἀνὰ-

3 χωρεῖν. ἐκδρόμους δὲ, εὴ πὴ προσβάλλοιεν αὐτοῖς, ἔταξε τοὺς νεωτάτους, καὶ αὐτὸς λογάδας ἔχων τριακοσίους τελευταίοις γνώμην εἰχεν ὑπο-

χωρῶν τοῖς τῶν ἐναντίων πρῶτοις προσκεισμο-

4 μένοις ὀνθιστάμενοι ἀμύνεσθαι. καὶ πρὶν τοὺς πολεμίους ἔγγυς εἶναι, ὡς διὰ ταχέων παρεκελεύ-

σατο τοῖς στρατιώταις τοιάδε.

CXXVI. "Εἰ μὲν μὴ ὑπώπτευον, ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι, ἵματι τῷ τε μεμονωθαί καὶ ὅτι βάρβαροι οἱ ἐπίνοντες καὶ πολλοὶ ἐκπληκτὲς ἔχειν, οὔπερ ὁμοίως διδαχὴν ἀμα τῇ παρακελεῦσει

1 Hude adopts van Herwerden's conjecture, προανακε-

χωρικότας.

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BOOK IV. cxxv. 1–cxxvi. 1

and taken sides with Arrhabaeus; consequently, because of their fear of these people, who were warlike, both generals now agreed that it was best to retreat. But in consequence of their dispute nothing had been determined as to when they should set out; and when night came on the Macedonians and the mass of the barbarians immediately took fright, as large armies are wont to be smitten with unaccountable panic, and thinking that the advancing enemy were many times more numerous than they really were and were all but on them, betook themselves to sudden flight and hastened homewards. Perdiccas, who at first was not aware of their movement, was compelled, when he did learn of it, to go away without seeing Brasidas; for they were encamped far away from each other. But at daybreak, when Brasidas saw that the Macedonians had already decamped and that the Illyrians and Arrhabaeus were about to come against him, he formed his hoplites into a square, put the crowd of light-armed troops in the centre, and was himself intending to retreat. He so stationed the youngest of his troops that they might dash out against the enemy, in case they attacked at any point, and proposed to take himself three hundred picked men and, bringing up the rear, to make a stand and beat off the foremost of the enemy whenever they pressed him hard. And before the enemy were near he exhorted his soldiers, so far as haste allowed, in the following words:

CXXVI. "Did I not suspect, men of Peloponnesus, that you are in a state of panic because you have been left alone, and because your assailants are barbarous and numerous, I should not offer you

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ἐποιούμην· νῦν δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἀπόλειψιν τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ τὸ πλήθος τῶν ἐναντίων βραχεῖ ὑπομνῆματι καὶ παρανέσει τὰ μέγιστα πειρά-2 σομαι πείθειν. ἦγαθοίς γὰρ εἶναι ὑμῖν προσήκει τὰ πολέμια οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων παρουσίαν ἐκά-3 στοτε, ἀλλὰ δι’ οἰκείαν ἀρετήν, καὶ μηδὲν πλήθος πεφοβηθαυ τέτρων, οὔγε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτείων τοιούτων ἤκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ̂ 1 πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἀρ-4 χουσιν, ἀλλὰ πλειόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσουσιν, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχώ-3 μενοι κρατεῖν. ἐπὶ οἰς νῦν ἀπειρία δέδιτε, μαθεῖν χρῆ, ἐξ ὅν τε προηγώνοιτε τοῖς Μακεδόσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀφ’ ὅν ἐγὼ εἰκάξων τε καὶ
4 ἄλλων ἀκοῇ ἐπίσταμαι, οὐ δεινοὺς ἐσομένους. καὶ γὰρ ὅσα μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἀσθενῆ ὄντα τῶν πολεμίων δόκησιν ἔχει ἑικόνοις, διδαχῆ ἀληθῆς προσγενομένη 2 περὶ αὐτῶν ἐθάρσουν μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀμνομένους· οἷς δὲ βεβαιῶς τε πρόσεστον ἀγαθὸν, μὴ προειδῶς
5 τις ἀν αὐτοῖς τολμηρότερον προσφέροιτο. οὕτωι δὲ τὴν μέλλησιν μὲν ἔχουσι τοῖς ἀπείροις φο-βερὰν καὶ γὰρ πληθεὶς ὀψεως δεινοὶ καὶ βοῆς
μεγέθει ἀφόρητοι, ὡ τε διὰ κενῆς ἐπανάσεωις τῶν ὀπλων ἔχει τινὰ δήλωσιν ἀπειλῆς. προσ-μειξαί δὲ τοῖς ὑπομένουσιν αὐτὰ οὔχ ὀμοίοι· οὔτε

1 οὐ, Hude deletes, after Stephanus.
2 Hude adopts προσγενομένη, after Bekker.
instruction combined with encouragement. But as it is, in view of our abandonment by our allies and of the multitude of our opponents, I shall try by a brief reminder and by advice to impress upon you the most important considerations. For it is proper that you should be brave in war, not because of the presence of allies each and every time, but because of innate valour; nor should you be afraid of any number of aliens, you who do not come from states like theirs, but states in which, not the many rule the few, but rather the minority rule the majority, having acquired their power by no other means but superiority in fighting. And as for the barbarians, whom now in your inexperience you fear, you ought to know, both from the contest you have already had with the Macedonians among them,¹ and may gather from the knowledge I gain by inference and from reports of others, that they will not be formidable. For whenever the enemy’s power conveys an impression of strength, but is in reality weak, correct information about them, when once it has been gained, tends rather to embolden their opponents; whereas, when the enemy possesses some solid advantage, if one has no previous knowledge of it, one would be only too bold in attacking them. Now as for these Illyrians, for those who have had no experience of them, the menace of their attack has terror; for their number is indeed dreadful to behold and the loudness of their battle-cry is intolerable, and the idle brandishing of their arms has a threatening effect. But for hand to hand fighting,

¹ i.e. the Lyncestians, who, according to ch. lxxxiii. 1 and ii. xcix. 2, belonged to the Macedonians, and had been beaten, as stated in ch. cxxiv. 3.
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γάρ τάξιν ἔχοντες αἰσχυνθεῖν ἄν λυπεῖν τινα χώραν βιαζόμενοι, ἢ τε φυγῇ καὶ ἢ ἔφοδος αὐτῶν ἵσην ἔχουσα δόξαν τοῦ καλοῦ ἀνεξέλεγκτων καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἔχει (αὐτοκράτωρ δὲ μάχη μάλιστ' ἄν καὶ πρόφασιν τοῦ σφέσθαι τινι πρεπόντως πορίσειε), τοῦ τε ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν πιστότερον τὸ ἐκφοβῆσεν ὑμᾶς ἀκινδύνως ἤγονται· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ἄν πρὸ τούτου ἔχρωντο. σαφῶς τε πᾶν τὸ προϋπάρχον δεινὸν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὀράτε ἔργῳ μὲν βραχὺ ὅν, ὃς τέ καὶ ἀκοῆς καταστέρχον. ὅ ὑπομειναντες ἐπιφέρομενοι καὶ, ὅταν καίρος ἦ, κόσμῳ καὶ τάξει αὕθης ὑπαγαγόντες, ἔς τε τὸ ἀσφαλῆς θάσσον ἀφίζοντε καὶ γνώσθῃ τὸ λοιπὸν ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὄχλοι τοῖς μὲν τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον δεξαμένους ἀπώθην ἀπειλαῖς τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μελλήσει ἐπικομποῦσι συν, οἴ δ' ἄν εἰξωσιν αὐτοῖς, κατὰ πόδας τὸ εὐψυχον ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ ὄξεις ἐνδείκυνται."

CXXVII. Τοιαύτα ὁ Βρασίδας παραγόντας ὑπήγε τὸ στρατευμα. οὐ δὲ βάρβαροι ἱδόντες πολλῇ βοᾷ καὶ θορύβῳ προσέκειντο, νομίζοντες φεύγειν τε αὐτῶν καὶ καταλαβόντες διαφθείρειν. 2 καὶ ὡς αὐτοῖς αἳ τε ἐκδρομαί ὅτι προσπίπτοιεν ἀπήντων, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἔχων τοὺς λογάδας ἐπικειμένους ὑφίστατο, τῇ τε πρώτῃ ὀρμῇ παρὰ γνώμῃ

1 Hude emends to ἐκφοβῆσαι, after Torstrick.

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if their opponents but endure such threats, they are not the men they seem; for having no regular order, they would not be ashamed to abandon any position when hard pressed; and since flight and attack are considered equally honourable with them, their courage cannot be put to the test. Besides, a mode of fighting in which everyone is his own master will provide a man the best excuse for saving himself becomingly. They think, too, that it is a less risky game to try to frighten you from a safe distance than to meet you hand to hand; otherwise they would not have taken this course in preference to that. And so you clearly see that all that was at first formidable about them is but little in reality, startling merely to eye and ear. If you withstand all this in the first onrush, and then, whenever opportunity offers, withdraw again in orderly array, you will the sooner reach safety, and will hereafter know that mobs like these, if an adversary but sustain their first onset, merely make a flourish of valour with threats from afar in menace of attack, but if one yields to them, they are right upon his heels, quick enough to display their courage when all is safe."

CXXVII. After such words of admonition, Brasidas began to withdraw his army. On seeing this the barbarians came on with a mighty shouting and uproar, thinking that he was fleeing and that they could overtake and destroy his army. But the troops who had been selected to dash out met them wherever they charged, and Brasidas himself with his picked men sustained their attack; and so the Peloponnesians to their surprise withstood their first

1 Possibly μελλήσει = "without coming to action."
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ἀντέστησαν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπιφερομένους μὲν
dεχόμενοι ἡμῖνοντο, ἵσυχαξόντων δὲ αὐτοὶ ὑπεχώ-
ρουν, τότε δὴ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ Βρασίδου Ἕλληνων
eν τῇ εὐρυχωρίᾳ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἀπέ-
σχυντο, μέρος δὲ τι καταλιπόντες αὐτοῖς ἐπακο-
λουθοῦν προσβάλλειν, οἱ λοιποὶ χωρίσαντες
dρόμῳ ἐπὶ τοὺς φεύγοντας τῶν Μακεδόνων
ὸς ἐντύχοιον ἔκτενον καὶ τὴν ἐσβολήν, ἡ ἐστὶ
μεταξὺ δυοὶ λόφων στενῆ ἐς τὴν Ἀρραβαίουν,
φθάσαντες προκατέλαβον, εἰδότες οὐκ οὕσα
ἀλλην τῇ Βρασίδα ἀναχώρησαν. καὶ προσιόντος
αὐτοῦ ἐς αὐτὸ ἤδη τὸ ἄπορον τῆς ὀδοῦ κυκλοῦνται
ὡς ἄποληψόμενοι.

CXXVIII. Ὅς γε νῦν προείπε τοῖς μεθ' αὐτοῦ
τριακοσίοις, ὃν φεῖτο μᾶλλον ἄν ἔλειν τῶν λόφων,
χωρίσαντας πρὸς αὐτὸν δρόμῳ ὡς τάχιστα
ἐκαστὸς δύναται ἀνευ τάξεως, πειρᾶσαι ἀπ'
αὐτοῦ ἐκκρούσαι τοὺς ἦδη ἐπόντας 1 βαρβάρους,
πρὶν καὶ τὴν πλείονα κύκλωσιν σφῶν αὐτὸσε
2 προσμείξαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν προσπεσόντες ἐκράτησάν
τε τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ λόφου, καὶ ἡ πλείων ἦδη στρατιὰ
τῶν Ἕλληνων ῥάνον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπορεύοντο· οἱ
γὰρ βάρβαροι καὶ ἐφοβήθησαν, τῆς τροπῆς
αὐτοῖς ἐνταῦθα γενομένης σφῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ μετεώρου,
καὶ ἐς τὸ πλέον οὐκετ' ἐπηκολούθουν, νομίζοντες
καὶ ἐν μεθορίοις εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἦδη καὶ διαπεφυ-
3 γέναι. Βρασίδας δὲ ως ἀντελάβετο τῶν μετεώ-
ρων, κατὰ ἀσφάλειαν μᾶλλον ἵων αὐθημερὸν
ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ἀρμισαν πρῶτον τῆς Περίδικου
4 ἄρχης. καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁριζόμενοι οἱ στρατιώται τῇ
προαναχώρησει τῶν Μακεδόνων, ὅσοις ἐνέτυχον

1 Poppo's correction for ἐπίντας of the MSS.
onset and continued to receive their attacks and repulse them, but when they ceased, themselves retired. Thereupon most of the barbarians refrained from attacking the Hellenes under Brasidas in the open country, and leaving a portion of their force to follow and harass them, the rest, advancing on the run after the fleeing Macedonians, slew them as they came upon them, and getting ahead of them occupied the narrow pass between two hills which led into the country of Arrhabaeus, knowing that there was no other way of retreat for Brasidas. And just as he was coming to the most difficult part of the road, they began to encircle him with a view to cutting him off.

CXXVIII. But he perceived their intention and told his three hundred to break ranks and go at a run, each as fast as he could, to that one of the hills which he thought could be taken more easily and try to dislodge the barbarians already there before the larger outflanking body could come up. They accordingly attacked and overcame the men on the hill, and so the main body of the Hellenes now more easily made their way to it; for the barbarians, finding that their own men had been dislodged from the high ground, became alarmed and followed no further, thinking that the enemy were already on the frontier and had made good their escape. Brasidas, however, when he had gained the heights, proceeded in more security and arrived the same day at Arnisa, the first town in the dominions of Perdiccas. As for his soldiers, they were enraged at the Macedonians for having gone ahead in retreat, and whenever they came upon any ox-teams of
κατὰ τὴν ὀδὸν ξεῦγεσιν αὐτῶν βοεικοῖς ἢ εἰ τινὶ σκεύει ἐκπεπτωκότι, οἷα ἐν νυκτερινῇ καὶ φοβερᾷ ἀναχωρῆσει εἰκός ἦν ξυμβήναι, τὰ μὲν ὑπολύοντες κατέκοπτον, τῶν δὲ οἰκεῖοις ἐποιοῦντο. 5 ἀπὸ τοῦτον τε πρῶτον Περδικκᾶς Βρασίδας τε πολέμιον ἐνώμισε καὶ ἐς τὸ λοιπὸν Πελοποννησίων τῇ μὲν γυνώῃ δὲ Ἀθηναίους οὐ ξύνθες μῦσος εἰχε, τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων ξυμφόρων διαναστασὶ ἐπρασσεν ὅτι τρόπῳ τάχιστα τοῖς μὲν ξυμβῆσεται, τῶν δὲ ἀπαλλάξεται.

CXXIX. Βρασίδας δὲ ἀναχωρῆσας ἐκ Μακεδονίας ἐς Τορώνην καταλαμβάνει Ἀθηναίους Μένδην ἦδη ἔχοντας, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἡσυχάζων ἐς μὲν τὴν Παλλήνην ἀδύνατος ἦδη ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι διαβάς τιμωρεῖν, τὴν δὲ Τορώνην ἐν φυλακῇ εἰχεν. 2 ὕπο γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῖς ἐν τῇ Δύνκῳ ἐξέπλευσαν ἐπὶ τε τὴν Μένδην καὶ τὴν Σκιώνην οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, ὀσπερ παρεσκενάζοντο, ναυσὶ μὲν πεντήκοντα, ὃν ἦσαν δέκα Χίαι, ὀπλίται δὲ χιλίων ἐαυτῶν καὶ τοξόταις ἐξακοσίοις καὶ Ὕμαξτοις χιλίοις καὶ ἀλλοις τῶν αὐτών ξυμμάχους πελταστασὶ ἐστρατηγεῖ δὲ Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτω καὶ Νικόστρατος ὁ Διειστρέφους. 3 ἀραντες δὲ ἐκ Ποσειδώνων ταῖς ναυσὶ καὶ σχόντες κατὰ τὸ Ποσειδώνων ἐξόρουν ἐς τοὺς Μενδανοὺς. οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ τε καὶ Σκιωναίως τρικόσιοι βέβοηθηκότες Πελοποννησίων τε οἱ ἐπίκουροι, ἐξυμπαντεῖς ἐπτακόσιοι ὀπλίται, καὶ Πολυδαμίδας ὁ ἄρχων αὐτῶν, ἔτυχον ἐξεστρατοπεδευμένοι ἔξω τῆς

1 Hude adopts Madvig's correction, τοῦ δὲ ἀναγκαίῳ ξυμφόρῳ διαστάς, "However, such was the urgency of his situation that he stood aside and began to devise how . . . ."
2 δέ, in the MSS. after ξύμπαντες, deleted by Krüger.
BOOK IV. cxxviii. 4–cxxix. 3

theirs in the road or upon any baggage that had been dropped, as was likely to happen in a retreat made by night and in a panic, of their own accord they loosed the oxen and slaughtered them, but appropriated the baggage. And from this time Perdiccas began to regard Brasidas as an enemy, and thenceforth he cherished a hatred of the Peloponnesians, which was indeed not consistent with his feeling against the Athenians. However, disregarding his own urgent interests, he was devising how he might in the quickest way come to terms with the latter and get rid of the former.

CXXIX. Returning from Macedonia to Torone, Brasidas found the Athenians already in possession of Mende; and thinking it now impossible to cross over to Pallene and give aid, he remained quiet where he was, but kept watch over Torone. For about the same time as the events in Lynceus the Athenians had sailed against Mende and Scione, as they had been preparing to do,1 with fifty ships, of which ten were Chian, and with one thousand hoplites of their own, six hundred bowmen, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and in addition tarateers from their allies in that neighbourhood. They were under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus and Nicostratus son of Diotrephes. Setting out with the fleet from Potidæa and putting in at the temple of Poseidon, they advanced into the country of the Mendeans. Now these and three hundred Scioneans who had come to their support, and the Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred hoplites in all, with Polydamidas as their commander, had just

1 cf. ch. cxxii. 6; cxxiii. 3.
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4 πόλεως ἐπὶ λόφου καρτεροῦ. καὶ αὐτοῖς Νικίας μὲν, Μεθωναίους τε ἔχουν εἰκοσὶ καὶ ἕκατὸν ψιλοῦς καὶ λογάδας τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὀπλιτῶν ἐξήκοντα καὶ τοὺς τοξότας ἀπαντάς, κατὰ ἅτραπόν τινα τοῦ λόφου πειρώμενος προσβήναι καὶ τραυματιζόμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐδυνήθη βιώσασθαι. Νικόστρατος δὲ ἄλλῃ ἐφόδῳ ἐκ πλείονοις παντὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατοπέδῳ ἐπὶ ἑνῷ τῷ λόφῳ δυνὴ δυσπροσβάτῳ καὶ πάνυ ἑθορυβήθη, καὶ ἔσ ὁλίγον ἀφίκετο πᾶν τὸ

5 στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων νικηθῆναι. καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ὡς οὐκ ἐνέδοσαν οἱ Μενδαῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀναχωρήσαντες ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο, καὶ οἱ Μενδαῖοι νυκτὸς ἐπελθοῦσης ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἀπῆλθον.

CXXX. Τῇ δ' υστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι περιπλεύσαντες ἔσ τὸ πρὸς Σκιώνης τὸ τε προάστειον εἶλον καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἅπασαν ἐδήσαν τὴν γῆν οὐδενὸς ἐπεξίοντος (ἡν γὰρ τι καὶ στασιασμὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει), οἱ δὲ τρικόσιοι τῶν Σκιώναιῶν τῆς

2 ἐπιούσις νυκτὸς ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ' οίκου. καὶ τῇ ἐπιγιγνομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ Νικίας μὲν τῷ ἡμίσει τοῦ στρατοῦ προῖδον ἄμα ἐς τὰ μεθόρια τῶν Σκιώναιῶν τὴν γῆν ἔδησεν, Νικόστρατος δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς κατὰ τὰς ἀνοὺς πῦλας, ἦ ἐπὶ Ποτευδαίας ἔρχονται, προσ-

3 εκάθετο τῇ πόλει. ὁ δὲ Πολυδαμίδας (ἐνυχε γὰρ ταύτῃ τοῖς Μενδαίοις καὶ ἐπικούριος ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους τὰ ὁπλα κείμενα) διατάσσει τε ὡς ἐς

4 μάχην καὶ παρῆμει τοῖς Μενδαίοις ἐπεξεῖναι. καὶ τίνος αὐτῷ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἀντεπόντος κατὰ τὸ στασιωτικὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπέξεισιν οὐδὲ δέωτο πολεμεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀντεῖπεν ἐπισπασθέντος τε τῇ

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encamped outside the city in a strong position on a hill. Nicia tried to reach them by a path up the hill, having with him one hundred and twenty light-armed Methonaeans, sixty picked men of the Athenian hoplites, and all the bowmen, but his troops suffered in the attempt and he was unable to carry this position. Nicostratus, however, with all the rest of the army, advancing against the hill, which was difficult of access, by another and longer route, was thrown into utter confusion, and the whole Athenian army narrowly escaped defeat. So on this day, as the Mendeans and their allies did not yield, the Athenians withdrew and encamped, and the Mendeans, when night came on, returned to the city.

CXXX. On the next day the Athenians sailed round to the side of the town facing Scione and took the suburb, and all that day they ravaged the land. No one came out against them, as there was some sort of uprising in the town; and during the following night the three hundred Scionaeans returned home. On the next day Nicia with half of the army advanced as far as the boundary of the Scionaeans and ravaged the land, while Nicostratus with the rest sat down before the city at the upper gates, on the road leading to Potidæa. But it chanced that in that quarter of the town, inside the walls, the arms of the Mendeans and their auxiliaries were deposited, and Polydamidas was there drawing his troops up for battle and exhorting the Mendeans to make a sortie. Some one of the popular party mutinously answered him that he would not go out and had no use for war, but no sooner had he answered than Polydamidas seized
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χείρι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ θορυβηθέντος, ὁ δῆμος εὐθὺς ἀναλαβὼν τὰ ὅπλα περιοργῆς ἔχωρε ἐπὶ τε Πελοποννησίους καὶ τοὺς τὰ ἑναντία σφίσε μετ' 5 αὐτῶν πράξαντας. καὶ προσπεσόντες τρέπουσιν ἀμα μὲν μάχη αἰφνίδιο, ἀμα δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τῶν πυλῶν ἀνοιγμένων φοβηθέντων, ἐφηθεισαν γὰρ ἀπὸ προειρημένου τινὸς αὐτοῖς τὴν ἐπιχείρη- 6 σιν γενέσθαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ὅσοι μὴ αὐτίκα διεφθάρησαν, κατέψυχον, ἦν περι καὶ τὸ πρότερον αὐτοὶ εἶχον· οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι (Ἱδὴ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Νικίας ἐπιναστρέψας πρὸς τῇ πόλει ἦν) ἐσπε- σόντες ἐς τὴν πόλιν,2 ἀνέκατερωθεὶσαν ἀπάση τῇ στρατιᾷ ὡς κατὰ κράτος ἕλοτες διήρπασαν, καὶ μόλις οἱ στρατηγοὶ κατέ- σχον ὡστε μὴ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διαφέρεσθαι.

7 καὶ τοὺς μὲν Μενδαίους μετὰ ταῦτα πολιτεύουν ἐκέλευον ὡσπερ εἰσώθεσαν, αὐτοὺς κρίναντας ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς εἰ τινὰς ἤγονται αἰτίους ἐνναὶ τῆς ἀποστάσεως· τοὺς δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀκρόπολει ἀπετεί- χον ἐκατέρωθεν τείχει εἰς θάλασσαν καὶ φυλακὴν ἐπικαθίσταντο.3 ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν Μένδην κατέσχον, ἐπὶ τὴν Σκιώνην ἔχωρον.

CXXXI. Οἱ δὲ ἀντεπεξελθόντες αὐτοὶ καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι ἱδρύθησαν ἐπὶ λόφον καρτεροῦ πρὸ τῆς πύλεως, δι' εἰ μὴ ἔλοιπαν οἱ ἑναντίοι, οὐκ 2 ἐγίγνετο σφῶν περιτείχισις. προσβαλόντες δ' αὐτῷ κατὰ κράτος οἱ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ μάχη ἐκκρού- σαντες τοὺς ἐπόντας 4 ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο τε καὶ ἐς τὸν περιτείχισμον τροπαίον στήσαντες παρε-

1 θορυβηθέντος, Hude καταθροπηθέντος.
2 τὴν Μένδην πόλιν, MSS.; Dobree deletes Μένδην.
3 Poppo's correction for ἐπικαθίσταντο of the MSS.
4 Dobree's correction for ἐπώντας of the MSS.
him with violence and roughly handled him; whereupon the populace in great anger at once caught up their arms and advanced upon the Peloponnesians and the opposite party who were in league with them. Falling upon them they put them to rout, partly by the suddenness of their onslaught, partly because the others were terrified when the gates were opened to the Athenians; for they thought that the attack had been made upon them by a preconcerted agreement. Those of the Peloponnesians who were not killed on the spot took refuge on the acropolis, which they already had possession of; but the Athenians—for Nicias had already turned back and was near the city—burst into the city with their whole force, and, as the gates had been opened without an agreement, plundered the city as though they had taken it by storm; and the generals with difficulty kept them from destroying the inhabitants also. They then directed the Mendaeans henceforth to retain their former constitution, and bring to trial among themselves any whom they thought guilty of the revolt; but the men on the acropolis they fenced off with a wall extending on either side down to the sea, and set a guard over them. And when they had thus secured Mende, they proceeded against Scione.

CXXXI. The Scioneans and the Peloponnesians had come out against them and taken position on a strong hill before the city, which had to be taken by the enemy before the city could be invested with a wall. So the Athenians made a furious assault upon the hill and dislodged those that were upon it; they then encamped and, after raising a trophy, prepared
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3 σκευάζοντο. καὶ αὐτῶν οὐ πολὺ ὑστεροῦν ἡδη ἐν ἔργῳ ὄντων οἱ ἕκ τῆς ἀκροτόλεως ἐν τῇ Μένδῃ πολυροκόμαινοι ἐπίκουροι βιασάμενοι παρὰ θάλασσαν τὴν φυλακὴν νυκτὸς ἀφικνοῦνται, καὶ διαφυγόντες οἱ πλείστοι τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ Σκιώνῃ στρατόπεδον ἐσῆλθον ἐς αὐτὴν.

CXXXII. Περιτείχιζομένης δὲ τῆς Σκιώνης Περδίκκας τοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῖς ἐπικηρυκευσάμενος ὥμολογίαν ποιεῖται πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διὰ τὴν τοῦ Βρασίδου ἔχθραν περὶ τῆς ἐκ τῆς Δύνκου ἀναχωρήσεως, εὐθὺς τότε ἀρξάμενοι πράσσειν, καὶ ἐτύγχανε γὰρ τότε Ἰσχαγόρας ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος στρατιῶν μέλλων πεζῇ πορεύσεως ὡς Βρασίδαν, ὦ δὲ Περδίκκας, ἀμα μὲν κελεύωντος τοῦ Νικίου, ἐπειδή ἐνεβεβήκει, ἐνδηλύ τι ποιεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις βεβαιότητος πέρι, ἀμα δ’ αὐτὸς οὐκέτι βουλόμενος Πελοποννησίοις ἐς τὴν αὐτὸς ἀφικνεῖσθαι, παρασκευάσας τοὺς ἐν Θεσσαλία ἔνους, χρώμενος αἰεὶ τοῖς πρώτοις, διεκάλυνσε τὸ στρατεύμα καὶ τὴν παρασκευήν, ὡστε μηδὲ πειρᾶσθαι Θεσ.

3 σαλῶν. Ἰσχαγόρας μέντοι καὶ Ἀμεινίας καὶ Ἀριστεύς αὐτῶ τε ως Βρασίδαν ἀφίκουτο, ἐπιδεικνυμένοι περιφέρουσι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τῶν ἤβωσιν αὐτῶν παρασκευάζον ἀνδρὰς ἐξηγοῦν ἐκ Σπάρτης, ὡστε τῶν πόλεων ἀρχοντας καθίστανα καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἑντυχοῦσιν ἐπιτρέπετει. καὶ Κλεαρίδαν μὲν τῶν Κλεωνύμου καθίστησιν ἐν Ἀμφιτόλει, Πασιτελίδαιβ δὲ τῶν Ἡγησάνδρου ἐν Τορόνῃ.

1 δὲ, deleted by Hude, following Dobree.
2 αὐτῶν, Hude reads αὑτοῖς, after Stahl.
3 Dobree’s correction for Ἐπιτελίδαν of the MSS.; cf. v. 3.
for the circumvallation. But not long afterwards, when they were already at work, the auxiliaries who were besieged on the acropolis of Mende forced their way by night along the shore through the guard and reached Scione; and most of them escaped through the besieging army and got into the city.

CXXXII. While the circumvallation of Scione was in progress, Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenian generals and made an agreement with them; he was moved to this by the hatred he bore Brasidas for his retreat from Lyncus, at which time indeed he had begun his negotiations.¹ Now it happened at that time that Ischagoras, the Lacedaemonian, was on the point of taking an army by land to join Brasidas, but Perdiccas, partly because Nicias urged him, since he had made terms with the Athenians, to give them some token of his sincerity, partly also because he himself no longer wished the Peloponnesians to enter his territory, now worked upon his friends in Thessaly, with the foremost of whom he was always on good terms, and effectually stopped the army and the expedition, to such a degree that they did not even try to obtain permission from the Thessalians. Ischagoras, however, with Ameinias and Aristeus, came by themselves to Brasidas, having been commissioned by the Lacedaemonians to look into the situation. And they brought from Sparta, contrary to custom, some of their young men, intending to place them as governors over the cities instead of entrusting these to anybody that might chance to offer. Accordingly, they placed at Amphipolis Clearidas son of Cleonymus and at Torone Pasitelidas son of Hegesander.

¹ cf. ch. cxxviii. 5.
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CXXXIII. Ἡ Ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει Ὁβεβαίοι Θεσπιῶν τεῖχος περιέβαλον ἐπικαλέσαντες ἀττικῆς-σμόν, Βουλόμενοι μὲν καὶ αἰεί, παρεστηκός δὲ ῥάν ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους μάχῃ ὁ τι 2 ῥήν αὐτῶν ἄνθος ἀπολάλει. καὶ ὁ νεώς τῆς Ἡρας τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐν Ἀργει κατεκαύθη, Χρυσίδος τῆς ἱερείας λύχνον τινὰ θείας ἡμέρας πρὸς τὰ στέμματα καὶ ἐπικαταδαρθοῦσας, ὥστε ἔλαθεν 3 ἀφθέντα πάντα καὶ καταφλεξθέντα. καὶ Ἡ Χρυσίς μὲν εὐθὺς τῆς νυκτὸς δείσατο τοὺς Ἀργειόνων ἐσ Φλειοῦντα φεύγει. οἱ δὲ ἄλλην ἱερεῖαν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ προκειμένου κατεστήσαντο Φαεβίδα ὄνομα. ἔτη δὲ Ἡ Χρυσίς τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ δὲ ἐπέλαβεν ὅκτω καὶ ἑνατον ἐκ μέσου, ὅτε ἐπε- 4 φεύγει. καὶ Ἡ Σκιώνη τοῦ θέρους ἡ τελευτῶντος περιπετείχιστο τε παντελῶς, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἔποι αὐτῇ φυλακὴν καταλύοντες ἀνεχώρησαν τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατῷ.

CXXXIV. Ἡ Ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐπίοντι χειμώνι τὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Δακεδαιμονίων ἡσύχαζε διὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ Τεγεάται καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐκάτεροι ξυνέβαλον ἐν Δαοδόκειῳ τῆς Ὀρεσθίδος, καὶ νίκη ἀμφιδήριτος ἐγένετο· κέρας γὰρ ἐκάτεροι τρέψαντες τὸ καθ' αὐτοὺς τροπαία τε ἀμφότεροι ἐστησαν καὶ σκύλα ἐς Δελφοὺς 2 ἀπέπεμψαν. διαφθαρέντων μέντοι πολλῶν ἐκατέρως καὶ ἀγχομάλου τῆς μάχης γενομένης καὶ

1 Bursian’s correction for Λαοδίκη of the MSS.

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CXXXIII. In the same summer the Thebans dismantled the wall of the Thespians, accusing them of favouring the Athenians. Indeed they had always wished to do this, but now found it easier, since the flower of the Thespians had perished in the battle with the Athenians.\(^1\) In this same summer, too, the temple of Hera at Argos was burned down, Chrysis\(^2\) the priestess having placed a lighted torch near the garlands and then gone to sleep, so that the whole place took fire and was ablaze before she was aware. And Chrysis that very night, in fear of the Argives, fled to Phlius; but they appointed another priestess according to the custom prescribed, Phæinis by name. Chrysis had been priestess during eight years of this war and half of the ninth when she fled. Toward the close of the summer Scione was at length completely invested, and the Athenians, leaving a guard there, withdrew with the rest of their army.

CXXXIV. In the following winter, on account of the armistice, matters were quiet with the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians; but the Mantineans and the Tegeans with their respective allies fought a battle at Laodoeum in the district of Oresthis. The victory was disputed; for each side routed the wing opposed to themselves, and both set up trophies\(^3\) and sent spoils to Delphi. Certain it is at any rate that after many had fallen on both sides and night had cut short the action, the issue of battle being

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\(^1\) At Delium; cf. ch. xciii. 4; xcvi. 3.

\(^2\) The same who in 431 B.C. had held her office forty-eight years; cf. ii. ii. 1.

\(^3\) It seems that the Mantineans and Tegeans each defeated the other's allies, which were on the left wings of the opposing armies.
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άφελομένης νυκτὸς τὸ ἔργον οἱ Τεγεάται μὲν ἐπηνιλίσαντό τε καὶ εὐθὺς ἔστησαν τροπαίον, Μαντινῆς δὲ ἀπεχῶρησάν τε ἐς Βουκολιῶνα καὶ ὑστερον ἀντέστησαν.

CXXXV. Ἀπεπείρασε δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας τελευτῶντος καὶ πρὸς ἔαρ ἡδὴ Ποτειδαίας. προσελθὼν γὰρ νυκτὸς καὶ κλίμακα προσθεὶς μέχρι μὲν τούτου ἔλαβεν· τοῦ γὰρ κόδωνος παρενεχθέντος οὕτως ἐς τὸ διάκενον, πρὶν ἐπανελθεῖν τὸν παραδιδόντα αὐτὸν, ἡ πρόσθεσις ἐγένετο· ἐπειτα μέντοι εὐθὺς αἰσθομένων, πρὶν προσβήναι, ἀπήγαγε πάλιν κατὰ τάχος τὴν 2 στρατίαν καὶ οὐκ ἀνέμεινεν ἡμέραν γενέσθαι. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ἐνατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὑπὸ Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.
still undecided, the Tegeans bivouacked on the field and set up a trophy at once, while the Mantineans retreated to Bucolion, and afterwards set up a rival trophy.

CXXXV. Toward the close of the same winter, when spring was near at hand, Brasidas made an attempt on Potidaea. He came up by night and placed a ladder against the wall, up to this point escaping detection; for the ladder was planted precisely at the interval of time after the bell had been carried by and before the patrol who passed it on had come back. ¹ The guards, however, discovered it immediately, before an ascent could be made, and Brasidas made haste to lead his army back again, not waiting for day to come. So ended the winter and with it the ninth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

¹ It appears that the bell was passed from one sentinel to the next. Another, and probably more common, way of testing the watchfulness of the sentinels was to have a patrol with a bell make the round, each sentinel having to answer the signal.
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